'""^ INTERNATION 
 ^ AL ^ MILITARY 
 
 M SERIES, -'-'-^-^-'^ 
 
 valry Studies from Two 
 Great Wars 
 
 BGInIE KAHUJER DAVIS 
 
c> 
 
^ OK TUK r 
 
 UNIVERSITY 
 
INTERNATIONAL SERIES, No. 2 
 
 EDITED BY 
 
 CAPTAIN ARTHUR L. WAGNER, 
 
 Sixth Infantry, U. S. Army; Instructor in the Art of War at the U. S. Infantry 
 and Cavalry School, Fort Ivcavenworth, Kansas. 
 
 *r 
 
 Cavalry Studies from Two Great Wars 
 
 COMPRISING 
 
 THE FRENCH CAVALRY IN 1870, 
 
 BY 
 
 I.IEUTKNANT-COI.ONEI. BONIE. 
 
 THE GERMAN CAVALRY IN THE BATTLE OF VIONVILLE 
 MARS=LA=TOUR, 
 
 BY 
 
 MAJOR KAEHLER. 
 
 THE OPERATIONS OF THE CAVALRY IN THE 
 GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN, 
 
 BY 
 
 LIEUTENANT-COLONEL GEORGE B. DAVIS. 
 
 'Df 'IMBERLY i .o COM 
 
 1014-1016 Wyandotte street. 
 KANSAS CITY, MO. 
 

 Digitized by the Internet Archive 
 
 in 20Q7 with funding from 
 
 Microsoft Corporation 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cavalrystudiesfrOObonirich 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 Preface Page 9 
 
 PART^I. 
 
 Mobilization of the Cavalry.— Positions of the Armies.— Prelimi- 
 nary Operations. — Divisional Cavalry. — Action at Wissem- 
 bourg. — Battle of Froeschwiller.— Retreat to Chalons Page 11 
 
 PART II. 
 
 Army of Metz.— Battle of Spicheren.— Retreat to Metz.— Battle of 
 Rezonville. — Observations on the Employment of the Cavalry 
 at Rezonville.— Battle of Gravelotte.— Attack on the Lines of 
 St. Barbe, 31st August, 1st September.— Last Portion of the 
 Siege Page 38 
 
 PART III. 
 
 Army of Chalons. — To Rheims, and from Rheims to Sedan. — Bat- 
 tle of Buzancy. — Battle of Beaumont. — Sedan, August 31st, 
 September 1st Page 70 
 
 PART IV. 
 
 The Role of Cavalry before an Action. — Role during the Action. — 
 
 Role after a Battle Page 99 
 
 PART V. 
 
 Future Employment of Cavalry Page 117 
 
 CoNCiyUSiON - . . Page 128 
 
 MAPS. 
 
 The Franco-German Frontier ... Frontispiece 
 
 Von Bredow's Charge Page 169 
 
 Von Barby's Charge Page 191 
 
 Map of Vionville— Mars-la-Tour Page 130 
 
 85168 
 
EDITOR'S PREFACE. 
 
 The three monographs united in this volume are each 
 believed to possess peculiar and positive merit. The work of 
 Colonel (now General) Bonie appeared very soon after the 
 close of the Franco-German War, having been written, as it 
 were, in the smoke of battle. In this respect it differs 
 materially from the book of Major Kaehler, which is a recent 
 production, and now makes its appearance in English for the 
 first time. While Kaehler, unlike Bonie, does not write as 
 an eye-witness and with the experience of an actual partici- 
 pator in the events described, he has had the advantage of 
 historical researches which were not available to the French 
 author, and though his book is naturally a less vivid picture, 
 it can doubtless lay claim to greater historical accuracy than 
 that of its companion. 
 
 The essay on "The Operations of the Cavalry in the Get- 
 tysburg Campaign," by Lieutenant-Colonel George B. Davis, 
 U. S. A., first appeared in the Journal of the U. S. Cavalry 
 Association, several years ago ; but it has been revised by its 
 author especially for the International Series. It is pre- 
 sented in this volume, not only because of its intrinsic merit 
 as a study of the methods of the cavalry in one of our great- 
 est campaigns, but also because of the picture it presents of 
 the screening and reconnoitering duty of cavalry more than 
 seven years before the performance of similar duty by the 
 German cavalry astonished Europe as with a new discovery 
 in war. 
 
 In fact, it was not until the Franco-German conflict had 
 
6 Editor' 8 Preface. 
 
 been some time in progress that the German cavalry devel- 
 oped its wonderful efficiency in this important duty; and, 
 owing to its lack of fire-action, it w^as never in a condition, 
 during its entire service in France, to perform the duties of 
 a cavalry screen with the efficiency shown by the Federal 
 cavalry — especially by Buford — in the Gettysburg campaign. 
 From the descriptions of Bonie, the reader might imagine 
 that the German cavalry sprang at once across the frontier 
 as perfect in its tactical training as it undoubtedly was in 
 organization and equipment. Yet we find this cavalry allow- 
 ing the Crown Prince to lose touch entirely with MacMahon's 
 defeated army after the battle of Worth ; and, because of its 
 feeble reconnaissance, permitting Von Moltke to make his 
 plans for the battle of Gravelotte on the assumption that the 
 French right rested at Amanvillers instead of Roncourt. 
 The German cavalry had not yet learned by experience, and 
 it is perhaps not too much to say that if its adversary, instead 
 of being trammeled with by-gone traditions and anachron- 
 istic customs, had learned the cavalry lessons already taught 
 beyond the sea, the story of the Franco-German war might 
 have been materially modified; for it is a striking fact that 
 the American cavalry, though some stubborn or ill-informed 
 European critics still term H "so-called cavalry" or "mounted 
 infantry," approached much more closely to the present 
 European ideal in arms, training, and strategic handling 
 than did the famous German cavalry in 1870. 
 
 U. H. Infantry and Cavalry School, 
 
 Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 
 
 February 17, 1896. 
 
The French Cavalry in 1870 
 
 WITH ITS 
 
 TACTICAL RESULTS. 
 
 . BY 
 
 lylEUraNANT-COIvONKL BONIE, 
 
 Eleventh Dragoons. 
 
 ^ OK THli ' r 
 
 UNIVERSITY 
 
 Translated by 
 
 LIEUTENANT C. F. THOMSON, 
 
 Seventh Hussars. 
 
French Cavalry in 1870, 9 
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 For some years past public opinion has been a good deal 
 occupied with the influence that would be exercised on cav- 
 alry by the greatly increased importance of infantry and 
 artillery. Discussions on this subject, at first very unfavor- 
 able to cavalry, greatly diminished the prestige of that arm; 
 soon afterwards a sort of reaction set in, and it was allowed 
 that, as formerly, it was an indispensable portion of an army, 
 only, however, on the condition that it should understand 
 how to accommodate itself to modern changes. The neces- 
 sity for a change was of the greatest importance, consider- 
 ing the complete revolution that was taking place in all 
 European armies, in everything that related to warfare. 
 
 Unfortunately, the committee appointed to consider the 
 necessary changes, instead of setting to work vigorously, 
 was more inclined to let things remain in statu quo, and came 
 to the conclusion that both the regulations and system of 
 tactics approved of in 1829 were perfect for 1869. 
 
 In the midst of this indifference war suddenly broke out, 
 and we were obliged to appear on the field of battle with 
 our old ideas and our old mistakes. In the course of this 
 work we shall find the cavalry, as formerly in its best days, 
 full of chivalrous devotion, having learnt nothing, it is true, 
 but at the same time not forgetful of its past bravery and 
 patriotism. 
 
 Generally injudiciously employed in this last war, our 
 cavalry has nevertheless, in spite of the conviction that they 
 were riding to a certain and useless death, always charged 
 
 - 2 
 
10 Cavalry Studies, 
 
 with valor and determination. Unhappily, the blood that 
 has been so generously poured out has served merely to save 
 the honor of our arms, without always reaping the reward 
 of victory. 
 
 Our sworn enemy, if less brilliant in this respect, has at 
 any rate shown himself more practical. Carrying on his 
 preparations with 'secrecy, he burst upon us with all the 
 greater force and overwhelmed us. Whilst we were occu- 
 pied in disputing as to the utility of cavalry, he, on the other 
 hand, casting aside prejudice, busied himself in perfecting 
 that branch of the service; in this manner the weight of 
 cavalry in this campaign has been such that to it Prussia 
 owes, for the most part, her unparalleled successes, and to 
 prove this we will let facts speak for themselves. 
 
 All will acknowledge that the French cavalry did all 
 that courage could do, but in other and more important 
 points it was found wanting. From this it seems certain 
 that the instruction imparted to the cavalry should undergo 
 important modifications. We shall endeavor to show what 
 these modifications should be, taking into consideration the 
 experience gained by the events of the late war. A diligent 
 study of the part played by the enemy's cavalry and our 
 own, more surely than any theory, will point out to us the 
 course to pursue. Such is the object of this volume. It is 
 
 the faithful story of what befel the cavalry in the War of 
 1870. 
 
 Note. — In the following translation peloton has been rendered 
 troop, and the distances given in the original in metres have been 
 expressed approximately in yards. 
 
French Cavalry in 1870. 11 
 
 THE 
 
 French Cavalry in 1870, 
 
 WITH THE 
 
 TACTICAL RESULTS. 
 
 PART I. 
 
 Mobilization of the Cavali-y.— Positions of tlie Armies.— Preliminary 
 Operations.— Divisional Cavalry.— Action at Wissembourg.— Bat- 
 tle of Froescbwiller.— Retreat to Chalons. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 As soon as war had been formally declared against 
 Prussia, the various cavalry regiments received the order to 
 mobilize. Immediately the vices of our organization were 
 brought to light, and, in spite of all efforts, our zeal failed to 
 contend successfully against impossibilities. It is evident 
 that during peace regiments cannot be kept up to a war foot- 
 ing; such a system would be ruinous. But, since this is the 
 case, there is all the more reason that a system should be 
 adopted which should enable the cavalry to receive, on the 
 shortest notice, supplies of men and horses sufficient to 
 carry the total to a war strength; otherwise the cavalry, 
 which ought to precede the army in order to obtain intelli- 
 gence, will, on^he contrary, be the last ready^ and, instead of 
 
12 , Cavalry Studies. 
 
 being the vanguard, will be the rear-guard. At the com- 
 mencement of this war we not only had no reserves of horses, 
 but a portion of our effective strength was composed of four- 
 year-old remounts. Thus it was that with the greatest diffi- 
 culty we only succeeded in getting together four squadrons 
 per regiment, of one hundred and two horses each, which 
 strength, the smallest with which one can take the field, was 
 soon lessened by a few days of hard work. 
 
 As the commissariat stores were empty, we were defi- 
 cient in mess tins, cans, kettles, and other necessaries for 
 camp life. On fresh arrivals indenting for what was requis- 
 ite, they were informed that their predecessors had taken 
 everything, that application had been made to Paris, and 
 that they must wait for fresh supplies. Time passed, noth- 
 ing arrived, and officers, as well as men, were obliged to 
 march without the most necessary articles. The same want 
 of preparation was the case in the medical department; 
 they were only just beginning to get the ambulance into 
 working order. Finally, as the generals had to get the scat- 
 tered regiments they were to command together from all sorts 
 of places, the marches and countermarches were intermina- 
 ble; all this time the enemy boldly advanced. Everybody 
 kept repeating that we had two days' start of the enemy; only, 
 as the latter was already on our frontier, the facts contra- 
 dicted the report, and a vague idea got abroad that our in- 
 formation was not of the best, and that we were but badly 
 prepared for a gigantic struggle, and that already we had be- 
 gun in a feeble manner. 
 
French Cavalry in 1S70. 13 
 
 It was now, however, too late to talk; war was declared, 
 and, ready or not, we had only one thing to do — viz., to do our 
 duty to the best of our ability; so, as is usual in such cases, 
 one hoped for the best, and, full of confidence, we advanced 
 to meet the enemy. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Positions of the Armies. 
 
 At the commencement of hostilities, the French Army 
 was Echeloned along the frontier, with a front of about one 
 hundred miles; the whole forming an angle of which Wis- 
 sembourg formed the apex, and Strasbourg and Thionville 
 two points at the base. The Germans advanced against us 
 in three bodies; the first, commanded by Steinmetz, held a 
 position behind the Sarre; the second, under the command 
 of Prince Frederick Charles, was in the valley of the Moselle; 
 and the third, which had for its chief the Crown Prince of 
 Prussia, rested on Rastadt. These three armies, more con- 
 centrated than ours, could naturally assume the offensive as 
 soon as they had pierced our thin line. 
 
 It was necessary for them, in order to do this with safety, 
 to push their patrols and scouts well ahead, and get the best 
 information possible. For some years Prussia had been 
 teaching her cavalry to perform this delicate portion of their 
 duties with intelligence. In 1866 the cavalry did but. little; 
 but, learning from the experience gained in that w^ar how 
 important a mission it had to fill for the future, and how 
 
14 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 greatly its sphere of action had been enlarged by the new 
 system of artillery tactics, it set itself to learn how to act 
 from long distances, to watch us with unceasing vigilance, 
 and to serve as a curtain to the rest of the army ; in short, to 
 practice how to mask one's own movements whilst finding 
 out everything concerning the enemy. 
 
 In order to obtain the above results, the first thing nec- 
 essary is to be perfectly acquainted with the country one is 
 going to work over. How, it mky be asked, is one to pass 
 rapidly along the roads with a chance of doing so success- 
 fully, if one is obliged to waste one's time in trying different 
 ways, and constantly changing the direction of the march? 
 This art the enemy has brought to perfection. It is as easy 
 for them to read a map as an open book; with us, on the 
 other hand, it is like wandering in a fog. At the last mo- 
 ment an outline map of Germany had been served out to a 
 few officers; as for a map of our own country, nobody 
 thought of it. Everybody was supposed to be perfectly 
 acquainted with his own country; and, as it is impossible to 
 remember all the roads in France, our cavalry was obliged 
 to trust to chance, whilst the enemy's pushed on without 
 hesitation. Thus we began the war by discovering one of the 
 mistakes in the practical teaching imparted to us, and the- 
 result was a disadvantage that the most brilliant courage 
 was unable to counterbalance. 
 
French Cavalry in 1870. 15 
 
 CHAPTER in. 
 
 Preliminary Operations. » 
 
 From the very commencement the German cavalry, by 
 its daring preliminary operations on our eastern frontiers, 
 gave us proofs of its intelligence and skill. With unpar- 
 alleled audacity^ it pushed across the boundary. Choosing 
 a few men, to the number of five or six together, they pushed 
 them forward to gain intelligence, cut telegraph wires, etc., 
 and, by their sudden appearances, strike terror into the 
 inhabitants. 
 
 Towards the end of July the first cavalry skirmishes 
 took place. On the 28th there was an affair to the northeast 
 of Sarreguemines, close to the bridge over the Blies. The 
 same night some Bavarian chasseurs pushed forward in 
 order to break up the line of railway from Sarreguemines to 
 Haguenau. Every day the same thing — like an irritating 
 fly, that is driven away only to return the next moment — ^the 
 enemy's cavalry could not be laid hold of. They even pushed 
 their audacity so far as to dismount and enter the inns. It 
 was in this way that a reconnaissance made,. close to Nieder- 
 bronn, by some of the Baden cavalry, was surprised and 
 attacked by our men. Three officers of the Baden dragoons, 
 one of them an Englishman, were killed. But what did this 
 signify, provided one of the party escaped to tell the tale of 
 what he had seen? the object for which the operation had 
 been undertaken was accomplished. It is thus that the Ger- 
 man cavalry made their d^but in this war; viz., in showing, 
 
16 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 from the first, an unlimited confidence in the dash of their 
 men, and in the staying powers of their horses. 
 
 Astonished by these maneuvers, our cavalry endeavored 
 to do likewise, but failed, owing to their imperfect knowl- 
 edge of the country, and were obliged to confine themselves 
 to merely posting vedettes along the frontier. A few scouts 
 sent ahead at the right moment would have sufiflced to end 
 this continued annoyance. Instead, however, we thought fit 
 to employ troops, squadrons, and even regiments, to watch 
 the country. Thus we exemplified the old proverb of the 
 lion and the gnat, and opposed stratagem with force, and in 
 so doing we used up the cavalry told off for this duty to no 
 purpose, ere a battle had taken place. 
 
 At the end of July the infantry divisions placed under 
 the orders of Marshal MacMahon left Strasbourg in order to 
 occupy their destined positions, and found, on arrival, their 
 divisional cavalry waiting for them. The cavalry was formed 
 in two divisions — the first, under the command of General 
 Duhesme, consisted of the Brigades Septeuil (3d Hussars, 
 11th Chasseurs), Nansouty (10th Dragoons, 2d and 6th Lan- 
 cers), and Michel (8th and 9th Cuirassiers) ; the second divi- 
 sion was commanded by General de Bonnemain, and con- 
 sisted of the Brigades Girard (1st and 4th Cuirassiers) and 
 Brauer (2d and 3d Cuirassiers). Of these eleven regiments, 
 six formed the reserve, the seventh was wanting and did not 
 arrive, whilst the four others were detached to do duty with 
 Infantry, and were the divisional cavalry. 
 
French Cavalry in 1870. 17 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Divisional Cavalry. 
 
 Tt is now necessary to discuss the r6Ie of this cavalry, for 
 it was an experiment, and one on which the greatest expecta- 
 tion of happy results was founded. As a matter of theory, 
 the plan seemed seductive and excellent. The cavalry, shel- 
 tered at the commencement of an action behind inequalities 
 of ground, were, it was said, to watch their opportunity, and 
 throw themselves upon the enemy already shaken by the 
 infantry; then, should this prove successful, to pursue, or, if 
 they experienced a check, to retire quickly to the place from 
 whence they came. 
 
 So- much for theory. Practice has not justified this man- 
 ner of employing us; shells search every nook and corner^ 
 and the shelter afforded by the inequalities of ground was 
 almost imaginary. As for throwing oneself upon the enemy 
 — seeing that their artillery, placed in positions inaccessible 
 to cavalry, commenced to play upon us from a distance of 
 from three to four thousand yards — it was useless to think 
 of it. 
 
 Having been personally attached to an infantry divis- 
 ion, I studied, with interest, how this system worked, and 
 found that, with the exception of a little scouting, there was 
 literally nothing for the remainder of the regiment to do, 
 and we were generally in the way. 
 
 The moment the cavalry approached the general, the 
 enemy, invariably on the qui vive, sent such a shower of bul- 
 
18 Cavalri/ Studies. 
 
 lets that the escort had to be much decreased in order to 
 ^void turning the general into a living target. 
 
 In addition to all this, let us add that first the infantry 
 general gave us an order, then the cavalry general, who did 
 not like being set aside, gave another, and these continual 
 changes of orders brought about a state of incertitude ex- 
 tremely prejudicial to carrying out an order properly. 
 
 In short, supposing you have a cavalry like ours, in- 
 ferior in number to the enemy's, a regiment for a division of 
 infantry is too large a proportion. One or two squadrons 
 would be ample, as their real business is to keep in constant 
 communication the various links of the military chain which 
 constitutes the line of battle. 
 
 As for divisional cavalry scouting, it can only do so in a 
 Very partial and local manner. We acted according to our 
 theory in this war, and we have no reason to congratulate 
 ourselves on the way it worked in practice. 
 
 Instead of employing a portion of the cavalry specially 
 to gain intelligence, we thought it better to let each infantry 
 division have its own cavalry, and these acting each in its own 
 way, the whole front would be covered by the reunion of the 
 scattered portions. But this isolated way of arranging mat- 
 ters does not answer, for if one portion is found wanting, the 
 rest of the line is not aware of it, and the whole is compro- 
 mised. We shall see how this was the case on the 4th August. 
 The divisions were separated and the most distant was anni- 
 hilated without any aid having been afforded to it. 
 
 The Prussians do not act in this manner. From the right 
 
OF THE 
 
 UNIVERSITY 
 
 French Cavalry in 1870. 19 
 
 to the left every portion is in communication, so that if any- 
 thing happens, it is known all along the front; as soon as con- 
 tact with the enemy is established, it is never again lost ; thus 
 the smallest movements are known, and immediately the 
 weak spot is discovered it is attacked. It was thus that, cer- 
 tain of what they were attempting, they surprised us at 
 Wissembourg.* 
 
 CHAPTER, V. 
 
 Battle of Wissemhourg. 
 On the 4th August our troops were encamped as follows: 
 The 2d division (Gen. Douai), in front, was at Wissembourg; 
 the 1st division (Gen. Ducrot) at Woerth; the 3d (Gen. Ra- 
 oult) was in rear of it; and the 4th (Gen. de Lartigues) had 
 only marched from Strasbourg at four o'clock that morning 
 m route for Haguenau. The cavalry occupied Soultz, Seltz, 
 Haguenau, and Brumath. Taking into consideration these 
 positions, which had the disadvantage of being a good deal 
 separated, the part that should have been played by an active 
 and intelligently instructed force of cavalry is easy to trace; 
 first to scout and cover the leading division in such a man- 
 ner as to render a surprise impossible, for otherwise its iso- 
 lation rendered a disaster extremely probable; next, to 
 establish a chain of communication between the other divis- 
 ions, so as to enable them to get timely notice to march to the 
 help of the one attacked. 
 
 *As this work is intended for cavalry, only sufficient will be said 
 of the other two arms to show how the cavalry came on the scene. 
 
20 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 From theory let us turn to fact. 
 
 The second division, not warned of coming danger, was 
 surprised and overwhelmed by the enemy, who appeared 
 with much larger forces, and crushed our unfortunate sol- 
 diers with their superior artillery; seven thousand men 
 were pitted against thirty-five thousand; General Douai 
 came up in haste, and had only time to call to his escort as he 
 passed in front of the cavalry at a gallop; a few minutes 
 later he was killed in endeavoring to encourage his men 
 already decimated, thus preferring a soldier's death on the 
 field of battle to retreat. The other divisions, ignorant of 
 what was going on, were unable to come to the rescue of this 
 fraction of oiir army which was fighting with such despera- 
 tion. This handful of men was opposed to a whole corps 
 d^armee, and was finally annihilated. The 50th and 74th 
 regiments almost ceased to exist. The Brigade Septeuil, 
 though eagerly waiting, failed to find an opportunity of 
 charging, owing to the bad ground, and our camp was seized 
 upon by the enemy's cavalry, who took possession of the 
 baggage. 
 
 Towards two o'clock fighting ceased, and the remains of 
 the 2d division retired on Lembach. 
 
 This recital renders useless all comment on our manner 
 of employing divisional 'cavalry. Its negative role only 
 stands out too prominently, and it would be painful to dwell 
 further on this subject. 
 
 After this action the Prussians pushed forward, follow- 
 ing close on our retreating troops, without, however, attack- 
 
French Cavalry in 1870. 21 
 
 ing them, owing to the difficulties in the ground, and so, dur- 
 ing the night of the 5th — 6th, the 1st corps (Varmee found 
 itself concentrated on the heights close to Reichshoffen and 
 Froeschwiller. The weather was dreadful-; a storm burst, 
 and the rain fell in torrents, converting the plains on which 
 w^e encamped into marshes ; in §pite of the weather, the ene- 
 my's vedettes never lost sight of us ; with ceaseless vigilance 
 they studied our position, and ascertained our w^eakness in 
 point of numbers, and thus enabled their own side to make 
 all necessary arrangements for the morrow's engagement. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 Battle of Woerth. 
 
 On the 6th August the corps d^armee of Marshal MacMa- 
 hon was posted on the eastern slope of the Vosges; it occu- 
 pied the heights that lie between Froeschwiller and Woerth, 
 ElsashausenandGunstett. The left extended as far as the val- 
 ley of Jaegerthal, and the 4th division formed a disconnected 
 line with the 8d on the right. This was the weak point, as it 
 could be turned. For this reason the Brigade Michel (8th 
 and 9th Cuirassiers) was placed as a support behind this 
 flank. The cavalry division (General de Bonnemain,lst,2d,3d, 
 4th Cuirassiers) was placed in reserve, behind the 2d infantry 
 division, as also was the Brigade Septeuil (3d Hussars and 
 11th Chasseurs). The army of the Crown Prince was so dis- 
 posed as to attack simultaneously at three points. The posi- 
 tion it took up was exceedingly strong, and admirably de- 
 fended by artillery posted on ridges commanding our lines; 
 
22 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 the form of the enemy's line was convex, with the Bavarians 
 on the right, the Wiirtembergef s on the left, and the Prus- 
 sians in the center. The cavalry was at Soultz. 
 
 At daybreak the enemy's outposts opened fire. The 
 French cavalry not having obtained any information. Mar- 
 shal MacMahon was left in ignorance of the fact that during 
 the night the enemy's forces had been tripled, and believing 
 it a simple reconnaissance, he accepted the battle. 
 
 Our left flank was attacked by the Bavarians, who held 
 the wood on the right of Neerwiller. In the center and right 
 the Germans opened a formidable artillery fire. Towards 
 eleven o'clock, fourteen batteries were firing into Woerth, 
 and the enemy's infantry began to advance in order to seize 
 upon it. 
 
 Women and children, frightened out of their senses, 
 came asking for succour, and saying that the enemy had 
 already penetrated into the streets ; the zouaves and turcos 
 now appeared on the scene. We could see them descend the 
 incline, and cross the fields with as much order and regular- 
 ity as on parade. A shower of bullets was poured on them, 
 and though men fell on all sides, the intervals were closed 
 and they still continued their onward course. On arriving 
 at the village, the turcos entered the streets with a yell. A 
 desperate hand-to-hand struggle took place here; the front 
 ranks were mowed down by the musketry, dead bodies were 
 heaped one on another, still every foot of ground was dis- 
 puted, and our men died rather than yield ; eventually, how- 
 ever, overcome by superior numbers, they were forced to give 
 
French Cavalry in 1810. 2S 
 
 way. About the same time Gunstett was taken. The Baden 
 division now began to advance, and the Wtirtembergers 
 moved up in support; the enemy were moving on Froesch- 
 willer, and their whole army commenced an onward move- 
 ment; Marshal MacMahon, in person, directed our columns 
 to advance into the thickest of ihe danger, but the loss was 
 too great, and they were unable to persevere. It now became 
 necessary to call all our forces to our aid; accordingly Gen- 
 eral de Bonnemain received the order to bring up his cavalry. 
 
 The same morning, on arriving on the plateau of Froesch- 
 willer, this division had been drawn up in four lines, at half 
 distance. As it was not intended to employ this division at 
 the commencement of the action, they were placed under the 
 shelter of a hollow in the ground (the same in which is the 
 source of the Eberbach) and at first were protected from the 
 enemy's fire. About 11 o'clock the shells began to fall in 
 great numbers, killing men and horses, right and left. The 
 division now took ground to its right and rested on a wood. 
 In front the ground was broken and full of ravines. On the 
 left there was sufficient space to form up in two lines. About 
 1 :30 the Marshal sent for a brigade, and the 1st brigade re- 
 ceived the order to advance, which they accordingly did,, 
 along a hollow to the right front. The 2d brigade also in- 
 clined to its right ; both brigades were in close column. The 
 1st brigade (1st and 4th Cuirassiers) was right in front, and 
 leading towards the village of Sparsbach. 
 
 In front of the cavalry, and rather on their left, the 
 infantry were endeavoring to hold their ground. As soon 
 
24 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 as the position became untenable, the cavalry attacked. Un- 
 fortunately, the ground was unfavorable, and, in addition to 
 this, it was impossible to get at the enemy, as they were 
 posted in hop-fields and vineyards, surrounded with palis- 
 ades; for these reasons the charge was absurd, as nothing 
 could be gained and none of the enemy reached. In spite of 
 all this, their courage rose equal to the danger, and without: 
 the least hesitation the 1st Cuirassiers twice charged by 
 squadrons in succession. As soon as they arrived at the 
 top of the ridge they received the enemy's fire, and were 
 forced to retire, with the loss of a large number of men and 
 horses, and without having effected anything. The 4th Cui- 
 rassiers were in support of this movement. In hopes of find- 
 ing more favorable ground, they moved some 200 yards to 
 their left, and, like their predecessors, charged by squadrons 
 in succession. They advanced under fire about two-thirds 
 of a mile through the hop-fields without seeing the enemy, 
 and then received a heavy fire from a belt of wood. This 
 regiment now returned, leaving the colonel on the field, and 
 more cut up than the 1st. 
 
 The 2d brigade now advanced and took the place of the 
 1st, and attacked to its front, over worse ground than the 
 latter had done. In addition to the hop-fields, they had in 
 front of them a ditch, lined with chevaux de frise, and forming 
 an obstacle absolutely insurmountable. This charge was, 
 therefore, bound to fail from the first. 
 
 The 2d Cuirassiers charged by wings. They lost their 
 colonel ; 5 officers were killed, several wounded, and 129 men 
 
French Cavalry in 1870. 25 
 
 and 170 horses remained on the ground. In addition, 80 
 horses returned so badly wounded that they died in the next 
 few days. 
 
 Lastly, the 3d Cuirassiers were brought into action, and 
 one wing charged. Theip loss was equally severe. The 
 colonel (De Lacarre) had his head carried away by a shot, 
 and 7 officers and 70 men and horses were killed and 
 wounded; in addition, several officers had their horses 
 killed; one, a lieutenant, lost three. Thus terminated the 
 first attempt to employ our cavalry on this campaign. The 
 result of these charges, undertaken without proper fore- 
 thought, was bloody and useless, as we were thrust forward 
 into the open against an enemy always out of reach and often 
 out of sight. 
 
 At the termination of these unsuccessful charges, the 
 whole Prussian Army advanced. The villages of Froesch- 
 willer and Woerth were on fire. Elsashausen was taken. 
 At two o'clock we found ourselves opposed to such over- 
 whelming numbers that it was impossible to maintain our 
 ground. At this moment the enemy brought up fresh troops, 
 and made a grand effort to secure success. Our right wing, 
 not being secured, as has been already observed, could be 
 turned. Already in the distance one could see the heads 
 of the approaching columns. They wound over the hills 
 and came on through the woods, nearer and nearer. Regi- 
 ment followed regiment, and finally they reached the lines 
 they wished to reinforce. We were now taken both in front 
 and flank; and our infantry, shaken by the fire, commenced 
 
 -3 ' 
 
26 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 to waver. A few stragglers caused some irregularity 
 amongst those who still stood their ground, and confusion 
 bega^n to show itself. 
 
 There was now only one hope of saving these brave 
 troops. The cavalry that had been posted in rear of the 
 right was still fresh, and it was determined to employ them. 
 We have already seen how one portion of this arm had 
 behaved at the other end of the line; we shall now see the 
 same bravery and devotion, only the result will be more 
 disastrous. The ground was as follows: a small but steep 
 hill in front; at its foot the cavalry awaited, under cover, the 
 moment of action. The far side of the hill, equally steep, 
 terminated in a plain, over which were scattered woods and 
 hop-gardens. Further still lay the village of Morsbronn 
 through which ran a narrow street leading into the fields, 
 and having a sharp turn at the far end. Thus we have, as 
 it were, an encircling frame, consisting of w^oods, houses 
 swarming with infantry, and hop-gardens dotted with long 
 poles, the whole affording the best of cover from which to 
 shoot with ease and safety. 
 
 To charge, under these circumstances, is to rush to cer- 
 tain death, without a chance of success; each man is aware 
 of this, but where duty and honor show the way they are 
 willing to follow. 
 
 Up to the moment of charging, the 8th and 9th Cuiras- 
 siers were drawn up in two lines, perpendicular to the ravine. 
 On their right rear was a small party of the 6th Lancers. 
 This party did not belong to Michel's brigade; it was under 
 
French Cavalry in 1870. 27 
 
 the orders of the infantry general (De Lartigues), and was 
 not intended to charge; it only did so by mistake. 
 
 The order to attack was given; how and by whom we 
 will discuss further on. The regiments now changed front, 
 and advanced parallel to the ravine. The 8th was formed 
 in column of squadrons; the 9tli was forced to diminish their 
 front by having to pass between two clumps of trees; they 
 then formed line to the front, with the exception of the 3d 
 squadron, and the party of the 6th, who were unable to 
 change their formation. - 
 
 As soon as General Michel was warned, he placed him- 
 self at the head of his brigade. The squadrons broke into 
 a gallop, and the earth resounded to the tread of the horses, 
 who kept quickening their pace. Unfortunately, the ground 
 had not been reconnoitered, and it was supposed that it was 
 necessary to charge over the open. The woods and hop- 
 fields being impracticable, they rode through the intervals. 
 The 8th led the way. The enemy waited immovable, took 
 steady aim, and, as soon as the cuirassed line appeared at 
 the proper distance, fired two volleys by word of command, 
 followed by independent fire. The effect was murderous — 
 two-thirds of the horses were hit, and staggered to the 
 ground with their riders, thus forming a line of corpses. 
 The remains of the regiment, passing through Morsbronn, 
 gained the open. 
 
 The 9th Cuirassiers and 6th Lancers followed in sup- 
 port; but their advance was delayed by obstacles; the fire 
 of the enemy was on this account more effective, and the 
 
28 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 whole mass was transformed into a confused mob of men 
 and horses pressing one against another. They now got to 
 the village, and were obliged to diminish their front to effect 
 an entrance. A terrible and crushing fire was poured on 
 them from the houses as they passed. They now found it 
 was impossible to get through, as the end of the street was 
 blocked, so they endeavored to retreat; this attempt was 
 unsuccessful, and, with the exception of a small number, 
 all who were not killed were taken prisoners. 
 
 Such was the result of the second attempt with our 
 cavalry on this day. It was even more disastrous than the 
 first. On both occasions the bravery displayed was ex- 
 treme; the results — nil. They started without knowing the 
 object of the charge, and advanced without reconnoitering 
 the ground in front of them, and, after losing heavily, fell 
 back without having an opportunity of using their arms. 
 The ground was covered with dead horses, and many a man 
 owed his life to his cuirass. One could hear the bullets rat- 
 tle like hail on the cuirasses, but none were pierced, and 
 many dismounted men sought refuge in the woods. 
 
 The above is important, as it demonstrates the utility 
 of the cuirass, and proves that it is not a thing of the past, 
 as many assert; on the contrary, cuirassiers will always 
 enter into the composition of cavalry for the future.* 
 
 After this futile disaster, nobody was willing to accept 
 the responsibility of having ordered it. Some laid the re- 
 
 ♦This was written some years ago, when the infantry rifle had by 
 no means reached its present power. The cuirass is no longer retained 
 in any army as a part of the field equipment, though it is still worn at 
 ceremonies by some cavalry organizations.— A. L. W. 
 
French Cavalry in 1870. 29 
 
 sponsibility on the cavalry commander, others on the in- 
 fantry. As I was close to the latter during the last portion 
 of this unfortunate day, I am in a position to state that I 
 heard him ask several times, ''What is the object of advanc- 
 ing three regiments? I only want one, to turn the enemy, 
 and not to attack him in iront" 
 
 This false interpretation of an order or suggestion has 
 happened at Mouzon, at Eezonville, and also at other places, 
 and it is impossible to insist too strongly on the unfortunate 
 consequences that have followed. When an aide-de-camp 
 conveys the order to charge to a cavalry officer, he must not 
 seem in too great a hurry, for the instinctive idea of the 
 officer is to obey at once, without, as it were, taking time to 
 reflect, as before all he is afraid of being accused of slowness 
 or cowardice. All this is extremely natural, and if one is 
 not careful to ascertain exactly the object to be gained and 
 also to reconnoiter the ground, you entail the destruction of 
 the troops engaged. The charge at Woerth is an example. 
 One regiment alone was wanted; three were pushed forward 
 by mistake, and completely annihilated. We may as well 
 now call attention to the 2d Lancers as a regiment which 
 suffered considerably. This regiment was left by the gen- 
 eral, exposed to fire all day, without apparently an attempt 
 to get them under cover. They lost their commanding 
 officer (Col. Poissonnier) and eleven other officers without 
 having charged. 
 
 One sees on all sides the same dash and the same want 
 of skill in employing us. Efforts will, no doubt, be made 
 
30 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 to justify this series of errors, by asserting that the object 
 for which the charges were undertaken was more or less 
 obtained. It is necessary all this should be known, for other- 
 wise how shall we profit by the rough lessons we have re- 
 ceived? It Is necessary that the history of this campaign 
 should be truthfully and dispassiortately written, and it is for 
 this reason that we repeat ^'That the bravery of the cavalry 
 was all that could be desired, but that their charges were 
 futile." And of this, here is the proof: the object of these 
 charges was to save the infantry, and give it time to recover 
 itself and retreat. A small portion of one regiment was 
 indeed saved; but in order to effect this, we lost three times 
 as many men and horses as, we saved foot soldiers. Where 
 then was the advantage? As for saying we enabled the 
 Infantry to retreat, that is easily answered by the fact that 
 there was no retreat, but a rout. One seems still to hear 
 General de Lartigues calling to the zouaves, as he placed 
 himself at their head, to follow him and die where they stood, 
 and receiving the answer, "How are we to go on fighting? we 
 have no more cartridges, and you can see how we are out- 
 numbered.'' There was neither terror nor despair, but 
 everyone saw further resistance was hopeless. For eight 
 hours we had fought like lions, and had afforded the spectacle 
 of 35,000 standing up against 140,000, and for a long time 
 keeping the day undecided. But there is a limit to all things, 
 and the battle was decided before the cavalry charged ; this 
 sacrifice was therefore useless. Thus it will be seen that we 
 saved nothing during the battle, nor did we protect the re- 
 
French Cavalry in 1870. 31 
 
 treat, as the whole corps d^armee fled pell-mell. This is the 
 truth about how we were employed in this battle. 
 
 After the final and useless effort of the cavalry, the ene- 
 my, finding that resistance ceased, attacked us on all sides. 
 The fire caused such loss that the officers were unable any 
 longer to maintain order, and 'the rout was complete; a 
 storm of bullets followed on the track of our unfortunate 
 soldiers, and swept away several at each discharge. We fell 
 back in the direction of Reichshoffen, and as every one 
 wished to escape the carnage that was going on, the roads 
 got blocked. At Niederbronn we were told to make for 
 Saverne as a rallying-point, and, after crossing the railway, 
 we mounted the low hills that surround that town, and com- 
 menced a long night march; officers and soldiers, generals, 
 cannons and wagons, all in one disorderly mob, pushed 
 along the road. In addition to the fatigue caused by the 
 day's hard work, we now had to undergo the weariness 
 brought on by continual stoppages. The road was nari'ow, 
 and any one can picture to himself the confusion that would 
 have reigned had the enemy, by continuing his fire, forced 
 long lanes of carnage through the defenceless crowd. Night 
 now came on and hid us from sight. How long the hours 
 seemed, and what unpleasant reflections occurred to one, 
 during this retreat, in whi(;h jon could see before you but 
 a few paces, and in which the silence was only broken by an 
 occasional shot from a rifle discharged by accident, and 
 which caused confusion by leading one to suppose that we 
 were again attacked! Worn out by their exertions, many 
 
32 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 men now fell out and lay down in the fields and ditches by 
 the roadside. Others, unwilling to be left behind, still strug- 
 gled on, but, overcome with sleep, they staggered and leaned 
 one against the other. In this manner we marched some 
 twelve leagues, an enormous distance for tired and hungry 
 men who had fought all day. Between midnight and 1 a. m., 
 some of the cavalry reached Saverne, and by degrees the 
 remains of the corps (Varmee reached this place. Happily, we 
 were unmolested on this march, for, as we were without either 
 front or rear guard or flankers, had the enemy pursued us 
 vigorously, they must have completed' our ruin. But the 
 Prussians committed the terrible mistake of not employing 
 properly their numerous and excellent cavalry, and this want 
 of activity after the battle of Woerth, which arose perhaps 
 from being unaware how great a victory they had obtained, 
 allowed Marshal MacMahon to save the remnants of his dis- 
 organized force, and retreat across the Vosges in something 
 like, order. After having committed the error of not extermi- 
 nating us on the spot, the Prussians sent scouts to follow us 
 up. These, as soon as they reached Niederbronn, captured 
 our treasure, and from that moment displayed the greatest 
 persistence and intelligence in the pursuit. The Prussian 
 cavalry has a system of scouting very far superior on service 
 to our own. They pushed ahead long distances with the 
 greatest rapidity and daring, and the glory of ensuring the 
 general success of their operations is entirely due to them. 
 They search thevillages, woods, by-paths — in short, the whole 
 country, in such a complete and efficient manner that the 
 
French Cavalry in 1870. 33 
 
 troops in rear are enabled to make every arrangement and 
 act without hesitation. 
 
 This manner of operating was unknown to us, and dur- 
 ing peace we entered into mimic warfare with indifference 
 and want of interest in the work. For this reason we were 
 always surprised, and to it may be attributed many of our 
 disasters. This fact will appear clearly in the record of our 
 retreat, and by the contrast thus established between our 
 cavalry and the Prussian, one will be able to judge which 
 army has the best method of imparting drill and instruction. 
 
 During the whole of the night between the 6th and 7th 
 August, the cavalry of the 1st corps d^armee kept arriving at 
 Saverne, and by 8 a. m. nearly the whole had come up. We 
 now set to work to restore order, when suddenly the parade 
 call sounded; without being able to rest ourselves after the 
 previous day's fatigues, we had to mount and proceed along 
 the road which leads from Saverne across the Vosges. 
 
 The line of retreat we were ordered to follow was to pro- 
 ceed by Phalsbourg to Sarrebourg; and as we marched, our 
 thoughts were occupied in considering how we were to live, 
 as the enemy's cavalry had captured everything at the bat- 
 tles of Wissembourg and Froesch wilier; they had even ob- 
 tained possession of our carriages and led horses. As noth- 
 ing was issued, and as we had neither clothes, tents, nor cook- 
 ing-utensils, it was a difficult problem how we were to get on. 
 Fortunately, the peasantry along the road gave us bread and 
 wine; we excited their sympathy, as they were aware that 
 we had fought with courage. 
 
34 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 As soon as we got to Sarrebourg, the regiments were 
 re-formed, and we sent in the returns of killed and wounded; 
 according to these, the loss was exceptionally heavy. The 
 generals now resumed command of their divisions and bri- 
 gades, and as no one imagined we should abandon Alsace 
 without an effort, we held ourselves in readiness for an offen- 
 sive movement, when, about mid-day on the 8th, we received 
 the order to saddle and bridle. We were now given to under- 
 stand that the enemy's cavalry was in sight. The fact was 
 the enemy's advanced scouts were taken for the heads of 
 strong columns, and immediately we again retreated. From 
 this time until we reached Lun^ville, their advanced parties 
 watched us ceaselessly. By their system of having a Contin- 
 uous line of communication kept up by their cavalry, their 
 main body always received the best information regarding 
 our positions — when we marched and where we halted — and 
 as they carried on their observations from some distance, and 
 kept continually appearing and then disappearing, only to 
 return, they kept us in a state of constant anxiety. Instead 
 of acting in a similar manner, our cavalry was left in un- 
 wieldy masses, which rendered no service, either by protect- 
 ing our own army or in any other way. 
 
 On the 10th we got to Lun^ville, where we hoiked to 
 obtain the camp equipment we stood in need of. In fact, we 
 were informed that now there would be regular issues of hay 
 and corn for our horses, and (luxuries that we had almost 
 forgotten) of meat, sugar, and coffee for ourselves. The 
 men, on this, recovered their spirits, lit fires, set to work to 
 
French Cavahy in 1870. 35 
 
 get ready their soup, and to rest themselves from then- fa- 
 tigues, when suddenly we got the order to march. The 
 cooking-pots were emptied, and their forage taken from the 
 horses, and we bridled up as quickly as possible. Again the 
 enemy's cavalry had disturbed us. Up to this they had 
 merely given us a foretaste of their power, and caused us to 
 hasten our marches; it was now that they began to display 
 themselves in all their vigor and dash. 
 
 The enemy, by their formidable attack, had thrust them- 
 selves between our corps d'armee, scattered alongthe frontier. 
 They had already pierced the first line, and they now en- 
 deavored to beat us in detail, and thus prevent the junction 
 of the various parts. It was to their cavalry they entrusted 
 the execution of this important duty. To attain this end, 
 two regiments pushed on to Nancy. On their arrival at this 
 place, they announced that all resistance was useless, as they 
 were the advanced guard of a large army. This intelligence 
 was conveyed to Lun^ville, and again we made off, changing 
 ouF line of retreat to the left by Colombey, Beaumont, Neuf- 
 chateau, and Joinville. 
 
 It may well be asked. What was our cavalry doing all 
 this time? Since the enemy that stopped our progress was 
 so weak, why f'.id we not send out parties to gain intelligence 
 and overthrow them? Why did we not imitate their activ- 
 ity, instead of allowint, them to oblige us to change our line 
 of retreat as they pleased? Our cavalry had already shown 
 their bravery at FYoesch wilier ; w^hy not give them an oppor- 
 tunity of displaying their intelligence? They wished to be 
 
36 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 allowed to act, and grumbled at the inactivity to which they 
 were condemned. But instead of sending us out as far as 
 possible, we were massed in divisions of five or six regiments 
 together, and hampered with a baggage train ; we never sent 
 out a single scout or vedette, but were content to follow the 
 main roads and simply accomplish the march. In short, it 
 was a mere trial of speed, in which our only thought was to 
 escape being cut off. Thus, it is evident that the part played 
 by our cavalry in this long retreat, a part that might have 
 been so important, was simply nily as we neither obtained 
 information nor fought. 
 
 From Joinville we marched towards Chalons, passing 
 on our way by Vitry, and our line of retreat still depended on 
 the extreme point reached by the enemy's cavalry, who 
 pushed on their advanced parties to long distances to occupy 
 the villages. As our route was continually being changed, 
 the rations never came up until a late hour, and were then 
 generally short in quantity. Moreover, owing to our bad 
 habit of not quartering ourselves in the villages, we got but 
 little rest. During the whole of the month of August it 
 rained ceaselessly, and we had for camping-grounds fields 
 under water. The earth was so soaked that our picketing- 
 pegs had no hold ; we had neither shelter nor straw to sleep 
 on, and, owing to the heavy rain, we could neither light fires 
 nor dry our clothes. The horses were equally miserable. The 
 wind blew away a portion of their scanty rations, and, press- 
 ing together, with their backs up and their heads out, they 
 endeavored to protect themselves against the weather. 
 Every morning we had to march, and men and horses left 
 
French Cavalry in 1870. 37 
 
 the species of bog in which they were encamped, stiff, tired, 
 and out of spirits. How much better our enemy understood 
 the art of war! Aware of the extreme importance of pre- 
 serving above all things the strength of their troops, they 
 quartered them on the inhabitants. Immediately on their 
 arrival, the men were housed a^d the horses put into barns; 
 in this manner they rested and dried themselves, were well 
 fed, and in the best condition to continue the struggle. 
 
 By our system of bivouacking we imagine that we lessen 
 the cost of war for the inhabitants, but such is not the case, 
 for soldiers who have to bivouac lay hands on all the wood 
 and straw that can be found for cooking and camping pur- 
 poses. It would be less expensive for a peasant to give a 
 place at his fire, as he would then avoid waste. Besides all 
 this, if you do away with tents, you lessen the amount car- 
 ried by the horse, and could thus get more work out of him, 
 as you would enable him to rest himself, by putting him 
 under shelter every night. 
 
 On August 20th, the corps d^armee of Marshal MacMa- 
 hon arrived at Chalons. We imagined that we should now 
 receive reinforcements, in order to make up for our losses at 
 JFroeschwiller; but, in spite of the returns of the killed and 
 wounded and the applications for reinforcements, we found 
 no steps had been taken to assist us in this matter. Mar- 
 shal MacMahon was now to take command of four corps 
 d'armee, including a large cavalry force. The campaign is 
 about to enter a fresh phase, but, before giving a description 
 of it, we will discuss the part played by the cavalry in the 
 battles fought round Metz. 
 
38 X Cavalry Studies. 
 
 PART 11. 
 
 ARMY OF METZ. 
 
 Battle of Spiebereu.— Retreat to Metz.— Battle of Rezonville.— Obser- 
 vations on the Employment of the Cavalry at Rezonville.— Battle 
 of Gravelotte.— Attack on the Lines of St. Barbe, 31st August, 1st 
 September.— Last Portion of tne Siege. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Battle' of Spicheren. 
 
 After the unimportant success that General Frossard 
 obtained at Sarrebruck on 2d of August, he took up a posi- 
 tion on the right of the Sarre, placing himself a cheval on the 
 Forbach road, with his right resting on Spicheren, and his 
 left in the direction of Stiring; his reserve was in the rear. 
 
 On the 6th of August, General Steinmetz ordered his 
 cavalry to pass through Sarrebruck and gain the left bank 
 of the Sarre. Following them up closely, he attacked our 
 2d corps d'armee. After an obstinate and sanguinary en- 
 gagement, the enemy stormed the wooded heights of Spich- 
 eren and Stiring, and General Frossard was obliged to retire 
 on Forbach, and from there to St. Avoid. 
 
 Our cavalry who had had nothing to do during the day, 
 found an opportunity of acting towards evening. As the 
 troops who were entrusted with the duty of guarding the 
 ontlets from the woods had been forced to retire, there wa^ 
 no one left at this point but a company of engineers and a. 
 portion of the 12th Dragoons. Two squadrons of this regi^ 
 
French Cavalry in 1870. 39 
 
 ment were accordingly dismounted, and, under cover of some 
 slight earthworks hastily thrown up by the engineers, 
 opened fire on the heads of the advancing columns. Having 
 succeeded in checking their advance, they remounted and 
 charged the enemy, whom they repulsed. After this brilliant 
 feat of arms, they retired behind the line of railway; and^ 
 with the assistance of the engineers, they maintained this 
 position long enough to give the troops who occupied For- 
 bach time to make the dispositions they wished. This 
 episode in the battle deserves to be mentioned, as it concerns 
 cavalry soldiers fighting on foot. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Retreat to Metz. 
 
 After this battle, the army fell back towards Metz, and 
 between the 7th and 14th the cavalry did but little. In the 
 course of this retreat, General de Cissey, commanding the 
 1st division of the 4th Corps, losing patience at the continual 
 surveillance that the enemy's cavalry, according to their 
 intelligent custom, exercised over him, ordered the 2d Hus- 
 sars to put a stop to it. A squadron of this regiment was 
 accordingly told off to drive back the enemy. By his ener- 
 getic attack. Captain Jouvenot, the officer in command of the 
 squadron, drove in the Prussian outposts; but, having pur- 
 sued too far, he was repulsed. Captain Jouvenot was killed, 
 and several officers and men wounded in this affair; but from 
 that time forth our army was allowed to retire unmolested 
 
40 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 to Metz. In the course of the 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, and 14th, 
 various reconnaissances were made by the chasseurs d'Af- 
 rique; of these, one example deserves mention. The Ger- 
 man cavalry had entered the town of Pont-k-Mousson and 
 cut the telegraph wires and the railway. Informed of what 
 was going on. General de Margueritte turned out his brigade 
 at 1 :30 o'clock, proceeded as quickly as possible along the left 
 bank of the Moselle, and arrived about 4 o'clock at Pont-k- 
 Mousson. The 3d squadron of the 1st Chasseurs d'Afrique, 
 passing through some orchards, galloped up the railway and 
 caught the Germans at w ork in the railway station. The re- 
 mainder of the brigade, sword in hand, charged, notwith- 
 standing the slipperiness of the pavement, up the streets to 
 the end of the town. ' There they were received with a fire 
 from the windows. General de Margueritte, who was in the 
 thick of the affair, was attacked by a Prussian officer, who 
 aimed at his head; his forage cap. however, was alone cut, 
 and the Prussian fell covered with wounds. At the termina- 
 tion of some other reconnaissances that were pushed along 
 the Moselle, the Prussian cavalry, consisting of four regi- 
 ments, after exchanging shots, left the plateau of Mouzon, 
 having sustained a loss of two officers and fourteen men 
 Icilled, and two officers, thirty-two rank and file, forty-one 
 horses, prisoners, who were brought into Metz. 
 
 On the 14th, the French Army was concentrated round 
 Metz. and our forces, which, at the beginning of the war had 
 been scattered along the frontier, now formed two distinct 
 armies; namely, that of Marshal Bazaine and that of Mac- 
 
French Cavalry in 1870. 41 
 
 « 
 
 Mahon. Both these armies had in view one object; namely, 
 to unite beyond the forests of the Argonne, and the enemy's 
 object was to prevent this junction. To attain this end, the 
 Prussians executed a turning movement and set themselves 
 to cross the Moselle to the south of Metz; their object being 
 to retain and prevent Bazaine's retreat. The 1st Prussian 
 Army, under the command of Steinmetz, tried to take us in 
 flank; whilst the 2d, under Prince Frederick Charles, was 
 occupied in turning us by Pont-^-Mousson. Attacked on the 
 14th at Borny, the French, in order to check the enemy, who, 
 in spite of all his efforts, was unable to surround us, were 
 obliged to suspend their march. But, as after this unsuccess- 
 ful action we were obliged to fall back on Verdun, we wasted 
 precious time on the 14th and 15th in the neighborhood of 
 Metz. As the line of retreat for the 2d and 6th corps lay 
 through Kezonville, Mars-la-Tour, and Mauheulles, General 
 de Forton was ordered to reconnoiter for this column. His 
 division consisted of the brigades Murat (1st and 9th Dra- 
 goons) ^and De Grammont (7th and 10th Cuirassiers). 
 
 On the evening of the 14th, General de Forton bivou- 
 acked on both sides nf the Mars-la-Tour road, just beyond the 
 post-house, and he had two troops of cuirassiers on outpost, 
 one placed opposite the wood of Ognons and the other oppo- 
 site the wood of Vaux; in addition there were two parties of 
 dragoons placed in the direction of the wood of St. Arnould. 
 
 On the morning of the 15th, some peasants informed us 
 of the presence of Prussian troops close to Ars, and they told 
 us likewise that a large body of cavalry had been seen close 
 
42 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 to Nov^ant. The truth was, that Prince Frederick Charles 
 had availed himself of his cavalry to make a reconnaissance 
 on a large scale along the left bank of the Moselle. Their 
 cavalry established contact with us on the 15th, and, accord- 
 ing to their usual custom, they spread their nets to catch us 
 as soon as we came up. 
 
 On the morning of the 15th, Forton's division set out to 
 reconnoitre the Mars-la-Tour road in the direction that the 
 enemy's vedettes had been seen. The brigade of dragoons 
 led in order to search the ground round Tronville and Pux- 
 ieux. Some troops of these, who were out feeling the way, 
 were stopped at this village by the fire of the Prussian 
 artillery. General Murat now sent to General de Forton 
 for support, and the officer who- carried the message was 
 attacked as he returned by some of the enemy's lancers, who 
 were concealed in a hollow. General de Forton, passing by 
 Mars-la-Tour, now brought up De Grammont's brigade and 
 two batteries of artillery. He posted the artillery on the 
 plateau looking towards Puxieux; behind it came the 7th 
 Cuirassiers; at a distance of some 150 yards from the 
 walls of Mars-la-Tour, and at about the same distance, 
 but stretching beyond the village, came the 10th Cuirassiers. 
 Whilst the artillery duel was progressing, in a fashion 
 which did but little damage on either side, the enemy's 
 skirmishers, taking advantage of a small ravine, boldly 
 advanced to within 300 yards of us. Two troops advanced 
 mounted against the enemy, and, assisted by the fire of a 
 dismounted party, succeeded in forcing them to retire, and 
 shortly after the artillery fire ceased. 
 
French Cavalry in 1810. 4^ 
 
 Forton's division now proceeded to the camping-ground 
 at Vionville and there encamped; the brigade of dragoons 
 was placed at the foot of the ridge on the plateau near Vion- 
 ville, and the cuirassier brigade on the opposite side of the 
 road. But the general in command (De Grammont), consid- 
 ering that this position w^as bad, owing to its being in a 
 hollow^, and to the cuirassiers having no carbines to defend 
 themselves in case of attack, ordered them to shift, and 
 placed them close to DeValabr^gue's division. The division 
 of General de Valabr^gue had mounted on hearing the sound 
 of the fight on this day, in order to support, if needful, but^ 
 finding it was unnecessary, had come back and taken up 
 ground in rear of Vionville. During the night the dragoons 
 and cuirassiers were protected by strong piquets. As for the 
 enemy, still keeping their contact by means of their scouts, 
 they^ ascertained our smallest movements, and, as their 
 object was, at all risks, to cut off our retreat, they marched 
 the whole of the night of the 15th and 16th, and, having tra- 
 versed an immense tract of ground, by morning they were 
 ready to dispute the passage. 
 
 On the morning of the 16th the French Army occupied , 
 the following positions. The 2d corps was in front of 
 Rezonville, to the left of the Verdun road; the 6th at about 
 the same distance on the right; the 3d was between Vern^- 
 ville and St. Marcel; the 4th was marching to Doncourt; 
 and the Guard occupied Gravelotte. The cavalry division 
 of General de Forton was at Vionville, and that of General 
 du Barail at Conflans. 
 
44 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 CHAPTER in. 
 
 Battle of Rezonmlle, August 16th. 
 
 General de Forton's cavalry had been ordered to march 
 at 5 a. m., but this was countermanded, and at 9 the saddles 
 and bridles were taken off. The dragoon officer in charge 
 of the piquet had twice sent in to announce the approach of 
 a large body of cavalry and artillery; a staff officer was 
 sent out to see if this was the case; he returned and said 
 there was nothing of importance going on, and the order to 
 take the horses to water was accordingly issued, the arrange- 
 ment being that whilst three squadrons per regiment were 
 being watered, the fourth was to be on the lookout. 
 
 Scarcely had they arrived at the watering-place, when 
 the Prussian artillery opened fire with a storm of shells, 
 and both the bivouacs and villages were literally riddled. 
 They had got information from their scouts of our careless- 
 ness, and had accordingly brought up their artillery at a 
 gallop, and placed it on both sides of the road, from which 
 position they fired as fast as they could. 
 
 Immediately there was a panic in the streets of Vion- 
 rille. The men mounted their horses and pushed up the 
 road, which was encumbered with wagons and loose horses. 
 The officers, in spite of the heavy fire, tried to stop their men, 
 but only succeeded with great difficulty; finally they man- 
 aged to restore order in a few troops, and these served as a 
 rallying-point to the remainder; they now returned to the 
 plateau of Rezonville. 
 
French Cavalry in 1810. 45 
 
 The cuirassier brigade, who, fortunately for them- 
 selves, had quitted their first ground and gone further to the 
 rear, escaped this shower of shells; they now mounted in 
 perfect order, and to avoid being cut off by large bodies of the 
 enemy's cavalry, which threatened their right, they retired 
 behind the woodl which borders the Roman road on the 
 east; then, passing in front of Villers aux Bois, they de- 
 bouched on to the plateau of Rezonville, a little to the right 
 of the 9th Dragoons. 
 
 De Valabr^gue's division, who had been on the qui vive, 
 mounted quickly and arrived soon after, and in order to get 
 under cover from the enemy's artillery, they also placed 
 themselves close to the wood of Villers. This division was 
 composed of General de Valabr^gue's brigade (4th and 5th 
 Chasseurs) and Bachelier's (7th and 12th Dragoons). 
 
 At the sound of the cannonade the 2d corps stood to 
 their arms and formed up; General Bataille's division was 
 on the right. General Verge's on the left, and Lapasset's 
 brigade refused and was extended to the rigjit by Marshal 
 Canrobert. Two attacks are now prepared against us: the 
 front one from Mars-la-Tour and Thionville, the other on the 
 left from the wood of Gorze. Up to about 11 o'clock the 
 action was undecided, but at that moment General Bataille 
 was wounded, and on the left of the 2d corps we began to 
 give ground. To put a stop to this and to re-establish the 
 battle. General Frossard determined to charge the enemy's 
 iaifantry, and accordingly ordered up the cavalry. 
 
 The 3d Lancers formed the first line, and beyond them 
 was General Desvaux's division, who had taken up a posi- 
 
46 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 tion on the right of the Rezonville road, in rear of that vil- 
 lage, and at a distance of about 1,000 yards from our lines. 
 General Desvaux now ordered General de Preuil to advance 
 in support with the cuirassiers of the Guard along the other 
 side of the road and in rear of the 3d Lancers. This move- 
 ment was immediately executed, and the regiment, placed 
 parallel to the brow of the hill and a little below it, was un- 
 der cover. 
 
 A few minutes afterwards this formation was changed 
 to a double-column formation, with the fifth squadron in 
 reserve. Towards 11 :30 the fire, which had been very severe, 
 slackened a moment, and suddenly we saw our skirmishers 
 falling back in disorder over the brow of the hill. They 
 were closly followed by the enemy's artillery, who crowned 
 the heights and commenced to shell the cavalry. Two squad- 
 rons of the 3d Lancers now advanced, but, as they received 
 no order to charge, they came back after going a short way. 
 
 General de Preuil now sent to inform General Desvaux 
 that in this part of the field there was a general retreat, and 
 almost immediately he received the order to charge. This 
 officer's command was at so great a distance from the ene- 
 my's infantry that the success of a charge was doubtful, 
 unless preceded by a heavy artillery fire, which should make 
 some impression on them. This objection was raised, but 
 General Frossard himself came up and said, "Charge imme- 
 diately, or we are all lost." 
 
 General de Preuil immediately ordered the first Echelon 
 to advance, and they galloped off in good order. The sec- 
 ond followed at about 150 yards distance, but, as they were 
 
French Cavalry in 1870. 47 
 
 going too fast, the general ordered them to slacken their 
 pace, and, accompanied by his staff, placed himself on the 
 flank. In the meantime the first line, going as fast as they 
 could, left the second a long way behind. As soon as the 
 enemy's skirmishers saw our cuirassiers start, they formed 
 rallying squares as quickly as possible, and in doing so had 
 ceased firing. 
 
 The advance accordingly arrived at a good distance, and 
 without much loss, when suddenly they were hindered by 
 various obstacles which lay in their way. These consisted 
 of biscuit barrels, baggage wagons, and) camp eq'Uipment 
 that had been abandoned by the troops in their hurried 
 retreat. 
 
 Obstructed in their advance, the 1st line inclined to its 
 left, and the further they went, the greater the pressure 
 became, and ended by throwing the two squadrons into dis- 
 order, so that when they received at thirty paces distance 
 the terrible fire of the enemy, they were thrown into hope- 
 less confusion and rushed forward into the intervals of 
 the Prussian squares. The lieutenant-colonel was badly 
 wounded; the commandant, although mortally wounded, 
 nevertheless forced his way into a square, followed only by 
 an adjutant, who was killed dead on the spot. As for the 
 others, obliged, in order to retreat, to go right round the 
 squares, they received the fire of all four faces, and were 
 annihilated. 
 
 The 2d line was now unmasked ; they were received by 
 a file fire, when at a distance of about 300 yards ; this made 
 a few gaps in the line, but they continued in good order, for 
 
48 Cavalry Studies, 
 
 the fire ceased for a moment; but when at 100 yards distance 
 they got the order to charge, the enemy poured in such a 
 hail of bullets that more than half the line was knocked over. 
 The remainder got entangled in the obstacles that covered 
 the ground, or else fell into a ditch that was dug about 
 ten paces in front of the squares. ^ 
 
 The 3d line was equally unsuccessful, and was dis- 
 persed by the fire like the two preceding ones. 
 
 Whilst the cuirassiers of the guard tried to re-form, they 
 were pursued by two regiments of Prussian cavalry, who 
 passed through the intervals between the Prussian squares; 
 one regiment came through the right center interval; the 
 other regiment (15th Lancers) came through the other inter- 
 val, and were received with a sharp fire at a short distance 
 from our skirmishers, who, not having had time to retire, 
 had lain down in the ditches along the roadside. This fire 
 stopped the pursuit of this regiment. As for the enemy's 
 hussars, with the greatest daring, they pursued so far that 
 they succeeded in surrounding the Marshal. The latter, as 
 well as the whole of the staff, were obliged to draw swords 
 and join in the m^l^e, when a squadron of the 5th Hussars, 
 and another of the 4th Chasseurs, warned in time by Gen- 
 eral de Preuil, arrived extremely apropos, and rescued the 
 Marshal and his staff. This charge of our hussars and 
 chasseurs was made perpendicularly to the road, and pre- 
 sented our flank to the Prussian squares, who were, however, 
 unable to fire, as their men were between us and them. Our 
 cuirassier regiment lost in this charge 22 officers, 208 rank 
 and file, and 243 horses. As the squares that were charged 
 
French Cavalry in 1870. 49 
 
 remained unbroken, the result was almost nil. It is to be 
 supposed that had the artillery opened fire on the line that 
 was to be attacked, as General de Preuil desired, a different 
 result might have been obtained. 
 
 Another conclusion ■ that may b^ formed is, that the 
 ground ought to have been prQ.viously reconnoitered, as, had 
 that been done, the charge might have received a diiferent 
 direction. 
 
 At the same time that the enemy displayed his attack 
 on Kezonville, the cavalry, under the command of Duke 
 William of Mecklenburg,* endeavored to overthrow our 6th 
 Corps, and some batteries of artillery who had been pushed 
 on ahead on the plateau, with a battalion of chasseurs as an 
 , escort. The enemy began by crushing our fire with a supe- 
 rior one ; he then sent forward two lines of cavalry in Eche- 
 lon at a distance of about 100 yards from each other; the first 
 line was composed of cuirassiers and the second of lancers. 
 These two lines charged, overthrew the chasseurs k pied, 
 in spite of their well-sustained fire, sabered our batteries as 
 they passed, and endeavored to annihilate the remnants of 
 our foot soldiers. But they were unaware that the moment 
 of reckoning had arrived, and that they were about to be cut 
 in pieces by our cavalry. 
 
 We have already related how de Forton's and Vala- 
 br^gue's divisions at the termination of certain movements 
 had gone and placed themselves near the wood which bor- 
 
 *Tbe cavalry here referred to was under the command of Gen. 
 von Rheinbaben. Duke William commanded another cavalry division. 
 -A. L. W. 
 
50 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 ders the Roman road. On arrival, the two brigades of Gen- 
 eral de Forton were formed in column of regiments, right in 
 front, and had executed several changes of front, sometimes 
 with a view to facing Rezonville and sometimes Vionville. 
 The last time this movement took place, they became in- 
 verted not only in each regiment, but in each squadron, and 
 in this formation proceeded to the top of the plateau, keep- 
 ing the wood close to the Roman road in their rear. On 
 seeing the enemy's cavalry amongst our batteries, General 
 de Forton ordered the dragoons and a portion of the cui- 
 rassiers to advance. They deployed and attacked the ad- 
 vancing lines. In the charge the 9th Dragoons passed 
 through the Prussian cuirassiers, who opened their ranks, 
 without stopping, and inclined to the right and left against 
 our artillery, and then pushed on to rejoin the lancers. 
 Their charge terminated, the lancers wheeled about to re- 
 tire, but were attacked by our cuirassiers, who charged to 
 the command, "Cuirassiers, attention ; go !" As these words 
 indicate no sort of formation, they advanced in a confused 
 mass, the officers being forced to push their horses to the 
 utmost in order to keep ahead of the men, who were riding 
 with their reins completely loose. A terrible mel^e now took 
 l)lace; the 16th Prussian Lancers, taken in flank, were over- 
 thrown, sabered, and actively pursued, when suddenly the 
 white cuirassiers came up to their assistance. Their horses, 
 however, were so blown with their long advance that they 
 were thoroughly done. It was now our turn, and the cav- 
 alry of General de Valabr^gue advanced to join de Forton's, 
 
French Cavalry in 1870. 51 
 
 and engaged the enemy. The fight was now at its height, 
 and was waged with the greatest fury on both sides. The 
 eagerness of our men was so great, and the two sides were 
 so mixed up, that, in spite of the trumpets sounding the rally, 
 the massacre went on. In a few seconds the enemy's cav- 
 alry was annihilated and the ground strewn with the dead 
 bodies of lancers and white cuirassiers. The best mounted 
 and those taken prisoners alone escaped. At this moment 
 the infantry from the side of Vionville opened fire on the 
 ground on which the 7th Cuirassiers were operating. The 
 retreat was therefore sounded and our regiments were re- 
 formed and proceeded to Gravelotte. 
 
 This affair was exceedingly creditable to us, and our 
 losses, compared to those of our enemy, were insignificant, 
 and the way to account for this is that we use the point of 
 our swords, and thus manage to get between the joints of 
 the cuirass and the portion of the helmet that covers the 
 back of the neck, whilst they, on the other hand, make cuts 
 and fire off their pistols, thus only wounding the horses, as 
 most of the men were protected by their cuirasses. 
 
 The German account of this business being a slight 
 stretch of the imagination, we will also give it. 
 
 With respect to the "Death Charge" that General von 
 Bredow's cavalry made against two batteries of artillery 
 and some infantry, the Count de Schmetow, a major of cui- 
 rassiers, who himself had two bullets put through his helmet, 
 gives the following account: 
 
 "It was an inexcusable thing for a commander to lead 
 
52 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 his troops to certain death, unless obliged to do so for impor- 
 tant reasons; this was, however, the case. 
 
 '^Colonel Voigts-Rhetz, the chief of the staff of the 3d 
 Army Corps came to General von Bredow, commanding our 
 brigade, and who is in the halbit of always commanding us, 
 and said to him : 'The general commanding and General von 
 Rheinbaben, commanding the cavalry division, are agreed 
 that it is your business to charge along the wood, and still 
 you remain here.' To this General von Bredow answered: 
 ^Do you mean to say that I ought to overthrow that infantry 
 along the wood?' 'Certainly,' was the answer; 'we have 
 already taken the village, and, as we were not able to ad- 
 vance against the wood, the fate of the battle depends on 
 this, that you sweep away everything along the wood, and 
 you must attack with the greatest vigor.' 
 
 "Two lines were accordingly formed in Echelon : the cui- 
 rassiers on the left along the edge of the wood, and the lan- 
 cers on the right, about 100 yards in rear. Our brave gen- 
 eral charged with four officers of his staff, three of whom 
 were killed. We scarcely gave the first battery time to fire 
 two of its pieces when we were already on them. It seemed 
 to me that the object in this death ride of ours was not so 
 much to obtain trophies as to sweep away everything be- 
 tween the wood and the road. In the battery, we killed every 
 one, and then gave chase to a column of infantry, whom we 
 rode over ; nevertheless, they sent some shots after us when 
 we had passed. 
 
 "Cuirassiers and lancers now formed together. We 
 attacked a second battery, and all who did not run awaj 
 
French Cavalry in 1810. ^^ 
 
 were ridden over, and in compan}^ with the runaways we 
 came up to a second column of infantry. Just before we 
 got up to them, some squadrons of French cuirassiers came 
 out from an opening in the wood, and after we had ridden 
 over this second column of infantry, our small body of men 
 was mixed up pell-mell with the French cuirassiers; the 
 lancers were on our right. We now retreated, and I shall 
 never forget the way we did so, from the point where our 
 charge, a charge of a quarter of a German mile in length, 
 terminated. I ordered the first trumpeter I could find to 
 sound the regimental call. The trumpet, which had been 
 pierced with bullets, gave out such an unearthly sound as 
 went through my very bones. On the roll being called, out 
 of eleven platoons (three were detached) we could only get 
 together three. The regiment had lost 7 oflQcers and 200 
 men." 
 
 A short time after the charges we have described took 
 place, Gen. de Ladmirault, who commanded our right wing, 
 and who had marched to the sound of the cannon, found him- 
 self opposed by the enemy in considerable force. The divi- 
 sions of the 4th corps, who had advanced with success as far 
 as the plateau of Gr^y^re, were now stopped by the enemy's 
 infantry, preceded by artillery, debouching by Mars-la-Tour; 
 they were also threatened in flank by a large body of cavalry. 
 
 This body of cavalry was composed as follows: The 
 brigade of dragoons of the Guard, Barby's brigade, two 
 other regiments, von Rheinbaben's division (4th Cuirassiers, 
 17th and 19th Dragoons, 13th Lancers, 10th Hussars), and 
 the 16th Dragoons belonging to the Vraatz infantry division. 
 
54 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 From his position at the farm of Gr^y^re, General de Lad- 
 mirault examined the field of battle. A ravine and deep 
 stream were at his feet, and on the opposite side were the 
 fields lying between Mars-la-Tour and Jarny, and which bor- 
 der the road that connects these two places. The whole of 
 this ground has a gentle slope to the N.W., and about half 
 way down is a sudden dip. The general crossed the ravine, 
 taking with him a battery of 12-pounders,* which, by its fire, 
 kept off two regiments of dragoons who were advancing. 
 Immediately guessing what the enemy were after, the com- 
 mander of the 4th corps ordered the 5th battalion of chas- 
 seurs k pied of Grenier's division to advance, and placed the 
 98th regiment in rear in a wood ; he then collected as large a 
 force of cavalry as possible to protect his menaced flank. 
 The regiments that composed this force and their disposi- 
 tion was as follows: In rear of the right, and at about 500 
 yards from the farm of Gr^y^re, were the 2d Chasseurs 
 d'Afrique under General du Barail. Next to them came the 
 2d and 7th Hussars and 3d Dragoons, under the command of 
 General Legrand. (The 11th Dragoons, who likewise were 
 under this officer, were in rear of the infantry.) At the 
 same distance as the village of Bruville were the dragoons 
 and lancers of the Guard, under General de France. Lastly, 
 De Cl^rembault's division of the 3d Army Corps was near 
 the village of Bruville; this division consisted of the 2d, 3d, 
 and 10th Chasseurs and the 2d, 4th, 5th, and 8th Dragoons. 
 (The regiments of chasseurs were not complete, owing to their 
 
 ♦French. 
 
^f^ OF TBB ^ 
 
 French Cavalry in 1870. 55 
 
 having detached portions of them with the infantry, and the 
 5th and 8th Dragoons were just at this moment with the 
 Marshal commanding the 3d Army Corps.) 
 
 Thus on both sides large masses of cavalry are about 
 to come on the scene, and afford a grand though terrible 
 sight. About 4:30 p. m., whilst our troops were engaged in 
 front, one of the enemy's batteries was detached to take lis 
 in flank, and with that object took up a position on the road 
 itself, nearly in a line with the Gr^y^re farm; in order to 
 avoid being turned it was absolutely necessary to silence this 
 fire; accordingly General de Ladmirault gave Generals du 
 Barail, Legrand, and de France the order to employ the cav- 
 alry to protect his right. Immediately General du Barail 
 passed over the ravine that lay in his front, with the 2d 
 Chasseurs d'Afrique, wheeled to the left, and charged the 
 battery in skirmishing order. The enemy had scarcely time 
 to fire before our men were on them. The 2d sabered the 
 gunners as they fled, and, still continuing their advance, they 
 came in contact with a superior force of the enemy; they 
 managed, however, to disengage themselves by going off to 
 the right; and, rallying in the angle formed by the wood and 
 the road, they opened a sharp fire on the enemy. After this- 
 brilliant feat of arms, the battery was no more seen. 
 
 In the meanwhile. Generals Legrand and de France had 
 made their arrangements for attacking the advancing Ger- 
 man cavalry, who were in a formation resenibling a pair of 
 tongs. 
 
 The first of these masses was on a line perpendicular to 
 
56 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 the road, with its right about 200 yards from it; the second 
 mass was formed in two lines almost parallel to the road. 
 
 Legrand's division, which was in line, went troops "right 
 wheel," crossed the ravine and road, and then formed line to 
 the front perpendicularly to the road. The 3d Dragoons 
 remained in reserve on the right. De France's brigade 
 (lancers and dragoons of the Guard), with the lancers in 
 front, passed the ravine in the same formation as the 1st 
 brigade and further to the right ; they then went in the direc- 
 tion of the southern edge of wood by the Gr^y^re farm-house 
 and formed line to the left at a trot. 
 
 In this manner our hussar brigade was opposed to the 
 1st body of the enemy, and our brigade of Guards, including 
 the 3d Dragoons, to the 2d body. General Legrand now got 
 a second time the command to attack at once, from the gen- 
 eral commanding. General du Barail, who was there, how- 
 ever, observed it was too late, and the right moment had 
 passed. At the same time, as the distance was great, one of 
 the colonels' of the hussars asked permission to open fire on 
 the enemy, who had halted on the sky-line. General 
 Legrand, however, anxious to attack the enemy, and only 
 taking counsel from his own courage, answered : "No ; draw 
 swords," and immediately ordered General de Montaigu's 
 brigade to advance. The German dragoons, motionless on 
 the crest and coming out against the sky-line like giants, at 
 first waited for us; then, when our hussars were quite close, 
 they fired their carbines, which are attached to the saddle, 
 and, drawing swords, they advanced with a loud cheer and in 
 
French Cavalry in 1870. 57 
 
 good order. These dragoons formed the right of the forma- 
 tion that has been already likened to a pair of tongs. 
 
 The shock was terrible. The majority of our horses, 
 small and blown by the distance they had advanced over, 
 were, as it were, broken against the species of wall that the 
 enemy's line presented, in addition to which their horses 
 were much bigger. The 7th Hussars charged through an 
 interval onto a regiment in close column. They then en- 
 deavored to return and take part in the fight, which now be- 
 came severe; amongst others. General de Montaigu was 
 wounded and taken prisoner. 
 
 General Legrand, with a bravery that deserves to be re- 
 corded, charged a hundred yards in front of the dragoons 
 that he was bringing up in support of his 1st line. He 
 attacked a regiment of the enemy's dragoons, who gave way 
 before our onslaught, and, covered with wounds, fell at the 
 head of the regiments he had led so bravely. 
 
 This first seething mass of combatants was now in- 
 €reased by more regiments coming and falling one over the 
 other. 
 
 General de France, finding himself attacked on the 
 flank, hurriedly sent the lancers, who had barely time to 
 form, to the front. The left of this regiment came in contact 
 with the right of Legrand's brigade; their center broke 
 through the German dragoons, and their right came against 
 the Prussian lancers, who took them in flank and knocked 
 them over. Then our dragoons of the Guard, who also had 
 scarcely had time to form, pushed to the rescue of our lan- 
 cers, fell o\i the enemy's lancers, and annihilated them 
 
 -5 
 
58 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 Finally, to complete the chaos, on the Prussian side up came 
 hussars and cuirassiers, and on ours the chasseurs d'Af rique. 
 Confusion was then at its height. 
 
 It was then neither an attack nor an ordinary fight, but 
 a kind of furious ra^l^e or whirlpool in which 6,000 cavalry 
 soldiers, dressed in all sorts of uniforms, armed in every 
 conceivable manner, were killing each other as fast as they 
 could, some with the point of the sword, others with the 
 forte. 
 
 Our unfortunate lancers were taken, on account of 
 their blue revers, for Prussian dragoons, and were accord- 
 ingly slain without mercy. In the midst of pistol shots and 
 the sound of swords clashing one against another, one could 
 hear cries of "Don't attack us; we are French!" "No quar- 
 ter!" was the only answer from our dragoons, who went on 
 killing, thinking that it was a ruse on the part of the ene- 
 my. Here, indeed, were enacted some terrible scenes; but 
 how was one to put a stop to them? Seeing this dreadful 
 mel^e. General de France ordered the recall to be sounded, 
 and our men returned in disorder, and were re-formed about 
 the place from which the attacks had commenced. At first 
 the enemy's cavalry followed us, but, recalled by their owm 
 trumpets, they remounted the brow of the hill, and we pro- 
 ceeded with our formation, protected on the left by the fire 
 of the chasseurs d'Afrique and two companies of the 5th 
 Chasseurs k Pied that General Grenier had posted behind 
 the trees on the Verdun road, and on the right by some men 
 who had been dismounted at the edge of the wood, by the 5th 
 Chasseurs h Pied, who had come up from Gr^y^re, and also 
 
French Cavalry in 1870. 59 
 
 by the 98th regiment, which was in the wood that lies between 
 the Verdun ro^d and Gv6y^re farm; finally, by the fire of 
 the 12-po.unders that General de Ladmirault had brought up 
 to support the attack. Our infantry fire almost annihilated 
 a regiment of Prussian dragoons of the Guard, who tried to 
 surprise us by coming round the head of the ravine. The 2d 
 regiment of the, same brigade met a similar fate a little 
 further off, and lost even their guidon, in trying to aid a 
 Prussian column that was in a critical position. After the 
 fight we have just described, the enemy's cavalry had at first 
 again taken up their old position on the brow of the hill, but 
 they afterwards retreated, owing to the arrival of General 
 de Cl^rembault. This officer was not informed of the action 
 the cavalry was about to take, but, perceiving from the place 
 where he was, the dust raised up by Legrand's charge, he 
 advanced as quickly as possible, in order to join in the fray 
 and render success certain. The regiments of chasseurs 
 who formed his right descended into the ravine so as to join 
 in the mel^e, but, being too far to the right, they were met by 
 the retreating hussars, and some disorder was the result of 
 the meeting. 
 
 General de Cl^rembault now crossed the ravine with 
 the 4th Dragoons, and, as soon as he reached the plateau, 
 charged. They sabered some of the last of the retreating 
 enemy, and the Prussians now finally retired towards Mars- 
 la-Tour. Thus ended this sanguinary conflict, at the end of 
 which we remained masters of the field. It would be neces- 
 sary to go very far back in history before one could come 
 upon a cavalry engagement in which such large masses had 
 
60 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 charged each other. The number of killed and wounded 
 was considerable, but our object was attained, as the enemy 
 had to desist from trying to turn our right. 
 
 A final charge terminated this series of engagements. 
 After darkness had set in, the Prussians retired, when sud- 
 denly on our left the sound of cavalry at a gallop was heard 
 approaching. A regiment of red hussars passed through 
 our infantry, but the zouaves, as soon as they had recovered 
 from their surprise, took post in the ditches along the road- 
 side and dispersed this party, who could scarcely be dis- 
 tinguished, and whose attack seemed to be without, any 
 definite object. 
 
 CHAPTER aV. 
 
 Observations on the Employment of the Cavalry at 
 Rezonville. 
 
 How many lessons we may learn from the engagements 
 that we have just described! Never in any battle was cav- 
 alry so desperately employed. On this long day (16th), on 
 which we fought for upwards of ten hours, we had seen the 
 eiffect of this arm under numberless circumstances. It was 
 by the help of his cavalry that the enemy was enabled at the 
 commencement of the battle to compensate for a numerical 
 inferiority by making its repeated charges replace the 
 troops he was in need of, and thus, by causing delay, give 
 time for reinforcements to come up. 
 
 We will not now enter upon the part played by the cav- 
 alry, from a strategic point of view, as we will discuss that 
 
French Cavalry in 1870. 61 
 
 later on. But from the examples that have been already 
 given we can deduce tactical truths which illustrate the fol- 
 lowing observations: 
 
 On the part of the enemy, as well as on our own, charges- 
 were begun at absurd distances. In addition, starting at 
 too rapid a pace at first, the horses, used up by having, to gal- 
 lop 1,000, 1,500, and even 2,000 yards, were completely blown 
 on arriving at the wished-f or point, and were therefore inca- 
 pable of insuring success. Amongst other instances, we 
 will quote the charge of von Bredow's brigade. When it was 
 taken in flank by our cavalry, the horses were so done up 
 that the men could do nothing with them, and they were 
 accordingly at the mercy of our soldiers, who broke through 
 them, knocking them over and scattering them like sheep. 
 This same charge likewise proves the necessity of a reserve, 
 which should support the movement without hurry, and 
 should arrive on the scene quite fresh, in order to take ad- 
 vantage of the enemy's being tired and blown. Von Bredow's 
 brigade was at first successful, but, as it had no support, 
 they were unable to preserve their success, and finally they 
 were entirely at our mercy. 
 
 If we look at the charges that were made against in- 
 fantry, we shall see that they failed because it had not first 
 been shaken by a cannonade. This truth is so old that it 
 seems almost foolish to repeat it. Nevertheless, this error 
 was over and over again committed, and always with one 
 same result; namely, the useless destruction of the troops 
 who were engaged. Take, for example, the gallant charge 
 
62 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 of our cuirassiers of the Guard. Besides, in this case we 
 had neglected to send out squadron vedettes, and, conse- 
 quently, before reaching the goal they arrived at, the line 
 was broken up by the obstacles it encountered on its path. 
 
 As for two bodies of cavalry meeting in full swing, this 
 happened repeatedly; and, in contradiction of the old belief, 
 that one of the two half-turns before the final shock. We 
 must, therefore, for the future study the causes that lead 
 both to success and to the reverse. The horses of our light 
 cavalry were knocked to pieces against the solid and impass- 
 able line formed by the German dragoons. From this it 
 appears that as the advantage' is on the side of size and 
 weight, one should never engage when there is too great a 
 disparity, but have for this reason cavalry of various sorts 
 in each brigade. We must also point out that many of our 
 regiments were surprised and attacked whilst in the middle 
 of a formation, and that they were obliged to charge before 
 finishing the movement, thus bringing about confusion and 
 taking away the men's presence of mind and coolness; to 
 this may be attributed the fact of our lancers having been 
 mistaken for Prussians by our dragoons, and attacked as 
 such. 
 
 All this proves how necessary it is to avoid on the field 
 of battle a succession of movements before one can face the 
 enemy, and for this reason in peace-time we should only prac- 
 tice a few rapid and simple movements, which should do 
 away with all hesitation as to which of them one is to 
 choose. Lastly, we may remark that one reason why we 
 
French Cavalry in 1870. 63 
 
 did not obtain a more decisive success was that the regi- 
 ments engaged were directed by a divided authority. Three 
 generals had a separate command to attain the same end; 
 each attacked in the formation he preferred, and each 
 sounded the recall when he thought fit. How is it then 
 possible to obtain a certain success if each has the power of 
 interfering with the plan of his neighbor? This is precisely 
 what happened in this charge. The recall that was sounded 
 for only a portion of the troops engaged was mistaken for a 
 general recall, and the whole of our men returned. We will 
 now sum up the mistakes that were committed : 
 
 Charges begun too far off; no squadron vedettes sent 
 out; unbroken infantry attacked ; regiments surprised whilst 
 forming; attacks entered upon without supports; the danger 
 of opposing light cavalry to heavy; want of unity in the 
 general command, there being no general-in-chief for the 
 cavalry. 
 
 Such are the lessons that may be learnt by a study of 
 the battle of Rezonville. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 Battle of Gravelotte, August 18th. 
 
 At the conclusion of the battle fought on the 16th, the 
 southern road leading to Verdun fell into the hands of the 
 Prussianw ; the northern road, however, passing by St. Marie 
 and the forest of Jaumont, was still open to us. In place of 
 hastening his march. Marshal Baza^ine remained in camp, at 
 
64 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 Metz, where lie was about to be hemmed in by the Prussians. 
 During the 17th, the enemy, by means of their cavalry, main- 
 tained their contact with us and prepared themselves for a 
 general action on the 18th. At this battle the part played 
 by our cavalry was unimportant. Along nearly the whole 
 of our front the country was wooded, and on this account 
 our army was on the defensive. This situation rendered 
 difficult the employment of the cavalry, and the greater 
 part of this arm remained massed during the battle in the 
 grounds of Lessy, Chatel St. Germain, Moulin Longeau, and 
 in rear of Amanvillers. 
 
 One may, however, record one instance of its utility on 
 the right wing of our army, in the action fought by the 6th 
 corps between St. Privat and Koncourt. At the time (viz., 
 about 6 p. m.) that the Prussians were trying to turn us by 
 the village of Koncourt, Du Barail's division, which was 
 formed up between St. Privat and Koncourt, made a move- 
 ment so as to extend our right, and by this demonstration 
 succeeded in holding the enemy in check for some time. The 
 4th corps sent General du Barail its brigade of dragoons 
 (2d and 11th), and these took part in the operations. The 
 3d Chasseurs were ordered to charge, and were led by Gen- 
 eral de Brichard. The regiment advanced in column, and 
 came across a wall behind which some of the enemy's in- 
 fantry was concealed. On our approach they opened a re- 
 markably well sustained fire, which, however, did not do our 
 men much damage, as they aimed too low, but caused a great 
 loss of horses. Some of the chasseurs jumped the wall and 
 were taken prisoners, bilt the majority fell back without 
 
French Cavalry in 1870. 6^ 
 
 having engaged tlie enemy, who were too well sheltered be- 
 hind their rampart. 
 
 After the battle of Gravelotte, the army of Marshal 
 Bazaine was completely shut up in Metz. The various cav- 
 alry divisions bivouacked close to their army corps, and 
 up to the 31st they were employed in repairing the disorder 
 caused by the fighting and marches of the preceding few 
 days. Several times the cavalry stood to their horses ready 
 to march, but as a rule they did not mount 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 Attack on the Lines of St. Barhe. 
 
 On the 31st August and 1st September, each cavalry 
 division at first marched with its own army corps, which 
 arrangement allowed the divisions attached to the 4th and 
 6th army corps to throw out for a short time, on arriving 
 on the field of battle, a^few squadrons to the front. But the 
 enemy's infantry did not delay us long, and the cavalry had 
 to go to the rear. Consequently, this enormous mass of cav- 
 alry, consisting of the divisions Desvaux (the guard), de For- 
 ton (the reserve), de Gondecourt (4th corps), were concen- 
 trated on the plateau to the east of Fort St. Julien, and on 
 the other side of the road was du BaraiPs division (6th corps). 
 
 These divisions, as at the battle of Amanvillers, found 
 that they were in such a position as precluded the possibility 
 of moving, and in the event of a reverse they would have been 
 destroyed by the enemy's shells. 
 
66 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 On this occasion (31st) General de Cl^rembault's divis- 
 ion had an opportunity of acting to a certain extent. About 
 4 p. m. it was ordered to proceed to the right of the 3d corps 
 and conform to the movements of the infantry. The divis- 
 ion, by brigades in two lines, advanced to the front, covered 
 by skirmishers, but, as the ground was unfavorable, they 
 were obliged to form open column, and eventually advance 
 by fours, which caused some confusion. 
 
 As General de Cl^rembault had been warned to support 
 the movements of General Montaudon in turning the enemy's 
 position, he advanced along the vineyards of Coincy and re- 
 formed his division in open column, with the 5th Dragoons 
 in front. Scarcely had the division reached the brow of the 
 hill, when it came under a fire from Servigny, from a position 
 some distance off on the left. The general now ordered his 
 division, in order to get it under cover, to cross the ravine 
 of Coincy, and^formed it up in two lines on the opposite bank, 
 just below^ the slope opposite the village. On his left was 
 the ravine of Coincy and Les Amines; on the right a piece of 
 rising ground, behind which was the enemy's infantry. In 
 front was a village surrounded by gardens, and occupied by 
 the enemy's infantry, and in rear the wood which ended in 
 the ravine of Colombey. General de Cl^rembault, finding 
 himself separated from the infantry, dismounted a squadron 
 of the 5tli Dragoons, and ordered them to leave their helmets 
 fastened to their saddles, so that they might not be seen 
 so easily, and to advance to the brow of the hill, and, as soon 
 as they had got there, to lie down and return the enemy's fire. 
 This movement was rapidly and successfully carried out, and 
 
French Cavalry in 1870. 67 
 
 at the same time a troop was sent to explore the wood of 
 Colombey, where there was a good deal of firing going on. 
 As our infantry did not come up, and as the fire from the 
 Village of Coincy augmented, our position became intolera- 
 ble, and the general ordered the remainder of the 5th Dra- 
 goons to dismount and attack the village. This order led to 
 some confusion, and, as there was no time to lose, the 4th 
 Dragoons, who were on the left of the 5th, received the order 
 to carry out this operation. As soon as the dragoons had 
 dismounted, they advanced at a double on Coincy, firing as 
 they went, and forced an entrance. The evening was coming 
 on, and the enemy, imagining that they were attacked by a 
 considerable force, offered but little opposition, and retired, 
 taking advantage of the gardens that lay in rear of and to 
 the right of the village, and keeping up a sharp fusillade. 
 The 5th Dragoons now got the order to turn the village, and, 
 taking the enemy in the rear, to charge. Two squadrons 
 moved to the front, but were unable to act, owing to the 
 hedges and gardens. In spite of the fire opened on them, 
 the regiments who remained mounted held their ground 
 until the infantry, who were to occupy the village, came up. 
 As night had now come on, the recall was sounded for the 
 dragoons, and this cavalry division encamped close to the 
 village of Montoy. 
 
 This is the second instance, in this campaign, of dra- 
 goons dismounting to attack and defend positions. 
 
 In the fighting that took place on the 1st September, the 
 cavalry was not called upon to act. Towards noon the Mar- 
 shal intended, it is believed, to employ the cavalry, who were 
 
68 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 massed close to the Fort of St. Julien, and to make them 
 charge along the plateau which lies between the village of 
 Mey and the Bouzonville road, had the enemy attempted to 
 pursue our infantry. 
 
 The chief command in this operation was entrusted to 
 General Desvaux, who communicated to each commanding 
 officer the part he was to take. Moreover, the ground was 
 examined, but, as the enemy did not commit the mistake of 
 following us up, no charge took place, and the regiments the 
 same evening encamped on their old ground. Dating from 
 the 1st September, the blockade of Metz was complete, and 
 the role of the cavalry became naturally unimportant. Nev- 
 ertheless, a system of scouting was organized in the 3d and 
 4th corps, and the men who were selected for this duty 
 acquitted themselves with intelligence. In addition to this, 
 the various regiments foraged and made reconnaissances, 
 but, with the exception of a few skirmishes, the history of the 
 cavalry during this fatal period was insignificant. 
 
 During the long days that intervened before the capitu- 
 lation, our sufferings increased day by day, and little by little 
 the cavalry melted away. 
 
 On the 9th September, provisions had already begun to 
 run short, and we had to furnish 1,000 horses to aid in feed- 
 ing the troops. Soon this amount had to be increased, and 
 we were barely able to feed those that were left. The men 
 gathered up. leaves wherever they could, to feed the horses, 
 and did not hesitate to lead them out to graze even under the 
 enemy's fire. 
 
 By the 21st the rations had been so cut down that more 
 
French Cavalry in 1870. 69 
 
 horses died than the commissariat wanted. Those that re- 
 mained ate each other's manes and tails, dirt, or leaves. 
 Every effort was made to keep them alive, not for combatant 
 purposes, as .they were so weak that they were unable to 
 move, but in order to feed the army. We were able, at this 
 time, to muster two squadrons a regiment, counting those 
 horses which were still living, and the dismounted men were 
 armed with chassepots and drilled to work as infantry. 
 
 Soon the mortality caused by famine became dreadful ; 
 it rained without ceasing, the whole camp was a sea of mud, 
 and the ground was covered with such a number of dead 
 horses that no one took the trouble to bury them. Those 
 horses that were still standing in the lines were knocked up 
 and quivering in every limb, without strength sufficient to 
 swallow the leaves that stuck to their wasted lips, and, as 
 soon as they fell to the ground, were torn to pieces by the 
 famished soldiery. In spite of all our sufferings, the morale 
 of the men did not diminish. Nearly always wet through, 
 without shelter, food, or a change of clothes, they underwent 
 the dreadful miseries of the last few days without a mur- 
 mur, thus giving proof of their indomitable courage under 
 reverses. 
 
 Thus vanished this numerous cavalry that we have 
 pictured so brilliant as regards courage on the battle-field. 
 Better for it had it perished altogether on the field where it 
 had fought so well. At least it would not have survived to 
 undergo a degradation worse than death itself — Viz., capitu- 
 lation. The bitter remembrance of this surrender will never 
 be effaced from those who were unhappy enough to take part 
 in it. 
 
70 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 PART III. 
 
 Army of Chalons.— To Rheims, and from Rheims to Sedan.— Battle 
 of Buzancy.— Battle of Beaumont— Sedan, August 31st, Sep- 
 tember 1st. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Army of Chalons. 
 
 We left Marshal MacMahon, on August 20tli, at the 
 camp of Chalons, about to take command of the 1st, 5th, 
 7th, and 12th corps. As these corps were composed of any- 
 thing but satisfactory materials, the Marshal intended to 
 give them time to get themselves in order, and in a council^ 
 of which the Emperor was president, it was decided to retire 
 on Paris. Seven divisions of cavalry were attached to this 
 army. Five belonged to the different corps and two were 
 in reserve. The cavalry of the different corps was as under: 
 
 1st corps, General Duhesme, three brigades: De Sep- 
 teuil (3d Hussars, 11th Chasseurs) ; De Nansouty (10th Dra- 
 goons, 2d and 6th Lancers) ; Michel (8th and 9th Cuirassiers). 
 
 5th corps, General Brahaut, two brigades: De Berni& 
 (5th Hussars, 12th Chasseurs); De la Morti^re (3d and 5th 
 Lancers) ; the 3d Lancers remained at Metz with Lapasset'& 
 brigade. 
 
 7th corps. General Ameil, two brigades : Cambriel (4th 
 Hussars, 4th and 8th Lancers) ; Du Colombier (6th Hussars 
 and 6th Dragoons); this brigade never joined. 
 
 12th corps. General F^n^lon; this division belonged 
 to the 6th corps at Metz, but never joined; two brigades: 
 
UNIVERSITY 
 
 ȣiLcAUFqg 
 French Cavalry in 1870. 
 
 Savaresse (1st and 7th Lancers); Tillard (1st Hussars, Qth 
 Chasseurs). 
 
 Another division, under the command of General 
 Lichtlin, joined the 12th corps, at Rethel, on the 25th, and 
 consisted of two brigades: De Beville (5th and 6th Cuiras- 
 siers); N^ant (7th and 8th Chasseurs). 
 
 The two reserve divisions were composed as follows^ 
 viz.: 1st division (1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th Cuirassiers), under 
 the command of General de Bonnemain; the 2d. under the 
 command of General de Margueritte, consisted of the two 
 regiments of chasseurs d'Afrique who had come from Metz 
 as an escort to the Emperor; also the 4th Chasseurs d'Af- 
 rique, who had just disembarked, and Tillard's brigade^ 
 which was withdrawn from General F^n^lon's division. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 To Rheims, and from Rheims to Sedan. 
 
 At 5 a. m. on the 21st, the army commenced its march 
 to Rheims. The Marshal started about 11 o'clock, and at 
 mid-day the Emperor, accompanied by his household, started 
 in a carriage. A division of cavalry was left behind to cover 
 the retreat and burn the camp at Chalons. 
 
 But at Paris they took alarm at this retrograde move- 
 ment, and M. Rouher came to Rheims to discuss the plan of 
 the campaign, and to endeavor to make the wishes of the 
 Regency prevail. A council was called, the original plan 
 abandoned, and Marshal MacMahon agreed to march to the 
 rescue of the Metz armv. 
 
72 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 In order to fully comprehend the difificulties we had now 
 to contend against, it is necessary to understand the enemy's 
 position, and the forces with which he intended to oppose us. 
 
 One army, tinder the command of Prince Frederic 
 Oharles, blockaded Metz. Two other armies were marching 
 on Paris. The one, under the command of the Crown Prince 
 of Saxony, was advancing by Verdun ; the other, under the 
 Crown Prince of Prussia, had its route by Nancy and St. 
 Dizier, and its cavalry was well ahead at • Vitry-le-Frangais 
 and Troyes. 
 
 The plan of campaign that Marshal MacMahon had 
 adopted was therefore an extremely diflScult one to carry out 
 with success, as, in the first place, it was necessary to out- 
 strip these two armies, and in addition, once adopted, it 
 ought to have been acted upon with the greatest celerity, 
 for the chance of success lay principally in taking the enemy 
 by surprise. The large body of cavalry which Marshal Mac- 
 Mahon had at his disposal would facilitate such an operation, 
 almost hide it altogether by interposing itself like a curtain 
 between our army and the enemy, and thus leave them hesi- 
 tating in the plains of Champagne; only, in order to do this, 
 it was necessary to unite it under the command of a skillful 
 leader. Such was the part we might have played, but if we 
 look and see what we really did do and how we were em- 
 ployed, we shall find the cavalry generally marching either 
 in unwieldy masses or else reconnoitering the opposite flank 
 to that where the enemy was; always full of dash when 
 called upon to charge, always wanting when called upon to 
 
^French Cavalry in 1870. 73 
 
 reconnoiter and establish contact with the enemy. From 
 the 20th to the 23d General de F^nelon was ordered to 
 reconnoiter, with the 1st and 4th Lancers and the^4th Chas- 
 seurs d'Afriqtie, the whole of the country that lies between 
 the roads leading from Chalons to Vitry and from Chalons 
 to St. Menehould. On thei Z^d this division rejoined the 
 12th corps, and it is from this date that the distribution of 
 the cavalry corresponds to the list already given. 
 
 On the 22d the troops were w^arned that on the morrow 
 they were to march in the direction of Montm^dy, and ac- 
 cordingly on the 23d they left Klieims for Bethniville. We 
 now find them, after having wasted three days, returning to 
 exactly the spot that they occupied on the evening of the 
 20th. The 7th corps (Oeneral Douai) was on the extreme 
 right, and the 12tli (General Lebrun) on the extreme left. 
 The army had for the advance guard the two reserve cavalry 
 division's. General de Bonnemain's division was at Suippe 
 and Vaudesincourt to protect the right, and General de Mar- 
 gueritte's, still farther in advance, went as far as Monthois, 
 and was entrusted with the duty of observing the defiles of 
 Argonne, Grandpr6, and Croix-aux-Bois. The other cavalry 
 regiments marched with their corps. 
 
 Scarcely had we started, when the Marshal began to fear 
 that he might run short of supplies, and accordingly directed 
 his left on Rethel, which place he reached on the 24th. 
 
 General de Margueritte received the order to remain in 
 observation at Monthois, and De Bonnemain's division was 
 ordered to Pont Faverjet. 
 
 6- 
 
74 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 We had made good progress these first two days, and, 
 by keeping it up, we might distance the enemy and arrive 
 before Metz in four d-ays. In place of doing so, however, we 
 halted at Rethel. 
 
 The Crown Prince, informed by his cavalry of the change 
 in our plans, immediately stopped in his advance on Paris, 
 changed front, and proceeded northeast, following the line 
 of the Meuse so as to threaten our right flank. On this side, 
 therefore, lay our danger, and it was indispensable that it 
 should be protected by cavalry. Instead, however, of tak- 
 ing this precaution. General de Bonnemain's division was 
 sent to Rethel — viz., to our left flank the opposite side to the 
 enemy; and, in addition to this. General de Margueritte's 
 division, which was now alone on the right flank, was sent 
 to Semuy with orders to reconnoiter as far as possible, espe- 
 cially in the direction of Ch^ne Populeux. One battery of 
 horse artillery of the 12th corps was ordered to proceed 
 to Stenay and place itself at the disposal of General de 
 Margueritte. 
 
 In consequence of these movements. General Douai (7th 
 corps) found, on reaching Vouziers, that our cavalry had 
 quited the defiles of Grandpr^ and Croix-aux-Bois, and, 
 therefore, that our right rear was completely unprotected. 
 Unwilling to remain in such a position, he sent the 4th Hus- 
 sars to Grandpr^ to ascertain, at all risks, the enemy's 
 movements. 
 
 The Germans employed their cavalry in a very different 
 fashion, and pushed on their scouts to enormous distances 
 
French Cavalry in 1870. 75 
 
 ahead. Those who preceded the army coming from Stenay 
 were twenty-four miles in advance, and were to be met with 
 beyond the defiles of the Argonne. On our arrival they fell 
 back slowly, and only w^hen they had ascertained our force, 
 etc., and which information they reported. The Crown 
 Prince's army, who were advaticing by forced marches, acted 
 in the same manner, throwing out their cavalry as a curtain 
 behind which they could operate; they came rapidly up to 
 us and began to threaten the 4th Hussars, who, as we have 
 already remarked, had been sent to Grandpr^ to watch the 
 enemy. This regiment having sent word to say that it had 
 a stronger body of the enemy opposed to it than it could hold 
 in check, General Douai came and took up a position a little 
 in advance of Longwy. This movement kept the enemy 
 back, and they confined themselves to some desultory skir- 
 mishes with the 4th Hussars. 
 
 On the 27th General de Margueritte's division was sent 
 to watch the roads in the direction of Stenay and Dun, and 
 their doing so rendered the passage of the Meuse at Mouzon 
 and Kemilly possible. On arriving at Chene Populeux, the 
 Marshal learnt of the arrival of the Saxons and the Crown 
 Prince of Prussia, and, seeing that his march on Montm^dy 
 was compromised, he determined to move westward, and 
 issued orders to that effect to the army. 
 
 During the night, however, the Minister of War tele- 
 graphed the following message: "Minister of War to Mac- 
 Mahon. The Council of Regency and the Council of Minis- 
 ters entreat you to succour Bazaine's Army, and unless you 
 
76 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 do so, a revolution in Paris is imminent." Marshal MacMa- 
 hon, with fatal results for France, again submits to a decis- 
 ion from Paris, resumes his march in the direction of Metz, 
 and proceeds to Stenay. 
 
 Several roads lead from Chene Populeux to Stenay : one, 
 inclining to the south, passes by Harricourt, Bar, Buzancy, 
 Nouart, and Stenay; another by Stone, where it branches off 
 to Stenay, either by Beaumont — and this is the most direct — 
 or else passing further north, by Roncourt, Mouzon, and 
 Carignan. On the 28th the movement of the troops com- 
 menced, and the headquarters arrived at Stone. General de 
 Margueritte's division went from Stone to Mouzon. close to 
 the 5th corps (General de Failly), and General de Bonne- 
 main's was at Petites-Armoises, a little in rear of the right. 
 
 On the 29th General de Bonnemain's division halted at 
 Roncourt, and General de Marguerittete reconnoitered the 
 right bank of the Meuse, in the direction of Stenay and Mont- 
 m^dy. The army corps marched very far apart. Those of 
 Ducrot and Lebrun marched towards Mouzon and Carignan, 
 and those of Douai and De Failly advanced by Harricourt 
 and Buzancy. 
 
 The further we advanced, the more frequently we en- 
 countered the enemy's cavalry. At first vedettes and small 
 parties of five or six continually appearing and disappearing, 
 but always out of reach. Their duty was not to fight, but 
 to watch continually, and this rule they carried out to perfec- 
 tion all through the campaign. 
 
French Cavalry in 1870. 77 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 Battle of Buzancy. 
 
 On arriving at Harricourt, General de Failly halted to 
 concentrate his force, and he learnt that on the previous 
 evening the Prussians had been requisitioning provisions 
 there, and at that very moment tl\ey were at Buzancy. He 
 sent on two squadrons of the 12th Chasseurs to reconnoiter, 
 and these were received, on debouching into the plain, by a 
 fire from two batteries posted on the hill that commands 
 Buzancy and the Nouart road. Without pausing, our chas- 
 seurs mounted the hill, and, in spite of the heavy fire, charged 
 the batteries in skirmishing order. They were still some 300 
 yards off, when two regiments of Saxon dragoons came out 
 of the wood on the left of the road and advanced to support 
 their guns. 
 
 The chasseurs now halted, fired, and recommenced their 
 advance. In spite of their small numbers, they attack the 
 Saxons sword in hand, our men using the point and the enemy 
 cutting. Captain d'Ollonne was badly wounded on the head, 
 and as our men could not hold their own for any time against 
 such superior numbers, and as they were not supported by 
 the lancer brigade in rear, they were compelled to fall back, 
 which they did, again having recourse to their carbines. 
 
 On the morrow, hearing that the enemy were in consid- 
 erable force on the high ground at Kouart, the chief of the 
 staff of the 5th corps made a reconnaissance with the cav- 
 alry and a battery of artillery. But this was carried out 
 
78 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 without either an advanced guard or flankers, and conse- 
 quently we came unawares on the enemy concealed ini a 
 wood; fortunately for us, he fired too soon, and his eagerness 
 saved us. 
 
 Marshal MacMahon, being now of opinion that his corps 
 were too separated, ordered General de Failly to fall back 
 on Beaumont. Unfortunately for us, the enemy had so organ- 
 ized his cordon of vedettes that every way was secured, and 
 both officer and desx)atch fell into his hands. General Douai, 
 however, eventually communicated the order, and the 5th 
 corps marched to Beaumont. This march required great 
 care, as the road that it was necessary to follow lay through 
 a wood and was commanded nearly everywhere. This was 
 a case, above all others, in which the cavalry should have 
 been sent to the front .to examine every wood and hollow, 
 as we had everything to dread. But our confidence was 
 boundless. We started in the dark. The men, worn out 
 with the fatigues of two days of fighting and two night 
 marches, arrived at Beaumont on the 30th, in the middle of 
 a dark night, and, being without a soul to show them where 
 to encamp, they settled down by chance between the forest 
 and the village. In spite of the enemy's vicinity, we biv- 
 ouacked without our cavalry searching the surrounding coun- 
 try. A wood was close at hand; we neglected to examine 
 it, and it was full of the enemy's artillery and infantry, who,, 
 carefully concealed, silently assisted at our installation. 
 
 A Prussian officer who was present at this scene after- 
 wards told one of our wounded men that our blind confidence 
 had created a great impression. From their point of ob- 
 
French Cavalry in 1870. 79 
 
 servation they could see both officers and men making them- 
 selves comfortable, washing, cooking, talking, laughing, and 
 singing, the whole without the least suspicion of who were 
 near them. This officer added that although he was an 
 enemy, he could not help thinking that sometimes in war 
 there were scenes repugnant ±o a man's better feelings ; for 
 instance, he, under cover, would be forced to fire, when he 
 got the order, on a body of men who unsuspectingly laid 
 themselves open to it, and who would shortly be killed like 
 so many sheep. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Battle of Beaumont. 
 
 About 11 o'clock, in the middle of the tranquility, whilst 
 some were resting themselves and others were cooking, out 
 burst a storm of fire, and the bivouac was riddled with shot 
 and shell. Every one started thunderstruck from his tent, 
 rushed to the horses picketed in the lines, and which were 
 loosed with extreme difficulty. The infantry formed up, but 
 in the midst of such confusion it was difficult for the officers 
 to maintain order and cause an effective fire to be opened. The 
 right wing was annihilated and overthrown in the w^ood. 
 A portion of them rallied on a mound, opposite the village 
 of Mouzon, and, in order to save the remainder of the corps, 
 B^ville's brigade was ordered to check the enemy. 
 
 This brigade (5th and 6th Cuirassiers) were on the right 
 bank of the Meuse. On receiving the order, they mounted 
 
80 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 and crossed the river, and, having advanced about) 1,000 
 yards, they formed up in two lines on the slope of a mound, 
 defended by a mitrailleuse battery of the 5th corps; but, 
 immediately this battery opened fire, it was silenced and its 
 pieces dismounted by a storm of shells. At the same time 
 the Prussian infantry decimated our exposed squadrons with 
 their fire. An aid-de-camp now galloped up with an order 
 for the 6th Cuirassiers to retire, whilst the 5th were left to 
 hold the enemy in check. The 5th now remained alone, ex- 
 posed to a perfect hail of shot ; some of the bullets, striking 
 with a hard metallic sound, were flattened against the cui- 
 rasses; others took better effect. Lieutenant-Colonel Assant 
 was mortally wounded, and the Count de M^autis received 
 a wound in the lower part of his stomach. Wounded men 
 and horses kept falling down in the ranks. The enemy kept 
 advancing nearer and nearer, and his murderous fire swept 
 the Meuse, the bridge, and the fords. It was now, therefore, 
 absolutely necessary, at any sacrifice, to endeavor to check 
 him and stop his fire. 
 
 At a command from General F^n^lon, the colonel drew 
 sword and led his regiment to the front. Unfortunately, 
 the ground was boggy, uneven, and intersected by a deep 
 ditch. In spite of all this, the cuirassiers continued their 
 advance, under fire. The crests of their helmets were either 
 shot away altogether or pierced, epaulettes cut in two, 
 valises torn, and the skirts of tunics with holes in them, 
 so heavy was the fire. The brave Colonel de Contenson 
 was killed, and Commandant Brincourt was also mortally 
 
• French Cavalry in 1810. 81 
 
 wounded. Besides the field officers, nine troop officers were 
 killed and wounded, and six officers had their horses shot 
 under them; eleven non-commissioned officers and ninety 
 men were placed hors de combat. The remains of the 5th 
 Cuirassiers now fell back to the river and tried to cross, with 
 a view to forming up on the opposite bank ; but both bridges 
 and fords were blocked up with guns and baggage. It was 
 therefore determined to swim across the river. Unfor- 
 tunately, the current was rapid, and it was extremely deep 
 in places. The horses, encumbered by the dreadful weight 
 they had to carry, were scarcely able to swim, and were so 
 done up on reaching the opposite shore that they were unable 
 to climb the banks, and, falling backwards, drowned many 
 of the men with them. ' 
 
 This brilliant example of devoted but useless courage 
 afforded by the 5th Cuirassiers is only another instance of 
 the folly of our old notions that the sole use of cavalry is to 
 charge. 
 
 As it could no longer offer an effective resistance, the 
 5th corps was driven back to Mouzon, where it was under 
 the protection of the 12tli, who, thanks to their excellent 
 position, were ejabl'?d to hold out until evening. 
 
 Marshal MacMahon now saw that he was opposed to 
 such a large force of the enemy that it was useless to think 
 of trying to march to the aid of the Metz army. His right 
 wing had just been driven across the river Mouse, and his 
 left wing no longer rested on the Belgian frontier. To quit 
 the offensive and endeavor to avoid having his retreat cut 
 
82 Cavalry Studies. * 
 
 off was now his sole object, and with this view he issued 
 orders for the army to fall back on Sedan. At the same time 
 he informed the Emperor, who was at Carignan with the 1st 
 corps, of this decision. There was now such a hurry to get 
 ready the Emperor's carriages, relays, horses, and baggage 
 that everyone thought a panic had arisen. What sad reflec- 
 tions occur to one when one thinks of the great power once 
 wielded by this sovereign, who, as it were, dictated his wishes 
 to all Europe, and was now sad, and having lost his prestige^ 
 following his army as it marched to ruin ! 
 
 The retreat was begun; the night was dark and the 
 roads so blocked up by baggage that the progress of the 
 troops was exceedingly slow. The disorder on every side 
 was now so great that, instead of concealing our march from 
 the enem}^, our men lighted torches to show themselves the 
 road, and no one prevented them doing it. Thus the Ger- 
 mans could tell what our object was as well as if we had told 
 them. They followed in our wake, and, as they were per- 
 fectly aware of our intentions, they got together all their 
 forces to annihilate us. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 Sedan August 31st, Septemher 1st. 
 
 On the 31st, at about 11 o'clock in the morning, after hav- 
 ing passed Douzy, the point of junction of the roads from 
 Mouzon and Carignan to Sedan, General Lebrun's rear guard 
 was attacked by the enemy's cavalry, who threw themselves 
 
French Cavalry in 1870. 83 
 
 on the baggage. The terrified drivers cut their traces, over- 
 turned the wagons, and our baggage once more fell into the 
 enemy's hands. At the same time there was a sound of heavy 
 firing from the enemy, who were following and attacking 
 our troops. With a view to prevent our retreating beyond 
 Sedan, the Prussians had pushed forward their cavalry and 
 artillery to engage us and thus oblige us to halt. By this 
 maneuver they gave the rest of their array time to concen- 
 trate for the great battle of the following day. 
 
 The same evening a large body of the enemy's cavalry 
 advanced into the plain of Donch^ry and thus cut off all com- 
 munication with M^zi^res, and as soon as they were certain 
 that we intended to accept the battle, they made the neces- 
 sary dispositions for surrounding us. One may well ask 
 what our cavalry was doing all this time? Massed in divis- 
 ions, it marched, each with its own army corps. Not a 
 man was sent out to gain information regarding the enemy's 
 strength and intentions. It was supposed that we had to 
 deal with an army of 60,000; unfortunately, we were opposed 
 to 240,000. If, in place of leaving the cavalry idle, we had 
 employed it in every direction to maintain our contact with 
 the Prussians,. the disaster of Sedan would never have oc- 
 curred, as the Marshal, warned in time, would have retreated 
 to M(^zi^res at all risks. The road to this place was, it is 
 true, guarded by the hostile cavalry, but our own could have 
 attacked them, and would certainly have forced a passage. 
 Instead of playing so brilliant and useful a part, we are 
 about to witness this arm again uselessly devoted to death, 
 
84: Cavalry Studies. 
 
 and see it vanish in the gulf that already yawned ready to 
 swallow up our whole army. 
 
 On the night of the 31st the French divisions were en- 
 camped on the right bank of the Meuse and formed a half- 
 circle round Sedan, with the two flanks resting on the river. 
 The troops were drawn up on the hills that command the 
 town on all sides. Sedan, a second-rate fortress, was very 
 badly armed, and, being neither provisioned nor provided 
 with any exterior defences, was incapable of standing a 
 siege, and was therefore incapable of protecting a beaten 
 army. It was for this reason very important for the enemy 
 to arrest us at this point, and, surrounding us during the 
 night with overwhelming forces, he prepared to attack us 
 on both flanks, with a view to uniting, and thus placing us 
 completely at his mercy. Finally, the fire from the artillery 
 that lined the hills on the left bank was in unison with that 
 from the right bank. The King, who was at Yaudresse, 
 now went to Fr^nois. 
 
 At 4 a. m., September 1st, firing was heard in the direc- 
 tion of Bazeilles, which place was occupied by our 12th 
 corps. A heavy fog at this time covered the whole country, 
 and it was impossible to see any distance. General Lebruu, 
 who had given directions the night before to blow up the 
 bridge over the Meuse, could not at first understand how the 
 enemy had crossed. As the firing got heavier, he proceeded 
 to the village, and, as soon as the fog cleared away, saw, to 
 his astonishment, the Bavarians on the right bank of the 
 river. It will scarcely be credited, but such is the case., that 
 
French Cavalry in 1870. 85 
 
 there was no blasting-powder, that the bridge was perfectly 
 intact, and the enemy, profiting by this negligence, had 
 quietly crossed the river. Marshal MacMahon, accompa- 
 nied by his whole staff and his escort from the 6th Lancers, 
 mounted as soon as he heard the firing ; careless of danger, 
 he placed himself in such a pFominent position that he at 
 once attracted the enemy's fire. The bullets sowed death on 
 all sides, wounding the oflficers who stood near, decimating 
 the escort, and4he Marshal himself was struck by a fragment 
 of a shell. Unwilling to go to the rear, he tried to remain 
 on horseback, but, losing a great deal of blood, he was at last 
 obliged to allow himself to be conveyed to Sedan. As the 
 Marshal's wound was an exceedingly dangerous one, he was 
 unable to keep the command, and accordingly handed it over 
 to General Ducrot. Our new chief, judging correctly that 
 in the position in which we were placed it was impossible 
 to resist the immense masses of the enemy, supported by so 
 formidable an artillery, and seeing that our only hope of 
 safety lay in retreat, issued orders to the officers commancf- 
 ing the various army corps to fall back. General de 
 Wimpfen sent, in answer to this command, an official letter 
 appointing him commander-in-chief. This officer had only 
 arrived from Algeria two days previously, and, not having 
 been present at our reverses, was unaware of our weak 
 points; consequently, taking council only with his own cour- 
 age, he believed that success was still possible, and consid- 
 ered that at 8 a. m. one should think of victory and not of 
 retreat. General Ducrot's answer to General de Wimpfen 
 was : "I am ready to obey, but allow me, in the name of the 
 
86 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 country, to beg of you to retreat, and believe me that if we 
 do not do so, it can only lead to disaster." As, however, it 
 was determined to stand our ground all along the line, we 
 prepared to fight to the last gasp. 
 
 We will not enter into all the incidents that took place 
 on this unhappy 1st of September, as the story of the com- 
 bined operations of the three arms has already been told in 
 the Prussian and French reports. We will only detail the 
 part taken by the cavalry^ and also one or two matters that 
 are not generally known, even yet. The general features of 
 the ground, and the position taken up by the French Army, 
 rendered the employment of cavalry extremely difficult. 
 The battle was fought on a half-circle, of which Sedan was 
 the center. A good deal of maneuvering on the part of both 
 infantry and artillery was requisite to enable them to take 
 up positions on the arc of the circle, in order to deploy as 
 much as possible. For this reason the cavalry had to be 
 constantly oh the move, to avoid getting in the way of the 
 other arms. On this account also the cavalry attached to 
 an arm3^ corps did not invariably remain with it. Thus, the 
 12th corps had twelve regiments with it at one time. 
 
 The most favorable ground was in the direction of Flo- 
 ing, and it is at this point that we shall witness the most seri- 
 ous fighting. 
 
 Our army had been fighting since 4 a. m., and were now 
 beginning to tire, and already we could see the circle con- 
 tracting. On the left Greneral Douai's troops had come in 
 contact at St. Menge with the 4th and 11th Bavarian corps, 
 who had already passed Vrignes-aux-Bois. By degrees 
 
French Cavalry in 1870, 8T 
 
 fighting began all along the line of hills stretching from Flo- 
 ing to Illy. Our troops had stubbornly resisted this attack 
 from the north, but at last, overwhelmed by the enemy's 
 artillery, they fell back. The cavalry were accordingly now 
 called upon to restore the battle, if possible, by a grand 
 charge. 
 
 About 8 a. m. General de Margueritte's division occu- 
 pied the ground that extends between Floing and the spot 
 occupied by our cavalry at Illy. General de Gallifet's bri- 
 gade w^as draw^n up in three lines : 1st Chasseurs d' Af rique 
 in the 1st line, the 2d in support, and the 4th in a third line. 
 General Tillard's brigade (1st Hussars, 6th Chasseurs) was 
 on the right, both regiments in open column. 
 
 Bravely led by their officers, our squadrons broke into a 
 gallop, in order to attain the impossible goal to which they 
 were destined; that is to say, the Prussian batteries posted 
 on the heights between St. Menge and Fleigneux. Tbese 
 batteries had in front of them, half way down the hill, two 
 battalions deployed as skirmishers. On seeing us advance, 
 the enemy's infantry, who had not time to form square, nev- 
 ertheless opened a smart fire, which repulsed the 1st and 3d 
 Chasseurs d'Afriijue. These two regiments now fell back 
 on Illy, and cleared the front for the 4th. This regiment, 
 however, in spite of all its efforts, did not succeed in getting 
 further than the others. It now changed front, right back, 
 and rejoined the remainder of the division, w^hich was retir- 
 ing in open column to the wood of Garenne, thus giving way- 
 to De Bonnemain's cuirassiers, who also suffered some loss. 
 
88 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 Two squadrons of the 4th Lancers were likewise engaged in 
 this charge. They had bivouacked the previous evening 
 close to Floing, and, on seeing the chasseurs d'Afrique ad- 
 vance, they mounted and moved up in support, and lost about 
 tw^o-thirds of their men and horses. 
 
 As the enemy's artillery fire kept increasing in intensity, 
 and had already silenced the battery attached to General de 
 Margueritte's division, the plateau now became untenable 
 for our cavalry, who were obliged to fall back in the direc- 
 tion of Sedan. Whilst this retrograde movement was being 
 executed. General Tillard and his galloper were both killed 
 by a bursting shell, just as they got to the wood, behind 
 which the division was formed up in good order, in spite of 
 the losses it had suffered. About 2 o'clock in the afternoon 
 the fire became so hot and the enemy's infantry advanced 
 in such immense numbers that our infantry was obliged to 
 fall back from the crests of the hills. It was accordingly 
 determined to make another desperate appeal to the devo- 
 tion of the cavalry, which now, as at every other period of 
 the war, we shall find meeting certain destruction cheer- 
 fully. Unfortunately, as usual, it was too late; the only 
 result was a sanguinary and useless sacrifice of men and 
 horses. General de Margueritte now got together his whole 
 division, consisting of the 1st, 2d, and 4th Chasseurs d'Af- 
 rique, 1st Hussars, and 6th Chasseurs, and advanced upon 
 the heights that lie between Floing and the wood of Garenne. 
 Anxious to -examine the ground over which he intended to 
 charge, he advanced bravely to the front, and was mortally 
 
French Cavalry in 1870. 89 
 
 wounded on the head by a ball which passed through his 
 cheek and tongue. He handed over the command to Gen- 
 eral de Gallifet, and passed by us, supported on his horse, 
 by two sergeants-major. His eyes had already begun to 
 dim, his beard was covere^d with blood, and his hands con- 
 vulsively grasped the saddle, *and, as we gazed on this sad 
 spectacle, each of us regretted this popular leader, who was 
 an ornament to the cavalry, and whose memory will always 
 be dear to us. Placing himself in front of the division, 
 General de Gallifet advanced^ with great determination. 
 Twice these regiments endeavored to break through the 
 Prussian lines; twice they were obliged to fall back almost 
 annihilated, and with the loss of half their number. The 
 losses were so heavy that the average per regiment of horses 
 killed, wounded, and lost was 240, 
 
 The divisions attached to the various army corps also 
 suffered severely from the heavy fire which was poured in 
 on them from all sides. The colonel of the 8th Chasseurs 
 was killed, and General de F(^n^lon wounded. In this one 
 day our cavalry lost three generals killed and the fourth ho7^s 
 de combat* 
 
 In spite of the brilliant courage displayed by our cav- 
 alry, these charges had no appreciable effect, as the ground 
 was unfavorable ,and the infantry and artillery fire so heavy 
 that half of our squadrons were placed liors de combat, with- 
 out ever being able to reach the enemy. But although the 
 cavalry did not succeed, it has no cause to be ashamed of the 
 
 ♦Generals de Margiieritte, Tirard, and Tillard, killed; General de 
 Feuelon wounded; Colonel Jamin de Fresnay killed. 
 
 7- 
 
90 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 part it took on this day, for it preserved the honor of its 
 arms; and, beside the souvenirs of Jena, Friedland, and 
 Eylau, it can inscribe in j^olden characters the praise be- 
 stowed on it by our enemy. In a letter written by the King 
 to the Queen after the battle of Sedan, His Majesty thus ex- 
 presses himself: "I do not know the names of those brave 
 regiments which I saw charge up th^ heights with a valor 
 beyond all praise. They advanced up the hill, in spite of 
 the fire which more than decimated them, tried to break 
 through our lines, and, falling back, afforded us the sad 
 spectacle of a plain covered with dead and wounded men 
 and horses." The American general, Sheridan, who w^as 
 with the Prussian headquarters, likewise, in referring to this 
 charge, said that he never, in his experience, had seen any 
 attack so desperate, useless, and sanguinary. The German 
 newspapers also, in writing of this business, give the French 
 cavalry praise, in the following terms: "On a sudden the 
 French cavalry appeared on the scene; it was their last 
 hope, and their atfack was intended to take the batteries 
 that were causing them such loss in flank, and also to charge 
 our infantry, who had to withstand the onslaught of cui- 
 rassiers, hussars, and chasseurs d'Afrique, the latter 
 mounted on splendid barbs. At several points they endeav- 
 ored to break our line and thu^ open a road for their in- 
 fantry, but their efforts were repulsed by a cool and well- 
 directed fire, which laid the majority low. Let us give credit 
 to our valiant adversaries, who rushed to death to save, if 
 possible, the rest of their army." Does not language like 
 
French Cavalry in 1870. 91 
 
 the above, when it is used by our enemy, confer praise of the 
 highest description upon our cavalry? After these various 
 attacks, our infantry, being no longer supported, began to 
 give way. The army of the Crown Prince, operating from 
 the west, and that of the Crown Prince of Saxony from the 
 east, now effect a junction at Illy, and from this moment the 
 battle is lost. The Prussian columns now appear on all 
 sides, and drive back our army corps, w^ho no longer offer 
 sufficient resistance to maintain their cohesion. The enemy 
 now crowned the heights, and brought 500 pieces of artillery 
 into action, which concentrated their fire on our worn-out 
 troops. 
 
 It was now about half-past three in the afternoon. Gen- 
 eral de Wimpfen, unwilling for a moment to entertain the 
 idea that the army must surrender, wished to make a last 
 effort. He knew that he had not a chance in his favor, but, 
 provided he could save his honor, this did not signify. He 
 proposed to the Emperor to place himself in the center of a 
 body of troops which still maintained their order, and with 
 them to break through the enemy. The Emperor answered 
 that he was unable to join him, and sent him a parlementaire 
 to propose an armistice. At the same time a white flag was 
 hoisted on the walls of the town. General de Wimpfen re- 
 fused to allow the parlementaire to pass, and said that he 
 intended to continue the struggle, and proposed to General 
 Lebrun to join him in an attempt to break through the Prus- 
 sians, or die sword in hand. General Lebrun answered that 
 to attempt such a thing would be madness, but that, if he 
 
92 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 was determined, he was ready to accompany him. The two 
 generals then drew their swords, and, accompanied by their 
 staff and some soldiers, made the attempt. Their valor was, 
 however, useless, and, seeing the majority of those who ac- 
 companied them struck down, they wer6 compelled to relin- 
 quish the idea and fall back. 
 
 From this moment our troops, beaten at all points, and 
 thrown in disorder by the fire, retreated in confusion. Our 
 men fired off all their remaining cartridges as they fell back, 
 but of what use were they against the concentrated fire of 
 the enemy's artillery? As they could no longer offer any 
 resistance,our troops endeavored to shelter themselves behind 
 the fortifications and in the ditches, but they could not find 
 a refuge. The shells searched out every spot, killing, wound- 
 ing, and spreading confusion everywhere. 
 
 Whilst the majority of our army was making for Sedan, 
 two squadrons of cuirassiers endeavored to force their way 
 by the Porte de Balan, but it was impossible to do so. On 
 the opposite side Bazeilles was on fire, and the suburb of 
 Balan was occupied by the Bavarians. Unwilling to surren- 
 der, the commandant, D'Alincourt, formed column of troops, 
 and, without the least hesitation, advanced at a gallop. Our 
 cuirassiers overturned everything that lay in their path; 
 though fired upon from the windows, they kept advancing 
 without losing heart. The enemy, in order to stop them, 
 had barricaded the extremities of the suburb by upsetting 
 some carts. The commandant cleared this obstacle by a 
 desperate leap, but only to fall wounded in the midst of the 
 
French Cavalry in 1870. 93 
 
 German guard. The remainder rushed up against the barri- 
 cade, and, falling one over the other, were shot on the spot; 
 three officers, a veterinary surgeon, and a commissariat 
 officer who had attached himself to them, alone escaped 
 unhurt. 
 
 This was the last attempt "made by our cavalry, and it 
 reflects credit on it. 
 
 At this time the town presented a dreadful appearance. 
 Whilst the battle had been raging outside, Sedan had been 
 overwhelmed by the fire from the artillery posted on the 
 height on the left bank of the Meuse. Knowing their range, 
 these batteries had produced a terrible effect. In one place, 
 the projectiles falling into a court-yard knocked over men 
 and horses waiting the moment to act. Further on, a shell 
 broke into a hospital, knocked to pieces a bed on which lay a 
 wounded officer, and burst in the ward. Terrified and forget- 
 ful of their agony, the inmates sought some other place of 
 refuge. In every direction the same sort of thing was going 
 on. Two generals and several of the inhabitants were killed 
 in the streets. The debris of the various regiments now 
 crowded into the town, and the problem of how to place 
 80,000 men in a space that would only contain 20,000 arose. 
 The artillery got locked together, the cavalry crowded on 
 to the pavement, and the infantry had to flatten themselves 
 up against the sides of the houses to avoid being crushed to 
 death, and in less than an hour the crowed was so great that 
 it was impossible to either advance or retreat. By seven 
 o'clock in the evening the last shots had been fired, and the 
 
94 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 drama was finished. The battle had lasted fifteen hours, 
 and our loss was 14,000 killed and wounded. 
 
 All around Sedan the villages were on fire, lighting up 
 the field of battle with a sinister glow — this field which was 
 the scene of so much valor, and which was, in spite of it, the 
 resting-place of our glory. From the surrounding heights 
 we could hear the exultant shouts of the enemy. For them 
 the whole was a wild dream of joy; for us a funeral knell. 
 How acutely one feels on occasions like this the meaning of 
 the words Honor and Fatherland, and with what joy one 
 would shed one's blood to ensure victory! But it was not to 
 be. After having bravely done its duty, the beaten army 
 found itself without the powder of continuing the struggle, 
 and that nothing was left to it but capitulation. It is im- 
 possible to mention this unhappy event, w^hich struck all 
 France with horror and astonishment, without questioning 
 the judgment of the country, which heaped curses on the 
 prisoners of Sedan, as the circumstances on which the ver- 
 dict was based are not proved. Eight regiments of cavalry 
 belonging to Marshal MacMahon's army left the field of bat- 
 tle. Their courage has been exalted to the skies, and they 
 have been proudly mentioned as having broken through, at 
 the risk of their lives, the circle of fire that surrounded us. 
 If they acted thus, in accordance with an order they received, 
 they deserve to be handsomely rewarded. However, it is 
 not our business to discuss at present this matter, the rights 
 of which demand investigation. This business should be 
 enquired into by a commission, as it is important that a ques- 
 
French Cavalry in 1870. 95 
 
 tion which is so intimatelj mixed up with military matters , 
 should be settled finally. Until the verdict is pronounced, 
 the wisest course is to maintain silence; but if, on the one 
 hand, good taste enjoins silence with respect to those who 
 went away, it also insists that it is our duty to defend those 
 who remained; for, as the former have been praised by this 
 version, the self-respect of the latter have been wounded by 
 it. The Prussian reports state most distinctly that, once 
 we were surrounded, no body of armed men broke through 
 the circle. Now at 10 a. m. this circle already existed and 
 formed an impassable barrier round the regiments who were 
 on the field of battle. At 2 p. m. a great effort was made by 
 the chasseurs d'Afrique, the hussars, the cuirassiers, and 
 the lancers. The tributes paid by the King of Prussia, Gen- 
 eral Sheridan, and the German newspapers are witnesses 
 of the brilliant courage displayed by our cavalry. In spite 
 of it, however, we failed to pass. At 3:30 p. m. a second 
 effort was made with equal bravery by Generals de Wimp- 
 fen and Lebrun, accompanied by a portion of our army. This 
 also was unsuccessful, and they were compelled to fall back, 
 leaving the ground strewn with disabled guns and the dead 
 bodies of men and* horses. Finally, somewhat later on, a 
 last effort was made by the cuirassiers. We have seen how 
 they were stopped by the barricade and killed almost to a 
 man, without being able to break through. All these at- 
 tempts were unsuccessful, it is true, but what more could 
 these brave regiments, who encountered death so fearlessly, 
 effect? 
 
96 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 Thej did not break through, certainly, but they have 
 reason to be proud of not having left the field of battle, of 
 having remained where their duty required them, obedient 
 to the orders of the commander-in-chief; charging home 
 when called upon to do so, taking part up to the last in a des- 
 perate game, and devoting themselves cheerfully without a 
 thought for the consequences. 
 
 Such was the role of the prisoners of Sedan ; their only 
 wish is to be fairly judged, for the better it is known what 
 their behavior was on this occasion, the more will their de- 
 votion to a flag so obstinately betrayed by fortune be appre- 
 ciated. We have but few words to add to complete the his- 
 tory of the cavalry on this campaign. It is with a gloomy 
 sadness that one continues this recital, for the last drops in 
 the cup are the most bitter. 
 
 The commands of our conqueror are received. All we 
 have is to be given up, and, in order not to lose any of his 
 trophies, he promises more favorable terms if they are given 
 up intact. On the receipt of this intelligence we were all 
 filled with rage, and the men were animated with the same 
 feelings. The troops refuse to give up their arms, and, de- 
 spising reprisals, they set to work to break up everything. 
 
 Pistols, swords, cuirasses, lances, are all dashed to 
 pieces; the saddles are destroyed, and the fragments thrown 
 about; the guidons are burnt. Soon the streets were filled 
 with the debris, and the town resembled a sea-shore where 
 there had been a shipwreck. We were given, as a rendez- 
 vous, the village of Iges, which lies at the extremity of the 
 
French Cavalry in 1870. 97 
 
 angle formed by the Meuse. Sadly and silently the regi- 
 ments wend their way to this strip of cursed land. Try to 
 imagine all that there is most repugnant in misery, every- 
 thing that is pestilent and wretched, and you will form but 
 a faint conception of the privations we had to endure. Night 
 came on. we march on our why without knowing where to 
 halt, and keep swaying backwards and forwards; our un- 
 happy soldiers are without either food, shelter, or clothing. 
 We were obliged to remain in the open, and the rain fell in 
 torrents. Deep in mud, without cloaks and with our clothes 
 worn out, we crowd together for warmth. Hunger now as- 
 sailed us with its pangs. We likewise began to suffer from 
 thirst, for, though the Meuse was at hand, its waters were 
 corrupted by the numberless corpses that floated in it. 
 
 The horses had to undergo the same sort of sufferings, 
 and, in consequence, the disorder was dreadful. One has 
 often heard. of the immense herds of wild horses that gallop 
 about the plains of America. For miles they say the earth 
 trembles with the tread of their hoofs, and these wild bands, 
 like a hurricane that has broken loose, overthrow all in their 
 path. At Iges the same sort of thing occurred. There were 
 still 10,000 horses belonging to the cavalry. In order to 
 avoid giving them up to the enemy, their picketing-ropes had 
 beeh cut, and the horses, galloping in every direction, soon 
 left no place where one was out of their reach ; deprived of 
 their usual food, they commenced to fight, and tore each 
 other to pieces, and then for a change rushed down to the 
 river at such a pace that the foremost were driven into the 
 water and drowned, and the river encumbered with their 
 
98 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 bodies. For four days we did not die outright of hunger, 
 but merely existed in this hideous swamp, into which we had 
 been cast, and which more nearly resembled Dante's Inferno 
 than any other spot. 
 
 How can we ever forget these scenes? Our cavalry, 
 which scarcely a month ago was so brilliant, so confident in 
 itself and careless of danger, so devoted when called upon 
 to sacrifice itself, was now completely broken down. We 
 have already related how the cavalry of the Metz army 
 melted away by degrees, until at the end of October it dis- 
 appeared altogether; defeat did not spare them any more 
 than ourselves, and their last state was as pitiable as our 
 own. But the remembrance of their valor will live forever, 
 for their deeds are inscribed in the blood they everywhere 
 poured out so freely. . 
 
 Such was the part taken by the French cavalry of the 
 Army of the Rhine. The lesson we have received is a bitter 
 one; tte more reason is there, therefore, that we should 
 profit by it, and, with this object in view, we propose to de- 
 duct, in the following pages, from past events, what should 
 be the drill and instruction our cavalry should receive. 
 
French Cavalry in 1870. 99 
 
 PART IV. 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 T/ie Role of the Cavalry Before an Action. 
 
 The German authorities on this subject assert that the 
 part taken by the cavalry on the day of battle is not their 
 most important function. Often, indeed, it is but a subordi- 
 nate one. If the opportunity of charging occurs, naturally, 
 it must not be neglected; but its delicate and indispensable 
 role is on the eve of battle, when it must reconnoiter, estab- 
 lish contact with the enemy, keep up communications be- 
 tween the various army corps, and spread itself like a cur- 
 tain, behind which the commander-in-chief maneuvers his 
 troops and makes the necessary disposition for a general 
 action. 
 
 With such tactics, intelligently put in practice, Ger- 
 many commenced hostilities. Her scouts, far in advance, 
 pushed on until they came in contact with the enemy. As 
 soon as this contact (Ftihling) was once established, it was 
 never lost. Thus the enemy could not make the slightest 
 movement without the cognizance of the commander-in-chief. 
 To properly carry out such a system as the above, one must 
 have intelligent troops, and it is only fair to state that the 
 instruction imparted by Prussia to her cavalry in peace-time 
 had prepared them in the best possible manner for the ser- 
 vice she demanded of them in war. We shall find proofs of 
 this assertion at every period of the campaign. From the 
 
100 Cavalry Studies, 
 
 very first, the Prussian cavalry advanced onto our territory 
 in small bodies, to study our positions. Better acquainted 
 with the country than we were, they were enabled to advance 
 without hesitation. 
 
 Both at Wissembourg and Woerth the enemy's scouts 
 discovered and reported that our numbers were small, and 
 that we should be annihilated by being outnumbered. 
 Throughout our retreat thpy followed us step by step, watch- 
 ing us ceaselessly, giving an exact detail of our halts, times 
 of departure, marches, obliging us by the daring way in 
 which they pushed ahead to alter our route, appearing only 
 to disappear, and remaining the whole time perfectly unas- 
 sailable. For a very short time, certainly, in the plains of 
 Champagne, the Prussian staff missed us, because we sud- 
 denly changed our plans; but by means of their cavalry, 
 who never again lost the contact, and who marched on our 
 flank, deployed like a curtain behind which their army could 
 work, they soon recovered the lost thread. 
 
 When we were at Ch^ne Populeux, the enemy was cov- 
 ered for ten leagues in advance by his cavalry. As we ad- 
 vanced we kept meeting little groups of five or six men 
 together, who retired slowly and only after ascertaining our 
 movements, etc., which information they immediately com- 
 municated to those in rear. If we had followed them up, 
 each group would have fallen back until they reached a 
 support strong enough to resist, and then opposed us, in 
 order to prevent our breaking through the curtain and 
 getting at their main body. This service was so intelligently 
 
French Cavalry in 1870. 101 
 
 performed by the Prussian cavalry that we marched as it 
 were in a net, in the meshes of which we were eventually 
 entangled. 
 
 There is a striking difference between the above and our 
 way of acting. With the Metz army, just as much as with 
 the Strasbourg army, we shall see the same distinctive feat- 
 ure — heroic valor, but, in that lay the whole of our science. 
 The outposts were so badly posted that the cavalry were 
 placed behind the infantry; and this was our best means of 
 keeping guard. In place of keeping up a perpetual contact 
 by means of one or two men or by small detachments ad- 
 vancing continuously and keeping as much under cover as 
 possible, we carried out our reconnaissances with one or two 
 squadrons, or even with a regiment that proceeded in such a 
 way that all could see what was going on. These reconnais- 
 sances, no doubt, were ordered to proceed to long distances, 
 but often they returned and reported that they could see 
 nothing of the enemy. 
 
 What then happened? Why, that our enemy was fol- 
 lowing us only a mile or two off, and as soon as we were 
 asleep, or not on the lookout, overwhelmed us with shot 
 and shell in our bivouacs. 
 
 In this manner we were surprised, both at Wissembourg 
 and Beaumont. 
 
 At Yionville the horses w^ere being watered when the 
 enemy's artillery opened fire. At Woerth our commander- 
 in-chief had such bad information that he imagined he was 
 opposed to 40,000, in place of which he had to contend against 
 
102 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 140,000. The same thing occurred at Sedan. During the night 
 the enemy's forces were trebled, and we were surrounded by 
 240,000 men, without anybody having the least notion of 
 what was going on. These examples are sufficient to dem- 
 onstrate that we have much to learn in the art of reconnoi- 
 tering. We have been repeatedly told that the regulations 
 for outpost duty contain all the necessary rules for service, 
 but that we have not studied them sufficiently. According 
 to us, this is not quite correct; our regulations on outposts 
 are very far from laying down what is the best method to 
 obtain useful information regarding an enemy. The regula- 
 tions lay down a line of vedettes, outlying and inlying pick- 
 ets, reconnoiterers, and patrols, who keep going out and ve- 
 turning from time to time; all this is very well for an army 
 that is simply on the defensive. But this system is alto- 
 gether insufficient for an army with an offensive r^le, for if 
 you are satisfied to obtain information regarding an enemy 
 by pushing forward reconnaissances, to any distance you 
 like, but which merely come back and report what they have 
 seen, the situation may change during every second they are 
 occupied in returning, and the reports, perfectly exact at the 
 time they were made, will often be nothing when received 
 but a mass of fatal errors. In order to avoid reporting 
 what is not the case, it is absolutely indispensable to estab- 
 lish a contact, and we will now ehdeavor to lay down how 
 this should be done. 
 
 In what part of our regulations can you find it laid down 
 how to form an impenetrable curtain behind which the army 
 may maneuver quietly and unseen? Nevertheless, this is 
 
French Cavalry in 1870. 103 
 
 one of our most important duties. In proof of this, the fol- 
 lowing instance, selected from the Prussian reports, will 
 suffice: "On the Loire, Prince Frederick Charles, finding 
 his troops done up, deployed his cavalry, and, concealed be- 
 hind this curtain, and by making feints at Bourbaki and 
 Chanzy, he was enabled to give his army eight days' rest, 
 during which they were served out with uniforms, boots, 
 and provisions; and as soon as they had been completely 
 rested and reinforced, he withdrew his cavalry, placed it on 
 the flanks, and confided to his artillery the duty of annihi- 
 lating us." 
 
 A similar example is furnished by the Metz army. 
 After the battle of Rezonville, whilst the French army was 
 still in the neighborhood of the battle-field, the enemy's cav- 
 alry maintained their contact continuously, covering with 
 troops the ground that was to be the scene of action on the fol- 
 lowing day, and forming themselves into an impenetrable 
 curtain, masking the movements of both the German armies, 
 and thus permitting them to unite without he fear of being 
 disturbed, and allowing them to execute, on the morning of 
 the 17th, a change of front to the right, with Gravelotte for 
 a pivot. 
 
 The same sort of tactics were pursued throughout the 
 march of the Crown Prince and the Crown Prince of Sax- 
 ony to Sedan. In every direction we had bad information 
 concerning the enemy's movements, bec£tuse he carefully 
 concealed himself behind the curtain formed by his cavalry. 
 These novel ideas had brought into practice, in the Prussian 
 
104 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 Army, a system of tactics which was entirely unknown in 
 our regulations. As, besides all this, the enem;ji possessed 
 a most perfect knowledge of the country, our cavalry found 
 itself in a position so much inferior that no valor, however 
 brilliant, was sufficient to counterbalance its deficiencies in 
 these important particulars. It is not a difficult matter to 
 malie ourselves as good as the enemy, but to do so, it must 
 be allowed we have much to learn. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Hole During the Action. 
 
 It is generally admitted that the employment of cavalry 
 against unbroken infantry or artillery in position, owing to 
 the increased range of fire-arms, is impossible. The study 
 of this war, however, furnishes us with numerous examples 
 of engagements undertaken under such conditions. It is, 
 however, sufficient to examine these cases to prove to one- 
 self that the annihilation of troops engaged in such an enter- 
 prise is almost certain, and that without producing any 
 
 result. 
 
 » 
 At Froeschwiller cavalry were sent, at different stages 
 
 of the battle, against victorious infantry and artillery. On 
 
 this occasion the various regiments advanced in succession, 
 
 charged over unoccupied ground, and retired after suffering 
 
 fabulous losses, without ever using their sabers and without 
 
 ever getting at the enemy. The natural result was a re 
 
 pulse, without even a chance of success. 
 
French Cavalry in 1870. 105 
 
 At Beaumont, the same conditions and the same result. 
 At Sedan the cavalry charged with the courage of despair, 
 against infantry and artillery. The enemy waited for them 
 without moving, and annihilated our regiments, who retired 
 after losing half their numbers and without having suc- 
 ceeded in checking their fire. At Rezonville the cuirassiers 
 of the Guard charged Prussian squares. They were broken 
 to pieces against the squares, left the greater part of their 
 number on the ground, and failed to break the enemy. 
 Thus, in every instance, undeniable valor, accompanied by 
 enormous losses and want of appreciable result. 
 
 Now, for the other side of the argument ; we have often 
 heard quoted the charge made by von Bredow's brigade of 
 the Duke William of Mecklenburg's division.* If you refer 
 to the details of this charge, such as we have given them, 
 you will see that the conclusion is similar. This charge 
 against our infantry and artillery was made by two lines of 
 cuirassiers and lancers in Echelon. Before the advance, 
 the enemy took the indispensable precaution, that we invari- 
 ably neglected, of silencing our artillery with his. Never- 
 theless, if we examine the results obtained, we shall see 
 that, though their squadrons undoubtedly broke through 
 our lines, sabering all in their path, on their falling back, 
 they were literally cut to pieces by our dragoons and cuirras- 
 siers; and, setting aside the glory of the charge, the success 
 was more imaginarythan real, since our infantry was not 
 routed and our artillery did not lose a single gun. 
 
 *Evidently an error. Von Bredow's brigade belonged to von 
 Rheinbaben's division.— A. L. W.. 
 -8 
 
106 » Cavalry Studies. 
 
 From the examples that have been quoted it would seem 
 natural to conclude that the role of the cavalry on a battle- 
 field has been diminished; but this is far from being the 
 case, and it will be shown that its part, more intimately con- 
 nected with artillery, owing to the increased range of that 
 arm, is, although different, more important than ever. We 
 have seen it fail, notwithstanding the most brilliant valor, 
 because it was only employed against the front and after all 
 else had failed. Would the result have been the same had it 
 been employed in extending a position, in flanking movements 
 on a grand scale, and in advancing far to the front, combined 
 with artillery, of which arm it would have been the only pos- 
 sible support? This question it is proposed to answer by 
 an examination of our various engagements. 
 
 At Froeschwiller the battle at 2 p.m. was still undecided, 
 and this was the moment at which the enemy tried to out 
 flank us; 35,000 men were about to try conclusions with 
 140,000, and our right wing was our weak point. We might 
 have remedied this and made up for our numerical inferior- 
 ity by extending a long line of cavalry. There were ten 
 regiments of cavalry belonging to the 1st corps; two only 
 were on the left wing, and the remainder were aimlessly dis- 
 tributed about the center and amongst the infantry divis- 
 ions. They charged positions in front and were unsuccess- 
 ful. It is permissible to suppose that the result might have 
 been different had we responded to the enemy's flanking 
 movement by a similar one. At the time when their col- 
 umns advanced, winding along the hills, in order to outflank 
 us, if we had sent out artillery, supported by the whole of 
 
French Cavalry in 1870. 107 
 
 I 
 
 our cavalry, on to their flank, we might have checked their 
 advance and secured to our army time to fall back. The 
 officer commanding: the 4th division entertained this idea, 
 for he issued orders to that effect, but he wanted sufficient 
 materials, and he was obliged^to content himself with disput- 
 ing foot by foot the ground he occupied. It was impossible 
 on this occasion to anticipate success, but still our army 
 would have been able to beat an orderly retreat, whilst as 
 it was it was routed. 
 
 At Beaumont, likewise, our cavalry was thrown away, 
 because it was obliged to attack straight to its front, and 
 came across bad ground, whilst, if it had been allowed to 
 turn the hill, it would have acted on an easier piece of 
 ground. Circumstances at Sedan were quite exceptional. 
 It was impossible to deploy and extend the flanks, because 
 we had to fight on a circle, the two ends of wjiich rested on 
 a river. For this reason the regiments kept constantly on 
 the move, like the needle of a compass, turning in every 
 direction, and never still. In stud} ing the ev^ts of this day, 
 so fatal to the French arms, we shall discover an incident 
 which will prove better than all commentary the immense 
 benefit to be derived from a combination of cavalry and 
 artillery. 
 
 The colonel of Prussian hussars who came to take over 
 Sedan stated that for several hours the 200 guns which 
 caused us such damage were supported by his regiment 
 alone. His anxiety for a long time was intense, as, had any 
 thing happened, he could have afforded but little help. Ac- 
 cordingly, in order to convey the impression that he had a 
 
108 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 large body of troops at his disposal, he showed himself along 
 the crests of the various heights, and thus displayed a con- 
 tinuous line, which seemed to extend for some distance. 
 What a splendid success might have been achieved had our 
 cavalry been launched against the regiment that supported 
 those guns! 
 
 The battle of Rezonville demonstrates the utility of cav- 
 alry when it is employed on the flank. Threatened by a 
 grand flank attack on the part of the enemy. General de 
 Ladmirault hastily assembled the cavalry that was near, 
 and, thrusting it boldly forward, succeeded in extricating 
 the right of the) army, and remained master of the field. 
 This was, on the whole, successful ; but the general has often 
 stated that this indecisive success might have been changed 
 into a complete victory had he had a large cavalry force, 
 fresh and ready, formed up to be employed at the right 
 moment. In place of this, the cavalry was divided into four 
 distinct divisions, each under a separate officer. 
 
 In one place. Generals du Barail and Legrand; further 
 off. General de France, with the lancers and dragoons of the 
 Guard, who were merely there by accident, as they were 
 returning from escorting the Emperor, as hard as they could 
 go; lastly, close to Bruville, was General de Cl^rembault. 
 As this large body of cavalry was not launched in the de- 
 sired direction with a common object, as each commanding 
 officer was his own master, and as each had his ow^n individ- 
 ual ideas, naturally the orders issued by the commandant of 
 the 4th corps lost in power and rapidity of execution. 
 
 Indeed, it was necessary to explain to each officer sepa- 
 
French Cavalry in 1870. 109 
 
 rately the wishes of General de Ladmirault ; then the charges 
 were executed one after another, owing to the want of a di- 
 recting hand, and when the recall was sounded for the guards, 
 it was mistaken by the other regiments for a general recall, 
 and they also accordingly fell back. 
 
 As for de 016rembault,who was near Bruville, not having 
 been informed of what was about to occur, he only guessed 
 at the great action that was taking place from seeing the 
 heavy clouds of dust raised by the combatants. He imme- 
 diately advanced, but only came up at the end of the fight- 
 ing. His division consisted of five regiments; such a force 
 charging at the proper moment would certainly have altered 
 the result. 
 
 General de Ladmirault has, therefore, a perfect right to 
 assert that he would have obtained a complete victory in 
 place of a partial success had he had from the commence- 
 ment of the action this large body of cavalry at his disposal, 
 drawn up in the rear of the right wing, and ready to charge 
 at the right moment under the immediate orders of a single 
 general who completely understood the object to be attained. 
 
 From the battle of Rezonville we learn the importance 
 of turning movements, and the power of cavalry acting on 
 the flanks. We shall find further confirmation of this in the 
 following actions. 
 
 The part talven by our cavalry in this battle (Gravelotte) 
 was unimportant, because the various divisions (viz.. Guards, 
 de Forton's, de Valabr^gue's — in other words, the majority 
 of our cavalry) were massed in the grounds of Lessy,* Chatel 
 
 *East of Gravelotte. 
 
110 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 St. Germain, and Moulin Longeau, where they were under fire 
 without having the power to act. We will therefore en- 
 quire whether or no they might have been usefully employed 
 on our extreme right on the open ground in front of St. Pri- 
 vat and Roneourt. The ground on the right of our position 
 was the only portion of the battle-field where cavalry could 
 act. At this point then, naturally, our cavalry should have 
 been concentrated the previous evening, on the banks of the 
 river Orne, in the villages of St. Marie-aux-Chenes, St. Ail, 
 Batilh^, and Habonville. They would have had excellent 
 accommodation, a large open plain, and ground firm enough 
 to work over in every direction. 
 
 Placed in this position, the cavalry would have been 
 able to give information regarding the great turning move- 
 ment carried out by the enemy on the 18th, with the assist- 
 ance of his cavalry. Let us now turn to what the enemy's 
 cavalry did. It did not execute a number of charges against 
 our postion, but, accompanied by artillery, it preceded the 
 movement of their left wing in its great march, the object of 
 which was a change of front to the right. It thus covered 
 the deployment of the columns of infantry, in the grounds 
 of Batilly and St. Ail, before their attack on St. Privat. If 
 our cavalry, together with the horse artillery, had acted in a 
 similar manner, they would have been able to delay the march 
 of the enemy sufiiciently to prevent their attaining their ob- 
 ject before the end of the battle, and would have succeeded 
 in engaging the enemy's cavalry, who, as it was, were able 
 to do what they liked. If the divisions of Desvaux, de For- 
 ton, and de Valabr^gue, useless in the positions which they 
 
French Cavalry in 1810. Ill 
 
 occupiedj had been employed in the manner already indi- 
 cated (viz., in front of our right wing), they would have 
 enabled us to take the offensive with this wing, and this 
 movement would have been supported by the two divisions 
 of cavalry posted in rear of the 3d and 4th corps, and who 
 had no opportunity of actmg, as we remained on the 
 defensive. 
 
 On the 31st August and 1st September our cavalry was 
 not employed, but it might have rendered assistance to our 
 right wing had it been employed on the Sarrelouis and St. 
 Avoid roads. Preceded by the artillery, of which it would 
 have been the support, it might have accompanied the ad- 
 vance of Bastoul's division of the 2d corps, and been sup- 
 ported on their right by Castagny's division of the 3d corps. 
 In this case, as at Rezonville and Gravelotte, it was an offens- 
 ive and flanking movement of our right wing that would 
 have ensured success; to this place, therefore, we should 
 have taken our cavalry, more especially as the ground was 
 favorable. 
 
 From the preceding examples it is natural to conclude 
 that the importance of cavalry is not diminished, but only 
 that it is not expedient to employ this arm in the manner we 
 did during this campaign. 
 
 We must look for the best results to movements in ex- 
 tension of the line and to flank movements. 
 
 In all these battles it was on the flanks that our cavalry 
 might have taken a brilliant and decisive share had it been 
 concentrated, in place of being split up into useless 
 fractions. 
 
112 Cavalry Studies, 
 
 As regards charges, with the exception of those under- 
 taken against cavalry, experience shows that regiments that 
 attack sti;*aight to the front almost invariably suffer enor- 
 mously, without gaining any reasonable success. Let us 
 avoid, therefore, wasting our courage in this useless manner. 
 
 This leads us to consider a matter of some importance. 
 
 When a cavalry division is called upon to charge, the 
 regulations lay it down as a rule that the general in com- 
 mand should place himself in front to lead. What is the re- 
 sult of such a rule? Why, that whilst the general is engaged 
 in the mel^e there is nobody to follow the varying chances 
 of the engagement, and sound the recall if we are getting 
 the worst of it, or, on the other hand, organize a pursuit. In 
 proof of this you may cite the general charge at Rezonville. 
 
 General Legrand brarvely led his division into action; 
 wounded in several places, he fell to rise no more. His 
 division continued its course, joined in the melde, and there 
 was no one to either direct the fight or order a recall. 
 
 The consequence was, a mistake occurred — a recall was 
 sounded for a portion of the combatants, and was under- 
 stood to be for the whole. 
 
 Then there is the reserve that every body of cavalry 
 should have. Who is to lead it? Who is to judge of the 
 proper moment for charging, and in what direction it should 
 advance? Nevertheless, it is the reserve that ensures success. 
 
 The charge at Rezonville is a proof of this also. Our 
 regiments were giving way when the colonel of the 4th Dra- 
 goons came up just at the end of the engagement, attacked 
 
French Cavalry m 1810. 1 1 S 
 
 the enemy with a single squadron, and forced the latter first 
 to fall back to the heights, and finally to retreat altogether. 
 
 Therefore, according to us, the place of an officer who 
 commands a body of cavalry sufficiently strong to have a 
 reserve is not at the head of that body in the charge. He 
 ought to hand over his duty t© the second in command. A» 
 for himself, his business is to watch the battle, ready to em- 
 ploy his reserve either in support of the weak point, to en- 
 sure victory, or cover a retreat. 
 
 It will be difficult to break through this old custom, as. 
 it has a chivalrous side which corresponds with the national 
 character. But if the position is less brilliant in appearance^ 
 it has the advantage of being more practical, and should 
 therefore be adopted. 
 
 CHAPTER in. 
 
 Mole After a Battle. 
 
 If an army is victorious, the employment of cavalry does 
 not require discussion, as its part evidently is to pursue vig- 
 orously and harass the enemy in every possible way; but if 
 an army is retreating, the place of cavalry can no longer be 
 in the rear as formerly. Cavalry, being unable to contend 
 alone against long-range artillery, would soon find itself 
 crushed and dispersed if it was taken in rear or on the flank 
 by a numerous artillery, and this might produce irremediable 
 confusion amongst the troops in front. 
 
 The Metz army affords us a conclusive argument in favor 
 of what we advance. 
 
114 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 On the 7th the whole of the cavalry division of General 
 de Cl^rembault was ordered to cover the retreat of the 3d 
 corps, which was to leave St. Avoid for Metz on the 8th. 
 From St. Avoid to Longeville, a distance of some three miles, 
 the road passes between woods, which in some places almost 
 touch the road, and in others leave open ground sufficient to 
 deploy a small body of troops. At Longeville the road sepa- 
 rates, and to the left passes over a moderately broad plateau. 
 
 The division was composed of four regiments of dra- 
 goons (2d, 4th, 5th, and 8th). The two regiments belonging 
 to Juniac's brigade were sent to Forbach, and returned on 
 the morning of the 8th ; in addition to these regiments, there 
 were three regiments of chasseurs (2d, 3d, and 10th). The 3d 
 were detached with the 1st infantry division of the 3d corps. 
 General de Cl^rembault had therefore six regiments. The 
 general perceived that the least mishap to a rear guard thus 
 constituted might lead to the most fatal result, as he was un- 
 able to act on the sides of the road ; he therefore informed 
 Marshal Bazaine several times of this fact; viz.: that such 
 a large body of cavalry, under the circumstances, was more 
 harm than good. The Marshal did not consider it necessary 
 to attend to these observations, and, according to the orig- 
 inal arrangement, the retreat commenced at 3:30 a. m., on 
 the 8th. Three divisions of infantry (Grenier's of 4th corps, 
 Castagny's and Decaen's of the 3d) were in close column on 
 the road. In rear of these was a long train of hired trans- 
 ports, which stretched to an interminable extent, owing to its 
 slow and irregular march. 
 
O*' itt** 
 
 French Cavalry in 1870. 115 
 
 During the whole time this column was filing by, the 
 cavalry, to the great fatigue of both men and horses, had to 
 remain in the low ground about St. Avoid, and this without 
 being of the slightest use, as it was impossible for them to 
 prevent a flank attack. 
 
 It was 1 p. m. before the"" cavalry was able to move off. 
 They were now disposed in echelon, on both sides of the 
 road. Looking towards the frontier, there was only space 
 sufficient to deploy a single squadron. A battery of horse 
 artillery, placed under the orders of the general, was in posi- 
 tion at a point commanding the Valley of St. Avoid. By 2 
 p. m. Decaen's division had completely evacuated its posi- 
 tion. From this moment the cavalry was alone in rear to 
 protect the retreat, and, owing to the ground, it was soon 
 obliged to take to the road, and, quitting its offensive forma- 
 tion, break into a-column of route which stretched its length 
 through twenty-four squadrons. In front the infantry and 
 baggage train proceeded slowly and with a certain amount 
 of disorder. 
 
 It is easy to imagine what would have been the result of 
 all this had a single Prussian battery of artillery taken up a 
 position on the heights that command St. Avoid, and had 
 opened fire on this long line of cavalry, which liad no means 
 of defending itself, and which would have been deprived of 
 the support of even its own battery of artillery, as the posi- 
 tion occupied by the battery would have been commanded 
 by the enemy's guns, iii spite of all the courage and pres- 
 ence of mind that it is possible to imagine, by reason of being 
 
116 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 attacked without the possibility of retaliation, confusion 
 would have ensued, the march would have insensibly aug- 
 mented from the rear of the column to the front, and once 
 disorder in the ranks had occurred, the drivers of the wagons 
 would have taken fright, and would have brought about a 
 regular panic. 
 
 This danger was not realized, as the Prussians did not 
 make their appearance until we reached the plateau of 
 Longeville; but we may gather from this a lesson, and con- 
 clude that that ground is exceptional which permits cavalry 
 to cover a retreat. The duty of covering a retreat belongs 
 rather to the infantry, covered by skirmishers, who will re- 
 tire slowly, taking advantage of the ground, and be sup- 
 ported by artillery in commanding positions. All through 
 the campaign we find cases to support this theory. When- 
 ever cavalry charged, the enemy's infantry hardly ever took 
 the trouble to form square. A deployed formation was 
 sufficient to repel an attack, which formation was then sup- 
 ported by the skirmishers on the flanks, who advanced to 
 take the cavalry in rear and on the flank. 
 
 Under these circumstances the r61e of the cavalry in a 
 retreat is nil, and it is preferable to employ it on the flanks 
 to oppose that of the enemy and prevent them seizing con- 
 voys and cutting in between the columns. 
 
French Cavalry in 1870. 117 
 
 PART V. 
 
 Future Employment of Cavalry. 
 
 After the incidents we have narrated, it is easy to indi- 
 •cate the future use of cavalry, and the instruction it should 
 receive. The basis of instruction is as before, but the man- 
 ner of application is different. 
 
 If it is necessary to give intelligence, it is indispensable 
 to establish a contact and be acquainted with the least of 
 the enemy's movements, and, as we have already shown, to 
 attain this, our passive system of outposts is not sufficient; 
 a more active and intelligent system is indispensable to 
 meet this necessity. The needful system is to get into con- 
 tact, far in advance of the army one covers, and, according to 
 the German notions, the following is the way to do so: 
 
 A few men, at long distances from each other, advance 
 until they meet the enemy. As soon as the contact is estab- 
 lished, it must be maintained until a general engagement is 
 brought on. At about a mile and a half from these small 
 parties, small pickets are disposed in support of them. 
 These are detached from one or two squadrons, who are still 
 further in rear, say at a distance of one or one and a half 
 miles. And lastly, the regiments to which thes^ detach- 
 ments belong come some distance in rear. 
 
 This is the general outline of the system. As for its 
 working, it is necessary to trust to those in front. 
 
 It is not only necessary to guard against surprise, but 
 
118 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 also to fathom the enemy's intentions, to understand his dis- 
 positions, numbers, and future plans. The fate; of great 
 operations depends on the accuracy of these reports, and the 
 important duty of furnishing them should not be entrusted 
 to privates. A staff officer, whose special duty should be to 
 reconnoiter the enemy, accompanied by some officers and 
 men chosen from the cavalry, the whole mounted on good 
 horses, in order that they may pass rapidly along the line 
 and collect reports and information, should, after verifying 
 the reports, forward them to the officer commanding. 
 
 Protected in this manner, all surprise will be impossible; 
 every movement of the enemy will be immediately known, 
 and the work of the commander-in-chief simplified, as he 
 will be able to form his plans, modify them, and dispose his 
 troops in perfect security, and in taking as much time as he 
 needs. 
 
 For troops who are stationary and on the lookout it is 
 indispensable that a regular system of patrols, who should 
 proceed beyond the extreme advanced points, should be 
 organized in such a manner as to keep up a continual move- 
 ment of parties coming in and going out, so that no change 
 may take place in the extreme front without the body from 
 which these parties are sent out being immediately informed 
 of it. 
 
 To carry out this duty efficiently you must employ at 
 least a third of your party. It is also necessary to lay down 
 an exact detail of duties, as on this condition only will your 
 horses obtain the rest necessary to enable them to under- 
 take long marches. 
 
French Cavalry in 1810. H^ 
 
 It is not necessary for us to enter into these details, 
 as they would only make one lose sight of the general idea 
 that it is desired to sketch. The same observation applies 
 to the method of disposing the cavalry as a screen, as ^ell 
 as to the proper manner of occupying, with parties contin- 
 ually increasing in strength; villages, open towns, branch 
 lines of railway, etc. 
 
 If we now turn to the employment of cavalry during an 
 action, the incidents of this war will prove that charges to 
 the front* produce but small results, and that whilst wait- 
 ing for an opportunity to charge, which may perhaps never 
 occur, it is unwise to place your cavalry in such a position 
 that they cannot be of the slightest use. From this it also 
 seems necessary to conclude that the small bodies of cavalry 
 who are attached to army corps should only be attached 
 with the understanding that they may be withdrawn should 
 the ground prove unfavorable to their action, as, indeed, was 
 done on the 31st and 1st. 
 
 Judging from all these examples, it seems incontestable 
 that during a battle the real place of cavalry is the flanks, 
 and Woerth, Rezonville, and Gravelotte prove this. 
 
 A large field for the employment of cavalry is also 
 opened up by the introduction of rifled artillery. A splen- 
 did part may be played by the artillery undertaking flank 
 movements on a large scale, out of si^ht, and appearing sud- 
 denly in the rear or flanks of an enemy, and thus throw them 
 
 *It is important to remember tliat in all MacMahon's battles the 
 German cavab'y never attempted such charges, but were invariably 
 kept out of range. 
 
120 Cavalry Studies, 
 
 into confusion. But in marches such as these artillery is 
 neither able to reconnoiter nor to defend itself, unless, in- 
 deed, they leave their guns to themselves. It is therefore 
 indispensable that they should have a support against a sur- 
 prise or attack on the part of the enemy. This support must 
 be furnished by the cavalry exclusively, on account of its 
 mobility. 
 
 Whilst the guns are in action the cavalry should keep 
 as much as possible out of the line of fire, at the same time 
 being near enough to defend the artillery in case of neces- 
 sity. But from the distances from which artillery now 
 comes into action the enemy's cavalry can alone pretend to 
 attack it. Under these circumstances the two bodies of 
 <2avalry will meet in the charge, and one will often see, not- 
 withstanding all that history says on this subject, that 
 neither will avoid the shock, but act as they did at Rezon- 
 ville. In a case of this description it must be borne in mind 
 that, supposing the chances on both sides are equal, the 
 heavy cavalry will get the best of it. 
 
 We must therefore conclude that the more important 
 artillery becomes, the greater will the part of the cavalry be 
 also, as these two arms are necessary to each other, and from 
 a combination of them will arise a number of movements 
 which will enable one to undertake the most daring 
 enterprises. 
 
 What can afford a more striking instance of this than 
 the case of 200 guns, supported only by one regiment of hus- 
 sars, that played upon us with such terrible effect at Sedan? 
 Our fortunate enemy has demonstrated to us all the ad- 
 
French Cavalry in 1810. 121 
 
 vantage to be obtained from cavalry properly commanded. 
 Let us imitate his example. Before the war, much was 
 written and said in France in support of the theory that the 
 importance of cavalry had diminished, and that this arm 
 ought to be reduced. 
 
 Better informed and moi^e clear-sighted Prussia allowed 
 us to theorize, silently prepared her own cavalry, increased 
 its numbers and its relative proportion to the other arms, 
 and appeared on the field of battle with new tactics, and 
 thus reaped the reward it deserved. Listen to what the Ger- 
 man papers say with respect to this arm: 
 
 ''Have not they who asserted that a return of the glori- 
 ous days of Ziethen and* Seidlitz was impossible fallen into 
 a terrible mistake? And what gratitude we owe to our 
 royal general, who, unmoved by any opposition fearful of 
 expense, foresaw that, in spite of mitrailleuse and rifled fire- 
 arms, it was necessary to increase the cavalry. Thus he col- 
 lected such a force of this arm that the world has never 
 seen its equal. Everybody now understands that without 
 our scouts the bold and rapid advance of the Crown Prince 
 would have been impossible. What person in Prussia could 
 now be found to deny the importance of cavalry? Who, in 
 face of the results obtained, could be found to oppose with 
 idiotic stupidity our army budget, drawn up by competent 
 military men? Let him cast an eye on Alsace and Lorraine 
 and the work there performed by the cavalry." 
 
 At the same time that the Prussian press wrote with 
 
 such conviction — a conviction brought about by actual 
 
 events, a French pamphlet demanded the reduction of the 
 -9 
 
122 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 cavalry by half. There you have the whole lesson that we 
 have learnt from this war. Nevertheless, the lesson was 
 sufficiently bitter to prevent one's desiring a repetition of it. 
 
 The indisputable fact — and it is a fact that cannot be too 
 much impressed upon our cavalry — is that they have much 
 to learn and many reforms to undergo. The regulations of 
 1829 still held good under the Empire. Perfect at the 
 time they were originally drawn up, they no longer meet 
 modern requirements. Let us ask, is it possible, is it proba- 
 ble, that whilst infantry, and artillery, and every branch of 
 the service, in short, ha«, during these forty yeai's, un- 
 dergone various complete transformations, the cavalry 
 alone should have remained, like the heavenl}" bodies, per- 
 fect and incapable of improvement? Thus, from the com- 
 mencement of hostilities, the weakness of every part of our 
 organization became only too apparent. Owing to our sys- 
 tem of remounts, we were obliged, for want of reserves, to 
 march with a strength that w^a^ barely sufficient for a peace 
 establishment; and, once on the road, our squadrons of 80 
 horses remained at that strength without ever being com- 
 pleted up to their proper total. Therefore, we must reor- 
 ganize and perfect this branch of our system. An improved 
 system should supply an inexhaustible supply of j^emounts 
 told off to regiments beforehand, and which should be nu- 
 merous enough to fill up all vacancies. The same thing ap- 
 plies to the teaching of both man and horse. 
 
 If you turn to the way the soldier has been taught, you 
 see that from the first our army learns from its reverses that 
 
French Cavalry in 1870. 12S 
 
 it has had bad information, and that no contact has been 
 established with the enemy. Continually drilled in masses, 
 we are incapable of acting in an isolated fashion. But the 
 principal things which showed our deficient instruction were 
 our ignorance of the country, inability to read a map rap- 
 idly, and to find the most direct roads and choose the short- 
 est bridle-paths. In former days it was supposed that 
 physical force was more necessary to a cavalry soldier than 
 intelligence. This is no longer the case. This} campaign 
 has proved that courage is not everything — that an intelli- 
 gent system of instruction in reading maps, etc., is abso- 
 lutely indispensable; in addition to this, rapidity, dash, and 
 ruse in discovering an enemy; watch him ceaselessly, dis- 
 cover his plans, and defeat his projects by one's own com- 
 binations. Let us therefore combine together to under- 
 take for the future the part that it is necessary we should 
 take. We shall attain this result by ceasing to make num- 
 berless and intricate movements the groundwork of our 
 drill. From the month of February up to the annual inspec- 
 tion — that is to say, during the most seasonable months — 
 we spend our whole time in drilling in masses; everything 
 else is merely accessory. Without doubt it is of the utmost 
 importance that a regiment should be able to maneuver 
 rapidly, and maintain order whilst doing so; but one-third 
 of the movements prescribed in our cavalry regulations are 
 ample to attain this end. This abuse of the drill-ground, 
 and this mathematical exactitude, brought to bear on align- 
 ments, etc., all marked out beforehand, restrict our freedom 
 of action and habituate us to work in a confined manner,^ 
 
124 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 whilst really tlie cavalry soldier is destined to work over a 
 large tract of country, and ride to any spot he can see in the 
 distance, and to enable him to do so he has his horse, which 
 is his principal arm. 
 
 As to the powers of a troop horse, it is not too much to 
 assert that, as they have been but little studied, but little is 
 known of them. If we are to judge by the regulations that 
 rule us, — and as long as they are in force to them must we 
 turn for what we are to believe, — we shall form a curious idea 
 of these powers. 
 
 The pace of a horse was originally fixed by the range of 
 the fire-arm in use at that time. This weapon had a range 
 of some 200 — 250 yards, and the pace was calculated for this 
 distance. It was even imagined that there was danger in 
 attempting to gallop this distance, and, in orden to avoid 
 blowing a horse, it was laid down that about 85 yards should 
 be the distance over which one might charge, and the re- 
 mainder of the ground was to be traversed at a walk, a trot, 
 and a gallop. 
 
 Every one knows that the regulation rapidity of these 
 paces is as follows : 
 
 Walk 100 yards per minute. 
 
 Trot 240 yards per minute. 
 
 Gallop 300 yards per minute. 
 
 Charge .... 150 in 20 seconds, or 450 per minute. * 
 
 As there was no question of staying power, — that is to 
 say, the greatest distance for which these paces could be 
 maintained, — the figures given above constitute all that is 
 
French Cavalry in 1870. 125 
 
 laid down, and these figures have not been altered for the 
 last forty years. 
 
 It must be allowed that statistics like the above are not 
 calculated to convey an exaggerated opinion of the power of 
 cavalry to an officer ignorant of that arm, and who wished to 
 study it. 
 
 There is a prevalent suspicion, however, it is true, that 
 a horse's powers exceed these narrow limits; but this, of 
 course, is merely supposition. 
 
 Some people, referring to the fabulous distances trav- 
 ersed by African horses, lay down marches of 120 leagues in 
 forty hours as quite natural. Others, putting their faith in 
 thoroughbreds, consider steeple-chases of four miles over a 
 fair hunting country as mere child's play. Others, again, 
 talk lightly of eighteen to twenty miles at an unbroken trot 
 or gallop. 
 
 Between such marvels of endurance and speed and 
 what the regulations tell us, how are we to arrive at the 
 truth? Without horses there can be no cavalry. The horse 
 is the real weapon of the cavalry soldier, and we are igno- 
 rant of the powers of this weapon. This being the case, how 
 can any one pretend to regulate its proper employment? If 
 you went and said to the infantry or artillery, "Here is a cap- 
 ital rifle or gun, the powers of which are something tremen- 
 dous, but we are ignorant both of the range and trajectory, 
 but that does not matter, you can use it," they would most 
 assuredly reply, "No, thank you: we don't care about arms 
 that will leave us uncertain in face of an enemy." Such, 
 however, is the situation of the cavalry, and we wish to 
 
126 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 know if you can find an answer to the following questions in 
 any book whatever:* 
 
 What is the average of the extreme powers of staying 
 of a troop horse? 
 
 How often can he charge successively? 
 
 In what condition is he after marching 9, 12, 18, 24, 36 
 miles at a fair pace? 
 
 How should the pace be regulated so as to allow a given 
 distance to be traversed and bring your horse up fresh to 
 charge? 
 
 What influence has the weight on his back on his stay- 
 ing powers and speed? 
 
 What are the results of a gradual increase in the ration? 
 « * * * * 
 
 The day these questions are answered and laid down in 
 the regulations, our cavalry will have made a great step in 
 advance, for just as great discoveries have introduced great 
 destructive engines of mathematical precision, so also have 
 they fixed their powers. Then the generals under whose 
 orders we may be placed will know exactly what they can 
 expect, and we shall cease to be sometimes a bore and at 
 others a deception. 
 
 From the foregoing considerations we may conclude 
 that it is indispensable for the cavalry to introduce reforms 
 into all the matters that concern it, such, for instance, as 
 
 *This portion of the work was written before tlie war, but it was 
 not allowed to be published. 
 
French Cavalry in 1870. 127; 
 
 recruiting, remounts, and the drill and instruction of both 
 man and horse. , 
 
 So as not to overstep the limits of this work, the object 
 of which was to give a true account of the part taken by the 
 cavalry in this campaign, we shall at some other time treat 
 separately each of the abovg subjects. 
 
128 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 The history of this campaign is a very sad one for 
 France. Would that it were possible to strike out of our 
 annals this funeral page and bury forever those mournful 
 recollections, whose accents seem to murmur in our ears 
 like a death chant. But though we are wounded to the 
 quick by the defeats that have fallen on us, nevertheless we 
 have the right to be proud of our energy in misfortune. Our 
 neighbors looked on with folded arms at the unequal battle 
 we were waging, and rejoiced at the wounds inflicted on our 
 national pride. This makes no difference to us. 
 
 To Europe we will say: We care nothing for your 
 indifference; pray continue to look on, for the spectacle is 
 worth the( trouble. We have been devastated, pillaged 
 without mercy, burnt out of our homes, weighed down by a 
 war indemnity beyond parallel. In spite of our disasters, 
 our mutilated country remains without fear, and will soon 
 arise, for from the cinders that cover her you will see spring 
 up a nation greater than you have ever seen before, and one 
 strong enough to avenge herself. 
 
 To Prussia, so proud of her victories, we give the recom- 
 mendation to think over the memories of her past history. 
 Let her remember 1806, when we were prepared for the fray. 
 She will see her armies routed and scattered between two 
 sunsets; Berlin opening her gates at the very commence- 
 ment of the campaign; Stettin and Magdeburg giving in 
 
French Cavalry in 1870. 129 
 
 without a struggle; the same sort of thing at Spandau, 
 Liibeck, and other places; and, last of all, Bliicher saving 
 his army by a lie. To these instances of weakness we bring 
 forward in answer the energy displayed at Belfort, Toul, 
 Strasbourg, Metz, Verdun, and Paris, affording the world 
 the mighty spectacle of a capital unwilling to yield to aught 
 but famine. We have therefore good cause to hold up our 
 heads in the presence of those whom we defeated at Jena 
 and Auerstadt, for we fought one against three; at Froesch- 
 willer one against four; and, as Prussia has imposed hard 
 conditions on us and abused her triumph, let her reperuse 
 her history and learn from it the lesson that awaits her when 
 the ardently desired day shall arrive that we shall meet on 
 the field of battle in equal numbers. 
 
 Let us then prepare, all aiding in the work without 
 jealousy, and with a generous emulation. Let us acquire by 
 industry the qualities that we stand in need of, and let us 
 unite to rebuild the ruined edifice. Afer the dreadful dis- 
 asters that France has undergone, our hearts can have but 
 one thought, one ambition — that of restoring and avenging 
 our country, which has been so cruelly humbled. 
 
 Let us then take for a motto, "Courage and confidence in 
 the future," for it will most certainly give us a splendid 
 revenge. 
 
THE CAVALRY 
 
 Battle of Vionville and Mars-la-Tour 
 
 On the 16th of August, 1870. 
 
 BY 
 
 MAJOR KAEHLER, 
 
 Of the Great General 
 Staflf. 
 
 Translated from the Third German Edition by 
 
 CARI. REICHMANN, 
 First Lieutenant, Ninth Infantry, U. S. Army. 
 
A 5lh CAVAlRy DIVISION \ 
 
 .oca S Brigade grutep Kp^bqut 9 o'clock 
 
 C BRIGADE. RAUCH ) 
 
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 ♦ ♦»a b c def g= /"oi/ir/^j^ Iin.'. Agoor /o'clock 
 
 I k c = Lcfr r-L/.i-jf C PL'iHEO back) <ho'OLOChi 
 
 _i_ \<nn,X CoKo-^ AfiOl'T Soci-OCK 
 
 Bcoo p q = Bahby s Cavalry Atj ncM , 6 ISociocn 
 
 . ^_ 1 s t uuiuxu 5^ /'/fi/.SSy/i.v Outpost at EHO of B/'TrLC 
 
 
German Cavalry at Yionville. 133 
 
 THE GERMAN CAVALRY 
 
 IN THhC 
 
 Battle of Vionville— Mars=la=Tour. 
 
 Never since the battles of the Napoleonic wars has it 
 been the lot of cavalry to act in larger bodies and play a more 
 important role than in the conflicts around Vionville and 
 Mars-la-Tour. In connection with the experiences of the 
 campaign of 1870-71, in the use of large, independent bodies 
 of cavalry in the service of security and information, the day 
 of Vionville and Mars-la-Tour completes the picture by pre- 
 senting its use in battle. In order to draw its lines sharply 
 and mark its shades w'ith all their peculiarities, it is requisite 
 that the action of every participating link in the chain of 
 events be represented as accurately as possible; only then 
 may lessons be deduced from the facts for the future, and 
 from them rules for the employment and leading of cavalry 
 in battle. 
 
 In the following account of the cavalry conflicts at Vion- 
 ville and Mars-la-Tour it has been the endeavor to draw such 
 an accurate and complete picture of the conflicts. Although 
 the official Prussian sources, as well as the French reports 
 so far as they have reached the public, have been consulted, 
 still the description cannot be free from gaps and distortions. 
 It is given to the public for the purpose of affording an oppor- 
 
1 34 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 tunitj to all participants to contribute toward filling the 
 gaps, straightening the facts, and completing the picture; 
 the ampler the contributions, the better the interests of this 
 matter will be subserved. 
 
 The 13th Brigade of the 5th Prussian Cavalry Division 
 had come in touch with the French cavalry at Mars-la-Tour 
 on the forenoon of August 15, 1870.* 
 
 During the afternoon the entire division had gone into 
 bivouac, the 11th Brigade at Puxieux and Xonville, f the 12th 
 to the east of Hannonville, the 13th to the east of Sponville. 
 Of the two horse batteries present with the division, Bode's 
 battery was with the 12th, Schirmer's battery with the 13th 
 Brigade. 
 
 Outposts and patrols had observed the development of 
 strong hostile corps of all arms on the plateau east of Vion- 
 ville, on both sides of the chauss^e to Metz. Clear insight 
 
 *5tli Cavalry Division: 
 
 Commander, Lieutenant-General von Rheinbaben. 
 
 General Staff Officer, Captain von Heister of the lOth 
 Hussars. 
 11th Brigade: 
 
 Major-General von Barby, 
 
 4th Cuirassiers, 
 
 loth Ulans, 
 
 19th Dragoons. 
 12th Brigade: 
 
 Major-General von Bredow, 
 
 7th Cuirassiers, 
 
 16th Ulans, 
 
 13th Dragoons. 
 13th Brigade: 
 
 Major-Gdneral von Redem, 
 
 10th Hussars, 
 
 11th Hussars, 
 
 17th Hussars. 
 1st Horse Battery, Capt. Bode I., of the 4th Artillery Regiment. 
 2d Horse Battery, Capt. Schirmer, of the 10th Artillery Regiment. 
 Total, 5,400 Horses, 12 Guns. 
 
 tXonville, Sponville, and Hannonville were, in a general direction, 
 west of Puxieux and Chambley. Thiaueourt was some distance to 
 the south. 
 
German Cavalry at Yionville. V65r 
 
 into the strength and position of the hostile corps had not 
 been gained. 
 
 Lieutenant-General von Rheinbaben reported the results 
 gained by the troops under his command to the commander 
 of the X. Corps. The latter deemed further intelligence de- 
 sirable and directed the general to advance against the 
 enemy's position as early as "possible on the 16th, in order 
 to gain, by force if necessary, a closer view of the same. He 
 at the same time promised a reinforcement of artillery. 
 
 Lieutenant-Colonel von Caprivi,* chief of staff of the X. 
 Corps, brought this reinforcement from Thiaucourt early on 
 the morning of the 16th, consisting of the 1st and 3d Horse 
 Batteries of the 10th Field Artillery Regiment, escorted by 
 the 2d squadron of the 2d Dragoons of the Guard. 
 
 The four horse batteries now with the division were 
 placed under the command of Major von Koerber, of the 10th 
 Field Artillery Regiment. 
 
 Lieutenant-General von Rheinbaben considered himself 
 sufficiently strong to proceed to the execution of his task at 
 8:30 a. m. 
 
 The 13th Brigade, which had left its bivouac at Spon- 
 ville at 6 a. m. and stood in readiness on the height to the 
 west of the bottom of Puxieux, was ordered to escort the 
 four batteries. 
 
 The 12th Brigade, likewise ready to march since day- 
 break, was directed to proceed from its bivouac near Hannon- 
 ville to Mars-la-Tour and Vionville, and to take a position 
 to the north of the chauss^e suitable for covering the left 
 flank of the artillery, which was also advanced to this place, 
 
 ♦Afterwards the Chancellor of the German Empire.— A. L. W. 
 
136 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 as well as for joining in a further advance against the enemy's 
 position. 
 
 Such a position was found in the bottom which extends 
 from Vionville in a north-northwesterly direction toward 
 Bruville; the brigade reached it at 9 a. m., finding there cover 
 from the view and (for the present) also from the fire of the 
 enemy. The latter was kept under observation by scouts. 
 The brigade was drawn up in two lines of squadrons in 
 closed line of platoon columns; in the first line on the right 
 the 7th Cuirassiers, on the left the 16th Ulans, in second line 
 three squadrons of the 13th Dragoons.* 
 
 The four horse batteries under command of Major von 
 Koerber, escorted by the 13tl^ Brigade and the 2d squadron 
 of the 2d Guard Dragoons, had meanwhile trotted forward 
 from the bottom on the west of Puxieux in the following 
 order: Three squadrons of the 10th Hussarsf and the 2-X. 
 horse battery, Schirmer's, formed the advance guard, fol- 
 lowed at the proper distance by the brigade in closed line 
 of squadrons in platoon columns, with considerable intervals 
 between regiments, on the right the 11th Hussars, on the 
 left three squadrons of the 17th Hussars,:}: to which the 2d 
 squadron of the 2d Guard Dragoons had attached itself. In 
 rear of these regiments followed Horse Batteries 1-IX., 1-X., 
 and 3-X. 
 
 They moved at a lively trot in the general direction of 
 
 ♦The 4th squadron of the regiment had been detached to Fleury 
 on the east bank of the Moselle. 
 
 tThe 1st squadron had been detached to establish communication 
 with the III. Army. 
 
 Soon after G a. m. the 3d squadron had been despatched to 
 Maizeray on the Verdun chauss6e to reconnoiter on the left flank; it 
 was recalled at 11:30 a. m., but after its return the regiment was 
 engaged in no further conflicts on that day. 
 
German Cavalry at Yionville. 137 
 
 Vionville, past Puxieux and beyond Tronville. On reaching 
 the high ground near the latter place, the heads of Prussian 
 infantry and cavalry detachments became visible to the south 
 as they were descending from the heights near Chambley. 
 It was the 6th Infantry Division. 
 
 On the part of the 1.3th Brigade, the 10th Hussars ad- 
 vanced in the ravine which stretches with various windings 
 toward Gorze, to the point of its junction with the ravine 
 coming from Flavigny, pushed scouts to the heights on the 
 south, and thus covered the right flank. Schirmer's battery 
 came in position at a gallop on the height east of Tronville, 
 and opened fire immediately on a cavalry camp visible near 
 Vionville. 
 
 The remaining three horse batteries soon came up and 
 formed on the left of Schirmer's battery as they arrived, ex- 
 tending as far as the chauss^e Tronville — Vionville. The 11th 
 Hussars took position in the ravine in rear of the right flank 
 of the artillery position, the 17th Hussars and the 2d squad- 
 ron of the 2d Dragoons of the Guard in rear of the left flank, 
 to the north of, and close to, Tronville. 
 
 The first shells of Schirmer's battery threw the troops 
 of Murat's Dragoon Brigade of de Forton's Cavalry Division,* 
 
 *od Division of reserve cavaliy: 
 
 General de Forton. 
 
 Chief of Staff, Colonel Durand de Villiers. 
 1st brigade: 
 
 General, Prince Murat, 
 
 1st Dragoons, 
 
 9th Dragoons. 
 2d brigade: 
 
 General de Gramont, 
 
 7th Cuirassiers, 
 
 10th Cuirassiers, 
 
 7th and 8th batteries of the 20th Horse Artillery regiment. 
 Total, 1,600 horses, ,12 guns. 
 -10 
 
138 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 which were just about to ride their horses to water as though 
 they were many miles from the enemy, in the utmost confu- 
 sion and disordered flight. 
 
 A French account* gives the following description : 
 
 "General de Forton's cavalry was to march off at 5 a. m., 
 but counter-orders were issued, and at 9 a. m. the troops un- 
 saddled and unbridled. The dragoon officer on outpost twice 
 reported the approach of a numerous cavalry and artillery; 
 a general staff officer was sent to investigate. He reported 
 that nothing could be seen to give anxiety, and orders were 
 given that three squadrons of each regiment should ride to 
 water, while the fourth should be kept in readiness for an 
 emergency. 
 
 "Water had barely been reached when the first Prussian 
 shells came hissing through the village and bivouacs. In- 
 formed by their scouts of our carelessness, the Prussian 
 artillery had advanced at a gallop, come in position on both 
 sides of the road, and fired with all its might 
 
 "What a panic that was in the streets of Vionville! The 
 men jumped on their horses and rushed into the streets, in 
 which wagons and loose horses crowded and jammed. Dis- 
 regarding the missiles which were flying about them, the 
 officers endeavored to stop their men, but succeeded only 
 after considerable trouble in rallying a few platoons as a 
 support on which the rest might rally, and thus they reached 
 the plateau of R^zonville. 
 
 "The Cuirassierf Brigade (de Gramont), which on the 
 
 *"Campagne de 1870, La cavalerie frangaise," par le lieutenant- 
 colonel F. Bonie. 
 
German Cavalry at Yionville, 139 
 
 previous evening had unfortunately left its first position and 
 gone into bivouac farther to the rear, escaped this hail of can- 
 ister, mounted in good order, and, to avoid being cut off by a 
 strong column of hostile cavalrj^ which threatened its right 
 flank,* retired into the wood which skirts the Roman road 
 eastward; passing by Villers aux Bois, it debouched subse- 
 quently on the plateau of R^zonville to the right of the 9th 
 Dragoons. 
 
 "De Valabr^gue's Division,! which had been on its guard 
 and had quickly mounted, arrived soon afterward at the 
 wood of Villers, in order not to serve uselessly as a target for 
 the hostile artillery." 
 
 So far the French account. 
 
 One French squadron endeavored to advance in closed 
 formation to the north of the village, but was unable to with- 
 stand the fire from the Prussian guns, and hastily followed its 
 fleeing comrades.:}: A hostile battery, which attempted to 
 come in position in the same place, fared no better. 
 
 The Prussian cavalry subsequently reached the ground 
 of the French bivouacs. All the headgear of the dragoons 
 
 *This column must have been the 12th Cavalry Brigade, 
 t Cavalry division of the second corps: 
 General de Valabregue. 
 ' Chief of Staff, Colonel de Cools. 
 1st brigade: 
 
 General de ValabrSgue, 
 4th Chasseurs, 
 5th Chasseurs. 
 2d brigade: 
 
 General Bachelier, 
 7th Dragoons, 
 12th Dragoons. 
 Total, 1,800 horses, 
 t Probably one of the squadrons which, according to the French 
 account, had remained saddled and ready. 
 
140 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 had been abandoned there; the cookini^-pots were full of 
 cooked food ; wagons of all kinds, from the elegant carriages 
 of the generals to the military chest, kitchen, and medicine 
 wagons; a long table, all set, had to be abandoned at the 
 moment when breakfast was ready to be served. Everything 
 indicated the most complete surprise, the most hurried, dis- 
 orderly flight 
 
 The three Prussian batteries which came in position a 
 little after Schirmer's battery could hardly open fire before 
 they were led forward in line by Major von Koerber to the 
 ridge immediately to the west of Vionville, on which the 
 chauss^es coming from Mars-la-Tour and Tronville meet. 
 
 Here they soon had occasion to direct their fire on the 
 approaching hostile infantry and artillery, and to hold out to 
 the end of the day in a glorious and changeable, but very 
 unequal, contest. 
 
 At the same time Schirmer's battery advanced to the 
 ridge which begins between Vionville and Flavigny and 
 stretches away to the west, and took a most effective part 
 in the conflicts around Vionville and Flavigny. 
 
 The 1st squadron of the 17tli Hussars and the 2d squad- 
 ron of the 2d Dragoons of the Guard escorted the batteries 
 of Major von Koerber to their new position close to the west 
 of Vionville and suffered not inconsiderable losses, although 
 they found some cover, among the rows of trees lining the 
 Mars-la-Tour and Tronville chauss^es, from the French pro- 
 jectiles, which began to fall with increasing frequency. 
 
 The 10th Hussars accompanied Schirmer's battery in its 
 advance on the right and took position to the east of the road 
 
German Cavalry at Tionville. 141 
 
 Vionville — La Beauville* at the point where it crosses the 
 ravine which extends from Flavigny sOuthwestward (bottom 
 of Flavigny). The 11th Hussars also proceeded to this point 
 upon orders from Lieutenant-General von Rheinbaben, but 
 were soon recalled, about 10 a. m., by the brigade commander, 
 Major-General von Eedern, and dispatched to Tronville, 
 where they were joined by two squadrons (2d and 4th) of the 
 17th Hussars. 
 
 While these events were taking place, the 11th Brigade, 
 which had been alarmed in its bivouac at Xonville soon after 
 8 a. m., received orders at 9 :30 a. m. to follow the 13th Bri- 
 gade; it was joined on the march near Puxieux by the 19th 
 Dragoons, who had bivouacked here, and by the outposts fur- 
 nished by this regiment, and took position to the southwest 
 of Tronville at the place designated as rendezvous for the 
 whole division^ at a time when Major von Koerber's batteries 
 w^ere already in their second position ; i. e., after 10 a. m. 
 
 Soon after its arrival the brigade received orders from 
 the divisicn commander, Lieutenant-General von Rhe'nbaben, 
 to take a more forward position to cover the left flank of 
 the 13th Brigade. It advanced to the heights northeast of 
 Tronville,' where it received so vehement and effective a fire 
 from hostile batteries which had meanwhile come in position 
 to the northeast of Vionville;. that the brigade commander, 
 Major-General von Barby, w^as compelled to lead it to a more 
 protected position in rear of the Tronville copses northwest 
 of Vionville. This measure was all the more not only justi- 
 fied, but necessary for the safety of his tropps, as Major- 
 
 *La Beauville is the farm marked on the map west of Gorze. Tha 
 road mentioned runs almost north and south. 
 
142 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 ■ 
 
 General von Barby, who had in person proceeded to the front 
 to ascertain the situation, could discern neither danger to the 
 13th Brigade and the batteries entrusted to its protection, 
 nor any objective of attack for his own brigade. 
 
 While these events were taking place with the 5th Cav- 
 alry Division, the 6th* had arrived on the battle-field. 
 
 On the afternoon of the 15th of August this division had 
 been ordered into cantonments around Coine sur Seille, on 
 the right bank of the Moselle, by the commander of the III. 
 Army Corps; at 2 a. m. on the 16th it had received orders 
 from the same source "to be across the Moselle not later than 
 5 :30 a. m., advance from Gorze toward the road Metz — Ver- 
 dun, and take position on the plateau of Vionville, front 
 toward Metz." 
 
 Notwithstanding that the division was at once alarmed, 
 the 15th Brigade alone stood in readiness to advance on the 
 left bank at 7 a. m., the suspension (chain) bridge at Nov^ant 
 being passable only at a walk and in single file, on account of 
 its considerable oscillation. 
 
 The general staff officer of the division. Major von Schoen- 
 fels, arrived at 7:30 a. m. at Gorze with the 3d Hussars,, who 
 
 *6th Cavalry Division: 
 
 Commander, Major-General Duke William of Mecklenburg- 
 Schwerin. 
 
 General Staff Officer, Major von Schoenfels. 
 14th Brigade: 
 
 Major-General von GrQter, 
 
 6th Cuirassiers, 
 
 3d Ulans, 
 
 15th Ulans. 
 loth Brigade: 
 
 Major-General von Rauch, 
 
 3d Hussars, 
 
 16th Hussars, 
 
 2d Horse Battery, Captain Wittstoek, 3d Art. Regt. 
 Total, 3,000 horses, 6 guns. 
 
German Cavalry at Yionville. 143 
 
 had been the first to cross ; in rear of this regiment came the 
 16th Hussars, so far as they had been formed; in their rear 
 and at a greater distance, Wittstock's battery; and lastly, the 
 14th Brigade, numbering but 10 squadrons, the 1st and 2d 
 squadrons of the 3d Ulans having been left in the position 
 between the Moselle and the Seille. 
 
 Major von Schoenfels trotted through Gorze with the 1st 
 squadron of the 3d Hussars, ascended to the southern edge 
 of the height north of the village by the Vionville road, while 
 the division was gradually assembling in rendezvous forma- 
 tion to the east of Gorze abreast of Chateau Catherine. 
 
 The squadron referred to soon reported "that strong col- 
 umns of hostile infantry were marching on the chauss^e from 
 Gravelotte to Vionville and occupying the woods to the south 
 of that road." 
 
 The regimental commander, Colonel von Zieten, now 
 moved forward with the remaining three squadron's, ad- 
 vanced on the plateau, and pushed his scouts to the point 
 where the roads to Vionville and Flavigny separate. They 
 not only confirmed the former report, but also discovered a 
 large body of hostile infantry, numbering several regiments, 
 in a position of readiness on the northwestern edge of the 
 wood of Vionville. 
 
 While these observations were being communicated to 
 the 5th Infantry Division now approaching from Gorze, 
 Major-General von Rauch received orders to let the 16th Hus- 
 sars follow the 3d Hussars, and to advance with his brigade 
 
144 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 toward K^zonville. To support this movement and protect 
 the infantry detachments holding Gorze, Wittstock's battery 
 took position on the height immediately to the north of the 
 village. 
 
 The 14th Brigade was now directed to advance in the 
 direction of Buxi^res in order to anticipate there the enemy's 
 retreat if possible, and establish communication with the 5th 
 Cavalry Division, of whose whereabouts and doings nothing 
 specific was known. The opinion prevailed that the enemy 
 was in full retreat on Verdun, and that the troops in front 
 were his last columns and must be delayed and harassed as 
 much as possible. 
 
 The loth Brigade advancing in line of squadrons in 
 platoon columns with deploying intervals, one squadron 
 deployed in front to reconnoiter, immediately received from 
 the westerly projecting corner of the wood of Vionville such 
 vehement infantry fire that it was compelled not only to give 
 up the advance, but to quit the plateau altogether and with- 
 draw to the ravine northwest of Gorze, where it remained 
 for the present. The brigade took up a position on both sides 
 of the road Gorze— Vionville, the 16th Hussars on the right, 
 the 3d Hussars on the left. 
 
 The 14th Brigade, the 15th Ulans leading, did not long 
 pursue its original direction on Buxi^res, but turned off to 
 the north toward Vionville, because Lieutenant-General von 
 Buddenbrock, commanding the 6th Infantry Division, which 
 was about to debouch on Buxi^res, wished to have the plateau 
 of Vionville reconnoitered before allowing his infantry to 
 set foot upon it. 
 
Oerman Cavalry at Vionville. 145 
 
 This movement of the 14th Brigade corresponded exactly 
 to an order received at this time from the commanding gen- 
 eral of the III. Corps, which required the entire division to 
 advance on Vionville and to detach at least one regiment in 
 the direction of Metz for the purpose of menacing the re- 
 treating enemy. 
 
 The concluding part of this order might have been easily 
 carried out from the valley of the Moselle, but was now im- 
 practicable, since the troops were more than a mile from 
 there and in the presence of a very strong and (as it appeared) 
 greatly Superior enemy; it was therefore not carried out. 
 
 The brigade advanced through the wood of Gaumont in 
 the direction of Flavigny, and, on reaching the plateau, w^as 
 joined by Wittstock's battery, which the division commander 
 brought up from Gorze; it ascended the steep slope to the 
 south of Flavigny (the 15th Ulans in first line, in second line 
 and overlapping, the 6th Cuirassiers on the right, the two 
 squadrons of the 3d Ulans on the left), pushed back the hos- 
 tile scouts without difficulty, and brought its battery into 
 action to the east of the road Tronville — Gorze, near its point 
 of crossing with the Chambley — R^zonville road, against 
 large bodies of hostile infantry, which were advancing 
 against Flavigny and the wood of Vionville. That portion 
 of the infantry which advanced over the more open part of the 
 plateau was hurriedly driven back by the shells of the bat- 
 tery; another portion, however, favored by a depression of 
 the ground, continued to advance, opened a severe fire on 
 
146 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 the battery, and compelled it to withdraw in rear of the bri- 
 gade; the latter was in position on the edge of the bottom, 
 and afterward, when the fire of the enemy's batteries made 
 itself more and more felt, it descended into the depression 
 north of the Chambley — R^zonville road. 
 
 Major Ton Koerber's batteries at Vionville had opened 
 fire simultaneously with Wittstock's battery. 
 
 It was past 9 a. m. 
 
 Alarmed by the flight of its dragoons and by the fire 
 of the Prussian batteries, the French infantry in its camps 
 at R^zonville (VI. and parts of II. Corps) had rapidly formed 
 under arms; it advanced, simultaneously with the detach- 
 ments farther to the south which had moved out as far as 
 the wood of Vionville, against the Prussian cavalry divisions 
 which, extending in a wide arc, held the southern and west- 
 ern edges of the plateau. Very soon afterward the French 
 batteries opened fire, particularly from the northeast, against 
 the Prussian guns at Vionville. The hostile infantry occu- 
 pied Vionville, and soon afterward Flavigny also. Before 
 its fire the batteries of Major von Koerber had to withdraw a 
 short distance; the 1st Horse Battery (Bode's) of the 4th 
 Regiment alone was able, partly covered as it was by the 
 rows of trees lining the roads, to hold out at the junction 
 point of the roads from Mars-la-Tour and Tronville. 
 
 The French shells also began more and more to search 
 the ranks of the 12th Brigade (Major-General von Bredow's), 
 which was posted in the bottom north of Vionville and now 
 withdrew through the copses of Tronville, taking post to the 
 
German Cavalry at Vionville. 147 
 
 right of the 11th Brigade, which had reached this point some 
 time before. 
 
 Of the 13th Brigade, the 10th Hussars, from its posi- 
 tion in the bottom of Flavigny, had dispatched its 3d squad- 
 ron to the height south of its position and east of the La 
 Beauville — Vionville road, to protect batteries of the III. 
 Corp^, which off and on came in action there without escort. 
 Giving way before the hostile infantry fire from Flavigny in 
 the same measure as Von Koerber's batteries receded before 
 it, the two other squadrons of the regiment had reached the 
 junction point of the ravines which come down from Tron- 
 ville and the farmstead of Sauley. Here the 3d squadron 
 rejoined, having been relieved from its escori: duty by other 
 cavalry (12th Dragoons). 
 
 After the 11th Hussars had been joined at Tronville, as 
 above stated (see page 141),by two squadrons of the 17th Hus- 
 sars, the brigade commander led them forward in platoon col- 
 umn, the 11th Hussars leading, in a northeasterly direction 
 toward Vionville, for the purpose of joining the 12th Brigade 
 and acting against the right flank of the hostile attack; but 
 that brigade had just withdrawn through the copses of Tron- 
 ville. The regiments of Major-General von Redern were like- 
 wise compelled to seek a position less exposed to the enemy's 
 fire, and found it between the chaussiSe Mars-la-Tour — Vion- 
 ville and the southernmost part of the Tronville copses; there 
 they dismounted. 
 
 Meanwhile the 5th Infantry Division, advancing from 
 the south and southwest, the corps artiller^^ of the III. Corps, 
 which had come in action on the height to the southwest of 
 
148 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 Flavigny, and the 6th Infantry Division, which made gradual 
 progress to the north and, south of the Mars-la-Tour — Vion- 
 ville ehauss^e, succeeded in compelling the French infantry 
 and artillery, particularly to the south of the Mars-la-Tour — 
 Vionville chauss^e, to fall back and withdraw from Vion- 
 ville and Flavigny. 
 
 By this time it was 12 o'clock noon. 
 
 At the same time the 1st squadron of the 17th Hussars 
 (First Lieutenant von Hantelmann) and the 2d squadron of 
 the 2d Guard Dragoons (Captain Prince von Sayn- Wittgen- 
 stein), which, with the exception of a few changes, had main- 
 tained their position in support of the left flank of Major von 
 Koerber's batteries, although suffering some losses from 
 French shells, were ordered by Colonel von Voigts-Rhetz, 
 chief of staff of the III. Corps, to charge the hostile infantry 
 on its retreat from Vionville. But this infantry had still 
 such moral and good order, that the two squadrons failed 
 to reach it and had to withdraw with considerable loss. (The 
 squadron of the Guard Dragoons lost half of its horses.) 
 
 The 10th Hussars had also been sent forward at the same 
 time and for the same purpose by Lieutenant-General von 
 Alvensleben, commanding the HI. Corps, but were unable 
 to effect anything in front, as the enemy had halted on the 
 Vionville — R^zonville chauss^e. The division commander, 
 Lieutenant-General von Rheinbaben, now dispatched the 
 regiment around the north of Vionville to try its luck against 
 the enemy's right flank. But here the hostile artillery for- 
 bade any advance beyond Vionville; the regiment therefore 
 took up a position of readiness to the north of the chauss^e, 
 
German Cavalry at Yionville. 149 
 
 and between it and the southernmost of the Tronville copses, 
 on the ground lately occupied by the 13th Brigade. 
 
 This brigade had meanwhile received orders from the 
 division commander, who was near by, to move more to the 
 right and seek a position on the right of the 6th Infantry 
 Division suitable for maintaining communication with the 
 other troops of the III. Corps engaged on the right, and be- 
 tween this corps and the 5th Cavalry Division. 
 
 In execution of this order Major-General von Redem led 
 his remaining squadrons* down into the bottom of Flavigny, 
 passing around the heights of Vionville by the south^ and up 
 to the village itself and close to the infantry hotly engaged 
 near it. 
 
 To protect the squadrons to some extent from the vio- 
 lent fire of friend and foe, they were led up as close as possi- 
 ble to the burning buildings of the village. 
 
 On the march to this position the 11th Hussars were 
 joined by their 1st squadron and by what was left of the 2d 
 squadron of the 2d Guard Dragoons. 
 
 Shortly after 11 a. m. the left of the French II. Corps 
 (Frossard's) began to give way, say the French accounts, f 
 
 The Prussian infantry had been gaining ground all 
 
 along the line from the wood of Vionville in the south to 
 
 Flavigny and Vionville, and northward as far as the old 
 
 Roman road. At the time when the II. French Corps in its 
 
 position south of the R^zpnville — Vionville chauss^e began 
 
 ♦llth Hussars and 2 squadrons of the 17tli Hussars, 
 t "Journal d'un officier de I'armee du Rhin,'^ par Ch. Fay, lieut.- 
 <jol. d'etat-major, page 80: Bonie, "La Cavalerie Frangaise." 
 
150 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 to give way before the onsets of the Prussians, more particu- 
 larly on its left, the VI. French Corps (Canrobert's) not only 
 held its own north of the chauss^e on the ridge northwest 
 of R^zonville, but began to advance its right shoulder, resting 
 it on the woods north of the Roman road, while at the same 
 time fresh hostile forces made themselves felt, for the pres- 
 ent by artillery alone, from the direction of St. Marcel and 
 Bruville. 
 
 To arrest the retrograde movement of his corps and re- 
 store the battle. General Frossard resolved to attempt to 
 overthrow the Prussian infantry, and sent orders to his cav- 
 alry to act. 
 
 Of this cavalry the 3d Lancers* stood in first line to the 
 southwest of R^zonville, between the chauss^e to Vionville 
 and the road to Chambley. At the first shots of the Prus- 
 sian artillery Marshal Bazaine had sent the 1st and 3d Brig- 
 ades of the Cavalry Division of the Guardf down into the 
 
 *This regiment belonged to the 2d Brigade (De la Mortiere's) of 
 Brabant's Cavalry Division of the V. Corps (De Failly's), and had 
 been detached together with the 1st Brigade (Lapasset's) of the 2d 
 Infantry Division (De Labadie d'Aydrien's) to Saarguemines, whence 
 it had retired to Metz after the combat of Forbach with the 2d Corps 
 (Frossard's). 
 
 t Cavalry Division of the Imperial Guard: 
 
 General Desvaux. 
 
 Chief of Staff, Colonel Galinier. 
 1st brigade: 
 
 General Halna du Fretay, 
 
 The Guides Regiment of the Guard, 
 
 The Chasseurs-^-Cheval of the Guard. 
 2d brigade: 
 
 General de France, 
 
 The regiment of Guard Lancers, 
 
 The regiment of Guard Dragoons. 
 3d brigade: 
 
 General du Preuil, 
 
 The regiment of Guard Cuirassiers, 
 
 The regiment of Guard Carbineers. 
 Total, 3,000 horses. 
 
German Cavalry at Vionville. 151 
 
 valley which descends in a southerly direction from Bag- 
 neux and passes between the woods of St. Arnould and 
 Ognon at the point where the old Roman road descends into 
 it. The 2d Brigade of this division had started at 6 a. m. and 
 escorted the Emperor as far as Doncourt.* There it was re- 
 lieved by De Margueritte's (1st) brigade (1st and 3d Chas- 
 seurs d'Afrique) of the 1st Reserve Cavalry Division (Du 
 Barail's), and found opportunity, during a subsequent phase 
 of the battle, to take part in it north of Mars-la-Tour. 
 
 De Forton's division had, as above stated, f reassembled at 
 Villers aux Bois after it had been driven from the vicinity 
 of Vionville by the Prussian shells. It was now ordered to 
 advance to the old Roman road and ^'d charger des que Vocca- 
 sion se presentera.'^ It took position in the depression into 
 which the old Roman road descends, north of height 311, 
 where it was joined by the Cavalry Division of the II. Corps 
 under the command of General de Valabr^gue. 
 
 On the ground between R^zonville and Villers aux Boist 
 there was now available of French cavalry : the 3d Lancers, 
 and 3 divisions of two brigades each ; or 1 regiment of lancers, 
 4 of chasseurs, 4 of dragoons, 4 of cuirassiers; total,- 13 regi- 
 ments, numbering 5,000 horses after deducting the losses 
 already suffered on this day. 
 
 On receipt of the order from General Frossard, General 
 Desvaux directed General du Preuil to move with the cuiras- 
 
 * Southeast of Jarny on the Etain— Gravelotte road. 
 tSee paise 139. 
 
 tOn a front of 2,500 paces, distant from the battle-field proper 
 2,500 to 3,000 paces. 
 
152 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 siers of the Guard to the south of the chauss^e and to the rear 
 of the 3d Lancers to support them. The movement was at 
 once executed and the regiment posted parallel to the ridge 
 and slightly behind the crest, covered from the enemy's fire. 
 
 A few moments later the formation was changed to a 
 column with a front of two squadrons, the^ 5th squadron in 
 reserve. 
 
 About 12 :30 p. m. according to Prussian accounts, about 
 11 :30 a. m. according to French accounts,* ."the fire, which up 
 to that time had been very brisk, dropped, and French skir- 
 mishers could at once be seen on the crest of the ridge as 
 they retreated at the double and without order. They were 
 closely followed by the Prussian batteries, which at once 
 crowned the heights and sent their shells among the French 
 cavalry. Two squadrons of the 3d Lancers advanced, but, 
 after traversing some distance, they turned about, because 
 no objective had been assigned them for their charge." 
 
 General du Preuil sent word to General Desvaux that 
 where he was everything was in full retreat, but at the same 
 time he received orders to attack. At this time his troops 
 were so far from the line of the enemy's infantryf that defeat 
 was certain unless the infantry was first shaken by artillery. 
 This objection was urged, but General Frossard replied: 
 "Charge at once, or we all are lost." 
 
 General du Preuil at once threw forward the first line, 
 
 *Tliis discrepancy of time may be readily reconciled in that the 
 French may have noticed the wavering of their lines before it became 
 apparent to their opponents. 
 
 tThe Prussian infantry had not yet passed much beyond Fla- 
 vlgny, and was therefore about 2,500 paces distant. 
 
German Cavalry at Yionville. 153 
 
 which started at a gallop. The second followed at a distance 
 of 150 meters, but, as the gait seemed too rapid, the general 
 ordered it shortened, and then repaired with his staff to its 
 flank. Moving at full speed, the first line had gained much 
 ground and left the second far behind; the Prussian skir- 
 mishers were rallying to form squares, a movement which 
 interrupted their fire. 
 
 The charge reached effectfve range without much loss, 
 when its career was checked by a multitude of obstacles 
 strewn over the ground, consisting of biscuit boxes, baggage 
 wagons, and camp equipments which the fleeing troops had 
 thrown away in their hurry. 
 
 Cramped in its advance, the first line was obliged to 
 oblique to the left, and the more they advanced the more 
 the crowding caused by the oblique movement increased, 
 and finally threw the two squadrons into disorder; at a range 
 of 30 meters it was greeted with a terrible fire, and the whole 
 line dispersed and poured into the defile formed by the Prus- 
 sian squares. The lieutenant-colonel was seriously wounded; 
 the commander, mortally hit, nevertheless broke into the 
 square, followed by one adjutant, who was at once bayoneted. 
 The rest, on retreating, were compelled to pass by the squares, 
 received fire from four sides, and were annihilated. 
 
 The second line was now unmasked; at a distance of 300 
 meters it was received with rapid fire, which knocked over 
 some few men, but the advance was continued in good order, 
 a» the fire ceased for a moment ; but when it had approached 
 to within 100 meters, the command ^'ChargezT was answered 
 by the Prussians with a hail of canister and bullets which 
 
154 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 brought more than half of the line to the ground. The bal- 
 ance encountered obstacles of a permanent character, or fell 
 into a ditch 10 meters in front of the squares. 
 
 The third line fared no better, and was dispersed by the 
 fire like the others. 
 
 22 officers, 208 men, and 243 horses hors de combat repre- 
 sent the losses of the cuirassiers. As they had failed to shake 
 (^^entamer") the squares charged, the result was nil. 
 
 So far the French accounts. The Prussian narrative de- 
 scribes the event as follows: 
 
 "This cavalry charge strikes in the first line the com- 
 panies of the 10th Brigade, which were advancing eastward 
 beyond Flavigny. The Second Battalion of the 52d Infantry 
 Kegiment, under Captain Hildebrandt, awaits the charge in 
 line with arms at a carry; at 250 paces a rapid fire begins, 
 against which the enemy's blow^ shivers impotently. But 
 other swarms of horsemen pass the little band on the right 
 and left, the rear rank faces about and fires into the enemy 
 from the rear. On one side the fusilier companies of the 
 12th Infantry Regiment, and on the other the various com- 
 panies of the 6th Infantry Division,, which had advanced be- 
 tween the chauss^e and Flavigny, receive the hostile horse- 
 men with a fire as steady as it is destructive. Far and wide 
 the field is covered with dead and wounded; only a small 
 band of these cuirassiers, who charged with such superb 
 courage, succeed in escaping destruction by hasty retreat." 
 
 The further events are described by French accounts* as 
 follows: 
 
 ♦Fay, page 81. 
 
German Cavalry at Yionville. 155 
 
 "To cover the rally of the defeated cuirassiers, Marshal 
 Bazaine had sent a battery of the Guard to the line of battle,* 
 and was among the guns with his staff, attentively observing 
 the retreat of his horsemen, who had now arrived abreast 
 of his position, when all of a sudden Prussian hussars were 
 discovered among them, and immediately afterward also 
 among the guiis, no. one having noticed their approach 
 before." 
 
 Let us see how^ these Prussian hussars got there. 
 
 Lieutenant-Colonel von Caprivi, the chief of staff of the 
 X. Corps, had observed the approach of the French cuiras- 
 siers from his position on the height of Flavigny, and called 
 the attention of Major-General von Redern, who stood there 
 in readiness with part of his brigade.f to this favorable oppor- 
 tunity for action. The 17th Hussars,, posted on the left, at 
 once trotted forward in line of platoon columns, accompanied 
 on the left by the 2d squadron of the 2d Guard Dragoons, 
 passed around the north of the wet meadows lying east of 
 Flavigny, through the midst of the infantry, which greeted ' 
 them with a loud hurrah, formed line, and cut in among the 
 now retreating French cuirassiers. During further pursuit 
 of the same toward R^zonville the regimental commander, 
 Lieutenant-Colonel von Ranch, noticed the French batterj 
 above mentioned and galloped toward it, followed by some 
 twenty hussars. The surprise was so complete that the guns, 
 could not be limbered up. They were laid on the approaching 
 
 *To the northern slope of cone 311, southwest of Rezonville and 
 north of the road to Chambley. 
 
 tilth Hussars, 3 squadrons of the 17th Hussars, 2d squadron of 
 the 2d Guard Dragoons. 
 
166 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 hussars and fired at a range of 80 meters, but failed to stop 
 the charge a moment. The cannoneers defended themselves 
 and were almost all cut down. Some teams, whose drivers 
 had been killed, stood there quietly, and the hussars made 
 an attempt to remove the guns with their aid, but were pre- 
 vented by hostile cavalry. 
 
 Some hussars (according to French accounts, notably all 
 officer) threw themselves on Marshal Bazaine, who was in the 
 midst of the battery and tried to escape by beating a hasty 
 retreat, the officers of his staff being compelled to draw their 
 swords in defence, as the Marshal's escort squadrons had 
 been left behind at K^zonville. General du Preuil, perceiv- 
 ing the Marshal's danger, called up these escort squadrons, 
 one of the 5th Hussars,* and one of the 4th Chasseurs k 
 Cheval.f Their appearance prevented the hussars from re- 
 moving the guns and compelled them to retreat, as well as the 
 2d and 4th squadrons of their regiment, which had charged 
 more to the left against the chaussde Vionville — R^zonville 
 and had come under a very effective fire from hostile infantry. 
 
 The 11th Hussars, checked by the marshy meadows east 
 4)f Flavigny, which they had to cross, deployed somewhat 
 later than the 17th Hussars. After passing through the 
 Prussian infantry, they encountered, on ascending the west- 
 t^em slope of height 311 south of R^zonville, disordered bands 
 <of French infantry and cavalry, which were for the most 
 
 ♦Of the 1st Brigade (De Berni's) of the Cavah-y Division of 
 the V. Corps (De Failly's), which had probably joined the army at 
 Metz with Lapasset's Brigade. Compare foot-note page 150. 
 
 tOf the 1st Brigade (De Valabregue's) of the Cavalry Division of 
 the II, Coi-ps (Frossard's). 
 
German Cavalry at Vionville. 157 
 
 part ridden down or dispersed. The 1st squadron, under 
 Captain von Vaerst, joined in the charge of the 17th Hussars 
 on the battery of the French Guard above referred to. 
 
 A severe flank fire from the Rezonville — Vionville chaus- 
 s^e, and the retreat of the 17th Hussars, compelled the 11th 
 Hussars, both being disordered by the long charge (2,500 
 paces on the air-line), to fall back to the Flavigny meadows. 
 Here the regiment was asseihbled and, on being formed, 
 withdrawn to the height west of the cemetery of Vionville, 
 where it dismounted. 
 
 The 17th Hussars also assembled and re-formed south- 
 west of Flavigny and remained halted in the bottom, where, 
 soon after 1 :30 p. m., they were joined by the 11th Hussars, 
 called up by Major-General von Bedern, and subsequently 
 by the 3d squadron (detached to Maizeray; see foot-note 
 page 136). 
 
 The losses of the 11th Hussars were: dead, 1 man, 8 
 horses; wounded, 1 officer, 18 men, 5 horses; missing, 2 men, 
 17 horses; total, 1 officer, 21 men, 30 horses. 
 
 The losses of the 17th Hussars were: dead, 8 men, 74 
 horses; wounded, 2 officers, 68 men; missing, 14 men; total, 
 2 officers, 90 men, 74 horses. 
 
 Of the 6th Cavalry Division we know that soon after 9 
 a. m. it was compelled by the increasing fire of the enemy 
 to gend the 14th Brigade and Wittstock's battery down into 
 the ravine east of the wood of the Cote Fuz(^e, while the 15th 
 Brigade took position in the valley north of St. Thi^bault. 
 
158 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 The latter brigade soon received orders to close up on the 14th 
 Brigade, and in execution of this order it marched by the 
 ravine which stretches through the wood of Gaumont toward 
 Tronville; it reached the road La Beauville — Vionville soon 
 after 11 a. m., and took position there for the present. 
 
 Shortly after noon, at the time when the French II. Corps 
 retreated, some portions in full flight, the 6th Cavalry Divi- 
 sion received orders from Lieutenant-General von Alvensle- 
 ben, commanding the III. Corps, "to advance on K^zonville, 
 as the enemy's infantry was retreating in disorder." 
 
 Just before the receipt of this order the 15th Brigade 
 had again been moved up on the plateau, with directions to 
 join the right of the corps artillery of the III. Corps, which 
 was in action there, with a view of acting from there con- 
 centrically with the 14th Brigade, which the division com- 
 mander was contemplating to dispatch past Flavigny against 
 Rdzonville; for this reason the latter brigade was even now 
 advancing. 
 
 As the 15th Brigade was about to advance from its posi- 
 tion near the corps artillery in obedience to these directions, 
 it was stopped by Lieutenant-General von Sttilpnagel, com- 
 manding the 5th Infantr}^ Division, "in order not to interfere 
 with the field of fire of the artillery." 
 
 Concurrently with these movements of the 6th Cavalry 
 Division, an advance all along the enemy's line became visi- 
 ble. It was therefore with a view to repel a threatened 
 attack, not to pursue a retreating enemy, that the division 
 commander now decided to advance with both brigades past 
 Flavigny and direct his attack against the dense hostile 
 
German Cavalry at Vionville. 159 
 
 masses advancing from R^zonville, at the very moment when 
 the 13th Brigade, v^eakened by the length of the charge and 
 the dispersion which was the inevitable consequence of the 
 various personal encounters, was compelled to give way 
 before the closed charge of Marshal Bazaine's escort 
 squadrons. 
 
 The division advanced in line of squadrons in platoon 
 columns with deploying intervals, and passed close to the 
 south of the burning village of Flavigny, on the right the 
 15th Brigade, with the 3d Hussars on the right and the 16th 
 Hussars on the left; on the left and slightly held back in 
 second line, as it were, the 14th Brigade, with the 15th Ulans 
 leading, 3 squadrons of the 6th Cuirassiers on the left rear,* 
 and 2 squadrons of the 3d Ulans on the right rear, both over- 
 lapping the 15th Ulans.f 
 
 In passing the 15th Brigade touched the left flank of the 
 5th Infantry Division, which was hotly engaged, and tra- 
 versed the former positions of the French skirmish lines, 
 which were outlined along a slight fold of the ground by a 
 long and uninterrupted line of dead and wounded. The 
 charge was not carried out as contemplated; no faster gait 
 than a trot was taken, nor was line formed, since a crowding 
 leftward which originated on the right had obliterated all 
 the intervals, and the brigade was moving in a dense mass 
 
 *TIie 4th squadron of the regiment remained with Wittstock's 
 battery as special escort; the battery had ere this joined the corps 
 artillery of the III. Corps, where it continued to talie an effective 
 part in the conflicts of the day. 
 
 tThe official map of the battle of Mars-la-Tour, situation at noon, 
 shows the 3d Ulans on the left and the 6th Cuirassiers on the right 
 rear.— Translator. 
 
160 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 of squadrons in i)latoon columns. While in this unfavorable 
 formation the brigade came under very brisk fire at close 
 range from dense swarms of skirmishers ensconced in a fold 
 of the terrain. At the same moment Major-General von 
 Ranch, one of the brigade commanders, was wounded and 
 obliged to hand his command over to Colonel von Schmidt, 
 of the 16th Hussars. The losses, which under the circum- 
 stances increased rapidly, and the certainty of failure, caused 
 the colonel to arrest the movement. He gave the command 
 to halt and restore the intervals between squadrons by a 
 lateral movement; after a short halt, the squadrons were 
 wheeled about by platoons and withdrawn at a walk, because 
 the rest of the cavalry was also withdrawing and the present 
 formation of the brigade (closed line of squadrons in platoon 
 columns) was unsuited for action, since space was lacking for 
 deployment. 
 
 The brigade now took deploying intervals at a walk 
 under an uninterrupted, brisk fire from the hostile infantry 
 and artillery, and then retired at a trot behind some copses 
 on the edge of the ravine which stretches toward the farm- 
 stead of Sauley. These difficult movements, ordered with 
 great calmness and deliberation, were carried out in excel- 
 lent order. 
 
 Of the 3d Hussars the colonel commanding (Von Zieten) 
 and Lieutenants von Witzleben and von Byern were severely 
 wounded; in re-forming 80 men and more than 100 horses 
 were missing. The losses of the 16th Hussars were not quite 
 so heavy, since it was chiefly the former regiment that had 
 come under the enemy^s infantry fire. 
 
Qerman Cavalry at Yionville. 161 
 
 The 14th Brigade, which had to traverse 3,500 paces 
 over hill and dale, strained every nerve to be in time, and 
 come in at least for some gleaning. At the time when the 
 regiment got beyond Flavigny, the larger mounted bodies of 
 the enemy had already left the battle-field near Flavigny* 
 and withdrawn under the protection of the infantry occupy- 
 ing R^zonville. Part of the 17th Hussars were coming 
 straight against the ulans and passed through the intervals. 
 At the heels of the hussars, and before the ulans could deploy, 
 a French hussar squadronf threw itself on the latter from 
 the right front. "ij: The 1st squadron (Captain Brix) moved to 
 charge in flank, wheeled left into line, and, in company with 
 the leading platoons of the other squadrons, threw the hostile 
 squadron back with considerable loss. The regiment was 
 then assembled and formed by the regimental commander, 
 Lieutenant-Colonel von Alvensleben, within effective range 
 of the enemy's infantry fire from R^zonville, on which occa> 
 sion, as a matter of instruction for the young troops in their 
 first charge, the formation and dressing were effected, front 
 toward the enemy, the same as on the drill-ground. The 
 brigade commander soon afterward gave orders for the re- 
 turn march, which was begun at a walk. 
 
 *The cmrassiers of the Guard, who had charged the Prussian 
 infantry at Flavigny. 
 
 tOf the 5th Regiment and part of Marshal Bazaine's escort; it 
 had saved the latter from capture by the 17th and 11th Hussars. 
 
 J The regiment at this time must have been between the road 
 Chambley— Rezonville and the eastern extremity of the marshy mead- 
 ow near Flavigny, for the 17th Hussars and the 5th French Hussars 
 were coming from the Guard battery which Marshal Bazaine had 
 ordered in action north of the road named and on height 311, and in 
 which he came near being captured. 
 
162 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 In the second line of the 14th Brigade, as previously 
 mentioned, three squadrons of the 6th Cuirassiers advanced 
 on the left, overlapping, in line of squadrons in platoon col- 
 umns, at first without, afterward with deploying intervals, 
 and, passing close to the burning village of Flavigny, formed 
 line as soon as sufficient space was found. There was no 
 longer any objective of attack, since the hostile infantry col- 
 umns desisted, from the contemplated offensive blow, and 
 their leading detachments, upon the approach of the Prus- 
 sian cavalry, threw themselves hurriedly into the ditches of 
 the R^zonville — Vionville chauss^e, whence they opened an 
 effective fire. 
 
 The two squadrons of the 3d Ulans advanced in line of 
 squadrons in platoon columns left in front, close in rear of the 
 15th Ulans and overlapping the latter's right. In passing 
 the artillery in action south of Flavigny both squadrons had 
 to oblique to the left, which brought them in rear of the right 
 wing of the 15th Ulans; but when the left flank battery sus- 
 pended its fire, they obliqued to the right again. Dispersed 
 hostile horsemen of the enemy and many skirmish lines were 
 visible. The regimental commander. Colonel von der Groe- 
 ben, selected the latter for his objective and had the "gallop" 
 sounded. Suddenly the right flank squadron of the 15th 
 Ulans wheeled to the left into line against the hostile cavalry* 
 and masked the front of both squadrons of the 3d Ulans just 
 as they were in the act of forming line. Only the 4th platoon 
 of the 4th squadron, Captain von Hammerstein of this squad- 
 
 * French hussar squadron of the 5th Regiment, escort of Marshal 
 Bazaine. 
 
German Cavalry at Yionville. 163 
 
 ron, and all the platoon leaders, who had pushed through 
 the 15th Ulans, were with their regimental commander in 
 front of the regiment. When soon afterward the brigade 
 commander ordered the retreat, the commander of the 3d 
 Ulans remained halted with the 4th platoon of his 4th squad- 
 ron under a brisk infantry and artillery fire, assembled his 
 two squadrons, and followed the other two regiments of the 
 brigade only upon specific o^der, at a walk, and wheeling 
 twice about and facing the enemy. 
 
 The 1st and 2d squadrons, as well as three platoons of 
 the 3d squadron of the 9th Dragoons (the divisional cavalry 
 of the 19th Infantry Division), had reached the battle-field 
 from Nov^ant with the detachment of Colonel von Lynker; 
 they were under command of Major von Studnitz,* and joined 
 the 6th Cavalry Division at 9 a. m. in its position in the ravine 
 Gorze — Tronville, taking position on the right of the 15th 
 Ulans. t They took part in the movement just described in 
 the same relative position, and continued to act with this 
 division. 
 
 In like manner the 1st and 2d squadrons a d two platoons 
 of the 4th squadron of the 12th Dragoons, :j: which had been 
 assigned to the 12th Infantry Division as divisional cavalry, 
 
 joined in the movement of the 6th Cavalry Division to the 
 
 ♦The regimental staff, the 4th squadron, and one platoon of the 
 3d squadron remained with the detachment; during the subsequent 
 course of the battle they went wherever they hoped to find an oppor- 
 tunity, and succeeded repeatedly in tailing an effective part. 
 
 tThe official map of the battle of Mars-la-Tour, at 12 o'clock noon, 
 shows the 9th Dragoons to the right and 500 paces in front of the 15th 
 XJlans.— Translator. 
 
 1 The M squadron of the regiment had been detached to the right 
 flank to join the second battalion of the Body Guard Regiment; two 
 platoons of the 4th squadron to join the 10th Infantry Brigade. 
 
164 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 left of the 16th Hussars and connecting their left with the 
 right of the three squadrons of the 9th Dragoons.* 
 
 Both regiments came within the most effective fire, but 
 not in contact with the enemy. 
 
 Although of all these regiments the 15th Ulans alone 
 had partially succeeded in "cutting in," still the whole move- 
 ment had not remained without some influence on the course 
 of the battle. The hostile infantry desisted from its advance 
 southwestward beyond the chauss^e and returned to its 
 rifle-trenches, the hostile cavalry disappeared entirely from 
 this part of the battle-field and did not again appear south 
 of K^zonville, the batteries to the north of the chauss^e took 
 a more rearward position, and the 5th and 6th Infantry Divi- 
 sions escaped for the moment from a most serious situation. 
 
 In the course of the movement the regiments had tra- 
 versed a distance of nearly 5,000 paces and back to the place 
 of assembly, altogether more than a German mile. 
 
 The division remained in this pJace southwest of Fla- 
 
 vigny until about 4 p. m., when the fire of a renewed hostile 
 
 advance from the north (St. Marcel — Bruville) compelled it 
 
 to retire to the great ravine Tronville — Gorze at its junction 
 
 with the ravine coming down from the farmstead of Sauley. 
 
 ♦The official map of the battle of Mars-la-Toiir. at 12 o'clock noon, 
 shows the 12th Draisroons 200 paces to the right and 400 paces to the 
 front of the 9th Drasroons. According: to the text, the 9th Drag:oons 
 and 12th Draj?oons would have been in line abreast of each other and 
 between the 14th and 15th Brigades, while the oflScial map shows 
 these brigades posted with an interval of about 100 paces only, and 
 the 9th and 12th Dragoons, who could not possibly have found space 
 in this interval, are shown a considerable distance in front. In their 
 position the 12th Dragoons could connect their left with the right of 
 the 9th Dragoons, but it is not clear how they could have been on the 
 left of the 16th Hussars. In this particular the author's sources were 
 evidently defective.— Trans^afor. 
 
Qerman Cavalry at Yionville. 165 
 
 While these things were happening around Flavigny 
 and to the east of it between 11 a. m. and 1 p. m., the rest of the 
 cavalry present on the battle-field had not been idle. 
 
 The 11th and 12th Brigades,, as we know, sought and 
 found shelter on the west of the Tronville copses from the 
 hostile artillery fire, which became more and more vehement 
 and effective. Soon afterward, about 11 a. m., the 13th 
 Dragoons of the 12th Brigade, after being rejoined by the 
 4th squadron,* had been thrown forward toward St. Marcel 
 and Bruville to height 277, where hostile bodies began to 
 show themselves, particularly near the former place. Soon 
 afterward hostile detachments of all arms began to appear 
 at Bruville also, but disappeared again. 
 
 Meanwhile the Cth Infantry Division had come in action 
 near Vionville with good result, but the whole III. Corps 
 was now engaged from the wood of Vionville to the copses 
 of Tronville north of the chaussee. In consequence the com- 
 manding general, Lieutenant-General von Alvensleben, made 
 increased efforts to have some reserves in hand for this long 
 line, and to strengthen it as much as possible. For this pur- 
 pose there were in the first place available two brigades (11th 
 and 12th) of the 5th Cavalry Division, which, with this view, 
 had been moved to Tronville about noon, taking position in 
 the triangle between the chauss^es Vionville — Tronville and 
 Vionville — Mars-la-Tour,onthe northern slopes of height 288. 
 They were facing northeast; the 11th Brigade was on the 
 right, the 12th on the left; the 13th Dragoons remained on 
 the heights south of Bruville, and the last named brigade thus 
 
 ♦Detached to Floury. See foot-note page 136. 
 
166 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 numbered but two regiments, the 7th Cuiriassiers and 16th 
 Ulans. 
 
 xVt this time the enemy was making renewed efforts to 
 regain the lost ground. Marshal Canrobert, whose corps, as 
 stated above, was engaged north of the chauss^e, extended 
 his right for the purpose of turning the Prussian left. An 
 attack from St. Marcel by entirely fresh troops became also 
 more Imminent every minute. Despite all its efforts, the 
 Prussian infantry failed to gain and hold any considerable 
 ground beyond the line Flavigny — Vionville. The French 
 batteries on the heights northeast of R^zonville rendered 
 every advance nugatory; the 1st Division (Tixier's) of Canro- 
 bert's Corps, in the woods north of the Roman road, prevant.d 
 any attempt against these batteries. 
 
 The commanding general of the III. Army Corps, Lieu- 
 tenant-General von Alvensleben, perceived the necessity of 
 terminating this state of affairs, as it threatened to become 
 ruinous if allowed to develop further. He now ordered the 
 three battalions of Colonel Lehmann into the Tronville 
 copses* to meet the danger threatening from the north, and 
 directed Lieutenant-General von Rheinbaben to send one of 
 his brigades against the hostile advance between the Roman 
 road and the great chauss^e, and to detach another around 
 the Tronville copses by the west to cooperate with Colonel 
 Lehmann's detachment in covering the left of the 6th In- 
 fantry Division. 
 
 ♦3^2 battalions, 1 battery of the 37th Infantry Brigade had been 
 detached by the X. Corps from Thiaucourt toward Chambley to cover 
 the right flank of the corps, and had there taken part in the engage- 
 ment of the III. Corps. 
 
German Cavalry at Viouville. 167 
 
 In pursuance to these arrangements, Colonel von Voigts- 
 Rhetz, chief of staff of the III. Corps, rode up to Major- 
 General von Bredow and asked him to comply with what had 
 been agreed upon between Lieutenant-Generals von Alvens* 
 leben and von Rheinbaben, and to advance past the woods 
 in front — pointing toward the Tronville copses — against the 
 enemy's infantry and artillery. The colonel added that we 
 had taken Vionville; that the hostile infantry between the 
 wood and the chaussc^e must*be overthrown to render an 
 advance of our infantry beyond the village practicable; also 
 that by an early and vigorous attack the general could con- 
 tribute materially toward a successful issue. 
 
 The task as stated was definite and left no doubt, nor did 
 Major-General von Bredow hesitate to proceed to its vigorous 
 execution. Believing the infantry which appeared in the 
 Tronville copses before him to be hostile, he decided to send 
 two squadrons there to cover the left flank of his charge. 
 These squadrons were considered lost under any circum- 
 stances, and the lot was cast to determine which of the eight 
 squadrons should sacrifice themselves for their comrades. 
 The lot fell on the 3d squadron of the 7th Cuirassiers and on 
 the 1st squadron of the IGth Ulans. Their task, however, 
 as events proved, was the less dangerous of the two, for, as 
 we know, the copses w^ere held by Prussian infantry, and 
 although the squadrons came under the enemy's infantry 
 fire, they suffered but little loss and formed afterward the 
 nucleus around which the brigade rallied. 
 
 The remaining six squadrons of the brigade* advanced 
 
 *lst, 2d, and 4th of the 7th Cuirassiers, and 2d, 3d, and 4th of the 
 IGth Ulans. 
 
168 Ca-valnj Studies. 
 
 toward Vionville in closed line of squadrons in platoon col- 
 umns, the cuirassiers leading, crossed west of Vionville to 
 the north side of the chauss^e, passed by the left of a Prus- 
 sian battery in action there, changed direction half left, de- 
 scended into the bottom which extends from the north of 
 Vionville toward Bruville, and deployed to the right under 
 effective artillery fire. 
 
 The 7th Cuirassiers were on the left, and had nine pla- 
 toons in line and two in rear of the left;* the 16th Ulans were 
 on the right, with all three squadrons in line and slightly in 
 rear as a sort of second line. In this formation the brigade 
 made a slight wheel to the half right and advanced at a gal- 
 lop against the hostile batteries in action on the western 
 edge of the ridge northwest of R^zonville. 
 
 As the 12th Brigade descended into the bottom to form 
 for the charge, Major von Koerber, who during the previous 
 conflicts had held his four horse batteries to their position 
 west of Vionville, concentrated the fire of all his guns on the 
 position of the enemy's artillery, and thus prepared the 
 charge in an effective manner by facilitating the advance of 
 the regiments. As the charge got under way, he accom- 
 panied it with a few rounds, which he fired against the enemy 
 obliquely across the right flank of the regiments — right be- 
 fore their feet, as it were. 
 
 This artillery fire engaged the enemy's attention so com- 
 pletely that the 12th Brigade succeeded in traversing the 
 distance of 1,500 paces to the nearest batteries of the enemy 
 
 *The first platoon of the 1st squadron was detached on relay 
 service and did not rejoin the regiment until after the end of the 
 combat. 
 
. V^-^ OF TB* ^^ 
 
170 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 without much loss, and in surprising them in headlong charge. 
 
 But let the regiments tell their own stories. 
 
 Major Count von Schmettow, commanding the 7th Cui 
 rassiers,* says: 
 
 ''We penetrated into the first battery, of which but two 
 guns succeeded in firing. The battery commander and all 
 the men were cut down. Conscious of the prime necessity of 
 overthrowing as many of the enemy as possible between the 
 wood and chauss^e, the regiment, under a flanking infantry 
 fire from the wood, threw itself upon a second battery and 
 an infantry column. Whatever of this battery did not reach 
 the shelter of its infantry was cut down. According to the 
 instructions given by Major-General von Bredow, we were 
 not to stop at the first line to make prisoners, but to charge 
 the second line at once. In execution of these instructions 
 the regiment cut down and stabbed everything within reach. 
 Arriving thiis at the foot of the elevation which marked the 
 enemy's main position,'t-two squadrons of hostile cuirassiers:): 
 suddenly assailed the regiment in rear, which now had every 
 avenue of escape cut off except on the right. In selecting 
 this route we retreated pell-mell with the French cuirassiers, 
 who attacked with little energy, and some of whom accom- 
 panied us on their runaway horses to the rear of our infantry, 
 where they were cut down." 
 
 The 16th Ulans state: 
 
 *The commander of the regriment Lieutenant-Colonel von Lar- 
 isch, had his arm broken by a fall of his horse while marching throngh 
 the Palatinate, and had to remain behind. 
 
 tWestern slope of heigrht 311 north of Rgzonville. 
 
 „, i^^ t^® "^th Cuirassiers of the 2d Brigade (Do Grnmont's) of the 
 3d (L>e Forton's) Reserve Cavalry Division. 
 
German Cavalry at Yionville. , 171 
 
 *'The hostile battery, whose left wing we struck, was 
 traversed. Men and horses were for the most part cut down, 
 so that the guns were reduced to silence. In rear of this bat- 
 tery the regiment struck another, and, more toward the 
 chauss^e, infantry squares also, which were posted on a hill, 
 and rode down the two on the right almost completely and 
 dispersed the others for the most part. 
 
 "The enemy's fire, and the long distance and the exhaus- 
 tion of the horses, had thrown the squadrons into disorder, 
 and the officers, being unable to make themselves heard above 
 the din of the battle, were powerless to hold back the men, 
 who were riding onward with terrible fury, so that the attack 
 proceeded irresistibly and struck the second line of the ene- 
 my's infantry on the heights near R^zonville, while at the 
 same time hostile cavalry came trotting forward from the 
 bottom of R^zonville and from the old Roman road, on 
 our right hussars* and chasseurs,f on our left cuirassiers.:^ 
 This new enemy was not at once perceived, because at 
 this moment a mitrailleuse battery, which had been posted 
 in rear of the first line of infantry and was in the act of 
 escaping, had been overtaken and everybody was busily 
 engaged in cutting down the drivers. The men in front 
 were thrown back, carrying those nearest with them, all 
 turned about, and now we went back, for the most part the 
 way we had come, on winded horses, in a dense crowd, ulans, 
 
 ♦This must be an error; there were no French hussars on this 
 part of the battle-field, except Marshal Bazaine's escort squadron of 
 the 5th Reffinient. which, according to French accounts, took no part 
 in this conflict. 
 
 tDivisiou de Valabrfegue. 
 
 t2d Brigade (de Graraont's) of Dc Forton's (3d) Cavalry Division. 
 
172 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 cuirassiers, hussars, chasseurs, hostile cuirassiers, dispersed 
 infantry men, cutting, stabbing, firing^ between and over 
 standing and overthrown guns and limbers, past the infantry 
 which had reassembled in knots, past the front of the hostile 
 cuirassiers, under a murderous hail of shells and rifle bullets, 
 to the rear of the Prussian batteries posted north of Vion- 
 ville, where some infantry protected the remnants of the 
 regiment and brigade. Fortunately, the hostile cavalry pur- 
 sued with little determination, and their skirmishers, which 
 (particularly those of the cuirassiers) restricted themselves 
 to the use of their firearms, were soon recalled by the trum- 
 pet. The remnants of the regiment withdrew by the bottom 
 extending toward Flavigny, where they had the joy of finding 
 the regimental standard, which the devotion and bravery of 
 four non-commissioned ofiScers and ten ulans* had barely 
 succeeded in saving." 
 
 Let us hear what impression this Prussian charge made 
 on the opponent. Lieutenant-Colonel Fay writes : 
 
 "They" — the Prussian cuirassiers and ulans — "threw 
 themselves bravely against the position," — of the French 
 batteries — "penetrated our lines, and when they reached the 
 height which conceals De Forton's Division from them, we see 
 them coming down along the woods south of Villiers as fast 
 as their horses will carry them. The opportunity for our 
 cavalry is too good; it is put in motion at once with sabers 
 
 ♦These brave men were Sergeant Gaebler, standard-bearer, Sa*- 
 geant Hause, the non-commissioned officers Prange and Hoppe (the 
 latter falling a victim of his devotion), Lance Corporal Grosch,and the 
 ulans Liihmann, Vogel, Zunder, Menger, SoUe, and Mewes. The 
 names of the other three could not be ascertained. 
 
German Cavalry at Yionville, 173 
 
 drawn, our Dragoon Brigade,* and soon afterward the 7th 
 Cuirassiers, throw themselve's on these masses, which are 
 surprised by the unexpected encounter; two squadrons of 
 the cuirassiers assail from the rear, and throw them in com- 
 plete disorder after inflicting considerable loss." 
 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Bonie says: 
 
 "After he" — the enemy — "had begun to silence our guns 
 by the fire of his own,t he throws forward two Echelons of 
 cavalry with 100 meters distance, the cuirassiers in first line, 
 the ulans in second. This column approaches at the charg- 
 ing gallop, breaks through our foot chasseurs, sabers the 
 batteries, and seeks to retreat when arrived in rear of the 
 last line of our infantry. But the enemy has been unaware 
 of the presence of our cavalry, which now surprises and an- 
 nihilates him." 
 
 We have recounted above, in consequence of what move- 
 ments the divisions of De Forton and De Valabr^gue had 
 taken position near the wood which skirts the Roman road. 
 On arriving there, the two brigades of General de Forton had 
 formed column of regiments, right in front, and subsequently 
 made several changes of front in order to face toward R^zon- 
 ville or Vionville, according to circumstances. After its 
 last movement, the 2d Brigade:}: were in inversion, the regi- 
 ments in brigade as well as the squadrons in the regiment. 
 In this formation the brigade was led forward to the plateau, 
 its rear resting on the wood, close to the Roman road. 
 
 *Murat's Brigade (1st) of the 3d (De Forton's) Reserve Cavalry- 
 Division. 
 
 tThe batteries of Major von Koerber. 
 JDe Gramont's, 7th and 10th Cuirassiers. 
 
174 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 "After the hostile horsemen had traversed our batteries, 
 General de Forton charged them with his dragoons and part 
 of his cuirassiers. They advanced with deployed regiments 
 and threw themselves on the approaching lines. At the col- 
 lision the 9th Dragoons broke through the Prussian cuiras- 
 siers, who readily opened their ranks and turned to the right 
 and left in order to retreat to the position of our artillery and 
 rejoin the ulans which had already passed them in retreat. 
 At the end of their charge, the latter had turned about in 
 order to retreat, but were even then assailed by the remaining 
 squadrons of our cuirassiers at the mere call 'Attention, les 
 cuirassiers! PartezP As this call failed to designate any 
 formation, the advance was made in disorderly crowds; the 
 officers had to put their horses to their best speed in order to 
 remain at the head of their men, who were going full tilt. A 
 terrible confusion resulted; the 16th Ulans, taken in flank 
 and overthrown, were cut down and briskly pursued until the 
 white column of the cuirassiers approached and rescued 
 them. In consequence of the long distance covered at a gal- 
 lop, the horses were completely blown and at the end of their 
 strength. At this moment the horsemen of De Valabr^gue's 
 Division, joining those of General de Forton, threw them- 
 selves upon the enemy; everything became intermixed as in 
 a tornado, and both sides fought with frenzy. The fury of 
 our men was so great, every one was so much engaged with 
 his opponent, that the slaughter continued although the rally 
 was sounded. In a few moments the hostile cavalry was 
 destroyed, the ground covered with the bodies of the ulans 
 and white iron-clad riders. Those alone who had the best 
 
Germafi Cavalry at Vionville, 175 
 
 mounts or were made prisoners escaped the slaughter. At 
 this time the infantry from Vionville began to cover the 
 ground where the 7th Cuirassiers were fighting with a severe 
 fire, the recall was again sounded, and our regiments were 
 re-formed {reformes) and withdrawn to the bottom of Grave- 
 lotte." 
 
 Borne along by a five-fold* superior hostile cavalry, 
 which was perfectly fresh and attacked almost from a halt, 
 fired into during retreat by £he remnants of the hostile in- 
 fantry, the greater part of what was left of the regiments 
 passed between Flavigny and Vionville and was rallied in 
 the bottom to the southwest of the latter place. Smaller de- 
 
 * According to French reports, the following rode against the 12th 
 Brigade at the end of its charge: the divisions of De Forton and De 
 Valabregue, each four regiments strong according to the order of 
 battle above given. Even considering that the French regiments 
 were weali and numbered no more than 400 to 500 horses, dependent 
 upon whether they consisted of four or five squadrons; that the 
 dragoon regiments of Murat's Brigade of De Forton's Division had 
 suffered not inconsiderable losses that morning near Vionville, and 
 had therefore not more than 500 horses in ranks; that one squadron 
 of the 4th Regiment of Chasseurs h Cheval of De Valabregue's (1st) 
 Brigade had been detached as escort to Marshal Bazaine, and that 
 this regiment had no more than 400 horses in its four squadrons- 
 still those eight regiments numbered: 
 
 1st and 9th Dragoons, each 4 squadrons, @ 300. . . 600 horses. 
 
 7th and 10th Cuirassiers, each 4 squadrons,® 400. . 800 horses. 
 
 4th Chasseurs S, Cheval, 4 squadrons. 400 horses. 
 
 5th Chasseurs a Cheval, 5 squadrons 500 horses. 
 
 7th and 12th Dragoons, each 4 squadrons, @ 400. . 800 horses. 
 
 Total, 3,100 horses. 
 
 As against these the Prussian horsemen rode in 23 platoons, 11 
 of the 7th Cuirassiers, and 12 of the 16th Ulans. 
 
 According to the last preceding return of the 5th Cavalry Di- 
 vision, dated August 11th, the regiments of the same numbered on an 
 average 560 horses, which gives 35 horses per platoon (16 platoons in 
 a regiment), and for these 23 platoons 805 horses. Considering the 
 losses suffered by these squadrons before coming in collision with the 
 enemy's cavalry, which would leave little over 600 horses, an estimate 
 of five-fold superiority on the part of the French cavalry is hardly 
 placed too high. 
 
176 Ca/valry Studies, 
 
 tachments and individual dispersed men reached our in- 
 fantry, which fought east of the Tronville copses, and re- 
 joined their regiments by way of Mars-la-Tour. 
 
 ' Three platoons were formed of the remnants of the cui- 
 rassiers. Upon arrival of the 3d squadron, which had been 
 sent against the Tronville copses, and of the first platoon of 
 the 1st squadron, which had been detached on relay service, 
 the regiment was formed in 2 squadrons of 4 platoons of 11 
 files, altogether 220 men of all ranks. 
 
 Deducting the scattered men which rejoined during the 
 next few days, the losses of the regiment were as follows: 
 dead, 1 officer, 43 men, 33 horses; wounded, 6 officers, 72 
 men, 25 horses; missing, 83 men, 203 horses; total, 7 officers, 
 198 men, 261 horses. 
 
 Second-Lieutenants von Ploetz and Count Sierstorpf 
 died of their wounds; Captain Meyer was among the killed. 
 
 Six officers and 80 men of the 16th Ulans assembled at 
 first near Flavigny; 2 officers and 15 men rejoined by way 
 of Mars-la-Tour. Upon the arrival of the 1st squadron, which 
 had been sent against the Tronville copses, and of a few other 
 detachments, the regiment had in ranks in the evening 12 
 officers and 210 men, many of whom were slightly wounded. 
 
 Deducting the men who rejoined later, the losses of the 
 regiment are as follows: dead, 2 officers, 28 men, 172 
 horses; wounded, 5 officers, 101 men, 28 horses; missing, 2 
 officers, 54 men ; total, 9 officers, 183 men, 200 horses. 
 
 Second-Lieutenants von Roman and von Gellhorn were 
 killed. 
 
 The regimental commander, Von der Dollen, was miss- 
 
German Cavalry at Vionville. 177 
 
 ing, and also Second-Lieutenant Vogt; they were lying 
 wounded and helpless under their dead horses and fell in the 
 enemy's hands. 
 
 The French account, in its more poetic style, calls this 
 ride of the Prussian horsemen a "Death ride" {chevauchade de 
 mort) ; the Prussian account, with its characteristic language, 
 which confines itself strictly to facts, says : "But we are dis- 
 encumbered — from this direction no more attacks are made 
 to-day." This was the result of 'the "Death ride" for our lines; 
 those of the enemy had been broken through (traverse) ; his 
 batteries, in spite of their well-aimed fire, had been cut down 
 (sahr<e) ; his own horsemen, five-fold superior to the Prussians, 
 fresh, and who could only have had to do with the rinsings 
 of this w^ave of horsemen, had to be re-formed {reform^) and 
 withdrawn to the bottom of Gravelotte, a half a mile from 
 the field of battle. 
 
 The 7th Cuirassiers and the 16th Ulans may well be proud 
 of this "Death ride," the whole Prussian cavalry may be proud 
 of it, for all its regiments would have done the same; of this 
 the day of Vionville and Mars-la-Tour bears ample testimony. 
 
 In further execution of the above* order of Lieutenant- 
 General von Alvensleben, the 11th Brigade had, simultane- 
 ously with the advance of the 12th Brigade toward Vionville, 
 moved by the west of the Tronville copses toward Bruville 
 to the point where the 13th Dragoons were already in obser- 
 vation to meet any danger to the left flank of the fighting 
 troops. Here the brigade took position in closed line of 
 squadrons in platoon columns to the right rear of the 1.3th 
 
 *See page 166. 
 
178 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 Dragoons, the 19th Regiment forward on the plateau over- 
 looking the valley extending from St. Marcel to Bruville, on 
 their right rear the 13th lllans, on their left rear the 4th 
 Cuirassiers. 
 
 Soon after the brigade had taken position in this man- 
 ner, it was joined by the 1st Horse Battery of the Guard, 
 Captain von der Planitz, which enabled the brigade to remain 
 as long as it did in its exposed position, which would have 
 been impossible without artillery. The battery at once, di- 
 rected its fire against the hostile batteries posted south of 
 St. Marcel, drawing their fire on itself and diverting it from 
 the infantry, which was advancing south of the Tronville 
 copses, and frustrated the attack of a hostile battalion which 
 threatened the battery's right flank from a wood south of 
 St. Marcel. The 19th Dragoons, specially charged with the 
 escort of this battery, repeatedly repulsed, by short charges, 
 strong hostile skirmish lines which attempted to advance 
 from St. Marcel. 
 
 Meanwhile also the closed masses of the enemy's infantry 
 approached nearer and nearer from Bruville, and more par- 
 ticularly from St. Marcel, covered by bushes, hedges, and a 
 field covered with rows of sheaves; the fire of the skirmishers 
 began to reach the regiments of the 11th Brigade; officers, 
 men, and horses were wounded and killed. Finally, when 
 the supports of the enemy's line began to fire volleys into 
 the brigade and a mitrailleuse battery also opened, it with- 
 drew slowly in the direction of Tronville. The 13th Dra- 
 goons, though belonging to the 12th Brigade, joined in the 
 movement of the 11th Brigade. The battery of Captain von 
 
German Cavalry at Vionville. 179 
 
 der Planitz retreated in the direction of Mars-la-Tour, came 
 in action again for a short time north of this place, and then 
 joined the 1st Dragoons of the Guard, with whom it had 
 originally arrived on the battle-field.* 
 
 The arrival of the 20th Infantry Division at Tronville, 
 and its advance against the great chauss^e and the copses 
 to the north of the same, made the further presence of the 
 11th Cavalry Brigade at this point needless. In order not to 
 expose it to further useless losses, the brigade was withdrawn 
 to the southwest of Tronville and took position, 13th Ulans, 
 13th and 19th Dragoons, in the angle between the highroads 
 Buxi^res — Mars-la-Tour and Puxieux — Tronville, and to the 
 north of the latter. The 4th Cuirassiers were posted at the 
 southeast corner of Tronville, near the Gorze road, in sup- 
 port of the 20th Infantry Division and as right flank guard 
 of the batteries of the X. Corps, which were in action north 
 of the village. 
 
 The brigade here also came in touch with the 10th Hus- 
 sars, belonging to the 13th Brigade, who had withdrawn to 
 the deep ground north of Puxieux. when their exposed posi- 
 tion between the great chauss(^e and the southernmost part 
 of the Tronville copses was rendered untenable by the prog- 
 ress which the infantry fight made inside the wood. 
 
 The batteries of the X. Corps mentioned, having been re- 
 inforced by two additional battwies, advanced for the pres- 
 ent to, and subsequently beyond, the great chauss^e between 
 Mars-la-Tour and the Tronville copses. 
 
 ♦Compare foot-note page 180. 
 
180 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 The commanding general of the X. Corps, General of 
 Infantry von Voigts-Khetz, who had been on the field for 
 some time, directed that two squadrons of the 4th Cuirassiers 
 cover these batteries on the left, toward Mars-la-Tour. The 
 4th and 5th squadrons were detailed for this duty; they 
 trotted forward in the direction of Mars-la-Tour about 4 p. m., 
 under command of Major von Kuylenstierna, and took posi- 
 tion at the northwest corner of the southern one of the copses. 
 
 Soon afterward Von Wedell's (38th) Brigade of Lieu- 
 tenant-General von Schwarzkoppen^s (19th) Infantry Divi- 
 sion reached Mars-la-Tour and advanced in deployed line of 
 battle against the hostile divisions of Grenier and Cissey of 
 the IV. Corps (De Ladmirault's), which had moved forward 
 to the height south of the farmstead of Gr^y^re. The heroic 
 attack failed on account of the enemy's enormous superiority 
 of numbers and position. The debris poured back toward 
 Mars-la-Tour and across the chauss^e, briskly pursued by the 
 enemy. 
 
 Again it fell to the lot of the cavalry to restore the fight 
 by throwing itself into the dangerous gap. 
 
 The Dragoon Brigade of the Guard* had been placed 
 under the orders of the X. Corps on the 15th of August, and 
 had started with it from Thiaucourt early on the 16th in the 
 direction of Fresnes en Wo^vre. 
 
 The 2d squadron of the 2d Dragoons of the Guard did not 
 march with it, but had, as above mentioned, marched with 
 two horse batteries of the X. Corps, under the direction of 
 
 ♦1st and 2d Dragoons of the Guard, 1st Horse Battery of the 
 Guard. . 
 
German Cavalry at Vionville. 181 
 
 Lieutenant-Colonel von Caprivi^ to join the 5th Cavalry Divi- 
 sion, and, in conjunction with the 13th Brigade, found re- 
 peated opportunity to take a distinguished part in the 
 mounted conflicts near Vionville and Flavigny. The remain- 
 ing three squadrons were attached to the 19th Infantry Di- 
 vision (Von Schwarzkoppen's), whose divisional cavalry regi- 
 ment (the 9th Dragoons) was already in action on the battle- 
 field in conjunction with the detachment of Colonel von 
 Lynker at the point where the latter attacked in conjunction 
 with the 6th Cavalry Division.* These three squadrons con- 
 stituted the advance guard, the point being formed by the 
 3d squadron (Captain John's), from which a platoon was de- 
 tached to the right to establish communication with Colonel 
 Lehmann's detachment. The rest of the squadron General 
 of Infantry von Voigts-Rhetz took with him as escort, when 
 he left the line of march of the division which he had accom- 
 panied, in order to ride toward the sound of the guns coming 
 from Metz and to convince himself by personal inspection of 
 its import. The squadron remained with him during the sub- 
 sequent course of the battle, came under effective hostile fire, 
 and suffered some losses, particularly when temporarily 
 escorting a battery of the X. Corps which was advancing 
 without special escort ; but it had no opportunity to take an 
 active part. Two of its officers, the Second Lieutenants von 
 Tiimpling and Count zu Stolberg, were dispatched to guide 
 the 1st Dragoons of the Guard with the battery of Von der 
 Planitz, and the 19th Infantry Division, respectively, to the 
 battle-field. 
 
 ♦Compare page 163. 
 
182 • Cavalry Studies. 
 
 The 5th squadron (Captain von Trotha's) took the lead 
 in place of the 3d. Upon arrival at MarchcSville en Wo^vre, 
 it posted outposts to cover the troops of the division which 
 were going into bivouac. The latter, however;, was soon 
 abandoned, and the march resumed in an easterly direction 
 toward Mars-la-Tour. 
 
 The 1st Dragoons of the Guard with the battery of Cap- 
 tain von der Planitz had preceded the division in the direction 
 of St. Hilaire, and were resting there when the latter arrived. 
 The sound of guns resounding from the direction of Metz had 
 been heard here for some time, but it did not seem advisable 
 to march toward it, as the head of th^ 19th Infantry Division 
 would have been uncovered. When the latter reached St. 
 Hilaire, permission to march in the direction of Metz was 
 requested and granted. 
 
 While the 19th Infantry Division, with whom the 4th 
 and 5th squadrons of the 2d Dragoons of the Guard had 
 remained, was posting outposts near March^ville,* the 1st 
 Dragoons of the Guard and the battery of Von der Planitz 
 trotted briskly toward the sound of the guns. 
 
 They were soon followed by the 19th Infantry Division, 
 which had received orders from its commanding general to 
 hasten to the battle-field. To re-establish communication 
 with the 1st Dragoons of the Guard, the 4th squadron of the 
 2d Dragoons of the Guard, under Captain von Hindenburg, 
 was at once sent after them ; it was accompanied by the regi- 
 mental commander, Colonel von Finken tein. The 5th squad- 
 
 ♦Near St. Hilaire on tlie Verdun Road. 
 
German Cavalry at Vionville. 183 
 
 ron remained with the 19th Infantry Division, and marched 
 at the head of the column. 
 
 When about half a mile west of Mars-la-Tour, this 
 squadron was sent off to the north to reconnoiter toward 
 Jarny. At Ville sur Yron it observed hostile cavalry, and 
 remained there for further observation. 
 
 As the 1st Dragoons of the Guard and the battery of Von 
 der Planitz on their march toward the sound of the guns 
 approached Mars-la-Tour, denSe clouds of dust became visible 
 north of the woods in the direction of Jarny.* They could not 
 but be caused by considerable bodies of troops, which were 
 probably marching away on the chaussde Metz — Etain. 
 
 It was the duty of the cavalry to investigate; should 
 appearances turn out true, the cavalry might contribute 
 materially toward checking the enemy's retreat. The dra- 
 goon regiment and the battery therefore turned off to the 
 left from a point close to the west of Mars-la-Tour. The 4th 
 squadron of the 2d Dragoons of the Guard, just arrived from 
 the 19th Infantry Division, took the lead as advance guard, 
 followed by the 1st Dragoons of the Guard in closed line of 
 squadrons in platoon columns, and by the battery of Captain 
 von der Planitz, and thus they moved along the chauss^e to 
 Jarny. 
 
 On reaching Ville sur Yron, hostile cavalry was per- 
 ceived in the woods north of that place. This cavalry threw 
 out scouts, as did the Prussians, since reconnaissance was 
 required here, and the enemy's closed bodies did not leave the 
 wood and failed to offer an objective for a charge. 
 
 ♦On the road loading north from Mars-la-Tour. 
 
184 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 Captain von der Planitz, who did not find here an oppor- 
 tunity for the action of his battery and was attracted by the 
 artillery conflict raging in the direction of St. Marcel, re- 
 quested and received permission to take part there. The 
 very effective part taken by this battery has been detailed 
 above.* Meanwhile the hostile artillery continued to gain 
 ground between Bruville and St. Marcel, and its shells began 
 to reach the dragoons of the Prussian Guard near Ville 
 sur Yron. 
 
 The French account here states :f 
 
 ''On reaching the farmstead of Gr^y^re, General de Lad- 
 
 mirault examines the battle-field he crosses the ravine, 
 
 taking with him a 12-pounder battery, which drove back two 
 Prussian dragoon regiments that were approaching." 
 
 The account is soniewhat in error, in that it was not two 
 regiments that approached, but five squadrons belonging to 
 two different regiments. 
 
 They withdrew slowly toward Mars-la-Tour, and took 
 position southwest of the village. The battery of Captain 
 von der Planitz, which had been forced to retreat,! here 
 joined them, and a little later the heads of the 19th Infantry 
 Division also arrived. 
 
 Tlie commander of the latter, Lieutenant-General von 
 Schwarzkoppen, on going to the front to reconnoiter, per- 
 ceived the closed masses of the 20th Infantry Division in the 
 direction of Tronville; according to the information received, 
 
 *Compai'e page 178. 
 tCompare Bonie. 
 tSee page 179. 
 
German Cavalry at Yionville. 185 
 
 he had to believe his left flank covered toward Ville sur Yron 
 by cavalry (5th Cavalry Division). He therefore decided to 
 launch his attack between the two, passing by the east of 
 Mars-la-Tour. 
 
 The dragoons of the Guard were therefore directed to 
 advance by the west of Mars-la-Tour, to accompany the at- 
 tack of the 38th Brigade on the left, and to close the gap be- 
 tween the latter and the cavalry supposed to be at Ville 
 sur Yron. 
 
 In execution of these various arrangements the 38th 
 Infantry Brigade began its bold attack soon after 4 p. m. 
 
 At the same time the brigade commander, Major-General 
 Count von Brandenburg, who was with the 1st Dragoons of 
 the Guard, ordered the battery of Captain von der Planitz 
 forward to prepare the advance of the regiment and to come 
 into action north of Mars-la-Tour against the hostile cavalry, 
 which had advanced in closed masses to the farmstead of 
 Gr^y^re. The regimental commander, Colonel Count von 
 Finkenstein, joined the 4th squadron of the 2d Dragoons of 
 the Guard, which escorted the battery. 
 
 The battery came into action north of Mars-la-Tour on 
 the chauss^e to Jarny, near lieight 230, and a few shots suf- 
 ficed to cause the enemy's cavalry to withdraw behind the 
 height on which the farmstead is situated. In order to re- 
 new its fire against this cavalry, the battery, accompanied 
 by the squadron, galloped forward about 600 paces on the 
 chaussee, wheeled to the right so as to front parallel to the 
 chauss^e, and opened fire against the French cavalry, which 
 
186 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 had again come in view, and against other large bodies of 
 the enemy's right wing. 
 
 The 1st Dragoons of the Guard, however, did not accom- 
 pany that movement, having been recalled from this direc- 
 tion after taking it. The regiment was ordered to take a 
 position covering the left flank of the artillery of the X. 
 Corps, which had advanced beyond the great chaussde, and, 
 while carrying out the order, met, to the southwest of Mars- 
 la-Tour, the two squadrons of the 4th Cuirassiers which had 
 been sent there ere this.* 
 
 The attack of the 38th Infantry Brigade was dashed to 
 pieces. The 1st Dragoons of the Guard, posted southeast 
 of Mars-la-Tour, received orders from General of Infantry 
 von Voigts-Rhetz to protect the remnants, and to stem the- 
 enemy's pursuit, no matter at what cost. 
 
 It was about 5 p. m. when this order was received. The 
 regiment was in line of squadrons in platoon columns with 
 deploying intervals, the 1st squadron on the right, each squad- 
 ron right in front. The regimental adjutant, Second Lieu- 
 tenant von Dachroeden, was sent forward to reconnoiter the 
 ground and the enemy's position and to furnish the regi- 
 mental commander, Colonel von Auerswald, the requisite 
 information as to the direction to be taken under the circum- 
 stances. He returned with the report that dense bodies of 
 hostile infantry were briskly pursuing the 38th Infantry Bri- 
 gade and advancing against the heights east of Mars-la-Tour, 
 and that the terrain on the east of the village was cut up with 
 
 ♦Compare page 180. 
 
German Cavalry at Vionville. ' 187 
 
 hedges and ditches and extremely unfavorable to the move- 
 ments of cavalry. In spite of these not very promising cir- 
 cumstances, Colonel von Auerswald did not hesitate a mo- 
 ment to carry out his order. The regiment moved forward 
 to the northeast in platoon column, past Mars-la-Tour, the 
 5th squadron leading, next the 3d, and then the 1st squadron; 
 the 4th remained back as reserve. In order to overcome the 
 difficulties of the terrain, column of threes had to be formed, 
 and then again column of platoons under the effective fire of 
 hostile batteries in action north of the Ulzon brook,* so that 
 the regiment became somewhat strung out, despite the best 
 efforts of the squadrons to keep closed up. 
 
 When the first platoon of the 5th squadron got clear of 
 the difficult ground, and reached the edge of the heights to 
 the north of the chauss^e to Vionville, it was given such a 
 direction by Colonel von Auerswald as would, when w^heeling 
 into line for the charge as contemplated, bring it opposite 
 the right of the victoriously advancing infantry masses of 
 the enemy. 
 
 The rear platoons had to gallop throughout in order not 
 to lose distance. * 
 
 The 13th Regiment of the Line, of the French Brigade of 
 Bellecourt of the 2d (Grenier's) Division of the IV. Army 
 Corps, was in immediate pursuit of the 38th Prussian In- 
 fantry Brigade and had crossed the ravine (deep, with steep 
 sides) of the Ulzon brook and continued to advance southward 
 on the plateau, while the 43d Regiment of the Line remained 
 north of this ravine in second line, and parts of the 5th Chas- 
 
 *ETicleiitly the small brook north of the village. The name is not 
 given on tlie official maps. — A. L. W. 
 
188 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 seur battalion was pushing forward toward Mars-la-Tour in 
 the bushy valley. This infantry, particularly the skirmishers 
 of the 13th Regiment of the Line, were directing a severe fire 
 on the 1st Dragoons of the Guard during the movement just 
 described. The losses increased every minute. Under these 
 circumstances. Colonel von Auerswald deemed it necessary 
 to reach. the enemy as quickly as possible, and ordered the 
 platoons to wheel right into line before the 1st squadron had 
 completely cleared the difficult ground. As soon as sufficient 
 ground had been gained, the chief of this squadron. Count 
 Wesdehlen, ordered the platoons to wheel right into line, and 
 followed the preceding squadrons, which had formed line 
 ere this, in such a manner that during the ensuing advance 
 the right flank of his squadron skirted the road to St. Marcel. 
 The regiment was thus in proper order of battle, the 1st 
 squadron on the right, but the squadrons were inverted, the 
 1st platoon being on the left. 
 
 Soon after the 3d and 5th squadrons had formed line, 
 the signal "Gallop!" was given, followed immediately by 
 "March! March!" The 1st squadron followed a moment 
 later, upon command or signal by its chief. 
 
 The brigade commander (w^ho was present) and his staff 
 joined the charge on the right of the regiment. 
 
 As the regiment rushed upon them, the hostile skir- 
 mishers fell back on their supports, formed groups, and 
 opened a destructive fire on the dragoons, while a mitrailleuse 
 battery north of the Ulzon brook fired volley after volley into 
 their left flank. Nevertheless, though with terribly thinned 
 ranks, the brave regiment broke into the hostile infantry 
 
German Cavalry at Vionville. 189 
 
 and whirled it, to use the language of the French account 
 around its eagles. Some of the horsemen passed between 
 the groups and succumbed to the bullets of the second French 
 line. But the enemy's advance was checked; the Prussian 
 infantry was disengaged, and the task of the regiment glori- 
 ously accomplished. Its remnants, almost without leaders, 
 as eleven officers were hors de combat, fell back on Mars-la- 
 Tour, suffering additional heavy losses in doing so. On the 
 spot from which this magnificent charge had started, Cap- 
 tain Prince von Hohenzollern rallied the remnants of the 
 three squadrons, which had charged, around his own (4th) 
 squadron, which had remained in reserve. The regimental 
 commander, Colonel von Auerswald, himself fatally wounded, 
 addressed words of thanks and appreciation to his brave 
 regiment, called for a rousing cheer for the King, and then 
 sank from his horse, never to mount again. 
 
 Almost a third of the brave horsemen were lying on the 
 field: dead, 5 officers, 1 ensign, 42 men, 204 horses; wounded, 
 6 officers, 2 ensigns, 76 men, 42 horses; missing, 5 men ;. total, 
 11 officers, 3 ensigns, 123 men. 246 horses. 
 
 The killed were Major von Kleist, the Captains and 
 Squadron Commanders Count Westarp, Henry XVII. Prince 
 of Reuss, Count Wesdehlen, the Second Lieutenant von Tres- 
 kow, and Ensign von Treskow. Colonel von Auerswald, First 
 Lieutenant Count Schwerin, and Second Lieutenant Count 
 Solms-Sonnenwalde (whose appointment reached him just 
 before his death) succumbed to their wounds, while the Sec- 
 ond Lieutenants von Rohr III., von Kroecher, Count Strach- 
 
190 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 witz, and Count Stolberg-Rosla, and Ensign Count Bis- 
 marck L* (who was doing oflBcer's duty) recovered. 
 
 One squadron was formed of the remnants of the three 
 which had charged; it withdrew to Xonville in company 
 with the 4th squadron, both bivouacking there in the evening. 
 
 Captain Prince von Hohenzollern assumed command of 
 the regiment. 
 
 The 4th and 5th squadrons of the 4th Cuirassiers en- 
 deavored to join the charge of the 1st Dragoons of the Guard 
 on the right ; but, receiving severe infantry and mitrailleuse 
 fire from front and-flank, their advance, however brave;, could 
 have no important result. They withdrew, leaving three 
 oflScers wounded, and some thirty men and horses dead and 
 wounded, on the field, and re-formed near Tronville, where 
 they met the remaining two squadrons of the regiment late 
 in the evening. 
 
 According to the accounts of the 5th Cavalry Division, 
 it was not until this time that Major-General von Bar by re- 
 ceived orders to advance, with the regiments he then had with 
 him, by the west of Mars-la-Tour, to prevent the enemy's fur- 
 ther advance by pressure upon his right. 
 
 The 13th Dragoons (posted on the left) leading, in their 
 rear the 13th Ulans and 19th Dragoons, then the 1st and 3d 
 squadrons of the 4th Cuirassiers, the 10th Hussars and 16th 
 Dragoonsf all trotted off in a northwesterly direction, skirted 
 Mars-la-Tour on the south, and, when north of the chaus- 
 
 *Son of the German Chancellor, Another son rode in the ranks 
 as a private.— A. L. W. 
 
 tDivlsional cavalry regiment of the 20th Infantry Division. 
 
192 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 s6e to Verdun, advanced over the western slopes of the 
 height, the 13th Dragoons skirting the Mars-la-Tour — Jarny 
 chauss^e. 
 
 In first line are: on the right the 19th Dragoons, then 
 the two squadrons of the 4th Cuirassiers, on the left the 13th 
 Ulans; in second line: on the right the 10th Hussars, num- 
 bering but three squadrons, on the left the 16th Dragoons. 
 The formation was in part open, in part closed line of squad- 
 rons in platoon columns. 
 
 While passing by Mars-la-Tour the 3d squadron of the 
 13th Ulans (Captain Schlick's) was detached to the 19th In- 
 fantry Division, which was without cavalry and needed it 
 urgently, to assemble with its assistance the dispersed rem- 
 nants of the 38th Brigade. 
 
 The 13th Dragoons came in touch with the enemy before 
 long. For a proper understanding of this and subsequent 
 events, some knowledge of what meanwhile happened on the 
 enemy's side is requisite. 
 
 It has been stated above* that General de Ladmirault 
 hurried forward in advance of his (IV.) corps, which had 
 turned off to the left from the Gravelotte — Doncourt chaus- 
 s^e and was marching on Bruville, and placed a 12-pounder 
 battery in action at the Gr^y^re farm against the 1st Dra- 
 goons of the Guard. The appearance of hostile troeps on his 
 right made him uneasy for his battery, and he ordered the 5th 
 Battalion of Foot Chasseurs of the 1st (Bellecourt's) Brigade 
 of the 2d (Grenier's) Division into the valley intervening be- 
 tween the heights of Gr^y^re and Ville sur Yron, and posted 
 * Compare page 183. 
 
German Cavalry at Vionville. 193 
 
 the 98th Regiment of the Line of the 2d (Pradier's) Brigade 
 of the same division in the farmstead. As this failed to sat- 
 isfy him, he decided to oppose all his available cavalry to the 
 opponent, who threatened his flank. 
 
 The French account states:* "About 500 meters from 
 the farmstead of Gr^y^re, in rear of our right flank, was the 
 2d Regiment of Chasseurs d'Afrique under the command of 
 General du Barail. They were subsequently joined by Le- 
 grand's Division.f with the exception of the 11th Dragoons, 
 which were in reserve in rear of the infantry. General de 
 France, with the dragoons and lancers of the Guard, was also 
 on the height. Lastly, De Cl^rembault's Division;]: of the 
 
 *Bouie. 
 
 ^Cavalry division of the IV. Corps: 
 
 General Legi'and. 
 
 Chief of Staff, Colonel Campenon. 
 1st brigade: 
 
 General de Montaigu, 
 
 2d Hussars, 
 
 7th Hussars. 
 2d brigade: 
 
 General de Gondrecom-t, 
 
 3d Dragoons, 
 
 11th Dragoons. 
 Total, 1,800 horses, 
 t Cavalry division of the III. Corps: 
 
 General de Clerembault. 
 
 Chief of Staff, Colonel Jouffroy d'Abbaus. 
 1st brigade: 
 
 General de Bruchard, 
 
 2d Chasseurs, 
 
 3d Chasseiu-s, 
 
 10th Chasseurs. 
 2d brigade: 
 
 General de Maubranchos 
 
 2d Dragoons, 
 
 4tli Dragoons. 
 3d brigade: " 
 
 General de Juniac, 
 
 5th Dragoons, 
 
 8th Dragoons. 
 Total, 3,100 horses. 
 
194 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 III. Armv Corps was near Bruville. The chasseur regiments 
 of this division had been weakened by detachments furnished 
 to the Infantry Divisions. De Juniac's Brigade was at the 
 time with Marshal Leboeuf, commander of the III. Army 
 Corps."* 
 
 "Toward 4 :30 p. m. a battery separated itself from the 
 hostile cavalry to take us in right flank, and took position on 
 the road about abreast of the farmstead of Gr^y^re.f To 
 silence its fire, General de Ladmirault directed the Generals 
 
 *On the French side the following cavalry, which was entirely 
 
 fresh and had not yet been under fire, was therefore assembled near 
 
 the farmstead of Grey ere and available at any moment: 
 
 2d Chasseurs d'Af rique, 5 squadrons 500 horses. 
 
 2d and 7th Hussars, 5 squadrons each, @ 500 1,000 horses. 
 
 3d Dragoons, 4 squadrons 400 horses. 
 
 Dragoons and Lancers of the Guard, each 5 squad- 
 rons, @ 500 1,000 horses. 
 
 Total in first line 2,900 hoi-ses. 
 
 2d, 3d, and 10th Chasseurs k Cheval,each 4 squad- 
 rons, detachments having been furnished to 
 the infantry, @ 400 1,200 horses. 
 
 2d and 4th Dragoons, each 4 squadrons, @ 400. . . 800 horses. 
 
 Total in second line 2,000 horses. 
 
 Grand total 4,900 horses. ^ 
 
 As against this cavalry there were brought forward by Major- 
 General von Barby, or were near Ville sur Yron, the following regi- 
 ments, all of which had been under fire and in the saddle since day- 
 break, the strength being based on the average strength given in the 
 return for August 11th: 
 
 19th Dragoons 560 horses. 
 
 13th Ulans (3 squadrons) 420 horses. 
 
 4th Cuirassiers (2 squadrons) 280 horses. 
 
 13th Dragoons 560 horses. 
 
 10th Hussars (3 squadrons) 420 horses. 
 
 16th Dragoons 560 horses. 
 
 2d Dragoons of the Guard (2 squadrons) 280 horses. 
 
 Total, 3,080 horses. 
 
 Not counting the losses already suffered on this day. 
 tBattery Planitz; compare page 185. • 
 
German Cavalry at Yionville. 195 
 
 du Barail, Legrand, and De France to disencumber his right 
 flank. General du Barail crossed the valley with the 2d 
 Chasseurs d'Afrique, wheeled to the left, and, charging as 
 foragers {en fourageurs), threw himself on the guns, which 
 had barely time to fire ; the chasseurs cut down those artiller- 
 ists who had no time to escape, but, meeting superior forces,* 
 they turned off to the right, assembled in the angle between 
 the road and the wood.f and held the enemy in check by a 
 brisk fire. After this splendid feat, the battery did not again 
 make its appearance.'^ 
 
 Let us see what the Prussian accounts have to say of this 
 splendid feat, the non-reappearance of the battery. 
 
 We left the battery of Captain von der Planitz at the 
 moment when it took up its second position against the ene-^ 
 my's masses of cavalry near the farmstead of Gr^y^re. Soon 
 afterward a hostile company deployed as skirmishers near 
 the farmstead and directed a very accurate fire against the 
 battery.:}: while almost at the same time the 2d Chasseurs 
 d'Afrique charged it on the left. 
 
 The 4th squadron of the 2d Dragoons of the Guard ad- 
 vanced to meet them and broke the force of the charge, so 
 that the battery gained time to withdraw and take up a posi- 
 tion close to Mars-la-Tour on the north of the village for the 
 protection of the regiments which now took part in the action, 
 under Major-General von Barby's leadership. 
 
 The success of the chasseurs d'Afrique was not such as 
 
 *18tji Dragoons; compare below paj?e 194. 
 t Meaning the wood of Grr6ySre north of Ville sur Yron. 
 tProbably a company of the 5th Battalion of Foot Chassem*s, 
 which had been ordered into the valley by General de Ladmiranlt. 
 
196 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 it appeared to the latter, for, according to the official returns, 
 the battery lost: dead, 3 horses; wounded, 3 men, 4 horses; 
 total, 3 men, 7 horses. These losses, the battery commander 
 expressly states, "were caused exclusively by the infantry 
 skirmishers firing on the battery." 
 
 On perceiving the great superiority of the attacking 
 enemy over his own single squadron, and probably also the 
 approach of the remaining hostile regiments, which, as we 
 shall see below, had put themselves in motion soon after the 
 chasseurs d'Afrique, Colonel Count von Finkenstein has- 
 tened to the rear in the direction of Mars-la-Tour, where he 
 had noticed the 13th Dragoons, which, at the head of the regi: 
 ments of Major-General von Barby. came in view this mo- 
 ment. On his request, the regiment attacked at once, re- 
 leased the 4th squadron of the 2d Dragoons of the Guard, 
 which had been borne along by the enemy's superior numbers, 
 and drove back the French chasseurs, now themselves de- 
 fenseless, owing to the winded state of the horses and the dis- 
 order resulting from the attack, without difficulty, and with 
 such vigor that, according to French accounts,* they re- 
 treated as far as the wood of Gr^y^re and contented them- 
 selves with mere fire-action. 
 
 The brave 2d Dragoons had paid dearly for their heroic 
 devotion to the battery entrusted to their care. The leader 
 of the 4th squadron (Captain von Hindenburg) and several 
 dragoons were killed, and three officers and many men and 
 horses were wounded. 
 
 Those hostile squadrons whose approach Colonel Count 
 
 * Compare page 194. 
 
German Cavalry at Yionville. 197 
 
 von Finkenstein had observed were now about to come into 
 action. 
 
 While the 2d Chasseurs d'Afrique were making their 
 attack on the battery of Captain von der Planitz, the French 
 division of Legrand, which we left in position north of the 
 farmstead of Gr^y^re,* wheeled by platoons to the right, 
 crossed the ravine and road, and, when south of the wood of 
 Gr^y^re, wheeled by platoons to the left, the 3d Dragoons in 
 second line and overlapping fhe right of De Montaigu's Hus- 
 sar Brigade. At the same time De France's Brigade (lancers 
 and dragoons of the Guard) marched bytheright flank, crossed 
 the ravine to the right of Legrand's Division, the lancers 
 leading, and, after passing along the rear of Legrand, came 
 into line on his right rear; the lancer regiment in first line, 
 the dragoons in second line, each overlapping the right of 
 the regiment in its front, f 
 
 While engaged in the pursuit of the chasseurs d'Af rique, 
 the 13th Prussian Dragoons perceived the just described de- 
 ployment of the hostile cavalry. Colonel von Brauchitsch 
 had the rally sounded at once and assembled the regiment 
 about Ville sur Yron. 
 
 Meanwhile General Legrand had received repeated or- 
 ders from his commanding general to charge without delay. 
 With reference to the quick rally of the Prussian dragoons, 
 General du Barail said: "It is too late; the opportunity is 
 
 * Compare page 193. 
 
 tTlie French cavalry was thus formed in foiu* lines: in first line, 
 De Montaigu's Hussar Brigade; in second line and overlapping the for- 
 mer's right, the 3d Dragoons; in third line,, the lancers of the Guard, 
 overlapping the right of the dragoons; in fourth line, the dragoons of 
 the Guard, overlapping the right of the lancers. 
 
198 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 past." A colonel of hussars requested permission to shake 
 the enemy first by carbine fire, and thus prepare the charge 
 in view of the considerable distance of 2,000 paces measured 
 on the air-line. General Legrand, however, full of ardor, ex- 
 claimed: "Non; au sahreT and ordered General de Mont- 
 aigu to lead his brigade against the enemy. It advanced at 
 a gallop, a portion still in column with half distances,, not 
 well closed, but with spirit and dash. 
 
 "The German dragoons," says Lieutenant-Colonel 
 Bonie,* "awaited the charge on the spot,t and outlined 
 against the sky like giants \comme des colosses). When our 
 hussars had approached within a few paces, the Prussian 
 dragoons gave a terrible cheer, opened fire from their short 
 carbines, which were attached to the saddle,:}: quickly took 
 their sabers in hand, and descended in formidable array." 
 
 The commander of the 13th Dragoons soon noticed that 
 the hostile hussars, while advancing, endeavored to gain the 
 right flank of his regiment. To frustrate the attempt, he 
 wheeled by platoons to the right, trotted for some distance to 
 the right, wheeled into line and threw himself at a gallop 
 upon the enemy, who was quite close by that time. The 4th 
 squadron of the 2d Dragoons of the Guard, led by Col. Count 
 von Finkenstein, charged on the left of the 13th Dragoons. 
 
 The French account continues : 
 
 "The collision was terrible; the mass of our small horses, 
 
 winded by the long charge, breaks against this wall, which 
 
 *13tli Dragoons and 4tli squadron of the 2d Dragoons of the Guard. 
 
 tin addition to the considerable distance of 2,000 paces, the 
 French hussars had the disadvantage of charging up liill. 
 
 JProbably an error, ah-eady cleared up in "Reflections on the 
 Formation, Employment, and Action of Cavah'y, etc.," 1st pamphlet 
 of the Militaer WocJienblatt for 1872. page 13. 
 
German Cavalry at Yionville. 199 
 
 the enemy, much larger of stature, opposes. The 7th Hus- 
 sars turn off partly into a gap, partly against another hostile 
 regiment approaching rapidly in close column." 
 
 This hostile regiment consisted of the three squadrons 
 of the 10th Hussars. Leaving the regiments assembled at 
 Mars-la-Tour,* the 10th Hussars arrived in rear of the 13th 
 Dragoons in line of squadrons in platoon columns with de- 
 ploying intervals at the moment when this regiment wheeled 
 by platoons to the right. That movement unmasked the 3d 
 and (afterward) the 4th squadron of the Hussars (Captain 
 von Kotze and First Lieutenant von Ltibbe), f which at once 
 formed line, and, wheeling half right, attacked the French 
 hussars, which had passed partly through the gaps of the 
 13th Dragoons, partly around the left flank of the 4th squad- 
 ron of the 2d Dragoons of the Guard, and thus took them in 
 right flank. 
 
 This action of the hussar squadrons was all the more 
 timely, as the ranks of the 13th Dragoons had become some- 
 what loosened by the bold movement carried out at a dis- 
 tance of a few hundred paces from the enemy, who was charg- 
 ing full tilt. 
 
 The 2d squadron, under First Lieutenant von Redern, 
 was dispatched to the right flank of the dragoons by Colonel 
 von Weise. the regimental commander. Its 4th platoon, led 
 in person by the former squadron chief. Captain von Heister, 
 now on duty as general staff officer of the 5th Cavalry Divi- 
 
 * Compare page 192. 
 
 tTiOd the squadrou iu place of Captain von Kaisenberg, who was 
 w^ounded. 
 
200 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 sion, joined the right of the dragoons to meet any outflanking 
 movement on that side. The remaining three platoons, while 
 still in the act of forming line by the side of the fourth, en- 
 countered hostile hussars, which here also had penetrated 
 through the gaps or had passed by the right of the dragoons, 
 threw them back, and thus took the enemy in left flank. 
 
 The attack of the French hussars was repulsed by the 
 13th Dragoons and 2d Dragoons of the Guard, and, taken in 
 both flanks by the 10th Hussars, they fled after a short m61^e 
 toward the wood, briskly pursued, particularly by the Prus- 
 sian hussars, as far as the deep ravine which the French regi- 
 ments had crossed shortly before; there the chasseurs d'Af- 
 rique, rallied by this time, received the Prussian hussars with 
 a severe fire. 
 
 General de Montaigu came to the ground severely 
 wounded, and Lieutenant von Wedell, of the 10th Hussars, 
 received his sword, which he had wielded so bravely. Colo- 
 nel Count von Finkenstein received several wounds and was 
 killed, as was Major von Hertell, of the 10th Hussars. 
 
 On seeing the ill success of his hussars, General Legrand 
 placed himself at the head of the 3d Dragoons and threw him- 
 self on the Prussian dragoons and hussars; the left wing of 
 the regiment was carried away in part by the retreating 
 French, in part by the 10th Prussian Hussars. Pierced by a 
 sword, the general died the beautiful death of a soldier at the 
 head of his troops. 
 
 The 19th (Oldenburg) Dragoons, mentioned above* as on 
 the right of the regiments led forward by Major-General von 
 
 ♦Compare page 192. 
 
German Cavalry at Vionville. 201 
 
 Barby, also advanced, — leading perhaps slightly the 10th 
 Hussars,. — formed line abreast of Ville sur Yron, and, so far, 
 had followed the charge of the 13th Dragoons and 10th Hus- 
 sars at a trot. It now prepared to charge the French lancer,s 
 of the Guard, which had wheeled into line and were advanc- 
 ing slowly. 
 
 They (the Oldenburg Dragoons) were taken in right flank 
 by the two right squadrons of the 3d French Dragoons under 
 General Legrand, which had preserved their formation. First 
 Lieutenant Haake, leader of the 1st squadron,, noticed it in 
 time, wheeled half right, and, throwing himself at a gallop on 
 the hostile dragoons, broke through them. 
 
 The remaining three squadrons of the 19th Dragoons, 
 admirably closed up, continued their charge against the lan- 
 cers. They had been led forward in great haste by General 
 de France; their left wing became entangled with General 
 Legrand's dragoons and their center was pierced by the Prus- 
 sian 19th Dragoons. Almost at the same time the three 
 squadrons of the Prussian 13th Ulans had come up. Form- 
 ing line shortly after the 19th Dragoons, and probably on the 
 same spot, and ordered to gain the enemy's right flank, they 
 came on at the long gallop against the right wing of the 
 French lancers. Wheeling slightly half right. Captain von 
 Trzebinski threw himself on them with the 1st squadron. 
 The remaining two squadrons (2d and 4th, Captains von Du- 
 rant and von Rosenberg) continued straight to the front and 
 struck the French dragoons of the Guard, who came toward 
 them at a trot and not with any too great ^lan. The 2d squad- 
 ron of the 13th Ulans went straight against them; the 4th 
 
202 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 took them in right flank, wherein they were assisted by the 
 5th squadron of the 2d Dragoons of the Guard (Captain von 
 Trotha),* which galloped forward in platoon column on the 
 left of the 13th Ulans, took a hedge 3J feet high, wheeled into 
 line to the right, and, passing around the farmstead of La 
 Grange, attacked the French dragoons in rear. 
 
 The two squadrons of the 4th Cuirassiers, originally be- 
 tween the 19th Dragoons and 13th Ulans, had been crowded 
 out of the line, as the ground toward the farmstead of La 
 Grange narrowed considerably, and were unable to deploy.^ 
 One in rear of the other, each in line, they threw themselves 
 in the mel^e at the point where the 1st squadron of the 13th 
 Ulans was engaged with the French dragoons and lancers 
 of the Guard. 
 
 About the same time the French chasseurs d'Afrique, 
 which had been rallied, reappeared on the field. 
 
 The second line on the Prussian side had been formed 
 in the first place, as we know, by the 10th Hussars (on the 
 right) and 16th Dragoons (on the left). The hussars we have 
 seen engaged in the general confiict ; they were soon followed 
 by the dragoons, who state that they were chiefl;^' engaged 
 with lancers and 7th Hussars of the enemy. It is probable, 
 therefore, that. they struck that point of the enemy's line 
 where Legrand's Division and De France's Brigade had be- 
 come intermixed. They too broke through the enemy, and 
 
 ♦This squadron had been detached on reconnaissance to the left 
 of the line of march on the 19th Infantry Division, and we know that 
 until now it had remained neai- Ville siu- Yron, keeping a sharp eye on 
 the enemy. As General von Barby's regiments approached, it joined 
 the left of the 13th Ulans and advanced with them on their left front. 
 
German Cavalry at Vionville. 203 
 
 their main body joined the hussars in the pursuit of the hos- 
 tile horsemen as far as the ravine opposite the farmstead of 
 Gr^y^re. 
 
 "It was no longer a mere attack, a mere conflict; it was 
 a dizzy, whirling throng of battle, a furious tornado, in 
 which 6,000 horsemen of all colors and of all arms slaugh- 
 tered each other, some with the point, others with the full 
 weight of the sword." 
 
 Thus Lieutenant-Colonel Bonie paints with poetical lan- 
 guage this wild, surging conflict on the bloody field strewn 
 with corpses and torn by the horses' hoofs. 
 
 On account of their light blue uniforms, the French Ian- 
 
 « 
 
 cers were mistaken by their own countrymen for Prussian 
 dragoons, and cut down without mercy. On the other hand, 
 the Prussian 19th Dragoons suffered no small losses from the 
 thrusts of their lances. 
 
 The French dragoons of the Guard are of the opinion 
 that they annihilated the Prussian 13th Ulans {les ahiment) ; 
 the latter state the following about their collision with the 
 dragoons of the Empress: 
 
 "What enormous difference! Our men, so frequently 
 avoided in the past by hostile cavalry, and impatient of re- 
 straint, gave a ringing cheer when yet at a distance, barely 
 waiting for the squadron leaders command, ^March! March!' 
 The French dragoons made the impression as though they 
 
204 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 possessed the determination not to turn about, but could not 
 muster the requisite energy to advance."* 
 
 But who would undertake to decide that to-day? It is 
 certain, however, that the Prussian ulan regiment brought 
 back from the fight hostile officers and many other prisoners, 
 as well as captured hordes, while all French reports that have 
 become public so far fail to mention proof of similar good 
 results. 
 
 "Seeing the terrible mel^e,"- continues the French ac- 
 count,t "General de France has the recall sounded and our 
 men return in disorder (desordre) to re-form at about the point 
 whence the charge had been begun. ;{: The enemy's horsemen 
 pursued us at first, but, recalled by the trumpet, they re- 
 ascended to the edge of the height ; our men assembled and 
 re-formed, covered on the left by the fire of the chasseurs 
 d'Afrique and two companies of the oth Battalion of Foot 
 Chasseurs, which General Grenier had posted behind the 
 trees along the road to Verdun ;§ on the right by that of the 
 horseless riders who had congregated on the edge of the wood, 
 and by the 5th Battalion !l of the Foot Chasseurs who came 
 
 ♦The 13tb Ulans claim to have been engaged with hostile chas- 
 seiu's, in addition to the dragoons of the Guard, and to have seen some 
 squadrons of hostile cuirassiers by the side of the wood. The former 
 were the re-formed chasseurs d'Afrique, which, themselves disordered 
 by the charge as foragei-s on the battery of Captain von der Planitz, 
 had to give way before the Prussian .13th Dragoons. Hostile cuiras- 
 siers were not present on this part of the battle-field. The ulans were 
 probably deceived by the bright helmets with flowing plumes worn 
 by the French dragoons, and it was perhaps the dragoons of De 
 Cl§rembault's Division that they saw. 
 
 tBonie. 
 
 t North of the farmstead of Gr6y6re. 
 
 ^The chauss§e from Jarny to Mars-la-Tour is probably^ the one 
 meant. 
 
 II Probably not more than four companies, two being posted on 
 the road to Verdun. 
 
German Cavalry at Vionville. 205 
 
 from the Gr^y^re farmstead, and also by the fire of the 98th 
 Kegiment, posted in a wood between the road and the Gr^y^re 
 farmstead; lastly, by the fire of the 12-pounders posted by 
 General de Ladmirault to support the attack." 
 
 This description agrees on the whole with what the 
 Prussian regiments engaged in this conflict state. 
 
 After a long and furious mel^e, which, according to some 
 witnesses, lasted about half an hour, the enemy fled in dis- 
 order toward the wood, recalled, according to the French 
 accounts, by the trumpet. The pursuing Prussian cavalry, 
 itself in complete disorder, as any serious mounted conflict 
 naturally entails for both sides, came under a cross-fire from 
 the chauss^e and from the wood. Major-General von Barby 
 also had the recall sounded, and his regiments re-formed on 
 the edge of the height southeast of Ville sur Yron. 
 
 Meanwhile General de Cl^rembault had brought up his 
 division to the vicinity of the battle-field. He had not been 
 informed of the advance of Generals Legrand and de France; 
 it was only through the clouds of dust raised by the conflict 
 that he became aware of the collision of the opposing masses 
 of horse. He moved off at once to take part in the struggle. 
 The chasseur regiments which formed his right wing, while 
 in the act of descending into the ravine separating them from 
 the field, were thrown in disorder and partially carried away 
 by the hussars of De Montaigu's Brigade, which were hurry- 
 ing to the rear in disorder. The dragoon brigade of De Mau- 
 branches, the 4:th regiment leading, alone succeeded in gain- 
 ing the ground beyond. On the call of their colonel, "A moi, 
 
206 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 dragons r the first squadron of the 4th Dragoons threw itself 
 on the last Prussian horsemen and cut them down. 
 
 The latter were probably such only as had been delayed 
 near the wood of Gr^y^re by the exhaustion of their horses 
 or other causes, for, although all the Prussian regiments re- 
 port unanimously the appearance of fresh cavalry regiments 
 of the enemy on the field just quitted, they state with equal 
 unanimity that these regiments made no attempt to pursue, 
 although the rallying and re-forming of the Prussians took 
 quite a long time, as all the regiments had become completely 
 intermixed. The 13th Dragoons, which were the first to be 
 in line, and, having acted as the advance guard before the 
 fight, now formed the rear guard and remained near Ville sur 
 Yron until dark, state particularly in their report that the 
 fresh cavalry regiments of the enemy forming in their front 
 made no attempts whatever to molest them. 
 
 Shells* falling among the regiments before they were 
 completely re-formed prompted Major-General von Barby 
 to withdraw out of range and closer to Mars-la-Tour. 
 
 The general reports, as characteristic of the whole 
 conflict : 
 
 ''The charges were ridden by the regiments with great 
 
 gallantry and determination, and it is to be regretted that 
 
 the horses no longer possessed the requisite strength to ride the 
 
 charges with greater vehemence. The efforts of the day in 
 
 riding to and fro on the hattle-field in deep soil and hilly 
 
 terrain, and the fatigues of the preceding days, coupled with 
 
 * Probably from the 12-pounders which General de Ladmirault 
 had ordered in action near the farmstead of Greyere to support the 
 attack of his cavalry. 
 
German Cavalry at Vionville. 207 
 
 bivouacs, had considerably impaired the strength of the 
 horses." 
 
 All the regiments of the 5th Cavalry Division had been 
 in the saddle since daybreak. An approximate measurement 
 of the distances traversed in marching hither and thither in 
 the deep soil of the hilly battle-field gives about four German 
 miles. The last charge from the halting-place of the regi- 
 ments north of the chauss^e to Verdun to the farmstead of 
 La Grange amounted to 3,000 paces on the air-line. 
 
 Facta loquuntur! 
 
 None of the oflScers, and, so far as can be ascertained 
 from the official returns of the regiments, but twenty-eight 
 men, remained as prisoners in the enemy's hands ; the latter 
 left in the hands of the Prussian horsemen : one brigade gen- 
 eral (De Montaigu) seriously wounded, one colonel (Du Party 
 of the Guard dragoons), several captains and lieutenants^ 
 and a considerable number of men and horses. Unfortu- 
 nately, the exact figures are nowhere stated. 
 
 The losses of the regiments differed, and, on the whole, 
 were not inconsiderable: 
 
208 
 
 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 
 Dead. 
 
 Wounded. 
 
 Missing-. 
 
 Total. 
 
 ORGANIZATIONS. 
 
 o 
 
 
 o 
 
 W 
 
 V 
 
 <j 
 
 O 
 
 2 
 
 8 
 3 
 6 
 3 
 1 
 2 
 
 32 
 
 94 
 12 
 36 
 25 
 11 
 85 
 
 337 
 
 V 
 
 t 
 o 
 
 w 
 
 ■35 
 
 *i9 
 
 13 
 12 
 45 
 
 124 
 
 V 
 
 
 
 12 
 9 
 
 25 
 
 9 
 
 4 
 
 • 1 
 
 13 
 
 *73 
 
 1 
 
 "9 
 95 
 
 18 
 15 
 22 
 
 159 
 
 U3 
 
 
 
 2 
 8 
 
 12 
 3 
 
 7 
 4 
 
 4 
 42 
 
 IS 
 '90 
 
 113 
 42 
 51 
 31 
 13 
 
 103 
 
 443 
 
 in 
 
 Brigade Staff 
 
 
 13th Dragoons 
 
 19th Dragoons 
 
 1 
 
 4 
 
 *i 
 1 
 1 
 
 2 
 
 10 
 
 4 
 10 
 5 
 6 
 2 
 1 
 5 
 
 33 
 
 12 
 
 20 
 24 
 10 
 8 
 37 
 
 111 
 
 53 
 
 95 
 
 4th Cuirassiers (2 Sqs.).. 
 
 13th Ulans (3 Sqs.) 
 
 10th Hussars (3 Sqs.).. • 
 16th Dragoons. 
 
 20 
 61 
 38 
 49 
 
 2d Dragoons (G'd, 2 Sqs.) 
 
 82 
 
 Total 
 
 391 
 
 There were killed: 
 
 Of the 13th Dragoons, First Lieutenant Rogalla von 
 Bieberstein. 
 
 Of the 19th Dragoons, First Lieutenant Zedelius; the 
 Second Lieutenants von Luck, Count von Liittichau,. and von 
 Unger. 
 
 Of the 13th Ulans, Colonel and Regimental Commander 
 von Schack. 
 
 Of the lOth Hussars, Major von Hertell. 
 
 Of the 16th Dragoons, Second Lieutenant von Koblinski. 
 
 Of the 2d Dragoons of the Guard, Colonel and Regi- 
 mental Commander Count von Finkenstein and Captain von 
 Hindenburg. 
 
 Thus 1 officer was killed to 3 men, while the organiza- 
 tion provides 1 officer to 2G men. 
 
 At Mars-la-Tour the 16th Dragoons left the other regi- 
 
 *0f these 73 missing, 28 returned subsequently from captivity, 
 as appears from official papers; the remaining 45 returned in part 
 during the next few days; the remainder must be considered as killed. 
 
German Cavalry at Vionville. 209 
 
 ments,with the exception of the 13th Dragoons, guarding the 
 front dismounted, and went in quest of its infantry division 
 (20th), taking with them at the same time the prisoners and 
 delivering them at the headquarters of the X. Corps. 
 
 On reaching Tronville, a general staff officer of the III. 
 Corps asked the regiment to advance in the direction of 
 R^zonville, in order to reap the fruits of the success gained 
 there by the III. Corps. 
 
 With the 4th squadron*in front as advance guard, the 
 regiment trotted off in the direction indicated, but soon met 
 the 9th Dragoons and several battalions and batteries, which 
 delayed the advance. As no great success could be hoped 
 for, since darkness intervened, the 4th squadron, under Cap- 
 tain von Kutzschenbach, was recalled and the regiment with- 
 drawn to Tronville. 
 
 The squadron named had reached R^zonville, encounter- 
 ing there hostile infantry at the edge of the village and* in 
 the ditches by the roadside, from which it received a brisk 
 fire. The squadron withdrew with a loss of 4 men wounded 
 and 10 horses dead, and arrived at the regimental bivouac 
 near Tronville at 9 :30 p. m.* 
 
 As darkness settled down, Major-General von Bar by or- 
 dered his other regiments also farther to the rear, and they 
 went into bivouac : 4th Cuirassiers, 13th U lans, 19th Dra- 
 goons, and 10th Hussars at Xonville; 13th Dragoons at Pux- 
 ieux, as also the 5th squadron of the 2d Dragoons of the 
 Guard. 
 
 *Th.is movement against Rgzonville was therefore probably 
 simultaneous with the advance of the 6th Cavalry Division against 
 the same place. Compare page 211. 
 
210 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 The detached squadrons of the 4th Cuirassiers and 13th 
 Ulans rejoined their regiments here. 
 
 The latter (the 3d squadron of the 13th Ulaus, detached 
 from Mars-la-Tour to the 19th Infantry Division)* had as- 
 sisted in rallying the dispersed men of the 38th (Von We- 
 delPs) Infantry Brigade, and lost in doing so: dead, 2 men, 
 7 horses; wounded, 3 men; missing, 3 men; total, 8 men, 7 
 horses. 
 
 The 3d squadron of the 2d Dragoons of the Guard had 
 been detailed as escort to General of Infantry von Voigts- 
 Rhetz, and, when dismissed by him, it sought vainly for its 
 brigade, and finally settled down at a dressing station south 
 of Mars-la-Tour. The 4th squadron of the regiment suc- 
 ceeded in finding the 1st Dragoons of the Guard near Xon- 
 ville, where the 2d squadron also arrived later on.f 
 
 The remnants of the two regiments of the 12th Brigade, 
 7th Cuirassiers and 16th Ulans, had assembled southwest of 
 Flavigny in the bottom extending toward the farmstead of 
 Sauley. In the evening they went into bivouac south of 
 Xonville. 
 
 During the events last described Major-General von 
 Redern had maintained his position near Flavigny:j: with the 
 11th and 17th Hussars, until the infantry combat in the Tron- 
 ville copses became so brisk that it almost looked as though 
 the battle, which opposite R^zonville had died down, was to 
 recommence. The brigade therefore moved closer to Tron- 
 
 * Compare page 192. 
 
 tThe 5th squadron of the regiment had joined the 13th Dragoons 
 near Puxieux. Compare page 209. 
 tCompai'e page 149. 
 
German Cavalry at Yionville. 211 
 
 ville, so as to be ready for any emergency. Here it met the 
 6th Cavalry Division. After dark the commanding general 
 of the X. Army (^orps permitted the brigade to go to the great 
 road to water and feed the horses. 
 
 As the day declined, the battle gradually died out. Ex- 
 haustion descended on the blood-stained fields. Suddenly 
 the battle recommenced. Brisk infantry fire resounded from 
 the Prussian right, from the woods of St. Arnould and Des 
 Ognons. 
 
 His Royal Highness Prince Frederick Charles, who had 
 reached the battle-field after noon, deemed the moment op- 
 portune for bringing about a decision by a last general attack. 
 The participation therein of the cavalry also seemed oppor- 
 tune now before darkness settled down. The 6th Cavalry 
 Division, which had remained between Flavigny and Tron- 
 ville, received orders: "Griiter's Brigade to attack R^zon- 
 ville in two lines in a fan-shaped formation ; Ranch's Brigade 
 to accompany the right of the attack to be made along the 
 chauss^e by the 6th Infantry Division.'^ 
 
 By this time the 14th Brigade had moved to the right 
 and taken position in rear of the corps artillery of the III. 
 Corps, because it looked as though the enemy were assem- 
 bling large bodies of cavalry at R^zonville. In pursuance 
 of the above order the brigade advanced north of, and fol- 
 lowing the direction of, the road Chambley — R^zonville 
 against the enemy's position south of the village named. 
 
 Tfie 3d and 4th squadrons of the 3d Ulans, in extended 
 line of squadrons in platoon columns, were in first line. In 
 second line, in similar formation and overlapping both flanks 
 
212 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 of the first line, were, on the right the loth Ulans, on the left 
 three squadrons of the Oth Cuirassiers; the brigade was 
 accompanied on the right by the 12th Dragoons. 
 
 Increasing darkness made it impossible to see more than 
 twenty paces ahead. A deserted hostile camp was traversed, 
 where piles of fire-wood, cooking-pots, etc., obstructed the 
 movement. Major-General von Griiter and Colonel Count 
 von der Groeben rode forward to reconnoiter, as the enemy 
 in front could be heard, but not seen. Colonel Count von 
 der Groeben believed he recognized before him a formed mass 
 of infantry and was just about to charge, when Major-General 
 von Griiter returned. He had received fire from the right 
 from what he believed to be hostile skirmish lines. He 
 therefore gave orders to attack these skirmish lines, and not 
 the closed bodies in front, in order not to come between two 
 fires. 
 
 The squadrons wheeled by platoons to the right and 
 trotted in this direction until they were believed to be oppo- 
 site the hostile lines, when the platoons wheeled to the left, 
 formed line and cUarged at a gallop, the first platoon of the 
 3d squadron of the 3d TJlans being pushed forward as a right 
 offensive fiank. 
 
 Protected by a bank of earth, the hostile infantry allowed 
 the ulans to approach to within a few paces, when it opened 
 a most effective, rapid fire, which killed some forty horses at 
 once. At the same time the squadrons received fire from 
 their left from the closed infantry just mentioned, and had 
 to retreat ; when beyond range, they faced again toward the 
 
German Cavalry at Vionville. 213 
 
 enemy (who, however, did not follow them), remained halted^ 
 and posted outposts. 
 
 The enemy went into bivouac to the west and north of 
 R^zonville. 
 
 The other two regiments of the 14th Brigade, as well as 
 the 12th Dragoons, came in no further contact with the ene- 
 my, but suffered some losses from the enemy's fire. 
 
 Major-General von Griiter was seriously wounded and 
 obliged to hand the command over to Colonel Count von der 
 Groeben, who put the brigade into bivouaq southwest of 
 Flavigny at 1 a. m., August 17th, the third squadron of the 
 15th Ulans furnishing the outposts. 
 
 . The 12th Dragoons had left the brigade at 10 p. m. and 
 gone into bivouac along the chaussde Gorze — Chambley, not 
 far from the former place. 
 
 The 15th Brigjade, under command of Colonel von 
 Schmidt, and three squadrons of the 9th Dragoons had left 
 the position taken up southwest of Flavigny after the charge 
 in the afternoon, and advanced to Tronville and northward 
 of this village in support of the 19th Infantry Division. With- 
 drawing toward evening in a southeasterly direction,, the bri- 
 gade was in a fold of the ground east of the height 288 near 
 Tronville, when at 7 p. m. it received a request from Lieu- 
 tenant-General von Buddenl^rock to cover his batteries at 
 Vionville. The latter had expended almost all their ammu- 
 nition and the general feared a cavalry charge^, which seemed 
 to be in preparation at R^zonville, and had also been noticed 
 by the corps artillery farther south, on which account the 
 
214 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 14th Brigade was requested at the same time to advance in 
 support of the artillery. 
 
 Colonel von Schmidt at once advanced in the desired 
 direction with the 3d Hussars and 9th Dragoons, the 16th 
 Hussars remaining in their previous position. 
 
 When the two regiments reached Vionville soon after- 
 ward, the hostile cavalry was just disappearing behind the 
 heights of R^zonville and could no longer be reached. 
 
 On returning slowly to its former position, the brigade 
 received the order mentioned to make an attack with the 6th 
 Infantry Division, north of the chauss^e Vionville — R^zon- 
 ville against the enemy's positions near the latter place. 
 
 The brigade Vas halted at once; the 16th Hussars were 
 brought up and posted on the right, the 3d Hussars on the 
 left. The heads of the two regiments, in line of squadrons 
 in platoon columns with deploying intervals, started abreast 
 from the road Vionville — Gorze, the 9th Dragoons following 
 in second line in the same formation. 
 
 Leaving burning Flavigny on the right, the brigade 
 trotted forward south of the R^zonville chauss^e and tow ard 
 the village of that name. According to directions from the 
 brigade commander, the 3d Hussars were to cross to the north 
 side of the road first, followed by the two left squadrons of 
 the 16th Hussars. About 300 paces to the north of the chaus- 
 s^e dense masses of infantry became visible; in the dark it 
 could not be discerned whether they were hostile or Prussian 
 infantry. They were firing briskly in all directions, and their 
 bullets fell also among the brigade. Colonel von Schmidt 
 rode forward in person to ascertain how matters stood,, and 
 
German Cavalry at Vionville. 215 
 
 met an adjutant, who informed him that these were battal- 
 ions of the 6th Infantry Division and threatened by the ene- 
 my's cavalry. Colonel von Schmidt now at once moved the 
 entire brigade to the north side of the chauss^e; it passed 
 through the infantry, deployed, and rode at a gallop against 
 one of those dark masses, which had to be presumed to be 
 that hostile cavalry; this body avoided the charge by moving 
 to the right, and immediately afterward a severe infantry 
 fire was opened at close range. Both hussar regiments were 
 in the midst of hostile infantry; they rode through several 
 extensive skirmish lines, the enemy throwing himself on the 
 ground and rising and firing into the hussars' rear as soon as 
 they had passed. In rear of these skirmish lines stood closed 
 bodies. They were partly pierced, partly dispersed by the 
 hussars. The hostile infantry scattered, but maintained an 
 uninterrupted, very brisk fire while running to the rear. 
 
 Here the horse of the standard-bearer, non-commissioned 
 officer Grotte, received two bullets and fell; two of the 
 enemy's infantry reached for the standard, but, knocking 
 them down with the staff of the standard and pulling up his 
 horse and spurring it to a last effort, the brave non-commis- 
 sioned officer saved the insignia entrusted to him, representa- 
 tive of glorious traditions, the palladium of the old renowned 
 regiment. 
 
 The right flank support of the enemy, which was on a 
 small eminence and remained untouched, fired several vol- 
 leys into the whirling mass, causing considerable loss, par- 
 ticularly to the 3d Hussars. Colonel von Schmidt, assisted 
 
216 Vavalry Studies. 
 
 by Captain Krell, who commanded the left squadron, gath- 
 ered some fifty hussars and with them rode against the sup- 
 port. But the bold attempt to disperse it failed. In the 
 darkness the enemy's position could not be clearly recog- 
 nized, and, moi'eover, there was no force to the blow. The 
 horses were exhausted, having been under the saddle 
 since 2:30 a. m. and without water and food during the day, 
 and the men, no matter how willing they were, were no 
 better off. 
 
 Further success could not be hoped for ; the enemy was 
 everywhere retreating; the rally was sounded, and, after 
 re-forming as best they could in the darkness, the regiments 
 marched back at a walk, 
 
 As they passed through their infantry, the hussars gave 
 vent to their elation in a loud hurrah. 
 
 According to the statements of some captured officers, 
 it was the 93d Regiment of the Line and the 12th Battalion 
 of the Foot Chasseurs that the hussars had encountered; 
 they also stated that, on seeing the advance of the Prussians, 
 their own cavalry had withdrawn in rear of the infantry. 
 
 According to French reports, zouaves of the Guard also 
 took part in this interlude of the battle. 
 
 The 93d Regiment of the Line was part of Colin's (2d) 
 Brigade of La Font de Villiers' (3d) Division of the VI. Corps 
 (Canrobert's) ; the 12th Battalion of Foot Chasseurs belonged 
 to Pouget's (1st) Brigade of Bataille's (2d) Division of the 11. 
 Corps (Frossard's). During the conflicts of the day the left 
 and right Hanks respectively of the corps named had come 
 in touch at the R^zonville — Vionville chauss^e, and it is 
 
OF TSB _^ 
 
 IVEB.SITY 
 5f CALlFQg^^^ 
 
 German Cavalry at Yionville. 217 
 
 therefore very possible that in the evening troops of both 
 were together at the same place. The French accounts do 
 not contain the slightest reference to the attack contemplated 
 by the French cavalry. 
 
 With reference to this last conflict of the day, Fay writes: 
 
 "Marshal Bazaine had the zouaves posted across the 
 R^zonville road; General Bourbaki led forward his men and 
 repulsed a cavalry charge made by the regiments of the Duke 
 of Mecklenburg's Division." 
 
 Bonie says: 
 
 "A last charge terminated this long series of conflicts. 
 Night had come, the Prussian army was withdrawing, when 
 on the left of our lines we heard the gallop of horsemen who 
 were approaching at full speed. A regiment of red hussars 
 breaks through {traverse) our infantry, but, recovering from 
 their surprise, the zouaves threw themselves into the ditches 
 along the road, and by their fire dispersed these troops, which 
 could barely be discerned and whose attack disappeared with- 
 out definite object {sans hut defini)J^ 
 
 Colonel von Schmidt was wounded. 
 
 The 16th Hussars went into bivouac near Vionville, 
 posted outposts, and sent forward numerous patrols, which 
 found the enemy's position back as far as Gravelotte. 
 
 The 3d Hussars bivouacked farther to the rear, near 
 Gorze,, and at the same place the three squadrons of the 9th 
 Dragoons also bivouacked. They had followed the charge 
 of the two hussar regiments on the left rear; receiving fire 
 in front from a closed body of the enemy and in left flank 
 
218 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 from another such body at a range of 80 yards, they with- 
 drew some distance and fronted the enemy. The same diflS- 
 culties rendered futile a renewed attempt to advance, as com- 
 plete darkness rendered any survey of the hostile position 
 impossible. 
 
 In these night attacks the two brigades had traversed, 
 from the starting-point to the point of collision with the 
 enemy, the 14th Brigade about 3,000, the 15th Brigade about 
 2,500 paces. The losses of both were considerable, particu- 
 larly of the 3d Hussars. Two officers, Captain von Grimm 
 and Second Lieutenant von Klenke, were killed; three were 
 wounded. 
 
 As the reports of the regiments do not exhibit separate 
 lists of losses for this conflict, we must refer to the table of 
 losses given below.* 
 
 The 2d Dragoons, which had been attached to the 6th 
 Infantry Division, had had no opportunity to take part in 
 any of the large cavalry charges; its actual employment, 
 however, is not uninstructive as regards the use of divisional 
 cavalry, and merits to find a place in the discussion of the 
 employment of cavalry on this memorable day. 
 
 When the 6th Infantry Division marched off at 5 a, m., 
 this regiment marched at the head. From Buxi^res large 
 hostile camps became visible east of Vionville on both sides 
 of the chauss^e. The patrols thrown out reported that they 
 had been received with brisk fire by the infantry encamped 
 there. For the purpose of further reconnaissance, the 3d 
 
 ♦Compare page 222. 
 
German Cavalry at Yionville. 219 
 
 squadron (Captain von Jagow) was dispatched toward Vion- 
 ville, the 2d (Captain von Cramm) toward Tronville. 
 
 On reaching the plateau, the former received a brisk fire, 
 retired into the wood of Gaumont, joined temporarily the 
 14th Cavalry Brigade, which advanced through that wood, 
 and rejoined the regiment at 10 a. m. 
 
 The 2d squadron advanced northward beyond Tronville, 
 crossed the chauss^e west of Vionville, and obtained a view 
 of the enemy's position from the height on the north of this 
 place. It appeared from this point as though part of the 
 enemy was still in camp nearR^zonville and as though strong 
 columns were already in motion toward Vionville. This 
 squadron also rejoined the regiment at 10 a. m. 
 
 During the further advance of the division the 1st squad- 
 ron (Captain von Bothmer) was assigned to the advance 
 guard, and there received orders to escort the artillery. 
 
 The 4th squadron (Captain von Kraatz-Koschlau) re- 
 mained with the main body of the division. In the vicinity 
 of Tronville it was joined by the 2d and 3d squadrons. These 
 three squadrons received orders from Colonel von Voigt- 
 Rhetz;, chief of staff of the III. Corps, to protect the main 
 body of the artillery; they consequently took up a position 
 southwest of Vionville, to the right rear of the 6th Infantry 
 Division and connected with the 5th Infantry Division. From 
 this point the squadrons conformed in their movements for- 
 ward to those of the batteries entrusted to their protection. 
 
 The 1st squadron made a short attack, passing between 
 Vionville and the cemetery to support the hussar regiments 
 of the 13th Brigade, returning from pursuit of the cuirassiers 
 
220 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 of the French Guard. They advanced into the enemy's in- 
 fantry fire, but, finding no longer an opportunity to cut into 
 the enemy, returned to the regiment. 
 
 Soon after 3 p. m., when the 20th and 21st Infantry Kegi- 
 ments were driven out of the Tronville copses on the north 
 of the chauss^e by the attack of Leboeuf's corps, the 2d Dra- 
 goons were sent toward them in support. The latter crossed 
 the great chauss^e in front of the copses. The 1st squadron 
 attempted to advance along the eastern edge of the copses 
 to check the enemy's brisk pursuit, but the attempt failed 
 through the too severe fire of the enemy's infantry, which, 
 moreover, could not be reached in the dense undergrowth. 
 The squadron withdrew slowly toward the regiment, which 
 had remained halted on the chauss^e. 
 
 Subsequently, when the 20th Infantry Division again 
 advanced against the Tronville copses, the 4th squadron was 
 detached to cover the horse batteries of the X. Corps, which 
 were in action near Tronville under Major von Koerber. 
 
 The regiment took position in the bottom between Vion- 
 ville and Tronville, was afterward brought up to the support 
 of the corps artillery of the X. Corps, and joined in the even- 
 ing in the night attack of the 15th Cavalry Brigade, but, 
 remaining south of the chauss^e, it failed to become engaged. 
 It finally went into bivouac southwest of Vionville. 
 
 Comparison of Strength and Losses on Both Sides. 
 
 It is not uninteresting to briefly compare the bodies of 
 cavalry present on the battle-field on both sides, their effect- 
 ives and losses, which latter, unfortunately^ can be accu- 
 rately given only for the Prussians. 
 
German Cavalry at Vionville. 221 
 
 The calculation of effectives on the Prussian side is based 
 on the average strength of 560 horses per regiment, as given 
 in the return of the 11th of August. 
 
 With reference to the French regiments, as to whose 
 strength and losses accurate details are lacking, it has been 
 assumed that on the morning of August 16th the Guard and 
 light regiments numbered 5 squadrons each and the heavy 
 and line regiments 4 squadrons each, and that the squadrons 
 numbered 100 horses. 
 
 There were present on the battle-field — 
 1. On the Prussian side: 
 
 3 Cuirassier regiments 1,680 horses. 
 
 3 J Ulan regiments 1,960 horses. 
 
 8 Dragoon regiments 4,480 horses. 
 
 4 J Hussar regiments 2,660 horses. 
 
 Total, 19^ regiments, with 10,780 horses. 
 
 2. On the French side: 
 6 regiments of the Guard. . . .3,000 horses. 
 
 2 Cuirassier regiments 800 horses. 
 
 10 Dragoon regiments 4,000 horses. 
 
 1 Lancer regiment 400 horses. 
 
 6 Chasseur regiments 3,000 horses. 
 
 2 1-5 Hussar regiments 1,100 horses. 
 
 Total, 27 1-5 regiments with 12,300 horses. 
 
 Of theFrench regiments the following were not engaged: 
 
 2 regiments of the Guard .... 1,000 horses. 
 
 3 Dragoon regiments 1,200 horses. 
 
 2-5 of one Chasseur regiment. . 200 horses. 
 
 Total, 5 2-5 regiment^, with 2,400 horses. 
 
 Leaving as actually engaged 21 4-5 regiments., with 9,900 
 horses. ' 
 
222 
 
 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 If we deduct on the Prussian side those squadrons of 
 the 17th Hussars and 9th and 12th Dragoons which did not 
 take part in the cavalry combats proper — viz., 3J squadrons, 
 with 525 horses, there remain 18J regiments, with 10,255 
 horses. 
 
 There were thus employed on the Prussian side 355 
 horses more than on the French, although the latter had 
 1,520 horses moYe present, but did not employ them. 
 
 The Prussian losses were as follows: 
 
 
 Killed. 
 
 Wounded. 
 
 Missing. 
 
 Total. 
 
 ORGANIZATIONS. 
 
 12 
 
 1 
 
 O 
 
 
 i 
 
 u 
 
 
 
 w 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 CI 
 
 
 
 
 i 
 
 
 
 d 
 
 
 
 Staff nth Brigade 
 
 ... 
 
 "i6 
 
 6 
 
 10 
 43 
 
 28 
 4 
 
 "2 
 8 
 1 
 
 '29 
 
 24 
 
 '33 
 
 172 
 12 
 
 io 
 
 74 
 
 4 
 24 
 
 18 
 
 1 
 
 145 
 
 11 
 204 
 107 
 
 16 
 6 
 
 28 
 
 18 
 
 2 
 6 
 6 
 8 
 6 
 5 
 6 
 1 
 3 
 2 
 
 *i 
 
 1 
 1 
 3 
 1 
 6 
 2 
 6 
 5 
 1 
 
 i 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 6 
 7 
 12 
 7 
 9 
 7 
 1 
 4 
 2 
 
 "i 
 
 1 
 1 
 
 3 
 
 1 
 8 
 3 
 11 
 7 
 1 
 
 
 
 4th Cuirassiers .... 
 
 44 
 36 
 94 
 72 
 101 
 74 
 
 25 
 
 19 
 
 25 
 
 28 
 35 
 
 2 
 
 25 
 9 
 9 
 
 83 
 54 
 12 
 
 10 
 
 18 
 
 95 
 
 203 
 
 41 
 
 85 
 
 51 
 
 113 
 
 198 
 
 183 
 
 90 
 
 64 
 
 13th Ulans 
 
 1 
 
 4 
 1 
 2 
 1 
 
 61 
 
 19th Dragoons 
 
 7th Cuirassiers 
 
 16th Ulans 
 
 95 
 261 
 200 
 
 13th Dragoons 
 
 Staff 13th Brigade .... 
 
 88 
 
 10th Hussars 
 
 23 
 
 68 
 19 
 
 6 
 16 
 24 
 
 13 
 
 '5 
 20 
 12 
 
 
 4 
 
 14 
 
 2 
 
 15 
 
 30 
 
 29 
 90 
 22 
 
 "6 
 25 
 32 
 
 158 
 32 
 126 
 132 
 13 
 10 
 13 
 17 
 
 88 
 
 17th Hussars 
 
 74 
 
 nth Hussars 
 
 
 30 
 
 Staff 14th brigade 
 
 
 
 6th Cuirassiers 
 
 
 
 9 
 
 3d Ulans 
 
 
 I 
 
 
 2 
 2 
 
 33 
 4 
 
 77 
 
 15th Ulans 
 
 
 34 
 
 Staff 15th Brigade 
 
 
 1 
 
 3d Hussars 
 
 2 
 1 
 5 
 2 
 
 28 
 5 
 
 43 
 7 
 2 
 
 80 
 27 
 78 
 112 
 11 
 9 
 13 
 15 
 
 34 
 61 
 42 
 45 
 10 
 6 
 4 
 12 
 
 
 50 
 
 "5 
 
 13 
 
 i 
 
 32 
 2 
 
 211 
 
 16th Hussars 
 
 1st Guard Dragoons. . . . 
 2d Guard Dragoons. . . . 
 
 2d Dragoons 
 
 9th Dragoons 
 
 72 
 
 246 
 
 152 
 
 26 
 
 14 
 
 12th Dragoons 
 
 
 
 32 
 
 16th Dragoons . . . 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 
 1 
 
 22 
 
 2 
 
 52 
 
 Total.. 
 
 *>! 
 
 217 fl3R 
 
 7S 
 
 9?2 
 
 396 
 
 2 
 
 286 
 
 505 
 
 96 
 
 1425 
 
 183 7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
French Cavalry in 1870. 223 
 
 One officer was killed to every 10 men; in the grand 
 total 1 officer was lost to every 15 men. 
 
 Of the field strength, there was lost every seventh man 
 and sixth horse. The total strength of the Prussian forces 
 engaged on the 16th of August amounted to 67,,000 men, of 
 which 10,780 horses formed about the sixth part. The cav- 
 alry, therefore, bore its full share of the losses of the day. 
 These losses amounted altogether to 640 officers and 15,170 
 men; of the cavalry, 96 officers and 1,425 men. 
 
 In the total losses, therefore, there was 1 cavalry officer 
 to every 6 officers lost, and 1 horseman to every 10 men lost. 
 
 These are proportions which will probably not often be 
 repeated in the annals of war, and which furnish positive 
 proof that the cavalry is entitled to claim a full share of the 
 successful result of the day. 
 
THE OPERATIONS 
 
 Cavalry in the Gettysburg Campaign 
 
 BY 
 
 LIEUTENANT-COLONEL GEORGE B. DAVIS, 
 
 U. S. A. 
 
Cavalry in the Gettysburg Campaign, 227 
 
 THE OPERATIONS 
 
 OF THE 
 
 Cavalry in the Gettysburg Campaign.^ 
 
 BY 
 
 IvIEUTENANT-COLONEIv GEORGE B. DAVIS, 
 
 U. S. A. 
 
 It shall be my purpose in this paper to trace, as briefly 
 as may be, the operations of the cavalry of the Armies of the 
 Potomac and Northern Virginia in the campaign of Gettys- 
 burg. Those operations have peculiar interest and signifi- 
 cance on account of their magnitude and novelty. The cav- 
 alry of both armies had been reorganized during the preced- 
 ing winter, and it was employed in accordance with princi- 
 ples which are now familiar, but which were then in process 
 of deduction, or were, for the first time, subjected to the 
 test of practical experience. I shall treat the subject some- 
 
 *The maps used in the prepai-ation of this article were those 
 contained in McClellan's "Campaigns of Stuart's Cavah-y," Bates' 
 "Battle of Gettysburg," and those accompanying General H. J. 
 Hunt's concise and valuable history of the campaign in Numbers 19, 
 20, and 21 of the Century Company's "Battles and Leaders of the 
 Civil War." The movements can also be followed on Plates 7, 8, 
 40, 95, and 100 of the War Record Atlas on the "Map of Portions 
 of Virginia, Marjdand, and Pennsylvania," issued by the Engineer 
 Bureau of the War Department. For fuller details the reader is 
 referred to Vol. III. of the Compte de Paris' "Civil War in America," 
 Bates' "Battle of Gettysburg," McClellan's "Campaigns of Stuart's 
 Cavalry," Swintou's "Army of the Potomac," and Nos. 19, 20, a^id 21 
 of the "Battles and Leadei*s of the Civil War." 1 
 
228 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 what broadly, from the point of view of the strategic use of 
 the arm. I shall not go into the details of the several cav- 
 alry engagements, interesting and instructive as I know 
 them to be, but shall leave them to be made the subject of 
 separate tactical studies. 
 
 On the morning of June 1, 1863, the armies of the Poto- 
 mac and Northern Virginia still confronted each other, in 
 the lines which they had reoccupied at the close of the Chan- 
 cellorsville campaign. That campaign had terminated so 
 decisively in favor of the Confederates that an early move- 
 ment, in the nature of an offensive, might have been and was 
 daily expected by Generals Halleck and Hooker. It was 
 also, if not known, at least shrewdly suspected by the latter 
 that the Confederate movement would, in many respects, 
 resemble the invasion that had terminated unsuccessfully, in 
 the defeat at Antietam in September of the preceding year. 
 The Federal commander, however, was not long kept in doubt 
 as to the intentions of his antagonist, for, before any move- 
 ment of the Army of the Potomac had been fully determined 
 upon, Lee himself assumed the initiative by putting his army 
 in motion towards the Valley of Virginia. Such advantage, 
 whether political or military, as goes with the offensive hav- 
 ing been gained by his adversary, the more difficult task re- 
 mained to Hooker of ascertaining the movements of his ene- 
 my, and of so regulating his own as to keep his force, at any 
 cost, between that enemy and the city of Washington. 
 
 The country lying in the triangle between the Potomac, 
 Kappahannock, and Shenandoah rivers was to be the imme- 
 
Cavalry in the Gettysburg Campaign. 229 
 
 diate theater Of operations of the contending armies. The 
 area thus included was in some respects favorable and in 
 others decidedly unfavorable to military operations. Across 
 its western border run two ranges of mountains: the Blue 
 Ridge and the Bull Run or Catoctin range. They lie about 
 fifteen miles apart; their general course is from northeast 
 to southwest, and they are pierced by a number of gaps or 
 passes, which were destined to play an important part in the 
 ensuing campaign. Betweto the mountains and the Poto- 
 mac the surface is diversified by hills and valleys, terminat- 
 ing in the bluffs that mark the western bank of the Potomac 
 and the north bank of the Rappahannock rivers. The coun- 
 try is generally wooded, with timber of second growth stand- 
 ing so closely as to constitute nearly always an obstacle to 
 the movement of the troops, and at times to preclude their 
 passage. The principal roads of the region follow the tribu- 
 taries of the Potomac in a general southeasterly course; the 
 roads or cross-roads connecting these, and running north and 
 south, are narrow and tortuous; difficult to use at all times, 
 and after rains almost impracticable. It is important to re- 
 member .this, for it was chiefly upon these narrow roads that 
 the ^Vrmy of the Potomac was required to move. 
 
 The organization of both armies had been subject to 
 important modifications. The infantry of the Army of the 
 Potomac was organized into seven arni}^ corps : the 1st, 2d, 
 8d, 5th, 6th, 11th, and 12th; having a strength '^present for 
 duty" on June 30, 1863, of 77,208 men. Each of these corps 
 contained three divisions of infantry and a brigade of ar- 
 tillery. The artillery was composed of sixty-five batteries 
 
230 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 (370 guns). Of these, thirty-five batteries (212 guns) were 
 attached, in brigades of five batteries each, to the infantry 
 corps. Nine horse batteries (50 guns) were attached to 
 the cavalry corps, and twenty-one batteries (108 guns) were 
 in the General Artillery Keserve. The personnel of the 
 artillery consisted of 7,183 officers and men. The cavalry 
 was organized into a corps of three divisions. Its strength 
 at ai^y particular moment is very difficult to determine, ow- 
 ing to the great loss of horses during the campaign. The 
 aggregate present "mounted" on June 1, 1863, was less than 
 8,000 men. It was increased, late in June, by the absorption 
 of General Stahel's command, but was never able to muster, 
 at any time, more than 9,000 mounted men. 
 
 The infantry of the Army of Northern Virginia was or- 
 ganized into three corps, commanded by Generals Ewell, 
 Longstreet, and A. P. Hill. Its effective total on May 31, 
 1863, was 54,356 men. The Confederate artillery was com- 
 posed of fifteen battalions, of four batteries each, aggregat- 
 ing 257 guns and 4,460 men; and of one battalion of horse 
 artillery (six batteries of 30 guns), which was attached 
 to the cavalry. The cavalry retained its division brganiza- 
 tion, and was composed of five brigades, aggregating, on 
 May 31st, 9,536 men. The strength of the Confederate cav- 
 alry division, like that of the Federal cavalry corps, was sub- 
 ject to constant fluctuation, due to the same cause — loss of 
 horses in campaign.* 
 
 ♦The above account of the organization wand strength of the two 
 armies is taken from General Hunt's thoroughly digested article upon 
 •'The Opposing Forces at Gettysburg," in No. 21 of "Battles and 
 Leaders of the Civil War," page 434. 
 
Cavalry in the Gettysburg Campaign. 231 
 
 On June 3, 1863, the three corps of infantry composing 
 the Army of Northern Virginia were encamped along the 
 south bank of the Rappahannock, on a line extending from 
 the fortified position of Fredericksburg to the east and 
 southeast as far as Hamilton's crossing. From the Con- 
 federate left, the fords of the upper Rappahannock were ob- 
 served and held by Stuart's cavalry, the main part of which 
 was bivouacked in the open air between Culpeper Court 
 House and Brandy Station. The Federal infantry still occu- 
 pied its cantonments at Falmouth. To the right and 
 somewhat to the rear, the cavalry corps, under General 
 Pleasonton, was massed at Warrenton Junction, charged 
 with the duty of maintaining a line of outposts, extending 
 from a point on the north bank of the Rappahannock, a few 
 miles west of Falmouth, to the west and northwest as far as 
 Warrenton. From time to time, small bodies of the Federal 
 cavalry were pushed into the country between the Orange 
 & Alexandria Railway and the upper Rapidan, to check the 
 operations of partisan corps, and to give timely information 
 of any movements of the enemy in that quarter. 
 
 Lee's first objective was Culpeper Court House, a center 
 from w^hich two systems of road diverge — one to the north- 
 east, leading to Manassas, Fairfax, and Alexandria; the 
 other to the north and northwest, leading to the Shenandoah 
 Valley. Leaving Hill's corps to occupy the lines at Freder- 
 icksburg, the corps of Ewell and Longstreet were put in 
 motion towards Culpeper, which was reached by Longstreet's 
 advance on the evening of June 7th. By nightfall of the 8th, 
 Longstreet was joined by Ewell. The movement to that 
 
232 - Cavalry Studies. 
 
 point was to be covered by Stuart's cavalry, and was to be 
 discovered, if possible, by the Federal cavalry under Pleas- 
 onton. Lee's intentions were accurately suspected by Hook- 
 er, who, on June 6th, directed Pleasonton to make a recon- 
 naissance in force in the direction of Culpeper, to ascertain 
 whether any Confederate infantry had yet arrived in that 
 vicinity. To increase Pleasonton's force, the mistake was 
 made of attaching two brigades of infantry to his command. 
 Just how these infantry brigades were to assist General 
 Pleasonton, who was engaged in an undertaking in which 
 celerity of movement, rather than force, was essential to suc- 
 cess, does not appear. 
 
 The problem before General Pleasonton was to ascer- 
 tain whether the Confederate army, or any considerable por- 
 tion of it, was moving upon the road between Fredericks- 
 burg and Culpeper. If such a maneuver was in progress, he 
 was to ascertain something as to its state of forwardness. 
 Had one corps or more reached Culpeper? Was any force 
 in motion to the west of that town, and if so, in what direc- 
 tion? He knew that Stuart's command was bivouacked 
 somewhere in the vicinity of Brandy Station, and this knowl- 
 edge would be of avail in determining the strength and com- 
 position of his reconnoitering columns. 
 
 At some point on the north bank of the Rappahannock 
 Pleasonton divided his command into three columns. One, 
 which he accompanied, composed of Buford's division and 
 Ames' brigade of infantry, was to cross at Beverly Ford and 
 move by St. James' Church and Gee's house, to Brandy Sta- 
 tion. The second, composed of Gregg's and Duflfid's divis- 
 
Cavalry in the Getty shurg Campaign. 233 
 
 ions and Russell's brigade of infantry, was to cross at Kelly's 
 Ford, and move, by Shackleford's, to the crossing of Moun- 
 tain Run, near Stone's house. At that point Gregg's com- 
 mand was to separate, his own division moving by the direct 
 road past Mount Dumpling to Brandy Station, while DufiQ^'s 
 division was to take the left-hand road by C. Doggett's, Mad- 
 den and Doggett's houses to Stevensburg and beyond. Each 
 of the three columns encountered the enemy, attacking him 
 successively, in point of time Troni right to left, the right col- 
 umn under Buf ord being the first to engage, followed at short 
 intervals by Gregg and Duffi^. I shall not enter into the 
 details of this remarkable) engagement, which is worthy of 
 being made the subject of a separate tactical study, for it is 
 with the operations of these columns, as gatherers of infor- 
 mation as to Lee's movements, that I propose to deal. After 
 a battle lasting nearly all day, in which the fortune of war 
 rested first with one and then with another of the contest- 
 ants, the Federal cavalry returned unmolested to the north 
 bank of the Rappahannock, and there was an opportunity to 
 ascertain what had been gained during the day in the way of 
 information as to the enemy's movements. 
 
 Buford and Gregg had encountered the cavalry of the 
 enemy, which had been supported and relieved by his in- 
 fantry towards the close of the day. To what extent or in 
 what force that infantry had appeared on the field was not 
 accurately known. It was fair, therefore, to infer from these 
 operations that there was an infantry force of the enemy in 
 the vicinity of Culpeper. Duffi^, who must have crossed and 
 recrossed the road by which the corps of Longstreet and 
 
234 Cavalry Studies, " 
 
 Ewell had entered! Culpeper, did not examine the road to 
 ascertain that fact, or if he did, made no report of the result 
 of his examination. It is claimed in behalf of General Pleas- 
 onton that a part of Stuart's headquarter baggage was cap- 
 tured early in the day, in which certain papers were found, 
 disclosing the purpose of the Confederate movement, and 
 proving beyond doubt that Lee's army was on its way to the 
 Shenandoah Valley. This claim, though accepted by the 
 Compte de Paris, is stoutly denied by Stuart's friends. It 
 would have been certainly a remarkable circumstance if so 
 prudent a man as General Lee had formulated his intentions 
 at so early a period of the campaign; it is still more remark- 
 able that he should have entrusted them in writing to even 
 a trusted subordinate.* If such despatches or memoranda 
 were found and transmitted to General Hooker, they cer- 
 tainly did not clear his mind of doubt as to Lee's purposes, 
 since he admits that there was great uncertainty as to the 
 enemy's intention on the 12th, and even so late as the 21st of 
 June. 
 
 It must be admitted, therefore, that the movement of 
 the Federal cavalry on Brandy Station had not been fruitful 
 of results in the shape of authentic information as to the 
 movements of the enemy. It had shown, however, that such 
 information was to be obtained by a bold, well-directed, and 
 energetic quest. It w^as an object lesson, however, in a new 
 strategical employment of the arm, which the leaders of the 
 Federal cavalry were not slow in learning. 
 
 ♦General Lee, in a letter to Secretary Seddon, dated June 8, 
 1863, formally requested anthorlty to undei-take the invasion. Sec- 
 retai-y Seddon's reply, approving the project, bears date June 10, 
 1863. *No. 19, "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War," pages 265, 266. 
 
Cavalry in the Gettysburg Campaign, 235 
 
 The battle of Brandy Station illustrates two methods of 
 employing cavalry, which lia^e been slowly making their way 
 into general recognition in modern war: 1st. Its separate 
 employment against the cavalry of the enemy. 2d. Its em- 
 ployment, in sufficient force to be self-sustaining, for the pur- 
 pose: (a) of obtaining information of the enemy's move- 
 ment; (h) of preventing the enemy's cavalry from obtaining 
 similar information. Of the Federal cavalry, this engage- 
 ment may be said to have been a successful illustration of 
 the former use, but an unsuccessful example of the latter. 
 In so far as the Confederate cavalry was concerned, it is a 
 matter of surprise — as the attacks upon it were timed — that 
 it escaped destruction ; for, under the circumstances, to have 
 escaped destruction was, in itself, a brilliant success. It is 
 also not a little remarkable that so able and wary a general 
 as Stuart was — a very master of the art of outpost duty — 
 should have been so taken by surprise as he w^as on this occa- 
 sion. Had the Federal commander used his opportunities 
 with the vigor and skill that Stuart displayed in the conduct 
 of an obstinate and desperate defense, the Confederate cav- 
 alry would have been dealt a blow from which it could hard- 
 ly have recovered. "One result of incalculable importance 
 certainly did follow this battle — it made the Federal cavalry. 
 Up to this time confessedly inferior to the Southern horse- 
 men, they gained on this day that confidence in themselves 
 and their commanders which enabled them to contest so 
 fiercely the subsequent battle-fields of June, July, and 
 October."* 
 
 ♦McClellan's "Campaigns of Stuart's Cavalry," page 294. 
 
236 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 We have seen that the corps of Ewell and Longstreet had 
 succeeded in reaching Culpeper on June 8th and 9th. Hill's 
 corps, which had been left in the lines at Fredericksburg, to 
 mask this movement, was withdrawn on June 14th and 
 reached Culpeper on the following day. Hooker, in order to 
 conform to the movements of his adversary, on June 11th 
 established the 3d Corps on the north bank of the Rappahan- 
 nock, between Beverlj^ Ford and Rappahannock Station. 
 On the following day the 1st and 11th Corps were ordered, 
 the former to Bealeton and the latter to Catlett's Station on 
 the Orange & Alexandria Railway. These three corps con- 
 stituted the right wing of the Army of the Potomac, and 
 General Rejmolds was assigjned to command the whole. 
 These movements were made with the double purpose of con- 
 fronting Lee in his new position, and of covering Washing- 
 ton from a repetition of Jackson's maneuver of the preceding 
 year. 
 
 The initiative in the next movement rested with General 
 Lee. His first objective had been Culpeper, his second 
 was to be the fords of the upper Potomac. A reference to 
 the map will show two ranges of mountains, crossing the- 
 theater of operati^ms from north to south, and distant from 
 each other upon an average fifteen miles. Between these 
 ranges lies the Loudon Valley; to the west of the Blue Ridge 
 lies the valley of the Shenandoah. The eastern range crosses 
 the Potomac at the Point of Rocks, the western at Harper's 
 Ferry. Below the Point of Rocks the Potomac is rarely 
 fordable; above Harper's Ferry the fords are numerous and 
 practicable, especially in the summer. Both ranges are 
 
Cavalry in the Gettysburg Campaign. 237 
 
 pierced by frequent gaps or passes, most of which, though 
 practicable for troops of all arms, are easily defended and 
 are thus susceptible of being converted into efficient military 
 obstacles. The north and south roads in the Shenandoah 
 Valley are very good, especially in summer; those of the 
 Loudon Valley are less good, while those in the area between 
 the Bull Run — Catoctin Mountains and the Potomac are 
 extremely bad. For these reasons, Lee determined to pass 
 the larger part of his infantry and artillery through the val- 
 ley of the Shenandoah. The ranges of mountains on the 
 right of his column would thus constitute a screen, conceal- 
 ing his movements from the observation of the enemy. But 
 the mountain ranges alone, however well they may have been 
 situated for that purpose, were not to be his sole reliance 
 in screening his march, for, as we shall presently see, the 
 Loudon Valley and the passes connecting it with the region 
 to the east were to be watched and held by Stuart, sup- 
 ported, if need be, by Longstreet's corps of Confederate in- 
 fantry. From his left ilank, in his northward march, Lee 
 had little to fear. He therefore disposed his marching col- 
 umns in the following order: 
 
 On the morning of June 10th Ewell's corps was put in 
 motion for the Shenandoah, via Springville, Gaines Cross- 
 roads and Flint Hill. Hill and Longstreet were to follow 
 later ; the latter by the Loudon Valley, partly, as I have said, 
 to support Stuart, and partly to lead the enemy to believe 
 that Manassas and Centreville were the real objectives. On 
 the 12th the head of Ewell's column passed through Chester 
 Gap and reached the Shenandoah at Cedarville. Jenkins' 
 
238 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 brigade of cavalry had accompanied Ewell, and Imboden's 
 brigade had joined Mm in the valley; the former covering 
 the advance and the latter the left flank of the advancing 
 column. After passing the Blue Ridge at Chester Gap, 
 Rodes' division, preceded by Jenkins' cavalry, was de- 
 tached to attack and destroy McReynolds' brigade of Fed- 
 eral infantry, which was posted at Berryville, about twelve 
 miles east of Winchester. The rest of Ewell's corps con- 
 tinued, via Stevensburg and Kernstovvn, to Wincheister. 
 
 The military district of which Winchester is the center 
 was commanded by General Milroy. His command was in- 
 dependent of that of General Hooker, and he was not in- 
 formed by either Hooker, Halleck, or his own cavalry of the 
 rapid advance of Ewell's column, and it was not until late on 
 the 11th that he was made aware of his danger. The result 
 need hardly be stated. A commander who expects the com- 
 manding general of the army to do his outpost work for him 
 is not likely to tind that personage a sufficient substitute for 
 a vigilant and enterprising cavalry — indeed, it may perhaps 
 be questioned whether Halleck, in his office in Washington, 
 was able to render Milroy as efficient service in this respect 
 as he might have gotten from some of his raw levies of West 
 Virginia Horse, who wore plug hats and called their officers 
 by their Christian names. 
 
 Lee's columns were now stretched out to a dangerous 
 length, inviting irretrievable disaster had he been opposed by 
 a general less hampered with instructions from Washington 
 than was Hooker. On June 14th Ewell, having inflicted a 
 crushing defeat upon Milroy — whom he had compelled to 
 
Cavalry in the Getty shurg Campaign. 239 
 
 abandon his ai-tillery and trains and to retire in great confu- 
 sion upon Hancock and Harper's Ferry — resumed his route, 
 with Jenkins' and Imboden's cavalry in front and flank, 
 toward Williamsport, the place appointed by the Confeder- 
 ate commander for the crossing of the Potomac. 
 
 While General Lee had no intention of entering the re- 
 gion between Warrentou and Fairfax, in which he had oper- 
 ated so successfully the previous summer, he was not un- 
 willing to lead Hooker to be?lieve that an invasion of that 
 territory was among the possibilities of the near future. To 
 that end Longstreet was moved from Culpeper on June 15th, 
 with orders to enter the Loudon Valley and appear to threat- 
 en Leesburg, returning when that purpose had been accom- 
 plished by Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps. As this maneuver 
 would bring him within easy striking distance of the Federal 
 advance under Reynolds, Stuart was directed, with the bri- 
 gades of Fitz Lee, Robertson, and W. H. F. Lee, to mask the 
 movement of Longstreet, by moving his cavalry in front and 
 on the right flank of the infantry column. To perform this 
 task effectively, it was necessary to occupy and hold Aldie 
 and Thoroughfare Gaps. These are two central passes 
 through the Bull Run Mountains; through the former runs 
 the main road from Winchester to Alexandria; by the latter 
 the Manassas Gap Railway gains an entrance into the Lou- 
 don Valley. 
 
 Stuart, on June loth, pushed forward to occupy Thor- 
 oughfare and Aldie Gaps, assigning to Chambliss, tempora- 
 rily commanding the brigade of W\ H. F. Lee, the task of 
 occupying the former, and to Colonel Munford, who at the 
 
240 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 moment commanded the brigade of Fitzhugh Lee, that of 
 occupying the latter. Kobertson's brigade was directed to 
 Rectortown, a point in the Loudon Valley, from which he 
 could reinforce either Chambliss or Munford should occa- 
 sion arise. The brigades of Jones and Hampton were left 
 to guard the fords of the Rappahannock and cover the march 
 of Hill from Fredericksburg to the Shenandoah. 
 
 Munford, moving by Salem, Piedmont, and Upperville, 
 reached Middleburg on June 17th, and halted between that 
 town and Aldie, pushing his pickets, however, through the 
 pass to the eastern slope of the mountain. As there seemed 
 to be no prospect of a Federal advance by way of Warren- 
 ton and the ui)per courses of the Rapidan, Robertson was 
 moved on the 17th from Rectortown toi Middleburg. On 
 the same day Chambliss was withdrawn from Thoroughfare 
 Gap, and on the 18th he too arrived at Middleburg. 
 
 We have seen that the three corps constituting the ad- 
 vance of the Army of the Potomac, under Reynolds, were 
 moved on June 13th to Bealeton and Catlett's Station. On 
 the same day the cavalry was massed at Warrenton Junction. 
 
 EwelPs attack on Milroy, at Winchester, proved that a 
 very considerable force of Confederate infantry was on its 
 way to Pennsylvania, and it now became necessary for 
 Hooker to dispose his force to conform to the probable in- 
 tentions of the enemy. So, between June 14th and 17th, the 
 several corps were moved to their right and rear, and ar- 
 ranged in two lines : the first, composed of the 1st, 11th, 3d, 
 and 5th, occupying the line between Herndon's Station, on 
 the Loudon & Hampshire Railway, and Manassas Junction ; 
 
Cavalry in the Gettysburg Campaign. 241 
 
 the second, composed of the 12th, 6th, and 2d corps, occupy- 
 ing a line extending from Fairfax Court House due south to 
 the Occoquan. Tliis movement of the Federal infantry was 
 covered by Pleasonton, and it had hardly been completed 
 when Hooker determined to employ his cavalry in a bold 
 attempt to push through to the Shenandoah, if need be, to 
 obtain some definite information as to the strength and pur- 
 poses of the enemy. 
 
 On the 17th Pleasonton was directed to the vicinity of 
 A'ldie, with orders to pass the gap and ascertain what the 
 enemy was doing in the Loudon Valley and beyond. He 
 was supported in this undertaking by Barnes' division of the 
 5th Corps. He took with him Buford's and Gregg's divisions 
 of the Cavalry Corps — detaching Duffi^, with a single regi- 
 ment, to make a detour, by Thoroughfare Gap and the west- 
 ern slope of the Bull Run Mountains, to Middleburg, a move- 
 ment which will be described a little farther on. It was 
 Pleasonton's purpose to force his way, across the Loudon Val- 
 ley, to Ashby's Gap in the Blue Ridge; for it was only by 
 reaching that point that he could obtain any reliable informa- 
 tion of the Confederate forces in the valley of the Shenandoah. 
 
 The disposition of Stuart's force, on the morning of June 
 17th, has already been described. Munford was at Dover 
 Mills, a short distance to the west of Aldie, with outposts, on 
 the road to the gap to the east of the town. Chambliss was 
 between Thoroughfare Gap and Middleburg; Robertson be- 
 tween Rectortown and Middleburg; both converging upon 
 that point, which they reached, the latter on the evening of 
 the 17th, the former on the morning of the 18th of June. 
 
242 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 In advancing upon Aldie, Gregg's division was placed 
 at the head of the Federal column, and, at about 2 p. m., Mun- 
 ford's outposts were encountered and driven back through 
 the town. In the engagement that ensued, in which there 
 was much brilliant fighting on both sides — both mounted 
 and on foot — the advantage remained with General Gregg, 
 who held the field at the close of the day. Munford's brigade 
 withdrew from the field at about dark, in obedience to orders 
 to that effect from General Stuart. Its retirement was 
 effected in good order and without molestation from the 
 enemy. With a view to ascertain whether any considera- 
 ble force of the enemy was moving in the upper Loudon Val- 
 ley, Colonel DuflQ^, with the 1st Rhode Island Cavalry, was 
 directed by General Pleasonton to pass through Thorough- 
 fare Gap and examine the country as far "to the north as Mid- 
 dleburg. There it was expected that he would rejoin the 
 main body after it had passed Aldie Gap, and specific orders 
 were given him to that effect. Duffi^ passed Thoroughfare 
 Gap at 9:30 a. m. on the 17th; at 4 p. m. he encountered the 
 outposts of Stuart's headquarter guard in the outskirts of 
 the town of Middleburg. These were quickly driven in, but 
 disclosed the fact that the place was held by the enemy. 
 Duffle's orders, most unwisely, required him to encamp at 
 Middleburg on the night of the 17th. I say unwisely, for 
 Pleasonton was not then in possession of the town, nor was 
 he certain of his ability to occupy it even by nightfall of the 
 17th. Duffle's reconnaissance was for the purpose of ob- 
 taining information; when that information was obtained, 
 his orders should have required or permitted him to bring 
 
-e-f UBR^ 
 
 Cavalry in the Gettysburg Campaign. 243 
 
 it to the lines of his own army, wherever they were. To fix 
 the terminaton of a day's march, in the face of the enemy, 
 at a point within that enemy's lines, is not sound strategy. 
 In this case it resulted in defeat, and converted what might 
 have been a successful reconnaissance into a complete 
 disaster. 
 
 When poor Duffi^ encountered Stuart's outposts, he was 
 at first strangely successful. The vedettes were driven in, 
 and so precipitately that Stuart himself, who was in the 
 vicinity at the moment, narrowly escaped capture. The size 
 of Duffi^'s command, however, was soon made known ; Mun- 
 ford was recalled from Aldie, and Robertson and Ohambliss, 
 who were at that moment marching upon Middleburg, were 
 hurried forward with a view to surround and capture Dufl&^'s 
 entire command. At seven o'clock in the morning he was 
 attacked by Robertson's brigade. His men fought bravely 
 and repelled more than one charge before they were driven 
 from the town, retiring by the same road by which they had 
 advanced. Unfortunately for Duffit^, this route was now 
 closed by Chambliss' brigade, which surrounded him during 
 the night and captured, early the next morning, the greater 
 part of those who had escaped from Robertson on the previ- 
 ous evening. Colonel Duffi^ himself escaped capture and 
 reached Centreville early in the afternoon with four of his 
 officers and twenty-seven men.* 
 
 ■ On June 18th no important movements were undertaken 
 on either side. The day was passed by both Pleasonton and 
 
 *McClellan's "Stuart," pages 304, 305. 
 
244 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 Stuart in preparing for a renewal of the contest on the fol- 
 lowing day. 
 
 Early in the morning of Jane 19th Pleasonton (Gregg's 
 division being still in advance) moved out in the direction of 
 Middleburg and encountered Stuart about a mile to the east 
 of the town. From this position the Confederates were dis- 
 lodged by a successful dismounted attack on their right flank, 
 and obliged to take up a position about half a mile to their 
 rear. On the evening of this day Stuart w^as reinforced by 
 the arrival of Jones' brigade, w^hich was posted at Union. 
 On the morning of the 20th Hampton arrived and was sta- 
 tioned on the Upperville road, replacing Chambliss, who was 
 moved over to the left of the line, in front of Union. Stuart 
 aow h^d with him five brigades of cavalry and occupied a 
 line extending from Middleburg, due north, to Union. Op- 
 posed to him were the six brigades composing the divisions 
 of Buford and Gregg, supported by Barnes' division of Fed- 
 eral infantry. 
 
 On the 21st the initiative was again taken by Pleason- 
 ton. At 8 a. m. Buford advanced on the Union road, with 
 instructions to turn the left flank of the Confederate cavalry. 
 Gregg advanced, simultaneously with Buford, with orders 
 to engage the attention of the enemy's right. As is often 
 the case in war, the parts to be played by Gregg and Buford 
 were reversed, Gregg's feint becoming the principal attack. 
 Stuart was steadily pushed back, through Upperville, toward 
 the eastern slopes of the Blue Ridge. He retired slowly, 
 stubbornly contesting every inch of ground, and at nightfall 
 formed line of battle across the Upperville pike about two 
 
Cavalry in the Gettysburg Campaign. 245 
 
 miles west of the town. Here, after fighting for the day had 
 entirely ceased, he was reinforced by a brigade of Long- 
 street's infantry. On the morning of June 22d Pleasonton 
 retired and rejoined the Army of the Potomac; on the same 
 day Stuart established his headquarters at Rector's Cross- 
 roads, on the Aldie and Winchester pike, between Upper- 
 ville and Middleburg. 
 
 Pleasonton's success in the egagements at Aldie, Middle- 
 burg, and Upperville had beeti most encouraging; the more 
 as they were calculated to inspire both oflBcers and men of 
 his command with confidence in their capacity to cope, on 
 3qual terms, with their redoubtable adversary. In a series 
 of encounters covering a period of five days — between June 
 17th and 21st — he had succeeded in reaching the base of the 
 Blue Ridge at Snicker's Gap. Partly from the observations 
 of his scouts and partly from the stubborn character of 
 Stuart's resistance, he had ascertained the general fact that 
 the mass of Lee's infantry was moving northward through 
 the Shenandoah Valley. He does not seem to have learned, 
 however, that Longstreet's corps had entered the Loudon 
 Valley, or that it had passed through Ashby's and Snicker's 
 Gaps into the valley of Virginia, 
 
 General Lee had now fully committed his army to the 
 scheme of invading Pennsylvania; General Hooker was suffi- 
 ciently well informed of the plans of his adversary to enable 
 him to conform his movements to those of the enemy. Both 
 generals, for the next few days, stood less in need of their 
 cavalry than at any time since the campaign began. The 
 cavalry, which had been employed almost without inter- 
 
246 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 mission for more than two weeJiS in the performance of ardu- 
 ous and unfamiliar duties, stood much in need of rest. But 
 this it was not to have. The Army of Northern Virginia 
 completed its crossing of the Potomac on June 26th; Stuart, 
 two days earlier, had set out on his famous detour to reach 
 the Confederate right, between York and Harrisburg, in 
 Pennsylvania. The last troops of the Army of the Potomac 
 passed into Maryland on the same day — June 26th — ^that 
 Lee's rear guard crossed into the Cumberland Valley. 
 
 It will perhaps be well at this point to trace the march 
 of the Confederate infantry to the extreme point reached in 
 its invasion of Pennsylvania. Ewell, on June 15th, the day 
 following his decisive encounter with Milroy, reached ,and 
 crossed the Potomac at Shepherdstown ; Jenkins' cavalry 
 brigade covering the advance until the river w^as passed, 
 when it was directed to Chambersburg to gain information 
 and collect supplies. Ewell with the main body of his in- 
 fantry moved by Sharpsburg to Hagerstown, where he di- 
 vided his command, and directed Rodes' and Johnson's divis- 
 ions to Carlisle, via Chambersburg, and Early to York, via 
 Gettysburg. Carlisle was occupied on June 27th and York 
 on June 28th. On the 20th Lee, becoming satisfied that 
 Hooker was following him, recalled Ewell, directing him to 
 concentrate at Cashtown, about ten miles northwest of Get- 
 tysburg on the Chambersburg road. Longstreet, after his 
 detour through the Loudon Valley, turned to the west and 
 entered the valley of the Shenandoah through Ashby's and 
 Snicker's Gaps. He crossed the Potomac at Williamsport 
 on June 25th and 26th and passed through Chambersburg to 
 
Cavalry in the Gettysburg Campaign. 247 
 
 Fayetteville, where he arrived on June 27th. On the follow- 
 ing day he, was directed to Oashtown, which was reached by 
 his advance on June 29th. Hill, leaving Oulpeper on the 
 18th, reached Bhepherdstown on June 23d; there he crossed 
 into Maryland and marched, by Boonesborough, to Fayette- 
 ville, which he reached on June 27th. 
 
 In the general movement of the Confederate army down 
 the Shenandoah Valley, and across the Potomac into Mary- 
 land and Pennsylvania, it was Lee's intention that Stuart 
 should maintain his position on the right flank of the in- 
 fantry. In the iperf ormance of this duty Stuart, through his 
 orders under Longstreet's command, was left a wide discre- 
 tion. It was necessary that this should be so, for the task 
 to which he was about to address himself was altogether new 
 and untried; it was also beset with peculiar difficulty and 
 danger. To understand this difficulty it will be necessary to 
 consider for a moment the theater of operations. Stuart's 
 orders required him to keep to the right of the Confederate 
 infantry. That infantry was marching in a long column, the 
 head of which was in Pennsylvania, the rear in the lower 
 courses of the Shenandoah. East of the Blue Ridge and the 
 Catoctin range, and separated from Lee by the narrow 
 Loudon and Catoctin Yallej^s, the country was occupied by 
 the Army of the Potomac. The fords of the Potomac, from 
 Harper's Ferry to the west, w^ere reserved for the passage of 
 the artillery and infantry; from the Point of Rocks to the 
 south they were controlled by the enemy. Between Harjyer's 
 Ferry and the Point of Rocks the mountain ranges cross the 
 river; there are few practicable fords; the roads are nar- 
 
248 • Cavalry Studies. 
 
 row and difficult and the general surface of the country is 
 broken, irregular, and full of obstacles. There w^re then but 
 two courses open to Stuart: to cross at Shepherdstown, keep- 
 ing to the right and rear of Longstreet, or to cross the Poto- 
 mac below Hooker and join the right of the Confederate ad- 
 vance, under Ewell, in Pennsylvania. The latter course was 
 the one which he favored and advocated, in at least three 
 communications to General Lee. 
 
 A glance at the map will show that this route to York 
 or Harrisburg was at least as short as that taken by Ewell, 
 Longstreet, and Hill. The Maryland roads were certainly 
 better than those used by the infantry, and the moral effect 
 upon the authorities in Washington could be confidently 
 reckoned upon. There was no time during the progress of 
 the war when the approach of even an insignificant partisan 
 force to the vicinity of the defenses of the Capital did not 
 fully engage the attention and excite the alarm of the dis- 
 tinguished lawyer who then commanded the armies of the 
 United States. If such an effect followed the incursion of 
 a partisan force of less than a hundred men, why might not 
 Stuart count upon a correspondingly increased effect to fol- 
 low the news that he had interposed the greater part of his 
 command between the Army of the Potomac and Washing- 
 ton. In this he was not mistaken, and General Lee so far 
 concurred with him as to give him, upon certainly two occar 
 sions, written orders to carr}^ the scheme into effect. The 
 sound military objections to the project were either not ap- 
 parent to General Stuart, or were outweighed, in his mind, 
 by the apparent brilliancy of the undertaking. To the sue- 
 
Cavalry in the Gettysburg Campaign. 249 
 
 cess of his endeavor, time and the utmost celerity of move- 
 ment were absolutely necessary, but these were the uncer- 
 tain elements in the problem before him. He would have to 
 pass through, or evade, the columns of Federal infantry 
 which were then converging on P^rederick, andJ his recent 
 experiences with the Federal cavalry had not warranted the 
 belief that it was less enterprising or less ably commanded 
 or handled than his own. As^the event proved, these ele- 
 ments entered as causes of delay, preventing that junction 
 with Lee at Gettysburg which that general so ardently de- 
 sired, and the failure of which he so bitterly regretted. 
 
 In the execution of this movement, Stuart selected to 
 accompany him the brigades of Fitz Lee, Hampton, and 
 Chambliss, leaving those of Robertson and Jones to replace 
 him on the right and rear of the infantry corps. Salem was 
 selected as the point of departure of the expeditionary col- 
 umn, and the three brigades were assembled there on the 
 night of June 24th. At 1 a. m. of the 25th the command 
 moved via Glasscock's Gap to Haymarket, where Hancock's 
 corps of Federal infantry was encountered. This caused a 
 ielay of nearly twenty-four hours, as it required a longer 
 letour to be made, via Buckland Mills and Wolf Run Shoals. 
 On the 26th he passed Fairfax Court House, and on the 
 27th reached Dranesville. During the night of the 27th he 
 accomplished tlie difficult passage of the Potomac at Row- 
 ser's Ford, and massed his command, at daylight, on the 
 Maryland shore. After a short rest on the morning of the 
 28th, the column pushed forward (Hampton's brigade taking 
 the road via Darnstown), to Rockville, on the main road from 
 
250 , Cavalry Studies. 
 
 Washington to Frederick City. Here the telegraph wires 
 were cut, and the first and only important capture was made, 
 of a train 125 wagons, laden with supplies for the Federal 
 army. 
 
 Stuart, now believing that he had gained sufficient 
 ground to the east to pass well to the right of the Army of 
 the Potomac, turned to the north at a point about six miles 
 east of Eockville, and, by a rapid night march, reached the 
 Baltimore & Ohio Kailw^ay, at Hood's Mill, soon after day- 
 break on the morning of the 29th.. The railway and tele- 
 graph lines were destro^^d, and the railroad; bridge at 
 Sykesville was burned. Stuart then pressed on, reaching 
 Westminster at 5 p. m. of the same day, and here he deter- 
 mined to give to his tired men and horses the rest of which 
 they stood so greatly in need. 
 
 Meantime the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac had 
 not been idle. Pleasonton, on retiring from the Loudon Val- 
 ley, on June 22d, though actually employed on outpost ser- 
 vice, was enabled, in the few days that elapsed before he 
 crossed into Maryland, to supply his command with both 
 rations and forage. Hooker, still uncertain as to Lee's pre- 
 cise intention, had, on June 17th, established his corps in 
 two lines extending from Manassas Junction to Dranesville. 
 By the 24th, he had shifted them still farther to his right, 
 the 12th, 5th, and 2d occupying the line from Leesburg to 
 Haymarket, the 11th at Edw^ards' Ferry and the 1st, 3d, and 
 6th in reserve, upon a line extending from Farmwell, through 
 Gum Springs, to Centreville. It becoming apparent to 
 Hooker that the greater part of Lee's anny was now north 
 
Cavalry in the Getty shurg Campaign. 251 
 
 of the Potomac, and that all danger of a direct attack by 
 way of Centreville and Fairfax had disappeared, he passed 
 his army across the Potomac, at Edwards' Ferry, on June 
 25th and 26th. On the 27tli the advance under Reynolds 
 occupied Middletown. The divisions of Buford and Gregg 
 crossed, in the rear of the infantry, on the 27th. At about 
 this time, the strength of the cavalry corps was increased by 
 attaching to it the regiments of cavalry that had composed 
 the command of General Stahel, and which had been stationed 
 in front of Washington, on outpost duty, during the preceding 
 winter and spring. The command of the new division was 
 ?iven to General Kilpatrick. On June 28th General Hooker 
 was relieved froni the commaud'of the Army of the Potomac 
 by General Meade. 
 
 On the night of the day that General Meade succeeded 
 to the command, the Confederate invasion, unknown to him, 
 had spent its force and General Lee signalized the beginning 
 of his retrograde movement, by ordering a concentration of 
 his three corps at Cashtown. Meade, still unaware of Lee's 
 position, on the 28th determined upon Frederick as his first 
 objective. His line of march to that point ran in a north- 
 easterly direction, and the cavalry divisions were placed, 
 Buford on the left, Kilpatrick in advance, and Gregg on the 
 right of the advancing array. Kilpatrick was detached from 
 the column on the 28th and turned to the east with a view of 
 intercepting Stuart. This task should properly have fallen 
 to General Gregg, and such would have been the case had 
 that officer not been delayed from pursuing — or even from 
 starting in pursuit — by an unfortunate encounter with a col- 
 
252 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 umn of infantry, which blocked his way for some hours on 
 the morning of the 28th. It therefore fell to Kilpatrick, who 
 pushed forward to the vicinity of Littlestown, seven miles 
 from Hanover, where he encamped on the nij^ht of the 29th. 
 Stuart, as we have seen, had halted that night at Westmin- 
 ter, ten miles from Hanover. 
 
 Stuart seems to have been aware of Kilpatrick's pres- 
 ence, but Kilpatrick does not seem to have been so well in- 
 formed as to his adversary's movements; for, early on the 
 morning of the 30th, he pushed on through Hanover, where 
 his rear was attacked by Stuart's advance as it entered the 
 town. Kilpatrick thus failed to take advantage of an oppor- 
 tunity that is rarely offered to a general in war — to strike 
 an opponent at a decided and demonstrable disadvantage. 
 Stuart's command, worn out with six days and nights of hard 
 work, was stretched out in a long column, endeavoring to 
 protect a train of captured wagons over a mile in length. It 
 cannot be said, in Kilpatrick's defense, that he was not aware 
 of the near proximity of the enemy, for it was his first duty 
 to know, before Tie encamped on the night of the 29th, wheth- 
 er Stuart had yet passed the point on the Hanover — Westmin- 
 ster road, which his own line of march would intersect. Had 
 he known his enemy's position, any attack, however deficient 
 in energy, would have compelled Stuart to abandon his cap- 
 tured wagons — a tvell-directed attack upon Stuart's long line 
 would have resulted in his disastrous defeat, from which he 
 could only have escaped with the loss of a considerable por- 
 tion of his command. I regret to say that neither course 
 commended itself to General Kilpatrick. 
 
Cavalry in the Gettysburg Campaign. 253 
 
 His adversary, however, was more enterprising. He 
 was aware, as we have seen, of Kilpatrick's presence, and he 
 made his dispositions accordingly^ His first endeavor was 
 to escape annihilation; should he be so fortunate as to suc- 
 ceed in that, his desire was to save a portion, at least, of his 
 captured wagons. On the morning of the 30th, Stuart put 
 his brigades in march in the following order: Ohambliss 
 took the advance, followed hj the wagon train, which in turn 
 was followed by Hampton, as rear guard. Fitz Lee's bri- 
 gade marched on the left flank of the column — the side from 
 which Kilpatrick was expected to appear. Had such an 
 attack been made, this disposition would have been a good 
 one, as it would have placed Lee in an advanced line, with 
 the other brigades in echelon, to his right and left. But this 
 was not to be. Kilpatrick at daybreak pressed on through 
 Hanover, where his rear was attacked by Chambliss. For 
 this particular encounter — which was the last that would 
 have been predicted as likely to occur — the Confederate dis- 
 position was not a good one. It required too long a time to 
 deploy on the advanced brigade, and enabled Farnsworth, 
 who commanded Kilpatrick's rear guard, to repulse the at- 
 tack. This he did, though with considerable difficulty. 
 
 Kilpatrick formed his brigades in line of battle, a little 
 to the south of Hanover, but did not assume the offensive. 
 Stuart confronted him until dark, when he withdrew, by his 
 right, and resumed his march, via Jefferson, toward York, 
 where he expected some tidings of Ewell. From Jefferson 
 he pushed on, via Spring Forge, to Dover, whence, after a 
 short halt on the evening of July 1st, he pressed on toward 
 
254 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 Carlisle. He found the place in the secure possession of the 
 Federal troops, and, hearing that the Confederate army was 
 retiring in the direction of Gettysburg, he turned back, and 
 by a night march reached Hunterstown on the morning of 
 July 2d. Kilpatrick, who had lost touch of the enemy on the 
 night of the 30th, marched on an interior line, via Abbotts- 
 town and Berlin, to Heidlersburg, where he turned to the 
 southwest in the general direction of Gettysburg. At Hun- 
 terstowTi he encountered the rear of Stuart's retiring col- 
 umn under Hampton. After a combat lasting all day, both 
 parties bivouacked upon the lines which they occupied at 
 nightfall. At dawn on July 3d Hampton withdrew and 
 joined the main body. Stuart, with the brigades of Lee and 
 Cham bliss, reached Gettysburg on the evening of July 2d, 
 and took post in the rear of the Confederate left. 
 
 This bold ride of Stuart's has been much discussed. In 
 the opinion of military men it has always been regarded as a 
 useless and unwarrantable, though brilliantly executed, un- 
 dertaking. He eluded successfully the numerous detach- 
 ments that were set in motion to intercept him; he created 
 such consternation in the minds of the authorities in Wash- 
 ington as to cause the telegraph wires to fairly burn with 
 the orders and appeals that were sent, in every direction, to 
 fall upon him or drive him out of Maryland. He captured a 
 number of wagons and a quantity of supplies, the loss of 
 which was not felt in the Federal army. But he exhausted 
 the strength of his men and animals in a long, tedious, and 
 useless march; he gained no information of any practical 
 value to General Lee, and he was absent from the army at a 
 
Cavalry in the Gettysburg Campaign. 255 
 
 time when his skill, enterprise, and ability would have en- 
 abled him to render most important services to the Confed- 
 erate cause, services which I need hardly say no other com- 
 mander was capable of rendering. 
 
 With a word as to the cavalry that remained with the 
 Confederate infantry, I will bring this portion of the narra- 
 tive to a close. The brigades of Robertson and Jones were 
 left behind by Stuart, and accompanied the Confederate 
 army across the Potomac. Their orders were from Stuart, 
 and were given to Robertson in writing, by that officer, before 
 his departure. They were so explicit, and define the duty of 
 a body of cavalry, situated as was Robertson, so clearly and 
 accurately, as to be worth citing in full. 
 
 Headquarters Cavalry Division, Army Northern Virginia, 
 
 June 24, 1863. 
 Brigadier-General B. H. Robertson, Commanding Cavalry: 
 
 General,— Your own and Genei*al Jones' brigades will cover the 
 front of Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps, yourself, as senior ofRcer, being 
 in command. 
 
 Your object will be to watch the enemy, deceive him as to our 
 designs, and to harass his rear if you find he is retiring. Be alWays 
 on the alert; let nothing escape your observation, and miss no oppor- 
 tunity which offers to damage the enemy. After the enemy has 
 moved beyond your reach, leave sufficient pickets in the mountains 
 and withdraw to the west side of the Shenandoah, and place a strong 
 and reliable picket to watch the enemy at Harper's Ferry, cross the 
 Potomac and follow the army, keeping on its right and rear. As 
 long as the enemy remains in your front in force, unless otherwise 
 ordered by General R. E. Lee, Lieutenant-General Longstreet, or my- 
 self, hold the gaps with a line of pickets reaching across the Shenan- 
 doah by Charlestown to the Potomac. If, in the contingency men- 
 tioned, you withdraw, sweep the valley clear of what pertains to the 
 arrny and cross the Potomac at the different points crossed by it. 
 You will instruct General Jones from time to time as the movements 
 progress, or events may require, and report anything of importance 
 to Lieutenant-General Longstreet, with whose position you will com- 
 municate by relays through Charlestown. I send instructions for 
 
256 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 t 
 
 Greneral Jones, which please read. Avail yourself of every means 
 in your power to increase the efficiency of youi- command and lieep 
 it up to the highest number possible. Particular attention will be 
 paid to shoeing horses and to marching off of the tm-upilies. In case 
 of an advance of the enemy you will offer such resistance as will be 
 justifiable to check him and discover his intentions, and, if possible, 
 you will prevent him from gaining i>ossession of the gaps. In case 
 of a move by the enemy upon Warrenton, you will counteract it as 
 much as you can, compatible with previous insti-uctions. 
 
 You will have with the two brigades, two batteries of horse 
 artiUery. 
 
 Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 J. E. B. STUART, 
 Major-General Commanding. 
 
 Do not change your present line of pickets until daylight to- 
 morrow morning, unless compelled to do so.* 
 
 These orders fixed Robertson's responsibility, subject 
 only to the superior orders of Lee or Longstreet. They im- 
 posed upon General Robertson a most important duty, which 
 it is necessary to understand, in order to appreciate his re- 
 sponsibility. When Stuart left on his detour of the Army of 
 the Potomac, Hooker's forces were massed at Edwards' Ferry 
 for the purpose of crossing the river at that point. The main 
 body of the Confederate army was on the north bank of the 
 Potomac, on its way to Pennsylvania. It was still possible, 
 however, for Hooker to pass quickly to the west, enter the 
 Shenandoah Valley, and place himself across Lee's line of 
 retreat. To prevent this by giving timely notification of any 
 such movement on Hooker's part, Stuart directed Robertson 
 to establish a line of outposts, facing south and east, extend- 
 ing from Winchester, via Charleston, to the Potomac at Har- 
 per's Ferry. This order contemplated a line of vedettes 
 nearly thirty miles in length. A strict observance of this 
 *Century War Papers, Part 19, page 253. 
 
Cavalry in the Gettysburg Campaign. 257 
 
 order would, and probably did, carry Kobertson out of touch 
 with the main body of Lee's army. If General Lee desired 
 Robertson to pursue any other course of duty, or to operate 
 elsewhere, he should have given orders accordingly. Fail- 
 ing to do this, the responsibility for the failure to make prop- 
 er use of these two brigades rests, not with General Robert- 
 son, but with General Lee. 
 
 We will now return to the divisions of Buford and Gregg, 
 which we left, the former covering the left, and the latter the 
 right, of the advancing Army of the Potomac. The line of 
 march of this army after crossing the river was at first in a 
 northeasterly direction. After passing Frederick its course 
 was changed to one more nearly due north. This change of 
 direction, and the detachment of Kilpatrick, changed some- 
 what the positions and duties of Buford and Gregg, bringing 
 the former to the front, and the latter to the right rear, of 
 the advancing columns. Meade vaguely knew that the Con- 
 federate infantry was in Pennsylvania to the north, and in 
 Maryland to the northwest, but whether the main body of 
 the enemy was in Pennsylvania or in the vicinity of Hagers- 
 town, he did not know ; and it was necessary to ascertain this 
 fact in order to enable him to effect a concentration. 
 
 On June 2Sth the several corjDS of the Army of the 
 Potomac were stationed as follows: the 12th at Berlin, on 
 the Potomac; the 1st and 11th at Middletown; the 2d, 3d, and 
 5th at Frederick. Buford was in the Catoctin Valley, be- 
 yond Middletown, on the Frederick and Hagerstown road; 
 Gregg on the Little Monocacy, to the east of the Point of 
 Rocks, and Kilpatrick on the main Monocacy, a few miles 
 
258 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 north of Frederick. It was Meade's purpose on the 29th to 
 push forward his infantry to the line of Pipe Creek, but to 
 do this it was necessary, as we have seen, thatl he should 
 know whether the Cumberland Valley, below Hagerstown, 
 (vas occupied by the enemy. This duty was entrusted to 
 Buford. 
 
 On the morning of June 29th that officer detached the 
 Reserve Brigade, under Merritt, to occupy Mechanlcstown 
 and protect the division trains. Buford himself, with the 
 brigades of Gamble and Devin, then passed rapidly through 
 Turner's Gap into the Cumberland Valley. Turning to the 
 north, he skirted the western base of the Blue Ridge, and, 
 passing Cavetown and ^Ringgold, encamped at Fountain 
 Dale. At dawn on the 30th he pushed on through Fairfield 
 and approached Gettysburg at 10 a. m. Hill, who had biv- 
 ouacked near Fairfield on the night of the 29th on his way 
 to the point of concentration at Cashtown, detached Petti- 
 grew's brigade of Heth's division to occupy the town of Get- 
 tysburg, but Pettigrew withdrew at the approach of the 
 Federal cavalry. Buford, whose duty it was to observe 
 rather than to engage the enemy's infantry, withdrew in the 
 direction of Emmittsburg and reported H;he presence of a 
 force of Confederate infantry to General Reynolds. At Em- 
 mittsburg he w^as directed by General Pleasonton to 
 advance and occupy Gettysburg. This he did on the 
 afternoon of June 30th. Appreciating at once the im- 
 portance of the position and the necessity of securing it, 
 he advanced about a mile and a half beyond the town and 
 deployed his division: placing Gamble's brigade on the left. 
 
Cavalry in the Gettysburg Campaign. 259 
 
 across the Cliambersburg road, and Devin's on the right, to 
 cover those heading to Mummasburg and Carlisle. "Gamble 
 threw out his scouting parties towards Oashtown, and Devin 
 towards Hunterstown, which scouted the country, captur- 
 ing stragglers from the enemy, from whom important infor- 
 mation was obtained. Buf ord now became satisfied that the 
 mass of the rebel army was converging towards Gettysburg 
 and that heavy columns were in close proximity."* 
 
 The honor of being the first to discover the strategic 
 advantages that combined to determine the vicinity of Get- 
 tysburg as the site of an important battle has rested first, 
 with one and then with another of the corps commanders of 
 the Army of the Potomac. Neither Meade nor Lee seem to 
 have had anything approaching an exact knowledge of its 
 great strategic value, and it is altogether i^robable that on 
 the morning of the 1st of July neither general knew more 
 than that it was a place from which ten roads diverged, and 
 that it was for that reason an important point to occupy. 
 Each general was conducting his operations with but little 
 accurate information as to the movements of the other. Lee 
 had determined upon Cashtowu as a point of concentration, 
 and Meade seems to have looked upon the line of Pipe Creek 
 as a position having many claims to consideration. In the 
 light of what is now known, it seems to me that there can be 
 no escape from the conclusion that General Buford is fully, 
 completely, and beyond all manner of doubt, entitled to the 
 credit of the selection. It is fortunate that we have an ex- 
 pression of his own opinion upon the subject. It will be 
 *Bates* "Battle of Gettysburg," page 55. 
 
260 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 found at page 55 of Bates' ^'Battle of Gettysburg," and is so 
 pertinent and important as to be worthy of citation. ''A 
 lieutenant who was signal officer of Buford's division re- 
 ports the conversation of the chiefs on the occasion. 'On the 
 night of the 30th/ he says, 'General Buford spent some hours 
 with Colonel Tom Devin, and while commenting upon the 
 information brought in by Devin's scouts remarked ''that the 
 battle would be fought at that point," and that "he was afraid 
 that it would be commenced in the morning before the in- 
 fantry would get up." These are his own words. Devin did 
 not believe in so early an advance of the enemy, and re- 
 marked that he would take care of all that would attack his 
 front during the ensuing twenty-four hours. Buford an- 
 swered, "No, you won't ; they will attack you in the morning 
 and they will come booming — skirmishers three deep. You 
 will have to fight like the devil to hold your own until sup- 
 ports arrive. The enemy must know the importance of this 
 position and will strain every nerve to secure it, and if we 
 are able to hold we will do well." Upon his return, he or- 
 iered me, then first lieutenant and signal officer of his di- 
 rision, to seek out the most prominent points and watch 
 everything; to be careful to look out for camp-fires, and in 
 the morning for dust.'" 
 
 And Buford was not mistaken. From 8 until 10 a m. 
 his two small brigades, with Calef's battery of the 2d Ar- 
 tillery, held their ground against the most energetic and 
 well-directed attacks of Heth's division of Confederate in- 
 fantry. At 10, General Keynolds arrived with the advance 
 of the 1st Corps, but it was not until nightfall that it was 
 
Cavalry in the Gettysburg Campaign. 261 
 
 deemed safe to permit the command of Buford to be with- 
 drawn from the field of battle. On the following morning, 
 the division was posted, for a time, at the Round Top, to the 
 left and rear of the Union line. A little later in the day it 
 was withdrawn and directed to Westminster, thus uncover- 
 ing the left of the Army of the Potomac. 
 
 This movement, which seems to have been a mistaken 
 one, deprived the left of Meade's line of its cavalry. To 
 remedy the error, Kilpatrick, Farnsworth's brigade of his 
 division,* and the Reserve Brigade under Merrittt moved up, 
 on the morning of the 3d, and took post at Little Round Top, 
 connecting with the left of the 2d Corps. Here both Mer- 
 ritt and Farnsworth were heavily engaged on the afternoon 
 of the last day of the battle. After the repulse of Pickett's 
 charge. General Kilpatrick ordered Farnsworth to attack an 
 angle of the Confederate line, near its extreme right. The 
 ground in Kilpatrick's immediate front was broken and 
 irregular, covered with boulders and intersected by walls 
 and fences to such a degree as to make it extremely unfavor- 
 able to the mounted emplojment of the arm, but Fai*ns worth, 
 having drawn the attention of his superior to that fact, in a 
 manly and dignified protest against a rash and ill-considered 
 order, placed himself at the head of his command and rode 
 gallantly to his death. 
 
 We have seen that Buford, when he started on his detour 
 through the Cumberland Valley on June 29th, had left the 
 Reserve Brigade, under Merritt, at Mechanicstown. Here 
 
 * Custer's brigade was stationed on the Bona iijs:!! town' road, and 
 3o fell under Gregg's command on the following day. 
 
262 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 the brigade remained from June 29th to July 1st, protecting 
 the division trains and maintaining a line of outposts along 
 the road from Hagerstown to the eastern slopes of the Catoc- 
 tin Mountains. This was done with the view of preventing 
 a turning movement, and of giving timely warning of any 
 attempt on the part of General Lee to withdraw by his right 
 flank. This duty precisely resembled that imposed on Kob- 
 ertson, by Stuart, in his order of June 23d. On July 2d Mer- 
 ritt's line of outposts was moved up to the Emmittsburg — 
 Waynesboro road, and on the 8d he was called in and estab- 
 lished on Kilpatrick's left, at Little Round Top. 
 
 It will be remembered that Gregg's division was as- 
 signed the task of covering the right of the Army of the 
 Potomac In the advance on Gettysburg. The presence of 
 Stuart in Maryland, and the delays caused by the occupation 
 of the roads by columns of infantry, having the right of way, 
 had kept this division farther to the rear than had been an- 
 ticipated or intended. On the night of June 27th Gregg 
 entered Frederick and learned that Stuart had crossed the 
 Potomac. On the 28th Mcintosh's brigade was sent east on 
 the Baltimore Pike, and smaller commands were pushed out 
 on the countr3' roads, to the north and northeast, to prevent 
 Stuart from obtaining information, and to keep him as far to 
 the east as possible, in the hope of delaying him until Kil- 
 patrick could place himself across his line of march. At 
 noon of the 29th Stuart was reported at Hood's Mill. At 4 
 p. m. Gregg assembled his division at Mount Airy, and at 
 5 p. m. he sent out in pursuit. After a difficult night march, 
 his advance entered Westminster at daylight on the 30th, 
 
German Cavalry at Vionville. 263 
 
 and reached Manchester at 10 a. m. After a short halt, 
 Gregg pushed on to Hanover, which was reached at 9 a. m. 
 of July 1st. Here he found orders directing him to proceed 
 in the the direction of Baltimore, but, before leaving, new 
 orders reached him to send Huey's brigade to Manchester, 
 and proceed with the rest of his division, by the most direct 
 route, to Gettysburg. At noon of the 2d the division reached 
 the intersection of the Salem Church and Hanover roads, 
 at a point about three miles east of Gettysburg. Gregg's 
 prompt and intelligent obedience of orders had thus brought 
 him, none too soon, into a position from which, on the mor- 
 row, he was to render the Federal infantry a service hardly 
 less important than that rendered by Buford on the first day 
 of the battle. 
 
 We have seen that Stuart, on returning to the main 
 body on the evening of July 2d, had been posted on the York 
 road, to the right and rear of the extreme left of the Con- 
 federate infantry. In arranging the general assault, of 
 which Pickett's attack was to be the central feature. General 
 Lee proposed, with Ewell's corps and Stuart's cavalry, to 
 create a diversion in Pickett's favor, by a simultaneous ad- 
 vance upon the extreme right of the Union line. General 
 Gregg's fortunate presence, however, prevented the execu- 
 tion of this maneuver, for Stuart, in moving to the place from 
 which, on the afternoon of J uly 3d, he was to deliver his at- 
 tack, encountered Gregg, and, after an obstinately contested 
 engagement, lasting from 2 p. m. until dark, was obliged to 
 retire to the position which he had occupied in the morning 
 before the battle began. "This was no mere reconnaissance 
 
264 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 to develop the position or movement of the enemy. Stuart 
 had with him the main strength and the flower of the Con- 
 federate cavalry, led by their most distinguished command- 
 ers. His force comprised four brigades with twenty regi- 
 ments and battalions and four batteries. His avowed object 
 was to strike the rear of the Federal army in cooperation 
 with Pickett's grand attack upon the center."* 
 
 With Gregg's successful encounter on the right, the 
 three days of fighting at Gettysburg came to an end. I shall 
 not, at this time, follow the operations of the cavalry during 
 the retreat and pursuit of the Confederate army across the 
 Potomac into the valley of Virginia; the campaign ending 
 where it began, in the dense, impenetrable forest growths 
 on the south banks of the Rappahannock and Rapidan. 
 
 I will say a word in closing as to the lessons taught by 
 this campaign. In the first place, what may be called the 
 "science of outposts" was developed as it had not been be- 
 fore in the history of war. Up to this time the practice had 
 been to maintain a chain of infantry outposts along the front 
 and flanks of an army in the vicinity of the enemy. Cavalry 
 had been neither freely nor boldly used, and outpost duty 
 had, as a rule, been timidly and inefficiently performed. 
 Within the lines all was believed safe; beyond the outposts, 
 not only was it ''enemy's territor}^" but the country was pre- 
 sumed and believed to be actually filled with the troops of 
 the enemy. In the two great wars just preceding our own, 
 in the -Crimea and in Italy, this state of the case was true to 
 a remarkable degree. This was largely due to the fact that 
 
 *No. 21, "Battles and I^eaders of the Civil War," page 40G. 
 
Cavalry in the Oettyshurg Campaign. 265 
 
 the cavalry liad been fractioned up and distributed among 
 the larger units of infantry. The same thing was attempted 
 in the Army of the Potomac, but, after a year's experience, 
 the attempt was abandoned; the cavalry was withdrawn 
 from the infantry corps and concentrated, first in a division, 
 then a corps of three divisions, acting under the orders of 
 the commanding general. In a word, the same principle was 
 applied in its organization and^ employment that General 
 Hunt labored so successfully to introduce into the organi- 
 zation of the artillery. In the Army of Northern Virginia 
 the cavalry had been isolated from the first, and was thor- 
 oughly trained in outpost work — sometimes to the neglect 
 of its proper cavalry instruction. This course was perhaps 
 necessary, but it impaired the efficiency of the Confederate 
 cavalry whenever it was called upon to meet the Federal 
 cavalry mounted. The result was that the latter steadily 
 improved, while the former remained stationary, if, indeed, 
 it did not decrease in effectiveness towards the close of 
 the war. 
 
 In this campaign we have the first example of the out- 
 post w^ork of an army being done "by wholesale" by the arm 
 best fitted for the task. The cavalry of one army was em- 
 ployed to locate the main body of the enemy, and incidentally 
 to examine the country between the contending armies. The 
 cavalry of the other army endeavored to prevent this infor- 
 mation from being obtained, by interposing itself as a screen 
 between its own main body and that of the enemy. In the 
 performance of these duties, we have seen that there were 
 frequent collisions. If the tactical details of these encoun- 
 
266 
 
 Cavalry Studies. 
 
 ters be carefully and tliorouglil}^ studied, I think the fact 
 will appear that while there was much fighting on foot, it 
 was not so generally successful as has been supposed. I 
 think the fact will also appear that the command was most 
 frequently and uniformly successful which was most skill- 
 fully handled as a mounted force — dismounting only to accom- 
 plish a temporary purpose, or, as in Buford's case at Gettys- 
 burg, when it was necessary to oppose infantry, or to hold 
 a point of great strategic importance until the infantry could 
 arrive. 
 
 ORGANIZATION OF THE CAVALRY CORPS OF THE ARMY OF 
 THE POTOMAC. 
 
 Major- Generai, ALFRED PLEASONTON, Commanding. 
 
 J^t'rsi Divisicn.—Brigsidier-General JOHN BUFORD. 
 
 First Brigade. 
 
 Col. Wii,i,iAM Gamble. 
 
 Second Brigade. 
 
 Col. T. C. Devin. 
 
 8th 111. Cavalry, 6th N. Y. Cavalry, 
 
 12th 111. Cavalry (4 Cos.) , 9th N. Y Cavalry, 
 3d Ind Cavalry (6 Cos.), 17th Pa. Cavalry, 
 8th N. Y. Cavalry. 3d W. Va. Cavalry (2 
 
 Cos.) 
 
 Reserve Brigade. 
 
 Brig.-Gen. Wesi,EY 
 
 Merritt. 
 1st U. S. Cavalry, 
 2d U. S. Cavalry, 
 5th U. S. Cavalry, 
 6th U. S. Cavalry, 
 6th Pa. Cavalry. 
 
 Second Z?zz/w/o«.— Brig-adier-General D. McM. GREGG. 
 
 First Brigade. 
 Col. J. B. MclNTOSH. 
 1st Mo Cavalry, 
 1st Mass. Cavalry, 
 1st N. J. Cavalry, 
 1st Pa. Cavalry, 
 3d Pa. Cavalry, 
 
 Second Brigade. 
 
 Col. Pennock Huey 
 2d N. Y. Cavalry, 
 4th N. Y. Cavalry, 
 6th Ohio Cavalry, 
 8th Pa. Cavalry. 
 
 Third Brigade. 
 
 Col. J. I. Gregg. 
 
 1st Maine Cavalry, 
 10th N. Y. Cavalry, 
 
 4th Pa, Cavalry, 
 16th Pa. Cavalry. 
 
Cavalry in the Gettysburg Campaign. 
 
 267 
 
 Thir'd Z>iV«/o«.— Brigadier-General J. KII.PATRICK. 
 
 First Brigade. 
 
 Brig.-Gen. E. J. Farnsworth. 
 5th N. Y. Cavalry, 
 18th Pa. Cavalry, 
 1st W. Va. Cavalry, 
 1st Va. Cavalry. 
 
 Second Brigade. 
 Brig.-Gen. GEO. A. CuSTER. 
 1st Michigan Cavalry, 
 5th Michigan Cavalry, 
 6th Michigan Cavalry, 
 7th Michigan Cavalry. 
 
 Horse Artillery. 
 
 First Brigade. 
 
 Captain J. M. Robertson. 
 9th Michigan Battery, 
 6th N. Y. Battery, 
 B and L, 2d U. S. Artillery, 
 M, 2d U. S. Artillery. 
 
 Second Brigade. 
 
 Captain J. C. Tidbai,!/. 
 E and G, 1st U. S. Artillery, 
 K, 1st U. S Artillery, 
 A, 2d U. S. Artillery, 
 C, 2d U. S. Artillery. 
 
 ORGANIZATION OF THE CAVAI^RY DIVISION OF THE ARMY 
 OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA. 
 
 Major-General J. E. B. STUART, Commanding. 
 
 Brig.-Gen. FiTzhuGH 
 
 IvEE'S Brigade. 
 1st Md. Batt. Cavalry, 
 1st Va. Cavalry, 
 2d Va. Cavalry, 
 3d Va. Cavalry, 
 4th Va. Cavalry, 
 5th Va. Cavalry. 
 
 Brig.-Gen. A. G. Jen- 
 kins' Brigade. 
 14th Va. Cavalry, 
 16th Va. Cavalry, 
 17th Va. Cavalry, 
 34th Va. (Batt.), 
 Jackson's Va, Battery. 
 
 Brig.-Gen. Wade Hamp- 
 ton's Brigade. 
 1st N. C. Cavalry, 
 1st S. C. Cavalry, 
 2d S. C. Cavalry, 
 Cobb's Legion (Ga.) 
 Jeff Davis' Legion, 
 Phellips' Legion (Ga.) 
 
 Brig.-Gen. B. H. Rob- 
 ertson's Brigade. 
 4th N. C. Cavalry, 
 5th N. C. Cavalry. 
 
 Brig.-Gen. W. H. F 
 
 Lee's Brigade. 
 2d N. C. Cavalry, 
 9th Va. Cavalry, 
 10th Va. Cavalry, 
 13th Va. Cavalry. 
 
 Brig.-Gen. W. E. 
 
 Jones' Brigade. 
 
 6th Va. Cavalry, 
 
 7th Va Cavalry, 
 
 11th Va. Cavalry, 
 
 35th Va. (Batt.) 
 
 Horse Artillery Battalion.— Major R. F. BECKHAM. 
 
 Brethed's Va. Battery 
 Chew's Va. Battery, 
 Griffin's. Md. Battery. 
 
 Hart's S. C. Battery, 
 McGregor's Va. Battery, 
 Moorman's Va. Battery. 
 
 Imboden's Cowiwawrf.— Brigadier-General J. D. IMBODEN. 
 
 18th Va. Cavalry (?), 
 62d Va. (Mtd. Inf.), 
 
 Va. Partisan Rangers, 
 Va. Battery. 
 
GENERAL LIBRARY 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA— BERKELEY 
 
 RETURN TO DESK FROM WHICH BORROWED 
 
 This book is due on the last date stamped below, or on the 
 
 date to which renewed. 
 
 Renewed books are subject to immediate recall. 
 
 MAS^ 1954 LU 
 l6t)«5'60PM 
 
 '.J 
 
 REC'D LD 
 
 OCT 2 6 '64-1141^ 
 FEB 8 196? 8^ 
 
 LOAN DEPT. 
 
 SEP U '67 
 
 LOAN 
 
 3 PM 
 
 DEPT 
 
 NOV 4 1968x7 
 
 '.V,.., 
 
 LD 21-100ml,'S4(lSS7sI6)47e 
 
yc 63; 68 
 
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