CT COURT OF APPE Appellate Distr UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LOS ANGELES SCHOOL OF LAW LIBRARY THE LAW OF INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ACTIONS AND APPROVED FORMS WITH REFERENCES TO ANALOGOUS PRECEDENTS * BY CHARLES HUGHES Of the Chicago Bar EX-STATE'S ATTORNEY INDIANAPOLIS THE BOBBS-MERRILL COMPANY 1905 COPYRIGHT, 1905 BY CHABLES HUGHES. COPYRIGHT, 1905 BY THE BOBBS-MERRILL COMPANY T PREFACE The author of this volume has endeavored to present to the legal profession a useful and handy work on the law of instruc- tions, with its subject matter and the forms conveniently arranged for ready reference. In the first division of the book the rules and principles of the common law and under statutory enactment, which govern the preparation and presentation, and the giving and refusing of instructions, have been collected and classified. The second division of this work, it will be observed, presents a body of forms of instructions for both civil and criminal cases, classified and arranged in chapters. These forms, with few ex- ceptions, have been approved by the courts of last resort. No attempt has been made to encumber the pages with need- less duplications of "stock instructions," inasmuch as such repetition answers no useful purpose in a work designed for general practice. The law is presented as found in an exhaustive review of the law reports. The subject matter has been arranged in that order which the experience of an active practice for nearly a quarter of a century has suggested as rendering the material most accessible. C. H. Chicago, Illinois, March 20, 1905. TABLE OF CONTENTS. CHAPTER I. PURPOSE AND PREPARATION. Sec. Sec. 1. Object and office of instruc- 26a. tions. 2. Propriety of giving instruc- 26b. tions. 3. Court instructing of its own 27. motion. 28. 4. Written instructions required. 5. Oral charge taken down by 29. stenographer. 6. Party must request written in- 30. structions. 7. Specific instructions must be 31. requested. 32. 8. Neither party requesting, ef- 32a. feet. 33. 9. Must request in criminal cases. 34. 10. Presumed in writing When. 11. Written and oral charge. 35. 12. Waiving written instructions. 13. Exceptions to oral charges. 36. 14. Time of requesting Rule of court. 37. 15. Time of requesting Too late. 16. Error to refuse instruction 38. When. 17. Court may give time. 39. 18. Court's power to make rules. 40. 19. Too many instructions. 20. Repeating generally not re- 41. quired. 21. Repeating on preponderance 42. Reasonable doubt. 22. Repeating in detail Words, 43. phrases. 23. Repeating As to defense. 44. 24. Repeating As to witnesses. 25. Repeating Request substan- 45. tially given by others. 26. Repeating When, general and 46. special charge. 47. Repetition when evidence is close. Court may refuse all instruc- tions. Defective instructions refused. Clauses or paragraphs defect- ive. Incomplete instruction defect- ive. Modifying defective instruc- tions. Modifying correct instruction. In language of request. Modifying in criminal cases. Changing to conform to issues. Further instructions after jury retires. Further instructions in absence of counsel. Further instructions in absence of defendant. Instructing further, on other points. Recalling jury for further in- structions. Judge calling on jury Effect. Withdrawing erroneous instruc- tions Amending. Rulings and remarks not in- structions. Directions as to form of ver- dict. Signing and numbering in- structions. Marking "given," "refused" Effect. Marking for plaintiff Under- scoring. Court's manner of charging jury. Trial by court Jury waived. VI TABLE OF CONTENTS. CHAPTER II. QUALITIES AND REQUISITES. Sec. Sec. 48. Abstract propositions of law. 64. 49. Cautionary instructions Gen- erally. 65. 50. Cautionary instructions Matters not raised on the 66. trial. 51. Cautionary instructions 67. Against opinion of court. 52. Cautionary instructions Crim- 68. inal cases. 53. Referring jury to the pleadings. 69. 54. Instructions limited to some counts. 70. 55. In criminal cases Referring to indictment. 71. 56. Whole law in one instruction unnecessary. 72. 57. Instructions as to damages Measure of. 73. 58. Instructions as to damages Personal injury. 74. 59. Instructions as to damages 75. Exemplary or punitive. 76. 60. Misleading instructions Ob- scure, though correct. 77. 61. Misleading instructions Sus- ceptible of two meanings. 78. 62. Misleading instructions If ev- idence is conflicting. 79. 63. Misleading instructions Gen- erally erroneous. construed as a Misleading instructions Cured by others. Misleading instructions Illus- trations. Argumentative instructions Generally. Argumentative instructions Not necessarily erroneous. Argumentative instructions Illustrations. Interrogative instructions Im- proper. Instructions whole. Instructions of both parties construed together. If instructions be harmonious, defects are harmless. Grouping instructions into on 27 S. W. 730 177 27 S. W. 730 177 v. Levy, 10 Tex. Cv. App. 104 245 v. Lynes (Tex. Cv. App.) 65 S. W. 1119 197 v. McMonigal (Tex. Cv. App.) 25 S. W. 341.... 6 v. Michalke, 14 Tex. Cv. App. 495 183 v. Neel (Tex. Cv. App.) 26 S. W. 788 43 v. Newport, 26 Tex. Cv. App. 583 191, 238 v. Parvin (Tex. Cv. App.) 64 S. W. 1008 65 v. Sanchez (Tex. Cv. App.) 65 S. W. 893 195 v. Siligman (Tex. Cv. App.) 23 S. W. 298 94 v. Thompson (Tex. Cv. App.) 44 S. W. 8 172 v. Waldo (Tex. Cv. App.) 26 S. W. 1004 8, 80 v. Waldo (Tex. Cv. App.) 32 S. W. 783 198 v. Worthy (Tex. Cv. App.) 27 S. W. 426 57 Gambrill v. Schooley, 93 Md. 49 497 v. Schooley, 95 Md. 260 65, 80, 85 Gandy v. Bissell's Estate (Neb.) " 69 N. W. 633.. 25, 384, 416 v. Orient Ins. Co. 52 S. Car. 224 80 Gann v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 59 S. W. 1069 103. 304 Gantling v. S. 40 Fla. 237.... 305 Garbaczewski v. Third Ave. R. Co. 39 N. Y. S. 33 26 Garcia v. Candelaria, 9 N. M. 374 144 v. S. 34 Fla. 311., 326 Gard v. Neff, 39 Ohio St. 607. 862 Gardner v. Gooch, 48 Me. 489 656, 658, 659 v. S. 55 N. J. L. 17 336 v. S. 40 Tex. Cr. App. 272. 275 Garfield v. S. 74 Ind. 60 295 Garner v. S. 28 Fla. 113 281 v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 77 .S. W. 708 261 Garoutte v. Williamson, 108 Cal. 135 . . 347 TABLE OF CASES. Ixix (References are to Sections.) Garrett v. S. 109 Ind. 527... 360 Garrison v. S. 147 Mo. 548... 272 v. S. 6 Neb. 285 336 Garrity v. P. 107 111. 162.... 322 Garrott v. Ratliff, 83 Ky. 386 359 Garton v. Union City Nat. Bank, 34 Mich. 279 347 Gartside Coal Co. v. Turk, 147 111. 120 58 Gary v. Woodham, 103 Ala. 421 123, 124 Gasch v. Niehoff, 162 111. 395 53, 360 Gatlin v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 49 S. W. 87 109 Gavigan v. Evans, 45 Mich. 597 196 Gawn v. S. 13 Ohio C. C. 116 322, 324 Gaynor v. Louisville & N. R. Co. (Ala.) 33 So. 808 119, 124 Gearing v. Lacher, 146 Pa. St. 397 247 Geary v. Kansas City, O. & S. R. Co. 138 Mo. 257 198 v. Parker, 65 Ark. 521... 349 Gee .v- S. 80 Miss. 285 198 Gehl v. Milwaukee Pro. Co. 116 Wis. 263 219, 347 Gehr v. Hegeman, 26 111. 438 153, 155 Geiser Mfg. Co. v. Krogman (Iowa) 82 N. W. 938.. 361 Geist v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. 62 Neb. 322 641 Gemmill v. Brown, 25 Ind. App. 6 25, 56 General Fire E. Co. v. Schwartz, 165 Mo. 121 25 Gentry v. S. 24 Tex. App. 80. 321 Genz v. S. 58 N. -J. L. 482 198, 271, 329 George v. Los Angeles R. Co. 126 Cal. 357 639 v. Stubbs, 26 Me. 242 191 Georgia, &c. Ins. Co. v. Allen, 128 Ala. 451 192 v. Campbell, 102 Ga. 106.. 215 Georgia, &c. R. Co. v. Hutchin.s (Ga.) 46 S. E. 662.,.. 203 v. Pittman, 73 Ga. 325 649, 651 v. West, 66 Miss. 314 383, 556. 562. 565, 569. 581, 583, 652. 653 Georgia, &c. R. Co. v. Young Ins. Co. (Ga.) 46 S. E. 644 6 v. Zarks, 108 Ga. 800... 94 Gerdes v. Christopher & S. A. I. & F. Co. (Mo.) 27 S. W. 615 217 Gerke v. Fancher, 158 111. 385 127, 133, 196 Germaine v. City of Muskegon, 105 Mich. 213 234 German v. U. C. 120 Fed. 666 201 German F. Ins. Co. v. Colum- bia E. T. Co. 15 Ind. App. 623 15 German Fire Ins. Co. v. Gru- nert, 112 111. 68 33 German Sav. Bank v. Bates' Add. S. Co. (Iowa) 82 N. W. 1005 145 v. Citizens' Nat. Bank, 101 Iowa, 530 188 Germania Fire Ins. Co. v. Hicks, 125 111. 364 47 v. Klewer, 129 111. 611 117, 195 v. McKee, 94 111. 494 48 Germantown Pass. R. Co. v. Walling, 97 Pa. St. 55.. 183 Gerrard v. La Crosse City R. Co. 113 Wis. 258 232 Gerwe Consolidated Fire W. Co. 12 Ohio C. C. 420.. 134 Gibbons v. Van Alstyne, 29 N. Y. S. 461 39 Gibbs v. Johnson, 63 Mich. 674 46 v. Wall, 10 Colo. 153 94 Gibson v. Correker, 91 Ga. 617 107 v. S. 26 Fla. 109 347 v. S. 114 Ga. 34 7 v. S. 76 Miss. 136... 258. 305 Gichrist v. Brown, 165 Pa. St. 275 135 Gifford v. Ammer, 7 *Kas. App. 365 137 Gilbert v. Bone, 79 111. 341 153,155. 163' v. Watts-De Golyer Co. 169 111. 129 124 Gilbertson v. Forty-Second St. M. & St. N. Ave. R. Co. 43 N. Y. S. 782.... 80, 106 Ixx TABLE OF CASES. (References are to Sections.) Gilchrist v. Gilchrist, 76 111. 218 238 v'. Hartley, 198 Pa. St. 132 90 Giles v. S. 43 Tex. Cr. App. 561 258 Gill v. Donovan., 96 Md. 518.. 25 v. Skelton, 54 111. 158 359, 360 v. S. 59 Ark. 422 296, 307, 310 Gillen v. Riley, 27 Neb. 158.. 44 Gills v. Com. 18 Ky. L. R. 560 110 Gilmore v. Courtney, 158 111. 437 116, 127 v. McNeil, 45 Me. 599 250 v. P. 124 111. 383 19 v. Seattle, &c. R. Co. 29 Wash. 150 203 v. S. 126 Ala. 20 66 Gilroy v. Loftus, 48 N. Y. S. 532 351 Gilyard v. S. 98 Ala. 59 221 Ginnard v. Knapp, 95 Wis. 482 245 Givens v. S. 34 Tex. Cr. App. 563 221, 304 Gizler v. Witzel. 82 111. 322.. 105 Glaser v. Glaser (Okla.) 74 Pac. 945 351 Glass v. Cook. 30 Ga. 133.... 116 Glenn v. Hunt, 120 Mo. 330.. 35 Globe Ins. Co. v. Sherlock, 25 Ohio St. 67 243 Globe Oil Co. v. Powell, 56 Neb. 463 118, 351 Glover v. Blakeslee, 115 Ga. 696 243 v. Charleston & S. R. Co. 57 S. Car. 228 244 v. Gasque (S. Car.) 45 S. E. 113 156 v. S. 105 Ga. 597 265 v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 46 S. W. 824 326 Glucose Sugar R. Co. v. Flinn, 184 111. J28 80 Goddard v. Foster, 17 Wall (U. S.) 142 156, 160 Godfrey v. Phillips, 209 111. 584 236 Godwin v. S. 96 Ind. 550 281 v. S. 73 Miss. 873 105, 113. 279. 296 Goesel v. Davis, 100 Wis. 678 232 Goff v. Greer, 88 Ind. 122 37 Goffney v. St. Paul City R. Co. 81 Minn. 459 1 Gohn v. Doerle, 85 111. 514.. 183 Goins v. S. 46 Ohio St. 467 792, 804 Golden v. S. 25 Ga. 527 168 Goldsberry v. S. (Neb.) 92 N. W. 906 276 Goldsby v. U. S. 160 U. S. 70 326 Goldsmith v. City of New York, 43 N. Y. S. 447 25 v. S. 105 Ala. 8 301, 345 Goldthorp Estate, 115 Iowa. 430 45 Goldthorp v. Clark-Nickerson L. Co. 31 Wash. 467.... 119 v. Goldthorp, 115 Iowa, 430 114, 200 Goldsworthy v. Town of Lin- den, 75 W T is. 24 171 Goley v. S. 85 Ala. 333 115 Golibart v. Sullivan, 30 Ind. App. 428 25, 476 Gohn v. S. 37 Tex. Cr. App. 90 110 Gonzales v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. App. 339 274, 347 v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 57 ' S. W. 667 255, 310 Goodale v. Worcester Agr. S. 102 Mass. 405 532 Goodbar v. Lidikey, 136 Ind. 7 704 Goode v. Campbell, 14 Bush (Ky.) 75 39 Goodhue v. Farmers' W. Co. v. Davis, 81 Minn. 210 212 Goodman v. Sampliner, 23 Ind. App. 72 351 Goodsell v. Seeley, 46 Mich. 623 186 Goodwin v. S. (Ala.) 18 So. 694 44 v. S. 96 Ind. 550 211. 329. 377 v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 46 S. W. 226 274 v. S. 114 Wis. 318 321 Gordon v. Alexander, 122 Mich. 107 25, 80 v. Burris. 153 Mo. 223 25, 113, 238 v. City of Richmond, 83 Va.' 438 59, 61, 63, 591, 597 TABLE OF CASES. Ixxi (References are to Sections.} Gordon v. Com. 100 Va. 825.. v. P. 33 N. Y. 501 v. S. 129 Ala. 113 Gorgo v. P. 100 111. App. 130. Gorham v. Kansas City, &c. R. Co. 113 Mo. 410 616, 617, 618, 652, Gorman v. Campbell, 14 Ga. 142 Gorrell v. Payson, 170 111. 217 Goss v. Colkins, 162 Mass. 492 144, Goss Printing Pr. v. Lempke, 191 111. 201 Gott v. P. 187 111. 249 151. 206, 299, Gottfried Brewing Co. v. Szar- kowski, 79 111. App. 583 Gottlieb v. Hartman, 3 Colo. 53 Gottstein v. Seattle L. & C. Co. 7 Wash. 424 Gould v. Gilligan, 181 Mass. 600 v. Magnolia Metal Co. 207 111. 178 . Grove v. P. 162 111. 265 Gover v. Dill, 3 Iowa, 337 Gowdey v. Robbins, 38 N. Y. S. 280 Gowen v. Kehoe, 71 111. 66... Grace v. Dempsey, 75 Wis. 313 v. St. Louis, &c. R. Co. 156 Mo. 295 v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 69 S. W. 529 Grade v. Stevens, 171 N. Y. 658 Graferman Dairy Co. v. St. Louis Dairy Co. 96 Mo. App. 495 Graff v. P. 134 111. 3 83.. 105, v. P. 208 111. 326 Graham v. Frazier, 49 Neb. 90 v. Nowlin. 54 Ind. 389. .. v. St. Louis. I. M. & S. R. Co. 69 Ark. 562 Granado v. S. 37 Tex. Cr. App. 426 Granberry v. Frierson, 2 Baxt. (Tenn.) 326 338 222 299 218 653 48 250 195 217 421 404 219 6 15 363 320 94 355 172 32 244 85 346 116 246 223 191 173 136 304 37 Granby Mining & Smelting Co. v. Davis, 156 Mo. 422 170, 182 Grand Lodge v. Orrell, 99 111. App. 246 250 Grand Rapids & I. R. Co. v. Judson, 34 Mich. 507.. 223 Grand Tower Mfg. Co. v. Ull- man, 89 111. 244 54 Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Cob- leigh, 78 Fed. 786 636 Grande v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 38 S. W. 613 82 Granger v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 31 S. W. 807 293 Grant v. Roberts (Tex. Cv. App.) 38 S. W. 650 71 v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 70 S. W. 954 229 v. S. 97 Ala. 35 115 v. Westfall, 57 Ind. 121.. 356 Grau v. Houston, 45 Neb. 813 115, 196 Graves v. Cadwell, 90 111. 612 200 v. Colwell, 90 111. 612 113. 308 v. Dill. 159 Mass. 74 116 v. Hillyer (Tex. Cv. App.) 48 S. W. 889 238 v. P. 18 Colo. 181 312 v. S. 45 N. J. L. 203 331 Gravett v. S. 74 Ga. 196 37 Gray v. Callender, 181 111. 173 48 v. City of Emporia, 43 Kas. 706 604 v. Merriam, 148 111. 188.. 243 v. Sharpe (Colo. App.) 67 Pac. 375 48 v. S. 42 Fla. 174 71 v. Washington Water P. Co. 30 Wash. 665.. 346, 630 Graybeal v. Gardner, 146 111. 337 696 Graybill v. Chicago. &c. R. Co. 112 Iowa, 743 53. 630 Grayson v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 57 S. W. 808 258 Greaney v. Holyoke Water Power Co. 174 Mass. 437 25 Great N. R. Co. v. McLaugh- lin, 70 Fed. 669 20 Greathouse v. Moore (Tex. Cv. App.) 23 S. W. 226.... 200 Lxxii TABLE OF CASES. (References are to Sections.) Green v. Com. 17 Ky. L. R. 943 v. Eden, 24 Ind. App. 583 v. Hansen, 89 Wis. 597... v. Southern Pac. R. Co. 122 Cal. 563 v. S. 97 Ala. 59 v. S. 40 Fla. 474 v. S. 43 Fla. 556 v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 34 S. W. 283 v. Tierney, 62 Neb. 561.. v. Willingham, 100 Ga. 224 Greenbaum v. Millsaps, 77 Mo. 474 '. Greene v. Greene, 145 111. 264 48, Greenup v. Stoker, 8 111. (3 Gilm.) 202 Greenwood v. Davis, 106 Mich. 230 . v. Houston I. & B. Co. 27 Tex. Cv. App. 590 Greer v. Com. 23 Ky. L. R. 489 v. Lafayette Co. Bank, 128 Mo. 559 v. S. (Tex. Cv. App.) 45 S. W. 12 Gregg v. Jones (Tex. Cv. App.) 26 S. E. 132 v. P. 98 111. App. 170 v. Willis, 71 Vt. 313 Grentzinger v. S. 31 Neb. 460 Greschia v. P. 53 111. 299.... Grier v. Cable, 159 111. 29.... v. Puterbaugh, 108 111.602 v. S. 53 Ind. 420 Griffin v. Henderson, 117 Ga. 382 v. Lewiston (Idaho) 55 ,. Pae. 545 v. Manice, 62 N. Y. S. 364 v. Mulley, 167 Pa. St. 339 v. Southern R. 66 S. Car. 77 v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 53 S. W. 848 v. White, 52 N. Y. S. 807 11 71 351 247 304 42 80 303 353 80 359 363 98 71 7 107 243 269 200 119 351 816 795 25 48 209 93 247 25 22 119 80 195 Griffith v. Bergeson, 115 Iowa, 279 195 v. Hanks, 91 Mo. 109 84 v. Potter, 65 N. Y. S. 689 361 v. S. 90 Ala. 583 297 Grim v. Murphy, 110 111. 271 65, 94, 249 Grimes v. S. 105 Ala. 86 301 Grimes Dry Goods Co. v. Mal- colm, 164 U. S. 483... 148 Grmsinger v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 69 S. W. 583.86, 290 Griswold v. Town of Guilford. 75 Conn. 192 .' 80 Grogan v. U. S. Industrial Ins. Co. 36 N. Y. S. 687 145 Gross v. Shaffer, 29 Kas. 442. 113 Gross Luimfoer v. Coody, 99 Ga. 775 360 Grover v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 46 S. W. 824 304 Groves v. Acker, 33 N. Y. S. 406 145 Grows v. Maine C. R. Co. 69 Me. 412 191 Grubb v. S. 117 Ind. 277 229 330 Grube v. Nichols, 36 111. 92.! 113 Gruber v. Decker, 115 Ga. 779 243 Gruesendorf v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 56 S. W. 624 6 Grugan v. City of Philadelphia, 158 Pa. St. 337 352 Guardian Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hogan, 80 111. 35 200 Guenther v. Amsden, 44 N. Y. S. 982 145 Guerin v. New Eng. H. I. Co. 70 N. H. 133 360 Guerold v. Holtz, 103 Mich. 118 237 Guerrero v. S. 39 Tex. Cr. App. 662 265 v. S. 41 Tex. Cr. App. 161. 270 Guetig v. S. 63 Ind. 278.. 247, 332 v. S. 66 Ind. 106 331, 335, 377, 751, 755 Guimard v. Knapp, Stout & Co. 95 Wis. 482 199 Guimo v. S. 39 Tex. Cr. App. 257 229 Guinard v. Knapp, &c. Co. 90 Wis. 123 246 Guinn v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 65 S. W. 376 110 TABLE OF CASES. Ixxiii (References are to Sections.} Gull C. &c. R. Co. v. Brown (Tex. Cv. App.) 24 S. VV. 918 195 v. Carter (Tex. Cv. App.) 71 S. W. 73 238 v. Cash (Tex. Cv. App.) 28 S. W. 387 97 V. Condor, 23 Tex. Cv. App. 488 236 v. Courtney (Tex. Cv. App.) 23 S. W. 226 94 v. Dansbank, 6 Tex. Cv. App. 385 65 v. Dunlap (Tex. Cv. App.) 26 S. W. 655 73 v. Duvall, 12 Tex. Cv. App. 348 26 y. Greenlee, 70 Tex. 557... 648 v. Harriett, 80 Tex. 81 25 v. Higby (Tex. Cv. App.) 26 S. W. 737 94 v. Hill, 95 Tex. 629 199 v. Holt (Tex. Cv. App.) 70 S. VV. 591 26 v. McCarty, 82 Tex. 608.. 199 v. Manghan, 29 Tex. Cv. App. 486 7, 355 v. Moore (Tex. Cv. App.) 68 S. W. 559 80 v. Pendery (Tex. Cv. App.) 27 S. W. 213 8 v. Perry (Tex. Cv. App.) 30 S. W. 709 8 v. Pierce, 7 Tex. Cv. App. 597 196 v. Rowland, 90 Tex. 365 562, 564, 565 T. Shieder (Tex. Cv. App.) 26 S. W. 509 100 v. Thompson (Tex. Cv. App.) 35 S. W. 319 65 v. Warner, 22 Tex. Cv. App. 167 245 v. White (Tex. Cv. App.) 32 S. W. 322 193, 247 v. Wilbanks, 7 Tex. Cv. App. 489 196 v. Wilson, 79 Tex. 371 549, 554 Gulliher v. P. 82 111. 146 227 Gulliver v. Adams Ex. Co. 38 111. 509 358 Gumby v. Metropolitan St. R. Co. 171 N. Y. 635 347 Gunther v. P. 139 III. 526 113, 265, 816 Gusdorff v. Duncan, 94 Md. 160 . 163 Gustafon v. Seattle Tr. Co. 28 Wash. 227 211 Gutirrez v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 59 S. W. 274 322 Gutta P. & R. Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 84 Mich. 459 407, 413 Gutzman v. Clancy, 114 Wis. 589 45, 231, 351 Guy v. S. Ill Ga. 648.. 34, 168, 267 Gwaltney v. Scottish C. F. & L. Co. 115 N. Car. 579.. 7 Gwatkin v. Com. 9 Leigh (Va.) 678 3 Gwin v. Gwin, 5 Idaho, 271 48 Haacke v. Knights, &c. 76 Md. 431 434 Haas v. Brown, 47 N. Y. S. 606. 351 Haase v. S. 24 Vroom (N. J. L.) 40 . . . . 850 Hackelrath v. Stookey, 63 111. 486 308 Hacker v. Heiney, 111 Wis. 313 4, 111 v. Munroe & Sons, 176 111. 384, 394 363, 238 Hafner v. Heron, 165 111. 242, 251 363 Hagan v. Chicago, &c. R. Co. 86 Mich. 624 630 Hagenow v. P. 188 111. 553 45 Haggarty v. Strong, 10 S. Dak. 585 80 Hahn v. Miller, 60 Iowa, 96 363 Haight v. Vallet, 89 Cal. 249 211, 246 Haines v. Hayden, 95 Mich. 350 704 v. Illinois Cent. R. Co. 41 Iowa, 231 639 v. McLaughlin, 135 U. S. 584 171 Hale Elevator Co. v. Hall, 201 111. 131 215 Halff v. Wangemann (Tex, Cv. App.) 54 S. W. 967 6 Halfman v. Pennsylvania Boiler Ins. Co. 160 Pa. St. 202 191, 196 Hall v. Durham, 109 Ind. 434.. 126 v. Incorporated Town, &c. 90 Iowa, 585.. 196, 347, 358 v. Needles, 1 Ind. Ter. 146. 350 v. O'Malley, 49 Tex. 71 503, 508 Ixxiv TABLE OF CASES. (References are to Sections.} Hall v. Rankin, 87 'Iowa, 261.. 211 v. S. 130 Ala. 45.. 66, 192, 198 v. S. 134 Ala. 90 192, 217 v. S. 132 Ind. 317 340 v. Stroufe, 52 111. 421 243 v. Vanderpool, 156 Pa. St. 152 118 v. Woodin, 35 Mich. 67... 90 v. Wolff, 61 Iowa, 559 200 Hall-Moody Institute v. Copass, 108 Tenn. 582 6 Hallenbeck v. Garst, 96 Iowa, 509 351 Halley v. Tichenor, 120 Iowa, 164 43 Hamilton v. Great F. St. R. Co. 17 Mont. 334 71, 351 v. Hartinger, 96 Iowa., 7 ... 30 v. Love, 152 Ind. 641 238 v. P. 29 Mich. 173 165, 294, 308 v. Pittsburg B. & T. E. Co. 194 Pa. St. 1 7 v. S. 62 Ark. 543. .214, 253, 372 v. S. 96 Ga. 301 310 v. S. 75 Ind. 593 848 v. S. 97 Tenn. 452 201 v. Singer S. M. Co. 54 111. 370 93 Hamilton Keeling Co. v. Wheeler, 175 111. 514 144 Hamlin v. S. 39 Tex. Cr. App. 579 315 v. Treat, 87 Me. 310.. 119, 172 Hamman v. Central Coal & Coke Co. 156 Mo. 232 244 ' Hammel v. Lewis, 23 Ky. L. R. 2298 7 Hammond v. P. 199 HI. 173 118, 259, 260 v. S. 74 Miss. 214 ....340, 345 Hampton v. Norfolk & W. R. Co. 120 N. Car. 534 348 v. Ray, 52 S. Car. 74. ..350, 351 Hanchette v. Kimbark, 118 111. 132 3 Hancock v. Colrybark, 66 Mo. 672 158 v. Shockman (Ind. Ter.) 69 S. W. 826 360 Hand v. Agen, 96 Wis. 493 186 Hanes v. S. 155 Ind. 120... 86, 769 Haney v. Breeden, 100 Va. 781. 113 v. Caldwell, 43 Ark. 184.. 19 Hanger v. Evins, 38 Ark. 338. . 19 Hank v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 56 S. W. 922 303 Hankins v. S. 39 Tex. Cr. App. 261 293 Hanley v. Balch, 106 Mich. 46.. 120 Hanna v. Hanna, 3 Tex. Cv. App. 51 66 Hannah v. S. 1 Tex. App. 579.. 170 Hannahan v. S. 7 Tex. Cr. App. 610 37 Hannibal, &c. R. Co. v. Martin, 111 111. 227 53, 58, 172, 549, 579. 653 Hannigan v. S. 131 Ala. 29 304 Hannon v. S. 70 Wis. 448.. 38, 119 v. St. Louis Tr. Co. (Mo. App.) 77 S. W. 158 58 Hannton Keeling Co. v. Wheeler, 175 111. 514 144 Hannum v. S. 90 Tenn. 647... 165 Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Stod- dard, 52 Neb. 745 94 Hanrahan v. P. 91 111. 142 115 Hanrohan v. P. 91 111. 142. .198, 279 Hans v. S. 50 Neb. 150 198 Hansberg v. P. 120 111. 21.... 80 Hansen v. Boyd, 161 U. S. 397. 144 Hanson v. Garr, Scott & Co. 68 Minn. 68 48 v. S. 43 Ohio St. 378 772 v. St. Paul Gas Light Co. (Minn.) 92 N. W. 510... 99 Hanye v. T. 99 Ga. 212 274 Hardeman v. S. (Miss.) 16 So. 876 358 Hardin v. S. 40 Tex. Cr. App. 208 262 v. S. 4 Tex. App. 365.. 759, 761 Harding v. Wright, 119 Mo. 1. . 84 Hardy v. Brier, 9 1 Ind. 91 415 v. Milwaukee St. R. Co. 89 Wis. 183 203 v. S. 36 Tex. Cr. App. 400 275, 278 v. Turney, 9 Ohio St. 400. . 4 v. Wise, '5 App. Cas. (D. C.) 108 121 Hargadine v. Davis (Tex. Cv. App.) 26 S. W. 424 8 Hargis v. St. Louis, &c. R. Co. 75 Tex. 20 641, 642 Hargraves v. Home Fire Ins. Co. 43 Neb. 271 141 v. Western U. Tel. Co. (Tex. Cv. App.) 60 S. W. 689.. 393 Harlen v. Baden (Kas.) 49 Pac. 615 129 Harless v. U. S. 1 Ind. Ter. 447 351 TABLE OF CASES. Uxv (References are to Sections.) Harnianson v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 42 S. W. 995 255, 265 Harmon v. S. 158 Ind. 37 86 Harness v. Steele, 159 Ind. 293 7, 238, 503 Harp. v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 57 S. W. 835 269 Harper v. S. 109 Ala. 66 37 v. S. 101 Ind. 113 7, 202 v. S. 71 Miss. 202 ....265, 816 v. S. (Miss.) 35 So. 575... 246 v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 40 S. W. 272 26 Harpham v. Whitney, 77 111. 38 282 Harrell v. S. 39 Tex. Cr. App. 204 282 v. S. 31 Tex. Cr. App. 204. 70 v. S. 37 Tex. Cr. App. 612.. 215 Harrington v. Claplin (Tex. Cv. App.) 66 S. W. 898 80 v. Priest, 104 Wis. 362... 247 v. S. 19 Ohio St. 268 340 Harris v. Carrington, 115 N. N. Car. 187 118 v. First N. Bank (Tex. Cv. App.) 45 S: W. 311 27 v. Flowers, 21 Tex. Cv. App. 669 7 v. Higden (Tex. Cv. App.) 41 S. W. 412 93 v. Murphy, 119 N. Car. 34. 212 v. S. 96 Ala. 27 220 v. S. 36 Ark. 127 258 v. S. 97 Ga. 350 191 v. S. 155 Ind. 271 265, 776 v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 47 S. W. 643 268 v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 57 S. W. 833 . . . .: 103 V. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 65 S. W. 921 191 v. S. 34 Tex. Cr. App. 494. 310 v. Shebeck, 151 111. 287 144, 197 v. Smith, 71 N. H. 330... 351 v. U. S. 8 App. Cas. (D. C.) 20 25 v. Woodford, 98 Mich. 147. 81 Harrison v. Adamson, 86 Iowa, 695 677 v. Baker, 15 Neb. 43 80 v. Chappell, 84 N. Car. 258 347 v. Com. 123 Pa. St. 508... 165 v. S. 83 Ga. 129 228, 322 v. S. 6 Tex. App. 42 312 Hart v. Bowen, 86 Fed. 877 351 v. Chicago, &c. R. Co. 56 Iowa, 166 247 v. Cedar K. & M. C. R. Co. 109 Iowa, 631 530, 632 v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co. 9 Wash. 620 200 v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 44 S. VV. 247 269 v. S. 93 Ga. 160 80, 220 v. S. (Ga.) 23 S. E. 831... 303 v. U. S. 84 Fed. 799 189 Harter v. Marshall (Tex. Cv. App.) 36 S. W. 294.. 65, 247 Hartford v. City of Attala, 119 Ala. 59 129 Hartford Deposit Co. v. Calkins, 186 111. 104 246, 669 v. Pederson, 168 111. 224... 124 v. Sollitt, 172 111. 222. .124, 542 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Josey, 6 Tex. Cv. App. 290 94 Hartlep v. Cole, 120 Ind. 247 ... 47 Hartley v. Mullane, 45 N. Y. S. 1023 149 Hartman & F. B. Co. v. Clark, 94 Md. 520 200 Hartpence v. Rogers, 143 Mo. 623 53 Hartrich v. Hawes (111.) 67 N. E. 13 , 129 Hartsel v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 68 S. W. 285 25 Hartshorn v. Burlington, &c. R. Co. 52 Iowa, 616 685 v. Byrne, 147 III. 426 113, 171, 182 Harvey v. Keegan, 78 111. App. 682 4 v. S. 125 Ala. 47 150, 245 v. Tama Co. 53 Iowa, 228. 44 v. Vandegrift, 89 Pa. St. 346 156 Hasbrouck v. City of Milwau- kee, 21 Wis. 219 41 Haskell v. Starbird, 152 Mass. 118 . . . - 388 Hassett v. Johnson, 48 111. 68. . 48 Hasson v. Klee, 168 Pa. St. 510 80 Hatch v. Marsh, 71 111. 370 113 Hatcher v. S. 43 Tex. Cr. App. 237 271. 201 v. S. 116 Ga. 617 220, 272 v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 65 S. W. 97 . 75 Ixxvi TABLE OF CASES. (References are to Sections.) Hatchett v. Hatchett, 28 Tex. Cv. App. 33 233 Hatfield v. Chenoworth, 24 Ind. App. 343 41 Hathaway v. Detroit, &c. R. Co. 124 Mich. 610 646 Kaufman v. S. 49 Ind. 248 324 Hauk v. S. 148 Ind. 238 317, 714, 721, 725, 733 Haun v. Rio Grande W. R. Co. 22 Utah, 346 351 Haupt v. Haupt, 157 Pa. St. 469 192 Hauss v. Niblack, 80 Ind. 414. . 401 Havana v. Biggs, 58 111. 485.. 858 Haven v. Markstrum, 67 Wis. 493 321 Hawes v. S. 88 Atl. 37 90 Hawk v. Brownell, 120 111. 161. 172 Hawk v. Ridgway, 33 111. 473. . 193 Hawkins v. Collier, 106 Ga. 18. 360 v. S. 136 Ind. 634 ....198, 771 Hawley v. Chicago, &c. R. Co. 71 Iowa, 717 90, 173 v. Corey, 9 Utah, 175 .... 177 v. S. 69 Ind. 98 347 Hay v. Carolina M. R. Co. 41 S. Car. 542 26, 49 Hayden v. Com. 20 Ky. L. R. 274 261 v. Frederickson, 59 Neb. 141 117, 223 v. McCloskey, 161 111. 351. 363 Haydensville M. & Mfg. Co. v. Steffler, 17 Pa. Super. Ct. 609 70 Hayes v. Kelley, 116 Mass. 300 84 v. S. 114 Ga. 25 56, 228 v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 39 S. W. 106 . . 86 v. S. 36 Tex. Cr. App. 146. 193 v. S. 112 Wis. 304 351 v. Williams, 17 Colo. 465.. 34 Hays v. Border, 6 111. (1 Gilm.) 46 ' 33 v. Johnson, 92 111. App. 80. 203 v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 195 Pa. St.' 184 101, 113, 198 v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 57 S. W. 835 255 Hay ward v. Merrill. 94 111. 349 25 Hazard v. City of Council Bluffs, 87 Iowa, 54 596 Hazel] v. Bank of Tipton, 95 Mo. 60 363 Hazewell v. Coursen, 81 N. Y. 630 116 Hazy v. Woitke, 23 Colo. 556.. 130 Hazzard v. Citizens' Bank, 72 Ind. 130 136 Head v. Bridges, 67 Ga. 227... 154 v. Langworthy, 15 Iowa, 235 4 Healy v. P. 163 111. 383.... 48, 80 Hearn v. Shaw, 72 Me.' 187 360 Heaston v. Cincinnati & Ft. W. R. Co. 16 Ind. 275 12, 13 Hebbe v. Town of Maple Creek, 111 Wis. 480 65 Hector v. Knox, 63 Tex. 615.. 873 Heddle v. City Elec. R. Co. 112 Mich. 547 113, 223 Hedrick v. Smith, 77 Tex. 608. 361 v. Straus, 42 Neb. 485 348 Heed v. S. 25 Wis. 421 816 Helling v. Vanzandt, 162 111. 166 13 Heilman v. Com. 84 Ky. 461... 3 Heinman v. Kinnare, 73 111. App. .184 48 Heinsen v. Lamb, 117 111. 549 135, 136 Heintz v. Cramer, 84 Iowa, 497 656 Helbing v. Allegheny Cemetery Co. 201 Pa. St. 172 545 Heldmaier v. Cobbs, 195 111. 72 542 Heller v. Chicago & G. T. R. Co. 109 Mich. 53 93 v. Pulitzer Pub. Co. 153 Mo. 203 153 Hellyer v. P. 186 111. 550 193, 195, 214, 227 Helm v. P. 186 111. 153 4, 42 Helmholz v. Everingham, 24 Wis. 266 160 Helms v. Wayne Agr. Co. 73 Ind. 327 347, 415 Kelt v. Smith, 74 Iowa, 667... 53 Helton ville Mfg. Co. v. Fields, 138 Ind. 58 20, 610 Heminway v. Miller, 87 Minn. 123 244 Hemphill v. S. 71 Miss. 877... 296 Hempton v. S. 1 1 1 Wis. 127... 170 Henderson v. Bartlett, 53 N. Y. S. 149 348 v. Com. 98 Va. 736, 797.. 6 v. Henderson, 88 111. 248.. 153 TABLE OF CASES. Ixxvii (References are to Sections.} Henewacker v. Ferman, 152 111. 325 49 Henkle v. McClure, 32 Ohio St. 202 84 Henry v. Grand Ave. R. Co. 113 Mo. 534 529 v. Henry, 122 Mich. 6 347 v. Klopfer, 147 Pa. St. 178 286 v. McNamara, 114 Ala. 107 120, 129 v. P. 198 111. 162 798 v. S. 51 Neb. 149 247, 328 v. S. (Tex. Cv. App.) 30 S. W. 802 269 v. S. (Tex. Cv. App.) 49 S. W. 96 276 v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 43 S. ' W. 340 289 v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 54 S. W. 592 247 v. Stewart, 185 111. 448 116, 133, 438 Hensel v. Haas, 101 Mich. 443.. 191 Hensen v. S. 114 Ala. 25 258 Henson v. S. 112 Ala. 41 322 Hepler v. S. 58 Wis. 49 6 Herbert v. Drew, 32 Ind. 366 25, 199 v. Ford, 33 Me. 90 157 Herbich v. North Jersey St. R. Co. 67 N. J. L. 574 48 Herman v. S. 75 Miss. 340 9 Herrick v. Gary, 83 111. 86 1, 80, 200 v. Quigley, 101 Fed. 187... 189 Herring v. Herring, 94 Iowa, 56 84 Herrington v. Guernsey, 177 Pa. St. 175 191 Hersey v. Hutchins, 70 N. H. 130 80 Herzog v. Campbell, 47 Neb. 370 45 Hess v. Preferred M. M. A. Asso. 112 Mich. 196 363 v. Williamsport & N. B. R. Co. 181 Pa. St. 492 205 Hessing v. McCloskey, 37 HI. 351 56 Hewey v. Nourse, 54 Me. 256.. 360 Hewitt v. Johnson, 72 111. 513.. 113 Heydrick v. Hutchinson, 165 Pa. St. 208 133, 170 Heyl v. S. 109 Ind. 589 247 Hickman v. Griffin, 6 Mo. 37... 247 v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. 91 Mo. 435 565 Hickory v. United States, 151 U. S. 303 307 v. United States, 160 U. S. 408 191, 210 Hicks v. Nassau Electric R. Co. 62 N. Y. S. 597 25 v. Southern R. Co. 63 S. Car. 559 80 v. United States, 150 U. S. 442 210 Hide & Leather National Bank v. Alexander, 184 111. 416 48 Hidy v. Murray, 101 Iowa, 65. . 282 Higbee v. McMillan, 18 Kas. 133 218 Higginbotham v. Campbell, 85 Ga. 638 183 Higginbotham v. Higginbotham, 106 Ala. 314 183 Higgins v. Grace, 59 Md. 365.. 116 v. Hannibal, &c. R. Co. 36 Mo. 418 538 v. Wren, 79 Minn. 462.... 221 Highland v. Houston E. & W. T. R. Co. (Tex. Cv. App.) 65 S. W. 649 25 Highland Ave. & B. R. Co. v. Donovan, 94 Ala. 300 .. 570 v. Sampson, 112 Ala. 425.. 110 Highway Comrs. v. Highway Comr. 60 111. 58 175 Hildman v. City of Phillips, 106 Wis. 61 i 205 Hildreth v. Hancock, 156 111. 618 65 Hill v. Bahrns, 158 111. 304, 320 363 v. Inhabitants of Seekonk, 119 Mass. 88 600 v. Newman, 47 Ind. 187... 63 v. Parson, 110 111. Ill ... 26a v. S. 43 Ala. 335 361 v. S. 42 Neb. 503 196 v. S. (Tex. Cv. App.) 35 S. W. 660 314 v. S. 35 Tex. Cv. App. 371 262, 360 v. Spear, 50 N. H. 253 192 Hillebrant v. Green, 93 Iowa, 661 248 Hillis v. First Nat. Bank. 54 Kas. 421 136 Ixxviii TABLE OF CASES. (References are to /Sections.) Hills v. Ludaig, 46 Ohio St. Hirarod Coal Co. v. Clark, 197 111. 514 ............... Hindman v. First Nat. Bank, 112 Fed. 931 ...... 347, v. Timme, 8 Ind. App. 416. Hine v. Commercial Bank, 119 Mich. 448 ............. Hiner v. Jeanpert, 65 111. 429. . Mines v. Com. (Ky.) 62 S. W. 732 .................. Kingston v. ^Etna Ins. Co. 42 Iowa, 47 .............. Hinkle v. Davenport, 38 Iowa, 364 .................. Hinshaw v. Gilpin, 64 Ind. 116 v. S. 147 Ind. 334 6, 22, 25, 30, 49, 725, 735, Hinton v. Cream City R. Co. 65 Wis. 335 ........... Hintz v. Graupner, 138 111. 158 Hirsch v. Feeney, 83 111. 548.. Hirschman v. P. 101 111. 568 7, 226, 372, Hix v. P. 157 111. 383. .238, 265, Hobbs v. Ferguson, 100 111. 232 Hoben v. Burlington, &c. R. Co. 20 Iowa, 562 .......... Hoberg v. S. 3 Minn. 262 ...... Hockaday v. Wartham, 22 Tex. Cv. App. 419 .......... Hochworth v. Des Grandes Champs, 71 Mich. 520 656, Hodge v. Chicago & A. R. Co. 121 Fed. 52 ............ v. Ter. 12 Okla. 108 108, 301, 304, Hodge & W. v. Tufts, 115 Ala. 372 ......... 409, 411, Hodgen v. Latham, 33 111. 344. . Hodges v. O'Brien, 113 Wis. 97. Hodgman v. Thomas, 37 Neb. 568 .................. Hodo v. Mexican N. R. Co. (Tex. Cv. App.) 31 S. W. 708.. Hoehn v. Chicago, P. St. L. R. Co. 152 111. 223 ...... 25, Hoffine v. Swings, 60 Neb. 731 656. Hoffman v. Oates, 77 Ga. 703. . v. Cockrell, 112 Iowa, 141. 6 25 351 12 175 243 80 426 500 676 790 209 356 282 756 276 47 247 39 71 661 351 733 413 80 187 25 80 183 658 409 63 Hogan v. Citizens' R. Co. 150 Mo. 44 365, v. Shuart, 11 Mont. 498.. v. Peterson, 8 Wyo. 549.. Hoge v. P. 112 111. 46 v. P. 117 111. 46.. 78, 113, 195, 201, 246, 299, 322, Hoges v. Nalty, 113 Wis. 567.. Hogsett v. S. 40 Miss. 522 Holcomb v. P. 79 111. 409 Holder v. S. 5 Ga. 444 Holland v. S. 131 Ind. 572 v. S. 39 Fla. 178 316, Hollenbeck v. Cook, 180 111. 65. Holley v. S. 104 Ala. 100 Holliday v. Burgess, 34 111. 193 v. Gardner, 27 Ind. App. 231 v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. App. 133 196, Rollings v. Bankers' Union, 63 S. Car. 192 176, Hollingsworth v. S. 156 Mo. 178 256, 272, Hollins v. Gorham, 23 Ky. L. R. 2185 v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 69 S. W. 594. Hollowav v. Dunham, 170 U. S. 615 v. Johnson, 129 111. 367 195, v. S. 156 Mo. 222 Holmes v. Ashtabula R. T. Co. 10 Ohio C. C. 638 v. Hale, 71 111. 552 Hoist v. Stewart, 161 Mass. 516 Holston v. Southern R. Co. 116 Ga. 656 Holt v. Pearson, 12 Utah. 63. .. v Roberts, 175 Mass. 558 v. S. 62 Ga. 214 v. Spokane & P. R. Co. 3 Idaho 703 97, Holtzman v. Douglas, 168 U. S. 285 Home v. Walton, 117 111. 130. TABLE OF CASES. Ixxix (References are to Sections.} Homes v. Hale, 71 111. 552.... 113 Homish v. P. 142 111. 024 748 Hon v. Hon, 70 Ind. 135 523 Honesty v. Com. 81 Va. 283.. 80 Honeywell v. S. 40 Tex. Cv. App. 199 208 Honick v. Metropolitan St. R. Co. GO Kas. 124 80 Hood v. Olin, 68 Mich. 165.... 192 Hooper v. Moore, 50 N. Car. (5 Jones) 130 162 v. S. 106 Ala. 41 29 v. S. (Tex. Cv. App.) 69 S. W. 149 272 Hoover v. Haynes (Neb.) 91 N. W. 392 106 v. Mercantile, &c. Ins. Co. 93 Mo. App. Ill 249 v. S. 110 Ind. 349 47 Hopkins v. Bishop, 9 1 Mich. 328 39 v. Dipert, 11 Okla. 630 ... 4 v. Norfolk & S. R. Co. 131 N. Car. 463 121 Hopkinson v. P. 18 111. 264.... 172 Hoppe v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 61 Wis. 357 234 Hopps v. P. 31 111. 392 329, 748, 751 Hopt v. Utah, 104 U. S. 631 ... 4 Horgan v. Brady, 155 Mo. 659 94, 244 Hormon v. S. 158 Ind. 43 797 Horn v. Hutchinson, 163 Pa. St. 435 126 Home v. McRea, 53 S. Car. 51. 6 Hornish v. P. 142 111. 626 115 Horton v. Chevington & B. C. Co. 2 Penny (Pa.) 1 46 v. Com. 99 Va. 848 63, 299 v. Cooley, 135 Ma^s. 589.. 361 v. S. 110 Ga. 739 272 v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 19 S. W. 899 305 v. Smith, 115 Ga. 66 87 v. Williams, 21 Minn. 187. 154 Hosley v. Brooks, 20 111. 117.. 499 Hot Springs R. Co. v. William- son, 136 U. S. 121 80 Hotema v. United States, 186 U. S. 413 264 Hough v. Grant's Pass Power Co. 41 Ore. 531 48 House v. Marshall, 18 Mo. 370. 515 v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 69 S. W. 417 86 House v. Seaboard A. L. R. Co. 131 N. Car. 103 121 v. Wilder, 47 111. 510.. 122, 123 Householder v. Grandy, 40 Ohio St. 430 4 Housh v. S. 43 Neb. 163 7, 71, 227 Houston v. Com. 87 Va. 257... 192 v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 47 S. W. 468 293, 304 Houston, &c. R. Co. v. Dotson, 15 Tex. Cv. App. 73 5, 200, 549, 563, 584 v. Gorbett, 49 Tex. 576 530, 544, 563, 564, 571, 581 v. Cranberry, 16 Tex. Cv. App. 391 191 v. Hampton, 64 Tex. 429.. 543 v. Harion (Tex. Cv. App.) 54 S. W. 629 172 v. Hubbard (Tex. Cv. App.) 37 S. W. 25 183 v. Jones, 16 Tex. Cv. App. 179 184 v. Kelly, 13 Tex. Cv. App. 1 28 v. Miller, 49 Tex. 323 449 v. Patterson (Tex. Cv. App.) 57 S. W. 675 199 v. Patterson, 20 Tex. Cv. App. 255 94 v. Richards (Tex. Cv. App.) 49 S. W. 687 213 v. Richards, 20 Tex. Cr. App. 203 106 v. Ritter (Tex. Cv. App.) 41 S. W. 753 94 v. Runnels (Tex.) 47 S. W. 971 215 v. White, 23 Tex. Cv. App. 280 244 Houston City St. R. Co. v. Ar- tusey '(Tex. Cv. App.) 31 S. W. 319 195 Hovey v. Chase, 52 Me. 304.. 211 Howard v. Carpenter, 22 Md. 10 181 v. Inhabitants, 117 Mass. 588 480 v. P. 185 111. 552 71 v. S. 115 Ga. 244 271 v. S. 50 Ind. 190 322, 329 v. S. (Miss.) 35 So. 653... 376 v. Schwartz (Tex. Cv. App.) 55 S. W. 348 80 v. Supervisors, 54 Neb. 443 20 Ixxx TABLE OF CASES. (References are to Sections.} Howard v. Turner, 125 N. Car. 126 Howe v. Miller, 23 Ky. L. R. 1610 v. West S. Land & I. Co. 21 Wash. 594 Howe Machine Co. v. Riber, 66 Ind. 504 Howe S. M. Co. v. Layman, 88 111. 39 Howell v. Hanrick (Tex. Cv. App.) 24 S. W. 823 v. Mellon, 169 Pa. St. 138. v. New York, C. H. & R. R. Co. 73 N. Y. S. 994 v. Norfolk & C. R. Co. 124 N. Car. 24 v. S. 61 Neb. 391 206, v. Wilcox & Gibbs S. M. Co. 12 Neb. 177 Howes v. District of Columbia, 2 App. Cas. (D. C.) 188.. Howey v. Fisher, 111 Mich. 422 121, Howland v. Day, 56 Vt. 324. .. Hewlett v. Dilts, 4 Ind. App. 23 Howser v. S. (Ala.) 23 So. 681. Hoxie v. S. 114 Ga. 19 176, Hoye v. Turner, 96 Va. 624 Hoyt v. Dengler, 54 Kas. 309. . * v. P. 140 111. 596 Hronek v. P. 134 111. 135 Hubbard v. Hubbard (Tex. Cv. App.) 38 S. W. 388 v. S. 37 Fla. 156 Hubuer v. Friege, 90 111. 212. . . Hudelson v. S. 94 Ind. 426 166, Hudson v. Best, 104 Ga. 131 208, v. Hughan, 56 Kas. 159 695, v. S. 101 Ga. 520 v. S. 43 Tex. Cr. App. 420 Huelsenkamp v. Citizens' R. Co. 37 Mo. 537, 568 Huff v. Aultman, 69 Iowa, 71 .. v. Cole, 45 Ind. 300 Huffman v. Cauble, 86 Tnd. 591 . 20 27 94 80 163 101 130 121 247 90 126 131 7 203 293 228 14 6, 7 288 117a 93 347 80 710 305 701 272 191 558 360 129 I!).") Hufford v. Lewis, 29 Ind. App. 202 70 Huggins v. S. 42 Tex. Cr. App. 364 337 Hughes v. Antietam Mfg. Co. 34 Md. 319 462 Hughes v. Chicago & A. R. Co. 127 Mo. 447 238 v. P. 116 111. 330 258 v. S. 117 Ala. 25 258 v. Tanner, 96 Mich. 113 .. 157 Hughie v. Hammett, 105 Ga. 368 80 Hull v. City of St. Louis, 138 Mo. 018 182 Hull's Will, 117 Iowa, 738 7 Hulse v. S. 35 Ohio St. 429 ... 34, 36 Hulton v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 33 S. W. 969 .. ... 110 Humes v. Bernstein, 72 Ala. 546 160 v. Decatur Land, &c. Co. 98 Ala. 465 431 v. Gephart, 175 Pa. St. 417 6 Hummel v. Stern, 48 N. Y. S.. 528 25 Humphries v. Huffman, 33 Ohio St. 97 663 v. S. 100 Ga. 260 205 v. S. 34 Tex. Cr. App. 434. 284 Hunt v. McMullen (Tex. Cv. App.) 46 S. W. 666 .... 66 v. S. 3 Ind. App. 383. . .... 837 v. S. 7 Tex. Cv. App. 212 314, 726, 730 v. S. 135 Ala. 1 269, 783 v. Searcy, 167 Mo. 158 ... 80 Hunter v. S." 29 Fla. 486 217 v. S. 74 Miss. 515 282, 318 v. Third Ave R. Co. 45 N. Y. S. 1044 174 Hunter, E. & Co. v. Lanius, 82 Tex. 677 404 Huntingdon, &c. R. Co. v. Decker, 84 Pa. St. 422 650 Kurd v. Xeilson, 100 Iowa, 555 126. 129 Hurlbut v. Bagley, 99 Iowa, 127 199 v. Boaz, 4 Tex. Cv. App. 371 113 v. Hall, 39 Neb. 889 48 v. Hurlburt, 128 N. Y. 420. 171 Hurley v. S. 29 Ark. 17 67 Hurst v. McMullen (Tex. Cv. App.) 48 S. W. 744 48 Hurt v. Ford (Mo.) 36 S. W. 673 415 Huschle v. Morris, 131 111. 575. 66 Huston v. City of Council Bluffs. 101 Iowa. 33 603 v. P. 121 111. 497 1$ TABLE OF CASES. Ixxxi (References are to Sections.) Hutchins v. S. 151 Ind. 667 .... 238 Hutchinson v. Bowker, 5 M. & W. 535 160 v. Lemcke, 107 Ind. 121 43, 346 v. Wenzel, 155 Ind. 49 119 Huth v. Carondelet, 56 Mo. 207 . 158 Hutton v. Doxsee, 116 Iowa, 1 3 195 Hutts v. S. 7 Tex. App. 44 336 Hyde v. Shank, 77 Mich. 517.. 1 v. Town of Swanton, 72 Vt. 242 153 Hyde Park v. Washington Ice Co. 117 111. 233 683 I. & G. N. R. Co. v. Hassell, 62 Tex. 258 576 Ickenroth v. St. Louis Tr. Co. 102 Mo. App. 597 ..474,575 Idaho Mercantile Co. v. Kalan- quin (Idaho) 66 Pac. 933 65, 113 Ide v. Fratcher, 194 111. 552... 238 v. Lake Tp. (Pa. Com. PL) 9 Kulp, 192 191 Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Anderson, 184 111. 294 195 v. Ashline, 171 111. 320 133, 235 v. Beebe, 174 111. 13, 27... 363 v. Byrne, 205 111. 21 ..104,119 v. Cosby, 174 111. 109 70, 109, 126 v. Davenport, 177 111. 110. 53 v. Davidson, 76 Fed. 517.. 190 v. Eioher, 202 111. 556 53 v. Freeman, 210 111. 270 .. 50 v. Gilbert, 157 111. 365 116, 250 v. Goddard, 72 111. 569-627,635 v. Griffin, 184 III. 10 115 v. Hammer, 72 111. 347... 1 v. Hammer, 85 111. 526 42 v. Harris, 162 111. 200 363 v. Haskins, 115 111. 308 8, 14, 18, 366. 367 v. Hopkins, 200 111. .122.. 238 v. Jernigan, 198 111. 297.. 53 v. King, 179 111. 96...1, 120. 196 v. Latimer, 128 111. 171.. 363 v. Linstroth Wagon Co. 112 Fed. 737 353 v. McClelland, 42 111. 359. . 30 v. McKee, 43 111. 119 84 Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Modglin, 85 111. 481 347 v. Moffitt, 67 111. 431 250 v. Noble, 142 111. 584 74 v. Nowicki, 148 111. 29 149 v. O'Keefe, 154 111. 508 183, 356, 361 v. Sanders, 166 111. 270... 94 v. Slater, 139 111. 199 183 v. Smith, 208 111. 618...... 118 v. Swearingen, 47 111. 210.. 242 v. Thompson, 210 111. 226 53, 106 v. Turner, 194 111. 575 198 v. Weiland, 179 111. 609 .. 130 v. Weldon, 52 111. 294 649 v. Whalen, 42 111. 396 163 v. Wheeler, 149 111. 525... 42 v. Whittemore, 43 111. 420.. 163 v. Zang, 10 111. App. 594.. 203 Illinois Iron & M. Co. v. Weber, 196 111. 526 56 Illinois Life Ins. Co. v. Wells, 200 111. 453 363 Illinois Linen Co. v. Hough, 9 1 111. 67 247 Illinois Steel Co. v. McFadden, 196 111. 344 80 v. Mann, 197 111. 186 231 v. Novak, 184 111. 501 99 v. Schymanowski, 162 111. 447 195 Imhoff v. Chicago, &c. R. Co. 20 Wis. 344 247 Indianapolis, &c. R. Co. v. Ber- ney. 71 111. 390 94 . v. Boettcher, 131 Ind. 82, 615, 642 v. Brown (Ind.) 69 N. E. 408 549 v. Bundy, 152 Ind. 590 20 357 v. Bush, 101 Ind. 587.. 84', 232 v. Haines (Ind.) 69 N. E. 188 7, 199 v. Hale, 106 111. 371 640 v. Hendrain, 190 111. 504.. 360 v. Hockett, 159 Ind. 682 25, 236, 238 v. Houlihan, 157 Ind. 494.. 614 v. Push, 85 Ind. 279 358 v. Robinson, 157 Ind. 414 25, 105 v. Robinson. 157 Ind. 232 478, 482, 531 v. Sawyer, 109 Ind. 344... 646 v. Stout, 53 Ind. 143 635 Ixxxii TABLE OF CASES. (References are to Sections.) Indianapolis, &c. R. Co. v. Tay- lor (Ind.) Jan. 1905 457, 631 v. Taylor, 158 Ind. 279 384, 627 Ingalls v. S. 48 Wis. 647 220, 266, 288 Inglebright v. Hammond 19 Ohio, 337 28 Ingols v. Plimpton, 10 Colo. 535 105 Ingram v. S. 62 Miss. 142 19 Insurance Co. of N. A. v. Bird, 175 111. 42 133 International, &c. R. Co. v. An- chond (Tex. Cv. App.) 68 S. W. 743 247 v. Beasley, 9 Tex. Cv. App. 569 8 v. Bonatz (Tex. Cv. App.) 48 S. W. 767 65 v. Clark (Tex. Cv. App.) 71 S. W. 585 ' 6 v. Clark, 81 Tex. 48 430 v. Eason (Tex. Cv. App.) 35 S. W. 208 80 v. Eckford, 71 Tex. 274 549, 582, 583 v. Harris (Tex. Cv. App.) 65 S. W. 885 7 v. Kuehn, 11 Tex. Cv. App. 21 355 v. Lehman (Tex. Cv. App.) 66 S. W. 214 249 v. Locke (Tex. Cv. App.) 67 S. W. 1082 .. ..94, 194, 1,96 v. Martineg ( Tex. Cv. App. ) 57 S. W. 689 198 v. Newman (Tex. Cv. App.) 40 S. W. 854 115, 363 v. Niff (Tex. Cv. App.) 26 S. W. 784 28 v. Sun, 11 Tex. Cv. App. 386 363 v. Welch, 86 Tex. 203 .... 355 International Bank v. Ferris, 118 111. 470 114 International Farmers' Live Stock Ins. Co. v. Byrkett (Ind. App) 36 N. E. 779 174 International Soc. v. Hildreth, 11 N. Dak. 262 236 Iowa State Sav. Bank v. Black, 91 Iowa, 490 75 Irby v. S. 95 Ga. 467 80, 255 Iron M. Bank v. Armstrong, 92 Mo. 265 . 363 Iron R. Co. v.' Mowery, 36 Ohio St. 418 544 Iroquois Furnace Co. v. Bignall H. Co. 201 111. 299 402 Irvine v. S. 104 Tenn. 132 2o9 v. S. 20 Tex. App. 12 25 Irwin v. Smith, 72 Ind 488 35 Isaac v. McLean, 106 Mich. 79. 106 Isely v. Illinois Cent R. Co. 88 Wis. 453 223 Isham v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 41 S. W. 622 215 Ison v. Com. 23 Ky. L. R. 1805 296 Ittner v. Hughes, 154 Mo. 55. 25 Izlar v. Manchester & A. R. Co. 57 S. Car. 332 308, 356 Jackson v. Burnham, 20 Colo. 532 198 v. Com. 17 Ky. L. R. 1350 217 v. Com. 17 Ky. L. R. 1197 32 v. Com. 96 Va. 107 101 v. Com. 98 Va. 845... 255, 258 v. Consolidated Tr. Co. 59 N. J. L. 25 ,...149 v. Ferris (Pa.) 8 Atl. 435. 126 v. Grand Ave. R. Co. 118 Mo. 216 ...551,561,562,643 v. International & G. N. R. Co. (Tex. Cv. App.) 57 S. W. 869 6 v. Kas. City. Ft. S. & M. R. Co. 157 Mo. 621 115 v. Jackson, 82 Md. 17 26 v. P. 18 111. 269, 271 201, 279, 316, 737, 773, 776, 782 v. P. 126 111. 139 830 v. S. 106 Ala. 12 240, 258, 267 v. S. 91 Ga. 271 80 v. S. 71 Ind. 149 195 v. S. 20 Tex. Cr. App. 192. 765 v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 62 S. W. 914 304 v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 67 S. W. 497 326 v. S. 91 Wis. 253 188. 252, 708 v. Van Dusen, 5 Johns. (N. Y.) 144 330 TABLE OF CASES. Ixxxiii (References are to Sections. J Jackson Scjiool Tp. v. Shera, 8 Ind. App. 330 119 Jacksonville & S. E. R. Co. v. Walsh, 106 111. 257 .... 113 Jacksonville St. R. v. Walton, 42 Fla. 54 361 v. Wilhite, 209 111. 84 25, 68, 348, 363 Jacob Tome Inst. of Port De- posit v. Crothers, 87 Md. 569 116 Jacob! v. S. 133 Ala. 1 27, 80, 113 Jacobson v. Gunzburg, 150 111. 135 19, 25 Jacoby v. Stark, 205 111. 34... 238 Jahnke v. S. (Neb.) 94 N. W. 158 269 James v. Gilbert, 168 111. 627. 25 v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. 107 Mo. 480 63 v. S. 104 Ala. 20 52 v. S. 115 Ala. 83 328 Jameson v. Weld, 93 Me. 345.. 347 Jamison v. P. 145 111. 357 735, 751 v. Weld, 93 Me. 345 223 Jam son v. Quivey, 5 Cal. 490.. 31 Jane v. Com. 2 Mete. (Ky.) 30 295, 306 Janny v. Howard, 150 Pa. St. 342 352 Jansen v. Grimshaw, 125 111. 468 30 Jaqua v. Cordesman, 106 Ind. 141 4, 12, 347 Jarman v. Rea, 137 Cal. 339 191, 194 Jarmusch v. Otis Iron & Steel Co. 23 Ohio Cir. 122 99 Jarnigan v. Fleming, 43 Miss. 710 221, 222 Jarnis v. S. 70 Ark. 613 271 Jarrell v. Lillie, 40 Ala. 271. .. 202 v. S. 58 Ind. 296 295, 716 Jarvis v. Hitch, 161 Ind. 271.. 614 Jefferson v. S. 110 Ala. 89.... 113 Jeffries v. S. 61 Ark. 308 196 v. S. 77 Miss. 757.... 219, 297 Jenkins v. Louisville & N. R. Co. (Ky.) 47 S. W. 761.. 133 v. Mammoth Min. Co. 24 Utah, 513 347 v. S. 82 Ala. 27 282, 777 v. S. 35 Fla. 737 315 v. S. 62 Wis. 49 313 v. Tobin, 31 Ark. 307 182 Jenks v. Lansing Lumber Co. 97 Iowa, 342 53, 70 Jennings v. Kosmak, 45 N. Y. S. 802 219 Jenny Elec. Co. v. Branham, 145 Ind. 322 365 Jensen v. Steiber (Neb.) 93 N. W. 697 20, 90 Jesse v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 57 S. W. 826 48 Jesse French Piano & Organ Co. v. Forbes, 134 Ala. 302.. 199 Jinks v. S. 114 Ga. 430 238 Johnson v. Brown, 1 3 W. Va. 91. 501 v. Com. (Va.) 46 S. E. 790 80 v. Culver, 116 Ind. 278... 232 v. Galveston H. & N. R. Co. 27 Tex. Cv. App. 616... 26 v. Gebhauer, 159 Ind. 284. 238 v. Glidden, 11 S. Dak. 237. 238 v. Gulledge, 115 Ga. 981.. 12 v. Hirschberg, 185 111. 445. 244 v. Hirschburg, 85 111. App. 47 48 v. International & G. Co. 24 Tex. Cv. App. 148 172 v. Johnson (Tex. Cv. App.) 67 S. W. 123 355 v. Johnson, 114 111. 611... 94 v.Johnson, 187 111. 97 238 v. Kahn, 97 Mo. App. 628. 119 v. McKee, 27 Mich. 471... 48 v. Miller, 63 Iowa, 529 163 v. P. 113 111. 99 814 v. P. 140 III. 352 203, 209 v. P. 202 111. 53 294 v. S. 59 Ala. 37 318 v. S. 100 Ala. 55 36, 39 v. S. 102 Ala. 1 202, 345 v. S. 36 Ark. 242 80 v. S. 60 Ark. 45 187 v. S. 105 Ga. 665 257 v. S. 65 Ind. 269 376 v. S. 148 Ind. 522 266 v. S. (Miss.) 16 So. 494... 206 v. S. (Miss.) 27 So. 880... 182 v. S. 75 Miss. 635 255 v. S. 53 Neb. 103 6, 313 v. S. 100 Tenn. 254.. 255, 335 v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 4 S. W. 901 274 v. S. 18 Tex. App. 385.... 312 v. S. 18 Tex. Cr. App. 398. 734 v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 45 S. W. 901 26 v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 57 S. W. 805 . 326 Ixxxiv TABLE OF CASES. (References are to Sections.) Johnson v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 58 S. W. 105 269 v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 67 S. W. 412 . . 25 v. Stone, 69 Miss. 826 191 v. St. Louis & S. R. Co. 173 Mo. 307 50, 239 v. Superior R. Tr. R. Co. 9 1 Wis. 233 208 v. Thompson, 72 Ind. 167.. 211 v. U. S. 157 U. S. 320 227 v. Worthy, 17 Ga. 420 94 Joiner v. S. 105 Ga. 646 71, 305 Joines v. Johnson, 133 N. Car. 487 80 Jokers v. Borgman, 29 Kas. 109 487 Joliet, &c. R. Co. v. McPherson, 193 111. 629 33, 129 v. Velie, 140 111. 59.. 121, 124 Jolly v. S. 43 Neb. 857 44 Jones v. Achey, 105 Ga. 493.. 135 v. Adler, 34 Md. 440 438 v. Angell, 95 Ind. 376 202. 485, 4 f ' v. Bangs, 40 Ohio St. 139. 243 v. Casler, 139 Ind. 382 206, 702 v. Charleston & W. C. R. Co. 61 S. Car. 556 ..... 195 v. Chicago & Iowa R. Co. 68 111. 380 243 v. Cleveland, 6 Pa. Super. Ct. 640 174 v. Collins, 94 Md. 403 80 v. Durham, 94 Mo. App. 51. 199 v. East Tenn. V. and G. R. Co. 175 U. S. 682 351 v: Ellis, 68 Vt. 544... 350, 351 v. Foley, 121 Ind. 180 361 v. Fort, 36 Ala. 449 86 v. Hathaway, 77 Ind. 24.. 515 v. Heirs, 57 S. Car. 427. .. 6 v. Hess (Tex. Cr. App.) 48 S. W. 46 303 v. Johnson, 61 Ind. 257... 39 v. Johnson (N. Car.) 45^8. E 828 25 v. Jones, 19 Ky. 1516 113 v. Layman, 123 Ind. 573.. 356 v. McMillon, 129 Mich. 86. 192 v. Matheis, 1 7 Pa. Super. 220 7 v. Morris, 97 Va. 44 506 v. Murray, 167 Mo. 25 153, 500 v. P. 23 Colo. 276 335 v. P. 12 111. 259 265 Jones v. Parker (Tex. Cv. App.) 42 S. W. 123 118 v. Rex (Tex. Cv. App.) 31 S. W. 1077 : 101 v. S. 107 Ala. 93 290 v. S. 59 Ark. 417 193 v. S. 61 Ark. 88.. 227, 310, 372 v. S. 105 Ga. 649 303 v. S. 53 Ind. 237 816 v. S. 160 Ind. 539 351 v. S. 26 Miss. 247 266 v. S. 80 Miss. 181 118 v. S. 20 Ohio St. 34 7, 8 v. S. 26 Ohio St. 208 36 v. S. 34 Tex. Cr. App. 490. 310 v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 45 S. W. 596 21 v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 72 S. W. 845 291 v. Spartanburg Herald Co. 44 S. Car. 526 6 v. Swearingen, 42 S. Car. 58 38, 156 v. Warren (N. Car.) 46 S. E. 740 . ..'. 144 v. Wattles (Neb.) 92 N. W. 765 80 v. Williams, 108 Ala. 282. 48 Joplin Water Works v. Joplin (Mo.) 76 S. W. 960 94 Jordan v. City of Benwood, 42 W. Va. 312 32 v. Duke (Ariz.) 36 Pac. 896 163 v. Indianapolis Water Co. 155 Ind. 337 96 v. James, 5 Ohio, 88 243 v. Philadelphia, 125 Fed. 825 363 v. S. 81 Ala. 20 206 v. S. 117 Ga. 405 265 v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 30 S. W. 445 187 Joy v. S. 41 Tex. Cr. App. 46. . 326 Judy v. Sterrett, 153 111. 94 101 30, 56, 231, 363 Justice v. Com. 20 Ky. L. R. 386 255 v. Gallert, 131 N. Car. 393. 6 Jupitz v. P. 34 111. 516 340 v. P. 34 111. 521 340 K Radish v. Young, 108 111. 170. 101 Kafka v. Levensohn, 41 N. Y. S. 368 , 149 TABLE OF CASES. Ixxxv (References are to Sections.) Kahn v. Triest-R. &c. Co. 139 Cal. 340 Kahrs v. Kahrs, 115 Ga. 288.. Kairn v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 45 S. W. 203 Kalley v. Baker, 132 N. Y. 5.. Kane v. Footh, 70 111. 590.. 78, Kankakee Stone Co. v. Kanka- kee, 128 111. 177 Kansas City v. Birmingham, 45 Kas. 214 . . . .- v. Bradbury, 45 Kas. 483 368; 385, 596, Kansas City, &c. R. Co. v. Beck- er, 63 Ark. 477 v. Chamberlin, 61 Kas. 859 v. Henson, 132 Ala. 528. . . v. Ryan, 49 Kas. 1 v. Simpson, 30 Kas. 647.. Kansas Farmers'. &c. Ins. Co. v. Hawley, 46 Kas. 746 Kansas Inv. Co. v. Carter, 160 Mass. 421 Karl v. Juniata Co. 206 Pa. 633 Karnes v. Dovey, 5 3 Neb. 725. Karr v. S. 106 Ala. 1 67, Kassman v. Citv of St. Louis, 153 Mo. 293 Kaufman v. Maier. 94 Cal. 269 Kavanaugh v. City of Wausau (Wis.) 98 N. W. 553.. .. Keady v. P. (Colo.) 74 Pac. 895 v. P. (Colo.) 77 Pac. 895.. Keanders v. Montague, 180 111. 306 ,. Kearney v. Fitzgerald, 43 Iowa, 582 v. P. (Cal.) 17 Pac. 782. .. v. S. 68 Miss. 233 Kearns v. Burling, 14 Ind. App. 143 Keastner v. First National Bank, 170 111. 322 Keating v. P. 160 111. 483 235, 238, 265. v. S. (Neb.) 93 N. W. 980 25, Koatley v. Illinois Cent. R. Co. 94 Iowa, 685 Keaton v. S. 99 Ga. 197 Keegan v. Kinnare, 123 111. 290 192 136 255 438 230 250 599 608 76 25 68 211 569 352 94 192 353 297 48 319 214 238 505 250 487 170 170 129 25 816 226 53 256 84 Keeler v. Herr, 54 111. App. 468 363 v. Herr, 157 111. 57 156, 235, 399 v. Stuppe, 86 111. 309 66 Keeling v. Kuhn, 19 Kas. 441. 359 Keely v. S. 14 Ind. 36..., 815 Keener v. S. 18 Ga. 194 .' 168 V. S. 97 Ga. 3881 331 Keens v. Robertson, 46 Neb. 837 347 Keesier v. S. 154 Ind. 242.. 71, 216 Keesley v. Doyle, 8 Ind. App. 43 . . .". 25 Kehl v. Abram, 210 111. 218.. 76 Kehoe v. Allentown & L. V. Tr. Co. 187 Pa. St. 474 86 Kehrley v. Shafer, 36 N. Y. S. 510 35 Keiser v. S. 83 Ind. 234 166, 169, 710 Keith v. Hobbs, 69 Mo. 87 405 .v. Spencer, 19 Fla. 748... 245 v. S. 157 Ind. 376 316, 319, 738 v. S. 49 Kas. 439 204 ' v. Wells, 14 Colo. 321 12 Keithley v. Stafford, 126 111. 507 27, 29, 74 Kelch v. S. 55 Ohio St. 152... 331 Kelderhouse v. Hall, 116 111. 150 47 Kelleher v. City of Keokuk, 60 Iowa, 473 359, 361 Keller v. Lewis, 116 Iowa, 369. 7 v. Stuppe, 86 111. 309 25 Kelley v. Highfield, 15 Ore. 277. 457 v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 49 Til. App. 304 203 v. Schupp, 60 Wis. 86 205 Kellog v. Lewis, 28 Kas. 535.. 14 v. McCabe (Tex. Cv. App.) 38 S. W. 542 213 Kellogg v. Boyden, 126 111. 378 83 Kelly v. Cable Co. 7 Mont. 70.6,247 v. Eby, 141 Pa. 176 192 v. Fleming, 113 N. Car. 133 v. Palmer (Minn.) 97 N. W. 578 v. P. 55 N. Y. S. 565.. 94 29 760 v. S. (Fla.) 33 So. 235 792 v. S. 51 Neb. 572 80 v. S. 34 Tex. Cr. App. 412. 290 v. Strouse, 116 Ga. 872... 121 Kemp v. S. 13 Tex. 565 802 Ixxxvi TABLE OF CASES. (References are to Sections.) Kendall v. Brown, 74 111. 232.. 86 v. Brown, 86 111. 388 484 v. Young, 141 111. 188 25 Kendrick v. Cisco, 1 3 Lea (Tenn.) 248 160 v. Dillinger, 117 JSJ. Car. 491 7, 348 Kennard v. Grossman (Neb.) 89 N. W. 1025 25 Kennedy v. Behout, 62 Ind. 363 154 v. Forest Oil Co. 199 Pa. St. 644 102 v. Hannibal, &c. R. Co. 105 Mo. 273 636, 639 v. P. 44 111. 285 21, 115 v. S. 107 Ind. 144 71 Kent v. Cole, 84 Mich. 581 471, 574 v. P. 8 Colo. 563 282 v. S. 64 Ark. 247 1174, 289 Kenwood Bridge Co. v. Dunder- date, 50 111. App. 581 397 Kenyon v. City of Mondovi, 98 Wis. 50 26, 238 Keokuk Stove Works v. Ham- mond, 94 Iowa, 694 358 Kepler v. Jessup, 11 Ind. 241.. 199 Kepperly v. Ramsden, 83 111. 354 44 Kerr v. Modern Woodman, 117 Fed. 593 189 v. .S. 63 Neb. 115 8 v. Topping, 109 Iowa, 150. 247 Kerr-Murphy Mfg. Co. v. Hess, 98 Fed. 56 71 Ketchum v. Ebert, 33 Wis. 611. 171 v. Wilcox (Kas.) 48 Pac. 446 136 Kettry v. Thuma, 9 Ind. App. 498 93 Key v. Dent, 6 Md. 142 26a v. S. 37 Tex. Cr. App 276 Keyes v. City of Cedar Rapids, 107 Iowa, 509 6, 20 Kibler v. Com. 94 Va. 804 191 Kicld v. S. 83 Ala. 58 192 Kidman v. Garrison (Iowa) 97 N. W. 1078 25 Kidwell v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. App. 264 255, 304 Kiekhoef er v. Hidershide, 113 Wis. 280 , 70 Kielbeck v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. (Neb.) 97 N. W. 750. 126 Kieldsen v. Wilson, 77 Mich. 45 116 Kiernan v. Chicago, &c. R. Co. 123 111. 188 685, 688 Kildow v. Irick (Tex. Cv. App.) 33 S. W. 315 192 Kilgore v. S. 74 Ala. 5 328 v. S. 124 Ala. 24 258 Killiau v. Eigenmann, 57 Ind. 488 210 Kilpatrick v. Grand T. R. Co. 74 Vt. 288 25 Kilpatrick Koch Dry Goods Co. v. Kahn, "53 Kas. 274 .. 234 Kimball v. Borden, 97 Va. 478 71, 645 v. Friend, 95 Va. 126 628, 629, 630, 631, 633, 636 641 v. Paye, 96 Me. 487 54 Kimbrough v. S. 101 Ga. 583.. 328 Kimmel v. P. 92 111. 457 30, 32a King v. Franklin, 132 Ala. 559. 66 v. King, 155 Mo. 406.174, 243 v. Rea, 1 3 Colo. 69 84 v. S. 120 Ala. 329 223 v. S. 43 Fla. 211 353 v. S. 86 Ga. 355 34 v. S. (Miss.) 23 So. 166... 192 v. S. 74 Miss. 576 331 Kingsbury v. Missouri, &c. R. Co. 156 Mo. 384 646 v. Thorp, 61 Mich. 216 156 Kinkle v. P. 27 Colo. 450 245 Kinnemer v. S. 66 Ark. 206... 36 Kinney v. North Carolina R. Co. 122 N. Car. 961 182 v. P. 108 111. 524 258, 285 Kinyon v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 118 Iowa, 349.. 17 7, 355 Kipperly v. Ramsden, 83 111. 354 361 Kirby v. Southern R. Co. 63 S. Car. 494 7, 183 v. Wilson, 98 111. 240.117, 286 Kirchner v. Collins, 152 Mo. 394 200 Kirk v. Garrett, 84 Md. 383.. ]21 v. S. 14 Ohio St. 511 3!) v. Ter. 10 Okla. 46 48, 80, 170, 255 Kirkham v. P. 170 111. 16 227 Kirland v. S. 43 Ind. 146 250 Kirsher v. Kirsher, 120 Iowa, 337 7 Kischman v. Scott, 166 Mo. 214 25. 75 Kitchell v. Bratton, 2 111. 300.. 244 TABLE OF CASES. Ixxxvii ( References are to Sections.) Kitchen v. Loudenback, 48 Ohio St. 177 415, 4 It) Klatt v. N. C. Foster Lumber Co. 97 Wis. 641 232 Kleiner v. Third Ave. R. Co. 162 N. Y. 193 71 Kleinschmidt v. McDermott, 12 Mont. 309 359 Klepsch v. Donald, 8 Wash. 162 50 Kletzing v. Armstrong, 119 Iowa, 505 231 Kline v. Baker, 99 Mass. 253.. 162 Klink v. P. 16 Colo. 467 360 Klipstein v. Raschein, 117 Wis. 248 200 Kloke v. Martin, 55 Neb. 554 350, 353 Klugen v. S. 45 Ind. 521 247 Kluse v. Sparks, 10 Ind. App. 444 27 Knapp v. Griffin, 140 Pa. St. 004 171 v. Jones, 50 Neb. 490 126 Knight v. Denman, 64 Neb. 814 247 v. Overman Wheel Co. 174 Mass. 455 80 v. Pacific C. Stage Co. (Cal.) 34 Pac. 868 94 v. S. (Fla.) 32 So. 110.... 70 v. S. 114 Ga. 48 228, 321 Knopf v. Richmond, F. & P. R. Co. 85 Va. 773 574 Knowles v. Murphy, 107 Cal. 107 65 v. Nixon, 17 Mont. 473 182, 319, 321 Koerner v. S. 98 Ind. 8.... 196, 774 Kohl v. S. 57 N. J. L. 445.... 84 Kohler v. West Side R. Co. 99 \Vis. 33 232 v. Wilson, 40 Iowa, 185... 526 Kohn v. Johnson, 97 Iowa, 99. 70 Koller v. S. 36 Tex. Cr. App. 496 265 Kollock v. S. 88 Wis. 663 111, 310, 311, 312 Konold v. Rio Grande, &c. R. Co. 21 Utah, 379 247 Koster v. Seney, 100 Iowa, 562 461 Kostuch v. St. P. City R. Co. 78 Minn. 459 6 Kowalski v. Chicago 0. W. JR. Co. (Iowa) 87N.W. 409. 20 Krack v. Wolf, 39 Ind. 88 3, 188, 358 Krall v. Lull, 49 Wis. 405 474 Kranz v. Thieben, 15 111. App. 482 107 Kraus v. Haas, 6 Tex. Cv. App. 665 25 Krause v. Plumb, 195 Pa. St. 65 71 Krauss v. Haas (Tex. Cv. App.) 25 S. W. 1025 247 Krehnavy v. S. 43 Neb. 337... 279 Krepps v. Carlise, 157 Pa. St. 358 191 Krish v. Ford, 19 Ky. L. R. 1167 80 Kroeger v. Texas, &c. R. Co. 30 Tex. Cv. App. 87 25 Kroetch v. Empire Mill Co. (Idaho) 74 Pac. 868 130 Kuehn v. Wilson, 13 Wis. 117. 203 Kuenster v. Woodhouse, 101 Wis. 216 19!) Kugler v. Wiseman, 20 Ohio 361 . . 244 Kuhl v. Long, 102 Ala. 569... 35 Kuhn v. Nelson, 61 Neb. 224.. 12 Kunst v. Ringold, 116 Mich. 88. 238 Kurstelska v. Jackson, 89 Minn. 95 119, 246 Kutner v. Fargo, 45 N. Y. S. 753 5!) Kyd v. Cook, 56 Neb. 71 3 Kyner v. Sambuer (Neb.) 91 N. W. 491 94 LaBean v. Telephone & T. C. Co. 109 Mich. 302 . 347 Lacewell v. S. 95 Ga. 346.. 30, 228 Lackey v. S. 67 Ark. 416 6 Lacy v. Porter, 103 Cal. 597.. 126 Ladd v. Pigott, 114 111. 647... 172 v. Witte, 116 Wis. 35 119 Lafayette & I. R. Co. v. Ad- ams, 26 Ind. 76 243 Laflan v. Mississippi Pulp Co. 74 Vt. 125 25 Laflin v. Chicago W. & N. R. Co. 33 Fed. 422 211 Laflin R. P. Co. v. Tearney, 131 111. 322 155 La Grande Ins. Co. v. Shaw (Ore.) 74 Pac. 919 94 Ixxxviii TABLE OF CASES. (References are to Sections.) La Grande Nat. Bank v. Blum, 27 Ore. 215 26 Lagrone v. Timmerman, 46 S. Car. 372 172 Lahr v. Kraemer (Minn.) 97 N. W. 4 1 8 7 Laidlaw v. Sage, 80 Hun (N. Y. 550 286 Laird v. Warren, 92 111. 208.. 384 Lake E. &c. R. Co. v. Brafford, 15 Ind. App. 655 15 v. Holland, 162 Ind. 406.. 357 v. McKewen, 80 Md. 593. 25 v. Parker, 94 Ind. 95 365 v. Wills, 140 111. 614 235 Lake Shore, &c. R. Co. v. Brown, 123 111. 182 129, 195, 198, 649, 650 v. Conway, 169 111. 505.. 363 v. Hessions, 150 111. 559 98, 126 v. Hundt, 140 111. 525.... 58 v. Johnson, 135 111. 641 74, 129, 183, 198 v. Knital, 33 Ohio St. 471. 617 v. Mclntosh, 140 Ind. 271 53, 541, 630, 635 v. Miller, 25 Mich. 274.... 247 v. O'Conner, 115 111. 254 92, 129, 183 v. Parker, 131 111. 557 66, 74, 195 v. Richards, 152 111. 72 100, 124, 126 v. Shultz, 19 Ohio C. C. 639 32 v. Whiden, 23 Ohio Cir. 85 7, 65, 113 La Manna v. Munroe, 62 N. Y. S. 984 35] Lama v. S ; 46 Neb. 236 199 Lamb v. Lamb, 105 Ind. 460.. 692 v. P. 96 111. 73 2, 101, 785 v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. 147 Mo. 171 238 Lambeth R. Co. v. Brigham, 170 Mass. 518 238 Lambright v. S. 34 Fla. 564.. 188 Lampe v. Kennedy, 60 Wis. 100. 214 Lamphere v. S. 114 Wis. 193. . 191 Lampley v. Atlantic C. L. R. Co. 63 S. Car. 462 7 Lampman v. Bruning, 120 Iowa, 167 380 v. Van Alstyne, 94 Wis. 417 6 Lancashire Ins. Co. v. Stanley. 70 Ark. 1 ". . 214 Lancaster v. S. (Tex. Cv. App.) 31 S. W. 515 215, 270 Lancaster G. & (.'. Co. v. Murry G. S. Co. 19 Tex. Cv. App. 110 135 Lander v. P. 104 111. 248 : 1 Landers v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 63 S. W. 557 201 Landis v. S. 70 Ga. 651 322 Landman v. Glover (Tex. Cv. App.) 25 S. W. 994 198 Landrum v. Guerra (Tex. Cv. App.) 28 S. W. 358 65 Lane v. City of Madison, 86 Wis. 453 115 v. Miller, 17 Ind. 58 361 v. Minnesota S. Agr. Soc. 67 Minn. 65 351 v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. 132 Mo. 4 6 v. P. 10 111. 307 817 Laner v. Yetzer, 3 Pa. Super. Ct. 461 191 Langdon v. P. 133 111. 404 181, 192, 193, 238, 304, 331 v. Winterstein, 58 Neb. 278 77 Lange v. Weigan, 125 Mich. 647 174 Langford v. Jones, 18 Ore. 307. 211 v. P. 134 111. 444 265 Langshort v. Copn, 53 Neb. 765 . . 353 Langtry Sons v. Lowrie (Tex. Cv. App.) 58 S. W. 835. . 200 Lankster v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 72 S. W. 388 41 Lansing v. Wessell (Neb.) 97 N. W. 815 101 Lantmann v. Miller, 158 Ind. 382 233 Lanyon v. Edwards (Tex. Cv. App.) 26 S. W. 524 28 Lapeer Co. F. & M. F. Ins. Co. v. Doyle, 30 Mich. 159.. 156 La Plant v.' S. 152 Ind. 80.. . 238 Lapworth v. Leach, 79 Mich. 20 448 Large v. Moore, 17 Iowa, 258. 30 Largey v. Mantle, 26 Mont. '264 25 Larkin v. Burlington, &c. R. Co. 91 Iowa. 654 ...65, 141, 249 Lary v. Youngs (Tex. Cv. App.) 27 S. W. 908 347 TABLE OF CASES. Ixxxix (References are to Sections.} La Salle County C. Coal Co. v. Eastman, 99 ill. App. 495 198 Laselle v. Wells, 17 Ind. 33... 4, 18 Lassiter v. Norfolk & C. R. Co. 126 N. Car. 509 244 Last Chance Min. &c. Co. v. Ames, 23 Colo. 167 245 Latham v. Roache, 72 111. 182. . 238 Latimer v. S. 55 Neb. 609.. 335, 341 Lau v. Fletcher, 104 Mich. 295. 140 v. Merrills, 6 Wend. (N. Y.) 268 . 361 101 Laughlin v. Gerardi, 67 Mo. App. 372 Lawder v. Henderson, 36 Kas. 754 70 Lawhead v. S. 46 Neb. 607 294, 295, 302 Lawler v. P. 74 111. 230 803 Lawless v. S. 4 Lea (Tenn.) 179 1 Lawnsdale v. Grays Harbor Boom Co. 21 Wash. 542 6 Lawrence v. Bucklen, 45 Minn. 195 347 v. Hagerman, 56 111. 68.. 71 v. Jarvis, 32 111. 304.. 80, 243 v. Westlake (Mont.) 73 Pac. 119 192 Lawrenceville Cement Co. v. Park, 60 Hun (N. Y.) 586 44 Layton v. S. 56 Miss. 791 80 Lazarus v. Pheps, 156 U. S. 202 25 Lea v. Henry, 56 Iowa, 662... 156 Leach v. Hill, 97 Iowa, 81..351, 358 v. Nichols, 55 111. 273 94 v. P. 53 111. 311 243 v. S. 99 Tenn. 584 255 Lear v. McMillen, 17 Ohio St. 464 48 Leary v. Electric Tr. Co. 180 Pa. St. 136 7 v. Meier, 78 Ind. 387 383 Leasure v. Colburn, 57 Ind. 274 183 Leavenworth, &c. R. Co. v. Forks, 37 Kas. 448 646 Leavitte v. Randolph County, 85 111. 509 2, 361 Lebanon Coal & M. A. v. Zer- wick, 77 111. App. 486... 94 Le Cointe v. U. S. 7 App. Gas. (D. C.) 16 297 Ledbetter v. S. 21 Tex. App. 344 Lee v. Gorham, 165 Mass. 130. v. Hammond, 114 Wis. 550 25, 198, v. O'Quinn, 103 Ga. 355.. v. Publishers, &c. 137 Mo. 385 v. Quick, 20 111. 392 v. S. 74 Wis. 45 Leeds v. Reed (Tex. Cv. App.) 36 S. W. 347 Leeper v. S. 12 Ind. App. 637. . Lefler v. S. 122 Ind. 206 Leftwich v. City of Richmond, 4 Va. Super Ct. 128 v. S. 34 Tex. Cr. App. 489. 303, Lehman v. Hawks, 121 Ind. 546 1, 41, v. Press, 106 Iowa, 389... Leifheit v. Jos. Schiltz Brewing Co. 106 Iowa, 451 ..20, Leigh v. P. 113 111. 372.. 115, Leise v. Meyer, 143 Mo. 547 113, Leisenberg v. S. 60 Neb. 628.. Leiser v. Kieckhefer, 95 Wis. 4 Leiter v. Lyons (R. I.) 52 Atl. 78 Lemasters v. Southern Pac. R. Co. 131 Cal. 105 85, Le May v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. 105 Mo. 370 635, Lensing v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 45 S. W. 572 206, Leob. v. Huddleston, 105 Ala. Leonard v. Ter. 2 Wash. Ter. 397 182, Leslie v. Smith, 32 Mich. 64. .. v. S. 42 Tex. Cr. App. 65 269 282 v. Wabash, St. L. & P. R.' Co. 88 Mo. 53 Lesser Cotton Co. v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. 114 Fed. 133 107, 189, Lester v. Hays (Tex. Cv. App.) 38 S. W. 52 Letts v. Letts, 91 Mich. 596 Levan v. S. 114 Ga. 258 Lever v. Foote, 31 N. Y. S. 317 129 351 196 121 34 209 355 7 206 243 304 360 80 358 299 208 302 141 92 249 637 296 141 311 192 363 563 361 39 208 220 356 141 TABLE OF CASES. (References are to Sections.} Leverich v. S. 105 Ind. 277 357, Levi v. Gardner, 53 S. Car. 24. . Levy v. Cunningham, 56 Neb. 348 v. S. 79 Ala. 259 Lewellen v. Patton, 73 Mo. App. 472 Lewin v. Pauli, 19 Pa. Super. 447 Lewis v. Christie, 99 Ind. 377 321 v. Com. 19 Ky. L. R. 1139 v. McDaniels, 82 Mo. 583 492, v. Norfolk & W. R. Co. 132 N. Car. 382 v. Rice, 61 Mich. 97 .... v. S. 120 Ala. 339 v. S. 42 Fla. 253 v. S. 4 Ohio, 397 48, v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 59 S. W. 886 21, v. Topman, 90 Md. 274 . Lewton v. Hower, 35 Fla. 58 Lexington Ins. Co. v. Paver, 16 Ohio, 324 Libby v. Deake, 97 Me. 377-. Liberty Ins. Co. v. Erlich, 42 Neb. 553 Lichty v. Tarmatt, 11 Wash. 37 Lieber v. Weiden, 17 Neb. 584. Lifschitz v. Dry Dock, &c. R. Co Liggett & M. T. Co. v. Collier, 89 Iowa, 144 Light v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 93 Iowa, 83 Lilly v. P. 148 111. 47 3.... 56, Linch v. Paris, &c. Co. 80 Tex. 23 Lincoln v. City of Detroit, 101 Mich. 245 v. Felt (Mich.) 92 N. W. 780 Lindberg v. Chicago, &c. R. Co. 83 111. App. 433 Lindell v. Deere Wells Co. (Neb.) 92 N. W. 164 Lindeman v. Fry, 178 111. 174 104, Lindheim v. Duys, 31 N. Y. S. 870 358 25 119 815 141 7 325 261 494 173 192 258 353 245 337 347 164 48 156 235 348 527 245 41 363 329 444 191 20 247 244 116 351 Lindle v. Com. 23 Ky. L. R. 1307 Lindsay v. Turner, 156 U. S. 208 Line v. S. 51 Ind. 172 296, 325, 336, Linehan R. Tr. Co. v. Morris, 87 Fed. 127 . . Linehan v. S. 113 Ala. 70 Liner v. S. 124 Ala. 1.. 25, 101, Links v. S. 13 Lea (Tenn.) 701 Linn v. Massilion, &c. Co. 78 Mo. App. Ill Linton v. Allen, 154 Mass. 432. v. Butler, 40 Ohio St. 158 Linville v. Welch, 29 Mo. 203. Lion v. Baltimore City P. R. Co. 90 Md. 266 Lipscomb v. S. 75 Miss. 559... Litt v. Wabash R. Co. 64 N. Y. S/108 Little v. McGuire, 38 Iowa, 562 v. P. 157 111. 158 294, v. S. 58 Ala. 265 v. S. 89 Ala. 99 v. S. 157 111. 157 v. S. 39 Tex. Cv. App. 654 v. Superior Rapid Tr. Co. 88 Wis. 462 v. Town, &c. 102 Wis. 250 196, Little Dorritt Gold Min. Co. v. Arapahoe Gold Min. Co. 30 Colo. 431 7, Little M. R. Co. v. Wetmore, 19 Ohio St. 134 1, 13 Little Rock, &c. R. Co. v. At- kins, 46 Ark. 430 529, 561, 565, Littleton v. S. 128 Ala. 31 Litton v. Young, 2 Mete. (Ky.) 565 Liverpool. &c. Ins. Co. v. Ende, 65 Tex. 124 365, v. Farnsworth Lumber Co. 72 Miss. 555 v. Joy, 26 Tex. Cv. App. 613 Livingston v. Moore (Neb.) 89 N. W. 289 v. Stevens (Iowa) 94 N. W. 925 . 101 358 339 353 258 299 84 247 360 534 172 101 313 145 676 301 44 297 301 271 210 360 363 , 60 571 63 218 425 200 102 358 90 TABLE OF CASES. XC1 (References are to Sections.} Lloyd v. Moore, 38 Ohio St. 100 37 v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. 128 Mo. 595 176 Lobdell v. Keene, 85 Minn. 90 20 Locke v. S. C. & P. R. Co. 40 Iowa, 113 633 Lockwood v. Crawford, 18 Conn. 361 162 Loeb v. Weis, 64 Ind. 285 1 Loewenstein v. Bennett, 19 Ohio C. C. 616 347 Lofland v. Goben, 16 Ind. App. 67 70 Lofton v. S. 79 Miss. 723 255 Logansport, &c. Co. v. Coate (Ind.) 64 N. E. 638 244 Logg v. S. 92 111. 598 104, 113, 170 Logwood v. Hussey, 60 Ala. 421 446, 447 Lomax v. Holbine, (Neb.) 90 N. W. 1122 237 Long v. Hunter, 58 S. Car. 152 48 v. Martin, 152 Mo. 668 .. 200 v. S. 42 Fla. 509 315, 323 326 v. S. 23 Neb. 33 275, 336 v. Shull, 7 Pa. Super. Ct. 476 359 v. Southern R. Co. 50 S. Car. 49' 7, 44 v. Travellers' Ins. Co. 113 Iowa, 259 -211 Longacre v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 41 S. W. 621 258 Longenecker v. S. 22 Ind. 247 . 101 Longley v. Com. 99 Va. 807 307, 310 Longyear v. Gregory, 110 Mich. 277 358 Lonkster v. S. 41 Tex. Cr. App. 603 25, 255 Lopez v. Jackson, 80 Miss. 684 193 v. S. Tex. Cr. App. 649 303 Lorie v. Adams, 51 Kas. 692.. 170 Lorimer v. S. 776 Ind. 497 849 Los Angeles Farming & Milling Co. v. Thompson, 117 Cal. 594 136 Lou v. Grimes Drygoods Co. 38 Neb. 215 . 32 Louisville, &c. R. Co. v. Baker, 106 Ala. 624 80 Louisville, &c. R. Co. v. Banks (Ky.) 23 S. W. 627.. 4, 113 v. Buck, 116 Ind. 566 232 v. Cowherd, 120 Ala. 51 25, 26 v. Dick (Ky.) 78 S. W. 914 122 v. Falvey, 104 Ind. 429 181, 552, (i52, 654 v. Ferry's Adm'rx. 20 Ky. L. R. 803 126 v. Finley, 86 Ky. L. R. 294 359 v. Foley, 88 Fed. 240 25 v. Fox, 11 Bush (Ky.) 506 545, 582 v. Frawley, 110 Ind. 28... 232 v. Gidley, 119 Ala. 525 588 v. Grantham, 104 Ind. 357 7, 646 v. Hall, 91 Ala. 113 13 v. Harrod, 25 Ky. L. R. 250 196 v. Hart, 119 Ind. 273 247 v. Hubbard, 116 Ind. 193.. 27 v. Jones, 130 Ala. 456 ... 113 'v. Kelly, 92 Ind. 374 577 v. Lynch, 147 Ind. 165 232 v. McCune (Ky.) 72 S. W. 756 81 v. Mattingly, 22 Ky. L. R. 489 94 v. Morgan, 114 Ala. 449 .. 223 v. Patchen, 167 111. 204... 48 v. Pittman, 23 Ky. L. R. 877 25 v. Pointer's Adm'r (Ky.) 69 S. W. 1108 74 v. Ray, 101 Tenn. 1 26 v. Rice. 101 Ala. 676 .... 177 v. Sandlin, 125 Ala. 585.. 63 v. Shires, 108 111. 617, 631 94, 97, 204, 363 v. Spencer, 149 111. 103 75 v. Suddoth, 70 Miss. 265.. 30 v. Sullivan T. Co. (Ala.) 35 So. 330 120, 645 v. Utz, 133 Ind. 265 196 v. Ward. 67 Fed. 927.. 198, 203 v. Whitehead, 71 Miss. 451 211 v. Wills' Adm'rx. 23 Ky. L. R. 1961 97 v. Wood, 113 Ind. 561 542. 549, 556, 577, 584, .638 v. Wright, 115 Ind. 378... 357 v. York, 128 Ala. 305 66, 191, 195, 204 TABLE OF CASES. (References are to Sections.} Lourance v. Goodwin, 170 111. 390 71 Love v. Anchor Raisin Vin. Co. (Cal.) 45 Pac. 1044 351 v. Gregg, 117 N. Car. 467.. 114 v. Moynehan, 16 111. 277.. 361 v. Wyatt, 19 Tex. 312 94 Lovejoy v. S. 62 Ark. 478 296 Lovick v. Atlantic C. L. R. Co. 129 N. Car. 427 25, 30 Low v. Freeman, 117 Ind. 345 35 Lowe v. Lehman, 15 Ohio St. 179 243 v. Salt Lake City, 13 Utah, 91 351 v. S. 88 Ala. 8 218 Lowenberg v. P. 5 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 414 343 Lower v. Franks, 115 Ind. 340 40, 247 Lowery v. Rowland, 104 Ala. 420 200 Lubsenz v. Metropolitan St. R. Co. 76 N. Y. S. 411 183 Lucas v. Milwaukee, &c. R. Co. 33 Wis. 50 555, 558 v. S. 110 Ga. 758 324 Lucia v. Meech, 68 Vt. 175.... 80 Lucio v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. App. 320 6 Luckhart v. Ogden, 30 Cal. 548 156 Luckie v. Schneider (Tex. Cv. App.) 57 S. W. 690 195 Ludwig v. Blackshere, 102 Iowa, 266 349, 351 v. Metropolitan St. R. Co. 75 N. Y. S. 667 25 v. Sager, 84 111. 100 66 Lueck v. Heisler, 87 Wis. 644. . 6 Luedtke v. Jeffrey, 89 Wis. 136 351 Luhrs v. Brooklyn H. R. Co. 42 N. Y. S. 606 122, 133 Lundon v. City of Chicago, 83 111. App. 208 200 Lung v. Deal. 16 Ind. 349 4 Lurssen v. Lloyd, 76 Md. 360. 80 Lusk v. Throop, 189 111. 127.. 80 Lydiek v. Gill (Neb.) 94 N. W. 109 109, 112, 119, 192 Lyle v. McCormick H. M. Co. 108 Wis. 81 49 v. Mclnnis (Miss.) 17 So. 510 195 Lyman v. P. 198 111. 544 80 Lynch v. Bates, 139 Ind. 206. . .214 v. Johnson, 109 Mich. 640. 144 Lynch v. S. 41 Tex. Cr. App. 510 ..255, 262, 272 Lyne v. Western U. Tel. Co. 123 N. Car. 129 20 Lynn v. P. 170 111. 534 251, 260, 773 Lyon v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 34 S. W. 947 326 v. Watson, 109 Mich. 390 71, 198- Lyons v. P. 68 111. 272 728 v. P. 137 111. 619 20 v. Wayercross A. L. R. Co. 114 Ga. 727 126 Lytle v. Boyer, 33 Ohio St. 506 245, 393 Lyts v. Keevey, 5 Wash. 606.. 218 M McAfee v. Montgomery, 21 Ind. App. 196 7 McAleer v. S. 46 Neb. 116 119 McAlister v. Long, 33 Ore. 368 351 McAlpine v. S. 117 Ala. 93 25 McArthur v. S. 60 Neb. 390 294, 297 McAvoy v. Cassioy, 60 N. Y. S. 837 656 McAyeal v. Gullett, 202 111. 214 196 McBaine v. Johnson, 153 Mo. 191 94 McBeth v. Trabue, 69 Mo. 650. 673 McBride v. Banguss, 65 Tex. 174 . . . 200 McCabe v. City of Philadelphia, 12 Pa. Super Ct. 383... 113 McCaleb v. Smith, 22 Iowa, 244 19 McCallister v. Mount, 73 Ind. 566 1, 41 McCallon v. Cohen (Tex. Cv. App.) 39 S. W. 973.... 195 McCandless v. S. 42 Tex. Cr. App. 58 258 McCann v. Ullman, 109 Wis. 574 94 McCarthy v. Kitchen, 59 Ind. 506 506 v. S. 56 Ind. 203 166 McCartney v. McMullen, 38 111. 237 H3 McCary v. Stull, 44 Neb. 175. . 243 McCasland v. Kimberlin, 100 Ind. 121 220 TABLE OF CASES. XC111 (References are to Sections.) McClary v. Stull, 44 Neb. 191 . . McClellan v. Hein, 56 Neb. 600 44, v. S. 117 Ala. 140 McClelland v. S. 117 Ala. 140. McClernan v. Com. 1 J Ky. L. R. 301 MeCloskey v. Pulitszer Pub. Co. 152 Mo. 346 McClung v. Com. 17 Ky. L. R. 1339 McClure v. Phila. W. & B. R. Co. 34 Md. 534 McClure v. Williams, 65 111. 390 53, McCoggle v. S. 41 Fla. 525 McCole v. Loeher, 79 Ind. 430.. McConkey v. Com. 101 Pa. St. 420 McCord v. McSpaden, 34 Wis. 549 v. S. 83 Ga. 521 McCord-Brady Co. v. Moneyhan, 59 Neb. 593 McCorkle v. Simpson, 42 Ind. 453 113, McCormick v. McCormick, 194 Pa. St. 107 v. Kreinkle, 179 111. 301.. v. McGaffray, 55 N. Y. S. 574 v. S. 92 N. W. 606 v. S. 133 Ala. 202 v. Standard Oil Co. 60 N. J. L. 243 79, McCormick H. M. Co. v. Send- zikowski, 72 111. App. 402 McCosker v. Banks, 84 Md. 292 McCoy v. Kokomo R. & L. Co. 158 Ind. 658 v. P. 175 111. 224 70, 251, 285. v. S. 40 Fla. 494 McCracken v. Webb, 36 Iowa, 551 McCray v. Humes, 116 Ind. Ill McCready v. Phillips (Neb.) 67 N.' W. 7 McCreery's Adm'rs v. Ohio River Co. 43 W Va. 110 McCrory v. Anderson, 103 Ind. 16 .... 38 349 218 313 369 493 574 218 65 247 220 432 154 200 119 189 104 192 79 324 124 45 349 234 776 252 61 47 94 118 247 McCrum v. Hildebrand, 85 Ind. 205 455 McCrystal v. O'Neill, 86 N. Y. S. 84 129 McCulley v. S. 62 Ind. 428.. 21 McCulloch v. S. 48 Ind. 109 .. 320 McCullough v. Armstrong (Ga.), 45 S. E. 379 196 v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. Co. 101 Mich. 234.. 192 V. S. 23 Tex. App. 626 . . 299 McCully v. S. 62 Ind. 433. ... 766 McCutcheon v. Loggins, 109 Ala. 457 48 McDaniel v. Crosby, 19 Ark. 533 38 v. S. 30 Ga. 853 168 v. S. 100 Ga. 67 255 McDaniels v. Monroe, 63 S. Car. 307 176 McDerott v. S. 89 Ind. 193... 777 McDommell v. De Los Fuentes, 7 Tex. Civ. App. 136.. 191 McDonald v. Beall, 55 Ga. 288 192 v. Fairbanks, Morse & Co. 161 111. 124 44 v. McDonald, 94 Ga. 675 80 v. McDonald, 142 Ind. 89 706 v. Metropolitan St. R. Co. 61 N. Y. S. 817 126 v. Minneapolis, St. P. R. Co. 105 Mich. 659 123 v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. (R. I.) 54 Atl. 795 32 V* Norfolk, &c. R. Co. 95 Va. 104 610, 614, 650 v. S. 63 Ind. 544 166, 169 v. S. (Miss.) 28 So. 750.. 219 v. U. S. 63 Fed. 426 347 McDonall v. P. 168 111. 93.. 6, 802 McDonnell v. Nicholson, 67 Mo. App. 408 363 McDonough v. Great N. R. Co. 15 Wash. 244 348 v. Metropolitan R. Co. 137 Mass. 210 183 v. Miller, 114 Mass. 94.. 116 McDoiigal v. S. 88 Ind. 24.. 247, 331 McEldon v. Patton (Neb.), 93 N. W. 938 80 McElroy v. P. 202 111. 478.. 373, 821 McElya v. Hill, 105 Tenn. 319 90 McEwen v. Morey, 60 HI. 38. . 26b v. S. (Miss.) 16 So. 242 226 XC1V TABLE OF CASES. (References are to Sections.) McFadyen v. Masters, 1 1 Okla. 16 360 McFarland v. Carver, 34 Mo. 196 522 McFaul v. Madero F. & F. C. 134 Cal. 313 71 McGar v. National & P. W. M. Co. 22 R. I. 347 94 McGee v. Smitherman, 69 Ark. 632 7, 25, 196 v. Wells, 52 S. Car. 472.. 27 v. Wineholt, 23 Wash. 748 245 McGehee v. Lane, 34 Tex. 390 118 McGinnis v. Fernandes, 126 111, 232 84 v. Kempsey, 27 Mich. 364 694, 695, 696, 697, 698 McGowen v. Larsen, 66 Fed. 910 102 McGrath v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. App. 413 269 McGraw v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. (Neb.) 81 ... W. 306 360 McGrew v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. 109 Mo. 582 48 McGuire v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. 158 N. Y. 680 .... 145 McHale v. McDonnell, 175 Pa. St. 632 65 McHenry v. Bulifant (Pa.) 56 Atl. 226 119, 192 v. Man, 39 Md. 510 156 McHugh v. S. 42 Ohio St. 154 31, 32 Mclntosh v. Moore, 22 Tex.^ Civ. App. 22 81 v. S. 151 Ind. 251 226, 227, 238, 243 300, 754 Mclntyre v. P. 38 111. 520 281 v. Sholtey, 121 111. 665.. 47 McKay v. Evans, 48 Mich. 597 116 McKee v. P. 36 N. Y. 118 333 v. S. Ill Ind. 378 760 McKenzie v. Sykes, 47 Mich. 294 156, 157 McKinney v. Guhman, 38 Mo. App. 344 199 v. Hopwood, 46 Neb. 871 129 v. Snyder, 78 Pa. St. 497 63 v. S. 134 Ala. 134 318 McKinnon v. Atkins, 60 Mich. 418 352 McKinsey v. McKee, 109 Ind 209 346 McKinzie v. Remington, 79 111. 388 44, 78 McKissack v. Witz, 120 Ala. 412 142 McKlervy v. S. 77 Ala. 95 295 McKnight v. Detroit M. R. Co. (Mich.) 97 N. W. 772.. 25 v. U. S. 115 Fed. 972 201 McKown v. Powers, 86 Me. 291 347 McLain v. Commonwealth, 99 Pa. St. 86 69 v. S. 18 Neb. 154 160, 322, 744 McLane v. Maurer, 28 Tex. Civ. App. 75 25, 196 McLean v. Clark. 47 Ga. 24.. 212 v. Erie R. Co. (N. J.) 54 . Atl. 238 204 McLellon v. Wheeler, 70 Me. 285 196 McLeod v. Sharp, 53 111. App. 406 200 McLeroy v. S. 120 Ala. 274.. 11 j McMahan v. Sankey, 133 111. 636 238 McMahon v. Eau Claire W. Works, 95 Wis. 640 .'. 35 v. Flanders, 64 Ind. 334. . 80 v. O'Connor, 137 Mass. 216 14 v. P. 120 HI. 584 217, 366, 367 v. Sankey, 133 111. 637. 56, 249 McManus v. Finan, 4 Iowa, 285 678 McMarshall v. Chicago, &c. R. Co. 80 Iowa, 759 .... 630 McMeen v. Com. 114 Pa. St. 300 302 McMillan v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. App. 370 360 McMillen v. Lee, 78 111. 433.. 238 McMinn v. Whalen, 27 Cal. 319 185, 208 McMullen v. Clark. 49 Ind. 81 73S McNair v. Platt. 46 111. 211.. 48 McNamnra v. King, 7 111. (2 Gil.) 432 59 v. Pengilly, 64 Minn. 543 351 v. P. 24 Colo. 61 324 McNeel v. Smith, 106 Ga. 215 135 McNeil v. Durham, 130 N. ' Car. 256 244 McNeile v. Cridland, 6 Pa. Super. Ct. 428 215 TABLE OF CASES. XCV (References are to Sections.} McNight v. Bell, 168 Pa. St. 50 141 McNulta v. Lockridge, 137 111. 288 74, 627, 641 McNutt, &c. R. v. Kaufman; 26 Ohio St. 130 199 McPeak v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. 128 Mo. 617 187 McPeck v. Central Vt. R. Co. 79 Fed. 590 126 McPhee v. McDermott, 77 Wis. 33 360 McPherson v. St. Louis I. M. & S. R. Co. 97 Mo. 253 105 McQuay v. Richmond & D. R. Co. 109 N. Car. 585.. 181 McQueen v. S. 82 Ind. 74.. 340, 756 v. S. 103 Ala. 12 252, 282 McQuinn v. Com. 17 Ky. 500 293 McQuown v. Thompson, 5 Colo. App. 466 141 McVay v. S. (Miss.) 26 So. 947 226 McVeigh v. S. 43 Tex. Cv. App. 17 182 McVey v. St. Clair Co. 49 W. , Va. 412 92, 102, 118, 610, 619 v. S. 55 Neb. 777 33S v. S. 57 Neb. 471 238 McWaters v. Equitable Mort. Co. 115 Ga. 723 135 Maas v. Ter. 10 Okla. 714.. 331 Mabry v. S. 7 1 Miss. 716 19 Machen v. Hooper, 73 Md. 354 453 Mackin v. P. 115 111. 312 21 v. S. 59 N. J. L. 495 329 Macon v. Holcomb, 205 111. 640 247 Madden v. State, 148 Ind. 183 41 Maddox v. Newport New & M. V. Co. 18 Ky. L. R. 635 195 Madison v. Com. 13 Ky. L. R. 313 267 Maes v. Texas & N. O. R. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 23 S. W. 725 25, 87 Magee v. McNeil, 41 Miss. 17 158 v. P. 139 111. 140 265 Magone v. Origet, 70 Fed. 778 145 Magoon v. Before, 73 Vt. 231 6, 351 Maliaffey v. Ferguson, 156 Pa. St. 156 195 v. Ter. (Okla.) 69 Pac. 342 255 Mahan v. Com. 21 Ky. L. R. 1807 80, 94 Mahaska County S. Bank v. Crist, 87 Iowa, 418 415 Maher v. James Hanley Brew- ing Co. 23 R. I. 343 91 Mahnken v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 62 N. J. L. 404 134 Mahoney v. San Francisco & S. M. R. Co. 110 Cal. 471 187 Maines v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. App. 109 265 Mallen v. Waldowiski, 203 111. 87 194, 245, 543 Malone v. Robinson, 77 Ga. 719 433 v. S. 66 Ga. 540 166, 168 v. Third Ave. R. Co. 42 N. Y. S. 694 16 Malott v. Hawkins, 159 Ind. 137 346 v. Hood, 201 111. 202 6, 53, 624 Manch v. City of Hartford, 112 Wis. 40 232 Manger v. S. (Tex. Cv. App.) 69 S. W. 145 272 Mangham v. S. 87 Ga. 549 . . 265 Mangum v. Com. 19 Ky. L. R. 94 329 Manier v. S. 6 Baxt. (Tenn.) 595 11 Manley v. Boston & M. R. Co. '159 Mass. 493 113 Mann v. Cowan, 8 Pa. Super. Ct. 30 191 v. S. 134 Ala, 1 102, 116. 258. 260,. 299 Manning v. Gasharie, 27 Ind. 399 14 Mansfield v. Neese. 2 1 Tex. Cv. App. 584 .' 48 Mantz v. Maguire 52 Mo. App. 137 156, 159, 160 Marcus v. Leake (Neb.) 94 N. W. 100 25 Marden v. Dorthy, 42 N. Y. S. 827 130 Mariner v. Dennison, 78 Cal. 202 27 Marion v. S. 16 Neb. 349 312 Mark v. S. 34 Tex. Cr. 136... 110 Market & Fulton Nat. Bank v. Sargent, 85 Me. 349 126 Marks v. Jacobs, 76 Ind. 216. 3, 6 XCV1 TABLE OF CASES. (References are to Sections.} Marr v. Marr, 5 Sneed (Term.) 385 Marsh v. Eichardson, 106 N. Car. 539 v. Smith, 49 111. 396 Marshall v. John Grosse Cloth- ing Co. 184 111. 421 v. Lewark, 117 Ind. 377 351, 359. v.Morris, 16 Ga. 368.... v. S. 37 Tex. Cr. App. 450 Marshalltown L. Ins. Co. v. Doll, 80 Ind. 113 Martens v. Pittock (Neb.) 92 N. W. 1038 Martensen v. Arnold, 78 111. App. 336 Martin v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 194 111. 138 121, v. Davis, 76 Iowa, 762. .. v. Home Bank, 160 N. Y. 190 . . v. Hughes, 98 Fed. 556. .. v. Johnson, 89 111. 537 106, v. McCray, 171 Pa. St. 575 v. St. Louis S. W. R. Co. (Tex. Cv. App.) 56 S. W. 1011 . v. S. 104 Ala. 71 v. S. (Neb.) 93 N. W. 161 v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 38 S. W. 194 v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 43 S. W. 352 175, v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 53 S. W. 849 v. S. 32 Tex. Cr. App. 441 v. S. 36 Tex. Cr. App. 632. v. Union M. L. Ins. Co. 13 Wash. L75 Martineau v. S. 14 Wis. 373.. Martinez v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 56 S. W. 580 v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 57 S. W. 670 'Marts v. S. 20 Ohio St. 162.. Marx v. Hess, 19 Ky. L. 42 129, Mar/en v. P. 173 111. 60.. 319. Mascott v. Insurance Co. 69 Vt. 116 Mason v. Jones, 36 111. 212.. 182 14 155 136 360 196 326 358 113 155 129 199 145 189 116 84 115 4 8 288 290 109 303 289 80 155 268 48 802 141 731 145 25 Mason v. McCampbell, 2 Ark. 506 361 v. Seiglitz, 22 Colo. 320 43, 236, 346 v. Silver, 1 Aik. (N. S.) (Vt.) 367 48 v. Southern R. Co. 58 S. Car. 70 94 Masonic, &c. Asso. v. Collins, 210 111. 482 71 Matheson v. Kuhn, 15 Colo. App. 477 94 Mathews v. Granger, 96 111. App. 536 223 Mathews Adm'rs v. Traders' Bank (Va.) 27 S E. 609 135 Mathis v. S. 80 Miss. 491... 294 v. S. 33 Tex. Cr. App. 605 192 Matson v. Port Townsend S. R. Co. 9 Wash. 449 144 Matthews v. Granger, 196 111. 164 363 v. Hamilton, 23 111. 416... 105 v. P. 6 Colo. App. 456... 229 v. S. 55 Ala. 65 153 v. Story, 54 Ind. 417 195 Mattingly v. Lewishon, 13 Mont. 508 196 Mattoon v. Freemont, E. & M. V. R. Co. 6 S. Dak. 196 133 Matula v. Lane, 22 Tex. Cv. App. 391 48 Maurer v. P. 43 N. Y. 1 36 Mawich v. Elsey, 47 Mich. 10.. 208 Maxfield v. S. 54 Neb. 44 716 Maxon. v. Farris (Tex. Cv. App.) 48 S. W. 741.... 200 Maxwell v. Chapman, 26 N. Y. S. 361 245 v. Cunningham, 50 W. Va. 298.. 25, 661, 662. 690, 691 v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. 85 Mo. 1C6 84 v. Williamson, 35 111. 529.. 219 May v. P. 8 Colo. 226 766, 770 v. P. 6 111. 119 294, 299 v. S. 94 Ga. 76 271 v. Tallman, 20 111. 443 25 Mayer v. Thompson B. Co. 104 Ala. 611 141 v. Wilkins, 37 Fla. 244 48, 181, 308 Mayers v. Smith, 121 111. 451.. 385 Mayes v. Kenton, 2b Kv. L. R. 1052 163 TABLE OF CASES. XCV11 (References are to Sections.) Mayfield v: Williams, 73 Tex. 508 Maynard v. Fellows, 43 N. H. 255 v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 39 S. W. 667 v. Sigman (Neb.) 91 N. W. 576 v. Tyler, 168 Mass. 107.. v. Vinton, 59 Mich. 139... Mazzia v. S. 51 Ark. 177 Mead v. Brotherton, 30 Mo. 201 v. McGraw, 19 Ohio St. 61 Meadows v. Pacific M. L. Ins. Co. 129 Mo. 76 v. Truesdell (Tex. Cv. App.) 56 8. W. 932 170, v. West. U. Tel. Co. 13 IX. Car. 73 Means v. Gridley, 164 Pa. St. 387 195, Mechanics' Bank v. Barnes, 86 Mich. 632 Medearis v. Anchor Mutual Fire Ins. Co. 104 Iowa, 88.. Meehan v. S. (Wis.) 97 N. W. 174 9, Mefford v. Sell (Neb.) 92 N. W. 148 Mehurin v. Stone, 37 Ohio St. 49 . . . . . Meier v. Shrunk, 79 Iowa, 21.. Meigs v. Dexter, 172 Mass. 217 Meiners v. City of St. Louis, 130 Mo. 274 Mellor v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. 105 Mo. 455 Mells v. U. S. 164 U. S. 644. Melvin v. Easly, 46 N. Car. 386 Memphis & C. P. Co. v. Abell, 17 Ky. L. R. 191 Memphis St. R. Co. v. Newman, 108 Tenn. 666 Mendenhall v. North; Carolina R. Co. 123 N. Car. 275.. Mendes v. Kyle. 16 Nev. 369 25, Mercer v. Wright. 3 Wis. 645.. Merchants & Planters' Oil Co. v. Burrow (Tex. Cv. App.) 69 S. W. 435 Merrietta & C. R. Co. v. Pick- sley, 24 Ohio St. 668 665 199 281 238 191 211 4 113 218 71 191 119 363 234 119 301 84 243 478 30 48 652 276 211 134 101 245 113 219 230 286 Merrill v. Equitable F. I. & S. I. Co. 49 Neb. 198 358 v. Hale, 85 Iowa, 66 113 v. Packer, 80 Iowa, 543 155, 156 v. Palmer, 68 Vt. 475 . . . 351 v. Reaver, 5 Iowa, 417 381, 396, 463 v. Suing (Neb.) 92 N. W. 618 94 Merrimac Paper Co. v. Illinois Trust & S. Bank, 129 111. 296 47 Merritt v. Merritt, 20 111. 80. .. 66 v. S. 107 Ga. 675 170 Mertens v. Keilman, 79 Mo. 416 659 Merwin v. Magone, 70 Fed. 776 145 v. Morris, 71 Conn. 564 658, 659, 662 Messmann v. Ihlenfeldt, 89 Wis. 585 26 Metropolitan, &c. Co. v. Hudson, 113 Fed. 449 347 v. McClure, 58 Kas. 109.. 195 v. Skola, 183 111. 454 21 Metropolitan Bank of Minneapo- lis v. Northern Fuel Co. 173 111. 345 124 Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. v. Howie, 62 Ohio St. 206.. 420 Metz v. S. 46 Neb. 547 195, 229 Meul v. P. 198 111. 258 31 Mewes v. Crescent P. L. Co. 170 Pa. St. 369 211 Mexican, &c. R. Co. v. Murray, 102 Fed. 264 131 v. Wilder, 114 Fed. 708.. 361 Mever v. Blackmore, 54 Miss. 575 199 v. Hafmeister (Wis.) 97 N. W. 166 200, 247 v. Mead. 83 111. App. 19.. 203 v. P. 156 111. 129 329 v. Pacific R. Co. 40 Mo. 151 113 v. Reimer. 65 Kas. 822 48 v. S. (Tex. Cr.) 49 S. W. 600 243 v. Shamp, 51 Neb. 424 . ... 160 v. Southiern R. Co. (Mo.) 3-6 S. W. 367 71 v. Temme, 72 111. 571 360 Meyers v. Birch, 59 N. J. L. 238 126, 129 xcvm TABLE OF CASES. (References are to Sections.) Meyers v. S. 39 (Tex. Cv. App.) 500 v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 49 S. W. 600 Michie v. Cochran, 93 Va. 614. Michigan S. & N. I. R. Co. v. Shelton, 66 111. 425 Mickle v. S. 27 Ala. 20 '. Middlebrooks v. Mayne, 96 Ga. 449 Miers v. S. 34 Tex. Cr. App. 161 Milburn Wagon Co. v. Kennedy, 75 Tex. 214 Miles v. Plant, 18 Pa. Super. Ct. 80 v. Stanke, 114 Wis. 94 v. Strong, 68 Conn. 273 v. Walker (Neb.) 92 N. W. 1014 Miller v. Barber, 66 N. Y. 558. v. Bathasser, 78 111. 305 105, 477, v. Cinnamon, 168 111. 451. v. Com. (Va.) 21 S. E. 499 v. Coulter, 156 Ind. 298 269 238 173 192 306 100 3 873 191 8 199 197 200 877 118 284 706 222 63 155 209 25, v. Dayton, 57 Iowa, 423... v. Dumon, 24 Wash. 648.. v. Dunlap, 22 Mo. App. 97. v. Eglin, 64 Ind. 197 v. Haas (Tex. Cv. App.) 27 S. W. 263 v. Howard, 19 Ky. L. R. 22 v. John, 108 111. 180 . ... 203 v. Madison Car Co. 130 Mo. 517 219 v. Miller, 17 Ind. App. 605 26 v. Miller. 187 Pa. St. 572. 185 v. P. 23 Colo. 95 274, 351 v. P. 39 111. 466 19, 221, 298, 299, 324, 325, 328, 367, 719, 760 v. Preston, 4 Johns. (N. Y. ) 314 43 v. Root, 77 Iowa, 545 244 v. S. 107 Ala. 40.. 56, 115, 345 v. S. 74 Ind. 1 260 v. S. (Miss.) 35 So. 690... 365 v. S. (Wis.) 81 N. W. 1020 9 v. R. 106 Wis. 156. .21, 25, 219 v. Stevens, 23 Ind. App. 365. . 71 Milhgan v. Texas & N. 0. R. Co. 27 Tex. Cv. App. 600 f> Milliken v. Marlin, (56 111. 22.. 20U v. Maund, 110 Ala. 332... 351 Milling v. Hillenbrand, 156 111. 310 238 Millman v. Rochester R. Co. 39 N. Y. S. 279 222 Mills v. S. 104 Ga. 502 271 Milmo Nat. Bank v. Convery (Tex. Cv. App.) 49 S. W. 926 27, 199 Milroy v. Chicago, &c. R. Co. 98 Iowa, 193 655 Milwaukee Harvester Co. v. Tymich, 68 Ark. 225 360 Mimms v. S. 16 Ohio St. 234 84, 119, 173 Mims v. S. 42 Fla. 199 101 Mineral R. & M. Co. v. Auten, 188 Pa. St. 568 6 Minnesota Thresher Mfg. Co. v. Wolfram, 71 Wis. 809.. 140 Minor v. Parker, 72 N. Y. S. 549 Mirrielees v. Wabash R. Co. 163 358 530 Mo. 470 Mississippi C. R. Co. v. Miller, 40 Miss. 45 247 Missouri, &c. R. Co. v. A very (Tex. Cv. App.) 64 S. W. 935 25 v. Bowles, 1 Ind. Ter. 250.. 590 v. Brown (Tex. Cv. App.) 39 S. W. o26 . 195 v. Byars, 58 Ark. 108 174 v. Cardena, 22 Tex. Cv. App. 300 101 v. Carter (Tex.) 68 S. W. 159 b8 v. Christman, 65 Tex. 369. 173 v. Coffey (Tex. Cv. App.) 68 S. W. 721 115 v. Collins, 15 Tex. Cv. App. 21 109, 113 v. Cook, 12 Tex. Cv. App. 203 244 v. Crowder (Tex. Cv. App.) 53 S. W. 380 6 v. Dil worth (Tex. Cv. App.) 65 S. W. 502 7 v. Edwards, 90 Tex. 69 537 v. Evans (Tex. Cv. App.) 41 S. W. 80 33 v. Fox. 56 Neb. 746 247 v. Fuller, 72 Fed. 468 ... 25 TABLE OF CASES. XC1X (References are to Sections.} Missouri, &c. R. Co. v. Hen- nessy (Tex.) 49 S. W. 641 20 v. Hildebrand, 62 Kas. 284. 26 v. Johnson (Tex. Cv. App.) 67 S. W. 769 191 v. King, 2 Tex. Cv. App. 122 28 v. Kirschoffer (Tex. Cv. App.) 24 S. W. 577 .... 355 v. Lyons (Tex. Cv. App.) 58 S: W. 96 71 v. Magee (Tex. Cv. App.) 49 S. W. 928 191 v. Miller, 15 Tex. Cv. App. 428 6 v. Mitchell, 75 Tex. 1 94 v. Peay, 7 Tex. Cv. App. 400 6 v. Rogers (Tex. Cv. App.) 40 S. W. 849 184 v. Steinberger, 60 Kas. 856 6 v. Walden (Tex. Cv. App.) 66 S. W. 584 26 v. Warren, 1 9 Tex. Cv. App. 463 196 v. White, 22 Tex. Cv. App. 424 549 v. Wickham (Tex. Cv. App.) 28 S. W. 917.... 94 v. Williams, 75 Tex. 4 347 Missouri Furnace Co. v. Abend, 107 111. 49 620 v. Abend, 107 111. 50 86 Missouri M. Iron Co. v. Hoover, 179 111. 107 133 Mitchell v. Charleston L. & P. Co. 45 S. Car. 146 28, 543, 546, 547 v. Electric Co. 129 N. Car. 173 546 v. Fond du Lac, 61 111. 174 153, 155 v. Harmony, 13 How. (U. S.) 130 119 v. Hindman, 150 111. 528 21, 199, 2CO, 239 v. Potomac Ins. Co. 183 U. S. 42 80 v. S. 133 Ala. 65 68, 88. 225 v. S. 38 Tex. Cr. App. 325 289 v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 41 S. W. 816 258 v. S. 43 Fla, 188 206 Mitchell-Tranter Co. v. Ehmett, 23 Ky. L. R. 1788 116 Mittwer v. Stremel, 69 Minn. 19 80 Mixon v. Mills, 92 Tex. 318 354 v. Warren, 94 Ga. 688 140 Mize v. S. 36 Ark. 662 801 Mobile, &c. R. Co. v. Godfrey, 155 111. 82 94, 101 v. Healy, 100 111. App. 586 198 v. Wilson, 76 Fed. 122 189 Mobile Fruit & T. Co. v. Potter, 78 Minn. 437 4 Mobley v. Charlotte, C. & A. R. Co. 42 S. Car. 306 .... 237 v. S. 83 Ind. 94 825 Mode v. Beasley, 143 Ind. 306 243 Model Mill Co. v. McEver, 95 Ga. 701 113, 117 Moellering v. Evans, 121 Ind. 197 670 Moffitt v. Colkin, 35 Mo. 453.. 192 Mohr v. Kinnane, 85 111. App. 447 193, 195 Mohrenstecher v. Westervelt, 87 Fed. 157 80 Momence Stone Co. v. Groves, 197 111. 93 222 v. Turrell, 205 111. 524 192 Monaghan v. Agriculture F. Ins. Co. 53 Mich. 238 200 Montag v. P. 141 111. 81 1, 20, 48, 80, 330, 331 Montgomery v. Black, 124 111. 62 47 v. Com. (Ky.) 63 S. W. 747 80 v. Del. Ins. Co. (S. Car.) 45 S. E. 934 119 v. Harker, 81 Mo. 63 359 v. Hickman, 62 Ind. 598.. 446 Moody v. S. 114 Ga. 449 182 Mooney v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 65 S. W. 926 272 Moor v. Heineke, 119 Ala. 627. 200 Moore v. Barker Asphalt Pav- ing Co. 118 Ala. 563 80 v. Brewer, 94 Ga. 260 199 v. Brown, 27 Tex. Cv. App. 208 7, 346 v. Dickinson, 39 S. Car. 441 191 v. Graham, 29 Tex. Cv. App. 235 7, 248, 363 TABLE OF CASES. (References are to Sections.) Moore v. Gwynn, 27 N. Car. (5 Ired. L.) 187 v. Hinkle, 151 Ind. 343.. v. People, 190 111. 331 v. Platterville, 78 Wis. 644 v. Prussing, 165 111. 319.. v. Richmond, 85 Va. 542 59, v. Ross, 11 N. H. 547 v. S. 97 Ga. 759 v. S. 114 Ga. 256 80, v. S. 65 Ind. 382 63, v. S. (Tex. Or. App.) 28 S. W. 874 358 v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 33 S. W. 990 3, 266 v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 68 S. W. 279 191 v. Shields, 121 Ind. 267.... 6 v. Sweeney, 28 111. App. 547 44 v. Wright, 90 111. 471.... 113 Moore Furniture Co. v. Sloane, 166 111. 460 101 Moran v. Higgins, 1 9 Ky. L. R. 456 113 v. P. 163 111. 372 219 v. S. 11 Ohio C. C. 464.. 34 T Moran Bros. Co. v. Snoqualmie Falls Power Co. 29 Wash. 292 25 Moratsky v. Wirth, 74 Minn. 146 20 Morearty v. S. 46 Neb. 652 94 Morehead v. Adajns, 18 Neb. 569 63 Morey v. Laird, 108 Iowa. 670. 134 Morgan v. Hudnell, 52 Ohio St. 552 512 v. Peet, 32 111. ?87 .... 30 v. S. 133 Ala. 18 295 v. S. 51 Neb. 672 196, 2,69, 299 v. S. 48 Ohio 371 115, 119, 720 v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 67 S. W. 420 196 v. S. (Neb.) 93 N. W. 743 20 v. Stone (Neb.) 93 N. W. 743 . 117 v. Wabash R. Co. 159 Mo. 271 641 v. Wattles, 69 Ind. 260.. 172 Moriarty v. S. 62 Miss. 661 19 Morris v. Com. 20 Ky. 402... 255 Morris v. Lachman, 68 Cal. 112. 68 v. Platt, 32 Com. 75.. 48, 245 v. S. 124 Ala. 44 65, 297, 326 v. S. 101 Ind. 562 319 v. S. 39 Tex. Cr. App. 371 191, 318 Morrison v. Northern P. R. Co. (Wash.) 74 Pac. 1066 25, 230 v. S. 42 Fla. 149 4 v. S. 39 Tex. Cr. App. 519. 258 v. S. 41 Tex. 520 317 Morrisson v. S. 76 Ind. 339.. 715 Morrow v. Pullman P. Car Co. (Mo. App.) 73 S. W. 281 129 v. St. Paul C. R. Co. 65 Minn. 382 94 Morse v. Ryland, 58 Kas. 250. 1 v. Weymouth, 28 Vt. 824. 155 Morton v. Gately, 2 111. (1 Scam.) 210 80 v. Harvey, 57 Neb. 304... 195 Mose v. S. 36 Ala, 211 297, 315, 730 Moseley v. S. 36 Tex. Cr. App. 578 Ill, 290 v. Washburn, 165 Mass. 417 35 Mosely v. S. 107 Ala. 74 258 v. Washburn, 167 Mass. 345 113 Mosher v. Rogers, 117 111. 446 65 Moshier y. Kitchell & Arnold, 87 111. 18 284 Mosier v. Stall, 119 Ind. 244. 27 Mount v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co. 76 N. Y. S. 533.... 358 Movar v. Harvey, 125 Mass. 574 249 Mowry v. Stogner, 3 Rich. (S. Car.) 251 160 Mt. Olive v. S. Ooal Co. v. Rademancher, 190 111. 538 104, 284, 382, 649 Mt. Vernor Bank v. Porter, 148 Mo. 176 126 Mueller v. Pels, 192 111. 76... 238 v. Rosen, 179 111. 131.... 104 Muetze v. Tuteur, 77 Wis. 236 191 Muir v. Miller, 82 Iowa. 700. 196 Mullen v. Bower 22 Ind. App. 294 440 TABLE OF CASES. Cl (References are to Sections.} Muller v. Powers, 174 Mass. 555 347 Mullin v. Spangenberg, 112 111. 140 505 Mullinix v. P. 76 111. 211.166, 709 Mullins v. Com. 23 Ky. L. R. 2433 253 v. P. 110 111. 42 115, 299, 322, 744, 745 Mulvihill v. Thompson, 114 Iowa, 734 71 Muncie Natural Gas Co. v. Allison (Ind.) 67 N. E. Ill 20 Muncy v. Mattfield (Tex. Cv. App.) 40 S. W. 345 7 Mundine v. Pauls, 28 Tex. Cv. App. 46 195 Hunger v. Waterloo, 83 Iowa, 562 594 Murchison v. Mansur-Tibbetts Implement Co. (Tex. Cv. App.) 37 S. W. 605 96 Murphy v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 38 Iowa, 539 19 v. Farlow, 124 Ala. 279.. 80 v. Johnson, 4 5 Iowa, 5 7 ... 361 v. Murphy, 95 Iowa, 271. 164 v. P. 37 111. 447 70 v. S. 31 Fla. 166 328 v. S. 36 Tex. Cr. App. 24. 262 v. S. 108 Wis. 111... 336, 337 v. St. Louis Tr. Co. 96 Mo. App. 272 236 Murray v. Board of Comrs. 58 Kas. 1 353 v. Boston Ice Co. 180 Mass. 165 25 v. Burd (Neb.) 91 N. W. 278 53, 70 v. Hudson. 65 Mich. 673.. 658 v. New York, L. & W. R. Co. 103 Pa. St. 37 25 v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 44 S. W. 830 4 Musfelt v. S. 64 Neb. 445 7 Musgrave v. S. 133 Ind. 297.. 30 Musser v. S. 157 Ind. 431.729 760 Muth v. St. Louis T. Co. 94 Mo. App. 94 390. 393. 436, 437 Mutual. &c. Ins. Co. v. Baker, 10 Tex. Cv. App. 515... 6 v. French, 2 Gin. (Ohio) 321 19 v. Miller, 39 Ind. 475 4, 8, 12, 420 Myer v. Mead, 83 111. 19.. 31, 385 v. Milwaukee E. R. Co. (Wis.) 93 N. W. 6 6 v. Myer, 86 111. App. 417. 195 v. Richards, 111 Fed. 296 20 v. Suburban Home Co. 55 N. Y. S. 566 360 Myers v. P. 156 111. 129 331 v. S. 43 Fla. 500 25, 708 v. S. 97 Ga. 76.. 94, 11-7, 224 v. S. (Tex. Cv. App.) 39 S. W. 938 93 v. Taylor, 107 Tenn. 364. 14 v. Walker, 31 111. 353 117 My rick v. Wells, 52 Miss. 149 170 N Nabours v. McCord (Tex. Cv. App.) 75 S. W. 827.... 192 Nappanee Canning Co. v. Reid, &c. Co. 159 Ind. 614 517 Nash v. Mam'stee Lumber Co. 75 Mich. 357 404 Nashville, &c. R. Co. v. Ham- mond, 104 Ala. 191 195 v. Norman, 108 Tenn. 324 00 v. O'Bryan, 104 Tenn. 28. 25 v. Witherspoon (Tenn.) 78 S. W. 1052 106 Nason v. Letz, 73 111. 371 361 National Bank v. Suimmer, 1 1 9 .... N. Car. 591 352 National Bank of Merrill v. Illinois and W. Lumber Co. 107 Wis. 247 7, 20 National Horse Importing Co. v. Novak, 95 Iowa, 596... 236 National L. M. Ins. Co. v. Whitacre (Ind. App.) 43 N. E. 905 236 National Linseed Oil Co. v. Mc- Blaine. 164 111. 597.... 25 National Lumber Co. v. Snell, 47 Ark. 407 34 National Syrup Co. v. Carlson, 155 111. 210 133 Naugher v. S. 116 Ala. 463 68. 227 Navarro v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 43 S. W. 105 255, 269 Nebraska M. M. Ins. Co. v. Sasek. 64 Neb. 17 20 Cll TABLE OF CASES. (References are to Sections.) Nebraska N. Bank v. Burke, 44 Neb. 234 Needham v. King, 95 Mich. 303 v. P. 98 111. 279.. 48, 284, Negley v. Cowell, 91 Iowa, 256 Nehms v. S. 58 Miss. 362 Neiders v. Bell, 174 111. 325.. Neill v: Jordan, 15 Mont. 47.. Neiman v. Schmitker, 181 111. 406 Neininger v. Cowen, 101 Fed. 787 Nelson v. Cottingham, 152 Ind. 135 v. Lake Shore, &c. R. Co. 104 Mich. 587. v. McLennan, 31 Wash. 208 v. S. (N. J.) 35 Atl. 785. v. S. 43 Tex. Cr. App. 553 v. Spears, 16 Mont. 351.. v. Terry (Ky.) 56 S. VV. 672 v. Voree, 55 Ind. 455.... Neufeld v. Roderninski, 144 111. 83 Neville v. Mitchell (Tex. Cv. App.) 66 S. W. 579.... v. S. 133 Ala. 29 Newbold v. Hayward, 96 Md. 247 Newbury v. Getchell & M. L. Mfg. Co. 100 Iowa, 441 New Dxmderberg Minn. Co. v. Old, 97 Fed. 150 Newell v. S. 115 Ala. 54 New England F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Wetmore. 32 111. 221. New England M. S. Co. v. Great W. & E. Co. 6 N. Dak. 407 New Ene. T. & C. Co. v. Cath- olican, 79 Fed. 294 Newman v. Day, 108 Ga. 813. v. Hazelrigg, 96 Ind. 377. v. McComas, 43 Ind. 70.. v. S. 49 Ala. 9 v. Schmilker, 181 111. 406 v. Virginia, &o. Co. 80 Fed. 228 . 56 363 772 94 328 284 244 193 121 47 650 211 295 191 65 244 209 242 355 301 121 86 353 297 80 146 353 356 321 308 318 192 351 New Omaha Thompson-Houston Elec. Light Co. v. John- son (Neb.) 93 N. W. 778 20 v. Rombold (Neb.) 97 N. W. 1030 192 New Orleans R. Co. v. Allbrit- ton, 38 Miss. 242 538 v. Clements, 100 Fed. 415 351 Newport v. S. 140 Ind. 299 70, 191, 206, 227, 253 Newport News & M. V. Co. v. Pace, 158 U. S. 36.... 348 Newton v. Newton, 12 Ind. 527 15 v. S. (Miss.) 12 So. 560. 195 v. S. 37 Ark. 333 113 New York, &c. R. Co. v. Blu- menthal, 160 111. 40 183 v.Jones, 94 Md. 24 195 v. Luebeck, 157 HI. 595 129, 643 v. Thomas, 92 Va. 606 113, 245 New York & T. Land Co. v. Gardner (Tex. Cv. App.) 25 S. W. 737 116 New York Dry Goods Store v. Pabst Brewing Co. 112 Fed. 381 121 New York Fire Ins. Co. v. Walden, 12 Johns (N. Y.) 519 171 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Browns' Adm.r. 23 Ky. L. R. 2070 6 v. Fraser, 130 U. S. 611. 84 Nichol v. Laumeister, 102 Cal. 658 6, 199 Nichols v. Bradley, 78 111. 44. v. Mercer, 44 111. 250 v. Munsel, 115 Mass. 567 v. S. 46 Miss. 284 v. Winfrey, 90 Mo. 407... Nicholson v. Merritt, 23 Ky. L. R. 2281 Nicklaus v. Burns, 75 Ind. 98 63, Nickless v. Pearson, 126 Ind. 477 Nickum v. Gaston, 24 Ore. 380 Nicol v. Crittendon, 55 Ga. Ga. 497 80 78 34 245 475 106 518, 10 351 222 TABLE OF CASES. cm (References are to Sections.) Nighbert v. Hornsby, 100 Term. 82 360 Nilan v. P. 27 Colo. 206.255, 279 Niles v. Sprague, 13 Iowa, 198 187 Nite v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 54 S. W. 763 80 v. S. 41 Tex. Cr. App. 340 304. 462 MX v. Reiss Coal Co. 114 Wis. 493 231 v. S. 97 Ga. 211 299, 318 Nixon v. Jacobs, 22 Tex. Cv. App. 97 7 Noble v. Worthy, 1 Indian Ter. 458 26 Nobles v. S. 98 Ga. 73.... 11 2, 319 Nofsinger v. Goldman, 122 Cal. 609 80 Nome Beach L. & T. Co. v. Munich Assur. Co. 123 Fed. 820 189 Norfleet v. Sigman, 41 Miss. 631 250 Norfolk Beet Sugar Co. v. Hight. 56 Neb. 162.. 94, 119 Norfolk, &c. R. Co. v. Ampsey, 93 Va. 112 617, 624 v. Corletto. 100 Va. 355. 80 v. De Board, 91 Va. 702. 637 v. Poole's Adm'r, 100 Va. 148 198 v. Reeves, 97 Va. 29 589 v. Stevens, 97 Va. 631 84 Norris v. Clinkscales (S. Car.) 22 S. E. 1 130, 172 North v. Mallory, 94 Md. 305 116 Northam v. International Ins. Co. 61 N. Y. S. 45.... 145 Nortli Chicago St. R. Co. v. Boyd. 156 111. 416.. 71, 238 v. Cossar, 203 111. 608.74, 126 v. Dudgeon, 83 111. App. 528 223 v. Eldridge, 151 111. 550 183, 562 v. Fitzgibbons, 180 111. 466 . v. Gastka, 27 111. App. 523 v. Honsinger, 175 111. 318 653 385 196 80 v. Husson. 101 Pa. St. 7. v. Hutchinson, 191 111. 104 63, 382 North Chicago St. R. Co. v. Ir- win, 202 111. 345 80. 530 v. Kaspers, 18G 111. 246 379, 380 v. Louis, 138 111. 12 26a v. Penser, 190 111. 67 238, 363, 551, 629 v. Polkey, 203 111. 232 1, 19, 90 v. Rodert, 203 111. 415... 379 v. Shreve, 171 111. 441 86, 652 v. Wellner, 206 111. 274 215, 365, 370, 379 v. Williams, 140 111. 281. 183 v. Wiswel, 168 111. 613... 133 v. Wrixon, 150 111. 532.. 356 v. Zeigler, 182 111. 13 78 Northern Ohio R. Co. v. Rigby, 69 Ohio, 184 119, 192 Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Bab- cock, 154 U. S. 190.. 25, 92 v. Lynch, 79 Fed. 268 71 v. Poirier, 67 Fed. 881 71 Northwestern Fuel Co. v. Dan- ielson, 57 Fed. 915 196 Norton v. Blinn, 39 Ohio St. 145 528 v. North Carolina R. Co. 122 N. Car. 910 26 Norwood v. S. (Ala.) 24 So. 53 209 Noyes v. Tootle, 48 S.W.I 031 218 Nudd v. Burrows, 91 U. S. 441 189 Nugent v. Brenchard, 157 N. Y. 687 198 v. Brenchard, 36 N. Y. S. 102 198 Nuzum v. S. 88 Ind. 599.168, 169 Nye v. Chase, 139 Mass. 380. 416 v.Kelly, 19 Wash. 73 84 Oberdorfer v. Newberger, 23 Ky. L. R. 2323 8 O'Brien 'v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 92 Wis. 340 133 v. Com. 89 Ky. 354 269 v. Northwestern I. & B. Co. 82 Minn. 136 63 v. P. 48 Barb. (N. Y.) 280 331 O'Callaehan v. Bode. 84 Cal. 489 ... 78 CIV TABLE OF CASES. (References are to Sections.) Och v. Missouri K. & T. R. Co. 130 Mo. 27 93a Oehs v. P. 124 111. 399.. 299, 363 O'Connell v. P. 87 N. Y. 384. 331 v. St. Louis, C. & W. R. Co. 106 Mo. 483 172, 368, 385, 531, 549 v. Samuel, 31 N. Y. S. 889 - 126 O'Connor v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 27 Minn. 166 347 v. S. 28 Tex. App. 288... 290 O'Dea v. S. 16 Neb. 243 858, 859, 860 Odette v. S. 90 Wis. 258 187, 188, 274 O'Donnell v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. (Neb.) 91 N. W. 566 93 v. Rodiger, 76 Ala. 222... 60 O'Driscoll v. Lynn & B. St. R. Co. 180 Mass. 187 8 Offterdinger v. Ford, 92 Va. 644 510 Offutt v. Columbian Exposition, 175 111. 472 120, 121, 122, 126 O'Flaherty v. Mann, 196 111. 304 192 Oftelie v. Town of Hammond, 78 Minn. 275 48 Ogbom v. Hoffman, 52 Ind. 439 404, 451 Oglsby v. Missouri P. R. Co. (Mo.) 37 S. W. 829 106 O'Hara v. Miller, 64 Iowa, 462 479 Ohio, &c. R. Co. v. Buck, 130 Ind. 300 204 v.Cosby, 107 Ind. 35 652 v. Cramker, 132 Ind. 277 220, 367 v.Dunn, 138 Ind. 18 126 v. McCartney, 121 Ind. 385 348 v. Pearcy, 128 Ind. 197 119, 170 v. Stein, 140 Ind. 61 235 v. Voight, 122 Ind. 288... 554 v. Wacker, 113 Ind. 201.. 640 v. Wangslin, 152 111. 141. 183 Ohio & I. Torpedo Co. v. Fish- burn, 61 Ohio St. 608.. 71 Ohlweiler v. Lohlman, 88 Wis. 75 198 Olds v. S. (Fla.) 33 So. 296... 341 Olds Wagon Works v. Coombs, 124 Ind. 62 156, 160 O'Leary v. German A. Ins. Co. 100 Iowa, 390 20 Olferman v. Union D. R. Co. 125 Mo. 408 363 Oliver v. Columbia, N. & L. R. Co. 65 S. Car. 1 213 v. Moore (Tex. Cv. App.) 43 S. W. 812 101 v. Ohio River R. Co. 42 W. Va. 703 80 v. S. 34 Fla. 203 228 v. S. 38 Fla. 46 28 v. S. (Tex. Cv. App.) 42 S. W. 554 110, 215 v. Sterling, 20 Ohio St. 400 48, 238 Olsen v. Oregon, S. L. & U. N. R. Co. 9 Utah, 129 205 Olson v. Oregon, S. L. R. Co. 24 Utah, 460 238 Omaha B. R. Co. v. McDer- mott, 25 Neb. 714 209 Omaha, &c. Asso. v. Missouri, &c. R. Co. 42 Neb. 105 181, 238, 308, 363 Omaha Fire Ins. Co. v. Deirks, 63 Neb. 473 351 Omaha L. & T. Co. v. Douglas Co. 62 Neb. 1 94 Omaha Nat. Bank v. Thomp- son, 39 Neb. 269 48 Omaha, &c. R. & B. Co. v. Lev- ingston, 49 Neb. 17.... 70 Omaha & R. V. R. Co. v. Chol- lette, 33 Neb. 148 561, 562. 570, 582 Omaha St. R. Co. v. Boeson (Neb.) 94 N. W. 619 19, 101, 561 O'Neal v. Curry, 134 Ala. 216 113 O'Neil v. Blase. 94 Mo. App. 648 192. 200 v. Dry Dock, &c. Co. 129 N. Y. 130 17 v. Hanscom, 175 Mass. 313 25 v. Orr, 5 111. (4 Scam.) 3 363 v. S. 48 Ga. 66 294 Ordway v. Sanders, 58 N. H. 132 116 Oregon R. & N. Co. v. Galliber, 2 Wash. Ter. 70 359 TABLE OF CASES. CV (References are to Sections.} O'Reily v. Fitzgerald, 40 111. 310 Orendorff v. Finfronch, 65 111. App. 174 Orne v. Cook, 31 111. 238 O'Rourke v. Vennekohl, 104 Cal. 254 Orr v. Cedar R. & M. R. Co. 94 Iowa, 423 v. S. (Miss.) 18 So. 118. Orth v. Clutz*s Adm'r, 18 B. Mon. (Ky.) 223 Ortwein v. Com. 76 Pa. St. 414 331, Osborne v. Ringland (Iowa) 98 N. W. 116 v. Simmerson, 73 Iowa, 513 v. S. 125 Ala. 106... 218. Ostrander v. Scott, 161 111. 345 Otmer v. P. 76 111. 149 78, 308. O'Toole v. Post P. Pub. Co. 179 Pa. St. 271 Ottawa Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Graham, 28 111. 73.. Ously v. Hardin, 23 111. 353.. Over v. Schiffling, 102 Ind. 194 Overall v. Armstrong (Tex. Cv. App.) 25 S. W. 440... Owen v. Brown, 70 Vt. 521 348, v. Long, 97 Wis. 78 7, v. Palmour, 111 Ga. 885.. v. Phillips, 73 Ind. 287. .. v. S. 78 Ala. 425 Owens v. Callaway, 42 Ala. 301 v. S. 80 Miss. 499... 288, v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. App. 345 v. S. 39 Tex. Cr. App. 391 223 117 22 238 296 197 334 6 472 221 404 729 6 182 476 27 192 841 195 208 679 318 361 368 110 193 P. Ft. W. & C. R. Co. v. Probst, 30 Ohio St. 106 351 Pace v. Harris, 97 Ga. 357... 126 v. Payne, 73 Ga. 675 360 v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 31 S. W. 173 103, 289 Pacific M. L. Ins. Co. v. Fisher, 109 Cal. 566 141 v. Walker, 67 Ark. 147.. 195 Packer v. Thompson-Houston E. Co. 175 Mass. 496.. 113 Padbury v. Metropolitan St. R. Co. 75 N. Y. S. 952 133 Padfield v. P. 146 111. 663.. 105, 226 Padgett v. Jacobs, 128 Mich. 632 78 v. Sweeting, 65 Md. 405 498 Padron v. S. 41 Tex. Cr. App. 548 Page v. Shainwald, 65 N. Y. S. 174 326 146 v. S. 141 Ind. 236 260, 802 Pahlman v. King, 49 111. 269 243 Paine v. Incorporated Town, &c. 103 Iowa, 481 6 Painter v. P. 147 111. 444.. 20, 719 Palm v. Chernowsky, 28 Tex. Civ. App. 405 200 Palmer v. First Nat. Bank of Ulysses (Neb.), 81 N. W. 303 356 v. Marshall, 60 111. 292.. 417 v. S. (Neb.) 97 N. W. 235 227 v. S. 9 Wyo. 40 247 v. Smith "(Conn.), 56 Atl. 516 7 Palmore v. S. 29 Ark. 248.. 11, 60 Palnode v. Westenhaver, 114 Wis. 460 231 Pannell v. Com. 86 Pa. St. 260 211 Panton v. P. 114 111. 509.. 251, 773 Paragon Paper Co. v. S. 19 Ind. App. 328 853 Paris v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 31 S. W. 855 110 Parish v. Williams (Tex. Cv. App.), 53 S. W. 79.... 6 Park v. Chicago, &c. R. Co. 43 Iowa, 636 679 Parker v. Chancellor, 78 Tex. 524 43, 101 v. Fisher, 39 111. 164 105 v. Hastings, 123 N. Car. 671 93 v. National M. B. & L. Asso. (W. Va.) 46 S. E. 811 80 v. P. 97 111. 32 55 v. S. 136 Ind. 284 361, 328, 743 v. S. 40 Tex. Cr. App. 119 2, 68 v. S. 43 Tex. Cr. App. 526 191 v. Taylor (Neb.), 91 N. W. 537 85 CV1 TABLE OF CASES. (References are to Sections. J Parker v. Wells (Neb.) 94 N. W. 717 Parkins v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. (Neb.) 93 N. W. 197 7, 90, Parkinson v. Concord St. R. Co. 71 N. H. 28 Parks v. Gulf, C. S. & F. R. Co. (Tex. Cv. App.) 30 S. W. 708 v. S. 105 Ga. 242 265, v. St. Louis & S. R. Co. (Mo.) 77 S. W. 70 .... Parman v. Kansas City (Mo.) 78 S. W. 1046 Parmlee v. Adolph, 20 Ohio St. 10 1 Parmley v. Farrar, 169 111. 607 Parr v. S. 36 Tex. Cr. App. 493 Parrish v. S. 14 Neb. 61 1, Parsons v. S. 81 Ala. 577.. 329, Partin v. Com. 17 Ky. L. R. 499 Partridge v. Cutter, 168 111. 504 56, 118, 119, Pate v. P. 8 111. ( Gilm.) 661 v. S. 94 Ala. 14, 18 322, 328, v. Wight 30 Ind. 476 Patee v. Adams, 37 Kas. 135 .. Patterson v. Inclined P. R. Co., 12 Ohio Cir. 280 v. Mills, 48 N. Y. S. 781 v. S. 75 Miss. 670 v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 29 S. W. 272 Patzwald v. U. S. 7 Okla. 232 Paul v. S. 100 Ala. 136 v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 45 S. W. 725 Paulin v. Howser, 63 111. 312 Payne v. Com. 1 Mete. (Ky.) 370 v. Crawford, 102 Ala. 387 v. McCormick, &c. Co., 11 Okla. 318 Payne Clothing Co. v. Payne (Ky.) 54 R. W. 709.... Paynter v. Com. 21 Ky. L. R. 1562 80 206 35 65 273 196 6 , 48 250 290 165 331 358 247 48 340 41 513 563 80 358 297 221 304 80 253 48 247 126 268 Peak v. P. 76 111. 289 219 Pearce v. Boggs, 99 Cal. 340.. 163 v. Strickler, 9 N. Mex. 467 20 Pearson v. Spartenberg Co. 51 S. Car. 480 6, 350, 351 Peart v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 8 S. Dak. 431.. 32 Pease Piano Co. v. Cameron, 56 Neb. 561 84, 351 Pecha v. Kastl,64 Neb. 380.. 25 Peck v. Boggess, 2 111. 285 .. 347 v. St. Louis Tr. Co. (Mo.) 77 S. W. 736 199,562 Peirce v. Walters, 164 111. 561 124, 149 Pelfrey v. Texas C. R. Co. (Tex. Cv. App.) 73 S. W. 411 25 Pellum v. S. 89 Ala. 28 324 Peltier v. Chicago, St. P. M. & O. R. Co., 88 Wis. 521.. 200 Pena v. S. 38 Tex. Cr. App. 333 280 Pence v. Makepeace, 65 Ind. 357 424 v. Wabash R. Co. 116 Iowa 279 85, 238 Pendleton St. R. Co. v. Stell- .man, 22 Ohio St. 1. 243,247 Pennsylvania Co. v. Backes. 133 111. 264 53, 101, 126 v. Bray, 125 Ind. 932 573 v. Conlan, 101 111. 106.133,183 v. Connell, 127 111. 419.... 81 v. Files, 65 Ohio St. 403 57 v. Frana, 13 111. App. 91 161 v. Frana, 112 111. 404 117a v. France, 112 111. 398.. 155 v. Gallagher, 40 Ohio St. 637 637 v. Harris, 101 Pa. St. 93 116 v. Horton, 132 Ind. 194 627, 644 v. Hunsley, 23 Ind. App. 37 215, 216 v. Langendorf, 48 Ohio St. 321 647 v. McCaffrey, 173 111. 175 .' 183 v. McCormack, 131 Ind. 250 617, 618. 622 TABLE OF CASES. CV11 (References are to Sections.} Pennsylvania Co. v. Marshall, 119 111. 404 33, 48, 56, 382, 650 v. Martin, 114 Fed. 586 126 v. Miller, 35 Ohio St. 543, 535 v. Platt, 47 Ohio St. 382 868 v. Rossman, 13 Ohio C. U. Ill 7 v. Roy, 102 U. S. 155.. 84, 579 v. Rudel, 100 111. 609.. 26a v. Sloetke, 104 111. 201.. 116 v. Versten, 140 111. 637 26a, 223 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Kelly, 150 111. 9 236 Penobscot R. Co. v. White, 41 Me. 512 80 Penso v. McCormick, 125 Ind. 116 537 People v. Abbott, 116 Mich. 263 773 v. Ahern, 93 Cal. 518 .... 294 v. Ah Fong, 12 Cal. 345. . 4 v. Ah Fung, 17 Cal. 377.. 19 v. Ah Sing, 51 Cal. 372.. 394 v. Ah Sing, 95 Cal. 654 219 v. Aiken, 66 Mich. 460 312, 734 v. Allender, 117 Cal. 81 333, 754 v. Alton, 193 111. 309.... 153 v. Amaya, 134 Cal. 531.180, 214 v. A m erman 118 Cal. 23 152, 299 v. Anderson, 105 Cal. 32.70,71 v. Anthony, 56 Cal. 397 312, 315, 733, 734 v. Appleton, 120 Cal. 250. 7 v. Arlington, 131 Cal. 231 219, 336 v. Armstrong, 114 Cal. 570 71 v. Arnold, 116 Cal. 682... 274 v.Arnold, 40 Mich. 715.. 228 v. Arnold, 46 Mich. 268.. 760 v. Ashmead, 118 Cal. 508.. 31 v. Baker, 153 N. Y. 111.. 294 v. Barberi, 149 N. Y. 256. 360 v. Barker, 60 Mich. 277.. 318 v. Barney, 114 Cal. 554.. 274 v. Barrie, 49 Cal. 342 318 v. Bartheman, 120 Cal. 7 25, 63, 335 v. Beeler, 6 Cal 246 4 v. Bell, 49 Cal. 489 343 v. Bellamy, 109 Cal. 610.. 315 People v. Bemmerly, 87 Cal. 121 295 v. Benham, 160 N. Y. 402 40, 297 v. Bennett, 121 Mich. 241. 247 v. Bennett, 49 N. Y. 137. 150 v. Berlin, 10 'Utah 39 353 v. Bernal, 10 Cal. 66.... 225 v. Beverly, 108 Mich. 509. 269 v. Board, &c. of Madison County, 125 111. 340 126 v. Bodley, 131 Cal. 240.. 301 v. Bonney, 98 Cal. 278 288 v. Bowers, (Cal.) 18 Pac. 660 336 v. Bowkus, 109 Mich. 360 194, 195 v. Brannon, 47 Cal. 96 925 v. Britton, 118 Cal. 409 240, 409 v. Brooks, 61 Hun (N. Y.) 344 v. Brow, 35 N. Y. S. 1009 171, 210, 212 v. Brown, 59 Cal. 345 11 v. Buddensieck, 103 N. Y. 487 352 v. Burgle, 123 Cal. 303.71, 334 v. Burns, 63 Cal. 614 284 v. Burns, 121 Cal. 529.300,304 v. Byrnes, 30 Cal. 206.. 3, 7 v. Caasata, 39 N. Y. S. 641 201 v. Caldwell, 107 Mich. 374 115, 347 v. Calvin, 60 Mich. 114 214, 227 v. Carey, 125 Mich. 535.. 208 v. Carpenter, 102 N. Y. 238 329 v. Carroll, 92 Cal. 568... 65 v. Casey, 53 Cal. 392 34 T v. Casey, 65 Cal. 260 170 v. Chadwick, 7 Utah 134 265, 290, 816 v. Charles, 26 Cal. 78 34 v. Chartoff, 75 N. Y. S. 1088 296, 309 v. Chaves, 122 Cal. 134 25, 42, 275 v. Chavez, 103 Cal. 407.. 268 v. Cheong Toon Ark, 61 Cal. 527 294 v. Chew Sing Wing, 88 Cal. 288 208 v. Chun Heong, 86 Cal. 329 203, 237, 253 CY111 TABLE OF CAS1-.S. (References are to Sections.) People v. Church, 116 Cal. 300. 267 v. Clark 105 Mich. 169.115,223 v. Clarke, 130 Cal. 642... 315 v. Comgus, 114 Cal. 107 .. 89 v. Compton (Cal.) 56 Pac. 44 | 217 v. Connelly (Cal.) 38 Pac. 42 ..... Ill v. Considine, 105 Mich. 149. 48 v. Corey, 157 N. Y. 332.. 191 v. Costello, 1 Denio (N. Y.) 87 288 v. Cotta, 49 Cal. 116 192 v. Coughlin, 65 Mich. 704.. 336 v. Crawford, 48 Mich. 498. 60 v. Cronin, 34 Cal. 191.215,307 v. Crotty, 47 N. Y. S. 845. 191 v. Curry, 103 Cal. 548.... 227 v. Davis, 47 Cal. 93 31 v. Davis, 64 Cal. 440 315 v.Davis, 135 Cal. 162 297 v. Daniels, 105 Cal. 362... 150 v. Daniels (Cal.) 34 Pac. 233 303, 306 v. De Garmo, 76 N. Y. S. 477 273 v. De La Cour Soto, 63 Cal. 165 340 v. Devine, 95 Cal. 227 80 v. Dick, 32 Cal. 216 198, 310, 326 v. Dippold, 51 N. Y. S. 859 340- v. Dole, 122 Cal. 486.. 301, 310 v. Dom Pedro, 43 N. Y. S. 44 198 v. Donlan, 135 Cal. 489... 754 v. Don Pedro, 43 N. Y. S. 44 340 v. Doyell, 48 Cal. 85 191 v. Elliott, 163 N. Y. 11 343, 757 v. Elmer, 109 Mich. 493.. 152 v. Enwright, 134 Cal. 527. 264 v. Eubanks, 117 Cal. 652.. 52 v. Ezzo, 104 Mich. 341.. 6, 295 v. Fasan, 66 Cal. 534 266 v. Fairchild, 48 Mich. 37 .. 312 v. Fanning, 131 N. Y. 663. 119 v. Feliz, 136 Cal. 19 326 v. Ferraro, 161 N. Y. 365.. 170 v. Ferry, 84 Cal. 31 227 v. Fice, 97 Cal. 460 6 v. Fish, 125 N. Y. 136.... 281 People v. Fitzgerald, 46 N. J. L. 1020 229 v. Fitzgerald, 156 N. Y. 253 229 v. Flaherty, 162 N. Y. 532 82 v. Flannelly, 128 Cal. 83 173 238 v. Flynn, 73 Cal. 511....'. 229 v. Foley, 64 Mich. 148 211 v. Fong Ah Sing, 64 Cal. 253 743 v. Forsythe, 65 Cal. 102 .. 741 v. Friedland, 37 N. Y. S. 974 295 v. Fuhrmann, 103 Mich. 593 269 v. Garbutt, 17 Mich. 25.14, 331 v. Gilmore (Cal.) 53 Pac. 806 21 v. Gleason, 122 Cal. 370... 342 v. Glover (Cal.) 74 Pac. 749 70 v. Goodrode (Mich.) 94 N. W. 14 244 v. Gorman, 83 Hun, 605... 208 Graney, 91 Mich. 646 .. 336 Guidici 100 N. Y. 503 295 Hall, 94 Cal. 595 . . 30 Hancock, 7 Utah, 170.. 340 Harlan, 133 Cal. 16 27 Harper, 83 Mich. 273... 337 Harris, 103 Mich. 473.. 268 Harrison, 93 Mich. 597. 343 Hartman, 130 Cal. 487. 48 Hawes, 98 Cal. 648 115 Hecker, 109 Cal. 451... 297 Henderson, 28 Cal. 465. 284 Hendrickson, 46 N. Y. S. 402 276 v. Herrick, 52 Cal. 446... 295 v. Hertz, 105 Cal. 660 172, 195, 214, 226 V. Httick, 126 Cal. 425.. 25 v. Hill, 116 Cal. 562 301 v. Hill, 123 Cal. 47....... 281 v. Hillick, 126 Cal. 425.... 331 v. Hinshaw (Mich.) 97 N. W. 758 !> v. Hitchcock, 104 Cal. 482 172, 214, 226- v. Hoagland, 137 Cal. 218. 341 v. Hoch, 150 N. Y. 291... 22 Wheatley v. Philadelphia. W. & B. R. Co. 1 Marv. (Del.) 305 126 Wheeler v. Baars, 33 Fla. 696. 177 TABLE OF CASES. cxlix (References are to Sections.) Wheeler v. Grand T. R. Co. 70 N. H. 607 25 v. S. 114 Ala. 22 82 v. S. 158 Ind. 687 21, 65, 85, 264, 747, 781 v. S. 42 Md. 563 168 v. S. 76 Miss. 265 . .. 80 v. Schroeder, 4 R. I. 383 174, 181 v.Thomas, 67 Conn. 577 186, 188 Whelan v. Kinsley, 26 Ohio St. 137 48 Wheschel v. Gainesville & D. E. R. Co. 116 Ga. 431 355 Whelpley v. Stroughton, 119 Mich. 314 70 Whipple v. Preece, 18 Utah, 454 199 v. Preece, 24 Utah, 364... 350 Whitaker v. Engle, 111 Mich. 205 24 v. S. 106 Ala. 30 297, 360 Whitcomb v. S. 30 Tex. Cv. App. 269 275, 284 White v. Blum, 79 Fed. 271... 120 v.Bryan, 96 Iowa, 166... 236 v. Cole, 20 Ky. 858 6 v. Dinkins, 19 Ga. 285 102 v. Epperson (Tex. Cr. App.) 73 S. W. 851 113 v. Ferris, 124 Ala. 461 200 v. Harris, 206 111. 596 65 v. Hoster B. Co. 51 W. Va. 259 126 v. McCracken, 60 Ark. 619. 3 v. McPherson, 183 Mass. 533 119 v. New York, C. & S. L. R. Co. 142 Tnd. 654 ,...70, 367 v. Ross, 35 Fla. 377 243 v. S. Ill Ala. 92 68. 115 v. S. 133 Ala. 122. .49. 85. 88, 211, 297 v. S. 153 Ind. 689 119 v. S. 52 Miss. 216 219 v. S. 21 Tex. App. 339.265,816 v. S. 32 Tex. Cr. App. 625. 304 v. S. 34 Tex. Cr. App. 153 240 v. S. 42 Tex. Cr. App. 567. 290 v. Smith, 54 Iowa, 237.... 522 v. Ter. 3 Wash. Ter. 397.. 319 v. Thomas, 39 111. 227.397. 400 v. U. S. 164 U. S. 100.... 342 White y. Van Horn, 159 U. S. 1 .................... v. Walker, 31 111. 422.. 109, White, Kingsland Mfg. Co. v. Herdrich, 98 111. App. 607 Whitehead & A. M. Co. v. Ry- der, 139 Mass. 366...".. Whitehouse v. Bolster, 95 Md. 458 .................. Whitford v. Inhabitants, 119 Mass. 571 ......... 594, Whiting v. Carpenter (Neb.) 93 N. W. 926 ............. Whitman v. S. 42 Neb. 841 ____ Whitney v. Cook, 53 Miss. 531. v. S. 154 Ind. 573 25, 196, 198, Whitney S. Co. v. O'Rourke, 172 ill. 177 ..... 25, 76, 238, Whitten v. S. 115 Ala. 72 ..... Whittlesey v. Burlington, C. R. & N. R. Co. (Iowa) 90 N. W. 516 ............. Wiborg v. U. S. 163 U. S. 632 189, Wickham v. Wolcott (Neb.) 95 N. W. 366 ............. Wier Plow Co. v. Walmsley, 110 Ind. 242 ........ ....... Wiggins v. Holley, 11 Ind. 5... v. S. 103 Ga. 559 ......... Wilber v. Wilber, 129 111. 392 195, 250, Wilber Lumber Co. v. Overbeck Bros. Mfg. Co. 96 Wis. 383 ................... Wilbur v. Stoepel, 82 Mich. 344 Wilcox v. Hines, 100 Tenn. 524. v. Kinzie, 4 111. (3 Scam.) 218 v. McCune, 21 Iowa, 294 .. v. S. 94 Tenn. 106 ........ v. Willmington R. Co. 2 Pen. (Del.) 157 ............. Wildey v. Crane, 69 Mich. 17.. Wildman v. S. (Ala.) 35 So. 995 .................. 25 Wi'lev v. Man-a-to-wah, 6 Kas. ' 195 454 v. S. 5 Baxt. (Tenn.) 662.. Wilkerson v. S. 103 Iowa, 6 ---- v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 57 S. W. 956 ........... 112, 41 361 117 606 58 266 153 240 359 281 70 196 7 301 657 80 696 142 53 203 192 361 223 120 199 , 80 197 326 269 196 el TABLE OF CASES. (References are to Sections.) Wilkins v. S. 35 Tex. Cv. App. 525 269 Wilkinson v. St. Louis S. D. Co. 102 Mo. 130 34 Willard v. Petitt, 153 111. 663.. 347 v. Swansen, 126 111. 384.. 238 v. Williams (Colo.) 50 Pac 207 7 Williams v. Andrew, 185 111. 98 80 v.Atkinson, 152 Ind. 98.. 84 v. Avery, 131 N. Car. 188. 80 v. Barrett, 52 Iowa, 638 348, 349 v. Belmont Coal &C. Co. (W. Va.) 46 S. E. 802 126 v. Casebeer, 126 Cal. 86... 351 v. Chapman, 160 Ind. 130 346 v. City of West Bay, 119 Mich. 395 210 v. Com. 80 Ky. 315.. 348, 349 v. Com. 85 Va. 607 17 v. Dickenson, 28 Fla. 90... 170 v. Finley, 40 Ohio St. 342. 162 v. Hoehle, 95 Wis. 510 199, 200 v. La Penatiere, 32 Fla. 491 177 v. Miller, 2 Lea (Tenn.) 406 14 V. P. 164 111. 481 9, 196, 198, 336 v. P. 166 111. 136 299, 342 v. S. 44 Ala. 396 815 v. S. 81 Ala. 1 112 v. S. 130 Ala. 107 49 v. S. 50 Ark. 511 211 v. S. 46 Neb. 704 113, 170, 175, 192 v. S. 73 Miss. 820 296 'v. S. 42 Tex. 392 292 v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. App. 606. 339 v. S. 37 Tex. Cr. App. 147. 318 v. S. 38 Tex. Cr. App. 144. 275 v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 40 S. W. 801 215 v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 45 S. W. 494 304 v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 55 S. W. 500 71 v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 65 S. W. 1059 198 v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 69 S. W. 415 258 Williams v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. 123 Mo. 573 45 v. Southern P. R. Co. 110 Cal. 457 94, 248 v. Watcon, 71 111. App. 180. 86 Williamson v. Gore (lex. Cv. App.) 73 S. W. 563 7 v. Toby, 86 Cal. 497 28 v. Tyson, 105 Ala. 644 113, 195 Willingham v. S. 130 Ala. 35.. 113 Willis v. Branch, 94 N. Car. 142 174 v. Chowning, 90 Tex. 617.. 200 v. Hudson, 72 Tex. 598 192 v. Locket (Tex. Cv. App.) 26 S. W. 419 8 v. S. 134 Ala. 429 66, 195 v. S. 89 Ga. 188 34 v, S. 27 Neb. 98 361 v. S. 43 Neb. 102.716, 718,722 Willoughby v. Northeastern R. Co. 52 S. Car. 166.. 242, 351 Wills v. Hardcastle, 19 Pa. Super Ct. 525 351 v. Lance, 28 Ore. 371 19] v. Tanner, 19 Ky. L. R. 795 355 Willson v. Whitefield, 38 Ga. 269 158 Wilson v. Board, &c. 63 Mo. 142 159 v. Commercial Union Ins. Co. 15 S. Dak. 322 3, 146 v. Coulter, 51 N. Y. S. 804 219 v. Crosby, 109 Mich. 449.. 192 v. Huguenin, 117 Ga. 546 119, 192, 199 v. Marvin-Rulofson Co. 201 Pa. St. 29 . . 49 v. P. 94 111. 327 243 v. S. 68 Ga. 827 37 v. S. 71 Miss. 880. ..179, 288 v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 34 S. W. 284 193 v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 36 S. W. 587 113 v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 73 S. W. 964 268 v. S. 37 Tex. Cr. App. 156 6, 35 v. White, 71 Ga. 507 45 v. White, 80 N. Car. 280.. 113 v. Williams, 52 Miss. 487.. 172 TABLE OF CASES. cli (References are to Sections.} Wimberly v. S. (Ga.) 31 S. E. 102 320 Wimbish v. Hamilton, 47 La. Ann. 246 . 26, 351 Winchester v. Carroll, 97 Va. 727 247 v. Charter, 102 Mass. 273. 517 Winfield v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 72 S. W. 182 291 Winfrey v. S. 41 Tex. Cr. App. 539 109 Winkler v. Winkler (Tex. Cv. App.) 26 S. W. 893 172 \Y T inkles v. S. 114 Ga. 449 284 Winn v. Sanborn, 10 S. Dak. 642 6 Winne v. Hammond, 37 111. 99. 86 Winstandley v. Breyfogle, 148 Ind. 618 47 Winter v. S. 133 Ala. 176 68, 191, 223, 299 v. Supreme Lodge K. P. 96 Mo. App. 67 171 v. Supreme Lodge K. P. 101 Mo. App. 550 80 v. Williamsbaugh S. Bank, 74 N. Y. S. 140 146 Winters v. Mowrer, 163 Pa. St. 239 . . . .: 172 v. S. 37 Tex. Cr. App. 582. 258 Wintz v. Morrison, 17 Tex. 387 197 Wisconsin Cent. R. Co. v. Ross, 142 111. 9 133 Wisdom v. P. 11 Colo. 170.288,324 v. Reeves, 110 Ala. 418... 80 Wissler v. Atlantic (Iowa) 98 N. W. 131 119 Wiswell v. Doyle, 160 Mass. 44 536 Witsell v. West Ashville R. Co. 120 N. Car. 557 232, 350 Wittenberg v. Mollyneaux, 59 Neb. 203 6 Wittleder v. Citizens' Elec. 111. Co. 62 N. Y. S. 297 27 Wohlford v. P. 148 111. 301 153, 166 Wolcott v. Heath, 78 111. 433.. 182 Wolf v. Hemrich Bros. Brew. Co. 28 Wash. 187 25 v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 53 S. W. 108 304 v. Troxell, 94 Mich. 575.. 415 Wolf v. Van Housen, 55 111. App. 295 200 v. Wolf, 158 Pa. St. 621.. 247 Wolfe v. Pugh, 109 Ind. 309.. 243 v. S. 25 Tex. App. 698 220 Wolff Mfg. Co. v. Wilson, 152 111. 9 231 Wollf v. Van Housen, 55 111. App. 295 200 Wonderly v. Nokes, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 589 502 Wood v. Collins, 111 Ga. 32.. 6 v. Long I. R. Co. 159 N. Y. 546 7 v. S. 64 Miss. 761 17 v. Steinau, 9 S. Dak. 110.. 195 v. Wells, 103 Mich. 320... 347 Woodbury v. S. 69 Ala. 242... 117 Woodman v. Chesney, 39 Me. 45 155 v. Town of Northwood, 67 N. H. 307 50 Woodmen, &c. v. Locklin, 28 Tex. Cv. App. 486 8, 230 Woodruff v. Hensley, 26 Ind. App. 592 . . ." 53 v. King, 47 Wis. 261 34,37 Woods v. Berry, 7 Mont. 201.. 348 v. Long Island R. Co. 42 N. Y. S. 140 7 v. S. 81 Miss. 408 118 Woodworth v. Parrott, 48 Neb. 675 26 Woolen v. Whitacre, 91 Ind. 502 216 v. Wire, 100 Ind. 251 232 Wooley v. Lyon, 117 111. 244.. 110 Woolsey v. Lake Shore, &c. R. Co. 33 Ohio St. 227 611 v. Lasher, 54 N. Y. S. 737. 340 v. Trustees of Village, 155 N. Y. 573 84 Wool weaver v. S. 50 Ohio St. 287 792 Wooten v. S. 99 Tenn. 189 261. 283 Wooters v. King, 54 111. 343 80 Worden v. Humeston & S. R. Co. 72 Iowa, 201 56 v. S. 24 Ohio St. 143 192 Workingmen's Banking Co. v. Blell, 57 Mo. App. 410.. 132 World M. B. Asso. v. Worthing, 59 Neb. 587 351 clii TABLE OF CASES. (References are to Sections.) Worswick v. Hunt, 106 Ala. 559 195 Worthan v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 65 S. W. 526 55 Worthington v. Yormey, 34 Md. 185 438, 441 Wragge v. S. Car. & G. R. Co. (S. Car.) 25 S. E. 76 45 Wray v. Tindall, 45 Ind. 517.. 385 Wreggitt v. . Barnett, 99 Mich. 477 198 Wright v. Brosseau, 73 111. 381. 45 v. Cincinnati St. R. Co. 9 Ohio C. C. 503 8 v. Com. 85 Ky. 123 215 v. Griffey, 146 111. 394 361 v. Hardie (Tex. Cv. App.) 30 S. W. 675 93 196 v. S. 69 Ind. 165 154, 294 Wright Fire P. Co. v. Poezekai, 130 111. 139 129 Wright Investment Co. v. Fris- coe, &c. Co. (Mo.) 77 S. W. 296 415 Wrigley v. Comelins, 162 111. 92 25 Wrisley v. Burke, 203 111. 259 20, 652, 653 Wrought Iron B. Co. v. Commis- sioners, 101 111. 522 47 Wry v. Wry, 33 Ala. 187 330 Wunderlich v. Palatine Ins. Co. 115 Wis. 509 26 Wylie v. Commercial & F. Bank, 63 S. Car. 406 191 Wyman v. Turner, 14 Ind. App. 118 . . 119 Yale v. Newton, 130 Mich. 434 244 Yankton F. Ins. Co. v. Freemont E. & M. V. R. Co. 7 S. Dak. 428 136 Yarborough v. S. 86 Ga. 396... 171 v. Weaver, 6 Tex. Cv. App. 215 28 Yarbrough v. S. 105 Ala. 43... 723 v. S. 115 Ala. 92 88, 297 Yates v. U. S. 90 Fed. 57 347, 361, 362 Yazoo, &c. R. Co. v. Smith (Mass.) 35 So. 168 106 Yeomans v. C. S. N. Co. 44 Cal. 81 580 v. Page, 98 111. App. 288.. 80 Yerkes v. Northern P. R. Co. 112 Wis. 184 74 Yetter v. Zurick, 55 Minn. 452. 199 Yoacham v. McCurdy, 27 Tex. Cv. App. 183 191 Yoakum v. Kelly (Tex. Cv. App.) 30 S. W. 836 25 Yoe v. McCord, 74 111. 40. .695, 705 Yontz v. Com. 23 Ky. L. R. 1868 85, 288 Yore v. Mueller Coal H. H. & T. Co. 147 Mo. 679 14 York v. Maine C. R. Co. 84 Me. 128 119 York County, &c. Ins. Co. v. Brooks, 51 Me. 506 415 York Park .Bldg. Asso. v. Barns, 39 Neb. 834 355 Young v. Alford, 118 N. Car. 215 86 v. Com. 19 Ky. L. R. 929.. 259 v. Com. 16 Ky. 496 268 v. Hahn (Tex.'Cv. App.) 69 S. W. 203 38 v. Jeffreys, 20 N. Car. 220 157 v. Market, 163 Pa. St. 513 101 v. P. 193 111. 236 73 v. S. 95 Ga. 456 313 v. S. 34 Tex. Cr. App. 290 103 v. Sage, 42 Neb. 37 25 v. Town of Macomb, 42 N. Y. S. 351 12 v. West Va. C. & P. R. Co. 42 W. Va. 112 144 Youngstown Bridge Co. v. Barnes, 98 Tenn. 401 7 Yundt v. Hartrunft, 41 111. 16 175, 218, 219, 238, 874 Zehner v. Kepler, 16 Ind. 290.. 84 Zeigler v. Pennsylvania Co. 63 111. App. 410 129 TABLE OF CASES. cliii (References are to Sections.) Zenor v. Johnson, 107 Ind. 69 156, 160, 319 Zibbell v. City of Grand Rapids, 129 Mich. 659 192 Zimmer v. Third Ave. R. Co. 55 N. Y. S. 308 70 Zimmerman v. Brannon, 163 Iowa, 144 238 Zimmerman v. Kearney County Bank (Neb.) 91 N. W. 497 126 v. Knox, 34 Kas. 245 80 Zimmerson v. S. 133 Ala. 18.. 295 Zook v. Simonson, 72 Ind. 88 415, 416 THE LAW OF INSTRUCTIONS. CHAPTER I. PURPOSE AND PREPARATION. Sec. Sec. 1. Object and office of instruc- 26a. tions. 2. Propriety of giving instruc- 26b. tions. 3. Court instructing of its own 27. motion. 28. 4. Written instructions required. 5. Oral charge taken down by 29. stenographer. 6. Party must request written in- 30. structions. 7. Specific instructions must be 31. requested. 32. 8. Neither party requesting, ef- 32a. feet. 33. 9. Must request in criminal cases. 34. 10. Presumed in writing When. 11. Written and oral charge. 35. 12. Waiving written instructions. 13. Exceptions to oral charges. 36. 14. Time of requesting Rule of court. 37. 15. Time of requesting Too late. 16. Error to refuse instruction 38. When. 17. Court may give time. 39. 18. Court's power to make rules. 40. 19. Too many instructions. 20. Repeating generally not re- 41. quired. 21. Repeating on preponderance 42. Reasonable doubt. 22. Repeating in detail Words, 43. phrases. 23. Repeating As to defense. 44. 24. Repeating As to witnesses. 25. Repeating Request substan- 45. tially given by others. 26. Repeating When, general and 46. special charge. 47. Repetition when evidence is close. Court may refuse all instruc- tions. Defective instructions refused. Clauses or paragraphs defect- ive. Incomplete instruction defect- ive. Modifying defective instruc- tions. Modifying correct instruction. In language of request. Modifying in criminal cases. Changing to conform to issues. Further instructions after jury retires. Further instructions in absence of counsel. Further instructions in absence of defendant. Instructing further on other points. Recalling jury for further in- structions. Judge calling on jury Effect. -Withdrawing erroneous instruc- tions Amending. Rulings and remarks not in- structions. Directions as to form of ver- dict. Signing and numbering in- structions. Marking "given," "refused" ' Effect. Marking for plaintiff Under- scoring. Court's manner of charging jury. Trial by court Jury waived. 1 PURPOSE AND PREPARATION. 2 1. Object and office of instructions. The object of instruc- tions is to inform the jury what are the precise principles or rules of law applicable to the evidence in the case, 1 and to ex- plain the issues that the jury may have a clear understanding of their duty in reaching a verdict. 2 Instructions should there- fore be clear and simple, and consist of a plain statement of the law applicable to the evidence or facts in the case; and they should be couched in such terms that they may be readily under- stood by ordinary men acting as jurors. 3 The instructions given should not only be correct, but so ex- plicit as not to be misleading or misconstrued. 4 In other words, the instructions given should be in plain English, and should avoid as far. as posible the use of technical terms. 5 The safer course is to draw them in the language of the approved and well settled forms; 6 and each party should see that his own instruc- tions are properly drawn. 7 2. Propriety of giving instructions. The propriety of giv- ing or refusing instructions must always be determined by the facts in the particular case. Hence it frequently happens that an instruction may be entirely proper in one case and erroneous in another, although the two cases may be similar in many re- spects ; but a different element may be found in one not entering into the other which would require the giving of different in- structions in the two cases. 8 iMontag v. P. 141 111. 81, 30 N. Newell, 62 111. 196, 202; Peri v. P. E. 337; Lehman v. Hawks, 121 Ind. 65 111. 26; Smith v. City of Sioux 541, 23 N. E. 670; Lander v. P. 104 City (Iowa) 93 N. W. 81. See gen- Ill. 248; Dodd v. Moore, 91 Ind. erally: Hyde v. Shank, 77 Mich. 523; McCallister v. Mount, 73 Ind. 517, 43 N. W. 890; Trinity & S. R. 567; Thork v. Goewy, 85 111. 616; Co. v. Schofield, 72 Tex. 496, 10 S. Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Murray, W. 575; Loeb v. Weis, 64 Ind. 285; 62 111. 326, 331; S. v. Stout, 49 Ohio Goffney v. St. Paul City R. Co. 81 St. 282, 30 N. E. 437; Crane Co. v. Minn. 459; Parmlee v. Adolk, 28 Tierney, 175 111. 82, 51 N. E. 715; Ohio St. 13; Aikin v. Weckerly, Chicago, &c. A. R. Co. v. Utley, 19 Mich. 482; Parrish v. S. 14 Neb. 38 111. 411; Baxter v. P. 3 Gilm. 60, 15 N. W. 357. (111.) 381; Morse v. Ryland, 58 4 yEtna Ins. Co. v. Reed, 33 Ohio Kas. 250. St. 255, 31 Am. R. 539; Little M. R. 2 Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. King, Co. v. Wetmore, 19 Ohio St. 134. 179 111. 96, 53 N. E. 552; North Chi- s Chappell v. Allen, 38 Mo. 213, cago St. R. Co. v. Polkey, 203 111. 222. 232. e Lawless v. S. 4 Lea (Tenn.) 179; 3 Armour v. Brazeau, 191 111. S. v. Murray, 91 Mo. 95, 3 S. W. 124, 60 N. E. 904; City of Freeport ;{97. v. Isbell, 83 111. 440; Herrick v. ? Denman v. Bloomer, 11 111. 193. Gary, 83 111. 86; Illinois C. R. Co. s Lamb v. P. 96 111. 84; Leavitte v. Hammer, 72 111. 347; Tresh v. v. Randolph County, 85 111. 507. ON COURT'S MOTION IN WRITING. 3. Court instructing of its own motion. The court un- doubtedly has the right to instruct the jury on its own motion-, and it may be added that it is the duty of the court to do so when the promotion of justice demands it. In some of the states the court is required to instruct the jury on its own mo- tion upon the general features of the law which control the substantial issues whether requested to do so or not ; 10 but in some jurisdictions this requirement applies to criminal cases only. 11 In Arkansas and Missouri the court is not required to instruct on its own motion in civil cases. 12 Under the practice in Texas the court must instruct the jury in felony cases whether re- quested or not. 13 4. Written instructions required. A statute requiring that all instructions to the jury shall be given in writing is manda- tory; 14 and the failure of the court to reduce the instructions Roy v. Goings, 112 111. 667; City of Chicago v. Keefe, 114 111. 230, 2 N. E. 267, 55 Am. R. 860; O'Reily v. Fitzgerald, 40 111. 310; Stumps v. Kelly, 22 111. 140; Galena C. & N. R. Co. v. Jacobs, 20 111. 478; Driver v. S. 37 Tex. Cr. App. 160, 38 S. W. 1020; Gwatkin v. Com. 9 Leigh (Va.) 678, 33 Am. Dec. 264; see also Viser v. Bertrand, 14 Ark. 267; Hanchette v. Kimbark, 118 111. 132, 7 N. E. 491; Brown v. P. 9 111. (4 Gilm.) 439; S. v. Pierce, 8 Nev. 291; Thistle v. Frostburg Coal Co. 10 Md. 129; Bunnell v. Greathead, 49 Barb. (N. Y.) 106; Spies v. P. 122 111. 244, 12 N. E. 865, 17 N. E. 898. 10 Welch v. Watts, 9 Ind. 115; Krack v. Wolf, 39 Ind. 88; Strick- land v. S. 98 Ga. 84, 25 S. E. 908; Sledge v. S. 99 Ga. 684, 26 S. E. 756. 59 Am. St. 251; Kyd v. Cook, 56 Neb. 71, 76 N. W. 534, 71 Am. St. 661; S. v. Fulford, 124 N. Car. 798, 32 S. E. 377; S. v. Clark, 147 Mo. 20, 47 S. W. 886; Wilson v. Commercial U. Ins. Co. 15 S. Dak. 322, 89 N. W. 649; Ter. v. Baca (N. Mex.), 71 Pac. 460, (in criminal cases) ; S. v. Ans- linger, 171 Mo. 600, 71 S. W. 1041; Donahue v. Windsor Co. M. F. Ins. Co. 56 Vt. 374; P. v. Byrnes, 30 Cal. 206, 89 Am. D. 85; Sanders v. S. 41 Tex. 306; Pryor v. Coggin, 17 Ga. 444; Barton v. Gray, 57 Mich. 622; 24 N. W. 638; S. v. Phipps, 95 Iowa, 487, 64 N. W. 410; Douglass v. Geiler, 32 Kas. 499, 4 Pac. 1039; Heilman v. Com. 84 Ky. 461, 4 Am. St. 207; 1 S. W. 7731. In Indiana the omission to give any instruc- tions is not available error unless instructions were asked and an ex- ception reserved to the court's re- fusal to give them, Marks v. Ja- cobs, 76 Ind. 216; Rauch v. State, 110 Ind. 384. 11 N. E. 450. n Potter v. S. 85 Tenn. 88, 1 S. W. 614, 4 Am. St. 744; S. v. Palmer, 88 Mo. 572; Heilman v. Com. 84 Ky. 461, 1 S. W. 731 4 Am. St. 207; P. v. Byrnes, 30 Cal. 206, 89 Am. Dec. 85; P. v. Murray, 72 Mich. 10, 40 N. W. 29. 12 White v. McCracken, 60 Ark. 619, 31 S. W. 882; Farmer v. Farm- er, 129 Mo. 530, 31 S. W. 926, 36 L. R. A. 806. is Miers v. S. 34 Tex. Cr. App. 161, 29 S. W. 1074, 53 Am. St. 705; Moore v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 33 S. W. 980; Sanders v. S. 41 Tex. 306; Barbee v. S. 23 Tex. App. 199, 4 S. W. 584; Bishop v. S. 43 Tex. 390; Warren v. S. 33 Tex. Cr. App. 502, 26 S. W. 1082. i* Ellis v. P. 159 111. 339, 42 N. E. 873; P. v. Beeler, 6 Cal. 246; Helm v. P. 186 111. 153, 57 N. E. 886; PURPOSE AND PREPARATION. to writing when requested by either party is error per se for which the judgment will be reversed. 15 So the giving of oral instructions when requested to instruct in writing, is error. 16 If it be desirable to modify a written instruction, such modifi- cation must be reduced to writing, especially where the court asks counsel to reduce it to writing. The court is not bound to give an oral modification of a written instruction. 17 It follows that the court is not required to regard an oral request where a statute requires that the instructions shall be given in writ- ing. 18 The court is not bound, however, to give written in- structions ' unless requested to do so; 19 but may instruct orally if neither party asks for written instructions. 20 In the absence of a statute the court may instruct the jury either orally or in writing in its discretion. 21 Where the court is authorized to instruct the jury orally and in writing, it is improper to call their attention to the written ney, 9 Ohio St. 400; Stephenson v. S. 110 Ind. 358, 11 N. B. 360, 59 Am. R. 216; Smur v. S. 88 Ind. 504; Jaqua v. Cordesman, 106 Ind. 141, 5 N. E. 907; Head v. Lang- worthy, 15 Iowa, 235; S. v. Harding, 81 Iowa, 599, 47 N. W. 877; Ellis v. P. 159 111. 337, 42 N. E. 873; S. v. Porter, 35 La. Ann. 585; Louisville & N. R. Oo. v. Banks (Ky.), 23 S. W. 627. 16 Householder v. Grandy, 40 Ohio St. 430. See Powers v. Hazel- ton, &c. L. R. Co. 33 Ohio St. 438; Bosworth v. Barker, 65 Ind. 596; Southerland v. Venard, 34 Ind. 390; Shafer v. Stinson, 76 Ind. 374. IT Savannah T. &c. I. R. Co. v. Beasley, 94 Ga. 142, 21 S. E. 285. See Provines v. Heaston. 67 Ind. 482; La Selle v. Wells, 17 Ind. 33, 79 Am. Dec. 453; Lung v. Deal, 16 Ind. 349; Ray v. Wooters, 19 111. 82, 68 Am. Dec. 583. is Hacker v. Heiney, 111 Wis. 313, 87 N. W. 249. is Blackburn v. S. 23 Ohio St. 146; Bradford v. P. (Gal.), 43 Pac. 1013; Davis v. Wilson, 11 Kas. 74. 20 Hopkins v. Dipert, 11 Okla. 630, 69 Pac. 883; Sutherland v. Han- kins, 56 Ind. 343; Mutual B. L. I. Co. v. Miller, 39 Ind. 475. 21 Smith v. Crichton, 33 Md. 103. Smaggart v. Ter. (Okla.), 50 Pac. 96; S. v. DeWitt 152 Mo. 76, 53 S. W. 429; S. v. Fisher, 23 Mont. 540, 59 Pac. 919; Murray v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 44 S. W. 830; Harvey v. Keegan, 78 111. App. 682; S. v. Colter, 15 Kas. 302; City of Atchison v. Jansen, 21 Kas. 560, 48 Kas. 3&8; Morrison v. S. 42 Fla. 149, 28 So. 97; P. v. Sanford, 43 Cal. 29, 1 Green, Cr. R. 682; Mobile Fruit & T. Co. v. Potter, 78 Minn. 487, 81 N. W. 392; Ray v. Wooters 19 111. 81; 68 Am. Dec. 583; Columbia Veneer & Box Co. v. Cottonwood Lumber Co. 99 Tenn. 123, 41 S. W. 351; S. v. Miles, 15 Wash. 534, 46 Pac. 1047; Wettengel v. City of Denver, 20 Colo. 552. 39 Pac. 343; Ehrlick v. S. 44 Neb. 810, 63 N. W. 35; Hopt v. Utah, 104 U. S. 631, 4 Am. Cr. R. 368; Bradway v. Waddell, 95 Ind. 171; Davis v. Foster, 68 Ind. 238; Shafer v. Stinson, 76 Ind. 374; Bosworth v. Barker, 65 Ind. 595; Southerland v. Venard, 34 Ind. 390; Mazzia v. S. 51 Ark. 177, 10 S. W. 257; Blashfield Instructions, 117; Arnold v. S. (Ark.), 74 S. W. 513. is P. v. Ah Fong, 12 Cal. 345; P. v. Payne, 8 Cal. 341; Traders De- posit Bank v. Henry, 20 Ky. L. R. 1506, 49 S. W. 536; Hardy v. Tur- ORAL CHARGE TAKEN WRITTEN REQUESTS. 6 instructions and say that they should consider and apply the law as therein set forth as well as in the oral charge, in that it gives undue influence to the written instructions. 22 5. Oral charge taken down by stenographer. The giving of oral instructions which are taken down at the time by a stenographer, and extended by him immediately, and as so ex- tended, given to the jury upon their retirement, is not a com- pliance with the statute. 23 6. Party must request written instructions. In the absence of a proper request for instructions a party will not be heard to complain of the failure of the court to instruct the jury. 24 The* 22 Martin v. S. 104 Ala. 71, 16 So. 82, 53 Am. St. 24; Smith v. S. 103 Ala. 40, 16 So. 12. 23 Crawford v. Brown, 21 Colo. 272. 40 Pac. 692; Shafer v. Stin- son, 76 Ind. 374; Rich v. Lappin, 43 Kas. 666; Wheat v. Brown, 3 Kas. App. 431, 43 Pac. 807. Contra: S. v. Preston, 4 Idano, 215, 38 Pac. 694, 95 Am. St. 59. See Union St. R. Co. v. Stone, 54 Kas. 83, 37 Pac. 1012. Ind. Acts, 1903, p. 339, 1. 24 McDonall v. P. 168 111. 93, 48 N. E. 86; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Brownis' Admr. 23 Ky. L. R. 2070, 66 S. W. 613; American T. & T. Co. v. Kersh 27 Tex. Cv. App. 127, 66 S. W. 74 (as to impeaching tes- timony); O'Toole v. Post P. Pub. Co. 179 Pa. St. 271, 36 Atl. 288; Smith v. S. 117 Ga. 59, 43 S. E. 703 (as to theory of a party) ; Lawns- dale v. Grays Harbor Boom Co. 21 Wash. 542, 58 Pac. 663; P. v. Oliveria, 127 Cal. 376; 59 Pac. 772; Wittenberg v. Mollyneaux, 59 Neb. 203, 80 N. W. 824; Boyard v. Johnson (Ky.), 53 S. W. 651; French v. Town of Watterbury, 72 Conn. 435, 44 Atl. 740; Howard v. Turner, 125 N. Car. 126, 34 S. E. 229; Missouri K. & T. R. Co. v. Crowder, (Tex. Cv. App.), 53 S. W. 380: Halff v. Wangemann (Tex. Cv. App.), 54 S. W. 967; Clark v. Clark, 16 Ohio C. C. 103; Bailey v. Carn- duff, 14 Colo. App. 169, 59 Pac. 407; Burr v. McCullum, 59 Neb. 326, 80 N. W. 1040, 80 Am. St. 677; Fergu- son v. S. 52 Neb. 432, 72 N. W. 590, 66 Am. St. 512 (alibi); S. v. Ridge, 125 N. Car. 655, 34 S. E. 439; Rutherford v. Southern R. Co. 56 S. Oar. 446, 35 S. E. 136; Rosenbaum Bros. v. Levitt, 109 Iowa, ' 292, 80 N. W. 393; Wagener v. Kirven, 56 S. Car. 126, 34 S. E. 18; Bass v. S. 103 Ga. 227, 29 S. E. 966; Lackey v. S. 67 Ark. 416, 53 S. W. 213; Tracey v. Hacket, 19 Ind. App. 133, 49 N. E. 185, 65 Am. St. 398; Weber v. Whetstono, 53 Neb. 371, 73 N. W. 695; Boynton v. S. 115 Ga. 587, 41 S. E. 995 (relating to impeach- ment) ; Justice v. Gallert, 131 N. Car. 393, 42 S. E. 850; S. r. Donette (Wash.), 71 Pac. 556; Carr v. Frick Coke Co. 170 Pa. St. 62, 32 Atl. 656; Humes v. Gephart, 175 Pa. St. 417, 34 Atl. 790; P. v. McLaughlin, 37 N. Y. S. 1005, 2 App. Div. 419; Hepler v. S. 58 Wis. 49, 16 N. W. 42; Rolling Mill Co. v. Corrigan, 46 Ohio St. 294, 15 Am. St. 596; Brantley v. S. 9 Wyo. 102, 61 Pac. 139; S. v. Chiles, 58 S. Car. 47, 36 t3. E. 496; Gruesendorf v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 56 S. W. 624; S. v. Todd, 110 Iowa, 631, 82 N. W. 322; Burgess v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 42 S. W. 562; Child v. Boyd & Corey Boot & Shoe Mfg. Co. 175 Mass. 493, 56 N. E. 608; Drury v. Connell, 177 111. 43, 52 N. E. 368; Home v. Mc- Rea, 53- S. Car. 51, 30 S. E. 701; White v. Cole, 20 Ky. 858, 47 S. W. 759; Waechter v. S. 34 Tex. Cr. App. 297, 30 S. W. 444, 800; see Kostuch v. St. P. City R. Co. 78 Minn. 459, 81 N. W. 215, 47 L. R. A. 136; Lucio v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. App. 320, 33 S. W. 358; Missouri K. & T. R. Co. v. PURPOSE AND PREPARATION. 6 failure of the court to instruct the jury upon any proposition of law deemed essential cannot be complained of as error unless the complaining party made proper request for instructions. 25 Hence, if the court fails to instruct on the burden of proof where no instructions in that respect are requested and the at- tention of the court is not called to the omission, there can be no ground to complain of error. 20 Also an instruction stating Steinberger, 60 Kas. 856, 55 Pac. 1101; Mineral R. & M. Co. v. Auten, 188 Pa. St. 568, 41 Atl. 327; Parish v. Williams, (Tex. .Cv. App.), 53 S. W. 79; Keyes v. City of Cedar Rapids, 107 Iowa, 509, 78 N. W. 227; Rawlins v. S. 40 Fla. 155, 24 So. 65; S. v. Ken- dall, 54 S. Car. 192, 32 S. E. 300; Chezem v. S. 56 Neb. 496, 76 N. W. 1056; Taylor v. S. 105 Ga. 746, 31 S. E. 764; Barfield v. S. 105 Ga. 491, 30 S. E. 743; Roark v. S. 105 Ga. 736, 32 S. E. 125; S. v. Can- ceinne, 50 La. Ann. 847, 24 So. 134; Texas & P. R. Co. v. Robinson, 4 Tex. Cv. App. 121, 23> S. W. 433; Miller v. Haas (Tex. Cv. App.), 27 S. W. 263; Lueck v. Heisler, 87 Wis. 644, 58 N. W. 1101; Robinson v. Mcllver ( Tex. Cv. App.), 23 S. W. 915; Galveston H. & S. A. R. Co. v. McMonigal (Tex. Cv. App.), 25 S. W. 341; Com. v. Washington, 202 Pa. St. 148, 51 Atl. 759; Hall- Moody Institute v. Copass, 108 Tenn. 582, 69 S. W. 327; Jones v. Spartan- burg Herald Co. 44 S. Car. 526, 22 S. E. 731; Scully v. S. 39 Ala. 240; Ewing v. Sanford, 19 Ala. 605; Saint v. Guerrerio, 17 Colo. 448, 30 Pac. 335, 31 Am. St. 320; Carpenter v. S. 43 Ind. 371; Moore v. Shields, 121 Ind. 267, 23 N. E. 89; S. v. Helvin, 65 Iowa, 289, 21 N. W. 645; Copas v. Anglo-American Prov. Co. 73 Mich. 541, 41 N. W. 690; Ed- wards v. S. 47 Miss. 589; Brinser v. Longenecker, 169 Pa. St. 51, 32 Atl. 60; Porath v. S, 90 Wis. 537, 63 N. W. 1061, 48 Am. St. 954; Missouri K. & T. R. Co. v. Miller, 15 Tex. Civ. Ap. 428, 39 S. W. 588; Feinstein v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 73 S. W. 1052; Winn v. Sanborn, 10 S. Dak. 642, 75 N. W. 201; Paine v. Incorporated Town, etc. 103 Iowa, 481, 72 N. W. 693; P. v. Winthrop, 118 Cal. 85, 50 Pac. 390; Johnson v. S. 53 Neb. 103, 73 N. W. 463; Driver v. Atch- ison, T. & S. F. R. Co. 59 Kas. 773, 52 Pac. 79; Patterson v. Mills, 48 N. Y. S. 781 (fellow servant); S. v. Pitts, 156 Mo. 247, 56 S. W. 887; S. v. Rosencrans, 9 N. Dak. 163, 82 N. W. 422; Conway v. Jordan, 110 Iowa, 462, 81 N. W. 703; Pearson v. Spartenberg Co. 51 S. Uar. 480, 29 S. E. 193; Chicago G. W. R. Co. v. Healey, 86 Fed. 245; Western U. T. Co. v. Seals (lex. Cv. App.), 45 S. W. 964; Race v. American F. S. & M. Co. (Tex. Cv. App.), 43 S. W. 36. See Wood v. Collins, 111 Ga. 32, 36 S. E. 423; Dominick v. Randolph, 124 Ala. 557, 27 So. 481; Bowen v. Southern R. Co. 58 S Car. 222, 36 S. E. 590; Jones v. Heirs, 57 S. Car. 427, 35 S. E. 748; Jackson v. International & G. N. R. Co. (Tex. Cv. App.), 5? S. W. 869; Felton v. S. 139 Ind. 531, 39 N. E. 228; P. v. Ezzo, 104 Mich. 341, 62 N. W. 407; S. v. Smith, 65 Conn. 283, 31 Atl. 206 (reasonable doubt); Porath v. S. 90 Wis. 527, 63 N. W. 1061, 48 Am. St. 954 (accomplice cor- roborated) ; Carson v. S. 34 Tex. Cr. App. 342, 30 S. W. 799; P. v. War- ner, 104 Mich. 337, 62 N. W. 405 (defendant failing to testify. 25 p. v . Oliveria, 127 Cal. 376, 57 Pac. 772; P. v. Fice, 97 Cal. 460, 32 Pac. 531; S. v. Pfefferle, 36 Kas. 90, 54 Kas. 107; Taft v. Wildman, 15 Ohio, 123; Hills v. Ludaig, 46 Ohio St. 373 24 N. E. 596, 15 Am. St. 608; Georgia S. & F. R. Co. v. Young Ins. Co. (Ga.) 46 S. E. 644; Marks v. Jacobs, 76 Ind. 216. 26 Lampman v. Van Alstyne, 94 Wis. 417, 69 N. W. 171; Osborne v. Ringland (Iowa), 98 N. W. 116. 7 REQUESTS IN WRITING REQUIRED. , 6. that the plaintiff must prove the affirmative issues alleged in his complaint by a preponderance of the evidence is sufficient in the absence of a request for further instructions as to the burden of proof. 27 Also the fact that no instruction was given restricting the jury to the evidence in their deliberations is no ground for error where no instruction in that respect was re- quested. 28 On the same principle a defective instruction as to the defini- tion of negligence cannot be the basis of error in the absence of a request for a better instruction. 29 Thus an instruction which states that by the term "negligence" is meant the omission or failure to do something which an ordinarily prudent and careful person would have done under like circumstances, can- not be objected to for not including the doing of an affirmative act where no request is made for a further charge to that effect. 30 So also the giving of an instruction for one party containing terms or expressions which perhaps ought to be explained, cannot be complained of as error if the party complaining fails to re- quest instructions explaining such terms or expressions. 31 Thus, where an instruction contains the expression "subsidiary facts," ""evidentiary facts" or "essential elements of the crime charged," if the opposing party desires these or other such terms explained he should prepare and request instructions explaining them, else he will not be heard to complain of error. 32 And in a murder case the failure of the court, in defining the crime of murder, to charge that the slayer must have been of sound mind cannot be urged as error, no request having been made for such in- 27 Nichol v. Laumeister, 102 Cal. (contributory negligence). See al- 58, 36 Pac. 925. See Gottstein v. so Magoon v. Before, 73 Vt. 231, Seattle L. & C. Co. 7 Wash. 424, 35 50 Atl. 1070; Smith v. South Car- Pac. 133. olina & G. R. 62 S. Car. 322, 40 S. 28 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Baker, E. 665. 10 Tex. Cv. App. 515, 31 S. W. 1072. ^ Hinshaw v. S. 147 Ind. 335, 47 29 Milligan v. Texas & N. O. R. N. E. 157; Western U. Tel. Co. v. Co. 27 Tex. Cv. App. 600, 66 S. W. Giffin (Tex. Cv. App.), 65 S. 896; Myer v. Milwaukee E. R. Co. W. 661; Kelly v. Cable Co. 7 Mont. (Wis.), 93 N. W. &; Internation- 70, 14 Pac. 633; Malott v. Hood, 201 al & G. N. R. Co. v. Clark (Tex. 111. 202, 66 N. E. 247; bchneider v. Cv. App.), 71 S. W. 585. Hosier, 21 Ohio St. 113. so Campbell v. Warner (Tex. Cv. 32 Hinshaw v. S. 147 Ind. 335, 47 App.), 24 S. W. 703; Stauning v. N. E. 157; Western U. Tel. Co. v. Great N. R. Co. 88 Minn. 480, 98 James (Tex. Cv. App.), 73 S. W. N. W. 518; Lane v. Missouri Pac. R. 79 (ordinary care). Co. 132 Mo. 4, 33 S. W. 645, 1128 PURPOSE AND PREPARATION. struction. 33 - But in some states it has been held that for a failure of the trial court to give instructions, where none were requested, error may be urged if the defendant in a criminal case has been deprived of a fair trial. 3 * 7. Specific instructions must be requested. Specific or more particular instructions must be requested by the party desiring them, although a statute requires the court to instruct the jury on all material issues. 35 Where the instructions correctly state the law applicable to the case as far as they go, then a party will not be heard to complain because the charge may be in- complete or not sufficiently specific. 36 If a party desires that the charge should be more specific and sufficiently full to cover any phase of the case which may have been omitted, he should request further instructions, and failing to do so, cannot complain of error in that respect. 37 Or if an ss Cincinnati, &c. R. Co. v. Smock, 133 Ind. 411, 33 N. E. 108, 18 L. R. A. 774; McAfee v. Mont- gomery, 21 Ind. App. 196, 51 N. E. 957; Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. v. Oyster, 58 Neb. 1 78 N. W. 359; Ware Cattle Co. v. Anderson, 107 Iowa, 231, 77 N. W. 1026; National Bank v. Illinois & "W. Lumber Co. 101 Wis. 247, 77 N. W. 185; Schryver v. Hawks, 22 Ohio St. 316; Galveston H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Edmunds (Tex. Cv. App.), 26 S. W. 633; First Nat. Bank v. Ragsdale, 171 Mo. 168, 71 S. W. 178; Du Souchet v. Butcher, 113 Ind. 249, 15 N. E. 459; Conard v. Kinzie, 105 Ind. 281, 4 N. E. 863; Louis- ville N. A. & C. R. Co. v. Grant- ham, 104 Ind. 358, 4 N. E. 49; Co- lumbus R. Co. v. Ritter, 67 Ohio St. 53, 65 N. E. 613; First Nat. Bank v. Ragsdale, 171 Mo. 168, 71 S. W. 178; Harper v. S. 101 Ind. 113; Indianapolis & G. R. Tr. Co. v. Haines (Ind.) 69 N. E. 188; Phin- ney v. Bronson, 43 Kas. 451; Hoyt v. Dengler, 54 Kas. 309. ST Hamilton v. Pittsburg B. & T. E. Co. 194 Pa. St. 1, 45 Atl. 67; Pope v. Branch County Sav. Bank, 23 Ind. App. 210, 54 N. E. 835; Nix- on v. Jacobs, 22 Tex. Cv. App. 97, 53 S. W. 595; Gulf C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Mangham, 29 Tex. Cv. App. ss S. v. Seossoni, 48 La. Ann. 1464, 21 So. 33. 34 Wilson v. S. 37 Tex. Cr. App. 373, 39 S. W. 373; S. v. Hathaway, 100 Iowa, 225, 69 N. W. 449; Strick- land, v. S. 98 Ga. 84. 25 S. E. 908; Sledge v. S. 99 Ga. 684, 26 S. E. 756, 59 Am. St. 251. ss p. v . Matthai, 135 Cal. 442, 67 Pac. 694; Caveny v. Neeley, 43 S. Car. 70, 20 S. E. 806; Quirk v. St. L. N. E. Co. 126 Mo. 279, 28 S. W. 1080; Treschman v. Treschman, 28 Ind. App. 206, 61 N. E. 961, 91 Am. St. 120; Texas &c. R. Co. v. Watson, 112 Fed. 402; Hammel v. Lewis, 23 Ky. L. R. 2298, 66 S. W. 1041 (as to damages) ; Abilene Cotton Oil Co. v. Briscoe, 27 Tex. Cv. App. 157, 66 S. W. 315, 11 Am. St. 182; Southern R. Co. v. Longbridge, 114 Ga. 173, 39 S. E. 882; Internation- al & G. N. R. Co. v. Harris (Tex. Cv. App.), 65 S. W. 885; Peterson v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 88 S. W. 549; Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Har- din, 114 Ga. 548, 40 S. E. 738, 58 L. R. A. 181; Rolling-Mill Co. v. Corrigan, 46 Ohio St. 294, 20 N. *3. 466, 15 Am. St. 596, 3 L. R. A. 385; Denver Tr. Co. v. Crumbaugh, 23 Colo. 363, 48 Pac. 503; S. v. Varner, 115 N. Car. 744, 20 S. E. 518; Long v. Southern Pac. R. Co. 50 S. Car. 49, 27 S. E. 531; Thomas v. S. 95 Ga. 484, 22 S. E. 315. REQUESTING SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS. 7 instruction states a general principle of law correctly it cannot be objected to as erroneous in the absence of a request for a more specific instruction limiting its application; 37 * or the fact that a charge may be too general cannot be assigned for error unless the complaining party made request for more specific instruc- tions. 38 Where the instructions given cover all points involved in the case, there is no ground for error if no request be made for more 486, 69 S. W. 80; Lewin v. Pauli, 19 Pa. Super. 447; Moore v. Graham, 29 Tex. Cv. App. 235, 69 S. W. 200; Kirby v. Southern R. Co. 63 S. Car. 494, 41 S. B. 765; Lampley v. Atlantic, C. L. R. Co. 63 S. Car. 462, 41 S. E. 517; Keller v.. Lewis, 116 Iowa, 369, 87 N. W. 1102; In re Hull's Will, 117 Iowa, 738, 89 N. W. 979; S. v. Young, 104 Iowa, 730, 74 N. W. 693; Owen v. Long, 97 Wis. 78, 72 N. W. 364; Baltimore & O. S-W. R. Co. v. Conoyer, 149 Ind. 524, 48 N. E. 352; Summitt Coal Co. v. Shaw, 16 Ind. App. 9, 44 N. E. 676; Sutherland v. S. 148 Ind. 695, 48 N. E. 246; Carter White- Lead Co. v. Kinlin, 47 Neb. 409, 66 N. W. 536; Housh v. S. 43 Neb. 163, 61 N. W. 571; Fortson v. Mikell, 97 Ga. 336, 22 S. E. 913; P. v. Apple- ton, 120 Gal. 250, 52 Pac. 582; Cleve- land C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Rich- ardson, 19 Ohio Cir. 385; Willard v. Williams (Colo.), 50 Pac. 207; Wood v. Long I. R. Co. 159 N. Y. 546, 54 N. E. 1095; Turner v. Tootle, 9 Kas. App. 765, 58 Pac. 562; Harris v. Flowers, 21 Tex. Cv. App. 669, 52 S. W. 1046; Felton v. Clarkson, 103 Tenn. 457, 53 S. W. 733; Burgett v. Burgett, 43 Ind. 78; Doll v. S. 45 Ohio St. 452, 15 N. E. 293, 4 Am. St. 542; Jones v. S. 20 Ohio St. 34; Smith v. Pittsburg, Ft. W. & C. R. Co. 23 Ohio St. 0; S. v. Pfefferle, 36* Kas. 90, 12 Pac. 406; P. v. Byrnes, 30 Cal. 206, 89 Am. Dec. 85; St. Louis S. W. R. Co. v. Byas, 12 Tex. Cv. App. 657, 35 S. W. 22; Reynolds v. Weiman, (Tex. Cv. App.), 40 S. W. 560; Leary v. Electric Tr. Co. 180 Pa. St. 136, 36 Atl. 562; Muncy v. Matt- field (Tex. Cv. App.), 40 S. W. 345; Moore v. Brown, 27 Tex. Cv. App. 208, 64 S. W. 946; Green- wood v. Houston I. & B. Co. 27 Tex. Cv. App. 590, 66 S. W. 585; Galveston H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Buch (Tex. Cv. App.), 65 S. W. 681; Rowland v. Day, 56 Vt. 324, 48 Am. R. 791; McGee v. Smitherman, 69 Ark. 632, 65 S. W. 461; Lake S. & M. S. R. Co. v. Whidden, 23 Ohio Cir. 85; Missouri K. & T. R. Co. v. Dilworth (Tex. Cv. App.), 65 S- W. 502; Wickham v. Wolcott (Neb.), 95 N. W. 366; Crosette v. Jordan (Mich,), 92 N. W. 782; Palmer v. Smith (Conn.), 56 Atl. 516; Thorn v. Cosand, 160 Ind. 566; Little Dor- ritt Gold Mining Co. v. Arapahoe Gold Mining Co. 30 Colo. 431, 71 Pac. 389; Seaboard Air Line R. v. Phillips, 117 Ga. 98; Lahr v. Krae- mer (Minn.), 97 N. W. 418. 37* Brasington v. South Bend R. Co. 62 S. Car. 325, 40 S. E. 665, 89 Am. St. 905; Parkins v. Missouri Pac. R. C. (Ncb.j 93 N. W. 197; S. v. Phipps, 95 Iowa, 487, 64 N. W. 410; Parman v. Kansas City (Mo.) 78 S. W. 1046. See also Hoyt v. Dengler, 54 Kas. 309, 38 Pac. 260; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Peay, 7 Tex. Cv. App. 400, 26- S. W. 768; Receivers of M. K. & T. R. Co. v. Pfluger (Tex. Cv. App.), 25 S. W. 792; Gibson v. S. 114 Ga. 34, 39 S. E. 948; Little Dor- rit Gold Min. Co. v. Arapahoe Gold Min. Co. 30 Colo. 431, 71 Pac. 389; S. v. Jelinek, 95 Iowa, 420, 64 N. W. 250. ss Pennsylvania Co. v. Rossman, 13 Ohio C. C. Ill, 7 Ohio Dec. 119; Woods v. Long Island R. Co. 42 N. Y. S. 140, 11 App. Div. 16: Texas &c. R. Co. v. Magill, 15 Tex. Cv. App. 353, 40 S. W. 188. 8 PURPOSE AND PREPARATION. 10 specific instructions. 39 And although a special charge may doubt- less be proper on account of the other instructions being too general, a party is not in a position to complain, if he fails to request the court to give such special charge. 40 And where an instruction correctly states a proposition of law applicable to the evidence, a party will not be heard to complain of error on ap- peal, to some particular feature of it, in the absence of a request for further instructions eliminating the objectionable feature. 41 8. Neither party requesting, effect. So by the same prin- ciple, if neither party asks instructions on any question involved in a case there will be no ground on which to base error for a failure to instruct the jury as to such question. 42 And where one party makes the proper request for written instructions, and afterwards withdraws it, the opposing party cannot be heard to complain, even where it was too late for him to make such re- quest after the withdrawal by the first party. 43 And, generally speaking, under the rule requiring that instructions shall be pre- sented to the court, a party will not be heard to complain of a failure of the court to instruct the jury on any fact, feature or element of a case on either side in the absence of a proper re- quest for such instructions. 44 39 s. v. Sullivan, 43 S. Car. 205, 21 40 S. W. 591; Priel v. S. (Neb.), S. E. 4; S. v. Harrison, 66 Vt. 91 N. W. 536. 523, 29 Atl. 807, 44 Am. St. 864; Youngstown Bridge Co. v. Harness v. Steele, 159 Ind. 268, 64 Barnes 98 Tenn. 401, 39 S. W. 714. N. E. 875; Kirsher v. Kirsher, 120 42 Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Has- lowa, 337, 94 N. W. 846; S. v. Hood, kins, 115 111. 307, 2 N. E. 654. 120 Iowa, 238, 94 N. W. 564, 98 Am. 43 Mutual, &c. Ins. Co. v. Miller, St. 352; Salem Iron Co. v. Com- 39 Ind. 475. monwealth Iron Co. 119 Fed. 593; 44 Brinser v. Longenecker, 169 Tuttle v. Wood, 115 Iowa, 507, 88 N. Pa. St. 51, 32 Atl. 60; Gulf C. S. W. 1056; St. Louis S. W. R. Co. & F. R. Co. v. Perry (Tex. Cv. App.), v. Hughes (Tex. Cv. App.), 73 30 S. W. 709; Warden v. City of S. W. 976; Williamson v. Gore, Philadelphia, 167 Pa. St. 523, bl (Tex. Cv. App.), 73 S. W. 563; Atl. 928, 46 Am. St. 689; Wright v. Gwaltney v. Scottish C. F. & L. Cincinnati St. R. Co. 9 Ohio C. C. Co. 115 N. Car. 579, 20 S. E. 465; 503; Dimmick v. Babcock, 92 Iowa, P. v. Willett, 105 Mich. 110, 62 N. 692, 61 N. W. 394; International & W. 1115; Leeper v. S. 12 Ind. App. G. N. R. Co. v. Beasley, 9 Tex. Cv. 637, 40 N. E. 1113; Jones v. Matheis, App. 569, 29 S. W. 1121; Dollman v. 17 Pa. Super. 220; Musfelt v. S. Haefner, 12 Ohio C. C. 721; O'Dris- 64 Neb. 445, 90 N. W. 237; Kendrick. coll v. Lynn & B. St. R. Co. 180 v. Dillinger, 117 N. Car. 491, 23 S. Mass. 187, 62 N. E. 3 (correcting E. 438; Reichsletter v. Bostick counsel in argument); Texas, &c. (Tex. Cv. App.), 33 S. W. 158. R. Co. v. Cody, 67 Fed. 71 (measure 40 Arnold v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), of damages); Texarkana & Ft. S. 11 ORAL AND WRITTEN PRESUMED IN WRITING. 9. Must request in criminal cases. The same rule applies in charging the jury in criminal cases. Thus, the fact that the court failed to instruct as to the presumption of innocence can- not be urged as error in the absence of a request for such in- struction. 45 Or that the court did not fully and clearly define or describe the doctrine of reasonable doubt in charging the jury cannot be urged as error in the absence of a request for in- structions in that respect. 46 So if the defendant fails to make a request for other or more specific instructions on any point he will not be heard to complain of the instructions given. 47 10. Presumed in writing When. Where it does not appear from the record in a court of appeal or review whether the trial court instructed the jury orally or in writing, it will be pre- sumed the instructions were given in writing as required by statute. 48 But in Indiana the record must show that written instructions were requested, or the objection that they were not given in writing will not be considered. 49 R. Co. v. Spencer, 28 Tex. Cv. App. 251, 67 S. W. 196 (defining market value) ; Woodmen, &c. v. Locklin, 28 Tex. Cv. App. 486, 67 S. W. 331; Southern R. Co. v. Coursey, 115 Ga. 602, 41 S. E. 1013; Oberdorfer v. Newberger, 23 Ky. L. R. 2323, 67 S. W. 267; J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co. v. Hoffman, 86 Minn. 30, 90 N. W. 5 (sufficiency of evi- dence) ; American Cotton Co. v. Smith, 29 Tex. Cv. App. 425, 69 S. W. 443 (contributory negligence) ; Miles v. Stanke, 114 Wis. 94, 89 N. W. 833 (proximate cause) ; Brown v. Foster, 41 S. Car. 118, 19 S. E. 2"99; San Antonio & A. P. R. Co. v. Kniffin, 4 Tex. Cv. App. 484, 23 S. W. 457; Galveston H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Waldo (Tex. Cv. App.), 26 S. W. 1004 (definition of neg- ligence); Gulf C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Pendery (Tex. Civ. App.), 27 S. W. 213 (contributory neg- ligence) ; Buzzell v. Emerton, 161 Mass. 176, 36 N. E. 796; Sigal v. Miller (Tex. Cv. App.), 25 S. W. 1012; Templeton v. Green (Tex. Cv. App.), 25 S. W. 1073; Doll v. S. 45 Ohio St. 452, 15 N. E. 293, 4 Am. St. 542; State v. Bennett, 8 Ind. App. 679, 36 N. E. 551, construction of document; Fink v. Gulf C. & S. F. R. Co. 4 Tex. Cv. App. 269, 23 S. W. 330; Hargadine v. Davis (Tex. Cv. App.) 26 S. W. 424; Willis v. Lock- et (Tex. Cv. App.), 26 S. W. 419; Kerr v. S. 63 Neb. 115, 88 N. W. 240; Clemmons v. S. 43 Fla. 200, 30 So. 699; Martin v. S. (Neb.), 93 N. W. 161; Jones v. S. 20 Ohio, 34. 45 Williams v. P. 164 111. 481, 45 N. E. 987; P. v. Hinshaw (Mich.), 97 N. W. 758. 46 Miller v. S. (Wis.), 81 N. W. 1020; Burgess v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 42 S. W. 562; Meehan v. S. (Wis.), 97 N. W. 174; Herman v. S. 75 Miss, 340, 22 So. 873; Shiver v. S. 41 Fla. 630, 27 So. 36; P. v. Brit- tain, 118 Cal. 409, 50 Pac. 664; By- num v. S. (Fla.), 35 So. 65. ' 47 Douthill v. Ter. 7 Okla. 55, 54 Pac. 312; S. v. Smith, 106 Iowa, 701, 77 N. W. 499; Cupps v. S. (Wis.), 97 N. W. 218; Cramer v. S. 21 Ind. App. 502, 52 N. E. 239; Com. v. Washington, 202 Pa. St. 148, 51 Atl. 757 (instruction re- viewing the testimony). 48 Condon v. Brockway, 157 111. 91, 41 N. E. 634; Citizens, &c. Ins. Co. v. Short, 62 Ind. 316. 49 Nickless v, Pearson, 126 Ind. 477, 26 N. E. 478. 13 PURPOSE AND PREPARATION. 12 11. Written and oral charge. In some jurisdictions the court may read to the jury from the statutes of the state with out violating the statute requiring that the instructions shall be in writing. 50 According to the practice in North Carolina, while the entire charge to the jury must be given in writing, yet the court may give an oral summary of the evidence. 61 12. Waiving written instructions. The right to have the jury instructed in writing as provided by statute may be waived by the parties agreeing that the court may instruct orally. 52 Or if a party sits by and without objection allows the court to instruct the jury orally, the same being taken down by a ste- nographer, he thereby waives written instructions. 53 And where a party neglects to prepare and ask instructions on a particular phase or feature of a case he waives any rights he may have had in that respect. 54 Thus, where the instructions given do not state the law ac- curately and with certainty, a party waives his right to object on that account if he fails to ask additional instructions to cover the deficiency. 55 So where a party fails to request writ- ten instructions, he cannot complain that his opponent's in- so p. v. Brown, 59 Cal. 345; S. 392, 61 N. W. 161; Heaston v. Cin- v. Mortimer, 20 Kas. 93; Palmore cinnati & Ft. W. R. Co. 16 Ind. v. S. 29 Ark. 248; S. v. Thomas, 275, 79 Am. Dec. 430. See Johnson 34 La. Ann. 1084; Contra: Smur v. S. v. Gulledge, 115 Ga. 981, 42 S. E. 88 Ind. 509. See Sellers v. City of 354. Greencastle, 134 Ind. 645, 34 N. E. 54 City of Chicago v. Keefe, 114 534; Manier v. S. 6 Baxt. (Tenn.) 111. 230, 2 N. "3. 267, 55 Am. R. 860; 595; S. v. Birmingham, 74 Iowa, Young v. Town of Macomb, 42 N. 407, 38 N. W. 121. Y. S. 351, 11 App. Div. 480; Frye v. si Phillips v. Wilmington, 130 N. Ferguson, 6 S. Dak. 392, 61 N. W. Car. 582, 41 S. E. 805. See Aiken v. 161; Caveny v. Neely, 43 S. Car. 70, Com. 24 Ky. L. R. 523 68 S. W. 849; 20 S. E. 806; Browning v. Wabash see Green v. Com. 17 Ky. L. R. 943, W. R. Co. 124 Mo. 55, 27 S. W. 33 S. W. 100. 644; Quirk v. St. L. N. E. Co. 126 52 Bates v. Ball, 72 111. 108, 112; Mo. 279, 28 S. W. 1080; Union Pac. Cutter v. P. 184 111. 395, 56 N. E. R. Co. v. Stanwood (Neb.), 91 N. W. 412; Vick v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 191; Hindman v. Timme, 8 ind. 69 S. W. 156; Bruen v. P. 206 111. App. 416, 35 N. E. 1046; S. v. Beatt*, 425; see Voght v. S. 145 Ind. 12, 51 W. Va. 232 (imprisonment reo 43 N. E. 1049; Keith v. Wells, 14 ommended by the jury instead of Colo. 321, 23 Pac. 991; Kuhn v. death penalty). Nelson, 61 Neb. 224, 85 N. W. 56; 5R Cincinnati & H. T. Co. v. Hes- Clark v. S. 31 Tex. 574; S. v. Chev- ter, 12 Ohio C. C. 350; Pierce v. allier, 36 La. Ann. 85; Continental Arnold Print Works, 182 Mass. 260, Nat. Bank v. Folson, 67 Ga. 624, 44 65 N. E. 368 (instruction obscure) ; Am. R. 739. Schmitt v. Murray, 87 Minn. 250, 91 53 Frye v. Ferguson, 6 S. Dak. N. W. 1116. 13 EXCEPTIONS TIME OF REQUESTING. 14 structions were not given in writing. 56 And where under the rules of practice a party is permitted to have instructions given to the jury before arguments of counsel, and he fails to insist on that right, the fact that the court gives the instruc- tions after arguments in the final charge is not error of which complaint can be made, although the instructions were sub- mitted to the court before arguments. 67 13. Exceptions to oral charges. The giving of an oral charge where a statute requires written instructions, affords no ground to complain of error if no exceptions be taken to such charge, especially where a party sits by and allows the court to thus instruct without making objection or taking exception. 58 The fact that the court may hand the instructions to the jury without reading them is not ground for error in the absence of an exception to such course. 59 14. Time of requesting Rule of court. Instructions should be requested within the time stated by the rules of the court, and if not so requested the court may in its discretion refuse them, 60 and such refusal affords no ground for error. 61 In the absence of a rule of' the court, instructions may be presented at the conclusion of the introduction of the evidence. 6 - 2 se Jacqua v. Cordesman & E. Co. A. 134; Venway v. S. 41 Tex. 106 Ind. 141, 5 N. E. 907; Mutual 639; Sutherland v. Venard, 34 Ind. B. S. I. Co. v. Miller, 39 Ind. 475. 390; S. v. DeMosse, 98 Mo. 340, 11 57 City of Toledo v. Higgins, 12 S. W. 731, 14 Am. St. 645, 4 L. R. Ohio C. C. 646. A. 776. 58 Hefling v. Vanzandt, 162 111. eo Arnold v. Lane, 71 Conn. 61, 166, 44 N. E. 424; Swaggart v. Ter. 40 Atl. 921; Chicago C. R. v. Sul- 6 Okla. 344, 50 Pac. 96; Frye v. Fer- livan, 76 111. App. 505. See Hoye guson, 6 S. Dak. 392, 61 N. W. 161; v. Turner, 96 Va. 624, 32 S. E. Phillips v. Wilmington & W. R. 291; Phillips v. Thome, 103 Ind. Co. 130 N. Car. 582, 41 S. E. 805; 275, 2 N. E. 747; Waldie v. Doll, Heaston v. Cincinnati & Ft. W. 29 Cal. 555; Town of Noblesville v. R. Co. 16 Ind. 275, 79 Am. Dec. 430. Vestal, 118 Ind. 80, 20 N. E. 479. See Deets v. National Bank, 57 ci Shober v. Wheeler, 113 N. Car. Kas. 288, 46 Pac. 306. When not 370, 18 S. E. 328; Marsh v. Rich- waived: S. v. Bungardner, 7 Baxt. ardson, 106 N. Car. 539, 11 S. E. (Tenn.) 163; S. v. Cooper, 45 Mo. 522; Ter. v. Harper, 1 Ariz. 399; 66; S. v. Hopkins, 33 La. Ann. 34. Cady v. Owen, 34 Vt. 598; Ben- 59 Little M. R. Co. v. Washburn, son v. S. 119 Ind. 488, 21 N. E. 22 Ohio St. 333. See S. v. Missio, 1109; Street R. Co. v. Stone, 54 105 Tenn. 218; Veneman v. McCur- Kas. 83. tain, 33 Neb. 643, 50 N. W. 955. In some of the states the time See also Stringham v. Cook, 75 when instructions must be present- Wis. 590, 44 N. W. 777; Prater v. ed to the court is fixed by stat- Snead, 12 Kas. 447; Louisville & ute. N. R. Co. v. Hall, 91 Ala. 113, 62 st. Louis &. S. F. R. Co. v. 8 So. 371, 24 Am. St. 863, 12 L. R. Dawson, 7 Kas. App. 466, 53 Pac. 14 PURPOSE AND PREPARATION. 14 Under a rule of court requiring instructions to be presented to the court before the close of the arguments to the jury, they are in time if presented to the court before the close of the argument for the plaintiff, and it is error to refuse them on the ground that they were not presented in time. 63 And under a statute requiring that instructions shall be given before ar- guments, it is error to give them after arguments. 64 But according to the practice in Missouri the court may give instructions after arguments of counsel, although the statute provides that the court may instruct the jury "when the evi- dence is concluded and before the case is argued." 65 But in- structions may be asked at the conclusion of the charge on any matter which has been omitted or in which the charge is im- proper. 66 Also the giving of instructions after arguments for the purpose of advising the jury as to mistakes or misconduct in argument is perfectly proper. 67 In North Dakota instructions are requested in time if pre- sented before the jury retire to consider of their verdict. 68 In some jurisdictions instructions should be presented to the court before the general charge, to be of any avail in the assignment of error on appeal. 69 If special instructions should be sub- mitted before the court has given the general charge, the refusal to give them will not be ground for error, 70 but in other jurisdic- 892; S. v. Haerston, 121 N. Car. 579, v. O'Connor, 137 Mass. 216; P. v. 28 S. E. 492; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Garbutt, 17 Mich. 25, 97 Am. Dec. Haskins, 115 111. 300, 311, 2 N. E. 162. 654; Manning v. Gasharie, 27 Ind. ? Yore v. Mueller Coal H. H. 399. & T. Co. 147 Mo. 679, 49 S. W. es Bowman v. Witlig, 39 111. 416, 855; P. v. Sears, 18 Cal. 635; Crip- 429. See Root v. Boston E. R. Co. pen v. Hope, 38 Mich. 344; Kellog 183 Mass. 418. v. Lewis, 28 Kas. 535; Foster v. 64 Root v. Village of M. 16 Ohio Turner, 31 Kas. 58, I Pac. 145. C. C. 457; Village of Monroeville v. es s. v. Barry (N. Dak.), 94 N. Root, 54 Ohio St. 523, 44 N. E. 237, W. 809. 56 Am. St. 731; Atchison, T. & S. eo City of Chicago v. Le Moyne, F. R. Co. v. Franklin, 23 Kas. 74; 119 Fed. 662; Gallagher v. McMul- P. v. Silva, 121 Cal. 66S, 54 Pac. len, 40 N. Y. S. 222 (additional in- 146, unless in case of exception to s-tructions requested after the the rule. charge held not unseasonably 05 Boggess v. Metropolitan St. R. made); Fitch v. Belding, 49 Conn. Co. 118 Mo. 328, 24 S. W. 210. 469; Marsh v. Richardson, 106 N. ee Brick v. Rosworth, 162 Mass. Car. 539, 11 S. E. 522; Billings v. 334, 39 N. E. 36, 44 Am. St. 362, 26 McCoy, 5 Neb. 187. L. R. A. 256; Brooks v. S. 96 Ga. Myers v. Taylor, 107 Tenn. 364, 353, 23 S. E. 413; Chapman v. 64 S. W. 719. McCormick, 86 N. Y. 479: McMahon 15 COURT EXTENDING TIME RULE OF COURT. 18 tions requests for additional instructions may be made after the general charge. 71 15. Time of requesting Too late. Instructions are not pre- sented in time after the arguments have commenced, where they are required to be presented at the close of the evidence, 72 or presenting written instructions after the court has commenced the oral charge is too late. 73 16. Error to refuse instruction When. Where, under the practice, counsel has the right to assume that the court will, without request, state such rules of law as are pertinent and applicable to the evidence, the refusal of an instruction embody- ing a correct rule not embraced in the charge is error, and should not be refused on the ground that it was not requested before the charge was given to the jury. 74 17. Court may give time. Where the statute requires the instructions to be requested and presented before the argu- ment, the court in its discretion may defer the argument until counsel have time to prepare and present instructions; but it is not error for a court to refuse to grant such time unless it ap- pears that the court has abused its discretion; 75 but the court in its discretion may give instructions though not requested in time. 76 18. Court's authority to make rules. The court, undoubt- edly, has power to make a rule as to when in the progress of 71 Boone v. Miller, 73 Tex. 557, Pac. 479; S. v. Forbes (La.), 35 So. 11 S. W. 551; Williams v. Miller, 710. 2 Lea (Tenn.) 406; Brooks v. S. 74 Malone v. Third Ave. R. Co. 96 Ga. 353, 23 S. B. 413. 42 N. Y. S. 694, 12 App. Div. 508. 72 Evansville & T. H. R. Co. v. 75 Phillips v. Thome, 103 Ind. Crist, 116 Ind. 457, 19 N. E. 310, 275, 2 N. E. 747; Williams v. Com. 9 Am. St. 865, 2 L. R. A. 450; 85 Va. 607, 8 S. E. 470; O'Neil v. Bartley v. S. Ill Ind. 358, 12 N. E. Dry Dock, &c. Co. 129 N. Y. 130, 503. See German F. Ins. Co. v. Co- 29 N. E. 84, 26 Am. St. 512. lumbia E. T. Co. 15 Ind. App. 623, 43 70 Buck v. People's St. R. & E. L. N. E. 41; Lake E. & W. R. Co. v. & P. Co. 108 Mo. 129, 18 S. W. Brafford, 15 Ind. App. 655, 43 N. E. 1090; Tully v. Despard, 31 W. Va. 882; Ransbottom v. S. 144 Ind. 250, 370, 6 S. E. 927; Phillip's Case, 43 N. E. 218; Gould v. Gilligan, 181 132 Mass. 233; Engeman v. S. 54 Mass. 600, 64 N. E. 409. N. J. L. 247, 23 Atl. 676; Wood v. 73 Boggs v. Clifton, 17 Ind. 217; S. 64 Miss. 761, 2 So. 247. See Newton v. Newton, 12 Ind. 527. See P. v. Reefer, 18 Cal. 636. Flint v. Nelson, 10 Utah, 261, 37 . 19 PURPOSE AND PREPARATION. 16 .a trial instructions shall be presented to the court, and such rule will be enforced if it is not in conflict with the law. But to make such rule valid and obligatory upon suitors it must be in writing and spread upon the records of the court and given reasonable publicity. 77 But such a rule must be fair and reason- able, 78 and not repugnant to the law. 79 19. Too many instructions. The giving of many instruc- tions upon every conceivable phase of the law is a pernicious practice, and tends to confuse rather than to enlighten the jury upon the issues. 80 The issues in a case being very simple, there should be only a few brief instructions. The giving of many on either side in such case naturally leads to confusion. 81 When instructions are numerous or prolix they are more apt to mislead the jury, unless prepared with great care, than when they are few in number and simple in structure. 82 Where the instructions requested are too numerous or volu- minous, the court may refuse them and charge the jury on its own motion. 83 But the court cannot arbitrarily limit the number of instructions each side shall be entitled to request. 84 The fact that more instructions have been requested than necessary 77 Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Has- as language can make them, kins, 115 111. 311, 2 N. E. 654. Miller v. P. 39 111. 466; Gilmore v. 78 Prindeville v. P. 42 111. 217, P. 124 111. 383, 15 N. E. 758; Barr 221; Sterling Organ Co. v. House, v. P. 113 111. 471. 25 W. Va. 65. si Chicago P. & M. R. Co. v. 79 Laselle v. Wells, 17 Ind. 33, 79 Mitchell, 159 111. 406, 42 N. E. 973; Am. Dec. 453; Conner v. Wilkie, I Jacobson v. Gunzburg, 150 111. 135, Kas. App. 492. 37 N. E. 229; Omaha St. R. Co. so Gilmore v. P. 124 111. 380, 15 v. Boeson (Neb.), 94 N. W. 619; S. N. E. 758; Chicago & E. R. Co. v. Mix, 15 Mo. 159; Talbort v. v. Holland, 122 111. 469, 13 N. E. Mearns, 21 Mo. 427; Hanger v. Ev- 145; Dunn v. P. 109 111. 635, 646; ins, 38 Ark. 338. Adams v. Smith, 58 111. 419; Mur- 2 Springdale Cemetery Asso. v. phy v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. Smith, 24 111. 480, 483; P. v. Ah 38 Iowa, 539; S. v. Ward, 19 Nev. Fung, 17 Gal. 377. 297, 10 Pac. 133; Brant v. Gallup, 83 Moriarty v. S. 62 Miss. 661; 111 111. 487, 53 Am. R. 638; S. v. Crawshaw v. Summer, 56 Mo. 517; Floyd, 15 Mo. 355; Haney v. Cald- Hanger v. Evins, 38 Ark. 338. See well, 43 Ark. 184; Ingram v. S. 62 Chicago C. R. Co. v. Sandusky, 99 Miss. 142; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. 111. App. 164; Roe v. Taylor, 45 111. Kelly, 25 111. Ap. 19; Mutual B. L. 485; McCaleb v. Smith, 22 Iowa, I. Co. v. French, 2 Cin. (Ohio), 321; 244; Mabry v. S. 71 Miss. 716, 14 S. v. Ott, 49 Mo. 326. So. 267. The state's attorney should ask 84 Chicago City R. Co. v. O'Don- very few instructions in criminal nell, 208 111. 280; Cobb Chocolate cases, and those as plain and simple Co. v. Kundson, 207 111. 461. 17 REPEATING UNNECESSARY. 20 will not justify the court in the refusal of necessary and proper instructions which have been requested. 85 The giving of volu- minous instructions which tend to confuse and mislead may be ground for a new trial. 88 20. Repeating generally not required. Where all the in- structions as given fully and clearly cover every phase or branch of the case, that is sufficient without repetition. The court is not bound to repeat in other instructions any of the principles embraced in those given at the request of either party or by the court on its own motion. 87 ss North C. St. R. Co. v. Polkey, 203 111. 231. so Thatcher v. Quirk, 4 Idaho, 267, 38 Pac. 652; Sidway v. Missouri L. & L. S. Co. 163 Mo. 342. ST Montag v. P. 141 111. 75, 81, 30 N. E. 337; Chicago C. R. Co. v. Van Vleck, 143 111. 480, 484, 32 N. E. 262; City of Salem v. Webster, 192 111. 369, 61 N. B. 323; City of Sterling v. Merrill, 124 111. 522, 17 N. E. 6; S. v. Grant, 152 Mo. 57, 53 S. W. 432; S. v. Kearley, 26 Kas. 77; Chicago, &c. R. Co. v. Groves, 56 Kas. 601; Spahn v. P. 137 111. 545, 27 N. E. 688; Lyons v. P. 137 111. 619, 27 N. E. 677; Thompson v. Duff, 119 111. 226, 10 N. E. 399; Preidberg v. P. 102 111. 164; Great N. R. Co. v. McLaughlin, 70 Fed. 669; Bowen v. Sweeney, 35 N. Y. S. 400; Bon v. S. 23 Ohio St. 349, 13 Am. R. 253; Wrisley v. Burke, 203 111. 259; S. v. Linhoff (Iowa) 97 N. W. 77; Heltonville Mfg. Co. v. Fields, 138 Ind. 58, 36 N. E. 529, 46 Am. St. 368; Siberry v. S. 149 Ind. 684, 39 N. E. 936; Deitz v. Regnler, 27 Kas. 94; S. v. Bailey, 32 Kas. 83, 3 Pac. 769; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Johnson, 44 Kas. 660, 24 Pac. 1116; Muncie Natural Gas Co. v. Allison (Ind.), 67 N. E. Ill; Foster v. Pacific C. S. 30 Wash. 515, 71 Pac. 48; S. v. Parker, 172 Mo. 191, 72 S. W. 650; Texas, &c. R. Co. v. Smissen (Tex. Cv. App.), 73 S. W. 42; S. v. Dent, 170 Mo. 1, 70 S. W. 881; Bond v. S. 23 Ohio St. 349, 13 Am. R. 253; Schafstelle v. St. Louis & M. R. Co. 175 Mo. 142, 74 S. W. 826; S. v. Pancoast (N. Dak.), 67 N. W. 1052; S. v. Smith, 142 Ind. 288, 41 N. E. 595; Painter v. P. 147 111. 444, 469, 35 N. E. 64; Field v. Crawford, 146 111. 136, 34 N. E. 481; Cleve- land, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Walter, 147 111. 60, 35 N. E. 529; Howard v. Supervisors, 54 Neb. 443, 74 N. W. 953; Crane Co. v. Tierney, 175 111. 79, 51 N. E. 715; Alton Pav. B. & Fire B. Co. v. Hudson, 176 111. 270, 52 N. E. 256; Lincoln v. Felt (Mich.), 92 N. W. 780; New Omaha Thompson-Houston Elec. Light Co. v. Johnson (Neb.), 93 N. W. 778, (contributory negligence) ; Morgan v. S. (Neb.), i>3 N. W. 743; Coombs v. Mason, 97 Me. 270, 54 Atl. 728, (d/ue care and contributory negli- gence); Howe v. Miller, 23 Ky. L. R. 1610, 65 S. W. 353; Boyd v. Port- land Elec. Co. 40 Ore. 126, 66 Pac. 576; Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Tram- mell, 114 Ga. 312, 40 S. E. 259; Nebraska M. M. Ins. Co. v. Sasek, 64 Neb. 17, 89 N. W. 428; Lobdell v. Keene, 85 Minn. 90, 88 N. W. 426; Kowalski v. Chicago G. W. R. Co. (Iowa), 87 N. W. 409; Basset t v. S. (Fla.), 33 So. 262; Belding v. Archer, 131 N. Car. 287, 42 S. E. 800; Rockford Ins. Co. v. Nelson, 65 111. 415, 425; Davis v. Wilson, 65 111. 525, 531; Twining v. Martin, 65 111. 157, 160; Reid v. S. (Tex. Cv. App.), 57 S. W. 662; Shenenberger v. S. 154 Ind. 630, 57 N. E. 519; Ragland v. S. 125 Ala. 12, 27 So. 983; P. v. Thiede, 11 Utah, 241, 39 Pac. 837; Bryant 21 PURPOSE AND PREPARATION. 18 21. Repeating on preponderance Reasonable doubt. Thus, for instance, the rule requiring the plaintiff to prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence need not be repeated when once correctly stated in an instruction given; 88 or the rule re- quiring the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt before a conviction can be had, need not be repeated. 89 22. Repeating in detail Words, phrases. And under this rule the refusal of an instruction which presents a subject mat- v. S. 34 Fla. 291, 16 So. 177; Phil- lips v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 31 S. W. 644; S. v. La Grange, 94 Iowa, 60, 62 N. W. 664; Dunn v. Bushnell (Neb.), 83 N. W. 693; Myer v. Richards, 111 Fed. 296; S. v. Prater, 52 W. Va. 132, 43 S. E. 230, 241; Fletcher v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 102 Tenn. 1, 49 S. W. 739; Coghill v. Kennedy, 119 Ala. 641, 24 So. 459; Moratsky v. Wirth, 74 Minn. 146, 76 N. W. 1032; Pearce v. Strickler, 9 N. Mex. 467, 54 Pac. 748; Smith v. Southern R. Co. 53 S. Car. 121, 30 S. E. 697; Clark v. Bennett, 123 Cal. 275, 55 Pac. 908; Bates-Smith Ins. Co. v. Scott, 56 Neb. 475, 76 N. W. 1063; Lyne v. Western U. Tel. Co. 123 N. Car. 129, 31 S. E. 350; Missouri K. & T. R. Co. v. Hennessy (Tex.) 49 S. W. 641; Bacon v. Bacon, 76 Miss. 458, 24 So. 968; Prosser v. Pretzel, 8 Kas. App. 856, 55 Pac. 854; Indiana I. & I. R. Co. v. Bundy, 152 Ind. 590, 53 N. E. 175, 71 Am. St. 345; National Bank of Merrill v. Illinois & W. Lumber Co. 101 Wis. 247, 77 N. W. 185; Leifheit v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co. 106 Iowa, 451, 76 N. W. 730; Keyes v. City of Cedar Rapids, 107 Iowa, 509, 78 N. W. 227. The court in charging the jury may refer to other parts of the charge without repeating: O'Leary v. German A. Ins. Co. 100 Iowa, 390, 69 N. W. 686; Jensen v. Seiber, (Neb.), 93 N. W. 697. ss Decatur Cereal Mill Co. v. Gogerty, 180 111. 197, 54 N. E. 231; Metropolitan W. S. E. R. Co. v. Skola, 183 111. 454, 458, 56 N. E. 171, 75 Am. St. 115; S. v. Pyscher (Mo.), 77 S. W. 841; Smith v. Smith, 169 111. 624, 48 N. E. 306; Taylor v. Cox, 153 111. 220, 229, 38 N. E. 656; Riepe v. Elting, 86 Iowa, 82, 56 N. W. 285, 48 Am. St. 356; Mitchell v. Hindman, 150 111. 538, 37 N. E. 916; Village of Altamont v. Carter, 196 111. 286, 97 111. App. 196. ss Schintz v. P. 178 111. 320, 328. 52 N. E. 903; Toledo, St. L. K. C. R. Co. v. Bailey, 145 111. 162, 33 N. E. 1089; Mackin v. P. 115 111. 312, 329, 3 N. E. 222, 56 Am. R. 167; P. v. Gilmore, (Cal.) 53 Pac. 806; Jones v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 45 S. W. 596; Davis v. S. 51 Neb. 301, 70 N. W. 984; Miller v. S. 106 Wis. 156, 81 N. W. 1020; Kennedy v. P. 44 111. 283; Peri v. P. 65 111. 17, 25; Sanches v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 55 S. W. 44; Spears v. S. 41 Tex. Cr. App. 527, 56 S. W. 347; Ford v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 56 S. W. 338; Edens v. S. 41 Tex. Cr. App. 522, 55 S. W. 815; S. v. Currie, 8 N. Dak. 545, 80 N. W. 475. See Cook v. P. 177 111. 146, 155, 52 N. E. 273; Franklin v. S. 34 Tex. Cr. App. 625, 31 S. W. 643; Carleton v. S. 43 Neb. 373, 61 N. W. 699; S. v. Tippet, 94 Iowa, 646, 63 N. W. 445; Deilks v. S. 141 Ind. 23, 40 N. E. 120; S. v. Hopkins, 94 Iowa, 86.' 62 N. W. 656; Ramirez v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 65 S. W. 1101: Wheeler v. S. 158 Ind. 687, 63 N. E. 975; McCulley v. S. 62 Ind. 428; Lewis v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 59 S. W. 886; Steiner v. P. 187 111. 244. 19 REPEATING AS TO DEFENSE SUBSTANCE. 25 ter more in detail than a very general one given on the same subject, cannot ordinarily be urged as error. 90 It is not necessary to instruct upon each separate item of evidence when the court has given full instructions covering the whole case. 91 Also any word, phrase or expression which has once been explained need not be again explained when used in other parts of the charge. 92 23. Repeating As to defense. So also the court having once charged that a certain defense must be established by a pre- ponderance of the evidence, a refusal to instruct that the ver- dict must be according to the weight of the evidence is not error. 93 So when a defense has once been fully and clearly stated in one instruction the court is not required to reiterate it in each of the others. 94 24. Repeating As to witnesses. Likewise under the same rule the refusal to instruct on the credibility of the plaintiff as a witness, that if the jury believe he has testified wilfully falsely to any material fact, they may take that fact into con- sideration in weighing his testimony is not material error where the general charge states substantially the same principal ap- plicable to any or all of the witnesses. 95 Nor need the court repeat an instruction as to the interest any witness may have in the result of the suit or trial, though the requested instruc- tion be in somewhat different language. 96 25. Repeating Request substantially given by others. It follows from what has been said that although the requested instructions may correctly state the law applicable to the facts in issue, they are properly refused if the same principles or doc- trines are substantially embodied in others given at the request of either party. 97 Thus in an action where negligence is a 90 O'Rourke v. Vennekohl, 104 Ins. Co. 95 Wis. 445, 70 N. W. 554. Cal. 254, 37 Pac. 930. * Canthem v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 91 S. v. Smith, 142 Ind. 288, 41 65 S. W. 96; Ter. v. Gonzales (N. N. E. 595. Mex.), 68 Pac. 925. 92 Griffin v. Mulley, 167 Pa. St. 9 o Whitaker v. Engle, 111 Mich. 339, 31 Atl. 664; French v. Ware, 205, 69 N. W. 493. 65 Vt. 338, 26 Atl. 1096, 36 Am. St. 9 Chicago City R. Co. v. Mayer, R. 864; Scruggs v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. 185 111. 336, 56 N. E. 1058, 76 Am. App. 622, 34 S. W. 951 ("adequate St. R. 30; Dunham Towing & cause" in homicide case); Childs v. Wrecking Co. v. Dandelin, 143 111. S. 35 Tex. Cr. App. 573, 34 S. W. 414, 32 N. E. 258. 939. 97 Indianapolis St. R. Co. v. Hock- 93 Agnew v. Farmers' M. P. Fire ett, 159 Ind. 683; City of Joliet v. 25 PURPOSE AND PREPARATION. material element of the plaintiff's case, the refusal of the general Johnson, 177 111. 183, 52 N. E. 498; England v. Fawbush, 204 111. 400; Crane Co. v. Tierney, 175 111. 79, 82, 51 N. E. 715; Spence v. Huckins, 208 111. 309; Whitney S. Co. v. O'Rourke, 172 111. 177, 186, 50 N. E. 242; Franklin v. Krum, 171 111. 378, 49 N. E. 513; S. v. Clark, 51 W. Va..457, 90 Am. St. 819; Davis v. Hall, (Neb.), 97 N. W. 1023; Kid- man v. Garrison (Iowa), 97 N. W. 1078; Collins v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. (Iowa), 97 N. W. 1103; Jones v. Johnson (N. Car.), 45 S. E. 828; S. v. Stantz (Wash.), 74 Pac. 590; Morrison v. Northern Pac. R. Co. (Wash.), 74 Pac. 1066; Wildman v. S. (Ala.), 35 So. 995; Baldwin v. S. (Fla.), 35 So. 221; Cook v. S. (Fla.), 35 So. 669; Kilpatrick v. Grand T. R. Co. 74 Vt. 288, 52 Atl. 531, 93 Am. St. 887; Southern I. R. Co. v. Davis (Ind.) 69 N E. 554; Copeland v. Hewitt, 96 Me. 525, 53 Atl. 36; Chicago C. R. Co. v. Fennimore, 199 111. 18; Crossen v. Grandy, 42 Ore. 282, 70 Pac. 906; West C. St. R. Co. v. Lieserowitz, 197 111. 616; S. v. Ashcraft, 170 Mo. 409, 70 S. W. 898; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Groves, 56 Kas. 601, 44 Pac. 628; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Fuller, 72 Fed. 468; Thorp v. Carvalho, 36 N. Y. S. 1, 14 Misc. 554; Pyle & Pyle, 15b 111. 289, 41 N. E. 999; Burgess v. Davis Sulphur Ore Co. 165 Mass. 71, 42 N. E. 501; Arthur v. City of Charleston, 51 W. Va. 132, 90 Am. St. 772; Pittsburg, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Hewitt, 202 111. 28, 66 N. E. 829; Golibart v. Sullivan, 30 Ind. App. 428, 66 N. E 188; Southern Ind. R. Co. v. Harrell (Ind. App.), 66 N. E. 1016; Frank Bird Tr. Co. v. Krug, 30 Ind. App. 602, 65 N. E. 309; Continental Nat. Bank v. Tradesmen's Nat. Bank 173 N. Y. 272, 65 N. E. 1108; Stuart v. Mitchum, 135 Ala. 546, 33 So. 670; West Va. C. & P. R. Co. v. S. 96 Md. 652, 54 Atl. 669, 61 L. R. A. 574; Copeland v. Hewitt, 96 Me. 525, 53 Atl. 36; Southern E. R. Co. v. Hage- man, 121 Fed. 262 (substance given in different language) ; Stockslager v. U. S. 116 Fed. 590; Marcus v. Leake (Neb.), 94 N. W. 100; S. v. Shunka, 116 Iowa, 206, 89 N. W. 977; Waterhouse v. Jos. S. Brew. Co. (S. Dak.), 94 N. W. 587; S. v. Landano, 74 Conn. 638, 51 Atl. 860; Gill v. Donovan, 96 Md. 518, 54 Atl. 117; Hartsel v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 68 S. W. 285; Warner v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 120 Iowa, 159, 94 N. W. 490; Bell v. In- corporated Town of Clarion, 120 Io- wa, 332, 94 N. W. 907; Sellman v. Wheeler (Md.), 54 Atl. 512; Rey- nolds v. Pierson, 29 Ind. App. 273, 64 N. E. 484; Kennard v. Grossman (Neb.), 89 N. W. 1025; Wbstern Stone Co. v. Musical, 196 111. 382, 63 N. E. 664, 89 Am. St. 325; Him- rod Coal Co. v. Clark, 197 111. 514, 64 N. E. 282; Corbus v. Leonhardt, 114 Fed. 10; Moran Bros. Co. v. Snoqualmie Falls Power Co. 29 Wash. 292, 69 Pac. 759; Lee v. Ham- mond, 111 Wis. 550, 90 N. W. 1073; Record v. Chickasaw Cooperage Co 103 Tenn. 657, 69 S. W. 334; Mc- Knight v. Detroit, M. R. Co. (Mich.), 97 N. W. 772; Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Courtney, 186 U. S. 342, 22 Sup. Ct. 833; Kilpatrick v. Grand T. R. Co. 74 Vt. 288, 52 Atl. 531, 93 Am. St. 887; Swensen v. Bender, 114 Fed. 1; Arthur v. City of Charleston, 51 W. Va. 132, 41 S. E. 171, 90 Am. St. 772; Cupps .v. S. (Wis.), 97 N. W. 217; Christensen v. Lambert, 67 N. J. L. 341, 51 Atl. 702; Cauble v. Worsham (Tex. Cv. App.), 69 S. W. 194; Wolf v. Hemrich Bros. Brew. Co. 28 Wash. 187, 68 Pac. 440; Con- naughton v. Sun Printing & Pub. Co. Asso. 76 N. Y. S. 755, 73 App Div. 316; Laflan v. Missisquoi Pulp Co. 74 Vt. 125, 52 Atl. 526; Downey v. Germini Min. Co. 24 Utah, 431, 68 Pac. 414, 91 Am. St. 798; Ray v. S. 108 Tenn. 282, 67 S. W. 553; S. v. Barnes (Utah), 69 Pac. 70; S. v. Hicks, 130 N. Car. 705, 41 S. E. 803; Danforth v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 69 S. W. 159; Myers v. S. 43 Fla. 500, 31 So. 275; Johnson v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 67 S. W. 412; S. v. Brennan (Mo.), 65 S. W. 325; Bannen v. S. 115 Wis. 317, 91 N. W. 107; Curry v. Catlin, 12 Wash. 322, 41 Pac. 55; Huston v. P. 121 111. 497, 500 13 N. REPEATING SUBSTANCE OF REQUEST. 25 definition of negligence is not error where the court in another E. 538; Crews v. P. 120 111. 317, 320, 11 N. E. 404; May v. Tall- man, 20 111. 443; S. v. McDonald, 57 Kas. 537, 46 Pac. 966; S. v. Eastern, 138 Mo. 103, 39 S. W. 461; Lake R. E. R. Co. v. McKewen, 80 Md. 593, 31 Atl. 797; Bewley v. Massie (Tex. Civ. App.), 31 S. W. 1086; Bushnell v. Chamberlain, 44 Neb. 751, 62 N. W. 1114; Scoville v. Salt Lake City, 11 Utah, 60, 39 Pac. 481; S. v. Harrison, 66 Vt. 523, 29 Atl. 807, 44 Am. St. 864; Lud- wig v. Metropolitan St. R. Co. 75 N. Y. S. 667, 71 App. Div. 210; Car- stens v. Stetson & P. M. Co. 14 Wash. 643, 45 Pac. 313; Crown Coal & Tow Co. v. Taylor, 184 111. 260, 56 N. E. 328; Kendall v. Young, 141 111. 188, 194, 30 N. E. 538, 16 L. R. A. 492; Trumbull v. Erickson, 97 Fed. 891; Fleming v. Dixon, 194 Pa. St. 67, 44 Atl. 1064; Reilly v. Con way, 121 Mich. 682, 80 N. W. 785; Duncan v. Borden, 13 Colo. App. 481, 59 Pac. 60; Gordon v. Burris, 153 Mo. 223, 54 S. W. 546; Ronsh v. Ronsh, 154 Ind. 562, 55 N. E. 1017; Pecha v. Kastl, 64 Neb. 380, 89 N. W. 1047; S. v. Rathbone (Idaho), 67 Pac. 186; Union Pac. R. Co. v. Ru- zicka (Neb.), 91 N. W. 543; Chicago T. T. Co. v. Kotoski, 199 111. 383, 65 N. E. 350; Chicago T. T. Co. v. Gruss (111.), 65 N. E. 693; Greaney v. Holyoke Water Power Co. 374 Mass. 437, 54 N. E. 880; Breedlove v. Dennie, 2 Indian Ter. 606, 53 S. W. 436; O'Neil v. Hanscom, 175 Mass. 313, 56 N. E. 587; City of Chicago v. Hastings, 136 111. 251, 254, 26 N. E. 594; City of Madison v. Moore, 109 Iowa, 476, 80 N. W. 257; Gemmill v. Brown (Ind.), 56 N. E. 691; Gor- don v. Alexander, 122 Mich. 107, 80 N. W. 978; Ittner v. Hughes, 154 Mo. 55, 55 S. W. 267; Hicks v. Nassau Electric R. Co. 62 N. Y. S. 597; Clifford v. Minneapolis, St. P. and S. S. R. Co. 105 Wis. 618, 81 N. W. 143; Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. R. Co. v. Chamberlin, 61 Kas. 859, 60 Pac. 15; Griffin v. Manice, 62 N. Y. S. 364; Anson v. P. 148 111. 494, 508. 35 N. E. 145; Robinson v. Brewster, 140 111. 649, 660, 30 N. E. 683, 33 Am. St. 265; Thrawley v. S. 153 Ind. 375, 55 N. E. 95; P. v. Hettick, 126 Cal. 425, 58 Pac. 918; Thompson v. P. 26 Colo. 496, 59 Pac. 57; Buel v. S. 104 Wis. 132, 80 N. W. 78; Miller v. S. 106 Wis. 156, 81 N. W. 1020; Drye v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 55 S. W. 65; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Cowherd, 120 Ala. 51, 23 So. 793; Childs v. Muckler, 105 Iowa, 279, 75 N. W. 100; Hummel v. Stern, 48 N. Y. S. 528; Wade v. Columbia Electric St. R. Light & Power Co. 51 S. Car.. 296, 29 S. E. 233, 64 Am. St. 676; Franklin v. Krum, 171 111. 378, 49 N. E. 513; Starrette Co. v. O'Rourke, 172 111. 177, 50 N. E. 242; Saunders v. Gloss, 117 Mich. 130, 75 N. W. 295; Rogers v. S. 117 Ala. 192, 23 So. 82; LevI v. Gardner, 53 S. Car. 24, 30 S. E. 617; Chicago & E. R. Co. v. Holland, 122 111. 461, 471, 13 N E. 145; Smith v. Hall, 69 Conn. 651, 38 Atl. 386; Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Krueger, 124 111. 457, 17 N. E. 52; Perin v. Parker, 126 111. 201, 213, 18 N. E. 747, 9 Am. St. 571 ; Chicago & N. R. Co. v. Dunleavy, 129 111. 132, 150, 22 N. E. 15; Keastner v. First National Bank, 170 111. 322, 48 N. E. 998; Mason v. Jones, 36 111. 212; City of Peoria v. Gerber, 168 111. 318, 48 N. E. 152; Jacobson v. Gunzburg, 150 111. 135, 37 N. E, 229; James v. Gilbert, 168 111. 627, 48 N. E. 177; Chicago, St. P. & K. City R. Co. v. Ryan, 165 111. 88, 46 N. E. 208; West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Nash, 166 111. 528, 46 N. E. 1082; Taylor v. Felsing, 164 111. 331, 338, 45 N. E. 161; National Linseed Oil Co. v. McBlaine, 164 111. 597, 602, 45 N. E. 1015; Ashley Wire Co. v. Mercier, 163 111. 487, 45 N. E. 222; West C. St. R. Co. v. Estep, 162 111. 131, 44 N. E. 404; Wrigley v. Comelins, 162 111. 92, 44 N. E. 406; West C. St. R. Co. v. Dwyer, 162 111. 482, 490, 44 N. E. 815; Vil- lage of Cullom v. Justice, 161 111. 372, 43 N. E. 1098; Grier v. Cable, 159 111. 29, 38, 42 N. E. 395; Pyle PURPOSE AND PREPARATION. instruction tells the jury what facts would constitute negligence v. Pyle, 158 111. 289, 300, 41 N. E. 999; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Stan- ley, 158 111., 396, 400, 41 N. E. 1012; St. L. A. & T. H. R. Co. v. Barrett, 152 111. 168, 38 N. E. 554; Burke v. Sanitary District, 152 111. 125, 134, 38 N. E. 670; Tay- lor v. Pegram, 151 111. 106, 121, 37 N. E. 837; Carlton v. P. 150 111. 181, 191, 37 N. E. 244, 41 Am. St. 346; Shorb v. Webber, 188 111. 126, 58 N. E. 949; Atchison, T. & S. Pe R. Co. v. Feehan, 149 111. 202, 213, 36 N. E. 1036; Cheshire v. Tappan, 94 Ga. 704, 19 S. E. 992; Chambers v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 44 S. W. 495; S. v. Bauerle, 145 Mo. 1, 46 S. W. 609; S. v. Gushing, 17 Wash. 544, 50 Pac. 514; Watkins v. U. S. 5 Okla. 729, 50 Pac. 88; Long v. S. (Tex. Cr. App), 46 S. W. 640; Stevens v. Com. 20 Ky. L. R. 48, 45 S. W. 76; Simnacher v. S. (Tex. Or. App.), 43 S. W. 354; Travess v. U. S. 6 App. Cas. (D. C.) 450; Taylor v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 42 S. W. 285; S. v. Bow,ser, 21 Mont. 133, 53 Pac. 179; S. v. Fogerty, 105 Iowa, 32, 74 N. W. 754; McAlpine v. S. 117 Ala. 93, 23 So. 130; P. v. Prather, 120 Cal. 660, 53 Pac. 259; Harris v. U. S. 8 App. Cas. (D. C) 20, 36 L. R. A. 465; Burton v. S. 118 Ala. 109, 23 So. 729; P. v. Barthleman, 120 Cal. 752 Pac. 112; Toll v. S. 40 Fla. 169, 23 So. 943; Beard v. Trustees of School, 106 111. 659; City of Chicago v. Stearns, 105 111. 554, 559; Hay ward v. Merrill, 94 111. 349, 356, 34 Am. R. 229; Freid- berg v. P. 102 111. 160, 164; Richmond v. Roberts, 98 111. 472, 478; Frank & Sons, v. Welch, 89 111. 38; S. v. Webb, 20 Wash. 484, 55 Pac. 935; Carter v. S. 106 Ga. 372, 32 S. E. 345, 71 Am. St. 262; P. v. Chaves, 122 Cal. 134, 54 Pac. 596; S. v. Branton, 33 Ore. 533, 56 Pac. 267, 43 L. R. A. 128; Dennis v. S. 118 Ala. 72, 23 So. 1002; Com. v. Ma- goon, 172 Mass. 214, 51 N. E. 1082; S. v. Burlingame, 146 Mo. 207, 48 S. W. 72; S. v. Booker, 123 N. Car. 713, 31 S. E. 376; Battle v. S. 105 Ga. 703, 32 S. E. 160; S. v. Cochran, 147 Mo. 504. 49 S. W. 558; Donaho v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 47 S. W. 469; S. v. Staley, 45 W. Va. 792, 32 S. E. 198; Holcomb v. P. 79 111. 409, 416; Underwood v. White, 45 111. 438; Allen v. P. 77 111. 484, 487; Keller v. Stuppe, 86 111. 309, 311; Scott v. Delany, 87 111. 146; S. v. Tucker 36 Ore. 291, 61 Pac. 8i>4, 51 L. R. A. 246; Castlin v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 57 S. W. 827; Stevens v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 18 S. W. 96; S. v. West, 157 Mo. 309, 57 S. W. 1071; Whitney v. S. 154 Ind. 573, 57 N. E. 398; S. v. Peterson, 110 Iowa, 649, 82 N. W. 329; Blume v. S. 154 Ind. 343, 56 N. E. 771; S. v. Mahoney, 24 Mont. 281, 61 Pac. 647; Liner v. S. 124 Ala. 1, 27 So. 438; West C. St. R. Co. v Nash, 166 111. '528, 46 N. E. 1082; Goldsmith v. City of New York, 43 N. Y. S. 447, 14 App. Div. ]35; Koch v. S. 115 Ala. 99, 22 So. 471; Diggers v. S. 38 Fla. 7, 20 So. 758; Hinshaw v. S. 147 Ind. 334, 47 N. E. 157; Yoakum v. Kelly (Tex Cv. App.), 30 S. W. 836; S. v. Case, 99 Iowa, 743, 68 N. W. 434; Cox v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 95 Iowa, 54, 63 N. W. 450; Tobey v. Burlington, C. R. & N. R. Co 94 Iowa, 256, 62 N. W. 761, 33 L. R. A. 496; Lazarus v. Pheps, 156 U. S. 202, 15 S. Ct. 271; Hoehn v. Chicago, P. St. L. R. Co. 152 111. 223, 38 N. E. 549; Young v. Sage, 42 Neb. 37, 60 N. W. 313; Ronnsaville v. Wal- ters, 94 Ga. 707, 20 S. E. .93; St. Louis, A. & T. H. R. Co. v. Barrett, 152 111. 168, 38 N. E. 554; Hodg- man, v. Thomas, 37 Neb. 568, 56 N. W. 199; Wheeler v. Grand T. R. Co. 70 N. H. 607, 50 Atl. 103, 54 L. R. A. 955; Puff v. Lehigh V. R. Co. 24 N. Y. S. 1068, 71 Hun, (N. Y.) 577; Faulkner v. Mammoth, 23 Utah, 437, 66 Pac. 799; Brown v. U. S. 150 U. S. 93, 14 Sup. Ct. 37; French v. Seattle Tr. Co. 26 Wash. 264, 66 Pac. 404; Brown v. Porter, 7 Wash. 327, 34 Pac. 1105; Maxwell v. Cunningham, 50 W. Va. 298. 40 S. E. 499; Bluedom v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. (Mo.), 24 S. W. 57; War- den v. Miller, 112 Wis. 67, 87 N. REPEATING SUBSTANCE OF REQUEST. 25 on the part of the defendant. 98 Or in a personal injury case the refusal of an instruction that the plaintiff cannot be held to have assumed any extraordinary danger if it appears that he did not know and appreciate such danger is not error, where in other instructions the court charges that if the plaintiff knew the risk and voluntarily assumed it, he cannot recover, and if he did not know it he can recover." The frequent repetition of a correct principle of law may be material error. Such practice gives undue prominence to the facts or subject matter to which the instruction relates, and tends to mislead the jury, indicating that, in the opinion of the court, one of the parties has the advantage over the other on the evidence relating to the particular question involved. 100 The repetition in a special instruction of matters as to a certain element or defense which has been fully covered in the general charge is error. 101 ~W. 828; Vredenburge v. Pall, 28 N. Y. S. 88, 7 Misc. 567; Walbert v. Trexler, 156 Pa. St. 112, 27 Atl. 65; Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Bab- cock, 154 U. S. 190, 14 Sup. Ct. 978; Largey v. Mantle. 26 Mont. 264, 7 Pac. 114; Indianapolis St. R. Co. v. Robinson, 157 Ind. 414, 61 N. E. 936; Lovick v. Atlantic Coast L. R. Co. 129 N. Car. 427, 40 S. E. 191; Cook v. Los Angeles & P. E. R. Co. 134 Gal. 279, 66 Pac. 306, 86 Am. St. 246; Keesley v. Doyle, 8 Ind. App. 43, 35 N. E. 126; Kischman v. Scott, 166 Mo. 214, 65 S. W. 1031; General Fire E. Co. v. Schwartz 165 Mo. 121, 65 S. W. 318; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Pittmrn, 23 Ky. L. R. 877, 64 S. W. 460; Farmers' Bank v. Garrow, 63 Neb. 64, 88 N. W. 131; Collins v. City of Janesville, 111 Wis. 348, 87 N. W. 241; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Avery (Tex. Cv. App.), 64 S. W. 935; McLane v. Mau- rer (Tex. Cv. App.), 66 S. W. 693; Daugherty v. Herndon, 27 Tex. Cv. App. 175, 65 S. W. 891; Vetterly v. McNeal, 129 Mich. 507, 89 N. W. 441; St. Louis & S. W. R. Co. v. Ferguson, 26 Tex. Cv. App. 460, 64 S. W. 797; Murray v. Boston Ice Co. 180 Mass. 165, 61 N. E. 1001, 91 Am. St. 269; McGee v. Smitherman, 69 Ark. 636, 65 S. W. 461; S. v. Howell, 26 Mont. 3, 66 Pac. 291; S. v. Dotson, 2*6 Mont. 305, 67 Pac. 938; S. v. Hendricks, 172 Mo. 654, 73 S. W. 194 (evidence cir- cumstantial) ; Jacksonville & St. L. R. Co.R. Co. v. Wilhite, 209 111. 87; Illinois I & M. R. Co. v. Freeman, 210 111. 270, 277; Chicago U. T. R. Co. v. Reuter, 210 LI. 279, 282. as St. Clair M. S. Co. v. City of St. Clair, 96 Mich. 463, 56 N. W. 18. 99 Breen v. Field, 159 Mass. 582, 35 N. E. 95. 100 Cross v. Kennedy (Tex. Cv. App.), 6*6 S. W. 318; Chisum v. Chestnut (Tex. Cv. App.), 36 S. W. 758; Gulf C. S. & T. R. Co. v. Har- riett, 80 Tex. 81, 15 S. W. 556; Pel- frey v. Texas C. R. Co. (Tex. Cv. App.), 73 S. W. 411; Chapman v. Conway, 50 111. 513; Kraus v. Haas, 6 Tex. Cv. App. 665, 25 S. W. 1025; Mendes v. Kyle, 16 Nev. 370 (the repetitions are set out in the opin- ion in this case) ; Chicago, W. & V. C. Co. v. Moran, 210 111. 9, 14; Kroeger v. Texas &c. R. Co. 30 Tex. Cv. App. 87, 69 S. W. 809; Miller v. Coulter, 156 Ind. 290, 59 N. E. 853. 101 Highland v. Houston E. & W. T. R. Co. (Tex. Cv. App.), 65 26 PURPOSE AND PREPARATION. 24 The practice of repeating and reiterating in a charge the principle of law applicable to a particular issue has been uni- formly condemned, because it is likely to lead the jury to be- lieve that in the opinion of the court the evidence in the case establishes facts which require the application of the proposition of law thus sought to be impressed upon the minds of the jury. Such repetition emphasizes and gives undue prominence to the question to which it refers. 102 But, on the contrary, such repeti- tion of a proposition several times in an instruction is not or- dinarily such error as will be ground for reversal where it oc- curs in connection with facts or questions involved in th^ case. 103 Nor does the repetition of the same principles or rules of law in different instructions ordinarily render the charge erroneous. 104 26. Repetition When, general and special charge. Where the general charge fully covers all the legal principles embraced in a special charge it is not eror to refuse the latter. 105 And if the general charge contains all the legal principles embodied S. W. 649; Wadsworth v. Wil- liams, 101 Ala. 264, 13 So. 755. 102 Kroeger v. Tex. &c. R. Co. 30 Tex. Cv. App. 87, 69 S. W. 809; Irvine v. S. 20 Tex. App. 12; Shen- kenberger v. S. 154 Ind. 630, 642, 57 N. E. 519; Traylor v. Townsend, 61 Tex. 147. 103 Denise v. City of Omaha, 49 Neb. 750, 69 N. W. 119; Maes v. Texas & N. O. R. Co. (Tex. Cv. App.), 23 S. W. 725. See Murray v. New York, L. & W. R. Co. 103 Pa. St. 37; see Gaudy v. Bissell's Estate (Neb.), 97 N. W. 632; Sonka v. Sonka (Tex. Cv. App.), 75 S. W, 325; Herbert v. Drew, 32 Ind. 364. 104 Nashville St. R. Co. v. O'Bryan, 104 Tenn. 28, 55 S. W. 300; Coffman v. Reeves, 62 Ind. 334; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Foley, 88 Fed. 240; Keating v. S. (Neb.), 93 N. W. 980, (credibility of de- fendant as a witness) ; Murray v. New York, L. & W. R. Co. 103 Pa. St. 37. ice Noble v. Worthy, 1 Indian Ter. 458, 45 S. W. 137; Dorrance v. McAlister, 1 Indian Ter. 473, 45 S. W. 141; Saunder v. Gloss, 117 Mich. 130, 75 N. W. 295; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Cowherd, 120 Ala. 51, 23 So. 793; Anacostia & P. R. Co. v. Klein, 8 App. Gas. (D. C.) 75; John- son v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 45 S. W. 901; Costello v. Kottas, 52 Neb. 15, 71 N. W. 950; Miller v. Miller, 17 Ind. App. 605, 47 N. E. 338; Can- field v. City of Jackson, 112 Mich. 120, 70 N. W. 444; Com. v. Carter, (Mass.), 66 N. E. 716; Richmond Tr. Co. v. Wilkinson, (Va.), 43 S. E. 622; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Holt, (Tex. Civ. App.), 70 S. W. 591; Schultz v. Bower, 64 Minn. 123, 66 N. W. 139; Jackson v. Jackson, 82 Md. 17, 33 Atl. 317, 34 L. R. A. 773; Woodworth v. Parrott, 48 Neb. 675, 67 N. W. 761; La Grande Nat. Bank v. Blum, 2< Ore. 215, 41 Pac. 659, 50 Am. St. 710; Garbaczewski v. Third Ave. R. Co. 39 N. Y. S. 33, 5 App, Div. 186; Gulf C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Duvall, 12 Tex. Civ. App. 348, 35 S. W. 649; Norton v. North Carolina R. Co. 122 N. Car. 910, 29 S. E. 886; Terrell v. McCowen, 91 Tex. 231, 43 S. W. 2; Barnes v. S. 39 Tex. Cr. App. 342, 45 S. W. 495; S. v. Fontenot, 50 La. Ann. 537, 25 REPEATING GENERAL AND SPECIAL CHARGE. 26 in the special charge, though differing somewhat in form and wording, the special charge is properly refused. 106 A special request for a charge that a fact may be proved' by circumstantial evidence may be refused where the same fact is properly submitted by other instructions. 106 * But if the general charge does not fully cover all the issues involved which the evi- dence tends to establish, the court, when requested, should give further instructions. 107 And in a criminal case where the identity of the accused is the material issue, a special charge on that issue should be given where the punishment for the crime charged is practically equivalent to a life sentence. 108 So where the general charge states that the plaintiff must prove the facts of the alleged negligence in order to recover, the refusal to in- struct the jury that proof of mere injury would not raise a presumption of negligence, is not error, the general charge covering the refused instruction. 109 So also in a case where the questions involved are very simple and the evidence is limited to a small compass, the refusal to instruct the jury how they should find in the event they should determine the facts the one way or the other, is not error, where previous to the request 23 So. 634, 69 Am. St. 435; S. v. Ca n - W. 347; Wunderlich v. Palatine non, 52 S. Car. 452, 30 S. E. 589; Bal- Ins. Co. 115 Wis. 509, 92 N. W. 264; timore & O. R. Co. v. Hollenthal, 88 S. v. Caymo, 108 La. Ann. 218, 32 Fed. 116; Taylor v. S. 97 Ga. 432, 25 So. 357, 61 L. R. A. 781; Seefeld v. S. E. 320, 54 Am. St. 433; Harper v. Thacker, 93 Wis. 518, 67 N. W. 1142; S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 40 S. W. 272; Stephens v. Anderson (Tex. Cv. Producer's Marble Co. v. Bergen App.), 36 S. W. 1000; Wellston Coal (Tex. Cv. App.), 31 S. W. 89; Wes- Co. v. Smith, 65 Ohio St. 81, 61 N. tra v. Westra Estate, 101 Mich. 526, E. 143 87 Am. St. 547, 55 L. R. A. 60 N. W. 53; Messmann v. Ihlen- 99. feldt, 89 Wis. 585, 62 N. W. 522; ioe Kenyon v. City of Mondovi, Wimbish v. Hamilton, 47 La. Ann. 98 Wis. 50. 73 N. W. 314; Chicago, 246, 16 S. 856; Savannah St. R. Co. R. I. & p. R. Co. v. Parks, 59 v. Ficklin, 94 Ga. 146, 20 S. E. 646; Kas. 790, 54 Pac. 1052; S. v. Can- Hay v. Carolina M. R. Co. 41 S. Car. non , 52 S. Car. 452, 30 S. E. 589. 542, 19 S. E. 976; Rogers v. Black, ioe* Smith v. Richardson Lumber 99 Ga. 139, 25 S. E. 23; Johnson Co. (Tex. Cv. App.), 47 S. W. 386. v. Galveston H. & N. R. Co. 27 JOT Carrell v. Kalamazoo Cold Tex. Cv. App. 616, 66 S. W. 906; Storage Co. 112, Mich. 34, 70 N. W. Southern R. Co. v. Coursey, 115 323, 67 Am. St. 381, 36 L. R. A. Ga. 602, 41 S. E. 1013; Missouri, 523. K. & T. R. Co. v. Walden (Tex. ios Ford v. S. 101 Tenn. 454, 47 Cv. App.), 66 S. W. 584; Missouri S. W. 713. Pac. R. Co. v. Hildebrand, 52 Kas. 109 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Ray, 284, 34 Pac. 738; Chicago, &c. R. Co. 101 Tenn. 1, 46 S. W. 554; S. v. v. Groves, 56 Kas. 601, 44 Pac. 628; Dudoussat, 47 La. Ann. 977, 17 So. S. v. Vincent (S. Dak.), 91 N. 685. 27 PURPOSE AND PREPARATION. 26 the court had stated the general propositions of law applicable to the issues in the case. 110 "26a. Repetition when evidence is close. But where the sub- ject matter is covered only in general and abstract terms by instructions, a special request should not be refused where the evidence is close as to the facts of the matter on which the special request is made. 111 26b. Court may refuse all instructions. It is not error for the court to refuse all the instructions asked by a party and prepare and give a full charge on its own motion, but the in- structions thus given must fully cover the law of the case. 111 * And the court may refuse all the instructions asked by both of the parties and prepare others on its own motion, and there will be no ground for error. 112 But, of course, it is error if the court in charging the jury on its own motion fails to embody all the questions of law properly presented in the refused in- structions. For instance, where the court, after instructing the jury for both parties, gives an instruction on its own motion, remarking as follows: ''I have taken upon myself to concen- trate all there is in those instructions into this one, as embodying all the law necessary for this case," it is error, when as a mat- ter of fact the instruction thus given did not state all the law applicable to the case. 113 The court may properly ask the views of opposing counsel as to the propriety of giving certain instructions. 114 27. Defective instructions refused. If an instruction is ma- terially defective or imperfect in any particular, the court is not bound to give it. 115 The court is not bound to correct a no Smith v. Gray, 46 N. Y. S. A. 696; Birmingham Fire Ins. Co. 180, 19 App. Div. 262. v. Pulver, 126 111. 329, 18 N. E. 804, in Snowden v. Waterman, 105 9 Am. St. 587; S. v. Collins, 20 Iowa, Ga. 384, 31 S. E. 110; Souey v. 85; Fowler v. Hoffman, 31 Mich. S. 13 Lea (Tenn.) 472. 215. in* Pennsylvania Co. v. Versteu, n 3 McEwen v. Morey, 60 111. 38. 140 111. 641, 30 N. E. 540, 15 L. R. A. * Sullivan v. McManers, 45 N. 798; North Chicago St. R. Co. v. Y. S. 1079, 19 App. Div. 167; East Louis, 138 111. 12, 27 N. E. 451; Hill Tenn. V. & G. R. Co. v. Gurley, v. Parson, 110 111. ill; Pennsylva- 12 Lea (Tenn.) 46. nia Co. v. Rudel, 100 111. 609; n& Freidman v. Weisz, 8 Okla. Bromley v. Goodwin, 95 111 122; 392, 58 Pac. 613; Howe v. West Key v. Dent, 6 Md. 142 S. Land & I. Co. 21 Wash. 594, 59 112 Wacaser v. P. 134 111. 438, Pac. 495: Preston v. Dunham, 52 25 N. E. 564, 23 Am. St. 683, 10 L. R. Ala. 217; Wittleder v. Citizens' Elec. DEFECTIVE AND IMPERFECTIVE. 28 faulty instruction requested. 116 An instruction which omits any material element or fact on the subject to which it relates is defective, and for that reason is properly refused. 117 Such defective instructions, though correct in other respects, may be refused. 118 And a defective instruction is properly refused, al- though the court may have previously indicated that it would be given; 119 or it may be modified, although the court had in- dicated that it would be given as requested. 120 28. Clauses or paragraph defective. And where an instruc- tion is divided into several clauses or propositions it may be refused if any one of such propositions be erroneous. 121 But it is generally the better practice to give the good and refuse the bad of such instructions. 122 And it has been held that where 111. Co. 62 N. Y. S. 297; Stan ton v. Southern R. Co. 56 S. Oar. 398, 34 S. E. 695; Keithley v. Stafford, 126 111. 507, 524, 18 N. E. 740 (will contest) ; Tutwiler Coal C. & I. Co. v. Enslen, 129 Ala. 336, 30 S. E. 600; Charter v Lane, 62 Conn. 121, 25 Atl. 464; Thompson v. O'Conner, 115 Ga. 120, 41 S. .E. 242; Earle v. Poat, 63 S. Car. 439, 41 S. E. 525, 90 Am. St. 681; Christian v. S. 7 Ind. App. 417, 34 N. E. 825; Terrill v. Tillson (Vt.), 54 Atl. 187; Ricketts v. Harvey, 106 Ind. 564, 6 N. E. 325; Over v. Schif- fling, 102 Ind. 194, 26 N. E. 91; Cleveland & Pittsburg R. Co. v. Sar- gent, 19 Ohio St. 452; Eckels v. S. 20 Ohio St. 508; Railroad Co. v. Shultz, 43 Ohio St. 273, 1 N. E. 324, 54 Am. R. 805; Barnes v. S. 103 Ala. 44, 15 So. 901; P. v. Harlan, 133 Cal. 16, 65 Pac 9; Underwood v. Hart, 23 Vt. 120; Tower v. Haslam, 84 Me. 86, 24 Atl. 587; Mariner v. Dennison, 78 Cal 202. 20 Pac. 386. us Harris v. First N. Bank (Tex. Cv. App.), 45 S. W. 311; Earth v. Kansas City E. R. Co. 142 Mo. 535, 44 S. W. 778; McGee v. Wells, 52 S. Car. 472, 30 S. E. 602; Amsden v. Atwood, 69 Vt. 527, 38 Atl. 263; Alabama S. L. Co. v. Slaton, 120 Ala. 259, 24 So. 720, 74 Am. St. 31; Croft v. Northwestern S. S. Co. 20 Wash. 175, 55 Pac 42; Milmo N. Bank, v. Convery (Tex Cv. App.), 49 S. W. 926; Waco A. Water Co. v. Cauble, 19 Tex. Cv. App, 317, 47 S W. 538; Kluse v. Sparks, 10 Ind. App, 444, 37 N. E. 1047; Mosier v. Stall, 119 Ind 244, 20 N. E. 752; Callan v. McDaniel, 72 Ala. 96; Rolfe v. Rich, 149 111. 4o6, 35 N. E. 352; Douglas v. Wolf, 6 Kas. 88. 117 American Bible Society v. Price, 115 111. 623, 638, 5 N. E. 126; Britton v. S. 61 Ark. 15, 31 S. W. 569; Jacobi v. S. 133 Ala. 1, 32 So. 158; Thomas v. S. 133 Ala. 139, 32 So. 250; S. v. Burns (Nev.), 74 Pac. 984. us S. v Nichols, 50 La. Ann. 699, 23 So. 9>80; S. v. Neal, 120 N. Car. 613, 27 S. E. 81, 58 Am. St. 810. us Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. v. Hubbard, 116 Ind. 193, 18 N. E. 611; Carleton v. S. 43 Neb. 373, 61 N. W. 699. 120 City of Logansport v. Dyke- man, 116 Ind. 26, 17 N. E. 587. 121 Riviere v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. (Tex. Cv. App.), 40 S. W. 1074; Inglebright v. Hammond, 19 Ohio, 346, 53 Am. Dec. 430; Con- solidated Tr. Co. v. Chenowith (V. J.), 34 Atl. 817; Boyden v. Fitch- burg R. Co. 72 Vt. 89, 47 Atl. 409. Contra: Burnham v. Logan, 88 Tex. 1, 29 S. W. 1067; Sword v. Keith, 31 Mich. 247; Peshine v. Shepper- son, 17 Gratt. (Va.) 472, 94 Am. Dec. 468. 122 Walker v. Devlin, 2 Ohio St. 593; Mitchell v. Charleston L. & P. Co. 45 S. Car. 146, 22 S. E. 767, 89 PURPOSE AND PREPARATION. 28 instructions are requested in the aggregate (apparently one en- tire charge) if any part thereof is erroneous it is not error to refuse the entire charge. 123 Also where the requested instruction contains two proposi- tions, a correct and incorrect one, so united that the court, in passing upon one of them, will be required also to pass upon ,the other, the whole instruction may be refused. 124 Or where several propositions of law are requested in one charge as a whole, if any part of the charge is erroneous, the whole may be refused. 125 In Texas, if several instructions are written on separate sheets and fastened together and the last one is signed, as required by statute, all may be refused if one of them is improper. 126 29. Incomplete instruction defective. Or it is proper to refuse an instruction which is but an incomplete statement of the law on the point in question. 127 Thus, where in one count of an indictment the defendant is charged with unlawfully altering the mark on a sheep and in another count with steal- ing the sheep, an instruction that if the jury have a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt from the evidence, they should acquit him, is properly refused, in that it is not a complete statement of the law covering both charges as stated in the in- dictment. 128 It has been held that if an instruction be incom- plete the opposing or complaining party should request the court to modify it so as to make it conform to the law. 129 30. Modifying defective instructions. But instead of re- 31 L. R. A. 577 (not the duty of the v. Weaver, 6 Tex. Cv. App. 215, court to eliminate the defective part 25 S. W. 468; Price v. S. 107 Ala. of a charge); Houston & T. C. R. 161, 18 So. 130; Inglebright v. Ham- Co, v. Kelly, 13 Tex. Cv. App. 1, rnond, 19 Ohio, 337, 53 Am. Dec. 430. 34 S. W. 809; French v. Millard, 2 120 international & G. N. R. Co. Ohio St. 44. v. Niff (Tex. Cv. App.), 26 S. W. 123 p. v . Thiede, 11 Utah, 241, 39 784; Missouri P. R. Co. v. King, Pac. 837; S. v. Watkins, 106 La. 2 Tex. Cv. App. 122, 23 S. W. 917. 380, 31 So. 10; Price v. S. 107 Ala. 127 Keithley v. Stafford, 126 111. 161, 18 So. 130; Bedford v. Penny, 524, 18 N. B. 740; Hooper v. S. 58 Mich. 424, 25 N. W. 381; Wil- 106 Ala. 41, 17 So. 679, 34 L. R. A. liamson v. Toby, 86 Cal. 497, 25 634; Kelly v. Palmer (Minn.), 97 N. Pac. 65. W. 578. 124 Burnham v. Logan (Tex. Cv. 128 Barnes v. S. 103 Ala. 44, 15 App.), 29 S. W. 1067. So. 901. 125 Oliver v. S. 38 Fla. 46, 20 129 Baltimore & O. S. W. R. Co. So. 803; Lanyon v. Edwards (Tex. v. Young, 153 Ind. 163, 54 N. B. Cv. App.), 26 S. W. 524; Yarborougu 791. 29 MODIFYING WHEN DEFECTIVE OR CORRECT. 31 fusing a defective instruction the court may modify it in such manner as will cure the defect and give it as modified; and if the instruction as modified correctly states the law, there can be no ground for complaint. 130 The modification may consist of striking out any objectionable word, phrase or clause, as for instance, "as testified to by the justice." 131 An instruction as to whether an injury was caused by accident may be mod- ified by adding to it a definition of the term "accident." 132 The modification of an instruction by substituting "due care" for "ordinary care" is not error. 133 And where the court modifies an instruction for the purpose of reconciling it with others asked by the complaining party, such modification cannot be urged as ground for error, although the modification may be improper. 13 * Nor will a party be allowed to complain of a modification of one of his instructions to make it conform to an- other asked by him. 135 31. Modifying correct instructions. But should the court modify a correct instruction, the modification will be regarded as immaterial if it in no manner changes the meaning of the instruction as originally requested. 136 The modification of an iso Crown C. & C. Co. v. Taylor, isi Lovick v. Atlantic C. L. R. 184 111. 250, 56 N. E. 388; Illinois Co. 129 N. Car. 427, 40 S. E. 191. Cent. R. Co. v. McClelland, 42 111. 1-12 Barnett & R. Co. v. Schlapka, 359; Morgan v. Peet, 32 111. 287; Hin- 208 111. 436. shaw v. S. 147 Ind. 334, 47 N. E. 157; isa St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Conkey Co. v. Bueherer, 84 111. App. Warren, 65 Ark. 619, 48 S. W. 222. 633; Meigs v. Dexter, 172 Mass. 134 Funk v. Babbitt, 156 111. 408, 217, 52 N. E. '<5; Cook v. Los An- 41 N. E. 166; Louisville, N. O. & T. geles & P. E. R. Co. 134 Cal. 279, R. Co. v. Suddoth, 70 Miss. 265, 66 Pac. 306; Bartlett v. Hawley, 12 So. 333. 38 Minn. 308, 37 N. W. 580; Eilard iss Judy v. Sterrett, 153 111. 94, v. S. 52 Ala. 330; Brown v. S. 38 N. E. 633. See Cicero & P. St. R. 72 Miss. 990, 18 So. 431; Jansen Co. v. Meixner, 160 111. 320, 43 N. E. v. Grimshaw, 125 111. 468, 17 N. E. 823, 31 L. R. A. 831; Hamilton v. 850; Evans v. Givens, 22 Fla. 476; Hartinger, 96 Iowa, 7, 64 N. W. 592, P. v. Hall, 94 Cal. 595, 30 Pac. 7; 59 Am. St. 348; Feary v. Metropol- Large v. Moore, 17 Iowa, 258; Mus- itan St. R. Co. 162 Mo. 75. grave v. S. 133 Ind. 297, 32 N. E. * Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Fiet- 885; Evans v. Montgomery, 95 sam, 123 111. 518, 15 N. E. 169; Mich. 497, 55 N. W. 362; Lace- Chicago & W. I. R. Co. v. Bingen- well v. S. 95 Ga. 346, 22 S. E. 546; heimer, 116 111. 226, 4 N. E. 840; 3. v. Horton, 100 N. Car. 443, 6 S. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Avery, E. 238, 6 Am. St. 613; S. v. Smith, 109 111. 322; P. v. Ashmead, 118 10 Nev. 123; Kimmel v. P. 92 111. Cal. 508, 50 Pac. 681; Dilling- 457; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Bun- ham v. Fields, 9 Tex. Cv. App. 1. dy, 210 111. 49. 29 S. W. 214; Brink v. Black, 77 PURPOSE AND PREPARATION. 30 instruction which ought to be given as asked is not material error if it states the law substantially as the one requested. 137 And if the modification correctly states the law pertinent to the issue and is applicable to the evidence, and does not in- terfere with a comprehension of the legal proposition as sub- mitted before modification, there is no ground for error. 138 But it is error to modify an instruction by adding to it a material qualification unauthorized by the evidence. 139 The modification of an instruction in such manner as to introduce an element in the case which finds no support in the evidence is error. 140 32. In language of request. The court is not bound to give instructions in the language of the request unless required by statute or local practice to do so, but may modify them. 141 In some jurisdictions it is held that instructions must be given in the exact language of the request ; 142 and where the requested instructions are pertinent and correctly state the law, they should be given in the language as submitted, instead of the N. Car. 59; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Kinnare, 90 111. 9; S. v. Fan- non', 158 Mo. 149; P. v. Davis, 47 Cal. 93. 137 s. v. Wilson, 3 111. (2 Scam.) 225; Meul v. P. 198 111. 258, 64 N. E. 1106; Fells Point S. Inst. v. Weed- on, 18 Md. 320, 81 Am. Dec. 597; P. v. Stewart, 75 Mich. 29, 42 N. W. 662; Jamson v. Quivey, 5 Cal. 490; S. v. Davis (N. Car.), 46 S. E. 722; S. v. Hicks, 130 N. Car. 710, 41 S. E 803 128 Myer v. Mead, 83 111. 19, 21. See Creed v. P. 81 111. 565, 569; P. v. Williams, 17 Cal. 142; Cook v. Brown, 62 Mich. 477, 29 N. W. 46, 4 Am. St. 870. 139 Walker v. Stetson, 14 Ohio St. 100; McHugh v. S. 42 Ohio St. 152 (an alteration of an in- struction is the same as a refusal). See Chicago, W. V. C. Co. v. Moran, 210 111. 9, 14, (improper modifica- tion of an irrelevant instruction is not error). 140 Badger v. Batavia Paper Mfg. Co. 70 111. 302, 305. "I S. v. Petsch, 43 S. Car. 132, 20 S. E. 993; S. v. Mills, 116 N. Car. 992, 21 S. E. 106; Lou v. Grimes Drygoods Co. 38 Neb. 215, 56 N. W. 954; Carroll v. Tucker, 26 N. Y. S. 86, 6 Misc. 613; Percival v. Chase, 182 Mass. 371, 65 N. E. 800; Daven- port v. Johnson, 182 Mass. 269, 65 N. E. 392; McDonald v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. (R. I.), 54 Atl. 795; Edwards v. Wessinger, 65 S. Car. 161, 43 S. E. 518, 95 Am. St. 789; S. v. Stout, 49 Ohio St. 283, 30 N. E. 437; McHugh v. S. 42 Ohio St. 154; Crisman v. McDonald, 28 Ark. 8; Jackson v. Com. 17 Ky. L. R. 1197, 34 S. W. 14; Robinson v. S. 82 Ga. 535, 9 S. E. 528; Bond v. S. 23 Ohio St. 349, 13 Am. R. 253. 142 Grace v. Dempsey, 75 Was. 313, 43 N. W. 1127; Lake S. & M. S. R. Co. v. Shultz, 19 Ohio. C. C. 639; Bush v. Glover, 4/ Ala. 167, 11 Am. R. 768; Rogers v. Brightman, 10 Wis. 55; East Tenn. V. & G. R. Co. v. Bayless, 77 Ala. 430, 54 Am. R. 69; P. v. Stewart, 75 Mich. 21, 42 N. W. 662; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Laffertys, 14 Gratt. (Va.) 478; Peart v. Cnicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 8 S. Dak. 431, 66 N. W. 814. 31 MODIFYING CRIMINAL CHANGING TO SUIT ISSUES. 33. court giving others on its own motion of a more general na- ture. 143 In Texas the rule is that whenever a special instruction is requested the court should give or refuse it as requested; and it is an improper practice for the court to make any alteration of the instruction as requested, yet a qualification may be harm- less. 144 32a. Modifying in criminal cases. Instructions requested by the defendant in a criminal case may be modified by the court so as to make them show the theory of the prosecution, although such theory is presented in the instructions given for the prose- cution. 145 And likewise where a requested instruction contains the caution to the jury that they should consider the danger of convicting an innocent person, it may be modified, directing them also to consider the danger to society in acquitting a guilty person. 146 And it is also proper to change an instruction so as to confine it to the evidence in the case. 147 33. Changing to conform to issues. The court may modify an instruction to make it comprehensive enough to cover the issues and evidence. 148 An instruction charging the jury that the plaintiff is bound to prove every material allegation con- tained in his declaration by a preponderance of the evidence is properly modified by adding the words "or in some count thereof," where all the counts are good. 149 An instruction, though proper under one branch of a case as alleged in one count of the declaration, may be modified to make it cover another element or branch alleged in another count. Instructions should not be so drawn as to ignore any issue raised by the pleadings. 150 So also where an instruction requested to be given for the defendant charges that if certain us Jordan v. City of Benwood, 42 146 p. y. Stegenberg, 127 Cal. 510, W. Va. 312, 26 S. E. 266, 57 Am. St. 59 Pac. 942. 859; 36 L. R. A. 519; S. v. McCann, 147 Kimmel v. P. 92 111. 457, 460. 16 Wash. 249, 49 Pac. 216. "8 Hays v. Border, 6 111. (1 i** Trezevant v. Rains (Tex. Cv. Gilm.) 46, 65. App.), 25 S. W. 1092; Dillingham 149 Joliet R. Co. v. McPherson, v. Fields, 9 Tex. Cv. App. 1, 29 S. W. 193 111. 629; St. Louis & S. W. R. 214. Co. v. Ball, 28 Tex. Cv. App. 287, 66 i Smith v. S. 75 Miss. 542, 23 S. W. 879. So. 260; Bingham v. Lipman, 40 IGO Pennsylvania Co. v. Marshall, Ore. 363, 67 Pac. 98. 119 111. 399, 406, 10 N. B. 220. 34 PURPOSE AND PREPARATION. 32 enumerated facts are established by the evidence, then the de- fendant would be free from liability, the court may, on its own motion, modify the instruction by stating the converse of the proposition. 151 An instruction which charges that: "If the jury believe from the evidence that the plaintiff in his application for insurance made a false or untrue statement as to the value or ownership of the property insured, as an inducement to the company to enter into the contract of insurance, and that the company relied upon such statement, and was induced thereby to enter into such contract of insurance, then such contract is voidable by its own terms and conditions, by the company, and it cannot be enforced against it, and the verdict should be for the company," is properly modified by adding: "Unless you further believe from the evidence that the defendant, after it had full knowledge of such representations, waived its right to a forfeiture of said policy on that ground. ' ' The right to a forfeiture and the waiver of that right are properly submitted in the one instruction. 152 34. Further instructions after jury retire. The court may recall the jury after they have remained out some time and give them, at their request, further instructions where equal oppor- tunity is given each party to submit such further instructions. 15 " And it is not only the right, but it may be the duty of the court to further instruct the jury at their request. 154 Such further instructions must be reduced to writing if the original instruc- tions were required to be in writing. 155 isi Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. S. 31 Tex. Cr. App. 173, 20 S. W. Evans (Tex. Cv. App.), 41 S. W. 80. 369, 37 Am. St. 799; Nichols v. 152 German Fire Ins. Co. v. Gru- Munsel, 115 Mass. 567; National nert, 112 111. 68, 77. Lumber Co. v. Snell, 47 Ark. 407, 1 iss Shaw v. Camp, 160 111. 430, S.W. 708; City of Morris v. S. 25 43 N. E. 608; Crowell v. P. 190 Ala. 57; Breedlove v. Sunday, 96 111. 514, 60 N. E. 872; City of Joliet Ind. 319; P. v. Mayes, 113 Gal. 618, v. Looney, 159 111. 471, 42 N. E. 45 Pac. 860, 54 Am. St. 373; Hayes 854; Lee v. Quick, 20 111. 392; Farley v. Williams, 17 Colo. 465, 30 Pac. v S. 57 Ind. 335; Guy v. S. 96 Md. 352. 692; Wilkinson v. St. Louis S. D. is-* Dowzelot v. Rowlings, 58 Mo. Co. 102 Mo. 130; Richlands Iron 75; King v. S. 86 Ga. 355, 12 S. Co. v. Elkins, 90 Va. 249, 17 S. E. E. 943. 890; Hulse v. S. 35 Ohio St. 421; iss Bowden v. 4rchor, 95 Ga. 243, Sage v. Evansville & T. H. R. Co. 22 S. E. 254; P. v. Charles, 26 Cal. 134 Ind. 100, 33 N. E. 771; Wood- 78; S. v. Harding, 81 Iowa, 599, ruff v. King, 47 Wis. 261, 2 N. W. 47 N. W. 877; P. v. Wappner, 14 452. See generally: Cox v. High- Cal. 437; Columbia V. & B. Co. v. ley, 100 Pa. St. 252; Benavides v. Cottonwood L. Co. 99 Tenn. 122, 33 FURTHER CHARGING THE JURY. 36 35. Further instructions in absence of counsel. But the court cannot send to the jury material additional instructions after they have retired, in the absence or without the knowledge or consent of counsel of the respective parties, though such ad- ditional instructions be requested by the jury. 150 The mere giving of further instructions, however, in the absence of counsel is not of itself error if given in open court. 157 In such case the court is not bound to send for the parties or their counsel, whose duty it is to remain in court until the jury return a ver- dict. 158 If it appears that no injury was done to the complain- ing party, the error in thus instructing is harmless. 159 It is not error to thus give further instructions when counsel are present and make no objection, if the additional instructions correctly state the law. 160 36. Further instructions in absence of defendant. The mere giving of further instructions in any criminal case in the ab- sence of the defendant is -error, unless in case the defendant has absconded, or in some manner waived his right to be present. 161 And it is error to further instruct, in the absence of the defendant, although the court may merely re-read the in- 41 S. W. 351; Willis v. S. 89 Ga. Dec. 430 (not error if counsel have 188, 15 S. E. 32. been called); Feibelman v. Man- ise Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Rob- Chester F. A. Co. 108 Ala. 180, 19 So. bins, 159 111. 602, 43 N. B. 332; 540. Com. v. Howe (Pa. Super. Ct), 4 157 Aerheart v. St. Louis, I. M. W. N. Oas. 246; Felker v. Douglass, & S. R. Co. 90 Fed 907; Wade v. (Tex. Cv. App.), 57 S. W. 323; Ordway, I Baxt. (Tenn.) 229. Seagrave v. Hall, 3 Ohio Cir. Dec. 158 Cooper v. Morris, 48 N. J. L. 221. See City of Joliet v. Looney, 607, 7 Atl. 427; Cornish v. Graff, 159 111. 471, 42 N. B. 854; Kehrley 36 Hun (N. Y.) 160. v. Shafer, 36 N. Y. S. 510, 92 Hun, 159 Moseley v. Washburn, 165 N. Y. 196; Fisher v. P. 23 111. 218. Mass. 417, 43 N. E. 182; Felker v. Contra: S. v. Dudousot, 47 La. Ann. Douglass, (Tex. Cv. App.) 57 S. 977, 17 So. 685. See also Seagrave W. 323; Glenn v. Hunt, 120 Mo. v. Hall, 10 Ohio C. C. 395 (no at- 330, 25 S. W. 181; Galloway v. Cor- tempt made to notify parties or bitt, 52 Mich. 461, 18 N. W. 218. counsel) ; Sargent v. Roberts, 1 18 Wilson v. S. 37 Tex. Cr. App. Pick. (Mass.), 337, 11 Am. Dec. 185; 156, 38 S. W. 1013; Barnett v. Salo- S. v. Davenport, 33 La. Ann. 231; mon, 118 Mich. 460, 76 N. W. 1035; Parkinson v. Concord St. R. Co. 71 see McMahon v. Eau Claire W. N. H. 28, 51 Atl. 268; S. v. Paterson, Works, 95 Wis. 640, 70 N. W. 829. 45 Vt. 301, 1 Green Cr. R. 492; Kuhl iei Maurer v. P. 43 N. Y. 1; Bon- v. Long, 102 Ala. 569, 15 So. 267, (no ner v. S. 67 Ga. 510; Benavides v. effort was made to have counsel S. 31 Tex. Cr. App. 173, 20 S. W. present); Low v. Freeman, 117 Ind. 369, 3 Am. St. 799; Jones v. S. 26 345, 20 N. E. 242; Campbell v. Ohio St. 208; Hulse v. S. 35 Ohio St. Beckett, 8 Ohio St. 211; Preston 429 (defendant absconding); Raff er- v. Bowers, 13 Ohio St. 14, 82 Am. ty v. P. 72 111. 46. 37 PURPOSE AND PREPARATION. 34 structions exactly as given. 162 But in several states the courts hold that if the defendant, in criminal cases, is present it is not improper to give such additional instructions, although his coun- sel may not be present. 163 37. Instructing further on other points. In the absence of a statute to the contrary it is not error in further charging the jury to instruct on other points in addition to those on which the jury requested information, providing the instructions are otherwise correct. 16 * But in Texas such practice is prohibited by statue. 165 But the court cannot go to the extent of giving substantially a new and complete charge on the issues. 166 Nor is it a wise practice to repeat the entire charge as originally given, when the jury ask for further instructions, for fear of confusion. 167 But if the jury say they do not understand the instructions, they may be re-read if the parties are present. 168 On the other hand, to repeat only a portion of the charge may be error, especially if no request has-been made by the jury for further instructions. 169 38. Recalling jury for further instructions. The court, in its discretion, in furtherance of justice, may recall the jury and give additional instructions, and the action of the court in this respect will not be the subject of review unless it appears that such discretion was abused. 170 And it has been held that the court may, on its own motion, recall the jury after they have been deliberating, for the purpose of aiding them when they were involved in any difficulty in reaching a verdict. 171 So for the court to say to the jury in asking them to deliberate 162 Kinnemer v. S. 66 Ark. 206, i6 Foster v. Turner, 31 Kas. 65, 49 S. W. 815. 1 Pac. 145. las p. v . Mayes, 113 Cal. 618, 45 "7 Gravett v. S. 74 Ga. 196; Wil- Pac. 860, 54 Am. St. 373; S. v. Mil- son v. S. 68 Ga. 827. ler, 100 Mo. 606, 13 S. W. 832, 1051; ios Woodruff v. King, 47 Wis. 261, Jones v. S. 26 Ohio St. 208; Bonner 2 N. W. 452; Goff v. Greer, 88 v. S. 67 Ga. 510; Hulse v. S. 35 Ohio Ind. 122. 45 Am. R. 449. St. 429; Johnson v. S. 100 Ala. 55, ISQ Cranberry v. Frierson, 2 Baxt. 14 So. 627. (Tenn.) 326; Cockrill v. Hall, 76 in* P. v. M'Kay, 122 Cal. 628, 55 Cal. 193, 18 Pac. 318. See Lloyd Pac. 594; Harper v. S. 109 Ala. v. Moore, 38 Ohio St. 100. 66, 19 So. 901; Chouteau v. Jupiter 170 McClary v. Stull, 44 Neb. 191, Iron Works, 94 Mo. 388, 7 S. W. 61 N. W. 501. See Young v. Hahn, 467. (Tex. Cv. App.), 69 S. W. 203. IBS Hannahan v. S. 7 Tex. Cr. App. ITI Allis v. U. S. 155 U. S. 117,. 610; Chamberlain v. S. 2 Tex. App. 39 Sup. Ct. 91. 451. 35 JUDGE VISITING JURY WITHDRAWING INSTRUCTIONS 40 further (after they had been considering the case for two days), "I feel that no twelve men can be found better qualified than you to decide this case," is not error. 172 Also the jury may be recalled by the court for the purpose of correcting errors in the giving of instructions. 173 It has been held in one jurisdiction that the court may, in its discretion, recall the jury and amplify or enlarge on the instructions, though not requested to do so. 174 The court may, in its discretion, refuse to recall the jury after they have retired, for further instructions at the request of a party. 175 39. Judge calling on jury Effect. The court has no au- thority to call on the jury in the jury room and confer with them about the case without the consent of the parties, and to do so is error; 176 and when the judge does so call on the jury it must appear that the consent of both sides was expressly given. 177 The mere presence of the judge of the court in the jury room, watching the deliberations of the jury, is error, whether he may have said anything or not. 178 40. Withdrawing erroneous instructions Amending. "Where erroneous instructions have been given the court may withdraw them from the consideration of the jury at any time before a verdict has been reached, 179 especially if they are with- 172 Shely v. Shely, 20 Ky. L. R. St. 480; S. v. Alexander, 66 Mo. 148; 1021, 47 S. W. 1071; McDaniel v. Reed v. City of Cambridge, 124 Crosby, 19 Ark. 533. See, also, Sol- Mass. 567, 26 Am. R. 690; Sommer omon v. Reis, 5 Ohio C. C. 375; v. Huber, 183 Pa. St. 162, 38 Atl. Hannon v. S. 70 Wis. 448. 36 N. W. 595; Kirk v. S. 14 Ohio St. 511; Sny- 1; S. v. Rollins, 77 Me. 380, 52 Am. der v. Wilson, 65 Mich. 336, 32 N. R. 779; S. v. Pitts, 11 Iowa, 343; S. W. 642; Hoberg v. S. 3 Minn. 262; v. Chandler, 31 Kas. 201, 1 Pac. 787. Gibbons v. Van Alstyne, 29 N. Y. S. ITS s. v. Lightsey, 43 S. Car. 114, 463. 20 S. E. 975; Florence Sewing M. 177 Smith v. McMillen, 19 Ind. Co. v. Grover & B. Sewing M. Co. 391; Bunn v. Growl, 10 Johns. (N. 110 Mass. 70, 14 Am. R. 579. Y.) 239. 174 Jones v. Swearingen, 42 S. Car. s Gibbons v. Van Alstyne, 29 58, 19 S. E. 947. N. Y. S. 461; S. v. Wroth, 15 Wash. 175 Young v. Hahn (Tex. Cv. App), 621, 47 Pac. 106. 69 S. W. 203. 179 Resmer v. Thornbury, 111 176 Lester v. Hays (Tex. Cv. App.), Iowa, 515, 82 N. W. 950; Sittig v. 38 S. W. 52; Jones v. Johnson, Birkestack, 38 Md. 158; Sommer v. 61 Ind. 257; Quinn v. S. 130 Ind. Gilmore, 168 Pa. St. 117, 31 Atl. 340, 30 N. E. 300. See, also, gen- 884; Sage v. Evansville & T. H. erally, Goode v. Campbell, 14 Bush. R. Co. 134 Ind. 100, 33 N. E. 771; (Ky.) 75; Johnson v. S. 100 Ala. P. v. Benham, 160 N. Y. 402, 55 55, 14 So. 629; S. v. Wroth, 15 Wash. N. E. 11, 14 N. Y. S. 188; Shack- 621, 47 Pac. 106; Hopkins v. Bishop, elford v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 53 91 Mich. 328, 51 N. W. 902, 30 Am. S. W. 884; Reed v. S. (Neb.), 92 N 41 PURPOSE AND PREPARATION. 36 drawn in such manner as to be clearly understood by the jury. 180 And where the parties, by agreement, submit a cause to be tried by the court without a jury, any legal proposition submitted as the law of the case may be withdrawn before the court has passed upon the same. 181 Instructions may be amended during the ar- guments where counsel are not thereby deprived of the right to discuss the effect of such amendments. 182 41. Rulings and remarks not instructions. Remarks made by the court during the introduction of the evidence, stating for what particular purpose certain evidence is admitted, that the jury may understand its proper application to the issues, are not instructions within the meaning of the statute requiring instructions to be in writing. 183 Rulings of the court in passing upon a motion to exclude from the jury certain testimony do not come within the rule of written instructions. 18 * It is not error for the court to give the jury oral directions on matters which do not relate to the merits of the case. 183 An oral state- ment by the court that, "you must not arrive at your verdict by lot or chance, but only by considering the evidence," was held not to be prejudicial error. 186 A direction to the jury to return a verdict in favor of a party is not an instruction within the meaning of a statute requiring instructions to be given in writing. 187 W. 321; Bonner v. S. 107 Ala. 97, ISB White, Kingsland Mfg. Co. v. 18 So. 226; Chicago & B. I. R. Co. Herdrich, 98 111. App. 607; Dodd \. v. Zapp, 209 111. 341 (withdrawn Moore, 91 Ind. 522; Pate v. Wight, orally after reading to the jury). 30 Ind. 476, 95 Am. Dec. 705; Sample iso s. v. Wells, 54 Kas. 161, 37 v. S. 104 Ind. 289, 4 N. E. 40 (oral Pac. 1005; Lower v. Franks, 115 statement that counsel have re- Ind. 334, 17 N. B. 630; Wenning v. quested written instructions not er- Teeple, 144 Ind. 189, 41 N. E. 600. ror) ; Sargent v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. App. isi Smith v. Mayfield, 163 111. 447, 325, 33 S. W. 364; Hasbrouck v. City 45 N. B. 157. of Milwaukee, 21 Wis. 219; Lehman 182 Powers v. Com. 22 Ky. L. R. v. Hawks, 121 Ind. 543, 23 N. E. 670; 1807, 61 S. W. 735. McCallister v. Mount, 73 Ind. 566; iss Farmer v. Thrift, 94 Iowa, Bradway v. Waddell, 95 Ind. 170; 374, 62 N. W. 804; Stanley v. Suth- Clouser v. Ruckman, 104 Ind. 588, erland, 54 Ind. 339; Bradway v. 4 N. E. 202, (reading the pleadings Waddell, 95 Ind. 170; Madden v. to the jury has been held not to State, 148 Ind. 183, 47 N. E. 220; be error); Moore v. City of Plat- Hatfield v. Chenoworth, 24 Ind. App. terville, 78 Wis. 644, 47 N. W. 1055. 343, 56 N. E. 51; S. v. Good, 132 iso Lankster v. S. (Tex. Cr. Mo. 114, 33 S. W. 795. App.), 72 S. W. 388. 184 Bloomer v. Sherrill, 11 III. 1*7 Liggett & M. T. Co. v. Collier, 483, 485. 89 Iowa, 144, 56 N. W. 417. 37 SIGNING, NUMBERING AND MARKING. 43 42. Directions as to form of verdict. The form of the ver- dict which calls for the statement of any legal proposition is included under a statute requiring instructions to be in writ- ing. 188 But to instruct the jury orally as to the form of the verdict is not a violation of the statute, unless some rule or principle of law applicable to the case should be given in di- recting the jury as to the form of the verdict. 189 If the de- fendant in a criminal case desires that a form of verdict should be given as to a lesser or included offense, he should prepare and request such form. 190 The giving of a form of verdict for a conviction without submitting a form for acquittal is not error in the absence of a request for such form. 191 43. Signing and numbering instructions. In some of the states, requested instructions must be signed by counsel, other- wise it is not error to refuse them; 192 and in other states they must be signed by the judge of the court, as well as by counsel. 193 But the giving of instructions which are not signed by counsel as required by statute is not error where the court signs them. 194 It has been held that a statute requiring instructions to be signed by the judge of the court is only directory, and that if they are not so signed the error is immaterial. 195 The failure of the IBS Ellis v. P. 159 111. 337, 339, Buchart v. Ell. 9 Ind. App. 353, 36 42 N. B. 873; Helm v. P. 186 111. N. E. 762; Board v. Legg, 110 Ind. 153, 57 N. E. 886. 474, 11 N. E. 612; Hutchinson v. 189 Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Wheel- Lemcke, 107 Ind. 121, 8 N. E. 71; er, 149 111. 525, 36 N. E. 1023; Helm Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v. Hedges, v. P. 186 111. 153; Ellis v. P. 159 105 Ind. 398, 7 N. E. 801; Citizens 111. 337, 42 N. E. 873, 57 N. E. St. R. Co. v. Hobbs, 15 Ind. App. 886; Carlyle Canning Co. v. Bal- 610, 43 N. E. 479; Craig v. Frazier, timore & O. S. W. R. Co. 77 111. 127 Ind. 286, 26 N. E. 842; Farrer App. 396; Smith v. P. 142 111. 124, 31 v. McNair, 65 Kas. 147, 69 Pac. 167. N. E. 599; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. ia Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. Hammer, 85 111. 526. v. Neel (Tex. Cv. App.), 26 S. W. 190 Dunn v. P. 109 111. 646; Dacey 788; Denmark v. S. 43 Fla. 182, v. P. 116 111. 575, 6 N. E. 165; 31 So. 269 (signature under seal Hughes Cr. Law, 3240. not required). 191 Green v. S. 40 Fla. 474, 24 So. i* Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. 537. v. Neel (Tex. Cv. App.), 26 S. W. The court may read the forms 788. of verdict to the jury. P. v. Chaves, 195 Halley v. Tichenor, 120 Iowa, 122 Cal. 134, 54 Pac. 596. 164, 94 N. W. 472; S. v. Stanley, 48 192 State Nat. Bank v. Bennett, Iowa, 221; Dlllingham v. Bryant 8 Ind. App. 679, 36 N. E. 551; Texas (Tex. App.), 14 S, W. 1017; & P. R. Co. v. Mitchell (Tex. Cv. Parker v. Chancellor, 78 Tex. 524, App.), 26 S. W. 154; Mason v. Sieg- 15 S. W. 157. Contra: Baker v. litz, 22 Colo. 320, 44 Pac. 588; S. 17 Fla. 410; Tyree v. Parham, 44 PURPOSE AND PREPARATION. 38 court to number the instructions or paragraphs is not ground for reversal, although by statute the court is required to number and sign them. 196 44. Marking "given," "refused," effect. Under a statute requiring instructions which are given, to be marked on the margin "given," and those which are refused to be marked "refused," it is not material error if they are not so marked. 197 A statute requiring instructions to be thus marked is only di- rectory, and not mandatory. 198 Hence, the giving of an instruc- tion, though not marked as required, is not material error, 199 especially if no objection was made to the giving of it without thus marking it. 200 So when it is difficult to determine whether an instruction which was given was marked ' ' given " or " re- fused," there is no ground for complaint. 201 It follows from what has been said that an instruction which is neither marked "given" nor "refused," and not read to the jury will be regarded as refused. 202 In some jurisdictions where instructions are given by the court on its own motion they are not required to be marked "given." 203 But where a cor- rect instruction which was proper to be given was marked "re- fused," but read to the jury and given with others marked "given," it was held to be error in the absence of any other 66 Ala. 424; Smith v. S. 1 Tex. 76 N. W. 660; Daxanbeklav v. P. App. 416 (as to felony); Carter v. 93 111. App. 553. S. 22 Fla. 553 (the manner of sign- 100 Tobin v. S. 101 111. 121; Mc- ing held sufficient). Clellan v. Hem, 56 Neb. 600, 77 N. 196 Shields v. S. 149 Ind. 412, 48 W. 120. N. E. 346; Coryell v. Stone, 62 Ind. 200 Jolly v. S. 43 Neb. 857, 62 N. 312; S. v. Booth (Iowa), 88 N. W. 300; City of Chadron v. Glover, W. 344; Miller v. Preston, 4 N. 43 Neb. 732, 62 N. W. 62. Mex. (Johns.) 314, 17 Pac. 565. See 201 Washington v. S. 106 Ala. Weightnovel v. S. (Fla.), 35 So. 58, 17 So. 546. 862. 202 buffln v. P. 107 111. 113, 122, 47 i7 McDonald v. Fairbanks, Morse Am. R. 431; Calef v. Thomas, 81 111. & Co. 161 111. 124, 131, 43 N. B. 783; 486. See Flower v. Beveridge, 161 111. McKinzie v. Remington, 79 111. 388, 53, 43 N. E. 722"; Little v. S. 58 Ala. 390; Cook v. Hunt, 24 111. 536, 551. 265; Tobin v. P. 101 111. 123; S. v. See Kepperly v. Ramsden, 83 111. 354, Hellekson, 13 S. Dak. 242, 83 N. W. 359; Bressemer Sav. Bank v. Ander- 254. son, 134 Ala. 343, 32 So. 716, 92 Am. 203 Ter. v. Cordova (N. Mex.), 68 St. 38; Barnewall v. Murrell, 108 Pac. 919; P. v. Samsels, 66 Cal. Ala. 366, 18 So. 831; Goodwin v. S. 99, 4 Pac. 1061; Gillen v. Riley, (Ala.), 18 So. 694; Moore v. Swee- 27 Neb. 158, 42 N. W. 1054 See ney, 28 111. App. 547 (writing on an Harvey v. Tama Co. 53 Iowa. 228, instruction the reason for refusing 5 N. W. 130 ("instructions one to is a compliance with the statute), seven all refused." is sufficient). 198 Turley v. Griffin, 106 Iowa, 161, Lawrenceville Cement Co. v. Park, 39 MARKING AND UNDERSCORING. 45 instructions on the same point in a case where the facts were closely contested. 204 45. Marking for plaintiff Underscoring, The charge should be given to the jury as the instructions of the court with- out anything appearing on them, showing at whose instance they were given. The instructions should not be marked or indi- cated as "for the plaintiff" or "for the defendant." 205 But to give instructions thus marked is not reversible error. 206 Sub- mitting to the jury instructions with the authorities noted on them, showing the volume and page of the book in which the law may be found, will not be presumed to be prejudicial error, although such practice is improper. 207 Underscoring words in instructions given is improper as it gives them undue weight. 208 But it has been held not to be error to underscore words of an instruction where such words are usually italicised in legal treatises. 209 The giving of such an instruction, however, cannot be urged as error unless it ap- pears to have been prejudicial. 210 The giving of instructions in which display type are used is harmless error, where they are used only in ordinary and general instructions on questions not involving specific facts; though such practice is improper. 211 Hun (N. Y.) 586; Ter. v. Baker, aoe Sample v. S. 104 Ind. 289, 4 4 N. Mex. 236, 13 Pac. 30 (marking N. E. 40. on the last page that the foregoing 207 Herzog v. Campbell, 47 Neb. are all refused is sufficient). 370, 66 N. W. 424; In re Goldthorp 204 Terre Haute & I. R. Co. v. Estate, 115 Iowa, 430, 88 N. W. 944; Hybarger, 67 111. App. 480. The Wright v. Brosseau, 73 111. 381; court is not authorized to mark in- City of South Omaha v. Fennell structions after the verdict, Bacon (Neb.), 94 N. W. 632; Williams T. Bacon, 76 Miss. 458, 24 So. 968. v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. 123 Only such instructions as the court Mo. 573, 27 S. W. 387 (held not holds to be the law need be read error unless the jury had the books to the jury: Com. v. Clark, 3 Pa. or knew what was decided in the Super. 141; Baltimore & O. R. Co. cases cited). See Wragge v. S. v. Friel, 77 Fed. 126; Long v. South- Car. & G. R. Co. (S. Car.), 25 S. E. era R. Co. 50 S. Car. 49, 27 S. E. 76 (rule of court requiring the au- 531; Stewart v. Mills, 18 Fla. 57. thorities to be noted on the mar- 205 Aneals v. P. 134 111. 401, 416, gin of instruction). 25 N. E. 1022; Stevenson v. Chicago 208 S. v. Cater, 100 Iowa, 501, 69 & N. W. R. Co. 94 Iowa, 719, 61 N. W. 880; McCormick H. M. Co. N. W. 964; Wilson v. White, 71 v. Sendzikowski, 72 111. App. 402. Ga. 507, 51 Am. R. 269; S. v. Cotrill, 209 Philpot v. Lucas, 101 Iowa, 52 W. Va. 363, 43 S. E. 244, 59 L. 478, 70 N. W. 625. R. A. 513. See Gutzman v. Clancy, 210 Wright v. Brosseau, 73 111. 381. 114 Wis. 589, 90 N. W. 1081, 58 L. R. 211 Hagenow v. P. 188 111. 553, A. 744., See also Barkman v. S. 13 59 N. E. 242; Featherstone v. P. Ark. 706; Anderson v. City of Bath, 194 111. 325, 62 N. E. 684; Wright 42 Me. 346. v. Brosseau, 73 111. 387. 46 PURPOSE AND PREPARATION. 40 46. Court's manner of charging the jury. The manner in which the court charges the jury his tone of voice or peculiar methods of emphasis or the like cannot be urged as error. The reviewing courts are powerless to afford relief for such griev- ances. 212 47. Trial by court, jury waived. In cases tried by the court without a jury, if a party desires to preserve the rulings of the court as to the law of the case, he should, as required by statute, prepare and submit formal propositions to be held or refused, and take exceptions to the rulings if adverse to him and preserve the propositions and rulings thereon in a bill of exceptions. 213 In Indiana, in order to preserve the holding of the court as to the law, the court is required by statute, at the request of either party, to make a special finding of the facts and conclusions of law thereon, in writing, and to which con- clusions of law exceptions must be properly taken. 214 In the trial of a case without a jury, where the decision depends entirely upon the view the court may take of the evidence, whether the evidence of the one or the other party is most reliable when conflicting, no difference what view the court may take of the abstract propositions of law, it will be immaterial. 215 The rulings of the court in rejecting propositions requested, where the case is tried by the court without a jury, cannot be urged as error if the propositions actually held to be the law appli- cable state every principle of law necessary to be considered in the decision of the case. 216 212 Horton v. Chevington & B. C. 150, 4 N. E. 652; Wrought Iron B. Co 2 Penny. (Pa.) 1; Gibbs v. Co. v. Commissioners, 101 111. 522. Johnson, 63 Mich. 674, 30 N. W. 21* Hartlep v. Cole, 120 Ind. 247, 343; Rountree v. Gurr, 68 Ga. 292; 22 N. E. 130; Winstandley, v. Brey- Bishop v. Journal Newspaper Co. fogle, 148 Ind. 618, 48 N. E. 224; 168 Mass. 327, 47 N. E. 119; S. v. Nelson v. Cottingham, 152 Ind. 135, Howell, 28 S. Car. 250, 5 S. E. 617. 52 N. E. 702; Hoover v. S. 110 Ind. 213 Hobbs v. Ferguson, 100 111. 349, 11 N. E. 434; Stumph v. Miller, 232; Merrimac Paper Co. v. Illi- 142 Ind. 446, 41 N. E. 812; McCray nois Trust & S. Bank, 129 111. 296, v. Humes, 116 Ind. Ill, 18 N. E. 21 N. E. 787; Montgomery v. 500; Branch v. Faust, 115 Ind. 464, Black, 124 111. 62, 15 N. E. 28; 17 N. E. 898. Christy v. Stafford, 123 111. 466, 14 215 Stowell v. Moore, 89 111. 563, 31 N. E. 680; Mclntyre v. Sholtey, Am. R. 105. 121 111. 665, 13 N. E. 239, 2 Am. St. 210 Germania Fire Ins. Co. v. 140; Kelderhouse v. Hall, 116 111. Hicks, 125 111. 364, 17 N. E. 792, 8 Am St. 384. CHAPTER II. QUALITIES AND REQUISITES. Sec. 48. Abstract propositions of law. 49. Cautionary instructions Gen- erally. 50. Cautionary instructions Matters not raised on the trial. 51. Cautionary instructions Against opinion of court. 52. Cautionary instructions Crim- inal cases. 53. Referring jury to the pleadings. 54. Instructions limited to some counts. 55. In criminal cases Referring to indictment. 56. Whole law in one instruction unnecessary. 57. Instructions as to damages Measure of. 58. Instructions as to damages Personal injury. 59. Instructions as to damages Exemplary or punitive. 60. Misleading instructions Ob- scure, though correct. 61. Misleading instructions Sus- ceptible of two meanings. 62. Misleading instructions If ev- idence is conflicting. 63. Misleading instructions Gen- erally erroneous. Sec. 64. Misleading instructions Cured by others. 65. Misleading instructions Illus- trations. 66. Argumentative instructions Generally. 67. Argumentative instructions Not necessarily erroneous. 68. Argumentative instructions- Illustrations. 69. Interrogative instructions Im- proper. 70. Instructions construed as a whole. 71. Instructions of both parties construed together. 72. If instructions be harmonious, defects are harmless. 73. Grouping instructions into one series. 74. Words, phrases and clauses. 75. Definition of terms. 76. Definition of terms Contin- ued. 77. Ungrammatical and awkwardly arranged. 78. Misuse of names, terms, etc. Effect. 79. Words omitted from instruc- tions. 48. Abstract propositions of law. Instructions should be so framed as to inform the jury what the law is, as applicable to the facts in evidence, and not in general terms in the form of 41 QUALITIES AND REQUISITES. abstract propositions of law. 1 Such instructions, although ab- stractly correct, are likely to be misleading, and for that rea- son should not be given. 2 Ah instruction, though correctly stating an abstract proposi- tion of law, may be refused if there is no evidence upon which to base it, or if it in no wise has any application to the facts of a case. 3 But the giving of instructions which merely announce 1 Morris v. Platt, 32 Conn. 75. See Hassett v. Johnson, 48 111. 68, D5 Am. Dec. 519; Seekel v. Norman, 71 Iowa, 264, 32 N. W. 334; Bald- win v. S. 75 Ga. 489; S. v. Jones, 87 N. Car. 542; Pittsburg Coal Co. v. Estievenard, 53 Ohio St. 43, 40 N. E. 725; Parmlee v. Adolph, 20 Ohio St. 10; Fisher v. Central Lead Co. 156 Mo. 479, 56 S. W. 1107; P. v. Hart- man, 130 Cal. 487, 62 Pac. 823; Smi- ley v. Scott, 179 111. 142, 53 N. E. 544; Thomas v. S. 126 Ala. 4, 28 So. 591; P. v. Considine, 105 Mich. 149, 63 N. W. 196. 2 Caughlin v. P. 18 111. 266, 68 Am. Dec. 541; Collins v. City of Janesville, 107 Wis. 436, 83 N. W. 695, 51 L. R. A. 917; Smith v. Bank Mich. 314, 78 N. W. 137; Chi- cago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Oyster, 58 Neb. 1, 78 N. W. 359; Zimmer v. Third Ave. R. Co. 55 N. Y. S. 308; Stokes v. Ralph Tp. 187 Pa. St. 333, 40 Atl. 958; Kiekhoefer v. Hi- dershide, 113 Wis. 280, 89 N. W. 189; Haydensville M. & Mfg. Co. v. Stef- fler, 17 Pa. Super. Ct. 609; Bay City Iron Co. v. Emery, 128 Mich. 506, 87 N. W. 652; Kohn v. Johnson, 97 Io- wa, 99, 66 N. W. 76; Decatur C. S. O M. Co. v. Johnson (Tex. Cv. App.), 35 S. W. 951; Farmers' & Mer. Bank v. Riddle, 115 Ga. 400, 41 S. E. 580; Blacman v. Edsall (Colo. App.), 68 Pac. 790; Hufford v. Lewis, 29 Ind. App. 202, 64 N. E. 99; Edwards v. Chicago & A. R. Co. 94 Mo. App. 36, 67 S. W. 950; Whittlesey v. Bur- lington, C. R. & N. R. Co. (Iowa) 90 N. W. 516; Southern Ind. R. Co. v. Harrell (Ind. App.), 66 N. E. 1016; Wampler v. House, 30 Ind. App. 513, 66 N. E. 500; Lofland v. Goben, 16 Ind. App. 67, 44 N. E. 553. ii Bay City Iron Co. v. Emery, 128 Mich. 506, 87 N. W. 652; Faust v. Hosford, 119 Iowa, 97 93 N. W. 58; City of Omaha v. Meyers (Neb.), 92 N. W. 743; Smurr v. S. 88 Ind. 504; De Goey v. Van Wyk, 97 Iowa, 491, 66 N. W. 787; P. v. Ricketts, 108 Mich. 584, 66 N. W. 483; S. v. Butler, 47 S. Car. 25, 24 S. E. 991. 61 CONSTRUED AS A WHOLE. 71 the jury, in arriving at their verdict, will consider the instruc- tions as a whole ; that they will notice the qualification which one instruction makes of another when considered together. 102 But whether one instruction qualifies another without reference to it, must depend upon its position in the series and its connection with the others given. 103 71. Instructions of both parties construed together. The instructions given for both parties must be construed together, and when so considered, if they correctly state the law as a whole, any error appearing in one series will be deemed corrected by the other. 104 And although an instruction may be faulty in some particular when standing alone, yet when construed in connection with all the others given for both sides on the same subject the error may be cured. 105 Hence there can be no ground 669, 31 S. E. 571; Northern P. R. Co. v. Lynch, 79 Fed. 268; Texas &c. R. Co. v. McCoy, 90 Tex. 264, 38 S. W. 36; Grant v. Roberts (Tex. Cv. App.) 38 S. W. 650; P. v. Armstrong, 114 Cal. 570, 46 Pac. 611; S. v. Riney, 137 Mo. 102, 38 S. W. 718 (alibi and possession of stolen goods) ; Board of Comrs. v. Nichols, 139 Ind. 611, 38 N. E. 526; North Chicago St. R. Co. v. Boyd, 156 111. 416, 40 N. E. 955; Greenwood v. Davis, 106 Mich. 230, 64 N. W. 26; Masonic, &c., Asso. v. Collins, 210 111. 482, 48ft 105 Sandell v. Sherman, 107 Cal. 391, 40 Pac. 493; Gray v. S. 42 Pla. 174, 28 So. 53; S. v. Lee, 58 S. Car. 335, 36 S. E. 706; Spears v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 56 S. W. 347; Howard v. P. 185 111. 552, 57 N. E. 441; S. v. Cocoran, 7 Idaho, 220, 61 Pac. 1034; P. v. Burgle, 123 Cal. 303, 55 Pac. 998; Joiner v. S. 105 Ga. 646, 31 S. E. 556; Ballou v. Young, 42 S. Car. 170, 20 S. E. 84; Hughes Cr. Law, 3261. citing: Bonardo v. P. 182 111. 418, 55 N. E. 519; Kennedy v. S. 107 Ind. 144, 6 N. E. 305, 7 Am. Cr. R. 426; Boy- kin v. P. 22 Colo. 496, 45 Pac. 419; S. v. McCoy, 15 Utah, 136, 49 Pac. 420; Thrawley v. S. 153 Ind. 375, 55 N. E. 95; Williams v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 55 S. W. 500; Small v. S. 105 Ga. 669, 31 S. E. 571; Kerr-Mur- 102 Galesburg & Great E. R. Co. v. Milroy, 181 111. 243, 247, 54 N. E. 939; Rock I. & P. R. Co. v. Leisly Brewing Co. 174 111. 547, 556, 51 N. E. 572. 103 Springdale Cemetery Asso. v. Smith, 24 111. 481, 483; Murphy v. P. 37 111. 447, 458. 104 Lourance v. Goodwin, 170 111. 390, 394, 48 N. E. 903; Lawrence v. Hagerman, 56 111. 68; Stringam v. Parker, 159 111. 310, 42 N. E. 794; England v. Fawbush, 204 111. 384, 395, 68 N. E. 526; Wenona Coal Co. v. Holmquist, 152 111. 581, 593, 38 N. E. 946; Chicago C. R. Co. v. Mead, 206 111. 178; East St. Louis Connecting Co. v. Enright, 152 111. 246, 38 N. E. 553; Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Monaghan, 140 111. 474, 479, 30 N. E. 869; Car- stens v. Earles, 26 Wash. 676, 67 Pac. 404; Western C. & M. Co. v. Ingraham, 70 Fed. 219; St. Louis S. & W. R. Co. v. Ferguson (Tex. Cv. App. 64 S. W. 797; Lyon v. Watson, 109 Mich. 390, 67 N. W. 512; Meyer v. Southern R. Co. (Mo.) 36 S. W. 367; Hamilton v. Great F. St. R. Co. 17 Mont. 334, 42 Pac. 860; Ritzman v. P. 110 111. 362, 372; Fessenden v. Doane, 188 111. 228, 58 N. E. 974; Stein v. Vannice, 44 Neb. 132, 62 N. W. 464; Durham v. Goodwin, 54 111. 169, 471; Smalls v. S. 105 Ga. 72 QUALITIES AND REQUISITES. for complaint of the giving of an instruction which ignores the facts tending to establish the defense, where it appears that the instructions given for the defendant fully cover the theory, of the defense. 100 So where an instruction may be faulty in that it conveys the impression that if either of two persons who are on trial is guilty both should be convicted, yet where by other in- structions the court states that the guilt of one would not neces- sarily warrant a conviction of the others there is no substantial error; the instructions being considered as a whole, the error is harmless. 107 72. If instructions be harmonious, defects are harmless. If all the instructions considered together are harmonious and con- sistent, and cover all the material issues involved in the ease, then the charge is sufficient, notwithstanding a single instruc- tion standing alone may not correctly or fully state the law. 10 * So if an instruction be faulty in that it requires a greater de- phy Mfg. Co. v. Hess, 98 Fed. 56; Standard Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Schmaltz, 66 Ark. 588, 53 S. W. 49; Miller v. Stevens, 23 Ind. App. 365, 55 N. E. 262; Green v. Eden, 24 Ind. App. 583, 56 N. E. 240; Krause v. Plumb, 195 Pa. St. 65, 45 Atl. 648; City of Louisville v. McGill (Ky.), 52 S. W. 1053; Thom- as v. Gates, 126 Cal. 1, 58 Pac. 315; Walrod v. Webster County, 110 Iowa, 349, 81 N. W. 598, 47 L. R. A. 480; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Zerneeke, 59 Neb. 689, 82 N. W. 26; Ohio & I. Torpedo Co. v. Fishburn, 61 Ohio St. 608, 56 N. E. 457; Bowman v. Bowman, 153 Ind. 498, 55 N. E. 422; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Lyons (Tex. Cv. App.) 58 S. W. 96; Toplitz v. Bauer, 161 N. Y. 325, 56 N. E. 1059; Kim- ball v. Borden, 97 Va. 477, 34 S. E. 45; Kleiner v. Third Ave. R. Co. 162 N. Y. 193, 56 N. E. 497; Stroud v. Smith, 194 Pa. St. 502, 45 Atl. 329; Warfleld v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 104 Tenn. 74, 55 S. W. 304; Hockaday v. Wartham, 22 Tex. Cv. App. 419, 54 S. W. 1094; S. v. Darrough, 152 Mo. 522, 54 S. W. 226; Edwards v. P. 26 Co.o. 539, 59 Pac. 56; Burns v. Woolery, 15 Wash. 134, 45 Pac. 894; Williams v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 55 S. W. 500 Keesier v. S. 154 Ind. 242, 56 N. E. 232; P. v. Anderson, 105 Cal. 32, 3-8 Pac. 513; Smith v. Meyers (Neb.), 71 N. W. 1006; Benham v. Taylor, 66 Mo. App. 308; Butler v. Greene, 49 Neb. 280, 68 N. W. 496; Cren- shaw v. Johnson, 120 N. Car. 270, 26 S. E. 810; P. v. Ross, 115 Cal. 233, 46 Pac. 1059; S. v. Urie, 101 Iowa, 411, 70 N. W. 603; Bell v. Martin (Tex. Cv. App.), 28 S. W. 108; Barr v. S. (Miss.), 21 So. 131; Northern P. R. Co. v. Poirier, 67 Fed. 881; Butler v. Machen, 6& Fed. 901; Housh v. S. 43 Neb. 163, 61 N. W. 571; Hollins v. Gorham, 23 Ky. L. R. 2185, 66 S. W. 823; Cof- fin v. U. S. 162 U. S. 664, 16 Sup Ct. 943; McFaul v. Madero F. & F. C. 134 Cal. 313, 66 Pac. 308; Debney v. S. 45 Neb. 856, 64 N. W. 446; Mulvihill v. Thompson, 114 Iowa, 734, 87 N. W. 693; Terre Haute & I. R. Co. v. Rittenhouse, 28 Ind. App. 633, 62 N. E. 295. ice Meadows v. Pacific M. L. Ins. Co. 129 Mo. 76, 31 S. W. 578. 107 Baker v. S. 17 Ga. 452, 25 S. E. 341. i<>8 Shaw v. Missouri & K. D. Co. 56 Mo. App. 521. 63 GROUPING IN SERIES WORDS, CLAUSES. 74- gree of care than the law calls for, the error is not material when the instructions, considered as a whole advise the jury as to the degree of care the law requires. 109 Or where an instruc- tion, standing alone, omits to state that the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to prove an essential element of his case there, is no material error when other instructions clearly state that the burden of proof is on the plaintiff. 110 Or where an instruction as to the burden of proof is obscure the error is immaterial where others given on the same subject clearly state the law. 111 There can be no ground for complaint that an instruction as- sumes the existence of a material fact where it appears from the whole evidence that the jury must have understood that such fact must be established by the evidence. 112 73. Grouping instructions into one series. The court in charging the jury may group the instructions asked by both parties by arranging them on each particular subject, and read them together as one series. 113 The order in which the in- structions -are arranged, in charging the jury, is discretionary with the court; and the fact that they may not be logically ar- ranged cannot ordinarily be urged as error in the absence of prejudicial error. 114 74. Words, phrases and clauses. The term ' ' difficulty, ' ' when used in drawing instructions, is well understood by all persons. It is of constant application in legal proceedings, and is expressive of a group or collection of ideas that cannot, perhaps, be imparted so well by any other term. Its use, there- fore, avoids a great deal of circumlocution which generally leads to confusion and misapprehension. 115 The word "while" used in an instruction relating to an in- jury alleged to have been sustained through the negligence of the defendant while the plaintiff was in the exercise of or- 109 San Antonio St. R. Co. v. 61 N. E. 1104; Crowell v. P. 190 111. Watzlavzick (Tex. Cv. App.), 28 S. 508, 519, 60 N. E. 872; Bonardo v. W. 115. P. 182 111. 411. 55 N. E. 579. no Crutcher v. Sechick, 10 Tex. n* Atcbison, T. & S. F. R. Co. Cv. App. 676, 32 S. W. 75. v. Calvert, 52 Kas. 547, 34 Pac. in Bingham v. Hartley, 44 Neb. 976; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. 682, 62 N. W. 1089. Dunlap (Tex. Cv. App.), 26 S. W. 112 City of Atlanta v. Young, 93 655. Ga. 265, 20 S. E. 317. us Gainey v. P. 97 111. 270, 279. us Young v. P. 193 111. 236, 239, 75 QUALITIES AND REQUISITES. 64 dinary care does not mean at the particular point of time when the injury was received; it relates to the entire transaction in question. 116 Also the words "at the time" when used in draw- ing instructions refer to the whole transaction. 117 The employ- ment of the word "purported" in drawing instructions in a will contest is not improper in referring to the will as the "pur- ported will;" it is more accurate than "the will." And to say the "pretended will" is not objectionable. 118 An instruction defining ordinary care to be "such care as a person of ordinary prudence and skill would usually exercise under the circumstances" is not improper. 119 The expressions ' ' due care, " " ordinary care " " and reasonable care ' ' are converti- ble terms and mean in the same degree ; so that if in a series of instructions these different terms are used in different instruc- tions there is no error. 120 The use of the words "punitive damages" in an instruction, instead of "exemplary damages," is not error. They are synonymous terms. 121 75. Definition of terms. The term ' ' prima facie ' ' used in an instruction in referring to the evidence is as well under- stood as a large share of the words employed, and requires no explanation ; it is recognized as an English term. 122 Using the words "ratification," " acquiescense " and " repudiation " in the giving of instructions without defining them is not error. 123 Nor lie Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Fisher, 111 Wis. 655, 87 N. W. 826; Yerkes 141 111. 625, 31 N. E. 406. See v. Northern P. R. Co. 112 Wis. 184, North Chicago St. R. Co. v. Cos- 88 N. W. 33 (ordinary care not cor- sar, 203 111. 608, 613, 68 N. E. 88 rectly defined), (instruction improper) ; St. Louis 120 Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. N. Stock Yards v. Godfrey, 198 111. Faith, 175 111. 58, 51 N. E. 807; 288, 294, 65 N. E. 90. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Yortz, 117 McNulta v. Lockridge, 137 111. 158 111. 321, 42 N. E. 64; Illinois 288. 27 N. E. 452; Lake Shore & Cent. R. Co. v. Noble, 142 111. 584, M. S. R. Co. v. Johnson, 135 111. 32 N. E. 684; Schmidt v. Sinnatt, 653, 26 N. E. 510; Lake Shore & M. 103 111. 160, 164; Louisville & N. R. S. R. Co. v. Parker, 131 111. 566, Co. v. Pointer's Adm'r (Ky.) ( 69 23 N. E. 237. S. W. 1108. us Egbers v. Egbers, 177 111. 82, 121 Roth v. Eppy, 80 111. 283, 287. 90, 52 N. E. 285; Smith v. Henline, 122 Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Esten, 174 111. 184, 200, 51 N. E. 227; Keith- 178 111. 198, 52 N. E. 954; Louisville, ley v. Stafford, 126 111. 507, 521, 18 E. & St. L. C. R. Co. v. Spencer, N. E. 740; Campbell v. Campbell, 149 111. 103, 36 N. E. 91. 138 111. 612, 28 N. E. 1080. 123 Iowa State Sav. Bank v. ii Chase v. Blodgett Milling Co. Black, 91 Iowa, 490, 59 N. W. 283. 65 DEFINITION OF TERMS. 75 is it necessary to define the term negligence when used in an instruction. 124 The word "carelessly" used in an instruction as to knowingly and carelessly permitting stock to injure trees, need not be defined. 125 Nor need the word "contributed" be defined when used in an instruction. 126 It is not necessary to define the words ^'fraud," "preponderance" and "presumption" when using them in instructions. 127 The words "felonious" and "feloniously," when used in in- structions, need not be defined. 128 But on the other hand, it has been held that the word felonious should be explained. "To charge a jury of even more than average intelligence, but who are unlearned in the law, that one who acted under the fears of a reasonable man that a felony was about to be committed on him by another would be justified in taking the life of such person without explaining what is meant by the term 'felony,' leaves the jury almost, if not entirely, in the dark as to what is necessary to constitute a defense in such a case." In all cases where the term "felony" or other technical term of the law is contained in the statute the meaning should be explained to the jury. 129 Nor need the words "falsely" and "fraudulently" be defined when used in instructions. 130 The court is not required to instruct as to the meaning of a particular word used in the indictment in describing the of- fense which may be eliminated as mere surplusage, such, for in- stance, as the word "feloniously" under a statute for wilfully shooting" at another. 131 The words "cool," "sedate" and "de- liberate" used in an instruction need not be defined. They should be received in their usual and ordinary acceptation. 132 In a homicide case the giving of an instruction containing the 124 American Cotton Co. v. Smith 129 Roberts v. S. 114 Ga. 450 40 (Tex. Cv. App.), 69 S. W. 443. S. E. 297. See Cobb v. Covenant 125 Warden v. Henry, 117 Mo. 530, M. B. Asso. 153 Mass. 176, 26 N. 23 S. W. 776. E. 230. 126 Bunyan v. Loftus, 90 Iowa, iso S. v. Gregory, 170 Mo. 598, 71 122, 51 N. W. 685. S. W. 170. 127 Kischman v. Scott 166 Mo. i" S. v. Beck, 46 La. 1419, 16 214, 65 S. W. 1031. So. 368. 128 s. v. Barton, 142 Mo. 450, 132 Beard v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 44 S. W. 239; S. v. Weber, 156 53 S. W. 348. Mo. 249, 56 S. W. 729; S. v. Penney, 113 Iowa, 691, 84 N. W. 509. 76 QUALITIES AND REQUISITES. b'6 words in the "heat of passion," without denning that expression 133 is erroneous. "Malice aforethought" need not be denned where malice and express malice have been properly denned in the same charge. 13 * So instructions containing the words "deliberation" and "pre- meditation" are improper without denning these terms. 133 The use of the words "deadly violence" to the person instead of "great violence" is not error where it clearly appears from the charge that the one expression was used in the sense of the other. 136 Nor is it necessary to define the term "great bodily injury" when used in an instruction. 137 On a burglary charge in the night time the failure of the court to define the term "night time" in giving instructions cannot be complained of as error in the absence of a request to define the term. 138 76. Definition of terms Continued. The use of the term "fellow servant" in charging the jury without defining it is er- roneous. The definition of fellow servant is a question of law. But when an instruction correctly defines the meaning of this term it is then a question of fact for the jury to determine, whether the person alleged to be a fellow servant comes within the definition of the term. 139 Or reading to the jury the statute defining fellow servant without any explanation, is error. 140 An instruction relating to master and servant, which states that the servant does not assume those "risks due to the master," was held not objectionable on the ground that these words are too indefinite in their meaning. 141 The court need not define the term "common laborer" in giving instructions. 142 iss S. v. Strong, 153 Mo. 548, 55 Co. v. Becker, 63 Ark. 477, 39 S. W. S. W. 78; S. v. Reed, 154 Mo. 122, 358. 55 S. W. 278. 141 Eastman v. Curtis, 67 Vt. 432, 134 Hatcher v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 32 Atl. 232. See also Pittsburg 65 S. W. 97. Bridge Co. v. Walker, 170 111. 550, "5 S. v. Foster, 130 N. Car. 666, 554, 48 N. E. 915; Chicago & E. I. 41 S. E. 284. R. Co. v. Kneirim, 152 111. 458, 466, ise Acers v. U. S. 164 U. S. 388, 39 N. E. 324. 17 S. Ct. 91. 142 Boeltger v. Scherpe & Koken 137 S. v. Bone, 114 Iowa, 537, 87 A. & I. Co. 136 Mo. 531, 38 S. W. N. W. 507, 55 L. R A. 378. 298. An instruction using the ex- iss Shaffel v. S. 97 Wis. 377, 72 pression "respondeat superior," N. W. 888. without explanation, is improper, 139 Whitney & Starrette Co. v. Chicago, &c. R. Co. v. White, 209 O'Rourke, 172 111. 186, 50 N. E. 242. 111. 124, 132. See Kehl v. Abram, 140 Kansas City, Ft S. & M. R. 210 111. 218 (material inducements). 67 NAMES AND TERMS MISUSED. 78 77. Ungrammatical and awkwardly arranged. The fact that an instruction is ungrammatical and awkward in its phrase- ology does not render it erroneous if it is clear in its meaning. 143 An instruction which states that a certain presumption "may be overcome by any evidence that satisfies your minds to the contrary," instead of stating that such presumption "may be overcome by evidence to the contrary which satisfies your minds" is not material error. 144 78. Misuse of names, terms, etc. Effect. The use of the word ' ' plaintiff, ' ' instead of ' ' defendant, " in an instruction is not harmful error where it is clear from the instruction that it cor- rects itself; 145 or where the context plainly shows which of the two words was intended to be used; 140 or the use of the word "prisoner" for defendant is not material error. 147 The use by mistake of the word "acquit," instead of "convict," in framing an instruction, renders it erroneous. Thus, when the court in- structs that if the jury find that the prosecution has proven all the essential facts necessary to establish guilt they should "acquit" it is error. 148 The improper use of the word "testimony," instead of "evi- dence," in drawing instructions is not material error. 149 Nor is it objectionable to make use of the word "will," instead of "may," in directing the jury that if they find from the evidence that the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages they "will" determine the amount to which he is entitled. 150 The word "must" should not be improperly used for the word "may" in the giving of instructions. If the jury believe a witness has wil- fully testified falsely as to any material fact in issue they may disregard the testimony of such witness, but they are not bound 1*3 Langdon v. Winterstein, 58 147 Dinsmore v. S. 61 Neb. 418, Neb. 278, 78 N. W. 501. 85 N. W. 445. 144 Rule v. Bolles, 27 Ore. 368, 41 i Cummins v. S. 50 Neb. 274, Pac, 691. 69 N. W. 756. 145 McKinzie v. Remington, 79 111. 149 p. v . Hubert, 119 Cal. 216, 388; Nichols v. Mercer, 44 111. 250. 51 Pac. 329; Padgett v. Jacobs, 128 146 Central Texas & N. W. R. Co. Mich. 632, 87 N. W. 898. v. Bush, 12 Tex. Cv. App. 291, 34 iso North Chicago St. R. Co. v. S. W. 133; Flam v. Lee, 116 Iowa, Zeigler, 182 111. 13, 54 N. E. 1006; 289, 90 N. W. 70; Pittman v. Weeks, Kane v. Footh, 70 111. 590 ("may" 132 N. Car. 81, 43 S. E. 582; O'Cal- or "shall"); Chicago & E. R. Co. v. laghan v. Bode, 84 Cal. 489, 24 Meech, 163 111. 305, 315, 45 N. E. Pac. 269. 290. 79 QUALITIES AND REQUISITES. 68 to do so. 151 The word "ought" used in an instruction means, in its ordinary sense, to be held or bound in duty or moral obliga- tion. 152 79. Words omitted from instructions. The omission of a word will sometimes render an instruction erroneous. 153 "I Hoge v. P. 117 111. 46, 6 N. (Neb.) 92 N. W. 606 ("and" omitted E. 7%. between fairly and truthfully is not 152 otmer v. P. 76 111. 152. error) ; Southwestern T. & T. Co. 153 Carleton Min. & Mill. Co. v. v. Newman (Tex. Cv. App.), 34 S. Ryan, 29 Colo. 401, 68 Pac. 279 W.' 661 (inadvertent use of "not" ("not" omitted); McCormick v. S. is error). CHAPTER III. BASED ON EVIDENCE AND PLEADINGS. Sec. 80. Supported by evidence. 81. Supported by evidence Illus- trations. 82. Supported by evidence Crim- inal cases. 83. Defense unsupported by evi- dence. 84. Based on incompetent evidence. 85. Speculative evidence Insuffi- cient. 86. Slight evidence will support instructions. 87. Circumstantial evidence suffi- cient. 88. Evidence sufficient Criminal cases. 89. Evidence sufficient Larceny. 90. Instructions stating issues arid contentions. 91. Instructions as to immaterial issues. 92. Instructions ignoring issues. 93. Issues unsupported by evi- dence. 93a. Issues unsupported by evidence Illustrations. 94. Instructions based on plead- ings. 95. Based on evidence rather than pleadings. 96. Instructions confined to de- fenses alleged. . 97. Instructions based on plead- ings Illustrations. 98. Instructions limited to counts. 99. Issues raised outside of plead- ings. Sec. 100. Issues abandoned. 101. Theory of party Instructions. 102. Instructions when several the- ories. 103. Instructions when several the- ories Illustrations. 104. Instructions need not notice opposing theory. 105. Instructions confining jury to evidence. 106. Confining jury as to damages. 107. Common and personal knowl- edge. 108. Confined within statute of lim- itations. 109. Limiting evidence to specific purpose. 110. Limited to impeaching Wit- nesses. 111. Limited to malice or intent. 112. Limited to certain defendants. 113. Instructions giving promi- nence to certain facts. 114. Singling out facts When not objectionable. 115. Singling out facts Criminal cases. 116. Instructions ignoring facts. 117. Instructions with dr awing facts. 117a. Actions for personal injury from negligence. 118. Instructions ignoring defense. 119. Instructions summing up the evidence. 80. Supported by evidence. One of the familiar rules to be observed in charging the jury is that the instructions must 69 80 BASED ON EVIDENCE AND PLEADINGS. 70 be based upon evidence ; for if there is no evidence adduced tend- ing to 'prove a material fact, or state of facts in issue, the giving of instructions as to such facts is improper. 1 And this rule ap- i Entivistle v. Meikle,, 180 111. 28, 54 N. E. 217; Lusk v. Throop, 189 111. 127, 142, 59 N. E. 529; Baxter v. Campbell (S. Dak.), 97 N. W. 368; Glucose Sugar R. Co. v. Flinn, 184 111. 128, 56 N. E. 400; American Strawboard Co. v. Chicago & A. R. Co. 177 111. 513, 53 N. E. 97; Sugar Creek Mining Co. v. Peter- son, 177 111. 329, 52 N. E. 475; Doyle v. P. 147 111. 398, 35 N. E. 372; Moore v. Barker* Asphalt Paving Co. 118 Ala. 563, 23 So. 798; Birr v. P. 113 111. 648; Rice v. P. 38 111. 436; S. v. Hicks (Mo.), 77 S. W. 542; Romine v. San Antonio Tr. Co. (Tex. Cv. App.), 77 S. W. 35; Denison & P. S. R. Co. v. O'Ma- ley (Tex. Cr. App.), 45 S. W. 225; Wadsworth v. Dunman, 117 Ala. 661, 23 So. 699; Plumb v. Camp- bell, 129 111. 109, 18 N. E. 790; Chicago, R. I. & P. Co. v. Lewis, 109 111. 125; Farlow v. Town, &c. 186 111. 256, 57 N. E. 781; Murphy v. Farlow, 124 Ala. 279, 27 So. 442; Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Windham, 126 Ala. 552, 28 So. 392; Rock I. & E. I. R. Co. v. Gordon, 184 111. 456, 56 N. E. 810; Williams v. Andrew, 185 111. 98, 56 N. E. 1041; Hersey v. Hutchins, 70 N. H. 130, 46 Atl. 33; Bennett v. McDonald, 60 Neb. 47, 80 N. W. 110; Einseidler v. Whit- man Co. 22 Wash. 388, 60 Pac. 1122; Washington Co. W. Works v. Gar- ver, 91 Md. 398, 46 Atl. 979; Steiner v. Jeffries, 118 Ala. 573, 24 So. 37; Burke v. Sanitary Dist. 152 111. 134, 38 N. E. 670; Hubuer v. Friege, 90 111. 212; Frost v. Foote (Tex. Cv. App.), 44 S. W. 1071; Frantz v. Rose, 89 111. 594; Howe S. M. Co. v. Layman, 88 111. 39; Bank of M. v. Page, 98 111. 125; Yeomans v. v. Page, 98 111. App. 228 (error); Parker v. National M. B. & L. Asso. (W. Va.), 46 S. E. 811; S. v. DeWolfe (Mont), 74 Pac. 1086; Krish v. Ford, 19 Ky. L. R. 1167, 43 S. W. 237; Selleck v. Selleck, 107 111. 396; S. v. Petsch, 43 S. Car. 132, 20 S. E. 993; Truslow v. S. 95 Tenn. 189, 31 S. W. 987; American T. & T. Co. v. Kersh (Tex. Cv. App.), 66 S. W. 74; Jones v. Col- lins, 94 Md. 403, 51 Atl. 398; Walter v. Victor G. Bloede Co. 90 Md. 80, 50 Atl. 433; Butterfield v. Kirtley, 114 Iowa, 520, 87 N. W. 407; Gam- brill v. Schooley, 95 Md. 260, 52 Atl. 500; Griswold v. Town of Guil- ford, 75 Conn. 192, 52 Atl. 742; Ward v. S. 102 Ga. 531, 28 S. E. 982; Wiggins v. S. 103 Ga. 559, 29 S. E. 26; Smith v. S. 75 Miss. 542, 23 So. 260; Dyal v. S. 103 Ga. 425, 30 S. E. 254; Patterson v. S. 75 Miss. 670, 23 So. 647; Herrick v. Gary, 83 111. 86; Lehman v. Press, 106 Iowa, 389, 76 N. W. 818; Braley v. Powers, 92 Me. 203, 42 Atl. 362; Hughie v. Hammett, 105 Ga. 368, 31 S. E. 109; Shiverick v. R. J. Gunning Co. 58 Neb. 29, 78 N. W. 460; Nof singer v. Goldman, 122 Cal. 609, 55 Pac. 425; Western U. Tel. Co. v. Waller (Tex. Cv. App.), 47 S. W. 396; Oliver v. Ohio River R. Co. 42 W. Va. 703, 26 S. E. 444; Nite v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 54 S. W. 763; Griffin v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 53 S. W. 848; Boone v. Ritchie (Ky.) 53 S. W. 518; Howard v. Schwartz (Tex. Cv. App.), 55 S. W. 348; Dolphin v. Plumley, 175 Mass. 304, 56 N. E. 281; Wallace v. Curtis, 36 111. 156, 160; Hodgen v. Latham, 33 111. 344, 349; New England F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Wetmore, 32 111. 221, 249; Lawrence v. Jarvis, 32 111. 304, 312; Pfund v. Zimmerman, 29 111. 269; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Feev's Ex'r, 94 Va. 82, 26 S. E. 406; Kelly v. S. 51 Neb. 572, 71 N. W. 299; Edwards v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 38 S. W. 779; West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Fetters, 196 111. 298, 63 N. E. 662; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Baker, 106 Ala. 624, 17 So. 452; Lucia v. Meech, 68 Vt. 175, 34 Atl. 695; Hodo v. Mexican N. R. Co. (Tex. Cv. App.), 31 S. W. 708; Wheeler v. S. 76 Miss. 265, 24 So. 71 SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE. 80 plies to any feature or element of a case. So if the evidence is wanting on any material fact, an instruction submitting such fact to the jury is improper, and should be refused. 2 And, gener- 310; Caledonian Ins. Co. v. Traul, 80 Md. 214, 30 Atl. 904; Fletcher v. Post, 104 Mich. 424, 62 N. W. 574; Ashworth v. East Tenn. V. & G. R. Co. 94 Ga. 715, 20 S. E. 424; Irby v. S. 95 Ga. 467, 20 S. E. 218 (confession) ; Mittwer v. Stremel, 69 Minn. 19, 71 N. W. 698; Hart v. S. 93 Ga. 160, 18 S. E. 550 (good character) ; Stevens v. Walton (Colo. App.), 68 Pac. 834; Norfolk R. & L. Co. v. Corletto, 100 Va. 355, 41 S. E. 740; Crete M. Fire Ins. Co. v. Patz, 64 Neb. 676, 90 N. W. 546; Texas T. & L. Co. v. Gevin (Tex. Cv. App.), 68 S. W. 721, 67 S. W. 892; Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Rogers' Adm'x, 100 Va. 324, 41 S. E. 732; Illinois Steel Co. v. McFadden, 196 111. 344, 98 111. App. 296, 63 N. E. 671; Ficken v. City of Atlanta, 114 Ga. 970, 41 S. E. 58; Gulf, C. S. & F. R. Co. v. Moore (Tex. Cv. App.), 68 S. W. 559; Hicks v. Southern R. Co. 63 S. Car. 559, 41 S. E. 753; Skow v. Locks (Neb.) 91 N. W. 204; Dow- ney v. Gemini Min. Co. 24 Utah, 431, 68 Pac. 414; Walton v. S. 114 Ga. 112, 39 S. E. 877; P. v. Ward, 134 Cal. 301, 66 Pac. 372; Jacobi v. S. 133 Ala. 1, 32 So. 158; Jones v. Wattles (Neb.), 92 N. W. 765; Cartiledge v. S. 132 Ala. 17, 31 So. 553; Lyman v. P. 198 111. 544, 64 -N. E. 974; S. v. Sheppard, 49 W. Va. 582, 39 S. E. 676; McEldon v. Patton (Neb.), 93 N. W. 938; Braxton v. S. 157 Ind. 213, 61 N. E. 195; Barnett v. Fearig, 101 Ind. 96; Rhea v. S. 63 Neb. 461, 88 N. W. 789; Clem v. S. 31 Ind. 480; Moore v. S. 114 Ga. 256, 40 S. E. 295; S. v. North- way, 164 Mo. 513, 65 S. W. 331; Green v. S. 43 Fla. 556, 30 So. 656; Terry v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 66 S. W. 451; P. v. Ross, 134 Cal. 256, 66 Pac. 229; Allen v. Fuller, 182 Mass. 202, 65 N. E. 31; Broy- hill v. Norton, 175 Mo. 190, 74 S. W. 1024; Prentice Co. v. Page, 164 Mass. 276, 41 N. E. 279; Davis v. Bingham (Tex. Cv. App.) 33 S. W. 1035; Zimmerman v. Knox, 34 Kas. 245, 8 Pac. 104. 2 Tompkins v. Montgomery, 123 Cal. 219, 55 Pac. 997; Gilbertson v. Forty-Second St. M. & St. N. Ave. R. Co. 43 N. Y. S. 782, 14 App. Div. 294; Chicago, K. & W. R. Co. v. Prouty, 55 Kas. 503, 40 Pac. 909; Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Waldo (Tex. Cv. App.) 26 S. W. 1004; Wisdom v. Reeves, 110 Ala. 418, 18 So. 13; Hasson v. Klee, 168 Pa. St. 510, 32 Atl. 46; S. v. Hertzog (W. Va.), 46 S. E. 796; Joines v. Johnson, 133 N. Car. 487, 45 S. E. 828; Towle v. Stimpson Mill Co. (Wash.), 74 Pac. 471; Wild- man v. S. (Ala.) 35 So. 995; Spraggins v. S. (Ala.) 35 So. 1003; Honick v. Metropolitan St. R. Co. 66 Kas. 124, 71 Pac. 265; Winter v. Supreme Lodge K. P. lol Mo. App. 550, 73 S. W. 877 (suicide); Fritz v. Western U. Tel. Co. 25 Utah, 263, 71 Pac. 209; S. v. Bart- ley, 56 Neb. 8,10, 77 N. W. 438; .Union P. R. Co. v. Ruzika (Neb.), 91 N. W. 543; Hunt v. Searcy, 167 Mo. 158, 67 S. W. 206; Parker v. Wells (Neb.), 94 N. W. 717; St. Louis, &c. R. Co. v. Philpot (Ark.), 77 S. W. 901; Bullard v. Brewer (Ga.), 45 S. E. 711; Bullard v. Smith (Mont.), 72 Pac. 761; Denver, &c. R. Co. v. Young, 30 Colo. 349, 70 Pac. 688; Scott v. Boyd (Va.), 42 S. E. 918; Williams v. Avery, 131 N. Car. 18*8, 42 S. E. 582; Burton v. Rosemary Mfg. Co. 132 N. Car. 17, 43 S. E. 480; Crossette v. Jordan (Mich.), 92 N. W. 782; Aldous v. Olverson (S. Dak.), 95 N. W. 917; Central City v. Engle (Neb.), 91 N. W. 849; McDonald v. McDonald, 94 Ga. 675, 20 S. E. 5; Morton v. Gately, 2 111. (1 Scam.) 210; Davis v. Searey, 79 Miss. 292, 30 So. 823 (fraud) ; Harrington v. Claplin (Tex. Cv. App.), 66 S. W. 898 (fraud); Challis v. Lake, 71 N. H. 80 BASED ON EVIDENCE AND PLEADINGS. ally speaking, the giving of instructions reciting matters of fact of a prejudicial character unsupported by any evidence what- ever, is material error. 3 90, 51 Atl. 260; Mitchell v. Poto- mac Ins. Co. 183 U. S. 42, 22 Sup. Ct. 22; Stoats v. Byers, 73 N. Y. S. '893, 68 App. Div. 634. a Redding v. Redding Estate, 69 ,Vt. 500, 38 Atl. 230; Hansberg v. P. 120 111. 21, 11 N. E. 526; Green v. Willingham, 100 Ga. 224, 28 S. E. 42; Birr v. P. 113 111. 649; Knight v. Overman Wheel Co. 174 Mass. 455, 54 N. E. 890; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Bragonier, 119 111. 51, 61, 7 N. E. 688; Mohrenstecher v. Westervelt, 87 Fed. 157; Cannon v. P. 141 111. 283, 36 N. E. 1027; Mon- tag v. P. 141 111. 80, 30 N. E. 337; Belk v. P. 125 111. 584, 17 N. E. 714; Healy v. P. 163 111. 383, 45 N. E. 230; Wallace v. S. 41 Fla. 547, 26 So. 713; Echols v. S. (Ga.) 46 S. E. 409; Rooks v. S. (Ga.) 46 S. E. 631; Johnson v. Com. (Va.) 46 S. E. 790; S. v. St. John, 94 Mo. App. 229, 68 S. W. 374; Scott v. Boyd (Va.), 42 S. E. 918; Spradley v. S. 80 Miss. 82, 31 So. 534; Chrisholm v. Keyfauver, 110 Cal. 102, 42 Pac. 424; Interna- tional & G. N. R'. Co. v. Eason (Tex. Cv. App.) 35 S. W. 208; Mar- tin v. Union M. L. Ins. Co. 13 Wash. 275, 43 Pac. 53; Thomas v. S. 126 Ala. 4, 28 So. 591; Mahan v. Com. (Ky.) 56 S. W. 529; S. v. Swallum, 111 Iowa, 37, 82 N. W. 439; Suddeth v. S. 112 Ga. 407 37 S. E. 747; P. v. Kelly, 133 Cal. 1, 64 Pac. 1091; Rosenkrans v. Bar- ker, 115 111. 336, 3 N. E. 93; Gordon v. Alexander, 122 Mich. 107, 80 N. W. 978; Conner v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. 78 Mo. App. 131; Archer v. U. S. 9 Okla. 569, 60 Pac. 268; Tully v. Excelsior Iron Works, 115 111. 544, 549, 5 N. E. 83; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Bundy, 210 111. 49; Boone v. P. 148 111. 440, 451, 36 N. E. 99; In re Stickhey's Will, 104 Wis. 581, 80 N. W. 921; Den- ver & R. G. R. Co. v. Spencer, 25 Colo. 9, 52 Pac. 211; Com. v. Reid, 175 Mass. 325, 56 N. E. 617; Arismendis v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 54 S. W. 599; P. v. Matthews, 126 Cal. 17, 58 Pac. 371; S. v. Calla- way, 154 Mo. 91, 55 S. W. 444; Haggarty v. Strong, 10 S. Dak. 585, 74 N. W. 1037; Gandy v. Orient Ins. Co. 52 S. Car. 224, 29 S. E. 655; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Bryan, 90 111. 126, 132; Terrell v. Russell (Tex. Cv. App.), 42 S. W. 129; Fore v. S. 75 Miss. 727, 23 So. 710; Brin v. McGregor (Tex. Cv. App.) 45 S. W. 923; S. v. Robinson,. 52 La. Ann. 616, 27 So. 124; S. v. Vaughan, 141 Mo. 514, 42 S. W. 1080; Toledo, W. & W. R. Co. v. Ingra- ham, 77 111. 313; Frame v. Badger, 79 111. 441, 446; Nichols v. Bradley, 78 111. 44; Plumner v. Rigdon, 78 111. 222; Straus v. Minzesheeiner, 78- 111. 497; Andreas v. Ketcham, 77 111. 380; North Chicago St. R. Co. v. Irwin, 202 111. 345, 356, 66 N. E. 1077; City of Chicago v. Shol- ten, 75 111. 468; Roach v. P. 77 111. 29; Toledo, P. & W. R. Co. v. Patterson, 63 111. 306; Paulin v. Howser, 63 111. 312; Albrecht v. Walker, 73 111. 73; St. Louis, I. M, & S. R. Co. v. Woodward, 70 Ark. 441, 65 S. W. 55; S. v. Valle, 164 Mo. 539, 65 S. W. 232; Stevens v. Metzger, 95 Mo. App. 609, 69 S. W. 625; P. v. Mendenhall, 135 Cal. 344, 67 Pac. 325, (intoxicating liquor); Johnson v. S. 36 Ark. 242; Eggett v. Allen, 106 Wis. 633, 82 N. W. 556; Hot Springs R. Co. v. Williamson, 136 U. S. 121, 10 Sup. Ct. 955; Northern C. R. Co. v. Husson, 101 Pa. St. 7; Lurssen v. Lloyd, 76 Md. 360, 25 Atl, 294; Simpson v. Post, 40 Conn, 321; S. v. Labuzan, 37 La. Ann. 489; Thomp- son v. Anderson, 86 Iowa, 703, 53 N. W. 418; Penobscot R. Co. v. White, 41 Me. 512; Layton v. S. 56 Miss. 791; S. v. Parker, 13 Lea (Tenn.) 221; Shaughnessey v. Sewell & D. C. Co. 160 Mass. 331, 35 N. E. 861; Consolidated Tr. Co. v. Haight, 5 N. J. L. 577, 37 Atl. 135; Harrison. 73 SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE ILLUSTRATIONS. 81 81. Supported by evidence Illustrations. Thus in an ac- tion for malicious prosecution an instruction that probable cause cannot exist when good faith is lacking, is erroneous, if there is no evidence that the defendant acted in bad faith. 4 In an action of trespass where there is no evidence tending to prove wilful or wanton conduct on the part of persons in charge of a train in expelling a passenger therefrom, an instruction submitting the issue of wilfulness or wantonness in estimating the amount of damages is erroneous. 5 Or where there is no evidence to show that an injury complained of was the result of wilfulness or wantonness, it is improper to instruct on that question. 6 The giving of an instruction on the question as to whether the conductor maliciously ejected the plaintiff from the car of the defendant, is prejudicial, where there is no evidence whatever tending to support it. 7 Also where there is no evidence tending to show undue influence in the making or destruction of a will, an instruction on that subject is erroneous. 8 Or the giving of an instruction as to the nature or character of undue influence suf- ficient to invalidate a will, is improper where there is no evidence whatever of such undue influence. 9 An instruction directing the jury to assess the plaintiff's dam- ages at the cash value of one half of his probable earnings dur- ing life, is erroneous where there is no evidence tending to prove T. Baker, 15 Neb. 43, 14 N. W. 541; * Harris v. Woodford, 98 Mich. Crowder v. Reed, 80 Ind. 1; P. v. 147, 57 N. W. 96. Devine, 95 Cal. 227, 30 Pac. 378; $ Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Connell, Zimmerman v. Knox, 34 Kas. 245, 127 111. 419, 20 N. E. 89; Waldron v. 8 Pac. 104: ^Etna Ins. Co. v. Reed, Marcier, 82 111. 551; Wenger v. Cal- 33 Ohio St. 283; Case v. Illinois der, 78 111. 275. Cent. R. Co. 38 Iowa, 581. See 6 St. Louis, A. & T. H. R. Co. v. also S. v. Myer, 69 Iowa, 148, 28 Manly, 58 111. 300, 304; Atchison, N. W. 484; Hines v. Com. (Ky.) 62 T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Wells, 56 Kas. S. W. 732; McMahon v. Flanders, 222, 42 Pac. 699 (malicious negli- 4 Ind. 334; Salomon v. Cress, 22 gence). Ore. 177, 29 Pac. 439; Montgomery ? Pittsburg, Ft. W. & C. R. Co. v. Com. (Ky.) 63 S. W. 747; Kirk v. Slusser, 19 Ohio St. 161. v. Ter. 10 Okla. 46, 60 Pac. 797; 8 Mclntosh v. Moore, 22 Tex. Cv. Slingerland v. Keyser, 127 Mich. App. 22, 53 S. W. 611; Boone v. 7, 86 N. W. 390; Donald v. S. Richie (Ky.), 53 S. W. 518; *'olks 21 Ohio C. C. 124; Jackson v. S. 91 v. Folks, 107 Ky. 561, 54 S. W. 837; Ga. 271, 18 S. E. 298; Moore v. Calkins, Estate of, 112 Cal. 296, 44 Ross, 11 N. H. 547; P. v. Hong Pac. 577. Fong, 85 Cal. 171, 24 Pac. 726; Ben- 9 Blough v. Parry, 144 Ind. 463, nett v. McDonald, 60 Neb. 47, 82 40 N. E. 70, 43 N. E. 560. N. W. 110. 82 BASED ON EVIDENCE AND PLEADINGS. 74 what he could earn, or what loss he had sustained in that re- spect. 10 So an instruction that the jury may take into considera- tion the expenses incurred for medical treatment, is improper and erroneous where there is no evidence showing any such expendi- ture or obligation incurred for such treatment. 11 And the failure to comply with certain statutory provisions in conducting a bus- iness will not warrant the giving of instructions based upon the statute if there is no evidence that such failure in any way con- tributed to the accident resulting in the damages complained of. The tendency of such instructions is confusing and misleading. 12 82. Supported by evidence Criminal cases. On a charge of having sexual intercourse with a female under the age of six- teen years, it appearing that the parish register of births had been changed so as to show from it that the prosecutrix was over sixteen years of age at the time of the alleged intercourse, it is improper and erroneous to submit to the jury the issue as to whether the defendant changed the register of birth, where it ap- pears from all the evidence on that issue that the register was not altered by him, and that he had no opportunity to alter it. 13 And in a case where the evidence in a prosecution for rape strong- ly tends to impeach the prosecutrix, there being no evidence whatever tending to corroborate her, it is error to instruct the jury as to corroboration of the prosecuting witness. 14 Or on a charge for maliciously destroying a fence the defendant is not entitled to an instruction charging that if the fence was on the dividing line between the premises of the prosecutor and the defendant he should be acquitted, there being no evidence that the fence was a partition fence. 15 Also an instruction as to the truth or falsity of an explanation by the defendant as to his possession of stolen goods is improper and erroneous where 10 Alabama M. R. Co. v. Marcus, & St. L. R. Co. v. McCune (Ky.), 115 Ala. 389, 22 So. 135. See Coyle 72 S. W. 756 (error held harmless). v. Pittsburg, B. & L. E. R. Co. 18 12 Coal Run Coal Co. v. Jones, Pa. Super. 235; Tuller v. City of 127 111. 382, 8 N. B. 865, 20 N. E. Mt. Vernon, 171 N. Y. 247, 72 N. Y. 89. S. 1103. 13 P. v. Flaherty, 162 N. Y. 532, 11 Andrews v. Toledo, A. A. & 57 N. E. 73. N. M. R. Co. 8 Ohio C. D. 584; i* Coney v. S. 108 Ga. 773, 36 S. Alabama, G. S. & R. Co. v. Davis, E. 907. 119 Ala. 572, 24 So. 862; Ft. Worth ir, Wheeler v. S. 114 Ala. 22, 21 & R. G. R. Co. v. Greer (Tex. Cv. So. 941. App.), 09 S. W. 421; Louisville, H. 75 NO EVIDENCE OF DEFENSE INCOMPETENT EVIDENCE. 84 there is no evidence that he gave any explanation as to how he came into possession of the goods in question. 16 It is error to give instructions on the theory of a conspiracy in the absence of any evidence tending to prove a conspiracy. 17 83. Defense unsupported by evidence. It follows from the rule mentioned that the court in the giving of instructions is not required to recognize any defense presented by the pleadings which is unsupported by any evidence. 18 Thus in an action on a replevin bond where the defendant pleads that the goods and chattels alleged to have been taken by virtue of the writ of re- plevin were not the goods and chattels mentioned and described in the bond, but were other and different goods, the court in charging the jury may properly ignore the defense set up by that plea, in the absence of any evidence whatever tending to support it. 19 So in a criminal case where the defense is insanity and the evidence is entirely inadequate to establish it, the court may ignore and withdraw from the consideration of the jury such defense. 20 84. Based on incompetent evidence. Incompetent or ir- relevant evidence, though admitted without objection, will not justify the giving of instructions based thereon ; 21 and, of course, 16 Grande v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 38 S. W. 613. IT Cunningham v. P. 195 111. 550, 63 N. B. 517; Ter. v. Claypool (N. Mex.) 71 Pac. 463; Crane v. S. Ill Ala. 45, 20 So. 590. is Kellogg v. Boyden, 126 111. 378, 18 N. E. 770; Town of New Wind- sor v. Stockdate, 95 Md. 196, 52 Atl. 596; Deatley v. Com. (Ky.) 29 S. W. 741; S. v. Morledge, 164 Mo. 522, 65 S. W. 226 (insanity); Barg- na v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 68 S. W. 997 (on receiving stolen goods). is Kellogg y. Boyden, 126 111. 378, 18 N. E. 770. 20 S. v. Morledge, 164 Mo. 522, 65 S. W. 226. 21 Eller v. Loomis, 106 Iowa, 276, 76 N. W. 686; Kohl v. S. 59 N. J. L. 445, 37 Atl. 73; Herring v. Her- ring, 94 Iowa, 56, 62 N. W. 666; Covington v. Simpson (Del. Super.) 52 Atl. 349; Elsworth v. Newby (Neb.), 91 N. W. 517; Provident S. L. A. Soc. v. Berger, 23 Ky. L. R. 2460, 67 S. W. 827. See Christian v. Connecticut M. L. I. Co. 143 Mo. 460, 45 S. W. 268; Crews v. Lack- land, 67 Mo. 621; Dingee v. Unrue's Adm'x, 98 Va. 247, 35 S. E. 794; Coos Bay R. Co. v. Siglin, 26 Ore. 387, 38 Pac. 192; Texas, &c. R. Co. v. Durrett, 24 Tex. Cv. App. 103, 58 S. W. 187; Capital Bank v. Arm- strong, 62 Mo. 65; Norfolk & West R. Co. v. Stevens, 97 Va. 631, 34 S. E. 525, 46 L. R. A. 367; Fox v. P. 95 111. 75. See Nye v. Kelly, 19 Wash. 73, 52 Pac. 528; Williams v. Atkinson, 152 Ind. 98, 52 N. E. 603; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Mc- Kee, 43 111. 119, '122; Kohl v. S. 57 N. J. L. 445, 37 Atl. 73; Hollins v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 69 S. W. 594; American Harrow Co. v. Dolvin (Ga.), 45 S. E. 983. But see Qualy v. Johnson, 80 Minn. 408, 83 N. W. 393; Collins v. Collins, 46 Iowa, 60; Central R. Co. v. Hubbard, 86 Ga. 84 BASED ON EVIDENCE AND PLEADINGS. 76 evidence which has been excluded as incompetent will not sup- port instructions. 22 It is not necessary to instruct the jury in reference to evidence which has been ruled out as incompetent; but if an instruction be given, directing the jury to disregard such evidence, it is harmless. 23 The court is not required, in charging the jury, to caution them against drawing any inference from evidence which has been excluded. 24 Incompetent evidence which might have been ex- cluded at any time during the trial may be excluded from the consideration of the jury by instructions if objection was prop- erly made to it. 25 And the court should specifically point out to the jury by instruction what portion of the evidence is in- competent, 25 * and when thus instructed, the error in admitting such incompetent evidence will, as a general rule, be regarded as cured. 26 But, on the contrary, it has been held that any dam- age done to the rights of a litigant, by the admission of improper and prejudicial evidence, cannot well be remedied by the with- drawing such evidence from the consideration of the jury by 623, 12 S. E. 1020. When incompe- tent evidence is introduced at the instance of a party, he has no right to complain of an instruc- tion based on such evidence, Phe- nix Ins. Co. v. Wilcox & G. G. Co. 65 Fed. 724. 22 McGinnis v. Fernandes, 126 111. 232, 19 N. E. 44; Pease Piano Co. v. Cameron, 56 Neb. 561, 76 N. W. 1053; Mefford v. Sell (Neb.), 92 N. W. 148; Pfaffenback v. Lake S. & M. S. R. Co. 142 Ind. 246, 41 N. E. 530; Atkinson v. Gatcher, 23 Ark. 101; Hayes v. Kelley, 116 Mass. 300; New York, &c. Co. v. Fraser, 130 U. S. 611, 9 Sup. Ct. 665; Cald- well v. Stephens, 57 Mo. 589; Shef- field v. Eveleth (S. Dak.), 97 N. W. 368; Sheffield v. Eveleth (S. Dak.), 97 N. W. 367; Honingstein v. Hol- lingsworth, 85 N. Y. Supp. 818. 23 Keegan v. Kinnare, 123 111. 290, 14 N. E. 14; Martin v. McCray, 171 Pa. St. 575, 33 Atl. 108. 24 S. v. Gates (Wash.), 69 Pac. 385. 25 Foxworth v. Brown, 120 Ala. 59, 24 So. 1, 41 L. R. A. 335; Stevens v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 49 S. W. 105; Woolsey v. Trustees of Village, 155 N. Y. 573, 50 N. E. 270; Price v. Wood, 9 N. Mex. 397, 54 Pac. 231. See also Henkle v. McClure, 32 Ohio St. 202; Boston Marine Ins. Co. v. Scales, 101 Tenn. 628, 49 S. W. 743; Russell v. Nail, 79 Tex. 664, 15 S. W. 635; Maxwell v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. 85 Mo. 106; Becker v. Becker, 45 Iowa, 239; S. v. Pratt, 20 Iowa, 269. Contra: S. v. Owens, 79 Mo. 619. 25* Colby v. Portman, 115 Mich. 95, 72 N. W. 1098. 26 s. v. Meller, 13 R. I. 66<9; Indianapolis, P. & C. R. Co. v. Bush, 101 Ind. 582; Links v. S. 13 Lea (Tenn.) 701; Pfaffenback v. Lake S. & M. S. R. Co. 142 Ind. 246, 41 N. E. 530; Busch v. Fisher, 89 Mich. 192, 50 N. W. 788; Deerfield v. Northwood, 10 N. H. 269; Griffith v. Hanks, 91 Mo. 109, 4 S. W. 508; Mimns v. S. 16 Ohio St. 221; Bridyers v. Dill, 97 N. Car. 222, 1 S. E. 767; Beck v. Cole, 16 Wis. 95; Pennsylvania Co. v. Roy, 102 U. S. 451; King v. Rea, 13 Colo. 69, 21 Pac. 1084; Zehner v. Kepler, 16 Ind. 290. 77 WHEN EVIDENCE SPECULATIVE SLIGHT. 86 instructing them to disregard it. 27 An instruction based upon incompetent and irrelevant evidence is erroneous in that it is mis- leading. 28 85. Speculative evidence Insufficient. Evidence which is so slight that it is merely speculative on any material matter of fact in a case will not warrant the giving of instructions. 29 So an instruction founded upon an hypothesis of fact of which there is no direct evidence, but only the possibility of an infer- ence, is improper and not a sufficient basis for the giving of instructions. 30 And although an instruction may be properly drawn and applicable to the facts of a case, yet where there is such a slight weight of evidence that the verdict could not reasonably be different than the one rendered, the refusal to give the instruction is but harmless error. 31 86. Slight evidence will support instructions. But on the other hand if there is any evidence, though slight, fairly tending to support a proposition of law applicable to the case, a party is entitled to have the jury instructed accordingly. The court has nothing whatever to do with the weight or value of the evi- dence. It is the province of the jury, and not the court, to de- termine the facts. 32 Thus in an action for personal injury, if 27 Prior v. White, 12 111. 260, 265. (Neb.) 91 N. W. 537; Sutton v. See Quinn v. P. 123 111. 347, 15 N. Madre, 47 N. Car. 320; Bloyd v. E. 46. Pollock, 27 W. Va. 75; Lemasters ss Evans v. George, 80 111. 51. v. Southern P. R. Co. 131 Cal. 105, See also Harding v. Wright, 119 63 Pac. 128. Mo. 1, 24 S. W. 211; Dickerson v. si Grain v. First Nat. Bank, 114 Johnson, 24 Ark. 251; Willits v. 111. 516, 527, 2 N. E. 486. Evidence Chicago, B. & K. C. R. Co. 80 Iowa, held sufficient to support instruc- 531, 45 N. W. 916. tions in the following cases: Pence 29 Com. v. Hillman, 189 Pa. St. v. Wabash R. Co. 116 Iowa, 279, 548, 42 Atl. 196; S. v. Evans, 138 90 N. W. 59; Yontz v. Com. 23 Ky. Mo. 116, 39 S. W. 462; Watts v. L. R. 1868, 66 S. W. 383 (conspiracy Southern Bell T. & T. Co. 66 in murder case); White v. S. 133 Fed. 453; Statford v. Goldring, 197 Ala. 122, 32 So. 139 (conspiracy); 111. 156, 64 N. E. 395; Steed v. Wheeler v. S. 158 Ind. 687, 63 N. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 67 S. W. 328; E. 975 (relating to violent tem- Gambrill v. Schooley, 95 Md. 260, per as a basis for insanity). Evi- 52 Atl. 500; Cawfield v. Ashville dence held not sufficient to war- St. R. Co. Ill N. Car. 597, 16 S. E. rant the giving of instructions: 703; S. v. Evans, 138 Mo. 116, 39 Com. v. Hillman, 189 Pa. St. 548, S. W. 462. See Cleveland, C. C. 42 Atl. 196 (insanity); Grace v. S. & St. L. R. Co. v. Drumm (Ind.) (Tex. Cr. App.) 69 S. W. 529. 70 N. E. 286 (possible benefits). 32 Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Faith, so Com. v. Boutwell, 162 Mass. 175 111. 58, 51 N. E. 807; Edwards 230, 38 N. E. 441; Parker v. Taylor v. Dellenmair, 85 111. App. 366; 87 BASED ON EVIDENCE AND PLEADINGS. 78 the testimony of the plaintiff alone tends to show permanent injury, it is proper to instruct the jury as to such injury. Ex- pert testimony in such case is not necessary. 33 And the fact that the evidence may appear unreasonable or inconsistent will not warrant the court in refusing an instruction based thereon. 34 87. Circumstantial evidence sufficient. An instruction may properly be given, though not supported by direct statement of witnesses ; any inference which may be fairly drawn from the evidence is sufficient to warrant the giving of instructions if otherwise correct. 35 Thus where there is no direct evidence that a deed was delivered, but there was evidence that it was recorded, that is sufficient to warrant the giving of instructions on the issue as to whether the deed was delivered or not. 36 House v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 69 S. W. 417; Jones v. Fort, 36 Ala. 449; Richmond P. & P. Co. v. Allen (Va.) 43 S. E. 356; Bradford v. Pearson, 12 Mo. 71; Turner v. Ter. 11 Okla. 660, 69' Pac. 804; Com. v. Rogers, 181 Mass. 184, 63 N. E. 421; Walls v. Walls, 170 Pa St. 48, 32 Atl. 649; Union M. L. Ins. Co. v. Buchanan, 100 Ind. 73; Brannum v. O'Conner, 77 Iowa, 632, 42 N. W. 504; S. v. Ezzard, 40 S. Car. 312, 18 S. E. 1025; Chicago Packing & Provision Co. v. Tilton. 87 111. 547; City of Chi- cago v. Shelton, 75 111. 468; Kendall v. Brown, 74 111. 232; Harmon v. S. 158 Ind. 37, 63 N. 630; Winne v. Hammond, 37 111. 99; Newbury v. Getchell & M. L. Mfg. Co. 100 Iowa, 441, 69 N. W. 743; Brooks v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 31 S. W. 410; Cal- lahan v. City of Port Huron, 128 Mich. 673, 87 N. W. 880; Union Pac. R. Co. v. Ruzika (Neb.) 91 N. W. 543; Ter. v. Guillen (N. Mex.) 66 Pac. 527; Grimsinger v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 69 S. W. 583; Young v. Al- ford, 118 N. Car. 215, 23 S. E. 978; Honesty v. Com. 81 Va. 283; S. v. Wright, 112 Iowa, 436, 84 N. W. 541; Hanes v. S. 155 Ind. 112, 57 N. E. 704 (rape); Williams v. Watson, 71 111. App. 130; S. v. Mahoney, 24 Mont. 281, 61 Pac. 647; Thompson v. Duff, 119 111. 226, 10 N. E. 399; Chicago R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Lewis, 109 111. 120, 131; Chicago & W. I. R. Co. v. Bingenheimer, 116 111. 226, 230, 4 N. E. 840; Chicago W. D. R. Co. v. Mills, 105 111. 70; Enright v. P. 155 111. 34, 39 N. E. 561; Brown v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 29 S. W. 772; Brown v. Everett Ridley Ra- gan Co. Ill Ga. 404, 36 S. E. 813; Missouri Furnace Co. v. Abend, 107 III. 50; Baltimore & O. S. W. R. Co. v. Faith, 175 111. 58, 51 N. E. 807; Kehoe v. Allentoron & L. V. Tr. Co. 187 Pa. St. 474, 41 Atl. 310, 43 W. N. C. 189; Reusens v. Lawson, 96 Va. 285, 31 S. E. 528; Tyson v. Williamson, 96 Va. 636, 32 S. E. 42; Wooters v. King, 54 111. 343; Richmond P. & P. Co. v. Allen (Va.), 43 S. E. 356; Carter v. Kauf- man (S. Car.), 45 S. E. 1017. 3 North Chicago St. R. Co. v, Shreve, 171 111. 441, 49 N. E. 534. 34 Hayes v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 39 S. W. 106; Campbell v. Pre- ferred M. A. Asso. 172 Pa. St. 561, 33 Atl. 564, 32 L. R. A. 766. 35 Maes v. Texas & N. O. R. Co. (Tex. Cv. App.) 23 S. W. 725; Stephan v. Met/ger, 95 Mo. App. 609, 69 S. W. 625; Quinn v. Eagal- ston, 108 111. 256; Chicago. R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Lewis, 109 111. 134. See also Sword v. Keith, 31 Mich. 247; Peoria, M. & I. Ins. Co. v. Anapow, 45 111. 86; S. v. Tucker, 38 La. Ann. 789. 36 Horton v. Smith, 115 Ga. 66, 41 S. E. 253. 79 CRIMINAL CASE EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT. 88 Where there is any evidence, though slight, tending to prove a material point or fact, the opposing party will not be heard to complain of the refusal of an instruction submitting the in- sufficiency of the evidence as to such fact when it was not dis- puted by him on the trial. 37 88. Evidence sufficient Criminal case. And in a criminal case if there is any evidence, though weak or slight, tending to prove a legal defense or material fact, it is error to refuse instruc- tions based on such evidence. 38 Thus where there is some evidence, though weak, tending to show that the defendant was mentally incapable of committing the crime charged, it is error to refuse instructions as to his mental condition. 39 And according to this rule, where the testimony of the defendant alone tends to es- tablish a legal defense, as self-defense, he has a right to have the jury correctly instructed as to the law applicable to that defense. 40 Thus on a charge of assault with intent to kill, where the defendant shows by his own testimony that he did not use his weapon until he had been beaten by the prosecuting witness and another, he is entitled to instructions on the law of self- defense. 41 And on a charge of larceny, there being evidence tending to prove that certain property alleged to have been stolen from a smokehouse by the accused was obtained by him from a third person, he is entitled to have the jury instructed that if they believe from the evidence that he got the property from such third person they should acquit him, and a refusal to so instruct is error. 42 Where there is some evidence, though slight, tending to prove a conspiracy, that issue should be submitted to the jury by proper instructions. 43 For instance, in a larceny case where it appears from the evidence that other persons besides 37 Schier v. Dankwardt, 88 Iowa, Rucker v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 750, 56 N. W. 420. 40 S. W. 991. ss s. v. Newman, 57 Kas. 705, 42 Yarbrough v. S. (Ala.) 20 So. 47 Pac. 881; Bargna v. S. (Tex. 534. Cr. App.) 68 S. W. 997. 43 Mitchell v. S. 133 Ala. 65, 32 39 S. v. Newman, 57 Kas. 705, So. 132; Stevens v. S. 133 Ala. 28, 47 Pac. 881. 32 So. 270; White v. S. 133 Ala. Enright v. P. 155 111. 34, 39 N. 122, 32 So. 139; S. v. Finley, 118 E. 561; S. v. Fredericks, 136 Mo. N. Car. 1161, 24 S. E. 495; Bridges 51, 37 S. W. 832; Bedford v. S. v. S. 110 Ala. 15, 20 So. 348. (Tex. Cr. App.) 38 S. W. 210. 89 BASED ON EVIDENCE AND PLEADINGS. 80 the defendant were present when the crime is alleged to have been committed, who may have acted in concert with the de- fendant, it is proper to instruct the jury that if they find the offense was committed by the defendant as the sole perpetrator, or that she acted in concert with others in the perpetration of the offense, they should find her guilty. 44 89. Evidence sufficient Larceny. Where the value of a portion of stolen property which was found in possession of the defendant made the offense only petit larceny it was held error to refuse to instruct on petit larceny, although the value of all the property taken was much in excess of the value constituting petit larceny, in a case where it appeared from the evidence that there were several persons in the house from which the property was stolen. 45 Also the defendant is entitled to an instruction on petit larceny under an indictment charging grand larceny, where it is doubtful from the evidence whether the property taken was of sufficient value to make the stealing grand larceny. 46 90. Instructions stating issues and contentions. While it is customary for the trial court to make a brief presentation of the issues raised by the pleadings as a preface to the law embodied in the charge to the jury, there is no rule requiring the court to make such presentation, and a charge cannot be held defective on that ground. 47 In Kentucky it has been held that the prac- tice of stating the issues in charging the jury is unusual and not to be commended, but not error to do so. 48 But the jury should have a clear understanding of the nature of the issues and con- tentions of the parties, and to that end it is proper for the court to briefly state the substance of the pleadings. This is better than to refer the jury to the pleadings. 49 44 Ter. v. De Gutman, 8 N. Mex. Dupee's Adm'r, 23 Ky. L. R. 2349, 92, 42 Pac. 68. 67 S. W. 15. 45 p. v . Comyus, 114 Cal. 107, 45 4 o San Antonio A. P. R. Co. v. Pac. 1034. De Ham (Tex. Cv. App.) 54 S. W. 40 s. v. Thompson, 137 Mo. 620, 395; Conley v. Redwine, 109 Ga. 39 S. W. 83, 59 L. R. A. 581; P. v. 640, 35 S. E. 92; West v. Averill Comyus, 114 Cal. 107, 45 Pac. 1034. Grocery Co. 109 Iowa, 488, 80 N. 47 Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. W. 555; City of Ft. Madison v. v. Hitzfelder (Tex. Cv. App.) 66 Moore, 109 Iowa, 476, 80 N. W. S. W. 707. Contra: Texas & N. O. 527; Stuart v. Line, 11 Pa. Sup. R. Co. v. Mortensen (Tex. Cv. App.) Ct. 345; Polykranas v. Kransz, 77 66 S. W. 99. N. Y. S. 46, 73 Ap. Div. 583; Bryce Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. v. Cayce, 62 S. C. 546, 40 S. E. 81 ISSUES AND CONTENTIONS IMMATERIAL ISSUES , 91 An explanation of the contentions of the respective claims of the parties enables the jury to act more intelligently in deciding the issues, and to reach a fair verdict. 50 However, the court, in stating the issues, should not copy the pleadings into the instructions, as this is a bad practice and should be. avoided. 50 * It is sufficient to state the substance of the pleadings, but the court should guard against a misstatement of the issues, that the jury may not be misled. 50 ** After once stating the ma- terial allegations of the pleadings and the contentions of the parties they may afterwards be referred to in general terms in the charge by stating that the plaintiff is required to establish each of the material allegations of his complaint by 71; ss Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Griffin v. Henderson, 117 Ga. 382 43 O'Conner, 115 111. 254, 263, 3 N. E. S. E. 712. 501. 83 ISSUES UNSUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE ILLUSTRATIONS. 93a is error to submit to the jury whether or not a party caused an injury by negligence, under a complaint or declaration charg- ing damages to have been sustained by unlawful and wilful con- duct, where the evidence fails to show negligence. 62 And where there are several issues presented by the plead- ings, and the evidence tends to support only one or a part of them, it is error to submit to the jury all of the issues ; only such of the issues should be submitted as the evidence tends to prove. 63 Also if some of the issues or facts a're admitted it is improper to give an instruction calling for proof of all of the issues set out in the pleadings. 64 The fact that the court limits the in- structions to the issues set out in the pleadings where a party has the right, under -statutory provision, to prove certain mat- ters without setting the same out in the pleadings cannot be complained of as error when no attempt has been made to prove such other matters. 65 93a. Issue unsupported by evidence Illustrations. "You are charged that if you find that the plaintiff received an elec- tric shock while attempting to board one of defendant's cars, then you are instructed that if the defendant, by the use of the highest care, could not have discovered the danger from electricity, and could not have prevented the same, then you cannot presume that the defendant was guilty of negligence merely from the fact that the plaintiff was shocked, and cannot find any damages for the plaintiff resulting as a direct and proximate result of such electric shock unless you find that the presence of such electrictiy in the handholds of said car was caused by some negligence of defendant." There was no error in refusing this charge for the reason that there was no evidence authorizing the submission of the issue presented therein. The witness Gerrett testified that the car was bought in 1895 or 1896, and that it was of an improved make. There was no evi- dence that at the time of the accident the car, or its appliances, was in proper condition, or that the danger from electricity 62 Parker v. Hastings, 123 N. Car. St. 541; Connecticut M. L. Ins. Co. 671, 31 S. E. 833. v. McWherter, 73 Fed. 444. es Hubbard v. Hubbard (Tex. Cv. 64 O'Donnell v. Chicago, R. I. & App.) 38 S. W. 388; Wright v. Har- P. R. Co. (Neb.) 91 N. W. 566; Day- die (Tex. Cv. App.) 30 S. W. 675; ton v. City of Lincoln, 39 Neb. 74, Heller v. Chicago & G. T. R. Co. 57 N. W. 754. 109 Mich. 53, 66 N. W. 667, 63 Am. Kettry v. Thumma, 9 Ind. App. 498, 36 N. E. 919. 94. BASED ON EVIDENCE AND PLEADINGS. 84 could not have been discovered by the exercise of care. It was not shown that it had recently been inspected and found in good repair, or that there was any system of inspection in vogue by the defendant. 66 In an action for personal injury, the defendant having pleaded a release, the plaintiff claiming that such release was procured by fraud while she was in a dazed condition of mind resulting from the injury, the issue of the mental capacity of the plain- tiff should not be submitted to the jury where there is no evi- dence tending to show want of mental capacity. 67 94. Instructions based on pleadings. Instructions must not only be predicated on the evidence but also confined to the issues set forth by the pleadings, 68 and avoid submitting for the determination of the jury matters of fact not in issue. 69 Thus, for example, where the pleadings do not pre- ee Dallas C. E. St. R. Co. v. Broad- hurst (Tex. Cv. App.) 68 S. W. 315. 67 Och v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. 130 Mo. 27, 31 S. W. 962. es Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Sanders, 166 111. 270, 281, 46 N. E. 799; Frorer v. P. 141 111. 171, 187, 31 N. E. 395; Brant v. Gallup, 111 111. 487, 493, 53 Am. R. 638; Grim v. Murphy, 110 111. 271, 276; Chica- go & E. R. Co. v. Jacobs, 110 111. 414; Pitstick v. Osterman, 107 Iowa, 189, 17 N. W. 845; Mobile O. R. Co. v. Godfrey, 155 111. 78, 39 N. E. 590; Boldenv/ick v. Cahill, 187 111. 218, 58 N. E. 351; Leach v. Nichols, 55 111. 273; Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. v. Sheris, 108 111. 631; P. v. Lehr, 196 111. 361, 63 N. E. 725; Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Peterson, 30 Colo. 77, 69 Pac. 578; Peters v. McCay & Co. 136 Cal. 73, 68 Pac. 478; Edd v. Union P. Coal Co. 25 Utah, 293, 71 Pac. 215; Chicago, G. W. R. Co. v. Bailey, 66 Kas. 115, 71 Pac. 246 (want of plaintiff's ordinary care) ; Crooks & Co. v. Eldridge & H. Co. 64 Ohio St. 195, 203, 60 N. E. 203 (damages not claimed by pleadings) ; Bartlett v. Cunningham, 85 111. 22; Sargent v. Linden M. Co. 55 Cal. 204; East St. Louis P. & P. Co. v. Hightower, 92 111. 139, 141; Fisk v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 74 Iowa, 424, 38 N. W. 132; Savannah, F. & W. R. Co. v. Tiedman, 39 Fla. 196, 22 So. 658; McCann v. Ullman, 109 Wis. 574, 85 N. W. 493; Anderson v. Baird, 19 Ky. L. R. 444, 40 S. W. 923; Rapp v. Kester, 125 Ind. 79, 25 N. E. 141; Austin & N. W. R. Co. v. Flannagan (Tex. Cv. App.) 40 S. W. 1043; Matheson v. Kuhn, 15 Colo. App. 477, 63 Pac. 125; Texas & P. R. Co. v. Vaughan, 16 Tex. Cv. App. 403, 40 S. W. 1065; Gibbs v. Wall, 10 Colo. 153, 14 Pac. 216; Roddy v. Harrell (Tex. Cv. App.) 40 S. W. 1064; Chamberlain Bank- ing H. v. Woolsey, 60 Neb. 516, 83 N. W. 729; Myers v. S. 97 Ga. 76, 25 S. E. 252; P. v. Topia, 131 Cal. 647, 63 P. 1001; Dieckerhoff v. Al- der, 32 N. Y. S. 698, 12 Misc. 445; Schrader v. Hoover, 87 Iowa, 654, 54 N. W. 463; Shaughnessy v. Sew- ell & D. C. Co. 160 Mass. 331, 35 N. E. 861; Tower v. McFarland (Neb.), 96 N. W. 172; Russell v. Huntsville &c. Co. 137 Ala. 627; Joplin Water Works v. Joplin (Mo.), 76 S. W. 960. es Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Sanders, 166 111. 281, 46 N. E. 799; Bourland v. Gibson, 124 111. 602, 607, 17 N. E. 319; Merrill v. Suing (Neb.) 92 N. W. 618; Wabash R. Co. v. Stewart, 87 111. App. 446; McBaine v. John- 85 CONFINED TO ISSUES IN PLEADINGS. 94 sent the issue of contributory negligence the giving of an in- struction on such issue is improper. 70 And by the same rule an instruction charging the jury that the plaintiff may recover damages sustained for any other negligence besides that al- leged in his declaration is erroneous. 71 A party is not entitled to instructions on any element or feature of a case not alleged in his pleadings, or which is not an issue in the case. 72 And if instructions are not confined to the issues presented they should be refused, although otherwise correct. 73 son, 153 Mo. 191, 55 S. W. 1031; Van Bergen v. Eulberg, 111 Iowa, 139, 82 N. W. 483; City of Dallas v. Beeman, 23 Tex. Cv. App. 315, 55 S. W. 762; Horgan v. Brady, 155 Mo. 659, 56 S. W. 294; Washington Ice Co. v. Bradley, 171 111. 255, 49 N. E. 422; Smith v. Bank of iNew England, 70 N. H. 187, 46 Atl. 230; Rotan Grocery Co. v. Martin (Tex. Cv. App.) 57 S. W. 706. 70 Perez v. San Antonio & A. P. R. Co. 28 Tex. Cv. App. 255, 67 S. W. 1082; International & G. N. R. CQ. v. Locke (Tex. Cv. App.) 67 S. W. 1082; St. Louis S. W. R. Co. v. Me Adams (Tex. Cv. App.), 68 S. W. 319. 71 Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Ray- burn, 153 111. 290, 38 N. E. 558; Cleveland, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Walter, 147 111. 60, 65, 35 N. E. 529; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Libey, 68 111. App. 144; Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v. Kneirim, 152 111. 465, 39 N. E. 324, 43 Am. St. 259; Lebanon Coal & M A. v. Zerwick, 77 111. App. 486; Camp Point Mfg. Co. v. Ballon, 71 111. 417; Indianap- olis, B. & W. R. Co. v Berney, 71 111. 390; Smith v. Wilmington & W. R. Co. 126 N. Car. 712, 36 S. E. 170. 72 Fetcher v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 102 Tenn. 1, 49 S. W. 739; Co- lumbus, C. & I. C. v. Troech, 68 111. 545, 549, 18 Am. R. 578; Taylor v. Felder, 5 Tex. Cv. App 417, 24 S. W. 313; La Grande Ins. Co. v. Shaw (Ore.), 74 Pac. 919. 73 Johnson v. Johnson, 114 111. 11, 622, 3 N. E. 232, 55 Am. R. 883; Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Stoddard, 52 Neb. 745, 73 N. W. 291; Sanger v. Thompson (Tex. Cv. App.), 44 S. W. 408; Baldwin v. Cornelius, 104 Wis. 68, 80 N. W. 63; Empson Packing Co. v. Vaughn, 27 Colo. 66, 59 Pac. 749; Richison v. Mead, 11 S. Dak. 639, 80 N. W. 131; Knight v. Pacific C. Stage Co. (Cal.), 34 Pac. 868; Gulf, C. & F. R. Co. v. Higby (Tex. Cv. App.), 26 S. W. 737; Kyner v. Sambuer (Neb.), 91 N. W. 491; Ben- ton Co. Sav. Bank v. Boddicker, 117 Iowa, 407, 90 N. W. 822; French v. Ware, 65 Vt. 338, 26 Atl. 1096; Kelly v. Fleming, 113 N. Car. 133, 18 S. E. 81; Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Courtney, 30 Tex. Cv. App. 544, 71 S. W. 307; Beach v. Netherland, 93 Ga. 233, 18 S. E. 525; Gover v. Dill, 3 Iowa, 337; Porter v. White, 128 N. Car. 42, 38 S. E. 24; Ten Eyck v. Witbeck, 55 App. Div. (N. Y.), 165; Kansas Inv. Co. v. Carter, 160 Mass. 421, 36 N. E. 63; Thomas v. S-. 126 Ala. 4, 28 So. 591; Texas, &c. R. Co. v. Gray (Tex. Cv. App.), 71 S. W. 316; Schafer v. Gilmer, 13 Nev. 330; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Mitchell, 75 Tex. 77; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Mattingly, 22 Ky. L. R. 489; Bender v. Dugan, 99 Mo. 126, 12 S. W. 795; McGar v. National & P. W. M. Co. 22 R. I. 347, 47 Atl. 1092; Abernathy v. Southern R. I. P. Co. (Tex. Cv. App.), 62 S. W. 786; St. Louis, K. C. & N. R. Co. v. Cleary, 77 Mo. 634; Omaha L. & T. Co. v. Douglas Co. 62 Neb. 1, 86 N. W. 936; Atlas Nat. Bank v. Holm, 71 Fed. 489; Johnson v. Worthy, 17 Ga. 420; City of Dallas v. Breeman, 23 Tex. Cv. App. 315, 55 S. W. 762; Eklund v. Toner, 121 Mich. 687, 80 N. W. 791; Saunders' Ex'rs v. Weeks (Tex. Cv. App.), 55 S. W. 95 BASED ON EVIDENCE AND PLEADINGS. 86 Instructions submitting to the jury an issue not raised by the pleadings nor supported by evidence, which brings into the case many details, having a tendency to mislead and draw the atten- tion of the jury away from the proper issues, are erroneous. 7 * So an instruction which directs the jury that they may base a verdict on some matter or thing not raised by the pleadings is improper and generally erroneous. 75 95. Based on evidence rather than pleadings. Instructions should be based on the evidence rather than on the pleadings. 78 Thus in a personal injury case an instruction that the jury, in estimating the plaintiff's damages, may consider his loss of time, if any, so far as shown by the evidence, is proper, although the plaintiff's declaration does not, in direct terms, allege any loss of time, but alleges in general terms the injury which caused the loss of time. It is sufficient that the declaration states the 33; Alexander v. Staley, 110 Iowa, 607, 81 N. W. 803; Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Patterson, 20 Tex. Cv. App. 255, 48 S. W. 747; Rosenblatt v. Haymam, 56 N. Y. S. 378; Rock- ford Ins. Co. v. Nelson, 65 111. 415, 422; Mahain ". Com. 21 Ky. L. R. 1807, 56 S. W. 529; Bell v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 56 S. W. 913; Sample v. Rand, 112 Iowa, 616, 84 N. W. 945; Breneman v. Kilgore (Tex. Cv. App.), 35 S. W. 202; Phillips v. Cor- nell, 133 Mass. 546. 74 Cerrillos Coal R. Co. v. Des- eran, 9 N. Mex. 49, 49 Pac. 807; Wells & Co. v. Heintz (Neb.) 72 N. W. 1034; Norfolk Beet Sugar Co. v. Hight, 56 Neb. 162, 76 N. W. 566; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Greg- ory, 58 111. 272, 283; St. Louis, A. & T. H. R. Co. v. Manley, 58 111. 304; Cossitt v. Hobbs, 56 111. 238; Blackman v. Kessler, 110 Iowa, 140, 81 N. W. 185; Cunningham v. Davis, 175 Mass. 213, 56 N. E. 2; Georgia, S. & F. R. Co. v. Zarks, 108 Ga. 800, 34 S. E. 127; Rishell v. Weil, 63 N. Y. S. 178, 61 N. Y. S. 1112, 30 Misc. 805; Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Ritter (Tex. Cv. App.), 41 S. W. 753; Queen Ins. Co. v. Leon- ard, 9 Ohio C. C. 46. 75 McCready v. Phillips (Neb.), 67 N. W. 7; Davidson v. Willing- ford (Tex. Cv. App.), 30 S. W. 827; Sweet v. Excelsior E. Co. 57 N. J. L. 224, 31 Atl. 721; Coos Bay, R. & E. R. Co. v. Siglin, 26 Ore. 387, 38 Pac. 192; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Wickham (Tex. Cv. App.), 28 S. W. 917; Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Siligman (Tex. Cv. App.), 23 S. W. 298; Reed v. Com. 98 Va. 817, 36 S. E. 399; Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Josey, 6 Tex. Cv. App. 290, 25 S. W. 685; Mason v. South- ern R. Co. 58 S. Car. 70, 79 Am. St. 826; Bruni v. Garza (Tex. Cv. App.), 26 S. W. 108; Neglev v. Cowell, 91 Iowa, 256, 59 S. W. 48; Spitalera v. Second Ave. R. Co. 25 N. Y. S. 919, 73 Hun. 37; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Courtney (Tex. Cv. App.), 23 S. W. 226; Cage v. Tucker's Heirs, 29 Tex. Cv. App. 586, 69 S. W. 425 (validity of a debt) ; El Paso & N. W. R. Co. v. McComas (Tex. Cv. App.), 72 S. W. 629; Love v. Wyatt, 19 Tex. 312; Southern R. Co. v. O'Bryan, 115 Ga. 659, 42 S. E. 42; Howe Machine Co. v. Riber. 66 Ind. 504; Terry v. Shively, 64 Ind. 112'; Williams v. Southern P. R. Co. 110 Cal. 457, 42 Pac. 974; Morrow v. St. Paul C. R. Co. 65 Minn. 382, 67 N. W. 1002; Holt v. Pearson, 12 Utah, 63, 41 Pac. 560; Morearty v. S. 46 Neb. 652, 65 N. W. 784. re Quinn v. P. 123 111. 342, 15 N. E. 46. See also Birney v. New 87 CONFINED TO DEFENSE ALLEGED ILLUSTRATIONS. 97 injury without describing it in all its seriousness. 77 So in a criminal case for the larceny of a horse an instruction referring to the horse as a "certain roan horse" is proper where the evi- dence shows him to be a roan horse, although the indictment does not allege the color of the horse. 78 96. Instructions confined to defense alleged. The court in charging the jury should disregard any defense not alleged in the pleadings. In other words, the instructions should be con- fined to the defense set out in the pleadings. 79 Thus the giving of instructions on the theory of fraud as a defense to an action for the price of property is error where the defense alleged in the pleadings is a breach of warranty, and not fraud. 80 Where the defendant pleads fraudulent representations as a defense to an action against him for the purchase price of property he cannot have the defense of mutual mistake submitted to the jury, that issue not being raised by the pleadings. 81 So in an action for a breach of warranty on the sale of goods an instruc- tion as to what constitutes fraud, is improper where fraud is not an issue in the case. 82 97. Instruction based on pleadings Illustrations. A charge which states that if the jury find for the plaintiff, such damage may be given as under the circumstances of the case may be just, and that in awarding damages they may take into considera- tion the relation proved as existing between the plaintiff and the deceased, and the injury sustained by the plaintiff, if any, in the loss of the society of the deceased, is improper and erroneous York & W. P. T. Co. 18 Md. 341, 81 Van Hall, 4 Tex. Cv. App. 404, 23 Am. Dec. 607' 2 Thomp. Trials, S. W. 573. 2310. si Braunschweiger v. Waits, 179 77 Chicago City R. Co. v.. Has- Pa. St. 47. 36 Atl. 155; Murchison tings, 136 111. 254, 26 N. E. 594; v. Mansur-Tibbetts Implement Co. City of Chicago v. Sheehan, 113 111. (Tex. Cv. App.), 37 S. W. 605. See 658. Daniels v. Florida, C. & P. R. Co. 78 Quinn v. P. 123 111. 342, 15 62 S. Car. 1, 39 S. E. 762. N. E. 46. See Preisker v. P. 47 111. 82 Wallace v. Wren, 32 111. 146; 382. Frick v. Kabaker, 116 Iowa, 494, 79 Pittsburg Spring Co. v. Smith, 90 N. W. 498. A plea of the stat- 115 Ga. 764, 42 S. E. 80; Jordan v. ute of limitations of three and five Indianapolis Water Co. 155 Ind. 337, years will not warrant the giving 64 N. E. 680. of instructions on the statute of so Farmers' & M. Bank v. Upton, limitations of ten years, Stringer 37 Neb. 417, 55 N. W. 1044. See v. Singleteny (Tex. Cv. App.), 23 Burleson v. Lindsey (Tex. Cv. S. W. 1117. App.), 23 S. W. 729. See Flint v. 98 BASED ON EVIDENCE AND PLEADINGS. 88 where the complaint or declaration does not allege damages growing out of the loss of the society of the deceased, and no evidence was introduced or offered as to the social relations existing between the plaintiff and the deceased. 83 In an action brought by a husband for personal injury to his wife an instruction that the plaintiff cannot recover for mental suffering is improper where the plaintiff does not claim damages for mental suffering. 84 So an instruction charging that "where the jury believe from the evidence that an injury was wilfully done, or resulted from a gross neglect of duty by the defendant," then he is liable for such injury, is misleading and prejudicial where such issue is not involved in the case nor supported by the evidence. 85 Another case : Where the defendant asked the court to charge the jury ''that if they believe from the evidence that the defendant's ice wagon did not run over the deceased they will find the defendant not guilty." The declaration con- tained no averment that the wagon ran over the deceased ; hence such instruction was properly refused. 86 98. Instructions limited to counts. A general instruction stating a correct proposition of law applicable to any one or more of the several counts of a declaration is proper if there is evidence to support it, though it may not be applicable to other counts. 87 But where a party is entitled to recover on only one of two or more counts of his pleadings, if at all, the court should so instruct the jury. Thus where the plaintiff's declara- tion contains two counts, one on a contract and one in tort, the instructions should limit the jury to a finding on only one of the counts. 88 ss Holt v. Spokane & P. R. Co. South Oovington & C. St. R. Co. v. 3 Idaho, 703, 35 Pac. 39. Stroth, 23 Ky. L. R. 1807, 66 S. W. 84 Dallis Rapid Tr. Co. v. Camp- 177; San Antonio & A. P. R. Co. v. hell (Tex. Cv. App.), 26 S. W. 884. Jazo (Tex. Cv. App.), 25 S. W. 712; ss Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Robin- Dallis, 0. & C. E. R. Co. v. Harvey son, 106 111. 142. See Louisville, (Tex. Cv. App.), 27 S. W. 423. N. A. & C. R. Co. v. Shires, 108 so Washington Ice Co. v. Brad- Ill. 617; Galveston, H. & S. A. R. ley, 171 111. 258, 49 N. E. 519. Co. v. Johnson (Tex. Cv. App.), 87 Greenup v. Stoker, 8 111. (3 29 S. W. 428; Gulf, C. & S. P. R. Gilm.), 202, 214; Lake S. & M. S. Co. v. Cash (Tex. Cv. App.), 28 R. Co. v. Hession, 150 111. 546, 37 S. W. 387; Denver & R. G. R. Co. N. E. 905. v. Buffehr, 30 Colo. 27, 69 Pac. 582; * Hoist v. Stewart, 161 (Mass.), Louisville R. Co. v. Wills' Admr'x, 516, 37 N. E. 577. See Cobb-Choc- 28 Ky. L. R. 1961, 66 S. W. 628; olate Co. v. Sandusky, 207 111. 463. 89 LIMITING TO COUNTS ISSUES OUTSIDE OF PLEADINGS. 99 Where there is no evidence tending to prove one or more of several counts the court in charging the jury should confine the instructions to the count or counts which the evidence tends to sustain, and not instruct as to the other counts. Thus in a criminal case where an information charges in one count an assault with intent to commit murder and in another count an assault with intent to commit great bodily injury, and there is no evidence tending to prove the charge in the first count, the court should not instruct as to that charge, and to do so is error, although the defendant was not found guilty of the crime charged in that count. 89 And where there is no evidence to sustain the charge in one of the counts of an indictment which charges the commission of an offense by different means in different counts, the court should instruct the jury that there is no evidence as to such count, and a refusal to do so is error, especially if the jury con- vict on both or all the counts. 90 Under an indictment containing but one count for the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor, where the evidence tends to prove several distinct sales at different times, covering a period of several months, the prosecution should be restricted to some one particular transaction or sale, and the court in charging the jury should confine them to the one par- ticular sale to which the prosecution is restricted. Under such indictment an instruction directing the jury to consider all the evidence in determining the guilt or innocence of the accused is erroneous. 91 99. Issues raised outside of pleadings. Where the parties raise issues of fact not alleged in the pleadings, without objection, it is not error to instruct the jury on such issues. 92 It is proper to give instructions on the theory upon which the parties try a case, although the pleadings, technically, do not support such theory. 93 When the facts proved are not within the allegations 89 Botsch v. S. 43 Neb. 501, 61 370, 41 S. E. 468; Brusie v.'Peck N. W. 730. Bros. & Co. 135 N. Y. 622, 3i2 N. E. o P. v. Vanzile, 143 N. Y. 368, 76. 38 N. E. 380. 93 Jarmusch v. Otis Iron & Steel si Stockwell v. S. 27 Ohio St. 566. Co. 23 Ohio Cir. 122. See Hansen 92 Qualey v. Johnson, 80 Minn. v. St. Paul Gas Light Co. (Minn.), 408, 83 N. W. 393; Davis v. At- 92 N. W. 510; Blum v. Whitworth, lanta & C. A. L. R. Co. 63 S. Car. 66 Tex. 350, 1 S. W. 108. 577, 41 S. E. 892, also 63 S. Car. 100 BASED ON EVIDENCE AND PLEADINGS. 90 of the pleadings, and each of the parties procures instructions declaring the law applicable to the facts thus shown, regardless of the issues made by the pleadings, and asks a verdict in ac- cordance therewith, neither will be heard to complain. 94 100. Issues abandoned. If some of the issues set out in the pleadings have been abandoned during the progress of the trial, by admission or otherwise, then it is proper for the court to restrict the instructions to the remaining issues upon which the parties are contending. 95 Thus where the defendant claims a set-off charging that the plaintiff has failed to perform his con- tract, and the plaintiff in reply thereto states that a settlement had been made between them every month as to the obligations of the contract, which was not denied by the defendant, he there- by abandoned his defense of set-off, and was not entitled to in- structions as to that defense. 96 So where the plaintiff has abandoned a count in his declaration or petition then it is im- proper to submit to the jury any issue contained in such count. 97 The giving of an instruction based on an original petition or declaration which has been abandoned by the filing of an amended petition or declaration is error. 98 But the court in charging the jury is not bound to withdraw an abandoned issue. 99 Where an issue in a cause has been disposed of by a former trial, it is improper to instruct the jury in such manner as to impress them with the idea that such issue is still in the case. Thus in a homicide case a conviction of manslaughter is in legal effect an acquittal of murder, and on a second trial the court is not authorized to instruct on the murder charge. 100 94 Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Har- S. E. 671; Bugbee v. Kendricken, rington, 192 111. 27, 61 N. E. 622; 132 Mass. 349. Illinois Steel Co. v. Novak, 184 96 Doysher v. Adams, 16 Ky. L. R. 111. 501, 56 N. E. 966. 582, 29 S. W. 348. See also Fox 95 De Graffenried v. Menard, 103 v. Utter, 6 Wash. 299, 33 Pac. 354. Ga. 651, 30 S. E. 560; Crum v. Yu- 07 Columbus S. Bank v. Crane nott (Ind. App.), 40 N. E. 79; Lake Co. 56 Neb. 317. 76 N. W. 557. Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Richards, os Purdom v. Brussells, 22 Ky. L. 152 HI. 59, 38 N. E. 773. See Mid- R. 1796, 66 S. W. 22; Western U. dlebrooks v. Mayne, 96 Ga. 449, Tel. Co. v. Johnson (Tex. Cv. App.), 23 S. E. 398; Scholtz v. North- 67 S. W. 338. western M. L. I. Co. 100 Fed. 573; w Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. Tathwell v. City of Cedar Rapids, v. Croskell (Tex. Cv. App.), 25 S. W. 114 Iowa, 180, 86 N. W. 291. See 486. also Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. 100 p. v . McFarlane, 134 Cal. 618, Shieder (Tex. Cv. App.), 26 S. W. 66 Pac. 865. In Indiana a defend- 509; Fry v. Leshi, 87 Va. 269, 12 ant who takes a new trial under 91 THEORY OF PARTY IF EVIDENCE SUPPORTS. 101 101. Theory of party Instruction. A party is entitled to instructions fairly presenting to the jury the law applicable to the evidence which tends to support his theory. 101 But, of course, if there is no evidence tending to support a theory there can be no ground for complaint in refusing instructions as to such theory. 102 Instructions stating the theory of one party on any feature of a case and ignoring the evidence in support of the theory of the opposing party are erroneous. 103 Hence, if there is any evi- dence tending to support the theory of the defendant the giving of an instruction for the plaintiff, which wholly ignores such theory, is erroneous. 104 Or if the instructions ignore the theory such circumstances waives the former acquittal and may be con- victed of murder on the second trial. Veach v. State, 60 Ind. 291; Burns' R. S. 1901 (Ind.) 1910. 101 Fessenden v. Doane, 188 111. 232, 58 N. E. 974; Chicago U. Tr. Co. v. Browdy, 206 111. 617, 69 N. E. 113; Pennsylvania Co. v. Backes, 133 111. 261, 24 N. E. 563; Lamb v. P. 96 111. 73, 80; Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. lies, 25 Colo. 19, 53 Pac. 222; Boice v. Palmer, 55 Neb. 389, 75 N. W. 849; Mobile & O. R. Co. v. Godfrey, 155 111. 82, 39 N. E. 590; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Gardenia, 22 Tex. Cv. App. 300, 54 S. W. 312; Robertson v. Burton, 88 Minn. 151, 92 N. W. 538; Defoe v. St. Paul C. R. Co. 65 Minn. 319, 68 N. W. 35; Republican V. R. Co. v. Fink, 18 Neb. 89, 24 N. W. 691; Barker v. S. 126 Ala. 83, 28 So. 589; Beall v. Pearre, 12 Md. 550; Botkin v. Cassady, 106 Iowa, 334, 76 N. W. 72i2; Hughes Cr. Law 3249; Lansing v. Wessell (Neb.), 97 N. W. 815; Rhoades v. Chesa- peake & O. R. Co. (W. Va.), 55 L. R. A. 175; Lion v. Baltimore City P. R. Co. 90 Md. 266, 44 Atl. 1045, 47 L. R. A. 127; P. v. Rice, 103 Mich. 350, 61 N. W. 540; Buck- ley v. Silverberg, 113 111. 673, 45 Pac. 804. See Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Kinnebrew, 7 Tex. Cv. App. 549, 27 S. W. 631; Poole v. Consolidated St. R. Co. 100 Mich. 379, 59 N. W. 390; Memphis St. R. Co. v. Newman, 108 Tenn. 666, 69 S. W. 269; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Buckstaff (Neb.), 91 N. W. 426; Omaha St. R. Co. v. Boeson (Neb.), 94 N. W. 619. 102 Moore Furniture Co. v. Sloane, 166 111. 460, 46 N. E. 1128; Long- enecker v. S. 22 Ind. 247. ios Mims v. S. 42 Fla. 199, 27 So. 868; Dolphin v. Plumley, 175 Mass. 304, 56 N. E. 281; Campbell v. P. 109 111. 565, 576, 50 Am. R. 621; Denny v. Stout, 59 Neb. 731, 82 N. W. 18; Young v. Market, 163 Pa. St. 513, 30 Atl. 196; Jones v. Rex (Tex. Cv. App.), 31 S. W. 1077; Howell v. Mellon, 169 Pa. St. 138, 32 Atl. 450; Sullivan v. S. 80 Miss. 596, 32 So. 2; Banner v. Schles- singer, 109 Mich. 262, 67 N. W. 116; Hays v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 196 Pa. St. 184, 45 Atl. 925. 104 Mobile & I. R. Co. v. Godfrey, 155 111. 82, 39 N. E. 590; Polly v. Com. 16 Ky. L. R. 208, 27 S. W. 862.; Boice v. Palmer, 55 Neb. 389, 75 N. W. 849; Webb v. Big Kanawha & O. R. P. Co. 43 W. Va. 800, 29 S. E. 519; Cerrolis Coal Co. v. Deserant, 9 N. Mex. 49, 49 Pac. 807; Blan chard v. Pratt, 37 111. 243; Bloch v. Edwards, 116 Ala. 90, 22 So. 600; Lindle v. Com. 23 Ky. L. R. 1307, 68 S. W. 986; S. v. Brady, (Iowa), 97 N. W. 64; De Foe v. St. Paul C. R. Co. 65 Minn. 319, 68 N. W. 35; Kadish v. Young, 108 111. 170, 185, 48 Am. R. 548; Parker v. Chancellor, 78 Tex. 524, 15 S. W. 157; Laughlin v. Gerardi, 67 Mo. App. 372; Oliver v. Moore (Tex. Cv. App.), 43 S. W. 812; Atlanta C. St. R. Co. v. Hardage, 93 Ga. 457, 21 102 BASED ON EVIDENCE AND PLEADINGS. 92 of a party as to any one element or branch of a case they are erroneous. 105 So where the evidence tends to support two opposing theories on a material issue or fact, and the court instructs as to the theory of the prosecution and refuses to instruct on the theory of the defense it is error. 106 If there is any evidence tending to 'support the theory of a party an instruction so drawn that it withdraws from the jury the consideration of such theory is er- roneous. 107 But the theory of each of the parties need not be stated in a single instruction. 108 102. Instruction when several theories. Where the evidence tends to support two different theories by which it is sought to prove a material fact, a charge to the jury ignoring the evi- dence of one of such theories is erroneous. 109 The charge should be comprehensive enough to cover both theories, especially where the pleading of a party sets out different theories in different counts. And the court may properly call the attention of the jury to the different theories. This rule applies to both civil and criminal cases. 110 So for the court, in charging the jury, to confine them by in- structions to one view of the case when the evidence is of such character that different constructions or views may be drawn from it, is error. 111 Likewise in an action of trespass for an assault, where there is evidence tending to prove self-defense, an instruction ignoring that issue is improper. 112 And where the evidence tends to support several different defenses it is S. E. 100; Caraway v. Citizens N. mann, 164 111. 250, 45 N. E. 164; B'k (Tex. Cv. App.), 29 S. W. 506; Collins v. Waters, 54 111. 486; Suther Memphis St. R. Co. v. Newman, v. S. 118 Ala. 88, 24 So. 43; 108 Tenn. 666, 69 S. W. 269; Jack- White v. Dinkins, 19 Ga. 285; Sack- son v. Com. 96 Va. 107, 30 S. E. ett. v. Stone, 115 Ga. 466, 41 452. S. E. 564; Kennedy v. Forest 105 Oliver v. Moore (Tex. Cv. Oil Co. 199 Pa. St. 644, 49 AtL App.), 43 S. W. 812; Pope v. Riggs 138; Ter. v. Baca (N. Mex.), 71 Pac. (Tex. Cv. App.), 43 S. W. 306; 460; McVey v. St. Clair Co. 49 W. Eppstein v. Thomas (Tex. Cv. Va. 412, 38 S. E. 648; Deasey v. App.), 44 S. W. 893. Thurman, 1 Idaho, 779; Anderson ioe Jackson v. Com. 96 Va. 107, v. Norwill, 10 111. App. 240; Blue 30 S. E. 452. Valley Lumber Co. v. Newman, 107 Liner v. S. 124 Ala. 1, 27 So. 58 Neb. 80, 78 N. W. 374. 438. no p. v . Willett, 105 Mich. 110, 108 Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 62 N. W. 1115. v. Groves, 56 Kas. 601, 44 Pac. m Samuel v. Knight, 9 Pa. Super. 628. Ct. 352, 43 W. N. C. 392. 108 Town of Wheatfield v. Grund- 112 Collins v. Waters, 54 111. 486. 93 WHEN SEVERAL THEORIES RULES ILLUSTRATED. 103 proper to submit to the jury whether any one of them has been established. 113 But where two theories set up as a defense are inconsistent the court may properly instruct that both theories cannot be true, being inconsistent. 114 But in a criminal case, although the different theories urged by the accused as a defense may be conflicting, it is not improper to instruct upon all of them. 115 An instruction may be given to meet a theory advanced by the opposing party, though there is no evidence upon which to base the instruction. 116 To instruct the jury to find for the plaintiff if, from the evi- dence, his theory is more acceptable and more consistent than the theory of the defendant is error. It is the duty of the jury to determine whether or not the plaintiff has proved his case by a preponderance of the evidence. 117 So in a case where neg- ligence is made a material issue by the pleadings it is improper to state that if the evidence shows any other theory as probable as that of the plaintiff then the plaintiff cannot recover. 118 So in a criminal case an instruction that if the evidence develops two theories, one of guilt and the other of innocence, and the jury are in doubt which of the two theories is established they should find the defendant not guilty, is improper. 119 It is also improper to instruct the jury that if the evidence for the de- fendant is as strong as that for the state he should be ac- quitted. 120 103. Instructions when several theories Illustrations. The following cases serve as illustrations of the rule. Thus on a charge of rape where the defendant gives evidence that the alleged sexual intercourse was with the consent of the female it is error to refuse instructions on that theory. 121 Or in a lar- ceny case where the defense is that the defendant took the property, believing in good faith that it belonged to him or us Liverpool & T. S. Ins. Co. HT Rommeny v. City of Ne-w v. Joy, 26 Tex. Cv. App. 613, 64 York, 63 N. Y. S. 186; S. W. 786; Bank .of Calloway v. us Watts v. Southern Bell T. & Henry (Neb.), 92 N. W. 631. T. Co. 66 Fed. 460. 114 McGowen v. Larsen, 66 Fed. n Thomas v. S. 103' Ala. 18, 910; Anderson v. Oskamp (Ind. 16 So. 4; Johnson v. S. 102 Ala. 1, App.), 35 N. E. 207. 16 So. 99. us Carver v. S. 36 Tex. Cr. App. 120 Mann v. S. 134 Ala. 1, 32 So. 552, 38 S. W. 183. 704. "6 American M. U. Ex. Co. v. 121 Sergest v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), Milk, 73 111. 224. 57 S. W. 845. 104 BASED ON EVIDENCE AND PLEADINGS. 94 his mother, to refuse to charge on this theory is error. 1 - 2 And if the defendant owned, or believed he owned, the property and had a right to take it, the court may explicitly charge the jury that in such case there is no offense. 123 On a charge of receiving and selling stolen property, where the evidence tends to prove that the defendant reasonably and honestly believed that he had a right to dispose of the property, he is entitled to have his defense affirmatively presented to the jury by proper instructions, although another instruction given may state that the receipt of the property, knowing it had been stolen, is essential to a conviction. 124 Or where there is any evidence tending to prove that the defendant's possession of the property was lawful he is entitled to instructions on that theory. 125 Or on a trial for embezzlement if there is evidence tending to prove that the defendant appropriated the property under an honest belief that he had a right to do so it is error to refuse to so instruct the jury. 126 104. Instructions need not notice opposing theory. But the rule which requires that instructions shall be given according to the theory of each party does not require that the instruc- tions shall anticipate the existence of hypotheses contrary to that upon the theory of which they are framed. That an in- struction rests upon an hypothesis which is sustained by evi- dence, and that it states accurately and fully the law upon that hypothesis, is sufficient without anticipating any theory of the opposing party. And if the evidence also fairly presents hy- potheses sustaining, modifying or repugnant to legal propositions, a party desiring to avail himself of such propositions may have them "presented in separate instructions. 127 Hence the plaintiff 122 Vance v. S. 34 Tex. Cr. App. 12* Harris v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 395, 30 S. W. 792; Barnes v. S. 57 S. W. 833; Gann v. S. 42 Tex. 103 Ala. 44, 15 So. 901. See S. v. Cr. App. 133, 57 S. W. 837. Jackson, 126 Mo. 521, 29 S. W. 601; 125 Pace v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), Clark v. S. 34 Tex. Cr. App. 31 S. W. 173; Brown v. S. 34 Tex. 120, 29 S. W. 382; Young v. S. 34 Cr. App. 150, 29 S. W. 772. Tex. Cr. App. 290, 30 S. W. 238; 120 Wadley v. Com. (Va.), 30 S. Phillips v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 31 S. E. 452. W. 644; Reese v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 127 Cook County v. Harms, 108 68 S. W. 283; Chambers v. S. (Tex. 111. 151, 161; Springfield Consol. R. Or. App.), 68 S. W. 286: Homer v. Hoeffner, 175 111. 634, 51 N. E. v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 68 S. W. 884; Trask v. P. 104 111. 569; City of 999; S. v. Main, 75 Conn. 55, 52 Chicago v. Schmidt, 107 111. 191; Atl. 257. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Byrne, 205 123 Black v. S. 38 Tex. Cr. App. 111. 21, 68 N. E. 720. 58, 41 S. W. 606. 95 OPPOSING THEORY JURY CONFINED TO EVIDENCE. 105 is not bound to anticipate and exclude the defense. He is only obliged to present the law applicable to his theory of the case. 128 The plaintiff is not required in his instructions to negative mere matters of defense. 129 So where an instruction tells the jury that if they believe from the evidence that the plaintiff has proved his case as laid in his declaration, or in any one of the counts thereof, they will find for the plaintiff, it is proper. 130 And so where the rights of a party, such, for instance, as his claim of set-off, are fully stated in his own instructions he can- not complain because his opponent's instructions may be silent as to such a claim or right. The court is not required to em- brace such party's claim in the instructions of the opposing party. 131 But, of course, where there is evidence to support the claim or contention of a party, and such claim is ignored by the refusal of his instructions and is not recognized in the in- structions given for his opponent, it is manifest error. 132 105. Instructions confining jury to evidence. The jury in their deliberations should not only be confined to the pleadings, but also to the evidence adduced, and the court should instruct them that they must not be influenced by any information out- side of the evidence; especially is this caution proper when any of the jurors ask questions. 133 The formula that "if you believe from the evidence" is the usual expression used in drawing instructions in referring to the evidence, but it is not necessary that this should be stated in each sentence of an instruction. 134 Nor is it necessary that all of the instructions given should contain this requirement. 135 For, although an instruction standing alone may be faulty 128 Eames v. Rend, 105 111. 506, 98 Tenn. 650, 40 S. W. 1085; Whar- 509; Logg v. P. 92 111. 604. ton v. S. 45 Tex. 2. 120 Mt. Olive & S. Coal Co. v. 134 Gizler v. Witzel, 82 111. 322, Rademancher, 190 111. 538, 544, 60 325; Belden v. Woodmanse, 81 111. N. E. 888. 25, 28; Miller v. Bathasser, 78 111. 130 Mt Olive Staunton Coal Co. v. 305; Mathews v. Hamilton, 23 111. Rademancher, 190 111. 538, 542, 60 416, 418; Slack v. . Harris, 200 111. N. E. 888. 96, 65 N. E. 669; Powers v. Com. 131 Mueller v. Rosen, 179 111. 131, 22 Ky. L. R. 1807, 61 S. W. 736; S. 53 N. E. 625. v. Davis, 27 S. Car. 609, 4 S E. 567; 132 McCormick v. Kreinkie, 179 Slack v. Harris, 200 111. 114, 65 N. 111. 301, 53 N. E. 549. See Linde- E. 437. man v. Fry, 178 111. 174, 52 N. E. iss Padfield v. P. 146 111. 660, 662, 851. 35 N. E. 469. iss Citizens St. R. Co. v. Burke, 106 BASED ON EVIDENCE AND PLEADINGS. 96 in not confining the jury to the evidence, that is, by omitting to charge that "if they believe from the evidence," yet where other instructions which are given, direct the jury to confine their deliberations to the evidence the defect will be regarded cured. 136 But it is only where the facts hypothetically stated are con- troverted by the opposing party .that the formula "if you be- lieve from the evidence" is important or essential. 137 An instruction which is but the statement of a legal proposi- tion, containing only a hypotehtical statement of facts, is not objectionable in that it does not make reference to the evidence or is not restricted thereto. 138 It is not improper to use the words "if the evidence shows you" instead of "if you believe from the evidence" in framing instructions. 139 Where the court in charging the jury states that everything done by them in determining the facts must be done "under the evidence," that is sufficient caution that the jury must confine their delibera- tions to the evidence before them without repeating the caution- ary words in every sentence. 140 106. Confining jury as to damages. Instructions which do not confine the jury to the evidence, nor place a limit upon the amount of damages to be awarded, if any, are improper. 141 Public policy, sympathy, or the like, are not proper elements to be taken into account in assessing damages; so an instruc- tion authorizing the jury to take into consideration such ele- ments is improper. The jury should be confined to the evi- dence. 142 is6 Speir v. P. 122 111. 1, 244, 12 1*0 Indianapolis St. R. Co. v. N. E. 865, 17 N E. 899, 3 Am. St. Robinson, 157 Ind. 414, 61 N. E. 320; Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v. Mo- 936. Charging the jury that the chell, 193 111. 208, 61 N. E. 1028; issues are to be determined "by Boykin v. P. 22 Colo. 496, 45 Pac. looking to the testimony of the wit- 419. See Godwin v. S. 73 Miss. 873, nesses who have testified in the 19 So. 712; Ingols v. Plimpton, 10 case" is not error, although the Colo. 535, 16 Pac. 155; Graff v. P. defendant made a statement giving 134 111. 380, 25 N. E. 563; McPherson. his version of the transaction and v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. 97 Mo. denying his guilt; Sledge v. S. ,253; Home v. Walton, 117 111. 130, 99 Ga. 684, 26 S. E. 756, 59 Am. St. 7 N. E. 100; Rock I. & P. R. Co. 251; Burney v. S. (Ga.), 25 S. E. 911. v. Leisy, 174 111. 547, 51 N. E. 572; 1*1 Central R. Co. v. Barmister, Holliday v. Burgess, 34 111. 193; 195 111. 48, 62 N. E. 864; Oglesby Parker v. Fisher, 39 111. 164, 171. v. Missouri P. R. Co. (Mo.), 37 S. 137 Schmidt v. Pfau, 114 111. 494, W. 829. 504, 2 N. E. 522. 1*2 Robelson v. Brown, 56 Neb- "8 Belt v. P. 97 111. 461, 472. 390, 76 N. W. 891. 139 Silberberg v. Pearson, 75 Tex. 287, 12 S. W. 850. 9? DAMAGES, JURY CONFINED TO EVIDENCE. 106 Thus an instruction that if the jury find the defendant guilty they may assess the plaintiff's damages at an amount not to exceed the amount claimed in the declaration is erroneous in not confining the jury to the evidence. 143 So an instruction that the plaintiff cannot recover more than five thousand dollars if he is entitled to recover; and if the jury believe from the evidence that the plaintiff is entitled to recover they will render a verdict for no more than that amount is erroneous, in that it tells the jury to render a verdict for five thousand dollars and does not confine them to the evidence. 144 Also for the same reason, an instruction permitting the jury to give such an amount "as they shall deem a fair and just compensation" is erroneous ; 145 or an instruction that the jury may allow as damages such sum as the evidence proves, is erroneous where the evidence shows a greater amount than that claimed in the complaint or declaration. 146 So a charge that the jury in determining the amount of dam- ages should allow such sum as seems proper under the cir- cumstances, and shall consider bodily and mental pain and probable future injury resulting from the injury inflicted, is erroneous as authorizing the jury to find damages for permanent injury without any evidence as to the amount. 147 But an in- struction that the jury are to assess damages at such sum as in their judgment the plaintiff is entitled to under the evidence, i Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. v. Austin, 69 111. 426. See Isaac v. Sykes, 96 111. 162, 173; Martin v. McLean. 106 Mich. 79, 64 N. W. 2. Johnson, 89 111. 537; Gilbertson v. i Rolling Mill Co. v. Morrissey, Forty-Second St. M. & St. N. Ave. Ill 111. 650; Cleveland, C. C. & R. Co. 43 N. Y. S. 782, 14 App. St. L. R. Co. v. Jenkins, 174 111. Div. 294; Hoover v. Haynes (Neb.), 409, 51 N. E. 811; City of Free- 91 N. W. 392; Chicago, R. I. & T. port v. Isbell, 83 111. 440, 25 Am. R. R. Co. v. Erwin (Tex. Cv. App.), 407; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. 65 S. W. 496 (party must request Levy, 160 111. 385, 43 N. E. 357. See specific instruction). It has been Cunningham v. Stein, 109 111. 375 held improper to charge that it is (correct); Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. the "duty" of the jury to assess Smith (Miss.), 35 So. 168; Nashville, damages, but that they may be, or C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Witherspoon are, at liberty to do so, Chicago (Tenn.), 78 S. W. 1052. & N. W. R. Co. v. Chisholm, 79 i Texas, &c. R. Co. v. Durrett, 111. 584, 591. Compare Nicholson v. 24 Tex. Cr. App. 103, 58 S. W. 187; Merritt, 23 Ky. L. R. 2281, 67 S. W. City of Dallas v Jones (Tex.), 53 5; P. v. McGraw, 72 N. Y. S. 679, S. W. 377. 66 App. Div. 372; Yazoo, &c. R. Co. i" Houston, E. & W. T. R. Co. v. Smith (Mass.), 35 So. 168. v. Richards, 20 Tex. Cr. App. 203, * Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 49 S. W. 687. 107 BASED ON EVIDENCE AND PLEADINGS. 98 is not faulty in stating that the jury may make up their ver- dict outside of the evidence. 148 107. Common and personal knowledge. The court may instruct on matters of common knowledge, or may refuse to do so in its discretion. It is not error to refuse to charge the jury on matters of common knowledge and experience of all men who have arrived at years of discretion. 149 The jury in weigh- ing evidence always exercise their judgment in the light of their own general knowledge of the subject in hand whether in- structed to do so or not; but a refusal to so instruct is not error. 150 But an instruction permitting the jury to consider their own personal knowledge as well as the evidence in determining a material fact is erroneous, as they are required to decide questions of fact from the evidence only. 151 The belief of the jury in determining the facts must be based upon the evidence ; hence an instruction that if the jury believe "from the evidence and the instructions of the court, etc," is improper. 152 108. Confined within statute of limitations Criminal cases. The evidence must be confined to some time within the statute of limitation. Hence the failure to instruct that unless the al- leged offense be shown to have been committed within the stat- utory limitation a conviction cannot be had is error, especially where there is no evidence to bring the offense charged within the statute of limitation. 153 Thus, on a charge of adultery, where it appears from the evidence that the offense was committed after the filing of the complaint, but before the filing of the formal information, the refusal to instruct the jury that a conviction can- not be had on any evidence of acts committed after the filing of 148 Calumet River R. Co. v. v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. 29 Moore, 124 111. 337, 15 N. E. 764; Minn. 43, 11 N. W. 124; Douglass Illinois, &c. R. Co. v. Thompson, 210 v. Trask, 77 Me. 35; Schultz v. 111. 226, 238. Bower, 57 Minn 493, 59 N. W. 631, 149 Lesser Cotton Co. v. St. Louis, 47 Am. St. 630; Petty John v. Lieb- I. & M. S. R. Co. 114 Fed. 133, scher, 92 Ga. 149, 17 S. B. 1007; S 144. v. Jones, 29 S. Car. 201, 7 S. E. 296; iso Baker v. Borrelli, 136 Cal. 160, Burrows v. Delta Tr. Co. 106 Mich. 68 Pac. 591; Renard v. Grande, 29 582, 64 N. W. 501. Ind. App. 579, 64 N. E. 644. 152 Kranz v. Thieben, 15 111. App. isi Gibson (v. Correker, 91 Ga. 482; Greer v. Com. 23 Ky. L. R. 489, 617, 17 S. E. 965 (value of land); 63 S. W. 443. Stiles v. Neillsville Milling Co. 87 iss s. v. Kunhi, 119 Iowa, 461, Wis. 266, 58 N. W. 411; Brakken 93 N. W. 342. 99 LIMITING EVIDENCE TO SPECIFIC PURPOSE. HO the complaint is error. 154 An instruction charging the jury to determine whether at any time within the statute of limitations the defendant committed the crime alleged is not improper, al- though the evidence limits the inquiry to a less period of time. 155 109. Limiting evidence to specific purpose. Evidence com- petent only for some specific purpose should be limited to that particular purpose by proper instructions, and a refusal to so instruct is error. 156 This rule governs in both civil and criminal cases alike. 157 110. Limited to impeaching witnesses. Thus where the prosecution introduces evidence to show a former conviction of the defendant for the purpose of discrediting his testimony, it is error for the court to refuse to limit such evidence by proper instructions, and it cannot be considered for any other pur- pose. 158 An instruction limiting the evidence of the prior con- viction of the accused to the sole purpose of impeaching him as a witness in his own behalf is perfectly proper and beneficial to the defendant rather than hurtful. 159 And where evidence is admissible only for the purpose of discrediting or impeaching a IB* Proctor v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), might be drawn from it injurious to 35 S. W. 172. the rights of the defendant: Win- iss s. v. Waddle, 100 Iowa, 57, frey v. S. 41 Tex. Cr. App. 539, 56 69 N. W. 279. S. W. 919; Blanco v. S. (Tex. Cr. 156 Robertson v. S. 40 Fla. 509, App.), 57 S. W. 828; S. v. Tommy, 24 So. 474; Finley v. S. (Tex. Cr. 19 Wash. 270, 53 Pac. 157 (confes- App.), 47 S. W. 1015; Bone v. S. sion of co-defendant). 102 Ga. 387, 30 S. B. 845; Gatlin v. IST Boggess v. Boggess, 127 Mo. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 49 S. W. 87; 305, 29 S. W. 1018; Lydick v. Gill Martin v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 53 (Neb.), 94 N. W. 109. But if at S. W. 849; Triolo v. Foster (Tex. the time certain evidence is intro- Cv. App.), 57 S. W. 695; Com. v. duced, the court or counsel state Wilson, 186 Pa. St. 1, 40 Atl. 283; to the jury that it is competent White v. Walker, 31 111. 422, 433; and offered only for a particular Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Collins, purpose, a failure to limit such 15 Tex. Cv. App. 21, 39 S. W. 150; evidence to that purpose by proper Pittsburg, C. C. &' St. L. R. Co. v. instruction is not material error, Parish, 28 Ind. App. 189, 62 N. B. Roark v. S. 105 Ga. 736, 32 S. E. 514, 91 Am. St. 120; Roos v. Lewyn, 125. 5 Tex. Cv. App. 593, 24 S. W. 538; "s Fosdahl v. S. 87 Wis. 482, Scott v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 68 S. W. 62 N. W. 185; Hulton v. S. (Tex. 680; Faulkner v. S. 43 Tex. Cr. App. Cr. App.), 33 S. W. 969. See Bout- 311, 65 S. W. 1093; Camarillo v. S. well v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 35 S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 68 S. W. 795; Ted- W. 376; S>coville v. S. (Tex. Cr. better v. S. (Tex. Cr.) 32 S. W. 903; App.), 77 S. W. 792. Bondurant v. S. 125 Ala. 31, 27 So. "9 Thornton v. S. 117 Wis. 338, 775. Contra: Unless inferences 93 N. W. 1107, 98 Am. St. 924. 111 BASED ON EVIDENCE AND PLEADINGS. 100 witness who has testified on the trial of the case, it is error to refuse to thus limit it. 100 111. Limited to malice or intent. Where evidence of the declarations of the defendant as to any previous acts not con- nected with the transaction described in the indictment is com- petent only on the question of malice or intent, it should be limited by proper instructions to such malice or intent. 161 But, on the contrary, it has been held that where evidence of other acts of the defendant similar to that charged in the indictment is admitted to prove guilty intent, the court is not bound to in- struct for what purpose such evidence is admitted. 162 112. Limited to certain defendants. Testimony which is competent against one or more of several defendants jointly tried on a criminal charge should be limited to him against whom it is competent, by proper instructions. 163 Accordingly, evidence of any declarations or statements made by one of two or more persons jointly tried which is competent only against him who made the same should be limited to him by instruction, and to refuse such instruction is error. 164 A confession made by one of two or more defendants jointly leo Coker v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), regard, P. v. Connelly (Cal.), 38 Pac. 31 S. W. 655; Mark v. S. 34 Tex. 42; Sproul v. City of Seattle, 17 Cr. 136, 31 S. W. 408; Oliver v. S. Wash. 256, 49 Pac. 487; S. v. Gas- 33 Tex. Cr. App. 541, 28 S. W. ton, 96 Iowa, 505, 65 N. W. 415; 202; Paris v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), Duke v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. App. 283, 31 S. W. 855; Golin v. S. 37 Tex. 33 S. W. 349. The court is not Cr. App. 90, 38 S. W. 794; Gills v. bound on its own motion to in- Oom. 18 Ky. L. R. 560, 37 S. W. 269; struct the jury for what particular Guinn v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 65 S. W. purpose evidence is admissible, Pur- 376; Ashcraft v. Com. 24 Ky. L. R. cell v. Tibbies, 101 Iowa, 24, 69 N. 488, 68 S. W. 847; Fuqua v. Com. W. 1120; Puth v. Zinbleman, 99 24 Ky. L. R. 2204, 73 S. W. 782; Iowa, 641, 68 N. W. 895. Owens v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. App. 345, ies Crosby v. P. 137 111. 334, 27 38 S. W. 875. N. E. 49; Bennett v. P. 96 111. lei Kollock v. S. 88 Wis. 663, 60 606; Sparf v. U. S. 156 U. S. 57, 15 N. W. 817; Hacker v. Heiney, 111 Sup. Ct. 273, 10 Am. Cr. R. 174; Wis. 313, 87 N. W. 249; S. v. Ged- Casner v. S. 42 Tex. Cr. App. 118, des, 22 Mont. 68, 55 Pac. 919, rela- 57 S. W. 821; Segrest v. S. (Tex. ting to motive. Cr. App.), 57 S. W. 845; Williams v. , 162 Shipp v. Com. 19 Ky. L. R. 634, S. 81 Ala. 1, 1 So. 179, 7 Am. Cr. 41 S. W. 856; Mosely v. S. 36 (Tex. R. 451, 60 Am. R. 133. See S. v. Cr. App.), 578, 38 S. W. 197; Thorn- Bowker, 26 Ore. 309, 38 Pac. 124, 9 ley v. S. 36 Tex. Cr. App. 118, 34 Am. Cr. R. 366; Cleveland v. Ander- S. W. 264, 61 Am. St. 837; But if son (Neb.), 92 N. W. 306. no request is made to thus limit i* S. v. Collins, 121 N. Car. 667, such evidence, a party will not oe 28 S. E. 520; Short v. S. (Tex. Cr. heard to complain of error in that App.), 29 S. W. 1072. 101 EVIDENCE LIMITED GIVING PROMINENCE TO FACTS. 113 indicted, but not in the presence of any of the others, is com- petent, if competent at all, only against the one making the same, and the jury should be cautioned by proper instructions not to consider it against the others. 105 A charge that a confes- sion made by one or more of several defendants applies only to the one making it, and that it has no application to any one of the others, and does not implicate any of them so far as that particular confession is concerned, sufficiently cautions the jury. 166 And where on a joint indictment the evidence shows that the defendants have different and distinct defenses the court should, on proper request, instruct as to the defense of each, and a refusal to do so is error. 167 The failure of the court to limit evidence to the particular purpose for which it is competent cannot be complained of as error in the absence of a request to do so. 168 So where evidence is competent against some of several joint defendants, but incompetent as to others, the fact that such evidence was not limited to the defendant against whom it was competent, nor the jury instructed not to consider it against the others, cannot be complained of as error in the absence of a request to limit the evidence. 169 113. Instructions giving prominence to certain facts. It is the duty of the jury to consider all of the testimony in the case. Therefore the instructions should be so drawn as to avoid giving prominence to certain portions of the evidence to the exclusion of other portions. 170 An instruction which singles out and draws iss S. v. Oxendine, 107 N. Car. 78'3, Scott v. P. 141 111. 208, 30 N. E. 12 S. E. 573; Casner v. S. 42 Tex. 346; Hartshorn v. Byrne, 147 111. Cr. App. 118, 57 S. W. 821 (conspir- 426, 35 N. E. 246; Smith v. S. 1U9 acy); Wilkerson v. S. (Tex. Cr. Ga. 479, 35 S. E. 59; Chicago & E. App.), 57 S. W. 956. I. v. Fuller, 195 111. 18, 62 N. E. ICG Nobles v. S. 98 Ga. 73, 26 S. E. 919; Christie v. P. 206 111. 342, 69 64; Wilkerson v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), N. E. 33; New York, P. & N. R. 57 S. W. 956 (held not assuming Co. v. Thomas, 92 Va. 606, 24 S. accomplice made a statement). E. 264; Coffin v. U. S. 162 U. S. is? Ross v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 43 664, 16 Sup. Ct. 943; Argabright S. W. 1004. v. S. 49 Neb. 760, 69 N. W. 102; 163 Boggess v. Boggess, 127 Mo. Burton v. S. 107 Ala. 108, 18 So. 305, 29 S. W. 1018; Lydick v. Gill, 284; Virgie v. Stetson, 73 Me. 452; (Neb.), 94 N. W. 109. Bush v. S. 37 Ark. 215; Mendes v. lea Coddington v. Canaday, 157 Kyle, 16 Nev. 369; McCorkle v. Ind. 243, 61 N. E. 567. Simpson, 42 Ind. 453; Mead v. i Moore v. Wright, 90 111. 471; Brotherton, 30 Mo. 201; Holt v. S. Chesney v. Meadows, 90 111. 431; 62 Ga. 314; Banner v. Schlessinger, BASED ON EVIDENCE AND PLEADINGS. 102 the attention of the jury to particular facts in evidence to the exclusion of others which are quite as important in determin- ing the issues involved is erroneous. 171 Instructions which give prominence to the testimony of one 109 Mich. 262, 67 N. W. 946; Barker v. S. 48 Ind. 163; Heddle v. City Elec. R. Co. 112 Mich. 547, 70 N. W. 1096; Com. v. Delaney, 16 Ky. L. R. 509, 29 S. W. 616; Gross v. Shaffer, 29 Kas. 442; Slack v-. Har- ris, 200 111. 96, 65 N. E. 669; Mar- tens v. Pittock (Neb.), 92 N. W. 1038; Vaughn v. S. 130 Ala. 18, 30 So. 669; Willingham v. Si 130 Ala. 35, 30 So. 429; Reynolds v. Com. 24 Ky. L. R. 1742, 72 S. W. 277; Southern Bell T. & T. Co. v. Mayo, 133 Ala. 641, 33 So. 16; Brickill v. City of Baltimore, 60 Fed. 98 (re- lating to damages) ; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Banks (Ky.), 33 S. W. 627; Wadsworth v. Williams, 101 Ala. 264, 13 So. 755; Newton v. S. 37 Ark. 333; Sexton v. School District, 9 Wash. 5, 36 Pac. 1052; Hurlbut v. Boaz, 4 Tex. Cv. App. 371, 23 S. W. 446; Lake S. & M. S. R. Co. v. Whidden, 23 Ohio Cir. 85; Birmingham Southern R. Co. v. Cuzzart, 133 Ala. 262, 31 So. 979; Crossen v. Oliver, 41 XDre. 505, 69 Pac. 308; Postal Tel. C. Co. v. Jones, 133 Ala. 217, 32 So. 500; O'Neal v. Curry, 134 Ala. 216, 32 So. 697; Alabama M. R. Co. v. Thompson (Ala.), 32 So. 672; Wilson v. White, 80 N. Car. 280; Com. v. Delaney, 16 Ky. L. R. 509, 29 S. W. 616; Leise v. Meyer, 143 Mo. 547, 45 S. W. 282; Francis v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 55 S. W. 488; Jones v. Jones, 19 Ky. 1516, 43 S. W. 412; Frost v. S. 124 Ala. 85, 27 So. 251; P. v. Reed (Cal.), 52 Pac. 835; Craig v. Miller, 133 111. 305, 24 N. E. 431; Sheehan v. P. 131 111. 25, 22 N. E. 818; Chittenden v. Evans, 41 111. 254; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Warner, 108 111. 550; Jacksonville & S. E. R. Co. v. Walsh, 106 111. 257. Properly refused: Callaghan v. Myer, 89 111. 569; Hewitt v. John- son. 72 111. 513; Merrill v. Hale, 85 Iowa, 66; Model Mill Co. v. McEver, 96 Ga. 701; Fox v. P. 84 111. App. 270; Packer v. Thomp- son-Houston E. Co. 175 Mass. 496, 56 N. E. 704; Trumbull v. Erick- son, 97 Fed. 891; Tibbe v. Kamp, 154 Mo. 545, 55 S. W. 440; S. v. Rutherford, 152 Mo. 124, 53 S. W. 417; Todd v. Danner, 17 Ind. App. 368, 46 N. E. 829. See Gordon v. Burris, 153 Mo. 223, 54 S. W. 546. See Davis v. Concord & M. R. Co. 68 N. H. 247, 44 Atl. 388; Mosely v. Washburn, 167 Mass. 345, 45 N. E. 753; Williamson v. Tyson, 105 Ala. 644, 17 So. 336; Stone v. S. 105 Ala. 60, 17 So. 114; Idaho Mer- cantile Co. v. Kalanquin (Idaho), 66 Pac. 933; Warden v. Miller, 112 Wis. 67, 87 N. W. 828; Haney v. Breeden, 100 Va. 781; Martens v. Pittock (Neb.), 92 N. W. 1038. i7i Drainage Corns, v. Illinois Cent. R. Co. 158 111. 353, 35, 41 N. E. 1073; Homes v. Hale, 71 111. 552; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Griffin, 68 111. 499; Hoge v. P. 117 111. 35, 46, 6 N. E. 796; Crain v. First National Bank, 114 111. 527, 2 N. E. 486; Calef v. Thomas, 81 111. 478, 483; Jacobi v. S. 133 Ala. 1, 32 So. 158; S. v. Prater, 52 W. Va. 132, 43 S. E. 230, 241; Dobbs v. Gate, 60 Mo. App. 658; Chaney v. Phoenix Ins. Co. 62 Mo. App. 45; Coffin v. U. S. 162 U. S. 664, 16 Sup. Ct. 943; Ball v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 36 S. W.448; Logg v. P. 92 111. 598, 602; Bourquin v. Bourquin, 110 Ga. 440, 35 S. E. 710; McCartney v. McMullen, 38 111. 237; C. A. Fargo & Co. v. Dixon, 63 111. App. 22; Moran v. Higgins, 19 Ky. L. R. 456, 40 S. W. 928; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Collins, 15 Tex. Cv. App. 21, 39 S. W. 150; Bell v. Hutchings (Tex. Cv. App.), 41 S. W. 200; Com. v. Gray, 17 Ky. 354, 30 S. W. 1015; Robinson v. Love, 50 W. Va. 75, 40 S. E. 454; Bachmeyer v. Mutual R. T. Life Asso. 87 Wis. 325, 58 N. W. 399 (insanity an is- sue) ; Bowling Green Stone Co. v. Caipshaw, 23 Ky. L. R. 945, 64 S. W. 507. 103 SINGLING OUT FACTS. 114 of the parties to the suit without adverting to the testimony of the other, for the same reason, should not be given. 172 Espe- cially is it error in charging the jury to single out the facts which are strongest against a party and fail to refer to those favorable to him. 173 And if it clearly appears that such instruc- tions must have misled the jury to the prejudice of the rights of the complaining party a new trial should be given. 174 To single out an unimportant fact tending to prove an element in a case, as if it were the only question to be considered, and base an instruction upon it is misleading. 175 Especially where the evidence is slight or highly contradictory is it improper for the court in giving instructions to select isolated portions of the evidence and give them prominence. 176 The attention of the jury should not be directed to any particular circumstance alone unless there is some special reason for so doing. 177 114. Singling out facts When not objectionable. But sin- gling out some particular question or point and calling the at- tention of the jury to it is not objectionable where the other questions involved are merely subordinate and are sufficiently 172 McCabe v. City of Philadel- phia, 12 Pa. Sup. Ct. 383; Hays v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 195 Pa. St. 184, 45 Atl. 925; Pyle v. Pyle, 158 111. 300, 41 N. E. 999; Simpson Brick Press Co. v. Wounley, 166 111. 383, 46 N. E. 967; Weiss v. Beth- leham Iron Co. 88 Fed. 23; Holmes v. Hale, 71 111. 552; Hatch v. Marsh, 71 111. 370, 374; Village of Warren v. Wright, 103 111. 298, 304; Barton v. Strond Gibson Grocer Co. (Tex. Cv. App.), 40 S. W. 1050; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Jones, 130 Ala. 456, 30 So. 586; Flowers v. Flowers, 92 Ga. 688, 18 S. E. 1006; Haney v. Breeden, 100 Va. 781, 42 S. E. 916; Evans v. George, 80 111. 51; Graves v. Colwell, 90 111. 612; Reber v. Her- ring, 115 Pa. St. 599, 8 Atl. 830; Atlanta C. St. R. Co. v. Jones, 116 Ga. 369. ITS Brantley v. S. 115 Ga. 229, 41 S. E. 695; Jefferson v. S. 110 Ala. 89, 20 So. 434; Godwin v. S. 73 Miss. 873, 19 So. 712; Williams v. S. 46 Neb. 704, 65 N. W. 788 (on insanity). 174 Jacksonville & S. E. R. Co. v. Walsh, 106 111. 253; Polly v. Com. 16 Ky. L. R. 203, 27 S. W. 862; Bertram v. People's R. Co. 154 Mo. 639, 55 S. W. 1040. 175 Bibbins v. City of Chicago, 193 111. 363, 61 N. E. 1030; Protec- tion Life Ins. Co. v. Dill, 91 111. 177; Graves v. Colwell, 90 111. 612, 619; City of Joliet v. Seward, 86 111. 402, 405; Manley v. Boston & M. R. Co. 159 Mass. 493, 34 N. E. 951; Gunther v. Gunther, 181 Mass. 217, 63 N. E. 402; Rising v. Nash, 48 Neb. 597, 67 N. W. 460. 176 Frame v. Badger, 79 111. 441, 446; Sullivan v. Eddy, 164 111. 391, 396, 45 N. E. 837; Flowers v. Flow- ers, 92 Ga. 688, 18 S. E. 1006. See also San Antonio & A. P. R. Co. v. Green (Tex. Cv. App.), 49 S. W. 672; Meyer v. Pacific R. Co. 40 Mo. 151; Grube v. Nichols, 36 III. 92, 98. 177 Seiler v. S. 112 Wis. 293, 87 N. W. 1072; White v. Epperson (Tex. Cr. App.), 73 S. W. 851; S. v. Buralli (Nev.), 71 Pac. 532 (re- viewing many cases) ; Wilson v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 36 S. W. 587. 115 BASED ON EVIDENCE AND PLEADINGS. 104 adverted to by other instructions; 178 and where, in the contest of a will, the court has properly charged that the jury must consider all the evidence in determining the issues, it is not error then to direct their attention to certain particular matters and say that these matters, of themselves, are not sufficient to establish either claim of the contestant. 179 , Where damages to be ascertained rest upon several separate alleged grievances, which may be considered separately as items, attention may properly be called to any one of such subjects without reference to the others. 180 So where some particular portion of the evidence or the testimony of a certain witness, if true, is decisive of the cause, it is not improper to call the attention of the jury to such evidence or witness, though refer- ence is not made to other evidence. 181 A charge that "if the jury believe from all the evidence before them that the plain- tiff did not receive any of the injuries complained of in his petition then it will be their duty to find for the defendant," was held proper, and does not give undue prominence to a par- ticular question. 182 115. Singling out facts Criminal cases. In a criminal cause the court should not designate any particular part or branch or fact of a ease, and tell the jury that unless it is proved be- yond a reasonable doubt they should acquit. 183 Especially in a summary instruction is it improper to single out and direct the attention of the jury to particular portions of the evidence to the exclusion of other parts equally as important in determining the issues. 184 Singling out the strong points for the prosecution "8 International Bank v. Ferris, v. S. (Tex. Or. App.), 36 S. W. 448; 118 111. 470, 8 N. E. 825. Morgan v. S. 48 Ohio, 371, 27 N. E. "9 Goldthorp v. Goldthorp, 115 710; McLeroy v. S. 120 Ala. 274, 25 Iowa, 430, 88 N. W. 944. So. 247. iso St. Louis, J. & S. R. Co. v. is* Scott v. P. 141 111. 210, 30 Kirby, 104 111. 345, 349. N. E. 329; Chambers v. P. 105 111. isi Love v. Gregg, 117 N. Car. 417; Campbell v. P. 92 111. 602; 467, 23 S. E. 332; Hart v. Bray, Coon v. P. 99 111. 371; Kennedy 50 Ala. 446. v. P. 44 111. 285; Coffman v. Com. 182 Weeks v. Texas Midland R. 10 Bush (Ky.) 495. 1 Am. Cr. R. (Tex. C. App.), 67 S. W. 1071. 294; Preston v. S. 41 Tex. Cr. App. isa Mullins v. P. 110 111. 42; Da- 252, 53 S. W. 881; S. v. Rutherford, vis v. P. 114 111. 86, 29 N. E. 192; 152 Mo. 124, 53 S. W. 417. See Leigh v. P. 113 111. 372; Crews v. also: Sanders v. P. 124 111. 226. 16 N. P. 120 111. 317, 11 N. E. 404; Hor- E. 81; Evans v. George, 80 111. 51; nish v. P. 142 111. 626, 32 N. E. Hoge v. P. 112 111. 46, 6 N. E. 796; 677; S. v. Smith, 53 Mo. 267; Ball P. v. Hawes, 98 Cal. 648, 33 Pac. 105 SINGLING OUT AND IGNORING FACTS. 116 by calling the witnesses by name is highly improper and prej- udicial, especially where the evidence for the defendant is not thus emphasized and very material points in his evidence not even referred to. 185 In a homicide case a requested instruction telling the jury that they may look to any threats made by the deceased against the accused, in determining whether the deceased or the accused was the aggressor, is improper as directing the attention of the jury to a particular fact to the exclusion of other evidence in the case. 180 An instruction that flight may indicate a con- sciousness of guilt, or may be caused from an innocent motive, and that the jury may look to the fact that the defendant surrendered himself in determining his guilt or innocence, is for the same reason improper. 187 The court in charging the jury is not required to single out each of the facts tending to connect the accused with the crime charged. 188 116. . Instructions ignoring facts. An instruction which ig- nores material facts in issue presented by the pleadings is er- roneous when the evidence tends to establish such facts. 189 A 791; Morgan v. S. 48 Ohio St. 377, W. 488; P. v. Sanders, 114 Cal. 216, 27 N. E. 710; Grant v. S. 97 Ala. 46 Pac. 153; Hanrahan v. P. 91 111. 35, 11 So. 915; Goley v. S. 85 Ala. 142, 146. Held not singling out 333, 5 So. 167; P. v. Caldwell, 107 facts: Jackson v. Kas. City, Ft. Mich. 374, 65 N. W. 213; Miller v. S. & M. R. Co. 157 Mo. 621, 58 S. S. 107 Ala. 40, 19 So. 37; Dobson W. 32; Martin v. St. Louis S. W. v. S. 61 Neb. 584, 85 N. W. 843. R. Co. (Tex. Cv. App.), 56 S. W. iss p. v . Clark, 105 Mich. 169 62 1011; International & G. N. R. Co. N. W. 1117; Prim v. S. 73 Miss. v. Newman (Tex. Cv. App.), 40 S. 838, 19 So. 711. W. 854; P. v. Neary, 104 Cal. 373, is6 Crawford v. S. 112 Ala. 1, 21 37 Pac. 943; Southern Ind. R. Co. So. 214. v. Peyton, 157 Ind. 690, 61 N. B. is? White v. S. Ill Ala. 92, 21 722; Lane v. City of Madison, 8& So. 330; Alberts v. U. S. 162 U. S. Wis. 453, 57 N. E. 93; Missouri, K. 499. But defendant may sometimes & T. R. Co. v. Coffey (Tex. Cv. have a right 1,o such an instruction App.), 68 S. W. 721; Gran v. Hous- if he requests it, Waybright v. ton, 45 Neb. 813, 64 N. W. 245. State, 56 Ind. 122. iso Dobney v. Conley (Tex. Cv. iss Punk v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), App.), 65 S. W. 1124; Crittenden 48 S. W. 171. Instructions inva- v. S. 134 Ala. 145, 32 So. 273; ding the province of the jury are Remey v. Olds (Cal.), 34 Pac. 216; properly refused, Illinois Cent. R. Henry v. Stewart, 185 111. 448, 5V Co. v. Griffin, 184 111. 10, 16, 56 N. E. N. E. 190; Gilmore v. Courtney, 337; Pittsburg, Ft. W. & C. R. Co. 158 111. 440, 41 N. E. 1023; Austill v. Callaghan, 157 111. 406, 413, 41 v. Heironmymus, 117 Ala. 620, 23 N. E. 909; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. So. 660. See also Illinois Cent. R. v. Lonergan, 118 111. 41, 57, 7 N. Co. v. Gilbert, 157 111. 364, 41 N. E. E. 55. Held singling out facts: 724; Chicago & W. I. R. Co. v, Bonner v. Com. 18 Ky. 728, 38 S. Flynn, 154 111. 453, 40 N. E. 332; 116 BASED ON EVIDENCE AND PLEADINGS. 106 charge which ignores every material fact affecting the rights of the parties and submits to the jury undisputed facts only is erroneous and properly refused. 190 And to state in an instruction that there is only one circumstance tending to prove a material fact and ignoring other evidence from which such fact may be inferred is error. 101 From this principle it follows that an instruction which pur- ports to sum up the principal facts, but directs the attention of the jury only to those favorable to one of the parties, is bad, as giving prominence to some of the facts in evidence and ig- noring others quite as material and important. 192 Or, in other words, an instruction which states the facts from the standpoint of the plaintiff and then concludes that "if you believe these facts you find for the plaintiff" is improper. 193 Likewise an instruction in a criminal case submitting the issue on the evi- Co. 69 Miss. 319, 10 So. 446; Hig- gins v. Grace, 59 Md. 365; McKay v. Evans, 48 Mich. 597, 12 N. E. 868; McDonough v. Miller, 114 Mass. 94; Ranney v. Barlow, 112 U. S. 207, 5 Sup. Ct. 104; Prothero v. Citizens' St. R. Co. 134 Ind. 431, 33 N. E. 765; Bloch v. Edwards, 116 Ala. 90, 22 So. 600; Charter v. Lane, 62 Conn. 121, 25 Atl. 464; Glass v. Cook, 30 Ga. 133; Chicago &c. Co. v. Moran, 210 111. 9, 15. 190 Henry v. Stewart, 185 111. 448, 57 N. E. 190. See Rock Island, &c v. Pohlman, 210 111. 139. 191 Berliner v. Travelers' Ins. Co. 121 Cal. 451, 53 Pac. 922; Costly v. McGowen, 174 111. 76, 50 N. E. 1047. See Weidman v. Symes, 116 Mich. 619, 74 N. W. 1008. i2 Sanders v. P. 124 111. 226, 16. N. E. 81; Town of Evans v. Dickey, 117 111. 291, 7 N. E. 263; Dupuis v. Chicago & N. R. Co. 115 111. 101. 3 N. E. 720; 'Pennsylvania Co. v. Sloetke, 104 111. 201, 205; Coon v. P. 99 111. 368; Evans v. George, 80 111. 54; Martin v. Johnson, 89 111. 537; Cushman v. Cogswell, 86 111. 65; New York & T. Land Co. v. Gardner (Tex. Cv. App.), 25 S. W. 737. 193 Mitchell-Tranter Co. v. Eh- mett, 23 Ky. L. R. 1788, 65 S. W. 835. 55 L. R. A. 710. Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. v. Raymond, 148 111. 248, 35 N. E. 729; Weiss v. Dittman, 4 Tex. Cv. App. 35, 23 S. W. 229; Fiore v. Ladd, 25 Ore. 423, 36 Pac. 572; Graferman Dairy Co. v. St. Louis Dairy Co. 96 Mo. App. 495, 70 S. W. 390; Penn. Canal Co. v. Harris, 101 Pa. St. 93; Plumb v. Curtis. 66 Conn. 154, 33 Atl. 998; Stocker v. Green, 94 Mo. 280, 7 S. W. 279, 4 Am. St. 382; Sherman v. Kreul, 42 Wis. 33; Sigerson v. Pom- eroy, 13 Mo. 620; Hazewell v. Cour- sen, 81 N. Y. 630; Uhl v. Robison, 8 Neb. 272; Kieldsen v. Wilson, 77 Mich. 45. 43 N. W- 1054; Graves v. Dill, 159 Mass. 74, 34 N. E. 336; Ordway v. Sanders, 58 N. H. 132; Jacob Tome Inst. of Port Deposit v. Crothers, 87 Md. 569, 40 Atl. 261; Wooley v. Lyon, 117 111. 244, 250, 6 N. E. 885; Lindesaan v. Fry, 178 111. 174, 52 N. E. 831; Von Glahn v. Von Glahn, 46 III. 134, 139; Blair v. Blanton (Tex. Cv. App.), 55 S. W. 321; North v. Mallory, 94 Md. 305, 51 Atl. 89; Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Dumas, 131 Ala. 172, 30 So. 867; Percival v. Chase, 182 Mass. 371, 65 N. E. 800; Anniston L. & C. Co. v. Lewis, 107 Ala. 538, 18 So. 326; Highland Ave. & B. R. Co. v. Sampson, 112 Ala. 425, 20 So. 566; Soloman v. City Compress 107 WITHDRAWING FACTS FROM JURY. 117 dence of the prosecution alone is improper in ignoring the de- fense. 19 * 117. Instructions withdrawing facts. Where there is evi- dence tending to support an issue of fact properly presented by the pleadings an instruction withdrawing such issue is improp- er. 195 And if any inference can be fairly drawn from the evi- dence which tends to support a material fact an instruction withdrawing such fact from the consideration of the jury is im- proper. 196 The giving of an instruction withdrawing from the considera- tion of the jury certain evidence, though slight, which tends to prove a material fact in issue is error. 197 So where doc- umentary evidence proper to be considered has ben introduced, an instruction so framed that it withdraws such documents from the jury is improper. In such case it is error for the court to state that the evidence is what the witnesses testify to on the witness stand. 198 But, on the other hand, where there is no competent evidence tending to prove a particular fact or issue involved, it is proper to withdraw such fact or issue by in- structions. 199 194 Sanders v. S. 134 Ala. 74, 32 162 111. 658, 44 N. E. 887; Chicago So. 654; Mann v. S. 134 Ala. 1, 32 & A. R. Co. v. Dumser, 161 111. So. 704; S. v. Gallivan, 75 Conn. 190, 197, 43 N. E. 698; Protection 326, 53 Atl. 731, 96 Am. St. 203. Life Ins. Co. v. Dill, 91 111. 174; 195 Cicero St. R. Co. v. Brown, Chezem v. S. 56 Neb. 496, 76 N. W. 193 111. 274, 279, 61 N. E. 1093; Chi- 1056; Hayden v. Frederickson, 56 cago, B & Q. R. Co. v. Sykes, 96 Neb. 141, 80 N. W. 494; Myers v. 111. 162, 176; Ayres v. Pittsburgh, Walker, 31 111. 353, 363; Orne v. C. C. & St. L. R. Co. 201 p a . St. Cook, 31 111. 238; Ayers v. Metcalf, 124, 50 Atl. 958 (held not with- 39 111. 307; Frasure v. Zimmerly, drawing); Pritchett v. Munroe, 22 25 111. 184; Bowden v. Achor, 95 Ala. 501; Providence G. M. Co. Ga. 243, 22 S. E. 254; American v. Thompson (Ariz.), 60 Pac. 874; Oak Ex. Co. v. Ryan, 104 Ala. 267, Chicago, &c. Co. v. Moran, 210 111. 15 So. 807; Woodbury v. S. 69 Ala. 9, 15. 242, 44 Am. R. 515. 196 Whitehouse v. Bolster, 95 Md. 197 Anderson v. Timberlake, 114 458, 50 Atl. 240. See also Germania Ala. 377, 22 So. 431, 62 Am. St. 155. Fire Ins. Co. v. Klewer, 129 111. "8 Myers v. S. 97 Ga. 76, 25 S. 599, 607, 22 N. E. 489; Chicago & N. E. 252; Bowden v. Archer, 95 Ga. R. Co. v. Snyder, 128 111. 655, 660, 21 243, 22 S. E. 254; Scarbrough v. N. E. 520; Cummings v. Tilton, Blackman. 108 Ala. 656, 18 So. 735; 44 111. 172; Dunn v. P. 172 111. 582, Mode Mill Co. v. McEver, 95 Ga. 599, 50 N. E. 137; Vierling v. Iri- 701, 22 S. E. 705. quois Furnace Co. 170 111. 189, 9 Supreme Council C. K. v. Fi- 48 N. E. 1069; Ennis v. Pullman delity & C. Co. 63 Fed. 48; Morgan P. C. Co. 165 111. 161, 46 N. E. 439; v. Stone, (Neb.) 93 N. W. 743. Chicago City R. Co. v. Dinsmore, 117a, BASED ON EVIDENCE AND PLEADINGS. 108 117a. Action for personal injury from negligence. In an action for personal injury resulting from negligence, an instruction which enumerates a certain state of facts and directs the jury that if they find such facts to be true then the party complaining cannot recover for an alleged injury, is er- roneous in that it takes from the jury the question of negligence, which is a question of fact for them to determine. 200 For in- stance, an instruction stating that "it is the duty of a person before attempting to cross a railroad track to stop, if necessary, and look and listen for the approach of trains before entering upon the track; and if the jury believe from the evidence that the plaintiff in this case could have discovered the approach of the defendant's train and avoided the injury in question by having stopped his mule before driving upon the track and looking and listening for the approach of said train then he cannot recover in this case, unless the jury shall believe from the evidence that the agents or servants of the defendants were guilty of gross negligence in the operation of said train," is erroneous, in that it withdraws from the jury the determination of the fact whether or not the plaintiff was guilty of negligence. 201 118. Instructions ignoring defense. Where there is evidence tending to establish a legal defense to an action, either civil or criminal, the giving of instructions which ignore or disregard such defense is error, although the instructions may in all other respects correctly state the law. 202 Thus in an action charging 200 Pennsylvania Co. v. Frana, timore, C. & A. R. Co. v. Kirby, 112 111. 404. 88 Md. 489, 41 Atl. 777; Globe Oil 201 Pennsylvania Co. v. Frana, 112 Co. v. Powell, 56 Neb. 463, 76 N. \V. 111. 404. Instructions held not with- 1081; Harris v. Carrington, 115 N. drawing facts from the jury: Car. 187, 20 S. E. 452; Birmingham Hronek v. P. 134 111. 135, 147, 24 S. R. Co. v. Cuzzart, 133 Ala. 262, N. E. 861; Kirby v. Wilson, 98 31 So. 979; Sutherland v. Holliday 111. 240, 244; Devine v. Chicago, (Neb.), 90 N. W. 937; Carwile v. M. & St. P. R. Co. 100 Iowa, 692, Carwile, 131 Ala. 603, 31 So. 568; 69 N. W. 1042; Dillingham v. Jones v. Parker (Tex. Cv. App.), Crank, 87 Tex. 104, 27 S. W. 93. 42 S. W. 123. See Clapper v. Men- It is improper for the court to dill, 96 Mo. App. 106, 69 S. W. charge that counsel did not make 669; Hall v. Vanderpool, 156 Pa. a certain argument, for the reason St. 152, 26 Atl. 1069; Burke v. that this is a matter as much with- Holmes (Tex. Cv. App.), 68 S. W. in the knowledge of the jury as 52; Remy v. Olds (Cal.) 34 Pac. of the judge of the court. Binning- 216; Eureka F. Co. v. Baltimore, ham, R. & E. Co. v. Williams, 119 C- S. & R. Co. 78 Md. 179, 27 Atl. Ala. 547, 24 So. 548. 1035: American C. Tel. Co. v. No- 202 Commercial Bank v. Chatfield, ble, 98 Mich. 67, 56 N. W. 1100; 121 Mich. 641, 80 N. W. 712; Bal- Stanfield v. Phoenix L. Asso. 53 109 IGNORING DEFENSE. 118 negligence, contributory negligence on the part of the plain- tiff, is a proper defense; hence the refusal to instruct on the theory of contributory negligence is error if there is any evidence tending to prove contributory negligence. 203 It has been held that the giving of instructions for the plain- tiff in a personal injury case where the defense was contributory negligence, which ignored the theory of the defendant, is error, although such defense may have been presented in other in- structions. 204 "Where the pleadings properly present the issue as to whether a claim is barred by the statute of limitations, and there is evidence tending to support the contention that the claim is barred, it is error for the court in charging the jury to ignore such defense. 205 So if there is any evidence tend- ing to establish a good defense to a part of a claim, an instruc- tion which ignores the evidence of such defense is erroneous. 206 And in a criminal cause where the testimony for the defendant tends to prove a defense as to any one of several counts of an indictment it is error to refuse instructions as to such defense. 207 In a criminal case where the branding of cattle is relied upon to establish the taking of them, if there is evidence that the accused was not connected with such branding, the court, on request, should instruct that if the evidence shows that the accused was not connected with such branding then there was no taking of the cattle by him. 208 And where the possession of .stolen goods is relied upon to connect the accused with the crime Mo. App. 595: S. v. Abbott, 65 W. 774; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Kas. 139, 69 Pac. 160 (defense of Kuckkuck, 197 111. 304, 98 111. App. alibi ignored); Faust v. Hosford, 252, 64 N. E. 358; Union Pac. R. Co. 119 Iowa, 97, 93 N. W. 58; Stoll v. Ruzika (Neb.), 91 N. W. 543; v. Loving, 120 Fed. 805; Volk v. Van -Winkle v. Chicago, M. & St. Roche, 70 111. 297; Peoples v. S. P. R. Co. 93 Iowa, 509, 61 N. W. (Miss.), 33 So. 289; Woods v. S. 929. 81 Miss. 408, 33 So. 285; Thompson 205 Miller v. Cinnamon, 168 111. v. Boden, 81 Ind. 176; McGehee 451, 48 N. E. 45; See also Pardridge v. Lane, 34 Tex. 390; Illinois Cent. v. Culter, 168 111. 511, 48 N. E. 125; R. Co. v. Smith, 208 111. 618 Baltimore & S. R. Co. v. Then, 203 Eastman v. Curtis, 67 Vt. 432, 159 111. 543, 42 N. E. 971. 32 Atl. 232; McVey v. St. Glair Co. soe Asher v. Beckner, 19 Ky. 521, 49 W. Va. 412, 38 S. E. 648; Den- 41 S. W. 35. ver Tr. Co. v. Lassasso, 22 Colo. 20? Jones v. S. 80 Miss. 181, 31 444, 45 Pac. 409. So. 581; Hammond v. P. 199 111. 204 McCreery's Adm'rs v. Ohio 173, 64 N. E. 980 (self-defense). River R. Co. 43 W. Va. 110, 27 So. 208 Black v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 327. See generally: Sherwood v. 41 S. W. 606. Grand Ave. R. Co. (Mo. App.), 33 S. 119 BASED ON EVIDENCE AND PLEADINGS. 110 charged, the time which elapsed between the commission of the crime and the time when found in possession of the accused is material, and the instructions should cover this feature of the case. 200 Also on a charge of assault with intent to kill and murder it is error to instruct that if the prosecuting witness made an attack on the defendant without any weapon in his hands, and without appearance of any such weapon, then the defendant would not be warranted in using a deadly weapon, because it includes every conceivable case of violent attack and ignores differences of age and strength of the two persons. 210 119. Instructions summing up the evidence. The practice of summing up or recapitulating the evidence is of common law origin and prevails in many jurisdictions. In the language of Blackstone, "when the evidence is gone through on both sides the judge, in the presence of the parties, the counsel and all others, sums up the whole to the jury; omitting all superfluous circumstances, observing wherein the main question and principal issue lies, stating what evidence has been given to support it, with such remarks as he thinks necessary for their direction, and giving them his opinion in matters of law arising upon the evi- dence." 211 The practice of summing up the evidence is recognized in jurisdictions where the court is prohibited by constitutional or statutory provisions from expressing an opinion on the facts, as well as in those jurisdictions where the court may express an opinion on the facts, unless such provisions also expressly or im- pliedly forbid the summing up of the evidence. 212 Under this practice the court in charging the jury may sum up all the evidence in detail, if fairly done, and then state the rule of 209 Sharp v. S. 105 Ga. 588, 31 761; Hannon v. S. 70 Wis. 448, 36 N. S. E. 541. W. 1; Morgan v. S. 48 Ohio St. 371; 210 Davis v. S. 152 Ind. 34, 51 N. First Baptist Church v. Rouse, 21 B. 928, 71 Am. St. 322. Conn. 167; Donnilly v. S. 26 N. J. 211 Blackstone Comm. 375. L. 480; District of Columbia v. 212 Blaishfield Instructions, 53 Robinson, 180 U. S. 92, 21 Sup. Ct. P. 130, citing: Mitchell v. Harmo- 283; Hamlin v. Treat, 87 Me. 310, ny, 13 How. (U. S.), 130; Starr v. 32 Atl. 909; Bellow v. Ahrburg, 23 U. S. 153 U. S. 614, 14 Sup. Ct. 919; Kas. 287; City & S. R. Co. v. Find- P. v. Fanning, 131 N. Y. 663, 30 N. ley, 76 Ga. 311 (and other cases); E. 569; S. v. Rose, 47 Minn. 47, Com. v. Barry, 9 Allen Mass. 278; 49 N. W. 525; Com. v. McManus, S. v. Sipsey, 14 N. Car. 485. 143 Pa. St. 64, 21 Atl. 1018, 22 Atl. Ill SUMMING UP THE EVIDENCE. 119 law applicable to the facts. 213 The rule applies to civil and criminal cases alike. 214 But in some jurisdictions this practice, though recognized, has been condemned. 215 Summarizing in- structions as such, however, are not necessarily objectionable or vicious.- 16 An instruction thus summarizing the evidence must necessarily state all the facts or elements which, as a matter of law, will authorize the verdict directed. The contentions of the opposing party should not be ignored in summarizing instructions if there is any evidence tending to support his contention. 217 If such an instruction omits material facts it is highly objectionable. The very fact that the court gives what assumes to be a summary of the facts of a case may induce the jury to believe that they are all the facts necessary to be considered in arriving at a con- clusion. 218 An instruction which thus undertakes to state all the material facts constituting a cause of action or defense, but omits a material fact, is fatally defective. 219 But a summarizing instruction is not erroneous in failing to state all the subsidiary or unimportant facts. It is sufficient if it enumerates all the material facts. 220 It has been held in Pennsylvania that if the trial court in 213 Morgan v. S. 48 Ohio St. 377, Co. v. Snyder, 117 111. 376, 7 N. E. 27 N. E. 710; Medearis v. Anchor 604; St. Louis & S. R. Co. v. Britz, Mutual Fire Ins. Co. 104 Iowa, 88, 72 111. 256, 261; McCorkle v. Simp- '73 N. W. 495; Mimms v. S. 16 Ohio son, 42 Ind. 453; Barker v. S. 48 St. 234; Sheets v. Stark, 14 Ga. Ind. 163; Snyder v. S. -59 Ind. 105; 429; York v. Maine C. R. 'Co. 84 Ward v. Ward, 47 W. Va. 766, 36 Me. 128, 24 Atl. 791. S. E. 873; McAleer v. S. 46 Neb. 214 Turly v. P. 188 111. 633, 59 116, 64 N. W. 358; Kurstelska v. N. E. 506; Gregg v. P. 98 111. App. Jackson, 89 Minn. 95. 170. 218 Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. 215 Terre Haute & I. R. Co. v. Griffin, 68 111. 499, 507; Levy v. Eggman, 159 111. 550, 42 N. E. 970; Cunningham, 56 Neb. 348, 76 N. W. City of Chicago v. Schmidt. 107 111. 882; Ford v. S. 75 Miss. 727, 23 186; Quinn v. P. 123 111. 333, 342, 15 So. 710; West v. Averill Grocery N. E. 46. Co. 109 Iowa, 488, 80 N. W. 555; 216 Norfolk Beet Sugar Co. v. Gallagher v. Williamson, 23 Cal. Hight, 56 Neb. 162, 76 N. W. 566; 334, 83 Am. Dec. 114. White v. State, 153 Ind. 689, 54 N. 219 Wyman v. Turner, 14 Ind. E. 763. App. 118, 42 N. E. 652; Jackson 217 Pardridge v. Cutter, 168 111. School Tp. v. Shera, 8 Ind. App. 512, 48 N. E. 125; Texas Loan Agen- 330, 35 N. E. 842; Dobson v. S. cy v. Fleming (Tex. Cv. App.), 46 61 Neb. 584, 85 N. W. 843. S. W. 63; Terre Haute & I. R. Co. 220 Hutchinson v. Wenzel, 155 v. Eggman, 159 111. 550, 42 N. E. Ind. 49, 56 N. E. 845; Illinois Cent. 970; City of Chicago v. Schmitt, R. Co. v. Byrne, 205 111. 21, 68 N. 107 111. 186; Chicago & N. W. R. E. 720. 119 BASED ON EVIDENCE AND PLEADINGS. 112 summing up the evidence mistakes the testimony, counsel should call the attention of the. court to the mistake immediately after the charge, and failing to do so, complaint in that respect will not be considered on review. 221 But the rule above mentioned does not apply to an instruction which merely fails to embody evidence tending to establish a distinct antagonistic theory. All the law requires is that such an instruction based upon some particular hypothesis warranted by the evidence must not omit any essential element or material fact to entitle a party to a re- covery upon such theory. 222 But in most of the states the court is prohibited from commenting on the evidence, suggesting the inferences that may be drawn, expressing an opinion as to its weight, or assuming that certain facts have been proved. 223 221 Bailey v. Mill Creek Coal Co. 20 Pa. Super. 186. 222 Springfield C. R. Co. v. Hoeff- ner, 175 111. 638, 51 N. E. 884; Terre Haute R. Co. v. Eggmann, 159 111. 550, 42 N. E. 970; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Harrington, 192 111. 24, 61 N. E. 622; Voris v. Shotts, 20 Ind. App. 220, 50 N. E. 484. 223 Fuller v. Ivew York F. Ins. Co. (Mass.) 67 N. E. 879; Gaynor v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 136 Ala. 244, 33 So. 808; Ray v. Long, 132 N. Car. 891, 44 S. E. 652; Ward v. Brown, 53 W. Va. 227, 44 S. E. 488; Dodd v. Guiseffl (Mo. App.), 73 S. W. 304; Griffin v. Southern R. 66 S. Car. 77, 44 S. E. 562; Dobson v. Southern R. Co. 132 N. Car. 900, 44 S. E. 593; Continental Tob. Co. v. Knoop, 24 Ky. L. R. 1268, 71 S. W. 3; Wilson v. Huguenin, 117 Ga. 546, 43 S. E. 857; Ohio, &c. R. Co. v. Pearcy, 128 Ind. 197, 27 M. E. 479; Abbitt v. Lake Erie, &c. R. Co. 150 Ind. 498, 50 N. E. 729; Rogers v. Manhattan, &c. Ins. Co. 138 Cal. 285, 71 Pac. 348; Selensky v. Chicago, &c. R: Co. 100 Iowa, 113, 94 N. W. 272; Lydick v. Gill (Neb.) 94 N. W. 109; McHenry v. Bulefant (Pa.) 56 Atl. 256; Northern Ohio R. Co. v. Rigby (Ohio), 68 N. E. 1046. Violations of the rule: Johnson v. Kahn, 97 Mo. App. 628, 71 S. W. 725; Allen v, Frost (Tex. Cv. App.), 71 S. W. 767; Meadows v. West. U. Tel. Co. 131 N. Car. 73 42 S. E. 534; Warfleld v. Clark, 118 Iowa, 69, 91 N. W. 833; White v. McPherson, 183 Mass. 533, 67 N. E. 643. Rule not violated: Gold- thorpe v. Clark-Nickerson L. Co. 31 Wash. 467, 71 Pac. 1091; Ladd v. Witte, 116 Wis. 35, 92 N. W. 365; Wissler v. Atlantic (Iowa), 98 N. W. 131; Snyder v. Lake Shore, &c. R. Co. (Mich.), 91 N. W. 643, Mont- gomery v. Del. Ins. Co. (S. Car.) 4b S. E. 934; Coombs v. Mason, 97 Me. 270, 54 Atl. 728; Schmuck v. Hill (Neb.), 96 N. W. 158. CHAPTER IV. DIRECTING VERDICT. Sec. Sec. 120. Peremptory instructions de- 136. fined. 137. 121. Nature and effect of motion for peremptory. 138. 122. Court will not weigh the ev- idence on the motion. 139. 123. Requesting peremptory in- 140. structions Waiving. 124. When motion for peremptory 141. presented. 142. 125. Peremptory instructions in- stead of nonsuit. 143. 126. Peremptory instructions for defendant. 144. 127. If plaintiff's evidence varies from his pleadings. 145. 128. If evidence shows contract to be illegal. 146. 129. Peremptory improper for de- fendant. 147. 130. If the evidence tends to prove plaintiff's case. 148. 131. When facts are doubtful 149. different conclusions. 132. Where either of two the- 150. ories is supported. 133. Evidence strongly against 151. plaintiff. 134. The foregoing principles il- 152. lustrated. 135. Peremptory instructions for plaintiff. Prima facie case undisputed. When defendant a,dmits all allegations. When defendant's pleading is insufficient. When verdict cannot stand. Improper for plaintiff If any evidence for defendant. If the evidence is conflicting. If part only of plaintiff's claim is contested. Where amount of claim is dis- puted. Waiving right to peremptory instruction. Motion by both parties Ef- fect. Waiving right to submit facts to jury. Motion of both parties denied Effect. Directing jurors to agree. Ruling of trial court review- able. Criminal Cases! Peremptory proper for defendant. When not proper for defend- ant. Peremptory proper for prose- cution When. 120. Peremptory instruction defined. When the facts of a case are such that it becomes the duty of the court, as a matter of law, to determine what the verdict shall be, the jury are then 113 121 DIRECTING VERDICT. 114 instructed by the court to find a verdict accordingly. In some states such a charge is called a peremptory instruction, 1 and in others it is called a "general affirmative charge." 1 * The court in thus charging the jury need not give any specific reasons for directing a verdict; it is sufficient to state that the evidence will not support any other verdict than the one directed. 2 The in- struction should not be drawn in such form as to complicate it with statements of the law on which it is based. 3 And the court in directing a verdict should give no other instructions except as to the measure of damages. 4 121. Nature and effect of motion for peremptory. A motion for a peremptory instruction is in the nature of a demurrer to the evidence and is governed by the same rules, except as to technical methods of procedure. The maker of the motion ad- mits the truth of all the opposing evidence and all inferences which may be fairly and rationally drawn from it, and does not involve a determination of the weight of the evidence nor the credibility of the witnesses. 5 The party requesting such an 1 Offutt v. Columbian Exposition, 175 111. 473, 51 N. E. 651; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. King, 179 111. 94, 53 N. E. 552; West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Foster, 175 111. 396, 51 N. E. 690; Swift & Co. v. Fue, 167 111. 443, 47 N. E. 761; Wenona Coal Co. v. Holmquest, 152 111. 581, 38 N. E. 946. i* Tennessee Coal, I. & R. Co. v. Stevens (Ala.), 16 So. 22; Henry v. McNamara, 114 Ala. 107, 22 So. 428; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Sul- livan (Ala.), 35 So. 327. 2 Hanley v. Balch, 106 Mich. 46, 63 N. W. 981; Cowles v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Co. (Iowa), 88 N. W. 1072. Contra: Carretson v. Apple- ton, 58 N. J. L. 386, 37 Atl. 150; Tanderup v. Hansen, 8 S. Dak. 375, 66 N. W. 1073. See Robey v. S. 94 Md. 61, 51 Atl. 411. s Thomas v. Carey, 26 Colo. 485, 58 Pac. 1093. * City of Omaha v. Bowman, 63 Neb. 333, 88 N. W. 521. The fol- lowing has been held sufficient in form for directing a verdict. "Now comes the defendants by their at- torney and request the court to instruct the jury that the evidence is insufficient to maintain the plain- tiff's case, as charged in the decla- ration, and therefore the verdict must be for the defendants." Ames & Frost Co. v. Shrackurski, 145 111. 192, 34 N. E. 48; Ayers v. City of Chicago, 111 111. 406. See Alexan- der v. Cunningham, 111 111. 511. A remark made by the court in the presence of the jury that any verdict except one for the plain- tiff would be set aside by the court, amounts to an instruction direct- ing a verdict for ths plaintiff, White v. Blum 79 Fed. 271. The court in directing a verdict under the statute of Washington is not required to file its findings of facts and conclusions of law, Fidelity Trust Co. v. Palmer, 22 Wash. 473, 61 Pac. 158. s Offutt v. Columbian Exposi- tion, 175 111. 472, 51 N. E. 651; Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Dun- leavy, 129 111. 132, 22 N. E. 15; Frazer v. Howe, 106 111. 563, 573; Joliet, A. & N. R. Co. v. Velie, 140 111. 59, 29 N. E. 706; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Adler, 129 111. 335, 21 115 MOTION FOR PEREMPTORY EVIDENCE CONSIDERED TRUE. 122 instruction admits not only what the evidence actually proves, but also the ultimate facts which it tends to prove for his op- ponent. In other words, the evidence of the opposing party must be taken as true in determining a motion for a peremptory instruction. 7 And the same rules govern also where the defendant presents his motion to nonsuit the plaintiff, as he may under the practice in some jurisdictions, for the reason that the plaintiff's evidence does not prove a case. On a motion of this nature the evidence of the plaintiff shall be taken as true in a light most favorable to him. 8 The court will regard the issues proved if there is any evidence tending to prove them. 9 And all inferences which may be fairly drawn from the plaintiff's evidence shall be counted in his favor by the court in passing upon the motion for a nonsuit. 10 122. Court will not weight the evidence on the motion. In considering the propriety of giving a peremptory instruction, when requested, the court does not weigh the evidence, nor does it determine the credibility of the witnesses or the force that should be given to the evidence having a tendency to impeach the veracity of the witnesses. 11 In deciding the motion the sole N. E. 846; Bartelott v. Interna- Duffy v. St. Louis Tr. Co. (Mo. tional Bank, 119 111. 259, 269, 9 App.), 78 S. W. 831. N. E. 898; Doane v. Lockwood, 115 9 Soyer v. Great Falls Water Co. 111. 490, 494, 4 N. E. 500; Hardy v. 15 Mont. 1, 37 Pac. 838. See How- Wise, 5 App. Cas. (D. C.) 108. ell v. Norfolk & C. R. Co. 124 N. G Neininger v. Cowen, 101 Fed. Car. 24, 32 S. E. 317. 787; West C. St. R. Co. v. Ship- 10 Lee v. Publishers, &c. 137 Mo. lett, 85 111. App. 683. 385, 38 S. W. 1107; Cummings v. 7 Kirk v. Garrett, 84 Md. 383, 35 Helena & L. S. R. Co. 26 Mont. Atl. 1089; Martin v. Chicago & 434, 68 Pac. 852; Bohl v. City of N. W. R. Co. 194 111. 138, 62 N. W. Dell Rapids (S. Dak.), 91 N. W. 599; New York Dry Goods Store 315. See also Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Pabst Brewing Co. 112 Fed. 381; v. Randolph, 78 Fed. 754; Howey v. Newbold v. Hayward, 96 Md. 247, Fisher, 111 Mich. 422, 69 N. W. 54 Atl. 67 (even though contra- 741; Wagner v. Lamont (Mich.), dieted in every particular). 98 N. W. 2. s Schiller v. Dry Dock, E. B. & n Rack v. Chicago C. R. Co. 173 B. R. Co. 56 N. Y. S. 184, 26 Misc. 111. 289, 50 N. E. 668, 44 L. R. A. 392; Coley v. North Carolina R. 127; Luhrs v. Brooklyn Heights Co. 129 N. Car. 407, 40 S. E. 195; R. Co. 42 N. Y. S. 606; Platz Hopkins v. Norfolk & S. R. Co. v. McKean Tp. 178 Pa. St. 601, 131 N. Car. 463, 42 S. E. 902; House 36 Atl. 136; House v. Wilder, v. Seaboard A. L. R. Co. 131 N. 47 111. 510; Davis v. Kroyden, Car. 103, 42 S. E. 553; Kelly v. 1 Mo. App. 192; Offutt v. Co- Strouse, 116 Ga. 872, 43 S. E. 280; lumbian Exposition. 175 111. 472, 123 DIRECTING VERDICT. 116 inquiry will be whether there is any evidence tending to support the cause of action. 12 The court may in its discretion hear further evidence before passing on a motion for nonsuit. 13 123. Requesting peremptory instructions Waiving. In Illi- nois the practice is that an instruction directing the jury to find a verdict for a party must be reduced to writing, the same as other instructions, and it should be presented to the court at the proper time, accompanied by a motion that it be given to the jury; a mere motion without such instruction is not suffi- cient. 14 The right to have such an instruction given to the jury is waived where it is submitted to the court, together with a series of other instructions on the issues. 15 Where a statute re- quires the grounds for a peremptory instruction or nonsuit to be stated, the party will be confined to the grounds stated in his motion ; other reasons will not be considered. 16 A motion by the defendant for a verdict in his favor on the ground that the plaintiff has not established his case by a preponderance of the evidence is not equivalent to a request for a verdict on the ground that there is no evidence to support a verdict for the plaintiff. 17 124. When motion for peremptory presented. A peremptory instruction to find a verdict for the defendant must be presented 51 N. E. 651; Louisville & N. R. Co. ing the jury to find a verdict for v. Dick (Ky.), 78 S. W. 914; St. the party, Smith v. Gillett, 50 Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Neal 111. 301; House v. Wilder, 47 111. (Ark.), 78 S. W. 220. 510. 12 Whaley v. Bartlett, 42 S. Car. is Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. 454, 20 S. E. 745. Murowski, 179 111. 77, 53 N. E. is Featherston v. Wilson, 123 N. 572; Chicago, P. & St. L. R. Co. Car. 623, 31 S. E. 843. v. Woolridge, 174 111. 332, 51 N. E. i* West C. St. R. Co. v. Foster, 701; Pierce v. Walters, 164 111. 56.0, 175 111. 396, 51 N. E. 690; Swift & 45 N. E. 1068; Baldwin v. Went- Co. v. Fue, 167 111. 443, 47 N. E. 761; worth, 67 N. H. 408, 36 Atl. 365. Wenona Coal Co. v. Holmquest, In Alabama it has been held that 152 111. 581, 38 N. E. 946; Offutt v. the court is not precluded from di- Columbian Exposition, 175 111. 473, recting a verdict for a party at 51 N. E. 651. The practice of ex- his request, although the court has eluding the evidence amounts to charged the jury on the issues, an instruction as in a case of non- Gary v. Woodham, 103 Ala. 421, suit, and is equivalent to an in- 15 So. 840. struction that the evidence does ie Sloan v. Petzer, 54 S. Car. not make out a case. This prac- 314, 32 S. E. 431. tice, though once in vogue, has i" McDonald v. Minneapolis, St. long since been superseded by the P. R. Co. 105 Mich. 659, 63 N. W. more appropriate mode of instruct- 966. 117 WAIVING, PRESENTING MOTION. 124 to the court by proper motion at the close of the plaintiff's evidence. 18 Or the defendant may ask that such an instruction be given after he has introduced his own evidence ; such practice being recognized by the courts, though it is unusual. But such an instruction can only be sustained when, as a matter of law, admitting all facts which the plaintiff's evidence tends to prove and wholly ignoring all the evidence introduced by the defendant the court can say the plaintiff has failed to make out his case. 19 According to the practice in some jurisdictions, however, the court may recall the jury even after they have been deliberating upon the case and direct a verdict. 20 So also the court may at any time before the jury are discharged change an order of non- suit, and direct a verdict for the defendant. 21 is Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Murowski, 179 111. 77, 53 N. B. 572; Peirce v. Walters, 164 111. 560, 45 N. E. 1068; Chicago, P. & S. L. R. Co. v. Woolridge, 174 111. 330, 332,51 N. E. 701; Baldwin v. Went- worth, 67 N. H. 408, 36 Atl. 365; Calumet St. R. Co. v. Van Pett, 173 111. 72, 50 N. E. 678; Gilbert v. Watts-De Golyer Co. 169 111. 129, 48 N. E. 430; Hartford Deposit Co. v. Pederson, 168 111. 224, 48 N. E. 30; Metropolitan Bank of Minne- apolis v. Northern Fuel Co. 173 111. 345, 50 N. E. 1062; Hartford Deposit Co. v. Sollitt, 172 111. 222, 50 N. E. 178; Franklin v. Krum, 171 111. 378, 49 N. E. 513; Calumet St. R. Co. v. Christenson, 170 111. 383, 48 N. E. 962; Chicago & Great Western 'R. Co. v. Wedel, 144 111. 9, 12, 32 N. E. 547; West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Yund, 169 111. 49, 48 N. E. 208; Central R. Co. v. Knowles, 191 111. 241; Sullivan v. Brooks, 31 N. Y. S. 36, 10 Misc. 368; West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Feldstein, 169 111. 139, 48 N. E. 193; Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Delaney, 169 111. 581, 48 N. E. 476; West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Fishman, 169 111. 196, 48 N. E. 447; Val- lette v. Bilinski, 167 111. 565, 47 N. E. 770; Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Richards, 152 111. 59, 72, 38 N. E. 773; Joliet, A. & N. R. Co. v. Velie, 140 111. 59, 29 N. E. 706; Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Randolph, 78 Fed. 754; Brunswick Grocery Co. v. Bruns- wick & W. R. Co. 106 Ga. 270, 32 S. E. 92. is Collar v. Patterson, 137 111. 403, 406, 27 N. E. 604; Randall v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. 109 U. S. 478; Reed v. Inhabitants, 8 Allen (Mass.), 524; Bartolett v. Interna- tional Bank, 119 111. 259, 269, 9 N. E. 898; Vanarsdell's Adm'r v. Louis- ville & N. R. Co. 23 Ky. L. R. 1666, 65 S. W. 858. But see McCormick v. Standard Oil Co. 60 N. J. L. 243, 37 Atl. 617. If no motion is made by the defendant to dismiss the case at the close of the intro- duction of the evidence, it amounts to an admission that the plaintiff's evidence is sufficient to make out his case and raises questions of fact for the jury, Rouse v. Print- ers' E. Co. 33 N. Y. S. 55, 12 Misc. 114; Sulyewski v. Windholz, 30 N. Y. S. 230, 9 Misc. 498. 20 Rainger v. Boston M. Life Asso. 167 Mass. 109, 44 N. E. 1088. See Gary v. Woodham, 103 Ala. 421, 15 So. 840 (may request a per- emptory after the court has charged the jury on the issues). The court should not direct a verdict on its own motion, Gaynor v. Louisville & N. R. Co. (Ala.), 33 So. 108. 21 Portance v. Lehigh Val. Coal Co. 101 Wis. 574, 77 N. W. 875; Rainger v. Boston M. Life Asso. 167 Mass. 109, 44 N. E. 1088. 125 DIRECTING VERDICT. 118 125. Peremptory instruction instead of nonsuit. Under statutory provisions in some states the court is not authorized to enter an order of involuntary nonsuit and judgment of dis- missal because the plaintiff has failed to make out his case. In such case the proper practice is to instruct the jury to find for the defendant. 22 126. Peremptory instruction for defendant. An instruction directing a verdict for the defendant should only be given when the evidence, with all the legitimate and natural inferences which may be drawn therefrom, is wholly insufficient, when taken as true, to sustain a verdict for the plaintiff. 23 When there is no evidence to support a verdict for the plaintiff a peremptory instruction to find for the defendant is proper. But to say there is no evidence does not mean literally none, but that there is none to reasonably satisfy the jury that the plaintiff has made out his case. 24 A verdict for the defendant should be directed if the court would be bound to set aside a verdict for the plain- tiff. 25 So if the evidence so greatly preponderates against the plaintiff that the court would, on motion, be compelled to set aside a verdict, a nonsuit is proper where the practice of nonsuiting prevails. 26 The court is authorized to direct a ver- 22 Thompson v. Missouri Pac. R. Amble v. Whipple, 139 111. 322, 28 Co. 51 Neb. 527, 71 N. W. 61. See N. E. 841; City of East St. L. v. Stern v. Frommer, 30 N. Y. S. O'Flynn, 119 111. 207, 10 N. E. 395; 1067, 10 Misc. 219. Ellermah v. St. Louis Tr. Co. (Mo. 23 Lake S. & M. S. R. Co. v. App.), 76 S. \V. 661 (injury from Richards, 152 111. 72, 38 N. E. 773, trolley bar collision). 30 L. R. A. 33 note; Lake S. & 24 offutt v. Columbian Exposi- M. S. R. Co. v. Hessions, 150 111. tion, 175 111. 472, 51 N: E. 651. 559, 37 N. E. 905; Fugate v. City See Conner v. Giles, 76 Me. 132; of Somerset, 97 Ky. 48, 29 S. W. 970; Boyle v. Illinois Cent. R. Co. 88 111. Springfield C. R. Co. v. Puntenney, App. 255; Phillips v. Rentz, 106 Ga. 200 111. 12; Day v. Boston & M. R. 249, 32 S. E. 107; Knapp v. Jones, (Me.), 55 Atl. 420; Offutt v. Colum- 50 Neb. 490, 70 N. W. 19; McPeck bian Exposition, 175 111. 472, 51 N. E. v. Central Vt. R. Co. 79 Fed. 590, 651; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Cozby, 25 C. C. A. 110; Lacy v. Porter, 103 174 111. 109, 50 N. E. 1011; Pennsyl- Cal. 597, 37 Pac. 635; Vance v. vania Co. v. Backes, 133 111. 264, 24 Vance, 74 Ind. 370; Sunsyside, &c. N. E. 563; P. v. Board, &c. of Mad- Co. v. Reitz, 14 Ind. App. 478, 500. ison County, 125 111. 340, 17 N. E. 25 De Graffeuried v. Wallace (Ind. 147; Roden v. Chicago & G. T. R. Ter.), 53 S. W. 452; Brown v. Pot- Co. 133 111. 72; Ruck v. Chicago C. ter, 13 Colo. App. 512, 58 Pac. 785; R. Co. 173 111. 291 50 N. E. 668; McDonald v. Metropolitan St. R. Siddall v. Jansen, 168 111. 45, 48 N. Co. 61 N. Y. S. 817; Payne Cloth- E. 191; Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v. ing Co. v. Payne (Ky.), 54 S. W. Chancellor, 165 111. 445, 46 N. E. 709; Howes v. District of Colum- 269; Baltimore & O. R. Co v. Stan- bia, 2 App. Gas. (D. C.) 188. ley, 158 111. 396, 41 N. E. 1012; 20 Cohn v. David Mayer Brewing 119 PEEEMPTOEY FOE DEFENDANT. 126 diet for either party where a contrary verdict could not be sustained by the evidence. 27 If the plaintiff's evidence, including all inferences which may be fairly drawn therefrom, when taken as true, is not sufficient to make out a prima facie case a verdict for the defendant is proper. 23 And it has been held that unless the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, not from his own evidence alone, but from the whole evidence, the court is authorized to direct a verdict for the defendant. 29 So it is proper to direct a nonsuit in those jurisdictions where such practice prevails, if the plain- tiff's evidence fails to establish a prima facie case. 30 Although the plaintiff proves every fact or element essential to a recovery, yet if other facts are also proved, which clearly show that he is not entitled to a verdict, a nonsuit is proper. 31 For example, if the plaintiff sues on an account and proves his case as laid, but also proves that the debt has been fully paid, a nonsuit should be awarded. Under such state of facts he proves his case and then disproves it. 32 If it appears that the plaintiff's evidence could not under any view of the law support his cause of action a verdict should be Co. 56 N. Y. S. 293; Downing v. mark, 20 Tex. Cv. App. 175, 49 S. Murray, 113 Cal. 455, 45 Pac. 869; W. 900. And where some of sever- Wheatley v. Philadelphia, W. & al defendants have filed cross-com- B. R. Co. 1 Marv. (Del.), 305, 30 plaints' the court is not authorized Atl. 660; Meyers v. Berch, 59 N. J. to dismiss the cross complaints by L. 238, 36 Atl. 95. a nonsuit of the plaintiff, Taylor 27 Coleman v. Lord (Me.), 52 Atl. v. Bartholomew (Idaho), 53 Pac. 645; Barnett v. Talbot, 90 Me. 229, 325. 38 Atl. 112; Barnhart v. Chicago, 23 Anders v. Life Ins. Co. 62 Neb. M. & St. P. R. Co. 97 Iowa, 654, 585, 87 N. W. 331; Freemont Brew- 66 N. W. 902; Reeder v. Dupuy, ing Co. v. Hansen (Neb.), 91 N. 96 Iowa, 729, 65 N. W. 338; Market w. 279; Barr v. Irey, 3 Kas. App. & Fulton Nat. Bank v. Sargent, 240, 45 Pac. Ill; Simrell v. Miller, 85 Me. 349, 27 Atl. 192. See also 169 Pa. St. 326, 32 At). 548. See Zimmerman v. Kearney County North C. St. R. Co. v. Cossar, 203 Bank (Neb.), 91 N. W. 497; Els- 111. 611; Sattler v. Chicago, R. I. worth v. Newby (Neb.), 91 N. W. & p. R. Co. (Neb.), 98 N. W. 664. 517; White v. L. Hoster Brewing 29 Preistly v. Provident Sav. Co. Co. 51 W. Va. 259, 41 S. E. 180; 117 Fed. 271. Kielbeck v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. 30 Congran v. Bigelow 164 U. S. (Neb.), 97 N. W. 750; Truskett v. 301, 17 Sup. Ct. 117; Baker v. John- Bronaugh (Indian Ter.), 76 S. W. son (Del.), 42 Atl. 449; Cummings 294. Where there are several defend- v. Halena & L. S. R. Co. 26 Mont, ants and one has not been served 434, 68 Pac. 852. and does not appear, the court is si Evans v. Mills (Ga.), 46 S. E. not authorized to direct a verdict 674. as to him, but should dismiss with- 32 Evans v. Mills (Ga.), 46 S. E. out prejudice, Sanders v. Wetter- 675. 126 DIRECTING VERDICT. 120 directed for the defendant. 33 Or where the evidence is so clearly deficient as to give no support to a verdict for the plaintiff, if rendered in his favor, it should be excluded and a verdict directed for the defendant. 34 Or if the evidence for the plain- tiff so clearly fails to make out a case that reasonable men could not differ, or no reasonable ground could exist for a difference of opinion among jurors as to the insufficiency of the evidence, a verdict should be directed for the defendant. 35 When the controlling facts are admitted or not controverted in any essential respect the court may instruct the jury what their verdict should be. 36 So also the court is authorized to di- rect a verdict where there is no conflict in the evidence between the parties litigant. 37 So if from the undisputed evidence the court would be compelled to set aside a verdict then the court may direct a verdict. 38 Where the admitted facts conclusively show that an action is barred by the statute of limitations a peremptory instruction for the defendant is proper. 30 If the testimony of the plaintiff himself shows that he has no cause of action a nonsuit is proper. 40 33 Chapman v. Yellow P. L. Co. 480, 54 Pac. 752; McCormick v. 89 Fed. 903; Phoenix A. Co. v. Standard Oil Co. 60 N. J. L. 243, Lucker, 77 Fed. 243; Fisher v. For- 37 Atl. 617. ter, 11 S. Dak. 311, 77 N. W. 112. ss Hurd v. Neilson, 100 Iowa, 555, See also Collar v. Patterson-, 137 69 N. W. 867; Sax v. Detroit, G. H. 111. 406, 27 N. E. 604; Randall v. & M. R. Co. (Mich.), 89 N. W. 368; Baltimore & O. R. Co. 109 U. S. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Martin, 114 478; Reed v. Inhabitants, 8 Allen Fed. 586. Contra: Dick v. Louis- (Mass.), 524. ville & N. R. Co. 23 Ky. L. R. 1068, s* Ritz v. City of Wheeling, 45 64 S. W. 725; Williams v. Belmont W. Va. 262, 31 S. E. 993, 43 L. R. Coal & C. Co. (W. Va.), 46 S. E. A. 148; Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. 802. R. Co. v. Heath, 22 Ind. App. 47, 39 Exchange Bank v. Trumble, 53 N. E. 198; Horn v. Hutchinson, 108 Ky. 234. 163 Pa. St. 435, 30 Atl. 152; White 40 Smith v. Cohn, 170 Pa. St. 132. v. Hoster B. Co. 51 W. Va. 259. 32 Atl. 565. An error committed 35 Fisher v. Porter, 11 S. Dak. in denying a motion to dismiss at 311, 77 N. W. 112; Ritz v. City of the close of the plaintiff's case for Wheeling, 45 W. Va. 262, 31 S. E. the want of sufficient evidence, will 993, 43 L. R. A. 148; Rickards v. be regarded as cured where the ev- Bemis (Tex. Cv. App.) 78 S. W. idence for the defendant afterwards 240. supplies the deficiency of the plain- se Wabash R. Co. v. Williamson, tiff's evidence, O'Connell v, Sam- 104 Ind. 157, 3 N. E. 814; Hall v. uel, 31 N. Y. S. 889, 81 Hun, 357; Durham, 109 Ind. 434, 9 N. E. 926, Cushman v. Carbondale Fuel Co. 10 N. E. 581; Peoples & Drovers' (Iowa), 88 N. W. 817. The court Bank v. Craig, 63 Ohio St. 382, 59 may cause a dismissal immediate- N. E. 102. ly after the opening statement of 37 Soloman v. Trisarri 9 N. Mex. counsel for the plaintiff without 121 PEREMPTORY WHEN VARIANCE. In case the plaintiff wholly fails to prove some one element essential to his right of recovery the court may properly direct a verdict for the defendant. 41 And for the same reason a non- suit is proper. For instance, where negligence is an essential element of the plaintiff's case, and he fails to prove that element, a nonsuit is proper. 42 127. If plaintiff's evidence varies from his pleadings. Where there is a variance between the plaintiff's pleadings and evi- dence it is proper to direct a verdict for the defendant, if the evidence also fails to prove a case for the plaintiff; and in such case it is not error to refuse leave to amend the pleadings. 43 Thus in an attachment suit where the evidence wholly fails to sustain the charge of fraudulent conveyance as alleged in the affidavit on which the action is based an instruction directing the jury to find for the defendant is proper. 44 So also a non- suit is proper where the plaintiff proves a different cause of action than that alleged in his complaint or declaration. 45 the introduction of evidence, it' such opening statement, taken as true, fails to show a case for the plaintiff, Sims v. Metropolitan St. R. Co. 72 N. Y. S. 835, 65 App. Div. 270. 41 Sack v. Dolese, 137 111. 138, 27 N. E. 62 (negligence); Bartelott v. International Bank, 119 111. 269, 9 N. E. 898; Abend v. Terre H. & I. R. Co. Ill 111. 202; Alexander v. Cunningham, 111 111. 515; Ayer v. City of Chicago, 111 111. 406; Fra- zer v. Howe, 106 111. 573; Clark v. Stitt, 12 Ohio C. C. 759; Lacy v. Porter, 103 Cal. 597, 37 Pac. 635; Louisville, St. L. & T. R. Co. v. Terry's Adm'rx, 20 Ky. L. R. 803, 47 S. W. 588; Jackson v. Ferris (Pa.), 8 Atl. 435; Brehmer v. Ly- man, 71 Vt. 98, 42 Atl. 613; Wilcox v. Willmin-gton R. Co. 2 Pen. (Del.) 157, 44 Atl. 686; Phillip v. Rentz, 106 Ga. 249, 32 S. E. 107; Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Dunn. 138 Ind. 18, 37 N. E. 546; Dunnington v. Syfeers, 157 Ind. 458, 62 N. E. 29; Cogan v. Cass Ave. & F. G. R. Co. (Mo. App.) 73 S. W. 738. 42 Daniels v. Leibig Mfg. Co. 2 Marv. (Del.) 207, 42 Atl. 447; Mt. Vernor Bank v. Porter, 148 Mo. 176, 49 S. W. 982; Cox v. Norfolk & C. R. Co. 123 N. Car. 604, 31 S. E. 848: Pace v. Harris, 97 Ga. 357, 24 S. E. 445. See Lyons v. Wayervoss A. L. R. Co. 114 Ga. 727, 40 S. E. 698. 43 Strahle v. First Nat. Bank, 47 Neb. 319, 66 N. W. 415. 44 Wadsworth v. Laurie, 164 111. 48, 45 N. E. 435. See Gilmore v. Courtney, 158 111. 437, 41 N. E. 1023. A motion for a peremptory in- struction because of a variance be- tween the pleadings and proof, to be of any avail on review, must specifically point out the variance, Probst Consolidation Co. v. Foley, 166 111. 31, 43 N. E. 750; Chicago C. R. Co. v. Carroll, 206 111. 327. 45 Thill v. Hoyt, 56 N. Y. S. 78, 37 App. Div. 521; Case v. Central R. Co. 59 N. J. L. 471, 37 Atl. 65: Baker v. Johnson, 2 Marv. (Del.) 219, 42 Atl. 449. If a declaration is defective, the defect cannot be reached by a motion to instruct the jury to find a verdict for the de- fendant, Gerke v. Faucher, 158 111. 375, 382, 41 N. E. 982. 128 DIRECTING VERDICT. 122 128. If evidence shows contract to be illegal. The fact that the transaction on which suit is brought was illegal, or that the action may be barred by the statute of limitations, is not suffi- cient reason for a nonsuit where such issue is raised by answer and reply. These are matters of defense. 40 But where the evidence conclusively shows that a suit is based on a gambling contract the court is authorized to direct a verdict. 47 129. Peremptory improper for defendant. If there is any evidence, though slight, which tends to establish the plaintiff's case a peremptory instruction to find for the defendant is im- proper. 48 And if the natural and reasonable inferences which may be fairly drawn from the evidence tend to prove the plain- tiff's case a general affirmative charge should not be given. 49 46 Fitch v. Bill, 71 Conn. 24, 40 Atl. 910. 47 West v. Sanders, 104 Ga. 727, 31 S. E. 619. 48 New York C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Luebech, 157 111. 604, 41 N. E. 897; West C. St. R. Co. v. Lyons, 157 111. 593, 42 N. E. 55; Chicago & N. R. Co. v. Snyder, 128 111. 655, 21 N. E. 520; Hartrich v. Hawes (111.), 67 N. E. 13; Agne v. Seitsinger, 96 Iowa, 181, 64 N. W. 836; P. v. People's Ins. Exchange, 126 111. 466, 18 N. E. 774; Wright Fire P. Co. v. Poezekai, 130 111. 139, 144, 22 N. E. 543; Lake S. & M. S. R. Co. v. Johnson, 135 111. 641, 649, 26 N. E. 510; Lake S. & M. S. R. Co. v. Brown. 123 111. 162, 185, 14 N. E. 197; Lake S. & M. S. R. Co. v. O'Conner, 115 111. 254, 261, 3 N. E. 501; Traveler's Ins. Co. v. Randolph, 78 Fed. 754; Harlen v. Baden (Kas.), 49 Pac. 615; Marx v. Hess, 19 Ky. L. R. 42, 39 S. W. 249; S. v. Spengler, 74 Miss. 129, 21 So. 4; Kurd v. Neilson, 100 Iowa, 555, 69 N. W. 867; Schmidt v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 90 Wis. 504, 63 N. W. 1057; Miller v. Howard, 19 Ky. L. R. 22, 39 S. W. 37; Meyers v. Birch, 59 N. J. L. 238, 36 Atl. 95; Hartford v. City of Attalla, 119 Ala. 59, 24 So. 845; Martin v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 194 111. 138, 146; Joliet R. Co. v. McPherson, 193 111. 629; Zeigler v. Pennsylvania Co. 63 111. App. 410; Consolidated L. & I. Co. v. Hawley, 7 S. Dak. 229, 63 N. W. 904; Pound v. Pound, 60 Minn. 214, 62 N. W. 264; Dietz v. Met- ropolitan L. I. Co. 168 Pa. St. 504, 32 Atl. 119; Rogers v. Brooks, 105 Ala. 549, 17 So. 97; Smart v. Hodges, 105 Ala. 634, 17 So. 22; Phillips v. Phillips, 93 Iowa, 615, 61 N. W. 1071; Chesapeake & N. R. Co. v. Ogles (Ky.), 73 S. W. 751; Morrow v. Pullman P. Car Co. (Mo. App.), 73 S. W. 281; Lee v. Gorham, 165 Mass. 130, 42 N. E. 556; Kearns v. Burling-, 14 Ind. App. 143, 42 N. E. 646; Rogers v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 17 Ky. L. R. 1421, 35 S. W. 109; McKinney v. Hopwood, 46 Neb. 871, 65 N. W. 1055; Davis v. Hoxey, 2 111. (1 Scam.), 406; Van Etten v. Edwards, 47 Neb. 279, 66 N. W. 1013; Dirim- ple v. State Bank, 91 Wis. 601, 65 N. W. 501; Sexton v. Steele, 60 Minn. 336, 62 N. W. 392; McCrystal v. O'Neill, 86 N. Y. S. 84. 49 Henry v. McNamara, 114 Ala. 107, 22 So. 428; Tennessee C. J. & R. Co. v. Stevens, 115 Ala. 461, 22 So. 80; New York C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Leubeck. 157 111. 604, 41 N. E. 897; West C. St. R. Co. v. Lyons, 157 111. 593, 42 N. E. 55; Florida C. & P. R. Co. v. Williams, 37 Fla. 406, 20 So. 558. It is error for the court to exclude proper evi- 123 PEREMPTORY WHEN EVIDENCE CLOSE OR DOUBTFUL. 131 130. If the evidence tends to prove plaintiff's case. If there is any evidence tending to support every element of the plain- tiff's case it is improper and erroneous to direct a nonsuit, al- though the defendant may have set up new matter in defense which the plaintiff answered by replication. 50 The fact that there is no evidence to prove some one or more of the par- ticulars of a, case will not authorize the dismissal of the plain- tiff's complaint, if his evidence supports a cause of action. 51 And if the evidence tends to support any one of the counts of the plaintiff's declaration an instruction to find a verdict for the defendant is properly refused, although some of the counts may not be sufficient to receive the evidence. 52 So if there is any evi- dence whatever tending to prove a cause of action a nonsuit is improper. 53 131. When facts are doubtful Different conclusions. If in the opinion of the court it is doubtful from the evidence whether the jury should be instructed to return a verdict for the defend- ant the doubt should be resolved in favor of submitting the case to the jury. 54 And where the case is doubtful the court is authorized to exercise its discretion. 55 Where it appears from the evidence that the defendant is not entitled to a verdict on the merits of the case it is error to direct a verdict in his favor, although the plaintiff's evidence is not sufficient to establish his case ; 56 and where different conclusions might be drawn from dence introduced by the plaintiff (S. Car.), 21 S. E. 322; Fitzwater and direct a verdict for the de- v. Roberts, 116 Pa. St. 454, 31 AtK fendiant, Huff v. Cole, 45 Ind. 300. 204; Howell v. New York, C. H. so Hazy v. Woitke, 23 Colo. 556, & R. R. Co. 73 N. Y. S. 994, 68 App. 48 Pac. 1048. See Cleveland Axle Div. 409; Davis v. Kent, 97 Ga. Co. v. Zilch, 12 Ohio C. C. 578; 275, 23 S. E. 88; Davidoff v. Wheel- Wells v. Snow (Gal.), 41 Pac. 858. er & W. Mfg. Co. 37 N. Y. S. 661, si Marden v. Dorthy, 42 N. Y. 16 Misc. 31; Evans v. Mills (Ga.), S. 827; Talbotton R. Co. v. Gib- 46 S. E. 675; Kroetch v. Empire son, 106 Ga. 229, 32 S. E. 151; Sex- Mill Co. (Idaho), 74 Pac. 868. ton v. Steele, 60 Minn. 336, 62 N. 54 Mexican Cent. R. Co. v. Mur- W. 392; Seymore v. Rice, 94 Ga. ray, 102 Fed. 264; Howey v. Fisher, 183, 21 S. E. 293. Ill Mich. 422, 69 N. W. 741. See 52 Illinois Cemit. R. Co. v. Weiland, Rinear v. Skinner, 20 Wash. 541, 179 111. 609, 613, 54 N. E. 300. See 56 Pac. 24. Taylor v. Corley, 113 Ala. 580, 21 55 Ferguson v. Venice Tr. Co. So. 404. 79 Mo. App. 352. 53 Norris v. Clinkscales (S. Car.), se Dennison v. Musgrave, 46 N. Y. 22 S. E. 1; Drummond v. Nichols S. 530, 20 Misc. 678. 132 DIRECTING VERDICT. 124 the evidence by different minds the jury should' determine the facts." 132. Where either of two theories is supported. When the evidence is such that it tends to support two theories, one of which renders the defendant liable and the other not, the case should be submitted to the jury. 58 133. Evidence strongly against plaintiff. It follows from what has been said that, although it may appear that the evi- dence tends strongly to show that the plaintiff has failed to prove the essential facts necessary to make out his case, yet the court is not authorized to take the case from the jury. 59 Hence the court should not direct the jury to find a verdict for the defendant on the ground that the evidence for the plaintiff does not preponderate in his favor. 60 In New York the court has gone to the extent of holding that 57 Sweet v. Chicago, M. & S. P. R. Co. 6 S. Dak. 281, 60 N. W. 77. According to the practice in Rhode Island it is discretionary with the court to give an instruction di- recting a verdict and no exception lies to the action of the court in giving or refusing such instruction, S. v. Collins (R. I.), 52 Atl. 990; Fillinghast v. McLeod, 17 R. I. 208, 21 Atl. 345. ss Voegeli v. Pickel Marble & G. Co. 56 Mo. App. 678; Working- men's Banking Co. v. Blell, 57 Mo. App. 410. 59 Padbury v. Metropolitan St. R. Co. 75 N. Y. S. 952, 71 App. Div. 616; Baker v. Irish, 172 Pa. St. 528, 33 Atl. 558; O'Brien v. Chi- cago & N. W. R. Co. 92 Wis. 340, 66 N. W. 363; Missouri M. Iron Co. v. Hoover, 179 111. 107, 53 N. E. 560; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Eston, 178 111. 192, 195; 52 N. E. 954; Pitts- burg, Ft. W. & C. R. Co. v. Calla- ghan, 157 111. 406, 409, 41 N. E. 909; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Hein- rich, 157 111. 388, 391, 41 N. E. 860; St. Louis, A. & T. H. R. Co. v. Bauer, 156 111. 106, 40 N. E. 448; National Syrup Co. v. Carlson, 155 111. 210, 40 N. E. 492; Weiiona Coal Co. v. Holmquist, 152 111. 581, 38 N. E. 946; Rich & B. Malting Co. v. International Bank, 185 111. 422, 428, 56 N. E. 1062; Henry v. Stewart, 185 111. 448, 452, 57 N. E. 190; Chicago, &c. Foundry Co. v. Van Dam, 149 111. 338, 36 N. E. 1024, Wisconsin Cent. R. Co. v. Ross, 142 111. 9, 31 N. E. 412; Ames & F. Co. v. Strachurski, 145 111. 192, 34 N. E. 48; Insurance Co. of N. A. v. Bird, 175 111. 42, 51 N. E. 686; Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Jenkins, 174 111. 398, 409, 51 N. E. 811; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Ash- line, 171 111. 314, 320, 49 N. E. 921; North C. St. R. Co. v. Wis- wel, 168 111. 613, 48 N. E. 407; Chi- cago & N. W. R. Co. v. Smith, 162 111. 185, 44 N. E. 390; Gerke v. Fancher, 158 111. 375, 383, 41 N. E. 982; Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Conlan, 101 111. 105; American Strawboard Co. v. Chicago & A. R. Co. 177 111. 513, 53 N. E. 97; Brant- ley Co. v. Lee, 106 Ga. 313, 32 S. E. 101; Jenkins v. Louisville & N. R. Co. (Ky.), 47 S. W. 761; Richards v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 2*0 Ky. L. R. 1478, 49 S. W. 419; Platz v. McKean Tp. 178 Pa. St. 601, 36 Atl. 136; Heydrick v. Hutchinson, 165 Pa. St. 208, 30 Atl. 918. o Mattoon v. Freemont, E. & M. V. R. Co. 6 S. Dak. 196, 60 N. W. 740. Ti5 PRINCIPLES ILLUSTRATED. 134 the fact that the evidence preponderates so strongly in favor of the defendant that the court would set aside a verdict for the plaintiff as against the weight of the evidence, does not warrant the court in directing a verdict for the defendant. 61 Where the evidence is such that under any view that can be taken of it questions of fact are involved which must be de- termined by the jury, a binding or peremptory instruction is properly refused. 02 134. The foregoing principles illustrated. In an action for personal injury if the plaintiff introduces any evidence tend- ing to show the defendant to be guilty of negligence the court is not authorized to instruct the jury to return a verdict for the defendant. 63 Also in an action for the loss of goods through negligence in shipping, if there is any evidence tending to prove the negligence charged, a motion to find for the defendant should be denied. 64 And in an action for killing stock, although the defendant's evidence has fully overcome the presumption of negligence from the fact of killing the stock, yet if the plaintiff's evidence in rebuttal raises a material conflict on the point, an instruction to find for the defendant is properly refused. 65 But if the evi- dence as to negligence is wholly speculative an instruction to find a verdict for the defendant is proper. 66 A nonsuit on the ground of contributory negligence will be denied, unless the evidence clearly shows that the plaintiff was guilty of negli- gence. 67 In an action brought on a promissory note, given in settle- ment of disputed claims, it was held that the plaintiff was not entitled to have a verdict directed in his favor unless the facts ei Luhrs v. Brooklyn H. R. Co. 64 Memphis & C. P. Co. v. Abell, 42 N. Y. S. 606, 11 App. Div. 173. 17 Ky. L. R. 191, 30 S. W. 658. 62 Smith v. Easton Tr. Co. 167 Pa. es Sheldon v. Chicago & M. & St. 209, 31 S. W. 557. St. P. R. Co. 6 S. Dak. 606, 62 N. ss Weeks v. Southern R. Co. 119 W. 955. See Robertson v. Illinois N. Car. 740, 26 S. E. 124; Rickert Cent. R. Oo. (Miss.), 17 So. 235. v. Southern R. Co. 123 N. Car. 255, e Gerwe Consolidated Fire W. Co. 31 S. E. 497; Central P. R. Co. v. 12 Ohio, C. C. 420. Chatterson, 17 Ky. L. R. 5, 29 S. W. GT Mahnken v. Board of Chosen 18. Freeholders, 62 N. J. L. 404, 41 Atl. 921. 135 DIRECTING VERDICT. 126 essential to make the note valid are so apparent that reasonable men could not differ as to such facts. 08 135. Peremptory instructions for plaintiff. The court may instruct the jury to find a verdict for the plaintiff where there is no evidence whatever tending to support a different verdict; 69 or where the evidence would not warrant a verdict otherwise than for the plaintiff. 70 And it has also been held that where the burden is on the defendant to establish his defense it is not error to take the case from the jury by directing a ver- dict, even before the defendant has rested his case, if his re- maining evidence, with that already introduced, would not make out his defense. 71 The court may direct the jury to find a ver- dict for the amount sued for, subject to the court's opinion, on a demurrer to the evidence. 72 136. Prima facie case undisputed. Where the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, and the defendant introduces no evidence tending to dispute his claim or to establish a de- fense, it is proper to direct a verdict for the plaintiff. 73 Thus in a suit in ejectment if the plaintiff makes out a case by prima facie proof, and there is no rebutting evidence, his right to a verdict follows as a matter of law. 74 Also a verdict may be es Morey v. Laird, 108 Iowa, 670, 421, 56 N. E. 807; Barrett v. Boddie, 77 N. W. 835. 158 111. 479, 42 N. B. 143; Solomon C9 Anthony v. Wheeler, 130 111. v. Yrisarri, 9 N. Mex. 480, 54 Pac. 128, 132, 22 N. E. 624 (ejectment); 752; Tidwell v. New South B. & L. Heinsen v. Lamb, 117 111. 549, 557, Asso. Ill Ga. 807, 35 S. E. 648; 7 N. E. 75; Caveny v. Weiller, 90 Arabak v. Village of Dodge, 62 111. 159. Neb. 591, 87 N. W. 358; Graham v. 70 Lancaster G. & C. Co. v. Mur- St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. 69 ry G. S. Co. 19 Tex. Cv. App. 110, Ark. 562, 65 S. W. 1048, 66 S. W, 344; 47 S. W. 387; Gichrist v. Brown, Faircloth v. Fulghum, 97 Ga. 357, 165 Pa. St. 275, 30 Atl. 839; Me- 23 S. E. 838. See also Kahrs v. Waters v. Equitable Mort. Co. 115 Kahrs, 115 Ga. 288, 41 S. E. 649; Ga. 723, 42 S. E. 52; Concord-Wil- Hazzard v. Citizens' Bank, 72 Ind. liamis Lumber Co. v. Warren Grain 130; Beckner v. Riverside, &c. 65 Co. 114 Ga. 966, 41 S. E. 41. Ind. 468; Yankton F. Ins. Co. v. 71 Davis v. Holbrook, 25 Colo. 493, Freemont, E. & M. V. R. Co. 7 S. 55 Pac. 730. See also Jones v. Dak. 428, 64 N. W. 514; Ketchum v. Achey, 105 Ga. 493, 30 S. E. 810; Wilcox (Kas.), 48 Pac. 446. Contra: McNeel v. Smith, 106 Ga. 215, 32 Devine v. Murphy, 168 Mass. 249, S. E. 119. 46 N. E. 1066; Hillis v. First Nat. 72 Mathews Adm'rs v. Traders' Bank, 54 Kas. 421, 38 Pac. 565. Bank (Va.), 27 S. E. 609. 74 Anderson v. McCormlck, 129 "Westside Auction House Co. v. 111. 308, 309, 21 N. E. 803; Heinsen Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. 186 v. Lamb, 117 111. 549, 557, 7 N. E. 111. 156, 57 N. E. 839; Marshall v. 75. John Grosse Clothing Co. 184 111. 127 ALLEGATIONS ADMITTED, PLEADING INSUFFICIENT. 141 directed for the plaintiff in a suit touching the title to real estate, where he shows a complete chain of title from the government to himself, there being no evidence in opposition to his deeds or documents proving his title. 75 137. When defendant admits all allegations. And it is proper to direct a verdict for the plaintiff where the defendant, by his answer and evidence, admits all the allegations of the. plaintiff's claim. 73 138. When defendant's pleading is insufficient. The court may instruct the jury to find a verdict for the plaintiff in a case where the defense could not be shown under the general issue, and where the special pleas relied upon were properly held demurrable. 77 139. When verdict cannot stand And it has been held that a peremptory instruction should be given for the plaintiff where the evidence is such that the court would be bound to set aside a verdict for the defendant as being against the weight of the evidence. 78 140. Improper for plaintiff If any evidence for defendant. The plaintiff is not entitled to a peremptory instruction if there is any evidence, though slight, tending to support the defense set up by the defendant. 79 141. If the evidence is conflicting. Where the evidence which would sustain or defeat a recovery is conflicting, the ques- tion is for the jury, and the giving of a peremptory instruction to find a verdict for the defendant is error. 80 A nonsuit is also 75 Quinn v. Eagleston, 108 111. 248, v. Wolf rani. 71 Wis. 809, 71 N. W. 255; Los Angeles Farming & Mill- 809; Dooley v. Gorman, 104 Ga. ing Co. v. Thompson, 117 Cal. 594, 767, 31 S. B. 203; Weatherford v. 49 Pac. 714. Strawn, 8 Kas. App. 206, 55 Pac. 7c Gifford v. Ammer, 7 Kas. App. 485; Forst v. Leonard, 116 Ala. 82, 365, 54 Pac. 802. See Stephens v. 22 So. 481; Mixon v. Warren, 94 Ga. Koken Barber S. Co. 67 Mo. App. 688, 21 S. E 714; Shoninger v. Lat- 587. imer, 165 Pa. St. 373, 30 Atl. 985; 77 Moore v. Trussing, 165 111. 319, Lau v. Fletcher, 104 Mich. 295, 62 324, 46 N. E. 184. N. W. 357. 78 Reading Braid Co. v. Stewart, so Hargraves v. Home Fire Ins. 43 N. Y. S. 1129, 19 Misc. 431. See Co. 43 Neb. 271, 61 N. W. 611; Leiser Decker v. Sexton, 43 N. Y. S. 167, v. Kieckhefer, 95 Wis. 4, 69 N. W. 19 Misc. 59. 979; Lewellen v. Fatten, 73 Mo. App. 79 Minnesota Thresher Mfg. Co. 472; Thornton v. Perry, 105 Ga. 837, 142 DIRECTING VERDICT. 128 improper, although the testimony of the plaintiff's witnesses may seem to be inconsistent, contradictory or conflicting. 81 142. If part only of plaintiff's claim is contested. The plaintiff is not entitled to have a verdict directed in his favor where the defendant, by his evidence, contests only a part of the claim for which suit was brought; 82 or where one of several /persons against whom suit is brought as a firm makes defense and contests the claim of the plaintiff a verdict should not be directed for the plaintiff. 83 143. Where amount of claim is disputed. The court is not authorized to direct a verdict for the plaintiff if there is any dispute as to the amount due him. 8 * 144. Waving right to peremptory instruction. If the de- fendant introduces evidence on his side of the case after the court has overruled his motion, made at the close of the plain- tiff's evidence, for a verdict in his favor, he thereby waives the right to submit a peremptory instruction, and will not be heard to complain of error in that respect unless he renews the former motion at the close of all the evidence. 86 Likewise where a mo- 31 S. E. 797; Crawford v. Wittish, ber Lumber Co. v. Oberbeck Bros. 4 Pa. Super. 585; McNight v. Bell, Mfg. Co. 96 Wis. 383, 71 N. W. 605. 168 Pa. St. 50, 31 Atl. 942; Lever v. ss McKissack v. Witz, 120 Ala. Foote, 31 N. Y. S. 356, 82 Hun (N. 412, 25 So. 21. Y.) 392; Leob v. Huddleston, 105 * Brown v. Baird, 5 Okla. 133, 48 Ala. 267, 16 So. 714; McQuown v. Pac. 180. Thompson, 5 Colo. App. 466, 39 Pac. ss Baltimore & O. S. R. Co. v. 68; Mayer v. Thompson B. Co. 104 Alsop, 176 111. 474, 52 N. E. 253, Ala. 611, 16 So. 620; Marx v. Hess, 752; Hamilton Keeling Co. v. 19 Ky. L. 42, 39 S. W. 249; Rogers Wheeler, 175 111. 514, 51 N. E. 893; v. Kansas C. & O. R. Co. 52 Neb. 86, Lynch v. Johnson, 109 Mich. 640, 71 N. W. 977; Swanson v. Menomi- 67 N. W. 908; Young v. West Va. nee, E. L. R. & P. Co. 113 Mich. C. & P. R. Co. 42 W. Va. 112, 24 03, 71 N. W. 1098. S. E. 615; Vanderhorst Brewing *i Crowe v. House of Good Shep- Co. v. Armhine (Md.), 56 Atl. 834; herd. 56 N. Y. S. 223; Cohn v. Da- Totten v. Burhans, 103 Mich. 6, 61 vid Mayer Brewing Co. 56 N. Y. S. N. W. 58; Bell v. Sheriden, 21 D. C. 293; Cook v. Morris, 66 Conn. 196, 370; American C. Ins. Co. v. Heiser- 33 Atl. 994; Larkin v. Burlington, man, 67 Fed. 947; Goss v. Calkins, C. R. & N. R. Co. 91 Iowa, 654, 162 Mass. 492, 39 N. E. 469; Freese 60 N. W. 195; Pacific M. L. Ins. Co. v. Kemplay, 118 Fed. 428 (the fail- v. Fisher, 109 Cal. 566, 42 Pac. ure to move for a verdict is an ad- 154; Reilly v. Atlas I. C. Co. 38 N.Y. mission that there is sufficient ev- S. 485, 3 App. Div. 363. iden.ce to go to the jury); Hansen R2 Carter v. Fischer, 127 Ala. 52, v. Boyd, 161 U. S. 397, 16 Sup. Ct. 28 So. 376; Talbotton R. Co^ v. Gib- 571. In some jurisdictions the de- son. 106 Ga. 229, 32 S. E. 157; Wil- fendant may renew his motion for 129 WAIVING PEREMPTORY, MOTION BY BOTH. 145 tion for a nonsuit is overruled the defendant waives the right to claim error as to such ruling by introducing his evidence after the court has thus ruled. 87 But in the State of Washington it has been held that if the defendant's evidence, together with that of the plaintiff in re- buttal, in no manner strengthens the plaintiff's case, then the motion for a nonsuit must be given force; and, therefore, the defendant, by proceeding with his evidence, waives his right to claim error in the court's ruling only to the extent of allow- ing the plaintiff any benefit he may derive from the evidence introduced after the overruling of the motion for a nonsuit. 88 And where there are two defendants an instruction directing the jury to find in favor of one of them is waived by the other, unless he objects, and excepts to the court's ruling. 89 145. Motion by both parties Effect. If each of the parties at the close of the evidence moves the court to direct a verdict in his favor then the finding of the court in passing upon the motions is conclusive, unless the evidence is wholly insufficient to support the conclusion. 90 Or if the plaintiff asks the court for a peremptory verdict in his favor and the defendant moves for a nonsuit, they both consent that the facts shall be de- termined by the court; 91 and in such case the finding of the court in favor of one of the parties settles the facts in favor a verdict in his favor at the close dons his plea and is not put to its of the entire evidence, Baltimore proof, Garcia v. Candelaria, 9 N. & 0. R. Co. v. Alsop, 176 111. 471, M. 374, 54 Pac. 342. 474, 52 N. E. 253, 752; Hannton oo Stearns v. Farrand, 60 N. Y. S. Keeling Co. v. Wheeler, 175 111. 514, 501, 29 Misc. 292; Shreyer v. Jordan, 51 N. E. 893; Harris v. Shebeck, 151 61 N. Y. S. 889, 30 Misc. 764; Nor- 111. 287, 292, 37 N. E. 1015. tham v. International Ins. Co. 61 87 Thompson v. Avery, 11 Utah, N. Y. S. 45; Mascott v. National 214, 39 Pac. 829; Western U. Tel. Fire Ins. Co. 69 Vt. 116, 37 Atl. Co. v. Thorn, 67 Fed. 287; Ratliff v. 255; Signa Iron Co. v. Brown, 171 Ratliff (N. Car.), 42 S. E. 887; N. Y. 488, 64 N. E. 194; Merwin v. Jones v. Warren (N. Car.), 46 S. E. Magone, 70 Fed. 776; Magone v. 740. Origet, 70 Fed. 778. Contra: ss Matson v. Port Townsend, S. Thompson v. Brerman, 104 Wis. 564, R. Co. 9 Wash. 449, 37 Pac. 705. 80 N. W. 947; German Sav. Bank Compare Cushman v. Carbondate v. Bates' Add. S. Co. (Iowa), 82 Fuel Co. (Iowa), 88 N. W. 817. N. W. 1005. 8 Pioneer Fire Proof C. Co. v. si Guenther v. Amsden, 44 N. Y. Hansen, 176 111. 100, 52 N. E. 17. S. 982; McGuire v. Hartford Fire Where the defendant's plea is one Ins. Co. 158 N. Y. 680, 52 N. E. of set-off, and he moves for a ver- 1134; Smith v. Weston, 34 N. Y. S. diet in his favor, he thereby aban- 557, 88 Hun, 25; Fogarty v. Hook, 146 DIRECTING VERDICT. 130 of the judgment. 92 Also if both of the parties agree that the jury may be dismissed and a verdict rendered by the court, this is equivalent to both asking the court to direct a verdict, and is an admission by the parties that only questions of law are involved to be determined by the court. 93 Where each of the parties moves for a verdict in his favor, if the party whose motion is denied does not thereupon ask to have the case submitted to the jury the verdict directed by the court for the other party shall stand as the finding of the jury. 94 And in such case if the party whose motion is thus denied desires to have the case submitted to the jury he must state the specific questions he wishes submitted; he cannot ask to have the case submitted generally to the jury on all ques- tions. 95 But where both parties move for a verdict in order to submit to the court some particular matter only, such as a ques- tion of notice, this act does not amount to a waiver of the right to have the facts of the case submitted to the jury. The court, under such circumstances, is not authorized to direct a verdict. 98 And the court is not authorized, over objection, to direct a ver- dict where the plaintiff moves for a verdict and the defendant for a dismissal in a case where the question of damages is in- volved, it being the duty of the jury to determine the dam- ages. 87 146. Waiving right to submit facts to jury. The right to have the facts submitted to a jury is waived where each party moves for a verdict in his favor. 98 Or if the plaintiff moves 32 N. Y. S. 555, 84 Hun, 165; Gro- Norton, 38 N. Y. S. 350, 3 App. Div. gan v. U. S. Industrial Ins. Co. 173; Campbell v. Prague, 39 N. Y. 36 N. Y. S. 687, 90 Hun, 521. S. 55-8, 6 App. Div. 554. In such 2 Martin v. Home Bank, 160 N. case the defeated party will be re- Y. 190, 54 N. E. 717. garded as having submitted all 93 Cutter v. Parsons, 43 N. Y. S. controverted questions of fact to 187. the court for determination, First 94 Pickett v. Metropolitan Life M. E. Church v. Fadden, 8 N. Dak. Ins. Co. 46 N. Y. S. 693; Thompson 162, 77 N. W. 615. v. Simpson, 128 N. Y. 270, 28 N. 96 University Press v. Williams, E. 627; First Nat. Bank v. Hayes, 62 N. Y. S. 986. 64 Ohio St. 101, 59 N. E. 893; Beut- 97 Litt v. Wabash R. Co. 64 N. tell v. Magone, 157 U. S. 154; Clason Y. S. 108, 54 App. Div. 550. v. Baldwin, 152 N. Y. 204, 46 N. E. 98 Cleason v. Baldwin, 152 N. Y. 322; Mascott v. Insurance Co. 69 204, 46 N. E. 322; New England M. Vt. 116, 37 Atl. 255. S. Co. v. Great W. & E. Co. 6 N. 95 Groves v. Acker, 33 N. Y. S. Dak. 407, 71 N. W. 130; Angier v. 406, 85 Hun, 492. See Switzer v. Western Ass. Co. 10 S. Dak. 82, 71 131 RIGHT WAIVED, DENIAL OF MOTION. 149 for a verdict and the defendant for a nonsuit they both waive the right to submit the facts to the jury." 147. Motion of both parties denied Effect. Where the court denies the motions of both parties to direct a verdict, and thereupon submits a single issue of fact to the jury, error may be assigned for a failure to submit the whole case, if the party complaining shall have properly taken exceptions to the action of the court. 100 148. Directing jurors to agree. The court is authorized to direct a juror that he must agree with the other jurors in a case where, in the judgment of the court, a peremptory verdict should be rendered; and on refusal, the juror may subject him- self to punishment for contempt of court. 101 149. Ruling of trial court reviewable. The action of the trial court in refusing to give to the jury an instruction directing them to find a verdict may be reviewed on appeal or writ of error, where the ruling of the trial court is properly preserved in the record by a bill of exceptions. 102 In order to make the rul- ing of the trial court the subject of review on appeal or writ of error the party complaining must, at the proper time, pre- sent a written instruction, asking that the court direct a ver- dict in his favor. 103 The ruling of the trial court on a motion for a nonsuit, as to some particular point, will not be considered by a court of review on appeal, unless the attention of the trial court was called to the precise point contended for. 104 The N. W. 761; Winter v. Williams- 101 Cahill v. Chicago, M. & St. baugh S. Bank, 74 N. Y. S. 140, P. R. Co. 74 Fed. 285; Grimes Dry- 68 App. Div. 193; Westervelt v. goods Co. v. Malcolm, 164 U. S. Phelps, 171 N. Y. 212, 63 N. E. 483, 17 Sup. Ct. 158, 58 Fed. 670. 962. Contra: Poppitz v. German 102 Gall v. Beckstein, 173 111. 187, Ins. Co. 88 Minn. 118, 88 N. W. 50 N. E. 711; Illinois Cent. R. Co. 438. v. Nowicki, 1*8 111. 29. 35 N. E. 358. Page v. Shainwald, 65 N. Y. 103 West C. St. R. Co. v. McCal- S. 174, 52 App. Div. 349; Blass lum, 169 111. 241, 48 N. E. 424; v. Ferry, 34 N. Y. S. 475, 87 Hun, Vallette v. Blenisld, 167 111. 565, 563. Contra: Wilson v. Commer- 47 N. E. 770; Peirce v. Walters, cial Union Ins. Co. 15 S. Dak. 322, 164 111. 561, 565, 45 N. E. 1068. 89 N. W. 649. See Clark v. Clark, i* Jackson v. Consolidated Tr. 36 N. Y. S. 294, 91 Hun, 295. Co. 59 N. J. L. 25, 35 Atl. 75. 100 Signa Iron Co. v. Green, 88 Fed. 207. 150 DIRECTING VERDICT. 132 action of the trial court will not be reviewed if the motion is too general. 105 150. Criminal cases Peremptory proper for defendant. In a criminal case if there is no evidence tending to convict the accused, or if the evidence is so weak that a con- viction could only be attributable to passion or prejudice, then it is proper to direct the jury to acquit the accused. 100 The court should not submit a case to the jury where a verdict of guilty would be palpably or flagrantly against the evidence. 107 Where there is no evidence whatever that the crime charged was committed in the county of the indictment it is error for the court to refuse to instruct that if the jury believe the evi- dence they must find him not guilty. 108 151. When not proper for defendant. But where the evi- dence, though wholly circumstantial, shows a state of facts disclosing motive, threats or conduct of the defendant tending to prove his guilt, an instruction requesting that the jury be directed to find him not guilty is properly refused. 109 In other words, where the weight of the evidence tends to support the offense charged in the indictment a motion for a peremptory instruction to find the defendant not guilty should be over- ruled. 110 105 Kafka v. Levensohn, 41 N. the evidence to be insufficient to Y. S. 368, 18 Misc. 202; Weber v. warrant a conviction, advise the Germania F. Ins. Co. 44 N. Y. jury to acquit, but the court is S. 976; Hartley v. Mullane, 45 N. not authorized to instruct the jury Y. S. 1023, 20 Misc. 418. that there is no evidence to sus- 106 s. v. Couper, 32 Ore. 212, 49 tain a conviction, P. v. Daniels, 105 Pac. 959; S. v. Feisher, 32 Ore. 254, Cal. 362, 38 Pac. 720. In Indiana if 50 Pac. 561; Com. v. Yost, 197 Pa. it appears that the crime was com- St. 171, 46 Atl. 845. But see P. v. mitted, but in another county, the Streuber, 121 Cal. 431, 53 Pac. 918; court must arrest the proceedings P v Daniels 105 Cal. 362, 38 Pac. and certify the case to that county 720 for trial, Burns' R. S. 1901, \ 1900; 107 Com. v. Hall, 18 Ky. L. R. 783, Welty v. Ward (Ind.), 72 N. E. 38 S. W. 498; S. v. Bartlett (Mo.), 596. 71 S. W. 149; P. v. Bennett, 49 N. 109 S. v. Hallock, 70 Vt. 159, 4 Y. 137; S. v. Flanagan (W. Va.). Atl. 51; Com. v. Williams, 171 35 S B. 862; Baker v. S. 31 Ohio Mass. 461, 50 N. E. 1035; S. v. Wil- St. 314. See S. v. Brown, 119 N. son, 10 Wash. 402, 39 Pac. 106 Car. 789, 26 S. E. 121. (facts stated); Ter. v. Padilla (N. 108 Harvey v. S. 125 Ala. 47, 27 Mex.), 71 Pa. 1084; S. v. Hyde, 22 So. 763; Bailey v. S. 116 Ala. 437, Wash. 551, 61 Pac. 719. 22 So. 918. By statute in Cali- no Com. v. Brooks, 164 Mass, fornia the court may, if it deems 397, 41 N. E. 660; S. v. Green, 133 PEREMPTORY FOR PROSECUTION WHEN. 152 152. Peremptory proper for prosecution When. The court may properly direct the jury to find for the prosecution on the issues of once in jeopardy and former acquittal where it clearly appears that the first information was fatally defective in that it contained no allegation whatever as to the ownership of the property charged to have been taken by robbery, and the infor- mation was dismissed after the jury was impanelled but before any evidence was offered. 111 And on the merits in one state it has been held that it is the duty of the court to direct the jury to return a verdict of guilty where the undisputed facts in evidence warrant a conviction. 112 117 N. Car. 695, 23 S. E. 98; Craw- Pa. Super. 542; Gott v. P. 187 111. ford v. Com. 18 Ky. L. R. 16, 35 S. 261, 58 N. E. 293. W. 114; Com. v. Foster (Ky.), 61 m P. v. Ammerman, 118 Cal. 23, S. W. 271; S. v. Utley, 126 N. 50 Pac. 15. Car. 997; S. v. Costner (N. Car.), 112 p. v. Elmer, 109 Mich. 493, 37 S. E. 326; Com. v. George, 13 67 N. W. 550. CHAPTER V. LAW DETERMINED BY THE COURT. Sec. Sec. 153. Jury bound by law given by 161. Validity of ordinances and the court. statutes for court. 154. Court should not belittle the 162. Foreign law a fact to be law. proved. 155. Submitting legal questions 163. Illustrations of the principles to jury improper. Legal questions. 156. Court interprets written in- 164. Illustrations of the principles struments. Questions of fact. 157. Jury interprets oral con- 165. In criminal causes court de- tracts, termines law. 158. Wills are construed by the 166. Jury made judge of law by courts. statute. 159. Writing as a fact in chain of 167. In Massachusetts and Con- evidence, necticut. 160. Some phases of writing ex- 168. In Maryland and Georgia. plained by oral evidence. 169. In Louisiana and Indiana. 153. Jury bound by law given by the court. In the absence of specific constitutional or statutory provisions expressly em- powering the jury to determine both law and facts the principle that the court shall determine the law and the jury the facts, in both civil and criminal cases, has become firmly established. 1 And even in those jurisdictions where the jury are authorized to determine the law, as well as the facts, it is the duty of the court to fully instruct the jury as to the law. Thus in Missouri, although the constitution of that state, in an action for libel, pro- vides that the jury shall be the judges of the law and the facts i Sparf v. U. S. 156 U. S. 51, case reviewing a long line of de- 15 Sup. Ct. 273 (a well considered oisions, and eminent text writers). 134 135 JURY BOUND BY THE LAW AS GIVEN. 154 the court is not divested of the right to fully instruct them as to the law of the case. 2 So in Illinois, under a statutory provision that in all criminal cases the jury shall be the judges of the law as well as the fact, it is the duty of the jury to receive and act upon the law as given them by the court, and they are not warranted in dis- regarding it unless they can say upon their oaths that they know the law better than the court does. 3 The rule that the court must determine the law and instruct the jury accord- ingly is so familiar and has been so often decided by the courts that the citation of authorities seems unnecessary.* And it is the duty of the jury to be governed by the law as given them by the court. 6 The jury are bound to accept and apply the law as laid down by the court, and while they have the power to disregard it, yet in doing so they violate their oaths. 6 154. Court should not belittle the law. The court in charg- ing the jury should not criticise or condemn the law. 7 Any remark made by the court as to the law in charging the jury, having a tendency to cause the jury to disregard or discredit any of the instructions, to the prejudice of a party, is error. 8 To tell the jury that common sense is their "best guide", amounts 2 Jones v. Murray, 167 Mo. 25, 1089; Wabash St. L. & P. R. 6 S. W. 981; Heller v. Pulitzer Co. v. Jaggerman, 115 111. 411, 4 Pub. Co. 153 Mo. 203, 54 S. W. N. E. 641. 457. * Moore v. Hinkle, 151 Ind. 343. s Wohlford v. P. 148 111. 301, 36 50 N. E. 822; Com. v. Anthes, 5 N. E. 107; Schnier v. P. 23 111. 11; Gray (Mass.), 185; Adams v. S. Davison v. P. 90 111. 221. 29 Ohio St. 412; Com. v. McManus, * Henderson v. Henderson, 88 14 Pa. St. 64, 21 Atl. 1018, 22 Atl. 111. 248; Mitchell v. Town of Fond 761; Brown v. Com. 86 Va. 466, du Lac, 61 111. 176; S. v. Cough, 472, 10 S. E. 745; Carpenter v. P. Ill Iowa, 714, 83 N. W. 727; Drake 8 N. Y. (8 Barb.), 603. v. S. 60 Ala. 62; Whitney v. Cook, 6 s. v. Matthews, 38 La. 795. See 53 Miss. 531; Albert v. Besel, 88 P. v. Worden, 113 Cal. 569, 45 Mo. 150; Vocke v. City of Chicago, Pac. 844. 208 111. 194; Byers v. Thompson, i Clifford v. S. 56 Ind. 245; Steb- 66 111. 421; Gehr v. Hagerman, 26 bins v. Keene Tp. 55 Mich. 552, 111. 442; Gilbert v. Bone, 79 111. 22 N. W. 37. 345; P. v. Ivey, 49 Cal. 56; Riley Horton v. Williams, 21 Minn, v. Watson, 18 Ind. 291; P. Ex. rel. 187; Head v. Bridges, 67 Ga. 227; Bibb. 193 111. 309, 61 N. E. 1077; Cone v. Citizens' Bank, 4 Kas. Matthews v. S. 55 Ala. 65; Hyde v. App. 470, 46 P. 414. See Roberts Town of Swanton, 72 Vt. 242, 47 v. Neal, 62 Ga. 163; McCord v. Atl. 790; Toledo, St. L. & R. Co. S. 83 Ga. 521, 10 S. E. 437. v. Bailey, 145 111. 159, 33 N. E. 155 LAW DETERMINED BY THE COURT. 136 to telling them that common sense is superior to law in determin- ing the guilt or innocence of the accused. 9 155. Submitting legal questions to jury improper. As a general rule the giving of instructions which submit legal propo- sitions to the jury for their determination is error. 10 But when a question of law has been erroneously submitted to the jury by (instructions, and they decide it correctly, the error is harmless. 11 Under the rule mentioned it is the duty of the court to de- termine what allegations in the pleadings are material and nec- essary to be proved, this being a question of law. 12 Hence an instruction that the plaintiff must prove all the material al- legations of his declaration is erroneous, in that it requires the jury to determine what are the material allegations; 13 but error committed in this respect may become harmless where other instructions in the charge clearly and plainly state the material issues to be determined by the jury. 14 . , But an instruction referring to the declaration and stating that "if the jury find from the evidence that the plaintiff has made out her case as laid in her declaration then the jury must find for the plaintiff", is not subject to the crit- icism, that it makes the jury the judges of the effect of the averments of the declaration ; it merely empowers them to de- termine whether the evidence introduced sustains the issues 9 Wright v. S. 69 Ind. 165; Dens- n Comfort v. Bollingal, 134 Mo. more v. S. 67 Ind. 306. See Clif- 281, 289, 35 S. W. 609; Woodman ford v. S. 56 Ind. 245; Kennedy v. v. Chesney, 39 Me. 45; Morse v. Bebout, 62 Ind. 363. Weymouth, 28 Vt. 824; Knoxville, 10 p. v. Mayor, &c. 193 111. 309. C. G. & L. R. Co. v. Beeler, 90 Tenn. 61 N. E. 1077, 56 L. R. A. 95; 548, 18 S. W. 391; Martineau v. S. Toledo, St. L. & K. C. R. 14 Wis. 373. Co. v. Bailey, 145 111. 159, 33 12 Endsley v. Johns, 120 111. 469, N. E. 1089; Wabash, St. L. & 477, 12 N. E. 247; Toledo, St. L. P. R. Co. v. Jaggerman, 115 111. & K. C. R. Co. v. Bailey, 145 111. 407, 411, 4 N. E. 641; Bullock v. 159, 33 N. E. 1089. Narrott, 49 111. 62, 65; Reno v. Wil- 13 Martensen v. Arnold, 78 111. son, 49 111. 95, 98; Marsh v. Smith, App. 336; Chicago T. Tr. R. Co. v. 49 111. 396, 399; Davis v. Kenaya, Schmelling, 99 111. App. 577, 64 N. 51 111. 170; Mitchell v. Town of E. 714; Toledo, St. L. & K. C. R. Pond du Lac, 61 111. 174, 176; Gil- Co. v. Bailey, 145 111. 159, 33 N. E. bert v. Bone, 79 111. 341, 345; Gehr 1089; Endsley v. Johns, 120 111. 469, v. Hageman, 26 111. 438, 442; Fink 477, 12 N. E. 247. v. Evans, 95 Tenn. 413, 32 S. W. " Endsley v. Johns, 120 111. 477, 307; Merrill v. Packer, 80 Iowa, 12 N. E. 247; Toledo, St. L. & K. 542, 45 N. W. 1076; Miller v. Dun- C. R. Co. v. Bailey, 145 111. 159, 33 lap, 22 Mo. App. 97. N. E. 1089. 137 LEGAL QUESTIONS ARE NOT FOR JURY. 156 made by the pleadings. 15 So where the declaration charges negligence in violation of a city ordinance an instruction that if the jury believe from the evidence, that the plaintiff, while in the exercise of ordinary care, was injured by the negligence of the defendant, as charged in the declaration, they should find for plaintiff, is not objectionable as submitting to the jury for their determination the applicability of the ordinance to the circumstances of the case. 16 156. Court interprets written instruments. Where papers or writings of any kind, such as contracts, deeds, mortgages, ordinances, by-laws, statutes, records or other documentary evi- dence of any nature or character require construction, it is the duty of the court, as a matter of law, to instruct the jury as to the meaning of them. It is the exclusive province of the court to interpret written instruments affecting the rights of the parties ; and where two instruments between the same parties, conveying different interests in the subject matter in litigation are admissible in evidence, the court must determine the force and effect of each, and whether the execution of the one is in- consistent with the delivery of the other. 17 It is the province of the court to interpret written contracts knd define what is and what is not within their terms ; for when the parties have assented to definite terms, and incorporated them in formal documents the meaning can be discovered on inspection. 18 It would be a dangerous principle' to establish where parties have reduced their contracts to writing and defined the meaning by plain and unequivocal language, to subject their interpretation to the arbitrary and capricious judgment of per- sons unfamiliar with legal principles and settled rules of con. struction. 19 ' Whether a contract is an entire one is a question is Laflin R. P. Co. v. Tearney, 756; Wason v. Rowe, 16 Vt. 525; 131 111. 322, 325, 23 N. E. 389. Glover v. Gasque (S. Car.), 45 S. is Pennsylvania Co. v. France, E. 113; Pitcairn v. Philip Hiss Co. 112 111. 398, 403. (C. C. A.), 125 Fed. 110. IT Robbins v. Spencer, 121 Ind. is McKenzie v. Sykes, 47 Mich. 594, 22 N. E. 660; H. G. Olds Wagon 294, 11 N. W. 164; Tompkins v. Gard- Co. v. Coombs, 124 Ind. 62, 24 N. E. ner, 69 Mich. 58, 37 N. W. 43; Mer- 589. See Comer v. Himes, 49 Ind. rill v. Packer, 80 Iowa, 543, 45 N. 482; Thompson Tr. 1065, 1066; W. 1076; Kingsbury v. Thorp, 61 Carlisle v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 56 Mich. 216 (partnership contract), S. W. 365; Brady v. Cassidy, 104 28 N. W. 74; Seller v. Johnson, 65 N. Y. 155, 10 N. E. 131; Daly v. Kim- N. Car. 104. ball Co. 67 Iowa, 132, 24 N. W. i Brady v. Cassidy, 104 N. Y. 157 LAW DETERMINED BY THE COURT. 138 of law for the court to determine. 20 The court must also de- termine and explain to the jury the legal effect of contracts or other documentary evidence. 21 In charging the jury on an issue as to whether there was a contract between the parties the court should instruct what would constitute such contract. 22 Whether a correspondence carried on between the parties con- stitute a contract or not must be determined by the court, and not by the jury. 23 157. Jury interpret oral contracts. Whether an oral con- tract has been made between parties, and what are its terms, are always questions of fact to be settled by the jury. But where the existence and terms of a contract have been estab- lished, its construction is a matter of law for the court. 2 * Where a contract is by parol the terms of the agreement are, of course, matters of fact, and if those terms be obscure or equivocal, or are susceptible of explanation from extrinsic evidence, it is for the jury to find also the meaning of the terms employed; but the effect of a parol agreement, when its terms are given and their meaning fixed, is as much a question of law as the con- struction of a written contract. 25 In cases of written contracts it is the duty of the court to define the meaning of the language used in them, but in verbal contracts such duty is confined to the 147, 155, 10 N. B. 131; Bryant v. register); Salem, M. & M. R. Co. Hagerty, 87 Pa. St. 256; Estes v. v. Anderson, 51 Minn. 829. Boothe, 20 Ark. 590; Comfort v. 22 Boltz v. Miller, 23 Ky. L. R. Ballingal, 134 Mo. 289, 35 S. W. 991, 64 S. W. 630. See generally on 609; Dwight v. Germania L. Ins. Co. construction!: Mantz v. Maguire, 52 103 N. Y. 341, 8 N. E. 654; Harvey Mo. App. 137; Jones v. Swearin- v. Vandegrift, 89 Pa. St. 346; Zenor gen, 42 S. Car. 58, 19 S. E. 947; v. Johnson, 107 Ind. 69, 7 N. E. 751; McHenry v. Man, 39 Md. 510; *Sel- Warren v. Chandler, 98 Iowa, 237, lars v. Johnson, 65 N. Car. 104; 67 N. W. 242; Olds Wagon Works v. Burke v. Lee, 76 Va. 386; Lapeer Coombs, 124 Ind. 62, 24 N. E. 589; Co. F. & M. F. Ins. Co. v. Doyle, S. v. Williams, 32 S. Car. 123, 10 30 Mich. 159 (construction of insur- S. E. 876; Knoxville, C. G. & L. ance policy turning on whether a R. Co. v. Beeler, 90 Tenn. 549, 18 word was "six" or "oix"). S. W. 391; Fairbanks v. Jacobs, 69 23 Lea v. Henry, 56 Iowa, 662, Iowa, 265, 28 N. W. 602; Keeler v. 10 N. W. 243; Batters>hall v. Steph- Herr, 157 111. 57, 41 N. E. 750; ens, 34 Mich. 68; Luckhart v. Ogden, Cohn v. Stewart, 41 Wis. 527. 30 Cal. 548; Goddard v. Foster, 17 20 Diefenback v. Stark, 56 Wis. Wall (U. S.), 123. 463, 14 N. W. 621. 24 Snolley v. Hendrickson, 29 N. 21 Libby v. Deake, 97 Me. 377, 54 J. L. 371. See Edwards v. Gold- Atl. 856; Barton v. Gray, 57 Mich. Smith, 16 Pa. St. 48. 622, 24 N. W. 638; Stribling v. Pret- 25 Belt v. Goode, 31 Mo. 128. tyman, 57 111. 377 (certificate of the 139 INTERPRETATION OF ORAL CONTRACTS. 158 jury. They are not merely to ascertain the words and forms of expression, but to interpret their sense and meaning. 26 The question whether a contract existed must be determined from the oral proof, from what the parties said .and did, and the matter is single and cannot be separated so as to refer one part to the jury and the other part to the court, but in its entirety the question is one of fact. 27 And the question as to what the contract really was between the parties is for the jury. 28 But after the jury shall have determined what the oral contract is, if any exists, it is the duty of the court, and not the jury, to determine its legal effect as a question of law. 29 The court submits to the jury the determination of the contract by hy- pothetical instructions, and declares the legal effect according to the finding of the jury. Where the pleadings set out questions of law and fact the court must submit to the jury only the questions of fact. 30 158. Wills are construed by the court. All questions touch- ing the construction, operation and effect of wills are also to be determined by the court, and not by the jury. 31 Whether a will contains a special trust, which requires the joint action of all the executors, is a question of law for the court to decide, stnd not a question of fact to be referred to the jury for their decision. 32 26 Herbert v. Ford, 33 Me. 90, 93; so Duren v. Kee, 41 S. Car. 171, Copeland v. Hall, 29 Me. 93; 19 S. E. 492. Walthelm v. Artz, 70 Iowa, 609, si Burke v. Lee, 76 Va. 386; 31 N. W. 953; Chichester v. White- Magee v. McNeil, 41 Miss. 17; S. leather, 51 111. 259. v. Patterson, 68 Me. 473; Roe v. 27 McKenzie v. Sykes, 47 Mich. Taylor, 45 111. 485; Collins v. 294, 11 N. W. 164; Sines v. Superin- Green, 28 N. Car. 139; Willson v. tendent, 55 Mich. 383, 21 N. W. Whitefield, 38 Ga. 269. 428. See Boyce v. Martin, 46 Mich. 32 Willson v. Whitefield, 38 Ga. 239 (whether altered by parol), 9 269, 283. Other documentary evi- N. W. 265; Codding v. Woodi, 112 Pa. dence is governed by the same rule. St. 371, 3 Atl. 455; Smith v. Hutch- Deeds: Bonney v. Monell, 52 Me. inson, 83 Mo. 683; Walthelm v. 255; Hancock v. Colrybark, 66 Mo. Artz, 70 Iowa, 609, 31 N. W. 953. 672; Huth v. Carondelet, 56 Mo. 28 Hughes v. Tanner, 96 Mich. 207; Dean v. Erskine, 18 N. H. 81; 113, 55 N. W. 661; Smalley v. Hen- Eddy v. Chase, 140 Mass. 471, 5 drickson, 29 N. J. L. 373; Folsom N. E. 306; Synames v. Brown, 13 v. Plumer, 43 N. H. 469; Tobin v. Ind. 318. Court records: Shook v. Gregg, 34 Pa. St. 446. Blount, 67 Ala. 301 (decree); Gal- 29 Diefenback v. Stark, 56 Wis. lup v. Fox, 64 Conn. 491, 30 Atl. 462, 14 N. W. 621; Young v. Jeffreys, 756 (construction); Turner v. First 20 N. Car. 220; Barton v. Gray, 57 Nat. Bank, 78 Ind. 19 (construc- Mich. 623, 24 N. W. 638. tion) ; S. v. Anderson, 30 La. Ann, 557. 159 LAW DETERMINED BY THE COURT. 140 159. Writing as a fact in chain of evidence. It frequently happens that a writing is introduced merely as a fact or cir- cumstance tending to prove some other fact. In such case it is generally but a link in a chain of evidence, the accompanying evidence being mostly, or altogether, oral. When such is the case the jury have to pass upon the whole transaction, of which the writing is but a part. The question then is, not so much what the document means, but what inference shall be drawn from its meaning, and what effect it shall have towards proving the point at issue. The writing and all the concomitant evidence go to the jury together. In such case the duty of the court is comparatively unimportant. It may pronounce what meaning the writing is, or is not, capable of, and whether it is, or is not, relevant to the issue; still the value and effect of such evidence is a question of fact for the jury. 33 So when a document is introduced in evidence as a foundation of an inference of fact to establish some other fact, whether such inference can be drawn from it, is a question for the jury. 34 In other words, where the question to be determined from a writing is not the con- struction of it, but its effect as collateral evidence, then the question is for the jury. 35 160. Some phases of writing explained by oral evidence. There is a large class of writings where the meaning of par- ticular words or phrases or characters or abbreviations must be shown in evidence outside of the writing, and there may be extrinsic circumstances of one kind or another affecting its in- terpretation which may be shown by oral testimony. And it has often been inaccurately said that in cases of this kind the writing itself is to be passed upon and construed by the jury. Strictly speaking, this is not so. The jury find what the oral testimony shows, and the court declares what the writing means in the light of the facts found by the jury. The facts may be found by a special verdict, and then the court interprets the .writing in view of such finding, or the case may go to the jury with hypothetical instructions from the court to render a ver- sa s. v. Patterson, 68 Me. 473; ss Reynolds v. Richards, 14 Pa. Wilson v. Board, &c. 63 Mo. 142. St. 205; Robbins v. Spencer, 121 * Prim v. Haren, 27 Mo. 205; Ind. 594, 22 N. E. 660; Thompson Mantz v. Maguire, 52 Mo. App. Tr. 1065, 1066. 137. 141 VALIDITY OF LAWS AND ORDINANCES. 162 diet if certain facts are found, and another way if the facts are found differently. The court may first inform the jury as to the law, or the jury may first inform the court as to the facts, as may be most practicable. 36 161. Validity of ordinances and statutes for court. It is the province of the court, and not the jury, to construe an ordinance when it is introduced in evidence. 37 The validity of an ordinance is a question for the court to determine, and not the jury. 38 An ordinance of a city, is to be proved by evi- dence addressed to the court, and not submitted as a fact to be determined by the jury. 39 So whether a statute shall be declared void for uncertainty, is a question of law for the court to determine, and not the jury. 40 162. Foreign law a fact to be proved. When the laws of another state come in question in the courts they must be pleaded and proved as a matter of fact and determined by the jury. 41 That the law of another state is a fact to be determined by the jury is a well established principle. 42 But in such case it becomes the duty of the court, as in the case of any other sfi S. v. Patterson, 68 Me. 473. R. Co. 74 Iowa, 127, 37 N. W. 107; Citing: Hutchinson v. Bowker, 5 Sadler v. Peoples, 105 Fed. 712. M. & W. 535, 540; Smith v. sa City of Peoria v. Calhoun, 29 Faulkner, 12 Gray (Mass.), 251, 255; m. 317; Pennsylvania Co. v. Frana, Putnam v. Bond, 100 Mass. 58; 13 111. App. 91. Cunningham v. Washburn, 119 39 Ronlo v. Valcour, 58 N. H. Mass. 224; Mowry v. Stogner, 3 346; Washington S. R. Co. v. Lacey, Rich (S. Car.) 251; Powers v. Gary, 94 Va. 460, 26 S. E. 834. 64 Me. 9, 21. See also Olds Wagon 40 s. v. Main, 69 Conn. 123, 37 Co. v. Coombs, 124 Ind. 62 (con- Atl. 80, 36 L. R. A. 623 (statutes tract ambiguous), 24 N. E. 589; construed by the court); Post v. Brady v. Cassidy, 104 N. Y. 147, Supervisors, 105 U. S. 667; Gallatin 10 N. E. 131; Burke v. Lee, 76 Turnpike Co. v. S. 16 Lea (Tenn.), Va. 386; Mantz v. Maguire, 52 Mo. 36. App. 137; Foster v. Berg, 104 Pa. 41 Williams v. Finlay, 40 Ohio St. 328; Goddard v. Foster, 17 St. 342; Ely v. James, 123 Mass. 36, Wall (U. S.) 142; Meyer v. Shamp, 44; Kline v. Baker, 99 Mass. 253; 51 Neb. 424, 71 N. W. 57; West v. Lockwood v. Crawford, 18 Conn. Smith, 101 U. S. 263; Helmholz v. 361; Hooper v. Moore, 50 N. Car. Everingham, 24 Wis. 266; Ken- 130. drick v. Cisco, 13 Lea (Tenn.), 248; 42 Alexander v. Pennsylvania Co. Philibert v. Burch, 4 Mo. App. 470, 48 Ohio St. 623, 634, 30 N. E. 69. (doubtful words must be determined See Thompson Tr. 1054; Wear v. by the jury); Zenor v. Johnson, 107 Sanger, 91 Mo. 348, 2 S. W. 307; Ind. 69; Humes v. Bernstein, 72 Moore v. Gwynn, 27 N. Car. (5 Ala. 546. Ired. L.) 187; Bank v. Barry, 20 Md. 37 Platt & S. v. Chicago, B. & Q. 287. 163 LAW DETERMINED BY TUB COUBT. 142 documentary evidence requiring construction, to construe the statutes or decisions of the foreign state. 43 When foreign laws are in evidence it is no less the duty of the court to determine the law of the case from them than it is the court's duty to declare our own laws in charging the jury. 4 * ' ' What is the law of another state or of a foreign country, is as much a 'ques- tion of law', as what is the law of our own state. There is this difference, however: the court is presumed to know judicially the public laws of our state, while in respect to private laws and the laws of other states and foreign countries, this knowl- edge is not presumed; it follows that the existence of the latter must be alleged and proved as facts." 45 163. Illustrations of the principles Legal questions. Whether the plaintiff or defendant has the affirmative on a particular issue is a question of law for the court, and not of fact for the jury. 46 The court may, without invading the pro- vince of the jury, instruct that two or more different writings introduced in evidence are not necessarily inconsistent in mean- ing in reference to some particular fact in issue. 47 Also an instruction which merely refers to certain documents involved in a case, stating that they are to be considered and construed together as part of one and the same contract, is not obnoxious as conveying the idea that the jury are authorized to con- strue the contract. 48 An instruction that if the jury find that a certain person (naming him), "by reason of having hired the team, wagon and driver from the defendant had become, as it were, the owner thereof for that day" the defendant would not be re- sponsible for any injury caused by the negligence of the driver of the team, is properly refused. The question thus submitted is 43 Alexander v. Pennsylvania Co. 4R Gilbert v. Bone, 79 111. 341, 48 Ohio St. 623, 634, 30 N. E. 69; 345. Ely v. James, 123 Mass. 36, 44; 47 Home Friendly Soc. v. Berry, Cobb v. Griffin & A. Co. 87 Mo. 94 Ga. 606, 21 S. E. 583. 90. 48 Anglo American Provision Co. 44 Slaughter v. Metropolitan St. v. Prestiss, 157 111. 506, 518, 42 N. R. Co. 116 Mo. 269, 23 S. W. 760; E. 157. Held submitting to the S. v. Whittle, 59 S. Car. 297, 37 jury questions of law in the fol- S. E. 923. lowing cases: Jordan v. Duke 45 Hooper v. Moore, 50 N. Car. (Ariz.), 36 Pac. 896; Pearce v. (5 Jones), 130. Boggs, 99 Cal. 340, 33 Pac. 906. 143 FOREIGN LAW A FACT ILLUSTRATIONS. 163 one of law for the court. 49 It is error for the court to charge that the jury may apply certain instructions "so far as they are practicable in arriving at a verdict;" such charge submits to the jury the question of determining the law. 50 Submitting to the jury the questions as to what is "legal possession" and "color of title" is improper, they being questions of law for the court to determine. 51 To instruct the jury that if they be- lieve the defendant was in actual possession of the land in controversy at the time the plaintiff purchased and took a con- veyance of it, without advising them what would constitute actual possession, is error in requiring the jury to determine the law. 52 In an action where the plaintiff's title to a tract of land was in issue a charge that if the plaintiff is the owner and entitled to the possession of the land the jury should find for him ; and if the defendant wrongfully entered and wrongfully withheld the land they should assess damages, is erroneous in that it makes the jury judges of the law as well as the facts. 53 An instruc- tion charging that the paper title introduced by the plaintiff is regular on its face, and with the proof of heirship is sufficient to vest title in him to the land in controversy, is proper, and does not invade the province of the jury in weighing the evi- dence. 54 Whether a rule adopted in conducting or carrying on a certain business, such, for instance, as railroad business, is reasonable or not is a question of law for the court, and not for the jury, to determine. 55 Also the question of the obligation of a rail- road company to fence its track is a question of law, and should not be submitted to the jury. 56 Whether certain clauses in an instrument as to the description of property are repugnant or not is a question of law to be determined by the court. 57 And the sufficiency of the description of property in a deed, mortgage or other instrument is a question of law. 58 Tompkins v. Montgomery, 123 54 Howell v. Hanrick (Tex. Cv. Gal. 219, 55 Pac. 997. App.), 24 S. W. 823. BO Duthie v. Town of Washburn, 55 Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Whitte- 87 Wis. 231, 55 N. W. 380. more, 43 111. 420, 423. si Blanchard v. Pratt, 37 111. 243. 56 Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Whalen, 52 Mayes v. Kenton, 23 Ky. L. R. 42 111. 396. 1052, 64 S. W. 728. 57 Rathbun v. Geer, 64 Conn. 421, ss Smith v. Cornett, 18 Ky. L. R. 30 Atl. 60. 818, 38 S. W. 689; Ferguson v. BS Austin v. French, 36 Mich. Moore, 98 Tenn. 342, 39 S. W. 341. 199. 163 LAW DETERMINED BY THE COURT. 144 What is a proper execution and acknowledgment of a mort- gage is a question of law, and hence improper to be submitted 1 to the jury by instruction. 59 Where there can be no controversy as to what facts are established by the constitution and by-laws of an association, in evidence, it is the duty of the court, and not the jury, to determine whether the association was or- ganized for an unlawful purpose. 00 A charge that "the records and papers which have been introduced in evidence are suffi- cient proof of the establishment of a public highway in ac- cordance with the plat therein set forth," is proper, it being the duty of the court to determine the sufficiency of the records to sustain the road. 61 Where an instruction states that if the jury believe from the evidence that the act complained of was a lawful act, the defendant is not guilty, it submits to the jury a question of law. 62 In an action for trespass, where the defense was justification under a replevin writ, an instruction submitting to the jury the question whether the writ was duly and properly executed, without informing them what would constitute a "due and proper" execution is improper. 63 Whether a warrant issued for the arrest of a person is valid or void is a question of law, and when such document is introduced in evidence the court may properly state to the jury whether it is or is not void. 64 The record of extradition proceedings is properly passed upon by the court for the purpose of determining as a matter of law whether the accused was extradited upon the same charge for which he was placed on trial. 65 Where by statutory provision a court is authorized to take judicial notice of the laws of na- ture and the measure of time, it is. proper to instruct the jury as to the time when the moon rose on a particular day, al- though no evidence was introduced on that subject at the trial. 68 So also the court may instruct on what day of the week a certain day of the month occurred. 67 so Bullock v. Narrott, 49 111. 62. * S. v. Yourex, 30 Wash. 611, 71 oo Johnson v. Miller, 63 Iowa, 529, Pac. 203. 17 N. W. 34. 5 S. v. Roller, 30 Wash. 692, 71 i S. v. Prine, 25 Iowa, 231. Pac. 718. 2 Can* v. S. 104 Ala. 4, 16 So. P. v. Mayes, 113 Cal. 618, 45 150. Pac. 860. Gusdorff v. Duncan, 94 Md. ^ Koch v. S. 115 Ala. 99, 22 160, 50 Atl. 57. So. 471. 145 PRINCIPLES ILLUSTRATED AS TO FACTS. 165 164. Illustrations of the principles Questions of fact An instruction stating that whether a certain act amounts to neg- ligence is for the jury to determine under all the circumstances in evidence is not objectionable as requiring the jury to decide a question of law where the charge contains a legal defini- tion of negligence. 68 Where a writing is introduced in evidence for the purpose of showing some, extrinsic or collateral fact, and its effect does not depend upon the construction or mean- ing of the instrument, or of its effect upon some other instru- ment, the inference of fact is to be drawn by the jury. 69 Where a memorandum or document on its face does not of itself purport to be a promise to pay or other binding obliga- tion, but which requires parol evidence to disclose the inten- tion of the maker of it, the jury must determine from all the facts and circumstances for what purpose the same was made. 70 The court will not decide as a matter of law whether a way of a certain width is necessary to the construction of a road on which to run or operate lumber trains. This is a question for the jury to determine. 71 The court after having defined probable cause in an action for malicious prosecution does not submit to the jury both the law and the facts by further charg- ing them that "both the question of probable cause and malice are for the jury to determine" from the evidence. 72 165. In criminal causes court determines law. In most, if not all, jurisdictions where the jury are not clothed with power by constitutional or statutory provision to determine the law they are bound to accept it as given them by the court, in criminal as well as civil cases. 73 It is the duty of the court to instruct ss Conner v. Citizens' St. R. Co. 269; S. v. Rheams, 34 Minn. 18, 146 Ind. 430, 45 N. B. 662. 24 N. W. 302; Sparf v. U. S. 156 9 Robbins v. Spencer, 121 Ind. U. S. 51, 15 Sup. Ct. 273 (exhaus- 594, 22 N. E. 660, citing: Thomp- tive review of cases and authori- son Tr. 1065, 1066. ties); Adams v. S. 29 Ohio St. 412; TO Murphy v. Murphy, 95 Iowa, S. v. Dickey, 48 W. Va. 325, 37 271, 63 N. W. 697. S. E. 695; S. v. Crotean, 23 Vt. 14; TI Waters v. Greenlief John Lum- S. v. Stevens, 53 Me. 548; Wash- ber Co. 115 N. Car. 648, 20 S. E. ington v. S. 63 Ala. 135; Pierce v. 718. S. 13 N. H. 536, 545; Harrison v. Lewton v. Hower, 35 Fla. 58, Com. 123 Pa. St. 508, 16 Atl. 611; 16 So. 616. Brown v. Com. 86 Va. 466, 10 S. 73 Duffy v. P. 26 N. Y. 588, 591; E. 745; S. v. Burpee,' 65 Vt. 1, 25 Hamilton v. P. 29 Mich. 173; Han- Atl. 964, 19 L. R. A. 145. num v. S. 90 Tenn. 647, 18 S. W. 166 LAW DETERMINED BY THE COURT. 146 the jury as to the law in criminal cases, and it is the duty of the jury to follow the law as stated by the court. 74 Under the statute of California, which requires the jury to receive the law as laid down as such by the court, an instruction in sub- stance charging that the jury should receive the law as the court states it to be, notwithstanding "you may firmly believe" the court is wrong, and that the law is, or should be, otherwise than as given by the court, is proper. 75 Doubtless, however, the jury have the power to disregard the law as given by the court, but they have neither the moral nor legal right to do so, and they cannot do so without violating their oaths and disregarding their duty. 76 The doctrine that the jury are the judges of the law in criminal cases is contrary to the fundamental law; contrary to a vast preponderance of judicial authority in this country, and contrary to the spirit and meaning of the constitution of the United States. 77 The controversy in England over the ques- tion whether jurors are judges of the law originated largely from the course of procedure in prosecutions for libel. The judges in such cases were accustomed to direct the jury to re- turn a verdict of guilty upon proof of publication and the truth of the inuendoes, without instructing them as to whether the paper, if they so found, was or was not libel. The question of malicious intent charged in the indictment was not submitted to the jury. 78 166. Jury made judge of law by statute. By either con- stitutional or statutory provisions of several of the states the jury are made the judges of the law and the facts in all criminal cases. 79 Hence the jury are not absolutely bound to accept the law as given them by the court. In Illinois under a statute which provides that "juries in all criminal cases shall be judges 74 Brown v. Com. 86 Va. 466, 472, S. v. Wright, 53 Me. 328. 10 S. E. 745; Com. v. McManus, 78 S. v. Burpee, 65 Vt. 1, 21, 25 143 Pa. St. 64, 21 Atl. 1018; Carpen- Atl. 964, 19 L. R. A. 145. ter v. P. 8 Barb. (N. Y.) 603; Roto- McCarthy v. S. 56 Ind. 203; bins v. S. 8 Ohio St. 167; Com. Broil v. S. 45 Md. 359; Com. v. v. Anthes, 5 Gray (Mass.), 198. Anthes, 71 Mass. (5 Gray), 185; 75 p. v . Worden, 113 Cal. 569, S. v. Buckley, 40 Conn. 246; S. v. 45 Pac. 844. Thomas, 47 Conn. 546; Malone v. TO Parrish v. S. 14 Neb. 61, 63, S. 66 Ga. 540; S. v. Ford, 37 La. Ann. 15 N. W. 357; U. S. v. Keller, 19 Fed. 443, 465. 633, 636. 147 JURY JUDGES OF LAW, WHEN. 167 of the law and the fact," while it is the duty of the jury to receive and act upon the law as given by the court they are not bound to do so if they believe upon their oaths the court is wrong. 80 In Indiana, under a constitutional provision which declares that "in all criminal cases whatever, the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the fact," while it is the duty of the jury to give careful and respectful consideration to the instructions of the court, and not disregard such instructions except for some good and sufficient reason, yet they have the right to determine the law for themselves. 81 In view of this provision the refusal of an instruction "that the jury in this case are the exclusive judges of the law and facts" was held to be error. 82 The jury may disregard the court's instructions and follow their own convictions, but they should give respect- ful consideration to the law as given by the court, especially if they are in doubt as to what is the law. 83 The decisions of the Supreme Court are no more binding on the jury in a crim- inal case than the instructions of the trial court. 84 167. In Massachusetts and Connecticut. The statute of Mas- sachusetts which provides that "in all criminal offenses it shall be the duty of the jury to try, according to the established forms and principles of law, all cases which shall be com- mitted to them, and after having received the instructions of the court to decide at their discretion by a general verdict both the fact and the law involved in the issue, or to return a special verdict at their election," has been construed as not conferring on the jury the power to determine questions of law against the instructions of the court. Such power under the constitu- tion of that state cannot be conferred upon the jury. 85 In Connecticut, under a statute which provides that "the court shall state its opinion to the jury upon all questions of law aris- ing in the trial of a criminal cause and submit to their con- so Davison v. P. 90 111. 221; Wohl- f* Bird v. S. 107 Ind. 154, 8 N. B. ford v. P. 148 111. 301, 36 N. E. 14; Blaker v. S. 130 Ind. 203, 29 N. 107; Mullinix v. P. 76 111. 211. E. 1077; Hudelson v. S. 94 Ind. 426; si McDonald v. S. 63 Ind. 544; McDonald v. S. 63 Ind. 544. Reiser v. S. 83 Ind. 234; Bird v. S. 4 Reiser v. S. 83 Ind. 234; Fow- 107 Ind. 154; Walker v. S. 136 Ind. ler v. S. 85 Ind. 538. 663. ss Com. v. Anthes, 71 Mass. (5 82 McCarthy v. S. 56 Ind. 203. Gray), 185. 168 LAW DETERMINED BY THE COURT. 148 sideration both the law and the facts without any direction how to find their verdict," the jury are the judges of the law, but not in the sense that they are at liberty to disregard it; nor are they at liberty to set aside the law and substitute for it something else which suits their notions. They cannot make law for the occasion. 86 168. In Maryland and Georgia. The constitution of Mary- land provides that "in the trial of all criminal cases the jury shall be the judges of the law, as well as the fact. 87 " The jury being thus authorized to determine the law, as well as the facts, are not bound by any instructions given them by the court, but are at liberty to disregard them. 88 The court's instructions in such case are regarded as merely advisory. 89 The Supreme Court of Maryland has declared that in view of the constitutional provision mentioned it is discretionary with the trial court to instruct the jury as to the law, at their request, though the court is not bound to do so. 90 The constitu- tion of Georgia declares that "in all criminal cases the jury shall be the judges of the law and fact." 91 But notwithstand- ing such constitutional provision the jury should listen to the law given by the court and adopt it if they can conscientiously do so; if not, then they are at liberty to judge the law for themselves. 92 And it is proper for the court to instruct the jury that they cannot set up ideas of their own in opposition to the charge of the court. 93 But the right of the jury to judge of the law is guaranteed to them and the accused by statute, and that right cannot be abridged, weakened or thwarted by the thunder of the court in their ears. 94 An instruction charg- ing the jury that they should be clearly satisfied that the court se S. v. Buckley, 40 Conn. 246; Wheeler v. S. 42 Md. 569; Guy v. S. v. Thomas, 47 Conn. 546. S. 96 Md. 692, 54 Atl. 879; Beard v. 87 Beard v. S. 71 Md. 275, 17 Atl. S. 71 Md. 280, 17 Atl. 1044, 4 L. R. 1044; Broil v. S. 45 Md. 359. A. 675; Swann v. S. 64 Md. 425, 1 ss Broil v. S. 45 Md. 359; Swann Atl. 872, v. S. 64 Md. 423, 1 Atl. 872; Wheeler i Malone v. S. 66 Ga. 540. v. S. 42 Md. 563; Franklin v. S. ^ McDaniel v. S. 30 Ga. 853; Dan- 12 Md. 236; Beard v. S. 71 Md. 275, forth v. S. 75 Ga. 614, 623. 17 Atl. 1044, 4 L. R. A. 675. 93 Akridge v. Noble, 114 Ga. 949, so Swann v. S. 64 Md. 423, 1 Atl. 41 S. E. 78. 872; Wheeler v. S. 42 Md. 563; 94 Dickens v. S. 30 Ga. 383; Nuzum v. S. 88 Ind. 594; Beard v. Keener v. S. 18 Ga. 194; McDaniel S. 71 Md. 275, 17 Atl. 1044. v. S. 30 Ga. 855. so Forwood v. S. 49 Md. 537; 149 JURY JUDGES OF LAW, WHEN. 1G9 is wrong before they are authorized to differ from the court is erroneous. 95 169. In Louisiana and Indiana. The constitution of Louis- iana provides that "the jury in all criminal cases shall be the judges of the law and of the facts on the question of guilt or innocence, having been duly charged as to the law applicable to the case by the presiding judge." 96 Although the jury are the judges of the law, as well as the fact, in criminal cases, as thus provided, they shall heed the law as given them by the court; by which is meant that the charge of the court shall have its moral weight with the jury. 97 Still, the jury should not be tied down by peremptory instructions from the court as to their duty in respect to any particular testimony nor what their course should be as a matter of law in respect to the tes- timony, in view of the fact that they are the judges of the law and the evidence. 98 The court is required to instruct the jury as to the law appli- cable to the case, and they ought to receive it as given to them, though they are under no obligation to do so. 99 But in that state it has been held error to charge the jury that if they "can- not conscientiously believe that the court has given the law correctly they do not violate their oaths in disregarding it," for the reason that they are bound to accept the law as given them by the court. 100 "That the jury are the sole judges of the law and the facts of this case, and that they have the right to ignore the law given them by the court should they deem proper to do so," is also erroneous. 101 In Indiana the statute requires the court to instruct the jury and to inform them that they have the right to determine the law. But the jury may disregard the instructions of the court and determine the law for themselves. In other words, the instructions of the court are advisory only in their influence upon the ultimate judgment of the jury, both as to the law and 05 Golden v. S. 25 Ga. 527. v. Ballerio, 11 La. Ann. 81; S. v. ss S. v. Ford, 37 La. Ann. 443, Scott, 11 La. Ann. 429; S. v. Saliba, 465. 18 La. Ann. 35. But see S. v. Mat- 9? S. v. Desforges, 47 La. Ann. thews, 38 La. Ann. 795. 1167, 17 So. 811; S. v. Tisdale 41 100 s. v. Matthews, 3-8 La. Ann. La. Ann. 338, 6 So. 579. 795. as S. v. Watkins, 106 La. 380, 31 101 S. v. Powell, 109 La. 727, 33 So. 10. . So. 748. 99 s. v. Tally, 23 La. Ann. 677; S. 169 LAW DETERMINED BY THE COURT. 150 the facts. 102 While the jury are the judges of the law and the facts, yet this does not give them the right to decide the law, regardless of all law, but it is their duty to follow or determine the law as established by the proper tribunals. Under their oaths they are required to determine the law correctly. But a trial court may not instruct that the law as decided by the Supreme Court is binding upon the jury. 103 102 McDonald v. S. 63 Ind. 544; 1077; Walker v. S. 136 Ind. 663, 36 Nuzum v. S. 88 Ind. 599; Wachstet- N. E. 356; Smith v. S. 142 Ind. 288, ter v. S. 99 Ind. 290. 41 N. E. 595; Reynolds v. S. 147 Ind. icsKeiser v. S. 83 Ind. 234; Ander- 3, 46 N. E. 31; Dean v. S. 147 Ind. son v. S. 104 Ind. 467, 4 N. E. 63; 215, 46 N. E. 528; Bridgewater v. S. Blaker v. S. 130 Ind. 203, 29 N. E. 153 Ind. 560, 55 N. E. 737. CHAPTER VI. JURY DETERMINE THE FACTS. Sec. 170. Court prohibited from ex- pressing opinion. 171. By common law court may express opinion. 172. Submitting facts hypothetical- ly. 173. Instructing that "evidence tends to show." 174. Competency of evidence Is there any evidence? 175. Intimating opinion is improp- er. 176. Opinion not intimated Illus- trations. 177. Opinion intimated Illustra- tions. 178. Opinion not intimated Criminal cases. 179. Opinion intimated Criminal cases. 180. Instructions as to dying declarations. Sec. 181. Inferences and conclusions are for the jury. 182. Weight of evidence is for jury to determine. 183. Negligence When a question of fact, when of law. 184. Instructions improper Illus- trations. 185. Remarks and conduct of court influencing jury. 186. Instructions urging jury to agree. 187. Instructions attempting to coerce jury. 188. Instructions not attempting to coerce jury. 189. When court may comment on evidence and express opin- ion. 190. Illustrations of the rule. 191. Instructions reviewing the evidence. 170. Court prohibited from expressing opinion. By con- stitutional and statutory provisions of many of the states the judges in charging the jury are prohibited from expressing or intimating an opinion on the weight of the evidence, or what the evidence proves or does not prove. Under these provisions the jury are the sole judges of the facts and of the weight of the evidence. 1 And by such provisions in some of the states the i P. v. Welch, 49 Cal. 181; P. v. S. 29 Tex. 499; Chicago & N. v. Casey, 65 Cal. 260, 3 Pac. 874; R. Co. v. Moranda, 108 111. 582; Beverly v. Burke, 9 Ga. 447; Ross Cameron v. Vandergriff, 53 Ark. 151 171 JURY DETERMINE THE FACTS. 152 courts in charging the jury are prohibited not only from ex- pressing opinions on the weight of the evidence, but are also forbidden to sum up or recapitulate the evidence, and 'are only permitted to declare the law. 2 Hence it is error to instruct the jury in such manner as to impress them with the idea that they are bound by the opinion of the court as to what the evidence proves or does not prove. 3 381, 13 S. W. 761; S. v. Benner, 64 Me. 267; S. v. Barry, 11 N. Dak. 428, 92 N. W. 809; S. v. Carter, 112 Iowa, 15, 83 N. W. 715; Kear- ney v. P. (Gal.), 17 Pac. 782; P. v. Webster, 59 Hun (N. Y.) 398, 13 N. Y. S. 414. See, also, Hempton v. S. Ill Wis. 127, 86 N. W. 596; Van Duzor v. Allen, 90 111. 499; Myrick v. Wells, 52 Miss. 149; United States Life Ins. Co. v. Lesser, 126 Ala. 568, 28 So. 646; Clark v. Goddard, 39 Ala. 164; S. v. Dorland, 103 Iowa, 168, 72 N. W. 492; Ryder v. S. 100 Ga. 528, 28 S. E. 246; Tyler v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. 88 Va. 389, 13 S. E. 975; Florida C. & P. R. Co. v. Lucas, 110 Ga. 121, 35 S. E. 283; S. v. Hahn, 38 La. Ann. 169; Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Pearcy, 128 Ind. 197, 27 N. E. 479; P. v. O'Brien, 130 Cal. 1, 62 Pac. 297; Earp v. Edginton, 107 Tenn. 23, 64 S. W. 40; Riviere v. McCormick, 14 La. Ann. 139; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Robinson, 106 111. 142; Fulwider v. Ingels, 87 Ind. 414; S. v. Ma- honey, 24 Mont. 281, 61 Pac. 647; Kearney v. S. 68 Miss. 233, 8 So. 492; S. v. Reed, 62 Me. 129; Lorie v. Adams, 51 Kas. 692, 33 Pac. 599; Granby Mining & S. Co. v. Davis, 156 Mo. 422, 57 S. W. 126; S. v. Daly, 16 Ore. 240, 18 Pac. 357; S. v. Greer, 22 W. Va. 801; Kirk v. Ter. 10 Okl. 46, 60 Pac. 797; Williams v. Dicken- son, 28 Fla. 90, 9 So. 847; Com. v. Briant, 142 Mass. 463, 8 N. E. 338; Texas, &c. R. Co. v. Durrett, 26 Tex. Cv. App. 268, 63 S. W. 904; S. v. Tickel, 13 Nev. 502; Meadows v. Truesdale (Tex. Cv. App.), 56 S. W. &32; Carroll v. Chicago, St. P. M. & O. R. Co. (Iowa), 84 N. W. 1035; Hughes Cr. Law, 3246, citing: Andrews v. P. 60 111. 354; S. v. Pepo, 23 Mont. 473. 59 Pac. 721; Logg v. S. 92 111. 598; S. v. Kerns, 47 W. Va. 266, 34 S. E. 734; Delvin v. P. 104 111. 504; S. v. Mitchell, 56 S. Car. 524, 35 S. E. 210; P. v. Travers, 88 Cal. 233, 26 Pac. 88; S. v. Rose, 47 Minn. 47, 49 N. W. 404; Stephens v. S. 10 Tex. App. 120; Barnett v. Com. 84 Ky. 449, 1 S. W. 722; Starr v. United States, 153 U. S. 614, 14 Sup. Ct. 919; Chap- man v. S. 109 Ga. 157, 34 S. E. 369; P. v. Plyler, 126 Cal. 379, 58 Pac. 904; Williams v. S. 46 Neb. 704, 65 N. W. 783; Merritt v. S. 107 Ga. 675, 34 S. E. 361; S. v. Austin, 109 Iowa, 118, 80 N. W. 303; P. v. Ferraro, 161 N. Y. 365, 55 N. E. 931, 15 N. Y. Cr. 266; S. v. Schmepel, 23 Mont. 523, 59 Pac. 927; Fuller v. New York L. Ins. Co. (Mass.), 67 N. E. 879; Ward v. Brown, 53 W. Va. 237; Central Tobacco Co. v. Knoop, 24 Ky. L. R. 1268, 71 S. W. 3; Potter v. S. 117 Ala. 693 ; Galveston, &c. R. Co. v. Karver (Tex. Cv. App.), 70 S. W. 328. 2 Southern R. Co. v. Kendrick, 40 Miss. 374; Renand v. City of Bay City, 124 Mich. 29, 82 N. W. 1008; S. v. Asberry, 37 La. Ann. 125 (as to criminal cases) ; S. v. Green, 7 La. Ann. 518; Hannah v. S. 1 Tex. App. 579 (as to criminal cases). In North Carolina the court in charging the jury is required by statute to state "in a plain and correct manner the evidence given in the case, and declare and ex- plain the law arising thereon," S. v. Norris, 10 N. Car. 391; S. v. Brady, 107 N. Car. 822, 12 S. E. 325. s Shanck v. Morris, 2 Sweeney (N. Y.), 464; Heydrick v. Hutch- inson, 165 Pa. St. 208; 30 Atl. 819; Burke v. Maxwell, 81 Pa. St. 139; Burdick v. P. 58 Barb. (N. Y.), 51. 153 SUBMITTING FACTS TO JURY. 172 171. By common law court may express opinion. But in the absence of such constitutional or statutory provisions under the common law the court in charging the jury may comment upon the facts and express an opinion on the weight of the evidence as to what it proves or tends to prove or does not prove, provided the jury are ultimately left free to determine the facts. 4 172. Submitting facts hypothetically. But the provisions above mentioned do not prohibit the court from enumerating the facts hypothetically which the evidence tends to prove with- out intimating an opinion as to the truth or falsity of the facts, and charging that if the jury believe the facts thus enumerated they should find for the plaintiff, or find the defendant guilty, as the case may be. 5 Thus, for example, it is not a violation * Vanarsdale v. Hax, 107 Fed. 878; Steven v. Talcott, 11 Vt. 25; Pool v. White, 175 Pa. St. 459. 34 Atl. 801; Setchel v. Keigeoin, 57 Conn. 478, 18 Atl. 594; Smith v. S. 41 N. J. L. 374; Hurlburt v. Hurl- burt, 128 N. Y. 420, 28 N. E. 651; Rowell v. Fuller, 59 Vt. 688, 10 Atl. 853; Simmons v. United States, 142 U. S. 148; First Nat. Bank v. Ho- lan, 63 Minn. 525, 65 N. W. 952; Holder v. S. 5 Ga. 444; Goldsworthy v. Town of Linden, 75 Wis. 24, 43 N. W. 656; Durkee v. Marshall, 7 Wend. (N. Y.), 312; S. v. Lynott, 5 R. I. 295; Shoohn v. Com. 106 Pa. St. 369; New York Fire Ins. Co. v. Walden, 12 Johns, (N. Y.), 519. See, also, Ames v. Cannon River Mfg. Co. 27 Minn. 245, 6 N. W. 787; Follmer v. McGinley, 146 Pa. St. 517, 23 Atl. 393; Anderson v. Avis, 62 Fed. 227; Bonner v. Herrick, 99 Pa. St. 225; Sindram v. P. 88 N. Y. 203; Haines v. Mc- Laughlin, 135 U. S. 584; Ketchum v. Ebert, 33 Wis. 611; Knapp v. Griffin, 140 Pa. St. 604, 21 Atl. 449. Under such constitutional provis- ion of South Carolina it is error for the court to comment on the facts in charging the jury, al- though the evidence is not dis- puted or contradicted, S. v. Can- non, 49 S. Car. 550, 27 S. E. 526. See, generally, cases prohibiting comment on the evidence by the court: Winter v. Supreme Lodge K. P. 96 Mo. App. 67, 68 S. W. 662; City of Bonham v. Crider (Tex. Cv. App.), 27 S. W. 419 (re- fused) ; Hartshorns v. Byrne, 147 111. 418, 35 N. E. 622; Rawls v. S. 97 Ga. 186, 22 S. E. 529; Ware v. S. 96 Ga. 349, 23 S. E. 410; Com. v. Flynn, 165 Mass. 153, 42 N. E. 562; P. v. Brow, 35 N. Y. S. 1009, 90 Hun, 509; Yarborough v. S. 86 Ga. 396, 12 S. E. 650. s P. v. Hitchcock, 104 Cal. 482, 38 Pac. 198; S. v. Mitchell, 41 La. Ann. 1073, 6 So. 785; Davis v. Elmore, 40 S. Car. 533, 19 S. E. 204; Shea v. City of Muncie, 148 Ind. 14, 46 N. E. 138; Norris v. Clinkscales, 47 S. Car. 488, 25 S. E. 797. Facts must be stated hypothetically. Gable v. Rauch, 50 S. Car. 95, 27 S. E. 555. Rattlemiller v. Stone, 28 Wash. 104, 68 Pac. 168; S. v. Means, 95 Me. 364, 50 Atl. 30; Ryan v. Los Angeles I. & C. S. Co. 112 Cal. 244, 44 Pac. 471; Lagrone v. Timmerman, 46 S. Car. 372. 24 S. E. 290; S. v. Whittle, 59 S. Car. "297, 37 S. E. 923; Thomp- son v. Johnson (Tex. Cv. App.), 58 S. W. 1030; Hamlin v. Treat, 87 Me. 310, 32 Atl. 909. See, also, Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. v. Mar- 173 JURY DETERMINE THE FACTS. 154 of the constitutional provision which confines the court to a statement of the law, to charge that if the jury believe from the evidence beyond, a reasonable doubt that the defendant testified to a certain state of facts (enumerating them) knowingly and wilfully he is guilty. 6 But where the facts are in dispute, or the evidence is conflicting, the instructions should be hypothetical in form, that is, they should state the law upon a supposed state of facts to be determined by the jury. 7 But where the evidence clearly and conclusively shows without dispute that a material averment or fact is true it is error to submit the same to the jury hypothetically as though it were, in dispute. 8 A fact which is admitted or undisputed by the parties should not be submitted for the jury to determine. 9 For to call upon the jury to decide whether an undisputed fact is or is not proved is to mislead them to the supposition that they may find either way when the evidence warrants but one conclusion. 10 173. Instructing that "evidence tends to show." It is not error for the court in reciting the substance of the testimony to say "the evidence tends to show" a certain fact. The use of such expression does not imply an opinion of the court on tin, 111 111. 219; Ladd v. Pigott, proposition hypothetically need not 114 111. 647, 2 N. E. 503; Morgan make reference to the evidence, by v. Wattles, 69 Ind. 260; O'Connell the use of the words "from the ev- v. St. Louis C. & W. R. Co. 106 idence in the case"). Mo. 482, 17 S. W. 494. 8 Galveston H. & S. A. R. Co. 6 P. v. Hitchcock, 104 Cal. 482, v. Dyer (Tex. Cv. App.), 38 S. W. 38 Pac. 198; S. v. Fetterer, 65 Conn. 218; Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. 287, 32 Atl. 394. But see P. v. Land- Harion (Tex. Cv. App.), 54 S. W. man, 103 Cal. 577, 37 Pac. 518; P. v. 629; Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. Hertz, 105 Cal. 660, 39 Pac. 32. v. Thompson (Tex. Cv. App.), 44 7 Sherman v. Dutch, 16 111. 282; S. W. 8; Scroggins v. S. 120 Ala. Wall v. Goodenough, 16 111. 415; 369, 25 So. 180. See Johnson v. Gowen v. Kehoe, 71 111. 66; Eames International & G. Co. 24 Tex. v. Blackhart, 12 111. 195; Cham- Cv. App. 148, 57 S. W. 869; Win- bers v. P. 105 111. 409; Bond v. ters v. Mowrer, 163 Pa. St. 239, P. 39 111. 26; Bartling v. Behr- 29 Atl. 916; Texas & P. R. Co. v. 'ends, 20 Neb. 211, 29 N. W. 472; Moore, 8 Tex. Cv. App. 289. 27 Wilson v. Williams, 52 Miss. 487; S. W. 962. Linville v. Welch, 29 Mo. 203; P. Winkler v. Winkler (Tex. Cv. v. Levison, 16 Cal. 98; Stillwell v. App.), 26 S. W. 893. Gray, 17 Ark. 473; Dodge v. Brown, * Hawk v. Brownell. 120 111. 161, 22 Mich. 446; Bartley v. Williams, 165, 11 N. E. 416. See Schmidt 66 Pa. St. 329; Hopkinson v. P. v. Pfau, 114 111. 494, 503, 2 N. E. 18 111. 264. See Belt v. P. 97 111. 522. 473 (an instruction stating a legal 155 COMPETENCY OF EVIDENCE INTIMATING OPINION. 174 the weight of the evidence. 11 Or to charge that "there is some evidence tending to show" a certain fact is not error as a comment on the weight of the evidence. 12 Nor is it improper to instruct the jury that a party claims that a certain fact is shown by the evidence. 13 The respective claims of the parties may be stated, when fairly done, for the purpose of making a proper application of the law to facts in evidence. 14 174. Competency of evidence Is there any evidence? But the court must determine whether there is any evidence for the consideration of the jury, tending to prove an issue or fact in- volved ; and, of course, if there is no evidence the court may, as a matter of law, instruct to that effect without invading the province of the jury. 15 And whether evidence is competent or not must be determined by the court. 16 "Where there is no evi- dence tending to prove a fact the court may instruct the jury to disregard such fact. 17 On the other hand, if there is any evidence tending to prove a material fact in issue an instruc- tion stating that there is no evidence of such fact is improper, as invading the province of the jury. 18 The court cannot, as a matter of law, instruct the jury what constitutes prima facie evidence of a fact unless the law so provides. 19 11 Lewis v. Norfolk & W. R. Co. S. Car. 546, 40 S. E. 948; Underwood 132 N. Car. 382, 43 S. E. 919; Gra- v. American Mortg. Co. 97 Ga. 238, ham v. Nowlin, 54 Ind. 389; S. v. 24 S. E. 847; P. v. Welch, 49 Cal. Watkins, 11 Nev. 30; P. v. Flan- 174; P. v. Sternberg, 111 Cal. 3, nelly, 128 Cal. 83, 60 Pac. 670. Oon- 48 Pac. 198 (accomplice); .Wells v. tra: S. v. Donovan, 61 Iowa, 369, Clements, 48 N. Car. 168; Willis 16 N. E. 206; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Branch, 94 N. Car. 142; S. v. v. Ohristman, 65 Tex. 369. Banks, 48 Ind. 197; Lange v. Wei- is. Michie v. Cochran, 93 Va. 614, gan, 125 Mich. 647, 85 N. W. 109. 25 So. 884; S. v. Brown, 28 Ore. i International Farmer's Live 147, 41 Pac. 1042. See S. v. Ed- Stock Ins. Co. v. Byrkett (Ind. wards, 126 N. Car. 1051, 35 S. E. App.), 36 N. E. 779. 540; P. v. Wong Ah Foo, 69 Cal. IT Lange v. Weigan, 125 Mich. 180, 10 Pac. 375. 647, 85 N. W. 109. is Hawley v. Chicago B. & Q. is Hunter v. Third Ave. R. Co. R. Co. 71 Iowa, 717, 29 N. W. 787. 45 N. Y. S. 1044, 20 Misc. 432; i* Minims v. S. 16 Ohio St. 234. Jones v. Cleveland, 6 Pa. Super. Ct. IB Com. v. Mulrey, 170 Mass. 103, 640; S. v. Horton L. & L. Co. 161 49 N. E. 91; Kent v. S. 64 Ark. Mo. 664; Cederson v. Oregon R. 247, 41 S. W. 849; King v. King, & N. Co. 38 Ore. 343, 62 Pac. 637, 63 155 Mo. 406, 56 S. W. 534; S. v. Pac. 763. Gibbons, 10 Iowa, 117; Pepperall 19 Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Byars, v. City P. Tr. Co. 15 Wash. 176, 58 Ark. 108, 23 S. W. 583. See 45 Pac. 743; Bryce v. Cayce, 62 Wheeler v. Schroeder, 4 R. I. 383. 175 JURY DETERMINES THE FACTS. 156 175. Intimating opinion is improper. The giving of instruc- tions which intimate what the judge of the court believes the evidence establishes as to any of the material facts in issue is improper, it being the province of the jury, and not the court, to determine the facts. 20 The expression of an opinion by the court as to what has been proved by the evidence is not only improper, but erroneous. 21 Especially is it improper for the court, by instructions, to express any opinion upon any com- bination of facts which does not embrace every contrary hy- pothesis which the evidence tends to establish. 22 And although the court's opinion on the weight of the evidence may be cor- rect as expressed, that will not cure the mischief. 23 176. Opinion not intimated Illustrations. An instruction that if the plaintiff by his negligence contributed to his injury, so that but for it he would not have been hurt, the jury should find for the defendant, is not objectionable as invading the pro- vince of the jury. 24 A charge that "if the agent of the de- fendant knew at the time of the delivery of the certificate or policy of insurance whether the party was sick or not, and knew he was sick and delivered the policy, then it would be a waiver; that a waiver implies the idea that one has a right, and, with knowledge of his rights and that which might defeat his rights, does an act by which he waives the right to stand upon his legal position or his legal right," is not a charge on the testi- mony. 25 A charge in substance stating that direct evidence is not es- sential to prove fraud, but that it may be inferred from all the 20 S. v. Allen, 45 W. Va. 65, 2A So. 188; Dorsey v. S. 110 Ga. 331, 30 S. E. 209; Coon v. P. 99 111. 35 S. E. 651; Searles v. S. 97 Ga. 368; Martin v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 692, 25 S. E. 388; Ezell v. S. 103 43 S. W. 91; Yundt v. Hartrunft, Ala. 8, 15 So. 818; Florida C. & 41 111. 14; Highway Comrs. v. P. R. Co. v. Lucas, 110 Ga. 121, Highway Comr. 60 111. 58; An- 35 S. E. 283. rlrews v. P. 60 111. 354, 357; Cut- 22 Weyrich v. P. 89 111. 99. ter v. Callison, 72 111. 113, 117; 23 Acme Brewing Co. v. Central Citizens' St. R. Co. v. Burke, 98 R. & B. Co. 115 Ga. 494, 42 S. E. Tenn. 650, 40 S. W. 1085; Williams 8; S. v. Hyde, 20 Wash. 234, 55 v. S. 46 Neb. 704, 65 N. W. 783; Pac. 49. Hine v. Commercial Bank, 119 24 Campbell v. McCoy, 3 Tex. Cv. Mich. 448, 78 N. W. 471; Thread- App. 298, 23 S. W. 34. gill v. Commissioners, 116 N. Car. 25 Rollings v. Banker's Union of 616, 21 S. E. 425; Davis v. Dregne, the World, 63 S. Car. 192, 41 S. E. (Wis.), 97 N. W. 512. 90. 21 S. v. Hopkins, 50 La. Ann. 1171, 157 COURT INTIMATING OPINION. 176 facts and circumstances of the case ; and that if the jury believe certain facts (enumerating them) they will find that there was a fraudulent conveyance, is not objectionable as telling the jury that fraud has been established. 26 A charge stating that "if the truth comes from the lips of a negro you are bound to be- lieve it just as much as if it comes from the lips of a white man" is not a charge on the evidence. 27 Telling the jury that they may ' ' consider what influence, if any, the passing of the engine would have upon the mind and conduct of a prudent person placed as the plaintiff was," was held not an improper comment on the evidence. 28 In determining whether the employes in charge of an engine at the time it was approaching a public crossing were exercising ordinary care, .or were guilty of negligence, an instruction stat- ing that the jury might consider the rate of speed of the engine, the signals, if any were given, the place of the accident, and all the facts and circumstances as to the movement and manage- ment of the train, is not erroneous, but rather a proper guide to aid the jury in determining what would, under the circum- stances, constitute negligence. 29 In an action for assault and battery, for the court to instruct that the plaintiff's injuries are either very severe and serious, or very slight and that the plaintiff is shamming, has been held not to be error where the evidence showed that the plaintiff had either become a men- tal wreck frem the alleged assault, or that he was in fact sham- ming and practicing a fraud. 30 The court by instructing the jury that the case is "one mostly of positive testimony" does not by such statement express an opinion on the weight of the evidence, where, in fact, the evidence is mostly positive. 31 A remark by the court that "I will allow any testimony that will tend to elucidate the facts in this case," cannot be held objectionable as intimating an opinion of the court on the weight or value of the testimony. 32 26 Alberger v. White, 117 Mo. so Spear v. Sweeney, 88 Wis. 545, 347, 23 S. W. 92. 60 N. W. 1060. 27 McDaniels v. Monroe, 63 S. ai S. v. Burns, 19 Wash. 52, 52 Car. 307, 41 S. B. 456. Pac. 316. 28 Baker v. Kansas City, &c. R. 32 Hoxie v. S. 114 Ga. 19, 39 Co. 147 Mo. 140, 48 S. W. 838. S. E. 944. 29 Lloyd v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. 128 Mo. 595, 31 S. W. 110. 177 JURY DETERMINE THE FACTS. 158 177. Opinion intimated Illustrations. For the court to charge the jury that the contract in question is conceded, when in fact it was denied, is error, although the jury may have been recalled by the court and informed that the court was in error, that counsel says that the court instructed wrong. 33 An in- struction charging the jury to give more weight to one kind of evidence than to another kind is improper, especially where the evidence is conflicting. 34 A charge that if the jury believe the evidence for the defendant they must find for the defendant is erroneous when there is other testimony in the case. 35 It is an improper comment on the evidence for the court to charge that "fraud will never be presumed from mere obscurity, or ap- parent error or incorrectness of the plaintiff's valuation of his property" in a suit to recover on an insurance policy for loss by fire. 36 Also, in an action against a railroad company for the destruction of grass by fire, charging the jury that they may consider the fact of burning by other fires and the volume and quantity of sparks emitted from the engine, is improper as in- vading the province of the jury in weighing the evidence. 37 For the court to charge the jury that if the defendants were insolvent and unable to pay for goods at the time they pur- chased them an intent not to pay for them should be presumed is improper as charging on the weight of the evidence. 38 A charge that "if the bridge was defective and unsafe on account of decay of the timbers, and considering the length- of time the bridge has been built, this condition ought to have been an- ticipated and known by the officers of the town, using ordinary care and precaution^' is an invasion of the duty of the jury. 3 * Also a charge stating that "there is evidence showing plain- tiff did not stop the cattle before going upon the crossing" is. 33 Hawley v. Corey, 9 Utah, 175, 37 Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. 33 Pac. 695. v. Knippa (Tex. Cv. App.), 27 S. 34 Williams v. La Penatiere, 32 W. 730; Blashfield Instructions, Fla. 491, 14 So. 157; Wheeler v. 47, p. 111. Baars, 3'3 Fla. 696, 15 So. 584; Bowie 38 Barton v. Strond-Gibson Gro- v. Maddox, 29 Ga. 286. eery Co. (Tex. Cv. App.), 40 S. W. 35 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Rice, 1050. 101 Ala. 676, 14 So. 639. 39 Bredlau v. Town of York, 115 36 F. Dohmen Co. v. Niagara Wis. 554, 92 N. W. 261. Fire Ins. Co. 96 Wis. 38, 71 N. W. 69. 159 COURT INTIMATING OPINION CRIMINAL CASES. 178 erroneous, as it is the exclusive province of the jury to find what is shown by the evidence. 40 178. Opinion not intimated Criminal cases. The expres- sion of an opinion by the court that there is no evidence tending to reduce the charge of murder to manslaughter affords no ground for complaint where the jury are further instructed that the facts were to be determined by them from the evi- dence, and not by the court. 41 A charge that if the jury be- lieve from the evidence that the defendant wilfully struck another with a pistol which was a deadly weapon, or calculated to produce death, when used in the way and manner the same was used, is not improper as taking from the jury the duty of determining whether the pistol was a deadly weapon, consider- ing the manner in which it was used by the defendant. 42 An instruction stating in substance that if the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant took hold of the prosecutrix and tore open her coat, and seized her arm with intent to have carnal knowledge of her against her will and with the intent to accomplish his object at all events, without regard to any resistance she might make, he is guilty of assault with intent to commit rape, is not an invasion of the province of the jury. 4a A charge that "innocent men, men conscious of innocency, do not have much occasion to fear a grand jury, and it is rather unusual, I think you will say in your own experience, that men who are conscious of having committed no offense either to fear an indictment or to undertake to get out of the juris- diction when a grand jury is sitting," was held not to be the expression of an opinion by the court in violation of a statute prohibiting the court from expressing an opinion during the trial. 44 An instruction charging that the jury may disregard any testimony which they believe from the evidence to be false, is proper where the evidence is conflicting. 45 And where the testimony of the witnesses for the defense is controverted by 40 Kinyon v. Chicago & N. W. 43 s. v. Urie, 101 Iowa, 411, 70 R. Co. 118 Iowa, 349, 92 N. W. N. W. 603. 40. 44 S. v. Means, 95 Me. 364, 50 ti Com. v. McGowan, 189 Pa. St. Atl. 30. See Adams v. S. 133 Ala. 641, 42 Atl. 365. 166, 31 So. 851. 42 Smallwood v. Com. 19 Ky. L. R. 45 3. v. Goforth, 136 Mo. Ill, 37 344, 40 S. W. 248. S. W. 801; Allen v. U. S. 164 U. S. 492, 17 Sup. Ct. 154. 179 JURY DETERMINE THE FACTS. 160 the prosecution it is not improper to instruct that if the jury believe the defendant has knowingly introduced false testimony this fact may be considered as tending to show his guilt. 46 Charging the jury that if they believe the evidence intro- duced by the state to be true it is their duty to convict the defendant, if such evidence establishes his guilt beyond a rea- sonable doubt, is not improper where the jury are also instructed as to what is meant by a reasonable doubt. 47 Or that if the jury believe the testimony of the defendant as given by him in his own behalf they may convict him where the evidence otherwise justifies the giving of such an instruction. 48 179. Opinion intimated Criminal cases. A charge that "the flight of a person suspected of a crime is a circumstance to be weighed by the jury as tending in some degree to prove a consciousness of guilt, and is entitled to more or less weight, according to the circumstances of the particular case in which such evidence is received, not as a part of the doing of the criminal act itself, but as indicative of a guilty mind; that at most it is but a circumstance tending to establish a conscious- ness of guilt in the person fleeing," is erroneous as on the weight of the evidence. 49 So to instruct that if the testimony of a witness is true then the defendant is guilty, is improper as being an invasion of the province of the jury where it appears from the evidence that such witness did not see the crime com- mitted by the defendant. 50 Charging the jury that "the evidence as to stolen property as to recovering possession of any property was introduced by the tate to show that the defendant had possession of stolen property, and is only for the purpose of fixing the crime on him," is improper as intimating an opinion of the court. 51 In a homicide case an instruction which states that if the defendant inflicted the blow designedly he will be presumed to " Allen v. U. S. 164 U. S. 492, S. v. Woolard, 119 N. Car. 17 Sup. Ct. 154; S. v. Magoon, 68 779, 25 S. E. 719. Vt. 289, 35 All. 310. Contra: Ter. Cleavenger v. S. 43 Tex. Cr. v. Lucero (N. Mex.), 46 Pac. 18. App. 273, 65 S. W. 89. 47 Derby v. S. 60 N. J. L. 258, 37 so s. v. Green, 48 S. Car. 136, 26 Atl. 614. See S. v. Green, 48 S. S. E. 234. Car. 136, 26 S. E. 234. si Seals v. S. 97 Ga. 692, 25 S. E. 388. 161 RELATING TO DYING DECLARATIONS. 181 have intended the probable consequences of his act is erroneous in that it invades the province of the jury. 52 Also, telling the jury that certain facts (enumerating them) or circumstances do not prove the guilt of the defendant is improper as an invasion of the province of the jury when such facts and cir- cumstances, together with other evidence, tend to prove the defendant's guilt. 53 180. Instructions as to dying declarations. The admissi- bility of a dying declaration is a question exclusively for the court to determine, but its credibility is for the jury, and the court should so instruct the jury; 54 hence the court cannot instruct as to the weight of such statements. 55 Dying declara- tions should be weighed by the ordinary rules governing the admission of other evidence; hence an instruction that "this kind of evidence is not so satisfactory as the evidence of the wit- nesses upon the witness-stand, and should, therefore, be care- fully scrutinized" is improper as discrediting and casting sus- picion upon such evidence. 08 An instruction that dying declarations are not entitled to the same weight as would be the testimony of the deceased were he present in court and testifying as a witness is properly re- fused as being an improper comment upon the weight of the evidence. 57 Also, a charge that dying declarations should be received with great caution is likewise improper. 58 Where the deceased, in his dying statement, positively declared that the defendant shot him; that he knew it, because he was very near to him at the time, an instruction submitting to the jury whether such statement was merely an opinion, and if so, it should not be. considered as evidence, is erroneous. 59 181. Inferences and conclusions are for the jury. It is not within the province of the court by instruction to tell the jury 52 p t . v . Martin, 53 N. Y. S. 745, ne Shenkenberger v. S. 154 Ind. 33 App. Div. 282. 630, 639, 57 N. E. 519. 53 Wilson v. S. 71 Mies. 880, 16 57 s. v. Reed, 137 Mo. 125, 38 S. So. 304. W. 574. 5* S. v. Phillips, 118 Iowa, 660, ss s. v. Gay, 18 Mont. 51, 44 Pac. 92 N. W. 876. 411. " p. v. Amaya, 134 Cal. 531, 66 Allen v. S. 70 Ark. 22, 68 S. Pac. 794. W. 28. 182 JURY DETERMINE THE FACTS. 162 that an ultimate fact is established from the proof of certain evidentiary facts; that is, that if certain facts (enumerating them) are established then the ultimate fact is proved. To so instruct would be invading the province of the jury. 60 What inferences may be drawn from the evidence should be left en- tirely to the jury without any intimation by the court in that respect. 01 In Massachusetts it has been held not to be error for the court, in commenting on the evidence, to state that it has a tendency to prove or is prima facie proof of a fact; that such charge is not a direction to the jury to find such fact, but merely that an inference of such fact would be supported by the evidence. 62 But where a presumption of law arises from the existence of certain facts then the court is authorized to instruct the jury as to the inference to be drawn in the event the evidence establishes the necessary facts to constitute the basis of such presumption. 63 But it is not proper for the court by instruction to say that the evidence admits of only one par- ticular construction. It is for the jury to draw their own con- clusions from the evidence what it proves or does not prove. 6 * 182. Weight of evidence is for the jury to determine. The weight of the evidence must be determined by the jury ; hence it is improper for the court to instruct that certain facts are en- titled to little weight. 05 "Whether circumstances shown in evi- dence are entitled to any weight or not is purely a matter for eo Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. 62 Cormody v. Boston Gaslight Warner, 123 111. 49, 14 N. E. 206; Co. 162 Mass. 539, 39 N. E. 184. Mayer v. Wilkins, 37 Fla. 244, 19 ss Wheeler v. Schroeder, 4 R. I. So. 639 (fraud). 383. ei Omaha Fair & E. Asso. v. Mis- e-* Langdon v. P. 133 111. 408, 24 souri Pac. R. Co. 42 Neb. 105, 60 N. E. 874; Chicago & E. I. R. Co. N. W. 330; City of Columbus v. v. O'Conner, 119 111. 598, 9 N. E. Strassner, 138 Ind. 301, 37 N. E. 263; McQuay v. Richmond & D. 719; Howard v. Carpenter, 22 Md. R. Co. 109 N. Car. 585, 13 S. E. 10; Bluedorn v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. 944; Burkham v. Mastin, 54 Ala. (Mo.), 24 S. W. 57; Clifford v. Lee 122. (Tex. Cv. App.), 23 S. W. 843; 65 Smith v. Meyers, 52 Neb. 70, Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. v 71 N. W. 1006; Bonner v. S. 107 Falvey, 104 Ind. 409; Brownell v. Ala. 97, 18 So. 226; Granby M. & Fuller, 60 Neb. 558, 83 N. W. 669; S. Co. v. Davis, 156 Mo. 422, 57 S. Cain v. Hunt, 41 Ind. 466; Union W. 126; Knowles v. Nixon, 17 M. L. Ins. Co. v. Buchanan, 100 Mont. 473, 43 Pac. 628; Davis v. Ind. 81; Shultz v. Shultz, 113 Mich. Hays, 89 Ala. 563, 8 So. 131 (full 502, 71 N. W. 854; S. v. Mahoney, weight). 24 Mont. 281, 61 Pac. 647. 163 WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE NEGLIGENCE A FACT. 183 the jury to determine; hence it is improper for the court to say that the jury must give weight to certain circumstances." The weight of the evidence is a matter exclusively for the jury, and it is not within the province of the court by instructions to in- timate anything on the subject. 67 In testing the truth and weight of evidence, and what it proves, the jury must do so by their knowledge and judgment derived from experience, observation and reflection. They are not bound to regard evi- dence precisely as given, but must consider its truth and weight by their knowledge of men and the business affairs of life, to- gether with the motives which influence men. 68 183. Negligence When a question of fact, when of law. Where the question of negligence is an element of the case it is for the jury to determine from all the evidence whether the party charged with negligence is guilty or not. The court cannot say by instructions that a certain fact or state of facts, constitute negligence. 69 For to say to the jury as a matter of law that certain facts per se constitute negligence is improper. ee Moody v. S. 114 Ga. 449, 40 S. E. 242. See Dickenson v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 63 S. W. 328; Phillips v. Williams, 39 Ga. 602; Marr v. Marr, 5 Sneed (Term.), 385. 67 Richmond v. Roberts, 98 111. 472, 479; Village of Fairbury v. Rogers, 98 111. 554; Johnson v. S. (Miss.), 27 So. 880; Stobie v. Dills, 62 111. 432, 438; Rice & Bullen Mat- ting Co. v. International Bank, 185 111. 422, 56 N. E. 1062; City of Dal- las v. Breeman, 23 Tex. Cv. App. 315, 55 S. W. 762; Granby Min- ing & Smelting Co. v. Davis, 156 Mo. 422, 57 S. W. 126; Hull v. City of St. Louis, 138 Mo. 618, 39 S. W. 446; Citizens' St. R. Co. v. Burke, 98 Tenn. 650; Bunting v. Saltz, 84 Cal. 168, 24 Pac. 167; S. v. Wyse, 32 S. Car 45, 40 S. W. 1085; Harts- horn v. Byrne, 147 111. 418, 35 N. E. 622; Kinney v. North Carolina R. Co. 122 N. Car. 961, 30 S. E. 318; Short v. Kelly (Tex. Civ. App.), 62 S. W. 944; Canado v. Curry, 73 Ind. 246 (stating that testimony is even- ly balanced); S. v. Swayne, 30 La. Ann. 1323; Bardwell v. Ziegler, 3 Wash. 34, 28 Pac. 360; McVeigh v. S. 43 Tex. Cv. App. 17, 62 S. W. 757; Leonard v. Ter. 2 Wash. Ter. 381 (disproving circumstances), 7 Pac. 872; Burkham v. Martin, 54 Ala. 122 (stating that the evidence is conclusive) ; Jenkins v. Tobin, 31 Ark. 307; Wolcott v. Heath, 78 111. 433. es Ottawa Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Graham, 28 111. 73, 78; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Krayenbuhl (Neb.), 91 N. W. 880. See Sanford v. Gates, 38 Kas. 405, 16 Pao. 807. 69 Pennsylvania Co. v. McCaffrey. 173 111. 175, 50 N. E. 713; Chicago & Alton R. Co. v. Maroney, 170 111. 526, 48 N. E. 953; City of Peoria v. Gerber, 168 111. 323, 48 N. E. 152; North Chicago St. R. Co. v. Williams, 140 111. 281, 29 N. E. 672; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Slater, 139 111. 199, 28 N. E. 830; Lake S. & M. S. R. Co. v. O'Conner, 115 111. 254, 262, 3 N. E. 501; Taylor v. Felsing, 164 III. 331, 338, 45 N. E. 161; New York C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Blumenthal, 160 111. 40, 49, 43 N. E. 809; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. O'Keefe, 154 ill. 508, 514, 39 N. E. 183 JURY DETERMINE THE FACTS. 164 Negligence is a question of fact to be proved like any other fact in issue. But, of course, this does not mean that the definition of negligence is a question of fact. 70 Courts are not at liberty to say, as a matter of law, by in- structions that a person must conduct himself in a particular manner and observe a certain line of conduct under all circum- stances. Negligence does not become a question of law alone, unless the acts constituting it are of such a character that all reasonable men would concur in pronouncing it so. 71 Nor can the court tell the jury what does not constitute negligence, as by instructing "that the mere fact that a drawbar of a car should break when struck by another car in motion is not suf- ficent to establish negligence." It is for the jury to determine whether the facts proved do or do not constitute negligence. 72 Nor has the court the right to charge, where negligence is an element, that if all the evidence be believed the plaintiff cannot recover, where the evidence shows that the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case. The weight of the evidence is for the jury to determine. 73 On the same principle it is improper for the court to state to the jury that if a person gets upon a street car drawn by horses, while it is in motion, his act is such conclusive proof of contributory negligence that he cannot recover for an injury 606; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Byrum, W. 25. The court cannot say by 153 111. 131, 135, 38 N. E. 578; East instruction what facts do or do not St. L. C. R. Co. v. O'Harra, 150 111. constitute fraud, Leasure v. Col- 580, 586, 37 N. E. 917; Chicago & A. burn, 57 Ind. 274. See Higgin- R. Co. v. Kelly, 182 111. 167, 173, 54 botham v. Campbell, 85 Ga. 638, N. E. 979; Consolidated Coal Co. 11 S. E. 1027; Shealy v. Edwards, v. B6kamp, 181 111. 9, 18, 54 N. E. 75 Ala. 411; nor what facts con- 567; Gohn v. Doerle, 85 111. 514; stitute undue influence in a will Texas, &c. R. Co. v. Nelson. 9 Tex. contest, Higginbotham v. Higgin- Cv. App. 156, 29 S. W. 78; Chicago botham, 106 Ala. 314, 17 So. 516; & A. R. Co. v. Anderson, 162 111. In re Townsend's Estate (Iowa), 572, 46 N. E. 1125; San Antonio 97 N. W. 1111. & A. P. R. Co. v. Long, 4 Tex. Cv. ?i Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. v. Pol- App. 497, 23 S. W. 499; Chesapeake lock, 195 111. 162, 62 N. E. 831. & O. R. Co. v. Gunter, 108 Ky. 365, 72 Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Wangslin, 56 S. W. 527; Texas C. R. Co. v. 152 111. 141, 38 N. E. 760; North Burnett, 80 Tex. 536, 16 S. W. 320. C. St. R. Co. v. Eldridge, 151 111. TO Pennsylvania Co. v. Conlan, 101 550, 38 N. E. 246; Galveston, H. & 111. 106; North C. St. R. Co. v. S. A. R. Co. v. Michalke, 14 Tex. Cv. Williams, 140 111. 281. 29 N. E. App. 495, 37 3. W. 480. 672; Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Sherrill v. Western N. T. Co. Hubbard (Tex. Cv. App.), 37 S. 116 N. Car. 655, 21 S. E. 429. 165 NEGLIGENCE A FACT ILLUSTRATIONS. 184 sustained while thus getting on the car. It is not negligence per se for a person to get on or off a street car under the circum- stance stated. 74 Nor can the court instruct that the omission or commission of a certain act would be a want of care or due caution. 75 But where negligence is made an issue, if the act or conduct of the party charged with negligence, or whose duty it is to use due and ordinary care, is so clearly and palpably negligent that all reasonable minds would pronounce it so with- out hesitation or dissent, then the court may state to the jury by instruction that such act constitutes negligence. 76 Also, where the admitted facts are such that no other conclusion could be reached than that of negligence it then becomes a question of law. 77 184. Instructions improper Illustrations. Charging the jury that if the defendant's employes negligently backed a freight train against the plaintiff while he was waiting to board a passenger train, and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the accident, or if such employes negligently failed to ring a bell or blow a whistle, and such negligence was the proximate cause of the injury, or if such employes negligently backed said train towards a crowd of people, one of whom was the plaintiff, without a lookout on it to give notice of its ap- proach, and such negligence was the proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff, they should find for the plaintiff, unless he was guilty of contributory negligence, is improper, in that it invades the province of the jury on the weight of the evidence. 78 An instruction stating that it is the duty of a person approach- ing a railroad crossing to exercise ordinary care, and if, in the exercise of such care, it was the plaintiff's duty to stop before 74 North C. St. R. Co. v. Will- Hoehn v. Chicago St. L. R. Co. iams, 140 111. 281, 29 N. B. 672; 152 111. 229, 38 N. E. 549; Lake S. McDonough v. Metropolitan R. Co. & M. S. R. Co. v. Johnson, 135 111. 137 Mass. 210; Eppendorff v. Brook- 647, 26 N. E. 510; Chicago, B. & lyn City & N. R. Co. 69 N. Y. S. Q. R. Co. v. Pollock, 195 111. 162, 62 195; Briggs v. Union' St. R. Co. N. E. 831; Cleveland, C. & C. R. 148 Mass. 72, 19 N. E. 19; German- Co. v. Crawford, 24 Ohio St. 636. town Pass. R. Co. v. Walling, 97 77 Exchange Bank v. Trumble, Pa. St. 55; Lubsenz v. Metropolitan 108 Ky. 234, 56 S. W. 156. St. R. Co. 76 N. Y. S. 411, 72 App. 78 St. Louis S. W. R. Co. v. Cas- Div. 181. edy (Tex. Cv. App.), 40 S. W. 198. 75 Kirby v. Southern R. Co. 63 See Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Jones, S. Car. 494, 41 S. E. 765. 16 Tex. Cv. App. 179, 40 S. W. 745. 185 JURY DETERMINE THE FACTS. 166 t driving up on the railway and he failed to do so, the jury should find for the defendant; and so, if in the exercise of such care, it was his duty to look and listen for a train and he failed to do so, they should find for the defendant, is improper; it invades the province of the jury in determining the facts and the weight of the evidence. 79 An instruction in a suit for personal injury which charges the jury that it became the duty of the plaintiff when going upon the defendant's cars to exercise due care and caution, use her eyes, and act with reasonable care and judgment for her own safety, more especially if she found the car unusually overcrowded with passengers, is erroneous ; and in 'lieu of it the court should have told the jury that it was incumbent on the plaintiff while on the car to exercise such care and cau- tion as might be reasonably expected of a person of ordinary prudence situated as she was. 80 185. Remarks and conduct of court influencing- jury.. ' ' The influence of the trial judge upon the jury is necessarily great because of his authoritative position, and by words or actions he may materially prejudice the rights of a party. By word or conduct he may, on the one hand, support the character or testimony of a witness, or, on the other, may destroy the same, in the estimation of the jury, and thus his personal in- fluence is exerted to the unfair advantage of one of the parties, with a corresponding detriment to the cause of the others." 81 Where the court in charging the jury says: "When you want to give somebody something as a gift you take it out of your own pocket, and not out of the pocket of some one else; in other words, let us have fair play," it invades the province of the jury. Such remark amounts to telling the jury that a verdict for the plaintiff would be a gift from the defendant to the plaintiff. 82 For the judge to state to the jury that "it seems to me that the plaintiff has made out the better case" 79 Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. en, 27 Cal. 320; S. v. Harkin, 7 Nev. Rogers (Tex. Cv. App.), 40 S. W. 377; Farhman v. City of Hunts- 849. ville, 54 Ala. 263; Andreas v. so Davis v. Paducah R. & L. Co. Ketcham, 77 111. 377. 24 Ky. 135, 68 S. W. 140. 82 Varner v. Western & A. R. si Blashfield Instructions, &c. Co. 108 Ga. 813, 34 S. E. 166. 50, p. 125. Citing McMinn v. Whal- 1G7 COURT URGING JURY TO AGREE. 187 is error where the evidence is such as would warrant a verdict for either party. 83 A remark by the court that ''it is some times said that parties cannot conscientiously agree to a verdict, there is no conscience in the case, it is simply a question of judgment," was held erroneous as directing the jury to eliminate conscience. 84 The court not being satisfied with the amount of damages arrived at by the jury for the plaintiff on a charge of fraud asked them to further consider the question ; and shortly afterwards they returned another verdict with more than double the amount of the former verdict. This was held error, in view of the fact of there being material evidence tending to reduce the amount of damages claimed. 85 186. Instructions urging jury to agree. It is not error for the court in charging the jury to instruct them that it is their duty to try to come to an agreement as to their verdict. 86 And so the court may properly instruct the jury to revolve the subject matter of the suit in their minds, and discuss it among themselves in the jury room. 87 But it is improper for the court to state to the jury, where they have failed to agree, that if there is a large majority of the jury on one side, perhaps the minority would yield to the majority by further considering the case. 88 Any statement by the court in charging the jury, suggesting that they are authorized to reach a verdict by com- promising their differences, is highly improper. Thus, for in- stance, for the court to say that "the law, which requires una- nimity on the part of the jury to render a verdict, expects and will tolerate reasonable compromise and fair concessions", is erroneous. 89 187. Instructions attempting to coerce jury. The court in ss Samuel v. Knight, 9 Pa. Super. ST Hand v. Agen, 96 Wis. 493, 71 Ct. 352. N. W. 899. s* Miller v. Miller, 187 Pa. St. ss Sargent v. Lawrence (Tex. Cr. 572, 41 Atl. 277. App.), 40 S. W. 1075. ss Schoefield v. Gear Pulley Co. SQ Richardson v. Coleman, 131 71 Conn. 1, 40 Atl. 1064. Ind. 210, 29 N. E. 909; Clem v. S. se Wheeler v. Thomas, 69 Conn. 42 Ind. 420; Southern Ins. Co. v. 577, 35 Atl. 499, 39 L. R. A. 794, White, 58 Ark. 277, 24 S. W. 425. Instructions tending to encourage See, also, Goodsell v. Seeley, 46 a disagreement are improper, Chi- Mich. 623, 10 N. W. 44; Cranston v. cago & E. I. R. Co. v. Rains, 203 New York C. & H. R. Co. 103 N. 111. 423, 67 N. E. 840. Y. 614, 9 N. E. 500; Edens v. Han- nibal & St. J. R. Co. 72 Mo. 212. 188 JURY DETERMINE THE FACTS. 168 charging the jury should guard against making any statement having a tendency to coerce them int-j reaching a verdict. 90 For the court to impress upon the jury the importance of the case and urge them to come to an agreement, and for that purpose to direct them to retire again for fur- ther deliberation, is error. 91 Any statement by the court having a tendency to impress the jury with the idea that the court will be obliged to keep them together until they reach a verdict is improper as tending to coerce the jury to come to an agreement. Thus, for instance, it is error for the court to call the attention of the jury to the costs to the county for each day the court remains in session, and urge them to struggle together until they reach a verdict. 92 So, after the jury have spent several hours in their efforts to reach a verdict, and report their failure to agree because of one of the jurors holding out against all the others, it is error for the court to speak to them concerning the expense incurred in trying the case; that the court trusts that every juror is acting rationally in the matter, and that nobody is acting from a dogmatic spirit merely for the purpose of assert- ing his opinion. 93 It is also error for the court to say that it is no credit to a man merely because he has an opinion to stubbornly stick to it. 94 188. Instructions not attempting to coerce jury. But there are cases holding that a court by instructions may insist on an agreement, and may otherwise, to a certain extent, attempt to coerce the jury into an agreement. Thus it has been held not to be error for the court to say to the jury on their announc- 90 Hodges v. O'Brien, 113 Wis. Sigsbee v. S. 43 Fla. 524, 30 So. 97, 88 N. W. 97. 816; Niles v. Sprague, 13 Iowa, 198. 91 S. v. DudO'US&at, 47 La. Ann. 93 McPeak v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. 977, 17 So. 685. See Cox v. Peltier, 128 Mo. 617, 30 S. W. 170; Stondt 159 Ind 355, 65 N. B. 6. v. Shepherd, 73 Mich. 58; Odette 92 Hodges v. O'Brien, 113 Wis. v. S. 90 Wis. 258, 62 N. W. 1054. 97, 88 N. W. 97; Chesapeake, O. & See, also, Mahoney v. San Fran- S. W. R. Co. v. Barlow, 86 Tenn. cisco & S. M. R. Co. 110 Cal. 471, 537, 8 S. W. 147; Terre Haute & 42 Pac. 968. Contra. S. v. Gorham, I. R. Co. v. Jackson, 81 Ind. 19; 67 Vt. 365, 31 Atl. 845; Jordan v. Richardson v. Coleman, 131 Ind. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 30 S. W. 445; 210, 29 N. E. 909; S. v. Hill, 91 Mo. Johnson v. S. 60 Ark. 45, 24 S. W. 423, 4 S. W. 121. See, also, Per- 792. kins v. S. 50 Ala. 154. Contra: 94 Randalp v. Lampkin, 90 Ky. 551, 14 S. W. 538, 10 L. R. A. '87. 169 COURT COERCING JURY COMMENTS ON EVIDENCE. 188 ing that they could not agree, that "this case is submitted to you for decision, and not for disagreement. I think I will let you give it a further trial." 95 Nor is it error for the court to direct the jury that if they should not agree within a certain time they should, on reaching a verdict, seal it and then sepa- rate, and return to court on a day named, to which the court would stand adjourned. 96 Or where the jury have been con- sidering a case two or three days it is not improper for the court to express to them its regrets that they have not reached an agreement; that the case must eventually be determined by a jury ; that if they do not agree the jury system that far is a failure. The court therefore directs the jury to return to their room and make another effort to come to an agreement. 97 The court, in the exercise of a proper discretion, may direct the jury to retire for further deliberation, even after a second announcement that they could not agree. 98 It is not improper for the court to state to the jury that they should reason to- gether and arrive at some kind of a verdict, and to continue their deliberations until they reach an agreement. Such a charge is not a threat to keep the jury out until they agree. 99 It has also been held not to be error for the court to say to the jury on their return into court for additional instructions, that it is your duty to decide the case if you can conscientiously do so; that you should listen to the arguments of each other with a disposition to be convinced ; that if much the larger number favor a conviction, a dissenting juror should consider whether his doubt is a reasonable one, and that if a majority favor an acquittal the minority should consider whether they may not reasonably be mistaken in their judgment. 100 95 German Sav. Bank v. Citizens' N. W. 1054; Jackson v. S. 91 Wis. Nat. Bank, 101 Iowa, 530, 70 N. 267, 64 N. W. 838; Warlick v. W. 769. Plonk, 103 N. Car. 81, 9 S. E. 190; se Darlington v. City of Alle- S. v. Gorham, 67 Vt. 371, 31 Atl 845; gheny, 189 Pa. St. 202, 42 Atl. 112. Wheeler v. Thomas, 67 Conn. 577, See Burgess v. Singer Mfg. Co. 35 Atl. 499; S. v. Hawkins, 18 Ore. (Tex. Cv. App.), 30 S. W. 1110. 476, 23 Pac. 475; Cowan v. Umba- 97 S. v. Pierce, 136 Mo. 34, 37 S. gog Pulp Co. 91 Me. 26, 39 Atl. 340; W. 815; "Com. v. Kelly, 165 Mass. Krack v. Wolf, 39 Ind. 88. .175, 42 N. B. 573. See Ter. v. 100 Allen v. U. S. 164 U. S. 492, Griego, 8 N. Mex. 133, 42 Pac. 81. 17 Sup. Ct. 154. See Ter. v. Griego, Lambright v. S. 34 Fla. 564, 8 N. Mex. 133, 42 Pac. 81; Odette 16 So. 582. v. S. 90 Wis. 258, 62 N. W. 1054. 9 Odette v. S. 90 Wis. 258, 62 189 JURY DETERMINE THE FACTS. 170 189. When court may comment on evidence and express opinion. But in the federal courts the rule is well settled that the court in charging the jury may comment upon the evidence and express an opinion as to its weight, what it proves or tends to prove or does not prove, provided the jury are ultimately left at liberty to determine the facts in issue. 101 And the same rule prevails in some of the state courts. 102 The constitutional and statutory provisions of the states which prohibit the courts from commenting on or expressing an opinion as to the weight of the evidence have no application to the practice in the federal courts and some of the state courts. 103 "That the judge may properly state to the jury his opinion as to what facts are proved or not proved by the evidence ... if he also instructs them that they are not bound by his opinions on such matters, but that it is their duty as jurors to consider the evidence, and find the facts therefrom, has been the uniform holding of the federal courts." 104 The instructions shall control as to the law of the case, and while the court may express an opinion on the weight of the evidence, as well as the credibility of the witnesses, yet the jury should be left free to exercise an independent .judg- ment in determining the facts. 105 It is proper for the court to comment fairly and impartially on the testimony for the pur- 101 Aerheart v. St. Louis & S. 102 Foley v. Longhran, 60 N. J. R. Co. 90 Fed. 907; Hart v. U. S. L. 468, 39 Atl. 358, 38 Atl. 960; Mc- 84 Fed. 799, 28 C. C. A. 612. See Cormick v. McCormick, 194 Pa. St. Herrick v. Quigley, 101 Fed. 187, 107, 45 Atl. 88; Cook v. Steinert 41 C. C. A. 294; Martin v. Hughes, & Sons Co. 69 Conn. 91, 36 Atl. 98 Fed. 556; Allis v. U. S. 155 U. S. 1008; First Nat. Bank v. Holan, 63 117, 15 Sup. Ct. 36; U. S. v. Schnei- Minn. 525, 65 N. W. 952; Pool v. der, 21 D. C. 381; U. S. v. Connelly, White, 175 Pa. St. 459, 34 Atl. 801, 1 Fed. 779 9 Biss. 338; Com. v. Ber- (transaction complicated) ; Rose- chine, 168' Pa. St. 603, 32 Atl. 109; var v. Borough, etc. Ib9 Pa. St. 565, Walls v. Southern B. T. T. Co. 66 32 Atl. 548; Price v. Hamsoher, 174 Fed. 453; Lesser Cotton Co. v. St. Pa. St. 73, 34 Atl. 546. L. I. M. & S. R. Co. 114 Fed. 133; 103 Nudd v. Burrows, 91 U. S. Freese v. Kemplay, 118 Fed. 428; 441; St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. Chimg v. U. S. 118 Fed. 538; First v. Vickers, 122 U. S. 360, 7 Sup. Ct. Nat. Bank v. Holan, 63 Minn. 525, 1216. 65 N. W. 952; Wiborg v. U. S. 163 U. 104 Kerr v. Modern Woodman, S. 632, 16 Sup. Ct. 1127; Treece v. 117 Fed. 593. American Asso. (C. C. A.), 122 Fed. 105 Mobile & O. R. Co. .v. Wilson, 598; Nome Beach L. & T. Co. v. 76 Fed. 122, 34 L. R. A. 477. Munich Assur. Co. 123 Fed. 820. 171 COURT REVIEWING EVIDENCE. 191 pose of more clearly defining the issues and to assist the jury in reaching a just conclusion. 100 190. Illustrations of the rule. Thus, in the federal courts, for the court, in charging the jury, to state that, under the circumstances, a certain act amounts to negligence, is not error where the charge left it to the jury to determine the question of negligence. 107 A charge that "it cannot be doubted under the evidence that the place where the plaintiff received his injury was a most dangerous one," is not error, if the jury are also instructed that they are the exclusive judges of the weight of the evidence. 108 Under this rule it has been held that a federal judge, in commenting upon the evidence, by saying that he could not see "how the defendant can be acquitted," is not cause for reversal where it appears that the court correctly stated the law and expressly left the jury free to determine the facts. 109 191. Instructions reviewing the evidence. Under the above rule the judge of the court should, in charging the jury, call their attention to the important matters of evidence bearing on the issues, and may express an opinion as to its weight and relevancy. 110 But instructions designed to review the evidence are not required to refer to every item in detail; it is sufficient to give a general review of the evidence, fairly showing the contentions of the parties. 111 It is not necessary to state the testimony of each witness separately in reviewing the evidence. The witnesses may be loe Sommers v. Carbon Hill Coal N. E. 436; Fineburg v. Second & Co. 91 Fed. 337; S. v. Means, 95 Third St. P. R. Co. 182 Pa. St. Me. 364, 50 Atl. 30. 97, 37 Atl. 925. 107 Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. in Taylor v. Burrell, 7 Pa. Super, v. Stahley, 62 Fed. 363. Ct. 461; Bank of Asheville v. Sum- 108 Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. David- mer, 119 N. Car. 591, 26 S. E. 129; son, 76 Fed. 517. Allis v. U. S. 155 U. S. 117, 15 Sup. 109 Endleraan v. U. S. 86 Fed. Ct. 36; Borham v. Davis, 146 Pa. 456. See Bank of Commerce v. St. 72, 23 Atl. 160. See Halfman Bright, 77 Fed. 946. v. Pennsylvania Boiler Ins. Co. 160 no Appeal of Sturdevant, 71 Pa. St. 202, 28 Atl. 837; S. v. Us- Conn. 392, 42 Atl. 70; Schoetield, sery, 118 N. Car. 1177, 24 S. E. 414; Gear & Pulley Co. v. Schoefield, 71 Com. v. Warner, 13 Pa. Super. Ct. Conn. 11, 40 Atl. 1046; S. v. Means, 461, the summary must be accurate 9 Me. 364, 50 Atl. 30. But see as far as attempted. Com. v. Walsh, 162 Mass. 242, 38 191 JURY DETERMINE THE FACTS. 172 grouped and the substance of their testimony stated. 112 Nor is it necessary for the court to review the evidence on the one side or the other, or comment upon the particular corroborating circumstances, where a case turns upon some single matter of fact which the court plainly submits to the jury. 113 And where the court states to the jury that there is one question for them to determine, a failure to instruct them to disregard a certain other issue is not error. 114 The court may, in its discretion, express an opinion on the weight of the evidence, but it is not bound to do so. 115 Es- pecially where the evidence is conflicting, it is not error if the court fails to express an opinion on the weight of the evidence. 116 And in the absence of a request the court is not required even to call the attention of the jury to a conflict between the testimony of the witnesses of the parties to the suit. 117 It is not improper, however, to instruct on the effect of conflicting evidence. 118 And if the court in stating the evidence makes a mistake in quoting the testimony it is the duty of the party affected to call the attention of the court to such mistake im- mediately after the charge is finished. 119 And if the party so 112 Maynard v. Tyler, 168 Mass. Wis. 236, 46 N. W. 123; S. v. Davis, 107, 46 N. E. 413; Krepps v. Car- 27 S. Car. 609, 4 S. E. 567. The lise, 157 Pa. St. 358, 27 Atl. 741; P. judge of the court should not state v. Doyell, 48 Cal. 85. to the jury his recollection of what us Laner v. Yetzer, 3 Pa. Super, a witness may have testified to in Ct. 461. a former trial, P. v. Corey, 157 114 Davis v. Alas Assur. Co. 16 N. Y. 332, 51 N. E. 1024. Held to Wash. 232, 47 Pac. 885. be improper comment on the facts us S. v. Main, 75 Conn. 55, 52 or weight of the evidence: Yoaoh- Atl. 257; Cohen v. Pemberton, 53 am v. McCurdy, 27 Tex. Cv. App. Conn. 235, 2 Atl. 315, 5 Atl. 682; 183, 65 S. W. 213; Berry v. S. Doon v. Ravey, 49 Vt. 293; Shank v. (Tex. Cr. App.) 38 S. W. 812; Kib- S. 25 Ind. 208. See, also, Breese i e r v. Com. 94 Va. 804, 26 S. E. v. United States, 106 Fed. 680; 858; Braun v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), George v. Stubbs, 26 Me. 242; Bruoh 39 S. W. 940; Santee v. S. (Tex. v. Carter, 32 N. J. L. 565. Cr. App.), 37 S. W. 436; Alexander us Ide v. Lake Tp. (Pa. Com. v . Bank of Lebenon (Tex. Cv. PI.), 9 Kulp, 192. See Balph v. App.), 47 S. W. 840; S. v. Col- Liberty Nat. Bank, 179 Pa. St. 430, ii ns , 47 La. Ann. 578, 17 So. 128; Van 36 Atl. 337. Camp Hardware Co. v. O'Brien (Ind. 117 Balph v. Liberty Nat. Bank, App.) 62 N. E. 464; S. v. Hyde, 20 179 Pa. St. 430, 36 Atl. 337. Wash. 234, 55 Pac. 49; Western U. us Louisville & N. R. Co. v. York, Tel. Co. v. Burgess (Tex. Cv. App.), 128 Ala. 305, 30 S. E. 676. 56 S. W. 237; Lincoln v. City of De- ii Mann v. Cowan, 8 Pa. Super, troit, 101 Mich. 245, 59 N. W. 617; Ct. 30; Grows v. Maine C. R. Co. Hensel v. Haas, 101 Mich. 443, 59 N. 69 Me. 412; Muetze v. Tuteur, 77 W. 808; Meadows v. Truesdell (Tex. 173 COURT REVIEWING EVIDENCE. affected shall fail to do so, by such failure he waives the right to appeal on the ground of the court's mistake. Cv. App.), 56 S. W. 932; Herring- ton v. Guernsey, 177 Pa. St. 175, 35 Atl. 603; Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Mortenson, 27 Tex. Cv. App. 806, 66 S. W. 99; Smith v. Gulf, W. T. & P. R. Co. (Te 272; Williamson v. Tyson, 105 Ala. 644, 17 So. 336; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. York, 128 Ala. 305, 30 S. E. 676; New York, P. & N. R. Co. v. Jones, 94 Md. 24, 50 Atl. 423; Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Sanchez (Tex. Cv. App.), 65 S. W. 893; Braden v. Cook, 18 Pa. Super. Ct. 156; Southern Pac. Co. v. Am- mons (Tex. Cv. App.), 26 S. W. 135; St. Louis, K. & W. R. Co. v. St. Louis U. Stock Yards (Mo.), 29 S. W. 399; Sample v. Rand, 112 Iowa, 616, 84 N. W. 683; Wadsworth v. Dunnam, 98 Ala. 610, 13 So. 597; Freeman v. Metropolitan St. R. Co. 95 Mo. App. 314, 68 S. W. 1057; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Brown (Tex. Cv. App.), 24 S. W. 918; Stead- man v. Keets, 129 Mich. 669, 89 N. W. 555; Duff v. Com. 24 Ky. L. R. 201, 68 S. W. 370 (selling liquor); Rogers v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co. 138 Cal. 285, 71 Pac. 348; Smith v. Dukes, 5 Minn. 373. See generally: Eller v. P. 153 111. 347, 38 N. E. 660; Hellyer v. P. 186 111. 550, 58 N. E. 245: Cannon v. P. 141 111. 282, 30 N. E. 1027; Hoge v. P. 117 111. 46, 6 N. E. 796; Barr v. P. 113 111. 473; Chambers v. P. 105 111. 417; Com. v. McMahon, 145 Pa. St. 413, 22 Atl. 971; S. v. Mackey, 12 Ore. 154, 6 Pac. 648, 5 Am. Cr. R. 536, Metz v. S. 46 Neb. 547, 65 N. W. 190; P. v. Bowkus, 109 Mich. 360, 67 N. W. 319; Newton v. S. (Miss.), 12 So. 560: P. v. Hertz, 105 Cal. 660, 39 Pac. 32; S. v. Wheeler, 79 Mo. 366; Underhill Cr. Ev. 279. An instruction which assumes dis- puted facts as illustrations of the la/w, which does not state the facts hypothetically, is improper as be- ing a charge on the evidence, Jones v. Charleston & W. C. R. Co. 61 S. Car. 556, .39 S. E. 758. 22 Fullerton v. Fordyce, 121 Mo. 1, 25 S. W. 587. 196 FACTS ASSUMED. 180 that such injury has been established. 23 Also, the giving of an instruction which assumes that certain machinery is a part of the real estate on which it is located is improper, where the fact as to whether the machinery was or was not a fixture was in dispute. 24 Also, where the evidence shows that the defendant denies being indebted to the plaintiff it is error to instruct the jury that the defendant admits such indebtedness. 25 196. Instructions may assume facts When. But where a material fact is conclusively shown by undisputed evidence, or is admitted to be true, then the giving of an instruction which assumes that such fact has been established is not error, and affords no ground for complaint on the giving of instructions. 26 (Tex. Cv. App.), 48 S. W. 542; Ellis v. Stewart (Tex. Cv. App.), 24 S. W. 585; San Antonio & A P. R. Co. v. Wright, 20 Tex. 136, 49 S. W. 147; Truxton v. Dait Stayle Co. (Del.), 42 Atl. 431; Lit- tle v. Town of Iron River, 102 Wis. 250, 78 N. W. 416; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Warren, 19 Tex. Cv. App. 463, 49 S. W. 254; Spigner v. S. 103 Ala. 30, 15 So. 892; Brown v. Emerson, 66 Mo. App. 63; Burt v. Long, 106 Mich. 210, 64 N. W. 60. But see Byers v. Wallace, 88 Texas, 503, 28 So. 1056 (facts not conclusive) ; S. v. Drumm, 156 Mo. 216, 56 S. W. 1086; Whitney v. S. 154 Ind. 573, 57 N. E. 398; Tyler v. Tyler, 78 Mo. App. 240; Wilkerson v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 57 S. W. 956; Torres v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 55 S. W. 828; Barkley v. Barkley Cemetery Asso. 15>3 Mo. 300, 54 S. W. 482; Bertram v. Peoples R. Co. 154 Mo. 639, 55 S. W. 1040; Keener v. S. 98 Ind. 13; Marshall v. Morris, 16 Ga. 368. 376; Roberts v. Mans- field, 32 Ga. 228; Jeffries v. S. 61 Ark. 308, 32 S. W. 108,0; S. v. Bone, 114 Iowa, 537, 87 N. W. 507; Board v. Legg, 110 Ind. 480, 11 N. E. 612; Wabash R. Co. v. William- son, 104 Ind. 157, 3 N. E. 814; Smith v. S. 28 Ind. 321; Stephenson v. Wright, 111 Ala. 579, 20 So. 622; Wiborg v. U. S. 163 U. S. 632, 16 Sup. Ct. 1127; Louisville, E. & St. L. C. R. v. Utz, 133 Ind. 265, 32 N. E. 881; Holliday v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. 23 Houston City St. R. Co. v. Artusey (Tex. Cv. App.), 31 S. W. 319. 24 Mundine v. Pauls, 28 Tex. Cv. App. 46, 66 S. W. 254. 25 Aliunde Consul Min. Co. v. Ar- nold (Colo. App.), 67 Pac. 28. 26 Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. King, 179 111. 96, 53 N. E. 552; Gerke v. Fancher, 158 111. 385, 41 N. E. 982; Chicago C. R. Co. v. Carroll, 206 111. 318, 68 N. E. 1087; North C. St. R. Co. v. Honsinger, 175 111. 318, 51 N. E. 613; Chicago City R. Co. v. Al- len, 169 111. 287, 48 N. E. 414; Wil- liams v. P. 164 111. 482, 45 N. E. 987; Quinn v. P. 123 111. 343, 15 N. E. 46; Wallace v. De Young, 98 111. 638; Chicago Screw Co. v. Weiss, 203 111. 539, 68 M. E. 54; Citizens' Ins. Co. v. Stoddard, 197 111. 331, 64 N. E. 355; Cupps v. S. (Wis.). 97 N. W. 216; First Nat. Bank v. Bower (Neb.), 98 N. W. 836; Lee v. O'Quinn, 103 Ga. 355, 30 S. E. 356; S. v. Gorham, 67 Vt. 365, 31 Atl. 845; Terrell v. Russell, .16 Tex. Cv. App. 573, 42 S. W. 129; County of Cook v. Harms, 108 111. 151, 163: Hill v. S. 42 Neb. 503, 60 N. W. 916; St. Louis, J. & S. R. Co. v. Kirby, 104 111. 345, 349; Morgan v. S. 51 Neb. 672, 71 N. W. 788; Cen- tral Georgia R. Co. v. Johnston, 106 Ga. 130, 32 S. E. 78; Drennen v. Smith, 115 Ala. 396, 22 So. 442; North C. St. R. Co. ' v. Honsinger, 175 111. 318, 51 N. E. 613; San Anto- nio & A. P. R. Co. v. Griffin 181 FACTS PROPERLY ASSUMED. 196 Thus an instruction which assumes that the plaintiff's leg was injured, is not material error where the fact of such injury was not disputed on the trial. 27 Or, in other words, where a fact is so conclusively proved by undisputed testimony that but one conclusion can be reached from the evidence the court may assume such fact as having been established. 28 And al- though a material fact may be disputed, yet if all the evidence can lead to no other conclusion than the truth of the fact, the court may, in giving instructions, assume such fact to be true. 29 Where a fact is so clearly established by the evidence that the court would be warranted in giving a peremptory instruc- tion on the subject, an instruction assuming such fact is not for that reason erroneous. 30 App. 133, 32 S. W. 538. See also McGee v. Smitherman, 69 Ark. 632, 65 S. W. 461; Hall v. Incorporated Town, &c. 90 Iowa, 585, 58 N. W. 881, McLane v. Maurer, 28 Tex. Cv. App. 75, 66 S. W. 693; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Pierce, 7 Tex. Cv. App. 597, 25 S. W. 1052; Mattingly v. Lewisohn, 13 Mont. 508, 35 Pac. Ill; Byers v. Wallace (Tex. Cv. App.), 25 S. W. 1043; Reliance T. & D. Works v. Martin. 23 Ky. L. R. 1625, 65 S. W. 809; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Wilbanks, 7 Tex. Cv. App. 489, 27 S. W. 302; Welden v. Omaha, K. C. & E. R. Co. 93 Mo. App. 668, 67 S. W. 698; Citizens' Ins. Co. v. Stoddard, 197 111. 330, 64 N. E. 355; International & G. N. R. Co. v. Locke (Tex. Cv. App.), 67 S. W. 1082; S. v. Nickels, 65 S. Car. 169, 43 S. E. 521; Parks v. St. Louis & S. R. Co. (Mo.), 77 S. W. 70; Mc- Ayeal v. Gullett, 202 111. 214; Louis- ville & N. R. Co. v. Harrod, 25 Ky. L. R. 250, 75 S. W. 233. 27 Chicago & A. R. Co. v. McDon- nell, 194 111. 82, 62 N. E. 308. See Gran v. Houston, 45 Neb. 813, 64 N. W. 245; Taylor v. Scherpe & K. A. I. Co. 133 Mo. 349, 34 S. W. 581; Black v. Rocky Mountain B. T. Co. (Utah), 73 Pac. 514; McCullough v. Armstrong (Ga.), 45 S. E. 379; Thayer County Bank v. Huddleson (Neb.), 95 N. W. 471; Vogeler v. Devries (Md.), 56 Atl. 782. 2 8 Wright v. Hardie, (Tex. Cv. App.), 30 S. W. 675; Rollings v. Bankers' Union, 63 S. Car. 192, 41 S. E. 90; Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Jenkins, 29 Tex. Cv. App. 440, 69 S. W. 233; Gavigan v. Evans, 45 Mich. 597, 8 N. W. 545; First Nat. Bank v. Sargent (Neb.), 91 N. W. 595; Morgan v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 67 S. W. 420; Northwestern Fuel Co. v. Danielson, 57 Fed. 915; Texas &c. R, Co. v. Gentry, 163 U. S. 353, 16 Sup. Ct. 1104; Muir v. Miller, 82 Iowa, 700, 47 N. W. 1011, 48 N. W. 1032; Douglass v. Geiler, 32 Kas. 499, 5 Pac. 178; McLellon v. Wheel- er, 70 Me. 285; P. v. Lee Sare Bo, 72 Cal. 623, 14 Pac. 310; Hogan v. Shu- art, 11 Mont. 498, 28 Pac. 736; Val- entine v. Sweatt (Tex. Cv. App.), 78 S. W. 385; Dallas R. Tr. R. Co. v. Payne (Tex. Cv. App.), 78 S. W. 1085. 29 Toole v. Bearce, 91 Me. 209, 39 Atl. 558; Ragan v. Kansas City, S. & E. R. Co. 144 Mo. 623, 46 S. W. 602; Half man v. Pennsylvania Boiler Ins. Co. 160 Pa. St. 202, 28 Atl. 837; Cook County v. Harms, 108 111. 151; Chicago, St. L. & P. R. Co. v. Spilker, 134 Ind. 380, 33 N. E. 280. so Thompson v. Brannin, 19 Ky. L. R. 454, 40 S. W. 914. .197 FACTS ASSUMED. 182 But the fact that the evidence on a material issue is all on one side does not authorize the court to direct the jury that it proves a controverted fact. Thus in an action against a railroad com- pany for the value of stock killed by it, where the plaintiff was the only witness who testified as to the value of the stock killed, it was held improper for the court to direct the jury to find the value to be the amount testified to by the plaintiff. In such state of the case the jury are not bound to believe the plaintiff, though no evidence was introduced to contradict him. 31 197. Facts admitted by both parties. Where a fact is ad- mitted by both of the parties to the suit the court in charg- ing the jury may in direct terms state that such fact is admitted. 32 But, of course, it is error to instruct that a material fact is admitted if there is no evidence of such admission. 33 Facts which are admitted by the pleadings or parties should not be submitted to the jury for determination as though in dispute. 34 And it has been held that where a fact is affirmed by one party in his pleadings and not denied by the other, the court may, in giving instructions, assume such fact to be true. 35 198. Assuming- facts in criminal cases. While it is the better practice for the court in charging the jury in a criminal case to avoid assuming any material fact as having been proved, however clear to the mind of the court such fact may seem to be established, 36 yet facts about which there is no dispute and si Choctaw, O. & G. R. Co. v. istence'of facts of common knowl- Deperade (Okl.), 71 Pac. 629. See edge about which there is no con- Foster v Franklin L. Ins. Co. (Tex. troversy is not error, Harris v. Cv. App.), 72 S. W. 91; P. v. Web- Shebeck, 151 111. 287, 37 N. E. 1015. ster, 111 Cal. 381, 43 Pac. 1114. 34 Miles v. Walker (Neb.), 92 N. 32 Cooper v. Denver & R. G. R. W. 1014; Trager v. Shepherd Co. 11 Utah, 46, 39 Pac. 478; Ste- (Miss.), 18 So. 122; Orth v. Clutz's phens v. Porter, 29 Tex. Cv. App. Adm'r, 18 B. Mon. (Ky.), 223; Wiley 556, 69 S. W. 423; S. v. Angel, 29 v. Man-a-to-wah, 6 Kas. Ill; Stew- N. Car. 27; Driver v. Board, &c. art v. Nelson, 79 Mo. 522; Com. v. 70 Ark. 358, 68 S. W. 26; Blaul v. Ruddle, 142 Pa. St. 144, 21 Atl. 814; Tharp, 83 Iowa, 665, 49 N. W. 1044; Bellefontaine R. Co. v. Snyaer, 24 S. v. Pritchard, 16 Nev. 101; San Ohio St. 670; Wintz v. Morrison, Antonio & A. R. Co. v. lies (Tex. 17 Tex. 387; Druse v. Wheeler. 26 Cv. App.), 59 S. W. 564; Galveston, Mich. 189. H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Lynes (Tex. 35 Bussey v. Charleston & W. C. Cv. App.), 65 S. W. 1119. R. Co. 52 S. Car. 438, 30 S. E. 477; ss C/ocoran v. Lehigh Coal Co. 138 Riser v. Southern R. Co. (S. Car.), 111. 399, 28 N. E. 759. The giving 46 S. E. 51. of an instruction assuming the ex- se Hughes Cr. Law, 3250, citing: 183 ASSUMING IN CRIMINAL CASES. 198 concerning which no issue is made, may properly be called to the attention of the jury in the giving of instructions. 37 Thus in a homicide case, where the fact that the defendant, and no one else, fired the fatal shot is admitted, an instruction assuming that the shooting took place is not objectionable; 38 or an in- struction assuming the fact of the killing is not prejudicial error where there is no dispute that the killing was done by the defendant. 39 But where the fact of the killing is controverted then an instruction assuming such fact is prejudicial error. 40 P. v. Dick, 32 Cal. 216; S. v. Whit- ney, 7 Ore. 386; S. v. Mackey, 12 Ore. 154, 6 Pac. 648, 5 Am. Cr. R. 536. 37 S. v. Ward, 61 Vt. 153, 17 Atl. 483, 8 Am. Cr. R. 219; Davis v. P. 114 111. 86, 29 N. E. 192; Williams v. P. 164 111. 483, 45 N. E. 987; Hol- liday v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. App. 133, 32 S. W. 538; S. v. Gorham, 67 Vt. 365, 31 Atl. 845, 10 Am. Cr. R. 28; S. v. Day, 79 Me. 120, 8 Atl. 544; P. v. Sternberg, 111 Cal. 3, 43 Pac. 198; S. v. Home, 9 Kas. 119, 1 Green Cr. R. 722; S. v. Aughtry, 49 S. Car. 285, 26 S. E. 619, 27 S. E. 199; Hawkins v. S. 136 Ind. 630, 36 N. E. 419; Underbill Cr. Ev. 277; Ber- tram v. Peoples R. Co. 154 Mo. 639, 55 S. W. 1040. ss Whitney v. S. 154 Ind. 573, 57 N. E. 398; S. v. Holloway, 156 Mo. 222, 56 S. W. 734; Hanrohan v. P. 91 111. 142; Genz v. S. 58 N. J. L. 482, 34 Atl. 816. The court may charge that the killing is conceded. 39 P. v. Pullman, 129 Cal. 258, 61 Pac. 961; S. v. Holloway, 156 Mo. 222, 56 S. W. 734; Davis v. P. 114 111. 97, 29 N. E. 192; Weller v. S. 19 Ohio C. C. 166. See S. v. Med- lin, 126 N. Car. 1127, 36 S. E. 344. 40 Cannon v. P. 141 111. 270, 282, 30 N. E. 1027; Weller v. S. 19 Ohio C. C. 166; Reins v. P. 30 111. 256, 274; S. v. Marsh, 171 Mo. 523, 71 S. W. 1003 (defendant denied being present); Gee v. S. 80 Miss. 285, 31 So. 792. Instructions held assuming facts: Barr v. P. 113 111. 471, 473; S. v. Reed, 50 La. Ann. 990, 24 So. 131; Hayes v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 195 Pa. St. 184, 45 Atl. 925; Dart v. Horn, 20 111. 213; P. v. Dom Pedro, 43 N. Y. S. 44, 19 Misc. 300; S. v. Bowker, 26 Ore. 309, 38 Pac. 124; Frank v. Tatum (Tex. Cv. App.), 26 S. W. 900; Dallas & O. C. R. Co. v. Harvey (Tex. Cv. App.), 27 S. W. 423; Richmond & D. R. Co. v. Green- wood, 99 Ala. 501, 14 So. 495; Land- man v. Glover (Tex. Cv. App.), 25 S. W. 994; Ohlweiler v. Lohman, 88 Wis. 75, 59 N. W. 678; La Salle County C. Coal Co. v. Eastman, 99 111. App. 495; Mobile & O. R. Co. v. Healy, 100 111. App. 586; Bonaparte v. Thayer, 95 Md. 548, 52 Atl. 496; St. Louis S. W. R. Co. v. Silbey (Tex. Cv. App.), 68 S. W. 516; Hall v. S. 130 Ala. 45, 30 So. 422; Lee v. Hammond, 114 Wis. 550, 90 N. W. 1073; Lake S. & M. S. R. Co. v. Brown, 123 111. 184, 14 N. E. 197; City of Elgin v. Beckwith, 119 111. 367, 10 N. E. 558; Commercial Nat. Bank v. Proctor, 98 111. 562. In- structions held not assuming facts in the following cases: Bartlett v. Board of Education, 59 111. 364, 373; Western M. M. Ins. Co. v. Boughton, 136 111. 317, 320, 26 N. E. 591; Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Johnson, 135 111. 641, 652, 26 N. E. 510; Chi- cago & N. W. R. Co. v. Goebel, 119 111. 515, 521, 10 N. E. 369; Chica- go, St. L. & P. R. Co. v. Welsh, 118 111. 572, 575, 9 N. E. 197; Roark v. S. 105 Ga. 736, 32 S. E. 125; Bird v. Forceman, 62 111. 212, 215; Nugent v. Brenchard, 157 N. Y. 687, 51 N. E. 1092; Freeman v. Gates, 22 Tex. Cv. App. 623, 55 S. W. 524; Dammann v. City of St. Louis, 152 Mo. 186, 53 S. W. 932; Triolo v. Foster (Tex. Cv. App.), 57 S. W. 698; International G. & N. R. Co. v. Martineg (Tex. Cv. App.), 57 S. 198 FACTS ASSUMED. 184 And this is true in all jurisdictions, and is a well settled prin- ciple. W. 689; Sherman, S. & S. R. Co. v. Bell (Tex. Cv. App.), 58 S. W. 147; Ryder v. Jacobs, 196 Pa. St. 386, 46 Atl. 667; Jackson v. Burnham, 20 Colo. 532, 39 Pac. 577; Robinson v. S. (Miss.), 16 So. 201; P. v. Mal- lon, 103 Cal. 513, 37 Pac. 512; Hans v. S. 50 Neb. 150, 69 N. W. 838; S. v. Straub, 16 Wash. Ill, 47 Pac. 227; Welsh v. S. 60 Neb. 101, 82 N. W. 368; Conners v. S. 95 Wis. 77, 69 N. W. 981; Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Buch, 27 Tex. Cv. App. 283, 65 S. W. 681; Throck- morten v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. 14 Tex. Cv. App. 222, 39 S. W. 174; Texas & O. R. Co. v. Echols, 17 Tex. Cv. App. 677, 41 S. W. 488; Geary v. Kansas City, O. & S. R. Co. 138 Mo. 257, 39 S. W. 774; Sonnefield v. Mayton (Tex. Cv. App.), 39 S. W. 166; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Mines (Tex. Cv. App.), 40 S. W. 152; Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Echols, 17 Tex. Cv. App. 677, 41 S. W. 488; Rapid Tr. R. Co. v. Lusk (Tex. Cv. App.), 66 S. W. 799; Wreggitt v. Barnett, 99 Mich. 477, 58 N. W. 467; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Turner, 194 111. 575, 62 N. E. 798; Crockett v. Miller, 112 Fed. 729; Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Poole's Adm'r, 100 Va. 148, 40 S. E. 627; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Ward, 61 Fed. 927; Moore v. S. 114 Ga. 256, 40 S. E. 295; Williams v. S. (Tex. Cr App.), 65 S. W. 1059; Tunnicliffe v. Fox (Neb.), 94 N. W. 1032; P. v. Lapique (Cal.), 67 Pac. 14; Lyon v. Watson, 109 Mich. 390, 67 N. W. 512; Fitzgerald v. Clark, 17 Mont. 100, 42 Pac. 273>; Nugent v. Breu- chard, 36 N. Y. S. 102, 91 Hun, 12; Comey v. Philadelphia Tr. Co. 175 Pa. St. 133, 34 Atl. 621; Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Waldo (Tex. Cv. App.), 32 S. W. 783; Richmond v. Traction Co. (Va.), 43 S. E. 622. CHAPTER VIII. BURDEN OF PROOF. Sec. 199. Instructions that burden is on affirmant. Sec. 202. Instructions when evidence is equally balanced. 200. Degree of proof by prepon- 203. Preponderance How deter- derance. 201. Burden and degree of proof in criminal cases. mined Witnesses. 199. Instruction that burden is on affirmant The party who, by his pleading, alleges a fact or state of facts is required to prove the same by a preponderance of the evidence, and the court, on proper request, should so instruct the jury. Thus the plaintiff is on the affirmative as to the facts alleged in his complaint or declaration, and the court should instruct the jury that the burden is on him to make out his case by a pre- ponderance of the evidence. 1 And in some cases at least it is not improper to instruct that the plaintiff must prove all the material facts of his complaint by a preponderance of the evi- dence. 2 But where the plaintiff's petition or declaration alleges i Mitchell v. Hindman, 150 111. 538, 37 N. E. 916; Central R. Co. v. Bannister, 195 111. 50, 62 N. E. 864; De Hart v. Bond, 143 Ind. 363, 41 N. E. 825; Williams v. Hoehle, 95 Wis. 510, 70 N. W. 556; Flores v. Maverick (Tex. Cv. App.), 26 S. W. 316; Meyer v. Blackmore, 54 Miss. 575; Fowler v. Harrison, 64 S. Car. 311, 42 S. E. 159; Guimard v. Knapp, Stout & Co. 95 Wis. 482, 70 N. W. 671. See Jesse French Piano & Organ Co. v. Forbes, 134 Ala. 302, 32 So. 678 (excluding un- certainty). 2 Salem Stone, &c. Co. v. Griffin, 139 Ind. 141, 38 N. E. 411; De Hart v. Board, 143 Ind. 363, 41 N. E. 825. In a personal injury case the burden of proof does not shift to the defendant on proof of the injury. The plaintiff must prove, not only the injury, but also that it was caused by the negligence ot the defendant, Peck v. St. Louis Tr. Co. (Mo.), 77 S. W. 736. 185 199 BURDEN OF PROOF. 186 several material facts, the proof of any one of which would make out his case (for instance, several different grounds of negligence), then such an instruction would be improper. Only so many of the material facts as are necessary to constitute a cause of action need be established. 3 Where the pleadings put several facts in issue, the proof of any one of which would entitle a party to a verdict, an instruc- tion calling for proof of all of such facts conjunctively is er- roneous. 4 But submitting several matters conjunctively, in- stead of disjunctively and severally, cannot be complained of as error in the absence of a. request for a proper instruction. 5 So where the defendant, by his pleading, sets up affirmative mat- ter in his plea or answer, the plaintiff is entitled to have the jury instructed that the burden is on the defendant to establish the facts thus alleged, by a preponderance of the evidence. 6 And although there may be no conflict of testimony as to a material fact, it is not error to charge the jury that the party alleging such fact must prove it by a preponderance of the evidence. 7 But the party upon whom rests the burden of proving a material fact in issue is not confined to evidence introduced on his side of the case. He may rely upon any evidence of his opponent to aid him. It matters not whether the evidence is given by the one party or the other; it is sufficient if the fact is proved by a preponderance of the evidence. 8 Hence, to instruct the jury that the burden of proving contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff rests on the defendant, is improper. 9 The court may, however, properly refuse instructions on the burden of proof where the evidence introduced by a party is s Houston & T. C. R. Co v. Pat- v. Laumeister, 102 Cal. 658, 36 Pac. terson (Tex. Cv. App.), 57 S. W. 925; Kepler v. Jessup, 11 Ind. 241. 675. * Blotcky v. Caplan, 91 Iowa, 352, 4 Bell v. Beazley, 18 Tex. Cv. App. 59 N. W. 204. See Chittim v. Marti- 639, 45 S. W. 401; Gulf, C. & S. F. nez, 94 Tex. 141, 58 S. W. 948. See R. Co. v. Hill, 95 Tex. 629, 69 S. W. Indianapolis & G. R. Tr. Co. v. 136; Wilson v. Huguenin, 117 Ga. Haines (Ind.), 69 N. E. 188. 546, 43 S. E. 857; Herbert v. Drew, Indianapolis & G. R. T. Co. v. 32 Ind. 366. Haines (Ind.), 69 N. E. 188; Chicago s Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Hill, & E. I. R. Co. v. Stephenson (Ind.), 95 Tex. 629, 69 S. W. 136. 69 N. E. 273. e Whipple v. Preece, 18 Utah, 454, a Indianapolis & G. R. T. Co. v. 56 Pac. 296; Kuenster v. Woodhouse, Haines (Ind.), 69 N. E. 188. 101 Wis. 216, 77 N. W. 165; Nicbol 187 BURDEN ON AFFIRMANT. 199 uncontradicted. 10 Or where a fact is conclusively established by the evidence the court may properly refuse to instruct on the burden of proof. 11 Also the refusal to charge the jury on which party the burden of proof originally rested is not error where the evidence conclusively establishes the fact in issue. 12 But when a party is entitled to have the jury instructed on the law as to the burden of proof, and makes proper request therefor, it is error for the court to refuse such instructions. 13 However, a party will not be heard to complain of the failure of the court to instruct the jury on the burden of proof in the absence of a proper request in that respect. 14 It is also error for the court -in charging the jury to place the burden of proof on the wrong party. 15 But if a party assumes the burden of an issue, which, by the pleadings, is on the other party, he cannot complain of error in that respect. 16 Where the court errs in charging that the burden of proof is on the defendant, and it appears that the plaintiff success- fully carried the burden by his proof, the error is not material. 17 While it is not necessary that the court, in charging the jury on the burden of proof, should define preponderance of^ evi- dence, 18 yet when the court undertakes to do so the instruc- tion defining the term should be proper and applicable to the 10 Milmo Nat. Bank v. Convery 113 Mich. 53, 71 N. W. 523; Martin (Tex. Cv. App.), 49 S. W. 926; Davis v. Davis, 76 Iowa, 762, 40 N. W. v. Davis, 20 Tex. Cv. App. 310, 49 712. S. W. 726. is Wildey v. Crane, 69 Mich. 17, 11 Yetter v. Zurick, 55 Minn. 452, 36 N. W. 734; S. v. Crossley, 69 Ind. 57 N. W. 147. 203; S. v. Grinstead, 62 Kas. 593, 64 is Black v. S. 1 Tex. App. 369; Pac. 49; McNutt & R. v. Kaufman, Stevens v. Pendleton, 94 Mich. 405, 26 Ohio St. 130. In such case the 53 N. W. 1108. court will not look to the evidence 14 Miles v. Strong, 68 Conn. 273, to see whether it sustains the ver- 36 Atl. 55; Donavan v. Bromley, 113 diet returned, Chicago & A. R. Co. Mich. 53, 71 N. W- 523; Anderson v. Murphy, 198 111. 470, 64 N. E. v. Baird, 19 Ky. L. R. 444, 40 S. W. 1011. 923; Lamina v. S. 46 Neb. 236, 64 ie Armstrong v. Penn, 105 Ga. N. W. 956. The court is not bound 229, 31 S. E. 158. See Freemont, E. to instruct on its own motion: May- & M. V. R. Co. v. Harlin, 50 Neb. nard v. Fellows, 43 N. H. 255; Gulf, 698, 70 N. W. 263, 36 L. R. A. 417. C. & S. F. R. Co. v. McCarty, 82 Tex. i" Moore v. Brewer, 94 Ga. 260, 608, 18 S. W. 716; McKinney v. 21 S. E. 460. Guhman, 38 Mo. App. 344; Dun- is Jones v. Durham, 94 Mo. App. combe v. Powers, 75 Iowa, 185, 39 51, 67 S. W. 976; Endowment Rank N. W. 261; Conway v. Jefferson, 46 K. P. v. Steele, 108 Tenn. 624, N. H. 521; In re Bromley's Estate, 69 S. W. 336. 200 BURDEN OF PROOF. 188 evidence before the jury. It is improper to say that prepon- derance means the greater weight of evidence, to be determined from a careful examination of all the evidence "tendered" where there was testimony offered but. not admitted. 19 200. Degree of proof by preponderance. As stated in the preceding section, the party upon whom the burden rests is required to establish his facts by a preponderance of the evi- dence. Hence an instruction in a civil case, which calls for proof by a greater weight of evidence than by a preponder- ance, is erroneous. 20 Thus an instruction exacting proof by a "clear preponderance," 21 or by a "fair preponderance," 22 or by "more and better evidence" than that of the opposing party, is improper, in that it calls for a higher degree of proof than a preponderance of the evidence. 23 Also a charge telling the jury that the evidence should "satisfy" their minds to warrant a verdict, 24 or an instruction requiring proof to the "satisfac- tion" of the jury, 25 or that the evidence must "conclusively" isHurlbut v. Bagley, 99 Iowa, 127, 68 N. W. 585; Western U. Tel. Co. v. James (Tex. Cv. App.), 73 S. W. 79. 20 White v. Ferris, 124 Ala. 461, 27 So. 259; Roe v. Bachelder, 41 Wis. 360; McCord-Brady Co. v. Money- ban, 59 Neb. 593, 81 N. W. 608; Long v. Martin, 152 Mo. 668, 54 S. W. 473; Lundon v. City of Chicago, 83 111. App. 208; Coffin v. U. 1. 156 U. S. 432, 15 Sup. Ct. 394. Contra: S. v. Linhoff (Iowa), 97 N. W. 77. See Kirchner v. Collins, 152 Mo. 394, 53 S. W. 1081; Herrick v. Gary, 83 111. 85; Guardian Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hogan, 80 111. 35, 41. 21 Douley v. Dougherty, 75 111. App. 379; Bitter v. Saathoff, 98 111. 266; Prather v. Wilkins, 68 Tex. 187, 4 S. W. 252; Hall v. Wolff, 61 Iowa, 559, 16 N. 710 (clearly and fairly) ; Meyer v. Hafemeister, (Wis.), 97 N. W. 166. 22 Atkinson v. Reed (Tex. Cv. App.), 49 S. W. 260; Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Dotson, 15 Tex. Cv. App. 73, 38 S. W. 642; Ashbome v. Town of W. 69 Conn. 217, 37 Atl. 498; Effinger v. S. 9 Ohio C. C. 376; B. Langtry Sons v. Lowrie (Tex. Cv. App.), 58 S. W. 835; Carstens v. Earles, 26 Wash. 676, 67 Pac. 404; Hart v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co. 9 Wash. 620, 38 Pac. 213; Altschuler v. Coburn, 38 Neb. 881, 57 N. W. 836. Contra: Meyer v. Hafemeister (Wis.), 97 N. W. 166. 23 Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Pol- lock, 195 111. 163, 62 N. E. 831; Rolfe v. Rich, 149 111. 436, 35 N. E. 352 (satisfactory evidence) ; Graves v. Cadwell, 90 111. 612, 615. 24 Moor v. Heineke, 119 Ala. 627, 24 So. 374; Town of Havana v. Biggs, 58 111. 483, 486; Willis v. Chowning, 90 Tex. 617, 40 S. W. 395; Texas, &c. R. Co. v. Ballin- ger (Tex. Cv. App.), 40 S. W. 822; Wollf v. Van Housen, 55 111. App. 295; Finks v. Cox (Tex. Cv. App.), 30 S. W. 512; Frick v. Kabaker, 116 Iowa, 494, 90 N. W. 498; Brown v. Master, 104 Ala. 451, 16 So. 443. See Sams A. C. Co. v. League, 25 Colo. 129, 54 Pac. 642. 25 Wolf v. Van Housen, 55 111. App. 295; Mitchell v. Hindman, 150 111. 538, 37 N. E. 916; McBride v. Banguss, 65 Tex. 174, 467; Gregg 189 DEGREE OF PROOF PREPONDERANCE. 200 prove a fact or case, calls for too high a degree of proof. 26 So also it is improper to instruct that a party must prove his claim with "clearness and certainty." 27 But it has been held that an instruction stating that "the minds of the jury should be satisfied to a reasonable degree of certainty" is not material error. 28 In South Carolina it has been held that a charge that the jury "must be sure" that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence before they can find for the defendant is not erroneous and does not call for too high a degree of proof. 29 But where fraud is alleged and made an issue, especially where the charge is such as, if true, it indicates criminal conduct, the evidence must establish the charge by a clear preponderance. 30 The refusal of an instruction calling for the "clearest and most satisfactory evidence" of the existence of the relation of debtor and creditor between husband and wife at the time of the transfer of property from one to the other has been held not to be error in the absence of an explanation of what is meant by the expression "clearest and most satisfactory evi- dence." 31 In a will contest a charge which states that "undue influence need not be proved by direct evidence, but may be shown by facts and circumstances which lead the mind to the conviction that v. Jones (Tex. Cv. App.), 26 S. B. 212; Palm v. Chernowsky, 28 Tex. 132; Feist v. Boothe (Tex. Cv. Cv. App. 405, 67 S. W. 165. App.), 27 S. W. 33; Lowery v. 28 Liverpool & L. & G. Ins. Co. Rowland, 104 Ala. 420, 16 So. 88; v. Farnsworth Lumber Co. 72 Miss. Miller v. Barber, 66 N. Y. 558; 555, 17 So. 445; Peltier v. Chicago, Monaghan v. Agriculture F. Ins. St. P. M. & O. R. Co. 88 Wis. Co. 53 Mich. 238; Pierpont Mfg. 521, 60 N. W. 250. Contra: Low- Co, v. Goodman Produce Co. (Tex. ery v. Rowland, 104 Ala. 420, 16 Cv. App.), 60 S. W. 347. Contra: So. 88; O'Neil v. Blase, 94 Mo. Surber v. Mayfield, 156 Ind. 375, App. 648, 68 S. W. 764. 60 N. E. 7; Carstens v. Earles, 26 20 Bodie v. Charleston, N. C. R. Wash. 676, 67 Pac. 404. Co. 61 S. Car. 468, 39 S. E. 715. 26 Greathouse v. Moore (Tex. Cv. so Klipstein v. Raschein, 117 App.) 23 S. W. 226; Gage v. Louis- Wis. 248, 94 N. W. 63; Poertner v. ville, N. O. & T. R. Co. 88 Tenn. Poertner, 66 Wis. 644, 29 N. W. 724, 14 S. W. 73. 386. See Wallace v. Maltice, 118 27Maxon v. Farris (Tex. Cv. Ind. 59, 20 N. E. 706; Stevens v. App.), 48 S. W. 741; F. Dohmen Stevens, 127 Ind. 560, 26 N. E. 1078. Co. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co. 96 Wis. Palm v. Chernowsky, 28 Tex. Cv. 38, 71 N. W. 69; McLeod v. Sharp, App. 405, 67 S. W. 165; Stocks v. 53 111. App. 406; Brown v. Master, Scott, 188 111. 266, 58 N. E. 990. 104 Ala. 451, 16 So. 443; U. S. si Hartman & F. B. Co. v. Clark, Fidelity & G. Co. v. Charles, 131 94 Md. 520, 51 Atl. 291. Ala. 657, 31 So. 558, 57 L. R. A. 201 BURDEN OF PROOF. 190 it has been exercised," is not rendered obnoxious by the use of the word "conviction," where other instructions in the charge state that the burden is on the contestants to establish want of mental capacity and undue influence by a preponderance of the credible testimony, which means by the greater weight of the testimony. 32 201. Burden and degree of proof in criminal cases. As stated in another chapter, the burden is on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, as charged in the indictment; and each of the essential elements necessary to constitute the offense charged must be established to the same degree of certainty before a conviction is warranted, and a refusal to so instruct the jury is error. 33 In some juris- dictions the burden is on the accused, in a criminal case, to establish his affirmative defense, such as insanity and self-de- fense by a preponderance of the evidence, and in others he is only required to raise a reasonable doubt of his guilt from all of the evidence on both sides considered together. In either case an instruction requiring him to establish his defense be- yond a reasonable doubt is erroneous, in that it calls for too high a degree of proof; 34 but, of course, such instruction is proper in those states where the law requires the accused to establish his defense beyond a reasonable doubt. 35 In those states where the burden is on the defendant to raise only a reasonable doubt of his guilt the giving of an instruction stating that the defendant is required to make "satisfactory" 32 Goldthorp v. Goldthorp, 115 i n that it requires too high a de- Iowa, 430, 88 N. W. 944. gree of proof, S. v. Courtright, 66 The improper use of the words Ohio St. 37, 63 N. E. 590. "burden of proof" for "preponder- 34 Hamilton v. S. 97 Tenn. 452, ance of evidence" is not material 37 s. W. 194; McKnight v. U. S. error where the court properly 115 Fed. 972 (intent); German v. states that the burden is on the U. S. 120 Fed. 666 (insanity by pre- plaintiff to make out his case by ponderance is error) ; Landers v. S. a preponderance of the evidence: (Tex. Cr. App.), 63 S. W. 557; S. v. Williams v. Hoehle, 95 Wis. 510, Porter, 64 Iowa, 237, 20 N. W. 168 70 N. W. 556; Flores v. Maverick (preponderance); Clark v. S. 150 (Tex. Cv. App.), 26 S. W. 316; Ind. 60, 64 N. E. 589 (self-defense). Doran v. Cedar Rapids & M. C. R. 35 Com. v. Kilpatrick, 204 Pa. St. Co. 117 Iowa, 442, 90 N. W. 815 218, 53 Atl. 774; S. v. Lewis, 20 ("testimony" for "evidence"). Nev. 333. 22 Pac. 241, 8 Am. Cr. 33 See "Reasonable Doubt," 150. R. 592; S. v. Scott, 49 La. R. 253, On a charge of perjury an in- 21 So. 271, 10 Am. Cr. R. 591; struction calling for proof equiva- Hughes Cr. Law, 2434. lent to two witnesses is erroneous, 191 DEGREE OF PROOF IN CRIMINAL CASES. 202 proof of his defense or mitigation, unless such proof "satis- factorily" arises out of the evidence for the prosecution is error in exacting a higher degree of proof than the law requires. 36 Thus an instruction in a homicide case requiring the accused to prove self-defense to the "satisfaction" of the jury is er- roneous, in that it calls for too high a degree of proof. The accused is only required to raise a reasonable doubt by his defense. 37 And it is also error, where the plea is self-defense, to charge that before the jury can acquit they must be rea- sonably satisfied that the defendant killed the deceased under an immediate sense of great danger of losing his life or suffer- ing serious bodily harm, in that it takes from the state the burden of proof. 38 So in a larceny case an instruction requir- ing the defendant to satisfactorily explain his possession of property alleged to have been stolen, for the same reason, is erroneous. 39 It is error for the court to charge that the threat- ened danger to the person must be so great as to create a rea- sonable belief in the mind of the person assaulted, of imminent peril to life or "the most serious bodily harm." The words of the statute being "great bodily harm" fall far short of "most serious bodily harm;" the one may endanger life, the other not. 40 202. Instructions when evidence is equally balanced. If the evidence is equally balanced, or so close as to make it doubtful which party has presented the greater weight of evi- dence, then the verdict should be against the party on whom rests the burden of proof, and the refusal to give an instruc- tion to that effect when properly requested is error. 41 But the giving of such an instruction under some state of facts may be se Smith v. P. 142 111. 122, 31 N. App. Div. 386, the burden never E. 599; Clark v. S. 159 Ind. 65, 64 shifts in a criminal case. N. E. 589; Boykin v. P. 22 Colo. sag. v. McKea, 120 N. Car. 608, 496, 45 Pac. 419; S. v. McKea, 120 27 S. E. 78. See S. v. Garvin (S. N. Car. 608, 27 S. E. 78. Car.), 26 S. E. 570. 37Wacaser v. P. 134 111. 438, 442; *o Reins v. P. 30 111. 256, 275. Alexander v. P. 96 111. 102. See Dor- *i City of Streeter v. Leibendor- sey v. S. 110 Ga. 331, 35 S. E. 651; fer, 71 111. App. 625; City Banks Jackson v. P. 18 111. 270; Hoge v. Appeal from Com'rs, 54 Conn. 273, P. 117 111. 44, 6 N. E. 796. See 7 Atl. 548; Bridenthal v. Davidson, "Homicide," "Reasonable Doubt." 61 111. 461; Jones v. Angell, 95 Ind. as Dent v. S. (Ala.), 17 So. 94: 376. See Harper v. S. 101 Ind. 109; P. v. Caasata, 39 N. Y. S. 641, 6 Jarrell v. Lillie, 40 Ala. 271. 203 BURDEN OF PROOF. 192 improper. Thus, where the defendant, by his pleading, raises affirmative issues, such, for instance, as accord and satisfac- tion, of fraudulent representations and of failure of considera- tion, the burden is upon him, and not upon the plaintiff, to prove such issues. An instruction, therefore, which, in substance, tells the jury that the plaintiff is bound to make out his case by a preponderance of the evidence upon every material point, and in weighing the evidence if the jury think that it is evenly bal- anced upon any point necessary to a recovery by the plain- tiff, or preponderates ever so slightly in favor of the defendant, they should find for the defendant, is improper, in that it throws on the plaintiff the burden of proving all the issues, including those raised by the defendant. 42 . 203. Preponderance How determined Witnesses, The court is authorized to instruct the jury on the mode of determin- ing the preponderance of the evidence, and should not refuse to do so, especially where the testimony is conflicting. 43 By a pre- ponderance of the evidence is meant the greater weight of the evidence. 44 The preponderance of the evidence is not necessarily determined by the number of witnesses who may testify for or against a party, or on any point or issue involved. 45 The quality of the testimony, as well as the number of witnesses, must be considered by the jury in determining the preponderance. 46 It is for the jury to say from all the evidence before them whether the testimony of the greater number of witnesses tes- tifying shall be more or less controlling than the better quality of the testimony of the fewer number of witnesses. 47 It is im- proper therefore for the court to charge that the preponder- ance of the evidence is determined by the number of witnesses 42 Richelieu Hotel Co. v. Inter- 313; West C. St. R. Co. v. Liesero- national M. E. Co. 140 111. 267, 29 witz, 197 111. 612, 64 N. E. 718; N. E. 1044. Georgia N. R. Co. v. Hutchins 43 Louisville & M. R. Co. v.' (Ga.), 46 S. E. 662. Ward, 67 Fed. 927. See Buck v. 46 Diver v. Hall, 46 N. Y. S. Hogeboom (Neb.), 90 N. W. 635; 533, 20 Misc. 677; S. v. Bohan, 19 Miller v. John, 208 111. 180. Kas. 35. See, also, Hardy v. Mil- 44Ewen v. Wilbor, 208 111. 500. waukee St. R. Co. 89 Wis. 183, 61 45Wastl v. Montana N. R. Co. N. W. 771; Gilmore v. Seattle & 17 Mont. 216, 42 Pac. 772; Bierbach R. R. Co. 29 Wash. 150, 69 Pac. v. Goodyear R. Co. 54 Wis. 213, 743; Dallas Cotton Mills v. Ash- 11 N. W. 514; Illinois Cent. R. Co. ley (Tex. Cv. App.), 63 S. W. 160. v. Zang, 10 111. App. 594; Howlett v. 47 Gilmore v. Seattle &c. R. Co. Dilts, 4 Ind. App. 23, 30 N. E. 29 Wash. 150, 69 Pac. 743. 193 PREPONDERANCE, HOW DETERMINED. 203 on each side where the opposing witnesses are equally credible and equally well corroborated and have no greater interest in the result of the trial. 48 And for the same reason it is improper for the court to say to the jury that if they should find that three witnesses are of equal credibility and weight, and that the testimony of two of them conflict with the other, they may disregard the testimony of the latter; such instruction invades the province of the jury. 49 But to state that other things being equal the greater number of witnesses would carry the greater weight has been held to be proper. 50 So, a charge stating that "a case might arise in which a jury would be justified in finding a verdict for the defendant on the testimony of one witness against the testimony of any greater number of witnesses" is not improper. 51 Also a charge stating that the preponderance of the evidence is not alone to be determined by the entire number of witnesses, but also by their means of knowledge, conduct and demeanor in testifying, their interest or lack of interest, if any, in the suit, the probability or improbability of their statements, and the facts and circumstances shown on the trial which might go to determine the weight of their testimony, is proper. 52 An. instruction which charges that the plaintiff must prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence, and that the jury should dispassionately weigh all the evidence, giving weight to the several witnesses as their character, intelligence, manner and testimony warrant, and to try to reconcile all statements so that all may appear to have told the truth, is equivalent to stating that preponderance does not consist in the greater numerical array of witnesses. 53 48 Christmam v. Ray, 42 111. App. ^ P. v. Chun Heong, 86 Cal. 329, 111. 24 Pac. 1021. 49Childs v. S. 76 Ala. 93; Amis 52 Buck v. Hogeboom (Neb.), 90 v. Cameron, 55 Ga. 449; Johnson N. W. 635; Pfaffenback v. Lake S. v. P. 140 111. 350, 29 N. E. 895; & M. S. R. Co. 142 Ind. 246. 41 N. Armstrong v. S. 83 Ala. 49, 3 So. E. 530; Meyer v. Mead, 83 111. App. 431; Kelley v. Louisville & N. R. 19; Hays v. Johnson, 92 111. App. Co. 49 111. App 304; Kuehn v. Wil- 80; West C. St. R. Co. v. Liesero- son, 13 Wis. 117. witz, 197 111. 612, 64 N. E. 718. 50 Spensley v. Lancashire Ins. Wilcox v. Mines, 100 Tenn. Co. 62 Wis. 453, 22 N. W. 740. See 524, 45 S. W. 781; see Ragsdale v. Bisewski v. Booth, 100 Wis. 383, 76 Ezell, 18 Ky. L. R. 146, 35 S. W. 629. N. W. 349. CHAPTER IX. AFFIRMATIVE AND NEGATIVE EVIDENCE. 204. Instructions on relative weight 205. Instructions on relative weight improper. proper. 204. Instructions on relative weight improper. Whether the affirmative testimony of a witness may be regarded as stronger than the negative testimony of another witness is a question for the jury to determine. The court cannot instruct them, as a matter of law, that the former is stronger than the latter without invading the province of the jury. 1 Accord- ing to this principle, a charge stating that the fact that a person who is in a position to hear a bell ring, does not hear it, is no evidence that the bell did not ring, is improper (though relating to negative testimony), as touching on the weight of the evidence. 2 So to instruct that positive testimony of witnesses that a whistle was blown and bell rung is entitled to more weight than testimony of others that they did not hear the one or the other is improper, in the absence of an instruc- tion on the credibility of the witnesses. 3 Also a charge "that affirmative evidence of the ringing of the bell and blowing of the whistle is generally entitled to more weight than evidence i Rockwood v. Poundstone, 38 Co. v. Buck, 130 Ind. 300, 30 N. E. 111. 200; Louisville, N. A. & C. R. 19. Co. v. Shires, 108 111. 617, 632; 2 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. York, Sparks v. Dawson, 47 Tex. 138. See 128 Ala, 305, 30 So. 676. Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Robinson, s Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. v. 106 111. 142; Chicago & A. R. Co. Devore, 114 Fed. 155; Southern R. v. Pelligreen, 65 111. App. 333; Co. v. Bryan, 115 Ga. 659, 42 S. E. Keith v. S. 49 Kas. 439; Sumpter v. 43. S. (Fla.), 3*3 So. 981; Ohio & M. R. 194 195 RELATIVE WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE. 205 that it was not heard or noticed" is improper as on the weight of the evidence. 4 205. Instructions on relative weight proper. But in some jurisdictions the court should instruct the jury as to the relative weight of positive and negative evidence when requested to do so, if there is evidence on which to base the instruction. 5 Hence, according to this rule, a charge that it is for the jury to consider how much testimony of a negative character is worth, compared with positive testimony, and that ordinarily the evi- dence of a witness who swears positively that he saw a certain thing, is more valuable than that of witnesses who say they did not see it, is proper. 6 The giving of an instruction that positive testimony is generally to be believed in preference to negative testimony, other things being equal, and the witnesses being of equal credibility, is not improper. 7 So it is also proper for the court to charge that a witness who states to the best of his recollection that a certain fact is true, testifies less posi- tively than one who positively states that such fact is true. 8 An instruction stating that where witnesses testify that cer- tain facts took place and other witnesses of equal credibility, having equal means of knowledge, testify that such facts did not take place, the testimony of the latter is not negative, but should be regarded by the jury as affirmative testimony, in which case the jury should weigh all the testimony and give a verdict as the weight preponderates, is not erroneous, though argumentative. 9 In a case in which witnesses have testified as positively on one side that a fact is not true as on the other side that such fact is true, the court may properly refuse to instruct that positive testimony is entitled to more weight than 4 McLean v. Erie R. Co. (N. J.), it, Humphries v. S. 100 Ga. 260, 28 54 Atl. 238. S. E. 25. s Hildman v. City of Phillips, 106 e Rhodes v. U. S. 79 Fed. 740. Wis. 611, 82 N. W. 566; Selensky See Hess v. Williamsport & N. B. v. Chicago G. W. R. Co. 120 Iowa, R. Co. 181 Pa. St. 492, 37 Atl. 568. 113, 94 N. W. 272; Olsen v. Oregon " Southern R. Co. v. O'Bryan S. L. & U. N. R. Co. 9 Utah, 129, (Ga.), 45 S. E. 1001. 33 Pac. 623. . s Gable v. Ranch, 50 S. Car. 95, A charge explaining the differ- 27 S. E. 555. ence between the probative value 9 West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Muel- of positive and negative testimony ler, 165 111. 499, 46 N. E. 373; see is erroneous of course where there Kelley v. Schupp, 60 Wis. 86, 18 N. is no evidence upon which to base W. 725. 205 AFFIRMATIVE AND NEGATIVE EVIDENCE. 196 negative, since it is largely within the discretion of the court to give such an instruction. 10 10 Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Lorentzen, 79 Fed. 291. CHAPTER X. RELATING TO WITNESSES. Sec. 206. Jury judges of credibility of witnesses. 207. Instructions violating rule Illustrations. 208. Intimating opinion by in- structions. 209. Interested witnesses corrob- orated. 210. Praising or denouncing wit- nesses. 211. Expert and non-expert wit- nesses. 212. Witnesses contradicting each other. 213. Reconciling conflicting testi- mony. 214. Interest of witness to be con- sidered. 215. Probability, 1 m p r o b a bility, manner, conduct, bias. 216. Instructing that jury "must" or "should" consider. 217. On disregarding evidence. Sec. 218. On swearing wilfully false. 219. On swearing falsely Improp- er. 220. Impeachment Instructions based on evidence. 221. Believing or disbelieving wit- ness. 222. Failure to produce witnesses or evidence. 223. Singling out witnesses Im- proper. 224. On detectives and informers as witnesses. 225. Relatives as witnesses. 226. On competency and testi- mony of the defendant. 227. Defendant's interest Other considerations. 228. On defendant's unsworn state- ments. 229. On defendant's failure to tes- tify. 206. Jury judges of credibility of witnesses. The jury are the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses and of the weight to be given to their testimony, and the court, if re- quested, should instruct the jury accordingly, and the refusal to so instruct is error. 1 Especially where the witnesses on each i Lensing v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 39 N. E. 926; Jones v. Oasler, 139 45 S. W. 572; S. v. Washington, Ind. 382, 38 N. E. 812, 47 Am. bt. 107 La. 298, 31 So. 638; Parkins 274; Lefler v. S. 122 Ind. 206, 23 V.Missouri Pac. R. Co. (Neb.), 93 N. N. E. 154; Durham v. S. 120 Ind. W. 197; Newport v. S. 140 Ind. 299, 467, 22 N. E. 333; Finch v. Bergins, 197 207 RELATING TO WITNESSES. 198 side are about equal in number and credibility, and the testi- mony of those on the one side is in direct conflict with the tes- timony of those on the other side, should the question of the credibility of the witnesses be exclusively for the jury. 2 The court can scarcely err in refusing to give instructions which seem to have a tendency to influence the jury as to the credit to be given particular witnesses. 3 It is within the discretion of the court to give or refuse instructions as to whether any occurrences or scenes taking place during the progress of the trial, such, for instance, as where a party or witness becomes hysterical, should be considered by the jury or not in weigh- ing the evidence.* 207. Instructions violating the rule Illustrations. The following cases serve as illustrations showing violations of the foregoing rule in the giving of instructions : Where the testimony of several disinterested witnesses is not contradicted and is not inherently improbable it is error to instruct the jury that they "are not bound to believe the testimony of any of the wit- nesses-" 5 as it is to instruct that the jury have the right to dis- regard the testimony of the witnesses for the defendant if 89 Ind. 360; S. v. Dickey, 48 W. Va. a Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. 325, 37 S. E. 695; Bowers v. P. 74 111. Feehan, 149 111. 202, 212, 36 N. E. 418; Hughes Cr. Law, 3017, citing, 1036; Faulkner v. Paterson R. Co. Bean v. P. 124 111. 580, 16 N. E. 65 N. J. L. 181, 46 Atl. 765. 656; Spahn v. P. 137 111. 543, 27 * Chicago & E. R. Co. v. Meech, N. E. 688; Shotz v. P. 121 111. 562. 163 111. 305, 45 N. E. 291. 13 N. E. 524; Peoples v. McKee, 92 The question of the competency 111. 397; Jordan v. S. 81 Ala. 20, 1 of a witness is primarily one to be So. 577; Dixon v. S. 46 Neb. 298, 64 decided by the court. If the ques- N. W. 961; S. v. Todd, 110 Iowa, tion of competency depends upon 631, 82 N. W. 322; Gott v. P. 187 the existence of facts which are 111. 249, 58 N. E. 293; Southern disputed, the proper practice is for. M. Ins. Co. v. Hudson, 113 Ga. the court by preliminary examina- 434, 38 S. E. 964; Howell v. S. 61 tion to determine whether such Neb. 391, 85 N. W. 289; Tarbell v. facts exist. If, however, the deter- Forbes, 177 Mass. 238, 58 N. E. 873; mination of the question depends S. v. Tate, 156 Mo. 119, 56 S. W. upon the decision of intricate ques- 1099; Chavarria v. S. (Tex. Cr. tions of fact, the court has the App.) 62 S. W. 312; Strong v. S. power in its discretion to take the 61 Neb. 35, 84 N. W. 410; Stewart opinion of the jury thereon, v. Anderson, 111 Iowa, 329, 82 N. Dowdy v. Watson, 115 Ga. 42, 41 W. 770; S. v. Adair, 160 Mo. 391, S. E. 266, citing 1 Greenleaf Ev. 61 S. W. 187; S. v. Taylor, 57 S, (16th ed.), 81e. Car. 483, 35 S. E. 729, 76 Am. St. 5 Tyler v. Third Ave. R. Co. 41 575. N. Y. S. 523, 18 Misc. 165. 2 Mitchell v. S. 43 Fla. 188, 30 So. 803. 199 COURT INTIMATING OPINION. 208 they consider them interested, even though they are not contra- dicted or impeached. 6 So an instruction stating that the jury are not at liberty to reject the testimony of any witness because his statements may be in conflict with that of other witnesses is improper, as invading the province of the jury. 7 For the court to charge the jury to scan with caution the testimony of abandoned women, for the same reason, is error. 8 Or to instruct the jury to give the testimony of the witnesses for the state the same weight as is given to the testimony of the witnesses for the defense is likewise improper. 9 208. Intimating opinion by instruction. The jury being the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses, the court, in giving instructions, should guard against the expression or in- timation of any opinion as to their credibility or the weight of their testimony. 10 Error committed by the court in thus ex- pressing or intimating an opinion on the weight or sufficiency of the evidence is not cured by the giving of other instructions, that the jury are the sole judges of the credibility of the wit- nesses and the weight of the evidence. 11 It matters not that the testimony of a witness may appear to be false and not worthy of belief, the court should refrain from intimating any opinion as to what credit should be attached to it. 12 The court therefore cannot tell the jury that one part of the testimony of a witness is to be given more weight than another part. 13 e Berzevizy v. Delaware, L. & W. P. v. Lyons, 49 Mich. 78, 13 N. W. Co. 46 N. Y. S. 27, 19 App. Div. 365; Letts v. Letts, 91 Mich. 596, 309. 52. N. W. 54; Leise v. Meyer, 143 7 F. Dohman Co. v. Niagara Fire Mo. 547, 45 S. W. 282 ; P. v. Gor- Ins. Co. 96 Wis. 38, 71 N. W. 69. man, 83 Hun, 605, 31 N. Y. S. 1064; See Chisholm v. Preferred Bank- Ter. v. O'Hare, 1 N. Dak, 30, 44 ers' Life Ass'n, 112 Mich. 50, 70 N. N. W. 1003; Mawich v. Elsey, 47 W. 415. Mich. 10, 8 N. W. 587, 10 N. W. 57; s S. v. Tuttle, 67 Ohio St. 440, 66 S. v. Kelly, 73 Mo. 608. N. E. 524, 93 Am. St. 689. " P. v. Kindleberg-er, 100 Cal. Evans v. S. 95 Ga. 468, 22 S. E. 367, 34 Pac. 852; Shorb v. Kinzie, 298. 100 Ind. 429. See P. v. Carey. 125 10 Crutchfield v. Richmond & R. Mich. 535, 84 N. W. 1087; S. v. Co. 76 N. Car. 320; Com. v. Barry, Dick, 60 N. Car. 440; P. v. Chew 91 Mass. (9 Allen), 276; McMinn v. Sing Wing, 88 Cal. 288. Whalen, 27 Cal. 319; Ross v. S. 12 Thompson v. S. 106 Ala. 67, 17 59 Ga. 249; S. v. White, 15 S. Car. So. 512; Bell v. Ober & Sons Co. 293; Berliner v. Travelers' Ins. Co. 96 Ga. 214, 23 S. E. 7. 121 Cal. 451, 53 Pac. 922; Hudson 13 Owen v. Palmour, 111 Ga. 885, v. Best, 104 Ga. 131, 30 S. E. 688; 36 S. E. 969. 209 RELATIVE TO WITNESSES. 200 While courts may, in a general way, state what facts may be taken into consideration in determining the credit to be given the testimony of a witness, yet where the evidence is conflict- ing or nearly evenly balanced, care should be exercised to pre- vent the expression or intimation of an opinion on the weight of the evidence. 14 For the court in charging the jury, to state (that "my observation is that pretty good persons sometimes lie, and that pretty bad persons sometimes tell the truth; you should consider the character of the witness so far as you know it as bearing upon the question whether a witness would be truthful and reliable or not," is error, and is not cured by an- other instruction which states that the verdict must be based upon the evidence; that nothing is to be found by conjecture. 15 209. Interested witness corroborated. The court is not authorized to state to the jury, as a matter of law, that one witness is entitled to more credit than another; 16 or that the testimony of the one is entitled to more weight than that of the other, whether the one may be disinterested and the other interested or not. 17 Nor is it proper to instruct that "as a general rule a witness who is interested in the result of a suit will not be as honest, candid and fair in his testimony as one who is not so interested." 18 But a charge that the testimony of an interested witness should be examined with greater care than that of a disinterested witness has been held proper. 10 It is improper for the court to instruct that but little or no credence should be given to the testimony of a witness because of his ill will, although such bias is always proper to be con- sidered by the jury in weighing the testimony of such witness. 20 On the same principle it is improper to charge the jury that the testimony of a witness who is corroborated, is entitled to "Smith v. Chicago & W. I. R. 184; Grier v. S. 53 Ind. 420. See Co. 105 111. 511, 521; Wabash R. Johnson v. P. 140 111. 352. 29 N. E. Co. v. Biddle, 27 Ind. App. 161, 59 895; Lee v. S. 74 Wis. 45, 41 N. W. N. E. 284. 960: Nelson v. Vorce, 55 Ind. 455; is Johnson v. Superior R. Tr. R. Pratt v. S. 56 Ind. 179. Co. 91 Wis. 233, 64 N. W. 753. i Hinton v. Cream City R. Co. 16 Omaha B. R. Co. v. McDer- 65 Wis. 335, 27 N, W. 147. mott, 25 Neb. 714, 41 N. W. 648. 20 Norwood v. S. (Ala.), 24 So. IT Platz v. McKean Tp. 178 Pa. 53. See, also, Stanley v. Mont- St. 601, 36 Atl. 136. gomery, 102 Ind. 102, 26 N. E. 213; isBoyce v. Palmer, 55 Neb. 389, Unruh v. S. 105 Ind. 117, 4 N. E. 75 N. W. 848; Veatch v. S, 56 Ind. 453. 201 INTERESTED WITNESS PRAISING, DENOUNCING. 210 greater weight than the testimony of one uncorroborated. 21 Or that a witness may have a better opportunity of knowing the facts in issue than others, will not warrant the court in instruct- ing the jury that such witness is entitled to greater credit than such other witnesses. Where two witnesses are equally intel- ligent, equally truthful, fair and unprejudiced, the proposition may be true. But a person may have every means of being fully and accurately informed, and yet for various reasons might be utterly unworthy of belief. 22 So it is likewise improper for the court to state to the jury that the oral testimony of witnesses is entitled to greater weight than the depositions of absent witnesses. 23 For the same reason it is improper for the court to charge the jury that "where the testimony of witnesses is irreconcilably conflicting they should give great weight to the surrounding circumstances in determining which witness is entitled to credit." 24 210. Praising or denouncing witnesses. The credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence being questions for the jury to determine, it is improper to call attention to the testimony of a witness in words of praise as impressing one with its truthfulness, or to speak of the witness in terms of denunciation. 25 Nothing should be said by the court intimat- ing a disbelief of a witness. 26 Accordingly an instruction calling the attention of the jury to a certain witness who had given testimony to the bad character of another witness, stating that "he comes to blacken the character of his half- sister instead of defending her," is improper and erroneous. 27 21 Chittenden v. Evans, 41 111. 24 Skow v. Locks (Neb.), 91 N. 251. W. 204. 22 Milliken v. Marlin, 66 111. 22. 25 Little v. Superior Rapid Tr. 23 Miller v. Eglin, 64 Ind. 197, 31 Co. 88 Wis. 462, 60 N. W. 705; Hick- Am. R. 121. ory v. United States, 160 U. S. 408, Where in order to prevent a con- 16 Sup. Ct. 327. tinuance the prosecution admits 20 Williams v. City of West Bay, that the facts stated in the de- 119 Mich. 395, 78 N. W. 328; P. v. fendant's affidavit for a continu- Brow, 35 N. Y. S. 1009, 90 Hun (N. ance may be given in evidence, Y.) 509. then the defendant is entitled to 27 Spicer v. S. 105 Ala. 123, 16 So. have the jury instructed that the 706. See Hickory v. United States, facts so admitted shall be given 160 U. S. 408, 16 Sup. Ct. 327. See the same weight as if the absent Smith v. Undted States, 161 U. S. witness were personally present 85, 16 Sup. Ct. 483; Hicks v. United testifying, and a refusal to so in- States, 150 U. S. 442, 16 Sup. Ct, struct is error, Lee v. S. 75 Miss. 144. 625, 23 So. 628. 211 RELATING TO WITNESSES. 202 While it may not be improper for the court, in charging the jury, to repeat the uncontradicted testimony of witnesses and point out the inquiries suggested by such testimony, 28 yet it is improper for the court to state what a witness may have said on any particular matter. 29 . 211. Expert and non-expert witnesses. According to the foregoing rule it is improper for the court to instruct the jury, as a matter of law, that the testimony of one class of witnesses experts or non-experts is entitled to greater weight than that of the other. 30 So it is improper for the court to say to the jury that the testimony of a certain witness should be received with caution, as the opinions of such witnesses, however honestly entertained, may be erroneous, whether the witness is an expert or not. 31 The weight and credibility of the testimony of expert wit- nesses are to be determined by the same rules that apply to any other witness, and such testimony should be considered by the jury in connection with all the other evidence. 32 The weight of the opinions of expert witnesses is exclusively for the jury. 33 Hence an instruction that the testimony of expert witnesses is usually "of little value" or "of great value," is improper, in that it invades the province of the jury. The court should as S. v. Glover, 27 S. Car. 602, 4 bama G. S. R. Co. v. Hill, 93 Ala. S. E. 564. 514, 9 So. 722; Bpps v. S. 102 Ind. 20 Killain v. Eigenmann, 57 Ind. 539, 1 N. E. 491; Langford v. Jones, 488; Cunningham v. S. 65 Ind. 380, 18 Ore. 307, 22 Pac. 1064; Thornton the court should not in any man- v. Thornton, 39 Vt. 122; Williams v. ner suggest or intimate an opinion S. 50 Ark. 511, 9 S. W. 5; Wagner as to the value or weight of the tes- v. S. 116 Ind. 181, 17 N. E. 833; S. timony of witnesses. v. McCullough (Iowa), 55 L. R. A. so Taylor v. Cox, 153 111. 230, 33 378. N. E. 656; Ryder v. S. 100 Ga. 528, ss White v. S. 133 Ala. 122, 32 So. 28 S. E. 246, X8 L. R. A. 721, 62 Am. 139; Rivard v. Rivard, 109 Mich. 98, St. 334; Nelson v. McLennan, 31 66 N. W. 681, 63 Am. St. 566; Sever Wash. 208, 71 Par. 747. See, also, v. Spangler, 93 Iowa, 576, 61 N. W. Durham v. Smith 120 Ind. 468, 22 1072; Taylor v. Cox, 153 111. 220, N. E. 333; Bradley v. S. 31 Ind. 492. 38 N. E. 656; Louisville, N. O. & 31 Louisville, N. O. & T. R. Co. T. R. Co. v. Whitehead, 71 Miss, v. Whitehead, 71 Miss. 451, 15 So. 451, 15 So. 890; Stevens v. City of 890, 42 Am. St. 472; Tarbell v. Minneapolis, 42 Minn. 136, 43 N. W. Forbes, 177 Pa. St. 238; P. v. Sea- 842; Mewes v. Crescent P. L. Co. man, 107 Mich. 348, 65 N. W. 203; 170 Pa. St. 369, 32 Atl. 1082; Tatum Weston v. Brown, 30 Neb. 609, 46 v. Mohr, 21 Ark. 349; Johnson v. N. W. 826. Contra: Haight v. Val- Thompson, 72 Ind. 167; Roberts v. let, 89 Cal. 245, 26 Pac. 897. Johnson, 58 N. Y. 613; .Etna L. Ins. 32 Goodwin v. S. 96 Ind. 550; Eg- Co. v. Ward, 140 U. S. 76, 11 Sup. gers v. Eggers, 57 Ind. 461; Ala- Ct. 720. 203 EXPERT AND NON-EXPERT WITNESSES. 212 make no comments intimating its opinion as to the weight of such testimony either favorable or unfavorable. 3 * But where the opinion of an expert witness is based upon an hypothetical state of facts, and the supposed facts are not sustained by the evidence, then it is proper to instruct the jury that such opinion is of little or no weight. 35 The facts upon which the question to the expert is based must be substantially proved to entitle his opinion to be of any value. 30 And it has been held that an instruction stating that "if 'one fact supposed to be true, included in the hypothetical question, is untrue not supported by the evidence, then the opinion of the expert would be valueless," is proper. 37 Also to state that the testimony of an expert should be weighed and considered by the jury with caution, is improper, in that it singles out the witness and discredits his testimony. 38 Or an in- struction which assumes or conveys the impression that an exam- ination made by an expert may not have been impartial is erro- neous. 39 212. Witnesses contradicting each other. The fact that two witnesses directly contradict each other does not warrant the giving of an instruction that the evidence is balanced unless there is some other circumstance corroborating the one or the other, 40 or that where two witnesses have contradicted each 3*Eggers v. Eggers, 57 Ind. 461; Laflin v. Chicago, W. & N. R. Co. P. v. Webster, 59 Hun (N. Y.), 398; 33 Fed. 422; S. v. Owen, 72 N. Car Persons v. S. 90 Tenn. 291, 16 S. W. 605. 726; Pannell v. Com. 86 Pa. St. 260; 35 Goodwin v. S. 96 Ind. 550; Hall Reichenbach v. Ruddach, 127 Pa. v. Rankin, 87 Iowa, 261, 57 N. W. 564, 18 Atl. 432; Kansas City, W. & 217. N, W. R. Co. v. Ryan, 49 Kas. 1, 30 Hovey v. Chase, 52 Me. 304, 83 Pac. 108; Williams v. S. 50 Ark. 511, Am. Dec. 514; Treat v. Bates, 27 9 S. W. 598; Brush v. " Smith, 111 Mich. 390. Iowa, 217, 82 N. W. 467; Long v. ^ P. v. Foley, 64 Mich. 148, 31 Travellers' Ins. Co. 113 Iowa, 259, 85 N. W. 94. But see Epps v. S. 102 N. W. 24; Bever v. Spangler, 93 Ind. 539, 1 N. E. 491. Iowa 576, 61 N. W. 1072; P. v. Van- 38 Gustafson v. Seattle Tr. Co. 28 derhoof, 71 Mich. 158, 39 N. W. 28; Wash. 227, 68 Pac. 721. In re Blake's Wall v. S. 112 Ga. 336, 37 S. E. 371; Estate, 136 Cal. 306, 68 Pac. 827. Maynard v. Vinton, 59 Mich. 139, See S. v. McCullough, 114 Iowa, 532, 26 N. W. 401; Melvin v. Easly, 46 87 N. W. 503, 55 L. R. A. 378; P. v. N. Car. 386. Seaman, 107 Mich. 348, 65 N. W. Contra, holding entitled to great 203; Coleman v. Adair, 75 Miss. 660, Weight: Tinney v. New Jersey 23 So. 369. Steamboat Co. 12 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.), 39 s. v. Rathbun, 74 Conn. 524, 51 3; St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Atl. 540. Phillips, 66 Fed. 35; S. v. Reidell, > Sickle v. Wolf, 91 Wis. 396, 9 Houst. (Del.), 479, 14 Atl. 550; 213 RELATING TO WITNESSES. 204 other that one of them has told a falsehood. 41 An instruction that the jury may disregard the testimony of certain witnesses for the reason that they had contradicted each other is errone- ous; the jury may, in their judgment, give credit to some of them and disregard the others, notwithstanding such contradic- tion. 42 So a charge that if the state has but one witness who swears to the guilt of the accused, and the accused contradicts the testimony of such witness and swears to his innocence, then the facts are uncertain and leaves the question of the guilt of the accused in doubt, is erroneous. 43 But it has been held that an instruction which in substance charges that if the plain- tiff and the defendant as witnesses are equally credible, and con- tradict each other on material facts, then there is no preponder- ance in favor of the plaintiff, and that the fact that they disagree in their testimony, if each honestly has stated the facts as he understood them to be, would not of itself warrant them in discrediting either of them, is not objectionable as invading the province of the jury. 44 An instruction that if the jury believe a certain witness and that the facts as testified to by him are true, they shall find for the plaintiff; but that if they do not believe him, and believe the facts are as testified to by other wit- nesses, they shall find for the defendant, is proper. 45 213. Reconciling conflicting testimony. Where the testi- mony of the witnesses is conflicting it is proper for the court to charge that the jury should reconcile any conflicts, if they can do so, in order to give effect to the testimony of all the wit- nesses. 46 But the contrary seems to be the rule in Texas. Thus it has been held to be improper for the court to charge the jury that "you will reconcile any conflicts in the evidence if you can, so as to give effect to all the testimony; but if you 64 N. W. 1028. Compare Chicago Cottrell v. Piatt, 101 Iowa, 231, & E. T. R. Co. v. Rains, 203 111. 70 N. W. 177. 422, 67 N. E. 840. 45 Harris v. Murphy, 119 N Car. 41 P. v. Brow, 35 N. Y. S. 1009, 34, 25 S. E. 708, 56 Am. St. 656. 90 Hun, 509. *e Price v. S. 114 Ga. 855, 40 S. E. 42 s. v. Bazile, 50 La. Ann. 21, 23 1015; Steen v. Sanders, 116 Ala. 155, So. 8. See Goodhue v. Farmers' 'w. 22 So. 498; Walters v. Philadelphia Co. v. Davis, 81 Minn. 210, 83 N. W. Tr. Co. 161 Pa. St. 36, 28 Atl. 941; 531. Ter. v. Gonzales (N. Mex.), 68 Pac. 43 S. v. Johnson, 48 La. Ann. 87, 925; Oliver v. Columbia N. & L. R. 19 So. 213. See McLean v. Clark, 47 Co. 65 S. Car. 1, 43 S. E. 307. Ga. 24. 205 RECONCILING TESTIMONY INTEREST OF WITNESS. 214 cannot, you will decide which of the witnesses is entitled to the greater credibility and weight, and in so determining, you may consider the intelligence, interest, bias, or prejudice, if any. of said witnesses as well as their manner of testifying, ' ' the court holding it to be a comment on the weight of the evidence. 47 214. Interest of witness to be considered. In determining the weight to be given to the testimony of the witnesses, in either a civil or criminal case, the court, in charging the jury, may state that they have the right to take into consideration the interest, if any, a witness may have in the result of the suit, together with all the other evidence in the case. 48 Especially where the plaintiff or defendant, when a witness in his own behalf, is contradicted on material matters by other credible evidence, is it the duty of the court, if so requested, to instruct the jury as to his interest, if any, in the result of the suit. 49 Accordingly an instruction stating that while the defendant is a competent witness, yet the jury have a right to take into con- sideration his interest in the result of the trial, and all the facts and circumstances in the case, and give his testimony only such weight as they, in their judgment, think it entitled to, is proper. 50 It is not error to instruct that the presumption that a witness will speak the truth may be repelled by proof of his interest or bias. This amounts to telling them that interest and bias 47 Kellog v. McCabe (Tex. Cv. 139, 18 So. 306; S. v. Ryan, 113 Iowa, App.), 38 S. W. 542; Houston, E. & 536, 85 N. W. 812; P. v. O'Neil, 67 W. T. R. Co. v. Richards (Tex. Cv. Gal. 378, 7 Pac. 790; P. v. Calvin, 60 App.), 49 S. W. 687. See Crane v. Mich. 114, 26 N. W. 851; Hellyer v. S. Ill Ala. 45, 20 So. 590. P. 186 111. 550, 58 N. E. 245; Ham- 48 Ammerman v. Teeter, 49 111. ilton v. S. 62 Ark. 543, 36 S. W. 402; Evans v. Lipscomb, 31 Ga. 71; 1065; S. v. McCann, 16 Wash. 249, Lampe v. Kennedy, 60 Wis. 100, 18 47 Pac. 443; S. v. Carey, 15 Wash. N. W. 730; Hellyer v. P. 186 111. 550, 549, 46 Pac. 1050; S. v. Fiske, 63 58 N. E. 245; Chezem v. S. 56 Neb. Conn. 392, 28 Atl. 572; S. v. Turner, 496, 76 N. W. 1056; Lynch v. Bates, 110 Mo. 196, 19 S. W. 645; Emery v. 139 Ind. 206, 38 N. E. 806; Smith v. S. 101 Wis. 627, 78 N. W. 145; P. S. 142 Ind. 288, 41 N. E. 595. v. Hertz, 105 Cal. 660, 39 Pac. 32; 40 Becker v. Woarms, 76 N. Y. S. Ter. v. Gatliff (Okla.), 37 Pac. 809; 438, 72 App. Div. 196. See Lan- P. v. Hitchcock, 104 Cal. 482, 38 cashire Ins. Co. v. Stanley, 70 Ark. Pac. 198; P. v. Jones, 24 Mich. 216. 1, 62 S. W. 66; Kavanaugh v. City See, also, S. v. McGinnis, 76 Mo. of Wausau (Wis.), 98 N. W. 553. 326; S. v. Zorn, 71 Mo. 415; S. v. BO Barmby v. Wolfe, 44 Neb. 77. Bohan, 19 Kas. 35. 62 N. W. 318; Smith v. S. 107 Ala. 215 RELATING TO WITNESSES. 206 may be considered by them in weighing the testimony of the witness. 01 215. Probability, improbability, manner, conduct, bias. The court may instruct that the jury may consider the inherent probability or improbability of the testimony of the witnesses; 52 that they may also consider any feeling, bias or partiality shown |by the witnesses, if any. 53 And it is also proper to instruct that the jury may take into consideration the manner, conduct and appearance of a witness while on the witness stand; 54 and the jury may also consider the intelligence or want of intelli- gence of a witness in weighing his testimony. 55 But to instruct that the jury may consider the demeanor and conduct of the accused as a witness, "during the trial," is error. 56 But in Texas the courts hold that an instruction which directs the jury that in determining the truth of the testimony they may consider the inelligence, interest, and apparent bias or prejudice of the witnesses is erroneous, in that it invades the province of the jury. 57 And in the same state, charging the jury that "in passing on the credibility of the witnesses, you may 6i P. v. Amaya, 134 Cal. 531, 66 Pac. 794. 52 McNeile v. Cridland, 6 Pa. Super. Ct. 428; Hale Elevator Co. v. Hall, 201 111. 131, 66 N. E. 249; As- py v. Botkins, 160 Ind. 170, 66 N. E. 462. 53 Blashfield Instructions, 260, citing: S. v. Nat, 51 N. Car. 114 (feeling); Telker v. S. 54 Ark. 489, 16 S. W. 663; S. v. Bohan, 19 Kas. 35; P. v. Cronin, 34 Cal. 192; P. v. Wheeler, 65 Cal. 77, 2 Pac. 892; S. v. Streeter, 20 Nev. 403, 22 Pac. 758; S. v. Fiske, 63 Conn. 392, 28 Atl. 572; S. v. Adair, 160 Mo. 392, 61 S. W. 187. Contra: Oliver v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 42 S. W. 554; Isham v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 41 S. W. 622. s* S. v. Adair, 160 Mo. 391, 61 S. W. 187; Georgia Home Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 102 Ga. 106, 29 S. E. 148; S. v. Hoshor, 26 Wash. 643, 67 Pac. ,.386; S. v. Burton, 27 Wash. 528, 67 Pac. 1097; Brown v. Stacy, 5 Ark. 403; Ter. v. Leyba (N. Mex.), 47 Pac. 718. But see P. v. Newcomer, 118 Cal. 263, 50 Pac. 405. " North C. St. R. Co. v. Wellner, 206 111. 277, 69 N. E. 6. See Penn- sylvania Co. v. Hunsley, 23 Ind. App. 37, 54 N. E. 1071. An instruction that the jury, in weighing the testimony of wit- nessses may consider the fact that they were called by the court is improper. The testimony of wit- nesses called by the court must be subjected to the same tests as that of other witnesses, Smith v. City of Seattle (Wash.), 74 Pac. 676. 56 Purdy v. P. 140 111. 46, 29 N. E. 700; Vale v. P. 161 111. 310, 43 N. E. 1091. The jury may be directed that they have a right to consider their knowledge of men which they have acquired in their experience, Cin- cinnati, H. & I. R. Co. v. Cregor, 150 Ind. 625, 50 N. E. 760. 57 Doggett v. S. 39 Tex. Cr. App. 5, 44 S. W. 842- Williams v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 40 S. W. 801; Isham v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 41 S. W. 622; Harrell v. S. 37 Tex. Cr. App. 612, 40 S. W.' 799. See Lan- caster v. S. 36 Tex. Cr. App. 16, 35 S. W. 165. 207 WEIGHING TESTIMONY CONSIDERATIONS. 217 consider the age, intelligence, interest in the case, apparent prejudice, if any, and all the other circumstances in evidence before you," is held to be improper as bearing upon the weight of the evidence. 58 And this same rule prevails in other states besides Texas. ou 216. Instructions that jury "must" or "should" consider. A charge that in determining the credibility of the witnesses and of the weight of their testimony the jury must take into consideration the interest, the appearance upon the witness stand, the intelligence, the opportunities for learning the truth con- cerning the things testified about, the apparent candor and cor- rectness of the statements as compared with the usual and ordi- nary nature of things, is not objectionable in the use of the word "must." It is the duty of the jury to consider these things in weighing the testimony. "Must" implies no more than the idea of duty. 60 It has been held that a charge directing the jury that they "should" take into consideration the intelli- gence of a witness is improper. The jury may, or are at liberty to take into consideration the intelligence of a witness, but they are not bound to do so. 61 217. On disregarding testimony. While the jury cannot arbitrarily disregard the testimony of a credible witness, 02 yet they are not bound to believe the testimony of a witness merely because he has sworn positively to a material fact or state of facts, and it is proper for the court so to instruct them. Thus, cs Oliver v. S. (Tex. Cv. App.), 42 Ind. 368, 39 N. B. 390. The follow- S. W. 554; Peny v. S. (Tex. Or. ing cases in Indiana are no longer App.), 42 S. W. 297; Shields v. S. authority on this proposition: 39 Tex. Cr. App. 13, 44 S. W. 844; Woolen v. Whitacre, 91 Ind. 502; Houston, B. & W. T. R. Co. v. Run- Unruh v. S. 105 Ind. 118, 4 N. E. nels (Tex.), 47 S. W. 971. 453; Duval v. Kenton, 127 Ind. 178. BO Buckley v. S. 62 Miss. 705 (de- ei Smith v. S. 142 Ind. 288, 41 N. fendant); Wright v. Com. 85 Ky. E. 595; Pennsylvania Co. v. Huns- 123, 2 S. W. 904. ley, 23 Ind. App. 37, 54 N. E. 1071. eo Fifer v. Hitter, 159 Ind. 11, 64 See S. v. Bryant (Mo.), 35 S. W. N. E. 463; Keesier v. S. 154 Ind. 597 ("should" or "may"); Wabash 242, 56 N. E. 232; S. v. Dotson, 26 R. Co. v. Biddle, 27 Ind. App. 161, 59 Mont. 305, 67 Pac. 938; Stanley v. N. E. 284. See also Bird v. S. 107 Cedar Rapids & M. C. R. Co. 119 Ind. 154, 8 N. E. 14; Unruh v. S. Iowa, 526, 93 N. W. 489; City of 105 Ind. 118, 4 N. E. 453. Harvard v. Crouch, 47 Neb. 133, 66 02 Hall v. S. 134 Ala. 90, 32 So. N. W. 276 (interest) ; S. v. Hilsabeck 750; McMahon v. P. 120 111. 584, (Mo.), 34 S. W. 38; Deal v. S. 140 11 N. E. 883. 218 RELATING TO WITNESSES. 208 an instruction that the jury are not necessarily bound to believe anything to be a fact because a witness has stated it to be so, provided the jury believe, from the evidence, that such witness is mistaken or has sworn wilfully falsely as to such fact, is proper.' 53 And where the testimony of the witnesses appears to be wholly irreconcilable and the credibility of some of them is questioned, it is proper for the court to instruct that the jury may entirely or in part disregard the testimony of any witness they believe to have testified wilfully falsely. 64 But to instruct that the jury may disregard the testimony of any witness interested in the result of the trial, "if in their judgment it is right to do so," is improper. 65 So to instruct that the jury may, if they think proper, disregard the testimony of any witness, if for any reason they believe it to be untrue, is error. 66 Or to instruct that the jury are not at liberty to disregard the testimony of a witness who has been corroborated by other credible evi- dence, is error if the word "disregard" may be considered as synonymous with the words "refuse to consider," as implying that the testimony of an uncorroborated witness need not be con- sidered by them. 67 218. On swearing wilfully falsely. The jury may disregard the entire testimony of a witness where the evidence shows that he has wilfully or knowingly sworn falsely to a material matter unless his testimony is corroborated by other credible evidence, and it is error for the court to refuse to so instruct. 68 Especially should such an instruction be given for the defendant, es Goss Printing Pr. v. Lempke, mer v. S. Ill Ga. 839, 36 S. E. 233; 191 111. 201, 60 N. E. 968. See also Churchwell v. S. 117 Ala. 124, 23 Davis v. Northern E. R. Co. 170 So. 72; Osborn v. S. 125 Ala. 106, 27 111. 602, 48 N. E. 1058; S. v. Small- So. 758; Yundt v. Hartrunft. 41 wood, 75 N. Car. 104. 111. 16: P. v. Wilder, 134 Cal. 182, 66 e* Gerdes v. Christopher & S. A. Pac. 228; S. v. Perry, 41 W. Va. I. & F. Co. (Mo.), 27 S. W. 615. 641, 24 S. E. 634; Bunce v. Mc- 65 Rucker v. S. (Miss.), 18 So. Mahon, 6 Wyo. 24, 42 Pac. 23, (held 121. not singling out witness); P. v. 6 Rylee v. S. 75 Miss. 352, 22 So. Petmecky, 99 N. Y. 415 (defendant), 890; Jackson v. Com. 17 Ky. L. R. 2 N. E. 145; Mead v. McGraw, 1350, 34 S. W. 901. Compare, Hun- 19 Ohio St. 61; Seligman v. Rogers, ter v. S. 29 Fla. 486, 10 So. 730. 113 Mo. 642, 21 S. W. 94; Bevelot v. 67 p. v . Compton (Cal.), 56 Pac. Lestrade, 153 111. 625, 38 N. E. 1056; 44. Lyts v. Keevey, 5 Wash. 606, 32 68 Rider v. P. 110 111. 11; Plum- Pac. 534. 209 WITNESS SWEARING FALSELY. 219 in a criminal case, where one of like nature has been given for the prosecution. 69 And it is proper to instruct that if the jury conclude that any witness has sworn wilfully falsely as to any material matter they may reject or treat as untrue the whole or any part of his testimony. 70 But the jury are not bound to reject the whole of the testimony of such witness and they may be so instructed by the court. 71 It is the privilege of the jury in such case to disregard the testimony of such a witness, but the court cannot, as a matter of law, direct that they "should" disbelieve it. 72 But it has been held that the giving of such an instruction is within the sound discretion of the court, and the refusal to give it is not to be regarded as of sufficient error upon which to reverse, especially where other instructions given relating to the credi- bility of the witnesses cover the omission. 73 An error com- mitted by using the word "intentionally" in an instruction instead of "knowingly and wilfully," as to the credibility of a witness is harmless, when the instruction is read in connection .with another, charging that in determining the weight to be given to the testimony of witnesses, the jury may consider their appearance and manner and interest in the suit. 74 219. On swearing falsely Improper. An instruction advis- ing the jury that they are at liberty to disregard the testimony of a witness if he has intentionally misstated or concealed material facts which does not contain the qualifying clause, to wit, "unless his testimony is corroborated by other credible 69 Gorgo v. P. 100 111. App. 130. 351. Contra: S. v. Hale, 156 Mo. TO S. v. Martin, 124 Mo. 514, 28 102, 56 S. W. 881; S. v. Kellerman, 8. W. 12; First Nat. Bank v. Min- 14 Kas. 135; Dunlop v. Patterson, neapolis & N. E. Co. 11 N. Dak. 280. 5 Cow. (N. Y.), 243; Stoffer v. S. 91 N. W. 436 (omitting the words 15 Ohio St. 47; S. v. Musgrave, "material matter" does not render 43 W. Va. 672, 28 S. E. 813; S. v. the instruction bad). Burton (Ala.), 22 So. 585; McClellan 71 S. v. Thompson, 21 W. Va. v. S. 117 Ala. 140, 23 So. 653; 746. Wastl v. Montana N. R. Co. 17 Mont. 72Higbee v. McMillan, 18 Kas. 213, 42 Pac. 772. 133; Reynold v. -Greenbaum, 80 111. 73 Cicero St. R. Co. v. Brown, 193 416; P. v. Oldham, 111 Cal. 648, 44 111. 279, 61 N. E. 1093; S. v. Hick- Pac. 312; Callanan v. S. 24 Iowa, man, 95 Mo. 322, 8 S. W. 252; S. 441; Lowe v. S. 88 Ala. 8, 7 So. 97; v. Banks, 40 La. Ann. 736, 5 So. 18. Litton v. Young, 2 Mete. (Ky.), 74 Noyes v. Tootle, 48 S. W. 1031; 565; P. v. O'Neil, 109 N. Y. 251, 16 McClure v. Williams, 65 111. 390 N. E. 68; Senter v. Carr, 15 N. H. (wilfully or knowingly). 220 RELATING TO WITNESSES. 210 evidence," is erroneous. 75 And the words "unless his testi- mony is corroborated by the statements of other credible wit- nesses," will not alone answer, as the corroboration may be by any credible evidence or by facts inferable therefrom. 76 Also such an instruction must embody the idea that the testimony was wilfully, corruptly or intentionally given by the witness. 77 The mere fact that a witness has sworn falsely on some mate- rial point will not authorize the jury to disregard his testimony. The testimony of the witness must not only be false, but know- ingly or corruptly false before the jury are at liberty to disre- gard it; a witness might even swear corruptly falsely on a material matter and if portions of his testimony are corrob- orated by other credible evidence, it would not necessarily follow that all his testimony should be disregarded. 78 And the instruc- tion must confine the false swearing to a material matter in issue. 79 And it should be so drawn as to apply to all the wit- nesses and not single out a particular witness. 80 220. Impeachment Instructions based on evidence. The 75 Miller v. S. 106 Wis. 156, 81 N. W. 1020; S. v. De Wolfe (Mont.), 77 Pac. 1087; Bratt v. Swift, 99 Wis. 579, 75 N. W. 411; Chitten- den v. Evans, 41 111. 251; Maxwell v. Williamson, 35 111. 529; F. Dohman Co. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co. 96 Wis. 38, 71 N. W. 69. See Wilson v. Coulter, 51 N. Y. S. 804; Moran v. P. 163 111. 372, 45 N. E. 23; Miller v. Madison Car Co. 130 Mo. 517, 31 S. W. 574; Peak v. P. 76 111. 289; Jeffries v. S. 77 Miss. 757, 28 So. 948; McDonald v. S. (Miss.), 28 So. 750. Contra: S. v. Sexton, 10 S. Dak. 127, 72 N. W. 84. 76 Dohman v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co. 96 Wis. 38, 71 N. W. 69. Contra: Brown v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. 66 Mo. 599; S. v. Musgrave, 43 W. Va. 672, 28 S. E. 813, holding that the addition of the words "un- less corroborated," renders the in- struction erroneous. 77 Ward v. Ward, 25 Colo. 33, 52 Pac. 1105; Jennings v. Kosmak, 46 N. Y. S. 802, 20 Misc. 300; Yundt v. Hartrunft, 41 111. 10, 14; Gehl v. Milwaukee Produce Co. 116 Wis. 263, 93 N. W. 26; Prater v. S. 107 Ala. 26, 18 So. 238; S. v. Kyle, 14 Wash. 550, 45 Pac. 147 (holding that "wilfully" is implied in "falsely") ; Gottlieb v. Hartman, 3 Colo. 53; S. v. Brown, 64 Mo. 367. 78 Chittenden v. Evans, 41 111. 251, 254; Cahn v. Ladd, 94 Wis. 134, 68 N. W. 652; Shenk v. Hager, 24 Minn. 339; Childs v. S. 76 Ala. 93; Fisher v. P. 20 Mich. 135; Mercer v. Wright, 3 Wis. 645. See also White v. S. 52 Miss. 216; Cahn v. Ladd, 94 Wis. 134; S. v. Sexton, 10 S. Dak. 127, 72 N. W. 84; Skipper v. S. 59 Ga. 63; S. v. Lett, 85 Mo. 52. 7 P. v. Plyer, 121 Cal. 160, 53 Pac. 553; Ter. v. Lucero, 8 N. Mex. 543, 46 Pac. 18; Cobb v. S. 115 Ala. 18, 22 So. 506; Peak v. P. 76 111. 289; Pierce v. S. 53 Ga. 365; White v. S. 52 Miss. 216. Contra: P. v. Ah Sing, 95 Cal. 65-4, 30 Pac. 796. so City of Spring Valley v. Gavin, 182 111. 232, 54 N. E. 1035; P. v. Arlington, 131 Cal. 231, 63 Pac. 347; Argabrigat v. S. 49 Neb. 760, 69 N. W. 102. IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES. 220 court is authorized to instruct the jury on the law as to the impeachment of witnesses when there is evidence upon which to base the instructions, whether requested to do so or not; 81 and it may be added that under some circumstances the refusal to give such instructions would be error where there is evidence upon which to base them. 82 The failure of the court to instruct on the law as to the impeachment of witnesses cannot be com- plained of as error in the absence of a request for such instruc- tions. 83 And, of course, if there is no evidence tending to im- peach or sustain a witness the court is not bound to give instruc- tions in that respect. 84 In the giving of instructions -relating to the impeachment of witnesses, the court cannot say, as a matter of law, that a witness has been impeached. Whether a witness has or has not been impeached, and to what extent, is a question for the jury to determine. 85 If the jury believe a witness, it is their duty to consider his testimony, notwithstanding an attempt to impeach him. 86 The court may, however, state that there is evidence tending to impeach a witness, 87 or that there is evidence tending to sustain him, when such is the case without invading the prov- ince of the jury. 88 It is not improper, therefore, for the court to state that a witness may be sustained by proof of good char- acter or by other facts and circumstances shown by the evi- dence. 89 si Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Crancher, S. E. 39. See also, relating to "false 132 Ind. 275, 31 N. E. 941; Ford in one thing false in, all things," S. v. S. 92 Ga. 459, 17 S. E. 667. See v. Hale, 156 Mo. 102, 56 S. W. 881; Freeman v. S. 112 Ga. 48, 37 S. E. Ingalls v. S. 48 Wis. 647, 4 N. W. 172. See Smith v. S. 142 Ind. 288, 785; S. v. McDevitt, 69 Iowa, 549, 41 N. E. 595. 29 N. W. 459; S. v. Palmer, 88 Mo. 82 Wolfe v. S. 25 Tex. App. 568. 698, 9 S. W. 44; Rose v. Otis, 18 S5 Harris v. S. 96 Ala. 27, 11 So. Colo. 59, 31 Pac, 493. 255; Powell v. S. 101 Ga. 20, 29 S. E. 83 Boynton v. S. 115 Ga. 587, 41 309;. McConkey v. Com. 101 Pa. St. S. E. 995; American T. & T. Co. 420. v. Kersh, 27 Tex. Cv. App. 127, 66 se McCasland v. Kimberlim, 100 S. W. 74; Levan v. S. 114 Ga. 258, Ind. 121; Harris v. S. 96 Ala. 27, 40 S. E. 252; Downing v. S. 114 11 So. 255; Smith v. Grimes, 43 Ga. 30, 39 S. E. 927; Hatcher v. S. Iowa, 365. 116 Ga. 617, 42 S. E. 1018; Anderson T Smith v. S. 142 Ind. 288, 41 N. v. S. 117 Ga. 255, 43 S. E. 835; E. 595; Ford v. S. 92 Ga. 459, 17 Thomas v. S. 95 Ga. 484, 22 S. E. S. E. 1006; Harris v. S. 96 Ala. 24, 315; S. v. Kirkpatrick, 63 Iowa, 11 So. 255. 554, 19 N. W. 660. Smith v. S. 142 Ind. 288, 41 s* Freeman v. S. 112 Ga. 48, 37 S. N. E. 595. E. 172; Hart v. S. 93 Ga. 160, 20 so Powell v. S. 101 Ga. 9, 29 S. 221 RELATING TO WITNESSES. 212 221. Believing or disbelieving witness. It is not improper to instruct that "where it is shown that the reputation of a witness for truth is bad, his evidence is not necessarily destroyed, but it is to be considered under all the circumstances described in the evidence, and given such weight as the jury believe it entitled to, and to be disregarded if they believe it entitled to no weight." 00 An instruction that the jury "are at liberty to disregard the statements of such witnesses, if any there be, who have been sucessfully impeached either by direct contradic- tion or by proof of general bad character, unless the statements of such witnesses have been corroborated by other evidence which has not been impeached/' is not improper. 91 A charge that the jury "should consider the impeaching evi- dence introduced, in estimating the weight which ought to be given to the testimony of the witness, and should also, for the same purpose, take into consideration the fact, if they should so find, that the moral character of any witness has been success- fully impeached, ' ' 92 is proper. A charge that a witness has either told the truth or that he has perjured himself is erroneous, in that the jury are compelled to find the one way or the other without giving the witness the credit of being mistaken. 93 The failure of the court to charge the jury as to the purpose and effect of impeaching testimony can not be urged as error, where the tes- timony of the prosecution, which tends to impeach a witness, is met by rebuttal testimony sustaining him, especially in view of the general charge given on the weight of the testimony and the credit to be given to the witnesses. 94 To instruct that the effect of impeaching evidence is not to exclude the testimony of the witness from the consideration of the jury is improper, as tending to lead the jury to believe that they cannot entirely discredit the testimony of the wit- ness. 95 A charge that "against the credibility of any witness, it is a strong circumstance, weighing heavily, that he is shown to have sworn falsely in regard to some material fact," is im- E. 309, 65 Am. St. 277; See Hart v. s Smith v. Lehigh V. R. Co. 170 S. 93 Ga. 160. 20 S. E. 39. N. Y. 394, 63 N. E. 338. oo S. v. Miller, 53 Iowa, 210, 4 N. * Givens v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. App. W. 838, 900. 563, 34 S. W. 636. 91 Miller v. P. 39 111. 463. ss Crockett v. S. 40 Tex. Cr. App. 92 Smith v. S. 142 Ind. 288, 41 173, 49 S. W. 392. N. E. 361. 213 BELIEVING OR DISBELIEVING FAILURE TO PRODUCE 222 proper. 90 To instruct that "while it is the province of the jury to pass upon the credibility of a witness, nevertheless the law furnishes to the jury certain rules to guide them in determining whether or not a witness has spoken the truth, and the law authorizes the jury to discard altogether the testimony of a witness who has been impeached," is improper, in that it tends to lead the jury to believe that the credibility of the witness depends alone upon the impeaching evidence irrespective of other evidence in the case. 97 222. Failure to produce witnesses or evidence. It may be stated as a general rule, in either a civil or criminal case, that where a party makes no effort to procure certain material evi- dence which is peculiarly or exclusively within his knowledge and control, and which, if true, would rebut or meet material evidence introduced against him, the court may, in charging the jury, comment on the failure to produce such evidence and direct the jury to consider such fact in determining the issues. 98 But this rule can have no application to the failure of the defendant in a criminal case to testify in his own behalf, or his failure to call his wife when she is a competent witness and may have knowledge of material facts in issue in the case. 99 So an instruc- tion stating that "when all the circumstances proved raise a strong presumption of the guilt of the accused, his failure to offer any explanation, where in his power to do so, tends to confirm the presumption of his guilt," is clearly erroneous. 100 as Paul v. S. 100 Ala. 136, 14 So. Ave. R. Co. 8 Misc. (N. Y.) ( 449; 634. Com. v. Costley, 118 Mass. 1; Flynn 97 Osborn v. S. 125 Ala. 106, 27 v. New York E. R. Co. 50 N. Y. So. 758. Instructions on impeach- S. 375. See Nicol v. Crittendon, 55 ment of witnessed held erroneous: Ga. 497. See S. v. Smallwood, 75 Plummer v. S. Ill Ga. 839, 36 S. E. N. Car. 104. See Momence Stone 233; Strong v. S. 61 Neb. 35, 84 Co. v. Groves, 197 111. 93, 64 N. E. N. W. 410; Osborn v. S. 125 Ala. 335; Hinshaw v. S. 147 Ind. 334, 106, 27 So. 758; Paul v. S. 100 Ala. 47 N. E. 157. 136, 14 So. 634; Jarnigan v. Fleming, 99 Stutsman v. Ter. 7 Okla. 490, 43 Miss. 710; Tarbell v. Forbes, 177 54 Pac. 707; Doan v. S. 26 Ind. 498; Mass. 238, 58 N. E. 873; Dean v. S. v. Grebe, 17 Kas. 458; Com. v. S. 130 Ind. 237, 29 N. E. 911; Hig- Harlow, 110 Mass. 411. gins v. Wren, 79 Minn. 462, 82 N. 100 Clem v. S. 42 Ind. 420, 2 Green W. 859; Gilyard v. S. 98 Ala. 59, C. R. 696, 13 Am. R. 369; Com. v. 13 So. 391; Spicer v. S. 105 Ala. 123, Hardiman, 9 Gray (Mass.), 136; 16 So. 706. Gordon v. P. 33 N. Y. 501; Com. v. 98 S. v. Grebe, 17 Kas. 458; Stover Pease, 110 Mass. 412. v. P. 56 N. Y. 320; Ripley v. Second 222 RELATING TO WITNESSES. 214 In civil cases, however, the parties to a cause are included within the rule mentioned. Thus, an instruction that if the jury find there are material and important circumstances appearing in evidence against the defendant, and they further find that the defendant has not satisfactorily explained said circumstances by other evidence, then the fact that he did not testify in his own behalf may be considered in evidence against him, and that they should give such fact such weight as it is entitled to when considered with the other evidence in the case, is proper. 101 But such an instruction is not proper unless it appears that the party thus failing to testify in his own behalf has knowledge of and could give material evidence as a witness. 102 So it is im- proper to charge that it is fair to infer that the testimony of a witness is untrue, from the failure to call another person as a witness who has knowledge of the same facts and who was acces- sible and able to appear. 103 The omission of a party to call a witness who might have been called by the other party is no ground for a presumption that the testimony of the witness would have been unfavorable. 104 Where a litigant produces and examines a witness on his side of the case, the fact that he fails to call the attention of the witness to certain material facts which the witness perhaps knows something about, will not warrant the inference that the testimony of the witness as to the facts omitted would have been unfavorable, nor authorize the giving of instructions sub- mitting any such inference to the jury. 105 The fact that a par- ticular person who is equally within the control of both parties, is not called as a witness, is no ground for any presumption against either party, and the jury have no right to presume anything in respect to his knowledge of any of 'the facts of the case. 106 While it is true that a party who introduces a witness vouches for his truthfulness and will not be permitted to impeach him, yet he does not warrant the witness to be truthful; hence an 101 Miller v. Dayton, 57 Iowa, 423, 39 N. Y. S. 279; Cramer v. City of 10 N. W. 814; Blackwood v. Brown, Burlington, 49 Iowa, 215. 29 Mich. 483; Union Bank v. Stone, IOB Millman v. Rochester R. Co. 50 Me. 5%. 39 N. Y. S. 274. 102 Emery v. Smith, 54 Ga. 273. ios Scovill v. Baldwin, 27 Conn. 103 Brown v. Town of Swanton, 316. See Flynn v. New York E. R. 69 Vt. 53, 37 Atl. 280. Co. 50 N. Y. S. 375. 104 Millman v. Rochester R. Co. 215 SINGLING OUT WITNESSES. instruction that when a party introduces a witness he thereby indorses his credibility is erroneous. 107 223. Singling out witnesses Improper. It is improper in the giving of instructions to single out a particular witness, by name or otherwise, and submit his testimony to the jury and thereby give it prominence. 108 Instructions relating to witnesses should apply equally to all of them and not single out and give prominence to the testimony of any particular witness. 109 It is also quite as improper to single out and give prominence to a certain class of witnesses, such as experts, and make comments on the testimony, either favorable or unfavorable. Such practice is an invasion of the province of the jury. 110 An instruction as to the testimony of non-expert witnesses where the defense is insanity, stating that their opinions are to be received and weighed only in the light of the facts related by them; that the jury should judge of the reasonableness of their opinions from such facts, and give them such weight as they might deem proper, and that both the expert and non-expert 107 Jarnigan v. Fleming, 43 Miss. 710; S. v. Brown, 76 N. Car. 225. 108 S. v. Chick (Mo.), 48 S. W. 829; P. v. Clark, 105 Mich. 169, 62 N. W. 1117: Davidson v. Walling- ford, 88 Tex. 619, 32 S. W. 1030; King v. S. 120 Ala. 329, 25 So. 178; Smith v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 49 S. W. 583; Thompson v. S. 106 Ala. 67, 17 So. 512; Donahue v. Egan, 85 111. App. 20; Southern R. Co. v. Reaves (Ala.), 29 So. 594; Grand Rapids & I. R. Co. v. Judson, 34 Mich. 507. 109 Wells v. S. 131 Ala. 48, 31 So. 572; Winter v: S. 133 Ala. 176, 31 So. 717; P. v. Weissenberger, 77 N. Y. S. 71, 73 App. Div. 428 (accom- plice) ; Graff v. P. 208 111. 326; Arnold v. Pucher, 83 111. App. 182; Doyle v. P. 147 111. 398, 35 N. B. 372; Argabright v. S. 49 Neb. 760, 9 N. W. 102; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Winters, 175 111. 299, 51 N. E. SOI (held not singling out witnesses of one party) ; Rafferty v. P. 72 111. 37, 46; Orendorff v. Pinfronch, 65 111. App. 174; Cogwell v. Southern P R. Co. 129 N. Car. 398, 40 S. E. 202; Mathews v. Granger, 96 111. App. 536, 63 N. E. 658; S. v. Smith, 8 S. Dak. 547, 67 N. W. 619. See al- so Frost v. S. 124 Ala. 71, 27 So. 550; Clausen v. Jones, 18 Tex. Cv. App. 376, 45 S. W. 183; S. v. Mc- Clellan, 23 Mont. 532, 59 Pac. 924; Heddle v. City Elec. R. Co. 112 Mich. 547, 70 N. W. 1096; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Morgan, 114 Ala. 449, 22 So. 20. It has been held that where only one witness . was impeached by showing that he had committed the crime of perjury, it was proper for the court in giving instructions to refer to such wit- ness by name. Shaw v. S. 102 Ga. 660, 29 S. E. 477. See S. v. Jackson, 103 Iowa, 702, 73 N. W. 467. no Hayden v. Frederickson, 59 Neb. 141, 80 N. W. 494; Coleman v. Adair, 75 Miss. 660, 23 So. 369; Blough v. Parry, 144 Ind. 463, 40 N. E. 70; Jamison v. Weld, 93 Me. 345, 45 Atl. 299; Thomas v. Gates, 126 Cal. 1, 58 Pac. 315; Smith v. Chicago & W. I. R. Co. 105 111. 511, 522; Brush v. Smith, 111 Iowa. 217, 82 N. W. 467. See Bever v. Spangler, 93. Iowa, 576, 61 N. W. 1072. 224 . RELATING TO WITNESSES. 216 testimony should be subjected to a careful and painstaking inves- tigation, properly states the law. 111 Where the evidence tends to prove that other witnesses besides the plaintiff who gave tes- timony, were interested in the result of the suit, an instruction singling out the plaintiff and applying to him alone the test of credibility because of his interest is improper. 112 So it is improper to instruct that if the jury believe a certain witness they should find for the defendant, when there is other evidence tending to contradict the testimony of such witness. 113 Where the testimony of a witness has been greatly weakened by his con- tradictory statements on former trials and by his apparently imperfect memory, it is improper for the court to charge that it is the duty of the jury to reconcile his testimony, if possible ; that it is better to assume that a witness has made mistakes rather than that he has testified falsely. Such a charge invades the province of the jury. 114 224. Detectives and informers as witnesses. The testi- mony of detectives and informers, whose business it is to secure evidence, should be examined and weighed with greater care than that of witnesses wholly disinterested, and it is proper to so instruct the jury. 115 That a reward has been offered for the apprehension of a person accused of the commission of a crime, is a fact proper to be shown in evidence as affecting the credi- bility of a witness who may have been instrumental in causing the arrest of the accused; hence it is improper to instruct the jury that "the mere fact that a reward had been offered is not evidence against the credibility of the witnesses; that there must be something in connection therewith to show that the in Wilcox v. S. 94 Tenn. 106, 28 5fi N. E. 796. See City of Spring S. W. 312. But in the federal Valley v. Gavin, 182 111. 232, 54 N. courts it has been held not im- E. 1035. proper for the court to state that us Fox v. Manhattan R. Co. 73 the testimony of medical experts N. Y. S. 896, 67 App. Div. 460; is entitled to great weight. St. Grand Rapids & I. R. Co. v. Jud- Louis, Q. M. & S. R. Co. v. Phil- son, 34 Mich. 507. lips, 66 Fed. 35. n* Isely v. Illinois Cent. R. Co. 112 City of Dixon v. Scott, 181 88 Wis. 453, 60 N. W. 794. 111. 116, 54 N. E. 897; Pennsylvania us Sandage v. S. 61 Neb. 240, 85 Co. v. Versten 140 111. 637, 642, N. W. 35; Fidelity M. L. Asso. v. 30 N. E. 540; North Chicago St. R. Jeffords, 107 Fed. 402. 53 L. R. A. Co. v. Dudgeon, 83 111. App. 528, 193 note. 217 DETECTIVES, INFORMERS, RELATIVES. 225 witness testified in view of the reward. ' ' 11G But calling the atten- tion of the jury to the admitted fact that the witnesses for the state had been paid and hired to arrest the defendant is improper. 117 225. Relatives as witnesses. In passing upon the credibility of the witnesses the jury may take into consideration the rela- tionship of any of them to the defendant, if any is shown, and it is proper to so instruct the jury. 118 Thus an instruction that the jury should scrutinize the testimony of the defendant's father and mother on account of their Relationship, and if they believe them to be credible, their testimony should be given as full weight as that of other witnesses, is proper. 119 An instruc- tion that "in considering the weight of the testimony given by both the defendant and his wife, you will take into considera- tion the fact that he is the defendant testifying in his own be- half and that she is his wife, and you may consider their interest in the case and the marital relation in passing upon the cred- ibility of their testimony," is proper. 120 A charge that: "It is the duty of the jury, in passing upon the evidence of the prisoner himself, and of his near relatives who have testified for him, to scrutinize their evidence with great caution, considering their interest in the result of the verdict, and after so considering, the jury will give to it such weight as they may deem proper," is erroneous, in that it does not fur- ther charge that if the witnesses were found to be credible their testimony should be given full credit. 121 An instruction directing the attention to the testimony of the wife of the accused, stating that although the law does not say that a wife cannot swear to the truth, it does cast suspicion upon her us Myers v. S. 97 Ga. 76, 25 S. testimony, Mitchell v. S. 133 Ala. E. 252. 65, 32 So. 132. 117 Copeland v. S. 36 Tex. Cr App. i" S. v. Apple, 121 N. Car. 584, 575, 38 S. W. 210. 28 S. E. 469. See S. v. Byers, 100 us Van Buren v. .S. 63 Neb. 453, N. Car. 512, 6 S. E. 420. 88 N. W. 671. But see P. v. Shat- 120 S. v. Napper, 141 Mo. 401, 42 tuck, 100 Gal. 673, 42 Pac. 315, 22 L. S. W. 957. R. A. 790. In a homicide case it has 121 S. v. McDowell, 129 N. Car. been held improper to call the at- 523. 39 S. E. 840. See also S. v. tention of the jury to the relation- Collins, 118 N. Car. 1203, 24 S. E. ship of the witnesses to the de- 118; S. v. Holloway, 117 N. Car. ceased as tending to discredit their 730, 23 S. E. 168; S. v. Nash, 30 N. Car. 35. 226 RELATING TO WITNESSES. 218 testimony by reason of the close relationship between husband and wife, and that the jury should, therefore, scan it closely, is improper, as tending to lead the jury to believe that the tes- timony of the wife may be discredited, although they may be- lieve that she has testified truthfully. 122 Also a charge that the jury have no right to reject the testimony of the wife and daughter of the accused simply because it comes from a source in which there would be strong motives to give the most favor- able coloring possible to the evidence for the accused, is im- proper as expressing a,n opinion on the question of motives. 123 The competency of children as witnesses depends upon their intelligence, judgment, understanding and ability to com- prehend the nature and effect of an oath. 124 The jury are the judges of the credibility of a child witness, as well as all other witnesses, but it has been held not improper for the court to call their attention to the fact of the tender age of the witness when considering any contradictory or inconsistent, statements in his testimony, if any, and advise them that they are not required to consider the testimony of such wit- ness as they would that of a mature person. Thus, on a charge of having carnal knowledge of a female child, seven years old, an instruction that "you will not take and consider her statements if they are contradictory and incon- sistent, as you would those of a mature person, but you must take them as the statements of a little girl, given under such cir- cumstances as you have seen, and must weigh them in con- nection with all the other testimony," has been held not to be improper. 125 A charge that the jury ' ' should weigh the testimony of an immature child with that degree of their own common knowledge and understanding of children in the narrative of events during childhood," is improper, in that it is incomplete and elliptical. 126 226. On competency and testimony of the defendant. By 122 s. v. Lee, 121 N. Car. 544, 28 10 Gal. 66; S. v. Dennis, 19 La. S. E. 552. Ann. 119; S. v. Richie, 28 La. Ann. 123 p. v. Pom/eroy, 30 Ore. 16, 46 327; S. v. Whitier, 21 Me. 341. Pac. 797. 125 Barnard v. S. 88 Wis. 656, 124 Rapalje Witnesses 7, citing 60 N. W. 1058. Flanigan v. S. 25 Ark. 92; Warner ize Walker v. S. 134 Ala. 86, 32 v. S. 25 Ark. 447; P. v. Bernal, So. 703. #19 COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES DEFENDANT. 227 statutory provision the defendant in a criminal case is made a competent witness in his own behalf, at his election, and when he does testify he becomes the same in all respects as any other witness, and his testimony is to be tested by the same rules or tests that are applied to other witnesses. 127 And, of course, under such statute the defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed that he is a competent witness in his own behalf. 1 - 8 But the court may call special attention to the testimony of the defendant and tell the jury that they are authorized to take into consideration the interest he may have in the result of the trial, as affecting his credibility in other words, the court may single out the testimony of the defendant which is improper as to other witnesses. 129 The court may instruct as to the credit to be given to the testimony of the accused, although there is no statute expressly authorizing it. 130 But this principle cannot be applied to any other witness who may be interested in the result of the trial or related to the defendant. 131 227. Defendant's interest Other considerations. As pre- viously stated, the jury in weighing the testimony of the defendant in a criminal case shall be governed by the same rules and tests that are applied to the other witnesses, but the court may direct them that they should consider his in- terest in the result of the trial. 132 The court may also call the attention of the jury to the fact, if it be a fact, that the accused has been previously convicted of a felony. 133 Also that 127 Sullivan v. P. 114 111. 24, 27, "i p. v . Hertz, 105 Cal. 660, 39 28 N. E. 381; Rider v. P. 110 111. Pac. 32; McEwen v. S. (Miss.), 16 13; Creed v. P. 81 111. 569. So. 242. Contra: as to wife of de- 128 McVay v. S. (Miss.), 26 So. fendant, S. v. Napper, 141 Mo. 401, 947. See S. v. McClellan, 23 Mont. 42 S. W. 957. 532, 59 Pac. 924. 132 S. v. Summar, 143 Mo. 220, 45 i29padfield v. P. 146 111. 663, 35 S. W. 254; S. v. Young, 104 Iowa, N. E. 469; Rhea v. U. S. 6 Okla. 249, 730, 74 N. W. 693; S. v. Wiggins, 50 Pac. 992; Barmoy v. Wolfe, 44 50 La. Ann. 330, 23 So. 334; Kirkham Neb. 77, 62 N. W. 318; Keating v. v. P. 170 111. 16, 48 N. E. 465; P. v. S. (Neb.), 93 N. W. 980; Ter. v. Petmecy, 99 N. Y. 421, 2 N. E. Gonzales (N. Mex.), 68 Pac. 925; 145. See also Honsh v. S. 43 Neb. Bressler v. P. 117 111. 422, 8 N. E. 163, 61 N. W. 571; Newport v. S. 62; Hirsehm-an v. P. 101 111. 568; 140 Ind. 299, 39 N. E. 926; S. v. Doyle v. P. 147 111. 394, 35 N. E. Case, 96 Iowa, 264, 65 N. W. 149; 372; Pryman v. S. 102 Ala. 130, 15 S. v. Metcalf, 17 Mont. 417, 43 Pac. So. 433; Macintosh v. S. 151 Ind. 251. 998; P. v. Calvin, 60 Mich. 114, 26 See Underbill Cr. Ev. 58. N. W. 851. iso p. v . Hitchcock, 104 Cal. 482, iss p. v . Johnson, 104 Cal. 418. 38 Pac. 198. 38 Pac. 91. See Conkey v. Carpen- 227 RELATING TO WITNESSES. 220 if the jury find from the evidence that the defendant has made any false, improbable or contradictory statements in his tes- timony these matters are proper to be considered in weighing his testimony. 134 And it is also proper to charge that the de- fendant sustains or occupies a relation to the case different from that of any other witness where the instruction clearly states what his relation to the case is that he is the defendant. 135 Although it is proper to thus caution the jury in weighing the testimony of the accused, yet the court should not cast sus- picion upon it in giving instructions. 136 An instruction stating that the jury are "to consider what he has at stake ; consider the temptations brought to bear on a man in Jris situation to tell a falsehood," is improper. 137 An instruction which states that the jury, in weighing the tes- timony of the defendant, may consider the relationship of the witnesses to him, their interest in the event of the suit, their temper and feeling and their demeanor while testifying, is im- proper. 138 On the other hand, if the testimony of the accused is corroborated by other credible evidence the jury may consider it as strengthened to the extent of such corroboration. 139 To instruct that the jury are not bound to believe the tes^ timony of the defendant, nor treat it the same as the testimony of other witnesses, is improper and prejudicial. 140 But an in- struction that "the testimony of the defendant is to be weighed ter, 106 Mich. 1, 63 N. W. 990 (re- of the defendant they must acquit lating to any witness who has been him, is improper, where there is convicted of a crime). other evidence tending to prove his "I Jones v. S. 61 Ark. 88, 32 S. guilt, Naugher v. S. 116 Ala. 463, 23 W. 81; Com. v. Devaney, 182 Mass. So. 26. An instruction relating to 33, 64 N. E. 402; Sater v. S. 58 Ind. an interview between the state's at- 378 (relating to the defendant pro- torney and the defendant, stating curing false testimony). that if the jury have any doubt as i P. v. Curry, 103 Cal. 548, 37 to what was said .between them, Pac. 503; P. v. Ferry, 84 Cal. 31, where they, as witnesses, contra- 24 Pac. 33; Mclntosh v. S. 151 Ind. dieted each other, then the jury 251, 51 N. E. 354. should adopt the version of the de- ise s. v. White, 10 Wash. 611, 39 fendant, is improper, S. v. Warner. Pac. 160; Alexander v. S. 114 Ga. &9 Vt. 30, 37 Atl. 246. 266, 40 S. E. 231. 1*0 Sullivan v. P. 114 111. 27, 28 137 p. v . Van Ewan, 111 Cal. 144, N. E. 381; Chambers v, P. 105 111. 43 Pac. 520. 409, 412; Reagan v. U. S. 157 U. S Eller v. P. 153 111. 344, 38 N. 310, 15 Sup. Ct. 610. See S. v. E. 660. Mecum, 95 Iowa, 433, 64 N. W. 286; 139 Johnson v. U. S. 157 U. S. 320 Gulliher v. P. 82 111. 146; Hellyer 15 Sup. Ct. 164.' An Instruction that v. P. 186 111. 550, 58 N. E. 245. See if the jury have a reasonable doubt Allen v. S. 87 Ala. 107, 6 So. 370. as to the truth of the testimony 221 DEFENDANT A WITNESS, HIS STATEMENTS. 228 by the same rules that govern in weighing the testimony of other witnesses, but in passing upon its weight the jury may consider the interest the defendant has in the result of the trial; but that they should not reject his testimony if they believe it to be true, simply because he is the defendant," is proper. 141 Or a charge that the defendant is a competent witness, but that the jury are the judges of the weight to be given to his tes- timony, and that they should take into consideration all the surrounding facts and circumstances and give his testimony such weight only as they believe it entitled to, in view of all the facts, is not improper. 142 228. On defendant's unsworn statements. By statute in some of the states the accused is permitted to make an unsworn statement in his defense. Any such statement thus made is proper to go to the jury and to be allowed such weight as they may see fit to give it. 143 And it is proper for the court to call the attention of the jury to the fact that the statement of the accused is not made under oath. 144 It is also proper for the court to advise the jury to be extremely cautious in believing the unsworn statement of the accused. 145 But to say to the jury that the defendant's statement is "not binding on them" is improper. 146 And in charging the jury as to the statement of the accused, the better practice is to instruct in the language of the statute, although the court is authorized to instruct on the effect of such statute. 147 The failure of the court, how- ever, to make any reference to the defendant's statement is not prejudicial error where the instructions in all other respects fully cover the questions involved. 148 1*1 S. v. Summar, 143 Mo. 220, us Alexander v. S. 114 Ga. 266, 45 S. W. 254. Set P. v. Holmes, 40 S. E. 231. 126 Gal. 462, 58 Pac. 917; S. v. Met- " Knight v. S. 114 Ga. 48, 39 S. calf, 17 Mont. 417, 43 Pac. 182. E. 928. 142 Mclntosh v. S. 151 Ind. 251, T Strickland v. S. 115 Ga. 222, 51 N. E. 354; Smith v. S. 118 Ala. 41 S. E. 713; Pitts v. S. 114 Ga. 35, 117, 24 So. 55; Palmer v. S. (Neb.), 39 S. E. 873. See also Hoxie v. S. 97 N. W. 235. 114 Ga. 19, 39 S. E. 944; Vaughn 143 Olive v. S. 34 Fla. 203, 15 So. v. S. 88 Ga. 371, 16 S. E. 64; Tucker 925; Blackburn v. S. 71 Ala. 319; v. S. 114 Ga. 61, 39 S. E. 926; P. v. Arnold, 40 Mich. 715; Smith v. Lacewell v. S. 95 Ga. 346, 22 S. E. S. 94 Ga. 591, 22 S. E. 214; Harrison 546. v. S. 83 Ga. 129, 9 S. E. 542; Sledge i Hayes v. S. 114 Ga. 25, 40 v. S. 99 Ga. 684, 26 S. E. 756. S. E. 13. 144 Poppell v. S. 71 Ga. 276. 221) RELATING TO WITNESSES. 222 229. On defendant's failure to testify. The fact that the accused does not testify in his own behalf cannot be construed as a circumstance against him, and the court may so advise the jury by proper instructions. 149 And in some jurisdictions the court should instruct, if requested, that the fact that the defendant does not testify should not be considered or con- strued against him; that no presumption of guilt should be in- dulged against him because he has not testified in his own be- half. The refusal of an instruction properly embracing this principle is reversible error. 150 But in the absence of a request for such an instruction there can be no ground for complaint. The court is not bound to give an instruction on its own mo- tion, that the failure of the defendant to testify in his own behalf should not be taken as a circumstance against him. 151 "a S. v. Johnson, 50 La. Ann. 154, IBO Farrell v. P. 133 111. 247, 24 23 So. 199; P. v. Fitzgerald, 46 N. J. N. B. 423; S. v. Evans, 9 Kas. App. L. 1020; Guimo v. S. 39 Tex. Cr. 889; Shrawley v. S. 153 Ind. 375,, App. 257, 45 S. W. 694; Ferguson 55 N. E. 95; S. v. Goff, 62 Kas. v. S. 52 Neb. 432, 72 N. W. 590; 104, 61 Pac. 683; S. v. Wines, 65 P. v. Fitzgerald, 156 N. Y. 253, N. J. L. 31, 46 Atl. 702; S. v. Car- 50 N. E. 846; Com. v. Brown, 167 nagy, 106 Iowa, 483, 76 N. W. 805; Mass. 144, 45 N. E. 1; Grant v. S. S. v. Landry, 85 Me. 95, 26 Atl. 998; (Tex. Cr. App.), 70 S. W. 954; P. v. S. v. Carr, 25 La. Ann. 408; P. v. Hoch, 150 N. Y. 291, 44 N. E. 976; Rose, 5.2 Hun (N. Y.), 33. S. v. Hogan, 115 Iowa, 455, 88 N. W. isi Metz v. S. 46 Neb. 547, 65 N. 1074; S. v. Weems, 96 Iowa, 426, W. 190; Matthews v. P. 6 Colo. 65 N. W. 387; Sullivan v. S. 9 Ohio App. 456, 41 Pac. 839; Grubb v. S. C. C. 652; S. v. Krug, 12 Wash, 288, 117 Ind. 277, 20 N. E. 257; S. v. 41 Pac. 126; S. v. Robinson, 117 Magers, 36 Ore. 38, 58 Pac. 892; Fox- Mo. 649, 23 S. W. 1066. Contra: well v. S. 63 Ind. 539; P. v. Flym, Prewitt v. S. 41 Tex. Cr. App. 262, 73 Cal. 511, 15 P. 102; Felton v. S. 53 S. W. 879; Torey v. S. 41 Tex. 139 Ind. 531, 39 N. E. 228. Cr. App. 543, 56 S. W. 60. CHAPTER XI. SPECIAL FINDINGS. Sec. Sec. 230. Questions for special findings 232. General instructions unneces- are proper. sary and improper. 231. Interrogatories should relate 233. Interrogatories illustrating to ultimate facts. practice. 234. General and special verdicts. 230. Questions for special findings are proper. The sub- mission of questions of fact for the determination of the jury by special finding is proper as a preliminary step to the submis- sion of the entire case or for directing a verdict. 1 Issues are sometimes presented by the pleadings, which should be submit- ted to the jury for separate finding, as, for instance, a plea of venue.- But whether questions of fact for special findings should be submitted to the jury is a matter largely within the discretion of the trial court. 3 The practice is usually regulated by statute, but in substance it is merely the submission to the jury of special interrogatories for answers.* 231. Interrogatories should relate to ultimate facts. When special interrogatories are thus submitted they should relate to the ultimate facts in issue; that is, the answers to the inter- 1 City of Elizabeth v. Fitzgerald, (Neb.), 90 N. W. 215; Kane v. 114 Fed. 547. Footh, 70 111. 590. But see Gale v. 2 Merchants & Planters' Oil Co. Priddy, 66 Ohio St. 400, 64 N. E. v. Burrow (Tex. Cv. App.), 69 S. W. 437; Morrison v. Northern P. R. 435. Co. (Wash.), 74 Pac. 1066, action s Chicago, St. P. M. & O. R. Co. of the trial court not reviewable. v. Lagerkrans (Neb.). 91 N. W. * See Woodmen, &c. v. Locklin, 358; City of Crete v. Hendricks 28 Tex. Cv. App. 486, 67 S. W. 331. 223 232 SPECIAL FINDINGS. 224 rogatories must be conclusive of the rights of the parties. 5 A question for special finding should be single and direct, and relate to an ultimate and controlling fact in the case, and not to evidentiary facts from which the ultimate fact may be de- duced by reasoning or argument. Several questions should not be submitted in one instruction in charging as to special verdict. 7 232. General instructions unnecessary and improper. In- structions submitting to the jury general propositions of law are unnecessary and improper where special findings are re- quested.* After the jury determine the facts by special find- ings the court applies the law. 9 Where there is a request for a special verdict the court should instruct as to the nature of the action, the issue, and as to the form of the verdict, but general instructions as to the law of the case are improper. 10 Under the procedure of North Carolina the jury do not render a general verdict, but merely respond to the issues submitted for determination. An instruction, therefore, which charges that, on a certain showing of the facts, the plaintiff cannot recover, is properly refused. 11 It is improper for the court to state to the jury the legal effect of their answers to questions pre- 5 Taylor v. Felsing, 164 111. 331, C. Foster Lumber Co. 97 Wis. 641, 339, 45 N. E. 161. See Judy v. 73 N. W. 563; Goesel v. Davis, 100 Sterrett, 153 111. 94, 98, 38 N. E. Wis. 678, 76 N. W. 768; Manch v. 633; Terre Haute & I. R. Co. v. City of Hartford, 112 Wis. 40, 87 Eggman, 159 111. 550, 42 N. E. 970; N. W. 816; Ward v. Cochran, 71 Kletzing v. Armstrong, 119 Iowa, Fed. 128. See Reed v. City of Mad- 505, 93 N. W. 500; Gutzman v. ison, 85 Wis. 667, 56 N. W. 182. Clancy, 114 Wis. 509, 90 N. W. 1081; Johnson v. Culver, 116 Ind. 278, Ward v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 19 N. E. 129. 102 Wis. 215, 78 N. W. 442; Gale 10 Stayner v. Joyce, 120 Ind. 99, v. Priddy, 66 Ohio St. 400, 64 N. E. 22 N. E. 89; Woolen v. Wire, 100 437; Cullen v. Hanisch, 114 Wis. Ind. 251; Indianapolis, P. & C. R. 24, 89 N. W. 900; Nix v. Reiss Coal Co. v. Bush, 101 Ind. 587; Boyce v. Co. 114 Wis. 493, 90 N. W. 437; Schreoder, 21 Ind. App. 28, 51 N. Palnode v. Westenhaver, 114 'Wis. E. 376; Udell v. Citizens' St. R. 460, 90 N. W. 467. Co. 152 Ind. 507, 52 N. E. 799; Illinois Steel Co. v. Mann, '197 Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. v. 111. 186, 64 N. E. 328, citing L. Buck, 116 Ind. 566, 19 N. E. 453. See Wolff Mfg. Co. v. Wilson, 152 111. Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. v. 9, 38 N. E. 694. Lynch, 147 Ind. 165, 44 N. E. 997, t Cullen v. Hanisch, 114 Wis. 24, 34 L. R. A. 298; Louisville, N. A. & 89 N. W. 900. C. R. Co. v. Frawley, 110 Ind. 28, 9 s Rhyner v. City of Menasha, 107 N. E. 594. Wis. 201, 83 N. W. 303; Kohler v. Witsell v. West Asheville & West Side R. Co. 99 Wis. 33, 74 S. S. R. Co. 120 N. Car. 537, 27 S. N. W. 568; Seibrecht v. Hogan, 99 E. 125, 35 L. R. A. 808 note. Wis. 437, 75 N. W. 71; Klatt v. N. 225 INTERROGATORIES ILLUSTRATING PRACTICE. 234 sented to them. 12 The court should not state to the jury that if they answer "yes" to a certain interrogatory, a general ver- dict for the plaintiff could not be sustained. 13 233. Interrogatories illustrating practice. The following in- terrogatories were held properly submitted to the jury for answers and serve to illustrate the rule: If defendant's ten- ancy did not expire March thirty-first, when did it expire by his agreement with the plaintiff? If the plaintiff agreed to let the defendant have the prem- ises longer than the end of March, when and how did they make the agreement? These questions do not ask for the statements of evidence, but material facts. 14 In an action for causing the death of a person by negligence the following interrogatory, to wit : ' ' Was the defendant passing over the crossing in the usual way and going directly across the same?" was held properly refused, because not relating to an ultimate fact in issue. 15 In another case, the court submitted to the jury this question : Was the note (of five thousand dollars) given as an induce- ment to procure the marriage of the plaintiff to the defendant, or not, and if not, for what was it given? Answer: "It was not given as an inducement to procure the marriage of the plaintiff, but only as a bridal present, and had no consideration, and was null and void." It was not necessary for the jury to state for what the note was given; but the fact that they found for what it was given necessarily means that they found it was not given in con- sideration of marriage. 16 Interrogatories submitted for the pur- pose of having the jury state upon which paragraph or par- agraphs- of the complaint a verdict is based is not warranted under the statutes of Indiana, as not asking for an ultimate fact. 17 234. General and special verdicts. To enable a party to 12 Gerrard v. La Crosse City R. ^ Terre Haute & I. R. Co. v. Co. 113 Wis. 258, 89 N. W. 125. Eggman, 159 111. 550, 42 N. E. 970. is Coats v. Town of Stanton, 90 16 Hatchett v. Hatchett, 28 Tex. Wis. 130. 62 N. W. 619. Cv. App. 33, 67 S. W. 163. " Lantmann v. Miller, 158 Ind. IT Consolidated Stone Co. v. Mor- 382, 63 N. E. 761. See Wabash R. gan, 160 Ind. 241, 66 N. E. 696. Co. v. Schultz, 30 Ind. App. 495, 64 N. E. 481. 234 SPECIAL FINDINGS. 226 successfully interpose the special findings of the jury upon par- ticular questions of fact as a reason for judgment in his favor, he must at least have special findings that stand in such clear antagonism to the general verdict .that the two cannot coexist. 18 The special finding must control where there is an irreconcilable conflict between it and the general verdict. 19 Where answers to interrogatories are inconsistent, contradictory and at war with each other, they simply work destruction among themselves, and do not impair the general verdict. 20 An instruction that the answers to particular questions sub- mitted to the jury must be consistent with 'each other and with the general verdict is improper. 21 But to say that "it is very important that the questions you are asked to answer should be answered so that they will correspond with your verdict" is not improper, and is not a direction to the jury that their answers to the special questions must correspond with their general verdict. 22 In passing on a motion for judgment on special findings, notwithstanding the general verdict to the contrary, it should be borne in mind that the verdict necessarily covers the whole issue, and that it solves every material fact against the party against whom it is rendered. 23 is McCoy v. Kokomo R. & L. Co. merman, 61 Kas. 750, 60 Pac. 1064; 158 Ind. 658, 64 N. E. 92; City of Kilpatrick Koch Dry Goods Co. v. Mishawaka v. Kirby (Ind.), 69 N. Kahn, 53 Kas. 274, 36 Pac. 327; E. 482. See Union Tr. Co. v. Van- Mechanics' Bank v. Barnes, 86 Mich, dercook (Ind.), 69 N. E. 487. 632, 49 N. W. 475. See St. Louis is Bedford Q. Co. v. Thomas, 29 & S. F. R. Co. v. Burrows, 62 Kas. Ind. App. 85, 63 N. E. 880; Roe v. 89, 61 Pac. 439. But see Hoppe v. Winston, 86 Minn. 77, 90 N. W. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 61 Wis. 122. 357, 21 N. E. 227. 20 McCoy v. Kokomo, R. & L. Co. 22 Germaine v. City of Muskegon, 158 Ind. 658, 64 N. E. 92; Rice v. 105 Mich. 213, 63 N. W. 78. See Manford, 110 Ind. 596, 11 N. E. 283; Redford v. Spokane St. R. Co. 9 Redelsheimer v. Miller, 107 Ind. 485, Wash. 55. 8 N. E. 447. See Brems v. Sher- 23 McCoy v. Kokomo, R. & L. Co man, 158 Ind. 300, 63 N. E. 571. 158 Ind. 658, 64 N. E. 92 (citing 21 Coffeyville Brick Co. v. Zim- Indiana case). CHAPTER XII. ERRORS. Sec. Sec. 235. Immaterial error Generally. 243. Verdict clearly right and jus- 236. Verdict showing error disre- tice done. garded. 244. Erroneous instructions favor- 237. The principles illustrated. able is harmless. 238. Imperfect instruction correct- 245. Principle or element refused ed by others. or omitted. 239. Error cured by opponent's in- 246. How a correct instruction structions. cures a defective one. 240. In criminal cases Error cur- 247. Instructions contradictory. ed by others. 248. Instructions differing widely 241. Damages Defective instruc- from each other. tions cured. 249. Instructions self-contradicto- 242. Instruction assuming fact ry. Harmless. 250. Evidence close, conflicting or doubtful. 235. Immaterial error Generally. It is the duty of the court to harmonize the instructions so that they will present to the jury the legal questions in a plain, consistent and in- telligible manner; but the giving of an erroneous instruction is not ground for reversal where it appears from an examination of the charge as a whole that the erroneous instruction did no harm to the party complaining. 1 The mere fact that an instruction is erroneous will not of itself be regarded as reversible error where it is apparent that it could not have been misleading when taken in connection with other instruc- tions given. 2 i Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. 2 Slingloff v. Bruner, 174 111. 570, Krapp, 173 111. 219, 50 N. E. 663; 51 N. E. 772; Seigel, Cooper & Co. City of Decatur v. Besten, 169 111. v. Connor, 171 111. 572, 49 N. E. 340, 48 N. E. 186; Copeland v. 728; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Ashline, Hewett, 96 Me. 525 53 Atl. 36. 171 111. 320, 49 N. E. 521; Chicago 227 236 ERRORS. 228 236. Verdict showing error disregarded. The giving of an improper instruction will be regarded as merely harmless error where it appears from the verdict to have been disregarded by the jury. 3 Or an error committed in refusing a proper in- struction is harmless where it appears from the verdict that it would have had no effect had it been given. 4 Thus, where it appears from answers to interrogatories, that the jury disre- garded an error in the charge, the error is not prejudicial. 5 Although an instruction may properly submit a material fact for determination, yet the refusal to give it is but harmless error where the jury, in answer to special interrogatories, have found against the party requesting the instruction as to such fact. 6 Also where the special findings of the jury show the plaintiff to have been wholly free from negligence, an error com- & A. R. Co. v. Anderson, 166 111. 572, 46 N. E. 1125; Keating v. P. 160 111. 483, 43 N. E. 724; Porter v. P. 158 111. 370, 41 N. E. 886; Pope v. Pope, 95 Ga. 87, 22 S. E. 245; Spies v. P. 122 111. 245, 12 N. E. 865, 17 N. E. 898; Liberty Ins. Co. v. Ehrlich, 42 Neb. 553, 60 N. W. 940; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Matthews, 153 111. 268, 38 N. E. 559; Wenona Coal Co. v. Holmquest, 152 111. 591, 38 N. E. 946; Rich v. City of Chi- cago, 152 111. 30, 38 N. E. 255; Lake E. & W. R. Co. v. Wills, 140 111. 614, 31 N. E. 122; City of Roodhouse v. Christian, 158 111. 137, 41 N. E.* 748; Consolidated Coal Co. v. Bo- kamp, 181 111. 16, 54 N. E. 567; Keeler v. Herr, 157 111. 57, 41 N. E. 750; South C. C. R. Co. v. Dufresne, 200 111. 456, 65 N. E. 1075; Van Buskirk v. Day, 32 111. 266. See generally: Com'rs v. Ryckman, 91 Md. 36, 46 Atl. 311; Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Stein, 140 Ind. 61, 39 N. E. 246. 3 St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Baker, 67 Ark. 531, 55 S. W. 941; Smith v. Rountree, 185 111. 219, 56 N. E. 1139; Brush v. Smith, 111 Iowa, 217, 82 N. W. 467; Gallimore v. Brewer, 22 Ky. L. R. 296, 57 S. W. 253; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Condor, 23 Tex. Cv. App., 488, 58 S. W. 58; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Cunifte (Tex. Cv. App.), 57 S. W. 692; Murphy v. St. Louis Tr. Co. 96 Mo. App. 272, 70 S. W. 159 (verdict rendered less than the de- mand) ; National Horse Importing Co. v. Novak, 95 Iowa, 596, 64 N. W. 616 (no general damages award- ed) ; White v. Bryan, 96 Iowa, 166, 64 N. W. 765; Westbrook v. S. 97 Ga. 189, 22 S. E. 398; S. v. Afray. 124 Mo. 393, 27 S. W. 1097. See also Ash v. Beck (Tex. Cv. App.), 68 S. W. 53; International Soc. v. Hildreth, 11 N. Dak. 262, 91 N. W. 70; Sunset T. & T. Co. v. Day, 70 Fed. 364; Clarkson v. Whitaker (Tex. Cv. App.), 33 S. W. 1032; Vickers v. Kennedy (Tex. Cv. App.), 34 S. W. 458; Godfrey v. Phillips, 209 111. 584, 594. * Thompson v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 30 S. W. 667; Town of West Cov- ington v. Sohultz, 16 Ky. L. R. 831, 30 S. W. 410. s Rouse v. Harry, 55 Kas. 589, 40 Pac. 1007; Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Kelly, 150 111. 9, 40 N. E. 938; Mason v. Sieglitz 22 Colo. 320, 44 Pac. 588. National L. M. Ins. Co. v. Whit- acre (Ind. App.), 43 N. E. 905. See East St. L. C. Co. v. O'Harra, 150 111. 585, 37 N. E. 917; Indianapolis St. R. Co. v. Hockett, 159 Ind. 682, 66 N. E. 39. 229 IMPERFECTIONS ILLUSTRATIONS. 238 mitted in charging the jury on the old doctrine of comparative negligence which is no longer in force, is harmless. 7 237. The principles illustrated. A charge which states the amount sued for to be too high and the verdict returned is for the proper amount claimed, the error is immaterial and harm- less. 8 Where the verdict of the jury exempts a party from liability, the giving of an erroneous instruction limiting his liability is harmless. 9 So where the jury find that the defendant was not guilty of negligence, that renders the question of con- tributory negligence immaterial, and hence the giving of an erroneous instruction as to contributory negligence is not ground for error. 10 Where the verdict is for the defendant in an action on a contract, an erroneous instruction as to the measure of damages stating that the plaintiff would be entitled to some damages if the contract was as he claimed it to be, is but harm- less error. 11 238. Imperfect instruction corrected by others An in- struction, though erroneous when standing alone, is not to be regarded as misleading where the matter upon which it touches is fully and properly stated in another instruction; 12 or if an instruction is defective in any particular, yet when taken to- gether with others given relating to the same subject such defect, is cured the error is harmless. 13 An imperfection in an 7 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Kelly, Rosenheimer v. Standard Gaslight 156 111. 9, 40 N. E. 938. Co. 53 N. Y. S. 192, 36 App. Div. s Doe v. United States (Neb.), 91 1; Indianapolis St. R. Co. v. Hock- N. W. 519. ett, 159 Ind. 679, 66 N. E. 39; Town Shaefer v. St. Louis & S. R. Co. of Vinegar Hill v. Busson, 42 111. 128 Mo. 64, 30 S. W. 331. See Gue- 45; P. v. Flannelly, 128 Cal. 83, 60 rold v. Holtz, 103 Mich. 118, 61 N. Pac. 670, Crane Co. v. Columbus S. W. 278. Bank (Neb.), 91 N. W. 532; Pence v. 10 Scheel v. City of Detroit, 130 Wabash R. Co. 116 Iowa, 279, 90 Mich. 51, 90 N. W. 274. N, W. 59; Choctaw, O. & G. R. Co. 11 Mobley v. Charlotte, C. & A. R. v. Tennessee, 116 Fed. 23; Barnes- Co. 42 S. Car. 306, 20 S. E. 83; ville Mfg. Co. v. Love (Del.), 52 Atl. Lomax v. Holbine (Neb.), 90 N. W. 267; Oliver v. Sterling, 20 Ohio St. 1122. 400; Jacoby v. Stark, 205 111. 34, G8 12 Boldenwick v. Cahill, 187 111. N. E. 557; City of Macon v. Hol- 218, 58 N. E. 351; McMahan v. comb, 205 111. 645, 69 N. E. 79; Sankey, 133 111. 636, 24 N. E. 1027; Ready v. P. (Colo.), 74 Pac. 895; Langdon v. P. 133 111. 282, 403, 24 Johnson v. Gebhauer, 159 Ind. 284, N. E. 874; City of Joliet v. John- 64 N. E. 855. son, 177 111. 178, 52 N. E. 498; Bal- 13 Rock I. & P. R. Co. v. Leisy timore & O. S. W. R. Co. v. Spaul- Brewing Co. 174 111. 556, 51 N. E. ding, 21 Ind. App. 323, 52 N. E. 410; 238 ERRORS. 230 instruction is harmless when the instructions taken as a whole correctly state the law. 14 Although an instruction may be in- correct or misleading when severed from its connection with other instructions, by omitting some needed qualifications, yet 572; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Go. v. Krapp, 173 111. 219, 50 N. E. 663, Chicago Trust Co. v. Goldsmith, 173 111. 326, 50 N. E. 676; Peoples' C. & A. Co. v. Darrow, 172 111. 62, 49 N. E. 1005; City of Lanark v. Dougher- ty, 153 111. 163, 38 N. E. 892; Central R. Co. v. Serfass, 153 111. 379, 39 N. E. 119; St. Louis B. Co. v. Miller, 138 111. 475, 28 N. E. 1091; City of Chicago v. McDonough, 112 111. 85; Westra v. Westra Estate, 101 Mich. 526, 60 N. W. 55; Citizens' St. R. Co. v. Hamer, 29 Ind. App. 426, 63 N. E. 778; Donk Bros. Coal & C. Co. v. Stroff, 200 111. 483, 66 N. E. 29; Redhing v. Central R. Co. 68 N. J. L. 641, 54 Atl. 431 (error cured by context). Error cured when in- struction assumes fact: Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Scott, 30 Tex. Cv. App. 496, 71 S. W. 26; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Carter (Tex. Cv. App.), 71 S. W. 73 (assuming plain- tiff was a passenger). See Keating v. P. 160 111. 483, 43 N. E. 724; Hix v. P. 157 111. 383, 41 N. E. 862; Carlton v. S. 43 Neb. 373, 61 N. W. 699; Omaha Fair & E. A. v. Missouri P. R. Co. 45 Neb. 105, 60 N. W. 330; P. v. Neary, 104 Cal. 373, 37 Pac. 943; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. City of Pontiac, 169 111. 155, 171; West Ch. St. S. R. Co. v. Scanlan, 168 111. 34, 48 N. E. 149; Buck v. Maddock, 167 111. 219, 225, 47 N. E. 208; Day v. Porter, 161 111. 235, 43 N. E. 1073; City of Rood- house v. Christian, 158 111. 137, 41 N. E. 748; St. Louis, A. & T. H. R. Co. v. Odurn, 156 111. 78, 40 N. E. 559; Milling v. Hillenbrand, 156 111. 310, 40 N. E. 941; North C. St. R. Co. v. Boyd, 156 111. 416, 40 N. E. 955; Cannon v. Farmers' Bank (Neb.), 91 N. W. 585; Cleve- land, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Baddeley, 150 111. 328, 36 N. E. 965; Johnson v. Johnson, 187 111. 97, 58 N. E. 237; Dueber Watch C. Mfg. Co. v. Young, 155 111. 226, 40 N. E. 582; Ide v. Fratcher, 194 111. 552, 62 N. E. 814; Hardware & Iron Co. v. O'Brien (Ind. App.), 62 N. W. 464; Mueller v. Pels, 192 111. 76, 61 N. E. 472; Boyd v. Portland Elec. Co. 40 Ore. 126, 66 Pac. 576; Gal- veston, H. & S. R. Co. v. Newport, 26 Tex. Cv. App. 583, 65 S. W. 657; Whitney & S. Co. v. O'Rourke, 172 111. 183, 50 N. E. 242; Kenyon v. City of Mondovi, 98 Wis. 50, 73 N. W. 314; Lambeth R. Co. v. Brig- ham, 170 Mass. 518, 49 N. E. 1022; Gilchrist v. Gilchrist, 76 111. 218; Zimmerman v. Brannon, 163 Iowa, 144, 72 N. W. 439; Lamb v. Mis- souri Pac. R. Co. 147 Mo. 171, 48 S. W. 659; Mclntosh v. S. 151 Ind. 251, 51 N. E. 354; McVey v. S. 57 Neb. 471, 77 N. W. 1111; S. v. Hea- cock, 106 Iowa, 191, 76 N. W. 654; Hutchins v. S. 151 Ind. 667, 52 N. E. 403; Yundt v. Hartrunft, 41 111. 13; Meyers v. S. (Tex. Cr. App), 49 S. W. 600. See North C. St. ,. Co. v. Peuser, 190 111. 73 (exception to the rule), 60 N. E. 78; Latham v. Roache, 72 111. 182; Chandler v. Com. 19 Ky. L. R. 631, 41 S. W. 437; De Weese v. Merimee I. M. Co. 128 Mo. 423, 31 S. W. 110; S. v. Stef- fens, 116 Iowa, 227, 89 N. W. 974; Clear Creek Stone Co. v. Dearmin, 160 Ind. 162, 66 N. E. 609; Aspy v. Batkins, 160 Ind. 170, 66 N. E. 462; Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Bowman (Tex. Cv. App.), 25 S. W. 140, an instruction that a rail- road company could not charge more than the local rate for freight, instead of agreed rate, is not error where the local and agreed rate are the same. i* Maynard v. Sigman (Neb.), 91 N. W. 576; Olson v. Oregon S. L. R. Co. 24 Utah, 460, 68 Pac. 148; 111. C. R. Co. v. Hopkins, 200 111. 122, 65 N. E. 656; Arbuckle v. S. 80 Miss. 15, 31 So. 437; Jinks v. S. 114 Ga. 430, 40 S. E. 320. 231 ERRORS CURED HOW. 239 when read in connection with the others the imperfection may be cured. If the instructions taken as a whole present the law with substantial accuracy that is sufficient. 15 A general instruction which states the law correctly will not cure an error in a specific instruction, although the instruc- tions must be considered together and as a whole. 16 But if any material element or fact be omitted in an instruction, the error is cured where such element or fact is stated in another instruc- tion. 17 Thus, for instance, an instruction, though defective in that it fails to submit to the jury the question whether or not the plaintiff was in the exercise of ordinary care when injured, is but harmless error where other instructions given for either or both parties clearly submit the question thus omitted. 18 239. Error cured by opponent's instructions. An error com- mitted in the giving of a defective instruction for one of the parties may be cured by the giving of a proper instruction for the other party. For instance, an instruction which is defective in not instructing as to the proper measure of damages, in case is Toluca M. & N. R. Co. v. Haws, 194 111. 92, 62 N. E. 312; Kunst v. Ringold, 116 Mich. 88, 74 N. W. 294; Liese v. Meyer, 143 Mo. 547, 45 S. W. 282. Clark v. S. 159 Ind. 66, 64 N. E. 589. i? Hacker v. Monroe & S. 176 111. 590, 52 N. E. 12; Tomle v. Hamp- ton, 129 111. 384, 21 N. E. 800; Springfield C. R. Co. v. Hoerfner, 175 111. 634, 51 N. E. 884; La Plant v. S. 152 Ind. 80, 52 N. E. 1452; Hamilton v. Love, 152 Ind. 641, 53 N. E. 181; Gordon v. Burris, 153 Mo. 223, 54 S. W. 546; Johnson v. Gebhauer, 159 Ind. 283, 64 N. E. S55; Harness v. Steele, 159 Ind. 293, 64 N. E. 875; S. v. Martin (Mont), 74 Pac. 728; Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v. Clapp, 201 111. 434, 66 N. E. 223; Springfield C. R. Co. v. Puntenney, 200 111. 12; 65 N. E. 442; McMillen v. Lee. 78 111. 443; Orr v. Cedar R. & M. R. Co. 94 Iowa, 423, 62 N. W. 851; P. v. Klee (Cal.), 69 Pac. 696 ("wilfully" supplied by "intention- ally"); Johnson v. Gehbauer, 159 Ind. 271, 64 N. E. 855; Cnicago C. R. Co. v. Finnemore, 199 111. 1, 64 N. E. 985 (ordinary care) ; S. v. Cot- trill, 52 W. Va. 363, 43 S. E. 244; S. v. Prater, 52 W. Va. 132, 43 S. E. 230; Johnson v. Glidden, 11 S. Dak. 237, 76 N. W. 933; Graves v. Hillyer (Tex. Cv. App.), 48 S. W. 889; S. v. Prater, 52 W. Va. 132, 43 S. E. 230; S. v. Cottrill, 52 W. Va. 363, 43 S. E: 244. isWillard v. Swansen, 126 111. 384, 18 N. E. 548; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Johnson, 116 111. 210, 4 N. E. 381; Cherokee Packet Co. v. Hilson, 95 Tenn. 1, 31 S. W. 737; Waller v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. 59 Mo. App. 410; Hughes v. Chicago & A. R. Co. 127 Mo. 447, 30 S. W. 127; St. Louis, A. & T. H. R. Co. v. Odum, 156 111. 78, 40 N. E. 559. An improper remark inadvertent- ly made by the court in charging the jury cannot be said to be ma- terial error if it is retracted by the court unless it appears that the jury did not accept the retraction, Brooks v. Rochester, 31 N. Y. 179, 10 Misc. 88. 239 ERRORS. 232 the jury should find for the plaintiff, is harmless error where the instructions given for the defendant fully and fairly state the rule for estimating damages. 19 So if an instruction is defec- tive in that it fails to state that the burden is on the plain- tiff to make out his case by a preponderance of the evidence, then one given for the defendant, correctly stating the law as to the burden of proof, will cure the error in the plaintiff's instruction. 20 The giving of an instruction which may perhaps be too general on the question of negligence is only harmless error where other instructions given at the request of the opposing party properly confine the jury to the negligence alleged. 21 Also where an instruction incorrectly states the rule as to contributory negli- gence it is harmless error, where another instruction given at the request of either party states the rule correctly. 22 Also an instruction which improperly states the law as to the safety of the machinery or appliances furnished by the master to his ser- vant in his work by permitting the jury to consider whether there were safer means at hand than that causing the injury, is not material error where another instruction properly announces the rule that the defendant is not required to procure the most im- proved appliances, but was required to use reasonably safe means only. 23 In an action on a contract, an error in the giving of an in- struction which in substance states that if the defendant has shown that there was a warranty which was broken, and that the machine was worthless, the money paid on account might be recovered, is cured where another instruction charges that the correct rule is the difference between the value of the ma- chine, if it was perfect when delivered, and its present value. 24 Also in a suit on a building contract, a charge that if the jury believe that the plaintiff delivered the materials called for in iBehm v. Parker (Md.), 32 Atl. 22 Cameron v. Union Trunk Line, 199, Springfield Coal Co. v. Punten- 10 Wash. 507, 39 Pac. 128; Chock- ney, 200 111. 9, 65 N. E. 442. tow O. & G. R. Co. v. Tenn. 116 Fed. 20 Mitchell v. Hindman, 150 111. 23. 538, 37 N. E. 916; Central R. Co. v. 23 Whaley v. Bartlett, 42 S. Car. Barmister, 195 111. 50, 62 N. E. 864. 454, 20 S. E. 745. 21 Johnson v. St. Louis & S. R. 24 j. R. Alsing Co. v. New Eng. Co. 173 Mo. 307, 73 S. W. 173; Buck- Q. & S. Co. 73 N. Y. S. 347, 66 App. man v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. 100 Div. 473. Mo. App. 30, 73, S. W. 270. 233 ERROUS, CURING CRIMINAL CASES. 240 the detail plans last approved by the architect, within ninety days from the said approval, and erected the same in place of the said building within ninety days after the delivery thereof, and had "substantially" completed the erection of all the struc- tural steel and iron work in said building within said last mentioned ninety days then they are entitled to recover, though erroneous, the error was cured by another instruction given at the request of the defendant, which states that the contract requires that the plaintiffs were bound "to furnish and com- plete the same and every part and detail thereof within ninety days" before they could recover. 25 240. In criminal cases Error cured by others. In a crim- inal case the omission of any material element, such, for instance, as the element of reasonable doubt, the error will be regarded as cured when another instruction given clearly defines the term. 26 Also where the court erroneously charges that proof of the ownership of property alleged to. have been stolen, must be established by a "preponderance of the evidence," the error is cured by a general charge that the defendant must be ac- quitted, unless proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 27 The omission of the words "with premeditated malice" is not material error where the phrase is properly stated in another instruction which was given. 28 The omission of the word "felo- niously" in a charge describing murder is not prejudicial error where the evidence for the prosecution shows that the defend- ant was lying in wait for his victim, the only defense being self-defense. 29 And if an instruction for the prosecution in a criminal case is calculated to mislead when standing alone, the error will be cured if the court fully instructs the jury on the 25 Bailey v. Trustees, 200 Pa. St. 333; Bonner v. Com. (Ky.), 38 S. 406, 50 Atl. 160. W. '488; P. v. Scott, 123 Cal. 434, 56 aepoteet v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), Pac. 102. 43 S. W. 339; S. v. Wright, 141 Mo. 273. v. Goforth, 136 Mo. Ill, 37 333, 42 S. W. 934; S. v. Cochran, 147 S. W. 801; Shields v. S. 149 Ind. 395, Mo. 504, 49 S. W. 558; Skeen v. S. 49 N. E. 351. Contra: S. v. Clark, (Miss.), 16 So. 495; Barnard v. S. 102 Iowa, 685, 72 N. W. 296. 88 Wis. 656, 60 N. W. 1058; S. v. 28 Whitney v. S. 154 Ind. 573, 57 Hunt, 141 Mo. 626, 43 S. W. 389; N. E. 398; White v. S. 34 Tex. Cr. P. v. Britton, 118 Cal. 409, 50 Pac. App. 153, 29 S. W. 1094. 664. See, also, Shields v. S. 104 29 Brooks v. Com. 16 Ky. 356, Ala. 35, 16 So. 85, 5 Am. St. 17; 28 S. W. 148. Jackson v. S. 106 Ala. 12, 17 So. 241 ERRORS. 234 same subject, in the instructions given for the defendant. 30 Thus, under an indictment for embezzlement, a charge that "you are instructed that the defendant being the cashier of the bank, and having control of the cash and other assets of said bank, is responsible therefor; .and the fact that other officers of the bank have access to the funds does not relieve the defendant from accounting for the same," though erroneous, is cured where the court also charged that before the jury could con- vict they must find beyond a reasonable doubt that he actually converted the money of said bank to his own use. 31 241. Damages Defective instruction cured. An instruction though faulty in not limiting the damages claimed to the amount complained of in the declaration, will be regarded as cured where other instructions given for the defendant properly confine such damages to the declaration. 32 Even though an instruction improperly allows damages for prospective suffering and loss of health in a personal injury case where the declaration fails to make claim for a permanent injury, such instruction, though erroneous, is harmless where the evidence of the plaintiff's inju- ries, up to the time of the commencement of the suit, seems to justify the damages awarded, without reference to any pros- pective suffering or loss of health. 33 Where it appears from an inspection of the whole case that the jury in assessing damages disregarded instructions which were defective in not confining them to the evidence, there can be no ground for error, the amount allowed being reasonable as appears from the evidence. 34 An instruction, though defective in directing the jury, in determining the value of property, "to consider the evidence of all the witnesses" is cured where another instruction expressly directs them to disregard any evi- dence which has been stricken out. 35 242. Instructing assuming fact Harmless. If an instruc- 30 Rogers v. S. (Miss.), 21 So. 130. * Spring Valley Coal Co. v. Ro- 31 Ritter v. S. 70 Ark. 472, 69 S. watt. 196 111. 156, 63 N. E. 649. W. 262. 35 Tedens v. Sanitary Dist. 149 32 Calumet & C. C. & D. Co. v. 111. 87, 96, 36 N. E. 1033; Consoli- Morawetz, 195 111. 406, 63 N. E. dated Coal Co. v. Haenni, 146 111. 165. 614, 626, 35 N. E. 162. 33 Best Brewing Co. v. Dunlevy, 157 111. 141, 41 N. E. 611. 235 IMMATERIAL ERRORS VERDICT RIGHT 243 tion, though erroneous when standing alone, in that it assumes the existence of a disputed material fact, yet when considered in connection with all the other instructions given on both sides clearly appears not to be misleading or improper, the error is harmless. 36 But a bad instruction will not be cured by others which state the law correctly except in cases that are plain and entirely free from doubt. 37 243. Verdict clearly right and justice done. If the verdict is clearly right under the evidence it should not be disturbed although the instructions may be erroneous. 38 Or, when from the nature of the evidence and the issues presented by the pleadings, the verdict could not.have been reasonably different, the error as to the instructions will be regarded as immaterial and harm- less. 39 So where the record discloses that a party was nut enti- so City of Elgin v. Joslyn, 136 111. 529, 26 N. E. 1090; Chicago C. R. Co. v. Hastings, 136 111. 251, 26 N. E. 594; East St. L. C. R. Co. v. Enright, 152 111. 246, 38 N. E. 553; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Swearingen, 47 111. 210; Scutt v. Woolsey, 47 N. Y. S. 320; City of San Antonio v. Kreusel, 17 Tex. Cv. App. 594, 43 S. W. 615; Everett v. Spencer, 122 N. Car. 1010, 30 S. E. 334; Wil- loughby v. North Eastern R. Co. 52 S. Car. 166, 29 S. E. 629; Anderson v. Daly Mining Co. 16 Utah, 28, 50 Pac. 815; Cicero St. R. Co. v. Rol- lins, 195 111. 220, 63 N. E. 98; Neu- feld v. Roderninski, 144 111. 83, 89, 32 N. E. 913; Scott, v. P. 141 111. 195, 205, 30 N. E. 329; Citizens' Gas Light Co. v. O'Brien, 118 111. 182, 8 N. E. 310. 37 Quirk v. St. Louis N. E. Co. 126 Mo. 460, 28 S. W. 1080. 3 Hartley v. Metropolitan St. R. Co. 148 Mo. 124, 49 S. W. 840; Hall v. Sroufe, 52 111. 421; Perry v. Makenson, 103 Ind. 302, 2 N. E. 713; Wolfe v. Pugh, 101 Ind. 309; La- fayette & I. R. Co. v. Adams, 26 Ind. 76; Ward v. Cochran, 71 Fed. 127; Evans v. Merritt, 62 Ark. 228, 35 S. W. 212; Sullivan v. Jefferson Ave. R. Co. 133 Mo. 1, 34 S. W. 566; South Chicago C. R. Co. v. Du- freene, 200 111. 464, 65 N. E. 1075; Vogg v. Missouri P. R. Co. 138 Mo. 172, 36 S. W. 646; Secor v. Oregon I. Co. 15 Wash. 35, 45 Pac. 654; Davis v. Gilliam, 14 Wash. 206, 44 Pac. 119; Turner v. Ft. Worth & D. C. R. Co. (Tex. Cv. App.), 30 S. W. 253; Rose v. Bradley, 91 Wis. 619, 65 N. W. 509; Mehurin v. Stone, 37 Ohio St. 49; City of Beardstown v. Clark, 204 111. 526, 68 N. E. 378; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Murphy, 198 111. 471, 64 N. E. 1011. so King v. King, 155 Mo. 406, 56 S. W. 534; Wagoner v. Wabash R. Co. 185 111. 154, 56 N. E. 1056; Cooper v. Delk, 108 Ga. 550, 34 S. E. 145; Hiner v. Jeanpert, 65 111. 429; Robinson v. Hyer, 35 Fla. 544, 17 So. 745; Gruber v. Decker, 115 Ga. 779, 42 S. E. 82; Citizens' St. R. Co. v. Hamer, 29 Ind. App. 426, 63 N. E. 778, 62 N. E. 658; Baxter v. Lusher, 159 Ind. 381, 65 N. E. 211; Thompson v. P. 125 111. 261, 17 N. E. 749; Vinson v. Scott, 198 111. 542, 65 N. E. 78; Telegraph Co. v. Lowrey, 32 Neb. 732, 49 N. W. 707. See Swearingen v. Inman, 198 111. 255, 65 N. E. 80; S. v. Hill, 47 Neb. 456, 66 N. W. 541; Blackman v. Housels (Tex. Cv. App.), 31 S. W. 511; Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v. Knieram, 152 111. 467, 39 N. E. 324; Metropolitan W. & S. E. R. Co. v. Skola, 183 111. 455, 56 N. E. 171, 75 Am. St. 120; Gray v. Merriam, 148 111. 188, 35 N. E. 810/39 Am. St. 172; Vanhousen v. Broehl, 59 Neb. 48, 80 N. W. 260; Foster v. 243 ERRORS. 236 tied to a verdict under the most favorable construction of the evidence, he cannot complain of error as to the instructions. 40 Or where it does not reasonably appear that the giving of an in- struction on a matter which was not presented by the pleadings nor supported by evidence, in any manner affected the verdict, the error will not warrant the reversal of the judgment. 41 So where the evidence standing uncontradicted is sufficient to sustain the verdict rendered, error in the giving of instructions will be regarded as harmless. 42 Thus, where the plaintiff's cause of action is clearly established by the admissions of the defend- ant, there can be no ground for complaint in the giving or refus- ing instructions even though they are erroneous. 43 The re- fusal of the court to give a proper instruction on behalf of the defendant is harmless error where the undisputed evidence con- clusively shows his guilt. 44 Or if it appears that substantial justice has been done, and the jury could have reached no other result from the evidence, the refusal of instructions, though cor- rect, will not be sufficient ground for reversal. 45 A judgment will not be reversed for error in the instructions, Chicago & A. R. Co. 84 111. 164; Greer v. Lafayette Co. Bank, 128 Mo. 559, 30 S. W. 319; Thompson v. Force, 65 111. 370; Strohm v. Hayes, 70 111. 41, 45; Cusick v. Campoell, 68 111. 508; Lawrence v. Jarvis, 32 111. 304, 312; Texas, &c. R. Co. v. Nolan, 62 Fed. 552; Strat- ton v. Dale, 45 Neb. 472, 63 N. W. 875; Glover v. Blakeslee, 115 Ga. 696, 42 S. E. 40; Dodds v. McCor- mick Harvesting M. Co. 62 Neb. 759, 87 N. W. 911; Leftwich v. City of Richmond, 4 Va. Super. Ct. 128, 40 S. E. 651. Where the verdict is warranted by the evidence slight inaccuracies in the charge cannot be urged as material error: Strong v. S. 95 Ga. 499, 22 S. E. 299; Collier v. Jenks, 19 R. I. 493, 34 Atl. 998 (as to bur- den of proof); see Texas P. & R. Co. v. Reed (Tex. Cv. App.), 32 S. W. 118; Bank of H. v. Napier, 41 W. Va. 481, 23 S. E. 800. 40 Elster v. Springfield, 49 Ohio St. 82, 30 N. E. 274; Frank v. Wil- liams, 36 Fla. 136, 18 So. 351. 41 Boygero v. Southern R. Co. 64 S. Car. 104, 41 S. E. 819. 42 Dwelling House Ins. Co. v. Dowdall, 55 111. App. 622. 43 Shultz v. Babcock, 166 111. 398, 46 N. E. 892. 44 Brown v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 65 S. W. 906. 45 Ryan v. Donnelly, 71 111. 104; Pahlman v. King, 49 111. 269; Schwarz v. Schwarz, 26 111. 81, 85; Beseler v. Stephani, 71 111. 404; Jones v. Chicago & Iowa R. Co. 68 111. 380, 384; DeClerg v. Mungin, 46 111. 112; Elam v. Badger, 23 111. 445, 450; Mode v. Beasley, 143 Ind. 306, 42 N. E. 727; Jordan v. James, 5 Ohio, 88; Thompson v. P. 125 111. 261, 17 N. E. 749. See, also, for crim- inal cases: Dacey v. P. 116 111. 576, 6 N. E. 165; Wilson v. P. 94 111. 327; Dunn v. P. 109 111. 646; Ritz- man v. P. 110 111. 362; Leach v. P. 53 111. 311, 318; Meyer v. S. (Tex. Cr.), 49 S. W. 600; Mclntosh v. S. 151 Ind. 251, 51 N. E. 354; Berry v. S. 31 Ohio St. 225; Edel- hoff v. S. 5 Wyo. 19, 36 Pac. 627, 9 Am. Cr. R. 262. 237 VERDICT RIGHT ERRORS HARMLESS. 244 unless it appears that the party complaining was in some manner prejudiced. 46 Where the charge submits to the jury matters not material to the issue, there is no ground for reversal unless prejudice is shown by so doing, 47 especially if such immaterial matter merely imposes a burden on the successful party with- out injury or prejudice to the other. 48 But the giving of an erroneous charge on a vital point or con- trolling issue involved in a ease will be presumed prejudicial unless the record clearly shows the contrary. 49 If the issues are not fairly submitted to the jury the court will not be authorized to look into the testimony to ascertain whether the weight of the evidence was or was not favorable to a verdict. A party is en- titled to have the issues passed upon by the jury under proper instructions. 50 Where the plaintiff's own testimony shows that the defendant agreed to pay him only one hundred dollars for certain services, an instruction that the defendant agreed to pay him two hundred dollars is material error, although the jury ren- dered a verdict of only one hundred dollars for the plaintiff, the defendant having contested and denied the whole of the plain- tiff's claim. 51 244. Erroneous instruction favorable is harmless. A party has no cause to complain of an erroneous instruction which is favorable to him rather than harmful. 52 Thus, for instance, an instruction erroneously requiring the plaintiff to prove a matter by a higher degree of proof than by a preponderance, is error of which the defendant cannot complain, being favorable to him. 53 Submitting to the jury an issue not supported by any Easley v. Valley M. L. Asso. Pendleton St. R, Co. v. Stellman, 22 91 Va. 161, 21 S. B. 235; Stein v. Ohio St. 1. Vamice, 44 Neb. 132, 62 N. W. 464; so Globe Ins. Co. v. Sherlock, 25 Wallace v. Cravens, 34 Ind. 534; Ohio St. 67. Beavers v. Mo. Pac. R. Co. 47 Neb. ^ Pipkin v. Home (Tex. Cv. 761, 66 N. W. 821; River Boom Co. App.), 68 S. W. 100. v. Smith (Wash.), 45 Pac. 750; 52 Kitchell v. Bratton, 2 111. (1 Chase v. Washburn, 1 Ohio St. 244. Scam.), 300; Missouri, K. & T. R. 47 White v. Ross, 35 Fla. 377, 17 Co. v. Cook, 12 Tex. Cv. App. 203, So. 640; Gulf C. & S. F. R. Co. v. 33 S. W. 669; Kugler v. Wiseman, Duvall, 12 Tex. Cv. App. 348, 35 S. 20 Ohio, 361; S. v. Hicks (Mo.), 77 W. 699 (issue not essential to plain- S. W. 542. Lindell v. Deere-Wells tiff's right to recover). Co. (Neb.), 92 N. W. 164. <* McCary v. Stull, 44 Neb. 175, Doran v. Cedar Rapids & M. 62 N. W. 501. C. R. Co. 117 Iowa, 442, 90 N. W. J Baldwin v. Bank of Massillon, 815; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Coun- 1 Ohio St. 141; Lowe v. Lehman, 15 tryman, 16 Ind. App. 139, 44 N. E. Ohio St. 179; Jones v. Bangs, 40 265. Ohio St. 139 49 Am. R. 664, note; 245 ERRORS. 238 evidence but which is favorable to the party, is not error of which he can complain. 54 245. Principle or element refused or omitted. The refusal of an instruction correctly stating a principle of law clearly appli- cable to the evidence and pleadings which is not contained in any other instruction given is manifest error, 55 especially if the 54 S. v. Brown, 145 Mo. 680, 47 S. W. 789; S. v. Kindred, 148 Mo. 270, 49 S. W. 845; Miller v. Root, 77 Iowa, 545, 42 N. W. 502. The errors complained of in the giving or refusing of instructions in the following cases were held to be harmless: Bowen v. Southern R. Co. 58 S. Oar. 222, 36 S. E. 590; Blair v. City of Groton, 13 S. Dak. 211, 82 N. W. 48; Fox v. Boyd, 104 Tenn. 357, 58 S. W. 221; Shannon v. Jefferson City, 125 Ala. 384, 27 So. 977; Smit- son v. Southern P. Co. 37 Ore. 74, 60 Pac. 907; Bibb County v. Ham, 110 Ga. 340, 35 S. E. 656; Horgan v. Brady, 156 Mo. 659, 56 S. W. 294; Nelson v. Terry (Ky.), 56 S. W. 672; Ward v. Odell Mfg. Co. 126 N. Car. 946, 36 S. E. 194; Lassiter v. Norfolk & C. R. Co. 126 N. Car. 509, 3-6 S. E. 48; Searcy v. Martin- Woods Co. 93 Iowa, 420, 61 N. W. 934; Neill v. Jordan, 15 Mont. 47, 38 Pac.- 223; Johnson v. Hirschberg, 185 111. 445, 57 N. E. 26; Chicago & A. R. Co. v.'Keegan, 185 111. 70, 56 N. E. 1088; Scrivani v. Dondero, 128 Cal. 31, 60 Pac. 463; Hamman v. Central Coal & Coke Co. 156 Mo. 232, 56 S. W. 1091; Glover v. Char- leston & S. R. Co. 57 S. Car. 228, 35 S. E. 510; Ellis v. Stone (Tex. Cv. App.), 55 S. W. 758; Bussanicy v. Myers, 22 Wash. 369, 60 Pac. 1117; Sears Adm'r v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 22 Ky. 152, 56 S. W. 725; St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Mag- ness, 68 Ark. 289, 57 S. W. 33; Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. White, 23 Tex. Cv. App. 280, 56 S. W. 204; Brunette v. Town of Gagen, 106 Wis. 618, 82 N. W. 564; Grace v. St. Louis R. Co. 156 Mo. 295, 56 S. W. 1121; Austin R. T. Co. v. Grothe, 88 Tex. 262, 31 S. W. 196; Traxler v. Greenwich Tp. 168 Pa. St. 214, 31 Atl. 1090; Wells v. Houston, 29 Tex. Cv. App. 619, 69 S. W. 183; Heminway v. Miller, 87 Minn. 123, 91 N. W. 428; Hoges v. Nalty, 113 Wis. 567, 89 N. W. 535; Davidson v. Jefferson (Tex. Cv. App.), 68 S. W. 822; Logansport & W. V. Gas Co. v. Coate, (Ind. App.), 64 N. E. 638; Clapp v. Royer, 28 Tex. Cv. App. 29, 67 S. W. 345; City Trans- fer Co. v. Draper, 115 Ga. 954, 42 S. E. 221; Union Pac. R. Co. v. Ru- zicka (Neb.), 91 N. W. 543; Driver v. Board, &c. 70 Ark. 358, 68 S. W. 26; McNeil v. Durham, 130 N. Car. 256, 41 S. E. 383; Charles Schatzlein Paint Co. v. Passiuore, 26 Mont. 500, 68 Pac. 1113; Stowers v. Singer, 24 Ky. 395, 68 S. W. 637, 67 S. W. 822; Yale v. Newton, 130 Mich. 434, 90 N. W. 37; In re Reed's Estate, 86 Minn. 163, 90 N. W. 319; Westinghouse Co. v. Gainor, 130 Mich. 393, 90 N. W. 52. Held harmful in the following cases: Frick v. Kabaker, 116 Iowa, 494, 90 N. W. 498; St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Woodward, 70 Ark. 441, 69 S. W. 55; Evans Lumber Co. v. Crawford (Neb.), 93 N. W. 177; Stuck v. Yates, 30 Ind. App. 441, 66 N. E. 177; Ballow v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 609 S. W. 513; S. v. How- ard, 41 Ore. 49, 69 Pac. 50; S. v. Phillips, 119 Iowa, 642, 94 N. W. 229; Barnesville Man. Co. v. Love (Del.) 52 Atl. 267; S. v. Crawford, 31 Wash. 260, 71 Pac. 1030; Western U. Tel. Co. v. Sorsby, 29 Tex. Cv. App. 345, 69 S. W. 122; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Camper, 199 111. 569, 65 N. E. 448; P. v. Goodrode (Mich.), 94 N. W. 14. ss Bennett v. Connelly, 103 111. 50, 53; Last Chance M. & M. Co. v. Ames, 239 IMPERFECTION BY OMISSIONS. 245 refused instruction relates to disputed questions of fact which are vital in determining the rights of the party requesting the instruction. 56 And the giving of an instruction which omits a material fact or element essential to a correct statement of the law, which is not contained in any other of the instructions, is error. 57 And the omission of a material element, such, for in- stance, as "due care and caution" on the part of the person injured, under some state of the facts is error, although other instructions contain the element thus omitted. 58 Thus, in an action for personal injury, the refusal to instruct that if the plaintiff was riding a wheel at the time he was injured he could not recover, is such error that the giving of a general instruction that to entitle the plaintiff to recover he must have been in the exercise of due care, or that he could not recover unless he received the injuries in the manner alleged in his decla- ration, 59 will not mend. In an action against a street car com- pany, a charge that "if you find that the plaintiff could have crossed the street and avoided the car but for the carelessness of the defendant's driver and his impetuous driving, you must find for the plaintiff," is erroneous, in that it eliminates con- tributory negligence; and the giving of an instruction for the 23 Colo. 167, 47 Pac. 382; Ginnard v. R. Co. v. Warner, 22 Tex. Cv. App. Knapp, 95 Wis. 482, 70 N. W. 671; 167, 54 S. W. 1064; Lewis v. S. 4 Maxwell v. Chapman, 26 N. Y. S. Ohio, 397; Lytle v. Boyer, 33 Ohio 361, 74 Hun, 111; Selma St. & S. St. 506, 511; Mallen v. Waldowski, R. Co. v. Owen, 132 Ala. 420; 31 So. 203 111. 91, 67 N. E. 409. 598; New York, P. & N. R. Co. v. But the refusal to instruct on Thomas, 92 Va. 606, 24 S. E. 264; matters not material to the issue McGee v. Wineholt, 23 Wash. 748, is not error, Mendenhall v. North 63 Pac. 571; Harvey v. S. 125 Ala. Carolina R. Co. 123 N. Car. 275, 31 47, 27 So. 763; Soney v. S. 13 Lea S. E. 480. (Tenn.), 472; Kinkle v. P. 27 Colo. 57 Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Peiinell, 459, 62 Pac. 197; Brainard v. Bur- 94 111. 448, 454; Galveston Land & ton, 5 Vt. 97; Sperry v. Spaulding, I. Co. v. Levy, 10 Tex. Cv. App. 104, 45 Cal. 544; Nichols v. S. 46 Miss. 30 S. W. 504; Pritchett v. Johnson 284; Keith v. Spencer, 19 Fla. 748; (Neb.), 97 N. W. 224. Lytle v. Boyer, 3'3 Ohio St. 506; . ss Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Har- Morris v. Platt, 32 Conn. 75; Cooper wood, 80 111. 88, 91; Callahan v. v. Mulder, 74 Mich. 374, 41 N. W. City of Port Huron, 128 Mich. 673, .1084; Suttle v. Finnegan, 86 111. 87 N. W. 880. App. 423; Anderson v. City of Bath, B Callahan v. City of Port Huron, 42 Me. 346. 128 Mich. 673, 87 N. W. 880. Cora- ssBinkley v. Dewell (Kas. App.). pare: Mallen v. Waldowski, 203 111. 58 Pac. 1028. See Gulf C. & S. F. 91, 67 N. E. 409. 246 ERRORS. 240 defendant that the plaintiff could not recover if he was negligent would not cure the error. 60 246. How a correct instruction cures defective one An instruction which assumes or undertakes to state a complete case cannot be truly regarded as but one of a series of instructions in the sense that it may be supplemented or qualified by others in the same series in such manner that an error in it will be cured. In other words, an error in such instruction cannot be cured by supplementary or qualifying instructions. 61 An in- struction based upon only a portion of the evidence bearing upon the main issue is erroneous, and the giving of a subsequent instruction stating the law correctly will not cure the error. 62 On the subject as to when a correct instruction does or does not cure a defective one, the Supreme Court of Illinois has used the following language: "Where instructions which are defective are cured by others unobjectionable, the latter must either directly refer to, and explain and qualify the former, or be supplementary to the former and supply what was omitted from the former; but obviously where the latter are supple- mentary to the former instructions the former must be correct as far as they go, and defective only in not going farther and including what is supplied by the supplementary instructions. But where one instruction says the law is one thing with regard to a particular matter or state of circumstances, and another instruction that the law is another and materially different thing with regard to precisely the same matter or state of circum- stances, the instructions are repugnant and no repetition of the correct instruction can cure the errors of those that are in- correct ; for the jury, assuming as is their duty, that they are all so Lifschitz v. Dry Dock E. B. & land, C. & C. R. Co. v. Crawford, B. R. Co. 73 N. Y. 888, 67 App. 24 Ohio St. 640, 15 Am. R. 633. Div. 602. 62 Burlingim v. Bader, 45 Neb. An instruction assuming to state 673, 63 N. W. 919. an hypothetical case must not omit A remittitur as to one of several any material fact, Cleveland, C. & items of damages claimed will not C. R. Co. v. Crawford, 24 Ohio St. cure an error in an instruction 640, 15 Am. R. 633. which applies to the several items si Graff v. P. 134 111. 383, 25 N. of damages: Hartford Deposit Co. B. 583. See Kurstelska v. Jackson, v. Oalkins, 186 111. 104, 57 N. E. 89 Minm. 96, 93 N. W. 1054; Cleve- 863. 241 CORRECT CHARGE CURING DEFECTIVE. 247 correct, may as readily follow those that are incorrect as those that are correct." 63 In Mississippi, where an abstract proposition of law is incor- rectly stated and the same or similar propositions are thereafter correctly set forth in other instructions given, then if, taking the instructions on both sides as a whole, the court can safely, affirm that no harm has been done to either side and that the! right result has been reached, the verdict will not in such case be disturbed. But where the court undertakes to collate certain facts, and, making a concrete application of the law to such facts, instructs the jury to bring in a verdict if they believe such facts exist, and the facts therein stated will not legally sustain the verdict directed, such error cannot be cured by other in- structions correctly stating the law; the reason for the differ- ence being that in the first instance it is simply an erroneous statement of a legal principle which may or may not mislead the jury, according to the varying circumstances of causes, but in the latter instance, where a verdict is directed to be based upon the facts stated in the instruction, other instructions em- bodying other and different statements of facts and authoriz- ing a verdict to be predicated thereon, do not modify the erro- neous instructions, but simply conflict therewith. If by an er- roneous instruction the jury is charged to convict if they believe certain facts to exist, and by another instruction the jury is told that they should acquit unless they believe certain other facts also exist, these instructions do not modify, but contra- dict each other. The one is not explanatory of the other, but in conflict therewith. In such a state of the case the jury are left without any sure or certain guide to conduct them to the proper conclusion. 64 The cases in which it has been held that a bad instruction may be cured by another, are cases where the bad and good instructions, when read together, clearly state the law and where it can be clearly seen that the bad instruc- tion did no harm. 86 247. Instructions contradictory. The giving of a correct es Hoge v. P. 117 111. 48, 6 N. B. 185 111. 80, 56 N. E. 1088. See Gui- 796. nard v. Knapp S. & Co. 90 Wis. Harper v. S. (Miss.), 35 So. 575. 123, 62 N. W. 625, 48 Am. St. 901. 65 Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Keegan, 247 ERRORS. 242 instruction will not obviate an error in an instruction on the other side where they are entirely variant with each other, and there is nothing to show the jury which to adopt as the law. In such case it is impossible to determine whether the jury followed the correct or erroneous instruction. 68 Nor will the giving of a correct instruction at the request of either party correct a material error in a bad instruction where the instruc- tions are contradictory. The correct instruction cannot be said to modify or supplement the wrong one as is the case where' they are not contradictory. 67 A charge containing positive error ee Chicago & A. R. Oo. v. Kee- gan, 185 111. 79, 56 N. E. 1088; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Dunn, 61 111. 385; Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Johnson, 106 Ga. 130, 32 S. E. 78; City of Macon v. Holcomb, 205 111. 640, 69 N. E. 79; Kerr v. Top- ping, 109 Iowa, 150, 80 N. W. 321; McCole v. Loeher, 79 Ind. 430; Har- rington v. Priest, 104 Wis. 362, 80 N. W. 442; American Strawboard Co. v. Chicago & A. R. Co. 177 111. 513, 53 N. E. 97; Crosby v. Ritchey, 56 Neb. 336, 76 N. W. 895; S. v. Utley, 132 N. Car. 1022, 43 S. E. 820; Edwards v. Atlantic' C. L. R. Co. 132 N. Car. 99, 43 S. E. 585 ("Ring the bell and blow the whis- tle" Ring the bell or blow the whistle); Meyer v. Hafmeister (Wis.), 97 N. W. 166; City of Boul- der v. Niles, 9 Colo. 421; Summer- lot v. Hamilton, 121 Ind. 91, 22 N. E. 973; S. v. Button, 99 Ind. 307; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Lafferty, 2 W. Va. 104; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Murphy, 198 111. 470, 64 N. E. 1011; Cresler v. City of Ashville (N. Car.), 46 S. E. 739. See, also, St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Beecher, 65 Ark. 64, 44 S. W. 715; Lake S. & M. S. R. Co. v. Miller, 25 Mich. 274; Brown v. McAllister, 39 Cal. 573; Deserant v. Cerrillos Coal Co. 178 U. S. 409; Bluedom v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. 108 Mo. 439, 18 S. W. 1103; Mississippi C. R. Co. v. Miller, 40 Miss. 45; Haight v. "Vallet, 89 Cal. 249, 26 Pac. 897; Hoben v. Burlington & -I. R. Co. 20 Iowa, 562; Blume v. S. 154 Ind. 343, 56 N. E. 771; Hart v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 56 Iowa, 166, 7 N. W. 9, 41 Am. R. 93; Kelly v. Cable Co. 7 Mont. 70, 14 Pac. 633. siEnright v. P. 155 111. 32, 39 N. E. 561; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. City of Naperville, 166 111. 87, 94, 47 N. E. 734; Partridge v. Cutter, 168 111. 504, 512, 48 N. E. 125; S. v. Shadwell, 26 Mont. 52, 66 Pac. 508; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Cozby, 174 111. 109, 119, 50 N. E. 1011; Ko- nold v. Rio Grande W. R. Co. 21 Utah, 379, 60 Pac. 1021; Chicago C. R. Co. v. Dinsmore, 162 111. 658, 44 N. E. 887; Farmers' T. N. Bank v. Woodell (Ore.), 61 Pac. 831; Arnett v. Huggins (Colo. App.), 70 Pac. 765 (contradictory as to damages) ; Werming v. Teeple, 144 Ind. 189, 41 N. E. 600; Pendleton St. R. Co. v. Stallman, 22 Ohio St. 1; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Fox, 56 Neb. 746, 77 N. W. 130; Shano v. Fifth Ave. & H. St. Bridge Co. 189 Pa. St. 245, 42 AtL 128; Green v. Southern Pac. R. Co. 122 Cal. 563, 55 Pac. 577; Griffin v. City of Lewiston (Idaho), 55 Pac. 545; S. v. Webb. 6 Idaho, 428, 55 Pac. 892; Illinois Linen Co. v. Hough, 91 111. 67; Baldwin v. Kil- lain, 63 111. 550; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Payne, 49 111. 499; Barr v. S. 45 Neb. 458, 63 N. W. 856; Citizens' St. R. Co. v. Shepherd, 107 Tenn. 444, 64 S. W. 710; Kraus v. Haas (Tex. Cv. App.), 25 S. W. 1025; Holt v. Spokane & P. R. Co. 3 Idaho. 703, 35 Pac. 39; Wolf v. Wolf, 158 Pa. St. 621, 28 Atl. 164; Town of Denver v. Myers, 63 Neb, 107, 88 N. W. 191; City of Winches- ter v. Carroll, 97 Va. 727, 40 S. E. 243 CONTRADICTORY WIDELY DIFFERING. 248 cannot be cured by contradictory instructions stating the law correctly, unless the latter makes direct reference to and with- draws or qualifies the erroneous charge. 68 And it must appear that the erroneous instructions are plainly withdrawn before the errors will be regarded as cured. 69 248. Instructions differing widely from each other. Also the giving of two instructions widely differing from each other op. the same vital point in issue in a case is such error that a 37; Payne v. McCormick H. M. Co. 11 Okla. 318. 66 Pac. 287; Denver & R. G. R. Go. v. Fatherington (Colo. App.), 68 Pac. 978; Eureka Fire & M. Ins. Co. v. Percell, 19 Ohio C. C. 135; Lindberg v. Chicago C. R. Co. 83 111. App. 433; Linn v. Massilon Bridge Co. 78 Mo. App. Ill; Virginia & N. C. Wheel Co. v. Chalkley, 98 Va. 62, 34 S. E. 976; S. v. Peel, 23 Mont. 358, 59 Pac. 169, 75 Am. St. 529; P. v. Ben- nett 121 Mich. 241, 80 N. W. 9; Criner v. S. 41 Tex. Cr. App. 290, 53 S. W. 873; Henry v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 54 S. W. 592; S. v. Evans, 12 S. Dak. 473, 81 N. W. 893; Palmer v. S. 8 Wyo. 40, 59 Pac. 793; S. v. McClellan, 23 Mont. 532, 59 Pac. 924; Swenie v. S. 59 Neb. 269, 80 N. W. 815; Bleiler v. Moore, 94 Wis. 385, 69 N. W. 164. See, also, Gearing v. Lacher, 146 Pa. St. 397, 23 AtL 229; Mississippi C. R. Co. v. Miller, 40 Miss. 45; Howell v. S. 61 Neb. 391, 85 N. W. 289; Hickman v. Griffin, 6 Mo. 37; Imhoff v. Chicago & M. R. Co. 20 Wis. 344; McDougal v. S. 88 Ind. 24; Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Noftsger, 148 Ind. 101, 47 N. E. 332; Baker v. Ashe, 80 Tex. 356, 16 S. W. 36; Henry v. S. 51 Neb. 149, 70 N. W. 924; Burnett v. S. 60 N. J. L. 255, 37 Atl. 622; Bos- well v. District of Columbia, 21 D. C. 526; Richardson v. Halstead, 44 Neb. 606, 62 N. W. 1077; S. v. Tat- law, 136 Mo. 678, 38 S. W. 552; Edwards v. Atlantic Coast L. R. Co. 129 N. Car. 78, 39 S. E. 730; Knight v. Denman, 64 Neb. 814, 90 N. W. 863; Spencer v. Terry's Estate (Mich.), 94 N. W. 372; Harter v. City of Marshall (Tex. Cv. App.), 36 S. W. 294; Eureka Fire & M. Ins. Co. v. Percell 19 Ohio C. C. 135; Lindberg v. Chicago C. R. Co. 83 111.. App. 433; Linn v. Missillon Bridge Co. 78 Mo. App. Ill; Vir- ginia & N. C. Wheel Co. v. Chalk- ley, 98 Va. 62, 34 S. E. 97; S. v. Peel, 23 Mont. 358, 59 Pac. 169; P. v. Bennett, 121 Mich. 241, 80 N. W. 9; Criner v. S. 41 Tex. Cr. App. 290, 53 S. W. 873; Henry v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 54 S. W. 592; S. v. Evans, 12 S. Dak. 473, 81 N. W. 893; Palmer v. S. 9 Wyo. 40, 59 Pac. 793; S. v. McClellan, 23 Mont. 532, 59 Pac. 924, 75 Am. St. 558; Sweenie v. S. 59 Neb. 269, 80 N. W. 815; Bleiler v. Moore, 94 Wis. 385, 69 N. W. 164; S. v. Tatlaw, 136 Mo. 678, 38 S. W. 552; Henry v. S. 51 Neb. 149, 70 N. W. 924; Burnett v. S. 60 N. J. 255, 37 Atl. 622; Bos- well v. District of C. 21 D. C. 526; Richardson v. Halstead, 44 Neb. 606, 62 N. W. 1077. es Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Mil- ler (Tex. Cv. App.), 65 S. W. 74; Baker v. Ashe, 80 Tex. 357, 16 S. W. 36; Chicago & E. R. Co. v. Lee, 29 Ind. App. 480, 64 N. E. 675; In- ternational & G. N. R. Co. v. An- chond (Tex. Cv. App.), 68 S. W. 743; S. v. Fitzgerald, 72 Vt. 142, 47 Atl. 403; Heyl v. S. 109 Ind. 589, 10 N. E. 916; Imhoff v. Chicago & M. R. Co. 20 Wis. 344; Guetig v. S. 63 Ind. 278, 3 Am. Cr. R. 233. es McCrory v. Anderson, 103 Ind. 16, 2 N. E. 211; Klugen v. S. 45 Ind. 521; Binns v. S. 66 Ind. 428; Toledo, N. & W. R. Co. v. Schuck- man, 50 Ind. 42; Lower v. Franks, 115 Ind. 340, 17 N. E. 630; Gulf C. & S. F. R. Co. v. White (Tex. Cv. App.), 32 S. W. 322. 249 ERRORS. 244 new trial will be given. 70 An absolute misstatement of the law in giving instructions is not corrected by properly stating the law in other instructions. 71 But where two instructions are in- consistent or contradictory, one correct and the other incorrect, if it appears that tine jury followed the correct one in reaching the verdict the error is immaterial. 72 And if a party was not entitled to an instruction which was given at his request he cannot claim error that another given for his opponent was con- tradictory to it. 73 249. Instructions self -contradictory An instruction which is itself contradictory in its own terms, is eroneous. 'Thus an instruction directing the jury that if the defendant was mentally incompetent to protect his own interests in making a contract, then, although they may believe he understood the same, they should find he was not mentally competent, and that the con- tract was invalid, is self-contradictory. 74 An ordinance prohibit- ing driving at a greater rate of speed than six miles an hour having been introduced on the trial of a homicide case, an in- struction charging the jury that "if t Campbell v. S. 55 Ala. 80. Starr v. U. S. 164 U. S. 627, 17 Sup. 318 CONFESSIONS ADMISSIONS. 316 318. Voluntary confessions Competency. Confessions or admissions are not competent evidence unless they were made freely and voluntarily by the accused. 10 If any degree of influ- ence has been exerted to induce the accused to make a confes- sion, it is incompetent. 11 Confessions induced by the appliances of hope or fear are not regarded as voluntarily made, and are, therefore, not to be relied on as true. A confession can never be received in evidence when the accused has been influenced to make it by any threat or prom- ise. 12 "And the slightest menace or threat, or any hope engendered or encouraged that the prisoner's case will be lightened, meliora- ted or more favorably dealt with, if he will confess either of these is enough to exclude the confession thereby superinduced." 13 The competency of a confession, that is, whether it was freely and voluntarily made, is a question for the court, and not for the jury, to determine. 14 Hence the giving of an instruction submitting its competency to the jury for them to determine is improper. 15 Thus for the court to charge that if the jury believe from all the evidence that the defendant's confession was procured by means of fear or terror, or by hope of reward, they should disregard it, is improper. 16 Or an instruction that the jury should disregard a confession unless they believe that it was voluntarily made by the defendant is likewise improper. 17 But if the testimony as to whether a confession was or was 10 Robinson v. P. 159 111. 119, 42 is Hughes Cr. Law, 3099, citing N. E. 375; Com. v. Preece, 140 Mass. Owen v. S. 78 Ala. 425, 6 Am. Cr. 276, 5 N. E. 494, 5 Am. Cr. R. 107; R. 206, 56 Am. R. 40. S v. Day, 55 Vt. 570, 4 Am. Cr. R. 1* Johnson v. S. 59 Ala. 37, 3 Am. 105; Hughes Cr. Law, 3094, 3096. Cr. R. 258; P. v. Barker, 60 Mich. 11 Hughes Cr. Law, 3096, citing- 277, 27 N. W. 539. Robinson v. P. 159 111. 119, 42 N. E. Brown v. S. 124 Ala. 76, 27 So. 375. 250; Dugan v. Com. 19 Ky. L. R. 12 Hughes Cr. Law, 3098, citing 1273, 43 S. W. 418; Holland v. S. 39 Gates v. P. 14 111. 436, 1 Greenleaf Fla. 178, 22 So. 298; Hunter v. S. 74 Ev 219 (Redf. Ed.); Johnson v. Miss. 515, 21 So. 305; Williams v. S. 59 Ala. 37, 3 Am. Cr. R. 258; S. 37 Tex. Cr. App. 147, 38 S. W. Newman v. S. 49 Ala. 9, 1 Am. Cr. 999; Stone v. S. 105 Ala. 60, 17 So. R. 173; P. v. Barrie, 49 Cal. 342, 1 114; McKinney v. S. 134 Ala. 134, Am. Cr. R. 181; Gillett Indirect & 32 So. 726. Col. Ev. 110. 16 Holland v. S. 39 Fla. 178, 22 By statute in Indiana a confes- So. 298. sion made under any inducement 17 Hunter v. S. 74 Miss. 515, 21 except fear produced by threats So. 305; Williams v. S. 37 Tex. Cr. may be given in evidence with all App. 147, 38 S. W. 999; Bailey v. the circumstances, Benson v. a. S. 42 Tex. Cr. App. 289, 59 S. W. 119 Ind. 488, 21 N. E. 1109. 900. 317 VOLUNTARY CONFESSIONS. 319 uot voluntarily made is conflicting, then the issue may be sub- mitted to the jury for them to determine, and the jury may re- gard or disregard the confession as they may determine. 18 And where the evidence is conflicting as to whether the confession was voluntarily made, it is error for the court to refuse to sub- mit the matter to the jury by proper instruction. 19 But the failure to instruct that the jury should be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was made vol- untarily is not material where the court instructs generally on reasonable doubt. 20 But if the legality of the confession is not challenged or contested, then the court may properly refuse to charge that before the jury can consider confessions made by the accused they must believe he made the same voluntarily, and not through promise or improper influence. 21 It has been held that if, after evidence of a confession has been admitted, it appears by evidence subsequently admitted that such con- fession was not freely and voluntarily made, then the court should withdraw the evidence of such confession. 22 319. Voluntary confessions Cautionary instructions. While it is usually very necessary that some degree of care should be used in receiving the confession of one charged with the com mission of crime, and much caution be employed by the jury in ascertaining its weight and sufficiency, 23 yet the court can- not properly state to the jury, as a matter of law, that con- fessions or admissions should, for certain reasons stated, be re- ceived with great caution, unless voluntarily made. The weight and credibility of confessions are to be determined by the jury as facts. Some confessions or admissions may be entitled to little credit, considering the circumstances under which they were made; others, if made deliberately, freely and voluntarily, may be among the most effective proofs in law, but the court- cannot say, as a matter of law, that the confession in evidence is Morris v. S. 39 Tex. Cr. App. 21 Bailey v. S. 42 Tex Cr. App. 371, 46 S. W. 253; Sparks v. S. 34 289, 59 S. W. 900. Tex. Cr. App. 86, 29 S. W. 264; 22 Holland v. S 39 Fla. 178, 22 So. Paris v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. App. 82, 31 298. S. W. 855. 23 Underbills Cr. Ev. 146, cit- 19 Sparks v. S. 34 Tex. Cr. App. ing Nobles v. S. 98 Ga. 73, 26 S. E. 86, 29 S. W. 264. 64. 20 Nix v. S. 97 Ga. 211, 22 S. E. 975. 320 CONFESSIONS ADMISSIONS. 318 belongs to the one class or the other. 24 The contrary view is held to be the law in other states. 25 Where the confessions or admissions were voluntarily and de- liberately made it is not necessary to instruct the jury to re- ceive them with caution. 26 In California such an instruction has been held as properly modified by striking out the word "great,"' it not being one of the statutory words relating to such admissions. 27 Hence an instruction that as a general rule the statements of witnesses as to verbal admission of a person charged with the commission of a criminal offense should be received by the jury with great caution, as that kind of evi- dence is subject to much imperfection and mistake unless vol- untarily made, is erroneous, in that it invades the province of the jury. 28 Also a charge that oral admissions of a party should be received with great caution, because a witness may not have correctly understood them, or may not have correctly recollected them, is likewise erroneous. 29 320. Confessions Corroboration. The corpus delicti can- not be established by confessions alone. It must be shown by other evidence, independent of confessions or admissions of the accused. 30 When the court undertakes to state this principle in the giving of instructions the jury should be left free to pass upon and determine whether the evidence of the confession, together with the evidence of the corpus delicti, is sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. An instruction leading the jury to believe that they would be 24 Keith v. S. 157 Ind. 376, 61 N. Maier, 94 Cal. 269, 29 Pac. 481: E. 716. See Collins v. S. 20 Tex. Knowles v. Nixon, 17 Mont. 473, 43 Cr. App. 400. Pac. 628; Keith v. S. 157 Ind. 376, 25 Marzen v. P. 173 111. 60, 50 N. 61 N. E. 716; Morris v. S. 101 Ind. E. 249; S. v. Hardee, 83 N. Car. 560; Zenor v. Johnson, 107 Ind. 69, 619 (discretionary). See S. v. Jack- 7 N. E. 751; Runnill v. Art, 169 son, 103 Iowa, 702, 73 N. W. 467. Mass. 341, 47 N. E. 1017; White v. See Nobles v. S. 98 Ga. 73, 26 S. Ter. 3 Wash. Ter. 397, 19 Pac. 37. E. 64. 29 Zenor v. Johnson, 107 Ind. 70, 26 S. v. Jackson, 103 Iowa, 702, 7 N. E. 751, 36 Am. R. 166; Morris 73 N. W. 467. v. S. 101 Ind. 562; Keith v. S. 157 27 p. v. Van Horn, 119 Cal. 323, Ind. 386. 61 N. E. 716. 51 Pac. 538. See P. v. Sternberg, so Gore v. P. 162 111. 265, 44 N. Ill Cal. 11, 43 Pac. 201. E. 500; South v. P. 98 111. 263; P. v. 28Wastl. v. Montana N. R. Co. Tarbox, 115 Cal. 57, 46 Pac. 896; 17 Mont. 213, 42 Pac. 772; Collins v. McCulloch v. S. 48 Ind. 109, citing S. 20 Tex. App. 400; Bobo v. S. many cases. Hughes Cr. Law, (Miss.), 16 So. 755; Kaufman v. 3093. 319 CORROBOEATION OF CONFESSIONS. 321 authorized to convict if the evidence of the confession is cor- roborated by proof of the corpus delicti, is erroneous. The jury must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt from all the evi- dence that the accused is guilty before they can convict him. 31 An instruction that the defendant cannot be convicted on his own confession if not corroborated by other evidence tending to establish the corpus delicti, is properly refused where it ap- pears that the evidence, outside of the confession, is sufficient to establish the corpus delicti. 32 321. Instructions when no evidence When evidence. If there is no evidence whatever tending to prove a confession, then instructions on that subject are improper, and they may be prejudicial. 33 To instruct the jury that the accused has made admissions when there is no evidence that he had, is error. 34 It is error to refuse instructions on the subject of confessions where the admissibility of the confessions is an important or controlling fact in the decision of the case. 35 But the omission to instruct on this subject is not material error where the other evidence in the case, alone, without the evidence of the con- fession, clearly establishes the guilt of the defendant. 36 31 Wimberly v. S. (Ga.), 31 S. E. E. 178. The same rules as to ad- 162. See Davis v. S. 105 Ga. 808, missions or statements apply to 32 S. E. 158. both civil and criminal cases alike. 32 Tidwell v. S. (Tex. Cv. App.), See generally the following cases: 48 S. W. 184; Com. v. Tarr, 4 Al- Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Gray, 113 Ga. len (Mass.), 315. 424, 38 S. E. 992; Lewis v. Christie, ss Knight v. S. 114 Ga. 48, 39 S. 99 Ind. 377; Tozer v. Hershey, 15 E. 928, 88 Am. St. 17; Davis v. S. Minn. 257; Shinn v. Tucker, 37 Ark. 114 Ga. 104, 39 S. E. 906; Goodwin 580; Allen v. Kirk, 81 Iowa, 658, v. S. 114 Wis. 318, 90 N. W. 120; 47 N. W. 906; Knowles v. Nixon, 17 Suddeth v. S. 112 Ga. 407, 37 S. E. Mont. 473, 43 Pac. 628; Stewart v. 747; Gentry v. S. 24 Tex. App. 80. De Loach, 86 Ga. 729, 12 S. E. 1067; 34 Andrews v. S. 21 Fla. 595. Newman v. Hazelrigg, 96 Ind. 377; 35 s. v. Moore, 160 Mass. 443. Haven v. Markstrum, 67 Wis. 493, 36 Sellers v. S. 99 Ga. 212, 25 S. 30 N. W. 720. CHAPTER XXII. RELATING TO ALIBI. Sec. Sec. 322. Alibi as a defense Burden on 326. Instructions on issue Proper defendant. and improper. 323. Burden Degree of proof. 327. Instructions proper. 324. Burden By preponderance, 328. Instructions improper. when. 325. Instructions discrediting alibi. 322. Alibi as a defense Burden on defendant. The de- fense of an alibi is not a substantive defense, but it is a fact proper to be shown in evidence in rebuttal to the evidence of the prosecution. The state must prove that the accused was present at the time of the commission of the crime charged, that is, where his presence is essential to connect him with its commission. 1 In some jurisdictions the burden is on the de- fendant to establish in support of an alibi such facts and cir- cumstances, as when considered in connection with the other evidence, create in the minds of the jury a reasonable doubt of the truth of the charge. 2 The evidence in support of an 1 S. v. Ardoin, 49 La. Ann. 1145, 596, 11 N. W. 5; S. v. Beasley, 81 22 So. 620, 62 Am. St. 678; S. v. Iowa, 83, 50 N. W. 570. See, also, Lowry, 42 W. Va. 205, 24 S. E. 561; Town v. S. Ill Ala. 1, 20 So. 598; Gawn v. S. 13 Ohio C. C. 116, 7 Beavers v. S. 103 \la. 36, 15 So. 616; Ohio Dec. 19. P. v. Piohette, 111 Mich. 461, 69 N. 2 Hughes Cr. Law, 2414, citing W. 739; Henson v. S. 112 Ala. 41, 21 Carlton v. P. 150 111. 181, 37 N. E. So. 79; S. v. Pry, 67 Iowa, 475, 25 244, 41 Am. St. 346; Garrity v. P. N. W. 738; S. v. Mcdellan, 23 107 111. 162; Mullins v. P. 110 Mont. 532, 59 Pac. 924, 75 Am. St. 111. 46; Ackerson v. P. 124 111. 558; P. v. Resh, 107 Mich. 251, 563, 16 N. E. 847; Hoge v. P. 65 N. W. 99; Thompson v. Com. 117 111. 44, 6 N. E. 796; Shee- 88 Va. 45, 13 S. E. 304; Underbill ban v. P. 131 111. 22, 22 N. E. 818; Cr. Ev. 152; Gutirrez v. S. (Tex. S. v. McGarry, 111 Iowa, 709, 83 Cr. App.), 59 S. W. 274. Contra: N. W. 718; S. v. Hamilton, 57 Iowa, S. v. Harvey, 131 Mo. 339, 32 S. W. 320 321 BURDEN DEGREE OF PROOF. 323 alibi should be considered in connection with all the other evidence in the case, and if on the whole evidence there is a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused he should be ac- quitted. And an instruction stating the law in this form is proper. 3 323. Burden Degree of proof. The burden of proof does not change when the defendant undertakes to prove an alibi ; and if by reason of the evidence in support of this defense the jury should have a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the de- fendant he would be entitled to an acquittal, although the jury might not be able to say that the alibi was fully proved.* The prosecution is not relieved from the necessity of proving the actual presence of the accused at the time and place of the commission of the alleged crime when personal presence is es- sential. 5 So where the jury are instructed that if they enter- tain a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant was present at the time and place of the commission of the alleged offense they should acquit him, sufficiently states the law without fur- ther instruction on alibi; 6 or that if the defendant was at an- other place before and during the commission of the crime charged, he should be acquitted, is proper. 7 1110; Shoemaker v. Ter. 4 Okla. Caldw. (Term.), 92; S. v. Ward, 61 118, 43 Pac. 1059; S. v. Taylor, 118 Vt. 153, 192., 17 Atl. 483; Beavers v. Mo. 153, 24 S. W. 449; S. v. Ghee S. 103 Ala. 36, 15 So. 616; Bennett Gong, 16 Ore. 534, 19 Pac. 607; v. S. 30 Tex. Cr. App. 341, 17 S. W. Fleming v. S. 136 Ind. 149, 36 N. E, 545; S. v. Ohee Gong, 16 Ore. 538, 154. 19 Pac. 607; Howard v. S. 50 Ind. s S. v. Ardoin, 49 La. Ann. 1145, 22 190; Landis v. S. 70 Ga. 651; Mc- So. 620, 62 Am. R. 678; Barr v. P. Lain v. S. 18 Neb. 154, 24 N. W. 30 Colo. 522, 71 Pac. 392. See S. v. 720; S. v. Hardin, 46 Iowa, 623, 26 Taylor, 118 Mo. 167, 3;5 S. W. 92; Am. R. 174; Pate v. S. 94 Ala. 14, S. v. Bryant, 134 Mo. 246, 35 S. W. 18, 10 So. 665. 597; Walker v. S. 42 Tex. 360; Shee- 4 Hughes Cr. Law, 2415, citing han v. P. 131 111. 22, 22 N. E. 818; Walters v. S. 39 Ohio St. 215, 4 Am. Underbills Cr. Ev. 148, citing S. Cr. R. 35, 1 Bish. Cr. Proc. 1061. v. Conway, 56 Kas. 682, 44 Pac. 627; 5 S. v. Lowry, 42 W. Va. 205, 24 S. v. Harvey, 131 Mo. 339, 32 S. W. S. E. 561. 1110; S. v. Lowry, 42 W. Va. 205, 6 Punk v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 48 24 S. E. 561; P. v. Pichette, 111 S. W. 171; S. v. Ward, 61 Vt. 153, Mich. 461, 69 N. W. 739; Borrego 17 Atl. 483, 8 Am. Cr. R. 224; Long v. Ter. 8 N. Mex. 446, 46 Pac. 349; v. S. 42 Fla. 509, 28 So. 775; S. v. Carlton v. P. 150 111. 181, 37 N. E. Spotted Hawk, 22 Mont. 33, 55 Pac. 244, 41 Am. St. 346; Ackerson v. P. 1026. See S..v. Button, 70 Iowa, 268, 124 111. 571, 16 N. E. 847; Watson v. 30 N. W. 567. Com. 95 Pa. St. 422; Ware v. S. 59 7 P. v. Pichette, 111 Mich. 461, Ark. 379, 27 S. W. 485; Harrison v. 69 N. W. 739; S. v. Taylor, 118 Mo. S. 83 Ga. 134, 9 S. E. 542; Walters v. 167, 24 S. W. 449. S. 39 Ohio St. 217; Chappel v. S. 7 324 RELATING TO ALIBI. 322 A charge directing the jury to acquit the defendant if his evidence raises a reasonable doubt of his guilt, correctly and sufficiently states the law as to the defense of an alibi. 8 To instruct that when the defendant undertakes to establish an alibi the evidence he introduces must, when considered with all the other evidence in the case, account for his whereabouts during the whole period of time is not improper where the jury are also properly instructed on reasonable doubt as to the where- abouts of the defendant during the time in question. 9 324. Burden By preponderance, when. In some jurisdic- tions, however, the burden is on the accused to establish the defense of an alibi by a preponderance of the evidence. 10 Under this rule an instruction that "it is the duty of the defendant, in proving an alibi, to reasonably satisfy the jury that he was elsewhere at the time of the commission of the offense," prop- erly states the law. 11 But an instruction that an alibi can only be satisfactorily sustained by proof which renders it impos- sible for the accused to have committed the crime charged against him is improper. 12 So an instruction requiring the de- fendant to establish the defense of alibi by a preponderance of the evidence, which fails to take into consideration the prin- ciple of reasonable doubt, is erroneous. 13 s S. v. Miller, 156 Mo. 76, 56 S. W. 13 S. E. 304; S. v. Ward, 61 Vt. 153, 907; S. v. Jones. 153 Mo. 457, 55 S. 17 All. 483, 8 Am. Cr. R. 222; P. v. W. 80; S. v. Hale, 156 Mo. 112, 56 Kessler, 13 Utah, 69, 44 Pac. 97. S. W. 881. Compare Shaw v. S. 102 Contra: McNamara v. P. 24 Colo. Ga. 660, 29 S. E. 477; Bone v. S. 61, 48 Pac. 541; S. v. Conway, 55 102 Ga. 387, 30 S. E. 845. See Towns Kas. 323, 40 Pac. 661. v. S. Ill Ala. 1, 20 So. 598; Toler v. n Pellum v. S. 89 Ala. 28, 8 So. S. 16 Ohio St. 585; P. v. Pearsall, 83; S. v. Henry, 48 Iowa, 403. But 50 Mich. 233, 15 N. W. 98; Gallagher see Beaver v. S. 103 Ala. 36, 15 So. v. S. 28 Tex. App. 247, 12 S. W. 1087; 616; Briceland v. Com. 74 Pa. St. French v. S. 12 Ind. 670; S. v. 469; Miller v. P. 39 111. 464; Wis- Starnes, 94 N. Car. 973. dom v. P. 11 Colo. 175, 17 Pac. 519. 9 P. v. Worden, 113 Cal. 569, 45 12 Gawn v. S. 13 Ohio C. C. 116, 7 Pac. 844; West v. S. 48 Ind. 483 Ohio Dec. 19; McCormick v. S. 133 (whole time); Albritton v. S. 94 Ala. 202, 32 So. 268; Pollard v. S. Ala. 76 (whole time), 10 So. 426. 53 Miss. 421; Kaufman v. S. 49 Ind. 10 S. v. Rowland, 72 Iowa, 327, 33 248; Stuart v. P. 42 Mich. 260, 3 N. N. W. 137; S. v. McCracken, 66 W. 863; Beavers v. S. 103 Ala. 36, 15 Iowa, 569, 24 N. W. 43; S. v. Ham- So. 616; Wisdom v. P. 11 Colo, 170, ilton, 57 Iowa, 596, 11 N. W. 5; 17 Pac. 519; Snell v. S. 50 Ind. 516. S. v. Kline, 54 Iowa, 185, 6 N. W. is s. v. Hogan (Iowa), 88 N. W. 184; Lucas v. S. 110 Ga. 756, 36 S. E. 1074. 87; Thompson v. Com. 88 Va. 45, 323 BURDEN BY PREPONDERANCE. 326 325. Instructions discrediting alibi. The defense of an alibi is as legitimate as any other defense, and the court should not, by instruction or otherwise, cast suspicion upon it. 1 * It is a well established rule that an instruction containing language which casts suspicion upon, discredits or disparages any class of evidence, is erroneous. 15 It is not improper, however, for the court, in charging the- jury, to state that evidence introduced to prove an alibi should be subjected to rigid scrutiny. 16 326. Instructions on issue Proper and improper. Where the defense to a criminal charge is an alibi, and the defendant in- troduces affirmative evidence tending to support it, he is entitled to an affirmative charge on the issue of alibi, and it is error for the court to refuse to so instruct. 17 It is also error to refuse to charge the jury that a reasonable doubt may arise from the evidence tending to prove an alibi. 18 The court is not required, however, to instruct on the law of alibi on its own motion. The desired instructions must be properly requested. 19 i* Miller v. P. 39 111. 465; Albin v. S. 63 Ind. 598, 3 Am. Cr. R. 295; P. v. Kelley, 35 Hun (N. Y.), 295; Line v. S. 51 Ind. 172; Simmons v. S. 61 Miss. 243; Sater v. S. 56 Ind. 378; S. v. Ghee Gong, 16 Ore. 534, 19 Pac. 607; S. v. Crowell, 149 Mo. 3U1, 50 S. W. 893; S. v. Jaynes, 78 N. Car. 504; S. v Lewis, 69 Mo. 92; P. v. Lattimore, 86 Cal. 403, 24 Pac. 1091; Spencer v. S. 50 Ala. 124; Dawson v. S. 62 Miss. 241. Contra: Provo v. S. 55 Ala. 222; S. v. Blunt, 59 Iowa, 468, 13 N. W. 427; S. v. .Wright, 141 Mo. 333, 42 S. W. 934; P. v. Wong Ah Foo, 69 Cal. 180, 10 Pac. 375. is Shenkenberger v. S. 154 Ind. 630, 640, 57 N. E. 519; Lewis v. Christie, 99 Ind. 377; S. v. Lewis, .69 Mo. 92; Spencer v. S. 50 Ala. 124. is S. v. Rowland, 72 Iowa, 329, 33 N. W. 137; Albritton v. S. 94 Ala. 76, 10 So. 426; S. v. Blunt, 59 Iowa, 468, 13 N. W. 427. IT Rountree v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 55 S. W. 827; Arismendis v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 60 S. W. 47; Padron v. S. 41 Tex. Cr. App. 548, 55 S. W. 827; Tittle v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. App. 96, 31 S. W. 677; Smith v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 50 S. W. 362; Garcia v. S. 34 Fla. 311, 16 So. 223; S. v. Con- way, 55 Kas. 333, 40 Pac. 661; An- derson v. S. 34 Tex. Cr. App 546, 31 S. W. 673; P. v. Dick, 32 Cal. 216; S. v. Mackey, 12 Ore. 1&4, 6 Pac. 648, 5 Am. Cr. R. 536; S. v. Whit- ny, 7 Ore. 386; S. v. Kaplan, 167 Mo. 298, 66 S. W. 967; Burton v. S. 107 Ala. 108, 18 So. 284; S. v. Porter, 74 Iowa, 623, 38 N. W. 514; Wiley v. S. 5 Baxt. (Tenn.), 662; Conway v. S. 33 Tex. Cr. App. 327, 26 S. W. 401; Long v. S. 42 Fla. 509, 28 So. 775; S. v. Bryant, 134 Mo. 246, 35 S. W. 597; Fletcher v. S. 85 Ga. 666, 11 S. E. 872; Joy v. S. 41 Tex. Cr. App. 46, 51 S. W. 935; Aris- mendis v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 60 S. W. 47 (alibi sole defense); Deggs v. S. 7 Tex. App. 359 (alibi the sole defense). Contra: Conrad v. S. 132 Ind. 258, 31 N. E. 805; S. v. Ward, 61 Vt. 194, 17 Atl. 483, 8 Am. Cr. R. 224; S. v. Button, 70 Iowa, 268, 30 N. W. 567. is Fleming v. S. 136 Ind. 149, 36 N. E. 154. 19 Marshall v. S. 37 Tex. Cr. App. 450, 36 S. W. 86; Goldsby v. U. S. 160 U. S. 70, 16 Sup. Ct. 216; 32? RELATING TO ALIBI. 324 Where there is abundant evidence of a conspiracy connecting the accused with the commission of a murder, .it could make no difference whether he was or was not present when the homicide was committed; hence an instruction on alibi in such case may be properly refused.- An instruction that "if you believe from the evidence that the defendant was not present at the time it is alleged that the crime was committed you must acquit him," is properly refused where the defendant may have aided and abetted the crime without being personally present. 21 But, of course, if there is no evidence introduced tending to prove the defense of alibi, an instruction as to that defense is prop- erly refused. 22 Thus, where, in a trial for murder, the evidence shows that the killing occurred about eight o'clock, and the defendant introduced no evidence to show his whereabouts from seven-thirty to eight-fifteen, and it appearing that he could have committed the crime during that time, he cannot complain that the court failed to instruct on the defense of alibi. 23 327. Instructions proper A charge that evidence to es- tablish an alibi, like any other evidence, may be open to special observation; that persons may perhaps fabricate it with greater hopes of success or less fear of punishment than most other kinds of evidence, and honest witnesses often mistake dates and periods of time and identity of people and other things about which they may testify, is proper. 24 In a case where the defense was an alibi, for the court to charge the jury that "I -ap- prehend you will have little trouble in coming to a conclusion whether it is a case of murder. I believe it is conceded by counsel who addressed you that the killing was a felonious one," was held not to be an improper charge on the facts of the Lyon v. S. (Tex. Or. App.), 34 S. W. 57 S. W. 805; Glover v. S. (Tex. Cr. 947; Com. v. Boschim, 176 Pa. St. App.), 46 S. W. 824; Morris v. S. 103, 34 Atl. 964; S. v. Peterson, 38 124 Ala. 44, 27 So. 336; Jackson v. Kas. 205, 16 Pac. 263; Anderson v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 67 S. W. 497; S. 34 Tex. Cr. App. 546, 31 S. W. 673. S. v. Jackson, 95 Mo. 623, 8 S. W. Contra: Fletcher v. S. 85 G-a. 666, 749; S. v. Seymour, 94 Iowa, 699, 11 S. E. 872. 63 N. W. 661. 20 s. v. Gatlin, 170 Mo. 354, 70 S. 23 S. v. Seymour, 94 Iowa, 699, 63 W. 885; S. v. Johnson, 40 Kas. 266, N. W. 661; S. v. Murray, 91 Mo. 95, 19 Pac. 749. 3 S. W/397. 21 P. v. Feliz, 136 Cal. 19, 69 Pac. 24 p. v . Wong Ah Foo, 69 Cal. 189, 220. 10 Pac. 375. 22 Johnson v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 325 PROPER AND IMPROPER REQUESTS. 328 case. 25 To charge the jury that an alibi is a good defense, if proved, is not error where in the same connection the jury are instructed that if they have a reasonable doubt as to the presence of the defendant they should acquit him. 26 An in- struction in substance charging that if the jury believe from the evidence that the testimony to sustain the defense of alibi is false and fraudulent, then this is a discrediting circumstance to which the jury may look, in connection with all the other evidence, in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant, is proper. 27 But an instruction which thus states that if the jury believe the alibi to be false, that is positive evidence of guilt, is erroneous. 28 An instruction that "the defense of an alibi is one easily manufactured, and jurors are generally and properly advised by the courts to scan the testimony of an alibi with care and caution," is proper. 29 A charge that "if the defendant was at the time of the killing at another and different place from that at which such killing was done, and therefore was not and could not have been the person who killed the deceased, if he was killed; that if the evidence raises in your minds a reason- able doubt as to the presence of the defendant at the place where the deceased was killed, if he was killed, at the time of such killing, you will find him not guilty," is correct. 30 328. Instructions improper. To instruct the jury that, as a rule, the defense of an alibi is open to great and manifest abuse, because of the comparative ease with which testimony to support it may be fabricated, or that this defense is often re- sorted to by those who are guilty, or that perjury, mistake, contrivance and deception are frequently employed and involved in supporting it, is error, as invading the province of the jury. 31 Stating to the jury that an alibi is a defense "easily fabricated, 25 S. v. Aughtry, 49 S. Car. 285, 26 as s. v. Manning (Vt ) 52 Atl. S. E. 619. 1033. S. v. Price, 55 Kas. 610, 40 29 s. v. Blunt, 59 Iowa, 468, 13 Pac. 1001; P. v. Resh, 107 Mich. 251, N. 427. 65 N. W. 99; P. v. Chun Heong, 86 Walker v. S. 6 Tex. App. 576. Cal. 330, 24 Pac. 1021. 31 Underbill Cr. Ev. 153. cit- 27 Tattim v. S. 131 Ala. 32, 31 So. ing S. v. Chee Gong, 16 Ore. 538. 19 369; Albritton v. S. 94 Ala. 76, 10 Pac. 607; Murphy v. S. 31 Fla. 166. 12 So. 426; Crittenden v. S. 134 Ala. So. 453; Dawson v. S. 62 Miss. 241. 145, 32 So. 273. 328 RELATING TO ALIBI. 326 that it has occasionally been successfully fabricated, and that the temptation to resort to it as a spurious defense is very great, especially in cases of importance," is highly improper as in- vading the province of the jury in determining the weight of the evidence. 32 An instruction that if the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant "has attempted to prove an alibi and failed, it is a circumstance of great weight against him and proper to be considered by the jury in determining his guilt or innocence," is improper. Failing to prove an alibi should have no greater weight to convince a jury of the guilt of the accused than the failure to prove any other important fact of defense. 33 It is also improper to charge that a failure to prove an alibi may be considered in connection with any other evidence in the case tending to prove guilt. 34 It is error to charge that if the jury do not believe that the testimony of the defense as to an alibi outweighs the testimony of the state, which connects the defendant with the offense charged, they should not believe the alibi. 35 An instruction that the defendant is not required to establish the defense of an alibi to the reasonable satisfaction of the jury is properly refused. 36 Also a charge that the burden of proving an alibi is not on the defendant is properly refused where 'other in- structions state that it is sufficient if, from the whole evidence on both sides, including the evidence relating to the alibi, there is a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt, and where the charge contains further instructions as to the presumption of innocence ; and that unless such presumption is overcome by evidence, the defendant should be acquitted. 37 It is error to 32 Henry v. S. 51 Neb. 149. 70 34 Parker v. S. 136 Ind. 284, 35 N. W. 924; Nehms v. S. 58 Miss. N. E. 1105. See, also, Kimbrough 362; Sawyers v. S. 15 Lea (Tenn.), v. S. 101 Ga. 583, 29 S. B. 39; S. v. 695. Compare P. v. Wong Ah Foo, Byers, 80 N. Car. 426. 69 Cal. 180, 10 Pac. 375. 35 Duncan v. S. 95 Ga. 477, 22 S. 33 Miller v. P. 39 111. 465; Prince E. 324. v. S. 100 Ala. 144, 14 So. 409; P. se Holley v. S. 104 Ala. 100, 17 So. v. Malaspina, 57 Cal. 628; S. v. 102; Pate v. S. 94 Ala. 18, 10 So. Jaynes, 78 N. Car. 504. See Sawyers 665. v. S. 15 Lea (Tenn.), 695; S. v. ST Emery v. S. 101 Wis. 627, 78 N. Collins, 20 Iowa, 85; Turner v. Com. W. 145. 86 Pa. St. 54; Parker v. S. 136 Ind. 293, 35 N. E. 1105. Contra: Kilgore v. S. 74 Ala. 5. 327 PROPER AND IMPROPER REQUESTS. 328 charge the jury that if it was possible that the defendant could have been at both places that is, at the place of the alleged crime and where he claimed he was at the time the proof of the alibi is of no value whatever. 38 Also a charge that "proof to establish an alibi, though not clear, may nevertheless, with other facts of the case, raise doubt enough to produce an ac- quittal ; a reasonable doubt of the defendant 's presence at the time and place necessary for the commission of the crime would necessarily raise a reasonable doubt of guilt," is improper as being misleading and argumentative. 39 ss Ford v. S. 101 Term. 454, 47 S. James v. S. 115 Ala. 83, 22 So. W. 703. 565. CHAPTER XXIII. INSANITY AS A DEFENSE. Sec. 329. Insanity defined. 330. Sanity presumed Insanity presumed to continue. 331. Insanity Burden on defend- ant. 332. Insanity Instructions may define. Sec. 333. Insanity feigned Cautionary instructions. 334. Insanity Instructions prop- er Illustrations. 335. Insanity Instructions im- proper Illustrations. 329. Insanity defined. Where insanity is the defense to a criminal charge, the inquiry is always to be reduced to the single question of the capacity of the accused to discriminate between right and wrong at the time of the alleged criminal act. 1 The insanity must be of such a degree as to create an uncontrollable impulse to do the act charged, by overriding -the reason and judgment, and obliterating the sense of right as to the particular act done, and depriving the accused of the power of choosing between them 1 . 2 i S. v. Harrison, 36 W. Va. 729, 15 S. E. 982, 18 L. R. A. 224 note, 9 Am. Cr. R. 638; Carr v. S. 96 Ga. 284, 22 S. E. 570, 10 Am. Cr. R. 331; S. v. Morwy, 37 Kas. 369, 15 Pac. 282; P. v. Carpenter, 102 N. Y. 238, 6 N. E. 584; S. v. Pagels, 92 Mo. 300, 4 S. W. 391; P. v. Hoin, 62 Cal. 120; S. v. Lawrence, 57 Me. 577. See Mangum v. Com. 19 Ky. L. R. 94, 39 S. W. 703; Com. v. Gerade, 145 Pa. St. 289, 22 Atl. 464; S. v. Hockett, 70 Iowa, 442, 30 N. W. 742. See Eckert v. S. 114 Wis. 160, 89 N. W. 826. Contra: Parsons v. S. 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854, 7 Am. Cr. R. 266. 2 Ho ps v. P. 31 111. 391; Lilly v. P. 148 111. 473, 36 N. E. 95; Dacey v. P. 116 111. 572, 6 N. E. 165; Meyer v. P. 156 111. 129, 40 N. E. 490; United States v. Faulkner, 35 Fed. 731. See, also, S. v. Nixon, 32 Kas. 212, 4 Pac. 159; Plake v. S. 121 Ind. 435, 23 N. E. 273; Goodwin v. S. 96 Ind. 550; Howard v. 9. 50 Ind. 190; Wagner v. S. 116 Ind. 187, 18 N. E. 833; Conway v. S. 118 ind. 482, 21 N. E. 285; S. v. Felter, 32 Iowa, 49; P. v. Riordan:, 117 N. Y. 71, 22 N. E. 455; Tiffiany v. Com. 121 Pa. St. 180, 15 Atl. 462; Mackin v. S. 59 N. J. L. 495, 36 Atl. 1040; Genz v. S. 59 N. J. L. 488, 37 Atl. 69; P. v. Carpen- 328 329 , BURDEN ON DEFENDANT. 331 330. Sanity presumed Insanity presumed to continue. The law presumes every man to be sane until the contrary is shown. But this legal presumption may be overcome by evi- dence from either side tending to prove insanity of the accused. 3 According to this principle it is proper, in charging the jury, to instruct them that every man is presumed to be sane, and to intend the natural and usual consequences of his own acts. 4 When insanity of a permanent type is proved to exist, it will be presumed to continue to exist until the presumption is over- come by competent evidence. But this rule does not apply to cases of occasional or intermittent insanity, but it does apply to all cases of habitual or apparently confirmed insanity of what- ever nature. 5 And the refusal to give an instruction embrac- ing this principle is error where the evidence tends to prove in- sanity of a permanent nature. 6 But a charge that if the de- fendant was insane a short time before the commission of the alleged criminal act, the presumption is that he was insane when he comitted the act, is properly refused. 7 331. Insanity Burden on defendant. And the burden of proof is on the defendant to overcome such presumption. The adjudged cases in this country present a vast weight of authority favorable to the doctrine that insanity as a defense must be es- tablished to the satisfaction of the jury by a preponderance of the evidence; that a reasonable doubt of the defendant's sanity, raised by all the evidence, does not authorize an acquittal. 8 But there are numerous decisions by courts of high authority ter, 102 N. Y. 250, 6 N. E. 584; P. inick v. Randolph, 124 Ala. 557, 27 v. Taylor, 138 N. Y. 406, 34 N. E. So. 481. 275; S. v. Plye, 26 Me. 312; S. v. & S. v. Wilner, 40 Wis. 306, citing Lawrence, 57 Me. 577, 581; Parsons 1 Greenleaf Ev. 42, 371, 689; v. S. 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854. Jackson v. Van Dusen, 5 Johns. (N. s Hughes Cr. Law, 2437, citing, Y.), 144; Grouse v. Holman, 19 Ind. Dacey v. P. 116 111. 572, 6 N. E. 30; Wry v. Wry, 33 Ala. 187; Under- 165; Montag v. P. 141 111. 80, 30 N. hill's Cr. Ev. 156; Branstrator v. E. 337; P. v. McCarthy, 115 Cal. 255, Crow (Ind.), 69 N. E. 668. 46 Pac. 1073; Davis v. United States S. v. Wilner, 40 Wis. 306. See 160 U. S. 469, 16 Sup. Ct. 353, and Grubb v. S. 117 Ind. 277, 20 N. E. many other cases; Sanders v. S. 94 257. Ind. 147; Com. v. Gerade, 145 Pa. T p. v . Smith, 57 Cal. 130. St. 297, 22 Atl. 464. s Hughes Cr. Law, 2435, citing, 4 S. v. Pagels, 92 Mo. 300, 4 S. S. v. Scott, 47 La. Ann. 251, 21 So. W. 931; Sanders v. S. 94 Ind. 147; 271, 10 Am. Cr. R. 585; Parsons v. S. v. Bruce, 48 Iowa, 533. See Dom- S. 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854, 7 Am. Cr. R. 266; Com. v. Gerade, 145 Pa. St. 331 INSANITY AS A DEFENSE. 330 holding that where a prima facie case is made out against the defendant, he is never bound to overcome it by a preponderance of the evidence where insanity is the defense ; that the burden of proof is always on the state and never shifts to the defend- ant; 9 that the presumption of sanity may be overcome by evi- dence which is sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt of the san- ity of the accused at the time of the commission of the alleged criminal act, and an instruction so stating is proper. 10 It is proper, therefore, to instruct the jury that the law presumes a man to be sane until the contrary is shown, and imposes on the accused the burden of proving insanity when set up as a defense to a criminal charge. 11 If the state shall prove, even prima facie, that the accused committed the act alleged to be criminal, and no other evidence is given, his sanity will be presumed, and if he, in his defense, offers no evidence as to his mental condition, his sanity will be regarded as proved. 12 289, 22 Atl. 464; Coyle v. Com. 100 Pa. St. 573, 4 Cr. L. Mag. 76; Car- lisle v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 56 S. W. 365; P. v. Nino, 149 N. Y. 317, 43 N. E. 853; King v. S. 74 Miss. 576, 21 So. 235; S. v. Larkins, 5 Idaho, 200. 47 Pac. 945; S. v. Cole, 2 Pen. (Del.), 344, 45 Atl. 391; Graves v. S. 45 N. J. L. 203. 4 Am. Cr. R. 387; Coates v. S. 50 Ark. 330, 7 S. W. 304. 7 Am. Cr. R. 585; S. v. Smith, 53 Mo. 267, 2 Green. Cr. R. 599; P. v. Wilson, 49 Gal. 13, 1 Am. Cr. R. 358; Ortwein v. Com. 76 Pa. St. 414, 1 Am. Cr. R. 298; S. v. Cleven- ger, 156 Mo. 190, 56 S. W. 1078; Underbill Cr. Bv. 158. Hughes Cr. Law, 2436, cit- ing S. v. Crawford, 11 Kas. 32, 2 Green. Cr. R. 642; P. v. McCann, 16 N. Y. 58; Chase v. P. 40 111. 353; P. v. Hellick, 126 Cal. 425, 58 Pac. 918. See, also, Kelch v. S. 55 Ohio St, 152, 45 N. E. 6; P. v. McCarthy, 115 Cal. 255, 46 Pac. 1073; S. v. Shaef- fer, 116 Mo. 96, 22 S. W. 447; Ford v. S. 73 Miss. 734, 19 So. 665; Walk- er v. P. 88 N. Y. 81, 88; Smith v. Com. 1 Duv. (Ky.), 224, 228; P. v. Holmes, 111 Mich. 364, 69 N. W. 501; Armstrong v. S. 30 Fla. 170, 204, 11 So. 618; S. v. Davis, 109 N. Car. 780, 14 S. E. 55; Underbill Cr. Ev. 157; Guetig v. S. 66 Ind. 94; Plake- v. S. 121 Ind. 433, 23 N. E. 273; McDougal v. S. 88 Ind. 24. 10 Dacey v. P. 116 111. 571, 6 N. E. 165; Montag v. P. 141 111. 80, 30 N. E. 337; Cunningham v. S. 56 Miss. 269; Maas v. Ter. 10 Okla. 714, 63 Pac. 960; Dunn v. P. 109 111. 635; Langdon v. P. 133 111. 406, 24 N. E. 874; P. v. Garbutt, 17 Mich. 9; O'Connell v. P. 87 N. Y. 377; S. v. Bart.lett, 43 N. H. 224; Myers v. P. 156 111. 129, 40 N. E. 490; Brother- ton v. P. 75 N. Y. 159, 3 Am. Cr. R. 219; Com. v. Pomeroy, 117 Mass. 143; Plake v. S. 121 Ind. 433, 23 N. E. 273; S. v. Nixon, 32 Kas. 205, 4 Pac. 159; Ballard v. S. 19 Neb. 609, 28 N. W. 271; Davis v. United States 160 U. S. 469, 16 Sup. Ct. 363; P. v. Taylor, 138 N. Y. 398, 34 N. E.. 275; Keener v. S. 97 Ga. 3881, 24 S. E. 28; S. v. Wright, 134 Mo. 404, 35 S. W. 1145; S. v. Stickley, 41 Iowa, 232, 234, Underbill Cr. Ev. 157. 11 S. v. Pagels, 92 Mo. 300, 4 S. W. 931; S. v. Clevenger, 156 Mo. 190, 56 S. W. 1078. 12 Underbill Cr. Ev. 157, cit- ing Boiling v. S. 54 Kas. 602; O'Brien v. P. 48 Barb. (N. Y.), 280; Armstrong v. S. 30 Fla. 197, 11 So. 618; O'Connell v. P. 87 N. Y. 384; 331 DEFINITION ON DEGREE FEIGNING INSANITY. 333 The burden being on tlie defendant to overcome the presump- tion of sanity, an instruction that the prosecution must affirma- tively establish, as part of their case, that the defendant was sane, is improper. 13 332. Insanity Instructions may define. The court, in charging the jury, may define what in law constitutes such a degree of insanity as excuses an act, which, but for the mental condition of the accused, would be a crime; but in doing so the court should avoid expressing its views of the case. 1 * But the court is not authorized to state to the jury that certain facts do or do not prove insanity. 15 And the court may instruct the jury that insanity, in all its forms, is liable to become worse, until it ends in complete dementia without expressing an opin- ion on the weight of the evidence. 16 333. Insanity feigned Cautionary instructions. Where the evidence warrants it, the court may caution the jury to examine into the defense of insanity that the accused shall not impose upon the court with an ingenious counterfeit of the malady. Thus it is not improper to instruct that tlie plea of insanity is "sometimes resorted to in cases where aggravated crimes have been committed under circumstances which afford full proof of the overt acts, and render hopeless all other means of evading punishment. While, therefore, it ought to be viewed as a not less full and complete, than it is a humane defense when sat- isfactorily established, yet it should be satisfactorily examined into, with care, lest an ingenious counterfeit of the malady furnish protection to guilt." 17 So also an instruction that "if you find the accused at the time the doctor was observing him through the hole in the wall, as described by the witness, was watching to see whether he was Com. v. Gerade, 145 Pa. St. 296, 22 Geier, 111 Towa, 706, 83 N. W. 718; Atl. 464; Dove v. S. 3 Heisk. S. v. Jones, 126 N. Car. 1099, 36 S. B. (Tenn.), 371. 38; P. v. Hubert, 119 Cal. 216, 51 is P. v. Garbutt, 17 Mich. 9, 97 Pac. 329. Am. Dec. 162; Reg. v. Layton, 4 ie Carr v. S. 96 Ga. 284, 22 S. E. Cox Cr. Gas. 155; S. v. Spencer, 1 570. Zab. (N. J.) 202. IT p. v . McCarthy, 115 Cal. 255. i* P. v. Holmes, 111 Mich. 364, 69 46 Pac. 1073; P. v. Larrabee, 115 N. W. 501. Cal. 158, 46 Pac. 922; P. v. Allender, is Guetig v. S. 63 Ind. 278; Rob- 117 Cal. 81, 48 Pac. 1014; P. v. inson v. Walton, 58 Mo. 380; S. v. Kloss, 115 Cal. 567, 47 Pac 459. 334 INSANITY AS A DEFENSE. 332 observed, and was regulating his conduct accordingly, it would raise a very strong presumption that he was feigning insanity, and indeed such evidence of design and calculation on his part as to be in my opinion entirely fatal to his defense of insanity," has been held not to be an improper comment on the defense of insanity where the evidence strongly tends to show that the defense was not founded in fact, but feigned. 18 334. Insanity Instructions proper Illustrations Where the defendant neither admits nor denies killing the deceased, but claims that she was unconscious, an instruction charging the jury that if they believe and find from the evidence that the defendant killed the deceased, but at the time of the killing was from any cause rendered so unconscious of her acts as not to know what she was doing, they should acquit her, properly states the law. 19 A charge that evidence of insanity can have no effect in reducing the degree of the crime is not improper where other instructions are given that if the accused is insane he should be acquitted. 20 On a plea of insanity an instruction stating that "we hear everything he says, consider everything he does; we observe his conduct on the witness stand; we don't check him in stat- ing his testimony, because one of the purposes is to see whether he is a sane man or not," is not improper as authorizing the jury to infer that the issue on the question of insanity shall be confined to the time of the trial instead of at the time of the crime charged, where other instructions in various forms confine the inquiry as to insanity to the time of the alleged offense. 21 "The law is that where the killing is admitted, and insanity or want of legal responsibility is alleged as an excuse, it is the duty of the defendant to satisfy the jury that insanity actually existed at the time of the act, and a doubt as to such insanity will not justify the jury in acquitting upon that ground." Held proper. 22 Another form held proper: "Was the defendant a free agent in forming the purpose to kill the deceased? Was he at the time the act was committed capable is McKee v. P. 36 N. Y. 118. 21 p. v . Burgle (Cal.), 53 Pac. 9&. is S. v. Lewjs, 136 Mo. 84, 37 S. W. 22 Ortwein v. Com. 76 Pa. St. 414, 806. 1 Am. Cr. R. 297, Hughes Cr. Law, 20 Com. v. Hollinger, 190 Pa. St. 3269. 155, 42 Atl. 548. 333 PROPER AND IMPROPER REQUESTS. 335 of judging whether that act was right or wrong? And did he at the time know it was an offense against the laws of God and man?" 23 335. Insanity Instructions improper Illustrations. Where insanity is the defense to a charge of murder, and evidence of the insanity of relatives of the defendant is introduced, it isl^ improper to instruct that the evidence of the insanity of such relatives should be considered only in case the jury entertain a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's sanity at the time of the commission of the act. All of the evidence should be con- sidered in determining the mental condition of the defendant. 24 A charge stating, among other things, that "the defense of insanity has been so abused as to be brought into great dis- credit; that it has been the last resort to cases of unquestion- able guilt, and has been an excuse to juries for acquittal," is highly prejudicial to the rights of the accused. 25 An instruction which charges that no state of mind resulting from drunkenness, short of actual insanity or loss of reason, is any excuse for committing a crime, is erroneous where the evidence shows that the accused was intoxicated, but where there was no evidence that he had premeditated committing the crime. 26 A charge that an attempt to commit suicide is evidence of insanity is properly refused ; such act is not evidence of in- sanity, but only one phase of the evidence to be considered, together with all the other evidence in the case. 27 An instruc- tion that although the defendant at the time of the commission of the crime charged was able to distinguish right from wrong, yet if he "did not possess the power to avoid the wrong and do the right, he is irresponsible and you must acquit" is errone- ous and properly refused. 28 It is improper and erroneous to charge that the presumption of innocence is of so much greater strength than that of sanity that when evidence appears tending to prove insanity it compels the prosecution to establish, from 23 Blackburn v. S. 23 Ohio St. 146, 26 Latimer v. S. 55 Neb. 609, 76 2 Green. Cr. R. 540; Clark v. S. 12 N. W. 207. Ohio, 494. 27 p. v. Owens, 123 Cal. 482, 56 24 Jones v. P. 23 Colo. 276, 47 Pac. Pac. 251. 275. 28 p. v . Bartheman, 120 Cal. 7, 25 S. v. Barry, 11 N. Dak. 428, 52 Pac. 112. ' 92 N. W. 809. 335 INSANITY AS A DEFENSE. 334 all the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, the mental sound- ness of the accused. 29 An instruction telling the jury that if there is a single fact essential to constitute the guilt of the de- fendant which has not been established beyond a reasonable doubt, that is sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt, is properly .refused where insanity is the defense and the only issue in the case. 30 28 Guetig v. S. 66 Ind. 94. so S. v. Soper, 148 Mo. 217, 49 S. W. 1007. The refusal to instruct on the law as to insanity cannot be urged as error if there is no evi- dence tending to show insanity of the defendant at or near the time of killing, S. v. Hartley, 22 Nev. 342, 40 Pac. 372, 28 L. R. A. 33 note. Instructions on insanity are prop- erly refused where insanity is not interposed as a defense, Johnson v. S. 100 Tenn. 254, 45 S. W. 436. CHAPTER XXIV. PRESUMPTIONS OP INNOCENCE. Sec. 336. Defendant presumed to be in- nocent. 337. Instructions refused W hen error and when not. Sec. 33S. Presumption of innocence is evidence. 339. Presumption is evidence Il- lustrations. 336. Defendant presumed to be innocent. In criminal cases the defendant is always presumed to be innocent of the crime charged until his guilt has been established beyond a reasonable doubt; 1 and this presumption continues in his favor throughout every stage of the trial down to and until the jury shall have reached a verdict, 2 and does not cease upon the submission of the case to the jury. 3 This is a fundamental principle of crim- inal law, and the defendant is entitled to have the jury properly instructed on the law of such presumption, and the refusal to so i Rogers v. S. 117 Ala. 192, 23 So. 82; Salm v. S. 89 Ala. 56, 8 So. 66; Foster v. S. 89 Wis. 482, 62 N. W. 185; P. v. Willett, 105 Mich. 110, 62 N. W. 1115; P. v. Pallister, 138 N. Y. 605, 33 N. E. 741; Aszman v. S. 123 Ind. 361, 24 N. E. 123; Gardner v. S. 55 N. J. L. 17, 26 Atl. 30; P. v. Resh, 107 Mich. 251. 65 N. W. 99; P. v. Coughlin, 65 Mich. 704, 32 N. W. 905; Farley v. S. 127 Ind. 421, 26 N. E. 766; Reeves v. S. 29 Fla. 527, 10 So. 901; Long v. S. 23 Neb. 33, 36 N. W. 310; Hutts v. S. 7 Tex. App. 44; Reid v. S. 50 Ga. 556; Underbill Cr. Ev. 17. See, also, P. v. Bowers (Cal.), 18 Pac. 660; Line v. S. 51 Ind. 172; P. v. Arlington, 131 Cal. 231, 63 1 Pac. 347; Garrison v. S. 6 Neb. 285; Murphy v. S. 108 Wis. HI, 83 N. W. 1112; Ter. v. Burgess, 8 Mont. 57, 19 Pac. 58; S. v. Stubblefield, 157 Mo. 360. 58 S. W. 337. 2 S. v. Krug, 12 Wash. 288, 41 Pac. 126; Bartley v. S. 53 Neb. 310, 73 N. W. 744; S. v. Stubblefield, 157 Mo. 360, 58 S. W. 337; S. v. Howell, 26 Mont. 3, 66 Pac. 291; P. v. McNa- mara, 94 Cal. 515, 29 Pac. 953; P. v. Macard, 73 Mich. 26, 40 N. W. 784. See P. v. Arlington, 131 Cal. 231, 63 Pac. 347, (relating to every stage of the trial) ; Underbill Cr. Ev. 18. Contra: Emery v. S. 101 Wis. 627, 78 N. W. 145; Baker v. Com. 90 Va. 820, 20 S. E. 776. s P. v. O'Brien, 106 Cal. 104, 39 Pac. 325. 335 337 PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE. 336 instruct when properly requested is reversible error; 4 but the failure to so instruct cannot be urged as error where the omission was not called to the attention of the court. 5 337. Instructions refused When error and when not. The refusal to instruct the jury on the law as to the presumption of the innocence of the accused when properly requested is error, although the court may fully instruct on the doctrine of reason- able doubt. 6 It is not error, however, to refuse an instruction on the presumption of innocence if the refused instruction is substantially covered by others given. 7 Thus where the court has stated to the jury that nothing can be presumed against the defendant, it is not prejudicial error to omit to charge that the defendant is presumed to be innocent, if the instructions in other respects fully and properly state the law applicable to the case. 8 So the refusal of a specific instruction which may perhaps more definitely state the principle of such presumption is not ground for error where the general charge on the same subject can be readily understood by the jury. 9 And the giving of an instruc- tion on the presumption of innocence may render it unnecessary to give instructions on other questions, such, for instance, as "the burden is upon the state to establish every element of the of- * Rogers v. S. 117 Ala. 192, 23 Vaughan v. Com. 85 Va. 671; Mur- So. 82; S. v. Gonce, 79 Mo. 602; ray v. S. 26 Ind. 141 (exception must Foster v. S. 89 Wis. 482, 62 N. W. be taken to the refusal), Contra: S. 185; P. v. Willett, 105 Mich. 110, 62 v. Heinze, 2 Mo. App. 1314; P. v. N. W. 1115; Castle v. S. 75 Ind. Ostrander, 110 Mich. 60, 67 N. W. 146; Reeves v. S. 29 Fla. 527, 10 So. 1079. 905; Coffee v. S. 5 Tex. App. 545; * Faqua v. Com. (Ky.), 73 S. W. P. v. Potter, 89 Mich. 354, 50 N. W. 782; Smith v. S. 63 Ga. 170; Murphy 994; Farley v. S. 127 Ind. 419, 26 v. S. 108 Wis. Ill, 83 N. W. 1112. N. E. 898. 8 P. v. Parsons,- 105 Mich. 177, 63 s P. v. Graney, 91 Mich. 646, 52 N. W. 69. See P. v. Harper, 83 N. W. 66; P. v. Ostrander, 110 Mich. Mich. 273, 47 N. W. 221. 60, 67 N. W. 1079; P. v. Smith, 92 8 Murphy v. S. 108 Wis. Ill, 83 Mich. 10. 52 N. W. 67; Williams v. Wis. 1112. On the trial of a charge P. 164 111. 481, 45 N. B. 987. See of murder in the first degree an in- Murray v. S. 26 Ind. 141. Contra: struction as to the presumption of P. v. Macard, 73 Mich. 15, 40 N. W. innocence which states among other 784; P. v. Potter, 89 Mich. 353, 50 things that the defendant is pre- N. W. 994. sumed to be innocent "of the crime Stokes v. P. 53 N. Y. 183; Coffin charged" relates as well to the in- v. United States, 156 L. S. 432, 15 eluded offenses as to the specific Sup. Ct. 394; P. v. Van Houter, 38 charge of murder in the first de- Hun (N. Y.),173; Cochran. v. United gree, S. v. Smith, 164 Mo. 567, 65 S. States, 157 U. S. 286, 15 Sup. Ot. 628; W. 270. 337 PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE AS EVIDENCE. 339 fense and never shifts to the defendant." 10 So the refusal to charge that if there is a probability of innocence there is a reason- able doubt of guilt, is not error where other instructions given properly state the law of the presumption of innocence. 11 338. Presumption of innocence is evidence. The legal pre- sumption of innocence shall be regarded as a matter of evidence to the benefit of which the defendant is entitled until his guilt is proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and a refusal to so instruct the jury when a proper instruction is requested is error. 12 A charge that the presumption of innocence "partakes of the nature of evidence, and if no evidence was introduced, then under this presumption of innocence the jury should acquit the defend- ant;" and that such presumption continues until the defendant is proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, is proper although evidence had in fact been introduced. 13 But the refusal of such an instruction is not error where the court instructs that the presumption of innocence continues until guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt. 14 339. Presumption is evidence Illustrations. An instruc- tion stating that every person is presumed to be innocent until his guilt has been established beyond a reasonable doubt is not erroneous in that it does not state that the guilt must be proved by competent evidence where it appears that all the evidence is competent. 15 A charge stating in substance that the law pre- sumes the innocence of a person accused of crime and that this presumption is not merely a matter of form, to be disregarded by 10 Huggins v. S. 42 Tex. Cr. App. 76 N. W. 438; Gordon v. Com. 100 364, 60 S. W. 52; Lewis v. S. (Tex. Va. 825, 41 S. E. 746, 57 L. R. A. Cr. App.), 59 S. W. 886. 744. Contra: S. v. Martin, (Mont), 11 Allen v. United States, 164 U. 74 Pac. 727. S. 492, 17 Sup. Ct. 154. In Virginia it is McVey v. S. 55 Neb. 777, 76 N. has been held that a charge that the W. 438. accused comes to trial presumed to i* McVey v. S. 55 Neb. 777, 76 N. be innocent, and this presumption W. 438. See Gordon v. Com. 100 extends to the end of the trial, and Va. 825, 41 S. E. 746, 57 L. R. A. the jury in considering the evi- 744; S. v. Hudspeth, 159 Mo. 178, dence should endeavor to reconcile 60 S. W. 136. it with this presumption, is im- is Dalzell v. S. 7 Wyo. 450, 53 proper as tending to mislead. Bar- Pax:. 297; S. v. Duck, 35 La. Ann. ker v. Com. 90 \a. 820, 20 S. E. 776. 764; Williams v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. App. 12 Bryant v. S. 116 Ala. 44b, 23 606. 34 S. W. 943; P. v. Resh, 107 So. 40; Bartley v. S. 53 Neb. 310, 73 Mich. 251, 65 N. W. 99; Gallagher N. W. 744; McVey v. S. 55 Neb. 777, v. S. 28 Tex. App. 247. 339 PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE. 338 the jury at their pleasure ; that such presumption continues with the defendant throughout all the stages of the trial, properly states the law. 16 An instruction that "the law raises no pre- sumption against the accused, but every presumption of the law is in favor of his innocence," is proper. 17 An instruction that the defendant, though indicted for perjury, is just as innocent of the crime as though not indicted, is erroneous. 18 " S. v. Krug, 12 Wash. 288, 41 19 Pac. 558, 1 L. R. A. 808. See, Pac. 126. Contra: Barker v. Com. also, Line v. S. 51 Ind. 172. 90 Va. 820, 20 S. E. 776. is Sanders v. P. 124 111. 21fc, 16 IT Ter. v. Burgess, 8 Mont. 57, N. E. 81. CHAPTER XXV. CHARACTER OP DEFENDANT. Sec. 340. Proof of good character prop- er. 341. Good character considered Instructions. 342. Instructions o n character Refusal When proper. 343. Good character creating rea- sonable doubt Instruction. 344. Good character unavailing When. Sec. 345. Good character Instructions improper. (1.) Considered as generating doubt. (2.) Persons not Mkely to com- mit crime. (30 Sufflciervt to raise doubt. (4.) Invading province of jury. (5.) Ignoring evidence of. 340. Proof of good character proper. In every criminal prosecution the accused is entitled to prove his good character, and when proved it is itself a fact in the case a circumstance tending in greater or less degree to establish his innocence ; and the accused has a right to have it considered by the jury the same as any other fact in evidence. 1 Evidence of the good char- acter of the accused is admissible whether the case as to his guilt or innocence is doubtful or not. 2 Therefore, to say by instruc- 1 S. v. Van Kuran, 25 Utah, 8, 69 Pac. 60. 2 Jupitz v. P. 34 111. 521; Mc- Queen v. S. 82 Ind. 74; Steele v. P. 45 111. 157; S. v. Lindley, 51 Iowa, 344, 1 N. W. 484; Aneals v. P. 134 111. 401, 25 N. E. 1022; Com. v. Leonard, 140 Mass. 473, 7 Am. Cr. R. 598, 4 N. E. 96, 54 Am. R. 485; P. v. De La Cour Soto, 63 Cal. 165; Hall v. S. 132 Ind. 317, 31 N. E. 536; S. v. Schleagel, 50 Kas. 325, 31 Par. 1105; Edg- ington v. U. S. 164 U. S. 361, 17 Sup. Ct. 72; Com. v. Wilson, 152 Mass. 12, 25 N. E. 16; Pate v. S. 94 Ala. 14, 10 So. 665; S. v. Mc- Murphy, 52 Mo. 251, 1 Green. Cr. R. 640; S. v. Anslinger, 171 Mo. 600, 71 S. W. 1041; Stewart v. S. 22 Ohio St. 478; S. v. Honing, 49 Iowa, 158; S. v. Porter, 32 Ore. 135, 49 Pac. 964; P. v. Mead, 50 Mich. 228, 15 N. W. 95; S. v. Henry, 50 N. Car. 65; Remsen v. P. 57 Barb. (N. Y.), 324, 43 N. Y. 6; Holland v. S. 131 Ind. 572, 31 N. E. 359; Hammond v. S. 74 Miss. 214, 21 So. 149. 339 341 CHARACTER OF DEFENDANT. 340 tion that evidence of the good character of the defendant can be considered by the jury only in cases where the other evidence leaves it doubtful whether the defendant is guilty or not, is error. 3 So a charge that "evidence of good character is entitled to great weight when the evidence against the accused is weak or doubtful, but is entitled to very little weight when the proof is strong," is erroneous in that it invades the province of the jury. 4 Also an instruction charging that "evidence of previous good character may be considered by you in connection with all the other evidence given in the cause in determining whether the defendant would likely commit the crime with which he is charged; and if you find from all the evidence in the cause, in- dependent of the evidence of his good character, that there is a reasonable doubt, then you should give him the benefit of good character and acquit him ; but if you should find from all the evidence given in the cause independent of the evidence of previous good character that the defendant did commit the crime or was present aiding or abetting, encouraging, counseling, directing and assisting in the same, evidence of previous good character would not avail him anything, and you should find him guilty," is erroneous in that it deprives the defendant of the benefit of his evidence of good character. 5 The weight that ought to be given to evidence of good character does not depend upon the grade of the crime, and an instruction that it does is er- roneous. 6 341. Good character considered Instructions. It is the duty of the jury to consider the evidence of the previous good character of the accused together with all the other evidence in the case in determining his guilt or innocence. They must con- s Rowe v. U. S. 97 Fed. 779; C. C. 613; Hammond v. S. 74 Miss. Jupitz v. P. 34 111. 516, 521; P. 214, 21 So. 149; Com. v. Cleary, 135 v. Hancock, 7 Utah, 170, 25 Pac. Pa. St. 64, 19 Atl. 1017; Felix v. S. 1093; Edgington v. U. S. 164 U. 18 Ala. 725; Stewart v. S. 22 Ohio S. 361, 17 Sup. Ct. 72; Powers v. St. 478; S. v. Kinley, 43 Iowa, 296; S. 74 Miss. 777, 21 So. 65; P. S. v. Daley, 53 Vt. 442. v. Don Pedro, 43 N. Y. S. 44, 19 * Vincent v. S. 37 Neb. 672, 56 Misc. 300. See P. v. Dippold, 51 N. W. 320. N. Y. S. 859, 30 App. Div. 62; S. 5 Holland v. S. 131 Ind. 568, 31 v. Holmes, 65 Minn. 230, 68 N. N. E. 359. W. 11; Com. v. Leonard, 140 Mass. Harrington v. S. 19 Ohio St. 473', 4 N. E. 96; 8. v. Henry, 50 268; Cancerni v. P. 16 N. Y. 501. N. Oar. 65; Donaldson v. S. 10 Ohio 341 GOOD CHARACTER, EFFECT. 343 sider whether the evidence of such good character, when weighed and considered with all the other evidence, raises a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused. 7 Such evidence should be submitted to the jury as any other evidence without any inti- mation as to its value or without any disparagement. 8 The evi- dence of the good character of the accused should be mentioned in connection with the other evidence in the case in charging the jury, and not disconnected from it. 9 342. Instructions on character Refusal When proper. If there is no evidence as to the good character of the defendant the court may properly refuse to instruct in that respect. 10 Thus an instruction that the defendant's character cannot be assailed unless he himself puts it in issue by introducing evidence in its support, is improper where the defendant has offered no evidence as to his character; it suggests the inference that the prosecution might have shown the bad character of the defend- ant had it been permitted to do so. 11 It is not error to refuse an instruction as to the good character of the accused if it is sub- stantially embodied in others given. 12 343 Good character creating reasonable doubt Instruction. The accused is entitled to an instruction that good character may of itself create a reasonable doubt where otherwise no such doubt would exist. 13 So an instruction that if in the judgment of the jury 7 S. v. Keefe, 54 Kas. 197, 38 Pac. ra, 100 Mo. 100 (holdiu that the re- 302; Olds v. S. (Fla.), 33 So. 296. fusal of a proper instruction is See Crump v. Com. (Va.), 23 S. E. not error), 13 S. W. 938; P. v. 700. Spriggs, 58 Hun (N. Y.), 603, 11 N. s Powers v. S. 74 Miss. 777, 21 Y. S. 433. So. 657; Latimer v. S. 55 Neb. 609, is P. v. Elliott, 163 N. Y. 11, 57 76 N. W. 207; Moran v. S. 11 Ohio N. E. 103; Lowenberg v. P. 5 Park. C. C. 464; P. v. Casey, 53 Cal. 392. Cr. (N. Y.), 414; Bryant v. S. 116 o Crawford v. S. 112 Ala. 1, 21 Ala. 445, 23 So. 40; S. v. Vankuran, So. 214; P. v. Hoagland, 137 Cal. 25 Utah, 8, 69 Pac. 60 (good char- 218, 69 Pac. 1063. acter may satisfy the jury of the 10 Williams v. P. 166 111. 136, 46 innocence of the defendant) ; Bank- N. E. 749; S. v. Gartrell, 171 Mo. head v. S. 124 Ala. 14, 26 So. 979; 489, 71 S. W. 1045. See S. v. Fur- Aneals v. P. 134 111. 415, 25 N. E. geson, 162 Mo. 668, 63 S. W. 101. 1022; P. v. Bell, 49 Cal. 489. See, 11 P. v. Gleason, 122 Cal. 370, 55 also, S. v. Porter, 32 Ore. 135, 49 Pac. Pac. 123. 964; Heine v. Com. 91 Pa. St. 145; 12 White v. U. S. 164 U. S. 100, P. v. Bell, 49 Cal. 485. Contra: 17 Sup. Ct. 38; Com. v. Wilson. Scott v. S. 105 Ala. 57, 16 So. 925; 152 Mass. 12, 25 N. E. 16; P. v. Briggs v. Conr. 82 Va. 554; Powers Johnson, 61 Cal. 142; S. v. McNama- v. S. 74 Miss. 777, 21 So. 657. 344 CHARACTER OF DEFENDANT. 342 the evidence of good character raises a reasonable doubt against positive evidence, they have the right to entertain such doubt, and the defendant should have the benefit of it, properly states the law. 14 It is not proper, however, to instruct that evidence of good character is admissible for the purpose of creating a reason- able doubt. 15 Also that good character is of importance to a person charged with the commission of a criminal offense, and that the jury have the right to consider whether a person of good character would be less liable to be guilty of the commis- sion of crime than a person of bad character, is proper. 16 344. Good character unavailing When. If, however, the evidence clearly and conclusively establishes the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury should find him guilty, notwithstanding his former good character. Hence, an instruction charging that if from the evidence the jury believe the defendant is guilty, then his previous good character neither justifies, mitigates, nor excuses the offense, is proper. 17 Also an instruction that if after full consideration of all the evidence adduced (including the evidence of good character), the jury believe the defendant to be guilty of any degree of the crime charged, they should so find, notwithstanding proof of good character, correctly states the law. 18 345. Good character Instructions improper. (1) Consider- ed as generating doubt: A charge which states that "the good character of the defendant if proved, is not only evidence of inno- cence, but it may be considered by the jury for the purpose of generating doubt," is improper, in that it tends to mislead the jury on the question of reasonable doubt. 19 Also charging that good character, if proved, may sometimes have the effect of generating such doubt as would authorize an acquittal, even i* P. v. Hughson, 154 N. Y. 153, Mo. 70; S. v. Spooner, 41 La. Ann. 47 N. B. 1092. 780, 6 So. 879; Creed v. P. 81 111. i" S. v. Gushing, 17 Wash. 544, 565; S. v. Porter, 32 Ore. 135, 49 50 Pac. 512. Pac. 964; P. v. Brooks, 61 Hun (N. IB P. v. Harrison, 93 Mich. 597, 53 Y.) 619, 15 N. Y. S. 362; S. v. Dar- N. W. 725. rah, 152 Mo. 522, 54 S. W. 226. IT S. v. Jones, 78 Mo. 282; S. v. is P. v. Smith, 59 Cal. 601. Leppere, 66 Wis. 355, 28 N. W. 376; i Johnson v. S. 102 Ala. 1, 16 Com. v. Eckerd, 174 Pa. St. 137, 34 So. 99; Eggleston v. S. 129 Ala. 80, Atl. 305; P. v. Samsels, 66 Cal. 99, 4 30 So. 582; Miller v. S. 107 Ala. 40, Pac. 1061; P. v. Mitchell, 129 Cal. 19 So. 37; Webb v. S. 106 Ala. 52, 584, 62 Pac. 187; S. v. Vansant, 80 18 So. 491. 343 IMPROPER REQUESTS ON CHARACTER. 345 when the jury would otherwise have entertained no doubt, and that the defendant may introduce evidence of his previous good character for the purpose of generating a doubt of his guilt, has been declared to be improper, as giving undue prominence to the evidence of good character. 20 (2.) Person not likely to commit crime''. So a charge that "if you find good character established by the evidence you should con- sider it and allow it such weight as you believe it fairly entitled to, as tending to show that men of such character would not be likely to commit the crime charged, ' ' is erroneous in that it does not ex- pressly refer to the good character of the accused, and is somewhat argumentative. 21 (3) Sufficient to raise the doubt: Also a charge that the good character of the defendant, if shown, is of itself sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt, is improper 22 (4.) Invading province of jury : A charge that if from all the evi- dence the jury have any reasonable doubt of the guilt of the de- fendant, and if they further believe from the evidence that the defendant has for a long time possessed and now possesses a good moral character for peace, sobriety, and honesty, then such fact of good character, coupled with the presumption of innocence which the law invokes is sufficient upon which to find a verdict of not guilty, is improper as invading the province of the jury. 23 (5.) Ignoring evidence of: The defense in rebuttal having intro- duced evidence tending to show that the reputation of the accused for truth, honesty and integrity was good, the court erred in charging the jury that they should draw no unfavor- able inference of the defendant from the fact that she had offered no evidence as to her general good character. 24 20 Goldsmith v. S. 105 Ala. 8, 16 other witnesses has been intro- So. 933; Crawford v. S. 112 Ala. 1, duced on both sides, a general in- 21 So. 214. struction that such evidence should 21 Dorsey v. S. 110 Ala. 38, 20 So. be considered on the credibility of 450. the witnesses is not erroneous and 22 Hammond v. S. 74 Miss. 214, 21 does not limit the effect of it to So. 149. the defendant's credibility, nor de- 23 s. v. McNamara, 100 Mo. 100, 13 prive him of the right to have it S. W. 938. considered on the issue of his guilt 21 S. v. Marks, 16 Utah, 204, 51 or innocence. S. v. Olds, 106 Iowa, Pac. 1089. Where evidence of the 110, 76 N. W. 644. character of the defendant and CHAPTER XXVI. OBJECTIONS AND EXCEPTIONS. Sec. Sec. 346. Method and manner of tak- 356. Error presented on motion for ing exceptions. new trial. 347. Time of taking exceptions. 357. Making instructions part of 348. Specific exceptions generally record. necessary. 358. By bill of exceptions. 349. General exceptions sufficient. 369. AIL instructions must be in 350. Exceptions when instructions record. are numbered. 360. Presumption in absence of all 351. Exceptions General, specific instructions. and joint. 361. When considered in absence 352. Failure to except Effect. of evidence. 353. Assignment of error on in- 362. Presumptions in. absence of structions in group. evidence. 354. Exceptions limited to grounds 363. Errors caused at one's own stated. request. 355. Objections and exceptions not 364. After cause is remanded. waived. 346. Method and manner of taking exceptions. As a general rule exceptions to the giving or refusing of instructions must be properly taken in the trial court before the assignment of errors thereon will be considered by a court of review. 1 Under stat- utory provisions in some jurisdictions the exceptions to instruc- tions must be signed by the judge presiding, and if not signed they will not be the subject of review on appeal or writ of error. 2 And the exceptions must be signed by the judge pre- i West C. St. R. Co. v. Martin, 658, 68 N. E. 1117; Bruen v. P. 206 154 111. 523, 39 N. E. 140; Buck- 111. 425, 69 N. E. 24; First Nat. Bank master v. Cool, 12 111. 74; Burnette v. Tolerton (Neb.), 97 N. W. 248. v. Town of Guyers, 106 Wis. 618, 2 Central R. Co. v. Coleman, 80 82 N. W. 564; Barker v. Lawrence Md. 328, 30 Atl. 918; Ayres v. Blev- Mfg. Co. 176 Mass. 203, 76 N. E. ins, 28 Ind. App. 101, 62 N. E. 305; 366; Gracie v. Stevens, 171 N. Y. Hutchinson v. Lerncke, 107 Ind. 344 345 TAKING EXCEPTIONS, HOW, WHEN. 347 siding, although the instructions were given on the court's own motion. 3 The taking of exceptions, to be of any avail on review, must extend to all the instructions on the same subject considered to- gether. An exception to detached portions of instructions will not be considered. 4 The indorsement on instructions of the words "given and excepted to at the time by the defendant," and signed by the court, is not sufficient under a statute which provides that "it shall be sufficient to write on the margin or at the close of each instruction, 'refused and excepted to, or given and excepted to,' " which memorandum shall be signed by the judge, in that it omits the date which is quite as material as the signature. 5 347. Time of taking exceptions. Objections to instructions cannot be raised for the first time in the reviewing court on ap- peal or writ of error. 6 . Thus, an objection that the court in- structed the jury orally instead of in writing, comes too late when raised for the first time on appeal. 7 The record must show that exceptions were taken at the time the instructions were given or refused, to be of any avail. 8 Where an exception appears 121, 8 N. E. 71; Board v. Legg, 110 171 N. Y. 635, 63 N. E. 1117; Fruchey Ind. 486, 11 N. E. 612; McKinsey v. v. Eagleson, 15 Ind. App. 88, 43 McKee, 109 Ind. 209, 9 N. E. 771; N. E. 146; Keens v. Robertson, 46 Mason v. Seiglitz, 22 Colo. 320, 44 Neb. 837, 65 N. W. 897; Romberg Pac. 588. See Moore v. Brown (Tex. v. Hediger, 47 Neb. 201, 66 N. W. Cv. App.), 64 S. W. 946. 283; Hall v. Incorporated Town, 90 s Silver v. Parr, 115 Ind. 113, 17 Iowa, 585, 58 N. W. 881; Price v. N. E. 114. An exception to the Hallett, 138 Mo. 561, 38 S. W. 451; ruling of the court need not be in Turner v. Goldsboro Lumber Co. a technical term, such as "I ex- 119 N. Car. 387, 26 S. E. 23; Daw- cept." Woolsey v. Lasher, 54 N. son v. Coston, 18, Colo. 493, 33 Y. S. 737. Pac. 189; Peck v. Boggess, 2 111. * Bell v. City of Spokane, 30 (1 Scam.), 285; Tomlinson v. Wai- Wash. 508, 71 Pac. 31; Gray v. lace, 16 Wis. 234; Carter v. Missouri Washington Water P. Co. 30 Wash. M. & L. Co. 6 Okla. 11, 41 Pac. 356; 665, 71 Pac. 206. P. v. Caldwell, 107 Mich. 374, 65 s Malott v. Hawkins, 159 Ind. 137, N. W. 213; Franklin v. Claflin, 49 63 N. E. 308; Behymer v. S. 95 Ind. Md. 24; S. v. Probasco, 46 Kas. 310, 140; Roose v. Roose, 145 Ind. 162, 26 Pac. 749; Lawrence v. Bucklen, 44 N. E. 1; Williams v. Chapman, 45 Minn. 195, 47 N. W. 655; Mc- 160 Ind. 130, 66 N. E. 460. Daneld v. Logi, 143 111. 487, 32 N. E. o Cathey v. Bowen, 70 Ark. 348, 423. Contra: Gonzales v. S. 35 Tex. 68 S. W. 31; Jenkins v. Mammoth Cr. App. 339, 33 S. W. 363. Min. Co. 24 Utah, 513, 68 Pac. 845; ? Bowling v. Floyd (Kas.), 48 Thompson v. Security T. & L. Ins. Pac. 875. Co. 63 S. Car. 290, 41 S. E. 464; s Washington County Water Co. Gumby v. Metropolitan St. R. Co. v. Garver, 91 Md. 398, 46 Atl. 979; 347 OBJECTIONS AND EXCEPTIONS. 346 in regular order upon the record, immediately following the in- struction to which exception was taken, it will be presumed by the reviewing court that the exception was taken at the time the instructions were given. 9 In some jurisdictions the exceptions relating to instructions must be taken before the jury retire to consider the case. 10 But in some of the states exceptions may be taken at any time before the verdict of the jury. 11 It follows from what has been said that the taking of exceptions after the verdict is too late to be considered on appeal. 12 And of course it is too late to object to Loewenstein v. Bennett, 19 Ohio C. C. b!6; Taylor v. Pullen, 152 Mo. 434, 53 S. W. 1086; Zingrebe v. Union R. Co. 60 N. Y. S. 913; Frenkmann v. Schneider, 64 N. Y. S. Ill; Snowden v. Town of Som- erset, 64 N. Y. S. 1088; Willard v. Petitt, 153 111. 663, 667, 39 N. E. 991 (Illinois cases reviewed); East St. Louis Elec. R. Co. v. Stout, 150 111. 9, 36 N. E. 963; S. v. Dewitt, 152 Mo. 76, 53 S. W. 429 (oral instruc- tions) ; Vaughn v. Ferrall, 57 Ind. 182; S. v. Sacre, 141 Mo. 64, 41 S. W. 905; Barr v. City of Omaha, 42 Neb. 341, 60 N. W. 591; S. v. Hath- away, 100 Iowa, 225, 69 N. W. 443; U. S. Sugar Refiner v. Provi- dence Steam & G. P. Co. 62 Fed. 375; Bradford Glycerine Co. v. Kizer, 113 Fed. 894; Bluff City Lum- ber Co. v. Floyd, 70 Ark. 418, 68 S. W. 484; S. v. -Harris, 107 La. Ann. 325, 31 So. 782; Aden v. Road Dist. &c. 197 111. 220, 64 N. E. 274; Shep- herd v. S. 36 Fla. 374, 18 So. 773; Hubbard v. S. 37 Fla. 156, 20 So. 235; Bush v. S. 47 Neb. 642, 66 N. W. 638; Crump v. Com. (Va.), 23 S. E. 760. 9 Strickfadden v. Zipprick, 49 111. 288. 10 Pitman v. Mauran, 69 N. H. 230, 40 Atl. 392; Yates v. U. S. 90 Fed. 57; Commercial Travelers' M. A. Asso. v. Fulton, 79 Fed. 423; McKown v. Powers, 86 Me. 291, 29 Atl. 1079; Hindman v. First Nat. Bank, 112 Fed. 931; Murray v. S. 26 Ind. 141; S. v. Westlake, 159 Mo. 669; Buel v. New York Steamer, 17 La. Ann. 541; Reynolds v. S. 68 Ala. 507; Schroeder v. Rin- hard, 25 Neb. 75, 40 N. W. 593; S. v. Clark, 37 Vt. 471; Little Miami R. Co. 22 Ohio St. 324; Garton v. Union City Nat. Bank, 34 Mich. 279; Garoutte v. William- son, 108 Cal. 135, 41 Pac. 35, 413; O'Conner v. Chicago M. & St. P. R. Co. 27 Minn. 166, 6 N. W. 481; Gibson v. S. 26 Fla. 109, 7 So. 376. 11 Polykrans v. Kransz, 77 N. . S. 46, 73 App. Div. 583; Gehl v. Mil- waukee Pro. Co. 116 Wis. 263, 93 N. W. 26; S. v. Pirlot, 19 R. I. 695; Vaughn v. Ferrall, 57 Ind. 182; Hawley v. S. 69 Ind. 98, 38 Atl. 656. If the court while charging the jury should misstate the evi- dence, counsel should at once call the court's attention to the mis- take that it may be corrected be- fore the jury retires, although specific exceptions may not be required, J&meson v. Weld, 93 Me. 345, 45 Atl. 299; Wood v. Wells, 103 Mich. 320, 61 N. W. 503. See Henry v. Henry, 122 Mich. 6, 80 N. W. 800. 12 McDonald v. U. S. 63 Fed. 426; S. v. O'Donald (Idaho), 39 Pac. 556; S. v. Hart, 116 N. Car. 976, 20 S. E. 1014; P. v. Thiede, 11 Utah, 241, 39 Pac. 837; Vaughn v. Ferrall, 57 Ind. 182; Jaqua v. Cordesman, 106 Ind. 141, 5 N. E. 907 (too late on motion for new trial); Murray v. S. 26 Ind. 141 (must be taken be- fore jury retire) ; Garoutte v. Wil- liamson, 108 Cal. 135, 41 Pac. 35; Le Bean v. Telephone & T. C. Co. 109 Mich. 302, 67 N. W. 339; S. v. 347 SPECIFIC EXCEPTIONS NECESSARY. 348 instructions for the first time on a motion for a new trial unless permitted by statute. 13 By statutory provision of Iowa excep- tions may be taken to the giving or refusing of instructions on a motion for a new trial. 14 348. Specific exceptions generally necessary. According to the practice in some of the states the exceptions should specific- ally point out the errors complained of as to each of the instruc- tions. 15 The mere exception to the giving of an instruction is not sufficient ; the attention of the court should be called to the particular point of objection, and a request made to correct the imperfection. 16 And the exception should be made to each in- Hart, 116 N. Car. 976, 20 S. E. 1014; Bynum v. Southern Pump Co. 63 Ala. 462; Thiede v. Utah. 159 U. S. 510, 16 Sup. Ct. 62; Barker v. Todd, 37 Minn. 370, 34 N. W. 895; Collins v. George (Va.), 46 S. E. 684. is Tobias v. Triest, 103 Ala. 664, 15 So. 914; S. v. Vickers, 47 La. Ann. 1574, 18 So. 639; Boon v. Mur- phy, 108 N. Car. 187, 12 S. E. 1032; Lary v. Young (Tex. Cv. App.), 27 S. W. 908; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Modglin, 85 111. 481; Harrison v. Chappell, 84 N. Car. 258; Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. v. Hart, 119 Ind. 273, 21 N. E. 753; Boss v. Northern P. R. Co. 2 N. Dak. 128, 49 N. W. 655; Snyder v. Nelson, 31 Iowa, 238; S. v. Meyers, 99 Mo. 107, 12 S. W. 516; Shepherd v. S. 36 Fla. 374, 18 So. 773; S. v. Halford, 104 N. Car. 874, 10 S. E. 524. But see Collins Ice Cream Co. v. Stephens, 189 111. 200, 59 N. E. 524. i* Shoemaker v. Turner, 117 Iowa, 340, 90 N. W. 709. The same rule governs as to the modification of requested instructions. Excep- tion must be taken to the refusal to give the instruction as requested, and also the action of the court in giving it as modified. Brozek v. Steinway R. Co. 161 N. Y. 63, 55 N. E. 395; Muller v. Powers, 174 Mass. 555, 55 N. E. 395; Elkhorn Valley Lodge v. Hudson, 58 Neb. 672, 81 N. W. 859; Lewis v. Topman, 90 Md. 274, 45 Atl. 450; Davis v. Bailey, 21 Ky. L. R. 839, 53 S. W. 31; Missouri P. R. Co. v. Williams, 75 Tex. 4, 12 S. W. 835; Metropolitan St. R. Co. v. Hudson, 113 Fed. 449; Helms v. Wayne A. Co. 73 Ind. 332. See Pat- terson v. Indianapolis & B. R. R. Co. 56 Ind. 20; Burns v. P. 126 111. 285, 18 N. E. 550; Ballance v. Leon- ard, 37 111. 43; St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Hecht, 38 Ark. 357. is Walters v. Laurens Cotton Mills, 53 S. Car. 155, 31 S. E. 1; Henderson v. Bartlett, 53 N. Y. S. 149, 32 App. Div. 435; Owen v. Brown, 70 Vt. 521, 41 Atl. 1025; Thomas v. Union R. Co. 45 N. Y. S. 920, 18 App. Div. 185; Lichty v. Tarmatt, 11 Wash. 37, 39 Pac. 260; Hedrick v. Straus, 42 Neb. 485, 60 N. W. 928; Emery v. Boston & M. R. 67 N. H. 434, 36 Atl. 367; Hamp- ton v. Norfolk & W. R. Co. 120 N. Car. 534, 27 S. E. 96, 35 L. R. A. 808; Fitzpatrick v. Union Tr. Co. (Pa.), 55 Atl. 1050; S. v. Webster, 107 La. 45. 31 So. 383; Gallman v. Union H. Mfg. Co. 65 S. Car. 192, 43 S. E. 524; Ohio & M. R. Co. v. McCartney, 121 Ind. 385, 23 N. B. 258; Kendrick v. Dillinger, 117 N. Car. 491, 23 S. E. 438; S. v. Tibbs, 48 La. Ann. 1278, 20 So. 735. Contra: Farmers' S. B. v. Wilka (Iowa), 17 N. W. 210; Williams v. Com. 80 Ky. 315; Williams v. Barrett, 52 Iowa, 638, 3 N. W. 690; Van Pelt v. City of Davenport, 42 Iowa, 314; Woods v. Berry, 7 Mont. 201, 14 Pac. 758. 16 Thomas v. Union R. Co. 45 N. Y. S. 920, 18 App. Div. 185; Bailey v. Mill Creek Coal Co. 20 Pa. Super. Ct. 186: Jacksonville & St. L. R. Co. v. Wilhite, 209 111. 84, 87. 349 OBJECTIONS AND EXCEPTIONS. 348 struction severally and distinctly ; 17 and it should disclose to what particular legal proposition it applies before it will be considered on review. 18 An exception which fails to state either the words . or the substance of an instruction of which complaint is made is too indefinite. 19 If an instruction is vague, indefinite and cal- culated to leave the jury in doubt, the court's attention should be called to the imperfection at the time, to be of any avail on appeal or writ of error. 20 An exception that the charge "does not properly state the measure of plaintiff's damages or recovery under the allegations of the complaint," is too indefinite. 21 An exception "to that part of the charge stating the effect of good character^ taken to a certain portion of the charge to the jury which treats only of the proper effect of evidence of good char- acter is sufficiently specific under the practice in the federal courts. 22 349. General exceptions sufficient. In other states a general exception is sufficient. Thus, in Kentucky the law makes no distinction between a general and particular or specific exception, as either is sufficient to authorize the reviewing court to consider and examine alleged errors in the giving or refusing of instruc- tions. 23 Under the code of Iowa, where the exceptions are taken to instructions at the time they are given, the ground of excep- tion need not be stated; 24 but exceptions taken after the verdict must specifically point out the ground of objection as to each instruction. 25 In Indiana by statute an entry in general terms that the party excepts to the giving or refusing of a designated instruction is sufficient. 25 * In Maryland it has been held that where several instructions are presented at the same time, forming a series of consecutive IT Newport News & M. V. Co. v. 22 Edington v. U. S. 164 U. S. 361, Pace, 158 U. S. 36, 15 Sup. Ct. 743; 17 Sup. Ct. 72; Brown v. U. S. 164 American Fire Ins. Co. v. Land- U. S. 221, 17 Sup. Ct. 33. fare, 56 Neb. 482, 76 N. W. 1068. 23 Williams v. Com. 80 Ky. 315. is Field v. Long, 89 Me. 454, 36 24 Williams v. Barrett, 52 Iowa, Atl. 984; Faivre v. Manderschild, 117 638, 3 N. W. 690; Van Pelt v. City Iowa, 724, 90 N. W. 76. of Davenport, 42 Iowa, 314. is Atkins v. Field, 89 Me. 281, 36 25 Byford v. Girton, 90 Iowa, Atl. 375. 661, 57 N. W. 588; Benson v. Lun- 20 Fowler v. Harrison, 64 S. Car. dy, 52 Iowa, 265, 3 N. W. 149. 311, 42 S. E. 159; City of South 25* Childress v. Callender, 108 Omaha v. Meyers (Neb.), 92 N. W. Ind. 394, 9 N. B. 292; Acts Ind. 743. 1903, p. 338; See post,. 357. 21 McDonough v. Great N. R. Co. 15 Wash. 244, 46 Pac. 334. 349 GENERAL EXCEPTIONS REQUESTS NUMBERED. 351 legal propositions, it is but a single act, and the whole will be embraced in one exception. 26 The taking of an exception ' ' to the refusal of the court to charge specifically as requested" is an exception to the refusal of each instruction requested under the practice in New Jersey. 27 In one jurisdiction it has been held that where a party requests the court to give an instruction and it is refused, an exception need not be taken to one given by the court which is inconsistent with the one requested. 28 Where exception is taken to any matter in the record it is not necessary to take other exceptions if the exception first taken covers the matter in issue. 29 350. Exceptions when instructions are numbered. Where the instructions are numbered and separately given, an exception at the conclusion "to the giving of each and every and all of said instructions separately," is sufficient under the practice in some of the states. 29 So, also, the taking of an exception "to the giving of instructions three, four, five and six, contained in the general charge of the court, and to the giving of each of said instructions," is sufficient, being separate and specific as to each instruction. 30 Or an exception to the giving or refusing of instructions numbered from "one to nine inclusive and to each of them" is sufficient. 31 But an exception that the court erred in giving instructions "three and four" is not sufficient if one of them properly states the law. 32 26 McCosker v!. Banks, 84 Md. ai Rice v. Williams (Colo. App.), 292, 25 All. 935. 71 Pac. 433; Denver & R. G. R. Co. 27 Consolidated Tr. Co. v. Chen- v. Young, 30 Colo. 349, 70 Pac. owith, 61 N. J. L. 554, 35 Atl. 1067. 688; Witsell v. West Asheville R. 28 Evans v. Clark, 1 Indian Ter. Co. 120 N. Car. 557, 27 S. E. 125. 216, 40 S. W. 771. 32 Cincinnati, H. & I. R. Co. v. 29 Ellis v. Leonard, 107 Iowa, Cregor, 150 Ind. 625, 50 N. E. 760; 487, 78 N. W. 246; McClellan v. Aitkens v. Rawlings, 52 Neb. 539, Hein, 56 Neb. 600, 77 N. W. 120; 72 N. W. 858; Kloke v. Martin, 55 Geary v. Parker, 65 Ark. 521, 47 Neb. 554, 76 N. W. 168; Hall v. S. W. 238; Rhea v. U. S. 6 Okla. Needles, 1 Indian Ter. 146, 38 S. W. 249, 50 Pac. 992; Ritchey v. P. 23 671; Voelckel v. Banner Brew. Co. Colo. 314, 47 Pac. 272, 384; Ludg- 9 Ohio C. C. 318; Baltimore & P. R. wig v. Blackshere (Iowa), 77 N. Co. v. Mackey, 157 U. S. 72, 15 Sup. W. 356; Terre Haute & I. R. Co. Ct. 491; Jones v. Ellis, 68 Vt. 544, v. McCorkle, 140 Ind. 613, 40 N. E. 35 Atl. 488. See Whipple v. Preece, 62; Bower v. Bower, 146 tnd. 393, 24 Utah, 364, 67 Pac. 1071, holding 45 N. E. 595. See Dunham v. Hoi- not sufficient to refer to the in- loway, 3 Okla. 244, 41 Pac. 140. struction by number only; the par- *o Brooks v. Dutcher, 22 Neb. 644, ticular point of objection must be 36 N. W. 128; City of Omaha v. indicated. Richards, 49 Neb. 249, 68 N. W. 528. 351 OBJECTIONS AND EXCEPTIONS. 350 351. Exceptions General, specific and joint. A general ex- ception to the entire charge, consisting of detached propositions of law, some of which are correct and some erroneous, will be of no avail in a court of review. The erroneous instructions must be specifically pointed out. 33 Thus, an exception to the charge "as given," without pointing out in what particular the charge is erroneous, is too general. 34 Also an exception "to the giving of each and every one ' ' of the instructions is too general. 35 as Postal T. C. Co. v. Hulsey, 115 Ala. 193, 22 So. 854; S. v. Webster, 121 N. Car. 586, 28 S. E. 254; Hamp- ton v. Ray, 52 S. Car. 74, 29 S. E. 537; Ruby C. M. & M. Co. v. Pren- tice, 25 Colo. 4, 52 Pac. 210; Pear- son v. Spartenberg Co. 51 S. Car. 480, 29 S. E. 193; Powers v. Hazel- ton & L. R. Co. 33 Ohiio St. 438; Standard L. & A. Ins. Co. v. Davis, 59 Kas. 521, 53 Pac. 856; Shaffer v. Cincinnati, H. & D. R. Co. 14 Ohio C. C. 488; Haas v. Brown, 47 N. Y. S. 606, 21 Misc. 434; Hart v. Bowen, 86 Fed. 877; Gilroy v. Loftus, 48 N. Y. S. 532, 22 Misc. 105; Bennett v. McDonald, 52 Neb. 278, 72 N. W. 268; Drenning v. Wesley, 189 Pa. St. 160, 44 Atl. 13; Craig v. Bor- ough, 11 Pa. Super. Ct 490; Gregg v. Willis, 71 Vt. 313, 45 Atl. 229; Phoenix A. Co. v. Lucker, 77 Fed. 243; -Newman v. Virginia T. & C. S. & I. Co. 80 Fed. 228; City of So. Omaha v. Powell, 50 Neb. 798, 70 N. W. 391; Adams v. S. 25 Ohio St. 584; Rosenfield v. Rosenthal (Tex. Cv. App.), 39 S. W. 193; Pickham v. Wheeter B. Mfg. Co. 77 Fed. 663; Wills v. Hardcastle, 19 Pa. Super. Ct. 525; Thompson v. Se- curity T. & L. Ins. Co. 63 S. Car. 290, 41 S. E. 464; Harris v. Smith, 71 N. H. 330, 52 Atl. 854; Gutz- man v. Clancy, 114 Wis. 589, 90 N. W. 1081; Lee v. Hammond, 114 Wis. 550, 90 N. W. 1073; Jones v. S. 160 Ind. 539, 67 N. E. 264; Ras- tetter v. Reynolds, 160 Ind. 141, 66 N. E. 612. s* S. v. Moore, 120 N. Car. 570, 26 S. E. 697; Winbish v. Hamilton, 47 La. Ann. 246, 16 So. 856; Antietam Paper Co. v. Chronicle Pub. Co. 15 N. Car. 147, 20 So. 367; Barrett v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 69 S. W. 144; Finance Co. v. Old Pittsburg C. Co. 65 Minn. 442, 68 N. W. 70; P. v. Thiede, 11 Utah, 241, 39 Pac. 839; S. v. Varner, 115 N. Car. 744, 20 S. E. 518; Jones v. S. 160 Ind. 539, 67 N. E. 264; Magoon v. Be- fore, 73 Vt. 231, 50 Atl. 1070; St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Norton (Ark.), 73 S. W. 1095; Hamilton v. Great F. St. R. Co. 17 Mont. 334, 42 Pac. 860; S. v. Varner, 115 N. Car. 744, 20 S. E. 518; P. Ft. W. & C. R. Co. v. Probst, 30 Ohio St. 106; Western Ins. Co. v. Tobin, 32 Ohio St. 88. 35 Crawford v. Athletic Asso. Ill Iowa, 736, 82 N. W. 944; Colum- bus C. Co. v. Crane Co. 101 Fed. 55, 98 Fed. 946; Allend v. Spokane Falls & N. R. Co. 21 Wash. 324, 58 Pac. 244; New Orleans & N. E. R. Co. v. Clements, 100 Fed. 415; Cook v. Kilgo, 111 Ga. 817, 35 S. E. 673; La Manna v. Munroe, 62 N. Y. S. 984; Appeal of Turner, 72 Conn. 305, 44 Atl. 310; Cavallora v. Texas & P. R. Co. 110 Cal. 348, 42 Pac. 918 (instructions given on court's own motion) ; Holloway v. Dunham, 170 U. S. 615, 18 Sup. Ct. 784; Consolidation C. & M. Co. v. Clay, 51 Ohio St. 542, 38 N. E. 610; Ryan v. Washington & G. R. Co. 8 App. Gas. (D. C.) 542; Car- penter v. Eastern R. Co. 67 Minn. 188, 69 N. W. 720; Willoughby v. Northeastern R. Co. 52 S. Car. 166, 29 S. E. 629; Pittsburg & W. R. Co. v. Thompson, 82 Fed. 720; Spears v. U. S. 81 Fed. 694, 26 C. C. A. 570; Harless v. U. S. 1 Indian Ter. 447, 45 S. W. 133; Ludwig v. Blackshere, 102 Iowa, 366, 71 N W. 356; Rheimfeldt v. Dahlman, 351 EXCEPTIONS GENERAL, SPECIFIC AND JOINT. 351 An exception taken thus: "To which said charge and the whole thereof the defendant then and there duly excepted, ' ' is not suffi- ciently specific upon which to assign error. 30 An assignment of error that the instructions "improperly state the law, are confusing, conflicting, misleading and present false issues," is too general. 37 So, an exception taken "to the portions of the charge wherein it is stated that certain parts of the pub lication are libelous per se, " is too broad. 38 The taking of an exception "severally and separately to each and every section and each and every paragraph of the charge" is not sufficient unless the entire charge is erroneous. 39 So, also, an exception to a number of instructions as an entirety is of no avail unless they are all erroneous. 40 But where the error complained of affects the entire charge, then such general exception is suffi- 43 N. Y. S. 28, 19 Misc. 162; Mil- ler v. P. 23 Colo. 95, 46 Pac. Ill; Jones v. East Term. V. & G. R. Co. 157 U. S. 682, 15 Sup. Ct. 719; Luedtke v. Jeffrey, 89 Wis. 136, 61 N. W. 292; Goodman v. Sampliner, 23 Ind. App. 72, 54 N. E. 823; World M. B. Asso. v. Worthing, 59 Neb. 587, 81 N. W. 620; Waples P. Co. v. Turner, 82 Fed. 64; Globe Oil Co. v. Powell, 56 Neb. 463, 76 N. W. 1081; McAlis- ter v. Long, 33 Ore. 368, 54 Pac. 124; Andrews v. Postal Tel. Co. 119 N. Car. 403, 25 S. E. 955; Bar- ker v. Cunard S. S. Co. 157 U. S. 693, 51 N. E. 1089; S. v. Melton, 120 N. Car. 591, 26 S. E. 933; Burnett v. Wilmington, N. & N. R. Co. 120 N. Car. 517, 26 S. E. 819. See Wil- liams v. Casebeer, 126 Cal. 86, 58 Pac. 380. se Love v. Anchor Raisin Vin. Co. (Cal.), 45 Pac. 1044; Gable v. Rauch, 50 S. Car. 95, 27 S. E. 555; Hayes v. S. 112 Wis. 304, 87 N. W. 1076; Bernstein v. Downs, 112 Cal. 197, 44 Pac. 557. 3? Shoemaker v. Bryant Lumber & S. M. Co. 27 Wash. 637, 68 Pac. 380. See Butler v. Holmes (Tex. Cv. App.), 68 S. W. 52. ss Cunningham v. Underwood, 116 Fed. 803. 39 Syndicate Ins. Co. v. Cutch- ings, 104 Ala. 176, 16 So. 46; Leach v. Hill, 97 Iowa, 81, 66 N. W. 69; Jones v. Ellis Estate, 68 Vt. 544, 35 Atl. 488; Ragsdale v. S. 134 Ala. 24, 32 So. 674; Merrill v. Palmer, 68 Vt. 475, 33 Atl. 829; Thiede v. P. 159 U. S. 510, 16 Sup. Ct. 62. See, also, Pease Piano Co. v. Cameron, 56 Neb. 561, 76 N. W. 1053; Thorn v. Pittard, 62 Fed. 232; Green v. Hansen, 89 Wis. 597, 62 N. W. 408; Dunnington v. Frick Co. 60 Ark. 250, 30 S. W. 212; Vider v. O'Brien, 62 Fed. 326; Carpenter v. American A. Co. 46 S. Car. 541, 24 S. E. 500; Scoville v. Salt Lake City, 11 Utah, 60, 39 Pac. 481; Omaha Fire Ins. Co. v. Deirks, 43 Neb. 473, 61 N. W. 740; Postal Tel. C. Co. v. Hul- sey, 132 Ala. 444, 31 So. 527; Hal- lenbeck v. Garst, 96 Iowa, 509, 65 N. W. 417; Schollay v. Moffitt W. Drug Co. (Colo. App.), 67 Pac. 182. 40 S. v. Ray, 14& Ind. 500s 45 N. E. 693; Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Phelps, 51 Neb. 623, 71 N. W. 303; Lane v. Minnesota S. Agr. Soc. 67 Minn. 65; 69 N. W. 463; Culter v. Skeels, 69 Vt. 154, 37 Atl. 228; Ras- tetter v. S. 160 Ina. 133, 66 N. E. 612; Milliken v. Maund, 110 Ala. 332, 20 So. 310; Union P. R. Co. v. Callaghan, 161 U. S. 91, 16 Sup. Ct. 493; McNamara v. Pengilly, 64 Minn. 543, 67 N. W. 661; Barker v. Cunard S. S. Co. 36 N. Y. S. 256, 91 Hun (N. Y.), 495; Dickerson v. 352 OBJECTIONS AND EXCEPTIONS. 352 cient. 41 Or where the whole charge or the portion to which exception is taken amounts merely to a single proposition a general exception is sufficient. 42 The taking of an exception to the instructions on the ground that the charge is too general is of no avail on review in the absence of a request for more specific instructions. 43 So, an exception taken to instructions by two parties jointly is of no avail if they are erroneous as to one only. 44 The rules deduced from the authorities cited are to the effect that if exceptions are taken jointly by two or more parties, they are unavailing unless the instructions are erroneous as to all who join; and if the exceptions are in gross to a series of instructions, they will likewise be unavailing if any one of the instructions is correct. 352. Failure to except Effect. The general rule is that ex- ceptions to instructions given, or the refusal to give, must be taken in the trial court; objections to instructions cannot be made for the first time on appeal. 45 But according to statutory provisions, or the practice, in some states, errors may be assigned on appeal or writ of error as to the giving or refusing of instruc- tions, although no exceptions whatever were taken in the trial court. 47 This rule governs in criminal as well as civil causes ; espe- Quincy M. F. Ins. Co. 67 Vt. 609, 32 92 N. W. 782; Copeland v. Ferris, Atl. 489; Lowe v. Salt Lake City, 13 118 Iowa, 554, 92 N. W. 699. Utah, 91, 44 Pac. 1050; Bonner v. 44 Marshall v. Lewark, 117 Ind. S. 107 Ala. 97, 18 So. 226; Hodge v. 377, 20 N. E. 253. Chicago & A. R. Co. 121 Fed. 52; 45 s. v. Probasco, 46 Kas. 310, Coal & Mining Co. v. Clay, 51 Ohio 26 Pac. 749; Kansas Farmers' etc. St. 550, 38 N. E. 610; Western Ins. Ins. Co. . v. Hawley, 46 Kas. 746, Co. v. Tobin, 32 Ohio St. 88; Glaser 27 Pac. 176; Ritzenger v. Hart, 43 v. Glaser (Okla.), 74 Pac. 945. Mo. App. 183; Fleming v. Fleming, 41 Hindman v. First Nat. Bank, 33 S. Car. 505; 12 S. E. 257; Price 112 Fed. 931, 57 L. R. A. 108. v. Vanstone, 40 Mo. App. 207; Con- 42Nickum v. Gaston, 24 Ore. 380, nelly v. Shamrock Ben. Soc. 43 Mo. 33 Pac. 671, 35 Pac. 31; Haun v. App. 283; East St. Louis Elec. R. Rio Grande W. R. Co. 22 Utah, Co. v. Stout, 150 111. 9, 36 N. E. 346, 62 Pac. 908; Boyce v. Wabash 963; West Chicago St. R. Co. v. R. Co. 63 Iowa, 70, 18 N. W. 673. Martin, 154 111. 523, 39 N. E. 140; Queen Ins. Co. v. Leonard, 9 McKinnon v. Atkins, 60 Mich. 418, Ohio C. C. 46; Burnham v. Logan, 88 27 N. W. 564; P. v. Buddensieck, Tex. 1, 29 S. W. 1067; Producers' 103 N. Y. 487, 9 N. E. 44; Coffee Marble Co. v. Bergen (Tex. Cv. v. McCord, 83 Ind. 593. App.), 31 S. W. 89. See, also, Lind- 4- National Bank v. Sumner, 119 heim v. Buys, 31 N. Y. S. 870, 11 N. Car. 591, 26 S. E. 129; Grugan v. Misc. 16; Baltimore & P. R. Co. City of Philadelphia, 158 Pa. St v. Mackey, 157 U. S. 72, 15 Sup. 337, 27 Atl. 1000; Janny v. How- Ct. 49; Crossette v. Jordan (Mich.), ard, 150 Pa. St. 342, 24 . Atl. 740; 353 FAILURE TO EXCEPT EXCEPTING IN GROUP. 354 dally in capital cases, in a few states, will errors as to instruc- tions be considered on review, although in the trial court no ex- ceptions were taken as is generally required. 48 353. Assignment of error on instructions in group. The assignment of error in a group or en masse as to the giving or refusing of instructions, will not be considered on appeal or writ of error if any one of the group of instructions was properly given or refused, as the case may be. 49 Where error is assigned in the giving and refusing of a group of instructions, and one of them is proper, the whole assignment of error fails. Assigning error in this manner without pointing out the reasons to enable the court to determine the questions involved will not be con- sidered on appeal. 50 So, where a party prepares a series of instructions and requests the court to give them as a whole, and excepts to the refusal to give the request as a whole, the assignment of error in refusing to give a portion will not be considered by the reviewing court. 51 In Nebraska the assign- ment of error must be separate on each instruction complained of on the motion for a new trial, as well as in the petition in error. 52 354. Exceptions limited to grounds stated. Instructions will be reviewed only as to the particular grounds for which error Whitaker v. S. 106 Ala. 30, 17 So. Neb. 304; 69 N. W. 835; Stough v. 456; Hill v. S. 35 Tex. Or. App. Ogden, 49 Neb. 291, 68 N. W. 516; 371, 33 S. W. 1075; McMillan v. S. Axthelm v. Chicago R. I. & P. 35 Tex. Cr. App. 370, 33 S. W. 970 R. Co. (Neb.), 89 N. W. 313; Green (misdemeanors require exception v. Tierney, 62 Neb. 561, 87 N. W. by statute). 331; Runquist v. Anderson, 64 Neb. 48 Falk v. P. 42 111. 335; P. v. 755, 90 N. W. 760; Redman v. Voss, Barberi, 149 N. Y. 256, 43 N. E. 635; 46 Neb. 512, 64 N. W. 1094; P. Hill v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. App. 371, 33 v. Berlin, 10 Utah, 39, 36 Pac. 190; S. W. 1075. Rowen v. Sommers (Iowa), 66 N. 49 Lewis v. S. 42 Pla. 253, 28 W. 897. So. 397; Frenzer v. Richards, 60 so Albion Milling Co. v. First Neb. 131, 82 N. W. 317; Brozek v. Nat. Bank, 64 Neb. 116, 89 N. W. Steinway R. Co. 161 N. Y. 63, 55 638. See King v. S. 43 Fla. 211, 31 N. E. 395; New Dunderberg Min. So. 254. Co. v. Old, 97 Fed. 150; Lineham si Murry v. Board of Comrs. 58 R. Tr. Co. v. Morris, 87 Fed. 127; Kas. 1. 48 Pac. 554. Illinois Cent. & E. Co. v. Linstroth r>2 Karnes v. Dovey, 53 Neb. Wagon Co. 112 Fed. 737; New Eng. 725, 74 N. W. 311; Langshort v. T. & C. Co. v. Catholican, 79 Fed. Coon, 53 Neb. 765, 74 N. W. 257; 294; Dempster M. Mfg. Co. v. First Kloke v. Martin-, 55 Neb. 554 76 Nat. Bank, 49 Neb. 321, 68 N. W. N. W. 168. 477; Behrends v. Beyschlag, 50 355 OBJECTIONS AND EXCEPTIONS. 354 is assigned. 53 The filing of exceptions with the clerk of the court, as provided by statute, to the ruling of the court in the giving or refusing of instructions, limits the party to the ex- ceptions thus filed. 54 355. Objections and exceptions not waived. The fact that instructions are not requested at all by a party on a particular point or issue will not bar him from assigning error and urging objections to erroneous instructions given for his opponent on the same subject. 55 The giving of erroneous instructions which are prejudicial to the rights of a litigant is ground for the assign- ment of error, although no instructions were requested by the complaining party. 5 " So, if it appears that the jury took the wrong view of the law, error may be assigned, whether the com- plaining party requested instructions or not. 57 An instruction assuming to cover an entire question, such, for instance, as the question of liability, but which omits a material element, is erroneous; and in such case the other party is not precluded from assigning error thereon, though he did not request an instruction on the same subject. 58 And in some juris- dictions, although an instruction is defective and for that reason properly refused, yet if it is sufficient to call the attention of the court to the question upon which it is requested to be given, the failure of the court to give a proper instruction on that particular matter is error. 59 ss Mixon v. Mills, 92 Tex. 318, 47 Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Kir- S. W. 966; Edmunds v. Black, 15 schoffer (Tex. Cv. App.), 24 S. W. Wash. 73; 45 Pac. 639. See, also, 577; Pierson v. Duncan, 162 Pa. Cole v. Curtis, 16 Minn. 182; Ryall St. 239, 29 Atl. 733; Whelchel v. v. CentraJ Pac. R. Co. 76 Cal. 474, Gainesville & D. E. R. Co. 116 Ga. 18 Pac. 430; Phipps v. Pierce, 94 431, 42 S. E. 776; Gowdey v. Rob- N. Car. 514; Price v. Burlington bins, 38 N. Y. S. 280, 3 App. Div. C. R. & N. R. Co. 42 Iowa, 16. 353; Carter v. Columbia & G. R. s* S. v. Campbell, 7 N. Dak. 58, Co. 19 S. Car. 26; Bynum v. Bynum, 77 N. W. 935. 33 N. Car. 632; S. v. Pennell, 56 55 Ford v. Chicago & R. I. & P. Iowa, 29, 8 N. W. 686. Co. 106 Iowa, 85, 75 N. W. 650; " York Park Bldg. Asso. v. Wills v. Tanner, 19 Ky. L. R. 795, Barns, 39 Neb. 834, 58 N. W. 440. 39 S. W. 422; International & G. N. City of South Omaha v. Hager R. Co. v. Kuehn, 11 Tex. Cv. App. (Neb.), 92 N. W. 1017. 21, 31 S. W. 322; Johnson v: John- so Cleveland v. Empire Mills Co. son (Tex. Cv. App.), 67 S. W. 123. 6 Tex. Cv. App. 479, 25 S. W. 1055; so Seffel v. Western U. Tel. Co. Carpenter v. Dowe (Tex. Cv. App.), (Tex. Cv. App.), 67 S. W. 897; In- 26 S. W. 1002; Kinyon v. Chicago ternational G. & N. R. Co. v. & N. W. R. Co. 118 Iowa, 349, 92 Welch, 86 Tex. 203, 24 S. W. 395; N. W. 40; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. 355 WAIVING PRESERVING INSTRUCTIONS IN RECORD. 357 356. Errors presented on motion for new trial. It must appear that any errors complained of in giving instructions were called to the attention of the court on a motion for a new trial, that the court may have an opportunity to correct the errors before they will be considered by a court of review. 60 And the errors complained of should be specifically pointed out in the motion for a new trial. 61 In some of the states the practice re- quires that the errors must be separately assigned as to each in- struction complained of, in the motion, for a new trial. 62 But in Illinois a court of review on appeal or writ of error will pass upon the correctness in giving instructions, although no motion for a new trial appears in the bill of exceptions. 63 357. Making instructions part of the record. In some of the states the instructions are made a part of the record by statute, thus dispensing with the necessity of embodying them in a bill of exceptions. 64 By statute in Indiana, when requested in writing by either party, the judge must reduce all instructions to writing and number and sign them. Exceptions may be taken by writing on the margin or at the end of each instruction "given and excepted to," or "refused and excepted to;" this memorandum must be dated and signed by the judge. But instructions thus excepted to must be filed and the record must affirmatively show that fact before they will be regarded as a part of the record. 65 v. Manghan, 29 Tex. Cv. App. 486, 160; Schenck v. Butsch, 32 Ind. 69 S. W. 80; Neville v. Mitchell 344. (Tex. Cv. App.), 66 S. W. 579; City ei Central of Georgia R. Co. v. of Sherman v. Greening (Tex. Cv. Bond, 111 Ga. 13, 36 S. E. 299; New- App.), 73 S. W. 424; Leeds v. Reed man v. Day, 108 Ga. 813, 34 S. B. (Tex. Cv. App.), 36 S. W. 347. 167. oo Brown v. Mayo, 80 Mo. App. 62 Palmer v. First Bank of Ulyses 81; Izlar v. Manchester & A. R. (Neb.), 81 N. W. 303; Stons & Har- Co. 57 S. Car. 332, 35 S. E. 583; rison v. Fesselman, 23 Ind. App. Hintz v. Graupner, 138 111. 158, 165, 293, 55 N. E. 245. 27 N. E. 935; Schmidt & Bro. Co. es Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. O'Keefe, v. Mahoney, 60 Neb. 20, 82 N. W. 154 111. 508, 514, 39 N. E. 606. See 99; First Nat. Bank v. Tolerton North C. St. R. Co. v. Wrixon, 150 (Neb.), 97 N. W. 248; Davis v. 111. 532, 37 N. E. 895. Hall (Neb.), 97 N. W. 1023; Even- 64 Utah Optical Co. v. Keith, 18 ing Post Co. v. Canfield, 23 Ky. L. Utah, 477, 56 Pac. 155; S. v. Bart- R. 2028, 68 S. W. 502; Jones v. Lay- ly, 56 Neb. 810, 77 N. W. 438; man, 123 Ind. 573, 24 N. E. 363; Clanin v. Fagan, 124 Ind. 304, 24 Grant v. Westfall, 57 Ind. 121. See N. E. 1044; Blumer v. Bennett, 44 Irwin v. Smith, 72 Ind. 488. See Neb. 873, 63 N. W. 14. Dawson v. Coffman, 28 Ind. 220; es Dix v. Akers, 30 Ind. 433; Wai- Douglass v. Blankenship, 50 Ind. lace v. Goff, 71 Ind. 294; Louis- 358 OBJECTIONS AND EXCEPTIONS. 356 The instructions may be brought into the record by bill of ex- ceptions, but there must be some showing that the instructions given or refused were properly excepted to. 06 It has recently been held in this state, apparently in the teeth of the statute, that the marginal exceptions provided by statute are not sufficient to raise any question on appeal, unless it is otherwise shown which party took the exceptions. 67 But in criminal cases instructions can only be made a part of the record by a bill of exceptions. 68 There are four methods in Indiana by which instructions may be brought into record: (1) By marginal exceptions; (2) By order of court ; (3 ) By bill of exceptions ; (4 ) By general excep- tions under the recent statute. But the only safe way is by a gen- eral bill of exceptions, as the record must affirmatively show that the instructions set out in the record were all the instructions giv- en. Copying the instructions in the motion for a new trial does not make them a part of the record, and in such form will not be considered on review. 69 358. By bill of exceptions. Errors assigned in the giving or refusing of instructions will not be considered by a court of review unless the instructions given and refused are properly preserved in a bill of exceptions or other proper mode, showing that exceptions were properly taken in the trial court. 70 Accord- ville, N. A. and C. R. Co. v. Wright, 106 Wis. 618, 82 N. W. 564; Piano 115 Ind. 378, 16 N. E. 145, 17 N. B. Mfg. Co. v. McCord (Iowa), 80 N. 584; Riley v. Allen, 154 Ind. 176, W. 659; Barker v. Lawrence Mfg. 56 N. E. 240. Co. 176 Mass. 203, 57 N. E. 366; e Eslinger v. East, 100 Ind. 434. Ryder v. Jacobs, 196 Pa. St. 386, 6T Indiana, &c. R. Co. v. Bundy, 46 Atl. 667; Commissioners v. 152 Ind. 590, 53 N. E. 175. Ryckman, 91 Md. 36, 46 Atl. 317; es Leverich v. S. 105 Ind. 277, 4 Westberg v. Simmons, 57 S. Car. N. E. 852; Delhaney v. 115 Ind. 499, 467, 35 S. E. 764; Bowen v. South- 18 N. E. 49; Utterback v. S. 153 ern R. Co. 58 S. Car. 222, 36 S. E. Ind. 545, 55 N. E. 420. 590; Hogan v. Peterson, 8 Wyo. By recent statute in Indiana in- 549; 59 Pac. 162; Gulliver v. Adams structions may be excepted to by Ex. Co. 38 111. 509; Dombrook v. numbers, either in writing or or- Rumely Co. (Wis.), 97 N. W. 493; ally, and such exceptions noted on Berkett v. Bond, 12 111. 86; Buck- the court's minutes and the in- master v. Cool, 12 111. 74; Lindsay structions filed, and they, with the v. Turner, 156 U. S. 208, 15 Sup. exceptions, become a part of the Ct. 355; Leifheit v. Jos. Schlitz record. Acts of 1903, p. 338. Brewing Co. 106 Iowa, 451, 76 N. 6 Archibald v. S. 122 Ind. 122. W. 730; Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 23 N. E. 758; Claflin v. Cottman, v. Siefke, 144 N. Y. 354. 39 N. E. 77 Ind. 58; Lake E. & W. R. Co. 358; Burnett v. Cavanaugh, 56 Neb. v. Holland, 162 Ind. 406, 69 N. E. 142. 190; 76 N. W. 576; Evans v. Clark TO Burnette v. Town of Guyers, (Miss.), 24 So. 532; Abbott v. City 357 BILL OF EXCEPTIONS PRESERVING ALL. 359 ing to the practice in Indiana, if a motion for a new trial is passed upon at a term subsequent to the return of the verdict, the court may then grant time within which to file a bill of exceptions em- bracing the evidence and the rulings upon the motion; but such bill will not preserve any ruling made during the trial, nor will such bill bring the instructions into the record. 71 359. All instructions must be in record. A court of review will not consider the assignment of errors as to instructions unless the entire charge or all of the instructions given and refused are made part of the record by a bill of exceptions or other proper manner. 72 All the instructions should be preserved in the record of Mobile, 119 Ala. 595, 24 So. 565; Sams Automatic C. Co. v. League, 25 Colo. 129, 54 Pac. 642; Colby v. McDermont (N. Dak.), 71 N. W. 772; Castle v. Boys, 19 Ky. L. Jl. 345, 40 S. W. 242; Merrill v. Equitable F. & S. I. Co. v. 49 Neb. 198, 68 N. W. 365; Costello v. Kottas, 52 Neb. 15, 71 N. W. 950; Prichard v. Budd, 76 Fed. 710; Schaff v. Miles, 31 N. Y. S. 134, 10 Misc. 395; Schwabel- and v. Buchler, 31 N. Y. S. 143, 10 Misc. 773; Ward v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 29 S. W. 274; Werner v. Jewett, 54 Kas. 530, 38 Pac. 793; Keokuk Stove Works v. Hammond, 94 Iowa, 694, 63 N. W. 563; Pike v. Sutton, 21 Colo. 84, 39 Pac. 1084; Ryan v. Conroy, 33 N. Y. S. 330, 85 Hun, (N. Y.) 544; Dunbar v. S. 34 Tex. Cr. App. 596, 31 S. W. 401; Phil- lips v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 30 S. W. 1063; Sigler v. McConnell, 45 Neb. 598, 63 N. W. 870; Partin v. Com. 17 Ky. L. R. 499, 31 S. W. 874; Moore v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 28 S. W. 686; Patterson v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 29 S. W. 272: Hardeman v. S. (Miss.), 16 So. 876; S. v. Owens, 44 S. Car. 324, 22 S. E. 244; S. v. Knutson, 91 Iowa, 549, 60 N. W. 129; S. v. Paxton, 126 Mo. 500, 29 S. W. 705; Bragger v. Oregon S. L. R. Co. 24 Utah, 391, 68 Pac. 140; American Cotton Co. v. Beasley, 116 Fed. 256; Mount v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co. 76 N. Y. S. 533; Andrysick v. Stak- owski, 159 Ind. 428, 63 N. E. 854; Engel v. Dado (Neb.), 92 N. W. 629; Challis v. Lake, 71 N. H. 90, 57 Atl. 260; Delhaney v. S. 115 Ind. 502, 18 N. E. 49; Minor v. Parker, 72 N. Y. S. 549, 65 App. Div. 120; Leverich v. S. 105 Ind. 277, 4 N. E. 852; Livingston v. Moore (Neb.), 89 N. W. 289; Trogden v. Deckard, 47 Ind. 572; Marshal ton L. Ins. Co. v. Doll, 80 Ind. 113; Suther- land v. Venard, 34 Ind. 390 (oral instructions must be preserved by bill of exceptions to be of any avail on review) ; Casey v. Ballou Banking Co. 98 Iowa, 107, 67 N. W. 98; Hall v. Incorporated Town, 90 Iowa, 585, 58 N. W. 881; Robbins v. Brockton St. R. Co. 180 Mass. 51, 61 N. E. 265; Krack v. Wolf, 39 Ind. 88; Eddy v. Lafayette, 163 U. S. 456, 16 Sup. Ct. 1082; Runnells v. Village of P. 109 Mich. 512, 67 N. W. 558; Longyear v. Gregory, 110 Mich. 277, 68 N. W. 116; Vil- lage of Monroeville v. Root, 54 Ohio St. 523, 44 N. E. 237; Ranson v. Weston, 110 Mich. 240, 68 N. W. 152; Thirkfield v. Mountain V. C. Asso. 12 Utah, 76, 41 Pac. 564; Sim- onds v. City of B. 93 Wis. 40, 67 N. W. 40; S. v. Nelson, 132 Mo. 184, 33 S. W. 809; S. v. Hilsabeck, 132 Mo. 348, 34 S. W. 38; S. v. Jones, 134 Mo. 254, 35 S. W. 607. 71 Indianapolis, D. & S. R. Co. v. Pugh, 85 Ind. 279. See Leach v. Hill, 97 Iowa, 81, 66 N. W. 69. 72 Long v. Shull, 7 Pa. Super. Ct. 476; Dubois v. Decker, 114 Fed/ 267; Sargent v. Chapman, 12 Colo. App. 529, 56 Pac. 194; S. v. Rover. 11 Nev. 343; Warren v. Nash (Ky.), 360 OBJECTIONS AND EXCEPTIONS. 358 to enable the court to determine whether the errors complained of were cured or not by considering the instructions together as a whole. 73 It must appear from the bill of exceptions that it contains all the instructions given and refused, otherwise the assignment of errors as to the instructions will not be considered on appeal or error by the reviewing court. 74 The record should affirmatively show that the instructions contained therein were the only instructions given and refused. 75 By a rule of long standing of the Supreme Court of the United States only such parts of the charge to which exceptions were taken need be embodied in the record by the bill of exceptions for the purpose of review by that court. 76 But the more recent authorities seem to hold that a positive or direct recital in a bill of exceptions that it contains all the evi- dence or all the instructions given and refused, is not essential to make it complete ; that it will be regarded as complete unless it affirmatively appears from the record that other instructions were given or refused. 77 360. Presumption in absence of all instructions. It will be presumed that the trial court fully and correctly stated the law applicable to the issues, or contentions of the parties if the entire charge is not embodied in the record. 78 Where the in- structions are not contained in the record showing that ex- ceptions were properly taken it will be presumed that the court 67 S. W. 274; Whitney E. I. Co. v. ton, 54 111. 158; Kleinschmidt v. Anderson, 172 Mass. 1, 51 N. E. McDermott, 12 Mont. 309, 30 Pac. 182; Craggs v. Bohart (Indian Ter.).. 393; Keeling v. Kuhn, 19 Kas. 441; 69 S. W. 931; Collins v. Breen, Pierson v. S. 12 Ala. 149; Michigan 75 Wis. 606, 44 N. W. 769; City v. Phillips (Ind.), 69 N. E. 701. Freeborn v. Norcross, 49 Cal. 313; 75 Barton v. S. 154 Ind. 670, 57 Greenabaum v. Millsaps, 77 Mo. N. E. 515; Lake E. & W. R. Co. v. 474; Cheaney v. S. 36 Ark. 74; Holland (Ind.), 69 N. E. 141. Con- Montgomery v. Harker, 81 Mo. 63; tra: Cox v. 'P. 109 111. 459. Kelleher v. City of Keokuk, 60 76 Crane v. Crane, 5 Pet. (U. S.), Iowa, 473, 15 N. W. 280; Berren- 356; Phoenix Life Ins. Co. v. Rad- berg v. City of Boston, 137 Mass. din, 120 U. S. 183, 7 Sup. Ct. 500. 231; Bean v. Green, 33 Ohio St. 77 Warren v. Nash, 24 Ky. L. R. 452. 479, 68 S. W. 658, citing Garrott v. 73 Marshall v. Lewark, 117 Ind. Ratliff, 83 Ky. 386; Louisville & N. 377, 20 N. E. 253; Oregon R. & N. R. Co. v. Finley, 86 Ky. L. R. 294, 5 Co. v. Galliber, 2 Wash. Ter. 70, 3 S. W. 753. Pac. 615. 78 Hawkins v. Collier, 106 Ga. 18, Board, &c. v. Gibson, 158 Ind. 31 S. E. 755; Myer v. Suburban 471, 63 N. E. 982. See, also, as to Home Co. 55 N. Y. S. 566, Misc. refused instructions, Gill v. Skel- 686. 359 PRESUMPTION IN ABSENCE OF INSTRUCTIONS. 360 properly instructed the jury on its own motion. 79 In the absence of some of the instructions it will be presumed that the court properly instructed the jury though the portion of the charge appearing in the record is susceptible of two meanings. 80 Also if erroneous instructions were given it will be presumed, in the absence of the full charge, that the errors were cured by others given which are not in the record. 81 But where the instructions given contain errors that could not be cured by others, then it may be proper to reverse on account of erroneous instructions although all that were given do not appear in the record. 82 And where all of the instructions are not in the record it will be presumed that the ones refused are covered by those given. 83 In passing upon alleged errors it will be presumed that the trial court properly instructed the jury in the absence of a showing to the contrary, or where the instruc- tions are not set out in the abstract as required by the rules of the court. 84 But it has been held that the reviewing court will not presume that a refused instruction was given in the general charge merely because such general charge is not embodied in the record. 85 That the instructions were given or refused or modified in the form they appear in the record will be presumed 79 Richardson v. City of Eureka, 82 Meyer v. Temme, 72 111. 577. 96 Gal. 443; Gross Lumber Co. v. ss Clore v. Mclntire, 120 Ind. 266, Goody, 99 Ga. 775, 27 S. B. 169; 22 N. E. 128; Puett v. Beard, 86 Ind. Marshall v. Lewark, 117 Ind. 377, 108; Vancleave v. Clark, 118 Ind. 20 N. E. 253; Ford v. Ford, 110 61, 20 N. E. 527; Lehman v. Hawks, Ind. 89, 10 N. E. 648; Becknell v. 121 Ind. 541, 23 N. E. 670; Gar- Becknell, 110 Ind. 42, 10 N. E. 414; rett v. S. 109 Ind. 527, 10 N. E. 570; Lehman v. Hawks, 121 Ind. 546, 23 Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. N. E. 670; Hancock v. Shockman Yando, 127 111. 214, 20 N. E. 70; (Ind. Ter.), 69 S. W. 826; Cobb v. Pace v. Payne, 73 Ga. 675; Gill v. Makme, 87 Ala. 514, 6 So. 299; Me- Skelton, 54 111. 158; Bolen v. S. 26 Phee v. McDermott, 77 Wis. 33, 45 Ohio St. 371; Hearn v. Shaw, 72 N. W. 808; Huff v. Aultman, 69 Me. 187; Stearnes v. Johnson, 17 Iowa, 71, 28 N. W. 440; McFad- Minn. 142. yen v. Masters, 11 Okla. 16, 66 Pac. * Guerin v. New Eng. T. & T. 284; Hewey v. Nourse, 54 Me. 256; Co. 70 N. H. 133, 46 Atl. 185; Mc- P. v. Niles, 44 Mich. 606, 7 N. W. Graw v. Chicago, R. & I. P. R. Co. 192; Bean v. Green, 33 Ohio St. (Neb.), 81 N. W. 306; Nighbert 444; Linton v. Allen, 154 Mass. v. Hornsby, 100 Tenn. 82; 42 S. W. 432, 28 N. E; 780; Klink v. P. 16 1060; Milwaukee Harvester Co. v. Colo. 467, 27 Pac. 1062. Tymich, 68 Ark. 225, 58 S. W. 252; so Davis v. S. 25 Ohio St. 369. Scott v. Smith, 70 Ind. 298. si Bell v. S. 69 Ga. 752; Fern- ^ Alabama M. R. Co. v. Guil- bach v. City of Waterloo, 76 Iowa, ford, 114 Ga. 627, 40 S. E. 794. 598, 41 N. W. 370; P. v. Von. 78 Cal. 1, 20 Pac. 35. 361 OBJECTIONS AND EXCEPTIONS. 360 on review, notwithstanding contentions to the contrary. 88 And where it appears that the trial court instructed the jury to find on special issues, it will be presumed on review that one of the parties to the 'cause requested such instructions, in the absence of a showing to the contrary. 87 361. When considered in absence of evidence. As a general rule the assignment of errors on the giving or refusing of in- structions will not be considered on appeal or writ of error unless the record contains all the evidence on which the instructions complained of were based. 88 Or at least all the evidence on the particular question to which the instruction relates must be pre- served by a bill of exceptions. 89 It is seldom necessary, how- ever, to set out all the evidence where it is only desirable to question the decision of the trial court in its rulings as to the giving or refusing of instructions. 90 Enough of the facts should be preserved to show the materiality and legitimate bearing of se Indiana, D. & W. R. Co. v. Hendrain, 190 111. 504; Riley v. Al- len, 154 Ind. 176, 56 N. E. 240; Tusley v. White (Ky.), 54 S. W. 169; Sternberg v. Mailhos, 99 Fed. 43; Holt v. Roberts, 175 Mass. 558, 56 N. E. 702; Smith v. Kennard, 54 Neb. 523, 74 N. W. 859; Cherry v. Cox, 1 Indian Ter. 578, 45 S. W. 122; Western U. Tel. Co. v. Baker, 85 Fed. 690; Texas Brew. Co. v. Wal- ters (T Richard Roe.J The defendant in the above entitled cause, at the conclusion of the evidence and before the beginning of the argument, here- by requests the court: (to instruct the jury in writing and) 1 to give to the jury each of the following instructions numbered from one to five, inclusive, to wit, etc. Each series of instructions, or if it seems necessary to make i This clause may be omitted if written instructions are not desired. 365 365 WITNESSES IN CIVIL OR CRIMINAL CASES. 366 the sense complete, each instruction, that is modelled upon the forms outlined in the following pages, should be commenced by the following statement: "The court instructs the jury," or "You are hereby instructed that," or "The jury is hereby in- structed that," or the like." 365. Jury judges of credibility of witnesses. (1) The law makes you the exclusive judges of the weight of the testimony and the credibility of the witnesses. You are sworn to find what are the true facts from the testimony before you without being influenced in the least by any feeling of sympathy or prejudice, giving such weight and credit to the testimony of the different witnesses, as you may believe the same entitled to; but after you have so found the facts, then, in determining what your verdict will be upon these facts, you have sworn to be governed by the law as set forth in this charge. 2 (2) You are the judges of the evidence and credibility of the witnesses. It is your duty to reconcile all the statements of the several witnesses so as to believe all the testimony if you can. But if you cannot do so on account of contradictions, then you have the right to believe the witnesses whom you deem most worthy of credit, and disbelieve those least worthy of credit. And in weighing the testimony it is proper for you to take into consideration all the surrounding circumstances of the wit- nesses, their interest in the result of the action, if any, and their opportunity of knowing the truth of the matter about which they testify, and from a preponderance of all the evidence thus considered, you will determine the rights of the parties to this action and find a verdict accordingly. 3 (3) You are the exclusive judges of the weight of the evidence before you, and of the credit to be given to the witnesses who have testified in the case. If there is any conflict in the testi- mony you must reconcile it if you can. If you cannot, you may believe or disbelieve any witness or witnesses as you may or may not think them entitled to credit. In civil cases juries are authorized to decide according as they may think the evi- dence preponderates in favor of one side or another. 4 2 Smith v. Merchants and Print- 3 Lake E. & W. R. Co. v. Parker, ers' Nat. Bank (Tex. Cv. App.), 94 Ind. 95. 40 S. W. 1038. * Liverpool & L. G. Ins. Co. v. Ende, 65 Tex. 124. 367 JURY JUDGES OF CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES. 365 (4) You are the judges of the credibility of each and every wit- ness, and you should give the testimony of each and every wit- ness such weight as, from all the facts and circumstances in proof before you in this case, you shall deem the same entitled to; it is your duty, if you can, to reconcile the testimony of the witnesses, if there be any disagreement between them; but, if you cannot, then you must determine, from all the evidence before you, which of the witnesses is entitled to the greater credit. 5 (5) The credibility of the witnesses is a question exclusively for the jury; and the law is that where a number of witnesses tes- tify directly opposite to each other or one another, the jury are not bound to regard the weight of the evidence as evenly balanced merely because of numbers. The jury have a right to determine from the appearance of the witnesses on the stand, their manner of testifying, their apparent candor and fairness, their apparent intelligence or lack of intelligence, and from all the other surrounding circumstances appearing on the trial, which witnesses are the more worthy of credit, and to give them credit accordingly. 6 (6) The credibility of the witnesses is a question exclusively for the jury. You have the right to determine from the appear- ance of the witness on the stand, his manner of testifying and his apparent candor and fairness, interest or lack of interest in the case, if any should appear, his bias or prejudice, if any should appear from all the surrounding circumstances, if any appear on the trial, which witnesses are more worthy of credit, and give credit accordingly. 7 (7) You are the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses, of the weight of the evidence, and of the facts. It is your right to determine from the appearance of the witnesses on the stand, their manner of testifying, their apparent candor or frankness or the lack thereof, their apparent intelligence or want of in- telligence, which of the witnesses are more worthy of credit. 5 Albright v. Brown, 23 Neb. 141, ? Citizens' Gas & Oil M. Co. v. 36 N. W. 297. Whipple, (Ind.), 69 N. E. 560; Ho- e North C. St. R. Co. v. Wallner, gan v. Citizens' R. Co. 150 Mo. 45, 206 111. 276, 69 N. E. 6. 51 S. W. 473. 366 WITNESSES IN CIVIL OR CRIMINAL CASES. 368 and to give weight accordingly. In determining the weight to be given to the testimony of the witnesses you are authorized to consider their relationship to the parties, if any is shown, their interest, if any, in the result of this suit, their temper, feeling or bias, if any has been shown, their demeanor on the stand, their means of information and the reasonableness of the story told by them, and to give weight accordingly. 8 (8) You are the exclusive judges of the credibility of the wit- nesses, and it is your duty to reconcile any conflict that may appear in the testimony as far as may be in your power, upon the theory that each witness has sworn to the truth; when this cannot be done, you may consider the conduct of the witnesses upon the witness stand ; the nature of the testimony given by them ; to what extent, if any, they are corroborated or con- tradicted by other testimony ; their interest, if any, in the cause ; their relation to the parties, and such other facts appearing in the evidence as will, in your judgment, aid you in determining whom you will or will not believe; and you may also, in con- sidering whom you will or will not believe, take into account your experience and relations among men. 9 366. Jury weigh the testimony. (1) In judging of the weight and importance to be given to the testimony of any of the witnesses who have testified, you should take into account their means of knowledge of the facts of which they speak, and you have a right to judge from your own common observation of the ability of persons to judge of given facts from given opportunities, and you are not obliged to accept as true the testimony of any witness or witnesses, if in your opinion, judg- ing from such common observation, they are or may be mis- taken concerning the facts of which they speak. 10 (2) In determining the weight to be given to the testimony of the different witnesses, you should take into account the in- terest or want of interest, if any, they have in the case, their manner on the witness stand, the probability or improbability s S. v. Morgan, (Utah) , 74 Pac. Pf aff enback v. Lake S. & M. S. R. 528; Miller v. S. (Miss.), 35 So. Co. 142 In-d. 249, 41 N. E. 530. 690. 10 Bressler v. P. 117 111. 422, 443, Jenny Elec. Co. v. Branham, 8 N. E. 62. 145 Ind. 322, 41 N. E. 448. See 369 JURY WEIGH THE TESTIMONY. 366 of their testimony with all the other facts and circumstances before you, which can aid you in weighing their testimony. 11 (3) In determining the weight to be given to the testimony of a witness, you will take into consideration the intelligence of the witness, the circumstances surrounding the witness at the time concerning which he testifies; his interest, if any, in the event of the suit; his bias or prejudice, if any; his manner on the witness stand; his apparent fairness or want of fairness, the reasonableness or unreasonableness of his testimony ; his knowl- edge and means of observation, the character of his testimony whether negative or affirmative and all matters and facts and circumstances shown in evidence on the trial bearing upon the question of the weight to be given to his testimony, and give each witness' testimony such weight as to you it may seem fairly entitled to. 12 (4) You are to take into account, in weighing the testimony of any witness, his interest or want of interest in the result of the case, his appearance upon the witness stand, his manner of testifying, his apparent candor or want of candor, whether he is supported or contradicted by the facts and circumstances in the case as shown by the evidence. You have a right to be- lieve all the testimony of a witness or believe it in part and dis- believe it in part, or you may reject it altogether as you may find the evidence to be. You are to believe as jurors what you would believe as men, and there is no rule of law which requires you to believe as jurors what you would not believe as men. 13 (5) While the jury are the judges of the credibility of the wit- nesses, they have no right to disregard the testimony of an unirflpeached witness, sworn on behalf of the defendant, simply because such witness was an employe of the defendant, but it is the duty of the jury to receive the testimony of such wit- ness in the light of all the evidence, the same as they would receive the testimony of any other witness, and to determine the credibility of such employe by the same rules and tests 11 Deal v. S. 140 Ind. 354, 39 N. sht.ll, or will, take certain matters E. 930. into consideration: Fifer v. Rifcter, 12 Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Pol- 159 Ind. 8, 64 N. E. 463. lock, 195 111. 162, 62 N. E. 831. is Dodge v Reynolds, (Mich.), 98 Instructions that the jury must, N. W. 738. 366 JURY JUDGES OF CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES. 370 by which they would determine the credibility of any other witness. 14 (6) The jury, in determining whether witnesses should be be- lieved or not, are not bound by the opinions of other witnesses, but have a right to consider all the testimony in the case, the mo- tives and interest of the witness, the nature of his testimony and all the facts in evidence throwing any light upon the point. 15 (7) The jury are the sole judges of the facts of this case a^nd of the credit, if any, to be given to the respective witnesses who have testified ; and in passing upon the credibiity of the wit- nesses, the jury have a right to take into consideration, not only their testimony itself, but also their conduct, demeanor or bear- ing while testifying on the witness stand, their objects, pur- poses or designs, if any have been shown by the evidence in so testifying, their feelings of prejudice against the defendant, if any have been shown, and their means of knowing the facts and circumstances in evidence, if any, tending to expose the feelings or purposes of such witnesses. 16 (8) In judging of the weight and importance to be given to the testimony of any witness who has testified, you have a right to judge from your own common observation of the ability of persons to judge of a state of facts from given opportunities; and you should take into consideration the circumstances sur- rounding the witness at the time concerning which he has tes- tified, the character of his testimony, whether affirmative or negative, the probability or improbability of his testimony, to- gether with all the other facts and circumstances proved, if any have been proved. You are not obliged to accept as true the testimony of any witness merely because he has testified positively to a fact or state of facts, if in your opinion, judging from your own com- mon observation, he is or may be mistaken concerning the mat- ters and things about which he has testified. You have the right to believe all the testimony of a witness or believe it in " Cicero St. R. Co. v. Rollins, " Bressler v. P. 117 111. 441, 8 195 111. 219, 63 N. 'E. 98. N. E. 62. is Brown v. S. 75 Miss. 842, 23 So. 422. 371 IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES. 367 part and disbelieve it in part, or you may reject it altogether as you may find the evidence to be when considered as a whole. 17 (9) While you are the sole judges of the credibility of the wit- nesses who have testified, you have no right to arbitrarily dis- regard an unimpeached witness simply because he is or has been an employe of the defendant, but you should receive the testimony of such witness in the light of all the evidence, the same as you would receive the testimony of any other witness, and determine his or her credibility by the same rules and tests by which you determine the credibility of any other wit- ness. In determining whether a witness should or should not be believed, you have a right to consider his motives, objects, pur- poses or designs, if any have been shown by the evidence before you. Whether the testimony of a witness is or is not worthy of belief must be determined by you, not only from his own testi- mony alone, but from all the other credible evidence and facts and circumstances established by the evidence in the case. 18 367. Impeachment of witnesses. (1) The credit of a witness may be impeached by showing that he has made statements out of court contrary to and inconsistent with what he has testified on the trial concerning matters material and relevant to the issues, and when such witness has been thus impeached about matters material and relevant to the issue, you have the right to reject all the testimony of such witness except in so far as the testimony of such witness has been corroborated by other credible evidence. 19 (2) If a witness is successfully impeached, you will disregard his testimony, unless he is corroborated by other unimpeached testimony or circumstances in the case. 20 (3) You are at liberty to disregard the statements of any wit- ness or witnesses, if. any there be, who have been successfully im- IT Bressler v. P. 117 111. 443, 8 N. v. S. 75 Miss. 842, 23 So. 422; Mc- B. 62; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Go. v. Mahon v. P. 120 111. 584, 11 N. E. Pollock 195 111. 162, 62 N. B. 831; 883; Illinois C. R. Co. v. Haskins, Dodge v. Reynolds (Mich.), 98 N. 115 111. 308, 2 N. E. 654. W. 738; Deal v. S. 140 Ind. 354, White v. New York, C. & S. L. 39 N. E. 930; Strong v. S. 63 Neb. R. Co. 142 Ind. 654, 42 N. E. 456. 440, 88 N. W. 772. See Craig v. Rohrer, 63 111. 325. is Cicero St. R. Co. v. Rollins, 20 Holston v. Southern R. Co. 116 195 111. 219, 63 N. E. 98; Bressler Ga. 656, 43 S. E. 29. v. P. 117 111. 441, 8 N. E. 62; Brown 367 JURY JUDGES OF CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES. 372 peached, either by direct contradiction or by proof of general bad character, unless the statements of such witnesses have been cor- roborated by other credible evidence.- 1 (4) While the law permits the impeachment of a witness by proving his general reputation for truth and veracity in the neigh- borhood where he resides to be bad, yet if you believe that the plaintiff, while on the stand, gave a truthful, candid and honest statement of the facts and circumstances surrounding the trans- action in question, then you should not disregard his testimony, but you should give it such faith and credit as in your opinion it is entitled to. 22 (5) Where evidence is given tending to contradict the sworn statement of a witness, that does not, of itself, as a matter of law, take out of the case the testimony of the witness, but it goes to you for what you may deem it worth, as affecting the value of the sworn statements of the witness before you; and it is for you to determine, when all these statements are taken to- gether, how much importance you will attach to the testimony of the witness. 23 (6) If the jury believe from the evidence that any witness be- fore testifying in this case made any statements out of court concerning any of the material matters, materially different and at variance with what he or she has stated on the witness stand, then the jury are instructed by the court that these facts tend to impeach either the recollection or the truthfulness of the witness, and the jury should consider such facts in esti- mating the weight which ought to be given to his or her tes- timony; and if the jury believe from the evidence that the moral character of any witness or witnesses has been success- fully impeached on this trial, then that fact should also be taken into consideration in estimating the weight which ought to be given to the testimony of such witness or witnesses. 24 (7) If the jury find from the evidence, written or oral, or both, 21 Miller v. P. 39 111. 463. See (while this instruction is not artis- Crabtree v. Hagenbaugh, 25 111. tically drawn, it states a correct 219; Bowers v. P. 74 111. 419. See rule of law). Instructions 2, 5 and 13, in this sec- 23 s. v. Birchard, 36 Ore. 484, 59 tion; also, Fifer v. Bitter, 159 Ind. Pac. 468. 8, 64 N. E. 463. 24 Smith v. S. 142 Ind. 289, 41 22 Roy v. Goings, 112 111. 566 N. E. 595. 373 IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES. 367 that any witness in the case is discredited or impeached as to his testimony on any one material fact, then the jury may, in their discretion, regard the testimony of such witness who is not corroborated or supported, as discredited or impeached as to other statements he has made in his testimony. 25 (8) You are instructed that while you are the sole judges of the credibility of the witness, you have no right to disregard the tes- timony of an unimpeached witness simply because such witness is or was an employe of the defendant. 26 (9) A witness may be impeached by proof of contradictory statements, and if you believe that any witness has been success- fully impeached, then it would be your duty to discard the testimony of such witness ; but it is for you to say whether or not you will believe the witness sought to be impeached, or the witness brought to impeach him, the credibility of all the witnesses being for you and your consideration. If you believe that any witness has been successfully impeached by showing contradictory statements on some material issue in the case, then you would not . be authorized to believe him, unless you find from the evidence that he has been corroborated. He may be corroborated, or he may be sustained by proof of good char- acter, or by other facts and circumstances in the case. 27 (10) If you find from the evidence that any witness who has testified is a person of bad moral character, you should consider that fact in determining what weight, if any, you will give to his testimony. 28 (11) Some evidence has been introduced for the purpose of im- peaching the testimony of certain witnesses by attempting to show that they have made statements out of court in conflict with their testimony in this case. Witnesses may be impeached in this manner, but whether a witness has been impeached in this manner, and if so, to what extent, are questions of which you are the exclusive judges. 29 (12) The reputation of a person for truth is made by what his 25 Dy e v. Scott, 35 Ohio St. 194. E. 309; 2 Thompson Tr. 2426. See 26 Illinois C. R. Co. v. Haskins, also, Smith v. S. 142 Ind. 289, 41 N. 115 111. 308, 2 N. E. 654; McMahon v. E. 595. P. 120 111. 584, 11 N. E. 883; Rock- 28 Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Crancher, ford, R. I. & St. L. R. Co. v. Coul- 132 Ind. 277, 31 N. E. 941. tas, 67 111. 403. 29 Treschman v. Treschmani, 28 27 Powell v. S. 101 Ga. 9, 29 S. Ind. App. 206, 218, 61 N. E. 961. 367 JURY JUDGES OF CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES. 374 neighbors generally say of him in that respect. If they generally say he is untruthful, that makes his general reputation for truth bad. On the other hand, if one's neighbors say nothing whatever about him as to his truthfulness, that fact of itself is evidence that his general reputation for truth is good. 30 (13) You should consider all the evidence in the case, and while it is your duty to reconcile, if possible, the testimony of all the witnesses in the case, you are not bound to believe anything to be a fact because a witness has stated it to be so, provided the testimony of such witness is uncorroborated, and you believe from all the evidence that such witness is mistaken or has intentionally misstated the facts. 31 (14) The credit of a witness may be impeached by showing that he or she has made statements out of court contradictory to and inconsistent with his or her testimony on the trial, concerning matters material and relevant to the issue, or by proof of gen- eral bad character of such witness. And when a witness has been successfully impeached by either of these modes of im- peachment, the jury are at liberty to disregard the entire tes- timony of such witness, unless his or her testimony has been corroborated by other credible evidence. But the jury are not bound to disregard the testimony of a witness thus impeached. If the jury believe that the witness while on the stand gave a truthful, candid and honest statement of the facts and circum- stances surrounding the transaction in question, then they should not disregard his or her testimony, notwithstanding such im- peachment, but should give it such weight and credit as in their opinion from all the evidence before them it is entitled to. So if the jury believe from the evidence that any witness who has testified in this case, made any statements out of court concerning any of the material matters materially different and ' at variance with what he or she has stated on the witness stand, then the jury are instructed that such facts tend to impeach the truthfulness of the witness, and the jury should consider so Treschmajn v. Treschman, 28 N. W. 772. This instruction is not Ind. App. 206, 61 N. E. 961; Davis v. objectionable; it merely states that Foster, 68 Ind. 238; Conrad v. S. the false testimony, whether given 132 Ind. 259, 31 N. E. 805, (held not corruptly or through mistake, invading the province of the jury), should not influence the decision. si Strong v. S. 63 Neb. 440, 88 375 WITNESS TESTIFYING FALSELY. 368 such facts in estimating the weight which ought to be given to his or her testimony; and if the jury believe that the moral character of any witness has been successfully impeached on this trial, then that fact should also be taken into consideration in estimating the weight which ought to be given to the tes- timony of any such witness. 32 368. Witness testifying wilfully falsely. (1) The jury are the judges of the credit that ought to be given to the testimony of the different witnesses, and that they are not bound to be- lieve anything to be a fact merely because a witness has stated it to be so, provided the jury believe, from all the evidence, that such witness is mistaken about such fact, or that he has knowingly testified falsely to the same. 33 (2) If you believe from the evidence that any witness has wil- fully testified falsely to any material fact in the case, you are at liberty to disregard the entire testimony of such witness, except in so far as it may be corroborated by the testimony of other cred- ible witnesses or supported by other credible evidence in the case. 3 * (3) If you believe from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that any witness has wilfully and knowingly testified falsely to any material fact in issue, then you have a right to disregard his entire testimony, except wherein it is corroborated by other cred- ible evidence in the case. 35 (4) If you believe from the evidence that any witness has here- tofore, or on his trial, sworn falsely to any material fact in the case, you may disregard the testimony of such witness alto- gether. 36 (5) The jury are the sole judges of the credibility of the several witnesses that have appeared before them, and of the weight or importance to be given to their respective statements or tes- timony; and if they believe from all that they have seen or 3*2 Smith v. S. 142 Ind. 289, 41 E. 941; Holston v. Southern' R. Co. N. E. 595; White v. New York C. 116 Ga. 656, 43 S E. 29. & S. R. Co. 142 Ind. 654, 42 N. E. 33 Taylor v. Felsing, 164 111. 331, 456; Miller v. P. 39 111. 463; Hoy v. 332, 45 N. E. 161. Goings, 112 111. 566; S. v. Birchard, 34 Trimble v. Ter. (Ariz.), 71 Pac. 35 Ore. 484, 59 Pac. 468; Dye v. 932. Scott, 36 Ohio St. 194; Powell v. S. ss Waters v. P 172 111. 372, 50 101 Ga. 9, 29 S. E. 309; Ohio & M. R. N. E. 148. Co. v. Grancher, 132 Ind. 277, 31 N. 36 Owens v. S. 80 Miss. " 499, 32 So. 153. 368 JURY JUDGES OF CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES. 376 heard at the trial that any witness has wilfully sworn falsely to any of the facts mentioned in the instructions herein, as bear- ing on the plaintiff's alleged claim or defendant's alleged de- fense thereto, then they are at liberty to disregard entirely the testimony of said witness. 37 (6) If the jury believe from the evidence that any witness has wilfully and corruptly testified falsely concerning any material matter in dispute, they may disregard the whole or any portion of the testimony of such witness; there is no inflexible rule inter- posed between the witnesses and the jury requiring the jury to accept or reject all the testimony of any witness. 38 (7) You are the judges of the credibility of the different wit- nesses and the weight to be attached to the testimony of each of them, and you are not bound to take the testimony of any witnesses as absolutely true, and you should not do so if you are satisfied from all the facts and circumstances proved on the trial that such witness is mistaken in the matters testified to by him, or that he has knowingly testified falsely to any matter ma- terial to the issue, or that for any other reason his testimony is untrue or unreliable. 39 (8) You are the judges of the credibility of the different wit- nesses and the weight to be attached to the testimony of each of them, and you are not bound to take the testimony of any witness as absolutely true, and you should not do so if you are satisfied from all the facts and circumstances proven on the trial that such witness is mistaken in the matters testified to by him or her, or that he or she has knowingly and intentionally testified falsely to any matter material to the issues, or that for any other reason his or her testimony is untrue or unreliable. You are at liberty to disregard the entire testimony of any such witness, except in so far as his or her testimony may be corroborated by the testimony of other credible witnesses or supported by other credible evi- dence in the case. 40 37 O'Connell v. St. Louis, C. & Taylor v. Felsing, 164 111. 332, W. R. Co. 106 Mo. 485, 17 S. W. 45 N. E. 161; Trimble v. Ter. (Ariz.) 494. See S. v. Thompson, 21 W. 71 Pac. 932; Waters v. P. 172 111. Va. 746. 372, 50 N. B. 148; O'Connell v. St. ss Kansas City v Bradbury, 45 Louis, C. & W. R. Co. 106 Mo. Kas. 383, 25 Pac. 889. 485, 17 S. W. 494; Kansas City v. 39 Taylor v. Felsing, 164 111. 331, Bradbury, 45 Kas. 388, 25 Pac. 889. 332, 45 N. E. 161. 377 HUSBAND AND WIFE POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE TESTIMONY. 371 369. Party a witness in his own behalf. While the law permits the plaintiff to testify in his own behalf, nevertheless the jury have a right, in weighing his testimony and in de- termining how much credence is to be given it, to take into consideration the fact that he is the plaintiff and his interest in the result of the suit. 41 370. Husband a witness for wife. Under the law of this state a husband is a competent witness to testify in behalf of his wife in a suit brought by her for personal injury alleged to have been sustained by her. You are instructed that if the testimony of the husband appears to be fair, is not unreason- able and is consistent with itself, and the witness has not been in any manner impeached, then you have no right to disre- gard the testimony of such witness merely from the fact that he is related by marriage to the plaintiff in the case. 42 371. Positive and negative testimony. When one witness testifies that a certain fact took place, or that certain words were spoken, and several other witnesses equally credible testify that they were present at the time and place, and had the same means of information, and further testify that such fact did not take place or that such words were not spoken, it is their prov- ince to weigh the testimony and give a verdict according to the weight of the testimony as it may preponderate on either side. 43 41 West C. St. R. Co. v. Estep, 42 North C. St. R. Co. v. Well- 162 111. 130, 44 N. E. 404; West C. ner, 206 111. 275, 69 N. E. 6. St. R. Co. v. Nash, 166 111. 528, 46 Frizell v. Cole, 42 111. 363. N. E. 1082. CHAPTER XXVIII. WITNESSES, IN CRIMINAL CASES ONLY. Sec. Sec. Defendant a Witness. 375. Demeanor and conduct of witness. 372. Instructions for the prosecu- 376. Accomplice as witness. tion. 377. Opinions of expert witnesses. 373. Instructions for defense. 378. Detectives as witnesses. 374. Defendant's failure to testify. 372. Defendant a witness, instructions for prosecution. (1) Under the law the defendant has the right to testify on his own behalf, but the credibility and weight to be given to his testimony are matters exclusively for the jury. In weighing the testimony of the defendant in this case, you have a right to take into consideration his manner of testifying, the rea- sonableness or unreasonableness of his account of the transac- tion and his interest in the result of the verdict as affecting his credibility. You are not required to receive blindly the testimony of the accused as true, but you are to consider whether it is true and made in good faith, or only for the purpose of avoiding conviction. 1 (2) You are not required to receive blindly the testimony of the accused as true, but you are to consider whether it is true and made in good faith, or only for the purpose of avoiding conviction. And you are not bound to believe the testimony of the defendant any further than it may be corroborated by other credible evi- dence in the case. 2 i Blair v. S. 69 Ark. 558, 64 S. W. 2 s. v. Hunter, 118 Iowa, 686, 92 948, citing: Hamilton v. S. 62 Ark. N. W. 872; S. v. Mecum, 95 Iowa, 543, 36 S. W. 1054; Jones v. S. 433, 64 N. W. 286. This instruction 61 Ark. 88, 32 S. W. 81. was held not objectionable as sing- 378 379 DEFENDANT A WITNESS. 372 (3) That although a defendant has a right to be sworn and to give testimony in his own behalf, the jury are not bound to believe his testimony, but they are bound to give it such weight as they believe it is entitled to ; and his credibility, and the weight to be attached to his testimony, are matters exclusively for the jury; and the defendant's interest in the result of the trial is a matter proper to be taken into consideration by the jury in determining what weight ought to be given to his testimony. 3 (4) In determining the weight to be given to the testimony of the different witnesses you should take into account the in- terest or want of interest they have in the case, their manner on the witness stand, the probability or improbability of their testimony, with all the other circumstances before you which can aid you in weighing the testimony. The defendant has testified as a witness, and you should weigh his testimony as you weigh that of any other witness; consider his manner as such witness, and his interest in the result of the trial and the probability or improbability of his testimony. 4 (5) The defendant is a proper witness in his own behalf, but the jury may consider the fact that he is the accused person testifying in his own behalf, in determining what weight and credibility they will give to his testimony. 5 (6) The defendants having become witnesses in their own be- half at once become the same as any other witness, and their credibility is to be tested by and subjected to the same tests as are legally applied to any other witness; and in determining the de- gree of credibility that should be accorded to their testimony, the jury have the right to take into consideration the fact that they are interested in the result of the prosecution, as well as their demeanor and conduct upon the witness stand; and the jury ling out the defendant. But is it a right* to believe the testimony not erroneous in telling the jury of the defendant without corrob- that they are not bound to believe oration. the testimony of the defendant any s Bressler v. P. 117 111. 439, 8 further than it may be corrobora- N. E. 62. ted? The defendant may tell the * Anderson v. S. 104 Ind. 472, 4 truth, and where the jury believe N. E. 63; Deal v. S. 140 Ind. 354, he tells the truth they should not 39 N. E. 930. disregard his testimony, although 5 S. v. Jones, 78 Mo. 282. not corroborated. The jury have 372 WITNESSES, IN CRIMINAL CASES ONLY. 380 are to take into consideration the fact, if such is the fact, that they have been contradicted by other credible evidence on mat- ters material to the issue. And the court further instructs the jury that if, after considering all the evidence in the case, they find that the accused have wilfully and corruptly testified falsely to any fact material to the issue in this cause, they have the right to entirely disregard their testimony, excepting in so far as their testimony is corroborated by other credible evidence or facts and circumstances proven by the evidence in the case. 6 (7) The defendant is a competent witness,, and has the right 10 testify in his own behalf, and when he does so testify he at once becomes the same as any other witness, and his credibility is to be tested by and subjected to the same tests, and only the same tests, as are legally applied to any other witness; and in determining the degree of credibility that should be accorded to his testimony the jury have the right to take into considera- tion the fact that he is the defendant and interested in the re- sult of the prosecution, as well as his demeanor and conduct on the witness stand; and the jury are to take into consideration the fact, if such is the fact, that he has been contradicted or corroborated by other credible evidence on matters material to the issue. You have also the right to take into consideration the reasonableness or unreasonablenss of his account of the transaction in question, the probability or improbability of his testimony, with all the other facts and circumstances before you which can aid you in weighing his testimony. You are not re- quired to receive blindly the testimony of the accused as true, but you are to consider whether it is true and made in good faith, or only for the purpose of avoiding conviction. The cred- ibility of the defendant as a witness and the weight to be at- tached to his testimony are matters exclusively for the jury; and if after considering* all the evidence in the case the jury find that the accused has wilfully and corruptly testified falsely to any fact material to the issue in the cause, they have the right to entirely disregard his testimony, excepting in so far e Siebert v. P. 143 111. 592, 32 29 N. E. 700; Ridfir v. P. 110 111. 11; N. E. 431; Purdy v. P. 140 111. 49, Hirschman v. P. 101 111. 576. 381 DEFENDANT A WITNESS INSTRUCTIONS 373 as it has been corroborated by other credible evidence in the case. 7 373. Instructions for defenses. (1) The defendant is a com- petent witness in her own behalf, and you have no right to dis- credit her testimony from caprice nor merely because she is the defendant. You are to treat her the same as any other witness, and subject her testimony to the same tests, and only the same tests, as are legally applied to the other witnesses, and while you have the right to take into consideration the interest she may have in the result of this trial, you have also the right, and it is your duty, to take into consideration the fact, if such is the fact, that she has been corroborated by other credible evidence. 8 (2) The jury have no right to disregard the testimony of the defendant through mere caprice, or merely because he is the de- fendant. The law makes him a competent witness, and you are bound to consider his testimony, and give it such weight as you believe it entitled to, and you are the sole judges of his credibil- ity. 9 (3) A person charged with the commission of a crime is a com- petent witness, and may testify in his own behalf. The de- fendant in this case has availed herself of this privilege, and in determining her guilt or innocence you must consider her tes- timony. She testifies as an interested witness and from an in- terested standpoint, and as such you should consider her tes- timony; and when you do this, together with all the other surrounding circumstances developed by the evidence, give the testimony of the defendant such weight, in connection with the other evidence in the case, as you may think it entitled to, and no more. 10 T Seibert v. P. 143 111. 592,- 32 N. this instruction where another E. 431; Purdy v. P. 140 111. 49, 29 given for the prosecution stated N. E. 700; Blair v. S. 69 Ark. 558, that the jury might consider the 64 S. W. 948; S. v. Hunter, 118 lo- fact, if it be a fact, that the de- wa 686, 92 N. W. 872; Bressler v. P. fendant had been contradicted by 117 111. 439, 8 N. E. 62; Anderson other evidence. v. S. 104 Ind. 472, 4 N. E. 63; S. Bressler v. P. 117 111. 422, 441, v. Jones, 78 Mo. 282; Rider v. P. 8 N. E. 62. 110 111. 11. 10 S. v. Hossack, 116 Iowa, 194, s McElroy v. P. 202 111. 478, 66 89 N. W. 1077; S. v. Sterrett, 71 N. E. 1058. Held error to refuse Iowa, 386, 32 N. W. 387. 374 WITNESSES, IN CRIMINAL CASES ONLY. 382 374. Defendant's failure to testify. While the statute of this state provides that a person charged with crime may tes- tify in his own behalf, he is under no obligation to do so, and the statute expressly declares that his neglect to testify shall not create any presumption against him. 11 375. Demeanor and conduct of witness. You are the sole judges of the facts in this case, and of the credit to be given to the respective witnesses who have testified; and in passing on the credibility of the witnesses you have a right to take into consideration not only their testimony itself, but their conduct, demeanor and bearing while testifying on the witness stand, their objects, purposes or designs, if any have been shown by the evidence, in so testifying, their feelings of prejudice against the defendant, if any have been shown, and their means of knowing the facts and circumstances in proof, if any, tending to expose the feelings or purposes of such witness. 12 376. Accomplices as witnesses. (1) The testimony of an ac- complice is competent evidence, and the credibility of his testi- mony is for the jury to pass upon as they do upon that of any other witness ; and while the testimony of an accomplice will sus- tain a verdict of guilty, though uncorroborated,, yet his testimony must be received with great caution ; but if his testimony carries conviction, and the jury are convinced of its truth, they should give it the same effect as would be allowed to a witness who is in no respect implicated in the offense charged. 13 (2) It is competent to convict upon the uncorroborated testimo- ny of an accomplice, if the jury, weighing the probability of his testimony, think him worthy of belief. 14 (3) The degree of credit which ought to be given to the testimo- ny of an accomplice is a matter exclusively within the province of the jury; but great caution should be used in weighing such testimony, and the jury should not convict upon the testimony of an accomplice alone, unless his testimony is corroborated 11 S. v. Ryno (Kas.), 74 Pac. 1116; is Shiver v. S. 41 Fla. 630, 27 (Indiana Statute,) see Thrawley v. So. 39. S., 153 Ind. 375, 380, 55 N. E. 95. 14 Earll v. P. 73 111. 383; Johnson 12 Bressler v. P. 117 111. 422, 441, v. S., 66 Ind. 269. S N. E. 62. 383 ACCOMPLICES EXPERTS. 377 by other evidence in some material point in issue, but such corroboration need not be as to everything to which the accom- plice testifies. 15 (4) Should you find from the evidence in this case that the pros- ecuting witness, D A, with whom the alleged incestuous inter- course is charged to have been had, did voluntarily, and with the same intent which actuated the defendant, or directly or indi- rectly consent to commit such act with him as alleged, then, in that event, she would be an accomplice, and her testimony would not be sufficient to warrant a conviction unless corroborated by other credible evidence tending to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense charged. 16 (5) In determining the interest a witness has in the case you are at liberty to consider the fact, if the proof shows it, that such witness is under indictment for gaming, and that, if he testifies in behalf of the state, is hereby discharged from liability to fine or punishment on account of such violation. You have the right to look to this fact, if shown by the evidence, in determining what weight, if any, you will give to his testimony. 17 (6) An accomplice is a competent witness, and the credibility and weight of his testimony is for the jury to pass upon and de- termine the same as they do the testimony of any other witness. The degree of credit which ought to be given to the testimony of an accomplice is a matter exclusively within the province of the jury ; and while the testimony of an accomplice will sustain a con- viction, though uncorroborated, yet his testimony should be re- ceived and acted upon with great caution ; but if his testimony car- ries conviction, and the jury are convinced of its truth, they should give it the same effect as would be allowed to any witness who is in no respect implicated in the offense charged. 18 377. Opinions of expert witnesses. (1) The opinions of med- is S. v. Greenburg, 59 Kas. 404, ity to fine or punishment for gaming 53 Pac. 61. See Waters v. P. 172 in consideration that he will ap- 111. 367 (extreme caution), 50 N. pear as a witness against his co- E. 148. defendants. i Tate v. S. (Tex. Cv. App.), 77 Shiver v. S. 41 Fla. 630, 27 S. W. 796. So. 39; S. v. Greenburg, 59 Kas. IT Howard v. S. (Miss.), 35 So. 404, 53 Pac. 61; Earll v. P. 73 111. 653. Held proper under a statute 333; Ayers v. S., 88 Ind. 275. releasing the witness from liabil- 377 WITNESSES, IN CRIMINAL CASES ONLY. 384 ical experts are to be considered by you in connection with all the other evidence in the case; but you are not bound to act upon such opinions to the entire exclusion of other evidence. Taking those opinions into consideration, and giving them just weight, you are to determine from the whole evidence taken together whether the accused was, or was not, of sound mind at the time in question, giving him the benefit of any reasonable doubt, if any such doubt arises from the evidence. 19 (2) The opinions of medical experts are to be considered by you in connection with all the other evidence in the case, but you are not bound to act upon such opinions to the exclusion of all other evidence. Taking into consideration these opinions, and giv- ing them just weight, you are to determine for yourselves, from the whole evidence, whether the accused was, or was not of sound mind, yielding him the benefit of a reasonable doubt, if any such doubt arises. 20 (3) The opinions of expert witnesses are to be considered by you in connection with all the other evidence in the case. You are not to act upon such opinions to the exclusion of other testimony. In determining the weight of the testimony of expert witnesses, you are to apply the same general rules that are applicable to the testimony of other witnesses. Taking into consideration the opinions of the expert witnesses, together with all the other evidence, you are to determine for yourselves, from the whole evidence, whether it establishes the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, as charged in the indictment. 21 (4) You are not required to take for granted that the state- ments contained in the hypothetical questions which have been propounded to the witnesses are true. On the contrary, you should carefully scrutinize the evidence, and from it determine what, if any, of such statements are true, and what, if any, are not true. Should you find from the evidence that any of the material state- ments contained in the hypothetical questions are not correct, and that they are of such a character as to entirely destroy the re- liability of the opinions based upon the hypothesis stated, you should attach no weight whatever to the opinions based thereon. 18 Guetig v. S. 66 Ind. 106. 21 Epps v. S. 102 Ind. 553 1 N. B. 20 Goodwin v. S. 96 Ind. 561. 491. 385 DETECTIVES AS WITNESSES. 378 You are to determine from all the evidence what are the real facts, and whether such hypothetical questions state them correctly or not. 22 378. Detectives as witnesses. (1) That in weighing the tes- timony, greater care should be used by the jury in relation to the testimony of persons who are interested in or employed to find evidence against the accused than in other cases, because of the natural and unavoidable tendency and bias of the minds of such persons to construe everything as evidence against the accused, and disregard everything which does not tend to support their preconceived opinion of the matter in which they are engaged. 23 (%Y The police department is an important part of the machi- nery of our government, and it is well enough to bear in mind that your homes, your lives and your property would not be safe but for the police department and officers. It does not follow that because an officer testifies, that his testimony is to be discarded, or any suspicion cast upon it unless there is something about it which calls your attention to it. 24 22 Guetig v. S. 66 Ind. 107. a* p. v . Shoemaker, 131 Mich. 23 Prenit v. P. 5 Neb. 377; San- 107, 90 N. W. 1035. (This instruc- dage v. S. 61 Neb. 240, 85 N. W. tion was held proper where an at- 35; Frudie v. S. (Neb.), 92 N. W. tack was made on the police offi- 320. cers). CHAPTER XXIX. CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL OR CRIMINAL CASES. Sec. Sec. 379. Jury determine the facts. 381. Court construes writings. 380. Court determines the law. 379. The jury determine the facts. (1) In determining what facts are proved in this case the jury should carefully consider all the evidence before them, with all the circumstances of the transaction in question as detailed by the witnesses; and they may find any fact to be proved which they think may be right- fully and reasonably inferred from the evidence in the case, although there may be no direct evidence or testimony as to such fact. 1 (2) In determining any of the questions of fact presented in this case, the jury should be governed solely by the evidence in- troduced before them. The jury have no right to indulge in con- jectures or speculations not supported by the evidence. 2 (3) The jury have been taken out to view the scene of this acci- dent twice, the first time for the purpose of being able to under- stand the testimony, and the second time to witness certain expe- riments, by agreement of the parties. I charge you, that you are not to consider as evidence what you saw on the first view; but what you saw on the second view, that was shown to you by the i North C. St. R. Co. v. Rodert, 2 Ramsey v. Burns, 27 Mont. 154, 203 111. 415; (held mot 'objectionable 69 Pac. 711; (held error to refuse in the use of the word "think" in- this instruction.) stead of believe.) 386 387 JURY DETERMINE FACTS. 379 parties under their agreement, you should take and consider as evidence in the case. 3 (4) It is the duty of the jury to find the facts of this case from the evidence, and having done so, then to apply to such facts the law as stated in these instructions. 4 (5) Neither by these instructions nor the special interrogatories, nor by any words uttered or remark made by the court during this trial, does, or did the court intimate, or mean to give, or wish to be understood as giving, an opinion as to what the proof is, or what it is not, or what the facts are in this case, or what are not the facts therein. It is solely and exclusively for the jury to find and determine the facts, and this they must do from the evidence, and having done so, then apply to them the law as stated in these instructions. The instructions given to the jury are, and constitute, one connected body and series, and should be so regarded and treated by the jury; that is to say, they should apply them to the facts as a whole, and not detached or separated, any one instruction from any, or either, of the others. 5 (6) In determining what facts have been proved in this case the jury should carefully consider all the evidence before them, with all the circumstances of the transaction as detailed by the witnesses; and they may find any material fact to have been proved, which they think may be rightfully and reasonably inferred from the evidence in the case, although there may be no direct evidence tending to establish such fact. But the jury have no right to indulge in mere conjecture or speculation not supported by evidence. It is the duty of the jury to find the facts from the evidence in the case before them, and, having done so, then to apply the law to such facts, as stated in these instructions. The court is not authorized to give or intimate an opinion as to what the evidence proves or does not prove, nor has the court intended, by any remark made during this trial, to give or intimate any opinion as to what the evidence proves s Schweinfurth v. Cleveland, C. 57 N. E. 849, (held not to be a C. & St. L. R. Co. 60 Ohio St. 227, direction to the jury to determine 54 N. E. 89. the facts independent of or without * North C. St. R. Co. v. Wellner, the aid of the law.) 20G 111. 274, 69 N. E. 6; North C. * North C. St. R. Co. v. Kas- St. R. Co. v. Raspers, 186 111. 246, pers, 186 111. 246, 57 N. E. 849. 380 CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL CASES. 388 or does not prove, or what are, or what are not, the facts. The jury are solely and exclusively the judges of the facts of the case, and must determine them from the evidence introduced, and then apply the law as given in these instructions. 380. Court determines the law. (1) In considering and de- ciding this case you should look to the evidence for the facts and to the instructions of the court for the law of the case, and find your verdict accordingly, without reference as to who is plaintiff or who is defendant. 7 (2) In considering this case it is not only your duty to decide the case according to the weight of the evidence, but it is also your duty to decide it according to the law as given you by the court, applicable to the evidence. While it is true, as a matter of law, that the attorneys for the respective parties may state to you what they believe the law to be and base arguments thereon, still, under your oaths, and under the law, you have no right to consider anything as law except it be given you by the court, and you have no right to take the statement of any attorney as to what the law is, except the court gives you an instruction to the same effect; or in other words, you should consider only that as law which is given you by the court, and decide the case accord- ingly. 8 (3) You are to try the question in the case submitted to you upon the testimony introduced upon the trial, and upon the law as given you by the court in these instructions. The court, however, has not attempted to embody all the law applicable to this case, in any one of these instructions, but in consider- ing any one instruction you must construe it in the light of and in harmony with every other instruction given, and so considering and so construing, apply the principles in it enun- ciated to all the evidence in the case. 9 (4) In considering and deciding this case you should look to the o North C. St. R. Co. v. Rodert, i Cicero St. R. Co. v. Brown, 193 203 111. 415, 67 N. B. 812; Ramsey 111. 277, 61 N. E. 1093. v. Burns, 27 Mont. 154, 69 Pac. 711; Vocke v. City of Chicago, 208 North C. St. R. Co. v. Wellner, 206 111. 194. 111. 274, 69 N. E. 6; North C. St. Lampman v. Bruning, 120 Iowa, R. Co. v. Raspers, 186 111. 246, 57 167, 94 N. W. 562. N. E. 849. 389 COURT DETERMINES LAW AND CONSTRUES WRITINGS. 381 evidence for the facts and to the instructions of the court for the law of the case and find your verdict accordingly. You have no right to consider anything as law unless it be given you by the court. (5) You have no right to take the statements of any attorney as to what the law is unless the court gives you an instruction to that effect. It is your duty to try this case upon the evidence introduced and the law given you by the court in these in- structions. The court has not attempted, however, to embody all the law of the case in any one instruction. Therefore in construing any single instruction you must consider it in con- nection with all the other instructions given you, and construe them in harmony with each other. 10 381. Court construes writings. The evidence upon this question, whether illegal stock was issued, is mainly record evi- dence, or written evidence, and under the law it is the duty of the court to construe such instruments, and to state the effect of such evidence, and it is the duty of the jury to re- ceive and to accept the instructions so given; and this is so, even though you may think the instructions here given are wrong. 11 10 Cicero St. R. Co. v. Brown, N. W. 562; North C. St. R. Co. v. 193 111. 277, 61 N. E. 1093; Vocke v. Raspers, 186 111. 246, 57 N. E. 849. City of Chicago, 208 111. 194; Lamp- " Merrill y. Reaver, 50 Iowa man v. Bruning, 120 Iowa 167, 94 417. CHAPTER XXX. BURDEN OF PROOF IN CIVIL CASES ONLY. Sec. Sec. 382. Instructions for plaintiff 385. Preponderance of evidence; General. number of witnesses. 383. Instructions for defendant 386. Evidence equally balanced. General. 387. Preponderance in a case of 384. Burden in specific cases. negligence. 382. Instructions for plaintiff General. (1) While the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to prove his case by a pre- ponderance of the evidence, still, if the jury find that the evi- dence bearing upon the plaintiff's case preponderates in his favor, although but slightly, it would be sufficient for the jury to find in his favor. 1 (2) If you find from the evidence that the plaintiff has proved his case as laid in his declaration, or in any count thereof, by a preponderance of the evidence, then you should find the defendant guilty. 2 (3) If you believe from the evidence that the plaintiff has proved her case as laid in her declaration, or either count thereof, you will find the issues for the plaintiff. 3 (4) If you find from the evidence that the plaintiff has made out her case by a preponderance of the evidence as laid in her declaration, or any single count thereof, then you should find for the plaintiff. 4 1 Taylor v. Felsing, 164 111. 331, 45 cher, 190 111. 540, 60 N. E. 888; N. E. 161; Donley v. Dougherty, 174 Pennsylvania Co. v. Marshall. 119 111. 582, 51 N. E. 714, See U. S. 111. 404, 10 N. E. 220. Brew. Co. v. Stoltenberg, 211 111. 4 North C. St. R. Co. v. Hutch- 585. inson, 191 111. 104, 60 N. E. 850 2 Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v. Filler, (held proper, though some of the 195 111. 17, 62 N. E. 919. counts had been dismissed, the s Mt. Olive Coal Co. v. Radema- court having given another in- 390 391 INSTRUCTIONS FOR DEFENDANT. 383 (5) While the burden is on the plaintiff to prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence, still, if the jury find that the evidence bearing upon the plaintiff's case preponderates in his favor, although but slightly, that would be sufficient to war- rant the jury in finding in his favor. If you find from the evidence that the plaintiff has proved his case as laid in his declaration, or in any one of the counts thereof, by a pre- ponderance of the evidence, then you should find the issues for the plaintiff. 5 383. Instructions for defendant General (1) The burden of proof is upon the plaintiff, and it is incumbent on her to estab- lish her case by a preponderance of the evidence, and that unless you believe she has done so from all the evidence in the case, you will find for the defendant; and if you believe that the evidence in this case is equally balanced, then you will find for the defendant. 6 (2) It is a requirement of the law that the plaintiff must make out and establish his case by a preponderance of the evidence, and unless he has done so in this case, then your verdict should be for the defendant. 7 (3) The burden of proof is upon the plaintiff, and he cannot recover unless he proves to your satisfaction and by the greater weight of evidence each and every material fact of his case. 8 (4) This is a civil suit, and is to be determined by a prepon- derance of the evidence. The burden of proof is upon the plaintiff, and to entitle him to a verdict in his favor he must have proved by a preponderance of the evidence all the ma- terial averments of some one of the three paragraphs of his complaint. 9 (5) This being a civil suit, it is to be determined by a prepon- derance of the evidence. The burden of proof is upon the plain- struction stating what counts had e Georgia P. R. Co. v. West, 66 been dismissed.) Miss. 314, 6 So. 207. s Taylor v. Felsing, 164 111. 331, ? Tedens v. Schumers, 112 HI. 45 N. E. 161; Chicago & E. I. R. 268; Sievers v. Peters B. & L. Co. Co. v. Filler, 195 111. 17, 62 N. E. 151 Ind. 661, 50 N. E. 877, 52 N. E. 919; Mt. Olive Coal Co. v. Roden- 399. macher, 190 111. 540, 60 N. E. 888; s Doyle v. Mo. K. & T. T. Co. Donley v. Dougherty, 174 111. 582, 140 Mo. 1, 41 S. W. 257. See San 51 N. E. 714; East v. Crow, 70 111. Antonio & A. P. R. Co. v. Waller, 92. 27 Tex. Cv. App. 44, 65 S. W. 210. Leary v. Meier, 78 Ind. 397. 384 BURDEN OF PROOF CIVIL CASES. 392 tiff to make out his case, and to entitle him to a verdict in his favor he must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, all the material facts or averments of some one of the several paragraphs of his complaint, and unless you believe he has done so from all the evidence in the case then you will find the issue for the defendant; and if you believe that the evidence in the case is equally balanced, then you will find for the defendant. 10 384. Burden of proof in specific cases. (1) The terms of the leasing of the plaintiff's farm to the defendant are material in this suit, and the plaintiff must prove to the satisfaction of the jury by a preponderance of the evidence that the terms of said leasing were such as the plaintiff claims the same to be; and if the jury shall find that the evidence preponder- ates in the slightest degree in favor of the defendant, or is equally balanced, then the law is for the defendant, and in such case the plaintiff cannot recover. 11 (2) The note in question is prima facie evidence of indebted- ness, and must be -overcome by a preponderance of the evidence ; and unless you believe from the evidence that the defendant has sustained his plea of set-off by a preponderance of the evi- dence, then you should find for the plaintiff as to that plea. 11 * (3) The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to prove by a pre- ponderance of the evidence that the note in controversy is the true, genuine note of said B., the deceased ; that it was delivered to the plaintiff by said B., the deceased, in his lifetime; and if the plaintiff has failed to so prove, then it is your duty to find your verdict in favor of the defendant's estate and against the plaintiff. 12 (4) The defendant must establish the existence of fraud by a preponderance of the evidence before you can find for him, for unless you are satisfied from the evidence that the de- fendant has clearly proved the existence of fraud in the lease if Leary v. Meier, 78 Ind. 397; not required to be made up from Georgia P. R. Oo. N. West, 66 Miss. testimony of the defendant alone) ; 314, 6 So. 207; East v. Crow, 70 111. Indianapolis St. R. Co. v. Taylor, 92. 158 Ind. 274. 11 East v. Crow, 70 111. 92. 12 Candy v. Biss>ell's Estate, 11* Laird v. Warren, 92 111. 208, (Neb.), 69 N. W. 634. (the preponderance of evidence is 393 PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE. 385 from H to P, the plaintiff, then you must find for the plain- tiff. 13 (5) Fraud is never to be presumed. The allegations of fraud in defendant's answer must be by him affirmatively established by the evidence, and will not be presumed from acts of the parties which may be accounted for on the basis of honesty and good faith. 1 * (6) Where the plaintiff proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that certain sums of money have been paid to the defendant, and the defendant claims that said payment was made upon some other demand or account, which he claims he then held against plaintiff, the burden of proof is on the defendant to show by a preponderance of evidence that there then was a subsisting and unpaid debt due defendant from plaintiff upon which such payment was applied. 15 385. Preponderance of evidence ; number of witnesses. (1) The burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to establish each and every particular fact necessary to make out his cause of action by a preponderance of the evidence. By the preponderance of the evidence is meant that .greater and superior weight of the evidence which satisfies your minds. Preponderance is not alone determined by the number of witnesses testifying to a particular fact or state of facts. It may occur that the state- ments or superior knowledge of the subject matter testified to, of one or a few witnesses, may be of more importance and be relied upon with a greater degree of assurance than that of a greater number, and the testimony of the witnesses is often- times strenghtened or weakened by other facts and circum- stances disclosed by the evidence. 16 (2) By a preponderance of the evidence is not necessarily meant a greater number of witnesses, but if the plaintiff has proven the material allegations of her declaration by such evi- dence as satisfies and produces conviction in the minds of the jury, then she has proven her case by a preponderance of the evidence. 17 13 Prichard v. Hopkins, 52 Iowa is Ball v. Marquis (Iowa), 98 N. 122, 2 N. W. 1028. W. 497. i* Prichard v. Hopkins, 52 Iowa "Mayers v. Smith, 121 111. 451. 122, 2 N. W. 1028. 13 N. E. 216, (this instruction does is Prall v. Underwood, 79 111. not ignore the defendant's evi- App. 452. dtence.) 385 BURDEN OF PROOF CIVIL CASES. 394 (3) The preponderance of the evidence is not necessarily de- termined alone by the number of witnesses testifying to any fact or facts, but in determining where the preponderance is, you may also take into consideration the opportunities or occasion of the witnesses for seeing or remembering what they testify to or about, the probability or improbability of its truth, the relation or con- nection, if any, between the witnesses and the parties, their interest or lack of interest in the result of the case, and their couduct and demeanor while testifying. 18 (4) While the preponderance of the evidence does not consist in the greater number of witnesses testifying the one way or the other, yet the number of credible and disinterested witnesses testifying on the one side or the other of a disputed point is a proper element for the jury to consider in determining where lies the preponderance of the evidence. 19 (5) The plaintiff holds the affirmative of the issue, or, what is called the burden of proof rests upon him, the defendant hav- ing denied the charges alleged against it in the declaration. The plaintiff must satisfy you by what is called a preponder- ance of the proof, that the wrong complained of was commit- ted by the servant of the defendant, in manner and form as charged in the declaration. By a preponderance of proof, the court does not mean the largest number of witnesses on a given point; four or five witnesses may testify to a fact, and a single witness may testify to the contrary, but under such circum- stances and in such manner and with such an air and appear- ance of truth and candor as to make it the more satisfactory or convincing to you that the one witness, with the opportunity of knowing the facts testified to, has told the truth of the matter. When you are thus satisfied that the truth lies with a single witness or any other number, you are justified in re- turning a verdict in accordance therewith. This is what is meant by a preponderance of proof. It is that character or measure of evidence which carries conviction to your minds. 20 (6) By mentioning "the burden of proof" and "preponder- is Myer v. Mead, 83 111. 20 (held 19 West G. St. R. Co. v. Liesero- not excluding from the jury the witz, 197 111. 612, 64 N. E. 718; St. facts) ; Kansas City v. Bradbury, 45 Louis, &c. R. Co. v. Union, &c. Kas. 382, 25 Pac. 889; Illinois Steel Bank, 209 Illinois, 457, 460. Co. v. Wierzbicky, 206 111. 201, 68 20 North C. C. R. Co. v. Gastka, N. E. 1101. 27 111. App. 523. 395 PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE. 385 ance of evidence" the court intends no reference to the number of witnesses testifying concerning any fact, or upon any issue in the case, but simply by way of expressing the rule of law, which is that, unless the evidence as to such issue appears in your judgment to preponderate, in respect to its credibility. in favor of the party to this action on whom the burden of proof as to such issue rests, then you should find against such party on said issue. 21 (7) The jury are instructed that the fact that the number of witnesses testifying on one side is larger than the number tes- tifying on the other side does not necessarily alone determine that the preponderance of the evidence is on the side for which the larger number testified. In order to determine that ques- tion the jury must be governed by and take into consideration the appearance and conduct of the witnesses while testifying; the apparent truthfulness of their testimony or the lack of it; their apparent intelligence or the lack of it; their opportunity of knowing or seeing the facts or subjects concerning which they have testified or the absence of such opportunity; their interest or the absence of interest in the result of the ease ; and from all these facts as shown by the evidence, and from all the other facts and circumstances so shown, the jury must decide on which side is the preponderance. After fairly and impartially considering and weighing all the evidence in this case, as hej-ein suggested, the jury are at liberty to decide that the preponderance of the evidence is on the side which, in their judgment, is sustained by the more intelligent, the better informed, the more credible and the more disinterested witnesses, whether these are the greater or the smaller number. But the jury have no right to capriciously disregard the testimony of the larger number of witnesses, nor to refuse to give whatever consideration, in their judgment, should be attached naturally to the fact that the larger num- ber have testified one way. The element of numbers should 'be considered, with all the other elements already herein sug- gesjed, for whatever, in the judgment of the jury that ele- ment is worth, and the evidence of the smaller number of wit- 21 O'Connell v. St. Louis, C. & W. R. Co. 106 Mo. 485, 17 S. W. 494. 385 BURDEN OF PROOF CIVIL CASES. 396 nesses cannot be taken by the jury in preference to that of the larger number unless the jury can say, on their oaths, that, from all the facts and circumstances in the case, it is more reasonable, more truthful, more disinterested and more credible. 22 (8) The burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to establish each and every particular fact necessary to make out his cause of action by a preponderance of the evidence. By the prepon- derance of the evidence is meant that greater and superior weight of the evidence which satisfies your minds. Prepon- derance is not determined alone by the number of witnesses testifying to a particular fact or state of facts, but if the plain- tiff has proven all the material allegations of his declaration by such preponderance of the evidence as satisfies the jury and produces conviction in their minds then that is sufficient to entitle him to a verdict in his favor. In determining the preponderance of the evidence, you must take into consideration, not alone the number of witnesses tes- tifying to any fact or state of facts, or for the one side or the other, but you must also take into consideration the op- portunities or occasion of the different witnesses for seeing, hearing, knowing or remembering what they have testified to or about, the probability or improbability of the truth of their statements, the relation or connection, if any has been' shown, between any of the witnesses and the parties to the suit, their interest or lack of interest, if any, in the result of the suit, and their conduct and demeanor while testifying. Yet the num- ber of credible and disinterested witnesses testifying to a ma- terial fact or state of facts in dispute, or for the one side or the other, is a proper matter for the jury to consider, together with all the evidence in the case, in determining where lies the preponderance of the evidence. The jury have no right to capriciously disregard the testi- mony of the number of witnesses, nor to refuse to give what- ever consideration, in their judgment, should be attached nat- urally to the fact that the larger number have testified one 22 Ga.ee v. Eddy, 179 111. 503, 53 posing party called the larger num- N. E. 1008, (held to be a proper ber of witnesses.) statement of the law where the op- 397 PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE. 387 way and the smaller number the other. The testimony of the smaller number of witnesses cannot be taken by the jury in preference to that of the larger number, unless the jury can say. on their oaths, that from all the facts and circumstances in the case it is more reasonable, more trustworthy, truthful, dis- interested and credible. 23 386. Evidence equally balanced. If after considering all the evidence in the case you shall find that the evidence upon any question is equally balanced, you should answer such ques- tion against the party who has the burden of such issues, for in such case there would be no preponderance in favor of such proposition. 24 387. Preponderance in a case of negligence. The burden of proof in this case is upon the plaintiff, and before he can recover on account of the alleged negligence on the part of the defendants in providing or having for use a weak, defective or insufficient plank as a scaffold, it is necessary for the plain- tiff to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, (1) that the plank was insufficient, weak or defective, and that the acci- dent happened as the result of such weakness, insufficiency or defect; (2) that the defendants had notice or knowledge of such insufficiency, weakness or defect, or that they might have had notice thereof by the exercise of ordinary care; (3) that the plaintiff did not know of such insufficiency, weakness or defect, and that he had no means of knowledge thereof equal to those of the defendants; (4) and that he was, in his relation to the accident, in the exercise of ordinary care. If the plain- tiff fails to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, any one of these four propositions, the jury should find for the defendants, even though they find that Gallagher was foreman, and gave directions to use the plank in question. 25 23 Ball v. Marquis, (Iowa) 98 N. N. E. 1008. See also, Wray v. Tin- *W. 497; Mayers v. Smith, 121 111. dall, 45 Ind. 517. 451, 13 N. E. 216: Myer v. Mead, 24 Renard v. Grande, 29 Ind. App. 83 111. 20; West C. St. R. Co. v. 579, 64 N. E. 644. Leiserowitz, 197 111. 612, 64 N. E. 25 Armour v. Brazeau, 191 111. 718; Gage v. Eddy, 179 111. 503, 53 117, 126, 60 N. E. 904. CHAPTER XXXI. AGENCY. See. Sec. INSTRUCTIONS FOR PLAINTIFF. 392. Railroad company bound by agents' negligence. 388. Principal bound acts of agent. 389. Agent borrowing money for INSTRUCTIONS FOR DEFENDANT. employer. 393. Agent acting without scope of 390. Company bound by acts of authority. paying teller. 394. Agent selling land at price 391. Agent exceeding authority; agreed upon. principal bound. 395. Contract on sale of machine by agent. Instructions for Plaintiff. 388. Principal bound by acts of agent. (1) If you believe from the evidence that prior and up to the time of the execution of the bond sued on, the said F & H had voluntarily and knowingly held said M out to the world as authorized to sign sontracts similar to the one in question, and had knowingly so conducted themselves to reasonably justify the public gen- erally and those dealing with them, in believing that said M was authorized to sign their firm name to such contracts, and that the plaintiffs accepted said bond, believing that said M had authority to sign the same, then the defendants would be bound by the acts of said M. 1 (2) If the defendant employed and authorized R to sell the land, and in pursuance of that authority R sold the land and in- duced the plaintiff to buy, and made false representations about the land, upon which the plaintiff relied and which induced i Fore v. Hitson, 70 Tex. 520, 8 Co. 58 111. 141, principal bound by S. W. 292. See Smith v. Wise & acts of agent. 398 399 PRINCIPAL BOUND BY ACTS OF AGENT. 388 him to purchase, then the defendant would be responsible for such fraud, notwithstanding there were no instructions given to R by the defendant which authorized him to make fraud- ulent representations, and notwithstanding the defendant did not know that he practiced those fraudulent representations. Employing him as agent, or as his agent, to do that thing, he became responsible for the methods which his said agent adopted in doing that thing. If the representations were false in fact and R had no knowledge personally of the truth there- of, but derived his information from others as to those facts, he or the person for whom he was acting as agent in that business would be liable to an action for deceit. 2 (3) If you find that A, the treasurer, had express authority to sign the notes and checks and effect the loan in question, or if you find that these acts were within the apparent scope of his authority, or within the ' scope of the authority which he was accustomed to exercise without objection by these de- fendants, your verdict should be for the plaintiff; but if you find that borrowing this money in the way testified to and giv- ing this paper was not within the authority expressly given to him, or within the apparent scope of the authority which he was accustomed to exercise, then your verdict should be for the defendants; and if you find that this money borrowed, or received for the paper in suit, was not for the use of the de- fendants, and the plaintiff knew, or had good cause to know the fact, or if for any other reason the plaintiff did not in good faith trust the credit of the defendants, then your ver- dict should be for the defendants. 3 (4) In bringing the action upon these notes the Globe Savings Bank and the plaintiff adopt and ratify all the acts of its agents or officers by which the notes in question came into the bank; that is, when the plaintiff seeks to recover upon these notes from the defendant, it is bound by what the evidence in the case shows to be the facts connected with the transac- tion. 4 2 Haskell v. Starbird, 152 Mass. * Chicago, T. & T. Co. v. Brady. 118, 25 N. E. 14. 165 Mo. 203, 65 S. W. 303. 3 Rowland v. Apothecaries' Hall Co. 47 Conn. 387. 389 AGENCY. 400 389. Agent borrowing money for employer. (1) If you be- lieve from the evidence that C borrowed money from plain- tiff, claiming to act as agent of defendants, and if such act of borrowing was within the usual and ordinary scope or pur- view of the business in which C was employed, and which he was authorized by defendants to conduct and carry on, and plaintiff loaned the money to C for the benefit of defendants, then defendants would be bound for such money, even if, by the private contract between defendants and C, he was not authorized to borrow money, unless plaintiff knew he was not so authorized when he loaned the money. 5 (2) If C borrowed money from plaintiff for the benefit of de- fendants,' without authority from defendants, either express or implied, and if defendants, knowing that such money had been borrowed, ratified and acquiesced in the act of C, or know- ing such money to be borrowed, accepted the benefit of it. then they would be held bound by the act of C, as much as if they had authorized it before it was done. 6 (3) It is not necessary for plaintiff to show any express au- thority in C to borrow money to render defendant liable. If money was borrowed by C in the general course and conduct of the business of defendants, and defendants knew this fact and acquiesced in it, and the note sued on was given for money borrowed of plaintiff, by C, for the business of defendants, and the money was in good faith used in such business, and plaintiff had no knowledge of any want of express authority on C 's part to borrow -money, then you will find for the plain- tiff. 7 (4) If you find that C was an agent of defendants, but that express authority was not given to him, as such agent, to bor- row money for defendants, then you may look to the contract between them as it may be shown, by the evidence, the na- ture and character of the business in which C was employed to act as agent, and all the transactions between them, and ascertain whether or not it is to be fairly implied as contem- plated by them or embraced in the scope of his employment s Collins v. Cooper, 65 Tex. 4G2. 1 Collins v. Cooper, 66 Tex. 462. e Collins v. Cooper, 65 Tex. 462. 401 PRINCIPAL BOUND BY ACTS OF AGENT. 392 as agreed on between them, that he should have such power to borrow money to be used in such business. 8 390. Company bound by acts of paying teller. If you find from the evidence that the checks were certified by the pay- ing teller of the defendant company, and if you further find from the evidence that said certifications were made in the general course of the defendant's business, and if you further find that plaintiff, in good faith, dealt with said defendant company on the basis of said course of business, and if you further find from the evidence that the officers of defendant knew of said course of business, then defendant will be bound by the act of its paying teller in making the certification of the check sued on. 9 391. Agent exceeding authority Principal bound. If the jury believe from the evidence that plaintiff authorized C, his agent, to rent the house in question to defendant for but one year, but that said agent rented it for two years, as alleged by the defendant's witnesses, and that the defendant held the same for two years, and that during the second year of the said tenancy plaintiff treated the defendant as his tenant by receiving the rent originally agreed upon, then the jury may infer that the landlord ratified the contract for the two years' lease and may find for the defendant. 10 392. Railroad company bound by agent's negligence. A railroad company is liable for the acts of its employes or ser- vants done in the prosecution of the company's business and within the scope of the authority given them as such employes. And so one of the important questions you are called upon to decide is whether the defendant, by its agents or employes, placed the hand-car that caused the injury on the highway. The true test is not the form of employment, whether by the day or by the month, but whether the men who left the car on the highway were under the control and direction of the defendant so that they were its servants, and not the servants of another. 11 s Collins v. Cooper, 65 Tex. 462. 10 Reynolds v. Davison, 34 Md. s Muth v. St. Louis T. Co. 94 Mo. 666. App. 94, 67 S. W. 978. Pittsburg, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Sponier, 85 Ind. 169. 393 AGENCY. 402 Instructions for Defendant. 393. Agent acting without scope of authority. (1) No statement made or action taken by defendant's agent and oper- ator, B, before its office opened for business, and when said agent and operator was at home, or not in the service of the com- >pany or engaged in the functions of his position, was binding upon the defendant ; -nor can the defendant be held liable there- for, as the responsibility of the company began when the mes- sage was filed with it for transmission. 12 (2) Unless you find from the evidence that J, the person whose name appears on the face of the writing introduced by the plaintiff, was authorized or held out to the public by the de- fendant company as being authorized to certify or mark "good, " writings or checks of the character of the paper sued on by plaintiff, you will find for the defendant, and the court states to the jury that the fact that the said J signed him- self as the "teller," or was designated or called "teller" or "paying teller" of the defendant company, is not of itself suf- ficient to justify the conclusion that the said J was clothed with any such authority. 13 (3) Even if the jury believe from the evidence that S did pur- chase the property in controversy for himself and L & M, yet if the jury believe from the evidence that L did not au- thorize him to do so, L is not bound by such purchase. If the jury find that in the contract and arrangement which re- sulted in the giving of the note in suit, the business between L and B was done by S, and that said S had no authority, as a general agent, from said L beyond that resulting from their relation as general partners in the manufacture of plows, but only an authority to do that particular business, he, the said S, would be, as far as this case is concerned, a special agent for L in that business, and so far as the jury find that the said S, in doing it, exceeded the authority and instruc- tions given to him by L, L would not be bound. 14 (4) If you find from the evidence that D was a canvassing 12 Hargrave v. Western U. Tel. is Muth v. St. Louis T. Co. 94 Co. (Tex. Cv. App.), 60 S. W. 689. Mo. App. 94, 67 S. W. 978. n Lytle v. Boyer, 33 Ohio St. 510. 403 CONTRACTS BY AGENTS. 395 agent, obtaining subscriptions for the plaintiff for books pub- lished by him and sold by subscription, and- that said D was restricted by the terms of his employment from collecting for any books or parts of books, except such as were delivered by him, and if you further find that the said canvassing agent never had possession of the parts and works for which this suit is brought, and did not deliver the same to the defendant, then the court declares the law to be that the employment of D, as canvassing agent, gave him no authority to collect the money for which this suit is brought, and it devolves upon the defendant to show that D had such authority. 15 394. Agent selling land at price agreed upon. If you shall find from the evidence that J, as agent of the plaintiff, agreed with the defendants that they should take and sell for the plaintiff certain of the lots then being offered for sale by the plaintiff for a certain and definite price fixed, and agreed upon by and between the defendants and the said J, for which the defendants were to take and receive an agreed commission, viz. : one and one-half per cent on the purchase price, and that the defendants have sold said lots for the agreed price, and have fully accounted to the plaintiff for the proceeds received there- for, less the stipulated commission, then they are not liable to the plaintiff in this action, although they may have received from the purchasers of said lots a sum for conducting the ne- gotiations, receiving and paying out the notes and money, and superintending the transactions, and receiving the deeds and other papers for them. 16 395, Contract in sale of machine by agent. If you find from the evidence in this case that the defendant, Kemp, at the time of their first conversation concerning the purchase of the machine, told the plaintiff's agent, Minnick, that any con- tract that Cook might make with the plaintiff through its agent would be all right with him, and used such language as would reasonably give the plaintiff to understand that he would stand by such agreements or contracts relative to the purchase of such machine, then the plaintiff would be justified in dealing ia Chambers v. Short, 79 Mo. 206. is Alexander v. Northwestern C. U. 57 Ind. 466. 395 AGENCY. 404 with him (Kemp) by and through Cook, and the acts and con- tracts, if any, made by him for himself and Kemp, would bind Kemp. Any orders or directions by Kemp to Cook would not affect the plaintiff until such time as it (the plaintiff) had no- tice or knowledge. If Kemp authorized Cook to act for him, and the plaintiff had knowledge of it, then he could have with- drawn such authority by notifying the plaintiff of his^ desire to do so, but not by giving Cook alone the notice to that effect. Cook could not bind Kemp without authority from Kemp. 17 IT Bell City Mfg. Co. v. Kemp, not commenting upon the facts 27 Wash. Ill, 67 Pac. 580, (held not intimating what the facto were.) CHAPTER XXXII. Sec. INSTRUCTIONS FOB THE PLAINTIFF. 396. Party completing contract can recover. 397. Preventing completion of con- tract. 398. Damages for failure to per- form contract. INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DEFENDANT. 399. Party failing to complete con- tract. 400. Damages far failure to deliv- er property sold. 401. Joint or several liability on contract. CONTRACTS IN GENERAL. Sec. RESCINDING CONTRACT. 402. Contract, rescinding without express words. 403. Contract void, if made by in- sane person. SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTED CLAIMS. 404. Consideration of settlement, when sufficient. CLAIMS WITHOUT CONSIDERATION. 405. Claim based upon void patent. Instructions for Plaintiff. 396. Party completing contract can recover. (1) The ex- ecution of the written instruments in suit is admitted, and if you find from the evidence that the railroad in question was built and completed from A to K, and the cars running thereon to the depot at K, within two years from the first day of June, 1875, then the plaintiff is entitled to recover the full amount named in said instruments, with interest thereon at the rate of ten per cent per annum from the time the road was thus completed to the present time, unless you find that the de- 405 397 CONTRACTS IN GENERAL. 406 fendant has maintained his defense of failure of consideration as hereinafter explained, by a preponderance of testimony. 1 (2) If you believe from the evidence that the plaintiffs entered upon the performance of their part of the said contract, and per- formed work under it, according to its terms, and if you further find that the engineer made out monthly proximate estimates of the work done by plaintiff at the end of each month, which were returned and brought to the notice of the defendant, and that the defendant, upon the request of the plaintiffs, after the expiration of fifteen days from the return of any such es- timate, refused and neglected to pay plaintiffs the amount due according to any such estimate, such failure or refusal of the defendant to pay was a breach of his part of the contract, and the plaintiffs were not bound to go on and complete all the work, but might suspend or quit the work until payment was made, and if you find that payment has not been made and the work has been suspended, the plaintiffs will be entitled to recover in this suit for all work done under said contract at the rates therein stipulated. 2 397. Preventing completion of contract. (1) Where two parties enter into a lawful contract upon sufficient consideration, and one of the parties is ready and willing to perform, and makes preparations to perform on his part, but is prevented from performing by the other party, the party so ready and willing to perform can recover all damages suffered by him by reason of the default of the other party, including necessary expenses incurred in making such preparation. 3 (2) Under the contract it was not the duty of the plaintiffs to procure the right of way ; and if you find from the evidence that the plaintiffs entered upon the performance of their part of the contract by grubbing, clearing, grading, etc., as therein stipulat- ed, and that they were prevented from completing their part of the contract because the right of way had not been obtained from the owners of the land through which the road ran, and where the work was to be done, who forbade and refused to permit the plaintiffs to enter and do the work, this would be a sufficient 1 Merrill v. Reaver, 50 Iowa, 404. 3 Kenwood Bridge Co. v. Dunder- 2 Bean v. Miller, 69 Mo. 393. date, 50 111. App. 581. 407 PREVENTING COMPLETION OF CONTRACT. 398 excuse for the failure of the plaintiffs to perform the work, where such right of way had not been obtained. 4 (3) The defendant was bound by the contract to furnish one track scales at the one-bark. The plaintiffs claim that the de- fendant failed and refused to furnish such track scales, and that by reason thereof they were damaged five hundred dol- lars, and they claim that they demanded such scales under the contract of the defendant. If the defendant failed and refused to furnish such scales, and the plaintiffs were damaged there- by, they will be entitled to recover such damages as they have sustained, if they have sustained any on this account. 5 (4) If the jury should find from the evidence that the plaintiff was wrongfully discharged, it was nevertheless the duty of the plaintiff not to remain idle, but to use every reasonable effort to procure employment, and the jury should deduct from such amount of salary as they find to have been unpaid such sums as the plaintiff earned in any other employment, and also any further sums which, in their judgment, he might have earned by due and reasonable industry and diligence. 6 (5) If the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant made with the plaintiff the agreement in either count of the plaintiff's declaration alleged, and that before the time for ex- ecution of the same on his part, by his own act put it out of his power to perform said agreement, then he is liable to the plaintiff in this suit for such damages as the plaintiff has sustained by any failure on the part of the defendant to perform, and in such case it was unnecessary for the plaintiff to make de- mand, or to do any other act to fix the defendant's liability. 1 . 398. Damages for failure to perform contract. The party who has been wrongfully deprived of the gains and profits of an executory contract may recover as an equivalent, and by way of damages, the difference between the contract price the amount which he would have earned and been entitled to recover on performance and the amount which it would have cost him to perform the contract. In estimating such costs, allowance must be made for every item of cost and expense * Bean v. Miller, 69 Mo. 393. e Equitable E. A. v. Fisher, 71 s Eaves v. Cherokee Iron Co. 73 Md. 436, 18 Atl. 808. Ga. 459. 7 White v. Thomas, 39 111. 227. 399 CONTRACTS IN GENERAL. 408 necessarily attending a full compliance on his part; and in es- timating his profits, you will, of course, exclude all such as are merely speculative and conjectural. 8 Instructions for Defendant. 399. Party failing to complete contract. (1) That under the written contract in evidence the defendant was entitled to have erected such a dock as was called for by the terms of the con- tract, and even though the jury may believe that there has been a substantial performance of the terms of the contract by the plaintiffs, yet nevertheless, if the jury believe that the terms have not been fully complied with, the jury should al- low to the defendant such sum or sums as, from the evidence, they may believe are reasonable and proper to enable the de- fendant to complete the dock in the manner stipulated for in the contract. 9 (2) If you find from the evidence that the plaintiff contracted to perform a certain job of work in making a road for a stipulated price, and that he, the plaintiff, did not complete said job, but without cause abandoned the same be- fore it was completed according to contract, without the con- sent of the defendant, and that it would cost more to com- plete said job, according to the contract, than the original con- tract price, the plaintiff cannot recover for the work done by him. 10 400. Damages for failure to deliver property sold. If the jury believe from the evidence that in the winter of 1865 the defendant sold to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff purchased of the defendant, the best sixty head of a lot of seventy head of cattle the defendant was then feeding, to be delivered to the plaintiff at any time between the first and fifth of March, 1865, at the option of the plaintiff, the plaintiff, on such delivery, to pay therefor six cents per pound of the gross weight of the same, and that the defendant, in February, 1865, sold and delivered to another person forty-eight head of said seventy s Cincinnati, &c. R. Co. v. Lutes, Keeler v. Herr, 157 111. 57, 59, 112 Ind. 281, 11 N. E. 784, 14 N. E. 41 N. E. 750. 706. 10 Swift v. Williams, 2 Ind. 366 409 JOINT OR SEVERAL RESCINDING CONTRACT. 403 head of cattle, and put it out of his power to comply with his agreement of sale to the plaintiff, then he is liable to the plain- tiff in this action for the difference between such contract price and what said sixty head of cattle were worth at the time and place, when and where, by said agreement, they .were to be delivered by the defendant to the plaintiff, and it makes no difference whether the price of the cattle rose or fell after the time the cattle were to be delivered under the contract. 11 401. Joint or several liability on contract. If some of the defendants employed the plaintiff by a contract, express or im- plied, and some of them did not so employ him, and did not after- wards accept and enjoy the fruits and benefits of his services, if such services were rendered by the plaintiff, then as to such defendants who did not so employ the plaintiff, and who did not accept and enjoy , the fruits of such services, you should find for such defendants, even though the plaintiff should be entitled to recover against others. 12 Rescinding Contract. 402. Contract, rescinding without express words. Any contract may be rescinded by consent of all the contracting parties, and such consent need not necessarily be expressed in words. 13 403. Contract void if made by insane person. The law cannot undertake to measure the validity of contracts by ' the greater or less strength of the understanding; but if the de- fendant was, at the time of signing the notes, so insane or destitute of reason as not to know the consequences of the act, then it is void. If he did know what he was doing, and un- derstood the consequences of his contract, then he is liable, and your verdict should be for the plaintiffs in case you so find. 14 11 White v. Thomas, 39 111. 227; nail H. Co. 201 111. 299, 66 N. E. Garfield v. Huls, 54 111 427, damages 237. for failure to do work properly. 14 Van Patton v. Beals, 46 Iowa, 12 Hauss v. Niblack. 80 Ind. 414. 62. is Iroquois Furnace Co. v. Big- CONTRACTS IN GENERAL. 410 Settlement of Disputed Claims. 404. Consideration of settlement, when sufficient. (1) A person cannot pay and satisfy a debt by the payment of a less sum than the debt, but if you believe from the evidence that the plaintiff, in order to avoid a suit, of the result of which he was doubtful, agreed to receive a sum in full satisfaction of the amount claimed to be due on said account, and upon such agreement the defendant paid the sum agreed upon, then such agreement and payment would completely discharge the defendant of all liability. 15 (2) The abandonment and discontinuance of a suit or action brought to enforce a doubtful right or claim, is a sufficient con- sideration for a promise, and so is the compromise of a disputed claim made bona fide, even though it ultimately appears that the claim compromised was wholly unfounded. If, therefore, you should believe and find from the evidence that the note sued on in this case was given in consideration of a compromise of the suit instituted by plaintiffs on the five thousand dollar note, and that said suit was dismissed by plaintiffs, and that said agreement of compromise was carried out by the parties thereto, then you are instructed that said agreement forms a sufficient consideration for the note sued on. 16 (3) If you believe from the evidence" that the parties to this action compromised their differences, as set forth in the plaintiff's declaration, and that the writing of April 27, 1897, marked exhibit No. 6, was signed by the plaintiff after being prepared and written by the defendant's agent, and that said writing embodied the actual terms of such compromise, and was accepted and acted upon by the defendant, then the defendant is bound by the provisions of said compromise. 17 (4) If these two men made an unfounded claim (they claim here this lumber was not according to contract), and made that is Ogbom v. Hoffman, 52 Ind. 439. ceipt for the amount in full; there is Hunter, E. & Co. v. Lanius, must be a consideration before such 82 Tex. 677, 18 S. W. Z01, (part settlement is binding). Osirander payment of the amount actually v. Scott, 161 111. 345, 43 N. E. 1089. due is not satisfaction of the whote IT Rhodes v Chesapeake & O. R. debt, even though the creditor Co. 49 W. \"a. 494, 55 L. R. A. agrees to receive a part for the 170, 175. whole of his claim and gives a re- 411 SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS. 404 knowingly, knowing there was no color of right to it, but asserted an unjust claim, and induced the parties to compromise, under the circumstances, in order to avoid litigation, etc., it would not be binding on the company here ; but, if these two men did find fault with the lumber, and had good reason for finding fault, if it did not comply with the contract, and they talked about it, and they finally made this offer in good faith, and these parties said, "We will take the money," and took it, they are bound by the contract, because, in that case, there would be a valid dispute between the parties, settled up by agreement. On the other hand, if it were a fraudulent scheme on the part of these parties to beat defendant out of money, it would not be binding. 18 (5) If the jury find that the parties met and this matter was all settled up, and was so understood by the parties, each party presenting a claim against the other, and the pretended settle- ment was not a myth, but a reality, that constitutes a good defense to this action, and the verdict must be for the defend- ants. 19 (6) If you believe from the evidence that from time to time the officers or agents of the plaintiff and defendant in this suit met and looked over their accounts together and settled all mat- ters between them, and struck a balance and agreed upon that as the amount due from the one to the other, then, in the absence of a mistake or fraud, neither party will be allowed to go behind that settlement for the purpose of increasing or diminishing the amount so agreed upon. 20 (7) When the parties have gone to law about a matter they may settle between themselves with the intervention of an attor- ney on either side, or with an attorney on one side, if they see fit to do so, but after an action is commenced, and the parties appear with an attorney in court, any settlement of the claim out of court, without the knowledge or consent of the attorney, is to be viewed with suspicion. If there is any fraud in the case, such a settlement may be set aside. 21 is Nash v. Manistee Lumber Co. 20 Gottfried Brewing Co. v. Szark- 75 Mich. 357, 42 N. W. 840. owski, 79 111. App. 583. ! Doyle v. Donnelly, 56 Me. 28. 21 Faloonio v. Larsen, 31 Ore. 149, 48 Pac. 703. 405 CONTRACTS IN GENERAL. 412 (8) If you find that the plaintiff performed certain legal ser- vices for the defendant, with the defendant's knowledge and con- sent, and that defendant recived the benefits thereof without ob- jection, then plaintiff will be entitled to recover the reasonable value of such services, unless defendant has established by a fair preponderance of the evidence that they were performed under a contract made by him with plaintiff's father, by which the latter agreed that plaintiff should perform the said services, and the value thereof should be indorsed upon an indebtedness which was then owing by H to the defendant, and that the plain- tiff had knowledge of such agreement. 22 (9) No particular form of words is necessary, to constitute a settlement, nor is it necessary to prove a promise to pay the balance found to be due, provided a balance be found in favor of the party. 23 Claim without Consideration. 405. Claim based on void patent. (1) The jury are in- structed that the letters patent are prima facie evidence that the plaintiffs are the joint inventors of the so-called improved com- position, yet, if that fact may be disproved, and if the jury should be satisfied from the testimony that said composition was in- vented by the plaintiff K alone, and not by K and E jointly, the letters patent are void ; there was no consideration for the note sued on, and the verdict must be for the defendants. 24 (2) The inventor should confine his specifications to sub- stances which he knows will answer the purpose for which they are used; that the specification accompanying the letters patent read in evidence makes use of the general term water; and, if the jury believe from the evidence, that the waters of the terri- tory of Colorado in general use will not accomplish the end for which water is used in the said composition, either by reason of alkaline properties or otherwise, then the specification is not sufficient and the letters are void; there was no considera- 22 Hudspeth v. Yetzer, 78 Iowa, 23 Brewer v. Wright, 25 Neb. 805, 13, 42 N. W. 529. 41 N. W. 159. 24 Keith v. Hobbs, 69 Mo. 87. 413 CLAIMS WITHOUT CONSIDERATION. 405 tion for the note sued on, and the verdict must be for the defend- ants. 25 (3) The specification accompanying the letters patent read in evidence must in and of itself contain a full, clear and exact description of the invention, and if the object of the alleged patent improved composition for tanning cannot be ob- tained when the specification is clearly followed out by compe- tent workmen of ordinary skill and proficiency in the art of tanning, without invention or addition of their own, or if, in order to attain the object of the patent, information must be derived from other sources than the specification, as by experi- ments, or from using other ingredients to make the thing de- scribed, or if it requires the solution of a problem, then, and in either of said cases, the letters patent are void, and the note sued on is without consideration and the jury must find for the defendants. 20 25 Keith v. Hobbs, 69 Mo. 87. at no definite time, the law implies 26 Keith v. Hobbs, 69 Mo. 88. that it is to be performed within *When a contract is made to b3 a reasonable time; Sanborn v. Ben- performed at a certain place, but edict, 78 111. 309, 313 (form). CHAPTER XXXIII. CONTRACTS SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY. , Sec. Sec. 406. Sale complete on delivery. 412. Conditions of sale complied 407. Sale of goods by sample. with. 408. Sale on warranty" Breach. 413. Rescinding sale for defects. 409. Implied warranty. 414. Purchasing with intent to de- 410. Burden of proving warranty. fraud. 411. Damages for breach of war- ranty. 406. Sale complete on delivery. (1) All that is necessary to pass property is that the buyer and seller agree. If one who has a long course of dealing with another have a correspondence in regard to certain specific property, nearer to the purchaser than to the seller, and, more properly, by reason of their busi- ness relations, in the control of the purchaser, and they agree, one to buy and the other to sell, the sale is complete just as soon as they agree, and the seller charges the buyer, and the buyer credits their respective books with the price of the prop- erty. 1 (2) If, after a full consideration of all the evidence before you, you shall find that there was a delivery of the goods in question, and that such delivery was absolute and unconditional, and was by the parties so intended, then the property vested in the plaintiff, and he should be entitled to recover. 2 (3) If you should find that there was a delivery to the plaintiff of the goods in question, but that such delivery was coupled * Robinson v. Uhl, 6 Neb. 332. 2 Albright v. Brown, 23 Neb. 141, 36 N. W. 297. 414 415 SALE COMPLETE WHEN ; SALE BY SAMPLE. 407 with the condition that the property should not pass until the purchase price was paid, and if you further find that the pur- chase price as agreed upon was not paid, and that defendants repossessed themselves of the property, then the conditions are not complied with on the part of the purchaser, and if the seller has done all he agreed to do on his part the seller has a right to repossess himself of the property, and such repossession is a rescinding of the sale, and defendants would be entitled to recover. 8 (4) It is a rule of law that a sale and a delivery of goods, on condition that the property is not to vest until the purchase money is paid or secured, does not pass the title to the purchaser until the condition is performed ; and the vendor, in case the condition is not fulfilled, has a right to repossess himself of the goods, both as against the vendee or one purchasing from such vendee with notice. When goods are delivered to the vendee, the inten- tion of the parties determines the interpretation to be given to the delivery. 4 (5) It is a general rule of law that when goods are sold, on condition of payment being made, or some other condition pre- cedent being performed, before or on delivery, then an absolute and unconditional delivery of the goods, without requiring at the time of delivery payment or performance, would be a waiver of such payment or performance as a condition precedent, and a complete title would pass to the purchaser, provided, that at the time of such delivery it was the intent of the parties that it should be absolute and unconditional delivery. Though it is important, it is not absolutely imperative that the vendor declare that he does not waive any condition of the sale at the time of a delivery to the vendee. The situation of the parties, the nature of the transaction, the presumption of honest dealing, and like considerations may be taken into account in determining whether any conditions of the sale have been waived. 5 407. Sale of goods by sample. (1) In a sale of goods by sample, the vendor warrants the quality of the bulk to equal 3 Albright v. Brown, 23 Neb. 141, *> Albright v. Brown, 23 Neb. 140, 36 N. W. 297. 36 N. W. 297. * Albright v. Brown, 23 Neb. 140 36 N. W. 297. 407 CONTRACTS, SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY. 416 that of the sample. In such sale, there is also an implied con- dition that the buyer shall have a fair opportunity to compare the bulk with the sample. It must not be assumed, however, that in all cases where a sample is exhibited, the sale is a sale by sample, for the vendor may show a sample, but decline to sell by it, and require the purchaser to inspect the bulk at his own risk. 6 (2) If the jury believe from the evidence that the plaintiff in- tended by exhibition of the samples to the defendant, taken in connection with all he said and did at the time the alleged con- tract of sale was made, to impress the defendant with the belief that he was selling by sample, and that the defendant believed he was purchasing by the sample so exhibited, then they must find for the defendant, unless they further believe from the evidence that the bulk did correspond in quality with the sample, or that the defendant has, by clear and unequivocal acts, accepted the peanuts after knowledge that the bulk did not correspond in quality with the sample. 7 (3) If the jury believe from all the evidence in this case that the sale of the peanuts by S to the defendant was made by a sam- ple, exhibited at the time of such gale, and that upon an inspection and comparison of the bulk of said peanuts with such sample, made by the defendant or his agent within a reasonable time after their delivery, it was ascertained that the bulk of such peanuts were inferior in quality to and did not correspond with such sample, and that the plaintiffs had notice thereof within a reasonable time, then they must find for the defendant, unless the jury believe further from the evidence that after the peanuts purchased by the defendant of the plaintiffs were received and inspected by the defendant or his agent, and the sample exhibited at the time of the sale compared with the bulk, that the defendant personally or by his agent exercised any act of owner- ship over them, or did any act amounting to an acceptance of them. The said acceptance is a waiver of any objection to their quality, and the failure of their quality will not afterwards avail him as a defense, except in case of fraud ; but the proof of e Proctor v. Spratley, 78 Va. 255. Wood, 84 Mich. 459, 48 N. W. 28. See Gutta P. & R. Mfg. Co. v. ? Proctor v. Spratley, 78 Va. 257. 417 SALE ON WARRANTY BREACH. 408 such acceptance must be clear and unequivocal, and not founded upon or induced by a mistake as to the facts at the time of such reception by the agent, and it is a question for the jury whether, under all the circumstances, the acts which the buyer or his agent does or forbears to do amount to an acceptance. 8 408. Sale on warranty Breach of warranty. (l)The bur- den of proof, in this case, is upon the defendants to establish any warranty by the plaintiff respecting the quality of machinery sold by the plaintiff to the defendants. 9 (2) It is not necessary that a representation, in order to con- stitute a warranty, should be simultaneous with the conclusion of the bargain ; but only that it should be made during the course of the dealing which leads to the bargain, and should then enter into the bargain as a part of it. 10 (3) The burden of proof, in this case, is upon the defendants to establish any warranty by the plaintiff respecting the quality of the machinery sold by the plaintiff to the defendants. It is not necessary, however, that the warranty should be simultane- ous with the conelusion of the bargain ; but only that it should be made during the course of dealing which leads to the bargain and should then enter into the bargain as a part of it. 11 (4) If you believe from the evidence that the defendant, Thorne, represented to the plaintiff, Raymond, that the hams in question were first class hams, equal in quality to any brand of hams made in the market, and that such representation was made by Thorne with the intention thereby of warranting the hams to be of such quality, and to induce the plaintiff to buy the same, and that Reynolds purchased said hams relying upon such rep- resentations as a warranty of the quality, and that at the time of purchasing the hams, they were not of the quality repre- sented, but were of a poor, inferior and bad quality, then your verdict will be for the plaintiffs. And, upon the question of damages, the court instructs you that if you believe, from the evidence, that they, at the time of such sale to the plaintiffs, s Proctor v. Spratley, 78 Va. 256. Adler v. Robert Portner Brew- a Adler v. Robert Portner Brew- ing Co. 65 Md. 28, 2 Atl. 918; Eureka ing Go. 65 Md. 28, 2 Atl. 918. Fertilizer Co. v. Baltimore, C. S. 10 Eureka Fertilizer Co. v. Balti- &c. R. Co. 78 Md. 183, 27 Atl. 1035. more Copper, Smelt and Roll Co. 78 Md. 183, 27 Atl. 1035. 408 CONTRACTS, SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY. 418 had a contract for the resale of said hams to one Davis, of Salt Lake City, and that they had sold the same as hams of the quality aforesaid, and that, at the time of the sale to the plain- tiffs, the defendant, Thorne, had knowledge of such contract of resale, and knew that the plaintiffs purchased said hams to fulfill said contract of resale, and that the hams were shipped to said Davis before the plaintiffs had any notice of their quality, and that upon their arrival at Salt Lake City the said Davis refused to receive or pay for the same, for the reason that they were not, at the time of their shipment to him, of the quality he had bargained for, then you will award to the plaintiffs as damages such sums of money as you may belive, from the evidence, the plaintiffs had sold said hams to said Davis for, less such sum, as you may believe from the evidence, said hams were actually worth at the time of their purchase by the plain- tiffs ; and you will further allow the plaintiffs such sum of money, if any, as you may believe from the evidence they were obliged to pay out on account of the transportation of said hams to said Salt Lake City at the time of their sale to the plaintiffs. 12 (5) If the jury believe that the plaintiff sold to the defendant the barge mentioned in the evidence, for which the notes sued on were given, and as inducement to the defendant to make said purchase, represented that said barge was all right, and was in condition for service at once, and that the defendant, relying on said representations, agreed to purchase and did actually purchase and accept the same, and gave the said notes for the purchase money; and shall further believe that said barge was not all right and in condition for service at once, but, on the contrary, was unsound and unseaworthy, and in consequence of such unsoundness was, together with a valuable cargo, lost and damaged, then the defendant is entitled to re- coup against plaintiff's claim on said notes the amount of dam- age (if any) sustained as a direct consequence of said breach of warranty. 13 409. Implied warranty. (1) An implied warranty is not 12 Thorne v. McVeagh, 75 111. 81, more Copper, S. & R. Co. 78 Md. 83. 183, 27 Atl. 1035. !3 Eureka Fertilizer Co. v. Balti- 419 IMPLIED WARRANTY. 409 that the article or thing sold shall be the best of its kind, or such as might have been represented at the time of the sale, hut only that such article or thing shall be reasonably suitable for the purpose for which it was inteded to be used. 14 (2) When one sells articles of personal property, he impliedly warrants that it is merchantable and reasonably suited to the use intended, and that the seller knows of no latent defects undis- covered. "Latent defects" means such defects as are hidden. The implied warranty, however, does not cover defects which can be discovered by ordinary prudence and caution. As to these, the law presumes the buyer to exercise his own judgment. If you believe that the consideration of the note sued on was a lot of horses, that they were not at the time of the sale mer- chantable and reasonably suited to the use intended, and that they were so because of defects which were not discoverable by ordinary prudence, 1jiis would be a good defense to the note. If the evidence shows that the consideration of the note failed entirely, this would altogether defeat a recovery. If there was a partial failure, there should be an apportionment between the parties, according to the facts of the case. 15 (3) An implied warranty is not that the article or thing sold shall be the best of its kind, or such as might have been rep- resented at the time of the sale, but only such article or thing shall be reasonably suitable for the purposes for which it was intended to be used. When one sells articles of personal property he impliedly warrants the same to be merchantable and reasonably suited to the use intended, and that the seller knows of no latent defects undiscovered that is, such defects as are hidden. The implied warranty, however, does not cover defects which can be discovered by ordinary prudence and caution. In such case the law presumes that the buyer exercises his own judgment in making the purchase. 16 (4) A purchaser of property has no right to rely upon the representations of the vendor or seller of the property as to the " Hodge & W. v. Tufts, 115 Ala. is Hodge & W. v. Tufts, 115 Ala. 370, 22 So. 422. 370, 22 So. 422; Hoffman v. Gates, is Hoffman v. Gates, 77 Ga. 703. 77 Ga. 703. 410 CONTRACTS, SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY. 420 quality where he has reasonable opportunity of examining the property and judging for himself as to its qualities. 17 410. Burden of proving warranty. (1) The burden of showing that the oats delivered by the defendant were not the kind which he contracted to deliver is upon the plaintiff, and un- less he has satisfied the minds of the jury, by the evidence adduced, that the oats delivered were not the kind or variety so agreed to be delivered, then they must find for the defend- ant. 18 (2) In so far as the defendant relies upon a warranty of quality of the property sold and a breach of the same, the burden of proving the warranty is upon the defendant; and unless it has proved both the warranty and the breach alleged by a preponderance of the evidence, it will not be entitled to any benefit therefrom in the suit. 19 411. Damages for breach of warranty. (1) In ascertaining the extent of the damages suffered by the defendants, if any, the jury must look to all the evidence to determine what it would reasonably cost to put the apparatus in a condition reasonably suitable for the manufacture and dispensing of soda water bev- erages; and if the only evidence on that point is that it would not cost over one hundred dollars, then that is the only abate- ment the defendants would be entitled to, and the plaintiff would be entitled to a verdict for the balance of notes and interest. 20 (2) Even if the jury should find from the evidence that the apparatus was not suitably fitted for the purpose for which it was sold, then the measure of defendant's damage is the amount necessary to repair the apparatus as it may be shown to be defective. 21 (3) If the evidence reasonably satisfies the jury that the appa- ratus as a whole was costly and expensive, and was only de- fective in some minor respects, and they further believe from the evidence that such defects could be remedied and put in such condition as would make the apparatus reasonably suit- 17 Shepard v. Goben, 142 Ind. 322, 20 Hoge & W. v. Tufts, 115 Ala. 39 N. E. 506. 372, 22 So. 422. is Gachet v. Warren, 72 Ala. 291. 21 Hodge & W. v. Tufts, 115 Ala. 10 Tacoma Coal Co. v. Bradley, 2 370, 22 So. 422. Wash. 606, 27 Pac. 454. 421 CONDITIONS OF SALE COMPLIED WITH. 412 able for the purposes intended, then the costs of putting the same in such condition would be the measure of defendant's damages. 22 (4) If you find for the plaintiff, you will award plaintiff as damages the difference between what you believe from the evi- dence to be the actual value of the goods described in the declara- tion at the time of the sale, and what you believe from the evi- dence their value would have been, if they had been as represent- ed in the warranty made by the defendant. 23 412. Conditions of sale complied with. (1) If it appears from the greater weight of the evidence that the plaintiff con- structed the apparatus in question in a good, workmanlike man- ner, and that, by the tests made of said apparatus by plaintiff and defendant, the same complied with all the terms of plaintiff's guaranty, then and in that event the plaintiff would be entitled to recover the contract price. 24 (2) If the jury believe that the contract between the parties was that the defendant was to deliver to the plaintiff one hundred and fifty tons of iron as soon as he could get it from the railroad company, and was to receive twenty-eight dollars per ton there- for, and that he did offer to deliver to the plaintiff so much of said iron as he, the said defendant, received from said company, and as soon as he so received it, and that the plaintiff, after ac- cepting a part of said iron, refused to receive any more, then they are to find for the defendant. 25 (3) If the jury believe from the evidence that nothing was agreed upon between the parties about the time for the delivery of the iron, but that the plaintiff, or his agent, was informed by the defendant, at or about the time the said contract was agreed on, that he, the defendant, was to get the iron from the rail- road company, and that he was dependent upon such company as to when it would be delivered, and further believe that the defendant did, as soon as he received any of the iron from the said company, offer to deliver it to the said plaintiff, who, after receiving a part, refused to accept any more, then they are to find for the defendant. 26 22 Hodge & W. v. Tufts, 115 Ala. 24 Smith v. Independent School 371, 22 So. 422. Dist. 112 Iowa, 38, 83 N. W. 810. 23 Ferguson v. Hosier, 58 Ind. 25 Smith v. Snyder, 77 Va. 440. 438. 26 Smith v. Snyder, 77 Va. 440. 413 CONTRACTS, SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY. 422 413. Rescinding sale for defects. (1) A defrauded vendee has the right, within a reasonable time after the knowledge of fraud, to rescind the contract, unless he has with such knowledge affirmed the sale by express words or unequivocal acts, or, while he is deliberating, an innocent third party has acquired an in- terest in the property. 27 (2) The defendants cannot rescind the contract on the ground that the apparatus shipped them was not new, and had been used by others prior to the sale, if they, after being informed by letter or otherwise that said apparatus had been used by other persons in the year 1887, continued to use the same. 28 (3) If defendants knew of all the defects complained of in March or April, 1888, and with this knowledge kept and used the same until midsummer of that year or later, and paid their notes given for the purchase money until November, 1888, this would be, as a matter of law, a waiver of their right to rescind the contract.- 9 (4) If the jury believe from the evidence that defendants kept and used the soda fountain and apparatus for three or more months after they had knowledge of all the alleged defects and fraud complained of, they should find for the plaintiff at least the amount of debt proven, less the value of repairing said de- fects. 30 (5) If the evidence shows that the defendants claimed in July, 1888, that they had rejected the apparatus and held it subject to the order of plaintiffs, and then continued to make monthly pay- ments until November or December, that was evidence tending to show that the claims or defects were unfounded. 31 (6) If the jury find from the evidence that defendants, after the receipt of this belting by them, had an opportunity to inspect and examine and determine by such examination and inspec- tion the quality of the belting they received, and if defects could have been ascertained by examination and inspection thereof, and without doing so they voluntarily paid their bill, 2T Proctor v. Spratley, 78 Va. 257. so Hodge & Williams v. Tufts, 28 Hodge & W. v. Tufts, 115 Ala. 115 Ala. 371, 22 So. 422. 371, 22 So. 422. 31 Hodge & W. v. Tufts, 115 Ala. 29 Hodge & W. v. Tufts, 115 Ala. 371, 22 So. 422. 371, 22 So. 422. 423 PURCHASING WITH FRAUDULENT INTENT. 414 then they cannot have set off the amount they paid at that time. 32 (7) If the jury find that the contract offered in evidence was entered into between the plaintiff and defendant, and that the plaintiff was ready and willing and did offer to deliver, during the period of time covered by said contract, coal daily, in quan- tities and of the quality contemplated by the contract, and that after receiving, consuming and paying for a portion of the coal embraced in said contract, the master of machinery and the master of transportation of the defendant rejected said coal as not satisfactory to them, and that said rejection was not bona fide, and that the defendant setting up such rejec- tion as an excuse thereafter refused to receive the balance of said coal from the plaintiff, then the plaintiff is entitled to recover. 33 414. Purchasing with intent to defraud. In considering the question as to whether or not S bought the goods with the intention and purpose of defrauding the plaintiff you are told that there are in law certain matters which are sometimes termed "badges of fraud," that is, matters which, if shown, are usually considered as evidence tending to show fraud. Among these are unusual or extraordinary methods of conduct- ing business, if shown. Any secrecy or concealment in said business, if shown, or any other unusual methods or acts con- nected with the transaction in question, if shown by the evi- dence, are proper to be considered when deciding whether fraud, in fact, existed in connection with the transaction. As applied to this case, if S, by his acts prior to or at the time of the sale, intentionally induced plaintiff to believe that he intended to pay for the goods, and said S, in fact, did not intend to pay therefor, and the said S induced this belief in- tending to deceive the plaintiff and induce him to sell the goods to him, and the plaintiff was thereby deceived, and was induced by this misrepresentation to make the sales, and would not have made them if defendant had not made this misrepre- sentation, then the debt was created by fraud of said S, and 32 Gutta P. & R. Mfg. Co. v. ss Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Bry- Wood, 84 Mich. 459, 48 N. W. 28. don, 65 Md. 200, 3 Atl. 306, 9 Atl. 126. 414 CONTRACTS, SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY. 424 the plaintiff would be entitled to recover, provided you find that said S. was at the time of the sale insolvent. 34 a* Phelps D. & P. Co. v. Samson, age, by transfer of warehouse re- 113 Iowa. 150. 84 N. W. 1051. ceipts, see: Cole v. Tyng, 24 111. *For forms of instructions held 100. good on the sale of grain in stor- CHAPTER XXXIV. CONTRACTS PROMISSORY NOTES. Sec. Holder of note may recover, 417. Transferring note by endorse- when, ment. 416. Holder of note, when cannot 418. Interest on note Usury. recover. 419. Suit to recover value of lost note. 415. Holder may recover on note, when. (1) In the absence of evidence, the holder of a promissory note indorsed by the per- son to whose order it is made payable is presumed to be a holder in good faith, and entitled to recover. Such presumption may be rebutted or overcome by evidence from which the jury be- lieve either that the note was transferred by the payee after due, or that the party to whom it was transferred took it with, notice of the defense thereto. 1 (2) If under all the circumstances you find the plaintiff ac- quired and holds the note by purchase in good faith in the usual course of trade for a valuable consideration before due, without notice of such infirmatives, your verdict will be in his favor for fifty dollars with six per cent, interest to date. Add together the sum so found, that is, the interest and principal, and the whole amount will be his damages. 2 (3) Even though you may believe from the evidence that the note in controversy was given to Dines by Hall for the sole purpose of using it as collateral in securing a loan for a smaller i Mahaska County S. Bank v. here laid down, Hardy v. Brier, 91 Crist, 87 Iowa, 418, 54 N. W. 450. Ind. 91. Under the laws of Indiana only 2 Kitchen v. Loudenback, 48 Ohio- notes payable at a designated bank St. 177, 26 N. E. 979. in tine state come within the rule 425 -i!5 CONTRACTS PROMISSORY NOTES. 426 amount, if you also believe from the evidence that the plain- till' purchased said note from Dines before its maturity for a valuable consideration, you must find your verdict for the plaintiff, unless you shall further believe from the evidence that, at the time the plaintiff purchased said note, it had notice or knowledge of the circumstances and conditions under which Dines secured and held said note. 3 (4) If you believe from the evidence that the plaintiff pur- chased the note in controversy for value before maturity, you must find your verdict for the plaintiff, even though you may be- lieve from the evidence that Dines had no right or authority to sell the note, unless you shall further believe from the evidence that at the time the plaintiff purchased said note, it had notice or knowledge that Dines had no right or authority to sell the note. 4 (5) In order to defeat a recovery by the plaintiff bank, it is in- cumbent on the defendants to establish by a preponderance of the evidence, first, the truth of the defense which they have pleaded against the note in suit ; and, second, the fact that the bank purchased the note with notice of such defense, or that it made such purchase after the note became due. If both these propositions have been so established, then the plaintiff cannot recover; but, if either proposition has not been so estab- lished, then plaintiff will be entitled to your verdict for the full amount of the note in suit. 5 (6) If the defendant's testator, having 'been discharged from the liability as surety upon the note sued on in this action with full knowledge and understanding of his release as surety, prom- ised the holder or payee to pay said note if the principal did not, he thereby revived his liability as surety, and such subsequent promise was binding without any new consideration to support it. 6 (7) Even if the defendant was an indorser of the note, and not a maker, and if no notice of the nonpayment of the note was given him within the time required to make him liable, if he subsequently, with knowledge of the fact that such notice had not been given, promised to pay or "fix it up," or any equiv- s Wright Investment Co. v. Fris- s Mahaska County S. Bank v. coe Realty Co. (Mo.), 77 S. W. 296. Crist, 87 Iowa, 419, 54 N. W. 450. 4 Wright Investment Co. v. Fris- c Bramble v. Ward, 40 Ohio St. coe Realty Co. (Mo.), 77 S. W. 296. 267. 427 RECOVERY ON NOTE, WHEN. -ilo alent words, meaning thereby to arrange for its payment, this would be a waiver of the want of notice, and he would be liable as though the notice had been duly given. 7 (8) If you find to make it more specific that when this note was drawn and signed by S there was no understanding and agreement on the part of H with the other defendants that he was to sign the note with them, and that the payee did not accept the note as signed, but merely took it into his possession temporarily in order to procure the other signers, and that he did not turn over this personal property to S until after all the others had signed it, then your verdict should be for the plaintiff. 8 (9) If the jury shall find from the evidence that the said notary did use reasonable diligence to ascertain the residence or place of business of the makers of said note as set out in its first instruction, but did not use reasonable diligence to ascertain the dwelling or place of business of the defendant, that then the notice deposited in the postoffice, as aforesaid, is not suffi- cient to hold the defendant, and the plaintiffs are not entitled to recover, unless the jury shall further find from the evi- dence that the notice so deposited in the postoffice, as afore- said, did actually reach the defendant on that or the succeed- ing day; or unless they shall find from the evidence that subse- quently to the day of the protest of said note, said defendant promised the plaintiffs or their attorney to pay the amount of said note, with a knowledge of the fact that notice of non- payment had not been regularly given to him. 9 (10) The burden of proof is upon the defendant in this case, and unless the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, his allega- tion in the answer that said notes (or some of them) were given for the accommodation of said bank (as explained in other in- structions), then your verdict should be for the plaintiff as to all of the notes sued upon in this case. 10 (11) The notes involved in this suit being joint notes executed by several persons, and one of the names thereon having been forged, would be void as to the person whose name was forged, 7 Cook v. Brown, 62 Mich. 477, Staylor v. Ball, 24 Md. 190. 29 N. W. 46. 10 Chicago T. & T. Co. v. Brady, s Steers v. Holmes, 79 Mich. 434, 165 Mo. 201, 65 S. W. 303. 44 N. W. 922. 4:15 CONTRACTS PROMISSORY NOTES. 428 but valid as to the others, unless at the time the plaintiff ac- cepted the notes she had knowledge of the forging, or in some way participated in the fraud of wrongfully obtaining the said signature; but if you find from the evidence the plaintiff re- ceived and accepted said notes in good faith and without any knowledge or information that any of the signatures were not genuine, being innocent of any wrong, the law protects her, and you should find for the plaintiff against those who did sign the notes. 11 (12) Although the witness, T, delivered the note in suit to wit- ness, Y, in violation of the instruction of defendants, and al- though he communicated his instructions to witness, Y, at the time of such delivery, yet, if the jury find and believe from the evidence that after said delivery, and after having knowl- edge that H had not signed said note, defendants approved and adopted as their own the act of said T in making said delivery to said Y, the verdict should be for the plaintiff. 12 (13) It would make no difference with the liability of B, as the maker of the note, that it was not signed by him at the time it was originally made by C. His liability would be the same if he subsequently signed it and sold and delivered it to the plain- tiff for a valuable consideration, as if he had signed it when first made. 13 (14) If you find from the evidence that the plaintiff bank re- ceived the note in good faith and before it was due, as a col- lateral security for a loan made to S & W, and that said loan is still unpaid, then plaintiff will be entitled to a verdict; that is, the holder of a note as collateral security for the payment of a loan made at the time the collateral security is deposited, is to be treated as a purchaser, and if he receives such col- lateral in good faith, and before due, he holds it free from the defenses to which it would be liable in the hands of orig- inal holders to the same extent. 14 11 Helms v. Wayne Agr. Oo. 73 12 Hurt v. Ford (Mo.), 36 S. W. Ind. 327. Citing: Stoner v. Milli- 673. kin, 85 111. 218; Selser v. Brock, 13 Cook v. Brown, 62 Mich. 478, 3 Ohio St. 302; Franklin Bank v. 29 N. W. 46. Stevens, 39 Me. 532; Craig v. 14 Mahaska County S. Bank v. Hobbs, 44 Ind. 363: York County Crist, 87 Iowa, 419, 54 N. W. 450. M. F. Ins. Co. v. Brooks, 51 Me. 506. 429 RECOVERY ON NOTE, WHEN. 415 (15) Under the pleadings and evidence, the defendant has ad- mitted the execution of all the notes sued upon by plaintiff in this case, and has admitted that plaintiff is the legal owner and holder of said notes. It is, therefore, the duty of the jury to find for the plaintiff as to each or all of said notes, unless the jury believe from the evidence that some one or more of said notes was obtained by the bank as a matter of accommodation, as explained in other instructions. 15 (16) A note to settle an embezzlement or a shortage of an agent is valid and good, if it was given to settle the 'indebtedness or shortage, and if there is no agreement to stifle the prosecu- tion for the embezzlement. 10 (17) The legal effect of the deed of trust (which has been read in evidence), and the said notes recited in said deed, is to indicate a transaction in which B issued the said notes as part payment of the purchase price of certain land. The. jury are further instructed that by his answer in this case defendant admits that the title to the land (described in the deed of trust) was conveyed to defendant before said deed of trust was executed by defendant. The court instructs you that the right to possession of said land, which defendant acquired by the admitted conveyance of title to him by S, was, if so intended by him and the officers of the bank with whom he had the transaction, a valuable consideration for the notes men- tioned in the deed of trust and sued upon in this case. 17 (18) The plaintiff in this case has sued on a note alleged to have been executed by the defendants to W and C, payable at the Vincennes National Bank and endorsed to the plaintiff. The defendant by his answer admits the execution and endorsement of the note. This admission makes out the plaintiff's side of the case and entitles him to a verdict for the full amount of the note and interest, unless the defendant has satisfied you by a preponderance of the evidence that the material allega- tions of the amended second paragraph of his answer so fa* as the burden of proof rests upon him, are true. 18 (19) The plaintiff has sued upon six different notes, each of is Chicago T. & T. Co v. Brady, " Chicago T. & T. Co. v. Brady, 165 Mo. 201, 65 S. W. 303. 165 Mo. 197, 65 S. W. 303. ie Wolf v. Troxell, 94 Mich. 575, is Zook v. Simonson, 72 Ind. 88. 54 N. W. 383. 416 CONTRACTS PROMISSORY NOTES. 430 which constitutes a separate and distinct claim or cause of action in plaintiff's petition. Those claimed are called "counts" in the instructions to you by the court. Your verdict should state your finding or decision as to each count or cause of action separately. And if your finding is for the plaintiff, as to any one or more counts, you should also state in your verdict the exact amount which you find from the evidence to be still due and unpaid at the present time (including principal and in- terest to date) on each particular note mentioned in the count or counts of the petition on which you may so decide to find for plaintiff. 19 416. Holder of note cannot recover, when. (1) As between the party accommodated and the party accommodating, the lat- ter can be under no liability to the former whatever by the relation which they are placed upon the paper; and in this case, if you find from the evidence that B was, in fact, an ac- commodation maker of the paper sued on, then he cannot be held liable no matter in what form the transaction was put. 20 (2) If you believe from the evidence that the promissory note read and shown in evidence was made by the defendant, M, and indorsed by the defendant, A, and delivered by him to his co- defendant, M, for the purpose of enabling M, the maker of the note, to raise money thereon for his own use; and if you further believe from the evidence that after the defendant, A, had so indorsed and delivered the note to the said M, the words and figures "with interest at ten per cent, per annum after maturity," now appearing in said note, were written there- in without the knowledge, consent or authority of the defend- ant, A, by the said M or by an agent or clerk of his, whether done in the presence of any officer or agent of the plaintiff or not, and whether with or without the knowledge of the plaintiff, the verdict should be for the defendant, A. 21 (3) It is claimed by the defendant, B, that after he signed a note similar in all respects to the one sued on, excepting that the written words "with interest at ten per cent" were not then 19 Chicago T. & T. Co. v. Brady, 21 Capital Bank v. Armstrong, 62 165 Mo. 200. 65 S. W. 303. Mo. 62. 20 Chicago T. & T. Co. v. Brady, 165 Mo. 202, 65 S. W. 303. 431 CANNOT RECOVER, WHEN. 416 in the note, and since he signed it, without his knowledge or consent, the said printed words were stricken out and the said written words inserted. If such an alteration of the note were made by any holder of the note, or made with the knowledge of any holder of the note, without the knowledge of B, it would be a material alteration, and would release him from all liability on the note, and if the defendant, B, proves this fact by a fair preponderance of the evidence, the verdict must be in his favor; and it would make no difference whether A, the plaintiff, was or was not the owner of the note at the time of the alteration, if he made the alteration after B, the defendant, signed it. 22 (4) Where an accommodation note is diverted from the purpose for which it was given, one who takes it with knowledge can- not recover from the accommodation party; and in this case, the receiver possesses, as a matter of law, all the knowledge that the G S bank possessed upon the subject of this note. 23 (5) If you believe from the evidence before .you that the prom- issory note in controversy was never delivered by B in his lifetime, nor by the duly appointed executor of his estate after his death, then it is your duty to find your verdict in favor of the said B estate, the defendant, and against G, the plain- tiff. 24 (6) If the jury believe from the evidence in this case that J indorsed his name on the back of the note sued on in this case as indorser and not as joint maker thereof, and that at the time said note was delivered to the plaintiff he knew the said J indorsed the said note as an indorser thereon, and not as a joint promisor, and that the said plaintiff had said note regularly protested and had notice sent to the said J as in- dorser of such protest, then the jury may consider said facts, along with the other evidence in the case, and that if therefrom they believe from the evidence that the said J was an indorser on the note sued on, and not a joint maker, or promisor, they should find for the defendant. 25 (7) The defendant in his answer alleges, in substance, that W 22 Brooks v. Allen, 62 Ind. 405. 25 Roanok Grocery & M. Co. v. 23 Chicago T. & T. Co. v. Brady, Watkins, 41 W. Va. 793, 24 S. E. 165 Mo. 203, 65 S. W. 303. 612. 2* Gandy v. Bissell's Estate (Neb.), 69 N. W. 633. 416 CONTRACTS PROMISSORY NOTES. 432 and C made an agreement with him by which they undertook to graft the defendant's apple trees with grafts that would grow .and bear a good quality of fruit, and do the work in a skillful manner; that the grafting was done in an unskillful manner to the injury of the plaintiff's trees and with worthless grafts; .that the note was given in consideration of said undertaking, and the plaintiff had knowledge of these facts when he took the assignment of said note. It is not incumbent on the defend- .ant to prove that the plaintiffs had knowledge, when the note was indorsed to them, of the other matters alleged in the said para- graph. Upon proof of these matters the burden of proof would rest on plaintiffs to show that they took the note in ignorance of .the existence of those matters. 26 (8) If you find from the evidence that B signed the notes sued *on in this case as an accommodation maker for the G S bank, and delivered them to the bank or one of its officers for the bank, he cannot be held liable thereon, no matter how the bank may have dealt with the notes, so long as it retained ownership and control thereof; and even though you find that the bank, after the notes were delivered to it, gave S the benefit of the whole or a part of the benefit thereof, this fact would not render B, the defendant, liable on the notes. And in this connection you are instructed that the possession of the receiver is the possession of the bank. 27 (9) As between the maker and the payee of a promissory note, oral evidence touching the consideration thereof may be con- sidered by you, and if you find from the evidence that the defendant, B, received no consideration for the signing of the notes sued on, and that the same were made for the accom- modation of the G S bank, then your verdict should be for the defendant. 28 (10) The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show that the note was given upon a valuable consideration, and, if that is doubtful upon the whole evidence, he could not recover; that proof of the execution of the note and its production in evidence made a prima facie case for the plaintiff, upon which 20 Zook v. Simonson, 72 Ind. 88. 28 Chicago T. & T. Co. v. Brady, 27 Chicago T. & T. Co. v. Brady, 165 Mo. 202, 65 S. W. 303. 165 Mo. 203, 65 S. W. 303. 433 TRANSFERRING NOTE BY ENDORSEMENT. 417 they might find a verdict for him, unless the defendant intro- duced evidence which shows either that it was not given for a valuable consideration, or that the consideration had failed, or evidence to render it doubtful in their minds whether it was given on a valuable consideration; and, that if not so given. or if it is doubtful whether it was given for a valuable con- sideration, either for want of consideration or for failure of consideration, the plaintiff could not recover. 29 (11) If you are satisfied from the evidence that the note in ques- tion was given for seed wheat, at fifteen dollars per bushel, and that such seed wheat proved worthless as such, then your verdict would be in favor of the defendant, provided you further find that the plaintiff had notice of the worthless character of the wheat and of such consideration, or had such notice as to put him on inquiry, and he failed to inquire solely for the reason that he did not want to know the consideration. 30 (12) If the defendant intended the note to be a gift to the plaintiff, it was given without any legal consideration therefor, although the plaintiff may have supposed the note to be in pay- ment for a prior indebtedness, unless the defendant by his words or conduct gave the plaintiff reasonable cause to believe, and the plaintiff was thereby led to believe, that the note was given in settlement of her claim against the estate of the wife for services, or of some claim in controversy between the plaintiff and the de- fendant. 31 417. Transferring note by endorsement. (1) Where one party, for a full and valuable consideration, agrees to give or transfer or let another have a promissory note, the law implies that the transfer is to be made by endorsement, unless a different agreement is made by the parties. 32 (2) And, where the agreement for the transfer is shown, and a valuable consideration therefor, the party claiming that the trans- fer was to be by delivery or by endorsement, without recourse or otherwise than by simple endorsement, has on him the burden of so proving. 33 29 Burnham v. Allen, 1 Gray 32 Wade v. Guppinger, 60 Ind. (Mass.) 497. 378. so Kitchen v. Loudenbeck, 48 33 Wade v. Guppinger, 60 Ind Ohio St. 177. 378. 31 Nye v. Chace, 139 Mass. 380. 418 CONTRACTS PROMISSORY NOTES. 434 (3) Where a note has been endorsed in blank, the holder of the same may fill the blank with the name of the endorsee ; that the endorsement of the note is said to be in blank when the name of the endorser is simply written on the back of the note, leaving a blank over it for the insertion of the name of the endorsee, or of any subsequent holder; and that in such case, while the -endorsement continues blank, the note may be passed by mere delivery, and the endorsee or other holder is understood to have full authority personally to demand payment of it, or make it payable at his pleasure to himself or to another person. 34 418. Interest on note Usury. (1) If the jury believe from the evidence that more than ten percent interest per annum has been paid by the defendants to the plaintiff, the law presumes that such amount, exceeding ten percent per annum, if proven, is a payment on the principal of the note, unless explained by the evidence. 35 (2) That under the issues in this case, if the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant, Crabtree, borrowed of the plain- tiff the sum of four hundred and fifty dollars, on or about Jan- uary first, 1858, for which said Crabtree gave the note sued on, with the defendant, Woods, the said Woods being, in fact, only security on said note, and that, at the time the said money was borrowed, the plaintiff and defendant, Crabtree, agreed that Crabtree should pay, besides the interest mentioned in the note, interest at the rate of six percent per annum in addition, the said additional interest was and is usury, and against the statute of the state. And if, from the evidence in the ease, the jury believe that said Crabtree has paid interest on said note at the rate of sixteen percent per annum, then under the law of this state, the plaintiff cannot recover any interest whatever on the principal of the said note, and whatever payments the evidence in the case may show the defendant has paid on said note as interest, must be allowed on the principal of the said note, and, if the sum actually paid, according to the evidence, amounts to more than the sum of four hundred and s* Palmer v. Marshall, 60 111. 292. ss Reinback v. Crabtree, 77 111. 182, 187. 435 SUIT ON LOST NOTE. 419 fifty dollars, then the defendants are entitled to a verdict in this case. 30 419. Suit to recover value of lost note. If the jury believe from the evidence that the plaintiff gave to the defendants, and the defendants received from the plaintiff, the promissory note in question for collection, for a compensation or reward therefor to be paid by the plaintiff to the defendants, and that the defend- ants or other persons to whom they intrusted it for collection lost it by carelessness, then the plaintiff is entitled to recover the value of the note; and that the value, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, is the amount of the note; and that, if the plaintiff is entitled to recover the value of the note, she is also entitled to interest on that value from the time the note became due to the date of the verdict; and that, if the jury believe from the evidence that the defendants, or those to whom they intrusted it lost it, and it is not shown under what circum- stances it was lost, it is presumed that it was lo^t by careless- ness. 37 36 Reinback v. Crabtree, 77 111. 44 111. 314, (held not erroneous as 182, 185. suggesting a legal conclusion of 37 American Ex. Co. v. Parsons, carelessness.) CHAPTER XXXV. CONTRACTS RELATING TO INSURANCE. Sec. Sec. LIFE INSUKANCE. FIBE INSURANCE. 420. False statements in applica- 425. Property not destroyed by fire tion avoids policy. No recovery. 421. The right to avoid policy may 426. Holder of policy not responsi- be waived. ble for agent's acts. 422. Manner or mode of giving 427. Fraud in proof of loss defeats notice of death. recovery. 423. Formal proof of death unnec- 428. Abandonment of insured boat, essary, when. . when justifiable. 424. Assignment of policy without 429. Boat not in safe and sea- authority of beneficiary. worthy condition defeats re- covery. Life Insurance. 420. False statements in application avoids policy. (1) A misrepresentation or false statement made in his application for insurance by the person whose life is insured, respecting a ma- terial fact, avoids the policy issued upon such application, and this, whether the misrepresentation was made innocently or designedly. If, therefore, the jury believe from the evidence that S, the insured, in his application for the policy or certificate here sued on, stated that he had no serious illness, or stated that he had not had during the last seven years any disease or severe sickness, and that either of those statements was false in any respect, and are deemed by the jury to be material, then, whether S, the insured, intended to deceive or not, the said policy or certificate is void, and the jury should find for the 436 437 AVOIDING INSURANCE POLICY. 421 defendant, unless they further believe that the avoidance of the policy or certificate has been waived by the defendant. 1 (2) If you shall find from the evidence that on the thirtieth day of November, M, the insured, had consumption, you must find a verdict for the defendant, and it makes no difference whether he knew he was thus afflicted or not. He may have been entirely ignorant of the fact, or may have believed that the symptoms he had did not indicate consumption. Yet if, in fact, he had consumption at that time, you must find for the defendant. 2 (3) The contract between the insurance company and the in- sured is like a contract between two individuals. If one makes a false statement as to facts, material to the settlement of the terms upon which the contract shall be made, which are exclusively within his knowledge, and thereby induces the other to agree to terms which he might not otherwise have assented to, the party deceived cannot be held liable upon the contract. 3 (4) If you find that on the thirtieth day of November, 1894, the date of the policy, or when it was delivered to the plaintiff, Mrs. H was not in a state of sound health, you must find for the defend- ant.* (5) Sound health, as used with reference to life insurance, means that state of health free from any disease or ailment that affects the general soundness and healthfulness of the system se- riously and not a mere indisposition which does not tend to weak- en or undermine the constitution of the assured. The word serious is not generally used to signify a dangerous condition, but rather a grave or weighty trouble. 5 421. The right to avoid policy may be waived. There can be no waiver of the avoidance of a policy by reason of material false statements or misrepresentations in the application, unless the acts relied upon as showing the waiver were done with full knowledge of the facts. While, therefore, the receipt of pre- miums or assessments with full knowledge on the part of the 1 Schwarzbach v. Ohio &c. Union Howie, 62 Ohio St. 206 (held error 26 W. Va. 640. to refuse this instruction under the 2 Mutual B. L. Ins. Co. v. Miller, wording of the policy), 56 N. E. 39 Ind. 483. 908. s Mutual B. L. Ins. Co. v. Miller, s Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. v. 39 Ind. 483. Howie, 62 Ohio St. 207, 56 N. E. * Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. v. 908. CONTRACTS RELATING TO INSURANCE. 438 J defendant of facts working a forfeiture of the policy, might constitute a waiver of such forfeiture, yet the receipt of such premiums or assessments in ignorance of such facts would not constitute a waiver. 6 422. Manner or mode of giving notice of death. (1) A sub- stantial compliance with the conditions of the policy of insurance, as to the manner and mode of giving notice of the death of the insured to the defendant, is all that can be required on the part of the plaintiff in giving such notice. No particular form of notice is required. 7 (2) Under the policy of insurance in this case no particular form of notice was required ; and that if the jury believe from the evidence that the letter written on August 24, 1884, was intended by the plaintiff to give the required notice to the company, and that upon receipt of said letter the company sent its agent to the city of R, the place of the death of the insured, for the purpose of investigating the facts and circumstances connected with the said death, and that such investigation was made imme- diately thereafter, then no further proof could be required in this case before the suit was brought. 8 (3) One of the conditions of the policy is that "immediate no- tice of any accidental injury or accidental death for which claim is to be made under this contract shall be given in writing to the secretary of the company at P, with full particulars of the acci- dent and injury, and unless affirmative and positive proof of death or injury, and that the same resulted from bodily injuries cov- ered by this contract, shall be furnished to the company within six months of the happening of such accident, in case of such injuries resulting fatally, then all claims based thereon shall be forfeited to the company." 9 (4) If the jury believe from the evidence that was a general agent of the defendant for the purpose of effecting policies of insurance and adjusting losses, and if they further believe from the evidence that the said agent declined to pay the policy upon the sole ground that the insured was intoxicated at the time of o Schwarzbach v. Ohio V. P. 8 Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Harvey, Union, 25 W. Va. 640. 82 Va. 951, 5 S. E. 553. 7 Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Harvey, Braymer v. Commercial M. A. 82 Va. 951, 5 S. E. 553. Co. 199 Pa. St. 259. 48 Atl. 972. 439 PROOF OF DFATH ASSIGNING POLICY. 425 the accident, or that he so acted as to warrant the plaintiff in believing that the payment by the company would be resisted upon that ground, then the plaintiff had the right to institute this suit, although ninety days had not expired from the death of the insured. 10 423. Formal proof of death unnecessary, when. The court/ instructs the jury .that if they believe from the evidence that the plaintiff wrote to the insurance company the letter dated August 21, 1884, giving notice of the death of B, the insured, and, that after receipt of said letter, and in consequence thereof, the company sent its agent, C, to inquire and ascertain all the facts in reference to said death, and that the said agent came to R,' the place of said death, and investigated the facts as to the death and the cause thereof, and that after making such investigation, the said agent, upon the sole ground of intoxication at the time of the accident, told the plaintiff "that he had no case, and that in his opinion the company ought not to pay and would not pay the policy," and that such denial of liability was not because the formal proofs of the death had not been given, then it was not incumbent on the plaintiff to furnish any further proof of said death, and the plaintiff had the right at any time thereafter to institute this suit. 11 424. Assignment of policy without authority of beneficiary. The policy of insurance being payable to M vested in her alone the absolute ownership of it, and it could not be assigned or transferred to C or any other person by her husband or any other person without her authority ; and an assignment or deliv- ery of the policy to C by the husband of the defendant without her authority would not bind her in any respect. 12 Fire Insurance. 425. Property not destroyed by fire No recovery. (1) The court instructs the jury that the plaintiffs under the pleadings 10 Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Harvey, 12 Pence v. Makepeace, 66 Ind. 82 Va. 952, 5 S. E. 553. 357, (held proper under the plead- n Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Harvey, ings.) 82 Va. 950, 5 S. E. 553. 426 CONTRACTS RELATING TO INSURANCE. 440 in this case cannot recover if the jury shall find from the testi- mony that the goods shipped by the plaintiffs to their con- signees in L. were damaged or destroyed from spontaneous com- bustion caused by their inherent infirmity. 13 (2) If you believe from the evidence before you that the build- ing described in the policy sued on was not destroyed by fire you will find for defendant. In this connection you are instructed that before the plaintiff can recover, it must appear from the evidence to your satisfaction that the fire caused the destruction of this building. If the building fell down before it was burned, and the fire occurred after the building fell down, and if you so believe from the evidence before you, you will find for the defendant. If the evidence satisfies you that the building was on fire before it fell, and that such fire caused the fall of the building, then you. should find for the plaintiff. 14 426. Holder of policy not responsible for acts of agent. If you find that the plaintiff was asked to and did sign the appli- cation in blank, and the agent of the defendant filled it up on his own motion without knowledge of the plaintiff as to what the answers were, or if you should find that the plaintiff made true and correct answers, but the agent, in writing the answers, for any reason, wrote incorrect answers, the plaintiff will not be responsible for the acts, mistakes or wrongs of such agent. 15 427. Fraud in proof of loss defeats a recovery. If you believe from the evidence that the policy in question contained a provision that all fraud or attempt at fraud, by false swearing or otherwise, shall cause a forfeiture of all claims under the policy, and that if you further believe from the evidence that the plaintiffs have fraudulently offered to the defendant proofs of loss under the policy containing material statements in regard to the loss under said policy, which the plaintiff knew to be false at the time the same were offered, you will find for the defend- ant. 16 13 Providence and Washington is Kingston v. Aetna Ins. Co. 42 Ins. Co. of Providence, R. I. v. Ad- Iowa, 47. ler, 65 Md. 163, 4 Atl. 121. ie Shulter v. Ins. Co. 62 Mo. 237. i* Liverpool & L. & G. Ins. Co. v. Ende, 65 Tex. 124. 441 ABANDONMENT OF INSURED PEOPEETY. 428 428. Abandonment of insured boat, justifiable when. (1) Although it was the duty of the master and crew to labor for the recovery of the vessel, they were not bound to do impossi- bilities; and that if it appeared to practical men that the vessel could not be saved, they would be justified in abandoning her, and were not bound to wait for the decision of the underwriters on the offer to abandon. 17 (2) If the condition of the boat was such that in the opinon of practical men the great probability appeared to be that she could not be raised and repaired, it was sufficient to justify an abandonment as for a total loss, though she was afterwards raised and repaired at a cost of less than half her value. 18 (3) If the injury to the boat was such that her repairs would cost more than half her value when repaired at the port of repair, then the assured had the right to abandon; and in estimating the expense of repairs the jury should take into consideration the amount paid by the insurance companies for raising the boat and bringing her to M, if fairly expended; that it was not necessary that the expense of repairs should amount to half the sum named in the policy as the agreed value of the boat, but it was sufficient if equal to half of her value in fact when repaired. 19 (4) An abandonment not accepted might be waived by the party making it; that the fact that the mortgagee, G, had taken possession of the boat and sold her because of his interest, would not have the effect of waiving abandonment, if he took possession on notice by the insurers that they would no longer be respon- sible for her, and after her abandonment by G, and did so to protect the interests of all concerned ; and that this was a ques- tion of intention to be judged by the acts and declarations of sajd G, done and made at the time. 20 (5) If the mortgagor was in possession and command of the boat as captain, and the mortgages were forfeited, perhaps neither he nor the mortgagee alone could make an abandonment; but if there was a right to abandon, and the mortgagor, having the i? Fulton Ins. Co. v. Goodman, 32 19 Fulton Ins. Co. v. Goodman, 32 Ala. 113. Ala. 113. is Fulton Ins. Co. v. Goodman, 20 Fulton Ins. Co. v. Goodman, 32 32 Ala. 113. Ala. 113, 114. 429 CONTRACTS RELATING TO INSURANCE. 442 command and control of the boat as master, did abandon or offer to abandon to the defendants, and they knew of the existence of the mortgages and did not reject the abandonment on account of the mortgages, and if the mortgagee shortly afterwards, when the offer of abandonment by the mortgagor was still unrevoked, and the boat was still at the disposal of the defendants so far as the mortgagor was concerned, assented to and approved of the aban- donment by the mortgagor and made known to the defendants his assent and approval, an abandonment so made, if in other respects good, would be valid. 21 (6) A parol abandonment was sufficient, and when once right- fully made it fixed the rights of the assured, and could not be forfeited by any subsequent event without the consent of the assured. 22 429. Boat not in safe and seaworthy condition defeats recovery. (1) The boat must have been kept in such condition as to be reasonably sufficient to withstand the ordinary perils attend- ing a boat so laid up at that time and place. If she was not so kept the plaintiff cannot recover, no matter what peril she may have encountered. If she was, and encountered wind or waves by which she broke her spars, was driven against the bank and careened so as to be thrown on her side in such a way as to take in water at her seams which were far enough above the water- line so as not to endanger her safety while lying up under or- dinary circumstances, and sunk in consequence thereof, then the plaintiff can recover if he had provided and kept at the boat a force of men sufficient to take care of the boat under ordi- nary perils, whether all such men were directly in his employ and pay or not. 22 (2) If the boat was seaworthy when laid up, but thereafter her seams were suffered to become open by exposure, which .the plaintiff failed to have properly caulked, and she was not in a safe and seaworthy condition requisite for her safety when tied up, then plaintiff cannot recover. 24 (3) The boat need not have been sufficiently seaworthy to per- 21 Fulton Ins. Co. v. Goodman, 32 23 Enterprise Ins. Co. v. Parisat, Ala. 113. 35 Ohio St. 35. 22 Fulton Ins. Co. v. Goodman, 32 24 Enterprise Ins. Co. v. Parisat, Ala. 113. 35 Ohio St. 35. 443 BOAT UNSEA WORTHY. 429 form a voyage, but it must hav.e been for her preservation under all ordinary circumstances while tied up during such period of non-user, and if she encountered a peril insured against which she would have safely resisted if seaworthy, but in con- sequence of being unseaworthy was sunk by encountering a peril insured against, then the plaintiff cannot recover. 25 25 Enterprise Ins. Co. v. Parisat, 35 Ohio St 35. CHAPTER XXXYI. CONTRACTS ON DIFFERENT MATTERS. Sec. ATTORNEY AND CLIENT. 430. Value of services of an at- torney. 431.' Party not liable for services of attorney Wh en . ARBITRATION. 432. Submitting disputes to arbi- tration. BAILMENTS. 433. Party hiring horse liable for injury. 434. Party liable for money in- trusted to him. 433. Hotel losing property of guest entrusted to it. BANKING TRANSACTIONS. 436. Company holding one out as agent. 437. Attempt to defraud company. BROKERS. 438. Brokers entitled to commis- sions When. 439. What is essential to entitle one to commissions. 440. Failure to comply with con- tract prevents recovery. 441. Notice to be given under the contract. 442. Burden of proof on plaintiff When. Sec. 443. 444. 445. 446. 447. 448. 449. 450. 451. 452. 453. 454. 455. Payment of interest on month- ly balances. BUILDING CONTRACTS. Contractor complying with contract can recover. Parties abandoning original contract. DOMESTIC RELATIONS. Husband entitled to income of wife's estate. Liability of wife for hus- band's debts. Duty of both parents to sup- port their children. Father entitled to minor child's services and earnings. Minor remaining with family after full age. Minor liable on his contracts When. Head of family or house- holder. LANDLORD AND TENANT. Liability of tenant for dam- ages to premises. New leasing of premises dis- charges guaranty. MARRIAGE CONTRACTS. What essential to entitle plaintiff to recover for breach. 444 445 CONTRACTS BETWEEN ATTORNEY AND CLIENT. 430 Sec. 456. Unchastity of woman not breach of contract. 457. Assessing damages for breach of contract. PARTNERSHIP CONTRACTS. 458. What constitutes a partner- ship. 459. Each partner has power to bind all others. 460. Partners Not general part- ners. CHATTEL MORTGAGES. 461. Mortgagee may take posses- sion of the property. SUBSCRIPTION CONTRACT. 462. Alteration of subscription contract. 463. Stock illegally issued, invalid. Sec. SERVICES RENDERED TO PUBLIC. 464. Liability of county for physi- cian's services. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 465. Reviving a claim barred by statute of limitations. 466. The promise reviving dis- charged claim must be clear. 467. Payment o>n running account How applied. 468. Deeds executed and placed in escrow. OTHER MATTERS. 469. Rights in contract may be waived. 470. Correspondence constituting contract. 471. Written contract cannot be varied by parol proof. 472. Unsigned contract binding. 473. Execution and delivery of deed. Attorney and Client. 430. Value of services of an attorney. (1) If the jury find from the evidence that the plaintiff has performed services for the defendant, with her consent, since September, 1873, and has advanced and paid moneys for her while acting as her solicitor, in matters connected with her employment, they will find for the plaintiff a reasonable value for such services, as shown by the evidence, and also the amount of moneys which the evi- dence shows he has advanced for her. 1 (2) In ascertaining the reasonable value of the services of plaintiff you will consider the nature of the litigation, the amount involved and the interests at stake, the capacity and fitness of the plaintiff for the required work, the services and labor rendered by plaintiff, the length of time occupied by him and the benefit, if any, derived by defendants from the litigation. You are further instructed to look at all the evidence in the case, and to exercise your sound discretion and judgment thereon, and allow the plain- Bennett v. Connelly, 103 111. 50, 55. 431 CONTRACTS ON DIFFERENT MATTERS. 446 tiff such reasonable amount as you may believe he is justly entitled to, not to exceed the amount claimed in his petition. 2 (3) If you find from the evidence before you that the plaintiff has performed any services for the defendant, with his con- sent, since the month of September, 1873, and has advanced and paid moneys for him while acting as his solicitor in matters connected with his employment, then you will find for the plain- tiff a reasonable value for such services, as shown by the evi- dence, and also the amount of moneys which the evidence shows he has advanced for him; and in ascertaining the reasonable value of the services of the plaintiff you will consider the na- ture of the litigation, the amount involved, the interests at stake, the capacity and fitness of the plaintiff to perform the work required, the services and labor rendered by the plain- tiff, the length of time occupied by him and the benefit, if any, derived by the defendant from such litigation. 3 431. Party not liable for services of attorney When. (1) Notwithstanding the land company may have been benefitted by the services rendered by the plaintiff in the case of G against B if you believe such to be a fact, yet the jury are not authorized to go beyond the parties making the contract by which such services in such cause were procured in search of an implied promise to pay for such incidental benefit. 4 (2) So far as the liability of this defendant land company is concerned, it makes no difference what plaintiffs understood as to the defendant being liable to them for their fee in said case of G against B. If you believe from the evidence that plaintiffs' services in said cause were not procured by the defendant, then this defendant is not liable to plaintiffs for their services in said case, and your verdict should be for the defendant. 5 (3) The law is that when plaintiffs were employed, and entered upon their employment in the case of G against B, their duty was a vigilant prosecution of the rights of I in that litiga- tion. If you believe from the evidence they were employed 2 International & G. N. R. Co. v. * Humes v. Decatur Land Im. Clark, 81 Tex. 48, 16 S. W. 631. & F. Co. 98 Ala. 465, 13 So. 368. 3 Bennett v. Connelly, 103 111. * Humes v. Decatur Land Im. & 55; International & G. N. R. Co. F. Co. 98 Ala. 461, 13 So. 368. v. Clark, 81 Tex. 48, 16 S. W. 631. 447 ARBITRATION BAILMENT. 433 by the defendant, it is immaterial what benefit the land company derived from the services rendered by them in this cause in the prosecution of the rights of said G. If said services were not procured by said land company, it is not liable to plain tiffs in this case. (4) The parties making the contract by which plaintiffs' serv- ices in the case of G against B were procured, if you find such contract was made, are alone liable to plaintiffs for their fee in said cause. 7 Arbitration. 432. Submitting disputes to arbitration. (1) If you find from the evidence that the plaintiff and the defendant agreed to submit their differences to arbitration, and if you find such award was made as agreed, you should find for the plaintiff for the amount found by the arbitrators in such matter, unless you further find (1), that said award does not include all the dif- ferences in dispute between the plaintiff and defendant at the time of the alleged award; or (2) that the defendant was not accorded a reasonable notice of the time of the hearing. 8 (2) If you believe from the evidence that one of the arbitrators, G, was induced to resign or withdraw from the arbitration by reason of the agreement of the other two arbitrators to with- draw and resign their authority as such arbitrators, and thereby the said arbitrator, G, so resigning was prevented from meet- ing with the arbitrators at the time of the making of the award, in such case the award is void, and you should find for the de- fendant. 9 Bailments. 433. Party hiring horse liable for injury. (1) If you believe from the evidence that the defendant hired the horse from the plaintiff to go to one or more particular places specified in the con- tract, and that he went to another and a different place in a s Humes v. Decatur Land Im. & 8 Amos v. Buck, 75 Iowa, 654, 37 F. Co. 98 Ala. 461, 13 So. 368. N. W. 118. T Humes v. Decatur Land Im. & McCord v. McSpaden, 34 Wis. F. Co. 98 Ala. 465, 13 So. 368. 549. 433 CONTRACTS ON DIFFERENT MATTERS. 448 different direction and over a different route from what was specified in the contract, that would amount to a conversion of the horse ; and if the horse died while in his possession and after he had thus converted it to his own use, he would be liable for the value of the horse at the time of the conversion. 10 (2) If the plaintiffs and defendant made a contract, by which the defendant hired the plaintiffs' horse and carriage for use in driving to and from Lynnfield only, and in violation of that contract the defendant drove the plaintiffs' horse and carriage to Lynnfield and from thence several miles to Peabody, he be- came thereby responsible to the plaintiff for any injury to such horse and buggy in Peabody, or while driving from Lynnfield to Peabody. Whether or not such injury was caused by any want of ordinary care or skill of the defendant in driving the horse and carriage from Lynnfield to Peabody, or in tying or managing the horse and carriage in Peabody, or by any insuffi- ciency of the harness of said horse, or any physical infirmity or want of docility of the horse, would be immaterial, as the defendant's use of the horse and carriage, in driving beyond Lynnfield in violation of his contract, was a conversion of such horse and carriage, in the nature of an original unlawful tak- ing of such horse and carriage, at the time of the defendant's leaving Lynnfield, and such conversion caused the defendant to be liable in damages to the plaintiff therefor, equal to the difference between the value of such horse and carriage at the time it was taken by the defendant from Lynnfield, and the value of the same when restored by the defendant to the plain- tiff. Accepting pay for the use of the horse under such a contract was a waiver of the conversion. 11 (3) If the plaintiffs and defendant made a contract by which the defendant hired the plaintiff's horse and carriage for use in driving for pleasure for a time and distance not fixed or agreed upon by them, the defendant rightfully drove the horse to Lynnfield and thence to Peabody, and was responsible for an injury to such horse or carriage, which was caused by the de- fendant's want of ordinary care and skill in driving or manag- ing such horse and carriage in Peabody, to be determined in * Malone v. Robinson, 77 Ga. n Perham v. Coney, 117 Mass. 719. 103. 449 BAILMENT CONTRACTS. 433 view of the fact known by the plaintiffs, and presumed to have been considered by them in letting the horse, that the defend- ant was a one-armed man, but was not responsible for any in- jury to such horse and carriage caused by the insufficiency of the plaintiffs' harness for driving or tying the horse, or by rea- son of any disease or physical infirmity, or want of docility of the horse, or by any peculiar habits or dispositions of the horse when tied, unless the defendant was notified of such pe- culiar habits and dispositions. 12 (4) If the jury find from the evidence that the defendant un- dertook for a reward to deliver the team of horses and vehicle attached, and described in the evidence, to a person designated by the plaintiff, and in the course of this undertaking intrusted the driving of the team to one who, by his negligence, per- mitted the horses to run away, whereby the plaintiff suffered damage, then the plaintiff is entitled to recover, and the jury will allow such damages as they may find from the evidence the plaintiff suffered by reason of the defendant's fault in the premises. 13 (5) Although it is true that, by hiring his mare to the defend- ants for use on the street cars, the plaintiff impliedly engaged that she was reasonably fit for that purpose, this gave the 'de- fendants no right to use her after it became manifest to them that by reason of her nervousness, or fretfulness, or diseased condition, she was not fit for such work. They had no right to use her. If her board devolved upon them, it was their duty to supply her with plentiful food and water at the proper time. It was their duty, also, not to require her to do more work than it was manifest she could perform without injury, and if, during such use, it was plainly evident to the defend- ant's employes that she was exhausted, overheated, or suffer- ing by reason of disease, and her continued use was dangerous to her health and life, it was their duty then to abstain from further use of her without obtaining the plaintiff's consent to the same; and if, without so doing they negligently persisted 12 Perham v. Coney, 117 Mass. is American D. T. C. Co. v. Walk- 404. er, 72 Md. 457, 20 Atl. 1. 434 CONTRACTS ON DIFFERENT MATTERS. 450 in such use, and by reason of the same she was so injured that she died, the defendants are liable. 14 (6) If you find from the evidence that the plaintiff hired his mare to the defendants for the purpose of being used by them in pulling street cars, the plaintiff thereby engaged and bound himself that the mare so hired was reasonably fit and suitable for such purposes and such uses. If, therefore, you find that the mare so hired was injured while in the use of the defend- ants in pulling their street cars, without their fault, and through the nervousness and fretfulness of said mare, or because of her diseased condition at the time the plaintiff hired her to the defendants, or because of her unfitness to pull said street cars, then you should find for the defendants. 15 434. Party liable for money intrusted to him. If the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant was intrusted with the safe-keeping of money belonging to the plaintiff, and that part of said money was delivered to him on Sunday, and the defendant thereafter on a week day admitted the sum of one hundred and sixty-seven dollars and forty-four cents to be iti his hands belonging to the plaintiff, and promised to apply the same in payment of the rent for the premises mentioned in and under the contract offered in evidence, but neglected and failed to apply said money in payment of said rent, then the jury must find for the plaintiff for said amount of money in the hands of the defendant, and in their discretion may allow interest thereon from the time the defendant failed to pay the same as promised by him 16 435. Hotel losing property of guest entrusted to it. If the jury find from the evidence in the cause that the plaintiff was a guest of the defendant, as alleged in the declaration in this cause, that the trunk of the plaintiff was brought by him into the hotel of the defendant, while the plaintiff was a guest in said hotel, that the said trunk contained the bank notes tes- tified to by the plaintiff, and that said trunk and its contents 14 Bass v. Cantor, 123 Ind. 446, 24 Haacke v. Knights, &c. 76 Md. N. E. 147. 431, 25 Atl. 422. i* Bass v. Cantor, 123 Ind. 446, 24 N. E. 147. 451 BANKING TRANSACTIONS. 436 were lost while so in said hotel, the plaintiff cannot recover for said bank notes in this action, unless they shall also find that the said bank notes were designed by the plaintiff for his use while on his journey, or while a guest in said hotel, or unless they shall find that they were lost by the fraud or negligence of the defendant. 17 Banking Transactions. 436. Company holding one out as agent. (1) The indorse- ment on the face of the check sued on is in proper form to consti- tute a certification thereof; and if you find from the evidence that defendant's paying teller at the time of making said in- dorsement had authority or apparent authority, as defined in these instructions, to make the indorsement of certification upon said check, and if you find further from the evidence that the plaintiff acted in good faith and without fraud, as de- fined in another instruction herewith given, then your verdict must be for the plaintiff. 18 (2) The plaintiff is not required to prove that the defendant's paying teller had actual authority conferred upon him by de- fendant to certify checks, but that plaintiff had the right in good faith to rely upon the apparent authority of said paying teller to certify checks. And the court further instructs you that whenever a person has held out another as his agent au- thorized to act for him in a given capacity, or has knowingly and without dissent permitted such other to act as his agent in such capacity, or where his habits and course of dealing have been such as to reasonably warrant the presumption that such other was his agent, authorized to act in that capacity, whether it be in a single transaction or in a series of trans- actions, his authority to such other to act for him in that ca- pacity will be conclusively presumed, so far as may be neces- sary to protect the rights of third persons who have relied thereon in good faith, and in the exercise of reasonable prudence, and the principal will not be permitted to deny that such other was not 17 Treiber v. Burrows, 27 Md. 132. is Muth v. St. Louis T. Co. 94 Mo. App. 94, 67 S. W. 978. 437 CONTRACTS ON DIFFERENT MATTERS. 452 his agent authorized to do the act that he assumed to do, pro- vided that act was within the real or apparent scope of the presumed authority. 10 (3) If you find from the evidence that the check sued on was certified by the authority of the defendant company, and that at the time of said certification there was sufficient funds of the maker of said check on deposit with defendant to pay said check, then defendant had the right to retain out of the funds of said maker a sufficient amount to pay said check whenever the same might be presented. 20 437. Attempt to defraud company. (1) If the jury find from the evidence that the writing or paper sued upon by the plain- tiff was marked or certified ''good" in the name of the defend- ant by an employe, and that the plaintiff obtained such mark- ing or certification in pursuance of a design or plan to defraud the defendant by keeping or secreting said paper for such time as might be necessary to permit the money represented by such paper to be drawn out upon other orders, writings or checks, with the intention of then presenting the said writing, and demanding payment of the amount ordered therein to be paid, the jury will find for the defendant. 21 (2) If the jury find from the evidence that the plaintiff and one M, his brother, confederated or conspired together to de- fraud the defendant by placing it in such a position that it might be called upon to pay the amount of the writing or cheek sued upon by plaintiff, after having already paid out upon other orders or checks the money to the credit of the drawer or drawers of such order or check, and that the plaintiff is in possession of the instrument sued on, as a party to such con- federacy or conspiracy, the jury will find for the defendant. 22 Muth v. St. Louis T. Co. 94 21 Muth v. St. Louis T. Co. 94 Mo. App. 94, 67 S. W. 978. Mo. App. 94, 67 S. W. 973. 20 Muth v. St. Louis T. Co. 94 22 Muth v. St. Louis T. Co. 94 Mo. App. 94, 67 S. W. 978. Mo. App. 94, 67 S. W. 978. 453 COMMISSION OF BROKERS. 438 Brokers. 438. Broker entitled to commissions When. (1) In ordi- nary cases, the law is well settled where a broker is employed in reference to a sale of real estate, that when he brings a buyer to the seller who is willing and ready to enter into an agree- ment with the seller for the purchase of his property on the terms that the seller has fixed, and the seller is satisfied to accept him as a purchaser, then the broker has earned his com- mission. The earning of it is not dependent, in such cases, on the question as to whether the buyer carries out the contract, or as to whether the seller is able to complete his contract. Therefore, in the absence of any express agreement to the con- trary, the law is that the broker is entitled to his commissions when the vendor accepts, when he (the broker) brings to the vendor a party ready and willing to accept the terms fixed by the vendor, and the party is satisfactory to the vendor, and he enters into a contract with him. The contention is that there was a different agreement here. That question is for you to determine. If you find that this was an ordinary contract, made without any conditions, the broker employed in the usual way, and that there was no bargain entered into between the plaintiff and the defendant, Mr. B, that he was only to be paid his commission in case this sale went through, then plain- tiff is entitled to recover. If, however, the bargain agreed upon between plaintiff and defendant was that commission was only to be paid in case this whole transaction went through, as provided by the terms of the contract of sale, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover, unless you are satisfied from the evi- dence here that the defendant capriciously refused to carry out the contract. 23 (2) If the jury find from the evidence that plaintiff was en- gaged in the business of a property broker in the city of B, and that the defendant offered certain property for sale to the park commissioners of said city, and that he employed the plaintiff to aid and assist him in effecting said sale, either by previous authority or the acceptance of the plaintiff's agency as Kalley v. Baker, 132 N. Y. 5, 29 N. E. 1091. 438 CONTRACTS ON DIFFERENT , MATTERS. 454 and the adoption of his acts, and that the plaintiff did diligently and faithfully occupy his time and render services in so aiding him to effect said sale, and a sale of said property to said com- missioners was in a short time made and effected, and that said services were of advantage and value to the defendant in effecting the said sale, then the plaintiff is entitled to re- cover such sum as the jury may find from the evidence to be a reasonable remuneration to the plaintiff for said services; and in ascertaining what is a reasonable remuneration, the jury may consider the rate of compensation, which they may find from the evidence was usual and customary in the said city for ser- vices of a like kind. 24 (3) If the jury find from the evidence that the defendant em- ployed the plaintiff to procure a purchaser for the property spoken of by the witnesses, and the plaintiff did procure a purchaser for said property, and the said property was sold by the defendant to the purchaser procured by the plaintiff, then the plaintiff is entitled to recover such compensation as they may find usual and customary. 25 (4) If you believe from the evidence in this case that the de- fendant employed the plaintiff, Stewart, as his agent to negotiate the sale of his, the defendant's, street railway property, and that the plaintiff undertook said employment and was instru- mental in bringing together the buyer and the defendant, then and in that case the plaintiff is entitled, as a matter of law, to recover from the defendant compensation for his services, regardless of the fact that the defendant himself concluded the sale, and upon a price less and upon terms different from those at which the plaintiff was authorized to sell. 26 (5) If the jury find that the defendant employed the plaintiffs as his brokers to buy 'and sell on commission stocks, bonds and grain for him in the markets of New York, Baltimore and Chicago, under an agreement that the defendant should secure to the plaintiffs by depositing with them a margin as testified to by the defendant, and if they find that the plaintiffs, through their agents, executed said orders of the defendant in said 24 Walker v. Rogers, 24 Md. 237. 57 N. E. 195. See, Fessenden v. 25 Jones v. Adler, 34 Md. 440. Doane, 188 111. 228; Swigart v. 20 Henry v. Stewart, 185 111. 452, Hawley, 140 111. 186, 190. 455 COMMISSIONS OF BROKERS. 438 markets as required to be found in the plaintiffs third and fourth prayers, according to the custom and usage of said mar- kets, and that plaintiffs paid all money necessary and required to be paid in the execution of such orders, and received all moneys that became receivable in the execution of such orders, and that they reported all such transactions to the defendant and charged him with the money so paid for him and credited him with the money so received by them for him; and if they find that the defendant failed to secure the plaintiffs by keep- ing up said margin when required, and that the plaintiffs there- upon sold such securities of the defendant as they had in hand after notice to him in the manner shown in evidence and re- ported such sales to defendant, then the plaintiffs are entitled to recover the loss sustained by them in the execution of the defendant's orders, as above set forth, and their commissions for executing the same. 27 (6) If the jury shall find from the evidence that the plaintiff was a stock broker in B. and that the defendant on March 9, 1868, authorized him to purchase on his account two hundred shares of the C stock, and shall find that the place where said stock was ordinarily bought and sold was at the Stock Exchange, in New York, and shall further find that the plaintiff there- for actually purchased two hundred shares of said stock through his sub-agents, P & Co., stock brokers in New York, and at a price not exceeding the price limited by the defend- ant, and that the defendant did not supply the plaintiff with funds to make said purchase, and that the plaintiff had funds and credit with his sub-agents, which were applied by them in making said purchase; and if they shall further find that the defendant, on the next day after the purchase, was informed of said purchase, and that the plaintiff notified the defendant on March 17, 1868, by letter addressed to him at his proper post- office, that he was ready to deliver to him two hundred shares of said stock so purchased on his account, and that unless he came forward and paid for it, he, the plaintiff, on or after March 19, 1868, would sell said stock at the risk and cost of the defendant; and if they shall further find that the plaintiff 27 Stewart v. Schall, 65 Md. 289, 4 Atl. 399. 439 CONTRACTS ON DIFFERENT MATTERS. 45G had ready for delivery to the defendant such stock, and that he did sell on March 21, 1868, at the Stock Exchange, in New York, two hundred shares of said stock for and at the risk of said defendant, and that after applying the whole proceeds of said sale there was a loss upon the said original purchase, which said loss the plaintiff did pay to his sub-agents, then the plain- tiff is entitled to recover the amount of said loss or the differ- ence in price, together with his reasonable commission for the purchase and the expense of said resale. 28 439. What is essential to entitle one to commissions. (1) If a principal rejects a purchaser and the broker claims his com- mission, he (the broker) must show that the person furnished by him (the broker) to make the purchase was willing to accept the offer precisely as made by the principal, that he was an eligible purchaser and such a one as the principal was bound in good faith, as between himself and the broker, to accept. 29 (2) If the plaintiffs agreed and undertook to sell the defend- ant 's farm for a commission upon the price realized, then in order to earn their said commission it must appear by a preponder- ance of the evidence that they effected a sale of the farm to a party ready, willing and able to perform the conditions of the sale. The mere procuring of a person to enter into a contract to purchase the land, unless such purchaser was ready, will- ing and able to make the cash payments named in the contract, and to make the mortgage therein named for the deferred pay- ments, would not be sufficient to entitle the plaintiffs to their commission. 30 (3) If the principal rejects a purchaser secured by the broker, and the broker claims commission for his services, he must show that the person secured by him as purchaser was willing to accept the offer precisely as made by the principal, that he was an eligible, competent purchaser, such as the principal was bound in good faith, as between himself and the broker, to accept. The mere procuring of a person to enter into a contract to purchase the land, unless such person was ready, willing and 28 Worthington v. Yormey, 34 so Stewart v. Fowler, 37 Kas. 679, Md. 185. 15 Pac. 918. 2 Buckingham v. Harris, 10 Colo. 458, 15 Pac. 817. 457 FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH CONTRACT. 440 able to make the payments named in the contract, and to make the mortgage therein mentioned for the deferred payments, would not be sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to recover commis- sion. 31 (4) The plaintiffs cannot recover in this case upon the dealings in grain between them and the defendant unless the jury shall find from the evidence all the following facts: (1st.) that the defendant authorized said dealings; (2d.) that the pur- chase and sales authorized by him were actually and bona fide made; (3d.) that the grain directed by him to be bought was in fact bought by the authorized agent or agents of the plaintiffs in C, and was in fact delivered by the seller or sellers to and accepted by said authorized agent or agents; (4th.) that the grain directed by the defendant to be sold was in fact sold by the authorized agent or agents of the plaintiff in C, and was in fact delivered by such authorized agent or agents to the purchasers thereof. 32 440. Failure to comply with contract prevents recovery. (1) If the jury find from the evidence that on April 30, 1885, the plaintiff authorized the defendants to buy wheat for him in quantities of five thousand bushels at a time whenever they bought at the same time and price ten thousand bushels for themselves, and not otherwise, and that the plaintiff agreed to pay to defendants a commission of one-fourth of one per cent, per bushel for all wheat so bought for him by them, and that de- fendants undertook and agreed that they would not buy five thousand bushels for plaintiff unless they at the same time and price bought ten thousand bushels for themselves ; and shall further find that defendants did thereafter, on May 1, 1885, and June 8, 1885, respectively, buy for the plaintiff five thousand bushels of wheat and charged the same to plaintiff, and that they represented to plaintiff that they had on each of said occasions bought ten thousand bushels for themselves at the same time and price as that at which they bought for plaintiff; and shall find that the plaintiff, on the faith of such representation (should si Buckingham v. Harris, 10 Colo. 2 Stewart v. Scholl, 65 Md. 294, 458, 15 Pac. 817; Stewart v. Fowler, 4 Atl. 399. 37 Kas. 679, 15 Pac. 918. 441 CONTRACTS ON DIFFERENT MATTERS. 458 the jury find it to have been made) and in the belief that de- fendants had bought ten thousand bushels for themselves as aforesaid, paid to defendants on account of the purchase of, and on account of the depreciation, when sold, in the value of said wheat bought as aforesaid for him (should the jury so find) the moneys testified to by plaintiff to have been paid; and shall further find that in fact the defendants did not upon either of the said occasions buy ten thousand bushels for themselves, then the plaintiff is entitled to recover the moneys so paid. 33 (2) If you find from the evidence given to you in this cause that the defendant employed plaintiff as a real estate broker to sell his farm, and that the plaintiff, for the purpose of aid- ing and assisting him in selling said farm, and for the pur- pose of procuring a purchaser therefor, took into his employ and service one W, and if you further find that said W, aid- ing and assisting said plaintiff in the sale of said farm, took to this defendant one L, as a probable purchaser for said farm, and if you further find that in the presence of said W the said L inquired of this defendant the selling price of said farm and then and there informed the defendant that he desired to purchase direct from the owner, and that he had never seen or been introduced to the plaintiff, and that he would not pur- chase of commission men; and you further find that the de- fendant did not know that 'the sale was being made by the plaintiff, and if the said W stood by and did not inform the defendant that the sale 'was being made by the plaintiff, the plaintiff would now be estopped from claiming that the said W was acting for and on his behalf in the sale of said farm, you should find for the defendant. 34 441. Notice to be given under the contract. (1) If the jury find from the evidence that specific instructions were given by the defendant to the plaintiff on March 9, 1868, that in the event of the purchase of the stock in the evidence mentioned, the plaintiff should immediately communicate the fact of the purchase to the defendant, and inform the plaintiff where to send the notice; and if they shall further find that the said 33 Burt v. Myer, 71 Md. 467, 18 Atl. 34 Mullen v. Bower, 22 Ind. App. 736. 294, 300. 459 BURDEN OF PROOF PAYMENT OF INTEREST. 443 stock was purchased on the said 9th of March, by the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff did not communicate the fact of the pur- chase immediately to the defendant, according to the order and instructions of the defendant, then the defendant was not re- quired to take said stock. 35 (2) If the jury shall find that the defendant resided near R, in Baltimore county, and the plaintiff in B city, and that there was a daily mail from B to R, which was the proper post- office of the defendant, and that the plaintiff deposited in the postoffice in B on March 17, a letter containing the notice mentioned in the first instruction, then the said notice was suf- ficent, notwithstanding the fact that it was not received by the defendant until March 24, 1868, and after the sale. 36 442. Burden of proof on plaintiff When. The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to make out his case by a preponder- ance of the evidence. In this case the plaintiff's claim, accord- ing to his bill of particulars, is for commissions alleged to have been improperly retained, and not paid to him, as shown by statements of account rendered and filed with said bill of par- ticulars; and the jury are instructed that the burden is on the plaintiff, to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the items referred to in such statement of accounts, and charged in his bill of particulars, are not lawful charges against the plaintiff, otherwise he is not entitled to recover in this action, and you must find for the defendant. 37 443. Payment of interest on monthly balance. If the jury find the facts stated in the plaintiffs' third, fourth and fifth pray- ers, and further find that, in the execution of the orders of the defendant therein referred to, the plaintiffs paid to the brokers employed by them interest on the monthly balances due said brokers for the execution of said orders, and reported said pay- ments, if entered to the defendant, and if they find that the cus- tom and usage of the business in the markets where such orders were executed was to charge interest on such monthly balances as Worthington v. Yormey, 34 Md. 37 Shrewsbury v. Tufts, 41 W Va. 189. 212, 23 S. E. 692. se Worthington v. Yormey, 34 Md. 186. 444 CONTRACTS ON DIFFERENT MATTERS. 460 of accounts, then the plaintiffs are entitled to recover the interest so paid by them on account of the defendant. 38 Building Contracts. 444. Contractor complying with contract can recover. (1) If the jury believe from the evidence that the plaintiff, either him- self or through others employed by him, constructed the building in the agreement in the declaration mentioned, in accordance with the specifications in said agreement set forth, and relying upon the contract in the declaration mentioned, then the jury shall find for the plaintiff the price therefor in said agreement stipulated to be paid by defendant to the plaintiff, although from the evidence the jury may believe that outside parties, by parol agreement, guaranteed that the plaintiff should lose nothing by his construction of said building under said agreement, and actually advanced to the plaintiff the money necessary to pay for the materials and labor employed in the construction of the said building. 39 (2) In deciding whether or not the plaintiff was proceeding with said building in compliance with the contract, you are instructed that there must have been a substantial compliance in every material particular in each item as called for by a fair, reasonable and practical construction of the contract, and plans and specifications, taken together, and where there is a conflict, if any, in these, this should be reconciled in a practical, workmanlike manner, so as to arrive at the fair and reasonable intention of the same. 40 445. Parties abandoning original contract. If the plaintiff wilfully abandoned the work, leaving the house not finished according to the contract, he cannot recover. But if a party in good faith proceeds under a contract, and doing what he reasonably supposes is required and substantially completes the work and the other party accepts the benefit of it, although the contractor may not have done all that was really his duty, or in ss Stewart v. Schall, 65 Md. 289, *<> Linch v. Paris L. & G. B. Co. 4 Atl. 399. 80 Tex. 23, 15 S. W. 208. 3 Ferguson's Adm. v. Wills, 88 Va. 139, 13 S. E. 392. 461 DOMESTIC RELATIONS HUSBAND AND WIFE. 447 the exact manner required by the contract, still the contractor may maintain an action to recover the value of his labor and materials, but he will not necessarily be entitled to recover the cost of his materials or the ordinary price of his labor. The party for whom the work is done is entitled to have deducted from the contract price the difference between the v