1 
 
THE 
 
 THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 JULY 23 -AUGUST 4, 1914 
 A CHRONICLE AND INTERPRETATION 
 
 BY 
 
 WILLIAM ARCHER 
 
 OXFORD 
 AT THE CLARENDON PRESS 
 
 LONDON EDINBURGH GLASGOW NEW YORK 
 
 TORONTO MELBOURNE BOMBAY 
 
 HUMPHREY MILFORD 
 
 1915 
 
\\s 
 
 THE relations between two States must often be termed 
 a latent war, which is provisionally being waged in peaceful 
 rivalry. Such a position justifies the employment of hostile 
 methods, cunning and deception, just as war itself does. 
 
 GENERAL VON BERNHARDI. 
 
 The determined attitude of the German Empire [in the Bosnian 
 Crisis of 1908] had sufficed to show the other Powers, acting 
 under England's leadership, that they must draw in their horns 
 as soon as it came to the final test, namely war. ... To her ally, 
 Austria-Hungary, the German Empire had done a great, nay, 
 a decisive, service. ... A further gain for Austria-Hungary lay 
 in the proof that her confidence had brilliantly justified itself. 
 The natural result was a great increase in the political self- 
 reliance of Austria-Hungary. It had hitherto been thought that 
 the Dual Monarchy was incapable of vigorous action in foreign 
 affairs. The Bosnian Crisis had shown this to be an error. 
 
 COUNT REVENTLOW. 
 
Y 
 
 FOREWORD 
 
 THE following pages contain the sum and substance of 
 a great historic drama certainly the greatest and most 
 momentous that ever was enacted in a similar space of 
 time. The stage is Europe ; the actors are four Empires 
 and a Republic, speaking through the mouths of their 
 statesmen and ambassadors. The dialogue is carried on, 
 in part, face to face ; but its determining factors are, 
 as a rule, telegraphic declarations and instructions. Nor 
 is it altogether fanciful to divide the drama into the 
 traditional five acts, as follows : 
 
 ACT I : From the Austrian Ultimatum to the Serbian 
 Reply. (July 23-5.) 
 
 ACT II : From the Serbian Reply to the Declaration 
 of War on Serbia. (July 26-8.) 
 
 ACT III : From the Declaration of War on Serbia to 
 the War Council at Potsdam. (July 28 and 29.) 
 
 ACT IV : From the War Council to Germany's Declara- 
 tion of War on Russia. (July 30 to August i.) 
 
 ACT V : From Germany's Declaration of War on 
 Russia to Britain's Declaration of War on Germany. 
 (August 2-4.) 
 
 In one important respect, however, this drama differs 
 from those of Aeschylus or Shakespeare. In plays pre- 
 pared for the stage, the speeches follow each other in 
 regular sequence, only one actor speaking at a time ; 
 
 A2 
 
 3G1222 
 
. 
 4 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 whereas in the European Drama all the actors speak at 
 once, and in the resultant babel it is often impossible to 
 make out the order of question and answer, statement 
 and counter-statement. To put it in another way, the 
 plot develops at different rates of speed in the different 
 capitals, so that, in spite of the boasted annihilation of 
 space by the telegraph, those ambiguities are constantly 
 arising on which Charles Lamb descants in his essay on 
 ' Distant Correspondents '. One actor may think he is 
 still in the second act, while the others have passed 
 irrevocably into the third ; and it is sometimes very 
 difficult to decide what stage of development any particu- 
 lar speaker is, or imagines himself to be, contemplating. 
 An attempt is made in the following pages to reduce 
 this confusion of voices to something like logical sequence, 
 and in so doing to determine who was responsible for the 
 fact that a ' happy ending ' was obstinately staved off, 
 in favour of the sanguinary catastrophe now working 
 itself out. It would, of course, be absurd to pretend that 
 I approached this question without any preconceived 
 opinion. I had long ago read enough of the negotiations 
 to assure me that the fault did not lie with Britain. But 
 this I may say, without unduly anticipating my argument, 
 that the more carefully I co-ordinated and the more 
 minutely I examined the documents, the stronger became 
 my conviction that Britain had neglected nothing that 
 could possibly have conduced to a peaceful solution of 
 the crisis. I went into the investigation believing, in 
 a general way, in Sir Edward Grey's ability and good 
 sense ; I came out of it with an enthusiastic admiration 
 for the skill, the tact, the temper, the foresight, the 
 unwearied diligence and the unfailing greatness of spirit 
 with which he ensued and strove for peace. Let me add 
 that his laurels are fairly shared by the Russian Foreign 
 
FOREWORD 5 
 
 Secretary, M. Sazonof . No statesman could possibly have 
 shown a more long-suffering spirit of conciliation. 
 
 This book was half written before Mr. J. W. Headlam's 
 History of Twelve Days appeared, and was almost finished 
 before that excellent work came into my hands. I had 
 it before me, however, in revising my manuscript, and it 
 enabled me to correct some not unimportant errors into 
 which I had fallen. 
 
 No one who has not tried it can quite realize the 
 difficulty of weaving the dispatches issued by the various 
 Governments into a rational narrative. Each country has 
 put together hastily, and with small care for lucidity, 
 a sheaf of documents. The British Blue Book is certainly 
 the clearest. It is compiled with some care, and contains 
 valuable cross-references. Next comes the French Yellow 
 Book, the most readable of all the collections. It presents 
 excellent summaries of the situation from day to day, and 
 admits, now and then, a touch of human feeling amid the 
 cold formulas of diplomacy. The Russian Orange Book 
 is good so far as it goes, but far from complete. The 
 Austrian Red Book is largely occupied with the one-sided 
 indictment of Serbia, but contains some really helpful 
 dispatches. The German White Book is a mere harangue 
 for the defence, illustrated by meagre fragments of 
 telegrams. All the books contain documents which are 
 pretty evidently misdated, and none of them (except in 
 the rarest instances) give any indication of the hour of 
 dispatch or receipt of a telegram. The investigator, then, 
 has to seize upon the most trifling indications, and some- 
 times to rely upon long trains of reasoning, in his effort 
 to establish the chronological order of the various docu- 
 ments. At best, he is often baffled. 
 
 My effort has been to tell the story of the fateful days 
 
6 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 simply as it appears in the official documents, seldom 
 going outside them, and making little attempt to place 
 the events in relation to their historical or political back- 
 ground. That is admirably done in Professor Gilbert 
 Murray's study of Sir Edward Grey's Foreign Policy 
 (Clarendon Press, 1915, is. 6d. net), to which the reader 
 is hereby referred. I have assumed without discussion 
 certain notorious facts of recent history, such as the 
 Kaiser's boast of the support given by Germany ' in 
 shining armour ' to Austria's Bosnian exploit of 1908-9 ; 
 but I have tried to dispense with collateral evidence, to 
 read the documents in their own light, and to make them, 
 so to speak, self-interpreting. 
 
 I have not (consciously at any rate) selected evidence 
 with a view to making a case, but have tried to give the 
 substance of all the really significant documents, cutting 
 away repetitions and verbiage, and condensing very 
 freely, but quoting verbatim such passages and expres- 
 sions as seemed to me of crucial importance. Wherever 
 quotation-marks are employed, I have taken only the 
 most trifling liberties with the text, such as substituting 
 ' Austria ' for * Austria-Hungary ', changing the first 
 person into the third, and so forth. Italics are throughout 
 my own. They appear very rarely in the original docu- 
 ments, perhaps because of the fact that most of these are 
 telegrams. 
 
 Before undertaking this investigation, I had not read 
 any of the other critical studies of the documents except 
 that of Mr. M. P. Price (The Diplomatic History of the War), 
 with whom I found myself in almost constant disagree- 
 ment. Where my interpretations and appraisements, 
 then, coincide with those of other students, it is not 
 because I have copied them, but because I have inde- 
 pendently arrived at the same conclusions. 
 
FOREWORD 7 
 
 Though Mr. Price's discussion of the documents seems 
 to me singularly unfortunate, his book contains a good 
 deal of subsidiary matter (text of treaties, newspaper 
 extracts, &c.) which has been of great use to me. 
 
 Practically the whole of the evidence here dealt with 
 is included in the Collected Diplomatic Documents relating 
 to the Outbreak of the European War (Miscellaneous, No. 10, 
 1915), issued by the British Government at the price of 
 one shilling. Numbered dispatches I have referred to by 
 their number, which is of course the same in all editions. 
 Quotations from unnumbered documents I refer to the 
 page on which they appear in the C.D.D. (Collected 
 Diplomatic Documents). References to ' Headlam ' and 
 ' Price ' apply respectively to the History of Twelve Days 
 (T. Fisher Unwin, IDS. 6d.) and the Diplomatic History of 
 the War, second edition, with paging very different from 
 that of the first (Allen & Unwin, 75. 6d.). 
 
 WILLIAM ARCHER. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 DRAMATIS PERSONAE . . . . . . .11 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 THE AUSTRIAN ULTIMATUM . . . . . .13 
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 HUMILIATION OR WAR . . . . . . .16 
 
 CHAPTER III 
 
 THE DAY AND THE HOUR . . . . . .22 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 WAS GERMANY AN ACCOMPLICE BEFORE THE FACT ? . 26 
 
 CHAPTER V 
 
 DIARY OF EVENTS : THURSDAY, JULY 23 . -33 
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 
 DIARY OF EVENTS : FRIDAY, JULY 24 . . . .35 
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 
 DIARY OF EVENTS : SATURDAY, JULY 25 . . -45 
 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 
 THE SERBIAN REPLY ....... 56 
 
 CHAPTER IX 
 
 GERMANY'S GREAT ILLUSION ..... 64 
 
 CHAPTER X 
 
 DIARY OF EVENTS : SUNDAY, JULY 26 .. 67 
 
 CHAPTER XI 
 
 DIARY OF EVENTS : MONDAY, JULY 27 . . . -79 
 
io THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 CHAPTER XII 
 
 DIARY OF EVENTS : TUESDAY, JULY 28 . . .92 
 
 CHAPTER XIII 
 
 AUSTRIA'S GUARANTEE OF SERBIAN ' INDEPENDENCE ' . 106 
 
 CHAPTER XIV 
 
 DIARY OF EVENTS : WEDNESDAY, JULY 29 . . .112 
 
 CHAPTER XV 
 
 DIARY OF EVENTS : THURSDAY, JULY 30 . . .132 
 
 CHAPTER XVI 
 
 DIARY OF EVENTS : FRIDAY, JULY 31 . . . . 148 
 
 CHAPTER XVII 
 
 DIARY OF EVENTS : SATURDAY, AUGUST i 162 
 
 CHAPTER XVIII 
 
 DID BRITAIN HANG BACK Too LONG ? . . . .178 
 
 CHAPTER XIX 
 
 DIARY OF EVENTS : SUNDAY, AGUST 2 . .190 
 
 CHAPTER XX 
 
 DIARY OF EVENTS : MONDAY, AUGUST 3 . . .194 
 
 CHAPTER XXI 
 
 DIARY OF EVENTS : TUESDAY, AUGUST 4 . . .198 
 
 CHAPTER XXII 
 
 PEACE PROPOSALS AND THEIR FATE .... 202 
 
 CHAPTER XXIII 
 THE SUMMING-UP 209 
 
 APPENDIX 
 
 ON MR. M. P. PRICE'S ' DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE WAR ' 229 
 
 INDEX . 238 
 
DRAMATIS PERSONAE 
 
 GEORGE V, King of Great Britain and Ireland, Emperor of India. 
 
 RAYMOND POINCARE, President of the French Republic. 
 
 NICOLAS II, Emperor of All the Russias. 
 
 ALBERT I, King of the Belgians. 
 
 ALEXANDER, Crown Prince of Serbia. 
 
 WILLIAM II, German Emperor. 
 
 FRANCIS JOSEPH, Emperor of Austria. 
 
 ALLIZ, M. 
 BELOW, Herr von 
 BENCKENDORFF, Count 
 BERCHTOLD, Count 
 
 BERTHELOT, M. 
 BERTIE, Sir F. 
 
 BETHMANN-HOLLWEG, Dr. von 
 BIENVENU-MARTIN, M. 
 
 BOSCHKOVITCH, M. 
 
 BRONEWSKY, M. 
 BUCHANAN, Sir George 
 
 BUNSEN, Sir Maurice de 
 CAMBON, M. Jules 
 CAMBON, M. Paul 
 CRACKANTHORPE, Mr. 
 
 DAVIGNON, M. 
 
 DUMAINE, M. 
 ELST, Baron van der 
 
 FLEURIAU, M. de 
 FORGACH, Count 
 
 GIESL, Baron von 
 GOSCHEN, Sir Edward 
 
 French Minister in Munich. 
 German Minister in Brussels. 
 Russian Ambassador in London. 
 Austrian Secretary for Foreign 
 
 Affairs. 
 
 French Acting Political Director. 
 British Ambassador in Paris. 
 German Imperial Chancellor. 
 French Acting Minister for 
 
 Foreign Affairs. 
 Serbian Minister in London. 
 Russian Charge d' Affaires in 
 
 Berlin. 
 
 British Ambassador in St, Peters- 
 burg. 
 
 British Ambassador in Vienna. 
 French Ambassador in Berlin. 
 French Ambassador in London. 
 British Secretary of Legation at 
 
 Belgrade. 
 Belgian Minister for Foreign 
 
 Affairs. 
 
 French Ambassador in Vienna. 
 Belgian Secretary-General for 
 
 Foreign Affairs. 
 French Charge" d' Affaires in 
 
 London. 
 Austrian Under - Secretary for 
 
 Foreign Affairs. 
 Austrian Minister in Belgrade. 
 British Ambassador in Berlin. 
 
12 
 
 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 GREY, Sir Edward, K.G. 
 
 ISVOLSKY, M. 
 
 JAGOW, Herr von 
 
 JOVANOVITCH, M. 
 
 KLOBUKOWSKI, M. 
 KUDACHEF, Prince 
 
 LICHNOWSKY, Prince 
 MACCHIO, Baron 
 
 MENSDORFF, Count 
 NICOLSON, Sir Arthur 
 
 PACHITCH, M. 
 PALISOLOGUE, M. 
 
 PATCHOU, Dr. 
 
 POURTALES, Count 
 
 RODD, Sir James Rennell 
 RUMBOLD, Sir Horace 
 
 SAN GIULIANO, Marchese di 
 SAZONOF, M. 
 
 SCHEBEKO, M. 
 
 SCHOEN, Baron von 
 STRANDTMAN, M. 
 
 SZAPARY, Count 
 
 SZOGYENY, Count 
 
 TSCHIRSCKY, Herr von 
 VIVIANI, M. 
 
 ZIMMERMANN, Herr von 
 
 British Secretary of State for 
 
 Foreign Affairs. 
 Russian Ambassador in Paris. 
 German Secretary for Foreign 
 
 Affairs. 
 
 Serbian Minister in Vienna. 
 French Minister in Brussels. 
 Russian Councillor of Embassy 
 
 at Vienna. 
 
 German Ambassador in London. 
 Austrian Under- Secretary for 
 
 Foreign Affairs. 
 
 Austrian Ambassador in London. 
 British Under - Secretary for 
 
 Foreign Affairs. 
 Serbian Prime Minister. 
 French Ambassador in St. Peters- 
 burg. 
 Serbian Minister for Foreign 
 
 Affairs. 
 German Ambassador in St. 
 
 Petersburg. 
 
 British Ambassador in Rome. 
 British Charge d' Affaires in 
 
 Berlin. 
 Italian Minister for Foreign 
 
 Affairs. 
 Russian Secretary for Foreign 
 
 Affairs. 
 
 Russian Ambassador in Vienna. 
 German Ambassador in Paris. 
 Russian Charge d' Affaires in 
 
 Belgrade. 
 Austrian Ambassador in St. 
 
 Petersburg. 
 
 Austrian Ambassador in Berlin. 
 German Ambassador in Vienna. 
 French Premier and Minister for 
 
 Foreign Affairs. 
 German Under- Secretary for 
 
 Foreign Affairs. 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
 THE AUSTRIAN ULTIMATUM 
 
 ' Germany and Austria knew, in those quiet midsummer days 
 of July, that civilization was about to be suddenly and most 
 cruelly torpedoed. The submarine was Germany and the 
 torpedo Austria.' J. M. BECK, 
 
 ON Sunday, June 28, 1914, the Archduke Franz Ferdi- 
 nand, heir to the Austrian throne, and his wife the 
 Baroness Hohenberg, were assassinated in the streets 
 of Serajevo, the capital of Bosnia. The assassins were 
 Bosniaks Austro-Hungarian subjects but of Serbian 
 race. 
 
 The investigation of the crime was pursued by the 
 Austrian authorities ' in the deepest secrecy '.* Neverthe- 
 less the papers were full of rumours to the effect that the 
 threads of the plot were found to lead back to Serbia, 
 and that Serbia was to be held responsible. 
 
 For more than three weeks there was practically no 
 official communication, much less anything that could 
 be called negotiation, between the Austrian and the 
 Serbian Governments. On June 30, the second day after 
 the assassination, the Austrian Legation at Belgrade 
 inquired of the Serbian Foreign Office what measures had 
 been taken by the Serbian police to follow up clues to the 
 crime. The answer was that as yet the Serbian police 
 had not occupied themselves with the matter. 2 At 
 Vienna, on the same day, the Serbian Minister, M. Jovano- 
 vitch, sought an interview with the Foreign Secretary, 
 Count Berchtold, but was received instead by the Under- 
 
 1 Austrian official statement quoted in Serbian Book, No. 16. 
 
 2 Austrian Book, No. 2. 
 
14 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 Secretary, Baron Macchio. 1 M. Jovanovitch, on behalf 
 of his Government, expressed the most ' energetic con- 
 demnation ' of the crime, and offered to do loyally all 
 that was possible to put down anti-Austrian agitation in 
 Serbia, and to bring to justice any Serbian accomplices 
 if such there were of the Serajevo assassins. Baron 
 Macchio took note of this conversation and promised to 
 communicate it to Count Berchtold. We also learn that, 
 on a date unspecified, the Austrian Government asked 
 the Serbian Government for information as to the where- 
 abouts of some students expelled from a school at Pakrac, 
 who were believed to have passed into Serbia. 2 It appears, 
 in short, that only one communication of any importance 
 took place between the two Governments, and in that 
 case the initiative came from the Serbian, not the Austrian, 
 side. 
 
 In the meantime, the Austrian officials in Serbia were 
 reporting to Vienna all sorts of ' Great Serbian ' intrigues 
 and manifestations of anti-Austrian feeling, while the 
 Serbian ministers at Vienna, Berlin, and elsewhere, were 
 noting the evidences of an Austrian press campaign 
 directed towards fixing upon Serbia the responsibility for 
 the Serajevo crime. 
 
 Every one knew that a storm was brewing. The only 
 question was : how and when would it burst ? 
 
 It burst at 6 p.m. on Thursday, July 23, when the 
 Austrian Minister at Belgrade, Baron von Giesl, personally 
 presented to M. Patchou, interim Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs, the ' Note ' which, under the title of the Austrian 
 Ultimatum, has earned for all time a sinister renown. 
 
 It was not an ultimatum in the strict sense of the word, 
 for ' ultimatum ' means the last of a series of diplomatic 
 moves. This move was the first as well as the last in 
 Austria's game against Serbia. It was not the finis to 
 negotiations, but a peremptory refusal to negotiate. It 
 was like a trumpet-blast at the gate of a beleaguered city, 
 1 Serbian Book, No. 5. z Ibid. No. 30. 
 
THE AUSTRIAN ULTIMATUM 15 
 
 heralding a demand for unconditional surrender. The 
 time allowed for reflection was forty-eight hours : ' The 
 Imperial and Royal Government expects the answer of 
 the Royal Government at latest on Saturday, the 25th of 
 this month, at 6 p.m.* Giesl informed Patchou by word 
 of mouth that if a satisfactory reply were not received 
 by the hour stated, he and his staff would quit Belgrade. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 HUMILIATION OR WAR 
 
 ' The requirements which we demand that Serbia shall fulfil, 
 and which indeed contain nothing that is not a matter of course 
 in the intercourse between States which are to live in peace and 
 friendship, cannot be made the subject of negotiations.' 
 COUNT BERCHTOLD. 
 
 THE Austrian note has at least the merit of being free 
 from ambiguity or beating about the bush. 
 
 It begins by reciting a declaration of the Serbian 
 Government, dated March 31, 1909 : 
 
 ' Serbia recognizes that the fait accompli regarding 
 Bosnia has not affected her rights. ... In deference to 
 the advice of the Great Powers, Serbia undertakes to 
 renounce from now onwards the attitude of protest and 
 opposition which she has adopted in regard to the 
 annexation . . . and to live in future on good neigh- 
 bourly terms with Austria-Hungary/ 
 
 This undertaking (the Note proceeds) has been systema- 
 tically disregarded. 1 The Serbian Government has done 
 nothing to repress ' subversive movements ' tending to 
 * the detaching of a part of the territories of Austria- 
 Hungary from the Monarchy '. It has permitted ' crimi- 
 nal machinations ', ' unrestrained language ' in the press, 
 ' the glorification of perpetrators of outrages/ ' the 
 participation of officers and functionaries in subversive 
 agitation/ and ' an unwholesome propaganda in public 
 instruction '. 
 
 1 It is not mentioned that Austria had in the meantime entirely 
 failed to act up to the reciprocal obligation of ' living on good 
 neighbourly terms ' with Serbia, having balked her natural and 
 legitimate ambition for an outlet on the Adriatic. 
 
HUMILIATION OR WAR 17 
 
 The depositions and confessions of the Serajevo assassins 
 (it is asserted) show that the crime was planned in Bel- 
 grade, executed with arms and explosives provided by 
 Serbian officers, and facilitated by the connivance of 
 Serbian frontier officials, who allowed the criminals, with 
 their arms, to pass into Bosnia. 
 
 Therefore (says the Note) the Austro-Hungarian 
 Government finds itself compelled ' to put an end to the 
 intrigues which form a perpetual menace to the tranquillity 
 of the Monarchy '. To that intent it makes the following 
 demands : 
 
 The Serbian Government shall publish on the front 
 page of their ' Official Journal ' for July 26 (the following 
 Sunday) this declaration : 
 
 ' The Royal Government of Serbia condemn the 
 propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary i. e. the 
 general tendency of which the final aim is to detach from 
 the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories belonging 
 to it, and they sincerely deplore the fatal consequences 
 of these criminal proceedings. 
 
 The Royal Government regret that Serbian officers 
 and functionaries participated in the above-mentioned 
 propaganda, and thus compromised the good neigh- 
 bourly relations to which the Royal Government were 
 solemnly pledged by their declaration of the 3ist March, 
 
 The Royal Government, who disapprove and repudiate 
 all idea of interfering or attempting to interfere with the 
 destinies of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of 
 Austria-Hungary, consider it their duty formally to 
 warn officers and functionaries, and the whole popula- 
 tion of the kingdom, that henceforward they will 
 proceed with the utmost rigour against persons who 
 may be guilty of such machinations, which they will 
 use all their efforts to anticipate and suppress/ 
 
 This declaration shall simultaneously be communicated 
 by the King to the Serbian Army as an order of the day, 
 and shall be published in the ' Official Bulletin ' of the 
 army. 
 
 1852 B 
 
i8 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 Furthermore, the Serbian Government shall undertake : 
 
 (1) To suppress all anti- Austrian publications. 
 
 (2) To dissolve immediately the society styled ' Narodna 
 Odbrana ' (Defence of the People) and all other societies 
 of anti-Austrian tendency, confiscating their means of 
 propaganda, and seeing that they are not revived under 
 other names. 
 
 (3) To eliminate from public instruction everything of 
 anti-Austrian tendency, ' as regards both the teaching 
 body and the means of instruction/ 
 
 (4) To dismiss all officers and officials ' guilty of 
 propaganda ' against Austria, their ' names and deeds ' 
 to be communicated in due course by the Austrian 
 Government. 
 
 (5) ' To accept the collaboration in Serbia of repre- 
 sentatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government for the 
 suppression of the subversive movement directed against 
 the territorial integrity of the Monarchy.' 
 
 (6) ' To take judicial proceedings against accessories to 
 the plot of the 28th June who are on Serbian territory ; 
 delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Government will take 
 part in the investigation relating thereto/ 
 
 (7) To proceed immediately against an officer, Major 
 Tankosic, and an official, Milan Ciganovic, who are 
 alleged to have been concerned in the Serajevo crime. 
 
 (8) To put a stop to the illicit traffic in arms and explo- 
 sives, and punish severely officials alleged to have assisted 
 the assassins to cross the frontier. 
 
 (9) To ' furnish explanations ' as to utterances of 
 ' high Serbian officials, both in Serbia and abroad ' who 
 have, since the date ol the Serajevo crime, expressed 
 themselves in terms of hostility to Austria. 
 
 (10) ' To notify the Imperial and Royal Government 
 without delay of the execution of the measures comprised 
 under the preceding heads/ 1 
 
 1 Blue Book, No. 4. The 5th, 6th and loth clauses are here 
 reproduced word for word ; the others are slightly condensed. 
 
HUMILIATION OR WAR 19 
 
 It is manifest on the face of it that this Ultimatum, 
 with its forty-eight hours' time-limit, was a mere formal 
 prelude to a declaration of war. No independent and 
 sovereign nation could possibly swallow it entire ; l and 
 Austria demanded that it should not only be swallowed 
 entire, but without the slightest discussion. ' Its integral 
 acceptance by Serbia ', says Sir Maurice de Bunsen, ' was 
 neither expected nor desired, and when ... it was rumoured 
 in Vienna that it had been unconditionally accepted, 
 there was a moment of keen disappointment.' 2 
 
 That Austria had reasonable grounds of complaint is 
 not denied. She had earned the hatred of Serbia by 
 arbitrarily annexing provinces inhabited in great measure 
 by Serbs, by oppressing (as the Serbians contended) these 
 kindred populations, and by cutting Serbia off from 
 access to the Adriatic. This hatred expressed itself in 
 anti-Austrian organizations, agitations, and press-utter- 
 ances, which a Great Power could not be expected to 
 tolerate indefinitely. So much (as we shall see in the 
 sequel) was practically admitted by Russia, 3 and, indeed, 
 by Serbia herself. The Austrian press embittered the 
 quarrel by inflammatory and provocative writing ; but 
 Serbia was doubtless not behindhand in replying. 
 
 Technically, therefore, there is no doubt that Austria 
 had at least plausible grounds for earnestly protesting to 
 the Serbian Government against the proceedings of many 
 Serbian subjects. 
 
 The attempt to connect Serbia with the crime of 
 Serajevo was a different matter. The Serbian Government 
 
 1 Herr von Jagow, the German Foreign Minister, admitted this. 
 Blue Book, No. 18. 
 
 2 Letter to Sir Edward Grey, dated September i, 1914. Blue 
 Book, No. 161. 
 
 3 The Russian Ambassador at Vienna admitted by implication 
 (Blue Book, No. 118) what seems to have been notorious, 
 that the late Russian minister at Belgrade, M. Hartwig, was 
 a strong anti- Austrian partisan. He died suddenly, a few days 
 before the crisis developed. 
 
 B2 
 
20 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 was ordered to accept without the smallest inquiry, 
 and without the production of a single shred of evidence, 
 the results of a secret investigation by Austrian officials- 
 results largely based upon alleged ' confessions ' by the 
 criminals, how obtained and how authenticated no one 
 can say. Serbia had no reason for blind faith in Austrian 
 judicial methods, 1 and to expect her to cry ' Mea culpa ! ' 
 without if or peradventure, on the bare affirmation of the 
 Austrian Foreign Office, was to place an impossible strain 
 on political human nature. 
 
 But Austria, in fact, cherished no such expectation. 
 The dictatorial insolence of the whole document, and the 
 introduction of two clauses (Nos. 5 and 6) demanding 
 that Serbia should waive her sovereign rights, and accept 
 foreign ' collaboration ' in her administrative and judicial 
 proceedings, proved beyond a doubt that Austria had 
 abandoned every pretence of reason, and was plunging 
 
 1 ' During the month of March [1909] in which the Bosnian 
 crisis ended and the Agram trial [of 58 Serb citizens of Croatia] 
 began, the Neue Freie Presse newspaper had published at Vienna 
 an. article on the relations of the Dual Monarchy to the South 
 Slavonic problem by an eminent Austrian historian, Dr. Fried Jung. 
 This article . . . specifically charged the Serbo-Croat Coalition 
 with being the exponents and tools of agencies in Belgrade, and 
 supported its assertions by quotations from documents. Some 
 of the documents purported to be official correspondence of the 
 Serbian Foreign Office, others were minutes of a semi-official 
 revolutionary society, but Dr. Friedjung, when challenged, 
 refused to reveal their provenance, and the Coalition deputies 
 accordingly entered a libel action against him at Vienna. . . . 
 The trial at Agram had cast a lurid light upon the methods of 
 espionage employed by the Austro-Hungarian Administration in 
 Bosnia, Croatia and Dalmatia ; now at Vienna Dr. Fried] ung's 
 documents were revealed as forgeries concocted within the walls 
 of the Austro-Hungarian legation at Belgrade, communicated to 
 Friedjung as genuine by the Joint Foreign Office, and utilized 
 by him in all good faith. . . . Dr. Spalaikovitch, the incriminated 
 Serbian official, put in an appearance and brilliantly vindicated 
 himself and his country.' Toynbee, Nationality and the War, 
 p. 200. 
 
HUMILIATION OR WAR 21 
 
 with open eyes into what the Germans call Machtpolitik 
 the Policy of Main Force. She offered to Serbia the 
 simple alternative : ' Abject humiliation or war ! ' She 
 took elaborate precautions, as we shall see (the time- 
 limit being the first of them) to block every middle course. 
 Well might Sir Edward Grey tell the Austrian Ambas- 
 sador that ' he had never before seen one State address 
 to another independent State a document of so formidable 
 a character '. 1 Well might Die Post of Berlin (July 25) 
 say : ' Every sentence is a blow of the fist in the face of 
 the Serbian Government/ 
 
 1 Blue Book, No. 5. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 THE DAY AND THE HOUR 
 
 ' Choose thine own time, give little warning.' MRS. BARBAULD. 
 
 THE time-limit is only the first and most obvious of the 
 precautions which Austria took to prevent Serbia from 
 eluding the tragic dilemma imposed upon her. Even an 
 extension of the time-limit, to admit of rational dis- 
 cussion, would have rendered her humiliation less com- 
 plete, or at any rate less catastrophic. But it would have 
 been awkward to refuse such a prolongation had it been 
 formally demanded by the other Great Powers, either 
 directly, or through Austria's partner, Germany. It was, 
 therefore, of great importance that the Powers should 
 not be able to take concerted action before the time- 
 limit expired, and that any action they might take 
 should be baffled by plausible delays. 
 
 There is clear evidence that these considerations guided 
 the Austrian Foreign Office in the selection of the moment 
 for the delivery of the Ultimatum. 
 
 On July 23rd the Emperor of Austria was at Ischl, 
 some six hours by rail from Vienna. This was his usual 
 summer resort ; but as Count Berchtold considered it 
 necessary to consult him in person before taking important 
 decisions, and did in fact leave Vienna for Ischl early 
 on the crucial day (Saturday the 25th), the Emperor's 
 absence obviously tended to cause, or at any rate to 
 excuse, delay and loss of time. 
 
 On July 23rd the German Emperor was yachting in 
 Scandinavian waters. He did not return to Potsdam 
 until Monday the 27th, at least thirty-six hours after the 
 expiry of the time-limit. No doubt he was in wireless 
 communication with Berlin ; but his absence would mani- 
 
THE DAY AND THE HOUR 23 
 
 festly excuse delays, and enable the German Government 
 (if such was its desire) to pursue a dilatory" policy at a 
 time when every moment was charged with incalculable 
 consequences. 
 
 On July 23rd, M. Pachitch, the Serbian Premier, with 
 other ministers, was known to be absent from Belgrade 
 on an electioneering tour. He was at once recalled and 
 reached Belgrade at 10 a.m. on Friday the 24th ; so that 
 sixteen hours, exactly one-third of the time allowed, had 
 been lost before the Serbian ministry could even begin to 
 discuss the situation. 
 
 These facts, if they stood alone, would justify a strong 
 suspicion of a deliberate design on Austria's part to 
 render illusory even the miserably scant breathing-space 
 allowed to Serbia. But when we look in the direction of 
 the Dual Alliance the quarter in which Austria had 
 most reason to apprehend trouble our suspicion becomes 
 certainty. We cannot resist the conclusion that the time 
 was carefully calculated so as to exclude all possibility 
 of effectual intervention before the sands had run out. 
 
 On the evening of July 23rd, the French President, 1 
 M. Poincare, and the Prime Minister and Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs, M. Viviani, sailed from Kronstadt on 
 their return to France after a three days' visit to St. Peters- 
 burg. Can we suppose it a mere coincidence that the 
 Ultimatum was delivered at this very moment ? Had 
 it been delivered twenty-four hours earlier, 1 the Russian 
 and the French Governments, being actually in council 
 together, would have been enabled to act with excep- 
 tional promptitude. Had its delivery been delayed by 
 three or four days, the two Governments would at any 
 rate have been able to communicate by the ordinary 
 channels, and to concert their measures without excep- 
 
 1 Speaking to Sir Horace Rumbold in Berlin on July 21, 
 Herr von Jagow said he thought ' this step on Austria's part 
 would have been made ere this ' an indication that the Ulti- 
 matum was ready and was being held back. Blue Book, No. 2. 
 
24 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 tional loss of time. As a matter of fact, the respite of 
 forty-eight hours was accurately timed to coincide with 
 the first two days of the homeward journey of the 
 French statesmen, so that concerted action on the part 
 of the Dual Alliance was rendered as difficult as possible. 
 Austria, as we shall see, was comfortably at war with 
 Serbia (midday Tuesday the 28th) before MM. Poincare 
 and Viviani reached Paris. Chance does not time things 
 so accurately as this. The choice of the day and hour 
 for the delivery of the Ultimatum is only one of many 
 indications of a deliberate design to ' rush ' matters, 
 and confront bewildered and gasping Europe with an 
 ' accomplished fact *. 1 
 
 Austrian statesmen, indeed, neglected nothing which 
 could help to throw possible opponents off their guard. 
 To no Ambassador save one was the least hint of what 
 was brewing vouchsafed. The Ambassador of Austria's 
 nominal ally, Italy, was left entirely in the dark. M. Du- 
 maine, the French Ambassador, had long interviews with 
 Baron Macchio (Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs), 
 ' by whom he was left under the impression that the note 
 which was being drawn up would contain nothing with 
 which a self-respecting State need hesitate to comply. 
 At the second of these interviews he was not even informed 
 that the note was at that very moment being presented 
 in Belgrade.' 2 M. Schebeko, the Russian Ambassador, 
 had left Vienna on a fortnight's leave of absence on or 
 about the 20th, having ' received an assurance from 
 
 1 The scheme was foreseen by the Serbian Minister at Vienna, 
 familiar with the methods of Austrian statesmanship. He wrote 
 to his Government on Monday, July 2oth : ' There is no doubt 
 that Austria-Hungary has something serious in preparation. . . . 
 She has a rooted idea that Serbia, after two wars, is completely 
 exhausted, and that a war against us would be a mere expedition 
 resulting in a prompt occupation. She believes that such a war 
 would be over before Europe had time to intervene.' Serbian Book, 
 No. 31. 
 
 2 Sir Maurice de Bunsen in Blue Book, No. 161. 
 
THE DAY AND THE HOUR 25 
 
 Count Berchtold that the demands on Serbia would be 
 thoroughly acceptable '. l This ' assurance ' points either 
 to simplicity or hypocrisy on Berchtold's part ; and of 
 simplicity he is scarcely to be suspected. 
 
 The one Ambassador who was thought to be thoroughly 
 cognizant of all that was going on was, of course, the 
 German Excellency, Herr von Tschirscky. There is no 
 direct evidence of his complicity ; but we shall find in 
 the next chapter good reason for believing in it. 
 
 There is no doubt that Austria, with Germany behind 
 her, was emboldened to deliver her stroke at this time by 
 the belief that Russia was embarrassed by serious labour 
 troubles, that France was * morally depressed ' by the 
 Humbert revelations regarding the army, and that 
 Britain was on the verge of civil war in Ulster. These 
 considerations, however, do not come within the scope of 
 this chapter, which is directed to showing that not 
 merely the month or week of action, but even the day 
 and hour, had been nicely calculated so as to secure to 
 the aggressor as free a hand as possible. 
 1 French Book," No. 55. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 WAS GERMANY AN ACCOMPLICE BEFORE 
 THE FACT ? 
 
 ' If it were for a moment conceivable that the German 
 Chancellor did not know to the last detail what Austria was 
 about to demand at Belgrade, if it were conceivable that such 
 a bomb-shell as the note to Serbia came as a surprise to us, then 
 we should have to confess that we were not the allies of Austria 
 but her lackeys.' MAXIMILIAN HARDEN. 
 
 As Germany whole-heartedly endorsed and supported 
 the action of Austria from the moment it became known, 
 it is of no great importance to determine whether she was 
 apprised of it in advance. The point is, however, much 
 debated, and a marshalling of the evidence may be found 
 to throw some light onAustro-German political psychology. 
 
 The discussion is almost ended ere it is begun, by 
 a circular telegram addressed by the German Chancellor, 
 Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, to the German Ambassadors 
 in Paris, London, and St. Petersburg. 1 It is dated 
 July 23rd the very day, as we know, when the bomb- 
 shell was timed to burst at Belgrade. The hour of its 
 dispatch is not given ; but it is extremely improbable 
 that the long Ultimatum was telegraphed to Berlin after 
 its delivery at Belgrade at 6 p.m., and that then, late in 
 the evening, the Chancellor sat down and wrote off this 
 general order a document of some 500 words to his 
 three emissaries. It is only reasonable to assume that he 
 knew the blow was to fall that evening, and sent off the 
 circular earlier in the day, so that the Ambassadors 
 might all sing in tune when the text of the Ultimatum 
 should reach the various capitals. 
 
 1 German Book, No. i ; Blue Book, No. 9. 
 
WAS GERMANY AN ACCOMPLICE ? 27 
 
 But the Chancellor might conceivably have known 
 when the Ultimatum was to be delivered without having 
 been informed of its contents. Will his circular bear that 
 interpretation ? 
 
 With the utmost difficulty. He begins by saying : 
 
 ' The declarations of the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
 ment with reference to the circumstances attendant 
 upon the murder of the Heir to the Austrian throne and 
 his wife, disclose clearly the end which the Pan-Serbian 
 propaganda proposed to itself, and the means which it 
 employed to attain that end/ 
 
 Now the ' declarations ' in question can be nothing 
 but the covering letter x which the Austrian Government 
 addressed to the Powers in communicating the text of 
 the Ultimatum. Is it to be supposed that the Chancellor 
 had received the covering letter and not the document it 
 covered ? 
 
 He goes on to restate, briefly, the Austrian case, and 
 then says : 
 
 ' In this condition of affairs, the action and the 
 demands of the Austro-Hungarian Government must 
 be considered as fully justified.' 
 
 Is it to be supposed that he would thus give a blank 
 cheque to Austria, without knowing how she proposed 
 to fill it up ? or, in other words, that he would instruct 
 his Ambassadors to support demands the details of which 
 he did not know ? Surely this is quite incredible. He 
 goes on to indicate in the clearest terms that the Austrian 
 action may lead to war, in which case the view of the 
 German Government is that the Powers should exert 
 themselves to keep the ring for Austria and Serbia, and 
 look on as at the settlement of a purely private quarrel. 
 ' We earnestly desire', he concludes, ' the localization of 
 the conflict, since, in view of diverse treaty-obligations, 
 any intervention by another Power might be attended by 
 incalculable consequences/ 
 
 1 Blue -Book, No. 4 ; C.D.D. p. 9. 
 
28 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 Note that if, when he dispatched this order of the day, 
 the Chancellor either did not know the Austrian demands, 
 or had only been apprised of them by telegraph that very 
 evening, he cannot possibly have communicated them to 
 the Kaiser and received his instructions. Who can believe 
 that the Chancellor deliberately embarked upon a course 
 which he knew might lead to ' incalculable consequences ', 
 without the full knowledge and approval of his Master ? 
 Is it not enormously more probable that both Chancellor 
 and Emperor had been amply informed as to what was 
 brewing, hours or days in advance, and had determined, 
 by wireless, the course to be pursued ? 
 
 In view of this overwhelming probability, we are not 
 surprised to find M. Allize, French Minister at Munich, 
 telegraphing to his Government on this same Thursday : 
 
 ' The President of the Council said to me to-day that 
 the Austrian note, the contents of which were known to 
 him, was in his opinion drawn up in terms which could 
 be accepted by Serbia/ 
 
 Can we suppose that the Ultimatum had been com- 
 municated to the President of the Bavarian Council, and 
 not to the Chancellor of the German Empire ? 
 
 Nor, again, are we surprised when Sir Maurice de 
 Bunsen, on July 30th, telegraphs from Vienna to Sir 
 Edward Grey : l 
 
 ' Although I am not able to verify it, I have private 
 information that the German Ambassador knew the 
 text of the Austrian Ultimatum to Serbia before it 
 was dispatched, and telegraphed it to the German 
 Emperor. I know from the German Ambassador 
 himself that he endorses every line of it.' 
 
 This rumour, indeed, is not evidence ; but it har- 
 monizes with what we have seen to be antecedently 
 probable. 
 
 On the other hand, we have repeated assertions from 
 
 1 Blue Book, No. 95. 
 
WAS GERMANY AN ACCOMPLICE ? 29 
 
 the German side that Austria acted on her own responsi- 
 bility, and without communicating to Berlin the contents 
 of her Ultimatum. 
 
 On Friday the 24th, the German Foreign Secretary, 
 Herr von Jagow, protested to the French Ambassador 
 that he ' had been entirely ignorant of Austria's require- 
 ments ' ; and on the following day he ' repeated very 
 earnestly ' to the British Charge d'Affaires, Sir Horace 
 Rumbold, ' that though he had been accused of knowing 
 all about the contents of that note, he had in fact no 
 such knowledge '. 1 
 
 On Saturday the 25th, Count Pourtales, the German 
 Ambassador at St. Petersburg, delivered to the Russian 
 Government a memorandum declaring it ' absolutely 
 false ' that the Austrian action was the result of German 
 instigation. ' The German Government had no know- 
 ledge of the text of the Austrian note before its delivery, 
 and exercised no influence on its contents/ 2 
 
 On the same date the German Ambassador in Paris, 
 Baron von Schoen, stated, both to journalists and to 
 representatives of the French Government, that : 
 
 ' There had been no " concert " between Austria 
 and Germany in connexion with the Austrian Note, 
 and that the German Government had no knowledge 
 of this note when it was communicated to them at the 
 same time as to the other Powers, though they had 
 approved it subsequently.' 3 
 
 Evidently in reference to the same communication, 
 the Russian Charge d'Affaires iri Paris telegraphed to 
 St. Petersburg that Schoen had declared that the note 
 had been presented to Serbia ' sans entente precise avec 
 Berlin ', but that in his own words, * la fleche une fois 
 partie ' (the bolt once shot), Germany could let herself be 
 guided only by her duties as an ally. 4 Thus we find the 
 
 1 French Book, No. 30 ; Blue Book, No. 18. 
 
 z Russian Book, No. 18. 3 French Book, No. 36. 
 
 4 Russian Book, No. 19. 
 
30 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 plea of the ' accomplished fact ' resorted to almost from 
 the beginning. 
 
 On the following day (Sunday, July 26th) Herr von 
 Schoen had an interview with M. Berthelot, Acting 
 Political Director at the French Foreign Office, in the 
 course of which he ' once more affirmed that Germany had 
 been ignorant of the text of the Austrian note, and had 
 only approved it after its delivery '. 1 
 
 In London, on Saturday, July 25th, the same affirma- 
 tion is offered. Sir Edward Grey telegraphs to Sir Horace 
 Rumbold in Berlin : 
 
 ' The German Ambassador read me a telegram from 
 the. German Foreign Office saying that his Government 
 had not known beforehand, and had had no more than 
 other Powers to do with, the stiff terms of the Austrian 
 note to Serbia, but once she had launched that note, 
 Austria could not draw back/ 2 
 
 ' Once she had launched that note ' ' la fleche une fois 
 par tie ' ! It is evident that von Schoen in Paris, Lich- 
 nowsky in London, and Pourtales in St. Petersburg, were 
 simply (as was of course their duty) echoing the very 
 words of von Jagow in Berlin. 
 
 Did von Jagow believe what he was saying ? It is not 
 improbable. We may note that no denial of previous 
 knowledge comes direct from von Bethmann-Hollweg, 
 not to mention the Kaiser. It is very possible that the 
 Chancellor purposely kept the Foreign Minister in 
 ignorance of the terms of the Ultimatum, in order that 
 he might issue his disclaimer with due conviction. 
 
 But why was so much importance attached to this 
 manoeuvre ? There may have been two reasons. 
 
 (i) It was Germany's cue all along to treat the Austro- 
 Serbian difficulty as a private matter between those two 
 States, in which no third party had any right to intervene. 
 
 1 French Book, No. 57. 
 
 2 Blue Book, No. 25 ; Russian Book, No. 20. 
 
WAS GERMANY AN ACCOMPLICE ? 31 
 
 Had Germany appeared publicly as Austria's bottle- 
 holder, she would have had all the less excuse for objecting 
 to Russia's rendering Serbia the same service. 
 
 (2) There was Italy to be considered. The Teutonic 
 members of the Triple Alliance knew, after the experience 
 of the previous year, 1 that if they tried to make Italy 
 their accomplice, she would certainly protest. They 
 dared not, therefore, take her into their councils ; but as 
 they did not want to give her unnecessary offence, it 
 was worth while to pretend that Austria had simply 
 gone her own way without consulting her northern any 
 more than her southern partner. 
 
 The manoeuvre, unimportant in itself, is part of 
 Germany's whole policy of these early days, which is to 
 affect detachment, while sedulously screening Austria 
 from all interference. If Serbia can be brought to her 
 knees before any other Power has had time to move, 
 what a triumph for the Central European Allies ! What 
 a humiliation for the poor, pre-occupied, practically 
 impotent Triple Entente ! 
 
 POSTSCRIPT. There is one conceivable theory according 
 to which the German asseverations would be literally 
 true, though still false in substance and in fact. Copies 
 of the Ultimatum were delivered to Grey in London and 
 to Sazonof in St. Petersburg on Friday morning. In all 
 probability they had arrived by post or messenger on 
 Thursday evening, if not earlier. Supposing, now, that 
 copies had been dispatched from Vienna simultaneously 
 to the Austrian Ambassadors in all the capitals, they 
 would reach Berlin and Munich from eighteen to twenty- 
 four hours before they would reach London and St. Peters- 
 burg. This would give Bethmann-Hollweg time to 
 acquaint himself with the terms of the Ultimatum, and, 
 
 1 In August 1913 Italy had declined to support Austria in 
 a proposed attack upon Serbia. See Signer Giolitti's statement 
 in the Italian Chamber, December 5, 1914. C.D.D. p. 401. 
 
32 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 if he disapproved, to veto it by telegraph before action 
 was taken at Belgrade : yet it would, in a sense, be true 
 that the document ' was communicated to Germany at 
 the same time as to the other Powers '. It is hard to 
 imagine Germany and Austria plotting such a trumpery 
 prevarication, or, indeed, showing any pedantic respect 
 for the word ' truth ' ; but the thing is not impossible. 
 On the other hand, there are people who profess to know, 
 not only that the Kaiser had seen the Ultimatum before- 
 hand, but that he had stiffened its exactions. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 DIARY OF EVENTS 
 
 Thursday, July 23 
 
 ' The possible consequences of the present situation are 
 terrible.' SIR EDWARD GREY. 
 
 THE Austrian Ambassador, Count Mensdorff, to-day London, 
 informed Sir Edward Grey ' that he would be able 
 to-morrow morning to let him have officially the com- 
 munication that he understood was being made to 
 Serbia to-day by Austria '. He also sketched the nature 
 of the demands, on which Sir Edward, in the absence 
 of fuller information, declined to make any comment. 
 But when Count Mensdorff indicated that * there would 
 be something in the nature of a time-limit, which was in 
 effect akin to an ultimatum ', Sir Edward at once scented 
 danger, and pointed out that this ' might inflame opinion 
 in Russia ', and render it impossible to get a satisfactory 
 reply from Serbia. If proceedings tended to drag out (he 
 said), ' a time-limit could always be introduced after- 
 wards '. 'A time-limit was generally a thing to be used 
 only in the last resort, after other means had been tried 
 and failed/ Then Sir Edward enlarged on the calamities 
 which could not but ensue from a great European war ; 
 to which the Count replied that ' all would depend upon 
 Russia '. 1 This remark we may bear in mind in the 
 sequel, when we find Austria affecting surprise that Russia 
 should interest herself in the affairs of Serbia. 
 
 The Serbian Minister, M. Boschkovitch, called upon 
 Sir A. Nicolson, the Permanent Under- Secretary for 
 Foreign Affairs, and stated that his Government was 
 
 1 Blue Book, No. 3. 
 
 1852 
 
34 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 London. ' most anxious and disquieted '. Serbia was perfectly 
 ready to meet any reasonable demands on the part of 
 Austria if the Serajevo inquiry, ' conducted with so 
 much mystery and secrecy ', showed that ' there were 
 any individuals conspiring or organizing plots on Serbian 
 territory '. But ' if Austria transported the question 
 [from the juridical] on to the political ground, and said 
 that Serbian policy, being inconvenient to her, must 
 undergo a radical change, and that Serbia must abandon 
 certain political ideals, no independent State would, or 
 could, submit to such dictation '* 
 
 Berlin. The German Chancellor sends to the German Ambassa- 
 dors in Paris, London, and St. Petersburg, the circular 
 of advice, already summarized (p. 27), in which he 
 declares the Austrian demands to be fully justified. 
 
 Belgrade. 6 P.M. THE ULTIMATUM DELIVERED. 
 
 On the same evening, M. Strandtman, the Russian 
 Charge d' Affaires, announced to St. Petersburg the 
 launching of the bolt, and said, ' Patchou [the interim 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs], who has communicated to 
 me the contents of the Note, solicits the aid of Russia, 
 and declares that no Serbian Government could accept 
 the demands of Austria '. 2 A later telegram of the same 
 night contained the text of the Ultimatum, but does not 
 seem to have reached St. Petersburg until well on in the 
 following day, after the document had been communi- 
 cated to the Foreign Minister by the Austrian Ambassador. 
 
 1 Blue Book, No. 30. 2 Russian Book, No. I. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 DIARY OF EVENTS 
 
 Friday, July 24 
 
 ' I do not understand why all means of retreat have been 
 cut off.' JULES CAMBON. 
 
 THE Russian Charge <T Affaires had told his Government Belgrade, 
 on Monday night that M. Pachitch was expected to return 
 at 10 this morning, and it was no doubt at that hour 
 that he arrived. His first step was to see the Russian 
 and the British Charges d'Affaires. To the former 
 (M. Strandtman) he said that he would reply to the 
 Austrian Ultimatum within the stated time, that Serbia 
 would appeal to the ' friendly Powers ' to protect her inde- 
 pendence, and that if war proved inevitable, she would 
 fight. 1 To the latter (Mr. Crackanthorpe) he said that 
 the Austrian demands were such that no independent 
 country could accept them in their entirety, and that he 
 hoped Britain might see her way to induce Austria to 
 moderate them. 2 He ' did not conceal his anxiety as to 
 future developments '. 
 
 The Serbian Premier made no other move to-day. 
 He and his colleagues were doubtless devoting all their 
 energies to the drafting of the reply. The Crown Prince 
 of Serbia, however, addressed to the Tsar a long telegram. 
 He recited Serbia's official condemnation of the Serajevo 
 crime and offer to co-operate in tracking down accomplices 
 (see p. 14). In spite of this, he said, Austria had put 
 forth demands which were ' uselessly humiliating and 
 incompatible with the dignity of an independent State '. 
 
 1 Serbian Book, No. 34 ; Russian Book, No. 9. 
 
 2 Serbian Book, No. 35 ; Blue Book, No. 8. 
 
 C2 
 
36 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 Belgrade. Any requirements that did not compromise her inde- 
 pendence Serbia would accept, and any that the Tsar 
 should counsel her to agree to. ' The time-limit ', he 
 proceeded, ' is too short. At its expiration we may be 
 attacked by the Austrian army, which is concentrating 
 on our frontier. We cannot defend ourselves, and we 
 implore your Majesty to come to our aid as soon as 
 possible/ He concluded with an appeal to the ' generous 
 Slav heart ' of the Russian monarch. 1 To this telegram 
 the Tsar made no reply until Monday the 27th 2 one 
 indication among many that Russia acted in no hot- 
 headed and impulsive spirit of partisanship. 
 
 Vienna. jh e Note was published in this morning's newspapers. 
 ' By common consent ', says Sir Maurice de Bunsen, ' it 
 was at once styled an Ultimatum/ 3 
 
 The only diplomatic incident in Vienna to-day was an 
 interview between Count Berchtold and the Russian 
 Charge d'Affaires, of which we have two accounts, one 
 by Herr von Tschirscky, the other by Sir Maurice de 
 Bunsen. 4 The Count, according to the German authority, 
 sent for Prince Kudachef, in order to explain to him 
 in a clear and friendly fashion the attitude of Austria 
 in regard to Serbia. The Monarchy had no thought 
 of posing as a conqueror, of annexing territory, or of 
 upsetting the balance of power in the Balkans, but it 
 must put a stop once for all to Serbian agitation, and 
 obtain guarantees for a friendly attitude on Serbia's 
 part in the future. As who should say : ' You shall 
 
 1 Serbian Book, No. 37 ; Russian Book, No. 6. 
 
 8 No public reply. That St. Petersburg and Belgrade were 
 in communication in the interval is not to be doubted. The 
 moderation of the Serbian reply was probably due to Russian 
 influence (Blue Book, No. 22). But the fact remains that the 
 Tsar made no haste to put himself forward publicly as the 
 champion of Serbia. 
 
 3 Blue Book, No. 161. 
 
 4 German Book, No. 3 ; Blue Book, No. 7. 
 
FRIDAY, JULY 24 37 
 
 love me, if I have to thrash you within an inch of your Vienna, 
 life ! ' From the English authority we learn that Prince 
 Kudachef, expressing his own personal view, said that 
 the Austrian Note could not possibly be accepted as it 
 stood ; whereupon the Count replied that the Austrian 
 Minister would certainly leave Belgrade unless the Note 
 were ' accepted integrally ' within the time appointed, 
 and that the Monarchy ' felt its very existence to be at 
 stake '. He added, what was certainly true, that ' the 
 step taken had caused great satisfaction throughout the 
 country '. 
 
 At 10 a.m. (just as M. Pachitch was arriving at Belgrade) St. 
 the Austrian Ambassador, Count Szapary, handed the 
 text of the Ultimatum to the Foreign Minister, M. Sazonof. 
 Here, then, as at Belgrade, sixteen hours out of the 
 forty-eight were rendered useless. 1 In the conversation 
 which ensued, 2 M. Sazonof showed clearly what he thought 
 of the Austrian move, and indeed objected strongly to 
 one point (the suppression of the Narodna Odbrana), 
 which Serbia eventually accepted. He, of course, pro- 
 tested against the participation of Austrian agents in 
 the internal affairs of Serbia. As for the Austrian offer 
 to present ' a dossier elucidating the Serbian intrigues ', 
 he said that it was rendered useless by the fact that the 
 Ultimatum was already delivered. ' This was the best 
 proof that Austria did not really desire an impartial 
 examination of the matter/ 
 
 M. Sazonof 's first move was to beg the British Ambas- 
 sador (by telephone) to meet him at the French Embassy ; 
 and there Sir George Buchanan, M. Paleologue, and 
 M. Sazonof had a long conference. M. Sazonof said that 
 Austria would never have taken such ' provocative and 
 immoral ' action except in concert with Germany ; that 
 some of her demands were impossible of acceptance, and 
 
 1 M. Sazonof himself says 17 hours. (Russian Book, No. 77.) 
 
 2 Austrian Book, No. 14. 
 
38 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 St. that he hoped Britain would not fail to proclaim her 
 
 Peters- * solidarity ' with Russia and France. M. Paleologue 
 declared that France would stand by Russia in word 
 and deed; and the two statesmen insisted in chorus, 
 again and again, that Britain ought at once to take up 
 a definite position by the side of the Dual Alliance. 
 Sir George Buchanan replied that ' direct British interests 
 in Serbia were nil, and that a war on behalf of that 
 country would never be sanctioned by public opinion'; 
 to which the obvious answer was that it was not merely 
 the future of Serbia, but the future of Europe, that was 
 at stake. 1 To Sir George's question whether, if Austria 
 attacked Serbia, Russia would at once attack Austria, 
 M. Sazonof replied that he thought Russia would have 
 to mobilize, but the question would be discussed at 
 a Cabinet Council that afternoon, and decided at another, 
 probably to-morrow, at which the Tsar would preside. 
 To Sir George's suggestion that the first thing to do 
 was to get the time-limit extended, M. Paleologue replied 
 that there was no time for that. M. Sazonof admitted 
 that Serbia could doubtless accept some of Austria's 
 demands, but said he must consult his colleagues as to 
 how far she should be advised to go. Ultimately, Sir 
 George Buchanan agreed to ask Sir Edward Grey whether 
 he would not make strong representations to both Austria 
 and Germany as to the probable consequences of an 
 attack by Austria upon Serbia, and whether he might 
 not even hint that it would be difficult for Britain to 
 keep out of any war that might ensue. 2 
 
 After the Cabinet Council, M. Sazonof received the 
 Serbian Minister and the German Ambassador. What 
 he said to the former does not appear, but on leaving 
 
 1 The question whether Britain ought to have yielded to the 
 reiterated urgency of Russia and France and thrown her sword 
 into the scale at an early stage of the proceedings, is discussed 
 in Chapter XVIII. 
 
 2 Blue Book, No. 6. 
 
FRIDAY, JULY 24 39 
 
 M. Sazonof's room the Serbian ran against his German St. 
 
 colleague, Count Pourtales, who ' appeared to be in high 
 good humour '. Asked how the situation created by the 
 Ultimatum was to be solved, Pourtales replied that that 
 depended entirely on Serbia, since the question was one 
 between Austria and Serbia alone, and no one else could 
 meddle with it. ' You are mistaken,' replied the Serb, 
 ' and will soon be able to convince yourself that this is 
 not an Austro-Serbian but a European question/ 1 
 
 It is probable that this prediction was immediately 
 fulfilled, to the detriment of the Count's high spirits. 
 At all events, he telegraphed to Berlin that he found 
 Sazonof much agitated, full of bitter complaints as to 
 the behaviour of Austria, and emphatic in declaring 
 that Russia could not permit the Austro-Serbian diffi- 
 culty to work itself out as though no one else had any 
 concern in it. 2 This must have dashed his roseate vision 
 of an easy triumph for Austrian arms and German 
 diplomacy, and Pourtales himself, as we shall see, did 
 not at all relish the idea of war with Russia. On Sazonof, 
 meanwhile, ' the evasive replies and recriminations of 
 Pourtales left an unfavourable impression.' 3 
 
 After the Cabinet Council, M. Sazonof telegraphed to 
 Prince Kudachef in Vienna, instructing him to urge 
 upon Count Berchtold the necessity for an extension 
 of the time-limit, if ' incalculable consequences, equally 
 disastrous for all the Powers ' were to be avoided. What 
 was the use, he asked, of Austria's offer to lay before 
 the Powers the proofs of her accusations against Serbia, 
 if she allowed them no time to acquaint themselves with 
 the documents ? Given time to convince themselves of 
 the justice of Austria's case, the Powers might be able 
 to advise Serbia in accordance with that conviction. 
 But a refusal to prolong the term of the Ultimatum 
 would render Austria's overtures to the Powers entirely 
 
 1 Serbian Book, No. 36. 2 German Book, No. 4. 
 
 3 French Book, No. 38. 
 
40 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 St. meaningless. 1 This telegram was communicated to the 
 
 burg 18 " Governments of Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and 
 
 France, but was not delivered, either in London or Paris, 
 
 until the following day. 
 
 Meanwhile the Russian Government issued to the 
 
 press the following announcement, 2 no doubt drawn up 
 
 at the Cabinet meeting : 
 
 ' Recent events, and the dispatch of an ultimatum 
 to Serbia by Austria, are causing the Russian Govern- 
 ment the greatest anxiety. The Government are closely 
 following the dispute between the two countries, to 
 which Russia cannot remain indifferent.' 
 
 Berlin. The newspapers received the Ultimatum with a chorus 
 of approval, deprecating any attempt on Serbia's part 
 to appeal to the Powers, and insisting on ' the sentiment 
 of monarchical solidarity '. 3 
 
 In the afternoon, the French Ambassador, M. Jules 
 Cambon, had an informal interview with Herr von 
 Jagow. 4 In the face of Cambon's barely-concealed 
 scepticism, von Jagow maintained that he had no 
 advance knowledge of the Austrian demands. To 
 Cambon's remark that the shortness of the time-limit 
 ' would make an unpleasant impression in Europe ', he 
 replied that ' he quite expected a little excitement on 
 the part of Serbia's friends, but that he counted on their 
 giving her wise advice '. To Cambon's suggestion that 
 if Russia gave good advice at Belgrade, good advice 
 should be offered at Vienna from another quarter, his 
 only reply was ' that the difficulty must be localized '- 
 the ' mot d'ordre ' of Berlin. He asked whether Cambon 
 really thought the situation serious. ' Certainly/ was 
 Cambon's very pertinent answer, ' because, if what is 
 
 1 Russian Book, No. 4 ; Blue Book, No. 13. 
 
 2 Russian Book, No. 10 ; Austrian Book, No. 15. 
 
 3 Russian Book, No. 7 ; French Book, No. 30. 
 
 4 French Book, No. 30. 
 
FRIDAY, JULY 24 41 
 
 happening is the result of reflection, I do not under- Berlin, 
 stand why all means of retreat have been cut off.' 
 
 In the morning the Austrian Ambassador delivered Paris, 
 at the Foreign Office a copy of the Ultimatum. It was 
 pointed out to him that the presentation of so peremptory 
 a document with so short a time-limit, at the very 
 moment when MM. Poincare and Viviani were out of 
 re*ach, could not but cause a painful impression in France. 1 
 At five in the afternoon the German Ambassador, Herr 
 von Schoen, read to M. Bienvenu-Martin, the Acting 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs, the German Chancellor's 
 circular memorandum (p. 27). M. Martin remarked 
 upon the unnecessary stringency of the dilemma pre- 
 sented, leaving no middle course between the refusal of 
 all satisfaction and the acceptance of such humiliation 
 as might well lead to a revolution in Serbia. He suggested 
 that ' if Serbia gave obvious proof of goodwill ' it could 
 not be thought that Austria would refuse to negotiate. 
 Herr von Schoen ' recognized the justice of those con- 
 siderations, and vaguely stated that hope was always 
 possible '. 2 
 
 Count Mensdorff this morning delivered to Sir Edward London. 
 Grey the text of the Ultimatum, and a conversation 
 ensued, 3 which went over much of the ground already 
 covered on the previous day (p. 33). It was now that 
 Sir Edward said that, while the crime of Serajevo naturally 
 aroused sympathy with Austria, ' he had never before 
 seen one State address to another independent State 
 a document of so formidable a character.' Demand 
 No. 5, he pointed out, ' would be hardly consistent with 
 the maintenance of Serbia's independent sovereignty.' 
 Britain, however, was not concerned in the dispute 
 between Austria and Serbia, and he should approach the 
 
 1 French Book, No. 25. 2 French Book, No. 28. 
 
 3 Blue Book, No. 5. 
 
42 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 London, matter ' simply and solely from the point of view of the 
 peace of Europe '. Count Mensdorff said that affairs 
 might never have come to this pass, ' if Serbia had held 
 out a hand after the murder of the Archduke ', but she 
 ' had shown no sign of sympathy or help ' which, by 
 the way, was not the case (see p. 14). 
 
 Sir Edward Grey then saw in succession the French 
 and the German Ambassadors. 
 
 To M. Paul Cambon, 1 Sir Edward said that Prince 
 Lichnowsky had asked him some days ago to ' exercise 
 moderating influence at St. Petersburg '. His view now 
 was that moderating influence at St. Petersburg would 
 be either unnecessary, if Russia took the Ultimatum 
 calmly, or, if she did not, unavailing and the latter 
 hypothesis seemed the only probable one. He suggested, 
 and M. Cambon agreed, that the best hope lay in the 
 possibility of joint and simultaneous action at Vienna 
 and St. Petersburg on the part of the Four Powers not 
 directly interested in Serbia to wit, Germany, France, 
 Italy, and Great Britain. He thought that even if 
 Austria moved into Serbia and Russia mobilized, it 
 might be possible for the Four Powers to obtain a suspen- 
 sion of military measures, pending mediation. ' But it 
 would be essential for any chance of success for such a step 
 that Germany should participate in it.' M. Cambon 
 thought nothing could be done if Austria once moved 
 against Serbia, but time might be gained at Vienna, if 
 Germany would co-operate in the effort. 
 
 To Prince Lichnowsky, 2 who communicated to him 
 the Chancellor's circular memorandum, Sir Edward Grey 
 repeated the substance of his conversation with M. 
 Cambon. ' The only chance he could see of mediating 
 or moderating influence being effective, was that the 
 Four Powers, Germany, Italy, France, and ourselves, 
 should work together simultaneously at Vienna and St. 
 Petersburg in favour of moderation.' Meanwhile, it was 
 1 Blue Book, No. 10. 2 Blue Book, No. n. 
 
FRIDAY, JULY 24 43 
 
 very desirable to gain time by persuading Austria to London, 
 delay the outbreak of hostilities ; but that would be 
 hopeless ' unless Germany would propose and participate 
 in such action at Vienna '. Prince Lichnowsky seems to 
 have returned no direct answer to this proposition. He 
 merely said that Austria would certainly move when the 
 time-limit expired, unless her demands were uncon- 
 ditionally accepted. He evidently knew that his Govern- 
 ment would lift no finger towards gaining time. 1 
 
 A telegram was dispatched to the British Charge 
 d' Affaires at Belgrade, instructing him to urge modera- 
 tion upon the Serbian Government, and suggest com- 
 pliance on as many points as possible. 2 This advice was 
 not, as a matter of fact, given, Mr. Crackanthorpe having 
 ascertained that it was not needed. 
 
 Already to-day the Belgian Government sent to its Brussels, 
 representatives abroad a declaration that Belgium had 
 exactly observed all its duties as a neutral State, and, 
 although believing her territory safe from attack, had 
 nevertheless taken all measures to preserve her neutrality 
 and fulfil her international obligations. This statement 
 was not to be delivered immediately, but only if the 
 course of events should seem to require it. 3 
 
 At 6 this evening, twenty-four out of the forty-eight Sum- 
 hours were gone. Serbia had cried to Russia for aid. 
 Russia had appealed direct to Austria for an extension 
 of the time-limit. The Russian frame of mind was not 
 yet known either in London or in Paris, but it was 
 rightly conjectured. In the West, as in the East, an 
 extension of the time-limit was seen to be needful, but 
 obtainable only by aid from Berlin ; and it was already 
 pretty clear that no such aid was forthcoming. Failing 
 that, there seemed to be some hope in Sir Edward 
 
 1 See Note 2, p. 74. 2 Blue Book, Nos. 12 and 22. 
 
 3 Belgian Book, No. 2. 
 
44 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 Grey's proposal of Four Power mediation at Vienna and 
 St. Petersburg, but for this, too, the co-operation of Ger- 
 many was indispensable. From Germany came nothing 
 but the stolid iteration : ' Localize the quarrel ! Keep 
 the ring ! No interference ! ' Austria, meanwhile, was 
 already protesting that she had no intention of annex- 
 ing Serbian territory a declaration the worth of which 
 we shall have to consider hereafter. 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
 DIARY OF EVENTS 
 
 Saturday, July 25 
 
 ' There is no question of war but of an execution in a local 
 matter.' VON JAGOW. 
 
 COUNT BERCHTOLD having left for Ischl, Prince Kuda- Vienna, 
 chef, the Russian Charge d'Affaires, telegraphed to him 
 Sazonof 's request for an extension of the time-limit, and 
 also conveyed it verbally to Baron Macchio, who said 
 he would forward it to Berchtold, but ' had no hesitation 
 in predicting a categorical refusal '. The Baron ' behaved 
 with icy coldness '. When it was represented to him 
 that to submit documentary proofs of grievances but 
 give no time for a study of the dossier ' was not consonant 
 with international courtesy ', he replied that ' one's 
 interests sometimes exempt one from being courteous 1 . 1 
 
 Berchtold promptly instructed Macchio to refuse the 
 request, but to add that, even after the breaking off of 
 diplomatic relations, Serbia could still ' bring about 
 a friendly solution ' by an unconditional surrender. In 
 that case, however, she would have to pay all expenses 
 incurred by Austria in preparing to chastise her. To 
 Count Szapary, Austrian Ambassador in St. Petersburg, 
 Berchtold telegraphed that it was a mistake to suppose 
 that the dossier had been submitted to the Powers for 
 discussion or appreciation. It ' merely bore the character 
 of a statement for information '. For the rest, Austria 
 regarded her action as a matter concerning herself and 
 Serbia alone. 2 
 
 1 Russian Book, No. n ; French Book, No. 45. 
 
 2 Austrian Book, Nos. 20 and 21. 
 
46 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 Vienna. So far, however, Berchtold did relax his haughty 
 attitude, as to instruct Szapary to explain away 'in 
 strict confidence ' (!) one of the most inacceptable of the 
 Austrian demands. ' Point 5 ', he said, * was in no way 
 intended to infringe the sovereignty of Serbia ' : the ' col- 
 laboration ' contemplated in it was merely to consist of 
 the establishment of a private ' Bureau de Surete ' at 
 Belgrade, which should co-operate with the Serbian 
 police, after the fashion of similar Russian establishments 
 in Paris. 1 The comment on this would seem to be that, 
 if Austria had really an admissible demand in mind, she 
 went out of her way to conceal the fact and to put it as 
 inadmissibly as possible. 
 
 To this day, also, belongs a dispatch of some length 
 from Count Berchtold to Count Szapary 2 (apparently 
 sent by post), containing a general vindication of Austrian 
 policy. It may best be considered when we come to 
 review the whole case. 
 
 Berlin. When we turn to Berlin, we discover the convenience, 
 from the Austro-German point of view, of the Austrian 
 Emperor's villeggiatura at Ischl. Both Britain and Russia 
 request von Jagow to make efforts at Vienna in favour 
 of an extended time-limit. 3 He consents to ' inform 
 Vienna telegraphically of this step ' on their part, but 
 fears that ' in the absence of Berchtold, who has left for 
 Ischl, and in view of the lack of time, his telegrams may 
 have no result '. As for the idea that he should himself 
 support the Russian and British appeal, he simply waves 
 it aside. He ' is inclined to think ' that any yielding 
 on Austria's part ' might increase the assurance of 
 Serbia '. To every suggestion that the German Govern- 
 ment should exert its influence at Vienna ' for the avoid- 
 
 1 Austrian Book, No. 27. On this see Headlam, p. 94. 
 
 2 Austrian Book, No. 26. 
 
 3 Russian Book, No. 14 ; Blue Book, No. 18. 
 
SATURDAY, JULY 25 47 
 
 ance of disastrous consequences ' he opposes an immovable Berlin, 
 negative. 
 
 M. Jules Cambon 1 gives us a curious sidelight on 
 von Jagow's methods. When the Russian Charge 
 d' Affaires asked for an interview in order to prefer the 
 Russian request, he gave him an appointment in the late 
 afternoon, just as the Ultimatum was about to expire, 
 so that M. Bronewsky had to make his request in writing. 
 Von Jagow may not have known exactly what Bronewsky 
 wanted of him, but he cannot but have guessed that, 
 whatever the Russian's purpose, a late afternoon appoint- 
 ment was likely to defeat it. At such a crisis, when 
 every moment was precious, to put off the representative 
 of a Great Power until the business day was over was 
 a discourtesy which cannot have been inadvertent. The 
 little trait is quite of a piece with the whole German 
 policy of obstructive inertia. When at last Bronewsky 
 came to speech with the Foreign Minister, he urged 
 that if the time-limit could not be extended, at least 
 the outbreak of war might be delayed, so as to give the 
 Powers a chance of intervening. Von Jagow replied 
 that * there was no question of a war, but of an execution 
 in a local matter '. This though Serbia was known to 
 have an army of 400,000 men, many of them veterans 
 inured to victory ! The term execution, moreover, 
 implied a denial of Serbia's independence. 
 
 To Sir Horace Rumbold, 2 von Jagow ' admitted quite 
 freely ' that Austria was determined to ' give the Serbians 
 a lesson ', and that * the Serbian Government could not 
 swallow some of the Austrian demands '. He relied on 
 the Austrian disclaimer of territorial ambitions to ' calm ' 
 St. Petersburg, nor was he to be persuaded that there 
 was any real danger of Russian intervention. ' He 
 remained of opinion that the crisis could be localized ' 
 blessed word ! If, however, the relations between 
 
 1 French Book, Nos. 42 and 43. 
 
 2 Blue Book, No. 18. 
 
4 8 
 
 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 Berlin. Austria and Russia became threatening, ' he was quite 
 ready to fall in with Sir Edward Grey's suggestion as 
 to the Four Powers working together in favour of modera- 
 tion at Vienna and St. Petersburg '. 
 
 Here the Foreign Minister spoke in unison with the 
 Chancellor, who to-day telegraphed to Lichnowsky in 
 London, to the effect that, while intervention between 
 Austria and Serbia would be inconsistent with the great 
 principle of ' localization ', in the event of an Austro- 
 Russian controversy, Germany would be prepared to 
 ' intercede ' conjointly with the other Powers. 1 In other 
 words : Austria must be perfectly free to thrash Serbia, 
 but if Russia proposes to thrash Austria, we will join in 
 persuading her to keep the peace. The apparent con- 
 cession amounted to no more than this. It meant that 
 if Austria, under the aegis of Germany, succeeded in 
 breaking Serbia's back, Germany would be content with 
 this enhancement of her prestige, and would try to stave 
 off a European war. It was a small mercy, but, such as 
 it was, it may stand to Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg's credit. 
 The Kaiser, we observe, was still on the high seas, and 
 even the Crown Prince was not in Berlin. 
 
 London. It will be convenient to turn next to London. While 
 he instructs Sir Maurice de Bunsen, at Vienna, to support 
 the Russian demand for the extension of the time-limit, 
 Sir Edward Grey has evidently very little hope that 
 anything will come of it. 2 On the other hand, he sees 
 a gleam of light in an assurance which Count Mensdorff 
 has been authorized to give him that, on the expiry of 
 the time-limit, Austria would ' break off diplomatic 
 relations, and commence military preparations, but not 
 military operations '. 3 We can now realize, in the light 
 of Count Berchtold's telegram to Macchio (p. 45), that 
 this does not imply any willingness to negotiate, but 
 
 1 German Book, No. 13. 2 Blue Book, No. 26. 
 
 3 Blue Book, No. 25. 
 
SATURDAY, JULY 25 49 
 
 merely means that, until Austrian preparations are London, 
 complete, Serbia may still escape war by unconditional 
 surrender and the payment of expenses. Still, Sir 
 Edward could not but welcome any postponement of 
 actual hostilities, and see in it a breathing-space for 
 conciliation. He foretold, only too justly, that ' we 
 should soon be face to face with the mobilization of 
 Austria and Russia'; and in that event (he telegraphed 
 to Sir Horace Rumbold) the only chance of peace would 
 be for Germany, France, Italy, and Britain to join in 
 asking Austria and Russia not to cross the frontier till 
 they (the Four Powers) ' had had time to try and arrange 
 matters between them '. This was his proposal of the 
 day before, rendered more hopeful by the promised pause 
 before the attack ; but, as he telegraphed to Sir George 
 Buchanan, ' No diplomatic intervention would be tolerated 
 by either Russia or Austria, unless it was clearly impartial 
 and included the allies or friends of both. The co-opera- 
 tion of Germany would, therefore, be essential '. 1 And now, 
 for once, it seemed as if that co-operation would be forth- 
 coming. Prince Lichnowsky telegraphed the proposal 
 to Berlin, and, as we have seen (p. 48), it was formally 
 accepted by Bethmann-Hollweg. 2 Thus prospects ap- 
 peared for the moment to be a little brighter. 
 
 Another ray of hope came from Belgrade, when Crackan- 
 thorpe telegraphed an outline of the ' most conciliatory ' 
 Serbian reply, and added, ' The Serbian Government 
 consider that, unless the Austrian Government want 
 war at any cost, they cannot but be content with the 
 full satisfaction offered *. 3 Sir Edward Grey at once 
 
 1 Blue Book, No. 24. 
 
 2 Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador in London, 
 reported to his Government (Russian Book, No. 22) that Grey 
 said to him, ' This plan requires first and foremost the concurrence 
 of Germany and an undertaking by that Power not to mobilize '. 
 But this suggestion does not seem to have been conveyed to 
 Berlin. 
 
 3 Blue Book, No. 21. 
 
 1852 D 
 
50 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 London, communicated the forecast to Prince Lichnowsky, and 
 expressed his hope that ' the German Government will 
 feel able to influence the Austrian Government to take 
 a favourable view of it '. 1 
 
 St. M. Sazonof telegraphed to Count Benckendorff in 
 
 burg^ London, saying that ' in the event of any change for the 
 worse in the situation ', he counted upon England at 
 once siding definitely with Russia and France. 2 In 
 conversation with Sir George Buchanan, 3 he took the 
 same line. Sir George replied that England could better 
 play the part of mediator at Berlin and Vienna in the 
 character of a friend than in that of a declared ally. 
 The question of England's attitude is discussed at length 
 in Chapter XVIII. 
 
 In the same interview M. Sazonof said that his informa- 
 tion from Germany rendered him sceptical as to the 
 postponement of hostilities promised by Count MensdorfL 
 The Serbian Minister had given him to understand that, 
 if Austria attacked, the Serbian Government would 
 abandon Belgrade, withdraw its forces into the interior, 
 and at the same time appeal to the Powers. Sazonof 
 approved of this appeal. The assurances given by Serbia 
 in 1908, to which the Ultimatum referred, were given, 
 not to Austria, but to the Powers. Should Serbia act 
 as proposed, ' Russia would be quite ready to stand 
 aside, and leave the whole question in the hands of 
 England, France, Germany, and Italy'. Sir George 
 Buchanan spoke strongly as to the necessity for prudence 
 in the matter of military preparations, warning Sazonof 
 that ' if Russia mobilized, Germany would not be content 
 with mere mobilization, or give Russia time to carry out 
 hers, but would probably declare war at once '. Sazonof 's 
 reply was that Russia ' could not allow Austria to crush 
 Serbia and become the predominant Power in the Balkans. 
 
 1 Blue Book, No. 27. 2 Russian Book, No. 17. 
 
 3 Blue Book, No. 17. 
 
SATURDAY, JULY 25 51 
 
 He had no wish to precipitate a conflict, but unless St 
 Germany could restrain Austria, the situation might be 
 regarded as desperate/ 
 
 From French sources, too, we learn that Sazonof 
 repeatedly declared that he would not break off negotia- 
 tions, even if Austria came to blows with Serbia. This 
 resolution appears to have been taken at a Council of 
 Ministers at which the Tsar presided. 1 
 
 Nothing of moment happened in Paris to-day. A some- Paris, 
 what garbled version of Bethmann-Hollweg's circular 
 memorandum (p. 27) having got into the cho de Paris, 
 and having been described as a ' threat ' on Germany's 
 part, Herr von Schoen declared that it was not to be re- 
 garded in that light. It was at this interview that he made 
 use of the expression, ' une fois la fleche partie '(p. 29). 2 
 
 We have already seen that an outline of the Serbian Belgrade, 
 reply had been received by the British Charge d'Affaires, 
 probably pretty early in the day. At 5.45 according to 
 M. Pachitch at 5.58 according to Baron von Giesl 
 the reply was delivered. Von Giesl, by his own showing, 
 must have weighed it and found it wanting with lightning 
 rapidity, for he and his staff left Belgrade by the 6.30 
 train. Crackanthorpe and Strandtman promptly tele- 
 graphed this fact to London and St. Petersburg respec- 
 tively, adding that the Serbian Government was leaving 
 that evening for Nish, where the Skuptchina would meet 
 on the 27th. 
 
 The ray of hope was quenched. 
 
 It is already necessary that we should include military Military 
 preparations in our survey of each day's occurrences, 
 Here it is, for various reasons, difficult to arrive at the 
 exact truth. In the first place, ' mobilization ' is at 
 
 1 French Book, Nos. 38 and 50. 
 
 2 French Book, No. 36 ; Russian Book, No. 19. 
 
 D2 
 
52 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 Military best an ill-defined term, and seems to be differently 
 defined m different countries. As a rule, the calling up 
 of reservists is the mark of transition from ' military 
 preparations ' in general to ' mobilization ' in particular. 
 In the second place, the air is full of rumours, which are 
 repeated by persons (journalists and others) who use the 
 word ' mobilization ' very loosely. In the third place, 
 the authorities of every country are inclined not wholly 
 from dishonourable motives to exercise a strict economy 
 of truth /as to their measures, and to postpone as long 
 as possible the use of the word of evil omen. They 
 may be torn between a sincere desire for peace and 
 a determination that war shall not take them at a dis- 
 advantage ; and they may judge (rightly or wrongly) 
 that the best hope of preserving peace is to minimize 
 their preparations for war. If there were any means by 
 which statesmen could be induced to speak the truth 
 and to believe each other when mobilization is in the 
 wind, the danger of war, in such a conjuncture as we are 
 considering, would be sensibly diminished. 
 
 There is no reason to doubt that Austria had begun 
 military preparations on the Serbian frontier several days 
 before the presentation of the Ultimatum. In a dispatch * 
 to his Government, dated July 20, the Serbian Minister 
 at Vienna says : ' The military preparations which are 
 going on, especially on the Serbian frontier, prove that 
 Austria's intentions are serious'. This is perfectly good 
 evidence, though it proceeds from a Serbian source, for 
 M. Jovanovitch had no motive in deceiving his own 
 Government. Indeed, he was merely alluding to what 
 was evidently a matter of common knowledge, as the 
 preparations in question were proceeding, so to speak, 
 under the very eyes of Belgrade. We have the less 
 difficulty in accepting this and other evidence to the 
 same effect, since it would have been manifestly foolish 
 of Austria to launch such an Ultimatum without having 
 1 Serbian Book, No. 31. 
 
SATURDAY, JULY 25 53 
 
 taken steps to back it up. It was always possible that Military 
 Serbia might simply have rejected her demands with 
 contempt, in which case she was obviously committed to 
 military measures. 
 
 The French Consul-General at Basle reports, on July 
 27th, that ' four days ago the German officers on leave in 
 this district received orders to break off their leave and 
 return to Germany '. ' Four days ago ' would mean 
 July 23 the day of the Ultimatum. Interpreting the 
 phrase liberally, however, we can only say that it affords 
 pretty good evidence that the German military authorities 
 were on the alert, either before or immediately after the 
 Ultimatum was presented. 1 
 
 This brings us to the day (Saturday the 25th) which 
 we have immediately in view. 
 
 On this day the Crown Prince of Serbia signed the 
 order for mobilizing the Serbian army. 2 The Austrian 
 Minister reported 3 that the order was issued at 3 p.m. 
 Von Tschirscky next day pointed to this fact (in con- 
 versation with Bunsen) 4 as showing that ' the Serbian 
 concessions were all a sham ', and that ' she well knew 
 they were insufficient '. It would be more to the point 
 to say that she rightly interpreted the fixed resolve of 
 Austria, an enemy who was already making military 
 preparations at her very gates. 
 
 Russia's decision to mobilize against Austria dates 
 from to-day. This is rendered certain by a telegram 
 from the Tsar to the Kaiser, 5 dated July 30, in which he 
 says ' the military measures now taking form were 
 decided upon five days ago, and for the reason of defence 
 against the preparations of Austria '. The determination 
 was reached at a Cabinet Council, the Tsar himself 
 presiding, and there is every reason to consider accurate 
 
 1 For other early preparations on Germany's part, see Chapter 
 KXIII, p. 217. 
 
 z Serbian Book, No. 41. 3 Austrian Book, No. 23. 
 
 4 Blue Book, No. 32. 5 German Book, No. 23a. 
 
THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 Military the summary of its decisions circulated on the follow- 
 P^P g ara ' ing morning to the various French Ambassadors by M. 
 
 Bienvenu-Martin, the French Acting Minister for Foreign 
 
 Affairs. 1 M. Martin says : 
 
 ' The mobilization of thirteen Army Corps, intended 
 eventually to operate against Austria, was considered ; 
 this mobilization, however, would only be made 
 effective if Austria were to bring armed pressure to 
 bear upon Serbia/ Upon M. Sazonof ' falls the duty 
 of fixing the day, liberty being left to him to go on 
 with negotiations even if Belgrade should be occupied '. 
 
 Everything speaks for the credibility of this detailed 
 account, proceeding from Russia's ally. Newspaper 
 rumours bear it out in the main. 2 The German ' Honorary 
 Aide-de-Camp to the Tsar ' reported to-day, 3 no doubt 
 correctly, that manoeuvres of troops in the Krasnoe 
 camp had been suddenly cancelled, and the regiments 
 returned to their garrisons. Also military pupils received 
 their commissions as officers. 
 
 Both in Germany and France there are newspaper 
 reports of leave being stopped to-day, and frontier forts 
 garrisoned, but no important movements seem to have 
 taken place. 
 
 Sum- The direct Russian request for an extension of the 
 
 mary. time-limit is curtly refused. The British and Russian 
 requests forwarded through von Jagow and von 
 Tschirscky 4 are simply ignored, if they ever reach 
 their destination. Berlin remains true to its great 
 watchword, ' localization ', which being interpreted, 
 means ' no interference between Austria and Serbia '. 
 If, however, trouble should arise between Austria and 
 Russia, Berlin is willing to join in ' intercession '. Grey, in 
 London, realizing the menace of imminent mobilizations, 
 
 1 French Book, No. 50. 2 See Price, p. 151. 
 
 3 German Book, No. 6. 4 Blue Book, No. 18. 
 
SATURDAY, JULY 25 55 
 
 does all he can to arrange a mechanism for delaying 
 the shock as long as possible, and thus allowing time 
 for a return to reason. With Germany's aid, this should 
 be feasible. The Austrian declaration that no immediate 
 attack is intended seems encouraging, still more so the 
 Russian resolve not to make an attack on Serbia a reason 
 for breaking off negotiations. Finally, the extreme 
 moderation of the Serbian reply awakens high and 
 reasonable hopes, which are presently shattered when 
 Austria precipitately breaks off diplomatic relations. 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
 THE SERBIAN REPLY 
 
 ' The Serbian reply involved the greatest humiliation to Serbia 
 that he had ever seen a country undergo.' SIR EDWARD GREY. 
 
 IF the Austrian demands upon Serbia were scarcely 
 to be paralleled in diplomatic history, it would certainly 
 be no less difficult to find a more conciliatory reply to 
 such demands than that which Serbia delivered. Here 
 was indeed the soft answer which ought to have turned 
 away wrath ; but wrath which is only a calculated means 
 to an ulterior and unavowed end has no ear for soft 
 answers. 
 
 On Monday the 27th, the reply was issued by the 
 Austrian Government, with its own running commen- 
 tary. The following is a summary of this interesting 
 document. 1 
 
 SERBIA 
 
 The reply begins by stat- 
 ing that since the promise 
 of March 31, 1909, to which 
 the Austrian Note refers, 
 protests in the Skuptchina 
 against the annexation of 
 Bosnia have entirely ,ceased, 
 nor has the Serbian Govern- 
 ment or any of its repre- 
 sentatives or agents made 
 the slightest attempt to 
 alter the state of things 
 created by that annexation. 
 Austria has during this 
 period made no complaint 
 
 AUSTRIA 
 
 This very natural clear- 
 ing of the ground Austria 
 declares to be a shifting of 
 the ground. The charge is 
 not that the Serbian Govern- 
 ment has officially tried to 
 undo the annexation, but 
 that it has * omitted to sup- 
 press the movement against 
 the territorial integrity of 
 the Monarchy'. What Serbia 
 undertook in 1909 was ' to 
 change her attitude and the 
 entire direction of her 
 policies, and to enter into 
 
 1 Austrian Book, No. 34 ; German Book, C.D.D. p. 417. 
 
THE SERBIAN REPLY 
 
 57 
 
 SERBIA 
 
 to Serbia, except on the 
 subject of one school-book, 
 as to which a satisfactory 
 explanation was given. 
 ' Serbia has several times 
 given proof of her pacific 
 and moderate policy during 
 the Balkan crisis, and it is 
 thanks to Serbia and to the 
 sacrifices she has made in 
 the exclusive interest of 
 European peace, that that 
 peace has been preserved/ 
 
 The Government cannot 
 be held responsible for 
 newspaper articles ' and 
 peaceable work of societies ', 
 which in almost all coun- 
 tries are exempt from official 
 control. Serbia has, in a 
 great many questions which 
 have arisen between her 
 and her neighbour, given 
 proof of a most accommo- 
 dating spirit, so that the 
 majority of these questions 
 have been settled to mutual 
 advantage. 
 
 Therefore the Govern- 
 ment has been surprised 
 and pained to be confronted 
 with the affirmation that 
 Serbian subjects had been 
 concerned in the planning 
 of the Serajevo crime. The 
 Government expected to be 
 asked to assist in the in- 
 vestigation of the crime, and 
 was prepared to take steps 
 against every one accused 
 of being implicated. 
 
 AUSTRIA 
 
 friendly and neighbourly 
 relations with Austria '. 
 
 In almost all countries 
 (says Vienna) newspapers 
 and societies are subject to 
 official control, and ' this 
 is also provided for by the 
 Serbian institutions '. 
 
 [On this statement Austria 
 makes no comment.] 
 
 ' This assertion is in- 
 correct.' The Serbian 
 Government knew quite 
 well that certain definite 
 persons were suspected and 
 ought to have instituted 
 investigations of its own 
 accord. 
 
 [Here there seems to be 
 a verbal misunderstanding, 
 real or feigned. The Serbian 
 Government does not ex- 
 press surprise on hearing 
 
THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 SERBIA 
 
 Serbia is, however, pre- 
 pared to hand over for trial 
 any Serbian sub j ect of whose 
 complicity in the crime of 
 Serajevo proofs are forth- 
 coming. 
 
 Further, she agrees to 
 publish on the front page of 
 the ' Official Journal/ and in 
 the other forms demanded, 
 the declaration prescribed in 
 the Austrian Note, with 
 two changes : Instead of 
 saying : ' The Royal Govern- 
 ment of Serbia condemns 
 the propaganda directed 
 against Austria ', she pro- 
 poses to say ' condemns 
 every propaganda which may 
 be directed, &c.'. And in- 
 stead of saying, * The Royal 
 Government regrets that 
 Serbian officers and func- 
 tionaries participated in the 
 above - mentioned propa- 
 ganda', she proposes to say, 
 ' The Royal Government re- 
 grets that, according to the 
 communication from the 
 Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
 ment, certain officers and 
 functionaries participated ', 
 &c. 
 
 Passing to the numbered 
 demands : 
 
 i. Serbia undertakes to 
 introduce at the first regular 
 session of the Skuptchina 
 an amendment of the pre- 
 sent law, giving the Govern- 
 
 AUSTRIA 
 that certain individuals are 
 suspected, but surprise that 
 Austria, instead of request- 
 ing that steps be taken 
 against them, should per- 
 emptorily affirm their 
 guilt.] 
 
 The alterations ' are 
 meant to imply that a 
 propaganda against Austria 
 does not exist '. ' The for- 
 mula is insincere, and the 
 Serbian Government re- 
 serves itself the subterfuge 
 for later occasions that it 
 had not disavowed by this 
 declaration the existing 
 propaganda . . . whence it 
 could deduce further that 
 it is not obliged to suppress 
 in the future a propaganda 
 similar to the present one.' 
 
 Here again Austria de- 
 tects a design ' to preserve 
 a free hand for the future '. 
 
 The Austrian objection 
 to this is scarcely compre- 
 hensible. It seems to imply 
 that Austria will not be 
 satisfied by Serbia's doing 
 
THE SERBIAN REPLY 
 
 59 
 
 SERBIA 
 
 ment full power to proceed 
 drastically against anti- 
 Austrian publications of any 
 sort, and, in the coming 
 revision of the Constitution, 
 to take powers to confiscate 
 any such publications. 
 
 2. Serbia notes that no 
 proofs are offered of the 
 criminal activities of the 
 ' Narodna Odbrana ' or 
 other societies, but it never- 
 theless promises to suppress 
 them. 
 
 3. Serbia binds herself 
 without delay to eliminate 
 from public instruction any- 
 thing tending to further 
 the anti-Austrian propa- 
 ganda of which the Aus- 
 trian Government shall fur- 
 nish proof. 
 
 4. Serbia promises to dis- 
 miss all officers and officials 
 who shall be proved by 
 judicial investigation to 
 have been guilty of working 
 against Austria, and ex- 
 pects Austria to furnish her 
 with their names and with 
 materials for proceeding 
 against them. 
 
 5. Serbia confesses that 
 she does not quite under- 
 stand what is meant by 
 ' accepting the collabora- 
 tion of representatives of 
 
 AUSTRIA 
 
 legally what she demands, 
 but insists that it must be 
 done illegally. The one 
 tangible point is that the 
 Serbian Government does 
 not bind itself to enforce 
 the new laws. 
 
 Austria declares the ten- 
 dencies of these societies to 
 be notorious, and com- 
 plains that Serbia does not 
 promise to ' confiscate their 
 means of propaganda, and 
 prevent their re-establish- 
 ment under other names '. 
 
 Again Austria declares 
 that proofs are entirely 
 superfluous, and that Serbia 
 does not promise to expel 
 from the body of instructors 
 as well as from the means 
 of instruction ' all elements 
 of hostility to the Dual 
 Monarchy '. 
 
 Here, too, Austria objects 
 to the dragging in of ' judi- 
 cial investigations ' and 
 proof. She admits that the 
 officers have done nothing 
 punishable by law ; there- 
 fore she can be satisfied by 
 nothing but their summary 
 dismissal. 
 
 Austria replies that in- 
 ternational law and criminal 
 procedure have nothing to 
 do with the matter, which 
 is purely one of ' state 
 
6o 
 
 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 SERBIA 
 
 the Austrian Government ' 
 in Serbian territory, but 
 ' will admit such collabora- 
 tion as agrees with the 
 principles of international 
 law, with criminal pro- 
 cedure and with good 
 neighbourly relations '. 
 
 6. Serbia will, as a matter 
 of course, take proceedings 
 against all persons con- 
 cerned in the Serajevo 
 crime, who are on Serbian 
 soil ; but the co-operation 
 of Austrian officials in this 
 investigation would be a 
 violation of the Constitu- 
 tion and of criminal pro- 
 cedure. 
 
 7. On receipt of the Aus- 
 trian Note, the Government 
 instantly ordered the arrest 
 of Ma] or Tankosic, but 
 could not lay hands on 
 Milan Ciganowic, an Austro- 
 Hungarian subject, for 
 whose arrest a warrant has 
 been issued. 
 
 8. Serbia will render 
 more stringent the existing 
 measures against the smug- 
 gling of arms and explosives, 
 and will, as a matter of 
 course, punish those officials 
 who permitted the assassins 
 to cross the frontier. 
 
 AUSTRIA 
 police ', to be solved by 
 special agreement. ' The 
 reserved attitude of Serbia 
 is therefore incomprehen- 
 sible ', and ' would lead to 
 unbridgeable difficulties '. 
 
 Austria here accuses 
 Serbia of deliberately mis- 
 understanding her de- 
 mand, and assuming that 
 Austrian officials were to 
 take part in the ' enquete 
 judiciaire ', where it was 
 intended only that they 
 should assist in the police 
 ' recherches '. This the 
 Serbian Government wants 
 to escape, as the investiga- 
 tion, ' if correctly carried 
 out, would yield highly un- 
 desirable results for it '. 
 
 ' This reply is disingen- 
 uous. ' Ciganowic was 
 spirited away by the Bel- 
 grade police three days 
 after the assassination. 
 
 [No comment.] 
 
THE SERBIAN REPLY 61 
 
 SERBIA AUSTRIA 
 
 9. Serbia will willingly 
 give explanations as to any 
 hostile utterances of its 
 functionaries at home and 
 abroad, after the Serajevo 
 crime, of which Austria 
 shall furnish proofs, and 
 will herself collect informa- 
 tion on the matter. 
 
 ' The Serbian Govern- 
 ment must be aware of the 
 interviews in question. If 
 it asks for all kinds of 
 detail, and reserves for it- 
 self the right of a formal 
 investigation, it shows that 
 it does not intend seriously 
 to fulfil the demand/ 
 
 [No comment.] 
 
 ' The Serbian Note, there- 
 fore, is entirely a play for 
 time/ 1 
 
 10. Serbia will notify 
 Austria, ' so far as this has 
 not already been done by 
 the present Note ', of the 
 execution of the measures 
 in question. 
 
 If Austria is not satisfied 
 with this reply, Serbia is 
 ready to refer the question 
 either to the Hague Tri- 
 bunal, or to the Great 
 Powers which took part in 
 formulating the declaration 
 of March 31, 1909. 
 
 Though the Austrian comments are drawn up with 
 considerable ingenuity, they cannot conceal nay, they 
 rather throw into relief the fact that Austria would be 
 satisfied with nothing short of the abject, grovelling 
 humiliation of her inconvenient neighbour. Serbia must 
 not dare to demand proofs of Austrian allegations or to 
 appeal to domestic law or international usage. She must 
 not say : ' If, and in so far as, I have sinned, I repent 
 and promise not to do it again ' ; she must say, ' I have 
 sinned ; I confess it humbly ; and behold ! I kiss the rod/ 
 
 The amazing concession of publishing in her Official 
 Journal, and issuing as an Army Order, an avowal and 
 
 1 This is the comment, not of the Austrian, but of the German 
 Government, in republishing the document. 
 
62 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 abjuration of national misdemeanour, is not sufficient for 
 Austria ; she will not allow Serbia to save her face by 
 even the whisper of a conditional clause. No legal or 
 constitutional difficulties are to be suffered to stand in the 
 way of the instant and despotic execution of the com- 
 mands of a foreign Power. Some of the Austrian objec- 
 tions (those, for instance, appended to Points i and 2) 
 evidently refer to inadvertent omissions which a few 
 words of explanation would have put right. Serbia 
 would certainly have engaged to enforce the new press 
 laws and to confiscate the ' means of propaganda ' of the 
 Societies which she promised to suppress. There is more 
 reason for suspecting duplicity in the omission to add to 
 the guarantee against anti-Austrian school-books the 
 more important guarantee against anti- Austrian teachers. 
 But if the Serbian Government was radically insincere, 
 it would have cost it nothing to give this undertaking 
 and then to forget all about it. As to Points 5 and 6, if 
 Austria really intended by them nothing inconsistent 
 with Serbian sovereignty, she had certainly expressed 
 herself in such a manner as to deceive not only the 
 Serbian Ministers, but an expert like Sir Edward Grey, 
 who remarked to Count Mensdorff on first reading the 
 text of the note that ' to introduce Austrian officials into 
 Serbia would be equivalent to the end of Serbian political 
 independence ' ] and, at that time at any rate, Sir Edward 
 could not be suspected of any partiality for Serbia. 
 
 It should also be noted that the Serbian reply breathed 
 no word of any sort of recrimination. It did not inquire 
 why Austria could not govern her provinces in such a way 
 as to prevent her subjects from plotting assassinations 
 and involving their Serbian kinsmen in their guilt. It did 
 not ask (as it very pertinently might) whether a muzzling 
 order was to be issued for the Austrian as well as for the 
 Serbian press. 
 
 No impartial reader can doubt that the Serbian Govern- 
 1 Austrian Book, No. 10. 
 
THE SERBIAN REPLY 63 
 
 ment sincerely intended to go to the utmost possible 
 limit of compliance. Certain it is that the conciliatory 
 spirit of the reply struck every one as astounding. 
 ' It exceeds all our expectations in its moderation/ said 
 M. Sazonof, ' and in its desire to afford the fullest 
 satisfaction to Austria/ l Sazonof, it may be said, is not 
 an impartial witness ; but France and England, in no 
 way pledged to the Serbian cause, were perfectly capable, 
 at the outset at any rate, of taking unprejudiced views ; 
 and there it was felt that the reply was all that could 
 reasonably be desired. In Paris, M. Bienvenu-Martin, 
 Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, ' called the Austrian 
 Ambassador's attention to the fact that Serbia had 
 accepted Austria's requirements on practically every 
 point, and that the differences that remained might 
 vanish with a little mutual goodwill '. 2 In London, 
 Sir Edward Grey said to Count Mensdorff that ' the 
 Serbian reply already involved the greatest humiliation 
 to Serbia that he had ever seen a country undergo '. 3 
 There can be no doubt that, if Austria had accepted the 
 reply, with a few trifling adjustments, she would generally 
 have been held to have won a great diplomatic victory. 
 
 Serbia humiliated did not suffice her; she must have 
 Serbia impotent. The violent anti-Slav feeling engen- 
 dered by the crime of Serajevo makes this determination 
 comprehensible ; but why did not Germany, less wrought- 
 up and less directly interested, counsel her to hold her 
 hand ? Was Germany already, on July 25-6, bent on 
 a European war ? We need not assume so. The truth 
 seems to be that Germany was at this point, and for two 
 or three days more, labouring under a fatal illusion. 
 
 1 Russian Book, No. 33. 2 French Book, No. 75. 
 
 3 Blue Book, No. 48. 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 
 GERMANY'S GREAT ILLUSION 
 
 ' It is generally thought that once again Russia will not inter- 
 vene.' Constantinople Report. 
 
 IT was the fixed opinion both at Berlin and at Vienna 
 that Russia would not fight. Testimony to this fact 
 reaches us from every hand. 
 
 We have seen how von Jagow, in his conversation 
 with Rumbold on the 25th, 1 ' remained of opinion that 
 the crisis could be localized'. ' I asked', says Sir Horace, 
 ' whether it was not to be feared that, in taking military 
 action against Serbia, Austria would dangerously excite 
 public opinion in Russia. He said he thought not. . . . 
 He maintained his optimistic view with regard to Russia.' 
 
 On July 26th Sir Maurice de Bunsen reported from 
 Vienna 2 that : 
 
 ' According to the confident belief of the German 
 Ambassador [von Tschirscky], Russia will keep quiet 
 during the chastisement of Serbia which Austria is 
 resolved to inflict, having received assurances that 
 no Serbian territory will be annexed. ... He pointed 
 out that the days of Pan-Slav agitation in Russia were 
 over, and that Moscow was perfectly quiet.' Russia 
 ' would not be so imprudent as to take a step which 
 would probably result in many frontier questions in 
 which Russia is interested, such as Swedish, Polish, 
 Ruthene, Rumanian, and Persian questions, being 
 brought into the melting-pot. France, too, was not 
 at all in a condition for facing war.' 
 
 When Sir Edward Grey, on July 27th, telegraphs to 
 Sir George Buchanan, 3 ' We hear from German and 
 
 1 Blue Book, No. 18. 2 Blue Book, No. 32. 
 
 3 Blue Book, No. 47. 
 
GERMANY'S GREAT ILLUSION 65 
 
 Austrian sources that they believe Russia will take no 
 action so long as Austria agrees not to take Serbian 
 territory ' , he may be referring simply to these reports 
 from Berlin and Vienna, or he may have other intelligence 
 in mind. On the same day, however, we have independent 
 testimony from Constantinople, where the French Ambas- 
 sador reports x that : 
 
 ' The Turks are delighted at the misfortunes of 
 Serbia, but people here generally are led to believe 
 that the conflict will remain localized. It is generally 
 thought that once again Russia will not intervene in 
 favour of Serbia.' 
 
 That these views result from German suggestion can 
 scarcely be doubted. 
 
 On the following day, July 28th, the Austrian Ambas- 
 sador at Berlin (Count Szogyeny) said to Sir Edward 
 Goschen 2 that ' a general war was most unlikely, as 
 Russia neither wanted nor was in a position to make 
 war '. 'I think ', Sir Edward adds, ' that that opinion 
 is shared by many people here/ 
 
 On the same day (July 28th) the Italian Ambassador 
 in Berlin reported a conversation 3 with von Jagow, in 
 which that statesman ' again repeated to him that he did 
 not think that Russia would move. He based this belief 
 on the fact that the Russian Government had just sent an 
 agent to Berlin to treat about some financial questions/ 
 
 Even so late as July 2Qth (Wednesday) the Marquis 
 di San Giuliano at Rome said to Sir Rennell Rodd 4 that 
 ' there seemed to be a difficulty in making Germany 
 believe that Russia was in earnest '. On this date, how- 
 ever, Sir Maurice de Bunsen reports from Vienna 5 that 
 ' the Ministry of Foreign Affairs here has realized, though 
 somewhat late in the day, that Russia will not remain 
 indifferent in the present crisis '. 
 
 1 French Book, No. 65. 2 Blue Book, No. 71. 
 
 3 French Book, No. 96. 4 Blue Book, No. 80. 
 
 5 Blue Book, No. 94. 
 
 1852 E 
 
66 
 
 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 If only this conviction had been reached on Sunday, 
 or even Monday, instead of on Wednesday, we might 
 now be living in a very different world. As it was, the 
 Central European powers were tempted by their belief in 
 Russian inertia to go just one step too far. Austria was 
 bent on blood-letting ; and Germany, instead of insisting 
 on her being content with the bloodless victory of the 
 Serbian Reply, thought it safe .to play for the still more 
 conspicuous triumph of Teutonism that would have been 
 involved in the violent trampling to earth of a Slav state, 
 while Russia looked idly on. In comparison with this, the 
 ' shining armour ' exploit of 1909 would have shrunk into 
 insignificance. In the last analysis, it was not Serbia, 
 but Russia, that was aimed at ; and Russian prestige 
 in the Balkans would have dwindled beyond recovery. 
 
 It was an alluring venture ; but it did not quite 
 come off. 
 
CHAPTER X 
 
 DIARY OF EVENTS 
 Sunday, July 26 
 
 ' What responsibility was the German Government assuming 
 ... if they persisted in interposing between Austria and the 
 Powers . . . when the slightest advice given by them at Vienna 
 would put an end to the nightmare that weighed on Europe.' 
 BERTHELOT. 
 
 IT will be remembered (see p. 50) that on receiving Vienna, 
 an outline of the Serbian Reply, Sir Edward Grey, 
 through Prince Lichnowsky, expressed a hope that, in 
 view of its conciliatory tenor, Berlin would feel able to 
 influence Vienna to take a favourable view of it. All 
 Berlin could find it in its heart to do was to instruct 
 von Tschirscky to pass on Grey's expressions to Berch- 
 told which von Tschirscky did to-day. Thereupon 
 Berchtold telegraphed to Mensdorff x in London, instruct- 
 ing him to point out to Grey that at the very time 
 (Saturday, 3 p.m.) when he had been conveying his 
 suggestion to Lichnowsky, Serbia had ordered the 
 mobilization of her army, ' which proves that no inclina- 
 tion for a peaceful solution existed in Belgrade '. This is 
 a striking example of the hypocrisy which marks the 
 whole Austrian procedure. 2 It may have been unwise to 
 issue the mobilization-order before Austria had positively 
 broken off relations ; but to imagine that Serbia delibe- 
 rately courted war with Austria, an enemy of more than 
 sixteen times her population, is to imagine the lamb 
 
 1 Austrian Book, No. 29. 
 
 2 ' It is quite usual in the diplomacy of the Monarchy ', says 
 the French Ambassador in Vienna, and adds, on the authority 
 of the Russian Ambassador, that it has ' greatly added to the 
 irritation of the Russian Government ' (French Book, No. 55). 
 
 E2 
 
68 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 Vienna, challenging the wolf. Proceeding from a statesman who 
 had in his hands the almost abject Serbian Reply, the 
 remark cannot but appear a cynical insincerity. 
 
 Herr von Tschirscky took the same line in a conversa- 
 tion with Sir Maurice de Bunsen, 1 parts of which have 
 already been noted (pp. 53, 64). ' Serbia ', he said, ' was 
 about to receive a lesson which she required ' ; but the 
 quarrel ought to be localized. Russia had no right to 
 assume a protectorate over Serbia, and he did not think 
 she would make any such claim. He asked whether 
 Sir Maurice had been informed that Serbia had made 
 a pretence of giving way ' at the last moment ' echoing, 
 in the latter phrase, expressions used by Berchtold in his 
 telegram to MensdorfL As though forty-eight hours 
 (reduced in practice to thirty-two) were superabundant 
 time for drawing up so momentous a state-paper ! The 
 whole interview proves, what is asserted on every hand, 
 that von Tschirscky was, if not the inspirer, at any rate 
 the trusted confederate and instrument of the Austrian 
 Government. 
 
 The Russian Ambassador, M. Schebeko, who had been 
 encouraged by Count Berchtold to leave for Russia a few 
 days before the Ultimatum was delivered, returned 
 to-day, and consulted with his French and British col- 
 leagues. 2 While they were together, there arrived a tele- 
 gram from Sir Edward Grey (to be afterwards noted, 
 p. 74), containing a new proposal on the subject of 
 Four-Power mediation. M. Schebeko and M. Dumaine 
 ' expressed great satisfaction with its contents ', but fore- 
 saw that Russia's right to ' have a say ' in the Austro- 
 Serbian dispute would be contested both in Vienna 
 and Berlin. They also foresaw that von Tschirscky, 
 4 in order to refuse his concurrence, would almost cer- 
 tainly entrench himself behind the principle of localizing 
 the conflict '. 
 
 1 Blue Book, No. 32. 
 
 2 French Book, No. 55 ; Blue Book, No. 40. 
 
SUNDAY, JULY 26 69 
 
 Count Berchtold to-day sent a circular telegram 1 to Vienna, 
 the Austrian Ambassadors in Berlin, Rome, London, 
 Paris, and St. Petersburg, announcing the breaking off 
 of diplomatic relations with Serbia. They were instructed 
 to inform the Governments to which they were respectively 
 accredited that Serbia had ' refused to comply ' with the 
 Austrian demands, and that therefore Austria, ' very 
 much against her wish', found herself 'obliged to compel 
 Serbia, by the sharpest measures, to make a funda- 
 mental alteration in the hostile attitude she had hitherto 
 adopted '. 
 
 Owing to an unexplained delay in transmission, the St. 
 Serbian Reply did not reach St. Petersburg to-day, ^ ers ~ 
 though the fact of its conciliatory tendency may probably 
 have been known, through Sir Edward Grey's telegram 
 of the previous evening to Sir George Buchanan. 
 
 M. Sazonof to-day sent for the Austrian Ambassador 
 and had a long and friendly talk with him, of which 
 we have four versions his own, Count Szapary's, 
 M. Paleologue's, and Sir George Buchanan's. 2 
 
 Szapary began by protesting that Austria had no 
 ulterior designs in her action that it was neither a move 
 towards Salonica nor the starting-point of a ' preventive 
 war ' against Russia. ' The goal of her action was self- 
 preservation and self-qlefence against hostile propaganda 
 by word, in writing, and in action ' ; but that goal she 
 was absolutely determined to reach. 
 
 Sazonof replied that the goal was a legitimate one ; 
 but, he said (according to Paleologue), ' the procedure to 
 which you have had recourse is not defensible '. He then 
 proposed to go over the Austrian demands point by point, 
 and Szapary agreed, with the reservation that ' he was 
 
 1 Austrian Book, No. 30. 
 
 2 Russian Book, No. 25 ; Austrian Book, No. 31 ; French 
 Book, No. 54 ; Blue Book, No. 44. In the Austrian Book this 
 conversation is dated July 2yth evidently by mistake. 
 
TIE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 St. 
 
 Peters- 
 burg. 
 
 not authorized either to discuss the text of the Note, or 
 to interpret it '. Sazonof found six l of the ten points 
 ' admissible without very great difficulty '. Points i and 2 
 could not be carried out without recasting the Serbian 
 press law and associations law ; while the enforcing of 
 Points 4 and 5 ' might lead to the most dangerous conse- 
 quences, and even to acts of terrorism against the Royal 
 Family '. On Point 5, Szapary was able to give the 
 explanation authorized by Berchtold (see p. 46) that 
 no infringement of Serbian sovereignty was intended. 
 Sazonof, according to Paleologue, concluded, ' Take back 
 your ultimatum, modify its form, and I will guarantee 
 the result '. He himself phrases his proposal more diplo- 
 matically to the effect that, in order ' to end the tension 
 of the present moment as soon as possible ', Szapary 
 should be authorized to redraft, in consultation with 
 Sazonof, certain articles of the Austrian Note. 2 This 
 proposal Szapary himself does not seem to have trans- 
 mitted to headquarters ; but the Russian Ambassador 
 at Vienna was instructed to convey its substance to 
 Count Berchtold ' in a judicious and friendly manner '. 
 It was definitely refused by Count Berchtold on Tuesday 
 the 28th (p. 97), but was revived towards the end of the 
 week when it was too late. 3 
 
 1 Count Szapary says seven, but this is apparently a miscount. 
 
 2 Sir George Buchanan's report of this conversation contains 
 no new feature of importance, except that it attributes to M. 
 Sazonof a suggestion that ' in order to put an end to the present 
 tension, England and Italy might be willing to collaborate with 
 Austria * . Here the text seems to need emendation. M. Schebeko 
 said to Sir Maurice Bunsen on the following day (Blue Book, 
 No. 56) that he understood Sazonof and Szapary ' had practically 
 reached an understanding as to the guarantees which Serbia 
 might reasonably be asked to give to Austria for her future good 
 behaviour '. One suspects on reading the documents closely that 
 Szapary, in Sazonof's presence, showed himself more amenable 
 to reason than he dared to confess in communicating with his 
 Government. 
 
 3 M. Sazonof afterwards said (Blue Book, No. 78) that ' he had 
 
SUNDAY, JULY 26 71 
 
 It should be noted that though Szapary spoke to St 
 Sazonof of the Serbian mobilization, neither seems to 
 have known that the Austrian Minister had left Belgrade. 
 
 By this time reports of Russian mobilization were 
 beginning to reach Berlin, and Count Pourtales was 
 to-night instructed ' to make the following declaration to 
 the Russian Government ' : 
 
 ' Preparatory military measures by Russia will force 
 us to counter measures, which must consist in mobilizing 
 the army. But mobilization means war/ x 
 
 This, be it noted, was before Russia had actually begun 
 to mobilize against Austria, and when there could be no 
 reasonable suspicion of any mobilization against Germany. 
 Count Szapary, speaking of the interview at which this 
 announcement was no doubt made, tells us 2 that Pour- 
 tales ' called Sazonof 's attention in the most serious 
 manner to the fact that nowadays measures of mobiliza- 
 tion would be a highly dangerous form of diplomatic 
 pressure ; for in that event the purely military considera- 
 tion of the question by the General Staffs would find 
 expression, and if that button were once touched in Germany, 
 the situation would get out of control'. 
 
 Herr von Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary for Berlin. 
 Foreign Affairs, told Sir Horace Rumbold 3 that the 
 Kaiser, of his own initiative, was returning to-night, and 
 that the Foreign Office regretted his doing so, as his 
 return might cause ' speculation and excitement '. Later, 
 Herr von Zimmermann stated (what we already know) 
 that von Tschirscky had been instructed to ' pass on ' to 
 Berchtold Grey's hope that the Serbian Reply might be 
 received with favour. In this act, said the Under-Secre- 
 tary, ' the German Government associate themselves to 
 
 proposed such an exchange of views on the advice of the German 
 Ambassador '. The advice was probably personal, not official. 
 
 1 German Book, C.D.D., p. 408. 2 Austrian Book, No. 28. 
 
 3 Blue Book, Nos. 33 and 34. 
 
72 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 Berlin, a certain extent with that hope. Beyond this they do not 
 see their way to go.' 
 
 Herr von Jagow makes no appearance to-day, but the 
 Chancellor sends to the German Ambassadors in London, 
 Paris, and St. Petersburg three carefully- worded tele- 
 grams. 1 They are all to the effect that as Austria has 
 forsworn territorial aggrandizement or infringement of 
 Serbian sovereignty, the responsibility for ' a possible 
 disturbance of the peace of Europe ' will rest solely with 
 Russia. After this, the telegram to London states that 
 Russia is on the verge of mobilization, which will entail 
 ' counter-measures ' in Germany, and begs England to re- 
 monstrate at St. Petersburg ' with all possible emphasis '. 
 The telegram to Paris makes no mention of mobilization, 
 but says, ' We depend upon France, with which we are 
 at one in the desire for the preservation of the peace of 
 Europe, that it will exercise its influence at St. Petersburg 
 in favour of peace '. The telegram to St. Petersburg 
 merely ' trusts that Russia will undertake no steps which 
 will threaten seriously the peace of Europe '. The 
 interesting point in these documents is the form of the 
 appeal to France. We shall find it develop, in the hands 
 of Herr von Schoen, into an ingenious attempt to detach 
 France from her Eastern ally. 
 
 The Russian Charge d'Affaires reports that ' on the 
 news reaching Berlin that the Austrian army had mobil- 
 ized against Serbia ', a large crowd made noisy demonstra- 
 tions in favour of Austria. There were also some slight 
 anti-Russian demonstrations. 2 
 
 Paris. Baron von Schoen called upon the Acting Foreign 
 Minister at 5 p.m., and conveyed to him the substance 
 of the German Chancellor's telegram. 3 M. Bienvenu- 
 Martin, however, did not show himself deeply touched 
 by the declaration that ' Germany felt herself identified 
 
 1 German Book, Nos. 10, loa and lob. 
 
 2 Russian Book, No. 30. 3 French Book, No. 56. 
 
SUNDAY, JULY 26 73 
 
 with France in the ardent desire that peace may be Paris, 
 maintained '. To the suggestion that France should 
 exercise a restraining influence at St. Petersburg, he 
 replied, in effect, that Russia was already showing great 
 moderation, and that it was for Germany to exercise 
 influence at Vienna, and dissuade Austria from attacking 
 Serbia. This, said von Schoen, ' could not be reconciled 
 with the position taken up by Germany that the question 
 concerned only Austria and Serbia.' At the mention of 
 Four-Power mediation at Vienna and St. Petersburg 
 alike, von Schoen ' entrenched himself behind his lack 
 of instructions '. 
 
 Two hours later, the industrious diplomat presented 
 himself at the ' Direction Politique ' of the Foreign Office 1 
 with a proposal that, to obviate misunderstandings, the 
 following communication should be made to the press : 
 
 ' During the afternoon the German Ambassador and 
 the Minister for Foreign Affairs had a fresh interview, 
 in the course of which, in the most amicable spirit and 
 acting in an identical sentiment of pacific solidarity, 
 they examined the means which might be employed 
 to maintain general peace.' 
 
 M. Berthelot (Acting Political Director) replied that, 
 while Austria persisted in her intransigeant attitude, and 
 Germany declined even to remonstrate with her, such 
 a note ' would give a false security to French opinion '. 
 Then, ' in a manner quite personal and private ', he ad- 
 dressed to Herr von Schoen something in the nature of 
 a ' straight talk ', with the following peroration : 
 
 ' How surprising appeared the refusal by Germany 
 to exercise mediating influence at Vienna now that 
 she knew the extraordinary text of the Austrian note ! 
 What responsibility was the German Government 
 assuming, and what suspicions would rest upon them, 
 if they persisted in interposing between Austria and 
 the Powers, after what might be called the absolute 
 
 1 French Book, No. 57. 
 
74 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 Paris. submission of Servia, and when the slightest advice 
 
 given by them to Vienna would put an end to the 
 nightmare which weighed on Europe ! ' 
 
 M. Berthelot's eloquence was not without its effect on 
 Herr von Schoen, who became astonishingly conciliatory 
 in tone. He declared that Austria was not uncom- 
 promising ; that what she shrank from was the idea of 
 a formal mediation, the ' spectre ' of a conference l \ but 
 that ' good words, in a conciliatory tone, from the Powers 
 of the Triple Entente would have a chance of being well 
 received '. He even added, in an effusive moment, that 
 ' he did not say Germany would not give some advice at 
 Vienna '. 2 
 
 Thus ended for a time the astute attempt to lure France 
 into an appearance of joining with Germany 3 to cast upon 
 Russia the responsibility for the hourly more imminent 
 war. 
 
 London. No interviews of note seem to have taken place to-day, 
 but one very important telegram 4 was dispatched by 
 Sir Edward Grey to the British Ambassadors at Paris, 
 Berlin, and Rome. It ran thus : 
 
 ' Would Minister for Foreign Affairs be disposed to 
 instruct Ambassador here to join with representatives 
 of France, Italy, and Germany, and myself, to meet 
 here in conference immediately for the purpose of 
 discovering an issue which would prevent compli- 
 cations ? ' 
 
 If so, Sir Edward continued, the assenting Powers 
 
 1 It would appear from this that von Schoen was already 
 informed of the new English proposal (see above) and had his 
 orders as to the official line of opposition to it. 
 
 2 Prince Lichnowsky knew better. He told Count Bencken- 
 dorff (a relative of his) that ' Germany would not lend herself to 
 any demarche at Vienna ' (French Book, No. 36). 
 
 3 There is some indication in Blue Book, No. 53, that a momen- 
 tary misunderstanding did in fact arise. 
 
 4 Blue Book, No. 36. 
 
 
SUNDAY, JULY 26 75 
 
 should instruct their representatives in Belgrade, Vienna, London, 
 and St. Petersburg, to urge the suspension of active 
 military operations pending the result of the conference. 
 
 It seems, on the face of it, surprising that this proposal 
 of an ambassadorial consultation in London should have 
 been substituted for the earlier proposal of simultaneous 
 action by the Four Powers at Vienna and St. Petersburg, 
 to which Germany had, in principle, consented. Why did 
 Sir Edward make the change ? Clearly in response to 
 M. Sazonof's offer (p. 50) that, if Serbia appealed to the 
 Powers, ' Russia would be quite ready to stand aside, 
 and leave the whole question in the hands of England, 
 France, Germany, and Italy '. We know as a fact, and 
 not merely by conjecture, that this was the reason of the 
 change ; for the French Charge d' Affaires in London, 
 after quoting M. Sazonof's offer, proceeds l : ' Sir E. Grey 
 has taken these words as a text on which to formulate 
 to the Cabinets of Paris, Berlin, and Rome, a proposal '- 
 which he then details in practically the terms of Sir 
 Edward's telegram. He adds that ' Sir A. Nicolson has 
 spoken of this suggestion to the German Ambassador, 
 who has shown himself favourable to it '. 
 
 Was the change a fortunate one ? In view of the fact 
 that it gave Germany an excuse for paltering with her 
 only definite promise of co-operation, one is disposed to 
 say * No '. It is possible that Sir Maurice de Bunsen's 
 account of his conversation with von Tschirscky (p. 68) ' 
 led Sir Edward to feel that some change was advisable, 
 inasmuch as nothing could be expected of any ' mediation ' 
 in which that fanatical partisan was to take a leading 
 share. Sir Edward may have thought that the only hope 
 of a satisfactory result lay in having Germany represented 
 by a man of moderate views like Prince Lichnowsky. 
 If he reasoned so, he probably reasoned justly. To 
 expect von Tschirscky to preach moderation to Berchtold 
 would have been like asking oil to expostulate with flame. 
 1 French Book, No. 68. 
 
76 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 London. The alteration may therefore have been a regrettable 
 necessity ; but regrettable it surely was. 
 
 From Sir Edward Grey's statement in Parliament on 
 the following day (Monday the 27th), it would seem that 
 he did not think of his second proposal as altering his 
 first, but rather as supplementing and defining it. Simul- 
 taneous action at Vienna and St. Petersburg was to 
 obtain the needful suspension of military operations, and 
 then the ambassadorial conference was to ' endeavour 
 to find a means of arranging the present difficulties '. 
 This is, of course, a perfectly reasonable representation 
 of the matter. Nevertheless the second proposal did 
 in fact appear to modify, if not to supersede, the first, 
 and thus favoured Germany's dilatory tactics. It might 
 perhaps have been better to have seized upon the German 
 promise to co-operate in simultaneous action at Vienna 
 and St. Petersburg, and to have pressed for its immediate 
 fulfilment, the form of procedure being left to the Germans 
 themselves to decide. As it was, action which Berlin 
 might perhaps have been goaded into taking on Sunday 
 morning was postponed until Monday probably till 
 Monday night and was declared on Tuesday to be 
 ' belated ' (see pp. 85, 95). 
 
 Military The Russian Consul at Prague to-day reports that 
 prepara- 'mobilization has been decreed', 1 and from newspaper 
 information it seems probable that, on this and the follow- 
 ing day, Austria was mobilizing eight Army Corps. 2 
 
 The French Charge d'Affaires at Luxemburg reports 
 that at Diedenhofen the reservists, ' without being com- 
 pletely mobilized, are forbidden to go away from their 
 place of residence '. If this was the case at Diedenhofen 
 (Thionville) it was probably the case elsewhere, at all 
 events in the frontier districts. Germany's most impor- 
 
 1 Russian Book, No. 24. 
 
 2 Price, p. 169. 
 
 
SUNDAY, JULY 26 77 
 
 tant move to-day, however, was the recall of all her fleet Military 
 
 from Norwegian waters. 1 prepara- 
 
 tions. 
 From France we hear to-day of ' much activity at the 
 
 War Ministry ' and the recall of officers on leave. 2 
 
 As to Russia, reports are somewhat confused, but 
 there is no reason to doubt that active preparations, 
 short of mobilization, were going on in the districts 
 facing the Austrian frontier. In reply to an earnest 
 warning by Count Pourtales 3 as to the danger of mobili- 
 zation (see p. 71), M. Sazonof gave his word of honour 
 that ' not a single horse or reservist had been called up ', 
 though ' measures of preparation were being taken in 
 the military districts of Kieff and Odessa, and perhaps in 
 Kazan and Moscow '. Similar assurances were given by 
 the Minister of War, who added : 
 
 ' If Austria crosses the Serbian frontier, the military 
 districts of Kieff, Odessa, Moscow, and Kazan, which 
 face Austria, will be mobilized. In no circumstances 
 will mobilization take place on the German front, 
 Warsaw, Vilna, and St. Petersburg. 4 
 
 The German military attache reported (probably later 
 in the day) : ' I deem it certain that mobilization has 
 been ordered for Kieff and Odessa. It is doubtful at 
 Warsaw and Moscow, and improbable elsewhere.' 5 The 
 German Chancellor in the above-noted telegram 6 to the 
 Ambassador in London (p. 72) said that, according to 
 information received from Russia, ' the call for several 
 classes of the reserves is expected immediately, which is 
 equivalent to mobilization, also against us.' 7 
 
 1 French Book, No. 58. 
 
 2 Price, p. 161. 
 
 3 Austrian Book, No. 28. 
 
 4 It is not quite clear whether these conversations took place 
 on Sunday the 26th or late on Saturday the 25th. The point 
 is not important. 
 
 5 German Book, No. 7. 6 German Book, No. 10. 
 
 7 The last three words are omitted in the somewhat inexpert 
 English translation officially issued in Germany. 
 
78 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 Sum- Austria, adopting the line that the small reservations 
 
 mary. ma de in Serbia's acceptance of her demands amount to 
 a refusal, announces to the Powers her intention of 
 taking the ' sharpest measures ' to bring about a change 
 of heart in her Slav neighbour. Germany, while moving 
 no finger at Vienna, entreats France and England to make 
 earnest representations at St. Petersburg that being her 
 idea of ' localizing ' the conflict. Russia admits the 
 justice of six of the Austrian demands, and suggests that 
 with a little goodwill the others may be modified to the 
 satisfaction of both parties M. Sazonof not knowing as 
 yet that Serbia has already made even larger concessions 
 than he would have proposed to her. France declines to 
 fall in with a German scheme for alienating her from 
 Russia ; and England puts forth a modification of her 
 proposal for Four-Power peace-making, which is perhaps 
 necessary, but has the disadvantage of allowing Germany 
 to retreat from her comparatively reasonable attitude 
 of the day before. Meanwhile partial mobilization is 
 going on in Austria, active preparations in Southern 
 Russia, and measures of precaution everywhere. 
 
CHAPTER XI 
 
 DIARY OF EVENTS 
 
 Monday, July 27 
 
 ' As I was leaving, I told him [von Jagow] that this morning 
 I had had the impression that the hour of detente had struck, 
 but I now saw clearly that there was nothing in it.' JULES 
 CAM BON, 
 
 THE Tsar to-day answered the telegram addressed to St. 
 him on Friday the 24th by the Crown Prince of Serbia. 
 He declared his ' cordial sympathy with the Serbian 
 people ' ; stated that his Government was using every 
 endeavour to smooth away the present difficulties ; 
 begged the Serbian Government to neglect nothing that 
 could facilitate this task ; and ended thus : 
 
 ' So long as there remains the least hope of avoiding 
 bloodshed, all our efforts must be directed to this end. 
 If, in spite of our most earnest desire, we should not 
 succeed, your Highness may rest assured that in no 
 event can Russia remain indifferent to the fate of 
 Serbia/ * 
 
 M. Sazonof, having at last 2 received the text of the 
 Serbian Reply, telegraphed to the Russian Ambassadors 
 abroad that its moderation exceeded all expectations, 
 and that he did not see what further demands could be 
 made unless Austria was merely seeking a pretext for war 
 with Serbia. 3 
 
 To the Ambassadors in London and Paris, Sazonof 
 
 1 Russian Book, No. 40. 
 
 * The Russian Ambassador at Paris to-day made the not 
 improbable suggestion that telegrams passing through Austria 
 were being intentionally delayed (Russian Book, No. 36). 
 
 3 Russian Book, No. 33. 
 
8o THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 St. acknowledged receipt of Grey's proposal for a conference 
 
 burg 1 " 8 " of ambassadors. He had, he said, entered upon conversa- 
 tions with Szapary which seemed to promise well ; but 
 he had not yet received an answer to his proposal for 
 a joint revision of the Note. If this move should fail, he 
 was ready to accept the British proposal, or any other 
 ' that would bring about a favourable solution of the 
 conflict '.! 
 
 In the afternoon he saw Sir George Buchanan, and 
 expressed himself to the same effect 2 Buchanan finding 
 him ' very conciliatory and more optimistic '. Vienna had 
 not as yet replied to his proposal of yesterday did not, 
 in fact, reply until to-morrow (p. 97). 
 
 Vienna. The text of the Serbian Reply, with the Austrian 
 embroideries, was to-day distributed to the Austrian 
 Ambassadors. 
 
 Sir Maurice de Bunsen reports 3 that ' the country has 
 gone wild with joy at the prospect of war with Serbia, 
 and its postponement or prevention would undoubtedly 
 be a great disappointment/ 
 
 1 Russian Book, No. 32 ; Blue Book, No. 53. Sazonof speaks 
 in this telegram of ' direct explanations with the Vienna Cabinet ' 
 and the ' proposal for revising the Note between the two Cabinets ', 
 which seems an odd way of alluding to consultations between 
 himself and the Austrian Ambassador. Sir George Buchanan, 
 too (Blue Book, No, 45), states the proposal in the form that 
 the required modifications ' should be the subject of direct con- 
 versation between Vienna and St. Petersburg '. Nevertheless it 
 seems clear that the proposal was nothing else than that Szapary 
 ' should be authorized to enter into a private exchange of views 
 in order to redraft certain articles '. This was how Sazonof 
 himself had stated it to Schebeko (Russian Book, No. 25) ; it is 
 in this form that Sir Maurice de Bunsen (Blue Book, Nos. 56 and 
 74) reports the suggestion ; and it is in this form that Berchtold 
 declines it (p. 97). When on July 3oth, the proposal is revived, 
 it is to ' pourparlers at St. Petersburg between M. Sazonof and 
 Count Szapary ' that Berchtold gives his sanction (French 
 Book, No. 104). 
 
 2 Blue Book, No. 55. 3 Blue Book, No. 41. 
 
MONDAY, JULY 27 81 
 
 The principal incident of the day was a ' long and Vienna, 
 earnest ' conversation between M. Schebeko and Baron 
 Macchio, reported by Schebeko himself and by Sir 
 Maurice de Bunsen. 1 The Russian Ambassador assured 
 Macchio that if war broke out with Serbia it could not 
 possibly be localized, because Russia would not give way 
 again as she had done on previous occasions, and especially 
 in the annexation crisis of 1909. Macchio said that it 
 ' would now be difficult ' to delay the outbreak of war, 
 as ' a skirmish had already taken place on the Danube, 
 in which the Serbians had been the aggressors '. Schebeko 
 engaged to do all he could to keep the Serbians quiet, 
 pending negotiations. To Bunsen he said that he 
 would advise his Government to induce the Serbians to 
 fall back before an Austrian advance, and avoid any 
 conflict as long as possible, so as to give time for a settle- 
 ment. It may be remarked that Schebeko is throughout 
 as earnest as Sazonof in his efforts for peace, and as slow 
 to despair of success. 
 
 In telegraphing to his Government he says the declara- 
 tion that Russia could not possibly remain indifferent in 
 the face of Austria's action (p. 40) ' has caused a great 
 sensation here '. 
 
 ' The Emperor William returned to Potsdam this after- Berlin, 
 noon from Kiel/ 2 
 
 The Serbian Reply, ' presumably in consequence of 
 a definite Austrian request/ says the Times correspondent, 
 was not published here to-day. It did not appear until 
 the evening of the 28th, and then ' in a framework of 
 hostile comment prepared in Vienna '. 3 
 
 1 Russian Book, No. 41 ; Blue Book, No. 56. 
 
 2 Telegram dated July 2/th in the Times, July 28th. 
 
 3 Times, July 29th. As published in the German Imperial 
 Gazette, it did not contain ' the most humiliating of Serbia's 
 concessions the publication as an Army Order of Serbia's 
 confession of wrong-doing '. The Reply appeared in the Times 
 of this (Monday) morning. 
 
 1852 
 
82 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 Herr von Jagow, who seems to have rested on the 
 Sabbath, is to-day very busy doing nothing. He has two 
 conversations with the French Ambassador, one with the 
 British, and one with the Russian Charge d'Affaires. 
 
 M. Jules Cambon 1 saw him first (apparently) in the 
 morning, before either of them was aware that the 
 proposal for simultaneous mediation at Vienna and 
 St. Petersburg had been modified. As to that proposal, 
 von Jagow remarked that he was still, as he had been 
 on Saturday, ' disposed to join in ' ; but had he, when 
 every moment was precious, done anything to pave the 
 way for it ? Not a thing ! He now spoke of the danger 
 of Russian mobilization, saying, however, that Germany 
 would not be bound to mobilize if Russia mobilized only 
 on the Austrian frontier. He authorized M. Cambon 
 ' formally to communicate this limitation ' to his Govern- 
 ment, but three days later 2 he declared that this ' did 
 not constitute a firm engagement'. He expressed the 
 opinion that the proposed intervention at St. Petersburg 
 and Vienna ' could only come into operation if events 
 were not precipitated ' but it does not seem to have 
 occurred to him that it was his partner, and no one else, 
 that was precipitating events. 
 
 The next interview was with Sir Edward Goschen, 3 
 who also had been on leave of absence at the critical 
 moment, but had now returned to his post. Sir Edward 
 submitted to von Jagow the proposal for a conference 
 of ambassadors in London, and was at once met with the 
 objection that this 'would practically amount to a court 
 of arbitration, and could not be called together except 
 at the request of Austria and Russia '. In vain Sir 
 Edward represented that there was no question of 
 arbitration, but only of discussing the best means ' for 
 avoiding a dangerous situation '. Von Jagow ' main- 
 tained that such a conference was not practicable ', and 
 1 French Book, No. 67. z French Book, No. 109. 
 
 3 Blue Book, No, 43. 
 
MONDAY, JULY 27 83 
 
 added that ' it would be best, before doing anything else, Berlin, 
 to await the outcome of the exchange of views ' between 
 Sazonof and Berchtold which he now understood to be 
 impending 1 the exchange which Berchtold to-morrow 
 refused. As to mobilization, he repeated to Goschen 
 very much what he had said to Cambon. 
 
 After learning from Goschen the result of this interview, 
 Cambon called a second time upon von Jagow, 2 to support 
 the English proposal. He was met, of course, by the 
 formal objection to a ' conference '. He made the admir- 
 able reply that ' the great object which Sir Edward Grey 
 had in view went beyond any question of form ' ; and he 
 reverted to the proposal of common action by the Four 
 Powers at St. Petersburg and Vienna, apparently without 
 reminding von Jagow that he had already agreed to it. 3 
 Such action, M. Cambon observed, would have the great 
 advantage of proving the existence of an ' esprit europeen', 
 by showing ' four Powers belonging to the two groups 
 acting in common agreement to prevent a conflict '. 
 Von Jagow ' evaded the point by saying that Germany 
 had engagements with Austria ', and then shuffled back 
 to the old position that he could not intervene in an 
 Austro-Serbian (as distinct from an Austro-Russian) 
 dispute. 
 
 And now ensued an incident so amazing that, if it were 
 not reported at first hand by an entirely credible witness, 
 one would hesitate to believe it. As von Jagow kept 
 harping on Germany's engagements towards Austria, 
 Cambon asked if they implied following blindfold wherever 
 Austria led, and inquired whether his Excellency had 
 taken note of the Serbian Reply, handed to him that 
 morning by the Serbian Charge d'Affaires. He answered 
 that he had not yet had time to read it ! Here was a docu- 
 
 1 In his later interview with Cambon he spoke as though it were 
 actually in progress. 2 French Book, No. 74. 
 
 3 He may not have known that the Chancellor also had given 
 his assent. 
 
 F2 
 
84 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 Berlin, ment of some 1,500 words, which even a slow reader could 
 master in ten minutes : a document on which depended 
 (or ought to have depended) the fate of Europe : and the 
 Foreign Minister of the German Empire, while the issues 
 of peace and war were trembling in the balance, did not 
 even take the trouble to acquaint himself with its contents, 
 but went on with his diplomatic fencing-match as though 
 it mattered nothing ! What can we conclude from this 
 except that von Jagow knew that the Reply did matter 
 nothing, the bludgeoning of Serbia being fully determined 
 on, whatever she chose to reply ? It is also possible, no 
 doubt, that he was prevaricating, and that he had not 
 read the document handed him by the Serbian Charge 
 d'Affaires because its substance had already reached him 
 from Vienna. In any case, whether real or affected, his 
 ignorance shows that Germany was not in the least 
 concerned to arrive at a just or reasonable solution of the 
 Austro-Serbian difficulty, 1 but was simply playing her 
 part in a preconcerted scheme. 
 
 M. Cambon then asked point-blank, ' Does Germany 
 wish for war ? ' Von Jagow ' protested energetically '. 
 ' You must then/ said Cambon, ' act consistently. When 
 you read the Serbian Reply, I entreat you, in the name 
 of humanity, to weigh the terms in your conscience, and 
 do not personally assume a part of the responsibility for 
 the catastrophe which you are allowing to be prepared/ 
 To this appeal von Jagow's only answer was that * he was 
 ready to join England and France in a common effort, 
 but that it was necessary to find a form of intervention 
 that he could accept '. The possibility that he might 
 himself propose such a form does not seem to have 
 crossed his mind. 
 
 A dispatch from the Russian Charge d'Affaires 2 adds 
 an interesting detail to M. Cambon 's own account of this 
 
 1 As Sir Edward Grey, in London, remarked to Count Mensdorff 
 this very afternoon (see p. 88). 
 
 2 Russian Book, No. 39. 
 
MONDAY, JULY 27 85 
 
 interview. Cambon suggested, says M. Bronewsky, that Berlin, 
 the Four Powers should give their advice to Vienna in 
 this form : ' To abstain from all action which might 
 aggravate the existing situation/ This ' vague formula ' 
 would have ' avoided all mention of the necessity for 
 refraining from an invasion of Serbia ' ; but von Jagow 
 ' gave to the proposition a sharp refusal '.* Not a whisper 
 was to reach Vienna from Berlin that should in any way 
 hamper or delay the action of Austria. 
 
 M. Bronewsky himself had an interview 2 with von 
 Jagow in which he begged him to support in Vienna the 
 proposal that Szapary should be authorized to arrange 
 with Sazonof an acceptable re-wording of the Austrian 
 demands. Von Jagow answered that 'as Szapary had 
 begun this conversation, he might as well go on with it ', 
 and that he would telegraph to Vienna in this sense. 
 On being urged to put a little more warmth into his 
 counsels he replied that ' he could not advise Austria to 
 give way '. Note that he had just been expressing to 
 Sir Edward Goschen and M. Cambon a lively faith in the 
 ' very good results ' to be expected from the Szapary- 
 Sazonof conversations. The moment he is asked to use 
 his influence towards securing these good results, his tone 
 drops to one of shoulder-shrugging indifference. The 
 conversations offer a splendid excuse for side-tracking 
 other proposals, but assume a very different aspect when 
 it is a question of doing anything to assure their success. 
 
 The Imperial Chancellor to-day sends two telegrams to 
 Prince Lichnowsky in London. 3 They run as follows : 
 
 ' (i) We know as yet nothing of a suggestion of 
 Sir Edward Grey's to hold a quadruple conference in 
 London. It is impossible for us to place our ally in his 
 dispute with Serbia before a European tribunal. Our 
 mediation must be limited to the danger of an Austro- 
 Russian conflict. 
 
 1 Mr. Price's translation. 2 Russian Book, No. 38. 
 
 3 German Book, Nos. 12 and 15. 
 
86 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 Berlin. (2) We have at once started the mediation proposal 
 
 in the sense as desired by Sir Edward Grey. We have 
 communicated besides to Count Berchtold the desire 
 of M. Sazonof for a direct parley with Vienna/ 
 
 It is rather difficult to ' place ' these two communications 
 in their relation to von Jagow's activities (or inactivities) 
 of to-day. The Chancellor's statement that the mediation 
 proposal (as distinct from the conference proposal) has 
 been ' started ' at Vienna must have been made either 
 before, or very shortly after, von Jagow in his second 
 conversation with Cambon (p. 83) had been sedulously 
 shuffling it off. There seems to be a curious lack of 
 co-ordination between the Chancellor's and the Foreign 
 Secretary's departments. Or are we to assume that the 
 Chancellor, more adroit than his subordinate, recognized 
 that the best way of blocking the conference proposal was 
 to make some show of moving in favour of mediation, 
 and therefore overruled von Jagow's shilly-shallying 
 tactics on that particular point ? In that case, the second 
 telegram would be dispatched, some time in the evening, 
 after von Jagow had reported his doings of the day. 
 Von Tschirscky did not carry out his instructions until 
 to-morrow, 1 and then only to be met with a curt too late. 
 
 Here it may be noted, once for all, that the German 
 Book does not contain the text of a single communication 
 from Berlin to Vienna.' 2 ' It gives us two short telegrams 
 from von Tschirscky to the Chancellor, but of telegrams 
 passing the other way we find no trace. In other words, 
 there is no documentary evidence for the frequent 
 assurances given by the Kaiser and his Ministers during 
 the current week, that they are making heroic exertions 
 at Vienna in favour of peace. The fact is, of course, that 
 Berlin and Vienna were in close touch, not only by 
 
 1 German Book, No. 16. 
 
 2 A telegram alleged to have been sent by Bethmann-Hollweg 
 to von Tschirscky on July 3oth appeared in the Westminster 
 Gazette for August ist. It will be discussed in its proper place. 
 
MONDAY, JULY 27 87 
 
 telegraph, but by telephone ; 1 and even of telephonic Berlin, 
 communications some record must exist in the archives 
 of the Wilhelmstrasse. What are we to conclude, then, 
 from the failure to publish a single line of direct proof 
 that Berlin attempted to exercise the smallest pacific 
 influence at Vienna ? In what court of law would verbal 
 assertions be accepted in place of documentary evidence 
 which is known to exist, but is not produced ? The 
 inevitable deduction is that the documents would not 
 bear examination. We need not assume that when the 
 Kaiser declared he was working for peace at Vienna he 
 was deliberately lying ; but we may be quite sure that 
 if there was any plausible air of sincerity in his messages, 
 or in those of his Ministers, they would be printed at full 
 length. 
 
 It is needless to accumulate proof that both France and Paris. 
 Italy accepted without hesitation the proposal for an 
 ambassadorial conference in London. 2 At no time, either 
 in France, Italy, or Russia, was the slightest opposition 
 offered to any movement in favour of an extension of the 
 time-limit, a postponement of hostilities, simultaneous 
 mediation, or a conference of ambassadors. Any and 
 every project that seemed to hold out the remotest hope 
 of peace was welcomed in all these capitals. Berlin was 
 the great rock on which everything split. 
 
 To-day's events in Paris were not of much importance. 
 The President and the Foreign Minister were still on the 
 high seas. Herr von Schoen renewed his endeavours to 
 make mischief between France and Russia by inducing 
 France to exercise a restraining influence at St. Petersburg, 
 while Germany left Vienna entirely unrestrained. 3 This 
 would, of course, have been equivalent to declaring Austria 
 in the right and Russia in the wrong. Von Schoen also 
 
 1 Blue Book, No. 121. 
 
 2 French Book, Nos. 61 and 70 ; Blue Book, Nos. 42, 49, 51, 
 and 80. 3 French Book, No. 62. 
 
88 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 Paris. returned to the point that the words ' mediation ', ' inter- 
 vention', and 'conference' were particularly objection- 
 able to Austria. She was more willing to admit ' friendly 
 advice ' and ' conversations '- 1 
 
 The Austrian Ambassador handed to M. Bienvenu- 
 Martin ' an indictment of Serbia ', 2 and stated that his 
 Government ' found themselves obliged to take strong 
 measures to induce Serbia to give the satisfaction and 
 guarantees that are required of her '. To-morrow, he 
 said, steps would be taken to that effect. It is noteworthy 
 that he knew that ' to-morrow ' was fixed for decisive 
 action, but had apparently heard nothing of the acts of 
 Serbian aggression which Macchio, in Vienna, was already 
 alleging (p. 81) as a reason for the declaration of war. 
 
 London. In London the events of Paris were almost exactly 
 reproduced. Lichnowsky called on Grey, 3 as von Schoen 
 called on Bienvenu-Martin, to urge that influence should 
 be used at St. Petersburg ' to localize the war and keep 
 up the peace of Europe '. Grey answered that, in view 
 of the extremely conciliatory nature of the Serbian Reply, 
 which was doubtless due to Russian influence, ' it was 
 really at Vienna that moderating influence was now 
 required '. ' The Serbian Reply should at least be treated 
 as a basis for discussion and pause ' and this the German 
 Government ought to urge at Vienna. ' If Germany 
 assisted Austria against Russia, it would be because, 
 without any reference to the merits of the dispute, 
 Germany could not afford to see Austria crushed/ Other 
 issues would then be raised, other Powers brought in, 
 ' and the war would be the biggest ever known '. But so 
 long as Germany would work for peace, England would 
 keep closely in touch. 
 
 In this interview Lichnowsky repeated, what had been 
 
 1 French Book, No. 70 ; Russian Book, No. 34. 
 
 2 French Book, No. 75, and Enclosure. 
 
 3 Blue Book, No. 46 ; Russian Book, No. 42. 
 
MONDAY, JULY 27 89 
 
 on record two days before, that Germany ' accepted in London, 
 principle ' the idea of Four-Power mediation. No allusion 
 seems to have been made to the proposed ambassadorial 
 conference. 
 
 The Austrian Ambassador also called on Sir Edward 
 Grey * to announce that Austria ' must at last appeal to 
 force ' against Serbia, and to expound her policy at 
 length ; but he did not, it would seem, produce the 
 written indictment of Serbia which was delivered in 
 Paris. 2 Sir Edward answered, in effect, that Russia 
 would probably think, as he did, that Austria ought to be 
 satisfied with a reply which ' involved the greatest 
 humiliation he had ever seen a country undergo ', and 
 that, if Austria persisted in making war upon Serbia in 
 spite of Russian feeling, ' the consequences ' (in the words 
 of the German Government) ' would be incalculable '. 
 'Already', he said, 'the effect on Europe was one of 
 anxiety ' ; and to illustrate that fact he pointed out that 
 the dispersal of the British Fleet, which was to have 
 occurred to-day, had been countermanded. 
 
 There is little additional news to-day under this head. Military 
 The German Consul at Kovno (near the German frontier) 
 reports 3 that in that town a state of war has been declared 
 usually a preliminary to mobilization. Newspaper 
 correspondents at St. Petersburg give vague reports of 
 mobilization in progress or impending. Von Jagow, in 
 Berlin, says to Goschen 4 that ' if Russia only mobilized 
 in the south Germany would not mobilize, but if she 
 mobilized in the north, Germany would have to do so, and 
 the Russian system of mobilization was so complicated that 
 it might be difficult exactly to locate her mobilization '. This 
 
 1 Blue Book, No. 48. 
 
 * This was no doubt the ' dossier ' which was dispatched to 
 Count Mensdorff by post on the 28th, as appears from the Austrian 
 Book, No. 39. 
 
 3 German Book, No. 8. 4 Blue Book, No. 43. 
 
90 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 Military remark is important as indicating, perhaps, the main 
 ti?ns ara ~ reason wn Y re P or ts from Russia are so conflicting. Sir 
 George Buchanan to-day expressed to M. Sazonof the 
 hope that Russia ' would defer the mobilization ukase as 
 long as possible ' ; to which Sazonof replied that ' until 
 the issue of the Imperial ukase no effective steps towards 
 mobilization could be taken, and the Austrian Government 
 would profit by delay in order to complete their military 
 preparations '. 
 
 As regards France, we have only the report of the 
 German Minister at Berne, 1 who ' learns reliably ' that 
 the French XlVth corps has ' discontinued manoeuvres '. 
 The French Charge d'Affaires in London, in reporting 
 to-day to his Government 2 that Sir Edward Grey thinks 
 the situation serious, adds : 
 
 ' The attitude of Great Britain is confirmed by the 
 postponement of the demobilization of the fleet. 3 The 
 First Lord of the Admiralty took this measure quietly 
 on Friday on his own initiative ; to-night, Sir Edward 
 Grey and his colleagues decided to make it public/ 
 
 Sir Edward Grey, as we have seen, called the attention 
 of the Austrian Ambassador to this significant measure. 
 
 Sum- Everywhere, except in Berlin, the fact that Austria 
 
 mary. should decline even to discuss the extremely conciliatory 
 Serbian Reply causes astonishment amounting to con- 
 sternation. It becomes unmistakably evident that the 
 crushing of Serbia has been decreed in Vienna, and that 
 Berlin (so unconcerned as to the merits of the case that 
 von Jagow does not even read the Serbian Reply) is 
 determined that her ally shall carry out this execution 
 without any interference. The interposition of the new 
 proposal for an ambassadorial conference in London 
 enables Germany to play fast and loose with her consent 
 
 1 German Book, No. 9. 2 French Book, No. 66. 
 
 3 It had been assembled for a great review on July 18-20. 
 
MONDAY, JULY 27 91 
 
 of the day before yesterday to the proposal for simul- 
 taneous mediation by the Four Powers. When at last, 
 after a delay of at least thirty-six, probably forty-eight, 
 hours, she does mention the idea at Vienna, it is only to 
 be told that it is too late. Russia, meanwhile, has not 
 quite given up hope of bringing Austria to reason by 
 direct negotiation ; but, failing that, is prepared to accept 
 any other method of pacification that her friends may 
 propose, and even to postpone any irreparable clash of 
 arms by advising Serbia to retreat before an Austrian 
 invasion. Austria, which, only two days ago, was protest- 
 ing that the breaking off of diplomatic relations with 
 Serbia did not necessarily mean war, has now determined 
 to declare war to-morrow. 
 
CHAPTER XII 
 
 DIARY OF EVENTS 
 
 Tuesday, July 28 
 
 ' The quintessence of the Berlin tactics was to retreat from 
 trench to trench, and finally to disappear once for all behind the 
 fortress of " Russian mobilization." ' J' Accuse! 
 
 Vienna. TO-DAY, at midday, in an open telegram from Count 
 Berchtold to the Serbian Premier, Austria declared war 
 on Serbia. 1 
 
 It was just three days since Count Mensdorff had 
 assured Sir Edward Grey (p. 48) that the breaking-off 
 of diplomatic relations would not mean immediate war. 
 In order to excuse her disregard of this assurance, Austria 
 now alleged that Serbia had committed acts of aggres- 
 sion. We found Macchio talking yesterday (p. 81) of a 
 ' skirmish on the Danube ', and now Berchtold telegraphs 
 to Szapary : ' Yesterday hostilities were opened against 
 us on the Hungarian frontier on the side of Serbia ', and 
 says to Sir Maurice de Bunsen, ' Our soldiers were yester- 
 day fired at by soldiers from over the Serbian frontier/ 2 
 On the other hand, Crackanthorpe this morning tele- 
 graphs from Nish (before he has heard of the declaration 
 of war) that ' two Serbian steamers have been fired on 
 and damaged, and two Serbian merchant vessels captured 
 by a Hungarian monitor at Orsova '. 3 Who actually 
 fired the first shot may never be ascertained, nor is it 
 of the slightest importance. When international tension 
 is acute, a ' frontier incident ' may spring up at any 
 moment, and it does not follow that the party which 
 pulls the first trigger is the real aggressor. It is wholly 
 
 1 Serbian Book, Nos. 45 and 46. 
 
 2 Austrian Book, Nos. 40 and 41. 3 Blue Book, No. 65. 
 
TUESDAY, JULY 28 93 
 
 incredible (this the essential point) that the Serbian Vienna. 
 Government, or any responsible Serbian, desired to 
 precipitate war with Austria. Even if they felt it to be 
 inevitable, their cue was clearly to delay it as long as 
 possible, in order to give their great protector time to 
 come to the rescue. These allegations of Serbian aggres- 
 sion, then, are simply examples of the wplf-and-lamb 
 tactics which we shall find Germany still more shame- 
 lessly pursuing with regard to France and Russia. Who 
 can believe that the nations whose manifest interest 
 and undoubted desire is to stave off hostilities to the 
 last possible moment, are always moved by some strange 
 madness to strike the first blow, in an aimless, ineffectual 
 manner, without even the excuse of gaining some momen- 
 tary advantage ? It is to be remarked that neither in 
 the actual declaration of war, nor in the Note to the 
 Powers announcing it, 1 is mention made of any breach 
 of the peace on Serbia's part. Moreover, in Count 
 Berchtold's ' Memorandum ' 2 to the German Government, 
 of the following day, he states that the Serbian Govern- 
 ment ' allowed three days to elapse without showing 
 any inclination to abandon the point of view contained 
 in their reply, whereupon the declaration of war followed 
 on our side ' quite independently, it would seem, of 
 any Serbian aggression. Is it too uncharitable to suspect 
 that his Excellency did not think it worth while to 
 address this plea to the German Government, because 
 they, as practitioners in the same line, would know just 
 what value to attach to it ? 
 
 When we remember, moreover, that the Austrian 
 Ambassadors in Paris and London knew yesterday that 
 * strong measures ' were to be taken to-day (pp. 88, 89), 
 but did not know anything of a Serbian attack, we may 
 safely dismiss this allegation as part of the ritual appointed 
 to be followed by a Teutonic Power when in the act of 
 attacking its neighbours. 
 
 1 Blue Book, No. 50. z Austrian Book, No. 44. 
 
94 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 Vienna. The Austrian proceedings of to-day and to-morrow 
 are marked by a sort of cool, ironical insolence, quite 
 different from the stolid obstructiveness of Berlin. There 
 are now three proposals in the field : 
 
 1. Simultaneous mediation at Vienna and St. Peters- 
 burg by the Four Powers not directly interested. 
 
 2. A conference of ambassadors at London. 
 
 3. Conversations between M, Sazonof and Count 
 Szapary at St. Petersburg, with a view to modifying 
 the terms of the Ultimatum so as to secure guarantees 
 for Serbia's future good behaviour without prejudice to 
 her independence and sovereignty. 
 
 Mediation, conference, and conversation such were, 
 briefly, the methods proposed for averting the great 
 calamity. Let us see how each in its turn was received 
 by the Austrian Government. 
 
 I. Mediation. The German Chancellor had, as we saw 
 (p. 86), passed on to von Tschirscky, late on Monday, 
 Sir Edward Grey's proposal, already three days old. 
 The terms of the Chancellor's communication to his 
 Ambassador, are unknown. 1 Had there been any sin- 
 cerity in his acceptance of the proposal, he would have 
 instructed von Tschirscky, in concert with the Italian 
 Ambassador, the Duke d'Avarna, to urge upon the 
 third member of the Triple Alliance a postponement 
 of hostilities pending the efforts of the Four Powers to 
 find a peaceful issue to the situation. It is clear that 
 the tenor of his instructions was nothing like this, and 
 that von Tschirscky merely ' passed on ' Grey's proposal. 
 We can almost hear him chuckling to himself as he 
 to-day dispatches the following reply : 2 
 
 ' Count Berchtold requests me to express to your 
 Excellency his thanks for the communication of the 
 
 1 It appears, from Austrian Book 44, that the mediation pro- 
 posal was presented in combination with the proposal (p. 88) that 
 the Serbian Reply should be treated as a basis for discussion. 
 
 2 German Book, No. 16. 
 
TUESDAY, JULY 28 95 
 
 English mediation proposal. He states, however, that Vienna, 
 after the opening of hostilities by Serbia and the 
 subsequent declaration of war, the step appears 
 belated.' 
 
 ' Appears belated ! ' This scarcely dissembled sneer 
 strikes the keynote of Berchtold's policy of these days, 
 which is to treat Austria's deliberate acts as ' events ' 
 beyond her control, and therefore justifying her in 
 saying ' Hands off ! ' to the busybodies who want to 
 interfere between her and her prey. Not otherwise 
 might an assassin, urged at least to give his enemy 
 a few minutes' grace, reply, ' Your proposal appears 
 belated ; for, see ! events have already placed my finger 
 on the trigger.' It is the old plan of forestalling remon- 
 strance by rushing out a fait accompli the policy which 
 the Serbian Minister foresaw, more than a week ago, 
 that Austria would adopt (p. 24), and which we shall 
 find von Jagow to-morrow openly attributing to her. 
 
 But the Austrian Government had another ingenious 
 reason, beyond the march of events, for rejecting Four- 
 Power mediation. ' It is held here ', says M. Dumaine, 1 
 ' that the formula, " Mediation between Austria and 
 Russia ", is unsuitable, inasmuch as it alleges a dispute 
 between these two Empires which does not exist up to 
 the present/ May we not say that evasion so unblush- 
 ing as this partakes of the nature of insolence ? 
 
 2. Conference. The conference proposal had been 
 brought to Count Berchtold's knowledge yesterday by 
 a telegram from Mensdorff, which he to-day sent on to 
 Count Szogyeny in Berlin, 2 with the comment : 
 
 ' I believe I need not specially point out to your 
 Excellency that Grey's proposal for a conference, in 
 so far as it relates to our conflict with Serbia, appears, 
 in view of the state of war which has arisen, to have 
 been outstripped by events.' 3 
 
 1 French Book, No. 83. 2 Austrian Book, No. 38. 
 
 3 On the following day this phrase is repeated : ' The Serbian 
 
96 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 Vienna. ' Appears belated ', in a more imposing form ! This 
 was to be the ' mot d'ordre ' at Berlin. 
 
 Sir Maurice de Bunsen to-day laid the proposal officially 
 before Count Berchtold, 1 in this form : 
 
 ' Following the precedent of the London conference 
 during the last Balkan crisis, the Ambassadors of the 
 various States mentioned resident at London should, 
 according to the view of the British Secretary of State, 
 keep themselves in continual contact with him for the 
 purpose indicated/ 
 
 Sir Maurice also suggested that, if it was too late to 
 suspend hostilities altogether, the Serbians might be 
 advised to withdraw without accepting battle, and thus 
 give time for further deliberation before blood was 
 actually shed. Even the prospect of such an added 
 humiliation for Serbia did not move Count Berchtold. 
 He ' declined to entertain the idea of a discussion based 
 on the Serbian answer. What Austria asked for was the 
 integral acceptance of the Ultimatum '. By anything 
 short of this, ' Serbia would be encouraged to continue 
 on the path it had formerly trod, and this would, in 
 a very short time, again imperil the cause of peace/ 
 ' The well-known pacific character of the Emperor, as 
 well as, he might add, his own, might be accepted as 
 a guarantee that war was both just and inevitable/ 
 Austria, in short, was out for blood, and no bloodless 
 triumph, however conspicuous, would now content her. 
 
 3. Conversation. M. Schebeko had yesterday failed 
 to see Count Berchtold, who was reported to be ' away'. 2 
 Therefore it was not until to-day that the proposal for 
 a continuance of conversations between M. Sazonof and 
 Count Szapary was officially conveyed to him, Szapary 
 himself having apparently not communicated it (p. 70). 
 
 Reply has already been outstripped by events/ Austrian Book, 
 No. 44. 
 
 1 Blue Book, No. 62 ; Austrian Book, No. 41. 
 
 2 Russian Book, No. 41. 
 
TUESDAY, JULY 28 97 
 
 Schebeko l ' brought to his notice in the most friendly Vienna, 
 manner how desirable it was to find a solution which, 
 while consolidating good relations between Austria and 
 Russia, would give the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy 
 genuine guarantees for its future relations with Serbia '. 
 With this object in view, M. Sazonof, through the Ambas- 
 sador, proposed that ' his exchange of thought with 
 Count Szapary should be continued ', and that Szapary 
 should receive instructions to that effect. Berchtold, in 
 reply, ' emphasized that he was unable to concur in such 
 a proposal '. No one in Austria could understand or 
 approve any discussion of the terms of the Austrian 
 Ultimatum or negotiation on the basis of the Serbian 
 Reply. ' This was all the more impossible as there was 
 a deep feeling of general excitement which had already 
 mastered public opinion. Moreover, war had to-day 
 been declared against Serbia/ When Schebeko pointed 
 out the danger to the peace of Europe involved in an 
 Austrian attack upon Serbia, Berchtold replied that he 
 was ' well aware of the gravity of the situation, and of 
 the advantages of a frank explanation with the St. 
 Petersburg Cabinet '. As all the points at issue were to 
 be rigidly excluded from the sphere of the ' explana- 
 tion ', it is difficult to see what end it could serve. The 
 really ' frank explanation ' would have been that Austria, 
 even now, did not believe that Russia would fight. 
 
 Though it is dated to-morrow, the ' Memorandum ' 2 
 handed by Count Berchtold to von Tschirscky as a general 
 answer to the English efforts at pacification is in fact 
 a summing-up of the Austrian ideas of to-day. Part 
 of it has already been quoted (p. 93). The only new 
 idea that it contributes to the discussion is this : 
 
 ' The Imperial and Royal Government cannot sup- 
 press their astonishment at the assumption that their 
 
 1 Russian Book, No. 45 ; Blue Book, No. 93 ; Austrian Book, 
 No. 40. 
 
 2 Austrian Book, No. 44. 
 
 1852 Q 
 
98 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 Vienna. action against Serbia was directed against Russia, and 
 Russian influence in the Balkans, for this implies 
 the supposition that the propaganda against the 
 Monarchy has not merely a Serbian but a Russian 
 origin. We have hitherto rather started from the idea 
 that official Russia has no connexion with these ten- 
 dencies . . . and that our present action is directed 
 exclusively against Serbia, while our feelings for Russia, 
 as we can assure Sir E. Grey, are entirely friendly/ 
 
 Again, one can only ask whether the transparent 
 insincerity of this attempt to confuse the issues may 
 not fairly be characterized as insolent. At the very 
 moment when Russia is offering to assist in finding 
 guarantees for Serbia's good behaviour in the future, 
 Austria sets up the ridiculous pretence that Russia 
 cannot take an interest in the fate of Serbia without an 
 implied confession that she is the instigator of the anti- 
 Austrian agitation in that country ! As though one 
 could not interfere to prevent a friend and kinsman 
 from being throttled without making oneself responsible 
 for everything he might ever have done ! Similarly, the 
 suggestion that the crushing of Serbia would not impair 
 Russian influence in the Balkans is so flagrantly non- 
 sensical as to amount to a sheer impertinence. The 
 attack upon Serbia was nothing if not an attack upon 
 Russian influence, and to plead innocence of any such 
 design was to insult the intelligence of Europe. It is 
 childish to say, ' I mean to shoot away that flagstaff, 
 but I have not the slightest intention of lowering the 
 flag that is flying from it '. 
 
 St. The news of the Austrian declaration of war was 
 
 Peters- apparently slow to reach St. Petersburg. M. Paleologue 
 
 reports x that ' this afternoon ', but evidently before the 
 
 declaration of war was known, ' M. Sazonof received the 
 
 German and Austrian Ambassadors '. The impression 
 
 1 French Book, No. 82. 
 
TUESDAY, JULY 28 99 
 
 left by this interview was a bad one. ' Certainly ', said St. 
 Sazonof to Paleologue, ' Austria is unwilling to converse.' P eter 
 To Count Benckendorff, he telegraphed x : ' The attitude 
 of the German Government is most alarming '. They 
 appear, he says, ' to be exerting no influence upon their 
 ally'. He urges that England should make another 
 attempt to induce Germany ' to take the necessary 
 action ', adding, ' There is no doubt that the key of the 
 situation is to be found in Berlin '. 
 
 Then came the decisive news from Vienna, and Sazonof 
 telegraphed to Benckendorff 2 : ' The Austrian declara- 
 tion of war clearly puts an end to the idea of direct 
 communications between Austria and Russia.' 3 He 
 now begs Sir Edward Grey to ' take instant mediatory 
 action ', and, as a preliminary, to secure the suspension 
 of military operations. If this cannot be obtained, 
 ' mediation would only allow matters to drag on, and 
 give Austria time to crush Serbia '. 
 
 To Sir George Buchanan, 4 M. Sazonof made it quite 
 clear that Russia would not be satisfied with an Austrian 
 undertaking to respect the integrity and sovereignty of 
 Serbia, and stated that ' the order for mobilization 
 against Austria would be issued the day that Austria 
 crossed the Serbian frontier '. When Count Pourtales 
 appealed to Sir George Buchanan to give moderating 
 
 1 Russian Book, No. 43 ; Blue Book, No. 54. 
 
 2 Russian Book, No. 48 ; Blue Book, No. 70. 
 
 3 It will be noted, however (p. 112), that he to-morrow returns 
 to the idea of direct conversations, only to drop it again when 
 Austria's formal refusal comes to hand. Herr von Tschirscky 
 (or his superiors at Berlin) adroitly twisted this remark so as to 
 make it appear (Austrian Book, No. 51) that Sazonof broke off 
 the conversations. He is made to say that 'he is no longer 
 in a position to deal directly with Austria '. It is obvious that 
 he is not expressing any unwillingness to converse, but merely 
 assuming that Austria's action has, in Berchtold's phrase, ' out- 
 stripped ' the idea of conversations. 
 
 4 Blue Book, No. 72. 
 
 G2 
 
ioo THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 St. counsels to Sazonof , Sir George replied that he ' had 
 
 bur? 8 " n t cease d to do so ', and that it was now von Tschirscky's 
 turn to ' use his restraining influence at Vienna '. * I 
 made it clear to his Excellency ', says Sir George, ' that, 
 Russia being thoroughly in earnest, a general war could 
 not be averted if Serbia was attacked by Austria.' 
 
 Berlin. It should be repeated that not until this evening did 
 any of the Berlin papers publish the Serbian Reply in 
 full, and then along with the Austrian commentary. 
 The Russian Charge d' Affaires, telegraphing this morn- 
 ing, suggests that the Wolff Bureau is holding it back, 
 ' being well aware of the calming effect which it would 
 have on German readers '. 1 
 
 M. Jules Cambon had to-day an interview with Herr 
 von Jagow, 2 which was mainly a repetition of their inter- 
 view of yesterday (p. 83). The Foreign Secretary still 
 ' expected a favourable result ' from the ' direct con- 
 versations which were in progress ' between Vienna and 
 St. Petersburg. 
 
 A consultation took place between the French, British, 
 and Italian Ambassadors, 3 at which it was agreed that if 
 von Jagow was sincere in his desire to co-operate in the 
 cause of peace, and only objected to the form of the 
 British proposal, he should be asked himself to ' suggest 
 lines on which he would find it possible to work with us ' 
 (Goschen), or ' to state precisely how diplomatic action 
 by the Powers to avert war could be brought about ' 
 (Cambon). This suggestion was communicated to the 
 British and French Governments by their respective 
 Ambassadors. To the lay mind it seems that so obvious 
 a measure of common-sense scarcely needed the sanction 
 of headquarters. Meanwhile the Austrian Ambassador 
 telegraphed to Vienna 4 that the conference proposal 
 
 1 Russian Book, No. 46. 2 French Book, No. 81. 
 
 3 French Book, No. 81 ; Blue Book, No. 60. 
 
 4 Austrian Book, No. 35. 
 
TUESDAY, JULY 28 ;ioi 
 
 had been declined ' on the ground that it is, impossible 
 for Germany to bring its ally before a European Court 
 in its settlement with Serbia '. Count Szogyeny is to-day 
 still confident, as he assures Sir Edward Goschen, that 
 Russia ' neither wants nor is in a position to make war '. 
 
 In the evening Sir Edward Goschen called, by invita- 
 tion, upon the Imperial Chancellor, 1 who was profuse 
 in his assurances of Germany's desire ' to work together 
 with England for the maintenance of general peace '. 
 The proposed conference could not be accepted, ' because 
 it would have had the appearance of an Areopagus con- 
 sisting of two Powers of each group sitting in judgement 
 on the two remaining Powers '. Nevertheless, he was 
 doing his very best, both at Vienna and St. Petersburg, 
 to promote direct conversations, as to the result of which 
 he had great hopes. But if it was true that Russia had 
 mobilized fourteen army corps in the south, ' he thought 
 the situation was very serious ', as he could no longer 
 ' continue to preach moderation at Vienna '. If war 
 were to result, ' Russia would be entirely responsible '. 
 When Sir Edward Goschen suggested that, after Austria's 
 refusal to take any notice of the Serbian Note, ' surely 
 a certain portion of the responsibility would rest with 
 her ', his Excellency replied that Austria's standpoint, 
 with which he agreed, was that her quarrel with Serbia 
 was ' a purely Austrian concern, with which Russia had 
 nothing to do '. 
 
 Since the Chancellor thus approved without reserve the 
 whole of Austria's conduct and contentions, it would be 
 interesting to know what was the nature of the ' modera- 
 tion ' he preached at Vienna. He had not preached the 
 extension of the time-limit, he had not preached the 
 acceptance or the discussion of the Serbian Reply, he 
 certainly was not now preaching the postponement of 
 
 1 Blue Book, No. 71. This must be the interview referred to 
 in the last half of French Book, No. 92, though by some slip 
 M. Cambon appears to refer to the interview of July 29. 
 
102 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 Berlin., hostilities. What was he recommending Vienna to do? 
 To continue ' conversations ' with St. Petersburg ? Per- 
 haps ; but since he held with Berchtold that Russia 
 had no business to interfere in the Austro-Serbian dispute, 
 how could he expect these conversations to lead to any 
 result ? ' Moderation ' was a perfectly meaningless word 
 unless it implied some slight unbending on Austria's 
 part, and it is evident that Bethmann-Hollweg was 
 ' preaching ' nothing of the sort. In this interview, as 
 throughout, we see clearly that Germany's idea of 
 ' working for the maintenance of peace ' was simply to 
 secure by hook or by crook Russia's passive acquiescence 
 in the Austrian coup. 
 
 At 10.45 this evening we hear for the first time the 
 voice of the Kaiser in person. He sends a telegram l to 
 the Tsar, denouncing the ' revolting crime ' of Serajevo 
 and the ' unscrupulous agitation ' which has led up to 
 it. All monarchs, he suggests, must stand together in 
 self-defence. But as he fears that the Tsar and his 
 Government may have difficulty in ' stemming the tide 
 of public opinion ', he will ' use his entire influence to 
 induce Austria to obtain a frank and satisfactory under- 
 standing with Russia '. Here again we are left to speculate 
 as to what can have been the nature of the ' understand- 
 ing ' which his Majesty had in mind. He certainly had 
 not used his influence to induce Austria to abate one 
 jot of her intransigeance, or even to defer the outbreak 
 of hostilities. It is hard to believe in the sincerity of 
 protestations which evidently do not imply the smallest 
 intention of putting any check upon Austria. 
 
 Paris. Von Schoen, in Paris, faithfully reflects the attitude 
 of Berlin. He assures Bienvenu-Martin 2 that ' Germany 
 only asks that she may act with France for the main- 
 tenance of peace ', but adds, ' provided that action does 
 not take the form of arbitration or a conference ', and 
 1 German Book, No. 20. z French Book, No. 78. 
 
TUESDAY, JULY 28 103 
 
 fails to suggest any other form of action. He also frankly Paris, 
 confesses that ' Germany refuses to exercise any pressure 
 on Austria '. The British Ambassador adds 1 that von 
 Schoen repeated that Austria would respect the integrity 
 of Serbia, ' but when asked whether her independence 
 also would be respected, he gave no assurance '. We 
 shall have to bear this reservation in mind when we 
 consider, in the next chapter, whether Russia ought to 
 have been satisfied with Austria's disclaimer of any 
 intention of conquest. 
 
 In London, as in Paris, this was a day of comparative London, 
 inactivity. There was nothing to do but to await the 
 development of the two ideas which (so far as was known) 
 held the field : (i) Four-Power intervention in one form 
 or another ; (2) direct conversations between Russia 
 and Austria. Sir Edward Grey telegraphed to the 
 Ambassador in Berlin 2 that he had not proposed any 
 sort of ' arbitration ', but simply ' a private and informal 
 discussion to ascertain what suggestion could be made 
 for a settlement '. Germany having ' accepted the 
 principle of mediation ', Sir Edward was quite ready 
 to let von Jagow himself ' suggest the lines on which 
 this principle should be applied '. But he thought it 
 best to ' keep the idea in reserve ' until the result of the 
 conversations between Austria and Russia should be 
 ascertained. He did not know that Berchtold had 
 refused to sanction their continuance, and that Sazonof 
 assumed them to be broken off by the fact of the declara- 
 tion of war. 
 
 The Russian Ambassador at Vienna to-day reported 3 Military 
 that ' the order for general mobilization had been signed '. 
 Either he was misinformed or the order was signed 
 without being issued, for Russia admits 4 that general 
 mobilization was not proclaimed until the 30th. At this 
 
 1 Blue Book, No. 59. a Blue Book, Nos. 67 and 68. 
 
 3 Russian Book, No. 47. * Russian Book, No. 77. 
 
104 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 Military time, according to the Russian account, ' the mobiliza- 
 prepara- ^ on o f j^f o f fa e Austrian army had been ordered/ 
 
 M. Sazonof to-day instructed the Russian Ambassador 
 at Berlin 1 to announce to the German Government that 
 in consequence of Austria's declaration of war against 
 Serbia, mobilization would be ' announced ' to-morrow 
 (the aQth) in the military circumscriptions of Odessa, 
 Kieff, Moscow, and Kazan. At the same time he was to 
 declare ' the absence in Russia of any aggressive inten- 
 tion against Germany '. There is no reason to doubt, 
 however, that preparations verging on, if not amounting 
 to, mobilization were already in progress in these dis- 
 tricts. This does not mean that Russia had any intention 
 of deceiving Germany, but simply that she delayed to 
 the last possible moment the utterance of the ominous 
 word ' mobilization '. Count Berchtold to-day instructs 
 Count Szogyeny, 2 in Berlin, to call the attention of the 
 German Government to the ' extensive military pre- 
 parations ' being made by Russia, and to suggest that 
 Germany should ' in a friendly manner ' convey to the 
 Russian Government that ' should these measures be 
 carried out, they would be answered by the most exten- 
 sive military counter-measures, not only by the Monarchy, 
 but by our ally, the German Empire '. In other words, 
 Austria hints that it is high time to bring the * shining 
 armour ' upon the scene. 
 
 We have seen that in his conversation of this evening 
 with Sir Edward Goschen (p. 101), the Imperial Chancellor 
 complained bitterly of Russian mobilization as hamper- 
 ing his pacific efforts. ' Austria, who was as yet only 
 partially mobilizing, would have to take similar measures, 
 and if war were to result, Russia would be entirely 
 responsible/ 
 
 From both Germany and France we have to-day 
 newspaper reports of considerable military activity, but 
 no evidence of any very definite movement. 
 
 1 Blue Book, No. 70. 2 Austrian Book, No. 42. 
 
TUESDAY, JULY 28 105 
 
 With the usual formality of attributing the first act Sum- 
 of aggression to her adversary, Austria declares war r 
 upon Serbia. She asserts that ' events have outstripped ' 
 any proposal for mediation or for a conference of ambas- 
 sadors, and refuses to continue any discussion with Russia 
 of the terms of her Ultimatum or of the Serbian Reply. 
 Her attitude, in short, is one of absolute intransigeance 
 at all points. The German authorities, from the Kaiser 
 downward, still protest their desire for peace, and declare 
 that they are working for it with all their might, but 
 produce no evidence of having taken, or even permitted, 
 any single step that could practically conduce to that 
 end. To-day, as always, they are simply acting as 
 a screen for their ally. Russia abandons hope of coming 
 to a direct understanding with Austria, but is still willing 
 to accept any form of mediation, if only Austria will 
 suspend active hostilities. France and England, mean- 
 while, can do nothing but await developments. 
 
CHAPTER XIII 
 
 AUSTRIA'S GUARANTEE OF SERBIAN 
 ' INDEPENDENCE ' 
 
 ' The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy is actuated by no selfish 
 motives in appealing to arms in order to reach a settlement of 
 her differences with Serbia.' COUNT BERCHTOLD. 
 
 Now that Austria has taken the irrevocable step of 
 declaring war upon Serbia, it is time to consider whether 
 there can have been any sincerity in her contention that 
 this did not imply a challenge to Russia, and ought not 
 to have been so regarded by that Power. 
 
 It was manifest that, so long as race and religion count 
 for anything in political groupings, Russia was the 
 natural protector of the smaller Slav and Orthodox 
 states. From an ideal point of view, it may be unde- 
 sirable that race and religion should be potent factors in 
 national and international life ; but Austria was the last 
 Power which could plausibly affect any such idealism. 
 Her polity was built, not on the effacement of race 
 boundaries, but on the domination of race by race. It 
 was ridiculous, then, to pretend that, in the world as it 
 is, a great Slav empire could possibly be indifferent to 
 the crushing of a small Slav state by a Germano-Magyar 
 empire. It was not only inevitable but right that Russia 
 should be sympathetically interested in the fate of 
 Serbia. Only from the extreme non-resistance standpoint 
 the standpoint of an impracticable idealism can this 
 position be contested. 
 
 Russia's warm interest in the Slav states of the Balkans 
 was, as Sir Edward Grey phrased it in 1913, 'a common- 
 place of European diplomacy '. ' We were perfectly 
 aware ', says the official German statement, 1 ' that a war- 
 1 German Book, C.D.D., p. 406. 
 
SERBIAN ' INDEPENDENCE ' 107 
 
 like attitude of Austria against Serbia might bring Russia 
 upon the field/ Nor had Russia herself failed to give 
 Austria ample warning that she would, in case of necessity, 
 make Serbia's cause her own. As Sir Maurice de Bunsen 
 reminded Count Forgach, 1 ' during the discussion of the 
 Albanian frontier at the London Conference of Ambassa- 
 dors, the Russian Government had stood behind Serbia ', 
 and the accepted frontier-line was the result of a com- 
 promise between the views of Russia and of Austria. 
 M. Sazonof also declared 2 that ' during the Balkan crisis 
 he made it clear to the Austrian Government that war with 
 Russia must inevitably follow an Austrian attack on 
 Serbia. It was clear that Austrian domination of Serbia 
 was as intolerable for Russia as the dependence of the 
 Netherlands on Germany would be to Great Britain'. 
 Austria, then, was under no illusion as to the fact that 
 Russia would unquestionably consider an attack upon 
 Serbia as touching both her honour and her interests. 
 Count Berchtold, indeed, in his dispatch to Count Szapary 
 of Saturday the 25th, 3 said : 
 
 ' We were, of course, aware, when we decided to 
 take serious measures against Serbia, of the possibility 
 that the Serbian dispute might develop into a collision 
 with Russia. We could not, however, allow ourselves 
 to be diverted by this eventuality from the position we 
 took up towards Serbia, because fundamental con- 
 siderations of national policy brought us face to face 
 with the necessity of putting an end to the state of 
 affairs in which a Russian charter made it possible for 
 Serbia to threaten the Monarchy continuously, without 
 punishment and without the possibility of punishment/ 
 
 Thus the Austrian air of surprise that Russia should 
 hold herself in any way concerned in the settlement of 
 this ' local ' dispute was the thinnest of affectations. 4 
 
 1 Blue Book, No. 118. 2 Blue Book, No. 139. 
 
 3 Austrian Book, No. 26. 
 
 4 Von Tschirscky, the most faithful mirror of the Austrian 
 frame of mind, was not slow to adopt (if he did not inspire) this 
 
io8 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 There remains, however, the official Austro-German 
 contention that Russia, however much interested in 
 Serbia, ought to have been satisfied by Austria's assurance 
 that she desired no territorial aggrandizement, but would 
 respect Serbian integrity and independence. For days 
 the air was full of these asseverations. If they appear 
 once in the documents, they appear fifty times. The 
 implication was that, as Russia admitted Serbia to be 
 in some measure in the wrong, she ought not to try to 
 shield her from condign chastisement by any method 
 short of dismemberment or total subjection. 
 
 On this point Count Berchtold himself reports a remark 
 of M. Schebeko which strikes at the root of the Austrian 
 argument. 1 Austria's warlike action, said the Russian 
 Ambassador, ' would not in any way suppress the admitted 
 hostile opinion in Serbia, but, on the contrary, would 
 only increase it '. This is self-evident. If Serbia hated 
 Austria before, her hatred would certainly be ten times 
 embittered after a devastating invasion. It is manifest, 
 therefore, that Austria could not possibly afford to leave 
 to Serbia anything that could properly be called inde- 
 pendence. She might not actually annex territory or 
 deprive Serbia of the nominal right of self-government ; 
 but, if the Serbian menace of which she complained was 
 not to be incomparably greater after than before the war, 
 she was bound to render Serbia permanently powerless 
 to take any revenge. She was bound, in short, to ' bleed 
 her victim white ', and take precautions against any 
 possible revival of national strength and spirit. That 
 being so, it mattered little whether Serbia were or were 
 not formally annexed to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. 
 She must certainly be reduced to such a condition of 
 helplessness that her national life should exist entirely on 
 
 pose. ' The German Ambassador ', says Sir Maurice de Bunsen 
 on July 29th, ' feigns surprise that Serbian affairs should be of 
 such interest to Russia ' (Blue Book, No. 94). 
 1 Austrian Book, No. 40. 
 
SERBIAN 'INDEPENDENCE' 109 
 
 Austria's sufferance, and might be snuffed out at any 
 moment. We have seen (p. 103) that Herr von Schoen, 
 in Paris, while asserting that Austria would respect 
 Serbia's integrity, declined to commit himself on the 
 subject of her independence. Here he was departing 
 from his instructions, for ' integrity and independence ' 
 (or ' sovereignty ') were guaranteed over and over again 
 by the authorities in Vienna and Berlin. But he doubt- 
 less knew that to talk of ' independence ', under the 
 circumstances, was a mere playing with words, and saw 
 no use in keeping up the comedy. 
 
 In well-informed quarters in Vienna the report ran l 
 that ' the object of Austria was to crush and disarm 
 Serbia, and in particular to capture the Serbian artillery, 
 and to compel Serbia to reduce her army in future to 
 inoffensive proportions '. This may or may not have been 
 Austria's precise design, but we may be sure that it was 
 something like this, for anything less drastic would have 
 left her position, not more, but less, secure. An inde- 
 pendent Serbia, with any offensive or even defensive 
 power, would have been no longer a thorn in her side, 
 but a poisoned spear-head. Therefore there can be no 
 reasonable doubt that the ' independence ' and ' sove- 
 reignty ' she proposed to leave to her beaten foe would 
 have been merely nominal an undeceptive sham. 2 
 
 Could Russia, then, be reasonably expected to find 
 satisfaction in such patently hollow assurances ? Clearly 
 not. ' It would be quite possible ', said Sir Edward Grey 
 to Count Mensdorff 3 on July 29th, ' without nominally 
 interfering with the independence of Serbia, or taking 
 away any of her territory, to turn her into a sort of 
 vassal state.' He might have gone further and said it 
 was not only possible but certain that Austria would 
 
 1 Vienna telegram to The Times, July 2pth. 
 
 2 See Headlam, p. 81, for a very clear demonstration that 
 Austria could not, if she would, have left to Serbia any real 
 independence. 3 Blue Book, No. 91. 
 
no THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 endeavour to do so, since nothing less would serve her 
 avowed purpose. M. Sazonof, of course, saw this clearly 
 from the first. Already on July 28th (Tuesday) he stated 
 explicitly to Sir George Buchanan 1 that ' Russia would 
 not be satisfied with any engagement which Austria 
 might take ' as to Serbian integrity and independence ; 
 and on July 3ist (Friday) he said to Count Szapary 2 
 that ' the real question which they had to solve at this 
 moment was whether Austria was to crush Serbia and 
 reduce her to the status of a vassal, or whether she was 
 to leave Serbia a free and independent State '. There can 
 be no doubt that Russia thought her honour as well as 
 her interest involved in the continued existence of a really, 
 as distinct from a nominally, independent Serbia. She 
 admitted that Austria had just grounds of complaint in 
 the past conduct of Serbia, and she actually offered 
 (p- 97) to discuss the best means of securing the Dual 
 Monarchy against similar trouble in the future. Had 
 this proposal been accepted there would have been an 
 end to the state of affairs alleged by Count Berchtold 
 (p. 107), in which ' a Russian charter made it possible for 
 Serbia to threaten the Monarchy continuously, without 
 punishment '. Austria would practically have had 
 Russia's guarantee for the good behaviour of Serbia, 
 and, had that been all she had in view, her end would have 
 been achieved without bloodshed, through the medium 
 of an almost unexampled diplomatic triumph. The fact 
 that this did not content her proves very clearly that her 
 real aim was not merely to protect herself against Serbian 
 agitation, but once for all to sweep Serbia out of her path 
 in the Balkans. Can any impartial person say that 
 Russia was to blame for not looking on idly at this 
 exploit of Machtpolitik ? 
 
 The psychology of Austria's statecraft is clear and 
 characteristic. She gambled on Russia's imagined impo- 
 tence. Believing that her great neighbour had neither 
 1 Blue Book, No. 72. 2 Blue Book, No. 139. 
 
SERBIAN 'INDEPENDENCE' in 
 
 the will nor the strength to intervene, she kindly provided 
 her with a plausible excuse for her supposed pusillanimity, 
 in the shape of a perfectly meaningless promise to respect 
 Serbian independence. ' Russia does not want to fight ', 
 she argued, ' but lest the humiliation of acquiescence 
 should prove more than she can bear, we will offer a sop 
 to her self-esteem by disclaiming any project of annexa- 
 tion/ It was an ingenious conception, vitiated only by 
 the fact that the hypothesis from which it started hap- 
 pened to be false. We shall find an exact parallel in 
 Germany's offer to buy the neutrality of Great Britain 
 by promising to respect the territorial integrity of France. 
 Indeed, the two manoeuvres are so strikingly similar that 
 one almost wonders whether they may not have formed 
 part of a carefully predetermined scheme, engendered in 
 a single brain. 
 
CHAPTER XIV 
 DIARY OF EVENTS 
 Wednesday, July 29 
 
 ' . . . The purely military consideration of the question by the 
 General Staffs would find expression, and if that button were 
 once touched in Germany, the situation would get out of control.' 
 COUNT POURTALES. 
 
 FROM this time forward, questions of military prepara- 
 tion and mobilization come so much into the foreground 
 that they cannot conveniently be treated in a section 
 apart. The heading of ' Military Preparations ' will, 
 however, be retained, and those details will be grouped 
 under it which do not appear in other parts of the record. 
 
 Belgrade. The Austrians to-day began the bombardment of 
 Belgrade, but not, apparently, until the late afternoon 
 or evening, so that the negotiations of the day were little, 
 if at all, influenced by the actual outbreak of hostilities. 
 
 St. M. Sazonof to-day addresses two telegrams to Count 
 
 burg 1 " 8 " Benckendorff in London one before, the other after, he 
 has heard of Austria's refusal to continue conversations. 
 In the former 1 he recounts a conversation with Count 
 Pourtales, to whom he repeated the declaration he had 
 already made at Berlin, that none of Russia's military 
 measures were directed against Germany. Pourtales 
 expressed himself ' in favour of direct explanations ' 
 between the Russian and the Austrian Governments ; 
 whereupon Sazonof replied that this procedure did not 
 exclude the proposed Four-Power conference, but that 
 
 1 Blue Book, No. 93 (2) ; Russian Book, No. 49. 
 
WEDNESDAY, JULY 29 113 
 
 the two methods of negotiation might be carried on St. 
 simultaneously. He suggested, in fact, ' parallel dis- P e * er 
 cussions ... on much the same lines as occurred during 
 the most critical moments of last year's crisis '. 
 
 In the second telegram x M. Sazonof says that after 
 ' the refusal of the Vienna Cabinet to agree to a direct 
 exchange of views ', nothing remains but for him ' to rely 
 entirely on the British Government to take the initiative 
 in any steps which they may consider advisable '. 
 
 The extreme moderation of his attitude appears in his 
 subsequent interview with Sir George Buchanan, 2 in 
 which he urged that ' a return should be made to Sir 
 Edward Grey's proposal for ... an exchange of views 
 between the three Ambassadors less directly interested, 
 Sir Edward Grey himself, and also the Austrian Ambassador , 
 if Sir Edward thought it advisable. Any arrangement 
 approved by France and England would be acceptable 
 to him, and he did not care what form conversations 
 took '. He was even prepared to admit a suggestion, 
 emanating from Rome, 3 that ' Serbia might be induced 
 to accept the Note [the Ultimatum] in its entirety on the 
 advice of the Four Powers invited to the conference ', 
 which would ' enable her to say that she had yielded to 
 Europe and not to Austria alone '. M. Sazonof said that 
 he would agree to this, provided it was acceptable to 
 Serbia ; he could not be more Serbian than Serbia. 
 ' Some supplementary statement or explanations would, 
 however, have to be made, in order to tone down the 
 sharpness of the Ultimatum.' 
 
 In short, Russia was willing to place herself without 
 reserve in the hands of the Four Powers, or, as M. Paleo- 
 logue to-day expressed it, 4 'to acquiesce in any measure 
 which France and England may propose in order to 
 maintain peace '. Only she could not, by refraining from 
 
 1 Blue Book, No. 93 (3) ; Russian Book, No. 50. 
 
 2 Blue Book, No. 78. 3 Blue Book, No. 57. 
 4 French Book, No. 86. 
 
 1852 H 
 
U 4 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 St. any military preparation, allow Austria to suppose that 
 
 Deters- ^ was absolutely free to do what she pleased with 
 
 Serbia. Therefore, as Sir George Buchanan announced 
 
 in the first line of the dispatch above cited : ' Partial 
 
 mobilization was ordered to-day '. 
 
 It may have been in consequence of instructions arising 
 out of Count Berchtold's appeal (p. 104) to Berlin to put 
 its foot down, that Count Pourtales paid a second visit 
 to M. Sazonof, 1 and, repeating his threat of three days 
 earlier (p. 71), 'informed him of the decision of his Govern- 
 ment to mobilize, if Russia did not stop her military pre- 
 parations '. ' As we cannot comply with the wishes of 
 Germany', says M. Sazonof in a circular telegram to 
 the Russian Ambassadors, ' we have no alternative but 
 to hasten on our own military preparations, and to 
 assume that war is probably inevitable/ ' The tone in 
 which Count Pourtales delivered his communication ', 
 says M. Paleologue, 2 ' has decided the Russian Govern- 
 ment this very night to order the mobilization of the 
 thirteen army corps which are to operate against Austria.' 
 In an earlier telegram, 3 M. Paleologue stated that ' the 
 Russian General Staff have satisfied themselves that 
 Austria is hurrying on her military preparations against 
 Russia, and is pressing forward the mobilization which 
 has begun on the Galician frontier. As a result, the order 
 to mobilize will be dispatched to-night to thirteen army 
 corps '. It is clearly not accurate, then, to represent this 
 action as being decided by the tone of Pourtales 's com- 
 munication. The probability is that, as M. Sazonof's 
 
 1 Russian Book, No. 58. M. Sazonof next day told Sir George 
 Buchanan (Blue Book, No. 97) that Pourtalds said his Govern- 
 ment were willing to guarantee that Serbian integrity would be 
 respected by Austria. ' To this he replied that this might be so, 
 but nevertheless Serbia would become an Austrian vassal, just 
 as, in similar circumstances, Bokhara had become a Russian 
 vassal. There would be a revolution in Russia if she were to 
 tolerate such a state of affairs.' 
 
 2 French Book, No. 100. 3 French Book, No. 91. 
 
WEDNESDAY, JULY 29 115 
 
 m statement suggests, the effect of the German threat St 
 was to infuse new vigour into the Russian preparations, 
 
 Pourtales himself gives a curious account of this inter- 
 view, 1 or at all events of an interview of this date, which 
 can scarcely have been the comparatively friendly talk 
 of the morning. He dilated on ' the baneful step of 
 mobilization ', and said that ' Russia was now demanding 
 of Germany, in regard to Austria, the same thing that 
 Austria was being blamed for in regard to Serbia, i.e. an 
 infraction of sovereignty '. This ridiculous remark was 
 afterwards (somewhat inaccurately) quoted by Bethmann- 
 Hollweg, with special approval. As though an effort to 
 influence the will of a Government by persuasion, or even 
 by threats, were an ' infraction of sovereignty ' in any 
 way analogous to Austria's demand that her agents 
 should participate with authority in the internal adminis- 
 tration of Serbia ! Pourtales then went on to say that 
 ' there would be time enough at the peace conference to 
 return to the matter of forbearance towards the sove- 
 reignty of Serbia ' ' forbearance ' towards what Austria 
 was swearing by all her gods that she did not in any way 
 threaten ! ' It was impossible ', he concludes, ' to dis- 
 suade Sazonof from the idea that Serbia could not now be 
 left in the lurch (im Stick gelasseri) by Russia/ 
 
 And the German Government, which publishes only 
 a small selection from its correspondence, actually gives 
 the Ambassador's confession of his own stupidity and 
 tactlessness a prominent place in its anthology ! The 
 more one examines the German documents, scanty as 
 they are, the stronger is one's impression of the insensi- 
 tiveness, the maladroitness of German diplomacy. Its 
 fingers are all thumbs. 
 
 A third interview between Sazonof and Pourtales, in 
 the small hours of the night, may best be considered in 
 relation to the decisive events which took place this 
 evening in Berlin and Potsdam. 
 
 1 German Book, C.D.D., p. 409. 
 H2 
 
n6 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 St. After Pourtales had left him, M. Sazonof had a long 
 
 Peters- v j s ^ f rom Count Szapary, 1 who did his best to soften the 
 effect of Berchtold's refusal to discuss the Serbian ques- 
 tion, by suggesting ' a much broader basis of discussion ' 
 and ' declaring that Austria had no desire to injure any 
 Russian interests '. Sazonof replied, in effect, that 
 Serbian interests were Russian interests, and that even 
 though Austria might stop short of annexation of territory, 
 she was evidently determined to reduce Serbia to a vassal 
 state. The discussion, as Szapary himself puts it, moved 
 in a vicious circle. It naturally ended in an effort, by 
 both diplomats, to minimize the significance of the 
 military preparations of their respective countries. 
 Szapary maintained that the mobilization of Austria's 
 southern corps ' could not constitute a menace for Russia ' ; 
 to which Sazonof replied that the Russian mobilization 
 was ' only a measure of prudence which the Emperor 
 Nicholas had found to be justified, since Austria, which in 
 any case had the advantage of quicker mobilization, had 
 now also already so great a start '. 
 
 Vienna. Little is to-day heard from Vienna indeed, nothing 
 at all from Austrian sources. Both the French and the 
 British Ambassadors 2 telegraph early in the day that 
 nothing can usefully be done to prevent the outbreak of 
 hostilities between Austria and Serbia. Austria ' is now 
 fully committed by the Emperor's appeal to his people, 
 which has been published this morning '. It is mentioned 
 that the Italian Ambassador thinks it ' very probable that 
 the imminence of a general insurrection among the Southern 
 Slavs precipitated the resolutions of the Monarchy '. 
 
 In the evening Sir Maurice de Bunsen reports, 3 as 
 before noted (p. 65), that Austria has realized, too late, 
 that Russia is in earnest. He has heard from the Russian 
 
 1 Austrian Book, No. 47. 
 
 2 French Book, No. 93 ; Blue Book, No. 79. 
 
 3 Blue Book, No. 94. 
 
WEDNESDAY, JULY 29 117 
 
 Ambassador of the Russian mobilization, but it is not yet Vienna, 
 generally known in Vienna. This telegram is notable as 
 recording Herr von Tschirscky's solitary utterance and 
 that a very guarded one of a pacific tendency. He said 
 that: 
 
 ' If proposals were put forward which opened up any 
 prospect of possible acceptance by both sides, he per- 
 sonally thought that Germany might consent to act as 
 mediator in concert with the three other Powers/ 
 
 Had he, too, begun to realize that the game was a more 
 dangerous one than he had bargained for ? 
 
 M. Bienvenu-Martin makes his last appearance this Paris, 
 morning ; for the President and M. Viviani return early 
 in the afternoon, and take the reins out of his hands. 
 
 M. Martin opens the day, as is his habit, with an excellent 
 summary of the situation, addressed as a circular to the* 
 French Ambassadors. 1 It shows a remarkably just appre- 
 ciation of the forces at work, but adds nothing to our 
 previous knowledge. Later in the day, M. Martin 
 reports a semi-official communication from the German 
 Ambassador, 2 to the effect that the German Government 
 are ' continuing their efforts ' to induce the Austrian 
 Government to ' state exactly the object and extent of 
 the operations in Serbia ', and that they ' hope to receive 
 declarations which will be of a kind to satisfy Russia \ 
 We shall consider later (p. 123) whether this is merely 
 another device for wasting time, or can be regarded as 
 a sincere though feeble movement in the direction of 
 peace. Herr von Schoen's note concluded with the 
 remark : ' The German efforts are in no way impeded by 
 the declaration of war which has occurred '. Austria's 
 declaration of war mattered nothing, but Russia's mobili- 
 zation, as we shall see anon, was fatal to the exertions 
 of these eager peacemakers. 
 
 1 French Book, No. 85. 2 French Book, No. 94- 
 
n8 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 Paris. M. Viviani, in a dispatch of this afternoon x to M. Paul 
 Cambon in London, makes the best of the German move, 
 and urges that Sir Edward Grey should follow it up by 
 as soon as possible renewing at Berlin his proposal for 
 Four-Power mediation, ' which had in principle obtained 
 the adherence of the German Government '. He thinks 
 that the ' explanations ' which Berlin is going to extract 
 from Vienna ' will allow the Four Powers to exercise 
 effective action between Vienna and St. Petersburg '. 
 
 From a telegram addressed by the Russian Ambassador 
 to his Government, 2 it appears that Viviani saw von 
 Schoen and urged that Germany * should hasten to give 
 her support to the British proposal for mediation '. Von 
 Schoen once more took refuge behind Austria's objection 
 to the words ' conference ' and ' arbitration ' ; to which 
 Viviani retorted, as did Cambon in Berlin (p. 83), ' that 
 it was not a question of words, and that it would be easy 
 to find some other form for mediation '. 
 
 London. Two very important interviews took place to-day 
 between Sir Edward Grey and Prince Lichnowsky. 3 In 
 the first, the German Ambassador spoke of Austria and 
 Russia being ' in constant touch ', and apparently did 
 not know that Berchtold had broken off the conversations, 
 until Sir Edward Grey informed him of the fact. Lich- 
 nowsky also spoke of Germany's efforts ' to make Vienna 
 explain in a satisfactory form at St. Petersburg the scope 
 and extension of Austrian proceedings in Serbia ' a 
 movement on which Sir Edward made no definite com- 
 ment. While agreeing that a direct arrangement between 
 Austria and Russia would be ' the best possible solution ', 
 he pointed out that there was now little chance of this, 
 and begged that the German Government, having accepted 
 
 1 French Book, No. 97. 
 
 2 Russian Book, No. 55. 
 
 3 Blue Book, Nos. 84 and 90 ; French Book, No. 98 ; Russian 
 Book, No. 54. 
 
WEDNESDAY, JULY 29 119 
 
 in principle the idea of Four-Power mediation, should do London, 
 something to give it effect. 
 
 ' They seemed to think the particular method of con- 
 ference, consultation or discussion, or even conversations 
 d quatre in London, too formal a method. I urged that 
 the German Government should suggest any method by 
 which the influence of the Four Powers could be used 
 together to prevent war between Austria and Russia. 
 France agreed, Italy agreed. The whole idea of media- 
 tion or mediating influence was ready to be put into 
 operation by any method that Germany could suggest 
 if mine was not acceptable. In fact, mediation was 
 ready to come into operation by any method that 
 Germany thought possible, if only Germany would 
 " press the button " in the interests of peace.' 
 
 It was in this conversation, too, that Sir Edward Grey 
 handed to Prince Lichnowsky a copy of a telegram 1 from 
 Sir Rennell Rodd, in Rome, reporting a suggestion made 
 by the Serbian Charge d'Affaires to the Italian Foreign 
 Minister, that if the Powers would do, what Austria would 
 not, and offer to Serbia some explanation of the part to 
 be played by Austrian agents under Articles 5 and 6 of 
 the Ultimatum, Serbia might still accept the whole of 
 that document. This, said Sir Edward, he gave to the 
 Ambassador simply for his information, feeling that he 
 himself could not move in the matter, ' so long as Austria 
 would accept no discussion with the Powers over her 
 dispute with Serbia '. He had, indeed, begun to doubt 
 whether Austria would now be satisfied by a complete 
 acceptance of her demands. ' As to mediation between 
 Austria and Russia ', he said, ' it could not take the form 
 of simply urging Russia to stand aside while Austria had 
 a free hand to go to any length she pleased.' Prince 
 Lichnowsky replied that the view of the German Govern- 
 ment was ' that Austria could not by force be humiliated '. 
 To this Sir Edward entirely agreed, but said ' it was not 
 a question of humiliating Austria; it was a question of 
 
 1 Blue Book, No. 64. 
 
120 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 London, how far Austria meant to push the humiliation of others. 
 There must, of course, be some humiliation of Serbia, but 
 Austria might press things so far as to involve the humilia- 
 tion of Russia '. The situation in a nutshell ! 
 
 The second conversation took place in the afternoon. 1 
 Sir Edward Grey now alluded to the German Chancellor's 
 effort to make Vienna satisfactorily explain her intentions 
 with regard to Serbia, and said, ' If he succeeded, well 
 and good '. But if not, it was more important than ever 
 that Germany should propose some practical method of 
 Four- Power mediation. To this end, however, a suspen- 
 sion of military operations was indispensable, as otherwise 
 ' mediation would only drag on matters, and give Austria 
 time to crush Serbia '. Austrian forces would no doubt 
 soon be in Belgrade and in occupation of some Serbian 
 territory. But even then hope need not be abandoned 
 ' if Austria, while saying that she must hold the occupied 
 territory, until she had complete satisfaction from Serbia, 
 stated that she would not advance further, pending an 
 effort of the Powers to mediate between her and Russia '. 
 
 Then Sir Edward Grey took a step (more fully dis- 
 cussed in Chapter XVIII) which was as judicious 
 as it was straightforward and honourable. While 
 Germany, a country with which we had no quarrel, 
 professed to be working towards the great common end 
 of European peace, there was of course no reason why 
 the tone of discussion between the British Foreign 
 Secretary and the German Ambassador (himself an 
 amiable man) should not be entirely friendly. But Sir 
 Edward now conveyed to Prince Lichnowsky, in the most 
 considerate terms, that he must not let this fact mislead 
 him into the belief that Britain would, under all circum- 
 stances, stand aside from any war that might ensue. In 
 other words, the good feeling which had prevailed in their 
 personal relations, and the absence of bluster or menace 
 in British policy, must not be interpreted as impairing 
 1 Blue Book, Nos. 88 and 89. 
 
WEDNESDAY, JULY 29 121 
 
 Britain's freedom of action or engaging her to neutrality. London. 
 Prince Lichnowsky took the warning in the spirit in which 
 it was offered, and said that 'it accorded with what he 
 had already given in Berlin as his view of the situation '. 
 
 Before speaking in these terms to Prince Lichnowsky, 
 Sir Edward Grey had had a parallel explanation with 
 M. Paul Cambon. 1 He told him what he proposed to say 
 to the German Ambassador, but added that this must not 
 be regarded as indicating a resolution to make common 
 cause with France. Public opinion, he said, distinguished 
 between the present difficulty and the Morocco question. 
 In that case ' the dispute was one in which France was 
 primarily interested ', and Germany ' was fastening 
 a quarrel on France on a question that was the subject of 
 a special agreement between France and us '. Here, on 
 the other hand, France was being drawn into a quarrel 
 which was not hers, in virtue of her alliance with Russia. 
 That being so, he reminded him that ' we were free from 
 engagements, and should have to decide what British 
 interests required us to do '. M. Cambon ' seemed quite 
 prepared for this announcement, and made no criticism 
 upon it '. 
 
 In the light of after events, the caution which dictated 
 this explanation to Cambon may seem excessive. It 
 could at worst do no harm, however, and it obviated 
 any possibility of misunderstanding. Incidentally, it 
 affords incontrovertible proof that the Entente involved 
 us in no secret responsibilities, and that Sir Edward Grey's 
 devotion to peace was such as to put him on his guard 
 against any temptation to Quixotism, even in his sympathy 
 for France. 
 
 The crucial events of the day, and indeed of the whole Berlin, 
 crisis, occurred this evening in Berlin. 
 
 The morning, however, opened calmly enough. There 
 was even a slight appearance of a disposition on the part 
 
 1 Blue Book, No. 87. 
 
122 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 Berlin, of the Chancellor and the Foreign Secretary to do some- 
 thing, however little, for peace. This we gather from 
 three interviews which may be considered as closely con- 
 nected : (i) between Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg and Sir 
 Edward Goschen ; (2) between Herr von Jagow and 
 Sir Edward Goschen ; (3) between Herr von Jagow and 
 M. Jules Cambon. 1 
 
 The Chancellor sent for the British Ambassador, and 
 said that he had communicated to the Austrian Govern- 
 ment Sir Edward Grey's opinion that the Serbian Reply 
 might form the basis of discussion, and that the answer 
 had been ' that events had marched too rapidly '. Von 
 Jagow, a little later, put the case more frankly and less 
 elegantly. He reminded Sir Edward Goschen that he 
 had said he must be very careful in giving advice to 
 Austria, else she would be likely ' to precipitate matters 
 and present a fait accompli '. He feared that this had 
 in fact happened, and that Sir Edward Grey's suggestion 
 as to the Serbian Reply forming a basis of discussion had 
 ' hastened the declaration of war '. Whether it was 
 real or assumed, the simplicity of this utterance is surely 
 amazing. 2 One would imagine that Austria was the 
 predominant partner in the confederacy, and that Ger- 
 many could not even venture to remonstrate when her 
 headstrong yoke-fellow took the bit between her teeth 
 and deliberately outran reason. 
 
 Meanwhile both the Chancellor and the Foreign 
 
 1 Blue Book, Nos. 75 and 76 ; French Book, No. 92. 
 
 2 The Chancellor took the same line, saying to Sir Edward 
 Goschen that ' he was " pressing the button " as hard as he 
 could, and was not sure whether he had not gone so far in urging 
 moderation at Vienna that matters had been precipitated rather 
 than otherwise ' (Blue Book, No. 107). The author of J'A ccuse ! 
 speaking of this plea that Austria was dragging an unwilling 
 Germany in her wake, says very frankly ' Alles dies ist eitel Lug 
 und Trug ' (' All this is sheer lying and humbug '). He adds 
 that Berlin had only to frown and Vienna would come to heel 
 (German edition, p. 147). 
 
WEDNESDAY, JULY 29 123 
 
 Secretary had acquainted themselves with the Serbian Berlin. 
 Reply, which the latter, as we have seen (p. 83), had 
 omitted to do when it was first delivered to him. Beth- 
 mann-Hollweg said to Sir Edward Goschen that ' a certain 
 desire had, in his opinion, been shown in the Serbian 
 Reply to meet the demands of Austria ', and von Jagow 
 confessed to M. Cambon that ' he saw in the Reply a basis 
 for possible negotiations '. Thus both implicitly con- 
 fessed that in refusing to give any consideration to the 
 Reply, Austria had gone too far. 
 
 But what was the practical result ? A warning, or 
 even a hint, to Austria that she had better hold her 
 hand and listen to reason ? Nothing of the sort. Beth- 
 mann-Hollweg told Goschen and made a great merit of 
 this spirited intervention that he had advised Austria, 
 since her object was * presumably ' to secure guarantees 
 for Serbian good behaviour, ' to speak openly in this 
 sense ' to Russia, whereupon, as he hoped, * the holding 
 of such language would eliminate all possible misunder- 
 standings '. This was obviously the official form of the 
 proposal which von Schoen in Paris (p. 117) and Lich- 
 nowsky in London (p. 118) represented as a suggestion 
 that Austria should pacify Russia by defining the object 
 and extent of her operations in Serbia. 
 
 Can we accept this ludicrously inadequate move as 
 sincere, and not a mere manoeuvre for delay ? It is 
 difficult, but not, perhaps, impossible. If the Berlin 
 Cabinet had said, ' We have told Austria that she may 
 exact such-and-such guarantees, but that we will not 
 support her in going any further ', that, indeed, would 
 have been a step towards peace. The advice actually 
 tendered 1 can at best be interpreted as a move in the 
 direction of salving Russia's self-esteem by securing 
 
 1 If it was actually tendered. There is nothing to show that 
 Austria ever heard of it. Some phrases used by Count Berchtold 
 on July soth (Austrian Book, No. 50) might perhaps be inter- 
 preted in this sense, but very doubtfully. 
 
124 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 Berlin, from Austria a more formal repetition of her assurances 
 as to Serbian ' integrity and independence '. In other 
 words, it was an attempt, not to save Russia from humilia- 
 tion, but to make her humiliation a little easier to swallow. 
 
 After all deductions, however, the morning mood of 
 Berlin appears comparatively pacific and reasonable. 
 How are we to account for the extraordinary change 
 which, as we shall see, came over the official spirit within 
 ten or twelve hours ? 
 
 The explanation is possibly to be found in the last 
 line of Sir Edward Goschen's second dispatch x : ' The 
 Russian Ambassador returned to-day, and has informed 
 the Imperial Government that Russia is mobilizing in 
 four southern governments.' A close examination of 
 the documents seems to bear out what is suggested in 
 an official communique published in the Norddeutsche 
 Allgemeine Zeitung for August i, 2 that Sazonof's message 
 of yesterday was not delivered till this evening, after 
 6.30. So long a delay seems improbable, but perhaps 
 the absence of the Russian Ambassador may account 
 for it. At all events, this is the most plausible way of 
 explaining the marked difference in the tone of two 
 telegrams dispatched by the Kaiser to the Tsar the 
 first at 6.30 p.m., the second at one in the morning. 
 As the German statement is consistent with the docu- 
 ments, and as we have nothing to oppose to it but an 
 abstract improbability, we seem bound to accept it. In 
 this case, the definite news of Russian mobilization must 
 be set down as the force which, between 6.30 and mid- 
 night, caused the dial-hand to veer decisively to ' War '. 
 
 At i p.m. to-day, but before the Kaiser's telegram of 
 yesterday had reached him, 3 the Tsar made an appeal 
 
 1 Blue Book, No. 76. 2 Price, p. 405. 
 
 3 When it did reach him, the Tsar replied to it in the following 
 telegram, omitted in the German Book : ' Thanks for Your 
 telegram, which is conciliatory, whereas the official message 
 presented by Your ambassador to my minister was conveyed 
 
WEDNESDAY, JULY 29 125 
 
 to his brother potentate. An ' ignominious war ', he Berlin. 
 said, 1 ' had been declared against a weak country '. The 
 indignation in Russia, which he fully shared, was ' tre- 
 mendous ', and he could not long resist the pressure 
 making for war. ' To prevent such a calamity ', he 
 concluded, ' I urge You, in the name of our old friend- 
 ship, to do all in Your power to restrain Your ally from 
 going too far.' 
 
 To this missive the Kaiser replied, 2 as aforesaid, at 
 6.30. He objected to the phrase ' ignominious war ' ; 
 held that Austria was justified in seeking guarantees 
 for the fulfilment of Serbia's promises, which without 
 guarantees were worthless ; expressed the opinion that 
 it was ' perfectly possible for Russia to remain a spec- 
 tator of the Austro- Serbian War ' ; and was therefore 
 endeavouring ' with all possible effort ' to bring about 
 an understanding between St. Petersburg and Vienna. 
 ' Naturally ', the telegram concluded, ' military measures 
 by Russia, which might be construed as a menace by 
 Austria-Hungary, would accelerate a calamity which 
 both of us desire to avoid, and would undermine my 
 position as mediator/ 
 
 A stiff document this, but scarcely a threatening one. 
 Six and a half hours later, at i a.m., it was followed 
 by another 3 of curiously different tone : 
 
 ' My Ambassador has instructions to direct the 
 attention of Your Government to the dangers and 
 serious consequences of a mobilization. I have told 
 You the same in my last telegram. Austria has 
 mobilized only against Serbia,, and only a part of her 
 
 in a very different tone. I beg You to explain the divergency. 
 It would be right to give over the Austro- Serbian problem to the 
 Hague Conference. I trust in Your wisdom and friendship.' 
 The suggestion of arbitration, though eminently reasonable, was 
 misplaced ; for the Hague Conference was a by-word and 
 a scoff in Berlin. 
 
 1 German Book, No. 21. 2 German Book, No. 22. 
 
 3 German Book, No. 23. 
 
THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 army. If Russia, as seems to be the case, according 
 to Your advice and that of Your Government, mobilizes 
 against Austria, the part of mediator with which You 
 have entrusted me ... is threatened if not made 
 impossible. The entire weight of decision now rests 
 upon Your shoulders. You have to bear the responsi- 
 bility for war or peace.' 
 
 What had occurred in the interval ? Very soon after 
 the dispatch of the first telegram, the Russian Ambas- 
 sador must have delivered his message. It merely 
 confirmed what had been suspected, and scarcely doubted, 
 for days before, and it was accompanied by the assurance 
 that Russia had no ' aggressive intention ' against Ger- 
 many. The very frankness of the announcement ought 
 to have been re-assuring, but the actual effect was far 
 different. An Extraordinary Council was held at Pots- 
 dam, 1 in which the political and military authorities 
 met, under the presidency of the Emperor, and there 
 can be no doubt that, as Count Pourtales had predicted 
 four days ago, with the entrance of the General Staff 
 upon the scene, ' the situation had got out of control '. 
 
 The Kaiser's second telegram is not the only evidence 
 of this. As soon as the Council was over, the Chancellor 
 rushed back to Berlin, summoned the British Ambassador, 
 and thus addressed him : 2 In spite of his continued 
 efforts for peace, war, he feared, might become inevitable. 
 Great Britain, he understood, would never stand by 
 and ' allow France to be crushed '. But that was not 
 
 1 It must surely have been summoned in advance. We know 
 that, after the Council was over, Bethmann-Hollweg returned 
 to Berlin, and had a momentous interview with Sir Edward 
 Goschen ; that Goschen then wrote his dispatch ; and that it 
 was received in London the same evening. All this would have 
 been quite impossible if the Council had been got together 
 hurriedly and without warning after the Russian announcement , 
 was delivered at (say) 7 p.m. It is much more probable that 
 the Council was actually sitting when the announcement arrived. 
 
 2 Blue Book, No. 85. 
 
WEDNESDAY, JULY 29 127 
 
 Germany's purpose. ' Provided that the neutrality Berlin, 
 of Great Britain were certain, every assurance would 
 be given to the British Government that the Imperial 
 Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the 
 expense of France/ With excellent presence of mind, 
 Sir Edward Goschen ' questioned his Excellency about 
 the French colonies ', but ' he was unable to give a similar 
 undertaking in that respect '. The neutrality of Holland 
 would not be threatened. ' It depended upon the action 
 of France what operations Germany might be forced to 
 enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was over, 
 Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not 
 sided against Germany/ Then the Chancellor enlarged 
 upon the prevailing benevolence of his policy towards 
 England, and mentioned his hopes for a ' general neutrality 
 agreement ', to which England's neutrality at the present 
 conjuncture might be a prelude. Sir Edward Goschen's 
 reply must have prepared his Excellency for the coming 
 disillusionment. He said ' he did not think it probable 
 that at this stage of events Sir Edward Grey would care 
 to bind himself to any course of action '. 
 
 This scene enables us to reconstruct with tolerable 
 confidence the course of the Council which had immedi- 
 ately preceded it. The diplomatists were pitted against 
 the soldiers, and the Emperor sat in the judgement- 
 seat between them. Asked to report as to the prospects 
 of the bloodless triumph they had promised, the diplo- 
 matists had but a poor tale to tell. Russia was evidently 
 not going to take it lying down ; the efforts to detach 
 France from her ally had failed ; and even England, while 
 backing Russia in her demands for negotiation on the 
 basis of the Serbian Reply, was keeping her fleet mobi- 
 lized. 1 ' Behold ', said the soldiers, ' what diplomacy is 
 
 1 Von Jagow told Goschen the next day (Blue Book, No. 98) 
 that Lichnowsky's report of Grey's warning did not reach Berlin 
 until very late at night ; ' had it been received earlier, the Chan- 
 cellor would, of course, not have spoken in the way he had done.' 
 
128 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 Berlin, preparing for us ! Not a brilliant revival of 1909 but 
 a disastrous repetition of 1911 ! Only the sword can 
 hack us out of the tight place in which diplomacy has 
 landed us/ It is not necessary to suppose that the 
 soldiers completely carried the day, and that war was 
 then and there decreed. If England could be bound 
 over to keep the peace, it was still possible that Russia 
 might be bluffed into acquiescence. Whether for peace 
 or for war, the first essential was to disintegrate the 
 Triple Entente. It was unthinkable that supine, decadent 
 England should really take up arms for France, if a loop- 
 hole of escape were offered her. Some concession must 
 be made in order to disguise from her her pusillanimity 
 what about an offer to respect the ' integrity and 
 independence ' of France, the question of her colonial 
 empire being kept discreetly in the background ? This 
 game had not succeeded very well with Russia, but 
 England was still more embarrassed and unready. The 
 attempt was at any rate well worth making, and the 
 Chancellor, empowered to that effect, stepped into his 
 automobile and sped through the summer gloaming to 
 place his ' strong bid ' in Goschen's hands. Meanwhile, 
 to pave the way either for a triumphant peace, or for 
 saddling Russia with the responsibility for war, the 
 Kaiser sat down to re-write, in terms of indignant menace, 
 his afternoon missive to his ' friend and cousin ' in 
 St. Petersburg. 
 
 St. To that capital we must return for a moment, before 
 
 bur? 8 " we nave done with the transactions of this agitated 
 
 night. It is clear that the Kaiser's telegram was not the 
 
 only one dispatched after the Potsdam Council. News 
 
 It is hard to see the reason for this ' of course '. The Chancellor's 
 ' bid ' sounds very like a result of Grey's warning. As the 
 Chancellor and the Foreign Secretary are not always in touch 
 with each other, one wonders whether von Jagow may not have 
 been mistaken as to the time of the telegram's arrival, 
 
WEDNESDAY, JULY 29 129 
 
 must have reached Count Pourtales that the General Military 
 Staff was getting the upper hand, for he descended upon P re P ara - 
 M. Sazonof at two in the morning, and (says Sir George 
 Buchanan l ) ' completely broke down on seeing that 
 war was inevitable '. His emotion, we may be sure, 
 was not wholly humanitarian, for, as he had consistently 
 told his Government that Russia would not fight, war 
 would mean, to him, a great professional failure. He 
 ' appealed to M. Sazonof to make some suggestion which 
 he could telegraph to the German Government as a last 
 hope '. M. Sazonof, according to M. Paleologue, 2 replied : 
 
 ' The situation is too serious for me not to tell you 
 all that is in my mind. By intervening at St. Peters- 
 burg while she refuses to intervene at Vienna, Germany 
 is only seeking to gain time so as to allow Austria 
 to crush the little Serbian kingdom before Russia can 
 come to its aid. But the Emperor Nicholas is so 
 anxious to prevent war that I am going to make 
 a new proposal to you in his name : 
 
 " If Austria, recognizing that her dispute with 
 Serbia has assumed the character of a question of 
 European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate 
 from her ultimatum the clauses which are damaging 
 to the sovereignty of Serbia, Russia undertakes to 
 stop all military preparations." 
 
 Count Pourtales ' promised to support this proposal 
 with his Government f , 3 and we shall hear a good deal 
 more of it in the sequel ; but from the moment it reached 
 Berlin it was doomed. 
 
 The French representatives in Frankfort and Munich Military 
 report very marked military activity in Germany. 4 P re P ara ' 
 Regiments in service dress are arriving at Frankfort, 
 
 1 Blue Book, No. 97. 2 French Book, No. 103. 
 
 3 This was afterwards semi-officially denied (Norddeutsche 
 Allgemeine Zeitung, December 21, 1914), but is probably true, 
 though it may also be true that Pourtales said he had little hope 
 of its acceptance. * French Book, Nos. 88 and 89. 
 
 1852 
 
130 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 Military ' especially by the roads from Darmstadt, Cassel, and 
 tiomf 1 ^' Mayence, which are full of soldiers '. Bridges and rail- 
 ways are guarded. Mills are asked to stop delivery to 
 their ordinary clients and keep all their output for the 
 army. Motor guns for firing on aeroplanes are passing 
 through Strasburg. Non-commissioned officers and men, 
 who were on leave in Bavaria for the harvest, have been 
 recalled to their regiments. 
 
 The French Consul at Prague reports, among other 
 things, that cavalry divisions in Galicia are mobilizing, 
 that reservists are being called together in this district, 
 and regiments transported from Vienna and Buda- 
 Pesth to the Russian frontier. Moreover, Bronewsky, 
 in Berlin, tells von Jagow that ' according to informa- 
 tion in his possession ', Austria is mobilizing against 
 Russia. In his Reichstag speech of August 4, Bethmann- 
 Hollweg admitted that at the time when Russia's partial 
 mobilization took place, Austria, in addition to her mobi- 
 lization against Serbia, had mobilized two army corps 
 ' towards the north, and far from the Russian frontier '. 
 
 Count Berchtold to-day sends to Count Szogyeny in 
 Berlin a telegram similar to that of yesterday, but in 
 stronger terms. ' If the Russian measures of mobiliza- 
 tion are not put a stop to without delay/ he said, ' our 
 general mobilization would have, on military grounds, to 
 follow at once.' 
 
 Sum- At Belgrade to-day the first shots are fired. Russia, 
 
 mary. w hile she sees in partial mobilization the only way of 
 convincing Austria that she is in earnest, still hopes 
 that something may come of the British proposal for 
 Four-Power mediation, and is willing to accept it in any 
 form. Sir Edward Grey endeavours to induce Germany 
 to make some move in this direction, giving to the pro- 
 posal whatever form she thinks fit, but Germany prefers 
 to waste time upon an inspiration of her own, that if 
 Austria can be induced to define her intentions with respect 
 
WEDNESDAY, JULY 29 131 
 
 to Serbia, Russia may thereby be placated. The official Sum- 
 announcement of Russia's partial mobilization makes it mai T- 
 clear that diplomacy, if it hoped for a peaceful triumph, 
 had grossly miscalculated, and the result is that, at the 
 Potsdam Council, the General Staff become, to all intents 
 and purposes, masters of the situation. The Chancellor 
 offers what is doubtless considered a spirited bid for 
 British neutrality ; the Kaiser makes a determined effort 
 to intimidate the Tsar ; and Count Pourtales, realizing 
 the failure of the policy of bluff, tries desperately to stop 
 the avalanche he has helped to set rolling. 
 
 I 2 
 
CHAPTER XV 
 
 DIARY OF EVENTS 
 
 Thursday, July 30 
 
 ' If we succeed in this object [preserving the peace of Europe] 
 the mutual relations of Germany and England will, I believe, 
 be ipso facto improved and strengthened. For that object His 
 Majesty's Government will work with all sincerity and good- 
 will.' SIR EDWARD GREY. 
 
 Belgrade THE bombardment of Belgrade was to-day continued. 
 
 and From Nish, where the Government of Serbia had estab- 
 lished itself, the Crown Prince addressed to the Tsar l 
 a reply to His Majesty's telegram of the 27th : ' The 
 future of Serbia ', he said, ' is secure now that it is the 
 object of your Majesty's gracious solicitude. These 
 painful moments cannot but strengthen the bonds of 
 deep attachment which bind Serbia to Holy Slav Russia '. 
 
 1 Serbian Book, No. 44 ; Russian Book, No. 56. There is 
 some difficulty about the date of this telegram. The Crown 
 Prince refers in it to ' the telegram which Your Majesty was 
 pleased to address to me yesterday ' which would seem to 
 imply that the answer was dispatched on the 28th. But in the 
 Serbian Book it is quite definitely dated ' Nish, July 3oth ' ; 
 and in the Russian Book (No. 57) the Russian Charge d'Affaires 
 says, under date July 2pth : ' I have communicated to Pashitch 
 the text of the telegraphic reply returned by His Majesty the 
 Emperor to Prince Alexander. On reading it Pashitch crossed 
 himself and exclaimed, " The Tsar is great and merciful ! " 
 He then embraced me and was overcome with emotion. The 
 heir-apparent is expected at Nish late to-night.' It would appear, 
 then, that the telegram did not reach Prince Alexander until the 
 2pth, and that he ought to have said, not ' which you addressed 
 to me yesterday ', but ' which I received yesterday '. 
 
THURSDAY, JULY 30 133 
 
 As Berlin is now more clearly than ever the point Berlin, 
 on which everything hinges, our survey of the events of 
 the day may best begin here. 
 
 A very significant event was the publication, and 
 instant withdrawal, of an order for general mobiliza- 
 tion. It appeared about midday in a special edition of 
 the semi-official Lokal-Anzeiger, whereupon von Jagow 
 instantly telephoned to all the embassies that the news 
 was false, and that the edition of the paper had been 
 confiscated. 1 To the Russian Ambassador he explained 
 that ' the news-sheets had been printed in advance, so 
 as to be ready for all eventualities '. At the same time 
 the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs confessed that 
 ' the military authorities are very anxious that mobiliza- 
 tion should be ordered, because every delay makes Ger- 
 many lose some of her advantages ', but added that 
 ' up to the present the haste of the General Staff had 
 been successfully prevented '. It is clear then that the 
 Lokal-Anzeiger was not merely indulging in 'intelligent 
 anticipation '. The mobilization order had actually been 
 sanctioned at the Council of the previous evening, but 
 the political authorities, having slept upon it (or perhaps 
 failed to sleep), had determined to hold it back. Who 
 was responsible for the premature firing of the fuse may 
 never be known. Perhaps the Foreign Office had forgotten 
 to countermand the order for publication ; perhaps the 
 War Office had determined to steal a march on the 
 diplomatists, and, by hurrying the publication, to con- 
 front, them, in true German fashion, with a fait accompli. 
 
 At all events, the incident shows that, during the 
 early part of the day, there was hesitation in the Prussian 
 councils, and the dial-hand was, for the moment, waver- 
 ing backwards towards ' Peace '. No doubt this was 
 largely the result of Sir Edward Goschen's chilly recep- 
 tion of the bid for British neutrality, and of Prince 
 Lichnowsky's report of Sir Edward Grey's warning. 
 1 French Book, No. 105 ; Russian Book, Nos. 61 and 62. 
 
134 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 Berlin. One is disposed, then, to see an authentic symptom of 
 this relenting mood in a telegram purporting to have 
 been addressed by the Imperial Chancellor to Herr von 
 Tschirscky, which was published in the Westminster 
 Gazette on August i, but does not appear in the German 
 Book. It ran thus x : 
 
 ' The report of Count Pourtales does not harmonize 
 with the account which your Excellency has given 
 of the attitude of the Austrian Government. Appa- 
 rently there is a misunderstanding which I beg you to 
 clear up. 
 
 We cannot expect Austria to negotiate with Serbia, 
 with which she is in a state of war. The refusal, 
 however, to exchange views with St. Petersburg would 
 be a grave mistake. 
 
 We are indeed ready to fulfil our duty as an ally. 
 We must, however, refuse to be drawn into a world- 
 conflagration through Austria not respecting our 
 advice. 
 
 Your Excellency will express this to Count Berchtold 
 with all emphasis and great seriousness/ 
 
 On the previous day M. Bronewsky had telegraphed 
 to M. Sazonof 2 : ' The Secretary of State tells me that 
 he received a telegram to-day from Pourtales stating 
 that you seemed more inclined than you previously were 
 to find a compromise acceptable to all parties.' This 
 may very probably be the ' report of Count Pourtales ' 
 alluded to in the telegram. Again, Sir Maurice de Bunsen 
 to-day telegraphed from Vienna 3 : ' The French Ambas- 
 sador hears from Berlin that the German Ambassador 
 at Vienna is instructed to speak seriously to the Austrian 
 Government against acting in a manner calculated to 
 provoke a European war.' In face of these collateral 
 indications, it seems difficult to doubt that the telegram 
 is genuine, and represents the Chancellor's mood of 
 a few hours on this Thursday morning. It has been 
 
 1 See ^rice, p. 393 ; Headlam, p. 239. 
 
 2 Russian Book, No. 51. 3 Blue Book, No. 95. 
 
THURSDAY, JULY 30 135 
 
 suggested that the telegram, though drafted, was never Berlin, 
 dispatched ; but the official statement which accompanied 
 it in the Westminster Gazette speaks of Berchtold's reply 
 to it that ' there was in fact a misunderstanding ' 
 which had already been cleared up. We shall see reason 
 to think that it cannot have been this telegram that 
 caused the slight relaxation in Austria's attitude which 
 is perceptible to-day. Nevertheless, it is notable as the 
 one positive indication we possess that the German 
 Chancellor did really, for a moment, intend to act up 
 to his professions of influencing Vienna in the direction 
 of peace. 1 
 
 But if the Chancellor had any sincerely pacific lean- 
 ings, he ought to have kept a tight hand upon von 
 Jagow, whose incorrigible obstructiveness to-day did 
 more decisive mischief than ever before. He took two 
 steps which were absolutely fatal. 
 
 When M. Jules Cambon inquired 2 ' what reply he 
 had made to Sir E. Grey, who had asked him to draw 
 up himself the formula for the intervention of the dis- 
 interested Powers ', he answered that ' to gain time ' he 
 had ' decided to act directly, and had asked Austria to 
 tell him the ground on which conversations might be 
 opened with her '. Thus he had deliberately, and on 
 a ridiculous pretext, shelved the whole principle of Four- 
 Power mediation, to which, three days ago, he stood 
 definitely committed. Incidentally, as M. Cambon points 
 out, he had eliminated England, France, and Italy, and 
 ' entrusted to Herr von Tschirscky, whose Pan-German 
 and Russophobe sentiments are well known, the duty 
 
 1 The only alternative hypothesis would be that it was deliber- 
 ately concocted to throw dust in the eyes of England, and make 
 her believe Russia responsible for the war. Even if we held the 
 Chancellor capable of such clever rascality, we could scarcely sup- 
 pose that he had time to think of such a machination in the crowded 
 hours of this Thursday and Friday. The telegram appeared in 
 London late on Saturday. 2 French Book, No. 109. 
 
136 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 Berlin, of persuading Austria to adopt a conciliatory attitude '. 
 If this was not a deliberate move to impede pacification, 
 it was an act of amazing stupidity. 
 
 More deplorable still was his other proceeding. 
 M. Sazonof, it will be remembered, had, at two in the 
 morning, dictated to Count Pourtales the following 
 declaration * : 
 
 * Si 1'Autriche, reconnaissant que la question austro- 
 serbe a assume le caractere d'une question europeenne, 
 se declare prte a eliminer de son ultimatum les points 
 qui portent atteinte aux droits souverains de la Serbie, 
 la Russie s'engage a cesser ses preparatifs militaries.' 
 
 In notifying the Russian Ambassador in Berlin of this 
 proposal, 2 M. Sazonof added : ' Please inform me at 
 once what attitude the German Government will adopt 
 in face of this fresh proof of our desire to do the utmost 
 possible for a peaceful settlement, for we cannot allow 
 such discussions to continue solely in order that Germany 
 and Austria may gain time for their military prepara- 
 tions.' The Russian Ambassador at once communicated 
 the text of the proposal to von Jagow, who had received 
 ' an identic telegram ' from Pourtales. ' He then declared ', 
 says the Ambassador, ' that he considered it impossible for 
 Austria to accept our proposal.' 3 
 
 If we can lay our finger on any one point at which 
 the last hope of peace became extinct, this is surely it. 
 Here was an offer from Russia to do the very thing that 
 Berlin was clamouring for, and stop her mobilization. 
 To it was attached a condition which, in substance if 
 not in expression, ought to have been perfectly accept- 
 able to the Power which had been unwearied in pro- 
 testing that it had no wish to impair the sovereignty 
 of Serbia, and had even authorized its Ambassador at 
 St. Petersburg (p. 46) to explain in that sense one of 
 the clauses of the sacrosanct Ultimatum. What, then, 
 
 1 For English translation, see p. 129. 
 
 2 Russian Book, No. 60. 3 Russian Book, No. 63. 
 
THURSDAY, JULY 30 137 
 
 does Herr von Jagow do ? Does he consult Austria ? Berlin. 
 Does he (as Sir Edward Grey did) propose a verbal 
 modification that should obviate any possible scruple 
 on Austria's part ? Does he even submit the momentous 
 decision to his superiors, the Kaiser and the Chancellor ? * 
 No ! On his own responsibility he curtly ' turns down ' 
 the extremely reasonable and conciliatory proposal, 
 which even Pourtalds had promised to support. As 
 a matter of fact, it never reached Vienna at all, or in 
 such a garbled form as to be unrecognizable. 
 
 What was the effect at St. Petersburg of von Jagow's 
 action ? M. Sazonof tells us three days later, in his 
 review 2 of the events leading up to the declaration 
 of war : 
 
 ' Germany considered this Russian proposal un- 
 acceptable to Austria. At that very moment news 
 of the proclamation of general mobilization by Austria 
 reached St. Petersburg. 
 
 All this time hostilities were continuing on Serbian 
 territory, and Belgrade was bombarded afresh. 
 
 The failure of our proposals for peace compelled 
 us to extend the scope of our precautionary military 
 measures/ 
 
 We may fairly say that, when von Jagow declined 
 even to transmit the Russian proposal to Vienna, 
 
 ' Hope, for a season, bade the world farewell '. 
 
 Meanwhile Berlin had positively deigned to hand on 
 to Vienna Sir Edward Grey's suggestion to Prince Lich- 
 nowsky that Austria, after occupying Belgrade and some 
 Serbian territory, might consent to stay her hand, ' pend- 
 ing an effort of the Powers to mediate between her and 
 Russia '. When Sir Edward Goschen saw von Jagow 
 
 1 These authorities may, of course, have been consulted before 
 the interview with the Russian Ambassador, but there is no 
 indication of this. It rather appears that von Jagow simply 
 did not recognize the crucial nature of the decision he was taking. 
 
 2 Russian Book, No. 77. 
 
138 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 Berlin, to-day, he had received no reply from Vienna, 1 but it 
 afterwards appears 2 that Berchtold answered, late in the 
 evening, to the effect that ' he would take the wishes of 
 the Emperor ' next morning. The result will appear in 
 due course (p. 152). 
 
 To this day belongs an exchange of telegrams between 
 Prince Henry of Prussia and King George. 3 Prince 
 Henry, who had just returned from a visit to England, 
 dwelt upon ' William's ' earnest solicitude in the cause 
 of peace, and the difficulties created by the military 
 preparations of both his eastern and his western neigh- 
 bour, ' while we have as yet taken none '. He begs that, 
 to avert the 'cruel calamity' of a European war, King 
 George ' should, by his influence, try to secure the 
 neutrality of France and Russia' or, in other words, 
 leave Austria a perfectly free hand to demolish Serbia. 
 It need scarcely be pointed out that had this been possible 
 at the present juncture, after a week of eager negotia- 
 tions, the Austro-German triumph would have been ten 
 times greater than if Russia had simply acquiesced from 
 the first in Austria's proceedings. King George says in 
 reply : 
 
 ' . . . My Government is doing its utmost to suggest 
 to Russia and France that they should postpone 
 further military preparations on the condition that 
 Austria declares herself satisfied with the occupation 
 of Belgrade and the neighbouring Serbian territory as 
 pledge for a satisfactory regulation of her terms, while 
 other countries should at the same time suspend their 
 military preparations. I am confident that William 
 will use his great influence in order to move Austria 
 to the acceptance of this proposal. . . .' 
 
 There is nothing to show that William moved a finger 
 in support of the almost extravagantly conciliatory 
 suggestion. 
 
 1 Blue Book, No. 98. a Blue Book, No. 112. 
 
 2 Full text in Headlam, pp. 197 and 229 ; and in Price, p. 393. 
 
THURSDAY, JULY 30 139 
 
 There is good reason for thinking that Vienna, like Vienna. 
 Berlin, but without any influence from Berlin, was this 
 morning beginning to wonder whether it might not be 
 wise to draw in its horns a little. Yesterday, as we saw 
 (p. 116), Bunsen reported that Austria had realized, too 
 late, that Russia was in earnest ; and the effect of this 
 realization is apparent in a very significant circum- 
 stance : though the fact of Russian mobilization on the 
 Austrian frontier was perfectly well known, it was, 
 evidently by order, kept out of the papers* This order, 
 which must have preceded, by many hours, the German 
 Chancellor's admonition to Herr von Tschirscky (p. 134), 
 shows an unmistakable desire to give peace a chance. 
 
 The same tendency was apparent in a conversation 
 between Berchtold and Schebeko, 2 in which Berchtold 
 tried to explain away his refusal to sanction further 
 ' conversations ' between Sazonof and Szapary. There 
 had been a misunderstanding, he said ; he thought it 
 had been proposed that Szapary should be given powers 
 ' to modify the terms of the Austrian Ultimatum '. He 
 was now quite content that conversations should be 
 resumed, on the understanding that Szapary was ' only 
 authorized to discuss what settlement would be com- 
 patible with the dignity and prestige for which both 
 Empires had equal concern '. He admitted, incidentally, 
 that Austria had taken steps towards mobilization in 
 Galicia ; but he and Schebeko exchanged assurances that 
 on neither side should military preparations be ' inter- 
 preted as signs of hostility '. 
 
 M. Schebeko in this interview proved himself a true 
 diplomatist. He must have known that there had been 
 no misunderstanding, and that it had, as a matter of 
 fact, been proposed that Szapary should be empowered 
 to modify the terms of the Ultimatum. But he knew, 
 
 1 French Book, No. 104. 
 
 2 Blue Book, No. 96 ; French Book, No. 104. 
 
140 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 Vienna, too, that words matter nothing and intentions every- 
 thing; and as Berchtold evidently intended to reopen 
 the door to discussion and conciliation, it was none of his 
 business to inquire whether the reason he alleged for 
 doing so was real or pretended. He came away from the 
 interview in a hopeful mood ; and Sir Maurice de Bunsen, 
 on hearing of its tenor, at once assured him that Eng- 
 land would entirely approve of the resumption of direct 
 conversations. 
 
 It is possible, of course, that Berchtold's comparatively 
 tractable attitude may have been a result of Bethmann- 
 Hollweg's remonstrance ; but considerations of time render 
 this highly improbable ; and, in view of the suppression 
 of the news of Russian mobilization, we need not doubt 
 that the movement was spontaneous. 
 
 The return to reason, however, is much less evident 
 in Count Berchtold's own telegrams to Count Szapary x 
 than in his conversation with M. Schebeko, as reported 
 by that gentleman to his French and English colleagues. 
 To Szapary, Berchtold is verbose and woodenly official. 
 The Ambassador is authorized to ' give M. Sazonof any 
 explanations he desires ' with regard to the Ultimatum ; 
 but they can only ' take the form of subsequent explana- 
 tions, as it was never our intention to depart in any 
 way from the points contained in the Note '. Twice his 
 Excellency returns to his favourite formula, and states 
 that the Ultimatum has ' already been outstripped by 
 recent events ', which can only be interpreted as a blandly 
 self-complacent way of saying, ' You see, we have been 
 too quick for you ! ' Twice, too, he hints that Szapary 
 should try to divert attention from Serbia by shifting 
 the discussion to the general relations between Austria 
 and Russia. 2 Then, passing to the question of military 
 
 1 Austrian Book, Nos. 49 and 50. 
 
 2 This Szapary, according to Sir George Buchanan (Blue Book, 
 No. 139), duly attempted to do ; but Sazonof told him that 
 ' while the Serbian question was unsolved, the abstract discussion 
 
THURSDAY, JULY 30 141 
 
 preparations, he relates that in talking to Schebeko he Vienna, 
 said he could not understand the Russian mobilization 
 on the frontiers of the Monarchy, ' as there was no 
 dispute between us and Russia '. The harping on this 
 tedious quibble is very characteristic of Austrian methods. 
 ' In view, however/ he continued, ' of the circumstance 
 that Russia was openly mobilizing against us, we should 
 have to extend our mobilization too ' of course without 
 the slightest hostile intention. 1 
 
 There is an apparently inextricable confusion as to St. 
 the order of the telegrams passing between St. Petersburg 
 and Paris. For instance, when M. Viviani, under date Paris 
 July 30,2 says : ' M. Isvolsky came to-night to tell me 
 that the German Ambassador had notified M. Sazonof 
 of the decision of his Government to mobilize the army, 
 if Russia does not cease her military preparations ', we 
 can only assume that he is telegraphing in the small 
 hours of the morning, and that by ' to-night ' he means 
 the evening of July 29. A similar ambiguity attaches to 
 M. Paleologue's telegrams of this date. 3 It is scarcely 
 worth while, even if it were possible, to unravel the 
 tangle, for nothing very important is involved, the 
 really crucial events of the day being clear enough. At 
 one time, seemingly on the night of July 28-29, we & n d 
 Russia ' suspending all measures of military precaution ', 
 in deference to advice from France that she should do 
 nothing ' that could offer Germany the pretext for 
 
 of the relations between Austria and Russia was a waste of 
 time ' (see p. 149). 
 
 1 Berchtold says he denied that Austria had mobilized ' a single 
 man ' against Russia. According to Schebeko he admitted ' steps 
 towards mobilization in Galicia '. The ambiguity of the term 
 ' mobilization ' probably accounts for this discrepancy. 
 
 2 French Book, No. 101. 
 
 3 French Book, Nos. 102 and 103. It seems pretty clear that 
 No. 102 ought to be dated July 2pth instead of July 3oth ; but 
 that, does not remove the whole difficulty. 
 
142 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 St. general mobilization ' . But immediately after, ' the 
 
 Peters- Russian General Staff and Admiralty receive disquieting 
 burg and . . J ~* 
 
 Paris. information concerning the preparations of the German 
 
 army and navy ' doubtless the same information referred 
 to by Sir George Buchanan 1 when he says M. Sazonof 
 told him that ' absolute proof was in the possession of 
 the Russian Government that Germany was making 
 military and naval preparations against Russia ', especi- 
 ally in the Gulf of Finland. 
 
 What we know for certain is that two telegrams to- 
 day passed from St. Petersburg to Berlin. One, from 
 M. Sazonof to the Russian Ambassador, has already been 
 noted (p. 136). The other was from the Tsar to the 
 Kaiser, 2 dispatched at 1.20 p.m. It begins : ' I thank 
 you from my heart for your quick reply ' and thus, it 
 would seem, ignores the second telegram of the previous 
 day (p. 125). ' The military measures now taking form ', 
 it proceeds, ' were decided upon five days ago, and for 
 the reason of defence against the preparations of Austria. 
 I hope with all my heart that these measures will not 
 influence in any manner your position as mediator, 
 which I appraise very highly. We need your strong 
 pressure upon Austria so that an understanding can be 
 arrived at with us.' The Tsar plainly wished to leave 
 the way open for a possible change of heart in his fellow 
 potentate, but had very little hope of it. 
 
 In Paris, President Poincare made to the British 
 Ambassador 3 a practically, though not literally, accurate 
 statement of the Russo-Austro- German situation of the 
 moment, leading up to an appeal for a declaration of 
 British solidarity with France, which is discussed in 
 Chapter XVIII. He declared incidentally that the 
 Government had reliable information that German 
 troops were concentrated round Thionville and Metz 
 ready for war. 
 
 1 Blue Book, No. 97. 2 German Book, No. 23a. 
 
 3 Blue Book, No. 99. 
 
THURSDAY, JULY 30 143 
 
 A much fuller statement of German military prepara- Paris, 
 tions, as contrasted with French, was to-day sent by 
 M. Viviani to M. Paul Cambon in London, 1 and was by 
 him conveyed, in a somewhat condensed form, to Sir 
 Edward Grey. Germany, he says, has made her cover- 
 ing dispositions a few hundred metres from the frontier, 
 all the way from Luxemburg to the Vosges ; France, 
 even to the prejudice of her plan of campaign, and against 
 the protests of local populations left undefended, has kept 
 her troops ten kilometres from the frontier. Germany 
 has rushed large numbers of troops from the interior to 
 the frontier ; France has done nothing of the kind. 
 The arming of positions (clearing of trees, placing of 
 batteries, &c.) was begun in Germany on the 25th ; it 
 is only to-day being taken in hand in France. German 
 reservists have been recalled by tens of thousands, and 
 the interior communications of Germany (railways, 
 roads, &c.) have been subjected to regulations which 
 mark ' the last stage before mobilization ' ; none of these 
 measures have been taken in France. ' England will see 
 from this ', says M. Viviani, ' that, if France is resolved, 
 it is not she who is taking aggressive steps/ 
 
 Sir Edward Grey to-day sends to Sir Edward Goschen London, 
 his answer 2 to the Imperial Chancellor's bid for British 
 neutrality. As it is one of the most momentous, and at 
 the same time most honourable, documents in British 
 history, the essential part of it must be quoted in full : 
 
 ' His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment 
 entertain the Chancellor's proposal that they should 
 bind themselves to neutrality on such terms. 
 
 What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by 
 while French colonies are taken and France is beaten, 
 so long as Germany does not take French territory as 
 distinct from the colonies. 
 
 From the material point of view such a proposal is 
 
 1 French Book, No. 106 ; Blue Book, No. 105, Enclosure 3. 
 
 2 Blue Book, No. 101. 
 
144 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 London. unacceptable, for France, without further territory 
 in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed 
 as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become 
 subordinate to German policy. 
 
 Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace 
 for us to make this bargain with Germany at the 
 expense of France, a disgrace from which the good 
 name of this country would never recover. 
 
 The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain 
 away whatever obligation or interest we have as 
 regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not 
 entertain that bargain either/ 
 
 Sir Edward then went on to reply to the Chancellor's 
 suggestion of a ' general neutrality agreement ' between 
 England and Germany, that the one way of maintaining 
 good relations between the two countries was that ' they 
 should continue to work together to preserve the peace 
 of Europe '. ' And I will say this ', he concluded : ' If 
 the peace of Europe can be preserved . . . my own endeavour 
 will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany 
 could be a party, by which she would be assured that no 
 aggressive or hostile policy should be pursued against 
 her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly 
 or separately. . . . The idea has hitherto been too Utopian 
 to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this 
 present crisis ... be safely passed, I am hopeful that the 
 relief and reaction which will follow may make possible 
 some more definite rapprochement between the Powers 
 than has been possible hitherto.' 
 
 The olive-branch was held out with a noble sincerity 
 which could not but have elicited some response from 
 a generous opponent. Germany was not asked to forgo 
 a victory for herself or her ally that was assured them 
 in the proposal that Austria should occupy the Serbian 
 capital, pending the mediation of the Powers. All she 
 was asked to do was to admit the intervention of the 
 common sense of Europe between Austria and her prey, 
 and for that small concession to reason she was offered 
 
THURSDAY, JULY 30 145 
 
 the active concurrence of England in establishing a new London, 
 era of peace and international comity. She rejected the 
 offer x : she trampled the olive-branch in mud and blood. 
 Why ? Because peace and comity were precisely what she 
 did not want ; because the element of truculence in her 
 mentality had taken the control of her actions, and the 
 voice of her world-ambition said ' Now or never ! ' 
 
 Meanwhile Prince Lichnowsky had conveyed to Sir 
 Edward Grey 2 that his Government ' would endeavour 
 to influence Austria, after taking Belgrade and Serbian 
 territory in region of frontier, to promise not to advance 
 further, while Powers endeavoured to arrange that Serbia 
 should give satisfaction sufficient to pacify Austria '. It 
 is characteristic that in the German Book 3 this proposal 
 is mentioned as follows : ' We even as late as the 3Oth 
 of July forwarded the English proposal to Vienna, as 
 basis for negotiations, that Austria should dictate her 
 conditions to Serbia, i.e. after her march into Serbia ' 
 nothing being said of mediation by the Powers. Rightly 
 or wrongly, however, Sir Edward Grey received the 
 impression from Prince Lichnowsky that Germany would 
 actually work for this proposal, and, in order to facilitate 
 it, he suggested a modification of M. Sazonof s wording 
 of the conditions on which Russia would stop her military 
 preparations (p. 129). He proposed that no mention 
 should be made of ' eliminating points in the Austrian 
 Ultimatum ', but that it should simply be stated that 
 ' the Powers would examine how Serbia could fully 
 satisfy Austria without impairing Serbian sovereign rights 
 or independence '. To this modification Sazonof gave 
 his consent. 4 Needless to say, it availed nothing. 
 
 M. Paul Cambon to-day recalled to Sir Edward Grey 
 letters which had passed between them in November 
 1912, to the effect that, though France and Britain were 
 under no obligation to lend each other military aid, yet 
 
 1 No notice was ever taken of it. 2 Blue Book, No. 103. 
 
 3 C.D.D., p. 410. 4 Russian Book, No. 67. 
 
 1852 K 
 
146 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 when either nation ' had grave reason to expect an 
 unprovoked attack by a third Power ', they should 
 ' immediately discuss what measures they were prepared 
 to take in common '. In other words, the two nations 
 declared : ' We do not pledge ourselves to intervene in 
 each other's quarrels, but should it in any case appear 
 in the east probable that we may wish to do so, we will 
 take measures betimes to render such intervention effec- 
 tive '. Copies of the letters embodying this under- 
 standing were now forwarded to the British Ambassador 
 in Paris. 1 
 
 Military Mr. Price 2 states that the order for partial mobiliza- 
 prepara- |j on appeared in all the Russian papers of to-day, and 
 adduces newspaper evidence to the effect that the decree 
 of general mobilization was issued late this evening. 
 This is quite consistent with Sazonof s statement (p. 137) 
 that von Jagow's rejection of his proposal to Pourtales 
 determined Russia to ' extend the scope of her pre- 
 cautionary measures '. He states, in the same passage, 
 that the news of von Jagow's refusal reached him simul- 
 taneously with the news of ' the proclamation of general 
 mobilization by Austria '. It seems pretty clear, however, 
 that Austria did not actually proclaim mobilization til 
 the 3ist, so we may assume that he was thinking oJ 
 Berchtold's statement to Schebeko that Austria woulc 
 have to ' extend ' her mobilization. 3 The telegrams 
 from Vienna and from Berlin would very probably 
 arrive about the same time. 
 
 As for Germany and France, there is every reason to 
 suppose that M. Viviani's statement (p. 143) is sub- 
 stantially accurate. 
 
 There are certain signs of relenting this morning 
 both in Vienna and in Berlin. We shall not be far wrong 
 
 1 Blue Book, No. 105. 2 Price, pp. 158, 171. 
 
 3 This conjecture is confirmed by Sir George Buchanan's 
 telegram of July 3ist, Blue Book, No. 113. 
 
THURSDAY, JULY 30 147 
 
 if we say that both Berchtold and Bethmann-Hollweg 
 showed a desire to seem to make concessions, whereas 
 formerly their desire had been to avoid even the appear- 
 ance of listening to reason. Berchtold, with very careful 
 reservations, agrees to the re-opening of the discussions 
 at St. Petersburg which he had broken off two days 
 ago. Bethmann-Hollweg drafts, and probably dispatches, 
 a telegram ordering Tschirscky to make a move in the 
 same direction. Von Jagow, on the other hand, is as 
 obstinately unhelpful as ever. He makes no response 
 to Sir Edward Grey's proposal that he should suggest 
 a formula for Four-Power mediation, and he abruptly 
 rejects the conditions on which Sazonof proposes to 
 suspend Russian mobilization. Thus, though the pre- 
 maturely-issued order for German mobilization is with- 
 drawn, it is clear that before evening the war party 
 have regained any ground they may have lost in the 
 morning. King George and Sir Edward Grey cling to 
 the hope of mediation after Austria shall have occupied 
 Belgrade, and Grey writes the historic dispatch in which 
 he refuses the bid for British neutrality, but offers to 
 work for a beneficent rapprochement between the two 
 groups of Powers if only this crisis can be tided over. 
 
 K 2 
 
CHAPTER XVI 
 
 DIARY OF EVENTS 
 
 Friday, July 31. 
 
 ' We worked for peace up to the last moment and beyond the 
 last moment.' SIR EDWARD GREY. 
 
 St. ALTHOUGH the bombardment of Belgrade had ' pro- 
 
 Peters- vo k e d very deep feeling ' in Russia, 1 M. Sazonof remained 
 true to his declared intention of continuing to negotiate 
 so long as a spark of hope was left. There were two pos- 
 sible means of escape from the deadlock : (i) action on the 
 basis of Sazonof 's own proposal to Pourtales (p. 129), as 
 amended by Grey ; (2) direct discussions with Szapary. 
 
 (i) Although von Jagow had declined even to let Austria 
 consider Sazonof's formula, Grey's amendment seemed 
 to open a renewed possibility, and Sazonof to-day z tele- 
 graphed his acceptance of it to the Russian Ambassadors 
 in the five great capitals. The formula would now run as 
 follows : 
 
 ' If Austria consents to stay the march of her troops 
 on Serbian territory, and if, recognizing that the Austro- 
 Serbian conflict has assunled the character of a question 
 of European interest, she admits that the Great Powers 
 may examine the satisfaction which Serbia can accord 
 to the Austro-Hungarian Government, without injury to 
 her sovereign rights as a State and to her independence, 
 Russia undertakes to preserve her waiting attitude/ 
 
 To Sir George Buchanan M. Sazonof said 3 that he 
 hoped the suggested ' examination ' by the Powers might 
 take place in London. But the formula was never even 
 
 1 French Book, No. 113. 2 Russian Book, No. 67. 
 
 3 Blue Book, No. 120. 
 
FRIDAY, JULY 31 149 
 
 considered in Berlin or Vienna. It was in very truth st 
 ' outstripped by the march of events '. 
 
 (2) For a moment, there seemed to be more hope in 
 the Sazonof-Szapary conversations. M. Sazonof himself 
 reported to-day's development in the following terms : l 
 
 ' The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador declared the 
 readiness of his Government to discuss the substance of 
 the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. M. Sazonof replied 
 by expressing his satisfaction, and said it was desirable 
 that the discussions should take place in London with 
 the participation of the Great Powers. 
 
 M. Sazonof hoped that the British Government 
 would assume the direction of these discussions. The 
 whole of Europe would be thankful to them. It would 
 be very important that Austria should meanwhile put 
 a stop provisionally to her military action on Serbian 
 territory/ 
 
 The two points to be noticed about this are, first, that, 
 in suggesting the transference of the discussions to London, 
 M. Sazonof appears to have aimed at merging this line 
 of action with that arising out of the amended formula ; 
 second, that he does not seem to make the suspension of 
 hostilities an absolute sine qua non. As to the proposed 
 change of the venue to London, Szapary said that he 
 would consult headquarters. 
 
 From M. Sazonof 's account of his conversation with 
 Szapary, given next day to the French and British 
 Ambassadors, 2 it appears that Szapary obeyed his instruc- 
 tions by trying to deflect the discussion from Serbia to 
 Austro-Russian relations at large. Sazonof replied that 
 this was ' a waste of time '. Austro-Russian relations 
 in general were ' perfectly satisfactory ' ; but the question 
 was ' whether Austria was to crush Serbia and reduce her 
 to the status of a vassal '. He added that ' discussion 
 was being made impossible by the action of Austria in 
 subjecting Belgrade, a virtually unfortified town, to bom- 
 bardment '. 
 
 1 Blue Book, No. 133. 2 Blue Book, No. 139. 
 
150 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 St. It is not easy to determine how far Austria really 
 
 ^tended to go in the direction of submitting the terms 
 of her Ultimatum to discussion. M. Sazonof says above 
 that she is willing to discuss ' the substance '. M. Viviani 
 and M. Jules Cambon l use the term ' basis ' (' even as to 
 its basis ') the French word being fond. But Count 
 Szapary, in a dispatch to Berchtold, 2 says that what he 
 offered was ' to subject the text of our Note to discussion 
 in so far as related to its interpretation ' which would 
 mean that Austria was not willing to waive or to modify 
 any requirement of her Ultimatum, but only to explain 
 away the more inacceptable points. As this was the 
 utmost length that his instructions (p. 140) permitted him 
 to go, it is probable that Szapary meant nothing more. 3 
 We frequently find that Austrian diplomatists appear 
 to their interlocutors to say more than they themselves 
 are afterwards willing to admit they did. Count Berch- 
 told to-day begged M. Schebeko to remove in St. Peters- 
 burg the impression that Austria had ' banged the door ' 
 on further conversations, and Count Mensdorff drew Sir 
 Edward Grey's special attention to this fact. 4 There is no 
 doubt that Vienna wished at this point to wear an appear- 
 ance of great reasonableness ; and Austrian statesmen 
 perhaps sincerely desired to dissociate themselves from 
 
 1 French Book, Nos. 120 and 121. 
 
 2 Austrian Book, No. 56. This dispatch is dated August ist, 
 but either that date is wrong, or the first words of the telegram 
 should run : ' I visited M. Sazonof yesterday.' 
 
 3 M. Schebeko told Sir Maurice de Bunsen on Saturday that 
 ' Count Szapary had at last conceded the main point at issue by 
 announcing to M. Sazonof that Austria would consent to submit 
 to mediation the points in the Note to Serbia which seemed 
 incompatible with the maintenance of Serbian independence. 
 M. Sazonof, M. Schebeko added, ' had accepted this proposal on 
 condition that Austria would refrain from the actual invasion of 
 Serbia. Austria, in fact, had finally yielded.' (Blue Book, 
 No. 1 6 1.) This is a decidedly roseate view of the Austrian frame 
 of mind much more so than the documents warrant. 
 
 4 Blue Book, No. 137. 
 
FRIDAY, JULY 31 151 
 
 the headlong war policy of Germany, holding that their st. 
 ends might still be gained by the skilful ' playing ' of Peters- 
 Russia. But it is very doubtful whether Austria ever 
 had the slightest intention of making any real conces- 
 sion. 
 
 Russia to-day ordered general mobilization. M. Paleo- 
 logue 1 calls it ' a result of the general mobilization of Austria, 
 and of the measures for mobilization taken secretly, but 
 continuously, by Germany for the last six days '. A like 
 account of the matter is given by Sir George Buchanan. 2 
 In point of fact, the two decrees seem to have been issued 
 almost simultaneously in the small hours of the Friday 
 morning. 
 
 About two in the afternoon, a telegram from the Tsar 
 to the Kaiser crossed one from the Kaiser to the Tsar. 3 
 They are not important. The Tsar, who is still ' your 
 cordially devoted Nicholas ', says that it is ' technically 
 impossible to discontinue our military preparations ', but 
 declares that so long as negotiations continue ' his troops 
 will undertake no provocative action '. 4 'I hope ', he con- 
 cludes, ' for the success of your mediation in Vienna.' 
 The Kaiser's telegram is simply a repetition of the com- 
 plaint that Russian mobilization has made his mediation 
 ' almost illusory '. Nevertheless he has ' gone to the 
 extreme limit of the possible in his efforts for the pre- 
 servation of the peace of the world '. He disclaims all 
 responsibility for ' the misfortune which now threatens 
 the entire civilized world ', and upbraids the Tsar with 
 ingratitude for past friendship, especially in times when 
 Russia was ' in serious affliction '. 
 
 1 French Book, No. 118. 
 
 2 Blue Book, No. 113. 
 
 3 German Book, C.D.D., p. 411. 
 
 4 There is here a bad mistranslation. The Tsar is made to 
 say, ' As long as the negotiations between Austria and Serbia 
 continue,' which is nonsense. What he really said was, ' As long 
 as the negotiations with Austria on the subject of Serbia continue.' 
 
152 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 Vienna. The French Ambassador x reports that ' general mobili- 
 zation for all men from 19 to 42 years of age was declared 
 this morning at one o'clock '. 
 
 The Austrian deliverances of to-day are for the most 
 part mere repetitions of the old phrases no hostility to 
 Russia, no designs upon Serbian integrity or independence, 
 mobilization in Galicia purely defensive, and so forth. 2 
 ' The pourparlers between the Cabinets at Vienna and 
 St. Petersburg are being continued, and from these we 
 hope that things will quieten down all round/ The only 
 document of importance is an account by Berchtold 3 of a 
 conversation between himself and von Tschirscky, who 
 ' yesterday, in accordance with instructions/ told him of 
 Sir Edward Grey's conversation with Prince Lichnowsky 
 on the 29th (p. 120) and of Sir Edward's strong advocacy 
 of mediation a quatre. The precise form in which he put 
 the proposal does not appear, but it is evident from 
 Berchtold's reply that Tschirscky paid no attention to 
 Bethmann-Hollweg's pet principle that there could be no 
 question of mediation between Austria and Serbia, but 
 only between Austria and Russia. The reply was : ' We 
 are quite prepared to entertain the proposal of Sir E. Grey 
 to negotiate between us and Serbia. The conditions of 
 our acceptance are, nevertheless, that our military action 
 against Serbia shall continue to take its course, and that 
 the English Cabinet shall move the Russian Government 
 to bring to a standstill the Russian mobilization which is 
 directed against us/ In other words : We are willing to 
 let you talk to us while we crush Serbia, on condition 
 that Russia renounces all idea of forcible interference on 
 her behalf. Or, more briefly : You can mediate as much 
 as you please, so long as we have everything our own 
 way. Count Berchtold, for all his disclaimers of ' door- 
 banging ' and his desire to appear reasonable, certainly 
 
 1 French Book, No. 115. 
 
 2 Austrian Book, No. 53 ; Blue Book, No. 118. 
 8 Austrian Book, No. 51. 
 
FRIDAY, JULY 31 153 
 
 did not carry the spirit of accommodation to extravagant Vienna, 
 lengths. 
 
 Unofficial accounts of Russia's general mobilization Berlin, 
 reached Berlin early in the day. 1 Sir Edward Goschen 
 called upon the Chancellor in the morning 2 to deliver the 
 British reply to the ' bid ' of Wednesday night, but found 
 him so much taken up with the Russian news that he could 
 not give his mind to it, and asked Sir Edward to leave him 
 a written memorandum of its contents. He complained 
 bitterly of the way in which ' his efforts to preach peace 
 and moderation at Vienna ' had been ' handicapped ' by 
 Russian military measures, and of the conduct of the Tsar 
 in mobilizing just when the Emperor, at his request, was 
 actually engaged in mediation. He was at that moment 
 going to have an audience with His Majesty. 
 
 A few hours later, the Chancellor again saw Sir Edward 
 Goschen. 3 Official news had now been received of the 
 mobilization of the Russian army and fleet. Kriegs- 
 gefahrzustand (a state of danger of war) would at once be 
 declared in Germany, and its natural sequel, mobilization, 
 could not long be delayed. ' The news from St. Petersburg 
 seemed to him to put an end to all hope of a peaceful 
 solution of the crisis.' 
 
 He did not tell Goschen that Germany had already sent, 
 or was on the point of sending, what was practically an 
 ultimatum to Russia, and something very like an ultima- 
 tum to France. Pourtales was instructed 4 to announce to 
 Sazonof the proclamation of Kriegsgefahrzustand and 
 to add : 
 
 ' Mobilization is bound to follow if Russia does not 
 stop every measure of war against us and against 
 Austria within 12 hours and notify us definitely to this 
 effect.' 
 
 1 Russian Book, No. 68. 2 Blue Book, Nos. 108 and 109. 
 
 3 Blue Book, No. 112. * German Book, No. 24. 
 
154 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 Berlin. Von Schoen, in Paris, 1 was to inform the French Govern- 
 ment of this step, and to ask ' whether it intends to remain 
 neutral in a Russo-German War. Reply must be made 
 in 1 8 hours '. 
 
 In the afternoon, Goschen called upon von Jagow 2 to 
 convey to him fresh proposals from Grey, to be hereafter 
 recorded (p. 157). It was then that he learned of the 
 ultimatum to Russia. Why, he asked, had Germany 
 demanded demobilization in the south as well, thus 
 making it ' even more difficult ' for Russia to comply ? 
 Von Jagow answered that it was ' to prevent Russia 
 from saying that all her mobilization was only directed 
 against Austria '. According to von Jagow, both the 
 Emperor and the Foreign Office had been working hard 
 for peace, ' and telegraphic and telephonic communi- 
 cations from Vienna had been of a promising nature 
 but Russia's mobilization had spoilt everything/ It 
 did not seem to strike him that, on his own showing, 
 Russia's mobilization in the south had not led Austria 
 to break off negotiations and send an ultimatum. 
 From the first, indeed, Austria was much less excited 
 than Germany about Russia's military measures. There 
 is nothing to indicate that the mobilization of the 
 southern provinces did in fact ' undermine ' the Kaiser's 
 position as mediator. On the contrary, as we have seen, 
 Austria had for two days past been adopting a compara- 
 tively conciliatory tone 3 at the very time when the 
 Kaiser was protesting that Russia's military preparations 
 were rendering her deaf to his blandishments. 
 
 Late in the day Sir Edward Goschen paid a second visit 
 to Herr von Jagow, the result of which we shall have to 
 
 1 German Book, No. 25 ; French Book, No. 116. 
 
 2 Blue Book, No. 121. 
 
 3 The Austrian Ambassador in Paris to-day stated to M. 
 Viviani that Austria ' was ready to discuss the grounds of her 
 grievance against Serbia with the other Powers '. Russian Book, 
 No. 73. 
 
FRIDAY, JULY 31 155 
 
 chronicle when the question of Belgium comes into the Berlin, 
 foreground (p. 159). 
 
 Viviani's circular dispatch l of this morning to the Paris. 
 French Ambassadors signifies his adhesion to Grey's 
 amendment of Sazonof s formula, and urges Russia to 
 agree to it of course on the understanding that Austria 
 stops her advance after the occupation of Belgrade and 
 surrounding districts, and evacuates the occupied terri- 
 tory as soon as she has received satisfaction. In a second 
 circular dispatch he announces Sazonof s acceptance of 
 Grey's amendment, and then gives the following admirable 
 summary of the whole situation : 
 
 ' Nevertheless, the constant attitude of Germany 
 who, since the beginning of the conflict, while cease- 
 lessly protesting to each Power her peaceful intentions, 
 has actually, by her dilatory or negative attitude, 
 caused the failure of all attempts at agreement, and 
 has not ceased to encourage through her Ambassador 
 the uncompromising attitude of Vienna ; the German 
 military preparations begun since the 25th July and 
 subsequently continued without cessation ; the im- 
 mediate opposition of Germany to the Russian formula, 
 declared at Berlin unacceptable for Austria before that 
 Power had even been consulted ; in conclusion, all 
 the impressions derived from Berlin bring conviction 
 that Germany has sought to humiliate Russia, to dis- 
 integrate the Triple Entente, and, if these results could 
 not be obtained, to make war/ 
 
 At seven in the evening Herr von Schoen informs 
 M. Viviani 2 of the declaration of Kriegsgefahrzustand, and 
 the demand for Russian demobilization, and announces 
 that he will call at one o'clock the next day (that is, 
 eighteen hours later), to learn ' what the attitude of 
 France would be in case of a war between Germany and 
 Russia '. 3 Viviani tells Paleologue that he does not 
 
 1 French Book, Nos. ii2andii4. 2 French Book, No. 117. 
 3 That he had no doubt as to what France would reply was 
 
156 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 Paris. propose to reply to this question, as ' the Republic need 
 not give any account of her intentions, except to her ally '. 
 
 An autograph letter from President Poincare 1 was this 
 evening delivered to King George. It briefly surveyed 
 the situation, and expressed the conviction that there was 
 still a chance of peace ' if Germany were convinced that 
 the entente cordiale would be affirmed, in case of need, 
 even to the extent of taking the field side by side '. ' Our 
 military and naval arrangements ', said the President, 
 ' leave complete liberty to your Majesty's Government. 
 . . . But the character of close friendship which public feel- 
 ing has given in both countries to the entente . . . and the 
 signs of sympathy which your Majesty has ever shown to 
 France, justify me in informing you quite frankly of my 
 impressions, which are those of the Government of the 
 Republic, and of all France. It is, I consider, on the 
 language and the action of the British Government that 
 henceforward the last chances of a peaceful settlement 
 depend.' 
 
 King George's reply, 2 delivered the following day, 
 faithfully reflected, as it was bound to do, the view of 
 his Government. He is still working for peace ; and 
 ' as to the attitude of my country ', he says, ' events are 
 changing so rapidly that it is difficult to forecast future 
 developments '. 
 
 The French Government naturally makes other endea- 
 vours to assure itself as to England's attitude, 3 while 
 England seeks assurances as to Belgian neutrality. Both 
 points will be dealt with in the following section. 
 
 London. Sir Edward Grey's first telegram of this morning (to 
 Sir George Buchanan) 4 is written in ignorance of the 
 general mobilizations of Austria and Russia. He expresses 
 
 proved by the fact that on this occasion he already, to all intents 
 and purposes, ' asked for his passports.' French Book, No. 120. 
 
 1 C.D.D., p. 542. 2 C.D.D., p. 544. 
 
 3 Blue Book, No. 124. 4 Blue Book, No. no. 
 
FRIDAY, JULY 31 157 
 
 satisfaction at the resumption of discussions between London. 
 Russia and Austria, and says he has told Prince Lich- 
 nowsky that he does not see how Russia can be urged to 
 suspend military preparations unless Austria will put 
 some limit to her advance in Serbia. 
 
 Next comes a telegram to Sir Edward Goschen in Berlin, 1 
 embodying two separate proposals, either of which might 
 have saved the situation if Germany had been willing to 
 give a moment's attention to them. 
 
 The first is a suggestion for the basis of Four-Power 
 mediation : to wit, that if all Powers would suspend 
 further military operations or preparations, the four less 
 interested Powers should promise Austria that they would 
 obtain full satisfaction of her demands on Serbia, which 
 do not, as she has declared, involve any infringement of 
 integrity or sovereignty, while they should at the same 
 time promise Russia that they would see that Serbian 
 integrity and sovereignty should be respected. If there 
 was any sincerity in Austro-German professions, it is hard 
 to see what objection could have been raised to this 
 proposal. 
 
 But Sir Edward evidently doubted (quite justly) 
 whether Germany was in any mood to give it fair con- 
 sideration. So, as a last resource, he made to Prince 
 Lichnowsky an offer of extraordinary daring. He com- 
 municates it to Goschen in these terms : 
 
 ' I said to German Ambassador this morning that 
 if Germany could get any reasonable proposal put 
 forward which made it clear that Germany and Austria 
 were striving to preserve European peace, and that 
 Russia and France would be unreasonable if they 
 rejected it, I would support it at St. Petersburg and 
 Paris, and go the length of saying that if Russia and 
 France would not accept it His Majesty's Government 
 would have nothing more to do with the consequences ; 
 but, otherwise, I told German Ambassador that if 
 France became involved we should be drawn in.' 
 
 1 Blue Book, No. in. 
 
158 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 London. It is not too much to say that Sir Edward Grey took 
 his political life in his hands in making this offer. Had 
 Germany taken him at his word, had he found her pro- 
 posals reasonable, and had Russia and France dissented, 
 it would have meant the break-up of the Triple Entente, 
 and very likely the break-up of the Liberal Government ; 
 for there would assuredly have been a strong party in 
 England which would have denounced Sir Edward Grey's 
 conduct as a base betrayal. He no doubt felt that he 
 could rely on M. Sazonof s acquiescence in any reasonable 
 proposal ; but, in view of the exasperated state of public 
 feeling, was it certain that M. Sazonof would be able to 
 carry Russia with him ? Any misunderstanding might have 
 been disastrous to Sir Edward's own political fortunes and 
 those of his associates. He took the risk for the sake of 
 peace : what Minister could have done more ? We shall 
 find him to-morrow pressed to formulate the conditions 
 on which Britain would remain neutral ; and he is some- 
 times blamed for not having done so. But here he had 
 done so in advance. Britain would remain neutral on 
 the very simple condition that Germany should put 
 forward a reasonable proposal, showing herself sincerely 
 anxious for the preservation of peace. 
 
 But Germany was by this time rushing full speed into 
 war, and nothing could stay her career. 
 
 After a Cabinet Council held this morning, Sir Edward 
 Grey saw M. Paul Cambon, who pressed once more for 
 a definite promise of British support for France, 1 on the 
 ground that the uncertainty as to whether we should 
 intervene ' was the encouraging element in Berlin '. Sir 
 Edward replied that Germany no longer trusted to our 
 neutrality ; that he had this morning warned Lichnowsky 
 of the probability of our being drawn in ; but that the 
 Cabinet was not as yet prepared to give any pledge to 
 France. ' Up to the present moment, we did not feel, 
 and public opinion did not feel, that any treaties or 
 1 French Book, No. no ; Blue Book, No. 119. 
 
FRIDAY, JULY 31 159 
 
 obligations of this country were involved.' He then went London, 
 on to say that ' the neutrality of Belgium might be, he 
 would not say a decisive, but an important factor in 
 determining our attitude '. 
 
 As soon, in fact, as it was known that German mobili- 
 zation was imminent, the question of Belgium became 
 a cardinal issue, and Sir Edward Grey took steps accord- 
 ingly. He addressed to both the French and the German 
 Government a formal inquiry l whether each would 
 ' engage to respect the neutrality of Belgium so long as 
 no other Power violated it ' ; and he instructed the British 
 Minister at Brussels to inform the Belgian Government 
 that these inquiries were being made, and to add that 
 ' he assumed that the Belgian Government would maintain 
 their neutrality to the utmost of their power '. The 
 answers to these inquiries were (i) a prompt declaration 
 in the affirmative by France ; 2 (2) a refusal by Germany 
 to reply, on the ground that to do so ' could not but dis- 
 close a certain amount of her plan of campaign ' ; 3 
 (3) a statement by Belgium that she ' expects and desires 
 that other Powers will observe and uphold her neutrality, 
 which she intends to maintain to the utmost of her 
 power '. 4 
 
 The mobilization of the Belgian Army was this morning Brussels, 
 decreed, to take effect on the following day. 5 
 
 The French Minister spontaneously assured the Belgian 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Davignon, that his Govern- 
 ment would respect the neutrality of Belgium. 6 
 
 The Secretary-General of the Department of Foreign 
 Affairs had an interview 7 with the German Minister, Herr 
 von Below, in which he explained that mobilization merely 
 showed the desire of Belgium to fulfil her international 
 
 1 Blue Book, No. 114. 2 Blue Book, No. 125. 
 
 3 Blue Book, No. 122. 4 Blue Book, No. 128. 
 
 5 Belgian Book, No. 10. 6 French Book, No. 119. 
 7 Belgian Book, No. 12. 
 
160 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 Brussels, obligations, and implied no distrust of her neighbours. 
 The Secretary also reminded the Minister that in 1911 
 Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg had privately given the 
 Belgian Government assurances that their neutrality was 
 in no danger from Germany, and that in 1913 Herr von 
 Jagow had publicly repeated these assurances. 1 Herr 
 von Below replied that he knew of the Chancellor's 
 utterances ' and was certain that the sentiments expressed 
 at that time had not changed '. 
 
 Military As a jj mobilizations except that of Britain are now 
 tions*' either officially announced or on the eve of announcement, 
 details are no longer important. It may be noted, how- 
 ever, that the Paris correspondent of the Times to-day 
 states that it has been decided at a Cabinet Council to 
 bring the French ' covering troops ' up from a peace to 
 a war footing thus confirming the statement that there 
 had previously been no approach to mobilization. He 
 also confirms M. Viviani's declaration of the previous day 
 that the French troops are being kept at a distance of 
 10 kilometres from the frontier. As for Germany, the 
 distinction between Kriegsgefahrzustand and mobilization 
 is admittedly a technical one, and it matters very little 
 whether it was strictly observed or not. The only point 
 
 1 In the Budget Committee of the Reichstag on April 29th, 
 1913, Herr von Jagow, in answer to a question, said : ' Belgian 
 neutrality is provided for by International Conventions, and 
 Germany is determined to respect those Conventions.' In 
 answer to further questions he reiterated this declaration. 
 Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, quoted in Belgian Book, 
 No. 12. The Chancellor had objected to making a public declara- 
 tion on the ground that it ' would weaken Germany's military 
 position in regard to France, who, secure on her northern side, 
 would concentrate all her energies on the east '. Mr. Headlam 
 (p. 359) has some excellent remarks on the Chancellor's attitude, 
 which already showed that Germany's respect for her plighted 
 word was subordinate to considerations of military convenience. 
 Von Jagow 's subsequent plunge into public mendacity was 
 forced upon him by the pestilent Social Democrats. 
 
FRIDAY, JULY 31 161 
 
 of any real interest is to determine how far Germany had 
 covertly advanced towards mobilization during the earlier 
 days of the week. 
 
 Even before it is known that Germany has sent an Sum- 
 Ultimatum to Russia, the hopes of peace have dwindled mar y- 
 almost to nothing. Nevertheless M. Sazonof is still 
 willing to follow either of two lines of conciliation which 
 are not yet absolutely blocked ; while Sir Edward Grey 
 puts forward an old proposal in a new shape, and at the 
 same time makes an offer to Germany which shows that 
 there is nothing he will not dare in order to save the last 
 glimmer of hope from extinction. Austria, meanwhile, is 
 still professing willingness to negotiate, though it does 
 not appear that she has any intention of abating a jot 
 of her demands. Germany, seized with real or pretended 
 panic at the news of Russia's general mobilization, sends 
 an Ultimatum to St. Petersburg, and demands from France 
 a statement of her intentions. As soon as Germany's 
 mobilization is seen to be imminent, Sir Edward Grey 
 requests from both Germany and France an assurance 
 that Belgian neutrality will be respected. France gives 
 the assurance without a moment's hesitation ; Germany, 
 in a very ominous way, declines to reveal her intentions 
 in the matter. Meanwhile, Belgium calls attention to 
 recent German disclaimers of any designs upon her 
 neutrality but at the same time prepares to defend it. 
 
 1852 
 
CHAPTER XVII 
 DIARY OF EVENTS 
 Saturday, August i 
 
 ' The most conscientious statesmanship in Europe toiled 
 breathlessly in the rear of the racing engines of war/ The 
 Nation. 
 
 St. AT midnight on July 3ist, Count Pourtales delivered 
 
 Peters- to M. Sazonof the Ultimatum requiring demobilization 
 within twelve hours. Russia made no answer. 1 
 
 At 3.30 a.m. King George addressed to the Tsar a 
 telegram 2 in which he quoted a long statement from 
 Berlin, asserting the pacific intentions and efforts of 
 Germany, and complaining of their being thwarted by 
 Russian mobilization. The chief interest of this state- 
 ment lies in the following lines : 
 
 ' The proposals made by the German Government 
 in Vienna were conceived entirely on the lines sug- 
 gested by Great Britain, and the German Government 
 recommended them in Vienna for their serious con- 
 sideration. They were taken into consideration in Vienna 
 this [Friday] morning. During the deliberations of 
 the [? Austrian] Cabinet, and before they were con- 
 cluded, the German Ambassador in St. Petersburg 
 reported the mobilization of the entire Russian army 
 and fleet.' 
 
 This is very significant. It shows that the most 
 important step which Germany can claim to have taken 
 at Vienna the step on which she stakes her credit as 
 a peacemaker was von Tschirscky's communication to 
 Berchtold, on Thursday the 3oth, of Grey's proposal to 
 Lichnowsky, made on the previous day (pp. 120, 152). 
 
 1 German Book, C.D.D., p. 412. 2 C.D.D., p. 536. 
 
SATURDAY, AUGUST i 163 
 
 It is clear from Count Berchtold's account 1 that von t 
 Tschirscky did no more than literally obey his instruc- Peters- 
 tions in communicating the fact that such a proposal burg * 
 had been made. Of any pressure for its acceptance 
 there is not the slightest trace. And this is the best 
 that Germany has to show for all her protestations of 
 pacific activity ! 
 
 Having quoted the German statement, King George 
 goes on to say that he thinks some misunderstanding 
 must have led to this deadlock; and he appeals to the 
 Tsar to try to remove it. The Tsar's reply we shall see 
 in due course (p. 165). 
 
 At midday Germany's time-limit expired. At 2 p.m. 
 the Tsar addressed a telegram to the Kaiser, 2 saying : 
 
 ' I comprehend that You are forced to mobilize, 
 but I should like to have from You the same guarantee 
 which I have given You, viz. that these measures do 
 not mean war, and that we shall continue to negotiate 
 for the welfare of our two countries and the universal 
 peace which is so dear to our hearts.' 
 
 To this the Kaiser replied : 
 
 ' I thank You for Your telegram. I have shown 
 yesterday to Your Government the way through 
 which alone war may yet be averted. . . . An immediate, 
 clear, and unmistakable reply of Your Government is 
 the sole way to avoid endless misery. . . .' 
 
 ' On the same afternoon ', says the German Book, 3 
 'Russian troops crossed our frontier and marched into 
 German territory. Thus Russia began the war against us/ 
 
 We have already noticed the remarkable circumstance 
 that, according to German accounts, it is always the 
 nation which is comparatively unready, and to which 
 every hour of delay is precious, that commits the first 
 act of war. It was Serbia that attacked Austria ; it is 
 Russia that here attacks Germany ; and we shall presently 
 
 1 Austrian Book, No. 51. 2 German Book, C.D.D., p. 413. 
 
 3 Ibid. 
 L2 
 
164 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 St. find France accused of committing a similar act of mad- 
 
 Peters- ness. Can there be any doubt that these assertions are 
 simply an obligatory part of the German ceremonial of 
 war-making ? It may conceivably be true, as a matter 
 of fact, that some Russians crossed the German frontier. 
 Such an incident easily happens. M. Viviani stated on 
 Thursday the 30th that ' on two occasions yesterday 
 German patrols penetrated our [French] territory ' ; 1 and 
 as he was not declaring war, nor seeking a pretext for 
 doing so, we can easily believe his assertion. 2 When 
 hundreds of thousands of men are nervously on the 
 alert, it is doubtless difficult to prevent some of them 
 from straying out of bounds. But it is wholly incredible 
 that the Russian trespass of to-day, if it ever took place, 
 was anything but a local error, for which, on due remon- 
 strance, apology would at once have been made. Ger- 
 many's one possible excuse for cutting short all negotia- 
 tions was that Russia's desire to continue them might 
 be merely a device to gain time for her admittedly slow 
 mobilization ; yet she deprives herself of that excuse by 
 affecting to throw upon Russia the responsibility for the 
 first breach of the peace ! It is hard to understand 
 why serious statesmen should think it worth while to 
 put forward these wholly undeceptive pretexts. 
 
 And yet, who knows ? Perhaps they serve their 
 purpose by deceiving Germans. 
 
 At ten minutes past seven this evening, Pourtales 
 delivered the Declaration of War, in the form of a state- 
 paper of some length. 3 One little fact makes it apparent 
 that it must have been drafted in Berlin before the 
 expiry of the time-limit at midday, and consequently 
 could have had nothing to do with the alleged frontier 
 incident of the afternoon. It had been drafted to meet 
 
 1 French Book, No. 106. 
 
 2 Bethmann-Hollweg, in his Reichstag speech of August 4th, 
 admitted one violation of French territory. 
 
 3 Russian Book, No. 76. 
 
SATURDAY, AUGUST i 165 
 
 two contingencies : either a refusal to demobilize or St. 
 a failure to reply ; and, by an oversight, both the alter- P eters - 
 native forms appeared in the document as delivered. 
 It of course began with the usual affirmation of Germany's 
 desire for peace. Then it proceeded : 
 
 ' In compliance with a wish expressed by his Majesty 
 the Emperor of Russia, the German Emperor had 
 undertaken, in concert with Great Britain, the part 
 of mediator between the Cabinets of Vienna and 
 St. Petersburg; but Russia, without waiting for any 
 result, proceeded to a general mobilization of her forces 
 both on land and sea.' 
 
 It would have been wiser to have omitted the italicized 
 phrase, since we might then have imagined the Emperor 
 personally making heroic efforts to bring Austria to 
 reason, in missives at once too august and too con- 
 fidential to be given to the world. But the words itali- 
 cized rule out any such fantasies. The reference is 
 evidently to measures taken through the ordinary diplo- 
 matic channels; and we know exactly how much the 
 German Government did ' in concert with Great Britain '. 
 
 In the evening the Tsar replied to King George's 
 telegram : l 
 
 ' I would gladly have accepted your proposals had 
 not the German Ambassador this afternoon presented 
 a note to my Government, declaring war. . . . Every 
 proposal, including that of your Government, was 
 rejected by Germany and Austria, and it was only 
 when the favourable moment for bringing pressure 
 to bear on Austria had passed that Germany showed 
 any disposition to mediate. Even then she did not put 
 forward any precise proposal. Austria's declaration 
 of war on Serbia forced me to order a partial mobiliza- 
 tion, though, in view of the threatening situation, my 
 military advisers strongly advised a general mobiliza- 
 tion, owing to the quickness with which Germany can 
 mobilize in comparison with Russia. I was eventually 
 
 1 C.D.D., p. 537. 
 
166 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 St. compelled to take this course in consequence of corn- 
 
 Peters- plete Austrian mobilization, of the bombardment of 
 burg. Belgrade, of concentration of Austrian troops in Galicia, 
 
 and of secret military preparations being made by 
 Germany. That I was justified in doing so is proved 
 by Germany's sudden declaration of war, which was 
 quite unexpected by me, as I have given most cate- 
 gorical assurances to the Emperor William that my 
 troops would not move so long as mediation negotia- 
 tions continued.' 
 
 It seemed worth while to quote almost at length 
 this most lucid and statesmanlike summary of the 
 situation. 
 
 True to his promise of negotiating to the very last, 
 M. Sazonof this morning told the French and British 
 Ambassadors 1 that the amended formula (p. 148) had 
 been forwarded by the Russian Government to Vienna, 
 ' and he would adhere to it if you [Grey] could obtain 
 its acceptance before the frontier was crossed by German 
 troops. In no case would Russia begin hostilities.' 
 He also delivered a little epilogue to the drama of the 
 past ten days : 
 
 ' The policy of Austria had throughout been both 
 tortuous and immoral. . . . Similarly the policy of 
 Germany had been equivocal and double-faced. . . . 
 Germany was unfortunate in her representatives in 
 Vienna and St. Petersburg : the former was a violent 
 Russophobe, who had urged Austria on; the latter 
 had reported to his Government that Russia would 
 never go to war. He was completely weary of the 
 ceaseless endeavours he had made to avoid a war. 
 No suggestion held out to Him had been refused.' 
 
 This was the literal truth. He had throughout dis- 
 played a genuinely conciliatory spirit, complete straight- 
 forwardness and admirable patience. One parts from 
 him. on the brink of the catastrophe, with sincere respect. 
 
 1 Blue Book, No. 139. 
 
 
SATURDAY, AUGUST i 167 
 
 From Vienna we have nothing to-day except a report Vienna, 
 from Sir Maurice de Bunsen x of the fluttering agitation 
 in the diplomatic dovecot under the imminent thunder- 
 cloud. ' The Russian Ambassador . . . says that the 
 so-called mobilization of Russia amounted to nothing 
 more than that Russia had taken military measures 
 corresponding to those taken by Germany. . . . Russia 
 would, according to the Russian Ambassador, be satisfied 
 even now with assurance respecting Serbian integrity 
 and independence/ In this last sentence, ' assurance ' 
 must evidently mean something quite different from 
 * assurances '. The air had been full for a week past 
 of assurances as to Serbian integrity and independence. 
 M. Schebeko must have meant that if Russia could be 
 assured of the reality of Serbian independence, she would 
 rest content. 
 
 The mobilization of the entire army and navy was Berlin, 
 ordered at 5 p.m. 2 
 
 Goschen had to-day an interview with von Jagow, 3 
 in which he asked why, when Austria and Russia were 
 ready to discuss matters, Germany, if she sincerely 
 desired peace, could not have held her hand. Von 
 Jagow went over the old story of Russia's mobilization, 
 and added : 
 
 ' Russia had said that her mobilization did not 
 necessarily imply war, and that she could perfectly 
 well remain mobilized for months without making 
 war. This was not the case with Germany. She had 
 the speed, and Russia had the numbers, and the safety 
 of the German Empire forbade that Germany should 
 allow Russia time to bring up masses of troops from 
 all parts of her wide dominions.' 
 
 There would be some force in this observation had 
 it been a question of waiting for weeks or months ; but 
 if there was any sincerity in Austria's willingness to 
 
 1 Blue Book, No. 141. 2 German Book, C.D.D., p. 413. 
 
 3 Blue Book, No. 138. 
 
168 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 Berlin, negotiate, a few hours might have secured a suspension 
 of mobilization, and a few days might perfectly well 
 have sufficed to lay down the lines of a peaceful solution, 
 and so to permit of a general demobilization. Of course 
 if Germany knew that the negotiations were bound to 
 be fruitless, it is clear that, in letting them drag on, she 
 would be sacrificing an advantage. But if she was sure 
 that Austria would not consent to any solution that 
 Russia could possibly accept, what are we to think of 
 the sincerity of her alleged efforts at conciliation ? 
 
 A misunderstanding which arose to-day with regard 
 to a supposed offer by England to secure French neutrality 
 may best be dealt with under the heading of LONDON. 
 
 Paris. Orders were given at 3.40 this afternoon for a general 
 mobilization of the French army. The decree was 
 accompanied by a proclamation signed by the President 
 and all the Ministers, explaining that mobilization is 
 not war, and that ' in the present state of affairs, it is 
 the best means for France of safeguarding peace '. 1 
 
 Herr von Schoen called on M. Viviani at eleven o'clock, 2 
 two hours before the expiry of the time-limit. M. Viviani 
 expressed to him his astonishment at the action of 
 Germany in presenting an ultimatum to Russia just 
 when a peaceful settlement seemed to be in sight, and 
 just when Russia had accepted ' the English formula ' 
 (more properly Sazonof 's own formula, amended by Grey 
 and reworded by Sazonof), ' which implied the cessation 
 of military preparations by all the countries which had 
 mobilized '. Herr von Schoen thought that there was 
 perhaps ' a glimmer of hope ', but does not seem to have 
 indicated the quarter of the political heavens in which 
 he discerned it. 
 
 The French Book, oddly enough, contains no record 
 of the German Ambassador's call at the stated hour of 
 
 1 Blue Book, No. 136 ; French Book, No. 127. 
 
 2 French Book, No. 125 ; Blue Book, No. 126. 
 
SATURDAY, AUGUST i 169 
 
 one o'clock. But he doubtless paid it punctually, for Paris, 
 he telegraphed at five minutes past one : ' Upon my 
 repeated definite inquiry whether France would remain 
 neutral in the event of a Russo-German war, the Prime 
 Minister declared that France would do that which her 
 interests dictated/ l 
 
 M. Viviani sent a long telegram to M. Paul Cambon 2 
 in London, rebutting a reported German attempt to make 
 England believe that Russia was responsible for the war. 
 In it he makes a statement, which is several times repeated 
 in Paris to-day, that Austria led the way in general 
 mobilization, and that Russia ' found herself obliged to 
 imitate her'. This is true in substance, but not in the 
 letter. Russia knew, before she ordered general mobili- 
 zation, that Austria intended to take the same step; 
 but the two decrees seem, as a matter of fact, to have 
 been issued almost simultaneously (pp. 146, 151, 152). 
 M. Viviani also says : ' Last Wednesday, well in advance 
 of Russian mobilization, Herr von Schoen announced to me 
 the impending publication of Kriegsgefahrzustand ' which 
 would be interesting if we could regard it as certain. 
 But one cannot but think that M. Viviani's memory 
 may have deceived him. It seems scarcely probable 
 that von Schoen knew of this determination, and blurted 
 it out, forty-eight hours in advance. He may have said, 
 conjecturally, that this step would probably be taken. 
 
 Germany's refusal to state her intentions with regard London, 
 to Belgium apparently did not reach London until after 
 a morning meeting of the Cabinet. On receiving the 
 news from Berlin, Sir Edward Grey told M. Paul Cambon 3 
 that he would ask the Cabinet at its next meeting to 
 authorize him to state in the House of Commons on 
 Monday that ' the British Government would not permit 
 a violation of Belgian neutrality ', and that the British 
 
 1 German Book, No. 27. 2 French Book, No. 127. 
 
 3 French Book, No. 126. 
 
170 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 London, fleet would ' oppose the passage of the Straits of Dover ' 
 or ' any demonstration on the French coasts ' by the 
 German fleet. 
 
 To Prince Lichnowsky, Sir Edward said * that ' the 
 reply of the German Government with regard to Belgium 
 was a matter of very great regret. ... If there were 
 a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant 
 while the other respected it, it would be extremely 
 difficult to restrain public feeling in this country '. 
 Prince Lichnowsky asked whether we would remain 
 neutral if Germany promised not to violate Belgian 
 neutrality. Sir Edward replied that ' our attitude would 
 be determined largely by public opinion. He did not 
 think that we could give a promise of neutrality on 
 that condition alone '. Lichnowsky then pressed him 
 to state the conditions on which Britain would remain 
 neutral, even suggesting that the integrity of France and 
 her colonies might be guaranteed. Sir Edward definitely 
 refused to make any promise of neutrality ' on similar 
 terms ', and said that we must keep our hands free. 
 
 The attitude of the Foreign Minister in this interview 
 has been much criticized. It is, indeed, rather difficult 
 to see why he did not take higher ground on the question 
 of Belgium why he seemed to detach the Government 
 from the nation, as though respect for treaty obligations 
 were stronger outside the Cabinet than in it. If it be 
 true that the Great General Staff was divided against 
 itself on the subject of Belgium, it seems just conceiv- 
 able that a firm word from Sir Edward at this moment 
 might have strengthened the hands of the party opposed 
 to the great outrage. If he had said (in diplomatic 
 terms), ' Tell your Government that if they break faith 
 with Belgium they will be committing a crime which 
 will set the whole world against them ', one does not see 
 that it could have done any harm, and it might have 
 done good. Perhaps he was, in fact, restrained by the 
 1 Blue Book, No. 123. 
 
SATURDAY, AUGUST i 171 
 
 knowledge that the Cabinet, as then constituted, was not London, 
 so solid on the point as it ought to have been. 
 
 It must also be remembered, in estimating both the 
 feeling in the Cabinet and the language of Sir Edward 
 Grey, that at this time the violation of Belgian neutrality 
 was still, so to speak, an abstract idea, and no one could 
 have anticipated the concrete horror of the process. 
 There are degrees in crime ; even a burglar is not neces- 
 sarily a brute ; and though the wrong contemplated was 
 bound to be great, there was as yet no reason for speaking 
 of it with the abhorrence which it now inspires through- 
 out the civilized world. We must not criticize either 
 Sir Edward Grey or his colleagues as though they ought 
 to have known what we now know that they were 
 face to face with one of the darkest deeds in history. 
 
 In other respects, it is hard to see how Sir Edward 
 could with dignity, or even with safety, have acted 
 otherwise than he did. It was not for England to say, 
 ' If only you hold your hand at this point or at that, 
 you may inflict on France what punishment you will 
 for the crime of being faithful to her Russian alliance '. 
 If England had judged France to be in the wrong, she 
 was free to stand aside altogether. Judging her to be 
 in the right, she could not make terms with the oppressor 
 on the basis of his putting such-and-such limits to his 
 oppression. Besides, Sir Edward had already stated the 
 condition of British neutrality that Germany should 
 make some proposal for conciliation so reasonable that 
 Russia and France would put themselves in the wrong 
 if they refused it (p. 157). 
 
 Learning to-day that M. Sazonof had accepted the 
 amended formula (p. 148) and that Austria had declared 
 her readiness ' to discuss the substance ' of the Ultimatum 
 to Serbia, Grey communicated these facts to Goschen x 
 
 1 Blue Book, Nos. 131, 132, 133. In No. 131 Sir Edward says : 
 ' The Russian Government has communicated to me the readiness 
 of Austria to discuss with Russia, and the readiness of Austria 
 
172 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 London, in Berlin, urging that ' things ought not to be hopeless 
 so long as Austria and Russia are ready to converse '. 
 But Germany was awaiting the inevitable news that 
 Russia had rejected her ultimatum. She had finally 
 closed her ears to the voice of the peacemaker. 
 
 We now come to a somewhat puzzling incident. Sir 
 Edward Grey sends to Sir George Buchanan in St. Peters- 
 burg the following telegram : 1 
 
 1 Information reaches me from a most reliable source 
 that Austrian Government have informed German 
 Government that though the situation has been changed 
 by the mobilization of Russia they would, in full 
 appreciation of the efforts of England for the preser- 
 vation of peace, be ready to consider favourably my 
 proposal for mediation between Austria and Serbia. 
 The effect of this acceptance would naturally be that 
 the Austrian military action against Serbia would con- 
 tinue for the present, and that the British Government 
 would urge upon Russian Government to stop the mobi- 
 lization of troops directed against Austria, in which 
 case Austria would naturally cancel those defensive 
 military counter-measures in Galicia, which have been 
 forced upon Austria by Russian mobilization. 
 
 You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs and 
 say that if, in the consideration of the acceptance of 
 mediation by Austria, Russia can agree to stop mobili- 
 zation, it appears still to be possible to preserve peace/ 
 
 The document which Sir Edward here reports is Count 
 Berchtold's telegram of yesterday to Berlin (p. 152) ; 
 and it has been represented that Germany, in failing to 
 forward it to London, repeated the manoeuvre of the 
 Ems telegram, and perfidiously extinguished the last 
 hope of peace. Here, for once, we may probably acquit 
 her. As Berchtold did not telegraph till after a meeting 
 
 to accept a basis of mediation which is not open to the objections 
 raised in regard to the formula which Russia originally suggested/ 
 For the second ' Austria ' we ought surely to read ' Russia '. 
 The amended formula seems never to have been considered by 
 Austria. * Blue Book, No. 135. 
 
SATURDAY, AUGUST i 173 
 
 of the Cabinet, 1 the message probably did not reach London. 
 Berlin till pretty late, when all was excitement over the 
 dispatch of the Ultimatum to Russia ; and the failure 
 
 1 German official statement, C.D.D., p. 536. It is not abso- 
 lutely certain that the proposal here stated to have been under 
 consideration by the Austrian Cabinet was Sir Edward Grey's 
 proposal ; but it is difficult to accept any other theory. We 
 know that von Jagow did, on Thursday, send on to Vienna 
 Grey's proposal to Lichnowsky that Austria, after occupying 
 Belgrade, might stay her hand ' pending an effort of the Powers 
 to mediate between her and Russia '. We know that when this 
 was communicated to him, Berchtold said that he would take 
 the pleasure of the Emperor on Friday morning. Germany 
 declares that she submitted to Vienna proposals ' conceived 
 entirely on the lines suggested by Great Britain ' and that they 
 were considered by the Vienna Cabinet on Friday morning. 
 Is it to be supposed that, besides forwarding Grey's proposals, 
 Germany sent other proposals of her own entirely on the English 
 lines, and that Berchtold answered Grey's proposal without 
 consulting the Cabinet, and then went to the Cabinet meeting 
 to deliberate on another Anglo-German suggestion ? This is 
 surely incredible. What the Cabinet discussed must have been 
 Grey's proposal as passed on by von Tschirscky and altered in 
 passing ; for mediation between Austria and Russia has become 
 mediation between Austria and Serbia. Grey, indeed, in the 
 telegram above quoted, accepts this as his proposal, but that 
 must have been simply because it was immaterial to him what 
 form the mediation took, so long as it took form at all. He had 
 never, as a matter of fact, proposed mediation between Austria 
 and Serbia, that having been barred by Germany herself. The 
 German statement says that no answer was given to the propo- 
 sals of mediation. This suggests a reason why Berchtold 's answer 
 was not forwarded narnely, that Szogyeny did not deliver it at 
 the Wilhelmstrasse till the time-limit attached to the German 
 Ultimatum was expiring or had expired. 
 
 If further proof be demanded that the Grey-Lichnowsky 
 proposal, and no other, was what Germany submitted to Austria, 
 it may be found in the introductory narrative to the German 
 Book (C.D.D., p. 410). It is there written : ' We even as late 
 as the 3oth of July forwarded the English proposal to Vienna, 
 as basis for negotiations, that Austria should dictate her con- 
 ditions in Serbia, i.e., after her march into Serbia. We thought 
 
174 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 London, to send it on may have been a mere inadvertence. We 
 may the more readily take this charitable view, as we can 
 scarcely suppose that it would be regarded as a promis- 
 ing basis for a pacific settlement, and therefore as being 
 dangerous to the designs of the war party. 
 
 The odd thing is that Sir Edward Grey, when a side- 
 wind brought it to his knowledge, 1 seems to have thought 
 it worth serious consideration. When he says, ' The 
 effect of this acceptance would naturally be that the 
 Austrian military action against Serbia would continue 
 for the present/ we discern a misunderstanding. In his 
 conversation with Lichnowsky he had assumed that 
 Austria would soon be in possession of Belgrade and its 
 environs ; and what he means in the above sentence is 
 doubtless that Austria should ' continue her military 
 action ' until she thus held a portion of Serbian territory, 
 and should then call a halt pending mediation. But in 
 Berchtold's mind there is no such idea. He simply 
 stipulates that ' our military action against Serbia shall 
 take its course ' ; which would mean that, by judiciously 
 protracting the negotiations, Austria would be able to 
 crush Serbia at her ease, while Russia stood paralysed. 
 It would manifestly have been futile to approach Russia with 
 such a proposition. But it seems strange that Sir Edward 
 should even have seen some hope in the proposal as he 
 understood it that Russia should stop mobilization, 
 while Austria was still battering at Belgrade. 2 
 
 that Russia would accept this basis.' If Germany thought this 
 a hopeful proposal, can we imagine that she submitted another, 
 also on English lines, almost simultaneously with it ? 
 
 1 In all probability the ' most reliable source ' was Count 
 Mensdorff. We know that the telegram was communicated by 
 Berchtold to the Austrian Ambassadors in London and St. 
 Petersburg ; and we know that Mensdorff called on Grey this 
 morning (Blue Book, No. 137). The mystery is probably due 
 to the fact that Mensdorff was not officially instructed to make 
 the communication. 
 
 2 Sir Edward probably knew, it may be said, that M. Sazonof 
 
SATURDAY, AUGUST i 175 
 
 Count Mensdorff to-day called twice at the Foreign London. 
 Office, 1 to communicate telegrams designed to show 
 Austria in a pacific and accommodating mood. It was 
 now that he quoted and emphasized Count Berchtold's 
 request to the Russian Ambassador ' to remove the wholly 
 erroneous impression in St. Petersburg that " the door had 
 been banged " by Austria on all further conversations ' 
 (p. 150). 
 
 A misunderstanding which arose to-day, and led to 
 an exchange of telegrams between the Kaiser and King 
 George, affords the one element of ' comic relief ' in this 
 sombre drama. 2 The episode was explained by Sir 
 Edward Grey in the House of Commons on August 28th. 
 It had been reported to Sir Edward that Prince Lichnowsky 
 had suggested the possibility that Germany might remain 
 neutral if France and England did so likewise, Austria and 
 Russia being thus left to fight it out between themselves. 
 Sir Edward naturally addressed himself to Lichnowsky to 
 ascertain whether this was a serious proposition ; and 
 Lichnowsky (perhaps mishearing what he said on the 
 telephone) understood him to ask whether, if France 
 promised neutrality, Germany would refrain from attacking 
 her. This misconception he at once passed on to Berlin, 
 where it evidently caused a flutter of surprise and delight. 
 ' What ! ' we can hear them exclaiming : ' England will 
 hold France in check while we dispose of Russia ! We 
 shall be able to crush the Entente Powers one by one 
 instead of together ! Truly our alte gute Gott is on our 
 side ! ' The Kaiser instantly dashed off a telegram to 
 King George. It was technically impossible, he said, to 
 
 had spoken on the previous day (see p. 149) as though the sus- 
 pension of hostilities against Serbia were not a sine qua non. But 
 Sazonof was not here thinking of any proposal which involved the 
 stoppage of Russian mobilization. He could never have consented 
 to such a measure while Austria refused to place any limit to her 
 action against Serbia. 
 1 Blue Book, No. 137. 2 Documents in Price, pp. 398-401. 
 
176 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 London, stop mobilization on the western frontier ; ' but if France 
 offers me her neutrality, which must be guaranteed by 
 the English army and navy, I will of course cease to con- 
 sider an attack on France, and use my troops in another 
 direction. I hope that France will not be nervous.' 
 Oddly enough, it was the Germans who published this 
 simple-minded missive. 1 One would have expected them 
 to be ashamed of having strayed even for a moment into 
 such a fool's paradise. King George at once replied : 
 'I think there must be a misunderstanding ' ; Sir Edward 
 Grey cleared the matter up ; and Lichnowsky, at 8.30 p.m., 
 telegraphed to cancel the telegram of n a.m., which had 
 conveyed his erroneous impression. 
 
 Rome. The Marquis di San Giuliano to-day informed the German 
 Ambassador 2 ' that as the war undertaken by Austria 
 was aggressive, and did not fall within the purely defensive 
 character of the Triple Alliance . . . Italy could not take 
 part in it '. 
 
 Sum- As Germany cannot possibly have expected that Russia 
 
 nary * would submit to the unexampled humiliation of demobiliz- 
 ing at her orders, and at twelve hours' notice, all hope of 
 peace had of course vanished. The Tsar at the last 
 moment held out a flag of truce by suggesting that nego- 
 tiations should continue in spite of the mobilization of 
 both countries ; but the Kaiser would hear of nothing but 
 unconditional surrender. At 5 p.m. mobilization was 
 decreed, and two hours later the declaration of war 
 was delivered. All negotiations are thus reduced to 
 insignificance ; and the one point on which interest 
 now centres is the question of Germany's intentions 
 towards Belgium. Sir Edward Grey points out to 
 
 1 Not in their official Book : in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine 
 Zeitung for August 20. 
 
 2 French Book, No. 124. 
 
 
SATURDAY, AUGUST i 177 
 
 Prince Lichnowsky the ominous contrast between the 
 prompt assurances of France as to Belgian neutrality 
 and Germany's ambiguous reticence. He makes no 
 response to Lichnowsky's entreaty that he will formulate 
 the conditions under which Britain will remain neutral ; 
 and he indicates to Cambon that Britain will refuse to 
 permit a naval attack by Germany on the Channel ports 
 of France. Austria, evidently thinking Germany's chal- 
 lenge to Russia too precipitate, seeks to emphasize the 
 moderation of her attitude ; and Italy announces that 
 she is not to be dragged into a war of aggression by her 
 partners of the Triple Alliance. 
 
 1B52 
 
CHAPTER XVIII 
 DID BRITAIN HANG BACK TOO LONG ? 
 
 ' Be stirring as the time ; be fire with fire ; 
 Threaten the threatener.' SHAKESPEARE. 
 
 ' Suaviter in modo : fortiter in re.' 
 
 FROM the moment the crisis became acute that is to 
 say, from Friday the 24th onward Russia and France 
 repeatedly urged that Great Britain should lose no time 
 in affirming the effective reality of the Triple Entente, 
 and thus warning the Central European Powers of the 
 magnitude of the task they were facing. In this country, 
 too, it has been argued by Mr. Bernard Shaw among 
 others that peace might have been preserved if Britain 
 had taken a firm stand earlier in the controversy. Let 
 us examine a little into this argument. 
 
 On July 24th, in his first interview with Sir George 
 Buchanan after the presentation of the Ultimatum, 1 
 M. Sazonof said ' He hoped that His Majesty's Govern- 
 ment would not fail to proclaim their solidarity with 
 Russia and France '. Sir George replied, as we have seen 
 (p. 38), that ' direct British interests in Serbia were nil, 
 and that a war on behalf of that country would never be 
 sanctioned by public opinion '. M. Sazonof s answer was 
 that, not merely the Serbian question, but the general 
 European question was involved, and that ' Great Britain 
 could not afford to efface herself from the problems now 
 
 1 Blue Book, No. 6. The French Ambassador took the same 
 line at this interview and telegraphed to his Government : 
 ' Nothing but the assurance of the solidarity of the Triple Entente 
 can prevent the German Powers from emphasizing their provo- 
 cative attitude ' (French Book, No. 31). 
 
DID BRITAIN HANG BACK TOO LONG ? 179 
 
 at issue'. Sir Edward Grey expressly approved the 
 Ambassador's attitude in this interview. 1 
 
 Again, on the following day, Saturday, July 25, 
 M. Sazonof returned to the charge. 2 Germany, he said, 
 was unfortunately ' convinced that she could count upon 
 our neutrality '. 
 
 ' He did not believe that Germany really wanted war, 
 but her attitude was decided by ours. If we took our 
 stand firmly with France and Russia there would be no 
 war. If we failed them now, rivers of blood would flow, 
 and we would in the end be dragged into war.' 
 
 The latter part of this prognostic has been only too 
 completely justified ; but it does not follow that the 
 former part would have been fulfilled had England acted 
 as the Russian statesman desired. Sir George Buchanan's 
 reply at the moment was that England could better play 
 the mediator in the character of a friend to Russia and 
 France, ' who, if her counsels of moderation were dis- 
 regarded, might one day be converted into an ally, than 
 if she were to declare herself Russia's ally at once '. 
 
 Two days later, on Monday the 27th, Sir George 
 Buchanan, 3 having meanwhile received Sir Edward Grey's 
 approval of the line he had taken in the interview of 
 Friday, made the English position still clearer by saying 
 to M. Sazonof that 
 
 ' His Excellency was mistaken if he believed that the 
 cause of peace could be promoted by our telling the 
 German Government that they would have to deal with 
 us as well as with Russia and France if they supported 
 Austria by force of arms. Their attitude would merely 
 be stiffened by such a menace, and we could only induce 
 her [Germany] to use her influence at Vienna to avert 
 war by approaching her in the capacity of a friend who 
 was anxious to preserve peace.' 
 
 To this Sazonof seems to have made no direct reply, 
 nor did he, personally, urge his point of view any further, 
 
 1 Blue Book, No. 24. 2 Blue Book, No. 17. 
 
 3 Blue Book, No. 44. 
 
 M~2 
 
i8o THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 though he probably inspired 1 the strong appeal to the 
 same purpose which was made by the French President 
 three days later. To this we shall presently return. In 
 the meantime, let us consider whether, in these early days, 
 Sir Edward Grey ought to have yielded to M. Sazonofs 
 importunity and taken a firm stand by the side of Russia 
 and France. 
 
 It is certain that Germany was under an illusion as 
 to England's frame of mind, just as Austria was under an 
 illusion as to Russia's. There were in those days many 
 unfortunate illusions abroad in Central Europe. On July 
 27th (the day of Buchanan's answer to Sazonof) the French 
 Charge d' Affaires in London reported to his Government 
 that ' the German Ambassador and the Austro-Hungarian 
 Ambassador allow it to be understood that they are sure 
 that England would preserve neutrality if a conflict were 
 to break out.' 2 It is regrettable, no doubt, that Germany 
 made this miscalculation. Had she formed from the 
 first a juster estimate of the factors in the problem, she 
 might have ordered Austria to behave with a little more 
 circumspection. But it by no means follows that after 
 the plunge was taken, and the two confederates were com- 
 mitted to the adventure, a sudden and aggressive dis- 
 illusionment as to England's frame of mind would have 
 brought them up short and restored them to reason. 
 
 Sir Edward Grey's conduct must of course be examined, 
 not from the point of view of the ideally desirable, but 
 of the practically possible. An autocrat and the minister 
 of an autocrat can do many things that are impossible to 
 the responsible minister of a constitutional state. It 
 is only human, however, to reflect upon the ideally desir- 
 able, and to express regret if the practically possible be 
 
 1 See French Book, No. 101. 
 
 2 French Book, No. 63. M. de Fleuriau adds, however, that 
 Sir Arthur Nicolson, in conversation with Prince Lichnowsky, 
 has done something to shake his confidence in Britain's immo- 
 bility. 
 
DID BRITAIN HANG BACK TOO LONG ? 181 
 
 not found to coincide with it. Was that the case in the 
 present instance ? 
 
 If Sir Edward Grey, on the Saturday or the Sunday, 
 had felt free to declare to the German Government: 
 ' Unless Austria desists from her attack on Serbia, which 
 is practically an attack upon Russia, England will throw 
 the whole weight of her land and sea forces into the scale 
 of the Triple Entente ' is it probable that that announce- 
 ment would have secured peace ? To any one who realizes 
 the German frame of mind in regard to England, 1 it must 
 seem improbable in the highest degree. Here was Germany 
 publicly embarked on a dashing political adventure which 
 was to enhance the prestige of the Central Powers to an 
 unexampled pitch : was she to cry ' Halt ! ' at the bidding 
 of the hated islanders who had balked her over Morocco, 
 and whom she believed to be blocking her world-policy on 
 every hand ? The exasperation over the Agadir incident 
 was still fresh in the public mind, and it would have been 
 very difficult for the Government, even if it had so desired, 
 to beat another retreat before a menace from Great 
 Britain. We must remember that the weight of the 
 threat would have been discounted by the prevalent 
 opinion that England's hands were tied by her Irish 
 troubles. It is conceivable, of course, that prudent 
 counsels might nevertheless have prevailed, and that 
 Germany, in a temper of white-hot fury, might have 
 determined once more to bide her time. But it is very 
 improbable that even this postponement of the inevitable 
 
 1 A friendly critic objects that no account is here taken of the 
 ' new friendship for England ' which the German Government 
 was showing, and in which some English statesmen seriously 
 believed. The answer is that, whether genuine or not, this 
 amicable sentiment was certainly confined to a very few people. 
 If any one doubts this, he has only to read Count Reventlow's 
 Deutschlands auswdrtige Politik, published in the spring of 1914. 
 Besides, Germany's alleged friendship for England would seem 
 to be a poor reason for taking the first opportunity to threaten 
 her with war. 
 
182 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 would have been secured. The chances are that, as Sir 
 George Buchanan said, Germany's ' back would have 
 been stiffened by such a menace ', the war would have 
 come, perhaps a day or two sooner, and England, instead 
 of having striven to the last for peace, would have stood 
 before the world as the Power which first threw her 
 gauntlet into the arena. 
 
 There seems, then, to be no reason for regret that 
 Sir Edward Grey was not an autocrat and did not try to 
 act as one. Still clearer is the case when we consider 
 what was his constitutional position and the limits it 
 imposed upon him. Nothing could have been more 
 foolish than for the British Government to shake a mailed 
 fist without knowing that Parliament and the nation were 
 behind it ; and nothing can be more certain than that 
 on Saturday, Sunday, or Monday, the 25th to the 27th 
 of July, Parliament and the nation would not have 
 endorsed anything approaching to a threat of war. We 
 must throw our minds back to these dates, and forget 
 all that subsequent events have revealed. At that time 
 no one could tell that Vienna would be obstinately un- 
 reasonable, Berlin immovably obstructive, and St. Peters- 
 burg reasonable to the utmost limit of compliance. All 
 we then knew was that Austria was seeking repara- 
 tion for a dastardly crime, and it did not seem to be 
 denied that she had some just grounds of complaint 
 against Serbia. Her method of procedure, it is true, 
 was inexcusably peremptory; but there was as yet no 
 reason to despair of her relaxing her truculent attitude. 
 Could Sir Edward Grey have come before Parliament 
 and said, ' For the sake of Serbia, a country with 
 which we have no historical or racial connexion, and 
 in which our interests are practically nil a country, 
 too, which has admittedly put herself more or less in 
 the wrong with regard to her powerful neighbour for 
 the sake of this remote and morally dubious nation, I 
 have pledged Great Britain, in certain not improbable 
 
DID BRITAIN HANG BACK TOO LONG ? 183 
 
 eventualities, to go to war, in alliance with Russia, 
 against Germany, Austria, and possibly Italy as well ' ? 
 It was unthinkable that any minister should place him- 
 self in such a hopeless position. When we remember the 
 state of the public mind a week later indeed, down to 
 the moment of the invasion of Belgium we cannot but 
 realize that when M. Sazonof and M. Paleologue implored 
 Britain to ' proclaim solidarity ' with Russia and France, 
 they were urging a course which would have been un- 
 wise in theory and was in practice impossible. Had 
 Sir Edward Grey needed anything to dissuade him from 
 such an error, he might have remembered the unfortunate 
 effect of Lord Palmerston's incautious attitude of menace 
 before the Danish War of 1864. 
 
 M. Sazonof himself, indeed, seems to have recognized 
 later that his early exhortations to ' solidarity ' were 
 premature. On Friday the 3ist, before England was in 
 any way committed to warlike action, he expressed to 
 Sir George Buchanan l 
 
 ' his deep gratitude to His Majesty's Government, who 
 had done so much to save the situation. It would be 
 largely due to them if war were prevented. The 
 Emperor, the Russian Government, and the Russian 
 people would never forget the firm attitude adopted 
 by Great Britain/ 
 
 If this utterance was sincere and there was no motive 
 for insincerity it is very authoritative evidence against 
 the view that any tardiness or indecision on England's 
 part contributed to the catastrophe. 
 
 By July 30 (Thursday), when M. Poincare took up 
 the Russian strain and begged England to make it clear 
 that she was to be reckoned with, events had so developed 
 that some of the foregoing arguments no longer apply. 
 Let us consider, then, whether M. Poincare was right in 
 his judgement of the situation. 
 
 1 Blue Book, No. 120. 
 
184 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 He expressed it thus (as reported by Sir F. Bertie) : * 
 
 ' The President is convinced that peace between the 
 Powers is in the hands of Great Britain. If His Majesty's 
 Government announced that England would come to 
 the aid of France in the event of a conflict between 
 France and Germany . . . there would be no war, for 
 Germany would at once modify her attitude.' 
 
 It may be admitted that a recourse to threats would 
 have been better justified on Thursday than on Monday, 
 since suasion, expostulation in a word, negotiation 
 had had a fair trial, with scant promise of success. It 
 could not have been said that England was impetuously 
 rushing into the fray, and proving herself ' more Serbian 
 than the Russians '. But is there any reason to suppose 
 that Germany would have retreated before the English 
 menace ? 
 
 There is less than no reason for such an assumption. 
 On Monday retreat might still have been possible with 
 a fair show of dignity. Only the initiated need have 
 known how deeply Germany had committed herself to 
 the support of Austrian intransigeance. If things had 
 been skilfully managed, the general public might scarcely 
 have realized the fact of a retreat, since they would have 
 had no certain knowledge of the extent of the advance. 
 There would have been no obvious disgrace in insisting 
 that Austria, suppressing her ingenious commentary, 
 should make the Serbian reply a basis for negotiation. 
 The Austrian jingoes would have been furious, but it is 
 possible that the German nation, as distinct from Junker- 
 dom and officialdom, might have remained comparatively 
 calm. On Thursday all was different. War was declared, 
 Belgrade bombarded, and there is not the slightest 
 doubt that military preparations on a large scale were 
 going on in Germany, and must have been known to 
 everybody. It was clear to the man in the street that 
 Germany was backing Austria against Russia for all she 
 1 Blue Book, No. 99. 
 
DID BRITAIN HANG BACK TOO LONG ? 185 
 
 was worth. If, then, there had been a sudden right- 
 about-face, and a rush towards peace instead of towards 
 war, every one would have seen that some new factor 
 had entered into the problem ; nor could there have been 
 any difficulty in divining what that factor was. It 
 would have been Agadir over again on a ten times larger 
 scale. The shearer would have come home very con- 
 spicuously shorn, and the rage, not merely of the military, 
 official, Pan-Prussian classes, but of the whole German 
 people, would have threatened revolution. 1 
 
 The theory that England could at this point have 
 intimidated Germany may with all the more confidence 
 be rejected, since Germany, as a matter of fact, was 
 no longer under any illusion as to England's attitude. 
 England had, without any definite menace, made it clear 
 that her neutrality was not to be counted on. Already 
 on July 25 (Saturday), Sir Edward Grey had said to 
 Prince Lichnowsky 2 that if Austrian mobilization led 
 to Russian mobilization ' a situation would exist in 
 which the interests of all the Powers would be involved. 
 In that event Great Britain reserved to herself full 
 liberty of action '. Again, on the ayth (Monday), he 
 said to Lichnowsky 3 that ' the British Government 
 were sincerely anxious to act with the German Govern- 
 ment as long as the preservation of peace was in question, 
 but, in the contrary event, Great Britain reserved to her- 
 self full liberty of action '. On the same day, Sir Arthur 
 Nicolson spoke to Prince Lichnowsky to the same in- 
 tent, and, it would seem, in still graver terms. 4 To any 
 
 1 It may perhaps be thought that this argument implies that 
 the German Government could not safely have made any move 
 in the direction of peace, and is therefore not to be blamed, after 
 the first days, for its obstructive policy. But there is all the 
 difference between the voluntary adoption of a reasonable 
 course and a retreat before menaces. If it be said that the 
 menaces need not have been publicly known, the reply is that 
 these things always leak out. 2 Russian Book, No. 20. 
 
 3 Russian Book, No. 42. 4 French Book, No. 63. 
 
i86 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 diplomat with a trained ear, these expressions must have 
 struck a clear note of warning. But, determined that 
 there should be no mistake, on the 2Qth the day before 
 M. Poincare made his appeal Sir Edward Grey spoke 
 to the German Ambassador in these terms : 1 
 
 ' I said that I wished to say to him, in a quite 
 private and friendly way, something that was on my 
 mind. The situation was very grave . . . and I did 
 not wish him to be misled by the friendly tone of 
 our conversation which I hoped would continue 
 into thinking that we should stand aside. 
 
 He said that he quite understood this, but he asked 
 whether I meant that we should, under certain circum- 
 stances, intervene. 
 
 I replied that I did not wish to say that, or to use 
 anything that was like a threat. . . . But we knew very 
 well that if the issue did become such that we thought 
 British interests required us to intervene, we must 
 intervene at once, and the decision would have to be 
 very rapid, just as the decisions of other Powers had 
 to be. I hoped that the friendly tone of our con- 
 versations would continue as at present, and that 
 I should be able to keep as closely in touch with the 
 German Government in working for peace. But if we 
 failed in our efforts to keep the peace ... I did not 
 wish to be open to any reproach from him that the 
 friendly tone of our conversations had misled him or 
 his Government into supposing that we should not 
 take action, and to the reproach that, if they had not 
 been so misled, the course of things might have been 
 different. 
 
 The German Ambassador took no exception to what 
 I said ; indeed he told me that it accorded with what he 
 had already given in Berlin as his view of the situation.' 
 
 Is it too much to say that this conversation gives the 
 completest possible answer to every accusation of tardi- 
 ness and indecision on England's part, at all events up 
 
 1 Blue Book, Nos. 87 and 89. 
 
 2 Von Jagow, on receiving Lichnowsky's report of this inter- 
 view, said that he heard of it ' with regret, but not exactly with 
 surprise ' (Blue Book, No. 98). 
 
DID BRITAIN HANG BACK TOO LONG ? 187 
 
 to the point of Germany's declaration of war against 
 Russia ? It is hard to imagine a more judicious move, 
 or one more rightly timed. Instead of rushing in with 
 a threat, and thereby, for the sake of one chance of 
 peace, incurring ninety-nine chances of making England 
 appear to have precipitated the struggle, Sir Edward 
 Grey at first confines himself to the purely diplomatic 
 warning conveyed in the phrase ' full liberty of action ' ; 
 and then when he sees that Germany is on the verge 
 of decision without, so to speak, raising his voice, or 
 putting into it the smallest note of menace, he conveys 
 an intimation that she must not count on England's 
 neutrality. His action is as straightforward as it is 
 adroit. It leaves Germany free to alter her course with 
 the least possible loss of dignity, the least possible appear- 
 ance of yielding to pressure. If the weight of British 
 metal was to deflect the balance in favour of peace, this 
 was assuredly the way to apply it. 
 
 The conversation with Lichnowsky took place on 
 Wednesday afternoon. On the same evening the War 
 Council assembled at Potsdam, and on his return to 
 Berlin the Imperial Chancellor made his bid for British 
 neutrality (p. 126). Sir Edward Goschen's very cool 
 reply ' I did not think it probable that at this stage 
 of events you would care to bind yourself to any course 
 of action, and I was of opinion that you would desire 
 to retain full liberty ' must at once have warned his 
 Excellency that there was small chance of its acceptance. 
 On the morrow (Thursday) it was emphatically refused 
 (p. 143), and on Friday the refusal was communicated 
 to the Chancellor (p. 153). At least thirty-six hours, 
 then, before Germany declared war upon Russia, she 
 was quite definitely aware that England was not to be 
 lulled into inaction by a promise of the ' integrity ' of 
 France, any more than Russia was to be narcotized by 
 a similar engagement with regard to Serbia. The verdict 
 of history will surely be that Sir Edward Grey hit with 
 
i88 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 astonishing accuracy the middle course between a policy 
 of bluster, which would have saddled England with 
 a large share in the responsibility for the war, and a policy 
 of flabbiness, which might fairly be accused of hiding 
 from Germany the gravity of the situation confront- 
 ing her. 
 
 Observe that so far back as Monday the 27th, Sir Ed- 
 ward Grey had pointed out to the Austrian Ambassador 1 
 (and it must have been perfectly well known in Germany) 
 that the British fleet, which was to have dispersed on 
 that day, had been kept in a state of mobilization. If, 
 in the face of that fact, Germany felt any false security, 
 the blame certainly did not lie with England. 
 
 It does not even appear that there is any need to fall 
 back upon Sir Edward Grey's position as a constitutional 
 Minister in order to explain or excuse his action. One 
 does not see where or how he could have done better 
 had he been an autocrat. In the unqualified rejection 
 of Germany's bid for neutrality, Sir Edward (of course with 
 the Cabinet behind him) probably went a good deal 
 further than public sentiment would, at that moment, 
 have warranted. He did not shrink from taking a certain 
 risk. He was pretty safe in putting his foot down about 
 Belgium ; but there was such a widespread feeling against 
 co-operation with Russia, that a large and influential 
 party would certainly have been tempted to argue that our 
 obligations to France would be fulfilled if we secured her 
 certain immunities as to which Germany was apparently 
 willing to bargain. It was quite on the cards that, if 
 Germany had given satisfactory assurances about Belgium, 
 the anti-Russian party, combining with the peace-at-any- 
 price party, might have turned against the Government 
 and dragged it down. Sir Edward took the stand which 
 he felt to be right, and the fact that events have justified 
 him does not make his conduct any the less courageous. 
 
 Towards the other Powers of the Entente, too, his 
 1 Blue Book, No. 48. 
 
DID BRITAIN HANG BACK TOO LONG ? 189 
 
 policy seems to have been eminently judicious. An 
 early declaration of complete solidarity, even if it had 
 been possible, would have been open to the objection 
 of making for war by rendering Russia's championship 
 of Serbia more aggressive and less conciliatory. Only 
 by preserving complete freedom of action could Sir Ed- 
 ward make sure that his counsels of moderation would 
 have their full weight. As it happened, Russia did not 
 require any such counsels. Her disposition to be reason- 
 able, her desire for conciliation, needed no reinforcement. 
 But in keeping his hands entirely free to the last possible 
 moment, Sir Edward certainly took the course that 
 enabled him to exert to the fullest his influence in favour 
 of peace. Incidentally, he afforded a complete answer 
 to the critics who accused him of not having disclosed 
 to Parliament and the nation the full extent of the 
 obligations involved in the Entente. It is patent on the 
 face of all the documents that, except for the naval 
 arrangement assigning the Channel to the British, and 
 the Mediterranean to the French, fleet, England was 
 under no definite obligation whatever either to France 
 or to Russia. 
 
CHAPTER XIX 
 
 DIARY OF EVENTS 
 
 Sunday, August 2 
 
 ' The weak nation is to have the same right to live as the 
 powerful and vigorous nation. The whole idea represents 
 a presumptuous encroachment on the natural laws of develop- 
 ment. ' BERNHARDI. 
 
 THE fight for peace was over. We have no longer to 
 follow proposals, and amendments, and refusals, and 
 ' bids ' and menaces, whizzing to and fro between capital 
 and capital, like the shuttles in a giant loom, and weaving, 
 alas ! a Nessus-robe for Europe. Britain's participation 
 in the war was not yet assured, but it depended no longer 
 on negotiation, but on the course of events on the 
 Belgian frontier. 
 
 After a Cabinet Council held this morning, Sir Edward 
 Grey handed to M. Paul Cambon the following declara- 
 tion : * 
 
 ' I am authorized to give an assurance that, if the 
 German fleet comes into the Channel or through the 
 North Sea to undertake hostile operations against 
 French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all 
 the protection in its power. 
 
 This assurance is of course subject to the policy of 
 His Majesty's Government receiving the support of 
 Parliament, and must not be taken as binding His 
 Majesty's Government to take any action until the 
 above contingency of action by the German fleet takes 
 place.' 
 
 This undertaking was a mere corollary to the arrange- 
 ment by which the French fleet was concentrated in the 
 Mediterranean, leaving the Channel and the North Sea 
 1 Blue Book, No. 148 ; French Book, No. 137. 
 
SUNDAY, AUGUST 2 191 
 
 to the British fleet. It did not necessarily involve war 
 with Germany, for Germany might be (and in fact was) 
 willing to abstain from naval action in the Channel and 
 the Atlantic, if she could thereby secure British neutrality. 
 In this assurance, said M. Viviani, ' we have obtained 
 from Great Britain a first assistance which is most valuable 
 to us/ ! 
 
 This morning ' very early ' German troops invaded the 
 Duchy of Luxemburg at several points, and armoured 
 trains, with troops and ammunition, were sent over the 
 frontier. The Luxemburg Minister of State at once 
 informed France and England of the violation of the 
 guaranteed neutrality of the Duchy, and sent a protest to 
 the Berlin Foreign Office. 2 Bethmann-Hollweg, through 
 the German Minister at Luxemburg, 3 declared that these 
 proceedings ' did not constitute a hostile act ' but were 
 ' solely measures intended to assure the use of the railways 
 which have been leased to the Empire, against the eventual 
 attack of a French Army '. 
 
 Sir Edward Grey pointed out to M. Cambon the dis- 
 tinction between Britain's obligations to Belgium and 
 her obligations to Luxemburg. She was bound to protect 
 the neutrality of Belgium, if necessary, alone ; whereas 
 she was bound to protect the neutrality of Luxemburg 
 only in concert with the other guaranteeing Powers. 4 
 
 M. Viviani to-day reports 5 in some detail several acts 
 of war committed by German troops on the frontier near 
 Belfort. He gives the name of the regiment (the 5th 
 mounted Jaegers) two patrols of which penetrated more 
 than ten kilometres over the frontier, killed a French 
 soldier, and carried off a number of horses. M. Jules 
 
 1 French Book, No. 138. 
 
 2 Blue Book, No. 147 ; French Book, No. 131. 
 
 3 French Book, No. 132. 
 
 4 Blue Book, No. 148 ; French Book, No. 137. The origin of 
 this distinction is very clearly explained by Mr. Headlam, 
 ' History of Twelve Days/ Chapter XVI. 
 
 5 French Book, No. 139. 
 
192 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 Cambon, at Berlin, was instructed to protest against these 
 outrages. It is not improbable that they were deliberately 
 planned, in the hope of goading France into a declaration 
 of war. 
 
 The Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day informed 
 the German Minister that though he did not doubt that 
 the intentions of Germany towards Belgium were ' per- 
 fectly correct ', a formal declaration to that effect would 
 be received by the Belgian nation ' with joy and gratitude '. 
 Herr von Below replied that he had not been instructed 
 to make any declaration, but that the Belgian Government 
 ' knew his personal opinion as to the feelings of security 
 which they had the right to entertain towards their 
 eastern neighbours/ 1 
 
 At seven in the evening, Herr von Below presented to 
 the Belgian Government a ' Very Confidential ' letter, 2 
 which is, in its different way, a companion-piece to the 
 Austrian Ultimatum to Serbia the one a triumph of 
 hypocrisy, the other of truculence. Germany has ' reli- 
 able information ' that French forces intend to march 
 against Germany ' on the line of the Meuse, by Givet and 
 Namur'. The German Government fears that Belgium 
 will be unable without assistance to repel this French 
 attack, and consequently proposes to ' anticipate ' it, but 
 will feel ' the deepest regret ' if Belgium regards this as an 
 act of hostility. To prevent all misunderstanding the 
 German Government makes a declaration under four 
 heads : 
 
 (1) If Belgium will maintain ' an attitude of friendly 
 neutrality towards Germany ' her integrity and inde- 
 pendence will be assured her at the end of the war. 
 
 (2) Germany will evacuate Belgian territory on the 
 conclusion of peace. 
 
 (3) Germany will pay her way and compensate for 
 damage. 
 
 (4) ' Should Belgium oppose the German troops . . . 
 1 Belgian Book, No. 19. 2 Belgian Book, No. 20. 
 
SUNDAY, AUGUST 2 193 
 
 Germany will, to her regret, be compelled to consider 
 Belgium as an enemy. In this event Germany can under- 
 take no obligations towards Belgium, but the eventual 
 adjustment of the relations between the two States must 
 be left to the decision of arms/ 
 
 A reply was demanded within twelve hours. 
 
 The French intention to invade Belgium was purely 
 fictitious. France, to her cost, had made all her dis- 
 positions in view of an invasion on her eastern frontier. 
 Germany had done her best to lure France into an infringe- 
 ment of Belgian neutrality, 1 but France had not fallen 
 into the trap. The accusation was simply a pre-arranged 
 manoeuvre, utterly undeceptive to any one not deter- 
 mined to be deceived. 
 
 At 1.30 in the morning, Herr von Below, on instructions 
 from Berlin, burst in upon Baron van der Elst (Secretary- 
 General for Foreign Affairs) with the intelligence that 
 French dirigibles had thrown bombs, and a French 
 cavalry patrol had crossed the frontier. Baron van der 
 Elst asked where these incidents had happened. The 
 answer was ' In Germany '. The Baron then observed 
 that in that case he could not understand the object of 
 the communication. Herr von Below replied ' that these 
 acts, which were contrary to international law, were cal- 
 culated to lead to the supposition that other acts contrary 
 to international law would be committed by France '. 
 
 It was a desperate attempt to bolster up the fiction of 
 a projected French invasion. 
 
 If it were not the prelude to so great a tragedy, how 
 comic it would be ! 
 
 1 On this complex piece of diplomatic finesse see Headlam, 
 pp. 359 and 377. 
 
 1852 
 
CHAPTER XX 
 DIARY OF EVENTS 
 Monday, August 3 
 
 ' France must be so completely crushed that she can never 
 again come across our path.' BERNHARDI. 
 
 AT seven in the morning Belgium returned its answer 
 to the German ultimatum. 1 
 
 That document ' has made a deep and painful impres- 
 sion upon the Belgian Government*. The intentions 
 attributed to France by Germany are in contradiction to 
 formal declarations made by France on August i. Should 
 France break her word, Belgium is prepared to offer 
 a vigorous resistance to the invader. The independence 
 and neutrality of Belgium are guaranteed by the Powers, 
 ' and notably by the Government of His Majesty the 
 King of Prussia '. 
 
 ' The attack upon her independence with which the 
 German Government threaten her constitutes a flagrant 
 violation of international law. No strategic interest 
 justifies such a violation. 
 
 The Belgian Government, if they were to accept the 
 proposals submitted to them, would sacrifice the honour 
 of the nation and betray their duty towards Europe. 
 
 Conscious of the part which Belgium has played for 
 more than eighty years in the civilization of the world, 
 they refuse to believe that the independence of Belgium 
 can only be purchased at the price of violation of her 
 neutrality. 
 
 If this hope is disappointed, the Belgian Govern- 
 ment are firmly resolved to repel, by all the means in 
 their power, every attack upon their rights/ 
 
 1 Belgian Book, No. 22, 
 
MONDAY, AUGUST 3 195 
 
 Surely it cannot be mere prejudice that sees, throughout 
 these documents, a marked and illuminating contrast 
 between the demands of the Germanic Powers (for they 
 are always demanding) and the replies which they elicit. 
 On the one side, menace, bribery, chicanery ; on the other 
 side, sincerity, honesty, and unswerving, though un- 
 menacing, resolution. It may certainly be said for the 
 Germanic utterances that, though far from noble them- 
 selves, they are the cause of nobleness in others ; and of 
 that the Belgian reply is a striking example. 
 
 The King of the Belgians addressed to King George the 
 following telegram : l 
 
 ' Remembering the numerous proofs of Your Majesty's 
 friendship and that of your predecessor, the friendly 
 attitude of England in 1870, and the proof of friendship 
 you have just given us again, I make a supreme appeal 
 to the diplomatic intervention of Your Majesty's 
 Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium.' 
 
 Until her territory was actually violated, Belgium made 
 no appeal for armed assistance, and even declined that 
 which was offered by France. 2 
 
 The course of events in London may be read in the 
 telegrams addressed by M. Paul Cambon to his Govern- 
 ment. 
 
 First Sir Edward Grey confirms his intention of laying 
 before Parliament his statement of yesterday (p. 190) 
 respecting the protection of the Channel coast of France 
 from naval attack, and adds that this also ' implies pro- 
 tection against a demonstration from the Atlantic Ocean '. 3 
 
 Next M. Cambon reports that just as Sir Edward Grey 
 was starting for the Cabinet meeting, Prince Lichnowsky 
 called ' to press him to say that the neutrality of Great 
 Britain did not depend upon respecting Belgian neutrality. 
 Sir Edward Grey refused all conversation on this matter.' 4 
 
 1 Belgian Book, No. 25. 
 
 2 Belgian Book, No. 24 ; French Book, No. 142. 
 
 3 French Book, No. 143. 4 French Book, No. 144. 
 
 N2 
 
196 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 M. Cambon then alludes to an extraordinary step taken 
 by the Councillor of the German Embassy in communi- 
 cating to the press a couple of paragraphs x arguing that 
 ' the maintenance of British neutrality would in no way 
 injure France ; on the contrary ... by remaining neutral 
 Great Britain could give France exactly as much strategic 
 assistance, and a good deal more effective diplomatic help '. 
 Any help that Britain could render by land would be 
 negligible, ' considering the enormous numbers engaged'; 
 and Germany would agree to make no maritime attack 
 on France ' in the north '. To this Bethmann-Hollweg, 
 in the Reichstag on the following day, added that if 
 France made a similar engagement, Germany ' would not 
 undertake any hostile operations against the French 
 mercantile marine*. At first sight it seems as though 
 Germany were practically offering to put her fleet out of 
 action as the price of England's neutrality ; 2 but it must 
 be noted that nothing is said of the Mediterranean coast 
 of France or (more important still) of the French colonies. 
 
 A third telegram from M. Cambon runs as follows : 
 
 ' Sir Edward Grey has made the statement regarding 
 the intervention of the British fleet. He has ex- 
 plained, in considering the situation, what he proposed 
 to do with regard to Belgian neutrality ; and the read- 
 ing of a letter from King Albert asking for the support 
 of Great Britain has deeply stirred the House. 
 
 The House will this evening vote the credit which is 
 asked for ; from this moment its support is secured to the 
 policy of the Government, and it follows public opinion 
 which is declaring itself more and more in our favour/ 
 
 The scenes of to-day and to-morrow in Parliament will 
 be ever memorable in history, but do not belong to the 
 diplomatic record which we are here following. 
 
 1 Text in Headlam, p. 337. 
 
 2 Mr. Headlam (p. 338) writes as though this were actually the 
 case. He represents Germany as agreeing ' that the war with 
 France should be confined to the mainland and not extend to 
 the sea '. 
 
MONDAY, AUGUST 3 197 
 
 M. Viviani to-day telegraphed a contradiction 1 of 
 a ridiculous German story that eighty French officers in 
 Prussian uniform had attempted to cross the German 
 frontier in twelve motor-cars. He begged M. Cambon 
 ' to draw the attention of the Foreign Office to the German 
 campaign of false news which is beginning '. 
 
 At 6.45 p.m. Herr von Schoen handed to M. Viviani the 
 German declaration of war. 2 It began by asserting that 
 French military aviators had violated the neutrality of 
 Belgium by flying over Belgian territory ; had tried to 
 destroy buildings near Wesel ; and had thrown bombs on 
 the railway near Carlsruhe and Nuremberg. ' In the 
 presence of these acts of aggression ', the document con- 
 tinued, ' the German Empire considers itself in a state of 
 war with France in consequence of the acts of this latter 
 power/ 
 
 Careful inquiry has failed to discover any confirmation 
 of the ' acts of aggression ' here enumerated. They seem 
 to have been heard of in Berlin, but not in the different 
 localities where they are alleged to have occurred. 3 They 
 were simply part of the prescribed German ritual. ' Let 
 it be the task of our diplomacy ', wrote General von 
 Bernhardi in 1912, 'so to shuffle the cards that we may 
 be attacked by France/ The aeroplane story is a last 
 and pathetically helpless attempt to ' shuffle the cards ' 
 according to order. 
 
 But the German authorities were guilty of one serious 
 omission. They forgot to allege that the Belgian army 
 had invaded Germany, or that Belgian aviators had 
 thrown bombs on Cologne Cathedral. 
 
 The Belgian Minister in London telegraphs to-night 
 to M. Davignon : 4 ' The Minister for Foreign Affairs has 
 informed me that if our neutrality is violated it means 
 war with Germany/ 
 
 1 French. Book, No. 146. 2 French Book, No. 147. 
 
 3 Headlam, p. 281. 4 Belgian Book, No. 26. 
 
CHAPTER XXI 
 DIARY OF EVENTS 
 Tuesday, August 4 
 
 ' A pacific agreement with England is, after all, a will-o'-the- 
 wisp which no serious German statesman would trouble to 
 follow. ' BERNHARDI. 
 
 THIS morning at six o'clock the German Minister handed 
 to the Belgian Government a note l declaring that since 
 they rejected ' the well-intentioned proposals ' made to 
 them by the German Government, ' the latter, to their 
 deep regret, find themselves compelled to take if necessary 
 by force of arms those measures of defence already fore- 
 shadowed as indispensable, in view of the menace of 
 France/ 
 
 At what hour does not appear, but evidently early in 
 the day, M. Davignon telegraphed to the Belgian Ministers 
 at London and Paris : 2 ' The General Staff announces 
 that Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenich.' 
 The Belgian Government at once declared that ' they were 
 firmly decided to resist the aggression of Germany by all 
 means in their power '. ' Belgium appeals ', they added, 
 ' to England, France and Russia to co-operate as guarantors 
 in the defence of her territory. ' 3 
 
 Sir Edward Grey, telegraphing to Sir Edward Goschen 4 
 in Berlin before the actual invasion of Belgium was known, 
 said : ' His Majesty's Government are bound to protest 
 against the violation of a treaty to which Germany is 
 a party in common with themselves, and must request an 
 assurance that the demand made upon Belgium will not 
 be proceeded with.' 
 
 1 Belgian Book, No. 27. 2 Belgian Book, No. 30. 
 
 3 French Book, No. 152. 4 Blue Book, No. 153. 
 
 
TUESDAY, AUGUST 4 199 
 
 In the course of the day, two interesting telegrams were 
 dispatched from Berlin. The first was from Herr von 
 Jagow to Prince Lichnowsky. 1 The German Ambassador 
 was requested to ' dispel any mistrust ' on the part of the 
 British Government, by assuring them that, ' even in the 
 case of armed conflict with Belgium/ Germany would 
 under no pretence annex Belgian territory. In con- 
 firmation it was pointed out that Germany was ' solemnly 
 pledged ' to respect the neutrality of Holland, and that 
 there would be no use in annexing Belgium without 
 a portion of Holland as well. ' According to absolutely 
 unimpeachable information,' the French had planned an 
 attack across Belgium ; wherefore ' Germany had to dis- 
 regard Belgian neutrality, it being for her a question of 
 life and death to prevent a French advance '. Herr von 
 Jagow apparently did not ask himself why Germany's 
 ' solemn pledge ' to Holland should be considered a good 
 security at the moment when she was breaking her 
 solemn pledge to Belgium. 
 
 The second telegram was from the Belgian Minister in 
 Berlin to his Government, 2 and contained the following 
 extract from a speech delivered in the Reichstag by the 
 Imperial Chancellor : 
 
 ' We are faced with the necessity of self-defence ; 
 and necessity knows no law. 
 
 Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and have 
 perhaps already entered Belgium. This is contrary to 
 the dictates of international law. France has, it is true, 
 declared at Brussels that she was prepared to respect 
 the neutrality of Belgium so long as it was respected 
 by her adversary. But we knew that France was ready 
 to invade Belgium. France could wait ; we could not. 
 A French attack upon our flank in the region of the 
 Lower Rhine might have been fatal. We were, there- 
 fore, compelled to override the legitimate protests of 
 the Governments of Luxemburg and Belgium. For the 
 
 1 Blue Book, No. 157. 
 
 2 Belgian Book, No. 35. The translation here given is rather 
 more literal than that in the C.D.D. 
 
200 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 wrong I speak frankly the wrong that we are thus 
 doing, we will make reparation as soon as our military 
 object is attained. 
 
 Any one in such grave danger as ourselves, and who 
 is struggling for his supreme welfare, can have only one 
 thought : how to hack his way through/ 
 
 It is well known that Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg has 
 since tried to withdraw this frank confession of wrong- 
 doing, on the childish ground that Belgium had sacrificed 
 her neutrality by consulting as to how it should be de- 
 fended if attacked ! As though burglary became morally 
 justified the moment it appeared that the victim had 
 installed a burglar-alarm ! 
 
 When the news of the German declaration of war 
 against Belgium and the violation of Belgian territory 
 reached London, Sir Edward Grey dispatched a second 
 telegram to Sir Edward Goschen, 1 which concluded thus : 
 
 ' In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that 
 Germany declined to give the same assurance respecting 
 Belgium as France gave last week in reply to our request 
 made simultaneously at Berlin and Paris, we must repeat 
 that request, and ask that a satisfactory reply to it, and 
 to my telegram of this morning, be received here by 
 12 o'clock to-night. If not, you are instructed to ask 
 for your passports, and to say that His Majesty's 
 Government feel bound to take all steps in their power 
 to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance 
 of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party as 
 ourselves/ 
 
 It was after presenting this ultimatum that Sir Edward 
 Goschen had his historic interview with the Imperial 
 Chancellor : 2 
 
 ' I found the Chancellor very much agitated. His 
 Excellency at once began a harangue which lasted about 
 twenty minutes. He said that the step taken by His 
 Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree ; just 
 for a word, " neutrality ", a word that in war-time 
 had so often been disregarded just for a scrap of jpaper 
 
 1 Blue Book, No. 159. 2 Blue Book, No. 160. 
 
TUESDAY, AUGUST 4 201 
 
 Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred 
 nation who desired nothing better than to be friends 
 with her. All his efforts in that direction had been 
 rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the policy 
 to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his 
 accession to office, had tumbled down like a house of 
 cards. What we had done was unthinkable ; it was 
 like striking a man from behind while he was fighting 
 for his life against two assailants. He held Great 
 Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might 
 happen. I protested strongly against that statement, 
 and said that, in the same way as he and Herr von 
 Jagow wished me to understand that for strategical 
 reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany 
 to advance through Belgium and violate the latter's 
 neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it 
 was, so to speak, a matter " of life and death " for the 
 honour of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn 
 engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's 
 neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply 
 had to be kept, or what confidence could any one have 
 in engagements given by Great Britain in the future ? ' 
 
 Under the form of perfect politeness, this was a scathing 
 mot de la fin. It was as much as to say, ' What confidence 
 can any one have in engagements given by Germany in 
 the future ? ' a question which remains unanswered. 
 
 That night the mob broke the windows of the British 
 Embassy ; but otherwise Sir Edward Goschen and his 
 staff escaped the puerile indignities to which M. Cambon 
 was subjected in leaving the country. It is pleasant to 
 record that Herr von Jagow, whom we have not hitherto 
 seen reason to regard with much respect, conducted him- 
 self like a perfect gentleman which is more than can be 
 said of his Imperial Master. 
 
CHAPTER XXII 
 
 PEACE PROPOSALS AND THEIR FATE 
 (!N TABULAR FORM) 
 
 THE ENTENTE POWERS 1 
 i. Sazonof, supported by 
 Grey, proposes at Vienna 
 extension of time-limit 
 (R.B. 4; B.B. 26). Same 
 proposal urged at Berlin by 
 Grey (B.B. 18), and by 
 Sazonof (F.B. 42). 
 
 THE GERMANIC POWERS 
 
 Jagow ' informs Vienna 
 telegraphically ', and in- 
 structs Tschirscky to 'speak 
 to Berchtold about it ' ; but 
 ' fears that, in absence of 
 Berchtold ', his action may 
 ' have no result ', and ' has 
 doubts as to the wisdom 
 of Austria yielding ' (R.B. 
 14; B.B. 18). In Vienna, 
 Macchio ' predicts categori- 
 cal refusal ' (R.B. n), and 
 Berchtold ' cannot consent ' 
 (A.B. 20). 
 
 Jagow, on July 25, is 
 ' ready to fall in with the 
 suggestion ' (B.B. 18) ; while 
 Bethmann-Hollweg is ' pre- 
 pared to intercede ' (G.B. 
 13). On July 27 Jagow is 
 still ' disposed to join in ' 
 (F.B. 67). On same day 
 (two days after receipt of 
 proposal) Bethmann-Holl- 
 weg says, ' We have at 
 once (!) started the media- 
 
 1 There was throughout absolute unanimity among the Entente 
 Powers. If any proposal made by one of them was not supported 
 by the others at Berlin or Vienna, it was solely for lack of time 
 or opportunity. 
 
 2. Grey proposes at Berlin 
 that 'Germany,Italy,France, 
 and England should work 
 together simultaneously at 
 Vienna and St. Petersburg in 
 favour of moderation' (B.B. 
 n). Cambon, at Berlin, re- 
 peatedly supports the pro- 
 posal. 
 
PEACE PROPOSALS AND THEIR FATE 203 
 
 THE ENTENTE POWERS 
 
 3. Grey to Berlin : 'Very 
 desirable to get Austria 
 not to precipitate military 
 action ' (B.B. n). Bro- 
 newsky to Jagow : ' Action 
 at least might be delayed 
 so as to allow the Powers 
 to exert themselves to avoid 
 a conflict ' (F.B. 43). 
 
 4. Grey ' hopes Germany 
 will feel able to influence 
 Austria to take a favour- 
 able view ' of Serbian reply 
 (B.B. 27). 
 
 5. Grey's conference pro- 
 posal : Ambassadors of 
 France, Italy, and Ger- 
 many to consult with him 
 (Grey) ' for purpose of dis- 
 covering an issue which 
 would prevent complica- 
 tions ' (B.B. 36). 
 
 THE GERMANIC POWERS 
 tion proposal in Vienna ' 
 (G.B. 15). Apparently it is 
 merged in Vienna with the 
 conference proposal (5), for 
 no separate answer is made. 
 
 No notice taken in Berlin. 
 
 Tschirscky instructed to 
 ' pass on ' (not to support) 
 this hope. Zimmermann, 
 however, thinks that in 
 passing it on the German 
 Government ' associate 
 themselves to a certain 
 extent with the hope '. 
 They ' do not see their way 
 to go beyond this ' (B.B. 
 34) ; Berchtold declines 
 (A.B. 29). 
 
 Jagow rejects, because 
 conference 'would amount 
 to a court of arbitration ' 
 (B.B. 43), and Bethmann- 
 Hollweg because ' it would 
 have the appearance of 
 an Areopagus ' (B.B. 71). 
 They do not even ' pass it 
 on ' to Vienna. It reaches 
 Berchtold, however, through 
 Mensdorff and Bunsen (A.B. 
 38 and 41). For his answer, 
 see under 6. 
 
204 
 
 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 THE ENTENTE POWERS 
 6. Grey suggests to Berlin 
 that Serbian reply ' should 
 at least be treated as basis 
 for discussion and pause ' 
 (B.B. 46). 
 
 7. Cambon suggested to 
 Jagow, on July 27, that the 
 Four Powers should advise 
 Vienna ' to abstain from all 
 action which might aggra- 
 vate the existing situation ' 
 (R.B. 39). 
 
 8. ' Direct conversations' 
 between Russia and Austria 
 proposed by Sazonof on 
 Pourtales' advice (R.B. 25). 
 Proposal energetically sup- 
 ported by France and Eng- 
 land. 
 
 THE GERMANIC POWERS 
 
 Bethmann-Hollweg ' com- 
 municates Grey's opinion ', 
 and is answered that 'events 
 have marched too rapidly ' 
 (B.B. 75). Berchtold de- 
 clines this proposal, along 
 with 5 and, by implica- 
 tion, 2. He does not, how- 
 ever, raise the objection to 
 the ' Areopagus ', which is 
 considered fatal in Berlin 
 (A.B. 41). 
 
 ' Jagow refused point- 
 blank to accept this sug- 
 gestion, in spite of the en- 
 treaties of the Ambassa- 
 dor ' (R.B. 39). 
 
 Jagow thought that con- 
 versations ' might as well 
 go on ', but ' could not 
 advise Austria to give way '. 
 (R.B. 38). Both Jagow and 
 Bethmann-Hollweg several 
 times expressed great faith 
 in the conversations, when 
 it was a question of side- 
 tracking another proposal. 
 Berchtold, on July 28, ' em- 
 phasized his inability to 
 concur in such a proposal ' 
 (A.B. 40). On July 30, 
 alleging that there had been 
 a misunderstanding, he 
 withdrew his veto (B.B. 96, 
 A.B. 50). Possibly, but not 
 probably, a telegram from 
 Bethmann-Hollweg (p. 134) 
 may have influenced him. 
 Conversations finally ' over- 
 
PEACE PROPOSALS AND THEIR FATE 205 
 
 THE ENTENTE POWERS 
 
 9. Grey proposes to Berlin 
 that since German Govern- 
 ment object to the form 
 of his conference proposal, 
 they should themselves sug- 
 gest a workable form (B.B. 
 84). This common-sense 
 proposal is several times 
 repeated by England and 
 France. 
 
 10. Sazonofs formula 
 dictated to Pourtales at 
 2 a.m. July 30 : Russia 
 will stop all military pre- 
 parations if Austria will 
 ' eliminate from Ultimatum 
 clauses damaging to sove- 
 reignty of Serbia ' (F.B. 
 103). 
 
 11. Sazonofs formula 
 modified by Grey and re- 
 modelled by Sazonof : If 
 Austria will check her ad- 
 vance and allow Powers to 
 determine whether Serbia 
 can satisfy Austria without 
 impairing her sovereignty, 
 Russia .'will maintain her 
 waitingjattitude'. Sent from 
 St. Petersburg to Vienna 
 (R.B. 67; B.B. 120). This 
 merges with an independent 
 but almost identical pro- 
 posal made by Grey to 
 Lichnowsky (B.B. 88) and 
 warmly supported by King 
 
 THE GERMANIC POWERS 
 taken * by German Ulti- 
 matum and war. 
 
 Proposal evaded by Jagow 
 on the plea that ' to gain 
 time ' he has * asked Aus- 
 tria to tell him the ground 
 on which conversations 
 might be opened with her ' 
 (F.B. 109). No answer is 
 ever given to this question, 
 nor does Germany ever 
 make the slightest attempt 
 to draw up a formula of her 
 own. 
 
 Jagow does not even pass 
 it on to Vienna, but simply 
 ' declares that he considers 
 it impossible for Austria to 
 accept it ' (R.B. 63). 
 
 Grey's proposal to Lich- 
 nowsky forwarded by Berlin 
 to Tschirscky in the form 
 that Austria should ' dic- 
 tate her conditions in Serbia* 
 (G.B., C.D.D., p. 410). Con- 
 veyed in still more garbled 
 form to Berchtold. Nomin- 
 ally accepted by him, though 
 essential condition name- 
 ly, that Austria should check 
 her advance is refused 
 (A.B.5I). Berchtold's reply 
 never forwarded by Berlin 
 to England. 
 
206 
 
 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 Jagow ' expressed himself 
 very sympathetically ', but 
 said it was ' impossible to 
 consider any proposal ' till 
 Russia's reply to the Ulti- 
 matum arrived (B.B. 121). 
 
 No notice taken in Berlin. 
 
 THE ENTENTE POWERS THE GERMANIC POWERS 
 George in telegram to Prince 
 Henry (C.D.D. p. 538). 
 
 12. Tsar's proposal to No notice taken in Berlin. 
 Kaiser that dispute should 
 
 be referred to Hague Con- 
 ference (p. 125). 
 
 13. Grey proposes to 
 Berlin formula for Four- 
 Power mediation : Powers 
 shall undertake to Austria 
 that she shall have full 
 satisfaction, and to Russia 
 that Serbian sovereignty 
 shall not be impaired (B.B. 
 in). 
 
 14. Grey's final offer : If 
 Germany will put forward 
 ' any reasonable proposal ' 
 which Russia and France 
 shall unreasonably reject, 
 Britain will withdraw from 
 them her support (B.B. 
 in). 
 
 This list does not include a proposal by Sazonof for 
 joint intervention by England and Italy (B.B. 44), which 
 seems never to have been quite clearly formulated. 
 Nor does it include certain more or less vague proposals 
 emanating from Italy (B.B. 64 and 90). Nor does it 
 include ideas thrown out in conversation, such as Jules 
 Cambon's admirable suggestion to von Jagow that an 
 International Commission might be appointed to see 
 that Austria's just demands upon Serbia were satisfied 
 (F.B. 92). 
 
 In sum, then, we have fourteen definite and clearly 
 distinguishable proposals. Of these not one emanates 
 in the first instance from Berlin. One (8) may have 
 been strongly supported by Bethmann-Hollweg, but the 
 
PEACE PROPOSALS AND THEIR FATE 207 
 
 evidence is doubtful. Five (i, 2, 4, 6, n) are passed 
 on by Berlin as a postman passes on a letter, with 
 complete indifference as to its contents. 1 Three (5, 7, 
 10) are definitely rejected, without consultation with 
 Vienna. Two (9, 13) are evaded, and lead to nothing. 
 Of three (3, 12, 14) no notice is taken. 
 Now listen to the protestations : 
 
 VON JAGOW : ' The last thing Germany wanted was 
 a general war, and he would do all in his power to 
 prevent such a calamity ' (B.B. 18). 
 
 VON JAGOW is ' desirous to co-operate for the main- 
 tenance of peace ' (B.B. 43). Assurance repeated 
 to all the Ambassadors (B.B. 60). 
 
 BETHMANN-HOLLWEG i ' Most anxious that Germany 
 should work together with England for maintenance 
 of general peace. ... He was doing his very best 
 both at Vienna and St. Petersburg. ... A war 
 between the great powers must be avoided (B.B. 71). 
 
 BETHMANN-HOLLWEG : ' Hoped Grey would realize 
 that he was sincerely doing all in his power to 
 prevent danger of European complications ' (B.B. 75). 
 
 BETHMANN-HOLLWEG : He was ' pressing the button ' 
 as hard as he could, and was ' not sure whether he 
 had not gone too far in urging moderation at Vienna ' 
 (B.B. 107). 
 
 BETHMANN-HOLLWEG : He has done everything possible 
 to preach peace and moderation at Vienna, ' perhaps 
 more than was altogether palatable at the Ballplatz ' 
 (B.B. 108). 
 
 VON SCHOEN : ' Germany feels herself identified with 
 France in the ardent desire that peace may be 
 maintained ' (F.B. 56). 
 
 GERMAN BOOK : ' Shoulder to shoulder with England 
 we laboured incessantly, and supported every pro- 
 posal in Vienna from which we hoped to gain the 
 
 1 The illustration is from J'A ccuse. 
 
208 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 possibility of a peaceable solution of the conflict * 
 
 (C.D.D., p. 410). 
 THE KAISER : ' I have gone to the extreme limit of 
 
 the possible in my efforts for the preservation of the 
 
 peace of the world ' (C.D.D., p. 412). 
 GERMAN GOVERNMENT (in declaration of war against 
 
 Russia) : ' The Imperial German Government have 
 
 used every effort since the beginning of the crisis 
 
 to bring about a peaceful settlement ' (R.B. 76). 
 
 Was there ever so crying a disparity between word 
 and deed ? 
 
CHAPTER XXIII 
 THE SUMMING-UP 
 
 ' Neither ridiculous shriekings for revenge by French chauvinists, 
 nor the Englishmen's gnashing of teeth, nor the wild gestures of 
 the Slavs, will turn us from our aim of protecting and extending 
 Deutschtum all the world over.' Memorandum on the strengthen- 
 ing of the German Army, 1913. 
 
 THERE is such a thing as having too good a case. 
 Common experience tells us that the right is seldom all 
 on one side, and he who has to contend that any given 
 instance offers an exception to this rule awakens scepti- 
 cism at the outset. That difficulty must here be faced. 
 I would gladly, if I could, admit faults here or there 
 on the side of the Triple Entente, saying, ' Here England 
 erred ', or ' There Russia put herself in the wrong '. 
 I should thus win credit for impartiality, and yet have, 
 on the balance, an enormously strong case. But I am 
 forced to renounce this advantage. A minute study 
 of the documents has convinced me, not only of the 
 general sincerity of the Triple Entente statesmen and the 
 general justice of their cause, but of the amazing success 
 with which they avoided anything that can be called 
 a tangible, obvious blunder. 
 
 I do not mean that in a large view of international 
 relations, extending over many years, justification might 
 not be found for some of the sentiments and actions of 
 the Germanic Powers. With that I am not concerned. 
 I believe that even such a survey would show that an 
 unwarrantable and fallaciously-inspired aggressiveness 
 on the part of these Powers was at the root of the 
 whole trouble ; but that is no part of my case. What 
 I do contend is that, from the delivery of the Austrian 
 
 1852 O 
 
210 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 Ultimatum onwards, every action of the Germanic 
 Powers showed, if not a deliberate design to provoke a 
 European war, at any rate a criminal recklessness in face 
 of the manifest danger of such a catastrophe. Or, to 
 put it more accurately, the diplomatists showed from the 
 first a criminal recklessness, which, in the course of a few 
 days, enabled the soldiers to take the upper hand, and 
 carry through their deliberate design of forcing a war. 
 
 When we penetrate the mist of words that has been 
 raised around it, the problem is really a simple one. The 
 main issues are three : 
 
 1. Were Germany and Austria bent on war from the 
 beginning ? Or with what other designs did they embark 
 upon their adventure ? 
 
 2. Ought Russia to have stood by, and let Austria 
 work her will upon the Serbs ? 
 
 3. If it be admitted that Russia did right to intervene, 
 must we nevertheless hold that, by undue haste to 
 mobilize, she precipitated the war ? 
 
 The answer to the first question is, I think, clearly 
 this : No, Germany and Austria that is to say, the 
 authorities who actually controlled the drafting and 
 launching of the Ultimatum did not deliberately set 
 forth to provoke a European war. What they aimed 
 at was a cheap and yet brilliant military-diplomatic 
 triumph. They wanted to gratify, by a ' punitive ' 
 expedition, the Austrian thirst for vengeance upon Serbia, 
 and at the same time to deal a deadly blow at Russian 
 influence in the Balkans. While resentment was the 
 immediate motive of Austria, the immediate motive of 
 Germany was a desire to rehabilitate her prestige felt 
 to be somewhat impaired in her Morocco adventures 
 by a resplendent repetition, on a much larger scale, of 
 the diplomatic victory of 1908-9. It was evident that 
 an Austrian conquest of Serbia would be a far more 
 bitter humiliation to Russia than the peaceable annexa- 
 tion of Bosnia and Herzegovina. When the Kaiser 
 
THE SUMMING-UP 211 
 
 telegraphed to the Tsar : ' I am of opinion that it is 
 perfectly possible for Russia to remain a spectator in 
 the Austro-Serbian war ', and when Austrian and German 
 statesmen professed surprise that Russia should think 
 this ' local ' quarrel any business of hers, they were 
 using phrases so manifestly ' diplomatic ' that they 
 scarcely deserve to be called hypocritical. Nobody knew 
 better than they did that, even if Austria's assurances 
 as to Serbian integrity and sovereignty had any sub- 
 stantial value and I think I have shown that they had 
 none a military ' chastisement ' of little Serbia by her 
 huge neighbour must be a cruel blow to Russian feeling 
 and an incurable wound to Russian prestige. Ultimately, 
 it would have shown the impotence of the Triple Entente ; 
 for if Russia had pocketed such an insult, it could only 
 have been because she and France together did not feel 
 strong enough to take up the gauntlet. That was pre- 
 cisely the point at which German diplomacy aimed ; 
 to have flouted the Entente, without any expenditure 
 of German money or blood (Serbian blood, and a little 
 Austro-Hungarian, were of no account) would have been 
 just such a triumph of Machtpolitik as German states- 
 manship extols in theory and hungers-for in practice. 
 Everything goes to show that this was what Bethmann- 
 Hollweg, von Jagow and Co. and possibly the Kaiser to 
 boot had at first in view. We may, if we please, imagine 
 the Great General Staff standing behind them and 
 chuckling to think how slight was the chance of their 
 bringing off the coup how certain the ultimate resort 
 to arms. But of this we have no evidence. We are 
 bound to say, on the evidence before us, that Germany, 
 as represented by the men who actually controlled her 
 policy, did not at first mean war, but hoped merely to 
 defy with impunity, and thereby to weaken, the Triple 
 Entente. 
 
 It may seem that in answering the first question, we 
 have assumed the answer to the second : ought Russia 
 
 02 
 
212 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 to have stood by and let Austria work her will upon the 
 Serbs ? But this is not precisely the case. We have 
 assumed that Russia would, as a matter of fact, deeply 
 resent an Austrian assault upon Serbia, but we have not 
 assumed that she would be right in doing so. It is con- 
 ceivable that abstract justice was on the Austrian side, 
 and that Russia ought, even at some cost to racial and 
 religious sympathies, to have left Serbia to her fate. 
 If this theory were tenable, we should have to admit 
 that France perhaps, and Britain certainly, ought to 
 have refused Russia their diplomatic and military sup- 
 port. But is the theory tenable ? 
 
 Let us first of all note that questions arising from the 
 murder of the Archduke and his consort are really 
 extraneous to the argument. We have incontrovertible 
 evidence in Signor Giolitti's revelations, that in August 
 1913, almost a year before the Serajevo crime, Austria 
 was on the verge of making a similar attack on Serbia, 
 and abandoned it only on the remonstrance of one, and 
 perhaps both, of her allies. The murder of the Archduke 
 was, then, only a pretext for her action of July 1914. 
 It might, and perhaps did (though the evidence offered 
 is far from conclusive) strengthen her case against Serbia, 
 but her will to crush her inconvenient neighbour existed 
 quite independently of it. Was this will, then, justified ? 
 
 It is not denied that Austria had a good deal to com- 
 plain of. She had given Serbia great provocation, both 
 in deed and in word. She had twice thrown herself 
 imperiously across the path of very natural Serbian 
 ambitions, and she governed large populations of Serbian 
 race and religion in such a way as to cause bitter dis- 
 content. Serbian hatred, then, was no groundless or 
 wanton emotion ; but for that Austria could not be 
 expected to make allowance. The plain fact was that 
 Serbian hatred existed, and took forms very inconvenient 
 for Austria, upon which she naturally desired to place 
 a check. It was also a fact that Russian influence had 
 
 
THE SUMMING-UP 213 
 
 in some degree fomented anti-Austrian feeling in Serbia. 
 Had Austria, then, taken reasonable measures to abate 
 this nuisance to see that the Serbian Government 
 exercised its power, and if necessary took new powers, 
 to quell anti-Austrian agitation within its territory no 
 one would have objected. The aim was legitimate, and 
 the Russian Government was prepared to admit it. 
 But Austria's whole proceedings proved that it was not 
 this legitimate aim that she had in view. She wanted, 
 in the first place, to take a bloody revenge upon a whole 
 people for the acts and expressions of a few individuals, 
 and the alleged neglect of the Government to keep these 
 individuals in control ; and in the second place she wanted 
 to prove to the Balkan peoples, by a conspicuous example, 
 that they could not rely upon the protection of Russia 
 against the encroachments of the Central-European 
 Powers. Her assertions that she merely wanted security 
 for the future good behaviour of Serbia were manifestly 
 hollow. She was out after vengeance and domination, 
 and the insolence of her demands was in fact directed, 
 not against Serbia, but against Russia. 
 
 In order to see things in their true proportions, let 
 us imagine the case reversed let us imagine Austria 
 acting reasonably and Russia unreasonably. Let us 
 suppose the Note to have been such that impartial judges 
 Sir Edward Grey, M. Viviani, the Marchese di San 
 Giuliano should have said, on seeing it, ' This is severe, 
 but, considering the circumstances, not excessive. Serbia 
 would do well to submit.' Let us suppose that Austria 
 had shown herself willing to explain, both to Serbia 
 and to the Powers, any points that seemed to infringe 
 upon Serbian sovereignty. Let us suppose that no 
 time-limit had, in the first instance, been fixed, and that 
 only after Serbia had shown a disposition to vexatious 
 delay had Austria threatened the breaking-off of diplo- 
 matic relations. Let us suppose, finally, that Russia had 
 encouraged Serbia in evasive recalcitrancy, professing, 
 
214 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 perhaps, an attitude of impartiality, but industriously 
 screening Belgrade, as Germany, in fact, screened Vienna. 
 If this, or something like this, had been the course of 
 events, the world might still conceivably have been at 
 war, for France might have been unwillingly dragged 
 in by her obligations to Russia, and, if Germany had 
 violated Belgian neutrality, we, too, should have had 
 to take up arms. But how different would have been 
 the spirit of the Triple Entente ! Instead of feeling 
 that we were resisting two monstrously unjust aggres- 
 sions of strength upon weakness, we should have had to 
 own that the initial fault was pretty evenly divided 
 between Teuton and Slav, and that only a deplorable 
 concatenation of circumstances had forced France and 
 England into a struggle which their honour demanded, 
 but in which their conscience was ill at ease. 
 
 Now contrast with this the actual course of events ! 
 Austria hurls at Serbia, with calculated brutality, a set 
 of demands unprecedented in diplomatic history. She 
 has the effrontery to pretend to impartial Powers that 
 ' her requirements contain nothing which is not a matter 
 of course in the intercourse between States which are to 
 live in peace and friendship '. l She attaches to them 
 a time-limit which gives Serbia no chance of taking 
 counsel with her friends, and the Powers no chance of 
 acquainting themselves with the alleged grounds for this 
 violent procedure. She chooses her time so as to take 
 everybody, except her ally, off their guard, and con- 
 tributes to this effect by giving obviously insincere 
 assurances as to the nature of her demands. The inten- 
 tion to place Russia ' in presence of a fait accompli ' is 
 cynically evident, and when Russia begs for an extension 
 of the time-limit, Austria curtly refuses. 
 
 1 Austrian Book, No. 9. A dispatch from Count Berchtold 
 to Count Mensdorff on the day of the delivery of the Ultimatum. 
 It was to Sir Edward Grey that this amazing impertinence was 
 to be addressed. 
 
THE SUMMING-UP 215 
 
 Nevertheless, Russia urges Serbia to reply with modera- 
 tion, and Serbia acts upon the advice with a complete- 
 ness which surprises everybody, and most of all, we 
 may be sure, Austria herself. Serbia, with scarcely 
 a wry face, eats almost the whole of the huge slice of 
 humble-pie handed out to her. She promises public 
 apology for any misdeeds of which she may have been 
 guilty, engages to gag her press, to break up her patriotic 
 societies, to alter the spirit of her education, consents 
 to dismiss from her service any officials who can be 
 shown to have offended against Austria, and even agrees 
 to accept Austrian interference in her internal administra- 
 tion, so far as it may be consistent with her rights as 
 a sovereign State. She goes, in short, to such an extreme 
 of self-abasement, that had Austria simply accepted the 
 reply as it stood, she would have scored an unexampled 
 diplomatic victory. But a diplomatic victory is not 
 enough for her she must have blood. Therefore, with- 
 out taking a moment to consider the Reply just 
 thirty-two minutes, on his own showing, after it is handed 
 to him her Minister leaves Belgrade. Three days later 
 war is declared, and Belgrade bombarded. Can any 
 reasonable person pretend that if Russia had looked on 
 passively at this ferocious bludgeoning of a kindred 
 people which had implored her aid, she could have 
 retained either her self-respect or the respect of any 
 other nation in the world ? 
 
 To say that Russia made her stand upon the point of 
 prestige is to do her injustice. She was willing to sacrifice 
 a certain measure of prestige for the sake of peace. 
 So evident was the intention to flout and defy her, 
 that if she had come to any accommodation with Austria, 
 especially after the bombardment of Belgrade had 
 actually begun, her prestige could not but have suffered. 
 Yet she was willing to endure this if the world-catastrophe 
 could thereby have been averted. Only she was not 
 willing to stand by and see Serbia first devastated by 
 
216 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 war and then reduced to abject subserviency to the 
 Austro-Magyar Empire. 
 
 The answer to the third question the question of 
 Russian mobilization follows almost of necessity from 
 the answer to the second. If Russia was justified in 
 intervening at all on behalf of Serbia, she was also 
 justified in taking the only measures which could make 
 her intervention effective. To have proffered verbal 
 remonstrances unsupported by any military measures 
 would have been a gratuitous confession of impotence. 
 If she was not prepared to mobilize, her wisest course 
 would have been to make no protest at all, and simply 
 look the other way while Austria strangled Serbia. 
 Russia was bound either to mobilize or to renounce 
 all claim to influence the course of events in other 
 words, to submit to that ' localization ' of the quarrel 
 which would have meant the handing over of all the 
 Southern Slavs to Teuton domination. She had either 
 to mobilize or to abandon her whole position in the 
 Balkans. 
 
 If this be admitted, there still remains the question 
 whether her mobilization was over-hasty, and justified 
 Germany's headlong rush into the fray. But how can 
 this possibly be maintained ? Austria's every action 
 proclaimed her purpose of relying on her old and tried 
 manoeuvre of the fait accompli. She had openly mobilized 
 half her army against Serbia, and though she tried to 
 keep further preparations dark, it is admitted by the 
 German Chancellor that she had mobilized two army 
 corps 'in the north'. It is also certain that she had 
 made preparations in Galicia. So long as there was any 
 hope of her refraining from actual hostilities against 
 Serbia, Russia confined herself to measures of precaution, 
 and did not actually mobilize. When war was declared 
 and fighting had begun, Russia mobilized in four southern 
 circumscriptions, and loyally informed Germany of the 
 fact. Thirty-six hours later, Germany, without even 
 
THE SUMMING-UP 217 
 
 consulting Austria, flatly refused the extremely moderate 
 conditions on which Russia offered to ' stop all military 
 preparations '. At the same time, Austria proceeded 
 to meet Russia's partial mobilization by mobilizing at 
 all points. Can any one wonder that Russia, seeing 
 no signs of an honest will for conciliation in either of her 
 two neighbours, felt compelled to follow suit, and begin 
 the notoriously slow process of mobilizing all her 
 forces ? 
 
 In this she would have been justified even if Germany 
 had, as Germany pretended, taken no steps of the same 
 nature. But there is not the slightest reason to doubt 
 that the intelligence received by Russia as to Germany's 
 extensive preparations was correct. So early as July 21, 
 two days before the delivery of the Austrian Ultimatum, 
 M. Jules Cambon reported x from Berlin that preliminary 
 notices of mobilization had been sent out a recognized 
 means of calling reservists to ' attention ', to which the 
 Government could have recourse ' without indiscretion 
 and without exciting the people '. The testimonies to 
 great military activity in Germany, from the moment 
 the crisis declared itself, are numerous and circumstantial. 
 M. Viviani thus sums up the intelligence received by the 
 French Government as to preparations on the western 
 frontier : 2 
 
 ' From the morning of the 25th July, that is to 
 say even before the expiration of the time-limit given 
 to Serbia by Austria, she had confined to barracks 
 the garrisons of Alsace-Lorraine. The same day she 
 had placed the frontier-works in a complete state of 
 defence. On the 26th, she had indicated to the rail- 
 ways the measures preparatory for concentration. 
 On the 27th, she had completed requisitions and 
 placed her covering troops in position. On the 28th, 
 the summons of individual reservists had begun, and 
 units which were distant from the frontier had been 
 brought up to it.' 
 
 1 French Book, No. 15. 2 French Book, No. 159. 
 
2i8 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 Can we doubt that similar measures were being taken 
 on the eastern frontier as well ? We know that at mid- 
 day on Thursday the 30th, more than twelve hours 
 before Russia ordered general mobilization, a Berlin 
 official paper published the news of general mobilization 
 in Germany ; and although it was quickly withdrawn, it 
 affords unquestionable evidence that Germany was at 
 that moment trembling on the verge of a decision at 
 the very time, by the way, when von Jagow was refusing 
 the conditions on which Russia offered to stop all military 
 measures. In sum, there is every reason to believe that 
 Germany's pretended quiescence was entirely unreal, and 
 that M. Schebeko was right when he said on August i 
 that ' the so-called mobilization of Russia amounted to 
 nothing more than that Russia had taken military 
 measures corresponding to those taken by Germany '. 
 
 It is a notorious and unquestioned fact that Germany 
 could and did mobilize ten times more rapidly than 
 Russia. Her argument that Russian mobilization drove 
 her to war would have had some justification if the 
 rapidity had been on the other side, and Prussia had had 
 to face an enemy as nimble in attack as he was formid- 
 able in bulk. As matters really stood, it was absurd to 
 pretend that Germany could not afford, even for a day, 
 to confine herself to mere counter-mobilization, but must 
 hurry out her Ultimatum and rush into war. Such an 
 argument can only proceed either from conscious hypocrisy 
 or unreasoning panic. To be quite fair, however, one 
 must own that what would be hypocrisy in another nation 
 cannot always, in the case of Germany, be rightly called 
 by that name. She seems to be absolutely sincere in 
 asserting a prescriptive right to have all the advantages 
 always on her side, and regarding it as morally indefensible 
 on the part of her neighbours to contest this claim. 
 Therefore, measures which, in any other Power, would 
 be wanton aggression, are, in Germany, imperative self- 
 defence, and it was her sacred duty to plunge the world 
 
THE SUMMING-UP 219 
 
 into war rather than face, for the chance of peace, the 
 possibility that, if that chance failed, Russia might prove 
 to be slightly less unprepared than the interests of 
 Germany demanded. 
 
 Nor is there any ground, as we have already seen, 
 for Germany's reiterated assertion that Russia's mobiliza- 
 tion rendered her pacific exertions ' illusory ', and finally 
 ' spoiled everything '. It spoiled nothing but the Austro- 
 German scheme for ' localizing ' the conflict, which meant, 
 in other words, humiliating Russia. Austria, as a matter 
 of fact, took Russia's mobilization quite calmly. 1 Twice 
 before, in recent years, Austria and Russia had mobilized 
 against each other without coming to blows. There is 
 not the slightest evidence that Germany either originated 
 or ' passed on ' any proposal which Austria might have 
 accepted if Russia had not mobilized, but declined 
 because she had. We know that nothing of the sort 
 took place. On the contrary, any little disposition to- 
 wards compromise that Austria actually showed, followed 
 on Russian mobilization, and was certainly due to it. 
 Nothing can be emptier than the assertion in the German 
 Book that Russian mobilization ' destroyed the laborious 
 measures of pacification undertaken by the European 
 Cabinets, just as they were on the point of succeeding '. 
 If Germany thought they were on the point of succeeding 
 (and by lifting a finger she could have made them succeed), 
 she had all the less excuse for hurrying into war. She 
 knew very well that Russia did not want war. That 
 had been the general opinion both at Berlin and Vienna 
 at the beginning of the crisis, and Sazonof's patient 
 efforts at conciliation had shown the opinion to be true 2 
 
 1 She did not even declare war upon Russia until August 6. 
 
 2 A superficial criticism may object that I have myself called 
 this ' Germany's great illusion '. That is not so. Germany's 
 illusion was that Russia could not and would not under any 
 circumstances take the field. A country may not want war, 
 may be sincerely unwilling to make war except in the last resort, 
 
220 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 The Tsar had admitted that Germany's own mobilization 
 was a justified measure of security, and had promised 
 not to make it a reason for provocative action on the part 
 of the Russian forces. The sincerity of this promise was 
 beyond all doubt, if only because it was to Russia's 
 manifest interest that, even if war must come, it should 
 be delayed as long as possible. Under these circumstances, 
 if Germany really thought that the Serbian difficulty was 
 on the point of settlement, her action in declaring war 
 upon Russia was simply insane there is no other term 
 for it. We are bound, then, to accept the less violent 
 hypothesis in accounting for her proceedings, and con- 
 clude, not that she was insane in making war, but that 
 she was insincere in pretending that she believed a peaceful 
 settlement to be at hand. She knew it was not at hand, 
 because she did not choose that it should be. Those 
 who now controlled her actions saw that they had missed 
 the propitious moment for a peaceful victory. Had 
 they bidden Austria hold her hand five days, or even 
 three days, earlier, the confederates would still have 
 scored a diplomatic success of no mean importance, 
 though not quite the shining-armour triumph they had 
 set out for. But it was now too late. A peaceful settle- 
 ment at this point might still have looked like a mild 
 success for Austria, but for Germany it would have meant 
 a distinct ' climb down '. The choice lay between war 
 and fiasco, and Germany deliberately chose war. This 
 may have been moral insanity, but it was not the intel- 
 lectual aberration we usually designate by that word. 
 It was not insane it was only wicked. 
 
 It is true, of course it is implied in what has just 
 been said that Russian mobilization caused the war, 
 
 and may yet be resolute to take up arms rather than wholly 
 fail in her duty to others and to herself. That was Russia's 
 position. Germany was right in thinking that she did not want 
 war, but wrong in supposing that she could not be goaded 
 into it. 
 
THE SUMMING-UP 221 
 
 in the sense that it came between Germany and the 
 peaceful triumph she had planned. If everything is 
 morally wrong that interferes with German designs, then 
 Russia, no doubt, was greatly to blame. But this plea, 
 in its naked unreason, would scarcely satisfy even the 
 German conscience. Hence all the elaborate sophistries 
 that have to be devised in order to throw dust in the eyes 
 of the German people, and persuade them that inoffensive, 
 peaceful Germany was ambushed by a gang of bravos. 
 
 No one who reads the diplomatic documents attentively 
 can fail to be struck by an all-pervading difference of 
 tone. On the side of the Triple Entente, everything is 
 frank, straightforward, above-board ; -on the side of the 
 Germanic Powers everything is crafty, evasive, under- 
 hand. Austria strikes the keynote in her pretence to 
 the Ambassadors in Vienna, and even to Sir Edward 
 Grey, that her Note to Serbia would contain no unusual 
 or disquieting demands. No human being can believe 
 that this was her sincere opinion. It was the first move 
 in a preconcerted scheme for rushing through a spirited 
 act of vengeance, and of moral, if not territorial, aggran- 
 dizement, before bewildered Europe had time to collect 
 herself and intervene. And so the carefully-planned 
 razzia went on. This suggestion is ' belated ', that is 
 ' outstripped by events ' as though the ' events ' were 
 anything else than the deliberate acts of the party 
 putting forward the plea. It is impossible that Austria 
 can have been under any illusion : she must have known 
 very well that these were simply the ironic impertinences 
 of one who, thinking himself master of the situation, 
 professes a polite regret for setting every one else at 
 defiance. And presently Germany, with characteristic 
 clumsiness, proceeds to give the trick away. She is 
 sadly afraid that, in her ardent devotion to peace, she 
 may have imprudently put too much pressure on her 
 headstrong ally, and hurried him into adopting the 
 policy of the fait accompli. At many other points in 
 
222 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 her campaign of obstruction, her proceedings may con- 
 ceivably be attributable to stupidity. Indeed, it is only 
 fair to make generous allowances on this score. But 
 here it is not stupidity that is at work or rather it is 
 stupidity coupled with deliberate, purposeful bad faith. 
 The Chancellor and the Foreign Secretary simply cannot 
 have been sincere in concerting for they obviously did 
 concert this ridiculous manoeuvre. It is said that 
 Dickens is (or was) popular in Germany, but had Beth- 
 mann-Hollweg and von Jagow read their David Copperfield 
 they would have known that, in England at any rate, 
 the trick was exposed in advance. It carries us back 
 to Doctors' Commons in the eighteen-forties to hear 
 Herr von Spenlow protesting : ' Certainly I am all for 
 peace and conciliation. If it had been my lot to have 
 my hands unfettered if I had not a partner Graf 
 Jorkins ! But Graf Jorkins is not a man to respond 
 to a pacific proposition. We must handle Graf Jorkins 
 tenderly, or, before we know where we are, he may 
 confront us with a fait accompli ! ' The comedy is ex- 
 quisite, if one only had the heart to laugh. 
 
 To speak of stupidity as a prevailing characteristic 
 of the German proceedings may seem like a piece of mere 
 rudeness, and one would fain not fail in civility even to 
 German statesmen. But I am really not indulging in 
 random vituperation : I am stating quite soberly an 
 impression that has been irresistibly borne in upon me. 
 Here I distinguish between Germany and Austria. Vienna 
 is insolent, but not stupid. Berlin, on the other hand, 
 seems incapable of grasping an idea clearly or stating 
 it accurately. It is notable that the proposals ' passed 
 on ' from Berlin are generally more or less blurred or 
 distorted in the process not, as a rule, purposely, but 
 because every thought seems to lose its sharp edges in 
 the German mind. Sometimes, no doubt, it is wilfully 
 altered. When Sir Edward Grey's proposal that Austria, 
 being ' in occupation of some Serbian territory ', should 
 
THE SUMMING-UP 223 
 
 hold it ' pending an effort of the Powers to mediate ', 
 reappears in the form that Austria should ' dictate her 
 conditions ' in Serbia (dort seine Bedingungen diktieren), 
 the phraseology is evidently ' dictated ' by a desire to 
 place the dear ally in a conquering attitude, which 
 should reflect some of its glory upon the other member 
 of the firm. It might even be charitably interpreted as 
 an endeavour to put the proposal in the form most likely 
 to prove palatable to Graf Jorkins. As a rule, however, 
 one sees no clear motive of cunning in Berlin's inaccu- 
 racies. They seem rather to be the result of a natural 
 and unaffected muddiness of mind. 
 
 I am quite serious in saying that it is only fair to 
 make allowance for this characteristic in studying as 
 I propose to do in a few final words one or two note- 
 worthy passages in the exculpatory utterances of the 
 Imperial Chancellor : the opening narrative of the German 
 Book, the Reichstag speeches of August 4 and December 2, 
 and the circular letter of December 24. 
 
 In the German Book it is written : 
 
 ' In answer to our declaration that the German 
 Government desired and aimed at a localization of 
 the conflict, both the French and the English Govern- 
 ments promised action in the same direction. But 
 these endeavours did not succeed in preventing the 
 interposition of Russia in the Austro-Serbian dis- 
 agreement/ 
 
 In the speech of August 4 the same assertion is repeated: 
 ' All the Cabinets, especially England, take up the same 
 standpoint. Russia alone declares that she must have 
 a say in the settlement of this conflict/ If the speaker 
 were a clear-minded man, one would have to attribute 
 these statements to deliberate duplicity. Dr. von Beth- 
 mann-Hollweg, however, may possibly not have realized 
 that he was perverting the truth. It is perfectly simple. 
 England and France were of course quite willing that 
 the quarrel should be ' localized ', if Russia did not 
 
224 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 feel bound to move in it ; but from the first neither of 
 them doubted that she would feel bound to take the part 
 of Serbia, and both, admitting her right to do so, emphati- 
 cally declined any attempt to influence her to the contrary. 
 But why, it may be asked, did the Chancellor, wittingly 
 or unwittingly, pervert the truth in this particular ? 
 Because, at the time of these utterances, England had 
 not yet declared war, and it was his cue to heap upon 
 Russia the sole responsibility for a wanton attack on 
 her peace-loving neighbour. Was not the very title of 
 the German Book : Wie Russland Deutschland hinterging 
 und den Europdischen Krieg entfesselte ' How Russia 
 betrayed Germany and unchained the European War ' ? 
 It was to this refrain that the first German millions 
 were marched off to the frontiers, in accordance with 
 the freely-expressed German principle that Germany 
 must always seem to be attacked, else her people will 
 not put their heart into the great German industry of 
 war. But when England also ' betrayed ' Germany by 
 declining to betray Belgium, the tune was changed. In 
 his speech of December 2, the Chancellor said : 
 
 ' The responsibility for this greatest of all wars lies 
 clear before us. The outward responsibility rests 
 upon Russia, . . . but the inner responsibility must 
 be borne by the British Government. The London 
 Cabinet could have made this war impossible, had it 
 unmistakably declared in St. Petersburg that England 
 would not suffer a European war to grow out of the 
 Austro-Serbian conflict. In that case France, too, 
 would have been forced energetically to warn Russia 
 against all warlike measures. Then the way would have 
 been clear for our mediatory action. But England did 
 not take this course. ... In spite of all pacific pro- 
 fessions, London gave St. Petersburg to understand 
 that it placed itself at the side of France and Russia. 
 This is incontrovertibly proved by the publications 
 of the different Cabinets, and especially by the English 
 Blue Book itself.' 
 
 Can one conceive any able and clear-headed man, 
 
THE SUMMING-UP 225 
 
 however unscrupulous, standing up, with the knowledge 
 that his words would be scrutinized by history, and 
 talking like this ? In the first place, he contradicts his 
 own previous statement. On August 4 he tried to 
 convey the impression that England and France strove 
 in vain to hold Russia back ; on December 2 he says 
 exactly the opposite. The contradiction is not to be 
 explained by the publication of documents in the interval ; 
 for unless all the German Ambassadors were hopeless 
 incompetents, they must have kept the Chancellor fully 
 informed of the line taken by France and England. 
 Indeed, the Chancellor does not pretend to be correcting 
 his former statement. He seems simply to have for- 
 gotten all about it. 
 
 Now let us look at the delightful sentence which 
 I have ventured to italicize. If England had only acted 
 as Germany's unofficial ally, and bullied Russia into 
 quiescence, Germany would have been able to devote 
 herself to the congenial task of mediation ! To mediate ? 
 Between whom ? She had over and over again laid it 
 down as an axiom that there must be no mediation 
 between Austria and Serbia ; and if Russia was rendered 
 powerless to interfere, it was absurd to talk about media- 
 tion between her and Austria. The artless remark simply 
 throws into relief Germany's general conception of her 
 duty as a peacemaker. ' Mediation ', in her mind, means 
 saying to Austria, ' Go ahead, and God bless you ! ' and 
 to Russia, ' Stir a finger at your peril ! ' 
 
 Finally there arises the question whether it is stupidity 
 or effrontery that asserts that the Blue Book proves 
 England to have encouraged Russia and France by 
 placing herself definitely at their side. The Blue Book, 
 as we know, proves exactly the reverse : namely, that 
 Sir Edward Grey steadfastly resisted all entreaties to 
 take such a step, and only after Germany had declared 
 war on Russia gave his first limited promise of naval 
 support to France. The Chancellor must also have 
 
 1852 p 
 
226 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 known at least, it was his business to know that 
 Sir Edward Grey had been bitterly criticized for not 
 declaring ' solidarity ' with the other Entente Powers, 
 and so stopping the war by bullying, not Russia, but 
 Germany. Apparently the one thing clear to all critics 
 of England's action is that she ought to have bullied 
 somebody. If only Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg and Mr. 
 Bernard Shaw could agree as to who that somebody was, 
 we should at last know what to think. 
 
 After asserting that the Blue Book ' incontrovertibly ' 
 proved his statement, the Chancellor omitted to produce 
 any of these proofs. That is readily explicable, seeing 
 that they did not exist. What he did produce was 
 a sentence from an intercepted letter from the Belgian 
 Minister to Russia, dated July 30, to the effect that 
 people in St. Petersburg were at that date convinced 
 that England would stand by France, and that the 
 conviction greatly strengthened the war party. The 
 fact that this conjecture proved eventually to be right 
 cannot possibly entitle it to rank as evidence against Sir 
 Edward Grey's repeated and explicit refusals to commit 
 England to the support of either Russia or France. Even so 
 late as Saturday, August i, King George's telegram to the 
 French President was a polite evasion of a direct appeal. 
 
 It would be an endless task to follow the Chancellor 
 through all his absurdities, whether of statement or of 
 reasoning. Again and again one asks oneself, ' Can he 
 be stupid enough to believe this ? ' or ' to see any force 
 in that ? ' I have already commented sufficiently on 
 the solemn foolishness of pretending that Russia and 
 France, whose vital interest lay in the longest possible 
 delay, committed the first acts of war, and of arguing 
 that Belgium had forfeited her neutrality because she 
 had discussed measures for defending it in case it should 
 be violated. I shall conclude by instancing one con- 
 fusion of thought, and two false statements, from the 
 circular dispatch of December 24. 
 
THE SUMMING-UP 227 
 
 ' From the beginning ', says the Chancellor, ' Germany 
 had taken up the position that the Austro-Serbian 
 conflict was a matter that concerned only the States 
 immediately involved. This standpoint Sir Edward Grey 
 himself later recognized.' Obviously the Chancellor has 
 in mind the fact that Sir Edward Grey once or twice 
 remarked that if Russia did not feel called upon to 
 interfere, no one else need do so ; and he cannot dis- 
 tinguish between this common-sense remark and adher- 
 ence to the German dogma that Russia had no right to 
 interfere. Sir Edward Grey's attitude was, in fact, as 
 clear as daylight. He said : ' If the presentation of this 
 Ultimatum to Serbia did not lead to trouble between 
 Austria and Russia, we need not concern ourselves 
 about it ; but, if Russia took the view of the Austrian 
 Ultimatum which it seemed to me that any Power interested 
 in Serbia would take, I should be quite powerless, in 
 face of the terms of the Ultimatum, to exercise any 
 moderating influence.' 1 
 
 A wholly erroneous statement is the following : 'Russia 
 mobilized against Austria, though Sazonof fully realized 
 that any direct understanding with Austria was thereby 
 rendered impossible.' This may arise from a confused 
 recollection of the fact that Sazonof, when he learnt of 
 Austria's declaration of war upon Serbia, at first thought 
 that it ' clearly put an end to the idea of direct com- 
 munications between Austria and Russia '. 2 If this be 
 not what the Chancellor had in mind, there is no founda- 
 tion at all for his statement. 3 
 
 Lastly, let us consider this assertion : 
 
 ' It appears from the dispatch of the French Ambas- 
 sador in London (French Book, No. 66) that already 
 
 1 Blue Book, No. 10. z Blue Book, No. 70. 
 
 8 He himself gives a reference to Blue Book, No. 78, which 
 only shows that Austria had broken off conversations before 
 Russia mobilized. 
 
 P2 
 
228 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 on the 24th of July the First Lord of the Admiralty 
 had quietly taken measures for the assembling of the 
 British Fleet at Portland. Thus Britain mobilized 
 earlier than even Serbia.' 
 
 What really appears from French Book, No. 66, is 
 that Mr. Winston Churchill countermanded the dispersal 
 of the fleet, which had been assembled for a review 1 
 on July 18-20, and, but for the delivery of the Austrian 
 Ultimatum, would have been scattered on the 24th. 
 To any reasonable mind, there is a fundamental dis- 
 tinction between ' assembling ' a fleet and postponing 
 its dispersal. The one is an act which may fairly be 
 regarded as menacing, the other is the mildest possible 
 measure of prudence. But as that great national asset, 
 the hatred of England, must be maintained at any cost, 
 the German Chancellor, in support of the ridiculous 
 assertion that England was the first to mobilize, deliber- 
 ately misquotes a document which he apparently has 
 before his eyes, and actually gives the reference, in the 
 serene faith that no one not already in the conspiracy 
 will verify it. This is a case in which the plea of stupidity 
 breaks down. 
 
 It is presumptuous to ' anticipate the verdict of 
 history', but I fail to imagine a time when the shifty 
 crookedness of Count Berchtold, Herr von Jagow, and 
 Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg will not be regarded by 
 impartial students of the Great War as an extraordinarily 
 effective foil to the straightforward intelligence of Viviani, 
 the patient moderation of Sazonof, and the tact, the 
 resourcefulness, the transparent rectitude of Grey. 
 
 1 The review had been arranged and announced as far back 
 as the middle of May at least five weeks before the Serajevo 
 murders. 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 ON MR. M. P. PRICE'S DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF 
 THE WAR 
 
 DOMESTIC controversy, if one may call it so, has been 
 almost entirely excluded from the foregoing pages. A cam- 
 paign on two fronts would have been merely confusing. 
 But there are certain English writers who exhibit a muddi- 
 ness of mind, and a determination to misread the facts of 
 the case, worthy of any Prussian statesman. Chief among 
 these, as regards the volume of his work, at any rate, is 
 Mr. M. P. Price. His Diplomatic History of the War is such 
 an elaborate effort, so imposing in its bulk and in its appear- 
 ance of profound study even, let me add, so useful in 
 virtue of its assemblage of documents that it is perhaps 
 worth while to show, by chapter and verse, that Mr. Price's 
 treatment of his documents is exceedingly confused and 
 misleading. 
 
 Mr. Price's formula for impartiality is brief, if not entirely 
 adequate. It is simply ' Blame every one ! ' ' The more 
 the evidence is sifted ', he says, ' the stronger becomes the 
 conviction that the responsibility for the failure of diplomacy 
 to save the civilization of Europe must be laid at the door 
 of all the European Chancelleries without distinction.' I need 
 not here discuss this verdict : the foregoing pages have been 
 written in vain if the reader has any doubt of its worthless- 
 ness. What I propose to do is to show that the inaccuracy 
 and slovenliness of Mr. Price's mental processes are such as 
 to render it impossible to place confidence in any of his 
 judgements. 
 
 First let me note some minor slips, of small intrinsic 
 importance, but exhibiting a curious propensity to error. 
 Most of these slips occur in the first edition, and remain 
 uncorrected in the second, revised and largely rewritten, 
 issue thus showing a really incorrigible laxity of mind. 
 
 P. 59. ' The Minister asked if the Austrian Government 
 had definite information about the origin of the murder in 
 Belgrade. Count Szapary said they knew it was the result 
 
230 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 of the Serbian Government's instigation.' Neither Szapary 
 nor his superiors ever made this terrible charge, which, if 
 proved, would have altered the whole complexion of the 
 case, and justified Austria in refusing to negotiate with a 
 gang of criminals. What Szapary said was that the crime 
 ' sprang from Serbian instigation '. Mr. Price presumably 
 sees no difference between the two statements. 
 
 P. 72. ' Count Berchtold said that as Austria had not 
 accepted the most important point in the Note . . . negotia- 
 tions had to be broken off.' For 'Austria' read 'Serbia'. 
 It is also characteristic that the ridiculous phrase ' negotia- 
 tions had to be broken off ', is placed in Count Berchtold's 
 mouth. No one knew better than he that there had been 
 no negotiations. In the telegram cited he did not actually 
 make use of any similar phrase, but what he meant was that 
 diplomatic relations were broken off. 
 
 P. 72. ' The Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 
 Herr Jagow.' The Under Secretary was Herr von Zimmer- 
 mann, and it is he who is here in question. On p. 77, where 
 Herr von Jagow is actually in question, he is again called 
 ' Under Secretary '. Mr. Price might really have ascertained 
 the true status of his principal dramatis personae. 
 
 P. 76. ' Sir Maurice de Bunsen said in a talk with some 
 of his diplomatic colleagues that Austria appeared to him 
 to be determined on war.' This should read : ' Sir Maurice 
 de Bunsen said to Sir Edward Grey, after a talk with some of 
 his colleagues ' a not unimportant distinction. 
 
 P. 81. The Tsar is represented as saying to the Serbian 
 Crown Prince that ' he hoped Serbia would do nothing to 
 impair her integrity '. What he said was that he hoped the 
 Serbian Government would neglect no step that might 
 ' safeguard the dignity of Serbia '. 
 
 P. 82. ' Early in the morning [of July 27] the British 
 Admiralty issued orders that the fleet at Portland should 
 not be dispersed. This step was taken on the sole initiative 
 of ... Mr. Winston Churchill/ Had Mr. Price read the docu- 
 ment he cites with the smallest attention, he would have seen 
 that Mr. Churchill took this step, not on the 27th, but on 
 the 24th. 
 
 P. 86. Bethmann-Hollweg ' repeated that he could not 
 accept the Four-Power mediation scheme ij it were like an 
 
APPENDIX 231 
 
 Areopagus '. There was nothing conditional about his remark. 
 He said ' it would have the appearance of an Areopagus ', 
 and was therefore inacceptable. This may seem a trifle, 
 but when a writer's thought is honeycombed with such 
 small inaccuracies (to say nothing of greater ones) what 
 reliance is to be placed on the results at which he arrives ? 
 
 P. 87. ' The Manchester Guardian correspondent in Berlin 
 also says that Sir Edward Grey's proposal is " determined 
 only by fear that it is unworkable "/ This, as it stands, is 
 obvious nonsense, yet it appears in both editions. No doubt 
 we should read that ' the refusal of Sir Edward Grey's proposal 
 is determined ', &c. 
 
 P. 94. ' Count Szapary did not seem to hold that Russia's 
 interests were in the least affected, and that the affair con- 
 cerned only Austria and Serbia.' Mr. Price evidently means 
 ' but held that the affair ', &c. 
 
 P. 95. ' Indeed, M. Sazonof added that Russia intended 
 to hasten military preparations and regarded war as inevit- 
 able/ Sazonof is represented as saying this to the German 
 Ambassador. He did nothing so foolish. He said it to the 
 Russian Ambassador at Paris, after giving a summary of his 
 conversation with Pourtales. 
 
 P. 99. ' Sir Maurice de Bunsen met the Russian Ambas- 
 sador and expressed the hope that Austria would understand 
 the meaning of Russia's mobilization/ For and read who. 
 
 P. 113. ' Sir Edward Grey then asked the Chancellor if 
 he could still put pressure on Austria/ For Grey read Goschen. 
 
 P. 127. ' A zone of 10 kilometres was left by the French 
 and German troops on the frontier/ This is inexcusable. 
 There is nowhere the slightest suggestion that the German 
 troops were kept back from the frontier. 
 
 P. 132. ' Sir Edward Grey replied . , . that they were 
 personal suggestions made by the German Chancellor on 
 August i/ For Chancellor read Ambassador. 
 
 P. 138. ' To-day Germany issued an official declaration 
 of war on France, giving as reasons certain hostile acts 
 said to have been committed by France, including, amongst 
 others, the dropping of bombs by French aviators on the 
 railway near Nuremberg, and also marching troops across 
 Belgium to attack Germany.' No such ridiculous allegation 
 was ever made, even by Germany. She alleged (though not 
 
232 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 in the declaration of war) that the French were planning to 
 march troops through Belgium. What she said in the declara- 
 tion of war was that French aviators had ' violated the 
 neutrality of Belgium by flying over the territory of that 
 country '. Mr. Price apparently mixed up the two pretexts, 
 and thus produced a third, even more flagrantly false than 
 either of them. 
 
 These blunders I have picked out from among many 
 others because they can be comparatively briefly exposed. 
 They convey a very inadequate notion of Mr. Price's habitual 
 inaccuracy of mind. It is not too much to say that he is 
 more often wrong than right : that almost every fact or idea 
 suffers some small if not some great distortion in passing 
 through his mind. It seems as though he studied his material 
 through a knotty and uneven pane of glass. 
 
 Passing to more important matters, let me say that this 
 curious mental slovenliness is Mr. Price's best excuse for 
 what, in a more competent thinker, we could not but put 
 down to a rather violent bias against M. Sazonof, and more 
 particularly against Sir Edward Grey. The great principle 
 of ' Blame every one ! ' saves him from actually whitewashing 
 Berlin ; but he accepts the protestations of the German 
 statesmen with a childlike credulity. It never occurs to him 
 that there is next to no direct evidence in favour of their 
 alleged pacific action, and a good deal of indirect evidence 
 against it. He accepts as evidence the statements of news- 
 paper correspondents that Germany is ' working for peace ' 
 and ' putting pressure upon Austria ', not reflecting that the 
 correspondents can know nothing but what the statesmen 
 (directly or indirectly) tell them, and that it is precisely the 
 assertions of the statesmen that require and lack proof. 
 The upshot is that he constantly does more than justice to 
 Berlin and Vienna, and a great deal less than justice to 
 St. Petersburg and London. 
 
 Fully to prove these statements would demand a long 
 dissertation. I can only endeavour to exhibit Mr. Price's 
 methods of interpretation in a few characteristic instances. 
 
 On p. 86, under date July 28, we read that Austria 
 ' claimed a free hand with Serbia ' and ' would no longer 
 discuss the terms of the Note with a view to their modifica- 
 tion Unfortunately her speedy march into Serbian territory 
 
APPENDIX 233 
 
 aroused the suspicion of certain Powers and gave them the excuse 
 they wanted.' The ' no longer ' is wholly out of place. Austria 
 had never at any time been willing to discuss the terms of 
 the Note. But what are we to say of the passage italicized ? 
 If it has any meaning at all, it means that the Entente Powers 
 were bent on war and only awaited an opportunity. It is 
 impossible to believe that Mr. Price really means this. He 
 might conceivably (in the face of all the evidence) hold such 
 an opinion of Russia ; but then why does he speak of ' Powers ' 
 in the plural ? The truth seems to be that he does not in 
 the least realize what he is saying, or think of the harm that 
 may be done by such random talk. 
 
 P. 95, under date July 29 (Wednesday) : ' M. Sazonof 
 thanked the French Government " for the assurances given to 
 him by the French Ambassador that Russia can rely in full 
 measure on the support of her ally France ". This shows 
 that up till this time Russia was not certain of France's 
 support in the event of war/ On this basis Mr. Price builds 
 up a complex argument apparently designed to prove (though 
 its intent is far from clear) that Sir Edward Grey encouraged 
 France to encourage Russia to press home her demands on 
 Austria. The whole theory is baseless, for there is nothing 
 in Sazonof 's telegram to suggest that only that day, or only 
 recently, had Russia felt secure of the support of France. So 
 early as July 24 M. Paleologue had told Sir George Buchanan, 
 apparently in Sazonof 's presence, that ' France would fulfil all 
 the obligations entailed by her alliance with Russia '. Isvolsky 
 telegraphed to Sazonof on the 29th (Russian Book, No. 55) : 
 ' Viviani has just confirmed to me the French Government's 
 firm determination to act in concert with Russia', thus showing 
 that the assurance was no new thing. Sazonof may conceivably 
 refer to some fresh assurance given by Paleologue ; but his 
 words, in the official translation he speaks of ' the declaration 
 which the French Ambassador made to me ', not ' has made ' 
 imply that he has not in mind a quite recent utterance. Thus 
 the whole construction, vaguely tending to make Sir Edward 
 Grey responsible for a supposed stiffening of Russia's attitude, 
 crumbles to pieces. 
 
 But worse remains behind. On the next page, still harping 
 on the idea that Russia's resolve ' to make Austria deal 
 with her in her dispute with Serbia ' requires, at this point, 
 
234 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 some special explanation, Mr. Price quotes Renter's corre- 
 spondent at St. Petersburg as saying : ' Confident of England's 
 support, about which doubts have mostly disappeared, the 
 Russian public is prepared to accept war.' On this he 
 remarks : ' It is possible that Russia decided upon her 
 military step on the 2Qth, after being privately assiired of this 
 support.' And again, on p. 98, he says : ' Sir Edward Grey's 
 attitude to-day appears obscure. ... He would not say openly 
 whether he would support Russia in the ensuing quarrel, 
 although the Renter's message from St. Petersburg on this 
 day suggests that Russia had received an intimation privately 
 of what England would really do.' The smallest objection to 
 this remark is that Renter's message suggests nothing of the 
 sort, but shows quite clearly that the confidence attributed 
 to the Russian public is founded on mere conjecture. But 
 even if Renter's correspondent had really pointed to any 
 such secret assurance, would it not have been merely reason- 
 able to believe him mistaken, rather than to suspect Sir 
 Edward Grey of the elaborate double-dealing, the purposeless 
 dishonesty, attributed to him in the passages italicized ? 
 What are we to think of a writer who thus wantonly casts 
 aspersions on a statesman's character, not only without 
 evidence, but without any tinge of probability ? 
 
 Mr. Price is obsessed by the idea that there is some pro- 
 found mystery about the Russian mobilization. He says 
 on p. 106 : ' The cause of the Russian general mobilization 
 is therefore inexplicable from the published official docu- 
 ments.' Far from being inexplicable, it is quite fully ex- 
 plained. Pourtales begged Sazonof to propose a formula 
 which should afford a last hope of peace. Sazonof dictated 
 such a formula. Jagow instantly, and without consulting 
 Austria, rejected it, thus giving very good reason for the 
 belief that Germany was bent on war. At the same time 
 reports reached Russia of Germany's extensive military 
 preparations on her eastern frontier, and Berchtold warned 
 Schebeko that Austria would have to ' extend her mobiliza- 
 tion '. When we remember that Belgrade was all the while 
 being diligently bombarded, and remember, moreover (what 
 Mr. Price never for a moment takes into account)* that Germany 
 
 1 On p. 118 Mr. Price says that Germany's ultimatum to Russia 
 was 'almost as rash as Russia's determination to mobilize, although 
 
APPENDIX 235 
 
 could mobilize in a few days more completely than Russia 
 in as many weeks, can we find the slightest mystery in 
 Russia's mobilization, or discern any need to trace it back 
 to occult influences proceeding from France or England ? 
 
 On Sir Edward Grey's answer to the Imperial Chancellor's 
 bid for British neutrality, Mr. Price makes the astounding 
 comment (p. no) : ' According to Sir Edward Grey, the 
 refusal of the German Chancellor to unconditionally guarantee 
 the integrity of the whole French Empire under all circumstances, 
 even on the supposition that France might be the aggressor, was 
 to be regarded as a disgraceful attempt to bribe the British 
 Empire to stand aside.' Is monstrous too strong a word for 
 this ineptitude ? Sir Edward Grey answers a definite offer 
 made him under a given set of circumstances, and Mr. Price, 
 without the faintest warrant, reads into his answer a demand 
 for an absolute guarantee that France shall be for ever 
 inviolable under all circumstances whatsoever ! The force 
 of unreason can no further go. After this, one need not 
 enlarge on the mere impertinence (' Sir Edward Grey on this 
 occasion, at any rate, had conceived an idea ') with which 
 Mr. Price comments on Sir Edward's nobly-inspired offer of 
 a larger reconcilement, conveyed in the same dispatch. 
 
 On p. 120 Mr. Price runs into one Sir Edward Grey's two 
 perfectly distinct proposals or rather a proposal and an 
 offer stated in Blue Book, No. in (see p. 157). This does 
 not greatly matter. I merely note it as a conspicuous example 
 of Mr. Price's tendency to misread the plainest English. 
 
 On the next page we come upon a statement which cannot 
 be excused on the plea of mere carelessness : ' Sir Edward 
 Grey told M. Cambon to " wait for the situation to develop " 
 and added that he was making inquiries from France and 
 Germany about Belgian neutrality. It was evidently hoped 
 that here the pretext would be found, and that this would enable 
 the British support for France, upon which the French were 
 counting and upon which they had been allowed, along with 
 Russia, to base all their actions for the previous two days, to be 
 openly forthcoming.' It is hard to speak in measured terms 
 of such mischievous nonsense as this. To any one who reads 
 
 it certainly had the justification of military exigencies to defend it ' . 
 But the ' military exigencies ' were all on the side of the slow-moving 
 Power. 
 
236 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 with ordinary understanding, Sir Edward Grey's position is 
 crystal-clear, and it needs something worse than mere density 
 to represent him as ' hoping ' that Germany would violate 
 Belgian neutrality, in order to relieve him from some (purely 
 imaginary) embarrassment. Mr. Price quotes with emphasis 
 a remark of M. Cambon's that ' it would be well that England 
 should consider the conditions upon which she would give 
 the support on which France relied ', as though this proved 
 the existence of a definite engagement. To any one who 
 understands the meaning of language it proves exactly the 
 opposite namely, that there was no engagement, and that 
 France was hoping, without any certainty, that her reliance 
 was justified. Who does not know except, apparently, 
 Mr. Price that when people say, ' I rely/ ' I trust,' ' I am 
 confident/ they are, nine times out of ten, expressing, not 
 certainty, but only a strong hope ? This is the obvious 
 sense of M. Cambon's words : if Mr. Price still doubts that 
 it is the true sense, let him turn to M. Poincare's letter to 
 King George, of the same date (July 31), and there read, 
 ' It is true that our military and naval arrangements leave 
 complete liberty to your Majesty's Government '. But it is 
 idle to cite proofs to a mind which either cannot or will not 
 apprehend them. 
 
 ' During August 1st ', says Mr. Price (p. 134), ' Count 
 Mensdorff had an interview with Sir Edward Grey, in which 
 he informed him that Austria would respect the integrity 
 and sovereignty of Serbia. This confirmed what took place 
 in St. Petersburg and Vienna on this day, namely the virtual 
 settlement of the Austro-Serbian quarrel.' And on the next 
 page we read, ' By irony of fate, the countries over whom 
 all the trouble had originally started had by this time settled 
 their grievances '. Though it is of small practical moment, 
 one cannot pass unnoticed such a strange misreading of the 
 facts. Even if we believe in the perfect sincerity of Austria's 
 apparently more reasonable attitude, it merely meant that 
 a settlement was possible, not that it had been reached. 
 I am wholly unconvinced that Austria meant to abate a jot 
 of her pretensions, but here I may do her an injustice. What 
 is certain is that, even if she really intended to listen to 
 reason, she had not actually begun to do so, far less con- 
 sented to any definite terms that could possibly satisfy 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 237 
 
 Russia. Mr. Price cites as a confirmation of his statement 
 the fact that Count Mensdorff told Sir Edward Grey on 
 August I that 'Austria would respect the integrity and 
 sovereignty of Serbia '. But she and her partner had been 
 saying and swearing the same thing every day for more 
 than a week. All the telegraph-wires of Europe had been 
 humming with 'integrity and sovereignty' assurances. How, 
 then, could Count MensdorfFs belated repetition of this catch- 
 word ' confirm ' the ' virtual settlement of the Austro-Serbian 
 quarrel ' ? 
 
 Though Mr. Price's second edition is in some respects 
 more faulty than his first, at least he has eliminated one of 
 his most amazing misstatements. Determined to make out 
 that Belgian neutrality was to Sir Edward Grey a mere 
 pretext, about which he really cared very little, Mr. Price, 
 referring to Sir Edward's speech in the House of Commons 
 on August 3, actually said in his first edition : ' Towards 
 the end only did he mention the question of Belgian 
 neutrality ' ; and again, ' He referred in his speech almost 
 entirely to France and the naval understanding, and said 
 practically nothing about Belgian neutrality '. As a matter 
 of fact, at least a third of the speech was devoted entirely 
 to Belgium, and the speaker pointed out in no uncertain 
 terms the disgrace that would accrue to us if we ' ran away 
 from the obligations of honour ' imposed on us by the neutrality 
 treaty. Some one seems to have pointed out to Mr. Price 
 that this can scarcely be called saying ' practically nothing ' 
 about Belgium, and the remark disappears from his second 
 edition. But he still declares, in the teeth of the clearest 
 and most abundant evidence, that ' the commitment to 
 France was unconditional ', and rendered it ' impossible for 
 England to keep out of war, in spite of a German guarantee 
 to respect Belgian neutrality or not to attack the French 
 coast '. It is because such judgements play into the hands 
 of England's enemies, and do grave wrong to a statesman 
 who has earned the gratitude of all intelligent men, that 
 I have thought it worth while to examine into the quality 
 of Mr. Price's mind, and to enable the reader to estimate the 
 value of judgements proceeding from so turbid a source. 
 
INDEX 
 
 A 
 
 Allize, M., 28. 
 Austria : 
 
 relations with Serbia, 14, 19, 36, 62, 67, 97, 107, 149, 212. 
 
 dossier submitted by, 37, 45, 88. 
 
 insolence of statesmen, 45, 94, 98, 222. 
 
 hypocrisy of statesmen, 16, 24, 67, 106, 107, 141, 214, 221. 
 
 declaration of war on Serbia, 88, 92. 
 
 news reaches St. Petersburg, 99. 
 says Serbia opened hostilities, 93. 
 
 policy of fait accompli, 24, 30, 95, 122, 140, 214, 216, 221, 222. 
 suspension of military operations demanded, 99, 120. 
 designs on Serbia, 109, 213. 
 psychology of Austro-German statecraft, no, 123, 128, 187, 
 
 210, 218. 
 
 general mobilization decreed, 137. 
 Russian mobilization kept out of papers, 139. 
 takes Russian mobilization calmly, 154, 219. 
 declaration of war on Russia, 219. 
 had not ' banged the door ', 150, 175. 
 wishes to appear compliant, 150. 
 nominal acceptance of mediation, 152, 172. 
 Austria, Emperor of, 22, 46, 96, 116. 
 Austrian ultimatum to Serbia : 
 presentation of, 14, 34. 
 terms of, 16. 
 
 acceptance not expected, 19. 
 time of presentation, 23-5, 214. 
 Germany's complicity in, 26-32, 40. 
 contents known in Munich, 28. 
 sketched to Grey, 33. 
 Serbian attitude towards, 34, 35. 
 delivered to Grey, 41. 
 Grey on, 21, 41, 62. 
 Berthelot on, 73. 
 
 * integral acceptance ' demanded, 96. 
 Point 5 ' explained ' to Sazonof, 46, 136. 
 terms not to be modified, 139 ; but may be ' explained ', 140, 
 
 150. 
 
 triumph of truculence, 192, 214. 
 time-limit, 15, 18, 22, 36, 38, 48, 68, 101. 
 
 Grey on danger of, 33. 
 
 Sazonof demands extension, 39. 
 
 J. Cambon protests against, 40. 
 
 extension refused, 45, 214. 
 
 von Jagow on, 46. 
 
INDEX 239 
 
 Belgian neutrality, 43, 127, 144, 159, 170, 192, 197. 
 
 Belgians, King of the, 195. 
 
 Below, Herr von, 159, 192, 193, 198. 
 
 Benckendorff, Count, 49, 74. 
 
 Berchtold, Count, 14, 25, 36, 45, 48, 67, 69, 70, 92, 94, 104, 107, 
 
 I 3&> 139, 146, 150, 152, 172, 214. 
 Berthelot, M., 73. 
 
 Bethmann-Hollweg, Dr. von, 26, 30, 31, 48, 72, 86, 94, 115, 160, 
 164, 191, 211. 
 
 circular on Austrian ultimatum, 27, 42, 51. 
 
 on conference of ambassadors, 85, 101. 
 
 ' pressing the button ', 122. 
 
 bid for British neutrality, 127, 187. 
 
 telegram to Tschirscky, 134. 
 
 receives reply to bid for neutrality, 153. 
 
 speeches in Reichstag : August 4, 130, 199, 223 ; December 2, 
 224. 
 
 ' scrap of paper ' interview, 200. 
 
 playing Spenlow and Jorkins, 222. 
 
 on mobilization of British fleet, 227. 
 Bienvenu-Martin, M., 41, 54, 72, 117. 
 Boschkovitch, M., 33. 
 
 British neutrality, 127, 143, 153, 158, 170, 171, 180, 187, 196. 
 British solidarity with France and Russia : 
 
 urged by Sazonof, 38, 50, 178. 
 Paleologue, 38, 178. 
 Poincare, 142, 184. 
 
 ought it to have been declared earlier ? 178-89. 
 
 Bethmann-Hollweg on, 224, 225. 
 Bronewsky, M., 85, 134. 
 
 Buchanan, Sir George, 37, 50, 90, 99, 151, 178. 
 Bunsen, Sir Maurice de, 19, 28, 36, 64, 65, 68, 75, 80, 96, 106, 116, 
 134, 140, 167. 
 
 C 
 
 Cambon, M. Jules, 40, 47, 82, 83, 100, 135, 158, 195, 201, 217. 
 Cambon, M. Paul, 42, 121, 145. 
 Chancellor, Imperial, see Bethmann-Hollweg. 
 Crackanthorpe, Mr., 35, 49, 51, 92. 
 
 D 
 
 Davignon, M., 159, 198. 
 Dumaine, M., 24, 68, 95. 
 
 E 
 
 Elst, Baron van der, 159, 193. 
 England, George V, King of : 
 telegram to Prince Henry, 138. 
 ,, the Tsar, 162. 
 the German Emperor, 176. 
 reply to M. Poincare, 156, 226. 
 
 Entente, Triple, responsibilities involved in, 121, 145, 156, 169, 
 171, 189. 
 
240 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 Fleuriau, M. de, 75, 90, 180. 
 
 Franz Ferdinand, Archduke, 13, 212. 
 
 Fried jung trial, 20. 
 
 German Emperor, the, 22, 28, 30, 32, 71, 81, 154, 165, 211. 
 telegrams to the Tsar, 102, 125, 151, 163. 
 telegram to King George, 175. 
 Germany : 
 
 screening Austria, 31, 48, 66, 73, 102, 214. 
 ' shining armour ' policy, 66, 104, 220. 
 illusion as to Russia's impotence, 64-6, 219. 
 
 ,, Britain's 180. 
 
 General Staff, influence of, 71, 133, 211. 
 attempt to detach France from Russia, 73, 87, 127. 
 dilatory tactics, 76. 
 
 pressure on Austria, no evidence of, 86. 
 professions of desire for peace, 72, 73, 84, 102, 135, 225. 
 
 ,, ,, pacific activity, 10 1, 117, 118, 122, 123, 134, 151, 
 154, 165, 173, 207. 
 
 psychology of statecraft, see Austria, 
 maladroit diplomacy, 115, 136, 221. 
 fait accompli manosuvre, 122. 
 council at Potsdam, 126. 
 
 mobilization prematurely announced, 133, 218. 
 Kriegsgefahrzu stand, 153, 155, 160, 169. 
 ultimatum to Russia, 153, 162. 
 
 ,, France, 154, 155, 168. 
 
 ,, ,, Belgium, 192. 
 
 Belgian reply to ultimatum, 194. 
 misunderstanding as to French neutrality, 175. 
 declaration of war on Russia, 164. 
 France, 197. 
 ,, ,, ,, Belgium, 198. 
 
 says Russia opened hostilities, 163. 
 ,, France 197. 
 
 refuses assurance as to Belgian neutrality, 159, 169. 
 previous assurances as to Belgian neutrality, 160. 
 invades Luxemburg, 191. 
 violates French frontier, 164, 191. 
 
 ,, Belgian ,, 198. 
 
 offers to make no maritime attack on France, 196. 
 pledge not to annex Belgian territory, 199. 
 Giesl, Baron von, 14, 51. 
 Giolitti, Signor, 31, 212. 
 Goschen, Sir Edward, 82, 100, 122, 126, 133, 137, 153, 167, 187, 
 
 200. 
 Grey, Sir Edward, 21, 30, 33, 48, 62, 64, 84, 103, 106, 109, 133, 156, 
 
 i?5 179, 198, 214, 225, 227. 
 on Austrian ultimatum, 41. 
 on Four-Power mediation, 42, 49. 
 urges delay of hostilities, 43. 
 
INDEX 241 
 
 Grey, Sir Edward (continued) : 
 on Serbian reply, 63, 88, 89. 
 
 pleads for acceptance of Serbian reply, 50, 67, 71, 88. 
 proposes conference of ambassadors, 74. 
 urges Germany to propose formula for mediation, 119. 
 suggests occupation of Serbian territory pending mediation, 120. 
 warnings to Germany, 120, 185, 186. 
 attitude to France, 121. 
 reply to German bid, 143. 
 olive-branch to Germany, 144. 
 amends Sazonof's formula, 145. 
 proposes new formula for mediation, 157. 
 offer to Germany. 157. 
 on Belgian neutrality, 170. 
 on Berchtold's acceptance of mediation, 172, 
 declaration to France as to German fleet, 190, 195. 
 statement in Parliament, 196. 
 ultimatum to Germany, 200. 
 
 H 
 
 Hartwig, M., 19. 
 
 Henry, Prince, of Prussia, 138. 
 
 Hohenberg, Baroness, 13. 
 
 I 
 
 Isvolsky, M., 141. 
 Italy, 31, 87, 176. 
 
 J 
 
 Jagow, Herr von, 19, 23, 29, 30, 40, 46, 64, 82, 89, 100, 122, 133, 
 
 I 35 X 46, 154, 160, 167, 186, 199, 201, 211, 222. 
 Jovanovitch, M., 13, 24, 52. 
 
 K 
 
 Kaiser, see ' German Emperor '. 
 Klobukowski, M., 159. 
 Kudachef, Prince, 36, 45. 
 
 Lichnowsky, Prince, 42, 49, 50, 74, 88, 118, 133, 145, 175, 180, 
 
 185, 195. 
 ' Localization ' of Austro- Serbian quarrel, 27, 40, 47, 48, 68, 81, 
 
 88, 211, 216, 223, 227. 
 Luxemburg invaded by Germany, 191. 
 
 M 
 
 Macchio, Baron, 14, 24, 45, 48, 81. 
 Mensdorff, Count, 33, 41, 48, 89, 174, 180, 214. 
 Military preparations : 
 
 Austrian, 52, 76, 103, 116, 130, 137, 139, 141, 146, 152, 166, 
 169, 216. 
 
 Belgian, 159. 
 
242 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 Military preparations (continued) : 
 British naval, 89, 90, 127, 188. 
 French, 77, 90, 104, 143, 146, 160, 168. 
 German, 53, 71, 76, 82, 104, 114, 129, 141, 142, 143, 146, 153, 
 
 160, 167, 217. 
 Russian, 38, 50, 53, 71, 72, 77, 82, 89, 99, 101, 104, 114, 116, 124, 
 
 I 3Q. J 37. I 4 I > *46, 151. I 53 J 62, 165, 167, 169, 216. 
 Serbian, 53, 67, 71. 
 
 Mobilization, see ' Military Preparations ', ' Austria ', ' Germany', 
 ' Russia '. 
 
 N 
 
 Neutrality, see ' Belgian ' and ' British '. 
 Nicolson, Sir Arthur, 75, 180, 185. 
 
 Pachitch, M., 23, 35, 51, 132. 
 Paleologue, M., 37, 69, 113, 141, 151, 178. 
 Patchou, M., 14, 34. 
 Peace proposals : 
 
 in tabular form, 202-7. 
 
 Four-Power mediation, 42, 49, 73, 76, 82, 83. 
 accepted in principle by Berlin, 48, 49, 89. 
 rejected by Austria, 94. 
 new formula proposed by Grey, 157. 
 conversations between Russia and Austria, 70, 80, 83, 86, 99, 
 
 100, 103, 118, 134, 149, 150, 172. 
 Jagow on, 85. 
 
 refused by Berchtold, 97, 113. 
 sanctioned by Berchtold, 139. 
 conference of ambassadors, 74, 80, 88, 112, 118. 
 rejected by Germany, 82. 
 Bethmann-Hollweg on, 85, 101. 
 rejected by Austria, 95. 
 
 Germany asked to propose formula, 100, 103, 119, 135. 
 Cambon's formula rejected by Jagow, 85. 
 Sazonof's formula to Pourtales, 129. 
 rejected by Germany, 136. 
 amended by Grey, 145. 
 amendment accepted by Sazonof, 148, 168, 171. 
 
 ,, Viviani, 155. 
 
 ,, forwarded to Vienna, 166. 
 
 Serbian reply to be treated as basis for discussion, 88, 122. 
 Serbia to accept ultimatum on advice of Powers, 113, 119. 
 Austria to occupy territory pending mediation, 42, 120, 137, 
 
 138, 145, 152, 162, 173, 222. 
 reference to Hague proposed by Tsar, 125. 
 Grey offers to back ' any reasonable proposal ', 157. 
 Poincare, President, 23, 142, 156, 183. 
 Pourtales, Count, 29, 39, 71, 77, 99, 112, 114, 129, 134, 164. 
 
INDEX 243 
 
 R 
 
 Reventlow, Count, 181. 
 Rumbold, Sir Horace, 30, 64. 
 Russia : 
 
 could not leave Serbia in the lurch, 39, 40, 50, 106, no, 115, 
 211-16. 
 
 moderation of, 50, 51, 80, 113, 215. 
 
 right to protect Serbia contested, 68. 
 
 offers to guarantee Serbian good-behaviour, 97, no. 
 
 partial mobilization announced to Germany, 104, 124, 216. 
 
 offer to stop mobilization, 129, 136, 217. 
 
 general mobilization, 137, 217. 
 
 mobilization justified, 216-19. 
 Russia, Tsar of, 36, 53, 220. 
 
 telegram to Crown Prince of Serbia, 79. 
 
 telegrams to German Emperor, 124, 142, 151, 163. 
 
 telegram to King George, 165. 
 
 San Giuliano, Marchese di, 65, 176. 
 
 Sazonof, M., 37, 63, 69, 75, 77, 90, 98, 104, no, 112, 129, 136, 140, 
 
 146, 148, 158, 166, 178, 183, 227. 
 
 Schebeko, M., 19, 24, 68, 81, 96, 108, 139, 150, 167, 218, 
 Schoen, Baron von, 29, 30, 41, 51, 72, 87, 102, 109, 117, 155, 168, 
 
 197. 
 
 Serajevo, crime of, 13, 19, 35, 63, 102. 
 Serbia : 
 
 appeal to Powers approved by Sazonof, 50. 
 
 accused of opening hostilities, 81, 92. 
 
 advised to retreat before Austria, 96. 
 
 bombardment of Belgrade, 112, 132, 148, 149, 166. 
 Serbia, Crown Prince of, 35, 53, 132. 
 Serbian ' integrity and sovereignty ', 36, 46, 62, 70, 72, 99, 103, 
 
 106-11, 114, 115, 116, 152, 167, 211. 
 Serbian reply to Austria : 
 
 outlined to Grey, 49. 
 
 delivered, 51. 
 
 Austria comments on, 56-61. 
 
 Sazonof on, 63, 70, 79. 
 
 Bienvenu-Martin on, 63. 
 
 Berthelot on, 73. 
 
 Grey on, 63. 
 
 Grey pleads for its acceptance, 50, 67, 71. 
 
 distributed to Austrian ambassadors, 80. 
 
 publication in Berlin delayed, 81, 100. 
 
 not read by Jagow, 83. 
 
 Bethmann-Hollweg and Jagow on, 123. 
 
 extreme moderation of, 215. 
 Strandtman, M., 34, 35, 51. 
 Szapary, Count, 37, 46, 69, 116, 140, 149. 
 Szogyeny, Count, 65, 101. 
 
244 THE THIRTEEN DAYS 
 
 i 
 T 
 
 Telegrams delayed, 34, 69, 79. 
 
 Tschirscky, Herr von, 25, 28, 53, 64, 67, 68, 75, 86, 94, 108, 117, 
 134. 135, 152, 163. 
 
 V 
 
 Viviani, M., 23, 118,' 141, 143, 155, 164, 168, 191, 197, 217. 
 
 Z 
 
 Zimmermann, Herr von, 71, 133. 
 
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