AUTHORISED EDITION, 
 
 hells " 
 National Finance. 
 
 Imperial 'Preference. 
 
 Liberalism 
 
 THREE SPEECHES 
 
 RIGHT HON 
 
 BY THE Rl< 
 
 H. H. ASQUITH, K.C 
 
 NEWCASTLE-ON-TYNE, May 16th, 1919, 
 NEWCASTLE-ON-TYNE, May 17th. 1919. 
 CONNAUGHT ROOMS. LONDON, June 3rd, 1919. 
 
 PUBLISHED BY 
 
 'HE LIBERAL PUBLICATION DEPARTMENT 
 
 (In connection with the National Liberal Federation 
 and the Liberal Central Association.) 
 
 42, PARLIAMENT STREET, LONDON, S.W.I. 
 
 1919. 
 
 PR1HF TWOPENHF 
 
T>5(7 
 
 : .••••Tfie: .two* Speeches printed first in this 
 ' pamphlet were delivered by Mr. Asquith at 
 Newcastle-on-Tyne on May 16th and 17th, 1919. 
 Mr. Asquith spoke first at a Dinner of the 
 Newcastle Liberal Club, of which he is 
 President, and on the following day at a 
 meeting organised by the Northern Counties 
 Liberal Federation. 
 
 The third Speech— a reply to Lord French's 
 statements about Shells Shortage— was delivered 
 in the Connaught Rooms, London, on June 3rd, 
 1919, at a Luncheon given to Mr. Asquith by 
 Mr. Oswald Partington. 
 
 Copies of this Pamphlet can be obtained at the 
 following rates 
 
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9 
 
 MR. ASQUITH'S SPEECHES. 
 
 I. 
 
 Reminiscences of Newcastle — Lord French's Story of 1914 — The 
 General Election of 1918 — Position of the Free Liberals — 
 Liberals and the Labour Party— Coalition a Top- 
 Heavy Machine — The Purpose and the 
 Spirit of Liberalism. 
 
 MR. ASQUITH (speaking at the dinner in the Netvcastle Liberal 
 Club) said:— 
 
 I thank you, and I wish I could find words adequately to express 
 my feelings, first for the confidence you have shown me now two 
 years in succession in electing me to the post of president of the 
 Club; next for your kind invitation and hospitality this evening; 
 and last, though not least, for the eloquent and, to me, most 
 touching tribute which my friend Sir George Lunn in your name 
 has been pleased to offer, and which, I may gather from what I 
 have just seen and heard, you unanimously endorse. It is twenty- 
 five years since I first had the honour of being elected president of 
 this Club. That is practically a life-time of a political generation. 
 
 There were giants in those days. I was myself a relatively young 
 politician, holding the office of Home Secretary in a Government 
 which was presided over by Mr. Gladstone, and in which his two 
 principal lieutenants were Sir William Harcourt, the great, I might 
 almost say the colossal, defender of Liberal principles in his day, a 
 gladiator at any rate whom the enemy feared, and feared with 
 reason ; and, as I still prefer to call him, John Morley, the Member 
 for Newcastle, who brought to politics, and carried out of politics, 
 gifts and graces of intellect and character, powers of raising from 
 the common level of ordinary controversy into a higher and serener 
 atmosphere all the disputes of the hour. I am glad to say to-day, 
 though he has passed his 80th birthday, I can testify, having seen 
 him and talked to him, that he is as strong and undefeated a Liberal 
 as he ever was at any time. But I must not be tempted by what 
 Sir George Lunn has said to indulge a reminiscent vein, nor shall 
 I attempt to-nigfht any survey of the political situation. 
 
 T have serious things, and very serious things, to say to 
 Newcastle and to the country, and you will probablv agree that th 
 
large 'audience of. to-morrow will afford a more appropriate occasion 
 \ih^n. tiie gathering here to-night. 
 
 ' But? before* 1 'say one or two things to you in this more intimate 
 comradeship I must, inopportune as it seems to me, take advantage 
 of the occasion, and I take it with reluctance, to refer for one 
 moment, and only for a moment, to some recent publications in the 
 Press by a distinguished Field-Marshal on the subject of the early 
 months of the war. The last thing that I should desire is to have 
 anything in the nature of a controversy with Lord French. He is 
 an old personal friend. We sat together week by week for years 
 before the war on the Committee of Imperial Defence, and during 
 the first fifteen months of the war, when he commanded our Armies 
 in France and Flanders, he and I were in the closest relations, and 
 he was good enough, not once, but many times, to acknowledge with 
 gratitude my confidence and support. 
 
 He has taken an unusual, and I think an unfortunate, course, in 
 giving to the world at this stage what must be an ex parte narrative 
 of what happened under his command. Some of his statements I 
 find it difficult, and even impossible, to reconcile with my own 
 recollection of the facts and with contemporaneous documents. The 
 living, however, can take care of themselves, and make their 
 contribution, as some of us will have to do when the fitting time 
 comes, to the materials upon which history pronounces its verdict. 
 With the dead it is different, and I am constrained, in justice 
 to the memory of Lord Kitchener, to refer in a few words — and they 
 shall be very few — to the account which Lord French has given of 
 his visit to Paris in the early autumn of 1914. In the first place, 
 it is wholly untrue to suggest that either Lord Kitchener, who was 
 Secretary of State for War, or the Home Government contemplated, 
 or attempted, to supersede the Commander in the field. But the 
 Government was seriously disquieted by communications from Sir 
 John French, as he then was, as to his intentions, and after full 
 deliberation the Cabinet unanimously came to important conclu- 
 sions, which seemed to them to be justified by reasons of policy, as 
 well as of strategy. 
 
 Lord Kitchener was entrusted, with the knowledge and full consent 
 of all his colleagues, as my right hon. friend here (Mr. Rvnciman) 
 knows well with the duty of conveying and explaining those views 
 to Sir John French. In visiting France and conferring as he did 
 with Sir John French, Lord Kitchener performed a service of the 
 greatest value to the country and, as the events showed, with the 
 best results. It is impossible to deal adequately with the case 
 until in due course there is a full disclosure of the confidential 
 documents, including Sir John French's letters, which passed at the 
 time, but you may take this from me: Lord Kitchener's friends 
 may await in perfect serenity the process of disclosure. I am sorry 
 I had to say that, but it had to be said. 
 
I see that my right hon. friend, Mr. Winston Churchill, has The Free 
 been among his constituents this week. He has been expressing the Literals. 
 opinion that the time has not arrived for the revival or reassertion 
 of party distinctions, though he is kind enough to add the wish that 
 some of us who suffered from taking a different view last December 
 may soon be back at Westminster. All in due course. I am not 
 sure that some of us cannot be more usefully employed outside than 
 sitting in a House of Commons which, as every one now knows, 
 is in no sense really representative of the deliberate opinion and 
 judgment of the people. I wish to add, on behalf of a vast body 
 of free and independent Liberals in the country, our tribute of 
 unstinted admiration and gratitude to Sir Donald Maclean, and to 
 his indefatigable Whips, Mr. Thorne and Mr. Hogge, and to the 
 small, but ever-growing band of his loyal followers. 
 
 But I should like to say something rather more important than 
 expressions, well deserved as they are, of gratitude to our friends. 
 It is a truism that nothing is so necessary to the conduct of 
 democratic government under Parliamentary conditions as a 
 vigilant and powerful Opposition. I have had as large an 
 experience as anyone now living of both sides of the House. 
 
 The first six years of any Parliamentary life were spent in 
 Opposition, and I am not sure that they were not the happiest and 
 most interesting. Those were the days — I am speaking of the time 
 between 1886 and 1892 — when we fought with tenacity Irish 
 coercion, not only by resisting tooth and nail reactionary legislation 
 such as the Crimes Act of 1887, but by ceaseless criticism of 
 administrative follies and excesses. It was the conviction, slowly 
 brought home to our people during those years, that self-government 
 is the only alternative to coercion (and it is as true to-day, and even 
 more true to-day than it was thirty years ago), it was that convic- 
 tion that gradually converted the majority of the British electorate 
 to Home Rule. 
 
 I remember another spell of Opposition which lasted ten years, 
 from 1895 to 1905. There were divisions in those days in the Liberal 
 Party on some aspects of the South African War, but the Opposition 
 never ceased to be formidable, and during the last three years of the 
 period, after the " Trick Election" — lor there have been trick 
 elections in our history — during the last three years, after the 
 trick election of 1900, we rapidly closed our ranks, over Education, 
 over Licensing, and, finally, over Free Trade, and we succeeded in 
 making things as disagreeable to the Government of the day as 
 they have ever been made in Parliamentary history. We had our 
 reward in the unprecedented Liberal majority of January, 1906. 
 
 I said a moment ago, and I am still on the same 
 theme, that I have sat on both sides — not upon both sides in a party 
 sense, for I have always kept company with Liberals and only with 
 Liberals, but I have sat on both sides in the sense of being in 
 Opposition and in Power. I was in office for three years between 
 
1892 and 1895 in a Government which lived on the smallest majority 
 that has ever kept an Administration alive. It never exceeded 
 40, and it frequently dwindled to ten and even seven. Later on, 
 as you know, I was in office from 1906 onwards in a Government 
 which had the largest majority ever known up to that date. I 
 believe it has been exceeded since, but I am talking of what is now 
 ancient history. 
 
 I reserve for my autobiography, if ever I write one, my judgment 
 of the comparative comfort or discomfort of those two periods, 
 because it is not so easy a question as it might as first sight appear. 
 But in both cases, where we had a small majority and where we 
 had a large one, we had the advantage — and an inestimable 
 advantage it is — of a compact and determined Opposition, which 
 kept us always on the alert. Depend upon it, this is the essence 
 of Parliamentary life. One of the many drawbacks of the artificial 
 situation created by the election of December is that, for 
 the time being, such an Opposition has of necessity almost 
 ceased to exist. It is coming into being, and every by-election 
 promises to add to its ranks, but meanwhile — and I say it 
 deliberately, for I am now an outsider and the outsiders see more 
 than the people who are actually upon the stage — I say it 
 deliberately, that under these conditions the House of Commons is 
 becoming, nay, has become, a top-heavy and unworkmanlike 
 machine . 
 
 A Coalition may be, and often is, a necessary instrument in time 
 of war. It is in my judgment wholly unsuited to the constructive 
 tasks of peace. For what is it? Assuming, as we are bound to 
 assume, and as I am sure we readily assume, that all its members 
 are animated by honest convictions, what is it? It is a conglomerate 
 in which the pebbles are imprisoned and isolated in an alien 
 material. Those are the conditions under which a Coalition is 
 carried on, and I express to you, for whatever it is worth, my own 
 deliberate judgment when I say that we shall not return to healthy 
 political and Parliamentary conditions, until we see once more an 
 independent Liberal Party pursuing its own ideals by its own 
 methods, and upon its own lines. 
 
 I am told that in despair at the immediate prospects some of 
 our young people are taking or throwing in their lot with the 
 Labour Party. I think they are making a mistake. There are 
 many roads on which we can travel for long distances side by side, 
 but anything in the nature of fusion or absorption will be found 
 in practice to have all the drawbacks and all the dangers of a 
 Coalition. Keep your identity, preserve your independence, and 
 remember always that the governing purpose of our creed 
 is to secure, not for this class or that class — I don't 
 care how few or how numerous its members may be — not to secure 
 for this class or that class, but for all the community, 
 without distinction, without discrimination, without partiality 
 or preference — to secure for all the community freedom, in 
 
its fullest and its most fruitful sense, botn in corporate aim 
 individual life. 
 
 That is the purpose and the spirit of Liberalism, as I learned The Liberal 
 it as a student in my young days, as I was taught it both by the Henta g e 
 precept and the example of that great Liberal statesman, Mr. 
 Gladstone, and the others with whom it was my pride and privilege 
 to be associated in the earlier days of my political life. It 
 remains the same to-day. Do not forsake for temporary expediencies, 
 for short-lived compromises, for brittle and precarious bridges — do 
 not forsake the great heritage of the Liberal tradition of the past. 
 It is not a superstition ; it is not a legend ; it is founded both upon 
 faith and upon experience, and justified at every stage in our 
 political history; and in my judgment, if only you will keep your 
 heads clear, your courage firm and unperturbed by the passing 
 vicissitudes of political fortune, it will be in the future, as it has 
 been in the past, the inspiration of the liberties of this country. 
 
II. 
 LIBERAL POLICY. 
 
 Shells Shortage— The Peace Treaty— The League of Nations- 
 End of the Party Truce— National Finances— Imperial 
 Preference— Public Extravagance— A Plea for 
 Cabinet Government. 
 
 V4R. ASQUITH (speaking in the Palace Theatre, N ew castle- on- 
 * * Tyne) said: — 
 
 I am very glad to find myself once more face to face here in 
 Newcastle with the representative Liberals of the North. This is 
 not, as some of you may be old enough to remember, by any means 
 the first time that I have found myself in that position. Two visits 
 to Newcastle have still a vivid place in my memory. One was when 
 I came here in October, 1903 — nearly sixteen years ago — when Mr. 
 Chamberlain had just started his fiscal campaign, and I had the 
 privilege of exposing, with special reference to the experience of 
 Tyneside, some of the many fallacies of history, of logic, and of 
 arithmetic which formed then, as they do now, the stock-in-trade 
 of the Tariff Reformer. I have just been reading that speech 
 again, and though I believe I am a fairly severe critic of my own 
 deliverances, I confess that, in view of some recent events, I found 
 it marvellously opportune, and, oddly enough, hardly at all out of 
 date. Perhaps some of you will follow my example and be good 
 enough to read it too. 
 
 I came here again in April, 1915, when we had had nearly nine 
 months of the war. I made a speech then which has been more 
 unscrupulously and shamelessly travestied than, perhaps, any public 
 utterance of our time. I kept silence about these misrepresenta- 
 tions, which were made for political purposes, while the. war was 
 going on, but no such reserve is any longer necessary. 
 
 From the very first days of the war the problem of an 
 adequate supply of munitions for our rapidly expanding forces — for 
 Lord Kitchener, remember, was developing those great new armies 
 with which his name will always be illustriously associated — was the 
 subject of serious solicitude to the Government. So far back as 
 the month of September, 1914, when the war was not a month old, 
 I appointed a strong Cabinet Committee, presided over by Lord 
 Kitchener, of which, among others, the present Prime Minister and 
 Lord Haldane were members, to deal with the matter in all its 
 aspects. That Committee worked hard and continuously from the 
 first. They gave orders wherever orders could be given, and they 
 succeeded in substantially enlarging both the field and the 
 machinery of supply. 
 
9 
 
 The development of new methods of warfare and the unprecedented 
 scale — far beyond the forecast of any expert in this or any other 
 country — upon which ammunition began to be expended in the 
 winter and spring of 1915 increased the urgency of the situation; 
 and the necessity for adding to our prospective means of supply was 
 acutely felt, both by the Commander-in-Chief in the field and by 
 Lord Kitchener. I accordingly, as head of the Government, 
 
 resolved on taking an unusual step and upon coming down here 
 myself to urge on the men of the Tyneside, primarily, and through 
 them on the community at large, that an increase in the out-turn 
 of munitions had become even more urgent than the growth in the 
 volume of recruiting. 
 
 But before I left London I made the most careful inquiry of the Lord 
 highest military authority whether it was true that up to that date Kitchener': 
 our operations had been or were being crippled or seriously hampered 
 by lack of munitions. I was assured by Lord Kitchener, who informed 
 me that he had been the day before in London in direct personal com- 
 munication with Sir John French, that that was not the case. It 
 was on the strength of that assurance — and I do not know where 
 else I could have gone for authentic information — it was on the 
 strength of that assurance that I made that statement as to the 
 past, here in Newcastle, which has been so much quoted. Was it 
 for me or for anyone in my position to question or to doubt the 
 accuracy of that statement? How could I? Being given to me 
 on the highest of all authority, I should have been wanting in my 
 duty if I had not imparted it to the country. 
 
 That statement, as I have said, was carefully limited to the past, j^ 
 and I did not attempt to conceal from my audience here, or, indeed, Newcastle 
 from the country outside — the very reverse was the sole purpose Speech, 
 of my visit — our anxiety as to the future. I pointed out, and you 5 * 
 will forgive my going into this in some detail — because this is one 
 of the grossest calumnies among many gross calumnies that have 
 been circulated . during the war — I pointed out here the sacrifices 
 that were required both from masters and men, the necessity, for 
 the time, of the limitation of profits and the suspension of trade 
 union rules and customs, of the drawing in from the outside of 
 skilled men to take the place of those who had voluntarily gone to 
 the front, and of broadening the basis of the production of munitions 
 by utilizing works devoted to other purposes, and I summed up my 
 general conclusion in terms which I will quote textually. I 
 venture to say that not one in one hundred thousand of those who 
 have referred to my speech have ever read the words I used at the 
 time. They are these: — 
 
 " There is not a single naval or military authority among us who, 
 in view of the approximate and prospective requirements, does not declare 
 that a large and rapid increase in the output of munitions has become 
 one of the first necessities of the State." 
 
so 
 
 And this is the only peroration I attempted. 
 
 " This, then, I say : What, in the name of your King and country, 
 we ask you to do is to deliver the goods." 
 
 That is the speech in which I am charged with lulling the nation 
 into a sense of false security. I am glad also to remember — and I 
 have abundant evidence to prove it — that that speech had precisely 
 the effect which it was intended to produce. 
 
 I am sorry to have kept you so long about that because, after all, 
 it is a matter of ancient history. It was four years ago and you had 
 not reached the end of the first twelve months of the war. We are 
 to-day six months after the suspension of hostilities. The Allies and 
 their associates have elaborated and published to the world their 
 terms of peace — terms which the enemy are still apparently in 
 doubt whether to accept or to reject. While their course of action 
 still remains uncertain it is obviously right for me or anyone else 
 to withhold any public comment upon this or that item in a long 
 series of complex and, to some extent, interdependent proposals; 
 but there is no reason why one should not speak with perfect 
 freedom, even at this stage, on the general outlook. 
 
 There are two tests by which a Treaty of Peace may be judged, a 
 false test or a true test. A false test, in my opinion, is to ask 
 how it compares with the terms which a victorious Germany would 
 have exacted from the defeated Allies. We know well — among 
 other things by the object-lesson which was given us at Brest- 
 Li tovsk — we know well what a German peace would have meant. 
 It would have meant covetous covenants, unscrupulous exactions, 
 everything that could materially impoverish, everything that could 
 morally humiliate, everything that could put in permanent serfdom 
 the national life and the free economic and political development 
 of the beaten foe. That is not the kind of model to which we should 
 seek to conform. To take it, or anything like it, as the measure of 
 our requirements would be to give the lie to all our professions and 
 to smirch and even to surrender our ideals. Let us wipe that off 
 the slate. 
 
 I have spoken of the false test. The true test by which any 
 Treaty of Peace imposed and sanctioned by the victors of freedom 
 is to be judged is a very different one. It is very simple. Does it 
 carry out in substance and in spirit, neither falling behind nor 
 going beyond, the purpose for which the war was begun and carried 
 on at an immeasurable sacrifice of personal and material wealth by 
 the free peoples of the world? There is no ambiguity as to those 
 purposes. They were defined first by myself in the early weeks of 
 the war, speaking on behalf not only of this country, but of this 
 Empire. They were expounded in practically identical terms by the 
 leading statesmen of the Allies, and when, two years later, America 
 came in they were reaffirmed and illustrated with lucidity, with full- 
 ness, with particularity of eloquence, by President Wilson. 
 
 You all know what those purposes are and were. I can sum- 
 
11 
 
 marize them in a sentence. The war was, for us, not a war of Conditions 
 aggression but of emancipation, and its aim and end was a peace of a Clean 
 which, while ensuring adequate punishment for the wrongdoers and eace ' 
 adequate reparation for their victims, should be a peace not of 
 vindictiveness, sowing the seeds of future enmity and conflict, but a 
 peace of security, a peace of finality — what I have more than once 
 described as "a clean peace ' ' which would not only put an end to 
 rival armaments, but would provide a workable means for safe- 
 guarding the world for all time from the desolations and the wastes 
 of war. The difficulties of framing such a peace were bound to be 
 greater still. Depend upon it it will be judged by history according 
 as it is proved in practice to bear the character and to yield the 
 fruits which I have described. 
 
 As I have said, this is not the moment to comment upon a 
 specific point, but there are one or two considerations which seem 
 to me to point to a definite and practical conclusion of paramount 
 urgency. 
 
 There is to be a large and drastic rearrangement of territory, 
 not only in Europe, but in other countries — that was inevitable — 
 the colouring of a new map. It was most unfortunate that that 
 process had to be gone through while some of the great nations, 
 Russia and Austria-Hungary for instance, had lost one form of 
 unity without yet acquiring another. 
 
 Then, again, it has been necessary to create — or recreate for the 
 most part — to create for the first time new States, founded mainly 
 on ethnical lines — the Poles, the Czecho-Slavs, the Jugo-Slavs. 
 Every lover of liberty rejoices in the emancipation of these down- 
 trodden nationalities, and wishes for these infant States a maturity 
 of peaceful and free development both on the geographical and 
 economic side. Every arrangement now made under existing con- 
 ditions must of necessity be subject to the test of experience, and 
 the same must be said of the mandatory system which it is proposed, 
 with my complete and cordial sympathy, to apply, particularly in 
 Africa, not for the aggrandizement or especial benefit of European 
 Powers, but to prevent selfish exploitation and to assist in the 
 development not only of the material prosperity, but of the capacity 
 for freedom of the races which are still unable to govern themselves. 
 
 Finally, as all history shows, there can be no lasting or fruitful 
 peace if it involves the permanent ostracism and impoverishment 
 of any of the nations of the world. Every belligerent on both sides, 
 every belligerent has undergone gigantic suffering and sustained 
 almost immeasurable waste. It is in the interests of all that at the 
 earliest opportunity each of us, under the appropriate safeguards 
 which the new peace will provide, should be able to restart our 
 industries, develop our resources, and to recreate our social and 
 economic life. 
 
 What is the condition ? What is the conclusion to which these The Leagu 
 considerations lead ? Surelv it is to set on foot, without a moment's of Nations, 
 avoidable delay, and as a living and working machine, the League 
 
of Nations. I do not hesitate to say that, in my opinion, by far the 
 greatest achievement of the Paris Conference is the elaboration in a 
 practical shape of this great and beneficent conception, and let me 
 add, by way of parenthesis, that, in that matter, we of the British 
 Empire owe an enormous debt of gratitude to the invaluable labours 
 of my noble friend and late colleague Lord Robert Cecil. 
 
 There is not one of the problems which I enumerated a few 
 moments ago the solution of which does not depend upon the effec- 
 tive authority of the League. The reduction of armaments — not 
 only in one quarter, but everywhere — it is no good reducing it in 
 one place if you do not reduce it all round — to a scale which will 
 put an end to the gamble in competitive force will be one of the 
 first and most urgent of its duties. Hardly less important is the 
 setting up without delay of workable machinery for the anticipation, 
 as well as for the settlement of internal disputes. The common 
 and collective will must have for its sanction a common and collec- 
 tive force. The door should be open always to any State that is 
 ready in good faith to enter in. There must be that sense of equality 
 of right and of privilege between great and small States which alone 
 can ensure confidence and give to a League the breath, not of a 
 machine, but of a living organization. If that is accomplished, 
 well and good. In my opinon it is the lynch-pin of the whole thing. 
 The peace will not become a lasting peace, its provisions will 
 become dead letters, tranquillity will, in the future as in the past, 
 be at the mercy of a chapter of accidents, unless as its first and most 
 effective result you see the creation as the living and working and 
 dominating force of this free organization a partnership of all the 
 nations of the world. 
 The Party I am not ashamed, to confess to you that' I have come to speak to 
 
 Truee. y OU this afternoon as a Liberal to Liberals. There is in my judg- 
 
 ment no longer any occasion for what is called the Party truce, of 
 which the belated offspring was the present House of Commons, 
 born, if anything ever was, out of due season. The election last 
 December was so manipulated that it was bound to result, as it did 
 result, in the enthronement of an artificially swollen Tory majority 
 at Westminster. It was a clever stroke of electioneering leger- 
 demain. It caught a lot of guileless folk who ought to have known 
 better, and none suffered so severely at the moment as the Liberal 
 Party. I did my best to open people's eyes to the realities of the 
 case, but my warnings were unheeded, and the mischief was done. 
 
 There are, it is true, abund<ant signs of rapid and even dramatic 
 revulsion. The electoral majorities of last December, wherever they 
 have since been tested, have been shown to be entirely and indeed 
 ludicrously fictitious. Three free Liberals have already been added 
 to the gallant band, which, under the leadership of my friend Sir 
 Donald Maclean, is holding the fort. The Government Whips, 
 poor men, must be having an uneasy time looking about with 
 anxious solicitude for the health of their flock, though by way of 
 compensation they are for the time being saved from the temptation 
 
13 
 
 of doing anything in the nature, so far as the House of Commons is 
 concerned, of a profligate multiplication of hereditary honours. The 
 Liberals who refused to fetter their freedom — and that, I believe, 
 after careful study of the figures, was the case with the bulk of the 
 Liberal electors — may look forward with the serenest confidence to 
 the complete vindication of their action. If there ever was a time 
 when there was need for concerted vigilance and activity by all who 
 call themselves Liberals, it is surely that in which we live. 
 
 I am going to ask you this afternoon to concentrate your atten- XJJJJJJ 
 tion wholly on a matter which, in my judgment, is of paramount 
 importance, for it overshadows and overrides the whole domain » 
 of what is called social reform — the state of our national finances. 
 It is a dry subject, but it is a very important one, and ought not 
 really to be dry. 
 
 Just look and use your imagination while you make the survey — 
 look at some of the figures which the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
 presented to the House of Commons in his Budget speech the other 
 day. The total amount of our National Debt at the outbreak of war 
 was 650 millions. Nothing gives me or my colleagues, who for ten 
 years administered the Government of the country, more satisfaction 
 than this, that we had — I will not say the courage, but the common 
 sense — instead of improvidently reducing taxation, to apply it to the 
 reduction of the capital of our national liabilities. We had reduced 
 the debt to a figure of 650 millions. To-day it is 7,400 millions, of 
 which, roughly, 6,000 is owed at home, and the balance abroad. 
 In other words, the gross total of the National Debt has been 
 multiplied 11 or nearly 12 times. 
 
 Let me give you another figure. During the war we have had to 
 sell something like 1,000 millions of our foreign investments, and in 
 selling them we have parted with the power which their ownership 
 gave us of drawing on the wealth of other countries and ceased to be a 
 creditor of other countries so far as that is concerned. It is true that 
 we have on the other side of that account claims upon our Allies and 
 Dominions for advances to them of a nominal sum of, I think, 1,700 
 millions, of which no less than 500 millions has been advanced to 
 Russia. I need not tell you that a prudent financier will write down 
 the value of those assets very considerably. 
 
 Just take one other equally portentous and significant figure. 
 The war, in the sense of the prosecution of active hostilities, has , 
 
 been over for six months, but our daily expenditure, as estimated 
 hy the Chancellor of the Exchequer, for the current year works out 
 at four millions a day, rather more than eight times what it was 
 before the war. The Chancellor of the Exchequer estimates the 
 deficit he has to make good this year as, roughly, 300 millions. As 
 an old-fashioned financier, who was brought up in the Gladstonian 
 school, I must enter a strong protest — it is the only opportunity T 
 have of making it; therefore, you must forgive me if I do what 
 otherwise I should have done elsewhere — against the manner in 
 
14 
 
 which the Chancellor of the Exchequer proposes to deal with the 
 realisation of assets, the salvage of the war. He is taking credit, 
 for the purpose of the present financial year, of no less than 200 
 millions, which is to be realised, or which he hopes will be realised, 
 from this salvage. 
 
 According to my ideas — I daresay they are out of date, but I 
 think they will be sanctioned by every accountant who has to deal 
 with the balance-sheet of any commercial firm — the proceeds of 
 salvage ought $o go, not to swell the apparent revenue of the year, 
 but, the bulk of them at any rate, to reduce the existing debt. 
 They are for the most part the produce of borrowed money, and they 
 ought to be applied to the reduction of the capital account. There 
 is not an accountant in England and Wales who will not agree with 
 that. The Chancellor of the Exchequer would say no doubt, and 
 with some reason, that if they were so treated he would have to 
 apportion it to increased borrowings, but in that case the actual 
 deficit of the current year would amount not to 300, but to very 
 nearly 500 millions sterling. That is the actual figure with which 
 we are faced. This is a little digression for which you will pardon 
 me as an old expert in these matters. 
 
 I come now to what is much more important. However you 
 draw the account you are confronted, I will not say with an appall- 
 ing, but certainly with a most formidable situation. Call it 300 
 millions, call it 500 millions; it matters very little; we are now so 
 accustomed to these colossal figures. There are only three ways out 
 of it: increased taxation, additions to borrowings, or reduction of 
 expenditure. No human ingenuity can suggest any fourth course. 
 If the Chancellor proposed to meet it by some increased taxation, 
 to which in principle I see no objection, or by borrowing to some 
 extent on the 250 millions — but I must pause before I go to what I 
 consider is the true solution of the financial difficulties to say a word 
 about a matter which among these gigantic figures bulks very small, 
 but which I think is of the utmost importance. 
 
 I am speaking now to Liberals, not only in Newcastle, but 
 throughout the length and breadth of the country, to all Liberals 
 and all Free Traders, and I trust that our representatives in the 
 House of Commons and our friends and followers outside will resist 
 to the utmost and by every means in their power the proposals for 
 what is called, as I think with very little reason, Imperial Prefer- 
 ence. It is true that, in point of amount, in these days of swollen 
 and exaggerated finance, they are, relatively speaking, a trumpery 
 affair, but they are not a trumpery affair from the point of view of 
 principle. Still less are they a trumpery affair from the point of 
 view of the future, and the precedent which they set. I knew that 
 some kind of Preference was to be given on existing Duties, because 
 by one part of the published electoral compact between two wings 
 of the Coalition — though I doubt whether many of my friends who 
 profit by the coupon realised it—Preference was also to be tacked on 
 
15 
 
 to the Sumptuary Duties on certain classes of imported manufactures 
 which were imposed by Mr. McKenna expressly and avowedly during 
 the war for temporary purposes. 
 
 Mr. Austen Chamberlain spoke, with a filial piety which I admire 
 and respect, of the pleasure he felt, when he proposed these Duties, 
 in taking up his father's work. I remember when I was a very 
 young man 'there was a celebrated French comic opera, one of the 
 celebrated masterpieces of Offenbach, which was in vogue all over 
 Europe, called La Grande Duchesse, and in that opera there was a 
 favourite song which was hummed by everybody in Paris, of which 
 this was the refrain, " Behold the sabre, the sabre of my father." 
 Mr. Chamberlain's sabre — I am speaking of the late Mr. Chamber- 
 lain — meant business. I never thought it a very formidable weapon, 
 but Mr. Austen Chamberlain's sabre is like one of those wooden 
 swords you see in the pantomime. It is an imitation, but not a 
 very plausible or convincing imitation, of the real thing, and it will 
 not cut, and much as I should desire any offspring of mine to show 
 both in word and in deed fidelity and loyalty to paternal 
 example, I confess I would rather have it in ,& more substantial and 
 workable shape than Mr. Austen Chamberlain's so-called 
 Preferential Duties. 
 
 Let us see what it all amounts to. If these Duties had been 
 proposed, even in the modest, shrinking, humble shape in which they 
 are now presented to Parliament, if they had been so proposed five 
 or even three years ago to the House of Commons, is there a man 
 or a woman here who does not know they would have been met with 
 the united resistance of the whole Liberal Party? Of course they 
 would, and yet I find that on a crucial amendment moved by my 
 friend Captain Benn only seventeen of the Coalition Liberals voted 
 with him, while others — it is one of the tributes which people pay 
 to their own party when for the moment they have forsaken it — 
 abstained. Could you have a more significant and melancholy 
 vindication of our predictions and warnings at the time of the 
 General Election? 
 
 Mr. Churchill says these things are "not worth talking about." I Four 
 venture to give him and to every one who has ever called himself a Reasons 
 Liberal or a Free Trader, four reasons — four ought to be enough — dSSUL 
 why these Duties should be opposed, unless people have changed the 
 whole of their convictions and traditions on this matter. In the first 
 place it is an absolutely unjustifiable abandonment of revenue. It 
 means the sacrifice in a full year, of three millions; and even in 
 these days three millions are three millions, and they ought not to 
 be thrown away for nothing. 
 
 In the next place, there are the so-called Sumptuary Taxes. We 
 have on record Mr. McKenna's statement, made as Chancellor of 
 the Exchequer with my full approval, for I was then Prime Minister, 
 that every one of these taxes introduced was founded on the special 
 conditions of the war. They were taxes, in other words, which 
 
 Preference. 
 
16 
 
 were intended to cease on the cessation of the war. It is absolutely 
 illegitimate to use them as a vehicle for the introduction of 
 Preference as part of our fiscal system. Those are two reasons, and 
 I will give you a third. These so-called Preferences are in reality 
 an absolute sham ; they are no advantage of any sort or kind to the 
 Dominions themselves. By far the most important, I think, is that 
 of tea. I think it amounts to £2,300,000 out of the whole three 
 millions. Ninety per cent, of the tea which we consume in this 
 country comes already from the British Empire, and the remaining 
 10 per cent, may be regarded as tea which ia not consumed by the 
 bulk of the people, which is more or less of a luxury, or a fashion, 
 or a positive fad. You may say that practically the whole of it 
 comes from within the British Empire. Therefore the case of 
 Preference, from the point of view of benefiting the Empire, is 
 obviously nugatory and a sham — it is equivalent really to reducing 
 the Duty on tea. I shall be glad to see the Duty on tea reduced as 
 soon as we are in a financial position to reduce that Duty at all, but 
 to call it, under these conditions, a form of Imperial Preference is 
 to hoodwink, or to attempt to hoodwink, the British and Colonial 
 electorate. 
 
 Again, let me remind you that the late Mr. Chamberlain knew 
 what he was talking about; he really understood this matter. I 
 thought him profoundly wrong and talked with him for years over 
 it, as some of you may remember, but he did understand it. He 
 always said, with perfect truth: — 
 
 11 It is no good fiddling with those little things ; they are of no value 
 whatever from my point of view. Colonial Preference means taxation 
 upon food, upon com, upon other commodities which the Dominions 
 send here in large quantities, and in regard to which they compete in 
 our markets with foreign countries." 
 
 I have always said that it is no good putting a Preference on corn 
 unless you put a Preference also on timber, because, although one 
 set of Canadians grow corn, another are only interested in growing 
 timber; and it is no good putting a Preference on corn unless you 
 put a Preference on wool, which comes to us from South Africa 
 and Australia, and so on. You can go through the whole range of 
 the Empire with the conclusion that the only Preference which will 
 be really effective for the purpose which he had in view was the 
 Preference which applied both to the food of our people and to the 
 raw materials of our most important industries. 
 
 That is what wrecked Mr. Chamberlain's scheme, because it led 
 — he would never admit that about raw materials, but he would 
 admit it about food — to this illogical result ; and I can imagine the 
 withering smile with which he would have received this homoeopathic, 
 and less than homoeopathic, instalment of Duties which do no good 
 to the Colonies even if they do very little harm to us. 
 
 Let me give you my fourth reason, and this goes to the root of 
 the whole matter. Trivial though they seem, they are intended — 
 
17 
 
 not by the thirty or forty Liberals who went into the Lobby to 
 support them, but by those who proposed them — as 1 the pioneers 
 and precursors of a fully-planned system of Imperial Preference and 
 Protection. Mr. Austen Chamberlain reminded the House that his 
 father had predicted that people would accept his policy one day, 
 after, I think, " a great deal of blood and trouble." I do not know 
 whether anyone thinks this war was fought over the cause of 
 Imperial Preference^ but he added, amid the tumultuous cheering 
 of the Tory Protectionists behind him: — 
 
 " That day has com©. " . 
 
 This is the true significance of these proposals in the eyes of those Significance 
 who really believe it. They mean the incorporation in principle in f the 
 our fiscal system of those doctrines of which Mr. Joseph Chamberlain Proposals. 
 was the apostle and against which the whole Liberal Party — with 
 many recruits, let us acknowledge, from the Unionist ranks — fought 
 with our whole heart and with our whole strength for three years 
 and on which we won an overwhelming victory. 
 
 The challenge is fairly thrown down, and though I desire to The 
 pronounce no sentence of ostracism or exclusion against anybody, Lib^raufnV 
 I say here, looking back upon that long, strenuous, and glorious 
 controversy, for such it was to us, that there is no Liberal who is 
 worthy of his name or of the traditions of the Party to which he 
 belongs, who will not oppose that from the beginning to the end. 
 
 I have kept you much longer than I intended. This goes to the 
 root of everything. It is no good talking about housing, no good 
 talking about land, no good talking about any of the great social 
 reforms on which our hearts are set and on which our energies ought 
 to be directed, unless you have first cleared! the ground of Govern- 
 ment finance. Money and credit govern the whole thing. I do not 
 say we have reached the limit of productive taxation, I do not say 
 that we have exhausted our credit or our ability to borrow, but I do 
 say with a full sense of responsibility that we are, or we shall be, 
 perilously near the one catastrophe or the other unless we return to 
 work in a very different spirit from that shown, I do not say by 
 Mr. Austen Chamberlain, but by many of his colleagues, first, by a 
 drastic and wholesale reduction in public extravagance and waste, 
 and next, and not less important, the emancipation without delay 
 of our trade, both import and export, from the restrictions which 
 are not only hampering industrial revival, but threatening it in 
 some quarters with something very like industrial paralysis under 
 the system, if system it can be called, cf irresponsible expenditure 
 which is allowed to run riot. 
 
18 
 
 In war time the control of the Treasury has become a dead letter ; 
 each Department does what is right in its own eyes. Almost every 
 week we have disclosed some new example of reckless and unpar- 
 donable waste. The unemployment dole in the manner in which 
 it is being administered is — and I cannot say anything worse — 
 worthy of the decadent days of Ancient Rome. There was a most 
 instructive incident, which I hope many of you have noticed, in the 
 House of Commons this week. Sir Alfred Mond, one of the great 
 business men who have been brought on the scene to show the poor 
 old-fashioned Civil Service how to administer the country, was 
 criticised for not reducing since the Armistice the number and cost 
 of the vast array of outhouses, from museums and hotels down to- 
 those long rows of unsightly huts that disfigure the various spots in 
 London, the outhouses in which the hosts of new officials during 
 the war have been quartered. I have no doubt that he is an able 
 man. He has done what he could. But he had to confess that he 
 was perfectly impotent to resist what the great Scottish divine> 
 Dr. Chalmers, once called the " unbridled impotency of his 
 colleagues.' ' Six months after the war he has to provide, so he 
 told us, accommodation for the same number of officials, or practi- 
 cally the same number, as when hostilities were in full blast. I fear 
 this is only typical of what is going on all over the place. The first 
 necessity of this country is to put a stern and effective stop to those 
 disastrous and impoverishing excesses which have tripped over and 
 demoralised the large part, if not the largest part, of the whole area 
 of administration. 
 
 Hardly less important is the removal of the restrictions and embar- 
 goes which, though they may be for the moment profitable to this 
 or that particular trade, are hampering and throttling trade at 
 large at the expense of the producer and consumer alike. In my 
 opinion, the war restrictions have become, now that the war is over, 
 simply a disguised system of Protection. Another of our new masters 
 of administration, Sir Auckland Geddes, who is temporarily run- 
 ning the Board of Trade, got nearer the truth than perhaps he knew 
 in an ingenious phrase which I see he dropped the other day about 
 •' nursing the baby." That is exactly what it is — nursing the baby. 
 Protection everywhere, and at all times, in all shapes, could not be 
 more tersely or more happily described. 
 
 How much longer are we going to stand it? I say to you, you 
 Liberals of the North, here is solid and urgent work of most practical 
 kind to the hands of the Liberal Party. We cannot for the moment 
 do much in Parliament, but we can do a great deal in the country, 
 a country which is bewildered and disgusted as it looks round for a 
 way out of this financial morass. What is our remedy? Let us 
 
19 , 
 
 return to Cabinet government, which was upset for a purpose that I 
 have never been able to discover in the middle of the war, and 
 which is the only safeguard. It was not a sudden invention, but a 
 matured growth over generations of Parliamentary experience. It is 
 the only safeguard of co-ordinated and responsible administration. 
 Let us get rid of the wasteful and costly method of the emergency 
 man, and let us instal once more in real and living authority the 
 principle of economy in expenditure and of freedom of trade, which 
 were not only the watchwords, but the governing rules, of the great 
 Liberal statesmen of the past. 
 
 I thank you very much for giving me the opportunity of speaking 
 plainly and fully to you upon these matters. These are not the days 
 for any indulgence in the empty superficial art of rhetoric. I am no 
 pessimist ; I never have been, and never shall be ; but I should be dis- 
 guising to my countrymen, after as long an experience in public life 
 as almost any of those who have tried to serve them, the real state 
 of my feelings if I did not tell them perfectly frankly, with full 
 sincerity, and with complete conviction that during the whole of the 
 time I have never known this country confronted with a graver or a 
 more serious situation. 
 
 It is no good blinking facts. It is no use wrapping ourselves up in 
 a facile delusive optimism which vaguely believes or hopes that 
 somehow or other we shall muddle through. We are face to face 
 with a situation on the economic and industrial side than which a 
 graver and more formidable has never been presented to this 
 country in the whole of its long and chequered annals. I believe as 
 firmly as I ever believed, not only in what was called by Burke " the 
 inbred integrity of our race and people," but in their resourcefulness 
 and in their tenacity, in their power under the stress of circum- 
 stances — it takes very heavy stress sometimes to make them display 
 that power— -to adapt themselves to new conditions. 
 
 All these things are required by us now, and I am confident thatT he OnlyW 
 we shall find them. But all that is of no use if you are going wander- ~J roductl ° 
 ing after those Protectionist will o' the wisps, or if you are going to Economy. 
 imagine that by the multiplication of borrowing and of credit 
 facilities you can really create wealth. There is one way, and one 
 way only, in which wealth can be created, and that is by production ; 
 only one way in which national prosperity can be sustained and 
 improved, and that is by honest finance, by economic expenditure, by 
 educating your people so as to keep them abreast of growing develop- 
 ments and applications of scientific research and knowledge, by 
 regarding it as your duty as a community to subordinate, for the 
 time being at any rate, all special interests and claims, I won't say of 
 labour and capital, I won't say of this class or of that, in order that 
 by combined and concerted co-operation we ma} 7- attain, as I am 
 certain we shall, a happy issue from all our difficulties. 
 
20 
 
 IIL 
 
 SHELLS SHORTAGE 
 CONTROVERSY. 
 
 A REPLY TO LORD FRENCH 
 
 Lord French's Narrative — An Infringement of Best Traditions — 
 Le Cateau — Reason for Lord Kitchener's Visit to France — The 
 Output of Munitions — Mr. Lloyd George's Testimony — 
 Shrapnel v. High Explosives — Lord Kitchener's 
 Account — Neuve Chapelle: Lord French's 
 Travesty of History — What Lord French told 
 Lord Kitchener— The Newcastle Shells 
 Speech — The Change of Govern- 
 ment — Lord French and the 
 Press — Lord French's 
 Letter to Mr. Asquith. 
 
 VIE. ASQUITH, on June 2nd, 1919, attended a luncheon 
 given in his honour at the Connaught Kooms in Londoi? 
 by Mr. Oswald Partington, and, acknowledging the toast of 
 his health, he made a comprehensive reply to many statements 
 about the shells supply contained in the final chapter of Lord 
 French's story of " 1914," published in the Daily Telegraph. 
 Mr. Asquith said : — 
 
 Let me first of all thank you, Sir, for your kind and generous 
 hospitality and my many old friends whom I am glad to see around 
 me for their kindness in coming here to take part in this little 
 gathering. I suppose it is probably the case that we should not 
 have met in this way at this particular moment if it had not been 
 that we have just come to the end of a journalistic serial in which the 
 lat9 Commander-in-Chief of our Armies in France and Flanders, 
 purporting to describe the first year of the war, has made himself 
 responsible for attacks and aspersions both upon the living and upon 
 the dead, which I, at any rate, cannot allow to pass without an 
 immediate and definite protest. I cannot recall any parallel to this 
 ill-advised and unhappy literary venture. 
 
21 
 
 Lord French is not only a Field-Marshal on the active list of Lord 
 the Army, but he occupies at the moment one of the highest and French's 
 most responsible posts in the Civil Service- of the Crown. He is Po8,t,on 
 Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, an office which has often, I agree, been 
 more of less of a sinecure, and of which the Duke of Shrewsbury 
 said, as far back as the reign of Queen Anne, " there is not enough 
 business to keep one awake, but enough to prevent one falling 
 asleep." That is not the case to-day. Ireland is one of the darkest 
 — I think myself it is the darkest — of the dark spots on the map, 
 not only of the British Empire, but of the world. And while 
 the statesmanship of free nations is trying to find everywhere else 
 some foothold, some point of new departure for nationalities, the 
 chief governor of Ireland, who one might have thought would have 
 been absorbed, or at any rate would have tried to show that he was 
 absorbed, in his own overwhelming responsibilities, apparently 
 can find no better occupation for his time and his energies than to 
 fill the columns of the daily Press with a narrative of the early days 
 of the war which I do not hesitate, speaking with as much knowledge 
 perhaps as any man possesses, to characterise here and now as 
 incomplete, partial, in most serious respects misleading, and, as 
 the whole world will soon see — indeed as I shall show to-day — in 
 patent variance and contradiction with his own spoken and written 
 utterances in the past. 
 
 This, in my judgment, is a very serious matter, and it is rendered 
 even more serious by the fact that, while apparently Lord French 
 enjoys in his character of Field-Marshal complete immunity from 
 the restrictions and regulations which apply to other officers on 
 the active list, he makes free use of official and confidential 
 documents to build up a case against those whose lips are closed, in 
 some instances by death, and in others by official restraints which 
 apply to them but not to him. 
 
 I feel it my duty to say that quite apart from tne merits or " The We 
 demerits, the justice or injustice, the accuracy or inaccuracy of Sample.' 
 Lord French's narrative, the whole proceeding is of the worst 
 example, in flagrant contradiction to the best traditions of our public 
 service, and manifestly and lamentably repugnant to the elementary 
 rules of fair play. I need hardly say to you that I do not make* 
 that protest from any desire to avoid the fullest publicity as to this 
 or any part of the war for which I have a direct or even the most 
 indirect responsibility. On the contrary, I have the utmost 
 confidence that complete disclosure of all the facts is the one thing 
 needed for an absolute vindication against all suggestions of supine- 
 ness, want of foresight, and lack of promptitude and energy, both in 
 council and in action, of the Governments of which I was the head. 
 That here and there mistakes were made, things done which had 
 better have been omitted, things omitted which might better have 
 been done, is obviously true. It would be, in the unexampled 
 circumstances in which we were placed, not only a marvel, but a 
 miracle, if it had been otherwise. But that is not the case put 
 
22 
 
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 ench 
 
 ntradicts 
 
 msdf. 
 
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 ted 
 
 vera eats. 
 
 rd 
 inch's 
 
 arge. 
 
 forward by Lord French, particularly with regard to the matter 
 which forms the subject of the last and, I suppose, the most vitriolic 
 of his chapters — I have not read them all — the allegation of 
 deliberate apathy — that is what it comes to — of calculated and callous 
 neglect, during the first year of the war, on the part of the 
 Government, in the provision of an adequate supply of artillery 
 ammunition for the Armies in the field. I am going to show to you 
 that not only has that charge no foundation in fact, but that no 
 one ought to know better that it has no foundation than Lord 
 French himself. 
 
 But before I deal with that, which will be my main theme, I 
 must point out — because this is a question of authority and credibility 
 — that there are in this narrative, dealing with other aspects of 
 the early days of the war, things which might, and I think ought, 
 to lead one to look with a good deal of, I will not say scepticism, 
 but of close scrutiny, on Lord French's articles. 
 
 In the first place he gives an account of the battle of Le Cateau 
 which I find it wholly impossible to reconcile, not only with my 
 recollection of the facts, but with his own published despatch on 
 the same subject after the battle had taken place, and it is an 
 account which differs very much from the other in that it reflects on 
 the honour and military capacity of one of his own subordinates. 
 
 There is another and still more serious illustration of the same 
 thing. I pointed out the other day, when I was speaking at 
 Newcastle, that Lord French's account of the visit paid to him in 
 Paris by Lord Kitchener at the- end of the month of August is a 
 travesty of the real facts. I am glad to know that all the contem- 
 porary documents, which have happily been preserved, will very 
 shortly be given to the world. But in the meantime let me say 
 in regard to that transaction that the Government received 
 a message from Lord French as to his contemplated movements, 
 of which it is no exaggeration to say that it filled the whole 
 Cabinet with consternation. There are several of my 
 
 colleagues here who sat in that Cabinet, and they will 
 bear me out. And why? Because the movements which it 
 indicated would in our judgment have amounted in effect to leaving 
 our Allies in the lurch in the moment of their extreme need ; and 
 the consternation which we felt was shared and expressed to us in 
 moving terms by the head of the French Government. It was in 
 these circumstances that Lord Kitchener, at the unanimous request 
 of his colleagues, undertook his mission to France, a mission which 
 he successfully achieved, and which in my judgment saved our cause 
 from an indelible reproach. 
 
 What is the charge made by Lord French in this matter of 
 munitions? He tells us his object was to make known some of the 
 efforts he made to awaken both the Government and the public 
 from that " apathy which means certain defeat " ; these efforts, he 
 states, were continued for months, but his appeals fell upon deaf 
 ears ; and finally, after reading my speech at Newcastle (I will come 
 
23 
 
 to that presently), he lost all hope, and determined, at the risk of his 
 own military future, by the aid of the Press and behind the back 
 and without the knowledge of his own official chief, to destroy the 
 apathy of the Government, and incidentally the Government itself, 
 which, he says, had brought the Empire to " the brink of disaster." 
 That is his case summarily put. As ycu see, it amounts to an 
 allegation that, in spite of his warnings, the Government as a whole, 
 and Lord Kitchener in particular, were criminally supine and 
 negligent in a matter of capital importance for the conduct of the 
 war. 
 
 Let me for a moment ask you, for they are all public property, Tne Fac ts 
 to recall the actual facts. Nobody questions that the Expeditionary Ammunition 
 Force which we sent to France in August was fully equipped in all 
 respects. Its artillery equipment was in excess of that which had 
 been settled to be necessary in case of war. The losses which had to 
 be made good after the retreat from Mons in the first Autumn, 
 and the rapid and enormous increase through recruiting of the New 
 Armies in the forces in the field, very soon began to put a strain, and 
 a severe strain, on our machinery of production. From almost the 
 first moment the matter engaged, and never ceased to engage 
 for one day, the close and continuous attention of the Government. 
 Lord Kitchener was assisted by a Committee of the Cabinet, and 
 later on in the Spring of 1915 I appointed a Special Munitions . 
 Committee of the Cabinet, independent of the War Office, and 
 presided over by Mr. Lloyd George. 
 
 A speech made the day after my famous speech, or infamous Mr. Lloyd 
 speech, at Newcastle — made by Mr. Lloyd George in the House of £ eo , r .£ e ' 8 
 'Commons on April 21st, to which it is curious Lord French makes 
 no reference, although I see he has dedicated his book to Mr. Lloyd 
 George — surely he might have paid him the compliment of reading 
 . bis speeches — this speech made on April 21st, the day after mine, 
 was an expansion, but in entire harmony with what I said. 
 
 Mr. Lloyd George described with perfect accuracy exactly what had 
 been done by this " lethargic,' • " apathetic/' " negligent " Govern- 
 ment. He pointed out that the area of the supply of production had 
 been enormously extended by from 2,500 to 3,000 new firms, by which 
 I mean firms not previously so employed who were brought into this 
 particular industry ; that immense orders had been placed both in 
 America and Canada; that legislation had been passed to enable 
 the War Office and the Admiralty to take over engineering works : 
 with the result that while the armies in the field between September 
 and March had been multiplied by something, I suppose, between 
 four and five-fold in number, the output of munitions in the same 
 time had been multiplied, not four or five, but nineteen-fold. In 
 the month of May, 1915, we were producing in three days the 
 amount of ammunition usually produced before in a whole year. 
 That is not a bad record. 
 
24 
 
 Shrapnel 
 and High 
 Explosive' 
 
 The field guns of our Army when war began were equipped, not 
 with high explosives, but with shrapnel. That was a decision 
 deliberately arrived at after a full inquiry by, our best experts, 
 and no doubt largely as a result of our experience in the South 
 African War. Lord French says that he was always an advocate 
 of high explosives for our field guns, but that his demands were 
 rejected. I have seen no more surprising statement. He was 
 Chief of the Imperial General Staff. He was chief military adviser 
 to the Government for years before the war, and this is the first time 
 that I or anyone whom I have been able to consult has ever heard 
 of any such demand. There is no trace of it in official records. No 
 one knows better than Lord French that in his position — for, as I 
 have said, he was the most trusted expert adviser of the War Office 
 and of the Government in all military matters — if he attached 
 serious importance to this proposal, and if it had been in fact what 
 is vulgarly called " turned down " by the War Office, he could have 
 brought it, as he constantly did bring these things, before the 
 Committee of Imperial Defence, where it would have received the 
 most attentive and respectful consideration. I can answer for it 
 that no such thing was ever done. 
 
 I do not want to occupy your time unduly, but I must say a 
 little more about this question of high explosives. I have told you 
 that our field guns were equipped with shrapnel, and not with high 
 explosives. I am now going to read a short passage from a report 
 which was made by Lord Kitchener immediately after the formation 
 of the Coalition Government in June, 1915. It throws a light 
 upon the history of this particular matter. Lord Kitchener says 
 that early in September (1914) — that is to say, the month after the 
 war began, the War Office took up the question of the design of 
 shells of this nature (high explosives). 
 
 In October, General Deville, the most distinguished French 
 artillerist then living, and head of the French Ordnance, at our 
 invitation, in this month of October, 1914, came over to discuss, 
 amongst other things, this very matter, and the subject of high 
 explosive shells for field guns, as well as the fuse to be employed, 
 the pattern of the shell, and the nature of the filling, was discussed 
 between us. General Headquarters in France were consulted, and 
 replies were received indicating that opinions were divided out 
 there. But they considered it desirable that some high explosives 
 should be provided if this could be done without interfering with the 
 supply of shrapnel. On October 19th the first thousand rounds of 
 18-pounder high explosive shell was sent to France for trial and 
 report. This was in the first two months of the war, and steps 
 were taken to proceed with further manufacture. On November 6th 
 a favourable report was received on the shells, and we were asked 
 by General Headquarters to supply in future, and as soon as we 
 could procure it, 50 per cent, of shrapnel and 50 per cent, of high 
 explosives. A week later a telegram was received asking that the 
 percentage of high explosives should not be 50 per cent, but 25 per 
 
25 
 
 cent. I earnestly hope this document will become a Parliamentary 
 paper. 
 
 I want to read to you what follows, at the risk of becoming Lord 
 rather technical, because I want to show the country the great Kitchener's 
 troubles with which we were concerned and our attempts to deal ers,0D « 
 with them : — 
 
 " At this stage, "says Lord Kitchener, " we had to consider whether 
 machinery employed in producing 18-pounder shrapnel, which was so 
 urgently required, should be stopped and turned on instead to high 
 explosive shell. The adoption of this course would not have produced any 
 high explosive shell for 10 weeks or more, and during this period, the 
 provision of the absolutely necessary amount of ammunition 
 for the fields guns would have been seriously imperilled just 
 when Sir JoHn French was pressing for every round. Our expenditure 
 of 18-pounder ammunition up to November 1st was 385,000 rounds, 
 while our supply from manufacture was at that date approximately 45,000 
 a month. The stoppage of the supply of shrapnel would, in my opinion, 
 have seriously affected the safety of the troops in the field, for we should 
 thus have placed a large proportion of our .machinery out of work at the 
 most critical period of the war in order later to have an article which, 
 no doubt, would have been somewhat better for certain purposes than 
 the shrapnel shells then being provided. Additional mste.nd of substi- 
 tuted orders were therefore at once placed, not <>nly with the experienced 
 armament firms but also with additional firms not previously engaged 
 in this nature of manufacture, as well as in Canada and America." 
 
 I think that is a conclusive vindication of the action which Lord 
 Kitchener took up to that point. But we were not content with, 
 that. As Mr. Lloyd George pointed out in the speech which lie 
 made on April 21st, and as Lord Kitchener emphasises in this 
 document, we had the advantage of having in this country in a high 
 official position a man of the greatest scientific eminence— Lord 
 Moulton, and he very) patriotically took up this subject of the 
 manufacture and development of high explosives, and as Lord 
 Kitchener says, writing in June, 1915 : — 
 
 " Lord Moulton has not only provided explosives for our needs and Lord 
 prepared for the large additional requirements we shall have to meet Moulton'? 
 later when our ammunition grows to larger proportions, but he has \chieve- 
 enabled us to give to all the Allies at various times, and notably France, "lent. 
 sufficient explosives to enable them to continue the war." 
 
 Lord French has referred to his letter of December 31st, 1914, 
 in which he set out his requirements, and as an illustration of what 
 he calls the " deplorable apathy " of the Home authorities he gives a 
 wholly misleading account of the answer which was sent him from 
 the War Office on January 19th. Therefore, I must in justice to 
 the War Office and to Lord Kitchener do what Lord French has not 
 done — cite textually the answer of the War Office. The suggestion 
 is that all this time we were living in a sort of fool's paradise, 
 stopping our ears, shutting our eyes, not listening to Lord French's 
 
26 
 
 appeals, doing nothing to provide our Army with needed ammuni- 
 tion. This is the War Office letter: — 
 
 " I am commanded to inform you that the Army Council are fully 
 alive to the urgent importance of increasing the supply of gun ammuni- 
 tion for the Expeditionary Force, and have spared, and will spare, no 
 effort to secure this end. In this connection the Council desire me to 
 mention the serious labour questions to which the enhanced rates of 
 output of all war materials have already given rise. It is hoped, for 
 instance, that during the month of March as many rounds of 18-pounder 
 ammunition will be produced in one week as would have been manufac- 
 tured in 18 months in time of peace. This will entail very considerable 
 development of our labour resources. . . . The Council desire to emphasise 
 the fact that the orders for manufacture are not being limited by what 
 they Ithink it necessary to supply, but are entirely conditioned by the 
 highest possible output of the ordnanc3 factories throughout the Empire 
 and the trade of England and the Allied and neutral countries of the 
 world." 
 
 Do not let it be supposed that the Government at this time and 
 in the succeeding months were satisfied, or anything but disquieted, 
 by the munitions situation. The contractors had promised more 
 than they could perform ; they were terribly behind in their 
 deliveries, particularly in the matter of high explosives. I will give 
 you one figure to show you how serious these failures were. The 
 Army ought to have received, according to contracts, by May 
 15th, 481,000 high explosive 18-pounder shells; instead of which 
 only 52,000, very little more than one-tenth of the whole, were 
 delivered. On the other hand, the increase of the forces in the 
 field, and the changed character of the fighting, led to an expendi- 
 ture of artillery ammunition far in excess of the calculations of any 
 expert authority in any of the belligerent forces. 
 
 In the fighting in and about Neuve Chapelle in the early spring 
 of 1915, as Mr. Lloyd George pointed out in his speech, nearly as 
 much artillery ammunition was spent by our Army as during the 
 whole of the 2| years of the Boer War. How had they got such an 
 enormous supply ? Entirely through the efforts which the Govern- 
 ment had made in the preceding weeks and months. So far from 
 being inattentive or careless, we were straining every nerve and 
 resorting to every expedient to fill the gap. 
 
 Here let me pause and digress from the main stream of my 
 argument. It is high time it was dealt with — the legend long 
 current in a certain section of the Press, to which Lord French seeks 
 to give the weight of his authority — I will show you before I sit 
 down what that is worth — the legend of an apathetic Government 
 with a lethargic head. I am represented in this pictorial and 
 romantic travesty of history as spending my time lolling in an 
 armchair, occasionally arbitrating over disputes of different Depart- 
 ments, waiting on the chapter of accidents, in the hope that somehow 
 or other, and some way or other, the storm-tossed ship might drift 
 safely into port. That is the picture which I believe finds credence 
 
27 
 
 and acceptance among large numbers of the more backward parts 
 of our population. 
 
 What is the fact? I do not like, as you know, to speak very A Prime 
 much about myself, but I am bound to do so. It is no exaggeration Minister's 
 to say that, particularly in these early months of the war — in the Burden 
 critical and decisive months of the war — everything depended on 
 what was done then or what was left undone — it is no exaggeration 
 to say that I was called upon almost every hour of every day to 
 take on my own responsibility and initiative decisions which might 
 be, and which often were, of the most momentous consequence. 
 I had to deal, not only with military and naval operations, the 
 recruiting of the New Army, transport, food supply, and Labour 
 problems, but also with inter- Allied finance, and what at that time 
 was a task of supreme difficulty and delicacy, Allied diplomacy. I 
 had the devoted help of most loyal and efficient colleagues, some 
 of whom I am glad to see sitting around me at this table. There 
 is not one of them who did not habitually come to me to get the 
 last word — sometimes even the first word — in cases of difficulty or 
 doubt. 
 
 And in the meantime what had this supine Government of 
 sluggards and paralytics been doing? They had, in time of peace, 
 prepared for any war on any scale that British statesmanship had 
 ever contemplated. We were, and we remained throughout the war, 
 perfectly secure, not only in these Islands but throughout our 
 world-wide Empire, against any risk of invasion. No foreign 
 soldier ever set his foot on one square yard of British ground. Our 
 Expeditionary Force was ready to start fully equipped and with 
 the necessary transport, at a moment's notice, as it did, to wherever 
 it was most required. 
 
 It soon, became apparent that this war was going to dwarf all Expanding 
 previous experience. What did we do? We recruited, raised, War Po,ic T- 
 equipped, and dispatched vast new armies, and we transported to 
 the field of action the splendid contingents sent to our aid from all 
 parts of the Empire all over the world. We cleared the seas of every 
 German cruiser and merchantman. We carried through the long 
 and delicate negotiations which secured for the Allies the co-opera- 
 tion and the active support of gallant Italy. These were some of 
 the things — it is not an exhaustive catalogue — which were actually 
 done in the course of six months, and I say again, the record is not 
 one of lethargy or apathy. 
 
 But to come back to Lord French. I can only say for myself 
 that, with all my other preoccupations, manifold and distracting as 
 they were, this matter of the supply of munitions was rarely out of 
 my thoughts. I used to see Lord Kitchener daily, often two or three 
 times a day, and I believe hardly a day passed but I did not press 
 him — not that he needed any pressure — to hurry on and increase 
 production by every possible means. So dissatisfied and apprehen- 
 sive did I become at the relatively slow rate of progress, as compared 
 with our expectations and hopes, that I resolved to make a direct 
 
28 
 
 personal appeal both to masters and to men. That was the object 
 and the motive of my visit to Newcastle. 
 
 But, observe, it was a very delicate business. I had to think, 
 not only of our own people, but of our Allies, and still more of the 
 enemy. Operations of great possible moment, as I knew, although 
 I could not disclose it, were then impending, and it was of the 
 utmost importance not to expose our own weaknesses or to give 
 encouragement to the Germans to think that we could not hold our 
 own or more than hold our own. I determined, therefore, to make 
 sure of my ground, and instructed Lord Kitchener to send for Sir 
 John French, to have him over here, and to get from him a concise 
 report and survey of the then military situation, and to make his 
 report to me before I spoke. Sir John French came over. He was 
 seen by Lord Kitchener at the War Office, and they discussed the 
 matter. I have here, it is an interesting historical document — at 
 least, it may become so — the letter in Lord Kitchener's own hand- 
 writing which he wrote to me immediately after the interview with 
 Sir John French. It is as follows : — 
 
 " My dear Prime Minister,— I have had a talk with French. 
 He told me I could let you know that, with the present supply 
 of ammunition, he will have as much as his troops will be able 
 to use in the next forward movement." 
 
 That isi dated April 14th, just 
 Newcastle. I will read it asrain. 
 
 a few days before T went to 
 
 " I have had a talk with French. He told me I could let you know." 
 — (That is what I wanted. I am blamed for relying on his word. 
 I believed in making assurance doubly sure.) — 
 
 " with the present supply of ammunition " • 
 
 — (that is, the ammunition we had been accumulating) — 
 
 " he will have as much as his troops will be able to use in the next 
 forward movement." 
 
 What more is to be said about that? I will say this — that Lord 
 Kitchener in a subsequent communication, before I went to New T - 
 castle, confirmed what is to be found in that letter. I therefore felt, 
 because here I had got what I wanted, that I should be able to speak 
 without giving encouragement to the enemy with regard to these 
 delicate and dangerous operations whioh I knew were about to be 
 launched. I felt not only entitled, but bound, at Newcastle to say 
 what I did on that point. I quote my exact words. Lord French 
 says he read my speech ; I wonder if he did. If he had read it with 
 anything like decent care, he would not have given a most misleading 
 travesty of what I said. I said : — 
 
 " I saw a statement the other day that the operations, not only 
 of our own Army, but of our Allies, were being crippled, or at any rate 
 hampered, by our failure to provide the necessary ammunition. There 
 is no truth in that statement." 
 
29 
 
 Was I not justified in making that statement? Then I went on — Mr. Lloyd 
 I am still quoting from my Newcastle speech ; then I went on to my George 
 main theme of the extreme and perilous urgency of the situation s a ! me 
 as regarded the future. That is the point I was on, and I may point 
 out in passing that the very next night, in his speech in the House 
 of Commons, Mr. Lloyd George said exactly the same thing — 
 namely, that up to that moment, the moment at which he and I 
 were speaking, the real point of danger and difficulty was the future. 
 It M 7 as a long speech. I summed up the case in these words : — 
 
 ''There is not a single naval or military authority among us who, 
 in view of the proximate and prospective requirements " (observe these 
 words) " does not declare that a large and rapid increase in the output 
 of munitions has become one of the first necessities of the State. Lord 
 Kitchener says so, Lord Fisher (who was then the First Sea Lord) I 
 know would say so,' and Sir John French has said so. This, then, is 
 what in the name of your King and Country we ask you to do — to 
 • deliver the goods.' " 
 
 That is the speech, the reading of which — for he says he did read " Overthrow 
 it — caused Lord French to lose all hope of receiving help from the ° f the 
 Government as then constituted, and set to work behind the back 
 of his official chief to secure, in concert with outsiders, the overthrow 
 of the Government. 
 
 There was a time in the decadent days of the Roman Empire 
 when the Praetorians, as they were called, and sometimes the armies 
 in distant parts of the Empire, used to change Emperors. I 
 confess I never knew, until I read Lord French's article, that it 
 was to him, the Commander-in-Chief of our Armies in France, that 
 we owed the blessings of a Coalition Government. But he says so, 
 and to bring about this beneficent revolution in the conduct of our 
 affairs he sent over here a versatile gentleman well known to many of 
 us, Captain Guest. Providence works, as you know, in all kinds 
 of mysterious ways. The combination of Lord French in his head- 
 quarters in France and Captain Guest manipulating the Press and 
 the politicians here had the desired result, and, as Lord French tells 
 you, the Government fell. 
 
 Well, I do not know which Lord French thinks was the chief 
 villain of the whole piece, Lord Kitchener or myself. As it happens 
 we both retained our old offices in the reconstructed Government, 
 and while I should be the last — I shall always be the last— to belittle 
 the splendid work which was subsequently done by the Ministry of 
 Munitions, to the formation of which I was a party, and the 
 principal party, and which in the early days, when there was a good 
 deal of friction with the War Office, I strenuously backed with all 
 my authority, yet Lord French appears to have forgotten that 
 during: the whole of the time he remained in command in France, 
 and for months afterwards, the British Army in France and in 
 Flanders lived and fought with great determination and with many 
 successes entirely on the ammunition ordered, before the Ministry 
 of Munitions came into existence, by the old regime. 
 
30 
 
 A Lord French's ridiculous suggestion that his action in this matter 
 
 tidiculous ^ had som ething to do with his subsequent removal from the command 
 ingestion. . g harQ ijy wort hy of serious notice. He remained in full command 
 for more than six months, and though I heard strange rumours, 
 which appear to have had more foundation in fact than I then 
 believed, I never took the pains to inquire what part he had played, 
 or whether he had played any part, in the newspaper campaign 
 which he now claims to have inspired. When his retirement came, 
 and I take myself the full and sole responsibility for it, it was for 
 reasons that had no more to do with the supply of shells than with 
 the next eclipse of the moon. 
 
 I am afraid I have kept you a long time, but before I part with 
 Lord French I have one word more to say. His whole case is that 
 he was obliged to do what he did because in the highest interest of 
 the Empire it was essential to get rid of an apathetic Government, 
 negligent of its first duty to the Army, and presided over by a supine 
 and lethargic head. I will refresh Lord French's memory on this 
 point. I have here in my hand a letter in his own writing addressed 
 to me from the Headquarters of the British Army in France, and 
 dated — observe the date — May 20th, 1915. I say " Observe the 
 date," because the Coalition Ministry, for which Lord French now 
 claims a sort of paternal responsibility, was formed exactly three 
 days earlier, on May 17th. It is a private letter to which I should 
 certainly not have referred had not Lord French, who himself makes 
 the freest use of secret and confidential documents, compelled me 
 by his last article to do so. What I am about to read is only an 
 extract, but I can assure you and the world that there is no 
 qualifying context. As far as I am concerned the letter may be 
 published in externa to-morrow. The letter reads: — 
 
 " My dear Prime Minister, — For two days I have been 
 hesitating to add an iota to the troubles and anxieties which 
 must weigh upon you just now "— (" I was forming the 
 Coalition Government," Mr. Asquith interpolated, amid 
 laughter). " You have, however, shown me so much true, 
 generous kindness throughout this trying campaign that I 
 venture at this critical juncture to convey to you what is in 
 my inmost thoughts. (*' Now comes the important part," 
 said Mr. Asquith.) I am sure in the whole history of war 
 no General in the field has ever been helped in a difficult task 
 by the head of his Government as I have been supported and 
 strengthened by your unfailing sympathy and encouragement." 
 
31 
 
 PRESS COMMENTS ON THE SHELL 
 CONTROVERSY. 
 
 M Lord French is either the victim of delusions .so strange that his own 
 written words are effaced from hie memory, or he is guilty of deliberate 
 mutilation of fact in order to humiliate the dead and slander the living." — ' 
 Daily Express, June 4th, 1919. 
 
 " The documents brought forward by Mr. Asquith are too complete, too 
 unreserved, too cordial, to admit of the idea that the writers had at the 
 back of their heads a very serious charge against Mr. Asquith's Administra- 
 tion." — Yorkshire Post, June 4th, 1919. 
 
 * * * * 
 
 " Mr. Asquith has not merely shown up contradictions between what 
 Lord French said before and what Lord French says now. There are deeper 
 implications. The whole conspiracy of the Northcliffe Press to bring down 
 Mr. Asquith is shown to have been based on false pretences." — Daily 
 Herald, June 4th, 1919. 
 
 •X- * * * 
 
 "The letters read by Mr. Asquith, one from Lord French and the other 
 from Lord Kitchener, will indeed, take some explaining away. Perhaps 
 the former was a mere expression of personal feeling, but, even so, it is 
 difficult to cee how the man who signed it can have written the newspaper 
 articles without laying himself open to a charge of inconsistency, or some- 
 thing worse." — Sheffield Daily Telegraph, June 4th, 1919. 
 
 * * * * 
 
 " There is no ground for the accusation that either the Administration of 
 the day or its responsible head failed in their conception of our obligations 
 to our own armies or those of our Aliiesi, or in their efforts to discharge 
 those obligations to the utmost extent. The Government of 1915 played 
 its part resolutely, persistently, in building up and developing the resources 
 of this land and in the securing of supplies from every available source, and 
 neither it nor Mr. Asquith have ever received the credit that was really due 
 to them." — North Mail, June 4th, 1919. 
 
 ■* * * * 
 
 'Gc and bring the sledge-hammer,' said Sir Henry CainpbeL- 
 Bannerman once to a colleague on the Treasury Bench when the new 
 Liberal Administration was under attack by Mr. Balfour. The colleague 
 jumped to the mission, and promptly returned with — Mr. Asquith. It was 
 the sledge-hammer which was in operation yesterday in Mr. Asquith's reply 
 to Lord French's 'journalistic serial,' and its smashing blow will rever- 
 berate as long as the story of the Great War is told. A more direct and 
 crushing answer was never made to a serious charge." — Yorkshire 
 Observer, June 4th, 1919. 
 
 * * * * 
 
 " A month after the Newcastle speech, which Lord French now declares 
 to have filled him with dismay and hopelesness, he confessed in a private 
 letter to Mr. Asquith that never in the history of war had a general in the 
 field been so helped in a difficult task by the unfailing sympathy and 
 encouragement of the head of his Government. This wm the Government 
 
 11 
 
32 
 
 H"IM1 Jl 
 DEC 1 7 1929 
 
 U1L 
 
 29) 
 
 ISSOTC 
 
 UNlvfa^S'.TY O? C* 
 
 which Lord French now convicts himself of scheming to overthrow. It i: 
 no satisfaction to anyone to see a man of Lord French's character an^ 
 position in so delicate and awkward and muddled a controversial situation.' 
 —Liverpool Daily Post, June 4th, 1919. 
 
 * * * * 
 
 "In a letter to Mr. Asquith written on May 20th, 1915, Lord Frenc;' 
 convicts 'himself beyond hope of acquittal. In that letter we find hinJ 
 sending fulsome thanks to Mr. Asquith and. the Government he now claiinj 
 to have overthrown for giving him support in the field such as no Britis' 
 general had ever had before. What is there to be said of a person wT 
 voluntarily, presents himself for public contempt in such a series of bas 
 parts? Is it all an af terthought ? Is it to curry favour with the living that hj 
 maligns the dead? Of one thing only the British public will be satisfied] 
 It is that his retention of his present office is impossible." — Daily New; 
 
 June 4th, 1919. 
 
 * * * * 
 
 " That intrigue, the so-called ' munition stunt ' of 1915, was a blacl] 
 offence against the country. When it was undertaken we bad had a ba<] 
 shortage of shells, it had been at once faced, and the means of raising on, 
 munition supply to its subsequent abundance had been provided; at any rat 
 their provision, and provision for their future growth, had. begun. All thaj 
 was then required of public-spirited newspapers and politicians was tha 
 they should not shriek into the ears of the enemy the news that we' had a] 
 the moment very few shells — that is, that now was the time to attack 
 and not shriek into the ears of neutrals that our war administration wa;i 
 improvident and incompetent — that is, that we were an ally to avoid an< 
 that we should probably lose the war. But nothing seems to have counted 
 against the prospect of a raging and tearing * stunt/ and the teniptatioij 
 to claim credit afterwards for having compelled the sowing of the tree whicl\ 
 was already above ground and growing fast when the 'stunt' began. That] 
 ' stunt,' with its repulsive detraction, of Kitchener, caused some disgust 
 at home, and a deeper resentment, which has not yet ceased, among oui 
 troops then in France." — Manchester Guardian, June 4th, 1919. 
 
 * * * * 
 
 " Wherever we dip into the records, they tell the same story : unceasin* 
 toil, strain, anxiety on Lord Kitchener's part and that of the Govern- 
 ment to meet unexampled demands to which no supply could be adequate; 
 an inevitable but highly disturbing controversy going on all the time betweei 
 the experts as to the merits of different kinds of munitions, frequent die j 
 appointments in the supply, unremitting efforts to convert workshops an(" 
 change the conditions of labour so as to increase the supply. Result that, 
 as Mr. Lloyd George claimed in a speech to the House of Commons th( 
 day after Mr. Asquith's Newcastle speech, a speech which repeated and| 
 expanded the Newcastle speech, we had between September, 1914, and] 
 March, 1915, increased the supply nineteenfold, and that in the month oi 
 May, 1915. we w^ere producing in. three days the amount of ammunition 
 usually produced before in a whole year. A few days before the Newcastle 
 speech Lord Kitchener, after a talk with Lord French, reports to the Prinu 
 Minister that Lord French has told him that ' with the present supply of j 
 ammunition he will have as much as hie troops will be able to use in the} 
 next forward movement,' and Lord French has further testified that after 
 the month of May the ammunition question had ceased to cause serious] 
 anxiety. Lord French, it is true, ascribes this sudden change to his own j 
 heroic action in displacing a lethargic Government and procuring an active 
 one to take its place, but no one who has the faintest idea what preliminary j 
 labour a change or increase in the supply of munitions entails will take 
 this explanation seriously. The simple truth is that the most difficult part of j 
 the work had been done by the previous Government, and the organisation 
 which it set up supplied the Army for a whole year, and eiipplied it most 
 efficiently before the new Ministry of Munitions could start on its output! 
 of shells'."— Westminster Gazette. June 4th, 1919. 
 
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