CT COURT OF APPE
Appellate Distr
UNIVERSITY
OF CALIFORNIA
LOS ANGELES
SCHOOL OF LAW
LIBRARY
THE LAW
OF
INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES
IN
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ACTIONS
AND
APPROVED FORMS
WITH REFERENCES TO ANALOGOUS PRECEDENTS
*
BY
CHARLES HUGHES
Of the Chicago Bar
EX-STATE'S ATTORNEY
INDIANAPOLIS
THE BOBBS-MERRILL COMPANY
1905
COPYRIGHT, 1905
BY
CHABLES HUGHES.
COPYRIGHT, 1905
BY
THE BOBBS-MERRILL COMPANY
T
PREFACE
The author of this volume has endeavored to present to the
legal profession a useful and handy work on the law of instruc-
tions, with its subject matter and the forms conveniently arranged
for ready reference.
In the first division of the book the rules and principles of
the common law and under statutory enactment, which govern
the preparation and presentation, and the giving and refusing
of instructions, have been collected and classified.
The second division of this work, it will be observed, presents
a body of forms of instructions for both civil and criminal cases,
classified and arranged in chapters. These forms, with few ex-
ceptions, have been approved by the courts of last resort.
No attempt has been made to encumber the pages with need-
less duplications of "stock instructions," inasmuch as such
repetition answers no useful purpose in a work designed for
general practice.
The law is presented as found in an exhaustive review of the
law reports. The subject matter has been arranged in that
order which the experience of an active practice for nearly
a quarter of a century has suggested as rendering the material
most accessible.
C. H.
Chicago, Illinois,
March 20, 1905.
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
CHAPTER I.
PURPOSE AND PREPARATION.
Sec. Sec.
1. Object and office of instruc- 26a.
tions.
2. Propriety of giving instruc- 26b.
tions.
3. Court instructing of its own 27.
motion. 28.
4. Written instructions required.
5. Oral charge taken down by 29.
stenographer.
6. Party must request written in- 30.
structions.
7. Specific instructions must be 31.
requested. 32.
8. Neither party requesting, ef- 32a.
feet. 33.
9. Must request in criminal cases. 34.
10. Presumed in writing When.
11. Written and oral charge. 35.
12. Waiving written instructions.
13. Exceptions to oral charges. 36.
14. Time of requesting Rule of
court. 37.
15. Time of requesting Too late.
16. Error to refuse instruction 38.
When.
17. Court may give time. 39.
18. Court's power to make rules. 40.
19. Too many instructions.
20. Repeating generally not re- 41.
quired.
21. Repeating on preponderance 42.
Reasonable doubt.
22. Repeating in detail Words, 43.
phrases.
23. Repeating As to defense. 44.
24. Repeating As to witnesses.
25. Repeating Request substan- 45.
tially given by others.
26. Repeating When, general and 46.
special charge.
47.
Repetition when evidence is
close.
Court may refuse all instruc-
tions.
Defective instructions refused.
Clauses or paragraphs defect-
ive.
Incomplete instruction defect-
ive.
Modifying defective instruc-
tions.
Modifying correct instruction.
In language of request.
Modifying in criminal cases.
Changing to conform to issues.
Further instructions after jury
retires.
Further instructions in absence
of counsel.
Further instructions in absence
of defendant.
Instructing further, on other
points.
Recalling jury for further in-
structions.
Judge calling on jury Effect.
Withdrawing erroneous instruc-
tions Amending.
Rulings and remarks not in-
structions.
Directions as to form of ver-
dict.
Signing and numbering in-
structions.
Marking "given," "refused"
Effect.
Marking for plaintiff Under-
scoring.
Court's manner of charging
jury.
Trial by court Jury waived.
VI
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
CHAPTER II.
QUALITIES AND REQUISITES.
Sec. Sec.
48. Abstract propositions of law. 64.
49. Cautionary instructions Gen-
erally. 65.
50. Cautionary instructions
Matters not raised on the 66.
trial.
51. Cautionary instructions 67.
Against opinion of court.
52. Cautionary instructions Crim- 68.
inal cases.
53. Referring jury to the pleadings. 69.
54. Instructions limited to some
counts. 70.
55. In criminal cases Referring to
indictment. 71.
56. Whole law in one instruction
unnecessary. 72.
57. Instructions as to damages
Measure of. 73.
58. Instructions as to damages
Personal injury. 74.
59. Instructions as to damages 75.
Exemplary or punitive. 76.
60. Misleading instructions Ob-
scure, though correct. 77.
61. Misleading instructions Sus-
ceptible of two meanings. 78.
62. Misleading instructions If ev-
idence is conflicting. 79.
63. Misleading instructions Gen-
erally erroneous.
construed as a
Misleading instructions Cured
by others.
Misleading instructions Illus-
trations.
Argumentative instructions
Generally.
Argumentative instructions
Not necessarily erroneous.
Argumentative instructions
Illustrations.
Interrogative instructions Im-
proper.
Instructions
whole.
Instructions of both parties
construed together.
If instructions be harmonious,
defects are harmless.
Grouping instructions into on<e
series.
Words, phrases and clauses.
Definition of terms.
Definition of terms Contin-
ued.
Ungrammatical and awkwardly
arranged.
Misuse of names, terms, etc.
Effect.
Words omitted from instruc-
tions.
CHAPTER III.
BASED ON EVIDENCE AND PLEADINGS.
Sec.
80. Supported by evidence.
81. Supported by evidence Illus-
trations.
82. Supported by evidence Crim-
inal cases.
83. Defense unsupported by evi-
dence.
84. Based on incompetent evidence.
Sec.
85. Speculative evidence Insuffi-
cient.
86. Slight evidence will support
instructions.
87. Circumstantial evidence suffi-
cient.
88. Evidence sufficient Criminal
cases.
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
Vll
CHAPTER III Continued.
Sec. Sec.
89. Evidence sufficient Larceny. 105.
90. Instructions stating issues and
contentions. 106.
91. Instructions as to immaterial 107.
issues.
92. Instructions ignoring issues. 108.
93. Issues unsupported by evi-
dence. 109.
93a. Issues unsupported by evidence
Illustrations. 110.
94. Instructions based on plead-
ings. 111.
95. Based on evidence rather than 112.
pleadings. 113.
96. Instructions confined to de-
fenses alleged. 114.
97. Instructions based on plead-
ings Illustrations. 115.
98. Instructions limited to counts.
99. Issues raised outside of plead- 116.
ings. 117.
100. Issues abandoned.
101. Theory of party Instructions. 117a.
102. Instructions when several the-
ories. 11.8.
103. Instructions when several the- 119.
ories Illustrations.
104. Instructions need not notice .
opposing theory.
Instructions confining jury to
evidence.
Confining jury as to damages.
Common and personal knowl-
edge.
Confined within statute of lim-
itations.
Limiting evidence to specific
purpose.
Limited to impeaching wit-
nesses.
Limited to malice or intent.
Limited to certain defendants.
Instructions giving promi-
nence to certain facts.
Singling out facts When not
objectionable.
Singling out facts Criminal
cases.
Instructions ignoring facts.
Instructions with dr awing
facts.
Actions for personal injury
from negligence.
Instructions ignoring defense.
Instructions summing up the
evidence.
CHAPTER IV.
DIRECTING VERDICT.
Sec.
120. Peremptory instructions de-
fined.
121. Nature and effect of motion
for peremptory.
122. Court will not weigh the ev-
idence on the motion.
123. Requesting peremptory in-
structions Waiving.
124. When motion for peremptory
presented.
125. Peremptory instructions in-
stead of nonsuit.
126. Peremptory instructions for
defendant.
Sec.
127. If plaintiff's evidence varies
from his pleadings.
128. If evidence shows contract
to be illegal.
129. Peremptory improper for de-
fendant.
130. If the evidence tends to prove
plaintiff's case.
131. When facts are doubtful
different conclusions.
.132. Where either of two the-
ories is supported.
133. Evidence strongly against
plaintiff.
Vlll
TABLE OF CONTEXTS.
CHAPTER IV Continued.
Sec.
134. The foregoing principles il-
lustrated.
135. Peremptory instructions for
plaintiff.
136. Prima facie case undisputed.
137. When defendant admits all
allegations.
138. When defendant's pleading
is insufficient.
139. When verdict cannot stand.
140. Improper for plaintiff If any
evidence for defendant.
141. If the evidence is conflicting.
142. If part only of plaintiff's claim
is contested.
143. Where amount of claim is dis-
puted..
Sec.
144. Waiving right to peremptory
instruction.
145. Motion by both parties Ef-
fect.
146. Waiving right to submit facts
to jury.
147. Motion of both parties denied
Effect.
148. Directing jurors to agree.
149. Ruling of trial court review-
able.
150. Criminal Cases Peremptory
proper for defendant.
151. When not proper for defend-
ant.
152. Peremptory proper for prose-
cution When.
CHAPTER V.
LAW DETERMINED BY THE COURT.
Sec. Sec.
153. Jury bound by law given by 161.
the court.
154. Court should not belittle the 162.
law.
155. Submitting legal questions 163.
to jury improper.
156. Court interprets written in- 164.
struments.
157. Jury interprets oral con- 165.
tracts.
158. Wills are construed by the 166.
courts.
159. Writing as a fact in chain of 167.
evidence.
160. Some phases of writing ex- 168.
plained by oral evidence. 169.
Validity of ordinances and
statutes for court.
Foreign law a fact to be
proved.
Illustrations of the principles
Legal questions.
Illustrations of the principles
Questions of fact.
In criminal causes court de-
termines law.
Jury made judge of law by
statute.
In Massachusetts and, Con-
necticut.
In Maryland and Georgia.
In Louisiana and Indiana.
CHAPTER VI.
JURY DETERMINE THE FACTS.
Sec.
170. Court prohibited from
pressing opinion.
ex-
Sec.
171.
By common law court may
express opinion.
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
CHAPTER VI Continued.
IX
.
172. Submitting facts hypothetical-
iy.
173. Instructing that "evidence
tends to show."
174. Competency of evidence Is
there any evidence?
175. Intimating opinion is improp-
er.
176. Opinion not intimated Illus-
trations.
177. Opinion intimated Illustra-
tions.
178. Opinion not intimated
Criminal cases.
179. Opinion intimated Criminal
cases.
180. Instructions as to dying
declarations.
181. Inferences and conclusions
are for the jury.
Sec.
182. Weight of evidence is for
jury to determine.
183. Negligence When a question
of fact, when of law.
184. Instructions improper Illus-
trations.
185. Remarks and conduct of
court influencing jury.
186. Instructions urging jury to
agree.
187. Instructions attempting to
coerce jury.
188. Instructions not attempting
to coerce jury.
189. When court may comment on
evidence and express opin-
ion.
Illustrations of the rule.
190.
191. Instructions
evidence.
reviewing the
CHAPTER VII.
FACTS ASSUMED.
Sec.
192. Instructions assuming facts
Generally.
Sec.
196. Instructions may
facts When.
assume
193. Instructions assuming facts 197. Facts admitted by both par-
Illustrations.
194. Instructions not assuming
facts Illustrations.
195. Assuming facts when evidence
is close or conflicting.
ties.
198. Assuming facts In criminal
cases.
CHAPTER VIII.
BURDEN OF PROOF.
Sec. Sec.
199. Instructions that burden is on 202. Instructions when evidence
affirmant. is equally balanced.
200. Degree of proof by prepon- 203. Preponderance How deter-
derance. mined Witnesses.
201. Burden and degree of proof
in criminal cases.
X TABLE OF CONTENTS.
CHAPTER IX.
AFFIRMATIVE AND NEGATIVE EVIDENCE.
Sec. Sec.
204. Instructions on relative weight 205. Instructions on- relative weight
improper. proper.
CHAPTER X.
RELATING TO WITNESSES.
Sec. Sec.
206. Jury judges of credibility of 218.
witnesses. .219.
207. Instructions violating rule
Illustrations. 220.
208. Intimating opinion by in-
structions. 221.
209. Interested witnesses corrob-
orated. 222.
210. Praising or denouncing wit-
nesses. 223.
211. Expert and non-expert wit-
nesses. 224.
212. Witnesses contradicting each
other. 225.
213. Reconciling conflicting testi- 226.
mony.
214. Interest of witness to be con- 227.
sidered.
215. Probability, i m p r o b a bility, 228.
manner, 'conduct, bias.
216. Instructing that jury "must" 229.
or "should" consider.
217. On disregarding evidence.
On swearing wilfully false.
On swearing falsely Improp-
er.
Impeachment Instructions
based on evidence.
Believing or disbelieving wit-
ness.
Failure to produce witnesses
or evidence.
Singling out witnesses-^Im-
proper.
On detectives and informers
as witnesses.
Relatives as witnesses.
On competency and testi-
mony of the defendant.
Defendant's interest Other
considerations.
On defendant's unsworn state-
ments.
On defendant's failure to tes-
tify.
CHAPTER XI.
Sec.
SPECIAL FINDINGS.
Sec.
230. Questions for special findings 232. General instructions unneces-
are proper .
231. Interrogatories should relate
to ultimate facts.
sary and improper.
233. Interrogatories illustrating
practice.
234. General and special verdicts.
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
XI
CHAPTER XII.
ERRORS.
Sec. Sec.
235. Immaterial error Generally. 243.
236. Verdict showing error disre-
garded. 244.
237. The principles illustrated.
238. Imperfect instruction correct- 245.
ed by others.
239. Error cured by opponent's in- 246.
structions.
240. In criminal cases Error cur- 247.
ed by others. 248.
241. Damages Defective instruc-
tions cured. 249.
242. Instruction assuming fact
Harmless. 250.
Verdict clearly right and jus-
tice done.
Erroneous instructions favor-
able is harmless.
Principle or element refused
or omitted.
How a correct instruction
cures a defective one.
Instructions contradictory.
Instructions differing widely
from each other.
Instructions self-contradicto-
ry.
Evidence close, conflicting or
doubtful.
CHAPTER XIII.
IN CRIMINAL CASES.
Sec.
HOMICIDE.
251. Degree determined by jury.
252. Degree Erroneous instruc-
tion Harmless error.
253. Instructions when degree is
doubtful.
254. "Cooling time" When a ques-
tion of law.
255. Self-defense Instructions
proper and improper.
256. Self defense Instructions on
belief and appearances.
257. Instructions on threats of de-
ceased.
258. Provoking difficulty Freedom
from fault.
Sec.
259. Defendant first in the wrong,
but abandons the conflict.
260. Duty of defendant to retreat.
261. Instructions when allegations
and proof vary.
262. Instructions when arrest is
unlawful.
263. Killing mere trespasser In-
structions.
264. Motive Instructions.
265. Mutual combat Instructions.
BUKGLARY AND LARCENY.
265a. Possession of stolen property
Instructions.
266. Presumption as to possession
is one of fact.
x ii TABLE OF CONTENTS.
CHAPTER XIV.
INCLUDED CRIMINAL OFFENSES.
Sec. Sec.
267. Included offenses I n s t r u c- 271. No evidence of manslaughter
tions. Instructions.
268. If no evidence Instructions 272. Manslaughter Instructions
properly refused. proper.
269. Homicide No evidence of in- 273. Involuntary manslaughter
eluded offenses. Evidence wanting.
270. Evidence supporting included 274. Instructions must be request-
offense Instructions. ed.
CHAPTER XV.
DEFINITION OF OFFENSES.
Sec. Sec.
275. Statutory offenses Instruc- 277. Enumerating elements of of-
tions defining. fense.
276. Elements omitted. 278. Deadly weapon defined.
CHAPTER XVI.
CRIMINAL INTENT.
Sec. ' Sep.
279. Intent inferred from acts and 282. Malice and malice afore-
words. thought.
280. On evidence disproving intent. 283. On inferring malice Improp-
281. Drunkenness disproving in- er.
tent.
CHAPTER XVII.
STATUTORY INSTRUCTIONS.
Sec. Sec.
284. Instructions in words of stat- 285. Instructions in words of stat-
ute, ute Improper, when.
286. Copying extracts from cases.
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
CHAPTER XVIII.
xni
ACCOMPLICE AS WITNESS.
Sec.
287. Accomplice defined.
288. Testimony of accomplice
How considered.
289. Testimony of accomplice
When corroboration is neces-
sary.
290. Is witness an accomplice In-
structions.
Sec.
291. Instructions assuming witness
is an accomplice.
292. Duty to instruct on accom-
plices without request.
293. Principal and accessory In-
structions.
CHAPTER XIX.
ON REASONABLE DOUBT.
Sec.
294. Definition and elements.
295. Definition and elements Il-
lustrations.
296. Instructions on degree of
proof.
297. Instructions on probability,
possibility.
298. Instruction on hunting up
doubt.
Sec.
299. Doubt arises from whole ev-
idence.
300. Modification of instruction on
reasonable doubt.
301. Instruction as to each juror.
302. Instruction that jurors "be-
lieve as men."
CHAPTER XX.
ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
Sec.
303. When evidence is circum-
stantial.
304. When evidence is direct and
circumstantial.
305. Instructing on comparative
weight improper.
306. Instructions improper Illus-
trations.
307. Instructions not improper
Illustrations.
308. Drawing inferences Instruc-
tions.
309. Instructing to convict on
proof of certain facts Ef-
fect.
Sec.
310. Circumstances must be con-
sistent with guilt.
311. Essential facts need only be
consistent.
312. Essential facts Degree of
proof.
313. Omission of words from in-
struction Effect.
314. Omission of words not fatal
Illustrations.
315. Illustrations of the rules.
XIV
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
CHAPTER XXI.
ON CONFESSIONS ADMISSIONS.
Sec. Sec.
316. Weight of confession is for 319. Voluntary concessions C a u-
the jury. tionary instructions.
317. Weight o f confession Im- 320. Confessions Corroboration.
proper comment. 321. Instructions when no evi-
318. Voluntary confessions Com- dence When evidence.
petency.
CHAPTER XXII.
RELATING TO ALIBI.
Sec.
322.
323.
324.
325.
Alibi as a defense Burden on
defendant.
Burden Degree of proof.
Burden By preponderance,
when.
Instructions discrediting alibi.
Sec.
326.
327.
328.
Instructions on issue Proper
and improper.
Instructions proper.
Instructions improper.
CHAPTER XXIII.
INSANITY AS A DEFENSE.
Sec.
329. Insanity defined.
330. Sanity presumed Insanity
presumed to continue.
331. Insanity Burden on defend-
ant.
332. Insanity Instructions may
define.
Sec,
333. Insanity feigned Cautionary
instructions.
334. Insanity Instructions prop-
er Illustrations.
335. Insanity Instructions im-
proper Illustrations.
CHAPTER XXIV.
PRESUMPTIONS OF INNOCENCE.
Sec. Sec.
336. Defendant presumed to be in- 338. Presumption of innocence is
nocent. evidence.
337. Instructions refused W hen 339. Presumption is evidence 11-
error and when not. lustrations.
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
CHAPTER XXV.
XV
CHARACTER OF DEFENDANT.
Sec.
340. Proof of good character prop-
er.
341. Good character considered
Instructions.
342. Instructions o n character
Refusal When proper.
343. Good character creating rea-
sonable doubt Instruction.
344. Good character unavailing
When.
Sec.
345. Good character Instructions
improper.
(1.) Considered as generating
doubt.
(2.) Persons not likely to com-
mit crime.
(3.) Sufficient to raise doubt.
(4.) Invading province of jury.
(5.) Ignoring evidence of.
CHAPTER XXVI.
OBJECTIONS AND EXCEPTIONS.
Sec.
346. Method and manner of tak-
ing exceptions.
347. Time of taking exceptions.
348. Specific exceptions generally
necessary.
349. General exceptions sufficient.
350. Exceptions when instructions
are numbered.
351. Exceptions General, specific
and joint.
352. Failure to except Effect.
353. Assignment of error on in-
structions in group.
354. Exceptions limited to grounds
stated.
355. Objections and exceptions not
waived.
Sec.
356. Error presented on motion for
new trial.
357. Making instructions part of
record.
358. By bill of exceptions.
369. All instructions must be in
record.
360. Presumption in absence of all
instructions.
361. When considered in absence
of evidence.
362. Presumptions in absence of
evidence.
363. Errors caused at one's own
request.
364. After cause is remanded.
XVI
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
FORMS.
CHAPTER XXVII.
WITNESSES IN CIVIL OR CRIMINAL CASES.
Sec.
365. Jury judges of credibility of
witnesses.
366. Jury weigh the testimony.
367. Impeachment of witnesses.
368. Witness testifying wilfully
falsely.
Sec.
369. Party witness in his own be-
half.
370. Husband a witness for wife.
371. Positive and negative testi-
mony.
CHAPTER XXVIII.
WITNESSES, IN CRIMINAL CASES ONLY.
and conduct of
Sec.
375. Demeanor
witness.
376. Accomplice as witness.
374. Defendant's failure to testify. 377. Opinions of expert witnesses.
378. Detectives as witnesses.
Sec.
372. Instructions for the prosecu-
tion.
373. Instructions for defense.
CHAPTER XXIX.
CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL OR CRIMINAL CASES.
Sec.
379. Jury determine the facts.
380. Court determines the law.
Sec.
381. Court construes writings.
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
CHAPTER XXX.
xvii
BURDEN OF PROOF IN CIVIL CASES ONLY.
Sec.
382. Instructions for plaintiff
General.
383. Instructions for defendant
General.
384. Burden in specific cases.
Sec.
385. Preponderance of evidence;
number of witnesses.
386. Evidence equally balanced.
387. Preponderance in a case of
negligence.
CHAPTER XXXI.
AGENCY.
Sec.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PLAINTIFF.
388. Principal bound acts of agent.
389. Agent borrowing money for
employer.
390. Company bound by acts of
paying teller.
391. Agent exceeding authority;
principal bound.
Sec.
392. Railroad company bound by
agents' negligence.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR DEFENDANT.
393. Agent acting without scope of
authority.
394. Agent selling land at price
agreed upon.
395. Contract on sale of machine
by agent.
CHAPTER XXXII.
Sec.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE PLAINTIFF.
396. Party completing contract can
recover.
397. Preventing completion of con-
tract.
398. Damages for failure to per-
form contract.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DEFENDANT.
399. Party failing to complete con-
tract.
400. Damages for failure to deliv-
er property sold.
401. Joint or several liability on
contract.
CONTRACTS IN GENERAL.
Sec.
RESCINDING CONTRACT.
402. Contract, rescinding without
express words.
403. Contract void, if made by In-
sane person.
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTED CLAIMS.
404. Consideration of settlement,
when sufficient.
CLAIMS WITHOUT CONSIDERATION.
405. Claim based upon void patent.
XV111
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
CHAPTER XXXIII.
CONTRACTS SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY.
Sec.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
Sale complete on delivery.
Sale of goods by sample.
Sale on warranty Breach.
Implied warranty.
Burden of proving warranty.
Damages for breach of war-
ranty.
Sec.
412.
413.
414.
Conditions of sale complied
with.
Rescinding sale for defects.
Purchasing with intent to de-
fraud.
CHAPTER XXXIV.
CONTRACTS PROMISSORY NOTES.
Sec.
415. Holder of note may recover,
when.
416. Holder of note, when cannot
recover.
Sec.
417. Transferring note by endorse-
ment.
418. Interest on note Usury.
419. Suit to recover value of lost
note.
CHAPTER XXXV.
CONTRACTS RELATING TO INSURANCE.
Sec.
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
Sec.
LIFE INSURANCE.
False statements in applica- 425.
tion avoids policy.
The right to avoid policy may 426.
be waived.
Manner or mode of giving 427.
notice of death.
Formal proof of death unnec- 428.
essary, when.
Assignment of policy without 429.
authority of beneficiary.
FIRE INSURANCE.
Property not destroyed, by fire
No recovery.
Holder of policy not responsi-
ble for agent's acts.
Fraud in proof of loss defeats
recovery.
Abandonment of insured boat,
when justifiable.
Boat not in safe and sea-
worthy condition defeats re-
covery.
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
CHAPTER XXXVI.
xix
CONTRACTS ON DIFFERENT MATTERS.
Sec.
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.
430. Value of services of an at-
torney.
431. Party not liable for services of
attorney When.
ARBITRATION.
432. Submitting disputes to arbi-
tration.
BAILMENTS.
433. Party hiring horso liable for
injury.
434. Party liable for money in-
trusted to him.
435. Hotel losing property of guest
entrusted to it.
BANKING TRANSACTIONS.
436. Company holding one out as
agent.
437. Attempt to defraud company.
BROKERS.
438. Brokers entitled to commis-
sions When.
439. What is essential to entitle
one to commissions.
440. Failure to comply with con-
tract prevents recovery.
441. Notice to be given under the
contract.
442. Burden of proof on plaintiff
When.
443. Payment of interest on month-
ly balances.
BUILDING CONTRACTS.
444. Contractor complying with
contract can recover.
445. Parties abandoning original
contract.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS.
446. Husband entitled to income
of wife's estate.
Sec.
447. Liability of wife for hus-
band's debts.
448. Duty of both parents to sup-
port their children.
449. Father entitled to minor
child's services and earnings.
450. Minor remaining with family
after full age.
451. Minor liable on his contracts
When.
452. Head of family or house-
holder.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.
453. Liability of tenant for dam-
ages to premises.
454. New leasing of premises dis-
charges guaranty.
MARRIAGE CONTRACTS.
455. What essential to entitle
plaintiff to recover for
breach.
456. Unchastity of woman not
breach of contract.
457. Assessing damages for breach
of contract.
PARTNERSHIP CONTRACTS.
458. W T hat constitutes a partner-
ship.
459. Each partner has power to
bind all others.
460. Partners' Not general part-
ners.
CHATTEL MORTGAGES.
461. Mortgagee may take posses-
sion of the property.
SUBSCRIPTION CONTRACT.
462. Alteration of subscription
contract.
463. Stock illegally issued, invalid.
SERVICES RENDERED TO PUBLIC.
464. Liability of county for physi-
cian's services.
XX
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
CHAPTER XXXVI Continued.
Sec.
465.
Sec.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
Reviving a claim barred by
statute of limitations.
466. The promise reviving dis-
charged claim must be clear.
467. Payment on running account
How applied.
468. Deeds executed and placed in
escrow.
OTHER MATTERS.
469. Rights iri contract may be
waived.
470. Correspondence constituting
contract.
471. Written contract cannot be
varied by parol proof.
472. Unsigned contract binding.
473. Execution and delivery of
deed.
CHAPTER XXXVII.
DAMAGES.
Sec.
INJURY TO THE PERSON.
474. Assaulting another in self-
defense.
475. Assaulting another not in
self-defense.
476. Assessing damages for phys-
ical injury.
477. Damages for assault to rav-
ish.
478. Injury to the person by ani-
mal.
479. Attack by vicious dog.
480. Dangerous obstruction in
highway.
481. Turnpike unsafe Liability.
482. Injury to bicycle-rider on
bridge.
483. Accidental injury to traveler
on highway.
MALPRACTICE BY PHYSICIAN.
484. Negligence of doctor Liabil-
ity.
485. Physician required to exer-
cise ordinary care.
486. Patient must observe doc-
tor's directions.
UNLAWFUL SALE OF LIQUOR.
487. Liability for selling liquor
unlawfully.
Sec.
488. Wife Selling to her husband
Liability.
489. Transfer of liquor license
Effect.
490. Sales made since commenc-
ing suit Evidence.
LIBEL AND SLANDER.
491. Libel and slander denned.
492. Malice an essential element.
493. Slanderous words must be
proved.
494. Proof of part of words suffi-
cient.
495. Words libelous in themselves.
496. Charging another with crime.
497. Publication Letter so held.
498. Measure of damages Consid-
erations.
499. Punitive damages When
proper.
500. Matters in mitigation.
501. Good faith Probable cause.
502. Degree of proof in justifica-
tion.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.
503. Arrest without warrant.
504. Probable cause for prosecu-
tion.
505. Unlawful arrest Liability.
506. Advice of counsel as a de-
fense.
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
CHAPTER XXX Vil Continued.
XXI
Sec.
507. Essential elements of a cause.
508. Estimating damages.
DAMAGE TO PERSONAL PROPERTY.
509. Unlawful seizure of property
Liability.
Sec.
510. Landlord seizing tenant's
property.
511. Damages for seizure How es-
timated.
512. Killing stock Liability.
513. Damages from diseased cat-
tle.
CHAPTER XXXVIII.
FRAUDULENT TRANSACTIONS.
Sec. Sec.
514. The law presumes men act 522.
fairly.
515. Fraudulent representations 523.
resulting in damages.
516. Fraudulent representations in 524.
sale of stocks.
517. Contracts made to defeat 525.
creditors, void.
518. Innocent purchaser for fair 526.
consideration, protected.
519. Purchaser knowing fraudu- 527.
lent intent of seller.
520. Opinion as to value not basis 528.
of fraud.
521. Sureties induced to sign bond
by fraud.
Fraud practiced in sale of
land resulting in damages.
Contracts between husband
and wife scrutinized.
Fraudulent assignment to
compel compromise.
Fraud in reference to indebt-
edness.
Contract made under compul-
sion may be avoided.
What constitutes duress to
avoid contract.
Gambling contracts On mar-
kets.
CHAPTER XXXIX.
NEGLIGENCE GENERALLY.
Sec.
529. Negligence, carelessness, care,
defined.
530. Ordinary care defined.
531. Burden of proof generally.
532. Degree of care required of de-
fendant.
533. Care in driving vehicle.
534. Care and safety of machin-ery.
535. Care of injured party may be
inferred.
Sec.
536. Infant Degree of care re-
quired of.
537. Children Care of defendant
for them.
538. Negligence may be inferred,
when.
539. Negligence will not be pre-
sumed.
540. What does not amount to neg-
ligence.
xxn
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
CHAPTER XXXiX Continued.
Sec. Sec.
541. Negligence the proximate 544.
cause of injury.
542. Instructions submitting ques- 545.
tion of negligence.
543. Plaintiff's contributory negli- 546.
gence.
547.
Plaintiff and defendant both
negligent.
Injury resulting from acci-
dent or natural cause.
Negligence in the use of elec-
tricity.
Electric wires out of repair.
CHAPTER XL.
NEGLIGENCE OF CAKK1EKS.
Sec. Sec.
548. Negligence of carrier pre- 567.
sumed Burden.
549. High degree of care required 568.
of carriers.
550. Carrier liable, though neg- 569.
ligence only slight.
551. Care of passenger Ordinary 570.
care.
552. Carrier bound to carry sick 571.
person.
553. Drunkenness of passenger not 572.
negligence.
554. Injury to postal clerk in mail 573.
train.
555. Injury to passenger on freight 574.
train.
556. Ordering or putting passen- 575.
ger off moving train.
557. Willful ejection of passenger 576.
from train. 577.
558. Plaintiff a trespasser, not a
passenger. 578.
559. Children trespassers, getting
on train. 579.
560. Passenger assisting in push-
ing car. 580.
561. Passenger getting off moving
train. 581.
562. Plaintiff negligent in getting
off train. 582.
563. Passenger injured in leaving
train. 583.
564. Duty of carrier to stop train. 584.
565. Passenger entitled to reason-
able time to get off. 585.
566. Platform unsafe Passenger
getting off. 586.
Injury to passenger approach-
ing or getting on train.
Passenger negligent in get-
ting on train.
Passenger falling off plat-
form No liability.
Passenger riding upon plat-
form of car.
Assisting passenger By
agent of carrier.
Ticket not essential to be-
come passenger.
Mistake of conductor in tak-
ing ticket.
Putting off passenger for
want of ticket or fare.
Putting off disorderly passen-
ger.
Passenger on wrong train.
Passenger may rely on direc-
tions of carrier's agents.
Passenger injured while
changing cars.
Liability when car owned by
another.
Liability for injury from boil-
er explosion.
Injury from accident No li-
ability.
Passenger guilty of contribu-
tory negligence.
Burden of proof generally.
Carrier not insurer of passen-
ger's safety.
Carrier liable for loss or in-
jury of baggage.
Carrier's liability for baggage
limited.
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
CHAPTER XL- Continued.
XX111
Sec. Sec.
587. Goods lost or delayed by car- 589. Liability in shipment of live
rier Liability. stock.
588. Carrier not liable for dam- 590. Freight rates of carrier under
age to goods. federal statute.
CHAPTER XLI.
NEGLIGENCE OF CITIES AND TOWNS.
Sec.
591. Sidewalks Duty of city to
keep them in repair.
592. Sidewalk presumed reasonably
safe.
593. Plaintiff knowing unsafe con-
dition.
594. Care of plaintiff when he
knows danger.
595. Notice to city of defect or
danger necessary.
596. Notice of unsafe condition may
be inferred.
597. City must take notice of un-
safe condition.
598. Injury from accident; no lia-
bility.
599. Elements necessary to a re-
covery.
600. Drains, left in dangerous con-
dition.
Sec.
601. Bridges, shall be kept in re-
pair.
602. Grades and embankments ob-
structing natural flow of wa-
ter.
603. Ice, sleet, snow, on sidewalk
Liability.
604. Signs overhanging sidewalks
Damages.
605. Building permits to obstruct
streets.
606. Streets and highways, shall be
safe for travel.
607. Considerations in assessing
damages.
608. Matters of evidence Incompe-
tent evidence.
609. Claims against city, mode of
allowing.
CHAPTER XLII.
MASTER AND SERVANT.
Sec.
Sec.
610. Care of master for safety of 614. Injury caused by fellow ser-
servant.
vant.
611. Rules for conduct of servants. 615. Injury from wilful act of ser-
612. Master must advise servant of
danger.
613. Not a fellow servant Liabil-
ity.
vant.
616. Burden on plaintiff to show
negligence.
617. Servant assumes risks incident
to employment.
XXIV
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
CHAPTER XLI1 Continued.
Sec.
618.
619.
620.
621.
622.
Servant knowing of danger is
negligent.
Servant continuing in service
after knowledge of danger.
Servant continuing after mas-
ter's promise of repair.
Servant does not assume risks
of negligence.
Servant may assume appli-
ances to be safe.
Sec.
623.
624.
625.
626.
Servant injured when not at
his place.
Brakeman injured coupling
cars Liability.
Question of negligence sub-
mitted to jury.
Servant discharged for cause
No liability.
CHAPTER XLIIL
NEGLIGENCE OF RAILROADS.
Sec.
627. Care required of plaintiff.
628. Care of plaintiff Exceptions.
629. The same Instructions for de-
fendant.
630. Care of defendant in running
trains.
631. Great care of defendant, when.
632. Contributory negligence, de-
fined.
633. Burden of proof as to contrib-
utory negligence.
634. Plaintiff's contributory negli-
gence.
635. Contributory negligence of de-
ceased.
636. Both parties guilty of negli-
gence.
637. The plaintiff not a trespasser.
638. Question of negligence sub-
mitted to jury.
639. Question of contributory neg-
ligence for the jury.
640. Speed of train, running at
high rate.
641. Failure to sound whistle or
ring bell.
642. Wrongfully blowing whistle.
643. Flagman at crossing Neces-
sity.
644. Railroad company violating
ordinances.
Sec.
645. Fire escaping from engine and
burning property.
646. Killing stock from failure to
fence track.
647. Essential facts necessary to
cover.
648. Accident No liability.
CASES OF DEATH.
649. Measure of damages to next
of kin.
650. Damages restricted to pecu-
niary loss.
651. Damages Instructions for de-
fendant.
MEASURE OF DAMAGES GENERALLY.
652. Consider permanency of inju-
ry, health, business, expense,
time.
653. Consider age, pain, mental an-
guish.
654. Considerations in mitigation
of damages.
CUSTOMS AND USAGES.
655. Customs, usages, rules relating
to railroad.
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
CHAPTER XLIV.
XXV
Sec.
REAL ESTATE.
Sec.
ADVERSE POSSESSION OF LAND.
DAMAGE BY ANIMALS.
656. Possession must be open and 676. Horses and cattle destroying
notorious. crops, liability.
657. Actual possession essential. 677. Measure of damages for in-
658. Possession shown by acts of jury to crops.
ownership. 678. Submitting facts to jury, on
659. Possession Acts of ownership injury to crops.
not sufficient.
660. Intention must accompany
possession.
661. Notice to legal owner essen-
tial.
662. Claiming land by color of
DAMAGES BT NUISANCE..
679. Residence, health, business,
title.
663. Occupying land without color
of title.
BOUNDARY LINES.
injury to.
680. Plaintiff must prove nuisance,
injury insufficient.
681. Purchasing property in fac-
tory locality, no liability.
682. Using premises as a pest-
house.
EMINENT DOMAIN CONDEMNATION.
664. Boundary line fixed by agree-
ment.
665. Locating the boundary line.
666. Meander line as the boun- 683. Highest and best use in es-
dary. timating damages.
667. By high-water mark. . 684. Damages based upon market
668. Accretions along rivers value.
Ownership. 685. Considerations in determining
value.
DAMAGES TO REALTY. 686. Value of lots fronting on nav-
igable streams.
669. Owner permitting property to 687. Benefits shall be deducted
be damaged. from damages.
670. Excavations on adjacent prem- 688. Witnesses magnifying values
ises Liability. Credibility.
67?. Damages from change of
grade. TAXES ON REALTY.
672. Damages from piling dirt,
filth. 689. Land unlawfully sold for taxes
673. Damages in destroying fences. Certificates void.
674. From diverting flow of sur- 690. Listing land on books for as-
face water. sessment.
675. Dam injured by bridge wash- 691. Forfeitures are odious and
ing out through negligence. must be strictly proved.
XXVI
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
CHAPTER XLV.
WILLS.
Sec. Sec.
692. Person making will may dis- 700.
inherit relatives.
693. Statutory requirements in at- 701.
testing wills.
694. Mental capacity to make will, T02.
essential.
695. Sound mind and memory de- 703.
fined.
696. Maker of will presumed of 704.
sound mind.
697. Insane delusions, lucid inter- 705.
vals.
698. Insanity is disease of brain 706.
affecting the mind.
699. Mental weakness will not dis-
qualify.
Unsoundness of mind of per-
manent nature.
Considerations in determin-
ing mental state.
Testimony of medical experts
on mental state.
Considerations in determin-
ing validity of will.
"Undue influence" used in
procuring will.
Advising person to make will
is not improper.
Will presumed genuine Not
forgery.
CHAPTER XLVI.
CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES.
Sec. Sec.
707. Caution as to duty in grave 710. In Indiana the jury are the
cases. judges.
708. Deliberations of jurymen as to 711. In Ohio the court is the
verdict. judge.
712. In Iowa the court is the
JUDGES OF CRIMINAL LAW. judge.
709. In Illinois the jury are the
judges.
CHAPTER XL VII.
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE.
Sec. sec.
713. Defendant is presumed inno- 715. Presumption continues through
cent. trial.
714. Presumption of innocence a
protection.
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
CHAPTER XLVIII.
XXVll
REASONABLE DOUBT.
Sec. Sec.
FOR THE PROSECUTION. 724. Doubt, though a probability
of guilt.
716. A substantial, well-founded 725. Doubt confined to essential
doubt. facts.
717. A doubt for which a reason 726. Doubt arising from part of
can be given. the evidence. ,
718. Doubt from undue influence.
719. Hunting up doubts outside of
evidence. PROBABILITIES.
720. Reasonable certainty only re-
721. DoubTas to "each link" in 727 ' A . me t re Probability not sum-
chain. cient
722. Jurors are to believe as men.
FOR THE DEFENSE.
ONE OF TWO OR MORE.
723. Every reasonable theory must 728. Uncertain which of two is
be excluded. guilty.
CHAPTER XLIX.
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
Sec.
729. Circumstantial evidence is
competent.
730. Every reasonable hypothesis,
must be excluded.
731. Circumstances consistent with
each other.
Sec.
733. Each link in chain of circum-
stances.
734. Degree of proof as to each
essential fact.
735. Subsidiary facts not within
the rule.
732. Inconsistent with any oth'er 736. Circumstances of suspicion
rational theory.
not evidence.
CHAPTER L.
CONFESSIONS, ADMISSIONS, FLIGHT.
Sec.
Sec.
737. Confessions to be considered 739. Admissions of deceased.
like other evidence.
740. Flight tends to prove guilt.
738. Admissions subject to imper- 741. Flight is a circumstance only.
fection.
742. Defendant surrendering.
XXV111
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
CHAPTER LI.
ALIBI AS DEFENSE.
Sec. Sec.
743. Burden of proof. 745. High degree of proof in II-
744. Alibi raising a reasonable linois.
doubt.
CHAPTER LII.
INSANITY AS DEFENSE.
Sec. Sec.
746. Every man presumed to be 750. Will overcome by irresistible
sane.
747. Insanity presumed to con-
tinue, when.
748. Ability to distinguish right
from wrong.
749. No will power to refrain from
act.
impulse.
751. Reasonable doubt of sanity.
752. Higher degree of proof re-
quired in some states.
753. Mere weakness of mind.
754. Defense of insanity, examined
with care.
755. Drunkenness is not insanity.
CHAPTER LIII.
GOOD CHARACTER OF ACCUSED.
Sec. Sec.
756. Good character of defendant 758. Character of defendant pre-
a circumstance. sumed good.
757. Good character may create
reasonable doubt.
CHAPTER LIV.
CRIMINAL OFFENSES CONSPIRACY.
Sec.
759. Conspiracy denned.
760. Formal agreement unneces-
sary.
761. All responsible for result of
design.
762. Conspiracy to commit rob-
bery.
Sec.
763. Declarations of one evidence
against all.
764. Principal and accessory, dis-
tinction abrogated.
765. Aiding and abetting.
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
CHAPTER LV.
XXIX
ASSAULTS.
Sec.
766. Simple assault defined.
767. Assault with deadly weapon.
768. Assault with intent to kill.
769. Assault to commit rape.
Sec.
770. Consent to sexual intercourse.
771. Consent a question of fact.
772. Assault to rob.
CHAPTER LVI.
HOMICIDE, MURDER AND MANSLAUGHTER.
Sec. Sec.
773. Definition and illustrative 784.
cases.
774. Murder in first degree Illus- 785.
trations.
775. Murder in the second degree. 786.
776. Malice defined Essential ele- 787.
ment. 788.
777. Intent presumed from means 789.
used. 790.
778. Intent in administering drug.
779. Drunkenness reducing grade 791.
of crime.
780. Time of deliberation, length 792.
immaterial.
781. Motive proper, but not indis- 793.
pensable.
782. Killing being proved presumed 794.
murder.
783. Doubt as to degree of homi-
cide.
Killing while lying in wait,
murder.
Killing by one of several
burglars.
Killing person not intended.
Officer killing- while arresting.
Killing officer while arresting.
Arresting without a warrant.
Degree of proof to warrant
conviction.
Wound neglected causing
blood poisoning.
Mere presence of accused is
not aiding.
Inquest proceedings not evi-
dence.
Manslaughter defined and il-
lustrations.
CHAPTER LV1I.
HOMICIDE SELF-DEFENSE.
Sec. Sec.
795. Justifiable homicide defined 801.
Illustrations. 802.
796. Cases illustrating self-defense. 803.
797. Defendant at fault in provok-
ing difficulty. 804.
798. Declining further struggle.
799. Bare fear no justification. 805.
800. Mere belief of danger no de- 806.
fense. 807.
Mere previous threats.
Danger need not be real.
Reasonable doubt of appre-
hension.
Resisting attack of several
persons.
Resisting unlawful arrest.
Accidental killing no offense.
Character of deceased proper
matter.
XXX
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
CHAPTER LVII1.
BURGLARY AND LARCENY.
Sec.
808.
809.
810.
811.
812.
813.
Breaking- defined.
Intend, how shown.
Burglary and larceny at same
time.
Aiding and abetting, acting,
together.
Possession of property taken
by burglary.
Submitting facts to the jury.
Sec.
814. Definition and essential ele-
ments.
815. Intent an essential element.
816. Possession of stolen proper-
ty , u evidence.
817. Property found and appropri-
ated.
818. Taking under claim of right
819. Prosecution confined to prop-
erty alleged.
CHAPTER LIX.
EMBEZZLEMENT AND FALSE PRETENSE.
Sec. Sec.
820. Embezzlement defined Ele- 827.
ments.
821. Agent collecting on commis- 828.
sion.
822. Attorney receiving and appro- 829.
priating.
823. Debtor and creditor, their re- 830.
lation. 831.
824. Intent an essential element.
825. Intent, knowledge of bank's 832.
condition.
826 Bank receiving deposits by
officers or others.
President borrowing from his
bank, evidence.
Condition of bank, value of
assets, liabilities.
Failure of bank as prima fa-
cie evidence.
Definition and elements.
Offense committed by acts,
symbols, words.
Defrauding tax collector
Essential elements.
Sec.
CHAPTER LX.
OTHER SPECIFIC OFFENSES.
Sec.
ADULTERY.
BASTARDY.
833. Occasional acts of inter- 835. Facts to be determined by
course. jury.
834. Common law marriage. 836. Public rumor is not evidence.
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
CHAPTER LX Continued.
XXXI
Sec.
Sec.
CRUELTY TO ANIMALS.
PERJURY.
837. Killing stock to preserve
crops.
838. Intentionally overdriving
horse.
DISORDERLY HOUSE.
839. What constitutes disorderly
house.
840. Forgery defined.
841. Alteration of instrument is
forgery.
842. Aiding and abetting another.
843. Uttering or publishing forged
document.
844. Intent to defraud essential.
845. Forging a deed Venue.
846. Gaming defined.
847. Betting on game of cards.
848. Betting on game of billiards.
849. Doing forbidden act in public
place.
CRIMINAL LIBEL.
850. Motives prompting communi-
cation.
851. Evidence of one witness not
sufficient.
PUBLIC NUISANCE.
852. Offensive smells from slaugh-
terhouse.
853. Nuisance must affect whole
community.
854. Mill-dam and pond producing
offense.
855. Pond producing malaria.
856. Offense caused by other means.
857. Caused by others, not the de-
fendant.
HIGHWAY VIOLATIONS.
858. Public roads How establish-
ed.
859. Vacating public road How.
860. Malicious destruction of
bridge.
SUNDAY VIOLATIONS.
861. Operating machinery on Sun-
day.
Sec.
CHAPTER LXI.
MISCELLANEOUS INSTRUCTIONS.
Sec.
CONTRACTS.
CORPORATIONS.
862. Extending time of payment, 864. Proving existence of corpora-
evidence, tion by user.
CONVERTING PROPERTY. CUSTOMS.
863. Damages for property appro- 865. Customs and rules of board
priated. of trade.
XXXii TABLE OF CONTENTS.
CHAPTER LXI Continued.
Sec. Sec.
EJECTMENT. GUARDIAN.
866. Plaintiff must recover on 871. Estimating value of guar-
strength of his own title. dian's services.
HANDWRITING, PROVING.
EVIDENCE.
_ . 872. Knowledge from seeing per-
867. Copy, instead of original, used son wr ie.
as evidence. 873 comparison of signatures im-
proper.
VERDICT.
HOMESTEAD.
868. Separate verdict where several 874 - Abandonment of homestead.
defendants.
SEDUCTION.
ESTOPPEL. 875. Exemplary damages proper.
876. Damages for alienation of
869. Disclaiming interest in prop- wife's affections.
erty.
SELLING LIQUORS,
877. Residence district, selling
liquor in.
870. Notice of fence viewers to
parties interested.
878. Damages for trespass.
TABLE OF OASES.
(References are to Sections.)
Abbitt v. Lake Erie, &c. R. Co.
150 Ind. 498 119
Abbott v. City of Mobile, 119
Ala. 595 358
Abend v. Terre Haute & I. R.
Co. Ill 111. 202 126
Abernathy v. Southern R. I. P.
Co. (Tex. Cv. App.) 62
S. W. 786 94
Abilene Cotton Oil Co. v. Bris-
coe, 27 Tex. Cv. App. 157 7
Abram v. S. 36 Tex. Cr. App. 44. 297
Acers v. U. S. 164 U. S. 388
75, 278
Achey v. S. 64 Ind. 59 279
Acker v. S. 52 N. J. L. 259. ... 299
Ackerson v. P. 124 111. 571 322
Acme Brewing Co. v. Central R.
& B. Co. 115 Ga. 494... 175
Adams v. P. 47 111. 379 258
v. P. 109 111. 451 52
v. P. 179 111. 637 250
v. Smith, 58 111. 419. ..19, 192
v. S. 115 Ala. 90 297
v. S. 133 Ala. 166.63, 178, 7"3
v. S. 135 Ind. 571 302
V. S. 25 Ohio St. 584 351
v. S. 29 Ohio St. 412
61, 153, 165, 250
v. S. 38 Ohio St. 369 269
v. S. 34 Tex. Cr. App. 470. 303
v. Stringer, 78 Ind. 181
525, 526
Addington v. U. S. 165 U. S.
184 256
Aden v. Road Dist. &c. 197 HI.
220 347
Adkins v. S. 41 Tex. Cr. App.
577 275
Adler v. Robert Portner Brewing
Co. 65 Md. 28.. . 408
Advance Thresher Co. v. Esteb
41 Ore. 469 361
Aerheart v. St. Louis & S. R.
Co. 90 Fed. 907 35, 189
Aetna Ins. Co. v. Reed, 33 Ohio
St. 283 1, 61, 63, 80
v. Sanford, 200 111. 126... 91
v. Ward, 140 U. S. 76 211
Agee v. S. 113 Ala. 52 276
Agne v. Seitsinger, 96 Iowa, 181
129
Agnew v. Farmers' M. P. Fire
Ins. Co. 95 Wis. 445 23
Aguilan v. Ter. 8 N. Mex. 496
269, 270
Aiken v. Com. 24 Ky. L. R.
523 11, 269, 270, 273
Aikin v. Weckerly, 19 Mich. 482 1
Aitkens v. Rawlings, 52 Neb.
539 350
Akridge v. Noble, 114 Ga. 949. 168
Alabama, &c. R. Co. v. Davis,
119 Ala. 572 81
v. Guilford, -114 Ga. 621.. 360
v. Hill, 93 Ala. 514 211
v. Hoyne, 24 So. 907, 93
v.Marcus, 115 Ala. 389... 81
v. Slaton, 120 Ala. 259... 27
v. Thompson (Ala.) 32 So.
672
Alberger v. White, 117 Mo. 347
113
176
Albert v. Besel, 88 Mo. 150 153
Albertz v. U. S. 162 U. S. 499. 115
Albin v. S. 63 Ind. 598... 325, 745
Albion Milling Co. v. First Nat.
Bank, 64 Neb. 116 353
Albrecht v. Walker, 73-111. 73.. 80
Albright v. Brown, 23 Neb. 141
365, 406
Albritton v. S. 94 Ala. 76
323, 325, 327
XX XIV
TABLE OF CASES.
(References are to Sections.)
Albritton v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.)
26 S. W. 398 304
Alcorn v. Bass, 17 Ind. App. 500. 493
Aldous v. Olverson (S. Dak.)
95 N. W. 917 80
Alexander v. Bank of Lebenon
(Tex. Cv. App.) 47 S. W.
840 191
v. Cunningham, 111 111. 511
120, 126
v. Northwestern C. U. 57
Ind. 466 394
v. Pennsylvania Co. 48 Ohio
St. 623 162
v. P. 96 111. 102 201
v. Staley, 110 Iowa, 607.. 94
v. S. 114 Ga. 266.... 227, 228
v. S. 40 Tex. Cr. App. 395
304
v. Town of Mt. Sterling, 7 1
111. 369 597
Alexandria & F. R. Co. v. Hern-
don, 87 Va. 197.... -563, 566
Aliunde Consul Min. Co. v. Ar-
nold (Colo. App.) 67 Pac.
28 195
Allen v. Frost (Tex. Cv. App.)
71 S. W. 767 119
v. Fuller, 182 Mass. 202.. 80
v. Hamilton, 109 Ala. 634. 48
v. Kirk, 81 Iowa, 658 321
v. P. 77 HI. 484 25
v. S. 60 Ala. 19 299
v. S. 87 Ala. 107 227
v. S. 70 Ark. 337
. 180, 744, 782
v. S. Ill Mich. 80 294
v. S. 10 Ohio St. 288 288
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 66 S.
W. 671 93
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 70 S.
W. 85 274
v. U. S. 157 U. S. 675.... 255
v. U. S. 164 U. S. 492
178, 188, 277, 337
Allend v. Spokane Falls, &c. R.
Co. 21 Wash. 334 351
Allender v. C. R. I. & P. R. Co.
43 Iowa, 280 ..549, 567, 571
Allis v. U. S. 155 U. S. 117
38, 48, 189, 191
Allison v. C. & N. W. R. Co. 42
Iowa, 282 545
v. U. S. 160 U. S. 203
257, 261
Almond v. Gairdner, 76 Ga. 701
523
Alsing Co. v. New Eng. I. & S.
Co. 73 N. Y. S. 347 239
Alton Pav. B. & Fire B. Co. v.
Hudson, 176 111. 270... 20, 48
Altschuler v. Coburn, 38 Neb.
881 200
Amble v. Whipple, 139 111. 322. 126
American Bible Soc. v. Price,
115 111. 623
27, 66, 692, 694, 697, 699
American C. Ins. Co. v. Heiser-
man, 67 Fed. 947 144
American C. Tel. Co. v. Noble,
98 Mich. 67 118
American Cotton Co. y. Beasley,
116 Fed. 256 . . ." 358
v. Smith (Tex. Cv. App.)
69 S. W. 443 75
v. Smith, 29 Tex. Cv. App.
425 8
American D. T. C. Co. v. Walker,
72 Md. 457 433
American Ex. Co. v. Hawk, 51
Ohio St. 572 587
v. Parsons, 44 111. 314 419
American Fire Ins. Co. v. Land-
fare, 56 Neb. 482... 348, 363
American Harrow Co. v. Dolvin
(Ga.) 45 S. E. 983 84
American Ins. Co. v. Crawford,
89 111. 62 192, 250
American M. U. Ex. Co. v. Milk,
73 111. 224 102, 587
American Oak Ex. Co. v. Ryan,
104 Ala. 267 117
American Strawboard Co. v. Chi-
cago, &c. R. Co. 177 111.
513 80,' 133, 247
American T. & T. Co. v. Kersh,
27 Tex. Cv. App. 127
6, 80, 191, 220
Ames v. Cannon River Mfg. Co.
27 Minn. 245 171
Ames & F. Co. v. Strachurski,
145 111. 192 120, 133
Amis v. Cameron. 55 Ga. 449.. 203
Ammerman v. Teeter, 49 111.
402 214
Amos v. Buck, 75 Iowa, 654. . . 432
Amsden v. Atwcod, 69 Vt. 527. 27
Anacostia & P. R. Co. v. Klein,
8 App. Cas. (D. C.) 75... 26
Anders v. Life Ins. Co. 62 Neb.
585 126
TABLE OF CASES.
XXXV
(References are to Sections.}
Anderson v. Avis, 62 Fed. 227
65,
v. Baird, 19 Ky. L. R. 444
94,
v. City of Bath, 42 Me. 346
45,
v. Daley Mining Co. 16 Utah
28
v. McCormick, 129 111. 308.
v. McDonald, 31 Wash. 274
v. Nonvill, 10 111. App. 240
v. Oskamp (Ind. App.) 35
N. E. 207
v. S. 104 Ind. 472
169, 372, 710, 741,
v. S. 147 Ind. 451
v. S. 34 Tex. Cr. App. 546
v. S. 117 Ga. 255
v. Timberlake, 114 Ala. 377
65
v. U. S. 18 U. S. 689.....'
Andreas v. Ketcham, 77 111. 377
80,
Andrews v. Chicago, M. & St. P.
R. Co. 86 Iowa, 681
549,
v. P. 60 111. 354 170,
v. Postal Tel. Co. 119 N.
Car. 403
v. S. 21 Fla. 595
v. S. 134 Ala. 47
v. Toledo, A. A. & N. M.
R. Co. 8 Ohio C. D. 584.
Andrysick v. Stakowski, 159
Ind. 428
Aneals v. P. 134 111. 415
45, 340, 343,
Angier v. Western Ass. Co. 10 S.
Dak. 82
Anglo-American Provision Co. v.
Prestiss, 157 111. 506...
Anniston L. & C. Co. v. Lewis,
107 Ala. 538
Anson v P. 148 111. 494, 842.
Anthony v. Wheeler, 130 111.
128
Anthony Ittner Brick Co. v.
Ashby, 198 111. 562
Antietam. &c. Co. v. Chronicle
Pub. Co. 15 N. Car. 147..
Appeal of Sturdevant, 71 Conn.
392
171
199
245
242
136
191
102
102
771
777
326
220
117
251
185
641
175
351
321
301
81
358
757
146
163
116
25
135
48
351
191
Appeal of Turner, 72 Conn. 305
351
Apple v. Board, &c. 127 Ind.
555 601
Arabak v. Village of Dodge, 62
Neb. 591 136
Arbuckle v. S. 80 Miss. 15 238
Archer v. U. S. 9 Okla. 569 80
Archibald v. S. 122 Ind. 122.. 357
Argabright v. S. 49 Neb. 760
113, 219, 223
Arismendis v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.)
54 S. W. 599 80
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 60 S.
W. 47 326
v. S. 41 Tex. Cr. App. 374
303, 312
Armour v. Brazeau, 191 111. 124
1, 387
Armstrong v. Penn, 105 Ga. 229
199, 305
v. P. 38 111. 513 279
v. S. 30 Fla. 170 331
v. S. 83 Ala. 49 203
Arnett v. Huggins (Colo.) 70
Pac. 765 247
Arnold v. Lane, 7 1 Conn. 6 1 ... 14
v. Pucher, 83 111. App. 182. 223
v. S. 5 Wyo. 439 288, 290
v. S. (Ark.) 74 S. W. 513. 4
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 40 S.
W. 591 7
Arthur v. City of Charleston, 5 1
Arzman v. S. 123 Ind. 361
281, 336, 715, 754, 779
W. Va. 132 25
Ash v. Beck (Tex. Cv. App.) 68
S. W. 53 236
Ashborne v. Town of W. 69
Conn. 217 200
Ashcraft v. Com. 24 Ky. L. R.
488 110
Asher v. Beckner, 19 Ky. 521.. 118
Ashley Wire Co. v. Mercier, 163
111. 487 25
Ashlock v. Linder, 50 111. 169.. 308
Ashworth v. East Tenn. V. & G.
R. Co. 94 Ga. 715 80
Aspy v. Botkins, 160 Ind. 170
215, 238
Astley v. Capron, 89 Ind. 175.. 452
Atchison, &c. R. Co. v. Ayers,
56 Kas. 181 645
v. Calvert, 52 Kas. 547 73
v. Cuniffe (Tex. Cv. App.)
57 S. W. 692 236
XXXVI
TABLE OF CASES.
(References are to Sections.)
Atchison, &c. R. Co. v. Feehan,
149 111. 202 25, 206
v. Franklin, 23 Kas. 74.. 14
v. Wells, 56 Kas. 222 81
Atkins v. Field, 89 Me. 281 .... 348
Atkinson v. Dailey, 107 Ind.
117 '70
v. Catcher, 23 Ark. 101 84
v. Lester, 2 111. (1 Scam.)
409 48
v. Reed (Tex. Cv. App.) 49
S. W. 260 200
Atlanta, &c. R. Co. v. Hardage,
93 Ga. 457 101
v. Jones, 116 Ga. 369 113
Atlantic, &c. R. Co. v. Iron-
monger, 95 Va. 638 636
Atlas Nat. Bank v. Hohn, 71
Fed. 489 94
Augusta Mfg. Co. v. Vertrees, 4
Lea (Tenn.) 75 308
Austill v. Heironmymus, 117
Ala. 620 116
Austin v. French, 36 Mich. 199. 163
Austin, &c. R. Co. v. Anderson,
79 Tex. 428 674
v. Flannagan (Tex. Cv.
App.) 40 S. W. 1043... 94
v. Grothe, 88 Tex. 262 244
S. W. 1043 94
Avery v. S. 124 Ala. 20 295
Avery & Son v. Meek, 16 Ky.
L. R. 384 192
Ayer v. City of Chicago, 111
111. 406 120, 126
Ayers v. Metcalf, 39 111. 307... 117
v. S. 88 Ind. 275 376
Ayres v. Blevins, 28 Ind. App.
101 346
v. Pittsburgh, C. C. & St.
L. R. Co. 201 Pa. St.
124 117
Axthelm v. Chicago, R. I. & P.
R. Co. (Neb.) 353
B
Bachmeyer v. Mutual Life Asso.
87 Wis. 325 113
Bachtelheimer v. S. 54 Ind. 134
778
Bacon v. Bacon, 76 Miss. 458
20, 44
Badger v. Batavia Paper Mfg.
Co. 70 111. 302 31
Bailey v. Campbell, 2 111. (1
Scam.) 110 284, 363
Bailey v. Carnduff, 14 Colo.
App. 169 6
v. McCance (Va.) 32 S. E.
43 194
v. Mill Creek Coal Co. 20
Pa. Super. Ct. 186.. 119, 348
v. S. 116 Ala. 437 150
v. S. 133 Ala. 155 295
v. S. 52 Ind. 466 817
v. S. 42 Tex. Cv. App. 289. 318
v. Trustees, 200 Pa. St. 406
239
Bailus v. S. 16 Ohio C. C. 227. 280
Baker v. Ashe, 80 Tex. 356 247
v. Baker, 202 111. 595 70
v. Borrelli, 136 Cal. 160.. 107
v. Com. 90 Va. 820 336
v. Irish, 172 Pa. St. 528.. 133
v. Johnson, 2 Marv. (Del.)
219 126, 127
v. Kansas City, &c. R. Co.
147 Mo. 140 176
v. S. 17 Fla. 410 43
v. S. 17 Ga. 452 71
v. S. Ill Ga. 141 273
v. S. 31 Ohio St. 314 150
v. Summers, 201 111. 52... 53
v. Youngs, 44 111. 44.. 494, 499
Baldez v. S. (Tex. Cv. App.) 35
S. W. 664 312
Baldwin v. Bank of Massillon,
1 Ohio St. 141 243
v. Cornelius, 104 Wis. 68.. 94
v. Killain, 63 111. 550 246
v. Lincoln Countv, 29 Wash.
509 51
v. S. (Fla.) 35 So. 221.25,301
v. S. 75 Ga. 489 48
v. S. Ill Ala. 11 67
v. Wentworth, 67 N: H.
408 123, 124
Ball v. Marquis (Iowa) 98 N.
W. 497 385
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 36
S. W. 448 -. . ..113, 115
v. S. (Iowa) 92 N. W. 691. 362
Bnllance v. Leonard, 37 111. 43. 347
Ballard v. S. 19 Neb. 609 331
v. S. 43 Ohio St. 340 789
Ballou v. Young, 42 S. Car. 170
71
Ballow v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 69
S. W. 513 : 244
Balph v. Liberty Nat. Bank 179
Pa. St. 430 191
TABLE OF CASES.
XXXV11
(References are to Sections.)
Baltimore, &c. R. Co. v. Alsop,
176 111. 471 144.
v. Brydon, 65 Md. 200 413
v. Cain, 81 Md. 87 575
v. Campbell, 36 Ohio St.
647 585, 586
v. Cassell, 66 Md. 421 .... 652
v. Conoyer, 149 Ind. 524.. 7
v. Countryman, 16 Ind. App.
139 244
v. Faith, 175 111. 58 74, 86
v. Feev's Ex'r, 94 Va. 82.. 80
v. Few, 94 Va. 85 650
v. Friel, 77 Fed. 126 44
v. Hollenthal, 88 Fed. 116
26
v. Kean, 65 Md. 396 630
v. Kirby, 88 Md. 489 118
v. Lafferty, 2 W. Va. 104. . 247
v. Laffertys, 14 Gratt. (Va.)
478 32
v. Leapley, 65 Md. 573... 562
v. McKenzie, 81 Va. 78 ... 582
v. Mackey, 157 U. S. 72
350 351
v. Maryland, 75 Md. 153..' 619
v. Nugent, 86 Md. 351.547, 548
v. Owings, 65 Md. 505
530, 633, 634, 639, 643, 655
v. Pierce, 89 Md. 497 615
v. Rowan, 104 Ind. 88 361
v. S. 30 Md. 48 536
v. S. &c. 60 Md. 452.. 535, 553
v. Spaulding, 21 Ind. App.
323 238
v. Stanley, 158 111. 396
25,- 126
v. S. 91 Md. 506 195
v. Theu, 159 111. 535
118, 363, 650
v. Worthington, 21 Md. 275
538
v. Young, 153 Ind. 163
29, 632, 647
Bandalow v. P. 90 111. 218 ...... 48
Bank v. Barry, 20 Md. 287 162
Bank of Asheville v. Summer,
119 N. Car. 591 191
Bank of C, v. Eureka B. & L.
Co. 108 Ala. 89 48
Bank of Galloway v. Henry, 92
N. W. 63 1' 102
Bank of Commerce v. Bright, 77
Fed. 946 190
Bank of H. v. Napier, 41 W. Va.
481 243
Bank of M. v. Page, 98 111. 125
80
Bankhead v. S. 124 Ala. 14
282, 343
Banks v. S. 72 Ala. 522 306
Bannen v. S. 115 Wis. 317..^. 25
Banner v. Schlessinger, 109 Mich.
262 101, 113
Barbee v. S. 23 Tex. App. 199. 3
Bard well v. Ziegler, 3 Wash. 34
182
Barfield v. S. 105 Ga. 491 6
Bargna v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 68
S. W. 997 83, 88
Barker v. Com. 90 Va. 820.337, 339
v. Cunard S. S. Co. 36 N.
Y. S. 256 351
v. Lawrence Mfg. Co. 176
Mass. 203 346, 358
v. Ohio River R. Co. 57 W.
Va. 430 572
v. S. 126 Ala. 69 101, 299
v. S. 40 Fla. 178 192
v. S. 48 Ind. 163
113, 119, 192, 195
v. Todd, 37 Minn. 370 .... 347
Barkley v. Barkley Cemetery
Asso. 153 Mo. 300 196
Barkman v. S. 1 3 Ark. 706 45
Barmby v. Wolfe, 44 Neb. 77
214, 226
Barnard v. S. 88 Wis. 656.. 225, 240
Barnes v. Barnes, 66 Me. 300.. 696
v. S. 103 Ala. 44.... 27, 29, 103
v. S. Ill Ala. 56 52, 297
v. S. 39 Tex. Cv. App. 184
26, 268
Barnesville Mfg. Co. v. Love,
(Del.) 52 Atl. 267.. 238, 244
Barnett v. Com. 84 Ky. 449 170
v. Farmers', &c. Ins. Co. 115
Mich. 247 303
v. Fearig, 101 Ind. 96 80
v. Salomon, 118 Mich. 460. 35
v. Talbot, 90 Me. 229 126
Barnett & R. Co. v. Schlapka,
208 111. 436 30
Barnewall v. Murrell, 108 Ala.
366 44
Barney v. S. 49 Neb. 515 302
Barnhart v. Chicago, M. & St.
P. R. Co. 97 Iowa, 654.. 126
v. Ehrhart, 33 Ore. 279 ... 666
Barow v. Reading Iron Co. 202
Pa. St. 280 531, 539
XXXV111
TABLE OF CASES.
(References are to Sections.)
Barr v. City of Omaha, 42 Neb.
341 . 347
v. Irey, 3 Kas. App. 240. .. 126
v. P. 30 Colo. 522 322
v. P. 113 111. 471.. 19, 195, 198
v. S. (Miss.) 21 So. 131... 71
v. S. 45 Neb. 458 247, 274
Barrett v. Boddie, 158 ill. 479. 136
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 69 S.
W. 144 351
Barren v. Barren, 122 Ala. 194. 93
Barrow v. S. 80 Ga. 191 310
Bartay v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 67
S. W. 416
Bartelott v. International Bank,
119 111. 269 ...121, 124,
Earth v. Kansas City E. R. Co.
142 Mo. 535
Earthing v. Behrends, 20 Neb.
211
Bartlett v. Board of Education,
59 111. 364
v. Boston Gaslight Co. 122
Mass. 213
v. Cunningham, 85 111. 22..
v. Hawley. 38 Minn. 308..
v. Secor/56 Wis. 520
656, 658,
Bartley v. Metropolitan St. R.
Co. 148 Mo. 124
v. S. Ill Ind. 358
v. S. 53 Neb. 310
70, 302, 336,
v. Williams, 66 Pa. St. 329
Barton v. Gray, 57 Mich. 623
3, 156,
v. S. 154 Ind. 670
v. Strond-Gibson Grocery Co.
(Tex. Cv. App.) 40 S.' W.
1050 113,
Bass v. Cantor, 123 Ind. 446...
v. S. 103 Ga. 227
Bassett v. S. (Fla.) 33 So. 262.
Bates v. Ball, 72 111. 108
v. Bates, 27 Iowa, 115.695,
v. Benninger, 2 Cin. Super.
Ct. (Ohio) 568
Bates-Smith Ins. Co. v. Scott,
56 Neb. 475
v. Harte, 124 Ala. 427....
Batten v. S. 80 Ind. 401
255
126
27
172
198
544
94
30
663
242
15
338
172
157
359
177
433
6
20
12
696
66
20
195
742
Battershall v. Stephens, 34 Mich.
68 156
Battle v. S. 103 Ga, 53. . . 296
Bauer v. Bell, 74 111. 226
v. S. 105 Ga. 703
Baxter v. Campbell (S. Dak.) 97
N. W. 368
v. Lusher, 159 Ind. 381...
v. P. 3 Gilm. (111.) 381.. ..
v. P. 8 111. (3 Gil.) 368..
v. Roberts, 44 Cal. 191...
Baxton v. S. 157 Ind. 213
Bay City Iron Co. v. Emery, 128
Mich. 506 70,
Beabont v. S. 37 Tex. Cv. App.
515
Beach v. Netherland, 93 Ga. 233
Beall v. Pearre, 12 Md. 550
Bean V. Green, 33 Ohio St. 444
359, 360,
v. Miller, 69 Mo. 393.. 396,
v. P. 124 111. 580
Beard v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 53
S. W. 348
v. S. 41 Tex. Cv. App. 173
v. S. 71 Md. 275 169,
v. Trustees of School, 106
111. 659
Bearer v. S. 103 Ala. 36.. 322,
Beason v. S. 43 Tex. Cr. App.
442
Beaty v. S. 82 Ind. 232
Beavers v. Mo. Pac. R. Co. 47
Neb. 761
Beck v. Cole, 16 Wis. 95
v. S 51 Xeb. 106
Becker v. Becker. 45 Iowa, 239.
v. Woarms, 76 N. Y. S. 438
Beckham v. S. (Tex. Cv. App.)
69 S. W. 534 :
Becknell v. Becknell, 110 Ind.
42
Beckner v. Riverside, &c. 65
Ind. 468
Bedford v. Penny, 58 Mich. 424.
v. S. (Tex. 'Cr. App.) 38 S.
W. 210
v. S. 36 Tex. Cr. App. 477..
Bedford I. Co. v. Thomas, 29
Ind. App. 85
Bedford, S. O. & B. R. Co. v.
Rainbolt, 99 Ind. 556
Beecher v. Ferris, 112 Mich.
584
Beene v. Miller, 149 Mo. 233
656.
509
25
80
243
1
60
612
252
465
276
94
101
490
397
206
75
269
839
25
324
303
824
243
84
248
84
214
272
360
136
28
88
255
234
545
663
668
TABLE OF CASES.
XXXIX
(References are to Sections.)
Behm v. Parker (Md.) 32 Atl.
199 239
Behrends v. Beyschlag, 50 Neb.
304 353
Behymer v. S. 95 Ind. 140 346
Beidler v. King, 202 111. 302.. 48, 70
Belair v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co.
43 Iowa, 671 620
Belden v. Woodmanse, 81 111. 25
105
Belding v. Archer, 131 N. Car.
287 20
Belk v. P. 125 111. 584 48, 80
Belknap v. Grover (Tex. Cv.
App.) 56 S. W. 249.... 360
Bell v. Beazley, 18 Tex. Cv.
App. 639 199
v. City of Spokane, 30 Wash.
508 191, 346
v. Hutchins (Tex. Cv. App.)
41 S. W. 200 113
. v. Incorporated Town of
Clarion, 120 Iowa, 332.. 25
v. Martin (Tex. Cv. App.)
28 S. W. 108 71
v. Ober & Sons Co. 96 Ga.
214 208
v. Sherideh, 21 D. C. 370.. 144
v. S. 39 Tex. Cr. App. 677. 290
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 56 S.
W. 913 94
v. S. 115 Ala. 25
256, 258, 260, 297
v. Washington Cedar -Shin
gle Co. 8 Wash. 27 192
Bell City Mfg. Co.. v. Kemp, 27
W v ash. Ill 395
Bellamy v. S. 35 Fla. 242 266
Bellefontaine R. Co. v. Snyder,
24 Ohio St. 670 197
Bellow v. Ahrburg, 23 Kas. 287
119
Belt v. Goode, 31 Mo. 128 157
v. P. 97 111. 469.. 105, 172, 252
Benavides v. S. 31 Tex. Cr.
App. 173 34, 36
Bender v. Dugan, 99 Mo. 126. . 94
Benham v. Taylor, 66 Mo. App.
308 71
Benjamin v. Metropolitan St. R.
Co. 133 Mo. 274 48, 50
Bennett v. Connelly, 103 111. 50
245, 430
v. Ellison, 23 Minn. 245... 524
v. McDonald, 52 Neb. 278. 351
v. McDonald, 60 Neb. 47 .. 80
Bennett v. P. 96 111. 606
v. S. 70 Ark. 43
v. S. 30 Tex. Cr. App. 341.
v. S. 39 Tex. Cr. App. 639
261, 270, 276, 282,
Benson v. Lundy, 52 Iowa, 265
v. S. 119 Ind. 488
Bentley v. Standard F. Ins. Co.
40 W. Va. 729
Benton Co. Sav. Bank v. Bod-
dicker, 117 Iowa, 407 ..
Berez v. San Antonio & A. P. R.
Co. (Tex. Cv. App.) 67
S. W. 137
Berkett v. Bond, 12 111. 86
Berliner v. Travelers' Ins. Co.
121 Cal. 451 116,
Bernhard v. S. 76 Ga. 613
Bernstein v. Downs, 112 Cal. 191
Berrenberg v. City of Boston,
137 Mass. 231
Berry v. Rood, 168 Mo. 316...
v. S. 31 Ohio St. 225
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 38 S.
W. 812
Bertha Zinc Co. v. Martin, 93
Va. 794 611,
Bertram v. Peoples R. Co. 154
Mo. 639 113, 196,
Berzevizv v. Delaware L. & W.
Co. 46 N. Y. S. 27
Beseler v. Stephani, 71 111. 404.
Best Brewing Co. v. Dunlevy,
157 111. 141
Bett v. P. 97 111. 461
112
815
322
314
192
94
191
358
208
289
351
359
361
243
191
622
198
207
243
241
797
Betting v. Hobbett, 142 111. 76
48, 488
Beutell v. Magone, 157 U. S.
154 145
Bevelot v. Lestrade, 153 111.
625 218
Bever v. Spangler, 93 Iowa, 576
211, 223
Beverly v. Burke, 9 Ga. 447... 170
Bewley v. Massie (Tex. Cv. App.)
31 S. W. 1086 25
Bibb County v. Ham, 110 Ga.
340 244
Bibbins v. City of Chicago, 193
111. 363' 113
Bibby v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 65
S. W. 193 248
Bierbach v. Goodyear R. Co. 54
Wis. 213 . , .. 203
xl
TABLE OF CASES.
(References are to Sections.)
Billings v. McCoy, 5 Neb. 187. . 14
Bims v. S. 66 Ind. 433 770
Bingham v. Hartley, 44 Neb.
682 72
v. Lipman, 40 Ore. 363... 32a
Binkley v. Dewell (Kas. App.)
58 Pac. 1028 245
Binns v. S. 66 Ind. 428 247
Bird v. Forceman, 62 111. 212.. 198
v. S. 107 Ind. 154.... 166, 216
v. S. 43 Fla. 541 313
Birmingham, &c. Co. v. Cuzzart,
133 Ala. 262 113, 118
v. Mullen (Ala.) 35 So. 204,
701, 702 192, 475
v. Pulver, 126 111. 339 . .26b, 49
v. Williams, 119 Ala. 547
62, 117a
Birney v. New York & W. P. T.
Co. 18 Md. 341 95
Birr v. P. 113 111. 648 80
Bisewski v. Booth, 100 Wis.
383 203
Bishop v. Journal Newspaper Co.
168 Mass. 327 46
v. P. 200 111. 37 363
v. P. 194 111. 365 725
v. S. 43 Tex. 390 3
P.issot v. S. 53 Ind. 408 710
Bitter v. Saathoff, 98 111. 266. . 200
Black v. Rocky Mountain B. T.
Co. (Utah) 73 Pac. 514.. 196
v. S. 38 Tex. Cr. App. 58.103
v. S. 18 Tex. App. 124.. 279
v. S. 1 Tex. App. 369 199
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 41
S W. 606 118
v. S. 59 Wis. 471 288
Blackburn v. S. 71 Ala. 319.. 228
v. S. 23 Ohio St. 165
4, 334, 748
Blackman v. Edsall (Colo.
App.) 68' Pac. 790 70
v. Housels (Tex. Cv. App.)
31 S. W. 511..
v. Kessler, 110 Iowa, 140
243
94
Blackwell v. S. 33 Tex. Cr.
App. 287 252
Blackwood v. Brown, 29 Mich.
483 222
Blair v. Blanton (Tex. Cv.
App.) 55 S. W. 321.... 116
v. City of Groton, 13 S.
Dak. 211 244
v. S. 69 Ark. 558.. 372, 795
Blake's Estate, In re, 136 Cal.
306 66,
Blake v. Austin (Tex. Cv.
App.) 75 S. W. 571..
v. Rourke, 74 Iowa, 523..
Blaker v. S. 130 Ind. 203.166,
Blalock v. S. 79 Miss. 517
Blanchard v. Jones, 101 Ind.
542
v. Pratt, 37 111. 243.101,
Blanchard-Hamilton Furniture
Co. v. Calvin (Ind.) 69
N. E. 1035
Blanco v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.)
57 S. W. 828
Blass v. Ferry, 34 N. Y. S.
475
Blaul v. Tharp, 83 Iowa, 665
Bleiler v. Moore, 94 Wis. 385
Blesch v. Chicago, &c. R. Co.
48 Wis. 172
541, 684, 685,
Blige v. S. 20 Fla. 742
Blizzard v. Bross, 56 Ind. 74
Bloch v. Edwards, 116 Ala.
90 101,
v. S. 161 Ind. 276
Bloomer v. Shernll, 11 111.
483
Blotcky v. Caplan, 91 Iowa,
352
Blough v. Parry, 144 Ind. 463
81. 223,
Bloyd v. Pollock, 27 W. Va.
75
Blue V. L. Co. v. Smith, 48
Neb. 293
v. Newman, 58 Neb. 80..
Bluedom v. Missouri Pae. R.
Co. 108 Mo. 439.... 25,
v. Missouri Pac. R. Co.
(Mo.) 24 S. W. 57
Bluff City Lumber Co. v.
Floyd, 70 Ark. 418
Blum v. Whitworth, 66 Tex.
350
Blume v. S. 154 Ind. 343
25, 247,
Blumeno v. Grand Rapids & I.
B. R. Co. 101 Mich. 325
Blumer v. Bennett, 44 Neb.
873
Board, &c. v. Allman, 142 Ind.
573
211
194
702
169
255
123
163
534
109
146
197
247
687
361
362
116
809
41
199
702
85
195
102
247
181
347
99
249
191
357
480
TABLE OF CASES.
(References are to Sections.)
xli
Blair v. Boyd, 31 Kas. 765.... 301
v. Brewington, 74 Ind. 10
464
v. Galloway, 17 Ind. App.
689 464
v. Gibson, 158 Ind. 471..
359
v. Legg, 110 Ind. 474
43, 196, 346
v. Nichols, 139 Ind. 611.. 71
v. Vicker, 62 Kas. 25 364
Bobo v. S. (Miss.) 16 So. 755
319
Bodie v. Charleston N. C. R.
Co. ol S. Car. 468 200
Bodine v. S. 129 Ala. 106.66, 297
Boecker v. City of Nuperville
166 111. 151 363
Boeltger v. Scherpe & Koken
A. & I. Co. 136 Mo. 531 76
v. Boggess, 127 Mo.
305
109, 112
v. Metropolitan St. R. Co.
118 Mo. 328 14
v. Clifton, 17 Ind. 217
15
Bohl v. City of Dell Rapids (S.
Dak.) 91 N. W. 315... 121
Bohlman v. S. 135 Ala, 45
195
Boice v. Palmer, 55 Neb. 389
101
Boldenwick v. Cahill, 187 111.
218 94, 238
Boldt v. Budwig, 14 Neb. 743
500
v. Budwig, 19 Neb. 743
494, 495, 498
Bolen v. S. 26 Ohio St. 371
360
Boiling v. S. 54 Kas. 602.66, 331
Bolton v. Vellines, 94 Va. 399
505
Boltz v. Miller, 23 Ky. L. 'R.
991 156
v. Town of Sullivan, 101
Wis. 608 58
Bon v. S. 23 Ohio St. 349... 20
v. S. 34 Tex. Cr. App.
481 259
Bonaparte v. Thayer, 95 Md.
548 198
v. Wiseman, 89 Md. 12... 670
Bonardo v. P. 189. 111. 411.. 71. 73
Bond v. P. 39 111. 26 172, 194
Bond v. S. 23 Ohio St. 349.. 20, 32
Bondurant v. S. 125 Ala. 31
48, 109
Bone v. S. 102 Ga. 387
109, 300, 323
Bones v. S. 117 Ala. 138
296, 297
Bonic v. Maught, 76 Md. 4 4 2.. 46 5
Bonner v. Com. 18 Ky. 728.. 115
v. Com. (Ky.) 38 S. W.
488 240
v. Herrick, 99 Pa. St. 225
171
v. S. 67 Ga. 510 36
v. S. 107 Ala. 97
40, 351, 182
v. Monnell, 52 Me. 255... 158
Booher v. S. 156 Ind. 435
281, 755, 779
Booker v. S. 76 Ala. 25 757
Boon v. Murphy, 108 N. Car.
187 347
Boone v. Miller, 73 Tex. 557
14
v. P. 148 111. 440 80
v. Ritchie (Ky.) 53 S. W.
518 80, 81
Borham v. Davis, 146 Pa. St.
72 191
Borrego v. Ter. 8 N. Mex. 446
322
Bosqui v. Sutro R. Co. 131
Cal. 390 48
Boss v. Northern Pac. R. Co. 2
N. Dak. 128! 347
Bossit v. S. 53 Ind. 417 805
Boston v. S. 94 Ga. 590 274
Boston Marine Ins. Co. v.
Scales, 101 Tenn. 628.. 84
Boswell v. Dist. of Columbia,
21 D. C. 526 247
Bosworth v. Barker, 65 Ind.
596 4
Botkin v. Cassady, 106 Iowa,
334 101
Botsch v. S. 43 Neb. 501 98
Boulder v. Niles, 9 Colo. 421
247
Bourland v. Gibson, 124 111.
602 94
Bourquin v. Bourquin. 110 Ga.
440 113
Boutwell v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.)
35 S. W. 376 110
Bowden v. Archer, 95 Ga. 243
34, 92, 117
xlii
TABLE OF CASES.
(References are to Sections.)
Bowen v. Carolina, C. G. & C.
R. Co. 34 S. Car. 217..
v. Southern R. Co. 58 S.
Car. 222 6, 244,
v. Sweeney, 35 N. Y. S.
400
Bower v. Bower, 146 Ind. 393
Bowers v. P. 74 111. 419.. 206,
Bowie v. Maddox, 29 Ga. 285
v. Spaids, 26 Neb. 635...
Bowling v. Floyd (Kas.) 48
Pac. 875
Bowling Green Stone Co. v.
Capshaw, 23 Ky. L. R.
945
Bowman v. Bowman, 153 Ind.
503 71,
v. Roberts, 58 Miss. 126..
v. Witlig, 39 111. 416
Boyard v. Johnson (Ky.) 53
S. W. 651
Boyce v. Martin, 46 Mich. 239
v. Palmer, 55 Neb. 389..
v. Schroeder, 21 Ind. App.
28
v. Wabash R. Co. 63 Iowa,
70
Boyd v. Blue Ridge R. Co. 65
S. Car. 326
v. Portland Elec. Co. 40
Ore. 126 20,
v. S 24 Tex App. 570...
Boyden v. Fitehburg R. Co. 72
Vt. 89
Boyer v. Soules. 105 Mich. 31.
Boyett v. S. 130 Ala. 77
Boygero v. Southern R. Co. 64
S. Car. 104
Boykin v. P. 22 Colo. 496
71, 105,
Boyle v. Illinois Cent. R. Co.
88 111. App. 255
Boynton v. S. 115 Ga. 587.. 6,
Brace v. S. 43 Tex. Cr. App.
48
Bracken v. Union Pac. R. Co.
75 Fed. 347
Braden v. Cook, 18 Pa. Super.
Ct. 156
Bradford v. Pearson, 1 2 Mo. 7 1
v. P. (Cal.) 43 Pac. 1013
363
358
20
349
367
177
192
347
113
456
192
14
6
157
209
232
351
48
238
303
28
363
66
243
201
126
220
292
363
195
86
4
Bradford Glycerine Co. v. Kis-
jer, 113 Fed. 894 347
Bradley v. Coobaugh, 91 111.
148 195
v. Ohio River & C. R. Co.
126 N. Car. 735 195
v. S. 31 Ind. 492 211
Bradshaw v. S. 17 Neb. 147.. 299
Bradway v. Waddell, 95 Ind.
170 4, 41
Brady v. Cassidy, 104 N. Y.
147 156, 160
v. Com. 11 Bush (Ky.)
285 734
Braggen v. Oregon S. L. R. Co.
24 Utah, 391 358
Brainard v. Burton, 5 Vt. 97. 245
Brakken v. Minneapolis & St.
L. R. Co. 29 Minn. 43. . 107
Braley v. Powers, 9 2 Me. 203. 80
Bramble v. Ward, 40 Ohio St.
267 415
Branch v. Faust, 115 Ind. 464
47
v. Illinois (Tex. Cv. App.)
48 S. W. 40 665
Brande v. S (Tex. Cr. App.) 45
S. W. 17 272
Braniel v. Braniel, 19 Ky. L.
R. 72 " 696
Brann v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.)
39 S. W. 526 290
Brannum v. O'Conner, 77 Iowa.
632 86
Branson v. Com. 92 Ky. 330. 265
Branstrator v. Crow (Ind.) 60
N. E. 668 330
Brant v. Gallup, 111 111. 487
19, 94
Brantley v. Lee. 106 Ga. 313. 133
v. S. 115 Ga. 229 113
v. S. 9 Wyo. 102 6, 268
Brashinjjton v. South B. R. Co.
62 S. Car. 325 7. 101
Bratt v. Swift. 99 Wis. 579.. 210
Braun v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.)
39 S. W. 940 191
Braunschweiger v. Waits, 179
Pa. St. 47 96
Braxton v. S. 157 Ind. 213.. 80
Bray v. S. 41 Tex. 560 205
Braymer v. Commercial. &c.
Co. 199 Pa. St. 259 422
Bredlau v. Town of York, 115
Wis. 554. . .177
TABLE OF CASES.
xliii
(References are to Sections.)
Breedlove v. Sunday, 96 Ind.
319 34
v. Dennie, 2 Indian Ter.
606 25
Breen v. Field, 159 Mass. 582
25
Breese v. United States, 106
Fed. 680 191
Brehmer v. Lyman, 71 Vt. 98. 126
Brems v. Sherman, 158 Ind.
300 234
Breneman v. Kilgore (Tex. Cv.
App.) 35 S. W. 202 94
Bressemer Sav. Bank v. Ander-
son, 134 Ala. 343 44
Bressler v. P. 117 111. 422
48, 226, 299, 312, 366,
372, 373, 375, 721
Brewer v. Wright, 25 Neb.
805 404
Briceland v. Coin, 74 Pa. St.
469 324
Brick v. Bosworth, 162 Mass.
334 14
Brickill v. City of Baltimore,
60 Fed. 98 113
Bridenthal v. Davidson, 61 111.
461 202
Bridges v. S. 110 Ala. 15 88
Bridgeton v. Jones, 34 Mo.
472 465
Bridgewater v. S. 153 Ind.
560 169
Bridyers v. Dill. 97 N. Car.
222 84
Briggs v. Com. 82 Va. 554... 343
v. Union St. R. Co. 148
Mass. 72 183
Brin v. McGregor (Tex. Cv.
App.) 45 S. W. 923... . 80
Brink v. Black, 77 N. Car. 59
31
Brinser v. Longenecker, 169
Pa. St. 51 6, 8
Britton v. City of St. Louis,
120 Mo. 437 53, 194
v. S. 61 Ark. 15 27
Broil v. S. 45 Md. 359.. 166. 168
Bromley's Estate, In re, 113
Mich. 53 119
Bromley v. Goodwin, 95 111.
122 26a
Bronnenburg v. Charman, 80
Ind. 475 286
Brookin v. S. 26 Tex. App.
121 ... ..307
Brookins v. S. 100 Ga. 331
267,
Brooks v. Allen, 62 Ind. 405..
v. Barrett, 7 Pick. (Mass.)
94
v. Com. 16 Ky. 356
v. Dutcher, 22 Neb. 644..
v. Rochester, 31 N. Y. 179
v. S. 96 Ga. 353.14, 265,
v. S. 35 Ohio St. 48
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 31
S. W. 410
Brotherton v. P. 75 N. Y. 159
Brower v. Edson, 4 7 Mich. 9 1
Brown v. Baird, 5 Okla. 133..
v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R.
Co. 51 la. 235
v. Com. 86 Va. 466.. 153,
v. Com. 20 Ky. L. R. 1552
v. Emerson, 66 Mo. App.
63
v. Everett Ridley Ragan
Co. Ill Ga. 404
v. Foster, 41 S. Car. 118
v. Hannibal & St. J. R.
Co. 66 Mo. 599
v. McAllister, 39 Cal. 573
v. Master, 104 Ala. 451..
v. Mayo, .80 Mo. App. 81
v. P. 9 111. (4 Gilm.) 439
v. Pierce Co. 28 Wash. 345
v. Porter, 7 Wash. 327...
v. Potter, 13 Colo. App.
512
v. Stacy, 5 Ark. 403
v. S. 108 Ala. 18
v. S. 109 Ala. 70
v. S. 124 Ala. 76
v. S. 128 Ala. 12
v. S. 105 Ind. 390
70, 294, 716,
v. S. 32 Miss. 584
v. S. 72 Miss. 997
30, 195, 288,
v. S. 75 Miss. 842
v. S. 9 Neb. 157
v. S. 34 Tex. Cr. App. 150
268
416
696
240
350
238
816
817
86
331
192
143
574
165
255
196
86
219
247
260
356
3
682
25
126
215
310
251
318
297
719
317
296
366
255
103
xliv
TABLE OF CASES.
(References are to Sections.)
Brown v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 65
S. W. 906 243
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 29
S. VV. 772 86
v. S. 23 Tex. 195 306
v. Town of Swanton, 69
Vt. 53 222
v. U. S. 164 U. S. 221
25, 348
Brownell v. Fuller, 60 Neb.
558 181
Browning v. Wabash, &c. R. Co.
124 Mo. 65.12,616,625,649
Biroyhill v. Norton, 175 Mo.
190 80
Brozek v. Steinway R. Co. 161
N. Y. 63 353
Bruce v. Beall, 99 Tenn. 303.248
Bruch v. Carter, 32 N. J. L.
565 191
v. Smith, 111 Iowa, 217... 236
Bruen v. P. 206 111. 425... 12, 346
Bruker v. Town of Covington,
69 Ind. 35 593
Brunette v. Gagen, 106 Wis.
618 244
Bruni v. Garza (Tex. Cv. App.)
26 S. W. 108 94
Brunswick Grocery Co. v.
Brunswick & W. R. Co.
106 Ga. 270 124
Brush v. Smith, 111 Iowa, 217
211, 223
Brusie v. Peck Bros. & Co. 135
N. Y. 622 99
Bryant v. Hagerty, 87 Pa. St.
256 156
v. S. 116 Ala. 445
68, 343, 338
v. S. (Ala.) 23 So. 40 757
v. S. 34 Fla. 291 20, 299
v. S. 114 Ga 861 268
v. S. 106 Ind. 509 256
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 47
S. W. 373 257
Bryce v. Cayce, 62 S. Car. 546
90, 174
Buchart v. Ell, 9 Ind. App.
353 43
Buchman v. S. 109 Ala. 7.... 306
Buck v. Hogeboom (Neb.) 90
N. W. 635 203
v. Maddock, 167 111. 219. 238
v. People's St. R. & E. L.
& P. Co. 108 Mo. 129... 17
Buckingham v. Harris, 10 Colo.
458 439
Buckley v. S. 62 Miss. 705 215
v. Silverberg, 113 111. 673
101
Buckman v. Missouri K. & T.
R. Co. 100 Mo. App. 30
239
Buckmaster v. Cook, 12 111. 74
346, 358
Buel v. New York Steamer, 17
La. Ann. 541 347
v. S. 104 Wis. 132 25, 65
Bugbee v. Kendricken, 132
Mass. 349 100
Bugg v. Com. 18 Ky. L. R.
844 252
Bullard v. Brewer (Ga.) 45
S. E. 711 80
v. Smith (Mont.) 72 Pac.
761 80
Bullock v. Narrott, 49 111. 62
155, 163
Bumgardner v. Southern R. Co.
132 N. Car. 438 192, 195
Bunce v. McMahon, 6 Wyo. 24. 218
Bundy v. McKnight, 48 Ind.
505 693
Bunn v. Crowl, 10 Johns. (N.
Y.) 239 39
Bunnell v. Com. 17 Ky. L. R.
106 276
v. Greathead, 49 Barb. (N.
Y.) 106 3
Bunting v. Saltz, 84 Cal. 168. 182
Bunyan v. Loftus, 90 Iowa,
122 75
Burbridge v. Kansas City Cable
R. Co. 36 Mo. App. 678
568
Burdick v. P. 58 Barb. (N.
Y.) 51 170
Burgess v. Davis Sulphur Ore
Co. 165 Mass. 71 25
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 42
S. W. 562 6, 9
v. Singer Mfg. Co. (Tex.
Cv. App.) 30 S. W.
1110 188
Burgett v. Burgett, 43 Ind. 78. 7
Burke v. Holmes (Tex. Cv.
App.) 68 S. W. 52 118
v. Lee, 76 Va. 386
156, 158, 160
v. Maxwell, 81 Pa. St. 139
170
v. Sanitary Dist. 152 111.
134 25, 80
v. S. 34 Ohio St. 79 864
TABLE OF CASES.
xlv
(References are to Sections.}
Burkham v. Martin, 54 Ala.
122 181, 182
Burleson v. Lindsey (Tex. Cv.
App.) 23 S. W. 729 96
Burlingrin v. Bader, 45 Neb.
673 246
Burn v. P. 126 111. 285.. 66, 347
Burnett v. Cavanaugh, 56 Neb.
190 93, 358
v. P. 204 111. 225 738
v. S. 60 N. J. L 255 247
v. Wilmington N. & N. R.
Co. 120 N. Car. 517... 351
Burnette v. Town of Guyers,
106 Wis. 618 346. 358
Burney v. S. (Ga.) 25 S. E.
911 105
Burnham v Allen, 1 Gray
(Mass.) 497 416
v. Logan, 88 Tex. 1 28, 351
Burns v. Woolery, 15 Wash.
134 71
Burr v. McCullum, 59 Neb.
326 6
Burrows v. Delta Tr. Co. 106
Mich. 582 107
Burt v. Long, 106 Mich. 210.. 19G
v. Meyer, 71 Md. 467 440
v. S. 72 Miss. 408 305
Burton v. Rosemary Mfg. Co.
132 N. Car. 17 80
v. S. 118 Ala. 109 25
v. S. 107 Ala. 108
113, 296, 326
Busch v. Fisher, 89 Mich. 192. 84
Buse v. Russell, 86 Mo. 212.. 668
Bush v. Glover, 47 Ala. 167.. 32
v. S. 37 Ark. 215 113
v. S. 47 Neb. 642 347
Bushnell v. Chamberlain, 44
Neb. 751 25
Bussanicy v. Myers, 22 Wash.
369 244
Bussey v. Charleston & W. C.
R. Co. 52 S. Car. 438.. 197
Butler v. Greene. 49 Neb. 280. 71
v. Holmes (Tex. Cv. App.)
68 S. W. 52 351
v. Machen, 65 Fed. 901.. 71
Butterfield v. Kirtley, 114
Iowa, 520 80
Buzzell v. Emerton, 161 Mass.
176 8
Byers v. Maxwell, 22 Tex. Cv..
App. 269 48
v. Thompson, 66 111. 421.. 153
v. Wallace, 88 Texas, 503. 196
Byford v. Girton, 90 Iowa, 661
349
Bynum v. Bynum, 33 N. Car.
632 355
v. S. (Fla.) 35 So. 85 9
v. Southern Pump Co. 63
Ala. 462 347
Byrd v. Ellis (Tex. Cr. App.)
35 S. W. 1070... 363
C
Cady v. Owen, 34 Vt. 598 14
Cage v. Tucker's Heirs, 29 Tex.
Cv. App. 586 94
Cahill v. Chicago M. & St. P.
R. Co. 74 Fed. 285.... 148
Cahn v. Ladd, 94 Wis. 134... 219
Cain v. Hunt, 41 Ind. 466 181
Caldwell v. Stephens, 57 Mo.
589 84
Caledonian Ins. Co. v. Traul,
80 Md. 214 80
Calef v. Thomas, 81 111. 486
44, 113, 504
Calkins, Estate of, 112 Cal.
296 81
Callaghan v. Myers, 89 111.
566, 569 113. 192
Callahan v. Port Huron, 128
Mich. 673 86, 245
Callan v. McDaniel, 72 Ala.
96 27
Callanan v. S. 24 Iowa, 441.. 218
Calloway v. S. Ill Ga. 832
265, 816
Calquhour v. Wells & Fargo Co.
21 Nev. 459 60
Calumet, &c. R. Co. v. Christ-
enson, 170 111. 383 124
v.Moore, 124 111. 337 106
v. Morawetsy, 195 111. 406
241
v. Van Pett, 173 111. 72
71, 70, 53, 650, 124
Camarillo v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.)
68 S. W. 795 109
Camden A. R. Co. v. Williams,
61 N. J. L. 646 192
Cameron v. Union Trunk Line,
10 Wash. 507 239
v. Vandergriff, 53 Ark. 151
170
Camp P. Mfg. Co. v. Ballou
71 111. 421 94, 534
TABLE OF CASES.
(References are to Sections.)
Campbell v. Beckett, 8 Ohio.
St. 211 35
v. Campbell, 138 111. 612. 74
v. Me Coy, 3 Tex. Cv. App.
298 176
v. P. 16 111. 17.. 19, 256, 728
v, P. 92 111. 602 115
v. P. 109 111. 565 48, 101
v. Prague, 39 N. Y. S. 558
145
v. Preferred M. A. Asso.
172 Pa. St. 561 86
v. S. 133 Ala. 81
55, 68, 80, 317
v. S. 150 Ind. 74
75, 265, 266, 816
v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. App. 160
304
. v. Warner (Tex. Cv. App.)
24 S. W. 703 6
Canado v. Curry, 73 Ind. 246. 182
Cancerni v. P. 16 N. Y. 501.. 340
Canfielcl v. City of Jackson, 112
Mich. 120 26
Cannon v. Farmers' Bank
(Neb.) 91 N. W. 585
48, 238
v. P. 141 111. 270
80, 195, 198
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 56
S. W. 351 255, 269
Canthem v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.)
65 S. W. 96 23
Capital Bank v. Armstrong, 62
Mo. 62 84, 416
Caraway v. Citizens' N. B'k
(Tex. Cv. App.) 29 S.
W. 506 101
Cardon v. S. 84 Ala. 417... 52
Carle v. P. 200 111. 494.. 251, 773
Carleton v. S. 43 Neb. 373
21, 27, 67, 238. 258, 297
Carleton Min. & Mill Co. v.
Ryan, 29 Colo. 401 79
Carlisle v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.)
56 S. W 365 156, 331
Carlton v P. 150 111. 181
25, 294, 295, 299, 303
308, 315. 322, 721
Carlyle Canning Co. v. Balti-
more & O. S. W. R. Co.
77 111. App. 396 42
Carmona v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.)
65 S. W 928 304
Carpenter v American A. Co.
46 S. Car. 541.. .. 351
Carpenter v. City of Red Cloud,
64 Neb. 126 57
v. Dowe (Tex. Cv. App.)
26 S. W. 1002 355
v. Eastern R. Co. 67 Minn.
188 351
v. P. 8 Barb. (N. Y.) 603
153, 165
v. S. 62 Ark. 286 294
v. S. 43 Ind. 371 6
Carr v. Frick Coke Co. 170
Pa. St. 62 6
v. S." 104 Ala. 4 163
v. S. 84 Ga. 250 299
v. S. 96 Ga. 284 329, 332
Carrell v. Kalanuazoo Cold
Storage Co. 112 Mich.
34 26
Carretson v. Appleton, 58 N.
J. L. 386 120
Carroll v. Chicago, St. P. M.
& O. R. Co. (Iowa) 84
N. W. 1035 170
v. S. 45 Ark. 539 290
v. S. 53 Neb. 431 275
v. Tucker, 26 N. Y. S. 86. 32
Carruth v. Harris, 41 Neb.
789 92
Carson v. S. 34 Tex. Cr. App.
342 6
Carstens v. Earles, 26 Wash.
676 71. 191. 200
v. Stetson & P. M. Co. 14
Wash. 643 25
Carter v. Columbia & G. R. Co.
19 S. Car. 26 355
v. Fischer, 127 Ala. 52.. 142
v. Fulgham, 134 Ala. 238
249
v. Kaufman (S. Car.) 45
S. E. 1017 86
v. Missouri M. & L. Co. 6
Okla. 11 347
v. S. 106 Ga. 372 25
v. S. 22 Fla. 553 43
Carter White Lead Co. v. Ki'n-
lin, 47 Neb. 409 7
Cartier v. Troy, &c. Co. 138
111. 538 250
Cartiledge v. S. 132 Ala. 17.. 80
Carver v. S. 36 Tex. Cr. App.
552 102'
Carwile v. Carwile, 131 Ala.
603 118
Case v. Central R. Co. 59 N.
J. L. 471 .127
TABLE OF CASES.
xlvii
(References are to Sections.)
Case v. Illinois Cent. R. Co. 38
Iowa, 581 80
Casey v. Ballou Banking Co.
98 Iowa, 107 358
v. S. 49 Neb. 403 744
Casner v. S. 42 Tex. Cr. App.
118 112
Castle v. Boys, 19 Ky. L. R.
345 358
v. S. 75 Ind. 146 301, 336
Castlin v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.)
57 S. W. 827 25, 48
Castro v. S. (Tex. Cv. App.)
40 S. W. 985 272
Cathey v. Bowen, 70 Ark. 348. 347
Catholic Order of Foresters v.
Fitz' 181 111. 206 56
Catlett v. Young, 143 111. 74.. 649
Cauble v. Worsham (Tex. Cv.
App.) 69 S. W. 194... 25
Caughlin v. P. 18 111. 266.... 48
Cavallora v. Texas. &c. R. Co.
110 Cal. 348 351
Cavender v. S. 126 Ind. 48 310
Caveny v. Neely, 43 S. Car.
'70 7. 12
v. Weiller. 90 111. 159 135
Caw v. P. 3 Neb. 357 48
Cawfield v. Ashville St. R. Co.
111 N. Car. 597 85
Cawley v. S. 133 Ala. 128 295
Cederson v. Oregon R. & N. Co.
38 Ore. 343 174
Central, &c. R. Co. v. Barmis-
ter, 195 111. 48
53, 106, 199, 239
v. Bond 356
v. Bush, 12 Tex. Cv. App.
291 78
v. Chatterson, 17 Ky. L.
R. 5 134
v. Coleman, 80 Md. 328... 346
v. Dumas, 131 Ala. 172.. 116
v. Hardin, 114 Ga. 548.. 7
v. Haslett, 74 Ga. 59 63
v. Hubbarcl, 86 Ga, 623... 84
v. Johnson, 106 Ga. 130
196, 247
v. Knowles, 191 111. 241.. 124
v. Serpass, 153 111. 379
58. 238
v. Thompson, 76 'Ga. 775. 653
v. Trammell, 114 Ga. 312. 20
v. Windham, 126 Ala, 552
80
Central City v. Engle (Neb.)
91 N. W. 849 80
Central Tobacco Co. v. Knoop,
24 Ky. L. R. 1268.... 170
Centralia & C. R. Co. v. Rix-
man, 121 111. 2-14 286
Cerrillos Coal R. Co. v. Deser-
an, 9 N. Mex. 49 94, 101
Cesure v. S. 1 Tex. App. 19.. 67
Challis v. Lake, 71 N. H. 90
80, 358
Chamberlain v. S. 2 Tex. App.
451 37
Chamberlain Banking H. v.
Woolsey, 60 Neb. 516.. 94
Chambers v. P. 105 111. 409
48, 115, 172, 195, 227
v. Short. 79 Mo. 206 393
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 44
S. W. 495 25
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 68
S. W. 286 103
Chandler v. Com. 19 Ky. L.
R. 631 238
v. Keeler, 46 Iowa, 598... 689
Chancy v. Phoenix Ins. Co. 62
Mo. App. 45 113
Chapell v. Schmidt, 104 Cal.
511 65
Chapman v. Cawrey, 50 111.
518 25, 504
v. McCormick, 86 N. Y.
479 14
v. S. 109 Ga. 157 170
v. S. 61 Neb. 888 66
v. S. 42 Tex. Cr. App. 135
x 255
v. Southern Pac. R. Co. 12
Utah, 30 48
v. Yellow P. L. Co. 89 Fed.
903 126
Chappell v. Allen, 38 Mo. 213. 1
v. S. 7 Caldw. (Tenn.) 92
322
Charter v. Lane, 62 Conn. 121
27, 116
Chase v. Blodgett Milling Co.
Ill Wis. 655 74
v. Horton, 143 Mass. 118. 192
v. P. 40 111. 353 331
v. Washburn, 1 Ohio St.
244 243
Chattanooga R. & C. R. Co. v.
Owen, 90 Ga. 265 63
Chavarria v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.)
62 S. W. 312 206
Cheaney v. S. 36 Ark. 74 359
xlviii
TABLE OF CASES.
(References are to Sections./
Cheatham v. S. 67 Miss. 335.. 288
Cherokee Packet Co. v. Hilson,
95 Tenn. 1 238
Cherry v. Cox, 1 Indian Ter.
578 360
Chesapeake, &c. R. Co. v. An-
derson, 93 Va. 651 558
v. Barlow, 86 Tenn. 537.. 187
v. Board (Ky.) 77 S. W.
189 529
v. Clowes, 93 Va. 195
570, 584
v. Dupee's Adm'r, 26 Ky.
L. R. 2349 90
v. Gunter, 108 Ky. 365.. 183
v. Ogles (Ky.) 73 S. W.
751 . . 129
v. Rogers' Adm'x, 100 Va.
324 80
Cheshire v. Tappan, 94 Ga.
704 25
Chesney v. Meadows, 90 111.
431 113
Chestnut v. Southern I. R. Co.
157 Ind. 509 362
Chezem v. S. 56 Neb. 496
6, 117, 214
Chicago, &c. R. Co. v. Adler,
129 111. 335 121
v. Allen, 169 111. 287.196, 363
v. Anderson, 162 111. 572. 183
v. Anderson, 166 111. 572
54, 235
v. Anderson, 182 111. 298. 58'
v. Anderson, 193 111. 9... 48
v. Anderson. 38 Neb. 112. 192
v. Austin, 69 111. 429.106, 635
v. Avery, 109 111. 322.... 31
v. Bailey, 66 Kas. 115. .. 94
v. Bingenheimer, 116 111.
226 31, 86
v. Bragonier, 119 111. 51.. 80
v. Browdy, 206 111. 617
101, 648
v. Brown, 157 Ind. 547.. 645
v. Bryan, 90 111. 126 80
v. Buekstaff (Neb.) 91 N.
W. 426 101
v. Bundy, 210 111. 47
30, 80, 549
v. By rum, 153 111. 131
183, 549
v. Camper, 199 111. 569... 244
v. CarroH, 206 111. 318
127, 196
v. Catholic Bishop, 119 111.
528 .. 683
Chicago, &c. R. Co. v. Chancel-
lor, 165 111. 445
v. Chisholm, 79 111. 584..
v. Clapp, 201 111. 434....
v. Clark, 70 111. 276
v. Delaney, 169 111. 581..
v. Dickson, 143 111. 374..
v. Dimick, 96 111. 47
v. Dinsmore, 162 Ala. 658
117,
v. Dougherty, 110 111. 525
v. Dowd, 115 111. 659
v. Dumser, 161 111. 190..
v. Dunleavy, 129 111. 132
25,. 121,
v. Dunn, 61 111. 385
v. Erwin (Tex. Cv. App. )
65 S. W. 496
v. Eselin, 86 111. App. 94.
v. Eston, 178 111. 192.. 75,
v. Fennimore, 199 111. 18
25,
v. Fietsam, 123 111. 518..
v. Filler, 195 111. 17
v. Fisher, 141 111. 624
53, 74,
v. Flynn, 154 111. 453
v. Fuller, 195 111. 18
v. Garver, 83 111. App. 118
v. Goebel, 1 1 9 111. 5 1 5 ...
v. Goldsmith, 173 111. 326
v. Gore,. 202 111. 188.194,
v. Gregory, 58 111. 272...
v. Griffin, 68 111. 499
66. 113, 119,
v. Groves, 56 Kas. 601
20, 25, 26, 56,
v. Harrington, 192 111. 9
53, 56, 99, 119,
v. Harwood, 80 111. 91
245,
v. Harwood, 90 111. 429..
v. Hastings, 136 111. 251
95,
v. Healey, 86 Fed. 245...
v. Hedges, 105 Ind. 398..
v. Heinrich, 157 111. 388..
v. Hines, 132 111. 161
v. Holland, 122 111. 469
19, 25, 625,
v. Hutchinson, 120 '111.
587
v. Ingraham, 131 111. 659.
12(5
106
238
92
124
48
250
247
250
650
117
106
54
133
238
31
382
638
116
113
250
198
238
638
94
195
101
363
651
192
242
6
43
133
56
652
195
48
TABLE OF CASES.
xlix
(References are to Sections.}
Chicago, &c. R. Co. v. Jacobs,
110 111. 414 65, 94
v. Johnson, 103 111. 512.. 65
v. Johnson, 116 111. 210.. 238
v. Johnson (Neb.) 95 N.
W. 614 123
v. Keegan, 185 111. 80
244, 246, 247
v. Kelly, 182 111. 267
183, 363
v. Kelly, 25 111. App. 19.. 19
v. Kmnare, 90 111. 9 31
v. Kneirim, 152 111. 458
76. 94, 243
v. Krapp, 173 111. 219
235, 238
v. Krayenbuhl (Neb.) 91
N. W. 880 182
v. Krueger, 124 111. 457
25, 66
v. Kuckkuck, 197 111. 304. 118
v. Lagerkrans (Neb.) 91
N. W. 358 230
v. Lane, 130 111. 116 643
v. Leach, 152 111. 249.... 363
v. Lee, 29 Ind. App. 480.. 247
v. Levy, 160 111. 385 106
v. Lewis, 109 111. 134
80, 86, 87
v. Libey, 68 111. App. 144
94
v. Linn. 30 Ind. App. 88.. 468
v. Lonergan, 118 111. 41
65, 115
v. McCarthy, 66 111. App.
667 54
v. McDonnell, 194 111. 82.. 196
v. Maroney, 170 111. 526
56, 183
v. Matthews, 153 111. 268. 235
v. Mayer, 185 111. 336... 24
v. Mead, 206 111. 178.. 58, 71
v. Meech, 163 111. 305
78, 206
v. Mills, 91 111. 39.. 192, 195
v. Mills, 105 111. 70 86
v. Mitchell, 159 111. 406.. 19
v. Mochell, 193 111. 208.. 105
v. Moran, 210 111. 9
25, 31, 116, 117
v. Moranda, 108 111. 582. 170
v. Murowski, 179 111. 77
123, 124, 363
v. Murphy, 198 111. 470
199, 243, 247
v. Murray, 62 111. 331..1, 250
. v. Naperville, 166 111. 87. 247
Chicago, &c. R. Co. v. O'Conner,
119 111. 598 181
v. O'Donnell, 208 111. 273
19, 629, 530
v. O'Sullivan, 143 111. 60. 68
v. Otto, 52 111. 417 652
v. Oyster, 58 Neb. 1 7, 70
v. Parks, 59 Kas. 790 26
v. Payne, 49 111. 499 247
v. Payne, 59 111. 534.. 53, 650
v. Pelligreen, 65 111. App.
333 204
v. Pennell, 94 111. 448 245
v. Pollock, 195 111. 162
183, 200, 366
v. Pontiac, 169 111. 155
48, 238
v. Prouty, 55 Kas. 503... 80
v. Rains, 203 111. 422.186, 212
v. Rayburn, 153 111. 290
94, 195
v. Renter. 210 111. 279... 25
v. Roach. 180 111. 174
542, 551
v. Robbins, 159 111. 602.. 35
v. Robinson, 106 111. 142
97. 170, 204
v.Ryan, 165 111. 88 25
v. Sanders. 154 111. 531
195, 363
v. Sandusky, 99 111. App.
164 19
v. Schmelling, 99 111. Ap.
577 155
v. Smith, 162 111. 185 133
v. Snyder, 128 111. 655
51, 117. 119, 129
v. Spilker. 134 Ind. 401
196, 633
v. Stahley, 62 Fed. 363.. 190
v. Stephenson (Ind.) 69
N. E. 273 199
v. Sullivan. 76 111. App.
505 14
v. Sykes, 96 111. 162
66, 106, 117
v. Tilton, 87 111. 553 865
v. Utley. 38 111. 411 1
v. Van'Darn. 149 111. 338. 133
v. Van Patten, 64 111. 514
250
v. Van Vleck. 143 111. 480. 20
v. Warner, 108 111. 545
113, 624. 652, 653
v. Warner, 123 111. 49.68, 181
v. Wedel, 144 111. 9 124
v. Weiss, 203 111. 539.... 196
TABLE OF CASES.
(References are to Sections.)
Chicago. &c. R. Co. v. Welsh,
118 111. 572 198
v. White, 2Q9 111. 124... 76
v. Winters, 175 111. 299.. 223
v. Woolridge, 174 111. 330
123, 124
v. Yando, 127 111. 214... 360
v. Yorty, 158 111. 323.74, 642
v. Zapp, 209 111. 341 40
v. Zerneeke, 59 Neb. 689. 71
Chicago Packing & Provision
Co. v. Tilton, 87 111. 547. 86
Chicago T. & T. Co. v. Brady,
165 Mo. 201.. 388, 415, 416
Chicago T. T. Co. v. Gruss
(111.) 65 N. E. 693 25
v. Katoski, 199 111. 383.. 25
Chichester v. Whiteleather, 51
111. 259 157, 192
Child v. Boyd & Carey Boot &
Shoe Mfg. Co. 175 Mass.
493 6
Childers v. S. 37 Tex. Cr. App.
35 303
Childress v. Callender, 108 Ind.
394 349
Childs v. Muckler, 105 Iowa,
279 25
v. S. 76 Ala. 93.... 203, 219
v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. App. 573. 22
Chilesler v. S. 33 Tex. Cr. App.
635 311
Chins v. U. S. 118 Fed. 538.. 189
Chisholm v. Preferred Bank-
er's Life Ass'n, 112
Mich. 50 207
Chisum v. Chestnut (Tex. Cv.
App.) 36 S. W. 758.... 25
Chittenden v. Evans. 41 111.
251 209, 113, 219
Chittim v. Martinez, 94 Tex.
141 199
Choctaw, &c. R. Co. v. Deper-
ade (Okla.) 71 Pac. 629
192, 196
v. Tennessee, 116 Fed. 23
238, 239
Choutean v. Jupiter Iron
Works, 94 Mo. 388 37
Chrisholm v. Keyfauver, 110
Cal. 102 80
Chrisman v. S. 54 Ark. 288.. 281
Christensen v. Lambert, 67 N.
J. L. 341 25
Christian v. Connecticut Mut.
Life Ins. Co. 143 Mo.
460 84, 363
Christian v. S. 7 Ind. App. 417
27
Christie v. P. 206 111. 342
53. 113
Christman v. Ray, 42 111. App.
Ill 203
Christy v. Stafford, 123 111.
466 47
Churchwell v. S. 117 Ala. 124
218
Cicely v. S. 13 S. & M. (Miss.)
202 306
Cicero, &c. R. Co. v. Brown,
193 111. 274
117, 218, 380, 652
v. Meixner, 160 111. 320
30, 363
v. Rollins, 195 111. 220
242, 366
Cincinnati v. Whetstone, 47
Ohio St. 199 671
Cincinnati, &c. R. Co. v. Clif-
ford, 113 Ind. 460 361
v. Cregor, 150 Ind. 625
215, 350
v. Howard, 124 Ind. 287
629, 633
v. Lutes, 112 Ind. 281 398
v. Smock, 133 Ind. 411.. 7
Cincinnati & H. T. Co. v. Hes-
ter, 12 Ohio C. C. 350.. 12
Citizens' Gas & 0. M. Co. v.
Whipple (Ind.) 69 N.
E. 559 365, 532
Citizens' Gas Light Co. v. O'-
Brien, 118 111. 182.. 65, 242
Citizens' Ins. Co. v. Short, 62
Ind. 316 10
v. Stoddard, 197 111. 330. 196
Citizens' St. R. Co. v. Burke,
98 Tenn. 650
58, 105, 175, 182
v. Hamer, 29 Ind. App.
426 238, 243
v. Shepherd, 107 Tenn.
444 247
v. Willoeby, 134 Ind. 567. 557
City & S. R. Co. v. Findley, 76
Ga. 311 119
City Bank's Appeal from
Com'rs, 54 Com.. 273.. 202
City Council v. Wright, 72
Ala. 41 i 591
City of Aledo v. Honeyman,
208 111. 415 48
City of Atchison v. Jansen. 21
Kas. 560 4
TABLE OF CASES.
li
(References are to Sections.)
City of Atlanta v. Young, 93
Ga, 265 72
Ciify of Aurora v. Hillman, 90
111. 68 591
City of Austin v. Ritz, 72 Tex.
401 543, 594
City of Beardstown v. Clark,
204 111. 526 243
v. Smith, 150 111. 169,
175 363, 592
City of Birmingham v. Starr,
112 Ala. 98 66
City of Bonham v. Crider (Tex.
Civ. App.) 27 S. W. 419
68, 171
City of Chadron v. Glover, 43
Neb. 732 44
City of Chicago v. Bixby, 84
111. 83 192
.v. Hastings, 136 111. 251. 25
v. Keefe, 114 111. 230. ..3, 12
v. Langlass, 66 111. 363... 595
v. Le Moyne, 119 Fed. 662
14
v. McDonough, 112 111. 85
238
v. McLean, 133 111. 148.. 58
v. Moore, 139 111. 201 195
v. Schmidt, 107 111. 186
104, 119
v. Sheehan, 113 111. 658.. 95
v. Shelton, 75 111. 468.. 80, 86
v. Stearns, 105 111. 554
25, 591, 606, 607
City of Columbus v. Strassner,
138 Ind. 301 181, 308
City of Crete v. Hendricks
(Neb.) 90 N. W. 215.. 230
City of Dallas v. Breeman, 23
Tex. Cv. App. 3 15... 94, 182
v. Jones (Tex.) 53 S. W.
377 106
City of Decatur v. Besten, 169
111. 340 235
City of Dixon v. Scott, 181 111.
116 223
City of East St. L. v. O'Flynn,
119 111. 207 126
City of Elgin v. Beckwith, 119
111. 367 198
v. Joslyn. 136 111. 529 242
City of Elizabeth v. Fitzgerald,
114 Fed. 547 230
City of Evansville v. Tenhenn.
151 Ind. 42 595
City of Ft. Madison v. Moore,
109 Iowa, 476 90
City of Freeport v. Isbell, 83
111. 440 1, 106
City of Galveston v. Posnain-
sky, 62 Tex. 120.. 599, 600
City of Harvard v. Crouch, 47
Neb. 133 216
City of Indianapolis v. Doherty,
71 Ind. 6 605
v. Gaston, 58 Ind. 224
591, 607
v. Scott, 72 Ind. 200
591, 596, 597, 598, 607
City of Joliet v. Johnson, 177
111. 178 25, 48, 238
v. Looney, 159 111. 471
34, 35, 597
v. Seward, 86 111. 402 113
City of Lanark v. Dougherty,
153 III. 163 238
City of Logansport v. Dyke-
man, 116 Ind. 26 27
v. Kihm, 159 Ind. 68 482
City of Louisville v. McGill
(Ky.) 52 S. W. 1053... 71
City of Lynchburg v. Wallace,
95 Va. 640 48
City of Ma con v. Holcomb, 205
111. 645 238
City of Madison v. Moore, 109
Iowa, 476 25
City of Marshall v. McAlister,
22 Tex. Cv. App. 214.. 48
City of Mishawaka v. Kirby
(Ind.) 69 N. E. 482 234
City of Morris v. S. 25 Ala. 57
34
City of Omaha v. Bowman, 63
Neb. 333 120
v. Hager (Neb.) 92 N. W.
1017 355
v. Meyers (Neb.) 92 N. W.
743 70
v. Richards, 49 Neb. 249. 350
City of Peoria v. Calhoun, 29
111. 317 161
v. Gerber, 168 111. 323
25, 90, 183
City of Roodhouse v. Christian,
158 111. 137 235, 238
City of Salem v. Webster, 192
111. 369 20
City of San Antonio v. Kreusel,
17 Tex. Cv. App. 594... 242
City of Sherman v. Greening
(Tex. Cv. App.) 73 S.
W. 424 355
Hi
TABLE OF CASES.
(References are to Sections.)
City of So. Bend v. Hardy, 98
Ind. 585
City of South Omaha v. Fen-
nell (Neb.) 94 N. W.
632
v. Meyers (Neb.) 92 N.
W. 743
v. Powell, 50 Neb. 798...
v. Wizensinski (Neb.) 92
N. W. 1045
City of Spring Valley v. Gavin,
182 111. 232 219,
City of Sterling v. Merrill, 124
111. 522 20
City of Streeter v. Leibendorf-
er, 71 111. App. 625
City of Toledo v. Higgins, 12
Ohio C. C. 646
City Trans. Co. v. Draper, 115
Ga. 954
Clafin v. Cottman. 77 Ind. 58
damn v. Fagan, 124 Ind. 304
Clapp v. Royer, 28 Tex. Cv.
App. 29
Clapper v. Mendill, 96 Mo.
App. 106
Clare v. P. 9 Colo. 122.. 311,
Clark v. Bennett, 123 Cal. 275
v. Clark, 16 Ohio C. C.
103
v. Clark, 36 N. Y. S. 294.
v. Com. 18 Ky. L. R. 758.
v. Com. 23 Ky. L. R. 1029
v. Com. 123 Pa. St. 555..
v. Goddard. 39 Ala. 164. .
v. S. 159 Ind. 66 201,
v. S. 12 Ohio, 494... 334,
v. S. 31 Tex. 574
v. S. 8 Tex. App. 350
v. S. 34 Tex. Cr. App. 120
v. Stitt, 12 Ohio C. C. 759
Clarke v. S. 117 Ala. 1
Clarkson v. Whitaker (Tex. Cv.
App.) 68 S. W. 53
Clausen v. Jones, 18 Tex. Cv.
App. 376
Clear Creek Stone Co. v. Dear-
min, 160 Ind. 162
Cleason v. Baldwin, 152 N. Y.
204 145,
592
45
348
351
595
223
65
202
12
244
357
357
244
118
312
20
6
146
274
269
253
170
238
720
12
752
103
126
269
236
223
238
146
Cleavenger v. S. (Tex. Cr.
App.) 65 S. W. 89.. 179,
Clem v. S. 31 Ind. 480
v. S. 42 Ind. 420 186,
Clemmons v. S. 43 Fla. 200..
Cleveland v. Anderson (Neb.)
92 N. W. 306
v. Empire Mills Co. 6 Tex.
Cv. App. 479
Cleveland, &c. R. Co. v. Bad-
deley, 150 111. 328.238,
v. Bates, 91 Ind. 290
v. Best, 169 111. 301
v. Crawford, 24 Ohio St.
640 183, 245,
v. Drumm (Ind.) 70 N.
E. 286
v. Heath, 22 Ind. App. 47
v. Jenkins, 174 111. 398
106,
v. Miles, 162 Ind. 646
v. Monaghan, 140 111. 474
v. Patton, 203 111. 379...
v. Richardson, 19 Ohio Cir.
385
v. Sargent, 19 Ohio St.
452
v. Terry, 8 Ohio St. 570..
v. Walters, 147 111. 60.20.
Cleveland Axle Co. v. Zilch, 12
Ohio C. C. 578
Clewis v. Malone, 131 Ala.
465
Clifford v. Lee (Tex. Cv. App.)
23 S. W. 843 181.
v. Minneapolis St. P. & S.
S. R. Co. 105 Wis. 618.
v. S. 56 Ind. 245
Cline v. S. 43 Ohio St. 33
192,
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 28
S. W. 684
Clore v. Mclntire, 120 Ind. 266
Clough v. S. 7 Neb. 344
Clouser v. Ruckman, 104 Ind.
588
Coal & Mining Co. v. Clay, 51
Ohio St. 550
Coal Co. v. Estievenard, 53
Ohio St. 57
v.Jones, 127 111. 382.. 66.
Coates v. S. 50 Ark. 330....
v. Town of Stanton. 90
Wis. 130 .
297
80
222
112
355
650
646
195
246
85
126
133
631
71
363
27
70
94
130
191
191
25
154
281
259
360
781
41
351
544
81
331
232
TABLE OF CASES.
liii
( References are to Sections.}
Cobb v. Covenant M. B. Asso.
153 Mass. 176 75
v. Griffin & A. Co. 87 Mo.
90 162
v. Malone, 87 Ala. 514... 360
v. S. 115 Ala. 18 219, 299
v. Simon (Wis.) 97 N. W.
279 48
Cobb Chocolate Co. v. Kund-
son, 207 111. 461 19, 98
Coburn v. S. 36 Tex. Cr. App.
257 290, 292
Cochran v. United States, 157
U. S. 286 337
Coekrill v. Hall, 76 Cal. 193.. 37
Cocoran v. Lehigh Coal Co.
138 111. 399 197
Codding v. Wood, 112 Pa. St.
371 157
Coddington v. Canaday, 157
Ind. 243 112
Coffee v. McCord, 83 Ind. 593. 352
v. S. 5 Tex. App. 545 336
Coffey v. S. (Miss.) 24 So. 315
282
Coffeyville Brick Co. v. Zim-
merman, 61 Kas. 750.. 234
Coffin v. Brown. 94 Md. 190.. 191
v. United States, 156 U.
S. 432 200, 337
v. U. S. 162 U. S. 664
48. 71, 113
Coffman v. Com. 10 Bush.
(Ky.) 495 115
v. Reeves, 62 Ind. 334... 25
In re. 12 Iowa, 491 696
Cogan v. Cass. Ave. & F. G. R.
Co. (Mo. App.) 73 S.
W. 738 126
Coghill v. Kennedy, 119 Ala.
641 20, 67, 704
Cogwell v. Southern P. R. Co.
129 N. Car. 398 223
Cohen v. Pemberton, 53 Conn,
235 191
Cohn v. David Mayer Brewing
Co. 56 N. Y. S. 293
126, 141
v. Stewart. 41 Wis. 527.. 156
Coker v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 31
S. W. 655 110
Colby v. McDermont (N. Dak.)
71 N. W. 772 358
v. Portman, 115 Mich. 95
84
Cole v. City of Boston. 181
Mass. 374 .... 57
Cole v. Curtis, 16 Minn. 182.. 354
v. S. 75 Ind. 511..; 56
Colee v. S. 75 Ind. 515 281
Coleman v. Adair, 75 Miss.
660 195, 211, 223
v. Drane, 1-16 Mo. 387 664
v. Lord .(Me.) 52 Atl. 645
126
v. S. Ill Ind. 563 52
Coley v. North Carolina R. Co.
129 N. Car. 407 121
Collar v. Patterson, 137 111.
406 124. 126
Collier v. Gavin (Neb.) 95 N.
W. 842 363
v. Jenks, 19 R. I. 493 243
Collins v. Breen, 75 Wis. 606. 359
v. Chicago, &c. R. Co.
(Iowa) 97 N. W. 1103. 25
v. City of Janesville, 107
Wis. 436 48
v. City of Janesville, 111
Wis. 348 25
v. Collins, 46 Iowa, 60 84
v. Cooper, 65 Tex. 462 389
v. George (Va.) 46 S. E.
684 347
v. Green, 28 N. Car. 139. 158
v. P. 39 111. 233 276
v. P. 08 111. 589 288
v. S. 20 Tex. App. 400 319
v. S. 39 Tex. Cr. App. 441
191
v. Waters. 54 111. 486 102
Collins Ice Cream Co. v.
Stephens, 189 111. 200.. 347
Colquhonn v. Wells, Fargo &
Co. 21 Nev. 459 65
Colter v. S. 37 Tex. Cr.
App. 284 304
Columbus, C. & I. C. v.
Troesch, 68 111. 545 94
Columbus C. Co. v. Crane Co.
101 Fed. 946 351
Columbus R. Co. v. Ritter, 67
Ohio St. 53 7
Columbus S. Bank v. Crane Co.
56 Neb. 317 100
Columbia Veneer & Box Co. v.
Cottonwood Lumber Co.
99 Tenn. 122 4.. 34
Comer v. Hines. 49 Ind. 482.. 156
Comey v. Philadelphia Tr. Co.
175 Pa. St. 133 198
Comfort v. Balh'ngal, 134 Mo.
289 155, 156
v. P. 54 111. 404... . 265
liv
TABLE OF CASES.
(References are to Sections.)
Comfort v. Young, 100 Iowa,
629 492, 501
Commercial Bank v. Chatfield,
121 Mich. 641 118
Comjmercial Club v. Hilliker,
20 Ind. App. .239 G50
Commercial F. Ins. Co. v. Mor-
ris, 105 Ala. 49'8 195
Commercial Nat. Bank v. Proc-
tor, 98 111. 562 198
Commercial Travelers' M. A.
Asso. v. Fulton, 79 Fed.
423 347
Commissioners v. Ryckman, 9 1
Md. 36 235, 358
v. Wise, 71 Ind. 43 675
Commonwealth v. Anthes, 71
Mass. (5 Gray) 185
153, 165, 166, 167
v. Barry, 91 Mass. (9 Al-
len) 276 119, 208
v. Berchine, 168 Pa. St.
603, 32 Atl. 109
189, 252, 740
v. Bishop, 165 Mass, 148. 288
v. Boschim, 176 Pa. St.
103 326
v. Bosworth, 22 Pick.
(Mass.) 398 288
v. Boutwell, 162 Mass. 230
85
v. Briant, 142 Mass. 463. 170
v. Brooks, 164 Mass. 397. 151
v. Brown, 167 Mass. 144. 229
v. Brubaker, 13 Pa. Super.
Ct. 14 68
v. Carter (Mass.) 66 N.
E. 716 26
v. Castley, 118 Mass. 1
222 295
v. Clark, 3 Pa. Super. Ct.'
141 -44
v. Cleary, 135 Pa. St. 64. 340
v. Clume, 162. Mass. 206.. 288
v. Delaney, 16 Ky. L. R.
509 113
v. Devaney, 182 Mass. 33. 227
v. Devine, 18 Pa. Super.
Ct. 431 297
v. Eckerd, 174 Pa. St. 137
344
v. Flynn, 165 Mass. 153.. 171
v. Foster (Ky.) 61 S. W.
271 151
v. George, 13 Pa. Super.
Ct. 542 .151
Commonwealth v. Gerade, 145
Pa. St. 289. ..329, 330,
v. Gray, 17 Ky. 354
v. Grether, 204 Pa. 203..
v. Hagenlock, 140 Mass.
125
v. Hall, 18 Ky. L. R. 783
v. Hardiman, 9 Gray
(Mass.) 136
v. Harlow, 110 Mass. 411.
v. Harris, 168 Pa. St. 619
52,
v. Hillman, 189 Pa. St.
548
v. Hollinger, 190 Pa. St.
155
v. Holmes, 127 Mass. 124.
v. Hoskins, 18 Ky. L. R.
59
v. Howe (Pa. Super. Ct.)
4 W. N. Cas. 246
v. Hyde, 94 Ky. 517
v. Kelly, 165 Mass. 175..
v. Kilpatrick, 204 Pa. St.
218
v. Leonard, 140 Mass. 473
299,
v. Light, 195 Pa. St. 220.
v. McGorty, 114 Mass. 299
v. McGowen, 189 Pa. St.
641 178, 256,
v. McMahon, 145 Pa. St.
413
v. McManus, 143 Pa. St.
64 119. 153,
v. Miller, 139 Pa. St. 77
294,
v. Mudgett, 174 Pa. St.
'211
v. Mulrey, 170 Mass. 103.
v. O'Brien, 172 Mass. 248
v. Pease, 110 Mass. 412..
v. Pomeroy, 117 Mass. 143
v. Preece, 140 Mass. 276..
v. Reid, 175 Mass. 325.. .
v. Rogers, 181 Mass. 184.
v. Ruddle, 142 Pa. St. 144
v. Tarr, 4 Allen (Mass.)
315
v. Van Horn, 188 Pa. St.
143 .
331
113
272
281
150
222
222
284
85
334
288
258
35
841
188
201
340
192
265
281
195
165
295
261
174
284
222
331
317
80
86
197
320
281
TABLE OF CASES.
Iv
( References are to Sections.)
Commonwealth v. Walsh, 1(52
Mass. 242 191,
v. Warner, 13 Pa. Super.
Ct. 461
v. Washington, 202 Pa. St.
148
v. Webster, 5 Gush.
(Mass.) 320
295, 312, 734,
v. Williams, 171 Mass.
461
v. Wilson, 152 Mass. 12
340,
v. Wilson, 186 Pa. St. 1..
v. Wood, 111 Mass. 409..
v. Yost, 197 Pa. St. 171..
Compton v. S. 110 Ala. 24
272. 296,
Conard v. Kinzie, 105 Ind. 281
Concord-Williams Lumber Co.
v. Warren Grain Co. 114
Ga. 966
Conde v. S. 33 Tex. Cr. App.
10
Condon v. Brockway, 157 111.
91
Cone v. Citizens' Bank, 4 Kas.
App. 470
Coney v. S. 108 Ga. 773
Congran v. Bigelow, 164 U. S.
301
Conkey v. Carpenter, 106 Mich.
'l
Conkey Co. v. Bueherer. 84 111.
App. 633 '.
Conkwright v. P. 35 111. 204..
Conley v. Redwine, 109 Ga.
640
Conn v. P. 116 111. 464
Connaghan v. P. 88 111. 462..
Connaughton v. Sun Printing
and Pub. Co. Asso. 76 N.
Y. S. 755
Connecticut M. L. Ins. Co. v.
MoWherter, 73 Fed. 444
Connelly v. Shamrock Ben. Soc.
43 Mo. App. 283
Conner v. Citizens' St. R. Co.
146 Ind. 430
v. Giles, 76 Me. 132
v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co. 78 Mo. App. 131....
v. Wilkie, 1 Kas. App. 492
308
191
6, 9
776
151
342
109
838
150
783
7
135
290
10
154
82
126
227
30
195
90
279
294
25
93
352
164
126
80
18
Conners v. Chingren, 111 Iowa,
437 195
v. Indiana, I. & Q. R. Co.
193 111. 464 363
v. S. 95 Wis. 77 198
Connor v. Electric Tr. Co. 173
Pa. St. 605 649
Conrad v. S. 132 Ind. 259
326. 367
Convey Mill, Matter of, 52
Iowa, 198 693
Consolidated, &c. Co. v. Haw-
ley, 7 S. Dak. 229 129
Consolidated Coal Co. v. Bo-
kamp, 181 111. 16.. 183, 235
v. Haenni, 146 111. 614
241, 363
v. Scheiber, 167 111. 539.. 54
Consolidated Stone Co. v. Mor-
gan, 160 Ind. 241 233
Consolidated Tr. Co. v. Cheno-
with, 61 N. J. L. 554
28, 349
v. Haight, 59 N. J. L. 577
80
Consolidation C. & M. Co. v.
Clay, 51 Ohio St. 542.. 351
Continental, &c. Ins. Co. v.
Yung, 113 Ind. 159.... 308
Continental Nat. Bank v. Fol-
son, 67 Ga. 624 12
v. Tradesmen's National
Bank, 173 N. Y. 272... 25
Continental Tob. Co. v. Knoop,
24 Ky. L. R. 1268 119
Converse v. Converse, 21 Vt.
168 694
Conway v. Jefferson, 46 N. H.
521 199
v. .Jordan, 110 Iowa, 462. 6
v. S. 118 Ind. 482 329
v. S. 33 Tex. Cr. App. 327
326
v. Vizzard, 112 Ind. 268.. 701
v. Vizzard. 122 Ind. 271.. 70
Cook v. Bartlett, 179 Mass.
576 191
v. Brown, 39 Me. 443 308
v. Brown, 62 Mich. 478
31, 415, 471
v. Los Angeles & P. E. R.
Co. 134 Cal. 279 25, 30
v.Morris, 66 Conn. 196.. 141
v. P. 177 111. 146 21, 48
v. S. (Fla.) 35 So. 669
25, 269, 301, 779. 782
Ivi
TABLE OF CASES.
(References are to Sections.)
Cook v. Steinert & Sons Co. 69
Conn. 91 189
Cook County v. Harms, 108
111. 151 104, 196
Cooke v. Cook, 100 Ala. 175.. 48
Coombs v. Mason, 97 Me. 270
20, 119
Coon v. P. 99 111. 368
115, 116, 175
Cooper v. Central R. Co. 44 la.
136, 610, 611, 633, 634, 739
v. Delk, 108 Ga. 555 243
v. Denver & R. G. R. Co.
11 Utah. 46 197
v. Ford (Tex. Cv. App.)
69 S. W. 487 191
v. Morris, 48 N. J. L. 607
35
v. Mulder. 74 Mich. 374.. 245
v. S. 80 Miss. 175 258
Coos Bay, R. & E. R. Co. v.
Siglin, 26 Ore. 387.. 84, 94
Copas v. Anglo-American Prov.
Co. 73 Mich. 541 6
Copeland v. Ferris, 118 Iowa,
554 351
v. Hall, 29 Me. 93 157
v. Hewitt. 96 Me. 525.25, 235
v. S. 36 Tex. Cr. App. 575
224
Corfcin v. Shearer, 8 111. (3
Gilm.) 482 48
Corbus v. Leonhardt, 114 Fed.
10 25
Cordill v. Moore, 17 Tex. Cv.
App. 217 68
Cormody v. Boston Gaslight Co.
162 Mass. 539 181
Cornelius v. Com. 23 Ky. L. R.
771 258
Cornish v. Graff. 36 Hun (N.
Y.) 160 . 35
Coryell v. Stone, 62 Ind. 312.. 43
Cossitt v. Hobbs, 56 111. 238.. 94
Costella v. Kottas, 52 Neb. 15
26, 358
Costly v. McGowen, 174 111.
76 116
Cotton v. Ulmer, 45 Ala. 378. 696
Cottrell v. Piatt, 101 Iowa,
231 212
Covington v. Simpson (Del.
Super.) 52 Atl. 349 84
Cowan v. Umbagog Pulp Co.
91 Me. 26 188
Cowie v. City of Seattle, 22
Wash. 659 . 66
Cowles v. Chicago, R. I. & P.
Co. (Iowa) 88 N. W.
1072 120
Cox v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co.
95 Iowa, 54 25
v. Com. 125 Pa. St. 94.. 288
v. Highley, 100 Pa. St.
252 34
v. Matthews, 17 Ind. 367. 868
v. Norfolk & C. R. Co. 123
N. Car. 604 126
v. Peltier, 159 Ind. 355.. 187
v. P. 109 111. 459 359
v. S. 68 Ark. 462 192
Coyle v. Com. 100 Pa. St. 573 . 331
v. Pittsburg B. & L. E. R.
Co. 18 Pa. Super. 235.. 81
Crabtree v. Hagenbaugh, 25 111.
219 367
Craggs v. Bohart (Ind. Ter.)
69 S. W. 931 359
Craig v. Borough, 1 1 Pa.
Super. Ct. 490 351
v. Frazier, 127 Ind. 286.. 43
v. Hamilton, 118 Ind. 568
515
v. Hobbs, 44 Ind. 363 415
v. Miller, 133 111. 307
113, 250
v. Rohrer, 63 111. 325 367
v. Southard. 162 111. 213.. 696
Grain v. First National Bank,
114 111. 527 85, 113
Cramer v. City of Burlington,
39 Iowa, 512 594
v. City of Burlington, 42
Iowa, 322 608
v. City of Burlington, 49
Iowa, 215 222
v. S. 21 Ind. App. 502 9
Crane v. Crane, 5 Pet. (U. S.)
356 359
v. S. Ill Ala. 45.82. 213, 296
Crane Co. v. Columbus S. Bank
(Neb.) 91 N. W. 532.. 238
v. Tierney, 175 111. 79
1. 20. 25, 48
Cranston v. New York C. & H.
R. Co. 103 N. Y. 614.. 186
Crawford v. Athletic Asso. Ill
Iowa, 736 351
v. Brown. 21 Colo. 272.. 5
v. Com. 18 Ky. L. R. 16.. 151
v. S. 112 Ala. 1
61, 115, 258, 299, 306,
313, 341, 345
v. S. 117 Ga. 247 191
TABLE OF CASES.
Ivii
(References are to Sections.}
Crawford v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.)
34 S. W. 927
v. Wittish, 4 Pa. Super.
585
Crawshaw v. Summer, 56 Mo.
517
Creed v. P. 81 111. 565
31, 226, 344,
Crenshaw v. Johnson, 120 N.
Car. 270
Crescent Horse Shoe & Iron Co.
v. Eynon, 95 Va. 153
Cresler v. Ashville (N. Car.)
46 S. E. 739
Crete M. Fire Ins. Co. v. Patz,
64 Neb. 676
Crews v. Lackland, 67 Mo. 621
v. P. 120 111. 317
25, 115, 299,
v. S. 34 Tex. Cr. App. 533
Criner v. S. 41 Tex. Cr. App.
290
Crip pen v. Hope, 38 Mich. 344
Crisman v. McDonald, 28 Ark.
Crittenden v. City of Mt. Clem-
ens, 86 Mich. 227
v. S. 134 Ala. 145
116, 192, 288,
Crockett v. Miller, 112 Fed.
729
v. S. 40 Tex. Cr. App, 173
Croft v. Northwestern S. S. Co.
20 Wash. 175
v. S. 95 Ala. 3
Crooks & Co. v. Eldridge & H.
Co. 64 Ohio St. 195....
Cropper v. Pittman, 13 Md.
190
Crosby v. P. 137 111. 336.112.
v. P. 165 111. 619
v. Ritchey, 56 Neb. 336..
Cross v. Kennedy (Tex. Cv.
App.) 66 S. W. 318....
v. P. 47 111. 58
v. S. 132 Ind. 65
Crossen v. Grandy, 42 Ore. 282
v. Oliver, 41 Ore. 505
Crossette v. Jordan (Mich.) 92
N. W. 782 7, 80,
.289
141
19
745
71
626
247
80
84
802
303
247
14
32
609
327
198
221
27
297
94
192
279
281
247
25
287
302
25
113
351
Grouse v. Holman, 19 Ind. 30
330
Crow v. S. 33 Tex. Cr. App.
264 312
v. S. 37 Tex. Cr. App. 295
314, 731
Crowder v. Reed, 80 Ind. 1.. 80
Crowe v. House of Good Shep-
herd, 56 N. Y. S. 223.. 141
Crowell v. P. 190 111. 514
34, 73, 277, 773
Crown C. & C. Co. v. Taylor,
184 111. 250 25, 30
Crum v. Yunott (Ind. App.)
40 N. E. 79 100
Crump v. Com. (Va.) 23 S.
E. 760 341, 347
Crutcher v. Sechick, 10 Tex.
Cv. App. 676 72
Crutchfield v. Richmond & R.
Co. 76 N. Car. 320 208
v. S. 7 Tex. Cv. App. 65.. 314
v. S. 7 Tex. App. 65 730
Cullen v. Hanisch, 114 Wis.
24 231
Culter v. Skeels, 69 Vt. 154.. 351
Gumming v. S. 99 Ga. 662.... 257
Cummings v. Halena & L. S.
R. Co. 26 Mont. 434
121, 126
v. Tilton, 44 111. 172.... 117
Cummins v. S. 50 Neb. 274... 78
Cunningham v. Davis, ' 175
Mass. 213 94
v. P. 195 111. 550 82
v. P. 210 111. 410 60
v. S. 117 Ala. 59 301
v. S. 65 Ind. 380 210
v. S. 56 Miss. 269 331
v. S. 56 Neb. 691 303, 729
v. Stein, 109 111. 375 106
v. Underwood, 116 Fed.
803 351
v. Washburn, 119 Mass.
224 160, 445
Cupps v. S. (Wis.) 97 N. W.
218 9, 25, 192, 196, 269
Currier v. S. 157 Ind. 114.... 275
Curry v. Cathin, 12 Wash. 322
25
Curtis v. Detroit & M. R. Co.
27 Wis. 161
531, 532, 540, 543, 550
551. 567
v. S. 36 Ark. 284.. .267
Iviii
TABLE OF CASES.
(References an to Sections.)
Cushman v. Carbondale Fuel
Co. (Iowa) 88 N. W.
817 126, 144
v. Cogswell, 86 111. 414
110, 250
Cusick v. Campbell, 68 111.
508 195, 243
Cutler v. Callison, 72 111. 116
175, 664
v. Parsons, 43 N. Y. S.
187 145
v. P. 184 111. 395 12
I)
Dacey v. P. 116 111. 555
42, 243, 329. 330, 331,
727, 746, 747, 751
Dady v. Condit, 188 111. 234
192, 193
Dahlstrom v. St. Louis. &c. R.
Co. 108 Mo. 533 644
Dalby v. Snuffer, 57 Mo. 294. 656
Dallas. &c. R. Co. v. Broad-
hurst (Tex. Cv. App.)
68 S. W. 315 93a
v. Campbell (Tex. Cv.
App.) 26 S. W. 884.... 97
v. Harvey (Tex. Cv. App.)
27 S. W. 423... 92, 97, 198
v. Payne (Tex. Cv. App.)
78 S. W. 1085 196
Dallas Cotton Mills v. Ashley
(Tex. Cv. App.) 63 S.
W. 160 203
Dalton v. Bank, 54 Mo. 106.. 656
Daly v. Kimball Co. 67 Iowa,
132 156
Dalzell v. S. 7 Wyo. 450 339
Dammann v. St. Louis, 152
Mo. 186 198
Damour v. Lyons City, 44
Iowa, 281 602
Dancy v. S. (Tex. Cv. App.)
46 S. W. 247 269
Danforth v. S. 75 Ga. 614 168
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 69
S. W. 159 25
Danghrill v. S. 113 Ala. 7 253
Daniels v. Florida C. & P. R.
Co. 62 S. Car. 1 96
v. Leibig Mfg. Co. 2 Marv.
(Del.) 207 126
Danville St. Car Co. v. Wat-
kins, 97 Va. 717 547
Darity v. S. 38 Tex. Cr. App.
546 280
Darling v. Williams, 35 Ohio
St. 61 474, 475, 649
Darlington v. Allegheny, 189
Pa. St. 202 188
Dart v. Horn, 20 111. 213 198
Dashiel v. Harshmanj 113
Iowa, 824 668
Daugherty v. Herndon, 27 Tex.
Cv. App. 175 25
Davenport v. Hannibal, 108
Mo. 479 599
v. Johnson, 182 Mass. 260
32
v. Sebring, 52 Iowa, 364
656, 660
Davidoff v. Wheeling & W.
Mfg. Co. 37 N. Y. S.
661 130
Davidson v. Jefferson (Tex. Cv.
App.) 68 S. W. 822 244
v. P. 90 111. 231 709
v. Pittsburg, &c. R. Co. 41
W. Va. 415
641, 648, 529, 536
v. Wallingford, 88 Tex.
619 94, 223
Davis v. Alas Assur. Co. 16
Wash. 232 191
v. Atlanta, &c. C. A. L. R.
Co. 63 S, Car. 577.. 99. 191
v. Bailey, 21 Ky. L. R.
839 347
v. Bingham (Tex. Cv.
App.) 33 S. W. 1035... 80
v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co.
18 Wis. 188 582
v. Concord & M. R. Co. 68
N. H. 247 113
v. Davis, 20 Tex. Cv. App.
310 199
v. Dregne (Wis.) 97 N. .
W. 512 175
v. El more, 40 S. Car. 533. 172
v. Foster, 68 Ind. 238. .4, 367
v. Oilliam, 14 Wash. 206. 243
v. Ghiarnieri, 45 Ohio St.
478 543. 050
v. Hall (Neb.) 97 N. W.
1023 25. ?-5r,
v. Hays, 89 Ala. 563 182
v. Holbrook. 25 Colo. 493. 135
v. Hoxey, 2 111. (1 Scam.)
406 .' 120
v. Kenava. 51 III. 170... 155
TABLE OF CASES.
lix
(References are to Medians.)
Davis v. Kent, 97 Ga. 275.... 130
v. Kroyden, 1 Mo. App.
102 122
v. Living, 50 W. Va. 432. 866
v. Northern E. R. Co. 170
111. 602 217
v. P. 114 111. 86
115, 198, 273, 299
v. Paducah R. & L. Co. 24
Ky. 135 184
v. S. 131 Ala. 10, 31 So.
569 724
v. S. 74 Ga. 869 312
v. S. 105 Ga. 808 320
v. S. 114 Ga. 104
265, 297, 321
v. S. 152 Ind. 34 48, 118
v. S. 51 Neb. 301.21, 305, 307
v. S. 25 Ohio St. 369. .48, 360
v. S. 63 Ohio St. 173 301
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 54
S. W. 583 303
v. Searey, 79 Miss. 292... 80
v. U. S. 160 U. S. 469
330 331
v. U. S. 165 U. S. 373...! 269
v. Wilson, 65 111. 525.... 20
v. Wilson, 11 Kas. 74 4
Davis Coal Co. v. Polland, 158
Ind. 687 544
Davison v. P. 90 111. 231
153, 166, 260
Dawson v. Coffman. 28 Ind.
220 356
v. Coston, 18 Colo. 493... 347
v. S. 62 Miss. 241... 325, 328
Daxaribeklav v. P. 93 111. App.
553 44
Day v. Boston & M. R. (Me.)
55 Atl. 420 126
v. Porter, 161 111. 235... 238
Dayton v. Lincoln, 39 Neb. 74
93
v. Monroe, 47 Mich. 193.. 760
Deal v. S. 140 Ind. 354
216, 260, 372, 366
Dean v. Erskine, 18 N. H. 81. 158
v.Ross, 105 Cal. 22-7 195
v. S. 130 Ind. 237 221
v. S. 147 Ind. 215.. 169, 822
Deasey v. Thurman, 1 Idaho,
'779 102
Deatley v. Com. (Ky.) 29 S.
W. 741 83
Debney v. S. 45 Neb. 856 71
Decatur Cereal Mill Co. v.
Gogerty, 180 111. 197... 21
Decatur Cereal Mill Co. v. John-
son (Tex. Cv. App.) 35 S.
W. 951 70
Decker v. Sexton, 43 N. Y. S.
167 '....: 139
DeClerg v. Mungin, 46 111. 112
243
Deerfield v. Northwood, 10 N.
H. 269 84
Deering & Co. v. Hannah, 93
Mo. App. 618 362
Deets v. National Bank, 57
Kas. 288 13
Defoe v. St. Paul C. R. Co. 65
Minn. 319 101
Deggs v. S. 7 Tex. App. 359.. 326
DeGoey v. Van Wyk, 97 Iowa,
491 70
De Graff enried v. Menard, 103
Ga. 651 100
v. Wallace (Ind. Ter.) 53
S. W. 452 126
De Hart v. Board, 143 Ind.
363 199
Deig v. Morehead, 110 Ind.
461 70
Deilks v. S. 141 Ind. 26
21, 260, 777, 802
Deitz v. Regnier, 27 Kas. 94.. 20
Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. v.
Devore, 114 Fed. 155... 204
Delhaney v. S. 115 Ind. 502
357, 358
De Los Santos v. S. (Tex. Cr.
App.) 31 S. W. 395.... 284
Delvin v. P. 104 111. 504 170
Dempster M. Mfg. Co. v. First
Nat. Bank, 49 Neb. 321
353
Denise v. City of Omaha, 49
Neb. 750 25
Denison & P. S. R. Co. v. O'-
Maley (Tex. Cr. App.)
45 S. W. 225 80
Denman v. Bloomer, 11 111. 193
1
Denmark v. S. 43 Fla. 182 43
Dennis v. S. 112 Ala. 64 306
v. S. 118 Ala. 72
25, 68, 258, 279, 295, 304
v. S. 91 Ind. 292 852, 856
Dennison v. Musgrave, 46 N.
Y. S. 530 '131
Denny v. Stout, 59 Neb. 731.. 101
Densmore v. S. 67 Ind. 306,
154, 195, 294, 297, 715
Dent v. S. 17 So. 94 201
Ix
TABLE OF CASES.
(References are to Sections.)
Denton v. Jackson, 106 "111.
433 48
Denver v. Fatherington (Colo.)
68 Pac. 978 247
v. Myers, 63 Neb. 107 247
Denver, &c. R. Co. v. Buffehr,
30 Colo. 27 97
v. Crumbaugh, 23 Colo.
363 7
v. lies, 25 Colo. 19 101
v. Lassasso, 22 Colo. 444
92, 118
v. Lorentzen, 79 Fed. 291
205
v. Peterson, 30 Colo. 77.. 94
v. Spencer, 25 Colo. 9 80
v. Young, 30 Colo. 349
80, 350
Denver Tramway Co. v. Owens,
20 Colo. 112, 582 48
v. Reid, 4 Colo. App. 53.. 553
Derby v. S. 60 N. J. L. 258.. 178
Deserant v. Cerrillos Coal Co.
178 U. S. 409 247
Dessaunier v. Murphy, 33 Mo.
191 657
Detroit Elec. & L. P. Co. v.
Applebaum (Mich.) 94
N. W. 12 !. 514
Detwiler v. City of Lansing, 95
Mich. 486 601
Dever v. Clarke, 44 Kas. 752
491, 495
Devine v. Chicago, M. & St. P.
R. Co. 100 Iowa, 692..117a
v. Murphy, 168 Mass. 249
136
DeWeese v. Merimee, I. M. Co.
128 Mo. 423 238
Dick v. Louisville & N. R. Co.
23 Ky. L. R. 1068 126
Dicken v. Liverpool S. & C. Co.
41 W. Va. 511 53
Dickens v. S. 30 Ga. 383 168
Dickensen v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.)
63 S. W. 328 182
Dickerhoff v. Alder, 32 N. Y.
S. 698 94
Dickerson v. Johnson, 24 Ark.
251 84
v. Quincy M. F. Ins. Co. 67
Vt. 609 351
Dickie v. Carter, 42 111. 376
696, 705
Diefenback v. Stark, 56 Wis.
463 156, 157
Dietz v. Metropolitan L. I. Co.
168 Pa. St. 504 129
Diggers v. S. 38 Fla. 7 25
Dillingham v. Bryant (Tex.
App.) 14 S. W. 1017... 43
v. Crank, 87 Tex. 104 117a
v. Fields, 9 Tex. Cv. App.
1 31, 32
Dimmick v. Babcock, 92 Iowa,
692 8
Dina v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 78
S. W. 230 192
Dingee v. Unrue's Adm'x, 98
Va. 247 84
Dinsmore v. S. 61 Neb. 418. 49, 78
v. Tidball, 34 Ohio St. 416. 521
Dirimple v. State Bank, 9 1 Wis.
601 129
District of Columbia v. Robin-
son, 180 U. S. 92 119
Diver v. Hall, 46 N. Y. S. 553. 203
Dix v. Akers, 30 Ind. 433 357
Dixon v. Labry, 16 Ky. L. R.
522 65
v. S. 113 Ga. 1039 192
v. S. 46 Neb. 298 206
Doan v. S. 26 Ind. 498 222
Doane v. Lockwood, 115 111.
490 121
Dobbs v. Gate, 60 Mo. App.
658 113
Dobney v. Conley (Tex. Cv.
App.) 65 S. W. 1124... 116
Dobson v. S. 46 Neb. 250 265
v. S. 61 Neb. 584 115, 119
v. Southern R. Co. 132 N.
Car. 900 119, 192
Dockerty v. Hutson, 125 Ind.
102 479
Dodd v. Gui'seffi, 100 Mo. App.
311 119, 192
v. Gaines, 82 Tex. 433
518, 519
v.Moore, 91 Ind. 522.. 1, 41
Dodds v. McCormick Harvesting
M. Co. 62 Neb. 759 243
Dodge v. Brown, 22 Mich. 446. 172
v. Reynolds (Mich.) 98 N.
W. 738 366
Doe v. United States (Neb.) 91
N. W. 519 237
Doering v. S. 49 Ind. 56 278
Doggett v. S. 39 Tex. Cr. App.
5 215
Dohmen Co. v. Niagara Fire Ins.
Co. 96 Wis. 38
177, 200, 207, 219
TABLE OF CASES.
Ixi
(References are to Sections.}
Dolan v. S. 44 Neb. 643 267
Doll v. S. 45 Ohio St. 452.. 7, 8
Dollman v. Haefner, 12 Ohio
C. C. 721 8
Dolphin v. Plumley, 175 Mass.
304 80, 101
Dombrook -v. Rumeley Co.
(Wis.) 97 N. W. 493... 358
Dominick v. Randolph, 124 'la.
557 6, 330
Donaho v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.)
47 S. W. 469 25
Donahue v. Egan, 85 111. App.
20 223
v. Windsor Co. M. F. Ins.
Co. 56 Vt. 374 3
Donald v. S. 21 Ohio C. C.
124 80
Donaldson v. S. 10 Ohio C. C.
613 340
Donavan v. Bromley, 113 Mich.
53 199
Donaway v. P. 110 T .i. 333.. 279
Donk Bros. Coal & C. Co. v.
Stroff, 20 111. 483 238
Donley v. Dougherty, 174 111.
582 382
Donley v. Dougherty, .75 111.
App. 379 200
Donnilly v. S. 26 N. J. L. 480
119
Dooley v. Gorman, 104 Ga. 767
140
Doolittle v. Southern R. Co. 62
S. Car. 130 48
Doon v. Ravey, 49 Vt. 293... 191
Dooner v. Delaware & H. C.
Co. 164 Pa. St. 17 93
Doran v. Cedar Rapids & M. C.
R. Co. 117 Iowa, 442
200, 244
Dorrance v. McAlister, 1 Ind.
Ter. 473 26
Dorsey v. S. 110 Ga. 351
175, 201, 265, 272, 279,
345, 782
Dougherty v. King, 48 N. Y. S.
110 192
v. Mo. R. R. Co. 97 Mo. 658
548. 549, 567, 572. 574
Douglas v. Blankenship, Ind.
16C 356
Douglass v. Geiler, 32 Kas. 499
3, 196
v. Trask, 77 Me. 35 107
v. Wolf, 6 Kas. 88 27
Douthill v. Ter. 7 Okla. 55 9
Dove v. S. 3 Heisk (Tenn.)
371 331
Dowdy v. Watson, 115 Ga. 42. 206
Downey v. Germini Min. Co. 24
Utah, 431... 25, 80
Downing v. Murray, 113 Cal.
455 126
* S. 114 Ga. 30 220
v. S. (Wyo.) 69 Pac. 264
361
Dowzelot v. Rowlings, 58 Mo.
75 34
Doyle v. Donnelly, 56 Me. 28. 404
v. Mo. K. & T. T. Co. 140
Mo. 1..383, 610, 614,
617, 618, 621, 622
v. P. 147 111. 394. .80, 223, 226
v. S. 39 Fla. 155 48, 195
Doysher v. Adams, 1 6 Ky. L. ,R.
582 100
Drainage Corns, v. Illinois Cent.
R. Co. 158 111. 353 113
Drake v. S. 60 Ala. 62 153
Drennen v. Smith, 115 Ala. 396
196
Drenning v. Wesley, 189 Pa. St.
160 351
Dresback v. S. 33 Ohio St. 369. 269
Driggers v. S. 38 Fla. 7 284
Driver v. Atchison, T. & S. F.
R. Co. 59 Kas. 773 6
v. Board, 70 Ark. 358
197, 244
v. S. 37 Tex. Cr. App. 160. 3
Drumheller v. American Surety
Co. 30 Wash. 530 191
Drummond v. Nichols (S. Car.)
21 S. E. 322 130
Drury v. Connell, 117 111. 43.6,693
Druse v. Wheeler, 26 Mich. 189
197
Drye v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 55
S. W. 65 25
Dryman v. S. 102 Ala. 130
226, 758
Dubois v. Decker 114 Fed.
267 359
Dueber Watch C. Mfg. Co. v.
Young, 155 111. 226.... 238
Duff v. Com. 24 Ky. L. R. 201 . 195
Duffield v. Delaney. 36 111. 258. 195
Duffin v. P. 107 111. 113 44
Duffy v. P. 26 N. Y. 588 165
v. St. Louis Tr. Co. (Mo.
App.) 78 S. W. 831.... 121
Dugan v. Com. 19 Ky. L. R.
1273 . 318
Ixii
TABLE OF CASES.
(References are to Sections.)
Duggins v. Watson, 15 Ark.
118 361
Duke v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. App.
283 Ill
Dunbar v. S. 34 Tex. Cv. App.
596 358
Duncan v. Borden, 13 Colo.
App. 481 25
v. P. 134 111. 110. ...275, 791
v. S. 95 Ga. 477 328
Duncombe v. Powers, 75 Iowa;
185 199
Dunham v. Holloway, 3 Okla.
244 349
Dunham Towing & Wrecking Co.
v. Danclelin, 143 111. 414. 24
Dunlap v. United Statas, 165
U. S. 486 49
Dunlop v. Patterson, 5 Cow.
(N. Y.) 243 218
Dunn v. Bushnell (Neb.) 83 N.
W. 693 20
v. P. 109 111. 635.. 19, 42,
243, 284, 294, 295, 337,
644, 718, 748
v. P. 172 111. 582 117
Dunnington v. Frick Co. 60
Ark. 250 351, 363
v. Syfeers, 157 Ind. 458.. 126
Dunseath v. Pittsburg, A. & M.
Tr. Co. 161 Pa. St. 124. 192
Dupuis v. Chicago & N. R. Co.
115 111. 101 116
Duren v. Kee, 41 S. Car. 171.. 157
Durhami v. Goodwin, 54 111.
469 71
v. Smith, 120 Ind. 468.. 211
v. S. 120 Ind. 467 206
Durkee v. Marshall, 7 Wend.
(N. Y.) 312 171
Durrah v. Stillwell, 59 Ind. 142
493
Du Souchet v. Dutcher, 113
Ind. 249 7
Duthie v. Town of Washburn,
87 Wis. 231 163
Duval v. Kenton, 127 Ind. 178. 216
v. S. Tex. Cr. App.) 70
S. W. 543 268
Dwelling House Ins. Co. v.
Dowdall, 55 111. App. 622
243
Dwight v. Germania L. Ins. Co.
103 N. Y. 341 156
Dyal v. S. 103 Ga. 425 80
Dye v. Scott, 35 Ohio St. 194. 367
Dyer v. Dyer, 87 Ind. 18 694
v. S. 74 Ind! 595 773
E
Eames v. Blackhart, 12 111. 195
172, 308
v. Rend, 105 111. 506 104
Earle v. Poat, 63 S. Car. 439
27, 191
Earll v. P. 73 111. 329
294, 2'95, 297, 376, 716
Earp v. Edginton, 107 Tenn. 23
170
Easley v. Valley M. L. Asso. 91
Va. 161 243
East v. Crow, 70 111. 92.. 382, 384
East, &c. R. Co. v. Scott, 71
Tex. 705.. 614, 619, 621, 623
v. Waldrop, 114 Ga. 289.. 192
Eastman v. Curtis, 67 Vt. 432
76, 118, 363
East St. L. &c. R. Co. v. Allen,
54 111. App. 32 363
v. Eggman, 170 111. 539.. 53
v. Enright, 152 111. 246
71, 242
v. Hightower, 92 111. 139.. 94
v. O'Harra, 150 111. 585
183. 236
v. Stout, 150 111. 9 150, 347
East Tenn. &c. R. Co. v. Bayless.
77 Ala. 430 32
v. Gurley, 12 Lea (Tenn.)
46 26b
v. Lee, 90 Tenn. 570 53
v. Toppins, 10 Lea (Tenn.)
64 48
Eaverson v. S. 73 Miss. 810.. 255
Eaves v. Cherokee Iron Co. 73
Ga. 459 397, 469
Echols v. S. (Ga.) 46 S. E.
409 80
Eckels v. S. 20 Ohio St. 515
27. 814
Eckert v. S. 114 Wis. 160.... 329
Economy L. Co. v. Stephen, 187
111. 137 649
Edd v. Union P. Coal Co. 25
Utah, 293 94
Eddy v. Chase, 140 Mass. 471. 158
v. Lafayette, 163 U. S. 456
358
Edelhoff v. S. 5 Wyo. 19 243
TABLE OF CASES.
Ixiii
(References are to Sections.}
Edens v. Hannibal & St. J. R.
Co. 72 Mo. 212 186
v. S. 41 Tex. Cr. App. 522
21
Edgerton v. New York R. Co.
39 N. Y. 227 538
Edgington v. U. S. 164 U. S.
361 340, 348
Edmunds v. Black, 15 Wash.
73 354
Edwards v. Atlantic, &c. R. Co.
132 N. Car. 99 247
v. Chicago & A. R. Co. 94
Mo. App. 36 70
v. Dellenmair, 85 111. App.
366 86
v. Gold-Smith, 16 Pa. St.
48 157
v. P. 26 Colo. 539 71
v. S. 47 Miss. 589 6
v. S. (Neb.) 95 N. W.
1038 715
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 38
s. w. 779....:...: so
v. Wessinger, 65 S. Car.
161 32
Effinger v. S. 9 Ohio.C. C. 376. 200
Egbers v. Egbers, 177 111. 82,
89 74, 363
Eggers v. Eggers, 57 Ind. 461. 211
Eggett v. Allen, 106 Wis. 633. 80
Eggleston v. S. 102 Ala. 80.. 345
Ehrlick v. S. 44 Neb. 810.... 4
Eickhof v. Chicago N. S. St. R.
Co. 77 111. App. 196 361
Eilard v. S. 52 Ala. 330 30
Einseidler v. Whitman Co. 22
Wash. 388 80
Eklund v. Toner, 121 Mich. 687
94
El am v. Badger. 23 111. 445.. 243
Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. v. Ray-
mond, 148 111. 2'48 116
Elk Tanning Co. v. Brennan,
203 Pa. St. 232.. 249
Elkhorn Valley Lodge v. Hud-
son, 58 Neb. 672 347
Elledge v. National City & O.
R. Co. 100 Cal. 282 194
Eller v. P. 153 111. 344
84. 195. 227, 250
Ellerman v. St. Louis Tr. Co.
(Mo. App.) 76 S. W.
661 126
Elliott v. Elliott, 15 Ky. L. R.
274 '. ... 65
Ellis v. Iowa City, 29 Iowa,
230 602
v. Leonard, 107 Iowa, 487. 349
v. P. 159 111. 337 4, 42
v. S. 120 Ala. 333 258, 295
v. Simonds, 168 Mass. 316.. 282
v. Stewart (Tex. Cv. App.)
24 S. W. 585 196
v. Stone (Teoc. Cv. App.)
55 S. W. 758 244
v. Whitehead, 95 Mich. 115
496
El Paso & N. W. R. Co. v. Mc-
Comas (Tex. Cv. App.)
72 S. W. 629 94
Elster v. Springfield, 49 Ohio
St. 82 243
Elston & Wheeling Gravel Co.
v. Pierce, 96 111. 584 65
Elsworth v. Newby (Neb.) 91
N. W. 517 84, 126
Ely v. James, 123 Mass. 36.. 162
Emery v. Boston & M. R. 67
N. H. 434 348
v. Hoyt, 46 111. 258 65
v. Smith, 54 Ga. 273 222
v. S. 92 Wis. 146 294
v. S. 101 Wis. 627
214, 295 297, 328, 336
Emory v. Addis, 71 111. 275. 363
Empson Packing Co. v. Vaughn,
27 Colo. 66 94
Endleman v. U. S. 86 Fed.
456 190
Endowment Rank K. P. v.
Steele, 108 Tenn. 624.. 199
Endsley v. Johns, 120 111. 477. 155
Engel v. Dado (Neb.) 92 N. W.
629 358
Engeman v. S. 54 N. J. L. 247. 17
England v. Fawbush, 204 111.
384 25, 71, 704
English v. Yore, 123 Mich. 701. 364
Enlow v. S. 154 ind. 664.. 255, 256
Ennis v. Pullman P. C. Co. 165
111. 161 117
Enright v. P. 155 111. 32
86, 88, 255, 256, 285
Enterprise Ins. Co. v. Parisat,
35 Ohio St. 35 429
Entwistle v. Meikle, 180 111. 9
80, 701
Eppendorff v. Brooklyn City &
N. R. Co. 69 N. Y. S.
195 183
Epperson v. S. 22 Tex. App.
697 820, 824
Ixiv
TABLE OF CA.SES.
(References are to Medians.)
Epps v. S. 102 Ind. 553 . . . .21 1, 377
Eppstein v. Thomas (Tex. Cv.
App.) 44 S. W. 893 101
Equitable E. Asso. v. Fisher, 7 1
Md. 436 . . 397, 626
Eslinger v. East, 100 Ind. 434. 357
Estate of Spencer, 96 Cal. 448. 286
Estes v. Boothe, 20 Ark. 590. 156
Etchepare v. Aguirre, 91 Cal.
288 286
Etherington v. Prospect, &c. R.
Co. 88 N. Y. 642 631
Eubanks v. S. 3 Heisk. (Tenn.)
488 846
Eureka. &c. Ins. Co. v. Percell,
10 Ohio C. C. 135 247
Eureka Block Coal Co. v. Wells
(Ind.) 61 N. W. 236. 652
Eureka Fertilizer Co. v. Balti-
more, &c. Co. 78 Md. 183
118, 408
Evans v. Adams Ex. Co. 122
Ind. 365 543
v. Clark, 1 Indian Ter. 216
349
v. Clark (Miss.) 24 So.
532 358
v. George, 80 111. 51
84. 113, 115, 116
v. Givens, 22 Fla. 476 30
v. Lipscomb, 31 Ga. 7 1 ... 214
v. Merritt, 62 Ark. 228... 243
v. Mills (Ga.) 46 S. E.
675 126, 130
v. Montgomery, 95 Mich.
497 30
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 31
S. W. 648 207, 304
Evans Lumber Co. v. Crawford
(Neb.) 93 N. W. 177... 244
Evansville & T. H. R. Co. v.
Crist, 116 Ind. 457 15
v. Talbot, 131 Ind. 223
504, 507
Evening Post Co. v. Canfield,
23 Ky. L. R. 2028 356
Everett v. Spencer, 122 N. Car.
1010 242
Everson v. Sellers, 105 Ind. 270
863
Ewatt v. S. 100 Ga. 80, 273
Ewen v. Wilbor, 208 111. 500.. 203
Ewing v. Sanford. 19 Ala. 605. 6
Exchange Bank v. Trumble, 108
Ky. 234 126. 183
Ezell v. S. 103 Ala. 8 175
F
Fairbanks v. Jacobs, 69 Iowa,
265 156
Faircloth v. Fulghum, 9" Ga.
357 136
Faivre v. Manderschild, 117
Iowa, 724 348
Falconio v. Larsen, 3 1 Ore
149 4.04
Falk v. P. 42 111. 335 360
Fanton v. S. 50 Neb. 351 302
Faqua v. Com. (Ky.) 73 S. W.
782 337
Fargo & Co. v. Dixon, 63 111.
App. 22 113
Farley v. S. 127 Ind. 421 336
v. S. 57 Ind. 335 34
Farlow v. Town, &c. 186 111.
256 80
Farmer v. Farmer, 12u Mo.
530 3
v. Thrift, 94 Iowa, 374 41
Farmers' & M. Bank v. Upton,
37 Neb. 417 96
Farmers' & Mer. Bank v. Riddle,
115 Ga. 400 70
Farmers' Bank v. Garrow, 63
Neb. 64 25
v. Woodell (Ore.) 61 Pac.
831 247
Farmers' Banking Co. v. Key,
112 Ga. 301 48
Farmers' Loan & T. Co. v.
Siefke. 144 N. Y. 354.. 358
Farmers' S. B. v. Wilka. (Iowa)
17 N. W. 210 348
Farrall v. Broadway, 95 N. Car.
551 288
Farrar v. Heinrich, 86 Mo. 527
657
Farrel v. P. 133 111. 247 229
Farrer v. McNair, 65 Kas. 147. 43
Fassinow v. S. 89 Ind. 237
708, 301
Faulkner v. King, 130 N. Car.
494 191
v. Mammoth. 23 Utah. 437. 25
v. Paterson R. Co. 65 N. J.
L. 181 206
v. S. 43 Tex. Cr. App. 311. 109
Faust v. Hosford, 119 Iowa.
97 70, 118
Feary v. Metropolitan St. R. Co.
162 Mo. 75 30
Featherstone v. P. 194 111. 325. 45
v. Wilson, 123 N. Car. 623. 122
TABLE OF CASES.
Ixv
(References are to Sections.}
Fee v. Columbus Borough, 168
Pa. St. 384 594, 597
Feibelman v. Manchester F. A.
Co. 108 Ala. 180 35
Feinstein v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.)
73 S. W. 1052. 6
Feist v. Soothe (Tex. Cv. App.)
27 S. W. 33 200
Felhauer v. City of St. Louis
(Mo.) 77 S. W. 848.... 598
Felix v. S. 18 Ala. 725 340, 757
Felker v. Douglass (Tex. Cv.
App.) 57 S. W. 323.... 35
Fells Point S. Inst. v. Weedon,
18 Md. 320 : 31
Felmat v. Southern Ex. Co. 123
N. Car. 499 361
Felton v. Clarkson, 103 Tenn.
457 7
v. S. 139 Ind. 540.. 6, 229, 770
Fendriek v. S. 39 Tex. Cr. App.
147 272
Ferguson v. Davis County, 57
Iowa, 611 601
v. Hosier, 58 Ind. 438 411
v.Moore, 98 Tenn. 342.. 163
v. S. (Neb.) 77 N. W. 590. 813
v. S. 52 Neb. 432
4, 55. 229, 295
v. Smethers, 70 Ind. 521.. 875
v. Venice Tr. Co. 79 Mo.
App. 352 131
Ferguson's Adm'r v. Wills, 88
Va. 139 444
Fernbach v. City of Waterloo,
76 Iowa, 598 -. . . 360
Ferris v. Marshall (Neb.) 96
N. W. 602 90
Fessenden v. Doane. 188 111.
232 71, 101
Fetcher v. Louisville & N. R.
Co. 102 Tenn. 1 94
Ficken v. City of Atlanta, 114
Ga. 970 80
Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Court-
ney, 186 U. S. 342 25
Fidelity M. L. Asso. v. Jeffords,
107 Fed. 402 224
Fidelity Trust Co. v. Palmer,
22 Wash. 473 120
Field v. Crawford. 146 111. 136. 20
v. Long, 89 Me. 281 348
Fields v. S. 134 Ind. 55.. 796, 802
Fifer v. Ritter, 159 Ind. 11
216. 366, 367
Files v. S. 36 Tex. Cr. App.
206 . . 191
Finance Co. v. Old Pittsburg C.
Co. 65 Minn. 442 351
Finch v. Bergins, 89 Ind. 360
195, 206
Fineburg v. Second & Third St.
P. R. Co. 182 Pa. St. 97. 191
Fink v. Evans, 95 Tenn. 413. 155
v. Gulf C. & S. F. R. Co.
4 Tex. Cv. App. 269 8
Finks v. Cox (Tex. Cv. App.)
30 S. W. 512 200, 250
Finley v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.)
47 S. W. 1015 109
Finney v. Smith, 31 Ohio St.
529 499
Fiore v. Ladd, 25 Ore. 423 116
First Baptist Church v. Rouse,
21 Conn. 167 119
First C. M. H. Soc. v. Town of
Rochester, 66 Vt. 501... 49
First M. E. Church v. Fadden,
8 N. Dak. 162 145
First Nat. Bank v. Bower
(Neb.) 98 N. W. 836.. 196
v. Hayes, 64 Ohio St. 101. 145
v. Holan, 63 Minn. 525
171, 189
v. Minneapolis & N. E. Co.
UN. Dak. 280 218
v. Ragsdale, 171 Mo. 168. 7
v. Sargent (Neb.) 91 N. W.
595 196
v. Tolerton (Neb.) 97 N.
W. 248 346, 356
First National Bank of Mon-
mouth v. Dunbar, 118 111.
630 54
Fisher v. Central Lead Co. 156
Mo. 479 48
v. Hamilton, 49 Ind. 349.. 508
v. P. 23 111. 218 35
v. P. 20 Mich. 135 219
v. Porter, 11 S. Dak. 311. 126
v. S. 23 Mont. 540 270
Fisk v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R.
Co. 74 Iowa, 424 94
Fitch v. Belding, 49 Conn. 469. 14
v. Bill 71 Conn. 24 128
Fitzcock v. S. 52 Miss. 923... 288
Fitzgerald v. Clark, 17 Mont.
100 198
v. Goff, 99 Ind. 39 473
v. S. 112 Ala. 34 261
v. S. 20 Tex. Or. App. 294
772
Fitzpatrick v. P. 98 Til. 269... 279
Ixvi
TABLE OF CASES.
(References are to Sections.}
Fitzpatrick v. Union Tr. Co. 206
Pa. St. 335 348, 582
Fitzwater v. Roberts, 116 Pa.
St. 454 130
Flam v. Lee, 1 1 6 Iowa, 289 78
Flanigan v. S. 25 Ark. 92
225, 288
Fleetwood v. Com. 80 Ky. 1.. 788
Fleming v. Dixon, 194 Pa. St.
67 25
v. Fleming, 33 S. Car. 505. 352
v. S. 136 Ind. 149 322, 326
v. S. 107 Ala. 11 267
v. Wilmington & W. R. Co.
115 N. Car. 676 195
Fletcher v. Louisville & N. R.
Co. 102 Tenn. 1 20
v. Post, 104 Mich. 424 80
v. S. 85 Ga. 666 326
v. S. 132 Ala. 10 301
Flick v. P. 204 111. 225 738
Flint v. Nelson, 10 Utah, 261.. 15
v. Van Hall, 4 Tex. Cv.
App. 404 96
Flora v. Russell, 138 Ind. 153. 506
Florence Sewing M. Co. v. Gro-
ver & B. Sewing M. Co.
110 Mass. 70 38
Flores v. Maverick (Tex. Cv.
App.) 26 S. W. 316.. 199, 200
Florida. &c. R. Co. v. Foxworth,
41 Fla. 8 631
v. Lucas, 110 Ga. 121. .170, 175
v. Williams, 37 Fla. 406.. 129
Flower v. Beveridge, 161 111.
53 44
Flowers v. Flowers, 92 Ga. 688. 113
Flynn v. New York E. R. Co.
50 N. Y. S. 375 222
Fogarty v. Hook, 32 N. Y. S.
555 145
v. S. 80 Ga. 450 301
Foley v. Longhran, 60 N. J. L.
468 189
Folks v. Folks, 107 Ky. 561. 81
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 58
S. W. 98 255, 272
Follmer v. McGinley, 146 Pa.
St. 517 171
Folsom v. Plumer, 43 N. H.
469 157
Ford v. Chicago & R. I. & P.
Go. 106 Iowa 355
v. Ford, 110 Ind. 89 360
v. S. 92 Ga. 459 220
v. S. 73 Miss. 734 331
Ford v. S. 75 Miss. 727 119
v. S. 101 Tenn. 454.. 26, 328
Ford v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 56
S. W. 338 21, 268
Fore v. Hitson, 70 Tex. 520
388, 459
v. S. 75 Miss. 727 80
Forst v. Leonard. 116 Ala. 82. 140
Fortson v. Mikell, 97 Ga. 336. 7
Forwood v. S. 49 Md. 537 168
Fosdahl v. S. 87 Wis. 482 110
Fossum v. Chicago, &c. R. Co.
80 Minn. 12 647
Foster v. Berg, 104 Pa. St.
328 160
v. Chicago & A. R. Co. 84
111. 164 243
v. Franklin L. Ins. Co.
(Tex. Cv. App.) 72 S. W.
91 196
v. Pacific C. S. 30 Wash.
515 20
v. Pitts, 63 Ark. 387 363
v. S. 89 Wis. 482 336
v. Turner, 31 Kas. 65.. 14, 37
Fowler v. Harrison, 64 S. Car.
311 199, 348
v. Hoffman, 31 Mich. 215. 26b
v. S. 85 Ind. 538 166, 710
Fox v. Boyd, 104 Tenn. 357... 244
v. Manhattan R. Co. 73 N.
Y. S. 896 223
v. P. 95 111. 75 84
v. P. 84 111. App. 270 113
v. Utter, 6 Wash. 299 100
Foxwell v. S. 63 Ind. 539 229
Foxworth v. Brown, 120 Ala.
59 84
Frame v. Badger, 79 111. 441
80/113
Francis v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.)
55 S. W. 488 113
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 70
S. W. 75 802
Frank v. S. 94 Wis. 2 11.. 294. 295
v. Tatum (Tex. Cv. App.)
26 S. W. 900 198
v. Williams, 36 Fla. 136.. 243
Frank & Sons v. Welch, 89 111.
38 25
Frank Bird Tr. Co. v. Krug, 30
Ind. App. 602 25
Frankfurter v. Bryan. 12 111.
App. 549 282
Franklin v. Claflin. 49 Md. 24. 347
v. Krum. 171 111. 37 8.. 25, 124
v. S. 12 Md. 236 168
Franklin v. S. 34 Tex. Cr. App.
625 21, 271
TABLE OF CASES.
Ixvii
(References are to Sections.)
Franklin v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.)
48 S. W. 178 272
Franklin Bank v. Stevens, 39
Me. 532 415
Franks v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.)
45 S. W. 1013 304
Frantz v. Rose, 89 111. 594 80
Frazer v. Howe, 106 111. 573
121, 126
v. South, &c. R. Co. 81 Ala.
190 635, 648
Frazure v. Zimmerly, 25 111.
184 117
Frederick v. Allgaier, 88 Mo.
598 249
Freelcorn v. Norcross, 49 Cal.
313 359
Freeman v. Gates, 22 Tex. Cv.
App. 623 198
v. Metropolitan St. R. Co.
95 Mo. App. 314 195
v. S. 112 Ga. 48 220
v. Weeks, 48 Mich. 255.. 286
Freemont Brewing Co. v. Han-
sen (Neb.) 91 N. W. 279
126
Freemont E. & M. V. R. Co. v.
Harlin, 50 Neb. 698 199
Freese v. Kemplay, 118 Fed.
428 144, 189
Freidberg v. P. 102 111. 160
20, 25
Freidman v. Wersz, 8 Okla. 392
27, 66
Freidrick v. Ter. 2 Wash. 358 69
French v. Millard, 2 Ohio St.
44 28
v. S. 12 Ind. 670 323
v. Sale. 63 Miss. 386 192
v. Seattle Tr. Co. 26 Wash.
264 25, 191
v. Town of Waterbury, 72
Conn. 435 6
v. Ware, 65 Vt. 338 22, 94
Frenkmann v. Schneider, 64 N.
Y. S. Ill 347
Frenzer .v. Richards, 60 Neb.
131 353
Frick v. Kabaker, 116 Iowa,
494 96, 200, 244
Fritz v. Western Union Tel. Co.
25 Utah, 263 80
Frixell v. Cole, 42 111. 363 371
Frorer v. P. 141 111. 171 94
Frost v. Foote (Tex. Cv. App.)
44 S. W. 1071 80
Frost v. S. 124 Ala. 85.. 68, 113,
223
Fruchey v. Eagleson. 15 Ind.
App. 88 347
Frudie v. S. (Neb.) 92 N. W.
320 378
Fruit D. Co. v. Russo, 125 Mich.
306 63
Fry v. Leshi, 87 Va. 269 100
Frye v. Ferguson, 6 S. Dak. 392
12, 13
Ft. Worth & R. G. R. Co. v.
Greer (Tex. Cv. App.) 69
S. W. 421 81
Fugate v. City of Somerset, 97
Ky. 48 126
Fullam v. Rose, 181 Pa. St.
138 192
Fuller v. Gray, 124 Ala. 388.. 66
v. New York L. Ins. Co.
(Mass.) 67 N. E. 879
119, 170
v. S. 12 Ohio St. 435 727
v. S. (Tex. Cv. App.) 48
S. W. 183 271
Fullerton v. Fordyce, 121 Mo.
1 195
Fulton v. S. 13 Ark. 168 815
Fulton Ins. Co. v. Goodman, 32
Ala. 113 428
Fulwider v. Ingels, 87 Ind. 414
170
Funk v. Babbitt, 156 111. 408
30, 363
Fuqua v. Com. 24 Ky. L. R.
2204 110
Furhman v. City of Huntsville,
54 Ala. 263.. . 185
Gable v. Ranch, 50 S. Car. 95
172, 205, 351
Gables v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.)
68 S. W. 288 255
Gablick v. P. 40 Mich. 292
265, 816
Gachet v. Warren, 72 Ala. 291
410
Gafford v. S. 122 Ala. 54
260, 297
v. S. 125 Ala. 1
251, 269, 273
v. S. (Miss.) 24 So. 314.. 257
Gage v. Eddy, 179 111. 503 385
v. Louisville, N. O. & T. R.
Co. 88 Tenn. 724 200
Ixviii
TABLE OF CASES.
(References are to Sections.)
Gaines v. McAllister, 122 N.
Car. 340 195
v. S. 99 Ga. 703 192
Gainey v. P. 97 111. 277
70, 74, 285
Gale v. Priddy, 66 Ohio St.
400 230, 231
Galena, C. & N. R. Co. v. Ja-
cobs, 20 111. 478 3
Galesburg, &c. R. Co. v. Milroy,
181 111. 243 70, 683
Gall v. Beckstein, 173 111.187.. 149
Gallagher v. McMullen, 40 N.
Y. S. 222 14
v. S. 28 Tex. App. 247
323, 339
v. Williamson, 23 Cal. 334
119
Gallatin Turnpike Co. v. S. 16
Lea (Tenn.) 26 161
Galh'more v. Brewer, 22 Ky. L.
R. 296 236
Gallman v. Union H. Mfg. Co.
65 S. Car. 192 348
Galloway v. Corbitt, 52 Mich.
461 35
v. S. 29 Ind. 442 851
v. S. (Tex. Cv. App.) 70
S. W. 212 734
Gallup v. Fox, 64 Conn. 491.. 158
Galveston v. Posnainsky, 62
Tex. 122 .* 605
Galveston, &c. R. Co. v. Ben-
nett (Tex. Cr. App.) 38
S. W. 813 632
v. Bowman (Tex. Cv. App.)
25 S. W. 140 238
v. Buch, 27 Tex. Cv. App.
283 7, 65, 198
v. Courtney, 30 Tex. Cv.
App. 544 , 94
v. Croskell (Tex. Cv. App.)
25 S. W. 486 100
. v. Dyer (Tex. Cv. App.)
38 S. W. 218 172
v. Edmunds (Tex. Cv.
App.) 26 S. W. 633.... 7
v. Hitzfelder (Tex. Cv.
App.) 66 S. W. 707 90
v. Jenkins. 29 Tex. Cv.
App. 440 196
v. Johnson (Tex. Cv. App.)
29 S. W. 428 97
v. Karver (Tex. Cv. App.)
70 S. W. 328 170
v. Kinnebrew, 7 Tex. Cv.
App. 549 101
Galveston, &c. R. Co. v. Knip-
pa (Tex. Cv. App.> 27
S. W. 730 177
27 S. W. 730 177
v. Levy, 10 Tex. Cv. App.
104 245
v. Lynes (Tex. Cv. App.)
65 S. W. 1119 197
v. McMonigal (Tex. Cv.
App.) 25 S. W. 341.... 6
v. Michalke, 14 Tex. Cv.
App. 495 183
v. Neel (Tex. Cv. App.) 26
S. W. 788 43
v. Newport, 26 Tex. Cv.
App. 583 191, 238
v. Parvin (Tex. Cv. App.)
64 S. W. 1008 65
v. Sanchez (Tex. Cv. App.)
65 S. W. 893 195
v. Siligman (Tex. Cv.
App.) 23 S. W. 298 94
v. Thompson (Tex. Cv.
App.) 44 S. W. 8 172
v. Waldo (Tex. Cv. App.)
26 S. W. 1004 8, 80
v. Waldo (Tex. Cv. App.)
32 S. W. 783 198
v. Worthy (Tex. Cv. App.)
27 S. W. 426 57
Gambrill v. Schooley, 93 Md.
49 497
v. Schooley, 95 Md. 260
65, 80, 85
Gandy v. Bissell's Estate (Neb.)
" 69 N. W. 633.. 25, 384, 416
v. Orient Ins. Co. 52 S.
Car. 224 80
Gann v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 59
S. W. 1069 103. 304
Gantling v. S. 40 Fla. 237.... 305
Garbaczewski v. Third Ave. R.
Co. 39 N. Y. S. 33 26
Garcia v. Candelaria, 9 N. M.
374 144
v. S. 34 Fla. 311., 326
Gard v. Neff, 39 Ohio St. 607. 862
Gardner v. Gooch, 48 Me. 489
656, 658, 659
v. S. 55 N. J. L. 17 336
v. S. 40 Tex. Cr. App. 272. 275
Garfield v. S. 74 Ind. 60 295
Garner v. S. 28 Fla. 113 281
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 77
.S. W. 708 261
Garoutte v. Williamson, 108
Cal. 135 . . 347
TABLE OF CASES.
Ixix
(References are to Sections.)
Garrett v. S. 109 Ind. 527... 360
Garrison v. S. 147 Mo. 548... 272
v. S. 6 Neb. 285 336
Garrity v. P. 107 111. 162.... 322
Garrott v. Ratliff, 83 Ky. 386
359
Garton v. Union City Nat.
Bank, 34 Mich. 279 347
Gartside Coal Co. v. Turk, 147
111. 120 58
Gary v. Woodham, 103 Ala.
421 123, 124
Gasch v. Niehoff, 162 111. 395
53, 360
Gatlin v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.)
49 S. W. 87 109
Gavigan v. Evans, 45 Mich.
597 196
Gawn v. S. 13 Ohio C. C. 116
322, 324
Gaynor v. Louisville & N. R.
Co. (Ala.) 33 So. 808
119, 124
Gearing v. Lacher, 146 Pa. St.
397 247
Geary v. Kansas City, O. & S.
R. Co. 138 Mo. 257 198
v. Parker, 65 Ark. 521... 349
Gee .v- S. 80 Miss. 285 198
Gehl v. Milwaukee Pro. Co. 116
Wis. 263 219, 347
Gehr v. Hegeman, 26 111. 438
153, 155
Geiser Mfg. Co. v. Krogman
(Iowa) 82 N. W. 938.. 361
Geist v. Missouri Pac. R. Co.
62 Neb. 322 641
Gemmill v. Brown, 25 Ind.
App. 6 25, 56
General Fire E. Co. v. Schwartz,
165 Mo. 121 25
Gentry v. S. 24 Tex. App. 80. 321
Genz v. S. 58 N. -J. L. 482
198, 271, 329
George v. Los Angeles R. Co.
126 Cal. 357 639
v. Stubbs, 26 Me. 242 191
Georgia, &c. Ins. Co. v. Allen,
128 Ala. 451 192
v. Campbell, 102 Ga. 106.. 215
Georgia, &c. R. Co. v. Hutchin.s
(Ga.) 46 S. E. 662.,.. 203
v. Pittman, 73 Ga. 325
649, 651
v. West, 66 Miss. 314
383, 556. 562. 565, 569.
581, 583, 652. 653
Georgia, &c. R. Co. v. Young
Ins. Co. (Ga.) 46 S. E.
644 6
v. Zarks, 108 Ga. 800... 94
Gerdes v. Christopher & S. A.
I. & F. Co. (Mo.) 27 S.
W. 615 217
Gerke v. Fancher, 158 111. 385
127, 133, 196
Germaine v. City of Muskegon,
105 Mich. 213 234
German v. U. C. 120 Fed. 666
201
German F. Ins. Co. v. Colum-
bia E. T. Co. 15 Ind.
App. 623 15
German Fire Ins. Co. v. Gru-
nert, 112 111. 68 33
German Sav. Bank v. Bates'
Add. S. Co. (Iowa) 82
N. W. 1005 145
v. Citizens' Nat. Bank, 101
Iowa, 530 188
Germania Fire Ins. Co. v.
Hicks, 125 111. 364 47
v. Klewer, 129 111. 611
117, 195
v. McKee, 94 111. 494 48
Germantown Pass. R. Co. v.
Walling, 97 Pa. St. 55.. 183
Gerrard v. La Crosse City R.
Co. 113 Wis. 258 232
Gerwe Consolidated Fire W.
Co. 12 Ohio C. C. 420.. 134
Gibbons v. Van Alstyne, 29 N.
Y. S. 461 39
Gibbs v. Johnson, 63 Mich.
674 46
v. Wall, 10 Colo. 153 94
Gibson v. Correker, 91 Ga. 617
107
v. S. 26 Fla. 109 347
v. S. 114 Ga. 34 7
v. S. 76 Miss. 136... 258. 305
Gichrist v. Brown, 165 Pa. St.
275 135
Gifford v. Ammer, 7 *Kas. App.
365 137
Gilbert v. Bone, 79 111. 341
153,155. 163'
v. Watts-De Golyer Co. 169
111. 129 124
Gilbertson v. Forty-Second St.
M. & St. N. Ave. R. Co.
43 N. Y. S. 782.... 80, 106
Ixx
TABLE OF CASES.
(References are to Sections.)
Gilchrist v. Gilchrist, 76 111.
218 238
v'. Hartley, 198 Pa. St.
132 90
Giles v. S. 43 Tex. Cr. App.
561 258
Gill v. Donovan., 96 Md. 518.. 25
v. Skelton, 54 111. 158
359, 360
v. S. 59 Ark. 422
296, 307, 310
Gillen v. Riley, 27 Neb. 158.. 44
Gills v. Com. 18 Ky. L. R.
560 110
Gilmore v. Courtney, 158 111.
437 116, 127
v. McNeil, 45 Me. 599 250
v. P. 124 111. 383 19
v. Seattle, &c. R. Co. 29
Wash. 150 203
v. S. 126 Ala. 20 66
Gilroy v. Loftus, 48 N. Y. S.
532 351
Gilyard v. S. 98 Ala. 59 221
Ginnard v. Knapp, 95 Wis.
482 245
Givens v. S. 34 Tex. Cr. App.
563 221, 304
Gizler v. Witzel. 82 111. 322.. 105
Glaser v. Glaser (Okla.) 74
Pac. 945 351
Glass v. Cook. 30 Ga. 133.... 116
Glenn v. Hunt, 120 Mo. 330.. 35
Globe Ins. Co. v. Sherlock, 25
Ohio St. 67 243
Globe Oil Co. v. Powell, 56
Neb. 463 118, 351
Glover v. Blakeslee, 115 Ga.
696 243
v. Charleston & S. R. Co.
57 S. Car. 228 244
v. Gasque (S. Car.) 45 S.
E. 113 156
v. S. 105 Ga. 597 265
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 46
S. W. 824 326
Glucose Sugar R. Co. v. Flinn,
184 111. J28 80
Goddard v. Foster, 17 Wall
(U. S.) 142 156, 160
Godfrey v. Phillips, 209 111.
584 236
Godwin v. S. 96 Ind. 550 281
v. S. 73 Miss. 873
105, 113. 279. 296
Goesel v. Davis, 100 Wis. 678
232
Goff v. Greer, 88 Ind. 122 37
Goffney v. St. Paul City R.
Co. 81 Minn. 459 1
Gohn v. Doerle, 85 111. 514.. 183
Goins v. S. 46 Ohio St. 467
792, 804
Golden v. S. 25 Ga. 527 168
Goldsberry v. S. (Neb.) 92 N.
W. 906 276
Goldsby v. U. S. 160 U. S. 70
326
Goldsmith v. City of New York,
43 N. Y. S. 447 25
v. S. 105 Ala. 8 301, 345
Goldthorp Estate, 115 Iowa.
430 45
Goldthorp v. Clark-Nickerson
L. Co. 31 Wash. 467.... 119
v. Goldthorp, 115 Iowa, 430
114, 200
Goldsworthy v. Town of Lin-
den, 75 W T is. 24 171
Goley v. S. 85 Ala. 333 115
Golibart v. Sullivan, 30 Ind.
App. 428 25, 476
Gohn v. S. 37 Tex. Cr. App.
90 110
Gonzales v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. App.
339 274, 347
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 57 '
S. W. 667 255, 310
Goodale v. Worcester Agr. S.
102 Mass. 405 532
Goodbar v. Lidikey, 136 Ind.
7 704
Goode v. Campbell, 14 Bush
(Ky.) 75 39
Goodhue v. Farmers' W. Co. v.
Davis, 81 Minn. 210 212
Goodman v. Sampliner, 23 Ind.
App. 72 351
Goodsell v. Seeley, 46 Mich.
623 186
Goodwin v. S. (Ala.) 18 So.
694 44
v. S. 96 Ind. 550
211. 329. 377
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 46
S. W. 226 274
v. S. 114 Wis. 318 321
Gordon v. Alexander, 122 Mich.
107 25, 80
v. Burris. 153 Mo. 223
25, 113, 238
v. City of Richmond, 83
Va.' 438
59, 61, 63, 591, 597
TABLE OF CASES.
Ixxi
(References are to Sections.}
Gordon v. Com. 100 Va. 825..
v. P. 33 N. Y. 501
v. S. 129 Ala. 113
Gorgo v. P. 100 111. App. 130.
Gorham v. Kansas City, &c. R.
Co. 113 Mo. 410
616, 617, 618, 652,
Gorman v. Campbell, 14 Ga.
142
Gorrell v. Payson, 170 111. 217
Goss v. Colkins, 162 Mass. 492
144,
Goss Printing Pr. v. Lempke,
191 111. 201
Gott v. P. 187 111. 249
151. 206, 299,
Gottfried Brewing Co. v. Szar-
kowski, 79 111. App. 583
Gottlieb v. Hartman, 3 Colo.
53
Gottstein v. Seattle L. & C.
Co. 7 Wash. 424
Gould v. Gilligan, 181 Mass.
600
v. Magnolia Metal Co. 207
111. 178 .
Grove v. P. 162 111. 265
Gover v. Dill, 3 Iowa, 337
Gowdey v. Robbins, 38 N. Y.
S. 280
Gowen v. Kehoe, 71 111. 66...
Grace v. Dempsey, 75 Wis. 313
v. St. Louis, &c. R. Co.
156 Mo. 295
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 69
S. W. 529
Grade v. Stevens, 171 N. Y.
658
Graferman Dairy Co. v. St.
Louis Dairy Co. 96 Mo.
App. 495
Graff v. P. 134 111. 3 83.. 105,
v. P. 208 111. 326
Graham v. Frazier, 49 Neb.
90
v. Nowlin. 54 Ind. 389. ..
v. St. Louis. I. M. & S. R.
Co. 69 Ark. 562
Granado v. S. 37 Tex. Cr. App.
426
Granberry v. Frierson, 2 Baxt.
(Tenn.) 326
338
222
299
218
653
48
250
195
217
421
404
219
6
15
363
320
94
355
172
32
244
85
346
116
246
223
191
173
136
304
37
Granby Mining & Smelting Co.
v. Davis, 156 Mo. 422
170, 182
Grand Lodge v. Orrell, 99 111.
App. 246 250
Grand Rapids & I. R. Co. v.
Judson, 34 Mich. 507.. 223
Grand Tower Mfg. Co. v. Ull-
man, 89 111. 244 54
Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Cob-
leigh, 78 Fed. 786 636
Grande v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.)
38 S. W. 613 82
Granger v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.)
31 S. W. 807 293
Grant v. Roberts (Tex. Cv.
App.) 38 S. W. 650 71
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 70
S. W. 954 229
v. S. 97 Ala. 35 115
v. Westfall, 57 Ind. 121.. 356
Grau v. Houston, 45 Neb. 813
115, 196
Graves v. Cadwell, 90 111. 612
200
v. Colwell, 90 111. 612
113. 308
v. Dill. 159 Mass. 74 116
v. Hillyer (Tex. Cv. App.)
48 S. W. 889 238
v. P. 18 Colo. 181 312
v. S. 45 N. J. L. 203 331
Gravett v. S. 74 Ga. 196 37
Gray v. Callender, 181 111. 173
48
v. City of Emporia, 43
Kas. 706 604
v. Merriam, 148 111. 188.. 243
v. Sharpe (Colo. App.) 67
Pac. 375 48
v. S. 42 Fla. 174 71
v. Washington Water P.
Co. 30 Wash. 665.. 346, 630
Graybeal v. Gardner, 146 111.
337 696
Graybill v. Chicago. &c. R. Co.
112 Iowa, 743 53. 630
Grayson v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.)
57 S. W. 808 258
Greaney v. Holyoke Water
Power Co. 174 Mass.
437 25
Great N. R. Co. v. McLaugh-
lin, 70 Fed. 669 20
Greathouse v. Moore (Tex. Cv.
App.) 23 S. W. 226.... 200
Lxxii
TABLE OF CASES.
(References are to Sections.)
Green v. Com. 17 Ky. L. R.
943
v. Eden, 24 Ind. App. 583
v. Hansen, 89 Wis. 597...
v. Southern Pac. R. Co.
122 Cal. 563
v. S. 97 Ala. 59
v. S. 40 Fla. 474
v. S. 43 Fla. 556
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 34
S. W. 283
v. Tierney, 62 Neb. 561..
v. Willingham, 100 Ga.
224
Greenbaum v. Millsaps, 77 Mo.
474 '.
Greene v. Greene, 145 111. 264
48,
Greenup v. Stoker, 8 111. (3
Gilm.) 202
Greenwood v. Davis, 106 Mich.
230 .
v. Houston I. & B. Co. 27
Tex. Cv. App. 590
Greer v. Com. 23 Ky. L. R.
489
v. Lafayette Co. Bank, 128
Mo. 559
v. S. (Tex. Cv. App.) 45
S. W. 12
Gregg v. Jones (Tex. Cv. App.)
26 S. E. 132
v. P. 98 111. App. 170
v. Willis, 71 Vt. 313
Grentzinger v. S. 31 Neb. 460
Greschia v. P. 53 111. 299....
Grier v. Cable, 159 111. 29....
v. Puterbaugh, 108 111.602
v. S. 53 Ind. 420
Griffin v. Henderson, 117 Ga.
382
v. Lewiston (Idaho) 55
,. Pae. 545
v. Manice, 62 N. Y. S. 364
v. Mulley, 167 Pa. St. 339
v. Southern R. 66 S. Car.
77
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 53
S. W. 848
v. White, 52 N. Y. S. 807
11
71
351
247
304
42
80
303
353
80
359
363
98
71
7
107
243
269
200
119
351
816
795
25
48
209
93
247
25
22
119
80
195
Griffith v. Bergeson, 115 Iowa,
279 195
v. Hanks, 91 Mo. 109 84
v. Potter, 65 N. Y. S. 689
361
v. S. 90 Ala. 583 297
Grim v. Murphy, 110 111. 271
65, 94, 249
Grimes v. S. 105 Ala. 86 301
Grimes Dry Goods Co. v. Mal-
colm, 164 U. S. 483... 148
Grmsinger v. S. (Tex. Cr.
App.) 69 S. W. 583.86, 290
Griswold v. Town of Guilford.
75 Conn. 192 .' 80
Grogan v. U. S. Industrial Ins.
Co. 36 N. Y. S. 687 145
Gross v. Shaffer, 29 Kas. 442. 113
Gross Luimfoer v. Coody, 99 Ga.
775 360
Grover v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.)
46 S. W. 824 304
Groves v. Acker, 33 N. Y. S.
406 145
Grows v. Maine C. R. Co. 69
Me. 412 191
Grubb v. S. 117 Ind. 277
229 330
Grube v. Nichols, 36 111. 92.! 113
Gruber v. Decker, 115 Ga. 779
243
Gruesendorf v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.)
56 S. W. 624 6
Grugan v. City of Philadelphia,
158 Pa. St. 337 352
Guardian Mutual Life Ins. Co.
v. Hogan, 80 111. 35 200
Guenther v. Amsden, 44 N. Y.
S. 982 145
Guerin v. New Eng. H. I. Co.
70 N. H. 133 360
Guerold v. Holtz, 103 Mich.
118 237
Guerrero v. S. 39 Tex. Cr. App.
662 265
v. S. 41 Tex. Cr. App. 161. 270
Guetig v. S. 63 Ind. 278.. 247, 332
v. S. 66 Ind. 106
331, 335, 377, 751, 755
Guimard v. Knapp, Stout & Co.
95 Wis. 482 199
Guimo v. S. 39 Tex. Cr. App.
257 229
Guinard v. Knapp, &c. Co. 90
Wis. 123 246
Guinn v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 65
S. W. 376 110
TABLE OF CASES.
Ixxiii
(References are to Sections.}
Gull C. &c. R. Co. v. Brown
(Tex. Cv. App.) 24 S. VV.
918 195
v. Carter (Tex. Cv. App.) 71
S. W. 73 238
v. Cash (Tex. Cv. App.) 28
S. W. 387 97
V. Condor, 23 Tex. Cv. App.
488 236
v. Courtney (Tex. Cv. App.)
23 S. W. 226 94
v. Dansbank, 6 Tex. Cv.
App. 385 65
v. Dunlap (Tex. Cv. App.)
26 S. W. 655 73
v. Duvall, 12 Tex. Cv. App.
348 26
y. Greenlee, 70 Tex. 557... 648
v. Harriett, 80 Tex. 81 25
v. Higby (Tex. Cv. App.) 26
S. W. 737 94
v. Hill, 95 Tex. 629 199
v. Holt (Tex. Cv. App.) 70
S. VV. 591 26
v. McCarty, 82 Tex. 608.. 199
v. Manghan, 29 Tex. Cv.
App. 486 7, 355
v. Moore (Tex. Cv. App.) 68
S. W. 559 80
v. Pendery (Tex. Cv. App.)
27 S. W. 213 8
v. Perry (Tex. Cv. App.) 30
S. W. 709 8
v. Pierce, 7 Tex. Cv. App.
597 196
v. Rowland, 90 Tex. 365
562, 564, 565
T. Shieder (Tex. Cv. App.)
26 S. W. 509 100
v. Thompson (Tex. Cv. App.)
35 S. W. 319 65
v. Warner, 22 Tex. Cv.
App. 167 245
v. White (Tex. Cv. App.) 32
S. W. 322 193, 247
v. Wilbanks, 7 Tex. Cv. App.
489 196
v. Wilson, 79 Tex. 371
549, 554
Gulliher v. P. 82 111. 146 227
Gulliver v. Adams Ex. Co. 38
111. 509 358
Gumby v. Metropolitan St. R.
Co. 171 N. Y. 635 347
Gunther v. P. 139 III. 526
113, 265, 816
Gusdorff v. Duncan, 94 Md.
160 . 163
Gustafon v. Seattle Tr. Co. 28
Wash. 227 211
Gutirrez v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.)
59 S. W. 274 322
Gutta P. & R. Mfg. Co. v. Wood,
84 Mich. 459 407, 413
Gutzman v. Clancy, 114 Wis.
589 45, 231, 351
Guy v. S. Ill Ga. 648.. 34, 168, 267
Gwaltney v. Scottish C. F. &
L. Co. 115 N. Car. 579.. 7
Gwatkin v. Com. 9 Leigh (Va.)
678 3
Gwin v. Gwin, 5 Idaho, 271 48
Haacke v. Knights, &c. 76 Md.
431 434
Haas v. Brown, 47 N. Y. S. 606. 351
Haase v. S. 24 Vroom (N. J. L.)
40 . . . . 850
Hackelrath v. Stookey, 63 111.
486 308
Hacker v. Heiney, 111 Wis. 313
4, 111
v. Munroe & Sons, 176 111.
384, 394 363, 238
Hafner v. Heron, 165 111. 242,
251 363
Hagan v. Chicago, &c. R. Co.
86 Mich. 624 630
Hagenow v. P. 188 111. 553 45
Haggarty v. Strong, 10 S. Dak.
585 80
Hahn v. Miller, 60 Iowa, 96 363
Haight v. Vallet, 89 Cal. 249
211, 246
Haines v. Hayden, 95 Mich. 350
704
v. Illinois Cent. R. Co. 41
Iowa, 231 639
v. McLaughlin, 135 U. S.
584 171
Hale Elevator Co. v. Hall, 201
111. 131 215
Halff v. Wangemann (Tex, Cv.
App.) 54 S. W. 967 6
Halfman v. Pennsylvania Boiler
Ins. Co. 160 Pa. St. 202
191, 196
Hall v. Durham, 109 Ind. 434.. 126
v. Incorporated Town, &c.
90 Iowa, 585.. 196, 347, 358
v. Needles, 1 Ind. Ter. 146. 350
v. O'Malley, 49 Tex. 71
503, 508
Ixxiv
TABLE OF CASES.
(References are to Sections.}
Hall v. Rankin, 87 'Iowa, 261.. 211
v. S. 130 Ala. 45.. 66, 192, 198
v. S. 134 Ala. 90 192, 217
v. S. 132 Ind. 317 340
v. Stroufe, 52 111. 421 243
v. Vanderpool, 156 Pa. St.
152 118
v. Woodin, 35 Mich. 67... 90
v. Wolff, 61 Iowa, 559 200
Hall-Moody Institute v. Copass,
108 Tenn. 582 6
Hallenbeck v. Garst, 96 Iowa,
509 351
Halley v. Tichenor, 120 Iowa,
164 43
Hamilton v. Great F. St. R. Co.
17 Mont. 334 71, 351
v. Hartinger, 96 Iowa., 7 ... 30
v. Love, 152 Ind. 641 238
v. P. 29 Mich. 173
165, 294, 308
v. Pittsburg B. & T. E. Co.
194 Pa. St. 1 7
v. S. 62 Ark. 543. .214, 253, 372
v. S. 96 Ga. 301 310
v. S. 75 Ind. 593 848
v. S. 97 Tenn. 452 201
v. Singer S. M. Co. 54 111.
370 93
Hamilton Keeling Co. v. Wheeler,
175 111. 514 144
Hamlin v. S. 39 Tex. Cr. App.
579 315
v. Treat, 87 Me. 310.. 119, 172
Hamman v. Central Coal & Coke
Co. 156 Mo. 232 244
' Hammel v. Lewis, 23 Ky. L. R.
2298 7
Hammond v. P. 199 HI. 173
118, 259, 260
v. S. 74 Miss. 214 ....340, 345
Hampton v. Norfolk & W. R.
Co. 120 N. Car. 534 348
v. Ray, 52 S. Car. 74. ..350, 351
Hanchette v. Kimbark, 118 111.
132 3
Hancock v. Colrybark, 66 Mo.
672 158
v. Shockman (Ind. Ter.) 69
S. W. 826 360
Hand v. Agen, 96 Wis. 493 186
Hanes v. S. 155 Ind. 120... 86, 769
Haney v. Breeden, 100 Va. 781. 113
v. Caldwell, 43 Ark. 184.. 19
Hanger v. Evins, 38 Ark. 338. . 19
Hank v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 56
S. W. 922 303
Hankins v. S. 39 Tex. Cr. App.
261 293
Hanley v. Balch, 106 Mich. 46.. 120
Hanna v. Hanna, 3 Tex. Cv.
App. 51 66
Hannah v. S. 1 Tex. App. 579.. 170
Hannahan v. S. 7 Tex. Cr. App.
610 37
Hannibal, &c. R. Co. v. Martin,
111 111. 227
53, 58, 172, 549, 579. 653
Hannigan v. S. 131 Ala. 29 304
Hannon v. S. 70 Wis. 448.. 38, 119
v. St. Louis Tr. Co. (Mo.
App.) 77 S. W. 158 58
Hannton Keeling Co. v. Wheeler,
175 111. 514 144
Hannum v. S. 90 Tenn. 647... 165
Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Stod-
dard, 52 Neb. 745 94
Hanrahan v. P. 91 111. 142 115
Hanrohan v. P. 91 111. 142. .198, 279
Hans v. S. 50 Neb. 150 198
Hansberg v. P. 120 111. 21.... 80
Hansen v. Boyd, 161 U. S. 397. 144
Hanson v. Garr, Scott & Co. 68
Minn. 68 48
v. S. 43 Ohio St. 378 772
v. St. Paul Gas Light Co.
(Minn.) 92 N. W. 510... 99
Hanye v. T. 99 Ga. 212 274
Hardeman v. S. (Miss.) 16 So.
876 358
Hardin v. S. 40 Tex. Cr. App.
208 262
v. S. 4 Tex. App. 365.. 759, 761
Harding v. Wright, 119 Mo. 1. . 84
Hardy v. Brier, 9 1 Ind. 91 415
v. Milwaukee St. R. Co. 89
Wis. 183 203
v. S. 36 Tex. Cr. App. 400
275, 278
v. Turney, 9 Ohio St. 400. . 4
v. Wise, '5 App. Cas. (D. C.)
108 121
Hargadine v. Davis (Tex. Cv.
App.) 26 S. W. 424 8
Hargis v. St. Louis, &c. R. Co.
75 Tex. 20 641, 642
Hargraves v. Home Fire Ins. Co.
43 Neb. 271 141
v. Western U. Tel. Co. (Tex.
Cv. App.) 60 S. W. 689.. 393
Harlen v. Baden (Kas.) 49 Pac.
615 129
Harless v. U. S. 1 Ind. Ter.
447 351
TABLE OF CASES.
Uxv
(References are to Sections.)
Harnianson v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.)
42 S. W. 995 255, 265
Harmon v. S. 158 Ind. 37 86
Harness v. Steele, 159 Ind. 293
7, 238, 503
Harp. v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 57
S. W. 835 269
Harper v. S. 109 Ala. 66 37
v. S. 101 Ind. 113 7, 202
v. S. 71 Miss. 202 ....265, 816
v. S. (Miss.) 35 So. 575... 246
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 40 S.
W. 272 26
Harpham v. Whitney, 77 111. 38
282
Harrell v. S. 39 Tex. Cr. App.
204 282
v. S. 31 Tex. Cr. App. 204. 70
v. S. 37 Tex. Cr. App. 612.. 215
Harrington v. Claplin (Tex. Cv.
App.) 66 S. W. 898 80
v. Priest, 104 Wis. 362... 247
v. S. 19 Ohio St. 268 340
Harris v. Carrington, 115 N.
N. Car. 187 118
v. First N. Bank (Tex. Cv.
App.) 45 S: W. 311 27
v. Flowers, 21 Tex. Cv. App.
669 7
v. Higden (Tex. Cv. App.)
41 S. W. 412 93
v. Murphy, 119 N. Car. 34. 212
v. S. 96 Ala. 27 220
v. S. 36 Ark. 127 258
v. S. 97 Ga. 350 191
v. S. 155 Ind. 271 265, 776
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 47 S.
W. 643 268
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 57 S.
W. 833 . . . .: 103
V. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 65 S.
W. 921 191
v. S. 34 Tex. Cr. App. 494. 310
v. Shebeck, 151 111. 287
144, 197
v. Smith, 71 N. H. 330... 351
v. U. S. 8 App. Cas. (D. C.)
20 25
v. Woodford, 98 Mich. 147. 81
Harrison v. Adamson, 86 Iowa,
695 677
v. Baker, 15 Neb. 43 80
v. Chappell, 84 N. Car. 258
347
v. Com. 123 Pa. St. 508... 165
v. S. 83 Ga. 129 228, 322
v. S. 6 Tex. App. 42 312
Hart v. Bowen, 86 Fed. 877 351
v. Chicago, &c. R. Co. 56
Iowa, 166 247
v. Cedar K. & M. C. R. Co.
109 Iowa, 631 530, 632
v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co. 9
Wash. 620 200
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 44 S.
VV. 247 269
v. S. 93 Ga. 160 80, 220
v. S. (Ga.) 23 S. E. 831... 303
v. U. S. 84 Fed. 799 189
Harter v. Marshall (Tex. Cv.
App.) 36 S. W. 294.. 65, 247
Hartford v. City of Attala, 119
Ala. 59 129
Hartford Deposit Co. v. Calkins,
186 111. 104 246, 669
v. Pederson, 168 111. 224... 124
v. Sollitt, 172 111. 222. .124, 542
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Josey,
6 Tex. Cv. App. 290 94
Hartlep v. Cole, 120 Ind. 247 ... 47
Hartley v. Mullane, 45 N. Y. S.
1023 149
Hartman & F. B. Co. v. Clark,
94 Md. 520 200
Hartpence v. Rogers, 143 Mo.
623 53
Hartrich v. Hawes (111.) 67 N.
E. 13 , 129
Hartsel v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 68
S. W. 285 25
Hartshorn v. Burlington, &c. R.
Co. 52 Iowa, 616 685
v. Byrne, 147 III. 426
113, 171, 182
Harvey v. Keegan, 78 111. App.
682 4
v. S. 125 Ala. 47 150, 245
v. Tama Co. 53 Iowa, 228. 44
v. Vandegrift, 89 Pa. St.
346 156
Hasbrouck v. City of Milwau-
kee, 21 Wis. 219 41
Haskell v. Starbird, 152 Mass.
118 . . . - 388
Hassett v. Johnson, 48 111. 68. . 48
Hasson v. Klee, 168 Pa. St.
510 80
Hatch v. Marsh, 71 111. 370 113
Hatcher v. S. 43 Tex. Cr. App.
237 271. 201
v. S. 116 Ga. 617 220, 272
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 65 S.
W. 97 . 75
Ixxvi
TABLE OF CASES.
(References are to Sections.)
Hatchett v. Hatchett, 28 Tex.
Cv. App. 33 233
Hatfield v. Chenoworth, 24 Ind.
App. 343 41
Hathaway v. Detroit, &c. R. Co.
124 Mich. 610 646
Kaufman v. S. 49 Ind. 248 324
Hauk v. S. 148 Ind. 238
317, 714, 721, 725, 733
Haun v. Rio Grande W. R. Co.
22 Utah, 346 351
Haupt v. Haupt, 157 Pa. St.
469 192
Hauss v. Niblack, 80 Ind. 414. . 401
Havana v. Biggs, 58 111. 485.. 858
Haven v. Markstrum, 67 Wis.
493 321
Hawes v. S. 88 Atl. 37 90
Hawk v. Brownell, 120 111. 161. 172
Hawk v. Ridgway, 33 111. 473. . 193
Hawkins v. Collier, 106 Ga. 18. 360
v. S. 136 Ind. 634 ....198, 771
Hawley v. Chicago, &c. R. Co.
71 Iowa, 717 90, 173
v. Corey, 9 Utah, 175 .... 177
v. S. 69 Ind. 98 347
Hay v. Carolina M. R. Co. 41
S. Car. 542 26, 49
Hayden v. Com. 20 Ky. L. R.
274 261
v. Frederickson, 59 Neb. 141
117, 223
v. McCloskey, 161 111. 351. 363
Haydensville M. & Mfg. Co. v.
Steffler, 17 Pa. Super. Ct.
609 70
Hayes v. Kelley, 116 Mass. 300
84
v. S. 114 Ga. 25 56, 228
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 39 S.
W. 106 . . 86
v. S. 36 Tex. Cr. App. 146. 193
v. S. 112 Wis. 304 351
v. Williams, 17 Colo. 465.. 34
Hays v. Border, 6 111. (1 Gilm.)
46 ' 33
v. Johnson, 92 111. App. 80. 203
v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 195
Pa. St.' 184 101, 113, 198
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 57 S.
W. 835 255
Hay ward v. Merrill. 94 111. 349 25
Hazard v. City of Council Bluffs,
87 Iowa, 54 596
Hazel] v. Bank of Tipton, 95
Mo. 60 363
Hazewell v. Coursen, 81 N. Y.
630 116
Hazy v. Woitke, 23 Colo. 556.. 130
Hazzard v. Citizens' Bank, 72
Ind. 130 136
Head v. Bridges, 67 Ga. 227... 154
v. Langworthy, 15 Iowa,
235 4
Healy v. P. 163 111. 383.... 48, 80
Hearn v. Shaw, 72 Me.' 187 360
Heaston v. Cincinnati & Ft. W.
R. Co. 16 Ind. 275 12, 13
Hebbe v. Town of Maple Creek,
111 Wis. 480 65
Hector v. Knox, 63 Tex. 615.. 873
Heddle v. City Elec. R. Co. 112
Mich. 547 113, 223
Hedrick v. Smith, 77 Tex. 608. 361
v. Straus, 42 Neb. 485 348
Heed v. S. 25 Wis. 421 816
Helling v. Vanzandt, 162 111.
166 13
Heilman v. Com. 84 Ky. 461... 3
Heinman v. Kinnare, 73 111.
App. .184 48
Heinsen v. Lamb, 117 111. 549
135, 136
Heintz v. Cramer, 84 Iowa, 497
656
Helbing v. Allegheny Cemetery
Co. 201 Pa. St. 172 545
Heldmaier v. Cobbs, 195 111. 72
542
Heller v. Chicago & G. T. R. Co.
109 Mich. 53 93
v. Pulitzer Pub. Co. 153 Mo.
203 153
Hellyer v. P. 186 111. 550
193, 195, 214, 227
Helm v. P. 186 111. 153 4, 42
Helmholz v. Everingham, 24
Wis. 266 160
Helms v. Wayne Agr. Co. 73
Ind. 327 347, 415
Kelt v. Smith, 74 Iowa, 667... 53
Helton ville Mfg. Co. v. Fields,
138 Ind. 58 20, 610
Heminway v. Miller, 87 Minn.
123 244
Hemphill v. S. 71 Miss. 877... 296
Hempton v. S. 1 1 1 Wis. 127... 170
Henderson v. Bartlett, 53 N. Y.
S. 149 348
v. Com. 98 Va. 736, 797.. 6
v. Henderson, 88 111. 248.. 153
TABLE OF CASES.
Ixxvii
(References are to Sections.}
Henewacker v. Ferman, 152 111.
325 49
Henkle v. McClure, 32 Ohio St.
202 84
Henry v. Grand Ave. R. Co. 113
Mo. 534 529
v. Henry, 122 Mich. 6 347
v. Klopfer, 147 Pa. St. 178
286
v. McNamara, 114 Ala. 107
120, 129
v. P. 198 111. 162 798
v. S. 51 Neb. 149 247, 328
v. S. (Tex. Cv. App.) 30 S.
W. 802 269
v. S. (Tex. Cv. App.) 49 S.
W. 96 276
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 43 S. '
W. 340 289
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 54 S.
W. 592 247
v. Stewart, 185 111. 448
116, 133, 438
Hensel v. Haas, 101 Mich. 443.. 191
Hensen v. S. 114 Ala. 25 258
Henson v. S. 112 Ala. 41 322
Hepler v. S. 58 Wis. 49 6
Herbert v. Drew, 32 Ind. 366
25, 199
v. Ford, 33 Me. 90 157
Herbich v. North Jersey St. R.
Co. 67 N. J. L. 574 48
Herman v. S. 75 Miss. 340 9
Herrick v. Gary, 83 111. 86
1, 80, 200
v. Quigley, 101 Fed. 187... 189
Herring v. Herring, 94 Iowa, 56
84
Herrington v. Guernsey, 177 Pa.
St. 175 191
Hersey v. Hutchins, 70 N. H.
130 80
Herzog v. Campbell, 47 Neb.
370 45
Hess v. Preferred M. M. A. Asso.
112 Mich. 196 363
v. Williamsport & N. B. R.
Co. 181 Pa. St. 492 205
Hessing v. McCloskey, 37 HI.
351 56
Hewey v. Nourse, 54 Me. 256.. 360
Hewitt v. Johnson, 72 111. 513.. 113
Heydrick v. Hutchinson, 165 Pa.
St. 208 133, 170
Heyl v. S. 109 Ind. 589 247
Hickman v. Griffin, 6 Mo. 37... 247
v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. 91
Mo. 435 565
Hickory v. United States, 151
U. S. 303 307
v. United States, 160 U. S.
408 191, 210
Hicks v. Nassau Electric R. Co.
62 N. Y. S. 597 25
v. Southern R. Co. 63 S.
Car. 559 80
v. United States, 150 U. S.
442 210
Hide & Leather National Bank
v. Alexander, 184 111. 416
48
Hidy v. Murray, 101 Iowa, 65. . 282
Higbee v. McMillan, 18 Kas.
133 218
Higginbotham v. Campbell, 85
Ga. 638 183
Higginbotham v. Higginbotham,
106 Ala. 314 183
Higgins v. Grace, 59 Md. 365.. 116
v. Hannibal, &c. R. Co. 36
Mo. 418 538
v. Wren, 79 Minn. 462.... 221
Highland v. Houston E. & W.
T. R. Co. (Tex. Cv. App.)
65 S. W. 649 25
Highland Ave. & B. R. Co. v.
Donovan, 94 Ala. 300 .. 570
v. Sampson, 112 Ala. 425.. 110
Highway Comrs. v. Highway
Comr. 60 111. 58 175
Hildman v. City of Phillips, 106
Wis. 61 i 205
Hildreth v. Hancock, 156 111.
618 65
Hill v. Bahrns, 158 111. 304,
320 363
v. Inhabitants of Seekonk,
119 Mass. 88 600
v. Newman, 47 Ind. 187... 63
v. Parson, 110 111. Ill ... 26a
v. S. 43 Ala. 335 361
v. S. 42 Neb. 503 196
v. S. (Tex. Cv. App.) 35 S.
W. 660 314
v. S. 35 Tex. Cv. App. 371
262, 360
v. Spear, 50 N. H. 253 192
Hillebrant v. Green, 93 Iowa,
661 248
Hillis v. First Nat. Bank. 54
Kas. 421 136
Ixxviii
TABLE OF CASES.
(References are to /Sections.)
Hills v. Ludaig, 46 Ohio St.
Hirarod Coal Co. v. Clark, 197
111. 514 ...............
Hindman v. First Nat. Bank,
112 Fed. 931 ...... 347,
v. Timme, 8 Ind. App. 416.
Hine v. Commercial Bank, 119
Mich. 448 .............
Hiner v. Jeanpert, 65 111. 429. .
Mines v. Com. (Ky.) 62 S. W.
732 ..................
Kingston v. ^Etna Ins. Co. 42
Iowa, 47 ..............
Hinkle v. Davenport, 38 Iowa,
364 ..................
Hinshaw v. Gilpin, 64 Ind. 116
v. S. 147 Ind. 334
6, 22, 25, 30, 49, 725,
735,
Hinton v. Cream City R. Co.
65 Wis. 335 ...........
Hintz v. Graupner, 138 111. 158
Hirsch v. Feeney, 83 111. 548..
Hirschman v. P. 101 111. 568
7, 226, 372,
Hix v. P. 157 111. 383. .238, 265,
Hobbs v. Ferguson, 100 111. 232
Hoben v. Burlington, &c. R. Co.
20 Iowa, 562 ..........
Hoberg v. S. 3 Minn. 262 ......
Hockaday v. Wartham, 22 Tex.
Cv. App. 419 ..........
Hochworth v. Des Grandes
Champs, 71 Mich. 520
656,
Hodge v. Chicago & A. R. Co.
121 Fed. 52 ............
v. Ter. 12 Okla. 108
108, 301, 304,
Hodge & W. v. Tufts, 115 Ala.
372 ......... 409, 411,
Hodgen v. Latham, 33 111. 344. .
Hodges v. O'Brien, 113 Wis. 97.
Hodgman v. Thomas, 37 Neb.
568 ..................
Hodo v. Mexican N. R. Co. (Tex.
Cv. App.) 31 S. W. 708..
Hoehn v. Chicago, P. St. L. R.
Co. 152 111. 223 ...... 25,
Hoffine v. Swings, 60 Neb. 731
656.
Hoffman v. Oates, 77 Ga. 703. .
v. Cockrell, 112 Iowa, 141.
6
25
351
12
175
243
80
426
500
676
790
209
356
282
756
276
47
247
39
71
661
351
733
413
80
187
25
80
183
658
409
63
Hogan v. Citizens' R. Co. 150
Mo. 44 365,
v. Shuart, 11 Mont. 498..
v. Peterson, 8 Wyo. 549..
Hoge v. P. 112 111. 46
v. P. 117 111. 46.. 78, 113,
195, 201, 246, 299, 322,
Hoges v. Nalty, 113 Wis. 567..
Hogsett v. S. 40 Miss. 522
Holcomb v. P. 79 111. 409
Holder v. S. 5 Ga. 444
Holland v. S. 131 Ind. 572
v. S. 39 Fla. 178 316,
Hollenbeck v. Cook, 180 111. 65.
Holley v. S. 104 Ala. 100
Holliday v. Burgess, 34 111. 193
v. Gardner, 27 Ind. App. 231
v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. App. 133
196,
Rollings v. Bankers' Union, 63
S. Car. 192 176,
Hollingsworth v. S. 156 Mo. 178
256, 272,
Hollins v. Gorham, 23 Ky. L. R.
2185
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 69 S.
W. 594.
Hollowav v. Dunham, 170 U. S.
615
v. Johnson, 129 111. 367
195,
v. S. 156 Mo. 222
Holmes v. Ashtabula R. T. Co.
10 Ohio C. C. 638
v. Hale, 71 111. 552
Hoist v. Stewart, 161 Mass.
516
Holston v. Southern R. Co. 116
Ga. 656
Holt v. Pearson, 12 Utah. 63. ..
v Roberts, 175 Mass. 558
v. S. 62 Ga. 214
v. Spokane & P. R. Co. 3
Idaho 703 97,
Holtzman v. Douglas, 168 U. S.
285
Home v. Walton, 117 111. 130.
TABLE OF CASES.
Ixxix
(References are to Sections.}
Homes v. Hale, 71 111. 552.... 113
Homish v. P. 142 111. 024 748
Hon v. Hon, 70 Ind. 135 523
Honesty v. Com. 81 Va. 283.. 80
Honeywell v. S. 40 Tex. Cv.
App. 199 208
Honick v. Metropolitan St. R.
Co. GO Kas. 124 80
Hood v. Olin, 68 Mich. 165.... 192
Hooper v. Moore, 50 N. Car. (5
Jones) 130 162
v. S. 106 Ala. 41 29
v. S. (Tex. Cv. App.) 69 S.
W. 149 272
Hoover v. Haynes (Neb.) 91
N. W. 392 106
v. Mercantile, &c. Ins. Co.
93 Mo. App. Ill 249
v. S. 110 Ind. 349 47
Hopkins v. Bishop, 9 1 Mich.
328 39
v. Dipert, 11 Okla. 630 ... 4
v. Norfolk & S. R. Co. 131
N. Car. 463 121
Hopkinson v. P. 18 111. 264.... 172
Hoppe v. Chicago, M. & St. P.
R. Co. 61 Wis. 357 234
Hopps v. P. 31 111. 392
329, 748, 751
Hopt v. Utah, 104 U. S. 631 ... 4
Horgan v. Brady, 155 Mo. 659
94, 244
Hormon v. S. 158 Ind. 43 797
Horn v. Hutchinson, 163 Pa. St.
435 126
Home v. McRea, 53 S. Car. 51. 6
Hornish v. P. 142 111. 626 115
Horton v. Chevington & B. C.
Co. 2 Penny (Pa.) 1 46
v. Com. 99 Va. 848 63, 299
v. Cooley, 135 Ma^s. 589.. 361
v. S. 110 Ga. 739 272
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 19 S.
W. 899 305
v. Smith, 115 Ga. 66 87
v. Williams, 21 Minn. 187. 154
Hosley v. Brooks, 20 111. 117.. 499
Hot Springs R. Co. v. William-
son, 136 U. S. 121 80
Hotema v. United States, 186
U. S. 413 264
Hough v. Grant's Pass Power
Co. 41 Ore. 531 48
House v. Marshall, 18 Mo. 370. 515
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 69 S.
W. 417 86
House v. Seaboard A. L. R. Co.
131 N. Car. 103 121
v. Wilder, 47 111. 510.. 122, 123
Householder v. Grandy, 40 Ohio
St. 430 4
Housh v. S. 43 Neb. 163
7, 71, 227
Houston v. Com. 87 Va. 257... 192
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 47 S.
W. 468 293, 304
Houston, &c. R. Co. v. Dotson,
15 Tex. Cv. App. 73
5, 200, 549, 563, 584
v. Gorbett, 49 Tex. 576
530, 544, 563, 564, 571, 581
v. Cranberry, 16 Tex. Cv.
App. 391 191
v. Hampton, 64 Tex. 429.. 543
v. Harion (Tex. Cv. App.)
54 S. W. 629 172
v. Hubbard (Tex. Cv. App.)
37 S. W. 25 183
v. Jones, 16 Tex. Cv. App.
179 184
v. Kelly, 13 Tex. Cv. App.
1 28
v. Miller, 49 Tex. 323 449
v. Patterson (Tex. Cv. App.)
57 S. W. 675 199
v. Patterson, 20 Tex. Cv.
App. 255 94
v. Richards (Tex. Cv. App.)
49 S. W. 687 213
v. Richards, 20 Tex. Cr.
App. 203 106
v. Ritter (Tex. Cv. App.) 41
S. W. 753 94
v. Runnels (Tex.) 47 S. W.
971 215
v. White, 23 Tex. Cv. App.
280 244
Houston City St. R. Co. v. Ar-
tusey '(Tex. Cv. App.) 31
S. W. 319 195
Hovey v. Chase, 52 Me. 304.. 211
Howard v. Carpenter, 22 Md. 10
181
v. Inhabitants, 117 Mass.
588 480
v. P. 185 111. 552 71
v. S. 115 Ga. 244 271
v. S. 50 Ind. 190 322, 329
v. S. (Miss.) 35 So. 653... 376
v. Schwartz (Tex. Cv. App.)
55 S. W. 348 80
v. Supervisors, 54 Neb. 443
20
Ixxx
TABLE OF CASES.
(References are to Sections.}
Howard v. Turner, 125 N. Car.
126
Howe v. Miller, 23 Ky. L. R.
1610
v. West S. Land & I. Co.
21 Wash. 594
Howe Machine Co. v. Riber, 66
Ind. 504
Howe S. M. Co. v. Layman, 88
111. 39
Howell v. Hanrick (Tex. Cv.
App.) 24 S. W. 823
v. Mellon, 169 Pa. St. 138.
v. New York, C. H. & R. R.
Co. 73 N. Y. S. 994
v. Norfolk & C. R. Co. 124
N. Car. 24
v. S. 61 Neb. 391 206,
v. Wilcox & Gibbs S. M. Co.
12 Neb. 177
Howes v. District of Columbia,
2 App. Cas. (D. C.) 188..
Howey v. Fisher, 111 Mich. 422
121,
Howland v. Day, 56 Vt. 324. ..
Hewlett v. Dilts, 4 Ind. App. 23
Howser v. S. (Ala.) 23 So. 681.
Hoxie v. S. 114 Ga. 19 176,
Hoye v. Turner, 96 Va. 624
Hoyt v. Dengler, 54 Kas. 309. .
* v. P. 140 111. 596
Hronek v. P. 134 111. 135
Hubbard v. Hubbard (Tex. Cv.
App.) 38 S. W. 388
v. S. 37 Fla. 156
Hubuer v. Friege, 90 111. 212. . .
Hudelson v. S. 94 Ind. 426
166,
Hudson v. Best, 104 Ga. 131
208,
v. Hughan, 56 Kas. 159
695,
v. S. 101 Ga. 520
v. S. 43 Tex. Cr. App. 420
Huelsenkamp v. Citizens' R. Co.
37 Mo. 537, 568
Huff v. Aultman, 69 Iowa, 71 ..
v. Cole, 45 Ind. 300
Huffman v. Cauble, 86 Tnd. 591 .
20
27
94
80
163
101
130
121
247
90
126
131
7
203
293
228
14
6, 7
288
117a
93
347
80
710
305
701
272
191
558
360
129
I!).")
Hufford v. Lewis, 29 Ind. App.
202 70
Huggins v. S. 42 Tex. Cr. App.
364 337
Hughes v. Antietam Mfg. Co. 34
Md. 319 462
Hughes v. Chicago & A. R. Co.
127 Mo. 447 238
v. P. 116 111. 330 258
v. S. 117 Ala. 25 258
v. Tanner, 96 Mich. 113 .. 157
Hughie v. Hammett, 105 Ga. 368
80
Hull v. City of St. Louis, 138
Mo. 018 182
Hull's Will, 117 Iowa, 738 7
Hulse v. S. 35 Ohio St. 429 ... 34, 36
Hulton v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 33
S. W. 969 .. ... 110
Humes v. Bernstein, 72 Ala.
546 160
v. Decatur Land, &c. Co. 98
Ala. 465 431
v. Gephart, 175 Pa. St.
417 6
Hummel v. Stern, 48 N. Y. S..
528 25
Humphries v. Huffman, 33 Ohio
St. 97 663
v. S. 100 Ga. 260 205
v. S. 34 Tex. Cr. App. 434. 284
Hunt v. McMullen (Tex. Cv.
App.) 46 S. W. 666 .... 66
v. S. 3 Ind. App. 383. . .... 837
v. S. 7 Tex. Cv. App. 212
314, 726, 730
v. S. 135 Ala. 1 269, 783
v. Searcy, 167 Mo. 158 ... 80
Hunter v. S." 29 Fla. 486 217
v. S. 74 Miss. 515 282, 318
v. Third Ave R. Co. 45 N.
Y. S. 1044 174
Hunter, E. & Co. v. Lanius, 82
Tex. 677 404
Huntingdon, &c. R. Co. v. Decker,
84 Pa. St. 422 650
Kurd v. Xeilson, 100 Iowa, 555
126. 129
Hurlbut v. Bagley, 99 Iowa, 127
199
v. Boaz, 4 Tex. Cv. App.
371 113
v. Hall, 39 Neb. 889 48
v. Hurlburt, 128 N. Y. 420. 171
Hurley v. S. 29 Ark. 17 67
Hurst v. McMullen (Tex. Cv.
App.) 48 S. W. 744 48
Hurt v. Ford (Mo.) 36 S. W.
673 415
Huschle v. Morris, 131 111. 575. 66
Huston v. City of Council Bluffs.
101 Iowa. 33 603
v. P. 121 111. 497 1$
TABLE OF CASES.
Ixxxi
(References are to Sections.)
Hutchins v. S. 151 Ind. 667 .... 238
Hutchinson v. Bowker, 5 M. &
W. 535 160
v. Lemcke, 107 Ind. 121
43, 346
v. Wenzel, 155 Ind. 49 119
Huth v. Carondelet, 56 Mo. 207 . 158
Hutton v. Doxsee, 116 Iowa, 1 3
195
Hutts v. S. 7 Tex. App. 44 336
Hyde v. Shank, 77 Mich. 517.. 1
v. Town of Swanton, 72 Vt.
242 153
Hyde Park v. Washington Ice
Co. 117 111. 233 683
I. & G. N. R. Co. v. Hassell, 62
Tex. 258 576
Ickenroth v. St. Louis Tr. Co.
102 Mo. App. 597 ..474,575
Idaho Mercantile Co. v. Kalan-
quin (Idaho) 66 Pac. 933
65, 113
Ide v. Fratcher, 194 111. 552... 238
v. Lake Tp. (Pa. Com. PL)
9 Kulp, 192 191
Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Anderson,
184 111. 294 195
v. Ashline, 171 111. 320
133, 235
v. Beebe, 174 111. 13, 27... 363
v. Byrne, 205 111. 21 ..104,119
v. Cosby, 174 111. 109
70, 109, 126
v. Davenport, 177 111. 110. 53
v. Davidson, 76 Fed. 517.. 190
v. Eioher, 202 111. 556 53
v. Freeman, 210 111. 270 .. 50
v. Gilbert, 157 111. 365
116, 250
v. Goddard, 72 111. 569-627,635
v. Griffin, 184 III. 10 115
v. Hammer, 72 111. 347... 1
v. Hammer, 85 111. 526 42
v. Harris, 162 111. 200 363
v. Haskins, 115 111. 308
8, 14, 18, 366. 367
v. Hopkins, 200 111. .122.. 238
v. Jernigan, 198 111. 297.. 53
v. King, 179 111. 96...1, 120. 196
v. Latimer, 128 111. 171.. 363
v. Linstroth Wagon Co. 112
Fed. 737 353
v. McClelland, 42 111. 359. . 30
v. McKee, 43 111. 119 84
Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Modglin,
85 111. 481 347
v. Moffitt, 67 111. 431 250
v. Noble, 142 111. 584 74
v. Nowicki, 148 111. 29 149
v. O'Keefe, 154 111. 508
183, 356, 361
v. Sanders, 166 111. 270... 94
v. Slater, 139 111. 199 183
v. Smith, 208 111. 618...... 118
v. Swearingen, 47 111. 210.. 242
v. Thompson, 210 111. 226
53, 106
v. Turner, 194 111. 575 198
v. Weiland, 179 111. 609 .. 130
v. Weldon, 52 111. 294 649
v. Whalen, 42 111. 396 163
v. Wheeler, 149 111. 525... 42
v. Whittemore, 43 111. 420.. 163
v. Zang, 10 111. App. 594.. 203
Illinois Iron & M. Co. v. Weber,
196 111. 526 56
Illinois Life Ins. Co. v. Wells,
200 111. 453 363
Illinois Linen Co. v. Hough, 9 1
111. 67 247
Illinois Steel Co. v. McFadden,
196 111. 344 80
v. Mann, 197 111. 186 231
v. Novak, 184 111. 501 99
v. Schymanowski, 162 111.
447 195
Imhoff v. Chicago, &c. R. Co. 20
Wis. 344 247
Indianapolis, &c. R. Co. v. Ber-
ney. 71 111. 390 94
. v. Boettcher, 131 Ind. 82,
615, 642
v. Brown (Ind.) 69 N. E.
408 549
v. Bundy, 152 Ind. 590
20 357
v. Bush, 101 Ind. 587.. 84', 232
v. Haines (Ind.) 69 N. E.
188 7, 199
v. Hale, 106 111. 371 640
v. Hendrain, 190 111. 504.. 360
v. Hockett, 159 Ind. 682
25, 236, 238
v. Houlihan, 157 Ind. 494.. 614
v. Push, 85 Ind. 279 358
v. Robinson, 157 Ind. 414
25, 105
v. Robinson. 157 Ind. 232
478, 482, 531
v. Sawyer, 109 Ind. 344... 646
v. Stout, 53 Ind. 143 635
Ixxxii
TABLE OF CASES.
(References are to Sections.)
Indianapolis, &c. R. Co. v. Tay-
lor (Ind.) Jan. 1905
457, 631
v. Taylor, 158 Ind. 279
384, 627
Ingalls v. S. 48 Wis. 647
220, 266, 288
Inglebright v. Hammond 19
Ohio, 337 28
Ingols v. Plimpton, 10 Colo. 535
105
Ingram v. S. 62 Miss. 142 19
Insurance Co. of N. A. v. Bird,
175 111. 42 133
International, &c. R. Co. v. An-
chond (Tex. Cv. App.) 68
S. W. 743 247
v. Beasley, 9 Tex. Cv. App.
569 8
v. Bonatz (Tex. Cv. App.)
48 S. W. 767 65
v. Clark (Tex. Cv. App.) 71
S. W. 585 ' 6
v. Clark, 81 Tex. 48 430
v. Eason (Tex. Cv. App.)
35 S. W. 208 80
v. Eckford, 71 Tex. 274
549, 582, 583
v. Harris (Tex. Cv. App.) 65
S. W. 885 7
v. Kuehn, 11 Tex. Cv. App.
21 355
v. Lehman (Tex. Cv. App.)
66 S. W. 214 249
v. Locke (Tex. Cv. App.) 67
S. W. 1082 .. ..94, 194, 1,96
v. Martineg ( Tex. Cv. App. )
57 S. W. 689 198
v. Newman (Tex. Cv. App.)
40 S. W. 854 115, 363
v. Niff (Tex. Cv. App.) 26
S. W. 784 28
v. Sun, 11 Tex. Cv. App.
386 363
v. Welch, 86 Tex. 203 .... 355
International Bank v. Ferris,
118 111. 470 114
International Farmers' Live
Stock Ins. Co. v. Byrkett
(Ind. App) 36 N. E. 779
174
International Soc. v. Hildreth,
11 N. Dak. 262 236
Iowa State Sav. Bank v. Black,
91 Iowa, 490 75
Irby v. S. 95 Ga. 467 80, 255
Iron M. Bank v. Armstrong, 92
Mo. 265 . 363
Iron R. Co. v.' Mowery, 36 Ohio
St. 418 544
Iroquois Furnace Co. v. Bignall
H. Co. 201 111. 299 402
Irvine v. S. 104 Tenn. 132 2o9
v. S. 20 Tex. App. 12 25
Irwin v. Smith, 72 Ind 488 35
Isaac v. McLean, 106 Mich. 79. 106
Isely v. Illinois Cent R. Co. 88
Wis. 453 223
Isham v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 41
S. W. 622 215
Ison v. Com. 23 Ky. L. R. 1805
296
Ittner v. Hughes, 154 Mo. 55. 25
Izlar v. Manchester & A. R. Co.
57 S. Car. 332 308, 356
Jackson v. Burnham, 20 Colo.
532 198
v. Com. 17 Ky. L. R. 1350
217
v. Com. 17 Ky. L. R. 1197 32
v. Com. 96 Va. 107 101
v. Com. 98 Va. 845... 255, 258
v. Consolidated Tr. Co. 59
N. J. L. 25 ,...149
v. Ferris (Pa.) 8 Atl. 435. 126
v. Grand Ave. R. Co. 118
Mo. 216 ...551,561,562,643
v. International & G. N. R.
Co. (Tex. Cv. App.) 57 S.
W. 869 6
v. Kas. City. Ft. S. & M. R.
Co. 157 Mo. 621 115
v. Jackson, 82 Md. 17 26
v. P. 18 111. 269, 271
201, 279, 316, 737, 773,
776, 782
v. P. 126 111. 139 830
v. S. 106 Ala. 12
240, 258, 267
v. S. 91 Ga. 271 80
v. S. 71 Ind. 149 195
v. S. 20 Tex. Cr. App. 192. 765
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 62 S.
W. 914 304
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 67 S.
W. 497 326
v. S. 91 Wis. 253
188. 252, 708
v. Van Dusen, 5 Johns. (N.
Y.) 144 330
TABLE OF CASES.
Ixxxiii
(References are to Sections. J
Jackson Scjiool Tp. v. Shera, 8
Ind. App. 330 119
Jacksonville & S. E. R. Co. v.
Walsh, 106 111. 257 .... 113
Jacksonville St. R. v. Walton,
42 Fla. 54 361
v. Wilhite, 209 111. 84
25, 68, 348, 363
Jacob Tome Inst. of Port De-
posit v. Crothers, 87 Md.
569 116
Jacob! v. S. 133 Ala. 1
27, 80, 113
Jacobson v. Gunzburg, 150 111.
135 19, 25
Jacoby v. Stark, 205 111. 34... 238
Jahnke v. S. (Neb.) 94 N. W.
158 269
James v. Gilbert, 168 111. 627. 25
v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. 107
Mo. 480 63
v. S. 104 Ala. 20 52
v. S. 115 Ala. 83 328
Jameson v. Weld, 93 Me. 345.. 347
Jamison v. P. 145 111. 357
735, 751
v. Weld, 93 Me. 345 223
Jam son v. Quivey, 5 Cal. 490.. 31
Jane v. Com. 2 Mete. (Ky.) 30
295, 306
Janny v. Howard, 150 Pa. St.
342 352
Jansen v. Grimshaw, 125 111.
468 30
Jaqua v. Cordesman, 106 Ind.
141 4, 12, 347
Jarman v. Rea, 137 Cal. 339
191, 194
Jarmusch v. Otis Iron & Steel
Co. 23 Ohio Cir. 122 99
Jarnigan v. Fleming, 43 Miss.
710 221, 222
Jarnis v. S. 70 Ark. 613 271
Jarrell v. Lillie, 40 Ala. 271. .. 202
v. S. 58 Ind. 296 295, 716
Jarvis v. Hitch, 161 Ind. 271.. 614
Jefferson v. S. 110 Ala. 89.... 113
Jeffries v. S. 61 Ark. 308 196
v. S. 77 Miss. 757.... 219, 297
Jenkins v. Louisville & N. R.
Co. (Ky.) 47 S. W. 761.. 133
v. Mammoth Min. Co. 24
Utah, 513 347
v. S. 82 Ala. 27 282, 777
v. S. 35 Fla. 737 315
v. S. 62 Wis. 49 313
v. Tobin, 31 Ark. 307 182
Jenks v. Lansing Lumber Co.
97 Iowa, 342 53, 70
Jennings v. Kosmak, 45 N. Y.
S. 802 219
Jenny Elec. Co. v. Branham,
145 Ind. 322 365
Jensen v. Steiber (Neb.) 93 N.
W. 697 20, 90
Jesse v. State (Tex. Cr. App.)
57 S. W. 826 48
Jesse French Piano & Organ Co.
v. Forbes, 134 Ala. 302.. 199
Jinks v. S. 114 Ga. 430 238
Johnson v. Brown, 1 3 W. Va. 91. 501
v. Com. (Va.) 46 S. E. 790 80
v. Culver, 116 Ind. 278... 232
v. Galveston H. & N. R. Co.
27 Tex. Cv. App. 616... 26
v. Gebhauer, 159 Ind. 284. 238
v. Glidden, 11 S. Dak. 237. 238
v. Gulledge, 115 Ga. 981.. 12
v. Hirschberg, 185 111. 445. 244
v. Hirschburg, 85 111. App.
47 48
v. International & G. Co. 24
Tex. Cv. App. 148 172
v. Johnson (Tex. Cv. App.)
67 S. W. 123 355
v. Johnson, 114 111. 611... 94
v.Johnson, 187 111. 97 238
v. Kahn, 97 Mo. App. 628. 119
v. McKee, 27 Mich. 471... 48
v. Miller, 63 Iowa, 529 163
v. P. 113 111. 99 814
v. P. 140 III. 352 203, 209
v. P. 202 111. 53 294
v. S. 59 Ala. 37 318
v. S. 100 Ala. 55 36, 39
v. S. 102 Ala. 1 202, 345
v. S. 36 Ark. 242 80
v. S. 60 Ark. 45 187
v. S. 105 Ga. 665 257
v. S. 65 Ind. 269 376
v. S. 148 Ind. 522 266
v. S. (Miss.) 16 So. 494... 206
v. S. (Miss.) 27 So. 880... 182
v. S. 75 Miss. 635 255
v. S. 53 Neb. 103 6, 313
v. S. 100 Tenn. 254.. 255, 335
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 4 S.
W. 901 274
v. S. 18 Tex. App. 385.... 312
v. S. 18 Tex. Cr. App. 398. 734
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 45 S.
W. 901 26
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 57 S.
W. 805 . 326
Ixxxiv
TABLE OF CASES.
(References are to Sections.)
Johnson v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.)
58 S. W. 105 269
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 67 S.
W. 412 . . 25
v. Stone, 69 Miss. 826 191
v. St. Louis & S. R. Co.
173 Mo. 307 50, 239
v. Superior R. Tr. R. Co. 9 1
Wis. 233 208
v. Thompson, 72 Ind. 167.. 211
v. U. S. 157 U. S. 320 227
v. Worthy, 17 Ga. 420 94
Joiner v. S. 105 Ga. 646 71, 305
Joines v. Johnson, 133 N. Car.
487 80
Jokers v. Borgman, 29 Kas. 109
487
Joliet, &c. R. Co. v. McPherson,
193 111. 629 33, 129
v. Velie, 140 111. 59.. 121, 124
Jolly v. S. 43 Neb. 857 44
Jones v. Achey, 105 Ga. 493.. 135
v. Adler, 34 Md. 440 438
v. Angell, 95 Ind. 376
202. 485, 4 f '
v. Bangs, 40 Ohio St. 139. 243
v. Casler, 139 Ind. 382
206, 702
v. Charleston & W. C. R.
Co. 61 S. Car. 556 ..... 195
v. Chicago & Iowa R. Co.
68 111. 380 243
v. Cleveland, 6 Pa. Super.
Ct. 640 174
v. Collins, 94 Md. 403 80
v. Durham, 94 Mo. App. 51. 199
v. East Tenn. V. and G. R.
Co. 175 U. S. 682 351
v: Ellis, 68 Vt. 544... 350, 351
v. Foley, 121 Ind. 180 361
v. Fort, 36 Ala. 449 86
v. Hathaway, 77 Ind. 24.. 515
v. Heirs, 57 S. Car. 427. .. 6
v. Hess (Tex. Cr. App.) 48
S. W. 46 303
v. Johnson, 61 Ind. 257... 39
v. Johnson (N. Car.) 45^8.
E 828 25
v. Jones, 19 Ky. 1516 113
v. Layman, 123 Ind. 573.. 356
v. McMillon, 129 Mich. 86. 192
v. Matheis, 1 7 Pa. Super.
220 7
v. Morris, 97 Va. 44 506
v. Murray, 167 Mo. 25
153, 500
v. P. 23 Colo. 276 335
v. P. 12 111. 259 265
Jones v. Parker (Tex. Cv. App.)
42 S. W. 123 118
v. Rex (Tex. Cv. App.) 31
S. W. 1077 : 101
v. S. 107 Ala. 93 290
v. S. 59 Ark. 417 193
v. S. 61 Ark. 88.. 227, 310, 372
v. S. 105 Ga. 649 303
v. S. 53 Ind. 237 816
v. S. 160 Ind. 539 351
v. S. 26 Miss. 247 266
v. S. 80 Miss. 181 118
v. S. 20 Ohio St. 34 7, 8
v. S. 26 Ohio St. 208 36
v. S. 34 Tex. Cr. App. 490. 310
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 45 S.
W. 596 21
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 72 S.
W. 845 291
v. Spartanburg Herald Co.
44 S. Car. 526 6
v. Swearingen, 42 S. Car.
58 38, 156
v. Warren (N. Car.) 46 S.
E. 740 . ..'. 144
v. Wattles (Neb.) 92 N. W.
765 80
v. Williams, 108 Ala. 282. 48
Joplin Water Works v. Joplin
(Mo.) 76 S. W. 960 94
Jordan v. City of Benwood, 42
W. Va. 312 32
v. Duke (Ariz.) 36 Pac.
896 163
v. Indianapolis Water Co.
155 Ind. 337 96
v. James, 5 Ohio, 88 243
v. Philadelphia, 125 Fed.
825 363
v. S. 81 Ala. 20 206
v. S. 117 Ga. 405 265
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 30 S.
W. 445 187
Joy v. S. 41 Tex. Cr. App. 46. . 326
Judy v. Sterrett, 153 111. 94
101 30, 56, 231, 363
Justice v. Com. 20 Ky. L. R.
386 255
v. Gallert, 131 N. Car. 393. 6
Jupitz v. P. 34 111. 516 340
v. P. 34 111. 521 340
K
Radish v. Young, 108 111. 170. 101
Kafka v. Levensohn, 41 N. Y.
S. 368 , 149
TABLE OF CASES.
Ixxxv
(References are to Sections.)
Kahn v. Triest-R. &c. Co. 139
Cal. 340
Kahrs v. Kahrs, 115 Ga. 288..
Kairn v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 45
S. W. 203
Kalley v. Baker, 132 N. Y. 5..
Kane v. Footh, 70 111. 590.. 78,
Kankakee Stone Co. v. Kanka-
kee, 128 111. 177
Kansas City v. Birmingham, 45
Kas. 214 . . . .-
v. Bradbury, 45 Kas. 483
368; 385, 596,
Kansas City, &c. R. Co. v. Beck-
er, 63 Ark. 477
v. Chamberlin, 61 Kas. 859
v. Henson, 132 Ala. 528. . .
v. Ryan, 49 Kas. 1
v. Simpson, 30 Kas. 647..
Kansas Farmers'. &c. Ins. Co. v.
Hawley, 46 Kas. 746
Kansas Inv. Co. v. Carter, 160
Mass. 421
Karl v. Juniata Co. 206 Pa. 633
Karnes v. Dovey, 5 3 Neb. 725.
Karr v. S. 106 Ala. 1 67,
Kassman v. Citv of St. Louis,
153 Mo. 293
Kaufman v. Maier. 94 Cal. 269
Kavanaugh v. City of Wausau
(Wis.) 98 N. W. 553.. ..
Keady v. P. (Colo.) 74 Pac. 895
v. P. (Colo.) 77 Pac. 895..
Keanders v. Montague, 180 111.
306 ,.
Kearney v. Fitzgerald, 43 Iowa,
582
v. P. (Cal.) 17 Pac. 782. ..
v. S. 68 Miss. 233
Kearns v. Burling, 14 Ind. App.
143
Keastner v. First National Bank,
170 111. 322
Keating v. P. 160 111. 483
235, 238, 265.
v. S. (Neb.) 93 N. W. 980
25,
Koatley v. Illinois Cent. R. Co.
94 Iowa, 685
Keaton v. S. 99 Ga. 197
Keegan v. Kinnare, 123 111. 290
192
136
255
438
230
250
599
608
76
25
68
211
569
352
94
192
353
297
48
319
214
238
505
250
487
170
170
129
25
816
226
53
256
84
Keeler v. Herr, 54 111. App. 468
363
v. Herr, 157 111. 57
156, 235, 399
v. Stuppe, 86 111. 309 66
Keeling v. Kuhn, 19 Kas. 441. 359
Keely v. S. 14 Ind. 36..., 815
Keener v. S. 18 Ga. 194 .' 168
V. S. 97 Ga. 3881 331
Keens v. Robertson, 46 Neb.
837 347
Keesier v. S. 154 Ind. 242.. 71, 216
Keesley v. Doyle, 8 Ind. App.
43 . . .". 25
Kehl v. Abram, 210 111. 218.. 76
Kehoe v. Allentown & L. V. Tr.
Co. 187 Pa. St. 474 86
Kehrley v. Shafer, 36 N. Y. S.
510 35
Keiser v. S. 83 Ind. 234
166, 169, 710
Keith v. Hobbs, 69 Mo. 87 405
.v. Spencer, 19 Fla. 748... 245
v. S. 157 Ind. 376
316, 319, 738
v. S. 49 Kas. 439 204
' v. Wells, 14 Colo. 321 12
Keithley v. Stafford, 126 111.
507 27, 29, 74
Kelch v. S. 55 Ohio St. 152... 331
Kelderhouse v. Hall, 116 111.
150 47
Kelleher v. City of Keokuk, 60
Iowa, 473 359, 361
Keller v. Lewis, 116 Iowa, 369. 7
v. Stuppe, 86 111. 309 25
Kelley v. Highfield, 15 Ore. 277. 457
v. Louisville & N. R. Co.
49 Til. App. 304 203
v. Schupp, 60 Wis. 86 205
Kellog v. Lewis, 28 Kas. 535.. 14
v. McCabe (Tex. Cv. App.)
38 S. W. 542 213
Kellogg v. Boyden, 126 111. 378
83
Kelly v. Cable Co. 7 Mont. 70.6,247
v. Eby, 141 Pa. 176 192
v. Fleming, 113 N. Car. 133
v. Palmer (Minn.) 97 N.
W. 578
v. P. 55 N. Y. S. 565..
94
29
760
v. S. (Fla.) 33 So. 235 792
v. S. 51 Neb. 572 80
v. S. 34 Tex. Cr. App. 412. 290
v. Strouse, 116 Ga. 872... 121
Kemp v. S. 13 Tex. 565 802
Ixxxvi
TABLE OF CASES.
(References are to Sections.)
Kendall v. Brown, 74 111. 232.. 86
v. Brown, 86 111. 388 484
v. Young, 141 111. 188 25
Kendrick v. Cisco, 1 3 Lea
(Tenn.) 248 160
v. Dillinger, 117 JSJ. Car.
491 7, 348
Kennard v. Grossman (Neb.) 89
N. W. 1025 25
Kennedy v. Behout, 62 Ind.
363 154
v. Forest Oil Co. 199 Pa.
St. 644 102
v. Hannibal, &c. R. Co. 105
Mo. 273 636, 639
v. P. 44 111. 285 21, 115
v. S. 107 Ind. 144 71
Kent v. Cole, 84 Mich. 581
471, 574
v. P. 8 Colo. 563 282
v. S. 64 Ark. 247 1174, 289
Kenwood Bridge Co. v. Dunder-
date, 50 111. App. 581 397
Kenyon v. City of Mondovi, 98
Wis. 50 26, 238
Keokuk Stove Works v. Ham-
mond, 94 Iowa, 694 358
Kepler v. Jessup, 11 Ind. 241.. 199
Kepperly v. Ramsden, 83 111.
354 44
Kerr v. Modern Woodman, 117
Fed. 593 189
v. .S. 63 Neb. 115 8
v. Topping, 109 Iowa, 150. 247
Kerr-Murphy Mfg. Co. v. Hess,
98 Fed. 56 71
Ketchum v. Ebert, 33 Wis. 611. 171
v. Wilcox (Kas.) 48 Pac.
446 136
Kettry v. Thuma, 9 Ind. App.
498 93
Key v. Dent, 6 Md. 142 26a
v. S. 37 Tex. Cr. App 276
Keyes v. City of Cedar Rapids,
107 Iowa, 509 6, 20
Kibler v. Com. 94 Va. 804 191
Kicld v. S. 83 Ala. 58 192
Kidman v. Garrison (Iowa) 97
N. W. 1078 25
Kidwell v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. App.
264 255, 304
Kiekhoef er v. Hidershide, 113
Wis. 280 , 70
Kielbeck v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.
Co. (Neb.) 97 N. W. 750. 126
Kieldsen v. Wilson, 77 Mich. 45
116
Kiernan v. Chicago, &c. R. Co.
123 111. 188 685, 688
Kildow v. Irick (Tex. Cv. App.)
33 S. W. 315 192
Kilgore v. S. 74 Ala. 5 328
v. S. 124 Ala. 24 258
Killiau v. Eigenmann, 57 Ind.
488 210
Kilpatrick v. Grand T. R. Co. 74
Vt. 288 25
Kilpatrick Koch Dry Goods Co.
v. Kahn, "53 Kas. 274 .. 234
Kimball v. Borden, 97 Va. 478
71, 645
v. Friend, 95 Va. 126
628, 629, 630, 631, 633, 636
641
v. Paye, 96 Me. 487 54
Kimbrough v. S. 101 Ga. 583.. 328
Kimmel v. P. 92 111. 457 30, 32a
King v. Franklin, 132 Ala. 559. 66
v. King, 155 Mo. 406.174, 243
v. Rea, 1 3 Colo. 69 84
v. S. 120 Ala. 329 223
v. S. 43 Fla. 211 353
v. S. 86 Ga. 355 34
v. S. (Miss.) 23 So. 166... 192
v. S. 74 Miss. 576 331
Kingsbury v. Missouri, &c. R.
Co. 156 Mo. 384 646
v. Thorp, 61 Mich. 216 156
Kinkle v. P. 27 Colo. 450 245
Kinnemer v. S. 66 Ark. 206... 36
Kinney v. North Carolina R. Co.
122 N. Car. 961 182
v. P. 108 111. 524 258, 285
Kinyon v. Chicago & N. W. R.
Co. 118 Iowa, 349.. 17 7, 355
Kipperly v. Ramsden, 83 111.
354 361
Kirby v. Southern R. Co. 63 S.
Car. 494 7, 183
v. Wilson, 98 111. 240.117, 286
Kirchner v. Collins, 152 Mo. 394
200
Kirk v. Garrett, 84 Md. 383.. ]21
v. S. 14 Ohio St. 511 3!)
v. Ter. 10 Okla. 46
48, 80, 170, 255
Kirkham v. P. 170 111. 16 227
Kirland v. S. 43 Ind. 146 250
Kirsher v. Kirsher, 120 Iowa,
337 7
Kischman v. Scott, 166 Mo.
214 25. 75
Kitchell v. Bratton, 2 111. 300.. 244
TABLE OF CASES.
Ixxxvii
( References are to Sections.)
Kitchen v. Loudenback, 48 Ohio
St. 177 415, 4 It)
Klatt v. N. C. Foster Lumber
Co. 97 Wis. 641 232
Kleiner v. Third Ave. R. Co. 162
N. Y. 193 71
Kleinschmidt v. McDermott, 12
Mont. 309 359
Klepsch v. Donald, 8 Wash.
162 50
Kletzing v. Armstrong, 119
Iowa, 505 231
Kline v. Baker, 99 Mass. 253.. 162
Klink v. P. 16 Colo. 467 360
Klipstein v. Raschein, 117 Wis.
248 200
Kloke v. Martin, 55 Neb. 554
350, 353
Klugen v. S. 45 Ind. 521 247
Kluse v. Sparks, 10 Ind. App.
444 27
Knapp v. Griffin, 140 Pa. St.
004 171
v. Jones, 50 Neb. 490 126
Knight v. Denman, 64 Neb.
814 247
v. Overman Wheel Co. 174
Mass. 455 80
v. Pacific C. Stage Co.
(Cal.) 34 Pac. 868 94
v. S. (Fla.) 32 So. 110.... 70
v. S. 114 Ga. 48 228, 321
Knopf v. Richmond, F. & P. R.
Co. 85 Va. 773 574
Knowles v. Murphy, 107 Cal.
107 65
v. Nixon, 17 Mont. 473
182, 319, 321
Koerner v. S. 98 Ind. 8.... 196, 774
Kohl v. S. 57 N. J. L. 445.... 84
Kohler v. West Side R. Co. 99
\Vis. 33 232
v. Wilson, 40 Iowa, 185... 526
Kohn v. Johnson, 97 Iowa, 99. 70
Koller v. S. 36 Tex. Cr. App.
496 265
Kollock v. S. 88 Wis. 663
111, 310, 311, 312
Konold v. Rio Grande, &c. R.
Co. 21 Utah, 379 247
Koster v. Seney, 100 Iowa, 562
461
Kostuch v. St. P. City R. Co. 78
Minn. 459 6
Kowalski v. Chicago 0. W. JR.
Co. (Iowa) 87N.W. 409. 20
Krack v. Wolf, 39 Ind. 88
3, 188, 358
Krall v. Lull, 49 Wis. 405 474
Kranz v. Thieben, 15 111. App.
482 107
Kraus v. Haas, 6 Tex. Cv. App.
665 25
Krause v. Plumb, 195 Pa. St.
65 71
Krauss v. Haas (Tex. Cv. App.)
25 S. W. 1025 247
Krehnavy v. S. 43 Neb. 337... 279
Krepps v. Carlise, 157 Pa. St.
358 191
Krish v. Ford, 19 Ky. L. R.
1167 80
Kroeger v. Texas, &c. R. Co. 30
Tex. Cv. App. 87 25
Kroetch v. Empire Mill Co.
(Idaho) 74 Pac. 868 130
Kuehn v. Wilson, 13 Wis. 117. 203
Kuenster v. Woodhouse, 101
Wis. 216 19!)
Kugler v. Wiseman, 20 Ohio
361 . . 244
Kuhl v. Long, 102 Ala. 569... 35
Kuhn v. Nelson, 61 Neb. 224.. 12
Kunst v. Ringold, 116 Mich. 88. 238
Kurstelska v. Jackson, 89 Minn.
95 119, 246
Kutner v. Fargo, 45 N. Y. S.
753 5!)
Kyd v. Cook, 56 Neb. 71 3
Kyner v. Sambuer (Neb.) 91
N. W. 491 94
LaBean v. Telephone & T. C. Co.
109 Mich. 302 . 347
Lacewell v. S. 95 Ga. 346.. 30, 228
Lackey v. S. 67 Ark. 416 6
Lacy v. Porter, 103 Cal. 597.. 126
Ladd v. Pigott, 114 111. 647... 172
v. Witte, 116 Wis. 35 119
Lafayette & I. R. Co. v. Ad-
ams, 26 Ind. 76 243
Laflan v. Mississippi Pulp Co. 74
Vt. 125 25
Laflin v. Chicago W. & N. R.
Co. 33 Fed. 422 211
Laflin R. P. Co. v. Tearney,
131 111. 322 155
La Grande Ins. Co. v. Shaw
(Ore.) 74 Pac. 919 94
Ixxxviii
TABLE OF CASES.
(References are to Sections.)
La Grande Nat. Bank v. Blum,
27 Ore. 215 26
Lagrone v. Timmerman, 46 S.
Car. 372 172
Lahr v. Kraemer (Minn.) 97 N.
W. 4 1 8 7
Laidlaw v. Sage, 80 Hun (N.
Y. 550 286
Laird v. Warren, 92 111. 208.. 384
Lake E. &c. R. Co. v. Brafford,
15 Ind. App. 655 15
v. Holland, 162 Ind. 406.. 357
v. McKewen, 80 Md. 593. 25
v. Parker, 94 Ind. 95 365
v. Wills, 140 111. 614 235
Lake Shore, &c. R. Co. v.
Brown, 123 111. 182
129, 195, 198, 649, 650
v. Conway, 169 111. 505.. 363
v. Hessions, 150 111. 559
98, 126
v. Hundt, 140 111. 525.... 58
v. Johnson, 135 111. 641
74, 129, 183, 198
v. Knital, 33 Ohio St. 471. 617
v. Mclntosh, 140 Ind. 271
53, 541, 630, 635
v. Miller, 25 Mich. 274.... 247
v. O'Conner, 115 111. 254
92, 129, 183
v. Parker, 131 111. 557
66, 74, 195
v. Richards, 152 111. 72
100, 124, 126
v. Shultz, 19 Ohio C. C.
639 32
v. Whiden, 23 Ohio Cir. 85
7, 65, 113
La Manna v. Munroe, 62 N. Y.
S. 984 35]
Lama v. S ; 46 Neb. 236 199
Lamb v. Lamb, 105 Ind. 460.. 692
v. P. 96 111. 73 2, 101, 785
v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. 147
Mo. 171 238
Lambeth R. Co. v. Brigham,
170 Mass. 518 238
Lambright v. S. 34 Fla. 564.. 188
Lampe v. Kennedy, 60 Wis. 100. 214
Lamphere v. S. 114 Wis. 193. . 191
Lampley v. Atlantic C. L. R.
Co. 63 S. Car. 462 7
Lampman v. Bruning, 120 Iowa,
167 380
v. Van Alstyne, 94 Wis.
417 6
Lancashire Ins. Co. v. Stanley.
70 Ark. 1 ". . 214
Lancaster v. S. (Tex. Cv. App.)
31 S. W. 515 215, 270
Lancaster G. & (.'. Co. v. Murry
G. S. Co. 19 Tex. Cv. App.
110 135
Lander v. P. 104 111. 248 : 1
Landers v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.)
63 S. W. 557 201
Landis v. S. 70 Ga. 651 322
Landman v. Glover (Tex. Cv.
App.) 25 S. W. 994 198
Landrum v. Guerra (Tex. Cv.
App.) 28 S. W. 358 65
Lane v. City of Madison, 86
Wis. 453 115
v. Miller, 17 Ind. 58 361
v. Minnesota S. Agr. Soc.
67 Minn. 65 351
v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. 132
Mo. 4 6
v. P. 10 111. 307 817
Laner v. Yetzer, 3 Pa. Super.
Ct. 461 191
Langdon v. P. 133 111. 404
181, 192, 193, 238, 304, 331
v. Winterstein, 58 Neb.
278 77
Lange v. Weigan, 125 Mich.
647 174
Langford v. Jones, 18 Ore. 307. 211
v. P. 134 111. 444 265
Langshort v. Copn, 53 Neb.
765 . . 353
Langtry Sons v. Lowrie (Tex.
Cv. App.) 58 S. W. 835. . 200
Lankster v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.)
72 S. W. 388 41
Lansing v. Wessell (Neb.) 97 N.
W. 815 101
Lantmann v. Miller, 158 Ind.
382 233
Lanyon v. Edwards (Tex. Cv.
App.) 26 S. W. 524 28
Lapeer Co. F. & M. F. Ins. Co.
v. Doyle, 30 Mich. 159.. 156
La Plant v.' S. 152 Ind. 80.. . 238
Lapworth v. Leach, 79 Mich.
20 448
Large v. Moore, 17 Iowa, 258. 30
Largey v. Mantle, 26 Mont.
'264 25
Larkin v. Burlington, &c. R. Co.
91 Iowa. 654 ...65, 141, 249
Lary v. Youngs (Tex. Cv. App.)
27 S. W. 908 347
TABLE OF CASES.
Ixxxix
(References are to Sections.}
La Salle County C. Coal Co. v.
Eastman, 99 ill. App.
495 198
Laselle v. Wells, 17 Ind. 33... 4, 18
Lassiter v. Norfolk & C. R. Co.
126 N. Car. 509 244
Last Chance Min. &c. Co. v.
Ames, 23 Colo. 167 245
Latham v. Roache, 72 111. 182. . 238
Latimer v. S. 55 Neb. 609.. 335, 341
Lau v. Fletcher, 104 Mich. 295. 140
v. Merrills, 6 Wend. (N. Y.)
268 .
361
101
Laughlin v. Gerardi, 67 Mo.
App. 372
Lawder v. Henderson, 36 Kas.
754 70
Lawhead v. S. 46 Neb. 607
294, 295, 302
Lawler v. P. 74 111. 230 803
Lawless v. S. 4 Lea (Tenn.)
179 1
Lawnsdale v. Grays Harbor Boom
Co. 21 Wash. 542 6
Lawrence v. Bucklen, 45 Minn.
195 347
v. Hagerman, 56 111. 68.. 71
v. Jarvis, 32 111. 304.. 80, 243
v. Westlake (Mont.) 73 Pac.
119 192
Lawrenceville Cement Co. v.
Park, 60 Hun (N. Y.)
586 44
Layton v. S. 56 Miss. 791 80
Lazarus v. Pheps, 156 U. S.
202 25
Lea v. Henry, 56 Iowa, 662... 156
Leach v. Hill, 97 Iowa, 81..351, 358
v. Nichols, 55 111. 273 94
v. P. 53 111. 311 243
v. S. 99 Tenn. 584 255
Lear v. McMillen, 17 Ohio St.
464 48
Leary v. Electric Tr. Co. 180
Pa. St. 136 7
v. Meier, 78 Ind. 387 383
Leasure v. Colburn, 57 Ind.
274 183
Leavenworth, &c. R. Co. v. Forks,
37 Kas. 448 646
Leavitte v. Randolph County,
85 111. 509 2, 361
Lebanon Coal & M. A. v. Zer-
wick, 77 111. App. 486... 94
Le Cointe v. U. S. 7 App. Gas.
(D. C.) 16 297
Ledbetter v. S. 21 Tex. App.
344
Lee v. Gorham, 165 Mass. 130.
v. Hammond, 114 Wis. 550
25, 198,
v. O'Quinn, 103 Ga. 355..
v. Publishers, &c. 137 Mo.
385
v. Quick, 20 111. 392
v. S. 74 Wis. 45
Leeds v. Reed (Tex. Cv. App.)
36 S. W. 347
Leeper v. S. 12 Ind. App. 637. .
Lefler v. S. 122 Ind. 206
Leftwich v. City of Richmond,
4 Va. Super Ct. 128
v. S. 34 Tex. Cr. App. 489.
303,
Lehman v. Hawks, 121 Ind. 546
1, 41,
v. Press, 106 Iowa, 389...
Leifheit v. Jos. Schiltz Brewing
Co. 106 Iowa, 451 ..20,
Leigh v. P. 113 111. 372.. 115,
Leise v. Meyer, 143 Mo. 547
113,
Leisenberg v. S. 60 Neb. 628..
Leiser v. Kieckhefer, 95 Wis. 4
Leiter v. Lyons (R. I.) 52 Atl.
78
Lemasters v. Southern Pac. R.
Co. 131 Cal. 105 85,
Le May v. Missouri Pac. R. Co.
105 Mo. 370 635,
Lensing v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.)
45 S. W. 572 206,
Leob. v. Huddleston, 105 Ala.
Leonard v. Ter. 2 Wash. Ter.
397 182,
Leslie v. Smith, 32 Mich. 64. ..
v. S. 42 Tex. Cr. App. 65
269 282
v. Wabash, St. L. & P. R.'
Co. 88 Mo. 53
Lesser Cotton Co. v. St. Louis,
I. M. & S. R. Co. 114
Fed. 133 107, 189,
Lester v. Hays (Tex. Cv. App.)
38 S. W. 52
Letts v. Letts, 91 Mich. 596
Levan v. S. 114 Ga. 258
Lever v. Foote, 31 N. Y. S.
317
129
351
196
121
34
209
355
7
206
243
304
360
80
358
299
208
302
141
92
249
637
296
141
311
192
363
563
361
39
208
220
356 141
TABLE OF CASES.
(References are to Sections.}
Leverich v. S. 105 Ind. 277
357,
Levi v. Gardner, 53 S. Car. 24. .
Levy v. Cunningham, 56 Neb.
348
v. S. 79 Ala. 259
Lewellen v. Patton, 73 Mo. App.
472
Lewin v. Pauli, 19 Pa. Super.
447
Lewis v. Christie, 99 Ind. 377
321
v. Com. 19 Ky. L. R. 1139
v. McDaniels, 82 Mo. 583
492,
v. Norfolk & W. R. Co. 132
N. Car. 382
v. Rice, 61 Mich. 97 ....
v. S. 120 Ala. 339
v. S. 42 Fla. 253
v. S. 4 Ohio, 397 48,
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 59 S.
W. 886 21,
v. Topman, 90 Md. 274 .
Lewton v. Hower, 35 Fla. 58
Lexington Ins. Co. v. Paver, 16
Ohio, 324
Libby v. Deake, 97 Me. 377-.
Liberty Ins. Co. v. Erlich, 42
Neb. 553
Lichty v. Tarmatt, 11 Wash. 37
Lieber v. Weiden, 17 Neb. 584.
Lifschitz v. Dry Dock, &c. R.
Co
Liggett & M. T. Co. v. Collier,
89 Iowa, 144
Light v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R.
Co. 93 Iowa, 83
Lilly v. P. 148 111. 47 3.... 56,
Linch v. Paris, &c. Co. 80 Tex.
23
Lincoln v. City of Detroit, 101
Mich. 245
v. Felt (Mich.) 92 N. W.
780
Lindberg v. Chicago, &c. R. Co.
83 111. App. 433
Lindell v. Deere Wells Co. (Neb.)
92 N. W. 164
Lindeman v. Fry, 178 111. 174
104,
Lindheim v. Duys, 31 N. Y. S.
870
358
25
119
815
141
7
325
261
494
173
192
258
353
245
337
347
164
48
156
235
348
527
245
41
363
329
444
191
20
247
244
116
351
Lindle v. Com. 23 Ky. L. R.
1307
Lindsay v. Turner, 156 U. S.
208
Line v. S. 51 Ind. 172
296, 325, 336,
Linehan R. Tr. Co. v. Morris,
87 Fed. 127 . .
Linehan v. S. 113 Ala. 70
Liner v. S. 124 Ala. 1.. 25, 101,
Links v. S. 13 Lea (Tenn.) 701
Linn v. Massilion, &c. Co. 78
Mo. App. Ill
Linton v. Allen, 154 Mass. 432.
v. Butler, 40 Ohio St. 158
Linville v. Welch, 29 Mo. 203.
Lion v. Baltimore City P. R. Co.
90 Md. 266
Lipscomb v. S. 75 Miss. 559...
Litt v. Wabash R. Co. 64 N. Y.
S/108
Little v. McGuire, 38 Iowa, 562
v. P. 157 111. 158 294,
v. S. 58 Ala. 265
v. S. 89 Ala. 99
v. S. 157 111. 157
v. S. 39 Tex. Cv. App. 654
v. Superior Rapid Tr. Co. 88
Wis. 462
v. Town, &c. 102 Wis. 250
196,
Little Dorritt Gold Min. Co. v.
Arapahoe Gold Min. Co.
30 Colo. 431 7,
Little M. R. Co. v. Wetmore, 19
Ohio St. 134 1, 13
Little Rock, &c. R. Co. v. At-
kins, 46 Ark. 430
529, 561, 565,
Littleton v. S. 128 Ala. 31
Litton v. Young, 2 Mete. (Ky.)
565
Liverpool. &c. Ins. Co. v. Ende,
65 Tex. 124 365,
v. Farnsworth Lumber Co.
72 Miss. 555
v. Joy, 26 Tex. Cv. App.
613
Livingston v. Moore (Neb.) 89
N. W. 289
v. Stevens (Iowa) 94 N. W.
925 .
101
358
339
353
258
299
84
247
360
534
172
101
313
145
676
301
44
297
301
271
210
360
363
, 60
571
63
218
425
200
102
358
90
TABLE OF CASES.
XC1
(References are to Sections.}
Lloyd v. Moore, 38 Ohio St. 100
37
v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R.
Co. 128 Mo. 595 176
Lobdell v. Keene, 85 Minn. 90
20
Locke v. S. C. & P. R. Co. 40
Iowa, 113 633
Lockwood v. Crawford, 18 Conn.
361 162
Loeb v. Weis, 64 Ind. 285 1
Loewenstein v. Bennett, 19 Ohio
C. C. 616 347
Lofland v. Goben, 16 Ind. App.
67 70
Lofton v. S. 79 Miss. 723 255
Logansport, &c. Co. v. Coate
(Ind.) 64 N. E. 638 244
Logg v. S. 92 111. 598
104, 113, 170
Logwood v. Hussey, 60 Ala. 421
446, 447
Lomax v. Holbine, (Neb.) 90
N. W. 1122 237
Long v. Hunter, 58 S. Car. 152
48
v. Martin, 152 Mo. 668 .. 200
v. S. 42 Fla. 509
315, 323 326
v. S. 23 Neb. 33 275, 336
v. Shull, 7 Pa. Super. Ct.
476 359
v. Southern R. Co. 50 S. Car.
49' 7, 44
v. Travellers' Ins. Co. 113
Iowa, 259 -211
Longacre v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.)
41 S. W. 621 258
Longenecker v. S. 22 Ind. 247 . 101
Longley v. Com. 99 Va. 807
307, 310
Longyear v. Gregory, 110 Mich.
277 358
Lonkster v. S. 41 Tex. Cr. App.
603 25, 255
Lopez v. Jackson, 80 Miss. 684
193
v. S. Tex. Cr. App. 649 303
Lorie v. Adams, 51 Kas. 692.. 170
Lorimer v. S. 776 Ind. 497 849
Los Angeles Farming & Milling
Co. v. Thompson, 117 Cal.
594 136
Lou v. Grimes Drygoods Co. 38
Neb. 215 . 32
Louisville, &c. R. Co. v. Baker,
106 Ala. 624 80
Louisville, &c. R. Co. v. Banks
(Ky.) 23 S. W. 627.. 4, 113
v. Buck, 116 Ind. 566 232
v. Cowherd, 120 Ala. 51
25, 26
v. Dick (Ky.) 78 S. W. 914
122
v. Falvey, 104 Ind. 429
181, 552, (i52, 654
v. Ferry's Adm'rx. 20 Ky.
L. R. 803 126
v. Finley, 86 Ky. L. R. 294
359
v. Foley, 88 Fed. 240 25
v. Fox, 11 Bush (Ky.) 506
545, 582
v. Frawley, 110 Ind. 28... 232
v. Gidley, 119 Ala. 525 588
v. Grantham, 104 Ind. 357
7, 646
v. Hall, 91 Ala. 113 13
v. Harrod, 25 Ky. L. R.
250 196
v. Hart, 119 Ind. 273 247
v. Hubbard, 116 Ind. 193.. 27
v. Jones, 130 Ala. 456 ... 113
'v. Kelly, 92 Ind. 374 577
v. Lynch, 147 Ind. 165 232
v. McCune (Ky.) 72 S. W.
756 81
v. Mattingly, 22 Ky. L. R.
489 94
v. Morgan, 114 Ala. 449 .. 223
v. Patchen, 167 111. 204... 48
v. Pittman, 23 Ky. L. R.
877 25
v. Pointer's Adm'r (Ky.) 69
S. W. 1108 74
v. Ray, 101 Tenn. 1 26
v. Rice. 101 Ala. 676 .... 177
v. Sandlin, 125 Ala. 585.. 63
v. Shires, 108 111. 617, 631
94, 97, 204, 363
v. Spencer, 149 111. 103 75
v. Suddoth, 70 Miss. 265.. 30
v. Sullivan T. Co. (Ala.) 35
So. 330 120, 645
v. Utz, 133 Ind. 265 196
v. Ward. 67 Fed. 927.. 198, 203
v. Whitehead, 71 Miss. 451
211
v. Wills' Adm'rx. 23 Ky. L.
R. 1961 97
v. Wood, 113 Ind. 561
542. 549, 556, 577, 584, .638
v. Wright, 115 Ind. 378... 357
v. York, 128 Ala. 305
66, 191, 195, 204
TABLE OF CASES.
(References are to Sections.}
Lourance v. Goodwin, 170 111.
390 71
Love v. Anchor Raisin Vin. Co.
(Cal.) 45 Pac. 1044 351
v. Gregg, 117 N. Car. 467.. 114
v. Moynehan, 16 111. 277.. 361
v. Wyatt, 19 Tex. 312 94
Lovejoy v. S. 62 Ark. 478 296
Lovick v. Atlantic C. L. R. Co.
129 N. Car. 427 25, 30
Low v. Freeman, 117 Ind. 345 35
Lowe v. Lehman, 15 Ohio St.
179 243
v. Salt Lake City, 13 Utah,
91 351
v. S. 88 Ala. 8 218
Lowenberg v. P. 5 Park. Cr. (N.
Y.) 414 343
Lower v. Franks, 115 Ind. 340
40, 247
Lowery v. Rowland, 104 Ala.
420 200
Lubsenz v. Metropolitan St. R.
Co. 76 N. Y. S. 411 183
Lucas v. Milwaukee, &c. R. Co.
33 Wis. 50 555, 558
v. S. 110 Ga. 758 324
Lucia v. Meech, 68 Vt. 175.... 80
Lucio v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. App.
320 6
Luckhart v. Ogden, 30 Cal. 548
156
Luckie v. Schneider (Tex. Cv.
App.) 57 S. W. 690 195
Ludwig v. Blackshere, 102 Iowa,
266 349, 351
v. Metropolitan St. R. Co.
75 N. Y. S. 667 25
v. Sager, 84 111. 100 66
Lueck v. Heisler, 87 Wis. 644. . 6
Luedtke v. Jeffrey, 89 Wis. 136
351
Luhrs v. Brooklyn H. R. Co. 42
N. Y. S. 606 122, 133
Lundon v. City of Chicago, 83
111. App. 208 200
Lung v. Deal. 16 Ind. 349 4
Lurssen v. Lloyd, 76 Md. 360. 80
Lusk v. Throop, 189 111. 127.. 80
Lydiek v. Gill (Neb.) 94 N. W.
109 109, 112, 119, 192
Lyle v. McCormick H. M. Co.
108 Wis. 81 49
v. Mclnnis (Miss.) 17 So.
510 195
Lyman v. P. 198 111. 544 80
Lynch v. Bates, 139 Ind. 206. . .214
v. Johnson, 109 Mich. 640. 144
Lynch v. S. 41 Tex. Cr. App.
510 ..255, 262, 272
Lyne v. Western U. Tel. Co. 123
N. Car. 129 20
Lynn v. P. 170 111. 534
251, 260, 773
Lyon v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 34
S. W. 947 326
v. Watson, 109 Mich. 390
71, 198-
Lyons v. P. 68 111. 272 728
v. P. 137 111. 619 20
v. Wayercross A. L. R. Co.
114 Ga. 727 126
Lytle v. Boyer, 33 Ohio St. 506
245, 393
Lyts v. Keevey, 5 Wash. 606.. 218
M
McAfee v. Montgomery, 21 Ind.
App. 196 7
McAleer v. S. 46 Neb. 116 119
McAlister v. Long, 33 Ore. 368
351
McAlpine v. S. 117 Ala. 93 25
McArthur v. S. 60 Neb. 390
294, 297
McAvoy v. Cassioy, 60 N. Y. S.
837 656
McAyeal v. Gullett, 202 111. 214
196
McBaine v. Johnson, 153 Mo.
191 94
McBeth v. Trabue, 69 Mo. 650. 673
McBride v. Banguss, 65 Tex.
174 . . . 200
McCabe v. City of Philadelphia,
12 Pa. Super Ct. 383... 113
McCaleb v. Smith, 22 Iowa, 244
19
McCallister v. Mount, 73 Ind.
566 1, 41
McCallon v. Cohen (Tex. Cv.
App.) 39 S. W. 973.... 195
McCandless v. S. 42 Tex. Cr.
App. 58 258
McCann v. Ullman, 109 Wis.
574 94
McCarthy v. Kitchen, 59 Ind.
506 506
v. S. 56 Ind. 203 166
McCartney v. McMullen, 38 111.
237 H3
McCary v. Stull, 44 Neb. 175. . 243
McCasland v. Kimberlin, 100 Ind.
121 220
TABLE OF CASES.
XC111
(References are to Sections.)
McClary v. Stull, 44 Neb. 191 . .
McClellan v. Hein, 56 Neb. 600
44,
v. S. 117 Ala. 140
McClelland v. S. 117 Ala. 140.
McClernan v. Com. 1 J Ky. L.
R. 301
MeCloskey v. Pulitszer Pub. Co.
152 Mo. 346
McClung v. Com. 17 Ky. L. R.
1339
McClure v. Phila. W. & B. R.
Co. 34 Md. 534
McClure v. Williams, 65 111. 390
53,
McCoggle v. S. 41 Fla. 525
McCole v. Loeher, 79 Ind. 430..
McConkey v. Com. 101 Pa. St.
420
McCord v. McSpaden, 34 Wis.
549
v. S. 83 Ga. 521
McCord-Brady Co. v. Moneyhan,
59 Neb. 593
McCorkle v. Simpson, 42 Ind.
453 113,
McCormick v. McCormick, 194
Pa. St. 107
v. Kreinkle, 179 111. 301..
v. McGaffray, 55 N. Y. S.
574
v. S. 92 N. W. 606
v. S. 133 Ala. 202
v. Standard Oil Co. 60 N. J.
L. 243 79,
McCormick H. M. Co. v. Send-
zikowski, 72 111. App. 402
McCosker v. Banks, 84 Md. 292
McCoy v. Kokomo R. & L. Co.
158 Ind. 658
v. P. 175 111. 224
70, 251, 285.
v. S. 40 Fla. 494
McCracken v. Webb, 36 Iowa,
551
McCray v. Humes, 116 Ind. Ill
McCready v. Phillips (Neb.) 67
N.' W. 7
McCreery's Adm'rs v. Ohio
River Co. 43 W Va. 110
McCrory v. Anderson, 103 Ind.
16 ....
38
349
218
313
369
493
574
218
65
247
220
432
154
200
119
189
104
192
79
324
124
45
349
234
776
252
61
47
94
118
247
McCrum v. Hildebrand, 85 Ind.
205 455
McCrystal v. O'Neill, 86 N. Y.
S. 84 129
McCulley v. S. 62 Ind. 428.. 21
McCulloch v. S. 48 Ind. 109 .. 320
McCullough v. Armstrong (Ga.),
45 S. E. 379 196
v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.
S. Co. 101 Mich. 234.. 192
V. S. 23 Tex. App. 626 . . 299
McCully v. S. 62 Ind. 433. ... 766
McCutcheon v. Loggins, 109
Ala. 457 48
McDaniel v. Crosby, 19 Ark.
533 38
v. S. 30 Ga. 853 168
v. S. 100 Ga. 67 255
McDaniels v. Monroe, 63 S.
Car. 307 176
McDerott v. S. 89 Ind. 193... 777
McDommell v. De Los Fuentes,
7 Tex. Civ. App. 136.. 191
McDonald v. Beall, 55 Ga. 288 192
v. Fairbanks, Morse & Co.
161 111. 124 44
v. McDonald, 94 Ga. 675 80
v. McDonald, 142 Ind. 89 706
v. Metropolitan St. R. Co.
61 N. Y. S. 817 126
v. Minneapolis, St. P. R.
Co. 105 Mich. 659 123
v. New York, N. H. & H. R.
Co. (R. I.) 54 Atl. 795 32
V* Norfolk, &c. R. Co. 95
Va. 104 610, 614, 650
v. S. 63 Ind. 544 166, 169
v. S. (Miss.) 28 So. 750.. 219
v. U. S. 63 Fed. 426 347
McDonall v. P. 168 111. 93.. 6, 802
McDonnell v. Nicholson, 67
Mo. App. 408 363
McDonough v. Great N. R. Co.
15 Wash. 244 348
v. Metropolitan R. Co. 137
Mass. 210 183
v. Miller, 114 Mass. 94.. 116
McDoiigal v. S. 88 Ind. 24.. 247, 331
McEldon v. Patton (Neb.), 93
N. W. 938 80
McElroy v. P. 202 111. 478..
373, 821
McElya v. Hill, 105 Tenn. 319 90
McEwen v. Morey, 60 HI. 38. . 26b
v. S. (Miss.) 16 So. 242 226
XC1V
TABLE OF CASES.
(References are to Sections.)
McFadyen v. Masters, 1 1
Okla. 16 360
McFarland v. Carver, 34 Mo.
196 522
McFaul v. Madero F. & F. C.
134 Cal. 313 71
McGar v. National & P. W. M.
Co. 22 R. I. 347 94
McGee v. Smitherman, 69 Ark.
632 7, 25, 196
v. Wells, 52 S. Car. 472.. 27
v. Wineholt, 23 Wash. 748 245
McGehee v. Lane, 34 Tex. 390 118
McGinnis v. Fernandes, 126 111,
232 84
v. Kempsey, 27 Mich. 364
694, 695, 696, 697, 698
McGowen v. Larsen, 66 Fed.
910 102
McGrath v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. App.
413 269
McGraw v. Chicago, R. I. & P.
R. Co. (Neb.) 81 ... W.
306 360
McGrew v. Missouri Pac. R. Co.
109 Mo. 582 48
McGuire v. Hartford Fire Ins.
Co. 158 N. Y. 680 .... 145
McHale v. McDonnell, 175 Pa.
St. 632 65
McHenry v. Bulifant (Pa.) 56
Atl. 226 119, 192
v. Man, 39 Md. 510 156
McHugh v. S. 42 Ohio St.
154 31, 32
Mclntosh v. Moore, 22 Tex.^
Civ. App. 22 81
v. S. 151 Ind. 251
226, 227, 238, 243 300, 754
Mclntyre v. P. 38 111. 520 281
v. Sholtey, 121 111. 665.. 47
McKay v. Evans, 48 Mich. 597 116
McKee v. P. 36 N. Y. 118 333
v. S. Ill Ind. 378 760
McKenzie v. Sykes, 47 Mich.
294 156, 157
McKinney v. Guhman, 38 Mo.
App. 344 199
v. Hopwood, 46 Neb. 871 129
v. Snyder, 78 Pa. St. 497 63
v. S. 134 Ala. 134 318
McKinnon v. Atkins, 60 Mich.
418 352
McKinsey v. McKee, 109 Ind
209 346
McKinzie v. Remington, 79 111.
388 44, 78
McKissack v. Witz, 120 Ala.
412 142
McKlervy v. S. 77 Ala. 95 295
McKnight v. Detroit M. R. Co.
(Mich.) 97 N. W. 772.. 25
v. U. S. 115 Fed. 972 201
McKown v. Powers, 86 Me.
291 347
McLain v. Commonwealth, 99
Pa. St. 86 69
v. S. 18 Neb. 154
160, 322, 744
McLane v. Maurer, 28 Tex.
Civ. App. 75 25, 196
McLean v. Clark. 47 Ga. 24.. 212
v. Erie R. Co. (N. J.) 54 .
Atl. 238 204
McLellon v. Wheeler, 70 Me.
285 196
McLeod v. Sharp, 53 111. App.
406 200
McLeroy v. S. 120 Ala. 274.. 11 j
McMahan v. Sankey, 133 111.
636 238
McMahon v. Eau Claire W.
Works, 95 Wis. 640 .'. 35
v. Flanders, 64 Ind. 334. . 80
v. O'Connor, 137 Mass.
216 14
v. P. 120 HI. 584
217, 366, 367
v. Sankey, 133 111. 637. 56, 249
McManus v. Finan, 4 Iowa,
285 678
McMarshall v. Chicago, &c. R.
Co. 80 Iowa, 759 .... 630
McMeen v. Com. 114 Pa. St.
300 302
McMillan v. S. 35 Tex. Cr.
App. 370 360
McMillen v. Lee, 78 111. 433.. 238
McMinn v. Whalen, 27 Cal.
319 185, 208
McMullen v. Clark. 49 Ind. 81 73S
McNair v. Platt. 46 111. 211.. 48
McNamnra v. King, 7 111. (2
Gil.) 432 59
v. Pengilly, 64 Minn. 543 351
v. P. 24 Colo. 61 324
McNeel v. Smith, 106 Ga. 215 135
McNeil v. Durham, 130 N. '
Car. 256 244
McNeile v. Cridland, 6 Pa.
Super. Ct. 428 215
TABLE OF CASES.
XCV
(References are to Sections.}
McNight v. Bell, 168 Pa. St.
50 141
McNulta v. Lockridge, 137 111.
288 74, 627, 641
McNutt, &c. R. v. Kaufman;
26 Ohio St. 130 199
McPeak v. Missouri Pac. R. Co.
128 Mo. 617 187
McPeck v. Central Vt. R. Co.
79 Fed. 590 126
McPhee v. McDermott, 77 Wis.
33 360
McPherson v. St. Louis I. M.
& S. R. Co. 97 Mo. 253 105
McQuay v. Richmond & D. R.
Co. 109 N. Car. 585.. 181
McQueen v. S. 82 Ind. 74.. 340, 756
v. S. 103 Ala. 12 252, 282
McQuinn v. Com. 17 Ky. 500 293
McQuown v. Thompson, 5
Colo. App. 466 141
McVay v. S. (Miss.) 26 So.
947 226
McVeigh v. S. 43 Tex. Cv.
App. 17 182
McVey v. St. Clair Co. 49 W. ,
Va. 412
92, 102, 118, 610, 619
v. S. 55 Neb. 777 33S
v. S. 57 Neb. 471 238
McWaters v. Equitable Mort.
Co. 115 Ga. 723 135
Maas v. Ter. 10 Okla. 714.. 331
Mabry v. S. 7 1 Miss. 716 19
Machen v. Hooper, 73 Md. 354 453
Mackin v. P. 115 111. 312 21
v. S. 59 N. J. L. 495 329
Macon v. Holcomb, 205 111.
640 247
Madden v. State, 148 Ind. 183 41
Maddox v. Newport New & M.
V. Co. 18 Ky. L. R. 635 195
Madison v. Com. 13 Ky. L. R.
313 267
Maes v. Texas & N. O. R. Co.
(Tex. Civ. App.) 23 S.
W. 725 25, 87
Magee v. McNeil, 41 Miss. 17 158
v. P. 139 111. 140 265
Magone v. Origet, 70 Fed. 778 145
Magoon v. Before, 73 Vt. 231
6, 351
Maliaffey v. Ferguson, 156 Pa.
St. 156 195
v. Ter. (Okla.) 69 Pac.
342 255
Mahan v. Com. 21 Ky. L. R.
1807 80, 94
Mahaska County S. Bank v.
Crist, 87 Iowa, 418 415
Maher v. James Hanley Brew-
ing Co. 23 R. I. 343 91
Mahnken v. Board of Chosen
Freeholders, 62 N. J. L.
404 134
Mahoney v. San Francisco &
S. M. R. Co. 110 Cal.
471 187
Maines v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. App.
109 265
Mallen v. Waldowiski, 203 111.
87 194, 245, 543
Malone v. Robinson, 77 Ga.
719 433
v. S. 66 Ga. 540 166, 168
v. Third Ave. R. Co. 42 N.
Y. S. 694 16
Malott v. Hawkins, 159 Ind.
137 346
v. Hood, 201 111. 202
6, 53, 624
Manch v. City of Hartford,
112 Wis. 40 232
Manger v. S. (Tex. Cv. App.)
69 S. W. 145 272
Mangham v. S. 87 Ga. 549 . . 265
Mangum v. Com. 19 Ky. L.
R. 94 329
Manier v. S. 6 Baxt. (Tenn.)
595 11
Manley v. Boston & M. R. Co.
'159 Mass. 493 113
Mann v. Cowan, 8 Pa. Super.
Ct. 30 191
v. S. 134 Ala, 1
102, 116. 258. 260,. 299
Manning v. Gasharie, 27 Ind.
399 14
Mansfield v. Neese. 2 1 Tex. Cv.
App. 584 .' 48
Mantz v. Maguire 52 Mo. App.
137 156, 159, 160
Marcus v. Leake (Neb.) 94 N.
W. 100 25
Marden v. Dorthy, 42 N. Y. S.
827 130
Mariner v. Dennison, 78 Cal.
202 27
Marion v. S. 16 Neb. 349 312
Mark v. S. 34 Tex. Cr. 136... 110
Market & Fulton Nat. Bank v.
Sargent, 85 Me. 349 126
Marks v. Jacobs, 76 Ind. 216. 3, 6
XCV1
TABLE OF CASES.
(References are to Sections.}
Marr v. Marr, 5 Sneed (Term.)
385
Marsh v. Eichardson, 106 N.
Car. 539
v. Smith, 49 111. 396
Marshall v. John Grosse Cloth-
ing Co. 184 111. 421
v. Lewark, 117 Ind. 377
351, 359.
v.Morris, 16 Ga. 368....
v. S. 37 Tex. Cr. App. 450
Marshalltown L. Ins. Co. v.
Doll, 80 Ind. 113
Martens v. Pittock (Neb.) 92
N. W. 1038
Martensen v. Arnold, 78 111.
App. 336
Martin v. Chicago & N. W. R.
Co. 194 111. 138 121,
v. Davis, 76 Iowa, 762. ..
v. Home Bank, 160 N. Y.
190 . .
v. Hughes, 98 Fed. 556. ..
v. Johnson, 89 111. 537
106,
v. McCray, 171 Pa. St.
575
v. St. Louis S. W. R. Co.
(Tex. Cv. App.) 56 S.
W. 1011 .
v. S. 104 Ala. 71
v. S. (Neb.) 93 N. W. 161
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 38
S. W. 194
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 43
S. W. 352 175,
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 53
S. W. 849
v. S. 32 Tex. Cr. App. 441
v. S. 36 Tex. Cr. App. 632.
v. Union M. L. Ins. Co. 13
Wash. L75
Martineau v. S. 14 Wis. 373..
Martinez v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.)
56 S. W. 580
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 57
S. W. 670
'Marts v. S. 20 Ohio St. 162..
Marx v. Hess, 19 Ky. L. 42
129,
Mar/en v. P. 173 111. 60.. 319.
Mascott v. Insurance Co. 69
Vt. 116
Mason v. Jones, 36 111. 212..
182
14
155
136
360
196
326
358
113
155
129
199
145
189
116
84
115
4
8
288
290
109
303
289
80
155
268
48
802
141
731
145
25
Mason v. McCampbell, 2 Ark.
506 361
v. Seiglitz, 22 Colo. 320
43, 236, 346
v. Silver, 1 Aik. (N. S.)
(Vt.) 367 48
v. Southern R. Co. 58 S.
Car. 70 94
Masonic, &c. Asso. v. Collins,
210 111. 482 71
Matheson v. Kuhn, 15 Colo.
App. 477 94
Mathews v. Granger, 96 111.
App. 536 223
Mathews Adm'rs v. Traders'
Bank (Va.) 27 S E.
609 135
Mathis v. S. 80 Miss. 491... 294
v. S. 33 Tex. Cr. App. 605
192
Matson v. Port Townsend S.
R. Co. 9 Wash. 449 144
Matthews v. Granger, 196 111.
164 363
v. Hamilton, 23 111. 416... 105
v. P. 6 Colo. App. 456... 229
v. S. 55 Ala. 65 153
v. Story, 54 Ind. 417 195
Mattingly v. Lewishon, 13 Mont.
508 196
Mattoon v. Freemont, E. & M. V.
R. Co. 6 S. Dak. 196 133
Matula v. Lane, 22 Tex. Cv.
App. 391 48
Maurer v. P. 43 N. Y. 1 36
Mawich v. Elsey, 47 Mich. 10.. 208
Maxfield v. S. 54 Neb. 44 716
Maxon. v. Farris (Tex. Cv.
App.) 48 S. W. 741.... 200
Maxwell v. Chapman, 26 N. Y.
S. 361 245
v. Cunningham, 50 W. Va.
298.. 25, 661, 662. 690, 691
v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co.
85 Mo. 1C6 84
v. Williamson, 35 111. 529.. 219
May v. P. 8 Colo. 226 766, 770
v. P. 6 111. 119 294, 299
v. S. 94 Ga. 76 271
v. Tallman, 20 111. 443 25
Mayer v. Thompson B. Co. 104
Ala. 611 141
v. Wilkins, 37 Fla. 244
48, 181, 308
Mayers v. Smith, 121 111. 451.. 385
Mayes v. Kenton, 2b Kv. L. R.
1052 163
TABLE OF CASES.
XCV11
(References are to Sections.)
Mayfield v: Williams, 73 Tex.
508
Maynard v. Fellows, 43 N. H.
255
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 39 S.
W. 667
v. Sigman (Neb.) 91 N. W.
576
v. Tyler, 168 Mass. 107..
v. Vinton, 59 Mich. 139...
Mazzia v. S. 51 Ark. 177
Mead v. Brotherton, 30 Mo. 201
v. McGraw, 19 Ohio St. 61
Meadows v. Pacific M. L. Ins.
Co. 129 Mo. 76
v. Truesdell (Tex. Cv. App.)
56 8. W. 932 170,
v. West. U. Tel. Co. 13 IX.
Car. 73
Means v. Gridley, 164 Pa. St.
387 195,
Mechanics' Bank v. Barnes, 86
Mich. 632
Medearis v. Anchor Mutual Fire
Ins. Co. 104 Iowa, 88..
Meehan v. S. (Wis.) 97 N. W.
174 9,
Mefford v. Sell (Neb.) 92 N.
W. 148
Mehurin v. Stone, 37 Ohio St.
49 . . . . .
Meier v. Shrunk, 79 Iowa, 21..
Meigs v. Dexter, 172 Mass. 217
Meiners v. City of St. Louis, 130
Mo. 274
Mellor v. Missouri Pac. R. Co.
105 Mo. 455
Mells v. U. S. 164 U. S. 644.
Melvin v. Easly, 46 N. Car. 386
Memphis & C. P. Co. v. Abell,
17 Ky. L. R. 191
Memphis St. R. Co. v. Newman,
108 Tenn. 666
Mendenhall v. North; Carolina
R. Co. 123 N. Car. 275..
Mendes v. Kyle. 16 Nev. 369
25,
Mercer v. Wright. 3 Wis. 645..
Merchants & Planters' Oil Co.
v. Burrow (Tex. Cv.
App.) 69 S. W. 435
Merrietta & C. R. Co. v. Pick-
sley, 24 Ohio St. 668
665
199
281
238
191
211
4
113
218
71
191
119
363
234
119
301
84
243
478
30
48
652
276
211
134
101
245
113
219
230
286
Merrill v. Equitable F. I. & S.
I. Co. 49 Neb. 198 358
v. Hale, 85 Iowa, 66 113
v. Packer, 80 Iowa, 543
155, 156
v. Palmer, 68 Vt. 475 . . . 351
v. Reaver, 5 Iowa, 417
381, 396, 463
v. Suing (Neb.) 92 N. W.
618 94
Merrimac Paper Co. v. Illinois
Trust & S. Bank, 129 111.
296 47
Merritt v. Merritt, 20 111. 80. .. 66
v. S. 107 Ga. 675 170
Mertens v. Keilman, 79 Mo.
416 659
Merwin v. Magone, 70 Fed. 776
145
v. Morris, 71 Conn. 564
658, 659, 662
Messmann v. Ihlenfeldt, 89 Wis.
585 26
Metropolitan, &c. Co. v. Hudson,
113 Fed. 449 347
v. McClure, 58 Kas. 109.. 195
v. Skola, 183 111. 454 21
Metropolitan Bank of Minneapo-
lis v. Northern Fuel Co.
173 111. 345 124
Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. v.
Howie, 62 Ohio St. 206.. 420
Metz v. S. 46 Neb. 547 195, 229
Meul v. P. 198 111. 258 31
Mewes v. Crescent P. L. Co. 170
Pa. St. 369 211
Mexican, &c. R. Co. v. Murray,
102 Fed. 264 131
v. Wilder, 114 Fed. 708.. 361
Mever v. Blackmore, 54 Miss.
575 199
v. Hafmeister (Wis.) 97
N. W. 166 200, 247
v. Mead. 83 111. App. 19.. 203
v. P. 156 111. 129 329
v. Pacific R. Co. 40 Mo.
151 113
v. Reimer. 65 Kas. 822 48
v. S. (Tex. Cr.) 49 S. W.
600 243
v. Shamp, 51 Neb. 424 . ... 160
v. Southiern R. Co. (Mo.)
3-6 S. W. 367 71
v. Temme, 72 111. 571 360
Meyers v. Birch, 59 N. J. L.
238 126, 129
xcvm
TABLE OF CASES.
(References are to Sections.)
Meyers v. S. 39 (Tex. Cv. App.)
500
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 49 S.
W. 600
Michie v. Cochran, 93 Va. 614.
Michigan S. & N. I. R. Co. v.
Shelton, 66 111. 425
Mickle v. S. 27 Ala. 20 '.
Middlebrooks v. Mayne, 96 Ga.
449
Miers v. S. 34 Tex. Cr. App.
161
Milburn Wagon Co. v. Kennedy,
75 Tex. 214
Miles v. Plant, 18 Pa. Super.
Ct. 80
v. Stanke, 114 Wis. 94
v. Strong, 68 Conn. 273
v. Walker (Neb.) 92 N. W.
1014
Miller v. Barber, 66 N. Y. 558.
v. Bathasser, 78 111. 305
105, 477,
v. Cinnamon, 168 111. 451.
v. Com. (Va.) 21 S. E. 499
v. Coulter, 156 Ind. 298
269
238
173
192
306
100
3
873
191
8
199
197
200
877
118
284
706
222
63
155
209
25,
v. Dayton, 57 Iowa, 423...
v. Dumon, 24 Wash. 648..
v. Dunlap, 22 Mo. App. 97.
v. Eglin, 64 Ind. 197
v. Haas (Tex. Cv. App.) 27
S. W. 263
v. Howard, 19 Ky. L. R. 22
v. John, 108 111. 180 . ... 203
v. Madison Car Co. 130 Mo.
517 219
v. Miller, 17 Ind. App. 605
26
v. Miller. 187 Pa. St. 572. 185
v. P. 23 Colo. 95 274, 351
v. P. 39 111. 466
19, 221, 298, 299, 324,
325, 328, 367, 719, 760
v. Preston, 4 Johns. (N. Y. )
314 43
v. Root, 77 Iowa, 545 244
v. S. 107 Ala. 40.. 56, 115, 345
v. S. 74 Ind. 1 260
v. S. (Miss.) 35 So. 690... 365
v. S. (Wis.) 81 N. W. 1020
9
v. R. 106 Wis. 156. .21, 25, 219
v. Stevens, 23 Ind. App.
365. . 71
Milhgan v. Texas & N. 0. R. Co.
27 Tex. Cv. App. 600 f>
Milliken v. Marlin, (56 111. 22.. 20U
v. Maund, 110 Ala. 332... 351
Milling v. Hillenbrand, 156 111.
310 238
Millman v. Rochester R. Co. 39
N. Y. S. 279 222
Mills v. S. 104 Ga. 502 271
Milmo Nat. Bank v. Convery
(Tex. Cv. App.) 49 S. W.
926 27, 199
Milroy v. Chicago, &c. R. Co. 98
Iowa, 193 655
Milwaukee Harvester Co. v.
Tymich, 68 Ark. 225 360
Mimms v. S. 16 Ohio St. 234
84, 119, 173
Mims v. S. 42 Fla. 199 101
Mineral R. & M. Co. v. Auten,
188 Pa. St. 568 6
Minnesota Thresher Mfg. Co. v.
Wolfram, 71 Wis. 809.. 140
Minor v. Parker, 72 N. Y. S.
549
Mirrielees v. Wabash R. Co. 163
358
530
Mo. 470
Mississippi C. R. Co. v. Miller,
40 Miss. 45 247
Missouri, &c. R. Co. v. A very
(Tex. Cv. App.) 64 S. W.
935 25
v. Bowles, 1 Ind. Ter. 250.. 590
v. Brown (Tex. Cv. App.)
39 S. W. o26 .
195
v. Byars, 58 Ark. 108 174
v. Cardena, 22 Tex. Cv.
App. 300 101
v. Carter (Tex.) 68 S. W.
159 b8
v. Christman, 65 Tex. 369. 173
v. Coffey (Tex. Cv. App.)
68 S. W. 721 115
v. Collins, 15 Tex. Cv. App.
21 109, 113
v. Cook, 12 Tex. Cv. App.
203 244
v. Crowder (Tex. Cv. App.)
53 S. W. 380 6
v. Dil worth (Tex. Cv. App.)
65 S. W. 502 7
v. Edwards, 90 Tex. 69
537
v. Evans (Tex. Cv. App.)
41 S. W. 80 33
v. Fox. 56 Neb. 746 247
v. Fuller, 72 Fed. 468 ... 25
TABLE OF CASES.
XC1X
(References are to Sections.}
Missouri, &c. R. Co. v. Hen-
nessy (Tex.) 49 S. W.
641 20
v. Hildebrand, 62 Kas. 284. 26
v. Johnson (Tex. Cv. App.)
67 S. W. 769 191
v. King, 2 Tex. Cv. App.
122 28
v. Kirschoffer (Tex. Cv.
App.) 24 S. W. 577 .... 355
v. Lyons (Tex. Cv. App.)
58 S: W. 96 71
v. Magee (Tex. Cv. App.)
49 S. W. 928 191
v. Miller, 15 Tex. Cv. App.
428 6
v. Mitchell, 75 Tex. 1 94
v. Peay, 7 Tex. Cv. App.
400 6
v. Rogers (Tex. Cv. App.)
40 S. W. 849 184
v. Steinberger, 60 Kas. 856
6
v. Walden (Tex. Cv. App.)
66 S. W. 584 26
v. Warren, 1 9 Tex. Cv. App.
463 196
v. White, 22 Tex. Cv. App.
424 549
v. Wickham (Tex. Cv.
App.) 28 S. W. 917.... 94
v. Williams, 75 Tex. 4 347
Missouri Furnace Co. v. Abend,
107 111. 49 620
v. Abend, 107 111. 50 86
Missouri M. Iron Co. v. Hoover,
179 111. 107 133
Mitchell v. Charleston L. & P.
Co. 45 S. Car. 146
28, 543, 546, 547
v. Electric Co. 129 N. Car.
173 546
v. Fond du Lac, 61 111. 174
153, 155
v. Harmony, 13 How. (U.
S.) 130 119
v. Hindman, 150 111. 528
21, 199, 2CO, 239
v. Potomac Ins. Co. 183 U.
S. 42 80
v. S. 133 Ala. 65
68, 88. 225
v. S. 38 Tex. Cr. App. 325
289
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 41
S. W. 816 258
v. S. 43 Fla, 188 206
Mitchell-Tranter Co. v. Ehmett,
23 Ky. L. R. 1788 116
Mittwer v. Stremel, 69 Minn. 19
80
Mixon v. Mills, 92 Tex. 318 354
v. Warren, 94 Ga. 688 140
Mize v. S. 36 Ark. 662 801
Mobile, &c. R. Co. v. Godfrey,
155 111. 82 94, 101
v. Healy, 100 111. App. 586
198
v. Wilson, 76 Fed. 122 189
Mobile Fruit & T. Co. v. Potter,
78 Minn. 437 4
Mobley v. Charlotte, C. & A. R.
Co. 42 S. Car. 306 .... 237
v. S. 83 Ind. 94 825
Mode v. Beasley, 143 Ind. 306
243
Model Mill Co. v. McEver, 95
Ga. 701 113, 117
Moellering v. Evans, 121 Ind.
197 670
Moffitt v. Colkin, 35 Mo. 453.. 192
Mohr v. Kinnane, 85 111. App.
447 193, 195
Mohrenstecher v. Westervelt, 87
Fed. 157 80
Momence Stone Co. v. Groves,
197 111. 93 222
v. Turrell, 205 111. 524 192
Monaghan v. Agriculture F. Ins.
Co. 53 Mich. 238 200
Montag v. P. 141 111. 81
1, 20, 48, 80, 330, 331
Montgomery v. Black, 124 111.
62 47
v. Com. (Ky.) 63 S. W.
747 80
v. Del. Ins. Co. (S. Car.)
45 S. E. 934 119
v. Harker, 81 Mo. 63 359
v. Hickman, 62 Ind. 598.. 446
Moody v. S. 114 Ga. 449 182
Mooney v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.)
65 S. W. 926 272
Moor v. Heineke, 119 Ala. 627. 200
Moore v. Barker Asphalt Pav-
ing Co. 118 Ala. 563 80
v. Brewer, 94 Ga. 260 199
v. Brown, 27 Tex. Cv. App.
208 7, 346
v. Dickinson, 39 S. Car. 441
191
v. Graham, 29 Tex. Cv. App.
235 7, 248, 363
TABLE OF CASES.
(References are to Sections.)
Moore v. Gwynn, 27 N. Car.
(5 Ired. L.) 187
v. Hinkle, 151 Ind. 343..
v. People, 190 111. 331
v. Platterville, 78 Wis. 644
v. Prussing, 165 111. 319..
v. Richmond, 85 Va. 542
59,
v. Ross, 11 N. H. 547
v. S. 97 Ga. 759
v. S. 114 Ga. 256 80,
v. S. 65 Ind. 382 63,
v. S. (Tex. Or. App.) 28
S. W. 874 358
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 33 S.
W. 990 3, 266
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 68 S.
W. 279 191
v. Shields, 121 Ind. 267.... 6
v. Sweeney, 28 111. App. 547
44
v. Wright, 90 111. 471.... 113
Moore Furniture Co. v. Sloane,
166 111. 460 101
Moran v. Higgins, 1 9 Ky. L. R.
456 113
v. P. 163 111. 372 219
v. S. 11 Ohio C. C. 464.. 34 T
Moran Bros. Co. v. Snoqualmie
Falls Power Co. 29 Wash.
292 25
Moratsky v. Wirth, 74 Minn.
146 20
Morearty v. S. 46 Neb. 652 94
Morehead v. Adajns, 18 Neb.
569 63
Morey v. Laird, 108 Iowa. 670. 134
Morgan v. Hudnell, 52 Ohio St.
552 512
v. Peet, 32 111. ?87 .... 30
v. S. 133 Ala. 18 295
v. S. 51 Neb. 672
196, 2,69, 299
v. S. 48 Ohio 371
115, 119, 720
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 67 S.
W. 420 196
v. S. (Neb.) 93 N. W. 743
20
v. Stone (Neb.) 93 N. W.
743 . 117
v. Wabash R. Co. 159 Mo.
271 641
v. Wattles, 69 Ind. 260.. 172
Moriarty v. S. 62 Miss. 661 19
Morris v. Com. 20 Ky. 402... 255
Morris v. Lachman, 68 Cal. 112. 68
v. Platt, 32 Com. 75.. 48, 245
v. S. 124 Ala. 44
65, 297, 326
v. S. 101 Ind. 562 319
v. S. 39 Tex. Cr. App. 371
191, 318
Morrison v. Northern P. R. Co.
(Wash.) 74 Pac. 1066
25, 230
v. S. 42 Fla. 149 4
v. S. 39 Tex. Cr. App. 519. 258
v. S. 41 Tex. 520 317
Morrisson v. S. 76 Ind. 339.. 715
Morrow v. Pullman P. Car
Co. (Mo. App.) 73 S.
W. 281 129
v. St. Paul C. R. Co. 65
Minn. 382 94
Morse v. Ryland, 58 Kas. 250. 1
v. Weymouth, 28 Vt. 824. 155
Morton v. Gately, 2 111. (1
Scam.) 210 80
v. Harvey, 57 Neb. 304... 195
Mose v. S. 36 Ala, 211
297, 315, 730
Moseley v. S. 36 Tex. Cr. App.
578 Ill, 290
v. Washburn, 165 Mass.
417 35
Mosely v. S. 107 Ala. 74 258
v. Washburn, 167 Mass.
345 113
Mosher v. Rogers, 117 111. 446
65
Moshier y. Kitchell & Arnold,
87 111. 18 284
Mosier v. Stall, 119 Ind. 244. 27
Mount v. Brooklyn Union Gas
Co. 76 N. Y. S. 533.... 358
Movar v. Harvey, 125 Mass.
574 249
Mowry v. Stogner, 3 Rich. (S.
Car.) 251 160
Mt. Olive v. S. Ooal Co. v.
Rademancher, 190 111.
538 104, 284, 382, 649
Mt. Vernor Bank v. Porter, 148
Mo. 176 126
Mueller v. Pels, 192 111. 76... 238
v. Rosen, 179 111. 131.... 104
Muetze v. Tuteur, 77 Wis.
236 191
Muir v. Miller, 82 Iowa. 700. 196
Mullen v. Bower 22 Ind. App.
294 440
TABLE OF CASES.
Cl
(References are to Sections.}
Muller v. Powers, 174 Mass.
555 347
Mullin v. Spangenberg, 112 111.
140 505
Mullinix v. P. 76 111. 211.166, 709
Mullins v. Com. 23 Ky. L. R.
2433 253
v. P. 110 111. 42
115, 299, 322, 744, 745
Mulvihill v. Thompson, 114
Iowa, 734 71
Muncie Natural Gas Co. v.
Allison (Ind.) 67 N. E.
Ill 20
Muncy v. Mattfield (Tex. Cv.
App.) 40 S. W. 345 7
Mundine v. Pauls, 28 Tex. Cv.
App. 46 195
Hunger v. Waterloo, 83 Iowa,
562 594
Murchison v. Mansur-Tibbetts
Implement Co. (Tex. Cv.
App.) 37 S. W. 605 96
Murphy v. Chicago, R. I. & P.
R. Co. 38 Iowa, 539 19
v. Farlow, 124 Ala. 279.. 80
v. Johnson, 4 5 Iowa, 5 7 ... 361
v. Murphy, 95 Iowa, 271. 164
v. P. 37 111. 447 70
v. S. 31 Fla. 166 328
v. S. 36 Tex. Cr. App. 24. 262
v. S. 108 Wis. 111... 336, 337
v. St. Louis Tr. Co. 96
Mo. App. 272 236
Murray v. Board of Comrs. 58
Kas. 1 353
v. Boston Ice Co. 180
Mass. 165 25
v. Burd (Neb.) 91 N. W.
278 53, 70
v. Hudson. 65 Mich. 673.. 658
v. New York, L. & W. R.
Co. 103 Pa. St. 37 25
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 44
S. W. 830 4
Musfelt v. S. 64 Neb. 445 7
Musgrave v. S. 133 Ind. 297.. 30
Musser v. S. 157 Ind. 431.729 760
Muth v. St. Louis T. Co. 94
Mo. App. 94
390. 393. 436, 437
Mutual. &c. Ins. Co. v. Baker,
10 Tex. Cv. App. 515... 6
v. French, 2 Gin. (Ohio)
321 19
v. Miller, 39 Ind. 475
4, 8, 12, 420
Myer v. Mead, 83 111. 19.. 31, 385
v. Milwaukee E. R. Co.
(Wis.) 93 N. W. 6 6
v. Myer, 86 111. App. 417. 195
v. Richards, 111 Fed. 296
20
v. Suburban Home Co. 55
N. Y. S. 566 360
Myers v. P. 156 111. 129 331
v. S. 43 Fla. 500 25, 708
v. S. 97 Ga. 76.. 94, 11-7, 224
v. S. (Tex. Cv. App.) 39
S. W. 938 93
v. Taylor, 107 Tenn. 364. 14
v. Walker, 31 111. 353 117
My rick v. Wells, 52 Miss. 149
170
N
Nabours v. McCord (Tex. Cv.
App.) 75 S. W. 827.... 192
Nappanee Canning Co. v. Reid,
&c. Co. 159 Ind. 614 517
Nash v. Mam'stee Lumber Co.
75 Mich. 357 404
Nashville, &c. R. Co. v. Ham-
mond, 104 Ala. 191 195
v. Norman, 108 Tenn. 324
00
v. O'Bryan, 104 Tenn. 28. 25
v. Witherspoon (Tenn.) 78
S. W. 1052 106
Nason v. Letz, 73 111. 371 361
National Bank v. Suimmer, 1 1 9 ....
N. Car. 591 352
National Bank of Merrill v.
Illinois and W. Lumber
Co. 107 Wis. 247 7, 20
National Horse Importing Co.
v. Novak, 95 Iowa, 596... 236
National L. M. Ins. Co. v.
Whitacre (Ind. App.) 43
N. E. 905 236
National Linseed Oil Co. v. Mc-
Blaine. 164 111. 597.... 25
National Lumber Co. v. Snell,
47 Ark. 407 34
National Syrup Co. v. Carlson,
155 111. 210 133
Naugher v. S. 116 Ala. 463
68. 227
Navarro v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.)
43 S. W. 105 255, 269
Nebraska M. M. Ins. Co. v.
Sasek. 64 Neb. 17 20
Cll
TABLE OF CASES.
(References are to Sections.)
Nebraska N. Bank v. Burke,
44 Neb. 234
Needham v. King, 95 Mich.
303
v. P. 98 111. 279.. 48, 284,
Negley v. Cowell, 91 Iowa, 256
Nehms v. S. 58 Miss. 362
Neiders v. Bell, 174 111. 325..
Neill v: Jordan, 15 Mont. 47..
Neiman v. Schmitker, 181 111.
406
Neininger v. Cowen, 101 Fed.
787
Nelson v. Cottingham, 152 Ind.
135
v. Lake Shore, &c. R. Co.
104 Mich. 587.
v. McLennan, 31 Wash.
208
v. S. (N. J.) 35 Atl. 785.
v. S. 43 Tex. Cr. App.
553
v. Spears, 16 Mont. 351..
v. Terry (Ky.) 56 S. VV.
672
v. Voree, 55 Ind. 455....
Neufeld v. Roderninski, 144 111.
83
Neville v. Mitchell (Tex. Cv.
App.) 66 S. W. 579....
v. S. 133 Ala. 29
Newbold v. Hayward, 96 Md.
247
Newbury v. Getchell & M. L.
Mfg. Co. 100 Iowa, 441
New Dxmderberg Minn. Co. v.
Old, 97 Fed. 150
Newell v. S. 115 Ala. 54
New England F. & M. Ins. Co.
v. Wetmore. 32 111. 221.
New England M. S. Co. v.
Great W. & E. Co. 6 N.
Dak. 407
New Ene. T. & C. Co. v. Cath-
olican, 79 Fed. 294
Newman v. Day, 108 Ga. 813.
v. Hazelrigg, 96 Ind. 377.
v. McComas, 43 Ind. 70..
v. S. 49 Ala. 9
v. Schmilker, 181 111. 406
v. Virginia, &o. Co. 80
Fed. 228 .
56
363
772
94
328
284
244
193
121
47
650
211
295
191
65
244
209
242
355
301
121
86
353
297
80
146
353
356
321
308
318
192
351
New Omaha Thompson-Houston
Elec. Light Co. v. John-
son (Neb.) 93 N. W.
778 20
v. Rombold (Neb.) 97 N.
W. 1030 192
New Orleans R. Co. v. Allbrit-
ton, 38 Miss. 242 538
v. Clements, 100 Fed. 415
351
Newport v. S. 140 Ind. 299
70, 191, 206, 227, 253
Newport News & M. V. Co. v.
Pace, 158 U. S. 36.... 348
Newton v. Newton, 12 Ind. 527
15
v. S. (Miss.) 12 So. 560. 195
v. S. 37 Ark. 333 113
New York, &c. R. Co. v. Blu-
menthal, 160 111. 40 183
v.Jones, 94 Md. 24 195
v. Luebeck, 157 HI. 595
129, 643
v. Thomas, 92 Va. 606
113, 245
New York & T. Land Co. v.
Gardner (Tex. Cv. App.)
25 S. W. 737 116
New York Dry Goods Store v.
Pabst Brewing Co. 112
Fed. 381 121
New York Fire Ins. Co. v.
Walden, 12 Johns (N.
Y.) 519 171
New York Life Ins. Co. v.
Browns' Adm.r. 23 Ky.
L. R. 2070 6
v. Fraser, 130 U. S. 611. 84
Nichol v. Laumeister, 102 Cal.
658 6, 199
Nichols v. Bradley, 78 111. 44.
v. Mercer, 44 111. 250
v. Munsel, 115 Mass. 567
v. S. 46 Miss. 284
v. Winfrey, 90 Mo. 407...
Nicholson v. Merritt, 23 Ky.
L. R. 2281
Nicklaus v. Burns, 75 Ind. 98
63,
Nickless v. Pearson, 126 Ind.
477
Nickum v. Gaston, 24 Ore. 380
Nicol v. Crittendon, 55 Ga.
Ga. 497
80
78
34
245
475
106
518,
10
351
222
TABLE OF CASES.
cm
(References are to Sections.)
Nighbert v. Hornsby, 100 Term.
82 360
Nilan v. P. 27 Colo. 206.255, 279
Niles v. Sprague, 13 Iowa, 198
187
Nite v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 54
S. W. 763 80
v. S. 41 Tex. Cr. App. 340
304. 462
MX v. Reiss Coal Co. 114
Wis. 493 231
v. S. 97 Ga. 211 299, 318
Nixon v. Jacobs, 22 Tex. Cv.
App. 97 7
Noble v. Worthy, 1 Indian Ter.
458 26
Nobles v. S. 98 Ga. 73.... 11 2, 319
Nofsinger v. Goldman, 122 Cal.
609 80
Nome Beach L. & T. Co. v.
Munich Assur. Co. 123
Fed. 820 189
Norfleet v. Sigman, 41 Miss.
631 250
Norfolk Beet Sugar Co. v.
Hight. 56 Neb. 162.. 94, 119
Norfolk, &c. R. Co. v. Ampsey,
93 Va. 112 617, 624
v. Corletto. 100 Va. 355. 80
v. De Board, 91 Va. 702. 637
v. Poole's Adm'r, 100 Va.
148 198
v. Reeves, 97 Va. 29 589
v. Stevens, 97 Va. 631 84
Norris v. Clinkscales (S. Car.)
22 S. E. 1 130, 172
North v. Mallory, 94 Md. 305
116
Northam v. International Ins.
Co. 61 N. Y. S. 45.... 145
Nortli Chicago St. R. Co. v.
Boyd. 156 111. 416.. 71, 238
v. Cossar, 203 111. 608.74, 126
v. Dudgeon, 83 111. App.
528 223
v. Eldridge, 151 111. 550
183, 562
v. Fitzgibbons, 180 111.
466 .
v. Gastka, 27 111. App. 523
v. Honsinger, 175 111. 318
653
385
196
80
v. Husson. 101 Pa. St. 7.
v. Hutchinson, 191 111.
104 63, 382
North Chicago St. R. Co. v. Ir-
win, 202 111. 345 80. 530
v. Kaspers, 18G 111. 246
379, 380
v. Louis, 138 111. 12 26a
v. Penser, 190 111. 67
238, 363, 551, 629
v. Polkey, 203 111. 232
1, 19, 90
v. Rodert, 203 111. 415... 379
v. Shreve, 171 111. 441
86, 652
v. Wellner, 206 111. 274
215, 365, 370, 379
v. Williams, 140 111. 281. 183
v. Wiswel, 168 111. 613... 133
v. Wrixon, 150 111. 532.. 356
v. Zeigler, 182 111. 13 78
Northern Ohio R. Co. v. Rigby,
69 Ohio, 184 119, 192
Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Bab-
cock, 154 U. S. 190.. 25, 92
v. Lynch, 79 Fed. 268 71
v. Poirier, 67 Fed. 881 71
Northwestern Fuel Co. v. Dan-
ielson, 57 Fed. 915 196
Norton v. Blinn, 39 Ohio St.
145 528
v. North Carolina R. Co.
122 N. Car. 910 26
Norwood v. S. (Ala.) 24 So.
53 209
Noyes v. Tootle, 48 S.W.I 031
218
Nudd v. Burrows, 91 U. S. 441
189
Nugent v. Brenchard, 157 N.
Y. 687 198
v. Brenchard, 36 N. Y. S.
102 198
Nuzum v. S. 88 Ind. 599.168, 169
Nye v. Chase, 139 Mass. 380. 416
v.Kelly, 19 Wash. 73 84
Oberdorfer v. Newberger, 23
Ky. L. R. 2323 8
O'Brien 'v. Chicago & N. W. R.
Co. 92 Wis. 340 133
v. Com. 89 Ky. 354 269
v. Northwestern I. & B.
Co. 82 Minn. 136 63
v. P. 48 Barb. (N. Y.)
280 331
O'Callaehan v. Bode. 84 Cal.
489 ... 78
CIV
TABLE OF CASES.
(References are to Sections.)
Och v. Missouri K. & T. R. Co.
130 Mo. 27 93a
Oehs v. P. 124 111. 399.. 299, 363
O'Connell v. P. 87 N. Y. 384. 331
v. St. Louis, C. & W. R.
Co. 106 Mo. 483
172, 368, 385, 531, 549
v. Samuel, 31 N. Y. S.
889 - 126
O'Connor v. Chicago, M. & St.
P. R. Co. 27 Minn. 166
347
v. S. 28 Tex. App. 288... 290
O'Dea v. S. 16 Neb. 243
858, 859, 860
Odette v. S. 90 Wis. 258
187, 188, 274
O'Donnell v. Chicago, R. I. &
P. R. Co. (Neb.) 91 N.
W. 566 93
v. Rodiger, 76 Ala. 222... 60
O'Driscoll v. Lynn & B. St. R.
Co. 180 Mass. 187 8
Offterdinger v. Ford, 92 Va.
644 510
Offutt v. Columbian Exposition,
175 111. 472
120, 121, 122, 126
O'Flaherty v. Mann, 196 111.
304 192
Oftelie v. Town of Hammond,
78 Minn. 275 48
Ogbom v. Hoffman, 52 Ind. 439
404, 451
Oglsby v. Missouri P. R. Co.
(Mo.) 37 S. W. 829 106
O'Hara v. Miller, 64 Iowa, 462
479
Ohio, &c. R. Co. v. Buck, 130
Ind. 300 204
v.Cosby, 107 Ind. 35 652
v. Cramker, 132 Ind. 277
220, 367
v.Dunn, 138 Ind. 18 126
v. McCartney, 121 Ind. 385
348
v. Pearcy, 128 Ind. 197
119, 170
v. Stein, 140 Ind. 61 235
v. Voight, 122 Ind. 288... 554
v. Wacker, 113 Ind. 201.. 640
v. Wangslin, 152 111. 141. 183
Ohio & I. Torpedo Co. v. Fish-
burn, 61 Ohio St. 608.. 71
Ohlweiler v. Lohlman, 88 Wis.
75 198
Olds v. S. (Fla.) 33 So. 296... 341
Olds Wagon Works v. Coombs,
124 Ind. 62 156, 160
O'Leary v. German A. Ins. Co.
100 Iowa, 390 20
Olferman v. Union D. R. Co.
125 Mo. 408 363
Oliver v. Columbia, N. & L. R.
Co. 65 S. Car. 1 213
v. Moore (Tex. Cv. App.)
43 S. W. 812 101
v. Ohio River R. Co. 42
W. Va. 703 80
v. S. 34 Fla. 203 228
v. S. 38 Fla. 46 28
v. S. (Tex. Cv. App.) 42
S. W. 554 110, 215
v. Sterling, 20 Ohio St.
400 48, 238
Olsen v. Oregon, S. L. & U. N.
R. Co. 9 Utah, 129 205
Olson v. Oregon, S. L. R. Co.
24 Utah, 460 238
Omaha B. R. Co. v. McDer-
mott, 25 Neb. 714 209
Omaha, &c. Asso. v. Missouri,
&c. R. Co. 42 Neb. 105
181, 238, 308, 363
Omaha Fire Ins. Co. v. Deirks,
63 Neb. 473 351
Omaha L. & T. Co. v. Douglas
Co. 62 Neb. 1 94
Omaha Nat. Bank v. Thomp-
son, 39 Neb. 269 48
Omaha, &c. R. & B. Co. v. Lev-
ingston, 49 Neb. 17.... 70
Omaha & R. V. R. Co. v. Chol-
lette, 33 Neb. 148
561, 562. 570, 582
Omaha St. R. Co. v. Boeson
(Neb.) 94 N. W. 619
19, 101, 561
O'Neal v. Curry, 134 Ala. 216
113
O'Neil v. Blase. 94 Mo. App.
648 192. 200
v. Dry Dock, &c. Co. 129
N. Y. 130 17
v. Hanscom, 175 Mass. 313
25
v. Orr, 5 111. (4 Scam.) 3
363
v. S. 48 Ga. 66 294
Ordway v. Sanders, 58 N. H.
132 116
Oregon R. & N. Co. v. Galliber,
2 Wash. Ter. 70 359
TABLE OF CASES.
CV
(References are to Sections.}
O'Reily v. Fitzgerald, 40 111.
310
Orendorff v. Finfronch, 65 111.
App. 174
Orne v. Cook, 31 111. 238
O'Rourke v. Vennekohl, 104
Cal. 254
Orr v. Cedar R. & M. R. Co.
94 Iowa, 423
v. S. (Miss.) 18 So. 118.
Orth v. Clutz*s Adm'r, 18 B.
Mon. (Ky.) 223
Ortwein v. Com. 76 Pa. St.
414 331,
Osborne v. Ringland (Iowa)
98 N. W. 116
v. Simmerson, 73 Iowa,
513
v. S. 125 Ala. 106... 218.
Ostrander v. Scott, 161 111.
345
Otmer v. P. 76 111. 149
78, 308.
O'Toole v. Post P. Pub. Co.
179 Pa. St. 271
Ottawa Gas Light & Coke Co.
v. Graham, 28 111. 73..
Ously v. Hardin, 23 111. 353..
Over v. Schiffling, 102 Ind. 194
Overall v. Armstrong (Tex. Cv.
App.) 25 S. W. 440...
Owen v. Brown, 70 Vt. 521
348,
v. Long, 97 Wis. 78 7,
v. Palmour, 111 Ga. 885..
v. Phillips, 73 Ind. 287. ..
v. S. 78 Ala. 425
Owens v. Callaway, 42 Ala.
301
v. S. 80 Miss. 499... 288,
v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. App. 345
v. S. 39 Tex. Cr. App. 391
223
117
22
238
296
197
334
6
472
221
404
729
6
182
476
27
192
841
195
208
679
318
361
368
110
193
P. Ft. W. & C. R. Co. v. Probst,
30 Ohio St. 106 351
Pace v. Harris, 97 Ga. 357... 126
v. Payne, 73 Ga. 675 360
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 31
S. W. 173 103, 289
Pacific M. L. Ins. Co. v. Fisher,
109 Cal. 566 141
v. Walker, 67 Ark. 147.. 195
Packer v. Thompson-Houston
E. Co. 175 Mass. 496.. 113
Padbury v. Metropolitan St. R.
Co. 75 N. Y. S. 952 133
Padfield v. P. 146 111. 663.. 105, 226
Padgett v. Jacobs, 128 Mich.
632 78
v. Sweeting, 65 Md. 405 498
Padron v. S. 41 Tex. Cr. App.
548
Page v. Shainwald, 65 N. Y. S.
174
326
146
v. S. 141 Ind. 236 260, 802
Pahlman v. King, 49 111. 269 243
Paine v. Incorporated Town,
&c. 103 Iowa, 481 6
Painter v. P. 147 111. 444.. 20, 719
Palm v. Chernowsky, 28 Tex.
Civ. App. 405 200
Palmer v. First Nat. Bank of
Ulysses (Neb.), 81 N.
W. 303 356
v. Marshall, 60 111. 292.. 417
v. S. (Neb.) 97 N. W. 235 227
v. S. 9 Wyo. 40 247
v. Smith "(Conn.), 56 Atl.
516 7
Palmore v. S. 29 Ark. 248.. 11, 60
Palnode v. Westenhaver, 114
Wis. 460 231
Pannell v. Com. 86 Pa. St. 260 211
Panton v. P. 114 111. 509.. 251, 773
Paragon Paper Co. v. S. 19
Ind. App. 328 853
Paris v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 31
S. W. 855 110
Parish v. Williams (Tex. Cv.
App.), 53 S. W. 79.... 6
Park v. Chicago, &c. R. Co. 43
Iowa, 636 679
Parker v. Chancellor, 78 Tex.
524 43, 101
v. Fisher, 39 111. 164 105
v. Hastings, 123 N. Car.
671 93
v. National M. B. & L.
Asso. (W. Va.) 46 S. E.
811 80
v. P. 97 111. 32 55
v. S. 136 Ind. 284
361, 328, 743
v. S. 40 Tex. Cr. App.
119 2, 68
v. S. 43 Tex. Cr. App. 526 191
v. Taylor (Neb.), 91 N.
W. 537 85
CV1
TABLE OF CASES.
(References are to Sections. J
Parker v. Wells (Neb.) 94 N.
W. 717
Parkins v. Missouri Pac. R. Co.
(Neb.) 93 N. W. 197
7, 90,
Parkinson v. Concord St. R.
Co. 71 N. H. 28
Parks v. Gulf, C. S. & F. R.
Co. (Tex. Cv. App.) 30
S. W. 708
v. S. 105 Ga. 242 265,
v. St. Louis & S. R. Co.
(Mo.) 77 S. W. 70 ....
Parman v. Kansas City (Mo.)
78 S. W. 1046
Parmlee v. Adolph, 20 Ohio St.
10 1
Parmley v. Farrar, 169 111.
607
Parr v. S. 36 Tex. Cr. App.
493
Parrish v. S. 14 Neb. 61 1,
Parsons v. S. 81 Ala. 577.. 329,
Partin v. Com. 17 Ky. L. R.
499
Partridge v. Cutter, 168 111.
504 56, 118, 119,
Pate v. P. 8 111. ( Gilm.) 661
v. S. 94 Ala. 14, 18
322, 328,
v. Wight 30 Ind. 476
Patee v. Adams, 37 Kas. 135 ..
Patterson v. Inclined P. R. Co.,
12 Ohio Cir. 280
v. Mills, 48 N. Y. S. 781
v. S. 75 Miss. 670
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 29 S.
W. 272
Patzwald v. U. S. 7 Okla. 232
Paul v. S. 100 Ala. 136
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 45 S.
W. 725
Paulin v. Howser, 63 111. 312
Payne v. Com. 1 Mete. (Ky.)
370
v. Crawford, 102 Ala.
387
v. McCormick, &c. Co., 11
Okla. 318
Payne Clothing Co. v. Payne
(Ky.) 54 R. W. 709....
Paynter v. Com. 21 Ky. L. R.
1562
80
206
35
65
273
196
6
, 48
250
290
165
331
358
247
48
340
41
513
563
80
358
297
221
304
80
253
48
247
126
268
Peak v. P. 76 111. 289 219
Pearce v. Boggs, 99 Cal. 340.. 163
v. Strickler, 9 N. Mex. 467
20
Pearson v. Spartenberg Co. 51
S. Car. 480 6, 350, 351
Peart v. Chicago, M. & St. P.
R. Co. 8 S. Dak. 431.. 32
Pease Piano Co. v. Cameron, 56
Neb. 561 84, 351
Pecha v. Kastl,64 Neb. 380.. 25
Peck v. Boggess, 2 111. 285 .. 347
v. St. Louis Tr. Co. (Mo.)
77 S. W. 736 199,562
Peirce v. Walters, 164 111. 561
124, 149
Pelfrey v. Texas C. R. Co.
(Tex. Cv. App.) 73 S. W.
411 25
Pellum v. S. 89 Ala. 28 324
Peltier v. Chicago, St. P. M. &
O. R. Co., 88 Wis. 521.. 200
Pena v. S. 38 Tex. Cr. App.
333 280
Pence v. Makepeace, 65 Ind.
357 424
v. Wabash R. Co. 116
Iowa 279 85, 238
Pendleton St. R. Co. v. Stell-
.man, 22 Ohio St. 1. 243,247
Pennsylvania Co. v. Backes.
133 111. 264 53, 101, 126
v. Bray, 125 Ind. 932 573
v. Conlan, 101 111. 106.133,183
v. Connell, 127 111. 419.... 81
v. Files, 65 Ohio St. 403
57
v. Frana, 13 111. App. 91
161
v. Frana, 112 111. 404 117a
v. France, 112 111. 398.. 155
v. Gallagher, 40 Ohio St.
637 637
v. Harris, 101 Pa. St. 93
116
v. Horton, 132 Ind. 194
627, 644
v. Hunsley, 23 Ind. App.
37 215, 216
v. Langendorf, 48 Ohio
St. 321 647
v. McCaffrey, 173 111.
175 .' 183
v. McCormack, 131 Ind.
250 617, 618. 622
TABLE OF CASES.
CV11
(References are to Sections.}
Pennsylvania Co. v. Marshall,
119 111. 404
33, 48, 56, 382, 650
v. Martin, 114 Fed. 586 126
v. Miller, 35 Ohio St. 543,
535
v. Platt, 47 Ohio St. 382 868
v. Rossman, 13 Ohio C. U.
Ill 7
v. Roy, 102 U. S. 155.. 84, 579
v. Rudel, 100 111. 609.. 26a
v. Sloetke, 104 111. 201.. 116
v. Versten, 140 111. 637
26a, 223
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Kelly,
150 111. 9 236
Penobscot R. Co. v. White, 41
Me. 512 80
Penso v. McCormick, 125 Ind.
116 537
People v. Abbott, 116 Mich.
263 773
v. Ahern, 93 Cal. 518 .... 294
v. Ah Fong, 12 Cal. 345. . 4
v. Ah Fung, 17 Cal. 377.. 19
v. Ah Sing, 51 Cal. 372.. 394
v. Ah Sing, 95 Cal. 654 219
v. Aiken, 66 Mich. 460
312, 734
v. Allender, 117 Cal. 81
333, 754
v. Alton, 193 111. 309.... 153
v. Amaya, 134 Cal. 531.180, 214
v. A m erman 118 Cal. 23
152, 299
v. Anderson, 105 Cal. 32.70,71
v. Anthony, 56 Cal. 397
312, 315, 733, 734
v. Appleton, 120 Cal. 250. 7
v. Arlington, 131 Cal. 231
219, 336
v. Armstrong, 114 Cal. 570 71
v. Arnold, 116 Cal. 682... 274
v.Arnold, 40 Mich. 715.. 228
v. Arnold, 46 Mich. 268.. 760
v. Ashmead, 118 Cal. 508.. 31
v. Baker, 153 N. Y. 111.. 294
v. Barberi, 149 N. Y. 256. 360
v. Barker, 60 Mich. 277.. 318
v. Barney, 114 Cal. 554.. 274
v. Barrie, 49 Cal. 342 318
v. Bartheman, 120 Cal. 7
25, 63, 335
v. Beeler, 6 Cal 246 4
v. Bell, 49 Cal. 489 343
v. Bellamy, 109 Cal. 610.. 315
People v. Bemmerly, 87 Cal.
121 295
v. Benham, 160 N. Y. 402
40, 297
v. Bennett, 121 Mich. 241. 247
v. Bennett, 49 N. Y. 137. 150
v. Berlin, 10 'Utah 39 353
v. Bernal, 10 Cal. 66.... 225
v. Beverly, 108 Mich. 509. 269
v. Board, &c. of Madison
County, 125 111. 340 126
v. Bodley, 131 Cal. 240.. 301
v. Bonney, 98 Cal. 278 288
v. Bowers, (Cal.) 18 Pac.
660 336
v. Bowkus, 109 Mich. 360
194, 195
v. Brannon, 47 Cal. 96 925
v. Britton, 118 Cal. 409
240, 409
v. Brooks, 61 Hun (N. Y.) 344
v. Brow, 35 N. Y. S. 1009
171, 210, 212
v. Brown, 59 Cal. 345 11
v. Buddensieck, 103 N. Y.
487 352
v. Burgle, 123 Cal. 303.71, 334
v. Burns, 63 Cal. 614 284
v. Burns, 121 Cal. 529.300,304
v. Byrnes, 30 Cal. 206.. 3, 7
v. Caasata, 39 N. Y. S. 641
201
v. Caldwell, 107 Mich. 374
115, 347
v. Calvin, 60 Mich. 114
214, 227
v. Carey, 125 Mich. 535.. 208
v. Carpenter, 102 N. Y. 238
329
v. Carroll, 92 Cal. 568... 65
v. Casey, 53 Cal. 392 34 T
v. Casey, 65 Cal. 260 170
v. Chadwick, 7 Utah 134
265, 290, 816
v. Charles, 26 Cal. 78 34
v. Chartoff, 75 N. Y. S. 1088
296, 309
v. Chaves, 122 Cal. 134
25, 42, 275
v. Chavez, 103 Cal. 407.. 268
v. Cheong Toon Ark, 61
Cal. 527 294
v. Chew Sing Wing, 88
Cal. 288 208
v. Chun Heong, 86 Cal.
329 203, 237, 253
CY111
TABLE OF CAS1-.S.
(References are to Sections.)
People v. Church, 116 Cal. 300. 267
v. Clark 105 Mich. 169.115,223
v. Clarke, 130 Cal. 642... 315
v. Comgus, 114 Cal. 107 .. 89
v. Compton (Cal.) 56 Pac.
44 | 217
v. Connelly (Cal.) 38 Pac.
42 ..... Ill
v. Considine, 105 Mich. 149. 48
v. Corey, 157 N. Y. 332.. 191
v. Costello, 1 Denio (N. Y.)
87 288
v. Cotta, 49 Cal. 116 192
v. Coughlin, 65 Mich. 704.. 336
v. Crawford, 48 Mich. 498. 60
v. Cronin, 34 Cal. 191.215,307
v. Crotty, 47 N. Y. S. 845. 191
v. Curry, 103 Cal. 548.... 227
v. Davis, 47 Cal. 93 31
v. Davis, 64 Cal. 440 315
v.Davis, 135 Cal. 162 297
v. Daniels, 105 Cal. 362... 150
v. Daniels (Cal.) 34 Pac.
233 303, 306
v. De Garmo, 76 N. Y. S.
477 273
v. De La Cour Soto, 63 Cal.
165 340
v. Devine, 95 Cal. 227 80
v. Dick, 32 Cal. 216
198, 310, 326
v. Dippold, 51 N. Y. S. 859
340-
v. Dole, 122 Cal. 486.. 301, 310
v. Dom Pedro, 43 N. Y. S.
44 198
v. Donlan, 135 Cal. 489... 754
v. Don Pedro, 43 N. Y. S.
44 340
v. Doyell, 48 Cal. 85 191
v. Elliott, 163 N. Y. 11
343, 757
v. Elmer, 109 Mich. 493.. 152
v. Enwright, 134 Cal. 527. 264
v. Eubanks, 117 Cal. 652.. 52
v. Ezzo, 104 Mich. 341.. 6, 295
v. Fasan, 66 Cal. 534 266
v. Fairchild, 48 Mich. 37 .. 312
v. Fanning, 131 N. Y. 663. 119
v. Feliz, 136 Cal. 19 326
v. Ferraro, 161 N. Y. 365.. 170
v. Ferry, 84 Cal. 31 227
v. Fice, 97 Cal. 460 6
v. Fish, 125 N. Y. 136.... 281
People v. Fitzgerald, 46 N. J.
L. 1020 229
v. Fitzgerald, 156 N. Y. 253
229
v. Flaherty, 162 N. Y. 532
82
v. Flannelly, 128 Cal. 83
173 238
v. Flynn, 73 Cal. 511....'. 229
v. Foley, 64 Mich. 148 211
v. Fong Ah Sing, 64 Cal.
253 743
v. Forsythe, 65 Cal. 102 .. 741
v. Friedland, 37 N. Y. S.
974 295
v. Fuhrmann, 103 Mich.
593 269
v. Garbutt, 17 Mich. 25.14, 331
v. Gilmore (Cal.) 53 Pac.
806 21
v. Gleason, 122 Cal. 370... 342
v. Glover (Cal.) 74 Pac. 749
70
v. Goodrode (Mich.) 94 N.
W. 14 244
v. Gorman, 83 Hun, 605... 208
Graney, 91 Mich. 646 .. 336
Guidici 100 N. Y. 503 295
Hall, 94 Cal. 595 . . 30
Hancock, 7 Utah, 170.. 340
Harlan, 133 Cal. 16 27
Harper, 83 Mich. 273... 337
Harris, 103 Mich. 473.. 268
Harrison, 93 Mich. 597. 343
Hartman, 130 Cal. 487. 48
Hawes, 98 Cal. 648 115
Hecker, 109 Cal. 451... 297
Henderson, 28 Cal. 465. 284
Hendrickson, 46 N. Y.
S. 402 276
v. Herrick, 52 Cal. 446... 295
v. Hertz, 105 Cal. 660
172, 195, 214, 226
V. Httick, 126 Cal. 425.. 25
v. Hill, 116 Cal. 562 301
v. Hill, 123 Cal. 47....... 281
v. Hillick, 126 Cal. 425.... 331
v. Hinshaw (Mich.) 97 N.
W. 758 !>
v. Hitchcock, 104 Cal. 482
172, 214, 226-
v. Hoagland, 137 Cal. 218. 341
v. Hoch, 150 N. Y. 291... 22<V
v. Hoin, 62 Cal. 120 32
TABLE OF CASES.
C1X
(References are to Sections.}
People v. Holmes, 126 Cal. 462
Holmes, 111 Mich. 364
251, 331,
Hong Fong, 85 Cal. 171.
Howard, 112 Cal. 135..
Howard, 135 Cal. 266..
Hubert, 119 Cal. 216
78,
Hughson, 154 N. Y. 153
275, 277, 284,
Ivey, 49 Cal. 56
Johnson, 61 Cal. 142 ..
Johnson, 104 Cal. 418
191,
Johnson, 140 N. Y. 350.
Jones, 24 Mich. 216
Kaiser, 119 Cal. 456
Keefer, 18 Cal. 636
Kelley, 35 Hun (N. Y.)
295
Kelly, 132 Cal. 430....
Kelly, 133 Cal. 1
Kessler, 13 Utah. 69 ...
Kindleberger, 100 Cal.
367
Klee (Cal.) 69 Pac. 696.
Kloss, 115 Cal. 567
Landman, 103 Cal. 577.
Langton, 67 Cal. 427
279,
Lapique (Cal.) 67 Pac.
14
Larrabee, 115 Cal. 159
333,
Lattimore, 86 Cal. 403.
Lee Sare Bo, 72 Cal. 623
v. Lehr, 196 111. 361
v. Lem Deo, 132 Cal. 199.
v. Levison, 1 6 Cal. 98
v. Long, 104 Cal. 363
v. Lopez, 135 Cal. 23
v. Lyons, 49 Mich. 78
v. McArron. 121 Mich. 1..
v. McCann. 16 N. Y. 58
v. McCarthy, 115 Cal. 255
330, 331,
v. McFarlane, 134 Cal. 618
v. McGraw, 72 N. Y. S. 679
People v. McKane, 143 N". Y.
455
v. M'Kay, 122 Cal. 628...
227
332
80
255
191
332
343
153
342
227
302
214
299
17
325
63
80
324
208
238
333
172
777
198
754
325
196
94
304
195
268
208
312
331
333
100
106
65
37
v. McLaughlin, 37 N. Y. S.
1005
v. McNamara, 94 Cal. 515
336,
v. McNut, 93 Cal. 658
v. Macard, 73 Mich. 26
v. Machado (Cal.) 63 Pac.
66
v. Malaskina, 57 Cal. 628.
v. Mallon, 103 Cal. 513...
v. March, 6 Cal. 543
v. Martin, 53 N. Y. S. 745.
v. Matthai, 135 Cal. 442
7,
v. Matthews, 126 Cal. 17..
v. Mayes, 113 Cal. 618
34, 36,
v. Mayor, &c. 193 111. 309.
v. Mead, 50 Mich. 228
v. Mendenhall, 135 Cal. 344
v. Miller, 114 Cal. 10
v. Mills, 143 N. Y. 383
275,
v. Minnaugh, 131 N. Y. 563
v. Mitchell, 129 Cal. 584..
v. Moore 37 Hun (N. Y.)
84
v. Murray, 72 Mich. 10....
v. Neary, 104 Cal. 373
115,
v. Neufeld, 165 N. Y. 43..
v. Newcomb, 118 Cal. 263.
v. Newcomer, 118 Cal. 263
215,
v. Niles, 44 Mich. 606.286.
v. Nino. 149 N. Y. 317
v. O'Brien, 106 Cal. 104
336,
v. O'Brien, 130 Cal. 1..170
v. Oldham, 111 Cal. 648...
v. Oliveria, 127 Cal. 376..
v. O'Neil, 67 Cal. 378
v. O'Neil, 109 N. Y. 251..
v. Ostrander, 110 Mich. 60
336,
v. Owens, 123 Cal. 482
v. Pallister, 138 N. Y. 605
v. Palmer, 105 Mich. 568..
v." Parsons, 105 Mich. 177.
v. Paulsill, 115 Cal. 6
v. Payne, 8 Cal. 341
v. Pearne, 118 Cal. 154...
6
715
269
336
52
328
198
48
179
192
80
163
155
340
80
281
284
286
344
815
3
238
307
259
283
360
331
715
305
218
6
214
218
337
335
336
258
337
296
4
249
TABLE OF CASES.
(References are to Sections.)
People v. Pearsall, 50 Mich.
233 323
v. People's Ins. Exchange,
126 111. 466 129
v. Petmecy, 99 N. Y. 421
218, 227
v. Phidillia, 42 Cal. 536.. 295
v. Phipps, 39 Cal. 326 295
v. Pichette, 111 Mich. 461
322, 323
v. Plyer, 121 Cal. 160 219
v. Plyer, 126 Cal. 379.... 170
v. Pomeroy, 30 Ore. 16 225
v. Potter, 89 Mich. 354 336
v. Prather, 120 Cal. 660.. 25
v. Pullman, 129 Cal. 258.. 198
v. Reed (Cal.) 52 Pac. 835. 113
v. Reilly, 53 N. Y. S. 1005
291
v. Repke, 103 Mich. 459.. 269
v. Resh, 107 Mich. 251
322, 327, 336, 339
v. Rice, 103 Mich. 350... 101
v. Ricketts, 108 Mich. 584
70
v. Riordan, 117 N. Y. 71.. 329
v. Robertson, 67 Cal. 649. 798
v. Rose, 52 Hun (N. Y.)
33 229
v. Ross, 115 Cal. 233.. 71, 294
v. Ross, 134 Cal. 256 80
v. Rush, 65 Cal. 129 259
v. Samsels, 66 Cal. 99
44, 344, 756
v. Sanders, 114 Cal. 216.. 115
v. Sanford, 43 Cal. 29 4
v.Scott, 123 Cal. 434 240
v. Scott, 10 Utah, 217 303
v. Seaman, 107 Mich. 348
211. 261
v. Sears, 18 Cal. 635 14
v. Shattuck, 100 Cal. 673.. 225
v. Shoemaker, 131 Mich.
107 378
v. Silva, 121 Cal. 668 14
v. Simons, 60 Cal. 72 259
v. Slater, 119 Cal. 620.... 191
v. Smith, 57 Cal. 130 330
v. Smith, 59 Cal. 601 344
v. Smith, 105 Cal. 676
293, 297
v. Smith, 92 Mich. 10 336
v. Spiegel, 143 N. Y. 107.. 191
v. Spriggs, 58 Hun (N. Y.)
603 342
People v. Stanton, 106 Cal. 139
v. Stegenberg, 127 Cal. 510
268
32a
v. Stephenson, 32 N. Y. S.
1112 297
v. Sternberg, 111 Cal. 3
174, 198, 288, 289, 319
288, 289, 319
v. Steubenvoll, 62 Mich. 329
295
v. Stewart, 75 Mich. 21
31, 32, 307, 312
v. Streuber, 121 Cal. 431.. 150
v. Swartz, 118 Mich. 292. 297
v. Tarbox, 115 Cal. 57 320
v. Taylor, 138 N. Y. 406
329, 331
v. Thiede, 11 Utah, 241
20, 28, 270, 347, 351
v. Tice, 115 Mich. 219... 745
v. Topia, 131 Cal. 647 94
v. Totman, 135 Cal. 133.. 191
v. Travers, 88 Cal. 233 ..170
v. Underbill, 26 N. Y. S.
1030 841
v. Uquidas, 96 Cal. 239 .. 307
v. Vanderhoof, 71 Mich. 158
211
v. Van Ewan, 111 Cal. 144
227
v. Van Horn, 119 Cal. 323
319
v. Van Houter, 38 Hun (N.
Y.) 173 337
v. Vanzile, 143 N. Y. 368. 98
v. Walden, 51 Cal. 588... 308
v. Waller, 70 Mich. 237... 295
v. Wappner, 14 Cal. 437.. 34
v. Ward, 134 Cal. 301.. 80, 289
v. Warner, 104 Mich. 337. 6
v. Wayman, 128 N. Y. 585
286. 302
v. Webster, 111 Cal. 381.. 196
v. Webster, 50 Hun (N. Y.)
398 170, 211
v. Weissenberger, 77 N. Y.
S. 71 223
v. Welch, 49 Cal. 174.170, 174
v. Wells, 112 Mich. 648.. 299
v. Westlake, 124 Cal. 452. 250
v. Wheeler. 65 Cal. 77 215
v. White, 24 Wend. (N. Y.)
520 758
TABLE OF CASES.
CXI
(References are to Sections.)
People v. Wilder, 134 Cal. 182. 218
v. Willett, 105 Mich. 110
7, 102, 311, 336
v. Willett, 36 Hun (N. Y.)
500 279
v. Williams, 17 Cal. 142
31, 192
v. Wilson, 49 Cal. 13 331
v. Wilson, 135 Cal. 331... 816
v. Winthrop, 118 Cal. 85.. 6
v. Wong Ah Foo, 69 Cal.
180 . . ..173, 325, 327, 328
v. \Vood, 99 Mich. 620 265
v. Worden, 113 Cal. 569
90, 153, 165, 269, 302, '323
v. Zigouras, 163 N. Y. 250
255
Peoples v. McKee, 92 111. 397.. 206
v. S. (Miss.) 33 So. 289.. 118
People's & Drovers' Bank v.
Craig, 63 Ohio St. 382.. 126
Peoples C. & A. Co. v. Darrow,
172 111. 62 238
Peoria, &c. R. Co. v. Clayberg,
107 111. 644 641
v. Tamplin, 156 111. 285... 195
Peoria M. & I. Ins. Co. v. Ana-
pow, 45 111. 86 87
Pepperall v. City P. Tr. Co. 15
Wash. 176 174
Percival V. Chase, 182 Mass.
371 32, 116
Perez v. San Antonio & A. P.
R. Co. 28 Tex. Cv. App.
255 94
Perham v. Coney, 117 Mass. 103
433
Peri v. P. 65 111. 26 1, 21
Perigo v. Chicago, &c. R. Co. 52
Iowa, 277 619
Perin v. Parker, 126 111. 201.. 25
Perkins v. Attaway, 14 Ga. 27. 192
v. Perkins, 39' N. H. 163.. 690
v. S. 50 Ala. 154 187
Perrin v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 78
S. W. 932 767. 777
Perry v. Dubuque S. W. R. Co.
36 Iowa, 102 63
v. Makenson, 103 Ind. 302
243
v. P. 14 111. 496 279
v. S. 110 Ga. 234 304
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 42 S.
W. 297 215
Persons v. S. 90 Tenn. 291.. . 211
Peshine v. Shepperson, 17 Gratt.
(Va.) 472 28
Petefish v. Becker, 176 111. 455
284
Peters v. McCay & Co. 136 Cal.
73 94
Peterson v. S. 74 Ala. 34 63
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 88 S.
W. 549 7
v. Wistman (Mo. App.) 77
S. W. 1016 530
Petty v. S. (Miss.) 35 So. 213
725, 727, 730
Pettyjohn v. Liebscher, 92 Ga.
149 107
Peyton v. S. 54 Neb. 188.. 743, 744
Pfaffenback v. Lake S. &c. R.
Co. 142 Ind. 251
84, 203, 365, 558
Pfeuffer v. Maltby, 54 Tex. 454
361
Pfund v. Zimmerman, 29 111. 269
80
Phelps D. & P. Co. v. Sampson,
113 Iowa, 150 414
Philadelphia, &c. R. Co. v. An-
derson, 72 Md. 520
544, 551, 583, 639, 652
v. Hogeland, 66 Md. 150
531, 582, 638
Philbrick v. Town of University
Place, 106 Iowa, 352
361, 362
Philibert v. Burch, 4 Mo. App.
470 160
Phillips' Case, 132 Mass. 233.. 17
Phillips v. Cornell, 133 Mass.
546 94
v. Phillips, 93 Iowa, 615 .. 129
v. Rentz, 106 Ga. 249 126
v. S. (Tex. Cv. App.) 30 S.
W. 1063 358
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 31 S.
W. 644 20, 103
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 45 S.
W. 709 55
v. Thome, 103 Ind. 2 7 5.. 14, 17
v. Williams, 39 Ga. 602 .. 182
v. Wilmington & W. R. Co.
130 N. Car. 582 11, 13
Philpot v. Lucas, 101 Iowa,
478 45
Phinney v. Bronson, 43 Kas.
451 7
Phipps v. Pierce, 94 N. Car.
514 354
CXJ1
TABLE OF CASES.
(References are to Sections.}
Phoenix A. Co. v. Tucker, 77
Fed. 243 126, 351
Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Gray 321
v. Raddin, 120 U. S. 183
359, 361
v. Wilcox & G. G. Co. 65
Fed. 724 84
Pickens v. S. 115 Ala. 42
267, 297, 301
Pickett v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co. 46 N. Y. S. 693 145
Pickham v. Wheeter B. Mfg. Co.
77 Fed. 663 351
Pierce v. Arnold Print Works,
182 Mass. 260 12
v. Engelkemier, 10 Okla.
308 361
v. Pierce, 17 Ind. App. 107
489
v. S. 53 Ga. 365 219
v. S. 13 N. H. 536 165
v. S. 17 Tex. App. 239.... 765
v. Walters, 164 111. 561
123, 363
Pierpont Mfg. Co. v. Goodman
Produce Co. (Tex. Cv.
App.) 60 S. W. 347.... 200
Pierson v. Duncan, 162 Pa. St.
239 355
v. S. 12 Ala. 149 359
Pike v. Stutton, 21 Colo. 84 358
Pinkerton v. Verberg, 78 Mich.
580 503
Pioneer Fire Proof C. Co. v.
Hansen, 176 111. 100 144
Pipkin v. Home (Tex. Cv. App.)
68 S. W. 100 243
Pitcairn v. Philip Hiss Co. (C.
C. A.) 125 Fed. 110.... 156
Pitman v. Manran, 69 N. H.
230 347
Pitstick v. Osterman, 107 Iowa,
189 94
Pittman v. Gaty, 10 111. 186,
190 362
v. Weeks, 132 N. Car. 81. 78
Pitts v. Pitts, 21 Ind. 314 450
v. S. 114 Ga. 35 228
Pittsbnrg, &c. R. Co. v. Banfill,
206 111. 556 66
v. Callaghan, 157 111. 406
115, 133, 308
v. Hewitt, 202 111. 28 25
v. Kinnare, 203 111. 388.. 53, 90
v. Krouse, 30 Ohio St. 240
60
Pittsburg, &c. R. Co. v. Martin,
82 Ind. 482 641
v. Montgomery, 152 Ind. 1. 614
v. Noel, 77 Ind. 116 631
v. Noftsger, 148 Ind. 101
247, 248
v. Parish, 28 Ind. App. 189
109
v. Slusser, 19 Ohio St. 161
48, 81
v. Spencer, 85 Ind. 169
392, 652
v. Swinney, 52 Ind. 117 .. 683
v. Thompson, 82 Fed. 720. 351
v. Thompson, 56 111. 138.. 538
v.Williams, 74 Ind. 464.. 538
Pittsburg Bridge Co. v. Walker,
170 111. 550 76
Pittsburg Coal Co. v. Estieve-
nard, 53 Ohio St. 43 48
Pittsburg Spring Co. v. Smith,
115 Ga. 764 96
Plake v. S. 121 Ind. 433.. 329, 331
Piano Mfg. Co. v. McCord (Iowa)
80 N. W. 659 .'. 358
Platt & S. v. Chicago, B. & Q.
R. Co. 74 Iowa, 127.... 161
Platz v. McKean Tp. 178 Pa.
St. 601 122, 133, 209
Plumb v. Campbell, 129 111. 109
80
v. Curtis, 66 Conn. 154 116
v. Rigdon, 78 111. 222 80
Plummer v. S. Ill Ga. 839.218,221
v. S. 135 Ind. 308
260, 262, 305
Poertner v. Poertner, 66 Wis.
644 200
Polanka v. S. 33 Tex. Cr. App.
634 303
Pollard v. S. 53 Miss. 421 324
v. S. (Tex. Cv. App.) 73 S.
W. 953 258, 272
Polly v. Com. 16 Ky. L. R. 203
101, 113
Polvkrans v. Kransy, 77 N. Y. S.
46 90, 347
Pomerene Co. v. White (Neb.)
69 N. W. 234 652
Ponder v. S. 115 Ga. 831 303
Pool v. White, 175 Pa. St. 459
171, 189
Poole v. Consolidated St. R. Co.
100 Mich. 379 101
Pope v. Branch County Sav.
Bank, 23 Ind. App. 210.. 7
TABLE OF CASES.
CX111
(References are to Sections.)
Pope v. Pope, 95 Ga. 87 235
v. Riggs (Tex. Cv. App.) 43
S. W. 306 101
Poppell v. S. 71 Ga. 276 228
Poppitz v. German Ins. Co. 88
Minn. 118 146
Porath v. S. 90 Wis. 537 6
Portance v. Lehigh Val. Coal Co.
101 Wis. 574 124
Porter v. Knight, 63 Iowa, 365. 53
v. P. 158 111. 370 235
v. White, 128 N. Car. 42.. 94
Porterfield v. Com. 91 Va. 801
265, 266
Portis v. S. 27 Ark. 360 846
Post v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co.
14 Neb. 112 574
v. Supervisors, 105 U. S.
667 161
Postal T. C. Co. v. Hulsey, 115
Ala. 193 350, 351
v. Jones, 133 Ala. 217 .... 113
Poston v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 35
S. W. 656 304
Poteet v..S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 43
S. W. 399 239
Potter v. S. 117 Ala. 693 170
v. S. 162 Ind. 213... 806
v. S. 85 Tenn. 88 3
Potterfield v. Com. 91 Va. 801
812, 816
Pound v. Pound, 60 Minn. 214. 129
Powell v. S. 19 Ala. 581.. 257
v. S. 95 Ga. 502 295, 297
v. S. 101 Ga. 9 220, 367
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 44 S.
W. 504 292
Power v. Harlow, 57 Mich. 107
286
Powers v. Gary, 64 Me. 9 160
v. Com. 22 Ky. L. R. 1807
40, 105
v. Hazelton, &c. Co. 33 Ohio
St. 438 4, 351
v. S. 87 Ind. 154 794
v. S. 74 Miss. 777
317, 340, 341, 343
Prairie State L. & T. Co. v.
Doig, 70 111. 52 192
Prall v. Underwood, 79 III. App.
452 384
Prater v. S. 107 Ala. 26 219
v. Snead, 12 Kas. 447 13
Prather v. Wilkins, 68 Tex. 187
200
Pratt v. S. 56 Ind. 179 209
Preisker v. P. 47 111. 382 95
Preistly v. Provident !Sav. Co.
117 Fed. 271 126
Prendergast v. S. 41 Tex. Cr.
App. 358 290
Prentice Co. v. Page, 164 Mass.
276 80
Prentit v. P. 5 Neb. 377 378
President, &c. of B. &c. Tpk. Co.
v. S. 71 Md. 576
481, 483, 650
Presser v. S. 77 Ind. 274.. 256, 260
Preston v. Bowers, 13 Ohio St.
14 35
v. Dunham, 52 Ala. 217... 27
v. S. 41 Tex. Cr. App. 252. 115
Prewett v. S. 41 Tex. Cv. App.
262 93, 229, 269
Price v. Burlington, C. R. & N.
R. Co. 42 Iowa, 16 354
v. Grautz, 118 Pa. St. 406
679, 680
v. Hallett, 138 Mo. 561... 347
v. Hamscher, 174 Pa. St.
73 . . 189
v. S. 107 Ala. 161 28
v. S. 114 Ga. 855 213, 311
v. Vanstone. 40 Mo. App.
207 352
v. Wood, 9 N. MQX. 397... 84
Priel v. S. (Neb.) 91 N. W. 536
7
Prim v. Haren, 27 Mo. 205. . . . 159
v. S. 73 Miss. 838 115
Prince v. S. 100 Ala. \44 328
Prindeville v. P. 42 111 217.'.. 18
Prior v. White, 12 111. 260.... 84
Pritchard v. Budd, 76 Fed. 710. 358
v. Hopkins, 52 Iowa, 122. 384
Pritchett v. Johnson (Xeb.'* 97
N. W. 224 245
v. Munroe, 22 Ala. 501 117
v. S. 92 Ga. 65 90
Probst Consolidation Co. v. Fo-
ley, 166 111. 31 127
Proctor v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.)
35 S. W. 172 108
v. Spratley. 78 Va. 257
407, 413
Producers' Marble Co. v. Bergen
(Tex. Cv. App.) 31 S. W.
89 26, 351
Prosser v. Pretzel, 8 Kas. App.
856 20
CX1V
TABLE OF CASES.
(References are to Sections.)
Protection Life Ins. Co. v. Dill,
91 111. 174 113, 117
Prothero v. Citizens' St. R. Co.
134 Ind. 435 ..116, 577, 629
Providence, &c. Ins. Co. v. Ad-
ler, 65 Md. 163 425
Providence G. M. Co. v. Thomp-
son (Ariz.) 60 Pac. 874. 117
Provident S. L. A. Soc. v. Ber-
ger, 23 Ky. L. R. 2460.. 84
Provines v. Heaston, 67 Ind. 482
4
Provo v. S. 55 Ala. 222 325
Pryor v. Coggin, 17 Ga. 444.. 3
Puett v. Beard, 86 Ind. 108 360
Puff v. Lehigh V. R. Co. 24 N.
Y. S. 1068 25
Pugh v. S. 114 Ga. 16 273
Punk v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 48
S. W. 171 115, 323
Purcell v. Tibbies, 101 Iowa, 24
111
Purdom v. Brussells, 22 Ky. L.
R. 1796 . . '. 100
Purdy v. P. 140 111. 46
215, 372, 793
Purnell v. Raleigh, &c. R. Co.
122 N. Car. 839 635
Purvis v. S. 71 Miss. 706 304
Puth v. Zinbleman, 99 Iowa,
641 Ill
Putnam v. Bond, 100 Mass. 58
160
v. Wadley, 40 111. 346. .871, 872
Pyle v. Pyle, 158 111. 300.. 25, 113
Q
Quaife v. Chicago & N. W. R.
Co. 48 Wis. 516 566
Qualey v. Johnson, 80 Minn.
"408 84, 99
Queen City Mfg. Co. v. Bla-
lack (Miss.) 18 So. 800. 363
Queen Ins. Co. v. Leonard, 9 Ohio
C. C. 46 94, 351
Oueenan v. Ter. 11 Okla. 261.. 748
Quinn v. Eagleston. 108 Til.
248 87, 136
v. P. 123 111. 342
84, 95, 119, 196
v. S. 130 Ind. 340 39
Quirk v. St. L. N. E. Co. 126
Mo. 279 . . ..7, 12, 242, 363
Rabe v. Summerbeck, 94 Iowa,
659
Race v. American F. S. & M. Co.
(Tex. Cv. App.) 43 S. W.
36
Rack v. Chicago C. R. Co. 173
111. 289
Rafferty v. P. 72 111. 46 36,
Ragan v. Kansas City S. & E.
R. Co. 144 Mo. 623
Ragland v. S. Ill Ga. 211
v. S. 125 Ala. 534
20, 68, 254,
Ragsdale v. Ezell, 18 Ky. L. R.
146
v. S. 134 Ala. 24 273,
Railroad Co. v. Depew, 40 Ohio
St. 124
v. Schneider, 45 Ohio St.
688
v. Shultz, 43 Ohio St. 273
v. Walrath, 38 Ohio St.
462 , ....
Rainger v. Boston M. Life
Asso. 167 Mass. 109
Rains v. S. Io2 Ind. 69
v. S. 88 Ala. 91
Raker v. S. 50 Neb. 202
Ramirez v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.)
65 S. W. 1101
v. S. 43 Tex. Cr. App. 455
Ramsey v. Burns, 27 Mont.
154 57. 60,
Randall v. Baltimore & O. R.
Co. 109 U. S. 478.. 124,
Randalp v. Lampkin, 90 Ky.
551
Rankin v. Sharpies, 206 111.
309
Ranney v. Barlow, 112 U. S.
207
Ransbottom v. S. 144 Ind. 250
Ransom v. S. (Tex. Cv. App.)
7 S. W. 960
Ranson v. Weston, 110 Mich.
240
Rapid Tr. R. Co. v. Lusk (Tex.
Cv. App.) 66 S. W. 799
Rapp v. Kester, 125 Ind. 79
94,
541
122
223
196
251
269
203
351
627
627
27
539
124
252
304
248
21
314
379
126
187
48
116
15
269
358
198
361
TABLE OF CASES.
CXV
(References are to Sections.)
Rastetter v. Reynolds, 160 Ind.
141, 351
v. S. 160 Ind. 133 351
Ratchford v. Com. 16 Ky. L.
R. 411 270
Ratcliff v. Bellfonte Iron
Works Co. 87 Ky. 564.. 868
Rath v. Rath (Neb.) 89 N. W.
612 57
Rathbun v. Geer, 64 Conn. 421
163
Ratliff v. Ratliff (N. Car.) 42
S. E. 887 144
Rattlemiller v. Stone, 28 Wash.
104 172
Ranch v. State, 110 Ind. 384. 3
Rawlins v. S. 40 Fla. 155... 6
Rawls v. S. 97 Ga. 186 171
Ray v. Goings, 112 111. 662... 504
v. Loner, 132 N. Car. 891
119
v. S. 108 Tenn, 282 25
v. Wooters, 19 111. 82 4
Rayburn v. S. (Ark.) 63 S. W.
356 311, 312
Rea v. S. 8 Lea (Tenn.) 363. 306
Reading Braid Co. v. Stewart,
43 N. Y. S. 1129 139
Reagan v. U. S. 157 U. S. 310
227
Reardon v. Missouri Pac. R. Co.
114 Mo. 384 248
Reber v. Herring, 115 Pa. St.
599 113
Receivers of M. K. & T. R.
Co. v. Pfluger (Tex. Cv.
App.) 25 S. W. 792.... 6
Record v. Chickasaw Cooperage
Co. 103 Tenn. 657...!. 25
Red v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 53
S. W. 108 304
v. S. 3P Tex. Cr. App. 414
265
Reddick v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.)
47 S. W. 993 272
Redding v. Redding Estate, 69
Vt. 500 80
Redelsheimer v. Miller, 107
Ind. 485 234
Redford v. Spokane St. R. Co.
9 Wash. 55 234
Redhing v. Central R. Co. 68
N. J. L. 641 238
Redman v. Voss. 46 Neb. 512.353
Reed v. City of Cambridge, 124
Mass. 567 39
Reed v. Commonwealth, 98 Va.
817 48 94, 269, 281
v.Gould, 93 Mich. 359.. 90
v. Inhabitants, 8 Allen
(Mass.) 524 124, 12fi
v. Madison, 85 Wis. 667.. 232
v. S. 76 Miss. 211 276
v. S. (Neb.) 92 N. W. 321
40
Reeder v. Dupuy, 96 Iowa,
729 126
Reed's Estate, In re, 86 Minn.
163 244
Reese v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 68
S. W. 283. ...103, 191, 818
Reeves v. S. 29 Fla. 527 336
v. S. 34 Tex. Cr. App.
483 49
Reg. v. Farler, 8 C. & P. 106. 288
v. Layton, 4 Cox Cr. Cas.
155 V 331
Reiber v. Butler, &c. R. Co
201 Pa. St. 49 685
Reichenbach v. Ruddach, 127
Pa. 564 211
Reichsletter v. Bostick (Tex.
Cv. App.) 33 S. W. 158
7
Reid v. S. ifQ Ga. 556 336
v. S. (Tex. Cv. App.) 57
S. W. 662 20
Reighard v. S. 22 Ohio C. C.
340 271
Reilly v. Atlas I. C. Co. 38 N.
Y. S. 485 141
v. Conway, 121 Mich. 682
25
v. Third Ave R. Co. 35 N.
Y. S. 1030 48
Reinback v. Crabtree, 77 111.
182 418
Reins v. P. 30 HI. 257
198, 201, 796
Reiser v. Southern P. M. & L.
Co. 24 Ky. 796 534
Reliance T. & D. Works v.
Martin, 23 Ky. L. R.
1625 196
Remey v. Olds (Cal.) 34 Pac.
216 116, 118
Remner v. S. 43 Tex. Cr. App.
347 '. 191
Remsen v. P. 57 Barb. (N. Y.)
324 340
Renand v. City of Bay City,
124 Mich. 29 '. . 170
CXV1
TABLE OF CASES.
(References are to Sections.}
Renard v. Grande, 29 Ind. App.
579 107, 386
Reno v. Wilson, 49 111. 95 155
Rensens v. Lawson, 91 Va. 230
866
Republican & R. Co. v. Fink,
18 Neb. 89 101
Resmer v. Thornbury, 111 Iowa,
515 40
Rettig v. Fifth Ave. Tr. Co. 26
N. Y. S. 896 192
Reusens v. Lawson, 91 Va. 237
665
v. Lawson, 96 Va. 285 86
Rex v. Wilkes, 7 C. & P. 272. 288
Reynolds v. Com. 24 Ky. L. R.
1742 113
v. Davison, 34 Md. 666... 391
v. Greenbaum, 80 111. 416
218
v. Pierson, 29 Ind. App.
273 25
v. Richards, 14 Pa. St.
205 159
v. Richmond & M. R. Co.
92 Va. 41 550
v. S. 68 Ala. 507 347
v. S. 147 Ind. 3
169, 191, 274, 295, 307, 310
v. Weiman ( Tex. Cv. App. )
40 S. W. 560 7
Rhea v. S. 63 Neb. 461 80
v. U. S. 6 Okla. 249.. 226, 349
Rheimfeldt v. Dahlman, 43 N.
Y. S. 28 351
Rhoades v. Chesapeake & O. R.
Co. (W. Va.) 55 L. R.
A. 175 101
Rhodes v. Chesapeake & 0. R.
Co. 49 W. Va. 494 404
v. U. S. 79 Fed. 704 205
Rhyner v. City of Menasha, 107
Wis. 201 232
Rice v. City of Des Moines, 40
la. 639 591, 596
Rice & Sullen Matting Co. v.
International Bank, 185
111. 422 182
v. Manford, 110 Ind. 596. 234
v. P. 38 111. 436 80
v. Williams (Colo App.)
71 Pac. 433 350
Rich v. City of Chicago, 152
111. 30 235
v. Lappin, 43 Kas. 666... 5
Rich & B. Malting Co. v. In-
ternational Bank, 185 111.
422 133
Richards v. Louisville & N. R.
Co. 20 Ky. L. R. 1478.. 133
v. S. (Ga.) 27 S. E. 726.. 303
v. S. 55 Ind. 383 870
Richardson v. Coleman, 131
Ind. 210 186, 187
v. Dybedall (S. Dak.) 98
N. W. 164 195
v. Eureka, 96 Cal. 443... 360
v. Halstead, 44 Neb. 606. 247
Richelieu Hotel Co. v. Inter-
national M. E. Co. 140
111. 267 202
Richison v. Mead, 11 S. Dak.
639 94
Richlands Iron Co. v. Elkins,
90 Va. 249 34
Richmond v. Roberts, 98 111.
472 25, 182
Richmond, &c. R. Co. v. Bur-
nett, 88 Va. 540 616
v. Greenwood, 99 Ala. 501
198
Richmond P. & P. Co. v. Allen
(Va.) 43 S. E. 356
86, 544, 562
Richmond Tr. Co. v. Wilkinson
(Va.) 43 S. E. 623
26, 194, 198, 536, 559
Rickards v. Bennis (Tex. Cv.
App.) 78 S. W. 240.... 126
Rickert v. Southern R. Co. 123
N. Car. 255 134
Ricketts v. Harvey, 106 Ind.
564 27
Riddle v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.)
46 S. W. 1058 269
v. Webb, 110 Ala. 599
66, 68
Rider v. P. 110 111. 11
218, 226, 372
Riedle v. Mulhausen, 20 111.
App. 72 517
Riepe v. Elting, 89 Iowa, 82.. 21
Riley v. Allen, L54 Ind. 176
357, 360
v. Salt Lake R. T. Co. 10
Utah, 428 65
v. Watson, 18 Ind. 291... 153
Rindskopf v. Myers, 87 Wis.
80 50
Rinear v. Skinner, 20 Wash.
541 . . 131
TABLE OF CASES.
CXV11
(References are to Sections.)
Rios v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 48
S. W. 505 304
Ilipley v. Second Ave. R. Co.
8 Misc. (N. Y.) 449 222
Riptoe v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.)
42 S. W. 381 272
Riser v. Southern R. Co. (S.
Car.) 46 S. E. 51.. 192, 197
Rishell v. Weil, 63 N. Y. S.
178 94
Rising v. Nash, 48 Neb. 597.. 113
Ritchey v. P. 23 Colo. 314 349
Ritter v. Ewing, 174 Pa. St.
341 282
Y. P. 130 111. 255 793
v. S. 70 Ark. 472 240
Ritz v. City of Wheeling, 45
W. Va. 262 126
Ritzenger v. Hart, 43 Mo. App.
183 352
Ritzman v. P. 110 111. 362
71, 243
Rivard v. Rivard, 109 Mich.
98 211
River Boom Co. v. Smitih
(Wash.) 45 Pac. 750... 243
Riviere v. McCormick, 14 La.
Ann. 139 170
v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co.
(Tex. Cv. App.) 40 S.
W. 1074 28
Roach v. P. 77 111. 29 80, 256
Roanok Grocery, &c. Co. v.
Watkins, 41 W. Va. 793
416
Roark v. S. 105 Ga. 736
6, 109, 198, 265
Robbins v. Brockton St. R. Co.
180 Mass. 51 358
v. P. 95 111. 178 308
v. S. 8 Ohio St. 167
165, 167, 711
v. Spencer, 121 Ind. 594
156, 159, 164
Robelson v. Brown, 56 Neb.
390 106
Roberts v. Johnson, 58 N. Y.
613 211
v. Mansfield, 32 Ga. 228.. 196
v. Neal, 62 Ga. 163 154
v. Port Blakely, &c. Co. 30
Wash. 25 304
v. S. 83 Ga. 369 305
v. S. 110 Ga. 253 314
v. S. 114 Ga. 450 75. 250
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 70
S. W. 423 304
Robertson v. Burton, 88 Minn.
151 101
v. Illinois Cent., R. Co.
(Miss.) 17 So. 235 134
v. Parks, 76 Md. 125
514, 516, 520
v. S. 40 Fla. 509 109
Robey v. S. 94 Md. 61 120
Robinson v. Brewster, 140 111.
649 25
v. Hyer, 35 Fla. 544 -. 243
v. Love, 50 W. Va. 75 113
v. Mcllver (Tex. Cv. App.)
23 S. W. 915 6
v. P. 159 111. 119 317, 318
v. S. 82 Ga. 535 32
v. S. 84 Ga. 674 269
v. S. 114 Ga. 56 305
v. S. (Miss.) 16 So. 201.. 198
v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. App. 54. 290
v. Uhl, 6 Neb. 332 406
v. Walton, 58 Mo. 380... 332
Roche v. Baldwin, 135 Cal.
522 192
Rockford, R. I. & St. L. R. Co.
v. Coultas, 67 111. 403... 367
Rockford Ins. Co. v. Nelson, 65
111. 415 20, 94
Rock I. &c. R. Co. v. Gordon,
184 111. 456... f 80
v. Leisy Brew. Co. 174 111.
549.. 70, 105, 238, 683, 686
v. Pohlman, 210 111. 139
116, 192
Rockwood v. Poundstone, 38 111.
200 204
Roddy v. Harrell (Tex. Cv.
App.) 40 S. W. 1064... 94
Roden v. Chicago & G. T. R.
Co. 133 111. 72 126
Rodgers v. S. 36 Tex. Cr. App.
563 304
Roe v. Batchelder, 41 Wis.
360 200
v. Taylor, 45 111. 485.. 19, 158
v. Winston, 86 Minn. 77.. 234
Rogers v. Black. 99 Ga. 139.. 26
v. Brightman, 10 Wis. 55. 32
v. Brooks, 105 Ala. 549... 129
v. Com. 16 Ky. L. R. 199. 279
v. Kansas C. & O. R. Co.
52 Neb. 86 141
v. Louisville & N. R. Co.
17 Ky. L. R. 1421 129
v. Manhattan. &c. Ins. Co.
138 Cal. 285. .119, 192, 195
CXV111
TABLE OF CASES.
(References are to Sections.)
Rogers v. S. 1 1 7 Ala.
25, 68, 296, 336, 723
v. S. (Miss.) 21 So. 130
240, 284
Rolfe v. Rich, 149 111. 436
27, 200
Rolling Mill Co. v. Corrigan,
46 Ohio St. 294
6, 7, 534, 536
v. Morrissey, 111 111. 650
106
Romberg v. Hedi'ger, 47 Neb.
201 347
Rome R. Co. v. Thompson, 101
Ga. 26 90
Romine v. San Antonio Tr. Co.
(Tex. Cv. App.) 77 S.
W. 35
Rommeny v. City of New York,
63 N. Y. S. 186
Ronlo v. Valcour, 58 N. H.
346
Ronnsaville v. Walters, 94 Ga.
707
Rooks v. S. (Ga.) 46 S. E. 631
80
102
161
25
80
Roos v. Lewyn, 5 Tex. Cv. App.
593 109
Roose v. Roose, 145 Ind. 162.. 346
Root v. Boston E. R. Co. 183
Mass. 418 14
v. Village of M. 16 Ohio
C. C. 457 14
Rose v. Bradley. 91 Wis. 619. 243
v. Otis, 18'Colo. 59 220
Rosenbaum Bros. v. Levitt, 109
Iowa, 292 6
Rosenblatt v. Haymam, 56 N.
Y. S. 378 94
Rosenfield v. Rosenthal (Tex.
Cv. App.) 39 S. W. 193
351
Rosenheimer v. Standard Gas
light Co. 53 N. Y. S.
192 238
Rosenkrans v. Barker, 115 111.
336 80
Rosevear v. Borough, &e. 169
Pa. St. 555 189
Rosin v. U. S. 161 U. S. 29.... 279
Ross v. S. 59 Ga. 249 208
v. S. 29 Tex. 499 170
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 43
S. W. 1004 112
v. Thompson, 78 Ind. 97.. 858
Rotan Grocery Co. v. Martin
(Tex. Cv. App.) 57 S.
W. 706 94
Roth v. Eppy, 80 111. 283 74
Rountree v. Gurr, 68 Ga. 292. 46
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 55
S. W. 827 326
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 58
S. W. 106 303, 304
Rouse v. Harry, 55 Kas. 589.. 236
, v. Printers' E. Co. 33 N. Y.
S. 55 124
Roush v. Roush, 154, Ind. 562
25
Rowe v. U. S. 97 Fed. 779 340
Rowell v. Fuller, 59 Vt. 688.. 171
Rowen v. Sommers (Iowa) 66
N. W. 897 353
Rowland v. Apothecaries' Hall
Co. 47 Conn. 387 388
Roy v. Goings, 112 111. 667
3,' 367, 506
Ruby C. M. & M. Co. v. Pren-
tice, 25 Colo. 4 350, 351
Ruck v. Chicago C. R. Co. 173
111. 291 126
Rucker v. S. 1 14 Ga. 1 3 49
v. S. (Miss.) 18 So. 121
217, 296
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 40
S. W. 991 88
Rudy v. Com. 128 Pa. St. 500. 299
Ruff v. Jarrett, 94 111. 480 250
Rule v. Bolles, 27 Ore. 368.... 77
Rumbold v. Royal League, 206
111. 517 65, 250
v. Supreme Council, &c.
(111.) 69 N. E. 590 68
Runnells v. Village of P. 109
Mich. 512 358
Runnill v. Art, 169 Mass. 341
319
Runquist v. Anderson, 64 Neb.
755 ' 353
Ruschenberg v. Southern El. R.
Co. 161 Mo. 86 629
Russell v. Huntsville. &c. Co.
137 Ala. fi??.." 94
v. Nail, 79 Tex. 664 84
Rutherford v. Southern R. Co.
56 S. Car. 446
Rutledsre v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.)
33 S. W. 347
Ryall v. Central Pac. R. Co. 76
Cal. 474
Ryan v. Conroy, 33 N. Y. S.
330
TABLE OF CASES.
CX1X
(References are to Sections.)
Ryan v. Donnelly, 71 111. 104. 243
v. Los Angeles, I. & C. S.
Co. 112 Cal. 244 172
v. Washington, &c. R. Co.
8 App. Gas. (D. C. 542. 351
Ryder v. Jacobs, 196 Pa. St.
386 198, 358
v. S. 100 Ga. 528 170, 211
Rylee v. S. 75 Miss. 352 217
S
S. v. Abbott, 65 Kas. 139
v. Achey, 64 Ind. 59
v. Adair, 160 Mo. 394
206. 215,
v. Addy, 28 S. Car. 4
v. Adrion, 49 La. Ann.
1145 248,
v. Afray, 124 Mo. 393
236,
v. Akin, 94 la. 50
v. Albright, 144 Mo. 638.
v. Alcom, 137 Mo. 121...
v. Alexander, 66 Mo. 148.
v. Allen, 45 W. Va. 65
v. Anderson. 6 Idaho, 706.
v. Anderson, 30 La. Ann.
557
v. Anderson, 86 Mo. 309..
v. Anderson, 126 Mo. 542.
v. Anderson, 10 Ore. 448
277,
v. Andrews, 62 Kas. 207
310, 314,
v. Angel, 29 1ST. Car. 27...
v. Anslinger, 171 Mo. 600
3,
v. Apple, 121 N. Car. 584
v. Armstrong, 167 Mo. 257
v. Asbell, 57 Kas. 398
v. Asberry, 37 La. Ann.
125
v. Ashcraft. 170 Mo. 409
25,
v. Atkins, 49 S. Car. 481.
v. Aughtry, 49 S. Car. 285
198, 303, 305,
v. Austin, 109 Iowa, 118.
v. Austin, 129 N. Car. 534
v. Avery 113 Mo. 475
v. Bailey,' 3 2 Kas. 83
118
777
744
69
322
274
268
269
268
39
175
65
158
253
255
284
732
197
340*
225
304
310
170
774
191
327
170
303
303
20
S. v. Baker, 136 Mo. 74
v. Baker, 146 Mo. 379
269,
v. Ballerio, 11 La. Ann. 81
v. Banks, 48 Ind. 197.. .'.
v. Banks, 40 La. Ann. 736
v. Banks, 73 Mo. 592
v. Bar bee, 92 N. Car. 820.
v. Barber, 1 1 3 N. Car. 7 1 1
v. Barnes (Utah) 69 Pac.
70
v. Barrett, 132J N. Car.
1005
v. Barry, UN. Dak. 428
14, 170,
v. Bartlett (Mo.) 71 S. W.
149
v. Bartlett, 43 N. H. 224.
v. Bartley, 56 Neb. 810
80,
v. Barton. 142 Mo. 450
75,
v. Bauerle, 145 Mo. 1..25,
v. Bazile, 50 La. Ann. 21..
v. Beasley, 8 1 Iowa, 8 3 ...
v. Beatty, 51 W. Va. 232.
v. Beck, 46 La. 1419
v. Benner, 64 Me. 267
v. Bennett, 8 Ind. App.
679
v. Betsall, 11 W. Va. 704
v. Birchard, 35 Ore. 484..
v. Birmingham, 74 Iowa,
407
v. Black, 143 Mo. 166
v. Bland. 97 N. Car. 441.
v. Bliss. 27 Wash. 463...
v. Blue, 136 Mo. 41
v. Blunt, 59 Iowa, 468
325,
v. Bohan. 19 Kas. 35
203, 214,
v. Bone. 114 Iowa, 537
75,
v. Bonner (Mo.) 77 S. W.
463 .
v. Booker, 123 N. Car. 713
v. Booth (Iowa) 88 N. W.
344
v. Bowker, 26 Ore. 309
112.
v. Bowser, 21 Mont. 133...
294
270
169
174
218
267
279
288
25
269
335
150
331
357
268
277
212
322
12
75
170
8
288
367
11
2"55
787
266
294
327
215
196
192
25
43
198
25
cxx
TABLE OF CASES.
(References are to Sections.)
S. v. Brady, 100 Iowa. 191
101, 265, 729, 730,
v. Brady, 44 Kas. 436
v. Brady, 107 N. Car. 822
v. Branton, 33 Ore. 533..
v. Brennan, 164 Mo. 487
25,
v. Bridges, 29 Kas. 139
v. Broadwell, 73 Iowa, 765
v. Bronstine, 147 Mo. 520
v. Brown, 64 Mo. 367
v. Brown, 145 Mo. 680
244,
v. Brown, 168 Mo. 449
v. Brown, 76 N. Car. 225.
v. Brown 119 N. Car. 789
v. Brown, 28 Ore. 147....
v. Bruce, 48 Iowa, 534
330,
v. Bryan, 134 Mo. 246
v. Bryant, 55 Mo. 75....
v. Bryant, 134 Mo. 246
216, 265,
v. Buckley, 40 Conn. 246
166,
v. Bungardner, 7 Baxt.
(Tenn.) 163
v. Buralli (Nev.) 71 Pac.
532 113,
v. Burke, 30 Iowa, 333..
v. Burlingame, 146 Mo.
207
v. Burns (Nev.) 74 Pac.
984 27,
v. Burns, 19 Wash. 52...
v. Burpee, 65 Vt. 1
' v. Burton, (Ala.) 22 So.
585
v. Burton, 27 Wash. 528
49, 215.
v. Butler, 47 S. Car. 25. .
v. Butterfield, 75 Mo. 301
808.
v. Byers, 80 N. Car. 426
v. Byers, 100 N. Car. 512
v. Byrd, 52 S. Car. 480..
v. Cain, 20 W. Va, 710..
v. Calder, 23 Mont. 504
269.
v. Callaway, 154 Mo. 91..
S. v.
816
495
v.
170
V.
25
V.
316
362
V.
361
V.
269
V.
219
V.
270
V.
264
222
V.
V.
150
V.
173
V.
752
322
V.
270
V.
326
V.
167
V.
V.
13
V.
796
V.
25
V.
V.
290
V.
176
. v.
165
V.
V.
218
V.
744
70
V.
V.
813
V.
328
V.
1
V,
225
V.
255
V.
799
V.
304
V.
80
Campbell, 7 N. Dak. 58
Cancienne, 50 La. Ann.
847 6,
Cannon, 49 S. Car. 550
Cannon, 52 S. Car. 452
Canty, 41 La. Ann. 587
Carey, 15 Wash. 549
214,
Canagy, 106 Iowa, 483
Carr, 25 La. Ann. 408. .
Carson, 115 N. Car. 743
Carter, 100 Iowa, 501..
Carter, 1 1 2 Iowa, 1 5 ...
Carter (Wash.) 45 Pac.
745
Case, 96 Iowa, 264
227,
Case, 99 Iowa, 743
Castle, 133 N. Car. 769
Caymo, 108 La. Ann.
218
Chandler, 31 Kas. 201. .
Chee Gong, 16 Ore, 538
322, 325,
Chevallier, 36 La. Ann.
85
Chick (Mo.) 48 S. W.
829
Chiles, 58 S. Car. 47..
Clancy, 20 Mont. 498..
Clark, 102 Iowa, 685..
Clark, 147 Mo. 20
Clark, 37 Vt. 371
Clark, 51 W. Va. 457
25
Clevenger, 156 Mo. 190
Coates, 22 Wash. 601..
Cobhs, 4 W. Va. 7 1 8 ...
Cochran, 147 Mo. 504
240,
Cocoran. 7 Idaho, 220..
Cohen, 108 Iowa. 208. .
Cole. 2 Pen. (Del.) 344..
Collins, 20 Iowa, 85
261,
Collins, 47 La. Ann. 578
354
258
171
26
48
261
229
229
306
45
170
256
294
25
256
Collins. 118 N. Car. 1203
.26
38
328
12
223
6
723
240
8
347
91
331
288
274
256
71
312
331
328
191
225
TABLE OF CASES.
CXX1
(References are to Sections.)
S. v. Collins, 121 N. Car. GG7.
112
v. Collins (R. I.) 52 Atl.
990 131
v. Colter, 15 Kas. 302 4
v. Conley, 130 N. Car. 683
776
v. Conway, 55 Kas. 333
324, 326
v. Conway, 56 Kas. 682.. 322
v. Cooper, 45 Mo. 66 13
v. Costner (N. Car.) 37 S.
E. 326 151
v. Cottrill, 52 W. Va. 36^3
45, 238
v. Cough, 111 Iowa, 714.. 153
v. Couper, 32 Ore. 212.. 150
v. Cou'rtemarsh, 1 1 Wash.
446 268
v. Courtright, 66 Ohio St.
37 201
v. Covington, 117 N. Car.
834 269
v. Coy, 119 N. Car. 901.. 276
v. Crabtree, 170 Mo. 642
264, 312, 734
v. Craine, 120 N. Car. 601
255
v.Crawford, 11 Kas. 32.. 331
v. Crawford, 31 Wash. 260
244
v. Crockett, 39 Ore. 76 294
v. Cross, 42 W. Va. 253
281
v. Crossley, C9 Ind. 203.. 199
v. Crotean, 23 Vt. 14 165
v. Crowell, 149 Mo. 391.. 325
v. Crowner, 56 Mo. 149.. 833
v. Culver (Neb.) 97 N". W.
1017 ....
v. Cummings, 33 Conn. 260
823
815
v. Cunningham, 111 Iowa,
233 267, 274
v. Currie, 8 N. Dak. 545.. 21
v. Curtis, Mo. 594 316
v. Cushenberry, 157 Mo.
168 ". 294, 297
v. Gushing, 17 Wash. 544
25, 343
iv. Daley, 53 Vt. 442.,.. 340
v.Daly, 16 Ore. 240 170
v. Dana, 59 Vt. 614 288
v. Darrah, 152 Mo. 522
834, 522, 716, 730, 737
756, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829
S. v. Darrough, 152 Mo. 522
v.
v.
v.
v.
Davenport, 33 La. Ann.
231
David, 131 Mo. 380
55, 294, 297, 314,
Davis, 109 N. Car. 780
31, 90,
Davis, 27 S. Car. 609
105,
Davis, 104 Tenn. 501..
Davis, 52 W. Va. 224. .
Dawson, 124 Mo. 418..
Day, 79 Me. 120
Day, 55 Vt. 570
Dean. 49 Iowa, 74. ...
Debott, 104 Iowa, 105
71
35
732
331
191
255
258
288
198
317
817
65
282
13
225
20
316
169
269
273
347
764
208
297
786
191
271
269
758
Dolan, 17 Wash. 499
268, 279, 282
Donette (Wash.) 71 Pac.
556 6
Donnelly, 130 Mo. 642
288, 303, 304
Donovan, 61 Iowa, 369
173
Dorland. 103 Iowa, 168
170
Dotson, 26 Mont. 305
25. 216, 305, 307
v. Decklotts, 19 Iowa, 447
v. DeMosse, 98 Mo. 340...
v. Dennis, 1 9 La. Ann. 119
v. Dent, 170 Mo. 1
v. Derrick, 44 S. Car. 344
191,
v. Desforges, 47 La. Ann.
1167
v. Desmond, 109 Iowa, 72
268,
v. Dettmer, 124 Mo. 426..
v. Dewitt, 152 Mo. 76
4,
v De Wolfe (Mont.) 77 Pac.
1087 30, 219,
v. Dick, 60 N. Car. 440. .
v. Dickey, 48 W. Va. 325
165, 206,
v. Dickson, 6 Kas. 2 1 3 ...
v. Dill, 48 S. Car. 249
v. Diller, 170 Mo. 1
v. Dixon, 131 N. Car. 808
v. Dockstader, 42 Iowa, 436
cxxn
TABLE OF CASES.
(References are to Sections.)
S. v. Drumm, 156 Mo. 216
196,
v. Duck, 35 La. Ann. 764
v. Dudoussat, 47 La. Ann.
977 26, 35,
v. Duestrow, 137 Mo. 44
v. Duncan, 142 Mo. 456..
v. Dunn, 116 Iowa, 219..
v. Dunn, 1 8 Mo. 419
v. Earnest, 5 6 Kas. 31..
v. Eastman, 60 Kas. 557..
v. Easton, 138 Mo. 103
v. Edie, 147 Mo. 535
v. Edwards, 126 N. Car.
1051 173,
v. Elliott. 98 Mo. 150
v. Ellsworth, 30 Ore. 145
v. Elshain, 70 Iowa, 534
298, 302, 303,
v. Estep, 44 Kas. 572
v. Evans, 9 Kas. App. 889
v. Evans, 138 Mo. 116
v. Evans, 12 S. Dak. 473
v. Ezzard, 40 S. Car. 312
v. Fahey (Del.) 54 Atl. 693
713,
v. Faile, 43 S. Car. 52
v. Fairlamb, 121 Mo. 137
v. Fannon. 158 Mo. 149
31,
v. Feisher, 32 Ore. 254
v. Felter, 32 Iowa, 49....
v. Fergeson, 162 Mo. 668
v. Fetterer, 65 Conn. 287
v.
Fin ley, 118 N. Car.
1161 88,
v. Fisher, 23 Mont. 540..
v. Fiske, 3 Conn. 392
214.
v. Fitzgerald, 72 Vt. 142
v. Flanagan (W. Va.) 35
S. E. 862
v. Floyd, 15 Mo. 355
v. Flye, 26 Me. 3 12.. 329,
v. Fogerty, 105 Iowa. 32..
v. Foley, 144 Mo. 600
268
339
187
269
295
65
299
282
824
25
297
272
267
272
729
267
229
85
247
86
727
251
304
296
150
329
342
172
269
4
215
247
150
19
840
25
264
S. v. Fontenot, 50 La. Ann. 537
v. Forbes (La.) 35 So. 710
v. Ford, 37 La. Ann. 443
166,
v. Foster, 130 N. Car. 666
Fox, 80 Iowa, 312
Frahm, 73 Iowa, 355
265,
Fredericks, 136 Mo. 51.
Fruge, 106 La. 694
Fry, 67 Iowa, 475
301, 322,
Fulford, 124 N. Car.
798
Furney, 4 1 Kas. 115..
Gadberry, 117 N. Car.
811
Gallivan, 75 Conn. 326
116,
Gannon, 75 Conn. 206..
Garth, 164 Mo. 553
56,
Gartrell, 171 Mo.. 489
304,
Garvin (S. Car.) 26 S.
E. 570
Gaston, 96 Iowa, 505..
Gates, 130 Mo. 351
Gates (Wash.) 69 Pac.
385
Gatlin, 170 Mo. 354
Gay, 1 8 Mont. 51
Geddis, 42 Iowa, 271
111, 293,
Gee, 85 Mo. 647
740, 775,
Geier, 111 Iowa, 70C..
Gibbons, 1 Iowa, 1 1 /
v. Glass, 5 Ore. 81. .313.
v. Gleim, 17 Mont. 17
294. 295, 299, 311. 312,
v. Glover, 27 S. Car. 602..
v. Godfrey, 60 S. Car. 498
v. Goff. 62 Kas. 104.. 48,
v. Goforth, 136 Mo. Ill
178,
v. Gonce, 79 Mo. 602
v. Good, 132 Mo. 114.. 41,
v. Gorham, 67 Vt. 365
187, 188. 196. 198,
v. Grant. 144 Mo. 56
26
15
169
75
809
812
88
268
743
3
312
251
311
49
301
342
201
111
252
84
326
180
750
776
332
174
315
317
210
48
229
240
336
297
316
268
TABLE OF CASES.
CXX111
(References are to Sections.)
S v Grant 152 Mo 57 20
S. v.
v. Grebe, 17 Kas. 458 222
v.
v. Green, 7 La. Ann. 518.. 170
v.
v. Green, 117 N. Car. 695
151
V.
v. Green, 48 S. Car. 136
178, 179
V.
v. Greenburg, 59 Kas. 404
376
V.
v. Greer, 22 W. Va. 801.. 170
v. Gregory, 170 Mo. 598.. 75
V.
v. Grinstead, 62 Kas. 593
V.
199
v. Grugin, 147 Mo. 39
* V.
. 65, 769
iv.
v. Gunter, 30 La. Ann. 537
V.
316
V.
v. Gurley, 170 Mo. 429... 271
v. Haerston, 121 N. Car.
V.
579 14
V.
v. Halm, 38 La. Ann. 169
170
V.
v. Haines, 160 Mo. 555.. 90
v. Hale, 156 Mo. 112
V.
218, 220, 323
v. Halford, 104 N. Car.
V.
874 347
v. Hall, 168 Mo. 475 271
V.
v. Hal lock. 70 Vt. 159... 151
V.
v. Ham, 98 Iowa, 60 265
V.
v. Hamilton, 57 Iowa, 596
V.
322, 324
V.
v. Haney, 19 N. Car. 390
288
V.
v. Hannibal, 37 La. Ann.
V.
620 709
V.
v. Hardee, 83 N. Car. 619
319
V.
v. Hardin, 6 Iowa, 623.. 322
v. Hardin, 19 N. Car. 407
V.
288
v. Harding, 1 Iowa, 599
V.
4, 34
v. Harkin. 7 Nev. 377 185
\
v. Harlan, 130 Mo. 381.. 269
V.
V.Harris, 97 Iowa 407.. 294
V.
v. Harris, 107 La. Ann. 325
V.
347
V.
v. Harrison, 66 Vt. 5 2 3.. 7. 25
V.
v. Harrison, 36 W. Va. 729
329
V.
v. Hart, 116 N. Car. 976.. 347
v. Hartley, 22 Nev. 342.. 335
V.
v. Harvey, 131 Mo. 339.. 322
V.
v. Hathaway, 100 Iowa,
225 ... . 6 347
v.
v. Hawkins, 18 Ore. 476.. 188
Hay den, 45 Iowa, 11,....
Hayes, 78 Mo. 310
Haynes, 7 N. Dak. 352
Heacock, 106 Iowa, 191
Heinze, 2 Mo. App. 13L4
Hellekson, 13 S. Dak.
242
Helvin, 65 Iowa, 289..
Hendricks, 172 Mo. 654
Henry, 48 Iowa, 403..
Henry, 24 Ka.s. 460..
Henry, 50 N. Car. 65..
Hertzog (W. Va.) 46 S.
E. 796
Hickman, 95 Mo. 322..
Hicks (Mo.) 77 S. W.
541 .... 80, 244, 784,
Hicks, 125 N. Car. 636
Hicks, 130 N. Car. 705
25, 31
Higgerson, 157 Mo. 395
259,
Higgins, 124 Mo. 640. .
Hill, 65 Mo. 88
Hill, 91 Mo. 423
Hill, 47 Neb. 456
Hilsabeck, 132 Mo. 348
216,
Hockett, 70 Iowa, 442..
Hodge, 50 N. H. 51.0..
Hogan, 115 Iowa, 455
229,
Holloway, 156 Mo. 222
198,
Holloway, 117 N. Car.
730
Holman, 104 N. Car.
865.. 853, 854. 855, 856,
Holmes. 65 Minn. 230..
Honing, 4 9 Iowa, 158..
Hood, 120 Iowa, 238...
Hope. 102 Mo. 410
Hopkins, 94 Iowa, 86..
Hopkins, 33 La. Ann. 34
Hopkins, 50 La. Ann.
1171
Home, 9 Kas. 119
Horton L. & L. Co. 161
Mo. 664
Horton, 100 N. Car. 443
299
740
290
238
337
44
6
25
324
265-
340
80
218
797
269
, 48
268
276
732
187
243
358
329
266
13
175
198
174
30
CXX1V
TABLE OF OASES.
(References arc to Sections.)
S. v. Hoshor, 26 Wash. 643
v. Hossack, 116 Iowa, 194
v. Howard, 41 Ore. 49...
v. Howell, 26 Mont. 3
25, 301,
v. Howell, 28 S. Car. 250
v. Hudspeth, 159 Mo. 178
v. Hunt, 141 Mo. 626.. 240,
v. Hunter, 118 Iowa, 686
282, 372,
v. Hunter. 50 Kas. 302...
v. Hyde, 20 Wash. 234
175,
v. Hyde, 22 Wash. 551..
v. Hyland, 144 Mo. 302. .
v. Jackson, 103 Iowa, 702
223. 269. 289,
v. Jackson, 95 Mo. 623...
v. Jackson. 126 Mo. 521..
v. Jaynes, 78 S. Car. 504
325,
v. Jelinek, 95 Iowa, 420..
v. Jenkins, 21 S. Car. 595
v. Jennett, 88 N. Car. 665
v. Johnson, 102 Ind. 247..
v. Johnson, 40 Kas. 266..
v. Johnson, 6 Kas. App.
119 . .
v. Johnson, 48 La. Ann. 87
v. Johnson, 50 La. Ann.
154
v. Johnson, 129 Mo. 26..
v. Johnson, 19 Wash. 410
v. Jones, 46 La. Ann. 1395
v. Jones, 64 Mo. 391
v. Jones, 78 Mo. 283
344. 372,
v. Jones, 153 Mo. 4 5 7 ....
v. Jones, 19 Nev. 365
v. Jones, 87 N. Car. 542..
v. Jones, 126 N. Car. 1099
v. Jones, 29 S. Car. 201..
v. Kabrick, 39 Iowa, 277..
v. Kaplan, 167 Mo. 298. .
v. Kattlemann, 35 Mo. 105
v. Kearley. 26 Kas. 77.. 20,
v. Keefe,*54 Kas. 197
215
373
244
336
46
338
282
776
303
191
151
255
319
326
103
328
7
69
266
794
'326
195
212
229
268
294
269
288
757
323
731
48
332
107
758
326
841
295
341
S. v. Kellerman, 14 Kas. 135
218,
v. Kelley, 57 Iowa, 644
265,
v. Kelly, 73 Mo. 608
208,
v. Kelly (Vt.) 51 Atl. 434
v. Kendall, 54 S. Car. 192
v. Kennedy, 20 Iowa, 571
795,
v. Kennedy (Iowa) 62 N.
W. 673
v. Kennedy, 154 Mo. 268..
v. Kerns, 47 W. Va. 26ti
170,
v. Kindred, 148 Mo. 270
244,
v. Kmley, 43 Iowa, 296..
v. Kirkpatrick, 63 Iowa,
k 554
v. Kirkpatrick, 72 Iowa,
500
v. Kline, 54 Iowa, 185..
v. Knight, 95 Me. 467
v. Knittson, 9] Iowa, 549..
v. Knotts, 24 Ind. App. 477
v. Koonstett, 62 Kas. 221
63,
v. Kortgaard, 62 Minn. 7-.
v. Krug, 12 Wash. 288
229. 297, 336,
v. Kruger, 7 Idaho, 178
312,
v. Kunhi, 119 Iowa, 461..
v. Kyle, 14 Wash. 550. .
v. Labuzan, 37 La. Ann.
489
v. La Grange, 94 Iowa, 60
20,
v. Landano, 74 Conn. 638
v. Landry, 85 Me. 95....
v. Larkins. 5 Idaho, 200..
v. Laurie, 1 Mo. App. 371
v. Lawrence, 57 Me. 577..
v. Lee, 121 N. Car. 544...
v. Lee. 58 S. Car. 335
v. Lett. 85 Mo. 52
v. Lewis, 56 Kas. 374
v. Lewis, 69 Mo. 92
v. Lewis, 136 Mo. 84. .'. .
v. Lewis, 20 Nev. 333
288
816
265
279
6
802
70
288
261
271
340
220
816
324
749
358
488
268
279
339
734
108
219
80
265
25
229
331
285
329
225
71
219
195
325
334
201
TABLE OF CASES.
CXXT
(References are to Sections.}
S. v. Lightsey, 43 S. Car. 114
38
v. Lindley, 51 Iowa, 344..
340
v. Lmhoff, 121 Iowa, 632
20, 200,
713
v. Leppere, 66 Wis. 355..
344
v. Lockland, 136 Mo. 26..
276
v. Locklear, 118 N. Car.
1154
251
v. Loveless, 17 Nev. 424..
361
v. Lowry, 42 W. Va. 205
322,
323
v. Lucas (Iowa) 97 N. W.
1007
733
v. Lucas, 124 N. Car. 825
267,
268
v. Lucey, 24 Mont. 295 ....
272
v. Lynn (Del.) 51 Atl. 882
830, 831,
832
v. Lynott, 5 R. I. 295
171
v. McBee, 52 Va. 260
861
v. McCann, 16 Wash. 249
32, 214, 259,
260
v. McClellan, 23 Mont. 532
223, 226, 247,
322
v. McClune, 16 Utah, 170
297
v. McCoy, 34 Mo. 535
746
v. McCoy, 15 Utah, 136
70
, 71
v. McCracken, 66 Iowa, 569
324
v. McCullough, 114 Iowa,
532
211
v. McDevitt, 69 Iowa, 549
220
v. McDonald, 57 Kas. 537
25,
289
v. McDonnell, 32 Vt. 491..
282
v. McDowell, 129 N. Car.
523 65, 191,
225
v. McGarry, 111 Iowa, 709
322
v. McGinnis, 76 Mo. 26..
214
v. McKea, 120 N. Car. 608
201
v. McMurphy, 52 Mo. 251.
340
v. McNamara, 100 Mo. 100
342,
345
v. McPherson, 114 Iowa,
492
780
v. Mackey, 12 Ore. 154
195, 198,
326
v. Magers, 3 6 Ore. 38
229
v. Magoon, 68 Vt. 289....
178
v. Mahley, 68 Mo. 315
252
v. Mahn, 25 Kas. 186
751
S. v. Mahoney, 24 Mont. 281
25, 86, 170, 181
v. Main, 69 Conn. 123 161
v. Main, 75 Conn. 55.. 103, 199
v. Manning (Vt.) 52 Atl.
1033 327
v. Marks, 16 Utah, 204.. 345
v. Marsh, 171 Mo. 523 198
v. Marshall, 105 Iowa, 38. 297
v. Martin (Mont.) 74 Pac.
728 238, 338
v. Martin, 124 Mo. 514
218, 296
v. Martin, 166 Mo. 565 363
v. Martin, 47 S. Car. 67.. 70
v. Mason 54 S. Car. 240.. 253
v. Matthews, 38 La. Ann.
795 153, 169
v. Maxwell, 42 Iowa, 210.. 809
v. May, 172 Mo. 630
253, 271, 773, 776
v. Meadows, 156 Mo. 110
269
v. Means, 95 Me. 364
172, 178, 189, 191
v. Mecum, 95 Iowa, 433
227 372
v. Medley, 54 Kas. 627....' 714
v. Medlin, 126 N. Car.
1127 198, 259
v. Meller, 13 R. I. 669 84
v. Melton, 120 N. Car. 591
351
816
227
80
v. Merrick, 19 Me. 398..
v. Metcalf, 17 Mont. 417
v. Meyer, 69 Iowa, 148..
v. Meyer, 58 Vt. 457
252, 267, 295
v. Meyers, 99 Mo. 107 347
v. Meyesenburg, 171 Mo. 1
288
v. Miles, 15 Wash. 534.. 4
v. Milholland, 89 Iowa, 5.. 279
v. Miller, 53 Iowa, 157 712
v. Miller, 53 Iowa, 210.. 221
v. Miller, 107 Iowa, 656.. 816
v. Miller, 100 Mo. 606 36
v. Miller, 156 Mo. 76 323
v. Miller, 12 Ohio C. C. 66
834
v. Miller (Ore.) 74 Pac.
660 256, 802
v. Mills, 116 N. Car. 992
32
v. Missio, 105 Tenn. 218.. 13
v. Mitchell, 41 La. Ann.
1073 . . 172
CXXV1
TABLE OF CASES.
(References are to Sections.)
S. v. Mitchell, 56 S. Car. 524
v. Mix, 15 Mo. 159
v. Mize, 36 Kas. 187
v. Montgomers (S. Dak.)
97 N. W. 717
v. Moody, 18 Wash. 165..
v. Moore, 160 Mass. 443..
v. Moore, 168 Mo. 432....
v. Moore, 120 N. Car. 570. .
v. Moore, 49 S. Car. 438.
v. Morgan (Utah) 75 Pac.
528
v. Morledge, 164 Mo. 522..
v. Mortimer, 20 Kas. 93...
v. Morwy, 37 Kas. 369
v. Moxley, 102 Mo. 374
303,
v. Murphy, 109 Iowa, 116
v. Murphy, 118 Mo. 7
v. Murray, 91 Mo. 95.. 1,
v. Musgrave, 43 W. Va
672 218, 219,
v. Musick, 101 Mo. 260..
v. Myers, 12 Wash. 77
299,
v. Napper, 141 Mo. 401
225,
v. Nash, 30 N. Car. 35. ..
v. Nat. 5 1 N. Car. 114
v. Neal, 120 N. Car. 613..
v. Nelson (Minn.) 97 N. W.
655
v. Nelson, 132 Mo. 184..
v. Nelson, 11 Nev. 340
295,
v. Newman, 57 Kas. 705..
v. Nichols, 50 La. Ann. 699
27,
v. Nickels 65 S. Car. 169..
v. Nixon, 32 Kas. 213
329, 331,
v. Norris, 10 N. Car. 391.
v. Northway, 164 Mo. 513
v. Norton, 28 S. Car. 572. .
v. Norwood, 74 N. Car. 248
v. Oakes, 95 Me. 369....
v. O'Brien, 81 Iowa. 95...
v. O'Donald (Idaho) 39 Pac
556
v. Oilkili, 7 Ired. L. (N.
Car.) 251
v. Olds. 106 Iowa, 110
v. O'Neal, 58 Minn. 478..
170
19
267
819'
282
321
249
351
55
365
83
11
329
312
268
281
326
305
269
721
226
225
215
27
251
358
731
88
298
196
751
170
80
69
306
251
808
347
758
345
255
S. v. O'Reilly, 126 Mo. 597....
v. Ostrander, 18 Iowa, 437
v. Ott, 49 Mo. 326
v. Owen, 72 N. Car. 605..
v. Owens, 79 Mo. 619
v. Owens, 44 S. Car. 324
251,
v. Oxendine, 107 N. Car.
783
v. Pagels, 92 Mo. 300
329, 330, 331, 746,
v. Painter, 67 Mo. 84
v. Palmer, 88 Mo. 568
3, 220,
v. Pancoast (N. Dak.) 67
N. W. 1052
v. Parker, 13 Lea (Tenn.)
221
v. Parker, 172 Mo. 1 9 1 ...
v. Pasman, 118 Iowa, 501.
v. Patterson, 52 Kas. 335.
v. Patterson, 68 Me. 473
158, 159,
v. Patterson, 116 Mo. 505.
v. Patterson, 45 Vt. 301..
v. Patton, 66 Kas. 486..
v. Paxton, 126 Mo. 500..
v. Peck. 85 Mo. 190
v. Peebles (Mo.) 7-7 S. W.
520. .713, 729, 810,
v. Peel, 23 Mont. 358
247,
v. Pennell, 56 Iowa, 29..
v. Penney, 113 Iowa. 65)1.
v. Pennington, 164 Mo. 27
v. Pepo, 23 Mont. 473
v. Perry, 41 W. Va. 641
v. Peterson, 110 Iowa, 649
v. Peterson, 38 Kas. 205..
v. Petsch, 43 S. Car. 132
32, 49
v Pfefferle, 36 Kas. 90
v. Phillips, 118 Iowa, 660
180,
v. Phillips, 119 Iowa, 642
v. Phipps, 95 Iowa, 487.
v. Pierce, 65 Iowa, 90
294, 302,
v. Pierce, 136 Mo. 34
v. Pierce. 8 Nev. 291
v. Pirlot, 19 R. I. 695....
v. Pitts, 11 Iowa, 343....
297
19
211
84
358
112
748
279
267
20
80
20
281
289
160
279
35
294
358
316
878
750
355
75
258
170
218
25
326
, 80
6, 7
262
244
3, 7
719
188
3
347
38
TABLE OF CASES.
CXXV11
(References are to Sections.}
S. v. Pitts, 156 Mo. 247 ......
v. Poe (Iowa) 98 N. W.
588 .................
v. Porter, 64 Iowa, 237..
v. Porter, 74 Iowa, 623..
v. Porter, 35 La. Ann. 535
v. Porter, 32 Ore. 135
340, 344,
v. Potter, 42 Vt. 495 ......
v.Powell, 109 La. 727..
v. Prater, 52 W. Va. 132
20, 48, 113,
v. Pratt, 20 Iowa, 269 ____
v. Pratt, 98 Mo. 482 .....
v. Preston, 4 Idaho, 215..
v. Price, 55 Kas. 610 ____
v. Prine, 25 Iowa, 231..
v. Pritchard, 16 Nev. 101..
v. Probasco, 46 Kas. 310'
347,
v. Prudhomme, 25 La. Ann.
525 .................
v. Pugsley, 75 Iowa, 744..
v. Punshon, 124 Mo. 448
252, -69.
Pyscher (Mo.) 77 S. W
341 ................ 21,
Rath bone (Idaho) 67
Pac. 186 .............
Rathbun, 74 Conn. 524
70, 211,
Ray, 146 Ind. 500 ____
Reasly, 100 Iowa, 231..
Reavis, 71 Mo. 419 .....
Reed, 20 Iowa, 421 _____
Reed, 50 La. Ann. 990..
Reed, 62 Me. 129.. 170,
Reed, 137 Mo. 125 ____
Reed, 154 Mo. 122 ____
Reidell, 9 Houst. (Del.)
479 ................
Rheams, 34 Minn. 18
165,
Richie, 28 La. Ann. 327
6
741
201
326
756
288
169
238
84
289
5
327
163
197
352
288
250
296
.
845
25
301
351
268
289
808
198
294
180
75
211
260
225
6
Riney. 137 Mo. 102 ____ 71
Rivers, 68 Iowa, 611
265, 812
Robertson, 54 S. Car.
147 ................. 252
Robinson, 52 La. Ann.
616 ................. 80
Robinson, 117 Mo. 649
229, 304
Ridge. 125 N. Car. 655.
S. v. Robinson, 20 Wis. 713...
v. Rodgers, 56 Kas. 362. ..
v. Rolla, 21 Mont. 582
256,
v. Roller, 30 Wash. 692..
v. Rollins, 77 Me. 380
v. Rome, 64 Conn 329
v. Rorbacher, 19 Iowa, 155
v. Rose, 47 Minn. 47.. 119,
v. Rose, 70 Minn. 403
v. Rose, 142 Mo. 418
v. Rosencrans, 9 N. Dak.
163
v. Rover, 1 1 Nev. 3 4 3 ....
v. Rowland, 72 Iowa, 327
324,
v. Rue, 72 Minn. 296....
v. Rutherford, 152 Mo. 124
113, 115,
v. Ryan, 113 Iowa, 536..
v. Ryno (Kas.) 74 Pac.
1111 301,
v. Sacre, 141 Mo. 64 ....
v. Saliba, 18 La. Ann. 35..
v. Sauer, 38 Minn. 439...
v. Saxton, 147 Mo. 89. ..
v. Schaegel, 50 Kas. 325...
v. Schmepel, 23 Mont. 523
v. SchoffeT, 74 Iowa, 704
v. Scott, 11 La. Ann. 429. .
v. Scott, 47 La. Ann. 251.
v. Scott, 49 La. R. 253
v. Seossoni, 48 La. Ann.
1464
v. Serenson, 7 S. Dak. 277
v. Settleworth, 18 Minn.
208
v. Sexton, 10 S. Dak. 127
v. Seymour, 94 Iowa, 699
310, 311,
v. Shadwell, 26 Mont. 52
247,
v. Shaeffer, 116 Mo. 96. .
v. Shafer, 22 Mont. 17
276,
v. Shaw, 102 Ga. 660
v. Shelledy, 8 Iowa, 486
761, 763,
v. Sheppard, 49 W. Va. 582
80, 279.
v. Sherman, 106 Iowa, 684
63
301
260
163
38
307
301
170
840
48
6
359
325
301
374
347
169
294
269
340
170
295
169
331
201
294
295
219
326
272
331
282
191
794
297
268
exxvin
TABLE OF CASES.
(References are to Sections.)
S. v. Shunka, 116 Iowa, 206... 25
v. Silk, 145 Mo. 240 279
v. Simas, 25 Nev. 432... 63
v. Sipsey, 14 N. Car. 485
119
v. Slingerland, 19 Nev. 135
303, 306
v. Smallwood, 75 N. Car.
104 217. 222
v. Smith, 65 Conn. 283
6, 90, 294
v. Smith, 142 Ind. 288.. 20, 22
v. Smith, 102 Iowa
269, 282, 289
v. Smith, 106 Iowa, 701
9 289
v. Smith, 53 Mo. 267
115, 331
v. Smith, 125 Mo. 2 259
v. Smith, 164 Mo. 567
278 337
v. Smith, 10 Nev. 123 ' 30
v. Smith, 8 S. Dak. 547.. 223
v. Soper, 148 Mo. 217
304, 335
v. Spears, 46 La. Ann. 1524
260
v. Spencer, 1 Zab. (N. J.)
202 331
v. Spengler, 74 Miss. 129.. 129
v. Spooner, 41 La. Ann.
780 344
v. Spotted Hawk, 22 Mont.
33 291, 323
v. St. John, 94 Mo. App.
229 80
v. Staley, 45 W. Va. 792.. 25
v. Stanley, 48 Iowa, 221.. 43
v. Stantz (Wash.) 74 Pac.
590 25
v. Starnes, 94 N. Car. 973
323
v. Steffens, 116 Iowa, 227
238
v. Sterrett, 71 Iowa, 386.. 373
v. Stevens. 53 Me. 548 165
v. Stewart, 52 Iowa, 284.. 299
v. Stickley, 41 Iowa, 232
234, 331
v. Stout, 49 Ohio St. 281
1 32 768
v. Straub. 16 Wash.' ll'l
198
v. Streeter. 2 Nev. 403... 215
v. Strong. 153 Mo. 548... 75
v. Stubb'lefield, 157 Mo.
360 336
S. v. Sullivan, 43 S. Car. 205
v. Summar, 143 Mo. 220..
v. Sutton, 99 Ind. 307
v. Sutton, 70 Iowa, 268
323,
v. Swallum, 111 Iowa, 37
v. Swayne, 30 La. Ann.
1323
v. Tally, 23 La. Ann. 677. .
v. Tate. 156 Mo. 119
v. Tatlaw, 136 Mo. 678..
v. Taylor, 118 Mo. 167
322,
v. Taylor. 134 Mo. 109. ..
v. Taylor, 57 S. Car. 483..
v. Tettaton, 159 Mo. 354..
v. Thomas, 47 Conn. 546
166,
v. Thomas, 58 Kas. 805...
v. Thomas, 34 La. Ann.
1084
v. Thompson, 137 Mo. 620
v. Thompson, 21 W. Va.
746 218.
v. Thornton (S. Dak.) 73
N. W. 196
v. Tibbs. 48 La. Ann. 1278
48,
v. Tiekel, 13 Nev. 502...
v. Tighe. 27 Mont. 327. .
v. Tilton, 63 Iowa, 117
v. Tincher, 21 Ind. App.
142
v. Tippet, 94 Iowa, 646
21.
v. Tisdale, 41 La. Ann. 338
v. Tobie, 141 Mo. 547
v. Todd, 110 Iowa. 631
6,
v. Tomasitz, 144 Mo. 86..
v. Tommy, 19 Wash. 270..
v. Tozier, 49 Me. 404
v. Tucker, 38 La. Ann. 789
v. Tucker, 36 Ore. 291
25.
v. Turlington, 102 Mo. 568
v. Tattle. 67 Ohio St. 440
v. Turner, 110 Mo. 196. .
v. Turner, 63 S. Car. 548
7
227
247
326
80
182
169
206
247
323
301
206
52
167
741
11
89
336
743
348
170
271
812
849
273
169
316
206
269
109
758
87
811
267
207
214
265
TABLE OF CASES.
CXX1X
(References are to Sections.}
8. v. Urie, 101 Iowa, 411.
71,
v. Ussery, 1 1 8 N. Car. 1177
v. Utley, 126 N. Car. 997
v. Utley, 132 N. Car. 1022
v. Valle, 164 Mo. 539
v. Van Kuran, 25 Utah, 8
340,
v. Vansant, 80 Mo. 69
295, 344, 716, 756, 774,
797,
v. Van Tassel, 103 Iowa, 6
277,
v. Varner, 115 N. Car. 744
7,
v. Vaughan, 141 Mo. 514..
v. Vaughan, 22 Nev. 285.
v. Vickers, 47 La. Ann.
1574 . . . .
v. Vincent (S. Dak.) 91 N.
W. 347
v. Vinso, 171 Mo. 5 7 6 ...
v. Waddle, 100 Iowa, 57
v. Walker, 4 1 Iowa, 217..
v. Ward, 19 Nev. 297
v. Ward, 61 Vt. 194
90, 198, 322, 323, 324,
v. Warner 69 Vt. 30
v. Warren, 1 Marv. (Del.)
487
v. Washington, 107 La. 298
v. Watkins, 106 La. 380
28, 169,
v. Watkins, 11 Nev. 30...
v. Weakly (Mo.) 77 S. W.
527 ...
v. Weaver, 165 Mo. 1
v. Webb, 6 Idaho, 428
v.Webb, 20 Wash. 484..
v. Weber, 156 Mo. 249....
v. Webster, 107 La. 45...
v. Webster, 121 N. Car. 586
350,
v. Weems, 96 Iowa, 426..
v. Wells, 54 Kas. 161. .40,
v. West, 43 La. Ann. 1006
v. West. 157 Mo. 309
v. Westlake, 159 Mo. 669
v. Wheeler, 79 Mo. 366...
v. White, 15 S. Car. 293. .
178
191
151
247
80
S. v. White, 10 Wash. 611
227, 261
v. Whitier, 21 Me. 341... 225
v. Whitny, 7 Ore. 386
.98, 326
v. Whittle, 59 S. Car. 297
162, 172
v. Wiggins, 50 La. Ann.
330 227
343
807
v. Williams, 32 S. Car. 123
156
v. Wilner, 40 Wis. 306.. 330
v. Wilson, 3 111. (2 Scam.)
225 31
295
351
80
263
347
26
269
108
266
v. Wilson, 137 Mo. 592.. 265
v. Wilson, 10 Wash. 402.. 151
v. Wines, 65 N. J. L. 31
229
v Wisdom, 84 Mo. 190
279, 806
v. Wood, 20 Iowa, 541 841
v. Wood, 46 Iowa. 116 815
v. Woodruff, 47 Kas. 151
815
v. Woods, 124 Mo. 412... 268
v. Woolard, 111 Mo. 248.. 288
v. Woolard, 119 N. Car.
779 178
19
326
227
260
206
v. Wright, 112 Iowa, 436
86
v.Wright, 53 Me. 328... 165
v. Wright, 134 Mo. 404... 331
v. Wright. 141 Mo. 333
239 325
v. Wroth, 15 Wash. 621..' 39
v. Wyse, 32 S. Car. 45 182
v. Yohe, 87 Iowa, 35 812
296
173
272
93
247
25
75
348
351
v. Young, 104 Iowa, 730
7, 52, 227
v. Young, 105 Mo. 640... 301
v. Young, 67 N. J. L. 223
269
v. Young, 9 N. Dak. 165.. 312
v. Yourex, 30 Wash. 611.. 163
v. Zarn, 22 Ore. 591 281
v. Zeibart, 40 Iowa, 173
282, 777
v. Zorn, 7 1 Mo. 415 214
229
253
49
251
347
195
208
Sack v. Dolese. 137 111. 138.. 126
Sackett v. Stone, 115 Ga. 466
102
Sadler v. Peoples, 105 Fed. 712
161
Saffold v. S. 76 Miss. 258.. 40, 192
Sage v. Evansville & T. H. R. Co.
134 Ind. 100 34, 40
v. Haines, 76 Iowa, 581.. 00
cxxx
TABLE OF CASES.
(References are to Sections.}
Saine v. S. 68 Ind. 129 838
Saint v. Guerrerio, 17 Colo. 448
6
Salem, v. S. 89 Ala. 56 336
Salem Iron Co. v. Commonwealth
Iron Co. 119 Fed. 593.. 7
Salem, M. & M. R. Co. v. Ander-
son, 51 Minn. 829 156
Salem Stone, &c. Co. v. Griffin,
139 Ind. 141 19y
Sales v. Western Stage Co. 4
Iowa. 547 550
Salmon v. Cress, 22 Ore. 177
48, 80
Sample v. Rand, 112 Iowa, 616
94, 195
v. S. 104 Ind. 289 41, 45
Sams A. C. Co. v. League, 25
Colo. 129 200, 358
Samuels v. Knight, 9 Pa. Super.
Ct. 352 102, 185
San Antonio, &c. R. Co. v. De
Haren (Tex. Cv. App.)
54 S. W. 395 90
v. Green (Tex. Cv. App.)
49 S. W. 672 113
v. Griffin (Tex. Cv. App.)
48 S. W. 542 196
v. lies (Tex. Cv. App.) 59
S. W. 564 197
v. Jazo (Tex. Cv. App.) 25
S. W. 712 97
v. Kniffin, 4 Tex. Cv. App.
484 8
v. Long, 4 Tex. Cv. App.
497 183
v, Waller, 27 Tex. Cv. App.
4 383
v. Watzlavzick (Tex. Cv.
App.) 28 S. W. 115.. 72
v. Wright, 20 Tex. 136 196
San Antonio Trac. Co. v. Welter
(Tex. Cv. App.) 77 S. W.
414 194
Sanches v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 55
S. W. 44 21
Sandaee v. S. 61 Neb. 240.224, 378
Sandell v. Sherman, 107 Cal.
391 71
Sander v. S. 134 Ala. 74.. 192, 261
Sanders v. Brock (Tex. Cr. App.)
31 S. W. 311 363
v. P. 124 111. 218
65, 115, 116, 339
v. S. 134 Ala. 74 116
v. S. 94 Ind. 147 330
v. S. 41 Tex. 306 3
Sanders v. Wettermark, 20 Tex.
Cv. App. 175
Sandoval v. Ter. 8 N. Mex. 573
Sands v. Potter, 165 111. 402..
Sanford v. Gates, 38 Kas. 405
Sanger v. Thompson (Tex. Cv.
App.) 44 b. W. 408
Santee v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 37
S. W. 436
Sargent v. Chapman, 12 Colo,
App. 529
v. Lawrence (Tex. Cr. App.)
40 S. W. 1075
v. Linden M. Co. 55 Cal.
204
v. Roberts, 1 Pick. (Mass.)
337
v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. App. 325
Sater v. S. 56 Ind. 378
325 378
Sattler v. Chicago, R. I. &' P. R
Co. (Neb.) 98 N. W.
664
Saunders v. Closs, 1.17 Mich.
130 25
Saunders' Ex'rs v. Weeks (Tex.
Cv. App.) 55 S. W. 33..
Savannah, &c. R. Co. v. Austion,
104 Ga. 614
v. Beasley, 94 Ga. 142..
v. Tiedman, 39 Fla. 196..
Savannah St. R. Co. v. Ficklin,
94 Ga. 146
Sawyer v. S. 15 Lea (Tenn.)
695
Sax v. Detroit, G. H. &. M. R.
Co. (Mich.) 89 N. W.
368
Scanlon v. Warren, 169 111.
142
Scarbrough v. Blackman, 108
Ala. 656
Schafer v. Gilmer, 13 Nev. 330
Schaff v. Miles, 31 N. Y. S. 134
Schafstelle v. St. Louis & M. R.
Co. 175 Mo. 142
Schatzlein Paint Co. v. Pass-
more. 26 Mont. 500....
Scheel v. City of Detroit, 130
Mich. 51
Schenck v. Butsch, 32 Ind. 344
126
269
249
182
94
191
359
186
94
35
41
745
126
, 26
94
58
4
94
26
328
126
48
117
94
358
20
244
237
356
TABLE OF CASES.
CXXX1
(References are to Sections.}
Schier v. Dankwardt, 88 Iowa,
750 87
Schiller v. Dry Dock, E. B. &
13. R. Co. 56 N. Y. S.
184 121
Schintz v. P. 178 111. 320.. 21, 300
Schmidt v. Chicago, &c. R. Co.
83 111. 412 361
v. Chicago, &c. R. Co. 90
Wis. 504 129
v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. 20
Am. & Eng. R. Gas. 219
630
v. Pfau, 114 111 494
105, 172
v. Sinnatt, 103 111. 160
74, 533
Schmidt & Bro. Co. v. Mahoney,
60 Neb. 20 356
Schmitt v. Murray, 87 Minn.
250 12
Schmuck v. Hill (Neb.) 96 N.
W. 158 119
Schneider v. Hosier, 21 Ohio St.
113 6, 48
Schnieder v. P. 23 111. 25 709
Schnier v. P. 23 111. 11 153
Schoefield, uear & Pulley Co. v.
Schoefield, 71 Conn. 11
185, 191
Schollay v. Moffitt W. Drug Co.
(Colo. App.) 67 Pac.
182 351
Scholtz v. Northwertern M. L. I.
Co. 100 Fed. 573 .... 100
Schoolcraft v. P. 117 111. 277
729
Schrader v. Hoover, 87 Iowa
654 94
Schroeder v. Rinhard, 25 Neb.
75 347
v.Walsh. 120 111. 410... 514
Schrvver v. Hawks, 22 Ohio St.
316 7
Schultz v. Bower, 57 Minn. 493
107
v. Bower, 64 Minn. 123 .. 26
v. Schultz, 113 Mich. 502
195
Schwabacher v. P. 165 111. 624
251, 281
Schwabeland v. Buchler, 31 N.
Y. S. 143 358
Schwarz v. Schwarz, 26 111. 81
243
Schwarzbach v. Ohio. &c. Union,
25 W. Va. 640 . ...420, 421
Schweinfurth v. Cleveland, &c.
R. Co. 60 Ohio St. 225
192, 379, 640
Scott v. Boyd (Va.) 42 S. E.
918 80
v. Chope, 33 Neb. 75
487, 489
v. Delany, 87 111. 146 25
v. P. 141 111. 195
113, 115, 195, 242
v. Provo City, 14 Utah, 31
90
v. S. 105 Ala. 57 343
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 68
S. W. 680 109
v. Smith, 70 Ind. 298 . . . 360
Scovill v. Baldwin, 27 Conn. 316
222
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 77
S. W. 792 110
v. Salt Lake City, 11 Utah
60 25, 351
Scrivani v. Dondero, 128 Cal.
31 244
Scroggi'ns v. S. 120 Ala. 369
172, 260
Scruggs v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. App.
622 22
Scully v. S. 39 Ala. 240 6
Scutt v. Woolsey, 47 N. Y. S.
320 242
Seaboard Air Line R. v. Phillips,
117 Ga. 98 7
Seacord v. P. 121 111. 631 52
Seagrave v. Hall, 3 Ohio Cir. Dec.
221 35
v. Hall, 10 Ohio C. C. 395. 35
Searcy v. Martin Woods Co. 93
Iowa, 420 244
Searles v. S. 97 Ga. 692.. 175, 179
Sears Admr. v. Louisville, &c. R.
Co. 22 Ky. 152 244
Secor v. Oregon I. Co. 15 Wash.
35 243
Seefeld v. Thacker, 93 Wis.
518 26
Seekel v. Norman, 71 Iowa, 264
48
Seffel v. Western U. Tel. Co.
(Tex. Cv. App.) 67 S. W.
897 355
Segrest v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.)
57 S. W. 845 112
Seibrecht v. Hogan, 99 Wis. 437
232
CXXX11
TABLE OF CASES.
(References are to Sections.)
Seigel, Cooper & Co. v. Connor,
171 111 572 235
Seller v. S. 112 Wis. 293 113
Selling v. Clark, 41 N. Y. S.
982 191
Selensky v. Chicago G. W. R.
Co. 120 Iowa, 113
119, 192, 205
Seligman v. Rogers, 113 Mo.
642 218
Sellars v. Johnson, 65 N. Car.
104 156
Selleck v. Selleck, 107 111. 396. 80
Seller v. Johnson, 65 N. Car.
104 156
Sellers v. Greencastle, 134 Ind.
645 11
v. S. 99 Ga. 212 321
Sellman v. Wheeler (Md.) 54
Atl. 512 ....*. 25
Selma, &c. R. Co. v. Owen, 132
Ala. 420 245
Selser v. Brock, 3 Ohio St. 302
415
Senter v. Carr, 15 N. H. 351.. 218
Sergest v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 57
S. W. 845 103
Setchell v. Keigeoin, 57 Conn.
478 171
Sexton v. School District, 9
Wash. 5 113
v. Steele, 60 Minn. 336
129, 130
Seymour v. Rice, 94 Ga. 183.. 130
Shackelford v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.)
53 S. W. 884 40
Shaefer v. St. Louis & S. R.
Co. 128 Mo. 64 237
Shaeffer v. S. 61 Ark. 241 267
Shafer v. Stinson, 76 Ind. 374
4, 5, 362
Shaffel v. S. 97 Wis. 377 75
Shaffer v. Cincinnati, &c. R. Co.
14 Ohio C. C. 488 351
Slianck v. Morris, 2 Sweeney (N.
Y.) 464 170
Shank v. S. 25 Ind. 208 191
Shannon v. Jefferson City, 125
Ala. 384 244
Shano v. Fifth, &c. Bridge Co.
189 Pa. St. 245 247
Shapleigh Hardware Co. v. Ham-
ilton, 70 Ark. 319 65
Sharpv. S. 105 Ga. 588 118
Shartle v. Minneapolis, 1 7 Minn.
292 601
Shaughnessy v. Sewell & D. C.
Co. 160 Mass. 331 80, 94
Shaw v. Camp, 160 111. 430... 34
v. Missouri & K. D. Co. 56
Mo. App. 521 72
v. P. 81 111. 150 250
v. S. 125 Ala. 80 297
v. S. 102 Ga. 660.223,275,323
Shea v. City of Muncie, 148
Ind. 34 172, 876
Shealy v. Edwards, 75 Ala. 411
183
Shebeck v. National Cracker Co.
120 Iowa, 414 90
Sheehan v. P. 131 111. 25
66, 113, 322
Sheets v. Stark, 14 Ga. 429 119
Sheffield v. Eveleth (S. Dak.)
97 N. W. 367 84
Sheilds v. S; 104 Ala. 35 240
v. S. 149 Ind. 395
43, 240, 277
Sheldon v. Chicago & M. & St.
P. R. Co. 6 S. Dak. 606.. 134
Shely v. Shely, 20 Ky. L. R.
1021 38
Shenandoah V., R. Co. v. Moore,
83 Va. 823 548, 550
Shenk v. Hager, 24 Minn. 339. 219
Shenkenberger v. S. 154 Ind.
630, 640
20, 25, 180, 301, 325
Shepard v. Goben, 142 Ind. 322
404
Shepherd v. S. 36 Fla. 374 347
Shepperd v. S. 94 Ala. 104.... 265
Sherman v. Dutch, 16 111. 282.. 172
v. Kreul, 42 Wis. 33 116
Sherman S. & S. R. Co. v. Bell
(Tex. Cv. App.) 58 S. W.
147 198
Sherrill v. S. (Ala.) 35 So. 131
723, 777
v. Western 1ST. T. Co. 116 N.
Car. 655 183
Sherwin v. Rutland, 74 Vt. 1.. 361
Sherwood v. Grand Ave. R. Co.
132 Mo. 339 50, 118
Shibek v. Nat. Cracker Co.
(Iowa) 94 N. W. 930... 90
Shields v. S. 39 Tex. Cr. App.
13 215
Shinn v. Tucker, 37 Ark. 580.. 321
Shipp v. Com. 19 Ky. L. R.
634 . . Ill
TABLE OF CASES.
CXXX111
(References are to Sections.)
Shiver v. S. 41 Fla. 630
9, 288,
Shiverick v. R. J. Gunning Co.
58 Neb. 29
Shober v. Wheeler, 113 N. Car.
370
Shockley v. Mills, 71 Ind. 292..
Shoemaker v. Bryant Lumber &
S. M. Co. 27 Wash. 637..
v. Ter. 4 Okla. 11 8... 322,
v. Turner, 117 Iowa, 340..
Shoninger v. Latimer, 165 Pa.
St. 373
Shoohn v. Com. 106 Pa. St. 369
Shook v. Blount, 67 Ala. 301..
Shorb v. Kinzie, 100 Ind. 429..
v. Webber, 188 111. 126
Short v. Kelly (Tex. Cv. App.)
62 S. W. 944
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 29 S.
W. 1072
Shotz v. P. 121 111. 562
Showman v. Lee, 86 Mich. 564
Shrawley v. S. 153 Ind. 375
Shrewsbury v. Tufts, 41 W. Va.
217 442, 470,
Shreyer v. Jordan, 61 N. Y. S.
889 ,
Shulter v. Ins. Co. 62 Mo. 237 ..
Shultz v. Babcock, 166 111. 398
Shultz v. Shultz, 113 Mich. 502
v. Ter. (Ariz.) 52 Pac. 352.
Siberry v. S. 133 Ind. 677
717, 718,
v. S. 149 Ind. 684
Sibila v. Bahney, 34 Ohio St.
399
Sibley Warehouse Co. v. Durand
Co. 200 111. 357
Sickle v. Wolf, 91 Wis. 396
Siddall v. Jansen. 168 111. 45..
Sidway v. Missouri L. & L. S.
Co. 163 Mo. 342
Siebert v. P. 143 111. 592
Siese v. Meyer, 143 Mo. 547. ..
Si'evers v. Peters B. & L. Co.
151 Ind. 661
Sigal v. Miller (Tex. Cv. App.)
25 S. W. 1012
Sigerson v. Pomeroy, 13 Mo.
620 '
376
80
14
466
351
743
347
140
171
158
208
25
182
112
206
511
229
867
145
427
243
181
743
722
20
487
363
212
126
19
372
238
383
8
116
Sigler v. McConnell, 45 Neb. 598
358
Signa Iron Co. v. Green, 88 Fed.
207 145, 147
Sigsbee v. S. 43 Fla. 524
187, 361, 707
Silberberg v. Pearson, 75 Tex.
287 105
Silsby v. Michigan Car Co. 95
Mich. 207 483
Silver v. Parr, 115 Ind. 113... 346
Simmons v. S. 61 Miss. 243 325
v. S. (Tex. Cv. App.) 34 S.
W. 019 277
v. United States, 142 U. S.
148 171
Simnacher v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.)
43 S. W. 354 25
Simonds v. City of B. 93 Wis.
40 358
Simons v. S. (Tex. Cv. App.) 34
S. W. 619 275, 284
Simpson v. Post, 40 Conn. 321. 80
Simpson Brick Press Co. v.
Wounley, 166 111. 383... 113
Simrell v. Miller, 169 Pa. St.
326 126
Sims v. Metropolitan St. R. Co.
72 N. Y. S. 835 126
v. S. 43 Ala. 33 309
Sinclair v. Berndt, 87 111. 174.. 92
Sindram v. P. 88 N. Y. 203 171
Sines v. Superintendent, 55
Mich. 383 157
Sinnet v. Bowman, 151 111. 156
250
Sittig v. Birkestack, 38 Md. 158
40
Skeen v. S. (Miss.) 16 So. 495
240
Skipper v. S. 59 Ga. 63 219
Skow v. Locks (Neb.) 91 N.
W. 204 80, 209
Slack v. Harris, 200 111. 115
54, 105, 113, 363
Slaughter v. Metropolitan St. R.
Co. 116 Mo. 269 162
Sledge v. S. 99 Ga. 684
3, 6, 105 228.276
Slingerland v. Keyser, 127 Mich.
7 80
Slingloff v. Bruner, 174 111. 570
235
Sloan v. Fist (Neb.) 89 N. W.
760 70
v. Petzer, 54 S. Car. 314. 123
CXXX1V
TABLE OF CASES.
(References are to Sections.)
Slossen v. Burlington, &c. R. Co.
60 Iowa, 217 645
Smaggart v. Ter. (Okla.) 50 Pac.
96 4
Small v. Brainard, 44 111. 355. . 193
v S. 105 Ga. 669 71
Smalley v. Hendrickson, 29 N.
J. L. 373 157
Smalls v. S. 105 Ga. 669 71
Smallwood v. Com. 19 Ky. L.
R. 344 178
Smart v. Hodges, 105 Ala. 634. 129
Smiley v. Scott, 179 111. 142... 48
SmiseV v. S. 17 Ind. App. 519. 487
Smith v. Bank of New England,
70 N. H. 187 48, 94
v. Chicago & W. I. R. Co.
105 111. 511 208, 223
v. Cohn, 170 Pa. St. 132.. 126
v. Com. 17 Ky. 439.. 252, 253
v. Com. 1 Dur. (Ky.) 224,
228 331
v. Cornett, 18 Ky. L. R. 818
163
v. Crichton, 33 Md. 103... 4
v. Dawley, 92 Iowa, 312.. 191
v. Dukes, 5 Minn. 373 195
v. Easton Tr. Co. 167 Pa.
St. 209 133
v. Faulkner, 12 Gray (Mass.)
251 160
v. Gillett, 50 111. 301 123
v. Gray, 46 N. Y. S. 180.. 26
v. Grimes, 43 Iowa, 365... 220
v. Gulf, W. T. & P. R. Co.
(Tex. Cv. App.) 65 S. W.
88 191
v. Hall, 69 Conn. 651 25
v. Henline, 174 111. 184 74
v. Hutchinson, 83 Mo. 683. 157
v. Independent School Dist.
1 1 2 Iowa, 38 412
v. Kennard, 54 Neb. 523... 360
v. Lehigh V. R. Co. 170 N.
Y. 394 221
v. McMillen, 19 Ind. 391 ... 39
v. Mayfield, 163 111. 447 .. 40
v. Merchants, &c. Co. (Tex.
Cv. App.) 40 S. W. 1038
365
v. Meyers, 52 Neb. 70 ..71, 182
v. Middleton, 112 Ky. 592. 652
v. P. 25 111. 11 759
v. P. 74 111. 146 297, 716
v. P. 103 111. 85 816
v. P. 115 111. 17 265
Smith v. P. 142 111. 123
42, 201, 250, 251, 283
v. Pittsburg, Ft. W. & C. R.
Co. 23 Ohio St. 10 7
v. Richardson Lumber Co.
(Tex. Cv. App.) 47 S. W.
386 26
v. Roundtree, 185 111. 219. 236
v. S. 103 Ala. 40 4, 254
v. S. 107 Ala. 139 214
v. S. 118 Ala. 117 227
v. S. 63 Ga. 170 337
v. S. 94 Ga. 591 228
v. S. 95 Ga. 472 49
v. S. 109 Ga. 479 113
v. S. 117 Ga. 59 6
v. S. 28 Ind. 321 196
v. S. 58 Ind. 340 266, 816
v. S. 142 Ind. 289
169, 214, 216, 220, 221 367
v. S. 75 Miss. 542. .32a, 80, 280
v. S. 61 Neb. 296 307, 312
v. S. 41 N. J. L. 374 171
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 49 S.
W. 583 223
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 50 S.
W. 362 326
v. S. 1 Tex. App. 416...... 43
v. S. 24 Tex. Cr. App. 265. 304
v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. App. 618
307, 310
v. S. 36 Tex. Cr. App. 442. 290
v. S. 10 Wyo. 157 290
v. Schultz, 1 Scam. (111.)
490 815
v. Seattle (Wash.) 74 Pac.
676 215
v. Sioux City (Iowa) 93 N.
W. 8 1 1
v. Smith, 169 111. 623 21,56
v. Snyder, 77 Va. 440 412
V. South Carolina & G. R.
62 S. Car. 322 6
v. Southern R. Co. 53 S. Car.
121 20
v. Sovereign, &c. (Mo.) 77
S. W. 867 192
v. United States, 161 U. S.
85 210
v. Warden, 86 Mo. 395 532
v. Weston, 34 N. Y. S. 557
145
v. Wilmington & W. R. Co.
126 N. Car. 712 94
Smitson v. Southern P. Co. 37
Ore. 74 244
TABLE OF CASES.
CXXXV
(References are to Sections.)
Smoke, &c. Co. v. Lyford, 123
111. 300 286
Smurr v. S. 88 Ind. 504
4, 11, 70, 755
Snell v. S. 50 Ind. 516 324
Snider v. Adams Ex. Co. 63 Mo.
376 588
Snolley v. Hendrickson 29 N. J.
L. 371 157
Snowden v. Town of Somerset,
64 N. Y. S. 1088 347
v. Waterman, 105 Ga. 384
26a, 309
Snyder v. Lake Shore, &c. R. Co.
Co. (Mich.) 91 N. W. 643
119
v. Nelson, 31 Iowa, 238 347
v. S. 51 Ind. Ill 296
v. S. 59 Ind. 105 119
v. Wilson, 65 Mich. 336... 39
Solomon v. City Compress Co. 69
Miss. 319 116
v. Trisarri, 9 N. Mex. 480.. 126
Solomon v. Reis, 5 Ohio C. C.
375 38
v. Yrissarri, 9 N. Mex. 480
136
Sommer v. Gilmore, 168 Pa. St.
117 40
v. Huber, 183 Pa. St. 162. 39
Sommers v. Carbon Hill Coal Co.
01 Fed. 337 189
Soney v. S. 13 Lea (Tenn.) 472
26a, 245
Sonka v. Sonka (Tex. Cv. App.)
75 S. W. 325 25
Sonnefield v. Mayton (Tex. Cv.
App.) 39 S. W. 166 .... 198
South v. P. 98 111. 263 320
South Chicago C. R. Co. v. Du-
freene, 200 111. 464
68, 235, 243
South Covington & C. St. R. Co.
v. Stroth, 23 Ky. L. R.
1807 * 97
Southerland v. Texas, &c. R. Co.
(Tex. Cv. App.) 50 S. W.
195 549
v. Venard, 34 Ind. 390 4
Southern Bell T. & T. Co. v.
Mayo, 133 Ala. 641 ..49, 113
Southern Ind. R. Co. v. Davis
(Ind.) 9 6 N. E. 554 25
v. Harrell (Ind. App.) 66 N.
E. 1016 25, 70
Southern Ind. R. Co. v. Peyton,
157 Ind. 690.. 53, 115, 633
Southern M. Ins. Co. v. Hudson,
113 Ga. 434 206
v. White, 58 Ark. 277 186
Southern Pac. Co. v. Ammons
(Tex. Cv. App.) 26 S. W.
135 195
v. Smith, 95 Va. 190.. 652, 653
Southern R. Co. v. Bryan, 115
Ga. 659 204
v. Coursey, 115 Ga. 602.. 8, 26
v. O'Bryan (Ga.) 45 S. E.
1001 94, 205
v. Hageman, 121 Fed. 262. 25
v. Howell, 135 Ala. 639.. 66, 68
v. Kendrick, 40 Miss. 374. 170
v. Longbridge, 114 Ga. 173
7
v. Reaves (Ala.) 29 So. 594
223
v. Smith, 95 Va. 189.. 565, 570
Southwestern T. & T. Co. v.
Newman (Tex. Cv. App.)
34 S. W. 661 79
Soyer v. Great Falls Water Co.
1 5 Mont. 1 121
Spahn v. P. 137 111. 543 20,206
Sparf v. U. S. 156 U. S. 51
112, 153, 165, 269
Sparks v. Dawson, 47 Tex. 138
204
v. S. Ill Ga. 380 48
v. S. 34 Tex. Cr. App. 86
48, 275, 318
Spaulding v. Chicago, &c. R. Co.
98 Iowa, 219 650
Spear v. Sweeney, 88 Wis. 545
176
Spears v. S. 41 Tex. Cr. App. 527
21, 71
v. Town of Mt. Ayr, 66
Iowa, 721 363
v. U. S. 81 Fed. 694 351
Speir v. P. 122 111. 1 .105
Spence v. Huckins, 208 111. 309
25, 48
Spencer v. S. 50 Ala. 124 325
v. Terry's Estate (Mich.) 94
N. W. 372 247
Spensley v. Lancashire Ins. Co.
62 Wis. 453 203
Sperry v. Spaulding, 45 Cal. 544
245
Spicer v. S. 105 Ala. 123.. 210, 221
CXXXV1
TABLE OF CASES.
(References are to Sections.}
Spies v. P. 122 111. 1
3, 235, 709, 718, 722, 760
Spigner v. S. 103 Ala. 30 196
Spitalera v. Second Ave. R. Co.
25 N. Y. S. 919 94
Spradley v. S. 80 Miss. 82 80
Spraggins v. S. (Ala.) 35 So.
1003 66, 80, 297
Sprague, Warner & Co. v. Ha-
zenwinkle, 53 111. 419... 467
Springdale Cemetery Asso. v.
Smith, 24 111. 481 19, 70
Springer v. City of Chicago, 135
111. 552/560 363
Springfield Coal Co. v. Punten-
ney, 200 111. 9 239
Springfield, &c. R. Co. v. Hoeff-
ner, 175 111. 642.. 58, 104,
119, 238, 565, 652, 653
v. Puntenney, 200 111. 12
126, 238, 363
Spring Valley Coal Co. v. Robi-
zas, 207 111. 22 363
v. Rowatt, 196 111. 156 241
Sproul v. City of Seattle, 17
Wash. 256 Ill
St. Clair M. S. Co. v. City of St.
Clair, 96 Mich. 463 25
St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Bur-
rows, 62 Kas. 89 234
v. Dawson, 7 Kas. App. 466
14
St. Louis & S. W. R. Co. v.
Ball, 28 Tex. Cv. App. 287
33
v. Byas, 12 Tex. Cv. App.
657 7
v. Casedy (Tex. Cv. App.) 40
S. W. 198 184
v. Cates, 15 Tex. Cv. App.
135 588
v. Ferguson (Tex. Cv. App.)
64 S. W. 797 25, 71
v. Hughes (Tex. Cv. App.)
. 73 S. W. 976 7
v. McAdams (Tex. Cv. App.)
68 S. W. 319 94
v. McCullough (Tex. Cv.
App.) 32 S. W. 285 193
v. Silbey (Tex. Cv. App. 68
S. W. 516 191, 198
v. Smith (Tex. Cv. App.) 63
S. W. 1064 . . , 192
v. Smith (Tex. Cv. App.) 77
S. W. 28 529
St. Louis & S. W. R. Co. v.
Spivey (Tex. Cv. App.)
73 S. W. 973 191
St. Louis, &c. Co. v. Union, &c.
Bank, 209 111. 457 385
St. Louis, &c. R. Co. v. Beecher,
65 Ark. 44 247
v. Magness, 68 Ark. 289... 244
-v. Norton (Ark.) 73 S. W.
1095 351
v. Parks (Tex. Cv. App.)
73 S. W. 439 194
v. Philpot (Ark.) 77 S. W.
901 80
St. Louis, &c. Yards v. Godfrey,
198 111. 294
74, 542, 543, 638, 655
St. Louis A. & T. H. R. Co. v.
Barrett 152 111. 168 .... 25
v. Bauer 156 111. 106 133
v. Holman, 155 111. 21 53
v. Manley, 58 111. 304 ..81, 94
v. Odurn, 156 111. 78 238
St. Louis B. Co. v. Miller, 138
111. 475 238
St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v.
Baker, 67 Ark. 531 236
v. Britz, 72 111. 256 119
v. Cantrell, 37 Ark. 523
522, 566
v. Hecht, 38 Ark. 357.... 347
v. Kirby, 104 111. 345
114, 196
v. Neal (Ark.) 78 S. W.
220 122
v. Phillips, 66 Fed. 35.211,223
v. Vickers, 122 U. S. 360. 189
v. Warren, 65 Ark. 619.. 30
v. Woodward, 70 Ark. 441
80, 244
St. Louis, K. C. & N. R. Co.
v. Cleary, 77 Mo. 634.... 94
St. Louis. K. & W. R. Co. v. St.
Louis U. Stock Yards
(Mo.) 29 S. W. 399
192, 195
Staats v. Byers, 73 N. Y. S.
893 80
Stafford v. City of Oskaloosa,
57 Iowa/ 748 90
Stalling* v. Newman, 26 Ala.
304. .491, 492, 493, 496, 500
Standard. &c. Ins. Co. v. Davis,
59 Kas. 521 351
v. Schmaltz, 66 Ark. 588.. 71
TABLE OF CASES.
CXXXVll
(References are to Sections.}
Stanfield v. Phoenix L. Asso. 53
Mo. App. 595 118
Stanley v. Cedar Rapids, &c. R.
Co. 119 Iowa, 52,6
216, 652, 653
v. Montgomery, 102 Ind.
102 209, 308
v. Sutherland, 54 Ind. 339
41
Stanton v. Southern R. Co. 56
S. Car. 398 27
Starch v. S. 63 Ind. 283 815
Starr v. U. S. 164 U. S. 627
119, 170, 317
Starrette Co. v. O'Rourke, 172
111. 177 25
State Nat. Bank v. Bennett, 8
Ind. App. 679 43
Statford v. Goldring, 197 111.
156 85
Stauning v. Great N. R. Co. 88
Minn. 480 6
Staylor v. Ball, 24 Md. 190... 415
Stayner v. Joyce, 120 Ind. 99. 232
Steadman v. Keets, 129 Mich.
669 195
Stearnes v. Farrand, 60 N. Y.
S. 501 145
v. Johnson, 17 Minn. 142. 360
Stebbins v. Keene Tp. 55 Mich.
552 154
Steed v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 67
S. W. 328 85
Steele v. Davis, 75 Ind. 197
193, 507
v. P. 45 111. 157 340
Steen v. Sanders, 116 Ala. 155
213
Steers v. Holmes, 79 Mich. 434
415
Stein v. Vanice, 44 Neb. 132
71, 243
Steiner v. Jeffries, 118 Ala.
573 80
v. P. 187 111. 245. .21, 256, 773
Steinmeyer v. P. 95 111. 389
195, 250. 256
Stell v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 58
S. W. 75 258
Stephan v. Metzger, 95 Mo.
App. 609 87
Stephens v. Anderson (Tex. Cv.
App.) 36 S. W. 1000. . . 26
v. Koken Barber S. Co. 67
Mo. App. 587 137
v. Porter, 29 Tex. Cv. App.
556 . . 197
Stephens v. S. 10 Tex. App. 120
Stephenson v. S. 110 Ind. 358
170
v. Stephenson, 62 Iowa,
166 696
v. Wright, 111 Ala. 579 .. 196
Sterling Hydraulic Co. v. Will-
iams, 66 111. 400 545
Sterling Organ Co. v. House, 25
W. Va. 65 18
Stern v. Frommer, 30 N. Y. S.
1067 125
v. P. 102 111. 555 192
Sternberg v. Mailhos, 99 Fed.
43 360
Steven v. Talcott, 1 1 Vt. 25... 171
Stevens v. Com. 20 Ky. L. R.
48 25
v. Com. 20 Ky. L. R. 544
260
v. Maxwell, 65 Kas. 835.. 53, 90
v. Metzger, 95 Mo. App.
609 80
v. Minneapolis, 42 Minn.
136 211
v. Pendleton, 94 Mich.
405 199
v. S. 133 Ala. 28 88
v. S. (Ala.) 35 So. 124. . 780
v. S. 65 Miss. 330 837
v. S. 19 Neb. 650 772
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 49 S.
W. 105 84, 280
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 58 S.
W. 96 25
v. Stevens, 127 Ind. 560.. 200
v. Walton (Colo. App.) 68
Pac. 834 80
Stevenson v. Chicago & N. W.
R. Co. 94 Iowa, 719 45
v. Elberrale Coal Co. 201
Pa. St. 121 672
v. U. S. 86 Fed. 106 259
v. U. S. 162 U. S. 313... 272
Stewart v. Anderson, 111 Iowa,
329 206
v. De Loach, 86 Ga. 729.. 321
v. Fowler, 37 Kas. 679... 439
v. Mills, 18 Fla. 57 44
v. Nelson. 79 Mo. 522 197
v. S. 133 Ala. 105 724
v. S. 22 Ohio St. 478 340
v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. App. 174
289. 290
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 77
S. W. 791 304
cxxxvni
TABLE OF CASES.
(References are to Sections.)
Stewart v. Schall, 63 Md. 294
438, 439, 443,
Stickney's Will, 104 Wis. 581.
Stiles v. Neillsville Milling Co.
87 Wis. 266
Stillwell v. Gray, 17 Ark. 473.
Stitz v. S. 104 Ind. 359
Stoball v. S. 116 Ala. 452
Stobie v. Dills, 62 111. 432
Stocker v. Green, 94 Mo. 280..
Stocks v. Scott, 188 111. 266..
Stockslager v. U. S. 116 Fed.
(C. C.) 599
25, 715, 843,
Stockwell v. S. 27 Ohio St. 566
Stoffer v. S. 15 Ohio St. 47...
Stokes v. P. 53 N. Y. 183
v. Ralph Tp. 187 Pa. St.
333
v. Saltonstall, 13 Pet. (U.
S.) 181 ,
Stoll v. Loving, 120 Fed. 805..
Stondt v. Shepherd, 73 Mich.
58
Stone v. S. 105 Ala. 60.. 113,
Stone & larrison v. Fesselman,
23 Ind. App. 293
Stoneking v. S. 118 Ala. 70
253,
Stoner v. Mau (Wyo.) 73 Pac.
548
v. Millikin, 85 111. 218
Story v. S. 99 Ind. 413
Stough v. Ogden, 49 Neb. 291.
Stout v. S. 90 Ind. 12
707. 716,
Stover v. P. 56 N. Y. 317
222,
Stowell v. Moore, 89 111. 563..
528
80
107
172
301
269
182
116
200
844
98
.218
337
70
538
118
187
318
356
783
363
415
260
353
730
266
47
Stowers v. Singer, 24 Ky. 395. 244
Strader v. Monroe, 202 Pa. St.
626 480, 482
Strahle v. First Nat. Bank, 47
Neb. 319 127
Stratton v. Central City, &c.
Co. 95 111. 32 56, 250
v. Dale, 45 Neb. 472 243
Straus v. Minzesheeiner, 78 111.
497 80
Street v. S. 67 Ala. 87 63
Street R. Co. v. Bolton, 43 Ohio
St. 226 560
v. Stone, 54 Kas. 83 . . 14
Stribling v. Prettyman, 57 111.
377 156
Strickt'adden v. Yipprick, 49
111. 288 347
Strickland v. S. 98 Ga. 84.... 3. 6
v. S. 1,15 Ga. 222 228
Stringam v. Parker, 159 111.
310 53, 71
Stringer v. Singleteny (Tex. Cv.
App.) 23 S. W. 1117... 96
Stringham v. Cook, 75 Wis. 590
13
Strohm v. Hayes, 70 111. 41 243
Strong v. S. 95 Ga. 499 243
v. S. 61 Neb. 35
206, 221, 366, 367
Stroud v. Simith, 194 Pa. St.
502 71
Stryker v. Goodnow, 123 U. S.
527 48
Stuart v. Line, 1 1 Pa. Sup. Ct.
345 90
v. Mitchum, 135 Ala. 546
25
v. P. 42 Mich. 260 324
Stuck v. Yates, 30 Ind. App.
441 244
Stumer v. Pitchman, 124 111.
250 65
Stumph v. Miller, 142 Ind. 446
47
Stumps v. Kelly, 22 111. 140.. 3
Stutsman v. Ter. 7 Okla. 490.. 222
Suddeth v. S. 112 Ga. 407
80, 290, 321
Sugar Creek Min. Co. v. Peter-
son, 177 HI. 329 80, 192
Sullivan v. Brooks, 31 N. Y. S.
36 124
v. Collins, 107 Mich. 291. 63
v. Eddy, 164 111. 391 .... 113
v. Jefferson Ave. R. Co.
133 Mo. 1 243
v. McManers, 45 N. Y. S.
1079 261.
v. Market St. R. Co. 136
Cal. 479 191
v. P. 114 111. 27 226, 227
v. Philadelphia & R. Co. 30
Pa. St. 234 .-. 538
v. S. 117 Ala. 214 48
v. S. 52 Ind. 309 295
v. S. 80 Miss. 596 101, 255
v. S. 9 Ohio C. C. 652.... 229
v. S. 100 Wis. 283 277
Suiter v. S. 76 Ga. 105 296
Sulyewski v. Windholz, 30 N.
Y. S. 230 124
TABLE OF CASES.
CXXX1X
(References are to Sections.)
Summerlot v. Hamilton, 121
Ind. 91 247
Summitt Coal Co. v. Shaw, 16
Ind. App. 9 7
Sumner v. S. 109 Ga. 142 272
v. S. 5 Blackf. (Ind.) 579
299
Sumpter v. S. (Fla.j 33 So.
981 204
Sunberg v. Babcock, 66 Iowa,
519 514
Sunnyside, &c. Co. v. Reitz, 14
Ind. App. 478 126
Sunset T. & T. Co. v. Day, 70
Fed. 364 236
Supreme Council C. K. v. Fi-
delity & C. Co. 63 Fed.
48 117
Surber v. Mayfleld, 156 Ind.
375 200
Susquehana, &c. Co. v. Malone,
73 Md. 268 681
Suther v. S. 118 Ala. 88 102
Sutherland v. Hankins, 56 Ind.
343 4
v. Holliday (Neb.) 90 N.
W. 937 118
v. S. 148 Ind. 695 7
v. Venard, 34 Ind. 390
13, 358
Sutherlin v. S. 148 Ind. 695... 721
Suttle v. Finnegan, 86 111. App.
423 245
Sutton v. Madre, 47 N. Car.
320 85
Swaggert v. Ter. 6 Okla. 344.. 13
Swan v. P. 98 111. 612 250
v. S. 39 Tex. Cr. App. 531
269
Swann v. S. 64 Md. 423 168
Swanson v. Menominee E. L. R.
& P. Co. 113 Mich. 603
141
Swearingen v. Inman, 198 111.
255 243
Sweenie v. S. 59 Neb. 269.... 247
Sweet v. Chicago, M. & S. P. R.
Co. 6 S. Dak. 281 131
v. Excelsior E. Co. 57 N.
J. L. 224 94
Swensen v. Bender, 114 Fed. 1. 25
Swift & Co. v. Fue, 167 HI. 443
120. 123
v. Rutkowski, 167 111. 159
250, 363
v. Williams, 2 Ind. 366... 399
Switzer v. Norton, 38 N. Y. S.
350 145
Swope v. S. 115 Ala. 40 251
Sword v. Keith, 31 Mich. 247
28, 87
Sykes v. P. 127 111. 117 55
Symmes, v. Brown, 13 Ind. 318
158
Syndicate Ins. Co. v. Cutchings,
104 Ala. 176 351
T
Taft v. Wildman, 15 Ohio, 123
Talbort v. Mearns, 21 Mo. 427
Talbotton R. Co. v. Gibson, 106
Ga. 229 130,
Tanderup v. Hansen, 8 S. Dak.
375
Tapley v. Tapley, 10 Minn. 458
Tarbell v. Forbes, 177 Mass.
238 206, 211,
Tate v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 77
S. W. 796
v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. App. 231
Tathwell v. City of Cedar Rap-
ids, 114 Iowa, 180
Tatum v. Mohr. 21 Ark. 349..
v. S. 131 Ala. 32
v. S. 61 Neb. 229
Tawma Coal Co. v. Bradley, 2
Wash. 606
Taylor v. Bartholomew (Idaho)
53 Pac. 325
v. Burrell, 7 Pa. Super. Ct.
461
v. Corley, 113 Ala. 580...
v. Cox, 153 111. 228
21, 211,
v. Felder, 5 Tex. Cv. App.
417
v. Felsing, 164 111. 331
25. 183, 231. 368, 382,
v. Laden, 33 Mo. 205
v. Pegram, 151 111. 117
25,
v. Pullen, 152 Mo. 434
v. S. 97 Ga. 432
v. S. 105 Ga. 746
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 42 S.
W. 285 25.
6
19
142
120
527
221
376
258
100
211
327
310
410
126
191
130
692
94
620
660
696
347
26
6
cxl
TABLE OF CASES.
(References are to Sections.}
Taylor v. Scherpe & K. A. T. Co.
133 Mo. 349 196
v. Ter. (Ariz.) 64 Pac. 423
265
Teague v. Lindsey, 106 Ala.
266 66
Tedbetter v. S. (Tex. Cr.) 32
S. W. 903 109
Tedens v. Sanitary Dist. 149
111. 87 241
v. Schumers, 112 111. 268. 383
Teel v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 67
S. W. 531 255
Telegraph Co. v. Lowrey, 32
Neb. 732 243
Telker v. S. 54 Ark. 489 215
Templeton v. Green (Tex. Cv.
App.) 25 S. W. 1073... 8
Ten Eyck v. Witbeck, 55 App.
Div. (N. Y.) 165 94
Tennessee Coal, I. & R. Co. v.
Stevens (Ala.) 16 So. 22
120
Tennessee, C. J. & R. Co. v.
Stevens, 115 Ala. 461... 129
Tensing v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.)
45 S. W. 572 296
Terre Haute, &c. R. Co. v.
Brunker, 128 Ind. 551.. 652
v. Eggman, 159 111. 550
119, 231, 233
v. Hybarger, 67 111. App.
480 44
v.Jackson, 81 Ind. 19... 187
v. MeCorKle, 140 Ind. 613
349
Terrell v. McCowen, 91 Tex.
231 26
v. Rittenhouse, 28 Ind. App.
633 71
v. Russell, 16 Tex. Cv. App.
573 . . 80, 196
Terrill v. Tillson (Vt.) 54 Atl.
187 27
Territory v. Baca (N. Mex.) 71
Pac. 460
3, 55, 102. 255, 767
v. Baker, 4 N. Mex. 236.. 44
v. Burgess, 8 Mont. 57
52, 336, 339
v. Chavez, 8 N. Mex. 528.. 288
v. Claypool (N. Mex:) 71
Pac. 463 82
v. Cordova (N. Mex.) 68
Pac. 919 44
v. De Gutman 8 N. Mex.
92 . 88
Territory v. Friday, 8 N. Mex.
204 270
v. Gatliff (Okla.) 37 Pac.
809 214, 268
v. Gonzales (N. Mex.) 68
Pac. 925... 23, 213, 226, 258
v. Griego, 8 N. Mex. 133.. 188
v. Guillen (N. Mex.) 66
Pac. 527 86
v. Harper, 1 Ariz. 399 14
v. Lermo, 8 N. Mex. 566.. 303
v. Leyba (N. Mex.) 47
Pac. 718 215
v. Lucero, 8 N. Mex. 543
178, 21-9
v. Mahaffey, 3 Mont. 116.. 284
v. O'Hare, 1 N. Dak. 30.. 208
v, Padilla, 8 N. Mex. 510. 270
v. Turner (Ariz.) 31 Pac.
368 192
v. Vialpando, 8 N. Mex.
211 270
Terry v. Beatrice Starch Co. 43
Neb. 866 195
v. Buffington, 11 Ga. 337. 696
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 66
S. W. 451 80
v. Shively, 64 Ind. 112.... 94
Tettle v. S. fTex. Cr. App.) 31
S. W. 677 93
Texarkana & Ft. S. R. Co. v.
Spencer, 28 Tex. Cv. App.
251 8
Texas, &c. R. Co. v. Ballinger
(Tex. Cv. App.) 40 S.
W. 822 200
v. Birchfield, 12 Tex. Cv.
App. 145 53
v. Brick, 83 Tex. 598 619
v. Burnett, 80 Tex. 536... 183
v. Carr (Tex. Cr. App.) 42
S. W. 126 627
v. Cody, 67 Fed. 71 8
v. Durrett, 2 6 Tex. Cv. App.
268 170
v. Durrett, 24 Tex. Cr. App.
103 84, 106
v. Echols, 17 Tex. Cv. App.
677 198
v. Gentry, 163 U. S. 353.. 196
v. Gevin (Tex. Cv. App.)
68 S. W. 721: 80
v. Gray (Tex. Cv. App.) 71
S. W. 316 94
v. Johnson, 75 Tex. 161.. 640
v. Jones (Tex. Cv. App.)
39 S. W. 124 191
TABLE OF CASES.
cxli
(References are to Sections.)
Texas, &c. R, Co. v. McCoy, 90
Tex. 264 ' 71
v. Magill, 15 Tex. Cv. App.
353 7
v. Mitchell (Tex. Cv. App.)
26 S. W. 154 43
v. Moore, 8 Tex. Cv. App.
289 172
v. Mortenen (Tex. Cv.
App. 66 S. W. 99 90, 191
v. Nelson, 9 Tex. Cv. App.
156 183
v. Nolan. 62 Fed. 552 243
v. Reed (Tex. Cv. App.) 32
S. W. 118 243
v. Robinson,, 4 Tex. Cv.
App. 121 6
v. Scott, 30 Tex. Cv. App.
496 238
v. Smissen (Tex. Cv. App.)
73 S. W. 42 20
v. Terns (Tex. Cv. App.) 77
R. W. 231 569
v. Vaughan, 16 Tex. Cv.
App. 403 94
Texas Brew. Co. v. Walters
(Tex. Cv. App.) 43 S.
W. 548 360
v. Watson, 112 Fed. 402.. 7
Texas Loan Agency v. Fleming
(Tex. Cv. App.) 46 S.
W. 63 119
Tharp v. S. 15 Ala. 749 361
Thatcher v. Quirk, 4 Idaho, 267. 19
Thayer County Bank v. Hud-
dleston (Neb.) 95 N. W.
471 196
Thiede v. P. 159 U. S. 510. . . . 351
v. Utah, 159 U. S. 510... 347
Thill v. Hoyt, 56 N. Y. S. 78. 127
Thirkfield v. Mountain V. C.
Asso. 12 Utah, 76 358
Thistle v. Frostburg Coal Co.
10 Md. 129 3
Thorn v. Pittard, 62 Fed. 232. 351
Thomas v. Gary, 26 Colo. 485. 120
v. Gates, 126 Cal. 1
48, 71, 223
v. S. 103 Ala. 18 102
v. S. 126 Ala. 4 48, 80, 94
v. S. 133 Ala. 139.27, 63, 192
v. S. 95 Ga, 484.... 7, 68, 220
v. S. 42 Tex. Cr. App. 386
254
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 73
S. W. 1045... . 290
Thomas v. Union R. Co. 45 N.
Y. S. 920 348
Thomley v. S. 36 Tex. Cr. App.
118 Ill
Thompson v. Anderson, 86 Iowa,
703 80
v. Avery, 11 Utah, 214... 144
v. Boden, 81 Ind. 176 118
v. Brannin, 19 Ky. L. R.
454 196
v. Brerman, 104 Wis. 564. 145
v. Com. 88 Va. 45... 322, 324
v. Duff, 119 111. 226 20, 86
v. Force, 65 111. 370.. .66, 243
v. Johnson (Tex. Cv. App.)
58 S. W. 1030 172
/ v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. 51
Neb. 527 125
v. O'Conner, 115 Ga. 120. 27
v. P. 6 Colo. 496 25
v. P. 125 111. 261 243
v. S. 106 Ala. 67 208, 223
v. S. 131 Ala. 18 295
v. S. 73 Miss. 584 317
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 30
S. W. 667 236
v. S. 33 Tex. Cr. App. 217
v. Security, &c. Ins. Co. 63
S. Car. 290 347,
v. Simpson, 128 N. Y. 270
v. U. S. 157 U. S. 271....
Thork v. Goewy, 85 111. 616..
Thorn v. Cosand, 160 Ind. 566
Thome v. McVeagh, 75 111. 81.
Thornton v. Perry, 105 Ga.
837
v. S. 113 Ala. 43
v. S. 20 Tex. App. 535. ..
v. Thornton, 39 Vt. 122...
Thorp v. Carvalho, 36 N. Y. S.
1
Thorton v. S. 117 Wis. 338. .
304
351
145
257
1
7
408
141
306
744
211
25
110
Thrall v. Wilson, 17 Pa. Super.
Ct. 376 67
Thrawley v. S. 153 Ind. 375
25, 71, 374
Threadgill v. Commissioners,
116 N. Car. 616 175
Threshing Machine Co. v. Hoff-
man, 86 Minn. 30 8
Throckmorten v. Missouri, K. &
T. R. Co. 14 Tex. Cv.
App. 222 198
Tibbe v. Kamp, 154 Mo. 545.. 113
cxlii
TABLE OF CASES.
( References are to Sections.)
Tichenor v. Newman, 186 111.
264
Tidwell v. New South B. & L.
Asso. Ill Ga. 807
v. S. (Tex Cv. App.) 48 S.
W. 184
v. S. 40 Tex. Cr. App. 38.
Tiffiany v. Com. 121 Pa. St.
180
Tigerina v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. App.
302
Tillery v. S. 99 Ga. 209
Tillinghast v. McLeod, 17 R. I.
208
Tillman v. St. Louis Tr. Co.
(Mo. App.) 77 S. W. 321
544,
Tilly v. Hudson, &c. R. Co. 29
N. Y. 252
Timmons v. S. 34 Ohio St. 426
Tinney v. New Jersey Steamboat
Co. 12 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.)
3
Tischler v. Kurtz, 35 Fla. 323.
Tittle v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. App.
96
Tobey v. Burlington, C. R. & N.
R. Co. 94 Iowa, 256
Tobias v. Tn'est, 103 Ala. 664
Tobin v. Gregg, 34 Pa. St. 446
v. P. 101 111. 123
Todd v. Banner, 7 Ind. App.
368 113, 478,
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 44 S.
W. 1096
Toledo, &c. R. Co. v. Bailey, 145
111. 159 21,' 153,
v. Bray, 57 111. 514
v. Cline, 135 111. 48
v. Ingraham, 77 111. 313
80,
v. Larmon, 67 111. 71
v. Lockhart, 71 111. 630,
568
v. Maine. 67 111. 299
v. Patterson, 63 111. 306..
v. Schuckman, 50 Ind. 42.
Toler v. S. 16 Ohio St. 585
Toll v. S. 40 Fla. 169
Toilet v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 55
S. W. 335
Toluca. M. & N. R. Co. v. Haws,
194 111. 92
63
136
320
293
329
252
274
131
549
649
808
211
48
326
25
347
157
44
531
800
155
646
250
639
248
589
567
80
247
323
25
278
238
Tomle v. Hampton, 129 111. 384
238
Tomlinson v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.)
43 S. W. 332 294, 295
v. Wallace, 16 Wis. 234.. 347
Tompkins v. Gardner, 69 Mich.
58 156
v. Montgomery, 123 Cal.
219 80, 163
Toole v. Bearce, 91 Me. 209... 196
Toops v. S. 92 Ind. 16 716
Toplitz v. Bauer, 161 N. Y. 325
71
Torey v. S. 41 Tex. Cr. App.
543 229
Torres v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 55
S. W. 828 196, 291
Totten v. Burhans, 103 Mich. 6 144
Tower v. McFarland (Neb.) 96
N. W. 172 94
v. Haslam, 84 Me. 86 27
Towle v. Stimpson Mill Co.
(Wash.) 74 Pac. 471.... 80
Town of Boswell v. Wakley, 149
Ind. 64 480
Town of Elkhart v. Ritter, 66
Ind. 136 594
Town of Evans v. Dickey, 117
111. 291 116
Town of Fox, v. Town of Ken-
dall 97 111. 80 284
Town of Havana v. Biggs, 58
111. 483 200
Town of Noblesville v. Vestal,
118 Ind. 80 14
Town of Vinegar Hill v. Busson,
42 111. 45 238
Town of West Oovington v.
Schultz, 16 Ky. L. R.
831 236
Town of Wheatfield v. Grund-
mann, 164 111. 250 102
Town of Wheaton v. Hadley, 131
111. 644 48
Town of Windsor v. Stockdate,
95 Md. 196 83
Towns v. S. Ill Ala. 1.60, 322, 323
Townsend's Estate, In re (Iowa)
97 N. W. 111. 183,703. 704
Tozer v. Hersbey, 15 Minn. 257. 321
Trabue v. Com. 23 Ky. L. R.
2135 255
Tracy v. Hacket, 19 Ind. App.
133 6
Traders Deposit Bank v. Henry,
20 Ky. L. R. 1506 4
TABLE OF CASES.
cxliii
(References are to Sections.)
Trager v. Shepherd (Miss.) 18
So. 122 197
Trask v. P. 104 111. 569 104
Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Harvey,
82 Va. 951 422,423
v. Randolph, 78 Fed. 754
121, 124, 129
Traver v. Spokane St. R. Co. 25
Wash. 244
529, 634, 639, 640, 644, 530
Travers v. U. S., 6 App. Cas. (D.
C.) 450 25
Traxler v.' Greenwich Tp. 168
Pa. St. 214 244
Traylor v. Townsend, 61 Tex.
147 25
Treat v. Bates, 27 Mich., 390. 211
Treece v. American Asso. (C. C.
A.) 122 Fed. 598 189
Treiber v. Burrows, 27 Md. 132
435
Treschman v. Treschman, 28 Ind.
App. 206 7-, 367
Tresh v. Newell, 62 111. 196 1
Trezevant v. Rains (Tex. Civ.
App.) 25 S. W. 1092 32
Trimble v. Ter. (Ariz.) 71 Pac.
932 368
Trinity & S. R. Co. v. Schofield,
72 Tex. 496 1
Triolo v. Foster (Tex. Civ. App.)
57 S. W. 698 109, 198
Trish v. Newell, 62 111. 202.. 694
Trodgen v. Deckard, 47 Ind.
358, 472
Trogdon v. S. 133 Ind. 7.. 796, 802
Troy v. Rogers, 113 Ala. 131.. 48
Troy Min. Co. v. Thomas, 15 S.
Dak. 238 250
Truelove v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.)
71 S. W. 601 289
Truesdale v. Ford, 37 HI. 210. .659
Trumble v. Happy, 114 Iowa
624 53
Trumbull v. Erickson, 97 Fed.
'891 25,113
Truskett v. Bronaugh (Indian
Ter.) 76 S. W. 294 126
Truslow v. S. 95 Tenn. 189 80
Trustees v. McCormick & Bros.
41 111. 323 48
Truxton v. Dait Stayle Co. (Del.)
42 Atl. 131 '. 196
Tubbs v. Ogden, 46 Iowa. 137. 869
Tuberson v. S. 26 Fla. 472.. 288
Tucker v. Call, 45 Ind. 31 500
v. S. 114 Ga. 61 56, 228
v. S. 89 Md. 472 649
Tudor v. Com. 19 Ky. L. R.
1039 255
Tudor Iron Works v. Weber, 129
111. 539 652
Tully v. Despard, 31 W. Va.
370 17
v. Excelsior Iron Works, 115
111. 544 80
Tunnicliffe v. Fox (Neb.) 94 N.
W. 1032 198
Turley v. Griffin, 106 Iowa, 161
44
Turly v. P. 188 111. 633 119
Turner v. Com. 86 Pa. St. 54.. 328
v. Cook, 36 Ind. 129 696
v. First Nat. Bank, 78 Ind.
19 158
v. Ft. Worth & D. C. R. Co.
(Tex. Cv. App.) 30 S. W.
253 243
v. Goldsboro Lumber Co.,
119 N. Car. 387 ...... 347
v. S. 124 Ala. 59 65
v. S. 102 Ind. 427 714
v. Ter. 11 Okla. 660 86
v. Tootle, 9 Kas. App. 765
7
Tusley v. White (Ky.) 54 S. W.
'169 360
Tutt v. Com. 20 Ky. L. R. 492
282. 276
Tuttle v. Wood, 115 Iowa, 507 7
Tutwiler Coal C. & I. Co. v. Ens-
len, 129 Ala. 336 27
Twining v. Martin, 65 111. 157. . 20
Tyler v. Chesapeake & 0. R. Co.
88 Va. 389 170, 613,621
v. Third Ave. R. Co. 41 N.
Y. S. 523 207
v. Tyler, 78 Mo. App. 240. . 196
Tyler, Ullman & Co. v. Western
U. Tel. Co. 60 111. 421 308
Tyree v. Parham, 66 Aid. 424. . 43
Tyson v. Williamson, 96 Va.
636 . 86
U
U. S. v. Connelly, 1 Fed. 779.. 189
v. Faulkner', 35 Fed. 731.. 329
v. Fenwick, 4 Cranch (U.
S.) 680 765
cxliv
TABLE OF CASES.
(References are to Sections.)
U. S. v. Folson, 7 N. Mex. 532. 279
v. Harper, 33 Fed. 471... 299
v. Jackson, 29 Fed. 503.. 295
v.Keller, 19 Fed. 633 165
v. Long, 30 Fed. 678 840
v. Neverson, 1 Mackey (D.
C.) 154 288
v. Schneider, 21 D. C. 381
189
v. Sykes, 58 Fed. 1004.... 288
U. S. Brewing Co. v. Stolten-
berg, 211 111. 585 382
U. S. Ex. Co. v. Jenkins, 64
Wis. 542 303
L T . S. Fidelity & G. Co. v.
Charles, 131 Ala. 657... 200
U. S. Life Ins. Co. v. Lesser,
126 Ala. 568 170
U. S. Sugar Refiner v. Prov.
Steam & G. P. Co. 62 Fed.
375 347
Udell v. Citizens' St. R. Co. 152
Ind. 507 , 232
Uhl v. Robison, 8 Neb. 272... 116
Ulmer v. S. 14 Ind. 52 288
Ulun v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 32
S. W. 699 255
Underwood v. American Mortg.
Co. 97 Ga. 238 174
v. Hart, 23 Vt. 120 27
v. White, 45 111. 438 25
v. Wolf. 131 111. 425... 46, 249
Union, &c. Ins. Co. v. Buchan-
an, 100 Ind. 63.86, 181, 308
v. Skipper, 115 Fed. 69... 307
Union, &c. R. Co. v. Callaghan,
161 U. S. 91 351
v. Ruzicka (Neb.) 91 N.
W. 543. .25, 80., 86, 118, 244
v. Stanwood (Neb.) 91 N.
W. 191 12
v. Sternberger, 8 Kas. App.
131 53
v. Sue, 25 Neb. 779 567
Union Bank v. Stone, 50 Me.
595 222
Union E. R. Co. v. Nixon, 199
111. 235 48
Union Gold Min. Co. v. Craw-
ford, 29 Co]o. 511 90
Union St. R. Co. v. Stone, 54
Kas. 83 5
Union Tr. Co. v. Vandercook
(Ind.) 69 N. E. 487 234
v. Vandercook, 32 Ind. App.
621 . . 634
University Press v. Williams,
62 N. Y. S. 986 145
Unruh v. S. 105 Ind. 118
209, 216
Upchurch v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.)
39 S. W. 371 281, 304
Upstone v. P. 109 111. 169
48, , 5, 782
Utah Optical Co. v. Keith, 18
Utah, 477 357
Utterback v. Com. 20 Ky. L. R.
1515 263
v. S. 153 Ind. 545... 357
Vale v. P. 161 111. 310 215
Valentine v. Hickle, 39 Ohio
St. 23 460
v. Sweatt (Tex. Cv. App.)
78 S. W. 385 196
Valette v. Bilinski, 167 HI. 565
124, 149
Vanardsdale v. Hax, 107 Fed.
878 171
Vanardsdell's Adm'r v. Louis-
ville & N. R. <Jo. 23 Ky.
L. R. 1666 124
Van Bergen v. Eulberg, 111
Iowa, 139 94
Van Brown v. S. 34 Tex. 186.. 296
Van Buren v. S. 63 Neb. 453. . . 225
Van Buskirk v. Day, 32 111. 266
235
Van Camp Hardware Co. v. O'-
Brien (Ind. App.) 62 N.
E. 464 191
Vance v. S. 34 Tex. Cr. App.
395 103
v.Vance, 74 Ind. 370 126
Vancleave v. Clark, 118 Ind.
61 360
Vanderhorst Brewing Co. v.
Armhine (Md.) 56 Atl.
834 .
Van Duzor v. Allen, 90 111. 499
144
170
Van Etten v. Edwards, 47 Neb.
279 129
Vanhousen v. Broehl, 59 Neb.
48 243
Vann v. S. 83 Ga. 44 295
Van Patton v. Beals, 46 Iowa,
62 403
Van Pelt v. Davenport. 42 Iowa.
314 348. 349
TABLE OF CASES.
cxlv
(References are to Sections.)
Van Straaten v. P. 26 Colo.
184 816
Van Syoc v. S. (Neb.) 96 N. W.
266 715
Van Winkle v. Chicago M. &
St. P. R. Co. 93 Iowa,
509 118
Varner v. Western & A. R. Co.
108 Ga. 813 185
Vanghan v. Com. 85 Va. 672
337, 728, 781
v. S. 37 Ark. 1 304
Vaughn v. Ferrall, 57 Ind. 182
347
v. S. 130 Ala. 18 113
v. S. 88 Ga. 371 228
Veach v. State, 60 Ind. 291... 100
Veatch v. S. 56 Ind. 184 209
Veneman v. McCurtain, 33 Neb.
643 13
Venway v. S. 41 Tex. 639 13
Vetterly v. McNeal, 129 Mich.
507 25
Vick v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 69
S. W. 156 12
Vickers v. Kennedy (Tex. Cv.
App.) 34 S. W. 458 236
Vider v. O'Brien, 62 Fed. 326. 351
Vierling v. Iriquois Furnace Co.
170 111. 189 117
Village v. Altamont v. Carter,
196 111. 286 21
Village of Cullom v. Justice,
161 II. 372 25
Village of Fairbury v. Rogers,
98 111. 554 182
Village of Jefferson v. Chapman,
127 111. 447 54
Village of Monroeville v. Root,
54 Ohio St. 523 14, 538
Village of Sheridan v. Hibbard,
119 111. 307 56
Village of Warren v. Wright,
103 111. 298 113
Villereal v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.)
61 S. W. 715 314
Vincent v. S. 37 Neb. 672 340
Vinson v. Scott, 198 111. 542.. 243
Virgie v. Stetson, 73 Me. 452.. 113
Virginia, &c. Co. v. Chalkley,
98 Va, 62 '. . 247
Viser v. Bertrand, 14 Ark. 267
3
Vocke v. City of Chicago, 208
111. 194 153, 380
Voegeli v. Pickel. Marble & G.
Co. 56 Mo. App. 678 132
Voelckel v. Banner Brew. Co. 9
Ohio C. C. 318 350
Vogeler v. Devries (Ind.) 56
Atl. 782 196
Vogg v. Missouri P. R. Co. 138
Mo. 172 243
Voght v. S. 145 Ind. 12
12, 279, 298
Volk v. Roche, 70 111. 299.118, 250
Von Glahn v. Von Glahn, 46 111.
134 116
Voris v. Shotts, 20 Ind. App.
220 119
Vredenburge v. Pall, 28 N. Y.
S. 88 25
W
Wabash R. Co. v. Biddle, 27
Ind. App. 161 208, 216
v. Hanks, 91 111. 407 250
v. Jaggerman, 115 111. 411
153, 155
v. Rector, 104 111. 305 58
v. Schultz, 30 Ind. App. 495
233
v. Stewart, 87 111. App. 446
94
v. Williamson, 104 Ind. 157
126, 196
Wacaser v. P. 134 111. 438
26b, 201, 296
Wachstetter v. S. 99 Ind. 290.. 169
Waco A. Water Co. v. Cauble,
19 Tex. Cv. App. 317... 27
Wade v. Columbia Electric St.
R. Light & Power Co. 51
S. Car. 296 25
v. Guppinger, 60 Ind. 378.. 417
v. Ordway, 1 Baxt. (Tenn.)
229 35
v. S. 71 Ind. 541 296, 735
Wadley v. Com. (Va.) 30 S. E.
452 103
Wadsworth v. Dunnam, 98 Ala.
610 80, 195
v. Laurie, 164 HI. 48 127
v. Walker, 5 1 Iowa, 6 1 3 ... 517
v. Williams, 101 Ala. 264
25, 48, 113
Waechter v. S. 34 Tex. Cr. App.
297 6
Wagener v. Kirven, 56 S. Car.
126 . 6
cxlvi
TABLE OF CASES.
(References are to Sections.}
Waggoner v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. App.
199 290
Wagner v. Lament (Mich.) 98
N. W. 2 121
v. S. 107 Ind. 71 756
v. S. 116 Ind. 186
211, 281, 329
v. Wabash R. Co. 185 111.
154 243
Wait v. Westfall, 161 Ind. 648
692, 697
Walbert v. Trexler, 156 Pa. St.
112 25
Walcot v. Heath, 78 111. 433 .. 192
Waldie v. Doll, 29 Cal. 555... 14
Waldron v. Marcier, 82 111. 551 . 81
Walker v. Devlin, 2 Ohio St. 593
28
v. P. 88 N. Y. 81 331
v. Rogers, 24 Md. 237 438
v. S. 117 Ala. 138 296, 313
v. S. 134 Ala. 86 225
v. S. (Ala.) 35 So. 1012
299, 742
v. S. 8 Ind. 292 768
v. S. 136 Ind. 663
166, 169, 756
v. S. 6 Tex. App. 576 327
v. S. 42 Tex. 360 322
v. Stetson, 14 Ohio St. 100
31
Walkley v. S. 133 Ala. 183.... 68
Wall v. Goodenough, 16 111. 415
172, 195
v. S. 112 Ga. 336 211
Wallace v. Cravens, 34 Ind. 534
243
v. Curtis, *36 111. 156 80
v. De Young, 98 111. 638.. 196
v. Goff, 71 Ind. 294 357
v. P. 159 111. 446 773
v. Ransdell, 90 Ind. 173.. 484
v. S. 124 Ala. 87 65
v. S. 41 Fla. 547.. 48, 80, 717
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 66 S.
W. 1102 191, 304
v. Waltice, 118 Ind. 59 200
v. Wren, 32 111. 146 96
Waller v. Missouri K. & T. R.
Co. 59 Mo. App. 410 238
v. S. 110 Ga. 250 269
Wallis v. Luhring, 134 Ind. 450
700
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 40 S.
W. 794 . . 265
Walls v. Southern B. T. T. Co.
66 Fed. 453 189
v. Walls, 170 Pa. St. 48.. 86
Walrod v. Webster County, 110
Iowa, 349 71
Walsh v. P. 65 111. 64 757
Walter v. Victor G. Bloede Co.
90 Ind. 80 80
Walters v. American Jewelry &
M. Co. 114 Ga. 564 192
v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co.
41 Iowa, 75 536
v. Laurens Cotton Mills, 53
S. Car. 155 348
v. Philadelphia Tr. Co. 161
Pa. St. 36 213
v. S. 39 Ohio St. 217
322, 323, 743
v. S. 37 Tex. Cr. App. 388. 255
Walthelm v. Artz, 70 Iowa, 609
157
Walton v. S. 114 Ga. 112 80
Wampler v. House, 30 Ind. App.
513 70
v. S. 28 Tex. Cr. App. 352. 304
Wantland v. S. 145 Ind. 38
310, 729, 730
Waples P. Co. v. Turner, 82 Fed.
64 351
Warbosse v. Card, 74 Iowa, 306
361
Ward v. Bass (Ind. Ter.) 69 N.
W. 879 363
v. Brown, 53 W. Va. 237
119, 170
v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R.
Co. 102 Wis. 215 231
v. Cochran, 71 Fed. 128
232. 243
v. Henry, 19 Wis. 76 48
v. Odell' Mfg. Co. 123 N.
Car. 248 195
v. Odell Mfg. Co. 126 N.
Car. 946 244
v. S. 102 Ga. 531 80
v. S. 52 Ind. 454 361
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 29 S.
W. 274 358
v. Ward, 25 Colo. 33 219
v. Ward. 47 W. Va. 766.. 119
Warden v. City of Philadelphia,
167 Pa.' St. 523 8
v. Henry, 117 Mo. 530 ... 75
v. Miller, 112 Wis. 67.. 25, 113
TABLE OF CASES.
cxlvii
(References are to Sections.}
Ware v. S. 59 Ark. 379 322
v. S. 96 Ga. 349 171
Ware Cattle Co. v. Anderson,
107 Iowa, 231 7
Wai-field v. Clark, 118 Iowa, 69
119
v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 104
Tenn. 74 71
Warlick v. Plonk, 103 N. Car.
81 188
Warner v. Chicago & N. W. R.
Co. 120 Iowa, 159 25
v. S. 25 Ark. 447 225
Warren v. Chandler, 98 Iowa,
237 156
v. Nash, 24 Ky. L. R. 479. 359
v. S. 33 Tex. Cr. App. 502. 3
Wartena v. S. 105 Ind. 450 753
Washington v. S. 63 Ala. 135.. 165
v. S. 106 Ala. 58 44
v. S. 125 Ala. 40 255
Washington, &c. R. Co. v. La-
cey, 94 Va. 460 161
v. Quayle, 95 Va. 747
536, 559, 652
Washington County Water Co.
v. Carver, 91 Md. 398
80, 347
Washington Ice Co. v. Bradley,
171 111. 258 94, 97
Wason v. Rowe, 16 Vt. 525 156
Wastl v. Montana N. R. Co. 17
Mont. 213 203, 218, 319
Waterhouse v. Jos. S. Brew. Co.
(S. Dak.) 94 N. W. 587. 25
Waters v. Greenlief, John, Lum-
ber Co. 115 N. Car. 648. 164
v. Kansas City, 94 Mo. App.
413 192
v. P. 172 111. 371
288. 368, 376, 745
Watkins v. Moore, 196 Pa. St.
469 364
v. S. 133 Ala. 88 68, 191
v. U. S. 5 Okla. 729 25
Watson v. Com. 95 Pa. St. 422. 322
v. S. 83 Ala. 60 253
Watt v. P. 126 111. 30.... 7 18, 722
Watts v. Southern Bell T. & T.
Co. 66 Fed. 460 85, 102
Waxahachie, &c. Co. v. McLain,
27 Tex. Cv. App. 334.. 249
Way v. Ills. Cent. R. Co. 40
Iowa, 344 616, 617
Waybright v. S. 56 Ind. 122
115,
W T ear v. Sanger, 91 Mo. 348...
Weatherford v. Strawn, 8 Kas.
App. 206
Weaver v. P. 132 111. 536. .279,
v. S. 77 Ala. 26
Webb v. Big Kanawha & O. R. P.
Co. 43 W, Va. 800
v. S. 106 Ala. 52
v. S. 73 Miss. 456 . .296,
Webber v. Sullivan, 58 Iowa, 265
Weber v. Germania F. Ins. Co.
44 N. Y. S. 976
v. Whetstone, 53 Neb. 371
Webster v. Yorty, 194 111. 408.
Weeks v. Hutchinson (Mich.) 97
N. W. 697
v. Southern R. Co. 119 N.
Car. 740
v. Texas Midland R. (Tex.
C. App.) 67 S. W. 1071.
Weidman v. Symes, 116 Mich.
619
Weightnovel v. S. (Fla.) 35 So.
862 43,
Weiss v. Bethleham Iron Co. 88
Fed. 23
v. Dittman, 4 Tex. Cv. App.
35
Welch v. Browning, 115 Iowa,
690
v. S. 124 Ala. 41 258,
v. Union C. Life Ins. Co.
117 Iowa, 394
v. Watts, 9 Ind. 115
Welden v. Omaha, K. C. & E.
R. Co. 93 Mo. App. 668
Weller v. S. 19 Ohio C. C. 166.
Wellman v. Jones, 124 Ala. 580
Wells v. Clements, 48 N. Car.
168
v. Houston, 29 Tex. Cv. App
619
v. S. 131 Ala. 48
v. S. 99 Ga. 206
v. Snow (Cal.) 41 Pac. 858
Wells & Co. v. Heintz (Neb.)
72 N. W. 1034
742
162
140
299
815
101
345
309
694
149
6
193
458
134
114
116
252
113
116
667
304
53
3
196
198
195
174
244
223
313
130
94
cxlviii
TABLE OF CASES.
(References are to Sections.}
Wellston Coal Co. v. Smith, 65
Ohio St. 81 26
Welsh v. S. 60 Neb. 101 198
Welter v. Leistikow, N. Dak.
283 48
Welty v. Ward (Ind.) 72 N. E.
596 150
Wendler v. People's H. F. Co.
165 Mo. 539 618
Wenger v. Calder, 78 111. 275. . 81
Wenning v. Teeple, 144 Ind.
189 ..40, 247, 361
Wenona Coal Co. v. Holmquist,
152 111. 581
71, 120, 123, 133, 235
Werner v. Jewett, 54 Kas. 530. 358
West v. Averill Grocery Co. 109
Iowa, 488 90, 119
v. Sanders, 104 Ga. 727... 128
v. S. 48 Ind. 483 323
v. S. 63 Neb. 257 91
v. Smith, 101 U. S. 263... 160
West Chicago, &c. R. Co. v.
Buckley, 200 111. 262
53, 54, 363
v. Dougherty, 172 111. 365. 250
v. Dwyer, 162 111. 482 25
v. Estep, 162 111. 130
25, 195, 369
v. Feldstein, 169 111. 139.. 124
v. Fishman, 169 111. 196.. 124
v. Foster, 175 111. 396. .120, 123
v. Lieserowitz, 197 111. 616
25, 53, 70, 90, 203, 385
v.Lyons, 157 HI. 593 129
v. McCallum, 169 111. 241. 149
v. McNulty, 166 111. 203.. 551
v. Martin, 154 111. 523
346, 352
v. Mueller, 165 111. 499... 205
v. Nash, 166 111. 528... 25, 369
v. Scanlan, 168 111. 34.. 56, 238
v. Shiplett, 85 111. App. 683
121
v. Yund, 169 111. 49 124
West Memphis P. Co. v. White,
99 Tenn. 256 48
West Va. C. & P. R. Co. v. S.
96 Md. 652 25
Westbrook v. S. 97 Ga. 189
64, 636
Western C. & M. Co. v. Ingra-
ham, 70 Fed. 219 71
Western Ins. Co. v. Tobin, 32
Ohio St. 88 351
Western M. M. Ins. Co. v. Bough-
ton, 136 111. 317 198
Western Stone Co. v. Musical,
196 111. 382 25
v. Whalen, 151 111. 472... 92
Western U. Tel. Co. v. Baker,
85 Fed. 690 360
v. Burgess (Tex. Cv. App.)
56 S. W. 237 191
v. Chambers (Tex. Cv. App.)
77 S. W. 273 194
v. Giffin (Tex. Cv. App.) 65
S. W. 661 6
v. James (Tex. Cv. App.) 73
S. W. 79 6, 199
v. Johnson (Tex. Cv. App.)
67 S. W. 338 100
v. Seals (Tex. Cv. App.) 45
S. W. 964
v. Sorsby, 29 Tex. Cv. App.
345 .'... 244
v. Thorn, 67 Fed. 287 144
v. Waller (Tex. Cv. App.)
47 S. W. 396 80
Westervelt v. Phelps, 171 N. Y.
212 146
Westinghouse Co. v. Gainor, 130
Mich. 393 244
Weston v. Brown, 30 Neb. 609
211
Westra v. Westra Estate, 101
Mich. 526 26, 238
Westside Auction House Co. v.
Connecticut Mut. Life Ins.
Co. 186 111. 156 136
Wettengel v. City of Denver, 20
Colo. 552 4
Weybright v. Fleming, 40 Ohio
St. 55 192
Weyrich v. P. 89 111. 99.... 66, 175
Whalen v. Kinsley, 26 Ohio St.
137 * 48
Whaley v. Bartlett, 42 S. Car.
454 122, 230
Wharton v. S. 45 Tex. 2 105
Whatley v. S. 91 Ala. 108.... 297
Wheat v. Brown, 3 Kas. App.
431 ">
Wheatley v. Philadelphia. W. &
B. R. Co. 1 Marv. (Del.)
305 126
Wheeler v. Baars, 33 Fla. 696. 177
TABLE OF CASES.
cxlix
(References are to Sections.)
Wheeler v. Grand T. R. Co. 70
N. H. 607 25
v. S. 114 Ala. 22 82
v. S. 158 Ind. 687
21, 65, 85, 264, 747, 781
v. S. 42 Md. 563 168
v. S. 76 Miss. 265 . .. 80
v. Schroeder, 4 R. I. 383
174, 181
v.Thomas, 67 Conn. 577
186, 188
Whelan v. Kinsley, 26 Ohio St.
137 48
Wheschel v. Gainesville & D. E.
R. Co. 116 Ga. 431 355
Whelpley v. Stroughton, 119
Mich. 314 70
Whipple v. Preece, 18 Utah, 454
199
v. Preece, 24 Utah, 364... 350
Whitaker v. Engle, 111 Mich.
205 24
v. S. 106 Ala. 30 297, 360
Whitcomb v. S. 30 Tex. Cv.
App. 269 275, 284
White v. Blum, 79 Fed. 271... 120
v.Bryan, 96 Iowa, 166... 236
v. Cole, 20 Ky. 858 6
v. Dinkins, 19 Ga. 285 102
v. Epperson (Tex. Cr. App.)
73 S. W. 851 113
v. Ferris, 124 Ala. 461 200
v. Harris, 206 111. 596 65
v. Hoster B. Co. 51 W. Va.
259 126
v. McCracken, 60 Ark. 619. 3
v. McPherson, 183 Mass.
533 119
v. New York, C. & S. L. R.
Co. 142 Tnd. 654 ,...70, 367
v. Ross, 35 Fla. 377 243
v. S. Ill Ala. 92 68. 115
v. S. 133 Ala. 122. .49.
85. 88, 211, 297
v. S. 153 Ind. 689 119
v. S. 52 Miss. 216 219
v. S. 21 Tex. App. 339.265,816
v. S. 32 Tex. Cr. App. 625. 304
v. S. 34 Tex. Cr. App. 153
240
v. S. 42 Tex. Cr. App. 567. 290
v. Smith, 54 Iowa, 237.... 522
v. Ter. 3 Wash. Ter. 397.. 319
v. Thomas, 39 111. 227.397. 400
v. U. S. 164 U. S. 100.... 342
White y. Van Horn, 159 U. S.
1 ....................
v. Walker, 31 111. 422.. 109,
White, Kingsland Mfg. Co. v.
Herdrich, 98 111. App. 607
Whitehead & A. M. Co. v. Ry-
der, 139 Mass. 366..."..
Whitehouse v. Bolster, 95 Md.
458 ..................
Whitford v. Inhabitants, 119
Mass. 571 ......... 594,
Whiting v. Carpenter (Neb.) 93
N. W. 926 .............
Whitman v. S. 42 Neb. 841 ____
Whitney v. Cook, 53 Miss. 531.
v. S. 154 Ind. 573
25, 196, 198,
Whitney S. Co. v. O'Rourke, 172
ill. 177 ..... 25, 76, 238,
Whitten v. S. 115 Ala. 72 .....
Whittlesey v. Burlington, C. R.
& N. R. Co. (Iowa) 90
N. W. 516 .............
Wiborg v. U. S. 163 U. S. 632
189,
Wickham v. Wolcott (Neb.) 95
N. W. 366 .............
Wier Plow Co. v. Walmsley, 110
Ind. 242 ........ .......
Wiggins v. Holley, 11 Ind. 5...
v. S. 103 Ga. 559 .........
Wilber v. Wilber, 129 111. 392
195, 250,
Wilber Lumber Co. v. Overbeck
Bros. Mfg. Co. 96 Wis.
383 ...................
Wilbur v. Stoepel, 82 Mich. 344
Wilcox v. Hines, 100 Tenn. 524.
v. Kinzie, 4 111. (3 Scam.)
218
v. McCune, 21 Iowa, 294 ..
v. S. 94 Tenn. 106 ........
v. Willmington R. Co. 2 Pen.
(Del.) 157 .............
Wildey v. Crane, 69 Mich. 17..
Wildman v. S. (Ala.) 35 So.
995 .................. 25
Wi'lev v. Man-a-to-wah, 6 Kas.
'
195
454
v. S. 5 Baxt. (Tenn.) 662..
Wilkerson v. S. 103 Iowa, 6 ----
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 57 S.
W. 956 ........... 112,
41
361
117
606
58
266
153
240
359
281
70
196
7
301
657
80
696
142
53
203
192
361
223
120
199
, 80
197
326
269
196
el
TABLE OF CASES.
(References are to Sections.)
Wilkins v. S. 35 Tex. Cv. App.
525 269
Wilkinson v. St. Louis S. D.
Co. 102 Mo. 130 34
Willard v. Petitt, 153 111. 663.. 347
v. Swansen, 126 111. 384.. 238
v. Williams (Colo.) 50 Pac
207 7
Williams v. Andrew, 185 111. 98
80
v.Atkinson, 152 Ind. 98.. 84
v. Avery, 131 N. Car. 188. 80
v. Barrett, 52 Iowa, 638
348, 349
v. Belmont Coal &C. Co. (W.
Va.) 46 S. E. 802 126
v. Casebeer, 126 Cal. 86... 351
v. Chapman, 160 Ind. 130
346
v. City of West Bay, 119
Mich. 395 210
v. Com. 80 Ky. 315.. 348, 349
v. Com. 85 Va. 607 17
v. Dickenson, 28 Fla. 90... 170
v. Finley, 40 Ohio St. 342. 162
v. Hoehle, 95 Wis. 510
199, 200
v. La Penatiere, 32 Fla. 491
177
v. Miller, 2 Lea (Tenn.) 406
14
V. P. 164 111. 481
9, 196, 198, 336
v. P. 166 111. 136 299, 342
v. S. 44 Ala. 396 815
v. S. 81 Ala. 1 112
v. S. 130 Ala. 107 49
v. S. 50 Ark. 511 211
v. S. 46 Neb. 704
113, 170, 175, 192
v. S. 73 Miss. 820 296
'v. S. 42 Tex. 392 292
v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. App. 606. 339
v. S. 37 Tex. Cr. App. 147. 318
v. S. 38 Tex. Cr. App. 144. 275
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 40 S.
W. 801 215
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 45 S.
W. 494 304
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 55 S.
W. 500 71
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 65 S.
W. 1059 198
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 69 S.
W. 415 258
Williams v. St. Louis & S. F. R.
Co. 123 Mo. 573 45
v. Southern P. R. Co. 110
Cal. 457 94, 248
v. Watcon, 71 111. App. 180. 86
Williamson v. Gore (lex. Cv.
App.) 73 S. W. 563 7
v. Toby, 86 Cal. 497 28
v. Tyson, 105 Ala. 644
113, 195
Willingham v. S. 130 Ala. 35.. 113
Willis v. Branch, 94 N. Car. 142
174
v. Chowning, 90 Tex. 617.. 200
v. Hudson, 72 Tex. 598 192
v. Locket (Tex. Cv. App.)
26 S. W. 419 8
v. S. 134 Ala. 429 66, 195
v. S. 89 Ga. 188 34
v, S. 27 Neb. 98 361
v. S. 43 Neb. 102.716, 718,722
Willoughby v. Northeastern R.
Co. 52 S. Car. 166.. 242, 351
Wills v. Hardcastle, 19 Pa. Super
Ct. 525 351
v. Lance, 28 Ore. 371 19]
v. Tanner, 19 Ky. L. R. 795
355
Willson v. Whitefield, 38 Ga.
269 158
Wilson v. Board, &c. 63 Mo. 142
159
v. Commercial Union Ins. Co.
15 S. Dak. 322 3, 146
v. Coulter, 51 N. Y. S. 804
219
v. Crosby, 109 Mich. 449.. 192
v. Huguenin, 117 Ga. 546
119, 192, 199
v. Marvin-Rulofson Co. 201
Pa. St. 29 . . 49
v. P. 94 111. 327 243
v. S. 68 Ga. 827 37
v. S. 71 Miss. 880. ..179, 288
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 34 S.
W. 284 193
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 36 S.
W. 587 113
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 73 S.
W. 964 268
v. S. 37 Tex. Cr. App. 156
6, 35
v. White, 71 Ga. 507 45
v. White, 80 N. Car. 280.. 113
v. Williams, 52 Miss. 487.. 172
TABLE OF CASES.
cli
(References are to Sections.}
Wimberly v. S. (Ga.) 31 S. E.
102 320
Wimbish v. Hamilton, 47 La.
Ann. 246 . 26, 351
Winchester v. Carroll, 97 Va.
727 247
v. Charter, 102 Mass. 273. 517
Winfield v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.)
72 S. W. 182 291
Winfrey v. S. 41 Tex. Cr. App.
539 109
Winkler v. Winkler (Tex. Cv.
App.) 26 S. W. 893 172
\Y T inkles v. S. 114 Ga. 449 284
Winn v. Sanborn, 10 S. Dak.
642 6
Winne v. Hammond, 37 111. 99. 86
Winstandley v. Breyfogle, 148
Ind. 618 47
Winter v. S. 133 Ala. 176
68, 191, 223, 299
v. Supreme Lodge K. P. 96
Mo. App. 67 171
v. Supreme Lodge K. P. 101
Mo. App. 550 80
v. Williamsbaugh S. Bank,
74 N. Y. S. 140 146
Winters v. Mowrer, 163 Pa. St.
239 . . . .: 172
v. S. 37 Tex. Cr. App. 582. 258
Wintz v. Morrison, 17 Tex. 387
197
Wisconsin Cent. R. Co. v. Ross,
142 111. 9 133
Wisdom v. P. 11 Colo. 170.288,324
v. Reeves, 110 Ala. 418... 80
Wissler v. Atlantic (Iowa) 98
N. W. 131 119
Wiswell v. Doyle, 160 Mass.
44 536
Witsell v. West Ashville R. Co.
120 N. Car. 557 232, 350
Wittenberg v. Mollyneaux, 59
Neb. 203 6
Wittleder v. Citizens' Elec. 111.
Co. 62 N. Y. S. 297 27
Wohlford v. P. 148 111. 301
153, 166
Wolcott v. Heath, 78 111. 433.. 182
Wolf v. Hemrich Bros. Brew.
Co. 28 Wash. 187 25
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 53 S.
W. 108 304
v. Troxell, 94 Mich. 575.. 415
Wolf v. Van Housen, 55 111.
App. 295 200
v. Wolf, 158 Pa. St. 621.. 247
Wolfe v. Pugh, 109 Ind. 309.. 243
v. S. 25 Tex. App. 698 220
Wolff Mfg. Co. v. Wilson, 152
111. 9 231
Wollf v. Van Housen, 55 111. App.
295 200
Wonderly v. Nokes, 8 Blackf.
(Ind.) 589 502
Wood v. Collins, 111 Ga. 32.. 6
v. Long I. R. Co. 159 N.
Y. 546 7
v. S. 64 Miss. 761 17
v. Steinau, 9 S. Dak. 110.. 195
v. Wells, 103 Mich. 320... 347
Woodbury v. S. 69 Ala. 242... 117
Woodman v. Chesney, 39 Me. 45
155
v. Town of Northwood, 67
N. H. 307 50
Woodmen, &c. v. Locklin, 28
Tex. Cv. App. 486 8, 230
Woodruff v. Hensley, 26 Ind.
App. 592 . . ." 53
v. King, 47 Wis. 261 34,37
Woods v. Berry, 7 Mont. 201.. 348
v. Long Island R. Co. 42 N.
Y. S. 140 7
v. S. 81 Miss. 408 118
Woodworth v. Parrott, 48 Neb.
675 26
Woolen v. Whitacre, 91 Ind. 502
216
v. Wire, 100 Ind. 251 232
Wooley v. Lyon, 117 111. 244.. 110
Woolsey v. Lake Shore, &c. R.
Co. 33 Ohio St. 227 611
v. Lasher, 54 N. Y. S. 737. 340
v. Trustees of Village, 155
N. Y. 573 84
Wool weaver v. S. 50 Ohio St.
287 792
Wooten v. S. 99 Tenn. 189
261. 283
Wooters v. King, 54 111. 343 80
Worden v. Humeston & S. R.
Co. 72 Iowa, 201 56
v. S. 24 Ohio St. 143 192
Workingmen's Banking Co. v.
Blell, 57 Mo. App. 410.. 132
World M. B. Asso. v. Worthing,
59 Neb. 587 351
clii
TABLE OF CASES.
(References are to Sections.)
Worswick v. Hunt, 106 Ala. 559
195
Worthan v. State (Tex. Cr. App.)
65 S. W. 526 55
Worthington v. Yormey, 34 Md.
185 438, 441
Wragge v. S. Car. & G. R. Co.
(S. Car.) 25 S. E. 76 45
Wray v. Tindall, 45 Ind. 517.. 385
Wreggitt v. . Barnett, 99 Mich.
477 198
Wright v. Brosseau, 73 111. 381. 45
v. Cincinnati St. R. Co. 9
Ohio C. C. 503 8
v. Com. 85 Ky. 123 215
v. Griffey, 146 111. 394 361
v. Hardie (Tex. Cv. App.)
30 S. W. 675 93 196
v. S. 69 Ind. 165 154, 294
Wright Fire P. Co. v. Poezekai,
130 111. 139 129
Wright Investment Co. v. Fris-
coe, &c. Co. (Mo.) 77 S. W.
296 415
Wrigley v. Comelins, 162 111. 92
25
Wrisley v. Burke, 203 111. 259
20, 652, 653
Wrought Iron B. Co. v. Commis-
sioners, 101 111. 522 47
Wry v. Wry, 33 Ala. 187 330
Wunderlich v. Palatine Ins. Co.
115 Wis. 509 26
Wylie v. Commercial & F. Bank,
63 S. Car. 406 191
Wyman v. Turner, 14 Ind. App.
118 . . 119
Yale v. Newton, 130 Mich. 434
244
Yankton F. Ins. Co. v. Freemont
E. & M. V. R. Co. 7 S. Dak.
428 136
Yarborough v. S. 86 Ga. 396... 171
v. Weaver, 6 Tex. Cv. App.
215 28
Yarbrough v. S. 105 Ala. 43... 723
v. S. 115 Ala. 92 88, 297
Yates v. U. S. 90 Fed. 57
347, 361, 362
Yazoo, &c. R. Co. v. Smith
(Mass.) 35 So. 168 106
Yeomans v. C. S. N. Co. 44 Cal.
81 580
v. Page, 98 111. App. 288.. 80
Yerkes v. Northern P. R. Co. 112
Wis. 184 74
Yetter v. Zurick, 55 Minn. 452. 199
Yoacham v. McCurdy, 27 Tex.
Cv. App. 183 191
Yoakum v. Kelly (Tex. Cv. App.)
30 S. W. 836 25
Yoe v. McCord, 74 111. 40. .695, 705
Yontz v. Com. 23 Ky. L. R.
1868 85, 288
Yore v. Mueller Coal H. H. & T.
Co. 147 Mo. 679 14
York v. Maine C. R. Co. 84 Me.
128 119
York County, &c. Ins. Co. v.
Brooks, 51 Me. 506 415
York Park .Bldg. Asso. v. Barns,
39 Neb. 834 355
Young v. Alford, 118 N. Car.
215 86
v. Com. 19 Ky. L. R. 929.. 259
v. Com. 16 Ky. 496 268
v. Hahn (Tex.'Cv. App.) 69
S. W. 203 38
v. Jeffreys, 20 N. Car. 220
157
v. Market, 163 Pa. St. 513
101
v. P. 193 111. 236 73
v. S. 95 Ga. 456 313
v. S. 34 Tex. Cr. App. 290
103
v. Sage, 42 Neb. 37 25
v. Town of Macomb, 42 N.
Y. S. 351 12
v. West Va. C. & P. R. Co.
42 W. Va. 112 144
Youngstown Bridge Co. v. Barnes,
98 Tenn. 401 7
Yundt v. Hartrunft, 41 111. 16
175, 218, 219, 238, 874
Zehner v. Kepler, 16 Ind. 290.. 84
Zeigler v. Pennsylvania Co. 63
111. App. 410 129
TABLE OF CASES.
cliii
(References are to Sections.)
Zenor v. Johnson, 107 Ind. 69
156, 160, 319
Zibbell v. City of Grand Rapids,
129 Mich. 659 192
Zimmer v. Third Ave. R. Co. 55
N. Y. S. 308 70
Zimmerman v. Brannon, 163
Iowa, 144
238
Zimmerman v. Kearney County
Bank (Neb.) 91 N. W.
497 126
v. Knox, 34 Kas. 245 80
Zimmerson v. S. 133 Ala. 18.. 295
Zook v. Simonson, 72 Ind. 88
415, 416
THE LAW OF INSTRUCTIONS.
CHAPTER I.
PURPOSE AND PREPARATION.
Sec. Sec.
1. Object and office of instruc- 26a.
tions.
2. Propriety of giving instruc- 26b.
tions.
3. Court instructing of its own 27.
motion. 28.
4. Written instructions required.
5. Oral charge taken down by 29.
stenographer.
6. Party must request written in- 30.
structions.
7. Specific instructions must be 31.
requested. 32.
8. Neither party requesting, ef- 32a.
feet. 33.
9. Must request in criminal cases. 34.
10. Presumed in writing When.
11. Written and oral charge. 35.
12. Waiving written instructions.
13. Exceptions to oral charges. 36.
14. Time of requesting Rule of
court. 37.
15. Time of requesting Too late.
16. Error to refuse instruction 38.
When.
17. Court may give time. 39.
18. Court's power to make rules. 40.
19. Too many instructions.
20. Repeating generally not re- 41.
quired.
21. Repeating on preponderance 42.
Reasonable doubt.
22. Repeating in detail Words, 43.
phrases.
23. Repeating As to defense. 44.
24. Repeating As to witnesses.
25. Repeating Request substan- 45.
tially given by others.
26. Repeating When, general and 46.
special charge.
47.
Repetition when evidence is
close.
Court may refuse all instruc-
tions.
Defective instructions refused.
Clauses or paragraphs defect-
ive.
Incomplete instruction defect-
ive.
Modifying defective instruc-
tions.
Modifying correct instruction.
In language of request.
Modifying in criminal cases.
Changing to conform to issues.
Further instructions after jury
retires.
Further instructions in absence
of counsel.
Further instructions in absence
of defendant.
Instructing further on other
points.
Recalling jury for further in-
structions.
Judge calling on jury Effect.
-Withdrawing erroneous instruc-
tions Amending.
Rulings and remarks not in-
structions.
Directions as to form of ver-
dict.
Signing and numbering in-
structions.
Marking "given," "refused" '
Effect.
Marking for plaintiff Under-
scoring.
Court's manner of charging
jury.
Trial by court Jury waived.
1 PURPOSE AND PREPARATION. 2
1. Object and office of instructions. The object of instruc-
tions is to inform the jury what are the precise principles or
rules of law applicable to the evidence in the case, 1 and to ex-
plain the issues that the jury may have a clear understanding
of their duty in reaching a verdict. 2 Instructions should there-
fore be clear and simple, and consist of a plain statement of the
law applicable to the evidence or facts in the case; and they
should be couched in such terms that they may be readily under-
stood by ordinary men acting as jurors. 3
The instructions given should not only be correct, but so ex-
plicit as not to be misleading or misconstrued. 4 In other words,
the instructions given should be in plain English, and should
avoid as far. as posible the use of technical terms. 5 The safer
course is to draw them in the language of the approved and well
settled forms; 6 and each party should see that his own instruc-
tions are properly drawn. 7
2. Propriety of giving instructions. The propriety of giv-
ing or refusing instructions must always be determined by the
facts in the particular case. Hence it frequently happens that
an instruction may be entirely proper in one case and erroneous
in another, although the two cases may be similar in many re-
spects ; but a different element may be found in one not entering
into the other which would require the giving of different in-
structions in the two cases. 8
iMontag v. P. 141 111. 81, 30 N. Newell, 62 111. 196, 202; Peri v. P.
E. 337; Lehman v. Hawks, 121 Ind. 65 111. 26; Smith v. City of Sioux
541, 23 N. E. 670; Lander v. P. 104 City (Iowa) 93 N. W. 81. See gen-
Ill. 248; Dodd v. Moore, 91 Ind. erally: Hyde v. Shank, 77 Mich.
523; McCallister v. Mount, 73 Ind. 517, 43 N. W. 890; Trinity & S. R.
567; Thork v. Goewy, 85 111. 616; Co. v. Schofield, 72 Tex. 496, 10 S.
Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Murray, W. 575; Loeb v. Weis, 64 Ind. 285;
62 111. 326, 331; S. v. Stout, 49 Ohio Goffney v. St. Paul City R. Co. 81
St. 282, 30 N. E. 437; Crane Co. v. Minn. 459; Parmlee v. Adolk, 28
Tierney, 175 111. 82, 51 N. E. 715; Ohio St. 13; Aikin v. Weckerly,
Chicago, &c. A. R. Co. v. Utley, 19 Mich. 482; Parrish v. S. 14 Neb.
38 111. 411; Baxter v. P. 3 Gilm. 60, 15 N. W. 357.
(111.) 381; Morse v. Ryland, 58 4 yEtna Ins. Co. v. Reed, 33 Ohio
Kas. 250. St. 255, 31 Am. R. 539; Little M. R.
2 Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. King, Co. v. Wetmore, 19 Ohio St. 134.
179 111. 96, 53 N. E. 552; North Chi- s Chappell v. Allen, 38 Mo. 213,
cago St. R. Co. v. Polkey, 203 111. 222.
232. e Lawless v. S. 4 Lea (Tenn.) 179;
3 Armour v. Brazeau, 191 111. S. v. Murray, 91 Mo. 95, 3 S. W.
124, 60 N. E. 904; City of Freeport ;{97.
v. Isbell, 83 111. 440; Herrick v. ? Denman v. Bloomer, 11 111. 193.
Gary, 83 111. 86; Illinois C. R. Co. s Lamb v. P. 96 111. 84; Leavitte
v. Hammer, 72 111. 347; Tresh v. v. Randolph County, 85 111. 507.
ON COURT'S MOTION IN WRITING.
3. Court instructing of its own motion. The court un-
doubtedly has the right to instruct the jury on its own motion-,
and it may be added that it is the duty of the court to do so
when the promotion of justice demands it. In some of the
states the court is required to instruct the jury on its own mo-
tion upon the general features of the law which control the
substantial issues whether requested to do so or not ; 10 but in some
jurisdictions this requirement applies to criminal cases only. 11
In Arkansas and Missouri the court is not required to instruct
on its own motion in civil cases. 12 Under the practice in Texas
the court must instruct the jury in felony cases whether re-
quested or not. 13
4. Written instructions required. A statute requiring that
all instructions to the jury shall be given in writing is manda-
tory; 14 and the failure of the court to reduce the instructions
Roy v. Goings, 112 111. 667; City
of Chicago v. Keefe, 114 111. 230,
2 N. E. 267, 55 Am. R. 860; O'Reily
v. Fitzgerald, 40 111. 310; Stumps v.
Kelly, 22 111. 140; Galena C. & N.
R. Co. v. Jacobs, 20 111. 478; Driver
v. S. 37 Tex. Cr. App. 160, 38 S. W.
1020; Gwatkin v. Com. 9 Leigh
(Va.) 678, 33 Am. Dec. 264; see
also Viser v. Bertrand, 14 Ark. 267;
Hanchette v. Kimbark, 118 111. 132,
7 N. E. 491; Brown v. P. 9 111. (4
Gilm.) 439; S. v. Pierce, 8 Nev.
291; Thistle v. Frostburg Coal Co.
10 Md. 129; Bunnell v. Greathead,
49 Barb. (N. Y.) 106; Spies v. P.
122 111. 244, 12 N. E. 865, 17 N. E.
898.
10 Welch v. Watts, 9 Ind. 115;
Krack v. Wolf, 39 Ind. 88; Strick-
land v. S. 98 Ga. 84, 25 S. E. 908;
Sledge v. S. 99 Ga. 684, 26 S. E. 756.
59 Am. St. 251; Kyd v. Cook, 56
Neb. 71, 76 N. W. 534, 71 Am. St.
661; S. v. Fulford, 124 N. Car. 798,
32 S. E. 377; S. v. Clark, 147 Mo. 20,
47 S. W. 886; Wilson v. Commercial
U. Ins. Co. 15 S. Dak. 322, 89 N. W.
649; Ter. v. Baca (N. Mex.), 71 Pac.
460, (in criminal cases) ; S. v. Ans-
linger, 171 Mo. 600, 71 S. W. 1041;
Donahue v. Windsor Co. M. F. Ins.
Co. 56 Vt. 374; P. v. Byrnes, 30 Cal.
206, 89 Am. D. 85; Sanders v. S.
41 Tex. 306; Pryor v. Coggin, 17
Ga. 444; Barton v. Gray, 57 Mich.
622; 24 N. W. 638; S. v. Phipps,
95 Iowa, 487, 64 N. W. 410; Douglass
v. Geiler, 32 Kas. 499, 4 Pac. 1039;
Heilman v. Com. 84 Ky. 461, 4 Am.
St. 207; 1 S. W. 7731. In Indiana
the omission to give any instruc-
tions is not available error unless
instructions were asked and an ex-
ception reserved to the court's re-
fusal to give them, Marks v. Ja-
cobs, 76 Ind. 216; Rauch v. State,
110 Ind. 384. 11 N. E. 450.
n Potter v. S. 85 Tenn. 88, 1 S.
W. 614, 4 Am. St. 744; S. v. Palmer,
88 Mo. 572; Heilman v. Com. 84 Ky.
461, 1 S. W. 731 4 Am. St. 207; P.
v. Byrnes, 30 Cal. 206, 89 Am. Dec.
85; P. v. Murray, 72 Mich. 10, 40 N.
W. 29.
12 White v. McCracken, 60 Ark.
619, 31 S. W. 882; Farmer v. Farm-
er, 129 Mo. 530, 31 S. W. 926, 36 L.
R. A. 806.
is Miers v. S. 34 Tex. Cr. App.
161, 29 S. W. 1074, 53 Am. St. 705;
Moore v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 33 S.
W. 980; Sanders v. S. 41 Tex. 306;
Barbee v. S. 23 Tex. App. 199, 4 S.
W. 584; Bishop v. S. 43 Tex. 390;
Warren v. S. 33 Tex. Cr. App. 502,
26 S. W. 1082.
i* Ellis v. P. 159 111. 339, 42 N. E.
873; P. v. Beeler, 6 Cal. 246; Helm
v. P. 186 111. 153, 57 N. E. 886;
PURPOSE AND PREPARATION.
to writing when requested by either party is error per se for
which the judgment will be reversed. 15 So the giving of oral
instructions when requested to instruct in writing, is error. 16
If it be desirable to modify a written instruction, such modifi-
cation must be reduced to writing, especially where the court
asks counsel to reduce it to writing. The court is not bound to
give an oral modification of a written instruction. 17 It follows
that the court is not required to regard an oral request where
a statute requires that the instructions shall be given in writ-
ing. 18 The court is not bound, however, to give written in-
structions ' unless requested to do so; 19 but may instruct orally
if neither party asks for written instructions. 20 In the absence
of a statute the court may instruct the jury either orally or in
writing in its discretion. 21
Where the court is authorized to instruct the jury orally and
in writing, it is improper to call their attention to the written
ney, 9 Ohio St. 400; Stephenson v.
S. 110 Ind. 358, 11 N. B. 360, 59
Am. R. 216; Smur v. S. 88 Ind.
504; Jaqua v. Cordesman, 106 Ind.
141, 5 N. E. 907; Head v. Lang-
worthy, 15 Iowa, 235; S. v. Harding,
81 Iowa, 599, 47 N. W. 877; Ellis
v. P. 159 111. 337, 42 N. E. 873; S. v.
Porter, 35 La. Ann. 585; Louisville
& N. R. Oo. v. Banks (Ky.), 23 S.
W. 627.
16 Householder v. Grandy, 40
Ohio St. 430. See Powers v. Hazel-
ton, &c. L. R. Co. 33 Ohio St. 438;
Bosworth v. Barker, 65 Ind. 596;
Southerland v. Venard, 34 Ind. 390;
Shafer v. Stinson, 76 Ind. 374.
IT Savannah T. &c. I. R. Co. v.
Beasley, 94 Ga. 142, 21 S. E. 285.
See Provines v. Heaston. 67 Ind.
482; La Selle v. Wells, 17 Ind. 33,
79 Am. Dec. 453; Lung v. Deal, 16
Ind. 349; Ray v. Wooters, 19 111.
82, 68 Am. Dec. 583.
is Hacker v. Heiney, 111 Wis. 313,
87 N. W. 249.
is Blackburn v. S. 23 Ohio St. 146;
Bradford v. P. (Gal.), 43 Pac. 1013;
Davis v. Wilson, 11 Kas. 74.
20 Hopkins v. Dipert, 11 Okla.
630, 69 Pac. 883; Sutherland v. Han-
kins, 56 Ind. 343; Mutual B. L. I.
Co. v. Miller, 39 Ind. 475.
21 Smith v. Crichton, 33 Md. 103.
Smaggart v. Ter. (Okla.), 50 Pac.
96; S. v. DeWitt 152 Mo. 76, 53 S.
W. 429; S. v. Fisher, 23 Mont. 540,
59 Pac. 919; Murray v. S. (Tex. Cr.
App.), 44 S. W. 830; Harvey v.
Keegan, 78 111. App. 682; S. v. Colter,
15 Kas. 302; City of Atchison v.
Jansen, 21 Kas. 560, 48 Kas. 3&8;
Morrison v. S. 42 Fla. 149, 28 So.
97; P. v. Sanford, 43 Cal. 29, 1
Green, Cr. R. 682; Mobile Fruit &
T. Co. v. Potter, 78 Minn. 487, 81 N.
W. 392; Ray v. Wooters 19 111. 81;
68 Am. Dec. 583; Columbia Veneer
& Box Co. v. Cottonwood Lumber
Co. 99 Tenn. 123, 41 S. W. 351;
S. v. Miles, 15 Wash. 534, 46 Pac.
1047; Wettengel v. City of Denver,
20 Colo. 552. 39 Pac. 343; Ehrlick
v. S. 44 Neb. 810, 63 N. W. 35;
Hopt v. Utah, 104 U. S. 631, 4 Am.
Cr. R. 368; Bradway v. Waddell,
95 Ind. 171; Davis v. Foster, 68
Ind. 238; Shafer v. Stinson, 76 Ind.
374; Bosworth v. Barker, 65 Ind.
595; Southerland v. Venard, 34 Ind.
390; Mazzia v. S. 51 Ark. 177, 10
S. W. 257; Blashfield Instructions,
117; Arnold v. S. (Ark.), 74 S. W.
513.
is P. v. Ah Fong, 12 Cal. 345;
P. v. Payne, 8 Cal. 341; Traders De-
posit Bank v. Henry, 20 Ky. L. R.
1506, 49 S. W. 536; Hardy v. Tur-
ORAL CHARGE TAKEN WRITTEN REQUESTS.
6
instructions and say that they should consider and apply the
law as therein set forth as well as in the oral charge, in that it
gives undue influence to the written instructions. 22
5. Oral charge taken down by stenographer. The giving
of oral instructions which are taken down at the time by a
stenographer, and extended by him immediately, and as so ex-
tended, given to the jury upon their retirement, is not a com-
pliance with the statute. 23
6. Party must request written instructions. In the absence
of a proper request for instructions a party will not be heard to
complain of the failure of the court to instruct the jury. 24 The*
22 Martin v. S. 104 Ala. 71, 16 So.
82, 53 Am. St. 24; Smith v. S. 103
Ala. 40, 16 So. 12.
23 Crawford v. Brown, 21 Colo.
272. 40 Pac. 692; Shafer v. Stin-
son, 76 Ind. 374; Rich v. Lappin,
43 Kas. 666; Wheat v. Brown, 3
Kas. App. 431, 43 Pac. 807. Contra:
S. v. Preston, 4 Idano, 215, 38 Pac.
694, 95 Am. St. 59. See Union St.
R. Co. v. Stone, 54 Kas. 83, 37 Pac.
1012. Ind. Acts, 1903, p. 339, 1.
24 McDonall v. P. 168 111. 93, 48
N. E. 86; New York Life Ins. Co.
v. Brownis' Admr. 23 Ky. L. R. 2070,
66 S. W. 613; American T. & T.
Co. v. Kersh 27 Tex. Cv. App. 127,
66 S. W. 74 (as to impeaching tes-
timony); O'Toole v. Post P. Pub.
Co. 179 Pa. St. 271, 36 Atl. 288;
Smith v. S. 117 Ga. 59, 43 S. E. 703
(as to theory of a party) ; Lawns-
dale v. Grays Harbor Boom
Co. 21 Wash. 542, 58 Pac. 663; P.
v. Oliveria, 127 Cal. 376; 59 Pac.
772; Wittenberg v. Mollyneaux, 59
Neb. 203, 80 N. W. 824; Boyard v.
Johnson (Ky.), 53 S. W. 651;
French v. Town of Watterbury, 72
Conn. 435, 44 Atl. 740; Howard v.
Turner, 125 N. Car. 126, 34 S. E. 229;
Missouri K. & T. R. Co. v. Crowder,
(Tex. Cv. App.), 53 S. W. 380:
Halff v. Wangemann (Tex. Cv.
App.), 54 S. W. 967; Clark v. Clark,
16 Ohio C. C. 103; Bailey v. Carn-
duff, 14 Colo. App. 169, 59 Pac. 407;
Burr v. McCullum, 59 Neb. 326, 80
N. W. 1040, 80 Am. St. 677; Fergu-
son v. S. 52 Neb. 432, 72 N. W. 590,
66 Am. St. 512 (alibi); S. v.
Ridge, 125 N. Car. 655, 34 S. E. 439;
Rutherford v. Southern R. Co. 56 S.
Oar. 446, 35 S. E. 136; Rosenbaum
Bros. v. Levitt, 109 Iowa, ' 292, 80
N. W. 393; Wagener v. Kirven, 56
S. Car. 126, 34 S. E. 18; Bass v. S.
103 Ga. 227, 29 S. E. 966; Lackey v.
S. 67 Ark. 416, 53 S. W. 213; Tracey
v. Hacket, 19 Ind. App. 133, 49 N.
E. 185, 65 Am. St. 398; Weber v.
Whetstono, 53 Neb. 371, 73 N. W.
695; Boynton v. S. 115 Ga. 587, 41
S. E. 995 (relating to impeach-
ment) ; Justice v. Gallert, 131 N.
Car. 393, 42 S. E. 850; S. r.
Donette (Wash.), 71 Pac. 556; Carr
v. Frick Coke Co. 170 Pa. St. 62,
32 Atl. 656; Humes v. Gephart, 175
Pa. St. 417, 34 Atl. 790; P. v.
McLaughlin, 37 N. Y. S. 1005, 2
App. Div. 419; Hepler v. S. 58 Wis.
49, 16 N. W. 42; Rolling Mill Co.
v. Corrigan, 46 Ohio St. 294, 15 Am.
St. 596; Brantley v. S. 9 Wyo. 102,
61 Pac. 139; S. v. Chiles, 58 S. Car.
47, 36 t3. E. 496; Gruesendorf v. S.
(Tex. Cr. App.), 56 S. W. 624; S. v.
Todd, 110 Iowa, 631, 82 N. W. 322;
Burgess v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 42 S.
W. 562; Child v. Boyd & Corey Boot
& Shoe Mfg. Co. 175 Mass. 493, 56
N. E. 608; Drury v. Connell, 177
111. 43, 52 N. E. 368; Home v. Mc-
Rea, 53- S. Car. 51, 30 S. E. 701;
White v. Cole, 20 Ky. 858, 47 S. W.
759; Waechter v. S. 34 Tex. Cr. App.
297, 30 S. W. 444, 800; see Kostuch
v. St. P. City R. Co. 78 Minn. 459,
81 N. W. 215, 47 L. R. A. 136; Lucio
v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. App. 320, 33 S. W.
358; Missouri K. & T. R. Co. v.
PURPOSE AND PREPARATION.
6
failure of the court to instruct the jury upon any proposition
of law deemed essential cannot be complained of as error unless
the complaining party made proper request for instructions. 25
Hence, if the court fails to instruct on the burden of proof
where no instructions in that respect are requested and the at-
tention of the court is not called to the omission, there can be
no ground to complain of error. 20 Also an instruction stating
Steinberger, 60 Kas. 856, 55 Pac.
1101; Mineral R. & M. Co. v.
Auten, 188 Pa. St. 568, 41
Atl. 327; Parish v. Williams, (Tex.
.Cv. App.), 53 S. W. 79; Keyes
v. City of Cedar Rapids, 107 Iowa,
509, 78 N. W. 227; Rawlins v. S.
40 Fla. 155, 24 So. 65; S. v. Ken-
dall, 54 S. Car. 192, 32 S. E. 300;
Chezem v. S. 56 Neb. 496, 76 N.
W. 1056; Taylor v. S. 105 Ga. 746,
31 S. E. 764; Barfield v. S. 105 Ga.
491, 30 S. E. 743; Roark v. S. 105
Ga. 736, 32 S. E. 125; S. v. Can-
ceinne, 50 La. Ann. 847, 24 So. 134;
Texas & P. R. Co. v. Robinson, 4
Tex. Cv. App. 121, 23> S. W. 433;
Miller v. Haas (Tex. Cv. App.), 27
S. W. 263; Lueck v. Heisler, 87
Wis. 644, 58 N. W. 1101; Robinson
v. Mcllver ( Tex. Cv. App.), 23 S.
W. 915; Galveston H. & S. A. R.
Co. v. McMonigal (Tex. Cv. App.),
25 S. W. 341; Com. v. Washington,
202 Pa. St. 148, 51 Atl. 759; Hall-
Moody Institute v. Copass, 108 Tenn.
582, 69 S. W. 327; Jones v. Spartan-
burg Herald Co. 44 S. Car. 526, 22 S.
E. 731; Scully v. S. 39 Ala. 240;
Ewing v. Sanford, 19 Ala. 605; Saint
v. Guerrerio, 17 Colo. 448, 30 Pac.
335, 31 Am. St. 320; Carpenter v.
S. 43 Ind. 371; Moore v. Shields,
121 Ind. 267, 23 N. E. 89; S. v.
Helvin, 65 Iowa, 289, 21 N. W. 645;
Copas v. Anglo-American Prov. Co.
73 Mich. 541, 41 N. W. 690; Ed-
wards v. S. 47 Miss. 589; Brinser v.
Longenecker, 169 Pa. St. 51, 32 Atl.
60; Porath v. S, 90 Wis. 537, 63 N.
W. 1061, 48 Am. St. 954; Missouri K.
& T. R. Co. v. Miller, 15 Tex. Civ.
Ap. 428, 39 S. W. 588; Feinstein v. S.
(Tex. Cr. App.), 73 S. W. 1052;
Winn v. Sanborn, 10 S. Dak. 642,
75 N. W. 201; Paine v. Incorporated
Town, etc. 103 Iowa, 481, 72 N. W.
693; P. v. Winthrop, 118 Cal. 85,
50 Pac. 390; Johnson v. S. 53 Neb.
103, 73 N. W. 463; Driver v. Atch-
ison, T. & S. F. R. Co. 59 Kas.
773, 52 Pac. 79; Patterson v. Mills,
48 N. Y. S. 781 (fellow servant);
S. v. Pitts, 156 Mo. 247, 56 S. W.
887; S. v. Rosencrans, 9 N. Dak. 163,
82 N. W. 422; Conway v. Jordan,
110 Iowa, 462, 81 N. W. 703; Pearson
v. Spartenberg Co. 51 S. Uar. 480,
29 S. E. 193; Chicago G. W. R. Co.
v. Healey, 86 Fed. 245; Western
U. T. Co. v. Seals (lex. Cv. App.),
45 S. W. 964; Race v. American
F. S. & M. Co. (Tex. Cv. App.),
43 S. W. 36. See Wood v. Collins,
111 Ga. 32, 36 S. E. 423; Dominick
v. Randolph, 124 Ala. 557, 27 So.
481; Bowen v. Southern R. Co. 58 S
Car. 222, 36 S. E. 590; Jones v.
Heirs, 57 S. Car. 427, 35 S. E. 748;
Jackson v. International & G. N.
R. Co. (Tex. Cv. App.), 5? S. W.
869; Felton v. S. 139 Ind. 531, 39 N.
E. 228; P. v. Ezzo, 104 Mich. 341, 62
N. W. 407; S. v. Smith, 65 Conn.
283, 31 Atl. 206 (reasonable doubt);
Porath v. S. 90 Wis. 527, 63 N. W.
1061, 48 Am. St. 954 (accomplice cor-
roborated) ; Carson v. S. 34 Tex. Cr.
App. 342, 30 S. W. 799; P. v. War-
ner, 104 Mich. 337, 62 N. W. 405
(defendant failing to testify.
25 p. v . Oliveria, 127 Cal. 376, 57
Pac. 772; P. v. Fice, 97 Cal. 460,
32 Pac. 531; S. v. Pfefferle, 36 Kas.
90, 54 Kas. 107; Taft v. Wildman,
15 Ohio, 123; Hills v. Ludaig, 46
Ohio St. 373 24 N. E. 596, 15 Am.
St. 608; Georgia S. & F. R. Co. v.
Young Ins. Co. (Ga.) 46 S. E. 644;
Marks v. Jacobs, 76 Ind. 216.
26 Lampman v. Van Alstyne, 94
Wis. 417, 69 N. W. 171; Osborne v.
Ringland (Iowa), 98 N. W. 116.
7 REQUESTS IN WRITING REQUIRED. , 6.
that the plaintiff must prove the affirmative issues alleged in
his complaint by a preponderance of the evidence is sufficient
in the absence of a request for further instructions as to the
burden of proof. 27 Also the fact that no instruction was given
restricting the jury to the evidence in their deliberations is no
ground for error where no instruction in that respect was re-
quested. 28
On the same principle a defective instruction as to the defini-
tion of negligence cannot be the basis of error in the absence of
a request for a better instruction. 29 Thus an instruction which
states that by the term "negligence" is meant the omission
or failure to do something which an ordinarily prudent and
careful person would have done under like circumstances, can-
not be objected to for not including the doing of an affirmative
act where no request is made for a further charge to that effect. 30
So also the giving of an instruction for one party containing
terms or expressions which perhaps ought to be explained, cannot
be complained of as error if the party complaining fails to re-
quest instructions explaining such terms or expressions. 31 Thus,
where an instruction contains the expression "subsidiary facts,"
""evidentiary facts" or "essential elements of the crime charged,"
if the opposing party desires these or other such terms explained
he should prepare and request instructions explaining them, else
he will not be heard to complain of error. 32 And in a murder
case the failure of the court, in defining the crime of murder, to
charge that the slayer must have been of sound mind cannot
be urged as error, no request having been made for such in-
27 Nichol v. Laumeister, 102 Cal. (contributory negligence). See al-
58, 36 Pac. 925. See Gottstein v. so Magoon v. Before, 73 Vt. 231,
Seattle L. & C. Co. 7 Wash. 424, 35 50 Atl. 1070; Smith v. South Car-
Pac. 133. olina & G. R. 62 S. Car. 322, 40 S.
28 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Baker, E. 665.
10 Tex. Cv. App. 515, 31 S. W. 1072. ^ Hinshaw v. S. 147 Ind. 335, 47
29 Milligan v. Texas & N. O. R. N. E. 157; Western U. Tel. Co. v.
Co. 27 Tex. Cv. App. 600, 66 S. W. Giffin (Tex. Cv. App.), 65 S.
896; Myer v. Milwaukee E. R. Co. W. 661; Kelly v. Cable Co. 7 Mont.
(Wis.), 93 N. W. &; Internation- 70, 14 Pac. 633; Malott v. Hood, 201
al & G. N. R. Co. v. Clark (Tex. 111. 202, 66 N. E. 247; bchneider v.
Cv. App.), 71 S. W. 585. Hosier, 21 Ohio St. 113.
so Campbell v. Warner (Tex. Cv. 32 Hinshaw v. S. 147 Ind. 335, 47
App.), 24 S. W. 703; Stauning v. N. E. 157; Western U. Tel. Co. v.
Great N. R. Co. 88 Minn. 480, 98 James (Tex. Cv. App.), 73 S. W.
N. W. 518; Lane v. Missouri Pac. R. 79 (ordinary care).
Co. 132 Mo. 4, 33 S. W. 645, 1128
PURPOSE AND PREPARATION.
struction. 33 - But in some states it has been held that for a
failure of the trial court to give instructions, where none were
requested, error may be urged if the defendant in a criminal
case has been deprived of a fair trial. 3 *
7. Specific instructions must be requested. Specific or more
particular instructions must be requested by the party desiring
them, although a statute requires the court to instruct the jury
on all material issues. 35 Where the instructions correctly state
the law applicable to the case as far as they go, then a party
will not be heard to complain because the charge may be in-
complete or not sufficiently specific. 36
If a party desires that the charge should be more specific and
sufficiently full to cover any phase of the case which may have
been omitted, he should request further instructions, and failing
to do so, cannot complain of error in that respect. 37 Or if an
ss Cincinnati, &c. R. Co. v.
Smock, 133 Ind. 411, 33 N. E. 108,
18 L. R. A. 774; McAfee v. Mont-
gomery, 21 Ind. App. 196, 51 N. E.
957; Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. v.
Oyster, 58 Neb. 1 78 N. W. 359;
Ware Cattle Co. v. Anderson, 107
Iowa, 231, 77 N. W. 1026; National
Bank v. Illinois & "W. Lumber
Co. 101 Wis. 247, 77 N. W. 185;
Schryver v. Hawks, 22 Ohio St.
316; Galveston H. & S. A. R.
Co. v. Edmunds (Tex. Cv. App.),
26 S. W. 633; First Nat. Bank v.
Ragsdale, 171 Mo. 168, 71 S. W.
178; Du Souchet v. Butcher, 113 Ind.
249, 15 N. E. 459; Conard v. Kinzie,
105 Ind. 281, 4 N. E. 863; Louis-
ville N. A. & C. R. Co. v. Grant-
ham, 104 Ind. 358, 4 N. E. 49; Co-
lumbus R. Co. v. Ritter, 67 Ohio St.
53, 65 N. E. 613; First Nat. Bank
v. Ragsdale, 171 Mo. 168, 71 S. W.
178; Harper v. S. 101 Ind. 113;
Indianapolis & G. R. Tr. Co. v.
Haines (Ind.) 69 N. E. 188; Phin-
ney v. Bronson, 43 Kas. 451; Hoyt
v. Dengler, 54 Kas. 309.
ST Hamilton v. Pittsburg B. & T.
E. Co. 194 Pa. St. 1, 45 Atl. 67;
Pope v. Branch County Sav. Bank,
23 Ind. App. 210, 54 N. E. 835; Nix-
on v. Jacobs, 22 Tex. Cv. App. 97,
53 S. W. 595; Gulf C. & S. F. R.
Co. v. Mangham, 29 Tex. Cv. App.
ss S. v. Seossoni, 48 La. Ann.
1464, 21 So. 33.
34 Wilson v. S. 37 Tex. Cr. App.
373, 39 S. W. 373; S. v. Hathaway,
100 Iowa, 225, 69 N. W. 449; Strick-
land, v. S. 98 Ga. 84. 25 S. E.
908; Sledge v. S. 99 Ga. 684, 26 S. E.
756, 59 Am. St. 251.
ss p. v . Matthai, 135 Cal. 442, 67
Pac. 694; Caveny v. Neeley, 43 S.
Car. 70, 20 S. E. 806; Quirk v. St.
L. N. E. Co. 126 Mo. 279, 28 S. W.
1080; Treschman v. Treschman, 28
Ind. App. 206, 61 N. E. 961, 91 Am.
St. 120; Texas &c. R. Co. v. Watson,
112 Fed. 402; Hammel v. Lewis, 23
Ky. L. R. 2298, 66 S. W. 1041 (as
to damages) ; Abilene Cotton Oil
Co. v. Briscoe, 27 Tex. Cv. App.
157, 66 S. W. 315, 11 Am. St. 182;
Southern R. Co. v. Longbridge, 114
Ga. 173, 39 S. E. 882; Internation-
al & G. N. R. Co. v. Harris (Tex.
Cv. App.), 65 S. W. 885; Peterson
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 88 S. W.
549; Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Har-
din, 114 Ga. 548, 40 S. E. 738, 58
L. R. A. 181; Rolling-Mill Co. v.
Corrigan, 46 Ohio St. 294, 20 N. *3.
466, 15 Am. St. 596, 3 L. R. A. 385;
Denver Tr. Co. v. Crumbaugh, 23
Colo. 363, 48 Pac. 503; S. v. Varner,
115 N. Car. 744, 20 S. E. 518; Long
v. Southern Pac. R. Co. 50 S. Car.
49, 27 S. E. 531; Thomas v. S. 95
Ga. 484, 22 S. E. 315.
REQUESTING SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS.
7
instruction states a general principle of law correctly it cannot
be objected to as erroneous in the absence of a request for a more
specific instruction limiting its application; 37 * or the fact that a
charge may be too general cannot be assigned for error unless
the complaining party made request for more specific instruc-
tions. 38
Where the instructions given cover all points involved in the
case, there is no ground for error if no request be made for more
486, 69 S. W. 80; Lewin v. Pauli, 19
Pa. Super. 447; Moore v. Graham,
29 Tex. Cv. App. 235, 69 S. W. 200;
Kirby v. Southern R. Co. 63 S.
Car. 494, 41 S. B. 765; Lampley v.
Atlantic, C. L. R. Co. 63 S. Car.
462, 41 S. E. 517; Keller v.. Lewis,
116 Iowa, 369, 87 N. W. 1102; In
re Hull's Will, 117 Iowa, 738, 89 N.
W. 979; S. v. Young, 104 Iowa, 730,
74 N. W. 693; Owen v. Long, 97
Wis. 78, 72 N. W. 364; Baltimore
& O. S-W. R. Co. v. Conoyer, 149
Ind. 524, 48 N. E. 352; Summitt
Coal Co. v. Shaw, 16 Ind. App. 9,
44 N. E. 676; Sutherland v. S. 148
Ind. 695, 48 N. E. 246; Carter White-
Lead Co. v. Kinlin, 47 Neb. 409,
66 N. W. 536; Housh v. S. 43 Neb.
163, 61 N. W. 571; Fortson v. Mikell,
97 Ga. 336, 22 S. E. 913; P. v. Apple-
ton, 120 Gal. 250, 52 Pac. 582; Cleve-
land C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Rich-
ardson, 19 Ohio Cir. 385; Willard
v. Williams (Colo.), 50 Pac. 207;
Wood v. Long I. R. Co. 159 N. Y.
546, 54 N. E. 1095; Turner v. Tootle,
9 Kas. App. 765, 58 Pac. 562;
Harris v. Flowers, 21 Tex. Cv. App.
669, 52 S. W. 1046; Felton v.
Clarkson, 103 Tenn. 457, 53 S. W.
733; Burgett v. Burgett, 43 Ind. 78;
Doll v. S. 45 Ohio St. 452, 15 N. E.
293, 4 Am. St. 542; Jones v. S. 20
Ohio St. 34; Smith v. Pittsburg,
Ft. W. & C. R. Co. 23 Ohio St. 0;
S. v. Pfefferle, 36* Kas. 90, 12 Pac.
406; P. v. Byrnes, 30 Cal. 206, 89
Am. Dec. 85; St. Louis S. W. R.
Co. v. Byas, 12 Tex. Cv. App. 657,
35 S. W. 22; Reynolds v. Weiman,
(Tex. Cv. App.), 40 S. W. 560;
Leary v. Electric Tr. Co. 180 Pa.
St. 136, 36 Atl. 562; Muncy v. Matt-
field (Tex. Cv. App.), 40 S. W.
345; Moore v. Brown, 27 Tex. Cv.
App. 208, 64 S. W. 946; Green-
wood v. Houston I. & B. Co. 27
Tex. Cv. App. 590, 66 S. W. 585;
Galveston H. & S. A. R. Co. v.
Buch (Tex. Cv. App.), 65 S. W. 681;
Rowland v. Day, 56 Vt. 324, 48 Am.
R. 791; McGee v. Smitherman, 69
Ark. 632, 65 S. W. 461; Lake S. &
M. S. R. Co. v. Whidden, 23 Ohio
Cir. 85; Missouri K. & T. R. Co. v.
Dilworth (Tex. Cv. App.), 65 S- W.
502; Wickham v. Wolcott (Neb.),
95 N. W. 366; Crosette v. Jordan
(Mich,), 92 N. W. 782; Palmer v.
Smith (Conn.), 56 Atl. 516; Thorn
v. Cosand, 160 Ind. 566; Little Dor-
ritt Gold Mining Co. v. Arapahoe
Gold Mining Co. 30 Colo. 431, 71
Pac. 389; Seaboard Air Line R. v.
Phillips, 117 Ga. 98; Lahr v. Krae-
mer (Minn.), 97 N. W. 418.
37* Brasington v. South Bend R.
Co. 62 S. Car. 325, 40 S. E. 665, 89
Am. St. 905; Parkins v. Missouri
Pac. R. C. (Ncb.j 93 N. W. 197;
S. v. Phipps, 95 Iowa, 487, 64 N.
W. 410; Parman v. Kansas City
(Mo.) 78 S. W. 1046. See also
Hoyt v. Dengler, 54 Kas. 309,
38 Pac. 260; Missouri Pac. R. Co.
v. Peay, 7 Tex. Cv. App. 400, 26-
S. W. 768; Receivers of M. K. &
T. R. Co. v. Pfluger (Tex. Cv. App.),
25 S. W. 792; Gibson v. S. 114
Ga. 34, 39 S. E. 948; Little Dor-
rit Gold Min. Co. v. Arapahoe Gold
Min. Co. 30 Colo. 431, 71 Pac. 389;
S. v. Jelinek, 95 Iowa, 420, 64 N.
W. 250.
ss Pennsylvania Co. v. Rossman,
13 Ohio C. C. Ill, 7 Ohio Dec. 119;
Woods v. Long Island R. Co. 42
N. Y. S. 140, 11 App. Div. 16: Texas
&c. R. Co. v. Magill, 15 Tex. Cv.
App. 353, 40 S. W. 188.
8 PURPOSE AND PREPARATION. 10
specific instructions. 39 And although a special charge may doubt-
less be proper on account of the other instructions being too
general, a party is not in a position to complain, if he fails to
request the court to give such special charge. 40 And where an
instruction correctly states a proposition of law applicable to the
evidence, a party will not be heard to complain of error on ap-
peal, to some particular feature of it, in the absence of a request
for further instructions eliminating the objectionable feature. 41
8. Neither party requesting, effect. So by the same prin-
ciple, if neither party asks instructions on any question involved
in a case there will be no ground on which to base error for a
failure to instruct the jury as to such question. 42 And where
one party makes the proper request for written instructions, and
afterwards withdraws it, the opposing party cannot be heard to
complain, even where it was too late for him to make such re-
quest after the withdrawal by the first party. 43 And, generally
speaking, under the rule requiring that instructions shall be pre-
sented to the court, a party will not be heard to complain of a
failure of the court to instruct the jury on any fact, feature or
element of a case on either side in the absence of a proper re-
quest for such instructions. 44
39 s. v. Sullivan, 43 S. Car. 205, 21 40 S. W. 591; Priel v. S. (Neb.),
S. E. 4; S. v. Harrison, 66 Vt. 91 N. W. 536.
523, 29 Atl. 807, 44 Am. St. 864; Youngstown Bridge Co. v.
Harness v. Steele, 159 Ind. 268, 64 Barnes 98 Tenn. 401, 39 S. W. 714.
N. E. 875; Kirsher v. Kirsher, 120 42 Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Has-
lowa, 337, 94 N. W. 846; S. v. Hood, kins, 115 111. 307, 2 N. E. 654.
120 Iowa, 238, 94 N. W. 564, 98 Am. 43 Mutual, &c. Ins. Co. v. Miller,
St. 352; Salem Iron Co. v. Com- 39 Ind. 475.
monwealth Iron Co. 119 Fed. 593; 44 Brinser v. Longenecker, 169
Tuttle v. Wood, 115 Iowa, 507, 88 N. Pa. St. 51, 32 Atl. 60; Gulf C. S.
W. 1056; St. Louis S. W. R. Co. & F. R. Co. v. Perry (Tex. Cv. App.),
v. Hughes (Tex. Cv. App.), 73 30 S. W. 709; Warden v. City of
S. W. 976; Williamson v. Gore, Philadelphia, 167 Pa. St. 523, bl
(Tex. Cv. App.), 73 S. W. 563; Atl. 928, 46 Am. St. 689; Wright v.
Gwaltney v. Scottish C. F. & L. Cincinnati St. R. Co. 9 Ohio C. C.
Co. 115 N. Car. 579, 20 S. E. 465; 503; Dimmick v. Babcock, 92 Iowa,
P. v. Willett, 105 Mich. 110, 62 N. 692, 61 N. W. 394; International &
W. 1115; Leeper v. S. 12 Ind. App. G. N. R. Co. v. Beasley, 9 Tex. Cv.
637, 40 N. E. 1113; Jones v. Matheis, App. 569, 29 S. W. 1121; Dollman v.
17 Pa. Super. 220; Musfelt v. S. Haefner, 12 Ohio C. C. 721; O'Dris-
64 Neb. 445, 90 N. W. 237; Kendrick. coll v. Lynn & B. St. R. Co. 180
v. Dillinger, 117 N. Car. 491, 23 S. Mass. 187, 62 N. E. 3 (correcting
E. 438; Reichsletter v. Bostick counsel in argument); Texas, &c.
(Tex. Cv. App.), 33 S. W. 158. R. Co. v. Cody, 67 Fed. 71 (measure
40 Arnold v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), of damages); Texarkana & Ft. S.
11
ORAL AND WRITTEN PRESUMED IN WRITING.
9. Must request in criminal cases. The same rule applies
in charging the jury in criminal cases. Thus, the fact that the
court failed to instruct as to the presumption of innocence can-
not be urged as error in the absence of a request for such in-
struction. 45 Or that the court did not fully and clearly define
or describe the doctrine of reasonable doubt in charging the jury
cannot be urged as error in the absence of a request for in-
structions in that respect. 46 So if the defendant fails to make
a request for other or more specific instructions on any point he
will not be heard to complain of the instructions given. 47
10. Presumed in writing When. Where it does not appear
from the record in a court of appeal or review whether the trial
court instructed the jury orally or in writing, it will be pre-
sumed the instructions were given in writing as required by
statute. 48 But in Indiana the record must show that written
instructions were requested, or the objection that they were not
given in writing will not be considered. 49
R. Co. v. Spencer, 28 Tex. Cv. App.
251, 67 S. W. 196 (defining market
value) ; Woodmen, &c. v. Locklin,
28 Tex. Cv. App. 486, 67 S. W. 331;
Southern R. Co. v. Coursey, 115
Ga. 602, 41 S. E. 1013; Oberdorfer
v. Newberger, 23 Ky. L. R. 2323, 67
S. W. 267; J. I. Case Threshing
Machine Co. v. Hoffman, 86 Minn.
30, 90 N. W. 5 (sufficiency of evi-
dence) ; American Cotton Co. v.
Smith, 29 Tex. Cv. App. 425, 69 S.
W. 443 (contributory negligence) ;
Miles v. Stanke, 114 Wis. 94, 89 N.
W. 833 (proximate cause) ; Brown
v. Foster, 41 S. Car. 118, 19 S. E.
2"99; San Antonio & A. P. R. Co. v.
Kniffin, 4 Tex. Cv. App. 484, 23
S. W. 457; Galveston H. & S. A.
R. Co. v. Waldo (Tex. Cv. App.),
26 S. W. 1004 (definition of neg-
ligence); Gulf C. & S. F. R.
Co. v. Pendery (Tex. Civ. App.),
27 S. W. 213 (contributory neg-
ligence) ; Buzzell v. Emerton, 161
Mass. 176, 36 N. E. 796; Sigal v.
Miller (Tex. Cv. App.), 25 S. W.
1012; Templeton v. Green (Tex.
Cv. App.), 25 S. W. 1073; Doll v.
S. 45 Ohio St. 452, 15 N. E. 293, 4
Am. St. 542; State v. Bennett, 8 Ind.
App. 679, 36 N. E. 551, construction
of document; Fink v. Gulf C. & S. F.
R. Co. 4 Tex. Cv. App. 269, 23 S. W.
330; Hargadine v. Davis (Tex. Cv.
App.) 26 S. W. 424; Willis v. Lock-
et (Tex. Cv. App.), 26 S. W. 419;
Kerr v. S. 63 Neb. 115, 88 N. W.
240; Clemmons v. S. 43 Fla. 200,
30 So. 699; Martin v. S. (Neb.), 93
N. W. 161; Jones v. S. 20 Ohio, 34.
45 Williams v. P. 164 111. 481,
45 N. E. 987; P. v. Hinshaw (Mich.),
97 N. W. 758.
46 Miller v. S. (Wis.), 81 N. W.
1020; Burgess v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.),
42 S. W. 562; Meehan v. S. (Wis.),
97 N. W. 174; Herman v. S. 75
Miss, 340, 22 So. 873; Shiver v. S.
41 Fla. 630, 27 So. 36; P. v. Brit-
tain, 118 Cal. 409, 50 Pac. 664; By-
num v. S. (Fla.), 35 So. 65.
' 47 Douthill v. Ter. 7 Okla. 55, 54
Pac. 312; S. v. Smith, 106 Iowa,
701, 77 N. W. 499; Cupps v. S.
(Wis.), 97 N. W. 218; Cramer v.
S. 21 Ind. App. 502, 52 N. E. 239;
Com. v. Washington, 202 Pa. St.
148, 51 Atl. 757 (instruction re-
viewing the testimony).
48 Condon v. Brockway, 157 111.
91, 41 N. E. 634; Citizens, &c. Ins.
Co. v. Short, 62 Ind. 316.
49 Nickless v, Pearson, 126 Ind.
477, 26 N. E. 478.
13 PURPOSE AND PREPARATION. 12
11. Written and oral charge. In some jurisdictions the
court may read to the jury from the statutes of the state with
out violating the statute requiring that the instructions shall be
in writing. 50 According to the practice in North Carolina, while
the entire charge to the jury must be given in writing, yet the
court may give an oral summary of the evidence. 61
12. Waiving written instructions. The right to have the
jury instructed in writing as provided by statute may be waived
by the parties agreeing that the court may instruct orally. 52 Or
if a party sits by and without objection allows the court to
instruct the jury orally, the same being taken down by a ste-
nographer, he thereby waives written instructions. 53 And where
a party neglects to prepare and ask instructions on a particular
phase or feature of a case he waives any rights he may have
had in that respect. 54
Thus, where the instructions given do not state the law ac-
curately and with certainty, a party waives his right to object
on that account if he fails to ask additional instructions to
cover the deficiency. 55 So where a party fails to request writ-
ten instructions, he cannot complain that his opponent's in-
so p. v. Brown, 59 Cal. 345; S. 392, 61 N. W. 161; Heaston v. Cin-
v. Mortimer, 20 Kas. 93; Palmore cinnati & Ft. W. R. Co. 16 Ind.
v. S. 29 Ark. 248; S. v. Thomas, 275, 79 Am. Dec. 430. See Johnson
34 La. Ann. 1084; Contra: Smur v. S. v. Gulledge, 115 Ga. 981, 42 S. E.
88 Ind. 509. See Sellers v. City of 354.
Greencastle, 134 Ind. 645, 34 N. E. 54 City of Chicago v. Keefe, 114
534; Manier v. S. 6 Baxt. (Tenn.) 111. 230, 2 N. "3. 267, 55 Am. R. 860;
595; S. v. Birmingham, 74 Iowa, Young v. Town of Macomb, 42 N.
407, 38 N. W. 121. Y. S. 351, 11 App. Div. 480; Frye v.
si Phillips v. Wilmington, 130 N. Ferguson, 6 S. Dak. 392, 61 N. W.
Car. 582, 41 S. E. 805. See Aiken v. 161; Caveny v. Neely, 43 S. Car. 70,
Com. 24 Ky. L. R. 523 68 S. W. 849; 20 S. E. 806; Browning v. Wabash
see Green v. Com. 17 Ky. L. R. 943, W. R. Co. 124 Mo. 55, 27 S. W.
33 S. W. 100. 644; Quirk v. St. L. N. E. Co. 126
52 Bates v. Ball, 72 111. 108, 112; Mo. 279, 28 S. W. 1080; Union Pac.
Cutter v. P. 184 111. 395, 56 N. E. R. Co. v. Stanwood (Neb.), 91 N. W.
412; Vick v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 191; Hindman v. Timme, 8 ind.
69 S. W. 156; Bruen v. P. 206 111. App. 416, 35 N. E. 1046; S. v. Beatt*,
425; see Voght v. S. 145 Ind. 12, 51 W. Va. 232 (imprisonment reo
43 N. E. 1049; Keith v. Wells, 14 ommended by the jury instead of
Colo. 321, 23 Pac. 991; Kuhn v. death penalty).
Nelson, 61 Neb. 224, 85 N. W. 56; 5R Cincinnati & H. T. Co. v. Hes-
Clark v. S. 31 Tex. 574; S. v. Chev- ter, 12 Ohio C. C. 350; Pierce v.
allier, 36 La. Ann. 85; Continental Arnold Print Works, 182 Mass. 260,
Nat. Bank v. Folson, 67 Ga. 624, 44 65 N. E. 368 (instruction obscure) ;
Am. R. 739. Schmitt v. Murray, 87 Minn. 250, 91
53 Frye v. Ferguson, 6 S. Dak. N. W. 1116.
13 EXCEPTIONS TIME OF REQUESTING. 14
structions were not given in writing. 56 And where under the
rules of practice a party is permitted to have instructions
given to the jury before arguments of counsel, and he fails to
insist on that right, the fact that the court gives the instruc-
tions after arguments in the final charge is not error of which
complaint can be made, although the instructions were sub-
mitted to the court before arguments. 67
13. Exceptions to oral charges. The giving of an oral
charge where a statute requires written instructions, affords no
ground to complain of error if no exceptions be taken to such
charge, especially where a party sits by and allows the court
to thus instruct without making objection or taking exception. 58
The fact that the court may hand the instructions to the jury
without reading them is not ground for error in the absence
of an exception to such course. 59
14. Time of requesting Rule of court. Instructions should
be requested within the time stated by the rules of the court,
and if not so requested the court may in its discretion refuse
them, 60 and such refusal affords no ground for error. 61 In the
absence of a rule of' the court, instructions may be presented
at the conclusion of the introduction of the evidence. 6 - 2
se Jacqua v. Cordesman & E. Co. A. 134; Venway v. S. 41 Tex.
106 Ind. 141, 5 N. E. 907; Mutual 639; Sutherland v. Venard, 34 Ind.
B. S. I. Co. v. Miller, 39 Ind. 475. 390; S. v. DeMosse, 98 Mo. 340, 11
57 City of Toledo v. Higgins, 12 S. W. 731, 14 Am. St. 645, 4 L. R.
Ohio C. C. 646. A. 776.
58 Hefling v. Vanzandt, 162 111. eo Arnold v. Lane, 71 Conn. 61,
166, 44 N. E. 424; Swaggart v. Ter. 40 Atl. 921; Chicago C. R. v. Sul-
6 Okla. 344, 50 Pac. 96; Frye v. Fer- livan, 76 111. App. 505. See Hoye
guson, 6 S. Dak. 392, 61 N. W. 161; v. Turner, 96 Va. 624, 32 S. E.
Phillips v. Wilmington & W. R. 291; Phillips v. Thome, 103 Ind.
Co. 130 N. Car. 582, 41 S. E. 805; 275, 2 N. E. 747; Waldie v. Doll,
Heaston v. Cincinnati & Ft. W. 29 Cal. 555; Town of Noblesville v.
R. Co. 16 Ind. 275, 79 Am. Dec. 430. Vestal, 118 Ind. 80, 20 N. E. 479.
See Deets v. National Bank, 57 ci Shober v. Wheeler, 113 N. Car.
Kas. 288, 46 Pac. 306. When not 370, 18 S. E. 328; Marsh v. Rich-
waived: S. v. Bungardner, 7 Baxt. ardson, 106 N. Car. 539, 11 S. E.
(Tenn.) 163; S. v. Cooper, 45 Mo. 522; Ter. v. Harper, 1 Ariz. 399;
66; S. v. Hopkins, 33 La. Ann. 34. Cady v. Owen, 34 Vt. 598; Ben-
59 Little M. R. Co. v. Washburn, son v. S. 119 Ind. 488, 21 N. E.
22 Ohio St. 333. See S. v. Missio, 1109; Street R. Co. v. Stone, 54
105 Tenn. 218; Veneman v. McCur- Kas. 83.
tain, 33 Neb. 643, 50 N. W. 955. In some of the states the time
See also Stringham v. Cook, 75 when instructions must be present-
Wis. 590, 44 N. W. 777; Prater v. ed to the court is fixed by stat-
Snead, 12 Kas. 447; Louisville & ute.
N. R. Co. v. Hall, 91 Ala. 113, 62 st. Louis &. S. F. R. Co. v.
8 So. 371, 24 Am. St. 863, 12 L. R. Dawson, 7 Kas. App. 466, 53 Pac.
14 PURPOSE AND PREPARATION. 14
Under a rule of court requiring instructions to be presented
to the court before the close of the arguments to the jury, they
are in time if presented to the court before the close of the
argument for the plaintiff, and it is error to refuse them on
the ground that they were not presented in time. 63 And under
a statute requiring that instructions shall be given before ar-
guments, it is error to give them after arguments. 64
But according to the practice in Missouri the court may give
instructions after arguments of counsel, although the statute
provides that the court may instruct the jury "when the evi-
dence is concluded and before the case is argued." 65 But in-
structions may be asked at the conclusion of the charge on any
matter which has been omitted or in which the charge is im-
proper. 66 Also the giving of instructions after arguments for
the purpose of advising the jury as to mistakes or misconduct
in argument is perfectly proper. 67
In North Dakota instructions are requested in time if pre-
sented before the jury retire to consider of their verdict. 68 In
some jurisdictions instructions should be presented to the court
before the general charge, to be of any avail in the assignment
of error on appeal. 69 If special instructions should be sub-
mitted before the court has given the general charge, the refusal
to give them will not be ground for error, 70 but in other jurisdic-
892; S. v. Haerston, 121 N. Car. 579, v. O'Connor, 137 Mass. 216; P. v.
28 S. E. 492; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Garbutt, 17 Mich. 25, 97 Am. Dec.
Haskins, 115 111. 300, 311, 2 N. E. 162.
654; Manning v. Gasharie, 27 Ind. ? Yore v. Mueller Coal H. H.
399. & T. Co. 147 Mo. 679, 49 S. W.
es Bowman v. Witlig, 39 111. 416, 855; P. v. Sears, 18 Cal. 635; Crip-
429. See Root v. Boston E. R. Co. pen v. Hope, 38 Mich. 344; Kellog
183 Mass. 418. v. Lewis, 28 Kas. 535; Foster v.
64 Root v. Village of M. 16 Ohio Turner, 31 Kas. 58, I Pac. 145.
C. C. 457; Village of Monroeville v. es s. v. Barry (N. Dak.), 94 N.
Root, 54 Ohio St. 523, 44 N. E. 237, W. 809.
56 Am. St. 731; Atchison, T. & S. eo City of Chicago v. Le Moyne,
F. R. Co. v. Franklin, 23 Kas. 74; 119 Fed. 662; Gallagher v. McMul-
P. v. Silva, 121 Cal. 66S, 54 Pac. len, 40 N. Y. S. 222 (additional in-
146, unless in case of exception to s-tructions requested after the
the rule. charge held not unseasonably
05 Boggess v. Metropolitan St. R. made); Fitch v. Belding, 49 Conn.
Co. 118 Mo. 328, 24 S. W. 210. 469; Marsh v. Richardson, 106 N.
ee Brick v. Rosworth, 162 Mass. Car. 539, 11 S. E. 522; Billings v.
334, 39 N. E. 36, 44 Am. St. 362, 26 McCoy, 5 Neb. 187.
L. R. A. 256; Brooks v. S. 96 Ga. Myers v. Taylor, 107 Tenn. 364,
353, 23 S. E. 413; Chapman v. 64 S. W. 719.
McCormick, 86 N. Y. 479: McMahon
15 COURT EXTENDING TIME RULE OF COURT. 18
tions requests for additional instructions may be made after the
general charge. 71
15. Time of requesting Too late. Instructions are not pre-
sented in time after the arguments have commenced, where they
are required to be presented at the close of the evidence, 72 or
presenting written instructions after the court has commenced
the oral charge is too late. 73
16. Error to refuse instruction When. Where, under the
practice, counsel has the right to assume that the court will,
without request, state such rules of law as are pertinent and
applicable to the evidence, the refusal of an instruction embody-
ing a correct rule not embraced in the charge is error, and should
not be refused on the ground that it was not requested before
the charge was given to the jury. 74
17. Court may give time. Where the statute requires the
instructions to be requested and presented before the argu-
ment, the court in its discretion may defer the argument until
counsel have time to prepare and present instructions; but it is
not error for a court to refuse to grant such time unless it ap-
pears that the court has abused its discretion; 75 but the court
in its discretion may give instructions though not requested in
time. 76
18. Court's authority to make rules. The court, undoubt-
edly, has power to make a rule as to when in the progress of
71 Boone v. Miller, 73 Tex. 557, Pac. 479; S. v. Forbes (La.), 35 So.
11 S. W. 551; Williams v. Miller, 710.
2 Lea (Tenn.) 406; Brooks v. S. 74 Malone v. Third Ave. R. Co.
96 Ga. 353, 23 S. B. 413. 42 N. Y. S. 694, 12 App. Div. 508.
72 Evansville & T. H. R. Co. v. 75 Phillips v. Thome, 103 Ind.
Crist, 116 Ind. 457, 19 N. E. 310, 275, 2 N. E. 747; Williams v. Com.
9 Am. St. 865, 2 L. R. A. 450; 85 Va. 607, 8 S. E. 470; O'Neil v.
Bartley v. S. Ill Ind. 358, 12 N. E. Dry Dock, &c. Co. 129 N. Y. 130,
503. See German F. Ins. Co. v. Co- 29 N. E. 84, 26 Am. St. 512.
lumbia E. T. Co. 15 Ind. App. 623, 43 70 Buck v. People's St. R. & E. L.
N. E. 41; Lake E. & W. R. Co. v. & P. Co. 108 Mo. 129, 18 S. W.
Brafford, 15 Ind. App. 655, 43 N. E. 1090; Tully v. Despard, 31 W. Va.
882; Ransbottom v. S. 144 Ind. 250, 370, 6 S. E. 927; Phillip's Case,
43 N. E. 218; Gould v. Gilligan, 181 132 Mass. 233; Engeman v. S. 54
Mass. 600, 64 N. E. 409. N. J. L. 247, 23 Atl. 676; Wood v.
73 Boggs v. Clifton, 17 Ind. 217; S. 64 Miss. 761, 2 So. 247. See
Newton v. Newton, 12 Ind. 527. See P. v. Reefer, 18 Cal. 636.
Flint v. Nelson, 10 Utah, 261, 37
. 19 PURPOSE AND PREPARATION. 16
.a trial instructions shall be presented to the court, and such
rule will be enforced if it is not in conflict with the law. But
to make such rule valid and obligatory upon suitors it must be
in writing and spread upon the records of the court and given
reasonable publicity. 77 But such a rule must be fair and reason-
able, 78 and not repugnant to the law. 79
19. Too many instructions. The giving of many instruc-
tions upon every conceivable phase of the law is a pernicious
practice, and tends to confuse rather than to enlighten the jury
upon the issues. 80 The issues in a case being very simple, there
should be only a few brief instructions. The giving of many
on either side in such case naturally leads to confusion. 81 When
instructions are numerous or prolix they are more apt to mislead
the jury, unless prepared with great care, than when they are
few in number and simple in structure. 82
Where the instructions requested are too numerous or volu-
minous, the court may refuse them and charge the jury on its
own motion. 83 But the court cannot arbitrarily limit the number
of instructions each side shall be entitled to request. 84 The
fact that more instructions have been requested than necessary
77 Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Has- as language can make them,
kins, 115 111. 311, 2 N. E. 654. Miller v. P. 39 111. 466; Gilmore v.
78 Prindeville v. P. 42 111. 217, P. 124 111. 383, 15 N. E. 758; Barr
221; Sterling Organ Co. v. House, v. P. 113 111. 471.
25 W. Va. 65. si Chicago P. & M. R. Co. v.
79 Laselle v. Wells, 17 Ind. 33, 79 Mitchell, 159 111. 406, 42 N. E. 973;
Am. Dec. 453; Conner v. Wilkie, I Jacobson v. Gunzburg, 150 111. 135,
Kas. App. 492. 37 N. E. 229; Omaha St. R. Co.
so Gilmore v. P. 124 111. 380, 15 v. Boeson (Neb.), 94 N. W. 619; S.
N. E. 758; Chicago & E. R. Co. v. Mix, 15 Mo. 159; Talbort v.
v. Holland, 122 111. 469, 13 N. E. Mearns, 21 Mo. 427; Hanger v. Ev-
145; Dunn v. P. 109 111. 635, 646; ins, 38 Ark. 338.
Adams v. Smith, 58 111. 419; Mur- 2 Springdale Cemetery Asso. v.
phy v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. Smith, 24 111. 480, 483; P. v. Ah
38 Iowa, 539; S. v. Ward, 19 Nev. Fung, 17 Gal. 377.
297, 10 Pac. 133; Brant v. Gallup, 83 Moriarty v. S. 62 Miss. 661;
111 111. 487, 53 Am. R. 638; S. v. Crawshaw v. Summer, 56 Mo. 517;
Floyd, 15 Mo. 355; Haney v. Cald- Hanger v. Evins, 38 Ark. 338. See
well, 43 Ark. 184; Ingram v. S. 62 Chicago C. R. Co. v. Sandusky, 99
Miss. 142; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. 111. App. 164; Roe v. Taylor, 45 111.
Kelly, 25 111. Ap. 19; Mutual B. L. 485; McCaleb v. Smith, 22 Iowa,
I. Co. v. French, 2 Cin. (Ohio), 321; 244; Mabry v. S. 71 Miss. 716, 14
S. v. Ott, 49 Mo. 326. So. 267.
The state's attorney should ask 84 Chicago City R. Co. v. O'Don-
very few instructions in criminal nell, 208 111. 280; Cobb Chocolate
cases, and those as plain and simple Co. v. Kundson, 207 111. 461.
17
REPEATING UNNECESSARY.
20
will not justify the court in the refusal of necessary and proper
instructions which have been requested. 85 The giving of volu-
minous instructions which tend to confuse and mislead may be
ground for a new trial. 88
20. Repeating generally not required. Where all the in-
structions as given fully and clearly cover every phase or branch
of the case, that is sufficient without repetition. The court is
not bound to repeat in other instructions any of the principles
embraced in those given at the request of either party or by the
court on its own motion. 87
ss North C. St. R. Co. v. Polkey,
203 111. 231.
so Thatcher v. Quirk, 4 Idaho,
267, 38 Pac. 652; Sidway v. Missouri
L. & L. S. Co. 163 Mo. 342.
ST Montag v. P. 141 111. 75, 81,
30 N. E. 337; Chicago C. R. Co. v.
Van Vleck, 143 111. 480, 484, 32 N.
E. 262; City of Salem v. Webster,
192 111. 369, 61 N. B. 323; City of
Sterling v. Merrill, 124 111. 522, 17
N. E. 6; S. v. Grant, 152 Mo. 57, 53
S. W. 432; S. v. Kearley, 26 Kas.
77; Chicago, &c. R. Co. v. Groves,
56 Kas. 601; Spahn v. P. 137 111. 545,
27 N. E. 688; Lyons v. P. 137 111.
619, 27 N. E. 677; Thompson v.
Duff, 119 111. 226, 10 N. E. 399;
Preidberg v. P. 102 111. 164; Great
N. R. Co. v. McLaughlin, 70 Fed.
669; Bowen v. Sweeney, 35 N. Y.
S. 400; Bon v. S. 23 Ohio St. 349,
13 Am. R. 253; Wrisley v. Burke,
203 111. 259; S. v. Linhoff (Iowa)
97 N. W. 77; Heltonville Mfg. Co.
v. Fields, 138 Ind. 58, 36 N. E. 529,
46 Am. St. 368; Siberry v. S.
149 Ind. 684, 39 N. E. 936; Deitz
v. Regnler, 27 Kas. 94; S. v. Bailey,
32 Kas. 83, 3 Pac. 769; Missouri
Pac. R. Co. v. Johnson, 44 Kas.
660, 24 Pac. 1116; Muncie Natural
Gas Co. v. Allison (Ind.), 67 N.
E. Ill; Foster v. Pacific C. S.
30 Wash. 515, 71 Pac. 48; S. v.
Parker, 172 Mo. 191, 72 S. W. 650;
Texas, &c. R. Co. v. Smissen
(Tex. Cv. App.), 73 S. W. 42; S.
v. Dent, 170 Mo. 1, 70 S. W. 881;
Bond v. S. 23 Ohio St. 349, 13 Am.
R. 253; Schafstelle v. St. Louis &
M. R. Co. 175 Mo. 142, 74 S. W. 826;
S. v. Pancoast (N. Dak.), 67 N. W.
1052; S. v. Smith, 142 Ind. 288, 41 N.
E. 595; Painter v. P. 147 111. 444,
469, 35 N. E. 64; Field v. Crawford,
146 111. 136, 34 N. E. 481; Cleve-
land, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Walter,
147 111. 60, 35 N. E. 529; Howard
v. Supervisors, 54 Neb. 443, 74 N.
W. 953; Crane Co. v. Tierney, 175
111. 79, 51 N. E. 715; Alton Pav.
B. & Fire B. Co. v. Hudson, 176 111.
270, 52 N. E. 256; Lincoln v. Felt
(Mich.), 92 N. W. 780; New Omaha
Thompson-Houston Elec. Light Co.
v. Johnson (Neb.), 93 N. W. 778,
(contributory negligence) ; Morgan
v. S. (Neb.), i>3 N. W. 743; Coombs
v. Mason, 97 Me. 270, 54 Atl. 728,
(d/ue care and contributory negli-
gence); Howe v. Miller, 23 Ky. L. R.
1610, 65 S. W. 353; Boyd v. Port-
land Elec. Co. 40 Ore. 126, 66 Pac.
576; Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Tram-
mell, 114 Ga. 312, 40 S. E. 259;
Nebraska M. M. Ins. Co. v. Sasek,
64 Neb. 17, 89 N. W. 428; Lobdell
v. Keene, 85 Minn. 90, 88 N. W.
426; Kowalski v. Chicago G. W. R.
Co. (Iowa), 87 N. W. 409; Basset t
v. S. (Fla.), 33 So. 262; Belding
v. Archer, 131 N. Car. 287, 42 S.
E. 800; Rockford Ins. Co. v.
Nelson, 65 111. 415, 425; Davis
v. Wilson, 65 111. 525, 531; Twining
v. Martin, 65 111. 157, 160; Reid
v. S. (Tex. Cv. App.), 57 S. W.
662; Shenenberger v. S. 154 Ind.
630, 57 N. E. 519; Ragland v. S.
125 Ala. 12, 27 So. 983; P. v. Thiede,
11 Utah, 241, 39 Pac. 837; Bryant
21
PURPOSE AND PREPARATION.
18
21. Repeating on preponderance Reasonable doubt. Thus,
for instance, the rule requiring the plaintiff to prove his case
by a preponderance of the evidence need not be repeated when
once correctly stated in an instruction given; 88 or the rule re-
quiring the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
a reasonable doubt before a conviction can be had, need not
be repeated. 89
22. Repeating in detail Words, phrases. And under this
rule the refusal of an instruction which presents a subject mat-
v. S. 34 Fla. 291, 16 So. 177; Phil-
lips v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 31 S.
W. 644; S. v. La Grange, 94
Iowa, 60, 62 N. W. 664; Dunn v.
Bushnell (Neb.), 83 N. W. 693;
Myer v. Richards, 111 Fed. 296;
S. v. Prater, 52 W. Va. 132, 43 S.
E. 230, 241; Fletcher v. Louisville
& N. R. Co. 102 Tenn. 1, 49 S.
W. 739; Coghill v. Kennedy, 119
Ala. 641, 24 So. 459; Moratsky v.
Wirth, 74 Minn. 146, 76 N. W. 1032;
Pearce v. Strickler, 9 N. Mex. 467,
54 Pac. 748; Smith v. Southern R.
Co. 53 S. Car. 121, 30 S. E. 697;
Clark v. Bennett, 123 Cal. 275, 55
Pac. 908; Bates-Smith Ins. Co. v.
Scott, 56 Neb. 475, 76 N. W. 1063;
Lyne v. Western U. Tel. Co. 123
N. Car. 129, 31 S. E. 350; Missouri
K. & T. R. Co. v. Hennessy (Tex.)
49 S. W. 641; Bacon v. Bacon, 76
Miss. 458, 24 So. 968; Prosser v.
Pretzel, 8 Kas. App. 856, 55 Pac.
854; Indiana I. & I. R. Co. v. Bundy,
152 Ind. 590, 53 N. E. 175, 71 Am.
St. 345; National Bank of Merrill
v. Illinois & W. Lumber Co. 101
Wis. 247, 77 N. W. 185; Leifheit v.
Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co. 106 Iowa,
451, 76 N. W. 730; Keyes v. City of
Cedar Rapids, 107 Iowa, 509, 78 N.
W. 227.
The court in charging the jury
may refer to other parts of the
charge without repeating: O'Leary
v. German A. Ins. Co. 100 Iowa,
390, 69 N. W. 686; Jensen v. Seiber,
(Neb.), 93 N. W. 697.
ss Decatur Cereal Mill Co. v.
Gogerty, 180 111. 197, 54 N. E. 231;
Metropolitan W. S. E. R. Co. v.
Skola, 183 111. 454, 458, 56 N. E.
171, 75 Am. St. 115; S. v. Pyscher
(Mo.), 77 S. W. 841; Smith v.
Smith, 169 111. 624, 48 N. E. 306;
Taylor v. Cox, 153 111. 220, 229, 38
N. E. 656; Riepe v. Elting, 86 Iowa,
82, 56 N. W. 285, 48 Am. St. 356;
Mitchell v. Hindman, 150 111. 538,
37 N. E. 916; Village of Altamont
v. Carter, 196 111. 286, 97 111. App.
196.
ss Schintz v. P. 178 111. 320, 328.
52 N. E. 903; Toledo, St. L. K. C.
R. Co. v. Bailey, 145 111. 162, 33
N. E. 1089; Mackin v. P. 115 111.
312, 329, 3 N. E. 222, 56 Am. R. 167;
P. v. Gilmore, (Cal.) 53 Pac. 806;
Jones v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 45 S.
W. 596; Davis v. S. 51 Neb. 301, 70
N. W. 984; Miller v. S. 106 Wis.
156, 81 N. W. 1020; Kennedy v. P.
44 111. 283; Peri v. P. 65 111. 17, 25;
Sanches v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 55 S.
W. 44; Spears v. S. 41 Tex. Cr. App.
527, 56 S. W. 347; Ford v. S.
(Tex. Cr. App.), 56 S. W. 338;
Edens v. S. 41 Tex. Cr. App. 522,
55 S. W. 815; S. v. Currie, 8 N.
Dak. 545, 80 N. W. 475. See Cook
v. P. 177 111. 146, 155, 52 N. E.
273; Franklin v. S. 34 Tex. Cr. App.
625, 31 S. W. 643; Carleton v. S.
43 Neb. 373, 61 N. W. 699; S. v.
Tippet, 94 Iowa, 646, 63 N. W. 445;
Deilks v. S. 141 Ind. 23, 40 N. E.
120; S. v. Hopkins, 94 Iowa, 86.'
62 N. W. 656; Ramirez v. S.
(Tex. Cr. App.), 65 S. W. 1101:
Wheeler v. S. 158 Ind. 687, 63 N. E.
975; McCulley v. S. 62 Ind. 428;
Lewis v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 59 S.
W. 886; Steiner v. P. 187 111. 244.
19 REPEATING AS TO DEFENSE SUBSTANCE. 25
ter more in detail than a very general one given on the same
subject, cannot ordinarily be urged as error. 90
It is not necessary to instruct upon each separate item of
evidence when the court has given full instructions covering the
whole case. 91 Also any word, phrase or expression which has
once been explained need not be again explained when used in
other parts of the charge. 92
23. Repeating As to defense. So also the court having once
charged that a certain defense must be established by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, a refusal to instruct that the ver-
dict must be according to the weight of the evidence is not
error. 93 So when a defense has once been fully and clearly
stated in one instruction the court is not required to reiterate
it in each of the others. 94
24. Repeating As to witnesses. Likewise under the same
rule the refusal to instruct on the credibility of the plaintiff as
a witness, that if the jury believe he has testified wilfully
falsely to any material fact, they may take that fact into con-
sideration in weighing his testimony is not material error where
the general charge states substantially the same principal ap-
plicable to any or all of the witnesses. 95 Nor need the court
repeat an instruction as to the interest any witness may have
in the result of the suit or trial, though the requested instruc-
tion be in somewhat different language. 96
25. Repeating Request substantially given by others. It
follows from what has been said that although the requested
instructions may correctly state the law applicable to the facts in
issue, they are properly refused if the same principles or doc-
trines are substantially embodied in others given at the request
of either party. 97 Thus in an action where negligence is a
90 O'Rourke v. Vennekohl, 104 Ins. Co. 95 Wis. 445, 70 N. W. 554.
Cal. 254, 37 Pac. 930. * Canthem v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.),
91 S. v. Smith, 142 Ind. 288, 41 65 S. W. 96; Ter. v. Gonzales (N.
N. E. 595. Mex.), 68 Pac. 925.
92 Griffin v. Mulley, 167 Pa. St. 9 o Whitaker v. Engle, 111 Mich.
339, 31 Atl. 664; French v. Ware, 205, 69 N. W. 493.
65 Vt. 338, 26 Atl. 1096, 36 Am. St. 9 Chicago City R. Co. v. Mayer,
R. 864; Scruggs v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. 185 111. 336, 56 N. E. 1058, 76 Am.
App. 622, 34 S. W. 951 ("adequate St. R. 30; Dunham Towing &
cause" in homicide case); Childs v. Wrecking Co. v. Dandelin, 143 111.
S. 35 Tex. Cr. App. 573, 34 S. W. 414, 32 N. E. 258.
939. 97 Indianapolis St. R. Co. v. Hock-
93 Agnew v. Farmers' M. P. Fire ett, 159 Ind. 683; City of Joliet v.
25
PURPOSE AND PREPARATION.
material element of the plaintiff's case, the refusal of the general
Johnson, 177 111. 183, 52 N. E.
498; England v. Fawbush, 204 111.
400; Crane Co. v. Tierney, 175 111.
79, 82, 51 N. E. 715; Spence v.
Huckins, 208 111. 309; Whitney S.
Co. v. O'Rourke, 172 111. 177, 186,
50 N. E. 242; Franklin v. Krum,
171 111. 378, 49 N. E. 513; S. v. Clark,
51 W. Va..457, 90 Am. St. 819; Davis
v. Hall, (Neb.), 97 N. W. 1023; Kid-
man v. Garrison (Iowa), 97 N. W.
1078; Collins v. Chicago, M. & St. P.
R. Co. (Iowa), 97 N. W. 1103; Jones
v. Johnson (N. Car.), 45 S. E. 828;
S. v. Stantz (Wash.), 74 Pac. 590;
Morrison v. Northern Pac. R. Co.
(Wash.), 74 Pac. 1066; Wildman v.
S. (Ala.), 35 So. 995; Baldwin v.
S. (Fla.), 35 So. 221; Cook v. S.
(Fla.), 35 So. 669; Kilpatrick v.
Grand T. R. Co. 74 Vt. 288, 52
Atl. 531, 93 Am. St. 887; Southern
I. R. Co. v. Davis (Ind.) 69 N E.
554; Copeland v. Hewitt, 96 Me.
525, 53 Atl. 36; Chicago C. R.
Co. v. Fennimore, 199 111. 18;
Crossen v. Grandy, 42 Ore. 282,
70 Pac. 906; West C. St. R. Co.
v. Lieserowitz, 197 111. 616; S. v.
Ashcraft, 170 Mo. 409, 70 S. W. 898;
Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Groves,
56 Kas. 601, 44 Pac. 628; Missouri,
K. & T. R. Co. v. Fuller, 72 Fed.
468; Thorp v. Carvalho, 36 N. Y. S.
1, 14 Misc. 554; Pyle & Pyle, 15b
111. 289, 41 N. E. 999; Burgess v.
Davis Sulphur Ore Co. 165 Mass.
71, 42 N. E. 501; Arthur v. City of
Charleston, 51 W. Va. 132, 90 Am.
St. 772; Pittsburg, C. C. & St. L. R.
Co. v. Hewitt, 202 111. 28, 66 N. E.
829; Golibart v. Sullivan, 30 Ind.
App. 428, 66 N. E 188; Southern
Ind. R. Co. v. Harrell (Ind. App.),
66 N. E. 1016; Frank Bird Tr. Co.
v. Krug, 30 Ind. App. 602, 65 N. E.
309; Continental Nat. Bank v.
Tradesmen's Nat. Bank 173 N. Y.
272, 65 N. E. 1108; Stuart v.
Mitchum, 135 Ala. 546, 33 So. 670;
West Va. C. & P. R. Co. v. S. 96
Md. 652, 54 Atl. 669, 61 L. R. A. 574;
Copeland v. Hewitt, 96 Me. 525, 53
Atl. 36; Southern E. R. Co. v. Hage-
man, 121 Fed. 262 (substance given
in different language) ; Stockslager
v. U. S. 116 Fed. 590; Marcus v.
Leake (Neb.), 94 N. W. 100; S.
v. Shunka, 116 Iowa, 206, 89 N. W.
977; Waterhouse v. Jos. S. Brew.
Co. (S. Dak.), 94 N. W. 587;
S. v. Landano, 74 Conn. 638, 51 Atl.
860; Gill v. Donovan, 96 Md. 518,
54 Atl. 117; Hartsel v. S. (Tex.
Cr. App.), 68 S. W. 285; Warner
v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 120
Iowa, 159, 94 N. W. 490; Bell v. In-
corporated Town of Clarion, 120 Io-
wa, 332, 94 N. W. 907; Sellman v.
Wheeler (Md.), 54 Atl. 512; Rey-
nolds v. Pierson, 29 Ind. App. 273, 64
N. E. 484; Kennard v. Grossman
(Neb.), 89 N. W. 1025; Wbstern
Stone Co. v. Musical, 196 111. 382,
63 N. E. 664, 89 Am. St. 325; Him-
rod Coal Co. v. Clark, 197 111. 514,
64 N. E. 282; Corbus v. Leonhardt,
114 Fed. 10; Moran Bros. Co. v.
Snoqualmie Falls Power Co. 29
Wash. 292, 69 Pac. 759; Lee v. Ham-
mond, 111 Wis. 550, 90 N. W. 1073;
Record v. Chickasaw Cooperage Co
103 Tenn. 657, 69 S. W. 334; Mc-
Knight v. Detroit, M. R. Co. (Mich.),
97 N. W. 772; Fidelity & Deposit Co.
v. Courtney, 186 U. S. 342, 22 Sup.
Ct. 833; Kilpatrick v. Grand T.
R. Co. 74 Vt. 288, 52 Atl. 531, 93 Am.
St. 887; Swensen v. Bender, 114 Fed.
1; Arthur v. City of Charleston,
51 W. Va. 132, 41 S. E. 171, 90 Am.
St. 772; Cupps .v. S. (Wis.), 97 N.
W. 217; Christensen v. Lambert, 67
N. J. L. 341, 51 Atl. 702; Cauble v.
Worsham (Tex. Cv. App.), 69 S. W.
194; Wolf v. Hemrich Bros. Brew.
Co. 28 Wash. 187, 68 Pac. 440; Con-
naughton v. Sun Printing & Pub.
Co. Asso. 76 N. Y. S. 755, 73 App
Div. 316; Laflan v. Missisquoi Pulp
Co. 74 Vt. 125, 52 Atl. 526; Downey
v. Germini Min. Co. 24 Utah, 431,
68 Pac. 414, 91 Am. St. 798; Ray v.
S. 108 Tenn. 282, 67 S. W. 553; S.
v. Barnes (Utah), 69 Pac. 70; S. v.
Hicks, 130 N. Car. 705, 41 S. E. 803;
Danforth v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 69
S. W. 159; Myers v. S. 43 Fla. 500,
31 So. 275; Johnson v. S. (Tex. Cr.
App.), 67 S. W. 412; S. v. Brennan
(Mo.), 65 S. W. 325; Bannen v. S.
115 Wis. 317, 91 N. W. 107; Curry v.
Catlin, 12 Wash. 322, 41 Pac. 55;
Huston v. P. 121 111. 497, 500 13 N.
REPEATING SUBSTANCE OF REQUEST.
25
definition of negligence is not error where the court in another
E. 538; Crews v. P. 120 111. 317,
320, 11 N. E. 404; May v. Tall-
man, 20 111. 443; S. v. McDonald,
57 Kas. 537, 46 Pac. 966; S. v.
Eastern, 138 Mo. 103, 39 S. W. 461;
Lake R. E. R. Co. v. McKewen, 80
Md. 593, 31 Atl. 797; Bewley v.
Massie (Tex. Civ. App.), 31 S.
W. 1086; Bushnell v. Chamberlain,
44 Neb. 751, 62 N. W. 1114; Scoville
v. Salt Lake City, 11 Utah, 60, 39
Pac. 481; S. v. Harrison, 66 Vt.
523, 29 Atl. 807, 44 Am. St. 864; Lud-
wig v. Metropolitan St. R. Co. 75
N. Y. S. 667, 71 App. Div. 210; Car-
stens v. Stetson & P. M. Co. 14
Wash. 643, 45 Pac. 313; Crown Coal
& Tow Co. v. Taylor, 184 111. 260,
56 N. E. 328; Kendall v. Young, 141
111. 188, 194, 30 N. E. 538, 16 L. R. A.
492; Trumbull v. Erickson, 97 Fed.
891; Fleming v. Dixon, 194 Pa. St.
67, 44 Atl. 1064; Reilly v. Con way,
121 Mich. 682, 80 N. W. 785; Duncan
v. Borden, 13 Colo. App. 481, 59
Pac. 60; Gordon v. Burris, 153 Mo.
223, 54 S. W. 546; Ronsh v. Ronsh,
154 Ind. 562, 55 N. E. 1017; Pecha
v. Kastl, 64 Neb. 380, 89 N. W.
1047; S. v. Rathbone (Idaho), 67
Pac. 186; Union Pac. R. Co. v. Ru-
zicka (Neb.), 91 N. W. 543;
Chicago T. T. Co. v. Kotoski, 199
111. 383, 65 N. E. 350; Chicago T.
T. Co. v. Gruss (111.), 65 N. E.
693; Greaney v. Holyoke Water
Power Co. 374 Mass. 437, 54 N. E.
880; Breedlove v. Dennie, 2 Indian
Ter. 606, 53 S. W. 436; O'Neil v.
Hanscom, 175 Mass. 313, 56 N. E.
587; City of Chicago v. Hastings,
136 111. 251, 254, 26 N. E. 594;
City of Madison v. Moore, 109 Iowa,
476, 80 N. W. 257; Gemmill v.
Brown (Ind.), 56 N. E. 691; Gor-
don v. Alexander, 122 Mich. 107,
80 N. W. 978; Ittner v. Hughes,
154 Mo. 55, 55 S. W. 267; Hicks v.
Nassau Electric R. Co. 62 N. Y.
S. 597; Clifford v. Minneapolis, St.
P. and S. S. R. Co. 105 Wis. 618,
81 N. W. 143; Kansas City, Ft. S.
& M. R. Co. v. Chamberlin, 61 Kas.
859, 60 Pac. 15; Griffin v. Manice,
62 N. Y. S. 364; Anson v. P. 148
111. 494, 508. 35 N. E. 145; Robinson
v. Brewster, 140 111. 649, 660, 30
N. E. 683, 33 Am. St. 265; Thrawley
v. S. 153 Ind. 375, 55 N. E. 95; P. v.
Hettick, 126 Cal. 425, 58 Pac. 918;
Thompson v. P. 26 Colo. 496, 59 Pac.
57; Buel v. S. 104 Wis. 132, 80 N. W.
78; Miller v. S. 106 Wis. 156, 81 N.
W. 1020; Drye v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.),
55 S. W. 65; Louisville & N. R.
Co. v. Cowherd, 120 Ala. 51, 23 So.
793; Childs v. Muckler, 105 Iowa,
279, 75 N. W. 100; Hummel v.
Stern, 48 N. Y. S. 528; Wade v.
Columbia Electric St. R. Light &
Power Co. 51 S. Car.. 296, 29 S. E.
233, 64 Am. St. 676; Franklin v.
Krum, 171 111. 378, 49 N. E. 513;
Starrette Co. v. O'Rourke, 172 111.
177, 50 N. E. 242; Saunders v. Gloss,
117 Mich. 130, 75 N. W. 295; Rogers
v. S. 117 Ala. 192, 23 So. 82; LevI
v. Gardner, 53 S. Car. 24, 30 S. E.
617; Chicago & E. R. Co. v. Holland,
122 111. 461, 471, 13 N E. 145; Smith
v. Hall, 69 Conn. 651, 38 Atl. 386;
Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v.
Krueger, 124 111. 457, 17 N. E. 52;
Perin v. Parker, 126 111. 201, 213,
18 N. E. 747, 9 Am. St. 571 ; Chicago
& N. R. Co. v. Dunleavy, 129 111. 132,
150, 22 N. E. 15; Keastner v. First
National Bank, 170 111. 322, 48 N. E.
998; Mason v. Jones, 36 111. 212;
City of Peoria v. Gerber, 168 111.
318, 48 N. E. 152; Jacobson v.
Gunzburg, 150 111. 135, 37 N. E,
229; James v. Gilbert, 168 111. 627,
48 N. E. 177; Chicago, St. P. & K.
City R. Co. v. Ryan, 165 111. 88,
46 N. E. 208; West Chicago St. R.
Co. v. Nash, 166 111. 528, 46 N. E.
1082; Taylor v. Felsing, 164 111. 331,
338, 45 N. E. 161; National Linseed
Oil Co. v. McBlaine, 164 111. 597,
602, 45 N. E. 1015; Ashley Wire Co.
v. Mercier, 163 111. 487, 45 N. E.
222; West C. St. R. Co. v. Estep,
162 111. 131, 44 N. E. 404; Wrigley
v. Comelins, 162 111. 92, 44 N. E.
406; West C. St. R. Co. v. Dwyer,
162 111. 482, 490, 44 N. E. 815; Vil-
lage of Cullom v. Justice, 161 111.
372, 43 N. E. 1098; Grier v. Cable,
159 111. 29, 38, 42 N. E. 395; Pyle
PURPOSE AND PREPARATION.
instruction tells the jury what facts would constitute negligence
v. Pyle, 158 111. 289, 300, 41 N. E.
999; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Stan-
ley, 158 111., 396, 400, 41 N. E.
1012; St. L. A. & T. H. R. Co.
v. Barrett, 152 111. 168, 38 N. E.
554; Burke v. Sanitary District,
152 111. 125, 134, 38 N. E. 670; Tay-
lor v. Pegram, 151 111. 106, 121,
37 N. E. 837; Carlton v. P. 150 111.
181, 191, 37 N. E. 244, 41 Am. St. 346;
Shorb v. Webber, 188 111. 126, 58 N.
E. 949; Atchison, T. & S. Pe R. Co.
v. Feehan, 149 111. 202, 213, 36 N. E.
1036; Cheshire v. Tappan, 94 Ga.
704, 19 S. E. 992; Chambers v. S.
(Tex. Cr. App.), 44 S. W. 495; S.
v. Bauerle, 145 Mo. 1, 46 S. W.
609; S. v. Gushing, 17 Wash. 544,
50 Pac. 514; Watkins v. U. S. 5
Okla. 729, 50 Pac. 88; Long v. S.
(Tex. Cr. App), 46 S. W. 640;
Stevens v. Com. 20 Ky. L. R. 48, 45
S. W. 76; Simnacher v. S. (Tex.
Or. App.), 43 S. W. 354; Travess
v. U. S. 6 App. Cas. (D. C.) 450;
Taylor v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 42 S.
W. 285; S. v. Bow,ser, 21 Mont. 133,
53 Pac. 179; S. v. Fogerty, 105
Iowa, 32, 74 N. W. 754; McAlpine
v. S. 117 Ala. 93, 23 So. 130; P.
v. Prather, 120 Cal. 660, 53 Pac.
259; Harris v. U. S. 8 App. Cas. (D.
C) 20, 36 L. R. A. 465; Burton v. S.
118 Ala. 109, 23 So. 729; P. v.
Barthleman, 120 Cal. 752 Pac. 112;
Toll v. S. 40 Fla. 169, 23 So. 943;
Beard v. Trustees of School, 106 111.
659; City of Chicago v. Stearns, 105
111. 554, 559; Hay ward v. Merrill, 94
111. 349, 356, 34 Am. R. 229; Freid-
berg v. P. 102 111. 160, 164; Richmond
v. Roberts, 98 111. 472, 478; Frank
& Sons, v. Welch, 89 111. 38; S. v.
Webb, 20 Wash. 484, 55 Pac. 935;
Carter v. S. 106 Ga. 372, 32 S. E.
345, 71 Am. St. 262; P. v. Chaves,
122 Cal. 134, 54 Pac. 596; S. v.
Branton, 33 Ore. 533, 56 Pac. 267,
43 L. R. A. 128; Dennis v. S. 118
Ala. 72, 23 So. 1002; Com. v. Ma-
goon, 172 Mass. 214, 51 N. E. 1082;
S. v. Burlingame, 146 Mo. 207, 48 S.
W. 72; S. v. Booker, 123 N. Car. 713,
31 S. E. 376; Battle v. S. 105 Ga. 703,
32 S. E. 160; S. v. Cochran, 147 Mo.
504. 49 S. W. 558; Donaho v. S.
(Tex. Cr. App.), 47 S. W. 469;
S. v. Staley, 45 W. Va. 792, 32 S.
E. 198; Holcomb v. P. 79 111. 409,
416; Underwood v. White, 45 111.
438; Allen v. P. 77 111. 484, 487;
Keller v. Stuppe, 86 111. 309, 311;
Scott v. Delany, 87 111. 146; S. v.
Tucker 36 Ore. 291, 61 Pac. 8i>4,
51 L. R. A. 246; Castlin v. S. (Tex.
Cr. App.), 57 S. W. 827; Stevens v.
S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 18 S. W. 96; S. v.
West, 157 Mo. 309, 57 S. W. 1071;
Whitney v. S. 154 Ind. 573, 57 N.
E. 398; S. v. Peterson, 110 Iowa,
649, 82 N. W. 329; Blume v. S.
154 Ind. 343, 56 N. E. 771; S. v.
Mahoney, 24 Mont. 281, 61 Pac.
647; Liner v. S. 124 Ala. 1, 27
So. 438; West C. St. R. Co. v
Nash, 166 111. '528, 46 N. E. 1082;
Goldsmith v. City of New York,
43 N. Y. S. 447, 14 App. Div. ]35;
Koch v. S. 115 Ala. 99, 22 So. 471;
Diggers v. S. 38 Fla. 7, 20 So. 758;
Hinshaw v. S. 147 Ind. 334, 47 N.
E. 157; Yoakum v. Kelly (Tex
Cv. App.), 30 S. W. 836; S. v.
Case, 99 Iowa, 743, 68 N. W. 434;
Cox v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co.
95 Iowa, 54, 63 N. W. 450; Tobey
v. Burlington, C. R. & N. R. Co
94 Iowa, 256, 62 N. W. 761, 33 L. R.
A. 496; Lazarus v. Pheps, 156 U. S.
202, 15 S. Ct. 271; Hoehn v. Chicago,
P. St. L. R. Co. 152 111. 223, 38 N.
E. 549; Young v. Sage, 42 Neb. 37,
60 N. W. 313; Ronnsaville v. Wal-
ters, 94 Ga. 707, 20 S. E. .93; St.
Louis, A. & T. H. R. Co. v. Barrett,
152 111. 168, 38 N. E. 554; Hodg-
man, v. Thomas, 37 Neb. 568, 56
N. W. 199; Wheeler v. Grand T.
R. Co. 70 N. H. 607, 50 Atl. 103,
54 L. R. A. 955; Puff v. Lehigh
V. R. Co. 24 N. Y. S. 1068, 71 Hun,
(N. Y.) 577; Faulkner v. Mammoth,
23 Utah, 437, 66 Pac. 799; Brown v.
U. S. 150 U. S. 93, 14 Sup. Ct. 37;
French v. Seattle Tr. Co. 26 Wash.
264, 66 Pac. 404; Brown v. Porter, 7
Wash. 327, 34 Pac. 1105; Maxwell
v. Cunningham, 50 W. Va. 298. 40
S. E. 499; Bluedom v. Missouri Pac.
R. Co. (Mo.), 24 S. W. 57; War-
den v. Miller, 112 Wis. 67, 87 N.
REPEATING SUBSTANCE OF REQUEST.
25
on the part of the defendant. 98 Or in a personal injury case
the refusal of an instruction that the plaintiff cannot be held
to have assumed any extraordinary danger if it appears that he
did not know and appreciate such danger is not error, where
in other instructions the court charges that if the plaintiff knew
the risk and voluntarily assumed it, he cannot recover, and if he
did not know it he can recover."
The frequent repetition of a correct principle of law may be
material error. Such practice gives undue prominence to the
facts or subject matter to which the instruction relates, and
tends to mislead the jury, indicating that, in the opinion of the
court, one of the parties has the advantage over the other on
the evidence relating to the particular question involved. 100 The
repetition in a special instruction of matters as to a certain
element or defense which has been fully covered in the general
charge is error. 101
~W. 828; Vredenburge v. Pall, 28
N. Y. S. 88, 7 Misc. 567; Walbert
v. Trexler, 156 Pa. St. 112, 27 Atl.
65; Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Bab-
cock, 154 U. S. 190, 14 Sup. Ct. 978;
Largey v. Mantle. 26 Mont. 264,
7 Pac. 114; Indianapolis St. R. Co.
v. Robinson, 157 Ind. 414, 61 N. E.
936; Lovick v. Atlantic Coast L.
R. Co. 129 N. Car. 427, 40 S. E. 191;
Cook v. Los Angeles & P. E. R.
Co. 134 Gal. 279, 66 Pac. 306, 86 Am.
St. 246; Keesley v. Doyle, 8 Ind.
App. 43, 35 N. E. 126; Kischman v.
Scott, 166 Mo. 214, 65 S. W. 1031;
General Fire E. Co. v. Schwartz 165
Mo. 121, 65 S. W. 318; Louisville &
N. R. Co. v. Pittmrn, 23 Ky. L. R.
877, 64 S. W. 460; Farmers' Bank
v. Garrow, 63 Neb. 64, 88 N. W. 131;
Collins v. City of Janesville, 111
Wis. 348, 87 N. W. 241; Missouri,
K. & T. R. Co. v. Avery (Tex. Cv.
App.), 64 S. W. 935; McLane v. Mau-
rer (Tex. Cv. App.), 66 S. W. 693;
Daugherty v. Herndon, 27 Tex. Cv.
App. 175, 65 S. W. 891; Vetterly
v. McNeal, 129 Mich. 507, 89 N. W.
441; St. Louis & S. W. R. Co.
v. Ferguson, 26 Tex. Cv. App. 460,
64 S. W. 797; Murray v. Boston
Ice Co. 180 Mass. 165, 61 N. E.
1001, 91 Am. St. 269; McGee v.
Smitherman, 69 Ark. 636, 65 S. W.
461; S. v. Howell, 26 Mont. 3, 66
Pac. 291; S. v. Dotson, 2*6 Mont. 305,
67 Pac. 938; S. v. Hendricks, 172
Mo. 654, 73 S. W. 194 (evidence cir-
cumstantial) ; Jacksonville & St. L.
R. Co.R. Co. v. Wilhite, 209 111. 87;
Illinois I & M. R. Co. v. Freeman,
210 111. 270, 277; Chicago U. T. R.
Co. v. Reuter, 210 LI. 279, 282.
as St. Clair M. S. Co. v. City of
St. Clair, 96 Mich. 463, 56 N. W.
18.
99 Breen v. Field, 159 Mass. 582,
35 N. E. 95.
100 Cross v. Kennedy (Tex. Cv.
App.), 6*6 S. W. 318; Chisum v.
Chestnut (Tex. Cv. App.), 36 S. W.
758; Gulf C. S. & T. R. Co. v. Har-
riett, 80 Tex. 81, 15 S. W. 556; Pel-
frey v. Texas C. R. Co. (Tex. Cv.
App.), 73 S. W. 411; Chapman v.
Conway, 50 111. 513; Kraus v. Haas,
6 Tex. Cv. App. 665, 25 S. W. 1025;
Mendes v. Kyle, 16 Nev. 370 (the
repetitions are set out in the opin-
ion in this case) ; Chicago, W. & V.
C. Co. v. Moran, 210 111. 9, 14;
Kroeger v. Texas &c. R. Co. 30 Tex.
Cv. App. 87, 69 S. W. 809; Miller v.
Coulter, 156 Ind. 290, 59 N. E. 853.
101 Highland v. Houston E. & W.
T. R. Co. (Tex. Cv. App.), 65
26
PURPOSE AND PREPARATION.
24
The practice of repeating and reiterating in a charge the
principle of law applicable to a particular issue has been uni-
formly condemned, because it is likely to lead the jury to be-
lieve that in the opinion of the court the evidence in the case
establishes facts which require the application of the proposition
of law thus sought to be impressed upon the minds of the jury.
Such repetition emphasizes and gives undue prominence to the
question to which it refers. 102 But, on the contrary, such repeti-
tion of a proposition several times in an instruction is not or-
dinarily such error as will be ground for reversal where it oc-
curs in connection with facts or questions involved in th^ case. 103
Nor does the repetition of the same principles or rules of law in
different instructions ordinarily render the charge erroneous. 104
26. Repetition When, general and special charge. Where
the general charge fully covers all the legal principles embraced
in a special charge it is not eror to refuse the latter. 105 And
if the general charge contains all the legal principles embodied
S. W. 649; Wadsworth v. Wil-
liams, 101 Ala. 264, 13 So. 755.
102 Kroeger v. Tex. &c. R. Co.
30 Tex. Cv. App. 87, 69 S. W. 809;
Irvine v. S. 20 Tex. App. 12; Shen-
kenberger v. S. 154 Ind. 630, 642, 57
N. E. 519; Traylor v. Townsend,
61 Tex. 147.
103 Denise v. City of Omaha, 49
Neb. 750, 69 N. W. 119; Maes v.
Texas & N. O. R. Co. (Tex. Cv.
App.), 23 S. W. 725. See Murray
v. New York, L. & W. R. Co. 103
Pa. St. 37; see Gaudy v. Bissell's
Estate (Neb.), 97 N. W. 632; Sonka
v. Sonka (Tex. Cv. App.), 75 S. W,
325; Herbert v. Drew, 32 Ind. 364.
104 Nashville St. R. Co. v.
O'Bryan, 104 Tenn. 28, 55 S. W. 300;
Coffman v. Reeves, 62 Ind. 334;
Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Foley,
88 Fed. 240; Keating v. S. (Neb.),
93 N. W. 980, (credibility of de-
fendant as a witness) ; Murray v.
New York, L. & W. R. Co. 103
Pa. St. 37.
ice Noble v. Worthy, 1 Indian
Ter. 458, 45 S. W. 137; Dorrance v.
McAlister, 1 Indian Ter. 473, 45 S.
W. 141; Saunder v. Gloss, 117 Mich.
130, 75 N. W. 295; Louisville & N.
R. Co. v. Cowherd, 120 Ala. 51, 23
So. 793; Anacostia & P. R. Co. v.
Klein, 8 App. Gas. (D. C.) 75; John-
son v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 45 S. W.
901; Costello v. Kottas, 52 Neb. 15,
71 N. W. 950; Miller v. Miller, 17
Ind. App. 605, 47 N. E. 338; Can-
field v. City of Jackson, 112 Mich.
120, 70 N. W. 444; Com. v. Carter,
(Mass.), 66 N. E. 716; Richmond
Tr. Co. v. Wilkinson, (Va.), 43 S. E.
622; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Holt,
(Tex. Civ. App.), 70 S. W. 591;
Schultz v. Bower, 64 Minn. 123, 66
N. W. 139; Jackson v. Jackson, 82
Md. 17, 33 Atl. 317, 34 L. R. A. 773;
Woodworth v. Parrott, 48 Neb. 675,
67 N. W. 761; La Grande Nat. Bank
v. Blum, 2< Ore. 215, 41 Pac. 659, 50
Am. St. 710; Garbaczewski v. Third
Ave. R. Co. 39 N. Y. S. 33, 5 App,
Div. 186; Gulf C. & S. F. R. Co. v.
Duvall, 12 Tex. Civ. App. 348, 35 S.
W. 649; Norton v. North Carolina
R. Co. 122 N. Car. 910, 29 S. E.
886; Terrell v. McCowen, 91 Tex.
231, 43 S. W. 2; Barnes v. S. 39
Tex. Cr. App. 342, 45 S. W. 495;
S. v. Fontenot, 50 La. Ann. 537,
25 REPEATING GENERAL AND SPECIAL CHARGE. 26
in the special charge, though differing somewhat in form and
wording, the special charge is properly refused. 106
A special request for a charge that a fact may be proved' by
circumstantial evidence may be refused where the same fact
is properly submitted by other instructions. 106 * But if the general
charge does not fully cover all the issues involved which the evi-
dence tends to establish, the court, when requested, should give
further instructions. 107 And in a criminal case where the identity
of the accused is the material issue, a special charge on that issue
should be given where the punishment for the crime charged
is practically equivalent to a life sentence. 108 So where the
general charge states that the plaintiff must prove the facts
of the alleged negligence in order to recover, the refusal to in-
struct the jury that proof of mere injury would not raise a
presumption of negligence, is not error, the general charge
covering the refused instruction. 109 So also in a case where the
questions involved are very simple and the evidence is limited
to a small compass, the refusal to instruct the jury how they
should find in the event they should determine the facts the
one way or the other, is not error, where previous to the request
23 So. 634, 69 Am. St. 435; S. v. Ca n - W. 347; Wunderlich v. Palatine
non, 52 S. Car. 452, 30 S. E. 589; Bal- Ins. Co. 115 Wis. 509, 92 N. W. 264;
timore & O. R. Co. v. Hollenthal, 88 S. v. Caymo, 108 La. Ann. 218, 32
Fed. 116; Taylor v. S. 97 Ga. 432, 25 So. 357, 61 L. R. A. 781; Seefeld v.
S. E. 320, 54 Am. St. 433; Harper v. Thacker, 93 Wis. 518, 67 N. W. 1142;
S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 40 S. W. 272; Stephens v. Anderson (Tex. Cv.
Producer's Marble Co. v. Bergen App.), 36 S. W. 1000; Wellston Coal
(Tex. Cv. App.), 31 S. W. 89; Wes- Co. v. Smith, 65 Ohio St. 81, 61 N.
tra v. Westra Estate, 101 Mich. 526, E. 143 87 Am. St. 547, 55 L. R. A.
60 N. W. 53; Messmann v. Ihlen- 99.
feldt, 89 Wis. 585, 62 N. W. 522; ioe Kenyon v. City of Mondovi,
Wimbish v. Hamilton, 47 La. Ann. 98 Wis. 50. 73 N. W. 314; Chicago,
246, 16 S. 856; Savannah St. R. Co. R. I. & p. R. Co. v. Parks, 59
v. Ficklin, 94 Ga. 146, 20 S. E. 646; Kas. 790, 54 Pac. 1052; S. v. Can-
Hay v. Carolina M. R. Co. 41 S. Car. non , 52 S. Car. 452, 30 S. E. 589.
542, 19 S. E. 976; Rogers v. Black, ioe* Smith v. Richardson Lumber
99 Ga. 139, 25 S. E. 23; Johnson Co. (Tex. Cv. App.), 47 S. W. 386.
v. Galveston H. & N. R. Co. 27 JOT Carrell v. Kalamazoo Cold
Tex. Cv. App. 616, 66 S. W. 906; Storage Co. 112, Mich. 34, 70 N. W.
Southern R. Co. v. Coursey, 115 323, 67 Am. St. 381, 36 L. R. A.
Ga. 602, 41 S. E. 1013; Missouri, 523.
K. & T. R. Co. v. Walden (Tex. ios Ford v. S. 101 Tenn. 454, 47
Cv. App.), 66 S. W. 584; Missouri S. W. 713.
Pac. R. Co. v. Hildebrand, 52 Kas. 109 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Ray,
284, 34 Pac. 738; Chicago, &c. R. Co. 101 Tenn. 1, 46 S. W. 554; S. v.
v. Groves, 56 Kas. 601, 44 Pac. 628; Dudoussat, 47 La. Ann. 977, 17 So.
S. v. Vincent (S. Dak.), 91 N. 685.
27 PURPOSE AND PREPARATION. 26
the court had stated the general propositions of law applicable
to the issues in the case. 110
"26a. Repetition when evidence is close. But where the sub-
ject matter is covered only in general and abstract terms by
instructions, a special request should not be refused where the
evidence is close as to the facts of the matter on which the
special request is made. 111
26b. Court may refuse all instructions. It is not error for
the court to refuse all the instructions asked by a party and
prepare and give a full charge on its own motion, but the in-
structions thus given must fully cover the law of the case. 111 *
And the court may refuse all the instructions asked by both
of the parties and prepare others on its own motion, and there
will be no ground for error. 112 But, of course, it is error if the
court in charging the jury on its own motion fails to embody
all the questions of law properly presented in the refused in-
structions. For instance, where the court, after instructing the
jury for both parties, gives an instruction on its own motion,
remarking as follows: ''I have taken upon myself to concen-
trate all there is in those instructions into this one, as embodying
all the law necessary for this case," it is error, when as a mat-
ter of fact the instruction thus given did not state all the
law applicable to the case. 113 The court may properly ask
the views of opposing counsel as to the propriety of giving
certain instructions. 114
27. Defective instructions refused. If an instruction is ma-
terially defective or imperfect in any particular, the court is
not bound to give it. 115 The court is not bound to correct a
no Smith v. Gray, 46 N. Y. S. A. 696; Birmingham Fire Ins. Co.
180, 19 App. Div. 262. v. Pulver, 126 111. 329, 18 N. E. 804,
in Snowden v. Waterman, 105 9 Am. St. 587; S. v. Collins, 20 Iowa,
Ga. 384, 31 S. E. 110; Souey v. 85; Fowler v. Hoffman, 31 Mich.
S. 13 Lea (Tenn.) 472. 215.
in* Pennsylvania Co. v. Versteu, n 3 McEwen v. Morey, 60 111. 38.
140 111. 641, 30 N. E. 540, 15 L. R. A. * Sullivan v. McManers, 45 N.
798; North Chicago St. R. Co. v. Y. S. 1079, 19 App. Div. 167; East
Louis, 138 111. 12, 27 N. E. 451; Hill Tenn. V. & G. R. Co. v. Gurley,
v. Parson, 110 111. ill; Pennsylva- 12 Lea (Tenn.) 46.
nia Co. v. Rudel, 100 111. 609; n& Freidman v. Weisz, 8 Okla.
Bromley v. Goodwin, 95 111 122; 392, 58 Pac. 613; Howe v. West
Key v. Dent, 6 Md. 142 S. Land & I. Co. 21 Wash. 594, 59
112 Wacaser v. P. 134 111. 438, Pac. 495: Preston v. Dunham, 52
25 N. E. 564, 23 Am. St. 683, 10 L. R. Ala. 217; Wittleder v. Citizens' Elec.
DEFECTIVE AND IMPERFECTIVE.
28
faulty instruction requested. 116 An instruction which omits any
material element or fact on the subject to which it relates is
defective, and for that reason is properly refused. 117 Such
defective instructions, though correct in other respects, may be
refused. 118 And a defective instruction is properly refused, al-
though the court may have previously indicated that it would
be given; 119 or it may be modified, although the court had in-
dicated that it would be given as requested. 120
28. Clauses or paragraph defective. And where an instruc-
tion is divided into several clauses or propositions it may be
refused if any one of such propositions be erroneous. 121 But
it is generally the better practice to give the good and refuse
the bad of such instructions. 122 And it has been held that where
111. Co. 62 N. Y. S. 297; Stan ton v.
Southern R. Co. 56 S. Oar. 398, 34 S.
E. 695; Keithley v. Stafford, 126 111.
507, 524, 18 N. E. 740 (will contest) ;
Tutwiler Coal C. & I. Co. v. Enslen,
129 Ala. 336, 30 S. E. 600; Charter
v Lane, 62 Conn. 121, 25 Atl. 464;
Thompson v. O'Conner, 115 Ga. 120,
41 S. .E. 242; Earle v. Poat, 63 S.
Car. 439, 41 S. E. 525, 90 Am. St. 681;
Christian v. S. 7 Ind. App. 417, 34
N. E. 825; Terrill v. Tillson (Vt.),
54 Atl. 187; Ricketts v. Harvey, 106
Ind. 564, 6 N. E. 325; Over v. Schif-
fling, 102 Ind. 194, 26 N. E. 91;
Cleveland & Pittsburg R. Co. v. Sar-
gent, 19 Ohio St. 452; Eckels v. S. 20
Ohio St. 508; Railroad Co. v. Shultz,
43 Ohio St. 273, 1 N. E. 324, 54 Am.
R. 805; Barnes v. S. 103 Ala. 44, 15
So. 901; P. v. Harlan, 133 Cal. 16,
65 Pac 9; Underwood v. Hart, 23
Vt. 120; Tower v. Haslam, 84 Me.
86, 24 Atl. 587; Mariner v. Dennison,
78 Cal 202. 20 Pac. 386.
us Harris v. First N. Bank (Tex.
Cv. App.), 45 S. W. 311; Earth v.
Kansas City E. R. Co. 142 Mo.
535, 44 S. W. 778; McGee v. Wells,
52 S. Car. 472, 30 S. E. 602;
Amsden v. Atwood, 69 Vt. 527, 38
Atl. 263; Alabama S. L. Co. v.
Slaton, 120 Ala. 259, 24 So. 720, 74
Am. St. 31; Croft v. Northwestern
S. S. Co. 20 Wash. 175, 55 Pac 42;
Milmo N. Bank, v. Convery (Tex
Cv. App.), 49 S. W. 926; Waco A.
Water Co. v. Cauble, 19 Tex. Cv.
App, 317, 47 S W. 538; Kluse v.
Sparks, 10 Ind. App, 444, 37 N. E.
1047; Mosier v. Stall, 119 Ind 244,
20 N. E. 752; Callan v. McDaniel, 72
Ala. 96; Rolfe v. Rich, 149 111. 4o6,
35 N. E. 352; Douglas v. Wolf, 6
Kas. 88.
117 American Bible Society v.
Price, 115 111. 623, 638, 5 N. E. 126;
Britton v. S. 61 Ark. 15, 31 S. W.
569; Jacobi v. S. 133 Ala. 1, 32 So.
158; Thomas v. S. 133 Ala. 139, 32
So. 250; S. v. Burns (Nev.), 74 Pac.
984.
us S. v Nichols, 50 La. Ann. 699,
23 So. 9>80; S. v. Neal, 120 N. Car.
613, 27 S. E. 81, 58 Am. St. 810.
us Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co.
v. Hubbard, 116 Ind. 193, 18 N. E.
611; Carleton v. S. 43 Neb. 373, 61
N. W. 699.
120 City of Logansport v. Dyke-
man, 116 Ind. 26, 17 N. E. 587.
121 Riviere v. Missouri, K. & T.
R. Co. (Tex. Cv. App.), 40 S.
W. 1074; Inglebright v. Hammond,
19 Ohio, 346, 53 Am. Dec. 430; Con-
solidated Tr. Co. v. Chenowith (V.
J.), 34 Atl. 817; Boyden v. Fitch-
burg R. Co. 72 Vt. 89, 47 Atl. 409.
Contra: Burnham v. Logan, 88 Tex.
1, 29 S. W. 1067; Sword v. Keith,
31 Mich. 247; Peshine v. Shepper-
son, 17 Gratt. (Va.) 472, 94 Am. Dec.
468.
122 Walker v. Devlin, 2 Ohio St.
593; Mitchell v. Charleston L. &
P. Co. 45 S. Car. 146, 22 S. E. 767,
89 PURPOSE AND PREPARATION. 28
instructions are requested in the aggregate (apparently one en-
tire charge) if any part thereof is erroneous it is not error
to refuse the entire charge. 123
Also where the requested instruction contains two proposi-
tions, a correct and incorrect one, so united that the court, in
passing upon one of them, will be required also to pass upon
,the other, the whole instruction may be refused. 124 Or where
several propositions of law are requested in one charge as a
whole, if any part of the charge is erroneous, the whole may
be refused. 125 In Texas, if several instructions are written
on separate sheets and fastened together and the last one is
signed, as required by statute, all may be refused if one of
them is improper. 126
29. Incomplete instruction defective. Or it is proper to
refuse an instruction which is but an incomplete statement of
the law on the point in question. 127 Thus, where in one count
of an indictment the defendant is charged with unlawfully
altering the mark on a sheep and in another count with steal-
ing the sheep, an instruction that if the jury have a reasonable
doubt of the defendant's guilt from the evidence, they should
acquit him, is properly refused, in that it is not a complete
statement of the law covering both charges as stated in the in-
dictment. 128 It has been held that if an instruction be incom-
plete the opposing or complaining party should request the
court to modify it so as to make it conform to the law. 129
30. Modifying defective instructions. But instead of re-
31 L. R. A. 577 (not the duty of the v. Weaver, 6 Tex. Cv. App. 215,
court to eliminate the defective part 25 S. W. 468; Price v. S. 107 Ala.
of a charge); Houston & T. C. R. 161, 18 So. 130; Inglebright v. Ham-
Co, v. Kelly, 13 Tex. Cv. App. 1, rnond, 19 Ohio, 337, 53 Am. Dec. 430.
34 S. W. 809; French v. Millard, 2 120 international & G. N. R. Co.
Ohio St. 44. v. Niff (Tex. Cv. App.), 26 S. W.
123 p. v . Thiede, 11 Utah, 241, 39 784; Missouri P. R. Co. v. King,
Pac. 837; S. v. Watkins, 106 La. 2 Tex. Cv. App. 122, 23 S. W. 917.
380, 31 So. 10; Price v. S. 107 Ala. 127 Keithley v. Stafford, 126 111.
161, 18 So. 130; Bedford v. Penny, 524, 18 N. B. 740; Hooper v. S.
58 Mich. 424, 25 N. W. 381; Wil- 106 Ala. 41, 17 So. 679, 34 L. R. A.
liamson v. Toby, 86 Cal. 497, 25 634; Kelly v. Palmer (Minn.), 97 N.
Pac. 65. W. 578.
124 Burnham v. Logan (Tex. Cv. 128 Barnes v. S. 103 Ala. 44, 15
App.), 29 S. W. 1067. So. 901.
125 Oliver v. S. 38 Fla. 46, 20 129 Baltimore & O. S. W. R. Co.
So. 803; Lanyon v. Edwards (Tex. v. Young, 153 Ind. 163, 54 N. B.
Cv. App.), 26 S. W. 524; Yarborougu 791.
29 MODIFYING WHEN DEFECTIVE OR CORRECT. 31
fusing a defective instruction the court may modify it in such
manner as will cure the defect and give it as modified; and if
the instruction as modified correctly states the law, there can
be no ground for complaint. 130 The modification may consist
of striking out any objectionable word, phrase or clause, as
for instance, "as testified to by the justice." 131 An instruction
as to whether an injury was caused by accident may be mod-
ified by adding to it a definition of the term "accident." 132 The
modification of an instruction by substituting "due care" for
"ordinary care" is not error. 133 And where the court modifies
an instruction for the purpose of reconciling it with others
asked by the complaining party, such modification cannot be
urged as ground for error, although the modification may be
improper. 13 * Nor will a party be allowed to complain of a
modification of one of his instructions to make it conform to an-
other asked by him. 135
31. Modifying correct instructions. But should the court
modify a correct instruction, the modification will be regarded
as immaterial if it in no manner changes the meaning of the
instruction as originally requested. 136 The modification of an
iso Crown C. & C. Co. v. Taylor, isi Lovick v. Atlantic C. L. R.
184 111. 250, 56 N. E. 388; Illinois Co. 129 N. Car. 427, 40 S. E. 191.
Cent. R. Co. v. McClelland, 42 111. 1-12 Barnett & R. Co. v. Schlapka,
359; Morgan v. Peet, 32 111. 287; Hin- 208 111. 436.
shaw v. S. 147 Ind. 334, 47 N. E. 157; isa St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v.
Conkey Co. v. Bueherer, 84 111. App. Warren, 65 Ark. 619, 48 S. W. 222.
633; Meigs v. Dexter, 172 Mass. 134 Funk v. Babbitt, 156 111. 408,
217, 52 N. E. '<5; Cook v. Los An- 41 N. E. 166; Louisville, N. O. & T.
geles & P. E. R. Co. 134 Cal. 279, R. Co. v. Suddoth, 70 Miss. 265,
66 Pac. 306; Bartlett v. Hawley, 12 So. 333.
38 Minn. 308, 37 N. W. 580; Eilard iss Judy v. Sterrett, 153 111. 94,
v. S. 52 Ala. 330; Brown v. S. 38 N. E. 633. See Cicero & P. St. R.
72 Miss. 990, 18 So. 431; Jansen Co. v. Meixner, 160 111. 320, 43 N. E.
v. Grimshaw, 125 111. 468, 17 N. E. 823, 31 L. R. A. 831; Hamilton v.
850; Evans v. Givens, 22 Fla. 476; Hartinger, 96 Iowa, 7, 64 N. W. 592,
P. v. Hall, 94 Cal. 595, 30 Pac. 7; 59 Am. St. 348; Feary v. Metropol-
Large v. Moore, 17 Iowa, 258; Mus- itan St. R. Co. 162 Mo. 75.
grave v. S. 133 Ind. 297, 32 N. E. * Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Fiet-
885; Evans v. Montgomery, 95 sam, 123 111. 518, 15 N. E. 169;
Mich. 497, 55 N. W. 362; Lace- Chicago & W. I. R. Co. v. Bingen-
well v. S. 95 Ga. 346, 22 S. E. 546; heimer, 116 111. 226, 4 N. E. 840;
3. v. Horton, 100 N. Car. 443, 6 S. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Avery,
E. 238, 6 Am. St. 613; S. v. Smith, 109 111. 322; P. v. Ashmead, 118
10 Nev. 123; Kimmel v. P. 92 111. Cal. 508, 50 Pac. 681; Dilling-
457; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Bun- ham v. Fields, 9 Tex. Cv. App. 1.
dy, 210 111. 49. 29 S. W. 214; Brink v. Black, 77
PURPOSE AND PREPARATION.
30
instruction which ought to be given as asked is not material
error if it states the law substantially as the one requested. 137
And if the modification correctly states the law pertinent to
the issue and is applicable to the evidence, and does not in-
terfere with a comprehension of the legal proposition as sub-
mitted before modification, there is no ground for error. 138 But
it is error to modify an instruction by adding to it a material
qualification unauthorized by the evidence. 139 The modification
of an instruction in such manner as to introduce an element
in the case which finds no support in the evidence is error. 140
32. In language of request. The court is not bound to give
instructions in the language of the request unless required by
statute or local practice to do so, but may modify them. 141 In
some jurisdictions it is held that instructions must be given
in the exact language of the request ; 142 and where the requested
instructions are pertinent and correctly state the law, they
should be given in the language as submitted, instead of the
N. Car. 59; Chicago, R. I. & P. R.
Co. v. Kinnare, 90 111. 9; S. v. Fan-
non', 158 Mo. 149; P. v. Davis, 47
Cal. 93.
137 s. v. Wilson, 3 111. (2 Scam.)
225; Meul v. P. 198 111. 258, 64 N. E.
1106; Fells Point S. Inst. v. Weed-
on, 18 Md. 320, 81 Am. Dec. 597; P.
v. Stewart, 75 Mich. 29, 42 N. W.
662; Jamson v. Quivey, 5 Cal. 490;
S. v. Davis (N. Car.), 46 S. E. 722;
S. v. Hicks, 130 N. Car. 710, 41 S.
E 803
128 Myer v. Mead, 83 111. 19, 21.
See Creed v. P. 81 111. 565, 569;
P. v. Williams, 17 Cal. 142; Cook
v. Brown, 62 Mich. 477, 29 N. W.
46, 4 Am. St. 870.
139 Walker v. Stetson, 14 Ohio
St. 100; McHugh v. S. 42 Ohio
St. 152 (an alteration of an in-
struction is the same as a refusal).
See Chicago, W. V. C. Co. v. Moran,
210 111. 9, 14, (improper modifica-
tion of an irrelevant instruction is
not error).
140 Badger v. Batavia Paper Mfg.
Co. 70 111. 302, 305.
"I S. v. Petsch, 43 S. Car. 132,
20 S. E. 993; S. v. Mills, 116 N. Car.
992, 21 S. E. 106; Lou v. Grimes
Drygoods Co. 38 Neb. 215, 56 N. W.
954; Carroll v. Tucker, 26 N. Y.
S. 86, 6 Misc. 613; Percival v. Chase,
182 Mass. 371, 65 N. E. 800; Daven-
port v. Johnson, 182 Mass. 269, 65 N.
E. 392; McDonald v. New York,
N. H. & H. R. Co. (R. I.), 54 Atl.
795; Edwards v. Wessinger, 65
S. Car. 161, 43 S. E. 518, 95 Am. St.
789; S. v. Stout, 49 Ohio St. 283,
30 N. E. 437; McHugh v. S. 42 Ohio
St. 154; Crisman v. McDonald, 28
Ark. 8; Jackson v. Com. 17 Ky. L.
R. 1197, 34 S. W. 14; Robinson v. S.
82 Ga. 535, 9 S. E. 528; Bond v. S.
23 Ohio St. 349, 13 Am. R. 253.
142 Grace v. Dempsey, 75 Was.
313, 43 N. W. 1127; Lake S. & M.
S. R. Co. v. Shultz, 19 Ohio. C. C.
639; Bush v. Glover, 4/ Ala. 167, 11
Am. R. 768; Rogers v. Brightman,
10 Wis. 55; East Tenn. V. & G. R.
Co. v. Bayless, 77 Ala. 430, 54 Am.
R. 69; P. v. Stewart, 75 Mich. 21, 42
N. W. 662; Baltimore & O. R. Co.
v. Laffertys, 14 Gratt. (Va.) 478;
Peart v. Cnicago, M. & St. P. R. Co.
8 S. Dak. 431, 66 N. W. 814.
31 MODIFYING CRIMINAL CHANGING TO SUIT ISSUES. 33.
court giving others on its own motion of a more general na-
ture. 143
In Texas the rule is that whenever a special instruction is
requested the court should give or refuse it as requested; and
it is an improper practice for the court to make any alteration
of the instruction as requested, yet a qualification may be harm-
less. 144
32a. Modifying in criminal cases. Instructions requested by
the defendant in a criminal case may be modified by the court
so as to make them show the theory of the prosecution, although
such theory is presented in the instructions given for the prose-
cution. 145 And likewise where a requested instruction contains
the caution to the jury that they should consider the danger
of convicting an innocent person, it may be modified, directing
them also to consider the danger to society in acquitting a guilty
person. 146 And it is also proper to change an instruction so as
to confine it to the evidence in the case. 147
33. Changing to conform to issues. The court may modify
an instruction to make it comprehensive enough to cover the
issues and evidence. 148 An instruction charging the jury that
the plaintiff is bound to prove every material allegation con-
tained in his declaration by a preponderance of the evidence
is properly modified by adding the words "or in some count
thereof," where all the counts are good. 149
An instruction, though proper under one branch of a case
as alleged in one count of the declaration, may be modified to
make it cover another element or branch alleged in another
count. Instructions should not be so drawn as to ignore any
issue raised by the pleadings. 150 So also where an instruction
requested to be given for the defendant charges that if certain
us Jordan v. City of Benwood, 42 146 p. y. Stegenberg, 127 Cal. 510,
W. Va. 312, 26 S. E. 266, 57 Am. St. 59 Pac. 942.
859; 36 L. R. A. 519; S. v. McCann, 147 Kimmel v. P. 92 111. 457, 460.
16 Wash. 249, 49 Pac. 216. "8 Hays v. Border, 6 111. (1
i** Trezevant v. Rains (Tex. Cv. Gilm.) 46, 65.
App.), 25 S. W. 1092; Dillingham 149 Joliet R. Co. v. McPherson,
v. Fields, 9 Tex. Cv. App. 1, 29 S. W. 193 111. 629; St. Louis & S. W. R.
214. Co. v. Ball, 28 Tex. Cv. App. 287, 66
i Smith v. S. 75 Miss. 542, 23 S. W. 879.
So. 260; Bingham v. Lipman, 40 IGO Pennsylvania Co. v. Marshall,
Ore. 363, 67 Pac. 98. 119 111. 399, 406, 10 N. B. 220.
34 PURPOSE AND PREPARATION. 32
enumerated facts are established by the evidence, then the de-
fendant would be free from liability, the court may, on its own
motion, modify the instruction by stating the converse of the
proposition. 151
An instruction which charges that: "If the jury believe from
the evidence that the plaintiff in his application for insurance
made a false or untrue statement as to the value or ownership
of the property insured, as an inducement to the company to
enter into the contract of insurance, and that the company relied
upon such statement, and was induced thereby to enter into
such contract of insurance, then such contract is voidable by its
own terms and conditions, by the company, and it cannot be
enforced against it, and the verdict should be for the company,"
is properly modified by adding: "Unless you further believe from
the evidence that the defendant, after it had full knowledge
of such representations, waived its right to a forfeiture of said
policy on that ground. ' ' The right to a forfeiture and the waiver
of that right are properly submitted in the one instruction. 152
34. Further instructions after jury retire. The court may
recall the jury after they have remained out some time and give
them, at their request, further instructions where equal oppor-
tunity is given each party to submit such further instructions. 15 "
And it is not only the right, but it may be the duty of the court
to further instruct the jury at their request. 154 Such further
instructions must be reduced to writing if the original instruc-
tions were required to be in writing. 155
isi Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. S. 31 Tex. Cr. App. 173, 20 S. W.
Evans (Tex. Cv. App.), 41 S. W. 80. 369, 37 Am. St. 799; Nichols v.
152 German Fire Ins. Co. v. Gru- Munsel, 115 Mass. 567; National
nert, 112 111. 68, 77. Lumber Co. v. Snell, 47 Ark. 407, 1
iss Shaw v. Camp, 160 111. 430, S.W. 708; City of Morris v. S. 25
43 N. E. 608; Crowell v. P. 190 Ala. 57; Breedlove v. Sunday, 96
111. 514, 60 N. E. 872; City of Joliet Ind. 319; P. v. Mayes, 113 Gal. 618,
v. Looney, 159 111. 471, 42 N. E. 45 Pac. 860, 54 Am. St. 373; Hayes
854; Lee v. Quick, 20 111. 392; Farley v. Williams, 17 Colo. 465, 30 Pac.
v S. 57 Ind. 335; Guy v. S. 96 Md. 352.
692; Wilkinson v. St. Louis S. D. is-* Dowzelot v. Rowlings, 58 Mo.
Co. 102 Mo. 130; Richlands Iron 75; King v. S. 86 Ga. 355, 12 S.
Co. v. Elkins, 90 Va. 249, 17 S. E. E. 943.
890; Hulse v. S. 35 Ohio St. 421; iss Bowden v. 4rchor, 95 Ga. 243,
Sage v. Evansville & T. H. R. Co. 22 S. E. 254; P. v. Charles, 26 Cal.
134 Ind. 100, 33 N. E. 771; Wood- 78; S. v. Harding, 81 Iowa, 599,
ruff v. King, 47 Wis. 261, 2 N. W. 47 N. W. 877; P. v. Wappner, 14
452. See generally: Cox v. High- Cal. 437; Columbia V. & B. Co. v.
ley, 100 Pa. St. 252; Benavides v. Cottonwood L. Co. 99 Tenn. 122,
33 FURTHER CHARGING THE JURY. 36
35. Further instructions in absence of counsel. But the
court cannot send to the jury material additional instructions
after they have retired, in the absence or without the knowledge
or consent of counsel of the respective parties, though such ad-
ditional instructions be requested by the jury. 150 The mere
giving of further instructions, however, in the absence of counsel
is not of itself error if given in open court. 157 In such case the
court is not bound to send for the parties or their counsel,
whose duty it is to remain in court until the jury return a ver-
dict. 158 If it appears that no injury was done to the complain-
ing party, the error in thus instructing is harmless. 159 It is not
error to thus give further instructions when counsel are present
and make no objection, if the additional instructions correctly
state the law. 160
36. Further instructions in absence of defendant. The mere
giving of further instructions in any criminal case in the ab-
sence of the defendant is -error, unless in case the defendant
has absconded, or in some manner waived his right to be
present. 161 And it is error to further instruct, in the absence of
the defendant, although the court may merely re-read the in-
41 S. W. 351; Willis v. S. 89 Ga. Dec. 430 (not error if counsel have
188, 15 S. E. 32. been called); Feibelman v. Man-
ise Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Rob- Chester F. A. Co. 108 Ala. 180, 19 So.
bins, 159 111. 602, 43 N. B. 332; 540.
Com. v. Howe (Pa. Super. Ct), 4 157 Aerheart v. St. Louis, I. M.
W. N. Oas. 246; Felker v. Douglass, & S. R. Co. 90 Fed 907; Wade v.
(Tex. Cv. App.), 57 S. W. 323; Ordway, I Baxt. (Tenn.) 229.
Seagrave v. Hall, 3 Ohio Cir. Dec. 158 Cooper v. Morris, 48 N. J. L.
221. See City of Joliet v. Looney, 607, 7 Atl. 427; Cornish v. Graff,
159 111. 471, 42 N. B. 854; Kehrley 36 Hun (N. Y.) 160.
v. Shafer, 36 N. Y. S. 510, 92 Hun, 159 Moseley v. Washburn, 165
N. Y. 196; Fisher v. P. 23 111. 218. Mass. 417, 43 N. E. 182; Felker v.
Contra: S. v. Dudousot, 47 La. Ann. Douglass, (Tex. Cv. App.) 57 S.
977, 17 So. 685. See also Seagrave W. 323; Glenn v. Hunt, 120 Mo.
v. Hall, 10 Ohio C. C. 395 (no at- 330, 25 S. W. 181; Galloway v. Cor-
tempt made to notify parties or bitt, 52 Mich. 461, 18 N. W. 218.
counsel) ; Sargent v. Roberts, 1 18 Wilson v. S. 37 Tex. Cr. App.
Pick. (Mass.), 337, 11 Am. Dec. 185; 156, 38 S. W. 1013; Barnett v. Salo-
S. v. Davenport, 33 La. Ann. 231; mon, 118 Mich. 460, 76 N. W. 1035;
Parkinson v. Concord St. R. Co. 71 see McMahon v. Eau Claire W.
N. H. 28, 51 Atl. 268; S. v. Paterson, Works, 95 Wis. 640, 70 N. W. 829.
45 Vt. 301, 1 Green Cr. R. 492; Kuhl iei Maurer v. P. 43 N. Y. 1; Bon-
v. Long, 102 Ala. 569, 15 So. 267, (no ner v. S. 67 Ga. 510; Benavides v.
effort was made to have counsel S. 31 Tex. Cr. App. 173, 20 S. W.
present); Low v. Freeman, 117 Ind. 369, 3 Am. St. 799; Jones v. S. 26
345, 20 N. E. 242; Campbell v. Ohio St. 208; Hulse v. S. 35 Ohio St.
Beckett, 8 Ohio St. 211; Preston 429 (defendant absconding); Raff er-
v. Bowers, 13 Ohio St. 14, 82 Am. ty v. P. 72 111. 46.
37 PURPOSE AND PREPARATION. 34
structions exactly as given. 162 But in several states the courts
hold that if the defendant, in criminal cases, is present it is not
improper to give such additional instructions, although his coun-
sel may not be present. 163
37. Instructing further on other points. In the absence of
a statute to the contrary it is not error in further charging
the jury to instruct on other points in addition to those on which
the jury requested information, providing the instructions are
otherwise correct. 16 * But in Texas such practice is prohibited
by statue. 165 But the court cannot go to the extent of giving
substantially a new and complete charge on the issues. 166 Nor
is it a wise practice to repeat the entire charge as originally
given, when the jury ask for further instructions, for fear of
confusion. 167 But if the jury say they do not understand the
instructions, they may be re-read if the parties are present. 168
On the other hand, to repeat only a portion of the charge may
be error, especially if no request has-been made by the jury for
further instructions. 169
38. Recalling jury for further instructions. The court, in
its discretion, in furtherance of justice, may recall the jury and
give additional instructions, and the action of the court in this
respect will not be the subject of review unless it appears that
such discretion was abused. 170 And it has been held that the
court may, on its own motion, recall the jury after they have
been deliberating, for the purpose of aiding them when they
were involved in any difficulty in reaching a verdict. 171
So for the court to say to the jury in asking them to deliberate
162 Kinnemer v. S. 66 Ark. 206, i6 Foster v. Turner, 31 Kas. 65,
49 S. W. 815. 1 Pac. 145.
las p. v . Mayes, 113 Cal. 618, 45 "7 Gravett v. S. 74 Ga. 196; Wil-
Pac. 860, 54 Am. St. 373; S. v. Mil- son v. S. 68 Ga. 827.
ler, 100 Mo. 606, 13 S. W. 832, 1051; ios Woodruff v. King, 47 Wis. 261,
Jones v. S. 26 Ohio St. 208; Bonner 2 N. W. 452; Goff v. Greer, 88
v. S. 67 Ga. 510; Hulse v. S. 35 Ohio Ind. 122. 45 Am. R. 449.
St. 429; Johnson v. S. 100 Ala. 55, ISQ Cranberry v. Frierson, 2 Baxt.
14 So. 627. (Tenn.) 326; Cockrill v. Hall, 76
in* P. v. M'Kay, 122 Cal. 628, 55 Cal. 193, 18 Pac. 318. See Lloyd
Pac. 594; Harper v. S. 109 Ala. v. Moore, 38 Ohio St. 100.
66, 19 So. 901; Chouteau v. Jupiter 170 McClary v. Stull, 44 Neb. 191,
Iron Works, 94 Mo. 388, 7 S. W. 61 N. W. 501. See Young v. Hahn,
467. (Tex. Cv. App.), 69 S. W. 203.
IBS Hannahan v. S. 7 Tex. Cr. App. ITI Allis v. U. S. 155 U. S. 117,.
610; Chamberlain v. S. 2 Tex. App. 39 Sup. Ct. 91.
451.
35 JUDGE VISITING JURY WITHDRAWING INSTRUCTIONS 40
further (after they had been considering the case for two days),
"I feel that no twelve men can be found better qualified than
you to decide this case," is not error. 172 Also the jury may be
recalled by the court for the purpose of correcting errors in the
giving of instructions. 173 It has been held in one jurisdiction
that the court may, in its discretion, recall the jury and amplify
or enlarge on the instructions, though not requested to do so. 174
The court may, in its discretion, refuse to recall the jury after
they have retired, for further instructions at the request of
a party. 175
39. Judge calling on jury Effect. The court has no au-
thority to call on the jury in the jury room and confer with them
about the case without the consent of the parties, and to do
so is error; 176 and when the judge does so call on the jury it
must appear that the consent of both sides was expressly given. 177
The mere presence of the judge of the court in the jury room,
watching the deliberations of the jury, is error, whether he may
have said anything or not. 178
40. Withdrawing erroneous instructions Amending.
"Where erroneous instructions have been given the court may
withdraw them from the consideration of the jury at any time
before a verdict has been reached, 179 especially if they are with-
172 Shely v. Shely, 20 Ky. L. R. St. 480; S. v. Alexander, 66 Mo. 148;
1021, 47 S. W. 1071; McDaniel v. Reed v. City of Cambridge, 124
Crosby, 19 Ark. 533. See, also, Sol- Mass. 567, 26 Am. R. 690; Sommer
omon v. Reis, 5 Ohio C. C. 375; v. Huber, 183 Pa. St. 162, 38 Atl.
Hannon v. S. 70 Wis. 448. 36 N. W. 595; Kirk v. S. 14 Ohio St. 511; Sny-
1; S. v. Rollins, 77 Me. 380, 52 Am. der v. Wilson, 65 Mich. 336, 32 N.
R. 779; S. v. Pitts, 11 Iowa, 343; S. W. 642; Hoberg v. S. 3 Minn. 262;
v. Chandler, 31 Kas. 201, 1 Pac. 787. Gibbons v. Van Alstyne, 29 N. Y. S.
ITS s. v. Lightsey, 43 S. Car. 114, 463.
20 S. E. 975; Florence Sewing M. 177 Smith v. McMillen, 19 Ind.
Co. v. Grover & B. Sewing M. Co. 391; Bunn v. Growl, 10 Johns. (N.
110 Mass. 70, 14 Am. R. 579. Y.) 239.
174 Jones v. Swearingen, 42 S. Car. s Gibbons v. Van Alstyne, 29
58, 19 S. E. 947. N. Y. S. 461; S. v. Wroth, 15 Wash.
175 Young v. Hahn (Tex. Cv. App), 621, 47 Pac. 106.
69 S. W. 203. 179 Resmer v. Thornbury, 111
176 Lester v. Hays (Tex. Cv. App.), Iowa, 515, 82 N. W. 950; Sittig v.
38 S. W. 52; Jones v. Johnson, Birkestack, 38 Md. 158; Sommer v.
61 Ind. 257; Quinn v. S. 130 Ind. Gilmore, 168 Pa. St. 117, 31 Atl.
340, 30 N. E. 300. See, also, gen- 884; Sage v. Evansville & T. H.
erally, Goode v. Campbell, 14 Bush. R. Co. 134 Ind. 100, 33 N. E. 771;
(Ky.) 75; Johnson v. S. 100 Ala. P. v. Benham, 160 N. Y. 402, 55
55, 14 So. 629; S. v. Wroth, 15 Wash. N. E. 11, 14 N. Y. S. 188; Shack-
621, 47 Pac. 106; Hopkins v. Bishop, elford v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 53
91 Mich. 328, 51 N. W. 902, 30 Am. S. W. 884; Reed v. S. (Neb.), 92 N
41 PURPOSE AND PREPARATION. 36
drawn in such manner as to be clearly understood by the jury. 180
And where the parties, by agreement, submit a cause to be tried
by the court without a jury, any legal proposition submitted as the
law of the case may be withdrawn before the court has passed
upon the same. 181 Instructions may be amended during the ar-
guments where counsel are not thereby deprived of the right
to discuss the effect of such amendments. 182
41. Rulings and remarks not instructions. Remarks made
by the court during the introduction of the evidence, stating
for what particular purpose certain evidence is admitted,
that the jury may understand its proper application to the issues,
are not instructions within the meaning of the statute requiring
instructions to be in writing. 183 Rulings of the court in passing
upon a motion to exclude from the jury certain testimony do
not come within the rule of written instructions. 18 * It is not
error for the court to give the jury oral directions on matters
which do not relate to the merits of the case. 183 An oral state-
ment by the court that, "you must not arrive at your verdict
by lot or chance, but only by considering the evidence," was
held not to be prejudicial error. 186 A direction to the jury to
return a verdict in favor of a party is not an instruction within
the meaning of a statute requiring instructions to be given in
writing. 187
W. 321; Bonner v. S. 107 Ala. 97, ISB White, Kingsland Mfg. Co. v.
18 So. 226; Chicago & B. I. R. Co. Herdrich, 98 111. App. 607; Dodd \.
v. Zapp, 209 111. 341 (withdrawn Moore, 91 Ind. 522; Pate v. Wight,
orally after reading to the jury). 30 Ind. 476, 95 Am. Dec. 705; Sample
iso s. v. Wells, 54 Kas. 161, 37 v. S. 104 Ind. 289, 4 N. E. 40 (oral
Pac. 1005; Lower v. Franks, 115 statement that counsel have re-
Ind. 334, 17 N. B. 630; Wenning v. quested written instructions not er-
Teeple, 144 Ind. 189, 41 N. E. 600. ror) ; Sargent v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. App.
isi Smith v. Mayfield, 163 111. 447, 325, 33 S. W. 364; Hasbrouck v. City
45 N. B. 157. of Milwaukee, 21 Wis. 219; Lehman
182 Powers v. Com. 22 Ky. L. R. v. Hawks, 121 Ind. 543, 23 N. E. 670;
1807, 61 S. W. 735. McCallister v. Mount, 73 Ind. 566;
iss Farmer v. Thrift, 94 Iowa, Bradway v. Waddell, 95 Ind. 170;
374, 62 N. W. 804; Stanley v. Suth- Clouser v. Ruckman, 104 Ind. 588,
erland, 54 Ind. 339; Bradway v. 4 N. E. 202, (reading the pleadings
Waddell, 95 Ind. 170; Madden v. to the jury has been held not to
State, 148 Ind. 183, 47 N. E. 220; be error); Moore v. City of Plat-
Hatfield v. Chenoworth, 24 Ind. App. terville, 78 Wis. 644, 47 N. W. 1055.
343, 56 N. E. 51; S. v. Good, 132 iso Lankster v. S. (Tex. Cr.
Mo. 114, 33 S. W. 795. App.), 72 S. W. 388.
184 Bloomer v. Sherrill, 11 III. 1*7 Liggett & M. T. Co. v. Collier,
483, 485. 89 Iowa, 144, 56 N. W. 417.
37 SIGNING, NUMBERING AND MARKING. 43
42. Directions as to form of verdict. The form of the ver-
dict which calls for the statement of any legal proposition is
included under a statute requiring instructions to be in writ-
ing. 188 But to instruct the jury orally as to the form of the
verdict is not a violation of the statute, unless some rule or
principle of law applicable to the case should be given in di-
recting the jury as to the form of the verdict. 189 If the de-
fendant in a criminal case desires that a form of verdict should
be given as to a lesser or included offense, he should prepare
and request such form. 190 The giving of a form of verdict for
a conviction without submitting a form for acquittal is not error
in the absence of a request for such form. 191
43. Signing and numbering instructions. In some of the
states, requested instructions must be signed by counsel, other-
wise it is not error to refuse them; 192 and in other states they
must be signed by the judge of the court, as well as by counsel. 193
But the giving of instructions which are not signed by counsel
as required by statute is not error where the court signs them. 194
It has been held that a statute requiring instructions to be
signed by the judge of the court is only directory, and that if they
are not so signed the error is immaterial. 195 The failure of the
IBS Ellis v. P. 159 111. 337, 339, Buchart v. Ell. 9 Ind. App. 353, 36
42 N. B. 873; Helm v. P. 186 111. N. E. 762; Board v. Legg, 110 Ind.
153, 57 N. E. 886. 474, 11 N. E. 612; Hutchinson v.
189 Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Wheel- Lemcke, 107 Ind. 121, 8 N. E. 71;
er, 149 111. 525, 36 N. E. 1023; Helm Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v. Hedges,
v. P. 186 111. 153; Ellis v. P. 159 105 Ind. 398, 7 N. E. 801; Citizens
111. 337, 42 N. E. 873, 57 N. E. St. R. Co. v. Hobbs, 15 Ind. App.
886; Carlyle Canning Co. v. Bal- 610, 43 N. E. 479; Craig v. Frazier,
timore & O. S. W. R. Co. 77 111. 127 Ind. 286, 26 N. E. 842; Farrer
App. 396; Smith v. P. 142 111. 124, 31 v. McNair, 65 Kas. 147, 69 Pac. 167.
N. E. 599; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. ia Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co.
Hammer, 85 111. 526. v. Neel (Tex. Cv. App.), 26 S. W.
190 Dunn v. P. 109 111. 646; Dacey 788; Denmark v. S. 43 Fla. 182,
v. P. 116 111. 575, 6 N. E. 165; 31 So. 269 (signature under seal
Hughes Cr. Law, 3240. not required).
191 Green v. S. 40 Fla. 474, 24 So. i* Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co.
537. v. Neel (Tex. Cv. App.), 26 S. W.
The court may read the forms 788.
of verdict to the jury. P. v. Chaves, 195 Halley v. Tichenor, 120 Iowa,
122 Cal. 134, 54 Pac. 596. 164, 94 N. W. 472; S. v. Stanley, 48
192 State Nat. Bank v. Bennett, Iowa, 221; Dlllingham v. Bryant
8 Ind. App. 679, 36 N. E. 551; Texas (Tex. App.), 14 S, W. 1017;
& P. R. Co. v. Mitchell (Tex. Cv. Parker v. Chancellor, 78 Tex. 524,
App.), 26 S. W. 154; Mason v. Sieg- 15 S. W. 157. Contra: Baker v.
litz, 22 Colo. 320, 44 Pac. 588; S. 17 Fla. 410; Tyree v. Parham,
44 PURPOSE AND PREPARATION. 38
court to number the instructions or paragraphs is not ground
for reversal, although by statute the court is required to number
and sign them. 196
44. Marking "given," "refused," effect. Under a statute
requiring instructions which are given, to be marked on the
margin "given," and those which are refused to be marked
"refused," it is not material error if they are not so marked. 197
A statute requiring instructions to be thus marked is only di-
rectory, and not mandatory. 198 Hence, the giving of an instruc-
tion, though not marked as required, is not material error, 199
especially if no objection was made to the giving of it without
thus marking it. 200 So when it is difficult to determine whether
an instruction which was given was marked ' ' given " or " re-
fused," there is no ground for complaint. 201
It follows from what has been said that an instruction which
is neither marked "given" nor "refused," and not read to
the jury will be regarded as refused. 202 In some jurisdictions
where instructions are given by the court on its own motion they
are not required to be marked "given." 203 But where a cor-
rect instruction which was proper to be given was marked "re-
fused," but read to the jury and given with others marked
"given," it was held to be error in the absence of any other
66 Ala. 424; Smith v. S. 1 Tex. 76 N. W. 660; Daxanbeklav v. P.
App. 416 (as to felony); Carter v. 93 111. App. 553.
S. 22 Fla. 553 (the manner of sign- 100 Tobin v. S. 101 111. 121; Mc-
ing held sufficient). Clellan v. Hem, 56 Neb. 600, 77 N.
196 Shields v. S. 149 Ind. 412, 48 W. 120.
N. E. 346; Coryell v. Stone, 62 Ind. 200 Jolly v. S. 43 Neb. 857, 62 N.
312; S. v. Booth (Iowa), 88 N. W. 300; City of Chadron v. Glover,
W. 344; Miller v. Preston, 4 N. 43 Neb. 732, 62 N. W. 62.
Mex. (Johns.) 314, 17 Pac. 565. See 201 Washington v. S. 106 Ala.
Weightnovel v. S. (Fla.), 35 So. 58, 17 So. 546.
862. 202 buffln v. P. 107 111. 113, 122, 47
i7 McDonald v. Fairbanks, Morse Am. R. 431; Calef v. Thomas, 81 111.
& Co. 161 111. 124, 131, 43 N. B. 783; 486. See Flower v. Beveridge, 161 111.
McKinzie v. Remington, 79 111. 388, 53, 43 N. E. 722"; Little v. S. 58 Ala.
390; Cook v. Hunt, 24 111. 536, 551. 265; Tobin v. P. 101 111. 123; S. v.
See Kepperly v. Ramsden, 83 111. 354, Hellekson, 13 S. Dak. 242, 83 N. W.
359; Bressemer Sav. Bank v. Ander- 254.
son, 134 Ala. 343, 32 So. 716, 92 Am. 203 Ter. v. Cordova (N. Mex.), 68
St. 38; Barnewall v. Murrell, 108 Pac. 919; P. v. Samsels, 66 Cal.
Ala. 366, 18 So. 831; Goodwin v. S. 99, 4 Pac. 1061; Gillen v. Riley,
(Ala.), 18 So. 694; Moore v. Swee- 27 Neb. 158, 42 N. W. 1054 See
ney, 28 111. App. 547 (writing on an Harvey v. Tama Co. 53 Iowa. 228,
instruction the reason for refusing 5 N. W. 130 ("instructions one to
is a compliance with the statute), seven all refused." is sufficient).
198 Turley v. Griffin, 106 Iowa, 161, Lawrenceville Cement Co. v. Park,
39 MARKING AND UNDERSCORING. 45
instructions on the same point in a case where the facts were
closely contested. 204
45. Marking for plaintiff Underscoring, The charge
should be given to the jury as the instructions of the court with-
out anything appearing on them, showing at whose instance they
were given. The instructions should not be marked or indi-
cated as "for the plaintiff" or "for the defendant." 205 But to
give instructions thus marked is not reversible error. 206 Sub-
mitting to the jury instructions with the authorities noted on
them, showing the volume and page of the book in which the
law may be found, will not be presumed to be prejudicial error,
although such practice is improper. 207
Underscoring words in instructions given is improper as it
gives them undue weight. 208 But it has been held not to be
error to underscore words of an instruction where such words
are usually italicised in legal treatises. 209 The giving of such
an instruction, however, cannot be urged as error unless it ap-
pears to have been prejudicial. 210 The giving of instructions
in which display type are used is harmless error, where they
are used only in ordinary and general instructions on questions
not involving specific facts; though such practice is improper. 211
Hun (N. Y.) 586; Ter. v. Baker, aoe Sample v. S. 104 Ind. 289, 4
4 N. Mex. 236, 13 Pac. 30 (marking N. E. 40.
on the last page that the foregoing 207 Herzog v. Campbell, 47 Neb.
are all refused is sufficient). 370, 66 N. W. 424; In re Goldthorp
204 Terre Haute & I. R. Co. v. Estate, 115 Iowa, 430, 88 N. W. 944;
Hybarger, 67 111. App. 480. The Wright v. Brosseau, 73 111. 381;
court is not authorized to mark in- City of South Omaha v. Fennell
structions after the verdict, Bacon (Neb.), 94 N. W. 632; Williams
T. Bacon, 76 Miss. 458, 24 So. 968. v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. 123
Only such instructions as the court Mo. 573, 27 S. W. 387 (held not
holds to be the law need be read error unless the jury had the books
to the jury: Com. v. Clark, 3 Pa. or knew what was decided in the
Super. 141; Baltimore & O. R. Co. cases cited). See Wragge v. S.
v. Friel, 77 Fed. 126; Long v. South- Car. & G. R. Co. (S. Car.), 25 S. E.
era R. Co. 50 S. Car. 49, 27 S. E. 76 (rule of court requiring the au-
531; Stewart v. Mills, 18 Fla. 57. thorities to be noted on the mar-
205 Aneals v. P. 134 111. 401, 416, gin of instruction).
25 N. E. 1022; Stevenson v. Chicago 208 S. v. Cater, 100 Iowa, 501, 69
& N. W. R. Co. 94 Iowa, 719, 61 N. W. 880; McCormick H. M. Co.
N. W. 964; Wilson v. White, 71 v. Sendzikowski, 72 111. App. 402.
Ga. 507, 51 Am. R. 269; S. v. Cotrill, 209 Philpot v. Lucas, 101 Iowa,
52 W. Va. 363, 43 S. E. 244, 59 L. 478, 70 N. W. 625.
R. A. 513. See Gutzman v. Clancy, 210 Wright v. Brosseau, 73 111. 381.
114 Wis. 589, 90 N. W. 1081, 58 L. R. 211 Hagenow v. P. 188 111. 553,
A. 744., See also Barkman v. S. 13 59 N. E. 242; Featherstone v. P.
Ark. 706; Anderson v. City of Bath, 194 111. 325, 62 N. E. 684; Wright
42 Me. 346. v. Brosseau, 73 111. 387.
46 PURPOSE AND PREPARATION. 40
46. Court's manner of charging the jury. The manner in
which the court charges the jury his tone of voice or peculiar
methods of emphasis or the like cannot be urged as error. The
reviewing courts are powerless to afford relief for such griev-
ances. 212
47. Trial by court, jury waived. In cases tried by the
court without a jury, if a party desires to preserve the rulings
of the court as to the law of the case, he should, as required
by statute, prepare and submit formal propositions to be held
or refused, and take exceptions to the rulings if adverse to him
and preserve the propositions and rulings thereon in a bill of
exceptions. 213 In Indiana, in order to preserve the holding of
the court as to the law, the court is required by statute, at the
request of either party, to make a special finding of the facts
and conclusions of law thereon, in writing, and to which con-
clusions of law exceptions must be properly taken. 214 In the trial
of a case without a jury, where the decision depends entirely
upon the view the court may take of the evidence, whether the
evidence of the one or the other party is most reliable when
conflicting, no difference what view the court may take of the
abstract propositions of law, it will be immaterial. 215 The
rulings of the court in rejecting propositions requested, where
the case is tried by the court without a jury, cannot be urged
as error if the propositions actually held to be the law appli-
cable state every principle of law necessary to be considered
in the decision of the case. 216
212 Horton v. Chevington & B. C. 150, 4 N. E. 652; Wrought Iron B.
Co 2 Penny. (Pa.) 1; Gibbs v. Co. v. Commissioners, 101 111. 522.
Johnson, 63 Mich. 674, 30 N. W. 21* Hartlep v. Cole, 120 Ind. 247,
343; Rountree v. Gurr, 68 Ga. 292; 22 N. E. 130; Winstandley, v. Brey-
Bishop v. Journal Newspaper Co. fogle, 148 Ind. 618, 48 N. E. 224;
168 Mass. 327, 47 N. E. 119; S. v. Nelson v. Cottingham, 152 Ind. 135,
Howell, 28 S. Car. 250, 5 S. E. 617. 52 N. E. 702; Hoover v. S. 110 Ind.
213 Hobbs v. Ferguson, 100 111. 349, 11 N. E. 434; Stumph v. Miller,
232; Merrimac Paper Co. v. Illi- 142 Ind. 446, 41 N. E. 812; McCray
nois Trust & S. Bank, 129 111. 296, v. Humes, 116 Ind. Ill, 18 N. E.
21 N. E. 787; Montgomery v. 500; Branch v. Faust, 115 Ind. 464,
Black, 124 111. 62, 15 N. E. 28; 17 N. E. 898.
Christy v. Stafford, 123 111. 466, 14 215 Stowell v. Moore, 89 111. 563, 31
N. E. 680; Mclntyre v. Sholtey, Am. R. 105.
121 111. 665, 13 N. E. 239, 2 Am. St. 210 Germania Fire Ins. Co. v.
140; Kelderhouse v. Hall, 116 111. Hicks, 125 111. 364, 17 N. E. 792, 8
Am St. 384.
CHAPTER II.
QUALITIES AND REQUISITES.
Sec.
48. Abstract propositions of law.
49. Cautionary instructions Gen-
erally.
50. Cautionary instructions
Matters not raised on the
trial.
51. Cautionary instructions
Against opinion of court.
52. Cautionary instructions Crim-
inal cases.
53. Referring jury to the pleadings.
54. Instructions limited to some
counts.
55. In criminal cases Referring to
indictment.
56. Whole law in one instruction
unnecessary.
57. Instructions as to damages
Measure of.
58. Instructions as to damages
Personal injury.
59. Instructions as to damages
Exemplary or punitive.
60. Misleading instructions Ob-
scure, though correct.
61. Misleading instructions Sus-
ceptible of two meanings.
62. Misleading instructions If ev-
idence is conflicting.
63. Misleading instructions Gen-
erally erroneous.
Sec.
64. Misleading instructions Cured
by others.
65. Misleading instructions Illus-
trations.
66. Argumentative instructions
Generally.
67. Argumentative instructions
Not necessarily erroneous.
68. Argumentative instructions-
Illustrations.
69. Interrogative instructions Im-
proper.
70. Instructions construed as a
whole.
71. Instructions of both parties
construed together.
72. If instructions be harmonious,
defects are harmless.
73. Grouping instructions into one
series.
74. Words, phrases and clauses.
75. Definition of terms.
76. Definition of terms Contin-
ued.
77. Ungrammatical and awkwardly
arranged.
78. Misuse of names, terms, etc.
Effect.
79. Words omitted from instruc-
tions.
48. Abstract propositions of law. Instructions should be so
framed as to inform the jury what the law is, as applicable to
the facts in evidence, and not in general terms in the form of
41
QUALITIES AND REQUISITES.
abstract propositions of law. 1 Such instructions, although ab-
stractly correct, are likely to be misleading, and for that rea-
son should not be given. 2
Ah instruction, though correctly stating an abstract proposi-
tion of law, may be refused if there is no evidence upon which
to base it, or if it in no wise has any application to the facts of
a case. 3 But the giving of instructions which merely announce
1 Morris v. Platt, 32 Conn. 75.
See Hassett v. Johnson, 48 111. 68,
D5 Am. Dec. 519; Seekel v. Norman,
71 Iowa, 264, 32 N. W. 334; Bald-
win v. S. 75 Ga. 489; S. v. Jones, 87
N. Car. 542; Pittsburg Coal Co. v.
Estievenard, 53 Ohio St. 43, 40 N. E.
725; Parmlee v. Adolph, 20 Ohio St.
10; Fisher v. Central Lead Co. 156
Mo. 479, 56 S. W. 1107; P. v. Hart-
man, 130 Cal. 487, 62 Pac. 823; Smi-
ley v. Scott, 179 111. 142, 53 N. E.
544; Thomas v. S. 126 Ala. 4, 28 So.
591; P. v. Considine, 105 Mich. 149,
63 N. W. 196.
2 Caughlin v. P. 18 111. 266, 68
Am. Dec. 541; Collins v. City of
Janesville, 107 Wis. 436, 83 N. W.
695, 51 L. R. A. 917; Smith v. Bank
<N. H.), 54 Atl. 385; S. v. Prater,
52 W. Va. 132, 43 S. E. 230; Cobb
v. Simon (Wis.) 97 N. W. 279.
s Martinez v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.),
57 S. W. 670; S. v. Goff, 62
Kas. 104, 61 Pac. 683; Jesse v.
State (Tex. Cr. App.), 57 S. W. 826;
Kassman v. City of St. Louis, 153
Mo. 293, 54 S. W. 513; Sparks v.
S. Ill Ga. 380, 35 S. E. 654; Cham-
bers v. P. 105 111. 409, 416; Whelan
v. Kinsley, 26 Ohio St. 137; Lewis
v. S. 4 Ohio, 389; Davis v. S. 25
Ohio St. 373; Lexington Ins. Co.
v. Paver, 16 Ohio 324; City of Aledo
v. Honeyman, 208 111. 415; Spence
v. Huckins, 208 111. 309; Rankin
v. Sharpies, 206 111. 309; Germania
Fire Ins. Co.- v. McKee, 94 111.
494, 500; Crane Co. v. Tierney, 175
111. 79, 82, 51 N. E. 715; Atkinson
v. Lester. 2 111. (1 Scam.) 409;
Gray v. Sharpe (Colo. App.), 67 Pac.
375 (held error to give abstract in-
structions if there is no evidence
on which to base them) ; Hurlbut
v. Hall, 39 Neb. 889, 58 N. W.. 538;
Omaha Nat. Bank v. Thompson,
39 Neb. 269, 57 N. W. 997; Wads-
worth v. Williams, 101 Ala. 264, IS
So. 755; S. v. Hicks, 130 N. Car. 705,
41 S. E. 803; Union E. R. Co. v.
Nixon, 199 111. 235, 65 N. E. 314;
Oliver v. Sterling, 20 Ohio St. 399;
S. v. Tibbs, 48 La. Ann. 1278, 20 So.
735; Farmers' Banking Co. v. Key,
112 Ga. 301, 37 S. E. 447; Smith v.
Bank, &c. 70 N. H. 187, 46 Atl. 230;
Long v. Hunter, 58 S. Car. 152, 36 S.
E. 579, 79 Am. St. 836; Collins v.
City of Janesville, 107 Wis. 436, 83
N. W. 695, 51 L. R. A. 917; Lear
v. McMillen, 17 Ohio St. 464; Cast-
lin v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 57 S. W.
827; Kirk v. Ter. 10 Okla. 46, 60 Pac.
797; Wallace v. S. 41 Fla. 547, 26
So. 713; Mansfield v. Neese, 21 Tex.
Cv. App. 584, 54 S. W. 370; Thomas
v. Gates, 126 Cal. 1, 58 Pac. 315;
City of Marshall v. McAlister, 22
Tex. Cv. App. 214, 54 S. W. 1068;
Safford v. S. 76 Miss. 258, 26 So.
945; Matula v. Lane, 22 Tex. Civ.
App. 391, 55 S. W. 502; Chicago West
Division R. Co. v. Ingraham, 131.
111. 659, 667, 23 N. E. 350; Belk
v. P. 125 111. 584, 591, 17 N. E. 744;
Smiley v. Scott, 179 111. 142, 53 N.
E. 544; Montag v. P. 141 111. 75, 81,
30 N. E. 337; City of Joliet v. John-
son, 177 111. 178, 184, 52 N. E. 498,
69 Am. St. 216; Alton Paving, &c.
Co. v. Hudson, 176 111. 270, 275, 52
N. E. 256; Scanlon v. Warren, 169
111. 142, 48 N. E. 410; Pennsylvania
Co. v. Marshall, 119 111. 399, 406, 10
N. E. 220; Bressler v. P. 117 111. 422,
442, 8 N. E. 62; City of Lynchburg
v. Wallace, 95 Va. 640, 29 S. E. 675;
Gwin v. Gwin, 5 Idaho, 271, 48 Pac.
295; Davis v. S. 25 Ohio St. 373;
Whalen v. Kinsley, 26 Ohio St. 137;
Gray v. Callender, 181 111. 173, 54
N. E. 910; Byers v. Maxwell, 22
Tex. Cv. App. 269, 54 S. W. 789;
43
ABSTRACT PROPOSITIONS OF LAW.
48
abstract principles of law cannot be urged as material error
unless they are prejudicial or misleading. 4
If an irrelevant instruction be given, although unobjectionable
as an abstract proposition of law, which is calculated to mislead
the jury and affect their conclusion upon the issue submitted
to them it is error. 5 And where the instructions taken as a whole
Oftelie v. Town of Hammond, 78
Minn. 275, 80 N. W. 1123; Hart v.
Bowen, 80 Fed. 877; Heinman v.
Kinnare, 73 111. App. 184; Campbell
v. P. 109 111. 565, 577, 50 Am. R. 621;
TJpstone v. P. 109 111. 169, 176; John-
son v. Hirsehburg, 85 111. App. 47;
Hyde & Leather National Bank v.
Alexander, 184 111. 416, 56 N. E. 809;
Louisville, New Albany & Chicago
R. Co. v. Patchen, 167 111. 204, 211,
47 N. E. 368; Long v. Hunter, 58 S.
Car. 152, 36 S. E. 579, 79 Am. St.
836; Sullivan v. S. 117 Ala. 214, 23
So. 678; Bondurant v. S. 125 Ala. 31,
27 So. 775; Troy v. Rogers, 113 Ala.
131, 20 So. i99; Tischler v. Kurtz,
35 Fla. 323, 17 So. 661; Oliver v. Ster-
ling, 20 Ohio St. 391; Stryker v.
Goodnow, 123 U. S. 527, 8 Sup. Ct.
203; Coffin v. United States, 162 U.
S. 664, 16 Sup. Ct. 943; Allen v. Ham-
ilton, 109 Ala. 634; 19 So. 906; May-
er v. Wilkins, 37 Fla. 244, 19 So.
632; Reilly v. Third Ave. R. Co. 35
N. Y. S. 1030 14 Misc. 445; Chapman
v. Southern Pac. R. Co. 12 Utah, 30,
41 Pac. 551.
* Chicago & A. R. Co. v. City
of Pontiac, 169 111. 172, 48 N. E.
485; Pate v. P. 8 111. (3 Gilm.) 661;
Betting v. Hobbett, 142 111. 72, 30
N. E. 1048; Town of Wheaton v.
Hadley, 131 111. 644, 23 N. E. 422;
Herbich v. North Jersey St. R. Co.
67 N. J. L. 574, 52 Atl. 357; Doyle
v. S. 39 Fla. 155, 22 So. 272, 63 Am.
St. 159; Payne v. Crawford, 102 Ala.
387, 14 So. 854; Cooke v. Cook, 100
Ala. 175, 14 So. 171, 46 Am. St. 33;
Denver Tr. Co. v. Owens, 20 Colo.
107, 36 Pac. 848, (such instruction
is harmless if it states the law cor-
rectly) ; Meiners v. City of St. Louis,
130 Mo. 274, 32 S. W. 637; Bosqui
v. Sutro R. Co. 131 Cal. 390, 63 Pac.
682, 82 Am. St. 355; Johnson v. Mc-
Kee, 27 Mich. 471 (instruction com-
plained of favorable); Moore v.
People, 190 111. 331, 338, 60 N. E. 535;
Greene v. Greene, 145 111. 271, 33
N. E. 941; Hurst v. McMullen (Tex.
Cv. App.), 48 S. W. 744; Doolittle v.
Southern R. Co. 62 S. Car. 130, 40
S. E. 133; Chicago City R. Co. v.
Anderson, 193 111. 9, 14, 61 N. E.
999; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Dick-
son, 143 111. 374, 32 N. E. 380; Grier
v. Puterbaugh, 108 111. 602, 607;
Denton v. Jackson, 106 111. 433, 438;
Corbin v. Shearer, 8 111. (3 Gilm.)
482; Bandalow v. P. 90 111. 218;
Needham v. P. 98 111. 280; Healey
v. P. 163 111. 383, 45 N. E. 230;
Cook v. P. 177 111. 146, 52 N. E. 273.
See Underbill Cr. Ev. 278. S.
v. Rose, 142 Mo. 418, 44 S. W. 329;
Salomon v. Cress, 22 Ore. 177, 29
Pac. 439, 15 L. R. A. 614; Canon v.
Farmers' Bank (Neb.) 91 N. W. 585;
Reed v. Commonwealth, 98 Va. 817,
36 S. E. 399; Hough v. Grant's Pass
Power Co. 41 Ore. 531, 69 Pac. 655;
Anthony Ittner Brick Co. v. Ashby,
198 111. 562, 64 N. E. 1109; Caw v. P.
3 Neb. 357; Schneider v. Hosier,
21 Ohio St. 113; Bank of C. v. Eure-
ka B. & L. Co. 108 Ala. 89, 18 So.
600; Ward v. Henry, 19 Wis. 76, 88
Am. Dec. 672; Jones v. Williams,
108 Ala. 282, 19 So. 317; Benjamin
v. Metropolitan St. R. Co. 133 Mo.
274, 34 S. W. 590; State v. Canty,
41 La. Ann. 587 6 So. 338; McCutch-
en v. Loggins, 109 Ala. 457, 19 So.
810; P. v. March, 6 Cal. 543; Pitts-
burg, Ft. W. & C. R. Co. v. Slusser,
19 Ohio St. 157; Beidler v. King, 209
111. 302, 312.
r - Caughlin v. P. 18 111. 266, 68 Am.
Dec. 541; Trustees v. McCormick
& Bros. 41 111. 323; McNair v. Platt,
46 111. 211, 214. See Healy v. P. 163
111. 383, 45 N. E. 230; Welter v.
Leistikow, N. Dak. 283, 83 N. W. 9;
Smith v. Bank (N. H.) 54 Atl. 385;
State v. Prater, 52 W. Va. 132, 43
S. E. 230, 241; Meyer v. Reimer, 65
49 QUALITIES AND KEQUISITES. 44
are mere abstract propositions of law, having no application
to the facts in issue, they are, in fact, misleading. It is error
to give such an instruction if it leaves the jury in doubt as to
what application it has to the evidence. 7 But a charge con-
sisting of general abstract propositions given for the purpose
of illustrating the rules governing the facts in issue is not er-
roneous.* The court, in charging the jury, may use illustrations
by stating a hypothetical case without reference to the evidence.
But such illustrations should be used with great caution and
should guard against the intimation of an opinion by the court on
the facts. 9
49. Cautionary instructions Generally The giving of cau-
tionary instructions is necessarily a matter very much within
the discretion of the court. The judge is in a position to ob-
serve and know whether the situation is such as to require such
instructions, and a refusal to give them cannot ordinarily be
assigned as error. 10 And in giving cautionary instructions to the
jury as to their duties the court is not bound to instruct in the
precise form requested. 11
It is proper for the court in charging the jury to caution them
to be governed by the law and the evidence, and not be in-
fluenced by any falacious views or notions of counsel in his ar-
gument where any such false position may have been taken by
counsel. 12 Thus, for instance, where counsel for the defendant
Kas. 822, 70 Pac. 869; Holmes v. of as error, in the absence of a re-
Ashtabula R. T. Co. 10 Ohio C. C. quest that it be explained, Hanson
638; East Tenn. V. & G. R. Co. v. v. Gaar, Scott & Co. 68 Minn. 68,
Toppins, 10 Lea (Tenn.) 64. 70 N. W. 853.
Fisher v. Central Lead Co. 156 10 Birmingham Fire Ins. Co. v.
Mo. 479, 56 S. W. 1107; Gorman v. Pulver, 126 111. 339, 18 N. E. 804, 9
Campbell, 14 Ga. 142. Am. St. 581; Dinsmore v. State, 61
T Davis v. S. 152 Ind. 34, 51 N. E. Neb. 418, 85 N. W. 445; Lyle v. Mc-
928, 71 Am. St. 322. See Mason v. Cormick H. M. Co. 108 Wis. 81, 84
Silver, 1 Aik. (N. S.) (Vt.), 367. N. W. 18, 51 L. R. A. 906.
s West Memphis P. Co. v. White, " Hay v. Carolina M. R. Co. 41
99 Tenn. 256, 41 S. W. 583, 38 L. R. S. Car. 542, 19 S. E. 976; Southern
A. 427. See McGrew v. Missouri Bell T. & T. Co. v. Watts, 66 Fed.
Pac. R. Co. 109 Mo. 582, 19 S. W. 53. 460.
Boyd v. Blue Ridge R. Co. 65 12 Rucker -v. State, 114 Ga. 13,
S. Car. 326, 43 S. E. 817; State v. 39 S. E. 902; Williams v. State, 130
Godfrey, 60 S. Car. 498, 39 S. E. 1; Ala. 107, 30 So. 484; State v. Bur-
Allis v. U. S. 155 U. S. 117, 39 Sup. ton, 27 Wash. 528, 67 Pac. 1097;
Ct. 91 ; Sparks v. S. 34 Tex. Cr. App. State v. Gannon, 75 Conn. 206, 52
86, 29 S. W. 264. An instruction Atl. 727. See White v. State, 133
merely announcing an abstract Ala. 122, 32 So. 139; State v. West,
proposition cannot be complained 43 La. Ann. 1006, 10 So. 364.
45 CAUTIONARY CHARGES. 50
stated that the accused., in his statement, impressed him with
the belief that he was innocent, the court may instruct that what
counsel "believe" is to have no influence with the jury. 13
An instruction that the jury in arriving at their verdict should
not be influenced by any feeling of sentiment, but that they
should apply the law, as given them by the court, to the facts
of the case, is proper. 14 Or that the jury may apply to the facts
of the case "the same rules of good common sense, subject, of
course, to a conscientious exercise of that common sense that
you would apply to any other subject that comes under your
consideration and that demands your judgment," is not im-
proper. 15
Where ancient documents and old notes of survey in the
custody of the trustees of an estate were introduced in evidence
in an ejectment suit it was held proper for the court in charg-
ing the jury to caution them to scrutinize carefully the documents
to determine their genuineness. 16 An instruction in a civil case
directing the jury that it is their sworn duty to enforce the law
is of doubtful propriety, especially in an action brought by a
wife against a dramshop keeper, for damages based upon the
dram-shop law, for unlawfully selling intoxicating liquor to her
husband, where punitive damages are not allowed unless actual
damages are shown. 17
50. Cautionary instructions Matters not raised on the trial.
An instruction cautioning the jury as to a matter not raised
on the trial is properly refused; as, for instance, the refusal of
a charge that there is no evidence to warrant a finding of the ex-
istence of a conspiracy to defraud the creditors of a certain per-
son, is proper, where no such claim had been made or suggested
in the general charge or otherwise. 18 So an instruction caution-
is Smith v. S. 95 Ga. 472, 20 S. B. U. S. 486, 17 Sup. Ct. 375. See Hin-
291. Contra: Reeves v. S. 34 Tex. shaw v. State, 147 Ind. 334, 47 N.
Cr. App. 483, 31 S. W. 382. Telling E. 157.
the jury that they should be close- ie Wilson v. Marvin-Rulofson Co.
ly governed by the instructions of 201 Pa. St. 29, 50 Atl. 225.
the court is not improper in the IT Henewacker v. Ferman, 152 111.
way of caution., First C. M. H. 325, 38 N. E. 924.
Soc. v. Town of Rochester, 66 Vt. is Rindskopf v. Myers, 87 Wis.
501, 29 Atl. 810. 80, 57 N. W. 967, 41 Am. St. 23;
n State v. Petsch, 43 S. Car. 132, Johnson v. St. Louis & S. R. Co.
20 S. E. 993. 173 Mo. 307, 73 S. W. 173 (relating
is Dunlap v. United States, 165 to sympathy).
51 QUALITIES' AND REQUISITES. 46
ing the jury that it is improper for them to arrive at the damages;
by taking the average of the different amounts each of the
jurors may believe should be awarded, is properly refused, it
being the duty of the court to instruct only as to the law
of the case. 19 The refusal of an instruction that the jury should
not draw any inference unfavorable to the credibility of certain
witnesses brought from another state, because their expenses had
been paid by the defendant, is proper where opposing counsel
has made no unfavorable comment on the presence of such wit-
nesses. 20
51. Cautionary instructions Against opinion of court. An
instruction charging, by way of caution, that the jury should
not regard anything contained in any of the instructions as in-
timating, in the slightest degree, any opinion of the court as
to what any of the facts are, but that they should determine
from the evidence, and from that alone, what are the facts,
is a qualification of every instruction given on that branch of
the case. 21
52. Cautionary instructions Criminal cases. So in a
criminal case an instruction cautioning the jury that the crime
with which the accused is charged is a very serious one, is not
improper where they are also charged that the fact of the of-
fense, being a serious one, will not warrant a conviction on
slight evidence. 22 Also where several persons are jointly indicted,
and one of them secures a separate trial from the others, the court
may properly instruct the jury, that if they believe from the
evidence that the defendants are guilty they should find a verdict
accordingly, whether they believe the defendant, who secured
the separate trial, had anything to do with the crime charged
or not ; that the jury may convict one or more of the defendants
as the evidence may warrant; that they have nothing to do
is Sherwood v. Grand Ave. R. Co. ceeding; caution as to reaching ver-
132 Mo. 339, 33 S. W. 774; Ben- diet by averaging is proper),
jamin v. Metropolitan St. R. Co. 20 Klepsch v. Donald, 8 Wash. 162,
133 Mo. 274, 34 S. W. 590 (by lot). 35 Pac. 621.
The refusal to instruct that a cer- 21 Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v.
tain manner of arriving at a ver- Snyder, 117 111. 383, 7 N. E. 604.
diet in fixing damages is illegal See Baldwin v. Lincoln County, 29
is not error, Woodman v. Town of Wash. 509, 69 Pac. 1081.
Northwood, 67 N. H. 307, 36 Atl. 22 Commonwealth v. Harris, 168
255; Illinois, &c. R. Co. v. Freeman, Pa. St. 619, 32 Atl. 92.
210 111. 270, 278 (condemnation pro-
47 JURY REFERRED TO PLEADINGS. 53
with the influence a verdict of guilty may have in the trial of
the defendant who secured sUch separate trial. 23 An instruc-
tion stating that it is the policy of the law that it is better
that ninety and nine, or any number of guilty persons, should
escape rather than that one innocent person should be con-
victed is improper and may be refused. 24 The court after charg-
ing the jury as to the law of self-defense may, without com-
mitting error, properly add by way of caution that "courts and
jurors, however, must exercise due caution in applying these
principles." 25
53. Referring jury to the pleadings. It is common prac-
tice to refer to the pleadings in the giving of instructions in
both civil and criminal cases. But if reference be made to
the pleadings in such manner as to make the jury the judges
of what are the material allegations it is error ; it is for the court
to determine as a question of law what are the material allega-
tions. 26 Thus an instruction otherwise correct is not erroneous
in directing the jury, if they find for the plaintiff, to assess
the damages at such sum as from the evidence will be just
compensation for the injury sustained, not exceeding the sum
claimed in the declaration; 27 or an instruction that if the jury
find the defendant guilty as alleged in the declaration, or some
count thereof, they should find for the plaintiff is not erroneous
in referring the jury to the declaration to ascertain the charges
of negligence. 28
A charge that if the jury believe from the evidence that the
23 James v. S. 104 Ala. 20, 16 So. S. W. 1022. See Christie v. P. 206
94. 111. 343; Pittsburg, &c. R. Co. v.
24 Adams v. P. 109 111. 451, 50 Am. Kinnare, 203 111. 388, 392, 67 N. E.
R 617; Seacord v. P. 121 111. 631, 13 826.
N. E. 194; P. v. Eubanks, 117 Cal. 2 ? Calumet St. R. Co. v. Van Pelt,
652, 49 Pac. 1049, 40 L. R. A. 269; 173 111. 70, 73, 50 N. E. 678; Trum-
Coleman v. S. Ill Ind. 563, 13 N. E. ble v. Happy, 114 Iowa, 624, 87 N.
100; Barnes v. S. Ill Ala. 56, 20 So. W. 678.
565; S. v. Tettaton, 159 Mo. 354, 60 28 Central R. Co. v. Bannister,
S. W. 743; Cardon v. S. 84 Ala. 417; 195 111. 48, 51, 62 N. E. 864; Chi-
Ter. v. Burgess, 8 Mont. 57, 19 Pac. cago & A. R. Co. v. Fisher, 141 111.
558; P. v. Machado (Cal.) 63 Pac. 66. 624, 31 N. E. 406; Southern Ind.
25 S. v. Young, 104 Iowa, 730, R. Co. v. Peyton, 157 Ind. 690, 61
74 N. W. 693. N. E. 722; Malott v. Hood, 201 111.
26 Baker v. Summers, 201 111. 52, 202, 66 N. E. 247; West C. St. R.
66 N. E. 302; McClure v. Williams, Co. v. Lieserowitz, 197 111. 607, 612,
65 111. 390; Texas & P. R. Co. v. 64 N. E. 718.
Birchfleld, 12 Tex. Cv. App. 145, 33
53 QUALITIES AND REQUISITES. 48
defendant is guilty of negligence as alleged in the declaration
then the plaintiff is entitled to recover, is a proper form of in-
struction.- 9 So an instruction that if the jury believe from the
evidence that the plaintiff, without fault or negligence on his
part, was injured by the wrongful acts of the defendant as al-
leged in the plaintiff's declaration they should find the defendant
guilty, is proper although the evidence tends to support only
one of the several counts of the declaration. 30
An instruction referring the jury to the plaintiff's petition for
a description of the land or lots involved in the controversy
is not improper. 31 Also an instruction setting out the material
allegations of the plaintiff's declaration and then concluding
by stating that "if the jury believe from a preponderance of
the evidence that the material allegations of the plaintiff's decla-
ration are true the verdict should be for the plaintiff," is proper
and not objectionable as submitting to the jury a question of
law. 32 Also the giving of an instruction stating the nature
of the action, the issues to be determined, what is necessary
for the plaintiff to prove to entitle him to recover and then
concluding that the grounds claimed by the plaintiff are more
fully set out in his petition to which the jury are referred is not
prejudicial error. 33 So the fact that the court in charging the
jury sets out the pleadings in full, affords no ground for error,
where in another part of the charge the real issues are clearly
29 Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. & St. J. R. Co. v. Martin, 111 111.
Payne, 59 111. 534, 542; Chicago & 219, 234.
A. R. Co. v. Harrington, 192 111. si Jenks v. Lansing Lumber Co.
9, 25, 61 N. E. 622; Malott v. Hood, 97 Iowa, 342, 66 N. W. 231. An in-
201 111. 202, 206, 66 N. E. 247; struction that the affidavit in an
Lake S. & M. S. R. Co. v. Mcln- attachment suit is not evidence, but
tosh, 140 Ind. 261, 38 N. E. 476; that it is proper for the jury to
Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Jernigan, find whether the statements in the
101 111. App. 1, 65 N. E. 88; Illinois affidavit are true or not, is proper,
Cent. R. Co. v. Jernigan 198 111. Gosch v. Niehoff, 162 111. 395, 44 N.
297, 65 N. E. 88; West Chicago St. E. 731.
R. Co. v. Buckley, 200 111. 260, 65 N. 32 Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Daven-
E. 708; Britton v. City of St. Louis, port, 177 111. 110, 52 N. E. 266, 69
120 Mo. 437. 25 S. W. 366, 41 Am. Am. R. 212; East St. L. R. Co. v.
St. 705; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Eggman, 170 111. 539, 48 N. E. 981;
Eicher, 202 111. 556, 572, 67 N. E. 376. Stringam v. Parker, 159 111. 304, 310,
Contra: Murray v. Burd (Neb.), 91 42 N. E. 794; St. Louis, Alton & T.
N. W. 278; Illinois, &c. R. Co. v. H. R. Co. v. Holman, 155 111. 21 39
Thompson, 210 111. 226, 238. N. E. 573; Hartpence v. Rogers, 143
so Pennsylvania Co. v. Backes, Mo. 623, 45 S. W. 650.
133 111. 259, 24 N. E. 563; Hannibal 33 Union P. R. Co. v. Sternberger,
8 Kas. App. 131, 54 Pac. 1101.
49 LIMITING TO SOME COUNTS. 54
stated, so that the jury may know the exact points to be de-
cided. 34
But an instruction directing the jury to find the issues for the
plaintiff if she has proved the material allegations of her declara-
tion, is erroneous in the absence of further instruction as to what
are the material allegations. What are material allegations is a
question of law. 35 Also an -instruction which states that the de-
fendant by withdrawing his plea of general issue thereby admits
all the material averments in the declaration without stating
what are the material averments, is erroneous as tending to mis-
lead the jury. 36 And an instruction referring the jury to the
pleadings in a complicated case for a particular statement of
the facts in issue upon which the plaintiff must recover, if at
all, is erroneous. 37 But if the pleadings are short and simple
the court, in charging the jury, may refer to them without any
further explanation as to the issues. 38
54. Instructions limited to some counts. If a declaration
contains counts upon which a recovery cannot be had under the
evidence then any reference to the declaration in charging the
jury should be restricted to the counts upon which a recovery
may be had. In such case it is error to instruct the jury, that
"if you believe the plaintiff has made out his case as laid in
his declaration the finding must be for the plaintiff." 39 And
when an instruction is applicable to the facts of only one of
the counts of the declaration which differs materially from the
allegations of the other counts, forming the basis of a .different
34 Welch v. Union C. Life Ins. 344, 46 N. W. 7724, 21 Am. St. 563;
Co. 117 Iowa, 394, 90 N. W. 828. See Porter v. Knight, 63 Iowa, 365, 19
Britton v. City of St. Louis, 120 N. W. 282; East Tenn. V. & G. R.
Mo. 437, 25 S. W. 366, 41 Am. St. Co. v. Leo, 90 Tenn. 570, 18 S. W.
705; (Instruction held not referring 268; Baker v. Summers, 201 111. 52,
to petition for the issues). Kelt v. 56, 66 N. E. 302.
Smith, 74 Iowa, 667, 39 N. W. 81; McClure v. Williams, 65 111.
Lake S. & M. S. R. Co. v. Mclntosh, 390.
140 Ind. 261, 38 N. E. 476. 37 Keatley v. Illinois Cent. R. Co.
ss Baker v. Summers, 201 111. 52, 94 Iowa, 685, 63 N. W. 560; Wood-
66 N. E. 302; Stevens v. Maxwell, ruff v. Hensley, 26 Ind. App. 592, 60
65 Kas. 835, 70 Pac. 873 (pleadings N. E. 312.
intricate and some of the issues ss Graybill v. Chicago, M. & St.
not proved); Texas, &c. R. Co. v. P. R. Co. 112 Iowa, 738, 84 N. W.
Birchfield, 12 Tex. Cv. App. 145, 33 946.
S. W. 1022; Dicken v. Liverpool S. so Chicago N. S. St. R. Co. v. Me-
& C. Co. 41 W. Va. 511, 23 S. E. Carthy, 66 111. App. 667.
582; Wilbur v. Stoepel, 82 Mich.
55 QUALITIES AND REQUISITES. 50
right of action, then the instruction should be limited to that
count; otherwise it should be refused. 40 Where one or more of
the counts of the declaration have been dismissed in the presence
and hearing of the jury, an instruction referring to the declara-
tion or any count thereof will be understood to refer only to
the counts which have not been abandoned or dismissed. 41 There
may be defective counts in a declaration upon which a recovery
could not be had, and if so, an instruction referring to the
declaration should be limited to the good counts. 42
55. In criminal cases Referring to indictment. In a crim-
inal case the court in its instructions may properly refer the jury
to the indictment for a description of the offense charged in-
stead of setting it out in the language of the statute. 44 And it
is proper for the court in charging the jury to state the different
degrees or included offenses contained in the indictment, and to
inform the jury on which charge the defendant is on trial. 45
And a charge that the jury must determine of which one or more
of the counts of an indictment the defendant is guilty is not ob-
jectionable where the jury are also instructed that if they con-
clude the defendant is not guilty, then they should so state in
their verdict. 46 Where the prosecution is limited to some one
or more of the counts of an indictment an instruction charging
that if the jury believe from the evidence that certain facts
(stating them) have been established as charged in the indict-
ment they should find the defendant guilty, instead of limiting
the inquiry to the facts in the particular count or charge on
which the defendant is on trial is not erroneous where the in-
40 Village of Jefferson v. Chap- the court to instruct the jury to dis-
man, 127 111. 447, 20 N. E. 33; First regard any faulty counts of a dec-
National Bank of Monmouth v. laration, means such counts only
Dunbar, 118 111. 630, 9 N. E. 186. as would be insufficient to support
41 Slack v. Harris, 200 111. 96, 115, a judgment after verdict, Consol-
65 N. E. 669; West Chicago St. R. idated Coal Co. v. Scheiber, 167 111.
Co. v. Buckley, 200 111. 260, 262, 65 539, 543, 47 N. E. 1052.
N. E. 708. 44 Parker v. P. 97 111. 32, 37. See
42 Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Eselin, S. v. David, 131 Mo. 380, 33 S. W.
86 111. App. 94; Grand Tower Mfg. 28. Contra: Ter. v. Baca (N. Mex.),
Co. v. Ullman, 89 111. 244. See Chicu- 71 Pac. 460.
go & A. R. Co. v. Anderson, 166 111. 45 Worthan v. State (Tex. Cr.
572, 46 N. E. 1125. Contra: Kim- App.), 65 S. W. 526.
ball v. Paye, 96 Me. 487, 52 Atl. 4 s. v. Moore, 49 S. Car. 438, 27 S.
1010. A statute which authorizes E. 454.
51 WHOLE LAW IN ONE CHARGE UNNECESSARY. 56
struction enumerates the facts constituting the crime as set forth
in the count or charge to which the prosecution is limited. 47
56. Whole law in one instruction unnecessary. It is not
necessary that each instruction should contain the whole law
of the case, nor that it should call attention to the contentions
of the parties to the action. It is sufficient if the series of in-
structions considered as a whole fully and fairly announce the
rules of law applicable to the issues involved. 48 Nor is the court
required to give a separate instruction on each material fact or
element of a case. 49 But the fact that an instruction embraces
more than one proposition of law does not render it bad. 50
So an instruction which is complete within itself and relates
to the issues, is not erroneous simply because it does not embrace
other propositions which would be appropriate. 51 It is there-
fore not improper to state the law applicable to particular ques-
tions or particular parts of the case as separate questions in
giving instructions. 52 But an instruction relating to a particular
proposition or element involved in a case should be complete
within itself. For instance, an instruction applying the law of
reasonable doubt to self-defense is imperfect if it fails to set
forth the constituents of self-defense. 53 So every instruction
asked by the plaintiff is not required to have embodied in it
every fact or element essential to sustain his cause of action ;
47 Sykes v. P. 127 111. 117, 126, 234, 62 N. W. 452. See also Cath-
19 N. E. 705. An instruction prop- olic Order of Foresters v. Fitz, 181
erly refers to the time when an 111. 206, 54 N. E. 952; Cole v. S. 75
offense is alleged to have been com- Ind. 511; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co.
mitted, as "on or about" the day v. Groves, 56 Kas. 611, 44 Pac. 628;
stated in the indictment, or at any S. v. Hope, 102 Mo. 410, 14 S. W.
time within the statute of limita- 985.
tions, Ferguson v. S. 52 Netr. 432, * S. v. Garth, 164 Mo. 553, 65
72 N. W. 590; Phillips v. S. (Tex. S. W. 275.
Cr. App.), 45 S. W. 709. so Gemmill v. Brown, 25 Ind. App.
48 Lilly v. P. 148 111. 477, 36 N. 6, 56 N. E. 691.
E. 95; Stratton v. Central City H. 51 Hayes v. S. 114 Ga. 25, 40 S.
R. Co. 95 111. 33: Hessing v. Me- E. 13. See Tucker v. S. 114 Ga. 61,
Closkey, 37 111. 351; Illinois Iron 39 S. E. 926.
& M. Co. v. Weber, 196 111. 526, 63 52 Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v. Hines,
N. E. 1008; West Chicago St. R. Co. 132 111. 161, 169, 23 N. E. 1021, 22
v. Scanlan, 168 HI. 34, 48 N. E. 149; Am. St. 515. See also Tucker v. S.
Smith v. Smith, 169 111. 623, 48 N. 114 Ga. 61, 39 S. E. 926; Hayes v.
E. 306; Pardridge v. Cutter, 168 S. 114 Ga. 25, 40 S. E. 13.
Til. 504, 512, 48 N. E. 125; Judy v. Miller v. S. 107 Ala. 40, 19 So.
Sterrett, 153 111. 94, 100, 38 N. E. 633; 37; Worden v. Humeston & S. R.
Nebraska N. Bank v. Burke, 44 Neb. Co. 72 Iowa, 201, 33 N. W T . 629.
57 QUALITIES AND REQUISITES. 52
nor is it necessary to negative matters of mere defense. 54 So
where one instruction states one ground of liability and another
states another ground, there is a sufficient statement of the law
without stating both grounds in one instruction. 53 Thus where
negligence is alleged as a material element in the plaintiff's
declaration each instruction is not required to state every ground
of liability averred in the different counts of the declaration.
On the contrary, an instruction may be framed touching upon
each separate charge of negligence as set out in any of the
counts. 56 An instruction to guide the jury as to the measure
of damages is not required to recapitulate all the different ele-
ments constituting a cause of action which have been stated in
other instructions. Its design is to inform the jury what damages
they shall award in case they find the plaintiff entitled to re-
cover. 57
57. Instructions as to damages Measure of. A proper in-
struction should be given the jury, when requested, stating the
rule as to the measure of damages. 58 But where the charge as a
whole correctly states the rule as to the measure of damages that is
sufficient without stating the rule in any one instruction. 59 A
charge that the jury may give such damages as they think to be
in proportion to the injury resulting from the death of the
plaintiff's husband is sufficient where no instructions are asked
for correct measure of damages. 60 If an instruction as to the
measure of damages should be so broad as to allow remote or
fanciful damages it is erroneous. 01 The instructions should con-
fine the jury to such damages as are reasonably certain to follow
from the injury alleged. 62
s* Underwood v. Wolf, 131 111. 425, os Cole v. City of Boston, 181
442, 23 N. E. 598, 19 Am. St. 40; Mass. 374, 63 N. E. 1061; Carpen-
Village of Sheridan v. Hibbard. 119 ter v. City of Red Cloud, 64 Neb.
111. 307, 310, 9 N. E. 901. 126, 89 N. W. 637.
ss Nebraska Nat. Bank v. Burke, Rath v. Rath (Neb.) 89 N. W.
44 Neb. 234, 62 N. W. 452. 612.
se Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Maro- GO Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co.
ney, 170 111. 525, 48 N. E. 953, 62 v. Worthy (Tex. Cv. App.), 27 S.
Am. St. 396. W. 426.
57 Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Har- 01 Ramsey v. Burns, 27 Mont. 154,
rington, 192 111. 9, 27, 61 N. E. 622; 69 Pac. 711.
McMahon v. Sankey, 133 111. 636, 02 Pennsylvania Co. v. Files, 65
641, 24 N. E. 1027; Pennsylvania Co. Ohio St. 403, 407, 62 N. E. 1047.
v. Marshall, 119 111. 399, 404, 10
N. E. 220.
53 DIRECTIONS AS TO DAMAGES. 59
58. Instructions as to damages Personal injury. Where
an instruction properly presents the theory of the plaintiff as
to the amount of damages it is not erroneous in not excluding the
idea of damages arising from injuries aggravated by the plain-
tiff's own negligence. 62 * An instruction charging that the jury
should allow such damages as "under all the evidence would
be just compensation for the injury" is not erroneous in not
excluding punitive damages. 63 In a personal injury case a charge
that the jury should give "such damages for bodily pain and
mental anxiety, as they believe the plaintiff is justly entitled to
recover," is proper in connection with another instruction, stat-
ing that "the damages should be no greater and no less than they
believe from the evidence the plaintiff is entitled to recover." 64
An instruction that if the jury find the defendant guilty, and
that the plaintiff has sustained damages from the injury, they
ha"ve a right, in estimating such damages, to take into considera-
tion all the facts and circumstances in evidence before them, and
the nature and effect of the plaintiff's physical injuries, if any.
shown by the evidence to have been sustained from the cause
alleged in the declaration, her suffering in body and mind, if
any, resulting from such injuries, is proper. 65
59. Instructions as to damages Exemplary or punitive. An
instruction as to exemplary damages which" fails to state what
facts must be established by the evidence to warrant such dam-
ages, is improper. 66 In an action of trespass for assault and
62* Hannibal v. St. Joseph R. Co. N. B. 884; Chicago City R. Co. v.
v. Martin, 111 111. 233; Wabash, St. Anderson, 182 111. 298, 55 N. E.
L. & P. R. Co. v. Rector, 104 111. 305. "366; Gartside Coal Co. v. Turk,
es Whiting v. Carpenter (Neb.), 147 111. 120, 126, 35 N. E. 467; Lake
93 N. W. 926. Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Hundt.
o* Boltz v. Town of Sullivan, 101 140 111. 525, 30 N. E. 458; Chicago
Wis. 608, 77 N. W. 870. In Tennes- C. R. Co. v. Mead, 206 111. 177;
see it has been held that there Hannon v. St. Louis Tr. Co. (Mo.
can be no judgment for damages App.), 77 S. W. 158. For the purpose
in a personal injury case where no of determining the amount of dam-
instructions have been given on ages where an injury to the per-
the subject of damages, Citizens' son is permanent, it is proper for
St. R. Co. v. BurKe, 98 Te^nn. 650, the court to instruct the jury as to
40 S. W. 1088. tho use of tables of mortality, Sa-
es City of Chicago v. McLean, vannah F. & W. R. Co. v. Austion,
133 111. 148, 24 N. E. 527; Central 104 Ga. 614, 30 S. E. 770.
R. Co. v. Serpass, 153 111. 379, 384, oe Kutner v. Fargo, 45 N. Y. S.
39 N. E. 119; Springfield C. R. 753, 20 Misc. 207.
Co. v. Hoeffner, 175 111. 634, 51
60 QUALITIES AND REQUISITES. 54
battery it is proper to instruct that if the jury find the defendant
guilty they have a right to take into consideration the financial
circumstances of both the plaintiff and the defendant in as-
sessing damages. 67
60. Misleading instructions Obscure, though correct.
When instructions are so drawn that they will be more likely
to mislead than instruct a jury they should be refused, al-
though by careful study and analysis it may appear that such'
instructions announce correct principles of law. 68 Although an
instruction may technically state the law correctly, yet if ex-
pressed in such language as to be misunderstood by the jurors
in its application the court is not bound to give it, and does not
err in refusing it. 69 So a charge, though not objectionable in
point of law, but which leaves the jury to draw incorrect in-
ferences, is erroneous where a different verdict would have been
rendered had the jury not been mislead. 70 But the mere fact
that an instruction may have a tendency to mislead the jury
cannot be urged as material error. 71 A specific charge based on
particular facts, which, if followed by the jury, would cause an
erroneous verdict, is not cured by general charges. 72
61. Misleading instructions Susceptible of two meanings.
Also an instruction which is susceptible of two meanings, one
stating the law correctly and the other incorrectly, having a
tendency to mislead the jury, is erroneous. 73 So if an instruction
is so framed that others are needed to explain it, it is properly
refused. 74
62. Misleading instructions If evidence is conflicting. An
instruction that "if the jury do not believe the evidence they
will find the defendent not guilty," is properly refused in that
67 McNamara v. King, 7 111. (2 Ala. 222, 52 Am. R. 322. See Pal-
Gil.) 432. more v. S. 29 Ark. 248.
es Baxter v. P. 8 111. (3 Gil.) 72 Pittsburg, C. & St. L. R. Co. v.
368, 380; Cunningham v. P. 210 111. Krouse, 30 Ohio St. 240, 27 Am. R.
410. 443.
Ramsey v. Burns, 27 Mont. 154, 73 McCracken v. Webb, 36 Iowa,
69 Pac. 711. See Calquhour v. 551; Gordon v. City of Richmond,
Wells & Fargo Co. 21 Nev. 359, 83 Va. 436, 2 S. E. 727; JEtna. Ins.
33 Pac. 977 (unintelligible). Co. v. Reed, 33 Ohio St. 283.
70 Little M. R. Co. v. Wetmore, 74 Crawford v. S. 112 Ala. 1, 21
19 Ohio St. 134. So. 214. See Adams v. S. 29 Ohio St.
71 Towns v. S. Ill Ala. 1, 20 412.
So. 598; O'Donnell v. Rodiger, 76
55 MISLEADING WHEN CURED. 65
it is obscure and tends to confuse and mislead. Especially is this
true where the evidence is conflicting. 75 An instruction stating
that the undisputed evidence does not show that the plaintiff
is entitled to recover, though true, is misleading where the evi-
dence is conflicting. 76
63. Misleading Instructions Generally erroneous. Gener-
ally instructions which are misleading or confusing are er-
roneous. 77 An instruction which is obscure and uncertain in its
meaning is improper. For instance, it is improper to instruct
the jury that if they believe that such mental difficulty existed
as would preclude the exercise of malice they must find the de-
fendant not guilty. 78
64. Misleading instructions Cured by others. Although an
instruction may appear to be misleading or confusing, if when
taken in connection with others it forms part of a correct
statement of the law, the error in that respect will become
harmless. Thus, for example, for the court to charge the
jury "to find out what the truth of the case is, what the real facts
are, and look to the evidence for that purpose and to the pris-
oner's statement, if you think it worthy of credit," was held
not to be misleading, where the jury were also instructed that
they could believe a part of such statement and reject a part. 79
65. Misleading instructions Illustrations. An instruction
75 Koch v. S. 115 Ala. 99, 22 So. O'Brien v. Northwestern I. & B.
471. Co. 82 Minn. 136, 84 N. W. 735; S.
76 Birmingham, R. & E. Co. v. v. Komstett, 62 Kas. 221, 61 Pac.
Wildman, 119 Ala. 547, 24 So. 548. 805; P. v. Kelly, 132 Cal. 430, 64
TT Tichenor v. Newman, 186 111. Pac. 563.
264, 57 N. E. 826; Sullivan v. Col- 78 p. v . Barthleman, 120 Cal. 7,
lins, 107 Mich. 291, 83 N. W. 310; 52 Pac. 112; Thomas v. S. 133 Ala.
Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Sandlin, 139, 32 So. 250; Adams v. S. 133
125 Ala. 585, 28 So. 40, 82 Am. St. Ala. 166, 31 So. 851. See generally:
264; Nicklaus v. Burns, 75 Ind. 98; Morehead v. Adams, 18 Neb. 569,
Moore v. S. 65 Ind. 385; Hill v. New- 26 N. W. 242; Street v. S. 67 Ala.
man, 47 Ind. 187; ^Etna Ins. Co. v. 87; Perry v. Dubuque, S. W. R.
Reed, 33 Ohio St. 292; Littleton v. Co. 36 Iowa, 102; Gordon v. City
S. 128 Ala. 31, 29 bo. 390; S. v. Si- of Richmond, 83 Va. 436, 2 S. E.
mas, 25 Nev. 432, 62 Pac. 242; Pe- 727: McKinney v. Snyder, 78 Pa.
terson v. S. 74 Ala. 34; Horton v. St. 497; S. v. Robinson, 20 Wis.
Com. 99 Va. 848, 38 S. E. 184; Hoff- 713; James v. Missouri Pac. R. Co.
mann v. Cockrell, 112 Iowa, 141, 83 107 Mo. 480, 18 S. W. 31; Chatta-
N. W. 898; Miller v. Dumon, 24 nooga R. & C. R. Co. v. Owen, 90
Wash. 648, 64 Pac. 804; Fruit D. Co. Ga. 265, 15 S. E. 853; Central R. Co.
v. Russo, 125 Mich. 306, 84 N. W. v. Haslett, 74 Ga. 59.
308; North C. St. R. Co. v. Hutch- 73 Westbrook v. S. 97 Ga. 189, 22
inson, 191 111. 104 60 N. E. 850; S. E. 398.
65 QUALITIES AND REQUISITES. 56
that criminal intent must be "strictly proved" in order to war-
rant a conviction is properly refused, as it tends to mislead the
jury. 80 To state that if the jury "find certain facts from the
evidence, those facts are proved" is confusing and meaning-
less. 81 So also an instruction directing the attention of the jury
to a single fact which has no bearing on the merits of the case,
is misleading. 82 Instructions attempting to blend separate and
distinct legal propositions in the same sentence or paragraph are
usually erroneous in that such blending tends to confuse and mis-
lead. 83 An instruction stating that "fraud is never presumed,
but must be affirmatively proved; that the law presumes that
all men act fairly and honestly; that their dealings are in good
faith and without intention to wrong, cheat or defraud others;
and when a transaction called in question is equally capable of
two constructions, one that is fair and honest and one that is dis-
honest, then the law is that the fair and honest construction must
prevail and the transaction called in question must be presumed
to be honest and fair" was held to be misleading, as having a
tendency to induce the jury to disregard the preponderance of
evidence in the event they found that it showed that the trans-
action was dishonest. 84
An instruction which charges that "if the jury believe from
the evidence that the sidewalk in question, where the plaintiff
claims to have received her injury, was repaired and placed in
good condition by the city within a reasonable time prior to
the alleged accident, and if the jury believe from the evidence
that said walk afterwards became out of repair without actual
notice to the city then the plaintiff cannot recover" was held
to be obscure and misleading. It is not clear what is meant
by the expression "within a reasonable time prior to the al-
leged accident." The city was bound to exercise reasonable
prudence and diligence in the construction and maintenance
of its sidewalks. But just what period of time between the al-
leged repair of the sidewalk and the happening of the accident
so s. v. Debott, 104 Iowa, 105, 73 ss Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v.
N. W. 490. Johnson, 103 111. 512, 525.
si Sanders v. P. 124 111. 227, 16 &* A. F. Shapleigh Hardware Co.
N. E. 81; P. v. Carroll, 92 Cal. 568, v. Hamilton, 70 Ark. 319, 68 S. W.
28 Pac. 600. 490.
82 Emery v. Hoyt, 46 111. 258,
262.
57
ARGUMENTATIVE IMPROPER.
66
should be regarded as reasonable, and for what purpose it should
be so regarded, is not apparent. 85 In an action for personal in-
jury, where the plaintiff: in his pleading alleges several acts of
negligence of the defendant as the cause of his injury, it is mis-
leading and improper in charging the jury to single out
each of the several acts and state that any one of such acts alone
would not entail liability. 80 Also an instruction is misleading
which conveys the impression that only one witness testified to
a material fact in issue, when other witnesses testified on the
same issue. 87 And an instruction that a person dealing with an
agent is bound to know at his peril what the power of an agent
is, and to understand its legal effect, is erroneous. 88
66. Argumentative instructions Generally Instructions
ss City of Sterling v. Merrill, 124
111. 522, 525, 17 N. E. 6.
ss Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v.
Whidden, 23 Ohio C. C. 85.
87 Idaho Mercantile Co. v. Ka-
lanquin (Idaho), 66 Pac. 933.
ss Colquhonn v. Wells, Fargo &
Co. 21 Nev. 459, 33 Pac. 977.
Instructions in the following
cases were held misleading: Rum-
bold v. Royal League, 206 111. 518;
Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Lon-
ergan, 118 111. 41, 47, 7 N. B. 55;
McHale v. McDonnell, 175 Pa. St
632, 34 Atl. 966, 34 L. R. A. 159;
Grim v Murphy, 110 111. 271, 276;
White v. Harris, 206 111. 596; Cni-
cago & E. R. Co. v. Jacobs, 110 111.
415; Elston & Wheeling Gravel Co.
v. Pierce, 96 111. 584; S. v. Grugin,
147 -Mo. 39, 47 S. W. 1058, 42 L. R.
A. 774; Nelson v. Spears, 16 Mont.
351, 40 Pac. 786; Anderson v. Avis,
62 Fed. 227; Gambrill v. Schooley,
95 Md. 260, 52 Atl. 500; S. v. Ander-
son, 6 Idaho, 706, 59 Pac. 180; Wal-
lace v. S. 124 Ala. 87, 26 So. 932; Mc-
Coggle v. S. 41 Fla. 525, 26 So.
734; Turner v. S. 124 Ala. 59, 27 So.
272; Morris v. S. 124 Ala. 44, 27
So. 336; Buel v. S. 104 Wis. 132,
80 N. W. 78; Dixon v. Labry, 16
Ky. L. R. 522, 29 S. W. 21; Parks v.
Gulf, C. S. & F. R. Co. (Tex. Civ.
AppJt, 30 S. W. 708; Anderson v.
Timfterlake, 114 Ala. 377, 22 So. 431;
Hebbe v. Town of Maple Creek,
111 Wis. 480, 87 N. W. 459; S. v.
McDowell, 129 N. Car. 523, 39 S. E.
840, (stating that defendant went
out of his way to go home) ; Gulf
C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Thompson
(Tex. Cv. App.), 35 S. W. 319; Har-
ter v. City of Marshall (Tex. Cv.
App.), 36 S. W. 294.
Instructions held not misleading
in the following cases: Stumer v.
Pitchman, 124 111. 250, 15 N. E. 757
(slander) ; Citizens' Gas L. Co. v.
O'Brien, 118 111. 174, 182, 8 N. E.
310; Wheeler v. S. 158 Ind. 687, 63
N. E. 975; Mosher v. Rogers, 117
111. 446, 456, 5 N. E. 583; Interna-
tional & G. N. R. Co. v. Bonatz
(Tex. Cv. App.), 48 S. W. 767;
Knowles v. Murphy, 107 Cal. 107,
40 Pac. Ill; Larkin v. Burlington,
C. R. & N. R. Co. 91 Iowa, 654,
60 N. W. 195; Landrum v. Guerra
(Tex. Cv. App.), 28 S. W. 358; Riley
v. Salt Lake R. T. Co. 10 Utah, 428,
37 Pac. 681; Hildreth v. Hancock,
156 111. 618, 41 N. E. 155; Chapell
v. Schmidt, 104 Cal. 511, 38 Pac.
892; P. v. McKane, 143 N. Y. 455,
38 N. E. 950; Galveston, H. & S.
A. R. Co. v. Buch (Tex. Cv. App.),
65 S. W. 681; Galveston, H. & S.
A. R. Co. v. Parvin (Tex. Cv. App.).
64 S. W. 1008; Elliott v. Elliott,
15 Ky. L. R. 274, 23 S. W. 216; Gulf,
C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Dansbank,
6 Tex. Cv. App. 385, 25 S. W. 295;
S. v. Dunn, 116 Iowa, 219, 89 N. W.
984.
67
QUALITIES AND REQUISITES.
58
containing the reasons for a conclusion are argumentative, es-
pecially if they are long, verbose and uncertain in their meaning.
Such instructions are generally confusing and misleading, and
should be refused. 89 Thus an instruction which tells the jury
( that their verdict, whatever it may be, will not mean that any
witness has sworn falsely is argumentative and improper. 90 An
instruction stating the reasons why the testimony of expert wit-
nesses is unreliable and unsatisfactory is erroneous as being ar-
gumentative. 91 So an instruction containing a lengthy recital of
the facts on one side of a case without reference to the facts on
the other side is argumentative, and should be refused. 92
67. Argumentative instructions Not necessarily erroneous.
But the fact that an instruction may be argumentative is not of
itself material error. 93 Argumentative instructions cannot be
urged as ground for reversal unless they contain incorrect state-
ments of the law. 94 So where a charge contains a statement
89 Freidman v. Wersz, 8 Okla. 392,
58 Pac. 613; Riddle v. Webb. 110
Ala. 599, 18 So. 323; Hanna v/Han-
na, 3 Tex. Cv. App. 51, 21 S. W.
720; Spraggins v. S. (Ala.) 35 So.
1003; Pittsburg, &c. R. Co. v. Bau-
fill (111.), 69 N. E. 499; Southern R.
Co. v. Howell, 135 Ala. 639, 34 So.
.
so Boyett v. S. 130 Ala. 77, 30 So.
475.
i In re Blake's Estate, 136 Cal.
306, 68 Pac. 827, 89 Am. St. 35.
2 Coal Run Coal Co. v. Jones,
127 111. 379, 385, 8 N. E. 865, 20 N.
E. 89; Pittsburg, C. C. & St. L. R.
Co. v. Banflll, 206 111. 556; Chicago,
B. & Q. R. Co. v. Sykes, 96 111.
162, 171; Huschle v. Morris, 131
111. 575, 587, 23 N. E. 643; Burns
v. P. 126 111. 282, 18 N. E. 550;
Chicago, M. & St. R. Co. v. Krueger,
124 111. 457, 17 N. E. 52; Ludwig v.
Sager, 84 111. 100; Fuller v. Gray,
124 Ala. 388, 27 So. 458; Cowie v.
City of Seattle, 22 Wash. 659, 62
Pac. 121; Merritt v. Merritt, 20 111.
80; Teague v. Lindsey, 106 Ala. 266,
17 So. 538; Sheehan v. P. 131 111.
22, 25, 22 N. E. 818; Lake S. &
M. S. R. Co. v. Parker, 131 111.
557, 566, 23 N. E. 237; American
Bible Soc. v. Price, 115 111. 623, 638,
5 N. E. 126; Hunt v. McMullen
(Tex. Cv. App.), 46 S. W. 666;
Thompson v. Force, 65 111. 370;
Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Griffin,
68 111. 499, 505; Louisville & N. R.
Co. v. York, 128 Ala. 305, 30 So.
676; King v. Franklin, 132 Ala. 559,
31 So. 467; Hall v. S. 130 Ala. 45,
30 So. 422; Willis v. S. 134 Ala.
429, 33 So. 226. See generally, Chap-
man v. S. 61 Neb. 888; 86 N. W. 907;
Gilmore v. S. 126 Ala. 20, 28 So.
595; Keeler v. Stuppe, 86 111. 309;
City of Birmingham v. Starr, 112
Ala. 98, 20 So. 424; Boiling v. S.
54 Ark. 588, 16 S. W. 658; Bodine
v. S. 129 Ala. 106, 29 So. 926; Bates
v. Benninger, 2 Gin. Super. Ct.
(Ohio) 568; P. v. Crawford, 48 Mich.
498, 12 N. W. 673; Weyrich v. P.
89 111. 90.
as Coghill v. Kennedy, 119 Ala.
641, 24 So. 459; Carleton v. S. 43
Neb. 373, 61 N. W. 699; Karr v. S.
106 Ala. 1, 17 So. 328.
94 Karr v. S. 106 Ala. 1, 17 So.
328; Baldwin v. S. Ill Ala. 11, 20
So. 528; Cesure v. S. 1 Tex. <^
19; Hurley v. S. 29 Ark. 17.
59 ARGUMENTATIVE INTERROGATIVE. 69
of the reasons for a conclusion, and in so doing the court elabo-
rates more than necessary, there can be no ground for error if
the instructions are relevant and otherwise correct. 95
68. Argumentative instructions Illustrations. An instruc-
tion which directs the jury that if they believe that certain
witnesses testified that the offense was committed on the 14th or
15th day of April, and that the defendant was sick in bed from
the 10th to the 20th of that month, they should acquit the de-
fendant, was properly refused as being argumentative. 96 A
charge that if the testimony be such that two conclusions may
be reasonably drawn from it, one tending to prove the defendant's
innocence and the other tending to establish his guilt, justice,
humanity and the law demand that the jury should adopt the
former and acquit the defendant, is argumentative, and there-
fore properly refused. 97
69. Interrogative instructions Improper. Instructions sub-
mitted in the form of questions to the jury are improper as
intimating an opinion on the weight of the evidence. Thus,
for instance, to charge the jury by asking: Is that the way an
honest man would act? Do honest people act so? amounts to
the expression of an opinion. 98
95 Thrall v. Wilson, 17 Pa. v. Webb, 110 Ala. 599, 18 So. 323;
Super. Ct. 376. Kansas City, M. & B. R. Co. v.
96 Frost v. S. 124 Ala. 71, 27 So. Henson, 132 Ala. 528, 31 So. 590;
550; Southern R. Co. v. Howell, Watkins v. S. 133 Ala. 88, 32 So.
135 Ala. 639, 34 So. 6; Rumbold v. 627 (on character); South Chicago
Supreme Council, &c. (111.), 69 N. C. R. Co. v. Dufresne, 200 111. 456,
R. 590; Chicago, M. & St. P. R. 65 N. E. 1075; City of Bonham v.
Co. v. O'Sullivan, 143 111. 60, 32 N. Crider (Tex. Cv. App.), 27 S. W.
E. 398; Ragland v. S. 125 Ala. 12, 419; Mitchell v. S. 133 Ala. 65, 32
27 So. 983. See Com. v. Brubaker, So. 132 (on flight); Walkley v. S.
13 Pa. Super. Ct. 14; Chicago, B. 133 Ala. 183, 31 So. 854; Camp-
& Q. R. Co. v. Warner, 123 111. 49, bell v. S. 133 Ala. 81, 31 So. 802;
14 N. E. 206; Jacksonville, &c. St. R. Winter v. S. 133 Ala. 176, 31 So.
Co. v. Wilhite, 209 111. 84, 86. 717; Morris v. Lachman, 68 Cal.
97 Bryant v. S. 116 Ala. 445, 23 112. 8 Pac. 799.
So. 40; Rogers v. S. 117 Ala. 9, 22 98 BLashfield Instructions, 51,
So. 666; Naugher v. S. 116 Ala. 463, p. 127, citing S. v. Norton, 28 S.
23 So. 26. Held to be argumenta- Car. 572, 6 S. E. 820; S. v. Addy, 28
tive: Dennis v. S. 118 Ala. 72, S. Car. 4, 4 S. E. 814; Freidrick v.
23 So. 1002; Cordill v. Moore, 17 Ter. 2 Wash. 358, 26 Pac. 976; S.
Tex. Cv. App. 217, 43 S. W. 298; v. Jenkins, 21 S. Car. 595. Instruc-
White v. S. Ill Ala. 92, 21 So. 330; tions in this form are argumenta-
Thomas v. S. 95 Ga. 484, 22 S. E. tive. But see McLain v. Common-
315; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. wealth, 99 Pa.' St. 86.
Carter (Tex.), 68 S. W. 159; Riddle
70
QUALITIES AND REQUISITES.
GO
70. Instructions construed as a whole. It is a familiar rule
that in passing upon a single instruction it must be considered
in connection with all the other instructions bearing on the same
subject, and if, when thus considered, the law appears to have-
been fairly presented to the jury, the court will not entertain
complaint because the instruction complained of does not con-
tain all the law relating to the particular subject, unless under
all the peculiar circumstances of the case the court is of the
opinion that it is misleading." The instructions will not be
construed in fragmentary parts, but all of them must be con-
strued together. 100 Where the whole charge clearly states the
law of a case an imperfection in an instruction or paragraph
standing alone will be harmless. 101 The presumption is that
so McCoy v. P. 175 111. 224, 230,
51 N. E. 777; Illinois Cent. R. Co.
v. Cosby, 174 111. 109, 119, 50 N. E.
1011; Baker v. Baker, 202 111. 595,
618, 67 N. E. 410; Gainey v. P.
97 111. 370, 377; Bartley v. S. 53
Neb. 310, 73 N. W. 744; Harrell v.
S. 31 Tex. Cr. App. 204, 45 S. W.
581; S. v. McCoy, 15 Utah, 136, 49
Pac. 420; Murray v. Burd (Neb.),
91 N. W. 278; Sloan v. Fist (Neb.),
89 N. W. 760; Cleveland, C. & C. R.
Co. v. Terry, 8 Ohio St. 570; White
v. New York, C. & St. L. R. Co.
142 Ind. 648, 42 N. E. 456; West
Chicago St. R. Co. v. Lieserowitz,
197 111. 607, 610, 64 N. E. 718; P.
v. Glover (Cal.), 74 Pac. 749-; Law-
der v. Henderson, 36 Kas. 754, 14
Pac. 164; Beidler v. King, 202 111.
302, 314.
100 Newport v. S. 140 Ind. 299,
39 N. E. 926; State v. Kennedy
(Iowa), 62 N. W. 673; P. v. Ander-
son, 105 Cal. 32, 38 Pac. 513; S. v.
Rathbun, 74 Conn. 524, 51 Atl. 540;
Conway v. Vizzard, 122 Ind. 271, 23
N. E. 771; Knight v. S. (Fla.), 32
So. 110; Brown v. S. 105 Ind. 385, 5
N. E. 900; Atkinson v. Dailey, 107
Ind. 117, 7 N. E. 902; Deig v. More-
head, 110 Ind. 461, 11 N. E. 458;
Jenks v. Lansing Lumber Co. 97
Iowa, 342, 66 N. W. 231; S. v.
Martin, 47 S. Oar. 67, 25 S. E.
113: Omaha, &c.. R. & B. Co.
v. Levingston, 49 Neb. 17, 67 N.
W. 887; Whelpley v. Stroughton,
119> Mich. 314, 78 N. W. 137; Chi-
cago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Oyster,
58 Neb. 1, 78 N. W. 359; Zimmer v.
Third Ave. R. Co. 55 N. Y. S. 308;
Stokes v. Ralph Tp. 187 Pa. St.
333, 40 Atl. 958; Kiekhoefer v. Hi-
dershide, 113 Wis. 280, 89 N. W. 189;
Haydensville M. & Mfg. Co. v. Stef-
fler, 17 Pa. Super. Ct. 609; Bay City
Iron Co. v. Emery, 128 Mich. 506, 87
N. W. 652; Kohn v. Johnson, 97 Io-
wa, 99, 66 N. W. 76; Decatur C. S. O
M. Co. v. Johnson (Tex. Cv. App.),
35 S. W. 951; Farmers' & Mer. Bank
v. Riddle, 115 Ga. 400, 41 S. E.
580; Blacman v. Edsall (Colo. App.),
68 Pac. 790; Hufford v. Lewis, 29
Ind. App. 202, 64 N. E. 99; Edwards
v. Chicago & A. R. Co. 94 Mo. App.
36, 67 S. W. 950; Whittlesey v. Bur-
lington, C. R. & N. R. Co. (Iowa)
90 N. W. 516; Southern Ind. R. Co.
v. Harrell (Ind. App.), 66 N. E.
1016; Wampler v. House, 30 Ind.
App. 513, 66 N. E. 500; Lofland v.
Goben, 16 Ind. App. 67, 44 N. E. 553.
ii Bay City Iron Co. v. Emery,
128 Mich. 506, 87 N. W. 652; Faust
v. Hosford, 119 Iowa, 97 93 N. W.
58; City of Omaha v. Meyers (Neb.),
92 N. W. 743; Smurr v. S. 88
Ind. 504; De Goey v. Van Wyk, 97
Iowa, 491, 66 N. W. 787; P. v.
Ricketts, 108 Mich. 584, 66 N. W.
483; S. v. Butler, 47 S. Car. 25, 24
S. E. 991.
61
CONSTRUED AS A WHOLE.
71
the jury, in arriving at their verdict, will consider the instruc-
tions as a whole ; that they will notice the qualification which one
instruction makes of another when considered together. 102 But
whether one instruction qualifies another without reference to
it, must depend upon its position in the series and its connection
with the others given. 103
71. Instructions of both parties construed together. The
instructions given for both parties must be construed together,
and when so considered, if they correctly state the law as a
whole, any error appearing in one series will be deemed corrected
by the other. 104 And although an instruction may be faulty in
some particular when standing alone, yet when construed in
connection with all the others given for both sides on the same
subject the error may be cured. 105 Hence there can be no ground
669, 31 S. E. 571; Northern P. R.
Co. v. Lynch, 79 Fed. 268; Texas
&c. R. Co. v. McCoy, 90 Tex. 264,
38 S. W. 36; Grant v. Roberts (Tex.
Cv. App.) 38 S. W. 650; P. v.
Armstrong, 114 Cal. 570, 46 Pac.
611; S. v. Riney, 137 Mo. 102, 38
S. W. 718 (alibi and possession
of stolen goods) ; Board of Comrs.
v. Nichols, 139 Ind. 611, 38 N. E.
526; North Chicago St. R. Co. v.
Boyd, 156 111. 416, 40 N. E. 955;
Greenwood v. Davis, 106 Mich. 230,
64 N. W. 26; Masonic, &c., Asso. v.
Collins, 210 111. 482, 48ft
105 Sandell v. Sherman, 107 Cal.
391, 40 Pac. 493; Gray v. S. 42 Pla.
174, 28 So. 53; S. v. Lee, 58
S. Car. 335, 36 S. E. 706; Spears v.
S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 56 S. W. 347;
Howard v. P. 185 111. 552, 57 N. E.
441; S. v. Cocoran, 7 Idaho, 220,
61 Pac. 1034; P. v. Burgle, 123
Cal. 303, 55 Pac. 998; Joiner v. S.
105 Ga. 646, 31 S. E. 556; Ballou v.
Young, 42 S. Car. 170, 20 S. E. 84;
Hughes Cr. Law, 3261. citing:
Bonardo v. P. 182 111. 418, 55 N. E.
519; Kennedy v. S. 107 Ind. 144,
6 N. E. 305, 7 Am. Cr. R. 426; Boy-
kin v. P. 22 Colo. 496, 45 Pac. 419;
S. v. McCoy, 15 Utah, 136, 49 Pac.
420; Thrawley v. S. 153 Ind. 375,
55 N. E. 95; Williams v. S. (Tex.
Cr. App.), 55 S. W. 500; Small v. S.
105 Ga. 669, 31 S. E. 571; Kerr-Mur-
102 Galesburg & Great E. R. Co.
v. Milroy, 181 111. 243, 247, 54 N. E.
939; Rock I. & P. R. Co. v. Leisly
Brewing Co. 174 111. 547, 556, 51
N. E. 572.
103 Springdale Cemetery Asso. v.
Smith, 24 111. 481, 483; Murphy v.
P. 37 111. 447, 458.
104 Lourance v. Goodwin, 170 111.
390, 394, 48 N. E. 903; Lawrence
v. Hagerman, 56 111. 68; Stringam
v. Parker, 159 111. 310, 42 N.
E. 794; England v. Fawbush, 204
111. 384, 395, 68 N. E. 526; Wenona
Coal Co. v. Holmquist, 152 111. 581,
593, 38 N. E. 946; Chicago C. R.
Co. v. Mead, 206 111. 178; East St.
Louis Connecting Co. v. Enright,
152 111. 246, 38 N. E. 553; Cleveland,
C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Monaghan,
140 111. 474, 479, 30 N. E. 869; Car-
stens v. Earles, 26 Wash. 676, 67
Pac. 404; Western C. & M. Co. v.
Ingraham, 70 Fed. 219; St. Louis
S. & W. R. Co. v. Ferguson (Tex.
Cv. App. 64 S. W. 797; Lyon v.
Watson, 109 Mich. 390, 67 N. W.
512; Meyer v. Southern R. Co.
(Mo.) 36 S. W. 367; Hamilton v.
Great F. St. R. Co. 17 Mont. 334,
42 Pac. 860; Ritzman v. P. 110
111. 362, 372; Fessenden v. Doane,
188 111. 228, 58 N. E. 974; Stein
v. Vannice, 44 Neb. 132, 62 N. W.
464; Durham v. Goodwin, 54 111.
169, 471; Smalls v. S. 105 Ga.
72
QUALITIES AND REQUISITES.
for complaint of the giving of an instruction which ignores the
facts tending to establish the defense, where it appears that the
instructions given for the defendant fully cover the theory, of
the defense. 100 So where an instruction may be faulty in that it
conveys the impression that if either of two persons who are on
trial is guilty both should be convicted, yet where by other in-
structions the court states that the guilt of one would not neces-
sarily warrant a conviction of the others there is no substantial
error; the instructions being considered as a whole, the error is
harmless. 107
72. If instructions be harmonious, defects are harmless. If
all the instructions considered together are harmonious and con-
sistent, and cover all the material issues involved in the ease,
then the charge is sufficient, notwithstanding a single instruc-
tion standing alone may not correctly or fully state the law. 10 *
So if an instruction be faulty in that it requires a greater de-
phy Mfg. Co. v. Hess, 98 Fed. 56;
Standard Life & Accident Ins. Co.
v. Schmaltz, 66 Ark. 588, 53 S. W.
49; Miller v. Stevens, 23 Ind. App.
365, 55 N. E. 262; Green v. Eden,
24 Ind. App. 583, 56 N. E. 240;
Krause v. Plumb, 195 Pa. St. 65,
45 Atl. 648; City of Louisville v.
McGill (Ky.), 52 S. W. 1053; Thom-
as v. Gates, 126 Cal. 1, 58 Pac.
315; Walrod v. Webster County,
110 Iowa, 349, 81 N. W. 598, 47 L.
R. A. 480; Chicago, R. I. & P. R.
Co. v. Zerneeke, 59 Neb. 689, 82
N. W. 26; Ohio & I. Torpedo Co.
v. Fishburn, 61 Ohio St. 608, 56 N.
E. 457; Bowman v. Bowman, 153
Ind. 498, 55 N. E. 422; Missouri,
K. & T. R. Co. v. Lyons (Tex. Cv.
App.) 58 S. W. 96; Toplitz v. Bauer,
161 N. Y. 325, 56 N. E. 1059; Kim-
ball v. Borden, 97 Va. 477, 34 S.
E. 45; Kleiner v. Third Ave. R.
Co. 162 N. Y. 193, 56 N. E. 497;
Stroud v. Smith, 194 Pa. St. 502,
45 Atl. 329; Warfleld v. Louisville
& N. R. Co. 104 Tenn. 74, 55 S. W.
304; Hockaday v. Wartham, 22 Tex.
Cv. App. 419, 54 S. W. 1094; S. v.
Darrough, 152 Mo. 522, 54 S. W.
226; Edwards v. P. 26 Co.o. 539,
59 Pac. 56; Burns v. Woolery,
15 Wash. 134, 45 Pac. 894; Williams
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 55 S. W. 500
Keesier v. S. 154 Ind. 242, 56 N. E.
232; P. v. Anderson, 105 Cal. 32,
3-8 Pac. 513; Smith v. Meyers (Neb.),
71 N. W. 1006; Benham v. Taylor,
66 Mo. App. 308; Butler v. Greene,
49 Neb. 280, 68 N. W. 496; Cren-
shaw v. Johnson, 120 N. Car. 270,
26 S. E. 810; P. v. Ross, 115 Cal.
233, 46 Pac. 1059; S. v. Urie, 101
Iowa, 411, 70 N. W. 603; Bell v.
Martin (Tex. Cv. App.), 28 S. W.
108; Barr v. S. (Miss.), 21 So.
131; Northern P. R. Co. v. Poirier,
67 Fed. 881; Butler v. Machen, 6&
Fed. 901; Housh v. S. 43 Neb. 163,
61 N. W. 571; Hollins v. Gorham,
23 Ky. L. R. 2185, 66 S. W. 823; Cof-
fin v. U. S. 162 U. S. 664, 16 Sup Ct.
943; McFaul v. Madero F. & F. C.
134 Cal. 313, 66 Pac. 308; Debney
v. S. 45 Neb. 856, 64 N. W. 446;
Mulvihill v. Thompson, 114 Iowa,
734, 87 N. W. 693; Terre Haute
& I. R. Co. v. Rittenhouse, 28 Ind.
App. 633, 62 N. E. 295.
ice Meadows v. Pacific M. L. Ins.
Co. 129 Mo. 76, 31 S. W. 578.
107 Baker v. S. 17 Ga. 452, 25 S.
E. 341.
i<>8 Shaw v. Missouri & K. D. Co.
56 Mo. App. 521.
63 GROUPING IN SERIES WORDS, CLAUSES. 74-
gree of care than the law calls for, the error is not material when
the instructions, considered as a whole advise the jury as to
the degree of care the law requires. 109 Or where an instruc-
tion, standing alone, omits to state that the burden of proof is
on the plaintiff to prove an essential element of his case there,
is no material error when other instructions clearly state that
the burden of proof is on the plaintiff. 110 Or where an instruction
as to the burden of proof is obscure the error is immaterial
where others given on the same subject clearly state the law. 111
There can be no ground for complaint that an instruction as-
sumes the existence of a material fact where it appears from the
whole evidence that the jury must have understood that such
fact must be established by the evidence. 112
73. Grouping instructions into one series. The court in
charging the jury may group the instructions asked by both
parties by arranging them on each particular subject, and read
them together as one series. 113 The order in which the in-
structions -are arranged, in charging the jury, is discretionary
with the court; and the fact that they may not be logically ar-
ranged cannot ordinarily be urged as error in the absence of
prejudicial error. 114
74. Words, phrases and clauses. The term ' ' difficulty, ' '
when used in drawing instructions, is well understood by all
persons. It is of constant application in legal proceedings,
and is expressive of a group or collection of ideas that cannot,
perhaps, be imparted so well by any other term. Its use, there-
fore, avoids a great deal of circumlocution which generally leads
to confusion and misapprehension. 115
The word "while" used in an instruction relating to an in-
jury alleged to have been sustained through the negligence of
the defendant while the plaintiff was in the exercise of or-
109 San Antonio St. R. Co. v. 61 N. E. 1104; Crowell v. P. 190 111.
Watzlavzick (Tex. Cv. App.), 28 S. 508, 519, 60 N. E. 872; Bonardo v.
W. 115. P. 182 111. 411. 55 N. E. 579.
no Crutcher v. Sechick, 10 Tex. n* Atcbison, T. & S. F. R. Co.
Cv. App. 676, 32 S. W. 75. v. Calvert, 52 Kas. 547, 34 Pac.
in Bingham v. Hartley, 44 Neb. 976; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v.
682, 62 N. W. 1089. Dunlap (Tex. Cv. App.), 26 S. W.
112 City of Atlanta v. Young, 93 655.
Ga. 265, 20 S. E. 317. us Gainey v. P. 97 111. 270, 279.
us Young v. P. 193 111. 236, 239,
75 QUALITIES AND REQUISITES. 64
dinary care does not mean at the particular point of time when
the injury was received; it relates to the entire transaction in
question. 116 Also the words "at the time" when used in draw-
ing instructions refer to the whole transaction. 117 The employ-
ment of the word "purported" in drawing instructions in a will
contest is not improper in referring to the will as the "pur-
ported will;" it is more accurate than "the will." And to say
the "pretended will" is not objectionable. 118
An instruction defining ordinary care to be "such care as
a person of ordinary prudence and skill would usually exercise
under the circumstances" is not improper. 119 The expressions
' ' due care, " " ordinary care " " and reasonable care ' ' are converti-
ble terms and mean in the same degree ; so that if in a series of
instructions these different terms are used in different instruc-
tions there is no error. 120 The use of the words "punitive
damages" in an instruction, instead of "exemplary damages,"
is not error. They are synonymous terms. 121
75. Definition of terms. The term ' ' prima facie ' ' used in
an instruction in referring to the evidence is as well under-
stood as a large share of the words employed, and requires no
explanation ; it is recognized as an English term. 122 Using the
words "ratification," " acquiescense " and " repudiation " in the
giving of instructions without defining them is not error. 123 Nor
lie Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Fisher, 111 Wis. 655, 87 N. W. 826; Yerkes
141 111. 625, 31 N. E. 406. See v. Northern P. R. Co. 112 Wis. 184,
North Chicago St. R. Co. v. Cos- 88 N. W. 33 (ordinary care not cor-
sar, 203 111. 608, 613, 68 N. E. 88 rectly defined),
(instruction improper) ; St. Louis 120 Baltimore & O. R. Co. v.
N. Stock Yards v. Godfrey, 198 111. Faith, 175 111. 58, 51 N. E. 807;
288, 294, 65 N. E. 90. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Yortz,
117 McNulta v. Lockridge, 137 111. 158 111. 321, 42 N. E. 64; Illinois
288. 27 N. E. 452; Lake Shore & Cent. R. Co. v. Noble, 142 111. 584,
M. S. R. Co. v. Johnson, 135 111. 32 N. E. 684; Schmidt v. Sinnatt,
653, 26 N. E. 510; Lake Shore & M. 103 111. 160, 164; Louisville & N. R.
S. R. Co. v. Parker, 131 111. 566, Co. v. Pointer's Adm'r (Ky.) ( 69
23 N. E. 237. S. W. 1108.
us Egbers v. Egbers, 177 111. 82, 121 Roth v. Eppy, 80 111. 283, 287.
90, 52 N. E. 285; Smith v. Henline, 122 Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Esten,
174 111. 184, 200, 51 N. E. 227; Keith- 178 111. 198, 52 N. E. 954; Louisville,
ley v. Stafford, 126 111. 507, 521, 18 E. & St. L. C. R. Co. v. Spencer,
N. E. 740; Campbell v. Campbell, 149 111. 103, 36 N. E. 91.
138 111. 612, 28 N. E. 1080. 123 Iowa State Sav. Bank v.
ii Chase v. Blodgett Milling Co. Black, 91 Iowa, 490, 59 N. W. 283.
65 DEFINITION OF TERMS. 75
is it necessary to define the term negligence when used in an
instruction. 124
The word "carelessly" used in an instruction as to knowingly
and carelessly permitting stock to injure trees, need not be
defined. 125 Nor need the word "contributed" be defined when
used in an instruction. 126 It is not necessary to define the words
^'fraud," "preponderance" and "presumption" when using
them in instructions. 127
The words "felonious" and "feloniously," when used in in-
structions, need not be defined. 128 But on the other hand, it has
been held that the word felonious should be explained. "To
charge a jury of even more than average intelligence, but who
are unlearned in the law, that one who acted under the fears
of a reasonable man that a felony was about to be committed
on him by another would be justified in taking the life of such
person without explaining what is meant by the term 'felony,'
leaves the jury almost, if not entirely, in the dark as to what
is necessary to constitute a defense in such a case." In all cases
where the term "felony" or other technical term of the law is
contained in the statute the meaning should be explained to the
jury. 129 Nor need the words "falsely" and "fraudulently" be
defined when used in instructions. 130
The court is not required to instruct as to the meaning of
a particular word used in the indictment in describing the of-
fense which may be eliminated as mere surplusage, such, for in-
stance, as the word "feloniously" under a statute for wilfully
shooting" at another. 131 The words "cool," "sedate" and "de-
liberate" used in an instruction need not be defined. They
should be received in their usual and ordinary acceptation. 132
In a homicide case the giving of an instruction containing the
124 American Cotton Co. v. Smith 129 Roberts v. S. 114 Ga. 450 40
(Tex. Cv. App.), 69 S. W. 443. S. E. 297. See Cobb v. Covenant
125 Warden v. Henry, 117 Mo. 530, M. B. Asso. 153 Mass. 176, 26 N.
23 S. W. 776. E. 230.
126 Bunyan v. Loftus, 90 Iowa, iso S. v. Gregory, 170 Mo. 598, 71
122, 51 N. W. 685. S. W. 170.
127 Kischman v. Scott 166 Mo. i" S. v. Beck, 46 La. 1419, 16
214, 65 S. W. 1031. So. 368.
128 s. v. Barton, 142 Mo. 450, 132 Beard v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.),
44 S. W. 239; S. v. Weber, 156 53 S. W. 348.
Mo. 249, 56 S. W. 729; S. v. Penney,
113 Iowa, 691, 84 N. W. 509.
76 QUALITIES AND REQUISITES. b'6
words in the "heat of passion," without denning that expression
133
is erroneous.
"Malice aforethought" need not be denned where malice and
express malice have been properly denned in the same charge. 13 *
So instructions containing the words "deliberation" and "pre-
meditation" are improper without denning these terms. 133 The
use of the words "deadly violence" to the person instead
of "great violence" is not error where it clearly appears from
the charge that the one expression was used in the sense of the
other. 136 Nor is it necessary to define the term "great bodily
injury" when used in an instruction. 137 On a burglary charge
in the night time the failure of the court to define the term
"night time" in giving instructions cannot be complained of as
error in the absence of a request to define the term. 138
76. Definition of terms Continued. The use of the term
"fellow servant" in charging the jury without defining it is er-
roneous. The definition of fellow servant is a question of law.
But when an instruction correctly defines the meaning of this
term it is then a question of fact for the jury to determine,
whether the person alleged to be a fellow servant comes within
the definition of the term. 139 Or reading to the jury the statute
defining fellow servant without any explanation, is error. 140
An instruction relating to master and servant, which states that
the servant does not assume those "risks due to the master,"
was held not objectionable on the ground that these words are
too indefinite in their meaning. 141 The court need not define
the term "common laborer" in giving instructions. 142
iss S. v. Strong, 153 Mo. 548, 55 Co. v. Becker, 63 Ark. 477, 39 S. W.
S. W. 78; S. v. Reed, 154 Mo. 122, 358.
55 S. W. 278. 141 Eastman v. Curtis, 67 Vt. 432,
134 Hatcher v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 32 Atl. 232. See also Pittsburg
65 S. W. 97. Bridge Co. v. Walker, 170 111. 550,
"5 S. v. Foster, 130 N. Car. 666, 554, 48 N. E. 915; Chicago & E. I.
41 S. E. 284. R. Co. v. Kneirim, 152 111. 458, 466,
ise Acers v. U. S. 164 U. S. 388, 39 N. E. 324.
17 S. Ct. 91. 142 Boeltger v. Scherpe & Koken
137 S. v. Bone, 114 Iowa, 537, 87 A. & I. Co. 136 Mo. 531, 38 S. W.
N. W. 507, 55 L. R A. 378. 298. An instruction using the ex-
iss Shaffel v. S. 97 Wis. 377, 72 pression "respondeat superior,"
N. W. 888. without explanation, is improper,
139 Whitney & Starrette Co. v. Chicago, &c. R. Co. v. White, 209
O'Rourke, 172 111. 186, 50 N. E. 242. 111. 124, 132. See Kehl v. Abram,
140 Kansas City, Ft S. & M. R. 210 111. 218 (material inducements).
67 NAMES AND TERMS MISUSED. 78
77. Ungrammatical and awkwardly arranged. The fact
that an instruction is ungrammatical and awkward in its phrase-
ology does not render it erroneous if it is clear in its meaning. 143
An instruction which states that a certain presumption "may
be overcome by any evidence that satisfies your minds to the
contrary," instead of stating that such presumption "may be
overcome by evidence to the contrary which satisfies your minds"
is not material error. 144
78. Misuse of names, terms, etc. Effect. The use of the
word ' ' plaintiff, ' ' instead of ' ' defendant, " in an instruction is not
harmful error where it is clear from the instruction that it cor-
rects itself; 145 or where the context plainly shows which of the
two words was intended to be used; 140 or the use of the word
"prisoner" for defendant is not material error. 147 The use by
mistake of the word "acquit," instead of "convict," in framing
an instruction, renders it erroneous. Thus, when the court in-
structs that if the jury find that the prosecution has proven all
the essential facts necessary to establish guilt they should
"acquit" it is error. 148
The improper use of the word "testimony," instead of "evi-
dence," in drawing instructions is not material error. 149 Nor is
it objectionable to make use of the word "will," instead of
"may," in directing the jury that if they find from the evidence
that the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages they "will"
determine the amount to which he is entitled. 150 The word
"must" should not be improperly used for the word "may" in
the giving of instructions. If the jury believe a witness has wil-
fully testified falsely as to any material fact in issue they may
disregard the testimony of such witness, but they are not bound
1*3 Langdon v. Winterstein, 58 147 Dinsmore v. S. 61 Neb. 418,
Neb. 278, 78 N. W. 501. 85 N. W. 445.
144 Rule v. Bolles, 27 Ore. 368, 41 i Cummins v. S. 50 Neb. 274,
Pac, 691. 69 N. W. 756.
145 McKinzie v. Remington, 79 111. 149 p. v . Hubert, 119 Cal. 216,
388; Nichols v. Mercer, 44 111. 250. 51 Pac. 329; Padgett v. Jacobs, 128
146 Central Texas & N. W. R. Co. Mich. 632, 87 N. W. 898.
v. Bush, 12 Tex. Cv. App. 291, 34 iso North Chicago St. R. Co. v.
S. W. 133; Flam v. Lee, 116 Iowa, Zeigler, 182 111. 13, 54 N. E. 1006;
289, 90 N. W. 70; Pittman v. Weeks, Kane v. Footh, 70 111. 590 ("may"
132 N. Car. 81, 43 S. E. 582; O'Cal- or "shall"); Chicago & E. R. Co. v.
laghan v. Bode, 84 Cal. 489, 24 Meech, 163 111. 305, 315, 45 N. E.
Pac. 269. 290.
79 QUALITIES AND REQUISITES. 68
to do so. 151 The word "ought" used in an instruction means, in
its ordinary sense, to be held or bound in duty or moral obliga-
tion. 152
79. Words omitted from instructions. The omission of a
word will sometimes render an instruction erroneous. 153
"I Hoge v. P. 117 111. 46, 6 N. (Neb.) 92 N. W. 606 ("and" omitted
E. 7%. between fairly and truthfully is not
152 otmer v. P. 76 111. 152. error) ; Southwestern T. & T. Co.
153 Carleton Min. & Mill. Co. v. v. Newman (Tex. Cv. App.), 34 S.
Ryan, 29 Colo. 401, 68 Pac. 279 W.' 661 (inadvertent use of "not"
("not" omitted); McCormick v. S. is error).
CHAPTER III.
BASED ON EVIDENCE AND PLEADINGS.
Sec.
80. Supported by evidence.
81. Supported by evidence Illus-
trations.
82. Supported by evidence Crim-
inal cases.
83. Defense unsupported by evi-
dence.
84. Based on incompetent evidence.
85. Speculative evidence Insuffi-
cient.
86. Slight evidence will support
instructions.
87. Circumstantial evidence suffi-
cient.
88. Evidence sufficient Criminal
cases.
89. Evidence sufficient Larceny.
90. Instructions stating issues arid
contentions.
91. Instructions as to immaterial
issues.
92. Instructions ignoring issues.
93. Issues unsupported by evi-
dence.
93a. Issues unsupported by evidence
Illustrations.
94. Instructions based on plead-
ings.
95. Based on evidence rather than
pleadings.
96. Instructions confined to de-
fenses alleged. .
97. Instructions based on plead-
ings Illustrations.
98. Instructions limited to counts.
99. Issues raised outside of plead-
ings.
Sec.
100. Issues abandoned.
101. Theory of party Instructions.
102. Instructions when several the-
ories.
103. Instructions when several the-
ories Illustrations.
104. Instructions need not notice
opposing theory.
105. Instructions confining jury to
evidence.
106. Confining jury as to damages.
107. Common and personal knowl-
edge.
108. Confined within statute of lim-
itations.
109. Limiting evidence to specific
purpose.
110. Limited to impeaching Wit-
nesses.
111. Limited to malice or intent.
112. Limited to certain defendants.
113. Instructions giving promi-
nence to certain facts.
114. Singling out facts When not
objectionable.
115. Singling out facts Criminal
cases.
116. Instructions ignoring facts.
117. Instructions with dr awing
facts.
117a. Actions for personal injury
from negligence.
118. Instructions ignoring defense.
119. Instructions summing up the
evidence.
80. Supported by evidence. One of the familiar rules to
be observed in charging the jury is that the instructions must
69
80
BASED ON EVIDENCE AND PLEADINGS.
70
be based upon evidence ; for if there is no evidence adduced tend-
ing to 'prove a material fact, or state of facts in issue, the giving
of instructions as to such facts is improper. 1 And this rule ap-
i Entivistle v. Meikle,, 180 111. 28,
54 N. E. 217; Lusk v. Throop, 189
111. 127, 142, 59 N. E. 529; Baxter
v. Campbell (S. Dak.), 97 N. W.
368; Glucose Sugar R. Co. v. Flinn,
184 111. 128, 56 N. E. 400; American
Strawboard Co. v. Chicago & A.
R. Co. 177 111. 513, 53 N. E. 97;
Sugar Creek Mining Co. v. Peter-
son, 177 111. 329, 52 N. E. 475; Doyle
v. P. 147 111. 398, 35 N. E. 372;
Moore v. Barker* Asphalt Paving
Co. 118 Ala. 563, 23 So. 798; Birr
v. P. 113 111. 648; Rice v. P. 38
111. 436; S. v. Hicks (Mo.), 77 S.
W. 542; Romine v. San Antonio
Tr. Co. (Tex. Cv. App.), 77 S. W.
35; Denison & P. S. R. Co. v. O'Ma-
ley (Tex. Cr. App.), 45 S. W. 225;
Wadsworth v. Dunman, 117 Ala.
661, 23 So. 699; Plumb v. Camp-
bell, 129 111. 109, 18 N. E. 790;
Chicago, R. I. & P. Co. v. Lewis,
109 111. 125; Farlow v. Town, &c.
186 111. 256, 57 N. E. 781; Murphy v.
Farlow, 124 Ala. 279, 27 So. 442;
Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Windham,
126 Ala. 552, 28 So. 392; Rock I. &
E. I. R. Co. v. Gordon, 184 111. 456,
56 N. E. 810; Williams v. Andrew,
185 111. 98, 56 N. E. 1041; Hersey
v. Hutchins, 70 N. H. 130, 46 Atl.
33; Bennett v. McDonald, 60 Neb.
47, 80 N. W. 110; Einseidler v. Whit-
man Co. 22 Wash. 388, 60 Pac. 1122;
Washington Co. W. Works v. Gar-
ver, 91 Md. 398, 46 Atl. 979; Steiner
v. Jeffries, 118 Ala. 573, 24 So.
37; Burke v. Sanitary Dist. 152 111.
134, 38 N. E. 670; Hubuer v. Friege,
90 111. 212; Frost v. Foote (Tex.
Cv. App.), 44 S. W. 1071; Frantz
v. Rose, 89 111. 594; Howe S. M. Co.
v. Layman, 88 111. 39; Bank of M.
v. Page, 98 111. 125; Yeomans v.
v. Page, 98 111. App. 228 (error);
Parker v. National M. B. & L.
Asso. (W. Va.), 46 S. E. 811; S.
v. DeWolfe (Mont), 74 Pac. 1086;
Krish v. Ford, 19 Ky. L. R. 1167, 43
S. W. 237; Selleck v. Selleck, 107
111. 396; S. v. Petsch, 43 S. Car.
132, 20 S. E. 993; Truslow v. S. 95
Tenn. 189, 31 S. W. 987; American
T. & T. Co. v. Kersh (Tex. Cv.
App.), 66 S. W. 74; Jones v. Col-
lins, 94 Md. 403, 51 Atl. 398; Walter
v. Victor G. Bloede Co. 90 Md. 80,
50 Atl. 433; Butterfield v. Kirtley,
114 Iowa, 520, 87 N. W. 407; Gam-
brill v. Schooley, 95 Md. 260, 52
Atl. 500; Griswold v. Town of Guil-
ford, 75 Conn. 192, 52 Atl. 742;
Ward v. S. 102 Ga. 531, 28 S. E.
982; Wiggins v. S. 103 Ga. 559,
29 S. E. 26; Smith v. S. 75 Miss.
542, 23 So. 260; Dyal v. S. 103 Ga.
425, 30 S. E. 254; Patterson v. S.
75 Miss. 670, 23 So. 647; Herrick
v. Gary, 83 111. 86; Lehman v. Press,
106 Iowa, 389, 76 N. W. 818; Braley
v. Powers, 92 Me. 203, 42 Atl. 362;
Hughie v. Hammett, 105 Ga. 368,
31 S. E. 109; Shiverick v. R. J.
Gunning Co. 58 Neb. 29, 78 N. W.
460; Nof singer v. Goldman, 122 Cal.
609, 55 Pac. 425; Western U. Tel.
Co. v. Waller (Tex. Cv. App.), 47
S. W. 396; Oliver v. Ohio River R.
Co. 42 W. Va. 703, 26 S. E. 444;
Nite v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 54 S. W.
763; Griffin v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.),
53 S. W. 848; Boone v. Ritchie
(Ky.) 53 S. W. 518; Howard v.
Schwartz (Tex. Cv. App.), 55 S. W.
348; Dolphin v. Plumley, 175 Mass.
304, 56 N. E. 281; Wallace v. Curtis,
36 111. 156, 160; Hodgen v. Latham,
33 111. 344, 349; New England F. &
M. Ins. Co. v. Wetmore, 32 111.
221, 249; Lawrence v. Jarvis, 32
111. 304, 312; Pfund v. Zimmerman,
29 111. 269; Baltimore & O. R. Co.
v. Feev's Ex'r, 94 Va. 82, 26 S. E.
406; Kelly v. S. 51 Neb. 572, 71 N.
W. 299; Edwards v. S. (Tex. Cr.
App.), 38 S. W. 779; West Chicago
St. R. Co. v. Fetters, 196 111. 298,
63 N. E. 662; Louisville & N. R. Co.
v. Baker, 106 Ala. 624, 17 So. 452;
Lucia v. Meech, 68 Vt. 175, 34
Atl. 695; Hodo v. Mexican N. R.
Co. (Tex. Cv. App.), 31 S. W. 708;
Wheeler v. S. 76 Miss. 265, 24 So.
71
SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE.
80
plies to any feature or element of a case. So if the evidence
is wanting on any material fact, an instruction submitting such
fact to the jury is improper, and should be refused. 2 And, gener-
310; Caledonian Ins. Co. v. Traul,
80 Md. 214, 30 Atl. 904; Fletcher v.
Post, 104 Mich. 424, 62 N. W. 574;
Ashworth v. East Tenn. V. & G.
R. Co. 94 Ga. 715, 20 S. E. 424;
Irby v. S. 95 Ga. 467, 20 S. E. 218
(confession) ; Mittwer v. Stremel,
69 Minn. 19, 71 N. W. 698; Hart
v. S. 93 Ga. 160, 18 S. E. 550 (good
character) ; Stevens v. Walton
(Colo. App.), 68 Pac. 834; Norfolk
R. & L. Co. v. Corletto, 100 Va.
355, 41 S. E. 740; Crete M. Fire
Ins. Co. v. Patz, 64 Neb. 676, 90
N. W. 546; Texas T. & L. Co. v.
Gevin (Tex. Cv. App.), 68 S. W.
721, 67 S. W. 892; Chesapeake &
O. R. Co. v. Rogers' Adm'x, 100
Va. 324, 41 S. E. 732; Illinois Steel
Co. v. McFadden, 196 111. 344, 98
111. App. 296, 63 N. E. 671; Ficken
v. City of Atlanta, 114 Ga. 970,
41 S. E. 58; Gulf, C. S. & F. R.
Co. v. Moore (Tex. Cv. App.), 68
S. W. 559; Hicks v. Southern R.
Co. 63 S. Car. 559, 41 S. E. 753; Skow
v. Locks (Neb.) 91 N. W. 204; Dow-
ney v. Gemini Min. Co. 24 Utah,
431, 68 Pac. 414; Walton v. S.
114 Ga. 112, 39 S. E. 877; P. v.
Ward, 134 Cal. 301, 66 Pac. 372;
Jacobi v. S. 133 Ala. 1, 32 So.
158; Jones v. Wattles (Neb.), 92
N. W. 765; Cartiledge v. S. 132
Ala. 17, 31 So. 553; Lyman v. P.
198 111. 544, 64 -N. E. 974; S. v.
Sheppard, 49 W. Va. 582, 39 S. E.
676; McEldon v. Patton (Neb.),
93 N. W. 938; Braxton v. S. 157
Ind. 213, 61 N. E. 195; Barnett
v. Fearig, 101 Ind. 96; Rhea v.
S. 63 Neb. 461, 88 N. W. 789; Clem
v. S. 31 Ind. 480; Moore v. S. 114
Ga. 256, 40 S. E. 295; S. v. North-
way, 164 Mo. 513, 65 S. W. 331;
Green v. S. 43 Fla. 556, 30 So.
656; Terry v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.),
66 S. W. 451; P. v. Ross, 134 Cal.
256, 66 Pac. 229; Allen v. Fuller,
182 Mass. 202, 65 N. E. 31; Broy-
hill v. Norton, 175 Mo. 190, 74 S.
W. 1024; Prentice Co. v. Page,
164 Mass. 276, 41 N. E. 279; Davis
v. Bingham (Tex. Cv. App.) 33 S.
W. 1035; Zimmerman v. Knox, 34
Kas. 245, 8 Pac. 104.
2 Tompkins v. Montgomery, 123
Cal. 219, 55 Pac. 997; Gilbertson v.
Forty-Second St. M. & St. N. Ave.
R. Co. 43 N. Y. S. 782, 14 App. Div.
294; Chicago, K. & W. R. Co. v.
Prouty, 55 Kas. 503, 40 Pac. 909;
Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v.
Waldo (Tex. Cv. App.) 26 S. W.
1004; Wisdom v. Reeves, 110 Ala.
418, 18 So. 13; Hasson v. Klee,
168 Pa. St. 510, 32 Atl. 46; S. v.
Hertzog (W. Va.), 46 S. E. 796;
Joines v. Johnson, 133 N. Car. 487,
45 S. E. 828; Towle v. Stimpson
Mill Co. (Wash.), 74 Pac. 471; Wild-
man v. S. (Ala.) 35 So. 995;
Spraggins v. S. (Ala.) 35 So. 1003;
Honick v. Metropolitan St. R. Co.
66 Kas. 124, 71 Pac. 265; Winter
v. Supreme Lodge K. P. lol Mo.
App. 550, 73 S. W. 877 (suicide);
Fritz v. Western U. Tel. Co. 25
Utah, 263, 71 Pac. 209; S. v. Bart-
ley, 56 Neb. 8,10, 77 N. W. 438;
.Union P. R. Co. v. Ruzika (Neb.),
91 N. W. 543; Hunt v. Searcy, 167
Mo. 158, 67 S. W. 206; Parker v.
Wells (Neb.), 94 N. W. 717; St.
Louis, &c. R. Co. v. Philpot (Ark.),
77 S. W. 901; Bullard v. Brewer
(Ga.), 45 S. E. 711; Bullard v. Smith
(Mont.), 72 Pac. 761; Denver, &c.
R. Co. v. Young, 30 Colo. 349, 70
Pac. 688; Scott v. Boyd (Va.), 42 S.
E. 918; Williams v. Avery, 131 N.
Car. 18*8, 42 S. E. 582; Burton v.
Rosemary Mfg. Co. 132 N. Car.
17, 43 S. E. 480; Crossette v. Jordan
(Mich.), 92 N. W. 782; Aldous v.
Olverson (S. Dak.), 95 N. W. 917;
Central City v. Engle (Neb.), 91 N.
W. 849; McDonald v. McDonald,
94 Ga. 675, 20 S. E. 5; Morton v.
Gately, 2 111. (1 Scam.) 210; Davis
v. Searey, 79 Miss. 292, 30 So. 823
(fraud) ; Harrington v. Claplin
(Tex. Cv. App.), 66 S. W. 898
(fraud); Challis v. Lake, 71 N. H.
80
BASED ON EVIDENCE AND PLEADINGS.
ally speaking, the giving of instructions reciting matters of fact
of a prejudicial character unsupported by any evidence what-
ever, is material error. 3
90, 51 Atl. 260; Mitchell v. Poto-
mac Ins. Co. 183 U. S. 42, 22 Sup.
Ct. 22; Stoats v. Byers, 73 N. Y. S.
'893, 68 App. Div. 634.
a Redding v. Redding Estate, 69
,Vt. 500, 38 Atl. 230; Hansberg v.
P. 120 111. 21, 11 N. E. 526; Green
v. Willingham, 100 Ga. 224, 28 S. E.
42; Birr v. P. 113 111. 649; Knight
v. Overman Wheel Co. 174 Mass.
455, 54 N. E. 890; Chicago & A. R.
Co. v. Bragonier, 119 111. 51, 61,
7 N. E. 688; Mohrenstecher v.
Westervelt, 87 Fed. 157; Cannon v.
P. 141 111. 283, 36 N. E. 1027; Mon-
tag v. P. 141 111. 80, 30 N. E.
337; Belk v. P. 125 111. 584, 17 N.
E. 714; Healy v. P. 163 111. 383, 45
N. E. 230; Wallace v. S. 41 Fla.
547, 26 So. 713; Echols v. S. (Ga.)
46 S. E. 409; Rooks v. S. (Ga.)
46 S. E. 631; Johnson v. Com.
(Va.) 46 S. E. 790; S. v. St. John,
94 Mo. App. 229, 68 S. W. 374;
Scott v. Boyd (Va.), 42 S. E.
918; Spradley v. S. 80 Miss. 82, 31
So. 534; Chrisholm v. Keyfauver,
110 Cal. 102, 42 Pac. 424; Interna-
tional & G. N. R'. Co. v. Eason
(Tex. Cv. App.) 35 S. W. 208; Mar-
tin v. Union M. L. Ins. Co. 13
Wash. 275, 43 Pac. 53; Thomas v.
S. 126 Ala. 4, 28 So. 591; Mahan
v. Com. (Ky.) 56 S. W. 529; S. v.
Swallum, 111 Iowa, 37, 82 N. W.
439; Suddeth v. S. 112 Ga. 407 37
S. E. 747; P. v. Kelly, 133 Cal. 1,
64 Pac. 1091; Rosenkrans v. Bar-
ker, 115 111. 336, 3 N. E. 93; Gordon
v. Alexander, 122 Mich. 107, 80 N.
W. 978; Conner v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. 78 Mo. App. 131; Archer
v. U. S. 9 Okla. 569, 60 Pac. 268;
Tully v. Excelsior Iron Works, 115
111. 544, 549, 5 N. E. 83; Chicago, B.
& Q. R. Co. v. Bundy, 210 111. 49;
Boone v. P. 148 111. 440, 451, 36
N. E. 99; In re Stickhey's Will,
104 Wis. 581, 80 N. W. 921; Den-
ver & R. G. R. Co. v. Spencer,
25 Colo. 9, 52 Pac. 211; Com. v.
Reid, 175 Mass. 325, 56 N. E. 617;
Arismendis v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 54
S. W. 599; P. v. Matthews, 126
Cal. 17, 58 Pac. 371; S. v. Calla-
way, 154 Mo. 91, 55 S. W. 444;
Haggarty v. Strong, 10 S. Dak. 585,
74 N. W. 1037; Gandy v. Orient
Ins. Co. 52 S. Car. 224, 29 S. E.
655; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v.
Bryan, 90 111. 126, 132; Terrell v.
Russell (Tex. Cv. App.), 42 S. W.
129; Fore v. S. 75 Miss. 727, 23 So.
710; Brin v. McGregor (Tex. Cv.
App.) 45 S. W. 923; S. v. Robinson,.
52 La. Ann. 616, 27 So. 124; S. v.
Vaughan, 141 Mo. 514, 42 S. W. 1080;
Toledo, W. & W. R. Co. v. Ingra-
ham, 77 111. 313; Frame v. Badger,
79 111. 441, 446; Nichols v. Bradley,
78 111. 44; Plumner v. Rigdon, 78 111.
222; Straus v. Minzesheeiner, 78-
111. 497; Andreas v. Ketcham, 77
111. 380; North Chicago St. R. Co.
v. Irwin, 202 111. 345, 356, 66 N.
E. 1077; City of Chicago v. Shol-
ten, 75 111. 468; Roach v. P. 77
111. 29; Toledo, P. & W. R. Co.
v. Patterson, 63 111. 306; Paulin
v. Howser, 63 111. 312; Albrecht v.
Walker, 73 111. 73; St. Louis, I. M,
& S. R. Co. v. Woodward, 70 Ark.
441, 65 S. W. 55; S. v. Valle, 164
Mo. 539, 65 S. W. 232; Stevens
v. Metzger, 95 Mo. App. 609, 69 S.
W. 625; P. v. Mendenhall, 135
Cal. 344, 67 Pac. 325, (intoxicating
liquor); Johnson v. S. 36 Ark. 242;
Eggett v. Allen, 106 Wis. 633, 82
N. W. 556; Hot Springs R. Co. v.
Williamson, 136 U. S. 121, 10 Sup.
Ct. 955; Northern C. R. Co. v.
Husson, 101 Pa. St. 7; Lurssen v.
Lloyd, 76 Md. 360, 25 Atl, 294;
Simpson v. Post, 40 Conn, 321; S. v.
Labuzan, 37 La. Ann. 489; Thomp-
son v. Anderson, 86 Iowa, 703, 53 N.
W. 418; Penobscot R. Co. v. White,
41 Me. 512; Layton v. S. 56 Miss.
791; S. v. Parker, 13 Lea (Tenn.)
221; Shaughnessey v. Sewell & D.
C. Co. 160 Mass. 331, 35 N. E. 861;
Consolidated Tr. Co. v. Haight, 5
N. J. L. 577, 37 Atl. 135; Harrison.
73 SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE ILLUSTRATIONS. 81
81. Supported by evidence Illustrations. Thus in an ac-
tion for malicious prosecution an instruction that probable cause
cannot exist when good faith is lacking, is erroneous, if there is
no evidence that the defendant acted in bad faith. 4 In an action
of trespass where there is no evidence tending to prove wilful
or wanton conduct on the part of persons in charge of a train
in expelling a passenger therefrom, an instruction submitting
the issue of wilfulness or wantonness in estimating the amount
of damages is erroneous. 5 Or where there is no evidence to show
that an injury complained of was the result of wilfulness or
wantonness, it is improper to instruct on that question. 6
The giving of an instruction on the question as to whether the
conductor maliciously ejected the plaintiff from the car of the
defendant, is prejudicial, where there is no evidence whatever
tending to support it. 7 Also where there is no evidence tending
to show undue influence in the making or destruction of a will,
an instruction on that subject is erroneous. 8 Or the giving of an
instruction as to the nature or character of undue influence suf-
ficient to invalidate a will, is improper where there is no evidence
whatever of such undue influence. 9
An instruction directing the jury to assess the plaintiff's dam-
ages at the cash value of one half of his probable earnings dur-
ing life, is erroneous where there is no evidence tending to prove
T. Baker, 15 Neb. 43, 14 N. W. 541; * Harris v. Woodford, 98 Mich.
Crowder v. Reed, 80 Ind. 1; P. v. 147, 57 N. W. 96.
Devine, 95 Cal. 227, 30 Pac. 378; $ Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Connell,
Zimmerman v. Knox, 34 Kas. 245, 127 111. 419, 20 N. E. 89; Waldron v.
8 Pac. 104: ^Etna Ins. Co. v. Reed, Marcier, 82 111. 551; Wenger v. Cal-
33 Ohio St. 283; Case v. Illinois der, 78 111. 275.
Cent. R. Co. 38 Iowa, 581. See 6 St. Louis, A. & T. H. R. Co. v.
also S. v. Myer, 69 Iowa, 148, 28 Manly, 58 111. 300, 304; Atchison,
N. W. 484; Hines v. Com. (Ky.) 62 T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Wells, 56 Kas.
S. W. 732; McMahon v. Flanders, 222, 42 Pac. 699 (malicious negli-
4 Ind. 334; Salomon v. Cress, 22 gence).
Ore. 177, 29 Pac. 439; Montgomery ? Pittsburg, Ft. W. & C. R. Co.
v. Com. (Ky.) 63 S. W. 747; Kirk v. Slusser, 19 Ohio St. 161.
v. Ter. 10 Okla. 46, 60 Pac. 797; 8 Mclntosh v. Moore, 22 Tex. Cv.
Slingerland v. Keyser, 127 Mich. App. 22, 53 S. W. 611; Boone v.
7, 86 N. W. 390; Donald v. S. Richie (Ky.), 53 S. W. 518; *'olks
21 Ohio C. C. 124; Jackson v. S. 91 v. Folks, 107 Ky. 561, 54 S. W. 837;
Ga. 271, 18 S. E. 298; Moore v. Calkins, Estate of, 112 Cal. 296, 44
Ross, 11 N. H. 547; P. v. Hong Pac. 577.
Fong, 85 Cal. 171, 24 Pac. 726; Ben- 9 Blough v. Parry, 144 Ind. 463,
nett v. McDonald, 60 Neb. 47, 82 40 N. E. 70, 43 N. E. 560.
N. W. 110.
82 BASED ON EVIDENCE AND PLEADINGS. 74
what he could earn, or what loss he had sustained in that re-
spect. 10 So an instruction that the jury may take into considera-
tion the expenses incurred for medical treatment, is improper and
erroneous where there is no evidence showing any such expendi-
ture or obligation incurred for such treatment. 11 And the failure
to comply with certain statutory provisions in conducting a bus-
iness will not warrant the giving of instructions based upon the
statute if there is no evidence that such failure in any way con-
tributed to the accident resulting in the damages complained of.
The tendency of such instructions is confusing and misleading. 12
82. Supported by evidence Criminal cases. On a charge
of having sexual intercourse with a female under the age of six-
teen years, it appearing that the parish register of births had
been changed so as to show from it that the prosecutrix was over
sixteen years of age at the time of the alleged intercourse, it
is improper and erroneous to submit to the jury the issue as to
whether the defendant changed the register of birth, where it ap-
pears from all the evidence on that issue that the register was
not altered by him, and that he had no opportunity to alter it. 13
And in a case where the evidence in a prosecution for rape strong-
ly tends to impeach the prosecutrix, there being no evidence
whatever tending to corroborate her, it is error to instruct the
jury as to corroboration of the prosecuting witness. 14
Or on a charge for maliciously destroying a fence the defendant
is not entitled to an instruction charging that if the fence was
on the dividing line between the premises of the prosecutor and
the defendant he should be acquitted, there being no evidence
that the fence was a partition fence. 15 Also an instruction as
to the truth or falsity of an explanation by the defendant as to
his possession of stolen goods is improper and erroneous where
10 Alabama M. R. Co. v. Marcus, & St. L. R. Co. v. McCune (Ky.),
115 Ala. 389, 22 So. 135. See Coyle 72 S. W. 756 (error held harmless).
v. Pittsburg, B. & L. E. R. Co. 18 12 Coal Run Coal Co. v. Jones,
Pa. Super. 235; Tuller v. City of 127 111. 382, 8 N. B. 865, 20 N. E.
Mt. Vernon, 171 N. Y. 247, 72 N. Y. 89.
S. 1103. 13 P. v. Flaherty, 162 N. Y. 532,
11 Andrews v. Toledo, A. A. & 57 N. E. 73.
N. M. R. Co. 8 Ohio C. D. 584; i* Coney v. S. 108 Ga. 773, 36 S.
Alabama, G. S. & R. Co. v. Davis, E. 907.
119 Ala. 572, 24 So. 862; Ft. Worth ir, Wheeler v. S. 114 Ala. 22, 21
& R. G. R. Co. v. Greer (Tex. Cv. So. 941.
App.), 09 S. W. 421; Louisville, H.
75
NO EVIDENCE OF DEFENSE INCOMPETENT EVIDENCE. 84
there is no evidence that he gave any explanation as to how he
came into possession of the goods in question. 16 It is error to
give instructions on the theory of a conspiracy in the absence of
any evidence tending to prove a conspiracy. 17
83. Defense unsupported by evidence. It follows from the
rule mentioned that the court in the giving of instructions is not
required to recognize any defense presented by the pleadings
which is unsupported by any evidence. 18 Thus in an action on a
replevin bond where the defendant pleads that the goods and
chattels alleged to have been taken by virtue of the writ of re-
plevin were not the goods and chattels mentioned and described
in the bond, but were other and different goods, the court in
charging the jury may properly ignore the defense set up by
that plea, in the absence of any evidence whatever tending to
support it. 19 So in a criminal case where the defense is insanity
and the evidence is entirely inadequate to establish it, the court
may ignore and withdraw from the consideration of the jury
such defense. 20
84. Based on incompetent evidence. Incompetent or ir-
relevant evidence, though admitted without objection, will not
justify the giving of instructions based thereon ; 21 and, of course,
16 Grande v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.)
38 S. W. 613.
IT Cunningham v. P. 195 111. 550,
63 N. B. 517; Ter. v. Claypool (N.
Mex.) 71 Pac. 463; Crane v. S. Ill
Ala. 45, 20 So. 590.
is Kellogg v. Boyden, 126 111. 378,
18 N. E. 770; Town of New Wind-
sor v. Stockdate, 95 Md. 196, 52
Atl. 596; Deatley v. Com. (Ky.) 29
S. W. 741; S. v. Morledge, 164 Mo.
522, 65 S. W. 226 (insanity); Barg-
na v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 68 S. W.
997 (on receiving stolen goods).
is Kellogg y. Boyden, 126 111. 378,
18 N. E. 770.
20 S. v. Morledge, 164 Mo. 522, 65
S. W. 226.
21 Eller v. Loomis, 106 Iowa, 276,
76 N. W. 686; Kohl v. S. 59 N.
J. L. 445, 37 Atl. 73; Herring v. Her-
ring, 94 Iowa, 56, 62 N. W. 666;
Covington v. Simpson (Del. Super.)
52 Atl. 349; Elsworth v. Newby
(Neb.), 91 N. W. 517; Provident S.
L. A. Soc. v. Berger, 23 Ky. L. R.
2460, 67 S. W. 827. See Christian
v. Connecticut M. L. I. Co. 143 Mo.
460, 45 S. W. 268; Crews v. Lack-
land, 67 Mo. 621; Dingee v. Unrue's
Adm'x, 98 Va. 247, 35 S. E. 794;
Coos Bay R. Co. v. Siglin, 26 Ore.
387, 38 Pac. 192; Texas, &c. R. Co.
v. Durrett, 24 Tex. Cv. App. 103, 58
S. W. 187; Capital Bank v. Arm-
strong, 62 Mo. 65; Norfolk & West
R. Co. v. Stevens, 97 Va. 631, 34
S. E. 525, 46 L. R. A. 367; Fox v.
P. 95 111. 75. See Nye v. Kelly,
19 Wash. 73, 52 Pac. 528; Williams
v. Atkinson, 152 Ind. 98, 52 N. E.
603; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Mc-
Kee, 43 111. 119, '122; Kohl v. S. 57
N. J. L. 445, 37 Atl. 73; Hollins v.
S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 69 S. W. 594;
American Harrow Co. v. Dolvin
(Ga.), 45 S. E. 983. But see Qualy
v. Johnson, 80 Minn. 408, 83 N. W.
393; Collins v. Collins, 46 Iowa, 60;
Central R. Co. v. Hubbard, 86 Ga.
84
BASED ON EVIDENCE AND PLEADINGS.
76
evidence which has been excluded as incompetent will not sup-
port instructions. 22 It is not necessary to instruct the jury in
reference to evidence which has been ruled out as incompetent;
but if an instruction be given, directing the jury to disregard
such evidence, it is harmless. 23
The court is not required, in charging the jury, to caution them
against drawing any inference from evidence which has been
excluded. 24 Incompetent evidence which might have been ex-
cluded at any time during the trial may be excluded from the
consideration of the jury by instructions if objection was prop-
erly made to it. 25 And the court should specifically point out
to the jury by instruction what portion of the evidence is in-
competent, 25 * and when thus instructed, the error in admitting
such incompetent evidence will, as a general rule, be regarded as
cured. 26 But, on the contrary, it has been held that any dam-
age done to the rights of a litigant, by the admission of improper
and prejudicial evidence, cannot well be remedied by the with-
drawing such evidence from the consideration of the jury by
623, 12 S. E. 1020. When incompe-
tent evidence is introduced at the
instance of a party, he has no
right to complain of an instruc-
tion based on such evidence, Phe-
nix Ins. Co. v. Wilcox & G. G. Co.
65 Fed. 724.
22 McGinnis v. Fernandes, 126 111.
232, 19 N. E. 44; Pease Piano Co.
v. Cameron, 56 Neb. 561, 76 N. W.
1053; Mefford v. Sell (Neb.), 92 N.
W. 148; Pfaffenback v. Lake S. &
M. S. R. Co. 142 Ind. 246, 41 N. E.
530; Atkinson v. Gatcher, 23 Ark.
101; Hayes v. Kelley, 116 Mass.
300; New York, &c. Co. v. Fraser,
130 U. S. 611, 9 Sup. Ct. 665; Cald-
well v. Stephens, 57 Mo. 589; Shef-
field v. Eveleth (S. Dak.), 97 N. W.
368; Sheffield v. Eveleth (S. Dak.),
97 N. W. 367; Honingstein v. Hol-
lingsworth, 85 N. Y. Supp. 818.
23 Keegan v. Kinnare, 123 111.
290, 14 N. E. 14; Martin v. McCray,
171 Pa. St. 575, 33 Atl. 108.
24 S. v. Gates (Wash.), 69 Pac.
385.
25 Foxworth v. Brown, 120 Ala.
59, 24 So. 1, 41 L. R. A. 335; Stevens
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 49 S. W. 105;
Woolsey v. Trustees of Village, 155
N. Y. 573, 50 N. E. 270; Price v.
Wood, 9 N. Mex. 397, 54 Pac. 231.
See also Henkle v. McClure, 32 Ohio
St. 202; Boston Marine Ins. Co. v.
Scales, 101 Tenn. 628, 49 S. W. 743;
Russell v. Nail, 79 Tex. 664, 15 S. W.
635; Maxwell v. Hannibal & St.
J. R. Co. 85 Mo. 106; Becker v.
Becker, 45 Iowa, 239; S. v. Pratt,
20 Iowa, 269. Contra: S. v. Owens,
79 Mo. 619.
25* Colby v. Portman, 115 Mich.
95, 72 N. W. 1098.
26 s. v. Meller, 13 R. I. 66<9;
Indianapolis, P. & C. R. Co. v.
Bush, 101 Ind. 582; Links v. S.
13 Lea (Tenn.) 701; Pfaffenback
v. Lake S. & M. S. R. Co. 142
Ind. 246, 41 N. E. 530; Busch v.
Fisher, 89 Mich. 192, 50 N. W. 788;
Deerfield v. Northwood, 10 N. H.
269; Griffith v. Hanks, 91 Mo. 109,
4 S. W. 508; Mimns v. S. 16 Ohio
St. 221; Bridyers v. Dill, 97 N. Car.
222, 1 S. E. 767; Beck v. Cole,
16 Wis. 95; Pennsylvania Co. v.
Roy, 102 U. S. 451; King v. Rea,
13 Colo. 69, 21 Pac. 1084; Zehner
v. Kepler, 16 Ind. 290.
77 WHEN EVIDENCE SPECULATIVE SLIGHT. 86
instructing them to disregard it. 27 An instruction based upon
incompetent and irrelevant evidence is erroneous in that it is mis-
leading. 28
85. Speculative evidence Insufficient. Evidence which is
so slight that it is merely speculative on any material matter of
fact in a case will not warrant the giving of instructions. 29 So
an instruction founded upon an hypothesis of fact of which
there is no direct evidence, but only the possibility of an infer-
ence, is improper and not a sufficient basis for the giving of
instructions. 30 And although an instruction may be properly
drawn and applicable to the facts of a case, yet where there is
such a slight weight of evidence that the verdict could not
reasonably be different than the one rendered, the refusal to give
the instruction is but harmless error. 31
86. Slight evidence will support instructions. But on the
other hand if there is any evidence, though slight, fairly tending
to support a proposition of law applicable to the case, a party
is entitled to have the jury instructed accordingly. The court
has nothing whatever to do with the weight or value of the evi-
dence. It is the province of the jury, and not the court, to de-
termine the facts. 32 Thus in an action for personal injury, if
27 Prior v. White, 12 111. 260, 265. (Neb.) 91 N. W. 537; Sutton v.
See Quinn v. P. 123 111. 347, 15 N. Madre, 47 N. Car. 320; Bloyd v.
E. 46. Pollock, 27 W. Va. 75; Lemasters
ss Evans v. George, 80 111. 51. v. Southern P. R. Co. 131 Cal. 105,
See also Harding v. Wright, 119 63 Pac. 128.
Mo. 1, 24 S. W. 211; Dickerson v. si Grain v. First Nat. Bank, 114
Johnson, 24 Ark. 251; Willits v. 111. 516, 527, 2 N. E. 486. Evidence
Chicago, B. & K. C. R. Co. 80 Iowa, held sufficient to support instruc-
531, 45 N. W. 916. tions in the following cases: Pence
29 Com. v. Hillman, 189 Pa. St. v. Wabash R. Co. 116 Iowa, 279,
548, 42 Atl. 196; S. v. Evans, 138 90 N. W. 59; Yontz v. Com. 23 Ky.
Mo. 116, 39 S. W. 462; Watts v. L. R. 1868, 66 S. W. 383 (conspiracy
Southern Bell T. & T. Co. 66 in murder case); White v. S. 133
Fed. 453; Statford v. Goldring, 197 Ala. 122, 32 So. 139 (conspiracy);
111. 156, 64 N. E. 395; Steed v. Wheeler v. S. 158 Ind. 687, 63 N.
S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 67 S. W. 328; E. 975 (relating to violent tem-
Gambrill v. Schooley, 95 Md. 260, per as a basis for insanity). Evi-
52 Atl. 500; Cawfield v. Ashville dence held not sufficient to war-
St. R. Co. Ill N. Car. 597, 16 S. E. rant the giving of instructions:
703; S. v. Evans, 138 Mo. 116, 39 Com. v. Hillman, 189 Pa. St. 548,
S. W. 462. See Cleveland, C. C. 42 Atl. 196 (insanity); Grace v. S.
& St. L. R. Co. v. Drumm (Ind.) (Tex. Cr. App.) 69 S. W. 529.
70 N. E. 286 (possible benefits). 32 Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Faith,
so Com. v. Boutwell, 162 Mass. 175 111. 58, 51 N. E. 807; Edwards
230, 38 N. E. 441; Parker v. Taylor v. Dellenmair, 85 111. App. 366;
87
BASED ON EVIDENCE AND PLEADINGS.
78
the testimony of the plaintiff alone tends to show permanent
injury, it is proper to instruct the jury as to such injury. Ex-
pert testimony in such case is not necessary. 33 And the fact that
the evidence may appear unreasonable or inconsistent will not
warrant the court in refusing an instruction based thereon. 34
87. Circumstantial evidence sufficient. An instruction may
properly be given, though not supported by direct statement
of witnesses ; any inference which may be fairly drawn from the
evidence is sufficient to warrant the giving of instructions if
otherwise correct. 35 Thus where there is no direct evidence
that a deed was delivered, but there was evidence that it was
recorded, that is sufficient to warrant the giving of instructions
on the issue as to whether the deed was delivered or not. 36
House v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 69 S.
W. 417; Jones v. Fort, 36 Ala. 449;
Richmond P. & P. Co. v. Allen
(Va.) 43 S. E. 356; Bradford v.
Pearson, 12 Mo. 71; Turner v. Ter.
11 Okla. 660, 69' Pac. 804; Com.
v. Rogers, 181 Mass. 184, 63 N. E.
421; Walls v. Walls, 170 Pa St.
48, 32 Atl. 649; Union M. L. Ins.
Co. v. Buchanan, 100 Ind. 73;
Brannum v. O'Conner, 77 Iowa,
632, 42 N. W. 504; S. v. Ezzard,
40 S. Car. 312, 18 S. E. 1025;
Chicago Packing & Provision Co.
v. Tilton. 87 111. 547; City of Chi-
cago v. Shelton, 75 111. 468; Kendall
v. Brown, 74 111. 232; Harmon v.
S. 158 Ind. 37, 63 N. 630; Winne v.
Hammond, 37 111. 99; Newbury v.
Getchell & M. L. Mfg. Co. 100 Iowa,
441, 69 N. W. 743; Brooks v. S.
(Tex. Cr. App.) 31 S. W. 410; Cal-
lahan v. City of Port Huron, 128
Mich. 673, 87 N. W. 880; Union Pac.
R. Co. v. Ruzika (Neb.) 91 N. W.
543; Ter. v. Guillen (N. Mex.) 66
Pac. 527; Grimsinger v. S. (Tex. Cr.
App.) 69 S. W. 583; Young v. Al-
ford, 118 N. Car. 215, 23 S. E.
978; Honesty v. Com. 81 Va. 283;
S. v. Wright, 112 Iowa, 436, 84
N. W. 541; Hanes v. S. 155 Ind.
112, 57 N. E. 704 (rape); Williams
v. Watson, 71 111. App. 130; S.
v. Mahoney, 24 Mont. 281, 61 Pac.
647; Thompson v. Duff, 119 111.
226, 10 N. E. 399; Chicago R.
I. & P. R. Co. v. Lewis, 109 111.
120, 131; Chicago & W. I. R. Co.
v. Bingenheimer, 116 111. 226, 230,
4 N. E. 840; Chicago W. D. R.
Co. v. Mills, 105 111. 70; Enright v.
P. 155 111. 34, 39 N. E. 561; Brown
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 29 S. W.
772; Brown v. Everett Ridley Ra-
gan Co. Ill Ga. 404, 36 S. E. 813;
Missouri Furnace Co. v. Abend, 107
III. 50; Baltimore & O. S. W. R. Co.
v. Faith, 175 111. 58, 51 N. E. 807;
Kehoe v. Allentoron & L. V. Tr.
Co. 187 Pa. St. 474, 41 Atl. 310, 43
W. N. C. 189; Reusens v. Lawson,
96 Va. 285, 31 S. E. 528; Tyson v.
Williamson, 96 Va. 636, 32 S. E.
42; Wooters v. King, 54 111. 343;
Richmond P. & P. Co. v. Allen
(Va.), 43 S. E. 356; Carter v. Kauf-
man (S. Car.), 45 S. E. 1017.
3 North Chicago St. R. Co. v,
Shreve, 171 111. 441, 49 N. E. 534.
34 Hayes v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.)
39 S. W. 106; Campbell v. Pre-
ferred M. A. Asso. 172 Pa. St. 561,
33 Atl. 564, 32 L. R. A. 766.
35 Maes v. Texas & N. O. R. Co.
(Tex. Cv. App.) 23 S. W. 725;
Stephan v. Met/ger, 95 Mo. App.
609, 69 S. W. 625; Quinn v. Eagal-
ston, 108 111. 256; Chicago. R. I. &
P. R. Co. v. Lewis, 109 111. 134.
See also Sword v. Keith, 31 Mich.
247; Peoria, M. & I. Ins. Co. v.
Anapow, 45 111. 86; S. v. Tucker,
38 La. Ann. 789.
36 Horton v. Smith, 115 Ga. 66,
41 S. E. 253.
79 CRIMINAL CASE EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT. 88
Where there is any evidence, though slight, tending to prove
a material point or fact, the opposing party will not be heard
to complain of the refusal of an instruction submitting the in-
sufficiency of the evidence as to such fact when it was not dis-
puted by him on the trial. 37
88. Evidence sufficient Criminal case. And in a criminal
case if there is any evidence, though weak or slight, tending to
prove a legal defense or material fact, it is error to refuse instruc-
tions based on such evidence. 38 Thus where there is some evidence,
though weak, tending to show that the defendant was mentally
incapable of committing the crime charged, it is error to refuse
instructions as to his mental condition. 39 And according to this
rule, where the testimony of the defendant alone tends to es-
tablish a legal defense, as self-defense, he has a right to have
the jury correctly instructed as to the law applicable to that
defense. 40
Thus on a charge of assault with intent to kill, where the
defendant shows by his own testimony that he did not use his
weapon until he had been beaten by the prosecuting witness
and another, he is entitled to instructions on the law of self-
defense. 41 And on a charge of larceny, there being evidence
tending to prove that certain property alleged to have been
stolen from a smokehouse by the accused was obtained by him
from a third person, he is entitled to have the jury instructed
that if they believe from the evidence that he got the property
from such third person they should acquit him, and a refusal to so
instruct is error. 42 Where there is some evidence, though slight,
tending to prove a conspiracy, that issue should be submitted to
the jury by proper instructions. 43 For instance, in a larceny case
where it appears from the evidence that other persons besides
37 Schier v. Dankwardt, 88 Iowa, Rucker v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.)
750, 56 N. W. 420. 40 S. W. 991.
ss s. v. Newman, 57 Kas. 705, 42 Yarbrough v. S. (Ala.) 20 So.
47 Pac. 881; Bargna v. S. (Tex. 534.
Cr. App.) 68 S. W. 997. 43 Mitchell v. S. 133 Ala. 65, 32
39 S. v. Newman, 57 Kas. 705, So. 132; Stevens v. S. 133 Ala. 28,
47 Pac. 881. 32 So. 270; White v. S. 133 Ala.
Enright v. P. 155 111. 34, 39 N. 122, 32 So. 139; S. v. Finley, 118
E. 561; S. v. Fredericks, 136 Mo. N. Car. 1161, 24 S. E. 495; Bridges
51, 37 S. W. 832; Bedford v. S. v. S. 110 Ala. 15, 20 So. 348.
(Tex. Cr. App.) 38 S. W. 210.
89 BASED ON EVIDENCE AND PLEADINGS. 80
the defendant were present when the crime is alleged to have
been committed, who may have acted in concert with the de-
fendant, it is proper to instruct the jury that if they find the
offense was committed by the defendant as the sole perpetrator,
or that she acted in concert with others in the perpetration
of the offense, they should find her guilty. 44
89. Evidence sufficient Larceny. Where the value of a
portion of stolen property which was found in possession of the
defendant made the offense only petit larceny it was held error
to refuse to instruct on petit larceny, although the value of all
the property taken was much in excess of the value constituting
petit larceny, in a case where it appeared from the evidence that
there were several persons in the house from which the property
was stolen. 45 Also the defendant is entitled to an instruction
on petit larceny under an indictment charging grand larceny,
where it is doubtful from the evidence whether the property
taken was of sufficient value to make the stealing grand larceny. 46
90. Instructions stating issues and contentions. While it is
customary for the trial court to make a brief presentation of the
issues raised by the pleadings as a preface to the law embodied
in the charge to the jury, there is no rule requiring the court to
make such presentation, and a charge cannot be held defective
on that ground. 47 In Kentucky it has been held that the prac-
tice of stating the issues in charging the jury is unusual and not
to be commended, but not error to do so. 48 But the jury should
have a clear understanding of the nature of the issues and con-
tentions of the parties, and to that end it is proper for the court
to briefly state the substance of the pleadings. This is better
than to refer the jury to the pleadings. 49
44 Ter. v. De Gutman, 8 N. Mex. Dupee's Adm'r, 23 Ky. L. R. 2349,
92, 42 Pac. 68. 67 S. W. 15.
45 p. v . Comyus, 114 Cal. 107, 45 4 o San Antonio A. P. R. Co. v.
Pac. 1034. De Ham (Tex. Cv. App.) 54 S. W.
40 s. v. Thompson, 137 Mo. 620, 395; Conley v. Redwine, 109 Ga.
39 S. W. 83, 59 L. R. A. 581; P. v. 640, 35 S. E. 92; West v. Averill
Comyus, 114 Cal. 107, 45 Pac. 1034. Grocery Co. 109 Iowa, 488, 80 N.
47 Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. W. 555; City of Ft. Madison v.
v. Hitzfelder (Tex. Cv. App.) 66 Moore, 109 Iowa, 476, 80 N. W.
S. W. 707. Contra: Texas & N. O. 527; Stuart v. Line, 11 Pa. Sup.
R. Co. v. Mortensen (Tex. Cv. App.) Ct. 345; Polykranas v. Kransz, 77
66 S. W. 99. N. Y. S. 46, 73 Ap. Div. 583; Bryce
Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. v. Cayce, 62 S. C. 546, 40 S. E.
81
ISSUES AND CONTENTIONS IMMATERIAL ISSUES
, 91
An explanation of the contentions of the respective claims of
the parties enables the jury to act more intelligently in deciding
the issues, and to reach a fair verdict. 50 However, the court,
in stating the issues, should not copy the pleadings into the
instructions, as this is a bad practice and should be. avoided. 50 *
It is sufficient to state the substance of the pleadings, but the
court should guard against a misstatement of the issues, that
the jury may not be misled. 50 ** After once stating the ma-
terial allegations of the pleadings and the contentions of the
parties they may afterwards be referred to in general terms in
the charge by stating that the plaintiff is required to establish
each of the material allegations of his complaint by <a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. 51 Where some of the issues may
have been abandoned, or other change has taken place since
the suit was instituted, the court may, in charging the jury,
state how the issues originally stood, and may restrict them
in their deliberations to the issues after such changes. 52
91. Instructions as to immaterial issues. The court in charg-
ing the jury should state which are the material issues, es-
948; Nashville R. Co. v. Norman,
108 Tenn. 324, 67 S. W. 479; Sage
v. Haines, 76 Iowa, 581, 41 N. W.
366; North Chicago St. R. Co. v.
Polkey, 203 111. 225, 232, 67 N. E.
793. It is the duty of the court to
instruct the jury as to the issues
involved: Pittsburg, C. C. & St.
L. R. Co. v. Kinnare, 203 111. 388,
392, 67 N. E. 826; S. v. Davis,
(N. Car.) 46 S. E. 723. See Union
Gold Min. Co. v. Crawford, 29 Colo.
511, 69 Pac. 600; Ferris v. Marshall
(Neb.), 96 N. W. 602; Stevens v.
Maxwell, 65 Kas. 835, 70 Pac. 873.
so s. 7. Ward, 61 Vt. 153, 17 Atl.
483, 8 Am. Cr. R. 219; P. v. Worden,
113 Oil. 569, 45 Pac. 844; S. v.
Smith, 65 Conn. 283, 31 Atl. 206;
Pritclett v. S. 92 Ga. 65, 18 S. E.
536; Hawes v. S. 88 Atl. 37, 7 So.
302; Hawley v. Chicago & C. R. Co.
71 bwa, 717, 29 N. W. 787; West
Chicago St. R. Co. v. Lieserowitz,
197 111. 607, 64 N. E. 718; Gilchrist
v. Hartley, 198 Pa. St. 132, 47 Atl.
97f; S. v. Davis (N. Car.) 46 S.
E 723.
so* Parkins v. Mo. P. R. Co. (Neb.)
93 N. W. 197; Shebeck v. National
Cracker Co. 120 Iowa, 414, 94 N. W.
930. See Livingston v. Stevens
(Iowa) 94 N. W. 925.
so** Howell v. Wilcox & Gibbs S.
M. Co. 12 Neb. 177, 10 N. W. 700;
Stafford v. City of Oskaloosa, 57
Iowa, 748, 11 N. W. 668; Reed v.
Gould, 93 Mich. 359, 53 N. W. 356;
Hall v. Woodin, 35 Mich. 67; Shibek
v. Nat. Cracker Co. (Iowa), 94 N. W
930.
si Scott v. Provo City, 14 Utah,
31, 45 Pac. 1005; Texas & N. O. R.
Co. v. Mortenen (Tex. Cv. App.)
66 S. W. 99. See Jensen v. Steiber
(Neb.) 93 N. W. 697. For the pur-
pose of avoiding repetition, instruc-
tions may refer to others given in
the charge; McElya v. Hill, 105
Tenn. 319, 59 S. W. 1025; S. v.
Haines, 160 Mo. 555, 61 S. W. 621.
52 Rome R. Co. v. Thompson, 101
Ga. 26, 28 S. E. 429. See City of
Peoria v. Gerber, 168 111. 323, 48 N.
E. 152.
92 BASED ON EVIDENCE AND PLEADINGS. 82
pecially if immaterial issues become involved in the case. 53 The
court is not required to take notice of an immaterial issue;
hence instructions requested on such an issue are properly re-
fused. 54 But as a general rule the giving of an instruction on
an immaterial issue is harmless. 55
92. Instructions ignoring issues. The giving of an instruc-
tion designed to call the attention of the jury to the issues
presented by the pleadings, but which omits any material issue,
is error. 06 Thus in an action for personal injury an instruction
given which wholly ignores the necessity for the exercise of
reasonable care on the part of the plaintiff is erroneous, unless
cured by other instructions ; 57 or an instruction ignoring the
fact that the defendant is required to exercise care and caution
is also erroneous. 58 Or to single out one of the several im-
portant issues and submit it as the controling issue is improper
and prejudicial. 59 So it is likewise error for the court to direct
the attention of the jury to a subordinate issue, and to return
a verdict based upon their finding on such issue. 00
93. Issues unsupported by evidence. As a general rule it
is error in the giving of instructions to submit to the jury for
their determination any issue presented by the pleadings which
the evidence does not tend to establish. 01 Thus, for example it
ss West v. S. 63 Neb. 257, 88 N. Bowden v. Achor, 95 Ga. 243,
W. 503. 22 S. E. 254; Dallas & 0. O. C. E.
54 Maher v. James Hanley Brew- R. Co. v. Harvey (Tex. Cv. App.)
ing Co. 23 R. I. 343, 50 Atl. 392; 27 S. W. 423.
S. v. Clark, 51 W. Va. 457, 41 S. E. GO Northern Pac. R. Co. r. Bab-
204. ccck, 154 U. S. 190, 14 Sup. Ct. 978.
ss ^F.tna Life Ins. Co. v. Sanford, 6i Alabama & V. R. Co. r. Hoyne,
200 111. 126, 65 N. E. 661. 24 So. 907; Burnet v. Cavanagh, 56
56 Carruth v. Harris, 41 Neb. 789, Neb. 190, 76 N. W. 578; Hamilton
60 N. W. 106; Leiter v. Lyons (R. v. Singer S. M. Co. 54 111. 370;
I.) 52 Atl. 78. Harris v. Higden (Tex. Cv. App.)
57 Western Stone Co. v. Whalen, 41 S. W. 412; Myers v. S. (rex. Cv.
151 111. 472, 487, 38 N. E. 241, 42 Am. App.) 39 S. W. 938; Dooner v. Del-
St. 244; Sinclair v. Berndt, 87 111. aware & H. C. Co. 164 Pa. St. 17,
174; Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. 30 Atl. 269; Tettle v. S. (Ttx. Cr.
Clark, 70 111. 276; Denver Tr. Co. v. App.) 31 S. W. 677; Prewitt v. S.
Lassasso, 22 Colo 444, 45 Pac. 409 (Tex. Cr. App.) 29 S. W. 792; Bar-
(issue of contributory negligence ig- ron v. Barren, 122 Ala. 19s 25
nored); McVey v. St. Glair Co. 49 So. 55; S. v. Weaver, 165 IVb. 1,
W. Va. 412, 38 S. E. 648 (ignoring 65 S. W. 308, 88 Am. St. 406; /lien
issue of contributory negligence). v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.) 66 S. W. >71;
ss Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Griffin v. Henderson, 117 Ga. 382 43
O'Conner, 115 111. 254, 263, 3 N. E. S. E. 712.
501.
83 ISSUES UNSUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE ILLUSTRATIONS. 93a
is error to submit to the jury whether or not a party caused an
injury by negligence, under a complaint or declaration charg-
ing damages to have been sustained by unlawful and wilful con-
duct, where the evidence fails to show negligence. 62
And where there are several issues presented by the plead-
ings, and the evidence tends to support only one or a part of
them, it is error to submit to the jury all of the issues ; only such
of the issues should be submitted as the evidence tends to prove. 63
Also if some of the issues or facts a're admitted it is improper
to give an instruction calling for proof of all of the issues set
out in the pleadings. 64 The fact that the court limits the in-
structions to the issues set out in the pleadings where a party
has the right, under -statutory provision, to prove certain mat-
ters without setting the same out in the pleadings cannot be
complained of as error when no attempt has been made to prove
such other matters. 65
93a. Issue unsupported by evidence Illustrations. "You
are charged that if you find that the plaintiff received an elec-
tric shock while attempting to board one of defendant's
cars, then you are instructed that if the defendant, by the use
of the highest care, could not have discovered the danger from
electricity, and could not have prevented the same, then you
cannot presume that the defendant was guilty of negligence
merely from the fact that the plaintiff was shocked, and cannot
find any damages for the plaintiff resulting as a direct and
proximate result of such electric shock unless you find that the
presence of such electrictiy in the handholds of said car was
caused by some negligence of defendant." There was no error
in refusing this charge for the reason that there was no evidence
authorizing the submission of the issue presented therein. The
witness Gerrett testified that the car was bought in 1895 or
1896, and that it was of an improved make. There was no evi-
dence that at the time of the accident the car, or its appliances,
was in proper condition, or that the danger from electricity
62 Parker v. Hastings, 123 N. Car. St. 541; Connecticut M. L. Ins. Co.
671, 31 S. E. 833. v. McWherter, 73 Fed. 444.
es Hubbard v. Hubbard (Tex. Cv. 64 O'Donnell v. Chicago, R. I. &
App.) 38 S. W. 388; Wright v. Har- P. R. Co. (Neb.) 91 N. W. 566; Day-
die (Tex. Cv. App.) 30 S. W. 675; ton v. City of Lincoln, 39 Neb. 74,
Heller v. Chicago & G. T. R. Co. 57 N. W. 754.
109 Mich. 53, 66 N. W. 667, 63 Am. Kettry v. Thumma, 9 Ind. App.
498, 36 N. E. 919.
94.
BASED ON EVIDENCE AND PLEADINGS.
84
could not have been discovered by the exercise of care. It was
not shown that it had recently been inspected and found in
good repair, or that there was any system of inspection in vogue
by the defendant. 66
In an action for personal injury, the defendant having pleaded
a release, the plaintiff claiming that such release was procured
by fraud while she was in a dazed condition of mind resulting
from the injury, the issue of the mental capacity of the plain-
tiff should not be submitted to the jury where there is no evi-
dence tending to show want of mental capacity. 67
94. Instructions based on pleadings. Instructions must not
only be predicated on the evidence but also confined to the
issues set forth by the pleadings, 68 and avoid submitting
for the determination of the jury matters of fact not
in issue. 69 Thus, for example, where the pleadings do not pre-
ee Dallas C. E. St. R. Co. v. Broad-
hurst (Tex. Cv. App.) 68 S. W. 315.
67 Och v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co.
130 Mo. 27, 31 S. W. 962.
es Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Sanders,
166 111. 270, 281, 46 N. E. 799;
Frorer v. P. 141 111. 171, 187, 31
N. E. 395; Brant v. Gallup, 111
111. 487, 493, 53 Am. R. 638; Grim
v. Murphy, 110 111. 271, 276; Chica-
go & E. R. Co. v. Jacobs, 110 111.
414; Pitstick v. Osterman, 107 Iowa,
189, 17 N. W. 845; Mobile O. R.
Co. v. Godfrey, 155 111. 78, 39 N. E.
590; Boldenv/ick v. Cahill, 187 111.
218, 58 N. E. 351; Leach v. Nichols,
55 111. 273; Louisville, N. A. & C.
R. Co. v. Sheris, 108 111. 631; P. v.
Lehr, 196 111. 361, 63 N. E. 725;
Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Peterson,
30 Colo. 77, 69 Pac. 578; Peters v.
McCay & Co. 136 Cal. 73, 68 Pac.
478; Edd v. Union P. Coal Co. 25
Utah, 293, 71 Pac. 215; Chicago,
G. W. R. Co. v. Bailey, 66 Kas.
115, 71 Pac. 246 (want of plaintiff's
ordinary care) ; Crooks & Co. v.
Eldridge & H. Co. 64 Ohio St. 195,
203, 60 N. E. 203 (damages not
claimed by pleadings) ; Bartlett v.
Cunningham, 85 111. 22; Sargent v.
Linden M. Co. 55 Cal. 204; East
St. Louis P. & P. Co. v. Hightower,
92 111. 139, 141; Fisk v. Chicago, M.
& St. P. R. Co. 74 Iowa, 424, 38
N. W. 132; Savannah, F. & W. R.
Co. v. Tiedman, 39 Fla. 196, 22
So. 658; McCann v. Ullman, 109
Wis. 574, 85 N. W. 493; Anderson
v. Baird, 19 Ky. L. R. 444, 40 S. W.
923; Rapp v. Kester, 125 Ind. 79,
25 N. E. 141; Austin & N. W. R.
Co. v. Flannagan (Tex. Cv. App.)
40 S. W. 1043; Matheson v. Kuhn,
15 Colo. App. 477, 63 Pac. 125; Texas
& P. R. Co. v. Vaughan, 16 Tex.
Cv. App. 403, 40 S. W. 1065; Gibbs
v. Wall, 10 Colo. 153, 14 Pac. 216;
Roddy v. Harrell (Tex. Cv. App.)
40 S. W. 1064; Chamberlain Bank-
ing H. v. Woolsey, 60 Neb. 516, 83
N. W. 729; Myers v. S. 97 Ga. 76,
25 S. E. 252; P. v. Topia, 131 Cal.
647, 63 P. 1001; Dieckerhoff v. Al-
der, 32 N. Y. S. 698, 12 Misc. 445;
Schrader v. Hoover, 87 Iowa, 654,
54 N. W. 463; Shaughnessy v. Sew-
ell & D. C. Co. 160 Mass. 331, 35 N.
E. 861; Tower v. McFarland (Neb.),
96 N. W. 172; Russell v. Huntsville
&c. Co. 137 Ala. 627; Joplin Water
Works v. Joplin (Mo.), 76 S. W. 960.
es Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Sanders,
166 111. 281, 46 N. E. 799; Bourland
v. Gibson, 124 111. 602, 607, 17 N. E.
319; Merrill v. Suing (Neb.) 92 N.
W. 618; Wabash R. Co. v. Stewart,
87 111. App. 446; McBaine v. John-
85
CONFINED TO ISSUES IN PLEADINGS.
94
sent the issue of contributory negligence the giving of an in-
struction on such issue is improper. 70 And by the same rule
an instruction charging the jury that the plaintiff may recover
damages sustained for any other negligence besides that al-
leged in his declaration is erroneous. 71
A party is not entitled to instructions on any element or feature
of a case not alleged in his pleadings, or which is not an issue
in the case. 72 And if instructions are not confined to the issues
presented they should be refused, although otherwise correct. 73
son, 153 Mo. 191, 55 S. W. 1031;
Van Bergen v. Eulberg, 111 Iowa,
139, 82 N. W. 483; City of Dallas
v. Beeman, 23 Tex. Cv. App. 315,
55 S. W. 762; Horgan v. Brady, 155
Mo. 659, 56 S. W. 294; Washington
Ice Co. v. Bradley, 171 111. 255, 49
N. E. 422; Smith v. Bank of iNew
England, 70 N. H. 187, 46 Atl. 230;
Rotan Grocery Co. v. Martin (Tex.
Cv. App.) 57 S. W. 706.
70 Perez v. San Antonio & A. P.
R. Co. 28 Tex. Cv. App. 255, 67 S.
W. 1082; International & G. N.
R. CQ. v. Locke (Tex. Cv. App.)
67 S. W. 1082; St. Louis S. W. R.
Co. v. Me Adams (Tex. Cv. App.),
68 S. W. 319.
71 Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Ray-
burn, 153 111. 290, 38 N. E. 558;
Cleveland, C. & St. L. R. Co. v.
Walter, 147 111. 60, 65, 35 N. E.
529; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v.
Libey, 68 111. App. 144; Chicago &
E. I. R. Co. v. Kneirim, 152 111.
465, 39 N. E. 324, 43 Am. St. 259;
Lebanon Coal & M A. v. Zerwick,
77 111. App. 486; Camp Point Mfg.
Co. v. Ballon, 71 111. 417; Indianap-
olis, B. & W. R. Co. v Berney, 71
111. 390; Smith v. Wilmington & W.
R. Co. 126 N. Car. 712, 36 S. E. 170.
72 Fetcher v. Louisville & N. R.
Co. 102 Tenn. 1, 49 S. W. 739; Co-
lumbus, C. & I. C. v. Troech, 68
111. 545, 549, 18 Am. R. 578; Taylor
v. Felder, 5 Tex. Cv. App 417, 24
S. W. 313; La Grande Ins. Co. v.
Shaw (Ore.), 74 Pac. 919.
73 Johnson v. Johnson, 114 111.
11, 622, 3 N. E. 232, 55 Am. R. 883;
Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Stoddard,
52 Neb. 745, 73 N. W. 291; Sanger v.
Thompson (Tex. Cv. App.), 44 S. W.
408; Baldwin v. Cornelius, 104 Wis.
68, 80 N. W. 63; Empson Packing
Co. v. Vaughn, 27 Colo. 66, 59 Pac.
749; Richison v. Mead, 11 S. Dak.
639, 80 N. W. 131; Knight v. Pacific
C. Stage Co. (Cal.), 34 Pac. 868;
Gulf, C. & F. R. Co. v. Higby (Tex.
Cv. App.), 26 S. W. 737; Kyner v.
Sambuer (Neb.), 91 N. W. 491; Ben-
ton Co. Sav. Bank v. Boddicker, 117
Iowa, 407, 90 N. W. 822; French
v. Ware, 65 Vt. 338, 26 Atl. 1096;
Kelly v. Fleming, 113 N. Car. 133,
18 S. E. 81; Galveston, H. & S. A.
R. Co. v. Courtney, 30 Tex. Cv.
App. 544, 71 S. W. 307; Beach v.
Netherland, 93 Ga. 233, 18 S. E.
525; Gover v. Dill, 3 Iowa, 337;
Porter v. White, 128 N. Car. 42,
38 S. E. 24; Ten Eyck v. Witbeck,
55 App. Div. (N. Y.), 165; Kansas
Inv. Co. v. Carter, 160 Mass. 421,
36 N. E. 63; Thomas v. S-. 126 Ala.
4, 28 So. 591; Texas, &c. R. Co.
v. Gray (Tex. Cv. App.), 71 S. W.
316; Schafer v. Gilmer, 13 Nev. 330;
Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Mitchell, 75
Tex. 77; Louisville & N. R. Co. v.
Mattingly, 22 Ky. L. R. 489; Bender
v. Dugan, 99 Mo. 126, 12 S. W.
795; McGar v. National & P. W. M.
Co. 22 R. I. 347, 47 Atl. 1092;
Abernathy v. Southern R. I. P. Co.
(Tex. Cv. App.), 62 S. W. 786; St.
Louis, K. C. & N. R. Co. v. Cleary,
77 Mo. 634; Omaha L. & T. Co. v.
Douglas Co. 62 Neb. 1, 86 N. W.
936; Atlas Nat. Bank v. Holm, 71
Fed. 489; Johnson v. Worthy, 17
Ga. 420; City of Dallas v. Breeman,
23 Tex. Cv. App. 315, 55 S. W.
762; Eklund v. Toner, 121 Mich.
687, 80 N. W. 791; Saunders' Ex'rs v.
Weeks (Tex. Cv. App.), 55 S. W.
95
BASED ON EVIDENCE AND PLEADINGS.
86
Instructions submitting to the jury an issue not raised by the
pleadings nor supported by evidence, which brings into the case
many details, having a tendency to mislead and draw the atten-
tion of the jury away from the proper issues, are erroneous. 7 *
So an instruction which directs the jury that they may base a
verdict on some matter or thing not raised by the pleadings
is improper and generally erroneous. 75
95. Based on evidence rather than pleadings. Instructions
should be based on the evidence rather than on the pleadings. 78
Thus in a personal injury case an instruction that the jury, in
estimating the plaintiff's damages, may consider his loss of time,
if any, so far as shown by the evidence, is proper, although the
plaintiff's declaration does not, in direct terms, allege any loss
of time, but alleges in general terms the injury which caused
the loss of time. It is sufficient that the declaration states the
33; Alexander v. Staley, 110 Iowa,
607, 81 N. W. 803; Houston & T.
C. R. Co. v. Patterson, 20 Tex. Cv.
App. 255, 48 S. W. 747; Rosenblatt
v. Haymam, 56 N. Y. S. 378; Rock-
ford Ins. Co. v. Nelson, 65 111. 415,
422; Mahain ". Com. 21 Ky. L. R.
1807, 56 S. W. 529; Bell v. S. (Tex.
Cr. App.), 56 S. W. 913; Sample v.
Rand, 112 Iowa, 616, 84 N. W. 945;
Breneman v. Kilgore (Tex. Cv.
App.), 35 S. W. 202; Phillips v. Cor-
nell, 133 Mass. 546.
74 Cerrillos Coal R. Co. v. Des-
eran, 9 N. Mex. 49, 49 Pac. 807;
Wells & Co. v. Heintz (Neb.) 72 N.
W. 1034; Norfolk Beet Sugar Co. v.
Hight, 56 Neb. 162, 76 N. W. 566;
Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Greg-
ory, 58 111. 272, 283; St. Louis, A.
& T. H. R. Co. v. Manley, 58 111.
304; Cossitt v. Hobbs, 56 111. 238;
Blackman v. Kessler, 110 Iowa, 140,
81 N. W. 185; Cunningham v. Davis,
175 Mass. 213, 56 N. E. 2; Georgia,
S. & F. R. Co. v. Zarks, 108 Ga.
800, 34 S. E. 127; Rishell v. Weil, 63
N. Y. S. 178, 61 N. Y. S. 1112, 30
Misc. 805; Houston & T. C. R.
Co. v. Ritter (Tex. Cv. App.), 41
S. W. 753; Queen Ins. Co. v. Leon-
ard, 9 Ohio C. C. 46.
75 McCready v. Phillips (Neb.),
67 N. W. 7; Davidson v. Willing-
ford (Tex. Cv. App.), 30 S. W. 827;
Sweet v. Excelsior E. Co. 57 N. J. L.
224, 31 Atl. 721; Coos Bay, R. & E.
R. Co. v. Siglin, 26 Ore. 387, 38
Pac. 192; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co.
v. Wickham (Tex. Cv. App.), 28
S. W. 917; Galveston, H. & S. A.
R. Co. v. Siligman (Tex. Cv. App.),
23 S. W. 298; Reed v. Com. 98 Va.
817, 36 S. E. 399; Hartford Fire
Ins. Co. v. Josey, 6 Tex. Cv. App.
290, 25 S. W. 685; Mason v. South-
ern R. Co. 58 S. Car. 70, 79 Am. St.
826; Bruni v. Garza (Tex. Cv. App.),
26 S. W. 108; Neglev v. Cowell, 91
Iowa, 256, 59 S. W. 48; Spitalera v.
Second Ave. R. Co. 25 N. Y. S. 919,
73 Hun. 37; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co.
v. Courtney (Tex. Cv. App.), 23 S.
W. 226; Cage v. Tucker's Heirs, 29
Tex. Cv. App. 586, 69 S. W. 425
(validity of a debt) ; El Paso & N.
W. R. Co. v. McComas (Tex. Cv.
App.), 72 S. W. 629; Love v. Wyatt,
19 Tex. 312; Southern R. Co. v.
O'Bryan, 115 Ga. 659, 42 S. E. 42;
Howe Machine Co. v. Riber. 66 Ind.
504; Terry v. Shively, 64 Ind. 112';
Williams v. Southern P. R. Co. 110
Cal. 457, 42 Pac. 974; Morrow v.
St. Paul C. R. Co. 65 Minn. 382,
67 N. W. 1002; Holt v. Pearson,
12 Utah, 63, 41 Pac. 560; Morearty
v. S. 46 Neb. 652, 65 N. W. 784.
re Quinn v. P. 123 111. 342, 15 N.
E. 46. See also Birney v. New
87 CONFINED TO DEFENSE ALLEGED ILLUSTRATIONS. 97
injury without describing it in all its seriousness. 77 So in a
criminal case for the larceny of a horse an instruction referring
to the horse as a "certain roan horse" is proper where the evi-
dence shows him to be a roan horse, although the indictment
does not allege the color of the horse. 78
96. Instructions confined to defense alleged. The court in
charging the jury should disregard any defense not alleged in
the pleadings. In other words, the instructions should be con-
fined to the defense set out in the pleadings. 79 Thus the giving
of instructions on the theory of fraud as a defense to an action
for the price of property is error where the defense alleged in
the pleadings is a breach of warranty, and not fraud. 80 Where
the defendant pleads fraudulent representations as a defense
to an action against him for the purchase price of property
he cannot have the defense of mutual mistake submitted to the
jury, that issue not being raised by the pleadings. 81 So in an
action for a breach of warranty on the sale of goods an instruc-
tion as to what constitutes fraud, is improper where fraud is
not an issue in the case. 82
97. Instruction based on pleadings Illustrations. A charge
which states that if the jury find for the plaintiff, such damage
may be given as under the circumstances of the case may be
just, and that in awarding damages they may take into considera-
tion the relation proved as existing between the plaintiff and the
deceased, and the injury sustained by the plaintiff, if any, in
the loss of the society of the deceased, is improper and erroneous
York & W. P. T. Co. 18 Md. 341, 81 Van Hall, 4 Tex. Cv. App. 404, 23
Am. Dec. 607' 2 Thomp. Trials, S. W. 573.
2310. si Braunschweiger v. Waits, 179
77 Chicago City R. Co. v.. Has- Pa. St. 47. 36 Atl. 155; Murchison
tings, 136 111. 254, 26 N. E. 594; v. Mansur-Tibbetts Implement Co.
City of Chicago v. Sheehan, 113 111. (Tex. Cv. App.), 37 S. W. 605. See
658. Daniels v. Florida, C. & P. R. Co.
78 Quinn v. P. 123 111. 342, 15 62 S. Car. 1, 39 S. E. 762.
N. E. 46. See Preisker v. P. 47 111. 82 Wallace v. Wren, 32 111. 146;
382. Frick v. Kabaker, 116 Iowa, 494,
79 Pittsburg Spring Co. v. Smith, 90 N. W. 498. A plea of the stat-
115 Ga. 764, 42 S. E. 80; Jordan v. ute of limitations of three and five
Indianapolis Water Co. 155 Ind. 337, years will not warrant the giving
64 N. E. 680. of instructions on the statute of
so Farmers' & M. Bank v. Upton, limitations of ten years, Stringer
37 Neb. 417, 55 N. W. 1044. See v. Singleteny (Tex. Cv. App.), 23
Burleson v. Lindsey (Tex. Cv. S. W. 1117.
App.), 23 S. W. 729. See Flint v.
98 BASED ON EVIDENCE AND PLEADINGS. 88
where the complaint or declaration does not allege damages
growing out of the loss of the society of the deceased, and
no evidence was introduced or offered as to the social relations
existing between the plaintiff and the deceased. 83
In an action brought by a husband for personal injury to his
wife an instruction that the plaintiff cannot recover for mental
suffering is improper where the plaintiff does not claim damages
for mental suffering. 84 So an instruction charging that "where
the jury believe from the evidence that an injury was wilfully
done, or resulted from a gross neglect of duty by the defendant,"
then he is liable for such injury, is misleading and prejudicial
where such issue is not involved in the case nor supported by
the evidence. 85 Another case : Where the defendant asked the
court to charge the jury ''that if they believe from the evidence
that the defendant's ice wagon did not run over the deceased
they will find the defendant not guilty." The declaration con-
tained no averment that the wagon ran over the deceased ; hence
such instruction was properly refused. 86
98. Instructions limited to counts. A general instruction
stating a correct proposition of law applicable to any one or
more of the several counts of a declaration is proper if there
is evidence to support it, though it may not be applicable to
other counts. 87 But where a party is entitled to recover on only
one of two or more counts of his pleadings, if at all, the court
should so instruct the jury. Thus where the plaintiff's declara-
tion contains two counts, one on a contract and one in tort, the
instructions should limit the jury to a finding on only one of
the counts. 88
ss Holt v. Spokane & P. R. Co. South Oovington & C. St. R. Co. v.
3 Idaho, 703, 35 Pac. 39. Stroth, 23 Ky. L. R. 1807, 66 S. W.
84 Dallis Rapid Tr. Co. v. Camp- 177; San Antonio & A. P. R. Co. v.
hell (Tex. Cv. App.), 26 S. W. 884. Jazo (Tex. Cv. App.), 25 S. W. 712;
ss Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Robin- Dallis, 0. & C. E. R. Co. v. Harvey
son, 106 111. 142. See Louisville, (Tex. Cv. App.), 27 S. W. 423.
N. A. & C. R. Co. v. Shires, 108 so Washington Ice Co. v. Brad-
Ill. 617; Galveston, H. & S. A. R. ley, 171 111. 258, 49 N. E. 519.
Co. v. Johnson (Tex. Cv. App.), 87 Greenup v. Stoker, 8 111. (3
29 S. W. 428; Gulf, C. & S. P. R. Gilm.), 202, 214; Lake S. & M. S.
Co. v. Cash (Tex. Cv. App.), 28 R. Co. v. Hession, 150 111. 546, 37
S. W. 387; Denver & R. G. R. Co. N. E. 905.
v. Buffehr, 30 Colo. 27, 69 Pac. 582; * Hoist v. Stewart, 161 (Mass.),
Louisville R. Co. v. Wills' Admr'x, 516, 37 N. E. 577. See Cobb-Choc-
28 Ky. L. R. 1961, 66 S. W. 628; olate Co. v. Sandusky, 207 111. 463.
89 LIMITING TO COUNTS ISSUES OUTSIDE OF PLEADINGS. 99
Where there is no evidence tending to prove one or more of
several counts the court in charging the jury should confine the
instructions to the count or counts which the evidence tends
to sustain, and not instruct as to the other counts. Thus in a
criminal case where an information charges in one count an
assault with intent to commit murder and in another count an
assault with intent to commit great bodily injury, and there is no
evidence tending to prove the charge in the first count, the court
should not instruct as to that charge, and to do so is error,
although the defendant was not found guilty of the crime charged
in that count. 89
And where there is no evidence to sustain the charge in one
of the counts of an indictment which charges the commission
of an offense by different means in different counts, the court
should instruct the jury that there is no evidence as to such
count, and a refusal to do so is error, especially if the jury con-
vict on both or all the counts. 90 Under an indictment containing
but one count for the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor, where
the evidence tends to prove several distinct sales at different
times, covering a period of several months, the prosecution should
be restricted to some one particular transaction or sale, and the
court in charging the jury should confine them to the one par-
ticular sale to which the prosecution is restricted. Under such
indictment an instruction directing the jury to consider all the
evidence in determining the guilt or innocence of the accused
is erroneous. 91
99. Issues raised outside of pleadings. Where the parties
raise issues of fact not alleged in the pleadings, without objection,
it is not error to instruct the jury on such issues. 92 It is proper
to give instructions on the theory upon which the parties try
a case, although the pleadings, technically, do not support such
theory. 93 When the facts proved are not within the allegations
89 Botsch v. S. 43 Neb. 501, 61 370, 41 S. E. 468; Brusie v.'Peck
N. W. 730. Bros. & Co. 135 N. Y. 622, 3i2 N. E.
o P. v. Vanzile, 143 N. Y. 368, 76.
38 N. E. 380. 93 Jarmusch v. Otis Iron & Steel
si Stockwell v. S. 27 Ohio St. 566. Co. 23 Ohio Cir. 122. See Hansen
92 Qualey v. Johnson, 80 Minn. v. St. Paul Gas Light Co. (Minn.),
408, 83 N. W. 393; Davis v. At- 92 N. W. 510; Blum v. Whitworth,
lanta & C. A. L. R. Co. 63 S. Car. 66 Tex. 350, 1 S. W. 108.
577, 41 S. E. 892, also 63 S. Car.
100 BASED ON EVIDENCE AND PLEADINGS. 90
of the pleadings, and each of the parties procures instructions
declaring the law applicable to the facts thus shown, regardless
of the issues made by the pleadings, and asks a verdict in ac-
cordance therewith, neither will be heard to complain. 94
100. Issues abandoned. If some of the issues set out in
the pleadings have been abandoned during the progress of the
trial, by admission or otherwise, then it is proper for the court to
restrict the instructions to the remaining issues upon which the
parties are contending. 95 Thus where the defendant claims a
set-off charging that the plaintiff has failed to perform his con-
tract, and the plaintiff in reply thereto states that a settlement
had been made between them every month as to the obligations
of the contract, which was not denied by the defendant, he there-
by abandoned his defense of set-off, and was not entitled to in-
structions as to that defense. 96 So where the plaintiff has
abandoned a count in his declaration or petition then it is im-
proper to submit to the jury any issue contained in such count. 97
The giving of an instruction based on an original petition or
declaration which has been abandoned by the filing of an
amended petition or declaration is error. 98 But the court in
charging the jury is not bound to withdraw an abandoned issue. 99
Where an issue in a cause has been disposed of by a former trial,
it is improper to instruct the jury in such manner as to impress
them with the idea that such issue is still in the case. Thus in
a homicide case a conviction of manslaughter is in legal effect
an acquittal of murder, and on a second trial the court is not
authorized to instruct on the murder charge. 100
94 Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Har- S. E. 671; Bugbee v. Kendricken,
rington, 192 111. 27, 61 N. E. 622; 132 Mass. 349.
Illinois Steel Co. v. Novak, 184 96 Doysher v. Adams, 16 Ky. L. R.
111. 501, 56 N. E. 966. 582, 29 S. W. 348. See also Fox
95 De Graffenried v. Menard, 103 v. Utter, 6 Wash. 299, 33 Pac. 354.
Ga. 651, 30 S. E. 560; Crum v. Yu- 07 Columbus S. Bank v. Crane
nott (Ind. App.), 40 N. E. 79; Lake Co. 56 Neb. 317. 76 N. W. 557.
Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Richards, os Purdom v. Brussells, 22 Ky. L.
152 HI. 59, 38 N. E. 773. See Mid- R. 1796, 66 S. W. 22; Western U.
dlebrooks v. Mayne, 96 Ga. 449, Tel. Co. v. Johnson (Tex. Cv. App.),
23 S. E. 398; Scholtz v. North- 67 S. W. 338.
western M. L. I. Co. 100 Fed. 573; w Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co.
Tathwell v. City of Cedar Rapids, v. Croskell (Tex. Cv. App.), 25 S. W.
114 Iowa, 180, 86 N. W. 291. See 486.
also Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. 100 p. v . McFarlane, 134 Cal. 618,
Shieder (Tex. Cv. App.), 26 S. W. 66 Pac. 865. In Indiana a defend-
509; Fry v. Leshi, 87 Va. 269, 12 ant who takes a new trial under
91
THEORY OF PARTY IF EVIDENCE SUPPORTS.
101
101. Theory of party Instruction. A party is entitled to
instructions fairly presenting to the jury the law applicable to
the evidence which tends to support his theory. 101 But, of course,
if there is no evidence tending to support a theory there can
be no ground for complaint in refusing instructions as to such
theory. 102
Instructions stating the theory of one party on any feature
of a case and ignoring the evidence in support of the theory of
the opposing party are erroneous. 103 Hence, if there is any evi-
dence tending to support the theory of the defendant the giving
of an instruction for the plaintiff, which wholly ignores such
theory, is erroneous. 104 Or if the instructions ignore the theory
such circumstances waives the
former acquittal and may be con-
victed of murder on the second
trial. Veach v. State, 60 Ind. 291;
Burns' R. S. 1901 (Ind.) 1910.
101 Fessenden v. Doane, 188 111.
232, 58 N. E. 974; Chicago U. Tr.
Co. v. Browdy, 206 111. 617, 69 N.
E. 113; Pennsylvania Co. v. Backes,
133 111. 261, 24 N. E. 563; Lamb v.
P. 96 111. 73, 80; Denver & R. G.
R. Co. v. lies, 25 Colo. 19, 53 Pac.
222; Boice v. Palmer, 55 Neb. 389,
75 N. W. 849; Mobile & O. R. Co.
v. Godfrey, 155 111. 82, 39 N. E.
590; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v.
Gardenia, 22 Tex. Cv. App. 300, 54
S. W. 312; Robertson v. Burton, 88
Minn. 151, 92 N. W. 538; Defoe v.
St. Paul C. R. Co. 65 Minn. 319,
68 N. W. 35; Republican V. R. Co.
v. Fink, 18 Neb. 89, 24 N. W. 691;
Barker v. S. 126 Ala. 83, 28 So.
589; Beall v. Pearre, 12 Md. 550;
Botkin v. Cassady, 106 Iowa, 334,
76 N. W. 72i2; Hughes Cr. Law
3249; Lansing v. Wessell (Neb.),
97 N. W. 815; Rhoades v. Chesa-
peake & O. R. Co. (W. Va.), 55
L. R. A. 175; Lion v. Baltimore
City P. R. Co. 90 Md. 266, 44 Atl.
1045, 47 L. R. A. 127; P. v. Rice,
103 Mich. 350, 61 N. W. 540; Buck-
ley v. Silverberg, 113 111. 673, 45
Pac. 804. See Galveston, H. & S.
A. R. Co. v. Kinnebrew, 7 Tex. Cv.
App. 549, 27 S. W. 631; Poole v.
Consolidated St. R. Co. 100 Mich.
379, 59 N. W. 390; Memphis St. R.
Co. v. Newman, 108 Tenn. 666, 69
S. W. 269; Chicago, R. I. & P. R.
Co. v. Buckstaff (Neb.), 91 N. W.
426; Omaha St. R. Co. v. Boeson
(Neb.), 94 N. W. 619.
102 Moore Furniture Co. v. Sloane,
166 111. 460, 46 N. E. 1128; Long-
enecker v. S. 22 Ind. 247.
ios Mims v. S. 42 Fla. 199, 27 So.
868; Dolphin v. Plumley, 175 Mass.
304, 56 N. E. 281; Campbell v. P.
109 111. 565, 576, 50 Am. R. 621;
Denny v. Stout, 59 Neb. 731, 82 N.
W. 18; Young v. Market, 163 Pa.
St. 513, 30 Atl. 196; Jones v. Rex
(Tex. Cv. App.), 31 S. W. 1077;
Howell v. Mellon, 169 Pa. St. 138,
32 Atl. 450; Sullivan v. S. 80 Miss.
596, 32 So. 2; Banner v. Schles-
singer, 109 Mich. 262, 67 N. W. 116;
Hays v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 196
Pa. St. 184, 45 Atl. 925.
104 Mobile & I. R. Co. v. Godfrey,
155 111. 82, 39 N. E. 590; Polly v.
Com. 16 Ky. L. R. 208, 27 S. W. 862.;
Boice v. Palmer, 55 Neb. 389, 75
N. W. 849; Webb v. Big Kanawha
& O. R. P. Co. 43 W. Va. 800,
29 S. E. 519; Cerrolis Coal Co. v.
Deserant, 9 N. Mex. 49, 49 Pac. 807;
Blan chard v. Pratt, 37 111. 243;
Bloch v. Edwards, 116 Ala. 90, 22
So. 600; Lindle v. Com. 23 Ky. L.
R. 1307, 68 S. W. 986; S. v. Brady,
(Iowa), 97 N. W. 64; De Foe v.
St. Paul C. R. Co. 65 Minn. 319,
68 N. W. 35; Kadish v. Young, 108
111. 170, 185, 48 Am. R. 548; Parker
v. Chancellor, 78 Tex. 524, 15 S. W.
157; Laughlin v. Gerardi, 67 Mo.
App. 372; Oliver v. Moore (Tex. Cv.
App.), 43 S. W. 812; Atlanta C. St.
R. Co. v. Hardage, 93 Ga. 457, 21
102 BASED ON EVIDENCE AND PLEADINGS. 92
of a party as to any one element or branch of a case they are
erroneous. 105
So where the evidence tends to support two opposing theories
on a material issue or fact, and the court instructs as to the
theory of the prosecution and refuses to instruct on the theory
of the defense it is error. 106 If there is any evidence tending to
'support the theory of a party an instruction so drawn that it
withdraws from the jury the consideration of such theory is er-
roneous. 107 But the theory of each of the parties need not be
stated in a single instruction. 108
102. Instruction when several theories. Where the evidence
tends to support two different theories by which it is sought
to prove a material fact, a charge to the jury ignoring the evi-
dence of one of such theories is erroneous. 109 The charge should
be comprehensive enough to cover both theories, especially where
the pleading of a party sets out different theories in different
counts. And the court may properly call the attention of the
jury to the different theories. This rule applies to both civil and
criminal cases. 110
So for the court, in charging the jury, to confine them by in-
structions to one view of the case when the evidence is of such
character that different constructions or views may be drawn
from it, is error. 111 Likewise in an action of trespass for an
assault, where there is evidence tending to prove self-defense,
an instruction ignoring that issue is improper. 112 And where
the evidence tends to support several different defenses it is
S. E. 100; Caraway v. Citizens N. mann, 164 111. 250, 45 N. E. 164;
B'k (Tex. Cv. App.), 29 S. W. 506; Collins v. Waters, 54 111. 486; Suther
Memphis St. R. Co. v. Newman, v. S. 118 Ala. 88, 24 So. 43;
108 Tenn. 666, 69 S. W. 269; Jack- White v. Dinkins, 19 Ga. 285; Sack-
son v. Com. 96 Va. 107, 30 S. E. ett. v. Stone, 115 Ga. 466, 41
452. S. E. 564; Kennedy v. Forest
105 Oliver v. Moore (Tex. Cv. Oil Co. 199 Pa. St. 644, 49 AtL
App.), 43 S. W. 812; Pope v. Riggs 138; Ter. v. Baca (N. Mex.), 71 Pac.
(Tex. Cv. App.), 43 S. W. 306; 460; McVey v. St. Clair Co. 49 W.
Eppstein v. Thomas (Tex. Cv. Va. 412, 38 S. E. 648; Deasey v.
App.), 44 S. W. 893. Thurman, 1 Idaho, 779; Anderson
ioe Jackson v. Com. 96 Va. 107, v. Norwill, 10 111. App. 240; Blue
30 S. E. 452. Valley Lumber Co. v. Newman,
107 Liner v. S. 124 Ala. 1, 27 So. 58 Neb. 80, 78 N. W. 374.
438. no p. v . Willett, 105 Mich. 110,
108 Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 62 N. W. 1115.
v. Groves, 56 Kas. 601, 44 Pac. m Samuel v. Knight, 9 Pa. Super.
628. Ct. 352, 43 W. N. C. 392.
108 Town of Wheatfield v. Grund- 112 Collins v. Waters, 54 111. 486.
93 WHEN SEVERAL THEORIES RULES ILLUSTRATED. 103
proper to submit to the jury whether any one of them has been
established. 113 But where two theories set up as a defense are
inconsistent the court may properly instruct that both theories
cannot be true, being inconsistent. 114 But in a criminal case,
although the different theories urged by the accused as a defense
may be conflicting, it is not improper to instruct upon all of
them. 115 An instruction may be given to meet a theory advanced
by the opposing party, though there is no evidence upon which
to base the instruction. 116
To instruct the jury to find for the plaintiff if, from the evi-
dence, his theory is more acceptable and more consistent than
the theory of the defendant is error. It is the duty of the jury
to determine whether or not the plaintiff has proved his case
by a preponderance of the evidence. 117 So in a case where neg-
ligence is made a material issue by the pleadings it is improper
to state that if the evidence shows any other theory as probable
as that of the plaintiff then the plaintiff cannot recover. 118 So
in a criminal case an instruction that if the evidence develops
two theories, one of guilt and the other of innocence, and the
jury are in doubt which of the two theories is established they
should find the defendant not guilty, is improper. 119 It is also
improper to instruct the jury that if the evidence for the de-
fendant is as strong as that for the state he should be ac-
quitted. 120
103. Instructions when several theories Illustrations.
The following cases serve as illustrations of the rule. Thus on a
charge of rape where the defendant gives evidence that the
alleged sexual intercourse was with the consent of the female
it is error to refuse instructions on that theory. 121 Or in a lar-
ceny case where the defense is that the defendant took the
property, believing in good faith that it belonged to him or
us Liverpool & T. S. Ins. Co. HT Rommeny v. City of Ne-w
v. Joy, 26 Tex. Cv. App. 613, 64 York, 63 N. Y. S. 186;
S. W. 786; Bank .of Calloway v. us Watts v. Southern Bell T. &
Henry (Neb.), 92 N. W. 631. T. Co. 66 Fed. 460.
114 McGowen v. Larsen, 66 Fed. n Thomas v. S. 103' Ala. 18,
910; Anderson v. Oskamp (Ind. 16 So. 4; Johnson v. S. 102 Ala. 1,
App.), 35 N. E. 207. 16 So. 99.
us Carver v. S. 36 Tex. Cr. App. 120 Mann v. S. 134 Ala. 1, 32 So.
552, 38 S. W. 183. 704.
"6 American M. U. Ex. Co. v. 121 Sergest v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.),
Milk, 73 111. 224. 57 S. W. 845.
104 BASED ON EVIDENCE AND PLEADINGS. 94
his mother, to refuse to charge on this theory is error. 1 - 2 And if
the defendant owned, or believed he owned, the property and
had a right to take it, the court may explicitly charge the jury
that in such case there is no offense. 123
On a charge of receiving and selling stolen property, where
the evidence tends to prove that the defendant reasonably and
honestly believed that he had a right to dispose of the property,
he is entitled to have his defense affirmatively presented to the
jury by proper instructions, although another instruction given
may state that the receipt of the property, knowing it had been
stolen, is essential to a conviction. 124 Or where there is any
evidence tending to prove that the defendant's possession of the
property was lawful he is entitled to instructions on that
theory. 125 Or on a trial for embezzlement if there is evidence
tending to prove that the defendant appropriated the property
under an honest belief that he had a right to do so it is error
to refuse to so instruct the jury. 126
104. Instructions need not notice opposing theory. But the
rule which requires that instructions shall be given according
to the theory of each party does not require that the instruc-
tions shall anticipate the existence of hypotheses contrary to
that upon the theory of which they are framed. That an in-
struction rests upon an hypothesis which is sustained by evi-
dence, and that it states accurately and fully the law upon that
hypothesis, is sufficient without anticipating any theory of the
opposing party. And if the evidence also fairly presents hy-
potheses sustaining, modifying or repugnant to legal propositions,
a party desiring to avail himself of such propositions may have
them "presented in separate instructions. 127 Hence the plaintiff
122 Vance v. S. 34 Tex. Cr. App. 12* Harris v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.),
395, 30 S. W. 792; Barnes v. S. 57 S. W. 833; Gann v. S. 42 Tex.
103 Ala. 44, 15 So. 901. See S. v. Cr. App. 133, 57 S. W. 837.
Jackson, 126 Mo. 521, 29 S. W. 601; 125 Pace v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.),
Clark v. S. 34 Tex. Cr. App. 31 S. W. 173; Brown v. S. 34 Tex.
120, 29 S. W. 382; Young v. S. 34 Cr. App. 150, 29 S. W. 772.
Tex. Cr. App. 290, 30 S. W. 238; 120 Wadley v. Com. (Va.), 30 S.
Phillips v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 31 S. E. 452.
W. 644; Reese v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 127 Cook County v. Harms, 108
68 S. W. 283; Chambers v. S. (Tex. 111. 151, 161; Springfield Consol. R.
Or. App.), 68 S. W. 286: Homer v. Hoeffner, 175 111. 634, 51 N. E.
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 68 S. W. 884; Trask v. P. 104 111. 569; City of
999; S. v. Main, 75 Conn. 55, 52 Chicago v. Schmidt, 107 111. 191;
Atl. 257. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Byrne, 205
123 Black v. S. 38 Tex. Cr. App. 111. 21, 68 N. E. 720.
58, 41 S. W. 606.
95 OPPOSING THEORY JURY CONFINED TO EVIDENCE. 105
is not bound to anticipate and exclude the defense. He is only
obliged to present the law applicable to his theory of the case. 128
The plaintiff is not required in his instructions to negative
mere matters of defense. 129 So where an instruction tells the
jury that if they believe from the evidence that the plaintiff
has proved his case as laid in his declaration, or in any one
of the counts thereof, they will find for the plaintiff, it is proper. 130
And so where the rights of a party, such, for instance, as his
claim of set-off, are fully stated in his own instructions he can-
not complain because his opponent's instructions may be silent
as to such a claim or right. The court is not required to em-
brace such party's claim in the instructions of the opposing
party. 131 But, of course, where there is evidence to support the
claim or contention of a party, and such claim is ignored by
the refusal of his instructions and is not recognized in the in-
structions given for his opponent, it is manifest error. 132
105. Instructions confining jury to evidence. The jury in
their deliberations should not only be confined to the pleadings,
but also to the evidence adduced, and the court should instruct
them that they must not be influenced by any information out-
side of the evidence; especially is this caution proper when any
of the jurors ask questions. 133 The formula that "if you believe
from the evidence" is the usual expression used in drawing
instructions in referring to the evidence, but it is not necessary
that this should be stated in each sentence of an instruction. 134
Nor is it necessary that all of the instructions given should
contain this requirement. 135
For, although an instruction standing alone may be faulty
128 Eames v. Rend, 105 111. 506, 98 Tenn. 650, 40 S. W. 1085; Whar-
509; Logg v. P. 92 111. 604. ton v. S. 45 Tex. 2.
120 Mt. Olive & S. Coal Co. v. 134 Gizler v. Witzel, 82 111. 322,
Rademancher, 190 111. 538, 544, 60 325; Belden v. Woodmanse, 81 111.
N. E. 888. 25, 28; Miller v. Bathasser, 78 111.
130 Mt Olive Staunton Coal Co. v. 305; Mathews v. Hamilton, 23 111.
Rademancher, 190 111. 538, 542, 60 416, 418; Slack v. . Harris, 200 111.
N. E. 888. 96, 65 N. E. 669; Powers v. Com.
131 Mueller v. Rosen, 179 111. 131, 22 Ky. L. R. 1807, 61 S. W. 736; S.
53 N. E. 625. v. Davis, 27 S. Car. 609, 4 S E. 567;
132 McCormick v. Kreinkie, 179 Slack v. Harris, 200 111. 114, 65 N.
111. 301, 53 N. E. 549. See Linde- E. 437.
man v. Fry, 178 111. 174, 52 N. E. iss Padfield v. P. 146 111. 660, 662,
851. 35 N. E. 469.
iss Citizens St. R. Co. v. Burke,
106 BASED ON EVIDENCE AND PLEADINGS. 96
in not confining the jury to the evidence, that is, by omitting to
charge that "if they believe from the evidence," yet where
other instructions which are given, direct the jury to confine their
deliberations to the evidence the defect will be regarded cured. 136
But it is only where the facts hypothetically stated are con-
troverted by the opposing party .that the formula "if you be-
lieve from the evidence" is important or essential. 137
An instruction which is but the statement of a legal proposi-
tion, containing only a hypotehtical statement of facts, is not
objectionable in that it does not make reference to the evidence
or is not restricted thereto. 138 It is not improper to use the
words "if the evidence shows you" instead of "if you believe
from the evidence" in framing instructions. 139 Where the court
in charging the jury states that everything done by them in
determining the facts must be done "under the evidence," that
is sufficient caution that the jury must confine their delibera-
tions to the evidence before them without repeating the caution-
ary words in every sentence. 140
106. Confining jury as to damages. Instructions which do
not confine the jury to the evidence, nor place a limit upon the
amount of damages to be awarded, if any, are improper. 141
Public policy, sympathy, or the like, are not proper elements
to be taken into account in assessing damages; so an instruc-
tion authorizing the jury to take into consideration such ele-
ments is improper. The jury should be confined to the evi-
dence. 142
is6 Speir v. P. 122 111. 1, 244, 12 1*0 Indianapolis St. R. Co. v.
N. E. 865, 17 N E. 899, 3 Am. St. Robinson, 157 Ind. 414, 61 N. E.
320; Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v. Mo- 936. Charging the jury that the
chell, 193 111. 208, 61 N. E. 1028; issues are to be determined "by
Boykin v. P. 22 Colo. 496, 45 Pac. looking to the testimony of the wit-
419. See Godwin v. S. 73 Miss. 873, nesses who have testified in the
19 So. 712; Ingols v. Plimpton, 10 case" is not error, although the
Colo. 535, 16 Pac. 155; Graff v. P. defendant made a statement giving
134 111. 380, 25 N. E. 563; McPherson. his version of the transaction and
v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. 97 Mo. denying his guilt; Sledge v. S.
,253; Home v. Walton, 117 111. 130, 99 Ga. 684, 26 S. E. 756, 59 Am. St.
7 N. E. 100; Rock I. & P. R. Co. 251; Burney v. S. (Ga.), 25 S. E. 911.
v. Leisy, 174 111. 547, 51 N. E. 572; 1*1 Central R. Co. v. Barmister,
Holliday v. Burgess, 34 111. 193; 195 111. 48, 62 N. E. 864; Oglesby
Parker v. Fisher, 39 111. 164, 171. v. Missouri P. R. Co. (Mo.), 37 S.
137 Schmidt v. Pfau, 114 111. 494, W. 829.
504, 2 N. E. 522. 1*2 Robelson v. Brown, 56 Neb-
"8 Belt v. P. 97 111. 461, 472. 390, 76 N. W. 891.
139 Silberberg v. Pearson, 75 Tex.
287, 12 S. W. 850.
9? DAMAGES, JURY CONFINED TO EVIDENCE. 106
Thus an instruction that if the jury find the defendant guilty
they may assess the plaintiff's damages at an amount not to
exceed the amount claimed in the declaration is erroneous in
not confining the jury to the evidence. 143 So an instruction
that the plaintiff cannot recover more than five thousand dollars
if he is entitled to recover; and if the jury believe from the
evidence that the plaintiff is entitled to recover they will render
a verdict for no more than that amount is erroneous, in that it
tells the jury to render a verdict for five thousand dollars and
does not confine them to the evidence. 144 Also for the same
reason, an instruction permitting the jury to give such an amount
"as they shall deem a fair and just compensation" is erroneous ; 145
or an instruction that the jury may allow as damages such
sum as the evidence proves, is erroneous where the evidence
shows a greater amount than that claimed in the complaint or
declaration. 146
So a charge that the jury in determining the amount of dam-
ages should allow such sum as seems proper under the cir-
cumstances, and shall consider bodily and mental pain and
probable future injury resulting from the injury inflicted, is
erroneous as authorizing the jury to find damages for permanent
injury without any evidence as to the amount. 147 But an in-
struction that the jury are to assess damages at such sum as
in their judgment the plaintiff is entitled to under the evidence,
i Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. v. Austin, 69 111. 426. See Isaac v.
Sykes, 96 111. 162, 173; Martin v. McLean. 106 Mich. 79, 64 N. W. 2.
Johnson, 89 111. 537; Gilbertson v. i Rolling Mill Co. v. Morrissey,
Forty-Second St. M. & St. N. Ave. Ill 111. 650; Cleveland, C. C. &
R. Co. 43 N. Y. S. 782, 14 App. St. L. R. Co. v. Jenkins, 174 111.
Div. 294; Hoover v. Haynes (Neb.), 409, 51 N. E. 811; City of Free-
91 N. W. 392; Chicago, R. I. & T. port v. Isbell, 83 111. 440, 25 Am. R.
R. Co. v. Erwin (Tex. Cv. App.), 407; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v.
65 S. W. 496 (party must request Levy, 160 111. 385, 43 N. E. 357. See
specific instruction). It has been Cunningham v. Stein, 109 111. 375
held improper to charge that it is (correct); Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v.
the "duty" of the jury to assess Smith (Miss.), 35 So. 168; Nashville,
damages, but that they may be, or C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Witherspoon
are, at liberty to do so, Chicago (Tenn.), 78 S. W. 1052.
& N. W. R. Co. v. Chisholm, 79 i Texas, &c. R. Co. v. Durrett,
111. 584, 591. Compare Nicholson v. 24 Tex. Cr. App. 103, 58 S. W. 187;
Merritt, 23 Ky. L. R. 2281, 67 S. W. City of Dallas v Jones (Tex.), 53
5; P. v. McGraw, 72 N. Y. S. 679, S. W. 377.
66 App. Div. 372; Yazoo, &c. R. Co. i" Houston, E. & W. T. R. Co.
v. Smith (Mass.), 35 So. 168. v. Richards, 20 Tex. Cr. App. 203,
* Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 49 S. W. 687.
107 BASED ON EVIDENCE AND PLEADINGS. 98
is not faulty in stating that the jury may make up their ver-
dict outside of the evidence. 148
107. Common and personal knowledge. The court may
instruct on matters of common knowledge, or may refuse to
do so in its discretion. It is not error to refuse to charge the
jury on matters of common knowledge and experience of all men
who have arrived at years of discretion. 149 The jury in weigh-
ing evidence always exercise their judgment in the light of their
own general knowledge of the subject in hand whether in-
structed to do so or not; but a refusal to so instruct is not
error. 150
But an instruction permitting the jury to consider their own
personal knowledge as well as the evidence in determining a
material fact is erroneous, as they are required to decide questions
of fact from the evidence only. 151 The belief of the jury in
determining the facts must be based upon the evidence ; hence an
instruction that if the jury believe "from the evidence and the
instructions of the court, etc," is improper. 152
108. Confined within statute of limitations Criminal cases.
The evidence must be confined to some time within the statute
of limitation. Hence the failure to instruct that unless the al-
leged offense be shown to have been committed within the stat-
utory limitation a conviction cannot be had is error, especially
where there is no evidence to bring the offense charged within
the statute of limitation. 153 Thus, on a charge of adultery, where
it appears from the evidence that the offense was committed
after the filing of the complaint, but before the filing of the formal
information, the refusal to instruct the jury that a conviction can-
not be had on any evidence of acts committed after the filing of
148 Calumet River R. Co. v. v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. 29
Moore, 124 111. 337, 15 N. E. 764; Minn. 43, 11 N. W. 124; Douglass
Illinois, &c. R. Co. v. Thompson, 210 v. Trask, 77 Me. 35; Schultz v.
111. 226, 238. Bower, 57 Minn 493, 59 N. W. 631,
149 Lesser Cotton Co. v. St. Louis, 47 Am. St. 630; Petty John v. Lieb-
I. & M. S. R. Co. 114 Fed. 133, scher, 92 Ga. 149, 17 S. B. 1007; S
144. v. Jones, 29 S. Car. 201, 7 S. E. 296;
iso Baker v. Borrelli, 136 Cal. 160, Burrows v. Delta Tr. Co. 106 Mich.
68 Pac. 591; Renard v. Grande, 29 582, 64 N. W. 501.
Ind. App. 579, 64 N. E. 644. 152 Kranz v. Thieben, 15 111. App.
isi Gibson (v. Correker, 91 Ga. 482; Greer v. Com. 23 Ky. L. R. 489,
617, 17 S. E. 965 (value of land); 63 S. W. 443.
Stiles v. Neillsville Milling Co. 87 iss s. v. Kunhi, 119 Iowa, 461,
Wis. 266, 58 N. W. 411; Brakken 93 N. W. 342.
99 LIMITING EVIDENCE TO SPECIFIC PURPOSE. HO
the complaint is error. 154 An instruction charging the jury to
determine whether at any time within the statute of limitations
the defendant committed the crime alleged is not improper, al-
though the evidence limits the inquiry to a less period of time. 155
109. Limiting evidence to specific purpose. Evidence com-
petent only for some specific purpose should be limited to that
particular purpose by proper instructions, and a refusal to so
instruct is error. 156 This rule governs in both civil and criminal
cases alike. 157
110. Limited to impeaching witnesses. Thus where the
prosecution introduces evidence to show a former conviction
of the defendant for the purpose of discrediting his testimony, it
is error for the court to refuse to limit such evidence by proper
instructions, and it cannot be considered for any other pur-
pose. 158 An instruction limiting the evidence of the prior con-
viction of the accused to the sole purpose of impeaching him
as a witness in his own behalf is perfectly proper and beneficial
to the defendant rather than hurtful. 159 And where evidence is
admissible only for the purpose of discrediting or impeaching a
IB* Proctor v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), might be drawn from it injurious to
35 S. W. 172. the rights of the defendant: Win-
iss s. v. Waddle, 100 Iowa, 57, frey v. S. 41 Tex. Cr. App. 539, 56
69 N. W. 279. S. W. 919; Blanco v. S. (Tex. Cr.
156 Robertson v. S. 40 Fla. 509, App.), 57 S. W. 828; S. v. Tommy,
24 So. 474; Finley v. S. (Tex. Cr. 19 Wash. 270, 53 Pac. 157 (confes-
App.), 47 S. W. 1015; Bone v. S. sion of co-defendant).
102 Ga. 387, 30 S. B. 845; Gatlin v. IST Boggess v. Boggess, 127 Mo.
S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 49 S. W. 87; 305, 29 S. W. 1018; Lydick v. Gill
Martin v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 53 (Neb.), 94 N. W. 109. But if at
S. W. 849; Triolo v. Foster (Tex. the time certain evidence is intro-
Cv. App.), 57 S. W. 695; Com. v. duced, the court or counsel state
Wilson, 186 Pa. St. 1, 40 Atl. 283; to the jury that it is competent
White v. Walker, 31 111. 422, 433; and offered only for a particular
Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Collins, purpose, a failure to limit such
15 Tex. Cv. App. 21, 39 S. W. 150; evidence to that purpose by proper
Pittsburg, C. C. &' St. L. R. Co. v. instruction is not material error,
Parish, 28 Ind. App. 189, 62 N. B. Roark v. S. 105 Ga. 736, 32 S. E.
514, 91 Am. St. 120; Roos v. Lewyn, 125.
5 Tex. Cv. App. 593, 24 S. W. 538; "s Fosdahl v. S. 87 Wis. 482,
Scott v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 68 S. W. 62 N. W. 185; Hulton v. S. (Tex.
680; Faulkner v. S. 43 Tex. Cr. App. Cr. App.), 33 S. W. 969. See Bout-
311, 65 S. W. 1093; Camarillo v. S. well v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 35 S.
(Tex. Cr. App.), 68 S. W. 795; Ted- W. 376; S>coville v. S. (Tex. Cr.
better v. S. (Tex. Cr.) 32 S. W. 903; App.), 77 S. W. 792.
Bondurant v. S. 125 Ala. 31, 27 So. "9 Thornton v. S. 117 Wis. 338,
775. Contra: Unless inferences 93 N. W. 1107, 98 Am. St. 924.
111 BASED ON EVIDENCE AND PLEADINGS. 100
witness who has testified on the trial of the case, it is error to
refuse to thus limit it. 100
111. Limited to malice or intent. Where evidence of the
declarations of the defendant as to any previous acts not con-
nected with the transaction described in the indictment is com-
petent only on the question of malice or intent, it should be
limited by proper instructions to such malice or intent. 161 But,
on the contrary, it has been held that where evidence of other
acts of the defendant similar to that charged in the indictment
is admitted to prove guilty intent, the court is not bound to in-
struct for what purpose such evidence is admitted. 162
112. Limited to certain defendants. Testimony which is
competent against one or more of several defendants jointly tried
on a criminal charge should be limited to him against whom it is
competent, by proper instructions. 163 Accordingly, evidence of
any declarations or statements made by one of two or more
persons jointly tried which is competent only against him who
made the same should be limited to him by instruction, and to
refuse such instruction is error. 164
A confession made by one of two or more defendants jointly
leo Coker v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), regard, P. v. Connelly (Cal.), 38 Pac.
31 S. W. 655; Mark v. S. 34 Tex. 42; Sproul v. City of Seattle, 17
Cr. 136, 31 S. W. 408; Oliver v. S. Wash. 256, 49 Pac. 487; S. v. Gas-
33 Tex. Cr. App. 541, 28 S. W. ton, 96 Iowa, 505, 65 N. W. 415;
202; Paris v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), Duke v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. App. 283,
31 S. W. 855; Golin v. S. 37 Tex. 33 S. W. 349. The court is not
Cr. App. 90, 38 S. W. 794; Gills v. bound on its own motion to in-
Oom. 18 Ky. L. R. 560, 37 S. W. 269; struct the jury for what particular
Guinn v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 65 S. W. purpose evidence is admissible, Pur-
376; Ashcraft v. Com. 24 Ky. L. R. cell v. Tibbies, 101 Iowa, 24, 69 N.
488, 68 S. W. 847; Fuqua v. Com. W. 1120; Puth v. Zinbleman, 99
24 Ky. L. R. 2204, 73 S. W. 782; Iowa, 641, 68 N. W. 895.
Owens v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. App. 345, ies Crosby v. P. 137 111. 334, 27
38 S. W. 875. N. E. 49; Bennett v. P. 96 111.
lei Kollock v. S. 88 Wis. 663, 60 606; Sparf v. U. S. 156 U. S. 57, 15
N. W. 817; Hacker v. Heiney, 111 Sup. Ct. 273, 10 Am. Cr. R. 174;
Wis. 313, 87 N. W. 249; S. v. Ged- Casner v. S. 42 Tex. Cr. App. 118,
des, 22 Mont. 68, 55 Pac. 919, rela- 57 S. W. 821; Segrest v. S. (Tex.
ting to motive. Cr. App.), 57 S. W. 845; Williams v.
, 162 Shipp v. Com. 19 Ky. L. R. 634, S. 81 Ala. 1, 1 So. 179, 7 Am. Cr.
41 S. W. 856; Mosely v. S. 36 (Tex. R. 451, 60 Am. R. 133. See S. v.
Cr. App.), 578, 38 S. W. 197; Thorn- Bowker, 26 Ore. 309, 38 Pac. 124, 9
ley v. S. 36 Tex. Cr. App. 118, 34 Am. Cr. R. 366; Cleveland v. Ander-
S. W. 264, 61 Am. St. 837; But if son (Neb.), 92 N. W. 306.
no request is made to thus limit i* S. v. Collins, 121 N. Car. 667,
such evidence, a party will not oe 28 S. E. 520; Short v. S. (Tex. Cr.
heard to complain of error in that App.), 29 S. W. 1072.
101 EVIDENCE LIMITED GIVING PROMINENCE TO FACTS. 113
indicted, but not in the presence of any of the others, is com-
petent, if competent at all, only against the one making the
same, and the jury should be cautioned by proper instructions
not to consider it against the others. 105 A charge that a confes-
sion made by one or more of several defendants applies only
to the one making it, and that it has no application to any one
of the others, and does not implicate any of them so far as that
particular confession is concerned, sufficiently cautions the
jury. 166
And where on a joint indictment the evidence shows that the
defendants have different and distinct defenses the court should,
on proper request, instruct as to the defense of each, and a
refusal to do so is error. 167 The failure of the court to limit
evidence to the particular purpose for which it is competent
cannot be complained of as error in the absence of a request
to do so. 168 So where evidence is competent against some of
several joint defendants, but incompetent as to others, the fact
that such evidence was not limited to the defendant against
whom it was competent, nor the jury instructed not to consider
it against the others, cannot be complained of as error in the
absence of a request to limit the evidence. 169
113. Instructions giving prominence to certain facts. It is
the duty of the jury to consider all of the testimony in the case.
Therefore the instructions should be so drawn as to avoid giving
prominence to certain portions of the evidence to the exclusion
of other portions. 170 An instruction which singles out and draws
iss S. v. Oxendine, 107 N. Car. 78'3, Scott v. P. 141 111. 208, 30 N. E.
12 S. E. 573; Casner v. S. 42 Tex. 346; Hartshorn v. Byrne, 147 111.
Cr. App. 118, 57 S. W. 821 (conspir- 426, 35 N. E. 246; Smith v. S. 1U9
acy); Wilkerson v. S. (Tex. Cr. Ga. 479, 35 S. E. 59; Chicago & E.
App.), 57 S. W. 956. I. v. Fuller, 195 111. 18, 62 N. E.
ICG Nobles v. S. 98 Ga. 73, 26 S. E. 919; Christie v. P. 206 111. 342, 69
64; Wilkerson v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), N. E. 33; New York, P. & N. R.
57 S. W. 956 (held not assuming Co. v. Thomas, 92 Va. 606, 24 S.
accomplice made a statement). E. 264; Coffin v. U. S. 162 U. S.
is? Ross v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 43 664, 16 Sup. Ct. 943; Argabright
S. W. 1004. v. S. 49 Neb. 760, 69 N. W. 102;
163 Boggess v. Boggess, 127 Mo. Burton v. S. 107 Ala. 108, 18 So.
305, 29 S. W. 1018; Lydick v. Gill, 284; Virgie v. Stetson, 73 Me. 452;
(Neb.), 94 N. W. 109. Bush v. S. 37 Ark. 215; Mendes v.
lea Coddington v. Canaday, 157 Kyle, 16 Nev. 369; McCorkle v.
Ind. 243, 61 N. E. 567. Simpson, 42 Ind. 453; Mead v.
i Moore v. Wright, 90 111. 471; Brotherton, 30 Mo. 201; Holt v. S.
Chesney v. Meadows, 90 111. 431; 62 Ga. 314; Banner v. Schlessinger,
BASED ON EVIDENCE AND PLEADINGS.
102
the attention of the jury to particular facts in evidence to the
exclusion of others which are quite as important in determin-
ing the issues involved is erroneous. 171
Instructions which give prominence to the testimony of one
109 Mich. 262, 67 N. W. 946; Barker
v. S. 48 Ind. 163; Heddle v. City
Elec. R. Co. 112 Mich. 547, 70 N.
W. 1096; Com. v. Delaney, 16 Ky.
L. R. 509, 29 S. W. 616; Gross v.
Shaffer, 29 Kas. 442; Slack v-. Har-
ris, 200 111. 96, 65 N. E. 669; Mar-
tens v. Pittock (Neb.), 92 N. W.
1038; Vaughn v. S. 130 Ala. 18, 30
So. 669; Willingham v. Si 130 Ala.
35, 30 So. 429; Reynolds v. Com.
24 Ky. L. R. 1742, 72 S. W. 277;
Southern Bell T. & T. Co. v. Mayo,
133 Ala. 641, 33 So. 16; Brickill v.
City of Baltimore, 60 Fed. 98 (re-
lating to damages) ; Louisville &
N. R. Co. v. Banks (Ky.), 33 S. W.
627; Wadsworth v. Williams, 101
Ala. 264, 13 So. 755; Newton v.
S. 37 Ark. 333; Sexton v. School
District, 9 Wash. 5, 36 Pac. 1052;
Hurlbut v. Boaz, 4 Tex. Cv. App.
371, 23 S. W. 446; Lake S. & M. S.
R. Co. v. Whidden, 23 Ohio Cir.
85; Birmingham Southern R. Co.
v. Cuzzart, 133 Ala. 262, 31 So.
979; Crossen v. Oliver, 41 XDre. 505,
69 Pac. 308; Postal Tel. C. Co. v.
Jones, 133 Ala. 217, 32 So. 500;
O'Neal v. Curry, 134 Ala. 216, 32
So. 697; Alabama M. R. Co. v.
Thompson (Ala.), 32 So. 672; Wilson
v. White, 80 N. Car. 280; Com. v.
Delaney, 16 Ky. L. R. 509, 29 S. W.
616; Leise v. Meyer, 143 Mo. 547, 45
S. W. 282; Francis v. S. (Tex. Cr.
App.), 55 S. W. 488; Jones v. Jones,
19 Ky. 1516, 43 S. W. 412; Frost v.
S. 124 Ala. 85, 27 So. 251; P. v. Reed
(Cal.), 52 Pac. 835; Craig v. Miller,
133 111. 305, 24 N. E. 431; Sheehan
v. P. 131 111. 25, 22 N. E. 818;
Chittenden v. Evans, 41 111. 254;
Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Warner,
108 111. 550; Jacksonville & S. E.
R. Co. v. Walsh, 106 111. 257.
Properly refused: Callaghan v.
Myer, 89 111. 569; Hewitt v. John-
son. 72 111. 513; Merrill v. Hale,
85 Iowa, 66; Model Mill Co. v.
McEver, 96 Ga. 701; Fox v. P.
84 111. App. 270; Packer v. Thomp-
son-Houston E. Co. 175 Mass. 496,
56 N. E. 704; Trumbull v. Erick-
son, 97 Fed. 891; Tibbe v. Kamp,
154 Mo. 545, 55 S. W. 440; S. v.
Rutherford, 152 Mo. 124, 53 S. W.
417; Todd v. Danner, 17 Ind. App.
368, 46 N. E. 829. See Gordon v.
Burris, 153 Mo. 223, 54 S. W. 546.
See Davis v. Concord & M. R. Co.
68 N. H. 247, 44 Atl. 388; Mosely
v. Washburn, 167 Mass. 345, 45 N.
E. 753; Williamson v. Tyson, 105
Ala. 644, 17 So. 336; Stone v. S.
105 Ala. 60, 17 So. 114; Idaho Mer-
cantile Co. v. Kalanquin (Idaho),
66 Pac. 933; Warden v. Miller, 112
Wis. 67, 87 N. W. 828; Haney v.
Breeden, 100 Va. 781; Martens v.
Pittock (Neb.), 92 N. W. 1038.
i7i Drainage Corns, v. Illinois
Cent. R. Co. 158 111. 353, 35, 41 N.
E. 1073; Homes v. Hale, 71 111. 552;
Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Griffin,
68 111. 499; Hoge v. P. 117 111. 35,
46, 6 N. E. 796; Crain v. First
National Bank, 114 111. 527, 2 N.
E. 486; Calef v. Thomas, 81 111.
478, 483; Jacobi v. S. 133 Ala. 1,
32 So. 158; S. v. Prater, 52 W. Va.
132, 43 S. E. 230, 241; Dobbs v.
Gate, 60 Mo. App. 658; Chaney v.
Phoenix Ins. Co. 62 Mo. App. 45;
Coffin v. U. S. 162 U. S. 664, 16 Sup.
Ct. 943; Ball v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.),
36 S. W.448; Logg v. P. 92 111. 598,
602; Bourquin v. Bourquin, 110 Ga.
440, 35 S. E. 710; McCartney v.
McMullen, 38 111. 237; C. A. Fargo
& Co. v. Dixon, 63 111. App. 22;
Moran v. Higgins, 19 Ky. L. R. 456,
40 S. W. 928; Missouri, K. & T. R.
Co. v. Collins, 15 Tex. Cv. App.
21, 39 S. W. 150; Bell v. Hutchings
(Tex. Cv. App.), 41 S. W. 200;
Com. v. Gray, 17 Ky. 354, 30 S. W.
1015; Robinson v. Love, 50 W. Va.
75, 40 S. E. 454; Bachmeyer v.
Mutual R. T. Life Asso. 87 Wis.
325, 58 N. W. 399 (insanity an is-
sue) ; Bowling Green Stone Co. v.
Caipshaw, 23 Ky. L. R. 945, 64 S.
W. 507.
103
SINGLING OUT FACTS.
114
of the parties to the suit without adverting to the testimony
of the other, for the same reason, should not be given. 172 Espe-
cially is it error in charging the jury to single out the facts
which are strongest against a party and fail to refer to those
favorable to him. 173 And if it clearly appears that such instruc-
tions must have misled the jury to the prejudice of the rights
of the complaining party a new trial should be given. 174
To single out an unimportant fact tending to prove an element
in a case, as if it were the only question to be considered, and
base an instruction upon it is misleading. 175 Especially where
the evidence is slight or highly contradictory is it improper
for the court in giving instructions to select isolated portions of
the evidence and give them prominence. 176 The attention of the
jury should not be directed to any particular circumstance
alone unless there is some special reason for so doing. 177
114. Singling out facts When not objectionable. But sin-
gling out some particular question or point and calling the at-
tention of the jury to it is not objectionable where the other
questions involved are merely subordinate and are sufficiently
172 McCabe v. City of Philadel-
phia, 12 Pa. Sup. Ct. 383; Hays v.
Pennsylvania R. Co. 195 Pa. St.
184, 45 Atl. 925; Pyle v. Pyle, 158
111. 300, 41 N. E. 999; Simpson
Brick Press Co. v. Wounley, 166
111. 383, 46 N. E. 967; Weiss v. Beth-
leham Iron Co. 88 Fed. 23; Holmes
v. Hale, 71 111. 552; Hatch v. Marsh,
71 111. 370, 374; Village of Warren
v. Wright, 103 111. 298, 304; Barton
v. Strond Gibson Grocer Co. (Tex.
Cv. App.), 40 S. W. 1050; Louisville
& N. R. Co. v. Jones, 130 Ala. 456,
30 So. 586; Flowers v. Flowers, 92
Ga. 688, 18 S. E. 1006; Haney v.
Breeden, 100 Va. 781, 42 S. E. 916;
Evans v. George, 80 111. 51; Graves
v. Colwell, 90 111. 612; Reber v. Her-
ring, 115 Pa. St. 599, 8 Atl. 830;
Atlanta C. St. R. Co. v. Jones, 116
Ga. 369.
ITS Brantley v. S. 115 Ga. 229,
41 S. E. 695; Jefferson v. S. 110
Ala. 89, 20 So. 434; Godwin v. S.
73 Miss. 873, 19 So. 712; Williams
v. S. 46 Neb. 704, 65 N. W. 788
(on insanity).
174 Jacksonville & S. E. R. Co.
v. Walsh, 106 111. 253; Polly v.
Com. 16 Ky. L. R. 203, 27 S. W. 862;
Bertram v. People's R. Co. 154 Mo.
639, 55 S. W. 1040.
175 Bibbins v. City of Chicago,
193 111. 363, 61 N. E. 1030; Protec-
tion Life Ins. Co. v. Dill, 91 111.
177; Graves v. Colwell, 90 111. 612,
619; City of Joliet v. Seward, 86
111. 402, 405; Manley v. Boston &
M. R. Co. 159 Mass. 493, 34 N. E.
951; Gunther v. Gunther, 181 Mass.
217, 63 N. E. 402; Rising v. Nash,
48 Neb. 597, 67 N. W. 460.
176 Frame v. Badger, 79 111. 441,
446; Sullivan v. Eddy, 164 111. 391,
396, 45 N. E. 837; Flowers v. Flow-
ers, 92 Ga. 688, 18 S. E. 1006. See
also San Antonio & A. P. R. Co. v.
Green (Tex. Cv. App.), 49 S. W.
672; Meyer v. Pacific R. Co. 40
Mo. 151; Grube v. Nichols, 36 III.
92, 98.
177 Seiler v. S. 112 Wis. 293, 87
N. W. 1072; White v. Epperson
(Tex. Cr. App.), 73 S. W. 851; S.
v. Buralli (Nev.), 71 Pac. 532 (re-
viewing many cases) ; Wilson v.
S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 36 S. W. 587.
115 BASED ON EVIDENCE AND PLEADINGS. 104
adverted to by other instructions; 178 and where, in the contest
of a will, the court has properly charged that the jury must
consider all the evidence in determining the issues, it is not
error then to direct their attention to certain particular matters
and say that these matters, of themselves, are not sufficient to
establish either claim of the contestant. 179
, Where damages to be ascertained rest upon several separate
alleged grievances, which may be considered separately as items,
attention may properly be called to any one of such subjects
without reference to the others. 180 So where some particular
portion of the evidence or the testimony of a certain witness,
if true, is decisive of the cause, it is not improper to call the
attention of the jury to such evidence or witness, though refer-
ence is not made to other evidence. 181 A charge that "if the
jury believe from all the evidence before them that the plain-
tiff did not receive any of the injuries complained of in his
petition then it will be their duty to find for the defendant,"
was held proper, and does not give undue prominence to a par-
ticular question. 182
115. Singling out facts Criminal cases. In a criminal cause
the court should not designate any particular part or branch or
fact of a ease, and tell the jury that unless it is proved be-
yond a reasonable doubt they should acquit. 183 Especially in a
summary instruction is it improper to single out and direct the
attention of the jury to particular portions of the evidence to
the exclusion of other parts equally as important in determining
the issues. 184 Singling out the strong points for the prosecution
"8 International Bank v. Ferris, v. S. (Tex. Or. App.), 36 S. W. 448;
118 111. 470, 8 N. E. 825. Morgan v. S. 48 Ohio, 371, 27 N. E.
"9 Goldthorp v. Goldthorp, 115 710; McLeroy v. S. 120 Ala. 274, 25
Iowa, 430, 88 N. W. 944. So. 247.
iso St. Louis, J. & S. R. Co. v. is* Scott v. P. 141 111. 210, 30
Kirby, 104 111. 345, 349. N. E. 329; Chambers v. P. 105 111.
isi Love v. Gregg, 117 N. Car. 417; Campbell v. P. 92 111. 602;
467, 23 S. E. 332; Hart v. Bray, Coon v. P. 99 111. 371; Kennedy
50 Ala. 446. v. P. 44 111. 285; Coffman v. Com.
182 Weeks v. Texas Midland R. 10 Bush (Ky.) 495. 1 Am. Cr. R.
(Tex. C. App.), 67 S. W. 1071. 294; Preston v. S. 41 Tex. Cr. App.
isa Mullins v. P. 110 111. 42; Da- 252, 53 S. W. 881; S. v. Rutherford,
vis v. P. 114 111. 86, 29 N. E. 192; 152 Mo. 124, 53 S. W. 417. See
Leigh v. P. 113 111. 372; Crews v. also: Sanders v. P. 124 111. 226. 16 N.
P. 120 111. 317, 11 N. E. 404; Hor- E. 81; Evans v. George, 80 111. 51;
nish v. P. 142 111. 626, 32 N. E. Hoge v. P. 112 111. 46, 6 N. E. 796;
677; S. v. Smith, 53 Mo. 267; Ball P. v. Hawes, 98 Cal. 648, 33 Pac.
105 SINGLING OUT AND IGNORING FACTS. 116
by calling the witnesses by name is highly improper and prej-
udicial, especially where the evidence for the defendant is not
thus emphasized and very material points in his evidence not
even referred to. 185
In a homicide case a requested instruction telling the jury
that they may look to any threats made by the deceased against
the accused, in determining whether the deceased or the accused
was the aggressor, is improper as directing the attention of the
jury to a particular fact to the exclusion of other evidence in
the case. 180 An instruction that flight may indicate a con-
sciousness of guilt, or may be caused from an innocent motive,
and that the jury may look to the fact that the defendant
surrendered himself in determining his guilt or innocence, is for
the same reason improper. 187 The court in charging the jury
is not required to single out each of the facts tending to connect
the accused with the crime charged. 188
116. . Instructions ignoring facts. An instruction which ig-
nores material facts in issue presented by the pleadings is er-
roneous when the evidence tends to establish such facts. 189 A
791; Morgan v. S. 48 Ohio St. 377, W. 488; P. v. Sanders, 114 Cal. 216,
27 N. E. 710; Grant v. S. 97 Ala. 46 Pac. 153; Hanrahan v. P. 91 111.
35, 11 So. 915; Goley v. S. 85 Ala. 142, 146. Held not singling out
333, 5 So. 167; P. v. Caldwell, 107 facts: Jackson v. Kas. City, Ft.
Mich. 374, 65 N. W. 213; Miller v. S. & M. R. Co. 157 Mo. 621, 58 S.
S. 107 Ala. 40, 19 So. 37; Dobson W. 32; Martin v. St. Louis S. W.
v. S. 61 Neb. 584, 85 N. W. 843. R. Co. (Tex. Cv. App.), 56 S. W.
iss p. v . Clark, 105 Mich. 169 62 1011; International & G. N. R. Co.
N. W. 1117; Prim v. S. 73 Miss. v. Newman (Tex. Cv. App.), 40 S.
838, 19 So. 711. W. 854; P. v. Neary, 104 Cal. 373,
is6 Crawford v. S. 112 Ala. 1, 21 37 Pac. 943; Southern Ind. R. Co.
So. 214. v. Peyton, 157 Ind. 690, 61 N. B.
is? White v. S. Ill Ala. 92, 21 722; Lane v. City of Madison, 8&
So. 330; Alberts v. U. S. 162 U. S. Wis. 453, 57 N. E. 93; Missouri, K.
499. But defendant may sometimes & T. R. Co. v. Coffey (Tex. Cv.
have a right 1,o such an instruction App.), 68 S. W. 721; Gran v. Hous-
if he requests it, Waybright v. ton, 45 Neb. 813, 64 N. W. 245.
State, 56 Ind. 122. iso Dobney v. Conley (Tex. Cv.
iss Punk v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), App.), 65 S. W. 1124; Crittenden
48 S. W. 171. Instructions inva- v. S. 134 Ala. 145, 32 So. 273;
ding the province of the jury are Remey v. Olds (Cal.), 34 Pac. 216;
properly refused, Illinois Cent. R. Henry v. Stewart, 185 111. 448, 5V
Co. v. Griffin, 184 111. 10, 16, 56 N. E. N. E. 190; Gilmore v. Courtney,
337; Pittsburg, Ft. W. & C. R. Co. 158 111. 440, 41 N. E. 1023; Austill
v. Callaghan, 157 111. 406, 413, 41 v. Heironmymus, 117 Ala. 620, 23
N. E. 909; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. So. 660. See also Illinois Cent. R.
v. Lonergan, 118 111. 41, 57, 7 N. Co. v. Gilbert, 157 111. 364, 41 N. E.
E. 55. Held singling out facts: 724; Chicago & W. I. R. Co. v,
Bonner v. Com. 18 Ky. 728, 38 S. Flynn, 154 111. 453, 40 N. E. 332;
116
BASED ON EVIDENCE AND PLEADINGS.
106
charge which ignores every material fact affecting the rights
of the parties and submits to the jury undisputed facts only is
erroneous and properly refused. 190 And to state in an instruction
that there is only one circumstance tending to prove a material
fact and ignoring other evidence from which such fact may
be inferred is error. 101
From this principle it follows that an instruction which pur-
ports to sum up the principal facts, but directs the attention
of the jury only to those favorable to one of the parties, is bad,
as giving prominence to some of the facts in evidence and ig-
noring others quite as material and important. 192 Or, in other
words, an instruction which states the facts from the standpoint
of the plaintiff and then concludes that "if you believe these
facts you find for the plaintiff" is improper. 193 Likewise an
instruction in a criminal case submitting the issue on the evi-
Co. 69 Miss. 319, 10 So. 446; Hig-
gins v. Grace, 59 Md. 365; McKay
v. Evans, 48 Mich. 597, 12 N. E. 868;
McDonough v. Miller, 114 Mass.
94; Ranney v. Barlow, 112 U. S.
207, 5 Sup. Ct. 104; Prothero v.
Citizens' St. R. Co. 134 Ind. 431,
33 N. E. 765; Bloch v. Edwards,
116 Ala. 90, 22 So. 600; Charter v.
Lane, 62 Conn. 121, 25 Atl. 464;
Glass v. Cook, 30 Ga. 133; Chicago
&c. Co. v. Moran, 210 111. 9, 15.
190 Henry v. Stewart, 185 111. 448,
57 N. E. 190. See Rock Island, &c
v. Pohlman, 210 111. 139.
191 Berliner v. Travelers' Ins. Co.
121 Cal. 451, 53 Pac. 922; Costly
v. McGowen, 174 111. 76, 50 N. E.
1047. See Weidman v. Symes, 116
Mich. 619, 74 N. W. 1008.
i2 Sanders v. P. 124 111. 226, 16. N.
E. 81; Town of Evans v. Dickey,
117 111. 291, 7 N. E. 263; Dupuis v.
Chicago & N. R. Co. 115 111. 101.
3 N. E. 720; 'Pennsylvania Co. v.
Sloetke, 104 111. 201, 205; Coon v. P.
99 111. 368; Evans v. George, 80
111. 54; Martin v. Johnson, 89 111.
537; Cushman v. Cogswell, 86 111.
65; New York & T. Land Co. v.
Gardner (Tex. Cv. App.), 25 S. W.
737.
193 Mitchell-Tranter Co. v. Eh-
mett, 23 Ky. L. R. 1788, 65 S. W.
835. 55 L. R. A. 710.
Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. v. Raymond,
148 111. 248, 35 N. E. 729; Weiss v.
Dittman, 4 Tex. Cv. App. 35, 23
S. W. 229; Fiore v. Ladd, 25 Ore.
423, 36 Pac. 572; Graferman Dairy
Co. v. St. Louis Dairy Co. 96 Mo.
App. 495, 70 S. W. 390; Penn. Canal
Co. v. Harris, 101 Pa. St. 93; Plumb
v. Curtis. 66 Conn. 154, 33 Atl. 998;
Stocker v. Green, 94 Mo. 280, 7 S.
W. 279, 4 Am. St. 382; Sherman v.
Kreul, 42 Wis. 33; Sigerson v. Pom-
eroy, 13 Mo. 620; Hazewell v. Cour-
sen, 81 N. Y. 630; Uhl v. Robison, 8
Neb. 272; Kieldsen v. Wilson, 77
Mich. 45. 43 N. W- 1054; Graves v.
Dill, 159 Mass. 74, 34 N. E. 336;
Ordway v. Sanders, 58 N. H.
132; Jacob Tome Inst. of Port
Deposit v. Crothers, 87 Md.
569, 40 Atl. 261; Wooley v.
Lyon, 117 111. 244, 250, 6 N. E.
885; Lindesaan v. Fry, 178 111.
174, 52 N. E. 831; Von Glahn v.
Von Glahn, 46 III. 134, 139; Blair
v. Blanton (Tex. Cv. App.), 55 S.
W. 321; North v. Mallory, 94 Md.
305, 51 Atl. 89; Central of Ga. R.
Co. v. Dumas, 131 Ala. 172, 30 So.
867; Percival v. Chase, 182 Mass.
371, 65 N. E. 800; Anniston L. &
C. Co. v. Lewis, 107 Ala. 538, 18
So. 326; Highland Ave. & B. R.
Co. v. Sampson, 112 Ala. 425, 20
So. 566; Soloman v. City Compress
107 WITHDRAWING FACTS FROM JURY. 117
dence of the prosecution alone is improper in ignoring the de-
fense. 19 *
117. Instructions withdrawing facts. Where there is evi-
dence tending to support an issue of fact properly presented by
the pleadings an instruction withdrawing such issue is improp-
er. 195 And if any inference can be fairly drawn from the evi-
dence which tends to support a material fact an instruction
withdrawing such fact from the consideration of the jury is im-
proper. 196
The giving of an instruction withdrawing from the considera-
tion of the jury certain evidence, though slight, which tends
to prove a material fact in issue is error. 197 So where doc-
umentary evidence proper to be considered has ben introduced,
an instruction so framed that it withdraws such documents from
the jury is improper. In such case it is error for the court
to state that the evidence is what the witnesses testify to on
the witness stand. 198 But, on the other hand, where there is
no competent evidence tending to prove a particular fact or
issue involved, it is proper to withdraw such fact or issue by in-
structions. 199
194 Sanders v. S. 134 Ala. 74, 32 162 111. 658, 44 N. E. 887; Chicago
So. 654; Mann v. S. 134 Ala. 1, 32 & A. R. Co. v. Dumser, 161 111.
So. 704; S. v. Gallivan, 75 Conn. 190, 197, 43 N. E. 698; Protection
326, 53 Atl. 731, 96 Am. St. 203. Life Ins. Co. v. Dill, 91 111. 174;
195 Cicero St. R. Co. v. Brown, Chezem v. S. 56 Neb. 496, 76 N. W.
193 111. 274, 279, 61 N. E. 1093; Chi- 1056; Hayden v. Frederickson, 56
cago, B & Q. R. Co. v. Sykes, 96 Neb. 141, 80 N. W. 494; Myers v.
111. 162, 176; Ayres v. Pittsburgh, Walker, 31 111. 353, 363; Orne v.
C. C. & St. L. R. Co. 201 p a . St. Cook, 31 111. 238; Ayers v. Metcalf,
124, 50 Atl. 958 (held not with- 39 111. 307; Frasure v. Zimmerly,
drawing); Pritchett v. Munroe, 22 25 111. 184; Bowden v. Achor, 95
Ala. 501; Providence G. M. Co. Ga. 243, 22 S. E. 254; American
v. Thompson (Ariz.), 60 Pac. 874; Oak Ex. Co. v. Ryan, 104 Ala. 267,
Chicago, &c. Co. v. Moran, 210 111. 15 So. 807; Woodbury v. S. 69 Ala.
9, 15. 242, 44 Am. R. 515.
196 Whitehouse v. Bolster, 95 Md. 197 Anderson v. Timberlake, 114
458, 50 Atl. 240. See also Germania Ala. 377, 22 So. 431, 62 Am. St. 155.
Fire Ins. Co. v. Klewer, 129 111. "8 Myers v. S. 97 Ga. 76, 25 S.
599, 607, 22 N. E. 489; Chicago & N. E. 252; Bowden v. Archer, 95 Ga.
R. Co. v. Snyder, 128 111. 655, 660, 21 243, 22 S. E. 254; Scarbrough v.
N. E. 520; Cummings v. Tilton, Blackman. 108 Ala. 656, 18 So. 735;
44 111. 172; Dunn v. P. 172 111. 582, Mode Mill Co. v. McEver, 95 Ga.
599, 50 N. E. 137; Vierling v. Iri- 701, 22 S. E. 705.
quois Furnace Co. 170 111. 189, 9 Supreme Council C. K. v. Fi-
48 N. E. 1069; Ennis v. Pullman delity & C. Co. 63 Fed. 48; Morgan
P. C. Co. 165 111. 161, 46 N. E. 439; v. Stone, (Neb.) 93 N. W. 743.
Chicago City R. Co. v. Dinsmore,
117a, BASED ON EVIDENCE AND PLEADINGS. 108
117a. Action for personal injury from negligence. In an
action for personal injury resulting from negligence, an
instruction which enumerates a certain state of facts and
directs the jury that if they find such facts to be true then the
party complaining cannot recover for an alleged injury, is er-
roneous in that it takes from the jury the question of negligence,
which is a question of fact for them to determine. 200 For in-
stance, an instruction stating that "it is the duty of a person
before attempting to cross a railroad track to stop, if necessary,
and look and listen for the approach of trains before entering
upon the track; and if the jury believe from the evidence that
the plaintiff in this case could have discovered the approach
of the defendant's train and avoided the injury in question by
having stopped his mule before driving upon the track and
looking and listening for the approach of said train then he
cannot recover in this case, unless the jury shall believe from
the evidence that the agents or servants of the defendants were
guilty of gross negligence in the operation of said train," is
erroneous, in that it withdraws from the jury the determination
of the fact whether or not the plaintiff was guilty of negligence. 201
118. Instructions ignoring defense. Where there is evidence
tending to establish a legal defense to an action, either civil or
criminal, the giving of instructions which ignore or disregard
such defense is error, although the instructions may in all other
respects correctly state the law. 202 Thus in an action charging
200 Pennsylvania Co. v. Frana, timore, C. & A. R. Co. v. Kirby,
112 111. 404. 88 Md. 489, 41 Atl. 777; Globe Oil
201 Pennsylvania Co. v. Frana, 112 Co. v. Powell, 56 Neb. 463, 76 N. \V.
111. 404. Instructions held not with- 1081; Harris v. Carrington, 115 N.
drawing facts from the jury: Car. 187, 20 S. E. 452; Birmingham
Hronek v. P. 134 111. 135, 147, 24 S. R. Co. v. Cuzzart, 133 Ala. 262,
N. E. 861; Kirby v. Wilson, 98 31 So. 979; Sutherland v. Holliday
111. 240, 244; Devine v. Chicago, (Neb.), 90 N. W. 937; Carwile v.
M. & St. P. R. Co. 100 Iowa, 692, Carwile, 131 Ala. 603, 31 So. 568;
69 N. W. 1042; Dillingham v. Jones v. Parker (Tex. Cv. App.),
Crank, 87 Tex. 104, 27 S. W. 93. 42 S. W. 123. See Clapper v. Men-
It is improper for the court to dill, 96 Mo. App. 106, 69 S. W.
charge that counsel did not make 669; Hall v. Vanderpool, 156 Pa.
a certain argument, for the reason St. 152, 26 Atl. 1069; Burke v.
that this is a matter as much with- Holmes (Tex. Cv. App.), 68 S. W.
in the knowledge of the jury as 52; Remy v. Olds (Cal.) 34 Pac.
of the judge of the court. Binning- 216; Eureka F. Co. v. Baltimore,
ham, R. & E. Co. v. Williams, 119 C- S. & R. Co. 78 Md. 179, 27 Atl.
Ala. 547, 24 So. 548. 1035: American C. Tel. Co. v. No-
202 Commercial Bank v. Chatfield, ble, 98 Mich. 67, 56 N. W. 1100;
121 Mich. 641, 80 N. W. 712; Bal- Stanfield v. Phoenix L. Asso. 53
109 IGNORING DEFENSE. 118
negligence, contributory negligence on the part of the plain-
tiff, is a proper defense; hence the refusal to instruct on the
theory of contributory negligence is error if there is any evidence
tending to prove contributory negligence. 203
It has been held that the giving of instructions for the plain-
tiff in a personal injury case where the defense was contributory
negligence, which ignored the theory of the defendant, is error,
although such defense may have been presented in other in-
structions. 204 "Where the pleadings properly present the issue
as to whether a claim is barred by the statute of limitations,
and there is evidence tending to support the contention that
the claim is barred, it is error for the court in charging the
jury to ignore such defense. 205 So if there is any evidence tend-
ing to establish a good defense to a part of a claim, an instruc-
tion which ignores the evidence of such defense is erroneous. 206
And in a criminal cause where the testimony for the defendant
tends to prove a defense as to any one of several counts of an
indictment it is error to refuse instructions as to such defense. 207
In a criminal case where the branding of cattle is relied
upon to establish the taking of them, if there is evidence that
the accused was not connected with such branding, the court,
on request, should instruct that if the evidence shows that the
accused was not connected with such branding then there was
no taking of the cattle by him. 208 And where the possession of
.stolen goods is relied upon to connect the accused with the crime
Mo. App. 595: S. v. Abbott, 65 W. 774; Chicago & A. R. Co. v.
Kas. 139, 69 Pac. 160 (defense of Kuckkuck, 197 111. 304, 98 111. App.
alibi ignored); Faust v. Hosford, 252, 64 N. E. 358; Union Pac. R. Co.
119 Iowa, 97, 93 N. W. 58; Stoll v. Ruzika (Neb.), 91 N. W. 543;
v. Loving, 120 Fed. 805; Volk v. Van -Winkle v. Chicago, M. & St.
Roche, 70 111. 297; Peoples v. S. P. R. Co. 93 Iowa, 509, 61 N. W.
(Miss.), 33 So. 289; Woods v. S. 929.
81 Miss. 408, 33 So. 285; Thompson 205 Miller v. Cinnamon, 168 111.
v. Boden, 81 Ind. 176; McGehee 451, 48 N. E. 45; See also Pardridge
v. Lane, 34 Tex. 390; Illinois Cent. v. Culter, 168 111. 511, 48 N. E. 125;
R. Co. v. Smith, 208 111. 618 Baltimore & S. R. Co. v. Then,
203 Eastman v. Curtis, 67 Vt. 432, 159 111. 543, 42 N. E. 971.
32 Atl. 232; McVey v. St. Glair Co. soe Asher v. Beckner, 19 Ky. 521,
49 W. Va. 412, 38 S. E. 648; Den- 41 S. W. 35.
ver Tr. Co. v. Lassasso, 22 Colo. 20? Jones v. S. 80 Miss. 181, 31
444, 45 Pac. 409. So. 581; Hammond v. P. 199 111.
204 McCreery's Adm'rs v. Ohio 173, 64 N. E. 980 (self-defense).
River R. Co. 43 W. Va. 110, 27 So. 208 Black v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.),
327. See generally: Sherwood v. 41 S. W. 606.
Grand Ave. R. Co. (Mo. App.), 33 S.
119 BASED ON EVIDENCE AND PLEADINGS. 110
charged, the time which elapsed between the commission of the
crime and the time when found in possession of the accused
is material, and the instructions should cover this feature of
the case. 200 Also on a charge of assault with intent to kill and
murder it is error to instruct that if the prosecuting witness made
an attack on the defendant without any weapon in his hands,
and without appearance of any such weapon, then the defendant
would not be warranted in using a deadly weapon, because it
includes every conceivable case of violent attack and ignores
differences of age and strength of the two persons. 210
119. Instructions summing up the evidence. The practice
of summing up or recapitulating the evidence is of common law
origin and prevails in many jurisdictions. In the language of
Blackstone, "when the evidence is gone through on both sides
the judge, in the presence of the parties, the counsel and all
others, sums up the whole to the jury; omitting all superfluous
circumstances, observing wherein the main question and principal
issue lies, stating what evidence has been given to support it, with
such remarks as he thinks necessary for their direction, and
giving them his opinion in matters of law arising upon the evi-
dence." 211
The practice of summing up the evidence is recognized in
jurisdictions where the court is prohibited by constitutional or
statutory provisions from expressing an opinion on the facts, as
well as in those jurisdictions where the court may express an
opinion on the facts, unless such provisions also expressly or im-
pliedly forbid the summing up of the evidence. 212 Under this
practice the court in charging the jury may sum up all the
evidence in detail, if fairly done, and then state the rule of
209 Sharp v. S. 105 Ga. 588, 31 761; Hannon v. S. 70 Wis. 448, 36 N.
S. E. 541. W. 1; Morgan v. S. 48 Ohio St. 371;
210 Davis v. S. 152 Ind. 34, 51 N. First Baptist Church v. Rouse, 21
B. 928, 71 Am. St. 322. Conn. 167; Donnilly v. S. 26 N. J.
211 Blackstone Comm. 375. L. 480; District of Columbia v.
212 Blaishfield Instructions, 53 Robinson, 180 U. S. 92, 21 Sup. Ct.
P. 130, citing: Mitchell v. Harmo- 283; Hamlin v. Treat, 87 Me. 310,
ny, 13 How. (U. S.), 130; Starr v. 32 Atl. 909; Bellow v. Ahrburg, 23
U. S. 153 U. S. 614, 14 Sup. Ct. 919; Kas. 287; City & S. R. Co. v. Find-
P. v. Fanning, 131 N. Y. 663, 30 N. ley, 76 Ga. 311 (and other cases);
E. 569; S. v. Rose, 47 Minn. 47, Com. v. Barry, 9 Allen Mass. 278;
49 N. W. 525; Com. v. McManus, S. v. Sipsey, 14 N. Car. 485.
143 Pa. St. 64, 21 Atl. 1018, 22 Atl.
Ill SUMMING UP THE EVIDENCE. 119
law applicable to the facts. 213 The rule applies to civil and
criminal cases alike. 214 But in some jurisdictions this practice,
though recognized, has been condemned. 215 Summarizing in-
structions as such, however, are not necessarily objectionable
or vicious.- 16
An instruction thus summarizing the evidence must necessarily
state all the facts or elements which, as a matter of law, will
authorize the verdict directed. The contentions of the opposing
party should not be ignored in summarizing instructions if there
is any evidence tending to support his contention. 217 If such an
instruction omits material facts it is highly objectionable. The
very fact that the court gives what assumes to be a summary
of the facts of a case may induce the jury to believe that they
are all the facts necessary to be considered in arriving at a con-
clusion. 218 An instruction which thus undertakes to state all
the material facts constituting a cause of action or defense, but
omits a material fact, is fatally defective. 219 But a summarizing
instruction is not erroneous in failing to state all the subsidiary
or unimportant facts. It is sufficient if it enumerates all the
material facts. 220
It has been held in Pennsylvania that if the trial court in
213 Morgan v. S. 48 Ohio St. 377, Co. v. Snyder, 117 111. 376, 7 N. E.
27 N. E. 710; Medearis v. Anchor 604; St. Louis & S. R. Co. v. Britz,
Mutual Fire Ins. Co. 104 Iowa, 88, 72 111. 256, 261; McCorkle v. Simp-
'73 N. W. 495; Mimms v. S. 16 Ohio son, 42 Ind. 453; Barker v. S. 48
St. 234; Sheets v. Stark, 14 Ga. Ind. 163; Snyder v. S. -59 Ind. 105;
429; York v. Maine C. R. 'Co. 84 Ward v. Ward, 47 W. Va. 766, 36
Me. 128, 24 Atl. 791. S. E. 873; McAleer v. S. 46 Neb.
214 Turly v. P. 188 111. 633, 59 116, 64 N. W. 358; Kurstelska v.
N. E. 506; Gregg v. P. 98 111. App. Jackson, 89 Minn. 95.
170. 218 Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v.
215 Terre Haute & I. R. Co. v. Griffin, 68 111. 499, 507; Levy v.
Eggman, 159 111. 550, 42 N. E. 970; Cunningham, 56 Neb. 348, 76 N. W.
City of Chicago v. Schmidt. 107 111. 882; Ford v. S. 75 Miss. 727, 23
186; Quinn v. P. 123 111. 333, 342, 15 So. 710; West v. Averill Grocery
N. E. 46. Co. 109 Iowa, 488, 80 N. W. 555;
216 Norfolk Beet Sugar Co. v. Gallagher v. Williamson, 23 Cal.
Hight, 56 Neb. 162, 76 N. W. 566; 334, 83 Am. Dec. 114.
White v. State, 153 Ind. 689, 54 N. 219 Wyman v. Turner, 14 Ind.
E. 763. App. 118, 42 N. E. 652; Jackson
217 Pardridge v. Cutter, 168 111. School Tp. v. Shera, 8 Ind. App.
512, 48 N. E. 125; Texas Loan Agen- 330, 35 N. E. 842; Dobson v. S.
cy v. Fleming (Tex. Cv. App.), 46 61 Neb. 584, 85 N. W. 843.
S. W. 63; Terre Haute & I. R. Co. 220 Hutchinson v. Wenzel, 155
v. Eggman, 159 111. 550, 42 N. E. Ind. 49, 56 N. E. 845; Illinois Cent.
970; City of Chicago v. Schmitt, R. Co. v. Byrne, 205 111. 21, 68 N.
107 111. 186; Chicago & N. W. R. E. 720.
119
BASED ON EVIDENCE AND PLEADINGS.
112
summing up the evidence mistakes the testimony, counsel should
call the attention of the. court to the mistake immediately after
the charge, and failing to do so, complaint in that respect will
not be considered on review. 221 But the rule above mentioned
does not apply to an instruction which merely fails to embody
evidence tending to establish a distinct antagonistic theory.
All the law requires is that such an instruction based upon some
particular hypothesis warranted by the evidence must not omit
any essential element or material fact to entitle a party to a re-
covery upon such theory. 222 But in most of the states the court
is prohibited from commenting on the evidence, suggesting the
inferences that may be drawn, expressing an opinion as to its
weight, or assuming that certain facts have been proved. 223
221 Bailey v. Mill Creek Coal Co.
20 Pa. Super. 186.
222 Springfield C. R. Co. v. Hoeff-
ner, 175 111. 638, 51 N. E. 884; Terre
Haute R. Co. v. Eggmann, 159 111.
550, 42 N. E. 970; Chicago & A. R.
Co. v. Harrington, 192 111. 24, 61
N. E. 622; Voris v. Shotts, 20 Ind.
App. 220, 50 N. E. 484.
223 Fuller v. Ivew York F. Ins.
Co. (Mass.) 67 N. E. 879; Gaynor
v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 136 Ala.
244, 33 So. 808; Ray v. Long, 132
N. Car. 891, 44 S. E. 652; Ward v.
Brown, 53 W. Va. 227, 44 S. E. 488;
Dodd v. Guiseffl (Mo. App.), 73 S.
W. 304; Griffin v. Southern R. 66
S. Car. 77, 44 S. E. 562; Dobson
v. Southern R. Co. 132 N. Car. 900,
44 S. E. 593; Continental Tob. Co.
v. Knoop, 24 Ky. L. R. 1268, 71
S. W. 3; Wilson v. Huguenin, 117
Ga. 546, 43 S. E. 857; Ohio, &c. R.
Co. v. Pearcy, 128 Ind. 197, 27 M.
E. 479; Abbitt v. Lake Erie, &c. R.
Co. 150 Ind. 498, 50 N. E. 729;
Rogers v. Manhattan, &c. Ins. Co.
138 Cal. 285, 71 Pac. 348; Selensky
v. Chicago, &c. R: Co. 100 Iowa,
113, 94 N. W. 272; Lydick v. Gill
(Neb.) 94 N. W. 109; McHenry v.
Bulefant (Pa.) 56 Atl. 256; Northern
Ohio R. Co. v. Rigby (Ohio), 68 N.
E. 1046. Violations of the rule:
Johnson v. Kahn, 97 Mo. App. 628,
71 S. W. 725; Allen v, Frost (Tex.
Cv. App.), 71 S. W. 767; Meadows
v. West. U. Tel. Co. 131 N. Car. 73
42 S. E. 534; Warfleld v. Clark, 118
Iowa, 69, 91 N. W. 833; White v.
McPherson, 183 Mass. 533, 67 N.
E. 643. Rule not violated: Gold-
thorpe v. Clark-Nickerson L. Co.
31 Wash. 467, 71 Pac. 1091; Ladd v.
Witte, 116 Wis. 35, 92 N. W. 365;
Wissler v. Atlantic (Iowa), 98 N.
W. 131; Snyder v. Lake Shore, &c.
R. Co. (Mich.), 91 N. W. 643, Mont-
gomery v. Del. Ins. Co. (S. Car.) 4b
S. E. 934; Coombs v. Mason, 97 Me.
270, 54 Atl. 728; Schmuck v. Hill
(Neb.), 96 N. W. 158.
CHAPTER IV.
DIRECTING VERDICT.
Sec. Sec.
120. Peremptory instructions de- 136.
fined. 137.
121. Nature and effect of motion
for peremptory. 138.
122. Court will not weigh the ev-
idence on the motion. 139.
123. Requesting peremptory in- 140.
structions Waiving.
124. When motion for peremptory 141.
presented. 142.
125. Peremptory instructions in-
stead of nonsuit. 143.
126. Peremptory instructions for
defendant. 144.
127. If plaintiff's evidence varies
from his pleadings. 145.
128. If evidence shows contract
to be illegal. 146.
129. Peremptory improper for de-
fendant. 147.
130. If the evidence tends to prove
plaintiff's case. 148.
131. When facts are doubtful 149.
different conclusions.
132. Where either of two the- 150.
ories is supported.
133. Evidence strongly against 151.
plaintiff.
134. The foregoing principles il- 152.
lustrated.
135. Peremptory instructions for
plaintiff.
Prima facie case undisputed.
When defendant a,dmits all
allegations.
When defendant's pleading
is insufficient.
When verdict cannot stand.
Improper for plaintiff If any
evidence for defendant.
If the evidence is conflicting.
If part only of plaintiff's claim
is contested.
Where amount of claim is dis-
puted.
Waiving right to peremptory
instruction.
Motion by both parties Ef-
fect.
Waiving right to submit facts
to jury.
Motion of both parties denied
Effect.
Directing jurors to agree.
Ruling of trial court review-
able.
Criminal Cases! Peremptory
proper for defendant.
When not proper for defend-
ant.
Peremptory proper for prose-
cution When.
120. Peremptory instruction defined. When the facts of a
case are such that it becomes the duty of the court, as a matter
of law, to determine what the verdict shall be, the jury are then
113
121
DIRECTING VERDICT.
114
instructed by the court to find a verdict accordingly. In some
states such a charge is called a peremptory instruction, 1 and in
others it is called a "general affirmative charge." 1 * The court
in thus charging the jury need not give any specific reasons for
directing a verdict; it is sufficient to state that the evidence will
not support any other verdict than the one directed. 2 The in-
struction should not be drawn in such form as to complicate
it with statements of the law on which it is based. 3 And the court
in directing a verdict should give no other instructions except
as to the measure of damages. 4
121. Nature and effect of motion for peremptory. A motion
for a peremptory instruction is in the nature of a demurrer to
the evidence and is governed by the same rules, except as to
technical methods of procedure. The maker of the motion ad-
mits the truth of all the opposing evidence and all inferences
which may be fairly and rationally drawn from it, and does
not involve a determination of the weight of the evidence nor
the credibility of the witnesses. 5 The party requesting such an
1 Offutt v. Columbian Exposition,
175 111. 473, 51 N. E. 651; Illinois
Cent. R. Co. v. King, 179 111. 94, 53
N. E. 552; West Chicago St. R. Co.
v. Foster, 175 111. 396, 51 N. E. 690;
Swift & Co. v. Fue, 167 111. 443,
47 N. E. 761; Wenona Coal Co. v.
Holmquest, 152 111. 581, 38 N. E.
946.
i* Tennessee Coal, I. & R. Co. v.
Stevens (Ala.), 16 So. 22; Henry
v. McNamara, 114 Ala. 107, 22 So.
428; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Sul-
livan (Ala.), 35 So. 327.
2 Hanley v. Balch, 106 Mich. 46,
63 N. W. 981; Cowles v. Chicago,
R. I. & P. Co. (Iowa), 88 N. W.
1072. Contra: Carretson v. Apple-
ton, 58 N. J. L. 386, 37 Atl. 150;
Tanderup v. Hansen, 8 S. Dak. 375,
66 N. W. 1073. See Robey v. S.
94 Md. 61, 51 Atl. 411.
s Thomas v. Carey, 26 Colo. 485,
58 Pac. 1093.
* City of Omaha v. Bowman, 63
Neb. 333, 88 N. W. 521. The fol-
lowing has been held sufficient in
form for directing a verdict. "Now
comes the defendants by their at-
torney and request the court to
instruct the jury that the evidence
is insufficient to maintain the plain-
tiff's case, as charged in the decla-
ration, and therefore the verdict
must be for the defendants." Ames
& Frost Co. v. Shrackurski, 145
111. 192, 34 N. E. 48; Ayers v. City of
Chicago, 111 111. 406. See Alexan-
der v. Cunningham, 111 111. 511.
A remark made by the court in
the presence of the jury that any
verdict except one for the plain-
tiff would be set aside by the court,
amounts to an instruction direct-
ing a verdict for ths plaintiff,
White v. Blum 79 Fed. 271. The
court in directing a verdict under
the statute of Washington is not
required to file its findings of facts
and conclusions of law, Fidelity
Trust Co. v. Palmer, 22 Wash. 473,
61 Pac. 158.
s Offutt v. Columbian Exposi-
tion, 175 111. 472, 51 N. E. 651;
Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Dun-
leavy, 129 111. 132, 22 N. E. 15;
Frazer v. Howe, 106 111. 563, 573;
Joliet, A. & N. R. Co. v. Velie, 140
111. 59, 29 N. E. 706; Chicago & A.
R. Co. v. Adler, 129 111. 335, 21
115 MOTION FOR PEREMPTORY EVIDENCE CONSIDERED TRUE. 122
instruction admits not only what the evidence actually proves,
but also the ultimate facts which it tends to prove for his op-
ponent. In other words, the evidence of the opposing party
must be taken as true in determining a motion for a peremptory
instruction. 7
And the same rules govern also where the defendant presents
his motion to nonsuit the plaintiff, as he may under the practice
in some jurisdictions, for the reason that the plaintiff's evidence
does not prove a case. On a motion of this nature the evidence
of the plaintiff shall be taken as true in a light most favorable
to him. 8 The court will regard the issues proved if there is
any evidence tending to prove them. 9 And all inferences which
may be fairly drawn from the plaintiff's evidence shall be
counted in his favor by the court in passing upon the motion
for a nonsuit. 10
122. Court will not weight the evidence on the motion. In
considering the propriety of giving a peremptory instruction,
when requested, the court does not weigh the evidence, nor does
it determine the credibility of the witnesses or the force that
should be given to the evidence having a tendency to impeach
the veracity of the witnesses. 11 In deciding the motion the sole
N. E. 846; Bartelott v. Interna- Duffy v. St. Louis Tr. Co. (Mo.
tional Bank, 119 111. 259, 269, 9 App.), 78 S. W. 831.
N. E. 898; Doane v. Lockwood, 115 9 Soyer v. Great Falls Water Co.
111. 490, 494, 4 N. E. 500; Hardy v. 15 Mont. 1, 37 Pac. 838. See How-
Wise, 5 App. Cas. (D. C.) 108. ell v. Norfolk & C. R. Co. 124 N.
G Neininger v. Cowen, 101 Fed. Car. 24, 32 S. E. 317.
787; West C. St. R. Co. v. Ship- 10 Lee v. Publishers, &c. 137 Mo.
lett, 85 111. App. 683. 385, 38 S. W. 1107; Cummings v.
7 Kirk v. Garrett, 84 Md. 383, 35 Helena & L. S. R. Co. 26 Mont.
Atl. 1089; Martin v. Chicago & 434, 68 Pac. 852; Bohl v. City of
N. W. R. Co. 194 111. 138, 62 N. W. Dell Rapids (S. Dak.), 91 N. W.
599; New York Dry Goods Store 315. See also Travelers' Ins. Co.
v. Pabst Brewing Co. 112 Fed. 381; v. Randolph, 78 Fed. 754; Howey v.
Newbold v. Hayward, 96 Md. 247, Fisher, 111 Mich. 422, 69 N. W.
54 Atl. 67 (even though contra- 741; Wagner v. Lamont (Mich.),
dieted in every particular). 98 N. W. 2.
s Schiller v. Dry Dock, E. B. & n Rack v. Chicago C. R. Co. 173
B. R. Co. 56 N. Y. S. 184, 26 Misc. 111. 289, 50 N. E. 668, 44 L. R. A.
392; Coley v. North Carolina R. 127; Luhrs v. Brooklyn Heights
Co. 129 N. Car. 407, 40 S. E. 195; R. Co. 42 N. Y. S. 606; Platz
Hopkins v. Norfolk & S. R. Co. v. McKean Tp. 178 Pa. St. 601,
131 N. Car. 463, 42 S. E. 902; House 36 Atl. 136; House v. Wilder,
v. Seaboard A. L. R. Co. 131 N. 47 111. 510; Davis v. Kroyden,
Car. 103, 42 S. E. 553; Kelly v. 1 Mo. App. 192; Offutt v. Co-
Strouse, 116 Ga. 872, 43 S. E. 280; lumbian Exposition. 175 111. 472,
123 DIRECTING VERDICT. 116
inquiry will be whether there is any evidence tending to support
the cause of action. 12 The court may in its discretion hear
further evidence before passing on a motion for nonsuit. 13
123. Requesting peremptory instructions Waiving. In Illi-
nois the practice is that an instruction directing the jury to find
a verdict for a party must be reduced to writing, the same as
other instructions, and it should be presented to the court at
the proper time, accompanied by a motion that it be given
to the jury; a mere motion without such instruction is not suffi-
cient. 14 The right to have such an instruction given to the jury
is waived where it is submitted to the court, together with a
series of other instructions on the issues. 15 Where a statute re-
quires the grounds for a peremptory instruction or nonsuit to
be stated, the party will be confined to the grounds stated in
his motion ; other reasons will not be considered. 16 A motion by
the defendant for a verdict in his favor on the ground that
the plaintiff has not established his case by a preponderance of
the evidence is not equivalent to a request for a verdict on the
ground that there is no evidence to support a verdict for the
plaintiff. 17
124. When motion for peremptory presented. A peremptory
instruction to find a verdict for the defendant must be presented
51 N. E. 651; Louisville & N. R. Co. ing the jury to find a verdict for
v. Dick (Ky.), 78 S. W. 914; St. the party, Smith v. Gillett, 50
Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Neal 111. 301; House v. Wilder, 47 111.
(Ark.), 78 S. W. 220. 510.
12 Whaley v. Bartlett, 42 S. Car. is Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v.
454, 20 S. E. 745. Murowski, 179 111. 77, 53 N. E.
is Featherston v. Wilson, 123 N. 572; Chicago, P. & St. L. R. Co.
Car. 623, 31 S. E. 843. v. Woolridge, 174 111. 332, 51 N. E.
i* West C. St. R. Co. v. Foster, 701; Pierce v. Walters, 164 111. 56.0,
175 111. 396, 51 N. E. 690; Swift & 45 N. E. 1068; Baldwin v. Went-
Co. v. Fue, 167 111. 443, 47 N. E. 761; worth, 67 N. H. 408, 36 Atl. 365.
Wenona Coal Co. v. Holmquest, In Alabama it has been held that
152 111. 581, 38 N. E. 946; Offutt v. the court is not precluded from di-
Columbian Exposition, 175 111. 473, recting a verdict for a party at
51 N. E. 651. The practice of ex- his request, although the court has
eluding the evidence amounts to charged the jury on the issues,
an instruction as in a case of non- Gary v. Woodham, 103 Ala. 421,
suit, and is equivalent to an in- 15 So. 840.
struction that the evidence does ie Sloan v. Petzer, 54 S. Car.
not make out a case. This prac- 314, 32 S. E. 431.
tice, though once in vogue, has i" McDonald v. Minneapolis, St.
long since been superseded by the P. R. Co. 105 Mich. 659, 63 N. W.
more appropriate mode of instruct- 966.
117
WAIVING, PRESENTING MOTION.
124
to the court by proper motion at the close of the plaintiff's
evidence. 18 Or the defendant may ask that such an instruction
be given after he has introduced his own evidence ; such practice
being recognized by the courts, though it is unusual. But such an
instruction can only be sustained when, as a matter of law,
admitting all facts which the plaintiff's evidence tends to prove
and wholly ignoring all the evidence introduced by the defendant
the court can say the plaintiff has failed to make out his case. 19
According to the practice in some jurisdictions, however, the
court may recall the jury even after they have been deliberating
upon the case and direct a verdict. 20 So also the court may at
any time before the jury are discharged change an order of non-
suit, and direct a verdict for the defendant. 21
is Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v.
Murowski, 179 111. 77, 53 N. B. 572;
Peirce v. Walters, 164 111. 560, 45
N. E. 1068; Chicago, P. & S. L.
R. Co. v. Woolridge, 174 111. 330,
332,51 N. E. 701; Baldwin v. Went-
worth, 67 N. H. 408, 36 Atl. 365;
Calumet St. R. Co. v. Van Pett,
173 111. 72, 50 N. E. 678; Gilbert
v. Watts-De Golyer Co. 169 111. 129,
48 N. E. 430; Hartford Deposit Co.
v. Pederson, 168 111. 224, 48 N. E.
30; Metropolitan Bank of Minne-
apolis v. Northern Fuel Co. 173
111. 345, 50 N. E. 1062; Hartford
Deposit Co. v. Sollitt, 172 111. 222,
50 N. E. 178; Franklin v. Krum,
171 111. 378, 49 N. E. 513; Calumet
St. R. Co. v. Christenson, 170 111.
383, 48 N. E. 962; Chicago & Great
Western 'R. Co. v. Wedel, 144 111.
9, 12, 32 N. E. 547; West Chicago
St. R. Co. v. Yund, 169 111. 49, 48
N. E. 208; Central R. Co. v.
Knowles, 191 111. 241; Sullivan v.
Brooks, 31 N. Y. S. 36, 10 Misc.
368; West Chicago St. R. Co. v.
Feldstein, 169 111. 139, 48 N. E.
193; Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v.
Delaney, 169 111. 581, 48 N. E. 476;
West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Fishman,
169 111. 196, 48 N. E. 447; Val-
lette v. Bilinski, 167 111. 565, 47 N.
E. 770; Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co.
v. Richards, 152 111. 59, 72, 38 N. E.
773; Joliet, A. & N. R. Co. v. Velie,
140 111. 59, 29 N. E. 706; Travelers'
Ins. Co. v. Randolph, 78 Fed. 754;
Brunswick Grocery Co. v. Bruns-
wick & W. R. Co. 106 Ga. 270, 32
S. E. 92.
is Collar v. Patterson, 137 111.
403, 406, 27 N. E. 604; Randall v.
Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. 109 U. S.
478; Reed v. Inhabitants, 8 Allen
(Mass.), 524; Bartolett v. Interna-
tional Bank, 119 111. 259, 269, 9 N.
E. 898; Vanarsdell's Adm'r v. Louis-
ville & N. R. Co. 23 Ky. L. R. 1666,
65 S. W. 858. But see McCormick
v. Standard Oil Co. 60 N. J. L.
243, 37 Atl. 617. If no motion is
made by the defendant to dismiss
the case at the close of the intro-
duction of the evidence, it amounts
to an admission that the plaintiff's
evidence is sufficient to make out
his case and raises questions of
fact for the jury, Rouse v. Print-
ers' E. Co. 33 N. Y. S. 55, 12 Misc.
114; Sulyewski v. Windholz, 30 N.
Y. S. 230, 9 Misc. 498.
20 Rainger v. Boston M. Life
Asso. 167 Mass. 109, 44 N. E. 1088.
See Gary v. Woodham, 103 Ala.
421, 15 So. 840 (may request a per-
emptory after the court has charged
the jury on the issues). The court
should not direct a verdict on its
own motion, Gaynor v. Louisville
& N. R. Co. (Ala.), 33 So. 108.
21 Portance v. Lehigh Val. Coal
Co. 101 Wis. 574, 77 N. W. 875;
Rainger v. Boston M. Life Asso.
167 Mass. 109, 44 N. E. 1088.
125 DIRECTING VERDICT. 118
125. Peremptory instruction instead of nonsuit. Under
statutory provisions in some states the court is not authorized
to enter an order of involuntary nonsuit and judgment of dis-
missal because the plaintiff has failed to make out his case. In
such case the proper practice is to instruct the jury to find
for the defendant. 22
126. Peremptory instruction for defendant. An instruction
directing a verdict for the defendant should only be given when
the evidence, with all the legitimate and natural inferences
which may be drawn therefrom, is wholly insufficient, when taken
as true, to sustain a verdict for the plaintiff. 23 When there
is no evidence to support a verdict for the plaintiff a peremptory
instruction to find for the defendant is proper. But to say there
is no evidence does not mean literally none, but that there is
none to reasonably satisfy the jury that the plaintiff has made
out his case. 24 A verdict for the defendant should be directed
if the court would be bound to set aside a verdict for the plain-
tiff. 25 So if the evidence so greatly preponderates against
the plaintiff that the court would, on motion, be compelled to
set aside a verdict, a nonsuit is proper where the practice of
nonsuiting prevails. 26 The court is authorized to direct a ver-
22 Thompson v. Missouri Pac. R. Amble v. Whipple, 139 111. 322, 28
Co. 51 Neb. 527, 71 N. W. 61. See N. E. 841; City of East St. L. v.
Stern v. Frommer, 30 N. Y. S. O'Flynn, 119 111. 207, 10 N. E. 395;
1067, 10 Misc. 219. Ellermah v. St. Louis Tr. Co. (Mo.
23 Lake S. & M. S. R. Co. v. App.), 76 S. \V. 661 (injury from
Richards, 152 111. 72, 38 N. E. 773, trolley bar collision).
30 L. R. A. 33 note; Lake S. & 24 offutt v. Columbian Exposi-
M. S. R. Co. v. Hessions, 150 111. tion, 175 111. 472, 51 N: E. 651.
559, 37 N. E. 905; Fugate v. City See Conner v. Giles, 76 Me. 132;
of Somerset, 97 Ky. 48, 29 S. W. 970; Boyle v. Illinois Cent. R. Co. 88 111.
Springfield C. R. Co. v. Puntenney, App. 255; Phillips v. Rentz, 106 Ga.
200 111. 12; Day v. Boston & M. R. 249, 32 S. E. 107; Knapp v. Jones,
(Me.), 55 Atl. 420; Offutt v. Colum- 50 Neb. 490, 70 N. W. 19; McPeck
bian Exposition, 175 111. 472, 51 N. E. v. Central Vt. R. Co. 79 Fed. 590,
651; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Cozby, 25 C. C. A. 110; Lacy v. Porter, 103
174 111. 109, 50 N. E. 1011; Pennsyl- Cal. 597, 37 Pac. 635; Vance v.
vania Co. v. Backes, 133 111. 264, 24 Vance, 74 Ind. 370; Sunsyside, &c.
N. E. 563; P. v. Board, &c. of Mad- Co. v. Reitz, 14 Ind. App. 478, 500.
ison County, 125 111. 340, 17 N. E. 25 De Graffeuried v. Wallace (Ind.
147; Roden v. Chicago & G. T. R. Ter.), 53 S. W. 452; Brown v. Pot-
Co. 133 111. 72; Ruck v. Chicago C. ter, 13 Colo. App. 512, 58 Pac. 785;
R. Co. 173 111. 291 50 N. E. 668; McDonald v. Metropolitan St. R.
Siddall v. Jansen, 168 111. 45, 48 N. Co. 61 N. Y. S. 817; Payne Cloth-
E. 191; Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v. ing Co. v. Payne (Ky.), 54 S. W.
Chancellor, 165 111. 445, 46 N. E. 709; Howes v. District of Colum-
269; Baltimore & O. R. Co v. Stan- bia, 2 App. Gas. (D. C.) 188.
ley, 158 111. 396, 41 N. E. 1012; 20 Cohn v. David Mayer Brewing
119 PEEEMPTOEY FOE DEFENDANT. 126
diet for either party where a contrary verdict could not be
sustained by the evidence. 27
If the plaintiff's evidence, including all inferences which may
be fairly drawn therefrom, when taken as true, is not sufficient
to make out a prima facie case a verdict for the defendant is
proper. 23 And it has been held that unless the plaintiff makes
out a prima facie case, not from his own evidence alone, but
from the whole evidence, the court is authorized to direct a
verdict for the defendant. 29 So it is proper to direct a nonsuit
in those jurisdictions where such practice prevails, if the plain-
tiff's evidence fails to establish a prima facie case. 30 Although
the plaintiff proves every fact or element essential to a recovery,
yet if other facts are also proved, which clearly show that he
is not entitled to a verdict, a nonsuit is proper. 31 For example,
if the plaintiff sues on an account and proves his case as laid,
but also proves that the debt has been fully paid, a nonsuit
should be awarded. Under such state of facts he proves his
case and then disproves it. 32
If it appears that the plaintiff's evidence could not under any
view of the law support his cause of action a verdict should be
Co. 56 N. Y. S. 293; Downing v. mark, 20 Tex. Cv. App. 175, 49 S.
Murray, 113 Cal. 455, 45 Pac. 869; W. 900. And where some of sever-
Wheatley v. Philadelphia, W. & al defendants have filed cross-com-
B. R. Co. 1 Marv. (Del.), 305, 30 plaints' the court is not authorized
Atl. 660; Meyers v. Berch, 59 N. J. to dismiss the cross complaints by
L. 238, 36 Atl. 95. a nonsuit of the plaintiff, Taylor
27 Coleman v. Lord (Me.), 52 Atl. v. Bartholomew (Idaho), 53 Pac.
645; Barnett v. Talbot, 90 Me. 229, 325.
38 Atl. 112; Barnhart v. Chicago, 23 Anders v. Life Ins. Co. 62 Neb.
M. & St. P. R. Co. 97 Iowa, 654, 585, 87 N. W. 331; Freemont Brew-
66 N. W. 902; Reeder v. Dupuy, ing Co. v. Hansen (Neb.), 91 N.
96 Iowa, 729, 65 N. W. 338; Market w. 279; Barr v. Irey, 3 Kas. App.
& Fulton Nat. Bank v. Sargent, 240, 45 Pac. Ill; Simrell v. Miller,
85 Me. 349, 27 Atl. 192. See also 169 Pa. St. 326, 32 At). 548. See
Zimmerman v. Kearney County North C. St. R. Co. v. Cossar, 203
Bank (Neb.), 91 N. W. 497; Els- 111. 611; Sattler v. Chicago, R. I.
worth v. Newby (Neb.), 91 N. W. & p. R. Co. (Neb.), 98 N. W. 664.
517; White v. L. Hoster Brewing 29 Preistly v. Provident Sav. Co.
Co. 51 W. Va. 259, 41 S. E. 180; 117 Fed. 271.
Kielbeck v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. 30 Congran v. Bigelow 164 U. S.
(Neb.), 97 N. W. 750; Truskett v. 301, 17 Sup. Ct. 117; Baker v. John-
Bronaugh (Indian Ter.), 76 S. W. son (Del.), 42 Atl. 449; Cummings
294. Where there are several defend- v. Halena & L. S. R. Co. 26 Mont,
ants and one has not been served 434, 68 Pac. 852.
and does not appear, the court is si Evans v. Mills (Ga.), 46 S. E.
not authorized to direct a verdict 674.
as to him, but should dismiss with- 32 Evans v. Mills (Ga.), 46 S. E.
out prejudice, Sanders v. Wetter- 675.
126 DIRECTING VERDICT. 120
directed for the defendant. 33 Or where the evidence is so clearly
deficient as to give no support to a verdict for the plaintiff,
if rendered in his favor, it should be excluded and a verdict
directed for the defendant. 34 Or if the evidence for the plain-
tiff so clearly fails to make out a case that reasonable men
could not differ, or no reasonable ground could exist for a
difference of opinion among jurors as to the insufficiency of the
evidence, a verdict should be directed for the defendant. 35
When the controlling facts are admitted or not controverted
in any essential respect the court may instruct the jury what
their verdict should be. 36 So also the court is authorized to di-
rect a verdict where there is no conflict in the evidence between
the parties litigant. 37 So if from the undisputed evidence the
court would be compelled to set aside a verdict then the court
may direct a verdict. 38
Where the admitted facts conclusively show that an action
is barred by the statute of limitations a peremptory instruction
for the defendant is proper. 30 If the testimony of the plaintiff
himself shows that he has no cause of action a nonsuit is proper. 40
33 Chapman v. Yellow P. L. Co. 480, 54 Pac. 752; McCormick v.
89 Fed. 903; Phoenix A. Co. v. Standard Oil Co. 60 N. J. L. 243,
Lucker, 77 Fed. 243; Fisher v. For- 37 Atl. 617.
ter, 11 S. Dak. 311, 77 N. W. 112. ss Hurd v. Neilson, 100 Iowa, 555,
See also Collar v. Patterson-, 137 69 N. W. 867; Sax v. Detroit, G. H.
111. 406, 27 N. E. 604; Randall v. & M. R. Co. (Mich.), 89 N. W. 368;
Baltimore & O. R. Co. 109 U. S. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Martin, 114
478; Reed v. Inhabitants, 8 Allen Fed. 586. Contra: Dick v. Louis-
(Mass.), 524. ville & N. R. Co. 23 Ky. L. R. 1068,
s* Ritz v. City of Wheeling, 45 64 S. W. 725; Williams v. Belmont
W. Va. 262, 31 S. E. 993, 43 L. R. Coal & C. Co. (W. Va.), 46 S. E.
A. 148; Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. 802.
R. Co. v. Heath, 22 Ind. App. 47, 39 Exchange Bank v. Trumble,
53 N. E. 198; Horn v. Hutchinson, 108 Ky. 234.
163 Pa. St. 435, 30 Atl. 152; White 40 Smith v. Cohn, 170 Pa. St. 132.
v. Hoster B. Co. 51 W. Va. 259. 32 Atl. 565. An error committed
35 Fisher v. Porter, 11 S. Dak. in denying a motion to dismiss at
311, 77 N. W. 112; Ritz v. City of the close of the plaintiff's case for
Wheeling, 45 W. Va. 262, 31 S. E. the want of sufficient evidence, will
993, 43 L. R. A. 148; Rickards v. be regarded as cured where the ev-
Bemis (Tex. Cv. App.) 78 S. W. idence for the defendant afterwards
240. supplies the deficiency of the plain-
se Wabash R. Co. v. Williamson, tiff's evidence, O'Connell v, Sam-
104 Ind. 157, 3 N. E. 814; Hall v. uel, 31 N. Y. S. 889, 81 Hun, 357;
Durham, 109 Ind. 434, 9 N. E. 926, Cushman v. Carbondale Fuel Co.
10 N. E. 581; Peoples & Drovers' (Iowa), 88 N. W. 817. The court
Bank v. Craig, 63 Ohio St. 382, 59 may cause a dismissal immediate-
N. E. 102. ly after the opening statement of
37 Soloman v. Trisarri 9 N. Mex. counsel for the plaintiff without
121
PEREMPTORY WHEN VARIANCE.
In case the plaintiff wholly fails to prove some one element
essential to his right of recovery the court may properly direct
a verdict for the defendant. 41 And for the same reason a non-
suit is proper. For instance, where negligence is an essential
element of the plaintiff's case, and he fails to prove that element,
a nonsuit is proper. 42
127. If plaintiff's evidence varies from his pleadings. Where
there is a variance between the plaintiff's pleadings and evi-
dence it is proper to direct a verdict for the defendant, if
the evidence also fails to prove a case for the plaintiff; and in
such case it is not error to refuse leave to amend the pleadings. 43
Thus in an attachment suit where the evidence wholly fails to
sustain the charge of fraudulent conveyance as alleged in the
affidavit on which the action is based an instruction directing
the jury to find for the defendant is proper. 44 So also a non-
suit is proper where the plaintiff proves a different cause of
action than that alleged in his complaint or declaration. 45
the introduction of evidence, it'
such opening statement, taken as
true, fails to show a case for the
plaintiff, Sims v. Metropolitan St.
R. Co. 72 N. Y. S. 835, 65 App.
Div. 270.
41 Sack v. Dolese, 137 111. 138, 27
N. E. 62 (negligence); Bartelott v.
International Bank, 119 111. 269, 9
N. E. 898; Abend v. Terre H. &
I. R. Co. Ill 111. 202; Alexander v.
Cunningham, 111 111. 515; Ayer v.
City of Chicago, 111 111. 406; Fra-
zer v. Howe, 106 111. 573; Clark v.
Stitt, 12 Ohio C. C. 759; Lacy v.
Porter, 103 Cal. 597, 37 Pac. 635;
Louisville, St. L. & T. R. Co. v.
Terry's Adm'rx, 20 Ky. L. R. 803,
47 S. W. 588; Jackson v. Ferris
(Pa.), 8 Atl. 435; Brehmer v. Ly-
man, 71 Vt. 98, 42 Atl. 613; Wilcox
v. Willmin-gton R. Co. 2 Pen. (Del.)
157, 44 Atl. 686; Phillip v. Rentz, 106
Ga. 249, 32 S. E. 107; Ohio & M.
R. Co. v. Dunn. 138 Ind. 18, 37 N.
E. 546; Dunnington v. Syfeers, 157
Ind. 458, 62 N. E. 29; Cogan v.
Cass Ave. & F. G. R. Co. (Mo.
App.) 73 S. W. 738.
42 Daniels v. Leibig Mfg. Co. 2
Marv. (Del.) 207, 42 Atl. 447; Mt.
Vernor Bank v. Porter, 148 Mo.
176, 49 S. W. 982; Cox v. Norfolk
& C. R. Co. 123 N. Car. 604, 31
S. E. 848: Pace v. Harris, 97 Ga.
357, 24 S. E. 445. See Lyons v.
Wayervoss A. L. R. Co. 114 Ga.
727, 40 S. E. 698.
43 Strahle v. First Nat. Bank, 47
Neb. 319, 66 N. W. 415.
44 Wadsworth v. Laurie, 164 111.
48, 45 N. E. 435. See Gilmore v.
Courtney, 158 111. 437, 41 N. E. 1023.
A motion for a peremptory in-
struction because of a variance be-
tween the pleadings and proof, to
be of any avail on review, must
specifically point out the variance,
Probst Consolidation Co. v. Foley,
166 111. 31, 43 N. E. 750; Chicago
C. R. Co. v. Carroll, 206 111. 327.
45 Thill v. Hoyt, 56 N. Y. S. 78,
37 App. Div. 521; Case v. Central
R. Co. 59 N. J. L. 471, 37 Atl. 65:
Baker v. Johnson, 2 Marv. (Del.)
219, 42 Atl. 449. If a declaration
is defective, the defect cannot be
reached by a motion to instruct the
jury to find a verdict for the de-
fendant, Gerke v. Faucher, 158 111.
375, 382, 41 N. E. 982.
128
DIRECTING VERDICT.
122
128. If evidence shows contract to be illegal. The fact that
the transaction on which suit is brought was illegal, or that the
action may be barred by the statute of limitations, is not suffi-
cient reason for a nonsuit where such issue is raised by answer
and reply. These are matters of defense. 40 But where the
evidence conclusively shows that a suit is based on a gambling
contract the court is authorized to direct a verdict. 47
129. Peremptory improper for defendant. If there is any
evidence, though slight, which tends to establish the plaintiff's
case a peremptory instruction to find for the defendant is im-
proper. 48 And if the natural and reasonable inferences which
may be fairly drawn from the evidence tend to prove the plain-
tiff's case a general affirmative charge should not be given. 49
46 Fitch v. Bill, 71 Conn. 24, 40
Atl. 910.
47 West v. Sanders, 104 Ga. 727,
31 S. E. 619.
48 New York C. & St. L. R. Co.
v. Luebech, 157 111. 604, 41 N. E.
897; West C. St. R. Co. v. Lyons,
157 111. 593, 42 N. E. 55; Chicago
& N. R. Co. v. Snyder, 128 111.
655, 21 N. E. 520; Hartrich v.
Hawes (111.), 67 N. E. 13; Agne v.
Seitsinger, 96 Iowa, 181, 64 N. W.
836; P. v. People's Ins. Exchange,
126 111. 466, 18 N. E. 774; Wright
Fire P. Co. v. Poezekai, 130 111. 139,
144, 22 N. E. 543; Lake S. & M.
S. R. Co. v. Johnson, 135 111. 641,
649, 26 N. E. 510; Lake S. & M. S.
R. Co. v. Brown. 123 111. 162, 185,
14 N. E. 197; Lake S. & M. S. R.
Co. v. O'Conner, 115 111. 254, 261,
3 N. E. 501; Traveler's Ins. Co. v.
Randolph, 78 Fed. 754; Harlen v.
Baden (Kas.), 49 Pac. 615; Marx
v. Hess, 19 Ky. L. R. 42, 39 S. W.
249; S. v. Spengler, 74 Miss. 129,
21 So. 4; Kurd v. Neilson, 100
Iowa, 555, 69 N. W. 867; Schmidt
v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 90
Wis. 504, 63 N. W. 1057; Miller
v. Howard, 19 Ky. L. R. 22, 39 S. W.
37; Meyers v. Birch, 59 N. J. L.
238, 36 Atl. 95; Hartford v. City
of Attalla, 119 Ala. 59, 24 So. 845;
Martin v. Chicago & N. W. R.
Co. 194 111. 138, 146; Joliet R. Co.
v. McPherson, 193 111. 629; Zeigler
v. Pennsylvania Co. 63 111. App.
410; Consolidated L. & I. Co. v.
Hawley, 7 S. Dak. 229, 63 N. W.
904; Pound v. Pound, 60 Minn.
214, 62 N. W. 264; Dietz v. Met-
ropolitan L. I. Co. 168 Pa. St. 504,
32 Atl. 119; Rogers v. Brooks, 105
Ala. 549, 17 So. 97; Smart v.
Hodges, 105 Ala. 634, 17 So. 22;
Phillips v. Phillips, 93 Iowa, 615,
61 N. W. 1071; Chesapeake & N.
R. Co. v. Ogles (Ky.), 73 S. W.
751; Morrow v. Pullman P. Car
Co. (Mo. App.), 73 S. W. 281; Lee
v. Gorham, 165 Mass. 130, 42 N. E.
556; Kearns v. Burling-, 14 Ind.
App. 143, 42 N. E. 646; Rogers v.
Louisville & N. R. Co. 17 Ky. L. R.
1421, 35 S. W. 109; McKinney v.
Hopwood, 46 Neb. 871, 65 N. W.
1055; Davis v. Hoxey, 2 111. (1
Scam.), 406; Van Etten v. Edwards,
47 Neb. 279, 66 N. W. 1013; Dirim-
ple v. State Bank, 91 Wis. 601, 65
N. W. 501; Sexton v. Steele, 60
Minn. 336, 62 N. W. 392; McCrystal
v. O'Neill, 86 N. Y. S. 84.
49 Henry v. McNamara, 114 Ala.
107, 22 So. 428; Tennessee C. J. &
R. Co. v. Stevens, 115 Ala. 461, 22
So. 80; New York C. & St. L. R.
Co. v. Leubeck. 157 111. 604, 41
N. E. 897; West C. St. R. Co. v.
Lyons, 157 111. 593, 42 N. E. 55;
Florida C. & P. R. Co. v. Williams,
37 Fla. 406, 20 So. 558. It is error
for the court to exclude proper evi-
123 PEREMPTORY WHEN EVIDENCE CLOSE OR DOUBTFUL. 131
130. If the evidence tends to prove plaintiff's case. If there
is any evidence tending to support every element of the plain-
tiff's case it is improper and erroneous to direct a nonsuit, al-
though the defendant may have set up new matter in defense
which the plaintiff answered by replication. 50 The fact that
there is no evidence to prove some one or more of the par-
ticulars of a, case will not authorize the dismissal of the plain-
tiff's complaint, if his evidence supports a cause of action. 51 And
if the evidence tends to support any one of the counts of the
plaintiff's declaration an instruction to find a verdict for the
defendant is properly refused, although some of the counts may
not be sufficient to receive the evidence. 52 So if there is any evi-
dence whatever tending to prove a cause of action a nonsuit
is improper. 53
131. When facts are doubtful Different conclusions. If in
the opinion of the court it is doubtful from the evidence whether
the jury should be instructed to return a verdict for the defend-
ant the doubt should be resolved in favor of submitting the
case to the jury. 54 And where the case is doubtful the court
is authorized to exercise its discretion. 55 Where it appears from
the evidence that the defendant is not entitled to a verdict on
the merits of the case it is error to direct a verdict in his favor,
although the plaintiff's evidence is not sufficient to establish
his case ; 56 and where different conclusions might be drawn from
dence introduced by the plaintiff (S. Car.), 21 S. E. 322; Fitzwater
and direct a verdict for the de- v. Roberts, 116 Pa. St. 454, 31 AtK
fendiant, Huff v. Cole, 45 Ind. 300. 204; Howell v. New York, C. H.
so Hazy v. Woitke, 23 Colo. 556, & R. R. Co. 73 N. Y. S. 994, 68 App.
48 Pac. 1048. See Cleveland Axle Div. 409; Davis v. Kent, 97 Ga.
Co. v. Zilch, 12 Ohio C. C. 578; 275, 23 S. E. 88; Davidoff v. Wheel-
Wells v. Snow (Gal.), 41 Pac. 858. er & W. Mfg. Co. 37 N. Y. S. 661,
si Marden v. Dorthy, 42 N. Y. 16 Misc. 31; Evans v. Mills (Ga.),
S. 827; Talbotton R. Co. v. Gib- 46 S. E. 675; Kroetch v. Empire
son, 106 Ga. 229, 32 S. E. 151; Sex- Mill Co. (Idaho), 74 Pac. 868.
ton v. Steele, 60 Minn. 336, 62 N. 54 Mexican Cent. R. Co. v. Mur-
W. 392; Seymore v. Rice, 94 Ga. ray, 102 Fed. 264; Howey v. Fisher,
183, 21 S. E. 293. Ill Mich. 422, 69 N. W. 741. See
52 Illinois Cemit. R. Co. v. Weiland, Rinear v. Skinner, 20 Wash. 541,
179 111. 609, 613, 54 N. E. 300. See 56 Pac. 24.
Taylor v. Corley, 113 Ala. 580, 21 55 Ferguson v. Venice Tr. Co.
So. 404. 79 Mo. App. 352.
53 Norris v. Clinkscales (S. Car.), se Dennison v. Musgrave, 46 N. Y.
22 S. E. 1; Drummond v. Nichols S. 530, 20 Misc. 678.
132
DIRECTING VERDICT.
124
the evidence by different minds the jury should' determine the
facts."
132. Where either of two theories is supported. When the
evidence is such that it tends to support two theories, one of
which renders the defendant liable and the other not, the case
should be submitted to the jury. 58
133. Evidence strongly against plaintiff. It follows from
what has been said that, although it may appear that the evi-
dence tends strongly to show that the plaintiff has failed to
prove the essential facts necessary to make out his case, yet the
court is not authorized to take the case from the jury. 59 Hence
the court should not direct the jury to find a verdict for the
defendant on the ground that the evidence for the plaintiff does
not preponderate in his favor. 60
In New York the court has gone to the extent of holding that
57 Sweet v. Chicago, M. & S. P.
R. Co. 6 S. Dak. 281, 60 N. W. 77.
According to the practice in Rhode
Island it is discretionary with the
court to give an instruction di-
recting a verdict and no exception
lies to the action of the court in
giving or refusing such instruction,
S. v. Collins (R. I.), 52 Atl. 990;
Fillinghast v. McLeod, 17 R. I. 208,
21 Atl. 345.
ss Voegeli v. Pickel Marble &
G. Co. 56 Mo. App. 678; Working-
men's Banking Co. v. Blell, 57 Mo.
App. 410.
59 Padbury v. Metropolitan St. R.
Co. 75 N. Y. S. 952, 71 App. Div.
616; Baker v. Irish, 172 Pa. St.
528, 33 Atl. 558; O'Brien v. Chi-
cago & N. W. R. Co. 92 Wis. 340,
66 N. W. 363; Missouri M. Iron Co.
v. Hoover, 179 111. 107, 53 N. E.
560; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Eston,
178 111. 192, 195; 52 N. E. 954; Pitts-
burg, Ft. W. & C. R. Co. v. Calla-
ghan, 157 111. 406, 409, 41 N. E.
909; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Hein-
rich, 157 111. 388, 391, 41 N. E.
860; St. Louis, A. & T. H. R. Co.
v. Bauer, 156 111. 106, 40 N. E. 448;
National Syrup Co. v. Carlson, 155
111. 210, 40 N. E. 492; Weiiona
Coal Co. v. Holmquist, 152 111. 581,
38 N. E. 946; Rich & B. Malting
Co. v. International Bank, 185 111.
422, 428, 56 N. E. 1062; Henry v.
Stewart, 185 111. 448, 452, 57 N. E.
190; Chicago, &c. Foundry Co. v.
Van Dam, 149 111. 338, 36 N. E. 1024,
Wisconsin Cent. R. Co. v. Ross,
142 111. 9, 31 N. E. 412; Ames & F.
Co. v. Strachurski, 145 111. 192, 34 N.
E. 48; Insurance Co. of N. A. v.
Bird, 175 111. 42, 51 N. E. 686;
Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co.
v. Jenkins, 174 111. 398, 409, 51 N.
E. 811; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Ash-
line, 171 111. 314, 320, 49 N. E.
921; North C. St. R. Co. v. Wis-
wel, 168 111. 613, 48 N. E. 407; Chi-
cago & N. W. R. Co. v. Smith,
162 111. 185, 44 N. E. 390; Gerke
v. Fancher, 158 111. 375, 383, 41 N.
E. 982; Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Conlan, 101 111. 105; American
Strawboard Co. v. Chicago & A. R.
Co. 177 111. 513, 53 N. E. 97; Brant-
ley Co. v. Lee, 106 Ga. 313, 32 S. E.
101; Jenkins v. Louisville & N. R.
Co. (Ky.), 47 S. W. 761; Richards
v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 2*0 Ky.
L. R. 1478, 49 S. W. 419; Platz v.
McKean Tp. 178 Pa. St. 601, 36 Atl.
136; Heydrick v. Hutchinson, 165
Pa. St. 208, 30 Atl. 918.
o Mattoon v. Freemont, E. &
M. V. R. Co. 6 S. Dak. 196, 60 N.
W. 740.
Ti5 PRINCIPLES ILLUSTRATED. 134
the fact that the evidence preponderates so strongly in favor
of the defendant that the court would set aside a verdict for
the plaintiff as against the weight of the evidence, does not
warrant the court in directing a verdict for the defendant. 61
Where the evidence is such that under any view that can be
taken of it questions of fact are involved which must be de-
termined by the jury, a binding or peremptory instruction is
properly refused. 02
134. The foregoing principles illustrated. In an action for
personal injury if the plaintiff introduces any evidence tend-
ing to show the defendant to be guilty of negligence the court
is not authorized to instruct the jury to return a verdict for
the defendant. 63 Also in an action for the loss of goods through
negligence in shipping, if there is any evidence tending to prove
the negligence charged, a motion to find for the defendant should
be denied. 64
And in an action for killing stock, although the defendant's
evidence has fully overcome the presumption of negligence from
the fact of killing the stock, yet if the plaintiff's evidence in
rebuttal raises a material conflict on the point, an instruction
to find for the defendant is properly refused. 65 But if the evi-
dence as to negligence is wholly speculative an instruction to
find a verdict for the defendant is proper. 66 A nonsuit on the
ground of contributory negligence will be denied, unless the
evidence clearly shows that the plaintiff was guilty of negli-
gence. 67
In an action brought on a promissory note, given in settle-
ment of disputed claims, it was held that the plaintiff was not
entitled to have a verdict directed in his favor unless the facts
ei Luhrs v. Brooklyn H. R. Co. 64 Memphis & C. P. Co. v. Abell,
42 N. Y. S. 606, 11 App. Div. 173. 17 Ky. L. R. 191, 30 S. W. 658.
62 Smith v. Easton Tr. Co. 167 Pa. es Sheldon v. Chicago & M. &
St. 209, 31 S. W. 557. St. P. R. Co. 6 S. Dak. 606, 62 N.
ss Weeks v. Southern R. Co. 119 W. 955. See Robertson v. Illinois
N. Car. 740, 26 S. E. 124; Rickert Cent. R. Oo. (Miss.), 17 So. 235.
v. Southern R. Co. 123 N. Car. 255, e Gerwe Consolidated Fire W. Co.
31 S. E. 497; Central P. R. Co. v. 12 Ohio, C. C. 420.
Chatterson, 17 Ky. L. R. 5, 29 S. W. GT Mahnken v. Board of Chosen
18. Freeholders, 62 N. J. L. 404, 41
Atl. 921.
135 DIRECTING VERDICT. 126
essential to make the note valid are so apparent that reasonable
men could not differ as to such facts. 08
135. Peremptory instructions for plaintiff. The court may
instruct the jury to find a verdict for the plaintiff where there
is no evidence whatever tending to support a different verdict; 69
or where the evidence would not warrant a verdict otherwise
than for the plaintiff. 70 And it has also been held that where
the burden is on the defendant to establish his defense it is
not error to take the case from the jury by directing a ver-
dict, even before the defendant has rested his case, if his re-
maining evidence, with that already introduced, would not make
out his defense. 71 The court may direct the jury to find a ver-
dict for the amount sued for, subject to the court's opinion, on
a demurrer to the evidence. 72
136. Prima facie case undisputed. Where the plaintiff
makes out a prima facie case, and the defendant introduces
no evidence tending to dispute his claim or to establish a de-
fense, it is proper to direct a verdict for the plaintiff. 73 Thus
in a suit in ejectment if the plaintiff makes out a case by prima
facie proof, and there is no rebutting evidence, his right to
a verdict follows as a matter of law. 74 Also a verdict may be
es Morey v. Laird, 108 Iowa, 670, 421, 56 N. E. 807; Barrett v. Boddie,
77 N. W. 835. 158 111. 479, 42 N. B. 143; Solomon
C9 Anthony v. Wheeler, 130 111. v. Yrisarri, 9 N. Mex. 480, 54 Pac.
128, 132, 22 N. E. 624 (ejectment); 752; Tidwell v. New South B. & L.
Heinsen v. Lamb, 117 111. 549, 557, Asso. Ill Ga. 807, 35 S. E. 648;
7 N. E. 75; Caveny v. Weiller, 90 Arabak v. Village of Dodge, 62
111. 159. Neb. 591, 87 N. W. 358; Graham v.
70 Lancaster G. & C. Co. v. Mur- St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. 69
ry G. S. Co. 19 Tex. Cv. App. 110, Ark. 562, 65 S. W. 1048, 66 S. W, 344;
47 S. W. 387; Gichrist v. Brown, Faircloth v. Fulghum, 97 Ga. 357,
165 Pa. St. 275, 30 Atl. 839; Me- 23 S. E. 838. See also Kahrs v.
Waters v. Equitable Mort. Co. 115 Kahrs, 115 Ga. 288, 41 S. E. 649;
Ga. 723, 42 S. E. 52; Concord-Wil- Hazzard v. Citizens' Bank, 72 Ind.
liamis Lumber Co. v. Warren Grain 130; Beckner v. Riverside, &c. 65
Co. 114 Ga. 966, 41 S. E. 41. Ind. 468; Yankton F. Ins. Co. v.
71 Davis v. Holbrook, 25 Colo. 493, Freemont, E. & M. V. R. Co. 7 S.
55 Pac. 730. See also Jones v. Dak. 428, 64 N. W. 514; Ketchum v.
Achey, 105 Ga. 493, 30 S. E. 810; Wilcox (Kas.), 48 Pac. 446. Contra:
McNeel v. Smith, 106 Ga. 215, 32 Devine v. Murphy, 168 Mass. 249,
S. E. 119. 46 N. E. 1066; Hillis v. First Nat.
72 Mathews Adm'rs v. Traders' Bank, 54 Kas. 421, 38 Pac. 565.
Bank (Va.), 27 S. E. 609. 74 Anderson v. McCormlck, 129
"Westside Auction House Co. v. 111. 308, 309, 21 N. E. 803; Heinsen
Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. 186 v. Lamb, 117 111. 549, 557, 7 N. E.
111. 156, 57 N. E. 839; Marshall v. 75.
John Grosse Clothing Co. 184 111.
127 ALLEGATIONS ADMITTED, PLEADING INSUFFICIENT. 141
directed for the plaintiff in a suit touching the title to real estate,
where he shows a complete chain of title from the government
to himself, there being no evidence in opposition to his deeds
or documents proving his title. 75
137. When defendant admits all allegations. And it is
proper to direct a verdict for the plaintiff where the defendant,
by his answer and evidence, admits all the allegations of the.
plaintiff's claim. 73
138. When defendant's pleading is insufficient. The court
may instruct the jury to find a verdict for the plaintiff in a
case where the defense could not be shown under the general
issue, and where the special pleas relied upon were properly
held demurrable. 77
139. When verdict cannot stand And it has been held
that a peremptory instruction should be given for the plaintiff
where the evidence is such that the court would be bound
to set aside a verdict for the defendant as being against the
weight of the evidence. 78
140. Improper for plaintiff If any evidence for defendant.
The plaintiff is not entitled to a peremptory instruction if there
is any evidence, though slight, tending to support the defense
set up by the defendant. 79
141. If the evidence is conflicting. Where the evidence
which would sustain or defeat a recovery is conflicting, the ques-
tion is for the jury, and the giving of a peremptory instruction
to find a verdict for the defendant is error. 80 A nonsuit is also
75 Quinn v. Eagleston, 108 111. 248, v. Wolf rani. 71 Wis. 809, 71 N. W.
255; Los Angeles Farming & Mill- 809; Dooley v. Gorman, 104 Ga.
ing Co. v. Thompson, 117 Cal. 594, 767, 31 S. B. 203; Weatherford v.
49 Pac. 714. Strawn, 8 Kas. App. 206, 55 Pac.
7c Gifford v. Ammer, 7 Kas. App. 485; Forst v. Leonard, 116 Ala. 82,
365, 54 Pac. 802. See Stephens v. 22 So. 481; Mixon v. Warren, 94 Ga.
Koken Barber S. Co. 67 Mo. App. 688, 21 S. E 714; Shoninger v. Lat-
587. imer, 165 Pa. St. 373, 30 Atl. 985;
77 Moore v. Trussing, 165 111. 319, Lau v. Fletcher, 104 Mich. 295, 62
324, 46 N. E. 184. N. W. 357.
78 Reading Braid Co. v. Stewart, so Hargraves v. Home Fire Ins.
43 N. Y. S. 1129, 19 Misc. 431. See Co. 43 Neb. 271, 61 N. W. 611; Leiser
Decker v. Sexton, 43 N. Y. S. 167, v. Kieckhefer, 95 Wis. 4, 69 N. W.
19 Misc. 59. 979; Lewellen v. Fatten, 73 Mo. App.
79 Minnesota Thresher Mfg. Co. 472; Thornton v. Perry, 105 Ga. 837,
142 DIRECTING VERDICT. 128
improper, although the testimony of the plaintiff's witnesses may
seem to be inconsistent, contradictory or conflicting. 81
142. If part only of plaintiff's claim is contested. The
plaintiff is not entitled to have a verdict directed in his favor
where the defendant, by his evidence, contests only a part of
the claim for which suit was brought; 82 or where one of several
/persons against whom suit is brought as a firm makes defense
and contests the claim of the plaintiff a verdict should not be
directed for the plaintiff. 83
143. Where amount of claim is disputed. The court is not
authorized to direct a verdict for the plaintiff if there is any
dispute as to the amount due him. 8 *
144. Waving right to peremptory instruction. If the de-
fendant introduces evidence on his side of the case after the
court has overruled his motion, made at the close of the plain-
tiff's evidence, for a verdict in his favor, he thereby waives the
right to submit a peremptory instruction, and will not be heard
to complain of error in that respect unless he renews the former
motion at the close of all the evidence. 86 Likewise where a mo-
31 S. E. 797; Crawford v. Wittish, ber Lumber Co. v. Oberbeck Bros.
4 Pa. Super. 585; McNight v. Bell, Mfg. Co. 96 Wis. 383, 71 N. W. 605.
168 Pa. St. 50, 31 Atl. 942; Lever v. ss McKissack v. Witz, 120 Ala.
Foote, 31 N. Y. S. 356, 82 Hun (N. 412, 25 So. 21.
Y.) 392; Leob v. Huddleston, 105 * Brown v. Baird, 5 Okla. 133, 48
Ala. 267, 16 So. 714; McQuown v. Pac. 180.
Thompson, 5 Colo. App. 466, 39 Pac. ss Baltimore & O. S. R. Co. v.
68; Mayer v. Thompson B. Co. 104 Alsop, 176 111. 474, 52 N. E. 253,
Ala. 611, 16 So. 620; Marx v. Hess, 752; Hamilton Keeling Co. v.
19 Ky. L. 42, 39 S. W. 249; Rogers Wheeler, 175 111. 514, 51 N. E. 893;
v. Kansas C. & O. R. Co. 52 Neb. 86, Lynch v. Johnson, 109 Mich. 640,
71 N. W. 977; Swanson v. Menomi- 67 N. W. 908; Young v. West Va.
nee, E. L. R. & P. Co. 113 Mich. C. & P. R. Co. 42 W. Va. 112, 24
03, 71 N. W. 1098. S. E. 615; Vanderhorst Brewing
*i Crowe v. House of Good Shep- Co. v. Armhine (Md.), 56 Atl. 834;
herd. 56 N. Y. S. 223; Cohn v. Da- Totten v. Burhans, 103 Mich. 6, 61
vid Mayer Brewing Co. 56 N. Y. S. N. W. 58; Bell v. Sheriden, 21 D. C.
293; Cook v. Morris, 66 Conn. 196, 370; American C. Ins. Co. v. Heiser-
33 Atl. 994; Larkin v. Burlington, man, 67 Fed. 947; Goss v. Calkins,
C. R. & N. R. Co. 91 Iowa, 654, 162 Mass. 492, 39 N. E. 469; Freese
60 N. W. 195; Pacific M. L. Ins. Co. v. Kemplay, 118 Fed. 428 (the fail-
v. Fisher, 109 Cal. 566, 42 Pac. ure to move for a verdict is an ad-
154; Reilly v. Atlas I. C. Co. 38 N.Y. mission that there is sufficient ev-
S. 485, 3 App. Div. 363. iden.ce to go to the jury); Hansen
R2 Carter v. Fischer, 127 Ala. 52, v. Boyd, 161 U. S. 397, 16 Sup. Ct.
28 So. 376; Talbotton R. Co^ v. Gib- 571. In some jurisdictions the de-
son. 106 Ga. 229, 32 S. E. 157; Wil- fendant may renew his motion for
129 WAIVING PEREMPTORY, MOTION BY BOTH. 145
tion for a nonsuit is overruled the defendant waives the right to
claim error as to such ruling by introducing his evidence after
the court has thus ruled. 87
But in the State of Washington it has been held that if the
defendant's evidence, together with that of the plaintiff in re-
buttal, in no manner strengthens the plaintiff's case, then the
motion for a nonsuit must be given force; and, therefore, the
defendant, by proceeding with his evidence, waives his right
to claim error in the court's ruling only to the extent of allow-
ing the plaintiff any benefit he may derive from the evidence
introduced after the overruling of the motion for a nonsuit. 88
And where there are two defendants an instruction directing the
jury to find in favor of one of them is waived by the other,
unless he objects, and excepts to the court's ruling. 89
145. Motion by both parties Effect. If each of the parties
at the close of the evidence moves the court to direct a verdict
in his favor then the finding of the court in passing upon the
motions is conclusive, unless the evidence is wholly insufficient
to support the conclusion. 90 Or if the plaintiff asks the court
for a peremptory verdict in his favor and the defendant moves
for a nonsuit, they both consent that the facts shall be de-
termined by the court; 91 and in such case the finding of the
court in favor of one of the parties settles the facts in favor
a verdict in his favor at the close dons his plea and is not put to its
of the entire evidence, Baltimore proof, Garcia v. Candelaria, 9 N.
& 0. R. Co. v. Alsop, 176 111. 471, M. 374, 54 Pac. 342.
474, 52 N. E. 253, 752; Hannton oo Stearns v. Farrand, 60 N. Y. S.
Keeling Co. v. Wheeler, 175 111. 514, 501, 29 Misc. 292; Shreyer v. Jordan,
51 N. E. 893; Harris v. Shebeck, 151 61 N. Y. S. 889, 30 Misc. 764; Nor-
111. 287, 292, 37 N. E. 1015. tham v. International Ins. Co. 61
87 Thompson v. Avery, 11 Utah, N. Y. S. 45; Mascott v. National
214, 39 Pac. 829; Western U. Tel. Fire Ins. Co. 69 Vt. 116, 37 Atl.
Co. v. Thorn, 67 Fed. 287; Ratliff v. 255; Signa Iron Co. v. Brown, 171
Ratliff (N. Car.), 42 S. E. 887; N. Y. 488, 64 N. E. 194; Merwin v.
Jones v. Warren (N. Car.), 46 S. E. Magone, 70 Fed. 776; Magone v.
740. Origet, 70 Fed. 778. Contra:
ss Matson v. Port Townsend, S. Thompson v. Brerman, 104 Wis. 564,
R. Co. 9 Wash. 449, 37 Pac. 705. 80 N. W. 947; German Sav. Bank
Compare Cushman v. Carbondate v. Bates' Add. S. Co. (Iowa), 82
Fuel Co. (Iowa), 88 N. W. 817. N. W. 1005.
8 Pioneer Fire Proof C. Co. v. si Guenther v. Amsden, 44 N. Y.
Hansen, 176 111. 100, 52 N. E. 17. S. 982; McGuire v. Hartford Fire
Where the defendant's plea is one Ins. Co. 158 N. Y. 680, 52 N. E.
of set-off, and he moves for a ver- 1134; Smith v. Weston, 34 N. Y. S.
diet in his favor, he thereby aban- 557, 88 Hun, 25; Fogarty v. Hook,
146 DIRECTING VERDICT. 130
of the judgment. 92 Also if both of the parties agree that the
jury may be dismissed and a verdict rendered by the court, this
is equivalent to both asking the court to direct a verdict, and
is an admission by the parties that only questions of law are
involved to be determined by the court. 93
Where each of the parties moves for a verdict in his favor,
if the party whose motion is denied does not thereupon
ask to have the case submitted to the jury the verdict directed
by the court for the other party shall stand as the finding of the
jury. 94 And in such case if the party whose motion is thus
denied desires to have the case submitted to the jury he must
state the specific questions he wishes submitted; he cannot ask
to have the case submitted generally to the jury on all ques-
tions. 95 But where both parties move for a verdict in order to
submit to the court some particular matter only, such as a ques-
tion of notice, this act does not amount to a waiver of the right
to have the facts of the case submitted to the jury. The court,
under such circumstances, is not authorized to direct a verdict. 98
And the court is not authorized, over objection, to direct a ver-
dict where the plaintiff moves for a verdict and the defendant
for a dismissal in a case where the question of damages is in-
volved, it being the duty of the jury to determine the dam-
ages. 87
146. Waiving right to submit facts to jury. The right to
have the facts submitted to a jury is waived where each party
moves for a verdict in his favor. 98 Or if the plaintiff moves
32 N. Y. S. 555, 84 Hun, 165; Gro- Norton, 38 N. Y. S. 350, 3 App. Div.
gan v. U. S. Industrial Ins. Co. 173; Campbell v. Prague, 39 N. Y.
36 N. Y. S. 687, 90 Hun, 521. S. 55-8, 6 App. Div. 554. In such
2 Martin v. Home Bank, 160 N. case the defeated party will be re-
Y. 190, 54 N. E. 717. garded as having submitted all
93 Cutter v. Parsons, 43 N. Y. S. controverted questions of fact to
187. the court for determination, First
94 Pickett v. Metropolitan Life M. E. Church v. Fadden, 8 N. Dak.
Ins. Co. 46 N. Y. S. 693; Thompson 162, 77 N. W. 615.
v. Simpson, 128 N. Y. 270, 28 N. 96 University Press v. Williams,
E. 627; First Nat. Bank v. Hayes, 62 N. Y. S. 986.
64 Ohio St. 101, 59 N. E. 893; Beut- 97 Litt v. Wabash R. Co. 64 N.
tell v. Magone, 157 U. S. 154; Clason Y. S. 108, 54 App. Div. 550.
v. Baldwin, 152 N. Y. 204, 46 N. E. 98 Cleason v. Baldwin, 152 N. Y.
322; Mascott v. Insurance Co. 69 204, 46 N. E. 322; New England M.
Vt. 116, 37 Atl. 255. S. Co. v. Great W. & E. Co. 6 N.
95 Groves v. Acker, 33 N. Y. S. Dak. 407, 71 N. W. 130; Angier v.
406, 85 Hun, 492. See Switzer v. Western Ass. Co. 10 S. Dak. 82, 71
131 RIGHT WAIVED, DENIAL OF MOTION. 149
for a verdict and the defendant for a nonsuit they both waive
the right to submit the facts to the jury."
147. Motion of both parties denied Effect. Where the
court denies the motions of both parties to direct a verdict, and
thereupon submits a single issue of fact to the jury, error may
be assigned for a failure to submit the whole case, if the party
complaining shall have properly taken exceptions to the action
of the court. 100
148. Directing jurors to agree. The court is authorized to
direct a juror that he must agree with the other jurors in a
case where, in the judgment of the court, a peremptory verdict
should be rendered; and on refusal, the juror may subject him-
self to punishment for contempt of court. 101
149. Ruling of trial court reviewable. The action of the
trial court in refusing to give to the jury an instruction directing
them to find a verdict may be reviewed on appeal or writ of
error, where the ruling of the trial court is properly preserved
in the record by a bill of exceptions. 102 In order to make the rul-
ing of the trial court the subject of review on appeal or writ
of error the party complaining must, at the proper time, pre-
sent a written instruction, asking that the court direct a ver-
dict in his favor. 103 The ruling of the trial court on a motion
for a nonsuit, as to some particular point, will not be considered
by a court of review on appeal, unless the attention of the trial
court was called to the precise point contended for. 104 The
N. W. 761; Winter v. Williams- 101 Cahill v. Chicago, M. & St.
baugh S. Bank, 74 N. Y. S. 140, P. R. Co. 74 Fed. 285; Grimes Dry-
68 App. Div. 193; Westervelt v. goods Co. v. Malcolm, 164 U. S.
Phelps, 171 N. Y. 212, 63 N. E. 483, 17 Sup. Ct. 158, 58 Fed. 670.
962. Contra: Poppitz v. German 102 Gall v. Beckstein, 173 111. 187,
Ins. Co. 88 Minn. 118, 88 N. W. 50 N. E. 711; Illinois Cent. R. Co.
438. v. Nowicki, 1*8 111. 29. 35 N. E. 358.
Page v. Shainwald, 65 N. Y. 103 West C. St. R. Co. v. McCal-
S. 174, 52 App. Div. 349; Blass lum, 169 111. 241, 48 N. E. 424;
v. Ferry, 34 N. Y. S. 475, 87 Hun, Vallette v. Blenisld, 167 111. 565,
563. Contra: Wilson v. Commer- 47 N. E. 770; Peirce v. Walters,
cial Union Ins. Co. 15 S. Dak. 322, 164 111. 561, 565, 45 N. E. 1068.
89 N. W. 649. See Clark v. Clark, i* Jackson v. Consolidated Tr.
36 N. Y. S. 294, 91 Hun, 295. Co. 59 N. J. L. 25, 35 Atl. 75.
100 Signa Iron Co. v. Green, 88
Fed. 207.
150 DIRECTING VERDICT. 132
action of the trial court will not be reviewed if the motion is too
general. 105
150. Criminal cases Peremptory proper for defendant.
In a criminal case if there is no evidence tending to
convict the accused, or if the evidence is so weak that a con-
viction could only be attributable to passion or prejudice, then
it is proper to direct the jury to acquit the accused. 100 The
court should not submit a case to the jury where a verdict of
guilty would be palpably or flagrantly against the evidence. 107
Where there is no evidence whatever that the crime charged
was committed in the county of the indictment it is error for
the court to refuse to instruct that if the jury believe the evi-
dence they must find him not guilty. 108
151. When not proper for defendant. But where the evi-
dence, though wholly circumstantial, shows a state of facts
disclosing motive, threats or conduct of the defendant tending
to prove his guilt, an instruction requesting that the jury be
directed to find him not guilty is properly refused. 109 In other
words, where the weight of the evidence tends to support the
offense charged in the indictment a motion for a peremptory
instruction to find the defendant not guilty should be over-
ruled. 110
105 Kafka v. Levensohn, 41 N. the evidence to be insufficient to
Y. S. 368, 18 Misc. 202; Weber v. warrant a conviction, advise the
Germania F. Ins. Co. 44 N. Y. jury to acquit, but the court is
S. 976; Hartley v. Mullane, 45 N. not authorized to instruct the jury
Y. S. 1023, 20 Misc. 418. that there is no evidence to sus-
106 s. v. Couper, 32 Ore. 212, 49 tain a conviction, P. v. Daniels, 105
Pac. 959; S. v. Feisher, 32 Ore. 254, Cal. 362, 38 Pac. 720. In Indiana if
50 Pac. 561; Com. v. Yost, 197 Pa. it appears that the crime was com-
St. 171, 46 Atl. 845. But see P. v. mitted, but in another county, the
Streuber, 121 Cal. 431, 53 Pac. 918; court must arrest the proceedings
P v Daniels 105 Cal. 362, 38 Pac. and certify the case to that county
720 for trial, Burns' R. S. 1901, \ 1900;
107 Com. v. Hall, 18 Ky. L. R. 783, Welty v. Ward (Ind.), 72 N. E.
38 S. W. 498; S. v. Bartlett (Mo.), 596.
71 S. W. 149; P. v. Bennett, 49 N. 109 S. v. Hallock, 70 Vt. 159, 4
Y. 137; S. v. Flanagan (W. Va.). Atl. 51; Com. v. Williams, 171
35 S B. 862; Baker v. S. 31 Ohio Mass. 461, 50 N. E. 1035; S. v. Wil-
St. 314. See S. v. Brown, 119 N. son, 10 Wash. 402, 39 Pac. 106
Car. 789, 26 S. E. 121. (facts stated); Ter. v. Padilla (N.
108 Harvey v. S. 125 Ala. 47, 27 Mex.), 71 Pa. 1084; S. v. Hyde, 22
So. 763; Bailey v. S. 116 Ala. 437, Wash. 551, 61 Pac. 719.
22 So. 918. By statute in Cali- no Com. v. Brooks, 164 Mass,
fornia the court may, if it deems 397, 41 N. E. 660; S. v. Green,
133 PEREMPTORY FOR PROSECUTION WHEN. 152
152. Peremptory proper for prosecution When. The court
may properly direct the jury to find for the prosecution on the
issues of once in jeopardy and former acquittal where it clearly
appears that the first information was fatally defective in that
it contained no allegation whatever as to the ownership of the
property charged to have been taken by robbery, and the infor-
mation was dismissed after the jury was impanelled but before
any evidence was offered. 111 And on the merits in one state
it has been held that it is the duty of the court to direct the
jury to return a verdict of guilty where the undisputed facts
in evidence warrant a conviction. 112
117 N. Car. 695, 23 S. E. 98; Craw- Pa. Super. 542; Gott v. P. 187 111.
ford v. Com. 18 Ky. L. R. 16, 35 S. 261, 58 N. E. 293.
W. 114; Com. v. Foster (Ky.), 61 m P. v. Ammerman, 118 Cal. 23,
S. W. 271; S. v. Utley, 126 N. 50 Pac. 15.
Car. 997; S. v. Costner (N. Car.), 112 p. v. Elmer, 109 Mich. 493,
37 S. E. 326; Com. v. George, 13 67 N. W. 550.
CHAPTER V.
LAW DETERMINED BY THE COURT.
Sec. Sec.
153. Jury bound by law given by 161. Validity of ordinances and
the court. statutes for court.
154. Court should not belittle the 162. Foreign law a fact to be
law. proved.
155. Submitting legal questions 163. Illustrations of the principles
to jury improper. Legal questions.
156. Court interprets written in- 164. Illustrations of the principles
struments. Questions of fact.
157. Jury interprets oral con- 165. In criminal causes court de-
tracts, termines law.
158. Wills are construed by the 166. Jury made judge of law by
courts. statute.
159. Writing as a fact in chain of 167. In Massachusetts and Con-
evidence, necticut.
160. Some phases of writing ex- 168. In Maryland and Georgia.
plained by oral evidence. 169. In Louisiana and Indiana.
153. Jury bound by law given by the court. In the absence
of specific constitutional or statutory provisions expressly em-
powering the jury to determine both law and facts the principle
that the court shall determine the law and the jury the facts,
in both civil and criminal cases, has become firmly established. 1
And even in those jurisdictions where the jury are authorized
to determine the law, as well as the facts, it is the duty of the
court to fully instruct the jury as to the law. Thus in Missouri,
although the constitution of that state, in an action for libel, pro-
vides that the jury shall be the judges of the law and the facts
i Sparf v. U. S. 156 U. S. 51, case reviewing a long line of de-
15 Sup. Ct. 273 (a well considered oisions, and eminent text writers).
134
135 JURY BOUND BY THE LAW AS GIVEN. 154
the court is not divested of the right to fully instruct them as
to the law of the case. 2
So in Illinois, under a statutory provision that in all criminal
cases the jury shall be the judges of the law as well as the fact,
it is the duty of the jury to receive and act upon the law as
given them by the court, and they are not warranted in dis-
regarding it unless they can say upon their oaths that they
know the law better than the court does. 3 The rule that the
court must determine the law and instruct the jury accord-
ingly is so familiar and has been so often decided by the courts
that the citation of authorities seems unnecessary.* And it is
the duty of the jury to be governed by the law as given them
by the court. 6 The jury are bound to accept and apply the law
as laid down by the court, and while they have the power to
disregard it, yet in doing so they violate their oaths. 6
154. Court should not belittle the law. The court in charg-
ing the jury should not criticise or condemn the law. 7 Any
remark made by the court as to the law in charging the jury,
having a tendency to cause the jury to disregard or discredit
any of the instructions, to the prejudice of a party, is error. 8
To tell the jury that common sense is their "best guide", amounts
2 Jones v. Murray, 167 Mo. 25, 1089; Wabash St. L. & P. R.
6 S. W. 981; Heller v. Pulitzer Co. v. Jaggerman, 115 111. 411, 4
Pub. Co. 153 Mo. 203, 54 S. W. N. E. 641.
457. * Moore v. Hinkle, 151 Ind. 343.
s Wohlford v. P. 148 111. 301, 36 50 N. E. 822; Com. v. Anthes, 5
N. E. 107; Schnier v. P. 23 111. 11; Gray (Mass.), 185; Adams v. S.
Davison v. P. 90 111. 221. 29 Ohio St. 412; Com. v. McManus,
* Henderson v. Henderson, 88 14 Pa. St. 64, 21 Atl. 1018, 22 Atl.
111. 248; Mitchell v. Town of Fond 761; Brown v. Com. 86 Va. 466,
du Lac, 61 111. 176; S. v. Cough, 472, 10 S. E. 745; Carpenter v. P.
Ill Iowa, 714, 83 N. W. 727; Drake 8 N. Y. (8 Barb.), 603.
v. S. 60 Ala. 62; Whitney v. Cook, 6 s. v. Matthews, 38 La. 795. See
53 Miss. 531; Albert v. Besel, 88 P. v. Worden, 113 Cal. 569, 45
Mo. 150; Vocke v. City of Chicago, Pac. 844.
208 111. 194; Byers v. Thompson, i Clifford v. S. 56 Ind. 245; Steb-
66 111. 421; Gehr v. Hagerman, 26 bins v. Keene Tp. 55 Mich. 552,
111. 442; Gilbert v. Bone, 79 111. 22 N. W. 37.
345; P. v. Ivey, 49 Cal. 56; Riley Horton v. Williams, 21 Minn,
v. Watson, 18 Ind. 291; P. Ex. rel. 187; Head v. Bridges, 67 Ga. 227;
Bibb. 193 111. 309, 61 N. E. 1077; Cone v. Citizens' Bank, 4 Kas.
Matthews v. S. 55 Ala. 65; Hyde v. App. 470, 46 P. 414. See Roberts
Town of Swanton, 72 Vt. 242, 47 v. Neal, 62 Ga. 163; McCord v.
Atl. 790; Toledo, St. L. & R. Co. S. 83 Ga. 521, 10 S. E. 437.
v. Bailey, 145 111. 159, 33 N. E.
155 LAW DETERMINED BY THE COURT. 136
to telling them that common sense is superior to law in determin-
ing the guilt or innocence of the accused. 9
155. Submitting legal questions to jury improper. As a
general rule the giving of instructions which submit legal propo-
sitions to the jury for their determination is error. 10 But when
a question of law has been erroneously submitted to the jury by
(instructions, and they decide it correctly, the error is harmless. 11
Under the rule mentioned it is the duty of the court to de-
termine what allegations in the pleadings are material and nec-
essary to be proved, this being a question of law. 12 Hence an
instruction that the plaintiff must prove all the material al-
legations of his declaration is erroneous, in that it requires the
jury to determine what are the material allegations; 13 but error
committed in this respect may become harmless where other
instructions in the charge clearly and plainly state the material
issues to be determined by the jury. 14 . ,
But an instruction referring to the declaration and stating
that "if the jury find from the evidence that the plaintiff
has made out her case as laid in her declaration then the jury
must find for the plaintiff", is not subject to the crit-
icism, that it makes the jury the judges of the effect of the
averments of the declaration ; it merely empowers them to de-
termine whether the evidence introduced sustains the issues
9 Wright v. S. 69 Ind. 165; Dens- n Comfort v. Bollingal, 134 Mo.
more v. S. 67 Ind. 306. See Clif- 281, 289, 35 S. W. 609; Woodman
ford v. S. 56 Ind. 245; Kennedy v. v. Chesney, 39 Me. 45; Morse v.
Bebout, 62 Ind. 363. Weymouth, 28 Vt. 824; Knoxville,
10 p. v. Mayor, &c. 193 111. 309. C. G. & L. R. Co. v. Beeler, 90 Tenn.
61 N. E. 1077, 56 L. R. A. 95; 548, 18 S. W. 391; Martineau v. S.
Toledo, St. L. & K. C. R. 14 Wis. 373.
Co. v. Bailey, 145 111. 159, 33 12 Endsley v. Johns, 120 111. 469,
N. E. 1089; Wabash, St. L. & 477, 12 N. E. 247; Toledo, St. L.
P. R. Co. v. Jaggerman, 115 111. & K. C. R. Co. v. Bailey, 145 111.
407, 411, 4 N. E. 641; Bullock v. 159, 33 N. E. 1089.
Narrott, 49 111. 62, 65; Reno v. Wil- 13 Martensen v. Arnold, 78 111.
son, 49 111. 95, 98; Marsh v. Smith, App. 336; Chicago T. Tr. R. Co. v.
49 111. 396, 399; Davis v. Kenaya, Schmelling, 99 111. App. 577, 64 N.
51 111. 170; Mitchell v. Town of E. 714; Toledo, St. L. & K. C. R.
Pond du Lac, 61 111. 174, 176; Gil- Co. v. Bailey, 145 111. 159, 33 N. E.
bert v. Bone, 79 111. 341, 345; Gehr 1089; Endsley v. Johns, 120 111. 469,
v. Hageman, 26 111. 438, 442; Fink 477, 12 N. E. 247.
v. Evans, 95 Tenn. 413, 32 S. W. " Endsley v. Johns, 120 111. 477,
307; Merrill v. Packer, 80 Iowa, 12 N. E. 247; Toledo, St. L. & K.
542, 45 N. W. 1076; Miller v. Dun- C. R. Co. v. Bailey, 145 111. 159, 33
lap, 22 Mo. App. 97. N. E. 1089.
137 LEGAL QUESTIONS ARE NOT FOR JURY. 156
made by the pleadings. 15 So where the declaration charges
negligence in violation of a city ordinance an instruction that
if the jury believe from the evidence, that the plaintiff, while
in the exercise of ordinary care, was injured by the negligence
of the defendant, as charged in the declaration, they should
find for plaintiff, is not objectionable as submitting to the jury
for their determination the applicability of the ordinance to
the circumstances of the case. 16
156. Court interprets written instruments. Where papers
or writings of any kind, such as contracts, deeds, mortgages,
ordinances, by-laws, statutes, records or other documentary evi-
dence of any nature or character require construction, it is the
duty of the court, as a matter of law, to instruct the jury as
to the meaning of them. It is the exclusive province of the
court to interpret written instruments affecting the rights of
the parties ; and where two instruments between the same parties,
conveying different interests in the subject matter in litigation
are admissible in evidence, the court must determine the force
and effect of each, and whether the execution of the one is in-
consistent with the delivery of the other. 17
It is the province of the court to interpret written contracts
knd define what is and what is not within their terms ; for when
the parties have assented to definite terms, and incorporated
them in formal documents the meaning can be discovered on
inspection. 18 It would be a dangerous principle' to establish
where parties have reduced their contracts to writing and defined
the meaning by plain and unequivocal language, to subject their
interpretation to the arbitrary and capricious judgment of per-
sons unfamiliar with legal principles and settled rules of con.
struction. 19 ' Whether a contract is an entire one is a question
is Laflin R. P. Co. v. Tearney, 756; Wason v. Rowe, 16 Vt. 525;
131 111. 322, 325, 23 N. E. 389. Glover v. Gasque (S. Car.), 45 S.
is Pennsylvania Co. v. France, E. 113; Pitcairn v. Philip Hiss Co.
112 111. 398, 403. (C. C. A.), 125 Fed. 110.
IT Robbins v. Spencer, 121 Ind. is McKenzie v. Sykes, 47 Mich.
594, 22 N. E. 660; H. G. Olds Wagon 294, 11 N. W. 164; Tompkins v. Gard-
Co. v. Coombs, 124 Ind. 62, 24 N. E. ner, 69 Mich. 58, 37 N. W. 43; Mer-
589. See Comer v. Himes, 49 Ind. rill v. Packer, 80 Iowa, 543, 45 N.
482; Thompson Tr. 1065, 1066; W. 1076; Kingsbury v. Thorp, 61
Carlisle v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 56 Mich. 216 (partnership contract),
S. W. 365; Brady v. Cassidy, 104 28 N. W. 74; Seller v. Johnson, 65
N. Y. 155, 10 N. E. 131; Daly v. Kim- N. Car. 104.
ball Co. 67 Iowa, 132, 24 N. W. i Brady v. Cassidy, 104 N. Y.
157 LAW DETERMINED BY THE COURT. 138
of law for the court to determine. 20 The court must also de-
termine and explain to the jury the legal effect of contracts
or other documentary evidence. 21 In charging the jury on an
issue as to whether there was a contract between the parties
the court should instruct what would constitute such contract. 22
Whether a correspondence carried on between the parties con-
stitute a contract or not must be determined by the court, and
not by the jury. 23
157. Jury interpret oral contracts. Whether an oral con-
tract has been made between parties, and what are its terms,
are always questions of fact to be settled by the jury. But
where the existence and terms of a contract have been estab-
lished, its construction is a matter of law for the court. 2 * Where
a contract is by parol the terms of the agreement are, of course,
matters of fact, and if those terms be obscure or equivocal, or
are susceptible of explanation from extrinsic evidence, it is for
the jury to find also the meaning of the terms employed; but
the effect of a parol agreement, when its terms are given and
their meaning fixed, is as much a question of law as the con-
struction of a written contract. 25 In cases of written contracts
it is the duty of the court to define the meaning of the language
used in them, but in verbal contracts such duty is confined to the
147, 155, 10 N. B. 131; Bryant v. register); Salem, M. & M. R. Co.
Hagerty, 87 Pa. St. 256; Estes v. v. Anderson, 51 Minn. 829.
Boothe, 20 Ark. 590; Comfort v. 22 Boltz v. Miller, 23 Ky. L. R.
Ballingal, 134 Mo. 289, 35 S. W. 991, 64 S. W. 630. See generally on
609; Dwight v. Germania L. Ins. Co. construction!: Mantz v. Maguire, 52
103 N. Y. 341, 8 N. E. 654; Harvey Mo. App. 137; Jones v. Swearin-
v. Vandegrift, 89 Pa. St. 346; Zenor gen, 42 S. Car. 58, 19 S. E. 947;
v. Johnson, 107 Ind. 69, 7 N. E. 751; McHenry v. Man, 39 Md. 510; *Sel-
Warren v. Chandler, 98 Iowa, 237, lars v. Johnson, 65 N. Car. 104;
67 N. W. 242; Olds Wagon Works v. Burke v. Lee, 76 Va. 386; Lapeer
Coombs, 124 Ind. 62, 24 N. E. 589; Co. F. & M. F. Ins. Co. v. Doyle,
S. v. Williams, 32 S. Car. 123, 10 30 Mich. 159 (construction of insur-
S. E. 876; Knoxville, C. G. & L. ance policy turning on whether a
R. Co. v. Beeler, 90 Tenn. 549, 18 word was "six" or "oix").
S. W. 391; Fairbanks v. Jacobs, 69 23 Lea v. Henry, 56 Iowa, 662,
Iowa, 265, 28 N. W. 602; Keeler v. 10 N. W. 243; Batters>hall v. Steph-
Herr, 157 111. 57, 41 N. E. 750; ens, 34 Mich. 68; Luckhart v. Ogden,
Cohn v. Stewart, 41 Wis. 527. 30 Cal. 548; Goddard v. Foster, 17
20 Diefenback v. Stark, 56 Wis. Wall (U. S.), 123.
463, 14 N. W. 621. 24 Snolley v. Hendrickson, 29 N.
21 Libby v. Deake, 97 Me. 377, 54 J. L. 371. See Edwards v. Gold-
Atl. 856; Barton v. Gray, 57 Mich. Smith, 16 Pa. St. 48.
622, 24 N. W. 638; Stribling v. Pret- 25 Belt v. Goode, 31 Mo. 128.
tyman, 57 111. 377 (certificate of the
139 INTERPRETATION OF ORAL CONTRACTS. 158
jury. They are not merely to ascertain the words and forms
of expression, but to interpret their sense and meaning. 26
The question whether a contract existed must be determined
from the oral proof, from what the parties said .and did, and
the matter is single and cannot be separated so as to refer one
part to the jury and the other part to the court, but in its entirety
the question is one of fact. 27 And the question as to what the
contract really was between the parties is for the jury. 28 But
after the jury shall have determined what the oral contract is,
if any exists, it is the duty of the court, and not the jury, to
determine its legal effect as a question of law. 29 The court
submits to the jury the determination of the contract by hy-
pothetical instructions, and declares the legal effect according
to the finding of the jury.
Where the pleadings set out questions of law and fact the
court must submit to the jury only the questions of fact. 30
158. Wills are construed by the court. All questions touch-
ing the construction, operation and effect of wills are also to be
determined by the court, and not by the jury. 31 Whether a
will contains a special trust, which requires the joint action of
all the executors, is a question of law for the court to decide,
stnd not a question of fact to be referred to the jury for their
decision. 32
26 Herbert v. Ford, 33 Me. 90, 93; so Duren v. Kee, 41 S. Car. 171,
Copeland v. Hall, 29 Me. 93; 19 S. E. 492.
Walthelm v. Artz, 70 Iowa, 609, si Burke v. Lee, 76 Va. 386;
31 N. W. 953; Chichester v. White- Magee v. McNeil, 41 Miss. 17; S.
leather, 51 111. 259. v. Patterson, 68 Me. 473; Roe v.
27 McKenzie v. Sykes, 47 Mich. Taylor, 45 111. 485; Collins v.
294, 11 N. W. 164; Sines v. Superin- Green, 28 N. Car. 139; Willson v.
tendent, 55 Mich. 383, 21 N. W. Whitefield, 38 Ga. 269.
428. See Boyce v. Martin, 46 Mich. 32 Willson v. Whitefield, 38 Ga.
239 (whether altered by parol), 9 269, 283. Other documentary evi-
N. W. 265; Codding v. Woodi, 112 Pa. dence is governed by the same rule.
St. 371, 3 Atl. 455; Smith v. Hutch- Deeds: Bonney v. Monell, 52 Me.
inson, 83 Mo. 683; Walthelm v. 255; Hancock v. Colrybark, 66 Mo.
Artz, 70 Iowa, 609, 31 N. W. 953. 672; Huth v. Carondelet, 56 Mo.
28 Hughes v. Tanner, 96 Mich. 207; Dean v. Erskine, 18 N. H. 81;
113, 55 N. W. 661; Smalley v. Hen- Eddy v. Chase, 140 Mass. 471, 5
drickson, 29 N. J. L. 373; Folsom N. E. 306; Synames v. Brown, 13
v. Plumer, 43 N. H. 469; Tobin v. Ind. 318. Court records: Shook v.
Gregg, 34 Pa. St. 446. Blount, 67 Ala. 301 (decree); Gal-
29 Diefenback v. Stark, 56 Wis. lup v. Fox, 64 Conn. 491, 30 Atl.
462, 14 N. W. 621; Young v. Jeffreys, 756 (construction); Turner v. First
20 N. Car. 220; Barton v. Gray, 57 Nat. Bank, 78 Ind. 19 (construc-
Mich. 623, 24 N. W. 638. tion) ; S. v. Anderson, 30 La. Ann,
557.
159 LAW DETERMINED BY THE COURT. 140
159. Writing as a fact in chain of evidence. It frequently
happens that a writing is introduced merely as a fact or cir-
cumstance tending to prove some other fact. In such case it is
generally but a link in a chain of evidence, the accompanying
evidence being mostly, or altogether, oral. When such is the
case the jury have to pass upon the whole transaction, of which
the writing is but a part. The question then is, not so much what
the document means, but what inference shall be drawn from its
meaning, and what effect it shall have towards proving the
point at issue. The writing and all the concomitant evidence
go to the jury together. In such case the duty of the court
is comparatively unimportant. It may pronounce what meaning
the writing is, or is not, capable of, and whether it is, or is not,
relevant to the issue; still the value and effect of such evidence
is a question of fact for the jury. 33 So when a document is
introduced in evidence as a foundation of an inference of fact
to establish some other fact, whether such inference can be
drawn from it, is a question for the jury. 34 In other words, where
the question to be determined from a writing is not the con-
struction of it, but its effect as collateral evidence, then the
question is for the jury. 35
160. Some phases of writing explained by oral evidence.
There is a large class of writings where the meaning of par-
ticular words or phrases or characters or abbreviations must
be shown in evidence outside of the writing, and there may be
extrinsic circumstances of one kind or another affecting its in-
terpretation which may be shown by oral testimony. And it
has often been inaccurately said that in cases of this kind the
writing itself is to be passed upon and construed by the jury.
Strictly speaking, this is not so. The jury find what the oral
testimony shows, and the court declares what the writing means
in the light of the facts found by the jury. The facts may be
found by a special verdict, and then the court interprets the
.writing in view of such finding, or the case may go to the jury
with hypothetical instructions from the court to render a ver-
sa s. v. Patterson, 68 Me. 473; ss Reynolds v. Richards, 14 Pa.
Wilson v. Board, &c. 63 Mo. 142. St. 205; Robbins v. Spencer, 121
* Prim v. Haren, 27 Mo. 205; Ind. 594, 22 N. E. 660; Thompson
Mantz v. Maguire, 52 Mo. App. Tr. 1065, 1066.
137.
141 VALIDITY OF LAWS AND ORDINANCES. 162
diet if certain facts are found, and another way if the facts
are found differently. The court may first inform the jury
as to the law, or the jury may first inform the court as to the
facts, as may be most practicable. 36
161. Validity of ordinances and statutes for court. It is
the province of the court, and not the jury, to construe an
ordinance when it is introduced in evidence. 37 The validity
of an ordinance is a question for the court to determine, and
not the jury. 38 An ordinance of a city, is to be proved by evi-
dence addressed to the court, and not submitted as a fact to
be determined by the jury. 39 So whether a statute shall be
declared void for uncertainty, is a question of law for the court
to determine, and not the jury. 40
162. Foreign law a fact to be proved. When the laws
of another state come in question in the courts they must be
pleaded and proved as a matter of fact and determined by the
jury. 41 That the law of another state is a fact to be determined
by the jury is a well established principle. 42 But in such case it
becomes the duty of the court, as in the case of any other
sfi S. v. Patterson, 68 Me. 473. R. Co. 74 Iowa, 127, 37 N. W. 107;
Citing: Hutchinson v. Bowker, 5 Sadler v. Peoples, 105 Fed. 712.
M. & W. 535, 540; Smith v. sa City of Peoria v. Calhoun, 29
Faulkner, 12 Gray (Mass.), 251, 255; m. 317; Pennsylvania Co. v. Frana,
Putnam v. Bond, 100 Mass. 58; 13 111. App. 91.
Cunningham v. Washburn, 119 39 Ronlo v. Valcour, 58 N. H.
Mass. 224; Mowry v. Stogner, 3 346; Washington S. R. Co. v. Lacey,
Rich (S. Car.) 251; Powers v. Gary, 94 Va. 460, 26 S. E. 834.
64 Me. 9, 21. See also Olds Wagon 40 s. v. Main, 69 Conn. 123, 37
Co. v. Coombs, 124 Ind. 62 (con- Atl. 80, 36 L. R. A. 623 (statutes
tract ambiguous), 24 N. E. 589; construed by the court); Post v.
Brady v. Cassidy, 104 N. Y. 147, Supervisors, 105 U. S. 667; Gallatin
10 N. E. 131; Burke v. Lee, 76 Turnpike Co. v. S. 16 Lea (Tenn.),
Va. 386; Mantz v. Maguire, 52 Mo. 36.
App. 137; Foster v. Berg, 104 Pa. 41 Williams v. Finlay, 40 Ohio
St. 328; Goddard v. Foster, 17 St. 342; Ely v. James, 123 Mass. 36,
Wall (U. S.) 142; Meyer v. Shamp, 44; Kline v. Baker, 99 Mass. 253;
51 Neb. 424, 71 N. W. 57; West v. Lockwood v. Crawford, 18 Conn.
Smith, 101 U. S. 263; Helmholz v. 361; Hooper v. Moore, 50 N. Car.
Everingham, 24 Wis. 266; Ken- 130.
drick v. Cisco, 13 Lea (Tenn.), 248; 42 Alexander v. Pennsylvania Co.
Philibert v. Burch, 4 Mo. App. 470, 48 Ohio St. 623, 634, 30 N. E. 69.
(doubtful words must be determined See Thompson Tr. 1054; Wear v.
by the jury); Zenor v. Johnson, 107 Sanger, 91 Mo. 348, 2 S. W. 307;
Ind. 69; Humes v. Bernstein, 72 Moore v. Gwynn, 27 N. Car. (5
Ala. 546. Ired. L.) 187; Bank v. Barry, 20 Md.
37 Platt & S. v. Chicago, B. & Q. 287.
163 LAW DETERMINED BY TUB COUBT. 142
documentary evidence requiring construction, to construe the
statutes or decisions of the foreign state. 43 When foreign laws
are in evidence it is no less the duty of the court to determine
the law of the case from them than it is the court's duty to
declare our own laws in charging the jury. 4 * ' ' What is the
law of another state or of a foreign country, is as much a 'ques-
tion of law', as what is the law of our own state. There is this
difference, however: the court is presumed to know judicially
the public laws of our state, while in respect to private laws
and the laws of other states and foreign countries, this knowl-
edge is not presumed; it follows that the existence of the
latter must be alleged and proved as facts." 45
163. Illustrations of the principles Legal questions.
Whether the plaintiff or defendant has the affirmative on a
particular issue is a question of law for the court, and not of
fact for the jury. 46 The court may, without invading the pro-
vince of the jury, instruct that two or more different writings
introduced in evidence are not necessarily inconsistent in mean-
ing in reference to some particular fact in issue. 47 Also an
instruction which merely refers to certain documents involved
in a case, stating that they are to be considered and construed
together as part of one and the same contract, is not obnoxious
as conveying the idea that the jury are authorized to con-
strue the contract. 48
An instruction that if the jury find that a certain person
(naming him), "by reason of having hired the team, wagon
and driver from the defendant had become, as it were, the
owner thereof for that day" the defendant would not be re-
sponsible for any injury caused by the negligence of the driver
of the team, is properly refused. The question thus submitted is
43 Alexander v. Pennsylvania Co. 4R Gilbert v. Bone, 79 111. 341,
48 Ohio St. 623, 634, 30 N. E. 69; 345.
Ely v. James, 123 Mass. 36, 44; 47 Home Friendly Soc. v. Berry,
Cobb v. Griffin & A. Co. 87 Mo. 94 Ga. 606, 21 S. E. 583.
90. 48 Anglo American Provision Co.
44 Slaughter v. Metropolitan St. v. Prestiss, 157 111. 506, 518, 42 N.
R. Co. 116 Mo. 269, 23 S. W. 760; E. 157. Held submitting to the
S. v. Whittle, 59 S. Car. 297, 37 jury questions of law in the fol-
S. E. 923. lowing cases: Jordan v. Duke
45 Hooper v. Moore, 50 N. Car. (Ariz.), 36 Pac. 896; Pearce v.
(5 Jones), 130. Boggs, 99 Cal. 340, 33 Pac. 906.
143 FOREIGN LAW A FACT ILLUSTRATIONS. 163
one of law for the court. 49 It is error for the court to charge
that the jury may apply certain instructions "so far as they
are practicable in arriving at a verdict;" such charge submits
to the jury the question of determining the law. 50 Submitting
to the jury the questions as to what is "legal possession" and
"color of title" is improper, they being questions of law for
the court to determine. 51 To instruct the jury that if they be-
lieve the defendant was in actual possession of the land in
controversy at the time the plaintiff purchased and took a con-
veyance of it, without advising them what would constitute actual
possession, is error in requiring the jury to determine the law. 52
In an action where the plaintiff's title to a tract of land was
in issue a charge that if the plaintiff is the owner and entitled
to the possession of the land the jury should find for him ; and if
the defendant wrongfully entered and wrongfully withheld the
land they should assess damages, is erroneous in that it makes
the jury judges of the law as well as the facts. 53 An instruc-
tion charging that the paper title introduced by the plaintiff is
regular on its face, and with the proof of heirship is sufficient
to vest title in him to the land in controversy, is proper, and
does not invade the province of the jury in weighing the evi-
dence. 54
Whether a rule adopted in conducting or carrying on a certain
business, such, for instance, as railroad business, is reasonable
or not is a question of law for the court, and not for the jury,
to determine. 55 Also the question of the obligation of a rail-
road company to fence its track is a question of law, and should
not be submitted to the jury. 56 Whether certain clauses in an
instrument as to the description of property are repugnant
or not is a question of law to be determined by the court. 57
And the sufficiency of the description of property in a deed,
mortgage or other instrument is a question of law. 58
Tompkins v. Montgomery, 123 54 Howell v. Hanrick (Tex. Cv.
Gal. 219, 55 Pac. 997. App.), 24 S. W. 823.
BO Duthie v. Town of Washburn, 55 Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Whitte-
87 Wis. 231, 55 N. W. 380. more, 43 111. 420, 423.
si Blanchard v. Pratt, 37 111. 243. 56 Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Whalen,
52 Mayes v. Kenton, 23 Ky. L. R. 42 111. 396.
1052, 64 S. W. 728. 57 Rathbun v. Geer, 64 Conn. 421,
ss Smith v. Cornett, 18 Ky. L. R. 30 Atl. 60.
818, 38 S. W. 689; Ferguson v. BS Austin v. French, 36 Mich.
Moore, 98 Tenn. 342, 39 S. W. 341. 199.
163 LAW DETERMINED BY THE COURT. 144
What is a proper execution and acknowledgment of a mort-
gage is a question of law, and hence improper to be submitted 1
to the jury by instruction. 59 Where there can be no controversy
as to what facts are established by the constitution and by-laws
of an association, in evidence, it is the duty of the court, and
not the jury, to determine whether the association was or-
ganized for an unlawful purpose. 00 A charge that "the records
and papers which have been introduced in evidence are suffi-
cient proof of the establishment of a public highway in ac-
cordance with the plat therein set forth," is proper, it being
the duty of the court to determine the sufficiency of the records
to sustain the road. 61 Where an instruction states that if the
jury believe from the evidence that the act complained of was
a lawful act, the defendant is not guilty, it submits to the jury
a question of law. 62
In an action for trespass, where the defense was justification
under a replevin writ, an instruction submitting to the jury
the question whether the writ was duly and properly executed,
without informing them what would constitute a "due and
proper" execution is improper. 63 Whether a warrant issued
for the arrest of a person is valid or void is a question of law,
and when such document is introduced in evidence the court
may properly state to the jury whether it is or is not void. 64
The record of extradition proceedings is properly passed upon
by the court for the purpose of determining as a matter of law
whether the accused was extradited upon the same charge for
which he was placed on trial. 65 Where by statutory provision
a court is authorized to take judicial notice of the laws of na-
ture and the measure of time, it is. proper to instruct the jury
as to the time when the moon rose on a particular day, al-
though no evidence was introduced on that subject at the trial. 68
So also the court may instruct on what day of the week a
certain day of the month occurred. 67
so Bullock v. Narrott, 49 111. 62. * S. v. Yourex, 30 Wash. 611, 71
oo Johnson v. Miller, 63 Iowa, 529, Pac. 203.
17 N. W. 34. 5 S. v. Roller, 30 Wash. 692, 71
i S. v. Prine, 25 Iowa, 231. Pac. 718.
2 Can* v. S. 104 Ala. 4, 16 So. P. v. Mayes, 113 Cal. 618, 45
150. Pac. 860.
Gusdorff v. Duncan, 94 Md. ^ Koch v. S. 115 Ala. 99, 22
160, 50 Atl. 57. So. 471.
145 PRINCIPLES ILLUSTRATED AS TO FACTS. 165
164. Illustrations of the principles Questions of fact An
instruction stating that whether a certain act amounts to neg-
ligence is for the jury to determine under all the circumstances
in evidence is not objectionable as requiring the jury to decide
a question of law where the charge contains a legal defini-
tion of negligence. 68 Where a writing is introduced in evidence
for the purpose of showing some, extrinsic or collateral fact,
and its effect does not depend upon the construction or mean-
ing of the instrument, or of its effect upon some other instru-
ment, the inference of fact is to be drawn by the jury. 69
Where a memorandum or document on its face does not of
itself purport to be a promise to pay or other binding obliga-
tion, but which requires parol evidence to disclose the inten-
tion of the maker of it, the jury must determine from all the
facts and circumstances for what purpose the same was made. 70
The court will not decide as a matter of law whether a way
of a certain width is necessary to the construction of a road
on which to run or operate lumber trains. This is a question
for the jury to determine. 71 The court after having defined
probable cause in an action for malicious prosecution does not
submit to the jury both the law and the facts by further charg-
ing them that "both the question of probable cause and malice
are for the jury to determine" from the evidence. 72
165. In criminal causes court determines law. In most, if
not all, jurisdictions where the jury are not clothed with power
by constitutional or statutory provision to determine the law they
are bound to accept it as given them by the court, in criminal
as well as civil cases. 73 It is the duty of the court to instruct
ss Conner v. Citizens' St. R. Co. 269; S. v. Rheams, 34 Minn. 18,
146 Ind. 430, 45 N. B. 662. 24 N. W. 302; Sparf v. U. S. 156
9 Robbins v. Spencer, 121 Ind. U. S. 51, 15 Sup. Ct. 273 (exhaus-
594, 22 N. E. 660, citing: Thomp- tive review of cases and authori-
son Tr. 1065, 1066. ties); Adams v. S. 29 Ohio St. 412;
TO Murphy v. Murphy, 95 Iowa, S. v. Dickey, 48 W. Va. 325, 37
271, 63 N. W. 697. S. E. 695; S. v. Crotean, 23 Vt. 14;
TI Waters v. Greenlief John Lum- S. v. Stevens, 53 Me. 548; Wash-
ber Co. 115 N. Car. 648, 20 S. E. ington v. S. 63 Ala. 135; Pierce v.
718. S. 13 N. H. 536, 545; Harrison v.
Lewton v. Hower, 35 Fla. 58, Com. 123 Pa. St. 508, 16 Atl. 611;
16 So. 616. Brown v. Com. 86 Va. 466, 10 S.
73 Duffy v. P. 26 N. Y. 588, 591; E. 745; S. v. Burpee,' 65 Vt. 1, 25
Hamilton v. P. 29 Mich. 173; Han- Atl. 964, 19 L. R. A. 145.
num v. S. 90 Tenn. 647, 18 S. W.
166 LAW DETERMINED BY THE COURT. 146
the jury as to the law in criminal cases, and it is the duty of
the jury to follow the law as stated by the court. 74 Under the
statute of California, which requires the jury to receive the
law as laid down as such by the court, an instruction in sub-
stance charging that the jury should receive the law as the
court states it to be, notwithstanding "you may firmly believe"
the court is wrong, and that the law is, or should be, otherwise
than as given by the court, is proper. 75 Doubtless, however,
the jury have the power to disregard the law as given by the
court, but they have neither the moral nor legal right to
do so, and they cannot do so without violating their oaths and
disregarding their duty. 76
The doctrine that the jury are the judges of the law in
criminal cases is contrary to the fundamental law; contrary
to a vast preponderance of judicial authority in this country,
and contrary to the spirit and meaning of the constitution of
the United States. 77 The controversy in England over the ques-
tion whether jurors are judges of the law originated largely
from the course of procedure in prosecutions for libel. The
judges in such cases were accustomed to direct the jury to re-
turn a verdict of guilty upon proof of publication and the truth
of the inuendoes, without instructing them as to whether the
paper, if they so found, was or was not libel. The question of
malicious intent charged in the indictment was not submitted
to the jury. 78
166. Jury made judge of law by statute. By either con-
stitutional or statutory provisions of several of the states the
jury are made the judges of the law and the facts in all criminal
cases. 79 Hence the jury are not absolutely bound to accept the
law as given them by the court. In Illinois under a statute
which provides that "juries in all criminal cases shall be judges
74 Brown v. Com. 86 Va. 466, 472, S. v. Wright, 53 Me. 328.
10 S. E. 745; Com. v. McManus, 78 S. v. Burpee, 65 Vt. 1, 21, 25
143 Pa. St. 64, 21 Atl. 1018; Carpen- Atl. 964, 19 L. R. A. 145.
ter v. P. 8 Barb. (N. Y.) 603; Roto- McCarthy v. S. 56 Ind. 203;
bins v. S. 8 Ohio St. 167; Com. Broil v. S. 45 Md. 359; Com. v.
v. Anthes, 5 Gray (Mass.), 198. Anthes, 71 Mass. (5 Gray), 185;
75 p. v . Worden, 113 Cal. 569, S. v. Buckley, 40 Conn. 246; S. v.
45 Pac. 844. Thomas, 47 Conn. 546; Malone v.
TO Parrish v. S. 14 Neb. 61, 63, S. 66 Ga. 540; S. v. Ford, 37 La. Ann.
15 N. W. 357; U. S. v. Keller, 19 Fed. 443, 465.
633, 636.
147 JURY JUDGES OF LAW, WHEN. 167
of the law and the fact," while it is the duty of the jury to
receive and act upon the law as given by the court they are
not bound to do so if they believe upon their oaths the court
is wrong. 80
In Indiana, under a constitutional provision which declares
that "in all criminal cases whatever, the jury shall have the
right to determine the law and the fact," while it is the duty
of the jury to give careful and respectful consideration to the
instructions of the court, and not disregard such instructions
except for some good and sufficient reason, yet they have the
right to determine the law for themselves. 81 In view of this
provision the refusal of an instruction "that the jury in this
case are the exclusive judges of the law and facts" was held
to be error. 82 The jury may disregard the court's instructions
and follow their own convictions, but they should give respect-
ful consideration to the law as given by the court, especially
if they are in doubt as to what is the law. 83 The decisions of
the Supreme Court are no more binding on the jury in a crim-
inal case than the instructions of the trial court. 84
167. In Massachusetts and Connecticut. The statute of Mas-
sachusetts which provides that "in all criminal offenses it shall
be the duty of the jury to try, according to the established
forms and principles of law, all cases which shall be com-
mitted to them, and after having received the instructions of
the court to decide at their discretion by a general verdict both
the fact and the law involved in the issue, or to return a special
verdict at their election," has been construed as not conferring
on the jury the power to determine questions of law against
the instructions of the court. Such power under the constitu-
tion of that state cannot be conferred upon the jury. 85
In Connecticut, under a statute which provides that "the court
shall state its opinion to the jury upon all questions of law aris-
ing in the trial of a criminal cause and submit to their con-
so Davison v. P. 90 111. 221; Wohl- f* Bird v. S. 107 Ind. 154, 8 N. B.
ford v. P. 148 111. 301, 36 N. E. 14; Blaker v. S. 130 Ind. 203, 29 N.
107; Mullinix v. P. 76 111. 211. E. 1077; Hudelson v. S. 94 Ind. 426;
si McDonald v. S. 63 Ind. 544; McDonald v. S. 63 Ind. 544.
Reiser v. S. 83 Ind. 234; Bird v. S. 4 Reiser v. S. 83 Ind. 234; Fow-
107 Ind. 154; Walker v. S. 136 Ind. ler v. S. 85 Ind. 538.
663. ss Com. v. Anthes, 71 Mass. (5
82 McCarthy v. S. 56 Ind. 203. Gray), 185.
168 LAW DETERMINED BY THE COURT. 148
sideration both the law and the facts without any direction
how to find their verdict," the jury are the judges of the law,
but not in the sense that they are at liberty to disregard it;
nor are they at liberty to set aside the law and substitute for it
something else which suits their notions. They cannot make law
for the occasion. 86
168. In Maryland and Georgia. The constitution of Mary-
land provides that "in the trial of all criminal cases the jury shall
be the judges of the law, as well as the fact. 87 " The jury being
thus authorized to determine the law, as well as the facts, are not
bound by any instructions given them by the court, but are at
liberty to disregard them. 88 The court's instructions in such case
are regarded as merely advisory. 89
The Supreme Court of Maryland has declared that in view
of the constitutional provision mentioned it is discretionary
with the trial court to instruct the jury as to the law, at their
request, though the court is not bound to do so. 90 The constitu-
tion of Georgia declares that "in all criminal cases the jury
shall be the judges of the law and fact." 91 But notwithstand-
ing such constitutional provision the jury should listen to the
law given by the court and adopt it if they can conscientiously
do so; if not, then they are at liberty to judge the law for
themselves. 92 And it is proper for the court to instruct the
jury that they cannot set up ideas of their own in opposition
to the charge of the court. 93 But the right of the jury to judge
of the law is guaranteed to them and the accused by statute,
and that right cannot be abridged, weakened or thwarted by
the thunder of the court in their ears. 94 An instruction charg-
ing the jury that they should be clearly satisfied that the court
se S. v. Buckley, 40 Conn. 246; Wheeler v. S. 42 Md. 569; Guy v.
S. v. Thomas, 47 Conn. 546. S. 96 Md. 692, 54 Atl. 879; Beard v.
87 Beard v. S. 71 Md. 275, 17 Atl. S. 71 Md. 280, 17 Atl. 1044, 4 L. R.
1044; Broil v. S. 45 Md. 359. A. 675; Swann v. S. 64 Md. 425, 1
ss Broil v. S. 45 Md. 359; Swann Atl. 872,
v. S. 64 Md. 423, 1 Atl. 872; Wheeler i Malone v. S. 66 Ga. 540.
v. S. 42 Md. 563; Franklin v. S. ^ McDaniel v. S. 30 Ga. 853; Dan-
12 Md. 236; Beard v. S. 71 Md. 275, forth v. S. 75 Ga. 614, 623.
17 Atl. 1044, 4 L. R. A. 675. 93 Akridge v. Noble, 114 Ga. 949,
so Swann v. S. 64 Md. 423, 1 Atl. 41 S. E. 78.
872; Wheeler v. S. 42 Md. 563; 94 Dickens v. S. 30 Ga. 383;
Nuzum v. S. 88 Ind. 594; Beard v. Keener v. S. 18 Ga. 194; McDaniel
S. 71 Md. 275, 17 Atl. 1044. v. S. 30 Ga. 855.
so Forwood v. S. 49 Md. 537;
149 JURY JUDGES OF LAW, WHEN. 1G9
is wrong before they are authorized to differ from the court
is erroneous. 95
169. In Louisiana and Indiana. The constitution of Louis-
iana provides that "the jury in all criminal cases shall be the
judges of the law and of the facts on the question of guilt or
innocence, having been duly charged as to the law applicable
to the case by the presiding judge." 96 Although the jury are
the judges of the law, as well as the fact, in criminal cases, as
thus provided, they shall heed the law as given them by the
court; by which is meant that the charge of the court shall
have its moral weight with the jury. 97 Still, the jury should
not be tied down by peremptory instructions from the court as
to their duty in respect to any particular testimony nor what
their course should be as a matter of law in respect to the tes-
timony, in view of the fact that they are the judges of the law
and the evidence. 98
The court is required to instruct the jury as to the law appli-
cable to the case, and they ought to receive it as given to them,
though they are under no obligation to do so. 99 But in that
state it has been held error to charge the jury that if they "can-
not conscientiously believe that the court has given the law
correctly they do not violate their oaths in disregarding it,"
for the reason that they are bound to accept the law as given
them by the court. 100 "That the jury are the sole judges of
the law and the facts of this case, and that they have the right
to ignore the law given them by the court should they deem
proper to do so," is also erroneous. 101
In Indiana the statute requires the court to instruct the jury
and to inform them that they have the right to determine the
law. But the jury may disregard the instructions of the court
and determine the law for themselves. In other words, the
instructions of the court are advisory only in their influence
upon the ultimate judgment of the jury, both as to the law and
05 Golden v. S. 25 Ga. 527. v. Ballerio, 11 La. Ann. 81; S. v.
ss S. v. Ford, 37 La. Ann. 443, Scott, 11 La. Ann. 429; S. v. Saliba,
465. 18 La. Ann. 35. But see S. v. Mat-
9? S. v. Desforges, 47 La. Ann. thews, 38 La. Ann. 795.
1167, 17 So. 811; S. v. Tisdale 41 100 s. v. Matthews, 3-8 La. Ann.
La. Ann. 338, 6 So. 579. 795.
as S. v. Watkins, 106 La. 380, 31 101 S. v. Powell, 109 La. 727, 33
So. 10. . So. 748.
99 s. v. Tally, 23 La. Ann. 677; S.
169 LAW DETERMINED BY THE COURT. 150
the facts. 102 While the jury are the judges of the law and the
facts, yet this does not give them the right to decide the law,
regardless of all law, but it is their duty to follow or determine
the law as established by the proper tribunals. Under their oaths
they are required to determine the law correctly. But a trial
court may not instruct that the law as decided by the Supreme
Court is binding upon the jury. 103
102 McDonald v. S. 63 Ind. 544; 1077; Walker v. S. 136 Ind. 663, 36
Nuzum v. S. 88 Ind. 599; Wachstet- N. E. 356; Smith v. S. 142 Ind. 288,
ter v. S. 99 Ind. 290. 41 N. E. 595; Reynolds v. S. 147 Ind.
icsKeiser v. S. 83 Ind. 234; Ander- 3, 46 N. E. 31; Dean v. S. 147 Ind.
son v. S. 104 Ind. 467, 4 N. E. 63; 215, 46 N. E. 528; Bridgewater v. S.
Blaker v. S. 130 Ind. 203, 29 N. E. 153 Ind. 560, 55 N. E. 737.
CHAPTER VI.
JURY DETERMINE THE FACTS.
Sec.
170. Court prohibited from ex-
pressing opinion.
171. By common law court may
express opinion.
172. Submitting facts hypothetical-
ly.
173. Instructing that "evidence
tends to show."
174. Competency of evidence Is
there any evidence?
175. Intimating opinion is improp-
er.
176. Opinion not intimated Illus-
trations.
177. Opinion intimated Illustra-
tions.
178. Opinion not intimated
Criminal cases.
179. Opinion intimated Criminal
cases.
180. Instructions as to dying
declarations.
Sec.
181. Inferences and conclusions
are for the jury.
182. Weight of evidence is for
jury to determine.
183. Negligence When a question
of fact, when of law.
184. Instructions improper Illus-
trations.
185. Remarks and conduct of
court influencing jury.
186. Instructions urging jury to
agree.
187. Instructions attempting to
coerce jury.
188. Instructions not attempting
to coerce jury.
189. When court may comment on
evidence and express opin-
ion.
190. Illustrations of the rule.
191. Instructions reviewing the
evidence.
170. Court prohibited from expressing opinion. By con-
stitutional and statutory provisions of many of the states the
judges in charging the jury are prohibited from expressing or
intimating an opinion on the weight of the evidence, or what
the evidence proves or does not prove. Under these provisions
the jury are the sole judges of the facts and of the weight of the
evidence. 1 And by such provisions in some of the states the
i P. v. Welch, 49 Cal. 181; P. v. S. 29 Tex. 499; Chicago & N.
v. Casey, 65 Cal. 260, 3 Pac. 874; R. Co. v. Moranda, 108 111. 582;
Beverly v. Burke, 9 Ga. 447; Ross Cameron v. Vandergriff, 53 Ark.
151
171
JURY DETERMINE THE FACTS.
152
courts in charging the jury are prohibited not only from ex-
pressing opinions on the weight of the evidence, but are also
forbidden to sum up or recapitulate the evidence, and 'are only
permitted to declare the law. 2 Hence it is error to instruct the
jury in such manner as to impress them with the idea that they
are bound by the opinion of the court as to what the evidence
proves or does not prove. 3
381, 13 S. W. 761; S. v. Benner, 64
Me. 267; S. v. Barry, 11 N. Dak.
428, 92 N. W. 809; S. v. Carter,
112 Iowa, 15, 83 N. W. 715; Kear-
ney v. P. (Gal.), 17 Pac. 782; P.
v. Webster, 59 Hun (N. Y.) 398, 13
N. Y. S. 414. See, also, Hempton v.
S. Ill Wis. 127, 86 N. W. 596; Van
Duzor v. Allen, 90 111. 499; Myrick
v. Wells, 52 Miss. 149; United States
Life Ins. Co. v. Lesser, 126 Ala. 568,
28 So. 646; Clark v. Goddard, 39
Ala. 164; S. v. Dorland, 103 Iowa,
168, 72 N. W. 492; Ryder v. S. 100
Ga. 528, 28 S. E. 246; Tyler v.
Chesapeake & O. R. Co. 88 Va.
389, 13 S. E. 975; Florida C. &
P. R. Co. v. Lucas, 110 Ga. 121,
35 S. E. 283; S. v. Hahn, 38 La. Ann.
169; Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Pearcy,
128 Ind. 197, 27 N. E. 479; P. v.
O'Brien, 130 Cal. 1, 62 Pac. 297; Earp
v. Edginton, 107 Tenn. 23, 64 S.
W. 40; Riviere v. McCormick, 14
La. Ann. 139; Chicago & A. R. Co.
v. Robinson, 106 111. 142; Fulwider
v. Ingels, 87 Ind. 414; S. v. Ma-
honey, 24 Mont. 281, 61 Pac. 647;
Kearney v. S. 68 Miss. 233, 8 So.
492; S. v. Reed, 62 Me. 129; Lorie
v. Adams, 51 Kas. 692, 33 Pac. 599;
Granby Mining & S. Co. v. Davis,
156 Mo. 422, 57 S. W. 126; S. v. Daly,
16 Ore. 240, 18 Pac. 357; S. v. Greer,
22 W. Va. 801; Kirk v. Ter. 10 Okl.
46, 60 Pac. 797; Williams v. Dicken-
son, 28 Fla. 90, 9 So. 847; Com.
v. Briant, 142 Mass. 463, 8 N. E. 338;
Texas, &c. R. Co. v. Durrett, 26 Tex.
Cv. App. 268, 63 S. W. 904; S. v.
Tickel, 13 Nev. 502; Meadows v.
Truesdale (Tex. Cv. App.), 56 S. W.
&32; Carroll v. Chicago, St. P. M.
& O. R. Co. (Iowa), 84 N. W. 1035;
Hughes Cr. Law, 3246, citing:
Andrews v. P. 60 111. 354; S. v.
Pepo, 23 Mont. 473. 59 Pac. 721;
Logg v. S. 92 111. 598; S. v. Kerns,
47 W. Va. 266, 34 S. E. 734; Delvin
v. P. 104 111. 504; S. v. Mitchell,
56 S. Car. 524, 35 S. E. 210; P. v.
Travers, 88 Cal. 233, 26 Pac. 88;
S. v. Rose, 47 Minn. 47, 49 N. W.
404; Stephens v. S. 10 Tex. App.
120; Barnett v. Com. 84 Ky. 449,
1 S. W. 722; Starr v. United States,
153 U. S. 614, 14 Sup. Ct. 919; Chap-
man v. S. 109 Ga. 157, 34 S. E.
369; P. v. Plyler, 126 Cal. 379, 58
Pac. 904; Williams v. S. 46 Neb.
704, 65 N. W. 783; Merritt v. S.
107 Ga. 675, 34 S. E. 361; S. v.
Austin, 109 Iowa, 118, 80 N. W.
303; P. v. Ferraro, 161 N. Y. 365,
55 N. E. 931, 15 N. Y. Cr. 266;
S. v. Schmepel, 23 Mont. 523, 59
Pac. 927; Fuller v. New York L.
Ins. Co. (Mass.), 67 N. E. 879; Ward
v. Brown, 53 W. Va. 237; Central
Tobacco Co. v. Knoop, 24 Ky. L. R.
1268, 71 S. W. 3; Potter v. S. 117
Ala. 693 ; Galveston, &c. R. Co. v.
Karver (Tex. Cv. App.), 70 S. W. 328.
2 Southern R. Co. v. Kendrick,
40 Miss. 374; Renand v. City of
Bay City, 124 Mich. 29, 82 N. W.
1008; S. v. Asberry, 37 La. Ann. 125
(as to criminal cases) ; S. v. Green,
7 La. Ann. 518; Hannah v. S. 1 Tex.
App. 579 (as to criminal cases).
In North Carolina the court in
charging the jury is required by
statute to state "in a plain and
correct manner the evidence given
in the case, and declare and ex-
plain the law arising thereon,"
S. v. Norris, 10 N. Car. 391; S.
v. Brady, 107 N. Car. 822, 12 S.
E. 325.
s Shanck v. Morris, 2 Sweeney
(N. Y.), 464; Heydrick v. Hutch-
inson, 165 Pa. St. 208; 30 Atl. 819;
Burke v. Maxwell, 81 Pa. St. 139;
Burdick v. P. 58 Barb. (N. Y.), 51.
153
SUBMITTING FACTS TO JURY.
172
171. By common law court may express opinion. But in the
absence of such constitutional or statutory provisions under the
common law the court in charging the jury may comment upon
the facts and express an opinion on the weight of the evidence
as to what it proves or tends to prove or does not prove, provided
the jury are ultimately left free to determine the facts. 4
172. Submitting facts hypothetically. But the provisions
above mentioned do not prohibit the court from enumerating
the facts hypothetically which the evidence tends to prove with-
out intimating an opinion as to the truth or falsity of the facts,
and charging that if the jury believe the facts thus enumerated
they should find for the plaintiff, or find the defendant guilty,
as the case may be. 5 Thus, for example, it is not a violation
* Vanarsdale v. Hax, 107 Fed.
878; Steven v. Talcott, 11 Vt. 25;
Pool v. White, 175 Pa. St. 459.
34 Atl. 801; Setchel v. Keigeoin, 57
Conn. 478, 18 Atl. 594; Smith v. S.
41 N. J. L. 374; Hurlburt v. Hurl-
burt, 128 N. Y. 420, 28 N. E. 651;
Rowell v. Fuller, 59 Vt. 688, 10
Atl. 853; Simmons v. United States,
142 U. S. 148; First Nat. Bank v. Ho-
lan, 63 Minn. 525, 65 N. W. 952;
Holder v. S. 5 Ga. 444; Goldsworthy
v. Town of Linden, 75 Wis. 24, 43
N. W. 656; Durkee v. Marshall,
7 Wend. (N. Y.), 312; S. v. Lynott,
5 R. I. 295; Shoohn v. Com. 106
Pa. St. 369; New York Fire Ins.
Co. v. Walden, 12 Johns, (N. Y.),
519. See, also, Ames v. Cannon
River Mfg. Co. 27 Minn. 245, 6
N. W. 787; Follmer v. McGinley, 146
Pa. St. 517, 23 Atl. 393; Anderson
v. Avis, 62 Fed. 227; Bonner v.
Herrick, 99 Pa. St. 225; Sindram
v. P. 88 N. Y. 203; Haines v. Mc-
Laughlin, 135 U. S. 584; Ketchum
v. Ebert, 33 Wis. 611; Knapp v.
Griffin, 140 Pa. St. 604, 21 Atl. 449.
Under such constitutional provis-
ion of South Carolina it is error
for the court to comment on the
facts in charging the jury, al-
though the evidence is not dis-
puted or contradicted, S. v. Can-
non, 49 S. Car. 550, 27 S. E. 526.
See, generally, cases prohibiting
comment on the evidence by the
court: Winter v. Supreme Lodge
K. P. 96 Mo. App. 67, 68 S. W.
662; City of Bonham v. Crider
(Tex. Cv. App.), 27 S. W. 419 (re-
fused) ; Hartshorns v. Byrne, 147
111. 418, 35 N. E. 622; Rawls v.
S. 97 Ga. 186, 22 S. E. 529; Ware
v. S. 96 Ga. 349, 23 S. E. 410;
Com. v. Flynn, 165 Mass. 153, 42
N. E. 562; P. v. Brow, 35 N. Y. S.
1009, 90 Hun, 509; Yarborough v.
S. 86 Ga. 396, 12 S. E. 650.
s P. v. Hitchcock, 104 Cal. 482, 38
Pac. 198; S. v. Mitchell, 41 La. Ann.
1073, 6 So. 785; Davis v. Elmore, 40
S. Car. 533, 19 S. E. 204; Shea v.
City of Muncie, 148 Ind. 14, 46 N.
E. 138; Norris v. Clinkscales, 47
S. Car. 488, 25 S. E. 797. Facts
must be stated hypothetically.
Gable v. Rauch, 50 S. Car. 95,
27 S. E. 555. Rattlemiller v.
Stone, 28 Wash. 104, 68 Pac. 168;
S. v. Means, 95 Me. 364, 50 Atl.
30; Ryan v. Los Angeles I. & C.
S. Co. 112 Cal. 244, 44 Pac. 471;
Lagrone v. Timmerman, 46 S. Car.
372. 24 S. E. 290; S. v. Whittle,
59 S. Car. "297, 37 S. E. 923; Thomp-
son v. Johnson (Tex. Cv. App.),
58 S. W. 1030; Hamlin v. Treat,
87 Me. 310, 32 Atl. 909. See, also,
Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. v. Mar-
173 JURY DETERMINE THE FACTS. 154
of the constitutional provision which confines the court to a
statement of the law, to charge that if the jury believe from the
evidence beyond, a reasonable doubt that the defendant testified
to a certain state of facts (enumerating them) knowingly and
wilfully he is guilty. 6 But where the facts are in dispute, or
the evidence is conflicting, the instructions should be hypothetical
in form, that is, they should state the law upon a supposed
state of facts to be determined by the jury. 7 But where the
evidence clearly and conclusively shows without dispute that
a material averment or fact is true it is error to submit the
same to the jury hypothetically as though it were, in dispute. 8
A fact which is admitted or undisputed by the parties should
not be submitted for the jury to determine. 9 For to call upon
the jury to decide whether an undisputed fact is or is not
proved is to mislead them to the supposition that they may
find either way when the evidence warrants but one conclusion. 10
173. Instructing that "evidence tends to show." It is not
error for the court in reciting the substance of the testimony
to say "the evidence tends to show" a certain fact. The use
of such expression does not imply an opinion of the court on
tin, 111 111. 219; Ladd v. Pigott, proposition hypothetically need not
114 111. 647, 2 N. E. 503; Morgan make reference to the evidence, by
v. Wattles, 69 Ind. 260; O'Connell the use of the words "from the ev-
v. St. Louis C. & W. R. Co. 106 idence in the case").
Mo. 482, 17 S. W. 494. 8 Galveston H. & S. A. R. Co.
6 P. v. Hitchcock, 104 Cal. 482, v. Dyer (Tex. Cv. App.), 38 S. W.
38 Pac. 198; S. v. Fetterer, 65 Conn. 218; Houston & T. C. R. Co. v.
287, 32 Atl. 394. But see P. v. Land- Harion (Tex. Cv. App.), 54 S. W.
man, 103 Cal. 577, 37 Pac. 518; P. v. 629; Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co.
Hertz, 105 Cal. 660, 39 Pac. 32. v. Thompson (Tex. Cv. App.), 44
7 Sherman v. Dutch, 16 111. 282; S. W. 8; Scroggins v. S. 120 Ala.
Wall v. Goodenough, 16 111. 415; 369, 25 So. 180. See Johnson v.
Gowen v. Kehoe, 71 111. 66; Eames International & G. Co. 24 Tex.
v. Blackhart, 12 111. 195; Cham- Cv. App. 148, 57 S. W. 869; Win-
bers v. P. 105 111. 409; Bond v. ters v. Mowrer, 163 Pa. St. 239,
P. 39 111. 26; Bartling v. Behr- 29 Atl. 916; Texas & P. R. Co. v.
'ends, 20 Neb. 211, 29 N. W. 472; Moore, 8 Tex. Cv. App. 289. 27
Wilson v. Williams, 52 Miss. 487; S. W. 962.
Linville v. Welch, 29 Mo. 203; P. Winkler v. Winkler (Tex. Cv.
v. Levison, 16 Cal. 98; Stillwell v. App.), 26 S. W. 893.
Gray, 17 Ark. 473; Dodge v. Brown, * Hawk v. Brownell. 120 111. 161,
22 Mich. 446; Bartley v. Williams, 165, 11 N. E. 416. See Schmidt
66 Pa. St. 329; Hopkinson v. P. v. Pfau, 114 111. 494, 503, 2 N. E.
18 111. 264. See Belt v. P. 97 111. 522.
473 (an instruction stating a legal
155 COMPETENCY OF EVIDENCE INTIMATING OPINION. 174
the weight of the evidence. 11 Or to charge that "there is
some evidence tending to show" a certain fact is not error as
a comment on the weight of the evidence. 12 Nor is it improper
to instruct the jury that a party claims that a certain fact
is shown by the evidence. 13 The respective claims of the parties
may be stated, when fairly done, for the purpose of making a
proper application of the law to facts in evidence. 14
174. Competency of evidence Is there any evidence? But
the court must determine whether there is any evidence for the
consideration of the jury, tending to prove an issue or fact in-
volved ; and, of course, if there is no evidence the court may,
as a matter of law, instruct to that effect without invading the
province of the jury. 15 And whether evidence is competent or
not must be determined by the court. 16 "Where there is no evi-
dence tending to prove a fact the court may instruct the jury
to disregard such fact. 17 On the other hand, if there is any
evidence tending to prove a material fact in issue an instruc-
tion stating that there is no evidence of such fact is improper,
as invading the province of the jury. 18 The court cannot, as a
matter of law, instruct the jury what constitutes prima facie
evidence of a fact unless the law so provides. 19
11 Lewis v. Norfolk & W. R. Co. S. Car. 546, 40 S. E. 948; Underwood
132 N. Car. 382, 43 S. E. 919; Gra- v. American Mortg. Co. 97 Ga. 238,
ham v. Nowlin, 54 Ind. 389; S. v. 24 S. E. 847; P. v. Welch, 49 Cal.
Watkins, 11 Nev. 30; P. v. Flan- 174; P. v. Sternberg, 111 Cal. 3,
nelly, 128 Cal. 83, 60 Pac. 670. Oon- 48 Pac. 198 (accomplice); .Wells v.
tra: S. v. Donovan, 61 Iowa, 369, Clements, 48 N. Car. 168; Willis
16 N. E. 206; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Branch, 94 N. Car. 142; S. v.
v. Ohristman, 65 Tex. 369. Banks, 48 Ind. 197; Lange v. Wei-
is. Michie v. Cochran, 93 Va. 614, gan, 125 Mich. 647, 85 N. W. 109.
25 So. 884; S. v. Brown, 28 Ore. i International Farmer's Live
147, 41 Pac. 1042. See S. v. Ed- Stock Ins. Co. v. Byrkett (Ind.
wards, 126 N. Car. 1051, 35 S. E. App.), 36 N. E. 779.
540; P. v. Wong Ah Foo, 69 Cal. IT Lange v. Weigan, 125 Mich.
180, 10 Pac. 375. 647, 85 N. W. 109.
is Hawley v. Chicago B. & Q. is Hunter v. Third Ave. R. Co.
R. Co. 71 Iowa, 717, 29 N. W. 787. 45 N. Y. S. 1044, 20 Misc. 432;
i* Minims v. S. 16 Ohio St. 234. Jones v. Cleveland, 6 Pa. Super. Ct.
IB Com. v. Mulrey, 170 Mass. 103, 640; S. v. Horton L. & L. Co. 161
49 N. E. 91; Kent v. S. 64 Ark. Mo. 664; Cederson v. Oregon R.
247, 41 S. W. 849; King v. King, & N. Co. 38 Ore. 343, 62 Pac. 637, 63
155 Mo. 406, 56 S. W. 534; S. v. Pac. 763.
Gibbons, 10 Iowa, 117; Pepperall 19 Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Byars,
v. City P. Tr. Co. 15 Wash. 176, 58 Ark. 108, 23 S. W. 583. See
45 Pac. 743; Bryce v. Cayce, 62 Wheeler v. Schroeder, 4 R. I. 383.
175 JURY DETERMINES THE FACTS. 156
175. Intimating opinion is improper. The giving of instruc-
tions which intimate what the judge of the court believes the
evidence establishes as to any of the material facts in issue is
improper, it being the province of the jury, and not the court,
to determine the facts. 20 The expression of an opinion by the
court as to what has been proved by the evidence is not only
improper, but erroneous. 21 Especially is it improper for the
court, by instructions, to express any opinion upon any com-
bination of facts which does not embrace every contrary hy-
pothesis which the evidence tends to establish. 22 And although
the court's opinion on the weight of the evidence may be cor-
rect as expressed, that will not cure the mischief. 23
176. Opinion not intimated Illustrations. An instruction
that if the plaintiff by his negligence contributed to his injury,
so that but for it he would not have been hurt, the jury should
find for the defendant, is not objectionable as invading the pro-
vince of the jury. 24 A charge that "if the agent of the de-
fendant knew at the time of the delivery of the certificate or
policy of insurance whether the party was sick or not, and knew
he was sick and delivered the policy, then it would be a waiver;
that a waiver implies the idea that one has a right, and, with
knowledge of his rights and that which might defeat his rights,
does an act by which he waives the right to stand upon his
legal position or his legal right," is not a charge on the testi-
mony. 25
A charge in substance stating that direct evidence is not es-
sential to prove fraud, but that it may be inferred from all the
20 S. v. Allen, 45 W. Va. 65, 2A So. 188; Dorsey v. S. 110 Ga. 331,
30 S. E. 209; Coon v. P. 99 111. 35 S. E. 651; Searles v. S. 97 Ga.
368; Martin v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 692, 25 S. E. 388; Ezell v. S. 103
43 S. W. 91; Yundt v. Hartrunft, Ala. 8, 15 So. 818; Florida C. &
41 111. 14; Highway Comrs. v. P. R. Co. v. Lucas, 110 Ga. 121,
Highway Comr. 60 111. 58; An- 35 S. E. 283.
rlrews v. P. 60 111. 354, 357; Cut- 22 Weyrich v. P. 89 111. 99.
ter v. Callison, 72 111. 113, 117; 23 Acme Brewing Co. v. Central
Citizens' St. R. Co. v. Burke, 98 R. & B. Co. 115 Ga. 494, 42 S. E.
Tenn. 650, 40 S. W. 1085; Williams 8; S. v. Hyde, 20 Wash. 234, 55
v. S. 46 Neb. 704, 65 N. W. 783; Pac. 49.
Hine v. Commercial Bank, 119 24 Campbell v. McCoy, 3 Tex. Cv.
Mich. 448, 78 N. W. 471; Thread- App. 298, 23 S. W. 34.
gill v. Commissioners, 116 N. Car. 25 Rollings v. Banker's Union of
616, 21 S. E. 425; Davis v. Dregne, the World, 63 S. Car. 192, 41 S. E.
(Wis.), 97 N. W. 512. 90.
21 S. v. Hopkins, 50 La. Ann. 1171,
157 COURT INTIMATING OPINION. 176
facts and circumstances of the case ; and that if the jury believe
certain facts (enumerating them) they will find that there was
a fraudulent conveyance, is not objectionable as telling the jury
that fraud has been established. 26 A charge stating that "if
the truth comes from the lips of a negro you are bound to be-
lieve it just as much as if it comes from the lips of a white
man" is not a charge on the evidence. 27 Telling the jury that
they may ' ' consider what influence, if any, the passing of the
engine would have upon the mind and conduct of a prudent
person placed as the plaintiff was," was held not an improper
comment on the evidence. 28
In determining whether the employes in charge of an engine
at the time it was approaching a public crossing were exercising
ordinary care, .or were guilty of negligence, an instruction stat-
ing that the jury might consider the rate of speed of the engine,
the signals, if any were given, the place of the accident, and all
the facts and circumstances as to the movement and manage-
ment of the train, is not erroneous, but rather a proper guide
to aid the jury in determining what would, under the circum-
stances, constitute negligence. 29 In an action for assault and
battery, for the court to instruct that the plaintiff's injuries are
either very severe and serious, or very slight and that the
plaintiff is shamming, has been held not to be error where
the evidence showed that the plaintiff had either become a men-
tal wreck frem the alleged assault, or that he was in fact sham-
ming and practicing a fraud. 30
The court by instructing the jury that the case is "one mostly
of positive testimony" does not by such statement express an
opinion on the weight of the evidence, where, in fact, the evidence
is mostly positive. 31 A remark by the court that "I will allow
any testimony that will tend to elucidate the facts in this case,"
cannot be held objectionable as intimating an opinion of the
court on the weight or value of the testimony. 32
26 Alberger v. White, 117 Mo. so Spear v. Sweeney, 88 Wis. 545,
347, 23 S. W. 92. 60 N. W. 1060.
27 McDaniels v. Monroe, 63 S. ai S. v. Burns, 19 Wash. 52, 52
Car. 307, 41 S. B. 456. Pac. 316.
28 Baker v. Kansas City, &c. R. 32 Hoxie v. S. 114 Ga. 19, 39
Co. 147 Mo. 140, 48 S. W. 838. S. E. 944.
29 Lloyd v. St. Louis, I. M. & S.
R. Co. 128 Mo. 595, 31 S. W. 110.
177 JURY DETERMINE THE FACTS. 158
177. Opinion intimated Illustrations. For the court to
charge the jury that the contract in question is conceded, when
in fact it was denied, is error, although the jury may have been
recalled by the court and informed that the court was in error,
that counsel says that the court instructed wrong. 33 An in-
struction charging the jury to give more weight to one kind of
evidence than to another kind is improper, especially where the
evidence is conflicting. 34 A charge that if the jury believe the
evidence for the defendant they must find for the defendant is
erroneous when there is other testimony in the case. 35 It is an
improper comment on the evidence for the court to charge that
"fraud will never be presumed from mere obscurity, or ap-
parent error or incorrectness of the plaintiff's valuation of his
property" in a suit to recover on an insurance policy for loss
by fire. 36 Also, in an action against a railroad company for the
destruction of grass by fire, charging the jury that they may
consider the fact of burning by other fires and the volume and
quantity of sparks emitted from the engine, is improper as in-
vading the province of the jury in weighing the evidence. 37
For the court to charge the jury that if the defendants were
insolvent and unable to pay for goods at the time they pur-
chased them an intent not to pay for them should be presumed
is improper as charging on the weight of the evidence. 38 A
charge that "if the bridge was defective and unsafe on account
of decay of the timbers, and considering the length- of time the
bridge has been built, this condition ought to have been an-
ticipated and known by the officers of the town, using ordinary
care and precaution^' is an invasion of the duty of the jury. 3 *
Also a charge stating that "there is evidence showing plain-
tiff did not stop the cattle before going upon the crossing" is.
33 Hawley v. Corey, 9 Utah, 175, 37 Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co.
33 Pac. 695. v. Knippa (Tex. Cv. App.), 27 S.
34 Williams v. La Penatiere, 32 W. 730; Blashfield Instructions,
Fla. 491, 14 So. 157; Wheeler v. 47, p. 111.
Baars, 3'3 Fla. 696, 15 So. 584; Bowie 38 Barton v. Strond-Gibson Gro-
v. Maddox, 29 Ga. 286. eery Co. (Tex. Cv. App.), 40 S. W.
35 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Rice, 1050.
101 Ala. 676, 14 So. 639. 39 Bredlau v. Town of York, 115
36 F. Dohmen Co. v. Niagara Wis. 554, 92 N. W. 261.
Fire Ins. Co. 96 Wis. 38, 71 N. W.
69.
159 COURT INTIMATING OPINION CRIMINAL CASES. 178
erroneous, as it is the exclusive province of the jury to find
what is shown by the evidence. 40
178. Opinion not intimated Criminal cases. The expres-
sion of an opinion by the court that there is no evidence tending
to reduce the charge of murder to manslaughter affords no
ground for complaint where the jury are further instructed
that the facts were to be determined by them from the evi-
dence, and not by the court. 41 A charge that if the jury be-
lieve from the evidence that the defendant wilfully struck
another with a pistol which was a deadly weapon, or calculated
to produce death, when used in the way and manner the same
was used, is not improper as taking from the jury the duty of
determining whether the pistol was a deadly weapon, consider-
ing the manner in which it was used by the defendant. 42 An
instruction stating in substance that if the jury believe from
the evidence that the defendant took hold of the prosecutrix
and tore open her coat, and seized her arm with intent to have
carnal knowledge of her against her will and with the intent
to accomplish his object at all events, without regard to any
resistance she might make, he is guilty of assault with intent
to commit rape, is not an invasion of the province of the jury. 4a
A charge that "innocent men, men conscious of innocency, do
not have much occasion to fear a grand jury, and it is rather
unusual, I think you will say in your own experience, that
men who are conscious of having committed no offense either
to fear an indictment or to undertake to get out of the juris-
diction when a grand jury is sitting," was held not to be the
expression of an opinion by the court in violation of a statute
prohibiting the court from expressing an opinion during the
trial. 44 An instruction charging that the jury may disregard
any testimony which they believe from the evidence to be false,
is proper where the evidence is conflicting. 45 And where the
testimony of the witnesses for the defense is controverted by
40 Kinyon v. Chicago & N. W. 43 s. v. Urie, 101 Iowa, 411, 70
R. Co. 118 Iowa, 349, 92 N. W. N. W. 603.
40. 44 S. v. Means, 95 Me. 364, 50
ti Com. v. McGowan, 189 Pa. St. Atl. 30. See Adams v. S. 133 Ala.
641, 42 Atl. 365. 166, 31 So. 851.
42 Smallwood v. Com. 19 Ky. L. R. 45 3. v. Goforth, 136 Mo. Ill, 37
344, 40 S. W. 248. S. W. 801; Allen v. U. S. 164 U.
S. 492, 17 Sup. Ct. 154.
179 JURY DETERMINE THE FACTS. 160
the prosecution it is not improper to instruct that if the jury
believe the defendant has knowingly introduced false testimony
this fact may be considered as tending to show his guilt. 46
Charging the jury that if they believe the evidence intro-
duced by the state to be true it is their duty to convict the
defendant, if such evidence establishes his guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, is not improper where the jury are also instructed
as to what is meant by a reasonable doubt. 47 Or that if the
jury believe the testimony of the defendant as given by him
in his own behalf they may convict him where the evidence
otherwise justifies the giving of such an instruction. 48
179. Opinion intimated Criminal cases. A charge that
"the flight of a person suspected of a crime is a circumstance
to be weighed by the jury as tending in some degree to prove
a consciousness of guilt, and is entitled to more or less weight,
according to the circumstances of the particular case in which
such evidence is received, not as a part of the doing of the
criminal act itself, but as indicative of a guilty mind; that at
most it is but a circumstance tending to establish a conscious-
ness of guilt in the person fleeing," is erroneous as on the
weight of the evidence. 49 So to instruct that if the testimony
of a witness is true then the defendant is guilty, is improper as
being an invasion of the province of the jury where it appears
from the evidence that such witness did not see the crime com-
mitted by the defendant. 50
Charging the jury that "the evidence as to stolen property
as to recovering possession of any property was introduced
by the tate to show that the defendant had possession of
stolen property, and is only for the purpose of fixing the crime
on him," is improper as intimating an opinion of the court. 51
In a homicide case an instruction which states that if the
defendant inflicted the blow designedly he will be presumed to
" Allen v. U. S. 164 U. S. 492, S. v. Woolard, 119 N. Car.
17 Sup. Ct. 154; S. v. Magoon, 68 779, 25 S. E. 719.
Vt. 289, 35 All. 310. Contra: Ter. Cleavenger v. S. 43 Tex. Cr.
v. Lucero (N. Mex.), 46 Pac. 18. App. 273, 65 S. W. 89.
47 Derby v. S. 60 N. J. L. 258, 37 so s. v. Green, 48 S. Car. 136, 26
Atl. 614. See S. v. Green, 48 S. S. E. 234.
Car. 136, 26 S. E. 234. si Seals v. S. 97 Ga. 692, 25 S.
E. 388.
161 RELATING TO DYING DECLARATIONS. 181
have intended the probable consequences of his act is erroneous
in that it invades the province of the jury. 52 Also, telling
the jury that certain facts (enumerating them) or circumstances
do not prove the guilt of the defendant is improper as an
invasion of the province of the jury when such facts and cir-
cumstances, together with other evidence, tend to prove the
defendant's guilt. 53
180. Instructions as to dying declarations. The admissi-
bility of a dying declaration is a question exclusively for the
court to determine, but its credibility is for the jury, and the
court should so instruct the jury; 54 hence the court cannot
instruct as to the weight of such statements. 55 Dying declara-
tions should be weighed by the ordinary rules governing the
admission of other evidence; hence an instruction that "this kind
of evidence is not so satisfactory as the evidence of the wit-
nesses upon the witness-stand, and should, therefore, be care-
fully scrutinized" is improper as discrediting and casting sus-
picion upon such evidence. 08
An instruction that dying declarations are not entitled to the
same weight as would be the testimony of the deceased were
he present in court and testifying as a witness is properly re-
fused as being an improper comment upon the weight of the
evidence. 57 Also, a charge that dying declarations should be
received with great caution is likewise improper. 58 Where the
deceased, in his dying statement, positively declared that the
defendant shot him; that he knew it, because he was very
near to him at the time, an instruction submitting to the jury
whether such statement was merely an opinion, and if so, it
should not be. considered as evidence, is erroneous. 59
181. Inferences and conclusions are for the jury. It is not
within the province of the court by instruction to tell the jury
52 p t . v . Martin, 53 N. Y. S. 745, ne Shenkenberger v. S. 154 Ind.
33 App. Div. 282. 630, 639, 57 N. E. 519.
53 Wilson v. S. 71 Mies. 880, 16 57 s. v. Reed, 137 Mo. 125, 38 S.
So. 304. W. 574.
5* S. v. Phillips, 118 Iowa, 660, ss s. v. Gay, 18 Mont. 51, 44 Pac.
92 N. W. 876. 411.
" p. v. Amaya, 134 Cal. 531, 66 Allen v. S. 70 Ark. 22, 68 S.
Pac. 794. W. 28.
182 JURY DETERMINE THE FACTS. 162
that an ultimate fact is established from the proof of certain
evidentiary facts; that is, that if certain facts (enumerating
them) are established then the ultimate fact is proved. To
so instruct would be invading the province of the jury. 60 What
inferences may be drawn from the evidence should be left en-
tirely to the jury without any intimation by the court in that
respect. 01 In Massachusetts it has been held not to be error for
the court, in commenting on the evidence, to state that it has a
tendency to prove or is prima facie proof of a fact; that such
charge is not a direction to the jury to find such fact, but
merely that an inference of such fact would be supported by
the evidence. 62 But where a presumption of law arises from
the existence of certain facts then the court is authorized to
instruct the jury as to the inference to be drawn in the event
the evidence establishes the necessary facts to constitute the
basis of such presumption. 63 But it is not proper for the court
by instruction to say that the evidence admits of only one par-
ticular construction. It is for the jury to draw their own con-
clusions from the evidence what it proves or does not prove. 6 *
182. Weight of evidence is for the jury to determine. The
weight of the evidence must be determined by the jury ; hence it
is improper for the court to instruct that certain facts are en-
titled to little weight. 05 "Whether circumstances shown in evi-
dence are entitled to any weight or not is purely a matter for
eo Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. 62 Cormody v. Boston Gaslight
Warner, 123 111. 49, 14 N. E. 206; Co. 162 Mass. 539, 39 N. E. 184.
Mayer v. Wilkins, 37 Fla. 244, 19 ss Wheeler v. Schroeder, 4 R. I.
So. 639 (fraud). 383.
ei Omaha Fair & E. Asso. v. Mis- e-* Langdon v. P. 133 111. 408, 24
souri Pac. R. Co. 42 Neb. 105, 60 N. E. 874; Chicago & E. I. R. Co.
N. W. 330; City of Columbus v. v. O'Conner, 119 111. 598, 9 N. E.
Strassner, 138 Ind. 301, 37 N. E. 263; McQuay v. Richmond & D.
719; Howard v. Carpenter, 22 Md. R. Co. 109 N. Car. 585, 13 S. E.
10; Bluedorn v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. 944; Burkham v. Mastin, 54 Ala.
(Mo.), 24 S. W. 57; Clifford v. Lee 122.
(Tex. Cv. App.), 23 S. W. 843; 65 Smith v. Meyers, 52 Neb. 70,
Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. v 71 N. W. 1006; Bonner v. S. 107
Falvey, 104 Ind. 409; Brownell v. Ala. 97, 18 So. 226; Granby M. &
Fuller, 60 Neb. 558, 83 N. W. 669; S. Co. v. Davis, 156 Mo. 422, 57 S.
Cain v. Hunt, 41 Ind. 466; Union W. 126; Knowles v. Nixon, 17
M. L. Ins. Co. v. Buchanan, 100 Mont. 473, 43 Pac. 628; Davis v.
Ind. 81; Shultz v. Shultz, 113 Mich. Hays, 89 Ala. 563, 8 So. 131 (full
502, 71 N. W. 854; S. v. Mahoney, weight).
24 Mont. 281, 61 Pac. 647.
163
WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE NEGLIGENCE A FACT.
183
the jury to determine; hence it is improper for the court to say
that the jury must give weight to certain circumstances." The
weight of the evidence is a matter exclusively for the jury, and
it is not within the province of the court by instructions to in-
timate anything on the subject. 67 In testing the truth and
weight of evidence, and what it proves, the jury must do so
by their knowledge and judgment derived from experience,
observation and reflection. They are not bound to regard evi-
dence precisely as given, but must consider its truth and weight
by their knowledge of men and the business affairs of life, to-
gether with the motives which influence men. 68
183. Negligence When a question of fact, when of law.
Where the question of negligence is an element of the case
it is for the jury to determine from all the evidence whether the
party charged with negligence is guilty or not. The court
cannot say by instructions that a certain fact or state of facts,
constitute negligence. 69 For to say to the jury as a matter of
law that certain facts per se constitute negligence is improper.
ee Moody v. S. 114 Ga. 449, 40
S. E. 242. See Dickenson v. S.
(Tex. Cr. App.), 63 S. W. 328;
Phillips v. Williams, 39 Ga. 602;
Marr v. Marr, 5 Sneed (Term.),
385.
67 Richmond v. Roberts, 98 111.
472, 479; Village of Fairbury v.
Rogers, 98 111. 554; Johnson v. S.
(Miss.), 27 So. 880; Stobie v. Dills,
62 111. 432, 438; Rice & Bullen Mat-
ting Co. v. International Bank, 185
111. 422, 56 N. E. 1062; City of Dal-
las v. Breeman, 23 Tex. Cv. App.
315, 55 S. W. 762; Granby Min-
ing & Smelting Co. v. Davis, 156
Mo. 422, 57 S. W. 126; Hull v. City
of St. Louis, 138 Mo. 618, 39 S. W.
446; Citizens' St. R. Co. v. Burke,
98 Tenn. 650; Bunting v. Saltz, 84
Cal. 168, 24 Pac. 167; S. v. Wyse, 32
S. Car 45, 40 S. W. 1085; Harts-
horn v. Byrne, 147 111. 418, 35 N. E.
622; Kinney v. North Carolina R.
Co. 122 N. Car. 961, 30 S. E. 318;
Short v. Kelly (Tex. Civ. App.), 62
S. W. 944; Canado v. Curry, 73 Ind.
246 (stating that testimony is even-
ly balanced); S. v. Swayne, 30 La.
Ann. 1323; Bardwell v. Ziegler, 3
Wash. 34, 28 Pac. 360; McVeigh v. S.
43 Tex. Cv. App. 17, 62 S. W. 757;
Leonard v. Ter. 2 Wash. Ter. 381
(disproving circumstances), 7 Pac.
872; Burkham v. Martin, 54 Ala.
122 (stating that the evidence is
conclusive) ; Jenkins v. Tobin, 31
Ark. 307; Wolcott v. Heath, 78 111.
433.
es Ottawa Gas Light & Coke Co.
v. Graham, 28 111. 73, 78; Chicago,
B. & Q. R. Co. v. Krayenbuhl
(Neb.), 91 N. W. 880. See Sanford
v. Gates, 38 Kas. 405, 16 Pao. 807.
69 Pennsylvania Co. v. McCaffrey.
173 111. 175, 50 N. E. 713; Chicago
& Alton R. Co. v. Maroney, 170
111. 526, 48 N. E. 953; City of Peoria
v. Gerber, 168 111. 323, 48 N. E.
152; North Chicago St. R. Co. v.
Williams, 140 111. 281, 29 N. E.
672; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Slater,
139 111. 199, 28 N. E. 830; Lake S.
& M. S. R. Co. v. O'Conner, 115 111.
254, 262, 3 N. E. 501; Taylor v.
Felsing, 164 III. 331, 338, 45 N. E.
161; New York C. & St. L. R. Co.
v. Blumenthal, 160 111. 40, 49, 43 N.
E. 809; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v.
O'Keefe, 154 ill. 508, 514, 39 N. E.
183 JURY DETERMINE THE FACTS. 164
Negligence is a question of fact to be proved like any other fact
in issue. But, of course, this does not mean that the definition
of negligence is a question of fact. 70
Courts are not at liberty to say, as a matter of law, by in-
structions that a person must conduct himself in a particular
manner and observe a certain line of conduct under all circum-
stances. Negligence does not become a question of law alone,
unless the acts constituting it are of such a character that all
reasonable men would concur in pronouncing it so. 71 Nor can
the court tell the jury what does not constitute negligence, as
by instructing "that the mere fact that a drawbar of a car
should break when struck by another car in motion is not suf-
ficent to establish negligence." It is for the jury to determine
whether the facts proved do or do not constitute negligence. 72
Nor has the court the right to charge, where negligence is an
element, that if all the evidence be believed the plaintiff cannot
recover, where the evidence shows that the plaintiff has made
out a prima facie case. The weight of the evidence is for the
jury to determine. 73
On the same principle it is improper for the court to state
to the jury that if a person gets upon a street car drawn by
horses, while it is in motion, his act is such conclusive proof of
contributory negligence that he cannot recover for an injury
606; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Byrum, W. 25. The court cannot say by
153 111. 131, 135, 38 N. E. 578; East instruction what facts do or do not
St. L. C. R. Co. v. O'Harra, 150 111. constitute fraud, Leasure v. Col-
580, 586, 37 N. E. 917; Chicago & A. burn, 57 Ind. 274. See Higgin-
R. Co. v. Kelly, 182 111. 167, 173, 54 botham v. Campbell, 85 Ga. 638,
N. E. 979; Consolidated Coal Co. 11 S. E. 1027; Shealy v. Edwards,
v. B6kamp, 181 111. 9, 18, 54 N. E. 75 Ala. 411; nor what facts con-
567; Gohn v. Doerle, 85 111. 514; stitute undue influence in a will
Texas, &c. R. Co. v. Nelson. 9 Tex. contest, Higginbotham v. Higgin-
Cv. App. 156, 29 S. W. 78; Chicago botham, 106 Ala. 314, 17 So. 516;
& A. R. Co. v. Anderson, 162 111. In re Townsend's Estate (Iowa),
572, 46 N. E. 1125; San Antonio 97 N. W. 1111.
& A. P. R. Co. v. Long, 4 Tex. Cv. ?i Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. v. Pol-
App. 497, 23 S. W. 499; Chesapeake lock, 195 111. 162, 62 N. E. 831.
& O. R. Co. v. Gunter, 108 Ky. 365, 72 Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Wangslin,
56 S. W. 527; Texas C. R. Co. v. 152 111. 141, 38 N. E. 760; North
Burnett, 80 Tex. 536, 16 S. W. 320. C. St. R. Co. v. Eldridge, 151 111.
TO Pennsylvania Co. v. Conlan, 101 550, 38 N. E. 246; Galveston, H. &
111. 106; North C. St. R. Co. v. S. A. R. Co. v. Michalke, 14 Tex. Cv.
Williams, 140 111. 281. 29 N. E. App. 495, 37 3. W. 480.
672; Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Sherrill v. Western N. T. Co.
Hubbard (Tex. Cv. App.), 37 S. 116 N. Car. 655, 21 S. E. 429.
165 NEGLIGENCE A FACT ILLUSTRATIONS. 184
sustained while thus getting on the car. It is not negligence
per se for a person to get on or off a street car under the circum-
stance stated. 74 Nor can the court instruct that the omission
or commission of a certain act would be a want of care or due
caution. 75 But where negligence is made an issue, if the act or
conduct of the party charged with negligence, or whose duty
it is to use due and ordinary care, is so clearly and palpably
negligent that all reasonable minds would pronounce it so with-
out hesitation or dissent, then the court may state to the jury
by instruction that such act constitutes negligence. 76 Also, where
the admitted facts are such that no other conclusion could be
reached than that of negligence it then becomes a question of
law. 77
184. Instructions improper Illustrations. Charging the
jury that if the defendant's employes negligently backed a
freight train against the plaintiff while he was waiting to board
a passenger train, and that such negligence was the proximate
cause of the accident, or if such employes negligently failed to
ring a bell or blow a whistle, and such negligence was the
proximate cause of the injury, or if such employes negligently
backed said train towards a crowd of people, one of whom was
the plaintiff, without a lookout on it to give notice of its ap-
proach, and such negligence was the proximate cause of the
injury to the plaintiff, they should find for the plaintiff, unless
he was guilty of contributory negligence, is improper, in that it
invades the province of the jury on the weight of the evidence. 78
An instruction stating that it is the duty of a person approach-
ing a railroad crossing to exercise ordinary care, and if, in the
exercise of such care, it was the plaintiff's duty to stop before
74 North C. St. R. Co. v. Will- Hoehn v. Chicago St. L. R. Co.
iams, 140 111. 281, 29 N. B. 672; 152 111. 229, 38 N. E. 549; Lake S.
McDonough v. Metropolitan R. Co. & M. S. R. Co. v. Johnson, 135 111.
137 Mass. 210; Eppendorff v. Brook- 647, 26 N. E. 510; Chicago, B. &
lyn City & N. R. Co. 69 N. Y. S. Q. R. Co. v. Pollock, 195 111. 162, 62
195; Briggs v. Union' St. R. Co. N. E. 831; Cleveland, C. & C. R.
148 Mass. 72, 19 N. E. 19; German- Co. v. Crawford, 24 Ohio St. 636.
town Pass. R. Co. v. Walling, 97 77 Exchange Bank v. Trumble,
Pa. St. 55; Lubsenz v. Metropolitan 108 Ky. 234, 56 S. W. 156.
St. R. Co. 76 N. Y. S. 411, 72 App. 78 St. Louis S. W. R. Co. v. Cas-
Div. 181. edy (Tex. Cv. App.), 40 S. W. 198.
75 Kirby v. Southern R. Co. 63 See Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Jones,
S. Car. 494, 41 S. E. 765. 16 Tex. Cv. App. 179, 40 S. W. 745.
185 JURY DETERMINE THE FACTS. 166
t
driving up on the railway and he failed to do so, the jury should
find for the defendant; and so, if in the exercise of such care,
it was his duty to look and listen for a train and he failed to do
so, they should find for the defendant, is improper; it invades
the province of the jury in determining the facts and the weight
of the evidence. 79
An instruction in a suit for personal injury which charges
the jury that it became the duty of the plaintiff when going
upon the defendant's cars to exercise due care and caution, use
her eyes, and act with reasonable care and judgment for her
own safety, more especially if she found the car unusually
overcrowded with passengers, is erroneous ; and in 'lieu of it
the court should have told the jury that it was incumbent on
the plaintiff while on the car to exercise such care and cau-
tion as might be reasonably expected of a person of ordinary
prudence situated as she was. 80
185. Remarks and conduct of court influencing- jury.. ' ' The
influence of the trial judge upon the jury is necessarily great
because of his authoritative position, and by words or actions
he may materially prejudice the rights of a party. By word
or conduct he may, on the one hand, support the character or
testimony of a witness, or, on the other, may destroy the
same, in the estimation of the jury, and thus his personal in-
fluence is exerted to the unfair advantage of one of the parties,
with a corresponding detriment to the cause of the others." 81
Where the court in charging the jury says: "When you
want to give somebody something as a gift you take it out
of your own pocket, and not out of the pocket of some one else;
in other words, let us have fair play," it invades the province
of the jury. Such remark amounts to telling the jury that a
verdict for the plaintiff would be a gift from the defendant to
the plaintiff. 82 For the judge to state to the jury that "it
seems to me that the plaintiff has made out the better case"
79 Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. en, 27 Cal. 320; S. v. Harkin, 7 Nev.
Rogers (Tex. Cv. App.), 40 S. W. 377; Farhman v. City of Hunts-
849. ville, 54 Ala. 263; Andreas v.
so Davis v. Paducah R. & L. Co. Ketcham, 77 111. 377.
24 Ky. 135, 68 S. W. 140. 82 Varner v. Western & A. R.
si Blashfield Instructions, &c. Co. 108 Ga. 813, 34 S. E. 166.
50, p. 125. Citing McMinn v. Whal-
1G7 COURT URGING JURY TO AGREE. 187
is error where the evidence is such as would warrant a verdict
for either party. 83 A remark by the court that ''it is some
times said that parties cannot conscientiously agree to a verdict,
there is no conscience in the case, it is simply a question of
judgment," was held erroneous as directing the jury to eliminate
conscience. 84 The court not being satisfied with the amount
of damages arrived at by the jury for the plaintiff on a charge
of fraud asked them to further consider the question ; and shortly
afterwards they returned another verdict with more than double
the amount of the former verdict. This was held error, in
view of the fact of there being material evidence tending to
reduce the amount of damages claimed. 85
186. Instructions urging jury to agree. It is not error for
the court in charging the jury to instruct them that it is their
duty to try to come to an agreement as to their verdict. 86 And
so the court may properly instruct the jury to revolve the
subject matter of the suit in their minds, and discuss it among
themselves in the jury room. 87 But it is improper for the court
to state to the jury, where they have failed to agree, that if
there is a large majority of the jury on one side, perhaps the
minority would yield to the majority by further considering
the case. 88 Any statement by the court in charging the jury,
suggesting that they are authorized to reach a verdict by com-
promising their differences, is highly improper. Thus, for in-
stance, for the court to say that "the law, which requires una-
nimity on the part of the jury to render a verdict, expects and
will tolerate reasonable compromise and fair concessions", is
erroneous. 89
187. Instructions attempting to coerce jury. The court in
ss Samuel v. Knight, 9 Pa. Super. ST Hand v. Agen, 96 Wis. 493, 71
Ct. 352. N. W. 899.
s* Miller v. Miller, 187 Pa. St. ss Sargent v. Lawrence (Tex. Cr.
572, 41 Atl. 277. App.), 40 S. W. 1075.
ss Schoefield v. Gear Pulley Co. SQ Richardson v. Coleman, 131
71 Conn. 1, 40 Atl. 1064. Ind. 210, 29 N. E. 909; Clem v. S.
se Wheeler v. Thomas, 69 Conn. 42 Ind. 420; Southern Ins. Co. v.
577, 35 Atl. 499, 39 L. R. A. 794, White, 58 Ark. 277, 24 S. W. 425.
Instructions tending to encourage See, also, Goodsell v. Seeley, 46
a disagreement are improper, Chi- Mich. 623, 10 N. W. 44; Cranston v.
cago & E. I. R. Co. v. Rains, 203 New York C. & H. R. Co. 103 N.
111. 423, 67 N. E. 840. Y. 614, 9 N. E. 500; Edens v. Han-
nibal & St. J. R. Co. 72 Mo. 212.
188 JURY DETERMINE THE FACTS. 168
charging the jury should guard against making any statement
having a tendency to coerce them int-j reaching a verdict. 90
For the court to impress upon the jury the importance of the
case and urge them to come to an agreement, and for
that purpose to direct them to retire again for fur-
ther deliberation, is error. 91 Any statement by the court
having a tendency to impress the jury with the idea that the
court will be obliged to keep them together until they reach
a verdict is improper as tending to coerce the jury to come to
an agreement. Thus, for instance, it is error for the court
to call the attention of the jury to the costs to the county
for each day the court remains in session, and urge them to
struggle together until they reach a verdict. 92
So, after the jury have spent several hours in their efforts
to reach a verdict, and report their failure to agree because
of one of the jurors holding out against all the others, it is
error for the court to speak to them concerning the expense
incurred in trying the case; that the court trusts that every
juror is acting rationally in the matter, and that nobody is
acting from a dogmatic spirit merely for the purpose of assert-
ing his opinion. 93 It is also error for the court to say that
it is no credit to a man merely because he has an opinion to
stubbornly stick to it. 94
188. Instructions not attempting to coerce jury. But there
are cases holding that a court by instructions may insist on an
agreement, and may otherwise, to a certain extent, attempt to
coerce the jury into an agreement. Thus it has been held not
to be error for the court to say to the jury on their announc-
90 Hodges v. O'Brien, 113 Wis. Sigsbee v. S. 43 Fla. 524, 30 So.
97, 88 N. W. 97. 816; Niles v. Sprague, 13 Iowa, 198.
91 S. v. DudO'US&at, 47 La. Ann. 93 McPeak v. Missouri Pac. R. Co.
977, 17 So. 685. See Cox v. Peltier, 128 Mo. 617, 30 S. W. 170; Stondt
159 Ind 355, 65 N. B. 6. v. Shepherd, 73 Mich. 58; Odette
92 Hodges v. O'Brien, 113 Wis. v. S. 90 Wis. 258, 62 N. W. 1054.
97, 88 N. W. 97; Chesapeake, O. & See, also, Mahoney v. San Fran-
S. W. R. Co. v. Barlow, 86 Tenn. cisco & S. M. R. Co. 110 Cal. 471,
537, 8 S. W. 147; Terre Haute & 42 Pac. 968. Contra. S. v. Gorham,
I. R. Co. v. Jackson, 81 Ind. 19; 67 Vt. 365, 31 Atl. 845; Jordan v.
Richardson v. Coleman, 131 Ind. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 30 S. W. 445;
210, 29 N. E. 909; S. v. Hill, 91 Mo. Johnson v. S. 60 Ark. 45, 24 S. W.
423, 4 S. W. 121. See, also, Per- 792.
kins v. S. 50 Ala. 154. Contra: 94 Randalp v. Lampkin, 90 Ky.
551, 14 S. W. 538, 10 L. R. A. '87.
169 COURT COERCING JURY COMMENTS ON EVIDENCE. 188
ing that they could not agree, that "this case is submitted to
you for decision, and not for disagreement. I think I will let
you give it a further trial." 95 Nor is it error for the court
to direct the jury that if they should not agree within a certain
time they should, on reaching a verdict, seal it and then sepa-
rate, and return to court on a day named, to which the court
would stand adjourned. 96 Or where the jury have been con-
sidering a case two or three days it is not improper for the court
to express to them its regrets that they have not reached an
agreement; that the case must eventually be determined by a
jury ; that if they do not agree the jury system that far is a failure.
The court therefore directs the jury to return to their room
and make another effort to come to an agreement. 97
The court, in the exercise of a proper discretion, may direct
the jury to retire for further deliberation, even after a second
announcement that they could not agree. 98 It is not improper
for the court to state to the jury that they should reason to-
gether and arrive at some kind of a verdict, and to continue their
deliberations until they reach an agreement. Such a charge
is not a threat to keep the jury out until they agree. 99 It has
also been held not to be error for the court to say to the jury
on their return into court for additional instructions, that it
is your duty to decide the case if you can conscientiously do
so; that you should listen to the arguments of each other with
a disposition to be convinced ; that if much the larger number
favor a conviction, a dissenting juror should consider whether
his doubt is a reasonable one, and that if a majority favor an
acquittal the minority should consider whether they may not
reasonably be mistaken in their judgment. 100
95 German Sav. Bank v. Citizens' N. W. 1054; Jackson v. S. 91 Wis.
Nat. Bank, 101 Iowa, 530, 70 N. 267, 64 N. W. 838; Warlick v.
W. 769. Plonk, 103 N. Car. 81, 9 S. E. 190;
se Darlington v. City of Alle- S. v. Gorham, 67 Vt. 371, 31 Atl 845;
gheny, 189 Pa. St. 202, 42 Atl. 112. Wheeler v. Thomas, 67 Conn. 577,
See Burgess v. Singer Mfg. Co. 35 Atl. 499; S. v. Hawkins, 18 Ore.
(Tex. Cv. App.), 30 S. W. 1110. 476, 23 Pac. 475; Cowan v. Umba-
97 S. v. Pierce, 136 Mo. 34, 37 S. gog Pulp Co. 91 Me. 26, 39 Atl. 340;
W. 815; "Com. v. Kelly, 165 Mass. Krack v. Wolf, 39 Ind. 88.
.175, 42 N. B. 573. See Ter. v. 100 Allen v. U. S. 164 U. S. 492,
Griego, 8 N. Mex. 133, 42 Pac. 81. 17 Sup. Ct. 154. See Ter. v. Griego,
Lambright v. S. 34 Fla. 564, 8 N. Mex. 133, 42 Pac. 81; Odette
16 So. 582. v. S. 90 Wis. 258, 62 N. W. 1054.
9 Odette v. S. 90 Wis. 258, 62
189 JURY DETERMINE THE FACTS. 170
189. When court may comment on evidence and express
opinion. But in the federal courts the rule is well settled that
the court in charging the jury may comment upon the evidence
and express an opinion as to its weight, what it proves or tends
to prove or does not prove, provided the jury are ultimately
left at liberty to determine the facts in issue. 101 And the same
rule prevails in some of the state courts. 102 The constitutional
and statutory provisions of the states which prohibit the courts
from commenting on or expressing an opinion as to the weight
of the evidence have no application to the practice in the federal
courts and some of the state courts. 103 "That the judge may
properly state to the jury his opinion as to what facts are proved
or not proved by the evidence ... if he also instructs them that
they are not bound by his opinions on such matters, but that
it is their duty as jurors to consider the evidence, and find the
facts therefrom, has been the uniform holding of the federal
courts." 104 The instructions shall control as to the law of the
case, and while the court may express an opinion on the weight
of the evidence, as well as the credibility of the witnesses, yet
the jury should be left free to exercise an independent .judg-
ment in determining the facts. 105 It is proper for the court to
comment fairly and impartially on the testimony for the pur-
101 Aerheart v. St. Louis & S. 102 Foley v. Longhran, 60 N. J.
R. Co. 90 Fed. 907; Hart v. U. S. L. 468, 39 Atl. 358, 38 Atl. 960; Mc-
84 Fed. 799, 28 C. C. A. 612. See Cormick v. McCormick, 194 Pa. St.
Herrick v. Quigley, 101 Fed. 187, 107, 45 Atl. 88; Cook v. Steinert
41 C. C. A. 294; Martin v. Hughes, & Sons Co. 69 Conn. 91, 36 Atl.
98 Fed. 556; Allis v. U. S. 155 U. S. 1008; First Nat. Bank v. Holan, 63
117, 15 Sup. Ct. 36; U. S. v. Schnei- Minn. 525, 65 N. W. 952; Pool v.
der, 21 D. C. 381; U. S. v. Connelly, White, 175 Pa. St. 459, 34 Atl. 801,
1 Fed. 779 9 Biss. 338; Com. v. Ber- (transaction complicated) ; Rose-
chine, 168' Pa. St. 603, 32 Atl. 109; var v. Borough, etc. Ib9 Pa. St. 565,
Walls v. Southern B. T. T. Co. 66 32 Atl. 548; Price v. Hamsoher, 174
Fed. 453; Lesser Cotton Co. v. St. Pa. St. 73, 34 Atl. 546.
L. I. M. & S. R. Co. 114 Fed. 133; 103 Nudd v. Burrows, 91 U. S.
Freese v. Kemplay, 118 Fed. 428; 441; St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co.
Chimg v. U. S. 118 Fed. 538; First v. Vickers, 122 U. S. 360, 7 Sup. Ct.
Nat. Bank v. Holan, 63 Minn. 525, 1216.
65 N. W. 952; Wiborg v. U. S. 163 U. 104 Kerr v. Modern Woodman,
S. 632, 16 Sup. Ct. 1127; Treece v. 117 Fed. 593.
American Asso. (C. C. A.), 122 Fed. 105 Mobile & O. R. Co. .v. Wilson,
598; Nome Beach L. & T. Co. v. 76 Fed. 122, 34 L. R. A. 477.
Munich Assur. Co. 123 Fed. 820.
171 COURT REVIEWING EVIDENCE. 191
pose of more clearly defining the issues and to assist the jury
in reaching a just conclusion. 100
190. Illustrations of the rule. Thus, in the federal courts,
for the court, in charging the jury, to state that, under the
circumstances, a certain act amounts to negligence, is not error
where the charge left it to the jury to determine the question of
negligence. 107 A charge that "it cannot be doubted under the
evidence that the place where the plaintiff received his injury
was a most dangerous one," is not error, if the jury are also
instructed that they are the exclusive judges of the weight of
the evidence. 108 Under this rule it has been held that a federal
judge, in commenting upon the evidence, by saying that he
could not see "how the defendant can be acquitted," is not
cause for reversal where it appears that the court correctly
stated the law and expressly left the jury free to determine
the facts. 109
191. Instructions reviewing the evidence. Under the above
rule the judge of the court should, in charging the jury, call
their attention to the important matters of evidence bearing
on the issues, and may express an opinion as to its weight and
relevancy. 110 But instructions designed to review the evidence
are not required to refer to every item in detail; it is sufficient
to give a general review of the evidence, fairly showing the
contentions of the parties. 111
It is not necessary to state the testimony of each witness
separately in reviewing the evidence. The witnesses may be
loe Sommers v. Carbon Hill Coal N. E. 436; Fineburg v. Second &
Co. 91 Fed. 337; S. v. Means, 95 Third St. P. R. Co. 182 Pa. St.
Me. 364, 50 Atl. 30. 97, 37 Atl. 925.
107 Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. in Taylor v. Burrell, 7 Pa. Super,
v. Stahley, 62 Fed. 363. Ct. 461; Bank of Asheville v. Sum-
108 Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. David- mer, 119 N. Car. 591, 26 S. E. 129;
son, 76 Fed. 517. Allis v. U. S. 155 U. S. 117, 15 Sup.
109 Endleraan v. U. S. 86 Fed. Ct. 36; Borham v. Davis, 146 Pa.
456. See Bank of Commerce v. St. 72, 23 Atl. 160. See Halfman
Bright, 77 Fed. 946. v. Pennsylvania Boiler Ins. Co. 160
no Appeal of Sturdevant, 71 Pa. St. 202, 28 Atl. 837; S. v. Us-
Conn. 392, 42 Atl. 70; Schoetield, sery, 118 N. Car. 1177, 24 S. E. 414;
Gear & Pulley Co. v. Schoefield, 71 Com. v. Warner, 13 Pa. Super. Ct.
Conn. 11, 40 Atl. 1046; S. v. Means, 461, the summary must be accurate
9 Me. 364, 50 Atl. 30. But see as far as attempted.
Com. v. Walsh, 162 Mass. 242, 38
191 JURY DETERMINE THE FACTS. 172
grouped and the substance of their testimony stated. 112 Nor
is it necessary for the court to review the evidence on the one
side or the other, or comment upon the particular corroborating
circumstances, where a case turns upon some single matter
of fact which the court plainly submits to the jury. 113 And
where the court states to the jury that there is one question for
them to determine, a failure to instruct them to disregard a
certain other issue is not error. 114
The court may, in its discretion, express an opinion on the
weight of the evidence, but it is not bound to do so. 115 Es-
pecially where the evidence is conflicting, it is not error if the
court fails to express an opinion on the weight of the evidence. 116
And in the absence of a request the court is not required even
to call the attention of the jury to a conflict between the
testimony of the witnesses of the parties to the suit. 117 It is
not improper, however, to instruct on the effect of conflicting
evidence. 118 And if the court in stating the evidence makes a
mistake in quoting the testimony it is the duty of the party
affected to call the attention of the court to such mistake im-
mediately after the charge is finished. 119 And if the party so
112 Maynard v. Tyler, 168 Mass. Wis. 236, 46 N. W. 123; S. v. Davis,
107, 46 N. E. 413; Krepps v. Car- 27 S. Car. 609, 4 S. E. 567. The
lise, 157 Pa. St. 358, 27 Atl. 741; P. judge of the court should not state
v. Doyell, 48 Cal. 85. to the jury his recollection of what
us Laner v. Yetzer, 3 Pa. Super, a witness may have testified to in
Ct. 461. a former trial, P. v. Corey, 157
114 Davis v. Alas Assur. Co. 16 N. Y. 332, 51 N. E. 1024. Held to
Wash. 232, 47 Pac. 885. be improper comment on the facts
us S. v. Main, 75 Conn. 55, 52 or weight of the evidence: Yoaoh-
Atl. 257; Cohen v. Pemberton, 53 am v. McCurdy, 27 Tex. Cv. App.
Conn. 235, 2 Atl. 315, 5 Atl. 682; 183, 65 S. W. 213; Berry v. S.
Doon v. Ravey, 49 Vt. 293; Shank v. (Tex. Cr. App.) 38 S. W. 812; Kib-
S. 25 Ind. 208. See, also, Breese i e r v. Com. 94 Va. 804, 26 S. E.
v. United States, 106 Fed. 680; 858; Braun v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.),
George v. Stubbs, 26 Me. 242; Bruoh 39 S. W. 940; Santee v. S. (Tex.
v. Carter, 32 N. J. L. 565. Cr. App.), 37 S. W. 436; Alexander
us Ide v. Lake Tp. (Pa. Com. v . Bank of Lebenon (Tex. Cv.
PI.), 9 Kulp, 192. See Balph v. App.), 47 S. W. 840; S. v. Col-
Liberty Nat. Bank, 179 Pa. St. 430, ii ns , 47 La. Ann. 578, 17 So. 128; Van
36 Atl. 337. Camp Hardware Co. v. O'Brien (Ind.
117 Balph v. Liberty Nat. Bank, App.) 62 N. E. 464; S. v. Hyde, 20
179 Pa. St. 430, 36 Atl. 337. Wash. 234, 55 Pac. 49; Western U.
us Louisville & N. R. Co. v. York, Tel. Co. v. Burgess (Tex. Cv. App.),
128 Ala. 305, 30 S. E. 676. 56 S. W. 237; Lincoln v. City of De-
ii Mann v. Cowan, 8 Pa. Super, troit, 101 Mich. 245, 59 N. W. 617;
Ct. 30; Grows v. Maine C. R. Co. Hensel v. Haas, 101 Mich. 443, 59 N.
69 Me. 412; Muetze v. Tuteur, 77 W. 808; Meadows v. Truesdell (Tex.
173
COURT REVIEWING EVIDENCE.
affected shall fail to do so, by such failure he waives the right to
appeal on the ground of the court's mistake.
Cv. App.), 56 S. W. 932; Herring-
ton v. Guernsey, 177 Pa. St. 175,
35 Atl. 603; Texas & N. O. R. Co.
v. Mortenson, 27 Tex. Cv. App. 806,
66 S. W. 99; Smith v. Gulf, W.
T. & P. R. Co. (Te<x. Cv. App.),
65 S. W. 88; Sullivan v. Market
St. R. Co. 136 Gal. 479, 69 Pac. 143;
Earle v. Poat, 63 S. Car. 439, 41 S.
E. 525; St. L. S. W. R. Co. ,v. Sib-
ley, 29 Tex. Cv. App. 396, 68 S. W.
516; Johnson v. Stone, 69 Miss. 826,
13 So. 858; Clifford v. Lee (Tex. Cv.
App.), 23 S. W. 843; Blumeno v.
Grand Rapids & I. B. R. Co. 101
Mich, 325, 59 N. W. 594; P. v. Tot-
man, 135 Cal. 133, 67 Pac. bl; S.
v. McDowell, 129 N. Car. 523, 39
S. E. 840; Hickory v. U. S. 160
U. S. 408, 16 Sup. Ct. 327; Hud-
son v. S. 43 Tex. Cr. App. 420, 66 S.
W. 668; Parker v. S. 43 Tex. Cr. App.
526, 67 S. W. 121; Remner v. S. 43
Tex. Cr. App. 347, 65 S. W. 1102;
Wallace v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 66 S.
W. 1102; Harris v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.)
65 S. W. 921; Winter v. S. 133 Ala.
176, 32 So. 125; Reese v. S. (Tex.
Cr. App.), 68 S. W. 283; Coffin v.
Brown, 94 Md. 190, 50 Atl. 567;
Moore v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 68 S.
W. 279; Faulkner v. King, 130 N.
Car. 494, 41 S. E. 885; Crawford v.
S. 117 Ga. 247, 43 S. E. 762; Mc-
Dommell v. De Los Fuentes, 7 Tex.
Cv. App. 136, 26 S. W. 792. Held not
improper comment on the weight ot
the evidence: Moore v. Dickinson,
39 S. Car. 441, 17 S. E. 998; Miles
v. Plant, 18 Pa. Super. Ct. 80; St.
Louis S. W. R. Co. v. Spivey (Tex.
Cv. App.) 73 S. W. 973; Half man v.
Pennsylvania Boiler Co. 160 Pa. St.
202, 28 Atl. 837; Wills v. Lance,
28 Ore. 371, 43 Pac. 487; Files v. S.
36 Tex. Cr. App. 206, 36 S. W.
93. Held not intimating an opin-
ion on the evidence, in the following
cases: P. v. Grotty, 47 N. Y. S.
845, 22 App. Div. 77; S. v. Shaw,
102 Ga. 660, 29 S. E. 477; Collins v.
S. 39 Tex. Cr. App. 441, 46 S. W.
933; Morris v. S. 39 Tex. Cr. App.
371, 46 S. W. 253; P. v. Slater, 119
Cal. 620, 51 Pac. 957; Reynols v.
S. 147 Ind. 3, 46 N. E. 31; Smith v.
Dawley, 92 Iowa, 312, 60 N. W. 625;
S. v. Derrick, 44 S. Car. 344, 22 S. E.
337; Newport v. S. 140 Ind. 299, 39
N. E. 926; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co.
v. Magee (Tex. Cv. App.), 49 S. W.
928; Anderson v. McDonald, 31
Wash. 274, 71 Pac. 1037.; Bell v. 1
City of Spokane, 30 Wash. 508, 71
Pac. 31; Drumheller v. American
Surety Co. 30 Wash. 530, 71 Pac.
25; Harris v. S. 97 Ga. 350, 23 S. E.
993; Graham v. Frazier, 49 Neb. 90,
68 N. W. 367; Texas & N. O. R. Co.
v. Echols, 17 Tex. Cv. App. 677,
41 S. W. 488; Texas, &c. R. Co. v.
Jones (Tex. Cv. App.), 39 S. W. 124;
Houston, E. & W. T. R. Co. v. Gran-
berry, 16 Tex. Cv. App. 391, 40 S.
W. 1062; Selling v. Clark, 41 N.
Y. S. 982, 18 Misc. 464; Cook v.
Bartlett, 179 Mass. 576, 61 N. E.
266; Wylie v. Commercial & F.
Bank, 63 S. Car. 406, 41 S. E. 504;
Cooper v. Ford (Tex. Cv. App.), 69
S. W. 487; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co.
v. Johnson (Tex. Cv. App.), 67 S.
W. 769; Davis v. Atlanta & C. A. L.
R. Co. 63 S. Car. 370, 41 S. E. 468.
Held invading the province of the
jury: Clewis v. Malome, 131 Ala. 465,
31 So. 596; Berez v. San Antonio &
A. P. R. Co. (Tex. Cv. App.), 67 S.
W. 137; Lamphere v. S. 114 Wis. 193,
89 N. W. 128; Watkins v. S. 133 Alia.
8S, 32 So. 627; Nelson v. S. 43 Tex.
Cr. App. 553, 67 S. W. 320. Held
not invading the province of the
jury in the following cases: P. v.
Spiegel, 143 N. Y. 107, 38 N. E.
284; P. v. Johnson, 104 Cal. 418, 38
Pac. 91; S. v. Dill, 48 S. Car. 249,
26 S. E. 567; S. v. Atkins, 49 S. Car.
481, 27 S. E. 484; P. v. Howard,
135 Cal. 266, 67 Pac. 148; P. v. Tot-
man, 135 Cal. 133, 67 Pac. 51; Jar-
man v. Rea, 137 Cal. 339, 70 Pac.
216; Carstens v. Earles, 26 Wash.
676, 67 Pac. 404; French v. Seattle
Tr. Co. 26 Wash. 264, 66 Pac. 404;
Galveston, H. & N. R. Co. v. New-
port, 26 Tex. Cv. App. 583, 65 S.
W. 657; Brashington v. South B. R.
Co. 62 S. Car. 325, 40 S. E. 665;
American T. & T. Co. v. Kersh, 27
Tex. Cv. App. 127, 66 S. W. 74.
CHAPTER VII.
FACTS ASSUMED.
Sec.
192. Instructions assuming facts
Generally.
193. Instructions assuming facts
Illustrations.
194. Instructions not assuming
facts Illustrations.
195. Assuming facts when evidence
is close or conflicting.
Sec.
196. Instructions may assume
facts When.
197. Facts admitted by both par-
ties.
198. Assuming facts In criminal
cases.
192. Instructions assuming facts generally. Any assump-
tion of facts in dispute which must be determined by the jury
is an infringement of their province, and if the rights of a
party are thereby affected, such assumption is error. 1 Instruc-
tions which assume the existence of material facts are, as a
general rule, erroneous, especially if unsupported by evidence. 2
i P. v. Matthai, 135 Cal. 442, 67 Rombold (Neb.), 97 N. W. 1030;
Pac. 694; Cline v. S. 43 Ohio St.
332, 1 N. E. 22; Momence Stone
Co. v. Turrell, 205 111. 524, 68 N. E.
1078; S. v. Bonner (Mo.), 77 S. W.
463; Smith v. Sovereign, &c. (Mo.),
77 S. W. 867; Dobson v. Southern
R. Co. 132 N. Car. 900, 44 S. E.
593; Wilson v. Huguenin, 117 Ga.
546, 43 S. E. 857; Birmingham, &c.
Co. v. Mullen (Ala.), 35 So. 701;
Choctaw, &c. R. Co. v. Deperade
(Okl.), 71 Pac. 629; Rogers v. Man-
hattan, &c. Ins. Co. 138 Cal. 285, 71
Pac. 348; Selensky v. Chicago, &c.
R Co. 120 Iowa, 113, 94 N. W. 272;
Lydick v. Gill (Neb.), 94 N. W.
109; New Omaha T. H. &c. Co. v.
Kahn v. Triest-R. &c. Co. 139 Cal.
340, 73 Pac. 164; Lawrence v. West-
lake (Mont), 73 Pac. 119; North-
ern Ohio R. Co. v. Rigby, 69 Ohio,
184, 68 N. E. 1046; McHenry v.
Bulifant (Pa.), 56 Atl. 226; Karl v.
Juniata Co. 206 Pa. 633, 56 Atl. 78;
Riser v. Southern R. Co. (S. Car.),
46 S. E. 47; Dodd v. Guiseffl, 100
Mo. App. 311, 73 S. W. 304; Na-
bours v. McCord (Tex. Cv. App.),
75 S. W. 827; Bumgardner v. South-
ern R. Co. 132 N". Car. 438, 43 S. E.
948; Hock Island, &c. Co. v. Pohl-
man, 210 111. 139.
2 See Newman v. Schmilker, 181
111. 406; Langdon v. P. 133 111. 404,
174
175
ASSUMING FACTS GENERALLY.
192
Instructions which assume that there is evidence before the
jury tending to prove material facts, when in fact there is no
such evidence, are improper and generally erroneous. 3 An in-
struction which states that there is no evidence to prove a
material fact in issue when there is such evidence, though slight
or equivocal, is erroneous.*
The giving of an instruction intimating or implying that there
is no evidence touching a certain phase of a case is improper,
24 N. E. 874; Callaghan v. Myers,
89 111. 566; Walcot v. Heath, 78 111.
433; Sugar Creek Min. Co. v. Peter-
son, 177 111. 329, 52 N. E. 475; Dina
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 78 S. W. 230;
Gaines v. S. 99 Ga. 703, 26 S. E.
760; Wilcox v. Kinzie, 4 111. (3
Scam.), 218; East & W. R. Co. v.
Waldrop, 114 Ga. 289, 40 S. E. 268;
McCullough v. Minneapolis, St. P.
& S. S. Co. 101 Mich. 234, 59 N. W.
618; Weybright v. Fleming, 40 Ohio
St. 55; Schweinfurth v. Cleveland,
C. C. & St. L. R. Co. 60 Ohio St.
223, 54 N. E. 89; Birmingham R.
L. & P. Co. v. Mullen (Ala.), 35 So.
204; Dunseath v. Pittsburg A. & M.
Tr. Co. 161, Pa. St. 124, 28 Atl.
1021; O'Flaherty v. Mann, 196 111.
304, 63 N. E. 727; Bell v. Washing-
ton Cedar-Shingle Co. 8 Wash. 27,
35 Pac. 405; O'Neill v. Blase, 94
Mo. App. 648, 68 S. W. 764; Chicago,
B. & Q. R. Co. v. Anderson, 38
Neb. 112, 56 N. W. 794; Dixon v. S.
113 Ga. 1039, 39 S. E. 846 (confes-
sion) ; Rettig v. Fifth Ave. Tr. Co.
26 N. Y. S. 896, 6 Misc. 328; Wil-
liams v. S. 46 Neb. 704, 65 N. W.
783; Haupt v. Haupt, 157 Pa. St.
469, 27 Atl. 768; Dady v. Condit,
188 111. 234, 58 N. E. 900; Overall
v. Armstrong (Tex. Cv. App.), 25
S. W. 440; Cox v. S. 68 Ark. 462,
60 S. W. 27; McDonald v. Beall,
55 Ga. 288; French v. Sale, 63 Miss.
386; St. Louis S. W. R. Co. v.
Smith (Tex. Cv. App.), 63 S. W.
1064; Houston v. Com. 87 Va. 257,
12 S. E. 385; Willis v. Hudson, 72
Tex. 598, 10 S. W. 713; St. Louis,
K. & N. W. R. Co. v. St. Louis U.
S. Y. Co. 120 Mo. 541, 25 S. W.
399; Com. v. Light, 195 Pa. St.
220, 45 Atl. 933; Weybright v. Flem-
ing, 40 Ohio St. 52; P. v. Williams,
17 Cal. 142 (direct or indirect);
Hill v. Spear, 50 N. H. 253; Brower
v. Edson, 47 Mich. 91, 10 N. W. 121;
Chicago W. D. R. Co. v. Mills, 91
111. 39; Hood v. Olin, 68 Mich. 165,
36 N. W. 177; Kidd v. S. 83 Ala.
58, 3 So. 442; Kelly v. Eby, 141
Pa. 176, 21 Atl. 512; Bowie v. Spaids,
26 Neb. 635, 42 N. W. 700; Chase
v. Horton, 143 Mass. 118, 9 N. E.
31; P. v. Gotta, 49 Cal. 116;
King v. S. (Miss.), 23 So. 166; Saf-
fold v. S. 76 Miss. 258, 24 So. 314;
Com. v. Light, 195 Pa. St. 220 (as
to receiving stolen property), 45
Atl. 933. '
s Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Har-
wood, 90 111. 429; City of Chicago
v. Bixby, 84 111. 83; Michigan, S.
& N. I. R. Co. v. Shelton, 66 111.
425; McCormick v. McGaffray, 55
N. Y. S. 574, 25 Misc. 786; Chiches-
ter v. Whitehead, 51 111. 259; Ter.
v. Turner (Ariz.), 31 Pac. 368; Ad-
ams v. Smith, 58 111. 421; Roche v.
Baldwin, 135 Cal. 522, 69 Pac. 903;
Waters v. Kansas City, 94 Mo. App.
413, 68 S. W. 366; Hall v. S. 130
Ala. 45, 30 So. 422; Hall v. S. 134
Ala. 90, 32 So. 750; Thomas v. S.
133 Ala. 139, 32 So. 250; Crittenden
v. S. 134 Ala. 145, 32 So. 273; Barker
v. S. 48 Ind. 163; Perkins v. Atta-
way, 14 Ga. 27.
4 Prairie State L. & T. Co. v. Doig,
70 111. 52; Avery & Son v. Meek,
16 Ky. L. R. 384, 28 S. W. 337; Geor-
gia H. Ins. Co. v. Allen, 128 Ala.
451, 30 So. 537; Zibbell v. City of
Grand Rapids, 129 Mich. 659, 89
N. W. 563; Sander v. S. 134 Ala.
74, 32 So. 654 (conspiracy); Cupps
v. S. (Wis.), 97 N. W. 218.
193 FACTS ASSUMED. 176
unless there actually is no evidence on the point or question
to which it relates. 5 So to assume or state in an instruction
that a fact has been established when there is no evidence
to prove such fact is error. Also the giving of an instruction
which assumes the existence of a fact when there is evidence
tending to prove the contrary is error. 7
193. Instructions assuming facts Illustrations. An in-
struction reciting that the state has introduced evidence tend-
ing to prove the theft of property other than that alleged in
the indictment, at the same time and place, when there is no
evidence tending to show such theft, is prejudicial; and al-
though no exception was taken to the charge, it affords ground
for reversal. 8 In a will contest an instruction which suggests
that the will in question was made under the influence of par-
tial insanity, where there was no evidence of any delusions or
mania, is improper and erroneous. 9 And an instruction which
assumes that other witnesses were present, who had better op-
portunities of observing at the time of the execution of a will
than the subscribing witnesses, is erroneous when there is no
evidence tending to prove such fact. 10
To tell the jury by instruction that the plaintiff is entitled
to recover all damages proved to have been sustained by him
on account of the trespass committed by the defendant on the
plaintiff's premises, as alleged in the declaration, is error, in
assuming that the defendant committed the trespass. 11 So an
s Barker v. S. 40 Fla. 178, 24 So. Millon, 129 Mich. 86, 88 N. W. 206;
69; Kildow v. Irick (Tex. Cv. App.), Stern v. P. 102 111. 555. See Mathis
33 S. W. 315. v. S. 33 Tex. Cr. App. 605, 28 S. W.
6 Camden A. R. Co. v. Williams, 817.
61 N. J. L. 646, 40 Atl. 634; Dough- Wilson v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 34
erty v. King, 48 N Y. S. 110; Ameri- S. W 284; Hayes v. S. 36 Tex. Cr.
can Ins. Co. v. Crawford, 89 111. 65; App. 146, 35 S. W. 983.
Fullam v. Rose, 181 Pa. St. 138, 37 Neiman v. Schmitker, 181 111.
Atl. 197; Kildow v. Irick (Tex. Cv. 406, 55 N. E. 151; Langdon v. P.
App.), 33 S. W. 315; Wilson v. 133 111. 404, 24 N. E. 874; Webster
Crosby, 109 Mich. 449, 67 N. W. v. Yorty, 194 111. 408, 62 N. E.
693; Bentley v. Standard F. Ins. Co. 707, 62 N. E. 907.
40 W. Va. 729, 23 S. E. 584; Lewis 10 Neiman v. Schmitker, 181 111.
v. Rice, 61 Mich. 97, 27 N. W. 867; 404, 55 N. E. 151; Owens v. S. 39
Cropper v. Pittman, 13 Md. 190. Tex. Cr. App. 391, 46 S. W. 240.
* Walters v. American Jewelry & " Small v. Brainard, 44 111. 355;
M. Co. 114 Ga. 564, 40 S. E. 803; Hawk v. Ridgway, 33 111. 473; Steele
Leslie v. Smith, 32 Mich. 64; Bow- v. Davis, 75 Ind. 197; Mohr v. Kin-
man v. Roberts, 58 Miss. 126; Moffitt nane, 85 111. App. 447 (assault and
v. Colkin, 35 Mo. 453; Jones v. Me- battery).
177 ASSUMING FACTS ILLUSTRATIONS. 194
instruction stating that "if you find the plaintiff's action is
not barred you will, from the evidence, estimate the amount of
his damages caused by delay in receiving and transporting his
cattle, if you find there was any unreasonable delay," is erro-
neous, in that it assumes that the cattle had been damaged by
delay. 12 In an action for assault and battery a charge that
"if the jury find for the plaintiff they have the right to take
into consideration, in estimating the damages, the pecuniary
condition of the defendant," is erroneous where the testimony
as to malice is conflicting. 13 An instruction stating that "the
false, improbable and contradictory statements of the accused,
if made, in explaining suspicious circumstance against him are
evidences to be considered by the jury," is erroneous, in that
it assumes that the statements were false, improbable and con-
tradictory, or that there were suspicious circumstances against
him. 14
194. Instructions not assuming facts Illustrations. In an
action for personal injury an instruction which states that if
the defendants negligently left the ditch without barriers, and
that the plaintiff, without fault, fell into it, the jury should find
for the plaintiff, is not objectionable as assuming the fact of-
negligenee. 15 An instruction which states that the "plaintiff
has sued for injuries alleged to have been received by the
negligent act of the railroad company's servants in placing
obstructions across a public highway, -and without ordinary care,,
and that the obstructions were a handcar and tools," merely
states the allegations claimed by the plaintiff to have been
negligence and does not assume negligence. 16
12 Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. White E. 409; Jarman v. Rea, 137 Cal.
(Tex. Cv. App.), 32 S. W. 322. See 339, 70 Pac. 216; Chicago, &c. R.
St. Louis S. W. R. Co. v. McCul- Co. v. Gore, 202 111. 188, 66 N. E.
lough (Tex. Cv. App.), 32 S. W. 1063; San Antonio Trac. Co. v. Wel-
285; Dady v. Condit, 188 111. 234, ter (Tex. Cv. App.), 77 S. W. 414;
58 N. E. 900. Western U. Tel. Co. v. Chambers
is Lopez v. Jackson, 80 Miss. (Tex. Cv. App.), 77 S. W. 273; Blake
684, 32 So. 117. . v. Austin (Tex. Cv. App.), 75 S. W.
i* Jones v. S. 59 Ark. 417, 27 S. 571; St. Louis, &c. R. Co. v. Parks
W. 601. See Hellyer v. P. 186 111. (Tex. Cv. App.), 73 S. W. 439.
550, 58 N. E. 245. International & G. N. R. Co.
is Britton v. City of St. Louis, v. Locke (Tex. Cv. App.), 67 S. W.
120 Mo. 437, 25 S. W. 366. See gen- 1082. See Elledge v. National City
erally: Richmond Traction Co. v. & O. R. Co. 100 Cal. 282, 34 Pac.
Wilkinson (Va.), 42 S. E. 622; Mai- 720-852.
len v. Waldowiski, 203 111. 87, 67 N.
195
FACTS ASSUMED.
178
On a charge of keeping a saloon open on Sunday in violation
of law an instruction stating that it makes no difference whether
the defendant sold any liquor or not, he has no right to let
persons into the saloon, does not assume that the defendant
allowed persons to enter the saloon on Sunday. 17 An instruc-
tion charging that if the defendant wilfully assaulted the plain-
tiff the jury may assess vindictive damages is not subject to
the criticism that it assumes that an assault was made. 18
195. Assuming facts when evidence is close or conflicting.
Where the evidence is close 19 or conflicting, instructions which
assume the existence of controverted facts are improper and
erroneous; 20 especially are such instructions erroneous where
the evidence is conflicting on a vital point in the case. 21 Thus,
where an injury to the person becomes a material fact in issue,
" P. v. Bowkus, 109 Mich. 360, 67
N. W. 319.
is Bailey v. McCance (Va.), 32 S.
E. 43. See Bond v. P. 39 111. 26.
10 Mohr v. Kinnane, 85 111. App.
447; Myer v. Myer, 86 111. App.
417; Conners v. Chingren, 111 Iowa,
437, 82 N. W. 934; Steinmeyer v. P.
95 111. 388; Holloway v. Johnson,
129 111. 369, 21 N. B. 798.
20 Means v. Gridley, 164 Pa. St.
387, 30 Atl. 390; Hutton v. Doxsee,
116 Iowa, 13, 89 N. W. 79; Goss v.
Colkins, 162 Mass. 492, 39 N. E.
469; Wilber v. Wilber, 129 111. 396,
21 N. E. 1076; Mahaffey v. Ferguson,
156 Pa. St. 156, 27 Atl. 21; Lyle v.
Mclnnis (Miss.), 17 So. 510. See
Commercial F. Ins. Co. v. Morris,
105 Ala. 498, 18 So. 34; Bradley
v. Ohio River & C. R. Co. 126 N.
Car. 735, 36 S. E. 181; Baltimore
Consol. R. Co. v. S. 91 Md. 506, 40
Atl. 1000; Luckie v. Schneider (Tex.
Cv. App.), 57 S. W. 690; Richard-
son v. Dybedall (S. Dak.), 98 N.
W. 164.
21 Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Ray-
burn, 153 111. 290, 33 N. E. 558,
Eller v. P. 153 111. 347, 38 N. E.
660; Cannon v. P. 141 111. 283, 30
N. E. 1027; Coleman v. Adair, 75
Miss. 660, 23 So. 369; Owen v. Long,
97 Wis. 78, 72 N. W. 364; Scott v.
P. 141 111. 211, 30 N. E. 329; Griffin
v. White, 52 N. Y. S. 807; Gaines v.
McAlister, 122 N. Car. 340, 29 S. E.
844; S. v. Johnson, 6 Kas. App.
119, 50 Pac. 907; Germania Fire
Ins. Co. v. Klewer, 129 111. 611, 22
N. E. 489; Brown v. S. 72 Miss. 997,
17 So. 278; P. v. Long, 104 Cal. 363,
37 Pac. 1031; S. v. Buralli (Nev.),
71 Pac. 532; Bumgardner v. South-
ern R. Co. 132 N. Car. 438, 43 S. E.
948; Willis v. S. 134 Ala. 429, 33
So. 226; Bohlraan v. S. 135 Ala. 45,
33 So. 44; Finch v. Bergins, 89 Ind.
360 (assuming that a party made
admissions) ; Densmore v. S. 67
Ind. 306; Jackson v. S. 71 Ind. 149
(assuming that a crime was com-
mitted) ; Huffman v. Cauble, 86 Ind.
591; Moore v. S. 65 Ind. 382; Barker
v. S. 48 Ind. 163; Matthews v. Story,
54 Ind. 417; Wood v. Steinau, 9 S.
Dak. 110, 68 N. W. 160; Blue V. L.
Co. v. Smith, 48 Neb. 293, 67 N.
W. 159; Worswick v. Hunt, 106 Ala.
559, 18 So. 74; S. v. Lewis, 56 Kas.
374, 43 Pac. 265; Wall v. Good-
enough, 16 111. 415; Bradley v.
Coobaugh, 91 111. 148, 151; Chicago,
W. D. R. Co. v. Mills, 91 111. 39;
Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Griffin,
68 111. 499, 507; Cusick v. Campbell,
68 111. 508; Ward v. Odell Mfg. Co.
123 N. Car. 248, 31 S. E. 495; Morton
v. Harvey, 57 Neb. 304, 77 N. W.
808; Bates v. Harte, 124 Ala. 427,
179
ASSUMING, WHEN EVIDENCE CLOSE.
195
an instruction which assumes that the person's spine was injured,
when the evidence as to such fact is conflicting, is erroneous. 22
A charge that if the jury find for the plaintiff they should
give damages in such an amount as they believe will com-
pensate the plaintiff for permanent injury, is improper when the
question of permanent injury is in dispute, in that it assumes
26 So. 898; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v.
Anderson, 184 111. 294, 56 N. E. 331;
Wellman v. Jones, 124 Ala. 580,
27 So. 416; Pacific M. L. Ins. Co.
v. Walker, 67 Ark. 147, 53 S. W.
675; Duffield v. Delaney, 36 111. 258,
261; Conkwright v. P. 35 111. 204,
207; Dean v. Ross, 105 Cal. 227, 38
Pac. 912; Fleming v. Wilmington
& W. R. Co. 115 N. Car. 676, 20
S. E. 714; Nashville, C. & St. L.
R. Co. v. Hammond, 104 Ala. 191,
15 So. 935; Terry v. Beatrice Starch
Co. 43 Neb. 866, 62 N. W. 255; White
v. Van Horn, 159 U. S. 1, 15 Sup. Ct.
1027; Schultz v. Schultz, 113 Mich.
502, 71 N. W. 854; Metropolitan St.
R. Co. v. McClure, 58 Kas. 109, 48
Pac. 566; Maddox v. Newport News
& M. V. Co. 18 Ky. L. R. 635, 37 S.
W. 494; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v.
Brown (Tex. Cv. App.), 39 S. W.
326; McCallon v. Cohen (Tex. Cv.
App.), 39 S. W. 973; Griffith v.
Bergeson, 115 Iowa, 279, 88 N. W.
451; Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R.
Co. v. Best, 169 111. 301, 310, 48
N. E. 684; City of Chicago v. Moore,
139 111. 201, 208, 28 N. E. 1071; Lake
Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Boderner,
139 111. 596, 603, 29 N. E. 692; Illi-
nois Steel Co. v. Schymanowski,
162 111. 447, 461, 44 N. E. 876; West
C. St. R. Co. v. Estep, 162 111. 131,
44 N. E. 404; Peoria & P. N. R.
Co. v. Tamplin, 156 111. 285, 300,
40 N. E. 960; Chicago & A. R. Co.
v. Sanders, 154 111. 531, 537, 39 N.
E. 481; Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co.
v. Parker, 131 111. 557, 566, 23 N. E.
237; Chicago, St. L. & P. R. Co. v.
Hutchinson, 120 111. 587, 592, 11 N.
E. 855; Doyle v. S. 39 Fla. 155, 22
So> 272; Williamson v. Tyson, 105
Ala. 644, 17 So. 336; Louisville &
N. R. Co. v. York, 128 Ala. 305, 30
S. E. 676; New York, P. & N. R. Co.
v. Jones, 94 Md. 24, 50 Atl. 423;
Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v.
Sanchez (Tex. Cv. App.), 65 S. W.
893; Braden v. Cook, 18 Pa. Super.
Ct. 156; Southern Pac. Co. v. Am-
mons (Tex. Cv. App.), 26 S. W. 135;
St. Louis, K. & W. R. Co. v. St.
Louis U. Stock Yards (Mo.), 29 S.
W. 399; Sample v. Rand, 112 Iowa,
616, 84 N. W. 683; Wadsworth v.
Dunnam, 98 Ala. 610, 13 So. 597;
Freeman v. Metropolitan St. R. Co.
95 Mo. App. 314, 68 S. W. 1057; Gulf,
C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Brown (Tex.
Cv. App.), 24 S. W. 918; Stead-
man v. Keets, 129 Mich. 669, 89 N.
W. 555; Duff v. Com. 24 Ky. L. R.
201, 68 S. W. 370 (selling liquor);
Rogers v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co.
138 Cal. 285, 71 Pac. 348; Smith v.
Dukes, 5 Minn. 373. See generally:
Eller v. P. 153 111. 347, 38 N. E.
660; Hellyer v. P. 186 111. 550, 58
N. E. 245: Cannon v. P. 141 111.
282, 30 N. E. 1027; Hoge v. P. 117
111. 46, 6 N. E. 796; Barr v. P. 113
111. 473; Chambers v. P. 105 111.
417; Com. v. McMahon, 145 Pa. St.
413, 22 Atl. 971; S. v. Mackey, 12
Ore. 154, 6 Pac. 648, 5 Am. Cr. R.
536, Metz v. S. 46 Neb. 547, 65 N. W.
190; P. v. Bowkus, 109 Mich. 360,
67 N. W. 319; Newton v. S. (Miss.),
12 So. 560: P. v. Hertz, 105 Cal.
660, 39 Pac. 32; S. v. Wheeler, 79
Mo. 366; Underhill Cr. Ev. 279.
An instruction which assumes dis-
puted facts as illustrations of the
la/w, which does not state the facts
hypothetically, is improper as be-
ing a charge on the evidence, Jones
v. Charleston & W. C. R. Co. 61 S.
Car. 556, .39 S. E. 758.
22 Fullerton v. Fordyce, 121 Mo.
1, 25 S. W. 587.
196
FACTS ASSUMED.
180
that such injury has been established. 23 Also, the giving of
an instruction which assumes that certain machinery is a part
of the real estate on which it is located is improper, where the
fact as to whether the machinery was or was not a fixture was
in dispute. 24 Also, where the evidence shows that the defendant
denies being indebted to the plaintiff it is error to instruct the
jury that the defendant admits such indebtedness. 25
196. Instructions may assume facts When. But where a
material fact is conclusively shown by undisputed evidence, or
is admitted to be true, then the giving of an instruction which
assumes that such fact has been established is not error, and
affords no ground for complaint on the giving of instructions. 26
(Tex. Cv. App.), 48 S. W.
542; Ellis v. Stewart (Tex. Cv.
App.), 24 S. W. 585; San Antonio &
A P. R. Co. v. Wright, 20 Tex.
136, 49 S. W. 147; Truxton v. Dait
Stayle Co. (Del.), 42 Atl. 431; Lit-
tle v. Town of Iron River, 102 Wis.
250, 78 N. W. 416; Missouri, K. &
T. R. Co. v. Warren, 19 Tex. Cv.
App. 463, 49 S. W. 254; Spigner v.
S. 103 Ala. 30, 15 So. 892; Brown
v. Emerson, 66 Mo. App. 63; Burt
v. Long, 106 Mich. 210, 64 N. W.
60. But see Byers v. Wallace, 88
Texas, 503, 28 So. 1056 (facts not
conclusive) ; S. v. Drumm, 156 Mo.
216, 56 S. W. 1086; Whitney v. S.
154 Ind. 573, 57 N. E. 398; Tyler v.
Tyler, 78 Mo. App. 240; Wilkerson
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 57 S. W.
956; Torres v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.),
55 S. W. 828; Barkley v. Barkley
Cemetery Asso. 15>3 Mo. 300, 54 S.
W. 482; Bertram v. Peoples R. Co.
154 Mo. 639, 55 S. W. 1040; Keener
v. S. 98 Ind. 13; Marshall v. Morris,
16 Ga. 368. 376; Roberts v. Mans-
field, 32 Ga. 228; Jeffries v. S. 61
Ark. 308, 32 S. W. 108,0; S. v.
Bone, 114 Iowa, 537, 87 N. W. 507;
Board v. Legg, 110 Ind. 480, 11 N.
E. 612; Wabash R. Co. v. William-
son, 104 Ind. 157, 3 N. E. 814; Smith
v. S. 28 Ind. 321; Stephenson v.
Wright, 111 Ala. 579, 20 So. 622;
Wiborg v. U. S. 163 U. S. 632, 16
Sup. Ct. 1127; Louisville, E. & St.
L. C. R. v. Utz, 133 Ind. 265, 32
N. E. 881; Holliday v. S. 35 Tex. Cr.
23 Houston City St. R. Co. v.
Artusey (Tex. Cv. App.), 31 S. W.
319.
24 Mundine v. Pauls, 28 Tex. Cv.
App. 46, 66 S. W. 254.
25 Aliunde Consul Min. Co. v. Ar-
nold (Colo. App.), 67 Pac. 28.
26 Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. King,
179 111. 96, 53 N. E. 552; Gerke v.
Fancher, 158 111. 385, 41 N. E. 982;
Chicago C. R. Co. v. Carroll, 206 111.
318, 68 N. E. 1087; North C. St. R.
Co. v. Honsinger, 175 111. 318, 51 N.
E. 613; Chicago City R. Co. v. Al-
len, 169 111. 287, 48 N. E. 414; Wil-
liams v. P. 164 111. 482, 45 N. E. 987;
Quinn v. P. 123 111. 343, 15 N. E.
46; Wallace v. De Young, 98 111.
638; Chicago Screw Co. v. Weiss,
203 111. 539, 68 M. E. 54; Citizens'
Ins. Co. v. Stoddard, 197 111. 331,
64 N. E. 355; Cupps v. S. (Wis.).
97 N. W. 216; First Nat. Bank v.
Bower (Neb.), 98 N. W. 836; Lee
v. O'Quinn, 103 Ga. 355, 30 S. E.
356; S. v. Gorham, 67 Vt. 365, 31
Atl. 845; Terrell v. Russell, .16 Tex.
Cv. App. 573, 42 S. W. 129; County
of Cook v. Harms, 108 111. 151, 163:
Hill v. S. 42 Neb. 503, 60 N. W.
916; St. Louis, J. & S. R. Co. v.
Kirby, 104 111. 345, 349; Morgan v.
S. 51 Neb. 672, 71 N. W. 788; Cen-
tral Georgia R. Co. v. Johnston,
106 Ga. 130, 32 S. E. 78; Drennen
v. Smith, 115 Ala. 396, 22 So. 442;
North C. St. R. Co. ' v. Honsinger,
175 111. 318, 51 N. E. 613; San Anto-
nio & A. P. R. Co. v. Griffin
181
FACTS PROPERLY ASSUMED.
196
Thus an instruction which assumes that the plaintiff's leg was
injured, is not material error where the fact of such injury
was not disputed on the trial. 27 Or, in other words, where a
fact is so conclusively proved by undisputed testimony that
but one conclusion can be reached from the evidence the court
may assume such fact as having been established. 28 And al-
though a material fact may be disputed, yet if all the evidence
can lead to no other conclusion than the truth of the fact, the
court may, in giving instructions, assume such fact to be true. 29
Where a fact is so clearly established by the evidence that
the court would be warranted in giving a peremptory instruc-
tion on the subject, an instruction assuming such fact is not
for that reason erroneous. 30
App. 133, 32 S. W. 538. See also
McGee v. Smitherman, 69 Ark. 632,
65 S. W. 461; Hall v. Incorporated
Town, &c. 90 Iowa, 585, 58 N. W.
881, McLane v. Maurer, 28 Tex. Cv.
App. 75, 66 S. W. 693; Gulf, C. & S.
F. R. Co. v. Pierce, 7 Tex. Cv. App.
597, 25 S. W. 1052; Mattingly v.
Lewisohn, 13 Mont. 508, 35 Pac.
Ill; Byers v. Wallace (Tex. Cv.
App.), 25 S. W. 1043; Reliance T. &
D. Works v. Martin. 23 Ky. L. R.
1625, 65 S. W. 809; Gulf, C. & S. F.
R. Co. v. Wilbanks, 7 Tex. Cv. App.
489, 27 S. W. 302; Welden v. Omaha,
K. C. & E. R. Co. 93 Mo. App. 668,
67 S. W. 698; Citizens' Ins. Co. v.
Stoddard, 197 111. 330, 64 N. E. 355;
International & G. N. R. Co. v.
Locke (Tex. Cv. App.), 67 S. W.
1082; S. v. Nickels, 65 S. Car. 169,
43 S. E. 521; Parks v. St. Louis &
S. R. Co. (Mo.), 77 S. W. 70; Mc-
Ayeal v. Gullett, 202 111. 214; Louis-
ville & N. R. Co. v. Harrod, 25 Ky.
L. R. 250, 75 S. W. 233.
27 Chicago & A. R. Co. v. McDon-
nell, 194 111. 82, 62 N. E. 308. See
Gran v. Houston, 45 Neb. 813, 64
N. W. 245; Taylor v. Scherpe & K.
A. I. Co. 133 Mo. 349, 34 S. W.
581; Black v. Rocky Mountain B. T.
Co. (Utah), 73 Pac. 514; McCullough
v. Armstrong (Ga.), 45 S. E. 379;
Thayer County Bank v. Huddleson
(Neb.), 95 N. W. 471; Vogeler v.
Devries (Md.), 56 Atl. 782.
2 8 Wright v. Hardie, (Tex. Cv.
App.), 30 S. W. 675; Rollings v.
Bankers' Union, 63 S. Car. 192, 41 S.
E. 90; Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co.
v. Jenkins, 29 Tex. Cv. App. 440,
69 S. W. 233; Gavigan v. Evans,
45 Mich. 597, 8 N. W. 545; First Nat.
Bank v. Sargent (Neb.), 91 N. W.
595; Morgan v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.),
67 S. W. 420; Northwestern Fuel Co.
v. Danielson, 57 Fed. 915; Texas
&c. R, Co. v. Gentry, 163 U. S.
353, 16 Sup. Ct. 1104; Muir v. Miller,
82 Iowa, 700, 47 N. W. 1011, 48 N.
W. 1032; Douglass v. Geiler, 32 Kas.
499, 5 Pac. 178; McLellon v. Wheel-
er, 70 Me. 285; P. v. Lee Sare Bo, 72
Cal. 623, 14 Pac. 310; Hogan v. Shu-
art, 11 Mont. 498, 28 Pac. 736; Val-
entine v. Sweatt (Tex. Cv. App.), 78
S. W. 385; Dallas R. Tr. R. Co. v.
Payne (Tex. Cv. App.), 78 S. W.
1085.
29 Toole v. Bearce, 91 Me. 209,
39 Atl. 558; Ragan v. Kansas City,
S. & E. R. Co. 144 Mo. 623, 46 S.
W. 602; Half man v. Pennsylvania
Boiler Ins. Co. 160 Pa. St. 202, 28
Atl. 837; Cook County v. Harms,
108 111. 151; Chicago, St. L. & P.
R. Co. v. Spilker, 134 Ind. 380, 33
N. E. 280.
so Thompson v. Brannin, 19 Ky.
L. R. 454, 40 S. W. 914.
.197 FACTS ASSUMED. 182
But the fact that the evidence on a material issue is all on one
side does not authorize the court to direct the jury that it proves
a controverted fact. Thus in an action against a railroad com-
pany for the value of stock killed by it, where the plaintiff was
the only witness who testified as to the value of the stock killed,
it was held improper for the court to direct the jury to find the
value to be the amount testified to by the plaintiff. In such
state of the case the jury are not bound to believe the plaintiff,
though no evidence was introduced to contradict him. 31
197. Facts admitted by both parties. Where a fact is ad-
mitted by both of the parties to the suit the court in charg-
ing the jury may in direct terms state that such fact is
admitted. 32 But, of course, it is error to instruct that a material
fact is admitted if there is no evidence of such admission. 33
Facts which are admitted by the pleadings or parties should
not be submitted to the jury for determination as though in
dispute. 34 And it has been held that where a fact is affirmed
by one party in his pleadings and not denied by the other, the
court may, in giving instructions, assume such fact to be true. 35
198. Assuming- facts in criminal cases. While it is the
better practice for the court in charging the jury in a criminal
case to avoid assuming any material fact as having been proved,
however clear to the mind of the court such fact may seem
to be established, 36 yet facts about which there is no dispute and
si Choctaw, O. & G. R. Co. v. istence'of facts of common knowl-
Deperade (Okl.), 71 Pac. 629. See edge about which there is no con-
Foster v Franklin L. Ins. Co. (Tex. troversy is not error, Harris v.
Cv. App.), 72 S. W. 91; P. v. Web- Shebeck, 151 111. 287, 37 N. E. 1015.
ster, 111 Cal. 381, 43 Pac. 1114. 34 Miles v. Walker (Neb.), 92 N.
32 Cooper v. Denver & R. G. R. W. 1014; Trager v. Shepherd
Co. 11 Utah, 46, 39 Pac. 478; Ste- (Miss.), 18 So. 122; Orth v. Clutz's
phens v. Porter, 29 Tex. Cv. App. Adm'r, 18 B. Mon. (Ky.), 223; Wiley
556, 69 S. W. 423; S. v. Angel, 29 v. Man-a-to-wah, 6 Kas. Ill; Stew-
N. Car. 27; Driver v. Board, &c. art v. Nelson, 79 Mo. 522; Com. v.
70 Ark. 358, 68 S. W. 26; Blaul v. Ruddle, 142 Pa. St. 144, 21 Atl. 814;
Tharp, 83 Iowa, 665, 49 N. W. 1044; Bellefontaine R. Co. v. Snyaer, 24
S. v. Pritchard, 16 Nev. 101; San Ohio St. 670; Wintz v. Morrison,
Antonio & A. R. Co. v. lies (Tex. 17 Tex. 387; Druse v. Wheeler. 26
Cv. App.), 59 S. W. 564; Galveston, Mich. 189.
H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Lynes (Tex. 35 Bussey v. Charleston & W. C.
Cv. App.), 65 S. W. 1119. R. Co. 52 S. Car. 438, 30 S. E. 477;
ss C/ocoran v. Lehigh Coal Co. 138 Riser v. Southern R. Co. (S. Car.),
111. 399, 28 N. E. 759. The giving 46 S. E. 51.
of an instruction assuming the ex- se Hughes Cr. Law, 3250, citing:
183
ASSUMING IN CRIMINAL CASES.
198
concerning which no issue is made, may properly be called to
the attention of the jury in the giving of instructions. 37 Thus
in a homicide case, where the fact that the defendant, and no
one else, fired the fatal shot is admitted, an instruction assuming
that the shooting took place is not objectionable; 38 or an in-
struction assuming the fact of the killing is not prejudicial error
where there is no dispute that the killing was done by the
defendant. 39 But where the fact of the killing is controverted
then an instruction assuming such fact is prejudicial error. 40
P. v. Dick, 32 Cal. 216; S. v. Whit-
ney, 7 Ore. 386; S. v. Mackey, 12
Ore. 154, 6 Pac. 648, 5 Am. Cr. R.
536.
37 S. v. Ward, 61 Vt. 153, 17 Atl.
483, 8 Am. Cr. R. 219; Davis v. P.
114 111. 86, 29 N. E. 192; Williams v.
P. 164 111. 483, 45 N. E. 987; Hol-
liday v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. App. 133, 32 S.
W. 538; S. v. Gorham, 67 Vt. 365, 31
Atl. 845, 10 Am. Cr. R. 28; S. v.
Day, 79 Me. 120, 8 Atl. 544; P.
v. Sternberg, 111 Cal. 3, 43 Pac. 198;
S. v. Home, 9 Kas. 119, 1 Green
Cr. R. 722; S. v. Aughtry, 49 S.
Car. 285, 26 S. E. 619, 27 S. E. 199;
Hawkins v. S. 136 Ind. 630, 36 N. E.
419; Underbill Cr. Ev. 277; Ber-
tram v. Peoples R. Co. 154 Mo.
639, 55 S. W. 1040.
ss Whitney v. S. 154 Ind. 573, 57
N. E. 398; S. v. Holloway, 156 Mo.
222, 56 S. W. 734; Hanrohan v. P.
91 111. 142; Genz v. S. 58 N. J. L.
482, 34 Atl. 816. The court may
charge that the killing is conceded.
39 P. v. Pullman, 129 Cal. 258,
61 Pac. 961; S. v. Holloway, 156 Mo.
222, 56 S. W. 734; Davis v. P. 114
111. 97, 29 N. E. 192; Weller v. S.
19 Ohio C. C. 166. See S. v. Med-
lin, 126 N. Car. 1127, 36 S. E. 344.
40 Cannon v. P. 141 111. 270, 282,
30 N. E. 1027; Weller v. S. 19 Ohio
C. C. 166; Reins v. P. 30 111. 256,
274; S. v. Marsh, 171 Mo. 523, 71
S. W. 1003 (defendant denied being
present); Gee v. S. 80 Miss. 285, 31
So. 792. Instructions held assuming
facts: Barr v. P. 113 111. 471, 473;
S. v. Reed, 50 La. Ann. 990, 24 So.
131; Hayes v. Pennsylvania R. Co.
195 Pa. St. 184, 45 Atl. 925; Dart v.
Horn, 20 111. 213; P. v. Dom Pedro,
43 N. Y. S. 44, 19 Misc. 300; S. v.
Bowker, 26 Ore. 309, 38 Pac. 124;
Frank v. Tatum (Tex. Cv. App.),
26 S. W. 900; Dallas & O. C. R. Co.
v. Harvey (Tex. Cv. App.), 27 S. W.
423; Richmond & D. R. Co. v. Green-
wood, 99 Ala. 501, 14 So. 495; Land-
man v. Glover (Tex. Cv. App.), 25
S. W. 994; Ohlweiler v. Lohman,
88 Wis. 75, 59 N. W. 678; La Salle
County C. Coal Co. v. Eastman, 99
111. App. 495; Mobile & O. R. Co. v.
Healy, 100 111. App. 586; Bonaparte
v. Thayer, 95 Md. 548, 52 Atl. 496;
St. Louis S. W. R. Co. v. Silbey
(Tex. Cv. App.), 68 S. W. 516; Hall
v. S. 130 Ala. 45, 30 So. 422; Lee v.
Hammond, 114 Wis. 550, 90 N. W.
1073; Lake S. & M. S. R. Co. v.
Brown, 123 111. 184, 14 N. E. 197;
City of Elgin v. Beckwith, 119 111.
367, 10 N. E. 558; Commercial Nat.
Bank v. Proctor, 98 111. 562. In-
structions held not assuming facts
in the following cases: Bartlett v.
Board of Education, 59 111. 364, 373;
Western M. M. Ins. Co. v. Boughton,
136 111. 317, 320, 26 N. E. 591; Lake
Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Johnson,
135 111. 641, 652, 26 N. E. 510; Chi-
cago & N. W. R. Co. v. Goebel,
119 111. 515, 521, 10 N. E. 369; Chica-
go, St. L. & P. R. Co. v. Welsh,
118 111. 572, 575, 9 N. E. 197; Roark
v. S. 105 Ga. 736, 32 S. E. 125;
Bird v. Forceman, 62 111. 212, 215;
Nugent v. Brenchard, 157 N. Y. 687,
51 N. E. 1092; Freeman v. Gates,
22 Tex. Cv. App. 623, 55 S. W. 524;
Dammann v. City of St. Louis, 152
Mo. 186, 53 S. W. 932; Triolo v.
Foster (Tex. Cv. App.), 57 S. W.
698; International G. & N. R. Co.
v. Martineg (Tex. Cv. App.), 57 S.
198
FACTS ASSUMED.
184
And this is true in all jurisdictions, and is a well settled prin-
ciple.
W. 689; Sherman, S. & S. R. Co. v.
Bell (Tex. Cv. App.), 58 S. W. 147;
Ryder v. Jacobs, 196 Pa. St. 386, 46
Atl. 667; Jackson v. Burnham, 20
Colo. 532, 39 Pac. 577; Robinson
v. S. (Miss.), 16 So. 201; P. v. Mal-
lon, 103 Cal. 513, 37 Pac. 512; Hans
v. S. 50 Neb. 150, 69 N. W. 838;
S. v. Straub, 16 Wash. Ill, 47 Pac.
227; Welsh v. S. 60 Neb. 101, 82
N. W. 368; Conners v. S. 95 Wis.
77, 69 N. W. 981; Galveston, H. &
S. A. R. Co. v. Buch, 27 Tex. Cv.
App. 283, 65 S. W. 681; Throck-
morten v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co.
14 Tex. Cv. App. 222, 39 S. W. 174;
Texas & O. R. Co. v. Echols, 17
Tex. Cv. App. 677, 41 S. W. 488;
Geary v. Kansas City, O. & S. R.
Co. 138 Mo. 257, 39 S. W. 774;
Sonnefield v. Mayton (Tex. Cv.
App.), 39 S. W. 166; Missouri, K.
& T. R. Co. v. Mines (Tex. Cv.
App.), 40 S. W. 152; Texas & N. O.
R. Co. v. Echols, 17 Tex. Cv. App.
677, 41 S. W. 488; Rapid Tr. R. Co.
v. Lusk (Tex. Cv. App.), 66 S. W.
799; Wreggitt v. Barnett, 99 Mich.
477, 58 N. W. 467; Illinois Cent. R.
Co. v. Turner, 194 111. 575, 62 N. E.
798; Crockett v. Miller, 112 Fed.
729; Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Poole's
Adm'r, 100 Va. 148, 40 S. E. 627;
Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Ward,
61 Fed. 927; Moore v. S. 114 Ga. 256,
40 S. E. 295; Williams v. S. (Tex. Cr
App.), 65 S. W. 1059; Tunnicliffe
v. Fox (Neb.), 94 N. W. 1032; P.
v. Lapique (Cal.), 67 Pac. 14; Lyon
v. Watson, 109 Mich. 390, 67 N. W.
512; Fitzgerald v. Clark, 17 Mont.
100, 42 Pac. 273>; Nugent v. Breu-
chard, 36 N. Y. S. 102, 91 Hun, 12;
Comey v. Philadelphia Tr. Co. 175
Pa. St. 133, 34 Atl. 621; Galveston,
H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Waldo (Tex.
Cv. App.), 32 S. W. 783; Richmond
v. Traction Co. (Va.), 43 S. E. 622.
CHAPTER VIII.
BURDEN OF PROOF.
Sec.
199. Instructions that burden is on
affirmant.
Sec.
202. Instructions when evidence
is equally balanced.
200. Degree of proof by prepon- 203. Preponderance How deter-
derance.
201. Burden and degree of proof
in criminal cases.
mined Witnesses.
199. Instruction that burden is on affirmant The party
who, by his pleading, alleges a fact or state of facts is required
to prove the same by a preponderance of the evidence, and the
court, on proper request, should so instruct the jury. Thus
the plaintiff is on the affirmative as to the facts alleged
in his complaint or declaration, and the court should instruct the
jury that the burden is on him to make out his case by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. 1 And in some cases at least it is
not improper to instruct that the plaintiff must prove all the
material facts of his complaint by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. 2 But where the plaintiff's petition or declaration alleges
i Mitchell v. Hindman, 150 111.
538, 37 N. E. 916; Central R. Co.
v. Bannister, 195 111. 50, 62 N. E.
864; De Hart v. Bond, 143 Ind. 363,
41 N. E. 825; Williams v. Hoehle, 95
Wis. 510, 70 N. W. 556; Flores v.
Maverick (Tex. Cv. App.), 26 S.
W. 316; Meyer v. Blackmore, 54
Miss. 575; Fowler v. Harrison, 64 S.
Car. 311, 42 S. E. 159; Guimard v.
Knapp, Stout & Co. 95 Wis. 482,
70 N. W. 671. See Jesse French
Piano & Organ Co. v. Forbes, 134
Ala. 302, 32 So. 678 (excluding un-
certainty).
2 Salem Stone, &c. Co. v. Griffin,
139 Ind. 141, 38 N. E. 411; De
Hart v. Board, 143 Ind. 363, 41 N.
E. 825. In a personal injury case
the burden of proof does not shift
to the defendant on proof of the
injury. The plaintiff must prove,
not only the injury, but also that
it was caused by the negligence ot
the defendant, Peck v. St. Louis
Tr. Co. (Mo.), 77 S. W. 736.
185
199 BURDEN OF PROOF. 186
several material facts, the proof of any one of which would
make out his case (for instance, several different grounds of
negligence), then such an instruction would be improper. Only
so many of the material facts as are necessary to constitute a
cause of action need be established. 3
Where the pleadings put several facts in issue, the proof of
any one of which would entitle a party to a verdict, an instruc-
tion calling for proof of all of such facts conjunctively is er-
roneous. 4 But submitting several matters conjunctively, in-
stead of disjunctively and severally, cannot be complained of
as error in the absence of a. request for a proper instruction. 5
So where the defendant, by his pleading, sets up affirmative mat-
ter in his plea or answer, the plaintiff is entitled to have the
jury instructed that the burden is on the defendant to establish
the facts thus alleged, by a preponderance of the evidence. 6
And although there may be no conflict of testimony as to a
material fact, it is not error to charge the jury that the party
alleging such fact must prove it by a preponderance of the
evidence. 7
But the party upon whom rests the burden of proving a
material fact in issue is not confined to evidence introduced on
his side of the case. He may rely upon any evidence of his
opponent to aid him. It matters not whether the evidence is
given by the one party or the other; it is sufficient if the fact is
proved by a preponderance of the evidence. 8 Hence, to instruct
the jury that the burden of proving contributory negligence
on the part of the plaintiff rests on the defendant, is improper. 9
The court may, however, properly refuse instructions on the
burden of proof where the evidence introduced by a party is
s Houston & T. C. R. Co v. Pat- v. Laumeister, 102 Cal. 658, 36 Pac.
terson (Tex. Cv. App.), 57 S. W. 925; Kepler v. Jessup, 11 Ind. 241.
675. * Blotcky v. Caplan, 91 Iowa, 352,
4 Bell v. Beazley, 18 Tex. Cv. App. 59 N. W. 204. See Chittim v. Marti-
639, 45 S. W. 401; Gulf, C. & S. F. nez, 94 Tex. 141, 58 S. W. 948. See
R. Co. v. Hill, 95 Tex. 629, 69 S. W. Indianapolis & G. R. Tr. Co. v.
136; Wilson v. Huguenin, 117 Ga. Haines (Ind.), 69 N. E. 188.
546, 43 S. E. 857; Herbert v. Drew, Indianapolis & G. R. T. Co. v.
32 Ind. 366. Haines (Ind.), 69 N. E. 188; Chicago
s Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Hill, & E. I. R. Co. v. Stephenson (Ind.),
95 Tex. 629, 69 S. W. 136. 69 N. E. 273.
e Whipple v. Preece, 18 Utah, 454, a Indianapolis & G. R. T. Co. v.
56 Pac. 296; Kuenster v. Woodhouse, Haines (Ind.), 69 N. E. 188.
101 Wis. 216, 77 N. W. 165; Nicbol
187 BURDEN ON AFFIRMANT. 199
uncontradicted. 10 Or where a fact is conclusively established
by the evidence the court may properly refuse to instruct on
the burden of proof. 11 Also the refusal to charge the jury on
which party the burden of proof originally rested is not error
where the evidence conclusively establishes the fact in issue. 12
But when a party is entitled to have the jury instructed on
the law as to the burden of proof, and makes proper request
therefor, it is error for the court to refuse such instructions. 13
However, a party will not be heard to complain of the failure
of the court to instruct the jury on the burden of proof in the
absence of a proper request in that respect. 14 It is also error
for the court -in charging the jury to place the burden of proof
on the wrong party. 15 But if a party assumes the burden of
an issue, which, by the pleadings, is on the other party, he
cannot complain of error in that respect. 16
Where the court errs in charging that the burden of proof
is on the defendant, and it appears that the plaintiff success-
fully carried the burden by his proof, the error is not material. 17
While it is not necessary that the court, in charging the jury
on the burden of proof, should define preponderance of^ evi-
dence, 18 yet when the court undertakes to do so the instruc-
tion defining the term should be proper and applicable to the
10 Milmo Nat. Bank v. Convery 113 Mich. 53, 71 N. W. 523; Martin
(Tex. Cv. App.), 49 S. W. 926; Davis v. Davis, 76 Iowa, 762, 40 N. W.
v. Davis, 20 Tex. Cv. App. 310, 49 712.
S. W. 726. is Wildey v. Crane, 69 Mich. 17,
11 Yetter v. Zurick, 55 Minn. 452, 36 N. W. 734; S. v. Crossley, 69 Ind.
57 N. W. 147. 203; S. v. Grinstead, 62 Kas. 593, 64
is Black v. S. 1 Tex. App. 369; Pac. 49; McNutt & R. v. Kaufman,
Stevens v. Pendleton, 94 Mich. 405, 26 Ohio St. 130. In such case the
53 N. W. 1108. court will not look to the evidence
14 Miles v. Strong, 68 Conn. 273, to see whether it sustains the ver-
36 Atl. 55; Donavan v. Bromley, 113 diet returned, Chicago & A. R. Co.
Mich. 53, 71 N. W- 523; Anderson v. Murphy, 198 111. 470, 64 N. E.
v. Baird, 19 Ky. L. R. 444, 40 S. W. 1011.
923; Lamina v. S. 46 Neb. 236, 64 ie Armstrong v. Penn, 105 Ga.
N. W. 956. The court is not bound 229, 31 S. E. 158. See Freemont, E.
to instruct on its own motion: May- & M. V. R. Co. v. Harlin, 50 Neb.
nard v. Fellows, 43 N. H. 255; Gulf, 698, 70 N. W. 263, 36 L. R. A. 417.
C. & S. F. R. Co. v. McCarty, 82 Tex. i" Moore v. Brewer, 94 Ga. 260,
608, 18 S. W. 716; McKinney v. 21 S. E. 460.
Guhman, 38 Mo. App. 344; Dun- is Jones v. Durham, 94 Mo. App.
combe v. Powers, 75 Iowa, 185, 39 51, 67 S. W. 976; Endowment Rank
N. W. 261; Conway v. Jefferson, 46 K. P. v. Steele, 108 Tenn. 624,
N. H. 521; In re Bromley's Estate, 69 S. W. 336.
200
BURDEN OF PROOF.
188
evidence before the jury. It is improper to say that prepon-
derance means the greater weight of evidence, to be determined
from a careful examination of all the evidence "tendered" where
there was testimony offered but. not admitted. 19
200. Degree of proof by preponderance. As stated in the
preceding section, the party upon whom the burden rests is
required to establish his facts by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. Hence an instruction in a civil case, which calls for
proof by a greater weight of evidence than by a preponder-
ance, is erroneous. 20 Thus an instruction exacting proof by a
"clear preponderance," 21 or by a "fair preponderance," 22 or
by "more and better evidence" than that of the opposing party,
is improper, in that it calls for a higher degree of proof than a
preponderance of the evidence. 23 Also a charge telling the jury
that the evidence should "satisfy" their minds to warrant a
verdict, 24 or an instruction requiring proof to the "satisfac-
tion" of the jury, 25 or that the evidence must "conclusively"
isHurlbut v. Bagley, 99 Iowa,
127, 68 N. W. 585; Western U.
Tel. Co. v. James (Tex. Cv. App.),
73 S. W. 79.
20 White v. Ferris, 124 Ala. 461, 27
So. 259; Roe v. Bachelder, 41 Wis.
360; McCord-Brady Co. v. Money-
ban, 59 Neb. 593, 81 N. W. 608;
Long v. Martin, 152 Mo. 668, 54 S.
W. 473; Lundon v. City of Chicago,
83 111. App. 208; Coffin v. U. 1.
156 U. S. 432, 15 Sup. Ct. 394.
Contra: S. v. Linhoff (Iowa), 97 N.
W. 77. See Kirchner v. Collins, 152
Mo. 394, 53 S. W. 1081; Herrick v.
Gary, 83 111. 85; Guardian Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Hogan, 80 111. 35,
41.
21 Douley v. Dougherty, 75 111.
App. 379; Bitter v. Saathoff, 98 111.
266; Prather v. Wilkins, 68 Tex.
187, 4 S. W. 252; Hall v. Wolff, 61
Iowa, 559, 16 N. 710 (clearly and
fairly) ; Meyer v. Hafemeister,
(Wis.), 97 N. W. 166.
22 Atkinson v. Reed (Tex. Cv.
App.), 49 S. W. 260; Houston & T.
C. R. Co. v. Dotson, 15 Tex. Cv.
App. 73, 38 S. W. 642; Ashbome v.
Town of W. 69 Conn. 217, 37 Atl.
498; Effinger v. S. 9 Ohio C. C. 376;
B. Langtry Sons v. Lowrie (Tex.
Cv. App.), 58 S. W. 835; Carstens
v. Earles, 26 Wash. 676, 67 Pac.
404; Hart v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co.
9 Wash. 620, 38 Pac. 213; Altschuler
v. Coburn, 38 Neb. 881, 57 N. W.
836.
Contra: Meyer v. Hafemeister
(Wis.), 97 N. W. 166.
23 Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Pol-
lock, 195 111. 163, 62 N. E. 831; Rolfe
v. Rich, 149 111. 436, 35 N. E. 352
(satisfactory evidence) ; Graves v.
Cadwell, 90 111. 612, 615.
24 Moor v. Heineke, 119 Ala. 627,
24 So. 374; Town of Havana v.
Biggs, 58 111. 483, 486; Willis v.
Chowning, 90 Tex. 617, 40 S. W.
395; Texas, &c. R. Co. v. Ballin-
ger (Tex. Cv. App.), 40 S. W. 822;
Wollf v. Van Housen, 55 111. App.
295; Finks v. Cox (Tex. Cv. App.),
30 S. W. 512; Frick v. Kabaker,
116 Iowa, 494, 90 N. W. 498; Brown
v. Master, 104 Ala. 451, 16 So. 443.
See Sams A. C. Co. v. League, 25
Colo. 129, 54 Pac. 642.
25 Wolf v. Van Housen, 55 111.
App. 295; Mitchell v. Hindman, 150
111. 538, 37 N. E. 916; McBride v.
Banguss, 65 Tex. 174, 467; Gregg
189 DEGREE OF PROOF PREPONDERANCE. 200
prove a fact or case, calls for too high a degree of proof. 26 So
also it is improper to instruct that a party must prove his
claim with "clearness and certainty." 27 But it has been held
that an instruction stating that "the minds of the jury should
be satisfied to a reasonable degree of certainty" is not material
error. 28
In South Carolina it has been held that a charge that the
jury "must be sure" that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence before they can find for the defendant is not erroneous
and does not call for too high a degree of proof. 29
But where fraud is alleged and made an issue, especially where
the charge is such as, if true, it indicates criminal conduct, the
evidence must establish the charge by a clear preponderance. 30
The refusal of an instruction calling for the "clearest and
most satisfactory evidence" of the existence of the relation
of debtor and creditor between husband and wife at the time
of the transfer of property from one to the other has been held
not to be error in the absence of an explanation of what is
meant by the expression "clearest and most satisfactory evi-
dence." 31
In a will contest a charge which states that "undue influence
need not be proved by direct evidence, but may be shown by facts
and circumstances which lead the mind to the conviction that
v. Jones (Tex. Cv. App.), 26 S. B. 212; Palm v. Chernowsky, 28 Tex.
132; Feist v. Boothe (Tex. Cv. Cv. App. 405, 67 S. W. 165.
App.), 27 S. W. 33; Lowery v. 28 Liverpool & L. & G. Ins. Co.
Rowland, 104 Ala. 420, 16 So. 88; v. Farnsworth Lumber Co. 72 Miss.
Miller v. Barber, 66 N. Y. 558; 555, 17 So. 445; Peltier v. Chicago,
Monaghan v. Agriculture F. Ins. St. P. M. & O. R. Co. 88 Wis.
Co. 53 Mich. 238; Pierpont Mfg. 521, 60 N. W. 250. Contra: Low-
Co, v. Goodman Produce Co. (Tex. ery v. Rowland, 104 Ala. 420, 16
Cv. App.), 60 S. W. 347. Contra: So. 88; O'Neil v. Blase, 94 Mo.
Surber v. Mayfield, 156 Ind. 375, App. 648, 68 S. W. 764.
60 N. E. 7; Carstens v. Earles, 26 20 Bodie v. Charleston, N. C. R.
Wash. 676, 67 Pac. 404. Co. 61 S. Car. 468, 39 S. E. 715.
26 Greathouse v. Moore (Tex. Cv. so Klipstein v. Raschein, 117
App.) 23 S. W. 226; Gage v. Louis- Wis. 248, 94 N. W. 63; Poertner v.
ville, N. O. & T. R. Co. 88 Tenn. Poertner, 66 Wis. 644, 29 N. W.
724, 14 S. W. 73. 386. See Wallace v. Maltice, 118
27Maxon v. Farris (Tex. Cv. Ind. 59, 20 N. E. 706; Stevens v.
App.), 48 S. W. 741; F. Dohmen Stevens, 127 Ind. 560, 26 N. E. 1078.
Co. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co. 96 Wis. Palm v. Chernowsky, 28 Tex. Cv.
38, 71 N. W. 69; McLeod v. Sharp, App. 405, 67 S. W. 165; Stocks v.
53 111. App. 406; Brown v. Master, Scott, 188 111. 266, 58 N. E. 990.
104 Ala. 451, 16 So. 443; U. S. si Hartman & F. B. Co. v. Clark,
Fidelity & G. Co. v. Charles, 131 94 Md. 520, 51 Atl. 291.
Ala. 657, 31 So. 558, 57 L. R. A.
201 BURDEN OF PROOF. 190
it has been exercised," is not rendered obnoxious by the use
of the word "conviction," where other instructions in the charge
state that the burden is on the contestants to establish want of
mental capacity and undue influence by a preponderance of the
credible testimony, which means by the greater weight of the
testimony. 32
201. Burden and degree of proof in criminal cases. As
stated in another chapter, the burden is on the prosecution to
prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, as
charged in the indictment; and each of the essential elements
necessary to constitute the offense charged must be established
to the same degree of certainty before a conviction is warranted,
and a refusal to so instruct the jury is error. 33 In some juris-
dictions the burden is on the accused, in a criminal case, to
establish his affirmative defense, such as insanity and self-de-
fense by a preponderance of the evidence, and in others he is
only required to raise a reasonable doubt of his guilt from all
of the evidence on both sides considered together. In either
case an instruction requiring him to establish his defense be-
yond a reasonable doubt is erroneous, in that it calls for too
high a degree of proof; 34 but, of course, such instruction is
proper in those states where the law requires the accused to
establish his defense beyond a reasonable doubt. 35
In those states where the burden is on the defendant to raise
only a reasonable doubt of his guilt the giving of an instruction
stating that the defendant is required to make "satisfactory"
32 Goldthorp v. Goldthorp, 115 i n that it requires too high a de-
Iowa, 430, 88 N. W. 944. gree of proof, S. v. Courtright, 66
The improper use of the words Ohio St. 37, 63 N. E. 590.
"burden of proof" for "preponder- 34 Hamilton v. S. 97 Tenn. 452,
ance of evidence" is not material 37 s. W. 194; McKnight v. U. S.
error where the court properly 115 Fed. 972 (intent); German v.
states that the burden is on the U. S. 120 Fed. 666 (insanity by pre-
plaintiff to make out his case by ponderance is error) ; Landers v. S.
a preponderance of the evidence: (Tex. Cr. App.), 63 S. W. 557; S. v.
Williams v. Hoehle, 95 Wis. 510, Porter, 64 Iowa, 237, 20 N. W. 168
70 N. W. 556; Flores v. Maverick (preponderance); Clark v. S. 150
(Tex. Cv. App.), 26 S. W. 316; Ind. 60, 64 N. E. 589 (self-defense).
Doran v. Cedar Rapids & M. C. R. 35 Com. v. Kilpatrick, 204 Pa. St.
Co. 117 Iowa, 442, 90 N. W. 815 218, 53 Atl. 774; S. v. Lewis, 20
("testimony" for "evidence"). Nev. 333. 22 Pac. 241, 8 Am. Cr.
33 See "Reasonable Doubt," 150. R. 592; S. v. Scott, 49 La. R. 253,
On a charge of perjury an in- 21 So. 271, 10 Am. Cr. R. 591;
struction calling for proof equiva- Hughes Cr. Law, 2434.
lent to two witnesses is erroneous,
191 DEGREE OF PROOF IN CRIMINAL CASES. 202
proof of his defense or mitigation, unless such proof "satis-
factorily" arises out of the evidence for the prosecution is error
in exacting a higher degree of proof than the law requires. 36
Thus an instruction in a homicide case requiring the accused
to prove self-defense to the "satisfaction" of the jury is er-
roneous, in that it calls for too high a degree of proof. The
accused is only required to raise a reasonable doubt by his
defense. 37 And it is also error, where the plea is self-defense,
to charge that before the jury can acquit they must be rea-
sonably satisfied that the defendant killed the deceased under
an immediate sense of great danger of losing his life or suffer-
ing serious bodily harm, in that it takes from the state the
burden of proof. 38 So in a larceny case an instruction requir-
ing the defendant to satisfactorily explain his possession of
property alleged to have been stolen, for the same reason, is
erroneous. 39 It is error for the court to charge that the threat-
ened danger to the person must be so great as to create a rea-
sonable belief in the mind of the person assaulted, of imminent
peril to life or "the most serious bodily harm." The words of
the statute being "great bodily harm" fall far short of "most
serious bodily harm;" the one may endanger life, the other
not. 40
202. Instructions when evidence is equally balanced. If the
evidence is equally balanced, or so close as to make it
doubtful which party has presented the greater weight of evi-
dence, then the verdict should be against the party on whom
rests the burden of proof, and the refusal to give an instruc-
tion to that effect when properly requested is error. 41 But the
giving of such an instruction under some state of facts may be
se Smith v. P. 142 111. 122, 31 N. App. Div. 386, the burden never
E. 599; Clark v. S. 159 Ind. 65, 64 shifts in a criminal case.
N. E. 589; Boykin v. P. 22 Colo. sag. v. McKea, 120 N. Car. 608,
496, 45 Pac. 419; S. v. McKea, 120 27 S. E. 78. See S. v. Garvin (S.
N. Car. 608, 27 S. E. 78. Car.), 26 S. E. 570.
37Wacaser v. P. 134 111. 438, 442; *o Reins v. P. 30 111. 256, 275.
Alexander v. P. 96 111. 102. See Dor- *i City of Streeter v. Leibendor-
sey v. S. 110 Ga. 331, 35 S. E. 651; fer, 71 111. App. 625; City Banks
Jackson v. P. 18 111. 270; Hoge v. Appeal from Com'rs, 54 Conn. 273,
P. 117 111. 44, 6 N. E. 796. See 7 Atl. 548; Bridenthal v. Davidson,
"Homicide," "Reasonable Doubt." 61 111. 461; Jones v. Angell, 95 Ind.
as Dent v. S. (Ala.), 17 So. 94: 376. See Harper v. S. 101 Ind. 109;
P. v. Caasata, 39 N. Y. S. 641, 6 Jarrell v. Lillie, 40 Ala. 271.
203 BURDEN OF PROOF. 192
improper. Thus, where the defendant, by his pleading, raises
affirmative issues, such, for instance, as accord and satisfac-
tion, of fraudulent representations and of failure of considera-
tion, the burden is upon him, and not upon the plaintiff, to prove
such issues. An instruction, therefore, which, in substance, tells
the jury that the plaintiff is bound to make out his case by a
preponderance of the evidence upon every material point, and
in weighing the evidence if the jury think that it is evenly bal-
anced upon any point necessary to a recovery by the plain-
tiff, or preponderates ever so slightly in favor of the defendant,
they should find for the defendant, is improper, in that it throws
on the plaintiff the burden of proving all the issues, including
those raised by the defendant. 42
. 203. Preponderance How determined Witnesses, The
court is authorized to instruct the jury on the mode of determin-
ing the preponderance of the evidence, and should not refuse to
do so, especially where the testimony is conflicting. 43 By a pre-
ponderance of the evidence is meant the greater weight of the
evidence. 44 The preponderance of the evidence is not necessarily
determined by the number of witnesses who may testify for or
against a party, or on any point or issue involved. 45 The quality
of the testimony, as well as the number of witnesses, must be
considered by the jury in determining the preponderance. 46
It is for the jury to say from all the evidence before them
whether the testimony of the greater number of witnesses tes-
tifying shall be more or less controlling than the better quality
of the testimony of the fewer number of witnesses. 47 It is im-
proper therefore for the court to charge that the preponder-
ance of the evidence is determined by the number of witnesses
42 Richelieu Hotel Co. v. Inter- 313; West C. St. R. Co. v. Liesero-
national M. E. Co. 140 111. 267, 29 witz, 197 111. 612, 64 N. E. 718;
N. E. 1044. Georgia N. R. Co. v. Hutchins
43 Louisville & M. R. Co. v.' (Ga.), 46 S. E. 662.
Ward, 67 Fed. 927. See Buck v. 46 Diver v. Hall, 46 N. Y. S.
Hogeboom (Neb.), 90 N. W. 635; 533, 20 Misc. 677; S. v. Bohan, 19
Miller v. John, 208 111. 180. Kas. 35. See, also, Hardy v. Mil-
44Ewen v. Wilbor, 208 111. 500. waukee St. R. Co. 89 Wis. 183, 61
45Wastl v. Montana N. R. Co. N. W. 771; Gilmore v. Seattle &
17 Mont. 216, 42 Pac. 772; Bierbach R. R. Co. 29 Wash. 150, 69 Pac.
v. Goodyear R. Co. 54 Wis. 213, 743; Dallas Cotton Mills v. Ash-
11 N. W. 514; Illinois Cent. R. Co. ley (Tex. Cv. App.), 63 S. W. 160.
v. Zang, 10 111. App. 594; Howlett v. 47 Gilmore v. Seattle &c. R. Co.
Dilts, 4 Ind. App. 23, 30 N. E. 29 Wash. 150, 69 Pac. 743.
193 PREPONDERANCE, HOW DETERMINED. 203
on each side where the opposing witnesses are equally credible
and equally well corroborated and have no greater interest in
the result of the trial. 48 And for the same reason it is improper
for the court to say to the jury that if they should find that
three witnesses are of equal credibility and weight, and that
the testimony of two of them conflict with the other, they may
disregard the testimony of the latter; such instruction invades
the province of the jury. 49 But to state that other things being
equal the greater number of witnesses would carry the greater
weight has been held to be proper. 50 So, a charge stating that
"a case might arise in which a jury would be justified in finding
a verdict for the defendant on the testimony of one witness
against the testimony of any greater number of witnesses" is
not improper. 51 Also a charge stating that the preponderance of
the evidence is not alone to be determined by the entire number
of witnesses, but also by their means of knowledge, conduct and
demeanor in testifying, their interest or lack of interest, if any,
in the suit, the probability or improbability of their statements,
and the facts and circumstances shown on the trial which might
go to determine the weight of their testimony, is proper. 52 An.
instruction which charges that the plaintiff must prove his case
by a preponderance of the evidence, and that the jury should
dispassionately weigh all the evidence, giving weight to the several
witnesses as their character, intelligence, manner and testimony
warrant, and to try to reconcile all statements so that all may
appear to have told the truth, is equivalent to stating that
preponderance does not consist in the greater numerical array
of witnesses. 53
48 Christmam v. Ray, 42 111. App. ^ P. v. Chun Heong, 86 Cal. 329,
111. 24 Pac. 1021.
49Childs v. S. 76 Ala. 93; Amis 52 Buck v. Hogeboom (Neb.), 90
v. Cameron, 55 Ga. 449; Johnson N. W. 635; Pfaffenback v. Lake S.
v. P. 140 111. 350, 29 N. E. 895; & M. S. R. Co. 142 Ind. 246. 41 N.
Armstrong v. S. 83 Ala. 49, 3 So. E. 530; Meyer v. Mead, 83 111. App.
431; Kelley v. Louisville & N. R. 19; Hays v. Johnson, 92 111. App.
Co. 49 111. App 304; Kuehn v. Wil- 80; West C. St. R. Co. v. Liesero-
son, 13 Wis. 117. witz, 197 111. 612, 64 N. E. 718.
50 Spensley v. Lancashire Ins. Wilcox v. Mines, 100 Tenn.
Co. 62 Wis. 453, 22 N. W. 740. See 524, 45 S. W. 781; see Ragsdale v.
Bisewski v. Booth, 100 Wis. 383, 76 Ezell, 18 Ky. L. R. 146, 35 S. W. 629.
N. W. 349.
CHAPTER IX.
AFFIRMATIVE AND NEGATIVE EVIDENCE.
204. Instructions on relative weight 205. Instructions on relative weight
improper. proper.
204. Instructions on relative weight improper. Whether
the affirmative testimony of a witness may be regarded as
stronger than the negative testimony of another witness is a
question for the jury to determine. The court cannot instruct
them, as a matter of law, that the former is stronger than
the latter without invading the province of the jury. 1 Accord-
ing to this principle, a charge stating that the fact that a
person who is in a position to hear a bell ring, does not hear
it, is no evidence that the bell did not ring, is improper
(though relating to negative testimony), as touching on the
weight of the evidence. 2 So to instruct that positive testimony
of witnesses that a whistle was blown and bell rung is entitled
to more weight than testimony of others that they did not hear
the one or the other is improper, in the absence of an instruc-
tion on the credibility of the witnesses. 3 Also a charge "that
affirmative evidence of the ringing of the bell and blowing of
the whistle is generally entitled to more weight than evidence
i Rockwood v. Poundstone, 38 Co. v. Buck, 130 Ind. 300, 30 N. E.
111. 200; Louisville, N. A. & C. R. 19.
Co. v. Shires, 108 111. 617, 632; 2 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. York,
Sparks v. Dawson, 47 Tex. 138. See 128 Ala, 305, 30 So. 676.
Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Robinson, s Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. v.
106 111. 142; Chicago & A. R. Co. Devore, 114 Fed. 155; Southern R.
v. Pelligreen, 65 111. App. 333; Co. v. Bryan, 115 Ga. 659, 42 S. E.
Keith v. S. 49 Kas. 439; Sumpter v. 43.
S. (Fla.), 3*3 So. 981; Ohio & M. R.
194
195 RELATIVE WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE. 205
that it was not heard or noticed" is improper as on the weight
of the evidence. 4
205. Instructions on relative weight proper. But in some
jurisdictions the court should instruct the jury as to the relative
weight of positive and negative evidence when requested to
do so, if there is evidence on which to base the instruction. 5
Hence, according to this rule, a charge that it is for the jury to
consider how much testimony of a negative character is worth,
compared with positive testimony, and that ordinarily the evi-
dence of a witness who swears positively that he saw a certain
thing, is more valuable than that of witnesses who say they
did not see it, is proper. 6 The giving of an instruction that
positive testimony is generally to be believed in preference to
negative testimony, other things being equal, and the witnesses
being of equal credibility, is not improper. 7 So it is also proper
for the court to charge that a witness who states to the best
of his recollection that a certain fact is true, testifies less posi-
tively than one who positively states that such fact is true. 8
An instruction stating that where witnesses testify that cer-
tain facts took place and other witnesses of equal credibility,
having equal means of knowledge, testify that such facts did
not take place, the testimony of the latter is not negative, but
should be regarded by the jury as affirmative testimony, in
which case the jury should weigh all the testimony and give a
verdict as the weight preponderates, is not erroneous, though
argumentative. 9 In a case in which witnesses have testified
as positively on one side that a fact is not true as on the other
side that such fact is true, the court may properly refuse to
instruct that positive testimony is entitled to more weight than
4 McLean v. Erie R. Co. (N. J.), it, Humphries v. S. 100 Ga. 260, 28
54 Atl. 238. S. E. 25.
s Hildman v. City of Phillips, 106 e Rhodes v. U. S. 79 Fed. 740.
Wis. 611, 82 N. W. 566; Selensky See Hess v. Williamsport & N. B.
v. Chicago G. W. R. Co. 120 Iowa, R. Co. 181 Pa. St. 492, 37 Atl. 568.
113, 94 N. W. 272; Olsen v. Oregon " Southern R. Co. v. O'Bryan
S. L. & U. N. R. Co. 9 Utah, 129, (Ga.), 45 S. E. 1001.
33 Pac. 623. . s Gable v. Ranch, 50 S. Car. 95,
A charge explaining the differ- 27 S. E. 555.
ence between the probative value 9 West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Muel-
of positive and negative testimony ler, 165 111. 499, 46 N. E. 373; see
is erroneous of course where there Kelley v. Schupp, 60 Wis. 86, 18 N.
is no evidence upon which to base W. 725.
205 AFFIRMATIVE AND NEGATIVE EVIDENCE. 196
negative, since it is largely within the discretion of the court to
give such an instruction. 10
10 Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Lorentzen, 79 Fed. 291.
CHAPTER X.
RELATING TO WITNESSES.
Sec.
206. Jury judges of credibility of
witnesses.
207. Instructions violating rule
Illustrations.
208. Intimating opinion by in-
structions.
209. Interested witnesses corrob-
orated.
210. Praising or denouncing wit-
nesses.
211. Expert and non-expert wit-
nesses.
212. Witnesses contradicting each
other.
213. Reconciling conflicting testi-
mony.
214. Interest of witness to be con-
sidered.
215. Probability, 1 m p r o b a bility,
manner, conduct, bias.
216. Instructing that jury "must"
or "should" consider.
217. On disregarding evidence.
Sec.
218. On swearing wilfully false.
219. On swearing falsely Improp-
er.
220. Impeachment Instructions
based on evidence.
221. Believing or disbelieving wit-
ness.
222. Failure to produce witnesses
or evidence.
223. Singling out witnesses Im-
proper.
224. On detectives and informers
as witnesses.
225. Relatives as witnesses.
226. On competency and testi-
mony of the defendant.
227. Defendant's interest Other
considerations.
228. On defendant's unsworn state-
ments.
229. On defendant's failure to tes-
tify.
206. Jury judges of credibility of witnesses. The jury are
the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses and of the
weight to be given to their testimony, and the court, if re-
quested, should instruct the jury accordingly, and the refusal
to so instruct is error. 1 Especially where the witnesses on each
i Lensing v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 39 N. E. 926; Jones v. Oasler, 139
45 S. W. 572; S. v. Washington, Ind. 382, 38 N. E. 812, 47 Am. bt.
107 La. 298, 31 So. 638; Parkins 274; Lefler v. S. 122 Ind. 206, 23
V.Missouri Pac. R. Co. (Neb.), 93 N. N. E. 154; Durham v. S. 120 Ind.
W. 197; Newport v. S. 140 Ind. 299, 467, 22 N. E. 333; Finch v. Bergins,
197
207 RELATING TO WITNESSES. 198
side are about equal in number and credibility, and the testi-
mony of those on the one side is in direct conflict with the tes-
timony of those on the other side, should the question of the
credibility of the witnesses be exclusively for the jury. 2 The
court can scarcely err in refusing to give instructions which
seem to have a tendency to influence the jury as to the credit
to be given particular witnesses. 3 It is within the discretion
of the court to give or refuse instructions as to whether any
occurrences or scenes taking place during the progress of the
trial, such, for instance, as where a party or witness becomes
hysterical, should be considered by the jury or not in weigh-
ing the evidence.*
207. Instructions violating the rule Illustrations. The
following cases serve as illustrations showing violations of the
foregoing rule in the giving of instructions : Where the testimony
of several disinterested witnesses is not contradicted and is not
inherently improbable it is error to instruct the jury that they
"are not bound to believe the testimony of any of the wit-
nesses-" 5 as it is to instruct that the jury have the right to dis-
regard the testimony of the witnesses for the defendant if
89 Ind. 360; S. v. Dickey, 48 W. Va. a Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v.
325, 37 S. E. 695; Bowers v. P. 74 111. Feehan, 149 111. 202, 212, 36 N. E.
418; Hughes Cr. Law, 3017, citing, 1036; Faulkner v. Paterson R. Co.
Bean v. P. 124 111. 580, 16 N. E. 65 N. J. L. 181, 46 Atl. 765.
656; Spahn v. P. 137 111. 543, 27 * Chicago & E. R. Co. v. Meech,
N. E. 688; Shotz v. P. 121 111. 562. 163 111. 305, 45 N. E. 291.
13 N. E. 524; Peoples v. McKee, 92 The question of the competency
111. 397; Jordan v. S. 81 Ala. 20, 1 of a witness is primarily one to be
So. 577; Dixon v. S. 46 Neb. 298, 64 decided by the court. If the ques-
N. W. 961; S. v. Todd, 110 Iowa, tion of competency depends upon
631, 82 N. W. 322; Gott v. P. 187 the existence of facts which are
111. 249, 58 N. E. 293; Southern disputed, the proper practice is for.
M. Ins. Co. v. Hudson, 113 Ga. the court by preliminary examina-
434, 38 S. E. 964; Howell v. S. 61 tion to determine whether such
Neb. 391, 85 N. W. 289; Tarbell v. facts exist. If, however, the deter-
Forbes, 177 Mass. 238, 58 N. E. 873; mination of the question depends
S. v. Tate, 156 Mo. 119, 56 S. W. upon the decision of intricate ques-
1099; Chavarria v. S. (Tex. Cr. tions of fact, the court has the
App.) 62 S. W. 312; Strong v. S. power in its discretion to take the
61 Neb. 35, 84 N. W. 410; Stewart opinion of the jury thereon,
v. Anderson, 111 Iowa, 329, 82 N. Dowdy v. Watson, 115 Ga. 42, 41
W. 770; S. v. Adair, 160 Mo. 391, S. E. 266, citing 1 Greenleaf Ev.
61 S. W. 187; S. v. Taylor, 57 S, (16th ed.), 81e.
Car. 483, 35 S. E. 729, 76 Am. St. 5 Tyler v. Third Ave. R. Co. 41
575. N. Y. S. 523, 18 Misc. 165.
2 Mitchell v. S. 43 Fla. 188, 30
So. 803.
199 COURT INTIMATING OPINION. 208
they consider them interested, even though they are not contra-
dicted or impeached. 6
So an instruction stating that the jury are not at liberty
to reject the testimony of any witness because his statements
may be in conflict with that of other witnesses is improper, as
invading the province of the jury. 7 For the court to charge
the jury to scan with caution the testimony of abandoned women,
for the same reason, is error. 8 Or to instruct the jury to give
the testimony of the witnesses for the state the same weight
as is given to the testimony of the witnesses for the defense
is likewise improper. 9
208. Intimating opinion by instruction. The jury being
the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses, the court, in
giving instructions, should guard against the expression or in-
timation of any opinion as to their credibility or the weight of
their testimony. 10 Error committed by the court in thus ex-
pressing or intimating an opinion on the weight or sufficiency
of the evidence is not cured by the giving of other instructions,
that the jury are the sole judges of the credibility of the wit-
nesses and the weight of the evidence. 11 It matters not that
the testimony of a witness may appear to be false and not
worthy of belief, the court should refrain from intimating any
opinion as to what credit should be attached to it. 12 The court
therefore cannot tell the jury that one part of the testimony
of a witness is to be given more weight than another part. 13
e Berzevizy v. Delaware, L. & W. P. v. Lyons, 49 Mich. 78, 13 N. W.
Co. 46 N. Y. S. 27, 19 App. Div. 365; Letts v. Letts, 91 Mich. 596,
309. 52. N. W. 54; Leise v. Meyer, 143
7 F. Dohman Co. v. Niagara Fire Mo. 547, 45 S. W. 282 ; P. v. Gor-
Ins. Co. 96 Wis. 38, 71 N. W. 69. man, 83 Hun, 605, 31 N. Y. S. 1064;
See Chisholm v. Preferred Bank- Ter. v. O'Hare, 1 N. Dak, 30, 44
ers' Life Ass'n, 112 Mich. 50, 70 N. N. W. 1003; Mawich v. Elsey, 47
W. 415. Mich. 10, 8 N. W. 587, 10 N. W. 57;
s S. v. Tuttle, 67 Ohio St. 440, 66 S. v. Kelly, 73 Mo. 608.
N. E. 524, 93 Am. St. 689. " P. v. Kindleberg-er, 100 Cal.
Evans v. S. 95 Ga. 468, 22 S. E. 367, 34 Pac. 852; Shorb v. Kinzie,
298. 100 Ind. 429. See P. v. Carey. 125
10 Crutchfield v. Richmond & R. Mich. 535, 84 N. W. 1087; S. v.
Co. 76 N. Car. 320; Com. v. Barry, Dick, 60 N. Car. 440; P. v. Chew
91 Mass. (9 Allen), 276; McMinn v. Sing Wing, 88 Cal. 288.
Whalen, 27 Cal. 319; Ross v. S. 12 Thompson v. S. 106 Ala. 67, 17
59 Ga. 249; S. v. White, 15 S. Car. So. 512; Bell v. Ober & Sons Co.
293; Berliner v. Travelers' Ins. Co. 96 Ga. 214, 23 S. E. 7.
121 Cal. 451, 53 Pac. 922; Hudson 13 Owen v. Palmour, 111 Ga. 885,
v. Best, 104 Ga. 131, 30 S. E. 688; 36 S. E. 969.
209 RELATIVE TO WITNESSES. 200
While courts may, in a general way, state what facts may be
taken into consideration in determining the credit to be given
the testimony of a witness, yet where the evidence is conflict-
ing or nearly evenly balanced, care should be exercised to pre-
vent the expression or intimation of an opinion on the weight
of the evidence. 14 For the court in charging the jury, to state
(that "my observation is that pretty good persons sometimes
lie, and that pretty bad persons sometimes tell the truth; you
should consider the character of the witness so far as you know
it as bearing upon the question whether a witness would be
truthful and reliable or not," is error, and is not cured by an-
other instruction which states that the verdict must be based
upon the evidence; that nothing is to be found by conjecture. 15
209. Interested witness corroborated. The court is not
authorized to state to the jury, as a matter of law, that one
witness is entitled to more credit than another; 16 or that the
testimony of the one is entitled to more weight than that of
the other, whether the one may be disinterested and the other
interested or not. 17 Nor is it proper to instruct that "as a
general rule a witness who is interested in the result of a suit
will not be as honest, candid and fair in his testimony as one
who is not so interested." 18 But a charge that the testimony
of an interested witness should be examined with greater care
than that of a disinterested witness has been held proper. 10
It is improper for the court to instruct that but little or no
credence should be given to the testimony of a witness because
of his ill will, although such bias is always proper to be con-
sidered by the jury in weighing the testimony of such witness. 20
On the same principle it is improper to charge the jury that
the testimony of a witness who is corroborated, is entitled to
"Smith v. Chicago & W. I. R. 184; Grier v. S. 53 Ind. 420. See
Co. 105 111. 511, 521; Wabash R. Johnson v. P. 140 111. 352. 29 N. E.
Co. v. Biddle, 27 Ind. App. 161, 59 895; Lee v. S. 74 Wis. 45, 41 N. W.
N. E. 284. 960: Nelson v. Vorce, 55 Ind. 455;
is Johnson v. Superior R. Tr. R. Pratt v. S. 56 Ind. 179.
Co. 91 Wis. 233, 64 N. W. 753. i Hinton v. Cream City R. Co.
16 Omaha B. R. Co. v. McDer- 65 Wis. 335, 27 N, W. 147.
mott, 25 Neb. 714, 41 N. W. 648. 20 Norwood v. S. (Ala.), 24 So.
IT Platz v. McKean Tp. 178 Pa. 53. See, also, Stanley v. Mont-
St. 601, 36 Atl. 136. gomery, 102 Ind. 102, 26 N. E. 213;
isBoyce v. Palmer, 55 Neb. 389, Unruh v. S. 105 Ind. 117, 4 N. E.
75 N. W. 848; Veatch v. S, 56 Ind. 453.
201 INTERESTED WITNESS PRAISING, DENOUNCING. 210
greater weight than the testimony of one uncorroborated. 21 Or
that a witness may have a better opportunity of knowing the
facts in issue than others, will not warrant the court in instruct-
ing the jury that such witness is entitled to greater credit than
such other witnesses. Where two witnesses are equally intel-
ligent, equally truthful, fair and unprejudiced, the proposition
may be true. But a person may have every means of being
fully and accurately informed, and yet for various reasons
might be utterly unworthy of belief. 22
So it is likewise improper for the court to state to the jury
that the oral testimony of witnesses is entitled to greater weight
than the depositions of absent witnesses. 23 For the same
reason it is improper for the court to charge the jury that
"where the testimony of witnesses is irreconcilably conflicting
they should give great weight to the surrounding circumstances
in determining which witness is entitled to credit." 24
210. Praising or denouncing witnesses. The credibility of
the witnesses and the weight of the evidence being questions for
the jury to determine, it is improper to call attention to the
testimony of a witness in words of praise as impressing one
with its truthfulness, or to speak of the witness in terms of
denunciation. 25 Nothing should be said by the court intimat-
ing a disbelief of a witness. 26 Accordingly an instruction
calling the attention of the jury to a certain witness who
had given testimony to the bad character of another witness,
stating that "he comes to blacken the character of his half-
sister instead of defending her," is improper and erroneous. 27
21 Chittenden v. Evans, 41 111. 24 Skow v. Locks (Neb.), 91 N.
251. W. 204.
22 Milliken v. Marlin, 66 111. 22. 25 Little v. Superior Rapid Tr.
23 Miller v. Eglin, 64 Ind. 197, 31 Co. 88 Wis. 462, 60 N. W. 705; Hick-
Am. R. 121. ory v. United States, 160 U. S. 408,
Where in order to prevent a con- 16 Sup. Ct. 327.
tinuance the prosecution admits 20 Williams v. City of West Bay,
that the facts stated in the de- 119 Mich. 395, 78 N. W. 328; P. v.
fendant's affidavit for a continu- Brow, 35 N. Y. S. 1009, 90 Hun (N.
ance may be given in evidence, Y.) 509.
then the defendant is entitled to 27 Spicer v. S. 105 Ala. 123, 16 So.
have the jury instructed that the 706. See Hickory v. United States,
facts so admitted shall be given 160 U. S. 408, 16 Sup. Ct. 327. See
the same weight as if the absent Smith v. Undted States, 161 U. S.
witness were personally present 85, 16 Sup. Ct. 483; Hicks v. United
testifying, and a refusal to so in- States, 150 U. S. 442, 16 Sup. Ct,
struct is error, Lee v. S. 75 Miss. 144.
625, 23 So. 628.
211 RELATING TO WITNESSES. 202
While it may not be improper for the court, in charging the
jury, to repeat the uncontradicted testimony of witnesses and
point out the inquiries suggested by such testimony, 28 yet it
is improper for the court to state what a witness may have
said on any particular matter. 29
. 211. Expert and non-expert witnesses. According to the
foregoing rule it is improper for the court to instruct the jury,
as a matter of law, that the testimony of one class of witnesses
experts or non-experts is entitled to greater weight than that
of the other. 30 So it is improper for the court to say to the
jury that the testimony of a certain witness should be received
with caution, as the opinions of such witnesses, however honestly
entertained, may be erroneous, whether the witness is an expert
or not. 31
The weight and credibility of the testimony of expert wit-
nesses are to be determined by the same rules that apply to any
other witness, and such testimony should be considered by the
jury in connection with all the other evidence. 32 The weight
of the opinions of expert witnesses is exclusively for the jury. 33
Hence an instruction that the testimony of expert witnesses
is usually "of little value" or "of great value," is improper,
in that it invades the province of the jury. The court should
as S. v. Glover, 27 S. Car. 602, 4 bama G. S. R. Co. v. Hill, 93 Ala.
S. E. 564. 514, 9 So. 722; Bpps v. S. 102 Ind.
20 Killain v. Eigenmann, 57 Ind. 539, 1 N. E. 491; Langford v. Jones,
488; Cunningham v. S. 65 Ind. 380, 18 Ore. 307, 22 Pac. 1064; Thornton
the court should not in any man- v. Thornton, 39 Vt. 122; Williams v.
ner suggest or intimate an opinion S. 50 Ark. 511, 9 S. W. 5; Wagner
as to the value or weight of the tes- v. S. 116 Ind. 181, 17 N. E. 833; S.
timony of witnesses. v. McCullough (Iowa), 55 L. R. A.
so Taylor v. Cox, 153 111. 230, 33 378.
N. E. 656; Ryder v. S. 100 Ga. 528, ss White v. S. 133 Ala. 122, 32 So.
28 S. E. 246, X8 L. R. A. 721, 62 Am. 139; Rivard v. Rivard, 109 Mich. 98,
St. 334; Nelson v. McLennan, 31 66 N. W. 681, 63 Am. St. 566; Sever
Wash. 208, 71 Par. 747. See, also, v. Spangler, 93 Iowa, 576, 61 N. W.
Durham v. Smith 120 Ind. 468, 22 1072; Taylor v. Cox, 153 111. 220,
N. E. 333; Bradley v. S. 31 Ind. 492. 38 N. E. 656; Louisville, N. O. &
31 Louisville, N. O. & T. R. Co. T. R. Co. v. Whitehead, 71 Miss,
v. Whitehead, 71 Miss. 451, 15 So. 451, 15 So. 890; Stevens v. City of
890, 42 Am. St. 472; Tarbell v. Minneapolis, 42 Minn. 136, 43 N. W.
Forbes, 177 Pa. St. 238; P. v. Sea- 842; Mewes v. Crescent P. L. Co.
man, 107 Mich. 348, 65 N. W. 203; 170 Pa. St. 369, 32 Atl. 1082; Tatum
Weston v. Brown, 30 Neb. 609, 46 v. Mohr, 21 Ark. 349; Johnson v.
N. W. 826. Contra: Haight v. Val- Thompson, 72 Ind. 167; Roberts v.
let, 89 Cal. 245, 26 Pac. 897. Johnson, 58 N. Y. 613; .Etna L. Ins.
32 Goodwin v. S. 96 Ind. 550; Eg- Co. v. Ward, 140 U. S. 76, 11 Sup.
gers v. Eggers, 57 Ind. 461; Ala- Ct. 720.
203 EXPERT AND NON-EXPERT WITNESSES. 212
make no comments intimating its opinion as to the weight of
such testimony either favorable or unfavorable. 3 * But where
the opinion of an expert witness is based upon an hypothetical
state of facts, and the supposed facts are not sustained by the
evidence, then it is proper to instruct the jury that such opinion
is of little or no weight. 35
The facts upon which the question to the expert is based
must be substantially proved to entitle his opinion to be of any
value. 30 And it has been held that an instruction stating that
"if 'one fact supposed to be true, included in the hypothetical
question, is untrue not supported by the evidence, then the
opinion of the expert would be valueless," is proper. 37 Also
to state that the testimony of an expert should be weighed and
considered by the jury with caution, is improper, in that it
singles out the witness and discredits his testimony. 38 Or an in-
struction which assumes or conveys the impression that an exam-
ination made by an expert may not have been impartial is erro-
neous. 39
212. Witnesses contradicting each other. The fact that two
witnesses directly contradict each other does not warrant the
giving of an instruction that the evidence is balanced unless
there is some other circumstance corroborating the one or the
other, 40 or that where two witnesses have contradicted each
3*Eggers v. Eggers, 57 Ind. 461; Laflin v. Chicago, W. & N. R. Co.
P. v. Webster, 59 Hun (N. Y.), 398; 33 Fed. 422; S. v. Owen, 72 N. Car
Persons v. S. 90 Tenn. 291, 16 S. W. 605.
726; Pannell v. Com. 86 Pa. St. 260; 35 Goodwin v. S. 96 Ind. 550; Hall
Reichenbach v. Ruddach, 127 Pa. v. Rankin, 87 Iowa, 261, 57 N. W.
564, 18 Atl. 432; Kansas City, W. & 217.
N, W. R. Co. v. Ryan, 49 Kas. 1, 30 Hovey v. Chase, 52 Me. 304, 83
Pac. 108; Williams v. S. 50 Ark. 511, Am. Dec. 514; Treat v. Bates, 27
9 S. W. 598; Brush v. " Smith, 111 Mich. 390.
Iowa, 217, 82 N. W. 467; Long v. ^ P. v. Foley, 64 Mich. 148, 31
Travellers' Ins. Co. 113 Iowa, 259, 85 N. W. 94. But see Epps v. S. 102
N. W. 24; Bever v. Spangler, 93 Ind. 539, 1 N. E. 491.
Iowa 576, 61 N. W. 1072; P. v. Van- 38 Gustafson v. Seattle Tr. Co. 28
derhoof, 71 Mich. 158, 39 N. W. 28; Wash. 227, 68 Pac. 721. In re Blake's
Wall v. S. 112 Ga. 336, 37 S. E. 371; Estate, 136 Cal. 306, 68 Pac. 827.
Maynard v. Vinton, 59 Mich. 139, See S. v. McCullough, 114 Iowa, 532,
26 N. W. 401; Melvin v. Easly, 46 87 N. W. 503, 55 L. R. A. 378; P. v.
N. Car. 386. Seaman, 107 Mich. 348, 65 N. W.
Contra, holding entitled to great 203; Coleman v. Adair, 75 Miss. 660,
Weight: Tinney v. New Jersey 23 So. 369.
Steamboat Co. 12 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.), 39 s. v. Rathbun, 74 Conn. 524, 51
3; St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Atl. 540.
Phillips, 66 Fed. 35; S. v. Reidell, > Sickle v. Wolf, 91 Wis. 396,
9 Houst. (Del.), 479, 14 Atl. 550;
213 RELATING TO WITNESSES. 204
other that one of them has told a falsehood. 41 An instruction
that the jury may disregard the testimony of certain witnesses
for the reason that they had contradicted each other is errone-
ous; the jury may, in their judgment, give credit to some of
them and disregard the others, notwithstanding such contradic-
tion. 42
So a charge that if the state has but one witness who swears
to the guilt of the accused, and the accused contradicts the
testimony of such witness and swears to his innocence, then
the facts are uncertain and leaves the question of the guilt
of the accused in doubt, is erroneous. 43 But it has been held
that an instruction which in substance charges that if the plain-
tiff and the defendant as witnesses are equally credible, and con-
tradict each other on material facts, then there is no preponder-
ance in favor of the plaintiff, and that the fact that they disagree
in their testimony, if each honestly has stated the facts as he
understood them to be, would not of itself warrant them in
discrediting either of them, is not objectionable as invading the
province of the jury. 44 An instruction that if the jury believe
a certain witness and that the facts as testified to by him are
true, they shall find for the plaintiff; but that if they do not
believe him, and believe the facts are as testified to by other wit-
nesses, they shall find for the defendant, is proper. 45
213. Reconciling conflicting testimony. Where the testi-
mony of the witnesses is conflicting it is proper for the court to
charge that the jury should reconcile any conflicts, if they can
do so, in order to give effect to the testimony of all the wit-
nesses. 46 But the contrary seems to be the rule in Texas. Thus
it has been held to be improper for the court to charge the
jury that "you will reconcile any conflicts in the evidence
if you can, so as to give effect to all the testimony; but if you
64 N. W. 1028. Compare Chicago Cottrell v. Piatt, 101 Iowa, 231,
& E. T. R. Co. v. Rains, 203 111. 70 N. W. 177.
422, 67 N. E. 840. 45 Harris v. Murphy, 119 N Car.
41 P. v. Brow, 35 N. Y. S. 1009, 34, 25 S. E. 708, 56 Am. St. 656.
90 Hun, 509. *e Price v. S. 114 Ga. 855, 40 S. E.
42 s. v. Bazile, 50 La. Ann. 21, 23 1015; Steen v. Sanders, 116 Ala. 155,
So. 8. See Goodhue v. Farmers' 'w. 22 So. 498; Walters v. Philadelphia
Co. v. Davis, 81 Minn. 210, 83 N. W. Tr. Co. 161 Pa. St. 36, 28 Atl. 941;
531. Ter. v. Gonzales (N. Mex.), 68 Pac.
43 S. v. Johnson, 48 La. Ann. 87, 925; Oliver v. Columbia N. & L. R.
19 So. 213. See McLean v. Clark, 47 Co. 65 S. Car. 1, 43 S. E. 307.
Ga. 24.
205 RECONCILING TESTIMONY INTEREST OF WITNESS. 214
cannot, you will decide which of the witnesses is entitled to
the greater credibility and weight, and in so determining, you
may consider the intelligence, interest, bias, or prejudice, if any.
of said witnesses as well as their manner of testifying, ' ' the court
holding it to be a comment on the weight of the evidence. 47
214. Interest of witness to be considered. In determining
the weight to be given to the testimony of the witnesses, in either
a civil or criminal case, the court, in charging the jury, may
state that they have the right to take into consideration the
interest, if any, a witness may have in the result of the suit,
together with all the other evidence in the case. 48 Especially
where the plaintiff or defendant, when a witness in his own
behalf, is contradicted on material matters by other credible
evidence, is it the duty of the court, if so requested, to instruct
the jury as to his interest, if any, in the result of the suit. 49
Accordingly an instruction stating that while the defendant
is a competent witness, yet the jury have a right to take into con-
sideration his interest in the result of the trial, and all the facts
and circumstances in the case, and give his testimony only such
weight as they, in their judgment, think it entitled to, is proper. 50
It is not error to instruct that the presumption that a witness
will speak the truth may be repelled by proof of his interest
or bias. This amounts to telling them that interest and bias
47 Kellog v. McCabe (Tex. Cv. 139, 18 So. 306; S. v. Ryan, 113 Iowa,
App.), 38 S. W. 542; Houston, E. & 536, 85 N. W. 812; P. v. O'Neil, 67
W. T. R. Co. v. Richards (Tex. Cv. Gal. 378, 7 Pac. 790; P. v. Calvin, 60
App.), 49 S. W. 687. See Crane v. Mich. 114, 26 N. W. 851; Hellyer v.
S. Ill Ala. 45, 20 So. 590. P. 186 111. 550, 58 N. E. 245; Ham-
48 Ammerman v. Teeter, 49 111. ilton v. S. 62 Ark. 543, 36 S. W.
402; Evans v. Lipscomb, 31 Ga. 71; 1065; S. v. McCann, 16 Wash. 249,
Lampe v. Kennedy, 60 Wis. 100, 18 47 Pac. 443; S. v. Carey, 15 Wash.
N. W. 730; Hellyer v. P. 186 111. 550, 549, 46 Pac. 1050; S. v. Fiske, 63
58 N. E. 245; Chezem v. S. 56 Neb. Conn. 392, 28 Atl. 572; S. v. Turner,
496, 76 N. W. 1056; Lynch v. Bates, 110 Mo. 196, 19 S. W. 645; Emery v.
139 Ind. 206, 38 N. E. 806; Smith v. S. 101 Wis. 627, 78 N. W. 145; P.
S. 142 Ind. 288, 41 N. E. 595. v. Hertz, 105 Cal. 660, 39 Pac. 32;
40 Becker v. Woarms, 76 N. Y. S. Ter. v. Gatliff (Okla.), 37 Pac. 809;
438, 72 App. Div. 196. See Lan- P. v. Hitchcock, 104 Cal. 482, 38
cashire Ins. Co. v. Stanley, 70 Ark. Pac. 198; P. v. Jones, 24 Mich. 216.
1, 62 S. W. 66; Kavanaugh v. City See, also, S. v. McGinnis, 76 Mo.
of Wausau (Wis.), 98 N. W. 553. 326; S. v. Zorn, 71 Mo. 415; S. v.
BO Barmby v. Wolfe, 44 Neb. 77. Bohan, 19 Kas. 35.
62 N. W. 318; Smith v. S. 107 Ala.
215
RELATING TO WITNESSES.
206
may be considered by them in weighing the testimony of the
witness. 01
215. Probability, improbability, manner, conduct, bias.
The court may instruct that the jury may consider the inherent
probability or improbability of the testimony of the witnesses; 52
that they may also consider any feeling, bias or partiality shown
|by the witnesses, if any. 53 And it is also proper to instruct
that the jury may take into consideration the manner, conduct
and appearance of a witness while on the witness stand; 54 and
the jury may also consider the intelligence or want of intelli-
gence of a witness in weighing his testimony. 55
But to instruct that the jury may consider the demeanor and
conduct of the accused as a witness, "during the trial," is
error. 56 But in Texas the courts hold that an instruction which
directs the jury that in determining the truth of the testimony
they may consider the inelligence, interest, and apparent bias
or prejudice of the witnesses is erroneous, in that it invades the
province of the jury. 57 And in the same state, charging the jury
that "in passing on the credibility of the witnesses, you may
6i P. v. Amaya, 134 Cal. 531, 66
Pac. 794.
52 McNeile v. Cridland, 6 Pa.
Super. Ct. 428; Hale Elevator Co. v.
Hall, 201 111. 131, 66 N. E. 249; As-
py v. Botkins, 160 Ind. 170, 66 N.
E. 462.
53 Blashfield Instructions, 260,
citing: S. v. Nat, 51 N. Car. 114
(feeling); Telker v. S. 54 Ark. 489,
16 S. W. 663; S. v. Bohan, 19 Kas.
35; P. v. Cronin, 34 Cal. 192; P. v.
Wheeler, 65 Cal. 77, 2 Pac. 892; S. v.
Streeter, 20 Nev. 403, 22 Pac. 758; S.
v. Fiske, 63 Conn. 392, 28 Atl. 572;
S. v. Adair, 160 Mo. 392, 61 S. W.
187. Contra: Oliver v. S. (Tex. Cr.
App.), 42 S. W. 554; Isham v. S.
(Tex. Cr. App.), 41 S. W. 622.
s* S. v. Adair, 160 Mo. 391, 61 S.
W. 187; Georgia Home Ins. Co. v.
Campbell, 102 Ga. 106, 29 S. E. 148;
S. v. Hoshor, 26 Wash. 643, 67 Pac.
,.386; S. v. Burton, 27 Wash. 528, 67
Pac. 1097; Brown v. Stacy, 5 Ark.
403; Ter. v. Leyba (N. Mex.), 47
Pac. 718. But see P. v. Newcomer,
118 Cal. 263, 50 Pac. 405.
" North C. St. R. Co. v. Wellner,
206 111. 277, 69 N. E. 6. See Penn-
sylvania Co. v. Hunsley, 23 Ind.
App. 37, 54 N. E. 1071.
An instruction that the jury, in
weighing the testimony of wit-
nessses may consider the fact that
they were called by the court is
improper. The testimony of wit-
nesses called by the court must be
subjected to the same tests as that
of other witnesses, Smith v. City
of Seattle (Wash.), 74 Pac. 676.
56 Purdy v. P. 140 111. 46, 29 N. E.
700; Vale v. P. 161 111. 310, 43 N. E.
1091.
The jury may be directed that
they have a right to consider their
knowledge of men which they have
acquired in their experience, Cin-
cinnati, H. & I. R. Co. v. Cregor,
150 Ind. 625, 50 N. E. 760.
57 Doggett v. S. 39 Tex. Cr. App.
5, 44 S. W. 842- Williams v. S.
(Tex. Cr. App.), 40 S. W. 801;
Isham v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 41 S.
W. 622; Harrell v. S. 37 Tex. Cr.
App. 612, 40 S. W.' 799. See Lan-
caster v. S. 36 Tex. Cr. App. 16, 35
S. W. 165.
207 WEIGHING TESTIMONY CONSIDERATIONS. 217
consider the age, intelligence, interest in the case, apparent
prejudice, if any, and all the other circumstances in evidence
before you," is held to be improper as bearing upon the weight
of the evidence. 58 And this same rule prevails in other states
besides Texas. ou
216. Instructions that jury "must" or "should" consider.
A charge that in determining the credibility of the witnesses
and of the weight of their testimony the jury must take into
consideration the interest, the appearance upon the witness stand,
the intelligence, the opportunities for learning the truth con-
cerning the things testified about, the apparent candor and cor-
rectness of the statements as compared with the usual and ordi-
nary nature of things, is not objectionable in the use of the
word "must." It is the duty of the jury to consider these
things in weighing the testimony. "Must" implies no more
than the idea of duty. 60 It has been held that a charge directing
the jury that they "should" take into consideration the intelli-
gence of a witness is improper. The jury may, or are at liberty
to take into consideration the intelligence of a witness, but they
are not bound to do so. 61
217. On disregarding testimony. While the jury cannot
arbitrarily disregard the testimony of a credible witness, 02 yet
they are not bound to believe the testimony of a witness merely
because he has sworn positively to a material fact or state of
facts, and it is proper for the court so to instruct them. Thus,
cs Oliver v. S. (Tex. Cv. App.), 42 Ind. 368, 39 N. B. 390. The follow-
S. W. 554; Peny v. S. (Tex. Or. ing cases in Indiana are no longer
App.), 42 S. W. 297; Shields v. S. authority on this proposition:
39 Tex. Cr. App. 13, 44 S. W. 844; Woolen v. Whitacre, 91 Ind. 502;
Houston, B. & W. T. R. Co. v. Run- Unruh v. S. 105 Ind. 118, 4 N. E.
nels (Tex.), 47 S. W. 971. 453; Duval v. Kenton, 127 Ind. 178.
BO Buckley v. S. 62 Miss. 705 (de- ei Smith v. S. 142 Ind. 288, 41 N.
fendant); Wright v. Com. 85 Ky. E. 595; Pennsylvania Co. v. Huns-
123, 2 S. W. 904. ley, 23 Ind. App. 37, 54 N. E. 1071.
eo Fifer v. Hitter, 159 Ind. 11, 64 See S. v. Bryant (Mo.), 35 S. W.
N. E. 463; Keesier v. S. 154 Ind. 597 ("should" or "may"); Wabash
242, 56 N. E. 232; S. v. Dotson, 26 R. Co. v. Biddle, 27 Ind. App. 161, 59
Mont. 305, 67 Pac. 938; Stanley v. N. E. 284. See also Bird v. S. 107
Cedar Rapids & M. C. R. Co. 119 Ind. 154, 8 N. E. 14; Unruh v. S.
Iowa, 526, 93 N. W. 489; City of 105 Ind. 118, 4 N. E. 453.
Harvard v. Crouch, 47 Neb. 133, 66 02 Hall v. S. 134 Ala. 90, 32 So.
N. W. 276 (interest) ; S. v. Hilsabeck 750; McMahon v. P. 120 111. 584,
(Mo.), 34 S. W. 38; Deal v. S. 140 11 N. E. 883.
218 RELATING TO WITNESSES. 208
an instruction that the jury are not necessarily bound to believe
anything to be a fact because a witness has stated it to be so,
provided the jury believe, from the evidence, that such witness
is mistaken or has sworn wilfully falsely as to such fact, is
proper.' 53
And where the testimony of the witnesses appears to be wholly
irreconcilable and the credibility of some of them is questioned,
it is proper for the court to instruct that the jury may entirely
or in part disregard the testimony of any witness they believe
to have testified wilfully falsely. 64 But to instruct that the
jury may disregard the testimony of any witness interested in
the result of the trial, "if in their judgment it is right to do
so," is improper. 65 So to instruct that the jury may, if they
think proper, disregard the testimony of any witness, if for any
reason they believe it to be untrue, is error. 66 Or to instruct
that the jury are not at liberty to disregard the testimony
of a witness who has been corroborated by other credible evi-
dence, is error if the word "disregard" may be considered as
synonymous with the words "refuse to consider," as implying
that the testimony of an uncorroborated witness need not be con-
sidered by them. 67
218. On swearing wilfully falsely. The jury may disregard
the entire testimony of a witness where the evidence shows
that he has wilfully or knowingly sworn falsely to a material
matter unless his testimony is corroborated by other credible
evidence, and it is error for the court to refuse to so instruct. 68
Especially should such an instruction be given for the defendant,
es Goss Printing Pr. v. Lempke, mer v. S. Ill Ga. 839, 36 S. E. 233;
191 111. 201, 60 N. E. 968. See also Churchwell v. S. 117 Ala. 124, 23
Davis v. Northern E. R. Co. 170 So. 72; Osborn v. S. 125 Ala. 106, 27
111. 602, 48 N. E. 1058; S. v. Small- So. 758; Yundt v. Hartrunft. 41
wood, 75 N. Car. 104. 111. 16: P. v. Wilder, 134 Cal. 182, 66
e* Gerdes v. Christopher & S. A. Pac. 228; S. v. Perry, 41 W. Va.
I. & F. Co. (Mo.), 27 S. W. 615. 641, 24 S. E. 634; Bunce v. Mc-
65 Rucker v. S. (Miss.), 18 So. Mahon, 6 Wyo. 24, 42 Pac. 23, (held
121. not singling out witness); P. v.
6 Rylee v. S. 75 Miss. 352, 22 So. Petmecky, 99 N. Y. 415 (defendant),
890; Jackson v. Com. 17 Ky. L. R. 2 N. E. 145; Mead v. McGraw,
1350, 34 S. W. 901. Compare, Hun- 19 Ohio St. 61; Seligman v. Rogers,
ter v. S. 29 Fla. 486, 10 So. 730. 113 Mo. 642, 21 S. W. 94; Bevelot v.
67 p. v . Compton (Cal.), 56 Pac. Lestrade, 153 111. 625, 38 N. E. 1056;
44. Lyts v. Keevey, 5 Wash. 606, 32
68 Rider v. P. 110 111. 11; Plum- Pac. 534.
209 WITNESS SWEARING FALSELY. 219
in a criminal case, where one of like nature has been given for
the prosecution. 69 And it is proper to instruct that if the jury
conclude that any witness has sworn wilfully falsely as to any
material matter they may reject or treat as untrue the whole or
any part of his testimony. 70 But the jury are not bound to
reject the whole of the testimony of such witness and they may
be so instructed by the court. 71
It is the privilege of the jury in such case to disregard the
testimony of such a witness, but the court cannot, as a matter
of law, direct that they "should" disbelieve it. 72 But it has
been held that the giving of such an instruction is within the
sound discretion of the court, and the refusal to give it is not
to be regarded as of sufficient error upon which to reverse,
especially where other instructions given relating to the credi-
bility of the witnesses cover the omission. 73 An error com-
mitted by using the word "intentionally" in an instruction
instead of "knowingly and wilfully," as to the credibility of a
witness is harmless, when the instruction is read in connection
.with another, charging that in determining the weight to be
given to the testimony of witnesses, the jury may consider their
appearance and manner and interest in the suit. 74
219. On swearing falsely Improper. An instruction advis-
ing the jury that they are at liberty to disregard the testimony
of a witness if he has intentionally misstated or concealed
material facts which does not contain the qualifying clause,
to wit, "unless his testimony is corroborated by other credible
69 Gorgo v. P. 100 111. App. 130. 351. Contra: S. v. Hale, 156 Mo.
TO S. v. Martin, 124 Mo. 514, 28 102, 56 S. W. 881; S. v. Kellerman,
8. W. 12; First Nat. Bank v. Min- 14 Kas. 135; Dunlop v. Patterson,
neapolis & N. E. Co. 11 N. Dak. 280. 5 Cow. (N. Y.), 243; Stoffer v. S.
91 N. W. 436 (omitting the words 15 Ohio St. 47; S. v. Musgrave,
"material matter" does not render 43 W. Va. 672, 28 S. E. 813; S. v.
the instruction bad). Burton (Ala.), 22 So. 585; McClellan
71 S. v. Thompson, 21 W. Va. v. S. 117 Ala. 140, 23 So. 653;
746. Wastl v. Montana N. R. Co. 17 Mont.
72Higbee v. McMillan, 18 Kas. 213, 42 Pac. 772.
133; Reynold v. -Greenbaum, 80 111. 73 Cicero St. R. Co. v. Brown, 193
416; P. v. Oldham, 111 Cal. 648, 44 111. 279, 61 N. E. 1093; S. v. Hick-
Pac. 312; Callanan v. S. 24 Iowa, man, 95 Mo. 322, 8 S. W. 252; S.
441; Lowe v. S. 88 Ala. 8, 7 So. 97; v. Banks, 40 La. Ann. 736, 5 So. 18.
Litton v. Young, 2 Mete. (Ky.), 74 Noyes v. Tootle, 48 S. W. 1031;
565; P. v. O'Neil, 109 N. Y. 251, 16 McClure v. Williams, 65 111. 390
N. E. 68; Senter v. Carr, 15 N. H. (wilfully or knowingly).
220
RELATING TO WITNESSES.
210
evidence," is erroneous. 75 And the words "unless his testi-
mony is corroborated by the statements of other credible wit-
nesses," will not alone answer, as the corroboration may be
by any credible evidence or by facts inferable therefrom. 76 Also
such an instruction must embody the idea that the testimony
was wilfully, corruptly or intentionally given by the witness. 77
The mere fact that a witness has sworn falsely on some mate-
rial point will not authorize the jury to disregard his testimony.
The testimony of the witness must not only be false, but know-
ingly or corruptly false before the jury are at liberty to disre-
gard it; a witness might even swear corruptly falsely on a
material matter and if portions of his testimony are corrob-
orated by other credible evidence, it would not necessarily follow
that all his testimony should be disregarded. 78 And the instruc-
tion must confine the false swearing to a material matter in
issue. 79 And it should be so drawn as to apply to all the wit-
nesses and not single out a particular witness. 80
220. Impeachment Instructions based on evidence. The
75 Miller v. S. 106 Wis. 156, 81
N. W. 1020; S. v. De Wolfe (Mont.),
77 Pac. 1087; Bratt v. Swift, 99
Wis. 579, 75 N. W. 411; Chitten-
den v. Evans, 41 111. 251; Maxwell v.
Williamson, 35 111. 529; F. Dohman
Co. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co. 96
Wis. 38, 71 N. W. 69. See Wilson
v. Coulter, 51 N. Y. S. 804; Moran
v. P. 163 111. 372, 45 N. E. 23; Miller
v. Madison Car Co. 130 Mo. 517, 31
S. W. 574; Peak v. P. 76 111. 289;
Jeffries v. S. 77 Miss. 757, 28 So.
948; McDonald v. S. (Miss.), 28
So. 750. Contra: S. v. Sexton, 10
S. Dak. 127, 72 N. W. 84.
76 Dohman v. Niagara Fire Ins.
Co. 96 Wis. 38, 71 N. W. 69. Contra:
Brown v. Hannibal & St. J. R.
Co. 66 Mo. 599; S. v. Musgrave, 43
W. Va. 672, 28 S. E. 813, holding
that the addition of the words "un-
less corroborated," renders the in-
struction erroneous.
77 Ward v. Ward, 25 Colo. 33,
52 Pac. 1105; Jennings v. Kosmak,
46 N. Y. S. 802, 20 Misc. 300; Yundt
v. Hartrunft, 41 111. 10, 14; Gehl
v. Milwaukee Produce Co. 116 Wis.
263, 93 N. W. 26; Prater v. S. 107
Ala. 26, 18 So. 238; S. v. Kyle, 14
Wash. 550, 45 Pac. 147 (holding that
"wilfully" is implied in "falsely") ;
Gottlieb v. Hartman, 3 Colo. 53;
S. v. Brown, 64 Mo. 367.
78 Chittenden v. Evans, 41 111. 251,
254; Cahn v. Ladd, 94 Wis. 134,
68 N. W. 652; Shenk v. Hager, 24
Minn. 339; Childs v. S. 76 Ala. 93;
Fisher v. P. 20 Mich. 135; Mercer
v. Wright, 3 Wis. 645. See also
White v. S. 52 Miss. 216; Cahn v.
Ladd, 94 Wis. 134; S. v. Sexton, 10
S. Dak. 127, 72 N. W. 84; Skipper v.
S. 59 Ga. 63; S. v. Lett, 85 Mo. 52.
7 P. v. Plyer, 121 Cal. 160, 53
Pac. 553; Ter. v. Lucero, 8 N. Mex.
543, 46 Pac. 18; Cobb v. S. 115 Ala.
18, 22 So. 506; Peak v. P. 76 111.
289; Pierce v. S. 53 Ga. 365; White
v. S. 52 Miss. 216. Contra: P. v.
Ah Sing, 95 Cal. 65-4, 30 Pac. 796.
so City of Spring Valley v. Gavin,
182 111. 232, 54 N. E. 1035; P. v.
Arlington, 131 Cal. 231, 63 Pac.
347; Argabrigat v. S. 49 Neb. 760,
69 N. W. 102.
IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES. 220
court is authorized to instruct the jury on the law as to the
impeachment of witnesses when there is evidence upon which
to base the instructions, whether requested to do so or not; 81
and it may be added that under some circumstances the refusal
to give such instructions would be error where there is evidence
upon which to base them. 82 The failure of the court to instruct
on the law as to the impeachment of witnesses cannot be com-
plained of as error in the absence of a request for such instruc-
tions. 83 And, of course, if there is no evidence tending to im-
peach or sustain a witness the court is not bound to give instruc-
tions in that respect. 84
In the giving of instructions -relating to the impeachment
of witnesses, the court cannot say, as a matter of law, that a
witness has been impeached. Whether a witness has or has not
been impeached, and to what extent, is a question for the jury
to determine. 85 If the jury believe a witness, it is their duty
to consider his testimony, notwithstanding an attempt to impeach
him. 86 The court may, however, state that there is evidence
tending to impeach a witness, 87 or that there is evidence tending
to sustain him, when such is the case without invading the prov-
ince of the jury. 88 It is not improper, therefore, for the court
to state that a witness may be sustained by proof of good char-
acter or by other facts and circumstances shown by the evi-
dence. 89
si Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Crancher, S. E. 39. See also, relating to "false
132 Ind. 275, 31 N. E. 941; Ford in one thing false in, all things," S.
v. S. 92 Ga. 459, 17 S. E. 667. See v. Hale, 156 Mo. 102, 56 S. W. 881;
Freeman v. S. 112 Ga. 48, 37 S. E. Ingalls v. S. 48 Wis. 647, 4 N. W.
172. See Smith v. S. 142 Ind. 288, 785; S. v. McDevitt, 69 Iowa, 549,
41 N. E. 595. 29 N. W. 459; S. v. Palmer, 88 Mo.
82 Wolfe v. S. 25 Tex. App. 568.
698, 9 S. W. 44; Rose v. Otis, 18 S5 Harris v. S. 96 Ala. 27, 11 So.
Colo. 59, 31 Pac, 493. 255; Powell v. S. 101 Ga. 20, 29 S. E.
83 Boynton v. S. 115 Ga. 587, 41 309;. McConkey v. Com. 101 Pa. St.
S. E. 995; American T. & T. Co. 420.
v. Kersh, 27 Tex. Cv. App. 127, 66 se McCasland v. Kimberlim, 100
S. W. 74; Levan v. S. 114 Ga. 258, Ind. 121; Harris v. S. 96 Ala. 27,
40 S. E. 252; Downing v. S. 114 11 So. 255; Smith v. Grimes, 43
Ga. 30, 39 S. E. 927; Hatcher v. S. Iowa, 365.
116 Ga. 617, 42 S. E. 1018; Anderson T Smith v. S. 142 Ind. 288, 41 N.
v. S. 117 Ga. 255, 43 S. E. 835; E. 595; Ford v. S. 92 Ga. 459, 17
Thomas v. S. 95 Ga. 484, 22 S. E. S. E. 1006; Harris v. S. 96 Ala. 24,
315; S. v. Kirkpatrick, 63 Iowa, 11 So. 255.
554, 19 N. W. 660. Smith v. S. 142 Ind. 288, 41
s* Freeman v. S. 112 Ga. 48, 37 S. N. E. 595.
E. 172; Hart v. S. 93 Ga. 160, 20 so Powell v. S. 101 Ga. 9, 29 S.
221 RELATING TO WITNESSES. 212
221. Believing or disbelieving witness. It is not improper
to instruct that "where it is shown that the reputation of a
witness for truth is bad, his evidence is not necessarily destroyed,
but it is to be considered under all the circumstances described
in the evidence, and given such weight as the jury believe it
entitled to, and to be disregarded if they believe it entitled
to no weight." 00 An instruction that the jury "are at liberty
to disregard the statements of such witnesses, if any there be,
who have been sucessfully impeached either by direct contradic-
tion or by proof of general bad character, unless the statements
of such witnesses have been corroborated by other evidence
which has not been impeached/' is not improper. 91
A charge that the jury "should consider the impeaching evi-
dence introduced, in estimating the weight which ought to be
given to the testimony of the witness, and should also, for the
same purpose, take into consideration the fact, if they should so
find, that the moral character of any witness has been success-
fully impeached, ' ' 92 is proper. A charge that a witness has either
told the truth or that he has perjured himself is erroneous, in
that the jury are compelled to find the one way or the other
without giving the witness the credit of being mistaken. 93 The
failure of the court to charge the jury as to the purpose and effect
of impeaching testimony can not be urged as error, where the tes-
timony of the prosecution, which tends to impeach a witness,
is met by rebuttal testimony sustaining him, especially in view of
the general charge given on the weight of the testimony and
the credit to be given to the witnesses. 94
To instruct that the effect of impeaching evidence is not to
exclude the testimony of the witness from the consideration of
the jury is improper, as tending to lead the jury to believe
that they cannot entirely discredit the testimony of the wit-
ness. 95 A charge that "against the credibility of any witness,
it is a strong circumstance, weighing heavily, that he is shown
to have sworn falsely in regard to some material fact," is im-
E. 309, 65 Am. St. 277; See Hart v. s Smith v. Lehigh V. R. Co. 170
S. 93 Ga. 160. 20 S. E. 39. N. Y. 394, 63 N. E. 338.
oo S. v. Miller, 53 Iowa, 210, 4 N. * Givens v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. App.
W. 838, 900. 563, 34 S. W. 636.
91 Miller v. P. 39 111. 463. ss Crockett v. S. 40 Tex. Cr. App.
92 Smith v. S. 142 Ind. 288, 41 173, 49 S. W. 392.
N. E. 361.
213 BELIEVING OR DISBELIEVING FAILURE TO PRODUCE 222
proper. 90 To instruct that "while it is the province of the jury
to pass upon the credibility of a witness, nevertheless the law
furnishes to the jury certain rules to guide them in determining
whether or not a witness has spoken the truth, and the law
authorizes the jury to discard altogether the testimony of a
witness who has been impeached," is improper, in that it tends
to lead the jury to believe that the credibility of the witness
depends alone upon the impeaching evidence irrespective of
other evidence in the case. 97
222. Failure to produce witnesses or evidence. It may be
stated as a general rule, in either a civil or criminal case, that
where a party makes no effort to procure certain material evi-
dence which is peculiarly or exclusively within his knowledge
and control, and which, if true, would rebut or meet material
evidence introduced against him, the court may, in charging the
jury, comment on the failure to produce such evidence and direct
the jury to consider such fact in determining the issues. 98 But
this rule can have no application to the failure of the defendant
in a criminal case to testify in his own behalf, or his failure to
call his wife when she is a competent witness and may have
knowledge of material facts in issue in the case. 99 So an instruc-
tion stating that "when all the circumstances proved raise a
strong presumption of the guilt of the accused, his failure to offer
any explanation, where in his power to do so, tends to confirm
the presumption of his guilt," is clearly erroneous. 100
as Paul v. S. 100 Ala. 136, 14 So. Ave. R. Co. 8 Misc. (N. Y.) ( 449;
634. Com. v. Costley, 118 Mass. 1; Flynn
97 Osborn v. S. 125 Ala. 106, 27 v. New York E. R. Co. 50 N. Y.
So. 758. Instructions on impeach- S. 375. See Nicol v. Crittendon, 55
ment of witnessed held erroneous: Ga. 497. See S. v. Smallwood, 75
Plummer v. S. Ill Ga. 839, 36 S. E. N. Car. 104. See Momence Stone
233; Strong v. S. 61 Neb. 35, 84 Co. v. Groves, 197 111. 93, 64 N. E.
N. W. 410; Osborn v. S. 125 Ala. 335; Hinshaw v. S. 147 Ind. 334,
106, 27 So. 758; Paul v. S. 100 Ala. 47 N. E. 157.
136, 14 So. 634; Jarnigan v. Fleming, 99 Stutsman v. Ter. 7 Okla. 490,
43 Miss. 710; Tarbell v. Forbes, 177 54 Pac. 707; Doan v. S. 26 Ind. 498;
Mass. 238, 58 N. E. 873; Dean v. S. v. Grebe, 17 Kas. 458; Com. v.
S. 130 Ind. 237, 29 N. E. 911; Hig- Harlow, 110 Mass. 411.
gins v. Wren, 79 Minn. 462, 82 N. 100 Clem v. S. 42 Ind. 420, 2 Green
W. 859; Gilyard v. S. 98 Ala. 59, C. R. 696, 13 Am. R. 369; Com. v.
13 So. 391; Spicer v. S. 105 Ala. 123, Hardiman, 9 Gray (Mass.), 136;
16 So. 706. Gordon v. P. 33 N. Y. 501; Com. v.
98 S. v. Grebe, 17 Kas. 458; Stover Pease, 110 Mass. 412.
v. P. 56 N. Y. 320; Ripley v. Second
222 RELATING TO WITNESSES. 214
In civil cases, however, the parties to a cause are included
within the rule mentioned. Thus, an instruction that if the jury
find there are material and important circumstances appearing
in evidence against the defendant, and they further find that the
defendant has not satisfactorily explained said circumstances
by other evidence, then the fact that he did not testify in his
own behalf may be considered in evidence against him, and that
they should give such fact such weight as it is entitled to when
considered with the other evidence in the case, is proper. 101
But such an instruction is not proper unless it appears that the
party thus failing to testify in his own behalf has knowledge of
and could give material evidence as a witness. 102 So it is im-
proper to charge that it is fair to infer that the testimony of a
witness is untrue, from the failure to call another person as a
witness who has knowledge of the same facts and who was acces-
sible and able to appear. 103
The omission of a party to call a witness who might have been
called by the other party is no ground for a presumption that
the testimony of the witness would have been unfavorable. 104
Where a litigant produces and examines a witness on his side
of the case, the fact that he fails to call the attention of the
witness to certain material facts which the witness perhaps
knows something about, will not warrant the inference that
the testimony of the witness as to the facts omitted would have
been unfavorable, nor authorize the giving of instructions sub-
mitting any such inference to the jury. 105 The fact that a par-
ticular person who is equally within the control of both parties,
is not called as a witness, is no ground for any presumption
against either party, and the jury have no right to presume
anything in respect to his knowledge of any of 'the facts of the
case. 106
While it is true that a party who introduces a witness vouches
for his truthfulness and will not be permitted to impeach him,
yet he does not warrant the witness to be truthful; hence an
101 Miller v. Dayton, 57 Iowa, 423, 39 N. Y. S. 279; Cramer v. City of
10 N. W. 814; Blackwood v. Brown, Burlington, 49 Iowa, 215.
29 Mich. 483; Union Bank v. Stone, IOB Millman v. Rochester R. Co.
50 Me. 5%. 39 N. Y. S. 274.
102 Emery v. Smith, 54 Ga. 273. ios Scovill v. Baldwin, 27 Conn.
103 Brown v. Town of Swanton, 316. See Flynn v. New York E. R.
69 Vt. 53, 37 Atl. 280. Co. 50 N. Y. S. 375.
104 Millman v. Rochester R. Co.
215
SINGLING OUT WITNESSES.
instruction that when a party introduces a witness he thereby
indorses his credibility is erroneous. 107
223. Singling out witnesses Improper. It is improper in
the giving of instructions to single out a particular witness, by
name or otherwise, and submit his testimony to the jury and
thereby give it prominence. 108 Instructions relating to witnesses
should apply equally to all of them and not single out and give
prominence to the testimony of any particular witness. 109 It is
also quite as improper to single out and give prominence to a
certain class of witnesses, such as experts, and make comments on
the testimony, either favorable or unfavorable. Such practice is
an invasion of the province of the jury. 110
An instruction as to the testimony of non-expert witnesses
where the defense is insanity, stating that their opinions are to
be received and weighed only in the light of the facts related by
them; that the jury should judge of the reasonableness of their
opinions from such facts, and give them such weight as they
might deem proper, and that both the expert and non-expert
107 Jarnigan v. Fleming, 43 Miss.
710; S. v. Brown, 76 N. Car. 225.
108 S. v. Chick (Mo.), 48 S. W.
829; P. v. Clark, 105 Mich. 169, 62
N. W. 1117: Davidson v. Walling-
ford, 88 Tex. 619, 32 S. W. 1030;
King v. S. 120 Ala. 329, 25 So. 178;
Smith v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 49
S. W. 583; Thompson v. S. 106 Ala.
67, 17 So. 512; Donahue v. Egan,
85 111. App. 20; Southern R. Co. v.
Reaves (Ala.), 29 So. 594; Grand
Rapids & I. R. Co. v. Judson, 34
Mich. 507.
109 Wells v. S. 131 Ala. 48, 31
So. 572; Winter v: S. 133 Ala. 176,
31 So. 717; P. v. Weissenberger, 77
N. Y. S. 71, 73 App. Div. 428 (accom-
plice) ; Graff v. P. 208 111. 326;
Arnold v. Pucher, 83 111. App. 182;
Doyle v. P. 147 111. 398, 35 N. B.
372; Argabright v. S. 49 Neb. 760,
9 N. W. 102; Chicago & A. R. Co.
v. Winters, 175 111. 299, 51 N. E.
SOI (held not singling out witnesses
of one party) ; Rafferty v. P. 72
111. 37, 46; Orendorff v. Pinfronch,
65 111. App. 174; Cogwell v. Southern
P R. Co. 129 N. Car. 398, 40 S. E.
202; Mathews v. Granger, 96 111.
App. 536, 63 N. E. 658; S. v. Smith,
8 S. Dak. 547, 67 N. W. 619. See al-
so Frost v. S. 124 Ala. 71, 27 So.
550; Clausen v. Jones, 18 Tex. Cv.
App. 376, 45 S. W. 183; S. v. Mc-
Clellan, 23 Mont. 532, 59 Pac. 924;
Heddle v. City Elec. R. Co. 112
Mich. 547, 70 N. W. 1096; Louisville
& N. R. Co. v. Morgan, 114 Ala.
449, 22 So. 20. It has been held
that where only one witness . was
impeached by showing that he had
committed the crime of perjury, it
was proper for the court in giving
instructions to refer to such wit-
ness by name. Shaw v. S. 102 Ga.
660, 29 S. E. 477. See S. v. Jackson,
103 Iowa, 702, 73 N. W. 467.
no Hayden v. Frederickson, 59
Neb. 141, 80 N. W. 494; Coleman v.
Adair, 75 Miss. 660, 23 So. 369;
Blough v. Parry, 144 Ind. 463, 40
N. E. 70; Jamison v. Weld, 93 Me.
345, 45 Atl. 299; Thomas v. Gates,
126 Cal. 1, 58 Pac. 315; Smith v.
Chicago & W. I. R. Co. 105 111.
511, 522; Brush v. Smith, 111 Iowa.
217, 82 N. W. 467. See Bever v.
Spangler, 93. Iowa, 576, 61 N. W.
1072.
224 . RELATING TO WITNESSES. 216
testimony should be subjected to a careful and painstaking inves-
tigation, properly states the law. 111 Where the evidence tends
to prove that other witnesses besides the plaintiff who gave tes-
timony, were interested in the result of the suit, an instruction
singling out the plaintiff and applying to him alone the test
of credibility because of his interest is improper. 112 So it is
improper to instruct that if the jury believe a certain witness
they should find for the defendant, when there is other evidence
tending to contradict the testimony of such witness. 113 Where
the testimony of a witness has been greatly weakened by his con-
tradictory statements on former trials and by his apparently
imperfect memory, it is improper for the court to charge that
it is the duty of the jury to reconcile his testimony, if possible ;
that it is better to assume that a witness has made mistakes
rather than that he has testified falsely. Such a charge invades
the province of the jury. 114
224. Detectives and informers as witnesses. The testi-
mony of detectives and informers, whose business it is to secure
evidence, should be examined and weighed with greater care
than that of witnesses wholly disinterested, and it is proper to
so instruct the jury. 115 That a reward has been offered for the
apprehension of a person accused of the commission of a crime,
is a fact proper to be shown in evidence as affecting the credi-
bility of a witness who may have been instrumental in causing
the arrest of the accused; hence it is improper to instruct the
jury that "the mere fact that a reward had been offered is
not evidence against the credibility of the witnesses; that there
must be something in connection therewith to show that the
in Wilcox v. S. 94 Tenn. 106, 28 5fi N. E. 796. See City of Spring
S. W. 312. But in the federal Valley v. Gavin, 182 111. 232, 54 N.
courts it has been held not im- E. 1035.
proper for the court to state that us Fox v. Manhattan R. Co. 73
the testimony of medical experts N. Y. S. 896, 67 App. Div. 460;
is entitled to great weight. St. Grand Rapids & I. R. Co. v. Jud-
Louis, Q. M. & S. R. Co. v. Phil- son, 34 Mich. 507.
lips, 66 Fed. 35. n* Isely v. Illinois Cent. R. Co.
112 City of Dixon v. Scott, 181 88 Wis. 453, 60 N. W. 794.
111. 116, 54 N. E. 897; Pennsylvania us Sandage v. S. 61 Neb. 240, 85
Co. v. Versten 140 111. 637, 642, N. W. 35; Fidelity M. L. Asso. v.
30 N. E. 540; North Chicago St. R. Jeffords, 107 Fed. 402. 53 L. R. A.
Co. v. Dudgeon, 83 111. App. 528, 193 note.
217 DETECTIVES, INFORMERS, RELATIVES. 225
witness testified in view of the reward. ' ' 11G But calling the atten-
tion of the jury to the admitted fact that the witnesses for
the state had been paid and hired to arrest the defendant is
improper. 117
225. Relatives as witnesses. In passing upon the credibility
of the witnesses the jury may take into consideration the rela-
tionship of any of them to the defendant, if any is shown, and
it is proper to so instruct the jury. 118 Thus an instruction that
the jury should scrutinize the testimony of the defendant's
father and mother on account of their Relationship, and if they
believe them to be credible, their testimony should be given as
full weight as that of other witnesses, is proper. 119 An instruc-
tion that "in considering the weight of the testimony given by
both the defendant and his wife, you will take into considera-
tion the fact that he is the defendant testifying in his own be-
half and that she is his wife, and you may consider their interest
in the case and the marital relation in passing upon the cred-
ibility of their testimony," is proper. 120
A charge that: "It is the duty of the jury, in passing upon the
evidence of the prisoner himself, and of his near relatives who
have testified for him, to scrutinize their evidence with great
caution, considering their interest in the result of the verdict,
and after so considering, the jury will give to it such weight
as they may deem proper," is erroneous, in that it does not fur-
ther charge that if the witnesses were found to be credible
their testimony should be given full credit. 121 An instruction
directing the attention to the testimony of the wife of the
accused, stating that although the law does not say that a
wife cannot swear to the truth, it does cast suspicion upon her
us Myers v. S. 97 Ga. 76, 25 S. testimony, Mitchell v. S. 133 Ala.
E. 252. 65, 32 So. 132.
117 Copeland v. S. 36 Tex. Cr App. i" S. v. Apple, 121 N. Car. 584,
575, 38 S. W. 210. 28 S. E. 469. See S. v. Byers, 100
us Van Buren v. .S. 63 Neb. 453, N. Car. 512, 6 S. E. 420.
88 N. W. 671. But see P. v. Shat- 120 S. v. Napper, 141 Mo. 401, 42
tuck, 100 Gal. 673, 42 Pac. 315, 22 L. S. W. 957.
R. A. 790. In a homicide case it has 121 S. v. McDowell, 129 N. Car.
been held improper to call the at- 523. 39 S. E. 840. See also S. v.
tention of the jury to the relation- Collins, 118 N. Car. 1203, 24 S. E.
ship of the witnesses to the de- 118; S. v. Holloway, 117 N. Car.
ceased as tending to discredit their 730, 23 S. E. 168; S. v. Nash, 30
N. Car. 35.
226 RELATING TO WITNESSES. 218
testimony by reason of the close relationship between husband
and wife, and that the jury should, therefore, scan it closely, is
improper, as tending to lead the jury to believe that the tes-
timony of the wife may be discredited, although they may be-
lieve that she has testified truthfully. 122 Also a charge that
the jury have no right to reject the testimony of the wife and
daughter of the accused simply because it comes from a source
in which there would be strong motives to give the most favor-
able coloring possible to the evidence for the accused, is im-
proper as expressing a,n opinion on the question of motives. 123
The competency of children as witnesses depends upon
their intelligence, judgment, understanding and ability to com-
prehend the nature and effect of an oath. 124 The jury are the
judges of the credibility of a child witness, as well as all other
witnesses, but it has been held not improper for the court
to call their attention to the fact of the tender age of the
witness when considering any contradictory or inconsistent,
statements in his testimony, if any, and advise them that
they are not required to consider the testimony of such wit-
ness as they would that of a mature person. Thus, on a
charge of having carnal knowledge of a female child, seven
years old, an instruction that "you will not take and
consider her statements if they are contradictory and incon-
sistent, as you would those of a mature person, but you must
take them as the statements of a little girl, given under such cir-
cumstances as you have seen, and must weigh them in con-
nection with all the other testimony," has been held not to be
improper. 125 A charge that the jury ' ' should weigh the testimony
of an immature child with that degree of their own common
knowledge and understanding of children in the narrative of
events during childhood," is improper, in that it is incomplete
and elliptical. 126
226. On competency and testimony of the defendant. By
122 s. v. Lee, 121 N. Car. 544, 28 10 Gal. 66; S. v. Dennis, 19 La.
S. E. 552. Ann. 119; S. v. Richie, 28 La. Ann.
123 p. v. Pom/eroy, 30 Ore. 16, 46 327; S. v. Whitier, 21 Me. 341.
Pac. 797. 125 Barnard v. S. 88 Wis. 656,
124 Rapalje Witnesses 7, citing 60 N. W. 1058.
Flanigan v. S. 25 Ark. 92; Warner ize Walker v. S. 134 Ala. 86, 32
v. S. 25 Ark. 447; P. v. Bernal, So. 703.
#19 COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES DEFENDANT. 227
statutory provision the defendant in a criminal case is made
a competent witness in his own behalf, at his election, and when
he does testify he becomes the same in all respects as any other
witness, and his testimony is to be tested by the same rules or
tests that are applied to other witnesses. 127 And, of course,
under such statute the defendant is entitled to have the jury
instructed that he is a competent witness in his own behalf. 1 - 8
But the court may call special attention to the testimony of
the defendant and tell the jury that they are authorized to
take into consideration the interest he may have in the result
of the trial, as affecting his credibility in other words, the
court may single out the testimony of the defendant which is
improper as to other witnesses. 129 The court may instruct as to
the credit to be given to the testimony of the accused, although
there is no statute expressly authorizing it. 130 But this principle
cannot be applied to any other witness who may be interested
in the result of the trial or related to the defendant. 131
227. Defendant's interest Other considerations. As pre-
viously stated, the jury in weighing the testimony of the
defendant in a criminal case shall be governed by the same
rules and tests that are applied to the other witnesses, but
the court may direct them that they should consider his in-
terest in the result of the trial. 132 The court may also call the
attention of the jury to the fact, if it be a fact, that the
accused has been previously convicted of a felony. 133 Also that
127 Sullivan v. P. 114 111. 24, 27, "i p. v . Hertz, 105 Cal. 660, 39
28 N. E. 381; Rider v. P. 110 111. Pac. 32; McEwen v. S. (Miss.), 16
13; Creed v. P. 81 111. 569. So. 242. Contra: as to wife of de-
128 McVay v. S. (Miss.), 26 So. fendant, S. v. Napper, 141 Mo. 401,
947. See S. v. McClellan, 23 Mont. 42 S. W. 957.
532, 59 Pac. 924. 132 S. v. Summar, 143 Mo. 220, 45
i29padfield v. P. 146 111. 663, 35 S. W. 254; S. v. Young, 104 Iowa,
N. E. 469; Rhea v. U. S. 6 Okla. 249, 730, 74 N. W. 693; S. v. Wiggins,
50 Pac. 992; Barmoy v. Wolfe, 44 50 La. Ann. 330, 23 So. 334; Kirkham
Neb. 77, 62 N. W. 318; Keating v. v. P. 170 111. 16, 48 N. E. 465; P. v.
S. (Neb.), 93 N. W. 980; Ter. v. Petmecy, 99 N. Y. 421, 2 N. E.
Gonzales (N. Mex.), 68 Pac. 925; 145. See also Honsh v. S. 43 Neb.
Bressler v. P. 117 111. 422, 8 N. E. 163, 61 N. W. 571; Newport v. S.
62; Hirsehm-an v. P. 101 111. 568; 140 Ind. 299, 39 N. E. 926; S. v.
Doyle v. P. 147 111. 394, 35 N. E. Case, 96 Iowa, 264, 65 N. W. 149;
372; Pryman v. S. 102 Ala. 130, 15 S. v. Metcalf, 17 Mont. 417, 43 Pac.
So. 433; Macintosh v. S. 151 Ind. 251. 998; P. v. Calvin, 60 Mich. 114, 26
See Underbill Cr. Ev. 58. N. W. 851.
iso p. v . Hitchcock, 104 Cal. 482, iss p. v . Johnson, 104 Cal. 418.
38 Pac. 198. 38 Pac. 91. See Conkey v. Carpen-
227 RELATING TO WITNESSES. 220
if the jury find from the evidence that the defendant has made
any false, improbable or contradictory statements in his tes-
timony these matters are proper to be considered in weighing
his testimony. 134 And it is also proper to charge that the de-
fendant sustains or occupies a relation to the case different
from that of any other witness where the instruction clearly
states what his relation to the case is that he is the defendant. 135
Although it is proper to thus caution the jury in weighing the
testimony of the accused, yet the court should not cast sus-
picion upon it in giving instructions. 136
An instruction stating that the jury are "to consider what
he has at stake ; consider the temptations brought to bear on a
man in Jris situation to tell a falsehood," is improper. 137 An
instruction which states that the jury, in weighing the tes-
timony of the defendant, may consider the relationship of the
witnesses to him, their interest in the event of the suit, their
temper and feeling and their demeanor while testifying, is im-
proper. 138 On the other hand, if the testimony of the accused
is corroborated by other credible evidence the jury may consider
it as strengthened to the extent of such corroboration. 139
To instruct that the jury are not bound to believe the tes^
timony of the defendant, nor treat it the same as the testimony
of other witnesses, is improper and prejudicial. 140 But an in-
struction that "the testimony of the defendant is to be weighed
ter, 106 Mich. 1, 63 N. W. 990 (re- of the defendant they must acquit
lating to any witness who has been him, is improper, where there is
convicted of a crime). other evidence tending to prove his
"I Jones v. S. 61 Ark. 88, 32 S. guilt, Naugher v. S. 116 Ala. 463, 23
W. 81; Com. v. Devaney, 182 Mass. So. 26. An instruction relating to
33, 64 N. E. 402; Sater v. S. 58 Ind. an interview between the state's at-
378 (relating to the defendant pro- torney and the defendant, stating
curing false testimony). that if the jury have any doubt as
i P. v. Curry, 103 Cal. 548, 37 to what was said .between them,
Pac. 503; P. v. Ferry, 84 Cal. 31, where they, as witnesses, contra-
24 Pac. 33; Mclntosh v. S. 151 Ind. dieted each other, then the jury
251, 51 N. E. 354. should adopt the version of the de-
ise s. v. White, 10 Wash. 611, 39 fendant, is improper, S. v. Warner.
Pac. 160; Alexander v. S. 114 Ga. &9 Vt. 30, 37 Atl. 246.
266, 40 S. E. 231. 1*0 Sullivan v. P. 114 111. 27, 28
137 p. v . Van Ewan, 111 Cal. 144, N. E. 381; Chambers v, P. 105 111.
43 Pac. 520. 409, 412; Reagan v. U. S. 157 U. S
Eller v. P. 153 111. 344, 38 N. 310, 15 Sup. Ct. 610. See S. v.
E. 660. Mecum, 95 Iowa, 433, 64 N. W. 286;
139 Johnson v. U. S. 157 U. S. 320 Gulliher v. P. 82 111. 146; Hellyer
15 Sup. Ct. 164.' An Instruction that v. P. 186 111. 550, 58 N. E. 245. See
if the jury have a reasonable doubt Allen v. S. 87 Ala. 107, 6 So. 370.
as to the truth of the testimony
221 DEFENDANT A WITNESS, HIS STATEMENTS. 228
by the same rules that govern in weighing the testimony of
other witnesses, but in passing upon its weight the jury may
consider the interest the defendant has in the result of the trial;
but that they should not reject his testimony if they believe it
to be true, simply because he is the defendant," is proper. 141
Or a charge that the defendant is a competent witness, but that
the jury are the judges of the weight to be given to his tes-
timony, and that they should take into consideration all the
surrounding facts and circumstances and give his testimony such
weight only as they believe it entitled to, in view of all the facts,
is not improper. 142
228. On defendant's unsworn statements. By statute in
some of the states the accused is permitted to make an unsworn
statement in his defense. Any such statement thus made is
proper to go to the jury and to be allowed such weight as they
may see fit to give it. 143 And it is proper for the court to call
the attention of the jury to the fact that the statement of the
accused is not made under oath. 144 It is also proper for the
court to advise the jury to be extremely cautious in believing
the unsworn statement of the accused. 145 But to say to the jury
that the defendant's statement is "not binding on them" is
improper. 146 And in charging the jury as to the statement
of the accused, the better practice is to instruct in the language
of the statute, although the court is authorized to instruct on
the effect of such statute. 147 The failure of the court, how-
ever, to make any reference to the defendant's statement is not
prejudicial error where the instructions in all other respects
fully cover the questions involved. 148
1*1 S. v. Summar, 143 Mo. 220, us Alexander v. S. 114 Ga. 266,
45 S. W. 254. Set P. v. Holmes, 40 S. E. 231.
126 Gal. 462, 58 Pac. 917; S. v. Met- " Knight v. S. 114 Ga. 48, 39 S.
calf, 17 Mont. 417, 43 Pac. 182. E. 928.
142 Mclntosh v. S. 151 Ind. 251, T Strickland v. S. 115 Ga. 222,
51 N. E. 354; Smith v. S. 118 Ala. 41 S. E. 713; Pitts v. S. 114 Ga. 35,
117, 24 So. 55; Palmer v. S. (Neb.), 39 S. E. 873. See also Hoxie v. S.
97 N. W. 235. 114 Ga. 19, 39 S. E. 944; Vaughn
143 Olive v. S. 34 Fla. 203, 15 So. v. S. 88 Ga. 371, 16 S. E. 64; Tucker
925; Blackburn v. S. 71 Ala. 319; v. S. 114 Ga. 61, 39 S. E. 926;
P. v. Arnold, 40 Mich. 715; Smith v. Lacewell v. S. 95 Ga. 346, 22 S. E.
S. 94 Ga. 591, 22 S. E. 214; Harrison 546.
v. S. 83 Ga. 129, 9 S. E. 542; Sledge i Hayes v. S. 114 Ga. 25, 40
v. S. 99 Ga. 684, 26 S. E. 756. S. E. 13.
144 Poppell v. S. 71 Ga. 276.
221) RELATING TO WITNESSES. 222
229. On defendant's failure to testify. The fact that the
accused does not testify in his own behalf cannot be construed
as a circumstance against him, and the court may so advise
the jury by proper instructions. 149 And in some jurisdictions
the court should instruct, if requested, that the fact that the
defendant does not testify should not be considered or con-
strued against him; that no presumption of guilt should be in-
dulged against him because he has not testified in his own be-
half. The refusal of an instruction properly embracing this
principle is reversible error. 150 But in the absence of a request
for such an instruction there can be no ground for complaint.
The court is not bound to give an instruction on its own mo-
tion, that the failure of the defendant to testify in his own
behalf should not be taken as a circumstance against him. 151
"a S. v. Johnson, 50 La. Ann. 154, IBO Farrell v. P. 133 111. 247, 24
23 So. 199; P. v. Fitzgerald, 46 N. J. N. B. 423; S. v. Evans, 9 Kas. App.
L. 1020; Guimo v. S. 39 Tex. Cr. 889; Shrawley v. S. 153 Ind. 375,,
App. 257, 45 S. W. 694; Ferguson 55 N. E. 95; S. v. Goff, 62 Kas.
v. S. 52 Neb. 432, 72 N. W. 590; 104, 61 Pac. 683; S. v. Wines, 65
P. v. Fitzgerald, 156 N. Y. 253, N. J. L. 31, 46 Atl. 702; S. v. Car-
50 N. E. 846; Com. v. Brown, 167 nagy, 106 Iowa, 483, 76 N. W. 805;
Mass. 144, 45 N. E. 1; Grant v. S. S. v. Landry, 85 Me. 95, 26 Atl. 998;
(Tex. Cr. App.), 70 S. W. 954; P. v. S. v. Carr, 25 La. Ann. 408; P. v.
Hoch, 150 N. Y. 291, 44 N. E. 976; Rose, 5.2 Hun (N. Y.), 33.
S. v. Hogan, 115 Iowa, 455, 88 N. W. isi Metz v. S. 46 Neb. 547, 65 N.
1074; S. v. Weems, 96 Iowa, 426, W. 190; Matthews v. P. 6 Colo.
65 N. W. 387; Sullivan v. S. 9 Ohio App. 456, 41 Pac. 839; Grubb v. S.
C. C. 652; S. v. Krug, 12 Wash, 288, 117 Ind. 277, 20 N. E. 257; S. v.
41 Pac. 126; S. v. Robinson, 117 Magers, 36 Ore. 38, 58 Pac. 892; Fox-
Mo. 649, 23 S. W. 1066. Contra: well v. S. 63 Ind. 539; P. v. Flym,
Prewitt v. S. 41 Tex. Cr. App. 262, 73 Cal. 511, 15 P. 102; Felton v. S.
53 S. W. 879; Torey v. S. 41 Tex. 139 Ind. 531, 39 N. E. 228.
Cr. App. 543, 56 S. W. 60.
CHAPTER XI.
SPECIAL FINDINGS.
Sec. Sec.
230. Questions for special findings 232. General instructions unneces-
are proper. sary and improper.
231. Interrogatories should relate 233. Interrogatories illustrating
to ultimate facts. practice.
234. General and special verdicts.
230. Questions for special findings are proper. The sub-
mission of questions of fact for the determination of the jury
by special finding is proper as a preliminary step to the submis-
sion of the entire case or for directing a verdict. 1 Issues are
sometimes presented by the pleadings, which should be submit-
ted to the jury for separate finding, as, for instance, a plea of
venue.- But whether questions of fact for special findings
should be submitted to the jury is a matter largely within the
discretion of the trial court. 3 The practice is usually regulated
by statute, but in substance it is merely the submission to the
jury of special interrogatories for answers.*
231. Interrogatories should relate to ultimate facts. When
special interrogatories are thus submitted they should relate
to the ultimate facts in issue; that is, the answers to the inter-
1 City of Elizabeth v. Fitzgerald, (Neb.), 90 N. W. 215; Kane v.
114 Fed. 547. Footh, 70 111. 590. But see Gale v.
2 Merchants & Planters' Oil Co. Priddy, 66 Ohio St. 400, 64 N. E.
v. Burrow (Tex. Cv. App.), 69 S. W. 437; Morrison v. Northern P. R.
435. Co. (Wash.), 74 Pac. 1066, action
s Chicago, St. P. M. & O. R. Co. of the trial court not reviewable.
v. Lagerkrans (Neb.). 91 N. W. * See Woodmen, &c. v. Locklin,
358; City of Crete v. Hendricks 28 Tex. Cv. App. 486, 67 S. W. 331.
223
232 SPECIAL FINDINGS. 224
rogatories must be conclusive of the rights of the parties. 5 A
question for special finding should be single and direct, and
relate to an ultimate and controlling fact in the case, and not
to evidentiary facts from which the ultimate fact may be de-
duced by reasoning or argument. Several questions should not
be submitted in one instruction in charging as to special verdict. 7
232. General instructions unnecessary and improper. In-
structions submitting to the jury general propositions of law
are unnecessary and improper where special findings are re-
quested.* After the jury determine the facts by special find-
ings the court applies the law. 9 Where there is a request for
a special verdict the court should instruct as to the nature
of the action, the issue, and as to the form of the verdict, but
general instructions as to the law of the case are improper. 10
Under the procedure of North Carolina the jury do not render
a general verdict, but merely respond to the issues submitted
for determination. An instruction, therefore, which charges that,
on a certain showing of the facts, the plaintiff cannot recover,
is properly refused. 11 It is improper for the court to state
to the jury the legal effect of their answers to questions pre-
5 Taylor v. Felsing, 164 111. 331, C. Foster Lumber Co. 97 Wis. 641,
339, 45 N. E. 161. See Judy v. 73 N. W. 563; Goesel v. Davis, 100
Sterrett, 153 111. 94, 98, 38 N. E. Wis. 678, 76 N. W. 768; Manch v.
633; Terre Haute & I. R. Co. v. City of Hartford, 112 Wis. 40, 87
Eggman, 159 111. 550, 42 N. E. 970; N. W. 816; Ward v. Cochran, 71
Kletzing v. Armstrong, 119 Iowa, Fed. 128. See Reed v. City of Mad-
505, 93 N. W. 500; Gutzman v. ison, 85 Wis. 667, 56 N. W. 182.
Clancy, 114 Wis. 509, 90 N. W. 1081; Johnson v. Culver, 116 Ind. 278,
Ward v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 19 N. E. 129.
102 Wis. 215, 78 N. W. 442; Gale 10 Stayner v. Joyce, 120 Ind. 99,
v. Priddy, 66 Ohio St. 400, 64 N. E. 22 N. E. 89; Woolen v. Wire, 100
437; Cullen v. Hanisch, 114 Wis. Ind. 251; Indianapolis, P. & C. R.
24, 89 N. W. 900; Nix v. Reiss Coal Co. v. Bush, 101 Ind. 587; Boyce v.
Co. 114 Wis. 493, 90 N. W. 437; Schreoder, 21 Ind. App. 28, 51 N.
Palnode v. Westenhaver, 114 'Wis. E. 376; Udell v. Citizens' St. R.
460, 90 N. W. 467. Co. 152 Ind. 507, 52 N. E. 799;
Illinois Steel Co. v. Mann, '197 Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. v.
111. 186, 64 N. E. 328, citing L. Buck, 116 Ind. 566, 19 N. E. 453. See
Wolff Mfg. Co. v. Wilson, 152 111. Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. v.
9, 38 N. E. 694. Lynch, 147 Ind. 165, 44 N. E. 997,
t Cullen v. Hanisch, 114 Wis. 24, 34 L. R. A. 298; Louisville, N. A. &
89 N. W. 900. C. R. Co. v. Frawley, 110 Ind. 28, 9
s Rhyner v. City of Menasha, 107 N. E. 594.
Wis. 201, 83 N. W. 303; Kohler v. Witsell v. West Asheville &
West Side R. Co. 99 Wis. 33, 74 S. S. R. Co. 120 N. Car. 537, 27 S.
N. W. 568; Seibrecht v. Hogan, 99 E. 125, 35 L. R. A. 808 note.
Wis. 437, 75 N. W. 71; Klatt v. N.
225 INTERROGATORIES ILLUSTRATING PRACTICE. 234
sented to them. 12 The court should not state to the jury that
if they answer "yes" to a certain interrogatory, a general ver-
dict for the plaintiff could not be sustained. 13
233. Interrogatories illustrating practice. The following in-
terrogatories were held properly submitted to the jury for
answers and serve to illustrate the rule: If defendant's ten-
ancy did not expire March thirty-first, when did it expire by his
agreement with the plaintiff?
If the plaintiff agreed to let the defendant have the prem-
ises longer than the end of March, when and how did they
make the agreement?
These questions do not ask for the statements of evidence,
but material facts. 14 In an action for causing the death of
a person by negligence the following interrogatory, to wit : ' ' Was
the defendant passing over the crossing in the usual way and
going directly across the same?" was held properly refused,
because not relating to an ultimate fact in issue. 15
In another case, the court submitted to the jury this question :
Was the note (of five thousand dollars) given as an induce-
ment to procure the marriage of the plaintiff to the defendant,
or not, and if not, for what was it given?
Answer: "It was not given as an inducement to procure the
marriage of the plaintiff, but only as a bridal present, and had
no consideration, and was null and void."
It was not necessary for the jury to state for what the note
was given; but the fact that they found for what it was given
necessarily means that they found it was not given in con-
sideration of marriage. 16 Interrogatories submitted for the pur-
pose of having the jury state upon which paragraph or par-
agraphs- of the complaint a verdict is based is not warranted
under the statutes of Indiana, as not asking for an ultimate fact. 17
234. General and special verdicts. To enable a party to
12 Gerrard v. La Crosse City R. ^ Terre Haute & I. R. Co. v.
Co. 113 Wis. 258, 89 N. W. 125. Eggman, 159 111. 550, 42 N. E. 970.
is Coats v. Town of Stanton, 90 16 Hatchett v. Hatchett, 28 Tex.
Wis. 130. 62 N. W. 619. Cv. App. 33, 67 S. W. 163.
" Lantmann v. Miller, 158 Ind. IT Consolidated Stone Co. v. Mor-
382, 63 N. E. 761. See Wabash R. gan, 160 Ind. 241, 66 N. E. 696.
Co. v. Schultz, 30 Ind. App. 495, 64
N. E. 481.
234 SPECIAL FINDINGS. 226
successfully interpose the special findings of the jury upon par-
ticular questions of fact as a reason for judgment in his favor,
he must at least have special findings that stand in such clear
antagonism to the general verdict .that the two cannot coexist. 18
The special finding must control where there is an irreconcilable
conflict between it and the general verdict. 19 Where answers
to interrogatories are inconsistent, contradictory and at war with
each other, they simply work destruction among themselves, and
do not impair the general verdict. 20
An instruction that the answers to particular questions sub-
mitted to the jury must be consistent with 'each other and
with the general verdict is improper. 21 But to say that "it is
very important that the questions you are asked to answer
should be answered so that they will correspond with your
verdict" is not improper, and is not a direction to the jury
that their answers to the special questions must correspond with
their general verdict. 22 In passing on a motion for judgment
on special findings, notwithstanding the general verdict to the
contrary, it should be borne in mind that the verdict necessarily
covers the whole issue, and that it solves every material fact
against the party against whom it is rendered. 23
is McCoy v. Kokomo R. & L. Co. merman, 61 Kas. 750, 60 Pac. 1064;
158 Ind. 658, 64 N. E. 92; City of Kilpatrick Koch Dry Goods Co. v.
Mishawaka v. Kirby (Ind.), 69 N. Kahn, 53 Kas. 274, 36 Pac. 327;
E. 482. See Union Tr. Co. v. Van- Mechanics' Bank v. Barnes, 86 Mich,
dercook (Ind.), 69 N. E. 487. 632, 49 N. W. 475. See St. Louis
is Bedford Q. Co. v. Thomas, 29 & S. F. R. Co. v. Burrows, 62 Kas.
Ind. App. 85, 63 N. E. 880; Roe v. 89, 61 Pac. 439. But see Hoppe v.
Winston, 86 Minn. 77, 90 N. W. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 61 Wis.
122. 357, 21 N. E. 227.
20 McCoy v. Kokomo, R. & L. Co. 22 Germaine v. City of Muskegon,
158 Ind. 658, 64 N. E. 92; Rice v. 105 Mich. 213, 63 N. W. 78. See
Manford, 110 Ind. 596, 11 N. E. 283; Redford v. Spokane St. R. Co. 9
Redelsheimer v. Miller, 107 Ind. 485, Wash. 55.
8 N. E. 447. See Brems v. Sher- 23 McCoy v. Kokomo, R. & L. Co
man, 158 Ind. 300, 63 N. E. 571. 158 Ind. 658, 64 N. E. 92 (citing
21 Coffeyville Brick Co. v. Zim- Indiana case).
CHAPTER XII.
ERRORS.
Sec. Sec.
235. Immaterial error Generally. 243. Verdict clearly right and jus-
236. Verdict showing error disre- tice done.
garded. 244. Erroneous instructions favor-
237. The principles illustrated. able is harmless.
238. Imperfect instruction correct- 245. Principle or element refused
ed by others. or omitted.
239. Error cured by opponent's in- 246. How a correct instruction
structions. cures a defective one.
240. In criminal cases Error cur- 247. Instructions contradictory.
ed by others. 248. Instructions differing widely
241. Damages Defective instruc- from each other.
tions cured. 249. Instructions self-contradicto-
242. Instruction assuming fact ry.
Harmless. 250. Evidence close, conflicting or
doubtful.
235. Immaterial error Generally. It is the duty of the
court to harmonize the instructions so that they will present
to the jury the legal questions in a plain, consistent and in-
telligible manner; but the giving of an erroneous instruction
is not ground for reversal where it appears from an examination
of the charge as a whole that the erroneous instruction
did no harm to the party complaining. 1 The mere fact that
an instruction is erroneous will not of itself be regarded as
reversible error where it is apparent that it could not have
been misleading when taken in connection with other instruc-
tions given. 2
i Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. 2 Slingloff v. Bruner, 174 111. 570,
Krapp, 173 111. 219, 50 N. E. 663; 51 N. E. 772; Seigel, Cooper & Co.
City of Decatur v. Besten, 169 111. v. Connor, 171 111. 572, 49 N. E.
340, 48 N. E. 186; Copeland v. 728; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Ashline,
Hewett, 96 Me. 525 53 Atl. 36. 171 111. 320, 49 N. E. 521; Chicago
227
236
ERRORS.
228
236. Verdict showing error disregarded. The giving of an
improper instruction will be regarded as merely harmless error
where it appears from the verdict to have been disregarded
by the jury. 3 Or an error committed in refusing a proper in-
struction is harmless where it appears from the verdict that
it would have had no effect had it been given. 4 Thus, where
it appears from answers to interrogatories, that the jury disre-
garded an error in the charge, the error is not prejudicial. 5
Although an instruction may properly submit a material fact
for determination, yet the refusal to give it is but harmless
error where the jury, in answer to special interrogatories, have
found against the party requesting the instruction as to such
fact. 6 Also where the special findings of the jury show the
plaintiff to have been wholly free from negligence, an error com-
& A. R. Co. v. Anderson, 166 111.
572, 46 N. E. 1125; Keating v. P.
160 111. 483, 43 N. E. 724; Porter v.
P. 158 111. 370, 41 N. E. 886; Pope
v. Pope, 95 Ga. 87, 22 S. E. 245;
Spies v. P. 122 111. 245, 12 N. E. 865,
17 N. E. 898; Liberty Ins. Co. v.
Ehrlich, 42 Neb. 553, 60 N. W. 940;
Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Matthews,
153 111. 268, 38 N. E. 559; Wenona
Coal Co. v. Holmquest, 152 111. 591,
38 N. E. 946; Rich v. City of Chi-
cago, 152 111. 30, 38 N. E. 255; Lake
E. & W. R. Co. v. Wills, 140 111.
614, 31 N. E. 122; City of Roodhouse
v. Christian, 158 111. 137, 41 N. E.*
748; Consolidated Coal Co. v. Bo-
kamp, 181 111. 16, 54 N. E. 567;
Keeler v. Herr, 157 111. 57, 41 N. E.
750; South C. C. R. Co. v. Dufresne,
200 111. 456, 65 N. E. 1075; Van
Buskirk v. Day, 32 111. 266. See
generally: Com'rs v. Ryckman, 91
Md. 36, 46 Atl. 311; Ohio & M. R. Co.
v. Stein, 140 Ind. 61, 39 N. E. 246.
3 St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v.
Baker, 67 Ark. 531, 55 S. W. 941;
Smith v. Rountree, 185 111. 219,
56 N. E. 1139; Brush v. Smith, 111
Iowa, 217, 82 N. W. 467; Gallimore
v. Brewer, 22 Ky. L. R. 296, 57 S. W.
253; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v.
Condor, 23 Tex. Cv. App., 488, 58
S. W. 58; Atchison, T. & S. F. R.
Co. v. Cunifte (Tex. Cv. App.), 57
S. W. 692; Murphy v. St. Louis Tr.
Co. 96 Mo. App. 272, 70 S. W. 159
(verdict rendered less than the de-
mand) ; National Horse Importing
Co. v. Novak, 95 Iowa, 596, 64 N.
W. 616 (no general damages award-
ed) ; White v. Bryan, 96 Iowa, 166,
64 N. W. 765; Westbrook v. S. 97
Ga. 189, 22 S. E. 398; S. v. Afray.
124 Mo. 393, 27 S. W. 1097. See
also Ash v. Beck (Tex. Cv. App.),
68 S. W. 53; International Soc.
v. Hildreth, 11 N. Dak. 262, 91 N. W.
70; Sunset T. & T. Co. v. Day, 70
Fed. 364; Clarkson v. Whitaker
(Tex. Cv. App.), 33 S. W. 1032;
Vickers v. Kennedy (Tex. Cv. App.),
34 S. W. 458; Godfrey v. Phillips,
209 111. 584, 594.
* Thompson v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.),
30 S. W. 667; Town of West Cov-
ington v. Sohultz, 16 Ky. L. R. 831,
30 S. W. 410.
s Rouse v. Harry, 55 Kas. 589,
40 Pac. 1007; Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Kelly, 150 111. 9, 40 N. E. 938;
Mason v. Sieglitz 22 Colo. 320, 44
Pac. 588.
National L. M. Ins. Co. v. Whit-
acre (Ind. App.), 43 N. E. 905. See
East St. L. C. Co. v. O'Harra, 150
111. 585, 37 N. E. 917; Indianapolis
St. R. Co. v. Hockett, 159 Ind. 682,
66 N. E. 39.
229 IMPERFECTIONS ILLUSTRATIONS. 238
mitted in charging the jury on the old doctrine of comparative
negligence which is no longer in force, is harmless. 7
237. The principles illustrated. A charge which states the
amount sued for to be too high and the verdict returned is for
the proper amount claimed, the error is immaterial and harm-
less. 8 Where the verdict of the jury exempts a party from
liability, the giving of an erroneous instruction limiting his
liability is harmless. 9 So where the jury find that the defendant
was not guilty of negligence, that renders the question of con-
tributory negligence immaterial, and hence the giving of an
erroneous instruction as to contributory negligence is not ground
for error. 10 Where the verdict is for the defendant in an
action on a contract, an erroneous instruction as to the measure
of damages stating that the plaintiff would be entitled to some
damages if the contract was as he claimed it to be, is but harm-
less error. 11
238. Imperfect instruction corrected by others An in-
struction, though erroneous when standing alone, is not to be
regarded as misleading where the matter upon which it touches
is fully and properly stated in another instruction; 12 or if an
instruction is defective in any particular, yet when taken to-
gether with others given relating to the same subject such
defect, is cured the error is harmless. 13 An imperfection in an
7 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Kelly, Rosenheimer v. Standard Gaslight
156 111. 9, 40 N. E. 938. Co. 53 N. Y. S. 192, 36 App. Div.
s Doe v. United States (Neb.), 91 1; Indianapolis St. R. Co. v. Hock-
N. W. 519. ett, 159 Ind. 679, 66 N. E. 39; Town
Shaefer v. St. Louis & S. R. Co. of Vinegar Hill v. Busson, 42 111.
128 Mo. 64, 30 S. W. 331. See Gue- 45; P. v. Flannelly, 128 Cal. 83, 60
rold v. Holtz, 103 Mich. 118, 61 N. Pac. 670, Crane Co. v. Columbus S.
W. 278. Bank (Neb.), 91 N. W. 532; Pence v.
10 Scheel v. City of Detroit, 130 Wabash R. Co. 116 Iowa, 279, 90
Mich. 51, 90 N. W. 274. N, W. 59; Choctaw, O. & G. R. Co.
11 Mobley v. Charlotte, C. & A. R. v. Tennessee, 116 Fed. 23; Barnes-
Co. 42 S. Car. 306, 20 S. E. 83; ville Mfg. Co. v. Love (Del.), 52 Atl.
Lomax v. Holbine (Neb.), 90 N. W. 267; Oliver v. Sterling, 20 Ohio St.
1122. 400; Jacoby v. Stark, 205 111. 34, G8
12 Boldenwick v. Cahill, 187 111. N. E. 557; City of Macon v. Hol-
218, 58 N. E. 351; McMahan v. comb, 205 111. 645, 69 N. E. 79;
Sankey, 133 111. 636, 24 N. E. 1027; Ready v. P. (Colo.), 74 Pac. 895;
Langdon v. P. 133 111. 282, 403, 24 Johnson v. Gebhauer, 159 Ind. 284,
N. E. 874; City of Joliet v. John- 64 N. E. 855.
son, 177 111. 178, 52 N. E. 498; Bal- 13 Rock I. & P. R. Co. v. Leisy
timore & O. S. W. R. Co. v. Spaul- Brewing Co. 174 111. 556, 51 N. E.
ding, 21 Ind. App. 323, 52 N. E. 410;
238
ERRORS.
230
instruction is harmless when the instructions taken as a whole
correctly state the law. 14 Although an instruction may be in-
correct or misleading when severed from its connection with
other instructions, by omitting some needed qualifications, yet
572; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Go. v.
Krapp, 173 111. 219, 50 N. E. 663,
Chicago Trust Co. v. Goldsmith, 173
111. 326, 50 N. E. 676; Peoples' C. &
A. Co. v. Darrow, 172 111. 62, 49 N.
E. 1005; City of Lanark v. Dougher-
ty, 153 111. 163, 38 N. E. 892; Central
R. Co. v. Serfass, 153 111. 379, 39 N.
E. 119; St. Louis B. Co. v. Miller,
138 111. 475, 28 N. E. 1091; City of
Chicago v. McDonough, 112 111. 85;
Westra v. Westra Estate, 101 Mich.
526, 60 N. W. 55; Citizens' St. R.
Co. v. Hamer, 29 Ind. App. 426, 63
N. E. 778; Donk Bros. Coal & C.
Co. v. Stroff, 200 111. 483, 66 N. E.
29; Redhing v. Central R. Co. 68
N. J. L. 641, 54 Atl. 431 (error cured
by context). Error cured when in-
struction assumes fact: Texas &
N. O. R. Co. v. Scott, 30 Tex. Cv.
App. 496, 71 S. W. 26; Gulf, C. &
S. F. R. Co. v. Carter (Tex. Cv.
App.), 71 S. W. 73 (assuming plain-
tiff was a passenger). See Keating
v. P. 160 111. 483, 43 N. E. 724; Hix
v. P. 157 111. 383, 41 N. E. 862;
Carlton v. S. 43 Neb. 373, 61
N. W. 699; Omaha Fair & E.
A. v. Missouri P. R. Co. 45
Neb. 105, 60 N. W. 330; P. v. Neary,
104 Cal. 373, 37 Pac. 943; Chicago
& A. R. Co. v. City of Pontiac, 169
111. 155, 171; West Ch. St. S. R. Co.
v. Scanlan, 168 111. 34, 48 N. E. 149;
Buck v. Maddock, 167 111. 219, 225,
47 N. E. 208; Day v. Porter, 161 111.
235, 43 N. E. 1073; City of Rood-
house v. Christian, 158 111. 137, 41
N. E. 748; St. Louis, A. & T. H. R.
Co. v. Odurn, 156 111. 78, 40 N. E.
559; Milling v. Hillenbrand, 156 111.
310, 40 N. E. 941; North C. St. R.
Co. v. Boyd, 156 111. 416, 40 N. E.
955; Cannon v. Farmers' Bank
(Neb.), 91 N. W. 585; Cleve-
land, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v.
Baddeley, 150 111. 328, 36 N. E. 965;
Johnson v. Johnson, 187 111. 97, 58
N. E. 237; Dueber Watch C. Mfg.
Co. v. Young, 155 111. 226, 40 N. E.
582; Ide v. Fratcher, 194 111. 552, 62
N. E. 814; Hardware & Iron Co.
v. O'Brien (Ind. App.), 62 N. W.
464; Mueller v. Pels, 192 111. 76, 61
N. E. 472; Boyd v. Portland Elec.
Co. 40 Ore. 126, 66 Pac. 576; Gal-
veston, H. & S. R. Co. v. Newport,
26 Tex. Cv. App. 583, 65 S. W. 657;
Whitney & S. Co. v. O'Rourke, 172
111. 183, 50 N. E. 242; Kenyon v.
City of Mondovi, 98 Wis. 50, 73 N.
W. 314; Lambeth R. Co. v. Brig-
ham, 170 Mass. 518, 49 N. E. 1022;
Gilchrist v. Gilchrist, 76 111. 218;
Zimmerman v. Brannon, 163 Iowa,
144, 72 N. W. 439; Lamb v. Mis-
souri Pac. R. Co. 147 Mo. 171, 48 S.
W. 659; Mclntosh v. S. 151 Ind.
251, 51 N. E. 354; McVey v. S. 57
Neb. 471, 77 N. W. 1111; S. v. Hea-
cock, 106 Iowa, 191, 76 N. W. 654;
Hutchins v. S. 151 Ind. 667, 52 N.
E. 403; Yundt v. Hartrunft, 41 111.
13; Meyers v. S. (Tex. Cr. App), 49
S. W. 600. See North C. St. ,. Co.
v. Peuser, 190 111. 73 (exception
to the rule), 60 N. E. 78; Latham
v. Roache, 72 111. 182; Chandler v.
Com. 19 Ky. L. R. 631, 41 S. W. 437;
De Weese v. Merimee I. M. Co.
128 Mo. 423, 31 S. W. 110; S. v. Stef-
fens, 116 Iowa, 227, 89 N. W. 974;
Clear Creek Stone Co. v. Dearmin,
160 Ind. 162, 66 N. E. 609; Aspy
v. Batkins, 160 Ind. 170, 66 N. E.
462; Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co.
v. Bowman (Tex. Cv. App.), 25 S.
W. 140, an instruction that a rail-
road company could not charge
more than the local rate for freight,
instead of agreed rate, is not error
where the local and agreed rate
are the same.
i* Maynard v. Sigman (Neb.), 91
N. W. 576; Olson v. Oregon S. L.
R. Co. 24 Utah, 460, 68 Pac. 148;
111. C. R. Co. v. Hopkins, 200 111.
122, 65 N. E. 656; Arbuckle v. S.
80 Miss. 15, 31 So. 437; Jinks v. S.
114 Ga. 430, 40 S. E. 320.
231
ERRORS CURED HOW.
239
when read in connection with the others the imperfection may
be cured. If the instructions taken as a whole present the law
with substantial accuracy that is sufficient. 15
A general instruction which states the law correctly will not
cure an error in a specific instruction, although the instruc-
tions must be considered together and as a whole. 16 But if any
material element or fact be omitted in an instruction, the error
is cured where such element or fact is stated in another instruc-
tion. 17 Thus, for instance, an instruction, though defective in
that it fails to submit to the jury the question whether or not
the plaintiff was in the exercise of ordinary care when injured,
is but harmless error where other instructions given for either
or both parties clearly submit the question thus omitted. 18
239. Error cured by opponent's instructions. An error com-
mitted in the giving of a defective instruction for one of the
parties may be cured by the giving of a proper instruction for
the other party. For instance, an instruction which is defective
in not instructing as to the proper measure of damages, in case
is Toluca M. & N. R. Co. v. Haws,
194 111. 92, 62 N. E. 312; Kunst v.
Ringold, 116 Mich. 88, 74 N. W. 294;
Liese v. Meyer, 143 Mo. 547, 45 S.
W. 282.
Clark v. S. 159 Ind. 66, 64 N. E.
589.
i? Hacker v. Monroe & S. 176 111.
590, 52 N. E. 12; Tomle v. Hamp-
ton, 129 111. 384, 21 N. E. 800;
Springfield C. R. Co. v. Hoerfner,
175 111. 634, 51 N. E. 884; La Plant
v. S. 152 Ind. 80, 52 N. E. 1452;
Hamilton v. Love, 152 Ind. 641, 53
N. E. 181; Gordon v. Burris, 153
Mo. 223, 54 S. W. 546; Johnson v.
Gebhauer, 159 Ind. 283, 64 N. E.
S55; Harness v. Steele, 159 Ind. 293,
64 N. E. 875; S. v. Martin (Mont),
74 Pac. 728; Chicago & E. I. R. Co.
v. Clapp, 201 111. 434, 66 N. E. 223;
Springfield C. R. Co. v. Puntenney,
200 111. 12; 65 N. E. 442; McMillen
v. Lee. 78 111. 443; Orr v. Cedar R.
& M. R. Co. 94 Iowa, 423, 62 N. W.
851; P. v. Klee (Cal.), 69 Pac. 696
("wilfully" supplied by "intention-
ally"); Johnson v. Gehbauer, 159
Ind. 271, 64 N. E. 855; Cnicago C.
R. Co. v. Finnemore, 199 111. 1, 64
N. E. 985 (ordinary care) ; S. v. Cot-
trill, 52 W. Va. 363, 43 S. E. 244; S.
v. Prater, 52 W. Va. 132, 43 S. E.
230; Johnson v. Glidden, 11 S. Dak.
237, 76 N. W. 933; Graves v. Hillyer
(Tex. Cv. App.), 48 S. W. 889; S.
v. Prater, 52 W. Va. 132, 43 S. E.
230; S. v. Cottrill, 52 W. Va. 363,
43 S. E: 244.
isWillard v. Swansen, 126 111. 384,
18 N. E. 548; Chicago & A. R. Co.
v. Johnson, 116 111. 210, 4 N. E.
381; Cherokee Packet Co. v. Hilson,
95 Tenn. 1, 31 S. W. 737; Waller v.
Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. 59 Mo.
App. 410; Hughes v. Chicago & A.
R. Co. 127 Mo. 447, 30 S. W. 127;
St. Louis, A. & T. H. R. Co. v.
Odum, 156 111. 78, 40 N. E. 559.
An improper remark inadvertent-
ly made by the court in charging
the jury cannot be said to be ma-
terial error if it is retracted by the
court unless it appears that the
jury did not accept the retraction,
Brooks v. Rochester, 31 N. Y. 179,
10 Misc. 88.
239 ERRORS. 232
the jury should find for the plaintiff, is harmless error where
the instructions given for the defendant fully and fairly state
the rule for estimating damages. 19 So if an instruction is defec-
tive in that it fails to state that the burden is on the plain-
tiff to make out his case by a preponderance of the evidence,
then one given for the defendant, correctly stating the law as
to the burden of proof, will cure the error in the plaintiff's
instruction. 20
The giving of an instruction which may perhaps be too general
on the question of negligence is only harmless error where other
instructions given at the request of the opposing party properly
confine the jury to the negligence alleged. 21 Also where an
instruction incorrectly states the rule as to contributory negli-
gence it is harmless error, where another instruction given at
the request of either party states the rule correctly. 22 Also an
instruction which improperly states the law as to the safety of
the machinery or appliances furnished by the master to his ser-
vant in his work by permitting the jury to consider whether there
were safer means at hand than that causing the injury, is not
material error where another instruction properly announces the
rule that the defendant is not required to procure the most im-
proved appliances, but was required to use reasonably safe means
only. 23
In an action on a contract, an error in the giving of an in-
struction which in substance states that if the defendant has
shown that there was a warranty which was broken, and that
the machine was worthless, the money paid on account might
be recovered, is cured where another instruction charges that
the correct rule is the difference between the value of the ma-
chine, if it was perfect when delivered, and its present value. 24
Also in a suit on a building contract, a charge that if the jury
believe that the plaintiff delivered the materials called for in
iBehm v. Parker (Md.), 32 Atl. 22 Cameron v. Union Trunk Line,
199, Springfield Coal Co. v. Punten- 10 Wash. 507, 39 Pac. 128; Chock-
ney, 200 111. 9, 65 N. E. 442. tow O. & G. R. Co. v. Tenn. 116 Fed.
20 Mitchell v. Hindman, 150 111. 23.
538, 37 N. E. 916; Central R. Co. v. 23 Whaley v. Bartlett, 42 S. Car.
Barmister, 195 111. 50, 62 N. E. 864. 454, 20 S. E. 745.
21 Johnson v. St. Louis & S. R. 24 j. R. Alsing Co. v. New Eng.
Co. 173 Mo. 307, 73 S. W. 173; Buck- Q. & S. Co. 73 N. Y. S. 347, 66 App.
man v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. 100 Div. 473.
Mo. App. 30, 73, S. W. 270.
233 ERROUS, CURING CRIMINAL CASES. 240
the detail plans last approved by the architect, within ninety
days from the said approval, and erected the same in place of
the said building within ninety days after the delivery thereof,
and had "substantially" completed the erection of all the struc-
tural steel and iron work in said building within said last
mentioned ninety days then they are entitled to recover, though
erroneous, the error was cured by another instruction given at
the request of the defendant, which states that the contract
requires that the plaintiffs were bound "to furnish and com-
plete the same and every part and detail thereof within ninety
days" before they could recover. 25
240. In criminal cases Error cured by others. In a crim-
inal case the omission of any material element, such, for instance,
as the element of reasonable doubt, the error will be regarded
as cured when another instruction given clearly defines the
term. 26 Also where the court erroneously charges that proof
of the ownership of property alleged to. have been stolen, must
be established by a "preponderance of the evidence," the error
is cured by a general charge that the defendant must be ac-
quitted, unless proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 27
The omission of the words "with premeditated malice" is not
material error where the phrase is properly stated in another
instruction which was given. 28 The omission of the word "felo-
niously" in a charge describing murder is not prejudicial error
where the evidence for the prosecution shows that the defend-
ant was lying in wait for his victim, the only defense being
self-defense. 29 And if an instruction for the prosecution in a
criminal case is calculated to mislead when standing alone, the
error will be cured if the court fully instructs the jury on the
25 Bailey v. Trustees, 200 Pa. St. 333; Bonner v. Com. (Ky.), 38 S.
406, 50 Atl. 160. W. '488; P. v. Scott, 123 Cal. 434, 56
aepoteet v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), Pac. 102.
43 S. W. 339; S. v. Wright, 141 Mo. 273. v. Goforth, 136 Mo. Ill, 37
333, 42 S. W. 934; S. v. Cochran, 147 S. W. 801; Shields v. S. 149 Ind. 395,
Mo. 504, 49 S. W. 558; Skeen v. S. 49 N. E. 351. Contra: S. v. Clark,
(Miss.), 16 So. 495; Barnard v. S. 102 Iowa, 685, 72 N. W. 296.
88 Wis. 656, 60 N. W. 1058; S. v. 28 Whitney v. S. 154 Ind. 573, 57
Hunt, 141 Mo. 626, 43 S. W. 389; N. E. 398; White v. S. 34 Tex. Cr.
P. v. Britton, 118 Cal. 409, 50 Pac. App. 153, 29 S. W. 1094.
664. See, also, Shields v. S. 104 29 Brooks v. Com. 16 Ky. 356,
Ala. 35, 16 So. 85, 5 Am. St. 17; 28 S. W. 148.
Jackson v. S. 106 Ala. 12, 17 So.
241 ERRORS. 234
same subject, in the instructions given for the defendant. 30 Thus,
under an indictment for embezzlement, a charge that "you
are instructed that the defendant being the cashier of the bank,
and having control of the cash and other assets of said bank,
is responsible therefor; .and the fact that other officers of the
bank have access to the funds does not relieve the defendant
from accounting for the same," though erroneous, is cured
where the court also charged that before the jury could con-
vict they must find beyond a reasonable doubt that he actually
converted the money of said bank to his own use. 31
241. Damages Defective instruction cured. An instruction
though faulty in not limiting the damages claimed to the amount
complained of in the declaration, will be regarded as cured where
other instructions given for the defendant properly confine
such damages to the declaration. 32 Even though an instruction
improperly allows damages for prospective suffering and loss
of health in a personal injury case where the declaration fails
to make claim for a permanent injury, such instruction, though
erroneous, is harmless where the evidence of the plaintiff's inju-
ries, up to the time of the commencement of the suit, seems to
justify the damages awarded, without reference to any pros-
pective suffering or loss of health. 33
Where it appears from an inspection of the whole case that the
jury in assessing damages disregarded instructions which were
defective in not confining them to the evidence, there can be
no ground for error, the amount allowed being reasonable as
appears from the evidence. 34 An instruction, though defective
in directing the jury, in determining the value of property, "to
consider the evidence of all the witnesses" is cured where
another instruction expressly directs them to disregard any evi-
dence which has been stricken out. 35
242. Instructing assuming fact Harmless. If an instruc-
30 Rogers v. S. (Miss.), 21 So. 130. * Spring Valley Coal Co. v. Ro-
31 Ritter v. S. 70 Ark. 472, 69 S. watt. 196 111. 156, 63 N. E. 649.
W. 262. 35 Tedens v. Sanitary Dist. 149
32 Calumet & C. C. & D. Co. v. 111. 87, 96, 36 N. E. 1033; Consoli-
Morawetz, 195 111. 406, 63 N. E. dated Coal Co. v. Haenni, 146 111.
165. 614, 626, 35 N. E. 162.
33 Best Brewing Co. v. Dunlevy,
157 111. 141, 41 N. E. 611.
235
IMMATERIAL ERRORS VERDICT RIGHT
243
tion, though erroneous when standing alone, in that it assumes
the existence of a disputed material fact, yet when considered in
connection with all the other instructions given on both sides
clearly appears not to be misleading or improper, the error is
harmless. 36 But a bad instruction will not be cured by others
which state the law correctly except in cases that are plain and
entirely free from doubt. 37
243. Verdict clearly right and justice done. If the verdict
is clearly right under the evidence it should not be disturbed
although the instructions may be erroneous. 38 Or, when from the
nature of the evidence and the issues presented by the pleadings,
the verdict could not.have been reasonably different, the error
as to the instructions will be regarded as immaterial and harm-
less. 39 So where the record discloses that a party was nut enti-
so City of Elgin v. Joslyn, 136 111.
529, 26 N. E. 1090; Chicago C. R.
Co. v. Hastings, 136 111. 251, 26 N.
E. 594; East St. L. C. R. Co. v.
Enright, 152 111. 246, 38 N. E. 553;
Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Swearingen,
47 111. 210; Scutt v. Woolsey, 47 N.
Y. S. 320; City of San Antonio v.
Kreusel, 17 Tex. Cv. App. 594, 43
S. W. 615; Everett v. Spencer, 122
N. Car. 1010, 30 S. E. 334; Wil-
loughby v. North Eastern R. Co. 52
S. Car. 166, 29 S. E. 629; Anderson
v. Daly Mining Co. 16 Utah, 28, 50
Pac. 815; Cicero St. R. Co. v. Rol-
lins, 195 111. 220, 63 N. E. 98; Neu-
feld v. Roderninski, 144 111. 83, 89,
32 N. E. 913; Scott, v. P. 141 111.
195, 205, 30 N. E. 329; Citizens' Gas
Light Co. v. O'Brien, 118 111. 182,
8 N. E. 310.
37 Quirk v. St. Louis N. E. Co. 126
Mo. 460, 28 S. W. 1080.
3 Hartley v. Metropolitan St. R.
Co. 148 Mo. 124, 49 S. W. 840; Hall
v. Sroufe, 52 111. 421; Perry v.
Makenson, 103 Ind. 302, 2 N. E. 713;
Wolfe v. Pugh, 101 Ind. 309; La-
fayette & I. R. Co. v. Adams, 26
Ind. 76; Ward v. Cochran, 71 Fed.
127; Evans v. Merritt, 62 Ark. 228,
35 S. W. 212; Sullivan v. Jefferson
Ave. R. Co. 133 Mo. 1, 34 S. W. 566;
South Chicago C. R. Co. v. Du-
freene, 200 111. 464, 65 N. E. 1075;
Vogg v. Missouri P. R. Co. 138 Mo.
172, 36 S. W. 646; Secor v. Oregon
I. Co. 15 Wash. 35, 45 Pac. 654;
Davis v. Gilliam, 14 Wash. 206, 44
Pac. 119; Turner v. Ft. Worth & D.
C. R. Co. (Tex. Cv. App.), 30 S. W.
253; Rose v. Bradley, 91 Wis. 619,
65 N. W. 509; Mehurin v. Stone, 37
Ohio St. 49; City of Beardstown v.
Clark, 204 111. 526, 68 N. E. 378;
Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Murphy, 198
111. 471, 64 N. E. 1011.
so King v. King, 155 Mo. 406, 56
S. W. 534; Wagoner v. Wabash R.
Co. 185 111. 154, 56 N. E. 1056;
Cooper v. Delk, 108 Ga. 550, 34 S.
E. 145; Hiner v. Jeanpert, 65 111.
429; Robinson v. Hyer, 35 Fla. 544,
17 So. 745; Gruber v. Decker, 115
Ga. 779, 42 S. E. 82; Citizens' St.
R. Co. v. Hamer, 29 Ind. App. 426,
63 N. E. 778, 62 N. E. 658; Baxter
v. Lusher, 159 Ind. 381, 65 N. E.
211; Thompson v. P. 125 111. 261, 17
N. E. 749; Vinson v. Scott, 198 111.
542, 65 N. E. 78; Telegraph Co. v.
Lowrey, 32 Neb. 732, 49 N. W. 707.
See Swearingen v. Inman, 198 111.
255, 65 N. E. 80; S. v. Hill, 47 Neb.
456, 66 N. W. 541; Blackman v.
Housels (Tex. Cv. App.), 31 S. W.
511; Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v.
Knieram, 152 111. 467, 39 N. E. 324;
Metropolitan W. & S. E. R. Co. v.
Skola, 183 111. 455, 56 N. E. 171, 75
Am. St. 120; Gray v. Merriam, 148
111. 188, 35 N. E. 810/39 Am. St.
172; Vanhousen v. Broehl, 59
Neb. 48, 80 N. W. 260; Foster v.
243
ERRORS.
236
tied to a verdict under the most favorable construction of the
evidence, he cannot complain of error as to the instructions. 40
Or where it does not reasonably appear that the giving of an in-
struction on a matter which was not presented by the pleadings
nor supported by evidence, in any manner affected the verdict,
the error will not warrant the reversal of the judgment. 41
So where the evidence standing uncontradicted is sufficient to
sustain the verdict rendered, error in the giving of instructions
will be regarded as harmless. 42 Thus, where the plaintiff's cause
of action is clearly established by the admissions of the defend-
ant, there can be no ground for complaint in the giving or refus-
ing instructions even though they are erroneous. 43 The re-
fusal of the court to give a proper instruction on behalf of the
defendant is harmless error where the undisputed evidence con-
clusively shows his guilt. 44 Or if it appears that substantial
justice has been done, and the jury could have reached no other
result from the evidence, the refusal of instructions, though cor-
rect, will not be sufficient ground for reversal. 45
A judgment will not be reversed for error in the instructions,
Chicago & A. R. Co. 84 111. 164;
Greer v. Lafayette Co. Bank, 128
Mo. 559, 30 S. W. 319; Thompson
v. Force, 65 111. 370; Strohm v.
Hayes, 70 111. 41, 45; Cusick v.
Campoell, 68 111. 508; Lawrence v.
Jarvis, 32 111. 304, 312; Texas, &c.
R. Co. v. Nolan, 62 Fed. 552; Strat-
ton v. Dale, 45 Neb. 472, 63 N. W.
875; Glover v. Blakeslee, 115 Ga.
696, 42 S. E. 40; Dodds v. McCor-
mick Harvesting M. Co. 62 Neb.
759, 87 N. W. 911; Leftwich v. City
of Richmond, 4 Va. Super. Ct. 128,
40 S. E. 651.
Where the verdict is warranted
by the evidence slight inaccuracies
in the charge cannot be urged as
material error: Strong v. S. 95 Ga.
499, 22 S. E. 299; Collier v. Jenks,
19 R. I. 493, 34 Atl. 998 (as to bur-
den of proof); see Texas P. & R.
Co. v. Reed (Tex. Cv. App.), 32 S.
W. 118; Bank of H. v. Napier, 41
W. Va. 481, 23 S. E. 800.
40 Elster v. Springfield, 49 Ohio
St. 82, 30 N. E. 274; Frank v. Wil-
liams, 36 Fla. 136, 18 So. 351.
41 Boygero v. Southern R. Co. 64
S. Car. 104, 41 S. E. 819.
42 Dwelling House Ins. Co. v.
Dowdall, 55 111. App. 622.
43 Shultz v. Babcock, 166 111. 398,
46 N. E. 892.
44 Brown v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.),
65 S. W. 906.
45 Ryan v. Donnelly, 71 111. 104;
Pahlman v. King, 49 111. 269;
Schwarz v. Schwarz, 26 111. 81, 85;
Beseler v. Stephani, 71 111. 404;
Jones v. Chicago & Iowa R. Co. 68
111. 380, 384; DeClerg v. Mungin, 46
111. 112; Elam v. Badger, 23 111. 445,
450; Mode v. Beasley, 143 Ind. 306,
42 N. E. 727; Jordan v. James, 5
Ohio, 88; Thompson v. P. 125 111.
261, 17 N. E. 749. See, also, for crim-
inal cases: Dacey v. P. 116 111. 576,
6 N. E. 165; Wilson v. P. 94 111.
327; Dunn v. P. 109 111. 646; Ritz-
man v. P. 110 111. 362; Leach v.
P. 53 111. 311, 318; Meyer v. S.
(Tex. Cr.), 49 S. W. 600; Mclntosh
v. S. 151 Ind. 251, 51 N. E. 354;
Berry v. S. 31 Ohio St. 225; Edel-
hoff v. S. 5 Wyo. 19, 36 Pac. 627, 9
Am. Cr. R. 262.
237 VERDICT RIGHT ERRORS HARMLESS. 244
unless it appears that the party complaining was in some manner
prejudiced. 46 Where the charge submits to the jury matters
not material to the issue, there is no ground for reversal unless
prejudice is shown by so doing, 47 especially if such immaterial
matter merely imposes a burden on the successful party with-
out injury or prejudice to the other. 48
But the giving of an erroneous charge on a vital point or con-
trolling issue involved in a ease will be presumed prejudicial
unless the record clearly shows the contrary. 49 If the issues are
not fairly submitted to the jury the court will not be authorized
to look into the testimony to ascertain whether the weight of the
evidence was or was not favorable to a verdict. A party is en-
titled to have the issues passed upon by the jury under proper
instructions. 50 Where the plaintiff's own testimony shows that
the defendant agreed to pay him only one hundred dollars for
certain services, an instruction that the defendant agreed to pay
him two hundred dollars is material error, although the jury ren-
dered a verdict of only one hundred dollars for the plaintiff, the
defendant having contested and denied the whole of the plain-
tiff's claim. 51
244. Erroneous instruction favorable is harmless. A party
has no cause to complain of an erroneous instruction which is
favorable to him rather than harmful. 52 Thus, for instance,
an instruction erroneously requiring the plaintiff to prove a
matter by a higher degree of proof than by a preponderance,
is error of which the defendant cannot complain, being favorable
to him. 53 Submitting to the jury an issue not supported by any
Easley v. Valley M. L. Asso. Pendleton St. R, Co. v. Stellman, 22
91 Va. 161, 21 S. B. 235; Stein v. Ohio St. 1.
Vamice, 44 Neb. 132, 62 N. W. 464; so Globe Ins. Co. v. Sherlock, 25
Wallace v. Cravens, 34 Ind. 534; Ohio St. 67.
Beavers v. Mo. Pac. R. Co. 47 Neb. ^ Pipkin v. Home (Tex. Cv.
761, 66 N. W. 821; River Boom Co. App.), 68 S. W. 100.
v. Smith (Wash.), 45 Pac. 750; 52 Kitchell v. Bratton, 2 111. (1
Chase v. Washburn, 1 Ohio St. 244. Scam.), 300; Missouri, K. & T. R.
47 White v. Ross, 35 Fla. 377, 17 Co. v. Cook, 12 Tex. Cv. App. 203,
So. 640; Gulf C. & S. F. R. Co. v. 33 S. W. 669; Kugler v. Wiseman,
Duvall, 12 Tex. Cv. App. 348, 35 S. 20 Ohio, 361; S. v. Hicks (Mo.), 77
W. 699 (issue not essential to plain- S. W. 542. Lindell v. Deere-Wells
tiff's right to recover). Co. (Neb.), 92 N. W. 164.
<* McCary v. Stull, 44 Neb. 175, Doran v. Cedar Rapids & M.
62 N. W. 501. C. R. Co. 117 Iowa, 442, 90 N. W.
J Baldwin v. Bank of Massillon, 815; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Coun-
1 Ohio St. 141; Lowe v. Lehman, 15 tryman, 16 Ind. App. 139, 44 N. E.
Ohio St. 179; Jones v. Bangs, 40 265.
Ohio St. 139 49 Am. R. 664, note;
245
ERRORS.
238
evidence but which is favorable to the party, is not error of
which he can complain. 54
245. Principle or element refused or omitted. The refusal
of an instruction correctly stating a principle of law clearly appli-
cable to the evidence and pleadings which is not contained in
any other instruction given is manifest error, 55 especially if the
54 S. v. Brown, 145 Mo. 680, 47 S.
W. 789; S. v. Kindred, 148 Mo. 270,
49 S. W. 845; Miller v. Root, 77
Iowa, 545, 42 N. W. 502.
The errors complained of in the
giving or refusing of instructions
in the following cases were held
to be harmless:
Bowen v. Southern R. Co. 58 S.
Oar. 222, 36 S. E. 590; Blair v. City
of Groton, 13 S. Dak. 211, 82 N. W.
48; Fox v. Boyd, 104 Tenn. 357, 58
S. W. 221; Shannon v. Jefferson
City, 125 Ala. 384, 27 So. 977; Smit-
son v. Southern P. Co. 37 Ore. 74, 60
Pac. 907; Bibb County v. Ham, 110
Ga. 340, 35 S. E. 656; Horgan v.
Brady, 156 Mo. 659, 56 S. W. 294;
Nelson v. Terry (Ky.), 56 S. W.
672; Ward v. Odell Mfg. Co. 126 N.
Car. 946, 36 S. E. 194; Lassiter v.
Norfolk & C. R. Co. 126 N. Car.
509, 3-6 S. E. 48; Searcy v. Martin-
Woods Co. 93 Iowa, 420, 61 N. W.
934; Neill v. Jordan, 15 Mont. 47,
38 Pac.- 223; Johnson v. Hirschberg,
185 111. 445, 57 N. E. 26; Chicago
& A. R. Co. v.'Keegan, 185 111. 70,
56 N. E. 1088; Scrivani v. Dondero,
128 Cal. 31, 60 Pac. 463; Hamman
v. Central Coal & Coke Co. 156 Mo.
232, 56 S. W. 1091; Glover v. Char-
leston & S. R. Co. 57 S. Car. 228,
35 S. E. 510; Ellis v. Stone (Tex.
Cv. App.), 55 S. W. 758; Bussanicy
v. Myers, 22 Wash. 369, 60 Pac.
1117; Sears Adm'r v. Louisville &
N. R. Co. 22 Ky. 152, 56 S. W. 725;
St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Mag-
ness, 68 Ark. 289, 57 S. W. 33;
Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. White, 23
Tex. Cv. App. 280, 56 S. W. 204;
Brunette v. Town of Gagen, 106
Wis. 618, 82 N. W. 564; Grace v.
St. Louis R. Co. 156 Mo. 295, 56 S.
W. 1121; Austin R. T. Co. v. Grothe,
88 Tex. 262, 31 S. W. 196; Traxler
v. Greenwich Tp. 168 Pa. St. 214, 31
Atl. 1090; Wells v. Houston, 29
Tex. Cv. App. 619, 69 S. W. 183;
Heminway v. Miller, 87 Minn. 123,
91 N. W. 428; Hoges v. Nalty, 113
Wis. 567, 89 N. W. 535; Davidson v.
Jefferson (Tex. Cv. App.), 68 S.
W. 822; Logansport & W. V. Gas
Co. v. Coate, (Ind. App.), 64 N. E.
638; Clapp v. Royer, 28 Tex. Cv.
App. 29, 67 S. W. 345; City Trans-
fer Co. v. Draper, 115 Ga. 954, 42
S. E. 221; Union Pac. R. Co. v. Ru-
zicka (Neb.), 91 N. W. 543; Driver
v. Board, &c. 70 Ark. 358, 68 S.
W. 26; McNeil v. Durham, 130 N.
Car. 256, 41 S. E. 383; Charles
Schatzlein Paint Co. v. Passiuore,
26 Mont. 500, 68 Pac. 1113; Stowers
v. Singer, 24 Ky. 395, 68 S. W. 637,
67 S. W. 822; Yale v. Newton, 130
Mich. 434, 90 N. W. 37; In re Reed's
Estate, 86 Minn. 163, 90 N. W. 319;
Westinghouse Co. v. Gainor, 130
Mich. 393, 90 N. W. 52.
Held harmful in the following
cases:
Frick v. Kabaker, 116 Iowa, 494,
90 N. W. 498; St. Louis, I. M. &
S. R. Co. v. Woodward, 70 Ark.
441, 69 S. W. 55; Evans Lumber Co.
v. Crawford (Neb.), 93 N. W. 177;
Stuck v. Yates, 30 Ind. App. 441,
66 N. E. 177; Ballow v. S. (Tex.
Cr. App.), 609 S. W. 513; S. v. How-
ard, 41 Ore. 49, 69 Pac. 50; S. v.
Phillips, 119 Iowa, 642, 94 N. W.
229; Barnesville Man. Co. v. Love
(Del.) 52 Atl. 267; S. v. Crawford,
31 Wash. 260, 71 Pac. 1030; Western
U. Tel. Co. v. Sorsby, 29 Tex. Cv.
App. 345, 69 S. W. 122; Chicago,
B. & Q. R. Co. v. Camper, 199 111.
569, 65 N. E. 448; P. v. Goodrode
(Mich.), 94 N. W. 14.
ss Bennett v. Connelly, 103 111. 50,
53; Last Chance M. & M. Co. v. Ames,
239 IMPERFECTION BY OMISSIONS. 245
refused instruction relates to disputed questions of fact which
are vital in determining the rights of the party requesting the
instruction. 56 And the giving of an instruction which omits a
material fact or element essential to a correct statement of the
law, which is not contained in any other of the instructions, is
error. 57 And the omission of a material element, such, for in-
stance, as "due care and caution" on the part of the person
injured, under some state of the facts is error, although other
instructions contain the element thus omitted. 58
Thus, in an action for personal injury, the refusal to instruct
that if the plaintiff was riding a wheel at the time he was injured
he could not recover, is such error that the giving of a general
instruction that to entitle the plaintiff to recover he must have
been in the exercise of due care, or that he could not recover
unless he received the injuries in the manner alleged in his decla-
ration, 59 will not mend. In an action against a street car com-
pany, a charge that "if you find that the plaintiff could have
crossed the street and avoided the car but for the carelessness
of the defendant's driver and his impetuous driving, you must
find for the plaintiff," is erroneous, in that it eliminates con-
tributory negligence; and the giving of an instruction for the
23 Colo. 167, 47 Pac. 382; Ginnard v. R. Co. v. Warner, 22 Tex. Cv. App.
Knapp, 95 Wis. 482, 70 N. W. 671; 167, 54 S. W. 1064; Lewis v. S. 4
Maxwell v. Chapman, 26 N. Y. S. Ohio, 397; Lytle v. Boyer, 33 Ohio
361, 74 Hun, 111; Selma St. & S. St. 506, 511; Mallen v. Waldowski,
R. Co. v. Owen, 132 Ala. 420; 31 So. 203 111. 91, 67 N. E. 409.
598; New York, P. & N. R. Co. v. But the refusal to instruct on
Thomas, 92 Va. 606, 24 S. E. 264; matters not material to the issue
McGee v. Wineholt, 23 Wash. 748, is not error, Mendenhall v. North
63 Pac. 571; Harvey v. S. 125 Ala. Carolina R. Co. 123 N. Car. 275, 31
47, 27 So. 763; Soney v. S. 13 Lea S. E. 480.
(Tenn.), 472; Kinkle v. P. 27 Colo. 57 Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Peiinell,
459, 62 Pac. 197; Brainard v. Bur- 94 111. 448, 454; Galveston Land &
ton, 5 Vt. 97; Sperry v. Spaulding, I. Co. v. Levy, 10 Tex. Cv. App. 104,
45 Cal. 544; Nichols v. S. 46 Miss. 30 S. W. 504; Pritchett v. Johnson
284; Keith v. Spencer, 19 Fla. 748; (Neb.), 97 N. W. 224.
Lytle v. Boyer, 3'3 Ohio St. 506; . ss Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Har-
Morris v. Platt, 32 Conn. 75; Cooper wood, 80 111. 88, 91; Callahan v.
v. Mulder, 74 Mich. 374, 41 N. W. City of Port Huron, 128 Mich. 673,
.1084; Suttle v. Finnegan, 86 111. 87 N. W. 880.
App. 423; Anderson v. City of Bath, B Callahan v. City of Port Huron,
42 Me. 346. 128 Mich. 673, 87 N. W. 880. Cora-
ssBinkley v. Dewell (Kas. App.). pare: Mallen v. Waldowski, 203 111.
58 Pac. 1028. See Gulf C. & S. F. 91, 67 N. E. 409.
246 ERRORS. 240
defendant that the plaintiff could not recover if he was negligent
would not cure the error. 60
246. How a correct instruction cures defective one An
instruction which assumes or undertakes to state a complete case
cannot be truly regarded as but one of a series of instructions
in the sense that it may be supplemented or qualified by others
in the same series in such manner that an error in it will be
cured. In other words, an error in such instruction cannot be
cured by supplementary or qualifying instructions. 61 An in-
struction based upon only a portion of the evidence bearing upon
the main issue is erroneous, and the giving of a subsequent
instruction stating the law correctly will not cure the error. 62
On the subject as to when a correct instruction does or does
not cure a defective one, the Supreme Court of Illinois has
used the following language: "Where instructions which are
defective are cured by others unobjectionable, the latter must
either directly refer to, and explain and qualify the former, or
be supplementary to the former and supply what was omitted
from the former; but obviously where the latter are supple-
mentary to the former instructions the former must be correct
as far as they go, and defective only in not going farther and
including what is supplied by the supplementary instructions.
But where one instruction says the law is one thing with regard
to a particular matter or state of circumstances, and another
instruction that the law is another and materially different thing
with regard to precisely the same matter or state of circum-
stances, the instructions are repugnant and no repetition of
the correct instruction can cure the errors of those that are in-
correct ; for the jury, assuming as is their duty, that they are all
so Lifschitz v. Dry Dock E. B. & land, C. & C. R. Co. v. Crawford,
B. R. Co. 73 N. Y. 888, 67 App. 24 Ohio St. 640, 15 Am. R. 633.
Div. 602. 62 Burlingim v. Bader, 45 Neb.
An instruction assuming to state 673, 63 N. W. 919.
an hypothetical case must not omit A remittitur as to one of several
any material fact, Cleveland, C. & items of damages claimed will not
C. R. Co. v. Crawford, 24 Ohio St. cure an error in an instruction
640, 15 Am. R. 633. which applies to the several items
si Graff v. P. 134 111. 383, 25 N. of damages: Hartford Deposit Co.
B. 583. See Kurstelska v. Jackson, v. Oalkins, 186 111. 104, 57 N. E.
89 Minm. 96, 93 N. W. 1054; Cleve- 863.
241 CORRECT CHARGE CURING DEFECTIVE. 247
correct, may as readily follow those that are incorrect as those
that are correct." 63
In Mississippi, where an abstract proposition of law is incor-
rectly stated and the same or similar propositions are thereafter
correctly set forth in other instructions given, then if, taking
the instructions on both sides as a whole, the court can safely,
affirm that no harm has been done to either side and that the!
right result has been reached, the verdict will not in such case
be disturbed. But where the court undertakes to collate certain
facts, and, making a concrete application of the law to such
facts, instructs the jury to bring in a verdict if they believe such
facts exist, and the facts therein stated will not legally sustain
the verdict directed, such error cannot be cured by other in-
structions correctly stating the law; the reason for the differ-
ence being that in the first instance it is simply an erroneous
statement of a legal principle which may or may not mislead
the jury, according to the varying circumstances of causes, but
in the latter instance, where a verdict is directed to be based
upon the facts stated in the instruction, other instructions em-
bodying other and different statements of facts and authoriz-
ing a verdict to be predicated thereon, do not modify the erro-
neous instructions, but simply conflict therewith. If by an er-
roneous instruction the jury is charged to convict if they believe
certain facts to exist, and by another instruction the jury is
told that they should acquit unless they believe certain other
facts also exist, these instructions do not modify, but contra-
dict each other. The one is not explanatory of the other, but
in conflict therewith. In such a state of the case the jury are
left without any sure or certain guide to conduct them to the
proper conclusion. 64 The cases in which it has been held that
a bad instruction may be cured by another, are cases where
the bad and good instructions, when read together, clearly state
the law and where it can be clearly seen that the bad instruc-
tion did no harm. 86
247. Instructions contradictory. The giving of a correct
es Hoge v. P. 117 111. 48, 6 N. B. 185 111. 80, 56 N. E. 1088. See Gui-
796. nard v. Knapp S. & Co. 90 Wis.
Harper v. S. (Miss.), 35 So. 575. 123, 62 N. W. 625, 48 Am. St. 901.
65 Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Keegan,
247
ERRORS.
242
instruction will not obviate an error in an instruction on the
other side where they are entirely variant with each other, and
there is nothing to show the jury which to adopt as the law.
In such case it is impossible to determine whether the jury
followed the correct or erroneous instruction. 68 Nor will the
giving of a correct instruction at the request of either party
correct a material error in a bad instruction where the instruc-
tions are contradictory. The correct instruction cannot be said
to modify or supplement the wrong one as is the case where'
they are not contradictory. 67 A charge containing positive error
ee Chicago & A. R. Oo. v. Kee-
gan, 185 111. 79, 56 N. E. 1088;
Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Dunn,
61 111. 385; Central of Ga. R. Co.
v. Johnson, 106 Ga. 130, 32 S. E.
78; City of Macon v. Holcomb, 205
111. 640, 69 N. E. 79; Kerr v. Top-
ping, 109 Iowa, 150, 80 N. W. 321;
McCole v. Loeher, 79 Ind. 430; Har-
rington v. Priest, 104 Wis. 362, 80
N. W. 442; American Strawboard
Co. v. Chicago & A. R. Co. 177 111.
513, 53 N. E. 97; Crosby v. Ritchey,
56 Neb. 336, 76 N. W. 895; S. v.
Utley, 132 N. Car. 1022, 43 S. E.
820; Edwards v. Atlantic' C. L. R.
Co. 132 N. Car. 99, 43 S. E. 585
("Ring the bell and blow the whis-
tle" Ring the bell or blow the
whistle); Meyer v. Hafmeister
(Wis.), 97 N. W. 166; City of Boul-
der v. Niles, 9 Colo. 421; Summer-
lot v. Hamilton, 121 Ind. 91, 22 N.
E. 973; S. v. Button, 99 Ind. 307;
Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Lafferty,
2 W. Va. 104; Chicago & A. R. Co.
v. Murphy, 198 111. 470, 64 N. E.
1011; Cresler v. City of Ashville
(N. Car.), 46 S. E. 739. See, also,
St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v.
Beecher, 65 Ark. 64, 44 S. W. 715;
Lake S. & M. S. R. Co. v. Miller,
25 Mich. 274; Brown v. McAllister,
39 Cal. 573; Deserant v. Cerrillos
Coal Co. 178 U. S. 409; Bluedom v.
Missouri Pac. R. Co. 108 Mo. 439,
18 S. W. 1103; Mississippi C. R. Co.
v. Miller, 40 Miss. 45; Haight v.
"Vallet, 89 Cal. 249, 26 Pac. 897;
Hoben v. Burlington & -I. R. Co.
20 Iowa, 562; Blume v. S. 154 Ind.
343, 56 N. E. 771; Hart v. Chicago,
R. I. & P. R. Co. 56 Iowa, 166, 7 N.
W. 9, 41 Am. R. 93; Kelly v. Cable
Co. 7 Mont. 70, 14 Pac. 633.
siEnright v. P. 155 111. 32, 39 N.
E. 561; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v.
City of Naperville, 166 111. 87, 94,
47 N. E. 734; Partridge v. Cutter,
168 111. 504, 512, 48 N. E. 125; S.
v. Shadwell, 26 Mont. 52, 66 Pac.
508; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Cozby,
174 111. 109, 119, 50 N. E. 1011; Ko-
nold v. Rio Grande W. R. Co. 21
Utah, 379, 60 Pac. 1021; Chicago C.
R. Co. v. Dinsmore, 162 111. 658, 44
N. E. 887; Farmers' T. N. Bank v.
Woodell (Ore.), 61 Pac. 831; Arnett
v. Huggins (Colo. App.), 70 Pac.
765 (contradictory as to damages) ;
Werming v. Teeple, 144 Ind. 189, 41
N. E. 600; Pendleton St. R. Co. v.
Stallman, 22 Ohio St. 1; Missouri
Pac. R. Co. v. Fox, 56 Neb. 746, 77
N. W. 130; Shano v. Fifth Ave. & H.
St. Bridge Co. 189 Pa. St. 245, 42 AtL
128; Green v. Southern Pac. R. Co.
122 Cal. 563, 55 Pac. 577; Griffin
v. City of Lewiston (Idaho), 55
Pac. 545; S. v. Webb. 6 Idaho, 428,
55 Pac. 892; Illinois Linen Co. v.
Hough, 91 111. 67; Baldwin v. Kil-
lain, 63 111. 550; Chicago, B. & Q.
R. Co. v. Payne, 49 111. 499; Barr
v. S. 45 Neb. 458, 63 N. W. 856;
Citizens' St. R. Co. v. Shepherd, 107
Tenn. 444, 64 S. W. 710; Kraus v.
Haas (Tex. Cv. App.), 25 S. W.
1025; Holt v. Spokane & P. R. Co.
3 Idaho. 703, 35 Pac. 39; Wolf v.
Wolf, 158 Pa. St. 621, 28 Atl. 164;
Town of Denver v. Myers, 63 Neb,
107, 88 N. W. 191; City of Winches-
ter v. Carroll, 97 Va. 727, 40 S. E.
243
CONTRADICTORY WIDELY DIFFERING.
248
cannot be cured by contradictory instructions stating the law
correctly, unless the latter makes direct reference to and with-
draws or qualifies the erroneous charge. 68 And it must appear
that the erroneous instructions are plainly withdrawn before the
errors will be regarded as cured. 69
248. Instructions differing widely from each other. Also
the giving of two instructions widely differing from each other
op. the same vital point in issue in a case is such error that a
37; Payne v. McCormick H. M. Co.
11 Okla. 318. 66 Pac. 287; Denver &
R. G. R. Go. v. Fatherington (Colo.
App.), 68 Pac. 978; Eureka Fire
& M. Ins. Co. v. Percell, 19 Ohio
C. C. 135; Lindberg v. Chicago
C. R. Co. 83 111. App. 433; Linn v.
Massilon Bridge Co. 78 Mo. App.
Ill; Virginia & N. C. Wheel Co.
v. Chalkley, 98 Va. 62, 34 S. E.
976; S. v. Peel, 23 Mont. 358, 59
Pac. 169, 75 Am. St. 529; P. v. Ben-
nett 121 Mich. 241, 80 N. W.
9; Criner v. S. 41 Tex. Cr. App.
290, 53 S. W. 873; Henry v. S.
(Tex. Cr. App.), 54 S. W. 592;
S. v. Evans, 12 S. Dak. 473, 81 N.
W. 893; Palmer v. S. 8 Wyo. 40, 59
Pac. 793; S. v. McClellan, 23 Mont.
532, 59 Pac. 924; Swenie v. S. 59
Neb. 269, 80 N. W. 815; Bleiler v.
Moore, 94 Wis. 385, 69 N. W. 164.
See, also, Gearing v. Lacher, 146
Pa. St. 397, 23 AtL 229; Mississippi
C. R. Co. v. Miller, 40 Miss. 45;
Howell v. S. 61 Neb. 391, 85 N. W.
289; Hickman v. Griffin, 6 Mo. 37;
Imhoff v. Chicago & M. R. Co. 20
Wis. 344; McDougal v. S. 88 Ind.
24; Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. R.
Co. v. Noftsger, 148 Ind. 101, 47
N. E. 332; Baker v. Ashe, 80 Tex.
356, 16 S. W. 36; Henry v. S. 51
Neb. 149, 70 N. W. 924; Burnett v.
S. 60 N. J. L. 255, 37 Atl. 622; Bos-
well v. District of Columbia, 21 D.
C. 526; Richardson v. Halstead, 44
Neb. 606, 62 N. W. 1077; S. v. Tat-
law, 136 Mo. 678, 38 S. W. 552;
Edwards v. Atlantic Coast L. R. Co.
129 N. Car. 78, 39 S. E. 730; Knight
v. Denman, 64 Neb. 814, 90 N. W.
863; Spencer v. Terry's Estate
(Mich.), 94 N. W. 372; Harter v.
City of Marshall (Tex. Cv. App.),
36 S. W. 294; Eureka Fire & M.
Ins. Co. v. Percell 19 Ohio C. C. 135;
Lindberg v. Chicago C. R. Co. 83
111.. App. 433; Linn v. Missillon
Bridge Co. 78 Mo. App. Ill; Vir-
ginia & N. C. Wheel Co. v. Chalk-
ley, 98 Va. 62, 34 S. E. 97; S. v.
Peel, 23 Mont. 358, 59 Pac. 169;
P. v. Bennett, 121 Mich. 241, 80 N.
W. 9; Criner v. S. 41 Tex. Cr. App.
290, 53 S. W. 873; Henry v. S. (Tex.
Cr. App.), 54 S. W. 592; S. v. Evans,
12 S. Dak. 473, 81 N. W. 893; Palmer
v. S. 9 Wyo. 40, 59 Pac. 793; S.
v. McClellan, 23 Mont. 532, 59 Pac.
924, 75 Am. St. 558; Sweenie v. S.
59 Neb. 269, 80 N. W. 815; Bleiler
v. Moore, 94 Wis. 385, 69 N. W.
164; S. v. Tatlaw, 136 Mo. 678, 38
S. W. 552; Henry v. S. 51 Neb.
149, 70 N. W. 924; Burnett v. S.
60 N. J. 255, 37 Atl. 622; Bos-
well v. District of C. 21 D. C. 526;
Richardson v. Halstead, 44 Neb.
606, 62 N. W. 1077.
es Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Mil-
ler (Tex. Cv. App.), 65 S. W. 74;
Baker v. Ashe, 80 Tex. 357, 16 S.
W. 36; Chicago & E. R. Co. v. Lee,
29 Ind. App. 480, 64 N. E. 675; In-
ternational & G. N. R. Co. v. An-
chond (Tex. Cv. App.), 68 S. W.
743; S. v. Fitzgerald, 72 Vt. 142, 47
Atl. 403; Heyl v. S. 109 Ind. 589, 10
N. E. 916; Imhoff v. Chicago & M.
R. Co. 20 Wis. 344; Guetig v. S.
63 Ind. 278, 3 Am. Cr. R. 233.
es McCrory v. Anderson, 103 Ind.
16, 2 N. E. 211; Klugen v. S. 45
Ind. 521; Binns v. S. 66 Ind. 428;
Toledo, N. & W. R. Co. v. Schuck-
man, 50 Ind. 42; Lower v. Franks,
115 Ind. 340, 17 N. E. 630; Gulf
C. & S. F. R. Co. v. White (Tex.
Cv. App.), 32 S. W. 322.
249 ERRORS. 244
new trial will be given. 70 An absolute misstatement of the law
in giving instructions is not corrected by properly stating the
law in other instructions. 71 But where two instructions are in-
consistent or contradictory, one correct and the other incorrect,
if it appears that tine jury followed the correct one in reaching
the verdict the error is immaterial. 72 And if a party was not
entitled to an instruction which was given at his request he
cannot claim error that another given for his opponent was con-
tradictory to it. 73
249. Instructions self -contradictory An instruction which
is itself contradictory in its own terms, is eroneous. 'Thus an
instruction directing the jury that if the defendant was mentally
incompetent to protect his own interests in making a contract,
then, although they may believe he understood the same, they
should find he was not mentally competent, and that the con-
tract was invalid, is self-contradictory. 74 An ordinance prohibit-
ing driving at a greater rate of speed than six miles an hour
having been introduced on the trial of a homicide case, an in-
struction charging the jury that "if t<he defendant was engaged
in the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to a felony,
and while so engaged ran over and killed the deceased, whether
he intended to do so or not, it is manslaughter," is inconsistent
with a charge that driving at a greater rate of speed than six
miles an hour does not of itself prove guilt, and that the de-
fendant cannot be convicted unless he was driving in a dangerous
manner. The charges are contradictory. 75
TO Toledo, W. & W. R. Co. v. Pac. R. Co. 114 Mo. 384, 21 S. W.
Larmon, 67 111. 71; Pittsburg, C. C. 731.
& St. L. R. Co. v. Noftsger, 148 Ind. 74 Sands v. Potter, 165 111. 402, 46
101, 47 N. E. 332; Beck v. S. 51 Neb. N. E. 282, 56 Am. St. 253; Blume
106, 70 N. W. 498; Bibby v. S. v. S. 154 Ind. 343, 56 N. E. 771. See
(Tex. Cr. App.), 65 S. W. 193. International & G. N. R. Co. v.
71 S. v. Adrion, 49 La. Ann. 1145, Lehman (Tex. Cv. App.), 66 S. W.
22 So. 620. 62 Am. St. 678; Raker 214.
v. S. 50 Neb. 202, 69 N. W. 749. 75 P. v. Pearae, 118 Cal. 154, 50
See, also. Bruce v. Beall, 99 Tenn. Pac. 376. See Lemasters v. South-
303, 41 S. W. 445; Pittsburg, C. C. era Pac. R. Co. 131 Cal. 105. 63 Pac.
& St. L. R. Co. v. Noftsger, 148 128; Elk Tanning Co. v. Brennan,
Ind. 101, 47 N. E. 332. 203 Pa. St. 232, 52 Atl. 246; Hoover
72 Hillebrant v. Green, 93 Iowa, v. Mercantile T. M. Ins. Co. 93 Mo.
661, 62 N. W. 32. App. Ill, 69 S. W. 42; Carter v.
73 Moore v. Graham, 29 Tex. Cv. Fulgham, 134 Ala. 238, 32 So. 684.
App. 235. 69 S. W. 200. See Wil- Instructions held contradictory:
liams v. Southern Pac. R. Co. 110 Grim v. Murphy, 110 111. 271: Pred-
Cal. 457, 42 Pac. 974; Reardon v. Mo. erick v. Allgaier, 88 Mo. 598; Mov-
245
CONTRADICTORY, WHEN EVIDENCE CLOSE.
250
250. Evidence close, conflicting or doubtful. Where the
facts of a case are close or conflicting on a vital point all of
the instructions should state the law accurately. In such state
of the facts it is not sufficient that the jury were fully instructed
on behalf of the opposing party on every material question in-
volved. 76 Where the evidence is conflicting and contradictory,
and the case is one which may on the facts be decided either
way, it is of the greatest importance that all the instructions
should be accurate. 77
When the evidence is so evenly balanced that the jury might be
justified in finding either way, it is highly important that the law
should be stated to the jury accurately in the giving of instruc-
tions. 77 * In such state of the evidence the slightest intimation of
the opinion of the court or the assumption of a material fact in
the giving of instructions is error, although the law may be cor-
rectly stated in others given. 78 Also, if the evidence is close or
ar v. Harvey, 125 Mass. 574. In-
structions held not contradictory:
Underwood v. Wolf, 131 111. 425, 434,
23 N. E. 842, 19 Am. St. 40; Mc-
Mahon v. Sankey, 133 111. 637, 641,
24 N. E. 1027; Waxahachie Cotton
Oil Co. v. McLain, 27 Tex. Cv. App.
334, 66 S. W. 226; S. v. Moore, 163
Mo. 432, 68 S. W. 358; Larkin v.
Burlington, C. R. & N. R. Co. 91
Iowa, 654. 60 N. W. 195.
70 Chicago & N. R. Co. v. Dim-
ick, 96 111. 47; Stratton v. Central
City H. R. Co. 95 111. 32; Steinmeyer
v. P. 95 111. 390; Ruff v. Jarrett, 94
111. 480; Toledo, St. L. & K. Co.
v. Cline. 135 111. 48, 25 N. E. 846;
Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Dough-
erty, 110 111. 525; Rumbold v. Roy-
al League, 206 111. 517, 69 N. E. 590;
Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Murray, 62
111. 331; Illinois C. R. Co. v. Gilbert,
157 111. 365, 41 N. E. 724; Eller v.
P. 153 111. 344, 38 N. E. 660; Swan
v. P. 98 111. 612; Craig v. Miller, 133
111. 307, 24 N. E. 431; Grand Lodge
v. Orrell, 99 111. App. 246; Chicago,
B. & Q. R. Co. v. Van Patten, 64
111. 514; Illinois C. R. Co. v. Moffitt,
67 111. 431; Finks v. Cox. (Tex. Cv.
App.), 30 S. W. 512; Norfleet v.
Sigman, 41 Miss. 631; Adams v. S.
29 Ohio St. 412; Gilmore v. Mc-
Neil, 45 Me. 599.
77 Holloway v. Johnson, 129 111.
367, 21 N. E. 798; Wilber v. Wilber,
129 111. 396, 21 N. E. 1076; Kanka-
kee Stone & S. Co. v. City of Kan-
kakee, 128 111. 177, 20 N. E. 670;
Parmley v. Farrar, 169 111. 607, 48
N. E. 693; Keanders v. Montague,
180 111. 306, 54 N. E. 321; Gorrell
v. Payson, 170 111. 217, 48 N. E. 433;
Sinnet v. Bowman, 151 111. 156, 37
N. E. 885; Cartier v. Troy Lumber
Co. 138 111. 538, 28 N. E. 932; Ameri-
can Ins. Co. v. Crawford, 89 111. 62;
Wabash R. Co. v. Hanks, 91 111. 407,
414; Cushman v. Cogswell, 86 111.
62; Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v. Gar-
ver, 83 111. App. 118; Hughes' Cr.
Law, 3255, citing: Smith v. P.
142 111. 12-3, 31 N. E. 599; Kirland
v. S. 43 Ind. 146, 13 Am. R. 386; P.
v. Westlake, 124 Cal. 452, 57 Pac.
465; S. v. Peel, 23 Mont. 358, 59
Pac. 169; S. v. Evans, 12 S. Dak.
473, 81 N. W. 893; Hoge v. P. 117
111. 46; 6 N. E. 796; Steinmeyer v.
P. 95 111. 388; S. v. Pugsley, 75
Iowa, 744, 38 N. W. 498, 8 Am. C.
R. 108.
77* Shaw v. P. 81 111. 150; Waters
v. P. 172 111. 371, 50 N. E. 148; Ad-
ams v. P. 179 111. 637, 54 N. E. 296.
78 Adams v. P. 179 111. 638,
54 N. E. 296.
250 ERRORS. 246
doubtful the law should be accurately stated in the giving of in-
structions. 70 Where the facts are close or doubtful it is error to
refuse specific instructions applicable to the evidence, although
the court may have given general instructions on all the issues. 80
Thus, where there is evidence tending to show accord and satis-
faction, but there is some uncertainty touching the question of
acceptance and room for controversy, the court, in such state of
the case, should clearly and accurately state what constitutes an
acceptance. 81
7 Waters v. P. 172 111. 375, 50 N. so Roberts v. S. 114 Ga. 450, 40
E. 148; West C. St. R. Co. v. Dough- S. E. 297.
erty, 170 111.' 379, 48 N. E. 1000; si Troy Min. Co. v. Thotaas, 15
Swift & Co. v. Rutkowski, 187 111. S. Dak. 238, 88 N. W. 106.
159, 47 N. E. 362; Volk v. Roche,
70 111. 299.
CHAPTER XIII.
IN CRIMINAL CASES.
Sec. Sec.
HOMICIDE. 259. Defendant first in the wrong,
but abandons the conflict.
251. Degree determined by jury. *- T Dutv of defendant to retreat.
252. Degree - Erroneous instruc- 26L Instructions when allegations
tion-Harmless error. T and P roof var y-
253. Instructions when degree is 262 - Instructions when arrest is
doubtful. unlawful.
254. "Cooling time" When a ques- 263 - Killing mere trespasser In-
tion of law. structions.
255. Self-defense Instructions 2 ^. Motive-Instructions.
proper and improper. 2&5 - Mutual combat Instructions.
256. Self defense Instructions on
belief and appearances. BURGLARY AND LARCENY.
257. Instructions on threats of de- 265a. Possession of stolen property
ceased. Instructions.
258. Provoking difficulty Freedom 266. Presumption as to possession
from fault. is one of fact.
Homicide.
251. Degree determined by jury. Under an indictment for
murder, the defendant, if guilty at all, may be convicted of
murder, or the included crime of manslaughter, and the law
makes it the duty of the jury to determine whether the con-
viction should be for the one or the other. In such case the
court cannot say to the jury by instruction that if certain facts
(enumerating them) are true they should find the defendant
guilty of murder. The jury should be left free to determine
the degree of guilt. 1 Hence to instruct the jury that if they find
i Panton v. P. 114 111. 509, 2 N. E. 501; S. v. Oakes, 95 Me. 369, 50
411; Lynn v. P. 170 111. 537, 48 N. Atl. 28. Contra: Anderson v. U.
E. 964; McCoy v. P. 175 111. 224, 51 S. 18 U. S. 689; S. v. Nelson (Minn.),
N. E. 777. See Schwabacher v. P. 97 N. W. 655. See "Included Crim-
165 111. 624, 46 N. E. 809; P. v. inal Offenses." Chap XIV.
Holmes, 111 Mich. 364, 69 N. W.
247
IN CRIMINAL CASES. 248
from the evidence that the defendant shot and killed the de-
ceased after the latter was disarmed he is guilty of murder,
is error under a statute requiring the jury to determine the
degree of guilt, in that it invades the province of the jury on
that question. 2 But an instruction which properly recites all
the elements of the crime of murder may direct the jury to
find the defendant guilty of murder if all the elements of mur-
der have been established by the evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt. 8
252. Degree Erroneous instruction harmless error. The
giving of an erroneous instruction applicable only to the charge
of murder is but harmless error where the defendant is con-
victed of manslaughter, the jury, in legal effect, having acquitted
him of murder. 4 Also where an instruction which is clearly
erroneous as to the charge of murder in the first degree is ap-
plicable to that degree only, the error committed in giving it
could do no harm in case the verdict rendered is for a lower
degree, unless it in some manner contributed in producing the
verdict thus rendered. 5 An error committed in the giving of
instructions on the law as to the punishment for manslaughter,
if the jury should find the defendant guilty of that crime, af-
fords no ground to complain of error in that respect where the
2 Gafford v. S. 125 Ala. 1, 28 So. should find him guilty of man-
406. See Ragland" v. S. Ill Ga. slaughter, write "guilty of man-
211, 36 S. E. 682; Smith v. P. 142 slaughter," is proper. S. v. Owens,
111. 123, 31 N. E. 599; Brown v. S. 44 S. Car. 324, 22 S. E. 244; S. v.
109 Ala. 70, 20 So. 103; S. v. Lock- Faile, 43 S. Car. 52, 20 S. E. 798.
lear, 118 N. Car. 1154, 24 S. E. 410; * Belt v. P. 97 111. 469 (malice) ;
S. v. Gadberry, 117 N. Car. 811, 23 Baxton v. S. 157 Ind. 213, 61 N. E.
S. E. 477. It has been held that 195. See S. v. Gates, 130 Mo. 351,
where the accused asked an in- 32 S. W. 971, holding the same rule
struction which precluded the jury applicable to larceny, having the
from finding him guilty of mur- included offense petit larceny,
der in the second degree or of man- 5 McCoy v., S. 40 Fla. 494, 24 So.
slaughter in either degree, but con- 485; Rains v. S. 152 Ind. 69, 52 N.
fined them to a conviction of mur- E. 450 (malice) ; S. v. Robertson, 54
der in the first degree or not guilty, S. Car. 147, 31 S. E. 868 (malice),
it was properly refused, Swope v. See, also, Blackwell v. S. 33 Tex.
S. 115 Ala. 40, 22 So. 479. Cr. App. 278, 32 S. W. 128; Rut-
s Carle v. P. 200 111. 494, 66 N. E. ledge v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 33 S.
32, 93 Am. St. 208. On a trial for W. 347; Tigerina v. S. 35 Tex. Cr.
murder an instruction directing tne App. 302, 33 S. W. 353; Jackson v.
jury that if they find the defendant S. 91 Wis. 253, 64 N. W. 838 (rape
guilty of murder they should state and fornication),
in their verdict "guilty," and if they
249 DEGREE WHEN DOUBTFUL. 253
jury have found the defendant guilty of murder in the first
degree and fixed his puninshment at death. 6
The court in charging the jury as to the law of murder in
the second degree does not err by defining murder in the first
degree for the purpose of giving the jury a better understanding
of the meaning of murder in the second degree, where the charge
also advises the jury that the defendant is not on trial for
murder in the first degree. 7 Also on the trial of an indictment
for manslaughter it is not improper, in charging the jury, to
define murder in its various degrees, and justifiable homicide
also, for the purpose of giving the jury a proper understand-
ing of the meaning of manslaughter. 8 In Missouri it has been
held to be reversible error in a murder case, where a conviction
was had for manslaughter, to give instructions on the law of
manslaughter, where the evidence conclusively showed that the
defendant, if guilty at all, was guilty of nothing but murder
in the first degree. 9 Also where there is no evidence tending
to prove any crime except murder in the first degree, it is error
for the court to give an instruction defining murder in the sec-
ond degree. 10
253. Instructions when degree is doubtful. If there be a
reasonable doubt whether the evidence shows the defendant to
be guilty of murder or manslaughter, the jury should give him
the benefit of such doubt and find him guilty of the lesser rather
than the greater crime, and an instruction so directing them is
proper when given in connection with other instructions to ac-
quit entirely if the evidence fails to establish his guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. 11 But the failure of the court to instruct
that if the jury are in doubt as to which degree the defendant
e Smith v. Com. 17 Ky. 439, 31 S. v. Berchine, 168 Pa. St. 603, 32 Atl.
W. 724. 109. Contra: S. v. Meyer, 58 Vt.
7 McQueen v. S. 103 Ala. 12, 15 457, 3 Atl. 195, 7 Am. Cr. R. 434.
So. 824. US. v. Mason, 54 S. Car. 240, 32
sWeightnovel v. S. (Fla.), 35 So. S. E. 357; Danghrill v. S. 113 Ala.
862. 7, 21 So. 378. See Stone King v. S.
9 S. v. Punshon, 124 Mo. 448, 27 118 Ala. 68, 24 So. 47. See, also,
S. W. 1111. Newport v. S. 140 Ind. 299, 39 N. E.
10 S. v. Mahley, 68 Mo. 315, 3 Am. 926; Mullins v. Com. 23 Ky. L. R.
Cr. R. 184; Bugg v. Com. 18 Ky. L. 2433, 67 S. W. 824; Payne v. Com.
R. 844, 38 S. W. 684. Instructions 1 Mete. (Ky.), 370; S. v. Anderson,
as to the different degrees of homi- 86 Mo. 309; P. v. Chun Heong, 86
cide held sufficient: Hamilton v. Cal. 329, 24 Pac. 1021; Clark v. Com.
S. 62 Ark. 543, 36 S. W. 1054; Com. 23 Ky. L. R. 1029, 63 S. W. 740.
254 IN CRIMINAL CASES. 250
is guilty, they should convict him of the lower degree, is not
material error where the evidence shows the killing to have been
wilful and the instructions clearly define murder and man-
slaughter in their several degrees. 12 A charge that "if upon
the whole case you have a reasonable doubt of the defendant
having been proved guilty, or if you find him guilty, but have
a reasonable doubt from the evidence as to whether he has been
proved guilty of murder or manslaughter, then you will find
him guilty of manslaughter," is erroneous, in that it literally
directs the jury to find the accused guilty of manslaughter if,
upon the whole case, they have a reasonable doubt of his guilt
of any offense. 13 But the doubt as to the degree of the homicide
should be a reasonable doubt, not a "doubt." 14
254. "Cooling time" When a question of law. The court
may, as a matter of law, instruct that the defendant had suffi-
cient cooling time after being provoked to a heat of passion,
where the evidence clearly warrants the instruction, and that
in such case an unlawful killing would not be reduced to man-
slaughter. 15
255.. Self-defense Instructions proper and improper. The
refusal to give instructions properly requested, embracing the
law of self-defense, is error when there is any evidence, though
slight, upon which to base them; 16 or the giving of instruc-
tions submitting the theory of the prosecution which ignores
12 S. v. Wells, 54 Kas. 161, 37 Pac. S. 125 Ala. 40, 28 So. 78; Enlow v.
1005. S. 154 Ind. 664, 57 N. E. 539; P. v.
is Smith v. Com. 108 Ky. 57, 55 Zigouras, 163 N. Y. 250, 57 N. E.
S. W. 718. 465; Lofton v. S. 79 Miss. 723, 31
i* S. v. May, 172 Mo. 630, 72 S. So. 420; Blalock v. S. 79 Miss. 517,
W. 918; S. v. Anderson.. 86 Mo. 309; 31 So. 105; Teel v. S. (Tex. Cr.
Watson v. S. 83 Ala. 60, 3 So. 411. App.), 67 S. W. 531; Trabue v. Com.
IB Ragland v. S. 125 Ala. 534, 23 Ky. L. R. 2135, 66 S. W. 718; Bar-
27 So. 983. See Thomas v. S. 42 tay v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 67 S. W.
Tex. Cr. App. 386, 56 S. W. 70. See 416; Ter. v. Baca (N. Mex.), 71 Pac.
Smith v. S. 103 Ala. 4, 15 So. 843. 460. See McClurg v. Com. 17 Ky.
ie Kirk v. Ter. 10 Okla. 46, 60 Pac. L. R. 1339, 36 S. W. 14 (instructions
797; Johnson v. S. 75 Miss. 635, 23 held as favorable as warranted by
So. 579; Chapman v. S. 42 Tex. Cr. the evidence); Brown v. S. 9 Neb.
App. 135, 57 S. W. 965; Lynch v. 157, 2 N. W. 378. Held improper
S. 41 Tex. Cr. App. 510, 57 S. W. statement of the law of self-
1130; Morris v. Com. 20 Ky. 402, 46 defense, Mahaffey v. Ter. (Okla.),
S. W. 491; Polks v. S. (Tex. Cr. 69 Pac. 342.
App.), 58 S. W. 98; Washington v.
251 ON SELF DEFENSE. 255
the evidence tending to prove self-defense, is error. 17 Thus, when
the testimony of the defendant shows that 'the deceased raised
his gun and the defendant then shot him, this is sufficient to
entitle the defendant to instructions on self-defense, although
there is no evidence that the deceased actually pointed the gun
towards the defendant. 18 . And where the evidence shows that
the deceased and others made an attack on the defendant with
sticks and clubs, he is entitled to have the jury instructed on
the law of self-defense. 19
But applying the general rule that instructions are improper
unless there is evidence to support them, if there is no evidence
tending to prove self-defense, then instructions on the law of
such defense are improper. 20 And where the evidence clearly
and conclusively shows that the killing was not done in self-
defense, it is not improper to so state to the jury by instruc-
tion. 21 Thus, where the evidence for the prosecution tends to
prove murder, and the defendant's that he had nothing to do
with the commission of the crime, instructions on self-defense
are not applicable. 22 The refusal of the court to instruct on
the law of self-defense affords no ground to complain of error
where the defendant and his father both testified that the mortal
blow was inflicted by the latter, although the evidence for the
IT Sullivan v. S. 80 Miss. 596, 32 Colo. 206, 60 Pac. 485; Hays v. S.
So. 2; Eaverson v. S. 73 Miss. 810, (Tex. Cr. App.), 57 S. W. 835; Tu-
19 So. 715. dor v. Com. 19 Ky. L. R. 1039, 43 S.
is Bedford v. S. 36 Tex. Cr. App. W. 187; Johnson v. S. 100 Tenn.
477, 38 S. W. 210. See Enright v. 254, 45 S. W. 436; Lonkster v. S.
P. 155 111. 32, 35, 39 N. E. 561; 41 Tex. Cr. App. 603, 56 S. W. 65;
Gables v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 68 S. S. v. Byrd, 52 S. Car. 480, 30 S. E.
W. 288. 482; S. v. Craine, 120 N. Car. 601,
is Allen v. U. S. 157 U. S. 675, 15 27 S. E. 72; Danforth v. S. (Tex.
Sup. Ct. 720. Cr. App.), 69 S. W. 159; Ulun v.
20 Justice v. Com. 20 Ky. L. R. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 32 S. W. 699;
386, 46 b. W. 499; S. v. Davis, 104 Walters v. S. 37 Tex. Cr. App 388
Tenn. 501, 58 S. W. 122; Cannon v. 35 S. W. 652.
S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 56 S. W. 351; Na- 21 s. v. O'Neil, 58 Minn. 478, 59
varro v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 43 S. N. W. 1101.
W. 105; Leach v. S. 99 Tenn. 584, 42 22 Kidwell v. S. 35 Tex Cr App
S. W. 195; S. v. Hyland, 144 Mo. 264, 33 S. W. 342.
302, 46 S. W. 195; Kairn v. S. (Tex. It has been held that it is not
Cr. App.), 45 S. W. 703; P. v. How- material error to instruct on the
ard, 112 Cal. 135, 44 Pac. 464; Irby doctrine of imperfect self-defense,
v. S. 95 Ga. 467, 20 S. E. 218; Jack- though self-defense was not raised
son v. Com. 98 Va. 845, 36 S. E. 487; as an is-sue on the trial, Gonzales
Harmanson v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), v. S. (Tex. Or. App.), 29 S W.
42 S. W. 995; S. v. Black, 143 Mo. 1091.
166, 44 S. W. 340; Nilan v. P. 27
256 IN CRIMINAL CASES. 252
prosecution tended to prove that the defendant committed the
homicide. 23 So where it appears from the evidence that the
deceased did not attempt to assault or harm the defendant a
charge on the law of self-defense is properly refused. 24
256. Self-defense Instructions on belief and appearances.
When a person is assailed or assaulted in such manner as to
induce in him a reasonable and well-grounded belief (and he
honestly believes) that he is actually in danger of losing his
life or suffering great bodily harm, he may then act in defend-
ing himself, although it may afterwards turn out that the danger
was not real, but only apparent; and the court should instruct
the jury accordingly where the evidence tends to support such
belief. 25 A mere belief, however, unsupported by evidence, is
not sufficient to justify one in acting in self-defense, and an in-
struction so informing the jury is proper. Such an instruction
is not subject to the criticism that it withdraws from the jury
the consideration of the right of self-defense where the law on
that subject is properly given in other instructions. 26 Accord-
ingly it is not error to instruct that if the circumstances of
the killing were such as to produce in the mind of the defendant,
or that of any reasonably prudent person situated as he was, the
impression that he could save his own life or escape serious
bodily harm only by killing the deceased, such killing was justi-
fiable unless the defendant provoked the difficulty with intent
to kill the deceased. 27
An instruction on the law of self-defense which deprives the
defendant from acting on such appearance of danger as would
cause a reasonable man to act under like circumstances is fatally
defective and prejudicial. The defendant is not required to
23 McDaniel v. S. 100 Ga. 67, 27 low v. S. 154 Ind. 664, 57 N. B.
S. E. 158. 539; Hollingsworth v. S. 156 Mo.
24 Brown v. Com. 20 Ky. L. R. 178, 56 S. W. 1087; Steinmeyer v.
1552, 49 S. W. 545; S. v. Craine, 120 P. 95 111. 389; Steiner v. P. 187 111.
N. Car. 601, 27 S. E. 72. Where it 245, 58 N. E. 383. See Hughes Cr.
appears from the evidence that the Law, 2442; Presser v. S. 77 Ind.
deceased was a man of bad reputa- 274; Bryant v. S. 106 Ind. 509, 7 N.
tion the court may properly charge E. 217.
the jury that the unlawful killing 20 s. v. Cochran, 147 Mo. 504, 49
of a bad man is a crime, the same S. W. 558. See Com. v. McGowen,
as it is an offense to kill a good 189 Pa. St. 641, 42 Atl. 365.
man, S. v. Anderson, 126 Mo. 542, 27 Addington v. U. S. 165 U. S.
29 S. W. 576. 184, 17 Sup. Ct. 288 See Bell v. S.
2r. Campbell v. P. 16 111. 17; En- 115 Ala. 25, 22 So. 526.
253 ON SELF-DEFENSE BELIEF, APPEARANCE. 257
show that the killing was "absolutely necessary." He may act
from appearances. 28 So an instruction which states that it must
appear that the danger was so urgent and pressing that in order
to save life or prevent great bodily harm the killing was abso-
lutely necessary is erroneous, in that it holds the defendant to
actual and positive danger and deprives him of the right of
acting upon appearances. 29 A charge that if the defendant killed
the deceased, honestly believing that his own life was in jeopardy,
or that he was in imminent danger of receiving serious bodily
injury, and that he used no more force than was reasonably
necessary to protect himself, then the killing was justifiable,
correctly states the law of self-defense. 30 Also a charge that if
the defendant killed the deceased, but at the time of the killing
the deceased made an attack on him, which caused the defendant
to have reasonable expectation or fear of death or serious bodily
injury, and acting under the influence of such reasonable ex-
pectation or fear, he killed the deceased, the jury should acquit
him, is proper. 31 But it must appear that the party killing
acted under the influence of such fear, and not in a spirit of
revenge. 32
257. Instructions on threats of deceased. Evidence that
the deceased had previously threatened the defendant is, under
some circumstances, very material in determining whether the
defendant in good faith acted under a just fear of danger to
his life : 33 and it is error for the court, in charging the jury in
reference to such threats, to ignore the evidence relating there-
to. 34 Thus an instruction that "a mere threat is not sufficient,
that the mere drawing of a weapon or show of a weapon is not
sufficient," is erroneous where there is evidence that the de-
ceased actually made threats and drew a deadly weapon on
the defendant. 35
28 Enright v. P. 155 111. 35, 39 si Price v. S. 36 Tex. Cr. App.
N. E. 561; S. v. Rolla, 21 Mont. 403. 37 S. W. 743.
582, 55 Pac. 523. See S. v. Carter 32 Keaton v. S. 99 Ga. 197, 25 S.
(Wash.), 45 Pac. 745; S. v. Miller E. 615.
(Ore.), 74 Pac. 660; S. v. Castle, 133 33 Powell v. S. 1.9 Ala. 581; Lingo
N. Car. 769, 46 S. E. 4. v. S. 29 Ga. 470; S. v. Gushing, 17
29 Roach v. P. 77 111. 30; S. v. Wash. 544, 50 Pac. 512.
Carter (Wash.), 45 Pac. 745. s* Johnson v. S. 105 Ga. 665, 31
sop. v. Piper, 112 Mich. 644, 71 S. E. 399.
N. W. 174. ss Johnson v. S. 106 Ga. 665, 31
258 IN CRIMINAL CASES. 254
Telling the jury that "a fear growing out of and only sup-
ported by mere words, threats, menaces or contemptuous ges-
tures is not the fear which would justify or excuse another for
committing a homicide," is improper where it appears from the
evidence that the deceased cut him with a knife. 30 So a charge
that former threats made by the deceased to kill the defendant
cannot excuse the defendant for killing the deceased if there is
nothing indicating a deadly design against the defendant at the
time of the killing, is erroneous, in that it omits all reference
to the conduct of the deceased, showing an intention to carry
out his former threat at the time of the killing. 37 The fact that
the deceased had made threats against the defendant (and of
which the defendant had been informed) does not warrant the
giving of an instruction that such threats may be considered
by the jury as tending to show that the defendant killed the
deceased through malice or ill will. 38
258. Provoking difficulty Freedom from fault. The accus-
ed has not the right to provoke a quarrel, take advantage of it and
slay his enemy and then justify the killing on the ground of
self-defense. He must be wholly free from fault in bringing on
the difficulty. 39
But the burden is not on the defendant to show that he was
free from fault in bringing on the difficulty; and an instruction
which denies the defendant the right of self-defense unless he
shows himself free from fault is therefore erroneous. 40
If there is no evidence tending to show that the defendant was
in the wrong in bringing on the difficulty, then to instruct on that
S. E. 399; Gafford v. S. (Miss.), 47 S. W. 799; Mitchell v. S. (Tex.
24 So. 314 (timidity or fear). See Cr. App.), 41 S. W. 816 (not en-
Bryant v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 47 titled to instructions on man-
S. W. 373. slaughter).
so Gumming v. S. 99 Ga. 662, 27 4 Lewis v. S. 120 Ala. 339, 25 So.
S. E. 177. 43. An instruction that to entitle
37 Thompson v. U. S. 157 U. S. the defendant to an acquittal he
271, 15 Sup. Ct. 73. must have been "entirely free from
ss Allison v. U. S. 160 U. S. 203, fault in bringing on the difficulty"
16 Sup. Ct. 252. is not improper, as the word "en-
39 Hughes v. P. 116 111. 330, 6 N. tirely" exacts no higher degree of
E. 55; Adams v. P. 47 111. 379; Kin- fault than free from fault: Ellis
ney v. P. 108 111. 527; Crawford v. v. S. 120 Ala. 333, 25 So. 1; Bell v.
S. 112 Ala. 1, 21 So. 214; Hughes S. 115 Ala. 39, 22 So. 530; Crawford
v. S. 117 Ala. 25, 23 So. 677; Welch v. S. 112 Ala. 29, 21 So. 223. See
v. S. 124 Ala. 41, 27 So. 306; Jack- Dennis v. S. 118 Ala. 72, 23 So.
son v. Com. 98 Va. 845, 36 S. E. 1002.
487; S. v. Pennington, 146 Mo. 27,
255 PROVOKING DIFFICULTY FAULT. 259
subject is error. 41 But on the other hand, where there is evi-
dence tending to show that the defendant was at fault, the court
may, by proper instructions, submit the question to the jury. 42
It follows that where the evidence is clear and undisputed
that the defendant provoked the difficulty which resulted in the
homicide, he is not entitled to have the jury instructed on the
law of self-defense. 43
Where there is no evidence to justify the killing of another,
the court may properly refuse to instruct on the law of justifica-
tion, although the evidence may be sufficient to reduce the charge
from murder to manslaughter. For example, if a husband kill
his wife while she is in the act of adultery, the law regards the
provocation sufficient to reduce the crime from murder to man-
slaughter, but not sufficient to justify the homicide. 44
259. Defendant first in wrong, but abandons the conflict.
If it appears from the evidence that the defendant, though orig-
inally in the wrong in bringing on the difficulty with the de-
ceased, in good faith had abandoned the conflict and declined
any further struggle, then in that ease he would have the right
to act in self-defense, and the court, on proper request, should
not refuse to instruct the jury accordingly. 45 Thus an instruc-
41 Cornelius v. Com. 23 Ky. L. R. 134 Ala. 1, 32 So. 704. See Long-
771, 64 S. W. 412; McCandless v. S. acre v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 41 S. W.
42 Tex. Cr. App. 58, 57 S. W. 672; 621.
Grayson v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 57 44 S. v. Cancienne 50 La. Ann.
S. W. 808; Stell v. S. (Tex. Cr. 847. 24 So. 134. But see Morrison
App.), 58 S. W. 75; Williams v. S. v. S. 39 Tex. Cr. App. 519, 47 S. W.
(Tex. Cr. App.), 69 S. W. 415; Com. 369 (statute makes the killing justi-
v. Hoskins. 18 Ky. L. R. 59, S5 S. W. fiable) ; Giles v. S. 43 Tex. Cr. App.
284. See Winters v. S. 37 Tex. Cr. 561, 67 S. W. 411. Instructions in
App. 582, 40 S. W. 303; Cooper v. the following cases were held er-
S. 80 Miss. 175, 30 So. 579; Pollard roneous in not properly present-
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 73 S. W. 953; ing the question of "free from
Harris v. S. 36 Ark. 127. fault" or who was at fault in bring-
42 Ter. v. Gonzales (N. Mex.), 68 ing on the difficulty: Gibson v. S.
Pac. 928; Tate v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. (Miss.), 17 So. 892; Mosely v. S. 107
App. 231, 33 S. W. 121; Carleton v. Ala. 74, 17 So. 932; P. v. Palmer,
S. 43 Neb. 373, 61 N. W. 699 (cir- 105 Mich. 568, 63 N. W. 656; Line-
cumstantial evidence will support han v. S. 113 Ala. 70, 21 So. 497;
such instruction). See Jackson v. Bell v. S. 115 Ala. 25, 22 So. 526;
S. 106 Ala. 12, 17 So. 333 (defend- S. v. Davis, 52 W. Va. 224, 43 S. E.
ant killed a third person by mis- 99; Hensen v. S. 114 Ala. 25, 22
take). So. 127.
43 Kilgore v. S. 124 Ala. 24, 27 45 Young v. Com. 19 Ky. L. R. 929,
So. 4. See Carleton v. S. 43 Neb. 42 S. W. 1141; Stevenson v. U. S.
373, 61 N. W. 699. See Mann v. S. 86 Fed. 106; P. v. Newcomer, 118
2()0 IN CRIMINAL CASES. 25G
tion that ''even if the defendant had been the assailant, if he
had really and in good faith endeavored to decline any further
struggle before the homicide was committed, the killing might
be justifiable in self-defense/' is proper. 40 An instruction un-
supported by any evidence given on the assumption or theory
that the defendant was originally in the wrong, and sought
the deceased for the purpose of provoking a quarrel, and which
ignores the plea of self-defense, is erroneous. 47
260. Duty of defendant to retreat In some jurisdictions
the ancient doctrine prevails that the accused is bound to re-
treat and in good faith decline the combat, if he can, before
he will be permitted to invoke the law of self-defense as a
justification for killing another. 48 And where this doctrine is
recognized as the law it is proper, in charging the jury, to
instruct that the defendant must avoid the danger by flight, if
he can, before he has the right to act in ^elf-defense. 49
But it is error to give such an instruction applying this rule
to the defendant, if he was a peace officer at the time of the
difficulty, acting in his official capacity; 50 and by the very latest
expression of the supreme court of Illinois it has no application to
any other person who is not in the wrong and is unlawfully
attacked in a place where he has a right to be. 51
Cal. 263, 50 Pac. 405; S. v. Hig- (Del.), 487, 41 Atl. 190, 4 Blackstone
gerson, 157 Mo. 395, 57 S. W. 1014; Comm. 185.
Irvine v. S. 104 Tenn. 132, 56 S. W. 49 Stevens v. Com. 20 Ky. L. R.
845. See S. v. Medlin, 126 N. Car. 544, 47 S. W. 229. Compare: S. v.
1127, 36 S. E. 344; S. v. McCann, 16 Rolla, 21 Mont. 582, 55 Pac. 523.
Wash. 249, 47 Pac. 443, the evi- See, also, Scroggins v. S. 120 Ala.
dence was that the defendant did 369, 25 So. 180; Bell v. S. 115 Ala.
not decline further struggle. 25, 22 So. 526. See Mann v. S. 134
46 p. v. Simons, 60 Cal. 72; P. v. Ala. 1, 32 So. 704; S. v. McCann, 16
Rush. 65 Cal. 129, 3 Pac. 590, 5 Am. Wash. 249, 49 Pac. 216; Gafford v.
Cr. R. 463. S. 122 Ala. 54, 25 So. 10 (assuming
it Bow v. S. 34 Tex. Cr. App. 481, could not retreat).
31 S. W. 170; S. v. Smith, 125 Mo. Lynn v. P. 170 111. 536, 48 N.
2. 28 S. W. 181; Cline v. S. (Tex. E. 964.
Cr. App.), 28 S. W. 684. See Ham- ^ Hammond v. P. 199 111. 173,
mond v. P. 199 111. 173, 64 N. E. 64 N. E. 980; Miller v. S. 74 Ind. 1;
980. Presser v. S. 77 Ind. 274; Story v.
** Davison v. P. 90 111. 231; S. v. S. 99 Ind. 413; Plummer v. S. 135
Spears, 46 La. Ann. 1524, 16 So. 467, Ind. 308, 34 N. E. 968; Page v. S.
9 Am. Cr. R. 624; S. v. Rheams, 34 141 Ind. 236, 40 N. E. 745. In the
Minn. 18, 24 N. W. 302, 6 Am. Cr. decision referred to we find the fol-
R. 540; S. v. Warren, 1 Marv. lowing language: "The ancient doc-
257 RETREAT ALLEGATIONS AND PROOF VARY. 261
261. Instructions when allegations and proof vary. So
where the evidence tends to show that the deceased may have
met his death by other means than by the hands of the accused,
as by suicide, 52 by accident, 53 at the hands of a third person
without the aid or procurement of the accused, 54 or by a blow
instead of by poisoning, 55 or that death was the result of a
disease instead of the wound alleged, or operation on such
wound, 56 the refusal of instructions properly presenting such de-
fense is error. 57
Thus where the evidence, though conflicting, tends to show
that while the deceased was standing at the bar in a saloon,
and on calling attention to a revolver lying on the back of
the bar, the bar-keeper picked it up and, pointing it at the
deceased, shot and killed him; that the revolver was accidentally
discharged while handing it across the bar to show it to the
deceased, and that the defendant and deceased had always been
good friends, the giving of instructions as to intentional shoot-
ing and gross carelessness, and refusing to instruct as to whether
or not the killing was accidental, is material error. 58
trine of the common law that the 52 s. v. Kerns, 47 W. Va. 266, 34
right of self-defense does not arise S. E. 734; Bennett v. S. 39 Tex.
until every effort to escape even to Cr. App. 639, 48 S. W. 61; Garner v.
retreating until an impassable wall S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 77 S. W. 798.
or something of that nature has See Com. v. Mudgett, 174 Pa. St.
been reached, has been supplanted 211, 34 Atl. 588.
in America by the doctrine that 53 Fitzgerald v. S. 112 Ala. 34, 20
a man if unlawfully assaulted in So. 966; Wooten v. S. 99 Tenn. 189,
a place where he has a right to be, 41 S. W. 813; Allison v. U. S. 160
and put in danger, real or reason- U. S. 203, 16 Sup. Ct. 252. See S. v.
ably apparent of losing his life, or Carey, 15 Wash. 549, 46 Pac. 1050.
receiving great bodily harm, is not ^ s. v. White, 10 Wash. 611, 39
required to endeavor to escape Pac. 160; Sander v. S. 134 Ala. 74,
from his assailant, but may stand 32 So. 654.
his ground and repel force with ^ Lewis v. Com. 19 Ky. L. R.
force, even to the taking of the 1139, 42 S. W. 1127.
life of his< assailant, if necessary 56 Garner v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.),
for the preservation of his own life 77 S. W. 798.
or to protect himself from receiv- s? P. v. Seaman, 107 Mich. 348,
ing great bodily harm," Hammond 65 N. W. 203, evidence that the de-
v. P. 199 111. 173, 64 N. E. 980. But ceased aborted from natural causes,
where both parties are at fault ss Fitzgerald v. S. 112 Ala. 34, 20
neither can justify the taking of So. 906; Wooten v. S. 99 Tenn. 189,
life without retreating, and the in- 41 S. W. 813 (deceased fell). See
struction should use this qualify- Hayden v. Com. 20 Ky. L. R. 274,
ing statement or its equivalent: 45 S. W. 886 (no evidence of reek-
Deal v. S. 140 Ind. 354, 39 N. E. less or careless use of weapon). A
930; Deilks v. S. 141 Ind. 23. 40 N. charge that "if it is possible to
E. 120. account for the death of the de-
262 IN CRIMINAL CASES. 258
262. Instructions when arrest is unlawful. A person has
a right to resist an unlawful arrest, and may defend himself
against assaults made upon his person by an officer or other per-
son seeking to arrest him illegally and without color of authority ;
and where the evidence tends to prove that the deceased was
killed under such circumstances, the defendant is entitled to have
the jury instructed on the law of self-defense. 59 Where the evi-
.dence tends to show that the accused did not know that his arrest
was sought for a lawful purpose, an instruction on murder al-
leged to have been committed while resisting a lawful arrest is
erroneous in omitting such knowledge. 00
263. Killing mere trespasser. Instructions. Mere trespass
will not justify the taking of human life ; such extreme measures
cannot be resorted to for the purpose of removing a trespasser
from one's premises. The giving of instructions, therefore, tend-
ing to lead the jury to believe that one may lawfully kill a tres-
passer is improper. Thus, where the killing was the result of
the contentions of the accused and deceased as to the ownership
and right to occupy a tract of land it is error for the court to
instruct the jury as to the rights or claims of the contending
parties to the land. 61 In another case where the homicide was
the result of a dispute between the defendant and deceased,
arising from the refusal of the former to shut a gate after
passing through it, on a road extending through land owned by
the father of the deceased, it was held error to instruct on the
unlawfulness of passing through gates and leaving them open. 62
264. Motive Instructions. While it is always proper to
show motive for the commission of the crime of murder, the
prosecution is not bound to do so, motive not being an indis-
ceased on any reasonable hypothe- v. S. 41 Tex. Cr. App. 510, 57 S.
Bis other than that of the guilt of W. 1130. See Murphy v. S. 36 Tex.
the defendant" the jury should do Cr. App. 24, 35 S. W. 174.
po, renders it unnecessary to give so 3. v. Phillips, 118 Iowa, 660,
an instruction on the theory as to 92 N. W. 876. See, also, Plummer
whether the deceased may have v. S. 135 Ind. 308, 34 N. E. 968.
met his death by a fall, S. v. Oarey, ei Utterback v. Com. 20 Ky. L. R.
15 Wash. 549, 46 Pac. 1050. 1515, 49 S. W. 479. See Hughes Cr.
5 Hardin v. S. 40 Tex. Cr. App. Law, 13.
208, 49 S. W. 607; Hill v. S. 35 Tex. 62 s. v. Vaughan, 22 Nev. 285, 39
Cr. App. 371, 33 S. W. 1075; Lynch Pac. 733.
259 MOTIVE BURGLARY AND LARCENY. 265
pensable element of the crime; and the court, in charging the
jury, may so instruct them. 63 But in the absence of an instruc-
tion having been given for the prosecution on the subject, the
defendant is not entitled to instructions based on the absence
of motive. 64 But where the court instructs for the prosecution
that motive of the accused to commit the crime charged is not
a necessary element of guilt, then the refusal to instruct for the
defendant that the absence of a probable motive is a circum-
stance in favor of the accused, is error. 65
An instruction that a motive is difficult to prove ; that no one
can lay bare the secrets of the mind; that there may have been
a concealed motive, although impossible to prove, is improper as
allowing the jury to imagine a motive. 66
265. Mutual combat Instructions. The giving of instruc-
tions on the law of mutual combat is proper where the evi-
dence tends to prove a voluntary agreement to fight. 67 Thus,
where it appears from the evidence that the defendant and
prosecuting witness voluntarily fought with each other for the
purpose of settling their disputes, an instruction as to mutual
combat is proper in the trial of an assault with intent to kill,
and it matters not who commenced the assault. 68 Also where
the evidence shows that the defendant and deceased were in
an altercation threatening to kill each other, and that each went
his way and procured a weapon and they again met, and that
the defendant then shot and killed the deceased, an instruction
on the theory as to whether the defendant voluntarily engaged
the deceased in deadly conflict is proper. 69 On the other hand,
if there is no evidence tending to prove mutual combat, instruc-
tions on that theory are improper. Thus, where the evidence
esHotema v. United States 186 S. 105 Ga. 736, 32 S. B. 125; Kol-
U. S. 413, 22 Sup. Ct. 895; Wheeler ler v. S. 36 Tex. Or. App. 496, 38
v. S. 158 Ind. 687, 63 N. E. 975; S. W. 44. See Parks v. S. 105 Ga.
S. v. Crabtree, 170 Mo. 642, 71 S. W. 242, 31 S. E. 580; Red v. S. 39 Tex.
127. Cr. App. 414, 46 S. W. 408; Davis v.
e* S. v. Brown, 168 Mo. 449, 68 S. 114 Ga. 104, 39 S. E. 906; S. v.
S. W. 568. Turner, 63 S. Car. 548, 41 S. E. 778;
es S. v. Foley, 144 Mo. 600, 46 S. Dorsey v. S. 110 Ga. 331, 35 S. E.
W. 733. 651 (proper as to voluntary man-
es P. v. Enwright, 134 Cal. 527, slaughter).
66 Pac. 726. es Wallis v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 40
67 Harmanson v. S. (Tex. Cr. S. W. 794.
App.), 42 S. W. 995; Glover v. S. eg Roller v. S. 36 Tex. Cr. App.
105 Ga. 597, 31 S. E. 584; Roark v. 496, 38 S. W. 44.
265a IN CRIMINAL CASES. 260
shows that the defendant was forced into a fight by the de-
ceased against defendant's will, and that defendant was com-
pelled to act in self-defense, such an instruction should not be
given. 70
Burglary and Larceny.
265a. Possession of stolen property Instructions. In some
jurisdictions where burglary and larceny have been committed
at the same time by one and the same act, the person found
in possession of the stolen property soon after the burglary with-
out giving any reasonable explanation of how he came into pos-
session of it, then such possession is prima facie proof that he
committed the burglary as well as the larceny. 71 According
to this principle it is proper to instruct the jury that "the
possession of stolen property soon after the commission of a theft
is prima facie evidence of the guilt of the person in whose pos-
session it is found, and is sufficient to warrant a conviction, un-
less the other evidence in the case or the surrounding circum-
stances are such as to raise a reasonable doubt of such guilt." 72
A charge that "where property has been stolen and recently
thereafter the same or any part thereof is found in the pos-
session of another, such person is presumed to be the thief,
and if he fails to account for his possession of such property
70 Maines v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. App. Porterfield v. Com. 91 Va. 801, 22
109, 31 S. W. 667; Jordan v. S. 117 S. E. 352. See S. v. Bryant, 134
Ga. 405, 43 S. E. 747; Guerrero v. Mo. 246. 35 S. W. 597.
S. 39 Tex. Cr. App. 662, 47 S. W. " Hughes Grim. Law, 451, cit-
655. ing Keating v. P. 160 111. 483, 43 N.
71 S. v. La Grange, 94 Iowa, 60, E. 724; Gunther v. P. 139 111. 526,
62 N. W. 664; S. v. Ham, 98 Iowa, 28 N. E. 1101; Comfort v. P. 54
60, 66 N. W. 1038; Magee v. P. 139 111. 404; Campbell v. S. 150 Ind.
111. 140, 28 N. E. 1077; Langford 74; 49 N. E. 905; Gablick v. P. 40
v. P. 134 111. 444, 25 N. E. 1009; Mich. 292, 3 Am. Cr. R. 244; S. v.
Smith v. P. 115 111. 17, 3 N. E. 733; Kelley, 57 Iowa, 644, 11 N. W. 635;
S. v. Prahm, 73 Iowa, 355, 35 N. E. S. v. Brady (Iowa), 97 N. W. 64;
451, 7 Am. Cr. R. 134; S. v. Wilson, Brooks v. S. 96 Ga. 353, 23 S. E.
137 Mo. 592, 39 S. W. 80; S. v. 413, 10 Am. Cr. R. 136, and many
Rivers, 68 Iowa, 611, 27 N. W. 781; other cases. See Hix v. P. 157 111.
Branson v. Com. 92 Ky. 330, 13 Ky. 382, 41 N. E. 862. Contra: White
L. R. 614; P. v. Wood, 99 Mich. 620, v. S. 21 Tex. App. 339, 17 S. W.
58 N. W. 638; Mangham v. S. 87 727; P. v. Chadwick, 7 Utah, 134, 25
Ga. 549, 13 S. E. 558; Taylor v. Pac. 737; Harper v. S. 71 Miss. 202,
Ter. (Ariz.), 64 Pac. 423. Contra: 13 So. 882; Galloway v. S. Ill Ga.
Dobson v. S. 46 Neb. 250, 64 N. 832, 36 S. E. 63, and other cases.
W. 956. Contra, as to burglary:
261 POSSESSION OF STOLEN PROPERTY. 266
in a manner consistent with his innocence this presumption
becomes conclusive against him," is proper. 73
The refusal to give the following instruction for the defendant,
was held to be error, especially where an instruction on the same
subject was given for the prosecution: "If the jury believe from
the evidence that the defendant bought the property and paid
for it, and his purchase was open and public, unconnected with
any suspicious circumstances of guilt, that is a satisfactory ac-
count of his possession of the property, and removes all presump-
tion of guilt growing out of his possesion thereof." 74
266. Presumption as to possession is one of fact. But the
presumption that the person found in possession of recently
stolen property is the thief, is not a presumption of law, but
one of fact. There is no legal rule on the subject; but much
depends on the nature of the property stolen and the circum-
stances of each particular case. Such presumption establishes
no legal rule, ascertains no legal test, defines no legal terms,
measures no legal standard, bounds no legal limits. 75
The possession of stolen property by the defendant soon after
the burglary is a circumstance which the jury may consider, to-
gether with all the other evidence, in determining whether the
defendant committed the burglary. 76 Hence an instruction that
possession of recently stolen property is a strong criminating
circumstance tending to show guilt, is erroneous. Such posses-
sion is only a fact to be considered with all the other evidence. 77
73 S. v. Kelly, 73 Mo. 608; S. v. 76 Whitman v. S. 42 Neb. 841, 60
Henry, 24 Kas. 460; Shepperd v. N. W. 1025; Porterfield v. Com. 91
S. 94 Ala. 104, 10 So. 663; Com. v. Va. 801, 22 S. E. 352; S. v. Bliss,
McGorty, 114 Mass. 299; Campbell 27 Wash. 463, 68 Pac. &7; Johnson
v. S. 150 Ind. 74, 49 N. E. 905. v. S. 148 Ind. 522, 47 N. E. 926;
74 Jones v. P. 12 111. 259. Campbell v. S. 150 Ind. 74, 49 N.
75 Hughes Cr. Law, 452, cit- E. 905.
ing, Smith v. S. 58 Ind. 340, 2 Am. 77 3. v. Bliss, 27 Wash. 463, 68
Cr. R. 375; S. v. Hodge, 50 N. H. Pac. 87. On a charge of larceny an
510, 3 Greenleaf Ev. 31; S. v. Jen- instruction as to the failure of the
nett, 88 N. Car. 665; Stover v. P. accused to explain his possession
56 N. Y. 317; Bellamy v. S. 35 of the property alleged to have
Fla. 242, 17 So. 560; Ingalls v. S. been stolen, is improper in the ab-
48 Wis. 647, 4 N. W. 785; Jones v. sence of any demand or request for
S. 26 Miss. 247; S. v. Walker, 41 such explanation, Moore v. S. (Tex.
Iowa, 217, 1 Am. Cr. R. 433; P. v. Cr. App.), 33 S. W. 980.
Pagan, 66 Cal. 534, 6 Pac. 394, and
other cases.
CHAPTER XIV.
INCLUDED CRIMINAL OFFENSES.
Sec. Sec.
267. Included offenses I n s t r u c- 271.
tions.
268. If no evidence Instructions 272.
properly refused.
269. Homicide No evidence of in- 273.
eluded offenses.
270. Evidence supporting included 274.
offense Instructions.
No evidence of manslaughter
Instructions.
Manslaughter Instructions
proper.
Involuntary manslaughter
Evidence wanting.
Instructions must be request-
ed.
267. Included offenses Instructions. Where a defendant
is charged with a crime which includes other offenses of an
inferior degree, the law of each degree or included offense
which the evidence tends to prove should be given to the jury
by proper instructions, and the refusal to so instruct is error. 1
It is the duty of the court to so fully instruct the jury upon
every degree and kind of crime of which the accused may be
convicted, under the indictment, as to give him the benefit of
having the evidence considered by the jury under a full knowl-
edge of the law as to the essential characteristics of each kind
and degree of crime for which a verdict may be returned against
him. 2
i Curtis v. S. 36 Ark. 284; P. v.
Palmer, 96 Mich. 580, 55 N. W. 994;
Brookins v. S. 100 Ga. 331, 28 S.
E. 77; Guy v. S. Ill Ga. 648, 36 S.
E. 857; S. v. Mize, 36 Kas. 187; S.
v. Cunningham, 111 Iowa, 233, 82 N.
W. 775; S. v. Rutherford, 152 Mo.
124, 53 S. W. 417; Picken v. S. 115
Ala. 42, 22 So. 551; Shaeffer v. S. 61
Ark. 241, 32 S. W. 679 (petit lar-
ceny included in grand larceny) ;
Hughes Cr. Law, 3248, citing S.
v. Desmond, 109 Iowa, 72, 80 N.
W. 214; S. v. Lucas, 124 N. Car. 825,
32 S. E. 962; S. v. Estep, 44 Kas.
572, 24 Pac. 986.
2 Hughes Cr. Law, 3243, citing
S. v. Meyer, 58 Vt. 457, 3 Atl. 195,
7 Am. Cr. R. 435.
262
263 WHEN NO EVIDENCE OF INCLUDED OFFENSE. 268
Slight evidence is sufficient upon which to base instructions
embracing the law of inferior or included offenses, and it is the
duty of the court to instruct thereon, notwithstanding the weak-
ness of the testimony. 3 If the testimony of the defendant alone
tends to prove an included offense, instructions should be given
accordingly, although his testimony is at variance with that of
all the other witnesses. 4
Instructions which ignore or withdraw from the consideration
of the jury an included offense are erroneous where the evidence
tends to prove the included offense. 5
Thus on a charge of robbery there being evidence tending
to prove the included crime of larceny, the giving of instruc-
tions eliminating or withdrawing such included offense is er-
ror. 6 Also on a charge of felonious assault which includes
simple assault or assault and battery, an instruction directing
the jury to acquit if they are not satisfied beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant is guilty of felonious assault is im-
proper. 7
268. If no evidence. Instructions properly refused. Of
couse, if there is no evidence whatever tending to prove an in-
cluded offense the court may properly refuse to instruct thereon. 8
Thus, on a charge of assault with intent to kill, a failure to in-
struct on the law of the lesser or included offense of simple assault
is not error where the evidence conclusively proves only the
crime of assault with intent to kill or no offense at all. 9
3S. v. Mize, 36 Kas. 187; Madi- Parker v. S. 40 Tex. Cr. App. 119,
son v. Com. 13 Ky. L. R. 313, 17 S. 49 S. W. 80; S. v. Fruge, 106 La.
W. 164; S. v. Elliott, 98 Mo. 150, 11 694, 31 So. 323.
S. W. 566. 9 s. v. Barton, 142 Mo. 450, 44
4 S. v. Banks, 73 Mo. 592; S. . S. W. 239; Barnes v. S. 39 Tex.
v. Palmer, 88 Mo. 568. But see Cr. App. 184, 45 S. W. 495; Harris
S. v. Turlington, 102 Mo. 642, 15 v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 47 S. W.
S. W. 141. 643; Honeywell v. S. 40 Tex. Cr.
s Uolan v. S. 44 Neb. 643, 62 N. App. 199, 49 S. W. 586 (aggravated
W. 1090. assault); Ter. v. Gatliff (Okla.), 37
s P. v. Church, 116 Cal. 300, 48 Pac. 899; S. v. Alcom, 137 Mo.
Pac. 125. 121, 38 S. W. 548; S. v. Johnson,
T Fleming v. S. 107 Ala. 11, 18 129 Mo. 26, 31 S. W. 339; S. v.
So. 263; Jackson v. S. (Ala.), 18 So. Woods, 124 Mo. 412, 27 S. W. 1114;
728. P. v. Lopez, 135 Cal. 23, 66 Pac.
s S. v. Lucas, 124 N. Car. 825, 32 965; Wilson v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.),
S. E. 962; S. v. Sherman, 106 Iowa, 73 S. W. 964 (aggravated assault);
684, 77 N. W. 641; S. v. Murphy, Duval v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 70 S.
109 Iowa, 116, 80 N. W. 305; Brook- W. 543 (aggravated assault),
ins v. S. 100 Ga. 331, 28 S. E. 77;
269 INCLUDED CRIMINAL OFFENSES. 264
Where on a charge of malicious assault with intent to kill,
as defined by statute, the defendant may be convicted of assault
wiih intent to kill without malice, as defined by another section
of the statute, an instruction is not defective in omitting to
state the law on malicious or felonious intent. 10 Also, if a serious
injury be inflicted by means of a deadly weapon it is proper
*to refuse an instruction on simple assault which is included
in a charge of malicious assault with a deadly weapon. 11 Like-
wise where the evidence clearly establishes the guilt of the
accused on a charge of assault with intent to maim, it is not
error to refuse to instruct on assault and battery. 12
On a charge of robbery if there is no evidence that the crime
may have been larceny instead of robbery, a failure to instruct
as to larceny is not error. 13
Also under an indictment for rape where the evidence conclu-
sively proves that crime, the court may properly refuse to in-
struct as to the law of assault with intent to commit rape. 14 But
under a statute providing that the court shall instruct the jury
as to the law of assault, or assault and battery, on a charge of
assault with intent to kill, it is error to refuse to so instruct. 15
269. Homicide No evidence of included offenses. In a
homicide case where the evidence shows that the defendant is
guilty of murder in the first degree, or not guilty of any of-
fense, instructions requested on any of the lower degrees, or
on manslaughter, which are included in the indictment, are prop-
erly refused. 16 The evidence having no tendency to prove any
10 S. v. Grant, 144 Mo. 56, 45 S. Pac. 389; Paynter v. Com. 21 Ky. L.
W. 1102. R. 1562, 55 S. W. 687; P. v. Harris,
11 S. v. Drumm, 156 Mo. 216, 56 103 Mich. 473, 61 N. W. 871; Bryant
S. W. 1086; Brantley v. S. 9 Wyo. v. S. 114 Ga. 861, 40 S. E. 995 (as-
102, 61 Pac. 139; Ford v. S. (Tex. sault with intent to rape). See, al-
Cr. App.), 56 S. W. 338; S. v. Hig- so, S. v. Courtemarsh, 11 Wash. 446,
gerson, 157 Mo. 395, 57 S. W. 1014; 39 Pac. 955; Young v. Com. 16 Ky.
Martinez v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 56 496. 29 S. W. 439.
S. W. 580; P. v. Stanton, 106 Gal. is S. v. Dolan, 17 Wash. 499, 50
139, 39 Pac. 525. Contra: S. v. Pac. 472. See P. v. Demasters, 105
Desmond, 109 Iowa, 72, 80 N. W. Cal. 669, 39 Pac. 35.
214. is S. v. Kornstett, 62 Kas. 221,
12 S v. Akin, 94 Iowa, 50, 62 N. 61 Pac. 805: Ragland v. S. 125 Ala.
W. 667; Duval v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 12, 27 So. 983; S. v. Vinso, 171 Mo.
70 S. W. 543 576, 71 S. W. 1034; Cook v. S.
is S. v. Reasby, 100 Iowa, 231, 69 (Fla.), 35 So. 671 (third degree);
N. W. 451. S. v. Meadows, 156 Mo. 110, 56
14 P. v. Chavez, 103 Cal. 407, 37 S. W. 878; Reed v. Com. 98 Va. 817,
265
HOMICIDE, WHEN NO INCLUDED OFFENSE.
269
other offense than murder in the first degree, the court, in
charging the jury, may restrict them to that crime. 17
In Ohio it has been held error to instruct the jury on the law
of murder in the second degree and on manslaughter, where the
evidence has a tendency to prove only murder in the first
degree, or no crime at all. 18 Where the evidence tends to prove
murder of the first degree, an instruction that the jury could not
convict of that degree is properly refused. 19 So where there
is no evidence tending to prove murder in the second degree,
instructions as to that crime may be refused. 20
36 S. E. 399; Cannon v. S. 41 Tex.
Cr. App. 467, 56 S. W. 351; Henry
y. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 30 S. W. 802;
Gafford v. S. 125 Ala. 1, 28 So. 406;
McGrath v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. App. 413,
34 S. W. 127; Hays v. S. (Tex. Cr.
App.), 57 S. W. 835; O'Brien v.
Com. 89 Ky. 354, 11 Ky. L. R. 534,
12 S. W. 471; Baker v. S. Ill Ga.
141, 36 S. W. 607; Robinson v. S. 84
Ga. 674, 11 S. E. 544; Waller v. S.
110 Ga. 250, 34 S. E. 212; S. v. Cal-
der, 23 Mont. 504, 59 Pac. 903; S. v.
Hicks, 125 N. Car. 636, 34 S. E. 247;
Stoball v. S. 116 Ala. 452, 23 So.
162; Clarke v. S. 117 Ala. 1, 23 So.
671; S. v. Musick, 101 Mo. 260, 14
S. W. 212; Wilkerson v. S. (Tex.
Cr. App.), 7 S. W. 956; S. v. Van
Tassel, 103 Iowa, 6, 72 N. W. 497;
S. v. Albright, 144 Mo. 638, 46 S.
W. 620; Hart v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.),
44 S. W. 1105; Navarro v. S. (Tex.
Cr. App.), 43 S. W. 105; Dancy v.
S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 46 S. W. 247;
S. v. Smith, 102 Iowa, 656, 72 N. W.'
279; Meyers v. S. 39 Tex. Cr. App.
500. 46 S. W. 817; S. v. Tomasitz,
144 Mo. 86, 45 S. W. 1106; Riddle
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 46 S. W. 1058;
Greer v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 45 S. W.
12; P. v. Fellows, 122 Cal. 233, 54
Pac. 830; P. v. Chaves, 122 Cal. 134,
54 Pac. 596; P. v. Fuhrmann, 103
Mich. 593, 61 N. W. 865; Prewett v.
S. 41 Tex. Cr. App. 262, 53 S. W.
879; P. v. Repke, 103 Mich. 459, 61
N. W. 801; Davis v. United States
165 U. S. 373', 17 Sup. Ct. 360. See
Sparf v. United States 156 U. S. 51,
15 Sup. Ct. 273; Johnson v. S. (Tex.
Cr. App.), 58 S. W. 105; Ho-lloway v.
S. 156 Mo. 222, 56 S. W. 734; S. v.
Jackson, 103 Iowa, 702, 73 N. W.
467; Sandoval v. Ter. 8 N. Mex. 573,
45 Pac. 1125; Aguilar v. Ter. 8 N.
Mex. 496, 46 Pac. 342; S. v. Pun-
shon, 124 Mo. 448, 27 S. W. 1111;
Jahnke v. S. (Neb.), 94 N. W. 158;
S. v. Young, 67 N. J. L. 223, 57
Atl. 939; S. v. Dixon, 131 N. Car.
808, 42 S. E. 944; P. v. Beverly, 108
Mich. 509, 66 N. W. 379; S. v. Har-
lan, 130 Mo. 381, 32 S. W. 997; S.
v. Finley, 118 N. Car. 1161, 24 S. E.
495; S. v. Covington, 117 N. Car.
834, 23 S. E. 337; Hunt v. S. 135
Ala. 1, 33 So. 329. No evidence
tending to reduce from murder to-
manslaughter. Sparf v. United
States 156 U. S. 51, 10 Am. Cr. R.
215, 15 Sup. Ct. 273; P. v. McNut,,
93 Cal. 658, 29 Pac. 243; Clark v.
Com. 123 Pa. St. 555, 16 Atl. 795;
McClernan v. Com. 11 Ky. L. R. 301,
12 S. W. 148.
IT Cupps v. S. (Wis.), 97 N. W.
217.
is Dresback v. S. 38 Ohio St. 369.
See Adams v. S. 29 Ohio St. 414.
is S. v. Barrett, 132 N. Car. 1005,
43 S. E. 832. In this connection it
must not be forgotten that where
the jury are authorized by statute
to determine the degree of guilt,
the court cannot by instruction say
to the jury that if certain enum-
erated facts are established beyond
a reasonable doubt the defendant
is guilty of murder, it being the
province of the jury to determine
the degree of guilt if the accused is
guilty of any offense. See cases
cited under 251.
20 Beard v. S. 41 Tex. Cr. App.
173, 53 S. W. 348; S. v. Baker, 14&
INCLUDED CRIMINAL OFFENSES. 266
The court is not bound to instruct on any included degree
of murder where there is no evidence tending to prove such
included crime; especially is this true if the party complaining
makes no request for such instructions. 21 Thus, for example,
where the evidence shows that a husband, charging his wife
in the grossest terms with improper conduct, struck her and
shot her to death, without provocation, while she was pleading
for mercy, and then seized and shot his child, he was not en-
titled to instructions on murder in the second degree. 22 So under
an indictment charging murder while in the act of committing
rape, an instruction charging that murder in the second degree
and manslaughter are not included in such charge, and that
in case the accused is convicted the verdict should be for murder
in the first degree, is proper. 23
The killing of a person while the accused is attempting to
commit the crime of robbery is murder, as defined by statute
in some of the states; and an instruction on murder in the
second degree in such case may be refused. 2 * In charging the
jury as to the law of murder under such circumstances it is not
necessary to define robbery. 25
270. Evidence supporting included offense Instructions.
If the evidence, though circumstantial, tends to support the charge
of murder in the second as well as the first degree, it is error
to refuse instructions as to the law of murder in the second
degree. 26 Thus, where the evidence discloses that the deceased
Mo. 379, 48 S. W. 475 (facts stated) ; 23 Morgan v. S. 51 Neb. 672, 71
Swan v. S. 39 Tex. Cr. App ; 531, 47 N. W. 788.
S. W. 362; Leslie v. S. (Tex. Cr. 24 s. v. Saxton, 147 Mo. 89, 48
App.), 49 S. W. 73; S. v. Bronstine, S. W. 452; Aiken v. Com. 24 Ky.
147 Mo. 520, 49 S. W. 512. By L. R. 523, 68 S. W. 849; S. v. Young,
statute of Louisiana the jury 67 N. J. L. 223, 51 Atl. 959 (killing
should be instructed that there is while committing burglary). See
no crime known as "murder in the Wilkins v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. App. 525,
second degree," but that the jury 34 S. W. 627.
may find the accused guilty of man- 25 Ransom v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.),
slaughter, S. v. Jones, 46 La. Ann. 70 S. W. 960.
1395, 16 So. 369. 2G Fisher v. S. 23 Mont. 540, 59
21 S. v. Meadows, 156 Mo. 110, 56 Pac. 919; Guerrero v. S. 41 Tex.
S. W. 878; Gafford v. S. 125 Ala. Cr. App. 161, 53 S. W. 119; Lancas-
1. 28 So. 406. See P. v. Worden, 113 ter v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 31 S. W.
Cal. 569, 45 Pac. 844. 515; S. v. O'Reilly, 126 Mo. 597, 29
22 s. v. Duestrow, 137 Mo. 44, 38 S. W. 577; S. v. Bryant, 55 Mo. 75, 2
S. W. 554. Green Cr. R. 612.
267 EVIDENCE SHOWING INCLUDED OFFENSE. 271
was found dead in his wagon, his face cut and battered, and an
ax was found in his wagon with blood on it, and that some flour
had been taken out of the wagon, but there being no evidence
as to how or under what circumstances the killing was done,
it was held error to instruct only on murder in the first degree.
The court, under the circumstances, should have also instructed
on the lower degrees. 27 Also where it appears from the evidence
that the defendant and the deceased had had trouble in their
business affairs ; that the defendant followed the deceased with a
rifle, who had gone up a certain trail; that soon after this a
shot was heard, after which the defendant was seen returning
and that the deceased was found dead from a rifle bullet, a
failure to instruct as to the lower degree of murder was held
error, it being for the jury to determine the degree of the homicide
in the event of a conviction. 28 And in some jurisdictions the
court should instruct as to the lower degree, whether requested
to do so or not, where the evidence warrants the giving of such
instructions.- And the court should instruct on murder in the
second degree where the evidence is entirely circumstantial no
one knowing how the killing was done. 30
In Kentucky the court should instruct as to the law of mur-
der, manslaughter and justifiable homicide in case the evidence
is wholly circumstantial. 31 In Utah it has been held proper to
instruct as to all the degrees of murder, no matter whatever
may be the evidence. 33
271. No evidence of manslaughter Instructions. Where
there is no evidence whatever tending to prove manslaughter
in any degree as defined by statute, the court may properly
refuse to instruct as to such included crimes. 33 And if there
is no evidence whatever tending to prove manslaughter, the
27 Aguilar v. Ter. 8 N. Mex. 496, si Ratchford v. Com. 16 Ky. L. R.
46 Pac. 342. 411, 28 S. W. 499.
28 Ter v. Padilla, 8 N. Mex. 510, 32 p. v . TMede, 11 Utah, 241, 39
46 Pac. 346. Pac. 837.
29 Ter. v. Friday, 8 N. Mex. 204, 33 s. v. Brown, 145 Mo. 680, 47
42 Pac. 62; Ter. v. Vialpando, 8 N. S. W. 789; S. v. Baker, 146 Mo.
Mex. 211, 42 Pac. 64. 379, 48 S. W. 475 (facts) ; S. v. Kin-
so Bennett v. S. 39 Tex. Cr. App. dred, 148 Mo. 270, 49 S. W. 845;
639, 48 S. W. 61; Lancaster v. S. Mills v. S. 104 Ga. 502, 30 S. E. 778;
(Tex. Cr. App.), 31 S. W. 515; Aiken Puller v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 48 S.
v. Com. 24 Ky. L. R. 523, 68 S. W. W. 183; Hatcher v. S. 43 Tex. Cr.
849. App. 237, 65 S. W. 97; Howard v.
272 INCLUDED CRIMINAL OFFENSES. 268
court may properly instruct the jury that the evidence does
not warrant a verdict of that crime. 34 So where the evidence
tends to prove murder the defendant cannot insist on limiting
the instructions to manslaughter. 35
If the evidence shows that the defendant is either guilty of
murder, or that he is entitled to be acquitted on the ground of
self-defense, then it is improper to instruct the jury on the
law of manslaughter. 36 Where the evidence does not show that
the homicide was the result of a sudden quarrel, or that there
was. any reasonable or lawful provocation for the killing, the
accused is not entitled to have the jury instructed on any of the
degrees of manslaughter. 37 And the court need not instruct
on manslaughter where the evidence proves either the crime of
mur,der while in the act of committing robbery, or where the
evidence shows self-defense. 38 In a case where the defense was
insanity, the court having, at the request of counsel for the
accused, instructed on the law of that defense, and the court
having also given the statutory definitions of murder and man-
slaughter, it was held not to be error to refuse an instruction
on manslaughter, though correct as an abstract proposition of
law. 39 Or the defense being insanity, and the accused was either
absolutely insane or not at all, instructions as to the law of
murder of the second degree may be refused. 40
272. Manslaughter Instructions proper. But if there is
any evidence having a tendency to support the included crime
of manslaughter it is error to refuse to instruct the jury as to
the law of manslaughter. 41 If a person, while resisting an il-
S. 115 Ga. 244, 41 S. E. 654; S. v. 39 Reighard v. S. 22 Ohio C. C.
Diller, 170 Mo. 1, 70 S. W. 139; S. 340.
v. Gurley, 170 Mo. 429, 70 S. W. 40 Jarvis v. S. 70 Ark. 613, 67 S.
875; S. v. Hall, 168 Mo. 475, 68 W. 76.
S. W. 344. 41 Horton v. S. 110 Ga. 739, 35 S.
34 Genz v. S. 58 N. J. L. 482, 34 B. 659; Dorsey v. S. 110 Ga. 331, 35
Atl. 816. S. E. 651 (mutual combat); S. v.
ss S. v. Tighe, 27 Mont. 327, 71 Lucey, 24 Mont. 295, 61 Pac. 994;
Pac. 3. Folks v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 58 S. W.
36 Franklin v. S. 34 Tex. Cr. App. 98; Sumner v. S. 109 Ga. 142, 34 S.
625, 31 S. W. 643; May v. S. 94 Ga. E. 293; Hollingsworth v. S. 156 Mo.
76; 20 S. E. 251. 178, 56 S. W. 1087; Beckharn v.
37 S. v. May, 172 Mo. 630, 72 S. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 69 S. W. 534;
W. 918. Stevenson v. U. S. 162 U. S. 313, 16
ss Little v. S. 39 Tex. Cr. App. Sup. Ct. 839; Compton v. S. 110
654, 47 S. W. 984. Ala. 24, 20 So. 119; S. v. Weak-
269 HOMICIDE MANSLAUGHTER INCLUDED. 273
legal arrest, kill the officer who thus seeks to arrest him, the
crime is usually manslaughter, and not murder. In such case
the accused is entitled to have the jury fully instructed on the
law of manslaughter. 42
Where it appears from the evidence that while the deceased
and the defendant were having an altercation, the deceased struck
the defendant in the mouth; that they were then separated,
and that soon afterwards the deceased approached the defend-
ant apparently intending to assault him; and that the evidence
was conflicting as to whether he did assault or strike the de-
fendant, an instruction on manslaughter under such state of facts
is proper. 43 So under an indictment charging murder by the
administration of poison, evidence of the general reputation of
the defendant for peace and good order which tends to raise
a reasonable doubt as to the criminal intent, is sufficient foun-
dation for the giving of instructions as to the included crime of
manslaughter. 44 So, also, if the evidence tends in any manner
to establish the crime of voluntary manslaughter, then an in-
struction as to that offense is proper. 45
273. Involuntary manslaughter Evidence wanting. Where
the evidence shows that the homicide was either murder
in the first degree or the second degree, or that the killing was
done in self-defense, the court niay properly refuse instructions
as to the crime of voluntary manslaughter. 47 But where no one
ly (Mo.), 77 S. W. 527 (fourth 42 Lynch v. S. 41 Tex. Cr. App.
degree); Pollard v. S. (Tex. Cr. 510.-57 S. W. 1130; Mooney v. S.
App.), 73 S. W. 953; Gardner v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 65 S. W. 926. See
(Tex. Cr. App.), 73 S. W. 13; Riptoe Manger v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 69
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 42 S. W. 381; S. W. 145. Contra: S. v. Edwards,
Brande v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 45 126 N. Car. 1051, 35 S. B. 540; Com.
S. W. 17; Hudson v. S. 101 Ga. 520, v . Grether, 204 Pa. 203, 53 Atl. 753.
28 S. E. 1010; Horton v. S. 110 Ga. 43 Castra v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.).
739, 35 S. E. 659; Fendrick v. S. 40 S. W. 985.
39 Tex. Cr. App. 147, 45 S. W. 589; 44 3. v. Ellsworth, 30 Ore. 145, 47
Reddick v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 47 Pac. 199.
S. W. 993; Franklin v. S. (Tex. Cr. 45 Horton v. S. 110 Ga. 739, 35
App.), 48 S. W. 178 (facts); S. v. s. E. 659; Hatcher v. S. 116 Ga. 617,
Grugin, 147 Mo. 39, 47 S. W. 1058. 42 S. E. 1018.
42 L. R. A. 774; Garrison v. S. 147 47 Gafford v. S. 125 Ala. 1, 28 So.
Mo. 548, 49 S. W. 508; S. v. Dyer, 406; Baker v. S. Ill Ga. 141, 36 S.
139 Mo. 199, 40 S. W. 768; S. v. E. 607; Parks v. S. 105 Ga. 242, 31
Shadwell, 26 Mont. 52, 66 Pac. 508; S. E. 580; Pugh v. S. 114 Ga. 16,
Hooper v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 69 S. 39 S. E. 875. See Hollingsworth v.
W. 149. S. 156 Mo. 178, 56 S. W. 1087.
274 INCLUDED CRIMINAL OFFENSES. 270
saw the homicide, instructions should be given on all the de-
grees; also on manslaughter. 48 Likewise where the evidence
tends to support manslaughter of the first degree only, or no
offense, the instructions may be confined accordingly. 49
The accused is not entitled to instructions as to the law of
involuntary manslaughter where the evidence shows an inten-
tional killing without provocation or justification, although he
in his own behalf may state that the killing was accidental. 50
And where the evidence shows the case to be either murder or
voluntary manslaughter, and there is no evidence whatever tend-
ing to establish involuntary manslaughter, it is not necessary to
give instructions defining the latter crime, for to do so would
be directing the attention of the jury to a principle of law not
applicable to the facts of the case, having a tendency to confuse
rather than to enlighten the jury on the issues. 51 And on the
same principle where the evidence shows that the accused is
guilty of either murder or manslaughter, he cannot insist on
instructions as to any included offense lower in degree than
manslaughter. 52
274. Instructions must be requested The failure of the
court to instruct on the lesser or included offense is not error in
the absence of a request for such instructions. 53 So if instruc-
tions on manslaughter are not requested there can be no ground
for complaint that the court did not instruct as to that crime. 54
In the absence of a request for more specific instructions as to
the included crime of manslaughter there is no ground for com-
plaint in that respect, the court having charged the jury in
the language of the statute relating to manslaughter. 55 Or under
an indictment for an attempt to commit rape the defendant must
48 Aiken v. Com, 24 Ky. L. R. 523, Pac. 41; Reynolds v. S. 147 Ind. 3,
68 S. W. 849. 46 N. E. 31; Miller v. P. 23 Colo.
49 P. v. De Garmo, 76 N. Y. S. 95, 46 Pac. Ill; Odette v. S. 90
477, 73 App. Div. 46. Wis. 258, 62 N. W. 1054: Barr v. S.
so Ewatt v. S. 100 Ga. 80, 25 S. E. 45 Neb. 458, 63 N. W. 856; P. v.
846. Arnold, 116 Cal. 682, 48 Pac. 803.
si Davis v. P. 114 111. 86, 97, 29 54 Allen v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 70
,N. E. 192; S. v. Dettmer, 124 Mo. S. W. 85; Tillery v. S. 99 Ga. 209,
426, 27 S. W. 1117; Ragsdale v. S. 25 S. E. 170, the court is not re-
134 Ala. 24, 32 So. 674. quired to instruct on its own mo-
1 52 s. v. Tippet, 94 Iowa, 646, 63 tion.
N. W. 445. ss Hanye v. S. 99 Ga. 212, 25 S.
53 p. v . Barney, 114 Cal. 554, 47 E. 307.
271
FAILURE TO ASK REQUESTS.
274
request instructions on the included offense of simple assault if
he wishes the jury to consider that offense. 56 Likewise on a
charge of robbery, if the accused fails to ask instructions on the
included crime of larceny he cannot complain of error that
the court failed to instruct on larceny. 57 That the court failed
to call the attention of the jury to the fact that the defendant
surrendered himself after killing the deceased cannot be com-
plained of as error, no instruction having been requested on that
point. 58 And there is no error for a failure to charge as to the
punishment for murder, whether by death or by punishment
in the penitentiary, in the absence of a request for such an in-
struction. 59
se p. v . Barney, 114 Cal. 554, 47
Pac. 41.
57 Miller v. P. 23 Colo. 95, 46 Pac.
111.
58 Boston v. S. 94 Ga. 590, 21 S.
E. 603.
59 S. v. Cobbs, 40 W. Va. 718, 22
S. E. 310. An instruction which
states the punishment for each
grade of the different offenses is
sufficient if it describes or defines
each grade in such manner that
the jury may clearly understand
which particular offense is referred
to in the instructions, Clark v. Com.
18 Ky. L. R. 758, 38 S. W. 489. The
giving of instructions on murder in
the first degree is harmless error
where under a fair charge to the
jury the defendant is convicted of
murder in the first degree, S.
v. Alfray, 124 Mo. 393, 27 S. W.
1097. See Gonzales v. S. 35 Tex.
Cr. App. 33, 29 S. W. 1091. And
the giving of instructions as to the
law of murder in the second degree
where the evidence shows murder
only in the first degree, is not er-
ror, Johnson v. S, (Tex. Cr. App.),
4 S. W. 901. Nor is it error to in-
struct on the law of manslaughter
when there is no evidence tending
to prove that crime, Goodwin v.
S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 46 S. W. 226,
See S. v. Cunningham, 111 Iowa,
233, 82 N. W. 775.
CHAPTER XV.
DEFINITION OF OFFENSES.
Sec. Sec.
275. Statutory offenses Instruc- 277. Enumerating elements of of-
tions denning. fense.
276. Elements omitted. 278. Deadly weapon defined.
275. Statutory offenses Instructions defining. The court, in
charging the jury, may give the statutory definition of the offense
with which the accused is charged, in the exact words of the
statute; 1 but the court is not bound to do so. 2 If the instruc-
tions embody all the essential elements of the crime charged
that is sufficient without an instruction giving the statutory
definition. 3 But a departure from the statutory words in de-
fining a criminal offense or some element thereof in giving in-
structions, is error, unless the words used are equivalent in
meaning to the statutory words defining the offense. Thus, "or-
dinary temper and courage" are not of the same meaning as
the statutory words "ordinary temper." 4 And instructions in
the language of the statute defining a crime are proper, although
some of the modes of committing the offense as defined may
not be involved in the case. 5
1 Duncan v. P. 134 111. 110, 24 N. Tex. Cr. App. 400, 37 S. W. 434;
E. 765; Shaw v. S. 102 Ga. 660, 29 Currier v. S. 157 Ind. 114, 60 N.
S. E. 477; Long v. S. 23 Neb. 33, E. 1023, where the jury is not
36 N. W. 310. charged with determining what pen-
2 Carroll v. S. 53 Neb. 431, 73 alty shall be imposed in case the
N. W. 939. defendant is found guilty the in-
s Adkins v. S. 41 Tex. Cr. App. structions .need not state the penal-
577, 56 S. W. 63; Williams v. S. ty.
38 Tex. Cr.' App. 144, 41 S. W. 5 p. v . Chaves, 122 Cal. 134, 54
626; Long v. S. 23 Neb. 33, 36 N. Pac. 596; Sparks v. S. 34 Tex. Cr.
W. 310. App. 86, 29 S. W. 264; P. v. Mills,
* Gardner v. S. 40 Tex. Cr. App. 143 N. Y. 383, 38 N. E. 456; P. v.
19, 48 S. W. 170; Hardy v. S. 36 Hughson, 154 N. Y. 153, 47 N. E.
272
273 OMITTING ELEMENT IN DEFINING. 276
276. Elements omitted. The omission of a material element
of an offense in charging the jury on the definition thereof is
error. For example, in defining perjury the omission from the
instruction of the words ''wilfully and corruptly" renders the
instruction erroneous. 6 Or in a larceny case omitting from an
instruction the element of the value of the property alleged to
have been stolen renders the instruction defective, the value
being an essential element of the offense charged. 7 An instruc-
tion intended as a definition of larceny is fatally defective if it
omits the word "stealing." 8 Also an instruction defining lar-
ceny is fatally defective if it omits the element of criminal in-
tent. 9
So an instruction which attempts to state facts and circum-
stances constituting the crime of assault with intent to kill, is
erroneous if it omits the element of criminal intent. 10 Or an in-
struction on receiving stolen property, which omits the intent
and purpose with which the property was received is erroneous. 11
Or on a trial for forgery an instruction stating that if the de-
fendant wrote the order introduced in evidence, or procured it
to be written, is erroneous, in that it omits the element, "with
intent to defraud." 12 Or in an instruction intended to state the
essential elements of murder in the first degree if the words
''with malice aforethought" be omitted it is erroneous. 13 So
where one portion of a charge does not properly or sufficiently
state the essential elements of the crime, the error will not be
corrected although a full or correct statement of the law may be
given in other portions of the charge. 14
1002. Contra: Whitcomb v. S. 30 312, 43 L. R. A. 423. See Henry v.
Tex. Cr. App. 269, 17 S. W. 258; S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 49 S. W. 96.
Simons v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 34 S. " Goldsberry v. S. (Neb.), 92 N.
W. 619. W. 906.
s S. v. Higgins, 124 Mo. 640, 28 12 Agee v. S. 113 Ala. 52, 21 So.
S. W. 178; Hix v. P. 157 111. 382, 207; Sledge v. S. 99 Ga. 684 26 S.
41 N. E. 862. E. 756.
7 Collins v. P. 39 111. 233, 239. is s. v. Shafer, 22 Mont. 17, 55
s Hix v. P. 157 111. 383, 41 N. E. p a c. 526; Tutt v. Com. 20 Ky. L. R.
862. 492, 46 S. W. 675; Bennett v. S.
9 S. v. Lockland, 136 Mo. 26, 37 39 Tex. Cr. App. 639, 48 S. W. 61;
S. W. 812; S. v. Coy, 119 N. Car. Burton v. S. 107 Ala. 108 18 So.
901, 26 S. E. 120; P. v. Hendrick- 284. See Bunnell v. Com. 17 Ky.
son, 46 N. Y. S. 402, 18 App. Div. L. R. 106, 30 S. W. 604, omitting the
404. See Key v. S. 37 Tex. Cr. word "feloniously" in defining mur-
App. 511, 40 S. W. 296; Beabont v. der is not material error.
S. 37 Tex. Cr. App. 515. 40 S. W. u Mells v. U. S. 164 U. S. 644 17
405. Sup. Ct. 210.
10 Reed v. S. 76 Miss. 211, 24 So.
277 DEFINITIONS OF OFFENSES. 274
277. Enumerating elements of offense. An instruction
which recites all the essential elements or facts necessary to con-
stitute the crime of assault with intent to commit murder, and
which states that if the jury believe that such facts have been
proved beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant is guilty of as-
sault with intent to commit murder, is proper. 15 An instruction
designed as a definition of voluntary manslaughter stating that,
if the defendant took the life of the deceased as charged in the
indictment, he is guilty, is not objectionable in omitting the word
"unlawfully" before the word "took" where the indictment
properly charges the unlawful and felonious killing. 18
In a homicide case an instruction stating that if the defendant
administered poison to his wife and she partook of it and died
from its effects, that is sufficient to establish all the elements of
the crime, is not erroneous where it does not appear from the
evidence that he gave her the drug as a medicine to benefit her. 17
Also charging that if the jury believe from the evidence that
the defendant drew his pistol, and went to the deceased and
struck him with his fist and then shot and killed him, they
might from these facts infer that the defendant killed the de-
ceased wilfully and with malice aforethought, properly states
the law. 18
And under the statute of New York an instruction which
properly defines murder in the first degree, is not rendered erro-
neous by embodying in it other provisions of the statute relating
to homicide having no bearing on the case, if the jury are prop-
erly instructed that a premeditated design to kill must be shown
in order to warrant a conviction. 19 Under the statute of Mis-
souri an instruction stating that if the jury believe from the
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant wilfully,
premeditatedly and of his malice aforethought, shot and killed
the deceased, but without deliberation, they should convict him
of murder of the second degree, correctly states the law. 20
is Crowell v. P. 190 111. 508, 514, i P. v. Hughson, 154 N. Y. 153,
60 N. E. 872. 47 N. E. 1092. See S. v. Anderson,
IB Shields v. S. 149 Ind. 395, 49 10 Ore. 448. See Simons v. S. (Tex.
N. E. 357. Cr. App.), 34 S. W. 619. See, "Stat-
ic S. v. Van Tassel, 103 Iowa, 6, utory Instructions."
72 N. W. 497. 20 S. v. Bauerle, 145 Mo. 1, 46 S.
is Allen v. United States 164 U. "S. W. 609. See Sullivan v. S. 100 Wis.
492, 17 Sup. Ct. 164. 283, 75 N. W. 956.
275 ENUMERATING ELEMENTS DEADLY WEAPON. 278
278. Deadly weapon defined. Any instrument which is likely
to produce death or serious bodily injury from the manner in
which it is used is a proper definition of a deadly weapon. 21 A
charge which defines a deadly weapon to be " anything with
which death may be easily and readily produced," regardless
of the purpose for which it was made, or whether it was made or
not, is not improper. 22 An instruction stating that a certain in-
strument is a dangerous weapon is improper as invading the
province of the jury. 23 The definition of "deadly weapon" need
not be repeated in different instructions when once given. 24
21 Hardy v. S. 36 Tex. Cr. App. 22 Acers v. U. S. 164 U. S. 388, 17
400, 37 S. W. 434; Acers v. U. S. Sup. Ct. 91.
164 U.S. 388, 17 Sup. Ct. 91; Mikel 23 Doering v. S. 49 Ind. 56.
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 68 S. W. 512; 2* s. v. Smith, 164 Mo. 567, 65 S.
Toilet v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 55 S. W. 270 (billiard cue).
W. 335.
CHAPTER XVI.
CRIMINAL INTENT.
Sec.
279. Intent inferred from acts and
words.
280. On evidence disproving intent.
281. Drunkenness disproving in-
tent.
Sec.
282. Malice and malice afore-
thought.
283. On inferring malice Improp-
er.
279. Intent inferred from acts and words. Every sane man
is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of
his acts, and it has been uniformly held, therefore, that the
intent to commit a criminal offense may be inferred from the
acts, words or declarations of the person accused, as well as from
the manner and circumstances of the act committed, 1 and the
court in charging the jury may instruct them accordingly. 2 Thus
an instruction that the defendant is presumed to intend all the
natural, probable and usual consequences of his acts is proper,
especially when the act is committed voluntarily and wilfully. 3
i Crosby v. P. 137 111 336, 27 N.
E. 49; Fitzpatrick v. P. 98 111. 269;
S. v. Kortgaard, 62 Minn. 7, 64 N.
W. 51; Weaver v. P. 132 111. 536,
24 N. E. 571; Hanrahan v. P. 91
111. 147; Conn v. P. 116 111. 464,
6 N. E. 463; Donaway v. P.
110 111. 333; Perry v. P. 14 111. 496;
P. v. Langton, 67 Cal. 427, 7 Pac.
.843; 7 Am. Cr. R. 439; S. v. Milhol-
land, 89 Iowa 5, 56 N. E. 403; Rosin
v. U. S. 161 U. S. 29, 16 Sup. Ct.
43; S. v. Patterson, 116 Mo. 505,
22 S. W. 696; S. v. Barbee, 92 N.
Oar. 820, 6 Am. Cr. R. 180, 3 Green-
leaf Ev. 13, 14. See S. v. Shep-
pard, 49 W Va. 582, 39 S. E. 676,
instructions held erroneous.
^Krehnavy v. S. 43 Neb. 337, 61
N. W. 628; P. v. Langton, 67 Cal.
427, 7 Pac. 843.
s Jackson v. P. 18 111. 270; P. v.
Langton, 67 Cal. 427, 7 Pac. 843,
7 Am. Cr. R. 439; Krehnavy v. S.
43 Neb. 337, 61 N. W. 628; Achey
v. S. 64 Ind. 59 (form); S. v. Wis-
dom, 84 Mo. 177. Contra: Black v.
S. 18 Tex. App. 124; Rogers v. Com.
16 Ky. L. R. 199, 27 S. W. 813; P. v.
Willett, 36 Hun (N. Y.), 500.
276
277 INTENT INFERRED. 281
Also a charge which in substance states that if the jury believe
beyond a reasonable doubt that the wrongful act had been inten-
tionally committed, that is prima facie, but not conclusive proof,
of criminal intent, is proper.* So it is proper to instruct that
where an assault is made with a deadly weapon used in such man-
ner as to be reasonably calculated to destroy life, the criminal
intent may be inferred. 5
An instruction that "if the instrument used be a deadly
v weapon, the use of it is conclusively presumed to be from a
felonious and malicious intent, and the defendant must excuse the
intent by proof or he will be held guilty," is inconsistent and
contradictory. 6 A charge that if the jury believe from the* evi-
dence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant shot the
deceased in a vital part and ^killed him, then, there being no evi-
dence tending to disprove malicious intent, they should find that
he intended to kill is proper. 7 But if the evidence fails to
show any act or statement tending to support the inference
of criminal intent then an instruction as to inferring such intent
is improper and erroneous. 8
280. On evidence disproving intent. Where there is any
evidence tending to disprove malicious or criminal intent it is
error to refuse to submit to the jury by proper instructions
whether or not such intent existed, especially where a specific
intent is an element of the crime charged. 9
281. Drunkenness disproving intent. It is not improper to
instruct on the law as to drunkenness where it appears from
the evidence that the defendant was intoxicated at the time of
the alleged criminal act. 10 At common law voluntary intoxication,
4 U. S. v. Folson, 7 N. Mex. 532, v. P. 27 Colo. 206, 60 Pac. 485; Dor-
38 Pac. 70. sey v. S. 110 Ga. 351, 35 S. E. 651.
s Voght v. S. 145 Ind. 12, 43 N. E. s S. v. Kelly (Vt), 51 Atl. 434.
1049; Godwin v. S. 73 Miss. 873, 9 Smith v. S. 75 Miss. 542, 23 So.
19 So. 712. 260; Pena v. S. 38 Tex. Cr. App.
a Armstrong v. P. 38 111. 513; S. v. 333, 42 S. W. 991; Darity v. S. 38
Painter, 67 Mo. 84 (meaningless and Tex. Cr. App. 546, 43 S. W. 982,
absurd). (specific intent); Bailus v. S. 16
7 S. v. Silk, 145 Mo. 240, 44 S. Ohio C. C. 227.
W. 764. See S. v. Dolan, 17 Wash. 10 Upchurch v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.),
499, 50 Pac. 472- Dennis v. S. 118 39 S. W. 371. See Maynard v. S.
Ala. 72, 23 So. 1002. Contra: Nilan (Tex. Cr. App.), 39 S. W. 667; P. v.
Fish, 125 N. Y. 136, 26 N. E. 319.
281 CRIMINAL INTENT. 278
as distinct from mania a potu, furnishes no excuse, justifica-
tion or extenuation for a crime committed under its influence. 11
While drunkenness is no excuse for the commission of a criminal
offense, yet where a specific intent is necessary to be proved
before a conviction can be had, it is competent to show that
the accused was at the time wholly incapable of forming such
intent whether from intoxication or otherwise. In other words,
it is a proper defense to show that the accused was intoxicated
to such degree as rendered him incapable of entertaining the'
specific intent essential to the commission of the crime charged ;
and any instruction given to the jury which deprives the accused
pf that defense is therefore improper and erroneous. 12
Thus, an instruction stating that drunkenness is no excuse
for the commission of any crime or misdemeanor, unless such
drunkenness was occasioned by fraud, contrivance or force of
some other person for the purpose of causing the perpetration of
an offense, and that where the act of the defendant would be
criminal if committed when he was sober, the fact that he com-
mitted such act while intoxicated will constitute no defense,
unless his intoxication was caused by some other person for the
purpose above stated, and this is the rule even where such
intoxication is so extreme as to make the defendant uncon-
scious of what he was doing, is erroneous. 13 And where there
is evidence tending to support such defense the defendant, on
making proper request, is entitled to have the jury instructed on
intoxication. 14 On the trial of a case in which a specific intent
is an essential element of the crime charged, it is error to refuse
to charge the jury that if they entertain a reasonable doubt
whether the defendant was sufficiently sober to form such intent,
11 Underbill Cr. Ev. 164, citing: derhill Cr. Ev. 166, citing: S.
4 Blackstone Comm. 25, 26; 1 Hale, v. Zarn, 22 Ore. 591, 30 Pac. 317;
P. C. 32; Bacon's Maxims, Rule 5; Com. v. Hagenlock, 140 Mass. 125,
Garner v. S. 28 Fla. 113, 153, 9 So. 3 N. E. 36; Cline v. S. 43 Ohio St.
835; Colee v. S. 75 Ind. 515; Hopt 332, 1 N. E. 22; Aszman v. S. 123
v. P. 104 U. S. 633; Godwin v. S. Tnd. 347, 24 N. E. 123; Chrisman v.
96 Ind. 550; Wagner v. S. 116 Ind. S. 54 Ark. 288, 15 S. W. 889; Booher
186, 18 N. E. 833; S. v. Murphy, 118 v. S. 156 Ind. 435, 60 N. E. 156.
Mo. 7, 25 S. W. 95; P. v. Miller, is Schwabacher v. P. 165 111. 629,
114 Cal. 10, 45 Pac. 986. 46 N. E. 809. See Mclntyre v. P.
12 Schwabacher v. P. 165 111. 619, 38 111. 520.
46 N. E. 809; Crosby v. P. 137 111. 1* P. v. Hill, 123 Cal. 47, 55 Pac.
340, 27 N. E. 49. See R'eed v. 692; S. v. Pasnau, 118 Iowa, 501,
Com. 98 Va. 817, 36 S. E. 399; Un- 92 N. W. 682.
279 MALICE MALICE AFORETHOUGHT. 282
they could, not find him guilty. 15 So the giving of an instruction
that drunkenness is no excuse for the commission of a crime is
improper where the drunkenness is shown in evidence, not as
an excuse, but as the contributing cause of death by accident. 16
282. Malice and malice aforethought. Malice, when an es-
sential element of a case, is a fact to be determined by the jury
from the evidence; 17 but the court in charging the jury may
define the term. 18 The law implies malice from the unlawful
killing with a deadly weapon and thus imposes upon the accused
the burden of showing a want of malice ; 19 and an instruction to
the jury to that effect is proper. 20
In a homicide case the mere fact that the accused may have
killed another is not sufficient to warrant the giving of an instruc-
tion on a charge of murder. 21 It must appear that the killing
was done with malice aforethought to constitute the crime. 22
Hence an instruction which undertakes to enumerate and sub-
mit to the jury for their determination what facts must be
established to warrant a conviction of murder, but which omits
the element of malice aforethought, is fatally defective. 23
is Whitten v. S. 115 Ala. 72, 22 Iowa. 686, 92 N. W. 872. See S. v.
So. 483. See Booher v. S. 156 Ind. Dolan, 17 Wash. 499, 50 Pac. 472;
435, 60 N. E. 156. S. v. Moody, 18 Wash. 165, 51 Pac.
is S. v. Cross, 42 W. Va. 253, 24 356.
S. E. 996. An instruction that "the 19 Hughes Cr. Law, 136, citing:
jury must bear in mind that it is Bankhead v. S. 124 Ala. 14, 26 So.
only the effect of intoxication, had ,979; S. v. McDonnell, 32 Vt. 491;
upon the prisoner's mind in regard McQueen v. S. 103 Ala. 12, 15 So,
to his ability to design, deliberate 824; S. v. Decklotts, 19 Iowa, 447;
and meditate upon and fully com- Kent v. P. 8 Colo. 563, 9 Pac. 852;
prehend the act he did previous to S. v. Earnest, 56 Kas. 31, 42 Pac.
its performance, which is material," 359; Holderman v. Ter. (Ariz.), 60
has been held to be a proper state- Pac. 876.
ment of the law, Com. v. Me- 20 g. v. Zeibert, 40 Iowa, 173; Jen-
Gowen, 189 Pa. St. 641, 41 Atl. 365. kins v. S. 82 Ala. 25, 2 So. 150.
See Com. v. Van Horn, 188 Pa. 21 Hunter v. S. 74 Miss. 515, 21
St. 143, 41 Atl. 469. So. 305.
17 Harpham v. Whitney, 77 111. 22 Tutt v. Com. 20 Ky. L. R. 492,
38; Frankfurter v. Bryan, 12 111. 46 S. W. 675; S. v. Shafer (Mont.),
App. 549; Harrell v. S. 39 Tex. Cr. 55 Pac. 526; Bennett v. S. 39 Tex.
App. 204, 45 S. W. 581; Hidy v. Cr. App. 639, 48 S. W. 61.
Murray, 101 Iowa, 65, 69 N. W. 1138; 23 Tutt. v. Com. Ky. L. R. 492,
Hirsch v. Feeney, 83 111. 548; Rit- 46 S. W. 675; S. v. Sch'afer (Mont.),
ter v. Swing, 174 Pa. St. 341, 34 Atl. 55 Pac. 526; Bennett v. S. 39 Tex.
584; McClafferty v. Philp, 151 Pa. Cr. App. 639, 48 S. W. 61; Coffey
St. 86, 24 Atl. 1042; Ellis v. Sim- v. S. (Miss.), 24 So. 315; S. v. Smith,
onds, 168 Mass. 316, 47 N. E. 116. 102 Iowa, 656, 72 N. W. 279. See
is Harrell v. S. 39 Tex. Cr. App. Leslie v. S. 42 Tex. Cr. App. 65,
204, 45 S. W. 581; S. v. Hunter, 118 57 S. W. 659.
283 CRIMINAL INTENT. 280
An instruction, therefore, which submits that if the defendant
"wilfully, feloniously and maliciously" killed the deceased he
would be guilty of murder is erroneous in omitting the phrase
"with malice aforethought." 24 Or an instruction that if the
defendant "with a sedate and deliberate mind and formed design
to kill, did unlawfully shoot and kill" the deceased, they should
find him guilty of murder in the first degree, is erroneous in
omitting the element of malice aforethought, although that ele-
ment be clearly defined in another part of the charge. 25
283. Instructions on inferring malice Improper. A person
may intentionally kill another and the act will be neither murder
nor manslaughter. The intentional killing of an assailant in
necessary, self-defense is no crime whatever. An instruction,
therefore, which states that if the defendant intended to kill
the deceased the law will hold him responsible criminally, is erro-
neous. 26 So an instruction that "if one person attacks another
without justifiable cause, and from the violence used death ensues,
the question which arises is whether the killing be murder or
manslaughter ; that if the weapon used was a deadly weapon it is
reasonable to infer that the person making the attack intended
death and death was the consequence of his act, it is murder,"
for the same reason is fatally defective. 27 Where the court
instructs that if the evidence shows that the health of the de-
ceased was such that at the time he was struck by the
defendant it was reasonably probable that death might ensue
or that death might be hastened by the blow, then the defendant
would be guilty, is erroneous, in that it fails to state that the
act was unlawfully committed by the defendant. 28
24 Tutt v. Com. 20 Ky. L. R. 492, 50 Pac. 405; Smith v. P. 142 111.
46 S. W. 675; S. v. Schafer (Mont.), 120, 31 N. E. 599.
55 Pac. 526. 27 Smith v. P. 142 111. 123, 31 N.
25 Bennett v. S. 39 Tex. Cr. App. E. 599,
639, 48 S. W. 61. Contra: S. v. 28 Wooten v. S. 99 Tenn. 189, 41
Hunt, 141 Mo. 626, 43 S. W. 389. S. W. 813.
28 p. v. Newcomer, 118 Cal. 263,
CHAPTER XVII.
STATUTORY INSTRUCTIONS.
Sec.
284. Instructions in words of stat-
ute.
Sec.
285.
286.
Instructions in words of stat-
ute Improper, when.
Copying extracts from cases.
284. Instructions in words of statute. As a general rule
the giving of instructions in the words of the statute is proper,
although some of its terms, perhaps, ought to be explained; 1
or an instruction substantially in the language of the statute
is not objectionable. 2 If any of the terms of a statute be ambig-
uous a party will not be heard to complain of the court stating
the law to the jury in the language of the statute without explain-
ing such terms, in the absence of a request for such explana-
tion. 3
Thus, under the statute of Florida, it is proper in charging the
jury to give the definition of manslaughter and justifiable homi-
cide in the exact words of the statute ; 4 also of murder as defined
by the statute of Mississippi. 5
1 Town of Fox v. Town of Ken-
dall, 97 111. 80; Mt. Olive & S. Coal
Co. v. Rademacher, 190 111. 543,
60 N. E. 888; P. v. Mills, 143 N. Y.
383, 38 N. E. 456; Rogers v. S.
(Miss.), 21 So. 130; Dunn v. P. 109
111. 642.
2 Petefish v. Becker, 176 111. 455,
52 N. E. 71; Neiders v. Bell, 174
111. 325, 51 N. E. 855, refusing in-
structions reciting statutory pro-
visions, not error. Referring to a
statute by name, as for instance,
the "statute of frauds," in giving
instructions without explaining its
meaning is error; it is calculated
to confuse and mislead the jury.
Moshier v. Kitchell & Arnold, 87
111. 18. 22. Reference need not be
made to the common law in charg-
ing the jury where offense is based
upon a statute. Com. v. O'Brien,
172 Mass. 248, 52 N. E. 77.
3 Bailey v. Campbell, 2 111. (1
Scam.), 110.
* Driggers v. S. 38 Fla. 1, 20 So.
758.
s Rogers v. S. (Miss.), 21 So. 130.
281
285 STATUTORY INSTRUCTIONS. 282
The court is not required to give instructions defining words
or phrases of the statute which are used in their ordinary sense
and are easily understood. Thus, for instance, the words "serious
bodily injury" used in defining an aggravated assault and bat-
tery, need not be defined in the instructions. The giving of
an instruction in the language of the statute containing provisions
not relevant to the issues in the case is not error unless prejudi-
cial to the rights of the party complaining. 7 Where the court
has charged the jury in the language of the statute in one part
of the charge which defines an offense, it is not error if some mate-
rial word should be omitted in a subsequent part of the charge
which refers to the same statute. 8
285. In words of statute Improper, when. But it is not
always proper to give instructions in the language of the statute
without qualification. In Illinois the giving of an instruction on
the law of self-defense on homicide, in the words of the statute,
is error. 9 The statute mentioned is as follows : " If a person kill
another in self-defense, it must appear that the danger was so
urgent and pressing that in order to save his own life, or to pre-
vent his receiving great bodily harm, the killing of the other
was absolutely necessary; and it must appear also, that the per-
son killed was the assailant, or that the slayer had really,
and in good faith, endeavored to decline any further struggle
before the mortal blow was given." 10 The giving of an instruc-
tion in the language of this statute without qualification, limits
the right of self-defense to actual danger, no matter how threat-
ening may be the appearances, and deprives the defendant of
6 De Los Santos v. S. (Tex. Cr. jury may read the statutes defin-
App.), 31 S. W. 395; Humphreys v. ing the offense including the law,
S. 34 Tex. Cr. App. 434, 30 S. W. as to the penalty, with which th&
1066. defendant is charged. Com. v. Har-
7 P. v. Burns, 63 Cal. 614; S. v. ris 168 Pa. St. 619, 32 All. 92; Miller
Anderson, 10 Ore. 448; Needham v. v. Com. (Va.), 21 S. E. 499; P. v.
P. 98 111. 275; P. v. Hughson, 154 Henderson, 28 Cal. 465; Simons v
N. Y. 153, 47 N. E. 1092. Contra: S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 34 S. W. 619;
Whitcomb v. S. 30 Tex. App. 269, Ter. v. Mahaffey, 3 Mont. 116.
17 S. W. 258. See Simons v. S. Gainey v. P. 97 111. 277; McCoy
(Tex. Cr. App.), 34 S. W. 619. See v. P. 175 111. 230, 51 N. E. 777;
"Definition of Offenses." Enright v. P. 155 111. 35, 39 N. E.
8 Winkles v. S. 114 Ga. 449, 40 561; S. v. Laurie, 1 Mo. App. 371.
S. E. 259, intentionally omitted; 10 Kurd's 111. Stat. 149, Chap.
Under the practice in some of the 38 Cr. Code.
states the court in charging the
283 COPYING FROM REPORTS. 286
the right to act in self-defense unless the killing was "abso-
lutely necessary." 11
286. Copying extracts from cases In framing instructions
it is not a wise practice to copy extracts or expressions from
reported cases and formulate them into instructions. Such ex-
tracts may properly state the law applicable to the case from
which they are copied, but not applicable to some other case
of a different state of facts. 12 Such practice is held to be proper,
however, if the instructions thus framed correctly state the law
applicable to facts in issue. 13 So upon the same principle instruc-
tions may be framed by copying extracts from text-books (or
read by the court according to the practice), providing such
instructions properly state the law applicable to the facts of the
case. 14 The court, however, is not bound to give such instruc-
tions, but may frame the charge in its own language. 15
11 Enright v. P. 155 111. 35, 39 N. ia P. v. Minnaugh, 131 N. Y. 563,
E. 561; McCoy v. P. 175 111. 230, 51 29 N. E. 750; Estate of Spencer, 96
N. E. 777; Gainey v. P. 97 111. 277. Cal. 448, 31 Pac. 453; Power v. Har-
See Kinney v. P. 108 111. 524. low, 57 Mich. 107, 23 N. W. 606;
12 Smoke &c. Co. v. Lyford Kirby v. Wilson, 98 111. 240; Henry
123 111. 300, 13 N. E, 844; Centra- v. Klopfer, 147 Pa. St. 178, 23 Atl.
lia & C. R. Co. v. Rixman, 121 111. 338.
214, 12 N. E. 685. See Merrietta i* P. v. Wayman, 128 N. Y. 585,
& C. R. Co. v. Picksley, 24 Ohio 27 N. E. 1070; Bronnenburg v. Char-
St. 668. See generally: Etchepare man, 80 Ind. 475.
v. Aguirre, 91 Cal. 288, 27 Pac. 668; is P. v. Wayman, 128 N. Y 585,
Laidlaw v. Sage, 80 Hun (N. Y.), 27 N. E. 1070; P. v. Niles, 44 Mich.
550; Freeman v. Weeks, 48 Mich. 606, 7 N. W. 192.
255, 12 N. W. 215; Power v. Harlow.
57 Mich. 107, 23 N. W. 606.
CHAPTER XVIII.
ACCOMPLICE AS WITNESS.
Sec. Sec.
287. Accomplice defined. 291. Instructions assuming witness
288. Testimony of accomplice is an accomplice.
How considered. 292. Duty to instruct on accom-
289. Testimony of accomplice plioes without request.
When corroboration is neces- 293. Principal and accessory In-
sary. structions.
290. Is witness an accomplice In-
structions.
287. Accomplice defined. An accomplice is one who is in
some way concerned in the commission of a crime, though not as
principal ; and this includes all persons who have been concerned
in its commission, whether they are considered in strict legal pro-
priety as principals in the first or second degree, or merely as
accessories before or after the fact. 1 Another definition of an
accomplice is one of many equally concerned in a felony, the
term being generally applied to those who are admitted to give
evidence against their fellow criminals for the furtherance of
justice which might otherwise be excluded. 2
288. Testimony of accomplice How considered. In the ab-
sence of statutory provision, the jury may, if they see fit, convict
on the uncorroborated testimony of accomplices alone, but such
testimony should be acted upon with great care and caution;
and it is the practice for the court to instruct the jury accord-
ingly. 3 The refusal to direct the jury to weigh the testimony
1 Cross v. P. 47 111. 58, 4 Black- s Hoyt v. P. 140 111. 596, 30 N. E.
stone Comm. 331; 1 Bouvier Law 315, 16 L. R. A. 239; S. v. Dana,
Diet. 46. . 59 Vt. 614, 10 Atl. 727; S. v. Wool-
2 Cross v. P. 47 111. 58. ard, 111 Mo. 248, 20 S. W. 27. See
284
285
TESTIMONY OF ACCOMPLICE CONSIDERED.
288
of accomplices with great care and caution may under some
circumstances be prejudicial error. 4 Especially should the jury
be directed to act upon such testimony with great caution where
they are cautioned as to the testimony of the defendant. 5
The court should instruct the jury to consider the induce-
ments and influences for hope or promises under which an accom-
plice gives his testimony, as affecting his credibility as a witness,
and a refusal to so instruct is error. 6 The giving of such
cautionary instruction is not improper in not defining the phrase
"with great caution." 7 An instruction that the jury should
weight the testimony of an accomplice "with great caution," and
that they may disregard it if they believe it to be untrue, is
proper. 8 Also a charge that if the jury believe from the evi-
dence that such witness has wilfully sworn falsely to any mate-
Tuberson v. S. 26 Fla. 472, 7 So.
858; P. v. Sternberg, 111 Cal. 11,
43 Pac. 201; Shiver v. S. 41 Fla.
631, 27 So. 36; S. v. Kennedy, 154
Mo. 268, 55 S. W. 293; Wisdom v.
P. 11 Colo. 170, 17 Pac. 519; Allen
v. S. 10 Ohio St. 288; Waters v.
P. 172 111. 371, 50 N. E. 148; Under-
bill Cr. Ev. 71. See also Cox
v. Com. 125 Pa. St. 94 17 Atl. 227;
Flanagin v. S. 25 Ark. 96; Com. v.
Bosworth, 22 Pick. (Mass.), 398;
S. v. Barber, 113 N. Car. 711, 18
S. E. 515; Ulmer v. S. 14 Ind. 52;
S. v. Prudhomme, 25 La. Ann. 525;
Rex v. Wilkes, 7 C. & P. 272; S. v.
Hardin, 19 N. Car. 407; Collins v. P.
98 111. 589; S. v. Betsall, 11 W. Va.
704; Fitzcox v. S. 52 Miss. 923;
Ingall v. S. 48 Wis. 647, 4 N. W.
785; U. S. v. Neverson, 1 Mackey
(D. C.), 154.
4 Hoyt v. P. 140 111. 596, 30 N. E.
315, 16 L. R. A. 239; P. v. Stern-
burg, 111 Cal. 11, 43 Pac. 201; S. v.
Woolard, 111 Mo. 248, 20 S. W. 27.
See also Cheatham v. S. 67 Miss.
335, 7 So. 204; S. v. Jones, 64 Mo.
391; S. v. Potter, 42 Vt. 495 (not
error to refuse).
s S. v. Meyesenburg, 171 Mo. 1,
71 S. W. 239.
e Ter. v. Chavez, 8 N. Mex. 528,
45 Pac. 1107. Where on a plea of
guilty to a charge of murder, the
testimony of an accomplice is the
only evidence as to the degree of
the crime, the defendant is entitled
to have the jury instructed on the
testimony of an accomplice, Mar-
tin v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 38 S. W.
194.
T Home F. Ins. Co. v. Decker,
55 Neb. 346, 75 N. W. 841. An
instruction on accomplices is suffi-
cient if it refers to the testimony of
an accomplice without adding "or
accomplices," Yontz v. Com. 23 Ky.
L. R. 1850, 66 S. W. 383.
s Wilson v. S. 71 Miss. 880, 16
So. 304; P. v. Sternberg, 111 Cal.
11, 43 Pac. 201; Brown v. S. 72
Miss. 990, 18 So. 431 (modified by
adding: if the Jury have a reason-
able doubt of its truth); Wisdom
v. P. 11 Colo. 170, 11 Pac. 519; S. v.
Coates, 22 Wash. 601, 61 Pac. 726;
P. v. Bonney, 98 Cal. 278, 33 Pac.
98; S. v. Kellerman, 14 Kas. 135;
U. S. v. Sykes, 58 Fed. 1004; P. v.
Costello, 1 Denio (N. Y.), 87; Ar-
nold v. S. 5 Wyo. 439, 40 Pac. 967;
S. v. Dana, 59 Vt. 614, 10 Atl. 727;
Fan-all v. Broadway, 95 N. Car.
551; S. v. Donnelly, 130 Mo. 642, 32
S. W. 1124; S. v. Dawson, 124 Mo.
418, 27 S. W. 1104.
289 ACCOMPLICES AS WITNESSES. 286
rial matter they may disregard his entire testimony, is proper
and its refusal is error. 9
The court may, in its discretion, advise the jury that they
ought not to convict on the uncorroborated testimony of an ac-
complice, but it is not bound to do so. 10 An instruction that
it would not be safe to convict upon the testimony of an accom-
plice unless corroborated on some material point, and that such
testimony should be carefully scrutinized, has been held to be
improper. 11 Where the court charges that the accomplice has
turned state's evidence to avoid the consequences of his part
in the affair, and that the jury should take the circumstances
into consideration in weighing his testimony, the refusal of
an instruction that it is generally unsafe to convict on the testi-
mony of an accomplice is not prejudicial error. 12
289. Testimony of accomplice When corroboration is nec-
essary. Statutes exist in some of the states prohibiting a convic-
tion on the uncorroborated testimony of accomplices, and the de-
fendant, on making proper request, is entitled to instructions to
that effect when warranted by the evidence; and it is error for
the court to refuse. 13 And the nature and character of the corrob-
orative testimony should be described or defined by proper in-
structions. 14 The defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed
as to the meaning of corroborative evidence. 15 And the instruc-
tion must relate to the commission of the specific crime charged
in the indictment and not to other offenses. 16 If there is evidence
independent of the testimony of an accomplice tending to con-
nect the accused with the commission of the crime charged,
9 Owens v. S. 80 Miss. 499, 32 So. 12 Com. v. Bishop, 165 Mass. 148,
152. It has been held improper to 42 N. E.560, the accomplice was cor-
instruct that the testimony of the roborated.
wife of an accomplice should be is Martin v. S. 36 Tex. Cr. 632,
considered by the jury with cau- 36 S. W. 587, 38 S. W. 194; S. v.
tion, Crittenden v. S. 134 Ala. 145, Reavis, 71 Mo. 419; Stewart v. S.
32 So. 273. 35 Tex. Cr. App. 174, 32 S. W. 766;
10 Reg v. Farler, 8 C. & P. 106; S. v. Patterson, 52 Kas 335, 34 Pac.
Collins v. P. 98 111. 589; Com. v. 784; Bernhard v. S. 76 Ga. 613.
Bishop, 165 Mass. 148, 42 N. E. Mitchell v. S. 38 Tex. Cr. App.
560; S. v. Haney, 19 N. Car. 390; 325, 42 S. W. 989; S. v. Pratt, 98
Black v. S. 59 Wis. 471, 18 N. W. Mo. 482, 11 S. W. 977.
457; Allen v. S. 10 Ohio St. 288; S. IB P. v. Sternberg, 111 Cal. 11, 43
v. Potter, 45 Vt. 495; Com. v. Pac. 201; Crawford v. S. (Tex. Cr.
Holmes, 127 Mass. 424. App.), 34 S. W. 927.
11 Com. v. Glume, 162 Mass. 206, ie P. v. Ward, 134 Cal. 301, 66
38 N. E. 435. Pac. 372.
287 CORROBORATION REQUIRED WHEN. 290
then an instruction directing the jury to acquit if they believe
the witnesses were accomplices is properly refused. 17 And the
court must determine, as a question of law, whether there is
any evidence other than the testimony of accomplices tending
to connect the defendant with the crime charged. 18
Where a statute requires corroboration of an accomplice, such
requirement should be substantially observed without the omis-
sion of any material thing mentioned in the statute. Thus, where
a statute provides that such corroboration is not sufficient "if it
merely shows the commission of the offense or the circumstances
thereof/' an instruction based on such statute which omits the
element "or the circumstances thereof" is defective. 19 The refusal
of an instruction as to the corroboration of an accomplice, al-
though in the language of the statute, is not error where others
in the charge in substance state that the testimony of an accom-
plice must be corroborated by other evidence tending to connect
the defendant with the commission of the crime charged. 20
One accomplice cannot corroborate another accomplice, and
an instruction which in substance informs the jury, in so many
words, is sufficient, though not stated in distinct terms. 21 A
charge that one accomplice cannot corroborate another accom-
plice is properly refused in the absence of any evidence tending
to show that the corroborating witness was an. accomplice. 22
290. Is witness an accomplice Instructions The evidence,
of course, must show that the witness testifying was in fact
an accomplice before the court is required to give instructions
on the law relating to the testimony of accomplices; 23 and it
must also appear that he in his testimony stated material facts
IT Henry v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), W. -849; S. v. McDonald, 57 Kas.
43 S. W. 340. 537, 46 Pac. 966.
is Kent v. S. 64 Ark. 247, 41 S. 21 Stevens v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.),
W. 849. The court should specifl- 49 S. W. 105.
cally instruct the jury that the 22 Pace v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 31
corpus delicti of an offense can not S. W. 173.
be proved by the testimony of ac- 23 Robinson v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. App.
complice alone. Truelove v. S. 54, 43 S. W. 526; Brann v. S. (Tex.
(Tex. Cr. App.), 71 S. W. 601. Cr. -App.), 39 S. W. 940; Parr v. S.
19 S. v. Smith, 102 Iowa, 656, 72 36 Tex. Cr. App. 493, 38 S. W. 180;
N. W. 279; S. v. Jackson, 103 Iowa, P. v. Chadwick, 7 Utah, 134, 25
702, 73 N. W. 467. See S. v. Smith, Pac. 737. See Prendergast v. S. 41
106 Iowa, 701, 77 N. W. 499 (hold- Tex. Cr. App. 358, 57 S. W. 850; S.
ing instruction proper). v. Burns (Nev.), 74 Pac. 984.
20 Kent v. S. 64 Ark. 247, 41 S.
291 ACCOMPLICE AS WITNESS. 288
connecting or tending to connect the accused with the commis-
sion of the crime charged to entitle the defendant to such instruc-
tions. 24 If there is any evidence from which the jury might
fairly infer that a witness was an accomplice, it is sufficient
to warrant the giving of such instruction; and such inference
may be drawn from the testimony of the witness himself. 25 And
where it is suspected that a witness is or was an accomplice,
the fact as to whether he was or was not may be submitted
by instruction for the jury to determine, together with the effect
of complicity on his testimony, 20 but it is error to submit the
determination of the question to the jury without telling them
what an accomplice is. 27 And in explaining the meaning of
accomplice it is sufficient to give the statutory definition. 28 Mere
suspicion, however, against a witness is not sufficient to warrant
the conclusion that he was an accomplice ; so an instruction stat-
ing that a witness is an accomplice is properly refused if there
is no evidence to that effect. 29
In a larceny case one who receives the stolen goods knowing the
same to have been stolen is, on his becoming a witness for the
prosecution, an accomplice, and the defendant is entitled to have
the jury instructed on the law of accomplices. 30 Also on a
charge of incest, where there is evidence tending to show that
the woman consented to sexual intercourse with the defendant,
the court should charge the jury that if they believe she was an
accomplice they must find that she has been corroborated before
they could convict the defendant. 31
291. Instructions assuming witness is an accomplice. Where
the evidence conclusively shows that a witness is an accomplice,
24 Moseley v. S. 36 Tex. Cr. App. as Grinsinger v. S. (Tex. Cr.
578, 37 S. W. 736; Waggoner v. S. App.), 69 S. W. 583.
35 Tex. Cr. App. 199, 32 S. W. 896 29 s. v. Haynes, 7 N. Dak. 352, 75
(accomplices refuse to testify). N. W. 267; Smith v. S. 36 Tex. Cr.
25 Arnold v. S. 5 Wyo. 439, 40 Pac. App. 442, 37 S. W. 743; Smith v. S.
967; Conde v. S. 33 Tex. Cr. App. 10 Wyo. 157, 67 Pac. 977; O'Con-
10, 24 S. W. 415. nor v. S. 28 Tex. App. 288, 13 S.
26 s. v. Haynes, 7 N. Dak. 352, W. 14.
75 N. W. 267; Martin v. S. (Tex.'Cr. so Kelly v. S. 34 Tex. Cr. App.
App.), 43 S. W. 352; White v. S. 412, 31 S. W. 174.
42 Tex. Cr. App. 567, 62 S. W. 575. " Stewart v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. App.
27 Thomas v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 174, 32 S. W. 766; Coburn v. S. 36
73 S. W. 1045; Carroll v. S. 45 Ark. Tex. Cr. App. 257, 36 S. W. 442.
539; Suddeth v. S. 112 Ga. 407, 37
S. E. 747.
289 PRINCIPAL AND ACCESSORY. 293
the court may, as a matter of law, properly state the fact in
charging the jury. 32 And where the evidence warrants the court
in instructing that a witness is an accomplice, the giving of
such instructions is not objectionable as assuming the defendant's
guilt. 33 But to charge the jury that a witness is an accomplice
according to his own testimony assumes that his testimony is
true and is therefore erroneous. 34 An instruction which in sub-
stance states that if the jury believe the testimony of the accom-
plice has been corroborated they could convict the defendant
is erroneous, in that it assumes the truth of the accomplice's
testimony. 35 Also an instruction which assumes that a witness
who is jointly indicted with the accused is an accomplice is
erroneous. 36
292. Duty to instruct on accomplices without request. In
some of the states it is the duty of the court to give instructions
on the law relating to the testimony of accomplices, whether
requested to do so or not. 37 But the refusal of special requests
cannot be urged as error where the court on its own motion fully
instructs on the law relating to the testimony of accomplices. 38
293. Principal and accessory Instructions. If there is any
evidence tending to connect the accused with others in the com-
mission of an offense it is proper to instruct the jury on the law
of principal and accessory. 39 Thus, on a trial for an assault with
intent to kill where the evidence shows that two persons shot
at the prosecuting witness at the same time, the court may charge
the jury on the law of principal and accessory. 40 But unless there
is evidence upon which to base the instruction it is error to
give it. 41
32 Winfield v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), Brace v. S. 43 Tex. Cr. App. 48, 62
72 S. W. 182. S. W. 1067; Coburn v. S. 36 Tex.
ss Hatcher v. S. 43 Tex. Cr. App. Cr. App. 257, 36 S. W. 442.
237, 65 S. W. 97; Torres v. S. (Tex. as Powell v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.),
Cr. App.), 55 S. W. 828. 44 S. W. 504.
s* Bell v. S. 39 Tex. Cr. App. 677, 39 Houston v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.),
47 S. W. 1010. See P. v. Reilly, 53 47 S. W. 468; Tidwell v. S. 40 Tex.
N. Y. S. 1005. Cr. App. 38, 48 S. W. 184. See Han-
ss Jones v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 72 kins v. S. 39 Tex. Cr. App. 261, 45
S. W. 845. S. W. 807.
se S. v. Spotted Hawk (Mont.), 33 40 Granger v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.),
Pac. 1026; Heivner v. P. (Colo.), 31 S. W. 671.
43 Pac. 1047. 41 p. v . Smith, 105 Cal. 676, 39
37 Williams v. S. 42 Tex. 392; Pac. 38.
293 ACCOMPLICE AS WITNESS. 290
The court is not required to instruct on the law of accessory
after the fact in a homicide case where the evidence strongly
tends to prove the defendant actually did the shooting, and there
is no evidence tending to support the offense of accessory after
the fact. 42 In defining accessory the instructions should follow
the words of the statute, stating that an accessory is "one who
advises and encourages, and not one who advises or encourages. ' ' 43
Where the evidence tending to connect the accused with the
commission of an offense by conspiracy with others is circum-
stantial, he is entitled to have the jury instructed that he cannot
be held responsible for what others may have done, unless he
advised, aided or abetted in the commission of the offense. 44r
42 McQuinn v. Com. 17 Ky. 500, 44 Howser v. S. (Ala.), 23 So.
31 S. W. 872. 681.
43 S. v. Geddes, 22 Mont. 68, 55
Pac. 919.
CHAPTER XIX.
ON REASONABLE DOUBT.
Sec.
294. Definition and elements.
295. Definition and elements Il-
lustrations.
296. Instructions on degree of
proof.
Sec.
299. Doubt arises from whole ev-
idence.
300. Modification of instruction on
reasonable doubt.
301. Instruction as to each juror.
297. Instructions on probability, 302. Instruction that jurors "be-
possibility.
298. Instruction on hunting up
doubt.
lieve as men."
294. Definition and elements. It is difficult to define what
is a reasonable doubt, but all the authorities agree that such
a doubt must be actual and substantial as contra-distinguished
from a mere vague apprehension and must arise out of the evi-
dence 1 , or from a want of evidence. 2 The doubt must be sup-
ported by reason and not by mere conjecture and idle supposition
irrespective of evidence. 3
A reasonable doubt is not a mere whim, but is such a doubt as
reasonable men may entertain after a careful and honest con-
sideration of all the evidence in the case. 4 A reasonable doubt
1 Hughes Cr. Law 2488, citing:
3 Greenleaf Ev. (Re-df. Ed.). 29;
Earll v. P. 73 111. 329; Carlton v.
P. 150 111. 181, 192, 37 N. E. 244;
Hopt v. Utah, 120 U. S. 430, 439, 7
Sup. Ct. 614; Underbill Cr. Ev.
10.
2 S. v. Blue, 136 Mo. 41, 37 S. W.
796; Brown v. S. 105 Ind. 390, 5 N.
E. 900; Tomlinson v. S. (Tex. Cr.
App.), 43 S. W. 332; Emery v. S.
101 Wis. 627, 78 N. W. 145; Wright
v. S. 69 Ind. 165, 35 Am. R. 212;
Densmore v. S. 67 Ind. 307. The
omission of the words "want of
evidence," in such an instruction,
is not prejudicial error, however,
where the evidence is exceedingly
strong and overwhelming against
the accused, Mathis v. S. 80 Miss.
491, 32 So. 6.
P. v. Ross, 115 Cal. 233, 46 Pac.
1056; S. v. Patton, 66 Kas. 486, 71
Pac. 840; Carpenter v. S. 62 Ark.
286, 36 S. W. 900.
4 P. v. Baker, 153 N. Y. Ill, 47
N. E. 31. The rule of . reasonable
doubt has no application to the
291
295 ON REASONABLE DOUBT. 292
is "that state of the case which, after considering and compar-
ing all the evidence in the case, leaves the minds of the jury in
that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding con-
viction of the truth of the charge." 5 A reasonable doubt is
also defined to be a doubt arising from a candid and impartial
investigation of all the evidence, and such as, in the graver
transactions of life, would cause a reasonable and prudent man
to hesitate and pause. 6
The giving of several instructions on reasonable doubt, defining
that term in different forms, is not objectionable, although all
the definitions or elements might be embodied in one instruc-
tion. 7 A charge defining a reasonable doubt to be "a doubt
which a reasonable man of sound judgment, without bias, preju-
dice or interest, after calmly, consciously and deliberately weigh-
ing all the testimony, would entertain as to the guilt of the ac-
cused, " cannot be complained of as error in the absence of a
request for more adequate instructions on the subject. 8
295. Definition and elements Illustrations. An instruc-
tion which states that evidence is sufficient to remove a reason-
able doubt when it convinces the judgment of ordinarily prudent
men of the truth of a proposition with such force that they
law of a case, but to the facts only, Frank v. S. 94 Wis. 211, 68 N. W.
although the jury may be the judges 657 (in their own important affairs) ;
of the law. Hence instructions in S. v. Case, 96 Iowa, 264, 65 N. W.
this respect are improper, S. v. 149; Allen T. S. Ill Ala. 80, 20
Meyer, 58 Vt. 457, 3 Atl. 195; O'Neil So. 490; S. v. Harris, 97 Iowa, 407,
v. S. 48 Ga. 66. The definition of 66 N. W. 728; S. v. David, 131 Mo.
reasonable doubt, according to the 380, 33 S. W. 28; S. v. Gleim, 17
views of some courts, is of little Mont. 17, 41 Pac. 998 ("highest con-
or no practical benefit to the jury, cerns of his own interests") ; Law-
S. v. Sauer, 38 Minn. 439, 38 N. W. head v. S. 46 Neb. 607, 65 N. W.
355; Hamilton v. P. 29 Mich. 195. 779 ("most important affairs or con-
s Dunn v. P. 109 111. 645. cerns of life"); S. v. Serenson, 7
e Hughes Cr. Law, 2488, citing: s. Dak. 277, 64 N. W. 130; S. v.
Dunn v. P. 109 111. 635; May v. Crockett, 39 Ore. 76, 65 Pac. 447.
P. 60 111. 119; Connaghan v. P. See Emery v. S. 92 Wis. 146, 65 N.
88 111. 462; Little v. P. 157 111. 158, W. 848; S. v. Pierce, 65 Iowa, 89,
42 N. E. 389; Com. v. Miller, 137 21 N. W. 195.
Pa. St. 77, 21 Atl. 138, 8 Am. Cr. i Johnson v. P. 202 111. 53, 66 N.
R. 623. See P. v. Ah Sing, 51 Cal. E. 877.
372, 2 Am. Cr. R. 482; P. v. Cneong s S. v. Reed, 62 Me. 129; S. v.
Toon Ark, 61 Cal. 527. See also Smith, 65 Conn. 283, 31 Atl. 206; S.
McArthur v. S. 60 Neb. 390, 83 N. v. Johnson, 19 Wash. 410, 53 Pac.
W. 196; S. v. Cushanberry, 157 Mo. 667; P. v. Ahern, 93 Cal. 518, 29
168, 56 S. W. 737; S. v. Holloway, Pac. 250; P. v. Waller, 70 Mich. 237,
150 Mo. 222, 56 S. W. 734; S. v. 38 N. W. 261.
Baker, 136 Mo. 74, 37 S. W. 810;
293 DEFINITION AND ELEMENTS. 295
would act upon the conviction without hesitation in their own
most important affairs or in matters of highest importance to
themselves where there is no compulsion to act at all, is proper. 9
Also an instruction which states that proof beyond a reasonable
doubt means "such proof as satisfies the judgment and con-
science of the jury as reasonable men applying their reason to the
evidence before them that the crime charged has been com-
mitted by the defendant, and so satisfies them as to leave no other
reasonable conclusion possible," is correct. 10
A charge defining reasonable doubt to be "an actual, substan-
tial doubt arising from the evidence or from a want of evi-
dence in the case," is proper. 11 An instruction on reasonable
doubt is not defective in failing to embody the phrase "to
a moral certainty" in connection therewith. 12 Proof "beyond
a reasonable doubt" and proof "to a moral certainty" are synony-
mous and equivalent. 13 Hence, an instruction stating that "a juror
is understood to entertain a reasonable doubt when he has not
an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, that the person ac-
cused is guilty," properly states the law. 14
A charge that a reasonable doubt is a doubt for which a reason
may be given is erroneous. 15 Also an instruction charging that
9 Garfield v. S. 74 Ind. 60; Key- 974, 2 App. Div. 332 (absence of evi-
nolds v. S. 147 Ind. 3, 46 N. E. 31; dence) ; Earll v. P. 73 111. 329. See
Harris v. S. 155 Ind. 265, 58 N. E. Tomlinson v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 43
75; Jarrell v. S. 58 Ind. 293; Frank S. W. 332.
v. S. 94 Wis. 211, 68 N. W. 657; 12 s. v. Van Tassel, 103 Iowa, 6,
S. v. Kearley, 26 Kas. 77; Law- 72 N. W. 497.
head v. S. 46 Neb. 607, 65 N. W. 1 3 Carl ton .v. P. 150 111. 192, 37
779; S. v. Gleim, 17 Mont. 17, 41 N. E. 244; Com. v. Castley, 118
Pac. 998; S. v. Schoffer, 74 Iowa, Mass. 1; Bailey v. S. 133 Ala. 155,
704, 39 N. W. 89; U. S. v. Jackson, 32 So. 57.
29 Fed. 503. Contra: Bray v. S. 1* S. v. Vansant, 80 Mo. 67; Sul-
41 Tex. 560; Jane v. Com. 2 Mete, livan v. S. 52 Ind. 309; McKleroy
(Ky.), 30; P. v. Brannon, 47 Cal. ' v. S. 77 Ala. 95; P. v. Phidillia, 42
96; P. v. Bemmerly, 87 Cal. 121, Cal. 536; Carlton v. P. 150 111. 192,
25 Pac. 266. See also Com. v. 37 N. E. 244; Dunn v. P. 109 111.
Miller, 139 Pa. St. 77, 21 Atl. 138, 645 (to a reasonable and moral cer-
23 Am. St. 170; S. v. Settleworth, tainty) ; Com. v. Webster, 5 Gush.
18 Minn. 208. (Mass.). 320.
10 P. v. Ezzo, 104 Mich. 341, 62 is Thompson v. S. 131 Ala. 18, 31
N. W. 407. So. 725 (confusing); Jimmerson v.
11 Ferguson v. S. 52 Neb. 432, 72 S. 133 Ala. 18, 32 So. 141; Cawlev
N. W. 590, 66 Am. St. 512; S. v. v. S. 133 Ala. 128, 32 So. 227; Mor-
Duncan, 142 Mo. 456, 44 S. W. 263; gan v. S. 48 Ohio St. 376, 27 N. E.
Emery v. S. 101 Wis. 627, 78 N. W. 710; Avery v. S. 124 Ala. 20, 27 So.
145; Powell v. S. 95 Ga. 502, 20 S. 505. Contra: Ellis v. S. 120 Ala. 333,
E. 483; P. v. Freidland, 37 N. Y. S. 25 So. 1; Dennis v. S. 118 Ala. 72,
296 ON REASONABLE DOUBT. 294
a reasonable doubt must be a very reasonable doubt is erro-
neous. 16 When the jury are satisfied "to a moral certainty and
beyond a reasonable doubt," they are entirely satisfied, and an
instruction which contains the proposition that the jury need
not be "entirely satisfied" is erroneous. 17
296. Instructions on degree of proof. To warrant a convic-
tion the evidence must establish the guilt of the accused beyond
a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty ; and the defendant
on making proper request is entitled to have the term properly
defined. 18 And all of the essential elements necessary to con-
stitute the crime charged must be established to the same degree
of certainty; and the court should so instruct the jury if re-
quested. 39 But every incidental fact need not be established
beyond a reasonable doubt. An instruction so requiring is too
broad. 20
The court in charging the jury on the law as to the meaning
of reasonable doubt should not refuse the usual well known
instruction defining the term, and substitute another instead, as,
for instance, that such doubt must be based on common sense.
To do so is error. 21 That the jury may conscientiously believe
from the evidence that the defendant is guilty, does not meet the
requirements of the law. "Conscientious belief" does not mean
23 So. 1002; P. v. Stubenvoll, 62 572; Jones v. S. 107 Ala. 93, 18 So.
Mich. 329, 28 N. W. 883; Vann v. 237, error to refuse instruction.
S. 83 Ga. 44, 9 S. E. 945; P. v. Gui- is S. v. Martin, 124 Mo. 514, 28 S.
dici, 100 N. Y. 503, 3 N. E. 493. W. 12; Snyder v. S. 51 Ind. Ill;
ic Nelson v. S. (N. J.), 35 Atl. S. v. Fannon, 158 Mo. 149, 59 S. W.
785. 75; Crane v. S. Ill Ala. 45, 20 So.
17 P. v. Kerrick, 52 Cal. 446; P. 590. Where the evidence clearly
v. Phipps, 39 Cal. 326. Contra: S. establishes guilt and is so convinc-
v. Nelson, 11 Nev. 334. . ing as not to suggest a doubt, error
i Rogers v. S. 117 Ala. 9, 22 So. in refusing to instruct as to the
666; Walker v. S. 117 Ala. 42, 23 law of reasonable doubt will be re-
So. 149; Bones v. S. 117 Ala. 138, garded as harmless, Suiter v. S.
23 So. 138; Godwin v. S. 73 Miss. 76 Ga. 105; Van Brown v. S. 34
873, 19 So. 712. See also Webb v. Tex. 186.
S. 73 Miss. 456, 19 So. 238; Wacaser 20 s. v. Watkins, 106 La. 380, 31
v. P. 134 111. 438, 25 N. E. 564, 23 So. 10; Wade v. S. 71 Ind. 541
Am. St. 683; Tensing v. S. (Tex. Cr. (subsidiary matters, item by item.
App.), 45 S. W. 572; Battle v. S. 103 not to be established beyond
Ga. 53, 29 S. E. 491; Ison v. Com. reasonable doubt).
23 Ky. L. R. 1805, 66 S. W. 184; 21 p. v . Paulsill, 115 Cal. 6, 45
Line v. S. 51 Ind. 172; Lovejoy v. Pac. 734.
S. 62 Ark. 478, 36 S. W. 575; Lens-
ing v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 45 S. W.
295
DEGREE OF PROOF REQUIRED.
297
beyond a reasonable doubt, 2 - nor does "full satisfaction of guilt"
satisfy the law. 23 A charge that "if the facts and circumstances
proved by a preponderance of the evidence are such as to satisfy
the jury beyond a reasonable doubt," such evidence should have
the same weight as direct evidence, is improper in not requiring
that the facts themselves must be established beyond a reason-
able doubt. 24
297. Instructions on probability, possibility. A probability
of the innocence of the accused is equivalent to reasonable doubt ;
hence, the refusal to charge the jury that "if there is a probabil-
ity of the defendant's innocence he should be acquitted" is
error. 25 The evidence is not required to exclude the possibility
of innocence. Accordingly an instruction defining a reasonable
doubt to be a serious-, substantial and well founded doubt and
not the mere possibility of a doubt, is proper. 26 And an instruc-
tion calling for proof strong enough to exclude the possibility
of the innocence of the accused is, therefore, properly refused. 27
22 Orr v. S. (Miss.), 18 So. 118;
Johnson v. S. (Miss.), 16 So. 494;
Hemphill v. S. 71 Miss. 877, 16 So.
261; Brown v. S. 72 Miss. 95, 16 So.
202; Brown v. S. 72 Miss. 997, 17
So. 278.
23 Williams v. S. 73 Miss. 820,
19 So. 826. See also Burton v. S.
107 Ala. 108, 18 So. 284; Rucker v.
S. (Miss.), 18 So. 121; Compton v.
S. 110 Ala. 24, 20 So. 119.
24 Gill v. S. 59 Ark. 422, 27 S. W.
598. An instruction conveying the
impression that the jury are au-
thorized to convict of a misdemean-
or on lighter evidence than is re-
quired to warrant a conviction of
other offenses of a graver nature,
is erroneous, P. v. Chartoff, 75 N.
Y. S. 1088, 75 App. Div. 555.
25 Whitaker v. S. 106 Ala. 30, 17
So. 456; Shaw v. S. 125 Ala. 80, 28
So. 390; Bones v. S. 117 Ala. 138,
23 So. 138; Croft v. S. 95 Ala. 3, 10
So. 517; Spraggins v. S. (Ala.),
35 So. 1002. Instructing the jury
that even after the evidence has re-
moved all probability of the de-
fendant's innocence the law says
the jury may entertain a reason-
able doubt of his guilt and find him
not guilty, is improper in that it is
misleading. Bell v. S. 115 Ala. 25,
22 So. 526. See Pickens v. S. 115
Ala. 42, 22 So. 551; Adams v. S.
115 Ala. 90, 22 So. 612, 67 Am. St.
17.
26 Earll v. P. 73 111. 329; Smith
v. P. 74 111. 146; S. v. McCune, 16
Utah, 170, 51 Pac. 818; Little v. S.
89 Ala. 99, 8 So. 82; S. v. David,
131 Mo. 380, 33 S. W. 28; S. v.
Dickey, 48 W. Va. 325, 37 S. E. 695;
S. v. Cushenberry, 157 Mo. 168, 56
S. W. 737; McArthur v. S. 60 Neb.
390 ("fanciful suppositions") ; S.
v. Krug, 12 Wash. 288, 41 Pac. 126
("imaginary") ; Densmore v. S. 67
Ind. 306 (conjecture).
27 Morris v. S. 124 Ala. 44, 27 So.
336; P. v. Smith, 105 Cal. 676, 39
Pac. 38; S. v. Garrison, 147 Mo. 548,
49 S. W. 508; Karr v. S. 106 Ala. 1,
17 So. 328; Le Cointe v. U. S. 7
App. Gas. (D. C.) 16; Powell v. S.
95 Ga. 502, 20 S. E. 483; S. v. Edie,
147 Mo. 535, 49 S. W. 563; P. v.
Benham, 160 N. Y. 402, 55 N. E.
11 (absolute and positive proof);
Emery v. S. 101 Wis. 627, 78 N. W.
145; S. v. Ostrander. 18 Iowa, 437.
See also Bodine v. S. 129 Ala. 106,
298
ON REASONABLE DOUBT.
296
But it is error to instruct that the rule requiring the guilt of
the defendant to be established beyond a reasonable doubt, does
not mean that it shall be "conclusively established." 28
The law does not require proof of guilt to a mathematical
certainty; 29 nor does it require proof to an absolute certainty. 30
A charge that absolute certainty is not required and it is rarely,
if ever, possible in any case; but to justify a conviction, the evi-
'dence when taken as a whole and fairly considered must so satisfy
your judgments and consciences as to exclude every other
reasonable conclusion, has been held proper. 31 But in Alabama
it has been held that an instruction charging that unless the evi-
dence excludes to a moral certainty every reasonable hypothesis
but that of the guilt of the accused, the jury must acquit, is erro-
neous as requiring too high a degree of proof. 32
298. Instruction on hunting up doubts. The jury must con-
fine themselves to the evidence before them; they cannot go
jury, after having heard all the
evidence, feel a desire for more evi-
dence showing the defendant's
guilt, they have a reasonable doubt,
Newell v. S. 115 Ala. 54, 22 So.
572.
Misleading: "The court instructs
the jury that a reasonable doubt
to warrant an acquital in a crim-
inal case is not a mere possible
doubt, but is such a doubt as,
after mature comparison and
consideration of all the evidence,
leaves the minds of the jurors in
such a condition that they cannot
say they feel an abiding conviction
to a moral certainty of the truth
of the charge, or for which a reason
can be given." This instruction
was held bad because it is uncertain
whether the last clause, "or for
which a reason can be given," qual-
ifies the word "doubt" or the word
"conviction," thereby making the
instruction misleading. S. v. Shep-
pard, 49 W. Va. 582, 39 S. E. 676.
See Cleavenger v. S. (Tex. Cr.
App.), 65 S. W. 89 (held bad also).
See also Patzwald v. U. S. 7 Okla.
232, 54 Pac. 458; P. v. Swartz, 118
Mich. 292, 76 N. W. 491 (not mis-
leading); Brown v. S. 128 Ala. 12,
29 So. 200 (misleading).
29 So. 926; Griffith v. S. 90 Ala. 583
("clear and distinct proof"), 8 So.
812; Whatley v. S. 91 Ala. 108
(absolute belief), 9 So. 236; White
v. S. 133 Ala. 122, 32 So. 139; P. v.
Davis, 135 Cal. 162, 67 Pac. 59;
Com. v. Devine, 18 Pa. Super. Ct.
431; S. v. Good, 132 Mo. 114, 33
S. W. 790; Abram v. S. 36 Tex. Cr.
App. 44, 35 S. W. 389, instruction
as to possibility of innocence held
erroneous.
ss p. v . Stephenson, 32 N. Y. S.
1112, 11 Misc. 141.
29 Davis v. S. 114 Ga. 104, 33 S.
E. 906; P. v. Hecker, 109 Cal. 451,
42 Pac. 307, "absolute moral cer-
tainty" not required; Jeffries v. S.
77 Miss. 757, 28 So. 948; Mose v.
S. 36 Ala. 211 (circumstantial evi-
dence).
so S. v. Marshall, 105 Iowa, 38,
74 N. W. 763. See Carleton v. S.
43 Neb. 373, 61 N. W. 699.
si S. v. Marshall, 105 Iowa, 38.
74 N, W. 763. See Carleton v. S.
43 Neb. 373. 61 N. W. 699.
32 Barnes v. S. Ill Ala. 56, 20
So. 565; Gafford v. S. 122 Ala. 54,
25 So. 10. See Yarbrough v. S.
115 Ala. 92, 22 So. 534. See Dermis
v. S. 118 Ala. 72, 23 So. 1002. It is
improper to instruct that if the
297 ' HUNTING DOUBTS ARISING FROM EVIDENCE. 299
beyond the evidence to seek for or to hunt up doubts, nor must
they entertain such doubts as are merely chimerical or conjectural.
An instruction so charging is proper. 33 Especially is such an
instruction proper where the law as to the presumption of inno-
cence has been fully and accurately stated in other instructions
of the charge. 34
299. Doubt arises from whole evidence And a reasonable
doubt which will authorize an acquittal is one as to the guilt
of the accused on the whole of the evidence and not as to any par-
ticular fact. 35 Thus an instruction that "the reasonable doubt
the jury are permitted to entertain must be as to the guilt of the
accused on the whole of the evidence and not as to any particular
fact in the case" is proper. 36 Also an instruction "that the
rule requiring the jury to be satisfied of the defendant's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt in order to warrant a conviction does
not require that the jury should be satisfied beyond a reasonable
doubt of each link in the chain of circumstances relied upon to
establish the defendant's guilt; it is sufficient if, taking the
testimony altogether, the jury are satisfied beyond a reasonable
doubt that the state Has proved each material fact charged and
that the defendant is guilty," properly states the law. 37 It is_
therefore, proper to refuse an instruction which directs the atten-
tion of the jury to some particular fact or facts in the case requir
ing proof of such facts beyond a reasonable doubt. 38
33 Miller v. P. 39 111. 457, 463; 111. 86, 29 N. E. 192; Leigh
Voght v. S. 145 Ind. 12, 43 N. E. v. P. 113 111. 372; Bressler v. P.
1049; S. v. Elsham, 70 Iowa, 531, 117 111. 422, 8 N. E. 62; Miller v. P,
31 N. W. 66. 39 111. 457; May v. P. 60 111. 119;
3* S. v. Nichols, 50 La. Ann. 699, Hoge v. P. 117 111. 35, 6 N. E. 796.
23 So. 980. Contra: S. v. Gleim, 17 Mont. 17,
35 Mullins v. P. 110 111. 47; Crews 41 Pac. 998, 10 Am. Cr. R. 52,
v. P. 120 111. 321, 11 N. E. 404; ?.- Bradshaw v. S. 17 Neb. 147, 22
Williams v. P. 166 111. 136, 46 N. E. N. W. 361, 5 Am. Cr. R. 499; Gott
749; Weaver v. P. 132 111. 536, 24 N. v. P. 187 111. 249, 58 N. E. 293;
E. 571; Acker v. S. 52 N. J. L. Allen v. S. 60 Ala. 19; Morgan v. S.
259; S. v. Stewart, 52 Iowa, 284; 51 Neb. 672, 71 N. W. 788; Sumner
Nix v. S. 97 Ga. 211; Carr v. S. 84 v. S. 5 Blackf. (Ind.), 579, 36 Am.
Ga. 250; Barker v. S. 126 Ala. 69, Dec. 561; S. v. Hayden, 45 Iowa, 11;
28 So. 685: McCullough v. S. 23 Rudy v. Com. 128 Pa. St. 500, 18 Atl.
Tex. App. 626; Gordon v. S. 129 Ala. 344.
113, 30 So. 30. ss Qchs v. P. 124 111. 399, 429, 16
so Hughes Cr. Law 3263, citing: N. E. 662; Bressler v. P. 117 111.
Carl ton v. P. 150 111. 181, 37 N. E. 439, 8 N. E. 62; Davis v. P. 114 111.
244, 41 Am. St. 346; Mullins v. P. 86, 98, 29 N. E. 192; Leigh v. P.
110 111. 42; Davis v. P. 114 113 111. 379; Mullins v. P. 110 111.
300 ON REASONABLE DOUBT. 298
So an instruction that a reasonable doubt need not arise from
the whole evidence but may arise from a part of it, is properly
refused. The reasonable doubt to justify an acquittal must arise,
if at all, from the whole of the evidence taken together. 39 As
previously stated, a reasonable doubt must arise out of the evi-
dence or from a want of evidence. Hence an instruction stating
that "if a reasonable doubt is raised by the ingenuity of counsel
upon any hypothesis reasonably consistent with the evidence"
the jury should acquit the defendant, is improper. 40 So a charge
that the impeachment of one or more of the witnesses for the state
might generate a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant
is improper. 41
300. Modification of instruction on reasonable doubt. The
modification of an instruction by changing the phrase "from all
reasonable doubt" to "a reasonable doubt" is not error and af-
fords no ground for complaint. 42 An instruction on reasonable
doubt, requested in behalf of the defendant, which correctly states
the law, may be modified without committing error, so as to pre-
sent the theory of the prosecution on the same doctrine; as, for
instance, after correctly stating the rule for the defendant it is
proper to add: "But, on the other hand, if you are satisfied of the
guilt of the accused to a reasonable and moral certainty, then it
would be your duty to find him guilty." 43 So a charge that the
law presumes that the defendant is innocent of the crime with
which he is charged until he is proved guilty by competent evi-
dence beyond a reasonable doubt ; and if the evidence leaves in the
minds of the jury any reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt
the law makes it the duty of the jury to acquit him, is properly
modified by striking out the phrase "beyond a reasonable
doubt." 44
42; Mann v. S. 134 Ala. 1, 32 So. Com. 99 Va. 848, 38 S. E. 184. See
704; Winter v. S. 133 Ala. 176, 32 P. v. Kaiser, 119 Gal. 456, 51 Pac.
So. 125; Liner v. S. 124 Ala. 1, 27 702; Walker v. S. (Ala.), 35 So.
So. 438; Barker v. S. 126 Ala. 69, 1011.
28 So. 685; S. v. Dunn, 18 Mo. 419. Crawford v. S. 112 Ala. 1, 21
Contra: Com. v. Leonard, 40 Mass. So. 214; Cobb v. S. 115, Ala. 18, 22
473. So. 506.
so Bryant v. S. 34 Fla. 291, 16 So. 42 p. v . Burns, 121 Cal. 529, 53
177; S. v. Myers, 12 Wash. 77, 40 Pac. 1096.
Pac. 626. 43 Bone v. S. 102 Ga. 387, 30 S. B.
to P. v. Wells, 112 Mich. 648, 71 845; Mclntosh v. S. 151 Ind. 251, 51
N. W. 176; P. v. Ammerman. 118 N. E. 354.
Cal. 23, 50 Pac. 15; United States 44 Schintz v. P. 178 111. 320, 52
v. Harper, 33 Fed. 471; Horton v. N. E. 903.
299 DOUBT AS TO EACH JUROR. 301
301. Instruction as to each juror. Each juror must be sat-
isfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty as
charged, before he can, under his oath, consent to a verdict
of conviction. So an instruction that if any one of the jurors,
after having duly considered all the evidence, and after having
consulted with his fellow-jurymen, entertains such reasonable
doubt, the jury cannot, in such case, find the defendant guilty,
is correct in point of law. 45 Also a charge that ''if after con-
sideration of the whole case, any juror should entertain a reason-
able doubt of the guilt of the defendant, it is the duty of such
juror so entertaining such doubt not to vote for a verdict of
guilty, nor to be influenced in so voting for the single reason that
a majority of the jury should be in favor of a verdict of guilty,"
has been approved. 46
A charge that "if any one of the jurors has a reasonable doubt
of the guilt of the defendant, they are not, for that reason,
required to acquit," is not improper, for the reason that a lack
of unanimity does not necessarily require an acquittal. A mistrial
may be proper. 47 But a charge that "if there be one juryman who
believes the state has not proved the defendant guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty, then such juryman
should not consent to a verdict" has been held bad, in that it is
calculated to impress the mind of a juror with the idea that
his verdict must be reached and adhered to without the aid of
that consideration and deliberation with his fellow-jurors which
the law requires. 48 Also an instruction that if any juror is not
45 Meehan v. S. (Wis.), 97 N. W. 35 So. 221; Davis v. S. 63 Ohio St.
174; Castle v. S. 75 Ind. 146; Stitz 173, 57 N. E. 1099; Cook v. S. (Fla.),
v. S. 104 Ind. 359; S. V. Ryno 35 So. 669.
(Kas.), 74 Pac. 1111; Parker v. S. 46 P. v. Dole, 122 Cal. 486, 55
136 Ind. 284, 35 N. B. 1105; Shen- Pac. 581. 68 Am. St. 50.
kenberger v. S. 154 Ind. 643, 57 47 Neville v. S. 133 Ala. 29, 32 So.
N. E. 519; Fassinon v. S. 89 Ind. 596; Andrews v. S. 134 Ala. 47, 32
235; Fletcher v. S. 132 Ala. 10, 31 So. 665. See S. T. Rorbacher, 19
So. 561; S. v. Howell, 26 Mont. 3, Iowa, 155.
66 Pac. 293; Grimes v. S. 105 Ala. 48 Cunningham v. S. 117 Ala. 59,
86, 17 So. 184; S. v. Rodgers, 56 Kas. 23 So. 693; Goldsmith v. S. 105 Ala.
362, 43 Pac. 256. See Little v. S. 8, 16 So. 933; Pickens v. S. 115
157 111. 157, 42 N. E. 389. Contra: Ala. 42, 22 So. 551; P. v. Rodley,
Hodge v. Ter. (Okla.), 69 Pac. 1080; 131 Cal. 240, 63 Pac. 251; S. v. Rath-
S. v. Garth, 164 Mo. 553, 65 S. W. bun, 74 Conn. 524, 51 Atl. 540; Da-
275; S. v. Young, 105 Mo. 640, 16 vis v. S. 63 Ohio St. 173 (held mis-
S. W. 408; Fogarty v. S. 80 Ga. 450, leading). See, also, S. v. Robin-
5 S. E. 782; Baldwin v. S. (Fla.), son, 12 Wash. 491, 41 Pac. 884.
302 ON REASONABLE DOUBT. 300
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant,,
his duty requires that he should refuse to agree to a verdict
of guilty, that a juror is not expected to surrender his individual
judgment in order to reach an agreement, has been held improper
as being an invitation to the jury to disagree. 40
302. Instruction that jurors "believe as men." In charging
the jury on the subject of reasonable doubt it is not improper to
state that "a juror is not at liberty to disbelieve as a juror what
he believes as a man;" 50 or to instruct that their oaths impose
upon them no obligation to doubt where no doubt would have
existed if no oath had been administered, is not objectionable. 51
Also an instruction, "you should be convinced as jurors where
you would be convinced as citizens, and you should doubt as
jurors only where you would doubt as men" from the evidence,
is proper. 52
49 S. v. Rue, 72 Minn. 296, 75 N. S. 46 Neb. 607, 65 N. W. 779; P. v.
W. 235; P. v. Hill, 116 Cal. 562, Wayman, 128 N. Y. 587, 27 N. E.
48 Pac. 711; Little v. P. 157 111. 1070; S. v. Pierce, 65 Iowa, 85, 21
153, 42 N. E. 389; S. v. Taylor, 134 N. W. 195; Fan ton v. S. 50 Neb.
Mo. 109, 35 S. W. 92; S. v. Fry, 351, 69 N. W. 953; S. v. Bridges, 29
67 Iowa, 475, 25 N. W. 738. Kas. 138; Adams v. S. 135 Ind.
so p. v . Worden, 113 Cal. 569, 45 571, 34 N. E. 956.
Pac. 844; Leisenberg v. S. 60 Neb. si Barney v. S. 49 Neb. 515, 68
628, 84 N. W. 6; Bartley v. S. 53 N. W. 636; Fanton v. S. 50 Neb.
Neb. 310, 73 N. W. 744. See S. v. 351, 69 N. W. 953, 36 L. R. A. 158;
Elsham, 70 Iowa, 531, 31 N. W. 66. Bartley v. S. 53 Neb. 310, 73 N. W.
Contra: P. v. Johnson, 140 N. Y. 744.
350, 35 N. E. 604; Cross v. S. 132 52 McMeen v. Com. 114 Pa. St.
Ind. 65, 31 N. E. 473; Lawhead v. 300, 9 Atl. 878.
CHAPTER XX.
ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
Sec. Sec.
303. When evidence is circum- 310. Circumstances mu&t be con-
stantial. sistent with guilt.
304. When evidence is direct and 311. Essential facts need only be
circumstantial. consistent.
305. Instructing on comparative 312. Essential facts Degree of
weight improper. proof.
306. Instructions improper Illus- 313. Omission of words from in-
trations. struction Effect.
307. Instructions not improper 314. Omission of words not fatal
Illustrations. Illustrations.
308. Drawing inferences Instruc- 315. Illustrations of the rules.
tions.
309. Instructing to convict on
proof of certain facts Ef-
fect.
303. When evidence is circumstantial. ' ' Circumstantial evi-
dence is legal and competent evidence in criminal cases ; and if it
is of such character as to exclude every reasonable hypothesis
other than that of the guilt of the defendant, it is sufficient to
authorize a conviction." In other words, circumstantial evi-
dence alone is sufficient to authorize a conviction when it con-
vinces the jury of the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable
doubt. 1 And in charging the jury the court may properly cau-
i Cunningham v. S. 56 Neb. 691, 280; S. v. Hunter, 50 Kas. 302, 32
77 N. W. 60; Hughes Cr. Law, Pac. 37; S. v. Elsham, 7 Iowa, 531,
3204, citing, Carlton v. P. 150 111. 31 N. W. 66. Facts may be proved
187, 37 N. E. 244, 41 Am. St. 346; P. in civil as well as criminal cases by
v. Daniels (Cal.) 34 Pac. 233; S. v. circumstantial evidence, Jones v.
Avery, 113 Mo. 475, 21 S. W. 193; S. Hess (Tex. Cr. App.), 48 S. W. 46.
v. Slingerland, 19 Neb. 141, 7 Pac.
301
304
ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
302
tion them that it is wrong to have a prejudice against convicting
on circumstantial evidence. -
Where the evidence against the accused is entirely circum-
stantial, the court should, when properly requested, charge the
jury on the law of circumstantial evidence, and a refusal to do
so is usually reversible error. 3 The fact, however, that the
.court did not fully and sufficiently instruct on the law of cir-
cumstantial evidence affords no ground to complain of error in
the absence of a request for a more specific charge. 4 But accord-
ing to the practice in some jurisdictions it is the duty of the court
to instruct on the law of circumstantial evidence whether re-
quested to do so or not. 5
304. When evidence is direct and circumstantial. But if the
evidence is both direct and -circumstantial a party cannot insist
on having the jury charged on the law of circumstantial evidence.
The rule governs only where a conviction depends entirely upon
such evidence. 6 It is not improper, however, to instruct on
2 S. v. Aughtry, 49 S. Car. 285,
26 S. E. 619.
s Hank v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 56
S. W. 922; Davis v. S. (Tex. Cr.
App.), 54 S. W. 583; Arismendis v.
S. 41 Tex. Cr. App. 374, 54 S. W.
599; Rountree v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.),
58 S. W. 106; Jones v. S. 105 Ga.
649, 31 S. E. 574; Ter. v. Lermo, 8
N. Mex. 566, 46 Pac. 10; Lopez v. S.
37 Tex. Cr. App. 649, 40 S. W. 972;
Polanka v. S. 33 Tex. Cr. App. 634,
28 S. W. 541; Adams v. S. 34 Tex.
Cr. App. 470, 31 S. W. 372; Left-
wich v. S. 34 Tex. Cr. App. 489, 31
S. W. 385 (facts stated). Contra:
Richards v. S. (Ga.), 27 S. E. 726.
See Crews v. S. 34 Tex. Cr. App.
533, 31 S. W. 373; S. v. Austin, 129
N. Car. 534, 40 S. E. 4; Season v.
S. 43 Tex. Cr. App. 442, 67 S. W.
96; Hart v. S. (Ga.), 23 S. E. 831;
Green v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 34 S.
W. 283; Childers v. S. 37 Tex. Cr.
App. 392,' 35 S. W. 654 (owner of
property involved circumstantial) ;
Ter. v. Lermo, 8 N. Mex. 566, 46
,Pac. 16; P. v. Scott, 10 Utah, 217,
37 Pac. 335; S. v. Moxley, 102. Mo.
374, 14 S. W. 969, 15 S. W. 556; Bo^d
v. S. 24 Tex. App. 570; U. S. Express
Co. v. Jenkins, 64 Wis. 542, 25 N.
W. 549; S. v. Donnelly, 130 Mo. 642,
32 S. W. 1124.
* Barnett v. Farmers' M. F. Ins.
Co. 115 Mich. 247, 73 N. W. 372;
Ponder v. S. 115 Ga. 831, 42 S. E.
224.
s Jones v. S. 105 Ga. 649, 31 S. E.
574. See, also, P. v. Scott, 10 Utah,
217, 37 Pac. 335; S. v. Donnelly, 130
Mo. 642, 32 S. W. 1124; Martin v.
S. 32 Tex. Cr. App. 441, 24 S. W. 512;
Childers v. S. 37 Tex. Cr. App. 35
S. W. 654.
s Grover v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 46
S W. 824; Williams v. S. (Tex. Cr.
App.), 45 S. W. 494; Taylor v. S.
(Tex. Cr. App.), 42 S. W. 285; Hous-
ton v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 47 S. W.
468; Rios v. S. 39 Tex. Cr. App.
675, 47 S. W. 987; Colter v. S.
37 Tex. Cr. App. 284, 39 S. W. 576;
Rodgers v. S. 36 Tex. Cr. App. 563,
38 S. W. 184; Moore v. S. 97 Ga.
759, 25 S. E. 362; Upchurch v. S.
(Tex. Cr. App.), 39 S. W. 371; Evans
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 31 S. W. 648;
Carmarillo v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.),
68 S. W. 795; Roberts v. Port Blake-
ly Mill Co. 30 Wash. 25, 70 Pac. Ill;
S. v. Donnelly, 130 Mo. 642, 32 S.
303 WHEN EVIDENCE DIRECT AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL. 304
circumstantial evidence where the evidence is largely circum-
stantial; but the court is not bound to do so. 7 So where the
whole of the evidence is given by eye witnesses to the transaction
in question an instruction as to the weight of circumstantial evi-
dence is improper. 8 And if the evidence is composed of both di-
rect and circumstantial the refusal to charge the jury that the bur-
den is on the prosecution to establish beyond a reasonable doubt
the existence of each link in the chain of circumstances is not
ground for error. 9 So if there is any direct evidence fairly
tending to connect the defendant with the commission of the
crime charged he is not entitled to have the jury instructed on
the law of circumstantial evidence. 10
The failure of the court to charge on circumstantial evidence
where there is positive evidence of the commission of the offense
charged, though given by an accomplice only, is not error. 11
Also, if the accused admits that he committed the crime charged,
the law of circumstantial evidence need not be given to the
jury. 12 And if the defendant confesses his guilt as charged,
he cannot insist upon instructions on circumstantial evidence,
where the corpus delicti is clearly established by other competent
W. 1124; Granado v. S. 37 Tex. Cr. Pac. 903; Nite v. S. 41 Tex. Cr. App.
App. 426, 35 S. W. 1069; P. v. Lena 340, 54 S. W. 763; Hodge v. Ter.
Deo, 132 Cal. 199, 64 Pac. 265; (Okla.), 69 Pac. 1077.
Rains v. S. 88 Ala. 91, 70 So. 315. 10 Alexander v. S. 40 Tex. Cr.
7 Rountree v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), App. 395, 49 S. W. 229; Givens v.
58 S. W. 106. ' S. 34 Tex. Cr. App. 563, 34 S. W.
s Welch v. S. 124 Ala. 41, 27 So. 626.
307; Red v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 53 11 Wampler v. S. 28 Tex. App.
S. W. 618; Wolf v. S. (Tex. Cr. 352; Rios v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 48
App.), 53 S. W. 108; Leftwick v. S. W. 505: Vaughan v. S. 57 Ark.
S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 55 S. W. 571; P. 1, 20 S. W. 588; Kidwell v. S. 35
v. Burns, 121 Cal. 529, 53 Pac. 1096; Tex. Cr. App. 264, 33 S. W. 342;
Campbell v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. App. 160, S. v. Donnelly, 130 Mo. 642, 32 S.
38 S. W. 171; Purvis v. S. 71 Miss. W. 1124; Thompson v. S. 33 Tex.
706, 14 So. 268; Thompson v. S. 33 Cr. App. 217, 26 S. W. 198.
Tex. Cr. App. 217, 26 S. W. 198; 12 Franks v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.),
Vaughan v. S. 37 Ark. 1; S. v. 45 S. W. 1013; Jackson v. S. (Tex.
Fairlamb, 121 Mo. 137, 25 S. W. 895; Cr. App.), 62 S. W. 914; Paul v. S.
Moore v. S. 97 Ga. 759, 25 S. E. (Tex. Cr. App.), 45 S. W. 725;
362; Purvis v. S. 71 Miss. 706, 14 Smith v. S. 24 Tex. Cr. App. 265,
So. 268; Granado v. S. 37 Tex. Cr. 30 S. W. 236; S. v. Robinson, 117
App. 426, 35 S. W. 1069; Gann v. S. Mo. 649, 23 S. W. 1066; Albritton v.
(Tex. Cr. App.), 59 S. W. 896; Evans S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 26 S. W. 398;
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 31 S. W. White v. S. 32 Tex. Cr. App. 625, 25
648, that the eye witness is the S. W. 784; Perry v. S. 110 Ga. 234,
prosecuting witness is sufficient to 36 S. E. 781; Langdon v. P. 133
take the case out of the rule. 111. 408, 24 N. E. 874.
a S. v. Calder, 23 Mont. 504, 59
305 ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
evidence. 13 So, also, where the only issue or defense is insanity
on which the evidence is direct, the court may properly refuse to
instruct on circumstantial evidence. 14 And in a larceny case
if the taking of the property be admitted, but claimed to have
been lawfully taken, it is not error to refuse to charge on cir-
cumstantial evidence even for the purpose of proving criminal
intent. 15 But where only possession of stolen property is relied on
to connect the accused with the commission of the offense charged,
the court cannot properly refuse to instruct on circumstan-
tial evidence. 16
305. Instructing on comparative weight improper. Where
an instruction contains any comment as to the comparative
weight of direct and circumstantial evidence, or upon the relia-
bility of the one kind as compared with the other, it is improper
as a comment on the weight of the evidence and may be refused.
Thus a charge stating that "the law makes no distinction between
circumstantial and positive evidence" is improper in the ab-
sence of a qualification as to the care to be used in considering
circumstantial evidence. 17 Or to charge that circumstantial evi-
dence is often more reliable than direct testimony of eye witnesses,
and a verdict of guilty in such cases may rest on a surer basis
than when rendered upon the testimony of eye witnesses whose
memory must be relied upon and whose passions or prejudices
may have influenced them, is error. 18 * So, also, to charge the
jury that "circumstantial evidence is just as good and convincing
and just as reliable as direct and positive evidence when properly
" Dennis v. S. 118 Ala. 72, 23 So. 66 S. W. 1102; Poston v. S. (Tex.
1002; Carmona v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), Cr. App.), 35 S. W. 656; Stewart v.
5 S. W. 928; Hannigan v. S. 131 S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 77 S. W. 791.
Ala. 29, 31 So. 89; S. v. Armstrong, " Burt v. S. 72 Miss. 408, 16 So.
167 Mo. 257, 66 S. W. 961; Roberts v. 342, 48 Am. St. 563, note; S. v. Dot-
S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 70 S. W. 423; S. son, 26 Mont. ?05, 67 Pac. 938. A
v. Gartrell, 171 Mo. 489, 71 S. W. charge that all the evidence relied
1045; Wampler v. S. 28 Tex. Cr. upon to connect the defendant with
App. 352 (direct proof by accom- the commission of the crim/e
plice) ; Green v. S. 97 Ala. 59, 12 charged is circumstantial, has been
So. 416, 15 So. 242. held to be improper as a comment
14 S. v. Soper, 148 Mo. 217, 49 S. upon the evidence, S. v. Aughtry,
W. 1007. 49 S. Car. 285, 26 S. B. 619.
is Houston v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), is S. v. Musgrave, 43 W. Va. 676.
47 S. W. 468; Gann v. S. (Tex. Cr. 28 S. ' E. 813; P. v. O'Brien, 130
App.), 59 S. W. 896 (ownership the Cal. 1, 62 Pac. 297. See Gibson v. S.
only question contested). 76 Miss. 136, 23 So. 582.
ie Wallace v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.),
305 COMPARATIVE WEIGHT ILLUSTRATIONS. 307
linked together" is improper, in that it invades the province of the
jury. 19 The court may, however, properly state to the jury that
the evidence before them consists of both direct and circum-
stantial; 20 and it is proper to explain the difference between
them. 21 The difference between the two kinds may be shown
by denning each in charging the jury. 22 And if the court errs
in charging as to the distinction between the two kinds of evi-
dence, the error will be rendered harmless where the court cor-
rectly instructs on the legal definition of both classes of evi-
dence. 23
306. Instructions improper Illustrations. According to the
principle stated in the preceding section, it is proper to refuse
an instruction that "the strength of circumstantial evidence
must be equal to the strength of the testimony of one credible
eyewitness" where the case is one depending upon circum-
stantial evidence alone. 2 * Or to charge that "before the jury
can convict the defendant they must be as well satisfied from
the combination of circumstances that the defendant did the
killing as though an eyewitness had testified before them that
the defendant did the killing", is improper. 25 Or a charge that
the "humane provision of the law" is that circumstantial evi-
dence, to justify a conviction, must exclude to a moral certainty
every reasonable hypothesis but that of the guilt of the accused,
is properly refused. 26
307. Instructions not improper Illustrations. But a charge
that there is no practical difference between direct and circum-
stantial evidence, that the sole question is whether the jury
are satisfied from the evidence, of the defendant's guilt, beyond
19 Hudson v. Best, 104 Ga. 131, 20 So. 384; Buchman v. S. 109 Ala.
30 S. E. 688; Armstrong v. Penn, 105 7, 19 So. 410: P. v. Daniels (Cal.),
Ga. 229, 31 S. E. 158. See Gant- 34 Pac. 233; Thornton v. S. 113 Ala.
ling v. S. 40 Fla. 237, 23 So. 857; 43, 21 So. 356; Banks v. S. 72 Ala.
Horton v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 19 522; S. v. Slingerland, 19 Nev. 135,
S. W. 899. 7 Pac. 280. See Brown v. S. 23 Tex.
20 Davis v. S. 51 Neb. 301, 70 N. 195. See, also, S. v. Norwood, 74
W. 984. N. Car. 248; Mickle v. S. 27 Ala.
21 Joiner v. S. 105 Ga. 646, 31 S. 20; Rea v. S. 8 Lea (Tenn.), 363;
E. 556. Jane v. Com. 2 Mete. (Ky.), 30;
22 Robinson v. S. 114 Ga. 56, 39 Cicely v. S. 13 S. & M. (Miss.), 202.
S. E. 862. 25 Banks v. S. 72 Ala. 522.
23 Roberts v. S. 83 Ga. 369, 9 S. 20 Dennis v. S. 112 Ala. 64, 20 So.
E. 675. 925; Crawford v. S. 112 Ala. 1, 21
24 S. v. Carson, 115 N. Car. 743, So. 214.
308 ON CIIICUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 306
a reasonable doubt, has been sustained as a proper instruction. 27
Or that "there is nothing in the nature of circumstantial evi-
dence that renders is less reliable than other classes of evidence"
is not improper. 28
A charge that "circumstantial evidence, if complete, may be
as conclusive or convincing as direct or positive evidence of
eyewitnesses. When it is strong and satisfactory, the jury
should consider it fairly, neither enlarging nor belittling its
force," is not so far erroneous as to warrant a reversal of a
judgment. 29 Nor is it prejudicial error in charging the jury,
to tell them that those who declare it to be cruel or criminal
to convict on circumstantial evidence are knaves or fools. 30 And
it has been hejd not improper to charge that in order to con-
vict, "the circumstantial evidence should be such as to produce
nearly the same degree of certainty as that which arises from
direct testimony, and to exclude a rational probability of in-
nocence." 31 Also a charge that if circumstantial evidence is of
such a character as to exclude every reasonable hypothesis other
than that of the guilt of the defendant, it is entitled to the
same weight as direct evidence, is not improper. 32 -
308. Drawing inferences Instructions. It is for the
jury to determine from the entire evidence what inference may
be drawn, if any, from a state of facts and circumstances with-
out being instructed as to what weight they are to attach to
any portion of the evidence. When the court says that a cer-
tain inference may be drawn from certain facts, if proved, a
jury would understand the instruction as meaning that it is-
t"bir duty to draw such inference; at least it would indicate
that the court thought it proper that the inference should be
drawn. 33 Facts may be inferred by the jury from circumstances
27 S. v. Rome, 64 Conn. 329, 30 A'pp. 121, 9 S. W. 735. Contra:
Atl. 57. S. v. Dotson, 26 Mont. 305, 67 Pac.
28 p. v . Uquidas, 96 Cal. 239, 31 938.
Pac. 52. 32 Reynolds v. S. 147 Ind. 3, 46
29 Union C. Life Ins. Co. v. Skip- N. E. 31; Gill v. S. 59 Ark. 422, 27
per, 115 Fed. 69, 75; Smith v. S. 61 S. W. 598; Longley v. Com. 99 Va.
Neb. 296. 85 N. W. 49. 807, 37 S. E. 337; Davis v. S. 51 Neb.
3" Hickory v. United States, 151 301, 70 N. W. 984; Smith v. S. 35
U. S. 303, 14 Sup. Ct. 334. Tex. Cr. App. 618, 34 S. W. 960; P.
si P. v. Cronin, 34 Cal. 191. See, v. Neufeld, 165 N. Y. 43, 58 N. E.
also, P. v. Stewart, 75 Mich. 21, 42 786.
N. W. 662; Brookin v. S. 26 Tex. 33 Hackelrath v. Stookey, 63 111-
307 INFERENCES SUFFICIENCY OF FACTS. 309
proved. 04 But the court has nothing to do with the facts, and
cannot instruct the jury as to what inferences may or may not be
drawn from the proof of other facts. 35 But a charge telling
the jury that it is for them to say whether or not they will
draw a certain inference, if it should seem proper for them
to do so, is not error. 36
309. Instructing to convict on proof of certain facts Effect.
The court cannot, as a matter of law, direct the jury to con-
vict the accused if they believe beyond a reasonable doubt that
the facts and circumstances pointing toward his guilt are true.
The jury may believe that such facts have been conclusively
established as required, yet they may not regard the facts and
circumstances so proved sufficient to satisfy their judgment and
conscience of the defendant's guilt. The facts and circumstances
might be true, but not sufficient to warrant a conviction. 37 Hence
an instruction which directs the jury to convict the accused,
if they believe the facts and circumstances beyond a reasonable
doubt pointing toward his guilt, is erroneous; 38 such an in-
struction is an invasion of the province of the jury. 39
Also a charge directing the jury to convict the defendant if the
facts and circumstances in evidence cannot reasonably be account-
ed for by any other reasonable hypothesis than that of guilt, is
erroneous. 40 Also the giving of an instruction that the jury
may infer the main fact in issue from facts and circumstances
486, 488; Ashlock v. Linder, 50 111. 35 Pittsburg, Ft. W. & C. R. Co.
169; Barnes v. Blackhart, 12 111. v. Callaghan, 157 111. 406, 41 N. E.
195, 198; Izler v. Manchester & A. 909; Continental Life Ins. Co. v.
R. Co. 57 S. Car. 332, 35 S. B. 583; Yung, 113 Ind. 159, 15 N. E. 220, 3
Omaha Fair & E. Asso. v. Missouri Am. St. 630, note; P. v. Walden, 51
Pac. R. Co. 42 Neb. 105. 60 N. W. Cal. 588; Newman v. McComas, 43
330; Cook v. Brown, 39 Me. 443; Ind. 70; Mayer v. Wilkins, 37 Fla.
Union M. L. Ins. Co. v. Buchanan, 244, 19 So. 632; Augusta Mfg. Co.
100 Ind. 63; City of Columbus v. v. Vertrees, 4 Lea (Tenn.), 75.
Strassner, 138 Ind. 301, 34 N. E. 5; 36 Com. v. Walsh, 162 Mass. 242,
Graves v. Colwell, 90 111. 612; Stan- 38 N. E. 436.
ley v. Montgomery, 102 Ind. 102, 26 37 Otmer v. P. 76 111. 149. See,
N. E. 213. also, P. v. Chartoof, 75 N. Y. S.
3-1 Tyler, Ullman & Co. v. West- 1088, 72 App. Div. 555.
ern U. Tel. Co. 60 111. 421, 434, 14 ss Otmer v. P. 76 111. 149; Sims v.
Am. R. 38; Robbins v. P. 95 111. S. 43 Ala. 33.
178; Graves v. Colwell, 90 111. 612; 39 Sims v. S. 43 Ala. 33.
Hamilton v. P. 29 Mich. 195. See *o Webb v. S. 73 Miss. 456, 19 So.
Carlton v. P. 150 111. 181, 37 N. E. 238.
244.
310 ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 308
in evidence is error where a case is closely contested on a ma-
terial and vital point in issue. 41
310. Circumstances must be consistent with guilt. Where a
conviction depends upon circumstantial evidence alone, the facts
and circumstances relied upon ought not -only to be consistent
with the defendant's guilt, but inconsistent with every other
rational conclusion before a conviction is warranted; and an
instruction which fails to so state to the jury is fatally defec-
tive. 42 The facts and circumstances proved must also exclude
every other reasonable hypothesis except the guilt of the de-
fendant before a conviction can be had. Hence an instruc-
tion based upon such evidence which fails to require proof
to that degree of certainty is erroneous. 43 But the refusal to give
such an instruction may not be error if the instructions, given
on reasonable doubt, burden of proof, presumption of innocence
and the like, are full, clear and comprehensive. 44 And although
an instruction as to circumstantial evidence may be erroneous,
yet, as a general rule, if others given correctly state the law,
the error will be regarded as harmless. 45
311. Essential facts need only be consistent. But the rule
thus requiring that the facts and circumstances shown in evi-
dence must be consistent with the defendant's guilt and incon-
sistent with every other rational conclusion, relates to the essen-
tial, indispensable facts or circumstances, and not to facts or cir-
cumstances which might be eliminated from the case, and there
would still remain sufficient material facts to warrant a con-
41 Snowden v. Waterman, 105 Ga. vis v. S. 51 Neb. 301, 70 N. W. 984.
384, 31 S. E. 110. Contra: Jones v. S. 61 Ark. 88, 32
42 Harris v. S. 34 Tex. Cr. App. S. W. 81.
494, 31 S. W. 388; Hamilton v. S. 43 Jones v. S. 34 Tex. Cr. App.
96 Ga. 301, 22 S. E. 528; Brown v. 490, 30 S. W. 1059; Wantland v. S.
S. 108 Ala. 18, 18 So. 811; Cavender 145 Ind. 38, 43 N. E. 931; Smith v.
v. S. 126 Ind. 48, 25 N. E. 875; S. 35 Tex. Cr. App. 618, 33 S. W.
Smith v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. App. 618; 339. See, also, Reynolds v. S. 147
Wantland v. S. 145 Ind. 38, 43 N. E. Ind. 3, 46 N. E. 31.
931; Kollock v. S. 88 Wis. 663, 60 44 s. v. Seymour, 94 Iowa, 699, 63
N. W. 817; S. v. Andrews, 62 Kas. N. W. 661; Tatum v. S. 61 Neb. 229,
207, 61 Pac. 808; Gonzales v. S. 85 N. W. 40. See Jones v. S. 61
(Tex. Cr. App.), 57 S. W. 667; P. v. Ark. 88, 32 S. W. 81; Hamilton
Dick, 32 Cal. 216; S. v. Asbell, 57 v. S. 96 Ga. 301, 22 S. E. 528; Bar-
Kas. 398, 46 Pac. 770; Gill v. S. 59 row v. S. 80 Ga. 191, 5 S. E. 64.
Ark. 422, 27 S. W. 598; Longly v. 45 p. v . Dole, 122 Cal. 486, 55 Pac.
Com. 99 Va. 807, 37 S. E. 339; Da- 581, 68 Am. St. 50.
309 ESSENTIAL FACTS DEGREE OF PROOF. 312
vietion if established beyond a reasonable doubt. It is therefore
proper to refuse to instruct that if a single circumstance proved
is inconsistent with the guilt of the accused, the jury should
acquit him; they should be restricted to the material, essential
facts or circumstances. 40 There may be facts or circumstances
proved in a case not at all essential to a conviction. Such
facts need not be established beyond a reasonable doubt. The
instruction should relate to the material fact's or circumstances. 47
Or an instruction that each of the several circumstances must
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and must not only point
with moral certainty to the guilt of the defendant, but must
exclude to a moral certainty every other reasonable hypothesis,
is likewise improper. 48 Only each essential element constituting
the crime charged need be proved beyond a reasonable doubt,
and not each circumstance, though important in determining
the guilt or innocence of the accused. 49
312. Essential facts Degree of proof. It is a fundamental
principle of the law of circumstantial evidence that each in-
dependent essential fact must be proved in the same satisfactory
manner as if the whole issue rested upon the proof of that fact. 50
In other words, each of such essential facts must be established
to the same degree of certainty as if it were the main fact. 51
According to this rule it is proper to instruct that ''when the
evidence against the defendant is made up wholly of a chain of
circumstances, and there is a reasonable doubt as to the ex-
istence of one of the facts essential to establish guilt, it is the
duty of the jury to acquit." 52
P. v. Willett, 105 Mich. 110, 62 48 Kollock v. S. 88 Wis. 663, 60
N. W. 1115. See S. v. Seymore, 94 N. W. 817.
Iowa, 699, 63 N. W. 661; Price v. 49 s. v. Gallivan, 75 Conn. 326, 53
S. 114 Ga. B 855, 40 S. B. 1015; Leon- All. 731, 96 Am. St. 203.
ard v. Ter. 2 Wash. Ter. 397, 7 so s. v. Crabtree, 170 Mo. 642, 71
Pac. 872; S. v. Gleim, 17 Mont. 17, S. W. 130; P. v. Stewart, 75 Mich.
41 Pac. 998, 52 Am. St. 655; Claire 21, 42 N. W. 662; Harrison v. S.
v. P. 9 Colo. 122, 10 Pac. 6 Tex. App. 42. But see Smith v.
799 (condemning the use of S. 61 Neb. 296, 85 N. W. 49; S. v.
the word "chain," preferring the Young, 9 N. Dak. 165, 82 N. W.
"cable" metaphor in referring to 420; Graves v. P. 18 Colo. 181, 32
the facts); Rayburn v. S. (Ark.), Pac. 63.
63 S. W. 356 (condemning "links in si Johnson v. S. 18 Tex. App. 385.
a chain," preferring "threads or 52 p. v . Anthony, 56 Cal. 397.
strands making a rope or cord" of The decisions which do not ap-
evidence). prove of this form of instruction
47 Chilesler v. S. 33 Tex. Cr. App. condemn it principally for the use
635, 28 S. W. 683. of the words "chain of circum-
313 ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 310
Where circumstantial evidence alone is relied upon for a con-
viction, each necessary link and each and every material fact
upon which a conviction depends, must be proved beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, and, of course, the jury should be instructed
accordingly, and a refusal to so instruct is error. 53
So a charge based upon circumstantial evidence alone, that
"each fact necessary to establish the guilt of the accused must be
proved by competent evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, and the
facts and circumstances proved should not only be consistent with
the guilt of the accused, but inconsistent with any other reason-
able hypothesis than that of his guilt," and producing a reason-
able certainty that the accused committed the crime charged, is
not objectionable. 54 Hence an instruction that the law does
not require the jury to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt
of each link in the chain of circumstances relied upon to estab-
lish the defendant's guilt; that it is sufficient if taking all of
the testimony together, the jury are satisfied beyond a reason
able doubt of the defendant's guilt, is improper. 55
313. Omission of words from instruction Effect. The omis-
sion of the word "reasonable" or "rational" in its proper con-
nection in the giving of an instruction on circumstantial evi-
dence renders the instruction defective. 50 Thus an instruction
stances" or "links in the chain of 5 Cush. (Mass.), 295; P. v. Phipps,
facts," as tending to mislead; also 39 Cal. 333; Bressler v. P. 117 111.
because of the confusion of minor 438, 8 N. E. 62; Burrill Cr. Ev. 773,
or dispensable facts with the es- 736, 2 Thomp. Trials, 2511, 1 Ros-
sential indispensable facts: Graves coe Cr. Ev. 27; S. v. Young, 9 N.
v. P. 18 Colo. 181, 32 Pac. 63; Ray- Dak. 165, 82 N. W. 420. Contra:
burn v. S. 69 Ark. 177, 63 S. W. If the evidence is not entirely cir-
356; Clare v. P. 9 Colo. 122, 10 Pac. cumstantial: Harvey v. S. 125 Ala.
799. See Bressler v. P. 117 111. 422, 47, 27 So. 763; Morris v. S. 124 Ala.
8 N. E. 62. 44, 27 So. 336; Bressler v. P. 117
ss p. v . Aiken, 66 Mich. 460, 33 N. 111. 438, 8 N. E. 62; S. v. Moxley,
W. 821, 7 Am. Cr. R. 363, 11 Am. 102 Mo. 374, 14 S. W. 969, 15 S. W.
St. 512; S. v. Kruger, 7 Idaho, 178, 556; Davis v. S. 74 Ga. 869; Aris-
61 Pac. 463; P. v. Fairchild, 48 mendis v. S. 41 Tex. Cr. App. 374,
Mich. 37, 11 N. E. 773; Graves 54 S. W. 599; S. v. Cohen, 108 Iowa,
v. P. 18 Colo. 170, 32 Pac. 208, 78 N. W. 857; P. v. McArron,
63; Marion v. S. 16 Neb. 349, 121 Mich. I, 79 N. W. 944.
20 N. W. 289; P. v. Anthony, 56 54 Baldez v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.),
Cal. 397; S. v. Gleim, 17 Mont. 17, 35 S. W. 664; Crow v. S. 33 Tex.
41 Pac. 998, 10 Am. Cr. R. 52, Cr. App. 264, 26 S. W. 209.
52 Am. St. 655; S. v. Furney, ss s. v. Gleim, 17 Mont. 17, 41 Pac.
41 Kas. 115, 21 Pac. 213, 8 Am. 998, 52 Am. St. 655.
Cr. R. 137; Kollock v. S. 88 Wis. se Crawford v. S. 112 Ala. 1, 21
663, 60 N. W. 817; Com. v. Webster, So. 214. See S. v. Glass, 5 Ore. 81.
WORDS OMITTED. 314
charging that if the facts in evidence can be explained upon
any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the defendant, he
should be acquitted, is defective, in that it omits the word
reasonable in connection with the word "hypothesis." 57
An instruction on circumstantial evidence which omits to state
that the guilt of the accused must be established beyond a reason-
able doubt before a conviction can be had is erroneous. 58 But
an error in the giving of an instruction on circumstantial evi-
dence, caused by omitting the element of reasonable doubt, is
harmless where other instructions in various forms call for proof
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 59 So the omission to charge
as to reasonable doubt is not material error where the court, in
charging on circumstantial evidence, states that the facts estab-
lished must not only be consistent with the defendant's guilt,
but must also exclude every other reasonable hypothesis before
a conviction can be had. 60
314. Omission of words not fatal Illustrations. A charge
that "a few facts or multitude of facts proved, all consistent
with the supposition of guilt are not enough to warrant a verdict
of guilty. In order to convict on circumstantial evidence, not only
the circumstances must all concur to show that the defendant
committed the crime, but they must be inconsistent with any
other rational conclusion," is a proper statement of the law, and
the refusal to give it is error. 61 An instruction on circumstantial
evidence charging that the facts shown in evidence and relied
upon for a conviction must be consistent with each other and
with the guilt of the accused, and taken together, must be of a
conclusive nature, producing a reasonable and moral certainty
that the defendant, and no other person, committed the crime
charged, properly states the law. 62
57 Johnson v. S. 53 Neb. 103, 73 Jenkins v. S. 62 Wis. 49, 21 N. W.
N. W. 463; Walker v. S. 117. Ala. 232.
42, 23 So. 149; McClelland v. S. 117 si s. v. Andrews, 62 Kas. 207, 61
Ala. 140, 23 So. 653. Pac. 808. See Roberts v. S. 110 Ga.
ss Lipscomb v. S. 75 Miss. 559, 23 253, 34 S. E. 203. See S. v. David,
So. 210. 131 Mo. 380, 33 S. W. 28. See Vil-
59 Bird v. S. 43 Fla. 541, 30 So. lereal v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 61 S.
655. W. 715 (giving a complete charge on
so Young v. S. 95 Ga. 456, 20 S. circumstantial evidence in one in-
".5. 270. Instructions on circum- struction).
stantial evidence held not erroneous 02 Crow v. S. 37 Tex. Cr. App.
when considered with others given: 295, 39 S. W. 574; Hill v. S. (Tex.
Wells v. S. 99 Ga. 206, 24 S. E. 853;
315 ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 312
A charge that "when a conviction is sought alone upon cir-
cumstantial evidence, the circumstances relied upon, taken to-
gether, must be incapable of explanation upon any other ra-
tional hypothesis but that of the defendant's guilt" properly
states the law of circumstantial evidence. 63 So an instruction on
circumstantial evidence is sufficient if it states that the jury
must exhaust every reasonable hypothesis or conclusion other
than that of the guilt of the defendant before they can con-
vict, although it does not state that the evidence must show
that the defendant, and "no other person," committed the of-
fense charged. 6 *
315. Illustrations of the rules. A charge that if one set
or chain of circumstances leads to two opposing conclusions,
one or the other of such conclusions must be wrong, and there-
fore, in such a case, if the jury have a reasonable doubt as
to which of said conclusions the chain of circumstances leads,
a reasonable doubt would thereby be created, and they should
give the defendant the benefit of such doubt and acquit him, is
improper, for the reason that both these "opposing conclusions"
might lead to the defendant's guilt. 65 An instruction charging
that "to justify the inference of legal guilt from circumstantial
evidence, the existence of the inculpatory facts must be estab-
lished absolutely and to a demonstration incompatible with the
innocence of the accused," is improper, in that it calls for a
greater degree of certainty than the law requires. 60 Absolute
moral certainty excludes not only reasonable doubt, but all
doubt. 67 Also an instruction on circumstantial evidence direct-
Cr. App.), 35 S. W. 660; S. v. Dav- Mose v. S. 36 Ala. 211; P. v. Davis,
enport, 38 S. Car. 348, 17 S. B. 37. 64 Cal. 440; P. v. Anthony, 56 Cal.
ea Crutchfield v. S. 7 Tex. Cr. 397.
App. 65; Hunt v. S. 7 Tex. Cr. App. or S. v. Glass, 5 Ore. 82. "Abso-
212. lute moral certainty is not attain-
64 Bennett v. S. 39 Tex. Cr. App. able by the human mind It de-
639, 48 S. W. 61; Ramirez v. S. 43 scribes a fixed and uncomipromis-
Tex. Cr. App. 455, 66 S. W. 1101; ing attitude of the mind of which
S. v. David, 131 Mo. 380, 33 S. W. men are not capable in any of the
28. situations of life. It means such
65 P. v. Clarke, 130 Cal. 642, 63 a degree of certainty as precludes
Pac. 138. the possibility of error or mistake,
ee p. v. Bellamy, 109 Cal. 610, 42 and as presupposes the infallibility
Pac. 236; Carlton v. P. 150 111. 181, of witnesses and jurors. It im-
37 N. E. 244, 41 Am. St. 346. See poses such conditions upon the ad-
Jenkins v. S. 35 Fla. 737, 18 So. 182; ministration of justice as would
313
ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE RULES.
315
ing the jury to acquit where the criminating circumstances are
either denied by the accused or are explained in such a way
as to render his guilt doubtful is erroneous, in that his mere
denial without reference to its credibility calls for an acquittal. 68
make the punishment of crime im-
possible, and the existence of crim-
inal courts useless."
as Long v. S. 42 Fla. 509, 28 So.
775. An instruction that "each fact
necessary to the conclusion sought
to be established must be proved
by competent evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt, and all the facts
necessary to such conclusion must
be consistent with each other, and
the main fact sought to be proved;
and the circumstances taken to-
gether must be of a conclusive na-
ture leading on the whole to a sat-
isfactory conclusion and producing
in effect a reasonable and moral
certainty of the guilt of the defend-
ant and excluding every reason-
able hypothesis, except the guilt of
the defendant," is properly modi-
fied by adding thereto that circum-
stantial evidence, to warrant a con-
viction need not demonstrate the
guilt of the defendant beyond the
possibility of his innocence, Ham-
lin v. S. 39 Tex. Or. App. 579, 47 S.
W. 656.
CHAPTER XXI.
ON CONFESSIONS ADMISSIONS.
Sec. Sec.
316. Weight of confession is for 319. Voluntary confessions C a u-
the jury. tionary instructions.
317. Weight o f confession Im- 320. Confessions Corroboration.
proper comnient. 321. Instructions when no evi-
318. Voluntary confessions Com- dence When evidence.
petency.
316. Weight of confession is for the jury. When admissions
or confessions of a person charged with crime are properly ad-
mitted in evidence, the weight and credibility thereof are to
be treated and considered by the jury precisely the same as any
other evidence. It is the province of the jury to determine
whether a confession is true; and hence, if they believe the
whole confession to be true, they will act upon the whole as the
truth. But if warranted by the evidence, the jury may believe
that part of the confession which makes against the accused and
reject that part which is in his favor. An instruction in proper
form embracing this principle has been approved. 1
The weight of the evidence of a confession is a question for
the jury, and should be the subject of appropriate instructions. 2
And in determining what credit should be given to a confes-
sion, the jury are entitled to know the circumstances under
which it was given, 3 and the evidence thereof should be con-
i Jackson v. P. 18 111. 271; S. v. 2 Williams v. S. 63 Ark. 527, 39
Gunter, 30 La. Ann. 537. See Keith v. S. W. 709.
S. 157 Ind. 376, 61 N. E. 716; S. v. s s. v. Brennan, 164 Mo. 487, 65
Derrick, 44 S. Car. 344, 22 S. E. 337; S. W. 325.
S. v. Peck, 85 Mo. 190; S. v. Cur-
tis. 70 Mo. 594.
314
315 WEIGHT OF CONFESSIONS COMMENT ON. 317
sidered, together with all the other evidence introduced. 1 Thus
if the accused believed he was about to die at the time of mak-
ing an alleged confession, the jury have the right to consider
whether, when in such condition, he would have been likely
to make a truthful or false statement as to his connection
with the offense charged. 4 *
317. Weight of confession Improper comment. It being
the duty of the jury to determine the weight and credit
that shall be given to a confession as evidence of guilt, the
court, in the giving of instructions, should guard against intimat-
ing anything as to the value of such evidence. The court can-
not state that a confession freely and voluntarily made is en-
titled to great weight. 5 Thus an instruction stating that "a
confession freely and voluntarily made is among the best evi-
dence known to the law, and if the jury believe from the evi-
dence that the defendant did make such a confession they are
authorized to consider this in connection with the other evi-
dence" is improper as bearing on the weight of the evidence. 6
Or an instruction advising the jury that the voluntary con-
fessions of the accused are, in law, to be regarded as the strongest
proof against him, for the same reason, is erroneous. 7
To charge the jury that any verbal confession made by the
defendant, and written down by another, is subject to mistake,
which may arise from a misunderstanding of the meaning of
the defendant's words, or by using words not used by him, or
by substituting the language of the person writing the state-
ment, is improper as invading the province of the jury. 8 So
an instruction that the fact that the person who is charged
with the commission of a crime says nothing, but remains silent,
is a circumstance to which the jury may look as a confession
of guilt, is likewise improper. 9
* Holland v. S. 39 Fla. 178, 22 So. Ct. 223 (stating that flight is a si-
298; S. v. Tobie, 141 Mo. 547, 42 lent admission from which guilt
S. W. 1076. may be inferred).
4* S. v. Gorham, 67 Vt. 365, 31 o Thompson v. S. 73 Miss. 584,
Atl. 845. 19 So. 204; Brown v. S. 32 Miss.
5 S. v. Gleim, 17 Mont. 17, 41 433; Morrison v. S. 41 Tex. 520.
Pac. 998, 52 Am. R. 655. See Powell ? Morrison v. S. 41 Tex. 520.
v. S. (Miss.), 20 So. 4; Hogsett v. s Hauk v. S. 148 Ind. 238, 46 N.
S. 40 Miss. 522; Ledbetter v. S. 21 E. 127.
Tex. App. 344, 17 S. W. 427. See > Campbell v. S. 55 Ala. 80.
Starr v. U. S. 164 U. S. 627, 17 Sup.
318 CONFESSIONS ADMISSIONS. 316
318. Voluntary confessions Competency. Confessions or
admissions are not competent evidence unless they were made
freely and voluntarily by the accused. 10 If any degree of influ-
ence has been exerted to induce the accused to make a confes-
sion, it is incompetent. 11
Confessions induced by the appliances of hope or fear are not
regarded as voluntarily made, and are, therefore, not to be relied
on as true. A confession can never be received in evidence when
the accused has been influenced to make it by any threat or prom-
ise. 12 "And the slightest menace or threat, or any hope engendered
or encouraged that the prisoner's case will be lightened, meliora-
ted or more favorably dealt with, if he will confess either of
these is enough to exclude the confession thereby superinduced." 13
The competency of a confession, that is, whether it was freely
and voluntarily made, is a question for the court, and not for
the jury, to determine. 14 Hence the giving of an instruction
submitting its competency to the jury for them to determine
is improper. 15 Thus for the court to charge that if the jury
believe from all the evidence that the defendant's confession
was procured by means of fear or terror, or by hope of reward,
they should disregard it, is improper. 16 Or an instruction that
the jury should disregard a confession unless they believe that
it was voluntarily made by the defendant is likewise improper. 17
But if the testimony as to whether a confession was or was
10 Robinson v. P. 159 111. 119, 42 is Hughes Cr. Law, 3099, citing
N. E. 375; Com. v. Preece, 140 Mass. Owen v. S. 78 Ala. 425, 6 Am. Cr.
276, 5 N. E. 494, 5 Am. Cr. R. 107; R. 206, 56 Am. R. 40.
S v. Day, 55 Vt. 570, 4 Am. Cr. R. 1* Johnson v. S. 59 Ala. 37, 3 Am.
105; Hughes Cr. Law, 3094, 3096. Cr. R. 258; P. v. Barker, 60 Mich.
11 Hughes Cr. Law, 3096, citing- 277, 27 N. W. 539.
Robinson v. P. 159 111. 119, 42 N. E. Brown v. S. 124 Ala. 76, 27 So.
375. 250; Dugan v. Com. 19 Ky. L. R.
12 Hughes Cr. Law, 3098, citing 1273, 43 S. W. 418; Holland v. S. 39
Gates v. P. 14 111. 436, 1 Greenleaf Fla. 178, 22 So. 298; Hunter v. S. 74
Ev 219 (Redf. Ed.); Johnson v. Miss. 515, 21 So. 305; Williams v.
S. 59 Ala. 37, 3 Am. Cr. R. 258; S. 37 Tex. Cr. App. 147, 38 S. W.
Newman v. S. 49 Ala. 9, 1 Am. Cr. 999; Stone v. S. 105 Ala. 60, 17 So.
R. 173; P. v. Barrie, 49 Cal. 342, 1 114; McKinney v. S. 134 Ala. 134,
Am. Cr. R. 181; Gillett Indirect & 32 So. 726.
Col. Ev. 110. 16 Holland v. S. 39 Fla. 178, 22
By statute in Indiana a confes- So. 298.
sion made under any inducement 17 Hunter v. S. 74 Miss. 515, 21
except fear produced by threats So. 305; Williams v. S. 37 Tex. Cr.
may be given in evidence with all App. 147, 38 S. W. 999; Bailey v.
the circumstances, Benson v. a. S. 42 Tex. Cr. App. 289, 59 S. W.
119 Ind. 488, 21 N. E. 1109. 900.
317 VOLUNTARY CONFESSIONS. 319
uot voluntarily made is conflicting, then the issue may be sub-
mitted to the jury for them to determine, and the jury may re-
gard or disregard the confession as they may determine. 18 And
where the evidence is conflicting as to whether the confession
was voluntarily made, it is error for the court to refuse to sub-
mit the matter to the jury by proper instruction. 19
But the failure to instruct that the jury should be satisfied
beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was made vol-
untarily is not material where the court instructs generally on
reasonable doubt. 20 But if the legality of the confession is not
challenged or contested, then the court may properly refuse to
charge that before the jury can consider confessions made by
the accused they must believe he made the same voluntarily,
and not through promise or improper influence. 21 It has been
held that if, after evidence of a confession has been admitted,
it appears by evidence subsequently admitted that such con-
fession was not freely and voluntarily made, then the court
should withdraw the evidence of such confession. 22
319. Voluntary confessions Cautionary instructions. While
it is usually very necessary that some degree of care should be
used in receiving the confession of one charged with the com
mission of crime, and much caution be employed by the jury
in ascertaining its weight and sufficiency, 23 yet the court can-
not properly state to the jury, as a matter of law, that con-
fessions or admissions should, for certain reasons stated, be re-
ceived with great caution, unless voluntarily made. The weight
and credibility of confessions are to be determined by the jury
as facts. Some confessions or admissions may be entitled to
little credit, considering the circumstances under which they
were made; others, if made deliberately, freely and voluntarily,
may be among the most effective proofs in law, but the court-
cannot say, as a matter of law, that the confession in evidence
is Morris v. S. 39 Tex. Cr. App. 21 Bailey v. S. 42 Tex Cr. App.
371, 46 S. W. 253; Sparks v. S. 34 289, 59 S. W. 900.
Tex. Cr. App. 86, 29 S. W. 264; 22 Holland v. S 39 Fla. 178, 22 So.
Paris v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. App. 82, 31 298.
S. W. 855. 23 Underbills Cr. Ev. 146, cit-
19 Sparks v. S. 34 Tex. Cr. App. ing Nobles v. S. 98 Ga. 73, 26 S. E.
86, 29 S. W. 264. 64.
20 Nix v. S. 97 Ga. 211, 22 S. E.
975.
320 CONFESSIONS ADMISSIONS. 318
belongs to the one class or the other. 24 The contrary view is
held to be the law in other states. 25
Where the confessions or admissions were voluntarily and de-
liberately made it is not necessary to instruct the jury to re-
ceive them with caution. 26 In California such an instruction
has been held as properly modified by striking out the word
"great,"' it not being one of the statutory words relating to
such admissions. 27 Hence an instruction that as a general rule
the statements of witnesses as to verbal admission of a person
charged with the commission of a criminal offense should be
received by the jury with great caution, as that kind of evi-
dence is subject to much imperfection and mistake unless vol-
untarily made, is erroneous, in that it invades the province of
the jury. 28 Also a charge that oral admissions of a party
should be received with great caution, because a witness may
not have correctly understood them, or may not have correctly
recollected them, is likewise erroneous. 29
320. Confessions Corroboration. The corpus delicti can-
not be established by confessions alone. It must be shown by
other evidence, independent of confessions or admissions of the
accused. 30 When the court undertakes to state this principle
in the giving of instructions the jury should be left free to pass
upon and determine whether the evidence of the confession,
together with the evidence of the corpus delicti, is sufficient
to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.
An instruction leading the jury to believe that they would be
24 Keith v. S. 157 Ind. 376, 61 N. Maier, 94 Cal. 269, 29 Pac. 481:
E. 716. See Collins v. S. 20 Tex. Knowles v. Nixon, 17 Mont. 473, 43
Cr. App. 400. Pac. 628; Keith v. S. 157 Ind. 376,
25 Marzen v. P. 173 111. 60, 50 N. 61 N. E. 716; Morris v. S. 101 Ind.
E. 249; S. v. Hardee, 83 N. Car. 560; Zenor v. Johnson, 107 Ind. 69,
619 (discretionary). See S. v. Jack- 7 N. E. 751; Runnill v. Art, 169
son, 103 Iowa, 702, 73 N. W. 467. Mass. 341, 47 N. E. 1017; White v.
See Nobles v. S. 98 Ga. 73, 26 S. Ter. 3 Wash. Ter. 397, 19 Pac. 37.
E. 64. 29 Zenor v. Johnson, 107 Ind. 70,
26 S. v. Jackson, 103 Iowa, 702, 7 N. E. 751, 36 Am. R. 166; Morris
73 N. W. 467. v. S. 101 Ind. 562; Keith v. S. 157
27 p. v. Van Horn, 119 Cal. 323, Ind. 386. 61 N. E. 716.
51 Pac. 538. See P. v. Sternberg, so Gore v. P. 162 111. 265, 44 N.
Ill Cal. 11, 43 Pac. 201. E. 500; South v. P. 98 111. 263; P. v.
28Wastl. v. Montana N. R. Co. Tarbox, 115 Cal. 57, 46 Pac. 896;
17 Mont. 213, 42 Pac. 772; Collins v. McCulloch v. S. 48 Ind. 109, citing
S. 20 Tex. App. 400; Bobo v. S. many cases. Hughes Cr. Law,
(Miss.), 16 So. 755; Kaufman v. 3093.
319 CORROBOEATION OF CONFESSIONS. 321
authorized to convict if the evidence of the confession is cor-
roborated by proof of the corpus delicti, is erroneous. The jury
must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt from all the evi-
dence that the accused is guilty before they can convict him. 31
An instruction that the defendant cannot be convicted on his
own confession if not corroborated by other evidence tending
to establish the corpus delicti, is properly refused where it ap-
pears that the evidence, outside of the confession, is sufficient
to establish the corpus delicti. 32
321. Instructions when no evidence When evidence. If
there is no evidence whatever tending to prove a confession,
then instructions on that subject are improper, and they may be
prejudicial. 33 To instruct the jury that the accused has made
admissions when there is no evidence that he had, is error. 34
It is error to refuse instructions on the subject of confessions
where the admissibility of the confessions is an important or
controlling fact in the decision of the case. 35 But the omission
to instruct on this subject is not material error where the other
evidence in the case, alone, without the evidence of the con-
fession, clearly establishes the guilt of the defendant. 36
31 Wimberly v. S. (Ga.), 31 S. E. E. 178. The same rules as to ad-
162. See Davis v. S. 105 Ga. 808, missions or statements apply to
32 S. E. 158. both civil and criminal cases alike.
32 Tidwell v. S. (Tex. Cv. App.), See generally the following cases:
48 S. W. 184; Com. v. Tarr, 4 Al- Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Gray, 113 Ga.
len (Mass.), 315. 424, 38 S. E. 992; Lewis v. Christie,
ss Knight v. S. 114 Ga. 48, 39 S. 99 Ind. 377; Tozer v. Hershey, 15
E. 928, 88 Am. St. 17; Davis v. S. Minn. 257; Shinn v. Tucker, 37 Ark.
114 Ga. 104, 39 S. E. 906; Goodwin 580; Allen v. Kirk, 81 Iowa, 658,
v. S. 114 Wis. 318, 90 N. W. 120; 47 N. W. 906; Knowles v. Nixon, 17
Suddeth v. S. 112 Ga. 407, 37 S. E. Mont. 473, 43 Pac. 628; Stewart v.
747; Gentry v. S. 24 Tex. App. 80. De Loach, 86 Ga. 729, 12 S. E. 1067;
34 Andrews v. S. 21 Fla. 595. Newman v. Hazelrigg, 96 Ind. 377;
35 s. v. Moore, 160 Mass. 443. Haven v. Markstrum, 67 Wis. 493,
36 Sellers v. S. 99 Ga. 212, 25 S. 30 N. W. 720.
CHAPTER XXII.
RELATING TO ALIBI.
Sec. Sec.
322. Alibi as a defense Burden on 326. Instructions on issue Proper
defendant. and improper.
323. Burden Degree of proof. 327. Instructions proper.
324. Burden By preponderance, 328. Instructions improper.
when.
325. Instructions discrediting alibi.
322. Alibi as a defense Burden on defendant. The de-
fense of an alibi is not a substantive defense, but it is a fact
proper to be shown in evidence in rebuttal to the evidence of
the prosecution. The state must prove that the accused was
present at the time of the commission of the crime charged,
that is, where his presence is essential to connect him with its
commission. 1 In some jurisdictions the burden is on the de-
fendant to establish in support of an alibi such facts and cir-
cumstances, as when considered in connection with the other
evidence, create in the minds of the jury a reasonable doubt
of the truth of the charge. 2 The evidence in support of an
1 S. v. Ardoin, 49 La. Ann. 1145, 596, 11 N. W. 5; S. v. Beasley, 81
22 So. 620, 62 Am. St. 678; S. v. Iowa, 83, 50 N. W. 570. See, also,
Lowry, 42 W. Va. 205, 24 S. E. 561; Town v. S. Ill Ala. 1, 20 So. 598;
Gawn v. S. 13 Ohio C. C. 116, 7 Beavers v. S. 103 \la. 36, 15 So. 616;
Ohio Dec. 19. P. v. Piohette, 111 Mich. 461, 69 N.
2 Hughes Cr. Law, 2414, citing W. 739; Henson v. S. 112 Ala. 41, 21
Carlton v. P. 150 111. 181, 37 N. E. So. 79; S. v. Pry, 67 Iowa, 475, 25
244, 41 Am. St. 346; Garrity v. P. N. W. 738; S. v. Mcdellan, 23
107 111. 162; Mullins v. P. 110 Mont. 532, 59 Pac. 924, 75 Am. St.
111. 46; Ackerson v. P. 124 111. 558; P. v. Resh, 107 Mich. 251,
563, 16 N. E. 847; Hoge v. P. 65 N. W. 99; Thompson v. Com.
117 111. 44, 6 N. E. 796; Shee- 88 Va. 45, 13 S. E. 304; Underbill
ban v. P. 131 111. 22, 22 N. E. 818; Cr. Ev. 152; Gutirrez v. S. (Tex.
S. v. McGarry, 111 Iowa, 709, 83 Cr. App.), 59 S. W. 274. Contra:
N. W. 718; S. v. Hamilton, 57 Iowa, S. v. Harvey, 131 Mo. 339, 32 S. W.
320
321 BURDEN DEGREE OF PROOF. 323
alibi should be considered in connection with all the other
evidence in the case, and if on the whole evidence there is a
reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused he should be ac-
quitted. And an instruction stating the law in this form is
proper. 3
323. Burden Degree of proof. The burden of proof does
not change when the defendant undertakes to prove an alibi ;
and if by reason of the evidence in support of this defense the
jury should have a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the de-
fendant he would be entitled to an acquittal, although the jury
might not be able to say that the alibi was fully proved.* The
prosecution is not relieved from the necessity of proving the
actual presence of the accused at the time and place of the
commission of the alleged crime when personal presence is es-
sential. 5 So where the jury are instructed that if they enter-
tain a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant was present
at the time and place of the commission of the alleged offense
they should acquit him, sufficiently states the law without fur-
ther instruction on alibi; 6 or that if the defendant was at an-
other place before and during the commission of the crime
charged, he should be acquitted, is proper. 7
1110; Shoemaker v. Ter. 4 Okla. Caldw. (Term.), 92; S. v. Ward, 61
118, 43 Pac. 1059; S. v. Taylor, 118 Vt. 153, 192., 17 Atl. 483; Beavers v.
Mo. 153, 24 S. W. 449; S. v. Ghee S. 103 Ala. 36, 15 So. 616; Bennett
Gong, 16 Ore. 534, 19 Pac. 607; v. S. 30 Tex. Cr. App. 341, 17 S. W.
Fleming v. S. 136 Ind. 149, 36 N. E, 545; S. v. Ohee Gong, 16 Ore. 538,
154. 19 Pac. 607; Howard v. S. 50 Ind.
s S. v. Ardoin, 49 La. Ann. 1145, 22 190; Landis v. S. 70 Ga. 651; Mc-
So. 620, 62 Am. R. 678; Barr v. P. Lain v. S. 18 Neb. 154, 24 N. W.
30 Colo. 522, 71 Pac. 392. See S. v. 720; S. v. Hardin, 46 Iowa, 623, 26
Taylor, 118 Mo. 167, 3;5 S. W. 92; Am. R. 174; Pate v. S. 94 Ala. 14,
S. v. Bryant, 134 Mo. 246, 35 S. W. 18, 10 So. 665.
597; Walker v. S. 42 Tex. 360; Shee- 4 Hughes Cr. Law, 2415, citing
han v. P. 131 111. 22, 22 N. E. 818; Walters v. S. 39 Ohio St. 215, 4 Am.
Underbills Cr. Ev. 148, citing S. Cr. R. 35, 1 Bish. Cr. Proc. 1061.
v. Conway, 56 Kas. 682, 44 Pac. 627; 5 S. v. Lowry, 42 W. Va. 205, 24
S. v. Harvey, 131 Mo. 339, 32 S. W. S. E. 561.
1110; S. v. Lowry, 42 W. Va. 205, 6 Punk v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 48
24 S. E. 561; P. v. Pichette, 111 S. W. 171; S. v. Ward, 61 Vt. 153,
Mich. 461, 69 N. W. 739; Borrego 17 Atl. 483, 8 Am. Cr. R. 224; Long
v. Ter. 8 N. Mex. 446, 46 Pac. 349; v. S. 42 Fla. 509, 28 So. 775; S. v.
Carlton v. P. 150 111. 181, 37 N. E. Spotted Hawk, 22 Mont. 33, 55 Pac.
244, 41 Am. St. 346; Ackerson v. P. 1026. See S..v. Button, 70 Iowa, 268,
124 111. 571, 16 N. E. 847; Watson v. 30 N. W. 567.
Com. 95 Pa. St. 422; Ware v. S. 59 7 P. v. Pichette, 111 Mich. 461,
Ark. 379, 27 S. W. 485; Harrison v. 69 N. W. 739; S. v. Taylor, 118 Mo.
S. 83 Ga. 134, 9 S. E. 542; Walters v. 167, 24 S. W. 449.
S. 39 Ohio St. 217; Chappel v. S. 7
324 RELATING TO ALIBI. 322
A charge directing the jury to acquit the defendant if his
evidence raises a reasonable doubt of his guilt, correctly and
sufficiently states the law as to the defense of an alibi. 8 To
instruct that when the defendant undertakes to establish an
alibi the evidence he introduces must, when considered with all
the other evidence in the case, account for his whereabouts
during the whole period of time is not improper where the jury
are also properly instructed on reasonable doubt as to the where-
abouts of the defendant during the time in question. 9
324. Burden By preponderance, when. In some jurisdic-
tions, however, the burden is on the accused to establish the
defense of an alibi by a preponderance of the evidence. 10 Under
this rule an instruction that "it is the duty of the defendant,
in proving an alibi, to reasonably satisfy the jury that he was
elsewhere at the time of the commission of the offense," prop-
erly states the law. 11 But an instruction that an alibi can only
be satisfactorily sustained by proof which renders it impos-
sible for the accused to have committed the crime charged
against him is improper. 12 So an instruction requiring the de-
fendant to establish the defense of alibi by a preponderance
of the evidence, which fails to take into consideration the prin-
ciple of reasonable doubt, is erroneous. 13
s S. v. Miller, 156 Mo. 76, 56 S. W. 13 S. E. 304; S. v. Ward, 61 Vt. 153,
907; S. v. Jones. 153 Mo. 457, 55 S. 17 All. 483, 8 Am. Cr. R. 222; P. v.
W. 80; S. v. Hale, 156 Mo. 112, 56 Kessler, 13 Utah, 69, 44 Pac. 97.
S. W. 881. Compare Shaw v. S. 102 Contra: McNamara v. P. 24 Colo.
Ga. 660, 29 S. E. 477; Bone v. S. 61, 48 Pac. 541; S. v. Conway, 55
102 Ga. 387, 30 S. E. 845. See Towns Kas. 323, 40 Pac. 661.
v. S. Ill Ala. 1, 20 So. 598; Toler v. n Pellum v. S. 89 Ala. 28, 8 So.
S. 16 Ohio St. 585; P. v. Pearsall, 83; S. v. Henry, 48 Iowa, 403. But
50 Mich. 233, 15 N. W. 98; Gallagher see Beaver v. S. 103 Ala. 36, 15 So.
v. S. 28 Tex. App. 247, 12 S. W. 1087; 616; Briceland v. Com. 74 Pa. St.
French v. S. 12 Ind. 670; S. v. 469; Miller v. P. 39 111. 464; Wis-
Starnes, 94 N. Car. 973. dom v. P. 11 Colo. 175, 17 Pac. 519.
9 P. v. Worden, 113 Cal. 569, 45 12 Gawn v. S. 13 Ohio C. C. 116, 7
Pac. 844; West v. S. 48 Ind. 483 Ohio Dec. 19; McCormick v. S. 133
(whole time); Albritton v. S. 94 Ala. 202, 32 So. 268; Pollard v. S.
Ala. 76 (whole time), 10 So. 426. 53 Miss. 421; Kaufman v. S. 49 Ind.
10 S. v. Rowland, 72 Iowa, 327, 33 248; Stuart v. P. 42 Mich. 260, 3 N.
N. W. 137; S. v. McCracken, 66 W. 863; Beavers v. S. 103 Ala. 36, 15
Iowa, 569, 24 N. W. 43; S. v. Ham- So. 616; Wisdom v. P. 11 Colo, 170,
ilton, 57 Iowa, 596, 11 N. W. 5; 17 Pac. 519; Snell v. S. 50 Ind. 516.
S. v. Kline, 54 Iowa, 185, 6 N. W. is s. v. Hogan (Iowa), 88 N. W.
184; Lucas v. S. 110 Ga. 756, 36 S. E. 1074.
87; Thompson v. Com. 88 Va. 45,
323
BURDEN BY PREPONDERANCE.
326
325. Instructions discrediting alibi. The defense of an alibi
is as legitimate as any other defense, and the court should not,
by instruction or otherwise, cast suspicion upon it. 1 * It is a
well established rule that an instruction containing language
which casts suspicion upon, discredits or disparages any class of
evidence, is erroneous. 15 It is not improper, however, for the
court, in charging the- jury, to state that evidence introduced
to prove an alibi should be subjected to rigid scrutiny. 16
326. Instructions on issue Proper and improper. Where
the defense to a criminal charge is an alibi, and the defendant in-
troduces affirmative evidence tending to support it, he is entitled
to an affirmative charge on the issue of alibi, and it is error for
the court to refuse to so instruct. 17 It is also error to refuse
to charge the jury that a reasonable doubt may arise from the
evidence tending to prove an alibi. 18 The court is not required,
however, to instruct on the law of alibi on its own motion. The
desired instructions must be properly requested. 19
i* Miller v. P. 39 111. 465; Albin
v. S. 63 Ind. 598, 3 Am. Cr. R. 295;
P. v. Kelley, 35 Hun (N. Y.), 295;
Line v. S. 51 Ind. 172; Simmons v.
S. 61 Miss. 243; Sater v. S. 56 Ind.
378; S. v. Ghee Gong, 16 Ore. 534, 19
Pac. 607; S. v. Crowell, 149 Mo. 3U1,
50 S. W. 893; S. v. Jaynes, 78 N.
Car. 504; S. v Lewis, 69 Mo. 92;
P. v. Lattimore, 86 Cal. 403, 24 Pac.
1091; Spencer v. S. 50 Ala. 124;
Dawson v. S. 62 Miss. 241. Contra:
Provo v. S. 55 Ala. 222; S. v. Blunt,
59 Iowa, 468, 13 N. W. 427; S. v.
.Wright, 141 Mo. 333, 42 S. W. 934;
P. v. Wong Ah Foo, 69 Cal. 180, 10
Pac. 375.
is Shenkenberger v. S. 154 Ind.
630, 640, 57 N. E. 519; Lewis v.
Christie, 99 Ind. 377; S. v. Lewis,
.69 Mo. 92; Spencer v. S. 50 Ala. 124.
is S. v. Rowland, 72 Iowa, 329, 33
N. W. 137; Albritton v. S. 94 Ala.
76, 10 So. 426; S. v. Blunt, 59 Iowa,
468, 13 N. W. 427.
IT Rountree v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.),
55 S. W. 827; Arismendis v. S. (Tex.
Cr. App.), 60 S. W. 47; Padron v.
S. 41 Tex. Cr. App. 548, 55 S. W.
827; Tittle v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. App. 96,
31 S. W. 677; Smith v. S. (Tex. Cr.
App.), 50 S. W. 362; Garcia v. S.
34 Fla. 311, 16 So. 223; S. v. Con-
way, 55 Kas. 333, 40 Pac. 661; An-
derson v. S. 34 Tex. Cr. App 546,
31 S. W. 673; P. v. Dick, 32 Cal.
216; S. v. Mackey, 12 Ore. 1&4, 6 Pac.
648, 5 Am. Cr. R. 536; S. v. Whit-
ny, 7 Ore. 386; S. v. Kaplan, 167 Mo.
298, 66 S. W. 967; Burton v. S. 107
Ala. 108, 18 So. 284; S. v. Porter,
74 Iowa, 623, 38 N. W. 514; Wiley v.
S. 5 Baxt. (Tenn.), 662; Conway v.
S. 33 Tex. Cr. App. 327, 26 S. W.
401; Long v. S. 42 Fla. 509, 28 So.
775; S. v. Bryant, 134 Mo. 246, 35
S. W. 597; Fletcher v. S. 85 Ga.
666, 11 S. E. 872; Joy v. S. 41 Tex.
Cr. App. 46, 51 S. W. 935; Aris-
mendis v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 60
S. W. 47 (alibi sole defense); Deggs
v. S. 7 Tex. App. 359 (alibi the
sole defense). Contra: Conrad v.
S. 132 Ind. 258, 31 N. E. 805; S. v.
Ward, 61 Vt. 194, 17 Atl. 483, 8 Am.
Cr. R. 224; S. v. Button, 70 Iowa,
268, 30 N. W. 567.
is Fleming v. S. 136 Ind. 149, 36
N. E. 154.
19 Marshall v. S. 37 Tex. Cr. App.
450, 36 S. W. 86; Goldsby v. U.
S. 160 U. S. 70, 16 Sup. Ct. 216;
32? RELATING TO ALIBI. 324
Where there is abundant evidence of a conspiracy connecting
the accused with the commission of a murder, .it could make no
difference whether he was or was not present when the homicide
was committed; hence an instruction on alibi in such case may
be properly refused.- An instruction that "if you believe from
the evidence that the defendant was not present at the time
it is alleged that the crime was committed you must acquit
him," is properly refused where the defendant may have aided
and abetted the crime without being personally present. 21
But, of course, if there is no evidence introduced tending to
prove the defense of alibi, an instruction as to that defense is prop-
erly refused. 22 Thus, where, in a trial for murder, the evidence
shows that the killing occurred about eight o'clock, and the
defendant introduced no evidence to show his whereabouts from
seven-thirty to eight-fifteen, and it appearing that he could have
committed the crime during that time, he cannot complain that
the court failed to instruct on the defense of alibi. 23
327. Instructions proper A charge that evidence to es-
tablish an alibi, like any other evidence, may be open to special
observation; that persons may perhaps fabricate it with greater
hopes of success or less fear of punishment than most other
kinds of evidence, and honest witnesses often mistake dates
and periods of time and identity of people and other things
about which they may testify, is proper. 24 In a case where the
defense was an alibi, for the court to charge the jury that "I -ap-
prehend you will have little trouble in coming to a conclusion
whether it is a case of murder. I believe it is conceded by
counsel who addressed you that the killing was a felonious one,"
was held not to be an improper charge on the facts of the
Lyon v. S. (Tex. Or. App.), 34 S. W. 57 S. W. 805; Glover v. S. (Tex. Cr.
947; Com. v. Boschim, 176 Pa. St. App.), 46 S. W. 824; Morris v. S.
103, 34 Atl. 964; S. v. Peterson, 38 124 Ala. 44, 27 So. 336; Jackson v.
Kas. 205, 16 Pac. 263; Anderson v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 67 S. W. 497;
S. 34 Tex. Cr. App. 546, 31 S. W. 673. S. v. Jackson, 95 Mo. 623, 8 S. W.
Contra: Fletcher v. S. 85 G-a. 666, 749; S. v. Seymour, 94 Iowa, 699,
11 S. E. 872. 63 N. W. 661.
20 s. v. Gatlin, 170 Mo. 354, 70 S. 23 S. v. Seymour, 94 Iowa, 699, 63
W. 885; S. v. Johnson, 40 Kas. 266, N. W. 661; S. v. Murray, 91 Mo. 95,
19 Pac. 749. 3 S. W/397.
21 P. v. Feliz, 136 Cal. 19, 69 Pac. 24 p. v . Wong Ah Foo, 69 Cal. 189,
220. 10 Pac. 375.
22 Johnson v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.),
325 PROPER AND IMPROPER REQUESTS. 328
case. 25 To charge the jury that an alibi is a good defense, if
proved, is not error where in the same connection the jury
are instructed that if they have a reasonable doubt as to the
presence of the defendant they should acquit him. 26 An in-
struction in substance charging that if the jury believe from
the evidence that the testimony to sustain the defense of alibi
is false and fraudulent, then this is a discrediting circumstance
to which the jury may look, in connection with all the other
evidence, in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant,
is proper. 27 But an instruction which thus states that if the
jury believe the alibi to be false, that is positive evidence of
guilt, is erroneous. 28
An instruction that "the defense of an alibi is one easily
manufactured, and jurors are generally and properly advised
by the courts to scan the testimony of an alibi with care and
caution," is proper. 29 A charge that "if the defendant was at
the time of the killing at another and different place from that
at which such killing was done, and therefore was not and
could not have been the person who killed the deceased, if he
was killed; that if the evidence raises in your minds a reason-
able doubt as to the presence of the defendant at the place
where the deceased was killed, if he was killed, at the time of
such killing, you will find him not guilty," is correct. 30
328. Instructions improper. To instruct the jury that, as
a rule, the defense of an alibi is open to great and manifest
abuse, because of the comparative ease with which testimony to
support it may be fabricated, or that this defense is often re-
sorted to by those who are guilty, or that perjury, mistake,
contrivance and deception are frequently employed and involved
in supporting it, is error, as invading the province of the jury. 31
Stating to the jury that an alibi is a defense "easily fabricated,
25 S. v. Aughtry, 49 S. Car. 285, 26 as s. v. Manning (Vt ) 52 Atl.
S. E. 619. 1033.
S. v. Price, 55 Kas. 610, 40 29 s. v. Blunt, 59 Iowa, 468, 13
Pac. 1001; P. v. Resh, 107 Mich. 251, N. 427.
65 N. W. 99; P. v. Chun Heong, 86 Walker v. S. 6 Tex. App. 576.
Cal. 330, 24 Pac. 1021. 31 Underbill Cr. Ev. 153. cit-
27 Tattim v. S. 131 Ala. 32, 31 So. ing S. v. Chee Gong, 16 Ore. 538. 19
369; Albritton v. S. 94 Ala. 76, 10 Pac. 607; Murphy v. S. 31 Fla. 166. 12
So. 426; Crittenden v. S. 134 Ala. So. 453; Dawson v. S. 62 Miss. 241.
145, 32 So. 273.
328 RELATING TO ALIBI. 326
that it has occasionally been successfully fabricated, and that
the temptation to resort to it as a spurious defense is very great,
especially in cases of importance," is highly improper as in-
vading the province of the jury in determining the weight of
the evidence. 32
An instruction that if the jury believe from the evidence that
the defendant "has attempted to prove an alibi and failed, it is
a circumstance of great weight against him and proper to be
considered by the jury in determining his guilt or innocence,"
is improper. Failing to prove an alibi should have no greater
weight to convince a jury of the guilt of the accused than the
failure to prove any other important fact of defense. 33 It is
also improper to charge that a failure to prove an alibi may
be considered in connection with any other evidence in the case
tending to prove guilt. 34
It is error to charge that if the jury do not believe that the
testimony of the defense as to an alibi outweighs the testimony
of the state, which connects the defendant with the offense
charged, they should not believe the alibi. 35 An instruction
that the defendant is not required to establish the defense of
an alibi to the reasonable satisfaction of the jury is properly
refused. 36 Also a charge that the burden of proving an alibi
is not on the defendant is properly refused where 'other in-
structions state that it is sufficient if, from the whole evidence
on both sides, including the evidence relating to the alibi, there
is a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt, and where the
charge contains further instructions as to the presumption of
innocence ; and that unless such presumption is overcome by
evidence, the defendant should be acquitted. 37 It is error to
32 Henry v. S. 51 Neb. 149. 70 34 Parker v. S. 136 Ind. 284, 35
N. W. 924; Nehms v. S. 58 Miss. N. E. 1105. See, also, Kimbrough
362; Sawyers v. S. 15 Lea (Tenn.), v. S. 101 Ga. 583, 29 S. B. 39; S. v.
695. Compare P. v. Wong Ah Foo, Byers, 80 N. Car. 426.
69 Cal. 180, 10 Pac. 375. 35 Duncan v. S. 95 Ga. 477, 22 S.
33 Miller v. P. 39 111. 465; Prince E. 324.
v. S. 100 Ala. 144, 14 So. 409; P. se Holley v. S. 104 Ala. 100, 17 So.
v. Malaspina, 57 Cal. 628; S. v. 102; Pate v. S. 94 Ala. 18, 10 So.
Jaynes, 78 N. Car. 504. See Sawyers 665.
v. S. 15 Lea (Tenn.), 695; S. v. ST Emery v. S. 101 Wis. 627, 78 N.
Collins, 20 Iowa, 85; Turner v. Com. W. 145.
86 Pa. St. 54; Parker v. S. 136 Ind.
293, 35 N. E. 1105. Contra: Kilgore
v. S. 74 Ala. 5.
327 PROPER AND IMPROPER REQUESTS. 328
charge the jury that if it was possible that the defendant could
have been at both places that is, at the place of the alleged
crime and where he claimed he was at the time the proof of
the alibi is of no value whatever. 38 Also a charge that "proof
to establish an alibi, though not clear, may nevertheless, with
other facts of the case, raise doubt enough to produce an ac-
quittal ; a reasonable doubt of the defendant 's presence at the
time and place necessary for the commission of the crime would
necessarily raise a reasonable doubt of guilt," is improper as
being misleading and argumentative. 39
ss Ford v. S. 101 Term. 454, 47 S. James v. S. 115 Ala. 83, 22 So.
W. 703. 565.
CHAPTER XXIII.
INSANITY AS A DEFENSE.
Sec.
329. Insanity defined.
330. Sanity presumed Insanity
presumed to continue.
331. Insanity Burden on defend-
ant.
332. Insanity Instructions may
define.
Sec.
333. Insanity feigned Cautionary
instructions.
334. Insanity Instructions prop-
er Illustrations.
335. Insanity Instructions im-
proper Illustrations.
329. Insanity defined. Where insanity is the defense to
a criminal charge, the inquiry is always to be reduced to the
single question of the capacity of the accused to discriminate
between right and wrong at the time of the alleged criminal
act. 1 The insanity must be of such a degree as to create an
uncontrollable impulse to do the act charged, by overriding -the
reason and judgment, and obliterating the sense of right as to
the particular act done, and depriving the accused of the power
of choosing between them 1 . 2
i S. v. Harrison, 36 W. Va. 729,
15 S. E. 982, 18 L. R. A. 224 note,
9 Am. Cr. R. 638; Carr v. S. 96
Ga. 284, 22 S. E. 570, 10 Am. Cr.
R. 331; S. v. Morwy, 37 Kas. 369,
15 Pac. 282; P. v. Carpenter, 102
N. Y. 238, 6 N. E. 584; S. v. Pagels,
92 Mo. 300, 4 S. W. 391; P. v. Hoin,
62 Cal. 120; S. v. Lawrence, 57 Me.
577. See Mangum v. Com. 19 Ky. L.
R. 94, 39 S. W. 703; Com. v. Gerade,
145 Pa. St. 289, 22 Atl. 464; S. v.
Hockett, 70 Iowa, 442, 30 N. W. 742.
See Eckert v. S. 114 Wis. 160, 89
N. W. 826. Contra: Parsons v. S.
81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854, 7 Am. Cr. R.
266.
2 Ho ps v. P. 31 111. 391; Lilly
v. P. 148 111. 473, 36 N. E. 95;
Dacey v. P. 116 111. 572, 6 N. E. 165;
Meyer v. P. 156 111. 129, 40 N. E.
490; United States v. Faulkner, 35
Fed. 731. See, also, S. v. Nixon, 32
Kas. 212, 4 Pac. 159; Plake v. S. 121
Ind. 435, 23 N. E. 273; Goodwin v. S.
96 Ind. 550; Howard v. 9. 50 Ind.
190; Wagner v. S. 116 Ind. 187, 18 N.
E. 833; Conway v. S. 118 ind. 482, 21
N. E. 285; S. v. Felter, 32 Iowa, 49;
P. v. Riordan:, 117 N. Y. 71, 22 N. E.
455; Tiffiany v. Com. 121 Pa. St. 180,
15 Atl. 462; Mackin v. S. 59 N. J. L.
495, 36 Atl. 1040; Genz v. S. 59 N.
J. L. 488, 37 Atl. 69; P. v. Carpen-
328
329 , BURDEN ON DEFENDANT. 331
330. Sanity presumed Insanity presumed to continue.
The law presumes every man to be sane until the contrary is
shown. But this legal presumption may be overcome by evi-
dence from either side tending to prove insanity of the accused. 3
According to this principle it is proper, in charging the jury, to
instruct them that every man is presumed to be sane, and to
intend the natural and usual consequences of his own acts. 4
When insanity of a permanent type is proved to exist, it will
be presumed to continue to exist until the presumption is over-
come by competent evidence. But this rule does not apply to
cases of occasional or intermittent insanity, but it does apply
to all cases of habitual or apparently confirmed insanity of what-
ever nature. 5 And the refusal to give an instruction embrac-
ing this principle is error where the evidence tends to prove in-
sanity of a permanent nature. 6 But a charge that if the de-
fendant was insane a short time before the commission of the
alleged criminal act, the presumption is that he was insane when
he comitted the act, is properly refused. 7
331. Insanity Burden on defendant. And the burden of
proof is on the defendant to overcome such presumption. The
adjudged cases in this country present a vast weight of authority
favorable to the doctrine that insanity as a defense must be es-
tablished to the satisfaction of the jury by a preponderance of
the evidence; that a reasonable doubt of the defendant's sanity,
raised by all the evidence, does not authorize an acquittal. 8
But there are numerous decisions by courts of high authority
ter, 102 N. Y. 250, 6 N. E. 584; P. inick v. Randolph, 124 Ala. 557, 27
v. Taylor, 138 N. Y. 406, 34 N. E. So. 481.
275; S. v. Plye, 26 Me. 312; S. v. & S. v. Wilner, 40 Wis. 306, citing
Lawrence, 57 Me. 577, 581; Parsons 1 Greenleaf Ev. 42, 371, 689;
v. S. 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854. Jackson v. Van Dusen, 5 Johns. (N.
s Hughes Cr. Law, 2437, citing, Y.), 144; Grouse v. Holman, 19 Ind.
Dacey v. P. 116 111. 572, 6 N. E. 30; Wry v. Wry, 33 Ala. 187; Under-
165; Montag v. P. 141 111. 80, 30 N. hill's Cr. Ev. 156; Branstrator v.
E. 337; P. v. McCarthy, 115 Cal. 255, Crow (Ind.), 69 N. E. 668.
46 Pac. 1073; Davis v. United States S. v. Wilner, 40 Wis. 306. See
160 U. S. 469, 16 Sup. Ct. 353, and Grubb v. S. 117 Ind. 277, 20 N. E.
many other cases; Sanders v. S. 94 257.
Ind. 147; Com. v. Gerade, 145 Pa. T p. v . Smith, 57 Cal. 130.
St. 297, 22 Atl. 464. s Hughes Cr. Law, 2435, citing,
4 S. v. Pagels, 92 Mo. 300, 4 S. S. v. Scott, 47 La. Ann. 251, 21 So.
W. 931; Sanders v. S. 94 Ind. 147; 271, 10 Am. Cr. R. 585; Parsons v.
S. v. Bruce, 48 Iowa, 533. See Dom- S. 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854, 7 Am. Cr.
R. 266; Com. v. Gerade, 145 Pa. St.
331
INSANITY AS A DEFENSE.
330
holding that where a prima facie case is made out against the
defendant, he is never bound to overcome it by a preponderance
of the evidence where insanity is the defense ; that the burden
of proof is always on the state and never shifts to the defend-
ant; 9 that the presumption of sanity may be overcome by evi-
dence which is sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt of the san-
ity of the accused at the time of the commission of the alleged
criminal act, and an instruction so stating is proper. 10
It is proper, therefore, to instruct the jury that the law
presumes a man to be sane until the contrary is shown, and
imposes on the accused the burden of proving insanity when
set up as a defense to a criminal charge. 11 If the state shall
prove, even prima facie, that the accused committed the act
alleged to be criminal, and no other evidence is given, his sanity
will be presumed, and if he, in his defense, offers no evidence
as to his mental condition, his sanity will be regarded as proved. 12
289, 22 Atl. 464; Coyle v. Com. 100
Pa. St. 573, 4 Cr. L. Mag. 76; Car-
lisle v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 56 S. W.
365; P. v. Nino, 149 N. Y. 317, 43
N. E. 853; King v. S. 74 Miss. 576,
21 So. 235; S. v. Larkins, 5 Idaho,
200. 47 Pac. 945; S. v. Cole, 2 Pen.
(Del.), 344, 45 Atl. 391; Graves v.
S. 45 N. J. L. 203. 4 Am. Cr. R. 387;
Coates v. S. 50 Ark. 330, 7 S. W.
304. 7 Am. Cr. R. 585; S. v. Smith,
53 Mo. 267, 2 Green. Cr. R. 599; P.
v. Wilson, 49 Gal. 13, 1 Am. Cr. R.
358; Ortwein v. Com. 76 Pa. St.
414, 1 Am. Cr. R. 298; S. v. Cleven-
ger, 156 Mo. 190, 56 S. W. 1078;
Underbill Cr. Bv. 158.
Hughes Cr. Law, 2436, cit-
ing S. v. Crawford, 11 Kas. 32, 2
Green. Cr. R. 642; P. v. McCann, 16
N. Y. 58; Chase v. P. 40 111. 353; P.
v. Hellick, 126 Cal. 425, 58 Pac. 918.
See, also, Kelch v. S. 55 Ohio St,
152, 45 N. E. 6; P. v. McCarthy, 115
Cal. 255, 46 Pac. 1073; S. v. Shaef-
fer, 116 Mo. 96, 22 S. W. 447; Ford
v. S. 73 Miss. 734, 19 So. 665; Walk-
er v. P. 88 N. Y. 81, 88; Smith v.
Com. 1 Duv. (Ky.), 224, 228; P.
v. Holmes, 111 Mich. 364, 69 N. W.
501; Armstrong v. S. 30 Fla. 170,
204, 11 So. 618; S. v. Davis, 109 N.
Car. 780, 14 S. E. 55; Underbill Cr.
Ev. 157; Guetig v. S. 66 Ind. 94;
Plake- v. S. 121 Ind. 433, 23 N. E.
273; McDougal v. S. 88 Ind. 24.
10 Dacey v. P. 116 111. 571, 6 N.
E. 165; Montag v. P. 141 111. 80, 30
N. E. 337; Cunningham v. S. 56
Miss. 269; Maas v. Ter. 10 Okla. 714,
63 Pac. 960; Dunn v. P. 109 111. 635;
Langdon v. P. 133 111. 406, 24 N. E.
874; P. v. Garbutt, 17 Mich. 9;
O'Connell v. P. 87 N. Y. 377; S. v.
Bart.lett, 43 N. H. 224; Myers v. P.
156 111. 129, 40 N. E. 490; Brother-
ton v. P. 75 N. Y. 159, 3 Am. Cr. R.
219; Com. v. Pomeroy, 117 Mass.
143; Plake v. S. 121 Ind. 433, 23 N.
E. 273; S. v. Nixon, 32 Kas. 205, 4
Pac. 159; Ballard v. S. 19 Neb. 609,
28 N. W. 271; Davis v. United States
160 U. S. 469, 16 Sup. Ct. 363; P. v.
Taylor, 138 N. Y. 398, 34 N. E.. 275;
Keener v. S. 97 Ga. 3881, 24 S. E.
28; S. v. Wright, 134 Mo. 404, 35
S. W. 1145; S. v. Stickley, 41 Iowa,
232, 234, Underbill Cr. Ev. 157.
11 S. v. Pagels, 92 Mo. 300, 4 S.
W. 931; S. v. Clevenger, 156 Mo.
190, 56 S. W. 1078.
12 Underbill Cr. Ev. 157, cit-
ing Boiling v. S. 54 Kas. 602;
O'Brien v. P. 48 Barb. (N. Y.), 280;
Armstrong v. S. 30 Fla. 197, 11 So.
618; O'Connell v. P. 87 N. Y. 384;
331 DEFINITION ON DEGREE FEIGNING INSANITY. 333
The burden being on tlie defendant to overcome the presump-
tion of sanity, an instruction that the prosecution must affirma-
tively establish, as part of their case, that the defendant was
sane, is improper. 13
332. Insanity Instructions may define. The court, in
charging the jury, may define what in law constitutes such a
degree of insanity as excuses an act, which, but for the mental
condition of the accused, would be a crime; but in doing so
the court should avoid expressing its views of the case. 1 * But
the court is not authorized to state to the jury that certain facts
do or do not prove insanity. 15 And the court may instruct the
jury that insanity, in all its forms, is liable to become worse,
until it ends in complete dementia without expressing an opin-
ion on the weight of the evidence. 16
333. Insanity feigned Cautionary instructions. Where the
evidence warrants it, the court may caution the jury to examine
into the defense of insanity that the accused shall not impose
upon the court with an ingenious counterfeit of the malady.
Thus it is not improper to instruct that tlie plea of insanity is
"sometimes resorted to in cases where aggravated crimes have
been committed under circumstances which afford full proof of
the overt acts, and render hopeless all other means of evading
punishment. While, therefore, it ought to be viewed as a not
less full and complete, than it is a humane defense when sat-
isfactorily established, yet it should be satisfactorily examined
into, with care, lest an ingenious counterfeit of the malady
furnish protection to guilt." 17
So also an instruction that "if you find the accused at the time
the doctor was observing him through the hole in the wall, as
described by the witness, was watching to see whether he was
Com. v. Gerade, 145 Pa. St. 296, 22 Geier, 111 Towa, 706, 83 N. W. 718;
Atl. 464; Dove v. S. 3 Heisk. S. v. Jones, 126 N. Car. 1099, 36 S. B.
(Tenn.), 371. 38; P. v. Hubert, 119 Cal. 216, 51
is P. v. Garbutt, 17 Mich. 9, 97 Pac. 329.
Am. Dec. 162; Reg. v. Layton, 4 ie Carr v. S. 96 Ga. 284, 22 S. E.
Cox Cr. Gas. 155; S. v. Spencer, 1 570.
Zab. (N. J.) 202. IT p. v . McCarthy, 115 Cal. 255.
i* P. v. Holmes, 111 Mich. 364, 69 46 Pac. 1073; P. v. Larrabee, 115
N. W. 501. Cal. 158, 46 Pac. 922; P. v. Allender,
is Guetig v. S. 63 Ind. 278; Rob- 117 Cal. 81, 48 Pac. 1014; P. v.
inson v. Walton, 58 Mo. 380; S. v. Kloss, 115 Cal. 567, 47 Pac 459.
334 INSANITY AS A DEFENSE. 332
observed, and was regulating his conduct accordingly, it would
raise a very strong presumption that he was feigning insanity,
and indeed such evidence of design and calculation on his part
as to be in my opinion entirely fatal to his defense of insanity,"
has been held not to be an improper comment on the defense
of insanity where the evidence strongly tends to show that the
defense was not founded in fact, but feigned. 18
334. Insanity Instructions proper Illustrations Where
the defendant neither admits nor denies killing the deceased,
but claims that she was unconscious, an instruction charging
the jury that if they believe and find from the evidence that
the defendant killed the deceased, but at the time of the killing
was from any cause rendered so unconscious of her acts as not
to know what she was doing, they should acquit her, properly
states the law. 19 A charge that evidence of insanity can have
no effect in reducing the degree of the crime is not improper
where other instructions are given that if the accused is insane
he should be acquitted. 20
On a plea of insanity an instruction stating that "we hear
everything he says, consider everything he does; we observe
his conduct on the witness stand; we don't check him in stat-
ing his testimony, because one of the purposes is to see whether
he is a sane man or not," is not improper as authorizing the
jury to infer that the issue on the question of insanity shall
be confined to the time of the trial instead of at the time of
the crime charged, where other instructions in various forms
confine the inquiry as to insanity to the time of the alleged
offense. 21 "The law is that where the killing is admitted, and
insanity or want of legal responsibility is alleged as an excuse,
it is the duty of the defendant to satisfy the jury that insanity
actually existed at the time of the act, and a doubt as to such
insanity will not justify the jury in acquitting upon that
ground." Held proper. 22 Another form held proper: "Was
the defendant a free agent in forming the purpose to kill the
deceased? Was he at the time the act was committed capable
is McKee v. P. 36 N. Y. 118. 21 p. v . Burgle (Cal.), 53 Pac. 9&.
is S. v. Lewjs, 136 Mo. 84, 37 S. W. 22 Ortwein v. Com. 76 Pa. St. 414,
806. 1 Am. Cr. R. 297, Hughes Cr. Law,
20 Com. v. Hollinger, 190 Pa. St. 3269.
155, 42 Atl. 548.
333 PROPER AND IMPROPER REQUESTS. 335
of judging whether that act was right or wrong? And did he
at the time know it was an offense against the laws of God and
man?" 23
335. Insanity Instructions improper Illustrations. Where
insanity is the defense to a charge of murder, and evidence of
the insanity of relatives of the defendant is introduced, it isl^
improper to instruct that the evidence of the insanity of such
relatives should be considered only in case the jury entertain
a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's sanity at the time of
the commission of the act. All of the evidence should be con-
sidered in determining the mental condition of the defendant. 24
A charge stating, among other things, that "the defense of
insanity has been so abused as to be brought into great dis-
credit; that it has been the last resort to cases of unquestion-
able guilt, and has been an excuse to juries for acquittal," is
highly prejudicial to the rights of the accused. 25
An instruction which charges that no state of mind resulting
from drunkenness, short of actual insanity or loss of reason, is any
excuse for committing a crime, is erroneous where the evidence
shows that the accused was intoxicated, but where there was no
evidence that he had premeditated committing the crime. 26
A charge that an attempt to commit suicide is evidence of
insanity is properly refused ; such act is not evidence of in-
sanity, but only one phase of the evidence to be considered,
together with all the other evidence in the case. 27 An instruc-
tion that although the defendant at the time of the commission
of the crime charged was able to distinguish right from wrong,
yet if he "did not possess the power to avoid the wrong and
do the right, he is irresponsible and you must acquit" is errone-
ous and properly refused. 28 It is improper and erroneous to
charge that the presumption of innocence is of so much greater
strength than that of sanity that when evidence appears tending
to prove insanity it compels the prosecution to establish, from
23 Blackburn v. S. 23 Ohio St. 146, 26 Latimer v. S. 55 Neb. 609, 76
2 Green. Cr. R. 540; Clark v. S. 12 N. W. 207.
Ohio, 494. 27 p. v. Owens, 123 Cal. 482, 56
24 Jones v. P. 23 Colo. 276, 47 Pac. Pac. 251.
275. 28 p. v . Bartheman, 120 Cal. 7,
25 S. v. Barry, 11 N. Dak. 428, 52 Pac. 112. '
92 N. W. 809.
335
INSANITY AS A DEFENSE.
334
all the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, the mental sound-
ness of the accused. 29 An instruction telling the jury that if
there is a single fact essential to constitute the guilt of the de-
fendant which has not been established beyond a reasonable
doubt, that is sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt, is properly
.refused where insanity is the defense and the only issue in the
case. 30
28 Guetig v. S. 66 Ind. 94.
so S. v. Soper, 148 Mo. 217, 49
S. W. 1007. The refusal to instruct
on the law as to insanity cannot be
urged as error if there is no evi-
dence tending to show insanity of
the defendant at or near the time
of killing, S. v. Hartley, 22 Nev.
342, 40 Pac. 372, 28 L. R. A. 33 note.
Instructions on insanity are prop-
erly refused where insanity is not
interposed as a defense, Johnson v.
S. 100 Tenn. 254, 45 S. W. 436.
CHAPTER XXIV.
PRESUMPTIONS OP INNOCENCE.
Sec.
336. Defendant presumed to be in-
nocent.
337. Instructions refused W hen
error and when not.
Sec.
33S. Presumption of innocence is
evidence.
339. Presumption is evidence Il-
lustrations.
336. Defendant presumed to be innocent. In criminal cases
the defendant is always presumed to be innocent of the crime
charged until his guilt has been established beyond a reasonable
doubt; 1 and this presumption continues in his favor throughout
every stage of the trial down to and until the jury shall have
reached a verdict, 2 and does not cease upon the submission of
the case to the jury. 3 This is a fundamental principle of crim-
inal law, and the defendant is entitled to have the jury properly
instructed on the law of such presumption, and the refusal to so
i Rogers v. S. 117 Ala. 192, 23 So.
82; Salm v. S. 89 Ala. 56, 8 So. 66;
Foster v. S. 89 Wis. 482, 62 N. W.
185; P. v. Willett, 105 Mich. 110,
62 N. W. 1115; P. v. Pallister, 138
N. Y. 605, 33 N. E. 741; Aszman
v. S. 123 Ind. 361, 24 N. E. 123;
Gardner v. S. 55 N. J. L. 17, 26
Atl. 30; P. v. Resh, 107 Mich. 251.
65 N. W. 99; P. v. Coughlin, 65
Mich. 704, 32 N. W. 905; Farley v.
S. 127 Ind. 421, 26 N. E. 766; Reeves
v. S. 29 Fla. 527, 10 So. 901; Long v.
S. 23 Neb. 33, 36 N. W. 310; Hutts v.
S. 7 Tex. App. 44; Reid v. S. 50 Ga.
556; Underbill Cr. Ev. 17. See,
also, P. v. Bowers (Cal.), 18 Pac.
660; Line v. S. 51 Ind. 172; P. v.
Arlington, 131 Cal. 231, 63 1 Pac. 347;
Garrison v. S. 6 Neb. 285; Murphy
v. S. 108 Wis. HI, 83 N. W. 1112;
Ter. v. Burgess, 8 Mont. 57, 19 Pac.
58; S. v. Stubblefield, 157 Mo. 360.
58 S. W. 337.
2 S. v. Krug, 12 Wash. 288, 41
Pac. 126; Bartley v. S. 53 Neb. 310,
73 N. W. 744; S. v. Stubblefield, 157
Mo. 360, 58 S. W. 337; S. v. Howell,
26 Mont. 3, 66 Pac. 291; P. v. McNa-
mara, 94 Cal. 515, 29 Pac. 953; P. v.
Macard, 73 Mich. 26, 40 N. W. 784.
See P. v. Arlington, 131 Cal. 231,
63 Pac. 347, (relating to every
stage of the trial) ; Underbill Cr.
Ev. 18. Contra: Emery v. S. 101
Wis. 627, 78 N. W. 145; Baker v.
Com. 90 Va. 820, 20 S. E. 776.
s P. v. O'Brien, 106 Cal. 104, 39
Pac. 325.
335
337 PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE. 336
instruct when properly requested is reversible error; 4 but the
failure to so instruct cannot be urged as error where the omission
was not called to the attention of the court. 5
337. Instructions refused When error and when not. The
refusal to instruct the jury on the law as to the presumption of
the innocence of the accused when properly requested is error,
although the court may fully instruct on the doctrine of reason-
able doubt. 6 It is not error, however, to refuse an instruction
on the presumption of innocence if the refused instruction is
substantially covered by others given. 7 Thus where the court
has stated to the jury that nothing can be presumed against the
defendant, it is not prejudicial error to omit to charge that the
defendant is presumed to be innocent, if the instructions in other
respects fully and properly state the law applicable to the case. 8
So the refusal of a specific instruction which may perhaps more
definitely state the principle of such presumption is not ground
for error where the general charge on the same subject can be
readily understood by the jury. 9 And the giving of an instruc-
tion on the presumption of innocence may render it unnecessary
to give instructions on other questions, such, for instance, as "the
burden is upon the state to establish every element of the of-
* Rogers v. S. 117 Ala. 192, 23 Vaughan v. Com. 85 Va. 671; Mur-
So. 82; S. v. Gonce, 79 Mo. 602; ray v. S. 26 Ind. 141 (exception must
Foster v. S. 89 Wis. 482, 62 N. W. be taken to the refusal), Contra: S.
185; P. v. Willett, 105 Mich. 110, 62 v. Heinze, 2 Mo. App. 1314; P. v.
N. W. 1115; Castle v. S. 75 Ind. Ostrander, 110 Mich. 60, 67 N. W.
146; Reeves v. S. 29 Fla. 527, 10 So. 1079.
905; Coffee v. S. 5 Tex. App. 545; * Faqua v. Com. (Ky.), 73 S. W.
P. v. Potter, 89 Mich. 354, 50 N. W. 782; Smith v. S. 63 Ga. 170; Murphy
994; Farley v. S. 127 Ind. 419, 26 v. S. 108 Wis. Ill, 83 N. W. 1112.
N. E. 898. 8 P. v. Parsons,- 105 Mich. 177, 63
s P. v. Graney, 91 Mich. 646, 52 N. W. 69. See P. v. Harper, 83
N. W. 66; P. v. Ostrander, 110 Mich. Mich. 273, 47 N. W. 221.
60, 67 N. W. 1079; P. v. Smith, 92 8 Murphy v. S. 108 Wis. Ill, 83
Mich. 10. 52 N. W. 67; Williams v. Wis. 1112. On the trial of a charge
P. 164 111. 481, 45 N. B. 987. See of murder in the first degree an in-
Murray v. S. 26 Ind. 141. Contra: struction as to the presumption of
P. v. Macard, 73 Mich. 15, 40 N. W. innocence which states among other
784; P. v. Potter, 89 Mich. 353, 50 things that the defendant is pre-
N. W. 994. sumed to be innocent "of the crime
Stokes v. P. 53 N. Y. 183; Coffin charged" relates as well to the in-
v. United States, 156 L. S. 432, 15 eluded offenses as to the specific
Sup. Ct. 394; P. v. Van Houter, 38 charge of murder in the first de-
Hun (N. Y.),173; Cochran. v. United gree, S. v. Smith, 164 Mo. 567, 65 S.
States, 157 U. S. 286, 15 Sup. Ot. 628; W. 270.
337 PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE AS EVIDENCE. 339
fense and never shifts to the defendant." 10 So the refusal to
charge that if there is a probability of innocence there is a reason-
able doubt of guilt, is not error where other instructions given
properly state the law of the presumption of innocence. 11
338. Presumption of innocence is evidence. The legal pre-
sumption of innocence shall be regarded as a matter of evidence
to the benefit of which the defendant is entitled until his guilt
is proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and a refusal to so instruct
the jury when a proper instruction is requested is error. 12 A
charge that the presumption of innocence "partakes of the
nature of evidence, and if no evidence was introduced, then under
this presumption of innocence the jury should acquit the defend-
ant;" and that such presumption continues until the defendant
is proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, is proper although
evidence had in fact been introduced. 13 But the refusal of such
an instruction is not error where the court instructs that the
presumption of innocence continues until guilt is established
beyond a reasonable doubt. 14
339. Presumption is evidence Illustrations. An instruc-
tion stating that every person is presumed to be innocent until
his guilt has been established beyond a reasonable doubt is not
erroneous in that it does not state that the guilt must be proved
by competent evidence where it appears that all the evidence is
competent. 15 A charge stating in substance that the law pre-
sumes the innocence of a person accused of crime and that this
presumption is not merely a matter of form, to be disregarded by
10 Huggins v. S. 42 Tex. Cr. App. 76 N. W. 438; Gordon v. Com. 100
364, 60 S. W. 52; Lewis v. S. (Tex. Va. 825, 41 S. E. 746, 57 L. R. A.
Cr. App.), 59 S. W. 886. 744. Contra: S. v. Martin, (Mont),
11 Allen v. United States, 164 U. 74 Pac. 727.
S. 492, 17 Sup. Ct. 154. In Virginia it is McVey v. S. 55 Neb. 777, 76 N.
has been held that a charge that the W. 438.
accused comes to trial presumed to i* McVey v. S. 55 Neb. 777, 76 N.
be innocent, and this presumption W. 438. See Gordon v. Com. 100
extends to the end of the trial, and Va. 825, 41 S. E. 746, 57 L. R. A.
the jury in considering the evi- 744; S. v. Hudspeth, 159 Mo. 178,
dence should endeavor to reconcile 60 S. W. 136.
it with this presumption, is im- is Dalzell v. S. 7 Wyo. 450, 53
proper as tending to mislead. Bar- Pax:. 297; S. v. Duck, 35 La. Ann.
ker v. Com. 90 \a. 820, 20 S. E. 776. 764; Williams v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. App.
12 Bryant v. S. 116 Ala. 44b, 23 606. 34 S. W. 943; P. v. Resh, 107
So. 40; Bartley v. S. 53 Neb. 310, 73 Mich. 251, 65 N. W. 99; Gallagher
N. W. 744; McVey v. S. 55 Neb. 777, v. S. 28 Tex. App. 247.
339 PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE. 338
the jury at their pleasure ; that such presumption continues with
the defendant throughout all the stages of the trial, properly
states the law. 16 An instruction that "the law raises no pre-
sumption against the accused, but every presumption of the
law is in favor of his innocence," is proper. 17 An instruction that
the defendant, though indicted for perjury, is just as innocent of
the crime as though not indicted, is erroneous. 18
" S. v. Krug, 12 Wash. 288, 41 19 Pac. 558, 1 L. R. A. 808. See,
Pac. 126. Contra: Barker v. Com. also, Line v. S. 51 Ind. 172.
90 Va. 820, 20 S. E. 776. is Sanders v. P. 124 111. 21fc, 16
IT Ter. v. Burgess, 8 Mont. 57, N. E. 81.
CHAPTER XXV.
CHARACTER OP DEFENDANT.
Sec.
340. Proof of good character prop-
er.
341. Good character considered
Instructions.
342. Instructions o n character
Refusal When proper.
343. Good character creating rea-
sonable doubt Instruction.
344. Good character unavailing
When.
Sec.
345. Good character Instructions
improper.
(1.) Considered as generating
doubt.
(2.) Persons not Mkely to com-
mit crime.
(30 Sufflciervt to raise doubt.
(4.) Invading province of jury.
(5.) Ignoring evidence of.
340. Proof of good character proper. In every criminal
prosecution the accused is entitled to prove his good character,
and when proved it is itself a fact in the case a circumstance
tending in greater or less degree to establish his innocence ; and
the accused has a right to have it considered by the jury the
same as any other fact in evidence. 1 Evidence of the good char-
acter of the accused is admissible whether the case as to his guilt
or innocence is doubtful or not. 2 Therefore, to say by instruc-
1 S. v. Van Kuran, 25 Utah, 8, 69
Pac. 60.
2 Jupitz v. P. 34 111. 521; Mc-
Queen v. S. 82 Ind. 74; Steele v. P.
45 111. 157; S. v. Lindley, 51 Iowa,
344, 1 N. W. 484; Aneals v. P. 134
111. 401, 25 N. E. 1022; Com. v.
Leonard, 140 Mass. 473, 7 Am. Cr.
R. 598, 4 N. E. 96, 54 Am. R. 485;
P. v. De La Cour Soto, 63 Cal.
165; Hall v. S. 132 Ind. 317,
31 N. E. 536; S. v. Schleagel,
50 Kas. 325, 31 Par. 1105; Edg-
ington v. U. S. 164 U. S. 361,
17 Sup. Ct. 72; Com. v. Wilson,
152 Mass. 12, 25 N. E. 16; Pate v. S.
94 Ala. 14, 10 So. 665; S. v. Mc-
Murphy, 52 Mo. 251, 1 Green. Cr. R.
640; S. v. Anslinger, 171 Mo. 600,
71 S. W. 1041; Stewart v. S. 22 Ohio
St. 478; S. v. Honing, 49 Iowa, 158;
S. v. Porter, 32 Ore. 135, 49 Pac. 964;
P. v. Mead, 50 Mich. 228, 15 N. W. 95;
S. v. Henry, 50 N. Car. 65; Remsen
v. P. 57 Barb. (N. Y.), 324, 43 N. Y.
6; Holland v. S. 131 Ind. 572, 31
N. E. 359; Hammond v. S. 74 Miss.
214, 21 So. 149.
339
341 CHARACTER OF DEFENDANT. 340
tion that evidence of the good character of the defendant can
be considered by the jury only in cases where the other evidence
leaves it doubtful whether the defendant is guilty or not, is error. 3
So a charge that "evidence of good character is entitled to
great weight when the evidence against the accused is weak or
doubtful, but is entitled to very little weight when the proof
is strong," is erroneous in that it invades the province of the
jury. 4 Also an instruction charging that "evidence of previous
good character may be considered by you in connection with all
the other evidence given in the cause in determining whether the
defendant would likely commit the crime with which he is
charged; and if you find from all the evidence in the cause, in-
dependent of the evidence of his good character, that there is
a reasonable doubt, then you should give him the benefit of good
character and acquit him ; but if you should find from all the
evidence given in the cause independent of the evidence of
previous good character that the defendant did commit the
crime or was present aiding or abetting, encouraging, counseling,
directing and assisting in the same, evidence of previous good
character would not avail him anything, and you should find him
guilty," is erroneous in that it deprives the defendant of the
benefit of his evidence of good character. 5 The weight that ought
to be given to evidence of good character does not depend upon
the grade of the crime, and an instruction that it does is er-
roneous. 6
341. Good character considered Instructions. It is the
duty of the jury to consider the evidence of the previous good
character of the accused together with all the other evidence in
the case in determining his guilt or innocence. They must con-
s Rowe v. U. S. 97 Fed. 779; C. C. 613; Hammond v. S. 74 Miss.
Jupitz v. P. 34 111. 516, 521; P. 214, 21 So. 149; Com. v. Cleary, 135
v. Hancock, 7 Utah, 170, 25 Pac. Pa. St. 64, 19 Atl. 1017; Felix v. S.
1093; Edgington v. U. S. 164 U. 18 Ala. 725; Stewart v. S. 22 Ohio
S. 361, 17 Sup. Ct. 72; Powers v. St. 478; S. v. Kinley, 43 Iowa, 296;
S. 74 Miss. 777, 21 So. 65; P. S. v. Daley, 53 Vt. 442.
v. Don Pedro, 43 N. Y. S. 44, 19 * Vincent v. S. 37 Neb. 672, 56
Misc. 300. See P. v. Dippold, 51 N. W. 320.
N. Y. S. 859, 30 App. Div. 62; S. 5 Holland v. S. 131 Ind. 568, 31
v. Holmes, 65 Minn. 230, 68 N. N. E. 359.
W. 11; Com. v. Leonard, 140 Mass. Harrington v. S. 19 Ohio St.
473', 4 N. E. 96; 8. v. Henry, 50 268; Cancerni v. P. 16 N. Y. 501.
N. Oar. 65; Donaldson v. S. 10 Ohio
341 GOOD CHARACTER, EFFECT. 343
sider whether the evidence of such good character, when weighed
and considered with all the other evidence, raises a reasonable
doubt as to the guilt of the accused. 7 Such evidence should be
submitted to the jury as any other evidence without any inti-
mation as to its value or without any disparagement. 8 The evi-
dence of the good character of the accused should be mentioned
in connection with the other evidence in the case in charging
the jury, and not disconnected from it. 9
342. Instructions on character Refusal When proper. If
there is no evidence as to the good character of the defendant the
court may properly refuse to instruct in that respect. 10 Thus
an instruction that the defendant's character cannot be assailed
unless he himself puts it in issue by introducing evidence in
its support, is improper where the defendant has offered no
evidence as to his character; it suggests the inference that the
prosecution might have shown the bad character of the defend-
ant had it been permitted to do so. 11 It is not error to refuse an
instruction as to the good character of the accused if it is sub-
stantially embodied in others given. 12
343 Good character creating reasonable doubt Instruction.
The accused is entitled to an instruction that good character may
of itself create a reasonable doubt where otherwise no such doubt
would exist. 13 So an instruction that if in the judgment of the jury
7 S. v. Keefe, 54 Kas. 197, 38 Pac. ra, 100 Mo. 100 (holdiu that the re-
302; Olds v. S. (Fla.), 33 So. 296. fusal of a proper instruction is
See Crump v. Com. (Va.), 23 S. E. not error), 13 S. W. 938; P. v.
700. Spriggs, 58 Hun (N. Y.), 603, 11 N.
s Powers v. S. 74 Miss. 777, 21 Y. S. 433.
So. 657; Latimer v. S. 55 Neb. 609, is P. v. Elliott, 163 N. Y. 11, 57
76 N. W. 207; Moran v. S. 11 Ohio N. E. 103; Lowenberg v. P. 5 Park.
C. C. 464; P. v. Casey, 53 Cal. 392. Cr. (N. Y.), 414; Bryant v. S. 116
o Crawford v. S. 112 Ala. 1, 21 Ala. 445, 23 So. 40; S. v. Vankuran,
So. 214; P. v. Hoagland, 137 Cal. 25 Utah, 8, 69 Pac. 60 (good char-
218, 69 Pac. 1063. acter may satisfy the jury of the
10 Williams v. P. 166 111. 136, 46 innocence of the defendant) ; Bank-
N. E. 749; S. v. Gartrell, 171 Mo. head v. S. 124 Ala. 14, 26 So. 979;
489, 71 S. W. 1045. See S. v. Fur- Aneals v. P. 134 111. 415, 25 N. E.
geson, 162 Mo. 668, 63 S. W. 101. 1022; P. v. Bell, 49 Cal. 489. See,
11 P. v. Gleason, 122 Cal. 370, 55 also, S. v. Porter, 32 Ore. 135, 49 Pac.
Pac. 123. 964; Heine v. Com. 91 Pa. St. 145;
12 White v. U. S. 164 U. S. 100, P. v. Bell, 49 Cal. 485. Contra:
17 Sup. Ct. 38; Com. v. Wilson. Scott v. S. 105 Ala. 57, 16 So. 925;
152 Mass. 12, 25 N. E. 16; P. v. Briggs v. Conr. 82 Va. 554; Powers
Johnson, 61 Cal. 142; S. v. McNama- v. S. 74 Miss. 777, 21 So. 657.
344 CHARACTER OF DEFENDANT. 342
the evidence of good character raises a reasonable doubt against
positive evidence, they have the right to entertain such doubt,
and the defendant should have the benefit of it, properly states
the law. 14 It is not proper, however, to instruct that evidence of
good character is admissible for the purpose of creating a reason-
able doubt. 15 Also that good character is of importance to a
person charged with the commission of a criminal offense, and
that the jury have the right to consider whether a person of
good character would be less liable to be guilty of the commis-
sion of crime than a person of bad character, is proper. 16
344. Good character unavailing When. If, however, the
evidence clearly and conclusively establishes the guilt of the
accused beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury should find him
guilty, notwithstanding his former good character. Hence, an
instruction charging that if from the evidence the jury believe
the defendant is guilty, then his previous good character neither
justifies, mitigates, nor excuses the offense, is proper. 17 Also an
instruction that if after full consideration of all the evidence
adduced (including the evidence of good character), the jury
believe the defendant to be guilty of any degree of the crime
charged, they should so find, notwithstanding proof of good
character, correctly states the law. 18
345. Good character Instructions improper. (1) Consider-
ed as generating doubt: A charge which states that "the good
character of the defendant if proved, is not only evidence of inno-
cence, but it may be considered by the jury for the purpose of
generating doubt," is improper, in that it tends to mislead the
jury on the question of reasonable doubt. 19 Also charging that
good character, if proved, may sometimes have the effect of
generating such doubt as would authorize an acquittal, even
i* P. v. Hughson, 154 N. Y. 153, Mo. 70; S. v. Spooner, 41 La. Ann.
47 N. B. 1092. 780, 6 So. 879; Creed v. P. 81 111.
i" S. v. Gushing, 17 Wash. 544, 565; S. v. Porter, 32 Ore. 135, 49
50 Pac. 512. Pac. 964; P. v. Brooks, 61 Hun (N.
IB P. v. Harrison, 93 Mich. 597, 53 Y.) 619, 15 N. Y. S. 362; S. v. Dar-
N. W. 725. rah, 152 Mo. 522, 54 S. W. 226.
IT S. v. Jones, 78 Mo. 282; S. v. is P. v. Smith, 59 Cal. 601.
Leppere, 66 Wis. 355, 28 N. W. 376; i Johnson v. S. 102 Ala. 1, 16
Com. v. Eckerd, 174 Pa. St. 137, 34 So. 99; Eggleston v. S. 129 Ala. 80,
Atl. 305; P. v. Samsels, 66 Cal. 99, 4 30 So. 582; Miller v. S. 107 Ala. 40,
Pac. 1061; P. v. Mitchell, 129 Cal. 19 So. 37; Webb v. S. 106 Ala. 52,
584, 62 Pac. 187; S. v. Vansant, 80 18 So. 491.
343 IMPROPER REQUESTS ON CHARACTER. 345
when the jury would otherwise have entertained no doubt, and
that the defendant may introduce evidence of his previous good
character for the purpose of generating a doubt of his guilt, has
been declared to be improper, as giving undue prominence to
the evidence of good character. 20
(2.) Person not likely to commit crime''. So a charge that "if you
find good character established by the evidence you should con-
sider it and allow it such weight as you believe it fairly entitled to,
as tending to show that men of such character would not be likely
to commit the crime charged, ' ' is erroneous in that it does not ex-
pressly refer to the good character of the accused, and is somewhat
argumentative. 21
(3) Sufficient to raise the doubt: Also a charge that the good
character of the defendant, if shown, is of itself sufficient to raise
a reasonable doubt, is improper 22
(4.) Invading province of jury : A charge that if from all the evi-
dence the jury have any reasonable doubt of the guilt of the de-
fendant, and if they further believe from the evidence that the
defendant has for a long time possessed and now possesses a good
moral character for peace, sobriety, and honesty, then such fact
of good character, coupled with the presumption of innocence
which the law invokes is sufficient upon which to find a verdict of
not guilty, is improper as invading the province of the jury. 23
(5.) Ignoring evidence of: The defense in rebuttal having intro-
duced evidence tending to show that the reputation of the
accused for truth, honesty and integrity was good, the court
erred in charging the jury that they should draw no unfavor-
able inference of the defendant from the fact that she had
offered no evidence as to her general good character. 24
20 Goldsmith v. S. 105 Ala. 8, 16 other witnesses has been intro-
So. 933; Crawford v. S. 112 Ala. 1, duced on both sides, a general in-
21 So. 214. struction that such evidence should
21 Dorsey v. S. 110 Ala. 38, 20 So. be considered on the credibility of
450. the witnesses is not erroneous and
22 Hammond v. S. 74 Miss. 214, 21 does not limit the effect of it to
So. 149. the defendant's credibility, nor de-
23 s. v. McNamara, 100 Mo. 100, 13 prive him of the right to have it
S. W. 938. considered on the issue of his guilt
21 S. v. Marks, 16 Utah, 204, 51 or innocence. S. v. Olds, 106 Iowa,
Pac. 1089. Where evidence of the 110, 76 N. W. 644.
character of the defendant and
CHAPTER XXVI.
OBJECTIONS AND EXCEPTIONS.
Sec. Sec.
346. Method and manner of tak- 356. Error presented on motion for
ing exceptions. new trial.
347. Time of taking exceptions. 357. Making instructions part of
348. Specific exceptions generally record.
necessary. 358. By bill of exceptions.
349. General exceptions sufficient. 369. AIL instructions must be in
350. Exceptions when instructions record.
are numbered. 360. Presumption in absence of all
351. Exceptions General, specific instructions.
and joint. 361. When considered in absence
352. Failure to except Effect. of evidence.
353. Assignment of error on in- 362. Presumptions in. absence of
structions in group. evidence.
354. Exceptions limited to grounds 363. Errors caused at one's own
stated. request.
355. Objections and exceptions not 364. After cause is remanded.
waived.
346. Method and manner of taking exceptions. As a general
rule exceptions to the giving or refusing of instructions must be
properly taken in the trial court before the assignment of errors
thereon will be considered by a court of review. 1 Under stat-
utory provisions in some jurisdictions the exceptions to instruc-
tions must be signed by the judge presiding, and if not signed
they will not be the subject of review on appeal or writ of
error. 2 And the exceptions must be signed by the judge pre-
i West C. St. R. Co. v. Martin, 658, 68 N. E. 1117; Bruen v. P. 206
154 111. 523, 39 N. E. 140; Buck- 111. 425, 69 N. E. 24; First Nat. Bank
master v. Cool, 12 111. 74; Burnette v. Tolerton (Neb.), 97 N. W. 248.
v. Town of Guyers, 106 Wis. 618, 2 Central R. Co. v. Coleman, 80
82 N. W. 564; Barker v. Lawrence Md. 328, 30 Atl. 918; Ayres v. Blev-
Mfg. Co. 176 Mass. 203, 76 N. E. ins, 28 Ind. App. 101, 62 N. E. 305;
366; Gracie v. Stevens, 171 N. Y. Hutchinson v. Lerncke, 107 Ind.
344
345 TAKING EXCEPTIONS, HOW, WHEN. 347
siding, although the instructions were given on the court's own
motion. 3
The taking of exceptions, to be of any avail on review, must
extend to all the instructions on the same subject considered to-
gether. An exception to detached portions of instructions will
not be considered. 4 The indorsement on instructions of the
words "given and excepted to at the time by the defendant,"
and signed by the court, is not sufficient under a statute which
provides that "it shall be sufficient to write on the margin or
at the close of each instruction, 'refused and excepted to, or given
and excepted to,' " which memorandum shall be signed by the
judge, in that it omits the date which is quite as material as
the signature. 5
347. Time of taking exceptions. Objections to instructions
cannot be raised for the first time in the reviewing court on ap-
peal or writ of error. 6 . Thus, an objection that the court in-
structed the jury orally instead of in writing, comes too late
when raised for the first time on appeal. 7 The record must show
that exceptions were taken at the time the instructions were
given or refused, to be of any avail. 8 Where an exception appears
121, 8 N. E. 71; Board v. Legg, 110 171 N. Y. 635, 63 N. E. 1117; Fruchey
Ind. 486, 11 N. E. 612; McKinsey v. v. Eagleson, 15 Ind. App. 88, 43
McKee, 109 Ind. 209, 9 N. E. 771; N. E. 146; Keens v. Robertson, 46
Mason v. Seiglitz, 22 Colo. 320, 44 Neb. 837, 65 N. W. 897; Romberg
Pac. 588. See Moore v. Brown (Tex. v. Hediger, 47 Neb. 201, 66 N. W.
Cv. App.), 64 S. W. 946. 283; Hall v. Incorporated Town, 90
s Silver v. Parr, 115 Ind. 113, 17 Iowa, 585, 58 N. W. 881; Price v.
N. E. 114. An exception to the Hallett, 138 Mo. 561, 38 S. W. 451;
ruling of the court need not be in Turner v. Goldsboro Lumber Co.
a technical term, such as "I ex- 119 N. Car. 387, 26 S. E. 23; Daw-
cept." Woolsey v. Lasher, 54 N. son v. Coston, 18, Colo. 493, 33
Y. S. 737. Pac. 189; Peck v. Boggess, 2 111.
* Bell v. City of Spokane, 30 (1 Scam.), 285; Tomlinson v. Wai-
Wash. 508, 71 Pac. 31; Gray v. lace, 16 Wis. 234; Carter v. Missouri
Washington Water P. Co. 30 Wash. M. & L. Co. 6 Okla. 11, 41 Pac. 356;
665, 71 Pac. 206. P. v. Caldwell, 107 Mich. 374, 65
s Malott v. Hawkins, 159 Ind. 137, N. W. 213; Franklin v. Claflin, 49
63 N. E. 308; Behymer v. S. 95 Ind. Md. 24; S. v. Probasco, 46 Kas. 310,
140; Roose v. Roose, 145 Ind. 162, 26 Pac. 749; Lawrence v. Bucklen,
44 N. E. 1; Williams v. Chapman, 45 Minn. 195, 47 N. W. 655; Mc-
160 Ind. 130, 66 N. E. 460. Daneld v. Logi, 143 111. 487, 32 N. E.
o Cathey v. Bowen, 70 Ark. 348, 423. Contra: Gonzales v. S. 35 Tex.
68 S. W. 31; Jenkins v. Mammoth Cr. App. 339, 33 S. W. 363.
Min. Co. 24 Utah, 513, 68 Pac. 845; ? Bowling v. Floyd (Kas.), 48
Thompson v. Security T. & L. Ins. Pac. 875.
Co. 63 S. Car. 290, 41 S. E. 464; s Washington County Water Co.
Gumby v. Metropolitan St. R. Co. v. Garver, 91 Md. 398, 46 Atl. 979;
347
OBJECTIONS AND EXCEPTIONS.
346
in regular order upon the record, immediately following the in-
struction to which exception was taken, it will be presumed by
the reviewing court that the exception was taken at the time the
instructions were given. 9
In some jurisdictions the exceptions relating to instructions
must be taken before the jury retire to consider the case. 10 But
in some of the states exceptions may be taken at any time before
the verdict of the jury. 11 It follows from what has been said
that the taking of exceptions after the verdict is too late to be
considered on appeal. 12 And of course it is too late to object to
Loewenstein v. Bennett, 19 Ohio
C. C. b!6; Taylor v. Pullen, 152
Mo. 434, 53 S. W. 1086; Zingrebe
v. Union R. Co. 60 N. Y. S. 913;
Frenkmann v. Schneider, 64 N. Y.
S. Ill; Snowden v. Town of Som-
erset, 64 N. Y. S. 1088; Willard v.
Petitt, 153 111. 663, 667, 39 N. E.
991 (Illinois cases reviewed); East
St. Louis Elec. R. Co. v. Stout, 150
111. 9, 36 N. E. 963; S. v. Dewitt, 152
Mo. 76, 53 S. W. 429 (oral instruc-
tions) ; Vaughn v. Ferrall, 57 Ind.
182; S. v. Sacre, 141 Mo. 64, 41 S.
W. 905; Barr v. City of Omaha, 42
Neb. 341, 60 N. W. 591; S. v. Hath-
away, 100 Iowa, 225, 69 N. W.
443; U. S. Sugar Refiner v. Provi-
dence Steam & G. P. Co. 62 Fed.
375; Bradford Glycerine Co. v.
Kizer, 113 Fed. 894; Bluff City Lum-
ber Co. v. Floyd, 70 Ark. 418, 68
S. W. 484; S. v. -Harris, 107 La. Ann.
325, 31 So. 782; Aden v. Road Dist.
&c. 197 111. 220, 64 N. E. 274; Shep-
herd v. S. 36 Fla. 374, 18 So. 773;
Hubbard v. S. 37 Fla. 156, 20 So. 235;
Bush v. S. 47 Neb. 642, 66 N. W.
638; Crump v. Com. (Va.), 23 S.
E. 760.
9 Strickfadden v. Zipprick, 49 111.
288.
10 Pitman v. Mauran, 69 N. H.
230, 40 Atl. 392; Yates v. U. S.
90 Fed. 57; Commercial Travelers'
M. A. Asso. v. Fulton, 79 Fed.
423; McKown v. Powers, 86 Me.
291, 29 Atl. 1079; Hindman v. First
Nat. Bank, 112 Fed. 931; Murray
v. S. 26 Ind. 141; S. v. Westlake,
159 Mo. 669; Buel v. New York
Steamer, 17 La. Ann. 541; Reynolds
v. S. 68 Ala. 507; Schroeder v. Rin-
hard, 25 Neb. 75, 40 N. W. 593;
S. v. Clark, 37 Vt. 471; Little
Miami R. Co. 22 Ohio St. 324;
Garton v. Union City Nat. Bank,
34 Mich. 279; Garoutte v. William-
son, 108 Cal. 135, 41 Pac. 35, 413;
O'Conner v. Chicago M. & St. P.
R. Co. 27 Minn. 166, 6 N. W. 481;
Gibson v. S. 26 Fla. 109, 7 So.
376.
11 Polykrans v. Kransz, 77 N. .
S. 46, 73 App. Div. 583; Gehl v. Mil-
waukee Pro. Co. 116 Wis. 263, 93
N. W. 26; S. v. Pirlot, 19 R. I. 695;
Vaughn v. Ferrall, 57 Ind. 182;
Hawley v. S. 69 Ind. 98, 38 Atl.
656. If the court while charging
the jury should misstate the evi-
dence, counsel should at once call
the court's attention to the mis-
take that it may be corrected be-
fore the jury retires, although
specific exceptions may not be
required, J&meson v. Weld, 93
Me. 345, 45 Atl. 299; Wood v.
Wells, 103 Mich. 320, 61 N. W. 503.
See Henry v. Henry, 122 Mich. 6,
80 N. W. 800.
12 McDonald v. U. S. 63 Fed. 426;
S. v. O'Donald (Idaho), 39 Pac.
556; S. v. Hart, 116 N. Car. 976,
20 S. E. 1014; P. v. Thiede, 11 Utah,
241, 39 Pac. 837; Vaughn v. Ferrall,
57 Ind. 182; Jaqua v. Cordesman, 106
Ind. 141, 5 N. E. 907 (too late on
motion for new trial); Murray v.
S. 26 Ind. 141 (must be taken be-
fore jury retire) ; Garoutte v. Wil-
liamson, 108 Cal. 135, 41 Pac. 35;
Le Bean v. Telephone & T. C. Co.
109 Mich. 302, 67 N. W. 339; S. v.
347
SPECIFIC EXCEPTIONS NECESSARY.
348
instructions for the first time on a motion for a new trial unless
permitted by statute. 13 By statutory provision of Iowa excep-
tions may be taken to the giving or refusing of instructions on
a motion for a new trial. 14
348. Specific exceptions generally necessary. According to
the practice in some of the states the exceptions should specific-
ally point out the errors complained of as to each of the instruc-
tions. 15 The mere exception to the giving of an instruction is
not sufficient ; the attention of the court should be called to the
particular point of objection, and a request made to correct the
imperfection. 16 And the exception should be made to each in-
Hart, 116 N. Car. 976, 20 S. E. 1014;
Bynum v. Southern Pump Co. 63
Ala. 462; Thiede v. Utah. 159 U.
S. 510, 16 Sup. Ct. 62; Barker v.
Todd, 37 Minn. 370, 34 N. W. 895;
Collins v. George (Va.), 46 S. E.
684.
is Tobias v. Triest, 103 Ala. 664,
15 So. 914; S. v. Vickers, 47 La.
Ann. 1574, 18 So. 639; Boon v. Mur-
phy, 108 N. Car. 187, 12 S. E. 1032;
Lary v. Young (Tex. Cv. App.), 27 S.
W. 908; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v.
Modglin, 85 111. 481; Harrison v.
Chappell, 84 N. Car. 258; Louisville,
N. A. & C. R. Co. v. Hart, 119 Ind.
273, 21 N. E. 753; Boss v. Northern
P. R. Co. 2 N. Dak. 128, 49 N. W.
655; Snyder v. Nelson, 31 Iowa,
238; S. v. Meyers, 99 Mo. 107, 12
S. W. 516; Shepherd v. S. 36 Fla.
374, 18 So. 773; S. v. Halford, 104
N. Car. 874, 10 S. E. 524. But see
Collins Ice Cream Co. v. Stephens,
189 111. 200, 59 N. E. 524.
i* Shoemaker v. Turner, 117
Iowa, 340, 90 N. W. 709. The same
rule governs as to the modification
of requested instructions. Excep-
tion must be taken to the refusal
to give the instruction as requested,
and also the action of the court in
giving it as modified. Brozek v.
Steinway R. Co. 161 N. Y. 63, 55 N.
E. 395; Muller v. Powers, 174 Mass.
555, 55 N. E. 395; Elkhorn Valley
Lodge v. Hudson, 58 Neb. 672, 81 N.
W. 859; Lewis v. Topman, 90 Md.
274, 45 Atl. 450; Davis v. Bailey, 21
Ky. L. R. 839, 53 S. W. 31; Missouri
P. R. Co. v. Williams, 75 Tex. 4, 12
S. W. 835; Metropolitan St. R. Co.
v. Hudson, 113 Fed. 449; Helms v.
Wayne A. Co. 73 Ind. 332. See Pat-
terson v. Indianapolis & B. R. R.
Co. 56 Ind. 20; Burns v. P. 126 111.
285, 18 N. E. 550; Ballance v. Leon-
ard, 37 111. 43; St. Louis, I. M. & S.
R. Co. v. Hecht, 38 Ark. 357.
is Walters v. Laurens Cotton
Mills, 53 S. Car. 155, 31 S. E. 1;
Henderson v. Bartlett, 53 N. Y. S.
149, 32 App. Div. 435; Owen v.
Brown, 70 Vt. 521, 41 Atl. 1025;
Thomas v. Union R. Co. 45 N. Y.
S. 920, 18 App. Div. 185; Lichty v.
Tarmatt, 11 Wash. 37, 39 Pac. 260;
Hedrick v. Straus, 42 Neb. 485, 60
N. W. 928; Emery v. Boston & M.
R. 67 N. H. 434, 36 Atl. 367; Hamp-
ton v. Norfolk & W. R. Co. 120 N.
Car. 534, 27 S. E. 96, 35 L. R. A.
808; Fitzpatrick v. Union Tr. Co.
(Pa.), 55 Atl. 1050; S. v. Webster,
107 La. 45. 31 So. 383; Gallman v.
Union H. Mfg. Co. 65 S. Car. 192,
43 S. E. 524; Ohio & M. R. Co. v.
McCartney, 121 Ind. 385, 23 N. B.
258; Kendrick v. Dillinger, 117 N.
Car. 491, 23 S. E. 438; S. v. Tibbs,
48 La. Ann. 1278, 20 So. 735. Contra:
Farmers' S. B. v. Wilka (Iowa), 17
N. W. 210; Williams v. Com. 80 Ky.
315; Williams v. Barrett, 52 Iowa,
638, 3 N. W. 690; Van Pelt v. City
of Davenport, 42 Iowa, 314; Woods
v. Berry, 7 Mont. 201, 14 Pac. 758.
16 Thomas v. Union R. Co. 45 N.
Y. S. 920, 18 App. Div. 185; Bailey
v. Mill Creek Coal Co. 20 Pa. Super.
Ct. 186: Jacksonville & St. L. R.
Co. v. Wilhite, 209 111. 84, 87.
349 OBJECTIONS AND EXCEPTIONS. 348
struction severally and distinctly ; 17 and it should disclose to what
particular legal proposition it applies before it will be considered
on review. 18 An exception which fails to state either the words .
or the substance of an instruction of which complaint is made is
too indefinite. 19 If an instruction is vague, indefinite and cal-
culated to leave the jury in doubt, the court's attention should
be called to the imperfection at the time, to be of any avail on
appeal or writ of error. 20 An exception that the charge "does
not properly state the measure of plaintiff's damages or recovery
under the allegations of the complaint," is too indefinite. 21 An
exception "to that part of the charge stating the effect of good
character^ taken to a certain portion of the charge to the jury
which treats only of the proper effect of evidence of good char-
acter is sufficiently specific under the practice in the federal
courts. 22
349. General exceptions sufficient. In other states a general
exception is sufficient. Thus, in Kentucky the law makes no
distinction between a general and particular or specific exception,
as either is sufficient to authorize the reviewing court to consider
and examine alleged errors in the giving or refusing of instruc-
tions. 23 Under the code of Iowa, where the exceptions are taken
to instructions at the time they are given, the ground of excep-
tion need not be stated; 24 but exceptions taken after the verdict
must specifically point out the ground of objection as to each
instruction. 25 In Indiana by statute an entry in general terms
that the party excepts to the giving or refusing of a designated
instruction is sufficient. 25 *
In Maryland it has been held that where several instructions
are presented at the same time, forming a series of consecutive
IT Newport News & M. V. Co. v. 22 Edington v. U. S. 164 U. S. 361,
Pace, 158 U. S. 36, 15 Sup. Ct. 743; 17 Sup. Ct. 72; Brown v. U. S. 164
American Fire Ins. Co. v. Land- U. S. 221, 17 Sup. Ct. 33.
fare, 56 Neb. 482, 76 N. W. 1068. 23 Williams v. Com. 80 Ky. 315.
is Field v. Long, 89 Me. 454, 36 24 Williams v. Barrett, 52 Iowa,
Atl. 984; Faivre v. Manderschild, 117 638, 3 N. W. 690; Van Pelt v. City
Iowa, 724, 90 N. W. 76. of Davenport, 42 Iowa, 314.
is Atkins v. Field, 89 Me. 281, 36 25 Byford v. Girton, 90 Iowa,
Atl. 375. 661, 57 N. W. 588; Benson v. Lun-
20 Fowler v. Harrison, 64 S. Car. dy, 52 Iowa, 265, 3 N. W. 149.
311, 42 S. E. 159; City of South 25* Childress v. Callender, 108
Omaha v. Meyers (Neb.), 92 N. W. Ind. 394, 9 N. B. 292; Acts Ind.
743. 1903, p. 338; See post,. 357.
21 McDonough v. Great N. R.
Co. 15 Wash. 244, 46 Pac. 334.
349 GENERAL EXCEPTIONS REQUESTS NUMBERED. 351
legal propositions, it is but a single act, and the whole will be
embraced in one exception. 26 The taking of an exception ' ' to the
refusal of the court to charge specifically as requested" is an
exception to the refusal of each instruction requested under the
practice in New Jersey. 27 In one jurisdiction it has been held
that where a party requests the court to give an instruction
and it is refused, an exception need not be taken to one given
by the court which is inconsistent with the one requested. 28
Where exception is taken to any matter in the record it is not
necessary to take other exceptions if the exception first taken
covers the matter in issue. 29
350. Exceptions when instructions are numbered. Where
the instructions are numbered and separately given, an exception
at the conclusion "to the giving of each and every and all of
said instructions separately," is sufficient under the practice in
some of the states. 29 So, also, the taking of an exception "to
the giving of instructions three, four, five and six, contained in
the general charge of the court, and to the giving of each of
said instructions," is sufficient, being separate and specific as to
each instruction. 30 Or an exception to the giving or refusing of
instructions numbered from "one to nine inclusive and to each
of them" is sufficient. 31 But an exception that the court erred
in giving instructions "three and four" is not sufficient if one
of them properly states the law. 32
26 McCosker v!. Banks, 84 Md. ai Rice v. Williams (Colo. App.),
292, 25 All. 935. 71 Pac. 433; Denver & R. G. R. Co.
27 Consolidated Tr. Co. v. Chen- v. Young, 30 Colo. 349, 70 Pac.
owith, 61 N. J. L. 554, 35 Atl. 1067. 688; Witsell v. West Asheville R.
28 Evans v. Clark, 1 Indian Ter. Co. 120 N. Car. 557, 27 S. E. 125.
216, 40 S. W. 771. 32 Cincinnati, H. & I. R. Co. v.
29 Ellis v. Leonard, 107 Iowa, Cregor, 150 Ind. 625, 50 N. E. 760;
487, 78 N. W. 246; McClellan v. Aitkens v. Rawlings, 52 Neb. 539,
Hein, 56 Neb. 600, 77 N. W. 120; 72 N. W. 858; Kloke v. Martin, 55
Geary v. Parker, 65 Ark. 521, 47 Neb. 554, 76 N. W. 168; Hall v.
S. W. 238; Rhea v. U. S. 6 Okla. Needles, 1 Indian Ter. 146, 38 S. W.
249, 50 Pac. 992; Ritchey v. P. 23 671; Voelckel v. Banner Brew. Co.
Colo. 314, 47 Pac. 272, 384; Ludg- 9 Ohio C. C. 318; Baltimore & P. R.
wig v. Blackshere (Iowa), 77 N. Co. v. Mackey, 157 U. S. 72, 15 Sup.
W. 356; Terre Haute & I. R. Co. Ct. 491; Jones v. Ellis, 68 Vt. 544,
v. McCorkle, 140 Ind. 613, 40 N. E. 35 Atl. 488. See Whipple v. Preece,
62; Bower v. Bower, 146 tnd. 393, 24 Utah, 364, 67 Pac. 1071, holding
45 N. E. 595. See Dunham v. Hoi- not sufficient to refer to the in-
loway, 3 Okla. 244, 41 Pac. 140. struction by number only; the par-
*o Brooks v. Dutcher, 22 Neb. 644, ticular point of objection must be
36 N. W. 128; City of Omaha v. indicated.
Richards, 49 Neb. 249, 68 N. W.
528.
351
OBJECTIONS AND EXCEPTIONS.
350
351. Exceptions General, specific and joint. A general ex-
ception to the entire charge, consisting of detached propositions
of law, some of which are correct and some erroneous, will be
of no avail in a court of review. The erroneous instructions
must be specifically pointed out. 33 Thus, an exception to the
charge "as given," without pointing out in what particular the
charge is erroneous, is too general. 34 Also an exception "to the
giving of each and every one ' ' of the instructions is too general. 35
as Postal T. C. Co. v. Hulsey, 115
Ala. 193, 22 So. 854; S. v. Webster,
121 N. Car. 586, 28 S. E. 254; Hamp-
ton v. Ray, 52 S. Car. 74, 29 S. E.
537; Ruby C. M. & M. Co. v. Pren-
tice, 25 Colo. 4, 52 Pac. 210; Pear-
son v. Spartenberg Co. 51 S. Car.
480, 29 S. E. 193; Powers v. Hazel-
ton & L. R. Co. 33 Ohiio St. 438;
Standard L. & A. Ins. Co. v. Davis,
59 Kas. 521, 53 Pac. 856; Shaffer v.
Cincinnati, H. & D. R. Co. 14 Ohio
C. C. 488; Haas v. Brown, 47 N. Y.
S. 606, 21 Misc. 434; Hart v. Bowen,
86 Fed. 877; Gilroy v. Loftus, 48
N. Y. S. 532, 22 Misc. 105; Bennett
v. McDonald, 52 Neb. 278, 72 N. W.
268; Drenning v. Wesley, 189 Pa.
St. 160, 44 Atl. 13; Craig v. Bor-
ough, 11 Pa. Super. Ct 490; Gregg
v. Willis, 71 Vt. 313, 45 Atl. 229;
Phoenix A. Co. v. Lucker, 77 Fed.
243; -Newman v. Virginia T. & C.
S. & I. Co. 80 Fed. 228; City of So.
Omaha v. Powell, 50 Neb. 798, 70
N. W. 391; Adams v. S. 25 Ohio
St. 584; Rosenfield v. Rosenthal
(Tex. Cv. App.), 39 S. W. 193;
Pickham v. Wheeter B. Mfg. Co. 77
Fed. 663; Wills v. Hardcastle, 19
Pa. Super. Ct. 525; Thompson v. Se-
curity T. & L. Ins. Co. 63 S. Car.
290, 41 S. E. 464; Harris v. Smith,
71 N. H. 330, 52 Atl. 854; Gutz-
man v. Clancy, 114 Wis. 589, 90 N.
W. 1081; Lee v. Hammond, 114 Wis.
550, 90 N. W. 1073; Jones v. S.
160 Ind. 539, 67 N. E. 264; Ras-
tetter v. Reynolds, 160 Ind. 141, 66
N. E. 612.
s* S. v. Moore, 120 N. Car. 570,
26 S. E. 697; Winbish v. Hamilton,
47 La. Ann. 246, 16 So. 856; Antietam
Paper Co. v. Chronicle Pub. Co.
15 N. Car. 147, 20 So. 367; Barrett
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 69 S. W.
144; Finance Co. v. Old Pittsburg
C. Co. 65 Minn. 442, 68 N. W. 70;
P. v. Thiede, 11 Utah, 241, 39 Pac.
839; S. v. Varner, 115 N. Car. 744,
20 S. E. 518; Jones v. S. 160 Ind.
539, 67 N. E. 264; Magoon v. Be-
fore, 73 Vt. 231, 50 Atl. 1070; St.
Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Norton
(Ark.), 73 S. W. 1095; Hamilton
v. Great F. St. R. Co. 17 Mont.
334, 42 Pac. 860; S. v. Varner, 115
N. Car. 744, 20 S. E. 518; P. Ft. W.
& C. R. Co. v. Probst, 30 Ohio St.
106; Western Ins. Co. v. Tobin, 32
Ohio St. 88.
35 Crawford v. Athletic Asso. Ill
Iowa, 736, 82 N. W. 944; Colum-
bus C. Co. v. Crane Co. 101 Fed.
55, 98 Fed. 946; Allend v. Spokane
Falls & N. R. Co. 21 Wash. 324,
58 Pac. 244; New Orleans & N. E.
R. Co. v. Clements, 100 Fed. 415;
Cook v. Kilgo, 111 Ga. 817, 35 S.
E. 673; La Manna v. Munroe, 62
N. Y. S. 984; Appeal of Turner, 72
Conn. 305, 44 Atl. 310; Cavallora
v. Texas & P. R. Co. 110 Cal. 348,
42 Pac. 918 (instructions given on
court's own motion) ; Holloway v.
Dunham, 170 U. S. 615, 18 Sup.
Ct. 784; Consolidation C. & M. Co.
v. Clay, 51 Ohio St. 542, 38 N. E.
610; Ryan v. Washington & G. R.
Co. 8 App. Gas. (D. C.) 542; Car-
penter v. Eastern R. Co. 67 Minn.
188, 69 N. W. 720; Willoughby v.
Northeastern R. Co. 52 S. Car. 166,
29 S. E. 629; Pittsburg & W. R. Co.
v. Thompson, 82 Fed. 720; Spears
v. U. S. 81 Fed. 694, 26 C. C. A.
570; Harless v. U. S. 1 Indian Ter.
447, 45 S. W. 133; Ludwig v.
Blackshere, 102 Iowa, 366, 71 N
W. 356; Rheimfeldt v. Dahlman,
351
EXCEPTIONS GENERAL, SPECIFIC AND JOINT.
351
An exception taken thus: "To which said charge and the whole
thereof the defendant then and there duly excepted, ' ' is not suffi-
ciently specific upon which to assign error. 30
An assignment of error that the instructions "improperly state
the law, are confusing, conflicting, misleading and present false
issues," is too general. 37 So, an exception taken "to the portions
of the charge wherein it is stated that certain parts of the pub
lication are libelous per se, " is too broad. 38 The taking of an
exception "severally and separately to each and every section
and each and every paragraph of the charge" is not sufficient
unless the entire charge is erroneous. 39 So, also, an exception to
a number of instructions as an entirety is of no avail unless
they are all erroneous. 40 But where the error complained of
affects the entire charge, then such general exception is suffi-
43 N. Y. S. 28, 19 Misc. 162; Mil-
ler v. P. 23 Colo. 95, 46 Pac.
Ill; Jones v. East Term. V. & G.
R. Co. 157 U. S. 682, 15 Sup. Ct.
719; Luedtke v. Jeffrey, 89 Wis.
136, 61 N. W. 292; Goodman v.
Sampliner, 23 Ind. App. 72, 54 N.
E. 823; World M. B. Asso. v.
Worthing, 59 Neb. 587, 81 N. W.
620; Waples P. Co. v. Turner, 82
Fed. 64; Globe Oil Co. v. Powell,
56 Neb. 463, 76 N. W. 1081; McAlis-
ter v. Long, 33 Ore. 368, 54 Pac.
124; Andrews v. Postal Tel. Co.
119 N. Car. 403, 25 S. E. 955; Bar-
ker v. Cunard S. S. Co. 157 U. S.
693, 51 N. E. 1089; S. v. Melton, 120
N. Car. 591, 26 S. E. 933; Burnett
v. Wilmington, N. & N. R. Co. 120
N. Car. 517, 26 S. E. 819. See Wil-
liams v. Casebeer, 126 Cal. 86, 58
Pac. 380.
se Love v. Anchor Raisin Vin. Co.
(Cal.), 45 Pac. 1044; Gable v.
Rauch, 50 S. Car. 95, 27 S. E.
555; Hayes v. S. 112 Wis. 304, 87
N. W. 1076; Bernstein v. Downs,
112 Cal. 197, 44 Pac. 557.
3? Shoemaker v. Bryant Lumber
& S. M. Co. 27 Wash. 637, 68 Pac.
380. See Butler v. Holmes (Tex.
Cv. App.), 68 S. W. 52.
ss Cunningham v. Underwood,
116 Fed. 803.
39 Syndicate Ins. Co. v. Cutch-
ings, 104 Ala. 176, 16 So. 46; Leach
v. Hill, 97 Iowa, 81, 66 N. W. 69;
Jones v. Ellis Estate, 68 Vt. 544,
35 Atl. 488; Ragsdale v. S. 134 Ala.
24, 32 So. 674; Merrill v. Palmer, 68
Vt. 475, 33 Atl. 829; Thiede v. P.
159 U. S. 510, 16 Sup. Ct. 62. See,
also, Pease Piano Co. v. Cameron,
56 Neb. 561, 76 N. W. 1053; Thorn
v. Pittard, 62 Fed. 232; Green v.
Hansen, 89 Wis. 597, 62 N. W. 408;
Dunnington v. Frick Co. 60 Ark.
250, 30 S. W. 212; Vider v. O'Brien,
62 Fed. 326; Carpenter v. American
A. Co. 46 S. Car. 541, 24 S. E. 500;
Scoville v. Salt Lake City, 11 Utah,
60, 39 Pac. 481; Omaha Fire Ins.
Co. v. Deirks, 43 Neb. 473, 61 N.
W. 740; Postal Tel. C. Co. v. Hul-
sey, 132 Ala. 444, 31 So. 527; Hal-
lenbeck v. Garst, 96 Iowa, 509, 65
N. W. 417; Schollay v. Moffitt W.
Drug Co. (Colo. App.), 67 Pac. 182.
40 S. v. Ray, 14& Ind. 500s 45
N. E. 693; Home Fire Ins. Co. v.
Phelps, 51 Neb. 623, 71 N. W. 303;
Lane v. Minnesota S. Agr. Soc. 67
Minn. 65; 69 N. W. 463; Culter v.
Skeels, 69 Vt. 154, 37 Atl. 228; Ras-
tetter v. S. 160 Ina. 133, 66 N. E.
612; Milliken v. Maund, 110 Ala.
332, 20 So. 310; Union P. R. Co. v.
Callaghan, 161 U. S. 91, 16 Sup.
Ct. 493; McNamara v. Pengilly, 64
Minn. 543, 67 N. W. 661; Barker
v. Cunard S. S. Co. 36 N. Y. S. 256,
91 Hun (N. Y.), 495; Dickerson v.
352 OBJECTIONS AND EXCEPTIONS. 352
cient. 41 Or where the whole charge or the portion to which
exception is taken amounts merely to a single proposition a
general exception is sufficient. 42
The taking of an exception to the instructions on the ground
that the charge is too general is of no avail on review in the
absence of a request for more specific instructions. 43 So, an
exception taken to instructions by two parties jointly is of no
avail if they are erroneous as to one only. 44 The rules deduced
from the authorities cited are to the effect that if exceptions
are taken jointly by two or more parties, they are unavailing
unless the instructions are erroneous as to all who join; and if
the exceptions are in gross to a series of instructions, they will
likewise be unavailing if any one of the instructions is correct.
352. Failure to except Effect. The general rule is that ex-
ceptions to instructions given, or the refusal to give, must be
taken in the trial court; objections to instructions cannot be
made for the first time on appeal. 45 But according to statutory
provisions, or the practice, in some states, errors may be assigned
on appeal or writ of error as to the giving or refusing of instruc-
tions, although no exceptions whatever were taken in the trial
court. 47 This rule governs in criminal as well as civil causes ; espe-
Quincy M. F. Ins. Co. 67 Vt. 609, 32 92 N. W. 782; Copeland v. Ferris,
Atl. 489; Lowe v. Salt Lake City, 13 118 Iowa, 554, 92 N. W. 699.
Utah, 91, 44 Pac. 1050; Bonner v. 44 Marshall v. Lewark, 117 Ind.
S. 107 Ala. 97, 18 So. 226; Hodge v. 377, 20 N. E. 253.
Chicago & A. R. Co. 121 Fed. 52; 45 s. v. Probasco, 46 Kas. 310,
Coal & Mining Co. v. Clay, 51 Ohio 26 Pac. 749; Kansas Farmers' etc.
St. 550, 38 N. E. 610; Western Ins. Ins. Co. . v. Hawley, 46 Kas. 746,
Co. v. Tobin, 32 Ohio St. 88; Glaser 27 Pac. 176; Ritzenger v. Hart, 43
v. Glaser (Okla.), 74 Pac. 945. Mo. App. 183; Fleming v. Fleming,
41 Hindman v. First Nat. Bank, 33 S. Car. 505; 12 S. E. 257; Price
112 Fed. 931, 57 L. R. A. 108. v. Vanstone, 40 Mo. App. 207; Con-
42Nickum v. Gaston, 24 Ore. 380, nelly v. Shamrock Ben. Soc. 43 Mo.
33 Pac. 671, 35 Pac. 31; Haun v. App. 283; East St. Louis Elec. R.
Rio Grande W. R. Co. 22 Utah, Co. v. Stout, 150 111. 9, 36 N. E.
346, 62 Pac. 908; Boyce v. Wabash 963; West Chicago St. R. Co. v.
R. Co. 63 Iowa, 70, 18 N. W. 673. Martin, 154 111. 523, 39 N. E. 140;
Queen Ins. Co. v. Leonard, 9 McKinnon v. Atkins, 60 Mich. 418,
Ohio C. C. 46; Burnham v. Logan, 88 27 N. W. 564; P. v. Buddensieck,
Tex. 1, 29 S. W. 1067; Producers' 103 N. Y. 487, 9 N. E. 44; Coffee
Marble Co. v. Bergen (Tex. Cv. v. McCord, 83 Ind. 593.
App.), 31 S. W. 89. See, also, Lind- 4- National Bank v. Sumner, 119
heim v. Buys, 31 N. Y. S. 870, 11 N. Car. 591, 26 S. E. 129; Grugan v.
Misc. 16; Baltimore & P. R. Co. City of Philadelphia, 158 Pa. St
v. Mackey, 157 U. S. 72, 15 Sup. 337, 27 Atl. 1000; Janny v. How-
Ct. 49; Crossette v. Jordan (Mich.), ard, 150 Pa. St. 342, 24 . Atl. 740;
353 FAILURE TO EXCEPT EXCEPTING IN GROUP. 354
dally in capital cases, in a few states, will errors as to instruc-
tions be considered on review, although in the trial court no ex-
ceptions were taken as is generally required. 48
353. Assignment of error on instructions in group. The
assignment of error in a group or en masse as to the giving or
refusing of instructions, will not be considered on appeal or writ
of error if any one of the group of instructions was properly
given or refused, as the case may be. 49 Where error is assigned
in the giving and refusing of a group of instructions, and one
of them is proper, the whole assignment of error fails. Assigning
error in this manner without pointing out the reasons to enable
the court to determine the questions involved will not be con-
sidered on appeal. 50 So, where a party prepares a series of
instructions and requests the court to give them as a whole,
and excepts to the refusal to give the request as a whole, the
assignment of error in refusing to give a portion will not be
considered by the reviewing court. 51 In Nebraska the assign-
ment of error must be separate on each instruction complained
of on the motion for a new trial, as well as in the petition in
error. 52
354. Exceptions limited to grounds stated. Instructions will
be reviewed only as to the particular grounds for which error
Whitaker v. S. 106 Ala. 30, 17 So. Neb. 304; 69 N. W. 835; Stough v.
456; Hill v. S. 35 Tex. Or. App. Ogden, 49 Neb. 291, 68 N. W. 516;
371, 33 S. W. 1075; McMillan v. S. Axthelm v. Chicago R. I. & P.
35 Tex. Cr. App. 370, 33 S. W. 970 R. Co. (Neb.), 89 N. W. 313; Green
(misdemeanors require exception v. Tierney, 62 Neb. 561, 87 N. W.
by statute). 331; Runquist v. Anderson, 64 Neb.
48 Falk v. P. 42 111. 335; P. v. 755, 90 N. W. 760; Redman v. Voss,
Barberi, 149 N. Y. 256, 43 N. E. 635; 46 Neb. 512, 64 N. W. 1094; P.
Hill v. S. 35 Tex. Cr. App. 371, 33 v. Berlin, 10 Utah, 39, 36 Pac. 190;
S. W. 1075. Rowen v. Sommers (Iowa), 66 N.
49 Lewis v. S. 42 Pla. 253, 28 W. 897.
So. 397; Frenzer v. Richards, 60 so Albion Milling Co. v. First
Neb. 131, 82 N. W. 317; Brozek v. Nat. Bank, 64 Neb. 116, 89 N. W.
Steinway R. Co. 161 N. Y. 63, 55 638. See King v. S. 43 Fla. 211, 31
N. E. 395; New Dunderberg Min. So. 254.
Co. v. Old, 97 Fed. 150; Lineham si Murry v. Board of Comrs. 58
R. Tr. Co. v. Morris, 87 Fed. 127; Kas. 1. 48 Pac. 554.
Illinois Cent. & E. Co. v. Linstroth r>2 Karnes v. Dovey, 53 Neb.
Wagon Co. 112 Fed. 737; New Eng. 725, 74 N. W. 311; Langshort v.
T. & C. Co. v. Catholican, 79 Fed. Coon, 53 Neb. 765, 74 N. W. 257;
294; Dempster M. Mfg. Co. v. First Kloke v. Martin-, 55 Neb. 554 76
Nat. Bank, 49 Neb. 321, 68 N. W. N. W. 168.
477; Behrends v. Beyschlag, 50
355 OBJECTIONS AND EXCEPTIONS. 354
is assigned. 53 The filing of exceptions with the clerk of the
court, as provided by statute, to the ruling of the court in the
giving or refusing of instructions, limits the party to the ex-
ceptions thus filed. 54
355. Objections and exceptions not waived. The fact that
instructions are not requested at all by a party on a particular
point or issue will not bar him from assigning error and urging
objections to erroneous instructions given for his opponent on
the same subject. 55 The giving of erroneous instructions which
are prejudicial to the rights of a litigant is ground for the assign-
ment of error, although no instructions were requested by the
complaining party. 5 " So, if it appears that the jury took the
wrong view of the law, error may be assigned, whether the com-
plaining party requested instructions or not. 57
An instruction assuming to cover an entire question, such, for
instance, as the question of liability, but which omits a material
element, is erroneous; and in such case the other party is not
precluded from assigning error thereon, though he did not
request an instruction on the same subject. 58 And in some juris-
dictions, although an instruction is defective and for that reason
properly refused, yet if it is sufficient to call the attention of the
court to the question upon which it is requested to be given, the
failure of the court to give a proper instruction on that particular
matter is error. 59
ss Mixon v. Mills, 92 Tex. 318, 47 Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Kir-
S. W. 966; Edmunds v. Black, 15 schoffer (Tex. Cv. App.), 24 S. W.
Wash. 73; 45 Pac. 639. See, also, 577; Pierson v. Duncan, 162 Pa.
Cole v. Curtis, 16 Minn. 182; Ryall St. 239, 29 Atl. 733; Whelchel v.
v. CentraJ Pac. R. Co. 76 Cal. 474, Gainesville & D. E. R. Co. 116 Ga.
18 Pac. 430; Phipps v. Pierce, 94 431, 42 S. E. 776; Gowdey v. Rob-
N. Car. 514; Price v. Burlington bins, 38 N. Y. S. 280, 3 App. Div.
C. R. & N. R. Co. 42 Iowa, 16. 353; Carter v. Columbia & G. R.
s* S. v. Campbell, 7 N. Dak. 58, Co. 19 S. Car. 26; Bynum v. Bynum,
77 N. W. 935. 33 N. Car. 632; S. v. Pennell, 56
55 Ford v. Chicago & R. I. & P. Iowa, 29, 8 N. W. 686.
Co. 106 Iowa, 85, 75 N. W. 650; " York Park Bldg. Asso. v.
Wills v. Tanner, 19 Ky. L. R. 795, Barns, 39 Neb. 834, 58 N. W. 440.
39 S. W. 422; International & G. N. City of South Omaha v. Hager
R. Co. v. Kuehn, 11 Tex. Cv. App. (Neb.), 92 N. W. 1017.
21, 31 S. W. 322; Johnson v: John- so Cleveland v. Empire Mills Co.
son (Tex. Cv. App.), 67 S. W. 123. 6 Tex. Cv. App. 479, 25 S. W. 1055;
so Seffel v. Western U. Tel. Co. Carpenter v. Dowe (Tex. Cv. App.),
(Tex. Cv. App.), 67 S. W. 897; In- 26 S. W. 1002; Kinyon v. Chicago
ternational G. & N. R. Co. v. & N. W. R. Co. 118 Iowa, 349, 92
Welch, 86 Tex. 203, 24 S. W. 395; N. W. 40; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co.
355 WAIVING PRESERVING INSTRUCTIONS IN RECORD. 357
356. Errors presented on motion for new trial. It must
appear that any errors complained of in giving instructions were
called to the attention of the court on a motion for a new trial,
that the court may have an opportunity to correct the errors
before they will be considered by a court of review. 60 And the
errors complained of should be specifically pointed out in the
motion for a new trial. 61 In some of the states the practice re-
quires that the errors must be separately assigned as to each in-
struction complained of, in the motion, for a new trial. 62 But
in Illinois a court of review on appeal or writ of error will pass
upon the correctness in giving instructions, although no motion
for a new trial appears in the bill of exceptions. 63
357. Making instructions part of the record. In some of the
states the instructions are made a part of the record by statute,
thus dispensing with the necessity of embodying them in a bill
of exceptions. 64 By statute in Indiana, when requested in writing
by either party, the judge must reduce all instructions to writing
and number and sign them. Exceptions may be taken by writing
on the margin or at the end of each instruction "given and
excepted to," or "refused and excepted to;" this memorandum
must be dated and signed by the judge. But instructions thus
excepted to must be filed and the record must affirmatively show
that fact before they will be regarded as a part of the record. 65
v. Manghan, 29 Tex. Cv. App. 486, 160; Schenck v. Butsch, 32 Ind.
69 S. W. 80; Neville v. Mitchell 344.
(Tex. Cv. App.), 66 S. W. 579; City ei Central of Georgia R. Co. v.
of Sherman v. Greening (Tex. Cv. Bond, 111 Ga. 13, 36 S. E. 299; New-
App.), 73 S. W. 424; Leeds v. Reed man v. Day, 108 Ga. 813, 34 S. B.
(Tex. Cv. App.), 36 S. W. 347. 167.
oo Brown v. Mayo, 80 Mo. App. 62 Palmer v. First Bank of Ulyses
81; Izlar v. Manchester & A. R. (Neb.), 81 N. W. 303; Stons & Har-
Co. 57 S. Car. 332, 35 S. E. 583; rison v. Fesselman, 23 Ind. App.
Hintz v. Graupner, 138 111. 158, 165, 293, 55 N. E. 245.
27 N. E. 935; Schmidt & Bro. Co. es Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. O'Keefe,
v. Mahoney, 60 Neb. 20, 82 N. W. 154 111. 508, 514, 39 N. E. 606. See
99; First Nat. Bank v. Tolerton North C. St. R. Co. v. Wrixon, 150
(Neb.), 97 N. W. 248; Davis v. 111. 532, 37 N. E. 895.
Hall (Neb.), 97 N. W. 1023; Even- 64 Utah Optical Co. v. Keith, 18
ing Post Co. v. Canfield, 23 Ky. L. Utah, 477, 56 Pac. 155; S. v. Bart-
R. 2028, 68 S. W. 502; Jones v. Lay- ly, 56 Neb. 810, 77 N. W. 438;
man, 123 Ind. 573, 24 N. E. 363; Clanin v. Fagan, 124 Ind. 304, 24
Grant v. Westfall, 57 Ind. 121. See N. E. 1044; Blumer v. Bennett, 44
Irwin v. Smith, 72 Ind. 488. See Neb. 873, 63 N. W. 14.
Dawson v. Coffman, 28 Ind. 220; es Dix v. Akers, 30 Ind. 433; Wai-
Douglass v. Blankenship, 50 Ind. lace v. Goff, 71 Ind. 294; Louis-
358 OBJECTIONS AND EXCEPTIONS. 356
The instructions may be brought into the record by bill of ex-
ceptions, but there must be some showing that the instructions
given or refused were properly excepted to. 06 It has recently
been held in this state, apparently in the teeth of the statute, that
the marginal exceptions provided by statute are not sufficient to
raise any question on appeal, unless it is otherwise shown which
party took the exceptions. 67 But in criminal cases instructions can
only be made a part of the record by a bill of exceptions. 68 There
are four methods in Indiana by which instructions may be
brought into record: (1) By marginal exceptions; (2) By
order of court ; (3 ) By bill of exceptions ; (4 ) By general excep-
tions under the recent statute. But the only safe way is by a gen-
eral bill of exceptions, as the record must affirmatively show that
the instructions set out in the record were all the instructions giv-
en. Copying the instructions in the motion for a new trial does not
make them a part of the record, and in such form will not be
considered on review. 69
358. By bill of exceptions. Errors assigned in the giving
or refusing of instructions will not be considered by a court of
review unless the instructions given and refused are properly
preserved in a bill of exceptions or other proper mode, showing
that exceptions were properly taken in the trial court. 70 Accord-
ville, N. A. and C. R. Co. v. Wright, 106 Wis. 618, 82 N. W. 564; Piano
115 Ind. 378, 16 N. E. 145, 17 N. B. Mfg. Co. v. McCord (Iowa), 80 N.
584; Riley v. Allen, 154 Ind. 176, W. 659; Barker v. Lawrence Mfg.
56 N. E. 240. Co. 176 Mass. 203, 57 N. E. 366;
e Eslinger v. East, 100 Ind. 434. Ryder v. Jacobs, 196 Pa. St. 386,
6T Indiana, &c. R. Co. v. Bundy, 46 Atl. 667; Commissioners v.
152 Ind. 590, 53 N. E. 175. Ryckman, 91 Md. 36, 46 Atl. 317;
es Leverich v. S. 105 Ind. 277, 4 Westberg v. Simmons, 57 S. Car.
N. E. 852; Delhaney v. 115 Ind. 499, 467, 35 S. E. 764; Bowen v. South-
18 N. E. 49; Utterback v. S. 153 ern R. Co. 58 S. Car. 222, 36 S. E.
Ind. 545, 55 N. E. 420. 590; Hogan v. Peterson, 8 Wyo.
By recent statute in Indiana in- 549; 59 Pac. 162; Gulliver v. Adams
structions may be excepted to by Ex. Co. 38 111. 509; Dombrook v.
numbers, either in writing or or- Rumely Co. (Wis.), 97 N. W. 493;
ally, and such exceptions noted on Berkett v. Bond, 12 111. 86; Buck-
the court's minutes and the in- master v. Cool, 12 111. 74; Lindsay
structions filed, and they, with the v. Turner, 156 U. S. 208, 15 Sup.
exceptions, become a part of the Ct. 355; Leifheit v. Jos. Schlitz
record. Acts of 1903, p. 338. Brewing Co. 106 Iowa, 451, 76 N.
6 Archibald v. S. 122 Ind. 122. W. 730; Farmers' Loan & T. Co.
23 N. E. 758; Claflin v. Cottman, v. Siefke, 144 N. Y. 354. 39 N. E.
77 Ind. 58; Lake E. & W. R. Co. 358; Burnett v. Cavanaugh, 56 Neb.
v. Holland, 162 Ind. 406, 69 N. E. 142. 190; 76 N. W. 576; Evans v. Clark
TO Burnette v. Town of Guyers, (Miss.), 24 So. 532; Abbott v. City
357
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS PRESERVING ALL.
359
ing to the practice in Indiana, if a motion for a new trial is passed
upon at a term subsequent to the return of the verdict, the court
may then grant time within which to file a bill of exceptions em-
bracing the evidence and the rulings upon the motion; but such
bill will not preserve any ruling made during the trial, nor will
such bill bring the instructions into the record. 71
359. All instructions must be in record. A court of review
will not consider the assignment of errors as to instructions unless
the entire charge or all of the instructions given and refused are
made part of the record by a bill of exceptions or other proper
manner. 72 All the instructions should be preserved in the record
of Mobile, 119 Ala. 595, 24 So. 565;
Sams Automatic C. Co. v. League,
25 Colo. 129, 54 Pac. 642; Colby
v. McDermont (N. Dak.), 71 N. W.
772; Castle v. Boys, 19 Ky. L. Jl. 345,
40 S. W. 242; Merrill v. Equitable
F. & S. I. Co. v. 49 Neb. 198, 68 N.
W. 365; Costello v. Kottas, 52 Neb.
15, 71 N. W. 950; Prichard v. Budd,
76 Fed. 710; Schaff v. Miles, 31 N.
Y. S. 134, 10 Misc. 395; Schwabel-
and v. Buchler, 31 N. Y. S. 143, 10
Misc. 773; Ward v. S. (Tex. Cr.
App.), 29 S. W. 274; Werner v.
Jewett, 54 Kas. 530, 38 Pac. 793;
Keokuk Stove Works v. Hammond,
94 Iowa, 694, 63 N. W. 563; Pike
v. Sutton, 21 Colo. 84, 39 Pac. 1084;
Ryan v. Conroy, 33 N. Y. S. 330,
85 Hun, (N. Y.) 544; Dunbar v. S. 34
Tex. Cr. App. 596, 31 S. W. 401; Phil-
lips v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 30 S. W.
1063; Sigler v. McConnell, 45 Neb.
598, 63 N. W. 870; Partin v. Com. 17
Ky. L. R. 499, 31 S. W. 874; Moore
v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 28 S. W. 686;
Patterson v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 29
S. W. 272: Hardeman v. S. (Miss.),
16 So. 876; S. v. Owens, 44 S. Car.
324, 22 S. E. 244; S. v. Knutson,
91 Iowa, 549, 60 N. W. 129; S. v.
Paxton, 126 Mo. 500, 29 S. W. 705;
Bragger v. Oregon S. L. R. Co. 24
Utah, 391, 68 Pac. 140; American
Cotton Co. v. Beasley, 116 Fed. 256;
Mount v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co.
76 N. Y. S. 533; Andrysick v. Stak-
owski, 159 Ind. 428, 63 N. E. 854;
Engel v. Dado (Neb.), 92 N. W.
629; Challis v. Lake, 71 N. H. 90,
57 Atl. 260; Delhaney v. S. 115 Ind.
502, 18 N. E. 49; Minor v. Parker,
72 N. Y. S. 549, 65 App. Div. 120;
Leverich v. S. 105 Ind. 277, 4 N.
E. 852; Livingston v. Moore (Neb.),
89 N. W. 289; Trogden v. Deckard,
47 Ind. 572; Marshal ton L. Ins.
Co. v. Doll, 80 Ind. 113; Suther-
land v. Venard, 34 Ind. 390 (oral
instructions must be preserved by
bill of exceptions to be of any
avail on review) ; Casey v. Ballou
Banking Co. 98 Iowa, 107, 67 N. W.
98; Hall v. Incorporated Town, 90
Iowa, 585, 58 N. W. 881; Robbins v.
Brockton St. R. Co. 180 Mass. 51,
61 N. E. 265; Krack v. Wolf, 39
Ind. 88; Eddy v. Lafayette, 163 U.
S. 456, 16 Sup. Ct. 1082; Runnells
v. Village of P. 109 Mich. 512, 67
N. W. 558; Longyear v. Gregory,
110 Mich. 277, 68 N. W. 116; Vil-
lage of Monroeville v. Root, 54
Ohio St. 523, 44 N. E. 237; Ranson
v. Weston, 110 Mich. 240, 68 N. W.
152; Thirkfield v. Mountain V. C.
Asso. 12 Utah, 76, 41 Pac. 564; Sim-
onds v. City of B. 93 Wis. 40, 67
N. W. 40; S. v. Nelson, 132 Mo.
184, 33 S. W. 809; S. v. Hilsabeck,
132 Mo. 348, 34 S. W. 38; S. v.
Jones, 134 Mo. 254, 35 S. W. 607.
71 Indianapolis, D. & S. R. Co. v.
Pugh, 85 Ind. 279. See Leach v.
Hill, 97 Iowa, 81, 66 N. W. 69.
72 Long v. Shull, 7 Pa. Super. Ct.
476; Dubois v. Decker, 114 Fed/ 267;
Sargent v. Chapman, 12 Colo. App.
529, 56 Pac. 194; S. v. Rover. 11
Nev. 343; Warren v. Nash (Ky.),
360 OBJECTIONS AND EXCEPTIONS. 358
to enable the court to determine whether the errors complained
of were cured or not by considering the instructions together as
a whole. 73 It must appear from the bill of exceptions that it
contains all the instructions given and refused, otherwise the
assignment of errors as to the instructions will not be considered
on appeal or error by the reviewing court. 74
The record should affirmatively show that the instructions
contained therein were the only instructions given and refused. 75
By a rule of long standing of the Supreme Court of the United
States only such parts of the charge to which exceptions were
taken need be embodied in the record by the bill of exceptions
for the purpose of review by that court. 76
But the more recent authorities seem to hold that a positive or
direct recital in a bill of exceptions that it contains all the evi-
dence or all the instructions given and refused, is not essential to
make it complete ; that it will be regarded as complete unless it
affirmatively appears from the record that other instructions were
given or refused. 77
360. Presumption in absence of all instructions. It will be
presumed that the trial court fully and correctly stated the law
applicable to the issues, or contentions of the parties if the
entire charge is not embodied in the record. 78 Where the in-
structions are not contained in the record showing that ex-
ceptions were properly taken it will be presumed that the court
67 S. W. 274; Whitney E. I. Co. v. ton, 54 111. 158; Kleinschmidt v.
Anderson, 172 Mass. 1, 51 N. E. McDermott, 12 Mont. 309, 30 Pac.
182; Craggs v. Bohart (Indian Ter.).. 393; Keeling v. Kuhn, 19 Kas. 441;
69 S. W. 931; Collins v. Breen, Pierson v. S. 12 Ala. 149; Michigan
75 Wis. 606, 44 N. W. 769; City v. Phillips (Ind.), 69 N. E. 701.
Freeborn v. Norcross, 49 Cal. 313; 75 Barton v. S. 154 Ind. 670, 57
Greenabaum v. Millsaps, 77 Mo. N. E. 515; Lake E. & W. R. Co. v.
474; Cheaney v. S. 36 Ark. 74; Holland (Ind.), 69 N. E. 141. Con-
Montgomery v. Harker, 81 Mo. 63; tra: Cox v. 'P. 109 111. 459.
Kelleher v. City of Keokuk, 60 76 Crane v. Crane, 5 Pet. (U. S.),
Iowa, 473, 15 N. W. 280; Berren- 356; Phoenix Life Ins. Co. v. Rad-
berg v. City of Boston, 137 Mass. din, 120 U. S. 183, 7 Sup. Ct. 500.
231; Bean v. Green, 33 Ohio St. 77 Warren v. Nash, 24 Ky. L. R.
452. 479, 68 S. W. 658, citing Garrott v.
73 Marshall v. Lewark, 117 Ind. Ratliff, 83 Ky. 386; Louisville & N.
377, 20 N. E. 253; Oregon R. & N. R. Co. v. Finley, 86 Ky. L. R. 294, 5
Co. v. Galliber, 2 Wash. Ter. 70, 3 S. W. 753.
Pac. 615. 78 Hawkins v. Collier, 106 Ga. 18,
Board, &c. v. Gibson, 158 Ind. 31 S. E. 755; Myer v. Suburban
471, 63 N. E. 982. See, also, as to Home Co. 55 N. Y. S. 566, Misc.
refused instructions, Gill v. Skel- 686.
359 PRESUMPTION IN ABSENCE OF INSTRUCTIONS. 360
properly instructed the jury on its own motion. 79 In the absence
of some of the instructions it will be presumed that the court
properly instructed the jury though the portion of the charge
appearing in the record is susceptible of two meanings. 80 Also
if erroneous instructions were given it will be presumed, in the
absence of the full charge, that the errors were cured by others
given which are not in the record. 81
But where the instructions given contain errors that could not
be cured by others, then it may be proper to reverse on account
of erroneous instructions although all that were given do not
appear in the record. 82 And where all of the instructions are
not in the record it will be presumed that the ones refused are
covered by those given. 83 In passing upon alleged errors it will
be presumed that the trial court properly instructed the jury in
the absence of a showing to the contrary, or where the instruc-
tions are not set out in the abstract as required by the rules of
the court. 84 But it has been held that the reviewing court will
not presume that a refused instruction was given in the general
charge merely because such general charge is not embodied in
the record. 85 That the instructions were given or refused or
modified in the form they appear in the record will be presumed
79 Richardson v. City of Eureka, 82 Meyer v. Temme, 72 111. 577.
96 Gal. 443; Gross Lumber Co. v. ss Clore v. Mclntire, 120 Ind. 266,
Goody, 99 Ga. 775, 27 S. B. 169; 22 N. E. 128; Puett v. Beard, 86 Ind.
Marshall v. Lewark, 117 Ind. 377, 108; Vancleave v. Clark, 118 Ind.
20 N. E. 253; Ford v. Ford, 110 61, 20 N. E. 527; Lehman v. Hawks,
Ind. 89, 10 N. E. 648; Becknell v. 121 Ind. 541, 23 N. E. 670; Gar-
Becknell, 110 Ind. 42, 10 N. E. 414; rett v. S. 109 Ind. 527, 10 N. E. 570;
Lehman v. Hawks, 121 Ind. 546, 23 Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v.
N. E. 670; Hancock v. Shockman Yando, 127 111. 214, 20 N. E. 70;
(Ind. Ter.), 69 S. W. 826; Cobb v. Pace v. Payne, 73 Ga. 675; Gill v.
Makme, 87 Ala. 514, 6 So. 299; Me- Skelton, 54 111. 158; Bolen v. S. 26
Phee v. McDermott, 77 Wis. 33, 45 Ohio St. 371; Hearn v. Shaw, 72
N. W. 808; Huff v. Aultman, 69 Me. 187; Stearnes v. Johnson, 17
Iowa, 71, 28 N. W. 440; McFad- Minn. 142.
yen v. Masters, 11 Okla. 16, 66 Pac. * Guerin v. New Eng. T. & T.
284; Hewey v. Nourse, 54 Me. 256; Co. 70 N. H. 133, 46 Atl. 185; Mc-
P. v. Niles, 44 Mich. 606, 7 N. W. Graw v. Chicago, R. & I. P. R. Co.
192; Bean v. Green, 33 Ohio St. (Neb.), 81 N. W. 306; Nighbert
444; Linton v. Allen, 154 Mass. v. Hornsby, 100 Tenn. 82; 42 S. W.
432, 28 N. E; 780; Klink v. P. 16 1060; Milwaukee Harvester Co. v.
Colo. 467, 27 Pac. 1062. Tymich, 68 Ark. 225, 58 S. W. 252;
so Davis v. S. 25 Ohio St. 369. Scott v. Smith, 70 Ind. 298.
si Bell v. S. 69 Ga. 752; Fern- ^ Alabama M. R. Co. v. Guil-
bach v. City of Waterloo, 76 Iowa, ford, 114 Ga. 627, 40 S. E. 794.
598, 41 N. W. 370; P. v. Von. 78
Cal. 1, 20 Pac. 35.
361
OBJECTIONS AND EXCEPTIONS.
360
on review, notwithstanding contentions to the contrary. 88 And
where it appears that the trial court instructed the jury to find
on special issues, it will be presumed on review that one of the
parties to the 'cause requested such instructions, in the absence
of a showing to the contrary. 87
361. When considered in absence of evidence. As a general
rule the assignment of errors on the giving or refusing of in-
structions will not be considered on appeal or writ of error unless
the record contains all the evidence on which the instructions
complained of were based. 88 Or at least all the evidence on the
particular question to which the instruction relates must be pre-
served by a bill of exceptions. 89 It is seldom necessary, how-
ever, to set out all the evidence where it is only desirable to
question the decision of the trial court in its rulings as to the
giving or refusing of instructions. 90 Enough of the facts should
be preserved to show the materiality and legitimate bearing of
se Indiana, D. & W. R. Co. v.
Hendrain, 190 111. 504; Riley v. Al-
len, 154 Ind. 176, 56 N. E. 240;
Tusley v. White (Ky.), 54 S. W.
169; Sternberg v. Mailhos, 99 Fed.
43; Holt v. Roberts, 175 Mass. 558,
56 N. E. 702; Smith v. Kennard, 54
Neb. 523, 74 N. W. 859; Cherry v.
Cox, 1 Indian Ter. 578, 45 S. W. 122;
Western U. Tel. Co. v. Baker, 85
Fed. 690; Texas Brew. Co. v. Wal-
ters (T<ex. Cv. App.), 43 "S. W.
548; Little v. Town, &c. 102 Wis.
250. 78 N. W. 416.
ST Belknap v. Grover (Tex. Cv.
App.), 56 S. W. 249. Questions of
law will not be passed upon in a
court of review unless they were
submitted to the jury by the trial
court in the form of instructions
and preserved in the record, Gasch
v. Neihoff, 162 111. 395, 44 N. E.
731.
ss Geiser Mfg. Co. v. Krogman
(Iowa), 82 N. W. 938; Jackson-
ville St. R. v. Walton, 42 Fla. 54,
28 So. 59; Griffith v. Potter, 65 N.
Y. S. 689; Pierce v. Engelkemier,
10 Okla. 308, 61 Pac. 1047. See
Wright v. Griffey, 146 111. 394, 397,
34 N. E. 941; Berry v. Rood, 168
Mo. 316, 67 S. W. 644; Felmat v.
Southern Ex. Co. 123 N. Car. 499,
31 S. E. 722; Advance Thresher
Co. v. Esteb. 41 Ore. 469, 69 Pac.
447; Eickhof v. Chicago N. S. St.
R. Co. 77 111. App. 196; Yates v.
U. S. 90 Fed. 57; Hedrick v. Smith,
77 Tex. 608, 14 S. W. 197; Phil-
brick v. Town of University Place,
106 Iowa, 352, 76 N. W. 742; Mex-
ican C. R. Co. v. Wilder, 114 Fed.
708; Warbasse v. Card, 74 Iowa,
306, 37 N. W. 383; Owens v. Calla-
way, 42 Ala. 301; Love v. Moyne-
han, 16 111. 277; Board Com'rs v.
Boyd, 31 Kas. 765, 3 Pac. 523;
Ward v. S. 52 Ind. 454; Law v. Mer-
rills, 6 Wend. (N. Y.), 268.
89 Sherwin v. Rutland, 74 Vt. 1,
51 Atl. 1089; Lesser Cotton Co. v.
St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. 114 Fed.
133; Hill v. S. 43 Ala. 335; Jones
v. Foley, 121 Ind. 180, 22 N. E. 987;
Phoenix Life Ins. Co. v. Raddin,
120 U. S. 183, 7 Sup. Ct. 500; Wil-
cox v. McCune, 21 Iowa, 294;
Whitehead & A. M. Co. v. Ryder,
139 Mass. 366, 31 N. E. 736; Horton
v. Cooley, 135 Mass. 589; Blige v.
S. 20 Fla. 742.
o Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. O'Keefe,
154 111. 508, 513, 39 N. E. 606; Na-
son v. Letz, 73 111. 371, 374.
361 PRESUMPTIONS IN ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE. 362
the instructions, otherwise the action of the trial court in giv-
ing or refusing them cannot . be reviewed on appeal or error. 91
The action of the trial court in refusing to give an instruction
cautioning the jury as to improper remarks of counsel in argu-
ment, will not be considered on review, unless the objection-
able remarks are preserved in the record by bill of exceptions. 92
But if instructions are radically wrong under any state of facts
and direct the minds of the jury to an improper basis on which
to place a verdict, error may be assigned on such instructions
though the evidence is not preserved in the record. 93 And error
may be assigned as to the giving or refusing of instructions with-
out preserving all the evidence in the record where the instruc-
tions are based upon incompetent evidence. 94 So, if the plead-
ings, irrespective of the evidence, render the instructions errone-
ous, error may be assigned as to the giving of instructions with-
out preserving all the evidence. 95
362. Presumptions in absence of evidence. And if the evi-
dence is not preserved in the record it will be presumed that the
instructions given were applicable to the facts of the case. 96 Thus,
where it appears from the bill of exceptions that an instruc-
tion was refused on the ground that it was inapplicable, a court
of review will not further inquire into the propriety of the rul-
ing, unless the evidence is embodied in the record to which the
instruction is claimed to apply. 97
si Leavitte v. Randolph County, Nev. 424, 30 Pac. 1080; Willis v.
85 111. 509; Schmidt v. Chicago & N. S. 27 Neb. 98, 42 N. W. 920; Tharp
R. Co. 83 111. 412; Kelleher v. City v. S. 15 Ala. 749.
of Keokuk, 60 Iowa, 473, 15 N. * Lane v. Miller, 17 Ind. 58.
W. 280. 95 Pfeuffer v. Maltby, 54 Tex.
92 Kipperly v. Ramsden, 83 111. 454; Duggins v. Watson, 15 Ark.
354. 118; Mason v. McCampbell, 2 Ark.
93 Downing v. S. (Wyo.), 69 Pac. 506.
264; Murphy v. Johnson, 45 Iowa, 96 Yates v. United States, 90 Fed.
57; Wenning v. Teeple, 144 Ind. 57; Philbrick v. Town, &c. 106 Iowa,
189, 41 N. E. 600; Sigsbee v. S. 352, 76 N. W. 742; Deering &
(Fla.), 30 So. 816; Wier Plow Co. Co. v. Hannah, 93 Mo. App. 618,
v. Walmsley, 110 Ind. 242, 11 N. 67 S. W. 714; Chestnut v. South-
E. 232: Baltimore & O. & C. R. Co. era I. R. Co. 157 Ind. 509, 62 N. E.
v. Rowan, 104 Ind. 88, 3 N. E. 627; 32; Ball v. S. (Iowa), 92 N. W.
Rapp v. Kester, 125 Ind. 82, 25 N. 691; Shafer v. Stinson, 76 Ind. 374;
E. 141; Cincinnati, H. & I. R. Co. Blizzard v. Bross, 56 Ind. 74.
v. Clifford, 113 Ind. 460, 15 N. E. 9- Pittman v. Gaty, 10 111. 186,
524; S. v. Broadwell, 73 Iowa, 765, 190.
35 N. W. 691; S. v. Loveless, 17
363
OBJECTIONS AND EXCEPTIONS.
362
363. Error caused at one's own request. A party has no
right to complain of error in the giving of an instruction when a
like error appears in an instruction given at his own request
on the same subject. 98 But this rule should not preclude one
from objecting to an erroneous instruction which operates against
him, merely because it is given in connection with one he may
have asked, although the one asked by him may also be illegal."
So, if the instruction complained of by a party states a rule or
principle substantially the same as stated in an instruction given
at his own request, he cannot assign error on that subject; 100
or if he uses a particular word or clause in the same sense as the
os Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Har-
rington, 192 111. 10, 25; Consoli-
dated Coal Co. v. Haenni, 146 111.
614, 620, 35 N. E. 162; Greene v.
Greene, 145 111. 264, 273, 33 N. E.
941; Springer v. City of Chicago,
135 111. 552, 560, 26 N. E. 514; Ochs
v. P. 124 111. 399, 425, 16 N. E. 662;
Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Beebe, 174 111.
13, 27, 50 N. E. 1019; Peirce v.
Walters, 164 111. 561, 45 N. E. 1068;
Chicago, Burlington & Q. R. Co.
v. Murowski, 179 111. 77, 53 N. E.
572; Egbers v. Egbers, 177 111. 82,
89, 52 N. E. 285; Hacker v. Mun-
roe & Son, 176 111. 384, 394, 52 N.
E. 12; Chicago City R. Co. v. Al-
len, 169 111. 287, 48 N. E. 414; Lake
Shore & Mich. S. R. Co. v. Con-
way, 169 111. 505, 48 N. E. 483;
Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Sanders,
154 111. 531, 39 N. E. 481; Swift &
Co. v. Rutkowski, 167 111. 156, 160,
47 N. E. 362; Hafner v. Herron,
165 Illi. 242, 251 46 N. E. 211;
Boecker v. City of Nuperville, 166
111. 151, 48 N. E. 1061; Cicero St.
Car Co. v. Meixner. 160 111. 320,
328, 43 N. E. 893; Baltimore & O.
S. R. Co. v. Then, 159 111. 535, 42
N. E. 971; Hill v. Bahrns, 158 111.
304, 320, 41 N. E. 912; Funk v.
Babbitt, 156 111. 408, 41 N. E. 166,
41 N. E. 166; Judy v. Sterrett, 153
111. 94, 101, 38 N. E. 633; City of
Beardstown v. Smith, 150 111. 169,
175, 37 N. E. 211; Springfield C R.
Co. v. Puntenney, 200 111. 12; Am-
erican Fire Ins. Co. v. Landfare. 56
Neb. 482, 76 N. W. 1068; Hess v.
Preferred M. M. A. Asso. 112 Mich.
196, 70 N. W. 460; McDonnell v.
Nicholson, 67 Mo. App. 408; Sib-
ley Warehouse & S. Co. v. Durand
& K. Co. 65 N. E. 676; S. v. Martin,
166 Mo. 565, 66 S. W. 534; Bishop
v. P. 200 111. 37, 65 N. E. 421; Slack
v. Harris, 200 111. 115, 65 N. E. 669;
West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Buckley,
200 111. 262, 65 N. E. 708; Jackson-
ville St. L. R. Co. v. Wilhite, 209
111. 84, 87; Collier v. Gavin, (Neb.),
95 N. W. 842.
99 Oneil v. Orr, 5 111. (4 Scam.), 3.
100 city of Beardstown v. Smith,
150 111. 169, 175, 37 N. E. 211; Chi-
cago & A. R. Co. v. Kelly, 182 111.
267, 54 N. E. 979; Louisville, N. A.
& C. R. v. Shires, 108 111. 617, 631;
Foster v. Pitts, 63 Ark. 387, 38 S.
W. 1114; International & G. N. R.
Co. v. Newman (Tex. Cv. App.), 40
S. W. 854; Olferman v. Union D.
R. Co. 125 Mo. 408, 28 S. W. 742;
Omaha Fair & E. Asso. v. Mis-
souri Pac. R. Co. 42 Neb. 105, 60 N.
W. 330; International & G. N. R.
Co. v. Sun, 11 Tex. Cv. App. 386,
33 S. W. 558; Byrd v. Ellis (Tex.
Cv. App.), 35 S. W. 1070; Needham
v. King, 95 Mich. 303, 54 N. W. 891;
Hazell v. Bank of Tipton, 95 Mo.
60, 8 S. W. 173; Sibley Warehouse
Co. v. Durand Co. 200 111. 357, 65
N. E. 676; Illinois Life Ins. Co. v.
Wells, 200 111. 453, 65 N. E. 1072;
Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v.
Patton, 203 111. 379, 67 N. E. 804.
363 ERROR AT ONE'S OWN REQUEST. 363
other party, he cannot complain of error in that respect. 101 Thus,
where the plaintiff uses the words "ordinary care" in an in-
struction without denning that expression he will not be per-
mitted to complain of error that the defendant's instructions
contain the same term without defining it. 102
Where a question is submitted to the jury by instruction at
the special request of both parties neither will be heard to
complain of the giving of instructions on- that particular ques-
tion. A party cannot ask the court to rule upon a certain branch
of the case and then be heard to say that the court had no right
to thus rule at all. 103 So, where an instruction is given by agree-
ment of the parties they are precluded from assigning it as a
cause of error whether it states a correct principle of law or
not. 104 Or if both parties have given instructions substantially
on the same theory, neither is in a position to complain of
erroneously instructing the jury as to such theory. 105
On the same principle, he who procures an erroneous instruc-
tion to be given which is in conflict with a proper one given at
the instance of his opponent, will not be heard to complain of
error in the giving of instructions. 106 Thus, where a party by
his instructions asks to have a material question submitted to
the jury he will not be permitted, on appeal, to" complain that
101 Eastman v. Curtis, 67 Vt. 432, App. 32; Dunnington v. Prick Co.
32 Atl. 232; Keeler v. Herr, 54 111. 60 Ark. 250, 30 S. W. 212. See
App. 468. Hayden v. McCloskey, 161 111. 351.
102 Quirk v. St. Louis N. E. Co. 43 N. E. 1091; Queen City Mfg. Co.
126 Mo. 279, 28 S. W. 1080. v. Blalack (Miss.), 18 So. 800;
103 Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Lati- Gould v. Magnolia Metal Co. 207
mer, 128 111. 171, 21 N. E. 7; Greene 111. 178, 69 N. E. 896. A party can-
v. Greene, 145 111. 272, 33 N. E. 941, not except to the ruling of the
69 N. E. 925. See Spring Valley court in refusing to give instruc-
Coal Co. v. Robizas, 207 111. 22; tions for his opponent, Bailey v.
Gould v. Magnolia Metal Co. 207 Campbell, 2 111. (1 Scam.), 46.
111. 178, 69 N. E. 896; Jordan v. 106 Christian v. Connecticut Mut.
Philadelphia, 125 Fed. 825; Little Life Ins. Co. 143 Mo. 460, 45 S. W.
Dorritt Gold Min. Co. v. Arapahoe 268: Conners v. Indiana, I. & Q. R.
Gold Min. Co. 30 Colo. 431, 71 Pac. Co. 193 111. 464, 473, 62 N. E. 221;
389; Ward v. Bass, (Indian Ter.) 69 Chicago, P. & St. L. R. Co. v.
N. W. 879; Stoner v. Mau, (Wyo.) Leach, 152 111. 249, 38 N. E. 556;
73 Pac. 548; Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. Leslie v. S. 35 Fla. 171, 17 So. 555:
v. Johnson, (Neb.) 95 N. W. 614. Sanders v. Brock (Tex. Cv. App.),
104 Emory v. Addis, 71 111. 275. 31 S. W. 311; Moore v. Graham, 29
105 Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Harris, Tex. Cv. App. 235, 69 S. W. 200.
162 111. 200, 44 N. E. 498; Bracken See Blanchard v. Jones, 101 Ind.
v. Union Pac. R. Co. 75 Fed. 347; 542.
East St. L. C. R. Co. v. Allen, 54 111.
364
OBJECTIONS AND EXCEPTIONS.
364
the evidence was not sufficient to warrant the submission of such
question to the jury. 107 So, where a party, against objection,
introduces evidence which is outside of the issues presented by
the pleadings, will not be heard to complain of the giving of
instructions based on such evidence. 108 On appeal or writ of
error a party will be held to the position assumed by him in
the trial court and will be estopped to complain in the court of
review, of an erroneous ruling made by the trial court as to the
instructions if the court was induced to make such ruling by
the procurement or invitation of such party. 109
364. After cause is remanded. On the second trial of a
cause after it has been remanded for a new trial, for the reason
that the trial court erred in refusing instructions, the refusal
of the same instructions on the second trial is error where the
evidence was substantially the same as on the former trial. 110
After a case has been remanded for a new trial, the giving of an
instruction which embodies the language of the court of review,
stating that the Supreme Court is authority for such instruc-
tion, is improper. 111
107 Boyer v. Soules, 105 Mich. 31,
62 N. W. 1000. See Light v. Chi-
cago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 93 Iowa.
83, 61 N. W. 380; Means v. Grid-
ley, 164 Pa. St. 387, 30 Atl. 390;
Hahn v. Miller, 60 Iowa, 96, 14 N.
W. 119; Spears v. Town of Mt.
Ayr, 66 Iowa, 721, 24 N. W. 504.
IDS Bowen v. Carolina, C. G. &
C. R. Co. 34 S. Car. 217, 13 S. E.
421.
109 North Chicago Blec. R. Co. v.
Peuser, 190 111. 67, 72. See Mat-
thews v. Granger, 196 111. 164, 63
N. E. 658; Iron M. Bank v. Arm-
strong, 92 Mo. 265, 4 S. "W. 720.
no Watkins v. Moore, 196 Pa. St.
469, 46 Atl. 482. See English v.
Yore, 123 Mich. 701, 82 N. W. 659.
in Board of Comrs. v. Vicker, 62
Kas. 25, 61 Pac. 391.
FORMS
CHAPTER XXVII.
WITNESSES IN CIVIL OR CRIMINAL CASES.
Sec. Sec.
365. Jury judges of credibility of 369. Party witness in his own be-
witnesses. half.
366. Jury weigh the testimony. 370. Husband a witness for wife.
367. Impeachment of witnesses. 371. Positive and negative testi-
368. Witness testifying wilfully mony.
falsely.
Forms of Instructions Generally. When a party prepares in-
structions to be given by the court, he should provide them with
a title, as in a pleading, with the name of the court and with
the names of the parties. Then should follow a request, ad-
dressed to the court, that the instructions submitted, be given;
as follows:
State of Indiana, jln the Marion Circuit Court,
County of Marion.^ ^ September Term, 1903.
John Doe ]
>
Richard Roe.J
The defendant in the above entitled cause, at the conclusion
of the evidence and before the beginning of the argument, here-
by requests the court: (to instruct the jury in writing and) 1
to give to the jury each of the following instructions numbered
from one to five, inclusive, to wit, etc.
Each series of instructions, or if it seems necessary to make
i This clause may be omitted if written instructions are not desired.
365
365 WITNESSES IN CIVIL OR CRIMINAL CASES. 366
the sense complete, each instruction, that is modelled upon the
forms outlined in the following pages, should be commenced by
the following statement: "The court instructs the jury," or
"You are hereby instructed that," or "The jury is hereby in-
structed that," or the like."
365. Jury judges of credibility of witnesses. (1) The law
makes you the exclusive judges of the weight of the testimony and
the credibility of the witnesses. You are sworn to find what
are the true facts from the testimony before you without being
influenced in the least by any feeling of sympathy or prejudice,
giving such weight and credit to the testimony of the different
witnesses, as you may believe the same entitled to; but after
you have so found the facts, then, in determining what your
verdict will be upon these facts, you have sworn to be governed
by the law as set forth in this charge. 2
(2) You are the judges of the evidence and credibility of the
witnesses. It is your duty to reconcile all the statements of the
several witnesses so as to believe all the testimony if you can.
But if you cannot do so on account of contradictions, then you
have the right to believe the witnesses whom you deem most
worthy of credit, and disbelieve those least worthy of credit.
And in weighing the testimony it is proper for you to take
into consideration all the surrounding circumstances of the wit-
nesses, their interest in the result of the action, if any, and their
opportunity of knowing the truth of the matter about which
they testify, and from a preponderance of all the evidence thus
considered, you will determine the rights of the parties to this
action and find a verdict accordingly. 3
(3) You are the exclusive judges of the weight of the evidence
before you, and of the credit to be given to the witnesses who
have testified in the case. If there is any conflict in the testi-
mony you must reconcile it if you can. If you cannot, you may
believe or disbelieve any witness or witnesses as you may or
may not think them entitled to credit. In civil cases juries
are authorized to decide according as they may think the evi-
dence preponderates in favor of one side or another. 4
2 Smith v. Merchants and Print- 3 Lake E. & W. R. Co. v. Parker,
ers' Nat. Bank (Tex. Cv. App.), 94 Ind. 95.
40 S. W. 1038. * Liverpool & L. G. Ins. Co. v.
Ende, 65 Tex. 124.
367 JURY JUDGES OF CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES. 365
(4) You are the judges of the credibility of each and every wit-
ness, and you should give the testimony of each and every wit-
ness such weight as, from all the facts and circumstances in
proof before you in this case, you shall deem the same entitled
to; it is your duty, if you can, to reconcile the testimony of
the witnesses, if there be any disagreement between them; but,
if you cannot, then you must determine, from all the evidence
before you, which of the witnesses is entitled to the greater
credit. 5
(5) The credibility of the witnesses is a question exclusively for
the jury; and the law is that where a number of witnesses tes-
tify directly opposite to each other or one another, the jury
are not bound to regard the weight of the evidence as evenly
balanced merely because of numbers. The jury have a right
to determine from the appearance of the witnesses on the stand,
their manner of testifying, their apparent candor and fairness,
their apparent intelligence or lack of intelligence, and from all
the other surrounding circumstances appearing on the trial,
which witnesses are the more worthy of credit, and to give them
credit accordingly. 6
(6) The credibility of the witnesses is a question exclusively for
the jury. You have the right to determine from the appear-
ance of the witness on the stand, his manner of testifying and
his apparent candor and fairness, interest or lack of interest
in the case, if any should appear, his bias or prejudice, if any
should appear from all the surrounding circumstances, if any
appear on the trial, which witnesses are more worthy of credit,
and give credit accordingly. 7
(7) You are the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses,
of the weight of the evidence, and of the facts. It is your right
to determine from the appearance of the witnesses on the stand,
their manner of testifying, their apparent candor or frankness
or the lack thereof, their apparent intelligence or want of in-
telligence, which of the witnesses are more worthy of credit.
5 Albright v. Brown, 23 Neb. 141, ? Citizens' Gas & Oil M. Co. v.
36 N. W. 297. Whipple, (Ind.), 69 N. E. 560; Ho-
e North C. St. R. Co. v. Wallner, gan v. Citizens' R. Co. 150 Mo. 45,
206 111. 276, 69 N. E. 6. 51 S. W. 473.
366 WITNESSES IN CIVIL OR CRIMINAL CASES. 368
and to give weight accordingly. In determining the weight to
be given to the testimony of the witnesses you are authorized
to consider their relationship to the parties, if any is shown,
their interest, if any, in the result of this suit, their temper,
feeling or bias, if any has been shown, their demeanor on the
stand, their means of information and the reasonableness of
the story told by them, and to give weight accordingly. 8
(8) You are the exclusive judges of the credibility of the wit-
nesses, and it is your duty to reconcile any conflict that may
appear in the testimony as far as may be in your power, upon
the theory that each witness has sworn to the truth; when this
cannot be done, you may consider the conduct of the witnesses
upon the witness stand ; the nature of the testimony given by
them ; to what extent, if any, they are corroborated or con-
tradicted by other testimony ; their interest, if any, in the cause ;
their relation to the parties, and such other facts appearing in
the evidence as will, in your judgment, aid you in determining
whom you will or will not believe; and you may also, in con-
sidering whom you will or will not believe, take into account
your experience and relations among men. 9
366. Jury weigh the testimony. (1) In judging of the
weight and importance to be given to the testimony of any of the
witnesses who have testified, you should take into account their
means of knowledge of the facts of which they speak, and
you have a right to judge from your own common observation
of the ability of persons to judge of given facts from given
opportunities, and you are not obliged to accept as true the
testimony of any witness or witnesses, if in your opinion, judg-
ing from such common observation, they are or may be mis-
taken concerning the facts of which they speak. 10
(2) In determining the weight to be given to the testimony of
the different witnesses, you should take into account the in-
terest or want of interest, if any, they have in the case, their
manner on the witness stand, the probability or improbability
s S. v. Morgan, (Utah) , 74 Pac. Pf aff enback v. Lake S. & M. S. R.
528; Miller v. S. (Miss.), 35 So. Co. 142 In-d. 249, 41 N. E. 530.
690. 10 Bressler v. P. 117 111. 422, 443,
Jenny Elec. Co. v. Branham, 8 N. E. 62.
145 Ind. 322, 41 N. E. 448. See
369 JURY WEIGH THE TESTIMONY. 366
of their testimony with all the other facts and circumstances
before you, which can aid you in weighing their testimony. 11
(3) In determining the weight to be given to the testimony of a
witness, you will take into consideration the intelligence of the
witness, the circumstances surrounding the witness at the time
concerning which he testifies; his interest, if any, in the event
of the suit; his bias or prejudice, if any; his manner on the
witness stand; his apparent fairness or want of fairness, the
reasonableness or unreasonableness of his testimony ; his knowl-
edge and means of observation, the character of his testimony
whether negative or affirmative and all matters and facts and
circumstances shown in evidence on the trial bearing upon the
question of the weight to be given to his testimony, and give
each witness' testimony such weight as to you it may seem
fairly entitled to. 12
(4) You are to take into account, in weighing the testimony of
any witness, his interest or want of interest in the result of
the case, his appearance upon the witness stand, his manner of
testifying, his apparent candor or want of candor, whether he
is supported or contradicted by the facts and circumstances in
the case as shown by the evidence. You have a right to be-
lieve all the testimony of a witness or believe it in part and dis-
believe it in part, or you may reject it altogether as you may
find the evidence to be. You are to believe as jurors what you
would believe as men, and there is no rule of law which requires
you to believe as jurors what you would not believe as men. 13
(5) While the jury are the judges of the credibility of the wit-
nesses, they have no right to disregard the testimony of an
unirflpeached witness, sworn on behalf of the defendant, simply
because such witness was an employe of the defendant, but
it is the duty of the jury to receive the testimony of such wit-
ness in the light of all the evidence, the same as they would
receive the testimony of any other witness, and to determine
the credibility of such employe by the same rules and tests
11 Deal v. S. 140 Ind. 354, 39 N. sht.ll, or will, take certain matters
E. 930. into consideration: Fifer v. Rifcter,
12 Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Pol- 159 Ind. 8, 64 N. E. 463.
lock, 195 111. 162, 62 N. E. 831. is Dodge v Reynolds, (Mich.), 98
Instructions that the jury must, N. W. 738.
366 JURY JUDGES OF CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES. 370
by which they would determine the credibility of any other
witness. 14
(6) The jury, in determining whether witnesses should be be-
lieved or not, are not bound by the opinions of other witnesses, but
have a right to consider all the testimony in the case, the mo-
tives and interest of the witness, the nature of his testimony
and all the facts in evidence throwing any light upon the point. 15
(7) The jury are the sole judges of the facts of this case a^nd of
the credit, if any, to be given to the respective witnesses who
have testified ; and in passing upon the credibiity of the wit-
nesses, the jury have a right to take into consideration, not only
their testimony itself, but also their conduct, demeanor or bear-
ing while testifying on the witness stand, their objects, pur-
poses or designs, if any have been shown by the evidence in so
testifying, their feelings of prejudice against the defendant,
if any have been shown, and their means of knowing the facts
and circumstances in evidence, if any, tending to expose the
feelings or purposes of such witnesses. 16
(8) In judging of the weight and importance to be given to the
testimony of any witness who has testified, you have a right
to judge from your own common observation of the ability of
persons to judge of a state of facts from given opportunities;
and you should take into consideration the circumstances sur-
rounding the witness at the time concerning which he has tes-
tified, the character of his testimony, whether affirmative or
negative, the probability or improbability of his testimony, to-
gether with all the other facts and circumstances proved, if any
have been proved.
You are not obliged to accept as true the testimony of any
witness merely because he has testified positively to a fact or
state of facts, if in your opinion, judging from your own com-
mon observation, he is or may be mistaken concerning the mat-
ters and things about which he has testified. You have the
right to believe all the testimony of a witness or believe it in
" Cicero St. R. Co. v. Rollins, " Bressler v. P. 117 111. 441, 8
195 111. 219, 63 N. 'E. 98. N. E. 62.
is Brown v. S. 75 Miss. 842, 23
So. 422.
371 IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES. 367
part and disbelieve it in part, or you may reject it altogether
as you may find the evidence to be when considered as a whole. 17
(9) While you are the sole judges of the credibility of the wit-
nesses who have testified, you have no right to arbitrarily dis-
regard an unimpeached witness simply because he is or has
been an employe of the defendant, but you should receive the
testimony of such witness in the light of all the evidence, the
same as you would receive the testimony of any other witness,
and determine his or her credibility by the same rules and
tests by which you determine the credibility of any other wit-
ness. In determining whether a witness should or should not be
believed, you have a right to consider his motives, objects, pur-
poses or designs, if any have been shown by the evidence before
you. Whether the testimony of a witness is or is not worthy of
belief must be determined by you, not only from his own testi-
mony alone, but from all the other credible evidence and facts
and circumstances established by the evidence in the case. 18
367. Impeachment of witnesses. (1) The credit of a witness
may be impeached by showing that he has made statements
out of court contrary to and inconsistent with what he has
testified on the trial concerning matters material and relevant
to the issues, and when such witness has been thus impeached
about matters material and relevant to the issue, you have the
right to reject all the testimony of such witness except in so
far as the testimony of such witness has been corroborated
by other credible evidence. 19
(2) If a witness is successfully impeached, you will disregard
his testimony, unless he is corroborated by other unimpeached
testimony or circumstances in the case. 20
(3) You are at liberty to disregard the statements of any wit-
ness or witnesses, if. any there be, who have been successfully im-
IT Bressler v. P. 117 111. 443, 8 N. v. S. 75 Miss. 842, 23 So. 422; Mc-
B. 62; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Go. v. Mahon v. P. 120 111. 584, 11 N. E.
Pollock 195 111. 162, 62 N. B. 831; 883; Illinois C. R. Co. v. Haskins,
Dodge v. Reynolds (Mich.), 98 N. 115 111. 308, 2 N. E. 654.
W. 738; Deal v. S. 140 Ind. 354, White v. New York, C. & S. L.
39 N. E. 930; Strong v. S. 63 Neb. R. Co. 142 Ind. 654, 42 N. E. 456.
440, 88 N. W. 772. See Craig v. Rohrer, 63 111. 325.
is Cicero St. R. Co. v. Rollins, 20 Holston v. Southern R. Co. 116
195 111. 219, 63 N. E. 98; Bressler Ga. 656, 43 S. E. 29.
v. P. 117 111. 441, 8 N. E. 62; Brown
367 JURY JUDGES OF CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES. 372
peached, either by direct contradiction or by proof of general bad
character, unless the statements of such witnesses have been cor-
roborated by other credible evidence.- 1
(4) While the law permits the impeachment of a witness by
proving his general reputation for truth and veracity in the neigh-
borhood where he resides to be bad, yet if you believe that the
plaintiff, while on the stand, gave a truthful, candid and honest
statement of the facts and circumstances surrounding the trans-
action in question, then you should not disregard his testimony,
but you should give it such faith and credit as in your opinion
it is entitled to. 22
(5) Where evidence is given tending to contradict the sworn
statement of a witness, that does not, of itself, as a matter of law,
take out of the case the testimony of the witness, but it goes
to you for what you may deem it worth, as affecting the value
of the sworn statements of the witness before you; and it is
for you to determine, when all these statements are taken to-
gether, how much importance you will attach to the testimony
of the witness. 23
(6) If the jury believe from the evidence that any witness be-
fore testifying in this case made any statements out of court
concerning any of the material matters, materially different
and at variance with what he or she has stated on the witness
stand, then the jury are instructed by the court that these facts
tend to impeach either the recollection or the truthfulness of
the witness, and the jury should consider such facts in esti-
mating the weight which ought to be given to his or her tes-
timony; and if the jury believe from the evidence that the
moral character of any witness or witnesses has been success-
fully impeached on this trial, then that fact should also be
taken into consideration in estimating the weight which ought
to be given to the testimony of such witness or witnesses. 24
(7) If the jury find from the evidence, written or oral, or both,
21 Miller v. P. 39 111. 463. See (while this instruction is not artis-
Crabtree v. Hagenbaugh, 25 111. tically drawn, it states a correct
219; Bowers v. P. 74 111. 419. See rule of law).
Instructions 2, 5 and 13, in this sec- 23 s. v. Birchard, 36 Ore. 484, 59
tion; also, Fifer v. Bitter, 159 Ind. Pac. 468.
8, 64 N. E. 463. 24 Smith v. S. 142 Ind. 289, 41
22 Roy v. Goings, 112 111. 566 N. E. 595.
373 IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES. 367
that any witness in the case is discredited or impeached as to
his testimony on any one material fact, then the jury may, in
their discretion, regard the testimony of such witness who is
not corroborated or supported, as discredited or impeached as
to other statements he has made in his testimony. 25
(8) You are instructed that while you are the sole judges of the
credibility of the witness, you have no right to disregard the tes-
timony of an unimpeached witness simply because such witness
is or was an employe of the defendant. 26
(9) A witness may be impeached by proof of contradictory
statements, and if you believe that any witness has been success-
fully impeached, then it would be your duty to discard the
testimony of such witness ; but it is for you to say whether or
not you will believe the witness sought to be impeached, or
the witness brought to impeach him, the credibility of all the
witnesses being for you and your consideration. If you believe
that any witness has been successfully impeached by showing
contradictory statements on some material issue in the case,
then you would not . be authorized to believe him, unless you
find from the evidence that he has been corroborated. He may
be corroborated, or he may be sustained by proof of good char-
acter, or by other facts and circumstances in the case. 27
(10) If you find from the evidence that any witness who has
testified is a person of bad moral character, you should consider
that fact in determining what weight, if any, you will give to his
testimony. 28
(11) Some evidence has been introduced for the purpose of im-
peaching the testimony of certain witnesses by attempting to
show that they have made statements out of court in conflict
with their testimony in this case. Witnesses may be impeached
in this manner, but whether a witness has been impeached in
this manner, and if so, to what extent, are questions of which
you are the exclusive judges. 29
(12) The reputation of a person for truth is made by what his
25 Dy e v. Scott, 35 Ohio St. 194. E. 309; 2 Thompson Tr. 2426. See
26 Illinois C. R. Co. v. Haskins, also, Smith v. S. 142 Ind. 289, 41 N.
115 111. 308, 2 N. E. 654; McMahon v. E. 595.
P. 120 111. 584, 11 N. E. 883; Rock- 28 Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Crancher,
ford, R. I. & St. L. R. Co. v. Coul- 132 Ind. 277, 31 N. E. 941.
tas, 67 111. 403. 29 Treschman v. Treschmani, 28
27 Powell v. S. 101 Ga. 9, 29 S. Ind. App. 206, 218, 61 N. E. 961.
367 JURY JUDGES OF CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES. 374
neighbors generally say of him in that respect. If they generally
say he is untruthful, that makes his general reputation for truth
bad. On the other hand, if one's neighbors say nothing whatever
about him as to his truthfulness, that fact of itself is evidence
that his general reputation for truth is good. 30
(13) You should consider all the evidence in the case, and while
it is your duty to reconcile, if possible, the testimony of all the
witnesses in the case, you are not bound to believe anything to
be a fact because a witness has stated it to be so, provided the
testimony of such witness is uncorroborated, and you believe from
all the evidence that such witness is mistaken or has intentionally
misstated the facts. 31
(14) The credit of a witness may be impeached by showing that
he or she has made statements out of court contradictory to and
inconsistent with his or her testimony on the trial, concerning
matters material and relevant to the issue, or by proof of gen-
eral bad character of such witness. And when a witness has
been successfully impeached by either of these modes of im-
peachment, the jury are at liberty to disregard the entire tes-
timony of such witness, unless his or her testimony has been
corroborated by other credible evidence. But the jury are not
bound to disregard the testimony of a witness thus impeached.
If the jury believe that the witness while on the stand gave a
truthful, candid and honest statement of the facts and circum-
stances surrounding the transaction in question, then they should
not disregard his or her testimony, notwithstanding such im-
peachment, but should give it such weight and credit as in
their opinion from all the evidence before them it is entitled
to. So if the jury believe from the evidence that any witness
who has testified in this case, made any statements out of court
concerning any of the material matters materially different and '
at variance with what he or she has stated on the witness stand,
then the jury are instructed that such facts tend to impeach
the truthfulness of the witness, and the jury should consider
so Treschmajn v. Treschman, 28 N. W. 772. This instruction is not
Ind. App. 206, 61 N. E. 961; Davis v. objectionable; it merely states that
Foster, 68 Ind. 238; Conrad v. S. the false testimony, whether given
132 Ind. 259, 31 N. E. 805, (held not corruptly or through mistake,
invading the province of the jury), should not influence the decision.
si Strong v. S. 63 Neb. 440, 88
375 WITNESS TESTIFYING FALSELY. 368
such facts in estimating the weight which ought to be given to
his or her testimony; and if the jury believe that the moral
character of any witness has been successfully impeached on
this trial, then that fact should also be taken into consideration
in estimating the weight which ought to be given to the tes-
timony of any such witness. 32
368. Witness testifying wilfully falsely. (1) The jury are
the judges of the credit that ought to be given to the testimony
of the different witnesses, and that they are not bound to be-
lieve anything to be a fact merely because a witness has stated
it to be so, provided the jury believe, from all the evidence,
that such witness is mistaken about such fact, or that he has
knowingly testified falsely to the same. 33
(2) If you believe from the evidence that any witness has wil-
fully testified falsely to any material fact in the case, you are at
liberty to disregard the entire testimony of such witness, except
in so far as it may be corroborated by the testimony of other cred-
ible witnesses or supported by other credible evidence in the case. 3 *
(3) If you believe from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that any witness has wilfully and knowingly testified falsely to
any material fact in issue, then you have a right to disregard his
entire testimony, except wherein it is corroborated by other cred-
ible evidence in the case. 35
(4) If you believe from the evidence that any witness has here-
tofore, or on his trial, sworn falsely to any material fact in the
case, you may disregard the testimony of such witness alto-
gether. 36
(5) The jury are the sole judges of the credibility of the several
witnesses that have appeared before them, and of the weight
or importance to be given to their respective statements or tes-
timony; and if they believe from all that they have seen or
3*2 Smith v. S. 142 Ind. 289, 41 E. 941; Holston v. Southern' R. Co.
N. E. 595; White v. New York C. 116 Ga. 656, 43 S E. 29.
& S. R. Co. 142 Ind. 654, 42 N. E. 33 Taylor v. Felsing, 164 111. 331,
456; Miller v. P. 39 111. 463; Hoy v. 332, 45 N. E. 161.
Goings, 112 111. 566; S. v. Birchard, 34 Trimble v. Ter. (Ariz.), 71 Pac.
35 Ore. 484, 59 Pac. 468; Dye v. 932.
Scott, 36 Ohio St. 194; Powell v. S. ss Waters v. P 172 111. 372, 50
101 Ga. 9, 29 S. E. 309; Ohio & M. R. N. E. 148.
Co. v. Grancher, 132 Ind. 277, 31 N. 36 Owens v. S. 80 Miss. " 499, 32
So. 153.
368 JURY JUDGES OF CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES. 376
heard at the trial that any witness has wilfully sworn falsely
to any of the facts mentioned in the instructions herein, as bear-
ing on the plaintiff's alleged claim or defendant's alleged de-
fense thereto, then they are at liberty to disregard entirely the
testimony of said witness. 37
(6) If the jury believe from the evidence that any witness has
wilfully and corruptly testified falsely concerning any material
matter in dispute, they may disregard the whole or any portion of
the testimony of such witness; there is no inflexible rule inter-
posed between the witnesses and the jury requiring the jury to
accept or reject all the testimony of any witness. 38
(7) You are the judges of the credibility of the different wit-
nesses and the weight to be attached to the testimony of each
of them, and you are not bound to take the testimony of any
witnesses as absolutely true, and you should not do so if you are
satisfied from all the facts and circumstances proved on the trial
that such witness is mistaken in the matters testified to by him,
or that he has knowingly testified falsely to any matter ma-
terial to the issue, or that for any other reason his testimony
is untrue or unreliable. 39
(8) You are the judges of the credibility of the different wit-
nesses and the weight to be attached to the testimony of each of
them, and you are not bound to take the testimony of any witness
as absolutely true, and you should not do so if you are satisfied
from all the facts and circumstances proven on the trial that such
witness is mistaken in the matters testified to by him or her, or
that he or she has knowingly and intentionally testified falsely to
any matter material to the issues, or that for any other reason his
or her testimony is untrue or unreliable. You are at liberty to
disregard the entire testimony of any such witness, except in so
far as his or her testimony may be corroborated by the testimony
of other credible witnesses or supported by other credible evi-
dence in the case. 40
37 O'Connell v. St. Louis, C. & Taylor v. Felsing, 164 111. 332,
W. R. Co. 106 Mo. 485, 17 S. W. 45 N. E. 161; Trimble v. Ter. (Ariz.)
494. See S. v. Thompson, 21 W. 71 Pac. 932; Waters v. P. 172 111.
Va. 746. 372, 50 N. B. 148; O'Connell v. St.
ss Kansas City v Bradbury, 45 Louis, C. & W. R. Co. 106 Mo.
Kas. 383, 25 Pac. 889. 485, 17 S. W. 494; Kansas City v.
39 Taylor v. Felsing, 164 111. 331, Bradbury, 45 Kas. 388, 25 Pac. 889.
332, 45 N. E. 161.
377 HUSBAND AND WIFE POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE TESTIMONY. 371
369. Party a witness in his own behalf. While the law
permits the plaintiff to testify in his own behalf, nevertheless
the jury have a right, in weighing his testimony and in de-
termining how much credence is to be given it, to take into
consideration the fact that he is the plaintiff and his interest
in the result of the suit. 41
370. Husband a witness for wife. Under the law of this
state a husband is a competent witness to testify in behalf of
his wife in a suit brought by her for personal injury alleged
to have been sustained by her. You are instructed that if the
testimony of the husband appears to be fair, is not unreason-
able and is consistent with itself, and the witness has not been
in any manner impeached, then you have no right to disre-
gard the testimony of such witness merely from the fact that
he is related by marriage to the plaintiff in the case. 42
371. Positive and negative testimony. When one witness
testifies that a certain fact took place, or that certain words were
spoken, and several other witnesses equally credible testify that
they were present at the time and place, and had the same
means of information, and further testify that such fact did not
take place or that such words were not spoken, it is their prov-
ince to weigh the testimony and give a verdict according to
the weight of the testimony as it may preponderate on either
side. 43
41 West C. St. R. Co. v. Estep, 42 North C. St. R. Co. v. Well-
162 111. 130, 44 N. E. 404; West C. ner, 206 111. 275, 69 N. E. 6.
St. R. Co. v. Nash, 166 111. 528, 46 Frizell v. Cole, 42 111. 363.
N. E. 1082.
CHAPTER XXVIII.
WITNESSES, IN CRIMINAL CASES ONLY.
Sec. Sec.
Defendant a Witness. 375. Demeanor and conduct of
witness.
372. Instructions for the prosecu- 376. Accomplice as witness.
tion. 377. Opinions of expert witnesses.
373. Instructions for defense. 378. Detectives as witnesses.
374. Defendant's failure to testify.
372. Defendant a witness, instructions for prosecution.
(1) Under the law the defendant has the right to testify on his
own behalf, but the credibility and weight to be given to his
testimony are matters exclusively for the jury. In weighing
the testimony of the defendant in this case, you have a right
to take into consideration his manner of testifying, the rea-
sonableness or unreasonableness of his account of the transac-
tion and his interest in the result of the verdict as affecting
his credibility. You are not required to receive blindly the
testimony of the accused as true, but you are to consider whether
it is true and made in good faith, or only for the purpose of
avoiding conviction. 1
(2) You are not required to receive blindly the testimony of
the accused as true, but you are to consider whether it is true and
made in good faith, or only for the purpose of avoiding conviction.
And you are not bound to believe the testimony of the defendant
any further than it may be corroborated by other credible evi-
dence in the case. 2
i Blair v. S. 69 Ark. 558, 64 S. W. 2 s. v. Hunter, 118 Iowa, 686, 92
948, citing: Hamilton v. S. 62 Ark. N. W. 872; S. v. Mecum, 95 Iowa,
543, 36 S. W. 1054; Jones v. S. 433, 64 N. W. 286. This instruction
61 Ark. 88, 32 S. W. 81. was held not objectionable as sing-
378
379 DEFENDANT A WITNESS. 372
(3) That although a defendant has a right to be sworn and to
give testimony in his own behalf, the jury are not bound to believe
his testimony, but they are bound to give it such weight as
they believe it is entitled to ; and his credibility, and the weight
to be attached to his testimony, are matters exclusively for the
jury; and the defendant's interest in the result of the trial
is a matter proper to be taken into consideration by the jury
in determining what weight ought to be given to his testimony. 3
(4) In determining the weight to be given to the testimony of
the different witnesses you should take into account the in-
terest or want of interest they have in the case, their manner
on the witness stand, the probability or improbability of their
testimony, with all the other circumstances before you which
can aid you in weighing the testimony.
The defendant has testified as a witness, and you should
weigh his testimony as you weigh that of any other witness;
consider his manner as such witness, and his interest in the
result of the trial and the probability or improbability of his
testimony. 4
(5) The defendant is a proper witness in his own behalf, but
the jury may consider the fact that he is the accused person
testifying in his own behalf, in determining what weight and
credibility they will give to his testimony. 5
(6) The defendants having become witnesses in their own be-
half at once become the same as any other witness, and their
credibility is to be tested by and subjected to the same tests as are
legally applied to any other witness; and in determining the de-
gree of credibility that should be accorded to their testimony, the
jury have the right to take into consideration the fact that they
are interested in the result of the prosecution, as well as their
demeanor and conduct upon the witness stand; and the jury
ling out the defendant. But is it a right* to believe the testimony
not erroneous in telling the jury of the defendant without corrob-
that they are not bound to believe oration.
the testimony of the defendant any s Bressler v. P. 117 111. 439, 8
further than it may be corrobora- N. E. 62.
ted? The defendant may tell the * Anderson v. S. 104 Ind. 472, 4
truth, and where the jury believe N. E. 63; Deal v. S. 140 Ind. 354,
he tells the truth they should not 39 N. E. 930.
disregard his testimony, although 5 S. v. Jones, 78 Mo. 282.
not corroborated. The jury have
372 WITNESSES, IN CRIMINAL CASES ONLY. 380
are to take into consideration the fact, if such is the fact, that
they have been contradicted by other credible evidence on mat-
ters material to the issue. And the court further instructs the
jury that if, after considering all the evidence in the case, they
find that the accused have wilfully and corruptly testified falsely
to any fact material to the issue in this cause, they have the
right to entirely disregard their testimony, excepting in so far
as their testimony is corroborated by other credible evidence
or facts and circumstances proven by the evidence in the case. 6
(7) The defendant is a competent witness,, and has the right 10
testify in his own behalf, and when he does so testify he at
once becomes the same as any other witness, and his credibility
is to be tested by and subjected to the same tests, and only the
same tests, as are legally applied to any other witness; and in
determining the degree of credibility that should be accorded
to his testimony the jury have the right to take into considera-
tion the fact that he is the defendant and interested in the re-
sult of the prosecution, as well as his demeanor and conduct on
the witness stand; and the jury are to take into consideration
the fact, if such is the fact, that he has been contradicted or
corroborated by other credible evidence on matters material to
the issue. You have also the right to take into consideration
the reasonableness or unreasonablenss of his account of the
transaction in question, the probability or improbability of his
testimony, with all the other facts and circumstances before you
which can aid you in weighing his testimony. You are not re-
quired to receive blindly the testimony of the accused as true,
but you are to consider whether it is true and made in good
faith, or only for the purpose of avoiding conviction. The cred-
ibility of the defendant as a witness and the weight to be at-
tached to his testimony are matters exclusively for the jury;
and if after considering* all the evidence in the case the jury
find that the accused has wilfully and corruptly testified falsely
to any fact material to the issue in the cause, they have the
right to entirely disregard his testimony, excepting in so far
e Siebert v. P. 143 111. 592, 32 29 N. E. 700; Ridfir v. P. 110 111. 11;
N. E. 431; Purdy v. P. 140 111. 49, Hirschman v. P. 101 111. 576.
381 DEFENDANT A WITNESS INSTRUCTIONS 373
as it has been corroborated by other credible evidence in the
case. 7
373. Instructions for defenses. (1) The defendant is a com-
petent witness in her own behalf, and you have no right to dis-
credit her testimony from caprice nor merely because she is
the defendant. You are to treat her the same as any other
witness, and subject her testimony to the same tests, and only the
same tests, as are legally applied to the other witnesses, and while
you have the right to take into consideration the interest she
may have in the result of this trial, you have also the right,
and it is your duty, to take into consideration the fact, if such
is the fact, that she has been corroborated by other credible
evidence. 8
(2) The jury have no right to disregard the testimony of the
defendant through mere caprice, or merely because he is the de-
fendant. The law makes him a competent witness, and you are
bound to consider his testimony, and give it such weight as you
believe it entitled to, and you are the sole judges of his credibil-
ity. 9
(3) A person charged with the commission of a crime is a com-
petent witness, and may testify in his own behalf. The de-
fendant in this case has availed herself of this privilege, and in
determining her guilt or innocence you must consider her tes-
timony. She testifies as an interested witness and from an in-
terested standpoint, and as such you should consider her tes-
timony; and when you do this, together with all the other
surrounding circumstances developed by the evidence, give the
testimony of the defendant such weight, in connection with the
other evidence in the case, as you may think it entitled to, and
no more. 10
T Seibert v. P. 143 111. 592,- 32 N. this instruction where another
E. 431; Purdy v. P. 140 111. 49, 29 given for the prosecution stated
N. E. 700; Blair v. S. 69 Ark. 558, that the jury might consider the
64 S. W. 948; S. v. Hunter, 118 lo- fact, if it be a fact, that the de-
wa 686, 92 N. W. 872; Bressler v. P. fendant had been contradicted by
117 111. 439, 8 N. E. 62; Anderson other evidence.
v. S. 104 Ind. 472, 4 N. E. 63; S. Bressler v. P. 117 111. 422, 441,
v. Jones, 78 Mo. 282; Rider v. P. 8 N. E. 62.
110 111. 11. 10 S. v. Hossack, 116 Iowa, 194,
s McElroy v. P. 202 111. 478, 66 89 N. W. 1077; S. v. Sterrett, 71
N. E. 1058. Held error to refuse Iowa, 386, 32 N. W. 387.
374 WITNESSES, IN CRIMINAL CASES ONLY. 382
374. Defendant's failure to testify. While the statute of
this state provides that a person charged with crime may tes-
tify in his own behalf, he is under no obligation to do so, and
the statute expressly declares that his neglect to testify shall
not create any presumption against him. 11
375. Demeanor and conduct of witness. You are the sole
judges of the facts in this case, and of the credit to be given to
the respective witnesses who have testified; and in passing on
the credibility of the witnesses you have a right to take into
consideration not only their testimony itself, but their conduct,
demeanor and bearing while testifying on the witness stand,
their objects, purposes or designs, if any have been shown by
the evidence, in so testifying, their feelings of prejudice against
the defendant, if any have been shown, and their means of
knowing the facts and circumstances in proof, if any, tending
to expose the feelings or purposes of such witness. 12
376. Accomplices as witnesses. (1) The testimony of an ac-
complice is competent evidence, and the credibility of his testi-
mony is for the jury to pass upon as they do upon that of any
other witness ; and while the testimony of an accomplice will sus-
tain a verdict of guilty, though uncorroborated,, yet his testimony
must be received with great caution ; but if his testimony carries
conviction, and the jury are convinced of its truth, they should
give it the same effect as would be allowed to a witness who
is in no respect implicated in the offense charged. 13
(2) It is competent to convict upon the uncorroborated testimo-
ny of an accomplice, if the jury, weighing the probability of his
testimony, think him worthy of belief. 14
(3) The degree of credit which ought to be given to the testimo-
ny of an accomplice is a matter exclusively within the province
of the jury; but great caution should be used in weighing such
testimony, and the jury should not convict upon the testimony
of an accomplice alone, unless his testimony is corroborated
11 S. v. Ryno (Kas.), 74 Pac. 1116; is Shiver v. S. 41 Fla. 630, 27
(Indiana Statute,) see Thrawley v. So. 39.
S., 153 Ind. 375, 380, 55 N. E. 95. 14 Earll v. P. 73 111. 383; Johnson
12 Bressler v. P. 117 111. 422, 441, v. S., 66 Ind. 269.
S N. E. 62.
383 ACCOMPLICES EXPERTS. 377
by other evidence in some material point in issue, but such
corroboration need not be as to everything to which the accom-
plice testifies. 15
(4) Should you find from the evidence in this case that the pros-
ecuting witness, D A, with whom the alleged incestuous inter-
course is charged to have been had, did voluntarily, and with the
same intent which actuated the defendant, or directly or indi-
rectly consent to commit such act with him as alleged, then, in
that event, she would be an accomplice, and her testimony would
not be sufficient to warrant a conviction unless corroborated by
other credible evidence tending to connect the defendant with
the commission of the offense charged. 16
(5) In determining the interest a witness has in the case you are
at liberty to consider the fact, if the proof shows it, that such
witness is under indictment for gaming, and that, if he testifies
in behalf of the state, is hereby discharged from liability to fine
or punishment on account of such violation. You have the right
to look to this fact, if shown by the evidence, in determining
what weight, if any, you will give to his testimony. 17
(6) An accomplice is a competent witness, and the credibility
and weight of his testimony is for the jury to pass upon and de-
termine the same as they do the testimony of any other witness.
The degree of credit which ought to be given to the testimony of
an accomplice is a matter exclusively within the province of the
jury ; and while the testimony of an accomplice will sustain a con-
viction, though uncorroborated, yet his testimony should be re-
ceived and acted upon with great caution ; but if his testimony car-
ries conviction, and the jury are convinced of its truth, they
should give it the same effect as would be allowed to any witness
who is in no respect implicated in the offense charged. 18
377. Opinions of expert witnesses. (1) The opinions of med-
is S. v. Greenburg, 59 Kas. 404, ity to fine or punishment for gaming
53 Pac. 61. See Waters v. P. 172 in consideration that he will ap-
111. 367 (extreme caution), 50 N. pear as a witness against his co-
E. 148. defendants.
i Tate v. S. (Tex. Cv. App.), 77 Shiver v. S. 41 Fla. 630, 27
S. W. 796. So. 39; S. v. Greenburg, 59 Kas.
IT Howard v. S. (Miss.), 35 So. 404, 53 Pac. 61; Earll v. P. 73 111.
653. Held proper under a statute 333; Ayers v. S., 88 Ind. 275.
releasing the witness from liabil-
377 WITNESSES, IN CRIMINAL CASES ONLY. 384
ical experts are to be considered by you in connection with all the
other evidence in the case; but you are not bound to act upon
such opinions to the entire exclusion of other evidence. Taking
those opinions into consideration, and giving them just weight,
you are to determine from the whole evidence taken together
whether the accused was, or was not, of sound mind at the time
in question, giving him the benefit of any reasonable doubt, if
any such doubt arises from the evidence. 19
(2) The opinions of medical experts are to be considered by
you in connection with all the other evidence in the case, but you
are not bound to act upon such opinions to the exclusion of all
other evidence. Taking into consideration these opinions, and giv-
ing them just weight, you are to determine for yourselves, from
the whole evidence, whether the accused was, or was not of sound
mind, yielding him the benefit of a reasonable doubt, if any such
doubt arises. 20
(3) The opinions of expert witnesses are to be considered by you
in connection with all the other evidence in the case. You are
not to act upon such opinions to the exclusion of other testimony.
In determining the weight of the testimony of expert witnesses,
you are to apply the same general rules that are applicable to the
testimony of other witnesses. Taking into consideration the
opinions of the expert witnesses, together with all the other
evidence, you are to determine for yourselves, from the whole
evidence, whether it establishes the guilt of the defendant beyond
a reasonable doubt, as charged in the indictment. 21
(4) You are not required to take for granted that the state-
ments contained in the hypothetical questions which have been
propounded to the witnesses are true. On the contrary, you should
carefully scrutinize the evidence, and from it determine what, if
any, of such statements are true, and what, if any, are not true.
Should you find from the evidence that any of the material state-
ments contained in the hypothetical questions are not correct,
and that they are of such a character as to entirely destroy the re-
liability of the opinions based upon the hypothesis stated, you
should attach no weight whatever to the opinions based thereon.
18 Guetig v. S. 66 Ind. 106. 21 Epps v. S. 102 Ind. 553 1 N. B.
20 Goodwin v. S. 96 Ind. 561. 491.
385 DETECTIVES AS WITNESSES. 378
You are to determine from all the evidence what are the real facts,
and whether such hypothetical questions state them correctly
or not. 22
378. Detectives as witnesses. (1) That in weighing the tes-
timony, greater care should be used by the jury in relation to the
testimony of persons who are interested in or employed to find
evidence against the accused than in other cases, because of the
natural and unavoidable tendency and bias of the minds of such
persons to construe everything as evidence against the accused,
and disregard everything which does not tend to support their
preconceived opinion of the matter in which they are engaged. 23
(%Y The police department is an important part of the machi-
nery of our government, and it is well enough to bear in mind that
your homes, your lives and your property would not be safe but
for the police department and officers. It does not follow that
because an officer testifies, that his testimony is to be discarded,
or any suspicion cast upon it unless there is something about it
which calls your attention to it. 24
22 Guetig v. S. 66 Ind. 107. a* p. v . Shoemaker, 131 Mich.
23 Prenit v. P. 5 Neb. 377; San- 107, 90 N. W. 1035. (This instruc-
dage v. S. 61 Neb. 240, 85 N. W. tion was held proper where an at-
35; Frudie v. S. (Neb.), 92 N. W. tack was made on the police offi-
320. cers).
CHAPTER XXIX.
CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL OR CRIMINAL CASES.
Sec. Sec.
379. Jury determine the facts. 381. Court construes writings.
380. Court determines the law.
379. The jury determine the facts. (1) In determining what
facts are proved in this case the jury should carefully consider
all the evidence before them, with all the circumstances of the
transaction in question as detailed by the witnesses; and they
may find any fact to be proved which they think may be right-
fully and reasonably inferred from the evidence in the case,
although there may be no direct evidence or testimony as to
such fact. 1
(2) In determining any of the questions of fact presented in
this case, the jury should be governed solely by the evidence in-
troduced before them. The jury have no right to indulge in con-
jectures or speculations not supported by the evidence. 2
(3) The jury have been taken out to view the scene of this acci-
dent twice, the first time for the purpose of being able to under-
stand the testimony, and the second time to witness certain expe-
riments, by agreement of the parties. I charge you, that you are
not to consider as evidence what you saw on the first view; but
what you saw on the second view, that was shown to you by the
i North C. St. R. Co. v. Rodert, 2 Ramsey v. Burns, 27 Mont. 154,
203 111. 415; (held mot 'objectionable 69 Pac. 711; (held error to refuse
in the use of the word "think" in- this instruction.)
stead of believe.)
386
387 JURY DETERMINE FACTS. 379
parties under their agreement, you should take and consider
as evidence in the case. 3
(4) It is the duty of the jury to find the facts of this case
from the evidence, and having done so, then to apply to such facts
the law as stated in these instructions. 4
(5) Neither by these instructions nor the special interrogatories,
nor by any words uttered or remark made by the court during
this trial, does, or did the court intimate, or mean to give, or
wish to be understood as giving, an opinion as to what the proof
is, or what it is not, or what the facts are in this case, or what
are not the facts therein. It is solely and exclusively for the
jury to find and determine the facts, and this they must do
from the evidence, and having done so, then apply to them the
law as stated in these instructions. The instructions given to
the jury are, and constitute, one connected body and series, and
should be so regarded and treated by the jury; that is to say,
they should apply them to the facts as a whole, and not detached
or separated, any one instruction from any, or either, of the
others. 5
(6) In determining what facts have been proved in this case the
jury should carefully consider all the evidence before them,
with all the circumstances of the transaction as detailed by the
witnesses; and they may find any material fact to have been
proved, which they think may be rightfully and reasonably
inferred from the evidence in the case, although there may be
no direct evidence tending to establish such fact. But the jury
have no right to indulge in mere conjecture or speculation not
supported by evidence. It is the duty of the jury to find the
facts from the evidence in the case before them, and, having
done so, then to apply the law to such facts, as stated in these
instructions. The court is not authorized to give or intimate an
opinion as to what the evidence proves or does not prove, nor
has the court intended, by any remark made during this trial,
to give or intimate any opinion as to what the evidence proves
s Schweinfurth v. Cleveland, C. 57 N. E. 849, (held not to be a
C. & St. L. R. Co. 60 Ohio St. 227, direction to the jury to determine
54 N. E. 89. the facts independent of or without
* North C. St. R. Co. v. Wellner, the aid of the law.)
20G 111. 274, 69 N. E. 6; North C. * North C. St. R. Co. v. Kas-
St. R. Co. v. Raspers, 186 111. 246, pers, 186 111. 246, 57 N. E. 849.
380 CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL CASES. 388
or does not prove, or what are, or what are not, the facts. The
jury are solely and exclusively the judges of the facts of the
case, and must determine them from the evidence introduced,
and then apply the law as given in these instructions.
380. Court determines the law. (1) In considering and de-
ciding this case you should look to the evidence for the facts
and to the instructions of the court for the law of the case, and
find your verdict accordingly, without reference as to who is
plaintiff or who is defendant. 7
(2) In considering this case it is not only your duty to decide
the case according to the weight of the evidence, but it is also
your duty to decide it according to the law as given you by the
court, applicable to the evidence. While it is true, as a matter of
law, that the attorneys for the respective parties may state to you
what they believe the law to be and base arguments thereon, still,
under your oaths, and under the law, you have no right to consider
anything as law except it be given you by the court, and you have
no right to take the statement of any attorney as to what the
law is, except the court gives you an instruction to the same
effect; or in other words, you should consider only that as law
which is given you by the court, and decide the case accord-
ingly. 8
(3) You are to try the question in the case submitted to you
upon the testimony introduced upon the trial, and upon the
law as given you by the court in these instructions. The court,
however, has not attempted to embody all the law applicable
to this case, in any one of these instructions, but in consider-
ing any one instruction you must construe it in the light of
and in harmony with every other instruction given, and so
considering and so construing, apply the principles in it enun-
ciated to all the evidence in the case. 9
(4) In considering and deciding this case you should look to the
o North C. St. R. Co. v. Rodert, i Cicero St. R. Co. v. Brown, 193
203 111. 415, 67 N. B. 812; Ramsey 111. 277, 61 N. E. 1093.
v. Burns, 27 Mont. 154, 69 Pac. 711; Vocke v. City of Chicago, 208
North C. St. R. Co. v. Wellner, 206 111. 194.
111. 274, 69 N. E. 6; North C. St. Lampman v. Bruning, 120 Iowa,
R. Co. v. Raspers, 186 111. 246, 57 167, 94 N. W. 562.
N. E. 849.
389 COURT DETERMINES LAW AND CONSTRUES WRITINGS. 381
evidence for the facts and to the instructions of the court for the
law of the case and find your verdict accordingly. You have no
right to consider anything as law unless it be given you by the
court.
(5) You have no right to take the statements of any attorney as
to what the law is unless the court gives you an instruction to
that effect. It is your duty to try this case upon the evidence
introduced and the law given you by the court in these in-
structions. The court has not attempted, however, to embody
all the law of the case in any one instruction. Therefore in
construing any single instruction you must consider it in con-
nection with all the other instructions given you, and construe
them in harmony with each other. 10
381. Court construes writings. The evidence upon this
question, whether illegal stock was issued, is mainly record evi-
dence, or written evidence, and under the law it is the duty
of the court to construe such instruments, and to state the
effect of such evidence, and it is the duty of the jury to re-
ceive and to accept the instructions so given; and this is so,
even though you may think the instructions here given are
wrong. 11
10 Cicero St. R. Co. v. Brown, N. W. 562; North C. St. R. Co. v.
193 111. 277, 61 N. E. 1093; Vocke v. Raspers, 186 111. 246, 57 N. E. 849.
City of Chicago, 208 111. 194; Lamp- " Merrill y. Reaver, 50 Iowa
man v. Bruning, 120 Iowa 167, 94 417.
CHAPTER XXX.
BURDEN OF PROOF IN CIVIL CASES ONLY.
Sec. Sec.
382. Instructions for plaintiff 385. Preponderance of evidence;
General. number of witnesses.
383. Instructions for defendant 386. Evidence equally balanced.
General. 387. Preponderance in a case of
384. Burden in specific cases. negligence.
382. Instructions for plaintiff General. (1) While the
burden of proof is on the plaintiff to prove his case by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, still, if the jury find that the evi-
dence bearing upon the plaintiff's case preponderates in his
favor, although but slightly, it would be sufficient for the jury
to find in his favor. 1
(2) If you find from the evidence that the plaintiff has proved
his case as laid in his declaration, or in any count thereof, by a
preponderance of the evidence, then you should find the defendant
guilty. 2
(3) If you believe from the evidence that the plaintiff has
proved her case as laid in her declaration, or either count thereof,
you will find the issues for the plaintiff. 3
(4) If you find from the evidence that the plaintiff has made
out her case by a preponderance of the evidence as laid in her
declaration, or any single count thereof, then you should find for
the plaintiff. 4
1 Taylor v. Felsing, 164 111. 331, 45 cher, 190 111. 540, 60 N. E. 888;
N. E. 161; Donley v. Dougherty, 174 Pennsylvania Co. v. Marshall. 119
111. 582, 51 N. E. 714, See U. S. 111. 404, 10 N. E. 220.
Brew. Co. v. Stoltenberg, 211 111. 4 North C. St. R. Co. v. Hutch-
585. inson, 191 111. 104, 60 N. E. 850
2 Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v. Filler, (held proper, though some of the
195 111. 17, 62 N. E. 919. counts had been dismissed, the
s Mt. Olive Coal Co. v. Radema- court having given another in-
390
391 INSTRUCTIONS FOR DEFENDANT. 383
(5) While the burden is on the plaintiff to prove his case by a
preponderance of the evidence, still, if the jury find that the
evidence bearing upon the plaintiff's case preponderates in his
favor, although but slightly, that would be sufficient to war-
rant the jury in finding in his favor. If you find from the
evidence that the plaintiff has proved his case as laid in his
declaration, or in any one of the counts thereof, by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, then you should find the issues
for the plaintiff. 5
383. Instructions for defendant General (1) The burden
of proof is upon the plaintiff, and it is incumbent on her to estab-
lish her case by a preponderance of the evidence, and that
unless you believe she has done so from all the evidence in
the case, you will find for the defendant; and if you believe
that the evidence in this case is equally balanced, then you will
find for the defendant. 6
(2) It is a requirement of the law that the plaintiff must make
out and establish his case by a preponderance of the evidence,
and unless he has done so in this case, then your verdict should
be for the defendant. 7
(3) The burden of proof is upon the plaintiff, and he cannot
recover unless he proves to your satisfaction and by the greater
weight of evidence each and every material fact of his case. 8
(4) This is a civil suit, and is to be determined by a prepon-
derance of the evidence. The burden of proof is upon the
plaintiff, and to entitle him to a verdict in his favor he must
have proved by a preponderance of the evidence all the ma-
terial averments of some one of the three paragraphs of his
complaint. 9
(5) This being a civil suit, it is to be determined by a prepon-
derance of the evidence. The burden of proof is upon the plain-
struction stating what counts had e Georgia P. R. Co. v. West, 66
been dismissed.) Miss. 314, 6 So. 207.
s Taylor v. Felsing, 164 111. 331, ? Tedens v. Schumers, 112 HI.
45 N. E. 161; Chicago & E. I. R. 268; Sievers v. Peters B. & L. Co.
Co. v. Filler, 195 111. 17, 62 N. E. 151 Ind. 661, 50 N. E. 877, 52 N. E.
919; Mt. Olive Coal Co. v. Roden- 399.
macher, 190 111. 540, 60 N. E. 888; s Doyle v. Mo. K. & T. T. Co.
Donley v. Dougherty, 174 111. 582, 140 Mo. 1, 41 S. W. 257. See San
51 N. E. 714; East v. Crow, 70 111. Antonio & A. P. R. Co. v. Waller,
92. 27 Tex. Cv. App. 44, 65 S. W. 210.
Leary v. Meier, 78 Ind. 397.
384 BURDEN OF PROOF CIVIL CASES. 392
tiff to make out his case, and to entitle him to a verdict in his
favor he must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, all the
material facts or averments of some one of the several paragraphs
of his complaint, and unless you believe he has done so from all
the evidence in the case then you will find the issue for the
defendant; and if you believe that the evidence in the case is
equally balanced, then you will find for the defendant. 10
384. Burden of proof in specific cases. (1) The terms of
the leasing of the plaintiff's farm to the defendant are material
in this suit, and the plaintiff must prove to the satisfaction
of the jury by a preponderance of the evidence that the terms
of said leasing were such as the plaintiff claims the same to
be; and if the jury shall find that the evidence preponder-
ates in the slightest degree in favor of the defendant, or is
equally balanced, then the law is for the defendant, and in
such case the plaintiff cannot recover. 11
(2) The note in question is prima facie evidence of indebted-
ness, and must be -overcome by a preponderance of the evidence ;
and unless you believe from the evidence that the defendant
has sustained his plea of set-off by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, then you should find for the plaintiff as to that plea. 11 *
(3) The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to prove by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the note in controversy is the
true, genuine note of said B., the deceased ; that it was delivered
to the plaintiff by said B., the deceased, in his lifetime; and if
the plaintiff has failed to so prove, then it is your duty to find
your verdict in favor of the defendant's estate and against the
plaintiff. 12
(4) The defendant must establish the existence of fraud by a
preponderance of the evidence before you can find for him,
for unless you are satisfied from the evidence that the de-
fendant has clearly proved the existence of fraud in the lease
if Leary v. Meier, 78 Ind. 397; not required to be made up from
Georgia P. R. Oo. N. West, 66 Miss. testimony of the defendant alone) ;
314, 6 So. 207; East v. Crow, 70 111. Indianapolis St. R. Co. v. Taylor,
92. 158 Ind. 274.
11 East v. Crow, 70 111. 92. 12 Candy v. Biss>ell's Estate,
11* Laird v. Warren, 92 111. 208, (Neb.), 69 N. W. 634.
(the preponderance of evidence is
393 PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE. 385
from H to P, the plaintiff, then you must find for the plain-
tiff. 13
(5) Fraud is never to be presumed. The allegations of fraud
in defendant's answer must be by him affirmatively established
by the evidence, and will not be presumed from acts of the
parties which may be accounted for on the basis of honesty
and good faith. 1 *
(6) Where the plaintiff proves, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that certain sums of money have been paid to the
defendant, and the defendant claims that said payment was made
upon some other demand or account, which he claims he then
held against plaintiff, the burden of proof is on the defendant
to show by a preponderance of evidence that there then was a
subsisting and unpaid debt due defendant from plaintiff upon
which such payment was applied. 15
385. Preponderance of evidence ; number of witnesses.
(1) The burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to establish each
and every particular fact necessary to make out his cause of action
by a preponderance of the evidence. By the preponderance
of the evidence is meant that .greater and superior weight of
the evidence which satisfies your minds. Preponderance is not
alone determined by the number of witnesses testifying to a
particular fact or state of facts. It may occur that the state-
ments or superior knowledge of the subject matter testified to,
of one or a few witnesses, may be of more importance and
be relied upon with a greater degree of assurance than that
of a greater number, and the testimony of the witnesses is often-
times strenghtened or weakened by other facts and circum-
stances disclosed by the evidence. 16
(2) By a preponderance of the evidence is not necessarily
meant a greater number of witnesses, but if the plaintiff has
proven the material allegations of her declaration by such evi-
dence as satisfies and produces conviction in the minds of the
jury, then she has proven her case by a preponderance of the
evidence. 17
13 Prichard v. Hopkins, 52 Iowa is Ball v. Marquis (Iowa), 98 N.
122, 2 N. W. 1028. W. 497.
i* Prichard v. Hopkins, 52 Iowa "Mayers v. Smith, 121 111. 451.
122, 2 N. W. 1028. 13 N. E. 216, (this instruction does
is Prall v. Underwood, 79 111. not ignore the defendant's evi-
App. 452. dtence.)
385 BURDEN OF PROOF CIVIL CASES. 394
(3) The preponderance of the evidence is not necessarily de-
termined alone by the number of witnesses testifying to any fact
or facts, but in determining where the preponderance is, you may
also take into consideration the opportunities or occasion of the
witnesses for seeing or remembering what they testify to or about,
the probability or improbability of its truth, the relation or con-
nection, if any, between the witnesses and the parties, their
interest or lack of interest in the result of the case, and their
couduct and demeanor while testifying. 18
(4) While the preponderance of the evidence does not consist
in the greater number of witnesses testifying the one way or the
other, yet the number of credible and disinterested witnesses
testifying on the one side or the other of a disputed point is a
proper element for the jury to consider in determining where
lies the preponderance of the evidence. 19
(5) The plaintiff holds the affirmative of the issue, or, what is
called the burden of proof rests upon him, the defendant hav-
ing denied the charges alleged against it in the declaration.
The plaintiff must satisfy you by what is called a preponder-
ance of the proof, that the wrong complained of was commit-
ted by the servant of the defendant, in manner and form as
charged in the declaration. By a preponderance of proof, the
court does not mean the largest number of witnesses on a given
point; four or five witnesses may testify to a fact, and a single
witness may testify to the contrary, but under such circum-
stances and in such manner and with such an air and appear-
ance of truth and candor as to make it the more satisfactory
or convincing to you that the one witness, with the opportunity
of knowing the facts testified to, has told the truth of the
matter. When you are thus satisfied that the truth lies with
a single witness or any other number, you are justified in re-
turning a verdict in accordance therewith. This is what is
meant by a preponderance of proof. It is that character or
measure of evidence which carries conviction to your minds. 20
(6) By mentioning "the burden of proof" and "preponder-
is Myer v. Mead, 83 111. 20 (held 19 West G. St. R. Co. v. Liesero-
not excluding from the jury the witz, 197 111. 612, 64 N. E. 718; St.
facts) ; Kansas City v. Bradbury, 45 Louis, &c. R. Co. v. Union, &c.
Kas. 382, 25 Pac. 889; Illinois Steel Bank, 209 Illinois, 457, 460.
Co. v. Wierzbicky, 206 111. 201, 68 20 North C. C. R. Co. v. Gastka,
N. E. 1101. 27 111. App. 523.
395 PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE. 385
ance of evidence" the court intends no reference to the number of
witnesses testifying concerning any fact, or upon any issue in
the case, but simply by way of expressing the rule of law,
which is that, unless the evidence as to such issue appears in
your judgment to preponderate, in respect to its credibility.
in favor of the party to this action on whom the burden of
proof as to such issue rests, then you should find against such
party on said issue. 21
(7) The jury are instructed that the fact that the number of
witnesses testifying on one side is larger than the number tes-
tifying on the other side does not necessarily alone determine
that the preponderance of the evidence is on the side for which
the larger number testified. In order to determine that ques-
tion the jury must be governed by and take into consideration
the appearance and conduct of the witnesses while testifying;
the apparent truthfulness of their testimony or the lack of it;
their apparent intelligence or the lack of it; their opportunity
of knowing or seeing the facts or subjects concerning which
they have testified or the absence of such opportunity; their
interest or the absence of interest in the result of the ease ;
and from all these facts as shown by the evidence, and from
all the other facts and circumstances so shown, the jury must
decide on which side is the preponderance.
After fairly and impartially considering and weighing all
the evidence in this case, as hej-ein suggested, the jury are at
liberty to decide that the preponderance of the evidence is on
the side which, in their judgment, is sustained by the more
intelligent, the better informed, the more credible and the more
disinterested witnesses, whether these are the greater or the
smaller number. But the jury have no right to capriciously
disregard the testimony of the larger number of witnesses, nor
to refuse to give whatever consideration, in their judgment,
should be attached naturally to the fact that the larger num-
ber have testified one way. The element of numbers should
'be considered, with all the other elements already herein sug-
gesjed, for whatever, in the judgment of the jury that ele-
ment is worth, and the evidence of the smaller number of wit-
21 O'Connell v. St. Louis, C. & W. R. Co. 106 Mo. 485, 17 S. W. 494.
385 BURDEN OF PROOF CIVIL CASES. 396
nesses cannot be taken by the jury in preference to that of
the larger number unless the jury can say, on their oaths,
that, from all the facts and circumstances in the case, it is
more reasonable, more truthful, more disinterested and more
credible. 22
(8) The burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to establish each
and every particular fact necessary to make out his cause of
action by a preponderance of the evidence. By the prepon-
derance of the evidence is meant that greater and superior
weight of the evidence which satisfies your minds. Prepon-
derance is not determined alone by the number of witnesses
testifying to a particular fact or state of facts, but if the plain-
tiff has proven all the material allegations of his declaration
by such preponderance of the evidence as satisfies the jury
and produces conviction in their minds then that is sufficient
to entitle him to a verdict in his favor.
In determining the preponderance of the evidence, you must
take into consideration, not alone the number of witnesses tes-
tifying to any fact or state of facts, or for the one side or
the other, but you must also take into consideration the op-
portunities or occasion of the different witnesses for seeing,
hearing, knowing or remembering what they have testified to
or about, the probability or improbability of the truth of their
statements, the relation or connection, if any has been' shown,
between any of the witnesses and the parties to the suit, their
interest or lack of interest, if any, in the result of the suit,
and their conduct and demeanor while testifying. Yet the num-
ber of credible and disinterested witnesses testifying to a ma-
terial fact or state of facts in dispute, or for the one side or
the other, is a proper matter for the jury to consider, together
with all the evidence in the case, in determining where lies
the preponderance of the evidence.
The jury have no right to capriciously disregard the testi-
mony of the number of witnesses, nor to refuse to give what-
ever consideration, in their judgment, should be attached nat-
urally to the fact that the larger number have testified one
22 Ga.ee v. Eddy, 179 111. 503, 53 posing party called the larger num-
N. E. 1008, (held to be a proper ber of witnesses.)
statement of the law where the op-
397 PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE. 387
way and the smaller number the other. The testimony of the
smaller number of witnesses cannot be taken by the jury in
preference to that of the larger number, unless the jury can say.
on their oaths, that from all the facts and circumstances in
the case it is more reasonable, more trustworthy, truthful, dis-
interested and credible. 23
386. Evidence equally balanced. If after considering all
the evidence in the case you shall find that the evidence upon
any question is equally balanced, you should answer such ques-
tion against the party who has the burden of such issues, for
in such case there would be no preponderance in favor of such
proposition. 24
387. Preponderance in a case of negligence. The burden
of proof in this case is upon the plaintiff, and before he can
recover on account of the alleged negligence on the part of
the defendants in providing or having for use a weak, defective
or insufficient plank as a scaffold, it is necessary for the plain-
tiff to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, (1) that the
plank was insufficient, weak or defective, and that the acci-
dent happened as the result of such weakness, insufficiency or
defect; (2) that the defendants had notice or knowledge of
such insufficiency, weakness or defect, or that they might have
had notice thereof by the exercise of ordinary care; (3) that
the plaintiff did not know of such insufficiency, weakness or
defect, and that he had no means of knowledge thereof equal
to those of the defendants; (4) and that he was, in his relation
to the accident, in the exercise of ordinary care. If the plain-
tiff fails to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, any
one of these four propositions, the jury should find for the
defendants, even though they find that Gallagher was foreman,
and gave directions to use the plank in question. 25
23 Ball v. Marquis, (Iowa) 98 N. N. E. 1008. See also, Wray v. Tin-
*W. 497; Mayers v. Smith, 121 111. dall, 45 Ind. 517.
451, 13 N. E. 216: Myer v. Mead, 24 Renard v. Grande, 29 Ind. App.
83 111. 20; West C. St. R. Co. v. 579, 64 N. E. 644.
Leiserowitz, 197 111. 612, 64 N. E. 25 Armour v. Brazeau, 191 111.
718; Gage v. Eddy, 179 111. 503, 53 117, 126, 60 N. E. 904.
CHAPTER XXXI.
AGENCY.
See. Sec.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PLAINTIFF. 392. Railroad company bound by
agents' negligence.
388. Principal bound acts of agent.
389. Agent borrowing money for INSTRUCTIONS FOR DEFENDANT.
employer. 393. Agent acting without scope of
390. Company bound by acts of authority.
paying teller. 394. Agent selling land at price
391. Agent exceeding authority; agreed upon.
principal bound. 395. Contract on sale of machine
by agent.
Instructions for Plaintiff.
388. Principal bound by acts of agent. (1) If you believe
from the evidence that prior and up to the time of the execution
of the bond sued on, the said F & H had voluntarily and
knowingly held said M out to the world as authorized to sign
sontracts similar to the one in question, and had knowingly
so conducted themselves to reasonably justify the public gen-
erally and those dealing with them, in believing that said M
was authorized to sign their firm name to such contracts, and
that the plaintiffs accepted said bond, believing that said M
had authority to sign the same, then the defendants would be
bound by the acts of said M. 1
(2) If the defendant employed and authorized R to sell the
land, and in pursuance of that authority R sold the land and in-
duced the plaintiff to buy, and made false representations about
the land, upon which the plaintiff relied and which induced
i Fore v. Hitson, 70 Tex. 520, 8 Co. 58 111. 141, principal bound by
S. W. 292. See Smith v. Wise & acts of agent.
398
399 PRINCIPAL BOUND BY ACTS OF AGENT. 388
him to purchase, then the defendant would be responsible for
such fraud, notwithstanding there were no instructions given
to R by the defendant which authorized him to make fraud-
ulent representations, and notwithstanding the defendant did
not know that he practiced those fraudulent representations.
Employing him as agent, or as his agent, to do that thing,
he became responsible for the methods which his said agent
adopted in doing that thing. If the representations were false
in fact and R had no knowledge personally of the truth there-
of, but derived his information from others as to those facts,
he or the person for whom he was acting as agent in that
business would be liable to an action for deceit. 2
(3) If you find that A, the treasurer, had express authority
to sign the notes and checks and effect the loan in question,
or if you find that these acts were within the apparent scope
of his authority, or within the ' scope of the authority which
he was accustomed to exercise without objection by these de-
fendants, your verdict should be for the plaintiff; but if you
find that borrowing this money in the way testified to and giv-
ing this paper was not within the authority expressly given
to him, or within the apparent scope of the authority which
he was accustomed to exercise, then your verdict should be for
the defendants; and if you find that this money borrowed, or
received for the paper in suit, was not for the use of the de-
fendants, and the plaintiff knew, or had good cause to know
the fact, or if for any other reason the plaintiff did not in
good faith trust the credit of the defendants, then your ver-
dict should be for the defendants. 3
(4) In bringing the action upon these notes the Globe Savings
Bank and the plaintiff adopt and ratify all the acts of its
agents or officers by which the notes in question came into
the bank; that is, when the plaintiff seeks to recover upon these
notes from the defendant, it is bound by what the evidence
in the case shows to be the facts connected with the transac-
tion. 4
2 Haskell v. Starbird, 152 Mass. * Chicago, T. & T. Co. v. Brady.
118, 25 N. E. 14. 165 Mo. 203, 65 S. W. 303.
3 Rowland v. Apothecaries' Hall
Co. 47 Conn. 387.
389 AGENCY. 400
389. Agent borrowing money for employer. (1) If you be-
lieve from the evidence that C borrowed money from plain-
tiff, claiming to act as agent of defendants, and if such act of
borrowing was within the usual and ordinary scope or pur-
view of the business in which C was employed, and which he
was authorized by defendants to conduct and carry on, and
plaintiff loaned the money to C for the benefit of defendants,
then defendants would be bound for such money, even if, by
the private contract between defendants and C, he was not
authorized to borrow money, unless plaintiff knew he was not
so authorized when he loaned the money. 5
(2) If C borrowed money from plaintiff for the benefit of de-
fendants,' without authority from defendants, either express or
implied, and if defendants, knowing that such money had been
borrowed, ratified and acquiesced in the act of C, or know-
ing such money to be borrowed, accepted the benefit of it.
then they would be held bound by the act of C, as much as
if they had authorized it before it was done. 6
(3) It is not necessary for plaintiff to show any express au-
thority in C to borrow money to render defendant liable. If
money was borrowed by C in the general course and conduct of
the business of defendants, and defendants knew this fact and
acquiesced in it, and the note sued on was given for money
borrowed of plaintiff, by C, for the business of defendants,
and the money was in good faith used in such business, and
plaintiff had no knowledge of any want of express authority
on C 's part to borrow -money, then you will find for the plain-
tiff. 7
(4) If you find that C was an agent of defendants, but that
express authority was not given to him, as such agent, to bor-
row money for defendants, then you may look to the contract
between them as it may be shown, by the evidence, the na-
ture and character of the business in which C was employed
to act as agent, and all the transactions between them, and
ascertain whether or not it is to be fairly implied as contem-
plated by them or embraced in the scope of his employment
s Collins v. Cooper, 65 Tex. 4G2. 1 Collins v. Cooper, 66 Tex. 462.
e Collins v. Cooper, 65 Tex. 462.
401 PRINCIPAL BOUND BY ACTS OF AGENT. 392
as agreed on between them, that he should have such power
to borrow money to be used in such business. 8
390. Company bound by acts of paying teller. If you find
from the evidence that the checks were certified by the pay-
ing teller of the defendant company, and if you further find
from the evidence that said certifications were made in the
general course of the defendant's business, and if you further
find that plaintiff, in good faith, dealt with said defendant
company on the basis of said course of business, and if you
further find from the evidence that the officers of defendant
knew of said course of business, then defendant will be bound
by the act of its paying teller in making the certification of
the check sued on. 9
391. Agent exceeding authority Principal bound. If the
jury believe from the evidence that plaintiff authorized C, his
agent, to rent the house in question to defendant for but one
year, but that said agent rented it for two years, as alleged by
the defendant's witnesses, and that the defendant held the
same for two years, and that during the second year of the
said tenancy plaintiff treated the defendant as his tenant by
receiving the rent originally agreed upon, then the jury may
infer that the landlord ratified the contract for the two years'
lease and may find for the defendant. 10
392. Railroad company bound by agent's negligence. A
railroad company is liable for the acts of its employes or ser-
vants done in the prosecution of the company's business and
within the scope of the authority given them as such employes.
And so one of the important questions you are called upon
to decide is whether the defendant, by its agents or employes,
placed the hand-car that caused the injury on the highway.
The true test is not the form of employment, whether by the
day or by the month, but whether the men who left the car
on the highway were under the control and direction of the
defendant so that they were its servants, and not the servants
of another. 11
s Collins v. Cooper, 65 Tex. 462. 10 Reynolds v. Davison, 34 Md.
s Muth v. St. Louis T. Co. 94 Mo. 666.
App. 94, 67 S. W. 978. Pittsburg, C. & St. L. R. Co.
v. Sponier, 85 Ind. 169.
393 AGENCY. 402
Instructions for Defendant.
393. Agent acting without scope of authority. (1) No
statement made or action taken by defendant's agent and oper-
ator, B, before its office opened for business, and when said agent
and operator was at home, or not in the service of the com-
>pany or engaged in the functions of his position, was binding
upon the defendant ; -nor can the defendant be held liable there-
for, as the responsibility of the company began when the mes-
sage was filed with it for transmission. 12
(2) Unless you find from the evidence that J, the person
whose name appears on the face of the writing introduced by the
plaintiff, was authorized or held out to the public by the de-
fendant company as being authorized to certify or mark
"good, " writings or checks of the character of the paper sued
on by plaintiff, you will find for the defendant, and the court
states to the jury that the fact that the said J signed him-
self as the "teller," or was designated or called "teller" or
"paying teller" of the defendant company, is not of itself suf-
ficient to justify the conclusion that the said J was clothed
with any such authority. 13
(3) Even if the jury believe from the evidence that S did pur-
chase the property in controversy for himself and L & M,
yet if the jury believe from the evidence that L did not au-
thorize him to do so, L is not bound by such purchase. If
the jury find that in the contract and arrangement which re-
sulted in the giving of the note in suit, the business between
L and B was done by S, and that said S had no authority,
as a general agent, from said L beyond that resulting from
their relation as general partners in the manufacture of plows,
but only an authority to do that particular business, he, the
said S, would be, as far as this case is concerned, a special
agent for L in that business, and so far as the jury find that
the said S, in doing it, exceeded the authority and instruc-
tions given to him by L, L would not be bound. 14
(4) If you find from the evidence that D was a canvassing
12 Hargrave v. Western U. Tel. is Muth v. St. Louis T. Co. 94
Co. (Tex. Cv. App.), 60 S. W. 689. Mo. App. 94, 67 S. W. 978.
n Lytle v. Boyer, 33 Ohio St. 510.
403 CONTRACTS BY AGENTS. 395
agent, obtaining subscriptions for the plaintiff for books pub-
lished by him and sold by subscription, and- that said D was
restricted by the terms of his employment from collecting for
any books or parts of books, except such as were delivered by
him, and if you further find that the said canvassing agent
never had possession of the parts and works for which this
suit is brought, and did not deliver the same to the defendant,
then the court declares the law to be that the employment of
D, as canvassing agent, gave him no authority to collect the
money for which this suit is brought, and it devolves upon the
defendant to show that D had such authority. 15
394. Agent selling land at price agreed upon. If you shall
find from the evidence that J, as agent of the plaintiff, agreed
with the defendants that they should take and sell for the
plaintiff certain of the lots then being offered for sale by the
plaintiff for a certain and definite price fixed, and agreed upon
by and between the defendants and the said J, for which the
defendants were to take and receive an agreed commission, viz. :
one and one-half per cent on the purchase price, and that the
defendants have sold said lots for the agreed price, and have
fully accounted to the plaintiff for the proceeds received there-
for, less the stipulated commission, then they are not liable
to the plaintiff in this action, although they may have received
from the purchasers of said lots a sum for conducting the ne-
gotiations, receiving and paying out the notes and money, and
superintending the transactions, and receiving the deeds and
other papers for them. 16
395, Contract in sale of machine by agent. If you find
from the evidence in this case that the defendant, Kemp, at
the time of their first conversation concerning the purchase of
the machine, told the plaintiff's agent, Minnick, that any con-
tract that Cook might make with the plaintiff through its agent
would be all right with him, and used such language as would
reasonably give the plaintiff to understand that he would stand
by such agreements or contracts relative to the purchase of
such machine, then the plaintiff would be justified in dealing
ia Chambers v. Short, 79 Mo. 206. is Alexander v. Northwestern C.
U. 57 Ind. 466.
395 AGENCY. 404
with him (Kemp) by and through Cook, and the acts and con-
tracts, if any, made by him for himself and Kemp, would bind
Kemp. Any orders or directions by Kemp to Cook would not
affect the plaintiff until such time as it (the plaintiff) had no-
tice or knowledge. If Kemp authorized Cook to act for him,
and the plaintiff had knowledge of it, then he could have with-
drawn such authority by notifying the plaintiff of his^ desire
to do so, but not by giving Cook alone the notice to that effect.
Cook could not bind Kemp without authority from Kemp. 17
IT Bell City Mfg. Co. v. Kemp, not commenting upon the facts
27 Wash. Ill, 67 Pac. 580, (held not intimating what the facto were.)
CHAPTER XXXII.
Sec.
INSTRUCTIONS FOB THE PLAINTIFF.
396. Party completing contract can
recover.
397. Preventing completion of con-
tract.
398. Damages for failure to per-
form contract.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DEFENDANT.
399. Party failing to complete con-
tract.
400. Damages far failure to deliv-
er property sold.
401. Joint or several liability on
contract.
CONTRACTS IN GENERAL.
Sec.
RESCINDING CONTRACT.
402. Contract, rescinding without
express words.
403. Contract void, if made by in-
sane person.
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTED CLAIMS.
404. Consideration of settlement,
when sufficient.
CLAIMS WITHOUT CONSIDERATION.
405. Claim based upon void patent.
Instructions for Plaintiff.
396. Party completing contract can recover. (1) The ex-
ecution of the written instruments in suit is admitted, and if you
find from the evidence that the railroad in question was built
and completed from A to K, and the cars running thereon
to the depot at K, within two years from the first day of June,
1875, then the plaintiff is entitled to recover the full amount
named in said instruments, with interest thereon at the rate
of ten per cent per annum from the time the road was thus
completed to the present time, unless you find that the de-
405
397 CONTRACTS IN GENERAL. 406
fendant has maintained his defense of failure of consideration
as hereinafter explained, by a preponderance of testimony. 1
(2) If you believe from the evidence that the plaintiffs entered
upon the performance of their part of the said contract, and per-
formed work under it, according to its terms, and if you further
find that the engineer made out monthly proximate estimates
of the work done by plaintiff at the end of each month, which
were returned and brought to the notice of the defendant, and
that the defendant, upon the request of the plaintiffs, after
the expiration of fifteen days from the return of any such es-
timate, refused and neglected to pay plaintiffs the amount due
according to any such estimate, such failure or refusal of the
defendant to pay was a breach of his part of the contract, and
the plaintiffs were not bound to go on and complete all the
work, but might suspend or quit the work until payment was
made, and if you find that payment has not been made and
the work has been suspended, the plaintiffs will be entitled
to recover in this suit for all work done under said contract
at the rates therein stipulated. 2
397. Preventing completion of contract. (1) Where two
parties enter into a lawful contract upon sufficient consideration,
and one of the parties is ready and willing to perform, and
makes preparations to perform on his part, but is prevented
from performing by the other party, the party so ready and
willing to perform can recover all damages suffered by him
by reason of the default of the other party, including necessary
expenses incurred in making such preparation. 3
(2) Under the contract it was not the duty of the plaintiffs to
procure the right of way ; and if you find from the evidence that
the plaintiffs entered upon the performance of their part of the
contract by grubbing, clearing, grading, etc., as therein stipulat-
ed, and that they were prevented from completing their part of
the contract because the right of way had not been obtained from
the owners of the land through which the road ran, and where
the work was to be done, who forbade and refused to permit
the plaintiffs to enter and do the work, this would be a sufficient
1 Merrill v. Reaver, 50 Iowa, 404. 3 Kenwood Bridge Co. v. Dunder-
2 Bean v. Miller, 69 Mo. 393. date, 50 111. App. 581.
407 PREVENTING COMPLETION OF CONTRACT. 398
excuse for the failure of the plaintiffs to perform the work,
where such right of way had not been obtained. 4
(3) The defendant was bound by the contract to furnish one
track scales at the one-bark. The plaintiffs claim that the de-
fendant failed and refused to furnish such track scales, and
that by reason thereof they were damaged five hundred dol-
lars, and they claim that they demanded such scales under the
contract of the defendant. If the defendant failed and refused
to furnish such scales, and the plaintiffs were damaged there-
by, they will be entitled to recover such damages as they have
sustained, if they have sustained any on this account. 5
(4) If the jury should find from the evidence that the plaintiff
was wrongfully discharged, it was nevertheless the duty of
the plaintiff not to remain idle, but to use every reasonable
effort to procure employment, and the jury should deduct from
such amount of salary as they find to have been unpaid such
sums as the plaintiff earned in any other employment, and
also any further sums which, in their judgment, he might have
earned by due and reasonable industry and diligence. 6
(5) If the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant
made with the plaintiff the agreement in either count of the
plaintiff's declaration alleged, and that before the time for ex-
ecution of the same on his part, by his own act put it out of his
power to perform said agreement, then he is liable to the plaintiff
in this suit for such damages as the plaintiff has sustained
by any failure on the part of the defendant to perform, and
in such case it was unnecessary for the plaintiff to make de-
mand, or to do any other act to fix the defendant's liability. 1 .
398. Damages for failure to perform contract. The party
who has been wrongfully deprived of the gains and profits
of an executory contract may recover as an equivalent, and by
way of damages, the difference between the contract price
the amount which he would have earned and been entitled to
recover on performance and the amount which it would have
cost him to perform the contract. In estimating such costs,
allowance must be made for every item of cost and expense
* Bean v. Miller, 69 Mo. 393. e Equitable E. A. v. Fisher, 71
s Eaves v. Cherokee Iron Co. 73 Md. 436, 18 Atl. 808.
Ga. 459. 7 White v. Thomas, 39 111. 227.
399 CONTRACTS IN GENERAL. 408
necessarily attending a full compliance on his part; and in es-
timating his profits, you will, of course, exclude all such as
are merely speculative and conjectural. 8
Instructions for Defendant.
399. Party failing to complete contract. (1) That under
the written contract in evidence the defendant was entitled to
have erected such a dock as was called for by the terms of the con-
tract, and even though the jury may believe that there has
been a substantial performance of the terms of the contract
by the plaintiffs, yet nevertheless, if the jury believe that the
terms have not been fully complied with, the jury should al-
low to the defendant such sum or sums as, from the evidence,
they may believe are reasonable and proper to enable the de-
fendant to complete the dock in the manner stipulated for in
the contract. 9
(2) If you find from the evidence that the plaintiff
contracted to perform a certain job of work in making a
road for a stipulated price, and that he, the plaintiff, did not
complete said job, but without cause abandoned the same be-
fore it was completed according to contract, without the con-
sent of the defendant, and that it would cost more to com-
plete said job, according to the contract, than the original con-
tract price, the plaintiff cannot recover for the work done by
him. 10
400. Damages for failure to deliver property sold. If the
jury believe from the evidence that in the winter of 1865 the
defendant sold to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff purchased of
the defendant, the best sixty head of a lot of seventy head of
cattle the defendant was then feeding, to be delivered to the
plaintiff at any time between the first and fifth of March, 1865,
at the option of the plaintiff, the plaintiff, on such delivery,
to pay therefor six cents per pound of the gross weight of
the same, and that the defendant, in February, 1865, sold and
delivered to another person forty-eight head of said seventy
s Cincinnati, &c. R. Co. v. Lutes, Keeler v. Herr, 157 111. 57, 59,
112 Ind. 281, 11 N. E. 784, 14 N. E. 41 N. E. 750.
706. 10 Swift v. Williams, 2 Ind. 366
409 JOINT OR SEVERAL RESCINDING CONTRACT. 403
head of cattle, and put it out of his power to comply with his
agreement of sale to the plaintiff, then he is liable to the plain-
tiff in this action for the difference between such contract price
and what said sixty head of cattle were worth at the time
and place, when and where, by said agreement, they .were to
be delivered by the defendant to the plaintiff, and it makes
no difference whether the price of the cattle rose or fell after
the time the cattle were to be delivered under the contract. 11
401. Joint or several liability on contract. If some of the
defendants employed the plaintiff by a contract, express or im-
plied, and some of them did not so employ him, and did not after-
wards accept and enjoy the fruits and benefits of his services,
if such services were rendered by the plaintiff, then as to such
defendants who did not so employ the plaintiff, and who did
not accept and enjoy , the fruits of such services, you should
find for such defendants, even though the plaintiff should be
entitled to recover against others. 12
Rescinding Contract.
402. Contract, rescinding without express words. Any
contract may be rescinded by consent of all the contracting
parties, and such consent need not necessarily be expressed
in words. 13
403. Contract void if made by insane person. The law
cannot undertake to measure the validity of contracts by ' the
greater or less strength of the understanding; but if the de-
fendant was, at the time of signing the notes, so insane or
destitute of reason as not to know the consequences of the act,
then it is void. If he did know what he was doing, and un-
derstood the consequences of his contract, then he is liable,
and your verdict should be for the plaintiffs in case you so
find. 14
11 White v. Thomas, 39 111. 227; nail H. Co. 201 111. 299, 66 N. E.
Garfield v. Huls, 54 111 427, damages 237.
for failure to do work properly. 14 Van Patton v. Beals, 46 Iowa,
12 Hauss v. Niblack. 80 Ind. 414. 62.
is Iroquois Furnace Co. v. Big-
CONTRACTS IN GENERAL. 410
Settlement of Disputed Claims.
404. Consideration of settlement, when sufficient. (1) A
person cannot pay and satisfy a debt by the payment of a less
sum than the debt, but if you believe from the evidence that
the plaintiff, in order to avoid a suit, of the result of which
he was doubtful, agreed to receive a sum in full satisfaction
of the amount claimed to be due on said account, and upon
such agreement the defendant paid the sum agreed upon, then
such agreement and payment would completely discharge the
defendant of all liability. 15
(2) The abandonment and discontinuance of a suit or action
brought to enforce a doubtful right or claim, is a sufficient con-
sideration for a promise, and so is the compromise of a disputed
claim made bona fide, even though it ultimately appears that the
claim compromised was wholly unfounded. If, therefore, you
should believe and find from the evidence that the note sued
on in this case was given in consideration of a compromise of
the suit instituted by plaintiffs on the five thousand dollar note,
and that said suit was dismissed by plaintiffs, and that said
agreement of compromise was carried out by the parties thereto,
then you are instructed that said agreement forms a sufficient
consideration for the note sued on. 16
(3) If you believe from the evidence" that the parties to this
action compromised their differences, as set forth in the plaintiff's
declaration, and that the writing of April 27, 1897, marked
exhibit No. 6, was signed by the plaintiff after being prepared
and written by the defendant's agent, and that said writing
embodied the actual terms of such compromise, and was accepted
and acted upon by the defendant, then the defendant is bound
by the provisions of said compromise. 17
(4) If these two men made an unfounded claim (they claim
here this lumber was not according to contract), and made that
is Ogbom v. Hoffman, 52 Ind. 439. ceipt for the amount in full; there
is Hunter, E. & Co. v. Lanius, must be a consideration before such
82 Tex. 677, 18 S. W. Z01, (part settlement is binding). Osirander
payment of the amount actually v. Scott, 161 111. 345, 43 N. E. 1089.
due is not satisfaction of the whote IT Rhodes v Chesapeake & O. R.
debt, even though the creditor Co. 49 W. \"a. 494, 55 L. R. A.
agrees to receive a part for the 170, 175.
whole of his claim and gives a re-
411 SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS. 404
knowingly, knowing there was no color of right to it, but
asserted an unjust claim, and induced the parties to compromise,
under the circumstances, in order to avoid litigation, etc., it
would not be binding on the company here ; but, if these two
men did find fault with the lumber, and had good reason for
finding fault, if it did not comply with the contract, and they
talked about it, and they finally made this offer in good faith,
and these parties said, "We will take the money," and took it,
they are bound by the contract, because, in that case, there
would be a valid dispute between the parties, settled up by
agreement. On the other hand, if it were a fraudulent scheme
on the part of these parties to beat defendant out of money, it
would not be binding. 18
(5) If the jury find that the parties met and this matter was
all settled up, and was so understood by the parties, each party
presenting a claim against the other, and the pretended settle-
ment was not a myth, but a reality, that constitutes a good
defense to this action, and the verdict must be for the defend-
ants. 19
(6) If you believe from the evidence that from time to time
the officers or agents of the plaintiff and defendant in this suit
met and looked over their accounts together and settled all mat-
ters between them, and struck a balance and agreed upon that as
the amount due from the one to the other, then, in the absence
of a mistake or fraud, neither party will be allowed to go behind
that settlement for the purpose of increasing or diminishing
the amount so agreed upon. 20
(7) When the parties have gone to law about a matter they
may settle between themselves with the intervention of an attor-
ney on either side, or with an attorney on one side, if they see
fit to do so, but after an action is commenced, and the parties
appear with an attorney in court, any settlement of the claim out
of court, without the knowledge or consent of the attorney, is to
be viewed with suspicion. If there is any fraud in the case,
such a settlement may be set aside. 21
is Nash v. Manistee Lumber Co. 20 Gottfried Brewing Co. v. Szark-
75 Mich. 357, 42 N. W. 840. owski, 79 111. App. 583.
! Doyle v. Donnelly, 56 Me. 28. 21 Faloonio v. Larsen, 31 Ore. 149,
48 Pac. 703.
405 CONTRACTS IN GENERAL. 412
(8) If you find that the plaintiff performed certain legal ser-
vices for the defendant, with the defendant's knowledge and con-
sent, and that defendant recived the benefits thereof without ob-
jection, then plaintiff will be entitled to recover the reasonable
value of such services, unless defendant has established by a
fair preponderance of the evidence that they were performed
under a contract made by him with plaintiff's father, by which
the latter agreed that plaintiff should perform the said services,
and the value thereof should be indorsed upon an indebtedness
which was then owing by H to the defendant, and that the plain-
tiff had knowledge of such agreement. 22
(9) No particular form of words is necessary, to constitute a
settlement, nor is it necessary to prove a promise to pay the
balance found to be due, provided a balance be found in favor
of the party. 23
Claim without Consideration.
405. Claim based on void patent. (1) The jury are in-
structed that the letters patent are prima facie evidence that the
plaintiffs are the joint inventors of the so-called improved com-
position, yet, if that fact may be disproved, and if the jury should
be satisfied from the testimony that said composition was in-
vented by the plaintiff K alone, and not by K and E jointly,
the letters patent are void ; there was no consideration for the
note sued on, and the verdict must be for the defendants. 24
(2) The inventor should confine his specifications to sub-
stances which he knows will answer the purpose for which they
are used; that the specification accompanying the letters patent
read in evidence makes use of the general term water; and, if
the jury believe from the evidence, that the waters of the terri-
tory of Colorado in general use will not accomplish the end for
which water is used in the said composition, either by reason
of alkaline properties or otherwise, then the specification is
not sufficient and the letters are void; there was no considera-
22 Hudspeth v. Yetzer, 78 Iowa, 23 Brewer v. Wright, 25 Neb. 805,
13, 42 N. W. 529. 41 N. W. 159.
24 Keith v. Hobbs, 69 Mo. 87.
413 CLAIMS WITHOUT CONSIDERATION. 405
tion for the note sued on, and the verdict must be for the defend-
ants. 25
(3) The specification accompanying the letters patent read
in evidence must in and of itself contain a full, clear and
exact description of the invention, and if the object of the
alleged patent improved composition for tanning cannot be ob-
tained when the specification is clearly followed out by compe-
tent workmen of ordinary skill and proficiency in the art of
tanning, without invention or addition of their own, or if, in
order to attain the object of the patent, information must be
derived from other sources than the specification, as by experi-
ments, or from using other ingredients to make the thing de-
scribed, or if it requires the solution of a problem, then, and in
either of said cases, the letters patent are void, and the note
sued on is without consideration and the jury must find for the
defendants. 20
25 Keith v. Hobbs, 69 Mo. 87. at no definite time, the law implies
26 Keith v. Hobbs, 69 Mo. 88. that it is to be performed within
*When a contract is made to b3 a reasonable time; Sanborn v. Ben-
performed at a certain place, but edict, 78 111. 309, 313 (form).
CHAPTER XXXIII.
CONTRACTS SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY. ,
Sec. Sec.
406. Sale complete on delivery. 412. Conditions of sale complied
407. Sale of goods by sample. with.
408. Sale on warranty" Breach. 413. Rescinding sale for defects.
409. Implied warranty. 414. Purchasing with intent to de-
410. Burden of proving warranty. fraud.
411. Damages for breach of war-
ranty.
406. Sale complete on delivery. (1) All that is necessary
to pass property is that the buyer and seller agree. If one who
has a long course of dealing with another have a correspondence
in regard to certain specific property, nearer to the purchaser
than to the seller, and, more properly, by reason of their busi-
ness relations, in the control of the purchaser, and they agree,
one to buy and the other to sell, the sale is complete just as
soon as they agree, and the seller charges the buyer, and the
buyer credits their respective books with the price of the prop-
erty. 1
(2) If, after a full consideration of all the evidence before
you, you shall find that there was a delivery of the goods in
question, and that such delivery was absolute and unconditional,
and was by the parties so intended, then the property vested
in the plaintiff, and he should be entitled to recover. 2
(3) If you should find that there was a delivery to the plaintiff
of the goods in question, but that such delivery was coupled
* Robinson v. Uhl, 6 Neb. 332. 2 Albright v. Brown, 23 Neb. 141,
36 N. W. 297.
414
415 SALE COMPLETE WHEN ; SALE BY SAMPLE. 407
with the condition that the property should not pass until the
purchase price was paid, and if you further find that the pur-
chase price as agreed upon was not paid, and that defendants
repossessed themselves of the property, then the conditions are
not complied with on the part of the purchaser, and if the seller
has done all he agreed to do on his part the seller has a right to
repossess himself of the property, and such repossession is a
rescinding of the sale, and defendants would be entitled to
recover. 8
(4) It is a rule of law that a sale and a delivery of goods, on
condition that the property is not to vest until the purchase money
is paid or secured, does not pass the title to the purchaser until
the condition is performed ; and the vendor, in case the condition
is not fulfilled, has a right to repossess himself of the goods,
both as against the vendee or one purchasing from such vendee
with notice. When goods are delivered to the vendee, the inten-
tion of the parties determines the interpretation to be given to
the delivery. 4
(5) It is a general rule of law that when goods are sold, on
condition of payment being made, or some other condition pre-
cedent being performed, before or on delivery, then an absolute
and unconditional delivery of the goods, without requiring at the
time of delivery payment or performance, would be a waiver of
such payment or performance as a condition precedent, and a
complete title would pass to the purchaser, provided, that at the
time of such delivery it was the intent of the parties that it
should be absolute and unconditional delivery. Though it is
important, it is not absolutely imperative that the vendor declare
that he does not waive any condition of the sale at the time of
a delivery to the vendee. The situation of the parties, the nature
of the transaction, the presumption of honest dealing, and like
considerations may be taken into account in determining whether
any conditions of the sale have been waived. 5
407. Sale of goods by sample. (1) In a sale of goods by
sample, the vendor warrants the quality of the bulk to equal
3 Albright v. Brown, 23 Neb. 141, *> Albright v. Brown, 23 Neb. 140,
36 N. W. 297. 36 N. W. 297.
* Albright v. Brown, 23 Neb. 140
36 N. W. 297.
407 CONTRACTS, SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY. 416
that of the sample. In such sale, there is also an implied con-
dition that the buyer shall have a fair opportunity to compare
the bulk with the sample. It must not be assumed, however,
that in all cases where a sample is exhibited, the sale is a sale
by sample, for the vendor may show a sample, but decline to
sell by it, and require the purchaser to inspect the bulk at his
own risk. 6
(2) If the jury believe from the evidence that the plaintiff in-
tended by exhibition of the samples to the defendant, taken in
connection with all he said and did at the time the alleged con-
tract of sale was made, to impress the defendant with the belief
that he was selling by sample, and that the defendant believed
he was purchasing by the sample so exhibited, then they must find
for the defendant, unless they further believe from the evidence
that the bulk did correspond in quality with the sample, or that
the defendant has, by clear and unequivocal acts, accepted the
peanuts after knowledge that the bulk did not correspond in
quality with the sample. 7
(3) If the jury believe from all the evidence in this case that
the sale of the peanuts by S to the defendant was made by a sam-
ple, exhibited at the time of such gale, and that upon an inspection
and comparison of the bulk of said peanuts with such sample,
made by the defendant or his agent within a reasonable time
after their delivery, it was ascertained that the bulk of such
peanuts were inferior in quality to and did not correspond with
such sample, and that the plaintiffs had notice thereof within
a reasonable time, then they must find for the defendant, unless
the jury believe further from the evidence that after the peanuts
purchased by the defendant of the plaintiffs were received and
inspected by the defendant or his agent, and the sample exhibited
at the time of the sale compared with the bulk, that the
defendant personally or by his agent exercised any act of owner-
ship over them, or did any act amounting to an acceptance of
them. The said acceptance is a waiver of any objection to their
quality, and the failure of their quality will not afterwards
avail him as a defense, except in case of fraud ; but the proof of
e Proctor v. Spratley, 78 Va. 255. Wood, 84 Mich. 459, 48 N. W. 28.
See Gutta P. & R. Mfg. Co. v. ? Proctor v. Spratley, 78 Va. 257.
417 SALE ON WARRANTY BREACH. 408
such acceptance must be clear and unequivocal, and not founded
upon or induced by a mistake as to the facts at the time of such
reception by the agent, and it is a question for the jury whether,
under all the circumstances, the acts which the buyer or his
agent does or forbears to do amount to an acceptance. 8
408. Sale on warranty Breach of warranty. (l)The bur-
den of proof, in this case, is upon the defendants to establish any
warranty by the plaintiff respecting the quality of machinery
sold by the plaintiff to the defendants. 9
(2) It is not necessary that a representation, in order to con-
stitute a warranty, should be simultaneous with the conclusion
of the bargain ; but only that it should be made during the course
of the dealing which leads to the bargain, and should then enter
into the bargain as a part of it. 10
(3) The burden of proof, in this case, is upon the defendants
to establish any warranty by the plaintiff respecting the quality
of the machinery sold by the plaintiff to the defendants. It is
not necessary, however, that the warranty should be simultane-
ous with the conelusion of the bargain ; but only that it should
be made during the course of dealing which leads to the bargain
and should then enter into the bargain as a part of it. 11
(4) If you believe from the evidence that the defendant,
Thorne, represented to the plaintiff, Raymond, that the hams in
question were first class hams, equal in quality to any brand of
hams made in the market, and that such representation was made
by Thorne with the intention thereby of warranting the hams to
be of such quality, and to induce the plaintiff to buy the same,
and that Reynolds purchased said hams relying upon such rep-
resentations as a warranty of the quality, and that at the time
of purchasing the hams, they were not of the quality repre-
sented, but were of a poor, inferior and bad quality, then your
verdict will be for the plaintiffs. And, upon the question of
damages, the court instructs you that if you believe, from the
evidence, that they, at the time of such sale to the plaintiffs,
s Proctor v. Spratley, 78 Va. 256. Adler v. Robert Portner Brew-
a Adler v. Robert Portner Brew- ing Co. 65 Md. 28, 2 Atl. 918; Eureka
ing Go. 65 Md. 28, 2 Atl. 918. Fertilizer Co. v. Baltimore, C. S.
10 Eureka Fertilizer Co. v. Balti- &c. R. Co. 78 Md. 183, 27 Atl. 1035.
more Copper, Smelt and Roll Co.
78 Md. 183, 27 Atl. 1035.
408 CONTRACTS, SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY. 418
had a contract for the resale of said hams to one Davis, of Salt
Lake City, and that they had sold the same as hams of the
quality aforesaid, and that, at the time of the sale to the plain-
tiffs, the defendant, Thorne, had knowledge of such contract of
resale, and knew that the plaintiffs purchased said hams to
fulfill said contract of resale, and that the hams were shipped
to said Davis before the plaintiffs had any notice of their quality,
and that upon their arrival at Salt Lake City the said Davis
refused to receive or pay for the same, for the reason that they
were not, at the time of their shipment to him, of the quality
he had bargained for, then you will award to the plaintiffs
as damages such sums of money as you may belive, from the
evidence, the plaintiffs had sold said hams to said Davis for,
less such sum, as you may believe from the evidence, said hams
were actually worth at the time of their purchase by the plain-
tiffs ; and you will further allow the plaintiffs such sum of
money, if any, as you may believe from the evidence they were
obliged to pay out on account of the transportation of said hams
to said Salt Lake City at the time of their sale to the plaintiffs. 12
(5) If the jury believe that the plaintiff sold to the defendant
the barge mentioned in the evidence, for which the notes sued
on were given, and as inducement to the defendant to make
said purchase, represented that said barge was all right, and
was in condition for service at once, and that the defendant,
relying on said representations, agreed to purchase and did
actually purchase and accept the same, and gave the said notes
for the purchase money; and shall further believe that said
barge was not all right and in condition for service at once,
but, on the contrary, was unsound and unseaworthy, and in
consequence of such unsoundness was, together with a valuable
cargo, lost and damaged, then the defendant is entitled to re-
coup against plaintiff's claim on said notes the amount of dam-
age (if any) sustained as a direct consequence of said breach
of warranty. 13
409. Implied warranty. (1) An implied warranty is not
12 Thorne v. McVeagh, 75 111. 81, more Copper, S. & R. Co. 78 Md.
83. 183, 27 Atl. 1035.
!3 Eureka Fertilizer Co. v. Balti-
419 IMPLIED WARRANTY. 409
that the article or thing sold shall be the best of its kind, or such
as might have been represented at the time of the sale, hut
only that such article or thing shall be reasonably suitable for
the purpose for which it was inteded to be used. 14
(2) When one sells articles of personal property, he impliedly
warrants that it is merchantable and reasonably suited to the use
intended, and that the seller knows of no latent defects undis-
covered. "Latent defects" means such defects as are hidden.
The implied warranty, however, does not cover defects which
can be discovered by ordinary prudence and caution. As to
these, the law presumes the buyer to exercise his own judgment.
If you believe that the consideration of the note sued on was
a lot of horses, that they were not at the time of the sale mer-
chantable and reasonably suited to the use intended, and that
they were so because of defects which were not discoverable
by ordinary prudence, 1jiis would be a good defense to the
note. If the evidence shows that the consideration of the note
failed entirely, this would altogether defeat a recovery. If
there was a partial failure, there should be an apportionment
between the parties, according to the facts of the case. 15
(3) An implied warranty is not that the article or thing sold
shall be the best of its kind, or such as might have been rep-
resented at the time of the sale, but only such article or thing
shall be reasonably suitable for the purposes for which it was
intended to be used.
When one sells articles of personal property he impliedly
warrants the same to be merchantable and reasonably suited
to the use intended, and that the seller knows of no latent
defects undiscovered that is, such defects as are hidden. The
implied warranty, however, does not cover defects which can
be discovered by ordinary prudence and caution. In such case
the law presumes that the buyer exercises his own judgment
in making the purchase. 16
(4) A purchaser of property has no right to rely upon the
representations of the vendor or seller of the property as to the
" Hodge & W. v. Tufts, 115 Ala. is Hodge & W. v. Tufts, 115 Ala.
370, 22 So. 422. 370, 22 So. 422; Hoffman v. Gates,
is Hoffman v. Gates, 77 Ga. 703. 77 Ga. 703.
410 CONTRACTS, SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY. 420
quality where he has reasonable opportunity of examining the
property and judging for himself as to its qualities. 17
410. Burden of proving warranty. (1) The burden of
showing that the oats delivered by the defendant were not the
kind which he contracted to deliver is upon the plaintiff, and un-
less he has satisfied the minds of the jury, by the evidence
adduced, that the oats delivered were not the kind or variety
so agreed to be delivered, then they must find for the defend-
ant. 18
(2) In so far as the defendant relies upon a warranty of
quality of the property sold and a breach of the same, the
burden of proving the warranty is upon the defendant; and
unless it has proved both the warranty and the breach alleged
by a preponderance of the evidence, it will not be entitled to
any benefit therefrom in the suit. 19
411. Damages for breach of warranty. (1) In ascertaining
the extent of the damages suffered by the defendants, if any, the
jury must look to all the evidence to determine what it would
reasonably cost to put the apparatus in a condition reasonably
suitable for the manufacture and dispensing of soda water bev-
erages; and if the only evidence on that point is that it would
not cost over one hundred dollars, then that is the only abate-
ment the defendants would be entitled to, and the plaintiff
would be entitled to a verdict for the balance of notes and
interest. 20
(2) Even if the jury should find from the evidence that the
apparatus was not suitably fitted for the purpose for which it
was sold, then the measure of defendant's damage is the
amount necessary to repair the apparatus as it may be shown
to be defective. 21
(3) If the evidence reasonably satisfies the jury that the appa-
ratus as a whole was costly and expensive, and was only de-
fective in some minor respects, and they further believe from
the evidence that such defects could be remedied and put in
such condition as would make the apparatus reasonably suit-
17 Shepard v. Goben, 142 Ind. 322, 20 Hoge & W. v. Tufts, 115 Ala.
39 N. E. 506. 372, 22 So. 422.
is Gachet v. Warren, 72 Ala. 291. 21 Hodge & W. v. Tufts, 115 Ala.
10 Tacoma Coal Co. v. Bradley, 2 370, 22 So. 422.
Wash. 606, 27 Pac. 454.
421 CONDITIONS OF SALE COMPLIED WITH. 412
able for the purposes intended, then the costs of putting the
same in such condition would be the measure of defendant's
damages. 22
(4) If you find for the plaintiff, you will award plaintiff as
damages the difference between what you believe from the evi-
dence to be the actual value of the goods described in the declara-
tion at the time of the sale, and what you believe from the evi-
dence their value would have been, if they had been as represent-
ed in the warranty made by the defendant. 23
412. Conditions of sale complied with. (1) If it appears
from the greater weight of the evidence that the plaintiff con-
structed the apparatus in question in a good, workmanlike man-
ner, and that, by the tests made of said apparatus by plaintiff and
defendant, the same complied with all the terms of plaintiff's
guaranty, then and in that event the plaintiff would be
entitled to recover the contract price. 24
(2) If the jury believe that the contract between the parties
was that the defendant was to deliver to the plaintiff one hundred
and fifty tons of iron as soon as he could get it from the railroad
company, and was to receive twenty-eight dollars per ton there-
for, and that he did offer to deliver to the plaintiff so much of
said iron as he, the said defendant, received from said company,
and as soon as he so received it, and that the plaintiff, after ac-
cepting a part of said iron, refused to receive any more, then they
are to find for the defendant. 25
(3) If the jury believe from the evidence that nothing was
agreed upon between the parties about the time for the delivery
of the iron, but that the plaintiff, or his agent, was informed by
the defendant, at or about the time the said contract was agreed
on, that he, the defendant, was to get the iron from the rail-
road company, and that he was dependent upon such company
as to when it would be delivered, and further believe that the
defendant did, as soon as he received any of the iron from
the said company, offer to deliver it to the said plaintiff, who,
after receiving a part, refused to accept any more, then they
are to find for the defendant. 26
22 Hodge & W. v. Tufts, 115 Ala. 24 Smith v. Independent School
371, 22 So. 422. Dist. 112 Iowa, 38, 83 N. W. 810.
23 Ferguson v. Hosier, 58 Ind. 25 Smith v. Snyder, 77 Va. 440.
438. 26 Smith v. Snyder, 77 Va. 440.
413 CONTRACTS, SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY. 422
413. Rescinding sale for defects. (1) A defrauded vendee
has the right, within a reasonable time after the knowledge of
fraud, to rescind the contract, unless he has with such knowledge
affirmed the sale by express words or unequivocal acts, or, while
he is deliberating, an innocent third party has acquired an in-
terest in the property. 27
(2) The defendants cannot rescind the contract on the ground
that the apparatus shipped them was not new, and had been used
by others prior to the sale, if they, after being informed by letter
or otherwise that said apparatus had been used by other persons
in the year 1887, continued to use the same. 28
(3) If defendants knew of all the defects complained of in
March or April, 1888, and with this knowledge kept and used the
same until midsummer of that year or later, and paid their
notes given for the purchase money until November, 1888, this
would be, as a matter of law, a waiver of their right to rescind
the contract.- 9
(4) If the jury believe from the evidence that defendants kept
and used the soda fountain and apparatus for three or more
months after they had knowledge of all the alleged defects and
fraud complained of, they should find for the plaintiff at least
the amount of debt proven, less the value of repairing said de-
fects. 30
(5) If the evidence shows that the defendants claimed in July,
1888, that they had rejected the apparatus and held it subject to
the order of plaintiffs, and then continued to make monthly pay-
ments until November or December, that was evidence tending
to show that the claims or defects were unfounded. 31
(6) If the jury find from the evidence that defendants, after the
receipt of this belting by them, had an opportunity to inspect
and examine and determine by such examination and inspec-
tion the quality of the belting they received, and if defects
could have been ascertained by examination and inspection
thereof, and without doing so they voluntarily paid their bill,
2T Proctor v. Spratley, 78 Va. 257. so Hodge & Williams v. Tufts,
28 Hodge & W. v. Tufts, 115 Ala. 115 Ala. 371, 22 So. 422.
371, 22 So. 422. 31 Hodge & W. v. Tufts, 115 Ala.
29 Hodge & W. v. Tufts, 115 Ala. 371, 22 So. 422.
371, 22 So. 422.
423 PURCHASING WITH FRAUDULENT INTENT. 414
then they cannot have set off the amount they paid at that
time. 32
(7) If the jury find that the contract offered in evidence was
entered into between the plaintiff and defendant, and that the
plaintiff was ready and willing and did offer to deliver, during
the period of time covered by said contract, coal daily, in quan-
tities and of the quality contemplated by the contract,
and that after receiving, consuming and paying for a portion
of the coal embraced in said contract, the master of machinery
and the master of transportation of the defendant rejected said
coal as not satisfactory to them, and that said rejection was
not bona fide, and that the defendant setting up such rejec-
tion as an excuse thereafter refused to receive the balance of
said coal from the plaintiff, then the plaintiff is entitled to
recover. 33
414. Purchasing with intent to defraud. In considering
the question as to whether or not S bought the goods with
the intention and purpose of defrauding the plaintiff you are
told that there are in law certain matters which are sometimes
termed "badges of fraud," that is, matters which, if shown,
are usually considered as evidence tending to show fraud.
Among these are unusual or extraordinary methods of conduct-
ing business, if shown. Any secrecy or concealment in said
business, if shown, or any other unusual methods or acts con-
nected with the transaction in question, if shown by the evi-
dence, are proper to be considered when deciding whether
fraud, in fact, existed in connection with the transaction. As
applied to this case, if S, by his acts prior to or at the time
of the sale, intentionally induced plaintiff to believe that he
intended to pay for the goods, and said S, in fact, did not
intend to pay therefor, and the said S induced this belief in-
tending to deceive the plaintiff and induce him to sell the
goods to him, and the plaintiff was thereby deceived, and was
induced by this misrepresentation to make the sales, and would
not have made them if defendant had not made this misrepre-
sentation, then the debt was created by fraud of said S, and
32 Gutta P. & R. Mfg. Co. v. ss Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Bry-
Wood, 84 Mich. 459, 48 N. W. 28. don, 65 Md. 200, 3 Atl. 306, 9 Atl. 126.
414 CONTRACTS, SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY. 424
the plaintiff would be entitled to recover, provided you find
that said S. was at the time of the sale insolvent. 34
a* Phelps D. & P. Co. v. Samson, age, by transfer of warehouse re-
113 Iowa. 150. 84 N. W. 1051. ceipts, see: Cole v. Tyng, 24 111.
*For forms of instructions held 100.
good on the sale of grain in stor-
CHAPTER XXXIV.
CONTRACTS PROMISSORY NOTES.
Sec.
Holder of note may recover, 417. Transferring note by endorse-
when, ment.
416. Holder of note, when cannot 418. Interest on note Usury.
recover. 419. Suit to recover value of lost
note.
415. Holder may recover on note, when. (1) In the absence
of evidence, the holder of a promissory note indorsed by the per-
son to whose order it is made payable is presumed to be a holder
in good faith, and entitled to recover. Such presumption may
be rebutted or overcome by evidence from which the jury be-
lieve either that the note was transferred by the payee after
due, or that the party to whom it was transferred took it with,
notice of the defense thereto. 1
(2) If under all the circumstances you find the plaintiff ac-
quired and holds the note by purchase in good faith in the usual
course of trade for a valuable consideration before due, without
notice of such infirmatives, your verdict will be in his favor for
fifty dollars with six per cent, interest to date. Add together
the sum so found, that is, the interest and principal, and the
whole amount will be his damages. 2
(3) Even though you may believe from the evidence that the
note in controversy was given to Dines by Hall for the sole
purpose of using it as collateral in securing a loan for a smaller
i Mahaska County S. Bank v. here laid down, Hardy v. Brier, 91
Crist, 87 Iowa, 418, 54 N. W. 450. Ind. 91.
Under the laws of Indiana only 2 Kitchen v. Loudenback, 48 Ohio-
notes payable at a designated bank St. 177, 26 N. E. 979.
in tine state come within the rule
425
-i!5 CONTRACTS PROMISSORY NOTES. 426
amount, if you also believe from the evidence that the plain-
till' purchased said note from Dines before its maturity for
a valuable consideration, you must find your verdict for the
plaintiff, unless you shall further believe from the evidence that,
at the time the plaintiff purchased said note, it had notice or
knowledge of the circumstances and conditions under which
Dines secured and held said note. 3
(4) If you believe from the evidence that the plaintiff pur-
chased the note in controversy for value before maturity, you
must find your verdict for the plaintiff, even though you may be-
lieve from the evidence that Dines had no right or authority to
sell the note, unless you shall further believe from the evidence
that at the time the plaintiff purchased said note, it had notice
or knowledge that Dines had no right or authority to sell the
note. 4
(5) In order to defeat a recovery by the plaintiff bank, it is in-
cumbent on the defendants to establish by a preponderance
of the evidence, first, the truth of the defense which they have
pleaded against the note in suit ; and, second, the fact that
the bank purchased the note with notice of such defense, or
that it made such purchase after the note became due. If both
these propositions have been so established, then the plaintiff
cannot recover; but, if either proposition has not been so estab-
lished, then plaintiff will be entitled to your verdict for the
full amount of the note in suit. 5
(6) If the defendant's testator, having 'been discharged from
the liability as surety upon the note sued on in this action with
full knowledge and understanding of his release as surety, prom-
ised the holder or payee to pay said note if the principal did not,
he thereby revived his liability as surety, and such subsequent
promise was binding without any new consideration to support it. 6
(7) Even if the defendant was an indorser of the note, and not
a maker, and if no notice of the nonpayment of the note was
given him within the time required to make him liable, if he
subsequently, with knowledge of the fact that such notice had
not been given, promised to pay or "fix it up," or any equiv-
s Wright Investment Co. v. Fris- s Mahaska County S. Bank v.
coe Realty Co. (Mo.), 77 S. W. 296. Crist, 87 Iowa, 419, 54 N. W. 450.
4 Wright Investment Co. v. Fris- c Bramble v. Ward, 40 Ohio St.
coe Realty Co. (Mo.), 77 S. W. 296. 267.
427 RECOVERY ON NOTE, WHEN. -ilo
alent words, meaning thereby to arrange for its payment, this
would be a waiver of the want of notice, and he would be liable
as though the notice had been duly given. 7
(8) If you find to make it more specific that when this note
was drawn and signed by S there was no understanding and
agreement on the part of H with the other defendants that he was
to sign the note with them, and that the payee did not accept the
note as signed, but merely took it into his possession temporarily
in order to procure the other signers, and that he did not turn
over this personal property to S until after all the others had
signed it, then your verdict should be for the plaintiff. 8
(9) If the jury shall find from the evidence that the said notary
did use reasonable diligence to ascertain the residence or place
of business of the makers of said note as set out in its first
instruction, but did not use reasonable diligence to ascertain
the dwelling or place of business of the defendant, that then
the notice deposited in the postoffice, as aforesaid, is not suffi-
cient to hold the defendant, and the plaintiffs are not entitled
to recover, unless the jury shall further find from the evi-
dence that the notice so deposited in the postoffice, as afore-
said, did actually reach the defendant on that or the succeed-
ing day; or unless they shall find from the evidence that subse-
quently to the day of the protest of said note, said defendant
promised the plaintiffs or their attorney to pay the amount of
said note, with a knowledge of the fact that notice of non-
payment had not been regularly given to him. 9
(10) The burden of proof is upon the defendant in this case, and
unless the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant
has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, his allega-
tion in the answer that said notes (or some of them) were given
for the accommodation of said bank (as explained in other in-
structions), then your verdict should be for the plaintiff as to
all of the notes sued upon in this case. 10
(11) The notes involved in this suit being joint notes executed
by several persons, and one of the names thereon having been
forged, would be void as to the person whose name was forged,
7 Cook v. Brown, 62 Mich. 477, Staylor v. Ball, 24 Md. 190.
29 N. W. 46. 10 Chicago T. & T. Co. v. Brady,
s Steers v. Holmes, 79 Mich. 434, 165 Mo. 201, 65 S. W. 303.
44 N. W. 922.
4:15 CONTRACTS PROMISSORY NOTES. 428
but valid as to the others, unless at the time the plaintiff ac-
cepted the notes she had knowledge of the forging, or in some
way participated in the fraud of wrongfully obtaining the said
signature; but if you find from the evidence the plaintiff re-
ceived and accepted said notes in good faith and without any
knowledge or information that any of the signatures were not
genuine, being innocent of any wrong, the law protects her,
and you should find for the plaintiff against those who did sign
the notes. 11
(12) Although the witness, T, delivered the note in suit to wit-
ness, Y, in violation of the instruction of defendants, and al-
though he communicated his instructions to witness, Y, at the
time of such delivery, yet, if the jury find and believe from
the evidence that after said delivery, and after having knowl-
edge that H had not signed said note, defendants approved
and adopted as their own the act of said T in making said
delivery to said Y, the verdict should be for the plaintiff. 12
(13) It would make no difference with the liability of B, as the
maker of the note, that it was not signed by him at the time it was
originally made by C. His liability would be the same if he
subsequently signed it and sold and delivered it to the plain-
tiff for a valuable consideration, as if he had signed it when
first made. 13
(14) If you find from the evidence that the plaintiff bank re-
ceived the note in good faith and before it was due, as a col-
lateral security for a loan made to S & W, and that said loan
is still unpaid, then plaintiff will be entitled to a verdict; that
is, the holder of a note as collateral security for the payment
of a loan made at the time the collateral security is deposited,
is to be treated as a purchaser, and if he receives such col-
lateral in good faith, and before due, he holds it free from
the defenses to which it would be liable in the hands of orig-
inal holders to the same extent. 14
11 Helms v. Wayne Agr. Oo. 73 12 Hurt v. Ford (Mo.), 36 S. W.
Ind. 327. Citing: Stoner v. Milli- 673.
kin, 85 111. 218; Selser v. Brock, 13 Cook v. Brown, 62 Mich. 478,
3 Ohio St. 302; Franklin Bank v. 29 N. W. 46.
Stevens, 39 Me. 532; Craig v. 14 Mahaska County S. Bank v.
Hobbs, 44 Ind. 363: York County Crist, 87 Iowa, 419, 54 N. W. 450.
M. F. Ins. Co. v. Brooks, 51 Me.
506.
429 RECOVERY ON NOTE, WHEN. 415
(15) Under the pleadings and evidence, the defendant has ad-
mitted the execution of all the notes sued upon by plaintiff in this
case, and has admitted that plaintiff is the legal owner and holder
of said notes. It is, therefore, the duty of the jury to find for the
plaintiff as to each or all of said notes, unless the jury believe from
the evidence that some one or more of said notes was obtained
by the bank as a matter of accommodation, as explained in
other instructions. 15
(16) A note to settle an embezzlement or a shortage of an
agent is valid and good, if it was given to settle the 'indebtedness
or shortage, and if there is no agreement to stifle the prosecu-
tion for the embezzlement. 10
(17) The legal effect of the deed of trust (which has been read
in evidence), and the said notes recited in said deed, is to
indicate a transaction in which B issued the said notes as part
payment of the purchase price of certain land. The. jury are
further instructed that by his answer in this case defendant
admits that the title to the land (described in the deed of
trust) was conveyed to defendant before said deed of trust
was executed by defendant. The court instructs you that
the right to possession of said land, which defendant acquired
by the admitted conveyance of title to him by S, was, if so
intended by him and the officers of the bank with whom he
had the transaction, a valuable consideration for the notes men-
tioned in the deed of trust and sued upon in this case. 17
(18) The plaintiff in this case has sued on a note alleged to have
been executed by the defendants to W and C, payable at the
Vincennes National Bank and endorsed to the plaintiff. The
defendant by his answer admits the execution and endorsement
of the note. This admission makes out the plaintiff's side of
the case and entitles him to a verdict for the full amount of
the note and interest, unless the defendant has satisfied you
by a preponderance of the evidence that the material allega-
tions of the amended second paragraph of his answer so fa*
as the burden of proof rests upon him, are true. 18
(19) The plaintiff has sued upon six different notes, each of
is Chicago T. & T. Co v. Brady, " Chicago T. & T. Co. v. Brady,
165 Mo. 201, 65 S. W. 303. 165 Mo. 197, 65 S. W. 303.
ie Wolf v. Troxell, 94 Mich. 575, is Zook v. Simonson, 72 Ind. 88.
54 N. W. 383.
416 CONTRACTS PROMISSORY NOTES. 430
which constitutes a separate and distinct claim or cause of action
in plaintiff's petition. Those claimed are called "counts" in the
instructions to you by the court. Your verdict should state
your finding or decision as to each count or cause of action
separately. And if your finding is for the plaintiff, as to any
one or more counts, you should also state in your verdict the
exact amount which you find from the evidence to be still due
and unpaid at the present time (including principal and in-
terest to date) on each particular note mentioned in the count
or counts of the petition on which you may so decide to find
for plaintiff. 19
416. Holder of note cannot recover, when. (1) As between
the party accommodated and the party accommodating, the lat-
ter can be under no liability to the former whatever by the
relation which they are placed upon the paper; and in this
case, if you find from the evidence that B was, in fact, an ac-
commodation maker of the paper sued on, then he cannot be
held liable no matter in what form the transaction was put. 20
(2) If you believe from the evidence that the promissory note
read and shown in evidence was made by the defendant, M, and
indorsed by the defendant, A, and delivered by him to his co-
defendant, M, for the purpose of enabling M, the maker of
the note, to raise money thereon for his own use; and if you
further believe from the evidence that after the defendant, A,
had so indorsed and delivered the note to the said M, the
words and figures "with interest at ten per cent, per annum
after maturity," now appearing in said note, were written there-
in without the knowledge, consent or authority of the defend-
ant, A, by the said M or by an agent or clerk of his, whether
done in the presence of any officer or agent of the plaintiff
or not, and whether with or without the knowledge of the
plaintiff, the verdict should be for the defendant, A. 21
(3) It is claimed by the defendant, B, that after he signed a
note similar in all respects to the one sued on, excepting that the
written words "with interest at ten per cent" were not then
19 Chicago T. & T. Co. v. Brady, 21 Capital Bank v. Armstrong, 62
165 Mo. 200. 65 S. W. 303. Mo. 62.
20 Chicago T. & T. Co. v. Brady,
165 Mo. 202, 65 S. W. 303.
431 CANNOT RECOVER, WHEN. 416
in the note, and since he signed it, without his knowledge or
consent, the said printed words were stricken out and the said
written words inserted. If such an alteration of the note were
made by any holder of the note, or made with the knowledge
of any holder of the note, without the knowledge of B, it would
be a material alteration, and would release him from all liability
on the note, and if the defendant, B, proves this fact by a fair
preponderance of the evidence, the verdict must be in his favor;
and it would make no difference whether A, the plaintiff, was
or was not the owner of the note at the time of the alteration,
if he made the alteration after B, the defendant, signed it. 22
(4) Where an accommodation note is diverted from the purpose
for which it was given, one who takes it with knowledge can-
not recover from the accommodation party; and in this case,
the receiver possesses, as a matter of law, all the knowledge
that the G S bank possessed upon the subject of this note. 23
(5) If you believe from the evidence before .you that the prom-
issory note in controversy was never delivered by B in his
lifetime, nor by the duly appointed executor of his estate after
his death, then it is your duty to find your verdict in favor
of the said B estate, the defendant, and against G, the plain-
tiff. 24
(6) If the jury believe from the evidence in this case that
J indorsed his name on the back of the note sued on in this
case as indorser and not as joint maker thereof, and that at
the time said note was delivered to the plaintiff he knew the
said J indorsed the said note as an indorser thereon, and not
as a joint promisor, and that the said plaintiff had said note
regularly protested and had notice sent to the said J as in-
dorser of such protest, then the jury may consider said facts,
along with the other evidence in the case, and that if therefrom
they believe from the evidence that the said J was an indorser
on the note sued on, and not a joint maker, or promisor, they
should find for the defendant. 25
(7) The defendant in his answer alleges, in substance, that W
22 Brooks v. Allen, 62 Ind. 405. 25 Roanok Grocery & M. Co. v.
23 Chicago T. & T. Co. v. Brady, Watkins, 41 W. Va. 793, 24 S. E.
165 Mo. 203, 65 S. W. 303. 612.
2* Gandy v. Bissell's Estate
(Neb.), 69 N. W. 633.
416 CONTRACTS PROMISSORY NOTES. 432
and C made an agreement with him by which they undertook
to graft the defendant's apple trees with grafts that would grow
.and bear a good quality of fruit, and do the work in a skillful
manner; that the grafting was done in an unskillful manner
to the injury of the plaintiff's trees and with worthless grafts;
.that the note was given in consideration of said undertaking,
and the plaintiff had knowledge of these facts when he took
the assignment of said note. It is not incumbent on the defend-
.ant to prove that the plaintiffs had knowledge, when the note was
indorsed to them, of the other matters alleged in the said para-
graph. Upon proof of these matters the burden of proof would
rest on plaintiffs to show that they took the note in ignorance of
.the existence of those matters. 26
(8) If you find from the evidence that B signed the notes sued
*on in this case as an accommodation maker for the G S bank,
and delivered them to the bank or one of its officers for the bank,
he cannot be held liable thereon, no matter how the bank may have
dealt with the notes, so long as it retained ownership and control
thereof; and even though you find that the bank, after the notes
were delivered to it, gave S the benefit of the whole or a part of
the benefit thereof, this fact would not render B, the defendant,
liable on the notes. And in this connection you are instructed
that the possession of the receiver is the possession of the
bank. 27
(9) As between the maker and the payee of a promissory note,
oral evidence touching the consideration thereof may be con-
sidered by you, and if you find from the evidence that the
defendant, B, received no consideration for the signing of the
notes sued on, and that the same were made for the accom-
modation of the G S bank, then your verdict should be for
the defendant. 28
(10) The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show that the
note was given upon a valuable consideration, and, if that
is doubtful upon the whole evidence, he could not recover;
that proof of the execution of the note and its production in
evidence made a prima facie case for the plaintiff, upon which
20 Zook v. Simonson, 72 Ind. 88. 28 Chicago T. & T. Co. v. Brady,
27 Chicago T. & T. Co. v. Brady, 165 Mo. 202, 65 S. W. 303.
165 Mo. 203, 65 S. W. 303.
433 TRANSFERRING NOTE BY ENDORSEMENT. 417
they might find a verdict for him, unless the defendant intro-
duced evidence which shows either that it was not given for
a valuable consideration, or that the consideration had failed,
or evidence to render it doubtful in their minds whether it
was given on a valuable consideration; and, that if not so given.
or if it is doubtful whether it was given for a valuable con-
sideration, either for want of consideration or for failure of
consideration, the plaintiff could not recover. 29
(11) If you are satisfied from the evidence that the note in ques-
tion was given for seed wheat, at fifteen dollars per bushel, and
that such seed wheat proved worthless as such, then your verdict
would be in favor of the defendant, provided you further find
that the plaintiff had notice of the worthless character of the
wheat and of such consideration, or had such notice as to put
him on inquiry, and he failed to inquire solely for the reason that
he did not want to know the consideration. 30
(12) If the defendant intended the note to be a gift to the
plaintiff, it was given without any legal consideration therefor,
although the plaintiff may have supposed the note to be in pay-
ment for a prior indebtedness, unless the defendant by his words
or conduct gave the plaintiff reasonable cause to believe, and the
plaintiff was thereby led to believe, that the note was given in
settlement of her claim against the estate of the wife for services,
or of some claim in controversy between the plaintiff and the de-
fendant. 31
417. Transferring note by endorsement. (1) Where one
party, for a full and valuable consideration, agrees to give or
transfer or let another have a promissory note, the law implies
that the transfer is to be made by endorsement, unless a different
agreement is made by the parties. 32
(2) And, where the agreement for the transfer is shown, and a
valuable consideration therefor, the party claiming that the trans-
fer was to be by delivery or by endorsement, without recourse or
otherwise than by simple endorsement, has on him the burden of
so proving. 33
29 Burnham v. Allen, 1 Gray 32 Wade v. Guppinger, 60 Ind.
(Mass.) 497. 378.
so Kitchen v. Loudenbeck, 48 33 Wade v. Guppinger, 60 Ind
Ohio St. 177. 378.
31 Nye v. Chace, 139 Mass. 380.
418 CONTRACTS PROMISSORY NOTES. 434
(3) Where a note has been endorsed in blank, the holder of the
same may fill the blank with the name of the endorsee ; that
the endorsement of the note is said to be in blank when the name
of the endorser is simply written on the back of the note, leaving
a blank over it for the insertion of the name of the endorsee,
or of any subsequent holder; and that in such case, while the
-endorsement continues blank, the note may be passed by mere
delivery, and the endorsee or other holder is understood to have
full authority personally to demand payment of it, or make it
payable at his pleasure to himself or to another person. 34
418. Interest on note Usury. (1) If the jury believe from
the evidence that more than ten percent interest per annum has
been paid by the defendants to the plaintiff, the law presumes
that such amount, exceeding ten percent per annum, if proven,
is a payment on the principal of the note, unless explained by
the evidence. 35
(2) That under the issues in this case, if the jury believe from
the evidence that the defendant, Crabtree, borrowed of the plain-
tiff the sum of four hundred and fifty dollars, on or about Jan-
uary first, 1858, for which said Crabtree gave the note sued on,
with the defendant, Woods, the said Woods being, in fact, only
security on said note, and that, at the time the said money
was borrowed, the plaintiff and defendant, Crabtree, agreed that
Crabtree should pay, besides the interest mentioned in the note,
interest at the rate of six percent per annum in addition, the said
additional interest was and is usury, and against the statute
of the state. And if, from the evidence in the ease, the jury
believe that said Crabtree has paid interest on said note
at the rate of sixteen percent per annum, then under
the law of this state, the plaintiff cannot recover any
interest whatever on the principal of the said note, and whatever
payments the evidence in the case may show the defendant has
paid on said note as interest, must be allowed on the principal
of the said note, and, if the sum actually paid, according to
the evidence, amounts to more than the sum of four hundred and
s* Palmer v. Marshall, 60 111. 292. ss Reinback v. Crabtree, 77 111.
182, 187.
435 SUIT ON LOST NOTE. 419
fifty dollars, then the defendants are entitled to a verdict in
this case. 30
419. Suit to recover value of lost note. If the jury believe
from the evidence that the plaintiff gave to the defendants, and
the defendants received from the plaintiff, the promissory note
in question for collection, for a compensation or reward therefor
to be paid by the plaintiff to the defendants, and that the defend-
ants or other persons to whom they intrusted it for collection
lost it by carelessness, then the plaintiff is entitled to recover
the value of the note; and that the value, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, is the amount of the note; and that,
if the plaintiff is entitled to recover the value of the note, she
is also entitled to interest on that value from the time the note
became due to the date of the verdict; and that, if the jury
believe from the evidence that the defendants, or those to whom
they intrusted it lost it, and it is not shown under what circum-
stances it was lost, it is presumed that it was lo^t by careless-
ness. 37
36 Reinback v. Crabtree, 77 111. 44 111. 314, (held not erroneous as
182, 185. suggesting a legal conclusion of
37 American Ex. Co. v. Parsons, carelessness.)
CHAPTER XXXV.
CONTRACTS RELATING TO INSURANCE.
Sec. Sec.
LIFE INSUKANCE. FIBE INSURANCE.
420. False statements in applica- 425. Property not destroyed by fire
tion avoids policy. No recovery.
421. The right to avoid policy may 426. Holder of policy not responsi-
be waived. ble for agent's acts.
422. Manner or mode of giving 427. Fraud in proof of loss defeats
notice of death. recovery.
423. Formal proof of death unnec- 428. Abandonment of insured boat,
essary, when. . when justifiable.
424. Assignment of policy without 429. Boat not in safe and sea-
authority of beneficiary. worthy condition defeats re-
covery.
Life Insurance.
420. False statements in application avoids policy. (1) A
misrepresentation or false statement made in his application for
insurance by the person whose life is insured, respecting a ma-
terial fact, avoids the policy issued upon such application, and
this, whether the misrepresentation was made innocently or
designedly. If, therefore, the jury believe from the evidence
that S, the insured, in his application for the policy or certificate
here sued on, stated that he had no serious illness, or stated
that he had not had during the last seven years any disease or
severe sickness, and that either of those statements was false in
any respect, and are deemed by the jury to be material, then,
whether S, the insured, intended to deceive or not, the said
policy or certificate is void, and the jury should find for the
436
437 AVOIDING INSURANCE POLICY. 421
defendant, unless they further believe that the avoidance of the
policy or certificate has been waived by the defendant. 1
(2) If you shall find from the evidence that on the thirtieth
day of November, M, the insured, had consumption, you must
find a verdict for the defendant, and it makes no difference
whether he knew he was thus afflicted or not. He may have been
entirely ignorant of the fact, or may have believed that the
symptoms he had did not indicate consumption. Yet if, in fact,
he had consumption at that time, you must find for the defendant. 2
(3) The contract between the insurance company and the in-
sured is like a contract between two individuals. If one makes a
false statement as to facts, material to the settlement of the terms
upon which the contract shall be made, which are exclusively
within his knowledge, and thereby induces the other to agree
to terms which he might not otherwise have assented to, the
party deceived cannot be held liable upon the contract. 3
(4) If you find that on the thirtieth day of November, 1894, the
date of the policy, or when it was delivered to the plaintiff, Mrs.
H was not in a state of sound health, you must find for the defend-
ant.*
(5) Sound health, as used with reference to life insurance,
means that state of health free from any disease or ailment that
affects the general soundness and healthfulness of the system se-
riously and not a mere indisposition which does not tend to weak-
en or undermine the constitution of the assured. The word serious
is not generally used to signify a dangerous condition, but rather
a grave or weighty trouble. 5
421. The right to avoid policy may be waived. There can
be no waiver of the avoidance of a policy by reason of material
false statements or misrepresentations in the application, unless
the acts relied upon as showing the waiver were done with full
knowledge of the facts. While, therefore, the receipt of pre-
miums or assessments with full knowledge on the part of the
1 Schwarzbach v. Ohio &c. Union Howie, 62 Ohio St. 206 (held error
26 W. Va. 640. to refuse this instruction under the
2 Mutual B. L. Ins. Co. v. Miller, wording of the policy), 56 N. E.
39 Ind. 483. 908.
s Mutual B. L. Ins. Co. v. Miller, s Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. v.
39 Ind. 483. Howie, 62 Ohio St. 207, 56 N. E.
* Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. v. 908.
CONTRACTS RELATING TO INSURANCE. 438
J
defendant of facts working a forfeiture of the policy, might
constitute a waiver of such forfeiture, yet the receipt of such
premiums or assessments in ignorance of such facts would not
constitute a waiver. 6
422. Manner or mode of giving notice of death. (1) A sub-
stantial compliance with the conditions of the policy of insurance,
as to the manner and mode of giving notice of the death of the
insured to the defendant, is all that can be required on the part
of the plaintiff in giving such notice. No particular form of
notice is required. 7
(2) Under the policy of insurance in this case no particular
form of notice was required ; and that if the jury believe from the
evidence that the letter written on August 24, 1884, was intended
by the plaintiff to give the required notice to the company,
and that upon receipt of said letter the company sent its agent
to the city of R, the place of the death of the insured, for the
purpose of investigating the facts and circumstances connected
with the said death, and that such investigation was made imme-
diately thereafter, then no further proof could be required in
this case before the suit was brought. 8
(3) One of the conditions of the policy is that "immediate no-
tice of any accidental injury or accidental death for which claim
is to be made under this contract shall be given in writing to the
secretary of the company at P, with full particulars of the acci-
dent and injury, and unless affirmative and positive proof of death
or injury, and that the same resulted from bodily injuries cov-
ered by this contract, shall be furnished to the company within
six months of the happening of such accident, in case of such
injuries resulting fatally, then all claims based thereon shall be
forfeited to the company." 9
(4) If the jury believe from the evidence that was a general
agent of the defendant for the purpose of effecting policies of
insurance and adjusting losses, and if they further believe from
the evidence that the said agent declined to pay the policy upon
the sole ground that the insured was intoxicated at the time of
o Schwarzbach v. Ohio V. P. 8 Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Harvey,
Union, 25 W. Va. 640. 82 Va. 951, 5 S. E. 553.
7 Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Harvey, Braymer v. Commercial M. A.
82 Va. 951, 5 S. E. 553. Co. 199 Pa. St. 259. 48 Atl. 972.
439 PROOF OF DFATH ASSIGNING POLICY. 425
the accident, or that he so acted as to warrant the plaintiff in
believing that the payment by the company would be resisted
upon that ground, then the plaintiff had the right to institute
this suit, although ninety days had not expired from the death
of the insured. 10
423. Formal proof of death unnecessary, when. The court/
instructs the jury .that if they believe from the evidence that
the plaintiff wrote to the insurance company the letter dated
August 21, 1884, giving notice of the death of B, the insured, and,
that after receipt of said letter, and in consequence thereof, the
company sent its agent, C, to inquire and ascertain all the facts
in reference to said death, and that the said agent came to R,'
the place of said death, and investigated the facts as to the death
and the cause thereof, and that after making such investigation,
the said agent, upon the sole ground of intoxication at the time
of the accident, told the plaintiff "that he had no case, and that
in his opinion the company ought not to pay and would not pay
the policy," and that such denial of liability was not because
the formal proofs of the death had not been given, then it was
not incumbent on the plaintiff to furnish any further proof of
said death, and the plaintiff had the right at any time thereafter
to institute this suit. 11
424. Assignment of policy without authority of beneficiary.
The policy of insurance being payable to M vested in her alone
the absolute ownership of it, and it could not be assigned
or transferred to C or any other person by her husband or any
other person without her authority ; and an assignment or deliv-
ery of the policy to C by the husband of the defendant without
her authority would not bind her in any respect. 12
Fire Insurance.
425. Property not destroyed by fire No recovery. (1) The
court instructs the jury that the plaintiffs under the pleadings
10 Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Harvey, 12 Pence v. Makepeace, 66 Ind.
82 Va. 952, 5 S. E. 553. 357, (held proper under the plead-
n Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Harvey, ings.)
82 Va. 950, 5 S. E. 553.
426 CONTRACTS RELATING TO INSURANCE. 440
in this case cannot recover if the jury shall find from the testi-
mony that the goods shipped by the plaintiffs to their con-
signees in L. were damaged or destroyed from spontaneous com-
bustion caused by their inherent infirmity. 13
(2) If you believe from the evidence before you that the build-
ing described in the policy sued on was not destroyed by fire you
will find for defendant. In this connection you are instructed
that before the plaintiff can recover, it must appear from the
evidence to your satisfaction that the fire caused the destruction
of this building. If the building fell down before it was burned,
and the fire occurred after the building fell down, and if you so
believe from the evidence before you, you will find for the
defendant. If the evidence satisfies you that the building was
on fire before it fell, and that such fire caused the fall of the
building, then you. should find for the plaintiff. 14
426. Holder of policy not responsible for acts of agent.
If you find that the plaintiff was asked to and did sign the appli-
cation in blank, and the agent of the defendant filled it up on
his own motion without knowledge of the plaintiff as to what the
answers were, or if you should find that the plaintiff made true
and correct answers, but the agent, in writing the answers, for
any reason, wrote incorrect answers, the plaintiff will not be
responsible for the acts, mistakes or wrongs of such agent. 15
427. Fraud in proof of loss defeats a recovery. If you
believe from the evidence that the policy in question contained
a provision that all fraud or attempt at fraud, by false swearing
or otherwise, shall cause a forfeiture of all claims under the
policy, and that if you further believe from the evidence that
the plaintiffs have fraudulently offered to the defendant proofs
of loss under the policy containing material statements in regard
to the loss under said policy, which the plaintiff knew to be false
at the time the same were offered, you will find for the defend-
ant. 16
13 Providence and Washington is Kingston v. Aetna Ins. Co. 42
Ins. Co. of Providence, R. I. v. Ad- Iowa, 47.
ler, 65 Md. 163, 4 Atl. 121. ie Shulter v. Ins. Co. 62 Mo. 237.
i* Liverpool & L. & G. Ins. Co.
v. Ende, 65 Tex. 124.
441 ABANDONMENT OF INSURED PEOPEETY. 428
428. Abandonment of insured boat, justifiable when.
(1) Although it was the duty of the master and crew to labor for
the recovery of the vessel, they were not bound to do impossi-
bilities; and that if it appeared to practical men that the vessel
could not be saved, they would be justified in abandoning her,
and were not bound to wait for the decision of the underwriters
on the offer to abandon. 17
(2) If the condition of the boat was such that in the opinon
of practical men the great probability appeared to be that
she could not be raised and repaired, it was sufficient to justify
an abandonment as for a total loss, though she was afterwards
raised and repaired at a cost of less than half her value. 18
(3) If the injury to the boat was such that her repairs would
cost more than half her value when repaired at the port of
repair, then the assured had the right to abandon; and in
estimating the expense of repairs the jury should take into
consideration the amount paid by the insurance companies for
raising the boat and bringing her to M, if fairly expended;
that it was not necessary that the expense of repairs should
amount to half the sum named in the policy as the agreed value
of the boat, but it was sufficient if equal to half of her value in
fact when repaired. 19
(4) An abandonment not accepted might be waived by the
party making it; that the fact that the mortgagee, G, had taken
possession of the boat and sold her because of his interest, would
not have the effect of waiving abandonment, if he took possession
on notice by the insurers that they would no longer be respon-
sible for her, and after her abandonment by G, and did so to
protect the interests of all concerned ; and that this was a ques-
tion of intention to be judged by the acts and declarations of
sajd G, done and made at the time. 20
(5) If the mortgagor was in possession and command of the
boat as captain, and the mortgages were forfeited, perhaps neither
he nor the mortgagee alone could make an abandonment; but if
there was a right to abandon, and the mortgagor, having the
i? Fulton Ins. Co. v. Goodman, 32 19 Fulton Ins. Co. v. Goodman, 32
Ala. 113. Ala. 113.
is Fulton Ins. Co. v. Goodman, 20 Fulton Ins. Co. v. Goodman, 32
32 Ala. 113. Ala. 113, 114.
429 CONTRACTS RELATING TO INSURANCE. 442
command and control of the boat as master, did abandon or offer
to abandon to the defendants, and they knew of the existence of
the mortgages and did not reject the abandonment on account of
the mortgages, and if the mortgagee shortly afterwards, when the
offer of abandonment by the mortgagor was still unrevoked, and
the boat was still at the disposal of the defendants so far as the
mortgagor was concerned, assented to and approved of the aban-
donment by the mortgagor and made known to the defendants his
assent and approval, an abandonment so made, if in other respects
good, would be valid. 21
(6) A parol abandonment was sufficient, and when once right-
fully made it fixed the rights of the assured, and could not be
forfeited by any subsequent event without the consent of the
assured. 22
429. Boat not in safe and seaworthy condition defeats
recovery. (1) The boat must have been kept in such condition as
to be reasonably sufficient to withstand the ordinary perils attend-
ing a boat so laid up at that time and place. If she was not so
kept the plaintiff cannot recover, no matter what peril she may
have encountered. If she was, and encountered wind or waves by
which she broke her spars, was driven against the bank and
careened so as to be thrown on her side in such a way as to take
in water at her seams which were far enough above the water-
line so as not to endanger her safety while lying up under or-
dinary circumstances, and sunk in consequence thereof, then the
plaintiff can recover if he had provided and kept at the boat
a force of men sufficient to take care of the boat under ordi-
nary perils, whether all such men were directly in his employ
and pay or not. 22
(2) If the boat was seaworthy when laid up, but thereafter
her seams were suffered to become open by exposure, which .the
plaintiff failed to have properly caulked, and she was not in a
safe and seaworthy condition requisite for her safety when tied
up, then plaintiff cannot recover. 24
(3) The boat need not have been sufficiently seaworthy to per-
21 Fulton Ins. Co. v. Goodman, 32 23 Enterprise Ins. Co. v. Parisat,
Ala. 113. 35 Ohio St. 35.
22 Fulton Ins. Co. v. Goodman, 32 24 Enterprise Ins. Co. v. Parisat,
Ala. 113. 35 Ohio St. 35.
443 BOAT UNSEA WORTHY. 429
form a voyage, but it must hav.e been for her preservation under
all ordinary circumstances while tied up during such period
of non-user, and if she encountered a peril insured against
which she would have safely resisted if seaworthy, but in con-
sequence of being unseaworthy was sunk by encountering a
peril insured against, then the plaintiff cannot recover. 25
25 Enterprise Ins. Co. v. Parisat, 35 Ohio St 35.
CHAPTER XXXYI.
CONTRACTS ON DIFFERENT MATTERS.
Sec.
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.
430. Value of services of an at-
torney.
431.' Party not liable for services of
attorney Wh en .
ARBITRATION.
432. Submitting disputes to arbi-
tration.
BAILMENTS.
433. Party hiring horse liable for
injury.
434. Party liable for money in-
trusted to him.
433. Hotel losing property of guest
entrusted to it.
BANKING TRANSACTIONS.
436. Company holding one out as
agent.
437. Attempt to defraud company.
BROKERS.
438. Brokers entitled to commis-
sions When.
439. What is essential to entitle
one to commissions.
440. Failure to comply with con-
tract prevents recovery.
441. Notice to be given under the
contract.
442. Burden of proof on plaintiff
When.
Sec.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.
454.
455.
Payment of interest on month-
ly balances.
BUILDING CONTRACTS.
Contractor complying with
contract can recover.
Parties abandoning original
contract.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS.
Husband entitled to income
of wife's estate.
Liability of wife for hus-
band's debts.
Duty of both parents to sup-
port their children.
Father entitled to minor
child's services and earnings.
Minor remaining with family
after full age.
Minor liable on his contracts
When.
Head of family or house-
holder.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.
Liability of tenant for dam-
ages to premises.
New leasing of premises dis-
charges guaranty.
MARRIAGE CONTRACTS.
What essential to entitle
plaintiff to recover for
breach.
444
445
CONTRACTS BETWEEN ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.
430
Sec.
456. Unchastity of woman not
breach of contract.
457. Assessing damages for breach
of contract.
PARTNERSHIP CONTRACTS.
458. What constitutes a partner-
ship.
459. Each partner has power to
bind all others.
460. Partners Not general part-
ners.
CHATTEL MORTGAGES.
461. Mortgagee may take posses-
sion of the property.
SUBSCRIPTION CONTRACT.
462. Alteration of subscription
contract.
463. Stock illegally issued, invalid.
Sec.
SERVICES RENDERED TO PUBLIC.
464. Liability of county for physi-
cian's services.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
465. Reviving a claim barred by
statute of limitations.
466. The promise reviving dis-
charged claim must be clear.
467. Payment o>n running account
How applied.
468. Deeds executed and placed in
escrow.
OTHER MATTERS.
469. Rights in contract may be
waived.
470. Correspondence constituting
contract.
471. Written contract cannot be
varied by parol proof.
472. Unsigned contract binding.
473. Execution and delivery of
deed.
Attorney and Client.
430. Value of services of an attorney. (1) If the jury find
from the evidence that the plaintiff has performed services for
the defendant, with her consent, since September, 1873, and has
advanced and paid moneys for her while acting as her solicitor,
in matters connected with her employment, they will find for
the plaintiff a reasonable value for such services, as shown by
the evidence, and also the amount of moneys which the evi-
dence shows he has advanced for her. 1
(2) In ascertaining the reasonable value of the services of
plaintiff you will consider the nature of the litigation, the amount
involved and the interests at stake, the capacity and fitness of the
plaintiff for the required work, the services and labor rendered by
plaintiff, the length of time occupied by him and the benefit, if
any, derived by defendants from the litigation. You are further
instructed to look at all the evidence in the case, and to exercise
your sound discretion and judgment thereon, and allow the plain-
Bennett v. Connelly, 103 111. 50, 55.
431 CONTRACTS ON DIFFERENT MATTERS. 446
tiff such reasonable amount as you may believe he is justly
entitled to, not to exceed the amount claimed in his petition. 2
(3) If you find from the evidence before you that the plaintiff
has performed any services for the defendant, with his con-
sent, since the month of September, 1873, and has advanced
and paid moneys for him while acting as his solicitor in matters
connected with his employment, then you will find for the plain-
tiff a reasonable value for such services, as shown by the evi-
dence, and also the amount of moneys which the evidence shows
he has advanced for him; and in ascertaining the reasonable
value of the services of the plaintiff you will consider the na-
ture of the litigation, the amount involved, the interests at
stake, the capacity and fitness of the plaintiff to perform the
work required, the services and labor rendered by the plain-
tiff, the length of time occupied by him and the benefit, if
any, derived by the defendant from such litigation. 3
431. Party not liable for services of attorney When. (1)
Notwithstanding the land company may have been benefitted by
the services rendered by the plaintiff in the case of G against B
if you believe such to be a fact, yet the jury are not authorized
to go beyond the parties making the contract by which such
services in such cause were procured in search of an implied
promise to pay for such incidental benefit. 4
(2) So far as the liability of this defendant land company is
concerned, it makes no difference what plaintiffs understood as to
the defendant being liable to them for their fee in said case of
G against B. If you believe from the evidence that plaintiffs'
services in said cause were not procured by the defendant, then
this defendant is not liable to plaintiffs for their services in said
case, and your verdict should be for the defendant. 5
(3) The law is that when plaintiffs were employed, and entered
upon their employment in the case of G against B, their duty
was a vigilant prosecution of the rights of I in that litiga-
tion. If you believe from the evidence they were employed
2 International & G. N. R. Co. v. * Humes v. Decatur Land Im.
Clark, 81 Tex. 48, 16 S. W. 631. & F. Co. 98 Ala. 465, 13 So. 368.
3 Bennett v. Connelly, 103 111. * Humes v. Decatur Land Im. &
55; International & G. N. R. Co. F. Co. 98 Ala. 461, 13 So. 368.
v. Clark, 81 Tex. 48, 16 S. W. 631.
447 ARBITRATION BAILMENT. 433
by the defendant, it is immaterial what benefit the land company
derived from the services rendered by them in this cause in
the prosecution of the rights of said G. If said services were
not procured by said land company, it is not liable to plain
tiffs in this case.
(4) The parties making the contract by which plaintiffs' serv-
ices in the case of G against B were procured, if you find such
contract was made, are alone liable to plaintiffs for their fee in
said cause. 7
Arbitration.
432. Submitting disputes to arbitration. (1) If you find
from the evidence that the plaintiff and the defendant agreed to
submit their differences to arbitration, and if you find such award
was made as agreed, you should find for the plaintiff for the
amount found by the arbitrators in such matter, unless you
further find (1), that said award does not include all the dif-
ferences in dispute between the plaintiff and defendant at the
time of the alleged award; or (2) that the defendant was not
accorded a reasonable notice of the time of the hearing. 8
(2) If you believe from the evidence that one of the arbitrators,
G, was induced to resign or withdraw from the arbitration by
reason of the agreement of the other two arbitrators to with-
draw and resign their authority as such arbitrators, and thereby
the said arbitrator, G, so resigning was prevented from meet-
ing with the arbitrators at the time of the making of the award,
in such case the award is void, and you should find for the de-
fendant. 9
Bailments.
433. Party hiring horse liable for injury. (1) If you believe
from the evidence that the defendant hired the horse from the
plaintiff to go to one or more particular places specified in the con-
tract, and that he went to another and a different place in a
s Humes v. Decatur Land Im. & 8 Amos v. Buck, 75 Iowa, 654, 37
F. Co. 98 Ala. 461, 13 So. 368. N. W. 118.
T Humes v. Decatur Land Im. & McCord v. McSpaden, 34 Wis.
F. Co. 98 Ala. 465, 13 So. 368. 549.
433 CONTRACTS ON DIFFERENT MATTERS. 448
different direction and over a different route from what was
specified in the contract, that would amount to a conversion of
the horse ; and if the horse died while in his possession and
after he had thus converted it to his own use, he would be
liable for the value of the horse at the time of the conversion. 10
(2) If the plaintiffs and defendant made a contract, by which
the defendant hired the plaintiffs' horse and carriage for use
in driving to and from Lynnfield only, and in violation of that
contract the defendant drove the plaintiffs' horse and carriage
to Lynnfield and from thence several miles to Peabody, he be-
came thereby responsible to the plaintiff for any injury to such
horse and buggy in Peabody, or while driving from Lynnfield
to Peabody. Whether or not such injury was caused by any
want of ordinary care or skill of the defendant in driving the
horse and carriage from Lynnfield to Peabody, or in tying or
managing the horse and carriage in Peabody, or by any insuffi-
ciency of the harness of said horse, or any physical infirmity
or want of docility of the horse, would be immaterial, as the
defendant's use of the horse and carriage, in driving beyond
Lynnfield in violation of his contract, was a conversion of such
horse and carriage, in the nature of an original unlawful tak-
ing of such horse and carriage, at the time of the defendant's
leaving Lynnfield, and such conversion caused the defendant
to be liable in damages to the plaintiff therefor, equal to the
difference between the value of such horse and carriage at the
time it was taken by the defendant from Lynnfield, and the
value of the same when restored by the defendant to the plain-
tiff. Accepting pay for the use of the horse under such a
contract was a waiver of the conversion. 11
(3) If the plaintiffs and defendant made a contract by which
the defendant hired the plaintiff's horse and carriage for use
in driving for pleasure for a time and distance not fixed or
agreed upon by them, the defendant rightfully drove the horse
to Lynnfield and thence to Peabody, and was responsible for an
injury to such horse or carriage, which was caused by the de-
fendant's want of ordinary care and skill in driving or manag-
ing such horse and carriage in Peabody, to be determined in
* Malone v. Robinson, 77 Ga. n Perham v. Coney, 117 Mass.
719. 103.
449 BAILMENT CONTRACTS. 433
view of the fact known by the plaintiffs, and presumed to have
been considered by them in letting the horse, that the defend-
ant was a one-armed man, but was not responsible for any in-
jury to such horse and carriage caused by the insufficiency of
the plaintiffs' harness for driving or tying the horse, or by rea-
son of any disease or physical infirmity, or want of docility
of the horse, or by any peculiar habits or dispositions of the
horse when tied, unless the defendant was notified of such pe-
culiar habits and dispositions. 12
(4) If the jury find from the evidence that the defendant un-
dertook for a reward to deliver the team of horses and vehicle
attached, and described in the evidence, to a person designated
by the plaintiff, and in the course of this undertaking intrusted
the driving of the team to one who, by his negligence, per-
mitted the horses to run away, whereby the plaintiff suffered
damage, then the plaintiff is entitled to recover, and the jury
will allow such damages as they may find from the evidence
the plaintiff suffered by reason of the defendant's fault in the
premises. 13
(5) Although it is true that, by hiring his mare to the defend-
ants for use on the street cars, the plaintiff impliedly engaged
that she was reasonably fit for that purpose, this gave the 'de-
fendants no right to use her after it became manifest to them
that by reason of her nervousness, or fretfulness, or diseased
condition, she was not fit for such work. They had no right
to use her. If her board devolved upon them, it was their
duty to supply her with plentiful food and water at the proper
time. It was their duty, also, not to require her to do more
work than it was manifest she could perform without injury,
and if, during such use, it was plainly evident to the defend-
ant's employes that she was exhausted, overheated, or suffer-
ing by reason of disease, and her continued use was dangerous
to her health and life, it was their duty then to abstain from
further use of her without obtaining the plaintiff's consent to
the same; and if, without so doing they negligently persisted
12 Perham v. Coney, 117 Mass. is American D. T. C. Co. v. Walk-
404. er, 72 Md. 457, 20 Atl. 1.
434 CONTRACTS ON DIFFERENT MATTERS. 450
in such use, and by reason of the same she was so injured that
she died, the defendants are liable. 14
(6) If you find from the evidence that the plaintiff hired his
mare to the defendants for the purpose of being used by them in
pulling street cars, the plaintiff thereby engaged and bound
himself that the mare so hired was reasonably fit and suitable
for such purposes and such uses. If, therefore, you find that
the mare so hired was injured while in the use of the defend-
ants in pulling their street cars, without their fault, and through
the nervousness and fretfulness of said mare, or because of her
diseased condition at the time the plaintiff hired her to the
defendants, or because of her unfitness to pull said street cars,
then you should find for the defendants. 15
434. Party liable for money intrusted to him. If the jury
believe from the evidence that the defendant was intrusted with
the safe-keeping of money belonging to the plaintiff, and that
part of said money was delivered to him on Sunday, and the
defendant thereafter on a week day admitted the sum of one
hundred and sixty-seven dollars and forty-four cents to be iti
his hands belonging to the plaintiff, and promised to apply the
same in payment of the rent for the premises mentioned in
and under the contract offered in evidence, but neglected and
failed to apply said money in payment of said rent, then the
jury must find for the plaintiff for said amount of money in
the hands of the defendant, and in their discretion may allow
interest thereon from the time the defendant failed to pay the
same as promised by him 16
435. Hotel losing property of guest entrusted to it. If the
jury find from the evidence in the cause that the plaintiff was
a guest of the defendant, as alleged in the declaration in this
cause, that the trunk of the plaintiff was brought by him into
the hotel of the defendant, while the plaintiff was a guest in
said hotel, that the said trunk contained the bank notes tes-
tified to by the plaintiff, and that said trunk and its contents
14 Bass v. Cantor, 123 Ind. 446, 24 Haacke v. Knights, &c. 76 Md.
N. E. 147. 431, 25 Atl. 422.
i* Bass v. Cantor, 123 Ind. 446,
24 N. E. 147.
451 BANKING TRANSACTIONS. 436
were lost while so in said hotel, the plaintiff cannot recover
for said bank notes in this action, unless they shall also find that
the said bank notes were designed by the plaintiff for his use
while on his journey, or while a guest in said hotel, or unless
they shall find that they were lost by the fraud or negligence
of the defendant. 17
Banking Transactions.
436. Company holding one out as agent. (1) The indorse-
ment on the face of the check sued on is in proper form to consti-
tute a certification thereof; and if you find from the evidence
that defendant's paying teller at the time of making said in-
dorsement had authority or apparent authority, as defined
in these instructions, to make the indorsement of certification
upon said check, and if you find further from the evidence
that the plaintiff acted in good faith and without fraud, as de-
fined in another instruction herewith given, then your verdict
must be for the plaintiff. 18
(2) The plaintiff is not required to prove that the defendant's
paying teller had actual authority conferred upon him by de-
fendant to certify checks, but that plaintiff had the right in
good faith to rely upon the apparent authority of said paying
teller to certify checks. And the court further instructs you
that whenever a person has held out another as his agent au-
thorized to act for him in a given capacity, or has knowingly
and without dissent permitted such other to act as his agent
in such capacity, or where his habits and course of dealing
have been such as to reasonably warrant the presumption that
such other was his agent, authorized to act in that capacity,
whether it be in a single transaction or in a series of trans-
actions, his authority to such other to act for him in that ca-
pacity will be conclusively presumed, so far as may be neces-
sary to protect the rights of third persons who have relied thereon
in good faith, and in the exercise of reasonable prudence, and the
principal will not be permitted to deny that such other was not
17 Treiber v. Burrows, 27 Md. 132. is Muth v. St. Louis T. Co. 94 Mo.
App. 94, 67 S. W. 978.
437 CONTRACTS ON DIFFERENT MATTERS. 452
his agent authorized to do the act that he assumed to do, pro-
vided that act was within the real or apparent scope of the
presumed authority. 10
(3) If you find from the evidence that the check sued on was
certified by the authority of the defendant company, and that
at the time of said certification there was sufficient funds of
the maker of said check on deposit with defendant to pay said
check, then defendant had the right to retain out of the funds
of said maker a sufficient amount to pay said check whenever
the same might be presented. 20
437. Attempt to defraud company. (1) If the jury find from
the evidence that the writing or paper sued upon by the plain-
tiff was marked or certified ''good" in the name of the defend-
ant by an employe, and that the plaintiff obtained such mark-
ing or certification in pursuance of a design or plan to defraud
the defendant by keeping or secreting said paper for such time
as might be necessary to permit the money represented by such
paper to be drawn out upon other orders, writings or checks,
with the intention of then presenting the said writing, and
demanding payment of the amount ordered therein to be paid,
the jury will find for the defendant. 21
(2) If the jury find from the evidence that the plaintiff and
one M, his brother, confederated or conspired together to de-
fraud the defendant by placing it in such a position that it
might be called upon to pay the amount of the writing or cheek
sued upon by plaintiff, after having already paid out upon
other orders or checks the money to the credit of the drawer
or drawers of such order or check, and that the plaintiff is in
possession of the instrument sued on, as a party to such con-
federacy or conspiracy, the jury will find for the defendant. 22
Muth v. St. Louis T. Co. 94 21 Muth v. St. Louis T. Co. 94
Mo. App. 94, 67 S. W. 978. Mo. App. 94, 67 S. W. 973.
20 Muth v. St. Louis T. Co. 94 22 Muth v. St. Louis T. Co. 94
Mo. App. 94, 67 S. W. 978. Mo. App. 94, 67 S. W. 978.
453 COMMISSION OF BROKERS. 438
Brokers.
438. Broker entitled to commissions When. (1) In ordi-
nary cases, the law is well settled where a broker is employed in
reference to a sale of real estate, that when he brings a buyer
to the seller who is willing and ready to enter into an agree-
ment with the seller for the purchase of his property on the
terms that the seller has fixed, and the seller is satisfied to
accept him as a purchaser, then the broker has earned his com-
mission. The earning of it is not dependent, in such cases, on
the question as to whether the buyer carries out the contract,
or as to whether the seller is able to complete his contract.
Therefore, in the absence of any express agreement to the con-
trary, the law is that the broker is entitled to his commissions
when the vendor accepts, when he (the broker) brings to the
vendor a party ready and willing to accept the terms fixed
by the vendor, and the party is satisfactory to the vendor,
and he enters into a contract with him. The contention is that
there was a different agreement here. That question is for you
to determine. If you find that this was an ordinary contract,
made without any conditions, the broker employed in the usual
way, and that there was no bargain entered into between the
plaintiff and the defendant, Mr. B, that he was only to be
paid his commission in case this sale went through, then plain-
tiff is entitled to recover. If, however, the bargain agreed upon
between plaintiff and defendant was that commission was only
to be paid in case this whole transaction went through, as
provided by the terms of the contract of sale, the plaintiff is
not entitled to recover, unless you are satisfied from the evi-
dence here that the defendant capriciously refused to carry
out the contract. 23
(2) If the jury find from the evidence that plaintiff was en-
gaged in the business of a property broker in the city of B,
and that the defendant offered certain property for sale to the
park commissioners of said city, and that he employed the
plaintiff to aid and assist him in effecting said sale, either by
previous authority or the acceptance of the plaintiff's agency
as Kalley v. Baker, 132 N. Y. 5, 29 N. E. 1091.
438 CONTRACTS ON DIFFERENT , MATTERS. 454
and the adoption of his acts, and that the plaintiff did diligently
and faithfully occupy his time and render services in so aiding
him to effect said sale, and a sale of said property to said com-
missioners was in a short time made and effected, and that
said services were of advantage and value to the defendant
in effecting the said sale, then the plaintiff is entitled to re-
cover such sum as the jury may find from the evidence to be
a reasonable remuneration to the plaintiff for said services; and
in ascertaining what is a reasonable remuneration, the jury may
consider the rate of compensation, which they may find from
the evidence was usual and customary in the said city for ser-
vices of a like kind. 24
(3) If the jury find from the evidence that the defendant em-
ployed the plaintiff to procure a purchaser for the property
spoken of by the witnesses, and the plaintiff did procure a
purchaser for said property, and the said property was sold
by the defendant to the purchaser procured by the plaintiff,
then the plaintiff is entitled to recover such compensation as
they may find usual and customary. 25
(4) If you believe from the evidence in this case that the de-
fendant employed the plaintiff, Stewart, as his agent to negotiate
the sale of his, the defendant's, street railway property, and
that the plaintiff undertook said employment and was instru-
mental in bringing together the buyer and the defendant, then
and in that case the plaintiff is entitled, as a matter of law,
to recover from the defendant compensation for his services,
regardless of the fact that the defendant himself concluded the
sale, and upon a price less and upon terms different from those
at which the plaintiff was authorized to sell. 26
(5) If the jury find that the defendant employed the plaintiffs
as his brokers to buy 'and sell on commission stocks, bonds
and grain for him in the markets of New York, Baltimore and
Chicago, under an agreement that the defendant should secure
to the plaintiffs by depositing with them a margin as testified
to by the defendant, and if they find that the plaintiffs, through
their agents, executed said orders of the defendant in said
24 Walker v. Rogers, 24 Md. 237. 57 N. E. 195. See, Fessenden v.
25 Jones v. Adler, 34 Md. 440. Doane, 188 111. 228; Swigart v.
20 Henry v. Stewart, 185 111. 452, Hawley, 140 111. 186, 190.
455 COMMISSIONS OF BROKERS. 438
markets as required to be found in the plaintiffs third and
fourth prayers, according to the custom and usage of said mar-
kets, and that plaintiffs paid all money necessary and required
to be paid in the execution of such orders, and received all
moneys that became receivable in the execution of such orders,
and that they reported all such transactions to the defendant
and charged him with the money so paid for him and credited
him with the money so received by them for him; and if they
find that the defendant failed to secure the plaintiffs by keep-
ing up said margin when required, and that the plaintiffs there-
upon sold such securities of the defendant as they had in hand
after notice to him in the manner shown in evidence and re-
ported such sales to defendant, then the plaintiffs are entitled
to recover the loss sustained by them in the execution of the
defendant's orders, as above set forth, and their commissions
for executing the same. 27
(6) If the jury shall find from the evidence that the plaintiff
was a stock broker in B. and that the defendant on March 9, 1868,
authorized him to purchase on his account two hundred shares
of the C stock, and shall find that the place where said stock
was ordinarily bought and sold was at the Stock Exchange,
in New York, and shall further find that the plaintiff there-
for actually purchased two hundred shares of said stock
through his sub-agents, P & Co., stock brokers in New York,
and at a price not exceeding the price limited by the defend-
ant, and that the defendant did not supply the plaintiff with
funds to make said purchase, and that the plaintiff had funds
and credit with his sub-agents, which were applied by them
in making said purchase; and if they shall further find that the
defendant, on the next day after the purchase, was informed
of said purchase, and that the plaintiff notified the defendant
on March 17, 1868, by letter addressed to him at his proper post-
office, that he was ready to deliver to him two hundred shares
of said stock so purchased on his account, and that unless he
came forward and paid for it, he, the plaintiff, on or after
March 19, 1868, would sell said stock at the risk and cost of
the defendant; and if they shall further find that the plaintiff
27 Stewart v. Schall, 65 Md. 289, 4 Atl. 399.
439 CONTRACTS ON DIFFERENT MATTERS. 45G
had ready for delivery to the defendant such stock, and that
he did sell on March 21, 1868, at the Stock Exchange, in New
York, two hundred shares of said stock for and at the risk of said
defendant, and that after applying the whole proceeds of said
sale there was a loss upon the said original purchase, which
said loss the plaintiff did pay to his sub-agents, then the plain-
tiff is entitled to recover the amount of said loss or the differ-
ence in price, together with his reasonable commission for the
purchase and the expense of said resale. 28
439. What is essential to entitle one to commissions. (1) If
a principal rejects a purchaser and the broker claims his com-
mission, he (the broker) must show that the person furnished
by him (the broker) to make the purchase was willing to accept
the offer precisely as made by the principal, that he was an
eligible purchaser and such a one as the principal was bound
in good faith, as between himself and the broker, to accept. 29
(2) If the plaintiffs agreed and undertook to sell the defend-
ant 's farm for a commission upon the price realized, then in order
to earn their said commission it must appear by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that they effected a sale of the farm to a
party ready, willing and able to perform the conditions of the
sale. The mere procuring of a person to enter into a contract
to purchase the land, unless such purchaser was ready, will-
ing and able to make the cash payments named in the contract,
and to make the mortgage therein named for the deferred pay-
ments, would not be sufficient to entitle the plaintiffs to their
commission. 30
(3) If the principal rejects a purchaser secured by the broker,
and the broker claims commission for his services, he must show
that the person secured by him as purchaser was willing to
accept the offer precisely as made by the principal, that he
was an eligible, competent purchaser, such as the principal was
bound in good faith, as between himself and the broker, to
accept. The mere procuring of a person to enter into a contract
to purchase the land, unless such person was ready, willing and
28 Worthington v. Yormey, 34 so Stewart v. Fowler, 37 Kas. 679,
Md. 185. 15 Pac. 918.
2 Buckingham v. Harris, 10 Colo.
458, 15 Pac. 817.
457 FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH CONTRACT. 440
able to make the payments named in the contract, and to make
the mortgage therein mentioned for the deferred payments,
would not be sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to recover commis-
sion. 31
(4) The plaintiffs cannot recover in this case upon the dealings
in grain between them and the defendant unless the jury
shall find from the evidence all the following facts: (1st.) that
the defendant authorized said dealings; (2d.) that the pur-
chase and sales authorized by him were actually and bona
fide made; (3d.) that the grain directed by him to be bought
was in fact bought by the authorized agent or agents of the
plaintiffs in C, and was in fact delivered by the seller or sellers
to and accepted by said authorized agent or agents; (4th.) that
the grain directed by the defendant to be sold was in fact
sold by the authorized agent or agents of the plaintiff in C,
and was in fact delivered by such authorized agent or agents
to the purchasers thereof. 32
440. Failure to comply with contract prevents recovery.
(1) If the jury find from the evidence that on April 30, 1885, the
plaintiff authorized the defendants to buy wheat for him in
quantities of five thousand bushels at a time whenever they
bought at the same time and price ten thousand bushels for
themselves, and not otherwise, and that the plaintiff agreed to pay
to defendants a commission of one-fourth of one per cent, per
bushel for all wheat so bought for him by them, and that de-
fendants undertook and agreed that they would not buy five
thousand bushels for plaintiff unless they at the same time
and price bought ten thousand bushels for themselves ; and shall
further find that defendants did thereafter, on May 1, 1885, and
June 8, 1885, respectively, buy for the plaintiff five thousand
bushels of wheat and charged the same to plaintiff, and that they
represented to plaintiff that they had on each of said occasions
bought ten thousand bushels for themselves at the same time
and price as that at which they bought for plaintiff; and shall
find that the plaintiff, on the faith of such representation (should
si Buckingham v. Harris, 10 Colo. 2 Stewart v. Scholl, 65 Md. 294,
458, 15 Pac. 817; Stewart v. Fowler, 4 Atl. 399.
37 Kas. 679, 15 Pac. 918.
441 CONTRACTS ON DIFFERENT MATTERS. 458
the jury find it to have been made) and in the belief that de-
fendants had bought ten thousand bushels for themselves as
aforesaid, paid to defendants on account of the purchase of, and
on account of the depreciation, when sold, in the value of said
wheat bought as aforesaid for him (should the jury so find) the
moneys testified to by plaintiff to have been paid; and shall
further find that in fact the defendants did not upon either
of the said occasions buy ten thousand bushels for themselves,
then the plaintiff is entitled to recover the moneys so paid. 33
(2) If you find from the evidence given to you in this cause
that the defendant employed plaintiff as a real estate broker
to sell his farm, and that the plaintiff, for the purpose of aid-
ing and assisting him in selling said farm, and for the pur-
pose of procuring a purchaser therefor, took into his employ
and service one W, and if you further find that said W, aid-
ing and assisting said plaintiff in the sale of said farm, took
to this defendant one L, as a probable purchaser for said farm,
and if you further find that in the presence of said W the
said L inquired of this defendant the selling price of said farm
and then and there informed the defendant that he desired to
purchase direct from the owner, and that he had never seen or
been introduced to the plaintiff, and that he would not pur-
chase of commission men; and you further find that the de-
fendant did not know that 'the sale was being made by the
plaintiff, and if the said W stood by and did not inform the
defendant that the sale 'was being made by the plaintiff, the
plaintiff would now be estopped from claiming that the said
W was acting for and on his behalf in the sale of said farm, you
should find for the defendant. 34
441. Notice to be given under the contract. (1) If the jury
find from the evidence that specific instructions were given by
the defendant to the plaintiff on March 9, 1868, that in the
event of the purchase of the stock in the evidence mentioned,
the plaintiff should immediately communicate the fact of the
purchase to the defendant, and inform the plaintiff where to
send the notice; and if they shall further find that the said
33 Burt v. Myer, 71 Md. 467, 18 Atl. 34 Mullen v. Bower, 22 Ind. App.
736. 294, 300.
459 BURDEN OF PROOF PAYMENT OF INTEREST. 443
stock was purchased on the said 9th of March, by the plaintiff,
and that the plaintiff did not communicate the fact of the pur-
chase immediately to the defendant, according to the order and
instructions of the defendant, then the defendant was not re-
quired to take said stock. 35
(2) If the jury shall find that the defendant resided near R, in
Baltimore county, and the plaintiff in B city, and that there
was a daily mail from B to R, which was the proper post-
office of the defendant, and that the plaintiff deposited in the
postoffice in B on March 17, a letter containing the notice
mentioned in the first instruction, then the said notice was suf-
ficent, notwithstanding the fact that it was not received by the
defendant until March 24, 1868, and after the sale. 36
442. Burden of proof on plaintiff When. The burden of
proof is on the plaintiff to make out his case by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. In this case the plaintiff's claim, accord-
ing to his bill of particulars, is for commissions alleged to have
been improperly retained, and not paid to him, as shown by
statements of account rendered and filed with said bill of par-
ticulars; and the jury are instructed that the burden is on the
plaintiff, to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the
items referred to in such statement of accounts, and charged
in his bill of particulars, are not lawful charges against the
plaintiff, otherwise he is not entitled to recover in this action,
and you must find for the defendant. 37
443. Payment of interest on monthly balance. If the jury
find the facts stated in the plaintiffs' third, fourth and fifth pray-
ers, and further find that, in the execution of the orders of the
defendant therein referred to, the plaintiffs paid to the brokers
employed by them interest on the monthly balances due said
brokers for the execution of said orders, and reported said pay-
ments, if entered to the defendant, and if they find that the cus-
tom and usage of the business in the markets where such orders
were executed was to charge interest on such monthly balances
as Worthington v. Yormey, 34 Md. 37 Shrewsbury v. Tufts, 41 W Va.
189. 212, 23 S. E. 692.
se Worthington v. Yormey, 34 Md.
186.
444 CONTRACTS ON DIFFERENT MATTERS. 460
of accounts, then the plaintiffs are entitled to recover the interest
so paid by them on account of the defendant. 38
Building Contracts.
444. Contractor complying with contract can recover. (1)
If the jury believe from the evidence that the plaintiff, either him-
self or through others employed by him, constructed the building
in the agreement in the declaration mentioned, in accordance
with the specifications in said agreement set forth, and relying
upon the contract in the declaration mentioned, then the jury
shall find for the plaintiff the price therefor in said agreement
stipulated to be paid by defendant to the plaintiff, although from
the evidence the jury may believe that outside parties, by parol
agreement, guaranteed that the plaintiff should lose nothing by
his construction of said building under said agreement, and
actually advanced to the plaintiff the money necessary to pay
for the materials and labor employed in the construction of the
said building. 39
(2) In deciding whether or not the plaintiff was proceeding
with said building in compliance with the contract, you are
instructed that there must have been a substantial compliance
in every material particular in each item as called for by
a fair, reasonable and practical construction of the contract, and
plans and specifications, taken together, and where there is a
conflict, if any, in these, this should be reconciled in a practical,
workmanlike manner, so as to arrive at the fair and reasonable
intention of the same. 40
445. Parties abandoning original contract. If the plaintiff
wilfully abandoned the work, leaving the house not finished
according to the contract, he cannot recover. But if a party
in good faith proceeds under a contract, and doing what he
reasonably supposes is required and substantially completes the
work and the other party accepts the benefit of it, although the
contractor may not have done all that was really his duty, or in
ss Stewart v. Schall, 65 Md. 289, *<> Linch v. Paris L. & G. B. Co.
4 Atl. 399. 80 Tex. 23, 15 S. W. 208.
3 Ferguson's Adm. v. Wills, 88
Va. 139, 13 S. E. 392.
461 DOMESTIC RELATIONS HUSBAND AND WIFE. 447
the exact manner required by the contract, still the contractor
may maintain an action to recover the value of his labor and
materials, but he will not necessarily be entitled to recover the
cost of his materials or the ordinary price of his labor. The
party for whom the work is done is entitled to have deducted
from the contract price the difference between the v<Jue of the
work as done, and its value if it had been done in accordance
with the contract. 41
Domestic Relations.
446. Husband entitled to income of wife's estate. The hus-
band is entitled to the rents, income or profits of the wife 's statu-
tory separate estate and is not required to account to her, her
heirs or representatives for them ; and he may use them or invest
them for himself if he chooses ; or he may give them to his wife
in the same manner as he may give any other property. But if
she claims them as a gift from her husband, she must show by
proof that he had divested himself of the title and invested it
in her ; he must abandon his right and title to it and transfer it
to her by such words, acts or writing as will clearly show that
the title had passed from him to her. 42
447. Liability of wife for husband's debts. (1) If the jury
believe from the evidence that the account which the defendants
were owing to M, and to secure which they had given M a
mortgage on this property, was for articles of comfort and sup-
port of the household, suitable to the degree and condition of
the family, and for which the husband would be liable at com-
mon law, and that the plaintiff, at the request of the defendants,
paid said account for them, and, in consideration of the payment
of said account, they executed to him the said bill of sale for
the property sued for, then the contract was legal, and binding
on the wife and on her statutory separate estate, so far as con-
veyed by said bill of sale, and the plaintiff is entitled to recover. 43
41 Cunningham v. Washburn, 119 by statute declared to be her sep-
Mass. 224. arate property. Montgomery v.
42 Logwood v. Hussey, 60 Ala. Hickman, 62 Ind. 598.
421. The rule is wholly different 43 Logwood v. Hussey, 60 Ala.
in states where the rents and prof- 421.
its of a m-arried woman's land are
448 CONTRACTS ON DIFFERENT MATTERS. 462
(2) If the jury should find that the account due M was not for
articles of comfort and support of the household, suitable to the
degree and condition of the family, but that it was the personal
debt of the husband, and payment of said debt of her husband
was the consideration of the sale of her property, then her statu-
tory separate estate was not liable for and could not be sold to
pay her husband's debt; and if any part of the property in the
bill of sale was her statutory estate, said bill of sale was void
as to it, and the plaintiff cannot recover it. 44
(3) If the jury find from the evidence that L had made a gift of
the rents, income or profits of his wife's separate estate to her,
in such manner as divested him of the right and title to them,
and invested it in her, and that this gift was made before the
debt to M was incurred, which was paid off for him by the plain-
tiff, then the said rents and profits so given became a part of her
statutory separate estate, and could not be sold by her, unless
for the payment of a debt for articles of comfort and support of
the household, suitable to the degree and condition in life of the
family, and for which the husband would be liable at common
law ; and if the jury find that the property sued for was bought
with the proceeds of her separate estate received from her father,
or with the rents and profits which her husband had given her,
in the manner as before stated, then the sale of said property
conveyed no title to the plaintiff, unless it was in payment of
articles of comfort and support, as before stated. 45
448. Duty of both parents to support children. (1) No
promise on the part of the father to pay a mother for anything
she may do in the discharge of her moral duties to their offspring
can be implied. The mother is as much morally bound to care for,
support, nourish and educate the child as the father; and the law
will not allow her to recover for so doing, simply because the
father omits his duty. 46
449. Father entitled to minor child's services and earnings.
(1) When a person or corporation employs a minor, it devolves
4* Logwood v. Hussey, 60 Ala. 46 Lapworth v. Leach, 79 Mich. 20,
421. 44 N. W. 338.
45 Logwood v. Kussey, 60 Ala.
421.
463 PARENTS AND CHILDREN. 449
on such employer to obtain the consent of the father, when such
minor is under the control of the father, and while said minor
forms a part of the father's family. The father is liable for the
support of his minor child and is entitled to the earnings of
said child. And where the son, through the negligence of
the employer or its servants, receives an injury incapacitating
him from labor, and rendering him less serviceable up to his
arrival at the age ' of twenty-one years, the employer thus en-
gaging a minor, without the knowledge or consent of his father,
is liable to the father in damages.* 7
(2) When a person, company or corporation employs a minor, it
devolves upon such employer to obtain the consent of the father
when such minor is under the control of his father and forms a
part of his father's family. A minor cannot, without the consent
of his father, make a legal and binding contract. The father is
liable for the support of his child during the child's minority
and is entitled to his earnings. 48
(3) Under the law the father is entitled to the services of his
minor children during their minority. Minors cannot, without their
father's consent, make legal contracts; nor without such consent,
either before or by acquiescence after knowledge of the father,
engage in business for themselves. If you believe, then, from the
evidence that M was a minor, under twenty-one years of age ;
that, without the knowledge or consent of his father, he engaged
himself to defendant, and while so engaged received the injury
alleged, then, if such injury was not caused by said M's own
negligence, plaintiff is entitled to recover for the loss of his son's
services while under medical treatment, to his necessary ex-
penses in perfecting a cure, including medicines and extras
required in effecting a cure ; also to all reasonable medical bills
for which the father is liable, and to such damages as result and
flow directly from the injury such as the diminished value of
services up to the arrival at the age of majority of said minor. 49
(4) Under the law, the father is entitled to the services of his
minor children during their minority. Minors cannot, without their
47 Houston & G. N. R. Oo. v. Mil- Houston & G. N. R. Co. v. Mil-
ler, 49 Tex. 323. ler, 49 Tex. 323.
*s Houston & G. N. R. Co. v. Mil-
ler, 49 Tex. 323.
450 CONTRACTS ON DIFFERENT MATTERS. 464
father's consent, make legal contracts; nor without such consent
engage in business for themselves. If you believe from the evi-
dence that E was a minor, under twenty-one years of age ; that,
without the knowledge or consent of his father, he engaged him-
self to defendant, and while so engaged received the injury
alleged, then if such injury was not caused by said minor's own
negligence, the plaintiff is entitled to recover for the loss of his
son's services while under medical treatment, to his necessary
expenses in perfecting a cure, including medicines and extras
required in effecting a cure ; also to all reasonable medical bills
for which the father is liable, and to such damages as result and
flow directly from the injury such as the diminished value of
services up to the arrival at the age of majority of said minor. 50
450. Minor remaining with family after full age. If the
plaintiff, after she arrived at full age, continued to live with her
father, as she had done previously, with no new duties or respon-
sibilities assumed in the family by her, and was provided with
necessaries, etc., as one of the family, she would not be entitled
to recover for such services, unless there was an express under-
standing between her and her father, before these services were
rendered, that she should receive such compensation; and if the
note was given for such past services, and there was no such
understanding existing between them, she cannot recover. But
if the note was given for such past services, the fact that it was
given will raise a presumption that there had been a previous
understanding or agreement between the plaintiff and her father
that such compensation was to be made, and unless such pre-
sumption is overcome by evidence that no such understanding
existed, the plaintiff will be entitled to recover. 51
451. Minor liable on his contracts When. If the jury be-
lieve from the evidence that A, after she became twenty-one
years of age and before marriage, with knowledge that she, on
account of infancy, was not liable to the plaintiff for any pur-
chases she may have made of him, expressly promised that she
would pay for any portion of the articles mentioned in the bill
so Houston & G. N. R. Co. v. Mil- Pitts v. Pitts, 21 Ind. 314.
ler, 49 Tex. 323.
465 HOUSEHOLDER LANDLORD AND TENANT. 453
of particulars, such a promise would be a ratification of the pre-
'vious contract to the amount she promised to pay. If she
promised to pay all, it would render her liable for all. If she
promised to pay a part, or a certain sum, it would render her
liable for such part, or for such certain sum; and if she, after
such promise, paid any money to the plaintiff, it would go as a
credit on the amount for which she made herself liable on the
new promise. 52
452. Head of family or householder. As to what constitutes
a householder within the meaning of the statute, you are
instructed that a householder is the father or head of -a family
whom he supports or assists in supporting. It is not necessary
that the family should keep house in the ordinary sense of that
term. The father, as head of a family, may put his family out to
board, and still be entitled to the benefit of the law. If the
plaintiff, at the time of said demand for exemption, and after
the bringing of this suit, was supporting his wife or aiding in
her support, and was intending to continue to live with her and
return to Indiana to reside and remain permanently or indefi-
nitely, when his business in Colorado was terminated and finished,
then he was a householder within the meaning of that term in
the statute providing for the exemption of property from sale
on execution. 53
Landlord and Tenant.
453. Liability of tenant for damage to building. (1) If the
jury find that the defendants entered into possession of the build-
ing in question under the lease in evidence, and made such altera-
tions as they thought fit in order to adapt it to their purpose under
the authority given in the lease, and afterwards stored a large
quantity of heavy goods therein, and that owing to the excessive
quantity of said goods, if they shall find such quantity was exces-
sive, or by the manner in which they were stored by the defend-
ants a large part of the building was caused to fall down, then
the plaintiffs are entitled to recover. 5 *
52 Ogborn v. Hoffman, 52 Ind. 439. ^ Machen v. Hooper, 73 Md. 354,
ss Astley v. Capron, 89 Ind. 175. 21 Atl. 67.
454 CONTRACTS ON DIFFEKENT MATTERS. 466
(2) If the jury find that the injury shown by the evidence to
have been sustained by the building in question, occurred while
the same was in the occupation of the defendants under the lease
offered in evidence, and that the said injury is attributed to the
alterations made in the building by the defendants in connection
with the use thereafter made of it by them, then the plaintiffs are
entitled to- recover in this action the damages which the jury may
find from the evidence they have thereby suffered. 55
(3) If the jury shall find from the evidence in this case, that the
defendants entered upon the said demised premises in pursuance
of the lease declared on, and which is in evidence, and shall fur-
ther find that they used and .occupied the said premises, and that
during said term or tenancy, and while the defendants were so
in possession of said premises, they used the said building or
warehouse as persons of ordinary care and prudence would have
done, looking to its character, size, apparent construction and
strength, and that the said house fell down during said tenancy
in consequence of some defect in the structure of the same or on
account of a want of a proper thickness of the wall, or on account
of inferior materials used or on account of the ordinary decay of
the materials used in the erection of said building, all of which
was unknown to the defendants, and shall further find that the
same could not have been discovered by reasonable and ordinary
diligence, then the plaintiffs are not entitled to recover in this
action, and the verdict must be for the defendants. 56
454. New leasing of premises discharges guaranty. If the
jury believe from the evidence that N, from November, 1857, to
the time of his death, and his widow after his decease to May,
1859, occupied the premises in question at a different rate of rent
and under a different agreement from that specified in the lease
in question, then the jury may infer a new leasing of the
premises, and the defendant is thereby discharged upon his guar-
anty and is entitled to a verdict in his favor. 57
55 Machen v. Hooper, 73 Md. 353, Smith v. Wise, 58 111. 141, act of
21 Atl. 67. landlord is an eviction and termi-
oo Machen v. Hooper, 73 Md. 355, nates lease. Several instructions
21 Atl. 67. held good.
57 white v. Walker, 31 111. 438;
467 MARRIAGE CONTRACTS BREACH. 456
Marriage Contracts.
455. What essential to entitle plaintiff to recover. In order
to entitle the plaintiff, H, to recover in this case, it is necessary
that it shall be made to appear to your satisfaction, by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, that at some time before the commec ce-
ment of this action the defendant promised to marry her in con-
sideration of a like promise by the plaintiff to the defendant to
marry him; that the plaintiff thereafter either requested the
defendant within a reasonable time and before the commencement
of this action to marry her, the plaintiff, in pursuance of such
contract, and he refused to do so; or that, by the terms of the
contract, a day certain beyond the time of the commencement of
this action was fixed for the performance of such marriage con-
tract without performance or offer of performance of the same
by the defendant on or before the day so fixed, and that the plain-
tiff, at all times, from and after the making of such contract or
contracts up to the time of the commencement of this action, was
ready and willing to marry the defendant. 58 .
456. Unchastity of woman not breach of contract When.
(1) Illicit intercourse between parties to a marriage contract,- af-
ter the promise is made, is no defense to an action for a breach. A
plaintiff's immorality or unchaste conduct with third persons
after the promise is no defense if done with the defendant's con-
nivance or consent, or, if knowing it, he continued his attentions
and engagements. 59
(2) If the defendant in an action for breach of marriage con-
tract bases his renunciation of and his right to discharge from
his contract upon the bad or immoral conduct of the plain-
tiff, it must appear that his refusal to consummate his promise
was due to such bad or immoral conduct, and that he renounced
his promise as soon as he reasonably could after the conduct
happened, or was discovered by him. Dissolute conduct, upon
the part of the woman, is no defense, if the man was a party
to it, or connived at it. 60
BS McCrum v. Hildebrand, 85 Ind. o Bowman v. Bowman, 153 Ind.
205. 503, 55 N. E. 422.
59 Bowman v. Bowman, 153 Ind.
503, 55 N. E. 422.
457 CONTRACTS ON DIFFERENT MATTERS. 468
457. Assessing damages for breach of contract. If you find
the contract was made and has been broken, and consider the
question of damages, you may take into consideration the char-
acter of the plaintiff. If it is subject to any criticism on your
part, and if she is a woman of coarse manners, coarse in her asso-
ciations, and imprudent, careless and reckless in regard to her
conduct and demeanor, these circumstances you may take into
consideration in assessing damages ; such a woman is not injured
to the same extent by a breach of promise of marriage that one
more confiding, retiring and modest would be. Understand that
I am passing no judgment upon the plaintiff or suggesting that
you shall pass any judgment upon her, but I wish you to under-
stand that if you think she deserves consideration of that kind,
it is your privilege and duty to give such consideration to that
phase of the matter as you think it deserves. 61
Partnership Contracts.
458. What constitutes a partnership. (1) Partnership is a
contract of two or more competent persons to place their money,
effects, labor and skill or some or all of them in lawful commerce
or business and to divide the profits and bear the losses in certain
proportions. 62
(2) A partnership in fact can only exist when there is a vol-
untary agreement made for that purpose and there cannot be
such partnership against the intention of the parties to the con-
tract. 63
459. Each partner has power to bind all the partners. A
partnership can only exist as between the parties themselves, in
pursuance of an agreement to which the minds of all have
assented ; but that, when created, each partner has full power and
authority to bind all the partners by his acts or contracts in
relation to the business of the partnership; and as between the
firm and third persons dealing with 'them in good faith, it is of
si Kelley v. Highfield, 15 Ore. Indianapolis Street R. Co. v. Tay-
277, 14 Pac. 744. This is objection- lor, (Ind.), (Jan. 3, 1905).
able as declaring a fact which it is 02 Weeks v. Hutchinson (Mich.),
the province of the jury to pass 97 N. W. 697.
on under the rule declared in, 63 Weeks v. Hutchinson (Mich.),
97 N. W. 697.
469 PARTNERSHIP CONTRACTS MORTGAGES. 461
no consequence whether the partner is acting in good faith with
his copartners or not, provided the act done is within the scope
of partnership business, and professedly for the firm; but the
relation of the partnership confers no authority on one party to
bind the others, except as to transactions within the scope of the
partnership business. And if you believe that said F M & H
were partners, yet, if you believe that the partnership existing
between them was entered into for the sole purpose of buying
and selling cattle, then such partnership relation could not
authorize either party to sign the firm name as sureties on the
bond of a third party. And if you find that the bond sued on
was signed by M without the consent of said F & H and without
other authority from them, then you should find in favor of said
F & H, unless you should further find that said F & H, after
being informed that the bond was so signed by M, consented to
the same. 64
460. Partners not general partners. If the jury find that
the defendants had any arrangement for shipping cattle from S,
by which it was agreed that either of them might buy stock on
his own responsibility, and upon its delivery for shipment at
said place the others might take an interest in any stock so pur-
chased and delivered, if upon examination of it they thought it
suitable to ship or not purchased too high; or by which, if they
purchased stock when all together, it was to be shipped on joint
account ; or if, after looking at or agreeing to take an interest in
stock purchased by any one of them before delivered at
said place, it was to be shipped on joint account and the parties
to share in the profits and losses, such facts or agreements did
not constitute them general partners, but only partners in each
transaction. 85
Chattel Mortgages.
461. Mortgagee may take possession of the property. Under
the mortgage defendant had the right to take possession of all
the property therein described, at any time he chose to do so, and
e* Fore v. Hitson, 70 Tex. 520, 8 5 Valentine v. Kickle, 39 Ohio
S. W. 292. St. 23.
4G2 CONTRACTS ON DIFFERENT MATTERS. 470
no damage could be assessed against him for such taking. He
did not, however, have any right to sell said property before the
debt secured thereby became due. In other words, while he
would have a right under said mortgage to take possession of
all the property therein described, for the purpose of preserving
the same until the debt became due, he would have no right to
sell the said property unless the debt secured by said mortgage,
or some part of it, was due ; and if he did sell said property, or
any part of it, before the debt secured thereby became due, or
any part thereof, then he is liable to account to the plaintiffs for
the fair and reasonable value of the property so sold, without
reference to the amount for which the sale was made. 66
Subscription Contract.
462. Alteration of subscription contract. If the jury shall
believe from the evidence that at the time the defendant signed
the subscription paper the capital of the plaintiff was to be but
fifty thousand dollars, and that it was then so written in said
subscription paper, and the same was at any time afterwards
changed by an interlineation so as to make it read one hundred
and fifty thousand dollars, and that the defendant did not know
of such change and never assented to the same, then the defend-
ant cannot be required to pay and is exonerated from his sub-
scription, and in such case the verdict should be for the defend-
ant. 67
463. Stock illegally issued invalid. That under the articles
of incorporation the board of directors had no power to increase
the capital stock of the company; at least they had no such
power at a meeting of which there had been no notice given,
and at which all of the directors were not present. Therefore,
if you find that no notice was given of the meeting of directors
of May 24, 1875, and all of the directors were not present at such
meeting, then their action in attempting to increase the capital
stock of the company was invalid, and consequently the stock
ee Koster v. Seney, 100 Iowa, 562, e? Hughes v. Antietam Mfg. Co.
69 N. W. 868. See, Bell v. Prewitt, 34 Md. 319.
62 111. 3-61.
471 SUBSCRIPTION CONTRACTS SERVICES TO PUBLIC. 465
issued in excess of the original capital stock of the company was
illegally issued and was invalid. 68
Services Rendered to Public.
464. Liability of county for physician's services. If you
find from the evidence that the plaintiff rendered the services
stated in the first paragraph of the complaint or any part thereof
at the request of the township trustee, and that the person who
received the services was a pauper of - - township in Jay
County, Indiana, and that there was no physician provided by
the board of commissioners of said Jay County, whose duty it
was to render said services, then you should find for the plaintiff
on the first paragraph of the complaint. 69
Statute of Limitations.
465. Reviving a claim barred by statute of limitations. (1)
In order to take the case out of the statute of limitations and en-
title the plaintiff to recover, the jury must find from the evidence
that the defendant has, within the last ten years before the com-
mencement of this action, made his promise in writing to pay
said note, or that he has actually paid thereon some portion of
the principal or interest thereon within the time aforesaid. 70
(2) If the jury believe from the evidence that some portion of
plaintiff's claim for services accrued more than three years before
the institution of this suit, then the plaintiff cannot recover for
such portion under the pleadings in this cause, unless they shall
further find that the defendant or his testatrix promised to pay
the same within three years before the bringing of this suit. 71
(3) If you find there was no understanding or agreement in re-
gard to the credit of the fifteen dollars, then it does not avail as a
payment to take this claim out of the statute of limitations to
prevent its being barred, because the parties must agree upon
68 Merrill v. Reaver, 50 Iowa, 404. TO Bridgeton v. Jones, 34 Mo. 472.
69 Board v. Brewington, 74 Ind. 10. ?i Bonic v. Maught, 76 Md. 442,
See also Board, &c. v. Galloway, 25 Atl. 423.
17 Ind. App. 689, 47 N. E. 390; Ind.
Acts, 1901, p. 324, 6.
46G CONTRACTS ON DIFFERENT MATTERS. 472
the payment. The plaintiff cannot, by giving credit upon an
account, upon an outlawed bill or a bill that may be outlawed,
for the purpose of preventing the running of the statute, make a
credit of his own volition on that account, and save the running
of the statute. He cannot do it unless it is agreed between the
parties that there is to be an application upon the account; and
that is a question 'for you to determine, whether or not it was
understood between the parties that such credit was to be made
to E, and that it was to be credited upon that account and prop-
erly applied upon it. If it was so understood between them it
would be a proper application, and the plaintiff might maintain
this acton ; otherwise he cannot, and that is the question for you
to determine. 72
466. The promise reviving a discharged claim must be clear
and distinct. The promise by which a discharged, debt is revived
must be clear, distinct, and unequivocal. There must be an
expression by the defendant of a clear intention to bind himself
to the payment of the debt. The new promise must be distinct,
unambiguous, and certain. The expression of an intention to
pay the debt is not sufficient. There must be a promise before
the debtor is bound. An intention is but the purpose a man
forms in his own mind ; a promise is an express undertaking or
agreement to carry that purpose into effect, and must be express
in contradistinction to a promise implied from an acknowledg-
ment of the justness or existence of the debt. 73
467. Payments on running account How applied. If the
jury believe from the evidence that the defendants owed the
plaintiffs different debts, and have made several payments to the
plaintiffs without designating the debts to which such payments
should be applied, then the plaintiffs had the right to make the
application of the paj^ments to the debts as they pleased, and if
the jury believe from the evidence that neither the plaintiffs nor
the defendants made any specific application of the payments to
the discharge of any particular debt or debts, the presumption is
72 Bay City Iron Co. v. Emery, 73 Shockley v. Mills, 71 Ind. 292.
128 Mich. 506, 87 N. W. 652.
473 CONTRACTS IN ESCROW WAIVING RIGHTS. 470
that the first items of a running account, or that the debts which
are first in point of time, were to be thereby discharged. 74
468. Deed executed and placed in escrow. A deed which
has been surreptitiously obtained from the grantor without his
knowledge or consent does not, as a general rule, transfer title;
but a deed made by a grantor and placed in escrow to be deliv-
ered to the grantee upon the performance of certain conditions,
and which has been obtained from the party in whose possession
it was placed by untruthful statements, and afterwards the con-
dition upon which the deed was delivered was performed and
the grantee does not demand the possession of the deed nor take
any steps to recover the possession of the same, said deed will be
effectual to convey the title. 75
Other Matters.
469. Rights in contract may be waived. If the plaintiffs
were not ready on the first day of April, 1881, to comply with
their part of the contract, or if the ore was then and there
after and until July 15, 1882, being mined and received in less
quantities and in a manner otherwise than as the contract pro-
vided for, and if the plaintiffs acquiesced therein, or if the plain-
tiffs during the time did not complain and did not give the
defendant reasonable notice that they were standing on their
contract, and that he would be expected to receive daily, Sun-
days excepted, from fifty to sixty tons of ore, then the plaintiffs
would not be entitled to recover damages on this account for
defendant's failure to receive such amount of ore. 76
470. Correspondence constituting contract. If the jury be-
lieve that the contract between the plaintiff and the defendant
consisted of letters and the circular mentioned in the last instruc-
tion above, then such contract was a contract in writing and it
T* Sprague, Warner & Co. v. Ha- " Chicago, I. & E. R. Co. v. Linn,
zemvinkle, 53 111. 419. See, Snell v. 30 Ind. App. 88, 92, 65 N. E. 552.
Cottingham, 72 111. 124, payment cm ? Eaves & Collins v. Cherokee
which matter. Iron Co. 73 Ga. 459.
471 COX TRACTS OX DIFFERENT MATTERS. 474
bears date from the acceptance by the plaintiff of the terms
proposed by the defendant in the year 1884. 77
471. Written contract cannot be varied by parol proof
What the contract was between these parties is to be determined
by the writing the note itself. This is not to be controlled or
altered or varied by proof of any parol or verbal agreement or
understanding between them at or before the time of signing the
note. 78
472. Unsigned contract binding. The unsigned contract in-
troduced in evidence cannot be regarded as the contract of the
defendant, upon which the plaintiff can recover as upon a written
contract signed by him. It at the most can only be considered
as a part of the transaction at the time of the negotiation and
agreement between the parties. If said paper was read over to
the defendant .accurately and fully and fairly understood by
him, and he assented and agreed to the terms therein stated, he
is bound by said terms, and his liability will be determined
accordingly. 79
473. Execution and delivery of deed Signature. (1) Every
deed for the conveyance of real estate must be signed by the
grantor. This may be done in one of three ways : first, the
grantor may sign it in person with his own hand by writing or
making his or her mark to his or her name written by another to
the deed ; second, he may in writing or by parol direct another
person in his presence to sign his name to the deed ; third, he
may, by power of attorney duly executed, authorize another to
sign his name to the deed for him either in his presence or
absence. 80
(2) A deed takes effect from its delivery, and until the maker
parts with its possession and yields up his right to control
it the deed has no legal existence, and no other person can gain
any rights under it. 81
77 Shrewsbury v. Tufts, 41 W. Va. 79 Osborne & Co. v. Simmerson,
216. 23 S. B. 692. 73 Iowa, 513, 35 N. W. 615.
78 Cook v. Brown, 62 Mich. 478, so Fitzgerald v. Goff, 99 Ind. 39.
29 N. W. 46: si Fitzgerald v. Goff, 99 Ind. 40.
CHAPTER XXXVII.
DAMAGES.
Sec.
INJURY TO THE PERSON.
474. Assaulting another in self-
defense.
475. Assaulting another not in
self-defense.
476. Assessing damages for phys-
ical injury.
477. Damages for assault to rav-
ish.
478. Injury to the person by ani-
mal.
479. Attack by vicious dog.
480. Dangerous obstruction in
highway.
481. Turnpike unsafe Liability.
482. Injury to bicycle-rider on
bridge.
483. Accidental injury to traveler
on highway.
' MALPRACTICE BY PHYSICIAN.
484. Negligence of doctor Liabil-
ity.
485. Physician required to exer-
cise ordinary care.
486. Patient must observe doc-
tor's directions.
Sec.
LIBEL AND SLANDER.
491. Libel and slander defined.
492. Malice an essential element.
493. Slanderous words must be
proved.
494. Proof of part of words suffi-
cient.
495. Words libelous in themselves.
496. Charging another with crime.
497. Publication Letter so held.
498. Measure of damages Consid-
erations.
499. Punitive damages When
proper.
500. Matters in mitigation.
501. Good faith Probable cause.
502. Degree of proof in justifica-
tion.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.
503. Arrest without warrant.
504. Probable cause for prosecu-
tion.
505. Unlawful arrest Liability.
506. Advice of counsel as a de-
fense.
507. Essential elements of a cause.
508. Estimating damages.
UNLAWFUL SALE OF LIQUOR.
487. Liability for selling liquor
unlawfully.
488. Wife Selling to her husband
Liability.
489. Transfer of liquor license
Effect.
DAMAGE TO PERSONAL PROPERTY.
509. Unlawful seizure of property
Liability.
510. Landlord seizing tenant's
property.
511. Damages for seizure How es-
timated.
512. Killing stock Liability.
490. Sales made since commenc- 513. Damages from diseased cat-
ing suit Evidence.
tie.
475
474 DAMAGES INJURY TO PERSON. 476
Injury to the Person.
474. Assaulting another in self-defense. (1) To justify the
taking of the life of an assailant when attacked by him there
must appear to the satisfaction of the jury, first, that the defend-
ant, if assaulted without any wrong or cause on his part, honestly
and truly believed that he was in imminent danger of his life or
great bodily harm; and second, if he had just and reasonable
cause to apprehend such danger which he could not avoid with-
out taking the life of his adversary. Then it is excusable. 1
(2) It is not necessary, however, that the danger should be real
or in fact existing, for, whether real or apparent, if the circum-
stances are such as to induce a belief sufficiently well founded
that life is in peril or that grievous bodily harm is intended ; and
to be threatened with danger the accused may act upon appear-
ances and slay his assailant. Yet there must be reasonable ground
for his belief in the danger threatened arising out of the circum-
stances in which he is placed, otherwise the act of taking the life
of the assailant is entirely without justification. 2
(3) If the jury believe that the plaintiff assaulted the defend-
ant and was using a crowbar in a threatening manner, then the
defendant had the right to defend himself and to use such force as
was necessary to repel such assault. 3
(4) The court instructs the jury that the defendant was the best
judge of what was necessary to defend himself against the attack,
and of the means to be used for his own protection. As a techni-
cal legal proposition this is undoubtedly correct, and it is true not
only as a matter of law, but as a matter of common sense, that
the party attacked is obliged, in the very nature of the case, to
exercise his best judgment at the time as to what shall be done
in his own defense, and his judgment is one which, if honestly
exercised, is to a large extent controlling. It would be abso-
lutely controlling unless the jury should find that his exercise of
it at the time and under the circumstances was such an exercise
as was unreasonable under all the evidence in the case. 4
1 Darling v. Williams, 35 Ohio s Ickenroth v. St. Louis Tr. Co.
St. 61. 102 Mo. App. 597, 77 S. W. 163.
2 Darling v. Williams, 35 Ohio * Kent v. Cole, 84 Mich. 581, 48
St. 62. N. W. 168.
477 ASSAULTING NOT IN SELF-DEFENSE. 475
(5) If you find from the evidence that the defendant did not as-
sault the plaintiff, but having his pistol in his hand for a lawful
purpose and by the negligent of careless handling of the pistol or
by accident the pistol was discharged and the plaintiff received
an injury, he cannot recover damages for that injury in this ac-
tion. 5
475. Assaulting not in self-defense. (1) If the jury believe
from the evidence that the defendant had no reasonable cause to
apprehend that the deceased intended to take the defendant's
life, or to do him any other great bodily harm, and that thereupon
the defendant fired the pistol shot in revenge or in a reckless and
vindictive spirit, then there is no self-defense in the case and the
jury cannot find for the defendant on that ground. 6
(2) Although you may believe from the evidence that the de-
ceased took hold of the defendant and held him, and may also be-
lieve from the evidence that he attempted to follow him, when re-
leased with the intention of again taking hold of him, yet that
would not justiiy the defendant in taking his- life unless the jury
believe from all the evidence before them that the defendant had
reasonable cause to believe that the deceased was then about to
take his life, or do him some other great personal injury. 7
(3) If you believe from the evidence that the defendant's con-
ductor struck the plaintiff, then your verdict must be in favor of
the plaintiff, unless you further find from the evidence that said
conductor struck the plaintiff in self-defense or to save himself
from bodily harm. 8
(4) Abusive language or opprobrious epithets alone never justi-
fy the commission of an assault by a conductor in charge of a train
upon a passenger. 9
(5) If the deceased had been wounded and had not died of his
wounds and had brought an action against the defendant for
damages, if it appeared that the deceased made the first assault
and the defendant repelled it by force, employing no more force
than was necessary to protect himself, he could not recover ; but
s Krall v. Lull, 49 Wis. 405, 5 N. Birmin-gibam R. L. & P. Co. v.
W. 874. Mullen (Ala.), 35 So. 702.
Nichols v. Winfrey, 90 Mo. 407, 9 Birmingham R. L. & P. Co. v.
2 S. W. 305. Mullen (Ala.), 35 So. 702.
~ Nichols v. Winfrey, 90 Mo. 407,
2 S. W. 305.
476 DAMAGES INJURY TO PERSON. 478
if the defendant went unnecessarily beyond this and employed
force entirely disproportionate to the attack, such as to show
wantonness, malice or revenge, he himself would become a wrong-
doer and would be liable for any injury inflicted beyond what
was reasonably necessary. 10
(6) In defending himself against an unlawful attack of another
a man is justified in resorting to such violence and the use of
such force as the particular circumstances of the case may
require for his protection. Now the degree of force to be em-
ployed in protecting one's person must be in proportion to the
attack made, and must depend upon the circumstances in each
particular case, and the imminence of danger as it appears to
him at the time. Jhe only purpose which justifies the employ-
ment of force against the assault is to defend one's self, that is
the object to be attained; and a man is only justified in using
such an amount of force as may appear to him at the time to
be necessary to accomplish that purpose. As soon as that object
is attained, it is his duty to desist. If he used a kind of force
towards his assailant in excess or out of proportion to what may
be necessary to his own defense, as it honestly appeared to him at
the time, he is himself guilty of an assault. 11
476. Assessing damages for physical injury. If you find for
the plaintiff you will award him such damages as will fairly
compensate him for any injuries or indignity he may have sus-
tained. In awarding such damages you may consider the charac-
ter of his injuries, what physical injury, if any, he sustained,
and also the mental suffering, if any ; also any sense of shame
or humiliation he may have suffered on account of such wrong-
ful acts, if any, that were committed against him and award him
such damages as will be a fair compensation in the premises. 12
477. Damages for assault to ravish. If the jury believe
from the evidence that the defendant assaulted the plaintiff as
testified to by her, by laying his hands on her accompanied with
the threat that he would kill her, or words in substance, that if
10 Darling v. Williams, 35 Ohio App. 428, 66 N. E. 188, (held not
St. 58. assuming facts and confined the
11 Kent v. Cole, 84 Mich. 581, 48 jury to the eivdence. See, Ously v.
N. W. 1G8. Hardin, 23 111. 353.
12 Golibart v. Sullivan, 30 Ind.
479 PERSONS INJURED BY ANIMALS. 479
she did not consent to sexual intercourse with the defendant,
this in itself will warrant the jury in finding the defendant
guilty, although the jury may further believe from the evidence
that she ultimately freely consented to such intercourse. If,
however, the jury believe from the evidence that such ultimate
assent was not freely given, but was yielded by the plaintiff only
as a consequence of the preceding violence or force, then such
sexual intercourse should be regarded by the jury as a part of
the assault, and a ground for exemplary damages, that is, such
as will compensate the plaintiff for any wrong to her and to
punish the defendant, and to furnish an example to deter others
from like practices. 13
478. Injury to the person by animals. (1) The defendant
claims that the plaintiff, in passing the bull, provoked the bull to
make the attack upon him, by striking the bull with a cane or stick
without reasonable cause. If you find that the plaintiff struck
the bull, and thereby excited him to make the attack, you will
not assume, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff was in fault, but
you will inquire whether, under the circumstances, the plaintiff
had or had not reasonable cause to strike the bull with his cane.
You will carefully notice what the plaintiff did, if anything ; his
situation at the time as it appeared to him, and all the circum-
stances surrounding him, and decide whether he acted as a man
of ordinary prudence or not. 14
(2) The plaintiff has alleged in each paragraph of his complaint
that the steer in question was of a dangerous and vicious dis-
position, in the habit of attacking persons and animals. He has
also alleged that the defendant knew . of such dangerous and
vicious disposition of said steer, and that he the plaintiff had
no knowledge of such dangerous and vicious disposition. To
entitle the plaintiff to recover he must prove, by a fair pre-
ponderance of the evidence, not only that the steer was dan-
gerous and vicious, but that the defendant knew that fact and
the plaintiff was ignorant of it. 15
!3 Miller v. Bathasser, 78 111. 302, a recent statute, the plaintiff was
304. Held competent where no wit- relieved from the burden of prov-
ness except the plaintiff testified ing his own freedom from contrib-
to the assault on her. utory negligence in actions for per-
] * Meier v. Shrunk, 79 Iowa, 21, sonal injuries. Indianapolis Street
44 N. W. 209. R. Co. v. Robinson, 157 Ind. 232,
is Todd v. Banner, 17 Ind. App. 61 N. E. 197.
368, 46 N. E. 829. In Indiana, by
DAMAGES INJURY TO PERSON. 480
479. Attack by vicious dogs. (1) If the defendant had the
dog in his possession, and was harboring him on his premises
as owners usually harbor their dogs, then he is the owner within
the meaning of the law. If the dog was only casually upon
his premises, and was not being harbored by defendant as owners
usually harbor their dogs, then he was not the owner. In de-
termining how this was at the time of the alleged attack, you
will consider the defendant's former treatment of the dog, his
declarations concerning him, and the habit of the dog as to
staying at the defendant's place, if he was in the habit of stay-
ing there. 16
(2) The fact that the defendant or defendant's wife may have
been able to control the dog by calling him off or speaking to him
when he would run at any one, even if the jury believe this fact
proved, is not such a restraining as is contemplated by the law,
and would not relieve or excuse the defendant from the charge
of negligence if the other facts in said cause are proved that
would require the defendant to restrain his dog. 17
480. Dangerous obstructions in highway. (1) The way in
question was a highway which the defendant was bound to keep
in repair, and was liable to the plaintiff if he was injured by
a defect in it while he was traveling over it and using due care.
The defendant had a right to repair the road and to put the
mound of earth where it was for that purpose, but would be
bound to fence or guard it in some manner so as to prevent
travelers from injury by means of it. The defendant could
protect travelers from injury and the town from liability in
either of two ways: first, by placing and keeping a sufficient
guard or barrier at the place where the mound was, so. as to
keep travelers away from it; second, by placing and keeping
a suitable and sufficient fence or barrier across the highway at
the end of the part that was being constructed, so as to notify
travelers that the way was not for use and to prevent the us-
ing of it. If the defendant placed a proper and sufficient fence
or barrier across the way at the east end, the direction the
plaintiff came, sufficient and suitable to notify a person of or-
dinary prudence that the way was not for use, and such fence
IB O'Hara v. Miller, 64 Iowa, 462, " Dockerty v. Hutson, 125 Ind.
20 N. W. 760. 102, 25 N. E. 144.
481 OBSTRUCTIONS IN HIGHWAY, TURNPIKE. 481
or barrier was there in place at the close of the day of the
accident the defendant would not be liable. It is for the jury to
say whether the fence which was placed across the way at the
east end was suitable and sufficient. If the town attempted
to close the whole road by barriers, and knew or had reason
to know that those barriers had been constantly and repeatedly
taken down or left down, that knowledge is to be considered
by the jury in determining whether the defendant's precau-
tions were such as were reasonable. 18
(2) The county commissioners were bound to foresee and rea-
sonably provide against a common danger to ordinary travel
on the bridge. It may be taken as a well known fact that when
bicycles strike obstructions in their path, even though in the con-
trol of expert riders, they are apt to deviate from their course
and take a sudden and erratic direction, unexpected by the
riders, just as no one can foretell the conduct of a frightened
horse. The presence of guard rails or barriers at the point of
the accident would have been a protection from the danger
of going over the bridge, no matter what the movements of a
bicycle would be. The aptness of bicycles to deviate from their
course and to take sudden and unexpected direction when meet-
ing obstructions in their path was ordinary knowledge and to
be expected. If it were otherwise, it would be extraordinary,
because contrary to common observation and experience. The
county commissioners should have guarded against that which
was to be expected, and it will not excuse the negligence of
the commissioners, or make that negligence the remote cause
to assert that they could not foresee the peculiar aptness or
freak of a bicycle to take sudden and unexpected courses when
meeting obstacles in its path. The injury in the case must be
the natural and probable consequence of the neglect to have
had up guards or barriers, and the consequence is such as, under
the surrounding circumstances of this case, might and ought to
have been foreseen by the county commissioners. 19
481. Turnpike unsafe Liability. (1) If the jury believe
from the evidence that defendant corporation owned and kept
is Howard v. Inhabitants, 117 &c. v. Allman, 142 Ind. 573, 42 N.
Mass. 588. E. 206; Town of Boswell v. Wak-
19 Strader v. Monroe, 202 Pa. St. ley, 149 Ind. 64, 48 N. E. 637.
626, 51 Atl. 1100. But see Board,
482 DAMAGES INJURY TO PERSON.
open for public travel the turnpike road spoken of in evidence,
then it was the duty of defendant to make its said road in such
manner and in such condition as to make it safe for persons
traveling over the same, using ordinary care and caution while
so traveling; and if they shall further find that the defend-
ant negligently permitted a part of its road to be in an un-
safe and perilous condition for persons using the same with
ordinary care and caution, and that G, while traveling over said
road and said part and using ordinary care and caution, was
injured by the upsetting of the vehicle in which he was travel-
ing, as described in the evidence, and shall further find that
the said accident was caused by the 'negligence of the defend-
ant corporation in having its said road in an unsafe and peril-
ous condition for public travel at the place of accident, and
not by any negligence of the said G directly contributing there-
to, then the plaintiff is entitled to recover. 20
(2) The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show that the in-
jury complained of was caused by the defendant's negligence,
and that but for such negligence the injury would not have hap-
pened ; and further, that unless the jury should find from the pre-
ponderance of the testimony that the death of G was caused solely
by the defendant's negligence, the plaintiff was not entitled to
recover. 21
482. Injury to bicyclist on bridge. (1) Should you believe
from the evidence that the plaintiff was not expert, or was in-
experienced in the use of the wheel, yet she had a legal right
to use the bridge in question with her wheel, and it was the
duty of the county commissioners to have anticipated such use
and provided for the same, and their failure to do so was neg-
ligence, and the plaintiff is entitled to recover, provided she
was not guilty of contributory negligence. 22
(2) It is the law of this state that persons using bicycles on the
public highways and bridges are entitled to the same rights and
subject to the same restrictions in the use thereof as are prescribed
by the law in the case of persons using carriages drawn by
horses. 23
20 President, &c. v. S. 71 Md. 576, 627, 51 All. 1100; See City of Lo-
18 Atl. 884. gansport v. Kihm, 159 Ind. 68, 64
21 President, &c. v. S. 71 Md. 581, N. E. 595.
18 Atl. 884. 23 strader v. Monroe, 202 Pa. St.
22 Strader v. Monroe, 202 Pa. St. 627, 51 Atl. 1100.
483 ACCIDENTAL INJURY TO TRAVELER. 483
(3) The plaintiff in the use of her bicycle on the bridge in ques-
tion was not "bound to use the carriage drive, but had the right
to go over any part of the bridge open for travel. 24
(4) If the plaintiff knew of the existence of the obstruction, the
plank on the bridge, or saw it before she reached it, or was care-
less in not observing it, and then carelessly or imprudently ran in-
to it or on it and the accident resulted from such carelessness
and imprudence, then she cannot recover. She must show you
that she was reasonably careful and prudent as she rode across
the bridge at the point of the accident. She must satisfy you
of that first. If she has done so, then you may proceed to the
second question. 25
483. Accidental injury to traveler on highway. (1) If the
jury shall find that the turnpike road of the defendant at the
place in question was reasonably safe and fit to be driven upon
with a team of horses which were ordinarily gentle and man-
ageable, and that one of the horses of the deceased' was fright-
ened at an object which would not ordinarily have frightened
a gentle and well-broken horse, and that in consequence of
which the horse got beyond the control of the deceased and
that the wagon was upset and the death of G was caused by
his loss of control over said horse, then the verdict must be
for the defendant. 26
(2) The owner or driver of the horse being driven along the
highway is not responsible for the consequences of his horse run-
ning away or for injuries inflicted while the horses were out
of his control, provided he has used reasonable care in driving
and controlling them. The horses and truck of the defendant
were being lawfully used upon the highway at the time of the
collision with plaintiff's buggy; and if the collision occurred
while the driver had -temporarily lost control of the horse
by reason thereof, if you should find that he was thrown from the
truck in the manner that he has described, but if his loss of
control was not the result of want of care on his part, the
z* Strader v. Monroe, 202 Pa. St. plaintiff in actions for personal in-
627, 51 Atl. 1100. juries in Indiana: Indianapolis
25 Strader v. Monroe, 202 Pa. St. Street R. Co. v. Robinson, 157 Ind.
626, 51 Atl. 1100. The burden of 232, 61 N. E. 197.
disproving his own contributory 20 President, &c. v. S. 71 Md. 581,
negligence, does not rest on the 18 Atl. 884.
484 DAMAGES INJURY TO PERSON.
collision must be regarded as accidental, and the plaintiff could
not, under those circumstances, recover.- 7
Malpractice by Physician.
484. Negligence of doctor Liability. (1) If the jury be-
lieve from the evidence in this case that the plaintiff, having
broken his leg, employed the defendant as his physician and sur-
geon, to set and attend the same, and that the defendant, holding
himself out as a physician and surgeon, undertook and entered
upon such employment, and for a considerable time had charge
of the same, then the plaintiff was entitled to receive the care,
attention and skill of an ordinarily skilled physician and sur-
geon. And if, from the evidence in the case, the jury be-
lieve that the plaintiff did not receive from the defendant such
care, attention and skill, and that in consequence of not receiv-
ing the same, and without fault on his part, suffered increased
pain, suffering and injury, then the jury are instructed that
the defendant is liable, and the jury will render a verdict for
the plaintiff, and assess his damages, as found from all the
evidence in the case, at some amount not exceeding the sum
of three thousand dollars claimed by the plaintiff in his declara-
tion. 28
(2) If you find from the evidence that the defendant put the
plaintiff's leg in proper place and dressed it, you should in-
quire what means, if any, were used by him to keep it in place
and to guard against the effects of the ordinary and natural
movements of the plaintiff and his muscles in his then con-
dition ; and whether the responsibility of not providing such safe-
guards as were necessary and proper in the case rests with the
defendant. You should also consider what directions or instruc-
tions, if any, were given by the defendant, or whether any di-
rections or instructions were given, as to the necessity of remain-
ing quiet and not moving, or the dangerous results likely to
follow from undue motion. The responsibility for not giving such
instructions and directions as were necessary and proper rests
2T Silsby v. Michigan Car Co. 95 liday v. Gardner, 27 Ind. App. 231,
Mioh. 207, 54 N. W. 761. See Hoi- 59 N. E. 686, 61 N. E. 1.
28 Kendall v. Brown, 86 111. 388.
485 MALPRACTICE BY PHYSICIAN. 487
with the defendant, and if such directions and instructions were
necessary and proper, and he failed and neglected to give them,
you will be justified in considering such failure as negligence
and want of proper care and attention. 20
485. Physician required to exercise ordinary skill. A sur-
geon in the treatment of a fractured limb is not required to
have an infallible judgment or perfect skill. If he is possessed
of- ordinary knowledge and skill, and exercises them to the best
of his ability, he is not bound to warrant his judgment. Act-
ing in good faith, a physician or surgeon, possessed of reason-
able or ordinary skill, may do an act or adopt a treatment
which may do harm or produce a bad result, yet if done in
good faith and in the exercise of ordinary knowledge and skill
he would not be liable. 30
486. Patient must observe directions of doctor. If you find
that the injuries of which the plaintiff complains were caused
wholly or in part by his own acts or negligence, then he can-
not recover. It is the duty of the patient to observe and fol-
low the reasonable directions of his physician and surgeon. If
the plaintiff, after having been treated for some time by the
defendant, upon going away from the place where the treat-
ment had been given was instructed by the defendant to return
for further treatment as soon as he began to suffer pain, and
that, although he suffered pain, he neglected for a week to
return for treatment, this is a fact for you to take into con-
sideration, with the other facts in the case, in determining
whether the plaintiff himself was or was not negligent. 31
Unlawful Sale of Liquor.
487. Liability for selling intoxicating liquors. (1) It is un-
lawful and punishable for any person to furnish any intoxicating
liquors to one who is intoxicated or who is in the habit of
getting intoxicated at the time of so furnishing such liquors,
29 Wallace v. Ransdell, 90 Ind. so Jones v. Angell, 95 Ind. 382.
173, (held proper when taken in si Jones v. Angell, 95 Ind. 380.
connection with other instructions
given.)
488 DAMAGES INJURY TO PERSON. 486
unless given by a physician in the regular course of his prac-
tice. 82
(2) The amount of a sale is not material, nor is it material
that the sale should be the one which produced the final in-
toxication; but the saloon-keeper or the person furnishing in-
toxicating liquors is responsible for all damages which may
accrue as the result of his sales, if a person obtains but one
drink and then drinks at other places sufficient to intoxicate
him. And, if the death is established as a result of sales by
more than one person, you are not required to find which one
furnished the liquor that caused the death. 33
(3) If the jury believe from the evidence that the said C was
intoxicated at the time he upset and overturned his sled and
lost his team, and that the defendants sold any part of the
liquors that produced such intoxication, and that he upset his
sled and lost his team in consequence of such intoxication, and
that in endeavoring to reach home on foot he became exhaust-
ed, and that such exhaustion was caused by reason of his being
compelled to walk, and that he was unable to reach home and
was frozen to death, the defendants would be liable. 34
(4) If you should find from the evidence that the deceased
came to his death by violence inflicted by any other person, and
should further find that the person inflicting the violence was
intoxicated at the time, and that he obtained from the defend-
ants or either of them the liquors which caused his intoxica-
tion, and that he would not have used the violence that caused
the death except as a result of such intoxication, then, and in
that case, such of the defendants and their bondsmen as fur-
nished such intoxicating liquors would be equally liable. 35
488. Wife Selling to her husband Liability. (1) In a suit
brought by a wife or widow to recover for an injury to her means
of support, caused by the intoxication of her husband, produced,
in whole or in part, by intoxicating liquors sold or given to him
by the defendant or defendants (if such facts are shown by
32 Sibila v. Bahnez, 34 Ohio St. man, 29 Kas. 109; Smiser v. S. 17
399. Ind. App. 519, 47 N. E. 229.
ss Scott v. Chope, 33 Neb. 75. 49 34 Scott v. Chope, 33 Neb. 76, 49
N. W. 940. See Kearney v, Fitz- N. W. 940.
geral, 43 Iowa, 582; Jokers v. Borg- 35 Scott v. Chope, 33 Neb. 74, 49
N. W. 940.
487 DAMAGES IN SELLING LIQUORS. 490
the evidence), if it further appears, from the evidence, that
in consequence of such act of causing such intoxication, and
as a proximate result or consequence of such intoxication so
caused, she has sustained actual and real damages to her means
of support, then the jury may, in addition to the actual dam-
ages shown, give exemplary or vindictive damages, unless it
shall further appear, from the evidence, that such liquor was
sold or given to the husband, not by the defendants, but by
their agents or servants, and that the defendant or defendants
had forbidden his or their said agent or agents to sell or give
such liquor to said husband, and did not know of or permit
such sale or gift when made, in which case the defendants
would not be liable to exemplary or vindictive damages. 36
(2) The law requires that a husband shall provide for his wife
reasonable support according to her rank and station in society;
and to this end she is entitled with her husband and family to
share his property and the proceeds of his labor. 37
489. Transfer of liquor license Effect. (1) An individual
or partnership taking out a license for the sale of intoxicating
liquors cannot sell and transfer that license to another person
or party, and if they do sell and transfer their business, to-
gether with their rights under the license, the purchaser would
be holden to their agent, and they would be liable for all sales
made by him under and by virtue of such license. And if the
bondsmen of such license holder knew of such sale and trans-
fer, and took no steps to relieve themselves from liability, their
liability will continue. 38
(2) It would be the duty of a person going out of the saloon
business, selling and transferring his property, to return his li-
cense under which he was transacting business to the authority
granting the license and have the same canceled, and if he did not
do this, that he would be held liable for all damages accruing as
the result of the sales of intoxicating liquors by his successor in
business. 39
36 Betting v. Hobbett, 142 111. 76, 38 Scott v. Chope, 33 Neb. 75, 49
30 N. E. 1048. But see State v. N. W. 940. .License not transfer-
Knotts, 24 Ind. App. 477, 56 N. E. able: Pierce v. Pierce, 17 Ind. App.
941. 107, 46 N. E. 486.
37 Thill v. Pohlman, 76 Iowa, 639, 39 Scott v. Chope, 33 Neb. 75, 49
41 N. W. 385. N. W. 940.
491 DAMAGES INJURY TO PERSON. 488
490. Sales since commencing suit Evidence. If you find
from the evidence that since the commencement of this suit
the defendant has sold intoxicating liquors to G in violation
of law, that would afford no ground whatever for a recovery
on the part of the plaintiff; but if you find that the plaintiff
ought to recover on account of intoxicating liquors having been
sold to G, her husband, by the defendant for the four years
previous to the time of beginning this suit, you have a right
to consider the fact, if it is a fact, that it has been repeated and
the unlawful sales made since its commencement, for the purpose
of throwing light upon the mind of the defendant at the time he
sold such liquors to the said G during the four years prior
to 'the plaintiff's filing her petition; you have a right to con-
sider it in aggravation of her damages, or as a reason why
they should or may be increased. You cannot found her right
to recover upon any such sales, but the most you can do would
be to increase the amount of her recovery by way of exemplary
damages for such sales, -if she is otherwise entitled to a ver-
dict. 40
Libel and Slander.
491. Libel and slander defined. (1) Libel is defined by our
statute, so far as applicable to this case, as the malicious defama-
tion of a person, made public by any printing or writing tend-
ing to provoke him to wrath, or expose him to public hatred,
contempt or ridicule, or to deprive him of the benefits of public
confidence and social intercourse. 41
(2) Slander may be defined to be the false, wilful and malicious
speaking or publishing by another of any defamatory words,
charging him with being guilty of a felony or crime. 42
492. Malice an essential element. (1) Malice is essential to
the support of an action for slanderous words; but if one false-
ly, wrongfully and wilfully charges another with a felony, the
law will imply malice until the contrary is shown. 43
(2) If in this case the jury find that defendant spoke the slan-
40 Bean v. Green, 33 Ohio St. 457. 42 Slallings v. Newman, 26 Ala.
41 Dever v. Clark, 44 Kas. 752, 303.
25 Pac. 205. Slallings v. Newman, 26 Ala.
303.
489 LIBEL AND SLANDER. 494:
derous words as charged in the second and third counts of plain-
tiff's petition, then the law presumes they were spoken malicious-
ly, and it is not necessary to prove any express malice in order to
warrant a verdict for the plaintiff. 44
(3) If you find that the information was made and filed without
probable cause, or without honestly believing that the statements
therein were true, but was done to injure the plaintiff in his good
name and reputation, or for some advantage over him, then the
law would imply malice, and you should find for the plaintiff. 45
493. Slanderer's words must be proved. (1) In this action,
to authorize the plaintiff to recover, it is necessary for him to
prove that the defendant maliciously and falsely spoke of and
concerning the plaintiff, the words charged in his declaration.,
or some of them; and when plaintiff proves, to the satisfaction
of the jury, that defendant falsely and maliciously spoke or
uttered of and concerning plaintiff, the words charged in the
declaration, then he may recover such damages as he has sus-
tained. 46
(2) If you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the-
defendant spoke the words, in substance, as alleged in the com-
plaint, that he intended in the use of said words to say and
charge that the plaintiff had been guilty of the crime of lar-
ceny, and that said words were spoken maliciously and in the
presence of some person other than the plaintiff, then you should
find for the plaintiff. 47
(3) The jury are the sole judges as to whether the article com-
plained of is libelous. 48
494. Proof of part of words may be sufficient. (1) All the
words laid in the plaintiff's declaration need not be proved
to maintain the action, unless it takes them all to constitute
the slander, and if the jury believe from the evidence that a
sufficient number of the words laid in the declaration to amount
in their common acceptation to a charge of fornication against
44 Lewis v. McDonald, 82 Mo. 582. ing the idea that other words with
45 Comfort v. Young, 100 Iowa, the same meaning would be suffi-
629, 69 N. W. 1032. cienit.)
46 SMlings v. Newman, 26 Ala. 4s McCloskey v. Pulitzer Pub. Co.
303. 152 Mo. 346, 53 S. W. 1087. But see
47 Durrah v. Stillwell. 59 Ind. 142, Alcoro v. Bass, 17 Ind. App. 500.
(held not objectionable as convey-
495 DAMAGES INJURY TO PERSON. 490
the plaintiff have been proved to have been spoken by the de-
fendant, B, then they must find for the plaintiff. 40
(2) If the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant
spoke of and concerning the plaintiff in the presence and hearing
of T, or others as mentioned, the words in the petition alleged,
to wit: "T killed my hogs, and I can prove it, and he is the
biggest thief on this creek, and I can prove by M and his
boys that he has stolen my hogs;" or that enough of the words
stated in the petition have been proved to (substantially) con-
stitute the charge imputed to plaintiff, then the jury must find
for the plaintiff. 50
(3) The plaintiffs are not bound to prove the speaking of the
words charged in the petition. If the jury believe from the evi-
dence that the defendant spoke of and concerning the plaintiff,
in the presence and hearing of others, any of the slanderous words
charged in the petition ? the fair import of which would be to
charge the plaintiff with being a whore, then she is entitled to a
verdict. 51
(4) The defendant is charged by plaintiff with speaking of
plaintiff the following words : " T killed my hogs, and I can prove
it; he is the biggest thief on this creek, and I can prove it by
M. and his boys that he has stolen my hogs;" and with speak-
ing of plaintiff the following words: "T's water gates were
traps to steal other people's stock in;" and unless they be-
lieve from the evidence that defendant spoke of plaintiff the
said words, or so much of the said words as may be sufficient
to constitute a charge that plaintiff stole hogs, or was a hog
thief, they must find the issue in this cause for the defendant. 52
495. Words libelous in themselves. (1) To print and publish
concerning any person that he has been a convict in the state
penitentiary of the state of Kansas, is libelous per se, unless
the same is true; and in this connection you are instructed
that there was no attempt on the part of the defendant in this
case to prove the truth of the matter charged as libelous, or
to show that the same was published for justifiable ends. 53
49 Baker v. Young, 44 111. 43. 52 Lewis v. McDaniels, 82 Mo. 583,
so Lewis v. McDaniel. 82 Mo. 583. 53 S. v. Brady, 44 Kas. 436, 24 Pac.
11 Boldt v. Budwig, 19 Neb. 742, 948.
28 N. W. 280.
491 WOKDS LIBELOUS IN THEMSELVES. 496
(2) Words charging a woman with being a whore are action-
able in themselves, and the law presumes that a party uttering
them intended maliciously to injure the person against whom they
are spoken, unless the contrary appears from the circumstances,
occasion or manner of the speaking of the words; but all that
the plaintiffs are bound to prove in the case to entitle them
to recover is the speaking by the defendant of enough of the
slanderous words charged in the petition to amount to a charge
that the plaintiff was a whore, and express malice or ill will
need not be proved; but if the jury believe from the evidence
that plaintiff has failed to prove enough of the words to amount
to a charge that plaintiff was a whore, then plaintiff cannot
recover, and your verdict should be for the defendant. 54
(3) Although the plaintiff alleges in his petition that he has, on
account of the publications complained of, sustained a damage
of one thousand dollars on account of each of said publica-
tions, it is not necessary for him to prove any specific damage;
for the law presumes that his official duties as a public officer
were honestly performed, and his professional obligations prop-
erly discharged; and an article which tends to hold him up to
the public view as an unskilled lawyer and an incompetent
officer, is libelous 'per se (per se meaning of itself), and en-
titles the plaintiff to damages, unless the defendant establishes
the truth of said publication by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. 55
(4) Both of the articles complained of by the plaintiff in
his petition, copies of which articles are attached to said peti-
tion, are libelous in themselves, and unless the defendant proves
them to be true, by a preponderance of the evidence, then
the plaintiff would be entitled to recover such damages as he
has sustained by the publication of said articles. 50
496. Charging another with committing a crime. (1) To
charge one of murder in killing another is actionable and slan-
derous, and, falsely and maliciously spoken, warrants a recovery
of such damages as the jury may think the party has sustained,
commensurate with the injury sustained. 57
54 Boldt v. Budwig, 19 Neb. 743, so Dever v. Clark, 44 Kas. 752,
28 N. W. 280. 25 Pac. 205.
55 Dever v. Clark, 44 Kais. 753, RT Stallings v. Newman, 26 Ala.
25 Pac. 205. 303.
497 DAMAGES INJURY TO PERSON. 492
(2) The plaintiff did not commit the crime of larceny in taking
this ice, and no one now claims in this case that he did. And
if defendant's language used on the occasion complained of,
taken as a whole and all of it, did not, according to its fair
meaning under the circumstances, charge plaintiff with larceny,
or if the hearers did not understand that it charged him with
larceny, but that it simply charged him with doing some un-
fair or improper or dishonest thing, not amounting to larceny,
as the hearers understood it, then defendant is not guilty, for
then he would not charge the plaintiff with crime, and the charge
of crime is the gist of the alleged slander. 58
(3) If the language of the defendant under the circumstances
did not charge the plaintiff with larceny, and if none of the hear-
ers understood it as charging him with larceny, then the de-
fendant is not guilty. 59
497. Publication Letter so held. If the jury believe from
the evidence that on the eighth day of February, 1899, the wit-
ness W, was in the employ of the defendant as a stenographer
and typewriter in the office and business of the defendant, and
on said day said defendant dictated to the witness, W, the
typewritten words and figures in the letter of date of February
8, and set out in the first count of the declaration and offered
in evidence, and that said witness, W, took down said dicta-
tion in shorthand characters upon paper, and thereafter and on
the same day copied the same upon a typewriting machine upon
the business paper of the defendant, and in the form and man-
ing appearing in said letter offered in evidence, and after said let-
ter was thus typewritten the defendant subscribed his name there-
to in his proper handwriting, and thereafter said letter was copied
by a letter-press machine into the letter book of the defend-
ant by the witness, "W, in the course of her said employment
in the business of the defendant, then such action in law con-
stitutes a writing and publication by said defendant of the mat-
ters and things appearing in said letter, and if the jury further
find that the person therein mentioned and referred to is the
s Ellis v. Whitehead, 95 Mich. Ellis v. WMtehead, 95 Mich.
115, 54 N. W. 752. 115, 54 N. W. 752.
493 MEASURE OF DAMAGES PUNITIVE DAMAGES. 499
plaintiff, then the plaintiff is entitled to recover under the first
count of the declaration. 60
498. Measure of damages Considerations. (1) If from the
evidence and the instructions of the court the jury find for the
plaintiffs, then the jury are to determine from all the evidence
and the circumstances as proved on the trial what damages ought
to be given to the plaintiff, and find their verdict accordingly,
but not exceeding the amount claimed. In finding the measure
of damages the jury may take into consideration the mental
suffering produced, if any, by the uttering of the slanderous
words, if they believe from the evidence that such suffering
has been endured by the plaintiff, and the" present or probable
future injury, if any, to the plaintiff's character, which the ut-
tering of the words was calculated to inflict. If you find for
the plaintiff, she will be entitled to at least nominal damages
without proof of actual damages. 01
(2) If the jury find from the evidence that the defendant, P.,
uttered the words as set forth in the plaintiff's declaration,
then in estimating the amount of damages they may take into
consideration all the attending facts and circumstances under
which the defendant made such utterance, in mitigation of the
damages, and further, that in estimating the damages the jury
may consider the degree of malice on the part of the said de-
fendant. 02
499. Punitive damages When proper. (1) If the jury be-
lieve from the evidence that the defendant is guilty of utter-
ing the slanderous words charged in the plaintiff's declaration,
they may take into consideration the pecuniary circumstances
of the defendant and his position and influence in society in
estimating the amount of damages; and if they shall also find
from the evidence that the defendant obtruded himself into the
plaintiff's house and there offered undue familiarities to the
plaintiff's wife, at the time and on the occasion of the uttering of
the words in question, there circumstances may also be taken into
consideration in fixing the amount of damages, and the jury, in
so Gambrill v. Schooley, 93 Md. 62 Padgett v. Sweeting, 65 Md.
49, 48 Atl. 730. 405, 4 All. 887.
si Boldt v. Budwig, 19 Neb. 743,
28 N. W. 280.
500 DAMAGES INJURY TO PERSON. 494
their discretion, may give damages by way of punishment to
the defendant, proportioned to the circumstances in evidence as
well- as for compensation. 63
(2) In actions for slander the law implies damages from the
speaking of actionable words, and also that the defendant intend-
ed the injury which the slander is calculated to effect, and in case
the jury find a verdict of guilty, they are to determine from all
the facts and circumstances in the case what damages ought to be
given, and are not confined to mere pecuniary loss or injury. 6 *
(3) If the defendant published the paper in manner and form
as alleged, and injury resulted to the plaintiff from and by reason
of such publication, he will be entitled to recover such damages
as he has directly sustained; and in estimating compensatory
damages you may take into consideration and include reason-
able fees of counsel employed by the plaintiff in the prosecu-
tion of his action. If the publication was made with a bad
motive or wicked intention, you may go beyond mere compen-
sation and award vindictive or punitive damages that is, dam-
ages by way of punishment. 65
500. Matters in mitigation. (1) Anger is no justification for
the use of slanderous words, and it ought not to be considered
even in mitigation of damages, unless the anger is provoked by the
person against whom the slanderous words were used, and in
this case, if the jury believe from the evidence that the de-
fendant, B, spoke of the plaintiff any of the slanderous words
charged in the petition, then it matters not who commenced
the conversation, and that the defendant was angry at the time,
unless her anger was wrongfully provoked in whole or in part
by the acts or language of the plaintiff herself. 66
(2) Evidence introduced under a plea of justification charging
the plaintiff with having committed a crime, tending to prove his
guilt, but not establishing his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
cannot constitute a complete defense and bar to the action, but
may be considered in mitigation of damages. 67
es Hosley v. Brooks, 20 111. 117. 66 Boldt v. Budwig, 14 Neb. 743,
64 Baker v. Young, 44 111. 44, 28 N. W. 280.
' (held not assuming the guilt of - Tucker v. Call, 45 Ind. 31. By
the defendant.) a recent Indiana statute the ru'e
es Finney v. Smith, 31 Ohio St. that an answer in justification
529. must be proved beyond a reason-
495 MATTERS IN MITIGATION. 501
(3) If defendant at the time he spoke the words complained of
stated that he had heard such a report from others and gave
it as a matter of rumor, and he has proved that he heard it,
then while it would not amount to a justification, for no one
has a right, even through idle wantonness, to keep a slanderous
report afloat against another, yet it may be considered as tend-
ing to show that he did not originate the story in malice, and
given its due weight in mitigation of damages. 68
(4) For the purpose of rebutting and repelling the idea of mal-
ice, the defendant has the right to prove and explain all the facts
and circumstances surrounding the speaking of the words ; also,
he has the right to show and explain all the facts and circum-
stances surrounding the speaking of the words in mitigation of
damages. 69
(5) In this case thexe is no justification pleaded, but only a
general denial and a plea of mitigation, and the publication
is admitted in the pleadings. Under the evidence and the plead-
ings the defendant can only mitigate the damages. 70
501. Good faith Probable cause. (1) If the jury believe
from the evidence that the libelous matter, complained of by the
plaintiff, was composed and published in the due course of ju-
dicial procedure by the defendants, and that said defendants
had reasonable cause for belief, and did actually believe, that
the said matter was pertinent to the case they sought to make,
and the relief they prayed for, then the jury will find for the
defendants. 71
(2) The real question for you to determine first in this case is,
was the information made by the defendant and filed by
him honestly and in good faith, upon probable cause, he believing
at the time that the plaintiff was insane, or laboring under an
insane delusion, and was the act done for a laudable purpose,
to protect himself, his property or society? And if you find from
the preponderance of the credible evidence in the case that it was
so done, then your verdict should be for the defendant. 72
able doubt is abrogated in Indiana, 69 Slallings v. Newman, 26 Ala.
and proof by a preponderance of 304.
the evidence is now sufficient. Acts TO Jones v. Murray, 167 Mo. 49,
1897, p. 137, Burns' R. S. 1901 66 S. W. 981.
(Ind.), 376c. 71 Johnson v. Brown, 13 W. Va.
ss Hinkle v. Davenport, 38 Iowa, 91.
364. 72 Comfort v. Young, 100 Iowa,
629, 69 N. W. 1032.
502 DAMAGES INJURY TO PERSON. 496
502. Degree of proof in justification. (1) The testimony, to
sustain the plea of justification, should be as certain and con-
clusive as would be required to justify a conviction for the
larceny, if the plaintiff were indicted for the offense such as
leaves no doubt in the minds of the jury of the truth of the
charge. 73
Malicious Prosecution.
503. Arrest without a warrant. (1) It is the duty of a sheriff
on arresting a person without a warrant for an offense com-
mitted within his view, or when he arrests a person without
a warrant upon information when he has reasonable or probable
cause to believe that such person has committed a felony, in
either case without delay, and as soon as he can reasonably do
so, to take the person whom he has placed under arrest be-
fore some magistrate to be charged by affidavit with some of-
fense. Such an arrest can only be made and the person held
for such purpose. If the officer shall fail to take the person so
arrested before a magistrate as required by law, then he is
liable to such person in an action for damages. 74
(2) No officer is justified in making an arrest without a warrant
when the person whom he arrests is peaceable and not engaged in
open violence, as, for example, by fighting, engaging in a riot, or
about to escape after committing a felony. 75
(3) This is an action commenced by the plaintiff against the de-
fendant for the illegal arrest of the plaintiff by the defendant
under circumstances of aggravation as alleged by the plain-
tiff. Under the laws of this state, no civil officer has the right
to arrest a citizen unless he has a warrant, and if demand be
made, to exhibit it; or unless some offense against the crim-
inal law is being committed by the person arrested in the pres-
ence of the officer. 76
(4) The law does not look with favor on arrests made without
a warrant, and an arrest without a warrant cannot be justified
if the person arrested was not engaged in a breach of the peace,
73 Wonderly v. Nokes, 8 Blackf. 75 Pinkerton v. Verberg, 78 Mich.
(Ind.) 589. See ante 500. n. 67. 580, 44 N. W. 579.
74 Harness v. Steele, 159 Ind. 293, Hall v. O'Malley, 49 Tex. 70.
64 N. E. 875.
497 MALICIOUS PROSECUTION. 504
as, for example, in fighting, or in a riot, or about to escape after
having committed a felony. 77
(5) It is no defense that the sheriff supposed he had a capias;
nor had he any right to know there was an indictment for a mis-
demeanor or any other -indictment against M, the plaintiff. Until
a capias was issued and placed in his hands, he had no right
to arrest M, nor in any manner to molest him, because there
may have been an indictment, if there was one. 78
(6) If the jury shall find that the plaintiff was at the time she
was arrested walking on the street without molesting any one,
then she was not committing any act that would justify the
defendant in arresting her without a warrant, and his act in
arresting her was unjustifiable, and the burden is on him to
justify the act. 79
(7) If the jury shall find that the plaintiff, at the time she was
arrested by the defendant, was conducting herself in an orderly
manner, and not committing any breach of the peace, then the de-
fendant had no right or authority to arrest her. 80
504. Probable cause for prosecution. (1) The court further
instructs the jury, that to constitute a probable cause for a
criminal prosecution there must be a reasonable ground of sus-
picion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in them
selves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that the person
accused is guilty of the offense charged. 81
(2) If the jury believe from all the facts and circumstances
as given in evidence that the defendant had not a probable cause
for the prosecution of the plaintiff, they may infer malice from
such want of probable cause. 82
(3) Though probable cause cannot be inferred from malice,
yet in determining whether there was or was not probable cause,
the fact, if such is the fact, that there was ill will or malice, may
be considered. 83
(4) If the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant
77 Plnkerton v. Verberg, 78 Mich. 81 Chapman v. Cawrey, 50 111. 517.
580, 44 N. W. 579. 2 Chapman v. Cawry, 50 111. 517;
TS Hall v. O'Malley, 49 Tex. 70. Ray v. Goings, 112 111. 662.
79 Pinkerton v. Verberg, 78 Mich. *s Evansville & T. H. R. Co. v.
580, 44 N. W. 579. Talbot, 131 Ind. 223, 29 N. E. 1134.
so Pinkerton v. Verberg, 78 Mich.
580, 44 N. W. 579.
505 DAMAGES INJURY TO PERSON. 498
maliciously caused the arrest and imprisonment of the plaintiff
without a probable cause, as alleged in the plaintiff's declara-
tion, they will find for the plaintiff, and may assess his dam-
ages at such sum as they may think proper, from the facts
or circumstances of the case, not exceeding the sum of five
thousand dollars. 84
(5) If the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant
had probable cause to institute the criminal proceedings against
the plaintiff, then the plaintiff cannot recover. Probable cause is
defined to be a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cau-
tious man in the belief that the person accused is guilty of the
offense of which he is charged. 85
(6) The burden of proof in this case is upon the plaintiff to
show that the defendant, in instituting the prosecution before
a justice of the peace, for malicious mischief, acted without
probable cause, and if they believe, from the evidence, that the
plaintiff has failed to show a want of such probable cause by a
preponderance of the evidence, then the jury will find for the
defendant. 86
(7) If the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant
honestly believed that the plaintiff had committed a crime, breach
of the peace, or misdemeanor, or had threatened to commit a
crime, misdemeanor or breach of the peace, and if the defendant's
belief was founded on circumstances tending to show that he had
committed, or was about to commit such offense, such belief, so
founded, negatives the idea of want of probable cause for the pros-
ecution, and the jury will find for the defendant. 87
505. Unlawful arrest Liability. (1) The defendants act-
ing as a board of police commissioners, or a majority thereof,
had no right to order the arrest of the plaintiff for publicly wear-
ing the uniform and badge prescribed by said "board for the
police force. 88
(2) If the jury shall believe from the evidence that the defen-
dants, whether acting as the board of police commissioners or as
individuals did issue an order for the arrest of the plaintiff for so
s* Chapman v. Cawrey, 50 111. 517. s? Chapman v. Cawrey, 50 111. 518.
SB Calif v. Thomas, 81 111. 486. ss Bolton v. Vellines, 94 Va. 399,
ss Calif v. Thomas, 81 111. 486. 26 S. E. 847.
499 ADVICE OF COUNSEL AS DEFENSE. 506
wearing such uniform, and that because of such order, so issued,
the said plaintiff was arrested and imprisoned, then they must
find for the plaintiff. 89
(3) If the jury believe from the evidence that the plaintiff has
not committed any offense alleged in the defendant's pleas, and
that both the defendants concurred in laying hands on him and
arresting him, then the jury are instructed that they should find
both defendants guilty, and assess the plaintiff's damages. 90
(4) If one merely announces his intention of arresting a per-
son, such person is not justified in shooting him, although the
former's official character is not known to the latter, and although,
in fact, the arrest would be unwarrantable. 01
506. Advice of counsel as a defense. (1) Before the de-
fendant can shield himself by the advice of counsel, it must ap-
pear from the evidence that he made in good faith a full, fair and
honest statement of all the material circumstances bearing upon
the supposed guilt of the plaintiff which were within the knowl-
edge of the defendant, or which the defendant could, by the
exercise of ordinary care, have obtained, to a respectable at-
torney in good standing, and that the defendant in good faith
acted upon the advice of said attorney in instituting and car-
rying on the prosecution against the plaintiff. 92
(2) The burden of proof is upon the defendant to prove that
he sought counsel with an honest purpose to be informed as to the
law, and that he was in good faith guided by such advice in
causing the arrest of the plaintiff, and that whether or not the
defendant did, before instituting the criminal proceedings, make
a full, correct and honest disclosure to his attorney or attorneys
of all the material facts bearing upon the guilt of the plaintiff of
which he had knowledge, and whether, in commencing such pro-
ceedings, the defendant was acting in good faith upon the advice
of his counsel are questions of fact to be determined by the jury
from all the evidence and circumstances proved in the case. And
if the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant did not
make a full, correct and honest disclosure of all such facts to
89 Bolton y. Vellines, 94 Va. 399, 01 Ready v. P. (Colo.), 77 Pac.
26 S. E. 847. 895.
o Mullin v. Spangenberg, 112 111. ^ Roy v. Goings, 112 111. 663.
140.
507 DAMAGES INJURY TO PERSON. 500
his counsel, but that he instituted the criminal prosecution from
a fixed determination of' his own, rather than from the opinion
of counsel, then such advice can avail nothing in this suit. 93
(3) If the defendant consulted counsel as a means of covering
malice, and did not believe the advice given him, or that the
plaintiff was guilty of the crime charged against him, but com-
menced the prosecution as a means to get rid of the liability on
the note in question, then the fact that he consulted counsel
cannot avail him. 94
(4) If you believe from the evidence that the defendant con-
sulted an attorney, and made a full and fair representation to him
of the facts ; that said attorney advised the prosecution, and that
the defendant acted in good faith on such advice, then you
should find for the defendant. 95
507. Essential elements of a cause. (1) Before the plaintiff
can recover in this case he must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence, first, that he was charged with the crime of embezzle-
ment ; second, that he was arrested on said charge ; third, that
he was tried and acquitted on said charge; fourth, that the
defendants, or such of them as are liable, if any, caused the arrest
of the plaintiff, or were instrumental therein, or in some way
voluntarily aided or abetted in the prosecution of the plaintiff;
fifth, that such prosecution was malicious and without probable
cause. 96
(2) If you believe from the evidence that the defendant
did no other acts in connection with the trespass charged
in the complaint, except to bring an action before a justice of the
peace for the possession of the tract of land on which the house
described in the complaint is situated, as landlord against D as
his tenant and prosecute the action to judgment, procure a writ
of possession to be issued thereon and placed in hands of a
special constable for service, and to be present in the public high-
way ready to receive the possession of the premises when the
as Jones v. Morris 97 Va. 44, 33 506. See, Flora v. Russell, 138 Ind.
S. E. 377. 153, 37 N. E. 593.
94 McCarthy v. Kitchen, 59 Ind. Evansville & T. H. R. Co. v.
505. Talbot, 131 Ind. 223, 29 N. E. 1134.
95 McCarthy v. Kitchen, 59 Ind.
501 DAMAGES TO PERSONAL PROPERTY. 509
same should be delivered to him by said constable, he cannot be
held liable in this action. 97
508. Estimating damages. (1) In estimating damages, the
jury are not to be confined to actual damages, but are at liberty
to assess damages proportionate to the circumstances of outrage
attending the illegal arrest. The limit of the sum, if you find
for plaintiff, is as you shall find, but less than - - dollars. 98
(2) In the event you should find for the plaintiff, in fixing the
amount of damages you may take into consideration every cir-
cumstance of the acts of his arrest and prosecution, and also
every act which injuriously affected the plaintiff, if any, not only
in his person, but his peace of mind and individual happiness. 99
Damage to Personal Property.
509. Unlawful seizure of property Liability. (1) It is for
the jury to determine from all the evidence in the case and the
facts and circumstances proved, whether the piano in question
was the property of the plaintiff or that of the defendants at the
time the same is alleged to have been taken from the house of the
plaintiff, and the jury should determine this from the evidence;
and they are not bound to take the copy of the agreement in re-
spect to the piano introduced in evidence as conclusive upon this
point, but should consider the entire evidence in the case ; and if
the jury believe from the entire evidence that the defendants, B
and B, sold said piano to the plaintiff at an agreed price of five
hundred and ninety-five dollars, with a discount of forty dollars,
to be paid for in monthly installments, and if the jury further be-
lieve from the evidence, and from all the circumstances proved in
the case, that the plaintiff had fully paid the agreed price to the
defendants at the time of the alleged taking of the piano by
them ; and if the jury further believe from the evidence that the
dwelling house of the plaintiff was broken into against the will
of the plaintiff and the said piano carried away by the direction
97 Steele v, Davis, 75 Ind. 197. 98 Hall v. O'Malley, 49 Tex. 71.
See this case for an, instruction 99 Fisher v. Hamilton, 49 Ind. 349.
held proper as to the justice of the
peace who was made a co-defend-
ant.
510 DAMAGES TO PERSONAL PROPERTY. 502
or connivance of the defendants, the jury should find for the
plaintiff and against the defendants, or such of them as it is
shown by the evidence, participated, aided and encouraged in
the commission of the acts complained of. 100
510. Landlord seizing tenant's property. (1) If you be-
lieve from the evidence that the plaintiff, O, was removing, was
about to remove, or had within thirty days before the issuance of
the said attachment removed any of his effects from the leased
premises (whether with a fraudulent purpose or not, or whether
any rent was then due or not), then such removal, or contemplat-
ed removal, was of itself sufficient cause for the said attachment,
and the plaintiff is not entitled to recover anything in this action
unless you believe that there was or would have been left on the
premises property liable to distress sufficient to satisfy a year's
rent. 101
(2) If you believe from the evidence that there was a deed of
trust on the property attached to P, trustee, made by the plaintiff
after the property was carried on the leased premises, and such
trustee intended to remove any of the said property from the
leased premises, by sale or otherwise, not leaving sufficient prop-
erty on the leased premises to satisfy a year's rent, and without
securing to the landlord a year's rent, such intention on the part
of said trustee was of itself sufficient cause for suing out the said
attachment. 102
(3) If you believe from the evidence that the attachment sued
out by defendants against the plaintiff was sued out with suffi-
cient cause, then the jury will find a verdict for the defendants ;
and the burden of showing the absence of sufficient cause rests
upon the plaintiff. 103
511. Damages for seizure How estimated. (1) If you
find that the plaintiff is entitled to recover, then, in arriving:
at the amount of your verdict, you must take into consideration
the market value of the goods in question at the time of the
seizure ; and, in arriving at this market value, you have the right
to consider the question as to whether the condition of the goods
100 Bauer v. Bell, 74 111. 226. 102 Offterdinger v. Ford, 92 Va.
101 Offterdinger v. Ford, 92 Va. 644, 24 S. E. 246.
644, 24 S. E. 246. 103 Offterdinger v. Ford, 92 Va.
644, 24 S. E. 246.
503 KILLING STOCK, LIABILITY. 513
had changed between the day of the seizure and the day of the
sale and you may also consider in this connection the amount
that these goods brought at public auction under the execution
sale as bearing upon this question, as bearing upon the market
value at the time of the seizure uid upon the amount of your
verdict. 104
(2) If you find from the evidence that the plaintiff was enti- 1
tied to recover, she can only recover the actual value of the goods
at the time of the seizure, and when arriving at this value you
have the right to take into consideration all the evidence in the
case as to the character and condition of the goods, whether new
or second hand, or in good or bad condition, and also the evi-
dence of the length of time the goods have been in stock, how they
have been used, and how long in stock, and the fact that they
have passed from hand to hand for a number of years. 105
512. Killing stock Liability. (1) If the .defendant's
horse was at the time trespassing in the plaintiff's field on plain-
tiff's land, or on the land of a third person where the plaintiff
was pasturing his horse by the month for a consideration paid
by the plaintiff to such owner, and there attacked and killed the
plaintiff's horse, the defendant is liable for the injury, whether
he knew or not of the vicious propensity of his horse. 106
(2) If the jury find that the defendant's horse was in pasture
on his wife 's premises, and while there broke over her part of the
partition fence, separating her lands from the field in which the
plaintiff's horse was being rightfully pastured by him, the de-
fendant's horse was unlawfully in the place where the plaintiff's
horse was on pasture, and in such case, if the jury find that he
killed the plaintiff's horse, the defendant is liable to the plaintiff
for the injury, whether his horse was in fact vicious or not, and
whether he knew of such viciousness or not. 107
513. Damages from diseased cattle. (1) If you believe
from the evidence that the defendant, A, brought or caused to be
brought into R County, this state, Texas cattle, or cattle liable
104 Showman v. Lee, 86 Mich. 564, ioe Morgan v. Hudnell, 52 Ohio
49 N. W. 578. St. 552, 40 N. E. 716.
105 Showman v. Lee, 86 Mich. 564, 107 Morgan v. Hudnell, 52 Ohio
49 N. W. 578. St. 552, 40 N. E. 716.
513 DAMAGES TO PERSONAL PROPERTY. 504
to communicate Texas, Spanish or splenic fever to the domestic
cattle of this state, and that said cattle came from the country
south of this state between the first day of March, 1884, and the
first day of November, 1884, and that the defendant knew or had
reason to know or could by ordinary diligence have known thai
said cattle were diseased cattle, or were cattle liable to communi-
cate Texas, Spanish or splenic fever to the domestic cattle of this
state ; or if the defendant knew or could with ordinary diligence
have known that such cattle were diseased with said disease and
were liable to Gommunicate it to the domestic cattle of this state,
and such cattle so brought or caused to be brought into said R
county communicated such disease to the domestic cattle of the
plaintiff, and thereby the plaintiff's cattle died, you will find for
the plaintiff for the value of such cattle as she lost as shown by
the evidence. 108
(2) If you find from the evidence that the defendant, A, pur-
chased the cattle described in the petition in good faith in - - in
this state, without any knowledge that said cattle were infected
with Texas, Spanish or splenic fever, and that he had no reason to
believe that such cattle could or would communicate to cattle of
this state, Texas, Spanish or splenic fever, and that he did not
know or have reason to believe or know that such cattle would
or could communicate the Texas, Spanish or splenic fever to the
cattle of this state, until they arrived at R, and that the sheriff
immediately seized such cattle by virtue of a process issued by
W, a justice of the peace, and before the plaintiff's cattle had
been exposed and were by the sheriff placed in quarantine, and
the defendant, A, was deprived of any control over said cattle,
and that during the time the said cattle were quarantined by the
sheriff, and the defendant deprived of the control of said cattle,
the plaintiff's cattle took such disease by going upon said quaran-
tined ground, either while the defendant's cattle were there in
the custody of the sheriff or his deputy or after they were
removed therefrom, then the plaintiff cannot recover in the
action. 109
i8 Patee v. Adams, 37 Kas. 135, 109 Patee v. Adams, 37 Kas. 135,
14 Pac. 505. 14 Pac. 505.
CHAPTER XXXVIII.
FRAUDULENT TRANSACTIONS.
Sec. Sec.
514. The law presumes men act 522. Fraud practiced in sale of
fairly. land resulting in damages.
515. Fraudulent representations 523. Contracts between husband
resulting in damages. and wife scrutinized.
516. Fraudulent representations in 524. Fraudulent assignment to
sale of stocks. compel compromise.
517. Contracts made to defeat 525. Fraud in reference to indebt-
creditors, void. edness.
518. Innocent purchaser for fair 526. Contract made under compul-
consideration, protected. sion may be avoided.
519. Purchaser knowing fraudu- 527. What constitutes duress to
lent intent of seller. avoid contract.
520. Opinion as to value not basis 528. Gambling contracts On mar-
of fraud. kets.
521. Sureties induced to sign bond
by fraud.
514, The law presumes men act fairly and honestly. (1)
Fraud is never to be presumed but must be proved by the party
who alleges it. The law presumes that all men are fair and
honest, that their dealings are in good faith and without intention
to cheat, hinder, delay or defraud others ; and if any transaction
called in question is equally capable of two constructions, one
that is fair and honest and the other dishonest, then, in that case,
the law presumes the transaction to be fair and honest. 1
(2) The law presumes that persons in their dealings intend to
conduct them honestly; and where a transaction which is chal-
lenged will admit equally of an honest or a dishonest construc-
tion, it is the duty of the jury to accept the former, that is, to
accept the honest construction. 2
i Schroeder v. Walsh, 120 111. 410, 2 Detroit Elec. & L. P. Co. v. Ap-
11 N. E. 70. plebaum (Mich.), 94 N. W. 12.
505
515 FRAUDULENT TRANSACTIONS. 506
(3) Fraud is odious in contemplation of law and not to be pre-
sumed, and the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to overcome
such legal presumption by evidence satisfactory to the jury. 3
(4) Fraud is odious in contemplation of law and not to be pre-
sumed, but must be proved by the party alleging it. The law
presumes that all men are fair and honest in their dealings with
others, and that they act in good faith and without intention to
cheat, hinder, delay or defraud ; and where a transaction which
is challenged admits equally of an honest or dishonest construc-
tion, it is the duty of the jury to accept and adopt the former,
that is, the construction in favor of honesty and fair dealing.*
(5) If the jury find there was a sale by to plaintiff of the
property in controversy, then you will inquire into and determine
the character of this sale; that is, determine from the evidence
whether or not it was fraudulent. It is alleged by defendants
that it was and is fraudulent, and you are instructed that the
burden of proving the same rests upon the defendants, and they
must do so by a fair preponderance of the evidence ; and you are
instructed that the law presumes that all persons transact their
business honestly and in good faith, until the contrary appears
from the preponderance of the evidence ; and, in this case, if you
find there was a sale as claimed, ifc will be presumed that
plaintiff and acted honestly and in good faith in making the
same, until such time as the defendants, who allege the contrary,
establish the same by a fair preponderance of the evidence; and
if the case is left in equipoise then the defendants must fail as to
the fraud ; and fraud will never be imputed when the facts upon
which the charge is predicated are or may be consistent with
honesty and purity of intention. 5
515. Fraudulent representations resulting in damages. (1)
A misrepresentation to be fraudulent must be as to a material
matter or fact; it must be false and must be relied upon by the
person to whom it is made, and it must constitute an inducement
to enter into a transaction, must work injury or result directly in
s Robertson v. Parks, 76 Md. 125, Elec. & L. P. Co. v. Applebaum
24 Atl. 411. (Mich.), 94 N. W. 12.
* Robertson v. Parks, 76 Md. 125, Sunberg v. Babcock, 66 Iowa,
24 Atl. 411; Schroeder v. Walsh, 519, 24 N. W. 19.
120 111. 410, 11 N. E. 70; Detroit
507 DAMAGES FROM FRAUDULENT REPRESENTATIONS. 516
damages to the person relying thereon, and the person to whom
such misrepresentation is made must have a right to rely thereon.
If all these circumstances concur, then there is fraud, and the
party thus injured is entitled to relief.
(2) If the defendant made false and fraudulent representations
or statements as to any material matter of fact, and the plaintiff
did not rely on them, but sought and obtained information as to
such statements or facts from other sources, and then on his own
judgment concluded to enter into the contract mentioned and
to take his chances as to what he should get by reason thereof,
then he cannot recover on that issue in this action. 7
(3) If the defendant made false -and fraudulent representa-
tions or statements, and the plaintiff did not rely on them, but
sought and obtained information as to the facts from other
sources, and then, on his own judgment, concluded to enter into
the contract mentioned in the complaint, and take his chances
as to what he should get by reason thereof, then he cannot recover
in this action on that issue. 8
(4) The plaintiff is entitled to recover the amount due on said
notes, unless the jury find that the plaintiff made false representa-
tions in regard to the quality, improvements and natural advan-
tages of said land ; and if they find that he made such representa-
tions, then the jury can only deduct from the amount of said
notes the value of the injury sustained by defendant on account
of such false representations. 9
516. Fraudulent representations in sale of stock. (1) If the
jury find from the evidence that the plaintiff paid the sum of five
thousand dollars to the company in question for certain shares
of stock in said company, and shall find that the said plaintiff
was induced to purchase said shares of stock in said company by
the false representations and statements of the defendant, to the
effect that the said shares of stock in said company were a safe
and sure investment and would pay a high rate of interest, and
shall further find that such representations and statements were
false and fraudulent and known to be false and fraudulent by
B Jones v. Hathaway, 77 Ind. 24. Craig v. Hamilton, 118 Ind. 568,
i Craig v. Hamilton, 118 Ind. 568, 21 N. E. 315.
21 N. E. 315; Jones v. Hathaway, House v. Marshall, 18 Mo. 370.
77 Ind. 24.
517 FRAUDULENT HEP11ESENTATIONS. 508
said defendants, and that plaintiff relied upon these said false
and fraudulent statements and representations and was thereby
induced to purchase said shares of stock, the plaintiff is entitled
to recover, if the jury further find that the said plaintiff suffered
loss and damage by reason of said false and fraudulent represen-
tations and statements. 10
(2) In order to entitle the plaintiff to recover in this case the
jury must find from the evidence that the defendants, with a
view to induce the plaintiff to subscribe to or purchase the stock
in the company in question, made representations to him with
respect to the value of their assets and extent of their business,
which were false in fact when made, and that defendants had no
reasonable ground to believe the same to be substantially correct,
when made, and also that the same were made with the fraudu-
lent intent to cheat and deceive the plaintiff, and that the plain-
tiff had not at hand the means of verifying the truth of such rep-
resentation, and that in subscribing to or purchasing said stock
the plaintiff relied on such representations and would not have
made such purchase except upon the faith of the same, and that
in consequence thereof he was misled and injured. 11
517. Contract made to defeat creditors are void. (1) If
the jury believe from the evidence adduced that the conveyance
from the plaintiff to the .defendant was for the purpose of hinder-
ing, delaying or defeating the creditors of the plaintiff in any
attempt they might make to enforce their claims against the plain-
tiff, and that was the understanding and agreement between the
plaintiff and the defendant, and that the notes in suit were given
in pursuance of this agreement between plaintiff and defendant,
then the jury are instructed as a matter of law that the said
agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant was illegal
and cannot be enforced, and the jury must find for the defend-
ant. 12
(2) If the jury believe from the evidence that the convey-
ances to the defendant in evidence were made for the purpose of
hindering, delaying or defrauding the creditors of the said plain-
10 Robertson v. Parks, 76 Md. 120, 12 Riedle v. Mulhausen, 20 111.
24 Atl. 411. App. 72.
11 Robertson v. Parks, 76 Md. 120,
24 Atl. 411.
509 CONTRACT TO DEFEAT CREDITORS VOID. 517
tiff or any of them, and that the notes sued on herein were execut-
ed tod delievered by defendant to plaintiff in pursuance of such
unlawful agreement and upon no other consideration, then you
are instructed that such unlawful purpose precludes any recovery
by the plaintiff against the defendant upon any notes so given
upon such unlawful and fraudulent consideration, and your
verdict should be for the defendant. 13
(3) If the sale of said goods by P. and purchase by R, w r as not
an honest and real sale and purchase but was a sham transaction
or trade, made and gone into by them for the purpose of deceiving
the creditors of P, or some of them, as to the real disposition to
be made of the goods, they, P and R, knowing the trade would
have the effect to defraud some of P's creditors, or hinder or
delay some of them in the collection of their claims against him,
then such sale and purchase was fraudulent and void as to such
creditors, though said R may have given his note for the goods,
and the note may have been applied or .used in extinguishing
some of the claims against P. Said R, under such circumstances,
and if such were the real character of the transaction, cannot,
in law, be considered a purchaser in good faith, and if you -find
said sale and purchase to be substantially of the character above
stated, or for other reasons or facts presented by the evidence
find said sale and purchase to have been made with intent to
hinder or delay some of P's creditors in the collection of their
claims, then you should find said sale and purchase fraudulent
and void as to the creditors of said P. 14
(4) Whether a conveyance of this character is fraudulent or
not is a question of fact, to be determined on a view of all the cir-
cumstances attendant upon the making of the grant or convey-
ance, especially on the condition of the grantor as to property,
and as to the amount of debts which were due and owing from
him at the time he undertook to dispose of his estate, or a
portion thereof, by gift, or without adequate consideration. On
the one hand, it could not be properly adjudged that a volun-
tary conveyance was fraudulent and void, either as against ex-
isting or subsequent creditors, if it was proved to have been
is Riedle v. Mulhausen, 20 111. ning Co. v. Reid, &c. Co. 159 Ind.
App. 72. 614, 64 N. E. 870, 1115 (power of
i-t "Wadsworth v. Walker, 51 Iowa, preferring creditors).
613, 2 N. W. 420; Nappanee Can-
518 FRAUDULENT TRANSACTIONS. 510
made by a person substantially free from debt and possessed
of a large amount of property, who had no purpose to hinder
or delay his creditors, whose sole motive was to transfer the
property to his wife or children, so that it should not remain
at the hazard of business or be subjected to the risk of im-
providence. On the other hand, it would be very clear that a
voluntary transfer of property by a person deeply indebted, and
whose property was inadequate or barely sufficient for the pay-
ment of his debts, would furnish strong presumptive evidence
of fraud, and if unexplained would be set aside as void against
creditors. 15
518. Innocent purchaser for fair consideration, protected.
(1) Although you should find that C made one or both sales to
plaintiff, with intent to hinder, delay and defraud his creditors,
yet if he paid a valuable consideration for the goods, such in-
tent on the part of C would not alone make the sale void.
In order to invalidate the sale, it must further appear from the
evidence that the plaintiff, at the time he bought and paid for
the goods, had notice of such intent on the part of C, or that
he had knowledge of facts or circumstances such as would have
put an ordinarily prudent man upon inquiry, which, by the
use of proper diligence on his part, would have led to a knowl-
edge of such intention on the part of C. 1G
(2) If you believe from the evidence in this case that the de-
fendants purchased the property in controversy in this action
from B for a full, fair and valuable consideration and with-
out notice that the said B was seeking and intending thereby
to cheat, hinder, delay and defraud his creditors out of their
just demands existing at the time of said purchase, and that
if you further find that they, the defendants, had paid the
consideration and received their deeds for said property be-
fore the fraudulent intent of the said B to cheat, hinder and
defraud his creditors had come to their knowledge, then and
in that case the said defendants would be bona fide purchasers
of the property so conveyed to them, and would be entitled
to hold the same free from the claims of the creditors of the
said B. And any person buying from them, the defendants,
is Winchester v. Charter, 102 IG Dodd v. Gaines, 82 Tex. 433, 18
Mass. 273. S. W. 618.
511 INNOCENT PURCHASER PROTECTED KNOWING FRAUD. 521
under such circumstances, would be entitled to hold the prop-
erty as against all persons, and this, whether the second pur-
chaser had knowledge of the fraudulent intent of said B to
cheat and defraud his creditors in the original conveyance or
not. 17
519. Purchaser knowing fraudulent intent of seller. If the
sale was made by C to the plaintiff, G, with intent to hinder,
delay or defraud his creditors, and that G, at the time of the
purchase, knew of such intent on the part of C to hinder, de-
lay or defraud his creditors, or if he knew such facts or cir-
cumstances as would have put a man of ordinary prudence
upon inquiry, and which, by the use of ordinary diligence on
his part, would have led to a knowledge on his part that such
was the intention of C in selling the goods to him, then such
sale as between plaintiff and defendant is fraudulent and void. 18
520. Opinion as to value not basis of fraud. The plaintiff
is not entitled to recover on account of any representations
they may find the defendants, or either of them, may have made
to the plaintiff, that the stock of the company in question would
pay as much as twenty per cent dividend or for any other ex-
pression of opinion concerning the future value and profita-
bleness of the business they are carrying on. The jury must
exclude such representations as constituting a basis of recovery
in this action. 19
521. Sureties induced to sign bond by fraud. If you find
that T. at and before the time the bond was required of him
was intentionally and dishonestly a defaulter to the express
company, as to moneys intrusted to it, which he had received
as its agent, and that the witness, D, acted for said company
in demanding and receiving said bond, and, before receiving
the same, either knew of such default, or if he did not know
it, believed upon reasonable and reliable ground of informa-
tion or belief that such default existed, then, if suitable and
reasonable opportunity existed, it was the duty of the witness,
i? Nicklaus v. Burns, 75 Ind. 96. Robertson v. Parks, 76 Md. 123,
is Dodd v. Gaines, 82 Tex. 433, 18 24 Atl. 411.
S. W. 618.
FRAUDULENT TRANSACTIONS. 512
D, as the agent of the company, to make known to the sure-
ties upon the bond such fact of T's delinquency, or witness'
belief of such delinquency, before accepting the bond, although
the witness did not know before the bond was signed by the
sureties who they were to be, and, as witness did not give
such information, if the sureties, in signing the bond, acted
under a belief from its recitals that the company considered
T a trustworthy person, and would not have signed the bond
but for such belief, then the plaintiff cannot recover against
the sureties, or either of them. 20
522. Fraud practiced in sale of land, resulting in damages.
(1) If the jury believe from the evidence that the plaintiff at or
before the sale of the land in question to the defendant, know-
ing said land to be subject to overflow, used any artifice to
mislead the mind of the defendant and throw him off his guard,
and to prevent him from making as careful examination of the
land in question as a man of ordinary prudence would other-
wise have made; and that the defendant was thereby misled
and thrown off his guard and prevented from examining said
land, and in consequence thereof, was and remained ignorant
of the fact that said land was subject to overflow up to the
time when he bought said land, then and in that case the jury
should find for the defendant and assess his damages accord-
ing to the measure heretofore stated by the court. 21
(2) If you believe from the evidence that at the time the plain-
tiff purchased the lot in question the defendant knew that it
was intended as a residence lot; and if you further believe
that he then and there told the defendant where and on what
part of said lot he wished to build his house, and what the
style of the house should be, and in what direction it should
front: and if you believe the defendant then and there as an
inducement to the plaintiff to purchase said lot for a residence,
represented to him that there was a street on the east and on
the north side of him; and if you believe that by said repre-
sentations the plaintiff was induced to purchase said lot for
the sum of four hundred dollars for the purpose aforesaid, and
20 Dinsmore v. Tidball 34 Ohio 21 McFarland v. Carver, 34 Mo.
St. 411. 196.
513 FRAUD IN SALE OF LAND HUSBAND AND WIFE. 523
that such purpose was known to the defendant ; if you believe
that the plaintiff then arid there made said purchase and pro-
ceeded to build and did build a residence in the northeast corner
of said lot, fronting east and north, and that such design was com-
municated to the defendant at and before the time of said sale;
and if you further believe that said representations of the de-
fendant made about a street on the north were false, and known
to the defendant at the time they were made to be false; and
if you believe that the plaintiff has been damaged thereby, then
you will allow him for the same. 22
523. Contracts between husband and wife scrutinized. (1)
A husband may contract with his wife in relation to her sep-
arate estate, but on account of the peculiar relations of the
husband and wife toward each other, and the trust and con-
fidence that the wife is presumed to have in her hnsbaiid, and
the influence he is supposed naturally to exercise over her, the
law looks with much caution upon such contracts, and requires
of the husband the most scrupulous good faith, and if there
be any element of fraud or lack of consideration, the law scru-
tinizes it with much care, and will only uphold it when it is
for the benefit of the wife or has been made with the utmost
good faith. 23
(2) Gross inadequacy of consideration, if it exists, is a badge
of fraud and a circumstance which may be considered by the
jury in determining whether the conveyance by A to his wife,
Mrs. A (claimant) was fair an honest or pretended and fraud-
ulent. Transactions between husband and wife should be
scanned carefully when the rights of creditors are to be af-
fected thereby. The law requires them to exercise good faith,
and you should be satisfied that they have done so before sus-
taining any transaction which would defeat a creditor in the
collection of his debt. You should be satisfied of the actual
existence of a just debt due from A to Mrs. A, and that it
was the consideration of the deeds to her, and that the con-
sideration was not inadequate before you would be authorized
to sustain the title against creditors. All dealings between hus-
22 White v. Smith, 54 Iowa, 237, 23 Ron v. Hon, 70 Ind. 135.
6 N. W. 284.
524 FRAUDULENT TRANSACTIONS. 514
band and' wife which are injurious to creditors should be scru-
tinized closely, and their bona fides must be clearly established,
and in such case the burden of proof is on them as to this. 24
(3) A husband may contract with his wife in relation to her
separate estate, but on account of their peculiar relation toward
each other and the trust and confidence the wife is presumed
to have in the husband, and the influence he is supposed nat-
urally to exercise over her, the law looks with much, caution
upon such contracts, and requires of thfe husband the most
scrupulous good faith; and if there be any element of fraud
or lack of consideration, the law scrutinizes it with much care,
and will only uphold it when it is for the benefit of the wife.
or has been made with the utmost good faith. Transactions
between husband and wife should be scanned carefully when
the rights of creditors are to be affected thereby. All dealings
between husband and wife which are injurious to creditors
should be scrutinized closely, and their good faith must be clear-
ly established, and in such case the burden of proof is on them,
in this respect. 25
524. Fraudulent assignment to compel compromise. (1) If
the real object or intent of M, the assignor, in making this assign-
ment was not the one expressed on its face, but to induce,
persuade or force creditors to agree and consent to a compro-
mise, which he was then attempting to make with his creditors,
and to compel such creditors to accept fifty cents on the dol-
lar, then and in such case the assignment was fraudulent, and
void as to creditors. 26
(2) The court instructs the jury that as to the assignment under
which the plaintiff claims in this case there is but a single ques-
tion for you to pass upon, viz. : What was the intent of M, and
what was his purpose in making it ? The intent with which the
plaintiff, B, received the assignment is immaterial. 27
(3) The plaintiff, B, under this assignment, does not stand in
the position of a purchaser for valuable consideration ; and the
fact (if such be the case) that he had no knowledge that it was
a* Almond v. Gairdner, 76 Ga. 26 Bennett v. Ellison, 23 Minn.
701. 246.
25 Hon v. Hon, 70 Ind. 135; Al- 27 Bennett v. Ellison, 23 Minn,
mond v. Gaiidner, 76 Ga. 701. 245.
515 CONTRACT VOID FOB COMPULSION Oil DURESS. 527
M's intention, in making the assignment, to effect a compromise
with his creditors cannot cure the effect of such intention on M's
part. If such intention existed on M's part, at the time he ex-
ecuted the assignment, it is void, no matter whether plaintiff, B,
knew M's intention or not, and your verdict should be for the
defendant 28
525. Fraud in reference to indebtedness. If you believe
that the representation charged and relied upon as false and
fraudulent, was that the plaintiff was indebted to the defend-
ant in a certain sum, and the plaintiff was in fact so indebted,
then your finding must be for the defendant upon the ques-
tion of fraud. This will be so, even though the defendant may
have by mistake wrongfully stated the items, or some of the
items, which formed the consideration of such alleged indebt-
edness. 29
526. Contract made under compulsion may be avoided. (1)
A contract made under compulsion may be avoided by the party
compelled to execute it. Compulsion, however, to have this ef-
fect must amount to what the law calls duress. Mere angry
or profane words, or strong, earnest language cannot consti-
tute such compulsion as will amount to duress, or enable a per-
son to be relieved from his contract. There may be duress
by threats. But duress by threats exists only where a person
has entered into a contract under the influence of such threat
as excites or may reasonably excite a fear of some grievous
wrong, as bodily injury or unlawful imprisonment. 30
(2) If the payee of the note surrendered it to the maker volun-
tarily, in liquidation of a just debt then due from him to them,
the note was fully canceled by the surrender; but if the note
was obtained wrongfully and unlawfully by threats and duress,
it was not canceled by the surrender, and the plaintiff can main-
tain an action for the amount due thereon, if she is the owner
thereof. 31
527. What constitutes duress to avoid a contract. (1) To
constitute duress, which would avoid the deed, it is not necessary
28 Bennett v. Ellison, 23 Minn. 30 Adams v. Stringer, 78 Ind. 180.
246. si Kohler v. Wilson, 40 Iowa, 185.
29 Adams v. Stringer, 78 Ind. 181.
528 FRAUDULENT TRANSACTIONS. 516
that the threats be of a physical injury alone; but if the plain-
tiff, the wife of Tapley, was induced to execute the deed by
the threats of her husband, that he would separate from her
as her husband and not support her, it is duress, and will avoid
the deed. The threats must be such as she might reasonably
apprehend would be carried into execution, and the act of ex-
ecuting the deed must have been induced by the threats. It
is not necessary that the threats be made at the time, or im-
mediately before signing, if it was within such time, and the
circumstances satisfy you that the threats or their influence prop-
erly conduced to influence the plaintiff. 32
(2) The rule in this class of cases is, that where a payment of
money is made upon an illegal or unjust demand, when the
party is advised of all the facts, it can only be considered in-
voluntary when it is made to procure the release of the person
or property of the party from detention, or when the other party
is armed with apparent authority to seize upon either, and the
payment is made to prevent it. But where the person making the
payment can only be reached by a proceeding at law, he is
bound to make his defense in the first instance, and he cannot
postpone the litigation by paying the demand in silence and
afterwards suing to recover it back. 33
528. Gambling contracts On markets. (1) If the jury
shall find from the testimony that on or about the time stated in
the petition in this cause the defendant received from the plain-
tiff the sum of money in question under an arrangement that the
same should be invested by the defendant in wheat transactions,
illegal in their character, for the benefit of the plaintiff; that
said sum of money was so invested by the defendant and a
profit realized thereon; and that before the commencement of
this suit said sum of money and the profits so made came into
and are still in the hands of the defendant ; or that he received
credit therefor in the final settlement of his accounts with the
brokers, through whom said business was transacted, then the
plaintiff is entitled to recover said sum of money from the de-
fendant; nor in such case can the defendant avoid his liability
32 Tapley v. Tapley, 10 Minn. 458. 33 Lieber v. Weiden, 17 Neb. 584,
24 N. W. 215.
517 GAMBLING CONTRACTS VOID. 528
to account for said moneys, by showing that, by the under-
standing between the plaintiff and himself, said sum of money
was to be employed in illegal transactions in wheat of the na-
ture stated in his answer, and that said sum of money was
employed and said profits realized in such transactions. 34
(2) If the jury shall find from the evidence that when the de-
fendant gave to the plaintiffs the several orders offered in
evidence for the purchase and sale of grain, it was mutually
understood between them that the defendant was not to deliver
any of the grain that he ordered to be sold, or to accept any
of the grain that he ordered to be bought, but that all of said
transactions in grain were to be settled and adjusted by the
payment or receipt, as the case might be, of differences be-
tween the price at which said grain should be bought and at
which it should be sold; and if the jury shall further find that
in pursuance of said mutual understanding, the plaintiffs, in
their own names, transmitted to their correspondents for execu-
tion said orders of the defendant, and that said orders were
executed by the said correspondents of the plaintiffs upon the
credit of the plaintiffs and upon security furnished by them,
then the plaintiffs are not entitled to recover in this action
for services rendered or advances made by them in furthering
and conducting said transactions for the defendant. 35
s* Norton v. Blirni, 39 Ohio St. 4 Atl. 399. See, Shaffner v. Pinch-
145. back, 133 111. 410, betting on horse-
85 Stewart v. Schall, 65 Md. 294, race, contract void. Forms.
CHAPTER XXXIX.
NEGLIGENCE GENERALLY.
Sec. Sec.
529. Negligence, carelessness, care, 539. Negligence will not be pre-
defined, sumed.
530. Ordinary care defined. 540. What does not amount to neg-
531. Burden of proof generally. ligence.
532. Degree of care required of de- 541. Negligence the proximate
fendant. cause of injury.
533. Care in driving vehicle. 542. Instructions submitting ques-
534. Care and safety of machinery. tion of negligence.
535. Care of injured party may be 543. Plaintiff's contributory negli-
inferred. gence.
536. Infant Degree of care re- 544. Plaintiff and defendant both
quired of. negligent.
537. Children* Care of defendant 545. Injury resulting from acci-
for them. dent or natural cause.
538. Negligence may be inferred 546. Negligence in the use of elec-
when. tricity.
547. Electric wires out of repair.
529. Negligence, carelessness, care, defined. (1) Negli-
gence and carelessness, applied to both plaintiff and defendant,
means the failure to exercise ordinary care that is, such care as
ought to be expected of a reasonably prudent person under simi-
lar cimcumstances. 1
(2) Negligence has been aptly defined to be the omission to do
something which a reasonable man, guided by those considera-
tions which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs,
would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reason-
able man would not do, under the circumstances of a given case. 2
(3) Negligence consists in a want of the reasonable care which
i Henry v. Grand Ave. R. Co. 113 2 Traver v. Spokane St. R. Co. 25
Mo. 534, 21 S. W. 214. Wash. 239, 65 Pac. 284.
518
519 NEGLIGENCE, CARELESSNESS, CARE DEFINED. 530
would be exercised by a person of ordinary prudence, under all
existing circumstances, in view of the probable danger of injury. 3
(4) Negligence is the failure to do what a reasonably prudent
person would ordinarily have done under the circumstances
of the situation, or doing what such a person under the exist-
ing circumstances would not have done. 4
(5) Negligence is the failure to exercise ordinary care that
is, such care as ought to be expected of a reasonably prudent
person under similar circumstances. In other words, negligence
is the failure to do what a reasonably prudent person would or-
dinarily have done under the circumstances of the situation, or
doing what such person under the existing circumstances would
not have done. 5
(6) Gross negligence is the failure to take such care as a per-
son of common sense and reasonable skill in like business, but of
careless habits, would observe in avoiding injury to his own
person or life under like circumstances of equal or similar dan-
ger to the plaintiff on the occasion under consideration. 6
(7) As to the question of negligence upon the part of that per-
son or those persons in control of the extra passenger train
mentioned in the evidence, negligence may be denned as a fail-
ure to discharge the duty of taking ordinary care to avoid the
injury of one to whom the duty is due, such failure being the
direct and proximate cause of the injury; that ordinary care
is such as a prudent man of the requisite skill will take under
the circumstances of the particular case, and that the plaintiff
must show by a preponderance of evidence such failure upon
the part of the person or persons in charge of the extra pas-
senger train, before the defendant can be held liable for the
acts or omissions of such person or persons. 7
530. Ordinary care denned. (1) In relation to the care
required of each party you will only hold them to the exercise of
ordinary care, which consists in doing everything which a person
3 Little R. & Ft. S. R. Co. v. At- W. R. Co. v. Smith (Tex. Cv. App.),
kins, 46 Ark. 430. 77 S. W. 28.
4 St. Louis S. W. R. Co. v. Smith 6 Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Board
(Tex. Cv. App.), 77 S. W. 28. (Ky. App.), 77 S. W. 189.
s Henry v. Grand Ave. R. Co. 113 ~ Davidson v. Pittsburg, C. C. &
Mo. 534, 21 S. W. 214; St. Louis S. St. L. R. Co. 41 W. Va. 417, 23 S. E.
593.
530 NEGLIGENCE GENERALLY. 520
of ordinary care and prudence would do, and omitting to do every-
thing which a person of like care and diligence would omit
to do. 8
(2) The defendant is only required to use ordinary care in
the operation of its cars, and the plaintiff is required to use the
same degree of care that is, ordinary care in the use of the
streets, and in crossing or going upon the track of the defendant.
By ordinary care is meant such care as an ordinarily prudent
person would use under the particular circumstances involved.
(3) Ordinary care is that degree of care which an ordinarily
prudent person would exercise under like situation and circum-
stances. 10
(4) Ordinary care is that degree of care which an ordinarily
prudent person would exercise under like situation and circum-
stances. Or ordinary care consists in the doing of something
which a person of ordinary care and prudence would do, and
omitting to do something which a person of like care and dili-
gence would omit to do. 11
(5) Ordinary care, as mentioned in these instructions, is the
degree of care which an ordinarily prudent person, situated as
the deceased was, as shown by the evidence before and at the
time of the injury, would usually exercise for his own safety. 12
(6) By the term ordinary care, as used in these instructions,
is meant that degree of care that would be used by a person of
ordinary prudence under the same or similar circumstances. A
failure to exercise ordinary care is negligence. 13
(7) The ordinary care and prudence which the plaintiff was
required to use were such acts and conduct on her part as
would be the natural and ordinary course of prudent and discreet
persons under similar circumstances that is to say, such degree
of care as should have been reasonably expected from an or-
dinarily prudent person in her situation. 14
s Hart v. Oedar R. & M. C. R. 12 Chicago C. R. Co. v. .O'Donnell,
Co. 109 Iowa, 637, 80 N. W. 662. 208 111. 273. Held not assuming
Traver v. Spokane St. R. Co. 25 that the deceased was in the exer-
Wash. 242, 65 Pac. 284. cise of due care.
10 North C. St. R. Co. v. Irwin, Peterson v. Wistman (Mo.
202 111. 348, 66 N. E. 1077. App.), 77 S. W. 1016.
11 North C. St. R. Co. v. Irwin, Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Ow-
202 111. 348, 66 N. E. 1077; Hart v. ings, 65 Md. 504, 5 Atl. 329.
Cedar R. & M. C. R. Co. 109 Iowa,
637, 80 N. W. 662.
521 BURDEN OF PROOF, GENERALLY. 531
(8) By ordinary care is meant that degree of care which may
be reasonably expected of a person in the situation of the plaintiff
at the time the injury was received. 15
(9) The term "ordinary care," as used in these instructions,
means such care as would ordinarily be used by prudent
persons in the performance of like service under the same cir-
cumstances. 16
531. Burden of proof generally. (1) The burden of proof
is on the plaintiff to establish by a preponderance of the evidence
the facts necessary to entitle him to a verdict, under these in-
structions, except upon the issue concerning the exercise of
ordinary care by the plaintiff. As to that issue, the burden of
proof is on the defendant to show the want of such ordinary
care on the plaintiff's part. 17
(2) In order to defeat a recovery in this suit on the ground
of contributory negligence upon the part of the plaintiff, the
burden of proof is upon the defendant to show that the plaintiff
was guilty of negligence, and that such negligence on her part
directly contributed to produce the injury. 18
(3) In order to defeat a recovery on the ground of con-
tributory negligence on plaintiff's part, the defendant must
satisfy the jury by preponderating evidence of two facts: first,
that the plaintiff was negligent; and, second, that such negli-
gence directly contributed to the injury. 19
(4) Before the plaintiff can recover in this action, it must ap-
pear that the defendant was guilty of some act of negligence
which directly contributed to the accident. It must also ap-
pear that the plaintiff was without the least fault or negligence
on her part which may in any wise have contributed to the
accide'nt; and it is the same whether what she did was of her
own volition or by the advice or guidance of her husband. 20
(5) The burden of proof is upon the plaintiffs to show negli-
gence on the part of the defendant. If they fail to show any facts
is Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Cor- v. Anderson, 72 Md. 520, .20 Atl. 2.
bett, 49 Tex. 575. Such an instruction should be quali-
16 Mirrielees v. Wabash R. Co. 163 fied by others, stating that evidence
Mo. 470, 63 S. W. 718. showing plaintiff's contributory
17 O'Connell v. St. Louis, C. & W. negligence will defeat his action
R. Co. 106 Mo. 485, 17 S. W. 494. whether introduced by defendant or
is Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. plaintiff.
v. Hogeland, 66 Md. 150, 7 Atl. 105. 20 Curtis v. Detroit & M. R. Co.
i Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. 27 Wis. 160.
532 NEGLIGENCE GENERALLY. 522
which in law would be deemed negligence, then the plaintiffs
cannot recover, and the fact or circumstance relied on must
have contributed to the injury complained of; and in this con-
nection the jury will also understand that they must be con-
vinced from the evidence that the plaintiffs were guilty of no
fault or negligence on their part. 21
(6) The law devolves upon the plaintiff the duty and burden
of making out her case as alleged, and showing her right to a
recovery by a fair preponderance of the evidence. When she
has done this, then the burden is upon the defendant company to
show that the deceased at the time did not act as a person of
ordinary prudence and caution would have acted, or was in a
place or position where an ordinarily prudent and cautious per-
son would not have been, before plaintiff could be denied a
recovery. 22
(7) The plaintiff has alleged in each paragraph, among other
things, that he received the injury complained of without fault
or negligence on his part. This is a material and necessary
allegation. Without such allegation his complaint would not
have been sufficient to have constituted a cause of action, and
before the plaintiff can recover he must have proved by a fair
preponderance of the evidence that he did receive said injuries,
without fault or negligence on his part, directly and materially
contributing to the injury. It is not enough to enable the plain-
tiff to recover that he shall have proved fault and negligence
on the part of the defendant; he must also prove that he him-
self was free from such fault or negligence, and, if he has
failed to prove by a fair preponderance of the evidence that
he received the injury without such fault or negligence on his
own part he cannot recover. 23
532. Degree of care required of , defendant. (1) What the
law demands of the defendant is only that which men of skill and
vigilance are capable of exercising before the happening of
an accident, and not the adoption of extraordinary and pro-
21 Curtis v. Detroit & M. R. Co. 368, 46 N. E. 829. By a recent stat-
27 Wis. 1.61 ; Baran v. Reading Iron ute of Indiana the plaintiff has been
Co. 202 Pa. 280, 51 Atl. 979. relieved from the burden of proving
22 Southerland v. Tex. & P. R. his own freedom from contributory
Co. (Tex. Cv. App.), 40 S. W. 195. negligence, Indianapolis St. R. Co.
23 Todd v. Banner, 17 Ind. App. v. Robinson, 157 Ind. 232.
523 DEGREE OF CARE REQUIRED. 532
phetie measures of precaution, which the peculiar circumstances
of the event may afterwards show might have prevented it. 24
(2) A corporation or person furnishing natural gas to the
stoves, heaters, burners, pipes, pipe lines, machinery or apparatus
of another, to be used for the purp.ose of domestic heating, for
fuel in a dwelling house, storeroom, office or shop, is bound
to exercise such care, skill and diligence in all its operations
as is called for by the delicacy, difficulty and dangerousness
of the nature of its business, in order that injury may not be
done to others that is to say, if the danger, delicacy or dif-
ficulty is extraordinarily great, extraordinary skill and dili-
gence is required. 25
(3) It is for the jury to determine upon all the facts and cir-
cumstances in evidence whether the explosion of the boiler was or
was not caused by the want of a reasonable degree of skill of one
in the employ of said company, or whether said explosion was or
was not caused by the failure of said employe in charge of said
boiler to use a reasonable degree of care and caution to prevent
said explosion. 26
(4) The defendants were bound to adopt such precautions to
keep the track clear and prevent persons from driving on the
track during the race, as men of ordinary care and prudence
would adopt under similar circumstances ; and it was not enough
to order men off the track, but they should have had a force suf-
ficent to keep them off, they being bound to use due and proper
skill and care to prevent any person engaged in the race from
being injured by the ignorant, negligent or reckless acts of
the spectators, or persons not engaged in the race ; that the
degree of care the defendants were bound to use in such a
case as this must be measured by the extent of peril to human
life and limb which would be occasioned by neglect, and must
therefore be the highest which may reasonably be exercised in
order to prevent those injuries which human foresight could
avert; the defendants were not bound at all events to keep the
track clear; and the plaintiff can not make out his case by
only showing that there was an obstruction on the track, but
he must show that the defendants had in some way failed in
24 Curtis v. Detroit & M. R. Co. ^ Citizens Gas & O. M. Co. v.
27 Wis. 161. Whipple (Ind.), 69 N. E. 559.
26 Smith v. Warden, 86 Mo. 395.
533 NEGLIGENCE GENERALLY. 524
their duty, which was to use every effort which reasonable men
could be expected to use to keep the track clear. 27
533. Care in driving vehicle. Even if the jury should believe
from the evidence that the defendant was not, at the time of
the injury complained of, driving at an unusual rate of speed,
still, if they further believe from the evidence that the defend-
ant did commit the injury upon the plaintiff, as charged in
the declaration, while she was using due and proper care, and
the defendants might, by using ordinary and proper care at
the time, have avoided committing such injury, and that as the
consequence of a want of such reasonable and ordinary care
on the part of the defendants, the plaintiff received the in-
juries complained of, then the jury should find the defendants
guilty a?id . assess the plaintiff 's damages at such sum as they
may think, from the testimony, will compensate her for the
injuries so sustained by her, not to exceed the amount claimed
in the declaration. 28
534. Care and safety of machinery. (1) It was not the
duty of the plaintiff to furnish a guard or any part of the same
to be used on the machine on which he was injured, nor was
it his duty to ask the defendant to properly guard said ma-
chine for the various kinds of work he was required to do,
nor to complain to it because the machine was not so guarded. 29
(2) If the plaintiff was in the employ of the lessees of the
elevator at the time of the injury, and had been ever since the
building in question was erected, and the firm had had the entire
and exclusive use and occupancy of the building in question
and of the elevator during all that time, the defendant having
no right to use or occupy any of it in any way, the plaintiff
cannot recover. 30
(3) The defendant was not bound to furnish the very best or
most improved kind of machinery to be used in its manufactory ;
and if the jury believe, from the evidence, that the engine, gov-
ernor, emery-wheel and the frame and flanges connected with the
27 Goodale v. Worcester Agr. S. 29 Blanchard-Hamilton Furniture
102 Mass. 405. Co. v. Calvin (Ind.), 69 N. E. 1035.
ss Schmidt v. Sinnott, 103 111. 160, so Sinton v. Butler, 40 Ohio St.
164. Held not submitting to the 158.
jury a question of law to be deter-
mined by them.
525 CARE AND SAFETY OF MACHINERY. 534:
same were reasonably safe, and such as are ordinarily used in
similar establishments, they must find for the defendant. 31
(4) The fact that there were boilers and engines in an ad-
joining store which created the power to run the elevator in
question, and heat for the store and other stores just like it, and
the defendant hired the engineer and paid for the running of it
and the fuel, upon the agreement contained in the lease that the
lessees should pay for all such services, did not give the use of
any portion of the building or elevator in question to the defend-
ant, or deprive the lessees of the exclusive occupancy of it. 32
(5) It was the duty of the plaintiff when he accepted employ-
ment from the defendant to exercise ordinary care for his own
safety, and not knowingly to expose himself to unnecessary
risks or dangers connected with his said employment. And the
court instructs the jury that the plaintiff, when he accepted
employment from the defendant to operate the machine known
as a "joiner," assumed all the risks incident to such employ-
ment that is, such risks as naturally arose out of or were
necessarily connected with said employment. But he did not
assume risks that were unknown to him, and which were not
incident to his employment, nor such risks which the defend-
ant could by the exercise of ordinary care have guarded against. 33
(6) It was the duty of the defendant when he employed the
plaintiff to exercise ordinary care in providing him with a rea-
sonably safe machine or joiner; that is, one in good order and
fitted for the purpose and work for which it was intended. It
was the duty of the defendant to exercise ordinary care in keep-
ing the same in reasonably safe condition for the use of the plain-
tiff while he was so engaged in operating the said machine. 34
(7) If you believe from the evidence that the injury to the
plaintiff, complained of in his petition, was not the result of any
defect in the machine joiner, but was the result of such a risk or
danger as naturally arose or grew out of the plaintiff's employ-
ment, and was naturally attendant upon said employment, then
the law is for the defendant and the jury should so find. 35
si Camp P. Mfg. Co. v. Ballou, 71 34 Reiser v. Southern P. M. & L.
111. 421. Co. 24 Ky. 796, 69 S. W. 1086 (the
32 Sinton v. Butler, 40 Ohio St. plaintiff was an infant).
158. 35 Reiser v. Southern P. M. & L.
33 Reiser v. Southern P. M. & L. Co. 24 Ky. 796, 69 S. W. 1086.
Co. 24 Ky. 796, 69 S. W. 1086.
535 NEGLIGENCE GENERALLY. 526
(8) If you find that a minor employe did not understand all
the dangers and hazards of the situation in which he was placed
by the foreman, and that it was a dangerous and hazardous situa-
tion in which to place a boy of his age, judgment and experience,
then it was the duty of the foreman to instruct him in respect
thereto, that he might conduct himself so as to guard against
such peril. 36
535. Care of injured party may be inferred. In considering
the question of negligence it is competent and proper for the jury
in connection with the other facts and circumstances of the case
to infer the absence of fault on the part of the deceased, from
the general and known disposition of men to take care of them-
selves and to keep out of the way of difficulty and danger. 37
536. Infant Degree of care required. (1) The rule that
refuses damages to an individual whose negligence, however
slight, has in any manner contributed to produce the injury for
which he sues, presupposes that he has reached an age when he
has sufficient intelligence to know the existence of danger, and
sufficient thought to protect himself from its consequences. This
rule, therefore, does not and cannot apply to an infant of two
years or less; and if an infant of that age is found alone in a
place where he is exposed to danger, and in a situation where he
can easily be seen, it is the duty of every person approaching him
to use all the care and caution that such person may command to
avoid injury to him ; and if such person fail to use such care and
caution, and injury results to the infant from the want of such
care and caution, such person is guilty of negligence and would
be liable to the infant for the injuries so caused, had such infant
survived such injury. 38
(2) The conduct of an infant is not of necessity to be judged
by the same rules which govern that of an adult; while it is
the general rule in regard to an adult or grown person that to
entitle him or her to recover damages for an injury resulting from
the fault or negligence of another, he or she must have been free
from fault, such is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender
years. The care and caution required of a child is according to
se Rolling Mill Co. v. Corrigan, 37 Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. S.
46 Ohio St. 290, 20 N. E. 466; Thomp. &c. 60 Md. 452.
on Neg. 978. ss Walters v. Chicago, R. I. & P.
R. Co. 41 Iowa, 75; see, Illinois, &c.
R. Co. v. Slater, 129 111. 91, 99.
527 CARE REQUIRED OF CHILDREN. 536
its maturity and capacity wholly, and this is to be determined
by the circumstances of the case and the evidence before the
jury, and the law presumes that a child, between the ages of
seven and fourteen years, cannot be guilty of contributory neg-
ligence, and in order to establish that a child of such age is
capable of contributory negligence such presumption must be
rebutted by evidence and circumstances establishing his maturity
and capacity. 39
(3) The conduct of an infant is not of necessity to be judged
by the same rule which governs that of an adult. While it is
a general rule in regard to an adult or grown person, that to
entitle him to recover damages for any injury resulting from the
fault or negligence of another he must have been free from fault,
such is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender years. The
care and caution required of a child is according to his maturity
and capacity wholly ; and this is to be determined by the circum-
stances of the case and the evidence before the jury. 40
(4) If the jury shall find from the evidence that the death of
the child resulted from the want of ordinary care and caution on
the part of a driver in the employment of the defendant, the
plaintiff is entitled to recover; provided the jury find that the
accident causing her death could not have been avoided by the
exercise of such care and caution by the child as ought, under
all the circumstances, to have been reasonably expected from one
of her age and intelligence, or by the exercise of ordinary care
and caution on the part of the father of the child, or of the person
accompanying the child at the time of the accident. 41
(5) It is the duty of an infant employe to use ordinary care
and prudence, just such care and prudence as a boy of his age of
ordinary care and prudence would use under like or similar cir-
cumstances. You should take into consideration his age, the
judgment and knowledge he possessed. If not understanding
all the dangers and hazards of the situation in which he was
placed by the foreman, and you find it was a dangerous and
hazardous situation in which to place a boy of his age, judgment
and experience, it was the duty of the foreman to instruct him
so Richmond Tr. Co. v. Wilkinson R. Co. v. Quayle, 95 Va. 747, 30 S. E.
(Va.), 43 S E. 623. 391.
40 Washington, A. & Mt. V. Elec. 41 Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. S. 30
Md. 48.
537 NEGLIGENCE GENERALLY. 528
in reference thereto, that he might conduct himself so as to
guard against such peril; and if he was injured by reason of
the neglect or carelessness of the defendant, and by reason of
his youth and want of judgment as to the perils of his position,
did some act in the discharge of his duty as he understood it,
which also contributed to the injury, and which he did not know
to be likely to injure him and had not been properly advised
and instructed therein by the foreman, he is entitled to recover. 42
(6) If the jury believe from the evidence in this case that the
plaintiff permitted his decedent, D, a boy about nine years of
age, to 'go from his home at W after or to get his elderberries,
but did not know that he was going to ride on a handcar, he, the
plaintiff, is not by reason of such permission guilty of contribu-
tory negligence, and the defendant cannot be relieved from
liability solely because the plaintiff thus permitted his said son
to go from home. 43
(7) It does not necessarily follow, because a parent negligently
suffers a child of tender age to cross a street, that therefore the
child cannot recover. If the child, without being able to exer-
cise any judgment in regard to the matter, yet does no act which
prudence would forbid and omits no act that prudence would
dictate, there has been no negligence which was directly contrib-
utory to the injury. The negligence of the parent in such a case
would be too remote. 44
537. Children Care of defendant toward them. (1) The
defendant was under no obligation to the plaintiff to keep its lum-
ber yard in safe or proper condition for plaintiff to play thereon.
The yards were its property and it was entitled, as to plaintiff,
to use them for piling lumber and to pile the same in such form
as it found convenient, with due regard for the safety of such
persons only as might properly use the yards. It was under no
obligations to so pile or place its bridge ties as to prevent injury
to a child climbing upon them, or to so pile, fasten or brace the
same that the child could not, in trying to climb thereon, pull
one or more of them down upon herself, nor can it be held negli-
gent for failing to so pile, brace or secure them, if the injured
42 Rolling Mill v. Corrigan, 46 St. L. R. Co. 41 W. Va. 411, 23 S. E.
Ohio St. 283, 20 N. E. 466. 593.
43 Davidson v. Pittsburg, C. C. & 44 Wiswell v. Doyle, 160 Mass. 44,
35 N. E. 107.
529 CARE TOWARD CHILDREN NEGLIGENCE PRESUMED. 539
person was at the time thereon without its knowledge or invita-
tion. 45
(2) The defendant was under no obligation to keep watch over
its premises, in order to exclude children therefrom. If the
watchman of defendant discovered plaintiff with others playing
in the yard shortly before the accident and requested them to
leave, and plaintiff thereupon withdrew from the premises, but
thereafter returned without the knowledge of defendant's watch-
man or person in charge of its property, for the purpose of play-
ing in the yard, and while so doing was injured, without such
watchman having knowledge of her being then present; and
while playing there pulled down upon herself or caused to fall
a tie, or portion of a pile of ties, upon which she was climbing,
defendant would not be liable to plaintiff for any injury so
received. 46
538. Negligence may be inferred When. (1) When the fact
has been established that a passenger in a railroad car has been
injured without his fault by the car in which he was riding being
thrown from the track and upset, the law will presume negli-
gence on the part of the railroad company, unless the evidence
shows there was no negligence. 47
539. Negligence will not be presumed. (1) The burden of
proof is on the plaintiff to show that he was injured by the de-
fendant's negligence, either in not providing safe and suitable cars,
or in not properly inspecting and taking care of them. A mere
statement that a person was injured while riding on a railway,
without any statement of the character, manner or circumstances
of the injury, does not raise a presumption of negligence on the
part of the railway company. But, if the character, manner or cir-
cumstances of the injury are also stated, such statement may
raise, on the one hand, a presumption of such negligence, or, on
45 Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. 227; Pittsburg, &c. R. Co. v. Thomp-
Edwards, 90, Tex. 69, 36 S. W. 430. son, 56 111. 138; Sullivan v. Phila-
But see Penso v. McCormick, 125 delphia, &c. R. Co. 30 Pa. St. 234;
Ind. 116, 25 N. E. 156. Baltimore, &c. R. Co. v. Worthing-
46 Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. ton, 21 Md. 275; Yonge v. Kinney,
Edwards, 90 Tex. 69, 36 S. W. 430. 28 Ga. 1; New Orleans R. Co. v.
But see Penso v. McCormick, 125 Allbritton, 38 Miss. 242; Higgins
Ind. 116, 25 N. E. 156. v. Hannibal, &c. R. Co. 36 Mo. 418;
47 Pittsburg, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Stokes v. Saltonstall, 13 Pet. (U.
Williams, 74 Ind. 464, citing Edger- S.), 181.
ton v. New York R. Co. 39 N. Y.
539 NEGLIGENCE GENERALLY. 530
the other, a presumption that there was no such 'negligence. If
the plaintiff was in fact injured while sitting in her proper place,
by the falling of the upper berth upon her head, while said berth
ought to have remained in place above, such fact raises a pre-
sumption in this case of negligence for which the defendant is
liable. If you find that there was no defect in the road, or in the
car or in the mechanism used, yet if, upon the evidence in the
case, you find it reasonable to presume that the accident happened
by reason of the upper berth not having been properly fastened
in its place, or by reason of the persons having charge of the
car having failed to observe that it had become loosened, if such
insecure condition would have been observed by proper diligence,
you have a right to so presume, and you would then find, the
defendant guilty of negligence. If, on the other hand, in such
case you find it equally reasonable to presume that the fastening
of the berth was loosened by some other person not in the employ-
ment of the company, and such insecure condition would not be
observed by proper diligence on the part of the persons having
charge of the car, you have the right to so presume, and in that
case would find that the plaintiff had failed to make out a case
of negligence against the defendant. The plaintiff is entitled
to damages for injuries traceable to the defendant's fault, but
not for injury caused by his own act. 48
(2) Negligence as to the defendant is not to be presumed ; but
the burden of proof is upon the plaintiffs to satisfy the jury by a
preponderance of evidence that the defendants are chargeable
with negligence. 49
(3) If under all the evidence submitted in the cause you shall
come to the conclusion that the plaintiffs have not succeeded in
establishing the fact of negligence against the defendant company
by satisfactory evidence and fairly preponderating, bearing in
mind that the mere fact of the explosion of this boiler is not of
itself evidence of negligence, then the defendant company is en-
titled to the verdict. 50
(4) Negligence is never to be presumed, and the fact that an
accident occurred on October 8, 1896, would not justify the jury
48 Railroad Co. v. Walrath, 38 Baran v. Reading Iron Co. 202
Ohio St. 462. Pa. St. 280, 51 Atl. 979.
40 Baran v. Reading Iron Co. 202
Pa. St. 279, 51 Atl. 979.
531 NEGLIGENCE PRESUMED WHAT NOT NEGLIGENCE. 540
in inferring i'rom the fact that an explosion took place, that it was
caused by the negligence of the defendant, for the reason that it
might have occurred without any fault of the defendant what-
ever. 51
(5) The defendants were at the time of the explosion, and be-
fore, in the exercise of a lawful right in using and operating steam
boilers on their own premises in the 'management of this industry.
Other facts establishing the fault or negligence of the owners,
the defendants, besides the mere fact of the explosion itself, are
necessary to be proved in order to fix a liability for damages. 52
(6) The mere fact of the explosion of this particular boiler on
the evening of October 8, 1896, standing by itself and independent
of other facts, is no evidence of the company's negligence or
want, of proper care in the use of the boiler. It will be presumed,
until the contrary appears, that this company had a care and due
regard for the preservation of their own property, the safety of
their own employees and others, as well as of themselves. 53
(7) The mere fact that an explosion occurred, which caused the
death of the infant in this case, is not enough to establish negli-
gence of the defendant company. There must be additional and
affirmative proof of the particular negligence which caused the
explosion in this case. 54
540. What does not amount to negligence. (1) It is not nec-
essarily an act of negligence on the part of the defendant to suffer
a momentary arrest of motion of the cars in bringing the train
to the station and to its proper and convenient location. If such
temporary arrest of motion is incident to the careful management
of a mixed train like the one in question, then to suffer it would
not be an act of negligence. 55
(2) If the evidence shows the defendant to have moved the
train to the station in the mode usual on well regulated roads of
the country, and practiced by good conductors and engineers, the
observing of such usual mode cannot be deemed an act of negli-
gence. 56
si Baran v. Reading Iron Co. 202 54 Baran v. Reading Iron Co. 202
Pa. St. 280, 51 Atl. 979. Pa. St. 280, 51 Atl. 979.
52 Baran v. Reading Iron Co. 202 <", Curtis v. Detroit & M. R. Co.
Pa. St. 280, 51 Atl. 979. 27 Wis, 161.
sa Baran v. Reading Iron Co. 202 so Curtis v. Detroit & M. R. Co.
Pa. St. 279, 51 Atl. 9-79. 27 Wis. 161.
541 NEGLIGENCE GENERALLY. 532
(3) It is not enough to say or find that there is some evidence
of 'negligence on defendant's part. A scintilla of evidence, or a
mere surmise that there may have been negligence on the part
of the defendant, will not warrant the jury in finding a verdict
for the plaintiffs. There must be evidence upon which the jury
can reasonably conclude that there was negligence. 57
541. Negligence the proximate cause of injury. (1) Negli-
gence may be the proximate cause of an injury of which it was
not the sole or immediate cause. If the defendant negligently en-
croached upon and maintained obstructions in the highway at
the crossings, which, concurring with the movements of a passing
train, produced the collision resulting in the death of the dece-
dent, then such negligence would be a proximate cause of such
collision within the meaning of that term as used in these instruc-
tions. 58
(2) If you find from the evidence that croton oil was by de-
fendant administered to the plaintiff in dangerous quantity, as is
alleged, then you will consider whether or not it was the proxi-
mate cause of plaintiff's sickness and injury, as alleged; and if
you find that it was not the proximate cause thereof, or if the
plaintiff was sick at the time of administering the croton oil, if
any was administered, and the same did not increase the sickness
or pain, or the duration thereof, then you should find for the
defendant. 59
(3) No remote or speculative damages can be allowed in this ac-
tion, but only such as are the natural and proximate effect of the
defendant's acts. 60
542. Instructions submitting question of negligence. (1) If
the plaintiff did not receive the injuries complained of by any
contributing act of negligence or fault of her own, but was in-
jured at the time complained of by the carelessness and negligence
or fault of the defendant's servants, or one of them, committed in
the general scope of employment as such servants or servant,
57 Curtis v. Detroit & M. R. Co. 59 Rabe v. Summerbeck, 94 Iowa,
27 Wis. 161. 659, 63 N. W. 458.
ss Lake S. & M. S. R. Co. v. Me- eo Blesch v. Chicago & N. W. R.
Intosh, 140 Ind. 272, 38 N. E. 476. Co. 48 Wis. 172, 2 N. W. 113.
533 SUBMITTING NEGLIGENCE TO JURY. 542
the defendant is liable for such damages as she may have sus-
tained by the injuries thus received. 81
(2) If the jury believe from the evidence that the plaintiff was
employed to work for the firm of H & N, as stated in the declara-
tion, and that while he was engaged in the duties of such employ-
ment he was injured and sustained damages as complained of in
the declaration; that said firm of H & N were negligent in the
respect charged in the declaration; that the said injury to the
plaintiff was caused by said negligence of the defendants as
charged in the declaration, and that the plaintiff, at the time of
the injury, Avas in the exercise of due care and caution for his
own safety, then you should find for the plaintiff. 62
(3) If the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant is
guilty of the acts of negligence charged in the declaration, and
that the injury to the plaintiff complained of resulted therefrom,
while he was in the exercise of ordinary care for his own safety,
the defendant is liable, and the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict. 63
(4) If the jury believe from the evidence in the case that the
plaintiff, on or about the nineteenth day of May, 1893, was right-
fully in an elevator in the possession of and operated by the de-
fendant and located in the defendant's building, for the purpose
of being carried thereby from one of the upper floors of the de-
fendant 's said building to the ground floor thereof ; and if the jury
further believe from the evidence that while the plaintiff was so in
said elevator, and in the exercise of reasonable and ordinary care
on his part, the said elevator, owing to the negligent and faulty
construction thereof, or owing to the negligence or carelessness
on the part of the servant of the defendant in operating the same,
fell, and if you further believe from the evidence that the injury
to the plaintiff complained of was caused by the fall of said ele-
vator, then your verdict should be for the plaintiff. 64
(5) If you find from the evidence that the defendant has been
guilty of negligence as charged in the plaintiff's declaration, and
that such negligence caused the injury to the plaintiff complained
of in the declaration, and that before and at the time of such in-
ei Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. St. Louis N. S. Yards v. God-
v. Wood, 113 Ind. 562, 14 N. E. 572. frey, 198 111. 294, 65 N. E. 90.
62 Heldmaier v. Cobbs, 195 111. 64 Hartford Deposit Co. v. Sollitt,
172, 179, 62 N. E. 853. (held not 172 111. 224, 50 N. E. 178.
bound to anticipate defense).
543 NEGLIGENCE GENERALLY. 534
jury the plaintiff was in the exercise of ordinary care for her
personal safety, then your verdict will be for the plaintiff. 05
(6) The question of whether or not the defendant is guilty of
negligence as charged in the plaintiff's declaration, is for your
determination from all the facts and circumstances proven in the
case. 66
543. Plaintiff 's contributory negligence. ( 1 ) The doctrine of
imputed negligence does not prevail in Ohio, and if you find that
G. died through the wrongful act, neglect or default of the
defendant, by himself or his agent, then the plaintiff is not
deprived of the right of action in this case by reason of contribu-
tory negligence on the part of the husband or any one else, unless
such person was acting as agent of the deceased at the time. 67
(2) When one is placed by the negligence of another in a situa-
tion of terror, his attempt to escape danger, even by doing an act
which is in itself dangerous and from which injury results, is not
contributory negligence, such as will prevent him from recover-
ing. 6 *
(3) If you find from the evidence that the plaintiff was guilty
of negligence in attempting to saw the corner out while holding
several of the smaller pieces together with his hands, instead of
sawing the corner out of the solid piece of wood before it was
ripped into smaller pieces, and if you further believe from the
evidence that such negligence was the cause of his injury, then
you should find the defendant not guilty. 69
(4) If you believe from the evidence that it was necessary for
H, in the discharge of his duty, to project his head from the car
at K station, but that he put his head out before it was actually
necessary on account of the distance of the train from the passen-
ger platform, this would not prevent the plaintiff from recover-
ing if otherwise entitled, if you believe that the acts of the defend-
ant 's servants in charge of the train were such as would reason-
ably induce the said H, situated as he was, to believe that he was
es Chicago C. R. Co. v. Roach, 180 es Mitchell v. Charleston L. & P.
111. 174, 54 N. E. 212. Co. 45 S. C. 146, 31 L. R. A. 582.
es Chicago C. R. Co. v. Roach, 180 69 Mallen v. Waldowski, 203 111.
111. 174, 54 N. E. 212. 89, 67 N. E. 409. Held not assum-
67 Davis v. Guarnieri, 45 Ohio St. ing that the plaintiff was guilty of
478, 15 N. E. 350. negligence.
535 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF PLAINTIFF. 543
at the usual place for ejecting his head in performance of his
duty. 70
(5) The law did not require defendant to anticipate or presume
that plaintiff might be negligent. Defendant might lawfully pre-
sume the contrary, and might act upon the assumption that plain-
tiff would observe all due and proper precaution, according to
the circumstances surrounding him. 71
(6) If you find from the evidence that the ditch was dangerous,
that the defendant had been guilty of permitting it to become and
remain in such condition, still if you find that the plaintiff was
guilty of negligence in the manner in which he attempted to
cross, and that his negligence contributed to the accident, and
that the accident would not have occurred if the plaintiff had
exercised reasonable care, then the plaintiff cannot recover. 72
(7) Where one knows of danger which threatens injury to him-
self, or where one voluntarily places himself in a dangerous place,
as in a public street where horses and vehicles pass, and he can
avoid such danger by reasonable exertion, his negligent failure
to do so will prevent him from recovering damages for an injury
so incurred. 73
(8) If the jury find from the evidence that the plaintiff was in-
jured by coming in contact with, defendant's wire, and that by the
exercise of ordinary care h.e could have avoided such contact,
then the plaintiff is not entitled to recover anything in this
action. 74
(9) To stand in a public street, knowing that it is where wag-
ons and horses are liable to pass, and especially to stand in such a
place at night and to pay no heed to the danger of so standing
and to take no care to avoid the danger of such a place, is not
exercising reasonable care to protect one's self from the danger
of such a place. 75
(10) The question of whether the plaintiff was guilty of negli-
gence which contributed to his injury, and without which the ac-
cident would not have occurred, is for the jury, and must be de-
70 Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. 73 Evans v. Adams Ex. Co. 122
Hampton, 64 Tex. 429. Ind. 365, 23 N. E. 1039.
71 Curtis v. Detroit & M. R. Co. 74 Mitchell v. Charleston L. & P.
27 Wis. 160. Co. 45 S. Car. 146. 31 L. R. A. 582.
72 City of Austin v. Ritz, 72 Tex. 75 Evans v. Adams Ex. Co. 122
401, 9 S. W. 884. Ind. 365, 23 N. E. 1039.
544 NEGLIGENCE GENERALLY. 536
termined from all the facts and circumstances shown by the tes-
timony. 76
544. Plaintiff and defendant both negligent. (1) If the de-
fendant or its agents could by ordinary care have avoided the
consequences of the plaintiff's negligence or want of caution, or
by the direct act of its agent caused the act which produced the
injury, he would then be entitled to recover. 77
(2) In this case the defendant is responsible to the plaintiff for
any injury he may have received, if the defendant's negligence or
the negligence of its agents or servants was the primary and prox-
imate cause of the injury, although there may have been negli-
gence also on .the part of the plaintiff, unless it appears that under
the circumstances, he could by the exercise of ordinary care, have
avoided the consequences of the negligence of the defendants or
its agents. 78
(3) If you believe from the evidence that both the plaintiff and
the servant of the defendant operating its car were equally
guilty of negligence which directly contributed to the accident
and injury complained of, then your verdict should be for the
defendant. 79
(4) Although the defendant did not exercise the degree of care
required of it, yet, if the plaintiff was also at fault, and his fault
contributed directly to produce the injury, he cannot recover.
His right to recover, however, is not affected by his having con-
tributed to the injury, unless he was in fault in so doing. 80
(5) Notwithstanding the jury shall believe from the evidence
that the defendant was guilty of negligence, yet if they shall fur-
ther believe from the evidence that the plaintiff was also guilty
of negligence, and that the accident was directly caused partly by
the defendant's negligence and partly by the plaintiff's negli-
gence, then the verdict of the jury must be for the defendant,
without regard to whose negligence was the greater. 81
(6) If you believe from the evidence that both the plaintiff and
76 St. Louis N. S. Yards v. God- Tillman v. St. Louis Tr. Co.
frey, 198 111. 294, 65 N. E. 90. (Mo. App.) 77 S. W. 321.
77 Houston, T. & C. R. Co. v. Gor- so Iron R. Co. v. Mowery, 36 Ohio
bett, 49 Tex. 571; Richmond, P. & P. St. 418.
Co. v. Allen (Va.) 43 S. E. 356. i Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co.
78 Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Gor- v. Anderson, 72 Md. 522, 20 Atl. 2.
bett, 49 Tex. 576.
537 BOTH PARTIES NEGLIGENT. 544
the servant of the defendant operating its car were guilty of negli-
gence which directly contributed to the accident and injury com-
plained of, then your verdict should be for the defendant, and it
makes no difference whose negligence was the greater. But if the
defendant or its agents could by ordinary care have avoided the
consequences of the plaintiff's negligence or want of care, the
plaintiff would then be entitled to recover, notwithstanding the
negligence of the plaintiff. 82
(7) The plaintiff cannot recover, notwithstanding there may
have been negligence on the part of the defendant or its agents
which have contributed to the accident, if he, by the want of ordi-
nary care, and by his own voluntary acts, so far himself contrib-
uted to the accident, that but for this fact it would not have hap-
pened. 83
(8) If the jury are satisfied that the tenant, G, having discov-
ered the presence of gas in an unusually large quantity in the
house, or in a room of the house, did not take reasonable means and
precautions to remove and exclude the gas, or, not knowing what
such precautions were, did not notify the servants of the defend-
ant that gas was escaping, or make some reasonable effort to
notify them that gas was escaping into the house, and if he reck-
lessly brought the flame of the candle into contact with the gas
and air of the room, his want of care will prevent recovery on the
part of the plaintiff in this case, although the jury may believe
that the defendant was negligent. 84
(9) If the plaintiff knew the dangerous condition of the roof of
the room, and continued in the service in the room or remained
therein, he cannot recover in this case. 85
(10) If the plaintiff by the exercise of ordinary care could have
ascertained that the part of the roof which fell and injured
him was in an unsafe condition and liable to fall, and exposed
himself to the danger by going thereunder, he cannot recover in
this case. 86
(11) If the defendant in this case neglected to furnish props at
82 Tillman v. St. Louis Tr. Co. s Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Gor-
(Mo. App.) 77 S. W. 321; Phila- bett, 49 Tex. 576.
delphia, W. & B. R. Co. v. Ander- s* Bartlett v. Boston Gaslight Co.
son, 72 Md. 522, 20 Atl. 2; Houston, 122 Mass. 213.
T. & C. R. Co. v. Gorbett, 49 Tex. ^ Coal Co. v. Estievenard, 53
571; Iron R. Co. v. Mowery, 36 Ohio Ohio St. 56, 40 N. E. 725.
St. 418; Richmond P. P. Co. v. Allen Coal Co. v. Estievenard, 53 Ohio
(Va.), 43 S. E. 356. St. 56, 40 N. E. 725.
544 NEGLIGENCE GENERALLY. 538
the room in which the plaintiff worked, and the roof of the room
was in a dangerous condition and the plaintiff knew its condition,
then the plaintiff cannot recover in this case. 87
(12) Under the most careful circumstances mining coal is at-
tended with danger, and persons engaged therein are presumed to
incur the risks incident thereto, and if the plaintiff in this case
knew, or had the means of knowing, that a part of the roof
of the room in which he worked was unsafe and liable to fall
he cannot recover in this case. 8 *
(13) If the plaintiff, at the time he was injured, was acting by
his own will and his own judgment, uncontrolled by any one con-
nected with the mine, and if it was his duty to have determined
whether or not the roof of the mine was safe to work under, and
if the plaintiff was injured by his own misjudgment or negligence,
he cannot recover in this action, and your verdict should be for
the defendant/ 9
(14) If a part of the roof of the room in which the plaintiff
worked was unsafe and liable to fall, and props were needed for
its support, and the defendants neglected to furnish the props
when needed, and the plaintiff had the means of knowing the
roof was in that unsafe condition, and remained in the room
or otherwise exposed himself to the danger from the fall of the
roof, when he could have left the room, then the plaintiff can-
not recover in this case. 90
(15) If a part of the roof of the room in which the plaintiff
worked was unsafe and liable to fall, and props were needed for
its support, and the defendant neglected to furnish the props when
needed, and the plaintiff "knew the roof was in that unsafe condi-
tion, and remained in the room or otherwise exposed himself to
the danger from the fall of the roof, when he could have left the '
room, the plaintiff cfannot recover in this case. 91
(16) If the defendant in this case neglected to furnish props at
the room in which the plaintiff worked, and the roof of the room
was in a dangerous condition, and the plaintiff had the means of
ST Coal Co v. Estievenard, 53 .so Coal Co. v. Estievenard, 53
Ohio St. 55. 40 N. E. 725. Ohio St. 55, 40 N. E. 725. But see
ss Coal Co. v. Estievenard, 53 Davis Coal Co. v. Polland, 158 Ind.
Ohio St. 55, 40 N. E. 725. &07.
fin Coal Co v. Estievenard, 53 i Coal Co. v. Estievenard, 53
Ohio St. 57, 40 N. E. 725. Ohio St. 55, 40 N. E. 725.
539 INJURY FROM ACCIDENT OR NATURAL CAUSE. 545
knowing that the roof was in a dangerous condition, then the
plaintiff cannot recover in this case. u -
545. Injury resulting from accident or natural cause. (1)
Although the jury may believe that the injuries to the plaintiff's
property occurred at a time when the defendant was guilty oi
negligence, in not keeping their bulk-head, ice-breaker or other
works in repair, nevertheless, if the jury also believe, from the
evidence, that the defendant could not have prevented such in-
jury by the exercise of ordinary care, then the defendant is not
liable for such injuries. 93
(2) If you find from the weight of the testimony that the sole
cause of the loss was an extraordinary flood of course, the
cemetery company would not be responsible for that your ver-
dict should be for the defendant. If, however, the weight of the
evidence satisfies you that the loss was the result of two concur-
rent acts, an extraordinary flood and some negligence of the said
company in assisting in producing the loss, then the said com-
pany would be liable. 94
(3) If the jury believe from the evidence that frost or extreme
cold was not the sole cause of the breaking of said rail, but
only contributed thereto, and the railroad track where said rail
broke was in an unsafe and dangerous condition, that might
have been remedied or guarded against by the exercise by de-
fendant's employees of the highest degree of care and skill
then practicable and then known to track repairers, and that
such unsafe and dangerous condition of said railroad track of
defendant at said point also contributed to cause the break-
ing of said rail jointly with the said frost and extreme cold,
then the law is for the plaintiff, and he is entitled to compen-
satory damages. 95
(4) If you find from the evidence that the immediate cause of
the alleged disaster was the want of the proper construction
of said bridge over W river, either as to size, material, piers,
or the adjustment thereof, then you should find for the plain-,
tiff, unless you should further find that the size and construc-
92 Coal Co. v. Estievenard, 53 94 Helbing v. Allegheny Ceme-
Ohio St. 56, 40 N. E. 725. tery Co. 201 Pa. St. 172, 50 Atl. 970.
93 sterling Hydraulic Co. v. Wil- 93 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Fox,
liams, 66 111. 400. 74 Ky. (11 Bush), 506.
545 NEGLIGENCE GENERALLY. 540
tion of said bridge were right and proper for the use intended,
and that the material in said bridge had been properly tested,
by tests known to men skilled in such material, or could not
be so tested and preserve the strength of said material, and
said disaster was caused by a defect in said material which
could neither be foreseen nor provided against by human fore-
sight and care, then you should find for the defendant. 96
(5) If you find from the evidence that the accident was occa-
sioned by a condition of things which the company could neither
foresee nor provide against, then you should find for the de-
fendant. 97
(6) If you find from the evidence that the action complained
of was occasioned by a condition of things which the defendant
company could neither foresee nor provide against, then the
plaintiff cannot recover. So, if you find from the evidence
that the size and construction of the bridge in question were
right and proper for the use intended, and that the material
of the bridge had been properly tested by tests known
to men skilled in such material, or could not be so tested and
preserve the strength of said material, and the said disaster
was caused by' a defect in the material of the bridge which
could neither be foreseen nor provided against by human fore-
sight and care, then you should find for the defendant. 98
(7) If you believe from the evidence that such injury as the
plaintiff claims he has sustained could not have resulted without
leaving such marked traces of deformity as would manifest
itself to medical experts, so as to enable them to detect the
cause of his present physical condition, aside from the mere
wasted and shrunken condition of the muscles of his right
arm and shoulder, and -you further believe from the evidence
that the wasted and shrunken condition may have resulted from
simple disease without injury, and no such nor any traces of
deformity can be discovered as would account for the wasting
of the muscles, then you are bound to attribute it to disuse. 99
546. Negligence in the use of electricity. (1) The degree of
96 Bedford, S. O. & B. R. Co. v. ** Bedford, S. O. & B. R. Co. v.
Rainbolt, 99 Ind. 556. Rainbolt, 99 lad. 551.
7 Beedford, S. O. & B. R. Co. v. n Allison v. C. & N. W. R. Co.
Rainbolt, 99 Ind. 551. 42 Iowa, 282.
541 NEGLIGENCE IN USING ELECTRICITY. 546
care which the law requires in order to guard against injury
to others varies greatly, according to the circumstances of the
case; and if the jury believe that electricty was the power
used by the defendant in its business, and is a highly danger-
ous agency to life, unless exercised with constant and extreme
care, then, to such extent, a high degree of care in its super--
vision, management and use is required of defendant, and a
failure on its part to exercise such high degree of care would
be negligence. 100
(2) If you believe that the defendant company was notified by
telephone that there was trouble with its wires, and failed to
take immediate steps to investigate such trouble and rectify
the same, if trouble existed, and if a sufficient time between
the notice to the defendant of the trouble to its wires and the
accident to the plaintiff for its investigation and attention had
elapsed, and thereafter, by reason of the failure of the de-
fendant to attend to its said wires, such wire or wires charged
with electricity hung suspended over the scene of the accident
so as to become dangerous to persons on the street, then the
defendant would be guilty of negligence. I charge you that,
which, in plain words, is that if the company was notified that
its wires were down, and did not take steps in a reasonable
length of time to repair them, it would be guilty, if an acci-
dent occurred, in not repairing their wires in a reasonable length
of time. 101
(3) If the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant
was negligent, according to the definitions given above, and that,
in consequence of such negligence, the plaintiff accidently came
in contact with wires charged with electricity, operated and
controlled by defendant, and was injured thereby, then the
plaintiff would be entitled to recover. 102
(4) There is no evidence of any other cause of the death of the
plaintiff's intestate except from the electricity coming from the
wire of the defendant; therefore, if the jury find from the evi-
dence that the death of the intestate was caused by the current
100 Mitchell v. Charleston L. & P. 102 Mitchell v. Charleston L. & P.
Co. 45 S. Car. 146, 22 S. E. 769. Co. 45 S. Car. 146, 22 S. E. 769.
101 Mitchell v. Charleston L. &
P. Co. 45 S. Car. 146, 22 S. E. 769.
547 NEGLIGENCE GENERALLY. 542
of the electricity passing into his body from the charged wire of
the defendant, the jury will find that the negligence of the de-
fendant was the proximate cause of the death of the plaintiff's
intestate. 103
547. Electric wires out of repair. (1) The defendant was
entitled to a reasonable time, after the fall of the wire, to repair
it, or remove it out of the way of persons using the street,
and if you find that the injury to the plaintiff occurred before
the expiration of such reasonable, time, then the plaintiff is not
entitled to recover anything in this action. 104
(2) The law does not require impossibilities of any person, nat-
ural or artificial, nor does it require that the defendant should
have ready for service at every moment and every point of expos-
ure, an adequate force to overcome a sudden fracture of wire or
any other like casualty in the shortest possible time. All it can be
required to do in this connection is to maintain an efficient sys-
tem of oversight, and to be prepared with a competent and
sufficient force ready to furnish, within a reasonable time, a
proper remedy for all such casualties, defects and accidents,
as from experience there was any reasonable ground to an-
ticipate might occur. 105
(3) Although the jury may believe from the evidence in this
cause that the defendant company was guilty of negligence in the
manner of constructing or maintaining its electric wire over and
above the track of the railroad company in question, still the
plaintiff had no right to attempt to pass from one car to another
while the cars were passing under the said wire, if in so doing
he increased the danger of an accident from the said wire, and
if, from the evidence, the jury believe that the plaintiff did at-
tempt to pass from one car to another while passing under said
wire, and by so doing did increase the danger and chance of the
accident, he cannot recover in this case, and the jury must find
for the defendant. 106
(4) If the jury find from the evidence that the accident com-
plained of by the plaintiff was caused solely by hidden or latent
103 Mitchell v. Electric Co. 129 N. 105 Mitchell v. Charleston L. & P.
Car. 173, 39 S. E. 801. Co. 45 S. Car. 146, 22 S. E. 769.
104 Mitchell v. Charleston L. & P. ioe Danville St. Car Co. v. Wat-
Co. 45 S. Car. 146, 22 S. E. 769. kins, 97 Va. 717, 34 S. E. 884.
543 ELECTRIC WIRES OUT OF REPAIR. 547
defect not apparent to the eye in the trolley wire of the de-
fendant, and that the defendant could not have discovered or
detected it by any reasonable examination by the defendant
or its agents, and the jury further find that the defendant
company employed such proper and suitable contractors to erect
the trolley wire and over-head construction at the place of the
accident ; and that such contractors used suitable material and
a proper and skillful method of over-head construction of the
place of the accident, then defendant has performed its duty
to the passenger in this regard, and the verdict must be for
the defendant, even though the jury further find that the plain-
tiff, without fault on his part, did receive injuries by reason
of the breaking and falling of said trolley wire. 107
io7 Baltimore City P. R. Co. v. Nugent 86 Md. 351, 38 Atl. 779.
CHAPTER XL.
NEGLIGENCE OP CARRIERS.
Sec. Sec.
548. Negligence of carrier pre- 569.
sumed Burden.
549. High degree of care required 570.
of carriers.
550. Carrier liable, though neg- 571.
ligence only slight.
551. Care of passenger Ordinary 572.
care.
552. Carrier bound to carry sick 573.
person.
553. Drunkenness of passenger not 574.
negligence.
554. Injury to postal clerk in mail 575.
train.
555. Injury to passenger on freight 576.
train. 577.
556. Ordering or putting passen-
ger off moving train. 578.
557. Willful ejection of passenger
from train. 579.
558. Plaintiff a trespasser, not a
passenger. 580.
559. Children trespassers, getting
on train. 581.
560. Passenger assisting in push-
ing car. 582.
561. Passenger getting off moving
train. 583.
562. Plaintiff negligent in getting 584.
off train.
563. Passenger injured in leaving 585.
train.
564. Duty of carrier to stop train. 586.
565. Passenger entitled to reason-
able time to get off. 587.
566. Platform unsafe Passenger
getting off. 588.
567. Injury to passenger approach-
ing or getting on train. 589.
568. Passenger negligent in get-
ting on train. 590.
544
Passenger falling off plat-
form No liability.
Passenger riding upon plat-
form of car.
Assisting passenger By
agent of carrier.
Ticket not essential to be-
come passenger.
Mistake of conductor in tak-
ing ticket.
Putting off passenger for
want of ticket or fare.
Putting off disorderly passen-
ger.
Passenger on wrong train.
Passenger may rely on direc-
tions of carrier's agents.
Passenger injured while
changing cars.
Liability when car owned by
another.
Liability for injury from boil-
er explosion.
Injury from accident No li-
ability.
Passenger guilty of contribu-
tory negligence.
Burden of proof generally.
Carrier not insurer of passen-
ger's safety.
Carrier liable for loss or in-
jury of baggage.
Carrier's liability for baggage
limited.
Goods lost or delayed by car-
rier Liability.
Carrier not liable for dam-
age to goods.
Liability in shipment of live
stock.
Freight rates of carrier under
federal statute.
NEGLIGENCE OF CARRIER BURDEN. 549
548. Negligence of carrier presumed Burden. (1) When
injury or damage happens to a passenger (on a railroad) by a
collision, or by any other accident occurring on the road, the
prima facie presumption is that it occurred by the negligence
of the railroad company, and the burden of proof is on the
company to establish that there has been no negligence what-
soever, and that the damage has been occasioned by inevitable
casualty, or by some cause which human care and foresight
could not prevent. 1
(2) If the jury find from the evidence that the plaintiff, while
a passenger on one of the defendant's cars, and while exercising
ordinary care, was shocked and knocked off said car and injured
by coming in contact with the end of a broken trolley wire used
by defendant in the operation of their railway, then their ver-
dict must be for the plaintiff, unless they shall further find that
by the exercise of that high degree of care required by reason of
the well known dangerousness of the agency employed, the de-
fendant could not have prevented the injury complained of. 2
(3) If the jury believe from the evidence that the plaintiff was
a passenger on one of defendant's cars, and while exercising
reasonable care and diligence with respect to his own safety,
the car started with a sudden and violent jerk, causing the
injury now being inquired into, then the burden is thrown upon
the defendant to show, to the satisfaction of the jury, that the
horses hitched to the car were suitable for the service in ques-
tion, or that the accident was not due to the horses, and that
the servant of defendant managing the car exercised the ut-
most care, skill and foresight in the management of the same,
or that the accident occurred by reason of some cause not un-
der the control of defendant, or its servants and employes; and
unless the defendant has so satisfied the jury, their verdict
should be for the plaintiff. 3
549. High degree of care required of carriers. (1) While a
common carrier of passengers is not an insurer of their lives,
still, in consideration of the great danger to human life conse-
1 Shenandoah Val. R. Go. v. s Dougherty v. Missouri R. Co.
Moore, 83 Va. 828, 3 S. E. 796. 97 Mo. 647, 8 S. W. 900.
2 Baltimore City P. R. Co. v. Nu-
gent, 86 Md. 350, 38 Atl. 779.
549 NEGLIGENCE OF CARRIERS. 546
quent upon the neglect of duty upon the part of the carrier,
the law exacts of it the exercise of the highest practicable care
for the safety of its passengers in the operation of its cars and
stopping and starting its cars to enable passengers to get on
and off the same, and for any failure to exercise such care
and for slight neglect of its duty in this respect, resulting in
an accident or injury, it is liable to a passenger who is her-
self without fault for an injury sustained as the proximate re-
sult of such negligence. 4
(2) A common carrier of passengers, such as a street car com-
pany, is bound to use the highest degree of care for the safety of
its passengers and persons attempting to become passengers on its
cars. 5
(3) Negligence, when applied to carriers of passengers, means
the absence in the performance of a duty imposed by law for the
protection of others, of that high degree of care, in acting or
refraining from acting, which very cautious, prudent and com-
petent persons usually exercise under like circumstances. 6
(4) Kailway companies, in transporting passengers upon their
trains operated and managed by their employes, must, while
thus transporting such passengers, exercise a high degree of
care in order to avoid accident or injury to -such passengers, and
the failure to exercise such care as a person of ordinary prudence,
under like circumstances would use, is negligence. 7
(5) The right of the plaintiff to recover in this case will be sub-
mitted to you from two aspects, viz.: (1) Was S at the time
a passenger on defendant's train? or (2) was he a trespasser?
The law imposes upon the defendant company the duty of ex-
ercising the highest degree of care towards him if he was a
passenger for pay on defendant's cars at the time; but if he
was a trespasser on the defendant's train, the law imposes only
the duty of ordinary care for his safety after discovering that
lie was such trespasser. Now, if from all the facts and cir-
cumstances before you, you find that at the time S was killed
he was a passenger on defendant's cars, and that his death
* Indianapolis St. R. Co. v. 643; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v.
Brown (Ind.), 69 N. E. 408. White, 22 Tex. Cv. App. 424, 55 S.
s Tillman v. St. Louis Tr. Co. W. 593.
(Mo. App.), 77 S. W. 320. 7 Gulf, C, & S. F. R. Co. v. Wil-
Houston & T. C. K. Co. v. Dot- son, 79 Tex. 371, 15 S. W. 280.
son, 15 Tex. Cv. App. 73, 38 S. W.
547 HIGH DEGREE OF CARE REQUIRED. 549
was caused or occasioned by the carelessness of those in charge
of the train at the time; that is, if you find that the head-end
collision which resulted in S's death was brought about through
the carelessness and negligence and want of proper care on the
part of those operating the trains at the time, then the de-
fendant company would be liable in this case. If you find
and believe that S at the time was a trespasser on defendant's
train, that he at the time was riding on what is commonly known
as the "blind baggage," endeavoring to travel without paying
for his passage; and you further find and believe that a per-
son of ordinary prudence and caution would not have been in
such position, and would not have acted as S did at the time
he boarded the train, then, if you find this to be the case, the
defendant company would not be liable, unless you further
find and believe that the servants and agents of the defendant
company knew of his position before the accident, and could
have prevented the accident by the exercise of ordinary care. 8
(6) It is the duty of common carriers to do all that human care,
vigilance and foresight can reasonably do under the circum-
stances and in view of the character of the mode of convey-
ance adopted, reasonably to guard against accidents and con-
sequential injuries, and if they neglect so to do, they are to be
held strictly responsible for all consequences which flow from
such neglect; that while the carrier is not an insurer of the
absolute safety of the passenger, it does, however, in legal
contemplation, undertake to exercise the highest degree of care
to secure the safety of the passenger, and is responsible for
the slightest neglect resulting in injury to the passenger, if
the passenger is, at the time of the injury, exercising ordinary
care for his or her safety; and this care applies alike to the
safe and proper construction and equipment of the road, the
employment of skillful and prudent operatives, and the faith
ful performance by them of their respective duties. 9
(7) Common carriers of persons are required to do all that hu-
man care, vigilance and foresight can reasonably do, consistent
with the character and mode of conveyance adopted, and the prac-
s Southerland v. Texas, &c. R. Co. Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Byrum,
(Tex. Cv. App.) 40 S. W. 195. 153 111. 131, 133, 38 N. E. 578.
549 NEGLIGENCE OF CARRIERS. 548
ticable prosecution of the business to prevent accidents to passen-
gers riding upon their trains or alighting therefrom. 10
(8) If the plaintiff was a passenger upon the defendant's road
in one of the defendant's coaches, as alleged in the complaint,
the defendant's obligation was to carry her safely and properly;
and if the defendant entrusted this duty to the servants of
the company, the law holds the defendant responsible for the
manner in which they execute it. The carrier is obliged to
protect its passengers from improper and unnecessary violence
at the hands of its own servants. And it is the established
law that a carrier is responsible for the negligence and wrong-
ful conduct of its servants, suffered or done in the line of their
employment whereby a passenger is injured. 11
(9) A carrier of passengers for pay is responsible for injuries
sustained by a passenger through the neglect, recklessness and
carelessness of the servants of such carrier, while they are engaged
in the general scope of their employment, whether the act was or
was not authorized by the carrier. 12
(10) It is the duty of a railroad company to convey its passen-
gers safely, and it is the duty of the employes of the railroad com-
pany to exercise care and diligence in the performance of their
respective duties, and any omission or failure to discharge fully
all the obligations incumbent upon said employes is negligence
and if a passenger suffers injury by such negligence, the rail-
road company is liable therefor. 13
'(11) The degree of care which defendant and its employes were
bound to exercise towards plaintiff (if you find from the evidence
he paid his fare as a passenger at any time during his said trip on
the car, as he alleges) was this: Defendant was bound to run
and operate its cars with the highest degree of care of a very pru-
dent person, in view of all the facts and circumstances at the
time of the alleged injury. 14
(12) If the jury believe from the evidence in this case that on
or about the 16th day of February, 1880, the defendant was con-
10 Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Byrum, 12 Louisville, N. A. & C R Co.
153 111. 134, 38 N. B. 578; Chicago, v. Wood, 113 Ind. 560, 14 N. E. 572
&c. R. Co. v. Bundy, 210 111. 47. "international & G. N. R. Co.
n Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. v. Eckford, 71 Tex. 274. 8 S. W. 679.
v. Wood, 113 Ind. 560, 14 N. E. 572. ^ O'Connell v. St. Louis, C. & W.
R. Co. 106 Mo. 483, 17 S. W. 494
549 HIGH DEGREE OF CARE REQUIRED. 549
trolling and operating a train of ears on a railroad in this coun-
try, and that the defendant received the plaintiff on its cars
as a passenger, for hire, then the court instructs the jury that
the defendant was bound to make up its train, couple its cars
and engines in such a careful, skillful and prudent manner
as to carry the plaintiff with reasonable safety as such passen-
ger. 15
(13) If the jury believe from the evidence that the plaintiff was
at the time of the event in question a passenger on one of defend-
ant's cars, then the defendant owed to the plaintiff the duty of
exercising the utmost care and vigilance to carry him over its road
safely, and is responsible to the plaintiff for any neglect or want
of proper care which the jury may find from the evidence, if they
so find, causing the injury in question arising from the manage-
ment of the car and horses by the defendant's servants or em-
ployes, or from the use of skittish or unsuitable horses causing
the injury in question. 16
(14) It is the duty of a railroad company to use due care, not
only in conveying its passengers upon their journey, but also in
all preliminary matters, such as their reception into the car
and their accommodation while waiting for it; and whether
bound to render assistance in taking passengers aboard its cars
or not, it is liable for the consequences of negligence in giving
directions to passengers as to the mode of entering. 17
(15) When the carrier of passengers by railway does not re-
ceive passengers into the car at the platform erected for that pur-
pose, but suffers or directs passengers to enter at out of the way
places, it is its duty to use the utmost care in preventing accidents
to passengers while entering the car. 18
(16) It is claimed on the part of the plaintiff that the track was
out of repair in consequence of the defendant's neglect to remove
decayed and unsound ties, and supply them with sound ones : that
it was the duty of the defendant to take due care to see that the
ties in use are not permitted to decay to such extent as to endan-
ger the safety of its passengers, and omission of this duty is
a negligent failure to keep the road in proper repair. It is
is Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. v. Allender v. C. R. I. & P. R.
Martin, 111 111. 219, 225. Held Co. 43 Iowa, 277.
proper and not assuming facts. is Allender v. C. R. I. & P. R.
iG Dougherty v. Missouri R. R. Co. 43 Iowa, 277.
Co. 97 Mo. 656, 8 S. W. 900.
550 NEGLIGENCE OF CARRIERS. 550
for you to say, in the light of the evidence, whether or not
the defendant was guilty of negligence in regard to the ties at
the accident in question. 19
550. Carrier liable, though negligence only slight. (1) The
law, in tenderness to human life and limb, holds railroad com-
panies liable for the slightest negligence, and compels them to
repel by satisfactory proofs every imputation of such negli-
gence. When carriers undertake to convey passengers by the
powerful but dangerous agency of steam, public policy and
safety require that they be held to the greatest possible care
and diligence. Any negligence or default in such case will make
such carrier liable. 20
(2) If the injury to the plaintiff was occasioned without her
fault, by the least negligence or want of skill or prudence on the
part of the defendant or its employes in charge of the train, the
company is liable. 21
(3) A common carrier of passengers is bound to use the utmost
care and diligence for the safety of passengers, and it is liable for
an injury to a passenger occasioned by the slightest neglect
against which prudence and foresight might have guarded. 22
(4) The greatest care and diligence are required of a railroad
company as a common carrier of passengers conveyed by means
of steam-cars. If a passenger receives an injury without his fault,
by the least negligence or want of skill on the part of such carrier
or its employes in charge of the train, against which prudence
and foresight might have guarded, the law holds the carrier liable
for such injury. And in this case if you believe from the evidence
that the plaintiff, without any fault on his part, was injured as
charged in his declaration, by the slightest negligence of the de-
fendant company, then he is entitled to recover for such injury. 23
(5) It is the duty of stage proprietors, who run a line of coaches
for the conveyance of passengers, to provide good coaches, har-
ness and horses, and good, skillful and careful drivers, and
should they fail to do so, and their passengers are injured by
i Andrews v. Chicago, M. & St. 22 Reynolds v. Richmond & M. R.
P. R. Co. 86 Iowa, 681, 53 N. W. 399. Co. 92 Va. 401, 23 S. E. 770.
20 Shenandoah V. R. Co v. 23 Curtis v. Detroit & M. R. Co.
Moore, 83 Va. 827, 3 S. E. 796. 27 Wis. 158; Shenandoah V. R. Co.
21 Curtis v. Detroit & M. R. Co. v. Moore, 83 Va. 823, 3 S. E. 796;
27 Wis. 158. Reynolds v. Richmond & M. R. Co.
92 Va. 401, 23 S. E. 770.
551 CARRIER LIABLE FOR SLIGHT NEGLIGENCE. 551
such failure, the proprietors are responsible. They are not only
to furnish good coaches, harness, horses and skillful and care-
ful drivers, but they are to keep them in good repair, and are
to see that their drivers drive with the utmost skill and pru-
dence. Carriers of passengers for hire are bound to exert the
utmost skill and prudence in conveying their passengers, and
are responsible for the slightest negligence or want of skill either
in themselves or their servants. They are bound to use such
care and diligence as a most careful and vigilant man would
observe, in the exercise of the utmost prudence and foresight. 2 *
551. Care of passenger Ordinary care. (1) The degree of
care required of a passenger is not the highest degree of care,
but only the ordinary care which ordinarily prudent people are
accustomed to exercise. 25
(2) If the plaintiffs, in taking the train in question, acted as
persons of common sense and ordinary prudence and intelligence
usually act in like cases, then there was no such negligence on
their part as would prevent a recovery by them in this action. 26
(3) The plaintiff, as a passenger, was not required by law to
exercise extraordinary care or manifest the highest degree of pru-
dence to avoid injury. All the law required of him while traveling
as a passenger was, that he should exercise ordinary care and pru-
dence for his safety, such as ordinarily careful persons would ex-
ercise under the same circumstances as those shown in evidence. 27
(4) The question of whether or not the plaintiff exercised ordi-
nary care for her personal safety before and at the time of the oc-
currence of the injury complained of, is a question of fact to be
determined by you from the evidence. 28
(5) The plaintiff, as a passenger, was not required by law to ex-
ercise extraordinary care or manifest the highest degree of pru-
dence to avoid injury. All the law required of him while trav-
eling as a passenger was that he should exercise ordinary care
and prudence for his safety, such as ordinarily careful persons
24 Sales v. Western Stage Co. 4 27 West C. St. R. Co. v. McNulty,
Iowa, 547. 166 111. 203, 205, 46 N. E. 784.
25 Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. Chicago C. R. Co. v. Roach,
v. Anderson, 72 Md. 521, 20 Atl. 2. 180 111. 174, 54 N. E. 212.
26 Curtis v. Detroit & M. R. Co.
27 Wis. 159.
552 NEGLIGENCE OF CARRIERS. 55?
would exercise under the same circumstances. And whethei
the plaintiff did or did not exercise ordinary care for his per-
sonal safety before and at the time of the occurrence of the in^
jury complained of, is a question of fact to be determined by
you from the evidence before you. 29
(6) The jury are instructed by reason of its convenience to the
public as a carrier of passengers, and because of the inability of
its cars to turn out, that a street railway company is invested with
the right of way over other vehicles over and upon the portion
of the street occupied by its tracks, and it is the duty of the
driver of such vehicles to turn out and allow its cars to pass,
and to use care not to obstruct and delay the same, and if the jury
believe from the evidence that the plaintiff, while neglecting such
duty and failing thereby to use ordinary care for his own safety,
was injured, then he cannot recover in this case. 30
(7) Though the jury may believe from the evidence that the
plaintiff informed the conductor that she wanted to get off at
Ninth street, and although the car stopped before reaching Ninth
street, yet, if the jury believe that such stop was not made for pas-
sengers to alight, but for the gripman to await the signal from the
watchman to cross Ninth street, and if the plaintiff was told not
to get off at that place, but she did get off, and in so doing
was thrown down and injured, then she cannot recover in this
action, and your verdict will be for the defendant. 31
552. Carrier bound to carry sick persons. (1) A common car-
rier of passengers is bound to carry and transport for hire per-
sons who are sick, weak, debilitated or predisposed to disease,
as well as those who are healthy and robust; and if you find
from the evidence that the plaintiff received the injuries com-
plained of, or any of them, in the manner alleged in the com-
plaint, and that at the time of receiving said injuries, or any
of them, the plaintiff was predisposed to malarial, scrofulous
or rheumatic tendencies, so that thereby without the fault of
the plaintiff her present condition, whatever you may find that
29 West C. St. R. Co. v. McNulty, so North Chicago E. R. Co. v.
166 111. 205, 46 N. E. 784; Chicago Penser, 190 111. 67, 70, 60 N. E. 78.
C. R. Co. v. Roach, 180 111. 174, 54 si Jackson v. Grand Ave. Ry. Co.
N. E. 212; Curtis v. Detroit & M. 118 Mo. 216, 24 S. W. 192.
R. Co. 27 Wis. 159.
553 PASSENGER DRUNK INJURING POSTAL CLERK. 554
to be, has directly resulted, then you are instructed that the
plaintiff is entitled to recover to the full extent of whatever
you may find her present condition to be. 32
553. Drunkenness of passenger, not negligence. (1) Intoxi-
cation on the part of the plaintiff, if the jury believe that the
plaintiff was intoxicated, is not, as a general rule, in itself, a&
a matter of law, such negligence or evidence of such negli-
gence as will bar his recovery in this action. The law refuses
to impute negligence as, of course, to a plaintiff from the bare
fact that at the moment of suffering the injury he was intox-
icated. Intoxication is one thing and negligence sufficient to
bar an action for damages quite another thing. Intoxicated
persons are not removed from all protection of law. If the
plaintiff used that degree of care incumbent upon him to use,
under the circumstances of this case, then his intoxication, if
you believe from the evidence he was intoxicated, had nothing
to do with the accident. When contributory negligence is one
of the issues, as in this case, it must appear that the plaintiff
did not exercise ordinary care, and that, too, without refer-
ence to his inebriety. The question is whether or not the plain-
tiff's conduct came up to the standard of ordinary care not
whether or not the plaintiff was drunk. 33
(2 ) If you,find from the evidence that the deceased on the night
of June third and the morning of June fourth had used intox-
icating drink, as testified to by conductor P and witnesses Y
and H, but shall further find that he was not drunk when he
crossed the defendant's track at W, such use of intoxicating
drink is not evidence from which the jury may infer the want
of ordinary care and prudence on his part. 34
554. Injury to postal clerk on mail car. (1) If you find from
the evidence that B, the plaintiff's decedent, was a postal agent
in charge of the United States mail, being carried by the de-
fendant company on its railroad, and that the car in which
said B and the said mail were being carried, ran off the railway
32 Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. 34 Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. S. &c.
v. Falvey, 104 Ind. 426, 3 N. E. 389. 60 Md. 452.
33 Denver Tramway Co. v. Reid,
4 Colo. App. 53, 35 Pac. 269.
555 NEGLIGENCE OF CARRIERS. 554
track, thereby killing the said B without any fault on his part,
such facts would make a prima facie case of negligence, and
would entitle the plaintiff to a verdict, unless you find that
the defendant and those from whom it procured its cars had
used due care in constructing such cars, and had from time
to time carefully inspected the same to see if they remained
in proper order, and had failed to find any defects in the same
which contributed to said injury. 35
(2) If you believe from the evidence that on the 20th day of
August, or at any time within one year next before the 25th day
October, 1887, a train of cars operated by the defendant, its
agents, servants or employes, was wrecked, and that at the time
of such wreck the plaintiff was traveling upon said train of cars
as postal or mail clerk in the employment of the United States
government and in charge of the mail matter of said train, then
he would be entitled to recover of the defendant for such injuries
as he may have received, provided they are the injuries set forth
in his petition, resulting from the negligence (if there was neg-
ligence) of the servants, agents or employes of the defend-
ant, not to exceed the amount of either kind of injury alleged
in the different averments in the plaintiff's petition. 36
(3) If the plaintiff was riding in the mail car, composing a part
of said train, and in his proper place in said car, then the fact, if
such be a fact, that it was a more dangerous place in which to
travel than other cars composing said train, would in no way af-
fect the right of plaintiff to recover in this cause. 37
555. Injury to passenger on freight car. (1) If the jury find
that previous to and on the night in question the train in ques-
tion had been and was carrying passengers and receiving fare,
and if the jury shall believe from all the facts and circum-
stances that the persons in consequence of this went there to
take said train, they were neither trespassers nor outlaws. And
if said persons were conducting themselves in a prudent and
proper manner in attempting to get aboard the train, and the
boy in question was injured in consequence of the want of
ss Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Voight, 37 Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Wil-
122 Ind. 288, 23 N. E. 774. son, 79 Tex. 375, 15 S. W. 280.
36 Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Wil-
son, 79 Tex. 374, 15 S. W. 280.
555 INJURY TO PASSENGER PUTTING PASSENGER OFF. 55G
ordinary skill and care on the part of the employes of the
defendant, then the defendant is liable. 38
(2) If you should find from the testimony that the night freight
train in question was usually made up and started from the
place where it stood when the party having charge of the plain-
tiff attempted to go on board, and that the defendant com-
pany, its agents or servants, had previous to and about that
time carried such passengers in this night train to and from M
as went aboard on their own accord, or upon application to
some person having charge of the train, collecting from such
person the usual fare of passengers, and further find that the
caboose on the night in question, and at the time the party
having charge of the plaintiff went aboard, was open for pas-
sengers, you will be warranted in finding a verdict for plain-
tiff, if you still further find the absence of negligence upon the
part of said party in the care bestowed upon the boy, and the
existence of negligence at the time upon the part of the em-
ployes of the defendant having charge of the train. 39
556. Ordering or putting passenger off moving train. (1)
If the jury find from the evidence that the plaintiff was a pas-
senger on defendant's train for K, and, on arriving there, the
conductor or agent called out the name of the station and di-
rected the plaintiff to get off said train without first stopping
it, and that the platform at that station was unsafe and of in-
sufficient length for the safe landing of passengers, and that
the plaintiff got off the train under the directions of the de-
fendant's conductor, agent or employe, and, in doing so, was
injured, on account of not stopping said train in time, or on
account of such unsafe or insufficient platform, the defendant
is liable. 40
(2) If the jury find from the evidence that the plaintiff was or-
dered or directed by the defendant's conductor or employes to
get off the train, and told to hurry up, and such orders and
directions would cause a man of ordinary reason to believe
that he must leave the train, or submit to the inconvenience
ss Lucas v. Milwaukee & S. P. R. 40 St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v.
Co. 33 Wis. 51. Cantrell, 37 Ark. 522.
39 Lucas v. Milwaukee & St. P. R.
Co. 33 Wis. 50.
557 NEGLIGENCE OF CARRIERS. 556
of being carried past the station, and that the plaintiff in get-
ting off the train was injured, the defendant is liable, provided
that they find that the act of getting off the train was a care-
ful and prudent act, and not a rash and careless exposure to
peril and hazard. 41
(3) Before the jury can find for the plaintiff, on the ground
that the agent or other employe of the defendant directed or ad-
vised the plaintiff to get off the train, they must find from
the evidence that such directions or advice were given at a
time and in a manner that would have induced the belief in
the mind of a man of ordinary reason that such agent meant
and itended that he should get off at the time and under the
circumstances existing at the time he did get off. 42
(4) If the fact be that defendant's conductor, having charge of
the train upon which plaintiff was a passenger, seized hold of
her while the train was in motion and was moving on, and
pulled her from the platform of the coach by the exercise of
physical force, and thereby caused her to strike the ground
or other hard substance below, whereby she was injured, she
would not be guilty of contributing to injuries received there-
by. 43
(5) If the jury believe from the evidence that the injury to the
plaintiff would have been prevented if the defendant or its
employes had used reasonable care and caution in the
place and manner in which the plaintiff was put off the train,
and that it did not use such care and caution, under all the
circumstances of the case, they will find for the plaintiff the
full amount of her injury and damage that may be shown by
the evidence. 44
557. Willful ejection of passenger from train. (1) The gist
of this action is the alleged wrongful ejection of the plaintiff from
the defendant's car. He cannot recover upon proof of mere
negligence. The cause of action alleged by the plaintiff is not
for negligence, and does not require proof of plaintiff's free-
dom from negligence. The plaintiff's only right of recovery
41 St Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. 43 Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co.
Cantrell, 37 Ark. 522. v. Wood, 113 Ind. 562, 14 N. B. 572.
42 St. Louie, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. 44 Georgia P. R. Co. v. West, 66
Cantrell, 37 Ark. 523. Miss. 312, 6 So. 207.
557 EJECTING PASSENGER TRESPASSER. 558
under his complaint is for willful injury, if proven. A willful
injury is that which flows from an injurious act purposely com-
mitted with the intent to commit injury. In determining whether
the injury, if any, was committed willfully, you may consider
with the other circumstances of the case the manner of the con-
ductor, the force, if any, used by him and the effect of his
acts, together with the presumption that every person intends
the natural and probable consequences of his wrongful acts;
and an unlawful intent may be inferred from the conduct which
shows a reckless disregard of consequences and a willingness
to inflict injury by purposely and voluntarily doing the act,
with the knowledge that some one is in a situation to be un-
avoidably injured thereby. 45
558. Plaintiff a trespasser Not a passenger. (1) Before the
plaintiff is entitled to recover in this action, it must appear by
a fair preponderance of the evidence that at the time of the
injury, if any, he was a passenger on the defendant's train of
cars, and not a trespasser. If he was a trespasser he cannot
recover, and you should find for the defendant 46
(2) The plaintiff cannot recover as a passenger of the defendant
without showing that he occupied that relation. 4 '"
(3) Although the jury may believe that A, the plaintiff, had no
business or right to be on defendant's train, and was a trespasser
thereon, yet, if they further believe that he was given no reason-
able opportunity to get off the train without exposing himself to
danger, but was forced to leave the train while the same was in
motion, by reason of force exercised by the employes of said
company, or any of them, within the scope of their employment,
and that in so leaving he received the injuries complained of,
they must find a verdict for the plaintiff. 48
(4) If it appear that H was not a passenger at the time of the/
injury, the defendant is only bound to the use of ordinary care,
and is responsible only for gross negligence. Ordinary care is
that degree of care which a prudent man would exercise about
his own affairs. 49
45 Citizens' St. R. Co. v. Willoe- 48 Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. An-
by, 134 Ind. 567, 33 N. E. 627. derson, 93 Va. 651, 25 S. E. 947.
4e Pfaffenback v. Lake S. & M. 49 Huelsenkamp v. Citizens R.
S. R. Co. 142 Ind. 251, 41 N. E. 530. Co. 37 Mo. 540.
*7 Lucas v. Milwaukee & St. P.
R. Co. 33 Wis. 50.
559 NEGLIGENCE OF CARRIERS. 558
(5) If it appear that H was not a passenger, and that he did not
in any manner, by his own negligence, contribute to the injury,
still the plaintiff cannot recover, unless it appear that the injury
and death were caused by the gross negligence of defendant or its
agents. 50
559. Children trespassers Getting on cars. (1) If the plain-
jtiff, at the time of the injury complained of, was a child of
tender age of seven years, and was riding upon the defendant's
car in the city of R while the same was in motion, and that
the defendant's servants in charge of said car knew of his
presence on the car and ordered him to get off, it was their
duty to have reduced the speed of the car before ordering the
plaintiff to leave it, to such a rate of speed as the plaintiff
might depart from the car with safety, notwithstanding the jury
may believe that the plaintiff was, at the time, a trespasser
upon the defendant's car. But in order to find for the plain-
tiff, the jury must believe that the order of the conductor was
given in such a manner as to frighten or intimidate the plain-
tiff to such an extent as to cause him to jump from the car
while it was in motion, taking into consideration the age and
capacity of the plaintiff. 51
(2) If the jury further believe from the evidence that the em-
ployes of the defendant knew, or could have known by the exer-
cise of ordinary care, the plaintiff was on said car, in a dangerous
situation or position, considering his age and experience and un-
derstanding, then it was their duty to slow up sufficiently to permit
the plaintiff to leave said car in safety, if the same was in motion,
and if the said car had not been started, not to start the same
until the plaintiff had gotten to a place of safety ; and if the jury
believe from the evidence that the injury complained of resulted
to the plaintiff from the failure of said employes in either one of
these particulars, they must find for the plaintiff, provided they
believe from the evidence that the plaintiff exercised such a
degree of care and caution as under the circumstances might
reasonably be expected from one of his age and experience. 52
so Huelsenkamp v. Citizens' R. 52 Richmond Tr. Co. v. Wilkin-
Co. 37 Mo. 540. son (Va.), 43 S. B. 623.
si Richmond Tr. Co. v. Wilkin-
son (Va.), 43 S. E. 624.
559 CHILDREN TRESPASSERS ON TRAINS. 559
(3) If the jury believe from, the evidence that the motorman or
conductor knew or could have known by the exercise of reason-
able care that when the car was about to start off on its return
trip that the plaintiff occupied a dangerous position for a child
of tender years, then it was the duty of the said conductor
and motorman not to start the car while the plaintiff was so
occupying said position; and if they believe from the evidence
that they did so, negligence may be imputed to the defendant,
if the jury believe that the accident was occasioned by such
negligence; provided the jury shall believe from the evidence
that the plaintiff exercised such a degree of care and caution
as, under the circumstances, might reasonably be expected from
one of his age and intelligence. 53
(4) If the jury shall believe from the evidence that the plaintiff
was injured by jumping from a moving train of the defendant
whilst being propelled through the streets of the city of A, at
the unlawful rate of speed of from ten to twelve miles per hour,
and that the plaintiff's act of jumping from the train was
caused by the orders of the defendant's motorman or conductor
in charge of the train, then they may find for the plaintiff;
provided the jury shall believe that the plaintiff, by reason of
his age and want of judgment and discretion, was unable to
exercise sufficient care and caution to resist the orders of the
defendant's said motorman. 54
(5) Although the jury may find from the evidence that at the
time of the accident to the plaintiff defendant 's train was running
at a greater rate of speed than five miles an hour, that would
not justify a recovery in this case in favor of the plaintiff, unless
the jury further find that the plaintiff, taking into consideration
his age and experience and understanding, by reason of the threat-
ening- language of the motorman, had reasonable ground for
believing that the motorman intended to inflict physical violence
upon the plaintiff or to eject him from the car, or so terrorized
the plaintiff as to compel him, against his will, to jump from
the car. 55
53 Richmond Tr. Co. v. Wilkin- 55 Washington, A. & Mt. V. Elec-
son (Va.), 43 S. E. 624. trie R. Co. v. Quayle, 95 Va. 745, 30
s* Washington, A. & Mt. V. Elec. S. E. 391.
R. Co. v. Quayle, 95 Va. 747, 30 S.
E. 391.
560 NEGLIGENCE OF CARRIERS. 560
(6) Although the jury may believe from the evidence that the
motorman called to the plaintiff and his companions to get off
the car, yet, to entitle the plaintiff to recover in this action, the
jury must believe that said call of the motorman was of such a
threatening character as to justify the belief in the mind of the
plaintiff, taking into consideration his age, that the motorman
intended to do him bodily harm or to eject him from the said car
while it was in motion, and the plaintiff, through fear of such
threat, jumped from the car and was injured ; and that the jury
must further believe that it was within the scope of the duty of
said motorman to order the plaintiff to get off said car. 56
(7) If plaintiff at the time of the injury was a child of the ten-
der age of thirteen years, and was riding upon the defendant 's car
in the city of A, whilst the same was traveling at a fast rate of
speed, then it was the duty of the defendant's motorman in
charge of said train to have reduced the speed of said train,
before ordering the plaintiff to leave the same, to such a rate of
speed as that the plaintiff might depart from the train with safety,
notwithstanding the jury may believe that the plaintiff was at
the time a trespasser upon the defendant's car. 57
560. Passenger assisting in pushing car. (1) If the plaintiff
was requested by the driver of the car to assist in pushing it
back, and he did so assist and in doing so was injured by the
negligence or carelessness of the driver of the car on which he
had been riding, or of another car, he can recover if such assist-
ance was apparently necessary. Or if there was an actual neces-
sity for him to assist the driver in pushing back the car, and he
did so assist, and while doing so was injured by the negligence
of the driver of either this car or another, he can recover,
whether he was requested by the driver to do so or not. 58 .
561. Passenger getting off a moving train. (1) If the jury
believe from the evidence in this cause that the defendant's train
did not stop at the station at K long enough to enable the plain-
tiff, A, to leave the car and reach the platform while the train
oe Washington, A. & Mt. V. Elec- trie R. Co. v. Quayle, 95 Va. 747, 30
trie R. Co. v. Quayle, 95 Va. 744, 30 S. E. 391.
S. E. 391. ss Street R. Co. v. Bolton, 43 Ohio
ST Washington, A. & Mt. V. Elec- St. 226, 1 N. E. 333.
561 PASSENGER GETTING OFF MOVING TRAIN. 561
was stationary, and that she stepped off therefrom on the plat-
form while the train was in motion, it is a question for the jury
to say whether she was guilty of negligence, as above denned,
and barred thereby from a recovery for the injuries received. 59
(2) A passenger upon a railroad train is entitled to a reasonable
time to leave or alight from the car in which he is riding when
a train is stopped for that purpose, and when reasonable time is
not in fact given in which to alight in safety, if, in attempting to
do so, injuries result to him, he is entitled to recover from the
railroad company for such injuries, unless in doing so he is
guilty of criminal negligence, as elsewhere defined in these
instructions, or unless in doing so he is violating some express
rule or regulation of said railroad actually brought to his
notice. 60
(3) If, from the evidence in this case, you find that defendant's
train did not stop at the station at E long enough to enable the
plaintiff to leave the car in which she was riding, and reach the
platform while the train was standing and before it was again
started, and that she was thrown or precipitated therefrom, or
that she stepped therefrom onto the depot platform after the
train was started and was in motion, it is for you to say, upon
consideration of all the evidence upon that question, whether
she was guilty of criminal negligence as elsewhere defined in
these instructions. 61
(4) Should you find that defendant's train did not stop at E
station long enough to enable the plaintiff to alight from the car
in which she was riding, and that she was not guilty of such
gross or criminal negligence as here defined in attempting to
alight while the train was in motion, you should next determine
from the testimony whether or not the plaintiff, at the immediate
time of the injury in question, was guilty of violating any
express rule or regulation of the defendant company for the
59 Little Rock & Ft. S. R. Co. v. statute relating to criminal negli-
Atkins, 46 Ark. 430. gence.
so Omaha & R. V. R. Co. v. Choi- 01 Omaha & R. V. R. Co. v. Chol-
lette, 33 Neb. 148, 49 N. W. 1114. lette, 33 Neb. 148, 49 N. W. 1114.
This instruction is based upon a This instruction is based upon a
statute denning criminal negligence.
5G2 NEGLIGENCE OF CARRIERS. 502
safety of passengers upon its trains and whether she had actual
notice of such rule or regulation. 02
(5) Should you find from the testimony that the train on which
the plaintiff was riding did not stop at the E station a sufficient
time to permit plaintiff to alight therefrom, and that she after-
wards attempted to step or leap therefrom while said train was
in motion, you should next determine whether she was, in trying
to alight while the train was in motion, guilty of such gross
or criminal negligence as is defined in the last paragraph. 63
(6) If the plaintiff alighted from said car while the same was in
motion and going at such rate of speed that a person of ordinary
care and prudence would not have alighted under the circum-
stances, then she was guilty of contributory negligence, and
cannot recover in this cause, whether the defendant was negli-
gent or not, and if you find from the evidence that she did so
alight, then your verdict will be for the defendant. 6 *
(7) If you believe from the evidence that the plaintiff was not
thrown from the car, but that he attempted to get off the car
while it was in motion and fell into the street, then he cannot
recover damages, and your verdict should be for the defendant. 65
562. Plaintiff negligent in getting off train. (1) If the jury
believe from the evidence that the plaintiff attempted to step
from the platform of the coach of defendant to the platform art
B., while the train of defendant was in motion, and that under
the circumstances of this case, the train being in motion, the age,
sex of plaintiff, and other surrounding circumstances, the attempt
to get from the train was hazardous, and not one that a person
of ordinary prudence under similar situation or circumstances
would have made, they will find for the defendant. 66
(2) If you find from the evidence that defendant's train stopped
a sufficient length of time to enable plaintiff to leave it, and fur-
ther find that plaintiff neglected to leave it while so stopped, but
carelessly and negligently jumped from it after it was put in
62 Omaha & R. V. R. Co. v. Choi- 65 Omaha St. R. Co. v. Boeson
lette, 33 Neb. 147, 49 N. W. 1114. (Neb.), 94 N. W. 619.
83 Omaha & R. V. R. Co. v. Choi- es Georgia P. R. Co. v. West, 66
lette, 33 Neb. 146, 49 N. W. 1114. Miss. 314, 6 So. 207.
64 Jackson v. Grand Ave. R. Co.
118 Mo. 216, 24 S. W. 192.
563 PASSENGER NEGLIGENT GETTING OFF. 562
motion, and that by reason of so leaving the train the injury, if
any, was causetl, then he would not be entitled to recover. 67
(3) If, from the evidence, you believe that the defendant's ser-
vants were guilty of negligence in starting the train too soon
as alleged, yet if you believe from the evidence that the plaintiff
was also guilty of negligence at the time and in the manner of
his leaving the train, and that he would not have sustained any
injury (if you believe he did sustain such injury) if he had not
himself been guilty of negligence which directly contributed to
the alleged injury, then you will find for the defendant, although
you may believe that the train did not stop long enough for the
plaintiff to get off. 68
(4) The fact, if you find it to be a fact, that the defendant's
train did not stop at the station long enough to enable the plaintiff
to alight therefrom, would not of itself excuse the plaintiff or
justify her stepping from the train while in motion. 69
(5) Should you, however, find that the plaintiff had a reason-
able and sufficient time to alight from said train and reach the de-
pot platform in safety while said train was at rest, then the defend-
ant would not be liable in the action, and you should so find. 70
(6) If the jury believe from the evidence that plaintiff was a
passenger on the train of defendant from F to B, and that
defendant in transporting the plaintiff used due and proper care
for her safety and gave her reasonable time at B to alight from
defendant's train, and that the injury complained of by the
plaintiff was not occasioned by the negligence of defendant, its
servants or employes, they will find for defendant. 71
(7) If the jury find that the defendant's cars passed the plat-
form of the station where the plaintiff, a passenger, was to have
gotten off, and stopped some distance beyond said platform, and
the said plaintiff then and there, voluntarily, and without any di-
rection or command of any of the persons in charge of said train
got off the car with the assistance of the conductor and brake-
6? Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Row- Omaha & R. V. R. Co. v. Choi-
land, 90 Tex. 365, 38 S. W. 756. lette, 33 Neb. 146, 49 N. W. 1114.
"8 Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Row- 71 Georgia P. R. Co. v. West, 66
land, 90 Tex. 366, 38 S. W. 756. Miss. 312, 6 So. 207.
69 Omaha & R. V. R. Co. v. Chol-
lette, 33 Neb. 148, 49 N. W. 1114.
562 NEGLIGENCE OF CARRIERS. 564
man, and was not injured in thus getting off, the plaintiffs are
not entitled to recover. 72
(8) Even though you should believe from the evidence that the
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence in getting off
said car, and that her negligence contributed to the accident;
yet, if you further believe from the evidence that the conductor,
after he discovered the plaintiff's peril, by the exercise of proper
care and caution could have avoided the mischief which hap-
pened, and failed to do so, the plaintiff's negligence, if any, will
not excuse the defendant, and in such case the plaintiff is entitled
to recover. 73
(9) The actionable negligence charged in the plaintiff's petition
is that the conductor of the defendant 's car, upon which the plain-
tiff was a passenger, caused the car to stop on the south side of
L. avenue for the purpose of permitting the plaintiff to alight
therefrom, and that while the plaintiff was in the act of alighting
the defendant carelessly, negligently and suddenly started said
car whereby the plaintiff was thrown to the street and injured.
The burden of proof as to the act of negligence charged as above
rests upon the plaintiff throughout the case, and before you are
warranted in returning a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, you
must find by the preponderance or greater weight of the evidence
that the plaintiff's injuries were caused by the act of negligence
on the part of the defendant as above stated, and unless you so
find your verdict must be for the defendant. 74
(10) If the jury believe from the evidence that it was reasonably
prudent, for the safety of the traveling public, that the defendant
should stop or slow down its cars before reaching Ninth street
and await the signal of the watchman, then it became the duty of.
the defendant to make such stop or slow down; and passengers
riding on defendant's cars must take the responsibility of inform-
ing themselves of the methods so to be observed in operating
defendant's road at that point; and plaintiff had no right to
undertake to alight at that point, and if she did so, it was at her
own risk and she cannot recover, unless the jury shall further
72 Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Leap- -* Peck v. St. Louis Tr. Co.
ley, 65 Md. 573, 4 Atl. 891. (Mo.), 77 S. W. 736.
TS Richmond, P. & P. Co. v. Al-
len (Va.), 43 S. E. 356.
565 PASSENGER INJURED IN GETTING OFF. 563
find from the evidence that the car had come to a full stop, and
that said car was started up again while plaintiff was alighting
therefrom, with actual knowledge of the conductor that she was
so alighting at the time. 75
(11) Although you may believe that the plaintiff got off from
the car at the north side of Division street, when the usual place
for alighting was on the south side of Division street, that fact
alone would not justify you in finding her guilty of such negli-
gence as would bar a recovery in the case, unless you believe and
find that it was the proximate cause of the injury. 76
(12) The jury are instructed, as a matter of law, that if you be-
lieve from the evidence that the plaintiff got off the defendant's
car at an improper place, or in an improper manner, and if you fur-
ther believe that such action on the part of the plaintiff was a
want of ordinary care which contributed to the injuries complain-
ed of, then your verdict must be for the defendant. 77
(13) If you find from the evidence that the plaintiff's injuries,
if any she has sustained, were caused by her leaving the defend-
ant's car before it had stopped still and while it was in motion,.and
that but for such attempt on her part to alight from said car
while it was in motion she would not have sustained any injury,
then the plaintiff cannot recover and your verdict must be for
the defendant. 78
$ 563. Passenger injured in leaving train. (1) It was the duty
of the railroad company to use that high degree of care to avoid
injury to the plaintiff, when she was about to alight from its
train at M on the occasion in question, which very prudent,
cautious and competent persons usually exercise under the same
or similar circumstances as those then existing. It is a question
of fact for the jury to determine whether the defendant's em-
ployes were guilty of the acts of which plaintiffs complain, and
Jackson v. Grand Ave. R. Co. off the car on the north, instead
118 Mo. 217, 24 S. W. 192. of the south side of the street.
76 North C. St. R. Co. v. El- 77 North C. St. R. Co. v. El-
dridge, 151 111. 542, 546, 38 N. E. dridge, 151 111. 542, 548, 38 N. E. 246.
246. Held proper to meet the argu- Perk v. St. Louis Tr. Co.
ment of counsel that the plaintiff (Mo.), 77 S. W. 736.
was guilty of negligence in getting
563 NEGLIGENCE OF CARRIERS. 566
whether such acts show that said employes failed to use the
degree of care above defined or not. 79
(2) If the jury believe from the evidence that the night on
which the plaintiff was injured was intensely dark, and the vision
of the plaintiff was further obstructed by a fierce snowstorm that
was raging at the time, and that the defendant failed to light the
station or stopping place at Q, and that in consequence of the
defendant's failure to so light the station or stopping place at
Q, the plaintiff, in attempting to alight from the defendant's
train, fell and was injured, without fault on her part, then the
jury must find for the plaintiff. 80
(3) If the plaintiff in this case was accepted as a passenger on
the defendant's train, and paid his fare, and in reaching the
station of his destination, and upon attempting to get off the
train he was thrown down and injured, and this was caused by
the negligence or the failure of duty upon the part of the defend-
ant, its agents or servants, he is then entitled to recover, unless
by his own negligence or want of care he so contributed to the
accident as to deprive him of any remedy. 81
(4) The plaintiff had a right, after the name of the station was
announced, to infer that the first stop of the train at the platform
was at the station, and when the train came to a full stop, if the
jury believe it did come to a full stop, opposite the platform of
the station, and the conductor had stepped off his train with his
lantern immediately preceding said stopping, if any, the plaintiff
was warranted in believing the proper time had arrived for him
to leave the train, unless the jury believe he was warned or
directed not to alight then; and if the jury believe from the
evidence that said train came to a full stop opposite the platform
of this station, and the plaintiff, in the exercise of such care as
a prudent person would have used, undertook to leave the train,
and through the sudden starting of the same was jerked or
thrown therefrom, or fell upon the platform, and between it and
the cars, and was injured as charged in the petition, your finding
and verdict must be for the plaintiff. 82
T0 Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Dot- si Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Gor-
son, 15 Tex. Cv. App. 73, 38 S. W. bett, 49 Tex. 575.
643. 82 Leslie v. Wabash, St. L. & P.
so Alexandria & F. R. Co. v. R. Co. 88 Mo. 53.
Herndon, 87 Va. 197, 12 S. E. 289.
567 PASSENGER INJURED IN GETTING OFF. 563
(5) The plaintiff in this case claims that her dress was held in
some way on the platform of the defendant's car, and that the con-
ductor negligently started the car while it was so held. If her
dress was held upon the platform or step by some object or force,
that is a separate and independent fact, and if you find the evi-
dence justifies you in finding such to be the fact, you may do so
without determining how or by what it was held. 83
(6) The plaintiff was not bound to apprehend any carelessness
upon the part of the defendant. She had a right to rely upon
the defendant having its platform in good condition, and free
from obstacles of an unusual character upon which her dress
might catch. She was not bound to apprehend that the con-
ductor might start the car while her body was in contact with it,
or until she was free from it and had reached a position of safety.
She was not bound to apprehend that the defendant might do
anything that would place her in jeopardy. On the contrary,
she had a right to place full reliance on the defendant doing its
full duty towards her, and exercising the high degree of care
which the law requires of it. 84
(7) The jury are instructed that this case is to be determined
upon the facts in evidence, and not upon any theory advanced to
explain circumstances; that is to say, that before the plaintiff
shall be entitled to a verdict for any amount, the evidence must
satisfy the minds of the jury that the defendant, its agents or
employes had carelessly and negligently maintained or per-
mitted some obstruction to be on or upon the platform or steps
of said car whereby the dress of the lady in the act of leaving
the car would be caught. The evidence must prove this fact;
and, if it does not, and the defendant, its agents or employes not
being otherwise negligent in the discharge of their duty, and the
plaintiff herself, in leaving said car carelessly neglected, in the
exercise of ordinary care, to handle or take care of her dress
skirts, and such negligence or carelessness of the plaintiff was the
proximate cause of her injury, she cannot recover, and your
verdict should be for the defendant. 85
ss Patterson v. Inclined P. R. Co. 85 Patterson v. Inclined P. R. Co.
12 Ohio Cir. 280. 12 Ohio Cir. 280.
s* Patterson v. Inclined P. R. Co.
12 Ohio Cir. 280.
56-i NEGLIGENCE OF CARRIERS. 568
564. Duty of carrier to stop train. (1) It is the duty of a
railroad company at each station where passengers get on and off
the train at night to have the passway into and out of the cars
so arranged and lighted as to enable passengers getting on and
off, and using reasonable care and diligence, to do so with safety. 80
(2) It was the duty of the defendant's employes to stop the
train a sufficient and reasonable length of time to allow the plain-
tiff to get off the train, and whether or not the train did stop such
a length of time you must decide from all the evidence before
you. 87
(3) And the train must be brought to a complete halt the
length of time necessary, and not merely checked up in its
speed. 88
(4) If you believe from all the evidence in this case that the
plaintiff became and was a passenger upon a car of the defendant,
and that her fare had been paid to the conductor, and that the
plaintiff gave to the conductor on such car reasonable notice of
her desire to get off said car at the corner of Ninth and Rey-
nolds streets, as alleged in her declaration, it then and there
became and was the defendant's duty to stop said car at said
place, upon arriving at the same, a sufficient length of time to
enable the plaintiff to alight therefrom in safety ; and if the jury
further believe from all the evidence that the defendant there-
after ran its said car to the said corner of Ninth and Reynolds
streets and was then and there in the act of slowing up or
stopping said car, and that the plaintiff was then and there exer-
cising all due care and caution for her own safety, and that
while so exercising such care and caution she was preparing to
alight from said car when it should come to a stop, and that
such act or acts by her, of preparing to alight at the time, under
all the circumstances and in the manner shown by the evidence,
were not negligence or carelessness on her part, and that the
defendant then and there did not stop the said car so that the
plaintiff could safely alight therefrom, but suddenly started
said car in such manner that it thereby then and there threw
86 Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Gor- ss Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Gor-
bett, 49 Tex. 575. bett, 49 Tex. 575.
ST Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Row-
land, 90 Tex. 365, 38 S. W. 756.
569 DUTY TO STOP TRAIN. 565
the plaintiff to the ground, and that such starting of the car was
negligence 011 the part of the defendant, and that the plantiff
was thereby injured as charged in her declaration, and that the
plaintiff was during all the time in the exercise of due care and
caution for her own safety, then the defendant would be liable
to the plaintiff for such injury, and in such case you will find
for the plaintiff. 89
565. Passenger entitled to reasonable time to get off. (1) A
passenger is entitled to a reasonable time to leave the car in
which he has been riding. When a train is stopped for that
purpose, and when reasonable time is not in fact allowed to get
off in safety (of which the jury are the judges), and in attempt-
ing to do so, without fault on his part, injuries result to him, he
is entitled to recover for such injuries. 90
(2) A reasonable time to get off, as mentioned in these instruc-
tions, is such time as it usually requires for passengers to get off
arid on the train at that station in safety. 91
(3) If the jury find from the evidence that on the twenty-third
day of June, 1902, the defendant was operating the car mentioned
in the evidence for the purpose of carrying passengers for hire ;
and if the jury find from the evidence that on said day the plain-
tiff was, by the defendant's servants in charge of its car, received
as a passenger thereon ; that she paid her fare ; that the car
stopped at her destination to allow her to get off; that whilst
she was in the act of getting off the defendant's servants in
charge of said car caused or suffered it to start before she had
reasonable time to get off, and that thereby the plaintiff was
thrown from said car and injured; and if the jury believe from
the evidence that the plaintiff was exercising ordinary care at the
time, then she is entitled to recover. 92
(4) If the jury believe from the evidence that the plaintiff was
not afforded a reasonable time to alight on defendant's plat-
form by the defendant or its employes, and before she had time
to reach the platform safely the train was negligently started,
and thereby caused the plaintiff to fall off said platform, and
sa Springfield C. R. Co. v. Hoeff- i Little R. & Ft. S. R. Co. v.
ner, 175 111. 634, 51 N. E. 884. Atkins, 46 Ark. 430.
oo Little R. & Ft. S. R. Co. v. 92 Hannon v. St. Louis Tr. Co.
Atkins, 46 Ark. 430. (Mo. App.), 77 S. W. 159.
565 NEGLIGENCE OF CARRIERS. 570
by reason of said fall she has received injury, they will find
for the plaintiff to the amount of the damages as may appear
from the evidence to have been sustained by her. 93
(5) It was the duty of defendant's servants and employes, on
the occasion in question, to stop the train long enough for plain-
tiff, by the exercise of ordinary care and diligence, consider-
ing her age, sex and physical condition, to get off the train
safely before it was started, or suffered to start; and if the
jury believe, from the evidence, that the plaintiff, as soon as
the train stopped, got up from her seat and walked at once,
and as fast as she reasonably could, out on the platform and
down the step on the car, without stopping on the way; that
she did all the law required of her, so far as diligence on her
part in getting off the train was concerned ; and if, under such
circumstances, the defendant's servants or employes started the
train while she was proceeding to alight, still using due and rea-
sonable haste in getting off the train, such starting of said train
was an act of negligence on the part of defendant, and a breach
of its duty to plaintiff as a passenger on its road. 9 *
(6) If the defendant or its officers knew of any inability of the
plaintiff to alight from the train in the usual time, it was bound
to give her such reasonable time to get off and be clear of dan-
ger in getting off as the circumstances required, and if you
find from the evidence that such were the facts, and that it
did not afford the plaintiff a reasonable time to alight as afore-
said, you will find in her favor for all the injury and damage
suffered by her that may be shown by the evidence. 95
(7) If the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant
company, through their agents, employes and servants, whilst the
train of the company was at the depot, in the act of discharging
passengers, negligently and violently started its train from a
stand-still without notice or warning to its passengers, the de-
fendant company is responsible for all injury resulting to a pas-
senger from such act. 96
es Georgia P. R. Co. v. West, 66 ^ Georgia P. R. Co. v. West, 66
Miss. 312, 6 So. 207. See Gulf, C. Miss. 311, 6 So. 207.
& S. F. R. Co. v. Rowland, 90 Tex. 96 Southern R. Co. v. Smith, 95
365, 38 S. W. 756. Va. 189, 28 S. E. 173.
* Hickman v. Missouri Pac. R.
Co. 91 Mo. 435, 4 S. W. 127.
571 PLATFORM UNSAFE PASSENGER GETTING OFF. 566
566. Platform unsafe Passenger getting off. (1) If the jury
believe from the evidence that at the time of the plaintiff's
being injured there was no platform or other proper landing-
place at the train's stopping-place at D, and that the defend-
ant's servants did not assist the plaintiff to alight, and for want
of such platform or landing-place and assistance in alighting
the plaintiff was injured without fault on her part, then the
jury must find for the plaintiff. 97
(2) If a barrier or guard is reasonably necessary to prevent per-
sons, who are themselves in the exercise of ordinary and reason-
able care, from falling from the platform to their injury, then a
barrier should be placed upon it, or a guard should be placed to
warn people of danger. Such lights as are necessary to render
the use of the platform and the passage over it to the cars
reasonably safe should be upon the platform at the time of the
arrival of trains, and during the time the train remains at the
station. 08
(3) The defendant is bound to provide safe and sufficient plat-
forms for the landing of passengers, of sufficient length to afford
safe egress to passengers from an ordinary train."
(4) It is the duty of the defendant to have its platform reason-
ably sufficient and safe in all respects to be used by such per-
sons as may have lawful occasion to use it. It is not neces-
sary that it should be perfectly and absolutely safe; so great
a degree of perfection is usually impracticable; but it must be
reasonably safe and sufficient for .all persons using it, who are
themselves in the exercise of ordinary and reasonable care. If
a barrier or guard is reasonably necessary to prevent persons,
who are themselves in the exercise of ordinary and reasonable
care, from falling from the platform to their injury, then a
barrier should be placed upon it, or a guard should be placed
to warn people of danger. Such lights as are necessary to
render the use of the platform and the passage over it to the
cars reasonably safe should be upon the platform, at the time of
'the arrival of trains and during the time the trains remain at the
station. 100
97 Alexandria & F. R. Co. v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v.
Herndon, 87 Va. 196, 12 S. E. 289. Cantrell, 37 Ark. 523.
s Quaife v. Chicago & N. W. R. "o Quaife v. Chicago & N. W.
Co. 48 Wis. 516, 4 N. W. 658. R. Co. 48 Wis. 516, 4 N. W. 658.
567 NEGLIGENCE OF CARRIERS. 572
567. Injury to passenger approaching or getting on train.
(1) If you believe from the evidence that the train had not
come to a full stop, but that the stop during which the plain-
tiffs attempted to go on board was one which resulted from
checking the speed of the train in bringing it up to the sta-
tion, yet if the passengers were directed to go on board by
^the men in charge of the train, the plaintiffs had a right to
assume that the train was ready for their reception, and can-
not be charged with negligence in following that direction; pro-
vided the train, where they attempted to enter, was actually
still at the time; and if the cars were not ready for the re-
ception of passengers, it was a clear act of negligence in the
company's servant to tell them to go on board. 101
(2) When a railroad company receives passengers from a space
between parallel tracks it is bound to provide such safeguards
as will protect passengers in the exercise of ordinary care from
injury from a passing train, and if it fails to do this, whether
its negligence consists in its failure to provide proper plat-
forms, or failure to notify passengers who have gone between
its tracks to enter its cars on the approach of a train on a
track parallel to that on which a passenger train is standing,
and an injury results from said failure to one of its passengers
who is about to .enter its car without contributory negligence on
the part of said passenger the company is liable therefor. 102
(3) When the carrier of passengers by railway does not receive
passengers into the car at the platform erected for that
purpose, and suffers or directs passengers to enter at out
of the way places, it is its duty to use the utmost care in pre-
venting accidents to passengers while entering. And if you
find in this case that the defendant's agents were negligent
within the meaning of this instruction, and that the plaintiff
was injured thereby, still the question remains whether or not
the plaintiff on her part contributed by her own negligence
to the injury, and if you find that she did so contribute, she
cannot recover. If she did not contribute, she can recover. 103
101 Curtis v. Detroit & M. R. Co. ios Allender v. C. R. I. & P. R.
27 Wis. 160. Co. 43 Iowa, 280.
102 Union Pac. R. Co. v. Sue, 25
Neb. 779, 41 N. W. 801.
573 INJURY ON APPROACHING TRAIN. 567
(4) If the jury find from the evidence that it was necessary for
the deceased in order to take the W accommodation train, then on
the south track of the defendant's road at W, if the jury so
find, to cross the north track of the defendant's road, and that
said W train was engaged in receiving and discharging pas-
sengers, all of whom were compelled to cross said north track
in going either to or from said train, and if the jury find from
the evidence that passengers were passing and did pass across
the said north track, then the deceased had the right to con-
sider that these circumstances amounted to an implied invitation
on the part of the defendant to the deceased to cross the said
north track and to imply assurance that it would be safe for
him to do so. 104
(5) If the train, in being brought up to the station, came to a
stop in such a manner as to induce the belief on the part of
the passengers in waiting on the platform that it had stopped
for the reception of passengers, and then, when the passengers
acting on this belief were going aboard, started again without
caution or signal given, that would constitute an act of neg-
ligence on the part of the defendants; and it would make no
difference whether in so starting the train it was intended to
proceed to the next station, or merely to locate it more con-
vintly at the same station. 105
(6) If the jury believe from the evidence that the plaintiff was
at the time of the occurrence in question a passenger on one of
the cars of the defendant's street railroad, exercising reasonable
care and diligence, and that the car started, before plaintiff took
his seat, with a sudden and violent jerk, that by reason thereof
the plaintiff lost his balance, and his hand was thrown against
and through one of the windows of the car, cutting and injuring
it, then and in that case the defendant is liable to the plaintiff
for the damage caused by and resulting from said injury to
plaintiff, unless the jury further believe from the evidence that
the defendant, its agents, servants and employes managing said
car were not guilty of any negligence or want of care in the man-
agement of said car causing the injury, and the burden of show-
104 Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. S. 105 Curtis v. Detroit & M. R. Co.
&c. 60 Md. 452. 27 Wis. 161.
567 NEGLIGENCE OF CARRIERS. 574
ing such care and want of diligence is upon the defendant to
prove to the satisfaction of the jury. 106
(7) Although the jury may believe from the evidence that if the
plaintiff had, on entering the car, taken hold of a strap, or
taken a seat nearer the door than the one he attempted to
take, the accident would not have happened, yet if the jury fur-
ther believe from the evidence that he acted with reasonable
and ordinary care in not taking hold of a strap or in moving
further forward, and as a prudent man under similar circum-
stances would ordinarily act, then he was using all the care
and diligence imposed by law upon him. 107
(8) Even though the jury believe the defendant company was
to blame in starting the car in which plaintiff was standing,
with a violent and unusual jerk, and before plaintiff had an
opportunity of taking his seat, yet if the jury also find that
plaintiff was informed by the conductor striking the bell, or
in any other way knew or had reason to expect the car was
about to start, then it was the duty of the plaintiff to have
protected himself by the most prudent means within his reach
against the starting of the car. And if you find that straps
were provided in said car for the use or convenience of pas-
sengers, by which the plaintiff, after the warning of the con-
ductor's bell, might have supported himself while the car was
being started, and that he failed so to do, and by reason of
such failure he was injured, then you will find the issues for
the defendant. 108
(9) If the jury believe from the evidence that the plaintiff at
the time of the injury in question went upon the defendant's
car as a passenger, and there was a vacant seat, then and in
that case it was the bound en duty of defendant, its servants
and employes either to not start the car until he had time
to get a seat, or if it started it before, to use the utmost care
to start it smoothly and in such a manner as not to throw him
off his feet. And if the jury believe from the evidence that
the car was started before the plaintiff had reasonable time
ice Dougherty v. Missouri R. R. ios Dougherty v. Missouri R. R.
Co. 97 Mo. 655, 8 S. W. 900. Co. 97 Mo. 659, 8 S. W. 900.
lor Dougherty v. Missouri R. Co.
97 Mo. 659, 8 S. W. 900.
575 INJURY ON APPROACHING TRAIN. 567
to take his seat, and with a sudden and violent jerk which
might have been avoided, causing said injury, the jury will
find for the plaintiff, unless it appears from the evidence that
said jerk was produced by some cause not under the control
of defendant or its agents, servants or employees. 109
(10) If the jury believe from the evidence in the case that the
plaintiff, at the time of the alleged infliction of the injury sued
for in this case, was carefully walking on the passenger plat-
form of the defendant, prepared by it at Chapin for the use
of passengers, and that so walking the plaintiff was using or-
dinary care, and did not, by his carelessness or want of care,
contribute to the infliction of said alleged injury, and if they
further find, from the evidence in the ease, that the agents
of the defendant were guilty of gross carelessness in unloading
timber from a box car, and thereby carelessly and negligently
struck the plaintiff with said timber, then the defendant is
legally liable in this case, and the plaintiff is entitled to a ver-
dict. And if the jury find for the plaintiff, they will take
into consideration the nature and extent of the wound, the
pain and suffering, if any, the loss of time and costs incurred
in treating said wound, if any has been proven in the case,
and from all the facts and circumstances in evidence in the
case, give to the plaintiff such damages as will compensate
him, in the opinion of the jury, for such injury, not to exceed
the amount claimed in the plaintiff's declaration. 110
(11 ) If the jury believe from the evidence that at the time of the
alleged injury to the plaintiff said plaintiff was legally and right-
fully upon the passenger platform of the defendant at Chapin, for
the purpose of ascertaining the time of departure of a train, and
while passing along on said platform the agents or servants
of the defendant, without any notice or warning to passengers,
threw out of a box car, on the said passenger platform, a large
and heavy stick of timber on his forehead, and thereby knocked
said plaintiff down and seriously injured him; and if they fur-
ther find from the evidence that said plaintiff at that time
was using ordinary care and did not cause the infliction of
109 Dougherty v. Missouri R. R. " Toledo, W. & W. R. Co. v.
Co. 97 Mo. 657, 8 S. W. 900. Maine, 67 111. 299.
568 NEGLIGENCE OF CARRIERS. 576
said alleged injury by his negligence, and that the agents of
the defendant did not use reasonable care in discharging said
timber, then the defendant is liable in this case for, whatever
injury resulted to the plaintiff from said alleged injury, not
to exceed the sum claimed in the plaintiff's declaration. 111
(12) If the jury believe from the evidence that it was the direct
and usual way, in getting on or off defendant's trains on the
south track to or from the junction sidewalk on the north,
for passengers to cross over defendant's north track, and that
defendant invited and allowed passengers to so cross over its
north track, in getting on or off its trains on the south track
at said junction to or from the sidewalk on the north, then
they are instructed that the plaintiff's right as a passenger
entitled him tg the same degree of extraordinary care and
vigilance for his safety, on the part of the defendant, while
he was passing from his train over defendant's north track to
the junction sidewalk on the north as while being transported
as a passenger over defendant's line.. 112
(13) If H voluntarily took and placed himself in a dangerous
and improper position on the car, when he might have taken a
more safe place or position, and his death was caused by reason of
his having placed himself in such a dangerous position, then the
plaintiff cannot recover. 113
568. Passenger negligent in getting on train. (1) If the con-
ductor warned the passengers to keep away from the train,
it was the plaintiff's duty to have heeded such warnings, and
if she attempted to board the train before it had apparently
reached its location at the platform, and when it was apparent
that it had not reached said location, she was guilty of negli-
gence, and cannot recover. 114
569. Passenger falling off the platform No liability. (1)
If the jury believe from the evidence that the injury complained
of by the plaintiff in this action was caused by a fall from the
platform at B, to the ground, and not by reason of a fall in
in Toledo. W & W. R. Co. v. us Huelsenkamp v. Citizens' R.
Maine, 67 111. 299. Co. 37 Mo. 537.
112 Btirbridge v. Kansas City Ca- "* Curtis v. Detroit & M. R. Co.
ble R. Co. 36 Mo. App. 678. 27 Wis. 162.
577 PASSENGER FALLING OFF PLATFORM. 570
getting from the car on said platform, they will find for the
defendant. 115
(2) If the jury believe from the evidence that plaintiff got off of
defendant's train at B, and was safely delivered on the platform
at said station, where passengers on the road of defendant were
accustomed to alight, and in turning round she stepped off the
end of said platform, then an injury received from such a fall
is without fault on the part of defendant, and they will find for
defendant. 116
(3) If the jury believe from the evidence that after plaintiff had
safely gotten on the platform at B the train started, and that,
owing to her age, debility or other cause, she was startled by
the starting thereof, and in consequence made a false step and
fell from the platform and was injured, the defendant was not
responsible therefor, and they will find for the defendant. 117
(4) If, on the other hand, you believe from the evidence that the
conductor of said defendant railway company in charge of said
train did not push and kick the plaintiff, causing him to fall
from said train, or if you find from the evidence that some
person other than said conductor of the defendant railway com-
pany in charge of said train pushed and kicked the plaintiff
after the plaintiff had boarded said train, and thereby caused
him to fall from said train, then in either of said events you
will find for the defendant railway company. 118
570. Passenger riding upon platform of car. (1) A passen-
ger upon a railroad train, after said train has stopped at a regular
station, has a right to go upon the platform of said coach in
which said passenger may be, and within the time allowed by
the rules of the company for the stopping of said train at said
station, so that said passenger, being upon said platform, does
not interfere with the proper management of said train or with
passengers alighting therefrom or getting thereon, and that it
is not per se negligence so to do, and that the mere fact of a
passenger being upon the platform under such circumstances
us Georgia P. R. Co. v. West, 66 i" Georgia P. R. Co. v. West, 66
Miss. 313, 6 So. 207. Miss. 313, 6 So. 207.
"6 Georgia P. R. Co. v. West, 66 us Texas, &c. R. Co. v. Terns
Miss. 312, 6 So. 207. (Tex. Cv. App.), 77 S. W. 231.
570 NEGLIGENCE OF CARRIERS. 578
does not constitute negligence upon the part of said passen-
ger. 119
(2) If the jury believe from the evidence that under the cir-
cumstances of the case there was a reasonable necessity, either
real or apparent, for the plaintiff to travel on the platform of
the car, and that he made such effort to obtain accommodations
inside of the car as an ordinarily prudent man would ha've
made under similar circumstances, then he was not guilty of
negligence by reason of standing on the platform. 120
(3) If you believe from the evidence that while the train was in
motion the plaintiff, for his own convenience, left the inside of the
car in which he had been riding and went upon the platform for
the purpose of riding there or of passing into the next car
in search of a seat, you are instructed that the plaintiff as-
sumed all risk of falling or being thrown from the train by
reason of the motion or oscillation thereof, whether caused by
speed, curves, frogs or switches, and in that case you must find
for the defendant. 121
(4) If you find that at and prior to the time in question there
existed an express rule or regulation of the defendant
company that passengers should not stand upon the plat-
form of the cars while the train was in motion, and that
such rule or regulation was actually before that time brought
to the plaintiff's knowledge by means of notices posted upon
the doors of the defendant's cars, and if she went upon the
platform of the moving train in violation of such express rule
or regulation and attempted to step therefrom to the depot
platform, she could not recover in this case ; but if she was in
the act of leaving the train at the time it started, then the
standing upon said platform would not be a violation of such
rule or regulation, although the train may have been in mo-
tion. 122
571. Assisting passenger By carrier's agents. (1) Whether
it was the duty of the defendant's agent to have assisted the
119 Southern R. Co. v. Smith, 95 See Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v.
Va. 189, 28 S. E. 173. See St. Louis, Clowes, 93 Va. 196, 24 S. E. 833.
B. & S. Co. v. Hopkins, 100 111. App. 121 Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v.
567. Clowes, 93 Va. 195, 24 S. E. 833.
120 Highland Ave. & B. R. Co. v. 122 Omaha & R. V. R. Co. v.
Donovan, 94 Ala. 300, 10 So. 139. Chollette, 33 Neb. 147, 49 N. W.
1114.
579 ASSISTING PASSENGER TICKET UNNECESSARY. 572
plaintiff in getting on the car is a question for you to consider
and determine from the evidence in the case; and for this pur-
pose it is proper for you to consider the train and the car,
their distance from the platform and depot, the facility with
which access could be had, the sex, age and inexperience of
the plaintiff, if these matters were known to the defendants'
agents, and all the facts and circumstances surrounding the
case. 123
(2) A railroad company is not responsible for the willful tres-
pass or unlawful acts of its agents, or for acts done clearly out-
side of the scope of their employment; but where a brakeman
on a train undertakes to direct and assist passengers in getting on
and off the cars, in the absence of proof to show that this was out-
side of the scope of his duties, there would be no presumption that
such was the fact. 124
(3) The defendant was under no obligation or duty to the plain-
tiff on account of her age or feeble condition, to assist her off the
train, or to stop longer at the station than was usual, to enable
her to get off unless she had notified the conductor or some em-
ployee on the train of her condition. 125
572. Ticket not essential to become passenger. (1) To be-
come a passenger, and entitled to protection as such, it is not nec-
essary that a person shall have entered a train or paid his
fare, but he is a passenger as soon as he comes within the con-
trol of the carrier at the station through any of the usual ap-
proaches, with the intent to become a passenger, and the court
therefore further instructs the jury that if they believe from
the evidence that the plaintiff, B, on the second day of July, 1888,
went to the defendant's depot at the town of C by one of the
usual routes thereto, for the purpose and with the intention
of taking the next train, and stepped upon the platform of
said depot with the intention and purpose of becoming such
passenger, the plaintiff then became, in contemplation of law,
a passenger of the defendant, provided she came to said depot
and platform within a reasonable time before the time for the
123 Allender v. C. R. I. & P. R. 125 Little R. & Ft. S. R. Co. v.
Co. 43 Iowa, 277. Atkins, 46 Ark. 432.
124 Houston & T. C. R. Co. v.
Gorbett, 49 Tex. 576.
573 NEGLIGENCE OF CARRIERS. 580
departure of said train, whether or not she had purchased a
ticket from the defendant or its agent. 120
(2) Although when the occurrence inquestion happened the
plaintiff had not paid his fare, and by reason of said event got off
without paying, yet if the jury believe from the evidence that
he went on the car as a passenger with the intention of paying
his fare when called upon, then he was a passenger, and the de-
fendant owed to him the same duties as if, in fact, he had paid
his fare. 127
573. Mistake of conductor in taking ticket. (1) It is the duty
of carriers of passengers to provide agents and servants who
can and will properly protect the interests of the passengers,
and not by want of skill, lack of knowledge, a want of care,
take from passengers rights for which they have contracted
and paid. A passenger has a right to act upon the conduct
and directions of the agents of the company. If the conductor
of a train of cars takes from a passenger a coupon of a ticket,
which said ticket entitles him to passage from one station on
said road to another and return, and by mistake or otherwise
takes the coupon which entitles the passenger to return pas-
sage, when he should have taken the one entitling the passen-
ger to passage going, this would be neglect of the company, and
the pasenger would have a right to rely on the act of the con-
ductor in taking one coupon of his ticket, and he would be
entitled to use the other end of his coupon on his return pas-
sage. 128
574. Putting off passenger for want of ticket or fare. (1) If
you find from the evidence before you that the ticket in ques-
tion was a third-class or emigrant ticket which had been sold
at a reduced rate to a person in San Francisco other than the
plaintiff, and that said ticket, by its terms, was not transfer-
able, and the purchaser thereof in San Francisco, in part con-
sideration of such sale at a reduced price, agreed that it should
not be transferable, and you further find that the plaintiff pur-
chased it in Omaha from some person other than the defendants
126 Barker v. Ohio River R. Co. 128 Pennsylvania Co. v. Bray, 125
57 W. Va. 430, 41 S. E. 148. Ind. 232, 25 N. E. 439. Held cor-
127 Dougherty v. Missouri R. R. rect when taken in connection with
Co. 97 Mo. 658, 8 S. W. 900. other instructions.
581 PUTTING PASSENGER OFF, NO TICKET. 574
or their authorized agent, and offered and attempted to use it
as entitling him to a passage from Omaha to Chicago on the
defendant's road, and refused to pay his fare on the defend-
ant's road and did not pay his fare, then the defendants were
not under obligation to allow the plaintiff to ride upon said
ticket, and upon refusal to pay fare had a right to require the
plaintiff to leave the train, and he cannot recover damages
based on the fact that he was so compelled to leave the train. 129
(2) If the jury shall find from the evidence that the plaintiff on
the first day of May, 1868, purchased at New York a through
ticket from that place to B over the New Jersey railroad and
the P. W. & B. R. railroad, and on that day proceeded on his
journey as far as P on the last named road, where he left
the train, and if the jury shall further find that after passing
the then conductor of the train took up said through ticket
and gave the plaintiff a check in lieu thereof, which has been
introduced in evidence ; and if "the jury shall further find that
the plaintiff on the sixth day of May got upon the defendant's
train for B at H and the then conductor refused to take said
check, but informed the plaintiff that he must pay his fare
to B or he would be obliged to stop the cars and put him off,
and that the defendant refused to pay said fare, and the plain-
tiff was then put off, then the plaintiff is not entitled to recover
in this case, provided the jury shall find that no more force
than was necessary was used in putting the plaintiff off the
train, even if the jury shall further find that on arriving at P.
on the train on the said first day of May, the plaintiff inquired
from a man at the window of the ticket office of the defend-
ant at that place whether said check would be good to take
him to B another day, and was told by said man that it would. 130
(3) Railroad companies have the right to demand and receive
legal rates of fare from persons traveling on their trains; and,
in the event of the refusal of a passenger to pay his fare or
show a ticket, conductors of a train have a right to eject such
a passenger from the train, without using any more force or
violence than may be necessary to overcome any unlawful re-
129 Post v. Chicago & N. W. R. i 30 McClure v. Philadelphia, W.
Co. 14 Neb. 112, 15 N. W. 225. & B. R. Co. 34 Md. 534.
575 NEGLIGENCE OF CAllIilERS. 582
sistance which such passenger may offer. It is the duty of
the conductor to bring the train to a full stop before compel-
ling the party to be ejected to step from the train, and exercise
such ordinary care in ejecting him as an ordinarily prudent
man would exercise under similar circumstances as connected
with this case. In this state it is not necessary that the train
should be at a station in order to justify the ejection of a per-
son refusing to pay fare, but a conductor has the right to eject
such a person between stations at points where the situation
of the ground is such as not to expose the person ejected to
special risks of danger. 131
(4) If the jury believe from the evidence that K, the plaintiff,
took a seat on the train from M to R on the twenty-fourth day of
January, 1887, and refused to pay the usual fare or to furnish
the conductor the usual ticket entitling him to a seat from
M to R , but claiming a seat by virtue of a special contract
with the defendant company, which he failed to exhibit to the
conductor, and was in consequence thereof expelled from the
train by the conductor, using no unnecessary force to put him
off, then they must find for the defendant. 132
575. Putting off disorderly person. (1) If you believe from
the evidence that the plaintiff on the eleventh day of November,
1901, while a passenger on one of the defendant's cars near
M. street used violent, boisterous and profane language, or was
guilty of disorderly conduct, in the presence of other passen-
gers, who were then and there on said car, then it became and
was the duty of the defendant's conductor to remove the plain-
tiff from the car, and use such force as was necessary for that
purpose. 133
(2) It was the duty of the plaintiff to behave in a quiet and or-
derly manner while a passenger on the train of the defendant,
and that it was the duty of the conductor to sustain order on
said train, and if the plaintiff was acting in a disorderly man-
ner on said train, the conductor could eject him from said train ;
131 Brown v. Chicago, R. I.. & P. "3 Ickenroth v. St. Louis Tr. Co.
R. Co. 51 Iowa, 235, 1 N. W. 487. (Mo. App.), 77 S. W. 163.
132 Knopf v. Richmond, F. & P.
R. Co. 85 Va. 773, 8 S. E. 787.
583 DISORDERLY PASSENGER ON WRONG TRAIN. 576
and if the jury find that the plaintiff, while a passenger on said
train, was acting in a disorderly manner and was threatened
with expulsion from said train by the conductor, and that on
account of the companionship of the plaintiff with other per-
sons, who were also disorderly and riotous, the conductor could
not properly make the attempt to expel the plaintiff from the
train, as the plaintiff and his companions stated that they would
resist any attempt to expel them from the train, that then the
conductor was justified in requesting the first police officer whom
he could find to arrest the plaintiff; and if the jury find that
the police officer at the "W depot was the first police officer
the conductor saw, and that the conductor used due diligence
in procuring a police officer, and that the conductor directed
the police officer to arrest the plaintiff for said disorderly con-
duct, that the defendant is not liable for this arrest, and the
verdict of the jury must be for the defendant. 134
576. Passenger on wrong train. (1) The proof shows that
the railroad company runs two daily trains between points named
in plaintiff's ticket, and the regulation that one of these trains
shall not stop at all stations is a reasonable regulation and one
they had a right to make. A passenger who travels on said
road with notice of such regulation cannot get on a through
train and demand to be carried to a point at which said through
train does not stop, even if he has a ticket to such point, un-
less he goes on the train by direction of the railroad com-
pany's agents. If the person who acted as agent, and sold
tickets, directed the plaintiff to get on the through train, he
had a right to get on said train and travel upon it ; but if,
after getting on, he was at a regular station notified that the
train would not stop at E , it was his duty then to get off
and take the proper train, for if the railroad agent at J , his
point of departure, made a mistake, the railroad had a right
to correct the mistake at any regular stopping station for that
train. If, then, he was informed at P of the mistake, it was
his duty to get off, and if he did not do so, the conductor had
a right to put him off in a proper manner. 135
134 Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Cain, is--. I. & G. N. R. Co. v. Hassell,
81 Md. 87, 31 Atl. 801. 62 Tex. 258.
577 NEGLIGENCE OF CARRIERS. 584
577. Passenger may rely on directions of carrier's agents.
(1) A passenger is warranted in obeying the directions of the ser-
vants and agents of the carrier, when given within the scope of
their duty, unless such obedience leads to a known peril which a
prudent person would not encounter. 130
(2) It is the duty of a passenger on a car to follow the reason-
able instructions of those in charge of the car in regard to moving
from one part of the car to another, unless it is apparent to the
passenger that the moving would be attended with danger; and a
passenger may rightfully assume that the servants in charge of
the car are familiar with the operations of the car, and that
they have a reasonable knowledge of what is safe and pru-
dent for the passengers in giving such instructions. Therefore,
if you find from the evidence that one of the servants of the
defendant directed the plaintiff to move to that part of the
car where the accident occurred, it was the duty of the plain-
tiff so to do, unless it was known and apparent to her that it
would be unsafe for her to do so. And in the absence of ap-
parent danger, she had a right to assume that it was safe for
her to move to and stand at the place where the defendant's
servant directed her to move to in the car. And if you find
from the evidence that it was an unsafe place for the plain-
tiff to stand, and that without her fault she was injured by
reason of her moving to and standing at such place, then your
verdict should be for the plaintiff. 137
(3) It is the duty of a passenger to follow the reasonable di-
rections given by the agent in charge of the railway train
in respect to passing from one car to another while the same
is in motion for the purpose of finding a seat, but if the pas-
senger himself knows that the movement would be attended
with danger, it would not in such case be his duty to obey the
conductor. 138
(4) If the jury believe from a fair preponderance of the
evidence that the plaintiff obeyed the defendant's /conductor
in charge of the train upon which she was a passenger, in
getting off the train, and if she was not then apprised of
i3G Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. s Lcmisville & N. A. R. Co. v.
v. Wood, 113 Ind. 561, 14 N. E. 572. Kelly, 92 Ind. 374.
137 Prothero v. Citizens' St. R.
Co. 134 Ind. 440, 33 N. E. 765.
585 INJURED WHILE CHANGING CARS. 579
any peril that she would encounter thereby, ^ she would not
be guilty of contributing to any injury received by her in thus
alighting from the train. 130
578. Passenger injured while changing cars. (1) If the jury
find from the evidence that on the fourth day of June, 1880, H
was a passenger on the cars of the defendant with a ticket
entitling him to a ride from H to F; that he took the train
at II and rode thereon to W, where it became necessary for
him to change cars; and if they find from the evidence that
in alighting from the train on which he was and passing over
certain tracks of the defendant's road to take the train on
which he was to continue his journey he was killed by the loco-
motive and cars of a freight train of the defendant, operated
by the defendant's agent on its road, and if they find from the
evidence that the killing of H resulted directly from the want
of the exercise of ordinary care and prudence upon the part
of the agents of the defendant, and not from the want of or-
dinary care and prudence of the deceased contributing to the;
accident, then the plaintiffs are entitled to recover. 140
579. Liability when car owned by another. (1) If the jury
find from the evidence that the ear in which the plaintiff was
injured was not the car or the actual property of the defend-
ant, but was the property of another corporation, and if they
further find from the evidence that the car composed a part
of the train in which the plaintiff and other passengers were
to be transported upon their journey, and the plaintiff was
injured while in that car without any fault of his own and by
reason either of the defective construction of the car, or by
some negligence on the part of those having charge of the car,
then the defendant is liable. 141
(2) In this case it is immaterial whether the defendant actually
owned the cars or the engine forming the train on which the plain-
tiff was a passenger at the time of the alleged injury testified
about or not, but if the jury believe, from all the evidence in the
139 Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. 141 Pennsylvania Co. v. Roy, 102
v. Wood, 113 Ind. 561, 14 N. E. 572. U. S. 455.
140 Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. S.
60 Md. 455.
580 NEGLIGENCE OF CARRIERS. 586
case, that the plaintiff had purchased a ticket for her conveyance
as a passenger over the railroad of the defendant, and had been
received by the defendant in a car run and operated by the
said defendant, for the purpose of carrying her as a passenger,
and that while so a passenger on a car run and operated by
the defendant, by the carelessness and negligence of the de-
fendant, and without any fault or negligence on her part, the
plaintiff was injured in manner and form as alleged in the
declaration in the case or some count thereof, then the jury
should find the defendant guilty, and assess the plaintiff's dam-
ages at such amount .as, from all the facts and circumstances
in evidence, they believe she has sustained, not exceeding ten
thousand dollars. 142
580. Liability for injury from boiler explosion. If the jury
believe from the evidence that the defendants were negligent
in the transportation of passengers from S to P and from
P to S before and during the month of August, 1866, that dur-
ing the same period of time W & Co. employed the plaintiff
to carry their express matter between said place and paid the
defendants to transport the same for a certain sum of money
per month, and that the plaintiff and said defendant entered
upon said arrangements and were engaged in the same dur-
ing said period of time, and that it was understood and agreed
between the defendants and W & Co. that the plaintiff, as
their messenger, should be transported with their said express
matter from S to P and from P to S during said period of
time, and that the defendants made such transportation by
cars propelled by steam and a steamer, and that said cars started
from the town of P; that while thus engaged, the plaintiff
during said period of time came to said cars, at the depot of
the defendants, for the purpose of going to S ; that he was
standing on the platform of the defendants near said cars for
the purpose of stepping into a car of the defendants (and that
said platform was usually used by passengers departing or ar-
riving by said cars) when the boiler of the locomotive attached
to said cars exploded through the negligence or carelessness
us Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. v. suming that the plaintiff was a
Martin, 111 111. 226. Held not as- passenger.
587 INJURY FROM ACCIDENT. 581
of the engineer employed by the defendants, who was then
in charge of said locomotive, and the plaintiff was injured there-
by (the plaintiff not being guilty of any negligence contributing
to his injury), then the plaintiff is entitled to recover for such
injury. 143
581. Injury from accident No liability. (1) If the jury
believe from the evidence that- the injury to plaintiff in this suit
happened to her by mere accident, without any fault on the
part of defendant or its employees, then the plaintiff cannot
recover in this action, and they will find for the defendant 144
(2) A railroad company, in the conduct and management of its
trains, is required to employ skillful and competent agents, and
to use such means and foresight in providing for the safety
of passengers, as persons of the greatest care and prudence
usually exercise in similar cases; and should an injury result
to a passenger from a failure to use such a degree of care and
prudence, the company will be responsible for such injury, un-
less it appears that the passenger so injured, by the use of
ordinary care and prudence (that is, the ordinary care and
prudence usually exercised by persons of ordinary caution in
his condition and circumstances), could have avoided the in-
jury. But a railroad company is not responsible for an injury
to a passenger which is the result of a mere accident or casual-
ty, where there is no want of care or skill on the part of the
company or its agents. 145
(3) If the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant's
train of cars in which plaintiff was being carried as a pas-
senger on the morning of the twenty-seventh day of December,
1872, was thrown from the track, causing the injury to plaintiff in
the petition complained of, wholly because of a fresh and contem-
poraneous break in an iron rail or piece of an iron rail of de-
fendant's track, and under the train on which plaintiff was
a passenger, and that such fresh break was caused wholly by
I" Yeomans v. C. S. N. Co. 44 burgh, &c. R. Co. 157 Ind. 305, 61
Cal. 81. (As to the carrier's power N. E. 678.)
to contract against such liability 1*4 Georgia P. R. Co. v. West, 66
to an express messenger, see Louis- Miss. 316, 6 So. 207.
ville, &c. R. Co. v. Keefer, 146 Ind. 145 Houston & T. C. R. Co. v.
21, 44 N. E. 796; Russell v. Pitts- Gorbett, 49 Tex, 576,
582 NEGLIGENCE OF CARK1ERS. 588
frost or extreme cold, and that such cause was one which the
highest degree of practicable care, skill and caution consistent
with operating the road at all could not have provided against,
and that said train was not thrown from the track because
of the mode of construction and repair of said track, and not
because of any fault or neglect whatever of defendant, its agents
or servants, then the jury should find for defendant as to the
injuries to the person of plaintiff in the petition complained of. 146
582. Passenger guilty of contributory negligence. (1) Not-
withstanding the jury may find that the plaintiff was guilty
of negligence, and that such negligence contributed to the in-
jury of which she complains, yet still, if the agents of the de-
fendant were aware of such negligence in time, by the use
of ordinary care and prudence, to have avoided the effect of
such negligence on her part, but did not do so, then such neg-
ligence on her part is not such contributory negligence as to
constitute a defense to this action. 147
(2) Even though the jury may believe from the evidence that
the plaintiff received the injuries complained of by reason of his
jumping from the defendant's car at the time of the wreck, yet if
the jury further believe from the evidence that the plaintiff was
so stunned and bewildered by the shock of the collision as to
render said plaintiff unconscious of what he was doing, then the
jury are instructed that said jumping was not such negligence as
to prevent plaintiff from recovering damages, any more than if he
had received said injuries complained of while in defendant's
car, although the jury may further believe from the evidence
that no injury would have been received by him if he had
remained in the car. 148
(3) If the jury should believe from the evidence that the plain-
tiff jumped from the defendant's car at the time of the wreck,
yet if they further believe from the evidence that said plaintiff
did so under a well-grounded fear of danger to his life or
limbs, the plaintiff is as much entitled to recover in this ac-
tion, so far as his jumping is concerned, as if he had received
us Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Fox, i Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Mc-
11 Bush (Ky.) 506. Kenzie, 81 Va. 78. See, Galena, &c.
i Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. Co. v. Fay, 16 111. 558.
v. Hogeland, 60 Md. 150.
589 PASSENGER'S CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 582
the injuries complained of while in defendant's car, although
they may further believe from the evidence that if he had re-
mained in the car he would not have been injured. 140
(4) If you believe from the evidence that the plaintiff, in
alighting from the train, failed to exercise the ordinary care and
caution which a prudent man would usually exercise under like,
circumstances, and that such neglect on the part of the plaintiff
contributed proximately to the injury suffered by him, then the
plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence and he cannot re-
cover in this suit. 150
(5) Should you find that plaintiff did not have a sufficient time
to alight from the said train as above explained, but that she
was guilty of gross or criminal negligence in alighting while
the train was in motion, you will find for the defendant. 151
(6) If the jury believe from the evidence that the train of cars
upon which the plaintiff had taken passage had stopped a suffi-
cient time for the plaintiff to have left them upon the platform
where passengers leaving the defendant's cars usually land, and
had again started on their course and had passed the platform
provided by the defendant for passengers to get out of the cars
upon, and that the plaintiff then left the platform of the car
rather than be carried by, he was guilty of carelessness, and
cannot recover in this action. 152
(7) It was the duty of the plaintiff to use ordinary care as
hereinbefore defined, as to her own protection in alighting from
defendant's car, and if she was guilty of negligence contribut-
ing to the injuries of which she complains, then she cannot
recover. That is to say, if the defendant, by its servants, was
guilty of negligence, and the plaintiff was also guilty of neg-
ligence, contributing to her injuries, then the plaintiff cannot
recover in this action. 153
(8) It was the duty of the plaintiff in seeking to alight from the
cars of the defendant company, to wait until such cars came to
a full stop, or were moving so slowly that, under all the circum-
i Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Me- Chollette, 33 Neb. 146, 49 N. W.
Kenzie, 81 Va. 78. 1114.
iso International & G. N. R. Co. 152 Davis v. Chicago & N. W. R.
v. Eckford, 71 Tex. 276, 8 S. W. 679. Co. 18 Wis. 188.
isi Omaha & R. V. R. Co. v. T.SS Denver Tramway Co. v.
Owens, 20 Colo. 112, 36 Pac. 848.
583 NEGLIGENCE OF CARRIERS. 590
stances, including the time of night, her sex and condition, it was
safe for her to step off; and if she sought to alight from the car
before such time, although unless she did so she might be carried
beyond the point where she desired to get off, she was negligent
and cannot recover in this case. 15 *
(9) The facts of this case are for you to determine. The value
of the testimony is for you. If the plaintiff without any fault of
his own was injured by the fault of the defendant's motorman
as charged, then he can recover, and if he can recover, he can
recover according to the measure of damages I have given you.
If, however, he in the smallest degree himself contributed to
the injury, he cannot recover. Moreover, he cannot recover,
if, however innocent the plaintiff was, the motorman did nothing
wrong. If the motorman did his duty simply, and in conse-
quence of some other set of circumstances not known to us the
accident happened, then the plaintiff cannot recover. It requires
negligence in the defendant and freedom from negligence in
the plaintiff, both, to entitle the plaintiff to recover. 155
583. Burden of proof generally. (1) The proof must show
affirmatively that the plaintiff was a passenger upon the road of
the defendant, and as such passenger was injured by the acts
and negligence of the defendant and its employes; the proof
must also show that the plaintiff was induced to believe from the
acts or words of the employes of the defendant, that it was in-
tended the plaintiff should alight from the train at the time and
place when and where he had alighted from said train of cars. 159
(2) It is not sufficient in this case for the plaintiff to prove the
injuries alone, but it devolves upon her to show negligence on
the part of the defendant, and that unless they believe from the
evidence that defendant, its servants or employes, were negli-
gent in delivering the plaintiff at B, they will find for defend-
ant. 157
(3) Although the burden of proving that the plaintiff contrib-
uted to the injury complained of is upon the defendant, yet if the
154 Denver Tramway Co. v. iso International & G. N. R. Co.
Owens, 20 Colo. 112, 36 Pac. 848. v. Eckford, 71 Tex. 275, 8 S. W. 679.
155 Fitzpatrick v. Union Tr. Co. "7 Georgia P. R. Co. v. West, 66
206 Pa. St. 335, 55 Atl. 1050. Miss. 313, 6 So. 207.
591 BURDEN OF PROOF CARRIER NO INSURER. 585
jury shall believe from all the evidence in the case, whether such
evidence was introduced by plaintiff or defendant, that there is
a preponderance of evidence that the plaintiff was guilty of
any negligence which contributed directly to producing the
injury complained of, then the burden of proof is satisfied and
the verdict of the jury must be for the defendant. 158
584. Carrier not an insurer of passenger's safety. (1) The
duty of a carrier is to safely carry passengers. It is true that a
carrier of passengers is not an insurer of the safety of those
whom it undertakes to carry against all the risks of travel, but,
nevertheless, there rests upon such carrier this general duty of
safely carrying. 159
(2) Railroad companies are not insurers of their passengers
and are not liable for injuries which such passengers may receive
while being carried, unless the carrier is guilty of negligence
which was the proximate cause of the injury received, and the
passenger was free from negligence which may have contributed
proximately to the injury of which he complains. 160
(3) The defendant is not an insurer of the safety of its passen-
gers, and if the jury shall believe from the evidence that the de-
fendant had provided reasonable facilities for the transportation
of such passengers as might reasonably be expected to apply to be
carried from Old Point on the occasion in question, and that
the cars are such as are in general use and in good order and
condition; that the track, switches and frog at the point where
the plaintiff was injured were in proper order and condition,
and that the employes in charge of the train were experienced
and competent men, and that the train in question was carried
safely from Old Point to R, no negligence can be imputed to
the defendant. 161
585. Carrier liable for loss or injury to baggage. (1) A
railroad company may become liable as a common carrier by con-
tract for transportation of passengers and baggage over other
iss Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. Dotson, 15 Tex. Cv. App. 73, 38 S.
v. Anderson, 72 Md. 522, 20 A. 2. W. 643.
iss Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. "i Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v.
v. Wood, 113 Ind. 561, 14 N. E. 572. Clowes, 93 Va. 194, 24 S. B. 833.
160 Houston & T. C. R. Co. v.
585 NEGLIGENCE OF CARRIERS. 592
railroads forming with its own a continuous line; and, where it
does so contract, its liability is the same for losses occasioned
by its negligence while the baggage is upon such other road as
when it is upon its own road. 102
(2) When a railroad company takes baggage for a passenger
its liability is of the highest sort. It agrees to carry the baggage
safely, and insures against all sorts of risks, except the act of
God or the public enemy. But when the baggage is landed it is
the duty of the owner to call immediately, or as soon as the throng
and hurry incident to the arrival and departure of trains has
subsided, and get his property. But if he fails to thus call and
the agent of the company takes charge of it, then the respon-
sibility will be changed. It will be the responsibility of a ware-
houseman instead of that of a common carrier. The liability
will be to take such care of the property as an ordinarily pru-
dent man would of his own property under like circumstances.
All the defendant is required to do is to take ordinary care
under the circumstances, such as men usually exercise in their
own concerns. The defendant is not liable for the theft of the
property, unless it is the result of the want of proper care. 163
(3) In the absence of a special contract limiting the liability of
the defendant, if you find from the evidence that it is liable for
loss of the plaintiff's baggage, you will assess as damages the
value of the trunk and such of its contents as you find were the,
wearing apparel of herself or her child, or their necessary or
usual appendages or accompaniments of herself and child as
travelers, with interest from the time of demand to the first day
of the present term of this court. 164
(4) The burden of proving any qualification of the liability of
the defendant as a carrier rests upon it. The notice to be of
any force must amount to actual notice. At all events, to exon-
erate the defendant as a carrier from its general liability, it
must be shown at least by the evidence that the plaintiff, or
others acting for her, assented to the demands of the notice,
or with a knowledge of it acquiesced in it by making no remon-
strance. 165
162 Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. 164 Baltimore & O. R. Co. v.
Campbell, 36 Ohio St. 653. Campbell, 36 Ohio St. 647.
IBS Pennsylvania Co. v. Miller, 35 165 Baltimore & O. R. Co. v.
Ohio St. 543. Campbell, 36 Ohio St. .655.
593 CARRIER LOSING BAGGAGE LIABILITY. 587
586. Carrier's liability for baggage limited. (1) A carrier
may restrict or limit the amount of its liability by a special con-
tract accepted on the part of the owner of the baggage ; and this
may be done by notice brought to the knowledge of the owner of
the baggage before or at the delivery to the carrier, if assented to
by the owner. 166
(2) And in determining whether or not the conditions and lim-
itations were brought to the notice of the plaintiff and those act-
ing for her, you will look to all the evidence in the case ; as to the
manner of the delivery of the ticket and the check, whether any
thing was said or done calling attention to them or not ; whether
they were or were not read at the time of or before the receipt. 167
587. Goods lost or delayed by carrier Liability. (1) If the
defendant was guilty of any unreasonable delay in the delivery
of the turkeys, and it was the result of its own negligence or
want of care and diligence in that behalf, then it is liable for
whatever damages the plaintiff has sustained, if any. The de-
fendant being a common carrier, it cannot, by its bill of lading
given for shippers, or in any other way, exempt itself from lia-
'bility for loss or damage arising from failing to deliver the
goods shipped within a reasonable time, or at the time stipulated
by it for delivery, if there is any such time, if the failure be
the result of its own negligence or that of its agent or servant. 168
(2) No conditions in a bill of lading can bind the shipper, un-
less where it is averred and proven by the carrier that the shipper
knew of such conditions, and assented to them at or prior to the
time of shipment, and such assent must be proven by the carrier.
The law will not presume such assent. And whether there was
a bill of lading for the turkeys and the plaintiff knew of and
assented to the conditions, is a question for your determination,
and the burden is on the defendant to prove these facts. 169
(3) If you believe from the evidence that the defendant was a
common carrier, and as such carrier received the money in ques-
tion, to be carried and delivered to the plaintiff at Kankakee,
and that the defendant delivered said money to one Edmunds
!66 Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. 168 American Ex. Co. v. Hawk, 51
Campbell, 36 Ohio St. 655. Ohio St. 572.
i<" Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. iso American Ex. Co. v. Hawk, 51
Campbell, 36 Ohio St. 655. Ohio St. 572. See, Illinois., &c. R.
Co. v. Cobb, &c. Co. 72 111. 148. 154,
bill of lading prima facie evidence.
588 NEGLIGENCE OF CARRIERS. 594
on a writing purporting to be an order of the plaintiff, and
that said order was a forgery, then the defendant was guilty
of gross negligence, and the plaintiff is entitled to recover the
amount of said money. 170
588. Carrier not liable for damage to goods. (1) If the
jury believe from the evidence that the defendant held the leather
for shipment by its usual and customary route for shipping
freight to P, and that such arrangement for shipment was rea-
sonably prudent, and if the jury believe from the evidence that
the defendant exercised reasonable care and diligence in keeping
it for shipment, then the plaintiff is not entitled to recover, and
the jury must find for the defendant. 171
(2) If the jury believe from the evidence that the plaintiff, at
the time of delivering the package in question to the defendant's
agent received a receipt for said package wherein it was ex-
pressly stipulated that the defendant would not be responsible
for the same beyond the station of the defendant nearest to M,
and the plaintiff's attention was called to or he knew of such
underwritten limitation at the time, and that when it reached
that point. the defendant was to deliver the package to others,
and that S was the nearest point on the route of the defendant
to M, and that the defendant carried said package safely and in
good order to S, and there delivered it to the United States
Express Company in good order to complete the transportation,
then the defendant was not liable any further, and the issues
must be found for the defendant. 172
(3) If you believe from the evidence that if the plaintiff sus-
tained any damages by any of the trees becoming wholly worthless
before they arrived and were tendered to the plaintiff at A, if
in fact they were so tendered, and while they were being trans-
ported to that place, or by any of said trees being partially
damaged by reason of delay in transportation while in the
defendant's hands, then you will estimate such damages as the
evidence shows the plaintiff to have sustained, if any, and return
a verdict for such amount; but if you believe from the evidence
ITO American M. U. Ex. Co. v. i Snider v. Adams Ex. Co. 63
Milk, 73 111. 224, 226. Mo. 376.
i7i Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Gid-
ley, 119 Ala. 525, 24 So. 753.
595 DAMAGE TO GOODS AND LIVE STOCK. 589
that only a portion of said trees were damaged, and that within
a reasonable time after the trees arrived at A they were ten-
dered to the plaintiff, then it was the duty of the plaintiff to
accept said trees, and if you believe that such tender was made
to the plaintiff, then he can only recover damages for such trees
as are shown to have been totally worthless, and damages for
such other trees as were damaged at the time, if any were
damaged. 173
(4) If you believe from the evidence in this case that the trees
in question were tendered to plaintiff after their arrival at A, and
that if plaintiff had received them he could have preserved
them, or any part of them, by the use of proper care and atten-
tion, it was his duty to have done so, and if he suffered loss on
account of such failure to preserve said trees, he cannot recover
for such loss. 174
(5) In order to hold the defendant liable for the special dam-
ages claimed, that is, the price which different persons had con-
tracted to pay for the said trees on delivery at Alba, sought to
be recovered in this case, the facts of the sale of said trees by
the plaintiff should have been brought to the attention of the
defendant company at the time the trees were delivered to it for
shipment, and unless you find that the defendant was so notified,
or knew at the time the trees came into its hands of the special
circumstances which would make a quicker delivery necessary,
you should not allow the plaintiff the special damages claimed
by him, unless from the nature and character of the freight, the
defendant was charged with knowing that a quicker and speedy
delivery thereof was important and necessary. 175
589. Liability in shipment of live stock. (1) If the jury be-
lieve from the evidence that the defendant received from the
plaintiff, on December second, 1871, his cattle and hogs for trans-
portation to and delivery at Buffalo, New York, and that at the
time of the receipt of the stock the road of the defendant, and its
connecting lines running to Buffalo, were so crowded with freight
ITS st. Louis S. W. R. Co. v. Gates, 15 Tex. Cv. App. 135, 38 S.
Gates, 15 Tex. Cv. App. 135, 38 S. W. 648.
W. 649. "5 St. Louis S. W. R. Co. v.
IT* St. Louis S. W. R. Co. v. Gates, 15 Tex. Cv. App. 135, 38 S.
W. 649.
589 NEGLIGENCE OF CARRIERS. 596
that they were unable to furnish cars within the usual time for
the transportation of the plaintiff's stock, then such crowded
condition of said road or roads would furnish no excuse for the
defendant if the plaintiff's stock were not delivered at Buffalo,
New York, in a reasonable time, if the jury believe the defendant
was so bound to deliver. 176
(2) A railroad company engaged in the business of transporting
live stock assumes all the responsibilities of a common carrier.
In the absence of any special contract limiting its liability it
insures against all loss except that caused by the act of God or
the public enemy. It may limit its liability by a special con-
tract with the shipper or consignor of the property, but such
special contract can never relieve the railroad company from
liability for its own negligence. 177
(3^) If the jury believe from the evidence that the plaintiffs in
this case entered into a written contract with the defendant to
transport said stock in question (which was consigned to Media,
Lancaster and Philadelphia, Pa.) to the terminus of its road, and
there to deliver it to the connecting carrier, and that it was agreed
between plaintiffs and said defendant in said contract that in
case of loss and damage whereby any legal liability or responsi-
bility should or might be incurred by the terms of said contract,
that that company alone should be held responsible therefor in
whose actual custody the live stock might be at the happening
of such loss or damage, and if the jury further believe from the
evidence that the northern terminal of the defendant's railroad
is in H, Maryland, and that it safely and in a reasonable time
delivered the said stock there to the C V railroad, and that
the damage, if any, occurred after it had been so delivered to
the connecting carrier, then they will find for the defendant,
unless they believe from the evidence that the plaintiffs or their
agents did, within a reasonable time after said delay or damage,
if any, make demand upon the said defendant for satisfactory
proof that said delay or damage did not occur while the said
stock was in its possession. 178
"a Toledo, W. & W. R. Co. v. ITS Norfolk & W. R. Co. v.
Lockhart, 71 111. 630. Reeves, 97 Va. 291, 33 S. E. 606.
177 Kansas City R. Co. v. Simp-
son, 30 Kas. 647, 2 Pac. 821.
597 FREIGHT RATES UNDER STATUTE. 590
590. Freight rate of carrier under federal statute. If the
jury find from the evidence that the defendant company filed
with the interstate commerce commission its tariff rates on hay
and that said tariff rates so filed covered the tariff rate on hay
from the station of Gale, in Indian Territory, to the city of St.
Louis, and that said tariff rate on hay was printed and publicly
posted at said station of Gale for the information and inspection
of the public, and that in accordance with such tariff rate so
filed with the said interstate commerce commission, and so
printed and posted, the rate on hay was fixed and established
at twenty-five cents per hundred with a minimum weight of
twenty thousand pounds per car, and that such tariff rate was
on file with the said interstate commerce commission at the time
the hay in controversy was shipped, and that there had been no
reduction in said tariff rate for a period of three days before the
shipment of the hay in controversy was made, and if the jury
further find that the defendant company only collected from the
plaintiff an amount of money not exceeding the rate of twenty-
five cents per hundred, with a minimum of twenty thousand
pounds per car, then the jury must find for the defendant. 179
ITS Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Bowles, 1 Indian Ter. 250, 40 S. W.
901.
CHAPTER XLI.
NEGLIGENCE OF CITIES AND TOWNS.
Sec.
591.
to
Sidewalks Duty of city
keep them in repair.
592. Sidewalk presumed reasonably
safe.
593. Plaintiff knowing unsafe con-
dition.
594. Care of plaintiff when he
knows danger.
595. Notice to city of defect or
danger necessary.
596. Notice of unsafe condition may
be inferred.
597. City must take notice of un-
safe condition.
598. Injury from accident; no lia-
bility.
599. Elements necessary to a re-
covery.
600. Drains, left in dangerous con-
dition.
Sec.
601. Bridges, shall be kept in re-
pair.
602. Grades and embankments ob-
structing natural flow of wa-
ter.
603. Ice, sleet, snow, on sidewalk
Liability.
604. Signs overhanging sidewalks
Damages.
605. Building permits to obstruct
streets.
606. Streets and highways, shall be
safe for travel.
607. Considerations in assessing
damages.
608. Matters of evidence Incompe-
tent evidence.
609. Claims against city, mode of
allowing.
591. Sidewalks Duty of city to keep them in repair. (1)
It was the duty of the defendant to use reasonable diligence to
keep the sidewalk in question in a reasonably safe condition, and
if the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant failed
to perform such duty, and that by reason of its negligence in that
regard the said sidewalk was permitted to remain out of repair
and in a dangerous condition, by reason whereof the plaintiff,
while exercising reasonable care on her part, received the injury
complained of, then the defendant is liable. And the court
further instructs the jury that if they find from the evidence
that the plaintiff was herself guilty of some negligence, but that
598
599 KEEPING SIDEWALKS REPAIRED. 591
the defendant was guilty of gross negligence contributing to such
injury, and that the plaintiff's negligence was slight as compared
with the negligence of the defendant, still she may be entitled to
recover. 1
(2) If the jury believe from the evidence that the most direct
route for the plaintiff in going to and from his home to his place
of business was over South Eiver street in said city of Aurora,
then the fact, if shown by the evidence, that the sidewalk on said
street over which the plaintiff passed was defective, and had
been in a defective condition for some years previous to the
alleged injury, would not oblige him to take another sidewalk
less convenient. 2
(3) The law does not impose upon the city of Indianapolis the
duty of keeping its gas lights lighted during all hours of the
night, nor is the city liable for injuries which a person may
receive while going over or along its streets, even though such
injuries may have been caused by the failure of the city to have
its lamps lighted, if this is the only act of omission proved
against the city. But if there is a defect in a sidewalk or gutter-
crossing liable to be dangerous to traveler's passing along or
over the same in the nighttime, though using ordinary care, then
it is the duty of the city to guard the same in some way, and if
there are no lights then barriers or some other precautions must
be used. You have a right, therefore, to consider the circum-
stance of the absence of lights in the vicinity of the gutter-cross-
ing in question at the time of the alleged accident, if it is a fact
that there were no lights in connection with the other facts and
circumstances proved, both as bearing upon the question whether
or not the defendant was guilty of negligence, as well as in
determining whether or not the plaintiff herself was free from
negligence. 3
(4) If the jury find from the evidence that the injury com-
i City of Chicago v. Stearns, 105 negligence is no longer the law in
111. 554. This instruction is not ob- Illinois. If the plaintiff by his
jectionable as being in conflict with negligence contributed to his injury
the rule that the city shall have he cannot recover,
actual or constructive notice of the - City of Aurora v. Hillman, 90
defective sidewalk before it can be 111. 68.
held liable. 3 City of Indianapolis v Scott,
The doctrine of comparative 72 Ind. 200.
591 NEGLIGENCE OF CITIES AND TOWNS. 600
plained of was suffered, and that it was occasioned by a fall upon
the sidewalk, as charged in the petition of the plaintiff, and that
the sidewalk at the place where the fall occurred was in an
unsafe and dangerous condition for the passage of travelers on
foot, and that the accident occurred in consequence of such un-
safe condition of the sidewalk, and that the plaintiff could not
have known and guarded against the damages 'by the use of ordi-
nary care and prudence, then the jury will find for the plaintiff,
if they find that the negligence of plaintiff did not contribute
to the injury. 4
(5) It is the duty of the city to make and keep its sidewalks rea-
sonably safe for public travel, and that if it fails in the discharge
of this duty it is liable to persons sustaining injuries because of
such failure. And if the jury believe from the evidence that
the sidewalk in question where the plaintiff fell and sustained
the injuries complained of in his declaration, was not in such
reasonable repair, then they must find for the plaintiff the
damages they believe him to have sustained, unless they shall
also believe from the evidence that the plaintiff, by his own
negligence or want of ordinary care and caution, so far contrib-
uted to the misfortune that but for such negligence or want of
ordinary care and caution on his part the misfortune would not
have happened. 5
(6) The defendant is bound to use reasonable care and precau-
tion to keep and maintain its streets and sidewalks in good and
sufficient repair to render them reasonably safe for all persons
passing on or over the same ; and if the jury believe from the evi-
dence that the defendant failed to use all reasonable care and pre-
caution to keep its sidewalks in such repair, and the injury com-
plained of resulted from that cause, as charged in the declaration,
and that the plaintiff sustained damage thereby without negli-
gence on his part, then he is entitled to recover in this suit. 6
(7) It is the duty of the defendant city to keep its sidewalks in
safe condition and free from defects and obstructions dangerous
to persons passing along the same with ordinary care ; and the
* Rice v. City of Des Moines, 40 6 Moore v. City of Richmond, 85
Iowa, 639. Va. 541, 8 S. E. 387.
5 Gordon v. City of Richmond,
83 Va. 438, 2 S. E. 727.
601 KEEPING SIDEWALKS REPAIRED. 592
defendant is liable to a person who sustains injury without fault
on his part, by reason of its neglect to do so. 7
(8) It is the duty of the corporation to keep the streets of the
city in repair, and this includes the sidewalks for persons on foot
as well as the roadways, and it is no answer to a complaint for
injury caused by a defect in the sidewalk, that there was a suffi-
cient space thereon by which a safe passage might have been
made, unless the injury might have been avoided by proper
prudence on the part of the person injured, or unless negligence
can be imputed to him as contributing to cause the injury. 8
(9) The city of I is not an insurer nor a warrantor of the condi-
tion of its streets and sidewalks, nor is every defect therein, though
it may cause the injury sued for, actionable. It is sufficient to
relieve it from liability if the streets and sidewalks were in a
reasonably safe condition for travel as well by night as by day.
If, in this case, it is shown by the evidence that at the place where
the plaintiff met with his injury the sidewalk was in a reason-
ably safe condition for travel, your verdict should be for the
defendant. 9
(10) It is the duty of the defendant city to keep its sidewalks in
safe condition and free from defects and obstructions dangerous
to persons passing along the same with ordinary care; and the
defendant is liable to a person who, without fault on his part,
sustains injury by reason of its neglect to do so. But the city
is not an insurer nor a warrantor of the condition of its side-
walks and streets, nor is every defect therein actionable, though
it may cause injury. It is sufficient to relieve the city from
liability if the streets and sidewalks were in a reasonably safe
condition for travel as well by night as by day. If, in this case,
it is shown by the evidence that at the place where the plaintiff
met with his injury the sidewalk was in a reasonably safe condi-
tion for travel, the plaintiff cannot recover and the verdict should
be for the defendant. 10
592. Sidewalk presumed reasonably safe. The court in,
7 Gordon v. City of Richmond, 9 City of Indianapolis v. Gaston,
83 Va. 438, 2 S. E. 727. 58 Ind. 224.
s City Council v. Wright, 72 Ala. 10 Gordon v. City of Richmond,
411. 83 Va. 438, 2 S. E. 727; City of In-
dianapolis v. Gaston, 58 Ind. 224.
593 NEGLIGENCE OF CITIES AND TOWNS. 602
structs the jury that a person passing over a sidewalk or street
is not bound to exercise more than reasonable care and caution
in respect to his own safety. Until he is charged with notice to
the contrary, he has a right to presume the same to be in a rea-
sonably safe condition. 11
593. Plaintiff knowing unsafe condition. (1) If you find
from the evidence that the plaintiff knew of the defect, if any, that
is a circumstance which you should consider together with all the
other circumstances in evidence, in determining the question
whether with such knowledge the plaintiff exercised ordinary
care in proceeding on the walk known to him to be dangerous,
or whether in proceeding he used ordinary care to avoid injury. 12
(2) If the plaintiff knew the opening or cellar way was in the
sidewalk, and he attempted to pass the place where it was, when
in consequence of the darkness of the night he could not see it, he
has no legal reason to complain of the injury he received on
account of the fact that the opening or cellar way was there. In
such case he must be regarded as having taken the risk upon
himself, and this, too, although at the time the fact of the exist-
ence of the opening was not present in the plaintiff's mind. 13
(3) In determining whether the plaintiff was guilty of a want
of care in going upon the sidewalk you will take into consideration
the defective condition of the walk at and prior to the time of
the injury, as alleged by her in her petition, and which allegation
binds her on this branch of the case ; her condition, including her
pregnancy, and her agility or feebleness owing to said condition
or other cause and her knowledge or want of knowledge of the
walk, and all the circumstances of the case as established by the
evidence ; and if you believe, considering the knowledge that the
plaintiff had of the walk, if any, her ability to walk upon this
kind of a walk at the time and the necessities of the case, that is,
the need of her going upon the walk, that she could without
unreasonable precaution have taken another way and thus avoided
exposing herself to the danger of walking upon this walk in the
11 City of Beardstown v. Smith, " Bruker v. Town of Covington,
150 111. 173, 37 N. E. 211. 69 Ind. 35.
12 City of South Bend v. Hardy,
98 Ind. 585.
603 KNOWLEDGE OF UNSAFE CONDITION. 594
condition it is alleged to have been in at the time. If a reason-
ably prudent person in the exercise of ordinary care and caution
would not in her condition have attempted with her knowledge
of the walk, if any, to have gone upon the walk, then she is not
entitled to recover. 14
594. Care of plaintiff when he knows danger. (1) If the
plaintiff knew that the defendant or others were making or had
made an excavation where the injury was received, then the law
would require more care on his part to avoid injury than if he
knew nothing about it. When a person knows of an excavation,
the law requires of him to exercise such reasonable care as an
ordinarily prudent and cautious person would use under like
circumstances, and if this is done and injury .results the person
is without fault. 15
(2) The plaintiff must satisfy the jury that she was in the exer-
cise of due care at the time of the alleged injury ; and if a want of
due care on her part contributed in any degree to the injury she
cannot recover, though it would not have occurred e*xcept for
the omission of the town to perform its duty. A knowledge of the
condition of the way and its alleged defects would not be conclu-
sive that the plaintiff did not exercise due care ; but where a
person has knowledge of the defects or reason to apprehend any
danger, a much greater degree of care and circumspection is
properly required of such person ; and if, with her knowledge,
the plaintiff did not exercise due care and prudence, either in
entering upon the way or in proceeding thereon after she had
entered, she cannot recover. And whether with her knowledge,
and under all the circumstances, the plaintiff is in the exreise of
due care, is a question for the jury to determine. 16
(3) If plaintiff by his own negligence approximately contrib-
uted to his own injury, then the defendant is not liable in this suit.
In determining . the question of negligence on the part of the
plaintiff, it will be proper for the jury to take into consideration
the hour of the night the injury was received, the business call-
ing the plaintiff to S's saloon, and darkness of the night and
i* Munger v. Waterloo, 83 Iowa, i Whitford v. Inhabitants, 119
562, 49 N. W. 1028. Mass. 571.
is Town of Elkhart v. Ri ter, 66
Ind. 136.
595 NEGLIGENCE OF CITIES AND TOWNS. 604
all the facts and circumstances connected with his visiting said
saloon, and whether or not the plaintiff was under the influence
of intoxicating liquor. 17
(4) If you find from the evidence that the plaintiff drove up to
the ditch on T street, arid that he saw, or could by the exercise of
ordinary care and prudence have seen the same, and that he
could then have turned back and proceeded upon another
route, or that he could have driven safely directly across
the ditch, and instead of turning back or driving directly across,
he turned to the right and attempted to cross in a diagonal
course, and his vehicle was upset into the ditch and he was dis-
abled, then before you can find for the plaintiff you must find
from the evidence that he acted with ordinary prudence and care,
and that he was guilty of no contributory negligence. 18
(5) There is evidence that the plaintiff had passed over the
walk frequently. She did not testify that she had observed or no-
ticed the dangerous condition of the walk, these loose planks and
so on before this time ; but whether she had noticed it whether
she ought to have noticed it is for you to determine. She was
not bound to the exercise of extraordinary care, but she was
bound to use such care as a person of ordinary prudence, situated
as she was under like circumstances would use, and if she neg-
lected to use such care then it would be negligence. 19
595. Notice to city of defect or danger necessary. (1) If at
the time of the injuries complained of, the defendant had a con-
tract with any person to furnish it with lumber by the year or oth-
erwise and to deliver the same to the city, and such person did, in
fact, under such contract deliver said lumber and pile the same
in the street, then the act of such person or persons in delivering
the same was not the act of the city, and the city would not be
liable for any negligence of such person in placing the same in
the street, unless it had notice thereof, either express or im-
plied. 20
(2) If the lumber mentioned in the complaint was not placed in
IT Cramer v. City of Burlington, i Fee v. Columbus Borough, 168
39 Iowa, 512. Pa. 383, 31 Atl. 1076.
is City of Austin v. Ritz, 72 Tex. 20 City of Evansville v. Senhenn,
401, 9 S. W. 884. 151 Ind. 42, 41 L. R. A. 728, 733,
47 N. E. 634, 51 N. E. 88.
605 NOTICE OF UNSAFE CONDITION. 59G
the street by the city, but was placed there by some one else, to
be used in the construction or repair for a building or for any
other purpose, then the city is not liable for any accident result-
ing therefrom, unless it had notice, either express or implied,
that the same was in the street, and that the same was in an
unsafe and dangerous condition. 21
(3) To entitle the plaintiff to recover against the city in this
case, the evidence should show to the satisfaction of the jury one
or the other of the following facts, viz., that the city had actual
notice of the defect in the sidewalk which caused her injuries,
or that such sidewalk had remained in such defective condition
for an unreasonable length of time prior to the accident, and if
neither of these facts has been shown by the testimony in the
case, the plaintiff cannot recover in this action. 22
(4) In order to charge the defendant with negligence it must
appear from the evidence not only that the sidewalk was defec-
tive at the time of the alleged injury, but it must further appear
that such defect was actually known to the city or some of its
officers, whose duty it was to repair such defects or report the
same to the defendant, or that the defect had existed for such a
length of time prior to the alleged injury that the city, if exer-
cising ordinary diligence, would or should have known of the
defect. 23
596. Notice of unsafe condition may be inferred. (1) No-
tice of the defect in the street crossings or sidewalks may be rea-
sonably inferred where it is of such a character or has continued
for such a length of time as that the officers of the city, charged
with the supervision of its street crossings or sidewalks, might and
probably would have discovered it, if they had used ordinary
care in the discharge of their duties. 24
(2) If the sidewalk was properly constructed and afterward be-
came out of repair, then defendant would not be liable unless
you find it had notice of such defect. But actual notice need
not be proved in all cases. It may be inferred from the notoriety
21 City of Evansville v. Senhenn, 23 City of South Omaha v. Wrzen-
151 Ind. 42, 41 L. R. A. 728, 733, sinski (Nob.), 92 N. W. 1045.
47 N. E. 634, 51 N. E. 88. 24 City of Indianapolis v. Scott,
22 City of Chicago v. Langlass, 72 Ind. 109.
66 111. 363.
596 NEGLIGENCE OF CITIES AND TOWNS-. GOG
of the defect or danger, from its continuance for such a length of
time as to lead to the presumption that the proper officers did,
in fact, know or with proper diligence, might have known the
same. 25
(3) In the absence of express notice to the defendant city or its
officers, of the defects which caused the injury sustained by the
plaintiff, he, the plaintiff, cannot recover unless it is shown from
the evidence that the time the sidewalk was out of repair (if you
find from the evidence that it was out of repair) was so long
that the defendant or its officers should have known it and
reported it before the accident, or that the officers of the city
were guilty of negligence in not knowing of it and in not repair-
ing it before the accident. 26
(4) Actual notice need not be shown in all cases. Notice may
be inferred from the notoriety of the defect, or from its being so
visible and apparent and having continued for such length of
time, as that, in the exercise of reasonable observation and care,
the proper officers of the city ought to have known of and
remedied or removed the defect or obstruction. The evidence
in this case fails to show actual notice of the defect or obstruc-
tion complained of, if the same existed, to the defendant or its
officers, but if the evidence shows that such defect or obstruction
had existed for such length of time, was so visible and apparent
as that the officers and servants of the defendant ought, in the
exercise of ordinary care and observation to have known of and
remedied or removed the same before the time of the accident in
question, this would be sufficient to show that the defendant was
negligent in permitting such defects or obstructions to remain
at the time of the accident; but unless the evidence does show
that said defects or obstructions were caused by the negligence
of the defendant in constructing the culvert at the place in ques-
tion, as before explained, or that the same was of such notoriety or
had existed for such a length of time and were visible and appar-
ent before the accident, as that the officers and servants of the
defendant, in the exercise of ordinary care and observation,
ought to have known of and remedied or removed said defects
25 Rice v. City of Des Moines, 40 26 Kansas City v. Bradbury, 45
Iowa, 639. Kas. 385, 25 Pac. 889.
607 CITY MUST TAKE NOTICE. 597
or obstructions, the defendant cannot be charged with negligence
on account thereof, and the plaintiff cannot recover in this case. 27
597. City must take notice of unsafe condition. (1) It is not
enough to exonerate the city from liability on account of rotten
and insecure gutter crossings to show that they were originally
well constructed and safe. It is the duty of the city not only
to make its gutter crossings safe in the first instance, but to use
ordinary care to see that they are kept safe. The city is charge-
able with knowledge of the natural tendency of timber to rot
and decay by lapse of time and exposure to the elements, and it
is its duty to use ordinary care to detect and guard against the
same; and if injury results by reason of rotten and insecure
timbers in a gutter crossing, it is no excuse that the city officers,
charged with the supervision of its streets and sidewalks did
not know that the timbers of such gutter crossing were rotten
and insecure, if by ordinary care in the discharge of their duties
such officers might have discovered the condition thereof in time
to have repaired the same before such injury. 28
(2) If you believe from the evidence that the plaintiff was in-
jured by a defect in the sidewalk of the defendant, as alleged in
the plaintiff's declaration, and if you further believe that for sev-
eral years prior to and at the time of such injury, with knowledge
and approval of the superintendent of streets, a book was kept
at the police station in the city of Joliet, in which policemen were
directed to note defects in sidewalks, and that the policemen of
said city were charged with the duty of examining and reporting
to their departments defects in sidewalks observed by them, for
the benefit of the superintendent of streets, and that at that time
the superintendent of streets was accustomed to resort to said
books and to the reports of said policemen for information con-
cerning defects in sidewalks, and that one or more policemen
in the employ of the defendant noticed the defect in the sidewalk
so long before the time of the injury that there was time, in the
exercise of ordinary care, to report and repair said defect, then
such notice to the city of Joliet, and the failure to remedy the
" Hazard v. City of Council 28 City of Indianapolis v. Scott,
Bluffs, 87 Iowa, 54, 53 N. W. 1083. 72 Ind. 199.
598 NEGLIGENCE OF CITIES AND TOWNS. 608
defect within a reasonable time after such notice, would consti-
tute negligence on the part of the defendant. 29
(3) If the jury find from the evidence that the mode or man-
ner in which the sidewalk in question was originally built, and
thereafter continued, was so unskillful, negligent and improper
as to render it unsafe and hazardous for persons to pass along
the same, the said defendant was bound to take notice of its con-
dition, and was liable in damages to any person using ordinary
care who sustained personal injury in consequence of the unsafe
condition of said sidewalk. 30
(4) If the jury believe from the evidence that the sidewalk
where the plaintiff was injured was uneven, out of repair or fit
condition for any reason, and dangerous to persons passing along'
the same with ordinary care, and that the defendant, or its officers
or agents knew, or ought to have known, of its condition, and that
the plaintiff, in passing along the said sidewalk with such care as
an ordinarily prudent man would have observed, fell thereon by
reason of its defective condition, and was injured, then they must
find for the plaintiff. 31
(5) If plaintiff fell by reason of loose planks or other defects
in the walk, and if the defects had been there long enough so
that the officers of defendant either actually knew of the condi-
tion of the walk or should have known its condition by the exer-
cise of ordinary care, and the plaintiff was free from any negli-
gence on her part, she would be entitled to recover. 32
598. Injury from accident No liability. (1) If the jury
find from the evidence in this case that the cellar doors in the
sidewalk, in front of the premises occupied by the defendant,
were constructed and maintained in a reasonally safe condition
for passing over and upon said doors, and if they further find
that said doors, or either of them, were opened at or before the
time of the injury complained of by the plaintiff, by some person
not in the employ or service of the defendant, without the
knowledge or consent of the defendant, or which, by the exer-
29 City of Joliet v. Looney, 159 si Gordon v. City of Richmond,
111. 473, 42 N. E. 854. 83 Va. 438, 2 S. E. 727.
so Alexander v. Town of Mt. Ster- 32 Fee v. Columbus Borough, 168
ling, 71 111. 369. Pa. St. 384, 31 Atl. 1076.
609 ESSENTIALS TO WARRANT RECOVERY. 599
else of ordinary care, the defendant could not have known, then
the jury will find for the defendant. 33
(2) If you find from the evidence that the gutter crossing in
question, at the time in question, and in its then condition, and
without lights, if there were no lights, was reasonably safe for a
person crossing on foot, and in the use of ordinary care, then the
plaintiff cannot recover, even though she did step or fall, as she
claims, into the adjacent gutter, for, as before stated, the plain-
tiff must prove, not only that she received the injuries com-
plained of, but she must also prove that the city was guilty of
negligence as charged, and that such negligence directly con-
tributed to produce such injuries. 34
599. Elements necessary to a recovery. (1) Before the
plaintiff can recover in this action it must appear, by a preponder-
ance of the evidence (1) that the plaintiff's intestate, S, was killed
as a result of a defect or excavation in the sidewalk on J street in
the defendant city, as alleged in the declaration, and that such
excavation was left in an unsafe condition; and (2) that the de-
fendant city, or its officers, were negligent in permitting said side-
walk to remain in said unsafe condition at the time said S is al-
leged to have been killed. To charge the defendant with negli-
gence it must appear that the proper officers of the city had no-
tice of the unsafe condition of the sidewalk in time to have pre-
vented the killing of S by falling into said excavation, or that
by the exercise of reasonable and ordinary care and diligence
they could have known of the unsafe condition of said sidewalk
in time to have prevented such killing. By reasonable and ordi-
nary care and diligence is meant that degree of care and pru-
dence which an ordinarily careful and prudent man would rea-
sonably be expected to use under similar circumstances. 35
(2) If the jury find from the evidence that said crossing was not
so reasonably safe for ordinary travel as aforesaid at the time of
the alleged injury, by reason of an opening between the stones in
said crossing erected for and used as stepping stones therein;'
and further find that the defendant had notice of such defect in
33 Fehlhauer v. City ol St. Louis 35 Kansas City v. Birmingham,
(Mo.), 77 S. W. 848. 45 Kas. 214, 25 Pac. 569.
s* City of Indianapolis v. Scott,
72 Ind. 200.
600 NEGLIGENCE OF CITIES AND TOWNS. 610
such crossing, or that the same had existed for a time prior to the
time of said alleged injury, reasonably sufficient to have enabled
the defendant to have ascertained the fact and remedied said de-
fect, and further find that on the night of said day last aforesaid
the said plaintiff's wife, while walking over said crossing, and
while in the exercise of ordinary care and caution, fell into said
opening and was thereby injured, and that her said fall and in-
jury were caused by said alleged defect in said crossing, then
they must find for said plaintiff. 30
600. Drains left in dangerous condition. (1) It is the duty
of the defendant to provide for the health of the inhabitants of
the city by the construction of all necessary and proper drains. It
is a question for the jury to determine, from the evidence,
whether the drain on S street, covered at the crossings of the
streets and alleys, but left uncovered in the intervening spaces,
and without any barrier to prevent travelers falling into the
same, was such a construction as that the persons using said street
could, with ordinary care, avoid receiving injury therefrom. 37
(2) If the proof should satisfy you that the drain was one dan-
gerous to persons passing and using ordinary care, but should sat-
isfy you also that the injury in question resulted from the want of
ordinary care on behalf of the plaintiff, the plaintiff cannot re-
cover for the injury thus received through plaintiff's want of
ordinary care. In considering the question of the use of care on
the part of the plaintiff, you will have regard to the age of the
plaintiff, and not exact the same degree of care on the part of a
child of nine or ten years as would be exacted of and exercised
by a person of mature years and discretion. 38
(3) If the drain was a reasonably proper one in its manner of
construction, and the leaving it uncovered and unfenced between
the crossings of the streets and alleys was not reasonably liable
to result in injury to persons passing and using ordinary care to
be expected from those who usually travel streets in the city, the
defendant would not be liable, and you should return your ver-
dict for the defendant. 39
as Davenport v. City of Hannibal, 38 City of Galveston v. Posnain-
108 Mo. 479, 18 S. W. 1122. sky, 62 Tex. 123.
37 City of Galveston v. Posnain- 39 City of Galveston v. Posnain-
sky, 62 Tex. 122. sky, 62 Tex. 122.
611 BRIDGES KEPT IN REPAIR. 601
(4) The law requires of one riding in the daytime such atten-
tion to the road over which he is about to pass as to see large
holes that are conspicuous and obvious and in plain sight, unless
some good and sufficient reason excuses the inattention. 40
601. Bridges shall be kept in repair. (1) The board of com-
missioners are chargeable with knowledge of the tendency of tim-
bers to decay, and it is incumbent upon the commissioners to use
ordinary care in providing against the timbers in a bridge becom-
ing unsafe because of the decay incident to age and long use.
They are not bound, however, to do more than use ordinary care
and diligence; and if they act w r ith ordinary care and diligence
there is no liability 1 . 41
(2) The board of supervisors is charged by law with the duty
of supervising and keeping the county bridges in repair. If the
members of the board did not possess the requisite skill to dis-
charge the duty of inspection, then it was the duty of the board
to appoint or provide some one possessing such skill, and to have
all county bridges under their care examined as frequently as
men of ordinary prudence and care would deem necessary for
the safety of the traveling public, and as experience demon-
strated the necessity of examination, and if the board failed to
do this such failure would be negligence. 42
(3) To show an acceptance by the public, binding upon the city,
it is not necessary to show any formal action of the council to
that effect. If the jury find from the evidence that the city of M
expended money in the repair of the bridge, and assumed and
exercised control and supervision of the same, and that it was
upon a public thoroughfare in the city, this is evidence tending
to show an acceptance and assumption of the bridge by the city. 43
(4) Even if such bridge was in a public street, it must be con-
ceded that it was built by private individuals, and was maintained
by private individuals, and that the city had refused to consider
the bridge a public structure, and although built in the public
street, if it was simply and solely an appendage to H's mills, and
40 Hill v. Inhabitants of Seekonk, Indianaf Board of Allman, 142 Ind.
119 Mass. 88. 573.
41 Apple v. Board, &c. 127 Ind. 42 Ferguson v. Davis County, 57
555, 27 N. E. 166. Counties are not Iowa, 611, 10 N. W. 906.
now liable for injuries caused by 43 Shartle v. Minneapolis, 17
defective bridges, under the law of Minn. 292.
602 NEGLIGENCE OF CITIES AND TOWNS. 612
only useful as connected with the said mills and to the public only
as dealing with said mills, and was not, during the time it has
stood there, and up to the time of the accident, useful to the public
travel along said street to and from places other than H's mills,
then the city would not be liable for the injuries suffered by the
plaintiff through the falling of said bridge. But, on the other
hand, if said bridge stood in the public highway, and appeared to
be a part thereof, and the approaches from the traveled part of
the street led directly thereto, and it appeared to any one travel-
ing along the highway to be a part of the street in ordinary use,
and if it had been and was in actual use and utility generally to
the traveling public and used by the general traveling public,
then the city, if it had erected at or near the bridge no visible
sign or monument warning the public that such bridge was not
a part of the street, was under a duty so long as it permitted the
bridge to remain in and as a part of the street, subject to general
use and utility, to keep the same, or see that the same was kept,
in reasonable repair, so that it would be reasonably safe and con-
venient for public travel. 44
602. Grades and embankments obstructing natural flow of
water. (1) If said embankment was raised above the established
grade of the street it was an obstruction for which the defendant
is responsible, though it did not directly create or make the ob-
struction or authorize it to be done, and if said embankment was
and is an obstruction to the natural flow of the water upon and
across said street, and causes the water to dam up and flow back
upon the adjacent premises to the injury of the owner, the de-
fendant is liable, if, at the time of the injury, the premises were
as high as the grade of the street, and if defendant in grading
and working its streets obstructs the natural flow of surface
water, and by reason of its failure to provide necessary channels
for carrying off the water, it is caused to flow in increased quan-
tities upon the adjacent premises to the injury of the owner, for
such injury the defendant is liable, if no fault of the owner con-
tributed thereto. 45
(2) The city, as a public corporation, has a right to establish
4* Detwiler v. City of Lansing, 45 Damour v. Lyons City, 44 lo-
95 Mich. 486, 55 N. W. 361. wa, 281.
613 SIDEWALKS COVERED WITH ICE. 603
grades for streets, and to fill up the streets to correspond with the
grade established, and, if the work is done in a careful and skillful
manner, the city will not be liable for injuries to property which
are the necessary result of the careful and skillful grading of the
streets. On the other hand, if the city, in grading the streets, did
the work in an unskillful and improper manner, by making im-
proper or insufficient gutters, by reason of which the water was
caused to flow from the street upon the premises of plaintiff, he
will be entitled to recover, if you find the injuries complained of
resulted from such alleged unskillful construction of the street. 46
603. Ice sleet, snow on sidewalks Liability. As a general
rule, the mere fact that snow or sleet had fallen upon the side-
walk from the clouds, and thereby rendered the sidewalk slip-
pery and difficult to pass over, would not make the city liable
therefor, even though such ice and snow should remain upon the
walk for an unreasonable length of time after the officers of the
city, whose duties required them to look after such matters, had
notice of its existence, or after they, in the exercise of reasonable
care in performing their duties, ought to have known of its ex-
istence; but this rule relates only to the natural conditions re-
sulting from rain or sleet falling and freezing upon the walk, or
snow accumulating upon the walk from natural causes. Where,
after such ice or snow has thus accumulated, and if by reason of
persons traveling over the same, or if from other causes, as from
ice or snow thawing and flowing down upon the walk from other
lands, the surface of the snow or ice upon the walk becomes
rough or rigid, or rounded in form, or lies at an angle or slant-
ing to the plain surface of the walk, so that it becomes difficult
and dangerous for persons traveling on foot to pass over the same,
when exercising ordinary care, or if the walk is constructed in
such manner as not to permit the natural flow of the water and
thawing snow from lands adjoining, but dams the same upon the
walk and holds the same there until it freezes, and the walk be-
comes dangerous, by reason thereof, to persons using ordinary care
in attempting to pass over the same, or by reason of snow or ice
having accumulated on the walk from natural causes, the flowing
water and snow from adjoining lands are damned up and held
40 Ellis v. Iowa City, 29 Iowa, 230.
604 NEGLIGENCE OF CITIES AND TOWNS. 614
upon the walk, and frozen there, and by reason thereof mak-
ing the walk dangerous for persons using ordinary care in
passing over the same on foot, then the city becomes liable
for injuries caused by such obstruction, provided the person
injured did not contribute to his injury by negligence on
his part and the obstruction has existed for an unreasonable
length of time after the same became known to the city author-
ities, or ought to have been known to them in the exercise of
reasonable care. 47
604. Signs overhanging sidewalk Damage. It is the duty
of the city to use ordinary care to prevent the construction or
maintenance of signs which overhang the sidewalks, unless the
same are constructed and suspended with ordinary care and skill,
considering the dangers of such structures to the public who
travel thereunder upon the sidewalks. A failure of the city to
exercise this degree of diligence and care would be such negli-
gence as would make it liable for damages which might result
therefrom. 48
605. Building permits to obstruct streets. When the city is-
sues a building permit authorizing any one to use and obstruct
the streets, it is the duty of the corporate authorities to see to it
that the persons thus given authority to use the streets shall prop-
erly guard and protect such obstructions; and if the city negli-
gently fails to perform its duty in this respect it shall be held re-
sponsible to any one who, while in the exercise of due care, may
be injured by reason of such obstruction. 49
606. Streets and highways shall be kept safe for travel. (1)
The opening and repairing of streets is a matter of discretion in
the city government, but when it undertakes to open or construct
streets and travel ways it must so construct them as to render
their use reasonably safe to such persons as are naturally expected
to use such ways, using such care as such persons ordinarily exer-
cise. 50
(2) A traveler on a public street is held to the exercise of only
47 Huston v. City of Council 49 City of Indianapolis v. Doherty,
Bluffs, 101 Iowa, 33, 69 N. W. 1130. 71 Ind. 6.
48 Gray v. City of Emporia, 43 50 Galveston v. Posnainsky, 62
Kas. 706, 23 Pac. 944. Tex. 122.
615 HIGHWAYS SAFE ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES 607
ordinary care. Slight negligence, which does not amount to a
want of ordinary care, will not defeat a recovery for an injury re-
ceived in consequence of a defect in a public street or highway,
provided the evidence shows that the city authorities were guilty
of negligence in permitting the defect to exist, and that the trav-
eler was injured thereby, and was using ordinary care to avoid
the injury. 51
(3) A town is not bound to work and prepare for public travel
the whole of the land within the limits of the way, but only such
portions as are reasonably necessary for that purpose. And a town
is not necessarily chargeable with damage arising from every de-
fect existing within the located limits of a highway. Nor would
it be liable for obstructions or defects in portions of the highway
not a part of the traveled path, and not so connected with it that
they would affect the safety or convenience of those traveling on
the highway and using the traveled path ; nor would the town be
legally liable when an injury was sustained by a party using the
road for the purpose of passing from his own land, although it
was caused by a defect within the limits of the highway, if it was
outside the part of the road used for public travel. 52
(4) The town is not bound to prepare for abutters the means
of passing from their estates to the adjoining highway, or of
crossing from that part of the highway, not appropriated to
travel, to that part which is so appropriated. 53
607. Considerations in assessing damages. (1) If you find
the defendant guilty, then the plaintiff is entitled to recover her
actual damages which she has sustained as the direct or proximate
result of such injury, such as her loss of time, her pain and suf-
fering, her necessary and reasonable expenses in medical and
surgical aid and nursing, as the same may appear from the evi-
dence in the case. And if the jury find from the evidence that
the said injury is permanent and incurable, they should take this
into consideration in assessing the plaintiff's damages. 54
(2) If you find, under the evidence and the rules of law I have
given you, that the plaintiff is entitled to recover, it will be your
si Moore v. City of Richmond, 53 Whitford v. Inhabitants, 119
85 Va. 542, 8 S. E. 387. Mass. 570.
52 Whitford v. Inhabitants, 119 5 * City of Chicago v. Stearns, 105
Mass. 570. 111. 554, 557.
608 NEGLIGENCE OF CITIES AND TOWNS. 616
duty to assess the amount of damages which, in your judgment,
he should recover. In estimating this amount, you may take into
consideration expenses actually incurred, loss of time occasioned
by the immediate effect of the injuries, and physical and mental
suffering caused by the injuries. In addition, you may consider
the professional occupation of the plaintiff, and his ability to earn
money, and he will be entitled to recover for any permanent re-
duction of his power to earn money by reason of his injuries ; and
the amount assessed should be such a sum as, in your judgment,
will fully compensate him for the injuries, or any of them, thus
sustained. 55
(3) If you find for the plaintiff, then, in estimating her dam-
ages, if any, you should take into consideration the nature of her
injuries, the length of time she has been disabled in consequence
thereof, if she has been so disabled, and, if she is not yet cured,
whether it is probable that a permanent cure can be effected, and,
if so, how long it will be before such cure can be effected, her
physical and mental sufferings, if any, consequent upon such in-
juries, and award her such a sum as, in your judgment, will fully
compensate her for the injuries which you find are the natural
and direct result of the negligence complained of. 56
608. Matters of evidence Incompetent evidence. (1) It
was the duty of the plaintiff to exercise ordinary care and dili-
gence in traveling along the sidewalk to avoid accidents, and this
care and diligence increases or diminishes with the circumstances
of the case for instance, if the night was dark when traveling on
the sidewalk, it would be a duty to exercise more care and cau-
tion than in open day; and if you find from the evidence that
plaintiff did not exercise care and caution commensurate with
the surrounding circumstances, and such want of care materially
contributed to the injury, then the plaintiff cannot recover. 57
(2) Evidence of the existence of loose boards other than the
one upon which the plaintiff tripped is not competent for your con-
sideration for any purpose except as it may tend to show the want
of the exercise of due care on the part of the defendant, which
ss City of Indianapolis v. Gaston, 57 Kansas City v. Bradbury, 45
58 Ind. 224. Kas. 384, 25 Pac. 889.
56 City of Indianapolis v. Scott,
72 Ind. 201.
617 MATTERS OF EVIDENCE CLAIMS AGAINST CITY. 609
would have led to the discovery, on its part, of the fact that the
board upon which the plaintiff tripped was loose at the time of
the injury. 58
(3) The condition of the set-off prior to the injury cannot
be considered by ydu in determining whether or not the city
has been negligent, if you should find the set-off complained of as
dangerous, was, on the evening of the alleged injury, barricaded
or protected so as to be reasonably safe to persons walking on
the sidewalk there, in the exercise of due care, or such care as an
ordinarily prudent man would exercise, taking into consideration
the kind of night it was. 59
609. Claims against city Mode of allowing. (1) It is pro-
vided in substance by the charter of the city of C that all claims
against the city shall be audited and allowed by the common coun-
cil, and that a statement of the claim shall be made by the claim-
ant and filed with the common council, and verified by the oath of
the claimant, before it is allowed, and that it shall be a conclusive
answer to any suit brought by the claimant to enforce such claim
that it had not been presented to the council. In my judgment,
that part of the charter is applicable to this case. It is conceded
by the plaintiff that, before commencing this suit, he did not pre-
sent any claim to the common council for a return or payment
back to him of this tax, as provided by the charter, and, conse-
quently, for this reason the plaintiff cannot recover in this action,
and your verdict should be for the defendant. 60
ss Kansas City v. Bradbury, 45 eo Crittenden v. City of Mt. Clem-
Kas. 385, 25 Pac. 889. ens, 86 Mich. 227, 49 N. W. 144.
59 Cramer v. City of Burlington,
42 Iowa, 322.
CHAPTER XLIL
MASTER AND SERVANT.
Sec. Sec.
610. Care of master for safety of 619. Servant continuing in service
servant. after knowledge of danger.
611. Rules for conduct of servants. 620. Servant continuing after mas-
612. Master must advise servant of ter's promise of repair.
danger. 621. Servant does not assume risks
613. Not a fellow servant Liabil- of negligence.
ity. 622. Servant may assume appli-
614. Injury caused by fellow-ser- ances to be safe.
vant. 623. Servant injured when not at
615. Injury from wilful act of ser- his place.
vant. 624. Brakeman injured coupling
616. Burden on plaintiff to show cars Liability.
negligence. 625. Question of negligence sub-
617. Servant assumes risks incident mitted to jury.
to employment. 626. Servant discharged for cause
618. Servant knowing of danger is No liability.
negligent.
610. Care of master for safety of servant. (1) The meas-
ure of care which should have been taken by the defendant com-
pany to avoid a responsibility for the injury to the plaintiff is that
which a person of ordinary care, prudence and caution would use
if his own interests were to be affected, or the whole of the risk
were his own. It is such care as a person of ordinary prudence
would exercise under the circumstances surrounding the occur-
rence at the time of the injury. 1
(2) The defendant was under no greater obligation to care for
the safety of the plaintiff than he was to take care of himself;
while the company was under obligation to use care for the safety
i McVey v. St. Clair Co. 49 W. Va. 420, 38 S. E. 648.
618
619 MASTER'S CARE FOR SERVANT. G10
of the plaintiff, he was under a like obligation to use ordinary
care for his own safety, and to observe the machinery with which
he operated. 2
(3) The defendant was not bound to use the highest skill, the
greatest foresight, and the most extraordinary care in procuring
the very best appliances ; but rather those appliances which were
reasonably best calculated to answer the end proposed. 3
(4) The measure of care required of the defendant company to
avoid liability for injury to the plaintiff, is that which a person
of ordinary care, prudence and caution would use if his own in-
terest were to be affected or the whole of the risk were his own.
It is such care as a person of ordinary prudence would exercise
under the circumstances surrounding the occurrence at the time
of the injury. The defendant was not bound to use extraordinary
care and the greatest foresight in procuring the very best appli-
ances, but rather those appliances which were reasonably best
calculated to answer the end proposed. The defendant was under
no greater obligation to care for the safety of the plaintiff than
he was to care for himself. While the defendant company was
under obligation to use care for the safety of the plaintiff, he was
under a like obligation to use ordinary care for his own safety,
and to observe the machinery with which he operated*
(5) The law as to the master is, that, in supplying materials, ap-
pliances and machinery, he is held to ordinary care, and if un-
avoidable accidents growing out of hidden defects, or accidents
or injuries arising out of the use of machinery where the means
of knowledge as to the dangerous character and condition of such
machinery are equal on both sides ; that is to say, where the em-
ploye has equal knowledge with the master as to the condition
and character of the machinery he operates, then there can be no
recovery by the servant. 5
(6) If you find that the staging or runaway on which plaintiff
was injured was constructed before he was sent up there to work,
then it is immaterial as to who or which one of defendant's
2 McDonald v. Norfolk, &c. R. Central R. Co. 44 Iowa, 136; Mc-
Co. 95 Va 104 27 S. E. 821. Donald v. Norfolk, &C. R. Co. 95
s Cooper v. Central R. Co. 44 Va. 104, 27 S. E. 821.
Iowa, 136. 5 Heltonville Mfg. Co. v. Fields,
* McVey v. St. Clair Co. 49 W. 138 Ind. 62, 36 N. E. 529.
Va.'420, 38 S. E. 648; Cooper v.
610 MASTER AND SERVANT. 620
employes constructed it, as it would then be the duty of the
defendant in such case to have exercised reasonable care tq
have prepared there a staging or runway that was reasonably
safe for plaintiff to work upon.
(7) It was the duty of the defendant to exercise ordinary and
reasonable care to provide a reasonably safe place for the plain-
tiff to do the work which he was engaged to perform, and if you
find that plaintiff was employed by the defendant and directed
to go on top of the elevator in question and do the work he was
engaged in at the time of the injury, then it was the duty of the
defendant to have exercised ordinary and reasonable care propor-
tionate to the danger, in providing for him a reasonably safe stag-
ing or platform on which to do the work; and if you find that
defendant failed in this, by omitting to have the boards or planks
composing the staging or runway nailed or otherwise properly
secured and that in consequence thereof the plaintiff, without
fault on his part,,and in the exercise of ordinary care was injured,
then he is entitled to recover in this action, and you will so
find. 7
(8) If the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant
employed the plaintiff's intestate as a brakeman on one of its
passenger trains, it became and was the duty of the defendant to
provide the said McD with reasonably safe cars and couplings
for the performance of the work required of him as such brake-
man, and that if the defendant failed to perform its duty in this
regard, and did not provide the said McD with reasonably safe
and suitable cars and couplings, and that, as a result of such
failure of the defendant to perform said duty by providing said
McD with reasonably safe and suitable cars and couplings, he
was caught between two of defendant's cars, while he was trying,
to couple them together in the preformance of his duty as said
brakeman, and injured as alleged, they should find for the plain-
tiff, unless they further believe that he .was himself guilty of
negligence which proximately contributed to his death. 8
(9) It was the duty of defendant to use all reasonable precau-
tions for the safety of its employes, and among other things it was
e Doyle v. Missouri, &c. Co. 140 & McDonald's Adm'r v. Norfolk,
Mo. 1, 41 S. W. 257. &c. R. Co. 95 Va. 99, 27 S. E. 821.
7 Doyle v. Missouri, &c. Co. 140
Mo, 1, 41 S. W. 256.
621 RULES GOVERNING SERVANTS ADVISING OF DANGER. 612
bound to furnish suitable machinery materials sound, safe
and to keep it in such condition as would not endanger their
safety, such as was least likely to do or cause injury. 9
611. Rules for conduct of servants. (1) The defendant rail-
road company has the right to make such rules and regulations for
the conduct of its servants and agents while engaged in its service
as in its judgment are reasonable and proper, or would conduce
to the safety and comfort of its employes ; and all servants while
engaged in such service with a knowledge of such rules and regu-
lations, are bound to act in conformity therewith ; and if injuries
are sustained by them while acting in violation thereof, no recov-
ery can be had of the company therefor, if such violation was
the cause of or materially contributed to the injury. 10
(2) It was the duty of the defendant to use ordinary care and
prudence in making and publishing to its employes sufficient and
necessary rules for the safe running of its trains, and for gov-
ernment of its employes, and as great a degree of care for their
safety, taking into consideration their hazardous employment,
as could be procured by ordinary care and prudence, and the
more hazardous the employment the greater is the degree of
care required by the law. 11
612. Master must advise servant of danger. (1) Before
using a highly dangerous explosive it is the duty of the master to
ascertain and make known to his servants the dangers to be
reasonably apprehended from its use and the proper method
of manipulating it with reasonable safety, and the ignorance of
the master as to the dangers to be apprehended from its use, or
the proper methods of manipulating it, will furnish . no excuse
when the master, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, could
have obtained such knowledge. 12
(2) If R, the defendant, knew or if he had good reason to be-
lieve that rigid or forcible resistance would be offered to him and
his parties by parties whom he knew or believed to be there, on
that ground or in the vicinity, it was his duty to inform the
plaintiff B of the nature of the employment, to disclose to him
9 Cooper v. Central R. Co. 44 Cooper v. Central, &c. R. Co.
Iowa, 136. 44 Iowa, 138.
10 Woolsey v. Lake Shore, &c. R. 12 Bertha Zinc Co. v. Martin. 93
Co. 33 Ohio St. 227. Va. 794, 22 S. E. 869.
613 MASTER AND SERVANT.' 622
that knowledge, so that B might act understandingly, and take
the chances, if he chose to do so. If the defendant had such
knowledge and concealed it from the plaintiff, then he is liable. 13
613. Not a fellow servantLiability. (1) If the plaintiff,
being a night watchman of defendant, was at the time of the ex-
plosion at the place of explosion, and was sent there in charge of
the engine which pulled the car on which was the boiler that after-
wards exploded, by direction of S, the regular engineer in charge
of said engine, and you further find that under the custom
and usage of defendant's road management, the plaintiff was
expected or required to obey said directions, and did obey said
S's directions, then if the plaintiff was injured by said explosion
while at a proper place in carrying out said directions, by the
acts of negligence of defendant as charged, the defendant would
be liable. 14
(2) A section master of a railroad company, in charge of a par-
ticular section of the company's road, with a force of hands under
him, to take care of and preserve said section, is not merely a
coemploye with said hands, on an equal footing with them, but
the relation between the section master and those working un-
der him is that which exists between a superior and a subor-
dinate, and in all matters pertaining to the particular depart-
ment to which the section master is engaged, he is the repre-
sentative of the company, and, therefore, if one who is employed
by the section master to work under him on his section is injured
by the negligence of the section master, whilst engaged in and
about said employment, the company cannot escape liability for
said injury upon the ground that the injured party was the coem-
ploye of the section master; but the jury are further instructed
that this will not prevent the company from showing, if it can,
that, on other grounds or for other reasons, it is not liable to the
injured party for the injuries he has sustained. 15
' 614. Injury caused by fellow servant. (1) If the jury be-
lieve from the evidence that L was the engineer, and M the plain-
tiff was a brakeman on the same train, working under the same
conductor, deriving their authority and compensation from the
is Baxter v. Roberts, 44 Cal. 191. Tyler v. Chesapeake, &c. R. Co.
i* East L. &c. R. oo. v. Scott, 88 Va. 392, 13 S. E. 975.
71 Tex. 705, 10 S. W. 298.
623 FELLOW SERVANT CAUSING INJURY. 616
same source, and were engaged in the same general business of
running the train on which they were working, and one not in
authority over the other, they were .fellow servants, and each
took the risk of the other's negligence. 16
(2) If the plaintiff was, at the time of the explosion, engaged in
the management of an engine of defendant on its railroad, then
the engineer on the pile driver and plaintiff would be fellow
servants, and for an injury resulting to plaintiff from careless-
ness or negligence of such engineer, plaintiff cannot recover. 17
(3) The defendant was not an insurer of the life or safety of the
plaintiff while he was at work for it; and if you believe from
the evidence that this fall was an accident for which no one was
to blame, or that it was the result of the carelessness or negligence
of the plaintiff or of some fellow servant, then your verdict
should be for defendant. 18
615. Injury from willful act of servant. If the jury believe
that the motorman in charge of the defendant's car after he
had seen the plaintiff's carriage and had - completely stopped his
car, wantonly and maliciously and to gratify some private pur-
pose and not because it was necessary that he should again
start said car, in pursuance of his employment again started
said car and ran into the plaintiff's carriage and frightened the
plaintiff's horse and caused the accident, then the defendant
is not responsible for such acts on the part of the motorman, and
the verdict of the jury must be for the defendant. 19
616. Burden on plaintiff to show negligence. (1) The mere
fact that there may have been decayed ties in the roadbed at the
point of the accident does not authorize you to find for plain-
tiff. You must further believe that the decayed condition of
the ties, if they were decayed, was the cause of the wreck and
that defendant knew, or by the exercise of ordinary care,
might have known of the decayed condition of the ties, and
is McDonald v. Norfolk, &c. R. 71 Tex. 705 10 S. W. 298. See Jar-
Oo. 95 Va. 104, 27 S. E, 821. As to vis v. Hitch, 161 Ind. 217, 67 N. E.
the changes made in this rule by 1057.
the Employer's Liability acts in va- 18 Doyle v. Missouri, K. & T.
rious states, see Pittsburgh, &c. R. T. Co. 140 Mo. 1, 41 S. W. 257.
Co. v. Montgomery, 152 Ind. 1, 49 i Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Pierce,
N. E. 582; Indianapolis Union R. 89 Md. 497, 43 Atl. 940. But see
Co. v. Houlihan, 157 Ind. 494, 60 Indianapolis, &c. R. Co. v. Boettch-
N. E. 943. er, 131 Ind. 82, 88, 28 N. E. 551.
" East L. &c. R. Co. v. Scott,
61? MASTER AND SERVANT. 624
that the wreck was caused by the fact that the ties were de-
cayed, and unless you so believe, you will find for the defendant
on this issue. You are not authorized to find for the plaintiff
from the fact alone that the ties were rotten at' the point where
the wreck occurred. 20
(2) The only charge of negligence made in the petition against
this defendant which you are to consider, is concerning the re-
moval of the brake staffs from the flat cars which were loaded
with steel, and it devolves upon the plaintiff to prove that the
removal of said brake staffs was an act of negligence. The jury
cannot presume that it was a negligent act from the fact, if it
be a fact, that the cars escaped from the side track on to the
main track, and there collided with B's train. 21
(3) To entitle the plaintiff to recover in this action, the plaintiff
must show to the satisfaction of the jury, or else it must other-
wise appear in the evidence to the satisfaction of the jury, that
the deceased was injured by the negligence of the defendant,
whilst the deceased was observing ordinary care on his part to
avoid injury, or did not by his own negligence contribute to the
injury. 22
(4) Whenever a claim for damages is asserted the injury must
be shown by the plaintiff to have been caused by the negligence
of the defendant, and the happening of the accident, without
additional proof that it was caused by the negligence of the de-
fendant, is not sufficient to establish the liability of defendant. 23
617. Servant assumes risks incident to employment. (1) If
it be conceded that the switching of cars from the main track to a
side track while the train is in motion is a dangerous mode
of doing business and ought to be regarded as evidence of
negligence, still all employes who entered the service of the
company with full knowledge that such was the practice, or ac-
quired such knowledge afterwards, and remained in the service
without the least objection thereto, and fully acquiesced therein,
must be regarded as having consented to the practice or as having
20 Gorham v. Kansas C. & S. R. 22 Way v. Illinois Cent. R. Co. 40
Co. 113 Mo. 411, 20 S. W. 1060. Iowa, 344.
21 Browning v. Wabash W. R. 23 Richmond & D. R. Co. v. Bur-
Co. 124 Mo. 65, 27 S. W. 644. nett, 88 Va. 540, 14 S. E. 372.
625 SERVANT ASSUMES RISKS. 617
waived any objection thereto and therefore as having taken
the risk upon themselves. 24
(2) If you believe from the testimony that the plaintiff was an
experienced railroad man, both as engineer and conductor, at the
time of the accident, and that he permitted the train under his
charge to be run at an unusual and reckless rate of speed, and
that said unusual and reckless rate of speed of the train was the
proximate cause of the accident, and that, but for such rate of
speed, the accident would not have happened, notwithstanding
defects (if there were any) of the track or cars or manner of
loading the cars of the defendant, then the plaintiff cannot re^
cover, and your finding will be for defendant. 25
(3) The plaintiff in the performance of his duties as conductor
of the train of the defendant, assumed all the usual and ordinary
risks incident to his business, and if injured by any accident aris-
ing from these risks, the ^defendant is not liable to him therefor ;
if you believe from the testimony that the plaintiff created an
extraordinary risk for himself by permitting the train to run at
an unusually rapid rate of speed and was injured on that account,
your finding will be for defendant. 26
(4) The plaintiff, by entering the employment of the defendant,
and engaging in the work upon the top of the elevator, assumed
the ordinary risks and dangers incident thereto, not only so far
as they were known .to him, but also so far as they could have
been known to him by the exercise of ordinary care upon his
part; and if ypu believe from the evidence that plaintiff at and
prior to the time of the fall knew the condition of the runway,
and the manner in which it was constructed and laid, or that he
could have known its condition and the manner in which it
was laid by the exercise of ordinary care and prudence upon
his part, then the plaintiff cannot recover, and your verdict should
be for the defendant. 27
(5) When R the plaintiff sought employment at the hands of
the defendant he was held to an implied representation that he
was competent to perform the duties of the position he sought and
competent to apprehend and avoid all danger that might be dis-
24 Lake Shore, &c. R. Co. v. Knit- 26 Gorham v. Kansas C. & S. R.
tal, 33 Ohio St. 471. Co. 113 Mo. 413. 20 S. W. 1060.
25 Gorham v. Kansas C. & S. R. 27 Doyle v. Missouri, &c. T. Co.
Co. 113 Mo. 413, 20 S. W. 1060. 140 Mo. 1, 41 S. W. 257.
618 MASTER AND SERVANT. 626
covered by the exercise of ordinary care and prudence, and for
the purposes of this case, the plaintiff is to be treated as a brake-
man and switchman of ordinary experience and skill. 28
(6) The law presumes the compensation paid a person em-
ployed as a brakeman on a railroad is in part, a consideration
for the risks, hazards and dangers ordinarily incident to that
service. 29
(7) When the plaintiff entered the service of the defendant
company, the law presumes that he contracted with reference to
the risks and hazards incident to the business of his employment
as the company conducted it at the time he entered it, and that
his compensation was adjusted accordingly. 30
618. Servant knowing of danger is negligent. (1) If the
alleged dangers and improper condition of the track and the sit-
uation of the car on the side track was plain to be seen by R the
plaintiff, or if he ought, as an ordinarily prudent person, to have
seen or known of it, then there can be no recovery, and if he had
reasonable opportunity to see or know of the situation as touch-
ing the alleged condition of the tracks and car on the side
track, then he is, in law, held to such knowledge; or if on or
before the occasion of the injury he had knowledge or reason-r
able means of knowledge as a man of ordinary prudence of the
condition of the track and car on the side track, and incurred
the danger with such knowledge or means of knowledge, then
there can be no recovery. 31
(2) It was the plaintiff's duty to be careful, and to guard
against accidents; and if you believe from the evidence that the
plaintiff knew the manner in which the board upon which he
claims to have stepped was laid, or if the condition of the board
was apparent, and plaintiff by looking and using ordinary care,
could readily have discovered the danger, then your verdict
should be for the defendant. 82
(3) The defendant was under no obligation to keep the loose
boards picked up and it was plaintiff's duty to observe when
2 Pennsylvania Co. v . McCor- si Pennsylvania Co. v. McCor-
mack, 131 Ind. 250, 30 N. E. 27. mack, 131 Ind. 250, 30 N. E. 27.
20 Way v. Illinois Cent. R. Co. 40 32 Doyle v. Missouri, K. & T.
Iowa, 344. T. Co. 140 Mo. 1, 41 S. W. 257.
30 Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Ampey,
93 Va. 114, 25 S. E. 226.
627 SERVANT KNOWING DANGER. 618
and upon what he was stepping, and if his fall was due to his,
stepping upon a loose board near the runway, or where he
was working, then your verdict should be for the defendant. 33
(4) If the plaintiff knew that the cross ties in defendant's road-
bed were rotten, if they were rotten, or if the condition of the
ties were such that an ordinarily observant person would have
known before the accident, and he continued in the employ-
ment of said company after becoming possessed of such knowl-
edge, then he cannot recover if the condition of the ties was
the proximate cause of the injury. 34
(5) If the plainitff knew that the inside rail of defendant's
road was higher than the outside one, if such was the fact, or if
the same was of that character that an ordinarily observant
person would have known, and he continued in the employ-
ment of defendant or entered thereon with knowledge of the
fact, he cannot recover, if the height of the rail was the proxi-
mate cause of the injury. 35
(6) If the plaintiff knew of the defective condition of the
brakes, if they were defective, or could have known, if they were
of such a character, as an ordinarily observant person would have
known, and the condition of the brakes caused the wreck,
plaintiff cannot recover. 30
(7) If the jury find from the evidence that the defendant's
shipping room at or about the elevator hole mentioned in the
evidence was dark and unlighted, and if the jury further find
from the evidence that plaintiff, before his injury knew that
said room was dark and unlighted and that there was some
risk or danger of falling into the elevator hole by reason of
said condition of said room, while undertaking to use the.
elevator in the discharge of the duties of his employment, and
if the jury find from the evidence that defendant was main-
taining said elevator opening in said floor without causing the
same to be effectually barred or closed by railing, gate or
other contrivance for the prevention of accidents therefrom;
and if the jury find from the evidence that the plaintiff knew
before his injury that defendant was maintaining said elevator
ss Doyle v. Missouri, K. & T. T. 35 Gorham v. Kansas C. & S. R.
Co. 140 Mo. 1, 41 S. W. 257. Co. 113 Mo. 412, 20 S. W. 1060.
34 Gorham v Kansas C. & S. R. 3e Gorham v. Kansas C. & S. R.
Co. 113 Mo. 412, 20 S. W. 1060. Co. 113 Mo. 412, 20 S. W. 1060.
619 MASTER AND SERVANT. 628
opening without such guard or protection being closed, yet if
the jury further find from the evidence that said condition of
said room and elevator opening and the danger arising there-
from were not such as to threaten immediate injury to plaintiff
while in the defendant's service in the discharge of the duty
of his employment, and was not such that a person of ordinary
prudence while exercising care and caution would not have
undertaken to have remained in defendant's service and dis-
charge the duties of his employment, then the fact alone that
plaintiff continued in defendant's service under the circum-
stances will not of itself defeat the action. 37
619. Servant continuing in service after knowledge of
danger. (1) If you believe from the evidence in this case that
the proximity of said platform to the track and to the cars
as they passed was plain and apparent, and the liability to
injury therefrom was manifest, and that deceased knew of such
proximity, or, by the exercise of care to avoid injury to him-
self, might have known, and with such knowledge or oppor-
tunity of knowledge, remained in defendant's employ, and
continued to work in the vicinity thereof without objection
or protest, and without promise of amendment, then plaintiff
cannot recover in this action. 38
(2) If you believe from the evidence that the plaintiff knew
or had the same means of knowing as his employer, of the.
danger to which he would be exposed in performing services
at said place, and further find from the evidence that the plain-
tiff failed to exercise that degree of care that a man of ordinary
prudence would have used under the circumstances, to avoid
injury from such danger, and that by reason of his omission
to observe that measure of caution, he was injured, he cannot
recover; unless, however, you believe from the evidence that
at the time plaintiff -was hurt he was a youth of immature
judgment and inexperienced in the business in which he was
employed and that the perils of his undertaking were not
communicated or known to him, and that by reason of such im-
maturity of judgment and inexperience and want of informa-
37 Wendler v. People's H. F. Co. ss Perigo v. Chicago, &c. R. Co. 52
165 Mo. 539, 65 S. W. 737. Iowa, 277, 3 N. W. 43,
629 SERVANT KNOWING DANGER CONTINUES. 619
tion as to the perils of the employment he was incapable of un-
derstanding the nature and extent of the hazard to which he was
subjected; in which event in order to prevent a recovery by
him you must believe that he failed to exercise that degree of
care that persons of his age, undeveloped judgment and want of
information would ordinarily use under such circumstances.
From what has been stated you will perceive that it is not
the mere fact of the plaintiff's minority at the time he was
hurt that would relieve him from the care required of an adult,
but such immaturity of judgment, inexperience and lack of in-
formation as has been denned to you would be necessary to re-
lieve him from that degree of care. 39
(3) Although the jury may believe from the evidence that H
was not a capable man to run the mine machine referred to in
the evidence in this cause, and did not run such machine in a
capable manner at the time of the injury to B, yet, if they
believe from the evidence that the said B had knowledge of
the danger of said machine when in motion, and could have
avoided the injury to himself by the use of ordinary care upon
his part, he, the said B would be guilty of contributory negli-
gence and the jury should find for the defendant. 40
(4) If the jury shall find from the evidence that A, the plain-
tiff, entered the employ of the defendant as a freight brakeman
on or about the eleventh day of June, 1890, and continued there
in that capacity until his injury on August twenty-fifth, 1890, and
during all that time was passing through the tunnel mentioned,
generally twice a day, and often more frequently, and that it re-
quired only a few days to become acquainted with the tunnel
and the conditions of work therein, and after such opportu-
nity of knowing the same he continued in such employment
as aforesaid, then he took the risk of such employment and
the plaintiff cannot recover in this action even though the'
jury shall further find that the accident by which he lost his
life was caused by the defective construction of the tunnel or
lack of ventilation of the same. 41
39 Texas &c. R. Co. v. Brick, 83 *i Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Mary-
Tex. 598. land, 75 Md. 153, 23 Atl. 310.
40 McVey v. St. Clair Co. 49 W.
Va. 420. 38 S. B. 648.
620 MASTER AND SERVANT. 630
(5) If you find that said boiler exploded because of defects in
material and plaintiff knew of such defects before the explo-
sion or might have known of the same by the use of observation
in the course of his employment, and by placing himself near
the same, was injured by the explosion, or if such boiler ex-
ploded in consequence of incompetency of the engineer and
plaintiff knew of such incompetency before the explosion, then
he cannot recover. 42
620. Servant continuing after master's promise to repair.
(1) The court instructs the jury that if they believe, from the
evidence, that the plaintiff, while in the exercise of ordinary
care and caution for his own personal safety, was injured in
consequence of the defective condition of the machinery used
by the defendants as alleged in the second count of the decla-
ration, if they, the jury, believe from the evidence, that the
same was so defective; and if they further believe, from the
evidence, that the plaintiff repeatedly, and shortly before re-
ceiveing such injury, called the attention of the defendant's
superintendent to said defects, if any, and that said superin-
tendent there had authority to remedy said defects, if any,
and that thereupon said superintendent repeatedly, and shortly
before the injury, promised said plaintiff, that said defects,
if any, should be remedied, and that said plaintiff, relying
upon such promises remains in the employ of said defendants
until the injury, as aforesaid; and if the jury further believe,
from the evidence, that the danger from such defective ma-
chinery, if any, was not so imminent that no prudent person
would have undertaken to perform the service required of the
plaintff, then by so remaining for a reasonable time thereafter
the plaintiff would not assume the risks incident to such de-
fective machinery, if the same was defective during such rea-
sonable time. 43
(2) If the jury believe, from the evidence, that the deceased,
Charles Castaine, while in the exercise of due care and cau-
tion, was killed in consequence of the defective condition of
the engine used by the defendant, as alleged in the declaration,
and if they further believe, from the evidence, that the said
42 East Line, &c. R. Co. v. Scott, 43 Taylor v. Felsing, 164 111. 333,
71 Tex. 704, 10 S. W. 298. 45 N. E. 161.
631 MASTER'S PROMISE TO REPAIR. G21
Castaine, shortly before his death, called to the attention of
the superintendent and foreman, carpenters of the defendant,
the said defects and that said persons, or either of them, "then
.had authority to remedy said defects, and that said persons, or
either of them, thereupon promised the said Castaine that said
defects should be remedied, and that said Castaine relying upon
such promise, remained in the employ of the defendant, until he
was killed as aforesaid, then the jury must find for the plaintiff. 4 *
(3) If the drawbar was defective and the plaintiff had knowl-
edge of it and made objection thereto and was induced to
remain in the defendant's employment by promise or assurance
of its repair, and within a reasonable time, and before its
repair, and and not having waived the objection, he was in-
jured by reason of such defect, and he did not contribute
to the injury by his own fault or negligence, he will be enti-
tled to recover, but in such case greater care will be required
of him than if he had not known of the defect. 45
621. Servant does not assume risks of negligence. (1)
While a servant in accepting employment, assumes the ordinary
risk incident to it, he does not assume those occasioned by the neg-
ligence of the master: and while the plaintiff in this case as-
sumed the ordinary risks incident to the work he was called
upon to perform, he did not assume those, if there were any
such, arising from negligence of the defendant. 46 .
(2) If you find from the evidence that plaintiff was rightfully
at the place of the explosion and you further find that he left
his engine and went to the boiler that exploded, and you find
that he had no reason to believe that said boiler was in danger
of explosion, and in so going near it he did what was usual
in such a cage on the part of trainmen, and there was no ap-
parent danger in so doing, and was such an act of a man of
ordinary prudence and caution would commit, then the same
would not defeat his right to recover if he was otherwise enti-
tled to recover, under the evidence and instructions Werein
given. 47
Missouri Furnace Co. v. Abend, * Doyle v. Missouri, &c. T. Co.
107 111. 49. Held not assuming that 140 Mo. I, 41 S. W. 257.
the deceased was in the exercise of 47 East Line, &c. R. Co. v. Scott,
due care and diligence. 71 Tex. 705, 10 S. W. 298.
ts Belair v. Chicago & N. W. R.
Co. 43 Iowa, 671.
622 MASTER AND SERVANT. 632
(3) If the jury shall believe from the evidence that at the time
of the collision, which resulted in the injuries to the plaintiff
of which he complains in this action, E, as section master of
the defendant company on that part of said company's road
on which the collision occurred, was on the hand-car involved
in said collision, and in the control and management of the
same, and that the plaintiff was then and there on said hand-
car by permission of said E, and without knowing that it was
contrary to the rules of the defendant company for him to be
on said hand-car, and that the injuries sustained by the plain-
tiff in said collision resulted from the gross negligence of the
defendant company, or of its agents or any of them, whilst
the plaintiff was on said hand-car, then the court instructs
the jury that the defendant company is liable to the plaintiff
in this action for said injuries. 48
622. Servant may assume appliances to be safe. (1) An
employe or servant has the right to assume in the absence of
knowledge to the contrary, that the appliances which he is
called upon to use in the performance of his work, are reason-
ably safe, and if there are latent defects of which he has no
knowledge, or which are not obvious to him while using ordi-
nary care and observation, then he does not assume the risk
attendant thereon. 49
(2) A railroad company is required to use ordinary care in con-
structing and maintaining its roadway, switches, and appli-
ances in such a manner and condition that its servant can do
and perform all the labor and duties required of him with
reasonable safety, and a servant has a right to presume that
the company has in these respects done its duty, and a servant
does not assume risks flowing from his employer's negligence
in these duties, nor is there imposed upon him any duty of
watchfulness and care to discover defects in the roadway or
switches, when he has no notice of danger and when not so
glaring and apparent as to be open to the observation of ordi-
narily prudent men, and when not specially directed thereto
by his employer, and he will not be presumed to know of
48 Tyler v. Chesapeake & O. R. Doyle v. Missouri, &c. T. Co.
Co. 88 Va. 391, 13 S. E. 975. 140 Mo. 1, 41 S. W. 256.
633' SERVANT ASSUMING APPLIANCES SAFE. 623
danger therein when of such character that they might well
escape the observation of a prudent person. 50
(3) The plaintiff had a right to assume and rely and act upon
the assumption that the defendant had used reasonable care
in furnishing a reasonably safe scaffolding, staging or plat-
form, upon which he was required to pass in the duties of his
employment, if he was so required to pass; and that plaintiff
was not required to search or inspect such staging, scaffolding
or platform for defects therein that were not obvious and ap-
parent. 51
(4) If the jury believe from the evidence that it is dangerous
to thaw frozen dynamite by an open fire, and that the method
of thawing dynamite by an open fire is not reasonably safe,
and that such dangers could be avoided or greatly reduced by
the use of appliances and methods, which were within easy
reach of the master, and that the existence of such danger
and the means of avoiding it or greatly reducing it, were
known to the master, or by the exercise of reasonable care
and diligence on his part could have been known to him, that
it was a duty that the master owed his servants to adopt such
methods and use such appliances as were reasonably safe, and
any other methods which were not reasonably safe will not
excuse the master for injuries to the servant resulting there-
from. 52
623. Servant injured when not at his place. (1) If you find
from the evidence that the plaintiff was injured in the manner
as alleged, and that at the time of. the injury he was in the
employ of the defendant as night watchman, and that his du-
ties as such were performed at a different place from that at
which the injury occurred, then before plaintiff can recover,
he must show that he was properly at the place where the in-
jury occurred, and that his presence there was in the perform-
ance of a service for defendant. 53
(2) If the evidence should show that the .plaintiff was in-
jured by such explosion as alleged, yet if it also appears that
plaintiff at the time of such injury was away from the place at
so Pennsylvania Co. v. McCor- " Bertha Zinc Co. v. Martin, 93
mack, 131 Ind. 250, 30 N. E. 27. Va. 794, 22 S. E. 869.
si Doyle v. Missouri, K. & T. T. East L. &c. R. Co. v. Scott,
Co. 140 Mo. 1, 41 S. W. 257. 71 Tex. 705, 10 S. W. 298.
624 MASTER AND SERVANT. 634
which his duties required him to be (if you find that he was in
defendant's employment) and that he voluntarily placed himself
in a position of danger and in consequence thereof received the
injuries complained of, then he could not recover, no matter
whether such boiler was defective or the engineer in charge was
incompetent or not. 54
624. Brakeman injured while coupling Liability. (1) If
you believe from the evidence that the plaintiff while in the em-
ploy of the defendant as freight brakeman and in the discharge of
his duties as such brakeman, attempted to couple together two
freight cars on the defendant's road, and in so doing used that
care and caution for his own safety that the ordinarily careful
man would have exercised, and if you believe from the evidence
that the side-track where the cars were, was slanting and sid-
ling, and as a result thereof not a reasonably safe place to work,
then and in that case, if you believe, from the evidence, that
the plaintiff was injured as charged in the declaration as a
result thereof, and that the unsafe condition of the track, if
you believe, from the evidence, it was so unsafe, was caused
by the defendant not exercising reasonable care to provide a
reasonably safe track, it will be your duty to find for the plain-
tiff. 55
(2) If the jury believe from the evidence that at the time of the
injury to the plaintiff there was trouble with the couplings
which the plaintiff was attempting to make, and that the con-
ductor J, knew the fact, and that said conductor, ordered him
to make the coupling with his hand and was told by the plaintiff
that he would do so, but that he, the said conductor, must have
the train come back "very light"; that the conductor, instead
of signaling the engineer to come back gently, gave the signal
to come in the usual way when couplings are to be made, and
that the said injury occurred in consequence of his, the said
conductor's, giving the signal as he did, and not in giving the
signal to come back gently, they must find a verdict for the
plaintiff. 56
(3) The jury are instructed, as a matter of law, that it was the
54 East Line, &c. R. Co. v. Scott, SG Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Ampey,
71 Tex. 704, 10 S. W. 298. 93 Va. 112, 25 S. E. 226.
55 Malott v. Hood, 201 111. 206,
66 N. E. 247.
635 BRAKEMAN INJURED NEGLIGENCE SUBMITTED TO JURY. 625
duty of the plaintiff, before attempting to uncouple the car
in question, to use ordinary and reasonable care to ascertain
whether it was safe to do so or not while the train was in mo-
tion; and if the jury believe from the evidence, that it was
not safe for the plaintiff to uncouple said car at the time he
attempted it, and that the plaintiff, knew, or might by the exer-
cise of ordinary care have known, that it was not safe to attempt
it, then the plaintiff cannot recover, and the verdict should be
for the defendant. 57
625. Question of negligence submitted to jury. (1) If the
jury believe from the evidence that the main and side tracks of
the defendant's road at B were, on July 13, 1888, on a grade that
descended eastward and that defendant's division road master
at or about said first-named day, negligently caused the brake
staffs to be taken off of nine or more flat cars and the same to
be loaded with iron or steel rails and then set in upon said
B side track without any brakes set, or that could be set or
other reasonable or safe means or appliances for securing them
in their places, or for stopping them if put in motion, so that
said cars could not be safely coupled up or handled, and were
liable to move or be easily put in motion and to escape onto
defendant's other side or main track and obstruct the same,
and that in direct consequence of said negligent acts of defend-
ant's servants and agents (if they find them negligent) said cars
did escape from said side track onto defendant's main line
and collided -with train number twenty-seven, whereby plaintiff 's
husband, without any negligence on his part contributing thereto,
was killed, then the jury will find for plaintiff. 58
(2) In determining the questions of negligence in this case the
jury should take into consideration the conduct of both parties
at the time of the alleged injury, as disclosed by the evidence:
and if the jury believe, from the evidence, that the injury
complained of was caused by the negligence of the defendant's
servants, as described in the declaration, and if the jury further
believe, from the evidence in the case, that the plaintiff was
57 Chicago, &c. R. Co. v. Warner, ^s Browning v. Wabash W. R. Co.
108 111. 538, 553. Held error to re- 124 Mo. 55, 27 S. W. 644.
fuse this instruction under the evi-
dence.
62G MASTER AND SERVANT. 636
without fault, and was exercising ordinary care and prudence
in the discharge of his duties as conductor of the dummy train,
then the plaintiff is entitled to recover in this case such dam
ages as the jury may believe, from all the evidence, he is entitled
to receive, as compensation for all the damages received and
suffered by said plaintiff in the premises, provided the jury find,
from the evidence, that the plaintiff was injured as described
in the declaration. 59
626. Servant discharged for cause No liability. (1) If the
plaintiff without excuse conducted himself generally toward his
superior officer and coemployes in such a way as to interfere
with the harmonious transaction of business and to render it
injurious to the interest of the defendant to retain him in its
service, then the defendant had the right to discharge him and
he is not entitled to recover. 60
(2) Although a good cause for the discharge of the servant ex-
isted at the time of his discharge, and was not known to the
master at the time, nevertheless he may avail himself of this
cause as a defense to this action. 61
(3) If the plaintiff without excuse conducted himself generally
toward his superior officer and employes in such a way as to
interfere with the harmonious transaction of business and to
render it injurious to the interests of his employer, the defend-
ant, to retain him in its service, then the defendant had the
right to discharge him, and the plaintiff is not entitled to re-
cover; and although the defendant may not have known that a
good cause for discharge existed at the time of discharging the
plaintiff, yet if in fact such good cause actually did exist at
the time of such discharge, it is nevertheless a proper defense. 62
so Chicago & E. R. Co. v. Hoi- Co. v. Eynon, 95 Va. 153, 27 S.
land, 122 111. 470, 13 N. E. 145. This E. 935.
instruction does not authorize the 62 Equitable E. Asso. v. Fisher,
jury to give exemplary damages. 71 Md. 436, 18 Atl. 808; Crescent
so Equitable E. Asso. v. Fisher, Horse-Shoe & I. Co. v. Eynon, 95
71 Md. 436, 18 Atl. 808. Va. 153, 27 S. E 935.
6i Crescent Horse Shoe & Iron
CHAPTER XLIII.
NEGLIGENCE OF RAILROADS.
Sec.
627. Care required of plaintiff.
628. Care of plaintiff Exceptions.
629. The same Instructions for de-
fendant.
630. Care of defendant in running
trains.
631. Great care of defendant, when.
632. Contributory negligence, de-
fined.
633. Burden of proof as to contrib-
utory negligence.
634. Plaintiff's contributory negli-
gence.
635. Contributory negligence of de-
ceased.
636. Both parties guilty of negli-
gence.
637. The plaintiff not a trespasser,
638. Question of negligence sub-
mitted to jury.
639. Question of contributory neg-
ligence for the jury.
640. Speed of train, running at
high rate.
641. Failure to sound whistle or
ring bell.
642. Wrongfully blowing whistle.
643. Flagman at crossing Neces-
sity.
644. Railroad company violating
ordinances.
Sec.
645. Fire escaping from engine and
burning property.
646. Killing stock from failure to
fence track.
647. Essential facts necessary to
cover.
648. Accident No liability.
CASES OF DEATH.
649. Measure of damages to next
of kin.
650. Damages restricted to piecu-
niary loss.
651. Damages Instructions for de-
fendant.
MEASURE OF DAMAGES GENERALLY.
652. Consider permanency of inju-
ry, health, business, expense,
time.
653. Consider age, pain, mental an-
guish.
654. Considerations in mitigation
of damages.
CUSTOMS AND USAGES.
655. Customs, usages, rules relating
to railroad.
627. Care required of the plaintiff. (1) There is no law re-
quiring a man in the lawful use of a public street approaching a
railroad crossing, to stop his vehicle before crossing it, but he
is bound to use such care, under all the circumstances as a man
637
627 NEGLIGENCE OF RAILROADS. 638
of ordinary prudence would have exercised under like circum-
stances, and if you find from the evidence that H exercised
such care at the time of and preceding the injury, he was not
guilty of contributory negligence. 1
(2) The plaintiff was bound to use ordinary care under the cir-
cumstances shown to have existed in this case. He was bound
to approach the railroad carefully and to look and listen for
the approach of trains; and if the evidence shows that he did
do this with that degree of care that an ordinarily prudent person
would have exercised under all the circumstances and was unable
to hear or see the train approaching, until it was too late to
avoid the collision, then he is not guilty of contributory negli-
gence. 2
(3) It is the duty of every person when going upon or across a
railroad track to look in each direction to see if cars are ap-
proaching, and a failure to do so amounts to a want of ordi-
nary care. 3
(4) If it affirmatively appears from the evidence that the plain-
tiff did not use due care to discover the approach of cars upon
the defendant's track before he attempted to cross the same,
he cannot recover for any alleged negligence of the defendant. 4
(5) The deceased was bound to use the same care in protecting
himself that the defendant company was bound to use in seeing
that no person came to. injury by the management of its cars
and engines. That is, he was bound to use such care and pru-
dence as a reasonable, prudent man would use in protecting him-
self against any injury. It was his duty to use his senses, in
approaching the railway track, to discover whether or not there
was an approaching train or locomotive which might injure him ;
to make such reasonable use. of his eyes and other senses as a
reasonable and prudent man would make, and if by the use of
his senses he could have avoided the danger, then he cannot
recover from the company. But if he exercised such care as a
reasonable and prudent man would exercise, and if the defendant
was guilty of neglect in the running of the engine and the de-
1 Pennsylvania Co. v. Horton, 132 a Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Goddard,
Ind. 194, 31 N. E. 45. ' 72 111. 569: Chicago, &c. R. Co. v.
2 Pennsylvania Co. v. Horton, 132 Hatch, 79 111. 137.
Ind. 194, 31 N. E. 45. 4 Indianapolis St. R. Co. v. Tay-
lor, 158 Ind. 279, 63 N. E. 456.
639 CARE REQUIRED OF PLAINTIFF. 628
ceased was killed by reason of that, then the company is re-
sponsible. 5
(6) If you shall find from the evidence that the plaintiff, at the
time he was injured was walking up the main track of the rail-
road and was not using the county road as a crossing to reach the
caboose, the fact no signal was given by the engineer in charge of
the engine, of the moving of the engine and cars attached, toward
the crossing, would not be such neglect as would render the
company liable for the injury, unless the conductor or engineer
in charge of the train or engine knew, at the time the engine
was being backed, that the plaintiff was on the track and they
then failed to give him warning by signal or otherwise of the
approach of the train in the same direction on the same track. 8
(7) Evidence of the general habit of M when crossing the rail-
roads may be taken into consideration by the jury together with
all the facts and circumstances in evidence in determining the de-
gree of care used by the deceased while attempting to cross
the defendant's railroad track at the time of the killing, and
that it was not necessary that the plaintiff should show by an
eye-witness as to M's care and caution exercised at the time of
the killing in order to entitle the plaintiff to recover, provided
you believe from the evidence and all the facts and circum-
stances in evidence that they were exercising ordinary care
and caution for their own safety at the time of attempting to
cross said railroad track. 7
(8) The fault or negligence on the part of plaintiff which
would preclude him from recovery, if there was negligence both
upon his part and upon the part of the company, its agents or
employes, is not the least degree of fault or negligence, but
it must be such a degree as to amount to a want of ordinary
care on his part, under all the circumstances, at the time of
the injury. 8
628. Care of plaintiff Exceptions. (1) The general rule
that a person in crossing over a railroad track at a public crossing
must use his senses as to sight, is subject to the following excep 7
tion: That where the view of the track is obstructed, and
s Railway Co. v. Schneider, 45 f McNulta v. Lockridge, 137 111.
Ohio St. 688. 275, 27 N. E. 452.
s Railroad Co. v. Depew, 40 Ohio Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Carr
St. 124. (Tex. Cv. App.), 42 S. W. 126.
629 NEGLIGENCE OF RAILROADS. 640
hence, where the injured party, not being able to see, is obliged
to act upon his judgment at the time; in other words, where
compliance with the rule is -impracticable or unavailing.
(2) If the jury believe from the evidence that the defendants,
at the crossing where the accident occurred have suffered to re-
main on their land high embankments on the side of the road or
street, so as to exclude to a traveler a view of their track when
about to go upon said track, the traveler is excused from look-
ing, and the failure to look cannot be imputed to him as negli-
gence, but it throws upon him additional care in listening, and
to take such other precautions for his safety as may be reason-
ably necessary. 10
629. The same Instructions for defendant. (1) The plain-
tiff was bound to use reasonable care on her part to avoid injury
to which the defendant's negligence, if any, may have exposed
her. Reasonable care may be defined to be that degree of care
which a prudent person would have exercised under the circum-
stances in which the plaintiff found herself at that time. By
this test, was the plaintiff free from negligence herself? Might
she, situated as she was, by the exercise of ordinary prudence
have avoided injury to herself notwithstanding the negligent
conduct of the defendant, if any? If so, she cannot recover
if she failed to exercise such care. In considering this ques-
tion, all the evidence bearing upon the points indicated in the
foregoing instruction, as to the defendant's negligence, is proper
to be considered also. If in the light of all these circumstances
in evidence, a reasonably prudent person, exercising her facul-
ties of sight and hearing, would have seen or heard and avoided
the danger; or if the danger was apparent and easily avoidable
to a person exercising reasonable care, as before defined, the
plaintiff cannot recover, if she negligently failed to avoid it.
and must suffer the conseqeunces of her own carelessness. 11
(2) The fact that the train was behind time, and was running
faster than its usual speed, at the crossing to make up time, did
not excuse the plaintiff or her father from exercising the care and
Kimball v. Friend's Adm. 95 " Prothero v. Citizens' St. R. Co.
Va. 126, 27 S. E. 901. 134 Ind. 435, 33 N. E. 765.
10 Kimball v. Friend, 95 Va. 128,
27 S. E. 901.
641 CARE REQUIRED OF PLAINTIFF. . 629
caution required of them, when the train was on time and run-
ning at its usual rate of speed at that crossing. 12
(3) If there were any obstructions to the sight or hearing in
the direction of the approaching train, as the plaintiff and her
father neared the crossing, the obstructions required increased
care on the part of the plaintiff and her father on approaching
the crossing. In such case the care must be in proportion to
the increase of the danger that may come from the use of the
highway at such a place. 13
(4) The rights and duties of persons occupying the public
streets are reciprocal, and although it is the duty of a street
car company operating its cars upon such a street to use due
and ordinary care for the safety of persons using such street,
yet it is also the duty of such persons to use the same with
due and ordinary care for their own safety ; and if you believe,
from the evidence, that the plaintiff in this case failed to use
the care which a reasonably prudent person would have used
under similar circumstances, to avoid the injury for which this,
suit is brought, then he cannot recover. 14
(5) The issues you are sworn to try in this case are as fol-
lows: Was the electric car which collided with the wagon in
question carelessly and improperly driven or managed by the
servant or servants of the defendant? Was the said electric car
traveling at an unnecessarily high or dangerous rate of speed?
Did the servant or servants of the defendant negligently fail to
ring a gong or bell at the time and place in question ? Did the ser-
vant or servants of the defendant in charge of said car
know that W was in a position of peril, in time to have
stopped the car, in time to have avoided the collision by the
use of reasonable care on their part? Could the servant or
servants of the defendant in charge of. the electric car, by the
use of reasonable care have seen that W was in a position of
peril in time to have stopped the said car before the collision?
Was W at and just before the time of the collision, using or-
dinary care and caution for his own safety? If you conclude
12 Cincinnati, &c. R. Co. v. How- N. E. 892. See Kimball v. Friend's
ard, 124 Ind. 287, 24 N. E. 892. Adm'r, 95 Va. 126, 27 S. E. 901.
is Cincinnati, I. & St. L. & C. i* North Chicago, &.C. R. Co. v.
R. Co. v. Howard, 124 Ind. 290, 24 Penser, 190 111. 67, 72, 60 N. E. 78.
629 NEGLIGENCE OF RAILROADS. 64
that the greater weight of the evidence does not show that W
was using such care and caution for his own safety you need
not concern yourselves with the other issues, because in no
event can the plaintiff be entitled to recover a verdict unless
it has been shown by the greater weight of the evidence that
such care and caution was used by W. If you do find from
the greater weight of the evidence that such care and caution
was used by W, you will examine the evidence bearing upon the
other issues, and if you do not find the greater weight of the
evidence, taken as a whole, will warrant you in answering one
or more of them in the affirmative, you should find the de-
fendant not guilty. 15
(6) If the jury believe from the evidence that ordinary care
on the part of the deceased, for his own safety required him,
before driving to or upon the track parallel with the track upon
which he had been driving, at the time and place in question
and under all the circumstances in evidence, to look and ascer-
tain whether or not a car was approaching along the north
bound track, and not to drive upon said track without so looking,
and if the jury believe from the evidence that W, if he had looked,
could by the exercise of ordinary care have ascertained whether or
not a car was approaching along the said north-bound track, and
if the jury further believe from the evidence that W did not so
look and ascertain whether or not the ear was so approaching and
that he was injured in consequence and because of his failure, if he
did so fail to look anil ascertain, then the jury should find the de-
fendant not guilty. 16
(7) It was the duty of the said R to have exercised such a de-
gree of care and prudence in crossing said tracks, and in looking
and listening, as an ordinarily careful and prudent boy of like age
and intelligence would have exercised under like circumstances.
And if you believe from the evidence that the said R failed to ex-
ercise such a degree of care and prudence in going on or crossing
the tracks, then you should find that he was guilty of negligence. 17
(8) Where a railway company maintains an electric gong at its
crossing as a precaution to protect persons crossing, the traveler is
is Chicago C. R. Co. v. O'Donnell " Ruschenberg v. Southern Elec.
208 111. 276. R. Co. 161 Mo. 86, 61 S. W. 626.
is Chicago C. R. Co. v. O'Donnell,
208 111. 275.
643 CARE IN RUNNING TRAINS. ,630
not bound to exercise so high a degree of care as he would except
for such precautions on the part of the company, still he is, never-
theless, bound to use his senses and do all which a prudent man.
under the circumstances would do to avoid the danger. 18
630. Care of the defendant in running trains. (1) It was the
duty of the defendant's employees, who were controlling the en r
gine and train of cars on the morning of October 19, 1892, to
have exercised ordinary care and diligence in keeping a look-,
out to avoid injuries of the said F and to warn him of ap-
proaching danger, as well as to have exercised great care and
diligence in avoiding the injury to him after having seen him in
danger. 19
(2) If the jury find from the evidence that the defendant
was at the time of the happening of the alleged injury, of which
the plaintiff complains, the owner of a railroad with several
tracks running through the city of C and across the streets
thereof, and was engaged in moving trains propelled by steam
thereon, then, in the management of said trains, the defendant
was bound to use such care and caution to prevent injury to
persons traveling along said streets, where they are crossed by
said tracks, as prudent and discreet persons would have used and
exercised under like circumstances'; and if they find that on the
night of the twenty-seventh of July, 1879, the plaintiff, while cross-
ing the railroad of the defendant on W street, in said city, was
run over by the cars of the defendant and injured, as stated in
the testimony, and that such injury was caused by the negli-
gence of the defendant or its agents in charge of said cars, and
that, by the exercise of ordinary care and caution by the
defendant or its agents, the accident causing such injury could
have been avoided, the plaintiff is entitled to recover, if the
jury further find that the plaintiff was, at the time of the acci-
dent, using due care and caution on his part. 20
(3) The degree of care to be exercised by a railroad company
must necessarily depend upon the location of the track and the
circumstances of the case. In a place not frequented by the
public, either by right or permission, expressed or implied, of the
is Kimball v. Friend, 95 Va. 130, 20 Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Kean
27 S. E. 901. 65 Md. 396, 5 Atl. 325.
19 Baltimore & O. R. Co. v.
Few's Ex'r, 94 Va. 83, 26 S. E. 406.
G30 NEGLIGENCE OF RAILROADS. 644
company, and in locations where the people are not constantly
passing about, and where they cannot reasonably be expected to
be, persons in charge of a train are not required by law to be on
the lookout for them. In such cases, the company is entitled to the
exclusive use of the tracks, and the persons in charge of the
train are only required to avoid injury to them, if they can do
so upon becoming aware of their peril. But when the place
is within the city limits, in the yard of a company, or yard used
by several companies together, or with tracks in close proxim-
ity to each other, and employees of companies whose tracks
are in close proximity are engaged jn the discharge of their
duties, the safety of human life requires a different rule ; and
in this case, if you find that deceased was an employee of one
of said roads, in the line of his duty; and the employees of de-
fendant were not on the lookout for such persons, and had their
engine in possession or under the control of an incompetent
person, if it was, and running at a dangerous and unlawful
rate of speed, if it was, and the injury was inflicted by reason
of the want of proper care on the part of the defendant, if it
was, the defendant would be guilty of negligence. 21
(4) If the jury believe from the evidence, and from a view of
the place where the accident is alleged to have taken place, that
the view of an approaching train was obstructed by an embank-
ment or otherwise, and that ordinary care would have required
other precautions than those employed, and that the defendants
did not use such other precautions, then they must conclude that
the defendants were guilty of negligence; and if they believe
further from the evidence that F, the plaintiff, did not know
that the engine was nearing the crossing, so as to endanger his
passing over it, but acted as an ordinarily prudent man would
act under the circumstances, they must find for the plaintiff
such damages as are proper, not exceeding the amount claimed
in the declaration. 22
(5) It was the duty of the defendants servants in the run-
ning and handling of the said east-bound engine and train
of cars, to have exercised that degree of care and prudence
which an ordinarily careful and prudent person engaged in like
21 McMarshall v. Chicago, &c. R. 22 Kimball v. Friend, 95 Va. 1*29,
Co. 80 Iowa, 759, 45 N. W. 1065. 27 S. E. 901.
645 CARE IN RUNNING TRAINS. 630
business, would have exercised under like circumstances; and
a failure to exercise such a degree of care and prudence would
render the defendant guilty of negligence in that respect. 28
(6) If you find that the defendant, for an unreasonable and
unnecessary length of time, kept and maintained its crossing
of the highway in an unsafe condition, then it Was bound,
in operating its railroad, to exercise proper care to prevent
the injury of a person placed in danger by that wrong, in his
lawful use of the highway. 24
(7) It was the duty of the defendant to construct and main-
tain its tracks in the street in such a way as to be reasonably
safe to travel thereon by means of a buggy or other vehicle
drawn by the ordinary horse having the ordinary disposition,
allowing for the ordinary incidents of caprice or fright, and
driven by an ordinarily careful and prudent person. 25
(8) You are to consider that the necessity of running rail-
road cars with regularity and uniformity is not a matter of
convenience merely. The business cannot be done at all,
unless calculations are made upon the movements of trains.
The risks attending upon a disturbance of that regularity are
risks of human life, and not mere business delays. It would
be in the highest degree dangerous to make the movements of
the cars vary with the wind and weather. 26
(9) The engineer and fireman in managing the train are at
liberty, and it is their duty to run their train as nearly on time
as possible; and in case of a way freight, whose length of stops
at the stations is necessarily irregular, they are not to be
considered negligent by their use of natural and reasonable means
to make time. 27
(10) The defendant railway had the right to run its trains over
its road at any hour of the day or night, and the fact that the
train in question was an extra train, or not running on schedule
time, could not constitute negligence. 28
23 Sohmitt v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. 26 Hagan v. Chicago, D. & C. G.
20 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 219. T. J. R. Co. 86 Mich. 624, 49 N.
24 Lake S. & M. S. R. Co. v. Me- W. 509.
Intosh, 140 Ind. 271, 38 N. E. 476. 27 Hagan v. Chicago, &c. R. Co.
25 Gray v. Washington W. P. Co. 86 Mich. 624, 49 N. W. 509.
30 Wash. 665, 71 Pac. 207. 28 Graybill v. Chicago, &c. R. Co.
112 Iowa, 743, 84 N. W. 946.
631 XEGLIGEXCE OF RAILROADS. 646
631. Great care required of defendant in running trains.
(1) If the season at which the fire occurred was unusually dry,
the railroad company, defendant, was bound by law to take extra
precautions against fire; and if it did not do so, this fact may
be considered in determining the question of negligence. 29
(2) A railroad company, running and operating its trains on the
streets of a city, must use greater care and diligence to prevent
injuries to persons and property, than is required of them in run-
ning and operating their trains in less frequented and populous lo-
calities; and so, in certain localities in the town, greater precau-
tions may be necessary than in others; for example, if the train
is being carried around a corner, objects or persons on the other
side of which are hidden from view, it is required of them to
resort to special precautions, depending upon the particular
locality and the circumstances to avoid accidents, and any neg-
lect of such precautions as are proper, under the peculiar sur-
roundings and circumstances of the locality, constitutes negli-
gence, for which the railroad company is liable in damages,
unless the plaintiff's intestate, by the exercise of ordinary care
on his part, could have prevented the accident; and courts do
not hold a person who is faced with a sudden danger to the
same degree of judgment and presence of mind as would other-
wise be required of him ; and the burden of proof is on the rail-
road company to prove such absence of ordinary care on the
part of the plaintiff's intestate. 30
(3) A railroad company, operating its trains on the thorough-
fare of a village, must use greater care than in less frequented
localities; and any neglect of any precautions proper in the pecu-
liar circumstances of the locality, constitutes negligence. 31
(4) If the jury believe, from the evidence that the approach to
the crossing where F as killed was extra dangerous, then it was
the duty of the defendant to use extra care to prevent accidents to
travelers, and to use reasonable precautions to warn and protect
travelers against approaching trains, the degree of care required
2 Pittsburg, C. & St. L. R. Co. dianapolis Street R. Co. v. Taylor
v. Noel, 77 Ind. 116. Held proper (Ind.), 72 N. E. (Decided Jan. 3,
in the absence of a request for 1905.)
more specific instruction. 31 Florida, C. & P. R. Co. v. Fox-
so Kimball v. Friend, 95 Va. 127, worth, 41 Fla. 8, 25 So. 338. See
27 S. E. 901; Cleveland, &c. R. Co. Note 30.
v. Miles, 162 Ind. 646. But see In-
647 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE DEFINED. 633
of the defendants, as well as the plaintiff, being measured by the
dangerous character of the crossing. And, as to whether such rea-
sonable precautions were used or adopted by defendants, is a
question for the jury to determine. 32
(5) You will recollect that this railroad was on the public
street, and prima facie all persons have a right to be on the
street for all lawful purposes ; and the fact that this is a pub-
lic street and that all persons, old and young, adults and infants,
have a right to be on the same, ought to impose upon the driver
and conductor of a street car vigilance in looking out for dangers
and guarding against accidents and injuries to persons and
things. 33
632. Contributory negligence denned. (1) Contributory
negligence is such negligence on the part of the plaintiff as helped
to produce the injuries complained of, and if the jury find, from
a preponderance of all the evidence in the case, that the plaintiff
was guilty of any negligence that helped to bring about or pro-
duce the injuries complained of, then, and in that case, the
plaintiff cannot recover. 34
(2) The basis of this action is "negligence," which is defined by
the law to be the omitting to do something that a reasonably pru-
dent person would do, or the doing of something that such person
would not do. Under the circumstances of this case, and as applied
to the case, if you find from the evidence that the defendant, by
its employes, has omitted to do something that a reasonably pru-
dent person would do or has. done something that such person
would not do, you would be warranted in finding that the defend-
ant is guilty of negligence ; and if you find that H or W or the dri-
ver of the vehicle in question, has done something, or omitted to do
something which directly contributed to the collision and injury,
then you will be warranted in finding such person or persons
guilty of contributory negligence. 35
(3) Contributory negligence is the failure to use that ordinary
care and diligence that would be expected of an ordinarily pru-
dent person under like circumstances to avoid injury. Thus, even
3-' Kimball v. Friend, 95 Va. 128, 34 Baltimore & O. S. R. Co. v.
27 S. E. 901. Young, 153 Ind. 170, 54 N. E. 791.
33 Etherington v. Prospect, &c. R. ^ Hart v. Cedar Rapids, &c. R.
Co. 88 N 7 . Y. 642. Co. 109 Iowa, 637, 80 N. W. 662.
633 NEGLIGENCE OF RAILROADS. 648
though you may find that the defendant was negligent, still, if
you further believe from the evidence that the plaintiff B did not
exercise that ordinary care and diligence to prevent injury to him-
self that would be expected of an ordinarily prudent person, situ-
ated as he was, you should find for the defendant. 36
(4) Contributory negligence is such negligence on the part of
,the plaintiff as helped to produce the injuries complained of,
1 and if the jury find from a preponderance of the evidence in the
case, that the plaintiff was guiltyof any negligence that helped to
bring about or produce the injuries complained of, then, in that
case, the plaintiff cannot recover. To state the matter in other
words, contributory negligence is the failure to use that ordi-
nary care and diligence that would be expected of an ordinarily
prudent person under like circumstances to avoid injury. Thus,
even though you may find that the defendant was negligent, still,
if you further believe from the evidence that the plaintiff did not
exercise that ordinary care and diligence to prevent injury to him-
self that would be expected of an ordinarily prudent person, situ-
ated as he was, you should find for the defendant. 37
633. Burden of proof as to contributory negligence. (1) The
burden is on the plaintiff to show, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that she and her father vigilantly used their eyes and
ears to ascertain if a train of cars was approaching, and if this
has not been shown to you by a preponderance of the evidence,
the plaintiff canot recover. 38
(2) When a person crossing a railroad track is injured by col-
lision with a train, the fault is prima facie his own, and he must
show affirmatively that his fault or negligence did not contribute
to the injury before he is entitled to recover for such injury. 89
(3) To entitle the plaintiff to recover under either the first or
36 Galveston, H. & S. R. Co. v. Co. v. Howard, 124 Ind. 287, 24 N. E.
Bonnett (Tex. Cv. App.), 38 S. W. 892.
813. 39 Cincinnati, I. St. L. & C. R. Co.
37 Baltimore & O. S. R. Co. v. v. Howard, 124 Ind. 284, 24 N. E.
Young, 153 Ind. 170, 54 N. E. 791; 892. This is no longer the law in
Galveston, H. & S. R. Co. v. Ben- Indiana, the rule as to burden of
nett (Tex. Cv. App.), 38 S. W. 813. proof having been changed by st-at-
ss Cincinnati, I. St. L. & C. R. ute, Southern Indiana R. Co. v. Pey-
ton, 157 Ind. 690, 61 N. E. 722.
649 BURDEN OF PROOF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 63$
third paragraphs of the complaint it must appear from a fair pre-
ponderance of the evidence not only that the injuries complained
of were caused by the negligent acts or some of the negligent acts
of the agents, servants or employes of the defendant, but that he
was himself free from all negligence contributing directly to
said injuries. 40
(4) The plaintiff must show that the negligence of the defend-
ant, or its employes, caused the injury complained of, and that
the plaintiff in no way directly contributed to the injury. 41
(5) A traveler approaching a railroad crossing must look and
listen ; that it is not sufficient to look in one direction, but that he is-
under the duty to look in directions from which engines and
cars may approach, and that it is his duty to exercise a higher
degree of care where the crossing is dangerous, than where
it is not, and that if you believe from the evidence that the
plaintiff's intestate in this case could have seen the engine,
with which he collided, approaching, by looking, and so have
avoided the collision, the presumption is that he did not look,,
or, if he did look, did not heed what he saw; and the burden of
proof in such case is upon the plaintiff to show that he did look
and listen; and if the jury believe from the evidence that he
omitted to look and listen, they must find a verdict for the
defendant receivers, unless they further believe that, after per-
ceiving the negligence of the plaintiff's intestate, they could
have avoided the effect of such negligence by the exercise of
ordinary care. 42
(6) The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that he vigilantly used his eyes
and ears to ascertain if a train of cars was approaching, and if
. this has not been shown to you by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, the plaintiff cannot recover. And the plaintiff must also
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the negligence
of the defendant or its servants or employes caused the injury
> Chicago, St. P. & R. Co. v. *- Kimball v. Friend, 95 Va, 131,
Spilker, 134 Ind. 401, 33 N. E. 280, 27 S. E. 901. The rule as to burden
34 N. E. 218. See note 39. of proof has been changed in Indi-
41 Locke v. S. C. & P. R. Co. ana. See note 30.
46 Iowa, 113. See Note 39.
C34 NEGLIGENCE OF RAILROADS. 650
complained of, and that he, the plaintiff, in no way directly con-
tributed to the injury. 43
634 Plaintiff's contributory negligence. (1) To entitle the
plaintiff to recover in this action, the jury must find from the
evidence that the accident or injury complained of was caused
altogether and entirely by the negligence and want of due care
by the defendant or its servants and employes, and that the
plaintiff did not directly contribute to the said accident by neg-
ligence or by want of prudence and ordinary care on her part. 44
(2) One who is injured by the mere negligence of another can-
not recover any compensation for his injury, if he, by his own
ordinary negligence or willful wrong, contributed to produce
the injury of which he complains ; so that, but for his concurring
and co-operating fault, the injury would not have happened
to him, except when the direct cause of the injury is the omis-
sion of the other party, after becoming aware of the injured
party's negligence to use a proper degree of care to avoid the
consequences of such negligence. 45
(3) Ordinary prudence and common sense suggest to every one
who is aware of the character and operation of electric street cars
that it is dangerous to pass in front of them at a short distance
while in motion, and one who does so without looking and lis-
tening, when, if he had looked and listened, he could have discov-
ered the car, is guilty of contributory negligence, and cannot re-
cover ; and if you find that had the plaintiff looked and listened he
could have discovered the car, and thus have avoided the ac-
ident and injury, and that he failed to do so, your verdict must be
for the defendant. 46
(4) If the plaintiff thought that he had time to cross the track
of the defendant if he was attempting to cross the track before
the car of the defendant would reach him, and did not have
sufficient time to do so, then it was error in judgment on the
Cincinnati, I. St. L. & C. R. ** Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Ow-
Co. v. Howard, 124 Ind. 287, 24 N. ings, 65 Md. 505, 5 Atl. 329.
E. 892; Locke v. S. C. & P. R. Co. ^ Cooper v. Central R. Co. 44
46 Iowa, 113; Baltimore & O. R. Co. Iowa, 138.
v. Owings, 65 Md. 505, 5 Atl. 329; *e Traver v. Spokane St. R. Co.
Cooper v. Central R. Co. 44 Iowa, 25 Wash. 244, 65 Pac. 284; Union
138. The rule as to burden of proof Traction Co. v. Vandercook, 32 Ind.
has been changed in Indiana. See App. 621.
note 39.
651 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 634
part of plaintiff, and he cannot recover, and your verdict should
be for the defendant. 47
(5) The defendant company, at the place where the accident
happened and the collision occurred, had the preference and the
superior right to the use of the track ; and that it was the duty of
the plaintiff not to obstruct the use of said track or the opera-
tion of the cars thereon ; and it was his duty to turn out to allow
such street car to pass, if he was driving upon the track ; and it
was his duty to remain off the track, and not attempt to cross
the same in front of a moving car, except at a safe distance there-
from ; and a failure in either of these respects constitutes contrib-
utory negligence and defeats recovery, and entitles defendant to
a verdict. 48
(6) If plaintiff was guilty of any act of negligence which di-
rectly contributed to his injury, or was guilty of any lack of or-
dinary care on his part, whether the act be an active one or an
omission to do what he ought to have done under the circumstan-
ces, and such lack of care, act or omission contributed to the acci-
dent, and without which the accident would not have occurred,
then you cannot go further and apportion the accident cr injury,
but the plaintiff's contributory negligence in such case defeats
recovery, and your verdict must be for the defendant. 49
(7) Notwithstanding you should find that the defendant was
guilty of negligence in the operation of its car, yet, if you further
find that the accident or the injury to the plaintiff would not
have happened, except for the negligence or failure to use
ordinary care unon the part of the plaintiff, then your ver-
dict must be for the defendant. 50
(8) Before you can find for the plaintiff, therefore, you must
find the defendant to have been guilty of negligence as alleged
in the complaint. Another principle of law proper to be men-
tioned in this connection is, that if the plaintiff was himself
guilty of negligence which materially contributed to the injury
complained of, he cannot recover. 51
47 Traver v. Spokane St. R. Co. so Traver v. Spokane St. R. Co.
25 Wash. 244, 25 Pac. 284. 25 Wash. 243, 25 Pac. 284.
43 Traver v. Spokane St. R. Co. si Traver v. Spokane St. R. Co.
25 Wash. 243, 25 Pac. 284. 25 Wash. 239, 25 Pac. 284.
*9 Traver v. Spokane St. R. Co.
25 Wash. 243, 25 Pac. 284.
635 NEGLIGENCE OF RAILROADS. 652
, 635. Contributory negligence .of deceased. (1) This case
presents three questions of fact, among others, for the considera-
tion of the jury: First was the death of A caused by injuries re-,
ceived by her on the fifth day of August, 1891, and brought about
by the locomotive and cars of the defendant coming in collision
with the vehicle in which the deceased was riding on said day
as alleged in the complaint? second, were such injuries to said
deceased produced by the negligence of the defendant, its ser-
vants or employes? third, did the negligence of the deceased
woman contribute to such injuries and death ? 52
(2) If the train was backing under the shed without display-
ing the light from the front end of the leading car and without
having a flagman stationed thereon, and was backing without due
care, and the intestate knew it and placed himself in a position
of danger, his negligence was the proximate cause of the in-
jury, he had the last chance to avoid the injury, and this
being so, he, and not the defendant, would be responsible for
his death. On the contrary, if plaintiff was standing on or near
the track, he was not called upon to look out for a backing train
which displayed no light and had no flagman, if you should so
find, on the front of the leading car, for it was th duty of the
defendant, as before explained, to display the light and have a
flagman at his post, he not being bound to expect a violation of
duty. If, therefore, plaintiff was standing on or near the track,
and the defendant backed its train under the shed without the
light on the front end of the leading car, or in a conspicuous
place thereon, or without a flagman thereon, and if the jury
should further find that P did not discover the train in time
to escape, then the defendant was negligent and, such negli-
gence was the cause of the injury. 53
(3) If the deceased was hard of hearing and walked on the de-
fendant 's track without looking back, or having looked back, still
continued to walk on the track, such conduct on his part was
gross negligence, and makes out a case of contributory negligence
against him which will defeat all rights of recovery in this action
unless it is made to appear to the satisfaction of the jury that at.
52 Lake S. & M. S. R. Co. v. Me- 53 Purnell v. Raleigh & I. R. Co.
Intosh, 140 Ind. 263, 38 N. E. 476; 122 N. Car. 839, 29 S. E. 953.
Indianapolis, &c. R. Co. v. Stout,
53 Ind. -143.
'653 BOTH PARTIES NEGLIGENT. 636
and about the time of the near approach of the train, he used the
diligence and care necessary to extricate himself from the peril
in which he had placed himself by his own voluntary act. 64
(4) The defendant's servants in charge of the engine which
struck the deceased had the right to assume that he was rational,
and would exercise care and caution and keep himself out of dan-
ger until they saw something in his conduct which would be incon-
sistent with such assumption. If he was walking on a line par-
allel with the track, and so far removed therefrom as to be free
from danger of collision, they had the right to assume that he
would remain at such safe distance, until he manifested a purpose
to place himself in dangerous proximity to it. 55
(5) If the jury believe from the evidence that L the husband
of the plaintiff, was guilty of any negligence which contributed
to the injury resulting in his death, then the jury must find a ver-
dict for the defendant, although they may further believe that
the plaintiff's husband was killed by the negligence of the de-
fendant as charged in the petition. 56
(6) If the jury believe from the evidence, that the deceased,
might, in the exercise of ordinary care, have seen the
danger, and avoided it, and that he did not do so, and that
the omission of the deceased to do so contributed to the result,
then he was guilty of such negligence as will prevent a recovery,
unless the injury was produced by willful or intentional acts
of the defendant or its agents. 57
(7) If the jury believe from the evidence that the injury
and death of plaintiff's intestate was due to the failure of de-
ceased to look back while on the track, and the failure of the ser-
vants of defendant to keep a proper lookout ahead, and that
both these causes combined caused the death of plaintiff's intes-
tate, then it is the duty of the jury to find a verdict for the de-
fendant. 58
636. Both parties guilty of negligence. (1) If you believe,
from the evidence in this case, that both the plaintiff and the
s* Frazer v. South & N. A. R. Co. 57 Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. God-
81 Ala. 190, 1 So. 85. dard, 72 111. 569.
ss Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. 38 Frazer v. South & N. A. R. Co.
Austin, 69 111. 429. 81 Ala. 190, 1 So. 85.
5 Le May v. Missouri Pac. R. Co.
105 Mo. 370, 16 S. W. 1049.
636 NEGLIGENCE OF RAILROADS. 654*
agents and servants of the defendant were guilty of gross negli-
gence contributing to the injury complained of in this case,
then your verdict should be for the defendant. 59
(2) If the injuries complained of were the joint result of plain-
tiff's carelessness and lack of vigilance for his own safety, and
of the failure of defendant's servants in charge of said train to
,give signals of 'approach to said crossing, then the verdict must
be for the defendant. If both parties were careless, neither can
recover from the other on account thereof. 60
(3) If the injuries complained of were the joint result of the
plaintiff's carelessness and lack of vigilance for his own safety,
and of the failure of the defendant's servants in charge of the
train to give signals of approach to the crossing in question,
then the plaintiff cannot recover, If you believe from the evi-
dence in this case that both the plaintiff and defendant's agents
or servants were guilty of negligence contributing to the injury
complained of, then your verdict should be for the defendant. 61
(4) It is the duty of a traveler approaching a crossing on grade
over a railroad track to look and listen, and for this purpose it
is his duty to stop before crossing the track, if the circumstances
are such as to make it necessary to stop in order to properly look
and listen; and if the jury believe from the evidence that the
plaintiff's intestate was killed by the engine of defendant
while attempting to cross the track of said company, and that at
the time he was so killed he was riding upon a bicycle, and that
he approached the crossing over said tracks through a cut which
obstructs the view of the track until the plaintiff got within a
reasonably short distance of the track; and that the plaintiff
could not, without stopping his bicycle before reaching the cross-
ing, look carefully up and down the track, and if they believe
from the evidence that the plaintiff's intestate did not stop when
in view of the track and listen and look in both directions, then
the jury are instructed that he was guilty of contributory neg-
ligence, and cannot recover in this action, though the jury may
59 Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. ei Kennedy v. Hannibal & St. J
'Dunleavy, 129 111. 150, 22 N. E. 15. R. Co. 105 Mo. 273, 15 S. W. 983, 16
GO Kennedy v. Hannibal & St. J. S. W. 837; Chicago & N. W. R. Co.
R. Co. 105 Mo. 273, 15 S. W. 983, 16 v. Dunleavy, 129 111. 150, 22 N. E.
S. W. 837. 15.
655 PERSON NOT TRESPASSER. 637
believe that the defendant may have, also, been guilty of negli-
gence. 62
(5) The presence of railroad tracks is a proclamation of
danger to any one attempting to cross them, and that it
is not only the duty of the person about to cross railroad tracks
to vigilantly use his eyes and ears and to look in every direc-
tion, and to listen to make sure that the crossing is safe, and that
this duty is not performed by plaintiff's looking from a point
where the view is obstructed, but the duty is a continuous one,
and must be performed at any point, and if the plaintiff fails
to perform this duty, and by performing it might have seen
the danger in time to avoid it, such failure is contributory neg-
ligence on the plaintiff's part, and she cannot recover, notwith-
standing the jury may believe from the evidence that the de-
fendant is also guilty of negligence, unless the defendant's
agents might, after perceiving the negligence of the plaintiff,
have stopped the engine in time to avert the accident. 63
(6) It is not sufficient to enable the plaintiff to recover, if it ap-
pears that he stopped at a distance of two hundred feet from the
crossing, and being then unable, on account of a snow squall,
to see the train which he had heard whistle, started his horses
and drove at a trot onto the track, without again looking for
the train. If, under such circumstances, he drove onto the track
and injury ensued, he' was guilty of contributory negligence
and cannot recover, even though the jury find that the defend-
ant was also negligent in not giving proper signals for the cross-
ing. 64
637. The plaintiff not a trespasser. (1) If you shall find
that the defendant company and another company were each
rightfully in the joint use and occupation of the transfer track,
and the father of the plaintiff then in -the employment of the
other company, duly authorized, was engaged in repairing a car
upon the track; that the plaintiff brought to him his dinner,
and that while engaged in repairing said car, shortly there-,
after, the father requested the plaintiff child to render him
es Kimball v. Friend, 95 Va. 132, 64 Grand T. R. Co. v. Cobleigh,
27 S. E. 901. 78 Fed. 786.
es Atlantic & D. R. Co. v. Iron-
monger, 95 Va. 628, 29 S. E. 319.
See, Chicago, &c. R. Co. v. Hatch,
79 111. 137.
637 NEGLIGENCE OF RAILROADS. 656
necessary temporary assistance to enable him, the said father,
to perform the work of repairing the car, if he was thus
authorized to employ the plaintiff, then the plaintiff was right-
fully upon the track. 00
(2) The jury are the triers of the fact as to whether or not D
was a licensee on the defendant 's right of way. If the jury believe
from the evidence that the deceased D, when he received his in-
juries was traveling along the foot path or way over defendant's
land, which had been long used as a walkway leading to a cross-
ing over defendant's track by himself and certain other individ-
uals, occupants of an adjoining lot or close, or by the general
public, with the knowledge of the defendant company and with-
out any objection on its part, then the jury must find that said
D was not a trespasser while traveling said path, but that he was
a licensee and not wrongfully traveling said path. 66
(3) If the jury believe from the evidence that the plain-
tiff's husband and others were in the habit of using the track
of defendant's railway next to the M river, and on which plain-
tiff's husband was at the time he was killed, in towing said
boat up the river, and had been in the habit of doing so, con-
tinually, for a long time prior to the day in question, with-
out objection or protest on the part of defendant or under such
circumstances, when by the exercise of ordinary care it might
have been known that they were using said track ; and that from
the nature of the ground rising between said track and the M
river, there was no other place where those towing boats up the
river could reasonably be expected to go, then the court instructs
the jury that the plaintiff was not a trespasser in being upon
said track at the time he was run against and killed. 67
(4) Although the defendant varied from the usual manner of
using the track in question, yet if the plaintiff was not there as
an employe of the company, but was there wrongfully, he cannot
complain of the negligence of the company, unless the defend-
ant's agents knew that he was there, and willfully injured him. 68
05 Pennsylvania Co. v. Gallaghei, T Le May v. Missouri, &c. R. Co.
40 Ohio St. 637. 105 Mo. 368, 16 S. W. 1049.
OB Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. De GS Pennsylvania Co. v. Gallagher,
Board, 91 Va. 702, 22 S. E. 514. 40 Ohio St. 637.
S57 JURY DETERMINE NEGLIGENCE. 638
638. Question of negligence submitted to the jury. (1) It
was the duty of the defendant's switching crew to exercise ordi-
nary care in so doing their work as to avoid injuring the plain-
tiff while running his engine upon the defendant's track, and if
the jury believe, from the evidence, the engine which struck
and collided with plaintiff's engine at the crossing was not
managed and controlled with ordinary care by the defendant's
crew in charge of the same, and the plaintiff's injury was the
direct result of the negligence of such crew in managing and
controlling said colliding engine while he was in the exercise
of ordinary care for his own safety, the defendant is liable and
plaintiff is entitled to a verdict. 69
(2) If the jury find that on or about the thirteenth day of
August, 1884. the plaintiff was injured by the locomotive or cars
of the defendant while operated by its agents on its road and
that such injury resulted directly from the want of ordinary care
and prudence of the agents of the defendant and not from the
want of ordinary care and prudence on the part of the plaintiff
directly contributing to the injury, then the plaintiff is entitled
to recover. 70
(3) If the jury believe from the evidence that the plaintiff
while in the exercise of ordinary care was injured by or in con-
sequence of the negligence of the defendant, as charged in the
declaration or either one of the counts thereof, then you should
find the defendant guilty. 71
(4) If in this case the jury believe, from the evidence that the
plaintiff, while using such reasonable care for his own safety,
was injured in the manner as charged in the declaration and
that such injury was occasioned by the negligence of the defend-
ant or of its agents in charge of the train of cars mentioned in
the evidence, and as charged in the declaration, then the jury
should find the defendant guilty. 72
(5) If the plaintiff did not receive the injuries complained of,
by any contributory act of negligence or fault of her own, but
was injured at the time complained of by the carelessness and
negligence or fault of the defendant's servants, or one of them,
69 St. Louis N. S. Yards v. God- 141 111. 624, 31 N. E. 406.
frey, 198 111. 295, 65 N. E. 90. 72 Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Gore,
TO Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. 202 111. 188, 66 N. E. 1063. Held not
v. Hogeland, 66 Md. 150, 7 Atl. 105. assuming negligence.
71 Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Fisher,
639 NEGLIGENCE OF RAILROADS. G58
committed in the general scope of employment as such servant
or servants the defendant is liable for such damages as she may
have sustained by the injuries thus received. 73
639. Question of contributory negligence for jury. (1) If
you should believe that the plaintiff might have avoided the acci-
dent by driving directly across the track instead of undertaking
to turn, he would not necessarily be guilty of contributory neg-
ligence in that respect, provided you find that an ordinarily
careful and prudent man, under the excitement and particular
circumstances surrounding the plaintiff at the time, might have
adopted the course pursued by him. His conduct in that regard
is not necessarily to be judged by the facts as they now appear
before the jury, as the same are subjected to the cool, calm
consideration that you will be able to give them in the light
of all the facts and circumstances as they are now made to ap-
pear, but he is entitled to have them considered as they appeared
to him at the time; and, if an ordinarily careful and prudent
man might have acted as the plaintiff acted, with his view of the
circumstances as they then appeared to him, you will be justi-
fied in finding that he was not guilty of contributory negligence
by turning back, rather than by going directly across the track. 74
(2) If the jury find from the evidence that the car was
running at a moderate rate of speed, and that the bell or gong
had been sounded, and that the plaintiff suddenly and with-
out warning, and under circumstances which were ijot reason-
ably to be expected, drove upon or attempted to cross the track
of the defendant in close proximity to the car of the defendant,
and at a time when it was not prudent to do so ; then, and in that
event, the plaintiff would not be exercising ordinary care and
prudence. 75
(3) If you shall find that the defendant was operating its car
at a high rate of speed, yet, if you shall further find that the
plaintiff T, by his negligence and want of ordinary care contrib-
uted to the accident in any appreciable degree, your finding must
be for the defendant. 76
73 Louisville N. A. & C. R. Co. v. " Traver v. Spokane St. R. Co.
Wood, 113 Ind. 562, 14 N. E. 572, 25 Wash. 242, 68 Pac. 284.
16 N. E. 197. 76 Traver v. Spokane St. R. Co.
74 Traver v. Spokane St. R. Co. 25 25 Wash. 242, 68 Pac. 284.
Wash. 241, 65 Pac. 284.
659 JURY DETERMINE CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 639
(4) If the jury find from the evidence in this case that the ac-
cident complained of was in any degree owing to the want of due
care and caution on the part of the plaintiff, directly contributing
to said accident, then their verdict must be for defendant. 77
(5) If the jury find from the evidence that the accident com-
plained of was caused by the want of ordinary care on the part
of the defendant in the running of its cars, and shall also find
that the want of ordinary care and prudence on the part of the
plaintiff, directly contributed thereto, then the plaintiffs are not
entitled to recover. 78
(6) If you find from all the evidence before you that the
accident complained of was in any degree owing to the want of
due care and caution, that is, ordinary care and prudence, on the
part of the plaintiff, directly contributing thereto, then the plain-
tiff cannot recover and your verdict must be for the defendant- 79
(7) If you find from the evidence that the plaintiff, know-
ing the position of the railroad track and that trains were run-
ning frequently thereon, approached the crossing, without look-
ing in the direction from which the train was coming and with-
out stopping his team to listen for an approaching train so
quickly that he was unable to stop his horses before going upon
the track, and in consequence thereof the collision occurred, the
plaintiff cannot recover in this action. 80
(8) If the jury believe from the evidence that the plaintiff was
well acquainted with the crossing and the road leading thereto,
and further believe that at the point twenty-six feet from the
crossing he could have have stopped his team, and from that point,
if he had looked, could have seen the train approaching, and thus
have averted the accident, the verdict must be for defendant. 81
(9) It was the duty of plaintiff, while approaching said rail-
road track and before driving upon the same, to use his eyes and
ears, to look and listen for an approaching train ; and if the jury
believe from the evidence that the plaintiff, if he had so looked
and listened, could have thereby seen or heard the train in time
to have avoided collision with it and and the injuries complained
77 Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Owings,
v. Anderson, 72 Md. 521, 20 Atl. 2. 65 Md. 505, 5 Atl. 329.
78 Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. so Raines v. Illinois Cent. R. Co.
Owings, 65 Md. 505, 5 Atl. 329. 41 Iowa, 231.
79 Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. S1 Kennedy v. Hannibal & St. J.
v. Anderson, 72 Md. 521, 20 Atl. 2; R. Co. 105 Mo. 274, 15 S. W. 983, 16
S. W. 837.
640 NEGLIGENCE OF RAILROADS. 660
of, then your verdict must be for the defendant, notwithstanding
the jury may further believe from the evidence that defendant's
servants failed to give signals by bell or whistle of the tram's
approach. 62
(10) If by reason of any miscalculation of the plaintiff as
to the proximity of a train, he concluded to drive upon the
crossing without further efforts to ascertain certainly whether
he could safely do so, the verdict must be for the defendant. 83
(11) If the jury believe from the evidence that the ladders on
freight cars are placed there for the use of the brakemen, in the
discharge of their duties, then it was the duty of the plaintiff to
have noticed any visible defect in the ladder and to have report-
ed it to the company; and, therefore, if the jury believe from
the evidence, that there was a defect in the round of the ladder
and that it was a visible defect, and if the jury further believe
from the evidence that the plaintiff did not report the defect
to the company, then the plaintiff cannot recover on account of
such defect. 84
(12) If the jury believe from the evidence that any element
of danger connected with the defendant's trailer by which the
plaintiff was injured was not a hidden or concealed danger,
but was open to the observation and could be comprehended
by a boy of average intelligence, of the age of the plaintiff;
and if you further believe that the trailer, when left on the
track by the defendant's employes the day of the accident,
was held by brakes of the ordinary kind, and that the brakes
were set in a manner to hold the cars where they were unless
some one should loosen the brakes the plaintiff cannot recover. 88
640. Speed of trains Running at high rate. (1) If you
shall find from the evidence that the defandant's servants in
charge of the train that killed B, gave signals by whistling once
and no more at such distance if it exceeded one hundred rods from
- street, that said B would naturally think that he could
safely cross the track before the train arrived at said street,
82 Kennedy v. Hannibal & St. J. 84 Toledo, &c. R. Co. v. Ingra-
R. Co. 105 Mo. 274, 15 S. W. 983, 16 ham, 77 111. 313.
S. W. 837. so George v. Los Angeles R. Co.
sa Kennedy v. Hannibal & St. J. 126 Cal. 357, 46 L. R. A. 829, 58 Pac.
R. Co. 105 Mo. 274, 15 S. W. 983, 16 819.
S. W. 837.
661 SPEED OF TRAIN, HIGH RATE. 640
if he heard such whistle, and that he did hear it, and should
further find that no bell was rung, and that said train was
going at a greater rate of speed than men of ordinary care and
prudence in like employment would have run it, under like
circumstances and conditions, and that said B, as a reasonable
man, was thereby deceived and led to believe that he could cross
the tracks of the defendant's railroad in safety, and that if at-
tempting under these circumstances to cross said tracks without
fault or negligence on his part, he was, on account of careless-
ness upon the part of the servants of the defendant in operating
said train at an unusual and dangerous rate of speed, struck
and killed, then the plaintiff would be entitled to recover i
such carelessness was the sole cause of his injuries. 80
(2) If said train was being run by the employes of the defend-
ant at a high and dangerous rate of speed, such speed being so
high and dangerous as to become a negligent management of the
train, and that such accident resulted in consequence thereof,
then the jury will find the issues for the plaintiff. 87
(3) The jury are instructed that railway companies are permit-
ted by law to run their passenger trains at such high rate of
speed as, under all the surrounding circumstances and conditions
of track, etc., shall comport with the rule of law which requires
them to exercise a high degree of care for the safety of passen-
gers, and whether a given rate of speed is dangerous or not is
to be determined by the surrounding circumstances, such as con-
dition of the track, fencing of right of way, the management of
the train, as shown by the evidence, and it must be such degree
of danger as is not ordinarily incident to railway travel. 88
(4) If the jury find from the evidence that the accident by
which the plaintiff sustained the injuries complained of was the
result of the fast running of the train, and that the train was so
running against the orders of defendant's superior officers and
against the regulations made in that respect by defendant, then
86 Schweinfurth v. Cleveland, C. rate of speed for a passenger train
C. & St. L. R. Co. 60 Ohio St. 225, was a dangerous and negligent rate,
54 N. E. 89. rendering the defendant liable.
87 Indianapolis, B. & W. R. Co. S8 Indianapolis, B. & W. R. Co. v.
v. Hall , 106 111. 371, 374. Held prop- Hall, 106 111. 371, 375.
er and not stating that a given high
641 ':NEGLIGEXCE OF RAILROADS. 662
in that event the plaintiff will not be entitled to recover more
than his actual damages in this suit. 89
(5) Though a railroad company and the public have equal
rights at the intersection of the track of the former with a public
highway, those operating a train upon the railroad are under no
obligation to slacken the speed of such train, or to bring the
same to a stop, when they notice a person crossing or about to
cross the track at its intersection with the highway; but they
may presume that such person will himself take all proper
precautions to avoid injury. 90
(6) If a person be seen upon the track of defendant's electric
street railway, who is apparently capable of taking care of him-
self, the motorman may assume that such person will leave the
track before the car reaches him; and this presumption may be
indulged in so long as the danger of injuring him does not become
imminent ; and it is not necessary for a motorman to slacken the
speed of the car until such danger becomes imminent. 91
(7) If the plaintiff, T, was not in imminent peril at the time
he drove upon the track or attempted to cross the track of the
defendant, the motorman had a right to presume that he would
pass on, over and off the track, out of the way ; and the motorman
was not guilty of negligence in failing to stop the car, in either
of the events just mentioned, until the peril of the plaintiff be-
came imminent. 92
641. Failure to sound whistle or ring bell. (1) It was the
duty of the engineer or those in charge of the train, on approach-
ing a highway, to sound the whistle on the engine at least eighty
rods before reaching said crossing, and if they failed to do so
and an accident and injury occurred therefrom, this would be
negligence on the part of said railway company; and if you
believe from a preponderance of the evidence that the defend-
ant by its employes running the train from which said accident
occurred, failed to sound said whistle, and by reason of such
failure said accident occurred without negligence on the part of
8 Texas T. R. Co. v. Johnson, 75 i Traver v. Spokane St. R. Co.
Tex. 161, 12 S. W. 482. 25 Wash. 244, 65 Pac. 284.
90 Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Walker, 02 Traver v. Spokane St. R. Co. 25
113 Ind. 201, 15 N. E. 234. Wash. 244, 65 Pac. 284.
663 SOUNDING WHISTLE, RINGING BELL. 641
the plaintiff, then in that case, you should find for the plain-
tiff. 93
(2) If the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant
started a train in the city of Peoria without ringing a bell or
sounding a whistle, and if they further believe from the evi-
dence, that Fred Clark was attempting to cross the defendant's
track on which said train was started, and that by reason of
there being no bell rung or whistle sounded, such train or car
of that train struck him while so attempting to cross said track,
then the defendant was guilty of culpable negligence; and if
you further believe, from the evidence, that the death of said
Clark was the result of such negligence on the part of the de-
fendant, and that said Clark was not guilty of negligence con-
tributing to the injury, then you should find the' defendant
guilty. 94
(3) If you believe from the evidence that the agents or serv-
ants of the defendant in charge of the engine in , question
failed to ring a bell or sound a whistle, continuously, for a
distance of eighty rods, before reaching the crossing, and that
James Molohan and Mary Molohan, while attempting to pass
over the railroad track at said crossing, were exercising due
care and caution for their own safety, and were struck and
killed at said crossing by an engine then in charge of such
agents or servants, and that such killing was the direct con-
sequence or result of the failure of said agents or servants to
so ring a bell or sound a whistle, then the jury should find for the
plaintiff. 95
(4) If the jury believe from the evidence that F approached
the crossing where he met his death, as an ordinarily prudent
man would do, traveling as he was on a bicycle, and that the
electric gong did not sound to warn him of the approaching
engine when he was about to cross, and that if said electric
gong had sounded, it would have warned him of the approach-
ing engine in time to escape, and that no other sufficient warning
3 Pittsburg, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. 9 * Peoria & P. N. R. Co. v. Clay-
Martin, 82 Ind. 482. Statutory pro- berg, 107 111. 644, 650. Held not
visions exist requiring the bell to singling out facts and not objec-
be rung or whistle to be blown as a tionable as to the word "culpable. '
warning of the approach of a train 95 McNulta v. Lockbridge, 137 111.
of cars at any crossing. 274, 27 N. E. 452.
641 NEGLIGENCE OF RAILROADS. 664
of the approaching engine was given, and that the embankments
were such as to prevent his seeing the engine in time to escape,
and he lost his life thereby, and that he listened for the approach
of the train, and failed to hear, they must find for the plaintiff. 90
(5) The failure to ring the bell or give other warning of the ap-
proach of the train to the crossing, if such failure there was, does
not in itself constitute negligence and entitle the plaintiff to re-
cover; but such circumstances can only be considered by you in
connection with others as tending to prove negligence on the part
of the defendant company. 97
(6) The statute requiring the bell to be rung, or the whistle
to be blown at crossings, is intended for the protection of those
passing over the track at such crossings, and not for those using
the track elsewhere; and said statute is complied with, when
either the bell is rung or the whistle blown. 98
(7) It is made the duty, by law of railroad companies, to
cause the bell on their trains to be rung and the steam whistle
to be blown when approaching a public crossing. If in this
case you find that the engineer or fireman complained of
sounded the whistle or rang the bell, or did both as signals
that the train was about to back toward a street or other public
crossing, and said noise gave fright to the plaintiff's team and
caused him to be injured, the fact that said noise frightened
the team would not render defendant liable for the injury, un-
less such engineer or fireman saw and realized, or had to reason to
know that such noise would cause fright to the team and result
probably in injury. 99
(8) The defendant railroad company is not bound to whistle
or ring the engine bell when approaching a private or farm
crossing; and, further, that said defendant railroad company
may regulate the speed of trains approaching private crossings
as it may desire by its own regulations; but, nevertheless, the
jury are instructed that said defendant railroad company, know-
ing that said private crossings are likely to be used by persons
so Kimball v. Friend, 95 Va. 128, St. R. Co. 41 W. Va. 415, 23 S.
27 S. E. 901. E. 593.
97 Geist v. Missouri Pac. R, Co. 62 99 Hargis v. St. Louis, A. & T. R.
Neb. 322, 87 N. W. 43. Co. 75 Tex. 20, 12 S. W. 953.
8 Davidson v. Pittsburg, C. C.
665 BLOWING WHISTLE WRONGFULLY FLAGMAN. 642
passing over and upon the railroad track, are bound, when ap-
proaching said crossings, to keep a proper lookout, and to use
all reasonable precautions when approaching said private or farm
crossing, to prevent injury to any one on or approaching said
crossings. 100
642. Wrongfully blpwing whistle. (1) If the jury believe
from the evidence that the plaintiff, on the day and at the place
in question, and immediately before and at the time of the acci-
dent in question, was in the exercise of the care and caution
for his own safety, which a reasonably prudent and careful man
under the same circumstances, would have exercised; and if the
jury further believe, from the evidence, that the engineer or
fireman of the engine in question saw the plaintiff's position
at the head of his team within thirty feet of the track over
which said engine was then passing, and then negligently or
wantonly caused the whistle of said engine to be sounded in a
short, sharp, shrill and unusual manner, and the steam to escape
from said engine in a reckless or negligent manner; and if the
jury further believe, from the evidence, that the sounding of
said whistle, as aforesaid, or escaping of said steam, as afore-
said, frightened the team of the plaintiff so that said team
thereupon ran away and injured the plaintiff, then the plaintiff
should recover. 101
(2) If you believe from the evidence that plaintiff received
physical injuries, such as are alleged in the petition, by reason
of his team becoming frightened and throwing him to the ground
or by dragging him, and you further find that said team be-
came frightened by reason of the noise made by the employes
of defendant in blowing the whistle or ringing the bell, or caus-
ing steam to escape from an engine of defendant in their charge ;
and you find from the evidence that said employe or employes
of defendant caused such noise for the purpose and with the
intention of frightening said team, or knowing or having reason
to believe that such noise would frighten said team, then plain-
tiff would be entitled to recover such sum as actual damages as
100 Morgan v. Wabash R. Co. 159 101 Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v.
Mo. 271, 60 S. W. 195. Yorty, 158 111. 323, 42 N. E. 64.
643 NEGLIGENCE OF RAILROADS. 666
the evidence may show him entitled to under the instructions
hereinafter given. 102
(3) If, however, you do not find that said employe or em-
ployes made said noise with the intent to frighten plaintiff's
team, and you do not find that they knew or had reason to believe
that said noise would frighten said team and probably cause in-
jury to the plaintiff or others in said wagon, then you will find
for defendant. 103
(4) If you find from the evidence that plaintiff drove his team
across the defendant's railroad at a public crossing, and that an
engine of defendant was standing near such crossing, and you fur-
ther find that plaintiff's team was afraid of such engine and be-
came frightened in crossing in front of said engine ; and after
crossing said railroad plaintiff voluntarily stopped his team and
wagon, and said team became quiet, and the engineer or other
employe then bl&w the whistle and rang the bell as signals to
move such engine, believing from plaintiff's act in stopping his
team that no injury would arise from such signals or necessary
escaping steam, and plaintiff's team took fright and injured
him, then defendant would not be liable. 104
643. Flagman at crossing Necessity. (1) There was no
absolute duty imposed by law on the defendant to maintain either
gates or a flagman at the crossing in question, and if you believe,
from the evidence, that there were no gates or flagman there
at the time of the alleged injury, that is not of itself evidence
of negligence on the part of the defendant. The plaintiff does
not allege or claim any negligence on the part of the defendant
in regard to this. Evidence as to whether there were gates
or a flagman at the crossing in question at the time of the
alleged injury was admitted by the court, and should be con-
sidered by the jury, not as tending, of itself, to establish negli-
gence, but solely for the purpose of showing the general con-
dition of things at the locality of said crossing at the time of the
alleged injury, so as to assist the jury to determine, from all
the evidence and circumstances in the case, and under the
102 Hargis v. St. Louis, A. & T. R. 103 Hargis v. St. Louis, A. & T.
Co. 75 Tex. 20 12 S. W. 953. See R. Co. 75 Tex. 20, 12 S. W. 953.
also, Indianapolis Union R. Co. v. * Hargis v. St. Louis, A. & T. R.
Boettcher, 131 Ind. 82, 28 N. E. 551. Co. 75 Tex. 21, 12 S. W. 953.
667 RAILROADS VIOLATING ORDINANCES. 644
instructions of the court, whether the defendant was guilty of
negligence, as charged in the plaintiff's declaration. 105
(2) The defendant was not required by law to station a flaghian
at the road crossing, near which the accident complained of is tes-
tified to have occurred; and the jury cannot infer negligence on
the part of the defendant, because the defendant did not keep a
watchman or flagman at or near said crossing, or because said
defendant did not have any person at or near the place of said
accident, to warn persons of danger in attempting to cross the
railroad track at that place, or to prevent them from attempting
to cross at said point. 100
(3) Although you may believe from the evidence that it was
necessary to have a flagman at N and W streets, and that a flag-
man was so kept to notify or signal for cars to cross or to stop,
still, if you find from the evidence that the car stopped south of
N street, and while it was so stopped plaintiff started to alight
from said car, and the conductor saw her attempting to alight
while said car was stopped, it was his duty to cause said car to
remain standing until plaintiff had a reasonable time to alight,
notwithstanding the flagman may have signaled for the car to
cross. 107
644. Railroad company violating ordinances. (1) If you
find from the evidence that the view of the approaching train was
obstructed by buildings, trees and cars on the defendant's rail-
road at such crossing, to a traveler on such street from the
north, and at the time of the injury a valid ordinance of the
city of Warsaw was in force limiting the rate of speed of
defendant's trains to five miles an hour in said city, and that the
train which injured the plaintiff was, at the time of the injury,
running at the rate of ten or fifteen miles an hour, then the
defendant was guilty of negligence. And if you find from^the
evidence that such negligence produced the plaintiff's injury,
without any negligence on his part contributing to the injury,
then your verdict should be for the plaintiff. 105
105 New York. C & St. L. R. Co. 107 Jackson v. Grand Ave. R. Co.
v. Luebeck, 157 111. 595, 602, 41 118 Mo. 212, 24 S. W. 192.
N. E. 897; Chicago & I. R. Co. v. ios Pennsylvania Co. v. Horton,
Lane, 130 Til. 116. 123. 22 N. E. 513. 132 Ind. 193, 31 N. E. 45.
106 Baltimore & O. R. Co. v.
Owings, 65 Md. 505, 5 Atl. 329.
644 NEGLIGENCE OF RAILROADS. 668
(2) If you believe from the evidence that an ordinance of the
city of L required the defendant, when moving any car, cars or lo-
comotives propelled by steam power within the limits of the city/
to cause the bell of the engine to be constantly sounded, and when
backing any freight car, cars or locomotive propelled by steam
power near the city limits to have a man stationed on the top of
the car at the end of the train farthest from the engine to give
danger signals, and further required that no freight train should
at any time to be moved within city limits without being well
manned with experienced brakemen at their posts, so stationed as
to see the danger signals and to hear the signals from the engine,
then any neglect or failure by the defendant, its agents, servants
or employes, to comply with any or all of the above require-
ments, was of itself negligence on the part of the defendant;
and if you believe from the evidence that, as a rsult of such
negligence or failure on the part of the defendant, its agents,
servants or employes, the plaintiff was injured, you will give
a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, unless you ,also believe from
the evidence that plaintiff wai himself guilty of negligence
which contributed directly to cause of his injuries. 109
(3) If the defendant was engaged in the business of transport-
ing passengers for hire from one point to another within the city
of St. L, on or about the fifth day of June, 1893, then by the ordi-
nance read in evidence, it became the duty of the gripman in
charge of the gripcar to keep a vigilant watch for persons on foot,
especially for children, either on its track or moving toward it;
and on the first appearance of danger to such person or child,
it was the duty of the gripman to stop the car in his charge
in the shortest time and space possible under the circum-
stances. 110
(4) If you find -that the car which struck the plaintiff's
buggy at the time of or just previous to the collision was being
run at a greater rate of speed than eight miles an hour, which
is the limit under the ordinance of the city of S, you would be
justified in finding the defendant guilty of negligence in run-
ning the car at such rate of speed; and, if you further find that
such negligence caused the injury complained of, you should
109 Dahlstrom v. St. Louis, I. M. no Hogan v. Citizens R. Co. 150
& S. R. Co. 108 Mo. 533, Ib S. W. Mo. 44, 51 S. W. 473.
919.
669 FIRE ESCAPING AND BURNING PROPERTY. 645
find for the plaintiff, unless he was guilty of contributory negli-
gence. 111
645. Fire escaping from engine and burning property. (1)
The rule for the measure of damages, if there is a right of
recovering, is the difference, if any, between the fair market
value of the land burned over, belonging to the plaintiff, imme-
diately before the fire, and its fair market value immediately
afterwards. 112
(2) If the jury believe from the evidence that the property
of the plaintiff was burned in consequence of the failure of
the defendant company to use the best appliances and safe-
guards, in the nature of ash-pans &nd spark arresters on their
engines, and such as are generally adopted by and used upon
the modern leading railroads in this country, the defendants are
liable for any loss occasioned by any such omission. 113
(3) If from the evidence the jury find that defendant's engine
set out the fire alleged, and also that the same engines set out sev-
eral successive fires on the same trip, and on the same day, then
the fact of the repeated setting out of such fires will be evidence
tending to show that the defendant's engine was not properly
constructed as to its appliances for the prevention of the escape
of fire, or that the same was not properly used at the time, or that
it was not in repair, and as such, must be considered by you in
making up your verdict, and in determining as to whether or
not this fire occurred through the fault or negligence of defendant
or its employes!. 114
(4) If you believe that the plaintiff allowed hay or other
rubbish to accumulate on or about his property, or left any
cracks or openings in his building through which fire from a
passing locomotive could readily communicate to the hay or
other inflammable matter inside such building, and that the fire
was first communicated to the scattered hay or other inflam-
mable rubbish so left exposed, or to the hay or other inflammable
matter exposed through the cracks or openings of the buildings,
and you further believe that the doing or permitting these things
in Traver v. Spokane St. R. Co. us Kimball & F. v. Borden, 97
25 Wash. 241, 65 Pac. 284. Va. 478, 34 S. E. 45.
2 Chicago, I. & L. R. Co. v. 114 Slossen v. Burlington, &c. I
Brown, 157 Ind. 547, 60 N. E. 346. Co. 60 Iowa, 217, 14 N. W. 244.
646 NEGLIGENCE OF RAILROADS. 670
on the part of the plaintiff, were what an ordinarily prudent man
would not have done under the same or like circumstances,
then the plaintiff cannot recover because of his negli-
gence'. 115
(5) If the jury believe from the evidence that the defend-
ant's engine was furnished with a spark arrester and other
appliances for the purpose of preventing the escape of fire or
sparks, of a good character, and such as was in general use at
the time by well regulated railroads and that such appliances
were in good condition and that the defendant was not guilty of
negligence in operating its engine and train, but that fire never-
theless escaped and fell upon the plaintiff's premises and set it
on fire, the jury ought to find for the defendant. 116
(6) The court charges the jury that if they believe from the
evidence that one of the defendant's engines threw sparks upon
the plaintiff's shed, or directly against it, and that the sparks so
thrown themselves set fire to the shed and that the burning shed
communicated the fire to the plaintiff's other property; and fur-
ther that such engine was furnished with a spark arrester and
other appliances of approved character to prevent, so far as pos-
sible, throwing sparks and was properly handled by the engineer,
and that such spark arrester and other appliances were in good
condition, then they ought to find a verdict for the defendant. 117
646. Killing stock from failure to fence track. (1) The first
paragraph of the plaintiff's complaint is based upon a statute of
the state which requires railroad companies operating roads
in this state to securely fence in the tracks of their roads. A
railroad company operating a railroad in this state is required
to securely fence in its track, and where this is not done, the
railroad company so operating the road is liable for all damages
done to stock by its locomotives and cars while being operated
upon its road without regard to the question whether such injury
was the result of willful misconduct or negligence, or the result
of unavoidable accident. 118
us Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. n? Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Sul-
v. Ayers, 56 Kas. 181, 42 Pac. 722. livan Timber Co. (Ala.), 35 So. 331.
us Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Sul- us Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co.
livan Timber Co. (Ala.), 35 So. 330. v . Grantham, 104 Ind. 357, 4 N. E.
See, Chicago, &c. R. Co. v. Pennell, 49.
110 Til. 435; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v.
McClelland, 42 111. 355.
671 KILLING STOCK, FAILURE TO FENCE. 646
(2) If you find from the evidence that the plaintiff's cattle
were killed by the locomotive, cars or other carriages used on
the defendant's railroad in or running into or through Madison
county, Indiana, and that such railroad was not securely fenced
in and such fence was not properly maintained by the defendant
where at the point, the cattle entered upon said road, then you
should find for the plaintiff and assess his damages at the value
of the cattle so killed. 119
(3) If the jury believe, from the evidence, that the engine
driver, by the use of ordinary skill and prudence, could have
seen the cows spoken of by the witnesses, or that he did see the
cows, and that he might, without danger, by the use of ordinary
care, have stopped the train before striking the cows, and did
not, that this would be negligence on the part of the defendant. 120
(4) Even if you believe from the evidence that any hogs en-
tered the plaintiff's field and did damage to his crop, as com-
plained of in the petition, still, if you also believe from the evi-
dence that there was a space of ground lying between the fence
which the defendant had erected along the east side of the track,
and another fence which was upon the west side of the plaintiff's
enclosure, and that said strip of ground was open to a public high-
way at the south end, so that hogs and other stock could pass from
the public road into said strip of ground, and that it was necessary,
for hogs to pass through or under both of said fences, and across
said intervening strip of ground in order to get from defendant's
inclosure along its track into the plaintiff's field, then the plaintiff
cannot recover in this action, and your verdict must be for the
defendant. 121
(5) It is not necessary that the defendant should have erected
its fence upon the line of its way. It had the right to locate
the fence at any place between the edge of its track and the line
of its right of way. Therefore if you should believe from the evi-
dence that there was a strip of ground between the railroad
fence and the plaintiff's fence, and that a part of the same was
included within the line of the railroad right of way, but outside
119 Cleveland, C. C. & I. R. Co. constitute negligence, and not en-
v. Bates, 91 Ind. 290. croaching on the province of the
120 Toledo, P. & W. R. Co. v. jury.
Bray, 57 111. 514. Held not telling 121 Kingsbury v. Missouri, K. &
the jury that a certain state of facts T. R. Co. 156 Mo. 384, 57 S. W. 547.
646 NEGLIGENCE OF RAILROADS. 672
of the railroad fence, and that such strip of ground opened at
the south end upon a public highway, and that hogs passed
through or over said strip of ground, and thence under or
through plaintiff's fence, and even, although in passing over
said strip of ground they may have passed over the uninclosed
portion of the right of way, still, that does not entitle the
plaintiff to recover, and under such circumstances, if you so
find, your verdict should be for defendant. 122
(6) If the horse in question got onto the defendant's railway
track from a highway crossing, at a point where the defendant
had a side-track crossing the highway, on which it received and
discharged freight, and which it had constructed and used for the
convenience of the public and in the transaction of its business
with them, them the defendant was not required to fence in or in-
close its track at that point, and the plaintiff could not recover. 123
(7) The law does not require the defendant to fence its road at
stations or sidings where freight is received and discharged, and
the defendant is not liable in an action like this for stock that
may go upon the track at such point and get killed. 124
(8) The rules of law as to diligence and negligence apply to
stock owners as well as to railroad companies. Hence, if hogs were
prohibited by law from running at large in the township where the
plaintiff's hogs were kept by him, and were killed by the defend-
ant's railroad train, the law required from the plaintiff the same
degree of diligence to keep his hogs from escaping, that it required
from the railroad company to avoid killing them when they got
in front of its train ; and if the plaintiff failed to use that degree
of diligence to keep his hogs from escaping, he cannot recover
in this action. 126
If you find from the evidence in this case that the guards in
question were not such guards as were approved by the railroad
commissioner, or that they were not placed down as required
by the railroad commissioner, under his plans and specifications
submitted here, then you would find the defendant liable under
further instructions that I will give you. Or, if you find that
122 Kingsbury v. Missouri, K. & 12* Indiana, B. & W. R. Co. v.
T. R. Co. 156 Mo. 385, 57 S. W. 547. Sawyer, 109 Ind. 344, 10 N. E. 105.
123 Indiana, B. & W. R. Co. v. 125 Leavenworth, T. & S. W. R.
Sawyer, 109 Ind. 344, 10 N. E. 105. Co. v. Forbs, 37 Kas. 448, 15 Pac.
595.
673 FACTS NECESSARY TO RECOVERY. 647
they were such guards, and were so placed, as required by the
plans and specifications approved by the commissioner of rail-
roads, but that the company had negligently failed to keep such
guards in repair, then you will find them liable. When I say
''keep them in repair," I mean in good and sufficient repair,
so they would serve the purpose for which they were placed
there. I do not mean that, if you find they were in that condi-
tion, they would be liable; but you must further find that this
injury was occasioned because of such defect, if you find it. In
other words, if you find that the guards in question are such as
are approved, and further find that the company negligently
failed to keep the same in repair, (that is, negligently permitted
them to fill up between the slats with cinders, ballast or dirt,)
and that these cattle went upon the railroad track, over these
guards so out of repair, and that the injury was occasioned by
such want of repair, then the defendant would be liable. If, on
the other hand, you do not find these things to be true, then
they would not be liable; that is, if you find that the guards
were in repair, the company would not be liable, or, if you find
that the injury was not occasioned because of the want of re-
pair, then the company would not be liable. 126
647. Essential facts necessary to a recovery. (1) The facts
necessary to be established by the plaintiff by a preponderance
of all the evidence, to entitle him to recover, are first, negligence
on the part of the defendant in the matter complained of;
second, plaintiffs' freedom from fault or negligence in the matter
complained of; and third, damage to the plaintiff proximately
caused by the defendants' negligence; and a failure to establish
any of these by a preponderance of all the evidence will preclude
a recovery. 127
(2) It appears that the plaintiff was struck and injured by the
engine of the defendant while in the act of crossing the railroad
track and rescuing a little child from danger and saving its
life. To hold the company responsible in damages for such in-
jury in such case, it must be shown first, that the child was in
danger of being run over and injured by an approaching engine,
and that such danger was caused or created by the negligence
326 Hathaway v. Detroit, T. & M. 127 Baltimore & O. S. R. Co. v.
R. Co. 124 Mich. 610, 83 N. W. 598. Young, 153 Ind. 168, 54 N. E. 791.
648 NEGLIGENCE OF RAILROADS. 674
of the railroad company; and second, that in making the effort
to rescue the child the plaintiff was not guilty of contributory
negligence. These are questions of fact which it is your duty to
determine from the evidence in the case. 128
(3) The first question then for you to determine is this: Did
the water which flowed down the side of this hill in time of rain-
fall, and the thawing of snow, flow down through a natural and
well-defined channel, or did it not? If it did, the defendant had
no right to change the flow of that water so as to produce injury
to the plaintiff. If it did not nVv down through a natural well-
defined channel, but discharged itself generally upon the right
of way of the defendant, then the defendant could provide for
its discharge from that right of way in such a manner as it saw
fit. 129
648. Accident No liability. (1) It is the duty of both the
railroad company and of those operating its trains, and of per-
sons traveling along the public highway, to use reasonable care
and ordinary prudence to avoid collision at any -point where
the company's road and such public highway may cross each
other, and if a collision should occur at any such crossing, and
any injury should happen from such collision, and neither party
should be guilty of negligence in causing such collision, then no
action could be maintained by reason of such an injury. It
would be an accident for which the law gives no remedy. 130
(2) If the jury further believe from the evidence that the engi-
neer in control of the extra passenger train was keeping the proper
lookout which it was his duty to keep, that he saw the hand
car as soon as it could be seen under the circumstances, and ap-
plied all the means within his power as quickly as they could
be applied under the circumstances, and that he continued to
use all the means within his power which a prudent man with
the requisite skill and in the use of ordinary care would have
used under the circumstances, and that the appliances for stop-
ping and controlling the train were in good order, then they will
find for the defendant. 131
128 Pennsylvania Co. v. Langen- iso Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v.
dorf, 48 Ohio St. 321, 28 N. E. 172. Greenlee, 70 Tex. 557, 8 S. W. 129.
129 Fossum v. Chicago, M. & St. isi Davidson v. Pittsburg, C.. C.
P. R. Co. 80 Minn. 12, 82 N. W. & St. L. R. Co. 41 W. Va. 416, 23 S.
979. E. 593.
675 ACCIDENT, NO LIABILITY. 648
(3) Unless the jury are satisfied from the evidence that the
person or persons in charge of the extra passenger train failed to
stop the train as soon as a prudent man of the requisite skill and
in the exercise of ordinary care would have done under the cir-
cumstances, and unless they further believe that D's death was
caused by that failure, they will find for the defendant. 132
(4) If the jury, believe from the evidence that the engineer
was looking out for a flag on the right-hand side of the road,
at a place shortly beyond where the deceased was injured, and
just before he was struck, and that the engineer did not see the
deceased on the track or know he was there until too late to stop,
then, under the evidence in this case, the negligence of the engi-
neer, if such there was, was not such gross, wanton, intentional
wrong as will make the defendant liable, provided the jury find
the deceased walked down or on the track without looking
back. 133
(5) If the jury believe from the evidence in this case that
while the defendant and its servants were (if they were) exercis-
ing ordinary care, the plaintiff, at the time and place of the injury,
suddenly and unexepectedly, and without the knowledge of the
defendant, drove his wagon across and upon defendant's track
and thereby placed himself in a position of danger, then, in
order to charge the defendant with a duty to avoid injuring
him, the plaintiff must show, by a preponderance of the evi-
dence in the case, that the circumstances were of such char-
acter that the defendant's servant or servants had an op-
portunity to become conscious of the facts giving rise to
such duty, and a reasonable opportunity in the exercise of or-
dinary care and caution, to perform such duty. And if the
jury further believe from the evidence that the facts as shown
by the evidence did not charge the defendant and its servants
with a duty as thus defined, or if the jury believe from the evi-
dence, that the defendant and its servants did not have a rea-
sonable opportunity, in the exercise of ordinary care, to perform
such duty as thus defined, then they should find the defendant
not guilty. And if the jury believe from the evidence in the
case, that the plaintiff suddenly and unexpectedly drove his
132 Davidson v. Pittsburg, &c. R. 3 Frazer v. South & North Ala.
Co. 41 W. Va. 416, 23 S. E. 593. R. Co. 81 Ala. 190, 1 So. 85.
649 NEGLIGENCE OF RAILROADS. 676
wagon across and upon the defendant's track in front of the car
of the defendant which occasioned the injury, and that the ser-
vant or servants of the defendant in charge of such car did all
that could be done, in the exercise of ordinary care, to avoid
injuring and damaging him, then the plaintiff cannot recover
in this case, and the jury should find the defendant not guilty. 134
Cases of Death.
649. Measure of damages to next of kin. (1) If the jury
believe from the evidence that B, the -deceased, was the husband
of the plaintiff in this suit, and that the said B was rightfully
upon the defendant's engine by the invitation and direction of
the conductor and manager of the same, and that he was using
ordinary care for his safety, and was, by and through the care-
lessness and negligence of the defendant's servants in running
and handling the said engine, thrown therefrom to the ground,
and run over by a car and injured, from which injuries the
said B afterwards died, then the jury will find for the plaintiff,
and assess her damages at such sum as they believe, from all the
evidence, she has sustained, not exceeding ten thousand dol-
lars. 135
(2) The jury are instructed that in estimating the pecuniary
injury, if they believe from the evidence that the widow and
minor children of said deceased, have sustained any injury for
which the defendant is liable, they have a right to take into
consideration the support of the said widow and minor children
of the deceased, and the instruction, and physical, moral and
intellectual training, of the minor children of the deceased, and
also the ages of the said minor children, and the pecuniary con-
dition of the said minor children and widow of the deceased,
in determining the amount of damages, if they believe from the
evidence that the said deceased left a widow and minor chil-
dren. 136
is* Chicago U. Tr. Co. v. Browdy, guilty of negligence. See post n.
206 111. 617. 139.
iss Lake S. & M. S. R. Co. v. ise Illinois C. R. Co. v. Weldon,
Brown, 123 111. 182, 14 N. E. 197. 52 111. 294, citing Tilly v. Hudson
This instruction does not assume River R. Co. 29 N. Y. 252.
that the defendant's servants were
677 DAMAGES TO NEXT OF KIN. 649
(3) If the jury find for the plaintiff, they will assess her dam-
ages at such a sum as in their judgment will be a fair and just
compensation to her for the loss of her husband, not exceeding
the sum of ten thousand dollars. 137
(4) If you should consider that the defendant was in default
in this case, then of course you would have to consider the ques-
tion of compensation. As has been staged to you by both counsel
originally there was no right of action to a survivor in a case' of
this character. The person Avho was injured had a right to dam-
ages for pain and suffering and anguish which he had endured.
The legislature, however, have changed the old common law,
and the representative, the widow, now has a right to bring a
suit for the pecuniary loss which she sustained. Now of course
in all these cases nobody pretends that these companies act ma-
liciously. They operate entirely through their agents, and if
their agents are negligent, they are undoubtedly obliged to suf-
fer for it just as an individual would be. Just as a man driv-
ing your carriage, if he negligently should run into some one else,
you would be responsible for what he did, because he was your
servant, and your agent and performing the duty for which you
had employed him. Therefore there ought to be a reasonable
compensation. 138
(5) The law makes it the duty of every operator and owner of
a coal mine to securely fence the top of the shafts by gates prop-
erly protecting the shaft and the entry thereto, and if such oper-
ator fails willfully to so fence the shaft, and by reason of such
failure, a person employed about the mine is killed, the owner or
operator is liable to the widow of the person so killed for damages
not to exceed the sum of ten thousand dollars. 139
(6) The law makes it the duty of the owner, agent or oper-
ator of every coal mine to keep a supply of timber constantly
on hand, of sufficient lengths and dimensions to be used as
props and cap-pieces and to deliver the same as required with
the miner's empty car, so that the workmen may at all times
be able to properly secure said workings for their own safety,
and if such operator willfully fails so to do, and by reason of
137 Browning v. Wabash W. R. 139 Catlett v. Young, 143 111. 74,
Co. 124 Mo. 65, 27 S. W. 644. 32 N. E. 447. Ten thousand dollars
las Connor v. Electric Tr. Co. 173 is the statutory limit now.
Pa. St. 605, 34 Atl. i38.
649 NEGLIGENCE OF RAILROADS. 678
such failure a person employed about the mine is killed, the
owner or operator is liable to the widow of the person killed for
damages not exceeding the sum of ten thousand dollars. 140
(7) If the jury believe from the evidence that on the twenty-
second day of January, 1898, Frank Duffy came to his death,
while in the exercise ordinary care for his own safety,
in the manner and by th means set forth in the plaintiff's
amended declaration, and if the jury further believe, from the
evidence, that the death of the said Frank Duffy was caused by
the negligence of the defendant, as charged in said declaration ;
and if the jury further believe, from the evidence, that the
said Frank Duffy left surviving him a -widow and children, as
stated in said declaration, and that such widow and children,
by the death of the said Frank Duffy, have been and are de-
prived of their means of support, then, in law, the plaintiff is
entitled to recover. 141
(8) If you find for the plaintiff, you will look to the evi-
dence in determining the amount of damages you will allow.
In arriving at a conclusion, you will look to the evidence
as to the age of the plaintiff's husband, the probable length
of his life, the amount he earned or would probably earn during
his life, and you will also consider his state of health. 142
(9) This case is to be tried in the same manner and governed
by the same principles of law, as if the deceased had not died of
the injuries and had commenced an action for the recovery of
damages for the injuries; or, in other words, that this action can
be sustained under such state of facts only as would have entitled
the deceased, had he lived, to have maintained an action and
recover damages for the injuries which caused his death. 143
(10) That in making the calculation as to the amount the plain-
tiff would be entitled to recover, you Avould have a right and it
would be proper for you to consider whether or not the capacity
of the plaintiff's husband to labor and earn money would have
decreased by reason of advancing years, and if you believe under
"o Mt. Olive Coal Co. v. Rade- 142 Georgia R. Co. v. Pittman, 73
macher, 190 111. 540, 60 N. E. 888; Ga. 331.
Catlett v. Young, 143 111. 74, 32 N. 143 Darling v. Williams, 35 Ohio
E. 447. St. 58.
14 i Economy L. Co. v. Stephen,
187 111. 137, 58 N. E. 359.
679 DAMAGES TO NEXT OF KIN. 649
the evidence that it would have decreased in the same proportion
as you believe his capacity to labor and earn money would have
diminished, in the same proportion would it be proper and right
that your finding and verdict would be diminished. 144
(11) This case is to be tried in the same manner and governed
by the same principles of law as if the deceased had not died of the
injuries complained of, and had himself commenced an action to
recover damages for his injuries ; or, in other words, that this ac-
tion can be sustained only under such state of facts as would have
entitled the deceased to have maintained an action and recovered
damages for such injuries, had he lived. If you find for the
plaintiff you will look to the evidence in determining the amount
of damages you will allow, and in arriving at a conclusion you
have a right to take into consideration the ability of the de-
ceased to labor and earn money, and whether or not the capacity
of the deceased to labor and earn money would have de-
creased by reason of advancing years; and you have the right
to consider the age of the deceased, the probable length of his
life, his health and the amount he earned or would probably earn
during his life. You have also the right to take into considera-
tion the support of the widow and minor children of the de-
ceased, the instruction and proper training of any such minor
children, their ages, and the pecuniary circumstances and con-
dition of such widow and minor children, if the deceased left
a widow and minor children, and you will assess the damages at
such a sum as in your judgment, from the evidence, will be
a just, fair and reasonable compensation to such widow and minor
children not exceeding the sum of ten thousand dollars. 145
(12) If the jury find that J, the deceased, was related to the
equitable plaintiff as alleged in the declaration, and that on the
first day of April, 1893, the deceased and R were engaged in
a fight near the defendant's store, and that the defendant came
out of his store and seeing the fight ran up to within a short dis-
tance of J, the deceased, and fired his pistol toward him and
shot and killed him, the verdict must be for the plaintiff, unless
14* Georgia R. Co. v. Pittman, 73 Welden, 52 111. 2&4; Browning v.
Ga. 330. Wabash W. R. Co. 124 Mo. 65, 27
145 Darling v. Williams, 35 Ohio S. W. 644; Connor v. Electric Tr.
St. 58; Georgia R. Co. v. Pittman, Co. 173 Pa. St. 605, 34 Atl. 238.
73 Ga. 331; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v.
650 NEGLIGENCE OF RAILROADS. 680
the jury believe by preponderating proof that the shooting was
done for the purpose of preventing the deceased from killing
R or inflicting upon him great bodily harm, and that the cir-
cumstances at the time of the shooting were such as to warrant
a reasonable belief in his mind in the exercise of his judgment
that there was no other reasonably possible or at least probable
means of preventing such injury; and that his act was neces-
sary. 146
650. Damages restricted to pecuniary loss. (1) If the jury
find from the evidence, and under the instructions of the court,
that the defendant corporation is guilty of the wrongful act, neg-
lect or default, as charged in the plaintiff's declaration, and that
the same resulted in the death of. the deceased, then the plain-
tiff is entitled to recover such damages as the jury may deem,
from the evidence or proof, a fair and just compensation, there-
for, having reference only to the pecuniary injuries resulting
from said death, to the plaintiff and next of kin, not exceeding
the amount stated in the declaration. Grief or sorrow for the de-
ceased or any pain caused to the next of kin by the manner of hia
death, is not to be considered by the jury, and the pecuniary value
of the life of the deceased to the next of kin himself surviving, is
all for which damages can be assessed. 147
(2) If the jury believe from the evidence that B, the deceased,
was rightfully on the defendant's engine, as alleged in the decla-
ration in this cause, and that while he was on said engine he
was using ordinary care on his pare for his personal safety, and
was, by and through the carelessness of the defendant's ser-
vants in running and handling said engine, thrown from said
engine, and injured, from which said injuries the said B died, then
the jury should find for the plaintiff, and give her such damages
as they deem a fair and just compensation, with reference to the
pecuniary injuries resulting from such death to the wife and
next of kin of the said deceased, not exceeding ten thousand
dollars. 148
i4 Tucker v. S. use of Johnson, 148 Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v.
89 Md. 472, 43 Atl. 778, 44 Atl. 1004. Brown, 123 111. 182, 14 N. E. 197.
147 Pennsylvania Co. v. Marshall,
119 111. 404, 10 N. E. 220.
681 DAMAGES RESTRICTED. 650
(3) If you believe from the evidence that Edna I. Van Pelt,
while in the exercise of ordinary care for her safety and without
fault or negligence on her part lost her life by and through the
negligence of the defendant, as charged in the declaration, and
that said Edna I. Van Pelt left her surviving next of kin, then
you should find the defendant guilty, and assess the plaintiff's
damages at such sum as you believe, from the evidence, will be
a fair and just compensation, based upon the pecuniary loss,
if any, resulting from the death of the said Edna I. Van Pelt
to her said next of kin, not exceeding the sum claimed in the
plaintiff's declaration. 149
(4) The court instructs the jury that if they find a verdict for
the plaintiff they are not confined, in assessing the damages, to
the pecuniary value of the services of the deceased to her next
of kin until she would have arrived at the age of eighteen. But
the jury may consider the pecuniary benefits which the next of
kin may have derived from said deceased, had she not been killed,
at any age of her life. 150
(5) If the jury should find from the evidence in the case and
under the instructions of the court, that the defendant is guilty of
the wrongful act, neglect or default, as charged in the plaintiff's
declaration and that the same resulted in the death of Patrick
Dowd, then the plaintiff is entitled to recover in this action, for
the benefit of the widow and next of kin of such deceased, such
damages as the jury may deem, from the evidence, a fair and
just compensation thereof, having reference only to the pecuniary
injuries from such death to such widow and next of kin, not
exceeding the amount claimed in the declaration. 151
(6) If the jury should find from the evidence that the defend-
ant is guilty of the wrongful act, neglect or default, as is charged
in the plaintiff's declaration, and that the same resulted in the
death of P, then the plaintiff is entitled to recover in this ac-
tion, for the benefit of the next of kin of said deceased, such
damages as the jury may deem, from the evidence, a fair and
just compensation with reference to the pecuniary injuries re-
no Calumet St. R. Co. v. Van isi Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v.
Pelt, 173 111. 71, 50 N. E. 678. Dowd, 115 111. 659, 4 N. E. 368. Held
iso Baltimore & O. S. R. Co. v. to relate solely to the measure of
Then, 159 111. 535, 538, 42 N. E. 971. damages.
650 NEGLIGENCE OF RAILROADS. 682
suiting from such death to such next of kin not exceeding ten
thousand dollars." 2
(7) If you find the issues for the plaintiff, then you should
assess the plaintiff's damages at such sum as you believe from
the evidence to be a proper pecuniary compensation for damages
to her surviving husband and next of kin occasioned by her
death, not exceeding ten thousand dollars. 153
(8) If you find for the plaintiff, you will estimate the damages
to which he is entitled; and in so doing, you will not allow any-
thing for pain and suffering of the deceased, nor wounded feelings
nor grief of his relatives, nor anything by way of exemplary dam-
ages or punishment of defendant, nor infer any fortuitous circum-
stances whereby the income or fortune of the deceased might be
increased or improved had he lived. This suit is brought only to
recover a pecuniary loss, namely, what the estate of the deceased
had lost in consequence of his untimely death, and no more. And,
in determining what amount you will allow, you should take
into consideration the age of the deceased, his occupation, the
wages he was receiving, the condition of his health, his ability,
if any, to earn money, his expenditures and habits as to indus-
try, sobriety and economy, the amount of property which he had
accumulated at the time of his death, if any, the probable dura-
tion of his lifetime, and all these in connection with all the evi-
dence before you, throwing light on this question and determine
therefrom the probable pecuniary loss to the estate caused by
his death and allow the plaintiff such sum and such only as
will compensate the estate for such loss. 154
(9) If under all the evidence the jury find for the plaintiff, the
proper measure of damages is the pecuniary loss suffered by her
and her two children ; and that loss is what her husband would
have probably earned by his labor in his business during his life-
time, and which would have gone for the benefit of the plaintiff
and her two children, taking into consideration his age, ability,
152 Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. iss Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R.
Payne, 59 111. 534, 541. Held not Co. v. Baddeley, 150 111. 335, 36 N.
withdrawing from the jury all con- E. 965.
sideration of the conduct of the de- is* Spaulding v. Chicago, St. P. &
ceased. K. C. R. Co. 98 Iowa, 219, 67 N. W.
227.
683 DAMAGES RESTRICTED. 650
and disposition to labor, and his habits of living and expendi-
ture. 155
(10) If you find from the evidence and under the instructions
of the court that the defendant corporation is guilty of the wrong-
ful act, neglect or default as charged in the plaintiff's declara-
tion and that such wrongful act resulted in the death of the
deceased, then the plaintiff is entitled to recover such damages
as the jury may deem, from the evidence, to be a fair and just
compensation, having reference only to the pecuniary injuries
resulting to the plaintiff and next of kin, from the death of the
deceased. In estimating the damages, if any, you will not allow
anything for pain and suffering of the deceased, nor grief nor
wounded feelings of his relatives, nor anything by way of exem-
plary damages or punishment of the defendant. And in deter-
mining what amount you will allow, you should take into con-
sideration the age of the deceased, his occupation, business ca-
pacity, habits, experience, the condition of his health, the prob-
able duration of his life, the wages he was receiving, if any at
the time of his death, and his probable earnings during his
probable duration of life. You have also the right to take into
consideration the support of the widow and minor children of
the deceased, if he left a widow and minor children; also the
instruction and proper training of any such minor children,
their ages, and the pecuniary circumstances of such widow and
minor children, and you will assess the damages at such sum
as in your judgment, from all the evidence before you, will be
fair and reasonable compensation for the loss sustained by the
said next kin of the deceased, not exceeding ten thousand dol-
lars. 156
(11) If the jury believe from the evidence that the plaintiff
5 Huntingdon & B. T. R. v. St. P. & K. C. R. Co. 98 Iowa, 219,
Decker. 84 Pa. St. 422. 67 N. W. 227; Huntington & B. T.
ise Pennsylvania Co. v. Marshall, R. v. Decker, 84 Pa. St. 422; Mc-
119 111. 404, 10 N. E. 220; Lake S. Donald v. Norfolk & W. R. Co. 95
& M. S. R. Co. v. Brown, 123 111. Va. 100, 27 S. E. 821; Davis v.
182, 14 N. E. 197; Chicago, M. & Guarnieri, 45 Ohio St. 478, 15 N. E.
St. P. R. Co. v. Dowd, 115 111. 659, 350; Nelson v. Lake S. & M. S. R.
4 N. E. 368; Cleveland, C. C. & St. Co. 104 Mich. 587 (how to find
L. R. Co. v. Bradley, 150 111. 335, the present value); 62 N. W. 993.
26 N. E. 965; Spaulding v. Chicago,
650 NEGLIGENCE OF RAILROADS. 684
is entitled to recover, in estimating the damages the jury should
find the sum with reference :
First. To the pecuniary loss of the widow and child, at a
sum equal to the probable earnings of the deceased, considering
his age, business, capacity, experience, habits, energy, and per-
severance during his probable life.
Second. In ascertaining the probability of life reference may
be had to the scientific tables on that subject.
Third. They may consider the loss of his care, attention, and
society to his widow and child.
Fourth. They may add such sum as they deem fair and just
by way of solace and comfort to his widow for the sorrow, suffer-
ing, and mental anguish occasioned by his death, provided they
do not find over ten thousand dollars. 157
(12) In ascertaining the amount of damages plaintiff is enti-
tled to recover in this case, if any, the jury will take into consid-
eration :
First. By fixing the same at such sum as would probably
be equal to the earnings of the deceased, taking into consideration
the age, business, capacity, and experience and habits, health,
energy and perseverance of the deceased, during what would
probably have been his lifetime if he had not been killed.
Second. By adding thereto the value of his services in the
superintendence, attention to and care of his family, of which
they have been deprived by his death.
Third. The physical pain of the deceased, as well as the
mental suffering of the surviving members of his family.
Fourth. The loss to his family in reference to his moral and
intellectual training. 158
(13) In assessing damages you are to estimate the reasonable
probabilities of the life of the deceased G and give the equitable
plaintiffs such pecuniary damages as you may find that they have
suffered or will suffer as the direct consequence of the death
of the said G; that for his children these prospective damages
157 McDonald v. Norfolk & W. R. 1G8 Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Few,
Co. 95 Va. 100, 27 S. E. 821; Com. 94 Va. 85, 26 S. E. 406.
Club v. Hilliker, 20 Ind. App. 239,
50 N. E. 578.
685 DAMAGES RESTRICTED. 650
may be estimated to their majority ; and as to the widow of such
probability of life as you may find reasonable under the cir-
cumstances. 139
(14) The plaintiff's damages, if any, should be a fair and just
compensation for the pecuniary injury resulting to the husband
and children from the death of the wife. In no case can the^
jury, in estimating such damages, if any, consider the bereave-^
ment, mental anguish, or pain suffered by the living for the
dead. The damage is exclusively for a pecuniary loss, not a
solace. The reasonable expectation of what the husband and
children might have received from the deceased, had she lived,
is a proper subject for the consideration of the jury, if they
find for the plaintiff. What the husband and children might
reasonably expect to receive by reason of the services of the
wife in a pecuniary point of view is to be taken into account
in determining the amount of damages, if you find for the plain-
tiff. It should be said that it is the present worth as a gross
sum in money for the loss of the services of the wife, that the
jury are to find if they find a loss. It is that same
which put in money is a compensation for what you
find this woman would reasonably have saved for her
family. Of course, in determining this, these things
are all to be considered; that is, the age, health, prob-
ability of length of life, or death if she had not died from
taking the drug. 160
(15) The measure of damages in this case is the present value
of the amount of money which the plaintiff and the minor chil-
dren would have received from the deceased during the contin-
uance of her life, had she lived. The present value of a sum of
money payable in the future is what that sum is worth if paid
presently paid now. For example, the present value of one dol-
lar at six per cent, at the end of one year is found by dividing
one dollar, by one dollar and six cents; and the present value
of one dollar at the end of to years is found by dividing one dol-
lar by one dollar and twelve cents. 161
159 President, M. Co. of B. & R. 16 Davis v. Guarnieri, 5 Ohio St.
Turnpike R. v. State, 71 Md. 576, 18 478, 15 N. E. 350.
Atl. 884. 161 Nelson v. Lake S. & M. S. R.
Co. 104 Mich. 587, 62 N. W. 993.
651 NEGLIGENCE OF RAILROADS, G86
651. Damages Instructions for defendant. (1) You are
instructed that in considering the damages in this case, it is your
duty to dismiss from your minds all consideration of the grief,
sorrow and mental affliction of the widow and children of the
deceased; to dismiss from your minds all personal feeling and
sympathy which may have been aroused by the recital of the
circumstances of the casualty, and consider only the pecuniary
injury. 162
(2) If you believe from the evidence that the capacity of
the plaintiff's husband would be decreased by reason of ad-
vancing years, then it would be your duty to diminish the
amount that you may find for the plaintiff accordingly. 163
(3) The Carlisle tables have been offered in evidence, but you
are not to regard such tables as proving that plaintiff is to recover
for forty and three-fourths years of life. You are to bear in
mind that W was liable to die at any time, and that there was
no certainty that he ever would have lived until he was twenty-
one years old. You are not to presume that he would be diligent
in acquisition 01 property or successful in saving what he might
acquire. 184
Measure of Damages.
652. Consider permanency of injury, health, business, ex-
pense, time. (1) If you find for the plaintiff you will be required
to determine the amount of her damages. On this subject the
court instructs you that in estimating the damages, you will
consider her bodily pain and suffering occasioned by the in-
juries or sickness, if any, resulting from such injury; and in
case you find that the plaintiff has not yet recovered from
such injury, or that by such injury she has to any extent
been permanently disabled, then you should take such
facts into consideration in estimating her damages to
which you may add such amount as you, in the ex-
ercise of sound discretion, may think, from the evidence, will
be just compensation for anxiety and distress of mind as are
162 Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. KM Andrews v. Chicago, M. & St.
Harwood, 80 111. 91. P. R. Co. 86 Iowa, 684, 53 N. W.
ins Georeia R. Co. v. Pittman, 73 399.
Ga. 325.
687 DAMAGES FOR PERMANENT INJURY. 652
fairly and reasonably the plain consequences of the injury com-
plained of. 165
(2) If the jury find for the plaintiff they will fix the damages
at such sum, not exceeding ten thousand dollars, as would be a
fair compensation to the estate for the destruction of the power
of the deceased to earn money; and in fixing such damages the
jury should take into consideration the age of the deceased at
the time of his death, and the probable duration of his life. 166
(3) If you find from the evidence that the plaintiff is entitled
to recover, then you will be required to determine the amount
of damages he has sustained, if any. And in estimating the
damages, you will take into consideration the plaintiff's bodily
pain and suffering, if any, occasioned by the injury complained
of, sickness resulting from the injury, if any, mental anguish
suffered and endured by him on account of said injury, if any;
his age, his health and condition before the injury complained
of, and the effect on his health; and in case you find that the
plaintiff to recover, and under such circumstances, if you so
such injury he has to any extent been permanently disabled,
then you should take these matters into consideration in estima-
ting his damages. You should also consider the plaintiff's neces-
sary and reasonable expenses incurred, if any, for medical
and surgical aid or treatment, his loss of time, if any, the money
he is or was making by his business or labor, the effect, if any,
of the injury in the future upon the plaintiff in attending to his
affairs generally in pursuing his business or calling, and allow him
such damages as in your opinion, from all the facts and circum-
stances in evidence, will be a fair and just compensation for the
injury he has sustained. 167
IBS Pittsburg, C. & St. L. R. Co. & E. R. Co. v. Holland, 122 111. 470,
v. Sponier, 85 Ind. 171. 13 N. E. 145; North C. St. R. Co.
lee Smith v. Middleton, 112 Ky. v. Shreve, 171 111. 441, 49 N. E. 534;
592, 56 L. R. A. 484. Tudor Iron Works v. Weber, 129
IGT Pittsburg, C. & St. L. R. Co. 111. 539, 21 N. E. 1078; Eureka
v. Sponier, 85 Ind. 171; Philadelphia Block Coal Co. v. Wells (md. App.),
& W. B. R. Co. v. Anderson, 72 61 N. W. 236; Gorham v. Kansas
Md. 520, 20 Atl. 2; Washington A. City & S. R. Co. 113 Mo. 410, 20 S.
& Mt. V. E. R. Co. v. Quayle, 95 W. 1060; Georgia P. R. Co. v. West,
Va. 748, 30 S. E. 391; Louisville, 66 Miss. 313, 6 So. 207; Southern
N. A. & C. R. Co. v. Falvey, 104 P. R. Co. v. Smith, 95 Va. 190, 28
Ind. 429, 3 N. E. 389, 4 N. E. 908; S. E. 173; Stanley v. Cedar R. &
Terre Haute & I. R. Co. v. Brunker, M. C. R. Co. 119 Iowa, 526, 93 N.
128 Ind. 551, 26 N. E. 178; Chicago W. 493; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v.
652 NEGLIGENCE OF RAILROADS. 688
(4) If the jury shall find a verdict for the plaintiff, then in
estimating the damages they are to consider his health and con-
dition before the injury complained of as compared with his pres-
ent condition in consequence of said injury, and whether the
same is in its nature permanent, and how far, if at all, it is cal-
culated to disable him from engaging in employment for which,
in the absence of such injury, he would have been qualified, and
also the physical and mental suffering, if any, to which he was
subjected by reason of such injury and to allow him such dam-
ages as in the opinion of the jury will be a fair and just compen-
sation for the injury he has sustained. 168
(5) If the jury shall find a verdict for the plaintiff, then
in estimating damages they are to consider the health and con-
dition of the plaintiff before the injury complained of as com-
pared with his present condition in consequence of said injury,
and whether the same is in its nature permanent; and if the
jury further believe that the plaintiff's internal affliction is the
natural and proximate consequence of the injury sustained by
the defendant's negligence, then they are entitled to consider
the same in awarding damages, even if they believe that at the
time of the accident the plaintiff had a tendency or predisposi-
tion to the disease or trouble from which he now suffers.* 89
(6) If the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant
company is liable in this action, then in estimating damages they
should take into account the bodily injury, if any, sustained by
the plaintiff, the pain undergone, the effects. on the health of
the sufferer according to its degree and its probable duration
as being temporary or permanent, and the pecuniary loss sus-
tained by the plaintiff, through his inability to attend to his
business affairs after his arrival at the age of twenty-one
years. 170
(7) If you find under the evidence that the plaintiff is entitled
Warner, 108 111. 545; Cicero St. R. ies Philadelphia & W. B. R. Co. v.
Co. v. Brown, 193 111. 274, 61 N. E. Anderson, 72 Md. 520, 20 Atl. 2.
1093; Springfield C. R. Co. v. Hoeff- See Mellor v. Missouri Pac. R. Co,
ner, 175 111. 642, 51 N. E. 884; Wris- 105 Mo. 455, S. W. 849.
ley Co. v. Burke, 203 111. 259, 67 i Baltimore & L. T. Co. v. Cas-
N. E. 818; Chicago, R. I. & P. K sell, 66 Md. 421.
Co. v. Otto, 52 111. 417; Smith v. i Washington, A. & Mt. V. Elec.
Middleton, 112 Ky. 592, 56 L,. R. A. R. Co. v. Quayle, 95 Va. 748, 30 S.
484. B. 391.
689 DAMAGES FOR PERMANENT INJURY. 652
to recover, it will be your duty to assess the amount of damages
which, you in your judgment, think, from the evidence, she
should recover. And in estimating the amount you may take
into consideration any expenses actually incurred, loss of time,
if any, occasioned by the immediate effects of her injuries and
physical and mental suffering caused by and growing out of
her injuries. And in addition you may consider the professional
occupation, if any, of the plaintiff and her ability to earn money ;
and she will be entitled to recover for any permanent reduc-
tion if any, of her power to earn money by reason of her injuries,
and the amount assessed should be such a sum as, in your judg-
ment, will fully compensate her for the injuries or any of them,
thus sustained. 171
(8) If the jury find from the evidence that the plaintiff was in-
jured by the wrongful negligent act of the defendants, the rail-
road's agents and servants, and while the plaintiff himself was
acting with reasonable prudence, then in assessing his damages,
the jury should take into account the peril if any there was,
to the plaintiff's life; the suffering of body and mind, if any
there was; the fact, if it is a fact, as shown by the evidence,
that the injury he suffered is permanent; the extent of it;
how far, if at all, the injury renders him less capable and fit
to pursue his calling and business; any loss of time shown, its
value if shown; any expenses incurred; and so considering said
elements, the jury should assess such damages within the de-
mand of the complaint as will reasonably and justly compensate
the plaintiff for his injuries. 172
(9) If the jury find the issues for the plaintiff, then the plain-
tiff is entitled to recover such actual damages as the evidence
may show he has sustained as the direct or proximate result of
such injury, taking into consideration his loss of time, his pain
and suffering, his necessary and reasonable expenses in medical
and surgical aid, and nursing, so far as the same may appear
from the evidence in the case; and if the jury find from the
evidence, that the said injury is permanent and incurable, they
should also take this into consideration in assessing the plain-
171 Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. i Terre Haute & I. R. Co. v.
v. Palvey, 104 Ind. 429, 3 N. E. 389, Brunker, 128 Ind. 551, 26 N. E. 178.
4 N. E. 908.
652 NEGLIGENCE OF RAILROADS. 690
tiff's damages; and the jury are instructed that the fact that
the plaintiff is married and that his wife is living, cannot
be considered by the jury in determining the amount of damages
to which the plaintiff is entitled in this case. 173
(10) If you find the issues for the plaintiff in this case, then
the plaintiff is entitled to recover such actual damages as the evi-
dence may show she has sustained as the direct or approximate
result of such injury, taking into consideration her pain and
suffering so far as the same may appear from the evidence in
the case ; and if the jury find from the evidence that said injury
is permanent and incurable, they should take this fact into con-
sideration in assessing the plaintiff's damages. 174
(11) If, under the evidence in the case and the instructions of
the court, you find the defendant guilty, then in estimating the
plaintiff's damages, if any are proved, you have the right to
take into consideration not only the loss, expenses and imme-
diate damage arising from the injuries received at the time of
the accident, but also the permanent loss and damage, if any is
proved, arising from any disability resulting to the plaintiff from
the injury in question which renders him less capable of at-
tending to his business than he would have been if the injury
had not been received. 175
(12) If from the evidence in the case and the law given you in
these instructions, you find for the plaintiff, you may take into
consideration the bodily pain and suffering caused by the injury
if any has been shown, and the pain and suffering which will
result therefrom in the future, if you find from the evidence
that such will be the result; also the probability of the injuries
she has received being permanent, and the extent, if any, to
which the injury has incapacitated her for labor; also the
reasonable expanses paid or incurred for the services of a sur-
geon or physician, made necessary by such injuries, and assess
her damages at such sum as you may believe from all the
evidence, will compensate her for the injury so sustained. You
ITS Chicago & E. R. Co. v. Hoi- " Tudor Iron Works v. Weber,
land, 122 111. 470, 13 N. E. 145. 129 111. 539, 21 N. E. 1078.
174 North C. St. R. Co. v. Shreve,
171 111. 441, 49 N. E. 534.
691 CONSIDERATIONS IN ESTIMATING DAMAGES. 653
should allow no speculative damages, but only such as are
compensatory. 170
(13) If you find for the plaintiff in this cause, it will be your
duty to assess his damages. The damages should be assessed on
the basis of compensation for the injuries sustained. In doing so,
you should take into consideration the question as to whether
the plaintiff is temporarily or permanently injured; the question
of his physical and mental suffering; the loss of time, if any,
occasioned by his injury; the expense, if any, incurred in em-
ploying a physician or surgeon to treat his injuries; the expense
incurred, if any, in nursing, and should award him such damages
as will compensate him for his injuries, in any sum not exceed-
ing ten thousand dollars. 177
(14) To justify the assessment of damages for future or per-
manent disability, it must appear that continued or permanent
disability is reasonably certain to result from the injury com-
plained of. 178
653. Consider age, pain, mental anguish. (1) If you find
for plaintiff, you will in assessing his damages, take into consider-
ation, his age, and condition in life, the injury sustained by
him, if any, and physical pain and mental anguish suffered and
endured by him on account of said injury, if any, his loss of time,
if any, such damages, if any, as you believe from the evidence
he will sustain in the future as the direct effect of such injury,
such sums as he has paid out for medical attention on account
of said injury, if any, together with all the facts and circum-
stances in evidence in the case, anc! assess the damages at such
sum as from the evidence you may deem proper, not exceeding
fifteen thousand dollars, the amount sued for. 179
(2) In arriving at the amount of damages to be allowed in this
case, if you allow any, you are not restricted to any procrustean
rule in the mode of estimating the value of a life. The age of a
man, the health he enjoys, the money he is making by his labor,
"6 Pomerene Co. v. White (Neb.), s Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Cosby,
69 N. W. 234. 107 Ind. 35. 7 N. E. 373.
177 Eureka Block Coal Co. v 179 Gorham v. Kabsas City & S.
Wells (Ind. App.), 61 N. W. 236. R. Co. 113 Mo. 410, 20 S. W. 1060.
Held not objectionable as allowing
the jury to go outside of the evi-
dence in assessing damages.
653 NEGLIGENCE OF RAILROADS. 692
his habits, are data from which the jury may argue how long
he will probably live and work, and what his life is worth to
his wife in its pecuniary value. This is true generally, and this
is the rule laid down by which you are to estimate the damages,
if you find any. 180
(3) If the jury believe from the evidence that plaintiff received
injuries caused by the negligence of defendant, its servants or
employees, that it is competent for them, in ascertaining the
damages to which plaintiff is entitled, to take into consideration
her physical condition prior to said injury, her age, capacity for
labor, and the fact as to whether she was self-sustaining or
being supported by others. 181
(4) If the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant
was guilty of negligence upon the occasion mentioned in the
plaintiff's declaration, and that as a result of that negligence
the said plaintiff was injured, they can take into consideration not
only the bodily pain and suffering of the plaintiff, and the
expenses she has been put to, but in addition may allow such
damages as may reasonably seem to them fit, for the mental
suffering and nervous shock which has resulted or may result
from the said negligent act of said defendant. 182
(5) If you find for the plaintiff, you should allow him such sum,
not to exceed the amount claimed by him in his petition, as
from the evidence will reasonably compensate him for the pain
and suffering, if any, or loss of time, if any, or both suffered,
or that will be suffered by him because of his injuries, if any,
by him sustained by reason of colliding with the car of the
defendant at the intersection mentioned, on or about the third
day of May, 1899. 183
(6) In determining the amount of damages the plaintiff is en-
titled to recover, if any, the jury have a right to and should, take
into consideration all the facts and circumstances in evidence be-
fore them, the nature and extent of the plaintiff's physical in-
juries, if any, testified about by the witnesses in the case, her suf-
fering in body and mind, if any, resulting from such injuries, and
iso Central R. Co. v. Thompson, isz Southern Pac. R. Co. v. Smith,
76 Ga. 775. 95 Va. 190, 28 S. E. 173.
isi Georgia P. R. Co. v. West, 66 iss Stanley v. Cedar R. & M. C.
Miss. 313, 6 So. 207. R. Co. 119 Iowa-, 526, 93 N. W. 493.
693 CONSIDERATIONS IN ESTIMATING DAMAGES. 653
also, such prospective suffering and loss of health, if any, as the
jury may believe, from all the evidence before them in the case,
she has sustained or will sustain by reason of such injuries. 184
(7) If, under the evidence and instructions of the court, the
jury find the defendant guilty, then, in estimating the plaintiff's
damages, it will be proper for the jury to consider the effect of
the injury in future upon the plaintiff, the use of his arm, and
his ability to attend to his affairs generally, in pursuing any
ordinary trade or calling, if the evidence shows that these will
be affected in the future, and also the bodily pain and suffering
he has sustained, and all damages, present and future, which,
from the evidence, can be treated as the necessary and direct re-
sult of the injury complained of. 185
(8) If under the evidence and instructions of the court, you
find the defendant guilty, then, in assessing the plaintiff's dam-
ages, if any such damages as are alleged in her declaration are
proved, you have a right to take into consideration the nature,
extent and character of the injury sustained by her, so far as
the same is shovn by the evidence, if any such are so shown, the
pain and suffering undergone by her in consequence of such
injury, if any such is shown by the evidence, and assess damages
in such sum as in your judgment will compensate the plaintiff
for such injury and pain and suffering. 186
(9) If under the evidence, and instructions of the court, the
jury find the defendant guilty, then in estimating the plaintiff's
damages, it will be proper for the jury to consider the effect of
the injury in the future upon the plaintiff, if any is shown by the
evidence, the use of his foot and leg, his ability to attend to
his affairs, generally in pursuing any ordinary trade or calling,
if the evidence shows that these will be affected in the future;
and also the bodily pain and suffering he sustained, if any,
and all damages present and future, if any, which from the
is* Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. v. the latter clause did not submit a
Martin, 111 111. 227. Held not as- question of law to the jury,
suming that the party is entitled to iss Springfield C. R. Co. v. Hoeff-
recover damages. ner, 175 111. 642, 51 N. E. 884. Held
is5 Chicago, &c. R. Co. v. Warner, not objectionable as permitting the
108 111. 545. Held proper and that jury to go outside of the evidence
in assessing damages.
654 NEGLIGENCE OF RAILROADS. 694
evidence, can be treated as the necessary and direct result of
the injury complained of. 187
(10) If from the evidence in the case and under the instruc-
tions of the court, the jury shall find the issue for the plaintiff,
and that the plaintiff has sustained damages as charged, in the
declaration, then to enable the jury to estimate the amount of
such damages, it is not necessary that any witness should have
expressed an opinion as to the amount of such damages, but
the jury may themselves make such estimate from the facts and
circumstances proven by the evidence, and by considering them
in connection with their knowledge, observation and experience
in the business affairs of life. 188
654. Considerations in mitigation of damages. (1) It was
the duty of the plaintiff to use ordinary care, diligence and judg-
ment, in securing medical or surgical aid after she received the
injuries complained of, if she did receive any; and if you find
from the evidence that she failed to use such ordinary care,
diligence and judgment in procuring timely medical or surgical
aid ; and if you further find from the evidence that by reason of
such failure her condition is now different and worse than it
would have been if she had used such ordinary care, diligence
and judgment in the premises, then, if you find for the plaintiff,
you should take this into account in making up your verdict
and should not allow any damages for ailments or diseases, if
any, that may have resulted from r:uch failure. 189
(2) And so too it was the duty of the plaintiff to use ordinary
care to cure and restore herself, and if you find from the evi-
dence that the plaintiff failed to use such ordinary care in the
premises, but that she unnecessarily exposed herself in inclement
weather or otherwise, after receiving the injuries, if any 'she
did receive in said accident and thereby increased and aggra-
vated such injuries and enhanced their effects, you will take
these facts into account in arriving at your verdict, if you find
for the plaintiff, and should not allow any damages to the plain-
is? Wrisley Co. v. Burke, 203 111. 189 Louisville N. A. & C. R. Co.
259, 67 N. E. 818. v. Falvey, 104 Ind. 424, 3 N. E. 389,
iss North Chicago St. R. Co. v. 4 N. E. 908.
Fitzgibbons, 180 111. 466, 54 N. E.
483.
695 CUSTOMS, USAGES, RULES. 655
tiff for any ailments, injuries or diseases or their aggravation
from which the plaintiff has been or may be suffering by reason
of such exposure and from which she would not otherwise be
suffering. 190
(3) If you believe from the evidence that the plaintiff is enti-
tled to damages, but believe that only nominal damages would be
all the plaintiff should have, because of mitigating circumstances,
if you believe the evidence shows mitigating circumstances, then
you are authorized to award him only nominal damages. 191
655. Customs, usages, rules relating to railroads. (1) By
the term "general custom" is meant the general way of doing
some particular thing, the usual way of doing such thing. To es-
tablish a general custom in reference to any particular thing,
or way or manner of doing such thing, it must be made to ap-
pear from the evidence that such custom was generally and
uniformly extended to all persons, under like circumstances
and conditions and that the same is notorious, that is, well
understood. So if, in the case at bar, it does not appear from
the evidence that all persons holding tickets or passes from
points west of P to H were allowed to take their choice of line,
either by A or O to H, then the general custom in question in
this case :s not established. 192
(2) The railroad tracks and right of way of the defendant, at
and about where the accident complained of is shown by the plead-
ings and evidence to have happened, was the property of the
defendant, and if the jury shall find from the evidence that a
pathway to either side of the defendant's said tracks had been
made by persons traveling the same, and shall further find that
said pathway continued across said tracks, and that persons had
used the same as a near approach to the store building and sta-
tion used by defendant for twenty-five years or more, and with
knowledge of and without objection from the defendant or
its agents, that such user by persons, however numerous and
for however long a time, conferred no right upon the plaintiffs
or other persons to use such pathway across said tracks, and
i9o Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. ii Birmingham Ry. L. & P. Co.
v. Falvey, 104 Ind. 425, 3 N. E. 389, v. Mullen (Ala.), 35 So. 702.
4 N. E. 908. 192 Milroy v. Chicago, M. & St.
P. R. Co. 98 Iowa, 193, 67 N. W. 276.
655 NEGLIGENCE OF RAILROADS. 696
imposed upon the defendant and its servants no duty to exercise
greater care in the management and running of its trains at
such pathway, than at other points on or along its road where
there were no established crossings. 193
(3) If the jury believe from the evidence that the rule or notice
of the defendant read in evidence, relating to the use of tracks, by
crews of the plaintiff's company in entering the defendant's yard,
was habitually violated with the knowledge and acquiescence
of the defendant or was not enforced as to the switching crew
with which the plaintiff worked, then the jury should disregard
such notice or rule in considering the whole case. 194
193 Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. i* St. Louis N. S. Yards v. God-
Owings, 65 Md. 505, 5 Atl. 329. frey, 198 111. 294, 65 N. E. 90.
CHAPTER XLTV.
REAL ESTATE.
Sec. Sec.
ADVERSE POSSESSION OF LAND. 672. Damages from piling dirt,
filth.
656. Possession must be open and 673. Damages in destroying fences.
notorious. 674. From diverting flow of sur-
657. Actual possession essential. face water.
658. Possession shown by acts of 675. Dam injured by bridge wash-
ownership, ing out through negligence.
659. Possession Acts of ownership
not sufficient.
660. Intention must accompany
661. Notice to legal owner essen- .
oen f 677. Measure of damages for in-
662. Claiming land by color of jury to crQps
663. Occu|ying land without color Submitting facts tc
BOUNDARY LINES. DAMAGES BY NUISANCE..
664. Boundary line fixed by agree- 679. Residence, health, business,
ment. injury to.
665. Locating the boundary line. 680. Plaintiff must prove nuisance,
666. Meander line as the boun- injury insufficient.
dary. 681. Purchasing property in fac-
667. By high-water mark. tory locality, no liability.
668. Accretions along rivers 682. Using premises as a pest-
Ownership. house -
DAMAGES TO REALTY. EMINENT DOMAIN CONDEMNATION.
669. Owner permitting property to 683. Highest and best use in es-
be damaged. timating damages.
670. Excavations on adjacent prem- 684. Damages based upon market
isesi Liability. value.
671. Damages from change of 685. Considerations in determining
grade. value.
697
656 REAL ESTATE. 698
Sec. Sec.
686. Value of lots fronting on nav- TAXES ON REALTY.
igable streams.
687. Benefits shall be deducted 689. Land unlawfully sold for taxes
from damages. Certificates void.
688. Witnesses magnifying values 690. Listing land on books for as-
Credibility. sessment.
691. Forfeitures are odious and
must be strictly proved.
Adverse Possession of Land.
656. Possession must be open and notorious. (1) Adverse
possession sufficient to defeat a legal title must be hostile in its
inception and continue uninterruptedly for ten years. It must
also be open, notorious, adverse and exclusive, and must be held
during all of such time under a cjaim of ownership by the occu-
pant, and all of these facts must be proved by a preponderance
of the evidence. 1
(2) In order to divest the title to the land described in plain-
tiff's declaration out of the plaintiff and vest it in the defendant
by reason of his adverse possession, that possession must be actual,
visible, notorious and hostile, continuous and uninterrupted,
under a claim of title for a period of - - years next preceding
the commencement of this suit. 2
(3) If the defendants and those under whom they claim have
adverse possession of so much of the premises mentioned and
described in the petition as is covered by the building of the
defendants, and said possession was open, notorious and hostile,
under claim of title, and continuous for more than ten years prior
to the institution of this suit, then the plaintiffs cannot recover
the portion of said premises so covered by said building. 3
(4) If you find from the evidence that the defendant entered
into the occupancy and possession of the premises in question,
claiming the title thereto exclusive of and hostile to any other
right, and that such claim of title was made in good faith, the de-
fendant believing that he had a good title to the land as the owner
thereof, and further find that such occupancy and possession was
1 Hoffine v. Ewings, 60 Neb. 731, See Davenport v. Sebring, 52 Iowa,
84 N. W. 93. See McAvoy v: Gas- "64.
sioy, 60 N. Y. S. 827. 3 Dalton v. Bank, &c. 54 Mo. 106.
2 Dalby v. Snuffer, 57 Mo. 294.
699 ADVERSE POSSESSION OF LAND. 656
actual and continued, uninterrupted and notorious and hostile to
any other right or title to said land for a period of twenty years
prior to the commencement of this action, and that during all
that time the defendant so claimed title to said land, that would
constitute adverse possession and would bar plaintiff's right to
recover in this action, and your verdict in such case would and
should be for the defendant. 4
(5) If at the date this suit was commenced the defendant had
been in peaceful and exclusive possession of the land up to the
north line of the disputed strip and cultivated and claimed it as
his own, and such claim of ownership has been open, notorious and
adverse to all the world for more than - - years, then his pos-
session and claim has ripened into a good title, and if you so
find your verdict will be for the defendant. To be adverse, how-
ever, the holding or possession of the defendant must have been
with the intention of insisting upon his right to the land in con-
troversy as against all others an'd not by mere mistake as to the
location of the line as fixed by the government survey. 5
(6) If you believe from the evidence that S cleared and culti-
vated the land east of the old levee, beginning at an old stone in
the southeast corner of the lot number seven of the D tract, and
running eastwardly at right angles to said old levee toward the
Mississippi river, and that he and those under whom he claims
title have been in open, public, notorious and adverse possession
thereof, claiming title thereto for more than ten years prior to
the institution of this suit, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover
any part of the land so occupied nor any part of the. accretion
thereto. 6
(7) If the plaintiff's possession of the premises in dispute was
open, notorious, exclusive and adverse, comporting with the usual
management of a farm by its owner, though a portion was wood-
land and uncultivated, and though not wholly surrounded by
fences or rendered inaccessible by other obstructions, it would
constitute a disseizin of the true owner unaffected by other
facts. 7
* Bartlett v. Secor, 56 Wis. 520, e Beene v. Miller, 149 Mo. 233, 50
14 N. W. 714. S. W. 824.
s Heinz v. Cramer, 84 Iowa, 497, ? Gardner v Gooch, 48 Me. 489.
51 N. W. 173.
657 REAL ESTATE. 700
(8) When a party claims to have acquired title to the lands of
another by having held possession a length of time sufficient to
bar the owner from retaking possession, he must, to succeed,
show that his possession is of that exclusive, permanent, open,
hostile and adverse character as to put the owner in the position
of failing to assert his rights, knowing or having reason to know
.they were encroached upon for the full period of - years. 8
(9) To defeat the claim of the plaintiffs in this action upon the
defense of adverse possession the jury must find from the evi-
dence that the defendants in person or by their tenants have
for more than twenty years prior to May thirty-first, 1889, held
actual, exclusive, continuous, open, notorious and adverse posses-
sion of the said premises, and they cannot extend their possession
by tacking it to the prior possession of any person who during
such prior possession did not claim any title or right to the prem-
ises. 9
657. Actual possession is essential. (1) If you believe from
the evidence that the defendants and those under whom they
claim have had possession of the land in dispute for more than
twenty years prior to the commencement of this suit under claim
of title, and adversely to all other claims of title, you must find
for the defendants. 10
(2) If T and his representative took actual possession of the
tract of laud in question by fencing up the whole of it, and held
such possession claiming to be the owner thereof in fee, for more
than twenty years prior to the entry of the defendants or those
under whom they claim, such possession vested the fee in said
T's representatives. 11
(3) If you believe from the evidence that the defendant and
those through whom he obtained possession of the property sued
for, had had a continuous possession thereof for twenty years next
before the commencement of this suit, claiming the same as their
own, then you should find for the defendant as against each of
the plaintiffs, who has not proved herself or himself either under
twenty-one years of age or a married woman at the commence-
ment of such possession ; and the burden of proof is upon each
8 Hoohmoth v. Des Grand Champs, 10 Wiggins v. Holley, 11 Ind. 5.
71 Mich. 520, 39 N. W. 737. n Farrar v. Heinrich, 86 Mo. 527.
o Holtzman v. Douglas, 168 U. S.
285, 18 Sup. Ct. 65.
701 POSSESSION, HOW SHOWN. 658
of the plaintiffs claiming to have been under such age, or a
married woman at the commencement of such possession, to prove
it affirmatively; and until it be proved to the satisfaction of the
jury, the contrary thereof should be presumed by you. 12
658. Possession shown by acts of ownership. (1) If you be-
lieve from the evidence that the plaintiff upon receiving and re-
cording the deed from E to him dated September twenty-eighth,
1833, entered upon the land therein described and continued to
have a visible possession, occupancy and improvement of only
a portion thereof, such occupation and improvement, uncon-
trolled by other acts, were a disseizin of the true owner as to the
whole of said land described in the deed, though E might not
have had title thereto. 13
(2) To constitute possession it is not necessary that the land
should be enclosed with a fence, or that the same should be cul-
tivated, resided upon or that buildings should be erected thereon.
It is sufficient if the acts of ownership are of such a character as
to openly and publicly indicate an assumed control or use such
as are consistent with the character of the premises in question.
If you find in the spring of 1868, or the summer of that year,
B, after getting his deed, began the exercise of such acts of
ownership and control as are usual by owners of timber lots
when used to supply a farm in the neighborhood with timber,
and his acts were of such an adverse, open, notorious and hostile
nature as to clearly indicate that he asserted exclusive control
over it, and that he continued to do so up to the time of his sale
to H, and that afterwards H continued with like acts, you
would be justified in finding that the defendants had been in
such possession as to bar any claim of title on the part of the
plaintiff, and your verdict should be for the defendants. 14
(3) If you believe from the evidence in the case that the land
in controversy or any considerable part thereof was susceptible of
a definite occupation or possession, that is, that said land or any
part of it was fit for pasture or cultivation without clearing or
cutting away the timber thereon then, in order to constitute the
possession of the plaintiff, or that of those under whom he claims.
12 Dessaunier v. Murphy, 33 Mo. n Murray v. Hudson, 65 Mich.
191. 673, 32 N. W. 889.
is Gardner v. Gooch, 48 Me. 488.
658 REAL ESTATE. 702
adversely, you must believe from the evidence in the case that
the plaintiff or his grantor, M, either in person or by their
tenants, built permanent structures on said land, or actually
inclosed or cultivated it or some part of it for the period of ten
years prior to the institution of this suit, and that it is not suffi-
cient in such a case that the plaintiff or his grantor, M, paid
the taxes on said land, kept off trespassers, cut off timber, erected
temporary structures and pastured stock thereon under a claim
of ownership. 15
(4) Neither physical occupation, cultivation nor residence is
necessary to constitute actual adverse possession when the prop-
erty is so situated as not to admit of any permanent useful im-
provement and the continued claim of the property has been evi-
denced by open, visible, continuous acts of ownership, known to
and acquiesced in by the real owner, or so far notorious as to be
presumed to be within his knowledge. 16
(5) For the purpose of constituting adverse possession by a
person claiming title to land not founded upon some written in-
strument or some judgment or decree, the land shall be deemed to
have been possessed and occupied in the following cases only: (1)
when it has been protected by a substantial inclosure; (2) when
it has been usually cultivated and improved. 17
(6) If you believe from the evidence that the defendant H, not
less than ten years prior to the commencement of this suit,
entered into possession of the land in controversy and cultivated
or fenced the same, or erected improvements of any kind thereon,
or did any other acts of such a character as to clearly show that
he was occupying said land and claiming it the same as his own,
and during all of said time continued to so occupy said land
claiming during all of said time to be the owner thereof, and
never during any of said period of time abandoned the land,
but during all of the time of said ten years continued openly,
notoriously, adversely and exclusively to occupy and claim to
be the owner of said land, then you are instructed that said acts
on the part of the defendant H would constitute adverse pos-
session within the meaning of the law and would entitle the
is Cook v. Farrah, 105 Mo. 502, " Bartlett v. Secor, 56 Wis. 520,
16 S. W. 692. 14 N. W. 714.
ie Merwin v. Morris, 71 Conn. 564,
42 Atl. 855.
703 POSSESSION, HOW SHOWN. 660
defendant to a verdict. But if the defendant, H, has failed to
establish any of said acts by a preponderance of the evidence
your verdict should be for the -plaintiff. 18
659. Possession Acts of ownership not sufficient. (1) It is
not sufficient to constitute possession that the said K should have
occasionally used the property in dispute for the purpose of a
printing office during a period of time equal to ten years or more,
but such possession, in order to bind the true owner, must have
been continuous and unequivocal. 19
(2) The mere piling up of wood or lumber or rails or offal upon
a tract of land or lot, unaccompanied by any other act denoting
ownership, is not such possession of the land or lot as would
constitute notice to a bona fide purchaser of such tract of land
or lot, unless such piling of wood or lumber should constitute,
in the estimation of the jury, an open, visible and exclusive
possession of the lot in the person piling such wood or lumber. 20
(3) An occasional use of the land in question, such as the occa-
sional cutting of grass or fire wood, will not be sufficient to con-
stitute or establish adverse possession. 21
(4) If the plaintiff cut the grass upon a natural fresh meadow,
and carried the hay away and converted it to his own use annu-
ally for any period of time, however long, without any other pos-
session of the land on which it grew, or any claim of title to the
land, such acts alone would not constitute an adverse possession
against the true owner of the soil. 22
660. Intention must accompany possession. (1) Such pos-
session must be under a claim of title or right to the land occu-
pied ; or, in other words, the fact of possession and intention with
which it was commenced and held are the only tests. If therefore
the intention of claiming the title of the land against the true
owner is wanting, the possession will not be adverse, and however
long continued will not bar the owner's right to recover. 23
(2) If the defendants during the time they have held the land
in dispute only claimed to own the improvements made thereon
is Hofflne v. Ewings, 60 Neb. 731, 21 Mer\\in v. Morris, 71 Conn. 564,
84 N. W. 93. 42 Atl. 855.
is Mertens v. Keilman, 79 Mo. 416. 22 Gardner v. Gooch, 48 Me. 489.
20 Truesdale v. Ford, 37 111. 210. 23 Davenport v. Sebring, 52 Iowa,
366, 3 N. W. 403.
061 REAL ESTATE. 704
then no length of possession will give them title to the land;
and, in considering this case, you will take into consideration
the acts and declarations of the defendants and their statements
of the claim made by them, and if the evidence introduced satis-
fies you that the claim of the defendants was a claim for improve-
ments only, then you must find i'or the plaintiffs. 24
(3) If you believe from the evidence that the defendants pur-
chased the land in controversy from the railroad company, by
an assignment of a contract of purchase from one S, and
thereby derived the first claim they ever made to the land in
question, and afterwards sued and obtained the purchase money
paid for said land by their assignor, S, or themselves, by reason
of an alleged want of title in said railroad company, then such
action on the part of the defendants amounts to an abandonment
of all rights claimed or acquired by the defendants in and to
the title to the land in question up to the time of receiving such
repayments of the purchase money, and their claim of title now
made must commence from the date of the receipt of such pur-
chase money, if you find such claim has been made by the
defendants. 25
(4) The question of abandonment is one of fact and intention.
Ceasing to cultivate a common field and a removal elsewhere do
not make an abandonment; but to constitute an abandonment
by the party occupying the premises it must be shown that he
quit the property with the intention of making no further claim
to the same, and the burden of showing the abandonment rests
upon the party who alleges it. 26
661. Notice to the owner essential. (1) You cannot pre-
sume that the owner of the land in question, in going along the
highway where the fence is shown to be nearly on the line, and
seeing a fence extending north, has thereby notice that the fence
incloses any portion of the land. On the contrary, he is justified
in assuming that his neighbor is only inclosing what he is en-
titled to. 27
24 Davenport v. Sebring, 52 Iowa, 26 Taylor v. Laden, 33 Mo. 205.
366, 3 N. W. 403. See Heinz v. 27 Hockmoth v. Des Grand
Cramer, 84 Iowa, 499, 51 N. W. 173. Champs, 71 Mich. 520, 39 N. W.
25 Davenport v. Sebring, 52 Iowa, 737.
364, 3 N. W. 403.
705 COLOR OF TITLE. | 662
(2) The defendant, to make out a title by adverse possession,
must show that such possession was adverse in its inception, and
where the entry is under the title of the legal owner the holder
cannot controvert that title without an express disclaimer or its
equivalent, and the assertion of an adverse title with notice to
the owner. 28
(3) The owner need not move to retake possession till he learns
or ought to know that his lands are taken possesion of. 29
662. Claiming land by color of title. (1) The party who
relies on adverse possession of land under color or claim of title to
defeat the legal right of the owner of the land must show:
first, his color or claim of title and that it covers the land or a
part of the land in controversy; second, that he entered under
said claim or color of title upon said land or some part thereof;
third, that his entry was hostile and adverse to the party having
the legal title, and was actual, visible and exclusive ; and fourth,
must have so continued hostile, actual, visible, unbroken under
said color or claim of title for ten years before the commence-
ment of the action to dispossess him. 30
(2) If you find that the plaintiff entered into possession of the
land in dispute under the document introduced in evidence as ex-
hibit A, purporting to be signed by R under a claim of owner-
ship, and if you find that he has personally, or by his tenants,
continued in possession thereof for more than twenty years, then
you must find that he is presumed to have obtained a grant from
the state. 31
(3) If, as claimed by the plaintiff, you shall find that the
predecessors of the defendants in the claim of alleged title have
admitted the title to be in the predecessors, or any of them, and
you so find the title established, then it is not necessary that it
shall appear that any possession has been exercised on the part
of the owner. 32
28 Maxwell v. Cunningham, 50 W. si Maxwell v. Cunningham, 50
Va. 298, 40 S. E. 499. W. Va. 298, 40 S. E. 499.
29 Hockmoth v. Des Grand 32 Merwin v. Morris, 71 Conn. 564,
Champs, 71 Mich. 520, 39 N. W. 42 Atl. 855.
737.
so Maxwell v. Cunningham, 50
W. Va. 298, 40 S. E. 499.
663 REAL ESTATE. 706
663. Occupying land without color of title. (1) Color of
title and claim of title are not, in their strict sense, synonymous
terms. To constitute color of title, a paper title that is, a deed
or other instrument purporting to convey title is requisite ; but a
claim of title may exist wholly in parol, and may be manifested
by acts as well as by words, and if you find from the evidence
that the defendant S built a house or houses, and barn, and other
buildings, dug a well or wells, planted an orchard, and otherwise
improved and cultivated the premises in controversy, this is com-
petent evidence tending to show claim of title on part of the de-
fendant upon which an adverse possession may be predicated,
and which, if continued for a period of twenty years or more,
would bar the plaintiff from maintaining this action. 33
(2) Where a person enters upon land without a deed or other
paper title containing .specific descriptions of the land by metes
and bounds, or without color of title to the premises, claiming to
hold the same adversely, his possession only extends to that part
of the land actually improved and occupied by him ; and his entry
in such case upon a part of the premises does not give him ad-
verse possession to uninclosed and unimproved woodland. 34
(3) The plaintiff's adverse possession would become perfect
with the lapse of years, even if he originally had no shadow
of title, provided such adverse possession was so open that any
other person could bring suit to eject the plaintiff. 35
664. Boundary line fixed by agreement. (1) It is perfectly
competent for parties owning adjoining tracts of land to settle
by agreement where the division line shall be; and if the jury
shall believe from the evidence that the plaintiff and defendant
owned adjoining tracts of land, and any question or dispute had
arisen as to where the line now in controversy was, and the
plaintiff and defendant agreed upon the line and established it
as between themselves, then in that case it is wholly immaterial
where a survey would put the line. Each party is bound by his
agreement, and in determining whether there was such an agree-
ment and fixing of the line, it Is competent for the jury to take
ss Bartlett v. Secor, 56 Wis. 520, sr Beeoher v. Ferris, 112 Mich.
14 N. W. 714. 584, 70 N. W. 1106.
34 Humphries v. Huffman, 33 Ohio
St. 97.
707 FIXING BOUNDARY LINE. 665
into consideration acts and statements of the parties at the time,
the acts done by each, and the fixing and adjustment of fences
and improvements by them under such agreement, if any such
acts or statements are proven. 36
(2) Before you can find for the defendant on the issue that the
survey in the lane dividing the plaintiff's and the defendant's
fields has been agreed upon as the division or boundary line
between the southeast quarter of the southeast quarter of sec-
tion twenty-eight and the northeast quarter of the northeast
quarter of section thirty-three, you must be satisfied from the
evidence that there was a mutual agreement between the owners
of the land to that effect.
The fact that F, the former owner, in section thirty-three,
erected the south line of fence along the lane and cultivated the
lands on the south side of such lane, will not of itself alone be
sufficient to prove such consent and agreement. You are further
instructed that in determining whether the line which divides
the plaintiff's and the defendant's property has or Has not been
agreed upon between the former owners of adjacent property
as the division or boundary line, it is proper that you take into
consideration the long acquiescence of adjoining owners to such
line of division. 37
665. Locating the boundary line. (1) In questions of
boundary, natural objects called for, marked lines and reputed
boundaries well established, should be preferred in ascertaining
the identity of a tract of land to the courses and distances of
the calls of the grant. 38
(2) If there is any excess in quantity of land in the W survey,
such excess is not to be considered by you, whether the
same be great or small, unless it enables or assists you to deter-
mine the true location of the south boundary line of that
survey. You are required to find the true location of the line of
survey as originally run and located on the ground, retracing the
footsteps of the original survey ; and it does not matter whether a
36 Cutler v. Oallison, 72 111. 116; ss Reusens v. Lawson, 91 Va. 237
Henderson v. Dennis, 177 111. 547. 21 S. E. 347.
551.
sTColeman v. Drane, 116 Mo. 387,
22 S. W. 801.
66(5 REAL ESTATE. 708
greater or less quantity of land than called for in the grant be
included within the lines as originally run. 39
(3) In your deliberations to determine the location of the land
described in the Nixon patent, and whether or not it is included
in the Davis survey, you will search for the footsteps of the
surveyor in locating the Davis survey, and in this search you
will be guided first, by natural objects ; second, artificial objects,
and then by course and distance ; yet, in this case, you will inves-
tigate all the evidence and follow the actual survey of said Davis
as it was made, if, in fact, made by the surveyor, to decide said
location of said land described in said Nixon patent with refer-
ence to the said Davis survey. 40
666. Meander line as the boundary. (1) If you find from
the evidence in this case that there existed at the time of the gov-
ernment survey and plat of the meander line of the reservation a
quantity of upland between the meander line and the channel
of Wild Hose creek covered with a natural growth of vegetation,
and such tract of land was equal to or greater in area than the
adjacent lots lying north of the meander line and claimed by the
plaintiff, then you may consider this fact as a circumstance tend-
ing to show that the meander line was intended as the south
boundary of the lots claimed by the plaintiff, regardless of the
location of the creek. The court instructs you that a meander
line is a line run by a surveyor for the purpose of determining
the sinuosity of the stream and the area of the lots; and where
such line in fact meanders the stream, under the laws of this
state, the boundary of the lots described would be the center of
the channel of the stream, and not the meander line as run on
the shore. If, however, you find from the evidence in this case
that there is a wide and material divergence between the meander
line as run by the surveyor and the north bank of the stream, as
it existed at the time of the survey, then I instruct you, as a
matter of law, that the meander line as run by the surveyor upon
the ground, and not the stream, should be taken as the southern
boundary of the lots described in the plaintiff's complaint. 41
39 Branch v. Simons (Tex. Cv. Barnhart v. Ebrhart, 33 Ore.
App.) 48 S. W. 40. 279, 54 Pac. 195.
40 Mayfield v. Williams, 73 Tex.
508, 11 S. W. 530.
709 MEANDER LINE, HIGH WATER MARK. 667
667. By high- water mark. (1) The question as to what in
law constitutes ordinary high-water mark is the leading question
in this case. It therefore becomes necessary to define what the
law regards as ordinary high-water mark. It does not mean the
height reached by unusual floods, for these usually soon disap-
pear. Neither does it mean the line ordinarily reached by the
great annual rises of the river, which cover in places lands that
are valuable for agricultural purposes, since the waters brought
by these annual rises do not usually remain permanently or for
any great length of time, and crops may be raised on the soil as
the water subsides. Nor yet does it mean meadow land adjacent
to the river, which, when the water leaves it, is adapted to and
can be used for grazing or pasturing purposes. 42
. (2) Trees may be included under the general head of vegeta-
tion, but trees which grow and flourish best in the immediate vi-
cinity of running streams that are subject to overflow, and which
shoot up in places as the water recedes, and which can withstand
the effect of water encompassing the lower part of their trunks
without injury, and for a longer period than other kinds of trees,
should not necessarily be classed as the kind of vegetation to
which the law refers as marking the limit of ordinary high water
in cases of the character such as the one now on trial, unless the
soil on which they grow is adapted to and can be used for agri-
cultural purposes, or so far removed from the effect of high water
as to become permanent. You are to say from the evidence
before you whether or not the trees mentioned and located in the
testimony as growing upon the particular portion of the land,
the character of which is, in this action, the subject of dispute,
are or are not growing on soil upon which crops may be raised
or grass grown suitable for meadow or pasturage, or are so
unaffected by high water as to become permanent. It is for you
to say whether the soil upon which these trees grow and their
location in respect to the river can be used for agricultural pur-
poses, such as the cultivation of crops or as meadow or not. So
much of it as you may find susceptible of cultivation and the
growing of crops would be above ordinary high-water mark, and
not part of the river bed, as would also the groups of trees which
42 Welch v. Browning, 115 Iowa, 690, 87 N. W. 430.
668 REAL ESTATE. 710
have stood for many years unaffected by high water, and are
permanently fixed in the ground. 43
668. Accretions along rivers Ownership. (1) Under the
law of this state persons owning land on or bounded by the Mis-
sissippi river own to the water's edge, and when the water re-
cedes gradually and land is made thereby, the owner of the land
bounded by the river is owner of the land so made, and such
owner's right to such land remains equal to his river front, and
such riparian rights cannot be encroached upon by adjoining
owners so running their boundary lines as to diminish such river
front or accretions. 44
(2) The term accretion means portions of the soil added to that
already in possession of the owner by a gradual deposit caused
by a change in the bed of the river, and such accretion belongs
to the owner of the land, and it makes no difference whether the
accretions were formed before or after the ownership has accrued
and that ownership may be acquired by adverse possession as
well as by deed. 45
(3) If the jury believe from the evidence that the land and
premises described in the plaintiff's petition and of which the de-
fendants were in possession at the time of the institution of this
suit, were and are not within the boundary line of survey 1922,
nor are any part thereof nor are any accretion thereto, but that
they are within the original boundary line of Island 73, in Mis-
souri river, and the accretions thereto, and that the defendants
held and hold the possession wrongfully from the plaintiff, then
they will find for the plaintiff. 46
(4) Although the jury may believe that Island 73, section six,
township forty-four, range one, west, at any time washed away
entirely or in part after the same was surveyed and patented by
the United States government, yet if they further find that the
land in controversy is a reformation of said island on the bed of
the river where such island formerly existed, then the plaintiff
43 Welch v. Browning 115 Iowa, ^ Beene v. Miller, 149 Mo 234,
690, 87 N. W. 430. 50 S. W. 824.
44 Beene v. Miller, 149 Mo. 234, Buse v. Russell, 86 Mo. 212.
50 S. W. 824. See Dashiel v. Harsh-
man, 113 Iowa, 283, 85 N. W. 85.
DAMAGE TO REALTY.
G70
is entitled to recover in this action if it be shown that the defend-
ant unlawfully detained the same. 47
(5) If the jury believe from the evidence that a slough or arm
of the Missouri River ran between Island 73 and survey 1922, at
the time of making the United States survey, and that since that
time the same has been filled up so as to connect the island with
the main land and make the island and survey one continuous
tract of land, then the adjacent owners of Island 73 and survey
1922 are entitled to the accretions to their respective lands, but
if the slough merely filled up from the bottom or by deposits with-
in the bed of said slough, and said accretions did not form on the
one side or the other, then the center of the slough as it was
before the water deserted it is the boundary between said survey
and said islands. 48
Damages to Realty.
669. Owner permitting his property to be damaged. (1) A
person can in no case recover for damages to his business or prop-
erty which he permits to go on knowing that it is going on, and
without making every reasonable effort and taking active steps
to prevent it or have it stopped. If you believe from the evidence
that the plaintiffs knew their premises were being damaged, and
that they permitted the damages to continue when by their own
efforts the damage might have been stopped or prevented, then
the defendants are not liable for the damage so caused, and the
plaintiffs cannot recover in this suit for any such damages. 49
670. Excavations on adjacent premises Liability. (1) If
you shall believe from the evidence that the house in question was
in a ruinous and dilapidated condition before the witness A com-
menced work upon premises of the defendant adjoining it on the
east, and shall not find that by reason of such work it became
more ruinous and dilapidated, to an extent which impaired its
rental value, then, under the pleadings and all the proof in the
47 Buse v. Russell, 86 Mo. 213. Hartford D. Co. v. Calkins,
48 Buse v. Russell, 86 Mo. 209. 186 111. 104, 57 N. E. 863.
671 REAL ESTATE. 712
cause, the plaintiff cannot recover, and your verdict must be for
the defendant. 50
(2) If you believe from the evidence that the east and south
walls of the house in question were in a bad condition before
the commencement of the digging by the witness A, under
the foundation wall of the defendant's house, and that the set-
tling and cracking thereof were caused by their own inherent de-
fects, and not by the digging by the defendant of his cellar in
the year , then the plaintiff is not entitled to recover for any
injury, to her property caused by such settling and cracking. 51
(3) If you shall find that the work done upon the defendant's
premises, by which the house in question is alleged to have been
injured, was done by - - under the written contract offered in
evidence, and shall further find that a reasonable time before any
excavation below the foundation of said house was made the
plaintiff was notified or had actual knowledge that such excava-
tion was about to be made, then, under the pleadings and the evi-
dence in the cause, the verdict must be for the defendant. S2
(4) If you find from the evidence that the defendant in this
case removed land adjoining the plaintiff's land in the manner
charged in the complaint, then the measure of damages would be
the diminution in value of the plaintiff's land. 53
(5) There is incident to land in its natural condition a right to
support from the adjoining land ; and if land not subject to arti-
ficial pressure sinks or falls away in consequence of the removal
of such support, the owner is entitled to damages to the extent of
the injury sustained. The measure of damages in such case is not
the cost of restoring the land to its former condition or situation,
or of building a wall to support it, but it is the diminution in
value of the plaintiff's land by reason of the acts of the party re-
moving the support. 54
671. Damages from change of grade. (1) If the plaintiff
sustained any damages by reason of change of grade it occurred
so Bonaparte v. Wiseman, 89 Md. 53 Moellering v. Evans, 121 Ind.
12, 42 Atl. 918. 197, 22 N. E. 989.
si Bonaparte v. Wiseman, 89 Md. 54 Moellering v. Evans, 121 Ind.
12, 42 Atl. 918. 195, 22 N. E. 989.
52 Bonaparte v. Wiseman, 89 Md.
12, 42 A. 918.
713 DAMAGE BY CHANGING GRADE. 673
at the time the change was made, and in determining the measure
of damages by the differences between the value of improvements
before the change of grade, and the value of the improvements
after the change, you are to consider the values at that time. If
you find for the plaintiff in that regard, and having assessed a
reasonable and just compensation therefor, you will then consider
the question of interest on the amount of damages found for the
plaintiff, and on that question, if you find that the plaintiff is en-
titled to damages, then he should be allowed interest thereon from
the date of his damages to his improvements up to the first day
of this term. 55
(2) It is for you to say, taking into consideration all the evi-
dence on the subject, whether, under the circumstances, a retain-
ing wall was reasonably necessary to protect the plaintiff's build-
ings and improvements, and, if a wall was necessary, then,
whether the wall which was constructed was such a retaining
wall as was reasonably necessary. And if you find that the
wall was reasonably necessary, and the wall constructed was
a reasonable one for the purpose, then the plaintiff should re-
cover the fair and reasonable cost of such wall. And if, on this
question as to a retaining wall, you find for the plaintiff, then
he will be entitled to recover interest on the fair and reasonable
cost of the retaining wall from the time of its completion
up to the first day of the present term. 56
672. Damages from piling filth, dirt. (1) If you find from
the evidence that the plaintiff is entitled to recover, the true
measure of damages for permanent injury is the cost of removing
the coal dirt, unless the expense of removal of the same exceeds
the value of the entire property, in which case the value of the
property is the limit of the measure of damages, and in no event
can there be a recovery in excess of the value of the entire
property for a permanent injury. 57
673. Damages in destroying fences. (1) In assessing the
actual damages sustained by plaintiffs, if any, the jury should al-
55 Cincinnati v. Whetstone, 47 " Stevenson v. Elbervale Coal
Ohio St. 199, 24 N. E. 409. Co. 201 Pa. St. 121, 50 Atl. 818.
5 6 Cincinnati v. Whetstone, 47
Ohio St. 199, 24 N. E. 409.
674 REAL ESTATE. 714
low such sum as would reasonably be sufficient to pay for ma-
terial and labor required to rebuild plaintiffs' fence and gates, and
place them in as good condition as they were before they were torn
down; and in addition thereto they should allow reasonable com-
pensation for the injury to the use of plaintiffs' goods arising out
of the defendants' acts for such time as would reasonably be re-
quired to rebuild such fence and repair said gates. 58
(2) If the jury find a verdict for the plaintiffs, they should as-
sess the actual damages sustained by plaintiffs by reason of the
taking down and removing of the fence and gates, and if the jury
further find from the evidence that the act of the defendants in
taking down and removing plaintiffs' fence and gates was mali-
cious, they may assess in favor of plaintiffs and against defendants
by way of exemplary. damages, in addition to the actual damages,
such sum as the jury may believe under all the circumstances to
be a just and reasonable punishment for the malicious act. 59
674. From diverting flow of surf ace water. (1) The defend-
ant had the right to build its roadbed where it did, and if neces-
sary to its proper construction and use, to throw up the embank-
ment shown to have been made ; but, in so doing, it was required
by law to construct all the necessary culverts and sluices required
by the natural lay of the land to prevent surface water from
being diverted from its natural and usual course, and thrown
upon land where it would not otherwise have gone. 60
(2) If you find that plaintiff's said land, within the time here-
inbefore stated, was permanently injured, or any of his crops
within said time destroyed or injured by water flowing thereon,
and said embankment and culverts on defendant's roadbed, by di-
verting water from its natural and usual course, contributed to
such damage, destruction or injury, but that the same was caused
in part by water falling and running on said land regardless of
said embankment, then defendant would be liable for only such
proportion of said injury as was caused by said embankment,
and if you so find, and find for plaintiff, you will allow damages
herein for only such proportion of the damage covered by said
embankment and culverts. 61
ss McBeth v. Trabue, 69 Mo. 650. 01 Austin & N. W. R. Co. v. An-
5 McBeth v. Trabue, 69 Mo. 650. derson, 79 Tex. 429, 15 S. W. 484.
co Austin & N. W. R Co. v. AJI-
derson, 79 Tex. 428, 15 S. W. 484.
715 DIVERTING FLOW OF WATER, DAM INJURED. 675
(3) If you find from the evidence that the defendant construct-
ed said embankment and culverts, and that between said twenty-
second day of September, 1886, and the twenty-second day of Sep-
tember, 1888, during ordinary rains, surface water was thereby
diverted from its usual and ordinary course and caused to now
over and upon plaintiff's land, and destroyed or injured plain-
tiff's crop or crops of corn or cotton, if any he had growing there-
on, then you will find for the plaintiff the reasonable value of the
crop so destroyed, if any was destroyed, at the time and place of
its destruction; and such further sum as will fairly compensate
him for the injury, if any thereby caused, to any of said crops not
destroyed ; allowing for only such injury as was caused by said
embankment and culvert causing water to flow on said land which
otherwise would not have flowed there. 82
675. Dam injured by bridge washing out through negli-
gence. (1) The court instructs the jury that, if they find that on
the third day of August, 1885, the plaintiffs were the owners of
the property situated on Deer Creek, described in the deed from
P offered in evidence, with buildings and mill-dam as part there-
of, and which has existed for over thirty years, and that up to the
year 1883 the stream was crossed by the county road at a ford
below the dam, and that about that year the defendants changed
the location of the county road so as to cross the stream by an
iron bridge set upon abutments connected by wing walls with the
banks on either side of the stream, and if the jury shall believe
from the evidence that said abutments, or either of them, were
improperly and insecurely erected for the purposes for which they
were designed, and that, in building said abutments, they were
not built as high or with such space between as was reasonably
necessary in times of freshet, and that, owing to such defective
construction (if they find such) or insufficient space provided for
venting the water one of said abutments gave way, and the bridge
was carried off on the third day of August, 1885, and was lodged
upon the plaintiffs' mill-dam, and that thereby said mill-dam was
washed out and injuries sustained by the said mill and by the
washing away of their buildings, then the plaintiffs are entitled to
62 Austin & N. W. R. Co. v. Anderson, 79 Tex. 428, 15 S. W. 484.
676 REAL ESTATE. 716
recover the losses occasioned thereby and sustained by them in
the destruction of their property and business, notwithstanding
the jury may be of the opinion that the water at the time was
higher than usual in times of freshet. 63
(2) If the jury find that the bridge above Millford was carried
away by a flood on the third day of August, 1885, and in passing
down the stream carried away plaintiffs' dam, then plaintiffs are
entitled to recover such sum as will compensate them for the in-
jury sustained and loss suffered, provided the jury also find that
the location, construction or condition of the bridge was negli-
gent, and that the carrying away of the bridge was in conse-
quence of such location, construction or condition, 64
Damage ~by Animals.
676. Horses and cattle destroying crops, liability. (1) If
you find from the evidence that the fence, through or over which
the stock of the defendant entered on the land of the plaintiff,
was a partition fence, dividing the lands of the parties to this suit,
and that the defendant's stock crossed over said fence at a place
where it was the duty of the plaintiff to maintain said fence, then
the defendant would not be liable in this case, unless the plaintiff
has shown by the testimony of skillful men that the fence was
such as good husbandmen generally keep. 65
(2) If you find that the plaintiff could, by the use of ordinary
care, have prevented the horses and cattle from eating and de-
stroying his hay and corn, he cannot recover for such hay and
corn thus destroyed, which by ordinary diligence he might have
prevented. The plaintiff, after he knew the horses and cattle of
others were destroying his hay and corn, should have used rea-
sonable caution to have prevented further injury, such as fencing
his stacks, and fencing his corn beyond the reach of such stock,
provided he could reasonably have done so. 66
es County Com'rs of Hartford Co. ^ Hinshaw v. Gilpin, 64 Ind. 116.
v. Wise, 71 Ind. 43. ee Little v. McGuire, 38 Iowa, 562.
e* County Comrs. of Hartford Co.
T. Wise, 71 Ind. 43.
717 DAMAGE BY ANIMALS, INJURY TO CROPS. G78
(3) If you find from the evidence that the defendant's fence,
with the exception of one or two small gaps, was sufficient to have
turned the stock, and find that the plaintiff knew of these gaps,
and that the stock would come through such gaps, and after know-
ing such facts, and knowing that the stock did come through said
gaps, and if you find that the plaintiff, with the exercise of ordi-f
nary care, could have prevented said stock from thus trespassing,
and did not do so, he cannot recover for the damage which he
might have thus prevented. 67
(^) A man has no right to carelessly look on at the destruc-
tion of his property. It is his duty to use reasonable care to
prevent such destruction; and if he fails to use ordinary care
he cannot recover for the injury which, by ordinary care, he
might have prevented. 68
677. Measure of damages for injury to crops. (1) The
measure of plaintiff's damage for the loss or injury to the grass
for the years 1886 and 1887, if you find that he has sustained
any damages in that regard, will be the actual damage done to
the grass and crop for these years by the defendant's cattle; that
is the difference between the actual market value of the crop
upon the land for those years as it was, and what its market
value would have been had the plaintiff's cattle not been driven
or herded or pastured upon the land. To state it in other words,
the question for you to determine from the evidence, in fixing the
amount of damages, if any, on this claim, is, how much less was
the actual rental value of the land for the grass crop of these
years by reason of the defendant's cattle having been driven or
herded upon the land than it would have been had the cattle
not been driven or herded upon the land? If you find that the
plaintiff is entitled to recover in this case you will ascertain
whether he has sustained any damages by reason of any perma-
nent injury to the growth of grass on said land. The plaintiff's
damages upon this claim, if he is entitled to recover any, will be
such only as injuriously affect the market value of the land. 69
678. Submitting facts to the jury on injury to crops. (1)
The plaintiff claims that his crop was destroyed by defendant's
6T Little v. McGuire, 38 Iowa, 561. 6 9 Harrison v. Adamson, 86 Iowa,
es Little v. McGuire, 38 Iowa, 562. 695, 53 N. W. 334.
679 REAL ESTATE. 718
cattle. It is important that you determine whether the crop was
destroyed by defendant's cattle; whether plaintiff's fence was a
lawful fence, four and a half feet high, with spaces sufficiently
close ; was the fence four and a half feet high, and such as is gen-
erally, in this country, recognized as a good fence? This is a
matter entirely in your discretion. You will then inquire whether
defendant's cattle broke into plaintiff's field and destroyed his
crop; and if you find that the fence was such a one as comes
within the meaning of the law, and such a one as is recognized as
a good common fence in the country, and the defendant's cattle
broke through the inclosure, the defendant is liable for all dam-
ages resulting from such breach. In such case, it was the duty
of the defendant to keep his cattle up, and not suffer them to run
at large to the danger of his neighbor's property; and if property
was destroyed he would be responsible. No man has the right to
suffer to run at large animals of a dangerous kind, either to the
person or property of another; and if he does, he is responsible
for all damages which result from the acts of such animals. But
if the fence was not a reasonable one, such as would be calculated
to protect the property, the crop, and the loss was the conse-
quence of the negligence of plaintiff, and that by ordinary care
and prudence he could have protected the crops, it was his duty
to do so ; and if he failed to do so, and the fence was such as the
custom of the country and the law would not recognize as a law-
ful fence, he would not be entitled to recover ; the loss would be a
consequence of his own negligence and fault. 70
Damages by Nuisance.
679. Residence, health, business, injury to. (1) If you find
from the evidence that the personal enjoyment of the plaintiffs
in their residence has been, and will be, materially and essentially
lessened by either the noise, smoke, dirt, dust, cinders, horses,
mules or teams, caused by the running and using of said mill, then
the allegations of the complaint have been sustained. 71
(2) The defendants are entitled to use their property for any
TO McManus v. Finan, 4 Iowa, 71 Owen v. Phillips, 73 Ind. 287.
285. See "Nuisance" under criminal law.
719 DAMAGE BY NUISANCE. 680
lawful purpose or business, though it may be in a slight degree
inconvenient or unpleasant to the owners of the adjoining proper-
ty, and, to entitle the adjoining owners to suppress such works,
they must, show such business is injurious to life or health, or
emits such noisome smells as would render the plaintiff's property
unfit for occupation. 72
(3) If the defendants are guilty of maintaining a nuisance by
obstructing the public highway, as claimed, and if the jury find
that the effect thereof was to prevent the free ingress and egress
to the plaintiff's place of business, and that this caused to the
plaintiff a loss of trade and custom in his business as a merchant,
then the defendant would be liable therefor. 73
680. Plaintiff must prove a nuisance ; mere injury insuffi-
cient. (1) The plaintiff cannot recover unless the jury should
be satisfied from the evidence that the leadworks, or shot-tower,
as conducted by the defendants, was either a common or private
nuisance. 74
(2) The mere fact that the plaintiff's wife, or himself, or his
children, suffered from lead or arsenical poisoning, is not suffi-
cient to enable the plaintiff to recover; but the plaintiff must
prove that such poisoning was caused by the operation of either
the shot-tower or the leadworks by the defendants. 75
(3) In determining this case, the jury should remember that
the plaintiff does not claim that either the leadworks or the shot-
tower was run by defendants in a negligent manner; and should
the jury think that the said works, run in an ordinarily careful
and skillful manner, would not be a nuisance, either public or
private, the plaintiff could not recover, even though the jury
should also think that, by some carelessness or negligence of de-
fendant's employes at the time of the fire, or at some other time,
the plaintiff or his family were hurt. 76
(4) The burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to show, first,
that the defendants were guilty of maintaining a private nui-
sance in the operating of a shot-tower or leadworks; and second,
that, as a result from such operation, he, the plaintiff, suffered
72 Price v. Grautz, 118 Pa. St. 406, " Price v. Grautz, 118 Pa. St. 406,
11 Atl. 794. 11 Atl. 794.
73 Park v. Chicago & S. W. R. Co. 76 Price v. Grautz, 118 Pa. St. 407,
43 Iowa, 636. 11 Atl. 794.
74 Price v. Grautz, 118 Pa. St. 406,
11 Atl. 794.
G81 REAL ESTATE. 720
injury, and a failure on the part of the plaintiff to prove both
of these propositions to the satisfaction of the jury would pre-
vent a recovery. 77
681, Purchasing property in factory locality, no liability.
(1) If the jury find from the evidence that, at the time the plain-
tiff acquired the property mentioned in the evidence, and erected
thereon the improvements mentioned in the evidence, there was al-
ready erected and in operation on the adjacent lot a fertilizer fac-
tory which would use the same agents and from which were emit-
ted the like gases and emanations that were used in and emanated
from the factory of the defendant, and producing like effects ; and
that said factory afterwards passed into the possession of, and
was operated by, the defendant, as it had been operated before,
and if they shall further find that when plaintiff acquired and im-
proved his said property, and prior thereto, there was established
and operated in the same locality factories similar to that of the
defendant, from which like emanations producing like results
proceeded; and that said factories employed large numbers of
men and produced merchandise of great value ; and that the plain-
tiff was aware of the existence of saidfactories, and that he so
acquired and improved his said property ; and if they shall further
find that the factory of defendant was in a suitable and proper
place, with a view to the convenience, welfare and comfort of the
public ; and if they shall further find that the damage and injury
suffered by the plaintiff were only such as are incident to the
proximity of such a business as that of the defendant in that lo-
cality, and were not unreasonable or excessive in view of the
location and all of the circumstances of the case, then plaintiff is
not entitled to recover in this action. 78
682. Using premises as a pest house. The measure of dam-
ages in a case of this kind will be what you believe, from the evi-
dence, would be the fair and reasonable rental value of that prop-
erty for the purpose for which it was taken and used. It is what
damages the property sustained by reason of having been used
for a pest house. And you must arrive at the measure of damages
ascertain the measure of damages from the evidence, not from
" Price v. Grautz, 118 Pa. St. 405, Susquehana F. Co. v. Malone,
11 Atl. 794. 73 Md. 268, 20 Atl. 900.
721 EMINENT DOMAIN,ESTIMATING DAMAGES. 683
any preconceived notions of your own, but from the evidence
brought out upon the trial, and from that come to your conclu-
sion. 79
Eminent Domain Condemnation.
683. Highest and best use in estimating damages. (1) The
owner of the land is entitled to the use and enjoyment of the
same for the highest and best use to which it is adapted, and if
you find from all the evidence that a large portion of the Milroy
farm is, by the proposed railroad, cut off from the water supply,
and the several parts rendered inconvenient of access, so that the
whole farm is depreciated in market value and damaged for all
time, then you should take such facts into consideration in esti*
mating the damages. 80
(2) That in fixing the amount of compensation to be paid to the
defendants, severally, you should take into consideration the use
for which the property is suitable and to which it is adapted,
having regard for its situation and the business wants of that lo-
cality, or such as may reasonably be expected in the near future,
so far as the same appears from the evidence, and so far as the
same affects the market value on September 14, 1896. 81
(3) The true measure of compensation for the property to be
condemned is the market value of the same, but reference may be
had, not merely to the uses to which the land is actually applied,
but its capacity for other uses, so far as the same may be shown
in evidence, may also be considered. 82
(4) In determining the fair cash market value of the property
sought to be condemned in this case, you have a right to take into
consideration, and should take into consideration, all the pur-
poses for which said property is adapted and is used, or may
be used, so far as such adaptation and uses are shown by the
evidence or by your view of the said premises, so far as the
same may have affected the market value on September 14, 1896. 83
79 Brown v. Pierce County, 28 si Rock I. & P. R. Go. v. Leisy
Wash. 345, 68 Pac. 872. Brewing Co. 174 111. 550, 51 N. E.
so Galesburg & G. E. R. Co. v. 572.
Milroy, 181 111. 243, 246, 54 N. E. 2 Chicago, E. & L. S. R. Co. v.
939. See Rock I. & P. R. Co. v. Catholic Bishop, &c. 119 111. 528, 10
Leisy Brewing Co. 174 111. 549, 51 N. E. 372.
N. E. 572. ss Rock I. & P. R. Co. v. Leisy
684 UEAL ESTATE. 722
(5) The jury are instructed that they are to ascertain irom the
evidence, after their own view of the property sought to be taken,
and also the damages, if any have been proven, to the property
from which the strip is to be taken. And if the jury believe from
the evidence that the property occupied by the ice company, in
its present condition, has a special capacity, as an entirety, for the
purposes of ice-freezing, cutting and transporting, and as an en-
tirety is devoted to such purposes, and that the value of such tract
will be depreciated and lessened by the taking of the strip in
question, then the owners of the property are entitled to recover
a sum equal to such depreciation in value. 84
684. Damages based upon market value. (1) The damages
allowed to the plaintiff must not in any case exceed the market
value of his premises when the railroad was constructed. 85
(2) The measure of these damages is the difference between
the annual value of plaintiff's premises with the railroad con-
structed and operated as it was, and what such annual value
would have been had not the railroad been on said street during
that time; and that in determining such diminution in the an-
nual value they may consider the manner in which the road
was built along said street in front of said premises, the manner
in which and the extent to which it was used and occupied
at that place by defendant's cars and locomotives, the situation
of the premises in reference to that portion of the road and
the effect which defendant's occupation and use of that por-
tion of the road had upon the reasonable use and enjoyment
of the premises and of the improvements thereon. 86
(3) In no event must the damages exceed the sum which would
be obtained by determining the difference between the annual
rental value of the property with the railroad constructed and
operated as it was, and what that value would have been if there
had been no railroad on P Street during that time. 87
Brewing Co. 174 111. 547, 51 N. E. 85 Blesch v. Chicago & N. W. R.
572. Verdict should not be based Co. 48 Wis. 172, 2 N. W. 113.
on facts observed in viewing the 8G Blesch v. Chicago & N. W. R.
place: Pittsburg, &c. R. Co. v. Swin- Co. 48 Wis. 170, 2 N. W. 113.
ney, 59 Ind. 100; Heady v. Vevay, " Btesch v. Chicago & N. W. R.
&c. Co. 52 Ind. 117. Co. 48 Wis. 171, 2 N. W. 113.
s* Village of Hyde Park v. Wash-
ington Ice Co. 117 111. 233, 7 N. E.
523.
723 MARKET VALUE BASIS OF DAMAGES. 685
(4) At the time of the construction of the road plaintiff had
a vested private right of free access to and egress from his said
lots and the buildings thereon, over and along Pearl street in
front of the lots, "as the same was and would have continued
to be according to the mode of its original use and appropriation
by the public;" that this was a right of property which could
not be materially impaired or destroyed without plaintiff's con-
sent, except upon payment to him of due compensation; and
therefore, if defendant's road changed the mode of the original
use of the highway, or if it was thereby appropriated by the
public to new vehicles and methods of transportation, so as to
materially impair plaintiff's said right, he was entitled to recover
such damages as would compensate him for the injury. 88
(5) If defendant's said right of property was materially im-
paired, the jury must allow him the damages resulting therefrom
from the date of the building of the road in front of his premises
until the commencement of the action. 89
685. Considerations in determining market value. (1) If
you find from the evidence that the plaintiff's farm consisted of
about acres of improved lands, and the right of way of de-
fendant cut the same in such a manner as to injure the value of
the same by throwing it open and dividing it into pieces, you are
at liberty to consider such circumstances and the effect upon the
land, if any, by reason of the location upon the land of the rail-
road, and of the inconvenience directly caused by the railway,
in determining the effect the same would have upon the market
value of the lands, and it is the depreciation in the market value
of the premises which is the true measure of damages, and which
you are to allow for, and not the matters which would cause
such depreciation. 90
(2) If the construction and operation of the defendant's road
in front of the plaintiff's premises has depreciated their annual
value, the jury cannot apportion the damages for these injuries
according to the width of the strip actually taken and occupied,
but must award damages to compensate the plaintiff for the whole
amount of injuries sustained. 91
ss Bleseh v. Chicago & N. W. R. & N. R. Co. 52 Iowa, 616, 3 N. W.
Co. 48 Wis. 170, 2 N. W. 113. 648.
89 Blesch v. Chicago & N. W. R. i Blesch v. Chicago & N. W. R.
Co. 48 Wis. 170, 2 N. W. 113. Co. 48 Wis. 171. 2 N. W. 113.
so Hartshorn v. Burlington, C. R.
685 REAL ESTATE. 724
(3) The plaintiff had a right to put any lawful improve-
ments on the property after the railroad was built on his land,
in the street; and if, after such improvements were made, they
are to be considered in determining the subsequent rental value
of the premises. 92
(4) In this case it is proper for you to take into consideration
the proximity of this land to and its contact with the city of - .
And it is proper for you to take into consideration any fact which
may tend to add a value to that land. If any part of it was then
valuable as building lots, and that fact added a value to the land,
it is proper for you to take that into consideration, and if the loca-
tion and construction of the defendant's railroad across this land
destroyed it in part, or took away any part of this land which
might have had, or had value for that purpose, it is proper for
you to take that fact into consideration. It is not proper for you,
in determining the value, or the amount of damages sustained by
the plaintiff, to take the estimate of any one as to how many lots
might be laid out upon the premises, and what these lots might
have sold for in the event of their being sold. That would be fix-
ing a measure of damages not as of the date of entry, but as of a
future time, but your duty is to fix the measure of the damages
sustained by the plaintiff at the time of the entry, and, as we have
said, anything that then added value to the land, and any injury
then sustained, must be taken into consideration by you. 93
(5) The interruption of plaintiff in the use and cultivation of
his land, or any inconvenience he may have been put to in its cul-
tivation and use sis a live stock farm, or otherwise, according to
his peculiar taste in farming, since the appropriation of the right
of way, if any, cannot be considered by the jury as forming an ele-
ment of damages in his favor, and your inquiry must be confined
to the marketable value of plaintiff's land before and after the
right of way was appropriated, taking into account, in this con-
nection, the number of acres taken for the right of way, the man-
ner of its location, the way his land is cut by the railroad, and the
like, so as to be able to estimate the true market value of his land,
affected by the location of the railroad before and after such loca-
tion ; the difference in the market value of the land affected by
92 Blesch v. Chicago & N. W. R. ^ Reiber v. Butler & P. R. Co.
Co. 48 Wis. 171, 2 N. W. 113. 201 Pa. 49, 50 Atl. 311.
725 LOTS FRONTING ON STREAMS, VALUE. 686
the appropriation of the strip for the right of way before, and
then again after the right of way is asserted, will form or consti-
tute his true measure of damages. 94
(6) In assessing the damages to the market value of the prop-
erty not taken, you should not take into consideration anything
as an element of damages which is remote, or imaginary, or un-
certain, or speculative, even though mentioned or testified about
by the witnesses; but the only elements which you should take
into consideration, as tending to reduce the market value, are
those elements which are appreciable and substantial, and which
will actually lessen the market value of said property. 95
686. Value of lots fronting on navigable streams. (1) That
the owners, severally, of the lots fronting on the Illinois river, and
here sought to be condemned, own to the middle thread of the
stream, subject only to the right of the public to use the navigable
portions thereof for the purposes of navigation. Such owners
have also the exclusive right to any and all ice forming on said
river in front of their lots, respectively, to the middle thread of
the stream, and may themselves cut and remove the same, or sell
such ice to another with the exclusive right to harvest it. 96
(2) The jury are further instructed that, as owners of lands
fronting upon and bounded by a navigable stream, the defendants
in this case, subject to the rights of the public in such navigable
stream, own their several lots to the middle of the stream, and
the said defendants, as such lot owners, have the right to use and
enjoy their several lots by building docks and wharves thereon,
or by filling in the' same with earth or other solid material to
any extent whatever, so long as they do not interfere with the
rights of navigation by the public in such stream. 97
(3) That the owner of lands or lots fronting upon a navigable
stream, and of which lands or lots such stream forms one of the
boundary lines, has a lawful right to erect docks and wharves
conforming to such boundary line, in and along said stream, con-
forming, however, to the regulations of the proper public authori-
se Hartshorn v. Burlington, C. R. 96 Rock I. & P. R. Co. v. Leisy
& N. R. Co. 52 Iowa, 616, 3 N. W. Brewing Co. 174 111. 551, 51 N. E.
648. 572.
95 Kiernan v. Chicago, Santa Pe 97 Rock I. & P. R. Co. v. Leisy
& C. R. Co. 123 111. 188, 195, 14 N. Brewing Co. 174 111. 547, 51 N. E.
E. 18. 572.
>} 687 REAL ESTATE. 726
ties for the protection of the public rights in such stream; and
such owner may so place such docks and wharves as to have the
benefit of the navigable part of such stream, but not interfering
with the public rights of navigation. 08
(4) That if you find from the evidence in this case that the
lots in question, or any of them, are susceptible of enlargement
and extension by filling, thus giving increased areas for any use
to which the property may be put, then you have a right to
take that into account in arriving at your verdict, and give such
fact the weight which, in your judgment, it is entitled to re-
ceive, so far as the same affected their market value on September
14, 1896."
(5) The defendants in this case are each entitled to the fair
cash value on the fourteenth day of September, 1896, of their
respective lots sought to be taken, regardless of the causes
which gave them value at that time. If the jury believe from
the evidence in the case, including their own view, that the
value of said lots, or any of them, on that day, was owing, in
whole or in part, to the projection by the plaintiff of the improve-
ment to its railroad facilities, for which it seeks to condemn said
lots, still the owners of said lots are entitled to the fair cash mar-
ket value of said lots as they then stood. 100
687. Benefits shall be deducted from damages. (1) If the
plaintiff enjoyed any peculiar benefits from the railroad being on
this street, such benefits must be deducted from his damages ; but
that benefits common to the whole community are not to be
considered. 101
688. Witnesses magnifying value Credibility. (1) That if
you believe from the entire testimony, and from your inspection
of the premises, that any witness has magnified or exaggerated
the value of the land taken or the damages to the land not taken,
on account of nis interest in the suit, or his prejudice, or want of
knowledge, or experience, or truthfulness, then you have the
as Rock I. & P. R. Co. v. Leisy 10 Rock I. & P. R. Co. v. Leisy
Brewing Co. 174 111. 550, 51 N. E. Brewing Co. 174 111. 549, 51 N. E.
572. 572.
9 Rock I. & P. R. Co. v. Leisy 101 Blesch v. Chicago & N. W. R.
Brewing Co. 174 111. 550, 51 N. E. Co. 48 Wis. 172, 2 N. W. 113.
572.
727 TAXES OX REALTY. g 690
right, and it is your duty, to disregard the evidence of such wit-
ness in so far as the same is unjustly magnified or unjustly in-
creased, either as to the value of the land taken or the damages
to the property of the defendant not taken. 102
Taxes on Realty.
689. Land unlawfully sold for taxes Certificate void. (1)
If you find that the purchaser and holder of the certificate prior
to the time of the alleged sale made a private bargain with the
treasurer by which he was to take the lands, and that, in pursu-
ance of such private arrangement, a certificate was made out to
him, without said lands ever having been offered publicly, so that
competition was or could have been had, and that it was essen-
tially and entirely private, there then was no public sale, or such
a sale as would convey to the alleged purchaser the title to the
same. And if you find the facts to be that there was no sale, and
that the defendants had title to the land at the time' of the alleged
sale, or that their grantor did, then you will find for the defend-
ants. 103
(2) Upon the question of the title of the defendants, you are
instructed that it is sufficient if you find that they were in posses-
sion of tfye same, and as a matter of right were entitled to such
possession, with such an interest and right as could be enforced,
even though the same may have been defective by reason of the
loss of a deed or other defect. If they or their grantors were, in
fact, the owners of the land, it is sufficient, even though their
claim of title is shown to have been at the time of the alleged sale
deficient. 104
690. Listing land on books for assessment. (1) If a person
has his land charged upon the land books in a large tract that
covers all his smaller tracts, it is not necessary for him to have
it charged to him in the smaller tracts; and no forfeiture can
i2 Kiernan v. Chicago Santa Fe ios Chandler v. Keeler, 46 Iowa,
& C. R. Co. 123 111. 188, 197, 14 N. 599.
E. 18. 104 Chandler v. Keeler, 46 Iowa,
598.
091 REAL ESTATE. 728
accrue to those small tracts by reason of their not being so
charged as small tracts if they are included in the large tracts.
In other words, coterminous tracts of land belonging to the
same person, for the assessment and payment of taxes, are the
same as one tract, 105
691. Forfeitures are odious and must be strictly proved.
(1) Forfeitures are deemed odious in law, and will never be pre-
sumed, but must be strictly proved by the party relying on the
same. And before the defendants can have the benefit of the
forfeiture claimed by them, or any of them, for a failure of the
plaintiffs, or those under whom they claim to have had the land
in controversy placed upon the land books in R. county, and pay
the taxes thereon for five successive years after the year 1869,
the defendants must clearly prove that the said land, or any
part thereof in controversy, has not been upon the land books
for those years, neither in large tracts nor small ones. 106
105 Maxwell v. Cunningham, 50 ioe Maxwell v. Cunningham, 50
W. Va. 301, 40 S. E. 499. W. Va. 301, 40 S. E. 499.
CHAPTER XLV.
WILLS.
Sec.
692. Person making will may dis-
inherit relatives.
693. Statutory requirements in at-
testing wills.
694. Mental capacity to make will,
essential.
695. Sound mind and memory de-
fined.
696. Maker of will presumed of
sound mind.
697. Insane delusions, lucid inter-
vals.
698. Insanity is disease of brain
affecting the mind.
699. Mental weakness will not dis-
qualify.
701.
T02.
703.
704.
705.
706.
Unsoundness of mind of per-
manent nature.
Considerations in determin-
ing mental state.
Testimony of medical experts
on mental state.
Considerations in determin-
ing validity of will.
"Undue influence" used in
procuring will.
Advising person to make will
is not improper.
Will presumed genuine Not
forgery.
692. Person making will may disinherit relatives. (1) Every
person being twenty-one years of age and upwards, and of sound
mind and memory, has a right to make a disposition of his estate
by will, and to so divide his property as to divest those Who would
otherwise inherit it as his legal heirs of their interest therein.
Generally the object of a last will and testament is to enable a
testator to divide and distribute his property as to him may seem
best, and no next of kin, no matter how near they may be, can be
said to have any legal or natural right to the estate of a testator
which can be asserted against the will of the latter. The law of
this state has placed every person's estate, over twenty-one years
of age, wholly under the control of the owner, and to be devised
and distributed by the latter as he may freely choose and direct
729
692 WILLS. 730
jn the last will and testament made by him. Neither children nor
grandchildren have any natural rights to the estate of their
mother or grandmother which can be asserted against any dispo-
sition of said estate which said mother or grandmother may choose
to make by will. 1
(2) A person competent to make a will may disinherit all his
children, and bestow all his property upon strangers, or he may
give his property to one or more of his children and disinherit the
others, or he may bequeath more of his property to some than to
others of his children, and the motive for so doing cannot be ques-
tioned, and the hardship of the case can have no other weight fur-
ther than a circumstance, tending, with other testimony, to show
the insanity of the testator. It is a question of fact for the jury to
determine, from the evidence in the case, whether L made an
unequal or unnatural disposition of his estate ; if he did so, the
weight to be given to that fact must be determined from a con-
sideration of the circumstances in the case.
In determining the true character of the will in question, in
reference to the parties to this suit, it will be proper for you to
consider the pecuniary circumstances of the respective parties at
the time the will was made. If, upon a full consideration of all
the circumstances connected with the making of this will, you find
that the testator has made a rational and reasonable disposition of
his property, no presumption of unsoundness of mind can be
drawn from the fact that he bestowed a larger share of his prop-
erty upon the defendants than upon the plaintiffs. It is proper
for the jury to consider, with this part of the case, any declaration
which may have been made by the testator prior to the making of
the will, in regard to the disposition he intended to make of his
property. And if it should be found that, when he was in good
1 Taylor v. Cox, 153 111. 228, 38 version or remainder, which he or
"N. E. 656. Held proper where it she hath, at the time of his or
does not appear that the testator her death shall have, of, in and
had any creditors. The statute of to any lands, tenements, heredita-
Illinois provides "that every male ments, annuities, or rents charged
person of the age of twenty-one upon or issuing out of them, or
years, and every female of the age goods and chattels, and personal
of eighteen years, being of sound estate of every description what-
mind and memory, shall have pow- soever, by will or testament."
er to devise all the estate, right. 111. Stat. Chap. 148, 1, "Wills."
title and interest in possession, re-
731 DISTINGUISHING RELATIVES BY WILL. 693
health, in writing or otherwise, he declared his intention to dis-
pose of his property substantially in the same manner it is dis-
posed of in the will in suit, it is an important fact to be considered
in determining the validity of this will and as tending to its sup-
port. 2
(3) The owner of property, who has the capacity to attend to his
ordinary business, has the lawful right to dispose of it, either by
deed or by will, as he may choose, and it requires no greater
mental capacity to make a valid will than to make a valid deed.
And if such owner chooses to disinherit his heir, or leave his prop-
erty to some charitable object, he has a legal right to do so, and
such disposition of his property is valid, whether it be reasonable
or unreasonable, just or unjust; and the reasonableness, or jus-
tice, or propriety of the will are not questions for the jury to pass
upon. If, therefore, the jury believe from the evidence that,
when he executed the paper in dispute, Isaac Foreman had capac-
ity enough to attend to his ordinary business, and to know and
understand the business he was engaged in, then he had the right
and the capacity to make such will, and the jury should find the
paper in dispute to be the will of said Foreman. The court in-
structs the jury that, even if they find from the evidence that
Isaac Foreman had, during some portions of his life, eccentricities
or peculiarities, or even an insane delusion, or partial insanity on
the subjects of religion, or masonry, or education, or any other
subject, yet if they find from the evidence that, at the time he
made the will in question, he had sufficient mind and memory to
understand his ordinary business, and that he knew and under-
stood the business he was engaged in, and intended to make such
a will, the jury should find said will to be the will of said Isaac
Foreman. 3
693. Statutory requirements in attesting" wills. (1) In this
state it is provided by statute that any person of full age and
sound mind may execute a will, which, to be valid, must be in
writing, witnessed by two competent witnesses, and signed by
2 Lamb v. Lamb, 105 Ind. 460, to the effect of evidence of eccen-
5 N. E. 171. tricities and delusions on testamen-
3 American Bible Soc. v. Price, tary capacity, see Wait v. Westfall,
115 111. 623, 633, 5 N. E. 126. As 161 Ind. 648, 68 N. E. 271.
G93 WILLS. 732
the testator, or by some person in his presence, and by his ex-
press direction. 4
(2) The statute requires that a will, to be valid, must be in
writing, signed by the testator, or by some one in his presence, with
his consent, and attested and subscribed in his presence by two or
more competent witnesses. An attesting witness is one who sub-
scribes his name to the will as a witness to its execution at the
i
request of the testator. Such request by the testator is a part of
the testamentary act, and must be performed by the testator. A
person who signs or subscribes his name to a will without being
requested to do so by the testator is a mere volunteer, and not an
attesting witness, in contemplation of law. You are to determine
from the evidence whether or not at least two of the witnesses
whose names are signed to the will as witnesses signed the same
at the request of the testator. If you find from the evidence that
any two of said witnesses subscribed their names to the will as
witnesses at the request of the testator, and in his presence, then
the will is duly attested as required by law; but if you find that
at least two of said subscribing witnesses did not sign their names
to said will at the request of the testator, then said will was, and
is, not duly executed, and in that event you should find for the
plaintiff. 5
(3) Any person of full age and sound mind may execute a will,
which, to be valid, must be in writing, witnessed by two compe-
tent witnesses, and signed by the testator or by some person for
him in his presence, and by his express direction. An attesting
witness is one who subscribes his name to the will as a witness to
its execution at the request of the testator. Such request of the
testator is a part of the testamentary act, and must be performed
by the testator. A person who signs or subscribes his name to a
will without being requested to do so by the testator is a mere
volunteer, and not an attesting witness in contemplation of law.
(4) Relative to the witnessing or attestation of the alleged will
in question, the court instructs the jury that the statute of Illinois
provides that all wills shall be attested, in the presence of the
testator, by two or more credible witnesses; and if you believe
4 Matter of Convey Will, 52 Iowa, e Matter of Convey Will, 52 Iowa,
198, 2 N. 1084. 198. 2 N. W. 1084; Bundy v. Mc-
5 Bundy v. McKnight, 48 Ind. 505. Knight, 48 Ind. 505.
733 ATTESTING WILLS, REQUIREMENTS. 693
from the evidence that William Drury signed the alleged will in
question in the presence of Arthur W. Mannon and Richard H.
Roberts, and after he so signed the same they took said will to a
writing desk a short distance from the foot of the bed, and within
the range of the testator's vision, and that the said William Drury
was sitting on the bed, and they there subscribed their names to
the attestation clause of said alleged will in full and uninter-
rupted view of the said testator, then this is sufficient attestation
of the will in question, and a full compliance with the law on the
subject. 7
(5) If you believe from the evidence that at the time of the al-
leged attestation of William Drury 's alleged will, now in dispute,
that the alleged witnesses were in the same room with said William
Drury, and only a few feet from him, with the view between him
and them uninterrupted, and they within the range of his vision ;
and if you further believe from the evidence, and the then sur-
rounding circumstances proven on the trial, in connection with
the alleged attestation of said alleged will, that said William
Drury, taking into account his then condition or state of health,
and his then position as shown by the evidence, either saw, or
could have seen, if he had wished to, and had looked in the proper
direction, the alleged witnesses themselves, and enough of the act
then being done by them to know on his part (from what he so
saw, or might have seen if he had wished, and from what he knew
of the then surrounding circumstances) that the alleged witnesses
were then signing their names as witnesses to his, William
Drury 's, will, then upon that question you should find the alleged
will in question to have been properly attested. 8
(6) To make a legal attestation to a will the test is, was there
an uninterrupted view between the alleged testator and the sub-
scribing witnesses, and were the witnesses within the range of the
alleged testator's vision (his then condition as to health and pos-
ture being considered) when the alleged attesting was done? Was
the alleged will then present, and could the alleged testator, in
his then condition and posture, have seen if he had wished to, and
had looked in the proper direction, enough of the persons of the
T Drury v. Cormell, 177 111. 43, Drury v. Connell, 177 111. 43, 52
52 N. E. 368. N. E. 368.
694 WILLS. 734
alleged witnesses, and enough of the act then being done by them,
to know on his part (from what he could have seen if he had
wished to, and from what he knew of the then surrounding cir-
cumstances) that the alleged witnesses were then signing their
names as witnesses to the alleged testator's proposed will. 9
(7) While the presumption of the law is that, where a will is
signed by the attesting witnesses in the same room with the
testator, that it is signed in his presence, yet that is only a pre-
sumption ; and where the evidence shows that the witnesses were
in such position that the testator could not see the paper, nor see
the witnesses when signing it, the presumption of law is over-
come. 10
694. Mental capacity to make will essential. (1) It is only
requisite that a testator, at the time of making his will, should be
of such sound mind and memory as to enable him to know and
understand the business in which he is engaged. It is not nec-
essary that he should be in the full possession of his reasoning
faculties. 11
(2) If the jury believe from the evidence that Isaac Foreman,
at the time he signed the paper in dispute, had mind and memory
sufficient to transact his ordinary business, and that when he
made the will he knew and understood the business he was en-
gaged in, then the jury should find said paper writing to be the
will of said Foreman. 12
(3) Aside from the requisite formalities in the making of a
will, the law defines the requisite soundness or mental capacity
of the testator in this wise: A will is not valid unless the tes-
tator not only intends of his own free will to make such a
disposition, but is capable of knowing what he is doing and of
understanding to whom he gives his property, and in what pro-
portions, and whom he is depriving of it as heirs or as devisees
under the will he makes. 13
(4) In order to make a valid will it is necessary that the
decedent should be of sound mind at the time of the making of
the will ; that he was capable of comprehending his property in-
s Drury v. Conn ell, 177 111. 43, Redf's Wills, 64; Converse v. Con-
46, 52 N. E. ?68. verse, 21 Vt. 168.
10 Drury v Connell, 177 111. 43, 12 American Bible Soc. v. Price,
52 N. E. 368. 115 111. 623, 633, 5 N. E. 126.
11 Dyer v. Dyer, 87 Ind. 18, citing is McGinnis v. Kempsey, 27 Mich.
364.
735 CAPACITY TO MAKE WILL. 694
terests and determining what disposition he desired to make of
such interests, and of making sucn disposition. And by this it is
not meant that he must possess the intellectual vigor of youth, or
that usually enjoyed by him while in perfect health. It is enough
that, as above stated, he was capable of comprehending his prop-
erty interests of which he was possessed, and of determining what
disposition he desired to make of such property, and of making,
such disposition. 1 *
(5) In order to make a valid will it is only necessary that a man
shall have mental capacity sufficient for the transaction of the
ordinary affairs of life, and possessing this, though he may be
feeble in mind and body from sickness or old age, he has the legal
right to dispose of his property just as he pleases, without con-
sulting either his family or his acquaintances. And if the jury be-
lieve from the evidence that, when he executed the paper in dis-
pute, Isaac Foreman knew what he was doing, and executed it as
his will, understanding its nature and effect, and that at the time
he had sufficient mind and memory to transact his ordinary busi-
ness, such as buying or selling or renting property, or collecting
or paying out money, or settling accounts, then the jury should
find the paper in dispute to be the last will and testament of said
Isaac Foreman. 15
(6) It is only requisite that the testator, at the time of making
his will, should be of such sound mind and memory as to enable
him to know and understand the business in which he is engaged.
It is not necessary that he should be in the full possession of his
reasoning faculties. It is only necessary that the testator shall
have mental capacity sufficient for the transaction of the ordinary
affairs of life, and, possessing this, though he may be feeble in
mind and body from sickness or old age, he has the legal right to
dispose of his property just as he pleases, without consulting
either his family or acquaintances. And in this case, if you be-
lieve from the evidence that F, at the time he signed the paper
in dispute, had mind and memory sufficient to transact his ordi-
nary business, and that, When he made the will, he knew and un-
derstood the business he was ensraged in, then you should find
said paper writing to be his will. 16
i* Webber v. Sullivan, 58 Iowa, 115 111. 633, 5 N. E. 126. See Trisb
265, 12 N. E. 319. v. Newell, 62 111. 202.
is American Bible Soc. v. Price, ie Dyer v. Dyer, 87 Ind. 18; Web-
695 WILLS. 736
695. "Sound mind and memory" denned. (1) The law re-
quires that a person, in order to make a valid will, should be of
sound and disposing mind and memory. What we mean by
soundness, in this respect, is not that the mind should be in its
full vigor and power, but that its faculties, its machinery, should
be in working order, so to speak, with an active power to col-
lect and retain the elements of the business to be performed,
for a sufficient time to perceive their obvious relation to each
other. 17
(2) A party competent to make a valid will should possess a
mind capable of exercising judgment, reason and deliberation
a mind capable of weighing the consequences of his will and its
effects to a certain degree upon his estate and family; and all
persons devoid of such reason are incompetent to make a valid
will. 18 (3) The expression "sound mind and memory," as used
in the statute, means nothing more than the words "sound and
disposing mind." 19
(4) The term "sound mind" in the statute does not mean that
the testator shall have the same command of his mental faculties
that he may have when in health. The law, recognizing that wills
are often made in extremis, when the bodily powers are broken
and the mental faculties are enfeebled, only requires that the tes-
tator shall retain so much of his mental power as will enable him
to understand his relations to those who would be the natural ob-
jects of his bounty, and the property he wishes to distribute, and
the manner in which he intends to distribute it. 20
(5) A person of sound mind or memory, within the meaning of
the law, is one who has full knowledge of the act she is engaged in
and of the property she possesses, an intelligent understanding of
the disposition she desires to make of it, and of the persons she
desires shall receive her property, and the capacity to recollect
and apprehend the nature of the claims of those who are excluded
from participating in her bounty. It is not necessary that she
should have sufficient capacity to make contracts to do business
generally, or to engage in complex and intricate business matters ;
ber v. Sullivan. 58 Iowa, 265, 12 N. is Bates v. Bates, 27 Iowa, 115.
W. 319; American Bible Soc. v. 19 Yoe v. McCord, 74 111. 40.
Price, 115 111. 633, 5 N. E. 126; 20 McGinnis v. Kempsey, 27 Mich.
McGinnis v. Kempsey, 27 Mich. 366. 365.
IT McGinnis v. Kempsey, 27 Mich.
367.
SOUND MIND AND MEMORY. 696
and if the jury believe from the evidence in the case that, at
the time of making the will in controversy, the deceased, G, had
such a knowledge as above defined, and possessed such under-
standing of the disposition she desired to make of her property
and of the persons she desired to receive the same, and had capac-
ity to recollect and apprehend the nature of the claims of those
who were excluded from participating in her bounty, then she
would be of sound mind and memory within the meaning of the
law, even though the jury may believe from the evidence that
she was physically weak, and did not have the mental capacity
sufficient to make contracts to do business generally, or to engage
in complex and intricate business matters. But if, on the other
hand, you find by a preponderance of the evidence that, at the
time of making the will in controversy, the deceased, G, had any
such knowledge as above defined in this instruction, and did not
possess such understanding as to the disposition she desired to
make of her property and of the persons she desired to receive the
same ; and did not have capacity to recollect and apprehend the
nature of the claims of those who were excluded from participat-
ing in her bounty, then she would not be of sound mind and
memory within the meaning of the law. 21
696. Maker of will presumed of sound mind. (1) The legal
presumption is in favor of sanity, and, on the issue of sanity or
insanity, the burden is upon him who asserts insanity to prove it.
Hence, in a doubtful case, unless there appears a preponderance
of proof of mental unsoundness, the issue shall be found the other
way, and in favor of the execution of the will. 22
(2) When a will is proved, including soundness of mind and
memory on the part of the testator, by the testimony of two
subscribing witnesses, and unsoundness of mind is alleged as a
ground for setting the will aside, the fact of insanity, or of
unsoundness of mind, must be established with reasonable cer-
tainty; the evidence of insanity should preponderate or the will
must be considered as valid. If there is only a bare balance
of evidence, or a mere doubt only of the sanity of the testator,
21 Hudson v. Hughan, 56 Kas. Iowa, 166, 17 N. 456; Barnes v.
159, 42 Pac. 701. Barnes, 66 Me. 300 (burden).
22 Stephenson v. Stephenson, 62
696 WILLS. 738
the presumption in favor of sanity, if proved as above stated,
must turn the scale in favor of the sanity of the testator. 23
(3) If. the jury believe from the evidence that the said instru-
ment of writing is consistent in its provisions and rational on its
face, the presumption is that the said B was of sound mind at the
time of the execution of the same, and the burden shifts to the
contestants to show that he was not of sound mind at that time. 24
(4) The legal presumption arises by law in favor of the sanity
of all men, and, although this presumption is not conclusive,
still the jury should consider it in hearing the evidence in the
case of which for particular purposes it forms a part. 25
(5) A will proved or admitted to have been executed and at-
tested, as prescribed by law, will be presumed to have been made
by a person of sound mind; but if testimony is shown which
counterbalances that presumption, the party seeking to support
such will must establish by affirmative evidence that the tes-
tator was of sound mind wheoi he executed the will. 26
(6) The law presumes, and it is your duty to presume, that
every man who has arrived at the years of discretion is of sound
mind and memory, and capable of transacting ordinary business,
and capable of disposing of his property by will or otherwise,
until the contrary is shown; and the court instructs you that, in
the first instance, it is your duty to hold that C, at the time he ex-
ecuted the will offered in evidence, was of sound mind and mem-
ory, and to so hold until you believe, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that he was otherwise. 27
(7) When a will is proved, including soundness of mind
and memory on the part of the testator, by the testimony of
two subscribing witnesses, and unsoundness is alleged as a
ground for setting the will aside, the fact of the insanity or
unsoundness of mind must be established by a preponderance
of the evidence; the evidence of insanity or unsoundness of
23 Sackett Instructions, p. 592, Coffman, 12 Iowa, 491; Cotton v.
citing: Jarman Wills, 5 Am. Ed. Ulmer, 45 Ala. 378.
104; Redfern Wills, 31-50; Per- 2-4 Bramel v. Bramel, 19 Ky. L. R.
kins v. Perkins, 39 N. H. 163; 72, 39 S. W. 521.
Brooks v. Barrett, 7 Pick. (N. Y.) 25 McGinnis v. Kempsey, 27 Mich
94; Turner v. Cook, 36 Ind. 129; 366.
Dickie v. Carter, 42 111. 376; Terry 20 Bates v. Bates, 27 Iowa, 114.
v. Buffington, 11 Ga. 337; In re 27 Craig v. Southard, 162 111. 213,
44 N. E. 393.
739 INSANE DELUSIONS, LUCID INTERVALS. 697
mind should preponderate, or the will must be taken as valid.
If there is only a bare balance of evidence, or a mere doubt only
of the sanity of the testator, or of his unsoundness of mind, the
presumption in favor of sanity, if proven as above stated, must
turn the scale in favor of the sanity of the testator. 28
697. Insane delusions, lucid intervals. (1) An insane de-
lusion is a fixed and settled belief in facts not existing, which no
rational person would believe. Such delusions may sometimes
exist as to one or more subjects. And if the jury believe, from
the evidence in this case, that Isaac Foreman was laboring under
such insane delusions upon subjects connected with the testa-
mentary disposition of his property and the natural objects of
his bounty when he made the will in question, and was thereby
rendered incompetent to comprehend, rationally, the nature and
effect of the act, and that, but for such delusions, he would not
have made the will as he did, then the jury should find against
the validity of the will. 29
(2) There is an essential difference between the apparently
lucid, intervals in delirium, and in general insanity. In delirium,
the apparent return to reason may be real and unquestionable,
while those which seem to occur in insanity are delusive, the pa-
tient being as really laboring under the powers of the malady as
in the more distinctly marked periods of its progress; but testa-
mentary incapacity does not necessarily presuppose the existence
of insanity in its technical sense. Weakness of intellect, whether
arising from extreme old age, from disease or great bodily in-
firmity, from intemperance, or from all these causes combined,
and when such weakness disqualifies the testator from knowing
or appreciating the nature and effect of consequences of the act
he is engaged in, renders such testator incapable of making a
valid will. 30
698. Insanity is disease of brain affecting the mind. Insan-
ity is a disease of the brain affecting the mind to such an extent
28 Taylor v. Pegram, 151 111. 117, 115 111. 623, 632, 5 N. E. 126. See
37 N. E. 837; Hollenback v. Cook, Wait v. Westfall, 161 Ind. 648, 68
180 111. 65, 70, 54 N. E. 154; Wilber N. E. 238, as to the effect of evi-
v. Wilber, 129 111. 392, 396, 21 N. dence of delusions.
E. 1076; Graybeal v. Gardner, 146 so McGinnis v. Kempsey, 27 Mich.
111. 337, 346, 34 N. E. 528. 366.
29 American Bible Soc. v. Price,
699 , WILLS. 740
as to destroy a man's capacity to attend to his ordinary business,
or to know and understand the business he was engaged in when
making a will. And unless the jury find from the evidence that
Mr. Foreman's brain was diseased to such an extent that he did
not have mind and memory sufficient to enable him to transact
his ordinary business, such as renting his land, settling accounts,
buying and selling property, and to know and understand the
business he was engaged in at the time he made the will in dis-
pute, the jury should find that said will is the will of said Fore-
man. 31
699. Mental weakness or eccentricities will not disqualify. (1)
Even if the jury are satisfied that the mental powers of P had
become enfeebled or disturbed by disease at the time he made
the alleged will, still, if they find from the evidence that he did
fully understand and intend to make the disposition which he
made of his property, then the will must stand, as touching the
question of mental soundness or capacity. 32
(2) If in the present case you should find from the evidence
that P, on the day he made the alleged will, was delirious or that
his mental faculties were otherwise obscured by the disease from
which he was suffering, still this would not necessarily prevent
his having sufficient capacity to make a will. Delirium or obscu-
ration of the mental faculties by disease must be so complete and
so becloud the mind, that the testator does not understand the
nature of the business in which he is engaged, or does not under-
stand at the time of making the instrument, substantially the act,
the extent of his property, his relations to others, who might or
ought to be the objects of his bounty, and the scope and bearing
of the provisions of the will, and does not possess the other quali-
fications which I have already referred to. 33
(3) The impairing of the mental faculties by the effects of acute
disease such as delirium, or the enfeebling of them from any of
the causes incident to such disease, must be to that extent which
deprives him of the use of his reason and understanding to the
extent already intimated, for if this is not the testator's situa-
si American Bible Soc. v. Price, 33 McGinnis v. Kempsey 27 Mich.
115 111. 623, 634, 5 N. E. 126. 365.
32 McGinnis v. Kempsey, 27 Mich.
365.
741 PERMANENT INSANITY DETERMINING MENTAL STATE. 701
tion, although his understanding may be to some extent obscured
and his memory troubled, yet he may make his will. 34
(4) Eccentricities or peculiarities, or radical or extreme notions
or opinions upon religion, colleges, education or masonry and
secret societies, will not necessarily render a man incapable of
making a will; and if the jury find that in making the will in
dispute, Isaac Foreman had sufficient mind and memory to under-
stand the businese he was engaged in when he. made the will,
then the jury should find in favor of said will, though said Fore-
man may have had eccentricities and peculiarities, or extreme
notions and opinions upon religion, colleges, education or masonry
or secret societies. 35
700. Unsoundness of mind of permanent nature. The law
presumes that every person is of sound mind until the contrary
is proven. Yet when unsoundness of mind of a permanent nature
has been established, the presumption is that such state of un-
soundness exists or continues until the contrary is shown. 38
701. Considerations in determining mental state. (1) In de-
termining the issues of facts submitted to you under these instruc-
tions you should carefully look to all the evidence before you,
and in doing so you should take into consideration the physical
condition of G, arising from her age, sickness or any other cause ;
the condition of her mind at and before the time of the execution
of the will in controversy; the execution of the will and its con-
tents ; the execution of any former will by her and the provisions
thereof; the relations existing between her and the parties re-
spectively herein at and before the execution of the will in con-
troversy; her family and connections; the terms on which she
stood with them; the claims of particular individuals; the condi-
tion and relative situation of the legatees and devisees named in
the will; the situation of the testatrix herself and the circum-
stances under which the will was made ; and, in brief, every fact
or circumstance which tends to throw any light on the question
submitted to you. 31
(2) It is proper for the jury to consider any statement which
34 McGinnis v. Kempsey, 27 Mich. se Wallis v. Luhring, 134 Ind. 450,
366. 34 N. B. 231.
35 American Bible Soc. v. Price, T Hudson v. Hugaan, 56 Kas. 160,
115 111. 623, 633, 5 N. E. 126. 42 Pac. 701.
702 WILLS. 742
may have been made by the testator before the making of his will,
in reference to what he intended to d'o with his property. If you
should find from the evidence that when he was in good health he
stated his intention of disposing of his property substantially as
it is disposed of in the will, this is an important fact to be con-
sidered by you in determining the validity of the will and as
tending to its support. 38
(3) If upon the whole evidence you believe James Entwistle
was not of sound mind and memory, as denned in these instruc-
tions, then you should find that the purported will is not the
will of James Entwistle, deceased. 39
702. Testimony of medical experts in determining mental
condition. The testimony of medical men of experience in their
profession in this class of cases, after careful examination of the
testator's mental condition, touching the mental condition of the
deceased at the time of the execution of the will in question, may
be by you given more weight and consideration than the testi-
mony of non-professional witnesses. 40
703. Considerations in determining validity of will. There
is some evidence in this case tending to show that the testator was
at one time engaged in some litigation with the mother of the
contestant, and bore some ill will or dislike toward her; and you
are instructed that if the testator was influenced thereby to make
his will as he did, and at the time was of sound mind, if he did so
by his own free choice and agency, his will would be valid and
should be recognized by you; even if he did it unjustly or with
mistaken opinion as to the matters involved, yet that would not
invalidate the will, but would rather tend to explain why he made
his will as he did. 41
704. "Undue influence" used in procuring a will. (1) That
ss Conway v. Vizzard, 122 Ind. 40 Blake v. Rourke, 74 Iowa, 523,
268, 23 N. E. 771. But such dec- 38 N. W. 392. But see Blough v.
larations cannot be considered in Parry, 144 Ind. 463, 472, 4 N. E.
connection with the issue of undue 70; Jones v. Casler, 139 Ind. 482,
influence. 38 N. E. 812.
39 Entwistle v. Meikle, 180 111. In re Townsend's Est. (Iowa),
9, 28, 54 N. E. 217; Slingloff v. Bru- 97 N. W. 1111.
ner, 174 111. 561, 569, 51 N. E. 772.
743 WILL MADE BY UNDUE INFLUENCE. 704
inequality in the distribution of property among those who would
inherit if no will had been made is not of itself evidence of undue
influence or unsoundness of mind, yet it may be considered as a
circumstance by the jury, together with all the other facts and
circumstances shown by the evidence as tending to establish
undue influence or unsoundness of mind. 42
(2) If you find that the will was valid at the time of its execu-
tion it remained valid and is valid now, unless it has been revoked,
which is not claimed by the contestants. The condition of the
mind of the testator, or any undue influence exercised over him
after the execution of the will could not invalidate it, and no
such claim is made in this case. However, the law permits the
facts and circumstances occurring after the execution of the will
to be shown relating to the condition of the testator's mind, and
the question of fraud and undue influence claimed to have been
exercised over him, for the purpose of proving by inference or
otherwise that the conditions existed before and at the time of
the execution of the will as existed afterwards on these points. 43
(3) When undlue influence is alleged the real inquiry is this:
Did the testator make and execute the alleged will in all its pro-
visions of his own free will and volition so that it now expresses
his own wishes and intentions, or was the testator constrained or
induced through the undue influence, restraint, coercion or im-
proper conduct of others, to act contrary to his own desire and
intentions regarding the disposition of his property or any part
of it. 44
(4) If you believe from the evidence that the said E at the time
he executed the will now in question, was feeble in body and
mind from sickness, old age or otherwise, and that while in this
condition his son unduly influenced him to make said purported
will, and that at said time E was not a free agent, but was under
the undue influence of his son, then you should so find in your
verdict. 45
(5) In order that the contestant may recover in this case, there
are two facts that must be proven by her ; first, that undue influ-
42 England v. Fawbush, 204 111. 44 England v. Fawbush, 204 111.
384, 68 N. E. 526. 396, 68 N. E. 526.
Haines v. Hayden, 95 Mich. 350, 45 England v. Fawbush, 204 111.
54 N. W. 911. 394, 68 N. E. 526.
WILLS. 744
ence was in fact exerted; second, that it was successful in sub-
verting and controlling the will of the testator. Both of these
facts must be proven by the contestant by the weight of the evi-
dence in order to defeat the will. Upon the latter question,
evidence of the statements of the testator, made either before the
will was made or after, and which tend to throw light on the
condition of mind are admissible ; but as to the first question, the
evidence of such statements is hearsay and incompetent and
should not be considered by you. Such declarations have been
admitted only for the purpose of proving the condition of the
testator. They afford no substantive proof of undue influence,
and cannot be admitted for such purpose ; and before the contes-
tant can recover it is necessary that she should prove that undue
influence was, in fact, actually exerted upon the testator, by
other evidence than his own declarations. 46
(6) Whether the free agency of the testator is destroyed or con-
trolled by physical force or mental coercion, by threats which
occasion fear or by importunity which the testator is too weak to
resist or which extorts compliance in the hope of peace, is imma-
terial. In considering the question, therefore, it is essential to
ascertain as far as practicable the power of coercion on the one
hand, and the liability of its influence on the other. And where-
ever, through weakness, ignorance, dependence, or implicit reli-
ance of one on the good faith of another, the latter obtains
ascendency which prevents the former from exercising an un-
biased judgment, undue influence exists. 47
(7) It is not necessary that there should be confidential rela-
tions between all the beneficiaries and the testator. If there is such
a relation with one of the family, and the will is found to have
been procured through his undue influence, it operates against
all the family. 48
(8) As bearing on the question of undue influence, if you find
from the evidence that some months before the execution of the
will, when in good health and of unquestioned soundness of mind,
the testator declared in the presence of H that he intended to do a
46 In re Townsend's Est. (Io. a), 48 Coghill v. Kennedy, 119 Ala.
97 N. W. 1111. 641, 24 So. 464.
47 Coghill v. Kennedy, 119 Ala.
641, 24 So. 464.
745 ADVISING ONE TO MAKE WILL. 705
good part by H, or pay him well for attentions and kindness
bestowed, or give him a home ; and if you further find from the
evidence, that the bequest of H is in substantial compliance with
such declaration, you should consider this fact in determining
whether or not H used undue influence in procuring the bequest
made to him.* 9
705. Advising person to make will is not improper. (1) It is
not unlawful for a person by honest advice or persuasion to induce
a testator to make a will or to influence him in disposing of his
property by will. Such advice or persuasion will not vitiate a
.will made freely from a conviction of its propriety. To avoid a
will the influence which is exercised must be undue, and this
means something wrongful, amounting to a species of fraud. 50
(2) Though the devisee may have had improper intercourse
with the testatrix, that of itself, however immoral such relation
may be, is not sufficient to invalidate a will made in favor of the
wrongdoer, if no improper influences are shown to have been
exerted to induce the making of the will. 51
706. Will presumed genuine, not forgery. (1) In civil as
well as in criminal actions the law indulges the presumption of in-
nocence and fair dealing in all transactions ; and in this particular
case the law presumes that the signatures to the will in contest
are genuine and not forged, and that the defendant is innocent
of all criminal conduct in relation thereto. In criminal charges
the presumption of innocence must be overthrown and guilt
proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to secure a conviction ;
but in civil cases like the present, involving a charge of crimi-
nality, the rule of proof is different and not so strong. For the
plaintiffs to recover upon the charge of forgery they are not
compelled to prove the charge beyond a reasonable doubt, but the
law is satisfied, and you must be, if the charge is proven by a fair
preponderance of the evidence; that is, the evidence in favor of
the forgery must overcome the presumption of innocence, and all
countervailing evidence of genuineness. 52
49 Goodbar v. Lldikey, 136 Ind. 7, si Dickie v. Carter, 42 111. 388;
36 N. E. 691. Held proper where Eckert v. Flowry, 43 Pa. St. 46.
there is evidence tending to rebut 52 McDonald v. McDonald, 142
the charge of undue influence. Ind. 89, 41 N. E. 336.
so Yoe v. McCord, 74 111. 44;
Dickie v. Carter, 42 111. 388.
706 WILLS. 746
(2) If the evidence shows that the decedent, B, executed the
written instrument offered for probate by the proponents herein ;
that he requested Parish and Petty to attest the execution, which
they did in the presence of the testator, then such instrument is
not a forgery. If you find that the decedent, B, signed said
instrument, it cannot be a forgery. 63
63 Miller v. Coulter, 156 Ind. 298, 59 N. E. 853.
CHAPTER XLVL
CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES.
Sec. Sec.
707. Caution as to duty in grave 710. In Indiana the jury are the
cases. judges.
708. Deliberations of jurymen as to 711. In Ohio the court is the
verdict. judge.
JUDGES OF CRIMINAL LAW. 712 ' In Iowa tne court is th 6
judge.
709. In Illinois the jury are the
judges.
707. Caution as to duty in grave cases. (1) The duty of
counsel and the court has now been performed. The counsel en-
gaged in the case have been untiring in their efforts to bring before
you all possible evidence that may aid you in arriving at the truth.
They have ably assisted you in applying the evidence to the facts
in contention. The court has endeavored to rightly advise you on
the law, and now there confronts you the final and important
duty of pronouncing upon the guilt or innocence of the defendant.
I submit this case to you with the confidence that you will faith-
fully discharge the grave duty resting upon you without upon
the one hand being moved by any undue demand for conviction
on the part of counsel for the state, or being swayed from its right
performance by any undue appeal to your sympathies. You will
bear in mind that neither the life nor the liberty of the accused
may be trifled away, and neither taken by careless or inconsider-
ate judgment. But if, after a careful consideration of the law
and the evidence in the case, you are satisfied beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant is guilty, you should return your ver-
dict accordingly. Duty demands it. and the law requires it. You
747
708 CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES. . 748
must be just to the defendant and equally just to the state. As
manly, upright men, charged with the responsible duty of assist-
ing the court in the administration of justice, you will put aside
all sympathy and sentiment, all consideration of public approval
or disapproval, and look steadfastly and alone to the law and
evidence in the case, and return into court such a verdict as is
warranted thereby. 1
(2) It is proper for the court to remind you that the issue in
this case is to the defendant of so grave a nature, and to the public
safety of such vital importance, that upon your part there should
be no error. The accused, if he be innocent, ought not to be er-
roneously convicted, and on the contrary, if he be guilty, he ought
not to be erroneously acquitted. You were, after careful effort,
selected as intelligent and qualified jurors, sworn to impartially
try and determine this cause, and a true verdict render accord-
ing to the law and the evidence. If you comply with your oaths,
error against either side must be precluded. Remember that the
defendant's life and liberty are his most sacred and highest
rights, and can only be forfeited by him for the causes, upon the
conditions, and in the manner prescribed by law. In considering
his rights do not forget that by each acquittal of a guilty criminal
the safeguard erected by society for its protection is weakened ;
for, by the non-enforcement of penalties affixed to criminal acts,
contempt for the law is bred among the very class that it is in-
tended to restrain. The evidence has been placed before you; an
exhaustive discussion of the facts by counsel on either side has
been had in your hearing, and such instructions as in the judg-
ment of the court would aid you in arriving at a correct decision
have been given. 2
708. Deliberations of jurymen in reaching a verdict. (1)
Each juror acts for himself in coming to a conclusion, and acts on
his own convictions ; and although it is true that in case any one
of the jurors entertains a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the
defendant he ought not to find him guilty, yet such doubt in the
mind of one or more of the jurors ought not to control the action
i Hinshaw v. S. 147 Ind. 384, mur- 2 stout v. S. 90 Ind. 13.
der case, 47 N. E. 157.
749 JUDGES OF CRIMINAL LAW. 709
of the other jurors, so as to compel them to give a verdict of ac-
quittal. 3
(2) The jury are admonished that there should be no mistrial
in this case, if it be possible for the jury to agree upon a ver-
dict, if they can do so without violating their conscientious con-
victions, based on the evidence. This case has taken up a whole
week of this term, and has necessarily been costly to the state and
county, and has forced the postponement of other important cases.
The jury should therefore lay aside pride of opinion and judg-
ment, examine any differences of opinion there may be among
them in a spirit of fairness and candor, reason together, and talk
over such differences and harmonize them, if this be possible, so
that this case may be disposed of. 4
(3) It is the duty of each juryman, while the jury are deliberat-
ing upon their verdict, to give careful consideration to the views
his fellow-jurymen may have to present upon the testimony in the
case. He should not shut his ears and stubbornly stand upon the
position he first takes, regardless of what may be said by the other
jurymen. It should be the object of all of you to arrive at a com-
mon conclusion, and to that end you should deliberate together
with calmness. It is your duty to agree upon a verdict if pos-
sible. 5
Judges of Criminal Law.
709. In Illinois the jury are the judges. (1) You are the
judges of the law as well as the facts. But you are instructed that
it is your duty to accept and act upon the law as given you by the
court, unless you can say upon your oaths that you are better
judges of the law than the court ; and if you can say upon your
oaths that you are better judges of the law than the court, then
you are at liberty to so act. 6
(2) You are the judges of the law as well as the facts of this
case, and if you can say upon your oaths that you know the law
better than the court does, then you have the right to do so -, but,
s Fassinow v. S. 89 Ind. 237. " Davison v. P. 90 111. 231. Note:
* Sigsbee v. S. 43 Fla. 524, 30 The statute of Illinois provides
So. 816: Myers v. S, 43 Fla. 500, that "in all criminal cases the jury
31 So. 275. shall be th/e judges, the law and
s Jackson v. S. 91 Wis. 253, 64 fact."
N. W. 838.
710 CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES. 750
before assuming so solemn a responsibility, you should be assured
that you are not acting from caprice or prejudice ; that you are
not controlled by your will or wishes, but from a deep and confi-
dent conviction that the court is wrong and that you are right.
Before saying this upon your oaths it is your duty to reflect
whether, from your study and experience, you are better qualified
to judge the law than the court. If under all the circumstances
you are prepared to say that the court is wrong in its exposition
of the law, the statute has given you that right. 7
710. In Indiana the jury are the judges. (1) You are the
judges of the law as well as the facts in this case. You can take the
law as given and explained to you by the court, but, if you see fit,
you have the legal and constitutional right to reject the same and
determine and construe it for yourselves. But notwithstanding
you have the legal right to disagree from the court as to what the
law is, still you should consider and weigh the instructions given
you as you weigh the evidence, and you should disregard neither
without proper reason. 8
(2) You are the judges of the law and the evidence, and of what
facts are proved and what facts are not proved. It is the duty
of the court to instruct you in the law, but the instructions of the
court are advisory only, and you may disregard them and deter-
mine the law for yourselves. Likewise* the decisions of the Su-
preme Court read to you by counsel are not binding upon you,
and you may disregard such decisions and determine for your-
selves what the law is. 9
711. In Ohio the court is the judge of the law. It is the duty
of the jury to receive the law as it is given them by the court ; it
is the exclusive province of the court to determine what the law
is; and the jury have no right to hold the law to be otherwise in
any particular than as given to them by the court. 10
7 Spies v. P. 122 111. 83, 12 N. E. elson v. S. 94 Ind. 431. See Bissot
865; Mullinix v. P. 76 111. 2-15. See v. S. 53 Ind. 408.
Schnieder v. P. 23 111. 25; S. v. Fowler v. S. 85 Ind. 541, citing
Hannibal, 37 La. Ann. 620. Keiser v. S. 83 Ind. 234. But se
s Blaker v. S. 130 Ind. 203, 29 N. Bridgewater v. S. 153 Ind. 560, 566,
E. 1077; Anderson v. S, 104 Ind. 55 N. E. 737.
467 4 N. E 63, 5 N. E. 711; Hud- 10 Robbins v. S. 8 Ohio St. 131,
167.
751 JURY JUDGES OF LAW. 712
712. In Iowa the court is the judge. Gentlemen of
the jury : You have taken a solemn oath to try this cause accord-
ing to the law and evidence given you in open court, and you have
no authority to consider or be controlled by anything else than
that given you by the court as the law; and unless your verdict
accords with the law .as given you by the court, you are guilty of
willful perjury. It makes no difference what you think the law
ought to be, you have no authority to consider or be controlled by
anything else as law than that given you by the court. 11
n S. v. Miller, 53 Iowa, 157, 4 N. W. 838, 900.
CHAPTER XL VII.
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE.
Sec. Sec.
713. Defendant is presumed inno- 715. Presumption continues through
cent. trial.
714. Presumption of innocence a
protection.
713. Defendant is presumed innocent. (1) The rules with
reference to the presumption of innocence and the burden of
proof are among the fundamental principles of our law, and must
be regarded throughout your consideration of the evidence. 1
(2) All presumptions of law independent of evidence are in
favor of innocence ; and every person is presumed to be innocent
of the offense charged until he is proven guilty. If, upon such
proof, there is a reasonable doubt remaining, the accused is
entitled to the benefit of an acquittal. 2
(3) The defendants are presumed to be innocent of the offense
charged; that, before you can convict them, or either of them,
the state must overcome that presumption by proving such de-
fendant or defendants to be guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
If the jury have a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of either of
the defendants, they should acquit such defendant; but a doubt,
to authorize an acquittal, must be a substantial doubt, and not a
mere possibility of innocence. 3
714. Presumption of innocence a protection. The rule of
1 S. v. Linhoff, 121 Iowa, 632, 636, 3 S. v. Peebles (Mo.), 77 S. W.
97 N. W. 78. 519.
2 S. v. Fahey (Del.), 54 Atl. 693.
752
753 INNOCENCE PRESUMED THROUGH TRIAL. 715
law which clothes every person accused of crime with the pre-
sumption of innocence and imposes on the state the burden of es-
tablishing his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, is not intended to
aid any one who is in fact guilty to escape, but is a humane pro-
vision of the law, intended so far as human agencies can to guard
against the danger of any innocent person being unjustly pun-
ished. 4
715. Presumption continues through trial. (1) The law
presumes the defendant to be innocent of the crime charged, and
this presumption continues in his favor throughout the trial, step
by step; and you cannot find the accused guilty of any of the
crimes charged in the indictment until the evidence in the case
satisfies you beyond a reasonable doubt of his guilt. And as long
as any of you have a reasonable doubt as to the existence of any
one of the several elements necessary to constitute the offense
or offenses charged, the accused cannot be convicted. 5
(2) This defendant, like all other persons accused of crime, is
presumed to be innocent until his guilt is established to a moral
certainty and beyond all reasonable doubt, and this presumption
of innocence goes with him all through the case until the jury
shall have reached a verdict. 6
(3) The law raises no presumption against the defendant. On
the contrary, the presumption of law is in favor of his innocence.
This presumption of innocence continues through the trial until
every material allegation in the information is established by
evidence to the exclusion of all reasonable doubt. 7
4 Hawk v. S. 148 Ind. 254, 46 N. more v. S. 67 Ind. 306; Stock-
E. 127; Turner v. S. 102 Ind. 427, slager v. U. S. 116 Fed. 599.
1 N. E 869; S. v. Medley, 54 Kas. P. v. McNamara, 94 Gal. 514, 29
627, 39 Pac. 227. Pac. 953; P. v. O'Brien, 106 Cal. 105.
s Aszman v. S. 123 Ind. 360, 24 N. 39 Pac. 325.
E. 123; Line v. S. 51 Ind. 175. See " Edwards v. S. (Neb.), 95 N. W.
Morrisson v. S. 76 Ind. 339; Dens- 1038; Van Syoc v. S. (Neb.), 96 N.
W. 266.
CHAPTER XLVIII.
REASONABLE DOUBT.
Sec.
FOB THE PROSECUTION.
716. A substantial, well-founded
doubt.
717. A doubt for which a reason
can be given.
718. Doubt from undue influence.
719. Hunting up doubts outside of
evidence.
720. Reasonable certainty only re-
quired.
721. Doubt as to "each link" in
chain.
722. Jurors are to believe as men.
FOR THE DEFENSE.
723. Every reasonable theory must
be excluded.
Sec.
724. Doubt, though a probability
of guilt.
725. Doubt confined to essential
facts.
726. Doubt arising from part of
the evidence.
PROBABILITIES.
727. A mere probability not suffi-
cient.
ONE OF TWO OR MORE.
728. Uncertain which of two is
guilty.
For the Prosecution.
716. Substantial, well-founded doubt. (1) A reasonable
doubt is such a doubt as arises from a candid and impartial con-
sideration of all the evidence in the case, and which would cause a
reasonable and prudent man to pause and hesitate in the graver
transactions of life; and a juror is satisfied beyond a reasonable
doubt if, from a candid consideration of the entire evidence, he
has an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge. 1
(2) A reasonable doubt means, in law, a serious, substantial
and well-founded doubt, and not the mere possibility of a doubt ;
and the jury have no right to go outside of the evidence to search
Maxfield v. S. 54 Neb. 44, 74 N. W. 401.
754
755 REASONABLE DOUBT DEFINED. 717
for or hunt up doubts in order to acquit the defendant, not aris-
ing from the evidence or a want of evidence. 2
(3) Before the jury can convict the defendant they must be
satisfied of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; such doubt, to
authorize an acquittal upon a reasonable doubt alone, must be a
substantial doubt of the defendant's guilt with a view of all the
evidence in the case, and not a mere possibility of his innocence. 3
(4) A doubt, to justify an acquittal, must be reasonable, and it
must arise from a candid and impartial investigation of all the
evidence in the case; and unless it is such that, were the same
kind of doubt interposed in the graver transactions of life, it
would cause a reasonable and prudent man to hesitate and pause,
it is insufficient to authorize a verdict of not guilty. 4
(5) Evidence is sufficient to remove a reasonable doubt when it
is sufficient to convince the judgment of ordinarily prudent men
of the truth of the proposition with such force that they would
act upon that conviction without hesitation in their own most
important affairs. 6
717. Doubt for which a reason can be given. A reasonable
doubt is a doubt for which you can give a reason. In other
words, if the evidence of the defendant's guilt satisfies you to
such an extent as to leave you without a doubt that he may be
innocent, for which you can give an intelligent reason, then it
would be your duty to convict. Such a doubt may arise either
from affirmative evidence tending to show the defendant's in-
nocence, or from the lack of evidence sufficient to establish his
guilt. 6
718. Doubt from undue sensibility. (1) The doubt under
the influence of which the jury should find a verdict of not guilty
must be a reasonabe one. A doubt produced merely by undue
sensibility in the mind of any juror in view of the consequences
of his verdict, is not a reasonable doubt, and a juror is not al-
2 Earll v. P. 73 111. 334; Smith may arise from lack of evidence
v. P. 74 111. 146. But see Rhodes as well as upon a consideration of
v. S. 128 Ind. 189. the evidence.
a S. v. Darrah, 152 Mo. 522, 54 5 Jarrell v. S. 58 Ind. 296; Toops
S. W. 226; S y. Vansant, 80 Mo. v. S. 92 Ind. 16; Stout v. S. 90 Ind.
72. 12.
* Willis v. S. 43 Neb. 102, 61 N. Wallace v. S. 41 Fla. 547, 26
W. 254. Held erroneous in Brown v. So. 713. Contra, Siberry v. S. 133
S. 105 Ind. 3SS, 5 N. E. 900. on the Ind. 677, 33 N. E. 681.
ground tbat a reasonable doubt
719 REASONABLE DOUBT. 756
lowed to create sources or materials of doubt by resorting to
trivial and fanciful suppositions and remote conjectures as to
possible states of facts differing from that established by the
evidence. 7
(2) A doubt produced by undue sensibility in the mind of any
juror in view of the consequences of his verdict is not a reason-
able doubt. You are not at liberty to disbelieve, as jurors, if,
from the evidence, you believe as men; your oath imposes on
you no obligation to doubt where no doubt would exist if no
oath had been administered. If, after an impartial considera-
tion of all the evidence, you feel an abiding conviction of the
guilt of the defendant, and are satisfied to a moral certainty
of the truth of the charge made against him, then you are satis-
fied beyond a reasonable doubt. 8
719. Hunting up doubts outside of evidence. (1) In consid-
ering this case the jury are not to go beyond the evidence to hunt
up doubts, nor must they entertain such doubts as are merely
chimerical or conjectural. A doubt, to justify an acquittal, must
be reasonable, and it must arise from a candid and impartial in-
vestigation of all the evidence in the case; and unless it is such
that, were the same kind of doubt interposed in the graver trans-
actions of life, it would cause a reasonable and prudent man to
hesitate and pause, it is insufficient to authorize a verdict of not
guilty. If, after considering all the evidence, you can say you
have an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge, you are
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt. 9
(2) In considering the case the jury are not to go beyond the
evidence to hunt up doubts, nor must they entertain such doubts
as are merely chimerical or conjectural. A doubt, to justify an
acquittal, must be reasonable, and it must arise from a candid
and impartial investigation of all the evidence in the case ; and
unless it is such that, were the same kind of doubt interposed
in the graver transactions of life, it would cause a reasonable
7 "Watt v. P. 126 111. 30. 18 N. E. lieving the jurors from the obliga-
340; Spies v. P. 122 111. 81, 12 N. E. tion of their oath.
865. 17 N. E. 898. See Dunn v. P. Painter v. P. 147 111. 444, 467,
109 -111. 644. 35 N. E. 64; S. v. Pierce, 65 Iowa.
s Willis v. S. 43 Neb. 102, 61 N. 90, 21 N. W. 195. But see Brown
W. 254. Such an instruction was v. S. 105 Ind. 385, 5 N. E. 900, note
held erroneous in Siberry v. S. 133 4, this chapter.
Ind. 677, 686, 33 N. E. 681, as re-
757 REASONABLE CERTAINTY EACH LINK. 722
and prudent man to hesitate and pause, it is insufficient to au-
thorize a verdict of not guilty. If, after considering all the evi-
dence, you can say you have an abiding conviction of the truth
of the charge, you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt. 10
720. Reasonable certainty only required. A verdict of
guilty can never be returned without convincing evidence. The
law is too humane to demand a conviction while a rational doubt
remains in the minds of the jury. You will be justified, and are
required, to consider a reasonable doubt as existing if the ma-
terial facts, without which guilt cannot be established, may
fairly be reconciled with innocence. In human affairs absolute
certainty is not always attainable. From the nature of things
reasonable certainty is all that can be attained on many subjects.
When a full and candid consideration of the evidence produces
a conviction of guilt, and satisfies the mind to a reasonable cer-
tainty, a mere captious or ingenuous artificial doubt is of no
avail. You will look, then, to all the evidence, and if that satis-
fies you of the defendant's guilt you must convict him. If you
are not fully satisfied, but find that there are only strong proba-
bilities of guilt, your only safe course is to acquit. 11
721. Doubt as to "each link" in the chain. The rule re-
quiring you to be satisfied of the defendant's guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, in order to warrant a conviction, does not require
that you should be satisfied, beyond a reasonable doubt, of each
link in the chain of circumstances relied upon to establish the
defendant's guilt. It is sufficient, if, taking the testimony all to-
gether, you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the de-
fendant is guilty. 12
722. Jurors are to believe as men. You are not at liberty \
to disbelieve as jurors if, from all the evidence, you believe as
10 Miller v. P. 39 111. 457, 463. S. v. Myers, 12 Wash. 77, 40 Pac.
But see Brown v. S. 105 Ind. 385, 626; Hauk v. State, 148 Ind. 238,
5 N E. 900, note 4, this chapter. 254, 46 N. E. 127, 47 N. E. 465. In
11 Clark v. S. 12 Ohio 495; See Sutherlin v. S. 148 Ind. 695, 48 N.
Morgan v. S. 48 Ohio St. 377, 27 N. E. 246, the court declared that
E 710. under the Indiana law there is no
12 Bressler v. P. 117 111. 422, 437, difference in the application of the
(held not erroneous where there is doctrine of reasonable doubt wheth-
direct evidence); Gott v. P. 187 111. er the evidence is direct or cir-
249, 260, 58 N. E. 293. See Carleton cumstantial.
v. P. 150 111. 181, 189, 37 N. E. 244;
723 REASONABLE DOUBT. 758
men. Your oath imposes on you no obligation to doubt where
no doubt would exist if no oath had been administered. 13
For Hie Defense.
723. Every reasonable theory must be excluded. (1) A rea-
sonable doubt is one that excludes every reasonable hypothesis ex-
cept that of the guilt of the defendant, and only when no other
supposition will reasonably account for all the conditions of the
case can the conclusion of guilt be legitimately adopted. 14
(2) If the jury are not satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt to
a moral certainty, and to the exclusion of every other reasonable
hypothesis but that of defendant's guilt, they should find him
not guilty, and it is not necessary to raise a reasonable doubt that
the jury should find a probability of defendant's innocence; but
such a doubt may arise even where there is no probability of
his innocence in the testimony ; and if the jury have not an abid-
ing conviction to a moral certainty of his guilt they should acquit
him. 15
(3) You should acquit the defendant unless the evidence ex-
cludes every reasonable hypothesis but that of his guilt. 16
724. Doubt, though a probability of guilt. (1) A reasonable
doubt may exist though there is no probability of the innocence
of the defendant from the evidence ; and if the jury have not an
abiding conviction to a moral certainty of his guilt then they
should find him not guilty. 17
(2) The court charges the jury that a reasonable doubt of the
defendant's guilt is not the same as a probability of his inno-
cence. A reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt may exist
when the evidence fails to convince the jury that there is a
probability of the defendant's innocence. 18
725. Doubt confined to essential facts. (1) The doctrine of
is Hartley v. S. 53 Neb. 310, 73 is Rogers v. S. 117 Ala. 192, 23
N. W. 744; Watt v. P. 126 111. 30, So. 82. See S. v. Clancy, 20 Mont.
18 N. E. 340; Spies v. P. 122 111. 498, 52 Pac. 267.
81, 12 N. E. 865; Willis v. S. 43 i Sherrill v. S. (Ala.), 35 So.
Neb. 102, 61 N. W. 254. But see 130.
Siberry v. S. 133 Ind. 677, 686, 33 " Davis v. S. 131 Ala. 10, 31
N. E. 681; note 8 this chapter. So. 569.
14 Yarbrough v. S. 106 Ala. 43, is Stewart v. S. 133 Ala. 105, 31
16 So. 758. So. 944.
759 DOUBT LIMITED TO ESSENTIAL FACTS. 727
reasonable doubt, as a rule, has no proper application to mere mat-
ters of subsidiary evidence, taken item by item, but is applicable
always to the constituent essential elements of the crime charged,
and to any fact or group of facts which may constitute the entire
proof concerning any of the constituent or elementary facts
necessary to constitute guilt. If, from the whole evidence, or the
want of evidence, any material fact essential to a conviction has
not been established to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable
doubt, as explained in these instructions, the defendant should be*
acquitted. 19
(2) One of the material questions in this case is, whether or not
the wire in question is the identical wire taken from the electric-
light house, and the burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt the identity of the wire as coming from the
electric-light house. 20
(3) The court instruct you that, unless you believe from the
evidence beyond every reasonable doubt that the witness, C, saw
and recognized the defendant on the night of the killing, as stated
by him, you will acquit the defendant. 21
726. Doubt arising from part of evidence. If the jury, upon
considering all the evidence, have a reasonable doubt about the
defendant's guili arising out of any part of the evidence, they
must find him not guilty. 22
727. A mere probability is not sufficient. (1) It is not suffi-
cient to establish a probability, though a strong one, arising from
the doctrine of chances that the fact charged is more likely to be
true than the contrary ; but the evidence must establish the truth
of the charge to a reasonable and moral certainty a certainty
which convinces and directs the understanding and satisfies the
reason and judgment of those who are bound to act upon it con-
scientiously. 23
(2) Mere probabilities are not sufficient to warrant a convic-
tion ; nor is it sufficient that the greater weight or preponderance
is Hauk v. S. 148 Ind. 254, 46 N. only evidence tending to connect
E. 127; Hinshaw v. S. 147 Ind. 379, the defendant with the crime
47 N. E. 157. charged.
20 Bishop v. P. 194 111. 365, 369, 22 Hunt v. S. 135 Ala. 1, 33 So.
62 N. E. 785. 329.
21 Petty v. S. (Miss.), 35 So. 213. 23 s. v. Fahey (Del.), 54 All.
The testimony of C. was the 693.
728 REASONABLE DOUBT. 760
of the evidence supports the allegations of the indictment ; nor is
it sufficient that, upon the doctrine of chances, it is more probable
that the defendant is guilty than innocent To warrant a convic-
tion the defendant must be proved to be guilty so clearly and
conclusively that there is no reasonable theory upon which he
can be innocent when all the evidence in the case is considered
together, and if the prosecution has failed to make such proof,
the jury should find the defendant not guilty. 24
(3) In all criminal cases it is essential to a verdict of condem-
nation that the guilt of the accused shall be fully proved; neither
a mere preponderance of evidence nor any weight of preponder-
ant evidence is sufficient for the purpose unless it generates full
belief of the facts to the exclusion of all reasonable doubt. 25
(4) If the evidence in the case leaves it indifferent which of
several hypotheses arising and growing out of the evidence in
the case is true, or merely establishes some finite probability
in favor of the hypothesis of guilt, rather than another, such evi-
dence cannot amount to legal proof of guilt, however great the
probability may be. 26
728. Uncertain which of two is guilty. (1) If it is uncer-
tain from the evidence, in the minds of the jury, which one or two
or more persons inflicted the stab or blow, that would operate to
acquit the defendant unless there is evidence that the defendant
aided or abetted the one who actually did the killing. 27
(2) When two persons had the same opportunity to commit the
offense charged, and if, upon the whole evidence, there remains
a reasonable doubt as to which of the two committed it, then
neither of them can be convicted. 28
(3) Before the jury can convict, it must be made to appear,
from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant,
and not somebody else, committed the offense charged in the in-
dictment. It is not sufficient that the evidence may show that the
defendant or some other person committed such offense, nor that
the probabilities are that the defendant, and not some one else,
committed such offense. 29
2-t Dacey v. P. 116 111. 572, 6 N. 27 Campbell v. P. 16 111. 19:
E. 166. 28 Vaughan v. Com. 85 Va. 672, 8
25 Fuller v. S. 12 Ohio St. 435, S. E. 584.
citing: 1 Starkie Ev. 451. 29 Lyons v. P. 68 111. 272, 278.
26 Petty v. S. (Miss.), 35 S. E.
213.
CHAPTER XLIX.
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
Sec. . Sec.
729. Circumstantial evidence is 733. Each, link in chain of circum-
competent. stances.
730. Every reasonable hypothesis, 734. Degree of proof as to each
must be excluded. essential fact.
731. Circumstances consistent with 735. Subsidiary facts not within
each other. the rule.
732. Inconsistent with any othler 736. Circumstances of suspicion
rational theory. not evidence.
729. Circumstantial evidence is competent. (1) Circum-
stantial evidence is legal and competent evidence in criminal
cases ; and if it is of such character as to exclude every reasonable
hypothesis other than that of the .guilt of the defendant, it is
sufficient to authorize a conviction. 1
(2) It is not necessary to prove the defendants guilty by testi-
mony of witnesses who have seen the offense committed, but such
guilt may be established by proof of facts and circumstances from
which it may be reasonably and satisfactorily inferred. 2
(3) In submitting a case depending entirely upon circumstan-
tial evidence the jury should not be given loose rein, but should
have careful direction as to the quantum of proof necessary to
justify a conviction. 3
(4) Circumstantial evidence is to be regarded by the jury in all
cases. It is many times quite as conclusive in its convincing
i Cunningham v. S. 56 Neb. 691, 2 s. v. Peebles (Mo.), 77 S. W.
77 N. W. 60; Bennett v. S. 39 Tex. 520. See Lee v. S. 156 Ind. 541,
Cr. App. 639, 48 S. W. 61; Want- 546, 60 N. E. 299.
land v. S. 145 Ind. 38, 43 N. E. 3 s. v. Brady, 100 Iowa, 191, 69
931. N. W. 290.
761
729 CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 762
power as direct and positive evidence of eye witnesses. When
it is strong and satisfactory the jury should so consider it,
neither enlarging nor belittling its force. ' It should have its
just and fair weight with the jury; and if, when it is all taken
as a whole and fairly and candidly weighed, it convinces the
guarded judgment, the jury should act upon such conviction.
You are not to fancy situations or circumstances which do not
appear in the evidence, but you are to make such just and reason-
able inferences from circumstances proven which the guarded
judgment of a reasonable man would ordinarily make under like
circumstances. 4
(5) Some testimony has been admitted tending to show that
Samuel H. Marshall, who was jointly indicted with the defendant
for the murder, shortly after the alleged murder was committed,
had in his possession large sums of money, which it is claimed
by the state was the property of the deceased. This fact, if it
has been proved, is proper for you to consider, together with all
the other facts and circumstances proved on the trial, in deter-
mining the guilt or innocence of the defendant; if you further
find from the evidence that said money, or any part thereof, was
obtained or procured by said Marshall from the deceased as the
fruits of a conspiracy heretofore entered into by and between
the defendant and the said Marshall, or by and between the
defendant Marshall and some other person or persons, for the
robbing and murder of the deceased or for the burglarizing the
house of the deceased, and said facts, if any such facts have been
proved, must be considered by you with all the other facts and
circumstances proved in determining the guilt or innocence of
the defendant; whether the defendant was or was not present
at the time said Marshall was seen with said money, or any part
thereof, in his possession. 5
(6) If you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant deliberately and intentionally shot M in
manner and form as charged as he was passing along the public
highway, and that from the effects of such shooting the said M
died as alleged in the indictment, it matters not that such
4 S. v. Elsham, 70 Iowa, 534, 31 $ Musser v. S. 157 Ind. 431, 61
N. W. 68. N. E. 1.
763 REASONABLE HYPOTHESES.
evidence is circumstantial or made up from facts and circum-
stances, provided the jury believe such facts and circumstances
pointing toward his guilt have been proven by the evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt. 6
730. Every other reasonable hypothesis must be excluded
(1) In the application of circumstantial evidence to the determi-
nation of this case the utmost caution and vigilance should be
used. It is always insufficient when, assuming all to be proved
which the evidence tends to prove, some other reasonable hypothe-
sis arisng and growing out of the evidence in the cause than the
one sought to be established by the evidence, may be true. It
is the result based on the exclusion of every other reasonable
hypothesis arising and growing out of the evidence in the case
than that sought to be established by it, that will authorize the
jury to act upon it, and give the circumstances the force of truth
in the particular case. 7
(2) When the facts proved are susceptible of explanation upon
no reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence, and point
to guilt beyond any other reasonable solution, they are sufficient
to rest a conviction upon, although the crime charged is of the
utmost malignity and the penalty attached is the highest known
to the law. 8
(3) This is a case where the state seeks a conviction on circum-
stantial evidence. The defendant is presumed to be innocent until
the contrary is made to appear by the evidence ; and in a case of
this kind, in order to convict, the circumstances must be so strong
as to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis except that of
the guilt of the defendant. 9
(4) When a conviction is sought alone upon circumstantial evi-
dence, the circumstances relied upon, taken together, must be
incapable of explanation upon any other rational hypothesis but
that of the defendant's guilt; and if, after a careful considera-
tion of all the evidence in the case, there is in your minds any
such reasonable doubt of the defendant 's guilt, you will acquit. 10
Schoolcraft v. P. 117 III. 277, Wantland v. S. 145 Ind. 39, 43
7 N. E. 649. Contra: Otmer v. P. N. E. 931. See also Mose v. S. 36
76 111. 149. Ala. 221.
* Petty v. S. (Miss.), 35 So. 213. 10 Crutchfield v. S. 7 Tex. App.
s Stout v. S. 90 Ind. 12. 65; Hunt v. S. 7 Tex. App. 212.
731 CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 76-i
(5) You are further instructed that where the state seeks a con-
viction upon circumstantial evidence alone, it must not only show
that the alleged facts and circumstances are true, but that they
are absolutely incompatible with any reasonable hypothesis of
the innocence of the accused. 11
731. The circumstances must be consistent with each other.
(1) In order to warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence,
the' circumstances, taken together, should be of a conclusive
nature and tendency, leading on the whole to a satisfactory con-
clusion, and producing in effect a reasonable and moral certainty
that the accused, and no one else, committed the offense charged ;
and it is an invariable rule of law that to warrant a conviction
upon circumstantial evidence alone, such facts and circumstances
must be shown as are consistent with the guilt of the person
charged, and as cannot, upon any reasonable theory, be true and
the person charged be innocent ; and in this case, if all the facts
and circumstances relied upon by the people to secure a convic-
tion can be reasonably accounted for upon any theory consistent
with the innocence of the defendant, then the jury should acquit
the defendant. 12
(2) The facts and circumstances shown in evidence and relied
upon for a conviction must be consistent with each other and
with the guilt of the accused, and taken together must be of a
conclusive nature, producing a reasonable and moral certainty
that the defendant and no other person committed the crime. 13
732. Inconsistent with any other rational theory. (1) A few
facts or a multitude of facts proven, all consistent with the sup-
position of guilt, are not enough to warrant a verdict of guilty.
In order to convict on circumstantial evidence, not only the cir-
cumstances must all concur to show that the defendant com-
mitted the crime, but they must be inconsistent with any other
rational conclusion. 14
(2) In order to convict the defendant upon the evidence of cir-
11 S. v. Brady, 100 Iowa, 191, 69 is Crow v. S. 37 Tex. Cr. App. 295
N. W. 290. 39 S. W. 574.
12 Marzen v. P. 173 111. 61. See 14 s. v. Andrews, 62 Kas. 207, 61
generally; S. v. Jones, 19 Nev. Pac. 808. See S. v. David, 131 Mo.
365, 11 Pac. 317; S. v. Nelson, 11 380, 33 S. W. 28; S. v. Hill, 65 Mo.
Nev. 340. 88.
765 EACH LINK IN CHAIN. 733
cumstances it is necessary, not only that all the circumstances
relied upon for a conviction concur to show that he committed
the crime charged, but that they are inconsistent with any other
rational conclusion. It is not sufficient that the circumstances
proved coincide with, account' for and therefore render probable
the hypothesis sought to be established by the prosecution; but
they must exclude to a moral certainty every other reasonable
hypothesis but the single one of guilt, or the jury must find the
defendant not guilty. 15
733. "Each link" in chain of circumstance. (1) If you be-
lieve from the evidence before you beyond a reasonable doubt that
Emma Moore came to her death by reason of a shot fired from a
revolver by the hand of defendant substantially as charged in
the indictment, it matters not that such evidence is circumstan-
tial, or made up from the facts and circumstances surrounding
the death and the relations of the defendant with her, provided
only that the jury believe such facts and circumstances to be
proven by the evidence beyond all reasonable doubt, and to be
inconsistent with any other reasonable hypothesis than that of
the guilt of the defendant. It is not enough, however, that all
the facts and circumstances shown are consistent with the guilt
of the defendant, but they must be of such character that they
cannot be reasonably true in the ordinary nature of things and
the defendant be innocent. The rule requiring the jury to be
satisfied of the defendant's guilt beyond all reasonable doubt in
order to warrant a conviction, does not require, however, that
you should be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of each link
in the chain of circumstances relied upon to establish his guilt.
It will be sufficient, if taking the evidence altogether, you are
satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt that the defendant is
guilty. 16
(2) The law requires the jury to be satisfied of the defendant's
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in order to warrant a conviction,
but does not require that you should be satisfied beyond a rea-
sonable doubt of each link in the chain of circumstances relied
upon to establish the defendant's guilt. It is sufficient, if taking
is P. v. Anthony, 56 Gal. 400. S. v. Lucas (Iowa), 97 N. W.
1007.
734 CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 766
the testimony all together, you are satisfied beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant is guilty, as charged in the indictment. 17
734. Degree of proof as to each essential fact. (1) The sev-
eral circumstances upon which the. conclusion depends must be
fully established by proof. They are facts from which the main
fact is to be inferred; and they are to be proved by competent
evidence and by the same weight and force of evidence as if each
one were itself the main fact in issue. 18
(2) Where a conviction depends upon circumstantial evidence
alone, each fact necessary to establish the guilt of the accused
must be proved by competent evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt, and the facts and circumstances proved should not only
be consistent with the guilt of the accused, but inconsistent with
any other reasonable hypothesis than that of his guilt. 19
(3) When the evidence against the defendant is made up wholly
of a chain of circumstances, and there is a reasonable doubt as
to the existence of one of the facts essential to establish guilt,
it is the duty of the jury to acquit the defendant. 20
(4) The rule of law is that in order that a jury may be warrant-
ed in finding the defendant guilty on circumstantial evidence, all
the facts and circumstances necessary to establish the conclusion
of guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, all such facts
and circumstances must be consistent with each other and with
the conclusion sought to be established, which is, that the person
on trial committed the crime charged. All such facts and cir-
cumstances must be inconsistent with any reasonable theory of
the innocence of the defendant, and such facts and circum-
stances taken all together, must be of such conclusive and satis-
factory nature as to produce in the minds of the jurors a reason-
able and moral certainty that the person on trial, and not some
other person, committed the offense charged. 21
i? Hodge v. Ter. 12 Okla. 108, 69 35 S. W. 664; S. v. Crabtree, 170 Mo.
Pac. 1079. The evidence in this 642, 71 S. W. 130; Johnson v. S. 18
case was both direct and circum- Tex. Cr. App. 398.
stantial. See also Hauk v. S. 148 20 p. v . Anthony, 56 Cal. 397;
Ind. 238, 46 N. E. 127, 47 N. B. See P. v. Aiken, 66 Mich. 460, 33
465. N. W. 821; S. v. Kruger, 7 Idaho,
is Com. v. Webster, 5 Gush. 178, 61 Pac. 463. Contra: Brady
(Mass.) 317. See Johnson v. S. 18 v. Com. 11 Bush (Ky.) 285.
Tex. App. 398. 21 Galloway v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.),
i Baldez v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 70 S. W. 212.
767 DEGREE OF PROOF, SUBSIDIARY FACTS. 736
735. Subsidiary facts not within the rule. (1) The doctrine
of reasonable doubt as a general rule has no application to subsidi-
ary evidence taken item by item. It is applicable to the con-
stituent elements of the crime charged and to any fact or facts
which constitute the entire proof of one or more of the constitu-
ent elements of the crime charged. That is to say all the facts
which must have existed in order to make out the guilt of the
accused must be established beyond a reasonable doubt before
you can convict. But the rule of reasonable doubt does not
apply to subsidiary and evidentiary facts, that is to say, to such
facts and circumstances in evidence, if there be any such, as
are not essential elements of the crime charged and not neces-
sary to the proof thereof, and when considered together as a
whole, tend to prove or disprove the existence of one or more of
the primary facts necessary to make out the offense. Subsidiary
and evidentiary facts may be considered by you in determining
the necessary and essential facts when established by clear and
satisfactory proof. 22
(2) It is not necessary that the jury should believe that every
material fact or circumstance in evidence before them shall be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, but that it is sufficient if the
jury believe from the evidence in the case that every material
allegation in the indictment or either count thereof, in manner
and form as therein charged, has been proven beyond a reason-
able doubt. 23
736. Circumstances of suspicion not evidence. That cir-
cumstances of suspicion, no matter how grave or strong, are not
evidence of guilt, and the accused must be acquitted unless the
fact of his guilt is proven beyond every reasonable doubt to the
exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis consistent with his inno-
cence. 24
22 Hinshaw v. S. 147 Ind. 379, 23 Jamison v. P. 145 111. 357, 380,
47 N. E. 157; Wade v. S. 71 Ind. 34 N. E. 486.
535. 24 Henderson v. Com. 98 Va. 797
34 S. E. 881.
CHAPTER L.
CONFESSIONS, ADMISSIONS, FLIGHT.
Sec. Sec.
737. Confessions to be considered 739. Admissions of deceased.
like other evidence. 740. Flight tends to prove guilt.
738. Admissions subject to imper- 741. Flight is a circumstance only.
fection. 742. Defendant surrendering.
737. Confessions to be considered like other evidence. (1)
It is the duty of the jury to treat and consider any confessions
proven to have been made by the defendant precisely as any
other testimony; and hence if the jury believe the whole confes-
sion to be true, they will act upon the whole as the truth. But
the jury may believe that which charges the prisoner and reject
that which is in his favor if they see sufficient grounds in the
evidence or in any inherent improbability in the statement itself.
The jury are at liberty to judge of it like other evidence by all
the circumstances in the case. 1
(2) If verbal statements of defendant have been proven in this
case, you may take them into consideration with all the other
facts and circumstances proven. What the proof may show you,
if anything, that the defendant has said against himself, the law
presumes to be true because against himself, but anything you
may believe from the evidence that defendant said in his own
behalf, you are not obliged to believe, but you may treat the
same as true or false, just as you believe it true or false, \vhen
i Jackson v. P. 18 111. 271.
768
769 ADMISSIONS UNSATISFACTORY EVIDENCE. 739
considered with a view to all the other facts and circumstances
in the case. 2
738. Admissions subject to much imperfection. (1) Verbal
admissions consisting of mere repetitions of oral statements made
a long time before are subject to much imperfection and mistake,
for the reason that the person making them may not have
expressed his own meaning, or the witness may have misunder-
stood him, or by not giving his exact language may have changed
the meaning of what was actually said, and this is especially true
where long time has elapsed since the alleged admissions were
made; such evidence should therefore be received by you with
caution. 3
(2) Where a confession of the prisoner charged with a crime
has been introduced in evidence, the whole 1 of the confession so
introduced and testified to must be taken together, as well that
part which makes in favor of the accused as that part which
makes against him; and if the part of the statement which is in
favor of the accused is not disproved by other evidence in the
case and is not improbable or untrue, considered in connection
with all the other testimony in the case, then that part of the
statement is entitled to as much consideration by the jury as any
parts thereof which make against the accused. 3 *
(3) In a criminal case, admissions and confessions of the ac-
cused are admitted with caution, and the court tells you that it
is your province to consider all the circumstances under which
the alleged admissions were made, and' determine their exact
nature, import and meaning. 4
739. Admissions of deceased. The admissions of the de-
ceased shortly before his death will be considered by the jury
with great care, and all the circumstances in connection
therewith, his suffering, whether he was in such condition as to
speak with mature consideration and due deliberation, and
whether he spoke in regard to his legal rights, or whether he
referred to and meant that defendant was not to blame for any
2 S. v. Darrah, 152 Mo. 530, 54 S. s* Burnett v. P. 204 111. 225.
W. 226. * Flick v. Com. 97 Va. 766, 34 S.
3 McMullen v. Clark, 49 Ind. 81. B. 42. Contra: Keith v. S. 157 Ind.
But see Keith v. S. 157 Ind. 386, 386, 61 N. E. 716.
61 N. E. 716.
740 CONFESSIONS, ADMISSIONS, FLIGHT. 770
willful intention to injure him or cause said accident, and then
give his admission such meaning as you believe from all the
circumstances he intended it to have, and give such weight to
his statement or admission as in your judgment it may be
entitled to. And the admission of deceased will not be conclu-
sive as to what he states. But you will consider all the testi-
mony in relation thereto as in your judgment the whole evidence
will justify. 5
740. Flight tends to prove guilt. (1) If the jury believe
from the evidence that defendant, after he was charged with the
crime alleged in the indictment, fled from justice, or while under
recognizance forfeited the same on account of said charge, such
conduct on the part of the defendant is evidence to be con-
sidered by the jury in determining his guilt or innocence. 6
(2) Flight raises the presumption of guilt, and if you believe
from the evidence that the defendant, after having shot and killed
M as charged in the indictment, fled from the country and tried
to avoid arrest and trial, you may take that fact into consider-
ation in determining his guilt or innocence. 7
(3) Flight is considered as evidence tending to prove the guilt
of the accused. It is your privilege to look on it in that light.
You may also look on it as evidence of fear of summary punish-
ment at the hands of his pursuers. Weigh it carefully and give
it the effect it reasonably should have under all the circum-
stances of the case. 8
741. Flight is a circumstance only. (1) Evidence has been
offered tending to show flight by the defendant from the state
of Kansas to the state of Washington, at or about the time the
complaint was filed charging him with the crime alleged against
him in the information. If you find from the evidence that the
defendant at or about the time the charge contained in the infor-
mation was first preferred against him, fled to a distant part of
the country, and that such flight was induced by such charge,
this is a circumstance to be considered by you in connection
s Cooper v. Central R. Co. 44 ? s. v. Gee, 85 Mo. 647.
Iowa, 137. 8 Com. v. Berchine, 168 Pa. St.
s S. v. Hayes, 78 Mo. 310. 603, 32 Atl. 109.
771 FLIGHT ONLY A CIRCUMSTANCE. 742
with all the other evidence to aid you in determining his guilt
or innocence.
(2) Evidence has been introduced as to an attempted escape
from jail by the defendant while in the custody of the sheriff on
this charge. If you find from the evidence that the defendant did
thus attempt to escape from custody, this is a circumstance to
be considered by you in connection with all the other evidence
to aid you in determining the question of his guilt or innocence. 10
(3) The flight of a person immediately after the commission of
a crime, or after a crime has been committed with which he is
charged, is a circumstance not sufficient of itself to establish
his guilt, but a circumstance which the jury may consider in
determining the probabilities for or against him the probability
of his guilt or innocence. The weight to which this circum-
stance is entitled is a matter for the jury to determine in con-
nection with all the facts and circumstances shown in the evi-
dence. 11
742. Defendant surrendering. The fact that when charged
with the commision of a crime the defendant refuses to
flee, but surrenders himself to the proper authorities, cannot
be considered as showing his innocence of the offense charged. 12
9 S. v. Thomas, 58 Kas. 805, 51 12 Walker v. S. (Ala.), 35 So.
Pac. 229. See S. v. Poe (Iowa), 1012. See. also, Waybright v. S.
98 N. W. 588. 56 Ind. 125. Defendant may explain
10 Anderson v. S. 104 Ind. 472, his flight and its cause. Batten v.
4 N. E. 63, 5 N. E. 711. S. 80 Ind. 401.
11 P. v. Forsythe, 65 Cal. 102, 3
Pac. 402.
CHAPTER LI.
ALIBI AS DEFENSE.
Sec. Sec.
743. Burden of proof. 745. High degree of proof in II-
744. Alibi raising a reasonable linois.
doubt.
743. Burden of proof. (1) When the state makes out such
a case as would sustain a verdict of guilty, and the defendant
offers evidence, the burden is upon him to make out his defense
as to an alibi; and when the proof is all in, both that given, for
the defendant and for the state, then the primary question is
(the whole evidence being considered), is the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt? the law being that if, after you
have considered the evidence, as well that touching the alibi as
the criminating evidence introduced by the state, you have a
reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused, you should acquit ;
if you have not, you should convict. 1
(2) It is not incumbent on the defendant to prove an alibi be-
yond a reasonable doubt. Though the evidence introduced to es-
tablish an alibi falls short of the weight of moral certainty as to
the existence or truth of the alibi, yet if he leaves in the minds of
the jury such a doubt or uncertainty that, taken by itself, they
could not find for or against the alibi, they are bound to carry
such doubt into the case of the prosecution, and to array it there
as an element of the reasonable doubt, beyond which the prose-
cution must establish guilt. The defendant is entitled as much
i S. v. Thornton (S. Dak.), 73 N. W. 196.
772
773 ALIBI CREATING DOUBT. 744
to the benefit of such doubt as to any other doubt raised by the
evidence; and if the weight of the alibi, alone or added to that
of any other, be sufficient to reduce belief in the minds of the
jury as to the defendant's guilt to a reasonable doubt, they must
acquit. 2
(3) The burden of establishing an alibi is upon the defendants
and the evidence introduced to sustain it should outweigh the
evidence introduced by the state tending to show that the defend-
ants participated in the crime charged. They are not bound to
establish such defense beyond a reasonable doubt ; but if, upon
the whole case, the testimony raises in your minds a reasonable
doubt that the defendants were present at the place where the
assault was committed, that, of course, would create a reason-
able doubt as to their guilt and would entitle them to an acquit-
tal. 3
744. Alibi raising a reasonable doubt. (1) One of the de-
fenses interposed by the defendant in this case is an alibi ; that is,
that the defendant was at another place at the identical time the
crime was committed, if committed at all. If in view of all the
evidence you have any reasonable doubt as to whether the de-
fendant was at another place from where the crime was com-
mitted at the time of its commission, then you should acquit ; but
if you believe from the evidence that the accused was not so
far away from the place where the offense was committed, but
that he could with ordinary exertion have reached the place
where the offense was committed, then you will consider that
fact as a circumstance tending to prove or disprove the alibi. 4
(2) If there is any evidence before you which raises in your
minds a reasonable doubt as to the presence of the defendant at
the time and place where the crime is charged to have been com-
mitted, you must acquit him. 5
2 P. v. Fong Ah Sing, 64 Gal. derance of evidence by defendant).
253, 28 Pac. 233, 11 Am. Cr. R. 33. Contra: Shoemaker v. Ter. 4 Okla.
See Shultz v. Ter. (Ariz.), 52 Pac. 118, 43 Pac. 1059; Parker v. S. 136
352.; Walters v. S. 39 Ohio St. 215; Ind. 284, 35 N. E. 1104.
Peyton v. S. 54 Neb. 188, 74 N. W. * S. v. Burton, 27 Wash. 528, 67
597. Pac. 1097. See McLain v. S. 18
s S. v. Fry, 67 Iowa, 478, 25 N. Neb. 160, 24 N. W. 720.
W. 738. See S. v. Kline, 54 Iowa, $ S. v. Adair, 160 Mo. 394, 61 S.
185, 6 N. W. 184 (requiring prepon- W. 187; Thornton v. S. 20 Tex.
7
ALIBI AS A DEFENSE.
774
(3) You should not convict the defendant unless, after consid-
ering all the evidence introduced in this case, you are satisfied of
his guilt beyond all reasonable doubt ; and if, after considering all
the evidence introduced by the prosecution, and all the evidence
introduced by the defense, you entertain a reasonable doubt as
to whether the defendant, M, has been identified as one of the
persons present participating in the offense charged, you should
find him not guilty. 6
745. High degree of proof required in Illinois. (1) In this
case what is known as an alibi, that is, that the defendants and
each of them were at another place at the time of the burning of
the stacks, so far as the same is relied on by the defendants, to
render the proof of an alibi satisfactory to the jury the evidence
must cover the whole of the time of the setting of the fires, if the
jury believe from the evidence said stacks were set on fire, so as
to render it impossible or very improbable that the defendants,
or any of them, could have committed the act. 7
(2) You are to carefully scrutinize any evidence in relation to
an alibi. An alibi is a defense that is easily proven and hard
to disprove. Therefore, you will be careful and cautious in
examining the evidence in regard to the defense of an alibi. 8
App. 535; Casey v. S. 49 Neb. 403,
68 N. W. 643; Peyton v. S. 54 Neb.
188, 74 N. W. 597; Allen v. S. 70
Ark. 337, 68 S. W. 28.
e Mullins v. P. 110 111. 43, alibi
was the defense in this case.
7 Creed v. P. 81 111. 569; Miller
v. P. 39 111. 464. See Mullins v. P.
110 111. 43; Waters v. P. 172 111.
373, 50 N. E. 148, this instruction
is not good law, though sustained,
s P. v. Tice, 115 Mich. 219, 73
N. W. 108. An instruction which
casts discredit on the defense of
alibi is erroneous. Sater v. S. 56
Ind. 382; Albin v. S. 63 Ind. 598.
CHAPTER LIT.
INSANITY AS DEFENSE.
Sec. Sec.
746. Every man presumed to be 750. Will overcome by irresistible
sane. impulse.
747. Insanity presumed to con- 751. Reasonable doubt of sanity.
tinue When. 752. Higher degree of proof re-
748. Ability to distinguish right quired in some states.
from wrong. 753. Mere weakness of mind.
749. No will power to refrain from 754. Defense of insanity, examined
act. with care.
755. Drunkenness is not insanity.
746. Every one presumed to be sane. The law presumes
every man to be sane until the contrary is shown, and when
insanity is set up as a defense by a person accused of crime,
then, before the jury can acquit the accused on the ground of
insanity, it must appear from the evidence in the case that at
the time of the commission of the act the accused was not of
sound mind, but affected with insanity to such a degree as to
create an uncontrollable impulse to do the act charged by over-
riding his reason and judgment. 1
747. Insanity presumed to continue When. (1) A person who
is insane only at intervals may, during a lucid interval, commit a
crime and be responsible therefor, if the evidence shows beyond
a reasonable doubt that, at the time of the commission of the
crime charged, the person had sufficient mental capacity and will
i Dacy v. P. 116 111. 555, 570, 6 evidence. S. v. McCoy, 34 Mo. 535;
N. E. 165, this instruction does not S. v. Pagels, 92 Mo. 300, 10 N. W.
require the defendant to prove 288.
insanity by a preponderance of the
775
748 INSANITY AS DEFENSE. 776
power to make him criminally responsible under the law. It is
not a question of whether he exercised sufficient will power or not,
but the question is, did he possess sufficient will power at the
time to resist the impulse to commit the crime, and could he have
resisted had he tried? 2
(2) When it appears from the evidence that insanity has once
existed in the defendant, whether or not it will be presumed to
continue depends on the nature of the malady. If it is of a per-
manent and chronic character, then it is presumed to continue to
exist until the contrary appears from the evidence; but if the
insanity is the result of physical disease, a weakened condition
of the system, remorse, disappointment, shattered hopes, jealousy,
an excited condition, strong passions, violent temper, or some
other temporary or transient cause, and lucid intervals appear,
then no presumption as to its continued existence is indulged,
and the mental condition of the defendant at the time of the
commission of the crime charged is to be ascertained by the jury
from all the evidence and circumstances of the case. 8
(3) If from a careful consideration of the facts and circum-
stances shown by the evidence in this case, you believe that the
defendant, D, was insane and of unsound mind on the thirteenth
day of May last, at late as twelve o'clock on that day, then the
presumption of law is that that condition of mind continued up
until after the shooting mentioned, between ten and eleven
o'clock of that evening, as complained of in the indictment,
unless you shall further believe from the evidence before you,
beyond all reasonable doubt, that he had recovered from such
insane condition of mind prior to the shooting. 4
748. Ability to distinguish right from wrong. (1) If you
believe from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the de-
fendant committed the crime in manner and form as charged in
the indictment, and at the time of committing such act was able to
distinguish right from wrong, you should find him guilty. 5
2 Wheeler v. S. 158 Ind. 700, 63 4 Dacey v. P. 116 111. 573, 6 N. E.
N. E. 975. This statement of the 165.
law is clear enough without de- 5 Dunn v. P. 109 111. 635, 643.
fining "mental capacity." . See S. v. Pagels, 92 Mo. 300, 10 N.
a Wheeler v. S. 158 Ind. 701, 63 W. 288.
N. E. 975.
777 TRUE TEST OF INSANITY. 749
(2) If you believe from the evidence, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that at the time of committing the alleged act the de-
fendant was able to distinguish right from wrong, then you can-
not acquit him on the ground of insanity. 6
(3) Was the accused a free agent in forming the purpose to
kill? Was he at the time capable of judging whether his act was
right or wrong? And did he know at the time that it was an
offense against the laws of God and man? 7
(4) But the unsoundness of mind, or affection of insanity, must
be of such a degree as to create an uncontrollable impulse to do
the act charged, by overriding the reason and judgment, and oblit-
erating the sense of right and wrong as to the particular act
done, and depriving the accused of the power of choosing between
them. If it be shown the act was the consequence of an insane
delusion, and caused by it, and by nothing else, the accused
should be acquitted. 8
(5) If, from all the evidence in the case, you believe, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed the crime of
which he is accused in manner and form as charged in the indict-
ment, and that at the time of the commission of such
crime the defendant knew that it was wrong to commit such
crime, and was mentally capable of choosing either to do or not
to do, the act or acts constituting such crime, and of governing
his conduct in accordance with such choice, then it is your duty,
under the law, to find him guilty, even though you should be-
lieve, from all the evidence, that at the time of the commission of
the crime he was not entirely and perfectly sane, or that he was
greatly excited or enraged, or under the influence of intoxicating
liquor. 9
749. No will power to refrain from the act. If you find
from the evidence that the mind of the respondent, at the time
of the killing of Mamie Small, was diseased; that by reason of
such mental disease his will power was then impaired ; that by
reason of such impairment of his will power so caused he did
not then have sufficient will power to refrain from committing the
s Dunn v. P. 109 111. 635, 643; 7 Blackburn v. S. 23 Ohio St. 165.
Queenan v. Ter. 11 Okla. 261, 71 8 Hopps v. P. 31 111. 392.
Pac. 218; Homish v. P. 142 111. 624, Dunn v. P. 109 111. 635, 643.
32 N. E. 677.
750 INSANITY AS DEFENSE. 778
act ; and that the act was the product of such mental disease, he
was not responsible for the act, although he then had sufficient
mental capacity and reason to enable him to distinguish between
right and wrong as to the particular act he was doing. 10
750. Will overcome by irresistible impulse. (1) If the act
of G in assaulting the party, which is admitted to constitute a
breach of the bond, was caused by mental disease or unsoundness
which dethroned his reason and judgment with respect to that
act which destroyed his power rationally to comprehend the na-
ture and consequence of that act, and which overpowering his
will irresistibly forced him to its commission, then he is not
legally answerable therefor. But if you believe from all the evi-
dence and circumstances that he was in possession of a rational
intellect and sound mind, and allowed his passions to escape con-
trol, then, though passion may for the time being have driven
reason from her seat and usurped it, and have urged him with a
force at the moment irresistible to desperate acts, he cannot claim
for such acts the protection of insanity. 11
(2) To be held criminally responsible a man must have reason
enough to be able to judge of the character and consequences of
the act committed, and he must not have been overcome by an
irresistible impulse arising from disease. 12
751. Reasonable doubt of sanity. (1) If, upon the whole
evidence, the jury find that the defendant, at the time of commit-
ting the act, was not of sound mind, and was unconscious that he
was committing a crime, they should acquit him. The fact of the
soundness of mind at the time the act was committed is as much
an essential ingredient of the crime of murder as the fact of
killing, or of malice, or of any other fact or ingredient of mur-
der, and should be made out in the same way by the same party,
and by evidence of the same kind and degree, and as conclusive
in its character as is required in making out any other fact, in-
gredient or element of murder. The burden of proof in a crim-
10 S. v. Knight, 95 Me. 467, 50 " S. v. Geddis, 42 Iowa, 271.
Atl. 276, 55 L. R. A. 373, (this is 12 S. v. Peel, 23 Mont. 358, 59
a well considered case and sets out Pac. 169, citing and quoting from
a full charge on the law of insan- Dr. Clevenger's Med. Juris, p. 174.
ity in various forms.)
779 REASONABLE DOUBT OF SANITY. 751
inal case is always upon the state, and never shifts to the defend-
ant; and the making out of a prima facie case against the de-
fendant does not shift the burden of proof to the defendant. If
a prima facie case is made out by the state against the defend-
ant, then, in order to entitle the defendant to an acquittal, he is
only required by evidence to establish a reasonable doubt of his
sanity. If the jury cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant was sane at the time of the commission of the al-
leged act, or cannot say whether, at the time, he was sane or in-
sane, they are bound to acquit him. 13
(2) If the evidence in the case is sufficient to raise a reason-
able doubt as to the sanity of the defendant, then the jury will
find the defendant not guilty. 14
(3) To warrant a conviction in this case, it is incumbent on
the people to establish by evidence, to the satisfaction of the jury,
beyond all reasonable doubt, the existence of every element nec-
essary to constitute the crime charged. And if, after a careful
and impartial examination of all the evidence in the case bear-
ing upon the question of sanity or insanity, the jury entertain a
reasonable doubt of the sanity of the defendant at the time of
the alleged offense, they should give him the benefit of such
doubt and acquit him. 15
(4) While the law presumes all men to be sane, yet this pre-
sumption may be overcome by evidence tending to prove insanity
of the accused at the time of the commission of the alleged
offense. When such evidence is introduced, then the presump-
tion of sanity ceases, and the prosecution is bound to
prove the sanity of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. So,
in this case, in which the defense of insanity is interposed, if the
jury, after considering all the evidence, entertain a reasonable
doubt of the sanity of the defendant at the time of the alleged of-
fense, then he must be acquitted. 16
(5) True it is, the law presumes every man to be sane and re-
sponsible for his acts until the contrary appears from the evi-
13 S. v. Malm, 25 Kas. 188; S. v. IB Dacey v. P. 116 111. 555, 573, 6
Nixon, 32 Kas. 213, 4 Pac. 159. N. E. 165.
i* Jamison v. P. 145 111. 357, 381, i Jamison v. P. 145 111. 357, 380,
34 N. E. 486; Hopps v. P. 31 111. 34 N. E. 486.
392; S. v. Mahn, 25 Kas. 186.
752 INSANITY AS DEFENSE. 780
denct. Still, if there is any evidence in the case tending to rebut
the presumption sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt on the is-
sue of insanity, then the jury will find the defendant not guilty. 17
(6) The law presumes that a man is of sound mind until there
is some evidence tending to prove the contrary. In prosecutions
charging violations of the criminal code, the accused is entitled
to an acquittal if the evidence engenders a reasonable dubt as
to his mental capacity at the time the alleged offense is charged
to have been committed. Evidence rebutting or tending to rebut
the presumption of sanity need not, to entitle the accused to an
acquittal, preponderate in his favor. If the evidence raises in
your minds a reasonable doubt of sanity it is sufficient. 18
752. Higher degree of proof required in some states. (1)
The plea of insanity is a complete defense to the crime charged
if, from all the evidence before you, you believe the plea is sus-
tained. The law presumes all men to be sane until insanity shall
have been established by competent evidence to the satisfaction
of the jury. It is not necessary, in order to acquit, that the evi-
dence on the subject of insanity should satisfy you beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the defendant was insane ; it is sufficient if,
upon consideration of all the evidence, you are reasonably satis-
fied that he was insane. If the weight or preponderance of the
evidence shows the insanity of the defendant, it raises a reason-
able doubt of guilt. 19
(2) To establish a defense on the ground of insanity it must be
clearly proved that, at the time of committing the act, the accused
was laboring under such a defect of reason from disease of the
mind as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was
doing. 20
753. Mere weakness of mind. Mere weakness of mind does
not excuse the commission of crime. If one is of sound mind he
is to be held responsible for his criminal act, even though his
mental capacity be weak or his intellect be of an inferior order. 21
IT Dacey v. P. 116 111. 573, 6 N. 2 Thompson, Tr. 2525, citing
E. 165. Clark v. S. 8 Tex. App. 350; Smith
is Guetig v. S. 66 Ind. 106. v. S. 19 Tex. App. 96.
10 S. v. Bruce, 48 Iowa, 534; S. v. 21 Wartena v. S. 105 Ind. 450, 5
McCoy, 34 Mo. 535. N. E. 20.
781 DRUNKENNESS NOT INSANITY. 755
754. Defense of insanity to be examined with care. The
defense of insanity is one which may be, and sometimes is, re-
sorted to in eases where the proof of the overt act is so full and
complete that any other means of avoiding conviction and escap-
ing punishment seems hopeless. While, therefore, this is a de-
fense to be weighed fully and justly, and when satisfactorily es-
tablished, must recommend itself to the favorable consideration
of the humanity and justice of the jury, they are to examine it
with care, lest an ingenuous counterfeit of such mental disease or
disorder should furnish protection to guilt. 22
755. Drunkenness is not insanity. (1) Voluntary intoxica-
tion is no excuse for crime as long as the offender is capable of
conceiving an intelligent design ; he will be presumed, if the case
is otherwise made out beyond a reasonable dbubt, to have in-
tended the natural and probable consequences of his own act. 23
(2) Although it is the law in this state that a criminal offense
consists in a violation of a public law, in the commission of which
there must be a union or joint operation of act and intention, or
criminal negligence, yet where, without intoxication, the law will
impute to the act a criminal intent, as in the case of wanton kill-
ing without provocation, voluntary drunkenness is not available
to disprove such intent. 24
(3) If you believe from the evidence, beyond a reasonable
doubt, each of the following propositions, to-wit : that
at or about two hours before the commission of the alleged
homicide the defendant was sane, and had the power to abstain
from drinking alcohol ; that the defendant then knew that the
drinking of alcohol by him would have the effect to render him
insane or crazy; that the defendant, so knowing the effect of al-
cohol upon him, and being sane, and having the power to abstain
from taking alcohol, did then and there voluntarily drink alco-
hol ; that the alcohol so drank by the defendant then and there
made him insane or crazy; that while so insane or crazy from
22 P. v. Donlan, 135 Gal. 489, 67 ing that an instruction which tends
Pac. 761; P. v. Larrabee, 115 Gal. to discredit the defense of insani-
159, 46 Pac. 922; P. v. Allender, 117 ty is erroneous.
Cal. 81, 48 Pac. 1014. See Mcln- ^ Smurr v. S. 88 Ind. 507.
tosh v. S. 151 Ind. 259. But see 2* Upstone v. P. 109 111. 169, 176.
Aszman v. S. 123 Ind. 347, hold-
755 INSANITY AS DEFENSE. 782
the effects of such alcohol the defendant committed the act
charged in the indictment, at the time and place, and in the
manner and form therein charged, then you should find the de-
fendant guilty. 25
(4) If you believe from the evidence, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the defendant, when voluntarily intoxicated, commit-
ted the homicide charged in the indictment, under such circum-
stances as would have constituted such an act, by one not intox-
icated, murder, then you are instructed that such intoxication
would not reduce the crime from murder to manslaughter, nor
would such intoxication be any excuse or defense to the act. 26
(5) Frenzy arising solely from the passions of anger and
jealousy, no matter how furious, is not insanity. A man with
ordinary will power, which is unimpaired by disease, is re-
quired by law to govern and control his passions. If he yields
to wicked passions, and purposely and maliciously slays an-
other, he cannot escape the penalty prescribed by law, upon
the ground of mental incapacity. That state of mind caused by
wicked and ungovernable passions, resulting not from mental
lesion, but solely from evil passions, constitutes that mental con-
dition which the law abhors and to which the term malice is ap-
plied. The condition of mind which usually and immediately
follows the excessive use of alcoholic liquors, is not the unsound-
ness of mind meant by law. Voluntary drunkenness does not
even palliate or excuse. 27
25 Upstone v. P. 109 111. 169, 177. conspiracy and felonious intent not
-' Upston-e v. P. 109 111. 169, 177. consummated, see Booher v. S. 156
27 Guetig v. S. 66 Ind. 94. As to Ind. 439.
effect of intoxication in disproving
CHAPTER Lin.
GOOD CHARACTER OF ACCUSED.
Sec. Sec.
756. Good character of defendant 758. Character of defendant pre-
a circumstance. sumed good.
757. Good character may create
reasonable doubt.
756. Good character of defendant a circumstance. (1) Ev-
idence has been given to the character of the defendant for peace
and quietude. This evidence should be considered by you in de-
termining the guilt or innocence of the defendant; but, if you
should be satisfied from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt,
of the guilt of the defendant as charged in the indictment, then,
in that view of the case, although you may believe that he had
a good character before the alleged offense occurred, if it did
occur, that would not avail him as a defense or entitle him to
be acquitted. 1
(2) The defendant has put in evidence his general reputation
for peaceableness ; that such evidence is permissible under the law
and is to be by the jury considered as a circumstance in the case
But the court further instructs the jury that if, from all the evi-
dence in the case, they are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt
of the guilt of the accused, then it is the duty of the jury to find
him guilty, notwithstanding the fact that heretofore the accused
has borne a very good character for peaceableness. 2
(3) Some evidence has been introduced by the defendants in re-
i Walker v. S. 136 Ind. 669, 36 2 Hirschman v. P. 101 111. 568.
N. E. 356; P. v. Samsels, 66 Cal. 575. Held not erroneous as telling
99, 4 Pac. 1061. See Wagner v. S. the jury to disregard the evidence
107 Ind. 71, 7 N. E. 896. of good character.
783
756 GOOD CHARACTER OF ACCUSED. 784
gard to their character for honesty. This evidence should be con-
sidered by you as tending to establish a defense. If, however, you
should be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the
defendants, after a full consideration of all the evidence in the
case, including the testimony in regard to their character for
honesty, then in the view of the case, though you might believe
that the defendants had a good character for honesty before the
alleged crime, that would not avail them as a defense or entitle
them to an acquittal. 3
(4) In determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant, you
should take into account the testimony in relation to his character
for honesty, integrity, and veracity, and you chould give to such
testimony such weight as you deem proper, but if, from all the
evidence before you, you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt,
as defined in these instructions, that the defendant is guilty, then
his previous good character, if shown, cannot justify, excuse pal-
liate or mitigate the offense, and you cannot acquit him merely
because you may believe he has been a person of good repute. 4
(5) The character of the defendant is also a matter for your
consideration. The evidence as to his character should be given
such weight, in explanation of the transaction between himself
and the deceased, as to you shall seem proper. But, if you shall
conclude, from all the evidence, that the defendant is guilty, you
should not acquit him because you may believe that he has here-
tofore been a person of good repute. 5
(6) The defendant has a right to show his previous good char-
acter as a circumstance tending to show the improbability of his
guilt. If, however, you believe from the evidence, beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, that the defendant committed the crime as
charged in the indictment, then you should find him guilty, even
though the evidence satisfies your minds that the defendant, pre-
vious to the commission of the alleged crime, has sustained a good
reputation as a peaceable and law-abiding citizen. 6
(7) Whilst the jury may take into consideration the previous
good character of defendant, together with all the other facts and
circumstances of the case adduced in evidence, in determining
s McQueen v. S. 82 Ind. 74 (rob- $ S. v. Vansant, 80 Mo. 70.
bery). e s. v. Porter, 32 Ore. 135, 49 Pac.
* S. v. Darrah, 152 Mo. 531, 54 964.
S. W. 226.
785 GOOD CHARACTER CREATING DOUBT. 8 758
t>
whether or not defendant is guilty of the offense charged in the
indictment, yet if from the whole testimony, they believe defend-
ant is guilty, then his previous good character neither justifies,
mitigates, nor excuses the offense. 7
For the Defense.
757. Good character may create a reasonable doubt. (1)
You are instructed that evidence of the good character of the de-
fendant is competent to be taken into consideration by you in de-
termining his guilt or innocence. The good character of the ac-
cused, when satisfactorily established, may, of itself, create such a
reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury as will justify an ac-
quittal. 8
(2) In a case involved in much doubt, the good character of the
accused, abundantly proved, is entitled to great weight, and may
of itself create such a reasonable doubt as will justify an ac-
quittal. 9
(3) Good character of itself may, in connection with all the evi-
dence, generate a reasonable doubt and entitle the defendant to
an acquittal, though without such proof of good character you
would convict. 10
(4) The good character of the accused, when satisfactorily es-
tablished by competent evidence, is an ingredient which ought al-
ways to be considered by the jury, together with the other facts
and circumstances in the case, in determining his guilt or inno-
cence. 11
758. Character of defendant presumed good. (1) The law
presumes that a person charged with a commission of a criminal
offense has a good character or reputation until the contrary is
shown by the evidence ; and the jury have no right to consider the
omission, on the part of the defendant, to introduce evidence of
- S. v. Jones, 78 Mo. 283. Bryant v. S. (Ala.), 23 So. 40.
s Aneals v. P. 134 111. 415, 25 Booker v. S. 76 Ala. 25: P. v. El-
N. E. 1022; Bryant v. S. (Ala.), 23 liott, 163 N. Y. 11, 57 N. E. 103.
So. 40. " Felix v. S. 18 Ala. 725.
9 Walsh v. P. 65 111. 64; Aneals
v. P. 134 111. 415, 25 N. E. 1022.
758 GOOD CHARACTER OF ACCUSED. 786
gaod character as a circumstance against him, or as tending to
prove his guilt. 12
(2) Where a person is charged with the commission of a crime,
the failure to call witnesses to prove his general good character
raises no presumption against it. 13
12 S. v. Tozier, 49 Me. 404; Dry- brick, 39 Iowa, 277; S. v. Oilkill, 7
man v. S. 102 Ala. 130, 15 So. 433; Ired. L. (N. Car.) 251; P. v. White,
Hughes Cr. Law, 3156; Underbill 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 520; Dryman v.
Cr. Ev. 76. S. 102 Ala. 130, 15 So. 433; Under-
is S. v. Dockstader, 42 Iowa, 436, hill Cr. Ev. 76.
2 Am. Cr. R. 469, citing S. v. Ka-
CHAPTER LIV.
CRIMINAL OFFENSES CONSPIRACY.
Sec. Sec.
759. Conspiracy defined. 763. Declarations of one evidence
760. Formal agreement unneces- against all.
sary. 764. Principal and accessory, dis-
761. All responsible for result of tinction abrogated.
design. 765. Aiding and abetting.
762. Conspiracy to commit rob-
bery.
759. Conspiracy defined. A conspiracy is a combination of
two or more persons, by some concert of action, to accomplish
some criminal or unlawful purpose, or some purpose not in itself
criminal, by criminal or unlawful means. 1
760. Formal agreement unnecessary. (1) While it is neces-
sary, in order to establish the existence of a conspiracy, to prove
a combination of two or more persons by concert of action to ac-
complish a criminal or unlawful purpose, yet it is not necessary
to prove that the conspirators came together and entered into a
formal agreement to effect such purpose; that such common de-
sign may be regarded as proved if the jury believe from the evi-
dence that the parties to such conspiracy were actually pursuing
in concert the common design or purpose, whether acting sepa-
rately or together, by common or different means, provided that
all were leading to the same unlawful result. 2
1 Smith v. P. 25 111. 11; Hardin Wharton Cr. Law, 9th ed. 1398,
v. S. 4 Tex. Cr. App. 364. 1399, 1401; McKee v. S. Ill Ind.
2 Musser v. S. 157 Ind. 442, 61 378, 383, 12 N. E. 510; Kelly v. P.
N. E. 1, 3 Greenleaf Ev. 93; 55 N. Y. S. 565, 14 Am. R. 342; P.
787
7G1 CONSPIRACY. 788
(2) Evidence in proof of a conspiracy will generally be circum-
stantial, and it is not necessary, for the purpose of showing the ex-
istence of the conspiracy, for the state to prove that the defendant
and some other person or persons came together and actually
agreed upon a common design or purpose, and agreed to pursue
such common design and purpose in the manner agreed upon.
It is sufficient if such common design and purpose is shown to
your satisfaction by circumstantial evidence. 3
(3) While the law requires that, to find the defendants guilty
in this case, the evidence should show that they were acting in
concert, still it is not necessary that it should be positively proved
that they actually met together and agreed to rob R. Such concert
of action may be proved from circumstances, and if, from the evi-
dence, the jury are satisfied that the defendants acted together,
each aiding in his own way, it would be sufficient. 4
761. All responsible for results of design. (1) If two or
more persons conspire together to do an unlawful act, and in the
prosecution of the design an individual is killed, or death ensue,
it is murder in all who enter into or take part in the execution of
the design. But if the unlawful act be a trespass only, to make
all guilty of murder the death must happen in the prosecution of
the design. If the unlawful act be a felony, or be more than a
mere trespass, it will be murder in all, although death happens
collaterally or beside the original design. 5
(2) If you believe from the evidence that the defendant, and
other persons acting with him, entered into a conspiracy to kill
the deceased, W, and that in pursuance of such formed design
the defendant, and others acting wUh him, did, at or about the
time and at the place alleged in the indictment, shoot and kill
the said W, you will find the defendant guilty of murder in the
first degree. 6
762. Conspiracy to commit robbery. If you should believe
from the evidence that there was a conspiracy to commit rob-
v. Arnold, 46 Mich. 268, 9 N. W. be shown not only to the satisfac-
406; Dayton v. Monroe, 47 Mich, tion of the jury, but also beyond a
193, 10 N. W. 196; Spies v. P. 122 reasonable doubt.)
111. 1, 12 N. E. 868, 17 N. E. 898. * Miller v. P. 39 111. 464.
s Musser v. S. 157 Ind. 442, 61 $ S. v. Shelledy, 8 Iowa, 484.
N. E. 1. (The common design men- G Hardin v. S. 4 Tex. App. 365.
tioned in this instruction should
789 PRINCIPAL AND ACCESSORY, DECLARATIONS, AIDING. 765
bery, and that the same was undertaken, and that B was killed,
yet if you have a reason-able doubt whether such general purpose
was contemplated and assented to by the defendant, or whether
it was done, if at all, by his knowledge, and in furtherance of a
common design to commit said offense ; or if you have a reason-
able doubt of the defendant's identity as one of the persons en-
gaged in said robbery, if any was committed, or if you have a
reasonable doubt of the. presence of the defendant at the time
and place of the robbery, if any was committed in either event
you should find him not guilty. 7
763. Declarations of one evidence against all. Where two
or more persons conspire to do, and are associated for the pur-
pose of doing, an unlawful act, the act or declaration of one of
such persons while engaged in and in the pursuance of the com-
mon object, is the act and declaration of all, for which all are
liable, as each person so associated is deemed or presumed to
have assented to, or commanded, what was done by any other of
the conspirators in furtherance of the common object. 8
764. Principal and accessory, distinction abrogated. (1)
The distinction between an accessory before the fact and the prin-
cipal, and between principals in the first and second degree in
cases of felony, is abrogated; and all persons concerned in the
commission of a felony, whether they directly commit the act
constituting the offense or aid and abet in its commission, though
not present, must be prosecuted, tried and punished as principals,
and no other facts need be alleged or proved under an informa-
tion against such accessory than are required under an informa-
tion against the principal. 9
(2) An accessory to the commission of a felony may be pros-
ecuted, tried and punished, though the principal may be neither
prosecuted nor tried. 10
765. Aiding and abetting. (1) All persons who are guilty
of acting together in the commission of an offense are principals.
7 Nite v. S. 41 Tex. Cr. App. 340, 9 S. v. De Wolfe (Mont), 77
54 S. W. 767. Pac. 1087.
s S. v. Shelledy, 8 Iowa, 486; Har- 10 S. v. De Wolfe (Mont.), 77
din v. S. 4 Tex. App. 365. Pae. 1087, Ulmer v. S. 14 Ind. 52;
Ind. Acts, 1889, p. 260.
765 CONSPIRACY. 790
When an offense is actually committed by one or more persons,
but others are present, and, knowing the unlawful intent, aid by
acts, or encourage by words or gestures, those actually engaged
in the commission of the unlawful act, such persons so aiding or
encouraging are principal offenders, and may be prosecuted and
convicted as such. 11
(2) All persons concerned in the unlawful assembly are equally
guilty of the subsequent acts done by any of them in furtherance
of the common objects of the assembly; and all joining them after
the original meeting, and who were present at any subsequent act,
and were either active in doing, countenancing, or supporting,
or ready, if necessary, to support or aid in the doing of the unlaw-
ful act, thereby became parties to the alleged riot, and are equal-
ly guilty of all subsequent acts in the commission of the offense. 12
(3) The bare presence of the defendant at the time of the tak-
ing of the property in question, if he was present, would not justify
his conviction, unless the evidence shows that he did some act
aiding, abetting, assisting, or encouraging the person who actually
did steal the property. 13
11 Pierce v. S. 17 Tex. App. 239. is Jackson v. S. 20 Tex. Cr. App.
12 u. S. v. Fenwick, 4 Crunch (U. 192.
S.) 6SO.
CHAPTER LV.
ASSAULTS.
Sec. Sec.
766. Simple assault defined. 770. Consent to sexual intercourse.
767. Assault with deadly weapon. 771. Consent a question of fact.
768. Assault with intent to kill. 772. Assault to rob.
769. Assault to commit rape.
766. Simple assault defined. (1) An assault is an unlawful
attempt, coupled with a present ability, to commit a violent in-
jury on the person of another. 1
(2) By the expression, "coupled with the ability to commit a
battery," is meant that the person making the assault must at
that time be in such position, and within such distance of the
person assaulted, as to enable him to commit a battery on such
person by the means used. 2
(3) The use of any unlawful violence upon the person of an-
other, with intent to injure him, whatever be the means or de-
gree of violence used, is an assault and battery. Any attempt
to commit a battery, or any threatening gesture, showing in it-
self, or by words accompanying it, an immediate intention coup-
led with the present ability to commit a battery, is an assault. 3
767. Assault with a deadly weapon. (1) An assault and
battery becomes aggravated when a serious bodily injury is in-
flicted upon the person assaulted, or when committed with a dead-
i May v. P. 8 Colo. 226, 6 Pac. 816; 2 Perrin v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 78
McCully v. S. 62 Ind. 433; Kurd's S. W. 932.
111. Stat 20, chap. 38. 3 Perrin v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), 78
S. W. 932.
791
768 ASSAULT WITH INTENT. 792
ly weapon. A deadly weapon is one which, from the manner used,
is calculated or likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. 4
(2) If you believe from the evidence that the defendant and the
prosecuting witness, B, got into a fight, and that the defendant
cut the witness without intent to do so, then you will find the
defendant not guilty. 5
768. Assault with intent to kill. (1) If the defendant fired
into the crowd in question, of which A, the prosecuting witness,
was one, with the deliberate intention, either formed at the time or
previously, of killing or murdering some one of the crowd, and
that A received a portion of the shot and contents of the gun
and was wounded thereby, it is sufficient to establish the assault
and battery with the intent charged. And if the case is other-
wise made out it will be the duty of the jury to find the defend-
ant guilty as charged in the indictment. 6
(2) If you should find from the evidence that had death result-
ed from the assault, the killing would have been manslaughter
only, then you should find the defendant guilty of assault and bat-
tery only, and not guilty of assault with intent to kill. But if you
should find that such' killing, had death resulted, would have been
murder in the first degree, or murder in the second degree, then
you should find the defendant guilty as charged in the indict-
ment. 7
769. Assault to commit rape. (1) If the state has satisfied
you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant either had sex-
ual intercourse with the prosecuting witness, or that he laid his
hands upon her with the intent and purpose of having sexual in-
tercourse with her, and that she was under fourteen years of age,
then the state made out a case. 8
(2) If you are satisfied from the evidence, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the defendant took hold of the prosecutrix, it is for
you to say whether or not, under all the circumstances, the in-
tention to have intercourse with the girl was then in his mind,
'and it was with that purpose that he laid his hands on her. 9
4 Perrin v. S. (Tex. Or. App.) , 78 Hanes v. S. 155 Ind. 120, 57 N.
S. W. 932. B. 704.
s Ter. v. Baca (N. Mex.) 71 Pac. a Hanes v. S. 155 Ind. 112, 57 N.
460. E. 704. Held not objectionable as
e Walker v. S. 8 Ind. 292, authorizing the jury to infer par-
? S. v. Stout, 49 Ohio St. 281, 30 ticular intent.
N. E. 437.
793 ASSAULTS. 772
(3) If the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant,
Hadley, had intercourse with Alma Grugin in the year 1896, and
that she was then unmarried, of previously chaste character, and
under the age of eighteen years, then said Hadley is guilty of
felony, and this is true, even though you may further find that
she consented to such intercourse. 10
770. Consent to sexual intercourse. On the question
of consent the court instructs you that consent induced by fear
of personal violence is no consent, and though a man lay no hands
on a woman, yet if, by physical force, he so overpowers her mind
that she does not resist, he is guilty of rape by having the unlaw-
ful intercourse in such manner. 11
771. Consent a question of fact. If you find from the evi-
dence in this case that an act of sexual intercourse did take place
between the defendant and the prosecuting witness, as charged in
the indictment, the question as to whether or not the prosecuting
witness voluntarily consented to such act is a question of fact for
you to determine from all the evidence in the case. 12
772. Assault to rob. (1) If you find that the defendant had
not used such force and violence as makes him guilty of assault
with intent to rob, he may be found guilty of assault and battery. 13
(2) Violence, in order to constitute an assault with intent to
rob, must not be subsequent to the attempt to take the property
in question. 14
Robbery is the felonious and violent taking of money, goods,
or other valuable things from the person of another, by force
or intimidation. 18
(3) Kobbery is the felonious and violent taking of money,
goods, or other valuable thing from the person of another by force
or intimidation. Every person guilty of robbery shall be impris-
oned in the penitentiary not less than one nor more than fourteen
years; or, if he is armed with a dangerous weapon, with intent,
10 S. v. Grugin (Mo.), 42 L. R. A. is Hanson v. S. 43 Ohio St. 378, 1
774, 781. N. E. 136.
11 Felton v. S. 139 Ind. 540, 49 i* Hanson v. S. 43 Ohio St. 378.
N. E. 228. is Fitzgerald v. S. 20 Tex. Cr.
12 Anderson v. S. 104 Ind. 470, 4 App. 294, 296.
N. E. 63, 5 N. E. 711. See Hawkins
v. S. 136 Ind. 634, 36 N. E. 419.
772 ASSAULT TO BOB. 794:
if resisted, to kill or maim such person, or being so armed, he
wounds or strikes him, or if he has any confederate present so
armed, to aid or abet him, he may be imprisoned for any term
of years or for life. 16
(4) The fact that the defendant took the property in question
from the person, and that it was afterwards found in his posses-
sion, is not sufficient to convict him of robbery. You must further
find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the de-
fendant took it from the person mentioned by force, and in spite
of his resistance, with the intent to rob or steal, and unless you do
so find you must find the defendant not guilty. 17
is Needham v. P. 98 111. 279 IT Stevens v. S. 19 Neb. 650, 28
(proper as defined by the statute N. W. 304.
of Illinois).
CHAPTER LVI.
HOMICIDE, MURDER AND MANSLAUGHTER.
Sec. Sec.
773. Definition and illustrative 784.
cases.
774. Murder in first degree Illus- 785.
tratione.
775. Murder in the second degree. 786.
776. Malice defined Essential ele- 787.
ment 788.
777. Intent presumed from means 789.
used. 790.
778. Intent in administering drug.
779. Drunkenness reducing grade 791.
of crime.
780. Time of deliberation, length 792.
immaterial.
781. Motive proper, but not indis- 793.
pensable.
782. Killing being proved presumed 794.
murder.
783. Doubt as to degree of homi-
cide.
Killing while lying in wait,
murder.
Killing by one of several
burglars.
Killing person not intended.
Officer killing while arresting.
Killing officer while arresting.
Arresting without a warrant.
Degree of proof to warrant
conviction.
Wound neglected causing
blood poisoning.
Mere presence of accused is
not aiding.
Inquest proceedings not evi-
dence.
Manslaughter defined and il-
lustrations.
773. Definition and illustrative case. (1) Murder is the un-
lawful killing of a human being in the peace of the people, with
malice aforethought, either express or implied by law. 1
(2) Murder in the first degree is the killing of a human being,
willfully, deliberately, premeditatedly, and with malice afore-
thought. 2
(3) Murder in the second degree has all the elements of mur-
der in the first degree except that of deliberation. 3
(4) If a man happen to kill another in the execution of a ma-
1 Jackson v. P. 18 111. 270.
2 S. v. May, 172 Mo. 630, 72 S.
W. 918.
3 S. v. May, 172 Mo. 630, 72 S.
W. 918.
795
773 MURDER AND MANSLAUGHTER. 796
licious and deliberate purpose to do him a personal hurt by wound-
ing or beating him, or in the wilful commission of any unlawful
act which necessarily tends to raise tumults and quarrels, and
consequently cannot but be attended with the danger of personal
hurt to some one or other as by committing a riot shall be ad-
judged guilty of murder. 4
(5) You are further instructed that if you believe from the evi-
dence in this case, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant,
with malice aforethought, either expressed or implied, inflicted
upon the deceased the mortal wounds in manner and form as
charged in the indictment, not in self-defense, as the same is de-
nned in these instructions, and not upon a sudden heat of pas-
sion caused by a provocation apparently sufficient to make the
passion irresistible, and that the said H did thereafter die
from said mortal wound or wounds in manner and form as
charged in the indictment, then the jury should find the defend-
ant guilty of murder. 5
(6) If the jury believe from the evidence in the case, beyond
all reasonable doubt, that Belle Bowlby received, on the nineteenth
day of February, 1895, the injuries by the means and in the man-
ner set forth in the first, second or third counts of the indictment
herein, and further believe from the evidence, beyond all reason-
able doubt, that said injuries were inflicted upon the person of
said Belle Bowlby by the defendant, Albert Wallace, as charged in
the indictment, or in some of said counts thereof, and further be-
lieve from the evidence, beyond all reasonable doubt, that the
death of said Belle Bowlby was occasioned by reason of said in-
juries at the time and in the manner charged in said indictment,
or in some of said counts thereof, then in that state of the proof
the law would pronounce it murder. 6
(7) If you are satisfied from the evidence in this case, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the poison charged was administered by
the defendant, as charged in the indictment, for the purpose of
killing and murdering his wife, and that death ensued as alleged
* P. v. Abbott, 116 Mich. 263, 74 383; Panton v. P. 114 111. 505, 2 N.
N. W. 529, citing 1 Hawk. P. C. E. 411; Lyon v. P. 170 111. 527,
(Curw. ed.), 10, p. 86. 48 N. E. 964.; Crowell v. P. 190 111.
* Carle v. P. 200 111. 494, 66 N. 508, GO N. E. 872.
E. 32. Held distinguishable from 6 Wallace v. P. 159 111. 446, 451,
Steiner v. P. 187 111. 244, 58 N. E. 42 N. E. 771.
797 DEGREES OF MURDER. 775
in the indictment in consequence thereof, this will be sufficient
to warrant you in convicting the defendant. 7
774. Murder in first degree Illustrations. (1) If you shall
find and believe from the evidence that at the county of Jackson,
in the state of Missouri, at any time prior to the thirty-first day of
May, 1883, the day on which the indictment in this case was filed,
the defendant, V, in the manner and by the means specified in the
indictment willfully, with deliberation, premeditation, and malice
aforethought, assaulted and wounded the deceased, A, and that
within one year and a day thereafter, and before the filing of the
indictment, the said A, at the county and state aforesaid, died
from the effects of the wound so inflicted upon him by the de-
fendant, the verdict should be that the defendant is guilty of
murder in the first degree. 8
(2) If the jury believe from the evidence, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the defendant, A, in H county, Missouri, on or about
the sixteenth day of December, 1899, with a certain pistol will-
fully, deliberately, premeditately, and of his malice aforethought,
shot and killed Henry Hughes, then the jury will find the defend-
ant guilty of murder in the first degree, and will -so state in your
verdict. 9 -
775. Murder in the second degree. (1) If you shall believe
from the evidence that the defendant shot and killed M while he,
the defendant, was in a violent passion, suddenly aroused by op-
probrious epithets or abusive words spoken by M to the defend-
ant, then such shooting and killing was not done with deliberation,
and was not murder in the first degree. On the other hand, al-
though the defendant shot and killed M while the defendant was
in a violent passion suddenly aroused by opprobrious epithets or
abusive words spoken to him by M, yet if such shooting and kill-
ing was done willfully, premeditatedly, and of his malice afore-
thought, as heretofore explained, then the defendant is guilty of
murder in the second degree. 10
(2) If you shall believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable
7 Dyer v. S. 74 Ind. 595. S. W. 899. Full charge set out
s S. v. Vansant, 80 Mo. 67. See and held not error.
Koerner v. S. 98 Ind. 8. 10 S. v. Gee, 85 Mo. 649.
S. v. Ashcraft, 170 Mo. 409, 70
776 MURDER AND MANSLAUGHTER. 798
doubt, that the defendant, at the time and place mentioned in
the indictment, with a pistol willfully, premeditatedly, and of
his malice aforethought, but without deliberation, shot and killed
M., you will find him guilty of murder in the second degree, and
assess his punishment in the penitentiary for a term not less than
ten years. 11
776. Malice defined Essential element. (1) Malice is the
dictate of a wicked, depraved and malignant heart. 12
(2) By malice is meant not only anger, hate, and revenge, but
any other unlawful and unjustifiable motive. 13
(3) Malice includes not only anger, hatred, and revenge, but
every other unlawful and unjustifiable motive. Malice is not con-
fined to ill will towards an individual, but is intended to denote
an action flowing from any wicked and corrupt motive an act
done with a wicked mind where the fact has been attended
with such circumstances as evince plain indications of a heart
regardless of social duty and fatally bent on mischief; hence
malice is implied from any deliberate or cruel act against
another, however sudden, which shows an abandoned and malig-
nant heart. 14
(4) Premeditated malice is where the intention to unlawfully
take life is deliberately formed in the mind, and that determina-
tion meditated upon before the fatal stroke is given. There need be
no appreciable space of time between the formation of the inten-
tion to kill and the killing. They may be as instantaneous as suc-
cessive thoughts. It is only necessary that the act of killing be
preceded by a concurrence of will, deliberation and premeditation
on the part of the slayer. 15
(5) Malice, in law, and as used in the statute defining murder,
has a technical meaning, including not only anger, hatred and re-
11 S. v. Gee, 85 Mo. 648. Jackson v. P. 18 111. 269; Mc-
12 S. v. Conley, 130 N. Car. 683, Coy v. P. 175 111. 224, 229, 51 N. E.
41 S. E. 534. (The full charge of 777; S. v. May, 172 Mo. 630, 72 S.
the court is set out in this case pre- W. 918. Held that the words every
senting every phase of murder In other unlawful and unjustifiable
the first and second degrees and motive do not broaden the instruc-
manslaughter and self-defense, fol- tion to include every motive,
lowing the settled precedents.) whether growing out of the evi-
is S. v. Hunter, 118 Iowa, 686, 92 dence in the case or not.
N. W. 872; Com. v. Webster, 5 is Bims v. S. 66 Ind. 433; Koer-
Cush. (Mass.) 304, 52 Am. Dec. ner v. S. 98 Ind. 8.
711. See S. v. Gee, 85 Mo. 649.
799 INTENT, WHEN PRESUMED. 777
venge, but every other unlawful and unjustifiable motive. It is
not confined to ill will towards one or more individual persons,
but is used and intended to denote an action growing from any
wicked and corrupt motive a thing done with bad or malicious
intent where the fact has been attended by such circumstances
as carry in them the plain indication of a heart regardless of so-
cial duty and fatally bent on mischief; and therefore malice is
implied from any deliberate and cruel act against another, how-
ever sudden. 16
777. Intent presumed from means used. (1) Every man is
presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of
an act which he intentionally performs; and if you find from
the evidence that the defendants perpetrated an assault and bat-
tery upon B, and did throw him, the said B, from a rapidly
moving railroad train in such a manner that it was reasonably
calculated to destroy his life, then you are at liberty to infer that
the defendants intended to kill him, the said B, from such facts. 17
(2) In a case of homicide, the law presumes malice from the use
of a deadly weapon, and casts on the defendant the onus of re-
pelling the presumption of malice unless the evidence which
proves the killing shows also that it was perpetrated without
malice ; and whenever malice is shown, and is unrebutted by the
circumstances of the killing or by the evidence, there can be no
conviction for any degree of homicide less than murder. 18
(3) In a case of homicide the law presumes malice from the use
of a deadly weapon, and casts on the defendant the onus of repel-
ling the presumption, unless the evidence which proves the killing
shows also that it was perpetrated without malice ; and whenever
malice is shown, and is unrebutted by the circumstances of the
killing, or by other facts in evidence, there can be no conviction
for any less degree of homicide than murder. 19
(4) The law presumes that every sane person contemplates the
natural and ordinary consequences of his own voluntary acts,
until the contrary appears, and when a man is found to have
killed another by acts, the natural and ordinary consequences of
IB Harris v. S. 155 Ind. 271, 58 is Sherrill v. S. (Ala.), 35 So. 131.
N. E. 75. is Jenkins v. S. 82 Ala. 27, 2 So.
IT Anderson v. S. 147 Ind. 451, 46 150.
N. E. 901.
777 MURDER AND MANSLAUGHTER. 800
which would be death, if the facts and circumstances of the homi-
cide do not of themselves, or the evidence otherwise, show that it
was not done purposely, or create a reasonable doubt thereof, it
is to be presumed that the death of the deceased was designed by
the slayer. 20
(5) Every person is presumed to intend what his acts indi-
cate his intention to have been, and if the defendant fired a
loaded pistol at the deceased, and killed him, the law presumes
that he intended to kill the deceased, and unless' the defendant
can show that his intention was other than his act indicated the
law will not hold him guiltless. 21
(6) If an act be perpetrated with a deadly weapon, and so
used as to be likely to produce death, the purpose or intent
to kill may be inferred from such act. 22
(7) If a deadly weapon is used, the law infers an intent to
kill or to do grievious bodily harm; and if the circumstances
do not show excuse, justification, or immediate provocation, the
presumption of malice is conclusively drawn. A deadly weapon
is not one from which a blow could ordinarily produce death,
but one from which, as it was used in the particular case, death
would probably result. 23
(8) The instrument or means used by which a homicide is com-
mitted are to be taken into consideration in judging the intent of
the party offending. If the instrument be one not likely to pro-
duce death it is not to be presumed that death was designed, un-
less from the manner in which it was used such intention evi-
dently appears. 24
(9) Where a homicide is prepetrated by an intentional use
of a deadly weapon, in such a manner as is likely to, and
actually does, produce death, the law presumes such killing
was committed purposely and maliciously, unless it was done in
self-defense, or in a sudden heat caused by such provocation as
by law reduces the killing to the grade of manslaughter. 25
20 S. v. Achey, 64 Ind. 59. 22 Deilks v. S. 141 Ind. 26, 40 N.
21 P. v. Langton, 67 Cal. 427, 7 E. 120; S. v. Zeibart, 40 Iowa, 173.
Pac. 843, Am. Cr. R. 439. If the 23 Jenkins v. S. 82 Ala. 27, 2 So.
evidence of either side shows the 150.
intention of the defendant was 24 Perrin v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.),
other than his act indicated, he 78 S. W. 932.
should be held guiltless. The de- 25 McDermott v. S. 89 Ind. 193.
fendant should not be required to
show his innocence.
801 DRUNKENNESS, SPECIFIC INTENT. 779
778. Intent in administering drug. If you find from the
evidence that the defendant administered to S I cantharides, for
the purpose of exciting her sexual passions, and thereby, and by
means thereof, enabling him more easily to have sexual inter-
course with her, the said S I, and death resulted from such ad-
ministration by the defendant, without any intention or purpose
to kill the said S I, then under that state of facts you cannot
convict the defendant of murder. 26
779. Drunkenness, reducing grade of crime. (1) While vol-
untary intoxication is no excuse or palliation for the commission of
a crime, yet if, upon the whole evidence in this case, you shall
have a reasonable doubt whether, at the time of the killing if
you shall find from the evidence that the accused did kill the de-
ceased he had sufficient mental capacity to deliberately think
upon and rationally determine so to kill the deceased, then you
cannot find him guilty of murder of the first degree, although
such inability was the result of intoxication. 27
(2) It is a general principle of law that intoxication is no ex-
cuse for crime, but this principle has this important qualification,
as far as it relates to murder in the first degree : A particular or
specific intent is absolutely essential in the commission of this
crime, and if the mind of the person doing the killing is unable,
because of intoxication at the time of the killing, to form this
particular or specific intent, there can be no murder in the first
degree unless the person doing the killing became voluntarily in-
toxicated for the purpose of killing while intoxicated. 28
(3) While drunkenness is no excuse for the commission of a
criminal offense, unless occasioned by the fraud or contrivance of
another for the purpose of causing the perpetration of an offense,
yet if the drunkenness of the defendant be a fact appearing in the
evidence it is to be considered by the jury in connection with all
26 Bachtelheimer v. S. 54 Ind. 134. posely and with premeditated mal-
It was pointed out in this case that ice" administering poison, which
to constitute murder in either the is also murder by the Indiana law,
first or second degree it is essen- under another section of the stat-
tial that the killing be "purposely ute.
and maliciously" done. But this 27 Aszman v. S. 123 Ind. 351, 24
case is not believed to be good law, N. E. 123.
since such an act would clearly as Cook v. S. (Fla.), 35 S. 669.
amount to causing death by "pur-
780 MURDER AND MANSLAUGHTER. 80
the other facts proven, in determining the degree of guilt, if the
defendant is guilty. The fact that the defendant was drunk, if
proven, does not render his act any the less crimnial, and in this
sense drunkenness is not available as an excuse, but, upon the
question whether the act was deliberate or premeditated it is
proper to be considered, but only for this purpose. It neither ex-
cuses the offense nor avoids the punishment which the law pre-
scribes when the character of the offense is ascertained. 29
780. Time of deliberation, length immaterial. (1) If you
believe from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
defendant, in C county, this state, before the finding of the indict-
ment in this case, purposely killed W, after reflection, with a
wickedness or depravity of heart towards the deceased, and the
killing was determined on beforehand even a moment before the
fatal shooting was done then the defendant is guilty of murder
in the first degree. 30
(2) It is not essential that the willful intent, premeditation
and deliberation shall exist in the mind of the slayer for any
considerable length of time before the actual perpetration of
the crime. It is sufficient if there was a fixed design or deter-
mination to maliciously kill, distinctly formed in the mind of
such slayer at any time before the fatal injury inflicted. And
in this case, if the jury believe from the evidence, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the defendant assaulted and shot the de-
ceased at the time and place and in the manner charged in the in-
dictment, and that either at some time before, or in the moment
or instant of "time immediately before the fatal shot was fired, the
defendant had framed in his mind a willful, deliberate and pre-
meditated design or purpose of his malice aforethought to take
the life of the deceased, and that the said fatal shot was fired by
the defendant in furtherance of that design or purpose, without
any justifiable cause or lawful excuse therefor, then it may be
said that the defendant acted with deliberation and premedita-
tion, and you should find him guilty of murder in the first degree.
But if you fail to find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the said fatal act of the defendant was accompanied
with some degree of deliberation and premeditation, or that it
29 May v. P. 8 Colo. 220, 6 Pac. so Stevens v. S. (Ala.), 35 So. 124
816. See Booher v. S. 156 Ind. 435.
803 MOTIVE, MURDER PRESUMED. 782
was the result of a fixed determination on the part of the defend-
ant to kill the deceased, you must then acquit the defendant of
the crime of murder in the first degree. 31
781. Motive, proper but not indispensable. (1) Proof of mo-
tive to commit crime is not indispensable nor essential to convic-
tion. While a motive may be shown as a circumstance to aid in
fixing the crime on the defendant, yet the state is not required to
prove a motive on the part of the defendant in order to convict,
and the jury would be justified in inferring a motive from the
commission of the crime itself, if the commission of the crime by
the defendant is proved beyond every reasonable doubt, as re-
quired by law, and you find that the defendant, at the time of
the commission of said act was sane, and there were no extenuat-
ing circumstances. 32
(2) If the evidence fails to show any motive on the part of the
accused to commit the crime charged, this is a circumstance in
favor of his innocence which the jury ought to consider, together
with all the other facts and circumstances, in making up their
verdict. 33
(3) The absence of all evidence of an inducing cause or mo-
tive to commit the crime, when the fact is in reasonable doubt as
to who committed it, affords a strong presumption of innocence. 3 *
782. The killing being proved, presumed murder. (1) The
killing being proved to have been done by the defendant, the bur-
den of proving circumstances of mitigation that justify or excuse
the homicide shall devolve on the accused, unless by proof on the
part of the prosecution it is sufficiently manifest that the offense
committed only amounted to manslaughter, or that the accused
was justified or excused in committing the homicide. 35
(2) If the killing of the person mentioned in the indictment
has been satisfactorily shown by the evidence, beyond all rea-
sonable doubt, to have been the act of the defendant, then the
law presumes it to have been murder, provided the jury further
si S. v. McPherson, 114 Iowa, 492, 34 Vaughan v. Com. 85 Va. 672, 8
87 N. W. 422. S. E. 584.
32 Wheeler v. S. 158 Ind. 700, 63 ss Allen v. S. 70 Ark. 337, 68 S. W.
N. E. 975. Insanity was the de- 28. (Held not assuming that the
fense in this case. defendant did the killing.)
33 Clough v. S. 7 Neb. 344.
783 MURDER AND MANSLAUGHTER. 804
believe from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that no
circumstances existed excusing or justifying the act, or mitigat-
ing it so as to make it manslaughter. 36
(3) The law presumes a sober man intends to do what he
actually does, but the law does not presume a killing was done
with premeditated design. This, like every other element of
murder in the first degree, is to be inferred by the jury from the
facts proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 37
783. Doubt as to degree of homicide. (1) If the jury have a
reasonable doubt growing out of the evidence as to whether the
killing was done deliberately, or as to whether it was done pre-
meditatedly, then they cannot find the defendant guilty of murder
in the first degree ; and if they have a reasonable doubt growing
out of the evidence as to whether the killing was done out of mal-
ice, they cannot find the defendant guilty of murder in either de-
gree, but only of manslaughter, if guilty at all ; and if, after con-
sidering all the evidence, the jury have a reasonable doubt as to
the defendant's guilt of manslaughter, arising out of any part of
the evidence, then they should find the defendant not guilty. 38
(2) If the jury have a reasonable doubt as to whether the killing
was done deliberately, or as to whether it was done premedita-
tively, then they cannot find the defendant guilty of murder in
the first degree ; and if they have a reasonable doubt as to whether
the killing was done in malice, then they cannot find the defend-
ant guilty of murder in either degree, but only of manslaughter
at most ; and if, after considering all the evidence, the jury have
a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt of manslaughter,
arising out of all the evidence, then they should find him not
guilty of any offense. 39
784. Killing while lying in wait murder. Although the
jury may believe from the evidence that the deceased and
Tennie Hicks were criminally intimate, this would not in law
justify or excuse the defendant in lying in wait to shoot and kill
ae Upstone v. P. 109 111. 175. Held ss Hunt v. S. 135 Ala. 1, 33 So.
not ignoring the defense of insan- 329; Compton v. S. 110 Ala. 24, 20
ity. Jackson v. P. 18 111. 270. See So. 119: Stoneking v. S. 118 Ala.
Dorsey v. S. 110 Ga. 331, 35 S. E. 70, 24 So. 47.
651. 39 Adams v. S. 133 Ala. 166, 31
ST Cook v. S. (Fla.), 35 So. 669. So. 852.
805 BURGLAR KILLING OFFICER. 787
the deceased, if you believe from the evidence he did so lie in
wait. So, if the jury believe from the evidence that the defend-
ant followed the deceased, and shot him from ambush, feloniously,
premeditated, and with his malice aforethought, as the terms are
in these instructions denned, then the criminal relation between
the deceased and the said Tennie Hicks, if it did exist, and if it
were known to the defendant, does not reduce the killing below
murder in the second degree, and affords no justification or miti-
gation for the shooting if done under such circumstances. 41
785. Killing by one of several burglars. If the jury believe
from the evidence that the homicide charged in the indictment
was committed by one of several burglars while engaged in se-
creting or disposing of property which said burglars had pre-
viously stolen, and that the killing was done to prevent the dis-
covery and seizure of said property by the person killed, then, un-
less the jury believe from the evidence, beyond all reasonable
doubt, that the defendant was present at the homicide, or suffi-
ciently near to render aid and assistance to the perpetrator, and
actually did aid, abet, or encourage the person who committed
the homicide, or unless the jury shall find that the defendant, be-
fore the homicide, counseled or advised the persons in charge of
the said goods to oppose and resist whosoever should attempt to
seize said goods, or interrupt them in secreting them or disposing
of said goods, and that the killing of the deceased occurred in the
course of such resistance as the defendant had so counseled and
advised, then they ought to acquit the defendant. 42
786. Killing person not intended. It is not necessary that,
when a purpose to take life is formed, the particular party who is
killed shall be present to the mind of the party accused. It is
sufficient if the purpose was formed to kill any one coming along
who presented the opportunity and inducements to the crime. 43
787. Officer killing while arresting. If the defendant was a
policeman of the town, as he insists he was, the law clothed him
with the same authority to make arrests within the town as is
vested in the sheriff, and if he could have kept Brooks in custody.
S. v. Hicks (Mo.), 77 S. W. 541. 43 g. v . Dickson, 6 Kas. 213.
42 Lamb v. P. 96 111. 73, 81.
788 MURDER AND MANSLAUGHTER. 806
and prevented the deceased from rescuing him without striking,
it was his duty to have done so. Were there bystanders? If so,
he' had authority to call them to his aid, and if by doing so he
could have avoided striking the deceased, he should have done so,
and, if he failed to do so, he was not justified in striking the de-
ceased, and it will be your duty to return a verdict of guilty ; but
if the situation was such that he could not reasonably and con-
veniently procure assistance, then he had a right to use such force
as was necessary under the circumstances to secure Brooks, and
if, in the due exercise of that right, he struck the deceased, he was
justified. 44
788. Killing officer while arresting. Constables are peace
officers, and it is their right and duty to arrest with or without a
warrant any person who has committed any criminal offense in
their presence, or who is at the time engaged in or about to com-
mit any breach of the peace ; and they have the right, in making
such arrest, to use such force as is necessary therefor, and sum-
mon to their aid a posse sufficient to accomplish such arrest. A
breach of the peace is a public offense, and it may be committed
by any loud or boisterous words calculated to disturb the good
order of the persons there assembled, or by the drawing or bran-
dishing of deadly weapons, accompanied by threats to attack or
kill another then and there present. 45
789. Arresting without a warrant, justifiable. If the per-
son arrested is, as a matter of fact, in the act of committing such
offense at the time of the arrest, and the officer making the ar-
rest has information or knowledge which induces him to reason*
ably believe, and at the time of the arrest he does believe, that
such offense is being committed, and the arrest is made for that
reason, it is sufficient to justify the arrest without a warrant. 46
790. Degree of proof to warrant conviction. To warrant a
conviction the state is required to prove, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the defendant feloniously killed the deceased at the
44 S. v. Bland, 97 N. Car. 441, homicide in killing an officer while
2 S. E. 460. attempting to make an arrest for
45 Fleetwood v. Com. 80 Ky. 1. a breach of the peace.)
(See this case for a series of in- *c Ballard v. S. 43 Ohio St. 340,
structions relating to the law of 1 N. E. 76.
807 WOUND NEGLECTED MERE PRESENCE. 792
time and place and in the manner and form as alleged in the in-
dictment. It is not sufficient to envelope the death of the de-
ceased in mystery, rendering it incapable of explanation, without
inferring the guilt of the defendant. To warrant a conviction the
state is required to explain all mystery sufficiently to remove all
reasonable doubt and establish facts that are susceptible of ex-
planation upon no reasonable hypothesis consistent with the de-
fendant's innocence, and that point to his guilt beyond any other
reasonable solution and beyond all reasonable 'doubt. 47
791. Wound neglected, causing blood poisoning. If the jury
believe from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
defendant cut the deceased in the arm with a knife or other in-
strument capable of inflicting a similar wound, as charged in the
indictment, it is no excuse to say that the deceased would not
have died if he had taken proper care of himself, or that neglect,
or the want of proper applications to the wound had brought on
blood-poisoning, and of that he died, provided you believe from
the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the wound was the
primary or principal cause of his death. 48
792. Mere presence of accused is not aiding. (1) In the ab-
sence of a conspiracy, one who is present when a homicide is com-
mitted by another upon a sudden quarrel, or in the heat of pas-
sion, is not guilty of aiding and abetting the homicide, although
he may have become involved in an. independent fight with
others of the party of the deceased, unless he does some overt act
with a view to produce that result, or purposely incites or en-
courages the principal to do the act; and so in this case, if you
find the defendant on trial, although present at the time of the
shooting, knew nothing of his son H having a revolver or in-
tending to shoot, and took no part in the killing, and did no overt
act to produce that result, then he is in no way responsible, and
must be acquitted, unless you find from the evidence, beyond a
reasonable doubt, the shot was fired by H in pursuance of a con-
spiracy previously formed by them. 49
(2) The mere presence of the defendant at the time and during
47 Hinshaw v. S. 147 Ind. 386, 47 49 Woolweaver v. S. 50 Ohio St.
N. E. 157. 287, 34 N. B. 352. See Worden v.
*8 Duncan v. P. 134 111. 119, 24 N. S. 24 Ohio St. 143.
E. 765.
793 MURDER AND MANSLAUGHTER. 808
the act of killing would not of itself be sufficient to constitute him
an aider and abetter in the commission of the act charged ; but it
is not essential, in order to constitute him such aider and abetter.
that he should himself have fired the fatal shot. It is sufficient
if, at the time of the killing, he was present, consenting to and
encouraging the act, and ready, if need be, to give assistance to
the one who did the killing. 50
(3) It is not sufficient to establish the guilt of the defendant of
aiding and abetting H in the commission of the homicide charged
in the indictment that he was present on the scene with the others
where the alleged killing was done, for he may have been present
not knowing that any crime was about to be committed; and if
he was not there in furtherance of an understanding or common
purpose to commit some unlawful act, and was in company with
H without knowledge that H or any of his co-defendants con-
templated the commission of an offense, he is not responsible for
the acts of H or his co-defendants, if he, the defendant, did not
actually participate in the commission of the crime charged. 51
(4) If you find from the evidence that H named as principal in
the indictment, took the life of the deceased, but did it in a sudden
quarrel or in the heat of passion, his offense would be man-
slaughter ; and if you further find from the evidence that the de-
fendant did no overt act, and took no part in the killing, but was
merely present when the quarrel arose or fight began, you cannot
in such case find him guilty as an aider and abetter of the
said H. 52
793. Inquest proceedings not evidence. The court further
instructs you that what any witness or witnesses may have testi-
fied to before the grand jury, or at the coroner's inquest, is no
evidence of the guilt of the defendant. 53
794. Manslaughter defined, and illustrative cases. (1) Man-
slaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without mal-
ice, expressed or implied, either voluntarily, upon a sudden heat
BO Kelly v. S. (Fla.) 33 So. 235. Rjtter v. P. 130 111. 255, 260,
^ Goins v. S. 46 Ohio St. 467, 22 N. E. 605; Purdy v. P. 140 111.
21 N. E. 476. 46, 52, 29 N. E. 700.
52 Goins v. S. 46 Ohio St. 471, 21
N. E. 476.
809 MANSLAUGHTER DEFINED. 794
or involuntarily, but in the commission of some unlawful act.
And if you find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the defendant did the killing unlawfully and voluntarily, but
in a sudden heat or transport of passion, or involuntarily, in the
commission of an unlawful act, and without malice, express or
implied, then the offense would be manslaughter, and you should
so find him guilty. 54
(2) In general, where an involuntary killing happens in conse-
quence of an unlawful act, it will be either murder or man-
slaughter, according to the nature of the act which occasions it.
If it be in the prosecution of a felonious intent, or in consequence
of an act naturally tending to bloodshed, it will be murder. But,
if no more is intended than a mere civil trespass, it will be man-
slaughter. 55
(3) If you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt by the
evidence that the defendant unlawfully committed an assault and
battery upon the person of C on the sixteenth day of August,
1884, without any intention or purpose to kill him, the said C,
but thereby inflicted a wound upon his person by reason of which
fhe said C died on the twenty-fourth of August, 1884, then the
defendant is guilty of involuntary manslaughter. Assault and
battery, as used in this instruction, means any unlawful touch-
ing, striking, biting, beating, or wounding of another in a rude,
insolent and angry manner. 66
5 * Powers v. S. 87 Ind. 154. se s. v. Johnson, 102 Ind. 247, 1
55 s. v. Shelledy, 8 Iowa, 495. N. E. 377.
CHAPTER LVII.
HOMICIDE SELF-DEFENSE.
Sec. Sec.
795. Justifiable homicide defined 801. Mere previous threats.
Illustrations. 802. Danger need not be real.
796. Cases illustrating self-defense. 803. Reasonable doubt of appre-
797. Defendant at fault in provok- hension.
ing difficulty. 804. Resisting attack of several
798. Declining further struggle. persons.
799. Bare fear no justification. 805. Resisting unlawful arrest.
800. Mere belief of danger no de- 806. Accidental killing no offense.
fense. 807. Character of deceased proper
matter.
795. Justifiable homicide defined Illustrations. (1) Justifi-
able homicide is the killing of a human being in necessary self-de-
fense, or in the defense of habitation, person or property, against
one who manifestly intends or endeavors by violence or sur-
prise to commit a known felony. A bare fear of the offense
to prevent which the homicide is alleged to have been com-
mitted shall not be sufficient to justify the killing. It must ap-
pear that the circumstances were sufficient to excite the fears
of a reasonable person, and that the party killing really acted
under their influence, and not in a spirit of revenge. 1
(2) A person may repel force by force in defense of his person,
habitation or property against one who manifestly intends or
endeavors by violence or surprise to commit a known felony
i Blair v. S. 69 Ark. E.58, 64 S. "W. was raised but not decided by the
948. The objection that this in- court,
struction sets up an ideal person
810
SELF-DEFENSE DEFINED. 79 G
on either ; and if a conflict ensue in such case, and life is taken,
the killing is justifiable. It must be proved that the assault
was eminently perilous, and unless there is a plain manifesta-
tion of a felonious intent, no assault will justify the killing of
the assailant. A person is not compelled to flee from his ad-
versary who assails him with a 'deadly weapon ; but before he
can justify the homicide, the assault must be so fierce as not
to allow the person assailed to yield without manifest danger
to his life or of receiving enormous bodily injury. In such
case, if there be no other way of saving his own life, or of
preventing enormous bodily injury, he may, in self-defense, kill
his assailant. 2
(3) If the jury believe from the evidence that, just'prior to his
death, the deceased attempted, in a violent manner, to enter
the dwelling of the defendant for the purpose of assaulting or
offering personal violence to the defendant, being in said dwell-
ing or any other person dwelling or being therein, and that
the defendant, in reasonably resisting such attempt of the de-
ceased, unintentionally and without malice killed the deceased,
then the killing was justifiable or excusable, and the jury ought
to acquit the defendant. The jury, in considering whether the
killing was in defense of habitation, should consider the
circumstances attending the killing and the conduct of the par-
ties at the time, and immediately previous thereto, and the
means and force used as bearing upon the question of whether
the killing was in defense of habitation. 3
796. Cases illustrating self-defense. (1) If the defendant
went to the house of L for the purpose of ministering to his wants
as an invalid, and having no ill will or quarrel with B, and
said B requested the defendant to go out of the house with
him, and they went out together at B's request, and when
outside, B. threatened to assault and beat the defendant, and
without cause did assault and strike the defendant violently
and in anger, and if the defendant at the time believed and
had reason to believe that said B was about to and would
do him great bodily harm, then the defendant had a right to
2 S. v. Kennedy, 20 Iowa, 571. s Greschia v. P. 53 111. 299.
797 SELF-DEFENSE. 812
defend himself with his pocket knife if necessary ; and if in
the reasonable defense of his own person the defendant in-
flicted wounds upon the said B, of which he died, then the
defendant is not guilty, and he should be acquitted upon the
ground of self-defense. 4
(2) If the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant,
Reins, in defense of himself, inflicted upon the deceased thb
wounds or stabs which caused his death, while the deceased
was manifestly intending and endeavoring in a violent man-
ner to enter the habitation of the witness, Mrs. Poley, for the
purpose of assaulting or offering personal violence to the de-
fendant, Reins, being therein, the killing was justifiable, and
the jury must acquit the defendant. 5
(3) If the jury believe from the evidence that the deceased first
assaulted the defendant without any reasonable or justifiable
cause, and that at the door of Mrs. Foley's shanty the defendant
tried and endeavored, in good faith, to escape from the deceased
and prevent his entry therein and did not seek to renew the
fight, and that the defendant was in fear of his life, or of great
bodily harm from the deceased, and that from all the surround-
ing circumstances he had reasonable grounds for such fears, they
should acquit the defendant.
(4) If the jury believe that G and the deceased, acting in con-
cert and with the intention of inflicting great bodily harm
upon the defendant, attacked him with clubs, then the defend-
ant had the right to resist such attack with a weapon of like
character, and if, in the necessary defense of his own person
and without using any more force or a more dangerous weapon
than the one used against him, if any, he inflicted a blow which
he had reason to believe, and in good faith did believe, was
necessary for his own protection, but which, unintentionally upon
his part, produced the death of his assailant, such act would
not be criminal, and the jury should acquit the defendant. 7
797. Defendant at fault in provoking difficulty. (1) The de-
fendant cannot avail himself of the doctrine of necessary self-
* Fields v. S. 134 Ind. 55, 32 N. 5 Reins v. P. 30 111. 256, 262.
E. 780. See Trogdon v. S. 133 Ind. o Reins v. P. 30 111. 257, 263
7, 3?. N. E. 725. ? 3. v. Burke, 30 Iowa, 333.
813 DEFENDANT PROVOKING DIFFICULTY. 797
defense, if the necessity of that defense was brought on by
himself, or provoked by his own deliberate and lawless acts,
or by beginning the fight with the deceased for the purpose
of taking his life or committing a bodily harm upon him in
which he killed the deceased by the use of a deadly weapon,
unless the defendant had really, and in good faith, endeav-
ored to decline any further struggle before the shot was fired. 8
(2) If you shall believe and find from the evidence that the de-
fendant sought, brought on or voluntarily entered into a diffi-
culty with the deceased for the purpose of wreaking vengeance
upon him, or if you shall find and believe that he wounded
the deceased at a time when he had, because of the acts of
the deceased, no reasonable apprehension of immediate and im-
pending injury to himself, and did so from a spirit of retalia-
tion and revenge for the purpose of punishing the deceased
for past injuries done him, the defendant, then the defendant
cannot avail himself of the law of self-defense, and you should
not acquit him on that ground no matter how great the dan-
ger or imminent the peril to which the defendant may have
believed himself to have been exposed during such difficulty. 9
(3) The law of self-defense does not imply the right to attack.
If you believe from the evidence that the defendant armed
himself with a deadly weapon, and sought the deceased with
the felonious intent of killing him, and sought or brought on,
or voluntarily entered into a difficulty with the deceased with
the felonious intention to kill him, then the defendant can-
not invoke the law of self-defense, no matter how imminent
the peril in which he found himself placed. 10
(4) The right of self-defense is allowed to the citizen as a shield,
and not as a sword, and in the exercise of this right a person
must act honestly and in good faith. A person when assaulted
may exercise a reasonable degree of force to repel an attack, but
must not provoke an attack in order that he may have an ap-
parent excuse for killing his adversary. 11
s Belt v. P. 97 111. 461, 473. Hld 103. v. Hicks (Mo.), 77 S. W.
not assuming facts and not objec- 540.
tionable in not referring to the n Harmon v. S. 158 Ind. 43, 62
evidence. N. E. 630.
a S. v. Vansant, 80 Mo. 69.
798 SELF-DEFENSE. 814
798. Declining further struggle. (1) Before the defendant
can avail himself of the right of self-defense it must appear that
at the time of the killing the danger was so urgent and pressing
that, in order to save his own life, or to prevent his receiving
great bodily harm, the killing of the deceased was absolutely
necessary, or apparently necessary; and it must also appear
that the deceased was the first assailant, or that the defend-
ant had in good faith endeavored to. decline any further strug-
gle before the mortal shot was fired. 12
(2) Before the defendant can claim that he was acting in self-
defense it must appear that he really, and in good faith, endeav-
ored to decline any further struggle before the homicide was com-
mitted. And in this case, if you believe from the evidence that the
defendant was engaged in mortal combat with D, the deceased, and
that the defendant did not really and in good faith endeavor to
decline any further struggle before the homicide was commit-
ted, if one was committed, then and in such case the defendant
cannot avail himself of the plea of self-defense. 13
799. Bare fear no justification. The bare fear that a man
intends to commit murder or other atrocious felony, however
well grounded, unaccompanied by any overt act indicative of
any such intention, will not warrant killing the person by way
of prevention. There must be some overt act indicative of im-
minent danger at the time, but the jury will judge whether
the conduct and acts of the deceased, B, at the time of the
shooting were of such a character as to create in the mind
of the accused a reasonable fear that the deceased intended
to commit murder or other felony, or to do the accused great
bodily harm. Apprehension of danger, to justify a homicide,
ought not to be based on surmises alone, but there ought to
be coupled therewith some act or demonstration on the part
of the person from whom danger is or was apprehended, evinc-
ing an immediate intention to carry into execution his threats
or designs; and the jury are to judge of the reasonable grounds
for such apprehension on the part -of the accused from all the
' 12 Henry v. P. 198 111. 162, 65 is P. v. Robertson, 67 Cal. 649,
N. E. 120. 8 Pac. 600.
815 FEAR, BELIEF, THREATS. 801
facts and circumstances as they existed at the time of the kill-
ing. 14
800. Mere belief of danger no defense. It is not enough
that the party killing another believe himself in danger from
the person killed, unless the facts were such that the jury,
in the light of all the facts and circumstances known to the
slayer, or believed by him to be true, can say he had reason-
able ground for such belief. 15
801. Mere previous threats. Previous threats or acts of
hostility of the deceased towards the defendant, however vio-
lent they may have been, were not of themselves sufficient to
justify the defendant in seeking and slaying the deceased. To
excuse him or justify him, he must have acted under an honest
belief that it was necessary at the time to take the life of the
deceased in order to save his own, and it must appear that
there was reasonable cause to excite this apprehension on his
part; so that if you find that the deceased at the time he was
killed did nothing to excite in the mind of the defendant the
fear that the deceased was about to execute his threats, then
the threats and bad character of the deceased, whatever you
may find them to have been, are unavailing, and should not
be considered by you. But if the evidence leaves you in doubt
as to what the acts of the deceased were at the time, or im-
mediately after the killing, you may consider the threats and
character of the deceased, in connection with all the other evi-
dence, in determining who was probably the aggressor. The
jury are instructed that mere threats made by the deceased
before or at the time of the killing, unaccompanied at the time
of the killing with any attempt to carry them into execution,
are not sufficient to justify the killing or to reduce it to a lower
degree of homicide than murder; and if you find that the de-
fendant shot and killed the deceased because of such threats,
and because the defendant thought such threats would justify
him in killing the deceased, and that when he shot and killed
him he was in no fear of imminent danger, he is guilty of
" s. v. Cain, 20 W. Va. 710. Todd v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.),
44 S. W. 1096.
802 SELF-DEFENSE. 816
murder. And if the killing was the result of a deliberate pur-
pose fixed in his mind to kill, it was murder in the first de-
gree. 10
802. Danger need not be real, appearance sufficient. (1) It
is not always that the danger should be real in order that a per-
son may justify on the ground of self-defense, but if the de-
fendant, acting as a reasonable man, had reason to believe, and
did believe, that his life was in danger, or that he was in dan-
ger of receiving great bodily harm at the hands of the de-
ceased, and, acting upon such belief, took the life of the de-
ceased, such act would be justifiable, although it might after-
wards appear that there was in fact no real danger. 17
(2) The important questions for the jury to determine are : first,
was the defendant, at the time he fired the fatal shot, in present
danger of death or serious bodily harm, or were the circum-
stances such as to afford him reasonable grounds for believing
himself to be in such danger? second, was 'the shooting done
in good faith to protect himself from such danger or threat-
ened danger? If both of these questions can be answered in
the affirmative the shooting would be justifiable. The defend-
ant, under the law, would have the right to defend himself
from the appearances of danger the same and to the same ex-
tent as he would were the danger real. That the danger ap-
peared real to the defendant is all the law requires to justify
him in acting; and in passing upon the question as to the de-
fendant's right to act, the matter must be viewed from the
standpoint of the defendant. 18
(3) The law is, that if a person is assaulted in such a way as
to produce in the mind of a reasonable person a belief that he
is in actual danger of losing his life, or of suffering great bodily
harm, he will be justified in defending himself, although the
danger be not real, but only apparent. Such a person will not
be held responsible criminally if he acts in self-defense from
real and honest convictions as to the character of the danger,
induced by reasonable evidence, although he may be mistaken
as to the extent of the actual danger. 19
i Mize v. S. 36 AFK. 662. "Francis v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.),
IT S. v. Miller (Ore.), 77 Pac. 660. 70 S. W. 75.
i Crews v. P. 120 111. 317, 11 N.
E. 404.
817 APPEARANCE OF DANGER. 802
(4) The law is, if a person is assaulted in such a way as to pro-
duce in the mind of a reasonable person a belief, and if he does
honestly believe, that he is in actual danger of losing his life or of
suffering great bodily harm, he will be justified in defending him-
self, although the danger be not real, but only apparent. Such a
person will not he held responsible criminally if lie acts in self-de-
fense, from real and honest convictions, as to the character of the
danger, induced by reasonable evidence, although he may have
been mistaken as to the extent of the actual danger. 20
. (5) If you believe from the evidence in this case that the de-
fendants, or either of them, was assaulted by the deceased in
such a way as to induce in such defendant a reasonable and
well-founded belief that he was actually in danger of losing
his life or of suffering great bodily harm, then he was justified
in defending himself, whether the danger was real or only ap-
parent. Actual or positive danger is not indispensable to justify
self-defense. The law considers that men, when threatened with
danger, are obliged to judge from appearances, and determine
therefrom as to the actual state of things surrounding them;
and in such case, if persons act from honest convictions, in-
duced by reasonable evidence, they will not be held responsi-
ble criminally for a mistake as to the extent of the actual dan-
ger. 21
(6) One who is without fault and in a place where he has a
right to be and is then unlawfully assaulted, he may, with-
out retreating, repel force with force, and may go even to the
extent of taking the life of his assailant, if in repelling him
he uses no more force than is reasonably necessary in his own
self-defense. 22
(7) If a person assaulted, being himself without fault, reason-
ably apprehends death or great bodily harm, unless he kills
his assailant, the killing is excusable; and if you believe that
the defendant was assaulted by the deceased in such a man-
ner as to cause him to believe, and he did believe, that he was in
20 McDonnall v. P. 168 111. 93, N. E. 745. See Fields v. S. 134
48 N. E. 86. Ind. 55, 32 N. E. 780; Trogdon v.
21 McDonnall v. P. 168 111. 93. S. 133 Ind. 7, 32 N. E. 725; S. v.
48 N. E. 86. Kennedy, 20 Iowa, 571.
22 page v. S. 141 Ind. 237, 40
803 SELF-DEFENSE. 818
imminent clanger of losing his life or suffering great bodily harm
at the hands of the deceased unless he kills him, and while so be-
lieving he killed the deceased, he is entitled to an acquittal. 23
(8) The necessity which in law permits the taking of life in
self-defense may be either apparent or real. It is real when there
is actual danger to life or of great bodily harm; it is apparent
when the circumstances, at the time of the taking of life, in-
dicate to a reasonable mind the presence of actual danger to
life or great bodily harm, though in fact there is no danger. 2 *
(9) Every person has the right to defend himself against at-
tacks, or threatened attacks, of such a character as would endan-
ger his life or limb, or do him serious bodily harm or injury,
even to the taking of the life of the assailant; and where a
person apprehends that another is about to do him great bodily
harm, and has reasonable grounds for believing the danger to
be imminent, he may safely act upon such apprehension and
even kill the assailant, if that be necessary to avoid the appre-
hended danger. 25
(10) In order to justify homicide on the ground of self-defense,
or defense of another, it is not essential that there should be
any actual or real danger to the life or person of the
party killing or to the life or person of the party for whose
protection the homicide is committed, if there be an appear-
ance of danger, caused by the acts or demonstrations of the
person killed, or by words coupled with the acts or demon-
strations of such person ; and if such acts or demonstrations
or such words, coupled with acts or demonstrations, produce
in the mind of the person slaying a reasonable expectation or
fear of death or some serious bodily injury to himself or to the
person in whose behalf he interferes, the person killing will
be justified if he in good faith acts on such appearance of
danger and under such reasonable expectation or fear, even
though it subsequently appear that there was in reality no
danger. 26
803. Reasonable doubt of defendant's apprehension. If
'23 Deilks v. S. 141 Ind. 25; 40 25 Marts v. S. 20 Ohio St. 162.
N. E. 120. 26 Kemp v. S. 13 Tex. 565.
24 Marts v. S. 20 Ohio St. 162.
819 RESISTING ATTACK UNLAWFUL AR3EST. 805
the jury believe from the evidence in the case that there is a*
reasonable doubt as to whether the prisoner at the time of
the shooting was under reasonable apprehension that the pros-
ecuting witness intended to inflict upon him great bodily harm,
and that he fired the shots in self-defense, then the jury must
acquit. 27
804. Resisting attack of several persons. (1) If the defend-
ant and his co-defendants were in the exercise of their lawful
rights in passing along the streets at the time of the conflict in
which H was killed, and neither of the accused parties began the
affray or attack, then the defendant and those accused with
him had the right to repel the assault with such force as was
necessary to do so, and had the right to defend themselves
from danger to life or great bodily harm; and' if they were
suddenly assailed or surrounded by superior numbers of per-
sons armed with weapons dangerous to life or calculated to
do great bodily harm, the defendants had a right to stand on
their defense, to repel force by force, even to the taking of
life, if they believed, and had reasonable grounds to believe,
that it was necessary to do so to prevent either death or great
bodily harm to themselves, and if necessary, they may use such
weapons as will accomplish the purpose. 28
(2) If the only purpose made known to the defendant prior to
the killing of H, and the only one contemplated or entered upon
by him was the defense of himself and companions from an attack
by a number of men superior in numbers and strength which had
been threatened, and neither the defendant nor his companions
were to be the aggressors, or attack the opposing parties, then
such common purpose of defense merely was not unlawful or
criminal. 29
805. Resisting unlawful arrest. If an officer or other per-
son who attempts to prevent another from committing a felony,
uses more force than is reasonably necessary, he becomes a wrong-
doer, and the person sought to be prevented may resist such
excess of force by force, even to the killing of the wrong-doer,
2T Lawler v. P. 74 111. 230. 29 Goins v. S. 46 Ohio St. 468, 21
2s Goins v. S. 46 Ohio St. 469, 21 N. E. 476.
N. E. 476.
806 SELF-DEFENSE. 820
if necessary, to preserve his own life from such excessive use
of force, to save himself from great bodily harm. 30
806. Accidental killing no offense. If you find from the
evidence that the deceased and defendant were riding the same
horse along the road mentioned, the defendant having a pistol
in his hand, and that the deceased seized hold of the pistol
in the hand of the defendant and attempted to take the pistol
from the defendant by force, and in the scuffle which ensued
the pistol was accidentally discharged and produced the death
of the deceased by accident, and without the fault or culpable
negligence of the defendant, and without the defendant com-
mencing or bringing on the difficulty with the deceased, you
will find the defendant not guilty. 31
807. Character of deceased proper matter. The character
of the deceased is a proper matter for your consideration, and
you should give it such weight as you deem proper, under the
evidence, in determining whether or not he, by his acts at the
time of the wounding, gave the defendant reasonable cause to,
apprehend such danger as to justify his acts of wounding on
the ground of self-defense, according to the law upon that sub-
ject as stated in these instructions. The mere fact, however,
that the deceased was a man of bad character, if you believe
from the evidence he was of such character, will not justify
the taking of his life. 32
so Bossit v. S. 53 Ind. 417. See also Potter v. S. 162 Ind. 213, 70 N.
also Plummer v. S. 135 Ind. 308, 34 E. 129.
N. E. 568. 32 S. v. Vansant, 80 Mo. 70.
si S. v. Wisdom, 84 Mo. 190. See
CHAPTER LVIIL
BURGLARY AND LARCENY.
Sec. Sec.
808. Breaking defined. 814. Definition and essential ele-
809. Intent, how shown. ments.
810. Burglary and larceny at same 815. Intent an essential element.
time. 816. Possession of stolen proper-
811. Aiding and abetting, acting, ty, evidence.
together. 817. Property found and appropri-
812. Possession of property taken ated.
by burglary. 818. Taking under claim of right.
813. Submitting facts to the jury. 819. Prosecution confined to prop-
erty alleged.
Burglary.
808. Breaking defined. (1) The opening of a closed door
with the intent expressed in the statute, as by lifting a latch, turn-
ing a key in a lock, pushing open a closed door, or by pushing
open a window, or in any other way using any force to enter,
is sufficient to constitute a breaking, and it is not necessary
to show in evidence that any lock or other fastening was broken
by violence. 1
(2) The breaking of the window by pulling off the plank and
undoing the fastening is a forcible bursting and breaking within
the meaning of the statute. 2
(3) If you are satisfied from the evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt as to all the other elements necessary to constitute a bur-
glary, except a breaking, and find that the transom was closed
i S. v. Reed, 20 Iowa, 421. See 2 s. v. Butterfield, 75 Mo. 301.
S. v. O'Brien, 81 Iowa, 95, 46 N.
W. 861.
821
809 BURGLARY AND LARCENY. . 822
on the night in question, though not fastened, and that the de-
fendant used sufficient force to push it from its place, so that it
would swing open, that would be a sufficient breaking in law,
and, under the circumstances, if you are satisfied beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, your verdict should be guilty. 3
809. Intent, how shown. (1) If you find that in the night
time the defendant broke and entered the dwelling house de-
scribed in the indictment, this fact would be strong presump-
tive evidence that the defendant did such breaking and made
such entry with the intent to commit a public offense. But
such presumption may be overcome by evidence. 4
(2) The intent with which an act is committed being but a men-
tal state of the accused, direct proof of it is not required. Nor in-
deed can it ordinarily be so shown ; but it is generally established
by all the facts and circumstances attending the doing of the
act complained of as disclosed by the evidence; and in this case
the intent with which the defendant entered the dwelling house
of G, if he did enter it, must be determined by you from all
the evidence in the case. 5
810. Burglary and larceny at same time, verdict. (1) While
the offense of burglary and larceny are charged in the same
counts of the information, yet they are each separate and dis-
tinct offenses, a s nd the jury are at liberty to acquit as to one
and find the defendants guilty of the other, or find the de-
fendants guilty of both, or acquit of both offenses, as they may
believe from all the facts and circumstances in evidence; but to
find the defendants guilty of either offense they must so find from
all the facts and circumstances in evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt. And in this connection the court further instructs you
that you may find either one of the defendants guilty and acquit
the other of either or both offenses, as you may believe the
evidence warrants. 6
(2) If the jury find the defendants guilty of burglary, and if
the jury further believe that at the time of the commission of said
s Timmons v. S. 34 Ohio St. 426. also Bloch v. S. 161 Ind. 276 68
* S. v. Fox, 80 Iowa, 312, 45 N. N. E. 287.
W. 874. f, s. v. Peebles (Mo.), 77 S. W.
s S. v. Maxwell 42 Iowa, 210. See 520.
823 AIDING, ASSISTING POSSESSION OF PROPERTY. 812
burglary the defendant did take, steal and carry away from
the premises aforesaid any flour owned by Hall, you should
find the defendants guilty of larceny, and fix their punishment
at imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term not less than
two years nor more than five years in addition to the punish-
ment assessed for the burglary. 7
811. Aiding and abetting, acting together. Where two or
more defendants are charged jointly with the commission of
a crime, it is not necessary that it be shown that both of the
defendants, or either one of them, when tried alone, actually
broke and entered the building or took the property. It is
sufficient if it be shown that the joint defendants were acting
together for that purpose, and if either one of them, while
so acting together for that purpose, actually broke and en-
tered the building with the intention of stealing therein, then
all of the said defendants would be guilty of the crime, and
either one of them may be prosecuted alone therefor. 8
812. Possession of property taken by burglary. (1) To jus-
tify a conviction of burglary in this case there must be other
evidence than the mere unexplained possession of property re-
cently stolen by burglary. Evidence that the defendant was in
and about the .store in question on the evening preceding the
burglary thereof, is not sufficient to justify a conviction, even
when considered with the unexplained possession of goods re-
cently obtained from the store by burglary. 9
(2) If you believe from the evidence before you beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the property introduced in evidence or some
portion thereof was stolen from the dwelling house in question
by breaking and entering the same in the night time, with the
intent to steal said property, and if you further believe from
the evidence that recently thereafter the property thus stolen,
if any, was found in the possession of the defendant, then in
such case you would be warranted in concluding that he, the
defendant, stole the property thus found in his possession, if
any, by breaking and entering the said dwelling-house in the
night time with intent to steal the same, unless the facts and
7 S. v. Peebles (Mo.), 77 S. W. S v. Tilton, 63 Iowa, 117. See
520. Potterfield v. Com. 91 Va. 801, 805,
s S. v. Tucker, 36 Or. 291, 51 L.. 22 S. E. 352.
R. A. 246, 252.
N. W. 290.
813 BURGLARY AND LARCENY. 824
circumstances shown by the evidence raise in your minds a rea'-
sonable doubt as to whether he did come honestly into posses-
sion of the same. But if the facts and circumstances in evi-
dence do not raise such reasonable doubt, then you would not
be warranted in drawing such conclusion from such possession
alone, even if established by the evidence. 10
813. Submitting facts to the jury. (1) If the jury believe
from the evidence that the defendants on or about the twenty-
eighth day of March, 1881, at the county of Saline, broke and en-
tered the dwelling house of W by forcibly breaking and bursting
the window, in which there was at the time a human being, with
the intent of stealing and carrying away any goods, wares,
merchandise or other property then being in said dwelling house,
then they will find the defendants guilty of burglary in the
first degree and assess their punishment at imprisonment in the
state penitentiary for a term of years not less than ten. 13
(2) If in this case the jury are satisfied from the evidence be-
yond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the bur-
glary as charged, still if the jury believe from the evidence beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant did steal the goods de-
scribed in the information, then the jury may find the defend
ant guilty of larceny. 14
Larceny.
814. Definition and essential elements. Larceny is the fe-
lonious, stealing, taking, carrying, riding or driving away of
the personal property of another. 15
If the defendant had actually taken the money into his hands
and lifted it from the place where the owner had put it so as
to entirely remove it from the place where it was put, with the
intention of stealing it, he would be guilty of larceny,' though he
may have dropped it into the place it was laying, upon being
discovered, and had not taken it out of the money drawer. 16
10 S. v. Frahm, 73 Iowa, 355; S. W. 590. Held not assuming bur-
v. Rivers, 68 Iowa, 616; S. v. Yohe, glary was committed.
87 Iowa. 35. " Bennett v. S. 70 Ark. 43, 66
is S. v. Butterfield, 75 Mo. 301 S. W. 199; Hughes' Cr. Law, 375,
(held proper under the statute citing- 4 Bl. Com. 229; 2 East P.
of Missouri). C. 553'; 1 Hale P. C. 503, Johnson
i* Ferguson v. S. (Neb.), 77 N. v. P. 113 111. 99.
10 Eckels v. S. 20 Ohio St. 515.
825 LARCENY DEFINED, INTENT ESSENTIAL. 815
815. Intent an essential element. (1) The mere unlawful
taking and carrying away of the personal property of another is
not larceny. The taking of the property alleged to have been
stolen must have been accompanied with a felonious intent to
steal the same, and such intent must have existed at the time
of the taking of the property. 17
- (2) Not every unlawful taking and carrying away of the per-
sonal property of another will amount to larceny; the felonious
intention to steal the property must accompany the act of the
original taking. 18
(3) Although you may find from the evidence that the defend-
ant may have taken the horse in question, you cannot find him
guilty unless you further find from the evidence beyond a reason-
able doubt that the taking was with the felonious intent to steal,
and that the horse was then the property of S. 19
(4) Before you can find the defendant guilty, you must believe
from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that at some time
within three years from the finding of the indictment in the case,
he, the defendant, took possession of said horse with the intent
to steal, take or carry it away, and that said horse was then the
property of S. 20
(5) If the jury believe from the evidence that the horse in ques-
tion was running at large and regarded as an estray in the neigh-
borhood, and they further find from the evidence beyond a reason-
able doubt that the defendant took possession of said horse, or ex-
ercised such ownership over him as owners of live stock usually
exercise over the same, with intent to steal said horse, they wili
find the defendant guilty. 21
816. Possession of stolen property evidence of guilt. (1)
The court instructs the jury that the possession of stolen property
soon after the commission of the theft is prima facie evidence that
the person in whose possession it is found is guilty of the wrong-
" Williams v. S. 44 Ala. 396; S. v. Woodruff, 47 Kas. 151, 27 Pac.
Fulton v. S. 13 Ark. 168; Keely v. 842.
S. 14 Ind. 36; Smith v. Schultz i Bennett v. S. 70 Ark. 43. 6(5
1 Scam. (111.) 490. S. W. 199.
is Hughes' Or. L. 380, citing: 20 Bennett v. S. 70 Ark. 43, 66
S. v. Wood, 46 Iowa, 116; P. v. S. W. 199.
Moore, 37 Hun (N. Y.), 84; Weaver 21 Bennett v. S. 70 Ark. 43, 66
v. S. 77 Ala. 26; Levy v. S. 79 Ala. S. W. 199. See Starch v. S. 63 Ind.
259; S. v. Cummings, 33 Conn. 260; 283.
816 BURGLARY AND LARCENY. 826
ful taking, and is sufficient to warrant a conviction, unless the
other evidence in the case or the surrounding circumstances are
such as to raise a reasonable doubt of such guilt.- 2
(2) If the evidence in this case shows that the property de-
scribed in the indictment was feloniously stolen, taken and carried
away on - , and if it further shows that on the next day it was
found in the possession of the defendant, and that he claimed it to
be his own and sold it or a part of it ; and if the evidence shows
that the defendant has failed to honestly account for his possession
of the same, such failure is a circumstance tending to establish
his guilt, and from which you may find him guilty if the allega
tions of the indictment have been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. 23
(3) If the jury believe from the evidence that the property men-
tioned in the information, or any part thereof, was feloniously
taken from the person of the prosecuting witness, Carter, as
described in the information, and received into the possession
of the defendant shortly after being so feloniousy taken, the
failure, if failure there be, of the defendant to account for such
possession, or to show that such possession was honestly obtained,
ife a circumstance tending to show his guilt, and the accused is
bound to explain the possession in order to remove the effect of
the possession as a circumstance to be considered in connection
with other suspicious facts, if the evidence discloses any such. 24
(4) The exclusive possession of property recently stolen un-
accompanied by a reasonable account of how the possession was
acquired creates a presumption that the person found in pos-
session of the same is the thief. 25
(5) The defendant is not required to satisfactorily explain his
possession of recently stolen property. If after considering all
22 Smith v. P. 103 111. 82, 85. (This W. 727; P. v. Chadwick, 7 Utan, 134,
instruction dotes not assume the 25 Pac. 737; Harper v. S. 71 Miss,
existence of any fact); Keating v. 202, 13 So. 882; Galloway v. S. Ill
P. 160 111. 483, 43 N. E. 724; Gunther Ga. 832, 36 S. B. 63.
v. P. 139 111. 526, 28 N. E. 1101; 23 Jones v. S. 53 Ind. 237. See
Gablick v. P. 40 Mich. 292, 3 Am. Campbell v. S. 150 Ind. 75, 49 N. E.
Cr. R. 244; S. v. Kelley, 57 Iowa, 905.
644, 11 N. W. 635; S. v. Brady 24 P. v. Wilson, 135 Cal. 331, 67
(Iowa), 97 N. W. 64; Brooks v. S. Pac. 322.
96 Ga. 353, 23 S. E. 413. Contra: 25 Potterfield v. Com. 91 Va. 801,
White v. S. 21 Tex. App. 339, 17 S. 805, 22 S. E. 352.
827 POSSESSION OF PROPERTY PROPERTY FOUND. 817
the evidence introduced by him in connection with all the other
evidence in the case, there appears a reasonable doubt of his
guilt as charged in the indictment, then he should be acquitted. 26
817. Property found and appropriated by defendant. (1)
If you believe from the evidence that the defendant found the
trunk in the road, you are bound to find him not guilty, although
you may believe that he afterwards broke it open and disposed of
its contents to his own use.- 7
(2) If you find from the evidence that said goods had been lost
and were found by the defendant ; that at the time he found the
same he did not know who owned them ; that there were no marks
upon or about the goods showing to whom they belonged so that
the defendant could identify the owner at once, even though he
could afterwards have discovered the owner by honest diligence,
then you must acquit the defendant. 28
(3) Though the money was actually lost and the defendant
found it and at the time of finding supposed it to be lost, and ap-
propriated it with intent to take entire dominion over it, yet
really believing that the owner could not be found, that was
not larceny and in such case he cannot be convicted. The
intent to steal must have existed at the time of the taking.
It is not enough that he had the general means of discovering
the owner by honest diligence. He was not bound to inquire
on the streets or at the printing offices for the owner, though
if, at the time of the taking, he knew he had reasonable
means of ascertaining that fact, that might be taken as show-
ing a belief that the owner of the money could be found.
In order to convict it must be shown that the taking of
the money was with felonious intent, that is, with intent to
steal under the definition given ; and it is not sufficient that after
finding the money it was converted to his own use with felonious
intent. The intent must have existed at the time of the finding. 29
818. Taking property under claim of right. If, from the
2 Hughes Cr. Law, '3, citing: 31 Neb. 460, 48 N. W. 148; Heed
Hoge v. P. 117 111. 44, 6 N. E. 796; v. S. 25 Wis. 421; S. v. Merrick, 19
S. v. Kirkpatrick, 72 Iowa, 500, 34 Me. 398.
N. W 301, 7 Am. Cr. R. 334; Smith 27 Lane v. P.* 10 111. 307.
v. S. 58 Ind. 340, 2 Am.. Cr. R. 375; 28 s. v. Dean, 49 Iowa, 74; Bailey
Van Straaten v. P. 26 Colo. 184, 56 v. S. 52 Ind. 466.
Pac. 905; S. v. Miller, 107 Iowa, -' Brooks v. S. 35 Ohio St. 48.
656, 78 N. W. 679; Grentzinger v. S.
818 BURGLARY AND LARCENY. 828
evidence, you find that the defendant had any fair color or
right to take the cattle alleged to have been taken by him at
the time they were so taken by him, and you find that he took
the same under that claim of right, or if you find that he be-
lieved they were his cattle, or he had a right to take them, or
if you have a reasonable doubt that he so believed, then you will
acquit. 30
819. Prosecution confined to property alleged. If you find
from the evidence that any of the hogs alleged to have been stolen
do not answer the description given in the information, then, and
in that case, if you find the defendant guilty, you will ascertain
from the evidence the value of the hogs only that do answer the
description in the information in fixing the degree of the crime. 31
so Reese v. S. (Tex. Cr. App.), si s. v. Montgomery (S. Dak.),
68 S. W. 283. 97 N. W. 717.
CHAPTER LIX.
EMBEZZLEMENT AND FALSE PRETENSE.
Sec. Sec.
820. Embezzlement defined Ele- 827. President borrowing from his
ments. bank Evidence.
821. Agent collecting on oommis- 828. Condition of bank, value of
sion. assets, liabilities.
822. Attorney receiving and appro- 829. Failure of bank as prima fa-
priating. cie evidence.
823. Debtor and creditor, their re- 830. Definition and elements.
lation. 831. Offense committed by acts,
824. Intent an essential element. symbols, words.
825. Intent, knowledge of bank's 832. Defrauding tax collector-
condition. Essential elements.
826 Bank receiving deposits by
officers or others.
Embezzlement.
820. Embezzlement defined Elements. (1) Embezzlement is
the fraudulent appropriation or conversion to one's own use of
the personal property of another delivered to him as agent, ser-
vant, employe', bailee, trustee, or in some other fiduciary capacity,
with the intent to cheat and defraud the owner. 1
(2) If you believe from the evidence that the defendant received
from C the organ in question, under an agreement that he should
act as the agent of the said C in the sale of said organ, and that
the defendant should sell the said organ and pay over and deliver
to the said C a certain sum of money or notes which the defend-
ant should secure from the sale of said organ, and you further
believe that the defendant sold said organ as his own property,
and not as the agent for said C, and that at the time of said sale
the defendant had the fraudulent intent to appropriate the-pro-
i Hughes Cr. L. 492; Underbill Cr. Ev. 282.
829
821 EMBEZZLEMENT AND FALSE PRETENSE. 830
ceeds of said sale to his own use, and that in pursuance of said
intent the defendant afterwards appropriated the proceeds of
said sale to his own use and benefit without the consent of said
C, the defendant would, under such circumstances, be guilty of
embezzling said organ. -
821. Agent collecting on commission. If the jury believe
from the evidence that the defendant, at the time of the alleged
embezzlement, was a collector for the company in question, with
the right to retain her commissions, that is, that she was not
required to pay to the company the gross sum or sums of money
collected by her, but might first deduct her commissions and then
pay over the balance or net amount to the company, she was not
such an agent as is contemplated in the statute defining embezzle-
ment, and the verdict should be not guilty. 3
822. Attorney receiving and appropriating money. Where
an attorney receives money by collecting it from a client, he can-
not be held for embezzlement or convicted thereof, unless a
demand has first been made upon him for the money by the person
authorized to receive it. But where money or drafts or certifi-
cates of deposit are placed in the hands of an attorney or agent
to be by him forwarded or paid to another person, and he receives
the drafts, money or certificates for such purpose, and unlawfully
and fraudulently secretes, appropriates, purloins and converts
the same to his own use, then, in that case, he would be guilty of.
embezzlement whether any demand was made or not. 4
823. Debtor and creditor, their relation. The facts that the
relation of debtor and creditor exists between a principal and
his agent, and that on balancing the account the agent would be
found indebted to his principal, are not alone sufficient to sustain
a verdict finding the agent guilty of embezzlement or converting
to his own use the property of his principal. 5
824. Intent an essential element. (1) In embezzlement an
2 Epperson v. S. 22 Tex. App. the statute of Indiana on embezzle-
697, 3 S. W. 789. ment, one where demand is essen-
s McElroy v. P. 202 111. 477, 66 tial to be made and the other where
N. E. 1058. it is not essential.
* Dean v. S. 147 Ind. 221, 46 N. 55. v. Culver (Neb.), 97 N. W.
E. 528. There are two sections of 1017.
831 INTENT, KNOWLEDGE, BANK RECEIVING DEPOSITS. 826
intent to feloniously appropriate the property at the time of the
appropriation is essential ; and if the appropriation is made upon
the belief, honestly entertained by the accused that he has lawful
title or right to appropriate it, the act is not criminal. 6
(2) An essential element in the crime charged in this case is a
felonious intent, and before you can convict the defendant you
must find from the evidence that he intended to convert to his
own use the money of the prosecuting witness, and to cheat,
wrong and defraud him. 7
(3) If you believe from the evidence before you that it was the
intention of the defendant to act in good faith towards C, as his
agent for the sale of the organ in question and carry out his
alleged agreement, and that he, after the sale of the organ, con-
ceived for the first time the intention to appropriate the proceeds
of the sale to his own use or benefit, he would not be guilty of
embezzling the said organ. 8
825. Intent, knowledge of bank's condition. It is no offense
for an officer of a bank to assent to the receipt of a deposit by
such bank when the same is in failing circumstances, if at
the time of receiving such deposit, the officer did not at the time
know it was in failing circumstances, but in taking into con-
sideration the question as to whether or not the bank in question
was in failing circumstances on the tenth day of July, 1893, and
as to whether or not the defendant had knowledge on that day
of its condition, you may consider all the facts and circumstances
in evidence before you. 9
826. Bank receiving deposits by officer or others. (1) If you
shall believe from the evidence that the defendant, at the county
of Jackson, in this state, at any time within three years next
before the thirtieth day of - , was the president of the bank
mentioned, and that said bank was then and there a corporation
and doing business as a banking institution in said county and
state, and did then and there unlawfully and feloniously assent
to the taking and receiving on deposit in said banking institu- ,
e Beaty v. S. 82 Ind. 232. s Epperson v. S. 22 Tex. App.
T S. v. Eastman, 60 Kas. 557, 57 697, 3 S. W. 789.
Pac. 109. S. v. Darrah, 152 Mo. 529, 54
S. W. 226.
827 EMBEZZLEMENT AND FALSE PRETENSE. 832
tion the money of the witness, V, to the amount of three hundred
dollars or more, and that said banking institution was then and
there in failing circumstances, and that the defendant was then
and there the president of said banking institution doing business
as such, and that the defendant had knowledge at the time when
such deposit was received that said banking institution was in
failing circumstances, you will find the defendant guilty and fix
his punishment at imprisonment in the penitentiary for any time
not less than two years and not more than five years. 10
(2) If the jury shall believe from the evidence that on the day
of - , the witness, V, deposited in the bank in question, a bank-
ing institution doing business in this state, at the county of Jack-
son, the sum of three hundred dollars or any part thereof to the
value of thirty dollars or more lawful money of the United States,
of the money and property of the witness, V, and shall further
believe from the evidence that the said deposit was not taken and
received by the defendant himself, but was taken and received by
some other person, but that such person was then and there in
the employ of the said bank and acting under the direction and
control of the defendant in said employment, and that such other
person had general power and authority from the defendant to
receive deposits of money into said bank, and that said bank was
then and there in failing circumstances, and the defendant had
knowledge that said bank was then and there in failing circum-
stances, they will find the defendant guilty as charged. 11
827. President borrowing from his bank Evidence. It is
not of itself a crime for the president of a bank to borrow money
from the bank of which he is president, and you may consider the
fact that the defendant borrowed money from the bank in ques-
tion, if you find he was president of the same and did borrow
money from it, in determining the condition of the bank on
the tenth day of July, 1893, and for no other purpose. 12
828. Condition of bank, value of assets, liabilities. (1) A
banking institution is in failing circumstances when it is unable
10 S. v. Darrah, 152 Mo. 527, 54 12 S. v. Darrah, 152 Mo. 529, 54
S. W. 226. S. W. 226.
11 S. v. Darrah, 152 Mo. 527, 54
S. W. 2?6.
833 BANK OFFICIALS APPROPRIATING. 828
to meet the demands of its depositors in the usual and ordinary
course of business, and this is true even though you shall believe
that there was at the time a stringency in the money market. 13
(2) In determining the condition of the said bank on the tenth
day of July, 1893, you should consider the reasonable market value
of the assets of the bank on hand as compared to its liabilities on
that day; all consideration of the condition of the bank is con-
fined to the tenth day of July, 1893, but you may consider any
evidence that may be before you showing its condition immedi-
ately before that day, if there is any such, to aid you in determin-
ing its condition on that day. 14
(3) In determining the question of whether or not the said bank
was in failing circumstances on the tenth day of July, 1893, you
should consider the liabilities of the bank and the reasonable
market value of the assets of the bank on that day regardless of
any change, if any, or additional security, if any, which may have
been given since that day. If you shall find from the evidence
that any part of the assets of said bank have been proven to
have a market value, then you should give such assets such intrin-
sic value as may have been shown by the evidence in the case,
and if there be any of said assets, to wit, stocks, bonds or negoti-
able paper, that have not in your opinion, from the evidence,
been shown to have a market value nor an intrinsic value, then
such assets are presumed to be worth their face value. This will
have no application to such assets as may have been shown by
the evidence to have no value at all, provided there is such
evidence as to any of the assets of said bank. 15
(4) In considering the condition of the bank on the tenth day of
July, 1893, you will not take into account the three hundred
thousand dollars of capital stock as a liability. 16
(5) The court instructs you that in determining the value of
any of the assets of the said bank on the tenth day of July, 1893,
as shown on this trial, the testimony of expert witnesses, who
13 S. v. Darrah, 152 Mo. 528, 54 S. v. Darrah, 152 Mo. 531, 54
S. W. 226. S. W. 226.
1+ S. v. Darrah 152 Mo. 528, 54 i S. v. Darrah, 152 Mo. 528, 54
S. W. 226. S. W. 226.
829 EMBEZZLEMENT AND FALSE PRETENSE. 834
have testified before you, if deemed by you unreasonable, may be
disregarded. 17
829. Failure of bank as prima facie evidence. Although by
the statute the failure of the bank in question is made prima
facie evidence of the knowledge on the part of the defendant
that the same was in failing circumstances on the tenth day of
July, 1893, yet the burden of proving the state's case is not really
changed. The law enables the state to make a prima facie case
by proof of the assenting to the creation of said indebtedness
and the reception of the money into the bank, but the defendant
can show the condition of the bank and the circumstances at-
tending the failure and any facts tending to exonerate him from
criminal liability; and then, on the whole case, the burden still
rests on the state to establish defendant's guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt. The presumption of innocence with which defend-
ant is clothed never, shifts, but rests with him throughout the
case, notwithstanding a prima facie case may have been made
out by the state. 18
False Pretense.
830. Definition and elements. (1) A false pretense has been
denned to be such a fraudulent representation of a fact, past or
existing, by a person who knows it to be untrue as is adapted to
induce the person to whom it is made to part with something of
value. 19
(2) To make out a complete case of false pretense, the fol-
lowing essential facts must be established by the evidence be-
yond a reasonable doubt: first, the intent to defraud some par-
ticular person or people generally; second, an actual fraud com-
mitted; third, the false pretense; and fourth, that the fraud re-
sulted from the employment of the false pretense. 20
831. Offense committed by acts, symbols, words. A false
pretense may consist of any act, word, symbol, or token calculated'
to deceive another, and knowingly and designedly employed by
any person with intent to defraud another of money or other
personal property. And if you shall be satisfied from the evi-
" S. v. Darrah, 152 Mo. 532, 54 i S. v. Lynn (Del.), 51 Atl. 882;
S. W. 226. Jackson v. P. 126 111. 139, 18 N.
is S. v. Darrah, 152 Mo. 522, 533, E. 286; Hughes Or. Law, 579.
54 S. W. 226. 20 Hughes Cr. Law, 579.
835 FALSE PRETENSE BY ACTS DEFRAUDING TAXES. 832
dence that the defendant made such false pretense as charged
in the indictment, with the intent to cheat and defraud as de-
nned in these instructions, then you should ascertain whether
the defendant did by such false pretense actually obtain the
money of K, the receiver of taxes and treasurer aforesaid. 21
832. Defrauding tax collector Essential elements. In order
to convict under the indictment, the state must prove to your
satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt: first, that the defendant
knowingly made a false pretense as charged in the indictment ;
second, that he made such false pretense with the intent to cheat
and defraud R, the receiver of taxes and county treasurer:
third, that by such false pretense he actually did cheat and de-
fraud the said R, the receiver of taxes and county treasurer,
and did obtain from him thereby, in coin or paper money, or
both, lawful money, then the property of said R, receiver of
taxes and county treasurer aforesaid. 22
21 S. v. Lynn (Del.), 51 Atl. 883. 22 s. v. Lynn (Del.), 51 All. 882.
CHAPTER LX.
OTHER SPECIFIC OFFENSES.
Sec.
833.
834.
ADULTERY.
acts
Occasional
course.
Common law marriage.
BASTARDY.
of inter-
835.
836.. Public rumor is not evidence.
Facts to be determined by
jury.
CRUELTY TO ANIMALS.
837. Killing stock to preserve
crops.
838. Intentionally overdriving
horse.
DISORDERLY HOUSE.
839. What constitutes disorderly
house.
840. Forgery defined.
841. Alteration of instrument is
forgery.
842. Aiding and abetting another.
843. Uttering or publishing forged
document.
844. .Intent to defraud essential.
845. Forging a deed Venue.
Sec.
846.
847.
848.
849.
850.
851.
852.
853.
854.
855.
856.
857.
858.
GAMING.
Gaming defined.
Betting on game of cards.
Betting on game of billiards.
Doing forbidden act in public
place.
CRIMINAL LIBEL.
Motives prompting communi-
cation.
PERJURY.
Evidence of one witness not
sufficient.
PUBLIC NUISANCE.
Offensive smells from slaugh-
terhouse.
Nuisance must affect whole
community.
Mill-dam and pond producing
offense.
Pond producing malaria.
Offense caused by other means.
Caused by others, not the de-
fendant.
HIGHWAY VIOLATIONS.
Public roads How establish-
ed.
836
837 WHAT CONSTITUTES ADULTERY BASTARDY. 835
859. Vacating f public road How. SUNDAY VIOLATIONS.
860. Malicious destruction cxf
bridge. 861. Operating machinery on Sun-
day.
Adultery.
833. Occasional acts of intercouse not adultery. If the jury
shall find from the evidence that the defendants were not living
together in a state of open and notorious adultery, but were sim-
ply, at the time charged in the information, stopping together in
the same room occasionally, and were only guilty of occasional
acts of illicit intercourse, then the jury should find the defendants
not guilty. 1
834. Common law marriage, what constitutes. A simple
agreement between one man and one woman, who may lawfully
contract that they will take each other as husband and wife
thenceforth, and that they will sustain this relation thenceforth
so long as they both shall live, with the mutual understanding
that neither one nor both can rescind the contract or destroy the
relation followed by cohabitation; when they do this they are
married. And in such case their marriage is just as valid as
though a chime of bells had played a wedding march and a half
dozen bishops and clergymen assisted at the celebration before a
thousand people. 2
Bastardy.
835. Facts to be determined by the jury. You have heard the
statements of the relatrix and the evidence tending to show that
the defendant had opportunities for intercourse with her; and
you have also heard the evidence of the witnesses tending to show
that persons other than the defendant had intercourse with her
about the time the child was begotten; you may consider these
circumstances in determining whether the defendant is the father
of the child. 3
i S. v. Crowner, 56 Mo. 149. Rape 2 S. v. Miller, 12 Ohio C. C. 66;
and robbery For instructions on Teter v. Teter, 101 Ind. 129.
these offenses see "Assault," Chap- 3 Mobley v. S. 83 Ind. 94.
ter LV.
83G OTHER SPECIFIC OFFENSES. 838
836. Public rumor is not evidence. In determining the ques-
tion whether the defendant is the father of the child in ques-
tion, you should not regard or consider what public rumor
was before the time of the begetting of the child concerning the
intimacy of the defendant or other person with the relatrix, but
should look soley to the evidence, and be governed by it as to the
fact of the begetting of the child. 4
Cruelty to Animals,
837. Killing stock to preserve crops. If you believe from
the evidence that the defendant killed one or more of the hogs
of R. by shooting them, and did not cruelly beat, abuse, torture,
or purposely injure the hogs, but killed them in the manner above
stated, then you should find for the defendant, if you should be-
lieve from the evidence that the defendant killed them in order to
save his crop. 5
838. Intentionally overdriving horse. The commonwealth
must prove that the defendant overdrove the horse knowingly,
and intentionally ; that the defendant, like all other men, was pre-
sumed to know what he did, and to intend the natural and neces-
sary results of his acts ; that if, in the proper exercise of his own
judgment, he thought he was not overdriving the horse, he must
be acquitted: and that upon these instructions the jury might
come to the conclusion that it was a question of fact to be deter-
mined by the result of the. testimony introduced by the common-
wealth and by the defense.
Disorderly House.
839. What constitutes disorderly house. If you find from
the evidence that the defendant kept a bar-room and dance hall,
with music, for the purpose and with the intent of bringing to-
4 Saint v. S. 68 Ind. 129. Com. v. Wood, 111 Mass. 409.
s Stephens v. S. 65 Miss. 330, 3
So. 458; Hunt v. S. 3 Ind. App. 383.
839 DISORDERLY HOUSE, FORGERY DEFINED. 843
gether and entertaining prostitutes and men desirous of their
company, and that such persons habitually assembled there to
drink and dance together, then you may find said establishment
a disorderly house, within the meaning of the law, even, though
you may also believe that the house was quietly kept, and no
conspicuous improprieties were permitted inside. The jury being
the judges of the law as well as facts, this charge is to be under-
stood as advisory only of what the law is. 7
Forgery.
840. Forgery defined. Forgery is the fraudulent makng or
alteration of a writing to the prejudice of another's rights, with
intent to cheat and defraud. 8
841. Alteration of instrument is forgery. Any material al-
teration, in part, of a genuine instrument, whereby a new opera-
tion is given it to the prejudice of the rights of another, is a
forgery of the whole instrument, if done with intent to defraud. 9
842. Aiding and abetting another. It is not necessary, in
order to sustain a conviction, to show that the defendant actually
participated in making, uttering, or passing the instrument al-
leged to have been forged. If you believe from the evidence be-
fore you, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he aided, abetted or as-
sisted in such forgery, with intent to cheat and defraud, you
should find the defendant guilty. 10
843. Uttering or publishing forged document. You are in-
structed that whoever shall, with intent to injure and defraud
any one, knowingly utters or publishes as true and genuine any
T Beard v. S. 71 Md. 275, 17 Atl. Brown, 70 Vt. 521, 41 Atl. 1025;
1044. P. v. Underbill, 26 N. Y. S. 1030,
s Hughes Cr. Law, 896, 897, 75 Hun, 329, 142 N. Y. 38, 36 N. E.
citing: 4 Blackstone Comm. 247; U. 1049; Com. v. Hyde, 94 Ky. 517,
S. v. Long, 30 Fed. 678; S. v. Flye, 15 Ky. L. R. 264 23 S. W. 195, and
26 Me. 312; 3 Greenleaf Ev. (Redf. other cases.
ed.), 103; S. v. Rose. 70 Minn. 10 Hughes Cr. Law, 904, citing:
403, 73 N. W. 177; Underbill Cr. Anson v. P. 148 111. 502, 35 N.
Ev. 419. E. 145; 3 Greenleaf Ev. (Redf. Ed.),
s Hughes Cr. Law, 897, citing: 104.
S. v. Wood, 20 Iowa, 541; S. v.
Kattlenrann, 35 Mo. 105; Owen v.
844 OTHER SPECIFIC OFFENSES. 840
false or forged check, is guilty of a crime, and shall be punished
as prescribed by law. 11
844. Intent to defraud essential. If you shall find from the
evidenc'e in the case, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defend-
ant did knowingly utter and publish the check set forth in the
indictment as true and genuine, still, before you can convict him,
you must further find that he did so utter and publish it with the
intent to injure and defraud another. And in this respect you
may consider whether he had an intent to injure or defraud either
the person to whom he gave the check or W. And if you shall
find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he ut-
tered and passed the check upon J, with intent to deceive him,
and did obtain money on it, and that J, relying upon the check,
presented it to the bank for payment, then you may infer from
that act an intention to injure the said J or W ; and if you shall
find from all the evidence in the case, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the check was so uttered with the intent to obtain money
upon, you should find that he did utter and publish the said check
with an intent to injure or defraud. 12
845. Forging 1 a deed Venue. If you find, and believe from
the evidence, that the deed read in evidence and described in the
information, or any part thereof (not including the acknowledg-
ment of the same), was falsely made, and forged with intent to
cheat and defraud as defined in other instructions, and that the
defendant had possession of the same in S county, Missouri,
and that he made claim to the land therein described, or any part
thereof, by virtue of and under said deed, then these facts con-
stitute evidence that he committed the forgery of the same, or
caused the same to be forged, and that he committed said forgery
in S county and state of Missouri; and unless he explains or
accounts for his possession thereof in a manner consistent with
his innocence, then these facts are sufficient to warrant the jury
in finding him guilty of forgery as charged in the information. 13
" Stockslager v. U. S. 116 Fed. W. 841. (The facts recited in the
(C. C.), 599. instruction standing unexplained
12 Stockslager v. U. S. 116 Fed. raise the presumption that the de-
(C. .C.), 599. fendant forged the deed or caused
is S. v. Payscher (Mo.), 77 S. it to be forged in S county.)
841 GAMING DEFINED CRIMINAL LIBEL. 850
Gaming.
846. Gaming defined. Gaming is an unlawful agreement be-
tween two or more persons to risk money or other property on a
contest or chance of any kind where one will be gainer and the
other loser. 14
847. Betting on game of cards. If you believe from the evi-
dence in this case, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant
played at a game of cards with other persons, for money, in man-
ner and form as charged in the indictment, at or about the time
and place therein stated, under an agreement or understanding
that the winner of the game should take the money put up or
staked by each of them on said game, then you should find the
defendant guilty. 15
848. Betting on game of billiards. The playing of billiards,
pool, or other games played upon a billiard table, when there is
a wager of the money-rent of the table between the parties play-
ing, or when the parties play such game for a wager of chips,
checks, or other things of value, in either case the playing of such
game for such wager is gambling within the meaning of the law. 18
849. Doing forbidden act in a public place. A shop or other
building is the private property of its owner unless he, of his own
volition, so uses it as to give the public a right to enter it at will ;
and every one owning such building may, by himself or agent, in-
vite any number of his neighbors into his house or shop, and such
persons may assemble there pursuant to such invitation, and such
assembling would not make the place a public place in the legal
sense of that term. 17
Criminal Libel.
850. Motives prompting communication. The burden is on
the state to show affirmatively that the communication was made
with malice ; that is to say, not from a sense of duty, but from a
i* Hughes Cr. Law, 2193, cit- ie Hamilton v. S. 75 Ind. 593.
ing: Eubanks v. S. 3 Heisk. IT Lorimer v. S. 76 Ind. 497: S.
(Tenn.), 488; Portis v. S. 27 Ark. v. Tincher, 21 Ind. App. 142, 51 N.
360. E. 943.
is Hughes' Cr. Law, 2193.
851 OTHER SPECIFIC OFFENSES. 842
dishonest motive. If the defendant honestly believed it to be his
duty to make the communication, and did so under a sense of
duty only, he is not guilty. If, on the other hand, his motives
were not good, if the communication was not made for a justi-
fiable end, but from malice, to gratify a feeling of revenge for
supposed injury, then he is not justified, and he should be found
guilty. 18
Perjury.
851. Evidence of one witness not sufficient. The evidence of
one witness as to the falsity of the evidence upon which perjury
is assigned is not sufficient to warrant a conviction. If there is
but one witness testifying directly to the falsity of the evidence
of one charged with perjury, there must be evidence of circum-
stances corroborating such falsifying testimony. There is no rule
by which the exact weight of the corroborating circumstances
requisite to warrant a conviction can be determined ; and the jury
must determine whether such corroborating circumstances are
sufficient to justify a verdict of guilty. It is frequently stated
that such corroborating circumstances must be equivalent to the
positive or direct testimony of a witness. But sueh is not the
rule of law. 19
Public Nuisance.
852. Offensive smells from slaughter house. If the defend-
ant maintained a slaughter house, as charged in the affidavit and
information, and allowed and permitted offal of cattle and other
animals slaughtered there, if any, to there accumulate as alleged
in the information, and noisome and offensive smells were then
and there emitted therefrom, which blended with noisome smells
emanating from another slaughter house and a deposit of filth in
the vicinity of said slaughter house, if any, and rendered the air
impure or unhealthful, to the injury of persons named in the in-
formation, as therein alleged, the defendants would be liable, and
the fact that such other slaughter house and deposit of filth ex-
1$ Haase v. S. 24 Vroom (N. J. Galloway v S. 29 Ind. 442.
L.) 40, 20 Atl. 751.
843 WHAT CONSTITUTES NUISANCE. 855
isted and exhaled such noisome smells, if such is the fact, would
not justify or excuse the wrongful act of the defendants, if prov-
able. 20
853. Nuisance must affect whole community. To make the
defendant's mill-dam and pond a public nuisance and the de-
fendants indictable for maintaining the same, it must inju-
riously affect the public ; that is, must affect the whole community.
The fact that it injuriously affects individuals or families in a
community is not sufficient to make the defendants guilty. They
should be acquitted unless the jury are satisfied the whole com-
munity is so injuriously affected not every family or person in
the community, but the community generally. 21
854. Mill-dam and pond producing offense. If the dam
either directly causes or increases the inundation of the sand,
mud and stagnant water which produces the malaria, or the water
would, if unobstructed, carry off the sand, and the dam so ob-
structs as to prevent it doing so, the defendants would be guilty.
The law will not undertake to apportion the liability for a public
wrong. The question for the jury to decide, applying the prin-
ciples of law, is, does the dam and pond produce the nuisance?
If so, the defendants are guilty, otherwise they should be ac-
quitted. 22
855. Pond producing malaria, odors. The erection of the
dam is not in itself wrongful, nor is the mill-pond in itself a nui-
sance ; if, however, by reason of natural causes, such as decaying
vegetation which has grown or been brought into the pond by
the stream or its natural tributaries, or changes in the topography
of the land adjacent to the creek from the operation of natural
laws, the pond produces, or contributes to the production of
malaria or noxious, unhealthy odors, to that extent which injures
the health or comfort of the community in general, it would
thereby become a nuisance, and the defendants indictable for
maintaining it. 23
20 Dennis v. S. 91 Ind. 292. is indictable. Paragon Paper Co.
21 S. v. Holman, 104 N. Car. 864, v. S. 19 Ind. App. 328.
10 S. E. 758. Under the statutes 22 s. v. Holmani, 104 N. Car. 866.
of Indiana a public nuisance erected 10 S. E. 758.
or maintained "to the injury of any S. v. Holman, 104 N. Car. 866,
part of the citizens of this state" 10 S. E. 758.
856 OTHER SPECIFIC OFFENSES. 844
The defendants are liable only for such results as flow directly,
naturally and proximately from the pond and dam. Therefore, if
you find that the pond and dam are the cause of the nuisance,
you should convict the defendants; but if other causes or agen-
cies, to which the defendants have not contributed, and which did
not arise from their agency, so affected the pond and dam as to
produce the cause of the sickness, then such sickness would be
attributed by law to such agencies, and not to the pond or dam,
and you should acquit the defendants. 24
856. Offense caused by other means. If the evidence should
satisfy the jury that the whole community had been injuriously
affected, yet defendants would not be guilty unless it was further
found from the evidence that such injury was produced, directly
and proximately, by defendants' dam and pond, and by no other
cause. 25
857. Nuisance caused by others, not defendant. If other
persons, not under the control of the defendants, plow or bring
into the pond or the lands adjacent thereto, substances which
decay and produce malaria ; or if such persons cut ditches into the
stream above the pond, thereby bringing sand and mud into the
creek; or if, having cut such ditches, failed to keep them open,
permitting them to become choked and filled up, thereby causing
malaria, such result would be attributed to such persons and
agencies and not to the pond, and defendants should be ac-
quitted. 26
Highway Violations.
858. Public road How established, user, dedication. (1) A
public road may be properly established by user, and if the county
attempted to establish the roacl in question, and the proceedings
were void, yet if the said road, or the part thereof upon which
the bridge was located, was used as a public road, with the
knowledge of the defendant, for the term of ten years just prior
2* S. v. Holman, 104 N. Car, 865, 26 s. v. Hclman, 104 N. Car. 865,
10 S. E. 758. 10 S. E. 758.
.25 s. v. Holman, 104 N. Car. 865,
10 S. E. 758. But see Dennis v. S.
91 Ind. 291, note 20, this chapter.
845 OBSTRUCTING PUBLIC ROADS. 860
to the alleged destruction of said bridge, then the said road was
properly established. 27
(2) You are instructed that there can be no valid dedication to
the public of such right of way as is claimed unless it is proved
that the owner of the land intended a dedication of such way to
the public. 28
(3) The plaintiff is not bound to rely upon the record alone for
the road, but may rely on any facts that may constitute a road,
and the road may exist part by record and part by dedication;
and if Biggs, while he was the owner of' the land through which
the road runs at the point of alleged obstruction, dedicated a por-
tion of the road in question in exchange for a portion of the
laid-out road, of any way laid out, then the portion so dedicated
will be a valid road. 29
859. Vacating public road How.^-The county commission-
ers had no authority to vacate the road in question unless there
was first filed in the proper office the petition required by law,
properly published or posted, and any order they might make
without first filing the petition and the publication or posting
of the required notice would not vacate said road. 30
860. Malicious destruction of bridge on highway. (1) Before
you can convict you must be satisfied from the evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt of the truth of the following propositions : first,
that the bridge in question was a public bridge ; second, that the
road upon which it was placed was a public road at the time of
the alleged destruction ; third, that the said road was properly es-
tablished by the proper legal authorities, or was a public road by
user, and was such public road at the time of the alleged destruc-
tion; fourth, that the defendant willfully and unlawfully and
maliciously did cut and destroy the said bridge with intent to in-
jure the same. 31
(2) If the portion of the road upon which the said bridge alleged
to have been destroyed was placed had not been totally aban-
doned as a road for a period of five years next prior to the de-
struction charged against the defendant, then you may find that
27 O'Dea v. S. 16 Neb. 243, 20 N. so O'Dea v. S. 16 Neb. 243, 20 N.
W. 299. See, Wragg v. Penn. Tn. W. 299.
94 111. 24; Daniels v. P. 21 111. 438, si O'Dea v. S. 16 Neb. 242, 20 N.
several instructions held proper. W. 299.
28 Ross v. Thompson. 78 Ind. 97.
29 Town of Havana v. Biggs, 58
111. 485.
861 OTHEK SPECIFIC OFFENSES. 846
said part of the road was a public road, provided you further find
that the said road was in the original instance properly estab-
lished, or has been in public use for a period of ten years next
prior to the alleged destruction of said bridge. 32
(3) If you shall be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the
portion of the road on which the bridge was placed had been
totally abandoned as a public road for a period of five years next
prior to the establishing and placing thereon the bridge in ques-
tion, then it ceased to be a public road and no conviction can be
had. 33
(4) You may, in endeavoring to learn whether or not the de-
fendant knew the bridge was a public one and located upon a
properly established public road, consider that the defendant re-
ceived damages from the county of W for the land taken to con-
stitute the part of the road upon which the bridge was located. 34
Sunday Violations.
861. Operating machinery on Sunday.' ' The court instructs
the jury that the burden of proof is on the state in this case to
establish beyond a reasonable doubt the fact that the defendant
pumped or operated certain oil well or wells in K, county on a
Sabbath-day within one year prior to the finding of this indict-
ment ; and further, that the burden of proof is on the state to
prove that such pumping or operating was not a work of necessity
or charity." 35
32 O'Dea v. S. 16 Neb. 242, 20 N. 34 Q'Dea v. S. 16 Neb. 243, 20 N.
W. 299. W. 299.
as O'Dea v. S. 16 Neb. 242, 20 N. ss s. v. McBee, 52 W. Va. 260, 43
W. 299. S. E. 121.
CHAPTER LXI.
MISCELLANEOUS INSTRUCTIONS.
Sec. Sec.
CONTRACTS. FENCES.
862. Extending time of payment 869 - Notice of fence viewers to
Evidence. parties interested.
GUARDIAN.
CONVERTING PROPERTY.
870. Estimating value of guar-
863. Damages for property appro- dian's services.
priated.
HANDWRITING, PROVING.
CORPORATIONS. 871. Knowledge from seeing per-
son write.
864. Proving existence of corpora- 72. Comparison of signatures im-
tion by user. proper.
CUSTOMS. HOMESTEAD.
873. Abandonment of homestead.
865. Customs and rules of board
ra e ' SEDUCTION.
874. Exemplary damages proper.
875. Damages for alienation of
on
strength of his own title.
EJECTMENT.
O I'O. JL
T,, . wife's affections.
866. Plaintiff must recover on
EVIDENCE.
SELLING LIQUORS.
876. Residence district What is.
867. Copy, instead of original, used TRESPASS.
as evidence.
877. Damages for trespass.
ESTOPPEL. VERDICT.
868. Disclaiming interest in prop- 878. Separate verdict where several
erty. defendants.
847
862 MISCELLANEOUS INSTRUCTIONS. 848
Contracts.
862. Extending time of payment Evidence. The payment
of interest in advance is not of itself conclusive evidence of a
contract to extend the time of payment for the term for which
interest may have been thus paid, but it is a strong circumstance
to be looked to by the jury in determining the existence of the
contract claimed. 1
Converting property.
863. Damages for property appropriated. The measure of
damages is the value of the logs at the time they were converted
to the defendant's use, without any deduction for labor rendered
or bestowed upon them by the wrongdoer. 2
Corporations.
864. Proving existence of corporation by user. It is not
necessary for the state to prove the articles of association or
charter of the railway company; it is sufficient to prove by
reputation that there was at the time when the crime is alleged
to have been committed a corporation known by that name,
operating such road, and carrying goods, stock and passengers
for hire in its cars running along or upon said company's road.
A de facto existence of the corporation is only necessary to be
shown. 3
Customs.
865. Customs and rules of board of trade. If the jury be-
lieve from the evidence that the plaintiff went upon the board
of trade and made contracts and traded with the members, he
is bound by the rules, regulations and customs of said board the
same as if he had been a member thereof, and in that case will
not be permitted to plead his ignorance of said rules, regula-
tions and customs as a reason for not being bound by them. 4
i Gard v. Neff, 39 Ohio St. 607. s Burke v. S. 34 Ohio St. 79.
2 Everson v. Seller, 105 Ind. 270, * Chicago, P. & P. Co. v. Tilton,
4 N. E. 854. 87 111. 553.
849 EJECTMENT, EVIDENCE. 867
Ejectment.
866. Plaintiff must recover on strength of his own title. (1)
In an action of ejectment the general rule is that the plaintiff must
recover upon the strength of his own title and not upon the
weakness of the defendant's title, for the reason that the defend-
ant is not required to give up possession until the true owner
demands it, and the right to show in defense a subsisting out-
standing title rests upon the same principle. So if the title of
the plaintiff, D, to the three thousand acres of land claimed by
him, became forfeited to the state for any five consecutive years
before bringing this suit, for the non-payment of taxes thereon,
or for the failure of the said D, or any one under whom he claims
to have said lands entered on the land books of any county in
which part thereof is situated where they are located for the
purpose of taxation, then the said plaintiff cannot recover in
this action, and the jury must find for the defendant. 5
(2) Although the jury may believe from the evidence that the
land in controversy is covered by the deeds under which the
plaintiff claims, yet if they further believe from the evidence
that the defendants and those under whom they claim have been
in the honest, peaceable, continuous and adverse possession
of said land, paying taxes on the same, under color of title, for
fifteen years prior to the institution of this suit, they must find
for the defendants. 6
Evidence.
867. Copy instead of original used as evidence. Counsel
for the plaintiff have agreed that the accounts offered in evidence
by the defendant and taken from his books, shall have the
same effect as though the books themselves had been duly proved
and produced in court; but unless the jury believe from the
evidence that the books from which said accounts were taken
were books of original entry, then the same are not evidence in
favor of the defendant on this trial. 7
3 Davis v. Living, 50 W. Va. 432, T Shrewsbury v. Tufts. 41 W. Va.
40 S. B. 365. 217, 23 S. E. 692.
Rensens v. Lawson, 91 Va. 230,
21 S. E. 347.
868 MISCELLANEOUS INSTRUCTIONS. 850
Estoppel.
. 868. Disclaiming interest in property. (1) Where one person
by his acts or declarations made deliberately and with knowl-
edge induces another to believe certain facts to exist, and such
other person rightfully acts on the belief so induced and is
misled thereby, the former is estopped to afterwards set up a
claim based upon facts inconsistent with the facts so relied upon,
to the injury of the person so misled. This definition embraces
all the essential elements of an estoppel. It will be your duty
to examine the evidence and ascertain whether all these elements
are proved in this case. 9
(2) If before P had obtained his deed from G and B for the
land in contest, and before paying for the same, he went to
R and asked him if he had any claim on such land, and he told
him he did not claim any land on the south side of S, and he
was induced to take the deed and pay for said land by reason
of said statement by R, then R is barred from now setting up
claim to said land against P's vendee, the plaintiff. 10
(3) To constitute an equitable estoppel of the rights of the
plaintiffs in this action it must be shown that the plaintiffs were
apprised of each sale to innocent vendees, before it was made,
so that they might have had an opportunity to inform the pur-
chaser of their interest in the property sold. 11
Fences.
869. Notice of fence viewers to parties interested. (1) It was
not necessary that the notice of the fence viewers to plaintiff
and defendant, of the time they would examine the fence, should
have been given for any definite time or number of days before
such examination. The law required due notice to be given.
By the term due* notice, is meant reasonable notice; and the
notice to the defendant was due and reasonable, if after the
9 Pennsylvania Co. v. Platt 47 10 Ratcliff v. Bellfonte Iron
Ohio St. 382, 25 N. B. 1028. Works Co. 87 Ky. 564.
11 Cox v. Matthews, 17 Ind. 367.
851 HAND-WRITING, PROOF OF FENCES. 871
notice was given he had a reasonable time to go from the place
where it was served and be at the examination of the fence at
the time specified in the notice. 12
(2) It was not necessary to entitle the plaintiff to recover that
the certificate of the fence viewers, of the value of the fence, or a
copy thereof, should have been served upon the defendant, or
presented to him before, or at the time of, demand of the sum
certified. 13
Guardian.
870. Estimating value of guardian's services. (1) In deter-
mining the amount you will allow Gr for his services as guardian,
in the event you find for the plaintiff, you should take into
consideration the amount of interest he has charged himself
with, the rate of interest he could reasonably have loaned said
funds at from time to time, and his allowance for services by the
court up to the time of his death. A guardian who loans the
funds of his ward and collects but a small rate of interest
thereon, ought not to have for his services as much compensa-
tion as one who loans and collects for his ward a good rate of
interest. 14
Handwriting, Proving.
871. Knowledge from seeing person write. (1) Although a
witness may testify that he has seen the defendant write, yet
this is not proof of the execution of the instrument of writing
purporting to have been executed by the defendant, unless the
witness is able to distinguish the signature to the instrument as
that of the defendant, according to the belief of the witness
founded on his previous knowledge of the hand-writing of the
defendant. 15
872. Comparison of signatures improper. (1) The proof of
the signature of the defendant to the note in question cannot be
made by comparison with other signatures, but the burden of
12 Tnbbs v. Ogden, 46 Iowa, 137. Richards v. S. 55 Ind. 383.
13 Tubbs v. Ogden, 46 Iowa, 137. Putnam v. Wadley, 40 111. 346.
872 MISCELLANEOUS INSTRUCTIONS. 852
proof of his hand-writing must be made by witnesses who have
seen the defendant write and are familiar with his signature,
or who have seen letters or other documents which the defend-
ant had, in the course of his business, recognized or admitted to
be his own hand-writing. 16
Homestead.
873. Abandonment of homestead. (1) If you believe from
the evidence that the plaintiff abondoned his wife and left her to
shift for herself, and that he failed to support his wife, and that
he voluntariy and without cause left the premises used and
occupied as a homestead, and that he absented himself from
said house and continued said abandonment up to the death of
his said wife, then, and in that event, you will find your verdict in
favor of the defendant. 17
(2) If you believe from the evidence that defendant had aban-
doned the lot in controversy for home use and appropriated it
for other than home purposes, then you will find for the plain-
tiff, unless you believe that at the time of the levy the defendant
had reappropriated said lot for homestead purposes and was
using and occupying the same with the intention of permanently
using and occupying the same as a home, then, in that event,
you will find for defendant. If you believe from the evidence
that defendant had abandoned the lot in controversy for the
purpose of a home, and that at the time of the levy he was using
and occupying it as a sham and pretext to shield it, from his
creditors, then you will find for the plaintiff. 18
Seduction.
874. Exemplary damages proper. If the jury believe from
the evidence that the plaintiff is entitled to recover, and if they
further believe that the plaintiff put his business into the hands
i Putnam v. Wadley, 40 111. 346. " Milburn Wagon Co. v. Kenne-
i? Hector v. Knox, 63 Tex. 615. dy, 75 Tex. 214, 13 S. W. 28.
853 SEDUCTION SELLING LIQUORS. 876
of the defendant when he went to California in the year 1862, and
that the defendant took advantage of his situation- for the pur-
pose of gaining access to and seducing the wife of the plaintiff;
and if the jury further believe from the evidence that the defend-
ant did, under these circumstances, commit adultery with the
wife of the plaintiff, they have a right to give exemplary damages
to the plaintiff not exceeding the amount claimed in the plain-
tiff's declaration. 19
875. Damages for alienation of wife's affections. If you find
for the plaintiff, then, in determining the question of damages,
you may consider what injury, if any, the plaintiff has sustained
to his domestic peace and happiness and alienation of the affec-
tions and the society of his wife, if you believe from the evidence
that such alienation has been proved and wrong inflicted upon the
plaintiff's honor. 20
Setting Liquors.
876. Residence district What is. (1) If a certain part of
the city, large or small, is principally and chiefly used for resi-
dence purposes, families residing and having their homes there-
in, such part of the city would not become a business portion
of the city merely because a grocery or other business was
there carried on therein. The decided preponderance of resi-
dences and families residing therein determines the character
of such portion of such city. 21
.(2) A family residing in a dwelling house as a family residence
may furnish board and lodging to boarders who may occupy with
the family a part of such residence, and such use of a dwelling
house will not change its character from a residence to a busi-
ness house. 22
Trespass.
877. Damages for trespass. If the jury believe from the
evidence that the defendant is guilty of the trespasses, or either
19 Yundt v. Hartrunft, 41 111. 16. 22 Shea v. City of Muncie, 148
20 Ferguson v. Smethers, 70 Ind. Ind. 35, 46 N. B. 138 (ordinance
521. forbidding sale of intoxicating liq-
21 Shea v. City of Muncie, 148 uors in residence district, construed
Ind. .34, 46 N. E. 138. by the court in this case).
877 MISCELLANEOUS INSTRUCTIONS. 854
of them, as charged in the plaintiff's declaration, then the jury
will find for. the plaintiff and assess her damages at such sum
as is shown by the evidence, not exceeding five thousand dol-
ars. 23
Verdict.
878. Separate verdict where several defendants. Although
the defendants are jointly informed against and tried, yet as
to each you should make a separate finding, and if you should
find both or either of them guilty, you should state in your ver-
dict the finding and punishment of each separately. 24
23 Miller v. Balthasser, 78 111. 302. 24 s. v. Peebles (Mo.), 77 S. W.
302. 520.
INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365878 Forms.)
A
ABANDONED,
counts of declaration abandoned, 100.
issues abandoned, 100.
ABANDONMENT,
abandoning homestead, 873.
burden of proof, land, (4) 660.
claim to land abandoned, (3) 660.
insured property, forms, 428.
what is, what not, land, (4) 660.
ABBREVIATIONS,
determining meaning of, 160.
in writings, meaning, 160.
ABSENCE,
evidence wanting, conspiracy, 82.
motive wanting, killing, 264.
no street lights, (3) 591.
of request for instructions, 75, 220, 274, 284, 303.
of counsel, 35.
defendant, 36.
on circumstantial evidence, 303.
ABSENT WITNESS; 200.
See WITNESSES.
statement of, instruction n. 23, 211.
ABSTRACT INSTRUCTIONS,
may be refused though correct, 48.
misleading, when, 48.
too general, special required. 26a.
used to illustrate rules, 48.
ABSTRACT PROPOSITIONS, 48.
ACCEPTANCE,
a question of fact, (3) 407.
ACCESS,
access to premises impaired, (4) 684.
ACCESSORY. See AIDING, ABETTING; PRINCIPAL AND ACCESSORY.
accomplice an accessory, 287.
after the fact, 293.
855
856 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
ACCESSORY Continued.
before the fact, 293.
definition, statutory, 293.
evidence showing, 293.
in assault to kill, 293.
is principal, 764.
mere presence not aiding, 767.
forms, 765, 792.
trial of accessory, 764.
ACCIDENT,
accidental killing, **06.
shooting, defense, 261.
collision with hand car, 648.
defense to murder, 261.
forms of instructions, killing, 806.
railroads, 648, 806.
from natural cause, 581.
trolley wire, (4) 547.
injury from, (5) (6) 545.
no liability, 581.
railroads, 648.
neither party negligent, 648.
no liability for accident, 598, 614.
passenger assisting carrier, 560.
falling from platform, 569.
resulting in injury, 545.
ACCOMPLICE, See AIDING, ABETTING.
an accessory, 287.
assuming, proper when, 291.
testimony true, 291.
as a witness, 287, 376.
caution against, 288, (5) (6) 376.
corroborating another accomplice, 289.
corroboration of, 289.
required, (3) (4) 376.
credibility of, 288.
for jury, (5) 376.
defective instructions, 289.
defined, 287, 290.
evidence conclusive. 291.
if there is evidence of, 290.
if no evidence of accomplice, 290.
in incest, woman consenting, 290.
in larceny, 290.
instructing that witness is, 291.
without request, 290.
instruction assuming, 291.
discretionary, 288.
improper, when, 288, 290, 291.
proper caution, 288.
is witness accomplice, 290.
on material matters, 290.
participant in crime, 287.
proving corpus delicti, n. 18, 289.
degree of crime, n. 6, 288.
receiver of stolen goods, 290.
refusal if no request, 292.
refusing instructions on, 289.
INDEX. 857
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
ACCOMPLICE Continued.
statutory definition of, 290.
requirements, 289.
swearing falsely, 288.
testimony, error when, 288.
uncorroborated, 288, 289, 376.
weighing testimony, of 288.
what is, 287, 290.
wife of accomplice, n. 9, 288.
ACCOUNT,
proving and disproving, 126.
ACCRETIONS,
land along rivers, 668.
meaning of, 668.
owner of accretions, 668.
ACCUSED,
See DEFENDANT.
ACQUIT,
direction, argumentative, 68.
essential fact wanting, 312.
in circumstantial evidence, 312.
material fact unproved, 312.
used for "convict," 78.
ACQUITTAL,
instruction directing, n. 108, 150.
ACT,
circumstances of committing, 279.
clearly negligence, 183.
committed voluntarily, 279.
with deadly weapon, 279.
probable consequence of, 279, 777.
ACTION
barred by limitation. 126.
based on gambling contract, 128.
evidence tending to prove, 130.
for assault and battery, 176.
material facts of, proof, 199.
ACTUAL POSSESSION,
question of law, 163. '
ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS,
See FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS.
presenting after general charge, 14.
ADMISSIONS,
See CONFESSIONS, 318-737.
acting upon with caution, 738.
competent, when, 318.
in civil cases, n. 36, 321.
858 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
ADMISSIONS Continued.
instruction on, improper, 319.
made by deceased, 739.
proving case, no error, 243.
subjeect to imperfection, 738.
ADULTERY,
common law marriage, 834.
evidence after filing complaint, 108.
not within statute of limitation, 108.
instruction on limitation, 108.
living together openly, 833.
occasional acts, no offense, 833.
refusal on limitation, error, 108.
seducing another's wife, 874.
ADVERSE,
claiming land by possession, (3) 658.
possession of land, 656.
ADVICE,
counsel advising, malicious prosecution, 506.
AFFECTIONS,
alienating affections, 875.
AFFIDAVIT,
in attachment, n. 31, 53.
AFFIRMATIVE,
evidence, hearing bell, 204.
negative evidence, 204, 205.
on which party, 163.
AFFIRMATIVE CHARGE,
directing verdict, 120.
AFFIRMATIVE EVIDENCE, 204, 205.
AFFIRMATIVE ISSUES,
burden of proof on, 6.
AGE,
affecting credibility, (9) 365.
care of child, negligence, 600.
difference of, in defense, 118.
element of damages, 649.
death, (7) 650, (2) 652.
female in rape, 82.
immature judgment. 619.
in determining negligence, 619
negligence of boy, 639.
of witness, consideration, 215.
AGENCY.
applied to partners, 459.
company's teller acting, 390.
lorms, 388.
in acts of negligence, 392.
INDEX. 859
(References are to Sections, 1364 Principles, 365878 Forms.)
AGENCY Continued.
in borrowing money, ( 1 ) 389.
in partnership, form, (3) 393.
in renting house, 391.
in selling land, form, (2) 388, 394.
machine, 394.
in signing note, (3) 388.
in soliciting subscriptions, (4, 393.
partners act for each other, 459.
AGENT,
acting for principal, 388, 390.
appropriating proceeds, embezzlement, 820.
borrowing for employer, 389.
for principal "(3) (4) 389.
collecting on commission, embezzlement, 821.
embezzling property, 82u.
exceeding authority, form, 393.
executing notes, form, (3) 388.
fraudulent representations by, (2) 388.
instruction on, misleading, 65.
of banking company, 436.
power of, misleading, 65.
principal adopting act of, 389.
scope of authority, (3) 388, (4) 389.
signing contracts, 388.
waiving principal's rights, 176.
AGGRESSOR,
facts in determining, 801.
AIDING, ABETTING, 765. See ACCESSORY.
acting together. 811.
aiding in burglary, 811.
by woras or gestures, 765.
forms of instructions, 765.
in forgery, 842.
in murder, 785.
instructions on, 293.
for defendant. 785.
mere presence, forms, 792.
is not, (3) 765, 792.
not being present, 326.
overt act necessary, 792.
ALABAMA,
directing verdict, when, n. 15, 123.
ALIBI, See DEFENSE. ,
as a defense, 322, 743.
attempt to prove. 328.
burden of proof. 743.
on defendant, 322, 324, (3) 743.
casting suspicion upon, 325.
caution as to alibi, 745.
comparative weight, 328.
considered with other evidence, 743.
degree of proof of, 323.
860 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
ALIBI Continued.
easily fabricated, 328.
entitled to instruction, 326.
evidence supporting, 326.
failing to prove, 328.
forms of instructions, 743.
high degree of proof, 745.
instructions discrediting, 325.
improper, 323, 328.
proper, 324, 327.
no evidence of, 326.
open to abuse, 328.
preponderance of evidence, 324.
presence of defendant, 322.
raising reasonable doubt, 322, 323, 326, 743, 744.
reasonable doubt on, 322.
request for instruction, 326.
scan with caution, 327.
subjected to scrutiny, 325.
ALIENATION,
alienating wife's affections, 875.
ALLEGATIONS,
stating allegations, 194.
ALTERATION,
alteration in forgery, 841.
ALTERING,
written contract, altering, 471.
AMENDMENTS,
amending instructions, 40.
amending pleadings, 127.
ANIMALS,
attack by dog, 479.
cruelty to animals, 837.
dangerous animals at large. 678.
destroying crops, 676.
injuring person, 478.
killing another, liability, 512.
to preserve crops, 837.
overdriving horse, 838.
shipping cattle, hogs, 589.
trespassing on premises, 512.
ANSWERS,
to be conclusive of rights, 231.
to interrogatories, 231.
APPEAL,
all instructions in record. 359.
exceptions on appeal, 347.
taken after, 352.
in absence of evidence, 361.
legal questions not reeviewable, when, n. 87, 360.
objections, how considered. 10.
oral instructions on, n. 70, 358.
INDEX. 861
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
APPEAL Continued.
party held to position taken in trial court, 363.
review without evidence, 361.
reviewing error on : 346.
rulings reviewable on, 149.
what record must show, 10.
without preserving evidence, 362.
APPEARANCES, See SELF-DEFENSE.
appearances in self-defense, 256, 802.
instruction ignoring, 256.
reasonable doubt, 803.
refusing on. error when, 256.
APPLIANCES,
assuming machinery safe, 622.
safe, forms, 623.
servant presuming safe, 622.
APPROACHING,
approaching railroad crossing, 184.
ARBITRATION,
award void, when, 432.
form of instructions, 432.
settling disputes by, 432.
ARGUMENT,
commenting on argument, n. 201, 117a.
ARGUMENTATIVE,
containing reasons for conclusion, 66, 67.
if relevant, error harmless, 67.
illustrations of, 68.
instructions misleading, confusing, 66.
lengthy recital of facts, 66.
long and verbose, 66.
material error, when. 67.
not necessarily error, 67.
on false swearing, 66.
reciting facts of one side, 66.
relating to expert witness, 66.
stating reasons for conclusion, 66, 67.
two conclusions, suggesting, 68.
verdict, relating to, 66.
whereabouts of defendant, 68.
ARGUMENTS OF COUNSEL,
instructions relating to, 49.
ARKANSAS,
instructions, civil cases, 3.
ARRANGEMENT OF WORDS, 77.
ARREST,
caused maliciously, (4) 504.
officer acting unlawfully. 805.
resisting unlawful arrest, 262, 805.
862 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1364 Principles, 365878 Forms.J
ARREST Cow tinned.
unlawful arrest, forms, 805.
forms, 503, 505.
without authority, killing, 262.
without warrant, 503.
proper, 503, 789.
ASSAULT,
aggravated, definition, 284.
by several, defense, 804.
deadly weapon used, 279, 767.
exemplary damages, 477.
failure to instruct, 268.
forms of instructions, 766.
ignoring defense to, 118.
included in felonious assault, 267.
in rape, 274.
instructions not assuming, 194.
on accessory, 293.
intending to kill, forms, 768.
intent to commit rape, 178, 477, 769.
no evidence of assault, 268.
refusing instructions, error, 267.
simple assault defined, 766.
to commit robbery, 772.
with deadly weapon, 279, 767.
with intent, and bodily injury, 98.
to kill, 88, 268, 277, 768.
to murder, 277.
ASSAULT AND BATTERY,
assessing damages for, 59.
damages, how determined, 59.
defined, 794.
included in graver offense, 267.
in robbery, 772.
instruction as to injury, 176.
whether shaming as to injury, 176.
ASSAULTING,
in self-defense, 474.
not in self-defense, 475.
ASSESSMENT,
listing land for, 690.
ASSETS.
market value, embezzlement, 828.
value of, bank embezzlement, 828.
ASSIGNMENT,
fraudulent, when, 524.
void for fraud, 524.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS,
in court of review, 346.
on instructions in group, 353.
right not waived, 355.
unavailing, when, 353, 359.
INDEX. 863
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms'.)
ASSUMING,
assuming facts, illustrations, 193.
without evidence, 192, 197.
no evidence, 192.
trespass committed, 193.
truth of testimony, accomplice, 291.
when evidence contrary, 192.
controverted facts, error, 195.
damages assumed, 193.
defendant in wrong, 259.
made false statements, 193.
evidence of theft, error, 193.
facts in dispute, improper, 192.
properly assumed, when, 196.
harmless when defect cured, 72.
in criminal cases, 198.
not assuming, illustrations, 194.
not error when, n. 33, 197.
on common knowledge, n. 33, 197.
on disputed fact, 195.
on value of stock killed, error, 196.
permanent injury, 195.
risks of employment, 617.
shooting took place, proper, 188.
stating allegation, not assuming, 194.
suspicious circumstances, 193.
there is evidence when none, 192.
when both sides admit, 197.
when evidence all on one side, 196.
close, 195.
when facts admitted, 197.
witness accomplice, 290.
ASSUMING FACTS, 242, 192.
ATTACHMENT,
affidavit in attachment, n. 31, 53.
directing vrdict in, 127.
ATTESTING,
requirements in attesting wills, 693.
ATTORNEY,
See COUNSEL.
cannot recover, when, 431.
embezzlement by attorney, 822.
value of services of, 430.
B
BAGGAGE,
degree of care, carrier, 585.
forms rf instructions, 585.
limiting liability for, 586.
forms, 586.
lost by carrier, 585.
by railroad 584.
ordinary care, when, 581.
theft of, liability, 585.
value of, assessing, 585.
864 INDEX.
{References are to Sections, 1364 Principles, 365878 Forms.)
BAILMENT, See KOBSE.
abuse of hired horse, (5) 433.
forms of instructions, 433.
hiring horse, 433.
hotel losing property, 435.
injury to property, (2) 433.
liability for conversion, ( 1 ) 433.
money intrusted, liability, 434.
violating contract of, 433.
BANK,
assets and liabilities, embezzlement, 828.
expert testimony, embezzlement, 828.
failure prima facia evidence, 829.
holding one out as agent, 436.
in failing circumstances, when, 825, 828.
knowledge of bank's condition, 825.
officers appropriating deposits, 825.
officer embezzling funds, 240.
president borrowing from, 827.
receiving deposits unlawfully, (2) 826.
value of assets, embezzlement, 828.
BANKER,
embezzling deposits, 825.
receiving deposits by agents, (2) 826.
BANKING,
attempting to defraud, 437.
forms of instructions, 436.
teller's certification of check, 436.
BASED ON EVIDENCE, 94, 98.
on evidence rather than pleadings, 95.
BASED ON PLEADINGS, 97.
BASTARDY,
forms of instructions, 835.
jury determine facts, 835.
BELIEF,
mere belief, no defense, 800.
unsupported by evidence, 256.
well grounded in self-defense, 256.
BELIEVING WITNESS, 221.
See WITNESSES.
BELL.
failure to ring at crossings, 641.
forms, 184, 641.
frightening traveler's team, (8) 641.
ordinance requiring, 644.
ringing at crossings, 641.
at private crossings, (9) 641.
BENEFITS.
common to community, 687.
deducting benefits, damages, 687.
INDEX. 865
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
BETTING,
on game of cards, 847.
BICYCLE,
care in riding, 245.
crossing railway track, 636, 641.
injury to rider, 482.
on road, 480.
while riding. 245.
negligence of rider, (3) 482.
rights of rider, (2) 482.
using on highway, 480.
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS, See RECORD.
preserving all evidence, 361.
all instructions, 358, 359, 361.
court's rulings, 149.
instructions, part of record, 357.
oral instructions, n. 70, 358.
relating to instructions, jury waived, 47.
BILL OF LADING,
in shipment of goods, 587.
prima facie evidence, 587.
BILLIARDS,
betting on game, 848.
BLACKSTONE,
on summing up evidence, 119.
BOARD OF TRADE,
customs and rules, 865.
BOAT,
insurance on, forms, 428, 429.
BOILER,
explosion of, 539.
injury from explosion, 580, (5) 619, (2) 621, 623.
BOND,
inducing sureties to sign, 521.
BOOK ACCOUNTS,
copies as evidence, 867.
BOTH PARTIES,
admitting facts, instruction when, 197.
facts admitted by, 197.
guilty of negligence, (3) (6) 544.
requesting peremptory instruction, 145.
verdict, effect, 146.
BOUNDARY, See MEANDER.
by high-water mark, 667.
line agreed upon, 664.
locating dividing line, 665.
meander line boundary.. 666.
proof of agreement, 664.
BRAKEMAN, See RAILROADS.
assuming risks, (5) 617.
carelessly uncoupling cars, (3) 264.
continuing with knowledge of danger, 619.
866 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1 3C4 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
BRAKEMAN Continued.
fellow servant of engineer, 614.
forms of instructions, 624.
injured coupling cars, (8) 610, 624.
knowing danger, killed, (4) 619.
ladders for, on cars, 639.
not careful, coupling cars, 624.
presumed competent, (5) 617.
railroad carelessly injuring, 624.
BRANDING,
evidence of larceny, 118.
BREACH,
of contract, 296.
of marriage contract, 455.
of warranty, 408.
BREACH OF PEACE,
what constitutes, 788.
BREAKING,
breaking defined, burglary, 808.
lifting a latch, 808.
opening window or door, 808.
removing transom, 808.
turning a key, 808.
BRIDGE
construction of, (4) 545.
dangerous condition, (4) 545.
falling causing injury, 601.
in city, repairing, 601.
in highway, falling, 601.
indictment for destroying, 860.
insecurely erected, damages, 675.
keeping in repair, 482, 601.
malicious destruction of. 860.
private persons controlling, 601.
riding bicycle on, 482.
washing out, injuring dam, 675.
BROKER,
burden of proof, 442.
buying wheat, form, 440.
cannot . recover, when, 440.
commission earned, when, 438.
complying with contract, (5) (6) 438.
entitled to commission, when, 438, 439.
facts essential to commission, (4) 439.
failing to comply with contract, 440.
interest on balances, 443.
notice, element of contract, 441.
securing purchaser, 439.
.selling land, 438, (2) 439.
BUILDING,
contractor entitled to recover, 444.
contracts for, 444.
dangerous roof, (9-16) 544.
original contract abandoned, 445.
wilfully abandoning contract, 445.
INDEX. 867
(References are to Sections, 1364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
BUILDING CONTRACT,
erroneous instruction cured, 239.
forms of instructions on, 444, 445.
BURDEN,
all averments, form, (3) (4) (5) 383.
burden on plaintiff, 616.
by preponderance, (1) (4) 382, (2) 383. 531.
contributory negligence, 633.
disproving ordinary care, (2) 631.
does not shift, n. 2, 199.
forms of instruction on, 531.
from either side, (3) 583.
in proving warranty, 408.
in will contest, 696.
insanity, criminal, 201.
instructions properly refused, 191.
negligence, 633.
of proof, form, 382, 384.
' on defendant, form, (2) (4) (6) 384.
note, (5) 415.
when, 199, 202, (2) 410. (17) 415, 531, 548.
on free from fault, 258.
on mitigating circumstances, 782.
on party affirming, 199.
on payment, form, (6) 384.
on plaintiff, brokerage, 442.
negligence, 383, 385, 633, 616.
when. 383, 410, 531.
on wrong party, error, 199.
harmless, 199.
proving warranty, (1) 410.
refusal of instructions, error, 199.
requests on, essential, 199.
slight preponderance sufficient, (5) 382.
when facts conclusively shown, 199.
BURDEN OF PROOF, 199.
defective instruction, harmless, when, 72.
failure to instruct on. 6.
further instructions on, 6.
instructions on, 6.
not requested, 6.
on affirmative issues, 6.
preponderance of evidence, n. 32, 200.
request for instruction, 6.
BURGLARY, See LARCENY
aiding, acting together, 811.
breaking defined, 808.
burglars killing, 785.
burglary and larceny, 810.
evidence of, 812.
forms of instructions, 808, 810.
submitting facts. 813.
intent, how shown, 809.
joined with larceny, 810.
868 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
BURGLARY Con tinned.
night time, failure to define, 75.
possession, a circumstance, 2G6.
of goods, proof, 265a.
of stolen property, 812.
BURNING,
railroads burning property, 645.
BUSINESS,
See OCCUPATION.
element of damages, (3) 652.
injured by nuisance, 679.
BY-LAWS,
construction of, 155.
legality of law, 163.
CALIFORNIA,
instructions in criminal case, 165.
CAR, See TRAIN.
brakeman coupling, injured, 624.
gripman must stop, 644.
look and listen, (3) 634.
overcrowded, care when, 184.
CARDS,
betting on game, 847.
CARE, See CARRIERS, ORDINARY CARE, RAILROADS.
age of plaintiff considered, 600.
an issue, instructions ignoring, 92.
approaching railroad crossing. 627.
circumstances in determining, 608.
defective instruction on, cured. 72.
degree of care required, 532.
master for servant, 610.
disproving ordinary care, burden, (2) 631.
due care required, 594.
extraordinary care required, 532.
not required, (4) 610.
great care running trains, 630, 631.
high degree, carriers, 549, 563.
required, 549, 563.
highest degree required, (2) 549, 581.
in conducting a race, 532.
in driving vehicle, 533.
in furnishing gas, 532.
in observing danger, 618.
in operating machinery, 534.
trains, 648.
in personal injury, instructions, 92.
in preventing damage, (4) 676.
in traveling streets, 600.
in using electricity, 546.
master for servant, 610.
may be inferred, 535.
INDEX. 869
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.}
CARE Continued.
of defendant, degree, 532.
of injured party, 535.
of passenger, degree, 184.
omitting, "due care," error, 245.
on riding wheel, 245.
ordinary care, 529, 534.
defined, 530, 558, 599.
exercising, 184.
required, 532, 551, 610, 627.
passenger's care, 184, 551.
passing over sidewalk. 592.
question of fact, (3) 594.
reasonable care defined, 629.
required in riding, 600.
of infant, 536.
of passenger, 184, 551.
road commissioners, 601.
toward children, 537.
toward a trespasser,
trains in city, (3) 630.
traveling streets, circumstances, 608.
when car overcrowded, 184.
CARELESSLY,
definition unnecessary, 75.
CARELESSNESS,
defined, 529.
CARRIERS,
See RAILROADS.
accidental, injury to passenger, 581.
approaches to station, 567.
boiler explosion injuring passenger, 580.
burden of proof, 583.
on defendant, when. 548.
care in operating cars, ( 12 ) 549.
of passenger, 184, 551.
carrying live stock, 589.
sick person, 552.
children trespassing, 559.
delay in delivering good, 587.
directions to passengers, 577.
drunkenness, forms, 55.
duty to passenger, 584.
to stop, 564.
toward children. 559.
ejecting trespasser, 557, 558.
failing to light station. (2) 563.
to stop train, 561, 564.
freight rate under statute, 590.
getting off moving train. 561.
high degree of care, 549.
highest degree care, (6) 549.
injury to passenger. 563.
to postal clerk, 554.
trespasser, 558.
870 INPEX.
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
CARRIERS Continued.
instructions, on liability for baggage, 586.
letting passenger off, (7) 551, 565.
liability for baggage, 586.
to passenger, (1) 549.
liable for servant's acts, (8) 549.
limiting liability for baggage, 586.
losing baggage, liability, 585.
goods, liability, 585, 587.
forms, 587.
misusing child trespasser, 559.
negligence of carrier, 548.
of passenger, 562, 582.
not insurer of passenger, 549, 584.
not liable, when, 588.
obstructions on platform, 563.
passenger assisting, 560.
following directions, 567.
injury to, 548.
negligent, 568.
on freight car, 555.
on wrong train, 576.
platform unsafe, 563, 566.
putting disorderly passenger off, 575.
passenger off, 556, 574.
receiving passengers, (14) 549.
where, (15) 549.
riding on car platform, 570.
right of way, (6) 551.
rotten ties, (16) 549.
servant injuring passenger, (8) 549.
several carriers, liability, 585.
slight negligence, liable, 549, 550.
stages, coaches, 550.
starting cars suddenly, 548, 562, 563, 565, 567.
stopping at station, 563.
taking on passengers, (14) 549.
time to get off, 565.
trainmen assisting passenger, 571.
trains of different roads, 579.
trespasser on train, (5) 549.
or passenger, 558.
using horse cars, ( 13 ) 549
what plaintiff must prove, 583.
CATTLE,
See Cows, ANIMALS.
breaking fences, 678.
damages for failure to deliver, 400.
for killing, 646.
from disease, 513.
in shipping, 193.
destroying corn, liability, 676.
grass damaged by, 677.
guards at crossings, 646.
killed by railroad. 646.
larceny of. branding. 118.
shipping, 589.
INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
CAUSE,
remanded, 364.
CAUTION,
against convicting innocent person, 32.
in grave criminal cases, 707.
in weighing testimony, 207, 288.
CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTIONS, 49, 379.
against accomplice witnesses, 288.
against convicting innocent, 52.
on slight evidence, 52.
against court's opinions, 51.
caution as to excluded evidence, 84.
discretionary with court, 4!?.
"great caution," denning, 288.
in criminal cases, 52, 707.
on confessions, 319.
on examining evidence, 49.
on feigning insanity, 333.
on matters not raised, 50.
on relatives as witnesses, 225.
on self-defense, 52.
on wife as witness, 225.
on witness' credibility, 50.
properly refused, when, 50.
propriety in giving, 49.
purpose of giving, 49.
qualifying other instructions, 51.
refusing when no evidence, 50.
relating to evidence, 49.
restricting jury to evidence, 51.
when several defendants, 52.
CERTIFICATE,
fence viewer's certificate, (2) 869.
void, on sale "f land for taxes, 689.
CHARACTER,
See GOOD CHARACTER, 340.
a circumstance, 756.
consider when impeached, 221.
creating reasonable doubt, 757.
deceased's character, 807.
defendant's good character, 340.
for honesty, integrity, 756.
forms for prosecution, 756.
good character, 756.
unavailing, 756.
instructions for defense, 757.
for prosecution, 756.
on, 221.
limiting effect of evidence, n. 27. 345.
presumed good, 758.
witness' character, 208, 220.
impeached, 221.
872 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
CHARGING JURY,
See INSTRUCTIONS, REQUESTS.
court's manner, tone of voice, 46.
in abstract propositions, 48.
in writing and orally, 11.
oral summary of evidence, 11.
reading statutes, 11.
time of presenting request, 14.
waiving time of, 12.
CHATTEL MORTGAGE, 461. See MORTGAGE.
rights under, 461.
CHECK.
uttering forged check, 843, 844.
CHILD,
See CHILDREN, INFANT.
care of, age considered, 606, 619.
CHILDREN, See INFANT, MINOR.
as witnesses, 225.
competency as witnesses, 225.
credibility as witnesses, 225.
getting on cars, 559.
gripman must watch, 644.
intelligence, as witnesses, 225.
parents liable for support, 448.
railroad killing parent, (2) 649.
trespassers, 559.
wife supporting, 448.
CIRCUMSTANCES,
See ESSENTIAL FACTS, FACTS.
chain of facts, proof, 312.
consistent with guilt, 310.
defendant failing to testify, 229.
drawing inferences from, 308.
excluding rational conclusion, 310.
immaterial facts, 311.
inconsistent with each other, 310.
indispensable facts, 311.
inferring fact from, 308, 309.
possession stolen property, 266.
weight determined by jury, 182
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, 729.
absolute certainty, improper, 315.
accounting for facts. 309.
"all is circumstantial," improper, n. 17, 305.
applies in civil cases, n. 1, 303.
circumstances incompatible with innocence, (5) 730.
must be conclusive, 731.
must be consistent. 731.
comment on weight, 305.
comparative weight, instructions, 305.
INDEX. 873
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE Continued.
competency of, 729.
complete charge on, n. 61, 313.
conclusiveness of, (4) 729.
consistent with guilt, 731.
conviction based upon, 734.
degree of proof, 734.
direct and circumstantial, 304.
drawing inferences, 308.
duty of court without request, 303.
each fact, degree of proof, 734.
"each link" in chain, 733.
entirely circumstantial, 303.
enumerating facts, effect, 309.
excluding reasonable hypothesis, 303, 307, 313, 729, 730.
facts consistent, 310.
forms of instructions, 729.
illustrations, erroneous, 306, 315.
illustrations, proper, 307.
inconsistent with rational theory, 732.
in determining negligence, 639.
inferences from circumstances, (4) 729.
inferring main fact, 309.
in larceny case, 304.
in proving conspiracy, 760.
instructions discretionary, when, 304.
excluding other persons, 314.
explaining proper, 305.
improper, 315.
may be refused, when, 304.
on, improper, 306, 309.
proper, 303, 312, 314.
properly modified, n. 68, 315.
properly refused, 304.
on weight improper, 305.
when eyewitnesses, 304.
insufficiency of facts, 309.
legal and competent, 303.
"links in chain" condemned, n. 52, 312.
main fact, proof of. 312.
material facts, consistency, 311.
must exclude reasonable theory of innocence, 730.
of included offenses, 270.
omission of "reasonable." 313.
opposing conclusions, 315.
possession of fruits of robbery. 729.
prejudice against, 303.
refusal on, error when, 303, 304.
request on unnecessary, 303.
restricting to material facts, 311.
special instruction on, 26.
strength of, improper, 306.
subsidiary facts not within rule, 735.
sufficiency of, 303.
suspicions not evidence. 736.
two opposing conclusions, 315.
will support instructions, 87.
874 INDEX
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
CITY,
absence of lights, (3) 591.
allowing claims against, 609.
care as to crossings, 597.
of plaintiff, 594.
chargeable with knowledge, 597.
controlling bridge, 601.
forms of instructions, negligence, 591.
grade of streets improper, 602.
ice on sidewalks, 603.
issuing building permits, 605.
keeping lights at night, 591.
sidewalks in repair, (6) (7) (10) 591.
maintaining drains, 600.
must take notice, when, 597.
negligence of, streets, 606.
notice of danger, 595.
not liable, bridge, 601.
when, 593, (3) 595.
plaintiff knowing danger, 593, 594.
negligence, 594.
recovery against, when, (5) (6) (10) 591.
repair of sidewalks, 591.
CLAIM,
abandonment of, land, (3) 660.
barred by statute, 465.
based on void patent, ( 1 ) 405.
claims against city, 609.
disputed claims, 404, 405.
defense against, 118.
to part of, 118.
mode of allowing, 609.
payment on account, 467.
promise reviving claim, 466.
reviving when barred, 465.
stating admitted, when denied, 195.
without consideration, 405.
CLAUSES,
See WORDS, 28.
COERCING,
compelling jury to agree, 188.
COLLECTOR.
defrauding tax cpllector, 832.
COLLISION,
care to avoid, 648.
COLOR,
of title to land, 663.
question of law, 163.
COMBAT,
See MUTUAL COMBAT.
INDEX,. 875
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
COMMENT,
relating to fraud, improper, 177.
stating act is negligence, proper, 190.
COMMENT ON,
alibi, improper, 328.
argument improper, n. 201, 117a.
circumstantial evidence, 305.
evidence, held not, 173.
commenting on confession, 217.
on evidence, 189.
failure to produce evidence, 222.
when witnesses contradict, 212.
interested, 209.
COMMERCE COMMISSION,
tariff rates of, 590.
COMMISSION,
agent collecting on, embezzlement. 821.
selling on, 394.
broker entitled to, when, 438.
entitled to, when, form, 439.
facts essential to entitle, (4) 439
for selling land, 438.
rate in determining, 438.
COMMISSIONERS,
road commissioners, 601.
vacated by,
COMMON KNOWLEDGE,
instructions on discretionary, 107.
COMMON LABORER,
definition of, unnecessary, 76.
COMMON LAW,
court expressing opinion on evidence, 171.
instruction referring to, n. 2, 284.
COMMON SENSE,
instructing on improper, 154.
COMPENSATION,
for killing kindred, (4) 649.
measured by risks assumed, 617.
COMPETENCY,
competency of dying declarations, 180.
confession, court decides, 318.
evidence, court decides, 174.
witness, court determines, n. 4, 206.
COMPLAINT,
See DECLARATION.
COMPROMISE,
procuring by fraud, 524.
876 I^DEX.
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 S78 Forms.)
CONCEALING,
failure to produce evidence, 222.
CONCLUSIONS,
facts for jury, 181.
opposing conclusions, 315.
CONDEMNATION, 683.
benefits deducted, 687.
fair cash value, 686.
forms of instructions, 683.
highest and best use, 683.
market value, (4) 683.
measure of damages, 683, 685.
railroad taking land, 685.
witnesses magnifying value, 688.
CONDUCT,
witness' conduct, 206.
CONDUCTOR,
at fault running train, 617.
mistake taking ticket, 573.
running train rapidly, 617.
CONFESSIONS,
admitted with caution, 738.
alone insufficient, 320.
believing or disbelieving, 316.
by slightest menace or threat, 318.
caution against, proper, 319.
cautionary instructions on, 319.
circumstances of making, 316.
competency, if voluntary, 318.
for jury, when, 318.
of generally, 112.
considerations in weighing, 316.
considered same as other evidence, 737.
corpus delicti, proof, 320.
corroboration, 320.
credibility for jury, 319.
evidence conflicting, 318.
wanting, 321.
forms of instructions, 737.
freely and voluntarily made, 319.
if not improbable, 738.
induced by threat or promise, 318.
instruction on, proper, 112.
improper, when, 317, 318, 321.
intimating opinion on, 317.
jury believing or rejecting, 737.
part, 737.
misunderstanding of, 317.
no evidence of confession, 321.
not disputed or challenged, 318.
of one of several defendants. 112.
refusing instructions, error, 318.
regarding or disregarding, 318.
INDEX. 877
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
CONFESSIONS Continued.
through fear, 318.
voluntarily made, weight, 317.
whether voluntary, 318.
whole of the confession, ( 2 ) 738.
weight of for jury, 316.
withdrawing evidence of, 318.
CONFLICT,
abandoned, 259.
CONFINING,
confining to defense alleged, 96.
evidence, 105.
CONFLICTING,
evidence conflicting, instructions, when, 6.2.
reconciling conflicting testimony, 213, 365.
CONJECTURE,
caution against, (6) 379.
CONNECTICUT,
jury judges criminal law, 167.
CONSCIENTIOUS BELIEF,
belief of defendant's guilt, 296.
CONSENT,
consent to sexual intercourse, 770.
question of fact, rape, 771.
CONSIDERATION.
for note, form, (10) 416.
note given without, (1) 405.
insufficient, (4) 404.
sufficient, when, 404.
CONSIDERATIONS,
in assessing damages, condemnation, (4) 685.
determining market value, 685.
mental state, 701.
negligence, 176, 639.
validity of will. 703.
estimating damages, 81, 652.
death, (1) (8) 649.
guardian's services, 870.
in mitigation of damages, 654.
in settling disputed claim, 404.
in weighing testimony, 204. 215, 216, 227, (2) (5) (6) (8) (9) 365,
(6) 366.
probability or improbability, 215.
CONSISTENCY,
instructions proper, 314.
of circumstances, 310, 311.
material facts, 310, 311.
CONSPIRACY,
absence of, in murder, 792.
agreement to commit murder. 761.
to commit robbery, 762.
all responsible, when, 761.
declarations, evidence against all, 763.
878 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.}
Continued.
defined, 759.
evidence circumstantial, 760.
formal agreement unnecessary, 760.
in larceny case, 88.
instructions, when evidence slight, 88.
instructing without evidence, 82.
pursuing common design. 760.
slight evidence of conspiracy, 88.
CONSTABLES.
arresting without a warrant, 788.
CONSTITUTION,
legality of, law, 163.
See STATUTE.
CONSTRUCTION,
construed as a whole, 70.
cures defects, how, 71.
instructions as a whole, 238.
considered together, 72.
of both parties, 71.
wills construed, 158.
writings, construction of, 156.
written instruments construed, 155.
CONTESTANTS,
must prove facts, wills, (5) 704.
CONTRACT, See ORAL CONTRACT.
abandoned before completion, 399.
agent selling machine, 395.
altering written by oral, 471.
arbitration of, 432.
attorney's services, 430.
avoiding for duress, 527.
bailment, 433.
between husband and wife, 523.
breach by discharging servant, (2) 391, 397.
breach of, recovery, (2) 396.
building contracts, 444, 445.
buying through broker, 440.
by compulsion, 526.
correspondence, 156, 470.
correspondence, construction, 156.
insane person, void, 403.
completed by party, 396.
damages for breach, 397, 398, 400.
extending time of payment, 862.
failure to complete, damages, (3) 397, 399.
to perform, (3) 397.
for making road, (2) 397.
forms of instructions on, ( 1 ) 396.
gambling contracts, 528.
instruction on breach, form, 398.
in writing, construction of. 156.
joint or several liability, 401.
INDEX. 879
(References are to Sections, 1364 Principles, 365878 Forms.)
CONTRACT Continued.
made by minor, 451.
may recover on, when, 396.
meaning of contract, 156.
not signed, binding, 472.
on constructing road, 397.
on different matters, 430.
preventing completion of, 396.
promissory notes, forms, 415.
recovery on, form 396.
relating to insurance, 420.
rescinding for defects, 402, 413.
instruction on, 402.
sale by sample, ( 1 ) 407.
of personal property, 406.
settling disputed claims, 404.
signed by agent, form, 388.
subscription contract, 462.
terms of, for court to determine, 156.
time of performing, n. 26, 405.
to build railroad, (1) 396.
defeat creditors, void, 517.
make road (2) 399.
void when, 517, 526.
waiving rights in, (5) 406, (2) 413, 469.
warranty of, broken. 239.
what constitutes, for court, 156.
whether entire, for court, 156.
with brokers, 438.
CONTRACTOR,
complying with contract, 444.
CONTRADICTORY,
contradictory on vital point, 248.
error not available, 248.
immaterial, when, 248.
incurable, 247.
instructions contradictory, when, 246.
differing widely, 248.
on intent, 279.
self-contradictory, 249.
jury following correct instruction, 248.
self-contradictory instruction, illustration, 249.
CONTRIBUTED,
definition unnecessary, 75.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE,
a defense, 118.
both parties negligent, 636.
burden of proof, 633.
on whom, (3) 583.
considerations in determining, (3) 594, 639.
deceased guilty of, 635.
defense, when, (4) 582.
defined, 632.
eliminated or ignored, 245.
facts constituting, 635.
880 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1364 Principles, 365878 Forms.)
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE Con tinned.
fact for jury, 639.
forms of instructions, 543, 582, 632, 635.
harmless error, instruction, 239.
in operating machine, 619.
instructions for defendant, 639.
ignoring, 118.
improper, 199.
negligence of servant, 611.
no defense, when, 581.
not in issue, 94.
parent toward child, (5) (6) (7) 536.
passenger guilty of, 582.
plaintiff's negligence, 543, 544, 594, 634.
prevents recovery, 635.
what constitutes, (3) 543.
is not, (2) (4) 543.
CONVERTING PROPERTY, 863.
CONVICT,
See ACQUIT, 78.
CONVICTION,
beyond reasonable doubt, 296.
corroboration required, 289.
degree of proof required, 313, 790.
jurors' convictions, 708.
of included offense, 252.
of manslaughter, effect, 100.
on accomplice testimony, 288.
on circumstantial evidence, 310. 734.
on confession insufficient, 320.
proof of essential facts, 311.
COOL, SEDATE,
definition unnecessary, 75.
COOLING TIME, 254.
question law, when, 254.
COPYING,
instructions from books, 286.
CORPORATION,
de facto existence, 864.
increasing stock illegally, 463.
proving by user, 864.
CORPUS DELICTI,
proof of, 320.
by accomplice, n. 18, 289.
CORRESPONDENCE,
constituting contract, 470.
contracting by correspondence, 156.
meaning of correspondence, ' 156.
INDEX. 881
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forma.)
CORROBORATION,
accomplice corroborating another, 289.
affecting credibility, (9) 365.
corroboration of witness, 209, 221, 365.
of female in rape, 82.
required by statute, 289.
should be defined, 289.
COUNSEL, See ATTORNEY.
absence of counsel, 35.
instructing in absence of, 35.
stating the law, form, 380.
COUNTS, See DECLARATION.
alleging different theories, 102.
counts abandoned, 100.
disregarding if faulty, n. 42, 54.
evidence supporting count, 130.
information of several counts, 98.
instructions limited to, 98.
when several counts, 98.
no evidence on some counts, 98.
on contract and tort, 98.
several sales of liquor, 98.
COUNTY,
liable to physician, when, 464.
COURT.
belittling the law, 154.
cannot express opinion, 119.
coercing jury to agree, 187.
commenting on evidence, 119.
construes foreign law, when, 162.
writings, 381.
calling witnesses, n. 214.
determines law, 153, 380, 711.
of review, 346.
criticising the law, 154.
determines competency of witness, n. 4, 206.
criminal law, when, 165, 711.
facts, when, 145 146.
material allegations. 53, 155.
validity of laws, 161.
directing jurors to agree, 148.
directs verdicts, when, 120.
duty to instruct, when, 118.
expressing opinion, proper, 189.
influencing amount damages, 185.
jury. 185.
instructing on its motion, 3, n. 14, n. 54, 199, 234, 286.
instructs in all cases, 153.
instructions in criminal cases, 709, 710.
without request. 292.
interprets written instruments, 156.
intimating inference, improper, 181.
opinion, 175.
opinion on witness, 208.
882 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
COURT Continued,
making remarks, 154.
misstating evidencee, correcting, n. 11, 347.
must instruct in criminal cases, 165.
no conscience in case, improper, 185.
plaintiff made better case, 185.
stating what witness said, n. 119, 191.
suggesting compromise verdict, 186.
trial without jury, 40.
urging jury to agree, 186.
instructing in criminal cases, 167, 168, 169.
COWS,
See CATTLE, 646.
injured by negligence, 646.
railroad killing, (3) 646.
CREDIBILITY,
age of witness affecting, (9) 365.
credibility of accomplice, 288.
dying declarations, 180.
instruction improper, 221.
witness' credibility, 206, 207, 208, 215, 216, 365.
considerations 216.
determining, 365.
probability of story, (3) 385.
repeating on witness' credibility, 24.
swearing falsely, 221.
CREDITORS,
fraud in settling with, 524.
hindering, defeating, 517, 518.
husband and wife defeating, 523.
CRIME, See CRIMINAL OFFENSES.
defendant presumed innocent, 714.
elements of, proof, 296.
maliciously charged with, ( 1 ) 507.
no motive for committing, 781.
shown without motive, 781.
CRIMINAL INTENT. 279. See INTENT.
instructions on, proper, 280.
CRIMINAL OFFENSE,
definition omitting element, 276.
departing from statutory definition, 275.
erroneous definition incurable, 276.
instruction stating elements of, 277.
omission in defining, 276.
omitting intent in defining, 276.
statutory definition of, 275.
CRIMINAL LAW, 251. See DEFENSES.
accomplices as witnesses, 287.
accomplice, corroboration, 289.
adultery, what is not, 833.
INDEX. 883
(References are to Sections, 1364 Principles, 365878 Forms.)
CRIMINAL LAW Continued.
agreement in conspiracy, 760.
aiding, abetting, in burglary, 811.
alibi, defense, 322.
appropriating lost goods, 817.
arrest unlawful, 262.
assault to rape, 769.
with weapon, 767.
attorney appropriating money, 822.
bare fear, self-defense, 799.
bastardy, instructions on, 835.
belief as to danger, 256.
breaking denned, burglary, 808.
burden of proof, 201.
burglars killing, 785.
burglary and larceny, 265a.
joined, 810.
cautionary instructions, 52, 707.
caution in grave cases, 707.
character of defendant, 340.
circumstances, consistency of, 310.
circumstantial evidence, 88, 303.
claiming right in property, 818.
confessions, admissions, 316.
conspiracy denned, 759.
cooling time, homicide, 254.
court assuming facts, 198.
determines law, 165.
intimating opinions, 178, 179.
criminal intent, 279.
cruelty to animals, 837.
danger apparent, self-defense, 802.
deadly weapon denned, 278.
deceased's bad character, 807.
declarations, evidence, 763.
declining further struggle, 798.
defendant abandoning conflict, 259.
a witness, 226, 227.
failure to testify, 229.
presumed innocent, 713.
defendant's unsworn statement, 228.
defense to embezzlement, 824.
to larceny, 818.
definitions of offenses, 275.
degree of homicide, 251, 252, 253.
of murder doubtful, 783.
of proof, 201.
deliberation in murder, 780.
detectives, informers, 224.
determined by court, when, 711.
different offenses joined, 810.
directing verdict, 150.
disorderly house defined, 839.
drunkenness disproving intent, 281.
instructions, 779.
duty of jury, 707.
to retreat, murder, 260.
dying declarations, 180.
884 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1364 Principles, 365878 Forms.)
CRIMINAL LAW Continued.
embezzlement, agent appropriating, 821.
denned, 820.
errors cured, 240.
evidence close, conflicting, 250.
in larceny, 816.
in perjury, 851.
supporting instructions, 82.
exceptions to instructions, 346.
facts in burglary, 813.
false pretense defined, 830.
finding lost goods (intent), 817.
force essential in robbery, 772.
forms of instructions, 707.
forgery defined, 840.
further instructions given, 36.
gaming defined, 846.
grouping instructions into one series, 73.
included offenses, 267.
in Illinois, 709.
in Indiana, 710.
in Iowa, 712.
in Ohio, 711.
insanity defined, 329.
instructions as to highways, 858.
for murder, 773.
on burglary, 808.
referring to indictment, 55.
intent in burglary, 809.
in embezzlement, 824.
in larceny, -815.
presumed, when, 777.
jurors receive law from court, 709.
jury determine law, when, 166.
judges of, 709, 710.
justifiable homicide defined, 795.
killing in self-defense, 805.
officer while arresting, 788.
trespasser, 263.
larceny defined, 814.
lying in wait, 784.
malice aforethought, 282.
malice defined, 776.
manslaughter defined, 794.
mere belief of danger, 800.
threats no defense, 801.
motive for crime. 264, 781.
in libel, 850.
murder defined, 773.
presumed, when, 782.
mutual combat, 265.
officer wrongfully killing, 787.
peremptory for defendant, 151. ,
peremptory instructions, 150.
possession, evidence of guilt, 816.
of stolen goods, 811, 812.
presumption of innocence, 336.
INDEX. 885
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms J
CRIMINAL LAW Continued.
prima facie evidence, 816.
principal and accessory, 293.
provoking difficulty, 258.
public nuisances, 852.
reasonable doubt, 294.
forms, 716.
relatives as witnesses, 225.
repeating instructions, 20.
request for instructions, 9.
robbery defined, 772.
self-defense, homicide, 255.
unavailing, when, 797.
to murder, 798.
selling intoxicating liquors, 876.
simple assault defined, 766.
singling out facts, 115.
witnesses, 223.
slight evidence, 88, 89.
statute of limitation, 108.
statutory inst- % uctions. 284.
Sunday violations, 861.
threats of deceased, 257.
value in larceny, 819.
variance, 261.
verdict when several defendants, 878.
voluntary confessions, 319.
with intent to kill, 768.
wound neglected, 791.
CROPS,
damage by hogs, (4) (5) 646.
damaged, owner negligent, 676.
destruction by animals, 646, 676.
water, 674.
injury to, damages, 677.
instructions, 678.
CROSSING,
See RAILROADS.
bicyclist crossing track, 641.
care on approaching, 627.
careless in approaching, 627. (2) 629.
crossing railroad, forms. 627.
embankment Obstructing view, 628.
extra dangerous, care, (4) 631.
flagman at crossing, 643.
gong at crossing, (8) 629.
look and listen, 627, (6) 629, (5) 633, (4) 636, (9) 639.
presuming traveler cautious, (5) (6) 640.
private crossings, (9) 641.
railroad at fault, 641.
violating ordinance. 644.
safety required at, (6) 630.
sounding whistle, bell, 641.
unsafe condition of. 597,. (6) 630.
view obstructed, 628.
warning at crossings, (5) 641.
886 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
CULVERTS,
construction of culverts, 674.
CURING ERROR, See ERROR, HARMLESS ERROR.
by opponents instructions, 239.
by other instructions, 242.
by withdrawing evidence, 84.
construing instructions together, 64, 84, 235, 236, 237, 238.
correct curing erroneous, 246.
damages, instruction on, 239.
defective definition incurable, 276.
how oy other instructions, 246.
in circumstantial evidence, 310, 313.
in criminal cases, 240.
incurable if contradictory, 247.
when, 118, 247, 360.
in embezzlement, 240.
instructions as whole, 239.
on damages, 241.
not cured, when, 118, 177, 208.
on burden of proof, 239.
on reasonable doubt, 312.
presumed cured, when, 360.
reading instructions together, 239.
remittitur failing to cure, n. 62, 246.
warranty broken, value, 239.
when not cured, 60.
CUSTOM,
general custom, meaning, 655.
in using pathway, (2) 655.
relating to railroads, 655.
rules of board of trade, 865.
D
DAM,
injury to, 675.
DAMAGES.
age and element, 649.
age considered, injury, 653.
allowing greater than claimed, 106.
more than proven, 106.
remote damages, 57.
amount, estimating, fc
forms, 607.
arising from plaintiff's fault, 58.
assessed by jury, 145.
for assault, improper, 193.
for breach of warranty, (4) 411.
in trespass, 59.
assuming damages, 193.
based on market value, 684.
breach of marriage contract, 457.
bodily pain an element, 652.
by animals, 676.
by changing water, flow. 647.
by excavations, 670.
INDEX. 887
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
DAMAGES Continued.
by nuisance, 679.
by obstructing water, 602.
by tenant, 453.
care in preventing, 676.
caused by accident, (5) 474.
change of grade causing, 671. ,
confined to evidence rather than pleadings, 95.
to issues, 97.
to negligence alleged, 94.
jury to evidence, 106.
considerations in assessing, 106, 476.
in assessing, city, 607.
considerations in estimating, 58, (2) (8) 649, 652, 653.
in estimating, assault 193.
in estimating death, (9) (10) (11) 650.
in mitigation, 654.
damages to premises, (2) 685.
distress of mind, 652.
earnings during life, 81.
estimating on breach of contract, 398, 400.
on property, 511.
excluding improper damages, 58.
exemplary for seduction, 874.
damages, 673.
for assault, 477.
instructions on, 59.
expenses incurred, (13) 652.
failing to ask instructions on, 57.
failure to fence tracks, 646.
fire from engine, 645.
for alienation of affections, 875.
for assault and battery, 59.
for breach of contract, (5) 397, 398.
of warranty, (3) (4) 408, (2) 411.
for converting property, 863.
for death, forms, 650.
of wife, (14) 650.
for failure to deliver property, sold, 400.
for injury to person, (3) 653.
for killing anotheer, (12) 649.
person, 649, (7) *650.
restricted, 650.
for mental suffering, 476, 607.
for permanent injury, 647, 652, 607.
for personal injury, 58, 476.
assessing, n. 65, 58.
considerations, 81.
for seducing wife, 874.
for trespass, 877.
for unlawful seizure, 509.
forms on amount, 607.
framing instructions on, 56. 57.
from bridge washing out, 675.
from change of grade, 671. .
from diseased cattle, 513.
from flood, (2) 545.
INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.}
DAMAGE S Co ntinued.
from fraudulent representations, 515, 516.
from negligence, evidence, 93.
from piling filth, dirt, 672.
from sale of liquors, 487, 488, 489.
from surface water, 674.
from violating statute. 81.
improper elements. 106.
estimated, 81.
imperfect instruction cured, 239.
in admitting incompetent evidence, 84.
in condemnation proceedings, 683.
in destroying fences, 673.
in factory locality, 681.
inferred by jury, (10) 653.
influencing jury on, 185.
injury to land, 672.
to person, 476.
in malicious prosecution, 508.
in sale of land, 522.
in shipping goods, 587, 588.
liability, 587.
instructions erroneous, when, 57, 106.
for defendant, 651.
generally, 106.
on breach of contract, 399.
on measure of, 56.
on measure of, 120.
not faulty, 106.
in trespass, improper, 81.
jury not confined to evidence, 106.
restricted to reasonable, 57.
land damaged, 669.
limiting to complaint, 241.
loss of time, injury, 95, 607.
malpractice by physician, 484.
measure of, considerations, ( 1 ) 499.
crops, 677.
death, (4) 650.
from fire, 645.
generally, 57.
land, 671.
in slander, 498.
medical treatment, (3) 652.
mental anguish considered, (3) 652, 653.
plaintiff's theory for damages, 58.
nervous shock considered, (4) 653.
nominal damages, (3) 654.
opinion as to amount, (10) 653.
on issue not alleged, 97.
on motion for peremptory, 145.
pain considered, 653.
pecuniary loss, (6) 652.
only for death. (13) 650.
personal property damaged, 509, 511.
physical condition. (3) 653.
physician's bills, (13) 652.
INDEX. 889
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
DAMAGES Continued.
premises as pest-house, 681.
procrustean rule in estimating, (2) 653.
proper limit in assessing, 106.
prospective suffering, (6) (7) 653.
railroad in front of premises, 685.
injuring property, 684.
remote, speculative, (3) 541. (6) 685.
restricted to pecuniary loss, 650.
to pecuniary (death), (3) 650.
signs overnanging walks, 604.
speculative not allowed, ( 12 ) 652.
remote, (3) 541, (6) 685.
sufficiency of instruction, 57.
tables of mortality, death, 651.
tenant not liable for, (3) 453.
vindictive, for assault, 194.
when cannot recover land, 669.
when no evidence as to amount, 106.
wife not considered in estimating, (9) 652.
DANCE HALLS,
disorderly house, 839.
DANGER,
appearance of, self-defense, 256.
self-defense, 285.
city's notice of, 595.
continuing with knowledge of, 619.
evidence of, self-defense, 802.
greater precautions, when, 630.
master concealing from servant, 612.
ignorance of, 612.
must advise servant, 612.
means of knowing, 618.
need not be real. 256.
open, not concealed, (12) 639.
person knowing, care, 594.
plaintiff knowing, (12) 544, 593.
forms, (9) (10) (11) 544.
not heeding, 543, (9) (10) (11) 544.
reasonable doubt on, 803.
seen by plaintiff, 594.
servant continuing with knowledge, 619.
knowing, 618.
tunnel dangerous, 619.
warranting self-defense, 798.
DARK,
traveling street when, 608.
DAY OF WEEK,
instruction, 163.
"DEADLY VIOLENCE,"
used for "great violence," 75.
DEADLY WEAPON, 278. See WEAPON.
defined, 278.
forms of instructions, 767, 777.
manner of using weapon, 178.
890 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
DEATH, See DECEASED.
by accident, fall, n. 58, 261.
railroads, (3) (4) 648.
by murder or suicide, 261.
caused by negligence, 649, 650.
damage for death, pecuniary, ( 13 ) 650.
estimating damages for, (3) 650.
from accident, 806.
or murder, 261.
from blood poisoning, 791.
from blow or poison, 261.
from disease or wound, 261.
from electricity, (3) 546.
from neglected wound, 791.
DEBTS,
fraud in reference to, 525.
DECEASED, See DEATH.
ability to earn, (2) 652.
damages, ( 7 ) 650.
admissions of deceased, 739.
age, element of damages, (8) 650, (2) 652.
bad character of, 807.
character of deceased, 807.
contributory negligence of, 635.
drawing weapon, 257.
habits and industry, (7) (8) 650.
killing husband, damages, 649.
making threats, 257.
officer killing wrongfully, 787.
thrown from engine, 650.
value to kin, damages, (7) 650.
of services, 650.
DECLARATION, See COUNTS.
competency on intent, 111.
evidence of, limited when, 112.
containing defective counts, 54.
counts abandoned, 100.
abandoned, dismissed, 54.
in conspiracy, 763.
instruction on one count, 54.
referring to, 53.
limited to good counts, 54.
maker of will, 701.
material allegations of, what, 155.
of one of several defendants, 112.
several counts, instructions when, 53, 54.
DECLARATIONS, See CONFESSIONS, ADMISSIONS.
dying statements, 180.
evidence in conspiracy, 763.
DEDICATION,
highway established by, 858.
DEEDS,
construction of, 156.
conveying real estate, 473.
description of property in, 163.
execution and delivery, 473.
INDEX. 891
(References are to -Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms .)
DEEDS Continued.
forged deed, 845.
manner of signing, 473.
placed in escrow, 468.
takes effect from delivery, 473.
DEFECTIVE,
correct instruction curing, 246.
court correcting, 27.
how cured by construction, 70.
harmless if harmonious, 72.
if defective in any particular, 27.
if element omitted, 27.
in defining negligence, 6.
in ignoring facts, harmless, 71.
in omitting "if you believe from evidence," 105.
"reasonable," 313.
instruction cured, damages, 241.
modifying if imperfect, 27.
not ground for error, 6.
on burden of proof, harmless, 72. '
on degree of care, harmless, 72.
refusing after promising, 27.
entire charge, 28.
refusing, when, 27.
DEFENDANT,
abandons conflict, self-defense, 259.
admitting plaintiff's case, 243.
affirming facts, burden, 199.
believing his testimony, 227.
burden on defendant, when, 199.
casting suspicion upon him, 227.
character of defendant, 756, 757, 758.
conduct during trial, 215.
competent witness, criminal, 226.
competent witness, (7) 372, (2) 373.
considerations in weighing testimony, 227.
contradicted, criminal, 372.
corroborated, criminal, 372, (1) 373.
credibility as witness, 226.
declaring further struggle, 259, 797.
defendant a witness, instructions, 227.
testimony, n. 139. 227.
sufficient, 88.
doubt on his testimony, n. 139, 227.
failing to testify, civil. 222.
failure to testify, criminal, 222, 229, 374.
"free from fault." 258. (
guilt presumed, when 265a, 266.
having knowledge, civil, 222.
having stolen property, criminal, 265a, 266.
instructing in absence of, 36.
instructions, when witness, 214, 229.
interested witness, criminal, 214, 226, 227, (3) (5) (7) 372.
introducing false testimony, 178.
lying in wait, 240, 78.4.
892 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
DEFENDANT Continued.
making confession, 737.
making contradictory statements, 227.
making false statements, 227.
must retreat, when, 260.
not calling witness, 221.
originally in wrong, 259.
parents, witnesses for, 225.
presumed innocent, 336, 713.
probability of guilt, 727.
provoking quarrel, self-defense, 2581.
rejecting his testimony, 227.
same as other witness, 227, (7) 372.
several tried jointly, 112.
showing mitigation, 782.
singling out defendant, 226.
statement of defendant, 64.
surrendering himself, 742.
taking flight, 740.
testifying falsely, criminal, 372.
testimony of, when corroborated, 227.
unsworn statement, criminal, 228.
verdict, when several, 878.
weighing his testimony, criminal, 226, 227, 372.
wife, witness for, 225.
witness, 225.
criminal, 226, 227.
convicted of felony, 227.
corroborated, 227.
for himself, criminal, 215, (4) 372.
instruction improper, 227.
DEFENSE,
accidental killing, 806.
advice of counsel, 506.
against branding cattle, 118.
against unlawful arrest, 805.
age, an element, 118.
alibi, a defense, 322, 743.
strong proof required, 745.
bare fear no defense, 799.
belief as to owner, larceny, 103.
breach of marriage contract, 456.
claim barred by limitation, 118.
confined to that alleged, 96.
contributory negligence, 118, (4) to (9) 582.
declining further struggle, 798.
defense to some counts, 118.
degree of proof of. 201.
evidence of, embezzlement, 103.
female consenting, rape, 103.
fraud as defense, form, (4) 384.
fraudulent representation, 96.
fully and clearly stated, 23.
ignoring, 118.
assault, 118.
by instruction, 116.
INDEX. 893
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
DEFENSE Continued.
ignoring facts of, 71.
if not alleged, 96.
proper, when, 83.
injury wholly accidental, 581.
insanity a defense, 329, 746.
evidence wanting, 83.
examine with care, 754.
in slander, 500, 501, 502.
instructions negativing unnecessary, 104.
repeating, 23.
supporting, criminal, 103.
when several defenses, 102.
intent wanting, embezzlement, 824.
killing bad man, 807.
instruction, n. 24, 255.
malicious prosecution, (7) 504.
mere belief of danger, 800.
no offense. 792.
mere presence no offense, (3) 765.
mere threats no defense, 801.
negativing matters of, 56.
no evidence of defense, 83.
other means causing nuisance, 856.
preponderance required, ( 1 ) 396.
probable cause, (5) 504.
raising reasonable doubt, 201.
receiving stolen property, 103.
reiterating unnecessary, 23.
repelling force by force, 804.
resisting assault by several, 804.
satisfactory proof of defense, 201.
self-defense, appearances, 802.
to murder, 795.
set-off abandoned, 100.
slight evidence in support of, 88.
statute of limitations, 118.
strength an element, 118.
supported by testimony of defendant alone, 88.
taking property under claim, 818.
theory of defense, refusing on, 101.
to embezzlement, belief, 103.
to larceny, 818.
of cattle, 118.
to malicious prosecution, 506.
to murder, accident, 261.
accidental shooting, 261.
suicide, 261.
ignoring, 261.
to note, notice, (5) 415.
to part of claim, 118.
to promissory note, (17) 415.
to receiving stolen property, 103.
two theories inconsistent. 102.
unnecessary to exclude. 104.
variance a defense, criminal, 261.
violent attack. 118.
want of consideration, ( 1 ) 306.
894 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.}
DEFENSE Continued.
when properly withdrawn, 83.
wound neglected, no defense, 791.
DEFINITIONS OF OFFENSES, 275.
accessory defined, 293.
accomplice defined, 287.
assault and battery defined, 794.
breaking defined, burglary, 808.
conspiracy defined, 759.
criminal offense, 275.
deadly weapon defined, 278, 767.
defective as to negligence, 6.
definition containing matters not involved, 275.
defining "evidentiary facts," 6.
terms, 6.
disorderly house defined, 839.
embezzlement defined, 820.
false pretense defined, 830.
fellow-servant, should define, 76.
forgery defined, 840.
defectively defined, 276.
gaming defined, 846.
insanity defined, 329.
in statutory words, 275.
justifiable homicide defined, 795.
larceny defined, 814.
malice defined, 776.
manslaughter defined, 794.
murder defined, 773. '
murder defectively defined, 276.
negligence defined, 6, 529.
unnecessary to define, 75.
not in words of statute, 275.
not statutory, error when, 275.
of receiving stolen property, 276.
of serious bodily injury, 284.
of statutory words, 284.
unnecessary, 284.
of words phases, unnecessary, when, 75.
omitting element, 276.
ordinary care, 530.
perjury erroneous defined, 276.
reasonable doubt defined, 294, 295.
repeating, on negligence, 2"
of definition unnecessary 284.
simple assault, 766.
sound mind and memory, 695.
DEFRAUDING.
defrauding tax collector, 832.
DEGREE,
degree in homicide, 251, 11. 10, 252, 269, 270, 271.
degree of murder doubtful, 253, 783.
included offenses, 267.
manslaughter, degrees, evidence, 271.
murder, degrees, 773.
INDEX. 895
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
DEGREE Continued.
murder first or second degree, 273.
proof, circumstantial evidence, 734.
proof, instructions, 315.
proof on "each link," 312.
proof warranting conviction, 790.
restricting to first degree, n. 2, 251.
DEGREE OF CRIME,
proof by accomplice, n. 6, 288.
DEGREE OF PROOF, 200.
beyond reasonable doubt, 201.
for misdemeanor, n. 24, 296.
too high, when, 200.
in criminal case, 201.
conscientious belief, criminal, 296.
full satisfaction of guilt, 296.
DELIBERATE,
definition unnecessary, 75.
DELIBERATION,
definition necessary, 75.
forms of instructions, 780.
may be instantaneous, (4) 776.
time of immaterial, 780.
in murder, (4) 776.
DELIRIUM,
in reference making will, (2) 697.
DELIVERY,
carrier delaying, 587.
completes sale, (2) 406.
on conditions, (3) 406.
instruction on, form, (2) 406.
DELUSIONS,
insane delusions, wills, 697.
DEMAND,
in embezzlement, 822.
DEPOSITIONS,
comparing weight with oral, 209.
DEPOSITS,
banker appropriating, 825.
DESCRIPTION,
referring to indictment for, 55.
DETECTIVES,
as witnesses, 224.
caution against, ( 1 ) 378.
credibility of. 224.
instructions on. 224.
weighing testimony of, 224.
896 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1364 Principles, 365878 Forms.)
DIFFICULTY,
expressive of group of ideas, 74.
meaning and application of, 74.
DIRECTING VERDICT,
See NON-SUIT, PEREMPTORY INSTRUCTIONS, VERDICT.
action of trial court reviewable, 149.
court exercises discretion, when, 131.
court finding facts, 145.
discretionary, Rhode Island, n. 57, 131.
evidence insufficient for defendant, 139.
for defendant because of variance, 127.
evidence deficient, 126.
improper, when, 126, 129, 133, 134, 141.
criminal, 151.
proper, when, 126, 127.
criminal, 150.
for either party, when, 126.
form of instruction on, n. 4, 120.
for plaintiff, improper, when, 134, 140, 142, 143.
proper, when, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139.
for prosecution, proper, when, criminal, 152.
if certain facts proven, 309.
if evidence deficient on one element, 126.
illustrations of principles, 134.
improper, when, 131, 145.
two theories, 132.
in ejectment suit, 136.
in homicide case, 251.
instead of non-suit, statute, 125.
jurors must agree, 148.
jury determine facts, 131.
motion excluding evidence, n. 14, 123.
for, by both parties, 145.
no motion for, effect, n. 19, 124.
of acquittal proper, n. 108, 150.
of murder or acquittal, 271.
or no offense. 269.
of offense, proper, when, 277.
on former acquittal, 152. .
on gambling contract, 128.
on once in jeopardy, 152.
on title to land, 136.
part of plaintiff's claim contested, 142.
plaintiff's evidence insufficient, 126.
prima facie case undisputed, 136.
reasons for, unnecessary, 120.
recalling jury for. 124.
request of both denied, effect, 147.
ruling on motion for reviewable, 149.
statutory regulation, 125.
time of requesting instruction, 124.
to find murder, when, 251.
validity of note involved, 134.
waiving error when two defendants. 144.
right to, 144.
to claim error, 144.
INDEX. 897
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
DIRECTING VERDICT Continued.
when burden on defendant, 135.
when controling facts admitted, 126.
when claim is barred, 126.
when defendant admits allegations, 137.
when evidence conflicting, 141.
when facts doubtful, 131.
when negligence in issue, 134.
when neither entitled, 131.
when new matter set up, 130.
when no defense made out, 135.
when pleadings insufficient, 138.
when several defendants, n. 27, 126, 142.
when two defendants, 144.
when two theories shown, 132.
where amount of claim disputed, 143.
in criminal case, 150.
error to refuse, when, criminal, 150.
DISBELIEVING WITNESS,
See WITNESSES.
DISCHARGE,
discharging employee wrongfully, 397.
master discharging servant, 626.
DISCLAIMING,
estoppel by disclaiming, 868.
DISCRETIONARY,
instruction when discretionary, 49, 288.
DISEASE,
affecting the mind, 698, 699.
injury from, (7) 545.
DISMISSAL.
on opening statement, n. 40, 126.
DISORDERLY HOUSE,
drinking and dancing, 839.
forms of instructions, 839.
what constitutes, 839.
DISREGARDING,
accomplice testimony, 288.
confession, when, 318.
corroborated witness, 217.
credible witness, testimony, 217.
entire testimony, 219, (8) 368.
error on damages, 241.
husband as witness, 370.
impeached witness, (1) 367.
instructions improper. 219.
irreconcilable testimony, 217.
testimony in part, 217.
uncorroborated witness, 217.
unimpeached witness, 207, (8) 367.
898 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
DISREGARDING Continued.
unless corroborated, (8) 368.
when witnesses contradict each other, 212.
whole testimony, when, 217.
witness of bad reputation, 221.
testifying falsely, (2) (3) (4) (5) 368.
testimony arbitrarily, 217.
unles corroborated, 219.
DIRECTING NONSUIT,
improper, when, 130.
proper, when, 126.
variance as ground, 127.
when no opposing evidence, 126.
DISPUTED CLAIMS, 404, 405.
DISSEISIN,
what constitutes, (7) 657, (1) 658.
DOCUMENT,
book account evidence, 867.
collateral evidence merely, 159.
construction of, 156, 381.
copies as evidence, 867.
explaining by oral evidence, 160.
ignoring when in evidence, 117.
in evidence as fact, 159.
meaning of, 156.
parol evidence to explain, 164.
purpose of, a fact, when, 164.
uttering forged document, 843.
DOG, See ANIMALS.
attack by, 479.
determining ownership of, 479.
harboring on premises, 479.
restraining, controlling, (2) 479.
DOUBLE MEANING,
See Two MEANINGS, 61.
DOUBT,
See REASONABLE DOUBT, 294.
DRAIN,
causing person's injury, 600.
falling into, 600.
in dangerous condition, 600.
DRUG,
given to excite passions. 778.
intent in administering, 778.
DRUNKENNESS,
affecting intent, instruction, n. 6, 281.
competent to show, when, 779.
disproving deliberation. 779.
specific intent. 281.
evidence of proper, 281.
forms of instructions, 779.
INDEX. 899
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365878 Forms.)
DRUNKENNESS Continued.
instruction erroneous, 281.
proper, n. 16, 281.
is not insanity, 755.
no excuse for crime, 281, 755.
not negligence, 553.
passenger intoxicated, 553.
reducing grade of crime, 779.
refusing on, error, 281.
specific intent, disproving, 779.
voluntary drunkenness, (1) (2) 755.
no excuse, 779.
"DUE CARE,"
means, "ordinary care," "reasonable care," 74.
DURESS,
avoids contract, when, 527.
by threats, 526, 527.
procuring contract by, 526.
DWELLING,
breaking and entering, 813.
DYING DECLARATIONS,
cautioning against, 180.
comment on weight, 180.
competency of, for court, 180. N
credibility of, for jury, 180.
discrediting, when. 180.
instructions on, 180.
weighed by jury, 180.
DYNAMITE,
carelessness in using, (4) 622. .
thawing frozen dynamite, (4) 622.
E.
"EACH LINK,"
circumstantial evidence, 733.
degree of proof. 312.
doubt as to. 721.
forms of instructions, 733.
instruction improper. 299, 312.
proper, 299, 312.
reasonable doubt on, 299.
on whole evidence. 733.
refusal on, error, 312.
EJECTING,
disorderly passenger, 557. 575.
pasenger from train, 557.
directing verdict in, 136.
instructions on, 866.
EJECTMENT,
recovery on one's title, 866.
900 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 3G5 878 Forms.)
ELECTRICITY,
care in using, 546.
dangerous agency, 546.
forms of instructions, 546.
high degree of care, 546.
injury from, (2) 546.
negligence in using, 546.
railroad using wires, (2) 546.
trolley wire, injury, (4) 547.
ELECTRIC WIRES,
facilities for repairing, (2) 547.
injury from, 547.
injury to passenger, (4) 547.
out of repair, 547.
time to repair, 547.
ELEMENTS,
definition not involved, 275.
each essential element of crime, 735.
in definition, omitting, 276.
instructions enumerating elements of offense, 277.
necessary to recovery, 599.
no evidence sustaining, 126.
proof of each element of offense, 296.
refusing or omitting, 245.
ELEVATOR,
care in operating, 534.
carelessly operated, (4) 542.
faulty construction of, (4) 542.
opening unguarded, 618.
plaintiff knowing danger, 618.
ELIMINATING,
material element, 245.
EMBANKMENTS,
changing water flow, 674.
obstructing view at crossing, (4) 630, (5) 641.
water flow, 602.
EMBEZZLEMENT,
agent collecting on commission, 821.
deducting commissions, 821.
appropriating honestly, 824.
attorney appropriating money, 822.
balance on account, 823.
banker appropriating deposits. 825.
belief of right to appropriate, 103.
debtor and creditor, 823.
defined. 820.
defense on intent. 824.
demand essential, when. 822.
erroneous instruction cured, 240.
facts constituting, 820.
not sufficient. 823.
forms of instructions, 820.
INDEX. 901
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
EMBEZZLEMENT Continued.
fraudulent intent, 820.
growing out of agency, 820.
honestly appropriating, 103.
intent essential, 824. ,
maliciously charged with, ( 1 ) 507.
prima facie evidence, 829.
principal and agent, 823.
settlement for shortage, (1(5) 415.
EMINENT DOMAIN, 683. See CONDEMNATION.
EMPLOYE,
remaining idle after discharge, 397.
wrongfully discharging, liability, (4) 397.
ENGINE,
dangerous condition, 620.
fire escaping from, 645.
master's promise to repair, 620.
spark arresters on, 645.
ENGINEER,
fellow-servant of brakeman, 614.
not fellow-servant, 613.
ringing bell, (8) 641.
ERROR, See CURING ERROR, HARMLESS ERROR.
abstract instructions, misleading, 48.
acquit used for convict, is, 78.
as to argumentative requests, 67.
as to peremptory, how waived, 144.
as to time of instructing, 14.
of presenting requests, 14.
assigning separately, 356.
of in group, 353.
assignment of unavailing, 353, 359.
assuming controverted facts, 192, 195.
disputed facts, 192.
at one's own request, 363.
by incompetent evidence, 84.
by special instruction, 238.
cannot assign, when, 7, 8.
cannot urge, when, 9, 12, 13.
considered without exception, 352.
contradictory instructions, 246.
court calling on jury, 39.
curing by other instructions, 71.
withdrawing incompetent, 84.
error, how, 60, 71, 72, 84. 238, 239, 240.
when not, 60, 208, 218, 238, 242, 245, 276.
damages, allowing too much, 106.
defendant absent, instructing when, 36.
definition omitting element, 276.
disregarded by verdict, 236.
disregarding defense, 118.
witness, 217.
902 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1364 Principles, 365878 Forms.)
ERROR Continued.
due care and caution, 245.
erronecn s standing alone, 70.
exception to instructions essential, 13.
pointing out, 348.
failing to confine within statute of limitations, 108.
to sign, immaterial, 43.
favorable to party, 244.
further instructions entirely new, 37.
to correct, 35, 38.
general and special charges, 238.
giving manslaughter instructions, 252.
harmless, as to further instructions, 35.
when, 35, 236, 242, 243.
in assuming, 242.
in murder, 252. 253.
unless prejudicial, 243.
when verdict right, 243.
harmonizing instructions, 235.
if instructions contradictory, 247.
if whole charge be abstract, 48.
if you believe defendant, 177.
immaterial generally, 72, 235.
if cured, 72.
in assuming trespass, 193.
in coercing jury to agree, 187.
in condemning law, 154.
in conspiracy, 82.
in murder, degrees, 252, 253, 263.
in larceny, 103, 265a.
in rape, 103.
incurable by other instructions, 246.
when, 246, 247, 248, 360.
in directing verdict, waiving, 144.
in giving specific instructions, 60.
too many instructions, 19.
in ignoring facts, 116.
issues, 92.
theory, 101, 102, 104.
in influencing jury, 185.
in not restricting to counts, 98.
in omitting facts in summary instruction, 119.
words, 79.
in presenting issues, 243.
in referring to pleadings, 53.
in refusing, on theory, 104.
to limit evidence, 110.
in repeating instructions, 25.
in re-reading instructions, 37.
in stating disputed fact is conceded, 177.
instructing on issues without evidence, 93.
doubtful in application, 48.
evidence close, 250.
expressing opinion, 175.
not required, 6.
on damages, 57.
on witnesses, 207, 208.
self-contradictory, 249.
interrogative instruction, 69.
INDEX. 903
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
ERROR Con tinned.
in withdrawing facts, 117.
theory, 101.
irrespective of evidence, 243.
judge in jury-room, 39.
jury determining law, 155.
disregarding error, 241.
killing trespasser, 263.
malicious prosecution, 81.
marking instructions, harmless, 44, 45.
misleading abstract requests, 48.
modifying instructions, 30, 31.
correct instruction, 31.
motive refusing, 264.
ground for error, 31.
not cured, 60, 118, 208, 238, 245, 276.
by general charge, 60.
denning offense, 276.
omitting material element, 245.
on circumstantial evidence, 303.
on law, when trial by court, 47.
on presumption of innocence, 336.
possession stolen goods, 265a.
presenting on motion for new trial, 356.
presumed cured when, 360.
prejudicial when, 243.
reciting facts not in evidence 80.
refusal on burden, 199.
to limit evidence, 109.
refusing all requests, 26b.
further instructions, 38.
impeaching instruction, 220.
instructions, 16, 103, 104.
refusing instructions in larceny, 88, 103, 118.
on accomplice, 288, 289.
on alibi, 326.
on motive, 264.
on self-defense, 255.
on swearing falsely, 218.
special charge, 26.
special request, 26.
relating to fellow-servant, 76.
to further instructions, 36.
same error by both, 363.
singling out facts, 113.
issues, 92.
specifically pointing out, 351.
stating certain facts constitute murder, 251.
submitting facts hypothetically, when, 172.
issues not alleged, 94.
unavailing, when, 6, 274.
urging, though instructions not requested, 6.
when charge incomplete, 7.
vital point omitted, 245.
waiving error, 6.
when defendant is witness, 229.
when instructions repugnant, 246.
when issues abandoned, 100.
without motion for new trial, 356.
904 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
ESCAPE,
attempt to escape, 741.
ESCROW,
deed so placed, 468.
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS,
degree of proof., criminal, 201.
ESSENTIAL FACTS,
degree of proof on, 312.
in circumstantial evidence, 311, 312.
instructions on degree of proof, 312.
must be consistent, 311.
reasonable doubt on, 311.
restricting instructions to, 311.
ESTATE,
conveying by will, 692.
unnatural dispositioh by will, (2) 692.
ESTOPPEL,
barred from claiming (2) 868.
disclaiming interest in property, 868.
equitable estoppel, what is, 868.
forms of instructions, 868.
what constitutes, 868.
ESTRAY,
stealing an estray horse, (5) 815.
EVIDENCE,
admitting facts on motion for peremptory, 124.
age of female, rape, 82.
all on one side, instruction, 196.
as basis for damages, 106.
of instruction, 80, 220.
changing instruction to confine to, 32.
circumstantial, 303.
close on vital point, 250.
comparing direct and circumstantial, 305.
competent for one purpose, 110.
of evidence, 174.
conflicting, instruction when, 178.
copy instead of original, 867.
corroborating witness, 221.
in rape case, 82.
court's comment on, proper, 189.
does not weigh, 121.
expressing opinion on, 171.
misstating, correcting, n.' 11, 347.
declarations in conspiracy, 763.
of previous acts. 111.
defendant's statement as, 64.
statements, criminal, 228.
deficient on one element. 126.
details in reviewing, 191.
INDEX. 905
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms J
EVIDENCE Continued.
different conclusions drawn from, 131.
constructions of, 102.
direct and circumstantial, 304.
not essential, (1) 379.
disproving branding cattle, 118.
criminal intent, 210.
"undue influence," (8) 704.
doubtful whether grand or .petit larceny, 89.
dying declarations, evidence, 180.
entirely circumstantial, 303.
equally balanced, instruction, 202.
form, 202, (1) (5) 383, (1) 384, 386.
error irrespective of evidence, 243.
excluding, by instruction, 84.
incompetent, 84.
possibility of innocence, 222.
failure to produce evidence, 222.
how determine preponderance, 203.
impeaching witness, 220.
prosecutrix in rape, 82.
incompetent, adultery, 108.
evidence, 608.
instructions, when, 84.
when, n. 21, 84.
in conspiracy, slight, 88.
in control of party, 222.
in larceny slight, defense, 88.
in malicious mischief, 82.
instructing there is none, when there is, 174.
instructions based on evidence, 80, 95.
reviewing evidence, 191.
when close, 26a.
insufficient to ' sustain verdict, 126.
is there any evidence? 174.
jury confined to evidence, 105.
determine weight, 182, 183.
may disregard, 182.
limitLig to certain defendants, 112.
to impeaching witness, 110.
to malice, intent, 111.
to specific purpose, 109.
mistakes in reviewing, 191.
modifying to cover 33
negligence of railroad, 540.
no evidence of fact, 220.
not in record, presumption, 362.
obscure instructions when evidence conflicting, 62.
of branding cattle, 118.
of defense wanting, 83.
of earnings wanting, 81.
of expenses wanting, 81.
of extension on contract, 862.
of flight, 740, 741.
of former conviction, 110.
of good character, 340.
of malicious prosecution, 81.
906 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
EVIDENCE Continued.
of motive not essential, 264.
of negligence wanting, 93.
of opponent admitted, when, 121.
of plaintiff alone, 86.
of several defenses, 102.
of voluntary manslaughter, 272.
omission to produce evidence, 222.
on alibi, 322.
one kind better than other, 177.
on motion for peremptory, 121, 124, 126, 133, 134.
opinion on weight of, 170, 171, 175.
party having exclusive control, 222.
surrender, 742.
peremptory, when conflicting, 141.
portions made prominent, 113.
possible inferences, 85.
possession of stolen property, 816.
preponderance of, verdict, 133.
presumption of innocence, 338.
prima facie evidence, 136, 174, 165a, 829.
undisputed, verdict, 136.
proof by preponderance, 199.
proving guilty knowledge, (4) 860.
included offense. 270.
record containing all evidence, 361.
refusing instruction, error, 202.
relative weight, instructions, 204.
repeating instructions, when, 26a.
restricting jury to evidence, 6, 105.
rumor not evidence, 836.
scope in reviewing, 191.
several fires, by same engine, 645.
several sales of liquor. 98.
showing gambling contract, 128.
manslaughter, 272.
prima facie case. 126.
verdict right, 243.
singling out decisive portions, 114.
slight evidence sufficient, 86.
in criminal case, 86, 88.
peremptory improper, 129.
speculative insufficient, 85.
on negligence, directing verdict, 134.
striking out evidence, 241.
sufficient though slight, 86, 87.
though slight, for peremptory, 140.
summing up evidence, 119, 170.
forbidden, when, 119, 170.
supporting defense of limitation, 118.
facts, 117.
only manslaughter, 273.
self-defense, 255.
several theories, 101, 102.
theory, 101.
tending to prove any count, 130.
every element, 130.
two theories, 132.
INDEX. 907
(References are to Sections, 1364 Principles, 365878 Forms.)
EVIDENCE Continued.
"tends to show" proper, 173.
undisputed showing guilt, 243.
"undue influence," will contest, 81.
wills, 81, 704.
unreasonable or inconsistent, 86.
unsworn statement, 227, 228.
wanting, 80, 81, 82, 93, 93a, 98, 102, 126.
form, 717.
in conspiracy, 82.
in larceny, 82.
in replevin, 83.
in will contest, 81.
on any fact, 80.
on bad faith, 81.
on counts, 98.
on issues, illustrations, 93a.
on mental capacity, 93a.
on negligence, 126.
on opponent's theory, 102.
on wilful conduct, 81.
weight of, for jury, 170. 184.
directing verdict, 122.
on insanity, 751, 752.
when prima facie proof, 181.
when several issues, 93.
writing as a fact, 159.
EVIDENCE BALANCED,
instruction improper, when, 202.
verdict, when, 202.
EVIDENCE CLOSE,
accuracy on instructions, 250.
when, n. 77, 250.
assuming facts, when, 195.
commenting on witnesses, when, 208.
error in instructions, when. 250.
instructions, when, 26a, 202, 250.
on vital point, 195.
EVIDENCE CONFLICTING,
assuming facts, when, 195.
credibility of witnesses, when, 206.
instructions, when, 250.
on personal injury, 195.
on vital point, 195.
EVIDENCE LIMITED,
to one or more of several defendants, 112.
EVIDENCE WANTING,
See EVIDENCE.
on confession, 321.
on included offense, 268, 269, 273.
on involuntary manslaughter, 273.
on insanity, n. 30, 335.
on larceny, 268.
908 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.}
EVIDENCE WANTING Continued.
on manslaughter, 260, 271.
reasonable doubt from, 299.
"want of evidence," omitting, n. 2, 294.
EXCAVATION,
causing injury to person, 599.
damages by, recoverable, 670.
caused by, 670.
measure of damages, (5) 670.
no liability for, when, 670.
on adjacent premises, 670.
EXCEPTIONS, 346. See OBJECTIONS.
absence of exceptions, effect, 13.
after jury retire, 347.
before jury retire, 347.
bill of exceptions, 47.
by number of instruction, n. 32, 350.
by which party made, 357.
court misstating evidence, n. 11, 347.
essential to save error, 13.
excepting to several instructions, 353.
to oral charge, 13.
failure to accept, 352.
form of, sufficiency, 346, 349, 350, 351, 357.
general or specific, 349.
to entire charge, 351.
"given and excepted to," 346, 357.
if entire charge erroneous, 351.
if none taken, effect, 352.
in bill of exceptions, 357.
in criminal cases, 352.
instruction on character, 348.
too general, 351.
in trial court, 352.
limited to grounds stated, 354.
manner of taking, 346.
matter covered by other exception, 349.
must be taken, 346.
one exception to several instructions, 349.
on motion for new trial, 347.
pointing out errors, 348.
presumed properly taken, 347.
"refused and excepted to," 346.
relating to damages, 348.
request for specific instructions, 351.
should be specific, 348.
signing under statute, 346.
statutory requirements, 346.
sufficiency of exceptions, 350.
taking before verdict,
from "one to nine," 350.
jointly, 351.
to all instructions, 346.
to entire charge, 351.
to giving or refusing, 346.
INDEX. 909
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365878 Forms.)
EXCEPTIONS Continued.
taking to charge, "as given," 351.
"to each and every one," 348, 351.
to series of instructions, 353.
though instructions not requested, 355.
time of taking, 347, 349.
to instructions as entirety, 351.
"one, two, three," 350.
to modifying instruction, n. 14, 347.
to rulings on instructions, 47.
too general, 348, 351.
too indefinite, vague, 348.
too late, 347.
unavailing, 346, 347, 351.
excepting to part, 346.
unnecessary, when, 349, 352.
waiving, 355.
when instructions numbered, 350.
when to be taken, 347.
EXCLUDING,
damages by instruction, 58.
opposing theory, 58, 104.
punitive damages,
theory of innocence, 730.
of opponent, 58, 104.
EXCLUSIVE,
possession of land, 656, (5) 656. (2) 659.
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES, See PUNITIVE DAMAGED, VINDICTIVE DAMAGES.
for assault and battery, 59.
for seduction, 874.
instructions improper, 59.
in trespass, 59.
means punitive damages, 74.
omitting facts on, 59.
EXEMPTION,
from execution, 452.
EXPENSES,
element of damages, (3) 652.
for medical treatment, evidence wanting, 81.
in estimating damages, (7) 652.
no evidence of expenses, 81.
EXPERTS, See EXPERT WITNESSES.
comments on, improper. 211.
"entitled to great weight," n. Ill, 223.
hypothetical questions to, (4) 377.
medical experts, wills, 702.
testimony, if unreasonable, (5) 828.
testimony of experts, 377.
weight of opinion, wills. 702.
weighing testimony of, 377.
910 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1364 Principles, 365878 Forms.)
EXPERT WITNESSES,
See WITNESSES, EXPERTS.
argumentative request, 66.
basis for opinion, 211.
cautioning against, 211.
commenting on testimony, 211.
hypothetical state of facts, 211.
instruction on, improper, 211.
proper, 223.
suggesting fact, 211.
"little value," "great value," 211.
opinions of expert, 211.
valueless, when, 211.
questions hypothetical, 211.
singling out, improper, 211, 223.
weighing testimony of expert, 211, 223.
EXPLOSION,
boiler exploding, servant injured, (5) 619, (2) 621, 623.
injury from, to servant, 580, 623.
through negligence, 580.
EXTRADITION,
court passing upon, 163.
F.
FACTORY,
fertilizer factory, 681.
FACTS.
admitted by both sides, 196, 197.
as basis for presumption, 181.
assuming, criminal case, 198.
disputed facts, 192.
harmless, when, 72, 242.
improper, when, 192.
in will contest, 193.
killing, homicide_. 198.
proper, when, 196.
when disputed, 195.
when evidence close, 195.
without evidence, 192.
circumstantial evidence. 309.
close on vital point, 309, 250.
closely contested, 250, 309.
conclusively shown, instruction, 196.
though disputed, 196.
consistency on essential facts, 311.
with guilt, 310.
court expressing opinion, 170.
determined by court, when, 145, 146, 182.
by jury, 86, 'l70, 175, 379.
by special findings, 231.
entitled to "great weight," 182.
to "little weight," 182.
essential to cause, 119, 199.
to recovery, railroads, 647.
evidence slight, ' in support of, 87.
INDEX. 911
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
FACTS Continued.
favorable not referred to, 113.
finding of, by special verdict, 160.
for defense omitted, 115.
for prosecution made prominent, 115.
giving prominence to, 113, 116.
ignored by instruction, 65, 116.
immaterial circumstances, 311.
inconsistent with other conclusion, 310.
indispensable circumstances, 311.
informing main fact, 309.
instructions assuming, illustrations, 193.
enumerating facts, 647.
omitting, 72.
singling out, 65.
when no evidence, 174.
jury determine facts, 86, 145, 146, 170, 175, 182, 379.
sole judges of, (6) 379.
may be inferred, 308.
necessary to recovery, 647.
not assumed, illustrations, 194.
no evidence supporting, 80.
not in issue, 94.
not in pleadings, 99.
of one side made prominent, 113.
omitting in examination, 222.
in summing up, 119.
oral contract, a fact, 157.
prejudicial facts, reciting, 80.
no evidence, 80, 82.
prima facie evidence of, 174.
proof of, misleading, 65.
shown by circumstances, 27.
inference, 87, 290.
singling out facts, 113.
flight, 115.
threats, 115.
unobjectionable, 114.
submitting conjunctively, 199.
improper, when, 172.
hypothetically, 172.
to jury, 147.
burglary, 813.
when no evidence, 81.
when undisputed, 172.
summarizing on ont, side. 1 16.
summing up forbidden, 170.
in detail. 119.
supported by evidence, 117.
ultimate fact for jury, 181.
when need not be pleaded, 93.
when no evidence of, 174.
withdrawing, 117.
proper, when, 117.
FACTS CLOSE,
singling out, when close, 113.
912 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
FAILURE,
to call witness, 222.
to instruct on presumption of innocence, 9.
to produce, 222.
evidence, instruction improper, 222.
to request instructions, 220.
"FALSELY,"
definition unnecessary, 75.
FALSE PRETENSE,
committed by acts, symbol, 831.
definition and elements, 830.
defrauding tax collector, 832.
essential elements, (2) 830, 832.
forms of instructions, 830.
fraudulent intent essential, 832.
i
FARM,
damaged by railroad, 685.
FARMER,
property burned by railroad, 645.
FATHER, See MINOR, MOTHER.
entitled to child's earnings, 449.
head of family, when, 452.
FEAR,
bare fear no defense, 799.
FEDERAL COURTS,
commenting on evidence, 189.
exceptions to instructions, 348.
illustrations, commenting on evidence, 190.
opinion on evidence, proper, 189.
FEDERAL STATUTE,
carrier violating, 590.
FEIGNING INSANITY,
instructions on, proper, 333.
"FELLOW SERVANT,"
a question of fact, 76.
causing injury, 614.
engineer and brakeman, 614.
form of instructions, 613, 614.
liability, when not, 613.
section master and hands under him, 613.
should be defined, 76.
watchman and engineer, not, 613.
"FELONIOUS,"
definition necessary, when. 75.
unnecessary, 75.
omission of, immaterial, 240.
surplusage, when, 75.
FELONIOUS ASSAULT,
simple assault included, 267.
FELONY,
definition necessary, when, 75.
INDEX. 913
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
FELONY Continued.
instructing without request, 3.
on, Texas, 3.
witness convicted of, 227.
FEMALE,
carnal knowledge of, 225.
witness in sexual intercourse, 225.
FENCES,
cattle breaking through, 678.
damages in destroying, 673.
expense for rebuilding, 673.
failure to fence tracks, 646.
forms of instructions, 673.
gaps not repaired, 676.
lawful fence, 678.
malicious destruction, 673.
negligence in repairing, 676.
not required, where, (6) 646.
notice of fence viewers, 869.
partition fence, 676.
evidence, 82.
preventing stock entering, 676.
railroads fencing tracks, 646.
viewers examining, 869.
FEW, See Too MANY.
instructions for state, n. 80, 19.
FILTH,
damaging land by, 672.
FIRE,
appliances to prevent, 645.
buildings with openings, 645.
caused by train, 631.
damages from, railroads, 645.
engine out of repair, 645.
escaping from engine, 645.
precautions to prevent, 631.
property burned, forms,
railroad not liable, when, 645.
safe-guards against, railroads, 645.
FIRE INSURANCE, See INSURANCE.
FIREMAN,
ringing bell, (8) 641.
FIXTURES,
whether machinery is, 195.
FLAGMAN,
at railroad crossing, 643.
not required, when, 643.
train without flagman, 635.
FLIGHT,
a circumstance of guilt, 179.
only, 115, 179, 741.
evidence of guilt, 115.
forms of instructions. 740.
914 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
FLIGHT Continued.
from fear of pursuers, 740.
instruction on, improper, 179.
proper, 178.
singling out, 115.
tends to prove guilt, 740.
FLOOD,
damage from, (2) 545.
FLORIDA,
homicide statutory definition, 284.
FORCE,
essential to robbery, 772.
FOREIGN LAWS,
construction of, 162.
fact to be proved, 162.
proof of, a fact, 161.
FORFEITURES,
are odious, taxes. 691.
must be strictly proved, 691.
rights to land, 691.
FORGERY,
aiding and abetting, 842.
alteration of instrument, 841.
charged in making will, 706.
defined, 840.
definition defective, 276.
omitting "intent to defraud/' 276.
forms of instructions, 842.
intent to defraud, 841, 843, 844.
FORMER ACQUITTAL,
directing verdict on, 152.
FORMER CONVICTION,
evidence of, to impeach, 110.
FORMS,
IS,
accident, injury from. 648.
accidental injury, 545.
to person, 581.
FORM,
accomplice witness, 376.
act of teller, 390.
agency, 388, (2) 393.
actual possession of land, 657.
adultery, 833.
agent borrowing for principal, (3) 389.
borrowing money, 389.
exceeding authority, 391, (1) 393.
selling books, 393.
selling machine, 395.
alibi, 743.
all material averments, (3) (4) (5) 383.
arrest without cause, 504.
without warrant, 503.
assaults, 766.
assault to ravish, 477.
INDEX. 915
(References are to Sections, 1364 Principles, 365878 Forms J
FORM Continued.
assisting passenger on train, 571.
blowing whistle at crossings, 641, 642.
both parties negligent, 636.
building contracts, 444, 445.
burden as to negligence, 531.
of proof, 382, 384.
carriers, 583.
on defendant, (2) 384.
on plaintiff, 383, 385.
burglary and larceny, 808.
care defined, 529.
in driving vehicle, 533.
in running trains, 630.
carelessness on leaving train, (5) (6) (7) 561.
carrier carrying sick person, 552.
lighting platform, 566.
losing baggage, 585.
goods, 587.
not insurer., 584.
stopping train, 564.
taking ticket, 573.
circumstantial evidence, 729.
caution against, conjecture, (6) 379.
character of accused, 756.
cautionary instructions, civil or criminal, 379.
in criminal cases. 707
children trespassing, 559.
company's teller acting, 390.
conditions of sale complied with, 412.
conduct and demeanor, 375.
confessions, admissions, 737.
considerations on preponderance, (3) (7) 385.
conspiracy, 759.
construction of writings, 381.
contracts generally, 396, 430.
contributory negligence, 543, 582.
court determines law, 380.
construes writings, 381.
credibility of witnesses.. 365.
damages for death, 650.
damages generally, 474.
for slander, 498, 499.
measure of, 652.
on sale of cattle. 400.
to personal property, 509.
dangerous platform, carriers, 566.
defeating creditors, 517, 519.
defective scaffold, negligence, 387.
defendant witness, criminal, 372.
form, 373.
defense, accident.. 581.
in slander. 500.
destroying fences, 673.
detectives as witnesses, 378.
directions to passengers, 577.
disorderly house. 839.
disregarding entire testimony, 368.
false testimony. 368.
impeached witness, (7) 367.
unimpeached witness, (8) 367.
916 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.}
FORM Continued.
domestic relations, 446.
duress by threats, 527.
ejecting disorderly passenger, 557, 575.
passenger, 557. 574.
embezzlement, 820.
evidence equally balanced, (1) (5) 383, 386.
failing to stop train, 561.
falling off platform, 569.
false pretense, 820.
father and minor children, 449.
forgery, 840.
for railroad defendant, 269.
fraud as defense, (5) 384.
in selling land, (2) 388.
fraudulent assignment, 524.
representations, 515, 522.
transactions, 514.
gaining, 846.
gambling transactions, 528.
grades in streets, 602.
high degree care, 549.
husband and wife, 523.
for wife, 370.
ice on sidewalks, 603.
impeachment by contradictions, (6) 367.
implied warranty, 409.
inferring facts, 379.
injury from natural cause, 545.
on leaving train, 563.
proximate cause. 541.
to person, 652, 653.
to postal clerk, 554.
innocent purchaser. 518.
insanity, criminal, 746.
relating to wills, 679.
instructions for murder. 773.
on attorney's services, (8) 404.
on breach of contract, 397, 398.
on breach of warranty, 411.
on burglary, 808.
contract, 397, (1) 396. 407.
disputed claims, 404.
patent claim, 405.
presence, 792.
wills, 692.
relating to land 656.
sale by sample, (1) (2) 407.
on warranty, (1) 408.
insurance, 420.
insurance, proof of death, 423.
interrogative in form, 69.
joint or several liability, 401.
jury determine facts, 379.
viewing premises, (3) 379.
weigh testimony, 366.
killing next of kin, 649.
stock, damages. 512.
knowledge of fraud, 519.
917
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
FORM Continued.
landlord and tenant, 453.
law determined by court, 380.
libel and slander, 491.
defined, 491.
limiting liability, carrier, 586.
loss in shipment, 587.
malice in slander, 492.
malicious prosecution, 503, 504, 505, 506.
defense, 506.
malpractice, 484.
master and servant, 110.
medical experts, 377.
^minor's contracts, 451.
earning wages. 449.
money intrusted, bailment, 434.
murder, 773.
negligence, defendant liable, 542.
negligence, generally, 529.
defined, 529.
inferred, 538.
not inferred, 539.
of both, 544.
of carriers, 548.
of city, 591.
of defendant, 544.
of master and servant, 610.
of passenger, 582.
of railroads, 392, 627.
presumed, 548.
what is not, 539, 540.
not bound to believe witness, 368.
number of witnesses, (2) 385.
obstructions in highway, 480, 858.
on accommodation note,' (1) 416.
on agency, 388.
on applying instructions, (5) 379.
on attorney's services^ 431.
on contract of insane person, 403.
waiving rights, (5) 406.
on good character. 756, 757.
on impeachment of witness, 367.
on negligence. 542.
on reasonable doubt. 716.
on reconciling testimony, (2) (3) (4) (8) 365.
on rescinding contract, 402.
on sale of property, (7) 413.
on truth and veracity, (11) 367.
on unimpeached witness, (8) 367.
on witness contradictions, (13) 367.
opinions of experts, 377.
on value. 520.
ordinary care defined, 529, 530.
partnership contracts, 459.
party, witness for himself, 369.
passenger entering train, 567.
injured, 563.
leaving moving train, 561.
on wrong train, 576.
care. 551.
without ticket, 574.
physician's practice, 484, 485, 486.
918 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
FORM Continued.
plaintiff assuming risk, (12) (13) 544.
as witness, 369.
knowing danger, (9) (10) (11) 544.
policeman, (2) 378.
positive and negative testimony, 371.
preparing streets for travel.. 606.
preponderance, (5) 385.
of evidence, (4) 385.
presumption of innocence, 713.
how determined, (1) 385.
preventing completion of contract, 397.
principal bound by agent's act, 388.
promissory notes involved, 415.
proximate cause of injury, 541.
public nuisance, 852.
purchasing with intent to defraud, 414.
putting passenger off train, 556.
reasonable doubt, 716.
railroads burning property, 645.
not insurer, 584.
relating to assignment of policy, 424.
banking, 436, 437.
bicycles, (2) 480, 482.
brokers, 438.
carriers, 548.
children, 559.
contracts, 430.
electricity, 546.
insurance, 420.
real estate,
wills,
riding on car platform, 570.
ringing bell at crossings, 641.
sale induced by fraud, 414.
sale of personal property,
self-defense, instructions on, 474, 475, 795.
selling intoxicating liquors, 487.
land on commission, 394.
settlement by arbitration, 432.
several owners, injury, 579.
sidewalk cases, 591.
slander defined, (2) 491.
slight negligence, carriers, 550.
preponderance, (5) 382.
starting car suddenly, 562.
train too soon, 565.
statute of limitation, 465.
Sunday violations,
tenant guilty of negligence, (8) 544.
trolley-car wires, 547.
unlawful arrest, 505.
usury on note, 419.
value of attorney's services. 430.
verdict in criminal case. 42.
in writing. 42.
waiving right to rescind, 413.
which company liable for. 579.
witnesses, civil or criminal. 365.
criminal only. 372.
witness testifying falsely, 368
defendant a witness, criminal. 372, 373.
INDEX. 919
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
FORMULA,
"if you believe from evidence," 105.
"if the evidence shows,"
of instruction, 105.
need not repeat formula, 105.
not essential, when, 105.
"under the evidence," 105.
FOUND,
finding and appropriating, 817.
FRAMING INSTRUCTION,
in what manner, 1.
FRAUD,
as defense, burden, (4) 384.
attempt to defraud bank, 437.
badges of fraud, 523.
burden of proof on, 514.
committed by agent, 388.
definition unnecessary, 75.
degree of proof on, 200.
fair dealing presumed, 514.
fraudulent assignment, 524.
husband and wife. 200.
influencing jury en damages, 185.
innocent purchaser, 518.
in procuring insurance, 427.
' in reference to indebtedness, 525.
in sale of stocks, 516.
in selling land, (2) 388, 522.
form, (2) 388.
in settling with creditors, 524.
instructions improper, insurance, 177.
proper, 176.
knowledge of fraud, (3) 517.
men presumed honest, 514.
misleading instruction on, 65.
must be proved, form, (5) 384.
never presumed. 177, (5) 384, (3) 514.
"never presumed," improper, 177, (5) 384.
not in issue, 96.
not question of law, n. 70, 183.
opinions on value, 520.
presumptive proot of, (4) 517.
proof by "clear preponderance," 200.
purchaser in good faith. (3) 517.
purchasing to defraud, form, 414.
question of fact, (4) 517."
relief from, when, 515.
rescinding contract for, (1) 413.
.sale based on fraud. (4) 517.
settlement procured by fraud, 404.
shown by circumstances, 176.
stating facts constituting, n. 70, 183.
sureties signing bond, 521.
FRAUDULENT ASSIGNMENT.
forms of instructions on, 524.
920 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE
instruction not intimating opinion, 176.
no evidence sustaining 127.
shown by circumstances, 176.
FRAUDULENT INTENT,
known to purchaser, 519.
FRAUDULENT REPRESENTATIONS, 515.
damages resulting from, 516.
forms of instructions, 516.
in sale of stock, 516.
"FRAUDULENTLY,"
definition unnecessary, 75.
FREIGHT CAR,
carrying passengers, 555.
FRENZY,
is not insanity, (5) 755.
FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS, 7.
after jury retire, 34.
correctness of, 37.
counsel present without objecting to, 35.
discretionary with court, 38.
duty to further instruct, 34.
eliminating objectionable features in charge, 7.
further with jury request, 38.
giving entirely new charge, 37.
not error, when, 35.
without request, 38.
in absence of counsel, 35, 36.
of defendant, 36.
in presence of defendant, 36.
in writing, when, 34.
on court's motion, 38.
on points not requested, 37.
remarks of court on giving, 38.
re-reading original charge, 37.
right to have, 34.
statutory prohibition, Texas, 37.
when and when not error, 3 P.
G.
GAMBLING.
in grain, 528.
on markets, 528.
GAMBLING CONTRACTS. 528.
evidence showing, 128.
liability on, 528.
GAMING,
defined, 846.
betting on billiards, 848.
betting on horse race, n. 33, 528\.
chips or checks used, 848.
INDEX. 921
(References are to Sections, 1 3G4 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
GAS,
escaping through negligence, (8) 544.
GATES,
at crossings, necessity, 643.
GENERAL AFFIRMATIVE CHARGE, 120, 129.
GENERAL CHARGE,
covering all principles, 26.
embracing principles of special, 26.
specific charge with, 60.
sufficiency of, without special, 26.
GEORGIA,
jury judges of criminal law, 168.
GIVING,
abstract instructions, harmless when, 48.
after modifying request, 30.
by marking "given," 44.
discretionary, when, 206.
full charge on court's motion, 26b.
giving or refusing as requested, 31.
giving, though not requested in time, 17.
giving when no evidence, 81, 82.
in language of request. 32.
instruction employing no evidence, 192.
marked "refused," 44.
when evidence incompetent, 84.
when no evidence, 80, 81, 82.
without marking, 44.
instruction without marking, 44.
on court's motion. 3, 26b, 346.
on impeachment of witness, 220.
on issues when no evidence, 93.
too many instructions, 19.
when evidence speculative, 85.
without signing instructions, 43.
GIVING PROMINENCE,
prominence to facts, 113, 223.
prominence to testimony, 113, 223.
GOOD CHARACTER.
character evidence, 340, 341.
considered with other evidence, 241.
creating reasonable doubt, 341, 343.
defendant's character, 340.
in doubtful case, 340.
instruction disregarding. 340.
improper, 340. 345.
proper. 343, 344.
limiting effect of, n. 27. 345.
misleading instruction. 345.
no evidence of character, 342.
refusing on, proper when. 342.
repeating instruction on, 342.
unavailing, when, 344.
922 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1364 Principles, 365878 Forma.}
GOODS,
See PROPERTY.
carrier not liable, when, 588.
. damage, carrier not liable, 588.
delay in shipment, 588.
lost by carrier, 587.
shipment of, damage to, 588.
liability, 588.
GONG,
sounding at crossings, (5) 641.
GRADES,
in streets, forms, 602.
obstructing water flow, 602.
GRAIN,
sale of, in storage, n. 34, 414.
GRASS,
damaged by cattle, 677.
"GREAT BODILY HARM," 201.
GRIEF,
in assessing damages, 651. '
not element of damages, 650.
GRIPMAN,
keeping lookout, (3) 644.
GROUNDS,
stating reasons for exception, 354.
GROUPING,
grouping instructions, 73.
into one series, 73.
on each subject, 73.
order of arrangement discretionary, 73.
GUARDIAN,
failing to loan funds, 870.
value of services, 870.
GUARDS,
not in repair, railroads, 646.
preventing cattle crossing, 646.
GUILT,
beyond reasonable doubt, 296.
conclusively shown, 243.
degree of proof required, 313.
criminal, 201.
drunkenness affecting, 779.
excluding other hypothesis, except, 310.
facts consistent with. 310.
presumed when, larceny, 265a.
GUILTY,
uncertain who is, 728.
GUILTY PERSON,
caution against acquitting, 32.
INDEX. 923
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
H.
HABITATION,
killing in defending habitation, 795.
HANDWRITING,
comparing signatures improper, 872.
instructions on proof, 870.
proven how, 871.
seeing person write, 871.
HARMLESS ERROR, S 66 CURING ERROR, ERROR.
admissions proving case, 243.
assuming facts, 242.
cured by other instructions, 64.
defective instruction cured, 72, 105.
disputed facts, assuming, 242.
error cured, criminal, 240.
erroneous instructions - favorable, 244.
failure to limit evidence, n. 157, 109.
favorable to party, 244.
if verdict is right, 243.
illogical arrangement, 73.
illustrations of principles, 237.
imperfect instruction cured by others, 70.
improper remark, n. 18, 238.
in arranging instructions, 73.
in assessing damages, 241.
in giving instructions, 235.
in jury determining law, when, 155.
in personal injury, 241.
in refusing instruction, 85.
instructing on immaterial issues, 91.
instructions construed together, 238.
corrected, 238.
omitting facts, stated in others, 71.
on freight rates, n. 13, 238.
on machinery. 239.
on murder, 252, n. 59, 274.
manslaughter instructions, 252.
negligence, instructions on, 236, 239.
omitting "if you believe from evidence," cured, 105.
reasonable doubt, 313.
on argumentative requests, 67.
on burden, 199.
on circumstantial evidence, 310.
on contributory negligence, 239.
on negligence, 236, 239.
on presumption of innocence 337.
on reasonable doubt, n. 19, 296.
relating to damages, 237.
safety of machinery 239.
slight inaccuracies, n. 39, 243.
submitting immaterial matters, 243.
though refused instruction proper, 236.
using "intentionally" for knowingly and wilfully, 219.
verdict, showing error disregarded, 236.
when error cured, 238.
when evidence undisputed, 243.
924 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1364 Principles, 365878 Forms.)
HAY,
catching fire, railroads, 645.
destruction by animals, 676.
HEALTH,
affected by nuisance, 855.
damages for injury to, (6) 653.
drains in city necessary, 600.
element of damages, death, (7) 650.
injured by nuisance, 679.
"HEAT OF PASSION,"
definition necessary, 75.
HIGHWAY,
established by record, (3) 858.
established by user, dedication, 858.
forms of instructions, 606.
injury to traveler, 483.
keeping in repair, 480.
liability if dangerous, 606.
maliciously destroying bridge, 860.
notice of danger in, 480.
obstructions causing injury, 480.
owner giving land for, (2) 858.
preparing for travel, 606.
riding bicycle on, 480.
safe for travel, forms, 606.
turnpike unsafe, 481.
HOGS, See ANIMALS.
at large unlawfully, 646.
damaging crops, 646.
liability, (4) 646.
killing, owner negligent, 646.
trespassing hogs, 837.
shipping, 589.
HOME,
See HABITATION.
HOMESTEAD,
abandonment of, 873.
instructions on, 873.
HOMICIDE,
See MURDER, MANSLAUGHTER.
bare fear no defense, 795.
court cannot determine degree, 251.
defendant must retreat, 260.
degree of, jury determine, 251.
Utah, 270.
"entirely free from fault," n. 40, 258.
evidence circumstantial, instructions w y hen, 273.
"free from fault" n. 44, 258.
instructing murder or nothing, 269.
on degrees, 270.
when evidence wholly circumstantial, 270.
INDEX. 925
(References are to Sections, 1364 Principles, 365878 Forms.)
HOMICIDE Continued.
instruction erroneous, 251.
denning degrees, 252.
on all degrees, proper, when, 273.
self-contradictory, 249.
in unlawful arrest 262.
justifiable homicide defined, 795.
killing trespasser, 263.
murder or no offense. 252.
no evidence of included offense, 269.
retreat not required, 260.
self-defense, belief, appearance, 256.
instructions, 255.
threats by deceased, 257.
HORSE See BAILMENT.
injured by railroad, 646.
killing another, 512.
over-driving, cruelty, 838.
HORSE-CARS,
carrier using, ( 13 ) 549.
HOTEL,
liable for loss, when, 435.
losing guest's property, 435.
HOUSEHOLDER,
what constitutes, form, 452.
HUSBAND,
ability to earn, death, (10) 649.
age, health, length of life, (13) 650.
believing or disbelieving, 370.
damages for killing, (8) 649. .
duty to wife, (2) 488.
gift to wife, 446, (3) 447.
head of family, exemption, 452.
killed by railroad, 649.
rights to wife's estate, 446.
value of services to family, (13) 650.
widow and children, 649.
wife killed, damages, (7) 650.
witness for wife, form. 370.
HUSBAND AND WIFE, 446, 447, 523.
contracts between, 523.
debtor and creditor between, 200.
forms of instructions, 446, 447.
injuring creditors, 523.
HYPOTHESIS.
See REASONABLE HYPOTHESIS.
circumstantial evidence excluding. 730.
HYPOTHETICAL,
submitting facts hypothetically, 172.
926 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
I.
ICE,
on navigable streams, owner, 686.
on sidewalks, forms, 603.
liability, 603.
IGNORING,
defense, ignored, 118.
in criminal case, 118.
of limitation, 118.
proper, when, 83.
facts harmless, 71.
immaterial issues, proper. 91.
included offense ignored, 267.
in summary instructions, 119.
issue of care of plaintiff, 92.
material issues, 92.
self-defense in instructions, 255.
submitting undisputed facts, 116.
summarizing one side, 116.
theory of party, error, 101.
ILLINOIS,
directing verdict, practice, 123.
exceptions to instructions, 356.
faulty counts, instruction, n. 42, 54.
judges of criminal law, 153, 166, 709.
peremptory instructions in writing, 123.
retreat in murder, n. 51, 260.
ILLUSTRATIONS,
argumentative instructions, 68.
assuming facts, 193.
circumstantial evidence, 306, 307, 314, 315.
coercing jury, 188.
commenting on weight of evidence, 190.
court urging jury to agree, 186.
directing verdict, 134.
insanity, instructions proper, 334.
instructions based on pleadings, 97.
improper, 184. 315.
issues unsupported by evidence, 81, 93a.
legal questions, 163.
misleading instructions, 65.
no evidence supporting instructions, 81.
not assuming facts, 194.
omission of words, harmless, 314.
on good character, 345.
on reasonable doubt. 294.
on special findings, 233.
opinion intimated, 177.
not intimated, 176.
criminal, 178.
personal injury, improper, 97.
presumption of innocence, 339.
questions of fact, 164.
INDEX. 92?'
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
ILLUSTRATIONS Continued.
referring to pleadings, proper when, 155.
self-contradictory instruction, 249.
withdrawing negligence, 117a.
witness' credibility, improper, 207.
IMPEACHMENT,
by bad reputation, (13) 3G7.
by showing contradictions, (6) (9) (11) (13) 367.
former conviction, 110.
"evident tending to" impeach, 220.
form of instruction, 367.
impeaching witness, 220, 221, 367.
instruction misleading, 221.
improper, 221.
not legal question, 220.
of one's own witness, 222.
on moral character, (10) 367.
question for jury, 220.
INCEST,
corroboration required, 290.
woman, accomplice, 29,0.
INCLUDED CRIMINAL OFFENSES. 267.
evidence supporting, 267, 270, 272.
wanting on, 268, 273.
wholly circumstantial, 270.
form of verdict, requesting, 42.
if no evidence of. 268.
ignoring in instructions, 267.
instructions, 55, 267.
erroneous, when, 267.
improper, when. 267, 269.
improperly withdrawing, 267.
murder or no offense, 269.
must request instructions on, 274.
no evidence of, 269, 271.
presumption of innocence on, n. 9, 337.
refusing instructions, error when, 29, 267, 268, 270, 272.
slight evidence of, 267.
INCLUDING,
opposing theory, including, 32.
INCOMPLETE CHARGE,
instructions applicable though incomplete, 7.
not error though incomplete, 7.
INCOMPLETE INSTRUCTION,
in criminal case, 29.
opposing party requesting modification of, 27. 29.
INDIANA,
decisions of supreme court, criminal. 166.
disregarding instructions, criminal, 166.
928 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1364 Principles, 365878 Forms.)
INDIANA Continued.
exceptions, how taken, 357.
instructions merely advisory, 169.
judges of criminal law, 710.
jury judges criminal law, 166, 169.
legal propositions, preserving when jury waived. 47.
making instructions part of record, 357.
preserving instructions in record, criminal, n. 68, 357, 358.
record embodying instructions, 357.
must show written requests, 10.
signing instructions., 357.
statute on preserving instructions, n. 68, 357.
trial without jury, 47.
INDICTMENT, See INFORMATION.
containing distinct counts, 98.
several counts, defense to part, 118.
for selling liquor, counts, 98.
framing instruction for one count, 55.
instructions based on evidence rather than indictment, 95.
enumerating facts, 55.
limited to some count, 55.
no evidence on counts, 98.
proof of each material element, 735.
referring to. for description, 55.
several offenses, instructions, 29.
INFANT, See CHILDREN, MINOR.
care and prudence of, (5) 536.
cautioning against danger, (5) 536.
degree of care required, 536.
exposed to danger, ( 1 ) 536.
forms of instructions, 536, 537.
injured on premises, 537.
negligence of infant, 536.
parents' care of infant, (6) (7) 536.
playing on premises, 537.
INFERENCE,
drawing from document. 159.
from evidence, 290, 84, (1) (6) 379.
from writing collaterally, 164.
for jury to draw, 181, 308.
from circumstances proved, 308, (4) 729.
from circumstantial evidence, 308, 729.
from facts shown, 454.
incorrect, suggested by instruction, 60.
inferring main fact, 309.
material fact, 279.
intent inferred, 279.
instruction intimating, proper, 181.
on motion for nonsuit. 121.
for peremptory. 121, 129.
for verdict. 126.
supporting facts in issue, 117.
unwarranted from evidence, 85.
will support instructions, 87.
INDEX. 929
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.}
INFORMATION, See INDICTMENT.
of distinct counts, 98.
INFORMERS,
as witnesses, 224.
INGRESS,
preventing ingress, 679.
INJURY,
See INJURY TO PERSON.
by fellow servant, 614.
negligence in treating, 654.
INJURY TO PERSON,
age considered, 653.
aggravated by negligence, (2) 654.
alleged in general terms, 95.
assault to ravish, 477.
seif-defense, 474.
assessing damages for, 476.
city, 607.
mortality tables, n. 65, 58.
assuming disputed fact 195.
pe manent injury, 195.
at railroad crossings, 641, 642.
bodily pain considered, 58.
by common carrier, 550.
by his own fault, (1) 539.
by obstructions in road. 480.
by railroad company, 117a.
instruction improper, 184.
stating allegations, 194.
caused by animal, 478.
child injured, care, 600.
compensation for injury, 58.
considerations, estimating damages,. 476, (3) 652.
in assessing damages 476.
damages confined to issues, 97.
for humiliation, 476.
for pain, (4) 653.
improper, when, 106.
tables of mortality, n. 65, 58.
evidence conflicting, instructions, 195.
of permanent injury, 86.
of wilfulncss wanting. 81.
exposing one's self, (2) 654.
facts entitling recovery, 647.
falling into ditch 194.
forms on damages, 652. 653.
framing instruction for injury, 58.
from accident, (5) 474. 581, 598.
from disease, (7) 545.
from natural cause, (7) 545.
from negligence, instruction, 65.
from plaintiff's carelessness, 600.
930 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.}
INJURY TO PERSON Continued.
injury to postal clerk, 554.
undisputed, 196.
instructions for damages, 58.
liability for injury, 579.
medical treatment, damages, (3) 652.
neglected, 654.
mental anguish considered, 58.
suffering not in issue, 97.
minor working for another, 449.
negligence, proximate cause, 541.
no evidence of earnings, 81.
on entering car 184.
on highway, forms, 483.
' pain, suffering considered, 58, 653.
passenger leaving train, 563.
on freight car, 555.
standing on platform, 580.
permanent injury, damages, 607, (3) (4) (5) (10) 652.
proximate cause of injury, 541.
riding bicycle on bridge, 482.
several railroads involved, 579.
slight evidence of injury, 86.
speculative damages improper, ( 12 ) 652.
traveler on highway, 483.
traveling on turnpike, 481.
whether shamming injury, 176.
while changing cars, 578.
while riding wheel, 245.
while violating company's rules, 611.
INJURY TO PROPERTY,
accident or natural cause, 545.
INNOCENCE,
argumentative as to. 68.
defendant presumed -innocent. 336, 713.
presumed throughout trial, 336.
presumption favors innocence 715.
error, when, 337.
forms, 713.
protection, 714.
possibility of, improper. 297.
reasonable theory of, 723.
INNOCENT PERSON,
caution against convicting, 32, 52.
INQUEST,
proceedings not evidence, 793.
INSANITY,
ability to distinguish right from wrong, 748.
burden by preponderance, 331.
on defendant, when, 201, 331.
wills, 696.
clear proof of, when, 752.
defense to murder, instructions, 271.
INDEX. 931
(References are to Sections, 1364 Principles, 365878 Forms.}
INSANITY Continued.
defined, wills, 698.
definition, 329.
degree of proof, 201, 751.
rendering irresponsible, 329.
drunkenness is not, 755.
evidence of, slight, 88.
wanting, 83.
examine defense with care, 754.
feigning insanity, caution on, 333.
forms of instructions, criminal, 746.
relating to wills, 697, 698.
frenzy is not, (5) 755.
from violent temper, (2) 747.
higher degree of proof, 752.
ingenuous counterfeit, 333.
insane at intervals, 747.
delusions, wills, 697.
instruction cautioning on, 333.
may define, 332.
on degree, 332.
proper, improper, 334, 335.
intermittent type, 330.
in will contest, 696.
irresistible impulse, 750.
lucid intervals, 747.
mentally capable of choosing, (5) 748.
mind permanently unsound, 700.
non-expert, witness on, 223.
not presumed to continue, (2) 747.
of defendant's relatives, 335.
of permanent type, 330.
overriding reason, 329, 748.
permanent or chronic, (2) 747.
presumed to continue, when, 330, 747.
proof of, wills, 696.
raising reasonable doubt, 331.
reason dethroned, 750.
reasonable doubt of sanity, 331, 751.
refusing, error when, 330.
when no evidence of. n. 30, 335.
renders contract void, 403.
"right and wrong," test, 329, 748.
sanity presumed, 330, (4) 751.
temporary, causes, (2) 747.
testator making will, 692.
unable to refrain from act, (4) 748, 749.
uncontrollable impulse, (4) 748.
weak mind no defense, 753.
wicked passions, not, (5) 755.
will overcome by impulse, 749, 750.
power impaired, 749.
to resist act, 747.
INSOLVENCY,
instructions on insolvency, 177.
932 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
INSOLVENT,
purchasing goods, when, 177.
INSTRUCTING JURY, 3.
See CHARGING JURY.
accuracy required, when, n. 77, 250.
certain facts constitute negligence, 183.
do not prove guilty, 179.
debt is admitted, when denied, 195.
duty without request, when 3.
evidence admits of one conclusion, 181.
prima facie, 181.
tends to prove, 181.
tends to show, 173.
"if you believe derendant's evidence," 177.
evidence for state, 178.
testimony of defendant, 178.
in civil cases, 3.
in felony case, Texas, 3.
"must give weight," improper, 182.
on abandoned issues, error, 100.
on court's motion, n. 14, 199, n. 54, 274.
on court's own motion., 3.
on defective bridge, improper, 177.
on "free from fault," 258.
on manner of reaching verdict, n. 19, 50.
one kind of evidence better than other, 177.
INSTRUCTIONS, See INSTRUCTING, CHARGING JURY.
abstract instructions,
additional after general charge, 14.
after jury retire, 35.
discretionary, 38.
waived, 12.
affirmative and negative testimony, 204, 205.
after jury retire, 34, 35.
after remanding cause, 364.
alibi as defense, 322, 743.
all preserved in record, 359.
anticipating opposing theory, 104.
applicable as far as they go, 7.
to evidence, 1.
arbitrarily limiting number, 19.
argumentative, illustrations, 66, 68.
assuming facts, 192. 193.
permanent injury, 195.
as to each juror, 301.
as to punishment, 274.
at request of jury. 34.
based on circumstantial evidence, 87.
. on evidence, 80.
rather than pleadings, 95.
on inferences, 87.
on pleadings, 94.
bill of exceptions, preserving. 358.
burden of proof. 199. 382.
burglary and larceny, 265a. 810.
cautionary, criminal, 49, 52, 379, 707.
circumstantial evidence. 87. 303. 304, 729.
clause or paragraph, defective, 28.
INDEX. 933
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.}
INSTRUCTIONS Continued.
coercing jury to agree, 187.
common knowledge, 107.
comparative weight of evidence, 177.
confessions, admissions, 316, 787.
confined to defense alleged, 96.
to disputed issues, 93.
confining to evidence, 105.
to evidence, criminal, 98.
to issues in pleadings, 94.
conflicting evidence, 105.
considered together, 238.
conspiracy, evidence wanting, 82.
construed as a whole, 70, 380.
both parties together, 71.
together, form. 70, (4) 380.
containing objectionable- features, 7.
copying pleadings, improper, 90.
court correcting, if faulty, 27.
covering several counts, 29.
criminal intent, 279, 280.
damages, error cured, 241.
for death, 650, 651.
defective in any particular, 27.
cured, 72.
standing alone, 72.
defining offenses, 275, 276.
reasonable doubt, 294, 295.
degree of homicide, 251.
degree of proof, criminal, 296.
directing verdict, 120, 126.
for defendant, 120, 126.
for plaintiff, 135 to 139.
discretionary as to arrangement, 73.
doubtful in application, 48.
drawing inferences, 308.
duty to instruct, when, 3.
each link, 312.
elements of request, 33.
embezzlement, 820.
enumerating elements of crime, 277.
error held cured, 64.
in malicious prosecution, 81.
instructions, criminal, 169.
in will contest, 81.
evidence slight on insanity, 88.
if no evidence. 174.
wanting, criminal, 82.
exceptions to instructions, 13, 346.
to oral charge, 13.
excluding incompetent evidence, 84.
punitive damages. 58.
exemplary damages, 59.
explaining contentions, 90.
extracts from books, 286.
facts not alleged, 99.
failure to ask, criminal, 9.
to instruct, 8.
in writing. 4.
no request, 8.
false pretense, 830.
934 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1364 Principles, 365878 Forms.)
INSTRUCTIONS Continued.
form of verdict, 42.
fraudulent transactions, 514.
full charge on court's motion, 26b.
further, entire new .charge.. 37.
in absence of counsel, 35.
must be requested, 7.
on court's motion, 38.
on other points, 37.
giving abstract propositions, 48.
as requested, 32.
facts prominence, 113.
on court's motion, 3, n. 14, 199, n. 54, 234, 286.
or refusing, as requested 31.
out of statute of limitation. 108.
prominence to facts, 113.
too many, effect, 19.
without request, 3.
good character, forms, 756.
grouping into one series, 73.
harmonizing by modifying, 30.
how construed, 70.
how drawn, 1.
hypothetical in form, 172.
if contradictory, 246.
if too general, 7.
ignoring facts, 116.
defense, 118.
harmless, when^ 71.
issues, 33.
illustrative of rules, 48.
impeaching witness, 220.
imperfect, but harmless, 238.
in absence of defendant, criminal, 36.
of statute, 4.
in action of trespass, 59.
in bill of exceptions, 357.
included offenses, 55. 267.
incomplete, criminal, 169.
charge, 7.
instructions, 29.
when, several counts, 29.
when several offenses, 29.
inconsistent theories, 102.
in criminal cases, 3, 29, 251, 707.
in display type, 45.
injury to person, 474.
insanity as defense, 746.
interrogative form, 69.
intimating inference, 181.
opinion, 175.
in words of statute, 284.
in writing, 4.
issues and contentions, 90.
immaterial, 91.
abandoned, 100.
issues outside of pleadings, 99.
jury determining law, 153, 155.
facts, 170.
disregarding instructions, 153.
requesting instructions, 34.
INDEX. 935
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.}
INSTRUCTIONS Continued.
larceny, evidence slight, 88.
on legal possession, 163.
limited to one count, 54, 98.
to counts, criminal, 98.
limiting confession. 112.
evidence. 109.
to some counts, 54.
to specific purpose, 109, 110, 111.
malicious prosecution, 81.
manslaughter, proper, 272.
marking "for plaintiff," "for defendant," 45.
by noting authorities, 45.
by underscoring, 45.
"given," "refused," 44.
reasons for refusing, n. 197, 44.
may be modified, 32.
measure of damages, 56, 57, 120.
misleading instructions, 60, 63, 64, 65.
if of two meanings, 61.
though correct, 60.
misconduct in argument, 14.
modifying correct requests, 31.
defective, 30.
in criminal case, 32.
to cover all elements, 33.
evidence, 33.
negligence, stating facts, 183.
neither party requesting, 8.
not bound to give, when, 220.
not exnlaining each other, 246.
not referring to evidence, 105.
object of instructions.. 1.
omitting facts, cured how, 72.
"reasonable doubt," 240.
on aiding, abetting, 765.
on alibi, 322, 743.
on building contract, 239, 444.
on contracts, 396, 430.
on court's motion, marking, 3, 19, 38, 44.
on malice, intent, 279, 776, 777.
on marriage contract. 455.
on murder, 773.
on negligence, improper, 117a.
on permanent injury, 241.
on personal knowledge, 107.
special findings, 230.
reasonable doubt, 294.
on vital points, 243.
one of series. 246.
one qualifying another, 70.
one stating all issues, 56.
oral or written, 4.
discretionary, 4.
order of arrangement, 73.
outside of issues, improper, 94.
party must request, criminal, 9.
petit larceny, proper, 89.
plaintiff's negligence,
pointing out one circumstance, 116.
prejudicial in larceny, 82.
936 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1364 Principles, 365878 Forms.)
INSTRUCTIONS Continued.
preparing and presenting, 17.
presenting before general charge, 14.
to court, 8.
under rule, 14.
preserving in record. 357.
presumed in writing, when, 10.
properly given, when, 360.
presumption of innocence, 336, 713.
properly refused, when, 94.
propriety of giving, 2.
reasonable doubt, 716, 728.
referring to by number, n. 32, 350.
to declaration, 53, 155.
to each other, 246.
to issues, 90.
to pleadings, 53.
to time of offense, n. 47, 56.
refusing all instructions, 26b.
further requests, 38.
repetitions, 20 to 27.
relating to master and servant, 76.
to damages, 59, 474.
to master and servant,
to railroads,
to witnesses, 206, 365.
relative weight of evidence, 204.
remote damages, 57.
repeating as to defense, 23.
in detail, 22.
on preponderance, 21.
on reasonable doubt, 21.
unnecessary, 20.
requesting before general charge, 16:
in aggregate, 28.
required without request, when, 3.
requiring explanation, 61.
reviewing evidence, 191.
rule as to damages, 57.
rulings, remarks, not instructions, 41.
same error by both, 363.
self-contradictory, error, 249.
self-defense, criminal. 256.
unlawful arrest.. 262.
sending after jury retire, 35.
setting out pleadings, 53.
several sales of liquor, 98.
should be simple. 1.
signing and numbering, 43.
singling out facts. 65, 113, 114, 115.
witness, 223.
slight evidence. 86.
specific exceptions to, 348.
specific instructions. 7.
stating allegations, proper, 194.
cause of action, 56.
complete case. 246.
contentions, 53, 90, 173.
claim of party, 173.
whole law, 56.
INDEX. 937
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
INSTRUCTIONS Continued.
submitting facts hypothetically, 160, 172.
issues not alleged, 94.
negligence, 638.
undisputed facts, 172.
suggesting theory, improper, 102.
summing up evidence, 119.
supported by slight evidence, 86.
"testimony is mostly positive," 176.
theory of party, 101.
time of giving, 14.
of presenting, 14.
using "acquit" for convict, 78.
voluntary confession, 317.
waiving instructions, 12.
time of giving, 12.
weight of evidence, 182.
what are not, 41.
when case admitted, 243.
when contract is illegal, 128.
when different grounds of action, 56.
when degree doubtful, 253.
when evidence balanced, 202.
close, 26a, 250.
conflicting, 178, 191.
incompetent, 84.
when jury waived, 47.
when issues abandoned, 100.
when no evidence, 80, 93.
when several offenses joined, 98.
when several issues, 93.
when some issues admitted, 93.
when witnesses contradict each other, 212.
withdrawing facts, 117.
instructions, 8, 40.
prejudicial evidence, 84.
time of, 40.
whole law in one, 56.
written and oral, 11.
required, 4.
INSTRUMENT,
collateral evidence merely, 159.
INSURANCE,
abandonment of property, 428.
of insured boat, 428.
agent knowing ickness, 176.
wrongful acts, 426.
application for policy, 420.
boat insured, 428.
not seaworthy, 429.
building falling, form, 425.
contracts relating to, 420.
false statement avoids policy, 420.
in application, 420.
forms, 420.
forms of instructions, 420.
on waiving rights, 421.
fraud in proving loss, 427.
938 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
INSURANCE Continued.
instruction on fraud,, improper, 170.
proper, 176.
no recovery, when, 425.
not responsible for agent's acts, 426.
notice of death.. 422.
opinion not intimated. 176.
proof of death unnecessary. 423.
property not destroyed by fire, <L25.
receipt of premiums. 421.
recovery, what defeats, 429.
right to abandon property, (4) (5) 428.
statement as to health, (4) (5) 420.
sound health, meaning, (5) 420.
voidable when, instruction, 33.
waiving instruction on, 33.
notice of death, (4) 422.
rights, 176.
to avoid, 421.
INTELLIGENCE,
witness' intelligence, (5) (7) 365, (3) 366.
INTENT, See MALICE.
consequences of acts, 777.
disproving specific intent, 779.
doubt as to sobriety, 281.
drunkenness disproving, 281.
essential in embezzlement, 824.
in forgery, 844.
in larceny, 815.
evidence disproving, 280.
of similar acts, 111.
finding lost goods, 817.
forms of instructions, 777.
in false pretense, 832.
inferred from acts, 279.
from weapon used, 279.
in purchase of goods, 177.
instruction erroneous, 279.
proper, 279.
intent in burglary, 809.
inferred from act, 809.
sexual intercourse., 778.
knowledge of bank's condition, 826.
limiting evidence to, 111.
omitting in defining offense, 276.
presumed from means used, 777
from act, 179.
proof of intent, 65, 111.
refusing instructions on, 280.
shown by circumstances, 809.
weapon used indicating, 279.
INTENTION,
accompanying possession, land, 660.
in claiming land, (1) 660.
wanting in claiming land, 660.
INTEREST,
defendant, interested witness, 227.
INDEX. 939
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365878 Forms. )
INTEREST Continued.
in result of suit, 366.
on claim for damages, 671.
on monthly balances, 443.
on note, usurious, 418.
payment, evidence of, 862.
witness' interest considered, 214.
INTERESTED WITNESS,
See WITNESSES.
INTERPRETATION,
of oral contract, 157.
INTERROGATIVE,
intimating opinion, 69.
interrogative instructions, 69.
INTERROGATORIES,
answers to, 231.
inconsistent, 233.
effect of answers to, 232.
on special findings, proper, 230.
submitting for finding, 230.
largely discretionary, 230.
ultimate facts, 231.
INTIMATING OPINION,
by interrogative request, 69.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS,
death from sale of, (2) 487.
evidence, competency of, 490.
forms of instructions, 487, 488, 489, 490-
injury from sale of, 487.
instructions restricted, 98.
to wife from sales, 488.
liability in selling, 487.
selling in residence district, 876.
since suit instituted, 490.
to person in habit, 487.
unlawfully, 876.
several distinct sales, 98.
transfer of license, 489.
vindictive Damages, when, 488.
wife suing for damage, 490.
INTOXICATION,
See DRUNKENNESS.
INVADING,
in circumstantial evidence, 309.
in homicide case, 251.
instruction held not, 176.
on alibi defense, 328.
on confessions, 317, 319.
on good character, 340.
province of jury, 174, 175, 177, 181, 184, 185, 204, 211, 223.
singling out, 223.
INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER, See MANSLAUGHTER.
instructions on properly refused, when, 273.
no evidence of, 273.
940 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
IN WRITING,
written instructions required, when, 4, 34.
IOWA,
court, judge of criminal law, 712.
exceptions after verdict, 349.
to instructions, 349.
time of taking exceptions, 347.
ISSUES,
abandoned, instructions, 90.
admitted, instructions, 93.
as originally presented by pleadings, 90.
breach of warrant alleged, 96.
care in personal injury, 92.
changes in issues, 90.
confined to those remaining, 100.
controlling, instructions on, 243.
disposed of issues, 100.
error in presenting, 243.
further instructions on, 37.
gross neglect not involved, 97.
immaterial, instruction on. 91.
improperly submitted, 100.
in different counts, 33.
instructions, confine! to, 94, 100.
material and immaterial, 91.
question of law, 155.
mental capacity, no evidence. 93a.
suffering not involved, 97.
misstatement of issues, 90.
modifying requests to cover, 33.
no evidence on issues, 80, 93, 93a.
not covered by general charge, 26.
not in pleadings, 94, 99.
outside of pleadings, 94, 99.
properly withdrawn, when, 117.
proof of all issues, 93.
proving facts without pleading them, 93.
purpose of stating issues, 90.
raised by defendant, burden, 202.
new issues, 99.
without objection, 99.
requiring special findings, 230.
singling out as controling, 92. .
stating in instructions, 53, 90.
in one instruction, 56.
submitting issue not alleged, 96.
without evidence, 82.
unsupported by evidence, 81.
by evidence, 117.
ISSUES ABANDONED. 90, 100.
issues disposed of, criminal, 100.
withdrawing the same, 100.
J.
JEOPARDY,
directing verdict on, 152.
INDEX. 941
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.}
JOINT EXCEPTIONS,
taken by two, 351.
JUDGE,
See COUBT.
calling on jury, 39.
manner of instructing, voice, 46.
signing instructions, 346.
JUDGMENT,
error will not reverse, 243.
JUDICIAL NOTICE,
natural laws noticed, 163.
JURORS,
See JURY.
believe as men, 302, 718, 722.
convinced as men, 302.
instructions on proper, 301 302.
JURY,
See JURORS.
apply their knowledge, 182.
attention to particular facts, 114, 115.
believe as men, (4) 366.
from evidence, 105, 107.
from instructions, error, 107.
believing or disbelieving, 365, (1) (9) 366.
bound by instructions, 153, 711, 712.
law given by court, criminal, 165.
cautioning as to arguments, 49.
duty, 49.
in criminal cases, 52, 707.
in estimating damages, 50.
on witness' credibility, 50.
coercing into agreement, illustrations, 188.
common observation of ( 1 ) ( 8 ) 36o.
competency of confession, 318.
confined to evidence alone, 105, 107.
conscientious convictions, 708.
consider witness' interest, 214.
considering personal knowledge, 107.
construe instructions, how, 70.
court coercing, 187.
gives law, criminal, 711.
improperly influencing, 185.
recalling to further instruct, 38.
urging agreement of, 186.
deliberations in reaching verdict, 708.
determine contributorv negligence. 639.
facts, 86, 170, 172, 175, 365, (3) 379.
foreign laws. 162.
law. improper, 155.
negligence. 117a. 625, 638.
preponderance, 203.
942 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365878 Forms.)
JURY Continued.
directing several retirements of, 188.
to agree, 148.
to reason together, 188.
to retire again, 188.
to try again, 187.
dismissed by agreement, effect, 145.
disregarding credible witness, 217.
entire testimony, 218, (8) 368.
error, 241.
instructions, criminal, 153, 165, 166, 167, 168.
testimony in part, 217.
whole testimony, 217.
draws inferences, Ib4, 181, 308.
duty in grave criminal cases, 707.
to agree, if possible, 708.
each juror, 301.
acts for himself, 301, 708.
to be satisfied, 301.
error to call on, 31.
experience of, among men, (8) 365.
following correct instructions, 248.
governed by instructions, n. 13, 49.
the law, ( 1 ) 365.
heeding instructions, criminal, 169.
if believe certain facts, 309.
defendant, improper, 223.
instructing on damages, 57.
instruction influencing, 185.
instructions, when, 40.
interpret writings, when, 159.
invading province of jury, 207.
judge calling on while deliberating, 39.
judges of credibility, 365.
of criminal law, 165, 709.
of law and fact, 166.
of law by statute, criminal, 166, 167.
of law, when, 153.
juror's knowledge of men. n. 55, 215.
jurors reason together, 708.
should agree if possible, 708.
lack of unanimity, 301.
may disregard testimony, 78.
must consider witness' interest, 216.
not bound to believe, 207, (12) 367, (1) 368.
by instructions, criminal, 166, 168.
to believe witness, 217.
to reject testimony, 218.
not judges of criminal law, 165.
power of, in disregarding law, 165.
recalling for further instructions. 34.
reconciling testimony. 213, (2) 365.
referring them to petition or declaration, 53.
requesting further instruction, 34, 37.
restricting to evidence, 51.
restricted to issues, 90.
should follow instructions, 153.
INDEX. 943
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
JURY Continued.
special findings by, 231.
submitting legal questions to, 163.
trial without, waiving, 47.
urging agreement to save expense, 186, 187, 188.
violating oaths, 153.
waiving right to submit facts to, 146.
weigh testimony, 182, 183, 366.
withdrawing facts from, 117.
K.
KENTUCKY,
exceptions to instructions, 349.
instructions on murder, 270.
stating issues, 90.
KILL,
assault with intent, 768.
KILLING,
accidental killing, 806.
absolutely necessary, error, 285.
bad man, n. 24, 255.
by burglars, 785.
damage for live stock, 512.
excuse in justification, 782.
in mutual combat, 265.
murder or self-defense, 273.
officer making arrest, 262.
one not intended, 786.
resisting illegal arrest, 272.
resulting from contentions, 263.
trespasser, instructions, 263.
trespassing animals, 837.
while robbing, 762.
without justification, damages, (12) 649.
KIN,
assessing damages for death, ( 10 ) 650.
damages for killing, (9) 649.
elements of damages for death, (10) (11) 650.
killing next of kin, 649.
pecuniary loss for death, 650.
KNOWLEDGE,
See INTENT.
jury exercise knowledge, 182.
L.
LADDERS,
defects in. (11) 639.
for use of brakemen, (11) 639.
on freight cars, 639.
944 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.}
LAND,
See REAL ESTATE.
abandonment of claim to, (3) 660.
accretions along rivers, 668.
acts of ownership, (6) (7) 656, (2) 658.
actual possession essential, 657.
adjoining stream, boundary, 666.
tracts, boundary, 664.
adverse possession of, 656.
boundary line, 664.
ceasing to cultivate, (4) 660.
certificate of sale, void, 689.
claiming by color of title, 662.
by occupancy, 656.
improvements only, 660.
title to, forms, (6) 656.
color of title to, 662.
cultivating, improving, 663.
damaged by excavations, 670.
by railroad, (4) 685.
damages from change of grade, 671.
from piling filth, 672.
measure of, 671.
to land, 669.
defeating legal title to, 656.
disseisin of owner, (7) 657, (1) 658.
defeating owner's right, 662.
division line, by agreement, 664.
exclusive possession of, 656, 659.
fence nearly on line, 661.
fencing under claim, (2) 657.
forms as to possession, 657.
high-water mark, boundary, 667.
increased by accretions, 668.
intention of claiming, 660.
listing for assessment, 690.
locating boundary line, 665.
market value, ( 5 ) 685.
meander line boundary. 666.
measure of damages, 672.
notice to owner on claiming, 661.
occasional acts not possession, ( 1 ) 659.
use, not possession, (3) 659.
occupied by tenant, (9) 656.
twenty years, 657, 663.
occupying and cultivating. (6) (7) 656.
without color of title, 663.
owner dedicating for road, (2) 858.
permitting damage. 669.
paying taxes on, (3) 658.
permanent injury to, 672.
retaking possession, (3) 661.
selling for taxes, 689.
taken by railroad, 683.
taxes on land, 689.
time of occupancy, 656.
INDEX. 945
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365878 Forms.}
LAND Continued.
title by possession, forms, 656.
to, by occupancy, 656.
twenty years' occupancy, (1) 657, 663.
LANDLORD AND TENANT, 510. See TENANT.
seizing tenant's property, 510.
evicting tenant, n. 57, 454.
forms of instructions, 453.
new leasing discharges guaranty, 454.
LARCENY, See BUKGLAEY.
accomplice a witness, 290.
assuming evidence of, 193.
belief as to ownership, 103.
burglary and larceny, 810.
claiming to be owner, 818.
confined to property alleged, 819.
definition and elements, 814.
defective, 276.
omitting stealing, 276.
omitting value, 276.
description of property, 95.
doubtful whether grand or petit, 89.
evidence entirely circumstantial, 304.
not circumstantial, 304.
of defense, slight, 88.
forms of instructions, 814.
evidence of petit larceny, 89.
honestly disposing of property, 103.
included in robbery, 267.
instructions on petit, 89.
intent, essential, 815.
joined with burglary, 810.
no evidence of, 268.
petit or grand, evidence, 89.
possession of goods, evidence, 82, 118.
of goods, explanation, 82.
of stolen property, 179, 201, 265a, 816.
proof of, by preponderance, 240.
of ownership, error, 240.
property found and appropriated, 817.
reasonable doubt omitted, 240.
refusing, instructions, evidence slight, 88.
stealing cattle, branding, 118.
several offenses joined, 29.
submitting with burglary, 813.
taking an estray animal, 815.
coupled with intent, 815.
theory of defense, 103.
time material to defense, 118.
value of goods alleged, 89, 819.
LAW,
See LEGAL QUESTIONS, 163.
affirmative of issue, 163.
applicability of instruction, 163.
946 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365878 Forms.)
LAW Con t inued.
clauses of instrument, repugnancy, 163.
color of title, law, 163.
common sense as law, 154.
constitution and by-laws, 163.
construction of documents, 157.
of wills, 158.
counsel stating, form, 380.
court determines, 163, (4) 380.
denounced by court, 154.
description of property in mortgage, 163.
determined by court, 163, 165, 380.
by jury, criminal, 168.
enumerating certain facts, 309.
execution of writ, whether legal, 163.
hiring team, ownership, 163.
how to be stated, 172.
illustrations, legal questions, 163.
instruction, improper, 163.
merely advisory, 168.
on actual possession, improper, 163.
on title to land, 163.
jury judges by statute, 166.
, of criminal, 168, 169.
lawful act, law, 163.
laws of other states, construction, 162.
proof of, 162.
legal possession, law, 163.
material allegations of pleadings, 155.
mortgage, acknowledge of, 163.
natural laws, judicial notice, 163.
negligence, legal question, when, 183.
not reviewable, when, n. 87, 360.
organization for lawful purpose, 163.
of association, 163.
ownership and possession, 163.
rairoad, fencing track, 163.
reasonable doubt not applicable, n. 4, 294.
reasonableness of rules, 163.
statement of. on supposed state of facts, 172.
statutory provisions, judges, 166, 167.
submitting question of, to jury, 155.
two different writings, 163.
documents construed together, 163.
whole law, 56, 70, 246.
LAWFUL ACT,
a question of law, 163.
LEASE,
leasing farm, form, (1) 384.
LEGAL POSSESSION,
question of law, 163.
INDEX. 947
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
LEGAL PROPOSITIONS,
presenting to court, 47.
to court, Indiana, 47.
to court, preserving in record, 47.
preserving in record, Indiana, 47.
rulings on, 47.
LEGAL QUESTIONS,
See LAW.
improperly submitted, n. 48, 163.
LETTERS,
See CORRESPONDENCE.
LIABILITIES.
bank's liabilities, assets, (3) 828.
carrier not liable, 581.
for personal injury, 579.
in shipment of stock, 589.
limiting by contract, 586.
when several carriers involved, 585.
LIBEL,
See SLANDER.
defined, form.. 491.
instructions on, 850.
motives of revenge, 850.
prompting communication, 850.
LICENSE,
partnership, transferring, 489.
to sell liquors. 489.
LIFE INSURANCE,
See INSURANCE.
LIGHTS,
cities without, (3) 591.
in cities all night, (3) 591.
LIMITATION,
payments on account, 467.
statute of limitation, 465.
LIMITING.
failure to limit evidence, n. 157, 109.
in charging jury, 54.
limited to counts, when, 54, 98.
request to limit, necessary, n. 162, 111.
when defective counts, 54.
LIMITING EVIDENCE.. 109, 110.
to impeachment of witness, 110.
LINE.
center of stream, 666.
considerations in locating, 665.
fixing by agreement, 664.
locating boundary line. 665.
meander line defined, 666.
948 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1 304 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
"LINKS IN CHAIN,"
circumstantial evidence, n. 52, 312.
LIQUORS,
selling in residence district, 876.
unlawfully, 876.
LIVE STOCK,
shipment of, 589.
LOSS.
pecuniary loss only allowed, 650.
LOST,
goods lost, owner unknown, 817.
LOTS,
fronting on streams, 686.
increase by filling in, 686.
retaining wall, 671.
LOUISIANA,
jury disregarding instructions, 169.
LUMBER,
piling in street, 595.
LYING IN WAIT,
killing from ambush, 784.
provocation for killing, 784.
M.
MACHINERY,
assuming machinery safe, 622.
best appliances, (4) 610.
care and safety of, 534.
hidden defects of, 610.
injury from, 610.
master's promise to repair, 620.
reasonably safe, (3) 534.
servant presuming safe, 622.
knowing danger, 610.
shall be safe, (6) 610.
suitable and safe, 610.
whether real estate, 195.
MALICE,
See INTENT.
a fact, 282.
competency of evidence on, 111.
defined, murder, 776.
essential in slander, 492.
forms of instructions, 776.
implied from unlawful act, 282.
in slander, 492.
when, (3) 492, (5) 776.
includes anger, hatred, etc., (3) (5) 776.
INDEX. 949
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
MALICE Continued.
instruction may define, 282.
erroneous, 283.
inferring, 283.
intoxication affecting, instruction, n. 16, 281.
limiting evidence to. 111.
may be implied, 282.
"with premeditated malice," 240.
"MALICE AFORETHOUGHT,"
definition unnecessary, when, 75.
essential in number, 282.
MALICIOUS ASSAULT, 268.
MALICIOUS MISCHIEF,
evidence wanting, instructions, 82.
fence, destroying, evidence, 82.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION,
arrest without warrant, 503.
burden of proof, (6) 504.
cause for prosecution, 504.
charging with embezzlement, ( 1 ) 507.
defense, advice of counsel, 506.
essential elements, 507.
estimating damages for, 508.
forms of instructions, 503.
damages, 508.
instructions for defense, 506.
probable cause, instruction, 81, 164.
no evidence, 81.
MALPRACTICE.
by physician, 484.
MANSLAUGHTER,
act is murder, when, 794.
defined, 794.
evidence supporting, 272.
forms of instructions, 794.
included in murder, 251.
instruction explaining, 252.
harmless. 252.
proper. 272.
properly refused, 269.
involuntary, when. 794.
murder or self-defense, 271.
no evidence of manslaughter, 178, 269, 271.
refusing, error when, 272.
proper, when, 271.
requesting instructions on, 274.
specific instructions, 274.
resisting illegal arrest, 272.
restricting to, by instruction, proper, when, 273.
verdict for, when. 783.
voluntary, "272, 273.
what constitutes, (4) 792.
950 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1364 Principles, 365878 Forms. )
MARKING,
by noting authorities" on requests, 45.
instructions "given," refused, 44.
in display type, 45.
showing book for, law supporting, 45.
reasons for refusing, n. 197, 44.
statute on, directory only, 44.
MARRIAGE,
common law, what constitutes, 834.
MARRIAGE CONTRACTS,
action for breach, 455.
damage for breach, 457.
considerations in assessing, 457.
defense for breach, 456.
forms of instructions, 455.
unchastity of woman, 456.
MARYLAND,
exceptions to instructions, 349.
jury, judge of criminal law, 168.
MASSACHUSETTS,
instruction suggesting inference, proper, 181.
jury judges of law, criminal, 166, 167.
MASTER, See SERVANT.
advising servant of danger, 612.
concealing danger, 612.
discharging servant, 626.
liable to servant, when, (7) 610.
not liable, when, 615.
promise to repair, forms, 620.
safe appliances for servant, 622.
safety of servants, (2) 622.
servant, knowing danger, 619.
wilful act, 615.
MASTER AND SERVANT, 610.
forms of instructions, 610.
MATERIAL ALLEGATIONS,
question of law, 53, 155.
MATERIAL ELEMENT,
omitted, cured how, 240.
MATERIAL FACTS,
consistency of facts, 310, 311.
facts of case, 199.
restricting instructions to, 311.
MATERIAL ISSUES,
should be stated, 91.
MATERIAL MATTERS,
swearing falsely on, 218, 219, 221.
"MAY,"
instead of should, 216.
INDEX. 951
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
MEANING,
See CONSTRUCTION.
"fellow servant," essential, 70.
instructions, how determined, 70.
MEANDER, See BOUNDARY.
meander line defined, 666.
MEMORANDUM,
purpose of, a fact, wh'en, 164.
MERCHANT,
injury to business, 679.
MILL-DAM,
creating nuisance, 854.
MIND, See WrtLS.
affected by insanity, 698.
capable of reasoning, wills, (2) 695.
capacity to recollect, (5) 695.
determining condition, 702.
state of, 701.
faculties of, wills, 695.
feeble in mind, wills, (5) 694.
impairing mental faculties, 699.
presumed sound, wills, 696.
sound mind, wills, 692.
"sound mind and memory," defined, 695.
transacting ordinary business, (5) (6) 694.
unsoundness not presumed, 692.
permanent, 700.
vigor and power of, 695.
MINER,
killed carelessly, 649.
MINES,
appliances for safety, (6) 649.
careless operation of, 649.
fencing shafts, (5) 649.
miner killed carelessly, (5) 649.
MINOR, See CHILDREN, FATHER, MOTHER, INFANT.
employment of, 449.
injury to person of, 449.
liable on his contracts, when, 451.
mother must support, 448.
occupying minor's land, (3) 657.
railroad killing parent, (2) 649.
recovering from parent, 450.
remaining with parents after age, 450.
rights against parent, 450.
wages of, 449.
MISDEMEANOR,
convicting of, on light evidence, n. 24, 296.
952 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
MISLEADING INSTRUCTIONS, 1, 65.
abstract instructions, 48.
attention directed to immaterial facts, 65.
blending distinct proposition, 65.
'confusing instructions, erroneous, 63.
cured by others, 64, 240.
curing error, how, 64, 240.
error cured, criminal, 240.
fraud not presumed, 65.
fraudulent or honest transaction, 65.
held misleading, 62, 65, n. 88.
if argumentative, 66.
illustrations of, 65.
in singling out facts, 65, 113.
witness, 65.
instructions held not misleading, 65, n. 88.
mental condition, 63.
singling out facts, 65, 113.
two meanings, 61.
intent "strictly proved," 65.
obscure instruction, 62.
on criminal intent, 65.
on determining facts, 65.
on honesty and fair dealing, 65.
on "probability of innocence," n. 25, 297.
on proof of facts, 65.
on reasonable doubt, n. 32, 297.
on "reasonable time." 65.
relating to honest dealing, 65.
repairing of sidewalk, 65.
tendency to mislead not error, 60.
though correct, 60.
when evidence incompetent, 84.
MISSISSIPPI,
murder, statutory definition, 284.
MISSOURI.
elements stated, murder, 277.
instructions in civil case, 3.
in homicide. 252.
jury, judge of criminal law, 153.
MISTAKES,
how corrected. 119.
in summing up evidence, 119.
MITIGATION,
in assessing damages, 654.
MODIFYING INSTRUCTIONS, 4,
after promising to give, as requested, 27.
by adding words. 30.
by stating converse of proposition, 32, 33.
by striking out words, 30.
cautionary instruction, criminal. 32.
conforming requests to issues, 33.
correct instructions, 31.
INDEX. 953
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
MODIFYING INSTRUCTIONS Continued.
defective instructions, 30.
exception to modification, n. 14, 347.
immaterial modification, harmless error, 31.
incomplete instruction, 29.
in criminal cases, 32.
in what manner, 30.
may be harmless, 31.
no ground for error, when, 31.
not allowed, when, 31.
on circumstantial evidence, n. 68, 315.
on reasonable doubt, 300.
special request, Texas, 31.
to confine to evidence, 32.
to cover allegations of counts, 33.
to include different elements, 33.
omitted facts, 33.
opposing theory, criminal, 32.
when defective, 27.
MOON,
instruction on rising of, 163.
MORAL CHARACTER,
See CHARACTEB.
MORTGAGE, See CHATTEL MORTGAGE.
acknowledgment of, 163.
construction of, 156.
description of property in, 163.
instruction on acknowledgment of, 163.
on chattels, 461.
MOTHER.
must support children, 448.
MOTION,
at close of all evidence, 124.
of plaintiff evidence, 124.
by both parties, peremptory, 145.
defendant moving for verdict, proper when. 126.
denial of, error cured, n. 40, 126.
disposing of. for peremptory, 121, 122, 145.
evidence taken as true, 121, 126.
for non-suit, disposing of, 121.
stating grounds. 123.
time of presenting, 124.
for new trial, instructions, 356.
for peremptory for variance, n. 44, 127.
evidence. 122.
instruction, 121.
weighing evidence, 122.
when, 124.
grounds for, stating, 123.
nature of demurrer to evidence. 121.
properly denied, when, peremptory, 134.
renewing motion for verdict, n. 86, 144.
stating reasons for peremptory, 123.
954 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1364 Principles, 365878 Forms.)
MOTION Continued.
time of presenting peremptory, 124.
to exclude evidence, n. 14, 123.
weighing evidence on, 122.
MOTIVE,
absence of motive, 264, 781.
error in refusing, when, 264.
for criminal act, 781.
for killing, 264.
instructions on, 264.
improper, 264.
not indispensable, 264, 781.
of witness, (6) (10) 366.
refusing instructions on, 264.
MOTORMAN,
acting willfully, liability, 615.
may presume persons cautious, (7) 640.
MURDER, See SELF-DEFENSE.
accident, defense to, 261.
admissions of deceased, 739.
agreement to fight, 265.
aiding, abetting, assisting, 785.
bare fear no defense, 795, 799.
burglars killing, 785.
by administering drug, 277.
by drug, 778.
by one of several, 792.
by poison, (7) 773.
by snooting, instruction, 277.
circumstances tending to prove, (5) (6) 729.
committing by poison, 272.
consequences of act, presumed, 179.
conspiracy to commit, 761.
conviction of manslaughter, 252.
effect, 100.
"cooling time," 254.
danger apparent, self-defense, 802.
death by other means, 261.
defendant abandoning conflict, 259.
provoking difficulty, 797.
seeking difficulty, 797.
defense against several, 804.
defined, Illinois, 773.
Michigan, 773.
Missouri, 773.
definition defective, 276.
omitting "with malice aforethought," 276.
degree in doubt, 253, 783.
of proof required, 790.
directing to find, when, 251.
disposed of, 100. ,
drunkenness reducing crime, 779.
enumerating elements of, 277.
facts constituting, Illinois, (5) (6) 773.
INDEX. 955
(References are to Sections, 1 304 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
MURDER Continued.
"feloniously" omitted, immaterial, 240.
first degree, 774.
defined, 773.
or nothing, 252, 269.
first or second degree, 273.
from mutual combat, 265.
forms of instructions, 773.
giving murder instructions only, 252.
if all elements proven, 251.
includes manslaughter, 251.
insanity defense, instruction, 271.
in second degree, 269, 277.
instructing on all degrees, 270.
assuming Killing, 198.
erroneous, 282.
for second degree, 270.
harmless error, n. 59, 274.
when, 252.
improperly restricting, 270.
malice aforethought, 282.
manslaughter, 252.
not cured, 282.
omitting element, 282.
on degrees, n. 10, 252.
harmless, n. 59, 274.
on "fear," 257.
on "free from fault," n. 44, 258.
proper, 277.
intent presumed, when, 777.
killing, "absolutely necessary," error, 256, 285.
bad man 807.
being proved, 782.
in passion, 775.
in self-defense, 795.
instruction, n. 24, 255.
officer, in self-defense, 805.
trespasser, 263.
wrong person, 786.
malice aforethought, 774.
an element, 776.
essential, 282.
mere belief of danger, 800.
mere presence, not aiding, 792.
mere threats, no defense, 801.
mitigating circumstances, 782.
motive for killing, 264.
no conspiracy, 792.
no evidence of manslaughter, 178, 252.
or no offense, 269.
presumed from killing, 782.
proof and allegations vary, 261.
reasonable doubt of, 783.
restricting to first degree, n. 2, 251, 269, 270.
retreat not required, Illinois, n. 51, 260.
956 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
MURDER Continued.
second degree, 775.
elements, 773.
evidence, 270.
forms, 775.
self-defense, 798.
shooting admitted, instruction, 198.
slayer lying in wait, 784.
sound mind not defined, 6.
stating facts constituting, 251.
statutory definition, proper, 277.
suicide, defense, 261.
third person guilty, 216.
throwing from train, 777.
time of deliberation, 780.
verdict should be, (3) 777.
while committing robbery, 269, 271.
wound neglected, 791.
MUST,
implies duty, 216.
instead of may, 216.
misuse of, for may, 78.
MUST REQUEST,
See REQUEST, INSTRUCTIONS.
failure to request instructions, n. 9, 48.
MUTUAL COMBAT,
mutual comTbat or self-defense, 265.
improper, instructions on, 265.
instructions on, 265.
proper, when, 265.
N.
NAMES,
misuse of, 78.
plaintiff, instead of defendant, 78.
prisoner for defendant immaterial, 78.
NAVIGATION,
public rights of, 686.
NEBRASKA,
exception to each instruction, 353.
NEGATIVE,
not hearing bell, 204.
testimony, 204.
NEGLIGENCE,
accidental injury, 545.
act clearly negligence, 183.
age of plaintiff considered, 600.
agent negligent, principal liable, 392.
an issue, instruction, 93.
INDEX. 957
(References are to Sections, 1364 Principles, 365878 Forms.}
NEGLIGENCE Continued.
both parties guilty of, 544, 636.
bridge unsafe, (4) 545.
burden of proving, 531, (1) (2) 539.
on defendant, 531.
on plaintiff, form, 387, 481, 531, 616, 633.
by committing act, 183.
by omitting act, 183.
by violating ordinance, 644.
care inferred, when, 535.
cause of injury, 541.
city not negligent, 595.
common carriers, 548.
comparative negligence, 591.
obsolete, 236.
considerations in determining, 176, 594.
damages by one's own, 58.
defective definition, 6.
scaffold, form, 387.
defendant liable for, 638.
liable, when, 544.
denned, 529, (2) 632.
carriers, (3) 549.
definition of unnecessary, 75.
degree of care, 532.
directing verdict on, 134.
drunkenness is not, 553.
evidence of negligence, 540.
speculative on, directing verdict, 134.
fact for jury, 117a, 164, 183, (6) 542, 625.
facts constituting, (2) 639.
failure to ring bell, 641.
fire caused by, railroads, 645.
forms of instructions, 542.
for defendant, 639.
for defendant, railroads, 629.
of instructions, railroads, 638.
framing instruction on, 56.
gates at crossings, 643.
generally, 529.
getting off moving train, 561.
on moving car, 183.
gross and slight, 591.
negligence, 529, 558, (3) 635.
harmless error on, 237, 239.
if only slight, recovery, 606.
in approaching railroad crossing, 184.
in backing train, improper, .184.
in blowing whistle, 642.
in constructing bridge, 675.
in crossing railroad, 117a.
in driving vehicle, 533.
infant's negligence, 536.
inferring from facts, 539.
injuring passenger on platform, 567.
trespasser, 558.
958 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
NEGLIGENCE Continued.
in losing goods, 134.
in operating elevator, (4) 542.
in shipping live stock, (2) 589.
in speed of cars, (4) 044.
instructing act is, proper when, 183.
instruction enumerating facts, 117a.
not invading, 176.
proper, 164, 176.
stating law, 56.
submitting, 638.
withdrawing, 117a.
in treating injury, 654.
in using electricity, 546.
may define, 183.
negligence of railroads, 627.
neither party negligent, 648.
no evidence of negligence, 93.
proving, 126.
not assumed, illustration, 194.
, not negligence, when, 643.
not presumed, when, 539.
of carrier presumed, 548.
of cities and towns, 591.
of common carrier, 550.
of fellow servant, 614.
of highway commissioners, 480, 482.
of passenger, 551, 568.
of physician, liability, 484.
of plaintiff, (7) (8) (9) (10) 543, (9) 544.
and defendant, 544.
of railroad, instruction improper, 184.
of road supervisors, 601.
party assuming risk, 25.
passenger guilty of, 582.
negligent, 562.
plaintiff assuming risk, (12) 544.
at fault, (4) 544.
guilty of, (8) 544, 594.
knowing danger, (13) 544.
may recover, when, 544.
negligent, when, (8) 544, 594.
plaintiff's slight negligence, 591.
presumed, when, 26, 538, 548.
prima facie case of, 554.
proximate cause of injury, 184.
question of fact, 117a, 164, (6) 542, 625.
of law, when, 183.
railroads in city, (2) (3) 631.
killing person, 649.
referring to declaration for, 53.
relating to children, (6) (7) 536.
removing brake-staffs, 616.
repairing fence, (3) 676.
repeating definition, 25.
resulting in death, 649, 650.
INDEX. 959
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
NEGLIGENCE Continued.
ringing bell at crossings, (6) 641.
scintilla of evidence, 540.
servant does not assume negligence of employer, (2) 622.
negligent, 618.
several acts of, 65.
slight negligence, liable, 550.
starting train too soon, 565.
stating fact is negligence, improper, 184.
submitting to jury, forms, 625, 638.
tenant guilty of, (8) 544.
train running too fast, 640.
trespasser may recover, 559.
negligent, 559.
what is not, (3) (5) (6) 539, 540.
illustration, 183.
improper, 183.
NEGRO,
as witness, instruction, 176.
NEW JERSEY,
exceptions to instructions, 349.
NEW YORK,
directing verdict, 133.
statutory definition of murder, 277.
NIGHT,
dark night, negligence, 594.
traveling when dark, care, 608.
NOMINAL,
damages nominal, (3) 654.
NON-EXPERT,
on insanity, weighing, 223.
NONSUIT,
See DIRECTING VERDICT.
changing order for, 124.
directing, improper when, 130.
when, 126.
failure to prove one element, 126.
improper though evidence conflicting, 141.
motion for, 121.
on contributory negligence, properly denied, 134.
on plaintiff's testimony, 126.
waiving right to claim error, 144.
when action barred, 128.
when negligence involved, 134.
when transaction illegal, 128.
NORTH CAROLINA,
charging jury, manner of, 311.
960 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
NOTE,
accommodation note, (4) (8) 416.
only, (3) 415, (9) 416.
alteration relieves liability, (2) 416.
collateral security, (14) 415.
consideration worthless, (11) 416.
contracts on notes, 415.
dead person, (5) 416.
defense against, burden, (17) 415.
doubtful consideration, (10) 416.
endorsement without recourse, (2) 417.
executed by several, (11) 415.
forgery of name, (11) 415.
form of instructions on, 415.
holder cannot recover, 416.
may recover on, when, 415.
presumed owner, (1) 415.
indorsement in blank, (3) 417.
indorser only, (6) 416.
interest on, usury, 418.
lost by carelessness, 419.
never delivered, (5) 416.
notice of defenses to, (4) 415.
purchase before due, (2) (3) 415.
with notice, (3) 415.
without notice, (2) 415.
recovery on proper, form, (5) 415.
reviving liability on, (6) (7) 415.
suit on lost note, 419.
suit on several counts, (19) 415.
transferring by endorsement, (1) 417.
without consideration, (7) (10) (12) 416.
NOTICE,
actual not unnecessary, (3) (4) 596.
condition of sidewalk, 592.
defective sidewalk, notice, (3) 595.
element of contract, 441.
essential on claiming land, 661.
fence viewers, notice, 869.
inferred when, city, 596.
lumber in street, 595.
of condition of sidewalk, 65.
of danger in highway, 480.
of death in insurance, 422.
of defense to note, (5) 415.
reasonable time, misleading, 65.
sufficiency of, brokers, (2) 441.
to city of danger, 595.
what is sufficient, city, 597.
NUISANCE,
affecting only family, 853.
burden in proving, 180.
business injured by, 679.
by noise, smoke, dirt, horses, 679.
INDEX. 961
(References are to Sections, 1364 Principles, 305878 Forms. j
NUISANCE Continued.
causing injury, (579.
created by others, 857.
decaying vegetation, 855.
defense, other means causing, 856.
others causing, 857.
facts constituting, 680.
forms of instructions, 852.
civil, 679.
gases and emanations, 681.
health injured by, 679.
in factory locality, 681.
injuring health, 680.
injury to business, 679.
mill-dam and pond, 854.
must affect public, 853.
obstructing highway, 679.
offensive smells, 852.
other means causing, 856.
plaintiff proving, 680.
pond producing malaria, 855.
public nuisance, 852.
slaughter houses causing, 852.
NUMBER,
number of witnesses, (5) 365.
NUMBERING,
numbering instructions, 43.
See SIGNING.
NUMEROUS INSTRUCTIONS, See Too MANY.
confusing, misleading, 19.
prosecution should ask few, 19.
refusing when too many, 19.
O.
OBJECTIONS, 346. See EXCEPTIONS.
raising objections on review, 347.
time of making, 347.
too late, when, 347.
waiving, 355.
OBSCURE,
instructions held obscure, 62.
on burden of proof, 72.
on reasonable time, 65.
on repairing sidewalk, 65.
OBSCURE INSTRUCTIONS, 60.
See MISLEADING, 60
generally erroneous, 63.
misleading if obscure, 62.
when evidence conflicting, 62.
962 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
OBSTRUCTING,
flow of water, 602.
obstructing highway, 679.
railway tracks, (5) 634.
while building, streets, 605.
OCCUPATION,
See BUSINESS.
consider in damages, 607.
element of damages, (7) 652.
OFFENSE,
See CRIMINAL OFFENSES.
committed, on or about, n. 47, 56.
different offenses joined, 98.
instruction, when no offense, 103.
statutory definition proper, 275.
OFFICE,
office of instructions, 1.
OFFICERS,
arresting without warrant, 788.
killing in self-defense, 805.
officer, 788.
while arresting, 787.
making unlawful arrest, 262, 272, 805.
offense in officer's presence, 789.
wrongfully killing person, 787.
OHIO,
court judge of criminal law, 711.
OMISSION,
criminal intent omitted, error, 276.
definition omitted, harmless when, 284.
due care and caution omitted, 245.
element omitted, error, 245.
error cured, criminal, 240.
failing to call witness, 222.
to produce evidence, 222.
feloniously omitted, immaterial, 240.
in circumstantial evidence, 313.
in defining crime, error not cured, 276.
larceny, 276.
offense, 276.
perjury, 276.
in stating case, n. 60, 247.
on vital point, error, 245.
premeditated malice omitted, 240.
reasonable doubt omitted, 313.
want of evidence, harmless, n. 2, 294.
words omitted, harmless, 314.
OMITTING,
if you believe from evidence, 105.
INDEX. 963
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
OPENING,
saloon on Sunday, 194.
OPENING STATEMENT,
dismissal of case on, n. 40, 126.
OPINION,
as to amount of damages, (10) 653.
court intimating, (6) 379.
may express, when, 189.
court's opinion on weight of evidence, 170, 171.
prohibited, 119.
error in intimating, 203.
expert's opinion, comment on, 211.
valueless, when, 211.
weight, 211.
expert witness' opinion, 211.
expressing in comparing evidence, 177.
"if you believe defendant," error, 177.
instructing contract is conceded, 177.
intimated, illustrations, 177.
instruction, 175.
on witnesses, 208.
opinion, criminal, 178, 179.
non-expert on insanity, 223.
not basis of fraud, 520.
not intimated, illustrations, 176.
insurance, 176.
on fraud, 176.
on negligence, 176.
on positive testimony, 176.
on combination of facts, 175.
on confession, 317.
on evidence, in federal courts, 189.
on value, 520.
on weight of evidence, not, 173.
proper, 191.
on witness' credibility, 208.
opinion of medical expert, (1) 377.
submitting facts without expressing, 172.
though correct, improper, 175.
when evidence conflicting, 191.
opinion intimated, 179.
not intimated, 178.
OPPOSING THEORY,
See THEORY.
instructions excluding, 104.
not to anticipate, 104.
separate instructions for, 104.
ORAL CHARGE,
given without exception, 13.
stenographer taking down, 12.
964 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1 3U4 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
ORAL CONTRACT, See CONTRACT.
determined by jury, 157.
evidence of contract, 157.
interpreted by jury, 157.
legal effect, for court, 157.
terms of, for jury, 157.
ORAL DIRECTIONS,
not instructions, 41.
on form of verdict, 42.
ORAL INSTRUCTIONS,
oral or written charge, 4.
preserving by bill of exceptions, n. 70, 358.
proper, when, 4.
taken and written up, 5.
by stenographer, 5.
written instructions not requested, 4.
ORDINANCES,
construction of ordinances, 156.
forms for violating, 644.
governing street cars, (3) 644.
proof of, how made, 161.
railroads violating, 644.
regulating speed, trains, 644.
requiring bell, railroads, 644.
validity of, for court, 161.
violation of, instruction, 155.
ORDINARY CARE, See CARE.
definition of, 74.
failure to exercise, 529, 530.
OTHER HYPOTHESIS,
See HYPOTHESIS.
in circumstantial evidence, 310.
OTHER INSTRUCTIONS,
cure error, how, 246.
curing errors, 235. 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 242.
errors not cured by when, 246.
OUGHT,
means in duty bound, 78.
OWNER,
cars causing injury, 579.
entitled to notice, land, 661.
permitting damage to land, 669.
OWNERSHIP,
accretions along rivers, 668.
acts of ownership, (2) 658.
by occupying land, 656.
in larceny case, 240.
lots on navigable streams, 686.
owner of vicious dog, 479.
INDEX. 965
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms. )
P.
PARENT,
negligence of parent, (6) (7) 536.
PARTNERSHIP,
each partner acts for all, 459.
forms of instructions, 458.
not general partners, 460.
partners agents, form, (3) 393.
binding each other, 459.
what constitutes, 458.
PARTY,
completing contract, recovery, 396.
witness for himself, 369.
PARTY MUST REQUEST.
definition of essential elements, 36.
of terms, 6.
explanation of subsidiary facts, 6.
full instructions, 7.
in criminal cases, 9.
on matters omitted, 7.
specific instructions, 7.
PASSENGERS, See CARRIERS, RAILROADS.
accommodation of, ( 14) 549.
approaching train, 567.
assisting on car, 571.
assisting carrier in accident, 560.
at fault, (3) 547.
boarding cars away from station, (15) 549.
careless on leaving train, (5) (6) (7) 561.
carrier's duty to, 584.
carrying by stage, 550.
disorderly, 575.
drunkenness of passenger, 553.
ejecting from train, 557.
maliciously, 81.
entering cars, where, (15) 549.
exercising care, 551.
in getting off, (3) 565.
ordinary care, (2) 548.
expelling from train, 81.
falling off platform, 569.
no liability, (1) (2) 569.
following trainmen's directions, 567.
forcible ejection of, 575.
forms, on care of, 551.
getting off moving train, 561.
on train, (5) 567.
guilty of negligence, (7) 551, 568, 582.
having no ticket, 574.
injury to, 549.
accidentally, 581.
by carrier, 548, 550.
966 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
PASSENGERS Continued.
injury by which road, 579.
from boiler explosion, 580.
negligence, 538. .
on leaving train, 556, (3) 563, (4) 564.
on platform, 566, ( 10) 567.
while changing cars, 578.
instructing to get on, 567.
jumping from car, 582.
negligent in getting off train, 562.
on car, care and caution, 184.
on freight car, 555.
on wrong train, 576.
position on car, (13) 567.
putting off moving train, 556.
train, 574.
reasonable time to get off, 562.
receiving not at station, 567.
refusing to pay fare, 574.
relying on directions, 577.
requested to assist in accident, 560.
riding on car platform, 570.
rights as to ticket, 573.
rightfully put off, 574.
should follow directions, 577.
sick person as, 552.
ticket not essential, 572.
time for leaving train, 565.
waiting for train, injured, 184.
when one is passenger, 572.
wrongfully ejecting, 557.
PATENT,
claim based on, 405.
letters patent void, when, 405.
PATH,
on railway premises, 637.
PAYMENTS,
application of an account, 467.
PEACE,
breach of peace denned, 788.
PECUNIARY,
damages restricted, death, 650.
PEREMPTORY INSTRUCTION,
See DIRECTING VERDICT, NONSUIT.
both parties request, 145.
defendant's motion for, 124.
defined, 120.
for defendant, improper, when, 129, 141.
proper, when, 126.
properly refused, 134.
INDEX. 967
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
PEREMPTORY INSTRUCTIONS Continued.
for plaintiff, improper, when, 140.
proper, when, 135.
form of instruction, 120.
how waived, 144.
illustrations, 134.
in criminal case, 151.
for defendant proper, 150.
for prosecution proper, when, 152.
instead of nonsuit, 125.
in writing, 123.
measure of damages, instruction, 120.
motion for by defendant, 123.
nature, 121.
"no evidence," meaning of, 126.
other instructions with, 120.
presenting with motion, 123.
properly refused, when, 133.
requesting on motion, 123.
submitting with others, 123.
time of requesting, 124.
waiving right to, 144.
when claim is barred, 126.
when evidence strong against plaintiff, 133.
warrants, 196.
when no opposing evidence, 126.
waiving, 123.
PERJURY,
amount of evidence on, 851.
corroborating evidence, 851.
definition erroneous, 276.
one witness not sufficient, 851.
PERMITS,
building permits, 605.
forms of instructions, 605.
PEST-HOUSE,
damages from, 682.
PERSONAL INJURY,
See INJURY TO PERSON.
PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE,
instruction on improper, 107.
jury cannot consider, 107.
PETITION, 53.
See PLEADING, DECLARATION.
PHYSICIAN,
county liable for services, 464.
damages for malpractice, 484.
liable for negligence, 484.
patient observing directions, 486.
negligence, 486.
068 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 305 878 Forms.}
PH YSICIAN Continued.
services to public, 464.
skill of, ordinary, 484.
treatment by him, 485.
PIANO,
monthly payments for, 509.
PLAINTIFF,
all material facts, burden, 199.
assuming risks, (4) 617.
as witness, 369.
at fault, negligence, (7) (9) 544.
burden on plaintiff, 199, 616.
cannot recover, when, 632.
city, 593.
care approaching railroad, 627.
not extraordinary, 594.
of plaintiff, 618.
required of him, 594.
when knowing danger, 594.
careless, when, railroad, 639.
contributory negligence, (5) 591, 594, 632, 634.
essential elements of case, 599.
exposing himself to danger, (3) 593.
guilty of negligence, (8) to (13) 544.
his testimony alone, 86.
interested witness, 369.
knowing danger, (12) 544, 593.
walk, (3) 593.
negligence of, 543.
carriers, 562.
not at fault, negligence, 550.
not negligent, recovery, 644.
observing danger, (5) 618.
only witness on value, 196.
ordinary care by, 610.
singling out plaintiff, 223.
taking risk, city, 593.
using plaintiff for defendant, 78.
what he must prove, carrier, 583.
witness for himself, 369.
PLATFORM, See CARRIERS.
dangerous to passengers, 566.
lights on necessary. (2) (4) 566.
of carrier unsafe, 566.
of railroad, obstructions on, 563.
passenger falling off, 569.
injured on, (10) 567.
riding on car platform, 570.
PLEADINGS,
admitting facts in, 197.
copying in instructions, 90.
framing instruction referring to, 53.
INDEX. 969
(References are to Sections, 1364 Principles, 365878 Forma.}
PLEADINGS Continued.
instructions based on, 94.
referring to, 53.
criminal, 55.
error, when, 53.
issues in general terms, 95.
not in pleadings, 99.
material allegations for court, 155.
referring to for description, 53.
refusal to amend, 127.
showing verdict right, 243.
stating different theories, 102.
substance sufficient, 90.
POISON,
murder by, form, (7) 773.
POLICEMAN,
killing while arresting, 787.
POLICE OFFICERS,
instruction on, form, 378.
POLICY,
application for insurance, 420
assignment of, 424.
void, when, 420.
waiving right to avoid, 421.
POND,
causing nuisance, 854.
producing malaria, odors, 855.
POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE,
testimony, form, 371.
POSSE,
assisting officer, 787, 788.
POSSESSION,
accompanied by intention, land, 060.
acts of ownership, (2) 658.
showing, 663.
adverse possession of land, (4) 659, 663.
continuous, and unequivocal, (1) 659.
twenty years, (3) 657.
evidence of guilt, criminal, 812.
explaining, instruction improper, n. 77, 266.
explanation of sufficient, criminal, 265a.
fencing land unnecessary, (2) 658.
having stolen goods, 812.
property, 816.
honestly obtaining possession, criminal, 816.
must be actual, title, 657.
not adverse possession, forms, 659.
occasional acts of ownership, ( 1 ) 659.
obtaining honestly, criminal. 812.
970 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1364 Principles, 365878 Forms.)
POSSESSION Continued.
of goods unexplained, 265a.
of land by tenant, (9) 656.
of real estate, 656.
of stolen property, 265a.
open and notorious, 656.
prima facie evidence, 816.
refusing instruction, error, 265a.
retaking land, (3) 661.
securing title by, (5) 656.
shown by acts of ownership, (4) 658.
shown by inclosing land, (5) 658.
uninterrupted and notorious, 656.
POSSESSION OF GOODS, See POSSESSION.
evidence of theft, 118.
instruction on explanation, 82.
proper, 265a.
time when found in possession of, material, 118.
POSSESSION OF PROPERTY, See POSSESSION.
explanation of possession, 201.
instruction on, improper, 179.
POSSIBILITY,
of innocence, 297.
POSTAL CLERK,
forms of instructions, carriers, 554.
on mail car, 554.
PRACTICE,
on peremptory and nonsuit, 125.
PREMEDITATED MALICE,
omitted in instruction, 240.
PREMEDITATION,
See DELIBEBATION.
definition essential, 75.
PREMISES,
access to impaired, (4) 684.
annual value depreciated, (2) 685.
considerations, estimating damages, 684.
damaged by railroad, 684.
lumber yard, safety, 537.
rental value impaired, (3) 685.
safety of, 537.
using as a pest-house, 682.
PREPONDERANCE,
considerations in determining, 203, (3) (7) (8) 385.
defined, form, (8) 385.
definition of, improper, 199.
unnecessary, when, 75.
degree greater than, improper, 200.
INDEX. 971
(References are to Sections, 1364 Principles, 365878 Forms.)
PREPONDERANCE Continued.
determined, how, 203.
form, (1) 385.
error cured, 240.
erroneous instruction on, harmless, 244.
from opponent's evidence, 199.
from whole evidence, 199.
instruction proper, 203.
means greater weight, 200, 203.
number of witnesses, 203, (1) (5) 385.
of evidence denned, (1) 385.
on affirmant, 199.
required, 531.
on alibi, when, 324.
on negligence, form, 387.
on party affirming, 199.
quality of testimony, 203.
relating to definition of, 199.
repeating instructions, 21, 23.
PRESENCE,
aiding without being present, 326.
at place of crime, 322, 323.
forms of instructions, 792.
mere presence, not aiding, 765.
where office occurs, 792.
PRESENTING INSTRUCTIONS,
after arguments have commenced, 15.
at conclusion of evidence, 14.
before general charge, 14.
before jury retire, 14.
court may give time, 17.
court's power to make, 18.
giving time to prepare, 17.
in absence of rule, 14.
in North Dakota, 14.
too late, when, 15.
under rule of court, 14.
PRESUMPTION,
character presumed good, 758.
defendant not testifying, 229.
presumed innocent, 713.
definition unnecessary, 75.
exceptions on review, 347.
failing to call witness, 222.
from certain facts ; 181.
from possession stolen goods, 265a.
in absence of evidence, 302.
of instructions, 360.
in burglary and larceny, 265a, 266.
in construing instructions, 70.
in court of review, 360.
insanity presumed, when, 700.
intent inferred, burglary, 809
in murder, 777.
972 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 305 878 Forms.}
PRESUMPTION Con tinned.
jury construe instructions as a whole, 70.
murder presumed, when, 777, 782.
negligence not presumed, 26.
of ownership, (1) 415.
of theft from possession, 266.
on insanity, 330.
presumption of innocence, 336, 829.
protection, 714.
continues, 336, 715.
relating to witnesses, 214.
sanity presumed, (4) 751.
sidewalk presumed safe, 592.
sound mind presumed, 696.
will presumed genuine, 706.
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE, 336.
erroneous instructions, 337.
illustrations, instructions proper, 339.
instruction applies to included offenses, n. 9, 337.
proper, 338.
is evidence, 338.
misleading instruction, n. 11, 337.
refusing instructions on, 337.
"PRETENDED,"
referring to will, 74.
PR IMA FACIE,
evidence showing prima facie case, 126.
in embezzlement, evidence, 829.
need not be defined, 75.
possession of stolen property, 816.
PRINCIPAL,
acts of paying teller, 390.
adopting agent's acts, 388, (2) 389, 391.
borrowing by agent, 389.
bound by agent's acts, 388, 390, 391.
canvassing agent of, (4) 393.
liable for agent's act, 388.
not liable, when, (1) 393.
principal and agent, embezzlement, 823.
PRINCIPAL AND ACCESSORY, See ACCESSORY, AIDING.. ABETTING.
distinction abrogated, 764.
if evidence shows, 293.
if no evidence showing, 293.
instruction proper, when, 293.
PRISONER,
using prisoner for defendant, 78.
PROBABLE CAUSE,
defined, (5) 504.
for prosecution, 504.
in malicious prosecution, 81, 164.
instruction on, 164.
proper, 164.
INDEX. 973
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms. )
PROBABILITY,
of defendant's guilt, 727.
of innocence, criminal, 297.
PROMISE,
master's promise to repair, 620.
procuring confession by, 318.
PROMISSORY NOTES,
See NOTES.
PROOF,
all facts, unnecessary to prove, 199.
all material fact, 199.
burden of, 199, (2) 383.
carriers, 583.
criminal cases, 201.
either side, 583.
form, 382, 383.
on affirmant, 199.
will contest, 200.
by clear preponderance, 200.
circumstantial evidence, degree, 312.
"conclusive," improper, 200.
degree greater than preponderance, 200.
in criminal cases, 296.
on each link, 312.
of proof, 312.
necessary, criminal, 790.
too high, 200.
criminal, 201.
each essential fact, 312.
fair preponderance, 200.
fraud, degree of proof, 200.
in circumstantial evidence, 315.
jury must be sure, 200.
"more and better evidence," 200.
preponderance of, form, (1) 384, (5) 385.
prima facie, larceny, 265a.
proving all facts, 199.
insanity, 751, 752.
"satisfactory proof," 200.
varying from allegations, 261.
with "clearness and certainty," 200.
PROPERTY,
See GOODS.
in factory locality, 681.
purchasing with knowledge, 681.
taking by burglary, 812.
PROPRIETY,
propriety of giving instructions, 2.
PROSTITUTES,
in disorderly house, 839.
974
INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1364 Principles, 365878 Forms.)
PROVINCE OF JURY, See JUBY.
in circumstantial evidence, 309.
instruction invading, 207.
invading, railroad, 177.
invading, as to witness, 215.
by assuming facts, 192.
by instruction, 185.
illustration, 184.
on confessions, 319.
province of, 175.
when, 174, 181, 204.
jury determines facts, 175.
PROVOKING DIFFICULTY,
"entirely" free from fault, n. 40, 258.
PROXIMATE,
cause of injury, 541.
negligence, instruction improper, 184.
PUBLICATION,
libelous per se, (3) (4) 495.
what constitutes, 497.
PUBLIC PLACE,
what is not, 849.
PUNISHMENT,
for each grade, instruction, n. 59, 274.
instruction on, proper, n. 59, 274.
no instruction on requested, 274.
PUNITIVE DAMAGES, See EXEMPLARY DAMAGES, VINDICTIVE DAMAGES.
excluding punitive damages, 58.
instructions on, 59.
means "exemplary damages," 74.
PURCHASE,
induced by false statements, 516.
PURCHASER, See FRAUD.
innocent of fraud, 518.
knowing fraudulent intent, 519.
"PURPORTED,"
referring to will, 74.
Q.
QUESTIONS,
for special findings, 230.
on evidentiary facts, 231.
single and direct, for finding, 231.
INDEX. 975
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
R.
RAILROADS,
See CARRIERS, CROSSINGS.
accident and negligence, (3) 545.
from natural cause, 581.
injury from, 648.
appliances presumed safe, 622.
approaches to station, dangerous, (4) 567.
approaching crossing, care, 627.
assisting passenger on, 571.
benefits offsetting damages, 687.
blowing whistle, forms, 642.
wrongfully, 642.
boiler explosion, carelessness, 580.
brakeman injured, liability, 610, 624.
burning property, 631, 645.
not liable, 645.
car owned by another, 579.
care in coupling cars, (12) 549.
running trains, forms, 630.
carelessly injuring brakeman, 624.
carriers of passengers, 548, 549.
carrying live stock, 589.
children trespassing, 559.
competent employe's, essential, 581.
contract to build, 396.
contributory negligence, 633, 634.
forms, 632.
crossing land, damages, (4) 685.
customs, usages, rules, 655.
cutting up farm, 685.
damages by fire escaping, 645.
in shipping goods, 588.
damaging farm, 685.
property, 684.
deceased's contributory negligence, 635.
different companies operating, 579.
diverting water course 674.
duty in crossing sreets, 630.
to passenger, 584.
ejecting passenger, 574.
electric cars, using, 3, 634.
employe" at fault, 619.
knowing danger, 618.
employe's keeping lookout, 630.
failing to deliver goods, 587.
fence not required, when, (6) 646.
fencing tracks, 646.
tracks at stations, (7) 646.
flagman at crossing, 643.
forms for defendant, 629.
of instructions. 627.
frightening team, liability, (8) 641, (3) (4) 642.
team, wrongfully, 642.
gates at crossing, necessity, 643.
getting off moving train, 561.
976 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
RAILROADS Continued.
great care required, 631.
greater care, when, 630, (2) 631.
greatest care required, ( 1 ) 550.
gripman's duty, 644.
high degree of care, -549.
highest care required, (3) 545.
impairing access to premises, (4) 684.
injury to passenger, 550.
to person, 579.
instruction enumerating facts, 647.
enumerating issues, 629.
killing hogs, no liability, 646.
persons, damages, 649.
stock, liability, 646.
ladders on cars, (11) 639.
liable for injury, 550.
negligence, 638.
slight negligence, 550.
losing baggage, forms, 585.
moterman's willful act, 615.
negligence, causing injury, 610.
in city, (2) (3) 631.
not presumed, 533.
of agents, 392.
of both, (3) (6) 544.
of passenger, 582.
of railroad, 539, 627.
presumed, 538.
negligent, when, (3) 630.
not at fault, (5) 648.
not insurer ot passenger, 584.
not liable, injury to brakeman, (4) 624.
obstructing tracks, 634.
ordinance requiring bell, 644.
ordinary care required, 630.
owner of cars causing injury, 579.
passenger jumping from car, 582.
obeying directions, 567, 577.
on freight car, 555.
pathway across track, (2) 655.
plaintiff cannot recover, when, (4) 634.
can recover, when, 630.
careless, 629.
contributory negligence, 630, (6) 634.
may recover, when, 630.
negligent, fire, 645.
platform unsafe, 556.
presume travelers careful. (5) 640.
recovery against, when, 647.
right of way, damages, (5) 685.
rules for conduct of servants, 611.
violated, 655.
safe cars and couplings, 610.
safe guards against fire, 645.
safety for servants, (8) 610.
section master and hands, 613.
INDEX. 977
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 305 878 Forms.)
RAILROADS Continued.
servant's negligence, (4) 543.
side-tracks, fencing, (6) 046.
slight negligence, ( 1 ) 549.
sounding whistle, ring bell, 641.
spark arresters, 045.
speed of trains, regulating, (9) 641.
starting train suddenly, (3) 548, (8) (9) 567.
stopping at station, 564.
switchman assuming risk, 617.
ties out of repair, ( 16 ) 549.
train running too fast, 640.
traveling on premises of, 637.
trespasser, riding on, (5) 549.
trespassing on premises, 637.
using electric wires, (2) 546.
trolly wires, (2) 548.
view in approaching, obstructed, 628.
violating ordinances, 644.
water, removal of, 649.
what company owns road, 579.
is not negligence, 540.
RAILROAD COMPANY, See CROSSING.
burning property, instruction, 177.
engine emitting sparks, 177.
fencing track, legal question, 163.
RAILROAD CROSSING,
approaching without stopping, 184.
RAPE.
age of female, evidence, 82.
assault with intent, 178, 268, 769.
child witness.. 225.
instruction, 225.
consent, question of fact, 771.
through fear, 770.
evidence of consent, 103.
instructions on assault, 274.
intercourse by consent, 103.
requesting instructions on assault, 274.
testimony of child, 225.
theory of defense, female consenting, 103.
woman overpowered, 770.
REAL ESTATE,
See LANIX
real estate, 656.
adverse possession. 656.
forms of instructions, 056.
REASON,
for doubt, 717.
REASONABLE CARE,
See CARE, ORDINARY CARE, 74.
978 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.}
REASONABLE DOUBT, 294.
abiding conviction, 718, 719.
absolute certainty, 297.
not required, 720.
a doubt, or all doubt, 300.
affecting reasonable man, 719.
alibi creating doubt, 744.
arising irom evidence, 295.
as to each link, 721.
as to sanity, 751.
as to subsidiary facts, 735.
as to the whole evidence, 733.
based on common sense, 296.
reason, 294.
captious artificial doubt, 720.
causing hesitation, (4) 716, 719.
confined to essential facts, 311, 725.
conjectural, instructions, 298.
conscientiously believe, error, 296.
convincing evidence required, 720.
creating sources of doubt, 718.
definitions of, 294, 295.
unimportant, n. 4, 294.
degree of murder, 783.
desire for more evidence, n. 32, 297.
doubt removed, when, (5) 716.
though probably guilty, 724.
each juror, 301.
each link in chain, 299.
entirely satisfied, error, 295.
evidence conclusive, error harmless, n. 19, 296.
excluding theory, 723, 727.
fears from appearances, 803.
forms of instructions, 716.
from evidence, 719.
from part of evidence, 299, 726.
from undue sensibility, 718.
from want of evidence, 717.
from whole evidence^ 299.
full satisfaction of guilt, 296.
generating doubt, 299.
good character, creating, 343, 757.
greater weight of evidence, (2) 727.
hesitate and pause, 294.
hunting up doubts, 298, (2) 716, 719.
illustrations on doubt, 295.
in circumstantial evidence, 312.
ingenuity of counsel, 299.
in graver transactions. 295, (1) (4) 716, 719.
instruction erroneous, 295.
for defense, 723.
for prosecution, 716.
improper, 297.
proper, 294, 295, 297.
properly modified, 300.
whole evidence, 299.
INDEX. 979
(References are to Sections, 1364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.}'
REASONABLE DOUBT Continued.
jurors believe as men, (2) 718.
mathematical certainty, 297.
mere probability of guilty, 727.
merely conjectural, 298.
misleading on doubt, n. 32, 297.
modifying instructions on, 300.
must arise from evidence, (2) 716.
imust be removed, 716, 790.
not applicable to law, n. 4, 294.
not idle conjecture, 294.
not mere whim, 294.
omitting in circumstantial evidence^ 313.
in larceny instruction, 240.
on alibi, 323.
on defendant's testimony, n. 139, 227.
on degree of homicide, 253.
one essential fact doubtful, 734.
on insanity, 331.
on one fact in chain, 312.
on subsidiary facts, 725.
possibility of aoubt, (2) 716.
probability of guilt only, 724.
of innocence, n. 25, 297, 723.
possibility, 297.
proof beyond doubt. 201.
reason for doubt, 717'.
reasonable certainty required, 720.
repeating instructions on, 21.
refusing usual instruction, 296.
satisfy conscience, 297.
judgment, 297.
several instructions defining, 294.
substantial doubt, 295.
to moral certainty, 295.
trivial, fanciful doubts, 718.
uncertain, which guilty, 728.
very reasonable doubt, 295.
want of evidence, 299.
omitting, n. 2, 294.
well founded doubt, 716.
what is doubt, 716.
REASONABLE HYPOTHESIS,
evidence excluding, 303, 307.
excluding in circumstantial evidence, 310.
of innocence, 723.
omission of reasonable, error, 313.
REASONABLE TIME.
meaning of, carriers, 565.
to get off train, 565.
RECALLING JURY,
See FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS.
for further instructions, 38.
980 INDEX.
'(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
RECEIVING,
accomplice in receiving, 290.
RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY,
defense to charge of, 103.
definition defective, omitting intent, 276.
RECONCILING,
conflicting testimony, (8) 213, (2) (3) (4) (8) 365.
contradictory testimony, 223.
illustrations, improper, 213.
instructions on reconciling testimony, 223.
RECORD, See BILL OF EXCEPTIONS.
all evidence in, necessary, when, 361.
all instructions in record, 359, 360.
embodying instructions in, 359.
error, though all instructions not in, 360.
evidence and instructions in, 361.
instructions not in, presumption, 360.
making instructions part, 357.
must contain all evidence, 361.
of extradition proceedings, 163.
oral instructions, preserving, n. 70, 358.
presumed correct, 360.
presumption in absence of instructions, 360.
recitals as to instructions, 359.
showing instructions filed, 357.
silent as to all instructions, 359.
construction of records, 156.
instruction as to, proper, 163.
sufficiency of, as evidence, 163.
RECOVERY,
facts necessary to recover, 647.
REFERRING TO PLEADINGS,
illustration, instruction proper, 155.
REFUSAL,
See REFUSING.
on burden, error, when, 199.
on each link, 312.
on impeachment of witness, 220.
REFUSING,
all requests, 26b.
by marking, refused. 44.
caution against accomplice, 288.
cautionary instructions, 50.
correct instructions, if misleading, 60.
defective requests, 27, 28.
discretionary, when, 206.
error, when, 118.
further instruction, 38.
harmless to refuse, when, 243.
if argumentative. 66. 68.
if requiring explanation, 61.
INDEX. 981
(References are to Sections, 1364 Principles, 365878 Forms J
REFUSING Continued.
in absence of evidence, 83.
incomplete instruction, 29.
in homicide, proper, when, 269.
in petit larceny, 89.
in personal injury, 97.
instructions properly refused, 97.
.misleading instruction, 60.
on intent, 65.
on fraud, 65.
obscure instruction, 62.
on alibi, error, when, 326.
on burden of proof, 199.
on circumstantial evidence, 303, 304, 311.
on corroboration, error, 289.
on defendant as witness, 229.
on good character, 342.
on immaterial issues, 91.
on involuntary manslaughter, 273.
on presumption of innocence, 336.
on receiving stolen property, 103.
on self-defense, error, when, 255.
proper, when, 255.
repeating unnecessary, 25.
special covered by general, 26.
requests, 26a.
when evidence close, 26a, 250.
inconsistent, 84, 86.
slight, 85.
criminal, 88.
when justice is done, 243.
when no evidence, 80.
when substance is given, 25.
when too many, 19.
REFUSING REQUESTS, 27b.
See REFUSAL.
RELATIVES,
as witnesses, 225.
believing or disbelieving, 225.
caution in weighing testimony of, 225.
disinheriting by will, 692.
instruction improper, 225.
proper, 225.
weighing testimony of, 225.
REMANDED,
for new trial, 364.'
instructions after remanding, 364.
REMARK,
by court: no conscience in case. 185.
caution against, (5) 379, (6) 379.
equivalent to peremptory, n. 4. 120.
harmless, if retracted, n. 18, 238.
influencing jury, improperly, 185.
982 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
REMARK Continued.
instructions on, 361.
is directing verdict, n. 4, 120.
plaintiff has made better case, 185.
preserving by bill of exceptions, 361.
REMITTITUR,
failing to cure error, n. 62, 246.
REPAIR,
keeping sidewalks in, 591.
keeping streets in, (8) 591.
REPAIRING,
electric wires, 547.
REPEATING,
defense once stated, 23.
explanations of words, 22.
formula, if you believe from evidence, 105.
in special charge, error, 25.
may cause error, 25.
on assuming risk of danger, 25.
on interest of witness, 24.
on preponderance, 21, 23.
on reasonable doubt, 21. .
on witness' credibility, 24.
principles need not be repeated, 20.
of general charge, 26.
in detail, 22.
refusal not ground for error, 22.
refusing when given in others, 25.
rule once stated, sufficient, 21.
special charge repeating, general, 26.
substance given in others, 25.
when charge is general, 22.
when evidence is close, 26a.
REPEATING INSTRUCTIONS,
See REPEATING.
REPLEVIN,
action on bond, evidence, 83.
evidence wanting, on plea, 83.
writ of, legality of, law, 163.
REPUTATION,
See CHARACTER, 756.
believing or disbelieving witness, 271.
for peace and quiet, (2) 756.
witness' bad reputation, 221.
REQUESTS,
See INSTRUCTIONS, REQUESTING INSTRUCTIONS.
absence of requests, 6, 7, 8, 9, 274, 284.
for definition of "night time," 75.
INDEX. 983
{References are to. Sections, 1364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
REQUESTS Continued.
for instruction, absence of, 199.
on impeachment, 220.
unnecessary, 292.
for specific instructions, 9.
on abstract instruction, n. 9, 48.
on alibi, necessary, 326.
on circumstantial evidence, 303.
on reasonable doubt, 9, 294.
unnecessary, when, 303.
REQUESTING INSTRUCTIONS,
failure to request, 6.
giving without request, 292.
in criminal cases, 6.
neither party asking, 8.
on included offense, 274.
party must request, 6.
written requests, 6.
RESIDENCE,
business house or residence, (2) 876.
injured by nuisance, 679.
RESIDENCE DISTRICT,
what constitutes, 876.
RESTRICTING JURY,
jury restricted to evidence, 6.
RETREAT,
See HOMICIDE, SELF-DEFENSE.
officer need not retreat, 260.
not required, ' when, n. 51, 260.
required in self-defense, 260.
unnecessary, when, (6) 802.
REVIEW,
court reviewing errors, 349.
.in absence of evidence, 361.
legal questions not reviewable, when, n. 87, 360.
on appeal or error, 346.
same error by both, 363.
REVIEWING,
evidence in detail, 191.
on important matters, 191
mistakes in reviewing evidence, 191.
scope in reviewing evidence, 191. .
REWARD,
offering for detection, 224.
instruction, when reward offered, 224.
RHODE ISLAND,
directing verdict, not reviewable, n. 57, 131.
RIGHT OF WAY,
to carriers, (6) 551.
984 INDEX.
(References are to. Sections, 1364 Principles, 8 365878 Forms.)
RIGHTS PREJUDICED,
in admitting incompetent evidence, 84.
RISKS,
not assumed, when, 621.
servant assuming, t>17.
RIVER, See STREAM.
ROAD,
abandoned, (3) 860.
establishing public road, 858.
vacating road, how, 859.
width of railroad, 164.
ROBBERY,
armed with weapon, (3) 772.
conspiracy to commit, 762.
denned, (3) 772.
definition unnecessary, when, 269.
force essential, 772.
instructions on larceny, 268, 274.
larceny included, 267, 274.
requesting instructions, necessary,274.
resulting in killing, 762.
RULES,
for conduct of servants, 611.
habitually violated, 655.
of railroad company, 570.
reasonableness of, law, 163.
relating to passengers, (4) 570.
to railroads, 655.
RULE OF COURT,
for noting authorities on requests, n. 207, 45.
how made valid. 18.
must be reasonable and lawful, 18.
on presenting requests, 18.
power to make rule, 18.
presenting instructions under, 14.
RULINGS,
preserving for review, 149.
RUMOR,
rumor is not evidence, 836.
SALE,
complete, when, (1) (4) 406.
conditions complied with, 412.
delivery completes, form, (2) 406.
fraudulent sale, (3) 517.
full, fair consideration, 518.
grain, sale of, n. 34, 414.
husband to wife, 523.
induced by fraud, 414.
INDEX. 985
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms. )
SALE Con tinned.
instructions on, form, 406.
made by sample, (1) (3) 407.
made when in debt, (4) 517.
not void, when, 518.
of personal property, (1) 406.
on warranty, 409.
breach, 408.
purchaser knowing fraud, 519.
rescinding for defects, 413.
of sale, 406.
selling for taxes, 689.
to defeat creditors, (2) (3) 517.
to wife in good faith, (4) 517.
SALOON,
opening on Sunday, 194.
SANITY, See INSANITY.
overcoming presumption of, 331.
presumed, 330, 331, 696, 700.
SCAFFOLDING,
assuming to be safe, (3) 622.
"SEDATE,"
SEE COOL.
SEDUCTION,
seducing another's wife, 874.
SEIZURE,
personal property, damages, 511.
unlawful seizure of pioperty, 509.
SELF-DEFENSE, 795. See MURDEB.
abusive language only, (4) 475.
acting upon appearances, (2) 474, 802.
actual danger unnecessary, 285.
appearances, acting on, 285.
appearance of danger, 256.
forms, 802.
bare fear no defense, 795, 799.
belief from appearance, 256.
of danger well founded, 474.
burden on defendant, 201.
can not claim, when, 258.
cases illustrating, 796.
cautionary instruction on, 52.
character of deceased, 807.
danger need not be real. 802.
urgent and pressing, 798.
declining further struggle, 798.
defendant abandoning conflict, 259.
at fault, 258.
must retreat, 260.
986 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
SELF-DEFENSE Continued.
defendant originally in wrong, 259.
provoking difficulty, 258, 797.
threatened, 257.
defending another, (12) 649.
degree of proof, 201.
evidence supporting, 88, 255.
slight, sufficient, 88.
tending to prove, 102.
excessive force in defense, 475.
fear from words, threats, 257.
with overt act, 799.
fleeing from adversary, 795.
forms for defense, 795, 796, 802.
grounds for belief, 800.
ignoring when evidence of, 102.
improperly refusing on, 259.
instruction defective, 56.
for defense, 796.
ignoring, 255, 259.
improper, when, 255.
omitting elements of, 56.
proper, 255.
properly refused, 258.
requiring actual danger, 256.
killing not "absolutely necessary," 256.
law correctly stated, 256.
mere belief of danger, 800.
mere threats unavailing, 801.
murder or self-defense only, 271.
no evidence of self-defense, 255.
not well founded, 475.
reasonable doubt on, 803.
refusing on, error, when, 255.
proper, when, 255.
resisting attack of several, 804.
unlawful arrest, 262, 805.
retreat, essential, 260.
"satisfactory proof," too high, 201.
slight evidence supporting, 255.
statute defining, error, 285.
statutory language improper, 284.
testimony of defendant alone supporting, 88.
unavailing, when, 797.
using excessive force in, (5) 475.
what constitutes, 474.
when lying in wait, 240.
SERIES,
arranging into one, 73.
both sides into one, 73.
considered as a whole, 70.
instruction of both into, 73.
not one of, 246.
position of instruction in, 70.
INDEX. 987
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 forms .)
SERVANT, See MASTEB.
assuming appliances safe, 622.
risks, 617, 621.
at fault, injury, 623.
no recovery, 619.
running train, 617.
away from place of duty, 623.
care in observing danger, 618.
continuing after knowing danger, (5) 618.
master's promise to repair, 620.
with knowledge of danger, 619.
contributing to injury, 611.
discharging for cause, 626.
forms, 626.
does not assume risks, when, 621.
employer's negligence, 621.
employment hazardous, 611.
form of instructions, 620.
ignorant of danger, (2) 622.
injured, when at fault, forms, 000.
while violating rules, 611.
injury to servant 660.
knowing danger, 618, (4) 618.
defective boiler, 619.
defects in machinery, 610.
master advising of danger, 612.
concealing danger, 612.
not assuming risks, forms, 621.
observing companv's rules, 611.
of railroad, (8) (9) 549.
out of his place, injured, 623.
relying on master's promise, 620.
safety of, by master, 610.
injuring passenger, (8) (9) 549.
using scaffolding, (3) 622.
willful act of, 615.
SERVICES,
considerations in estimating, guardian, 870.
value of deceased's services, (4) 650.
SET-OFF,
burden on defendant, (2) 384.
instructions on claim of, 104.
issue of, abandoned, 100.
SETTLEMENT,
accepting less than due, 404.
binding, when, 404, (5) 404.
claim of not denied, 100.
compromising disputed claims, 404.
consideration for settlement, 404.
form of instruction on, 404.
of disputed claims, 404.
particular formality unnecessary, 404.
procured by fraud, (7) 404.
without consideration, 404.
988 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.;
SEVERAL COUNTS, See COUNTS.
instructions covering, 29.
SHIPMENT,
damage, delay in, 587, 588.
of live stock, 589.
SHOOTING,
not justifiable, damages, 649.
"SHOULD,"
instead of "may," 216.
SICK,
carrying sick person, 552.
SIDE-TRACKS,
need not be fenced, 646.
SIDEWALKS,
care in maintaining, 65.
in passing over, 592.
in traveling, 608.
city not insurer of, (9) (10) 591.
constructed properly, 596.
defective for years, (2) 591.
defects long standing, (3) (4) 595, 596, 597.
elements necessary to recovery, 599.
excavation in causing injury, 599.
forms of instructions, 591.
ice, snow, sleet on, 603.
in dangerous condition, 591.
keeping in repair, (6) (7) 591.
knowing unsafe condition, 593.
misleading instruction, 65.
notice of condition inferred, (1) 596, (4) 596.
of defects, 595, 597.
opening or cellar in walk, 593.
plaintiff knowing condition, forms, 593.
presumed safe, forms, 592.
reasonably safe, (9) (10) 591.
repairing, 65.
signs overhanging, 604.
slippery from ice, 603.
traveling on when bad, (2) 591.
unsafe condition, forms, 593, 596. ,
SIGNATURES,
proof of writing, 871.
testator signing will, 693.
SIGNING AND NUMBERING,
failure to number requests, 43.
to sign requests, 43.
statutory requirement, 4.3
SIGNING INSTRUCTIONS,
by court and counsel, 43.
INDEX. 989
(References are to Sections, 1364 Principles, 365878 Forms. )
SIGNS,
city liable for injury, 004.
shall regulate, 604.
overhanging sidewalks, dangerous, 604.
SINGLING OUT FACTS, 113.
by summary instruction, 115.
evidence decisive of cause, 114.
excluding facts, 114, 115.
facts of one side ignored, 113.
proper, when, 114.
unobjectionable, when, 114.
favorable facts, 116.
in criminal case, 115.
in homicide case, 115.
instruction condemned, 115.
unobjectionable, 114.
misleading, when, 113.
one of several issues, 92.
omitting defendant's side, 115.
plaintiff improper, 223.
singling out threats, 115.
singling out witness, 223.
strongest facts, 113.
strong points for prosecution, 115.
subordinate issue improper, 92.
unimportant facts, 113.
when evidence slight or contradictory, 113\
SLANDER, See LIBEL.
actual damages unnecessary, (1) 498.
charging one with larceny, (2) 496.
with murder. 496.
with fornication, 494.
damages not pecuniary only, (2) 499.
defined, form, (2) 491.
forms, on damages for, 498, 499.
good faith, defense, 501.
"he stole my hogs," (2) 494.
jury judges, (3) 493.
justification, degree of proof, 502.
malice implied, when, 492.
is essential, 492.
presumed, when, 492.
matters in mitigation, 500.
measure of damages, considerations, 498, (1) 499.
part of words sufficient, 494, (2) 495.
probable cause, defense, 501.
proving slanderous words, 493.
publication in good faith, 501.
libelous, (3) (4) 495.
what constitutes, 497.
punitive damages, proper, 499, (3) 499.
specific damages unnecessary, (3) 495.
woman is whore, (2) 495.
words essential to action, 494.
libelous per se, 495.
990 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms. J
SLAYER,
lying in wait, 784.
SLIGHT EVIDENCE, See EVIDENCE.
in criminal case, 88.
on insanity, 88.
will support instructions, 86.
SMELLS,.
causing nuisance, 679.
SMOKE,
causing nuisance, 679.
SNOW,
on sidewalks, liability, 603.
SORROW,
in assessing damages, 651.
not element of damages, 650.
SOUND MIND,
SEE MIND.
failure to define, 6.
SPECIAL FINDINGS, 230.
answers inconsistent, 234.
general instructions improper, 232.
jury find facts, 232.
proper, when, 230.
questions and answers, 233.
questions illustrating practice, 233.
statutory regulation, 231.
submitting interrogatories, 230.
SPECIAL INSTRUCTION,
error in not cured, 238.
not cured, 60.
exceptions should be taken, 348.
failing to request, 9.
failure to give, 7.
no ground for error, when, 7.
on matters omitted, 7.
party must request, 7.
refusal of error, when, 26.
in criminal case, 26.
when evidence close, 250.
when repetition, 26.
repeating matters in general charge, 25.
specific and general, 60.
when charge incomplete, 60.
when charge too general, 7.
SPECIFIC INTENT, 2BO. See INTENT.
drunkenness disproving, 281.
instructions on, proper, 280.
refusing instructions on, 281.
INDEX. 991
(References are to Sections, 1364 Principles, 365878 Forms.)
SPEED,
regulating by ordinance, 644. .
speed of train, 640.
train's speed at crossings, (5) 640.
STAGE,
as carrier, (4) 550.
STATE,
on exception, 354.
STATEMENT,
See UNSWORN STATEMENT.
defendant's statement, criminal, 64.
as evidence, 60.
STATION,
approaches to, (12) 567.
dangerous, (4) 567.
dark at station, 563.
lighted and safe, 564.
need not fence, (546.
receiving passengers away from, 567.
station not lighted, 563.
STATUTE,
carrier violating, 590.
construction of statute, 156.
defendant as witness, 226.
denning accessory, 291.
crimes, 275.
offenses, 284.
self-defense, 285.
definitions in words of, 275.
instructions in words of, 284.
in words of, improper, when, 285.
making jury judges of law, 166, 167, 169, 169.
on corroboration, 289.
on exceptions, 346, 347, 352.
on peremptory and nonsuit, 125.
on preserving instructions, Indiana, n. 68, 357.
on ringing bell, (7) 641.
on signing exceptions, 346.
prohibiting court from expressing opinion, 170.
provisions not relevant, 284.
reading to jury, n. 8, 284.
referring to by name, n. 2, 284.
relating to wills, 693.
stating substance of, 284.
validity of for court, 161.
violating provisions of, 81.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS,
referring to by name, n. 2, 284.
992 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365878 Forms.)
STATUTE OF LIMITATION, 465.
barring claim, 126.
suit, 128.
confining within, criminal, 108.
evidence confined within, 108.
in criminal cases, 108.
instruction confining within, 108.
on plea of, n. 82, 96.
proper, criminal, 108.
refusal, error, criminal, 108.
reviving barred claim, 466.
STATUTORY DEFINITIONS, 275.
STATUTORY INSTRUCTIONS, 284.
reading statutes to jury, n. 8, 284.
STATUTORY OFFENSES, 275.
STEALING,
essential in larceny, 276.
STENOGRAPHER,
taking oral charge, 5.
STOCK,
killing at side-track, 646.
live stock, 837.
railroads killing, 646.
STOCKS,
fraud in sale of, 516.
illegally increasing, 463.
STOLEN GOODS, See POSSESSION.
explaining possession, 82, 816.
instruction improper, 266.
on possession, 265a, 812.
possession a circumstance, (2) (3) 8J6.
evidence, 266, 816.
prima facie proof, 265a.
receiver of, accomplice, 290.
refusing instruction on, 265a.
unexplained possession, 812.
STREAM,
center of stream, line, 660.
docks and wharves on, (2) 686.
lots fronting on, value, 686.
owner to middle, 686.
public navigating, 686.
STREETS,
are for public, (5) 631.
care in passing over, 592.
channels for water, 602.
city must notice condition, 597.
shall keep safe, 606.
INDEX. 993
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.}
STREETS Continued.
defects in, notice of, 596.
electric cars running, (3) 634.
grade obstructing water, 602.
gutters insufficient for waterflow, 602.
keeping in repair, (8) 591.
obstructing in building, 605.
piling lumber in, 595.
reasonably safe condition, (9) 591.
safe to travel on, forms, 606.
unsafe condition, notice of, 596.
unskillfully constructed, 602.
STREET CARS,
right of way, 551.
STRENGTH,
element of defense, 118.
SUBSCRIPTION,
altering contract, 462.
alteration of release's subscriber, 462.
SUICIDE,
defense to murder, 261.
evidence supporting, 261. *
SUMMARY INSTRUCTIONS, 119.
civil and criminal cases, 119.
nature and qualities of, 119.
noticing antagonistic theory, 119.
omitting facts, objectionable, 119.
oral summary cf evidence, 311.
reco'gnized. but condemned, 119.
without expressing opinion, 119.
SUMMING UP,
material facts, 119.
mistakes in, correction of, 119.
unimportant facts immaterial, 119.
SUNDAY,
operating machinery on, 861.
opening saloon on, 194.
Sunday violations, 861.
work of necessity on, 861.
SUPERVISORS,
keeping roads repaired, (2) 601.
SURETIES,
signing bond, 521.
SURPLUSAGE,
explanation of, unnecessary, 75.
SURRENDER,
defendant surrendering, 742.
994 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 305 878 Forms.)
SUSPICION,
not evidence, 290.
suspicion not evidence, 735.
SUSTAINING,
"evidence tending to sustain," 220.
witness, if evidence, 220.
SWEARING FALSELY, See WITNESSES.
accomplice a witness, 288.
circumstance, 221.
disregarding witness, 218, 219.
unless corroborated, 219.
instruction improper, 219.
on material matters, 218.
SWITCHMAN,
assuming risks, 617.
SYMBOLS,
false pretense committed by, 831.
T.
TABLES OF MORTALITY.
in assessing damages, n. 65, 58.
TAXES,
certificate of sale, void, 689.
listing land for, 690.
on realty, 689.
public sale for, 689.
selling land for, 689.
tax title, 691.
TEAM,
frightening at crossings, 641, 642.
TELLER.
acting within authority, (2) 393.
without authority, (2) 393.
agent of bank, 436.
TENANT. See LANDLORD AND TENANT.
carelessly igniting gas, (8) 544.
damaging premises, liable, 543.
guilty of negligence, (8) 544.
land occupied by, (9) 656, (3) 658.
landlord seizing property of, 510.
not liable, when, (3) 453.
possession, land by, (2) 662.
TENNESSEE,
assessing damages for personal injury, n. 64, 58.
TESTATOR, See WILLS.
competent, though feeble, 694. 69o.
declarations as to property, 602.
of testator, 701, (5) (8) 704.
INDEX. 995
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
TESTATOR Continued.
disinheriting relatives, 692.
disqualification of, 697.
eccentric, peculiar, 699.
family and connections, 701.
feeble in mind, (4) 695.
free agency of, (5) (6) 704.
incompetent to comprehend, 697.
induced to make will, (3) 704.
ill will toward relatives, 703.
knowing what he is doing, 694.
mental weakness only, 699.
partially insane, 692.
persuading to make will, 705.
physically weak, (5) 695.
possessing eccentricities, 699.
presumed of sound mind, 696.
radical or extreme, 699.
reasoning faculties, 694.
requesting witnesses, 693.
signature to will, 693.
signing in presence of, (3) (4) 693.
sound mind and memory, 694.
understanding business, (5) (6) 694.
business, 698.
weakness of intellect, 697.
TESTATRIX,
sexual relation with devisee, (2) 705.
TESTIMONY,
abandoned woman, 207.
accomplice uncorroborated, 288.
affirmative or negative, (3) (8) 366.
considerations in weighing, (2) 365.
expert witness, 211, 377.
impeaching, effect, 221.
not excluding, 221.
instructions on affirmative, 204.
on negative, 204.
jury not bound to reject, 218.
oral and depositions, 209.
positive and negative, form, 371.
sustaining by rebuttal, 221.
using testimony for evidence, 78.
weighed by jury, 206, 366.
weighing, considerations, (3) 215, 366.
TEXAS,
considerations, weighing testimony, 215.
instructing as requested, 32.
instructions in felony cases, 3.
reconciling conflicting testimony, 213.
special instructions. 32.
weighing witness' testimony, 215.
cattle, 513.
990 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
TEXT BOOKS,
copying instructions from, 286.
THEORY,
antagonistic theory, 119.
argumentative instruction, 68.
belief, on ownership, larceny, 103.
circumstantial evidence excluding, 732.
comparing theories, criminal, 102.
confine to theory alleged, 96.
contributory negligence, defense, 118.
defendant's theory ignored, 71.
different theories, instruction, when, 102.
directing verdict, when two, 132.
each presenting his own, 104.
error in ignoring, when, 101.
evidence on two, 132.
female consenting, rape, 103.
guilt or innocence, criminal, 68, 102.
ignoring defendant's theory, criminal, 101.
defense, error, 255.
in all instructions, 104.
on any element, 101.
one of several, 102.
when evidence supports, 101.
illustrations of rule. 103.
inconsistent theories, criminal, 102.
instruction for plaintiff, proper, 104.
on, improper, 102.
when several, 102.
in one instruction unnecessary, 101.
modifying to include opposing theory. 32.
opponent's theory, instructions. 102. 104.
outside of pleading, 99.
presenting prosecution only, 255.
refusing instructions on, 101.
relating to damages, 58.
right to instructions, criminal, 101. 103.
several theories, criminal, 102.
suggested by instruction, improper, 102.
suggesting theory, criminal, 102.
summary instructions. 119.
two opposing theories, 101.
unsupported by evidence, 82, 101.
withdrawing, error, 101.
THREATS. See DEFENSE, SELF-DEFENSE.
by deceased, material, 257.
evidence, proving threats, 257.
instructions ignoring threat. 257.
improper, 257.
instructing proper. 257.
made to compel contract, 526. 527.
mere threats, no defense, 801.
procuring confession by. 318.
singling out threats. 115.
INDEX. 997
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 3U5 878 Forms.)
TICKET,
conductor, taking up, 573.
form of instruction on, 573.
passenger without ticket, 572, 574.
TIMBER,
supply at coal mines, (6) 649.
TIME,
damages for loss of, (5) 653.
element in larceny, 118.
of damage, (3) 652.
for deliberation in murder, 780.
loss of time, damages, (7) (8) 652.
take exceptions, when, 347.
TIME OF INSTRUCTING,
after arguments, Missouri, 14.
at conclusion of evidence, Missouri, 14.
before closing argument, 14.
before or after arguments, 14.
in absence of rule, 14.
refusal, error when, 14.
TIME OF PRESENTING,
at close of evidence, 15.
giving instructions though presented too late, 17.
TIME OF REQUESTING,
before charge was given, 16.
rule regulating, 14.
too late, 15.
TIPPLING HOUSE,
instruction on opening, proper, 194.
opening on Sunday. 194.
TITLE.
abandonment of land, (3) (4) 660.
acquired by occupancy only, 663.
acquiring without color, 663.
adverse possession, by color of, 662.
by adverse possession, (2) 661.
claim, without color of, 663.
claiming by possession, 657.
land by color of, 662.
defective, (2) 689.
established by admission, (3) 662.
forms of instructions, land, 656.
how obtained to land, 656.
inclosing land, (5) 659.
in ejectment, 867.
instructions on title, 163.
legal title, how defeated, 656.
loss of deed, affecting, (2) 689.
no writing, showing, (5) 659.
passes, when, (3) 406.
securing by possession, land, 656, 657.
998 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1364 Principles, 365878 Forms.)
TOO MANY, See FEW, NUMEROUS INSTRUCTIONS.
arbitrarily limiting number, 19.
error in giving., 19.
few instructions for prosecution, n. 80, 19.
too many, instruction, 19.
TOWN,
liable, dangerous highway, 606.
TRACKS,
fenced in, 646.
TRAIN.
See CAR, CARRIERS, RAILROADS.
approaching private crossings, (9) 641.
care in entering, (6) (7) 567.
in running, 630.
danger signals required, 644.
extra trains running, (10) 630.
getting on carelessly, 568.
great care, running, 630, 631.
in frequented localities, (3) 631.
negligence in city, (2) (3) 631.
ordinance requirements, 644.
passenger getting on, 567.
regulating speed, (9) 641.
rules governing servants operating, 611.
running dry season, fire, 631.
in city, care, 631.
on time, (9) 630.
too fast, 617, (3) 630.
special precautions, when, 631.
speed, dangerous, 617, 630.
high rate, (3) 639, 640.
violating ordinance, (4) 644.
starting car suddenly. (3) (4) 565, (9) 567.
stopping reasonable time, 565.
sufficient time, 565.
without flagman, 635.
TRANSFER,
See SALE.
TRAVELER,
approaching railroad crossing, 5, 633.
care at crossings, (4) 631.
injury at crossing, liability, 642.
by railroad, 644.
injured on highway, 483.
on public streets, injury, 606.
presumed careful at crossing, (5) 640.
team frightened at crossing, (8) 641.
TREATMENT,
expenses for. damages. 607.
for injury damages, 607.
INDEX. yy
(References are to Sections, 1 304 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
TRESPASS,
action for assault, 102.
assuming trespass committed, 193.
by expelling passenger, 81.
damages, considerations in assessing, 59.
for, 59, 877.
estimating damages in, 81.
execution of replevin writ, 163.
for assault and battery, 59.
self-defense to assault, 102.
wilful conduct, evidence wanting, 81.
TRESPASSER,
care toward trespasser, (5) 549, 558.
carrier injuring, 558.
children, getting on cars, 559.
trespassing, 559.
ejecting from train, 558.
facts showing not, 637.
forms of instructions, 559.
when not, 637.
killing, unjustifiable, 263.
may recover, when, 559.
on train, 558.
plaintiff, not trespasser, 637.
removing from premises, 263.
TRESPASSING,
animals trespassing, 512.
TRIAL WITHOUT JURY, 47.
TROLLEY-WIRE,
See ELECTRIC WIRE.
TRUTHFULNESS,
vouching for witness, 222.
TURNPIKE,
keeping in repair, 481.
used as highway, 481, 483.
TWO MEANINGS,
.instructions of, 61.
\
U.
UNCERTAIN,
which of two guilty, 728.
UNDERSCORING,
See "MARKING," "INSTRUCTIONS," 345.
UNDUE INFLUENCE, See WILLS.
evidence disproving, wills, (8) 704.
wills, 704.
in procuring will, 704.
what constitutes, wills, (6) 704.
1000 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1 3(54 Principles, 365 878 Forms.}
UNGRAMMATICAL WORDS, 77.
UNSWORN STATEMENT,
caution against believing, 228.
defendant's mere statement, criminal, 228.
failure to instruct on, 228.
given as evidence, criminal, 228.
instruction on, 228.
when, n. 105, 140.
no instruction on, 228.
"not binding," improper, 227.
statute on, instruction, 228.
USAGES,
relating to railroads, 655.
USER.
evidence of corporation, 8G4.
highway established by, 858.
USURY,
interest is principal, when, (2) 418.
on note, 418.
penalty for charging, (2) 418.
UTAH,
degrees of homicide, 270.
UTTERING,
publishing forged instruments, 843.
V.
VALIDITY,
ordinance, law, validity, 161.
warrant, validity of, 163.
VALUE,
attorney's services, forms, 430.
bank assets in embezzlement, 828.
confined to property alleged, 819.
considerations in determining, 511.
damaged property, 672.
essential defining larceny, 276.
estimating guardian's services, 870.
market value, 511.
in defining larceny, 276.
lots fronting on streams, 686.
market value, 645.
condemnation, (4) 683.
damages, 685.
land, 677.
new or second hand goods, (2) 511.
of stock killed, 196.
of stolen property doubtful, 89. 819.
one witness on, instruction, 196.
opinions as to, 520.
INDEX. 1001
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms. )
VALUE Con tinned.
property damaged by fire. 645.
taken by condemnation, G83.
railroad damaging farm, 085.
rental value impaired, (3) 685.
witnesses exaggerating, 688.
VARIANCE,
cause for nonsuit, 127.
death by blow, or poison, 261.
from disease or wound, 261.
error cured, n. 5B, 261.
evidence showing variance, 261.
ground for directing verdict, 127.
in homicide case, 261.
instructions, when, criminal, 261.
peremptory, when, n. 44, 127.
whether death was accident, n. 58, 261.
VEHICLE,
care in driving, 533.
VENUE,
forgery committed, when, 845.
VERDICT,
See DIRECTING VERDICT.
both parties negligent, 636.
coercing jury into verdict, 187.
correct, though instructions contradictory, 248.
could not be different, 243.
court urging compromise, 186.
covers whole issue, 234.
both parties requesting, 145.
burglary and larceny joined, 810.
by special findings, 232.
directed by court, when, 120.
because of variance, 127.
for defendant, 126.
for either party, 126.
for plaintiff, 135.
improper, when, 130.
in ejectment, 136.
jurors to agree, 148.
murder or acquittal, 269.
on former acquittal, 152.
on once in jeopardy, 152.
verdict generally, 124.
when claim admitted, 137.
when evidence conflicting, 141.
doubtful, 131.
when neither entitled, 131.
when part of claim contested. 142.
when pleadings insufficient, 138.
when several defendants, 142.
each juror acts for himself, 708.
1002 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1364 Principles, 365878 Forms.)
VERDICT Continued.
evidence conclusive against, 126.
exceptions before verdict, 347.
taken after, 349.
excluding proper, when, 126.
failure to request, form of, 42.
for damages, amount, 106.
for included offense, 252.
form of, for included offense, 42.
in writing, 42.
not requested, 42.
for plaintiff improper, when, 126.
general and special, 232, 234.
manner of reaching, n. 19, 50.
murder, first degree, 774.
not guilty, when, 783.
on gambling contract, 128.
party requesting, form of, 42.
peremptory instruction when negligence involved, 134.
right, though instructions wrong, 85.
should be murder, when, (3) 777.
showing error disregarded, 236, 237, 243.
unsupported by evidence, 139.
setting aside, 126.
warranted by evidence, n. 39, 243.
what it does not mean, 66.
when degree doubtful, 253.
homicide, 783.
when different counts, 810.
when evidence balanced, 202.
equally balanced, (5) 383.
strong against plaintiff, 133.
when prima facie proof, 136.
when several counts, civil, (19) 415.
defendants, 878.
VIEWERS,
giving due notice, fences, 869.
fence viewers notice, 869.
VIEWING PREMISES,
evidence, when, (3) 379.
to understand evidence, (3) 379.
VINDICTIVE DAMAGES See EXEMPLARY DAMAGES, PUNITIVE DAMAGE.
for assault, when, 194.
VIOLATION,
in public place, 849.
Sunday violations, 861.
VITAL POINT,
contradictory instructions on, 248.
evidence close on, 250.
facts closely contested on, 309.
instructions on, error presumed, 243.
omitting instructions on, 245.
INDEX. 1003
(References are to factions, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms. )
VOID,
assignment void, when, 526.
certificate of tax sale, 689.
contract void, when, 526.
VOID INSTRUMENT,
court determines, 163.
VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER, See MANSLAUGHTER.
evidence supporting, 272.
no evidence of, 273.
VOUCHING,
for witness' truthfulness, 222.
W.
WAIVING,
jury trial, 47.
waived on motion for verdict, 146.
notice of death, insurance, (4) 422.
rights in contract, 406, 469.
in insurance, 421.
on sale of goods, (3) 407.
to claim error, peremptory, 144.
to nonsuit, 144.
to peremptory, 144.
to rescind contract, (2) 413.
to submit facts to jury, 145, 146.
trial by jury, 47.
waiving rights, how determined, (5) 406.
written instructions, 12.
WAIVING INSTRUCTIONS, 12.
by agreement, 12.
by failing to ask, 12.
by not objecting to oral, 12.
WAIVING RIGHTS,
See WAIVING.
instruction on waiving, 33.
WALL,
retaining wall, land, 671.
WANTONNESS,
unsupported by evidence, 81.
WAREHOUSE RECEIPTS, n. 34 3 414.
WARRANT,
arrest without. 503.
when, 789.
valid or void, law, 163.
WARRANTY,
breach of warranty, 408.
burden of proving, (1) 408, 410.
damages for breach of, (4) 408, 411.
1004 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1 304 Principles, 305 878 Forms.}
WARRANTY Continued.
implied, when, 409.
liability for breach, (3) 408.
on sale of machine, 23!).
of property, (1) 408.
WATCHMAN,
injured not at his place, 623.
not fellow servant of engineer, 613.
WATER,
changing flow, railroads, 647.
channels to carry off, 602.
damage by, forms, 674.
from, 674.
diverting from natural course, 074.
natural channel, 647.
How of, 602.
obstructing flow of, 602.
WAY,
for railroad, width, 164.
WEAPON,
See DEADLY WEAPON, 278.
assault with deadly weapon, 767.
deadly weapon defined, 767.
intent inferred from, (2) (6) (7) (8) (9) 777.
likely to produce death, (8) 777.
manner of using, (7) (8) (9) 777.
WEIGHING,
plaintiff's testimony, weighing, 369.
WEIGHT,
absent witness' testimony, weight, n. 23, 211.
affirmative and negative testimony, 204, 205.
circumstantial evidence, 305.
confession, improper comment, 317.
weight of, 316, 317.-
consider witness' opportunity of knowing, (2) 365.
"evenly balanced," (5) 365.
expert testimony, weight, 211.
form on weight of testimony, 366.
jury determine weight, 86.
determine, experts, 211.
weighing conflicting testimony, 209.
of testimony, 366.
"WHILE,"
relates to entire transaction, 74.
use and scope of, 74.
WHISTLE,
failure to sound, 641.
blowing wrongfully, 642.
INDEX. 1005
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
WHOLE LAW,
in one instruction, 246.
in series of instructions, 56.
in several instructions, 70.
stating in one instruction, 56.
WHORE,
charging woman with being, (2) 495.
WIDOW,
damages for killing husband, (11) 649.
mine operator killing husband, (5) 649.
pecuniary damages only, (5) 650.
railroad killing husband, 649.
WIFE,
abandonment of, homestead, 873.
affections alienated, 875.
compelling to sign deed, 527.
cannot recover, 448.
damages for death, (13) 650.
for injury, (9) 652.
for killing husband, (2) 650.
discrediting improperly, 225.
injured by sale of liquor, 488.
to support of, 488.
instruction improper, 225.
interested witness, 225.
liability for husband's debts, 447.
must support children, 448.
of accomplice, instruction, n. 9, 288.
separate estate of, 446.
witness for defendant, 225.
suspicion, 225.
WiLFULNESS,
no evidence of, 81.
WILL, bee TESTATOR, UNDUE INFLUENCE.
age in making, 692.
assuming insanity without evidence, 193.
presence of witnesses. 193.
advice in making, forms, 705.
advising person to make, 705.
burden on contestants, 200.
capacity to make, 692, (5) 694.
to recollect, (5) 695.
competency to make, 692.
considerations in determining validity, 703.
construction, operation, effect, 158.
contestant must prove, (5) 704.
determining mental state, 701.
forms, 701.
devising to charity, 692.
100G INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1364 Principles, 365878 Forms.)
W I LL Con tinned.
disinheriting children, (2) 692.
relatives, 692.
evidence of undue influence wanting, 81.
forms, as to presumption, 696.
on insanity, 697, 698.
on mentaf state, 694.
on "undue influence," 704.
relating to forgery, 706.
sound mind, oJ5.
free will in making, 094.
incapable of making, (2) 695, (2) 697.
insane delusions, 697.
insanity defined, 698.
invalid, when, 697.
legal right to make, (5) 694.
lucid intervals, 697.
legatees and devisees, 701.
made in extremis, (4) 695.
maker presumed sound, 696.
medical experts on mental state, 702.
mental capacity to make, 694.
faculties feeble, (4) 695.
weakness only, 699.
mind presumed sound, 696.
must be in writing, 693.
presumed properly attested, 693.
procured by "undue influence," 704.
properly attested, 693.
provisions of consistent, 696.
"purported" will, 74.
requirement in attesting, 693.
signed by testator, 693.
sound mind and memory, 692, 694.
defined, 695.
submitting "undue influence," 81.
testator physically weak, (5) 695.
with eccentricities, 692.
two witnesses required, 693.
"undue influence," a fact, n. 70, 183.
evidence, 200.
used, 704.
validity, considerations in testing, (2) 692.
of will, 703.
what essential, (5) 694.
when, 696.
what constitutes undue influence, (6) 704.
whether contain special trust, 158.
Avill alleged to be forgery, 706.
presumed genuine, 706.
witnesses signing in presence, 693.
to will, 693.
words referring to, 74.
INDEX. 1007
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 forms.)
WITHDRAWING,
abandoned issues, 100.
defense of insanity, 83.
erroneous instructions, 40.
evidence of confession, 318.
manner of withdrawing instructions, 40.
when instructions withdrawn, 40.
WITHDRAWING FACTS, 117.
WITNESSES, See CREDIBILITY.
abandoned women, as .witness, 207.
accomplice, 287, 376.
inducements, 288.
affirmative or negative, (3) '8) 366.
age of witness, 225.
apparent candor of, 216.
appearance and conduct, 215, 216, (5) (7) (8) (9) 365, (4) 366, (7*) 385.
arbitrarily disbelieving witness, ( 10 ) 366.
. argumentative as to expert, 66,
attesting will, (2) 693.
witness defined, (2) (3) 693.
becoming hysterical, 206.
believing or disbelieving, 221, (4) (9) 366.
though impeached, 220, (4) (5) 367.
bias or prejudice. (6) 209, (6) (7) (9) 365, (3) 366.
temper, feeling, (7) 215, 365.
both failing to call, 222.
candor, or want of, (4) (6) (7) (9) 365, 366.
character of his testimony, (8) 366.
child as witness, 225.
competency, for court, n. 4. 206.
conduct or demeanor, 206. (7) (8) (9) 365, 375, (3) 385.
considerations on credibility, 208, 365, (3) 385.
contradicting each other, 212.
himself, 223.
control of both parties, 222.
corroborated or uncorroborated, 209, 221, 365.
or contradicted, (8) (9) 365.
court calling witness, n. 55, 215.
convicted of felony, 226.
creating scene, 206.
credibility affected, 206, 207, 208, 215, 216, 224, 365.
of 'witness, 206, 227.
defendant's competency, criminal, 226.
corroborated. 227.
failing to testify, 229.
same as other, 227.
demeanor on stand, (7) 206, (7) (8) (9) 365. 375, (3) 385.
detectives, informers, 224.
determining preponderance by, 203, (4) (2) 385.
disbelieving if impeached, 221, (9) 367.
discrediting entirely, 221.
disinterested, credible, form, (4) (8) 385.
disregarding if impeached, (10) 366, (1) (2) (7) 367.
testimony. (5) 217, 3G6.
1008 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
WITNESSES Continued.
equally truthful, fair, 209, 366.
evidence impeaching, 110.
examine testimony cautiously, 209.
expert, instruction proper, 223.
opinions of, 211.
failure to produce, 222.
fairness of, (3) 366.
feeling, partiality, bias, 215.
form for experts, 377.
on credibility, 365.
on impeachment, (13) 367.
greater number of, (1) 385.
"has told truth," 221.
having knowledge failing to testify, 222.
hired for state, 224.
. his appearance, conduct, manner, 215, 216, (5) (7) (8) (9) 365, (4) 366,
(7) 385.
his intelligence, considered, 216.
husband, for wife, 370.
if his testimony is true, 179, 212.
"if you believe witness," 179, 212.
ignoring testimony of, 65.
illustrations on credibility, improper, 207.
ill will, instruction, 209.
immature child as, 225.
impeached, how, 220, (1) 367.
impeachment of witness, 220, 367.
instruction on believing, 221.
on credibility, 170, 206.
on disbelieving, 221.
on "greater credit," 209.
to give same weight, 207.
when wilfully false, 218.
intelligence of witness, 215, (5) (9) 365, (3) 366.
interest in case, 223, (2) (6) (7) (8) (9)365. (2) (4)366, 372, (3)385.
considered, 209, 214.
or disinterested, 209, 214.
intimating disbelief of, 210.
opinion on, 208.
invading province of jury as to, 215.
is he accomplice, 290.
jury believing or disbelieving, (1) (2) (3) 365,366.
disregarding, error, 207.
judges of credibility, 206.
"must" consider interest, 216.
reconciling testimony of, 213.
knowledge, experience, (9) 365, 366.
liars and truthful, 208.
magnifying value, condemnation, 688.
manner of testifying, (5) (6) (7) 365, (2) (4) 366.
on stand, 366, (4) 372.
means of information, (7) 365.
of knowing, (7) 209, 216, (1) (6) (7) 366.
medical expert, forms, 377.
wills, 702.
INDEX. 1009
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.)
WITNESSES Continued.
mistaken or false, 223.
motives, purposes of, (6) (10) 366.
not bound to believe, 207, 217.
number testifying, form, (5) 365, (6) (7) (8) 385.
objects, purposes, (7) 366.
of tender age, 225.
omitting facts, examining, 222.
on motion for peremptory, 122.
opinion not intimated on, 176.
opportunity of knowing, (2) (9) 209, 216, (2) (9) 365.
"perjured himself," 221.
praising, denouncing, 210.
presumed truthful, 214.
prejudiced, feelings, (7) 3G6.
probability of testimony, 215, (2) (8) 366, (4) 372.
reasonableness of testimony, (7) (9) 365, (3) 366.
reconciling testimony of, (4) 365.
related to defendant, criminal, 226.
to parties, (7) (8) (9) 365.
relatives as witnesses, 225.
repeating on credibility, 24.
reputation bad, 221.
scan testimony with caution, 207.
singling out experts, 223.
improper, 219, 223.
witness, 65, 115.
stating what he said, 210.
supported or contradicted, (4) 220, 366.
sustaining, no evidence, 220, 366.
swearing falsely, 66, 217, 218, 221.
tending to sustain, 220.
testifying wilfully, falsely, 209, 368.
testimony of, conflicting, 178.
when absent, 209.
truth and veracity, (4) (11) 367.
\vncontradicted, instruction, when, 196, 366.
unimpeached... 196, (5) 366.
unworthy of belief, 209.
vouching for truthfulness, 222.
witness called by court, n. 215.
WOMAN,
abandoned women, 207.
testimony of, 207.
WORDS, PHRASES,
"acquiescence," need not explain, 75.
"acquit" used for "convict," 78.
"at the time," scope of, 74.
awkward arrangement immaterial. 77.
"carelessly," definition unnecessary, 75.
''common laborer," definition unnecessary, 76.
"contributed," definition unnecessary, 75.
"cool," "sedate," definition unnecessary, 75.
"deadly violence," instead of "great violence," 75.
definition not required, when, 284.
of words, 6.
"deliberation," definition necessary, 75.
"difficulty ," meaning of, 74.
1010 INDEX.
(References are to Sections, 1 364 Principles, 365 878 Forms.}
WORD PHRASES Continued.
"due care," "ordinary care," reasonable care, convertible, 74.
error to use "acquit" for "convict," 78.
"evidentiary facts," explaining, 6.
"exemplary damages," meaning, 74.
"falsely," explanation unnecessary, 75.
"fellow servant," definition essential, 76.
"felonious," definition necessary, when, 75.
"felonious," "feloniously," definition unnecessary, 75.
"felony," definition necessary, when, 75.
"fraud"," definition unnecessary, 75.
"fraudulently" need not be explained, 75.
"great bodily harm," 75.
"heat of passion," definition necessary, 75.
instructions defining, 6.
repeating, explanation, 22.
"intentionally" for "knowingly and wilfully," 219.
"malice aforethought," 75.
"must" for "may," 78, 216.
need explanation, 284.
"night time," not defined, 75.
"not" omitted, error, n. 153, 79.
of written instruments, 160.
omission of immaterial, when, 314.
of "reasonable," 313.
omitting words, 79.
"ordinary care" defined, 74.
"ought," meaning of, 78.
"premeditation," definition essential, 75.
"preponderance," definition unnecessary, 75.
"presumption," definition unnecessary, 75.
"pretended" will, 74.
"prima facie," unnecessary to define, 75.
"punitive damages," meaning, 74.
"purported," referring to will, 74.
"ratification," unnecessary to define, 75.
"repudiation," need not explain, 75.
"serious bodily injury," definition, 284.
"should" for "may," 216.
statutory words ambiguous, 284.
"subsidiary facts," explaining, 6.
technical terms should be explained, 75.
"testimony," used for "evidence," 78.
used in instructions, 74.
using "acquit" for "convict," 78.
"plaintiff" for "defendant," 78.
"prisoner" for "defendant," 78.
underscoring in instructions. 45.
ungrammatical and awkwardly arranged, 77.
"while," scope of, 74.
"will" used for "may," 78.
words which are surplusage, 75.
WOUND,
JNU,
causing blood poisoning, 791.
neglected, causing death, 791.
primary cause of death, 791.
INDEX. 1011
(References are to Sections, 1364 Principles, 365878 Forms.}
WRITINGS,
See WRITTEN INSTRUMENT.
as collateral fact, 164.
construed by court, form, 156, 381.
by oral evidence, 160.
proof of handwriting, 871.
when a fact in evidence, 159.
WRIT OF ERROR,
See APPEAL.
WRITTEN CONTRACTS,
meaning of terms, 157.
varying by parol evidence, 471.
WRITTEN INSTRUCTIONS, See INSTRUCTIONS.
failing to ask, waived, 12.
to give, effect, 4.
to request, 6.
to request, waives, 12.
form of verdict included, 42.
handing to jury without reading, 13.
how modified, 4.
instructing orally, effect, 4.
modification of, 4.
must be requested, 4.
neither party asking, 4.
oral directions as to verdict, 41.
request, disregarding, 4.
summary of evidence, 11.
party must request, 6.
peremptory in writing, 123.
presenting after commencing oral charge, 15.
presumed in writing, when, 10.
in writing, when not, 10.
reading statutes, 11.
required by statute, 4.
rulings, remarks are not, 41.
statute is mandatory, 4.
stenographer taking oral charge, 5.
waiving by agreement, 12.
how, 12.
opponent's, 12.
WRITTEN INSTRUMENT,
construction, when a fact, 159.
court determines effect, 156.
explaining by oral evidence, 160.
interpretation of, 156, 159.
by jury, when, 156, 159.
legal effect of instrument, 156.
oral evidence to interpret, 160.
two in evidence, effect, 156.
whether clauses of, are repugnant, 163.
Whole number of pages, 1165.
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