AUTHORISED EDITION, hells " National Finance. Imperial 'Preference. Liberalism THREE SPEECHES RIGHT HON BY THE Rl< H. H. ASQUITH, K.C NEWCASTLE-ON-TYNE, May 16th, 1919, NEWCASTLE-ON-TYNE, May 17th. 1919. CONNAUGHT ROOMS. LONDON, June 3rd, 1919. PUBLISHED BY 'HE LIBERAL PUBLICATION DEPARTMENT (In connection with the National Liberal Federation and the Liberal Central Association.) 42, PARLIAMENT STREET, LONDON, S.W.I. 1919. PR1HF TWOPENHF T>5(7 : .••••Tfie: .two* Speeches printed first in this ' pamphlet were delivered by Mr. Asquith at Newcastle-on-Tyne on May 16th and 17th, 1919. Mr. Asquith spoke first at a Dinner of the Newcastle Liberal Club, of which he is President, and on the following day at a meeting organised by the Northern Counties Liberal Federation. The third Speech— a reply to Lord French's statements about Shells Shortage— was delivered in the Connaught Rooms, London, on June 3rd, 1919, at a Luncheon given to Mr. Asquith by Mr. Oswald Partington. Copies of this Pamphlet can be obtained at the following rates 25 Copies 3s. 6d., Post free, 4s. 50 „ 6s. 9d., „ 7s. 6d. 100 ,, 13s., , 14s. 500 Copies, £2 10s. 0d.\ Carriage 1000 £4 0s. 0d.J extra. 9 MR. ASQUITH'S SPEECHES. I. Reminiscences of Newcastle — Lord French's Story of 1914 — The General Election of 1918 — Position of the Free Liberals — Liberals and the Labour Party— Coalition a Top- Heavy Machine — The Purpose and the Spirit of Liberalism. MR. ASQUITH (speaking at the dinner in the Netvcastle Liberal Club) said:— I thank you, and I wish I could find words adequately to express my feelings, first for the confidence you have shown me now two years in succession in electing me to the post of president of the Club; next for your kind invitation and hospitality this evening; and last, though not least, for the eloquent and, to me, most touching tribute which my friend Sir George Lunn in your name has been pleased to offer, and which, I may gather from what I have just seen and heard, you unanimously endorse. It is twenty- five years since I first had the honour of being elected president of this Club. That is practically a life-time of a political generation. There were giants in those days. I was myself a relatively young politician, holding the office of Home Secretary in a Government which was presided over by Mr. Gladstone, and in which his two principal lieutenants were Sir William Harcourt, the great, I might almost say the colossal, defender of Liberal principles in his day, a gladiator at any rate whom the enemy feared, and feared with reason ; and, as I still prefer to call him, John Morley, the Member for Newcastle, who brought to politics, and carried out of politics, gifts and graces of intellect and character, powers of raising from the common level of ordinary controversy into a higher and serener atmosphere all the disputes of the hour. I am glad to say to-day, though he has passed his 80th birthday, I can testify, having seen him and talked to him, that he is as strong and undefeated a Liberal as he ever was at any time. But I must not be tempted by what Sir George Lunn has said to indulge a reminiscent vein, nor shall I attempt to-nigfht any survey of the political situation. T have serious things, and very serious things, to say to Newcastle and to the country, and you will probablv agree that th large 'audience of. to-morrow will afford a more appropriate occasion \ih^n. tiie gathering here to-night. ' But? before* 1 'say one or two things to you in this more intimate comradeship I must, inopportune as it seems to me, take advantage of the occasion, and I take it with reluctance, to refer for one moment, and only for a moment, to some recent publications in the Press by a distinguished Field-Marshal on the subject of the early months of the war. The last thing that I should desire is to have anything in the nature of a controversy with Lord French. He is an old personal friend. We sat together week by week for years before the war on the Committee of Imperial Defence, and during the first fifteen months of the war, when he commanded our Armies in France and Flanders, he and I were in the closest relations, and he was good enough, not once, but many times, to acknowledge with gratitude my confidence and support. He has taken an unusual, and I think an unfortunate, course, in giving to the world at this stage what must be an ex parte narrative of what happened under his command. Some of his statements I find it difficult, and even impossible, to reconcile with my own recollection of the facts and with contemporaneous documents. The living, however, can take care of themselves, and make their contribution, as some of us will have to do when the fitting time comes, to the materials upon which history pronounces its verdict. With the dead it is different, and I am constrained, in justice to the memory of Lord Kitchener, to refer in a few words — and they shall be very few — to the account which Lord French has given of his visit to Paris in the early autumn of 1914. In the first place, it is wholly untrue to suggest that either Lord Kitchener, who was Secretary of State for War, or the Home Government contemplated, or attempted, to supersede the Commander in the field. But the Government was seriously disquieted by communications from Sir John French, as he then was, as to his intentions, and after full deliberation the Cabinet unanimously came to important conclu- sions, which seemed to them to be justified by reasons of policy, as well as of strategy. Lord Kitchener was entrusted, with the knowledge and full consent of all his colleagues, as my right hon. friend here (Mr. Rvnciman) knows well with the duty of conveying and explaining those views to Sir John French. In visiting France and conferring as he did with Sir John French, Lord Kitchener performed a service of the greatest value to the country and, as the events showed, with the best results. It is impossible to deal adequately with the case until in due course there is a full disclosure of the confidential documents, including Sir John French's letters, which passed at the time, but you may take this from me: Lord Kitchener's friends may await in perfect serenity the process of disclosure. I am sorry I had to say that, but it had to be said. I see that my right hon. friend, Mr. Winston Churchill, has The Free been among his constituents this week. He has been expressing the Literals. opinion that the time has not arrived for the revival or reassertion of party distinctions, though he is kind enough to add the wish that some of us who suffered from taking a different view last December may soon be back at Westminster. All in due course. I am not sure that some of us cannot be more usefully employed outside than sitting in a House of Commons which, as every one now knows, is in no sense really representative of the deliberate opinion and judgment of the people. I wish to add, on behalf of a vast body of free and independent Liberals in the country, our tribute of unstinted admiration and gratitude to Sir Donald Maclean, and to his indefatigable Whips, Mr. Thorne and Mr. Hogge, and to the small, but ever-growing band of his loyal followers. But I should like to say something rather more important than expressions, well deserved as they are, of gratitude to our friends. It is a truism that nothing is so necessary to the conduct of democratic government under Parliamentary conditions as a vigilant and powerful Opposition. I have had as large an experience as anyone now living of both sides of the House. The first six years of any Parliamentary life were spent in Opposition, and I am not sure that they were not the happiest and most interesting. Those were the days — I am speaking of the time between 1886 and 1892 — when we fought with tenacity Irish coercion, not only by resisting tooth and nail reactionary legislation such as the Crimes Act of 1887, but by ceaseless criticism of administrative follies and excesses. It was the conviction, slowly brought home to our people during those years, that self-government is the only alternative to coercion (and it is as true to-day, and even more true to-day than it was thirty years ago), it was that convic- tion that gradually converted the majority of the British electorate to Home Rule. I remember another spell of Opposition which lasted ten years, from 1895 to 1905. There were divisions in those days in the Liberal Party on some aspects of the South African War, but the Opposition never ceased to be formidable, and during the last three years of the period, after the " Trick Election" — lor there have been trick elections in our history — during the last three years, after the trick election of 1900, we rapidly closed our ranks, over Education, over Licensing, and, finally, over Free Trade, and we succeeded in making things as disagreeable to the Government of the day as they have ever been made in Parliamentary history. We had our reward in the unprecedented Liberal majority of January, 1906. I said a moment ago, and I am still on the same theme, that I have sat on both sides — not upon both sides in a party sense, for I have always kept company with Liberals and only with Liberals, but I have sat on both sides in the sense of being in Opposition and in Power. I was in office for three years between 1892 and 1895 in a Government which lived on the smallest majority that has ever kept an Administration alive. It never exceeded 40, and it frequently dwindled to ten and even seven. Later on, as you know, I was in office from 1906 onwards in a Government which had the largest majority ever known up to that date. I believe it has been exceeded since, but I am talking of what is now ancient history. I reserve for my autobiography, if ever I write one, my judgment of the comparative comfort or discomfort of those two periods, because it is not so easy a question as it might as first sight appear. But in both cases, where we had a small majority and where we had a large one, we had the advantage — and an inestimable advantage it is — of a compact and determined Opposition, which kept us always on the alert. Depend upon it, this is the essence of Parliamentary life. One of the many drawbacks of the artificial situation created by the election of December is that, for the time being, such an Opposition has of necessity almost ceased to exist. It is coming into being, and every by-election promises to add to its ranks, but meanwhile — and I say it deliberately, for I am now an outsider and the outsiders see more than the people who are actually upon the stage — I say it deliberately, that under these conditions the House of Commons is becoming, nay, has become, a top-heavy and unworkmanlike machine . A Coalition may be, and often is, a necessary instrument in time of war. It is in my judgment wholly unsuited to the constructive tasks of peace. For what is it? Assuming, as we are bound to assume, and as I am sure we readily assume, that all its members are animated by honest convictions, what is it? It is a conglomerate in which the pebbles are imprisoned and isolated in an alien material. Those are the conditions under which a Coalition is carried on, and I express to you, for whatever it is worth, my own deliberate judgment when I say that we shall not return to healthy political and Parliamentary conditions, until we see once more an independent Liberal Party pursuing its own ideals by its own methods, and upon its own lines. I am told that in despair at the immediate prospects some of our young people are taking or throwing in their lot with the Labour Party. I think they are making a mistake. There are many roads on which we can travel for long distances side by side, but anything in the nature of fusion or absorption will be found in practice to have all the drawbacks and all the dangers of a Coalition. Keep your identity, preserve your independence, and remember always that the governing purpose of our creed is to secure, not for this class or that class — I don't care how few or how numerous its members may be — not to secure for this class or that class, but for all the community, without distinction, without discrimination, without partiality or preference — to secure for all the community freedom, in its fullest and its most fruitful sense, botn in corporate aim individual life. That is the purpose and the spirit of Liberalism, as I learned The Liberal it as a student in my young days, as I was taught it both by the Henta g e precept and the example of that great Liberal statesman, Mr. Gladstone, and the others with whom it was my pride and privilege to be associated in the earlier days of my political life. It remains the same to-day. Do not forsake for temporary expediencies, for short-lived compromises, for brittle and precarious bridges — do not forsake the great heritage of the Liberal tradition of the past. It is not a superstition ; it is not a legend ; it is founded both upon faith and upon experience, and justified at every stage in our political history; and in my judgment, if only you will keep your heads clear, your courage firm and unperturbed by the passing vicissitudes of political fortune, it will be in the future, as it has been in the past, the inspiration of the liberties of this country. II. LIBERAL POLICY. Shells Shortage— The Peace Treaty— The League of Nations- End of the Party Truce— National Finances— Imperial Preference— Public Extravagance— A Plea for Cabinet Government. V4R. ASQUITH (speaking in the Palace Theatre, N ew castle- on- * * Tyne) said: — I am very glad to find myself once more face to face here in Newcastle with the representative Liberals of the North. This is not, as some of you may be old enough to remember, by any means the first time that I have found myself in that position. Two visits to Newcastle have still a vivid place in my memory. One was when I came here in October, 1903 — nearly sixteen years ago — when Mr. Chamberlain had just started his fiscal campaign, and I had the privilege of exposing, with special reference to the experience of Tyneside, some of the many fallacies of history, of logic, and of arithmetic which formed then, as they do now, the stock-in-trade of the Tariff Reformer. I have just been reading that speech again, and though I believe I am a fairly severe critic of my own deliverances, I confess that, in view of some recent events, I found it marvellously opportune, and, oddly enough, hardly at all out of date. Perhaps some of you will follow my example and be good enough to read it too. I came here again in April, 1915, when we had had nearly nine months of the war. I made a speech then which has been more unscrupulously and shamelessly travestied than, perhaps, any public utterance of our time. I kept silence about these misrepresenta- tions, which were made for political purposes, while the. war was going on, but no such reserve is any longer necessary. From the very first days of the war the problem of an adequate supply of munitions for our rapidly expanding forces — for Lord Kitchener, remember, was developing those great new armies with which his name will always be illustriously associated — was the subject of serious solicitude to the Government. So far back as the month of September, 1914, when the war was not a month old, I appointed a strong Cabinet Committee, presided over by Lord Kitchener, of which, among others, the present Prime Minister and Lord Haldane were members, to deal with the matter in all its aspects. That Committee worked hard and continuously from the first. They gave orders wherever orders could be given, and they succeeded in substantially enlarging both the field and the machinery of supply. 9 The development of new methods of warfare and the unprecedented scale — far beyond the forecast of any expert in this or any other country — upon which ammunition began to be expended in the winter and spring of 1915 increased the urgency of the situation; and the necessity for adding to our prospective means of supply was acutely felt, both by the Commander-in-Chief in the field and by Lord Kitchener. I accordingly, as head of the Government, resolved on taking an unusual step and upon coming down here myself to urge on the men of the Tyneside, primarily, and through them on the community at large, that an increase in the out-turn of munitions had become even more urgent than the growth in the volume of recruiting. But before I left London I made the most careful inquiry of the Lord highest military authority whether it was true that up to that date Kitchener': our operations had been or were being crippled or seriously hampered by lack of munitions. I was assured by Lord Kitchener, who informed me that he had been the day before in London in direct personal com- munication with Sir John French, that that was not the case. It was on the strength of that assurance — and I do not know where else I could have gone for authentic information — it was on the strength of that assurance that I made that statement as to the past, here in Newcastle, which has been so much quoted. Was it for me or for anyone in my position to question or to doubt the accuracy of that statement? How could I? Being given to me on the highest of all authority, I should have been wanting in my duty if I had not imparted it to the country. That statement, as I have said, was carefully limited to the past, j^ and I did not attempt to conceal from my audience here, or, indeed, Newcastle from the country outside — the very reverse was the sole purpose Speech, of my visit — our anxiety as to the future. I pointed out, and you 5 * will forgive my going into this in some detail — because this is one of the grossest calumnies among many gross calumnies that have been circulated . during the war — I pointed out here the sacrifices that were required both from masters and men, the necessity, for the time, of the limitation of profits and the suspension of trade union rules and customs, of the drawing in from the outside of skilled men to take the place of those who had voluntarily gone to the front, and of broadening the basis of the production of munitions by utilizing works devoted to other purposes, and I summed up my general conclusion in terms which I will quote textually. I venture to say that not one in one hundred thousand of those who have referred to my speech have ever read the words I used at the time. They are these: — " There is not a single naval or military authority among us who, in view of the approximate and prospective requirements, does not declare that a large and rapid increase in the output of munitions has become one of the first necessities of the State." so And this is the only peroration I attempted. " This, then, I say : What, in the name of your King and country, we ask you to do is to deliver the goods." That is the speech in which I am charged with lulling the nation into a sense of false security. I am glad also to remember — and I have abundant evidence to prove it — that that speech had precisely the effect which it was intended to produce. I am sorry to have kept you so long about that because, after all, it is a matter of ancient history. It was four years ago and you had not reached the end of the first twelve months of the war. We are to-day six months after the suspension of hostilities. The Allies and their associates have elaborated and published to the world their terms of peace — terms which the enemy are still apparently in doubt whether to accept or to reject. While their course of action still remains uncertain it is obviously right for me or anyone else to withhold any public comment upon this or that item in a long series of complex and, to some extent, interdependent proposals; but there is no reason why one should not speak with perfect freedom, even at this stage, on the general outlook. There are two tests by which a Treaty of Peace may be judged, a false test or a true test. A false test, in my opinion, is to ask how it compares with the terms which a victorious Germany would have exacted from the defeated Allies. We know well — among other things by the object-lesson which was given us at Brest- Li tovsk — we know well what a German peace would have meant. It would have meant covetous covenants, unscrupulous exactions, everything that could materially impoverish, everything that could morally humiliate, everything that could put in permanent serfdom the national life and the free economic and political development of the beaten foe. That is not the kind of model to which we should seek to conform. To take it, or anything like it, as the measure of our requirements would be to give the lie to all our professions and to smirch and even to surrender our ideals. Let us wipe that off the slate. I have spoken of the false test. The true test by which any Treaty of Peace imposed and sanctioned by the victors of freedom is to be judged is a very different one. It is very simple. Does it carry out in substance and in spirit, neither falling behind nor going beyond, the purpose for which the war was begun and carried on at an immeasurable sacrifice of personal and material wealth by the free peoples of the world? There is no ambiguity as to those purposes. They were defined first by myself in the early weeks of the war, speaking on behalf not only of this country, but of this Empire. They were expounded in practically identical terms by the leading statesmen of the Allies, and when, two years later, America came in they were reaffirmed and illustrated with lucidity, with full- ness, with particularity of eloquence, by President Wilson. You all know what those purposes are and were. I can sum- 11 marize them in a sentence. The war was, for us, not a war of Conditions aggression but of emancipation, and its aim and end was a peace of a Clean which, while ensuring adequate punishment for the wrongdoers and eace ' adequate reparation for their victims, should be a peace not of vindictiveness, sowing the seeds of future enmity and conflict, but a peace of security, a peace of finality — what I have more than once described as "a clean peace ' ' which would not only put an end to rival armaments, but would provide a workable means for safe- guarding the world for all time from the desolations and the wastes of war. The difficulties of framing such a peace were bound to be greater still. Depend upon it it will be judged by history according as it is proved in practice to bear the character and to yield the fruits which I have described. As I have said, this is not the moment to comment upon a specific point, but there are one or two considerations which seem to me to point to a definite and practical conclusion of paramount urgency. There is to be a large and drastic rearrangement of territory, not only in Europe, but in other countries — that was inevitable — the colouring of a new map. It was most unfortunate that that process had to be gone through while some of the great nations, Russia and Austria-Hungary for instance, had lost one form of unity without yet acquiring another. Then, again, it has been necessary to create — or recreate for the most part — to create for the first time new States, founded mainly on ethnical lines — the Poles, the Czecho-Slavs, the Jugo-Slavs. Every lover of liberty rejoices in the emancipation of these down- trodden nationalities, and wishes for these infant States a maturity of peaceful and free development both on the geographical and economic side. Every arrangement now made under existing con- ditions must of necessity be subject to the test of experience, and the same must be said of the mandatory system which it is proposed, with my complete and cordial sympathy, to apply, particularly in Africa, not for the aggrandizement or especial benefit of European Powers, but to prevent selfish exploitation and to assist in the development not only of the material prosperity, but of the capacity for freedom of the races which are still unable to govern themselves. Finally, as all history shows, there can be no lasting or fruitful peace if it involves the permanent ostracism and impoverishment of any of the nations of the world. Every belligerent on both sides, every belligerent has undergone gigantic suffering and sustained almost immeasurable waste. It is in the interests of all that at the earliest opportunity each of us, under the appropriate safeguards which the new peace will provide, should be able to restart our industries, develop our resources, and to recreate our social and economic life. What is the condition ? What is the conclusion to which these The Leagu considerations lead ? Surelv it is to set on foot, without a moment's of Nations, avoidable delay, and as a living and working machine, the League of Nations. I do not hesitate to say that, in my opinion, by far the greatest achievement of the Paris Conference is the elaboration in a practical shape of this great and beneficent conception, and let me add, by way of parenthesis, that, in that matter, we of the British Empire owe an enormous debt of gratitude to the invaluable labours of my noble friend and late colleague Lord Robert Cecil. There is not one of the problems which I enumerated a few moments ago the solution of which does not depend upon the effec- tive authority of the League. The reduction of armaments — not only in one quarter, but everywhere — it is no good reducing it in one place if you do not reduce it all round — to a scale which will put an end to the gamble in competitive force will be one of the first and most urgent of its duties. Hardly less important is the setting up without delay of workable machinery for the anticipation, as well as for the settlement of internal disputes. The common and collective will must have for its sanction a common and collec- tive force. The door should be open always to any State that is ready in good faith to enter in. There must be that sense of equality of right and of privilege between great and small States which alone can ensure confidence and give to a League the breath, not of a machine, but of a living organization. If that is accomplished, well and good. In my opinon it is the lynch-pin of the whole thing. The peace will not become a lasting peace, its provisions will become dead letters, tranquillity will, in the future as in the past, be at the mercy of a chapter of accidents, unless as its first and most effective result you see the creation as the living and working and dominating force of this free organization a partnership of all the nations of the world. The Party I am not ashamed, to confess to you that' I have come to speak to Truee. y OU this afternoon as a Liberal to Liberals. There is in my judg- ment no longer any occasion for what is called the Party truce, of which the belated offspring was the present House of Commons, born, if anything ever was, out of due season. The election last December was so manipulated that it was bound to result, as it did result, in the enthronement of an artificially swollen Tory majority at Westminster. It was a clever stroke of electioneering leger- demain. It caught a lot of guileless folk who ought to have known better, and none suffered so severely at the moment as the Liberal Party. I did my best to open people's eyes to the realities of the case, but my warnings were unheeded, and the mischief was done. There are, it is true, abund Dr. Chalmers, once called the " unbridled impotency of his colleagues.' ' Six months after the war he has to provide, so he told us, accommodation for the same number of officials, or practi- cally the same number, as when hostilities were in full blast. I fear this is only typical of what is going on all over the place. The first necessity of this country is to put a stern and effective stop to those disastrous and impoverishing excesses which have tripped over and demoralised the large part, if not the largest part, of the whole area of administration. Hardly less important is the removal of the restrictions and embar- goes which, though they may be for the moment profitable to this or that particular trade, are hampering and throttling trade at large at the expense of the producer and consumer alike. In my opinion, the war restrictions have become, now that the war is over, simply a disguised system of Protection. Another of our new masters of administration, Sir Auckland Geddes, who is temporarily run- ning the Board of Trade, got nearer the truth than perhaps he knew in an ingenious phrase which I see he dropped the other day about •' nursing the baby." That is exactly what it is — nursing the baby. Protection everywhere, and at all times, in all shapes, could not be more tersely or more happily described. How much longer are we going to stand it? I say to you, you Liberals of the North, here is solid and urgent work of most practical kind to the hands of the Liberal Party. We cannot for the moment do much in Parliament, but we can do a great deal in the country, a country which is bewildered and disgusted as it looks round for a way out of this financial morass. What is our remedy? Let us 19 , return to Cabinet government, which was upset for a purpose that I have never been able to discover in the middle of the war, and which is the only safeguard. It was not a sudden invention, but a matured growth over generations of Parliamentary experience. It is the only safeguard of co-ordinated and responsible administration. Let us get rid of the wasteful and costly method of the emergency man, and let us instal once more in real and living authority the principle of economy in expenditure and of freedom of trade, which were not only the watchwords, but the governing rules, of the great Liberal statesmen of the past. I thank you very much for giving me the opportunity of speaking plainly and fully to you upon these matters. These are not the days for any indulgence in the empty superficial art of rhetoric. I am no pessimist ; I never have been, and never shall be ; but I should be dis- guising to my countrymen, after as long an experience in public life as almost any of those who have tried to serve them, the real state of my feelings if I did not tell them perfectly frankly, with full sincerity, and with complete conviction that during the whole of the time I have never known this country confronted with a graver or a more serious situation. It is no good blinking facts. It is no use wrapping ourselves up in a facile delusive optimism which vaguely believes or hopes that somehow or other we shall muddle through. We are face to face with a situation on the economic and industrial side than which a graver and more formidable has never been presented to this country in the whole of its long and chequered annals. I believe as firmly as I ever believed, not only in what was called by Burke " the inbred integrity of our race and people," but in their resourcefulness and in their tenacity, in their power under the stress of circum- stances — it takes very heavy stress sometimes to make them display that power— -to adapt themselves to new conditions. All these things are required by us now, and I am confident thatT he OnlyW we shall find them. But all that is of no use if you are going wander- ~J roductl ° ing after those Protectionist will o' the wisps, or if you are going to Economy. imagine that by the multiplication of borrowing and of credit facilities you can really create wealth. There is one way, and one way only, in which wealth can be created, and that is by production ; only one way in which national prosperity can be sustained and improved, and that is by honest finance, by economic expenditure, by educating your people so as to keep them abreast of growing develop- ments and applications of scientific research and knowledge, by regarding it as your duty as a community to subordinate, for the time being at any rate, all special interests and claims, I won't say of labour and capital, I won't say of this class or of that, in order that by combined and concerted co-operation we ma} 7- attain, as I am certain we shall, a happy issue from all our difficulties. 20 IIL SHELLS SHORTAGE CONTROVERSY. A REPLY TO LORD FRENCH Lord French's Narrative — An Infringement of Best Traditions — Le Cateau — Reason for Lord Kitchener's Visit to France — The Output of Munitions — Mr. Lloyd George's Testimony — Shrapnel v. High Explosives — Lord Kitchener's Account — Neuve Chapelle: Lord French's Travesty of History — What Lord French told Lord Kitchener— The Newcastle Shells Speech — The Change of Govern- ment — Lord French and the Press — Lord French's Letter to Mr. Asquith. VIE. ASQUITH, on June 2nd, 1919, attended a luncheon given in his honour at the Connaught Kooms in Londoi? by Mr. Oswald Partington, and, acknowledging the toast of his health, he made a comprehensive reply to many statements about the shells supply contained in the final chapter of Lord French's story of " 1914," published in the Daily Telegraph. Mr. Asquith said : — Let me first of all thank you, Sir, for your kind and generous hospitality and my many old friends whom I am glad to see around me for their kindness in coming here to take part in this little gathering. I suppose it is probably the case that we should not have met in this way at this particular moment if it had not been that we have just come to the end of a journalistic serial in which the lat9 Commander-in-Chief of our Armies in France and Flanders, purporting to describe the first year of the war, has made himself responsible for attacks and aspersions both upon the living and upon the dead, which I, at any rate, cannot allow to pass without an immediate and definite protest. I cannot recall any parallel to this ill-advised and unhappy literary venture. 21 Lord French is not only a Field-Marshal on the active list of Lord the Army, but he occupies at the moment one of the highest and French's most responsible posts in the Civil Service- of the Crown. He is Po8,t,on Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, an office which has often, I agree, been more of less of a sinecure, and of which the Duke of Shrewsbury said, as far back as the reign of Queen Anne, " there is not enough business to keep one awake, but enough to prevent one falling asleep." That is not the case to-day. Ireland is one of the darkest — I think myself it is the darkest — of the dark spots on the map, not only of the British Empire, but of the world. And while the statesmanship of free nations is trying to find everywhere else some foothold, some point of new departure for nationalities, the chief governor of Ireland, who one might have thought would have been absorbed, or at any rate would have tried to show that he was absorbed, in his own overwhelming responsibilities, apparently can find no better occupation for his time and his energies than to fill the columns of the daily Press with a narrative of the early days of the war which I do not hesitate, speaking with as much knowledge perhaps as any man possesses, to characterise here and now as incomplete, partial, in most serious respects misleading, and, as the whole world will soon see — indeed as I shall show to-day — in patent variance and contradiction with his own spoken and written utterances in the past. This, in my judgment, is a very serious matter, and it is rendered even more serious by the fact that, while apparently Lord French enjoys in his character of Field-Marshal complete immunity from the restrictions and regulations which apply to other officers on the active list, he makes free use of official and confidential documents to build up a case against those whose lips are closed, in some instances by death, and in others by official restraints which apply to them but not to him. I feel it my duty to say that quite apart from tne merits or " The We demerits, the justice or injustice, the accuracy or inaccuracy of Sample.' Lord French's narrative, the whole proceeding is of the worst example, in flagrant contradiction to the best traditions of our public service, and manifestly and lamentably repugnant to the elementary rules of fair play. I need hardly say to you that I do not make* that protest from any desire to avoid the fullest publicity as to this or any part of the war for which I have a direct or even the most indirect responsibility. On the contrary, I have the utmost confidence that complete disclosure of all the facts is the one thing needed for an absolute vindication against all suggestions of supine- ness, want of foresight, and lack of promptitude and energy, both in council and in action, of the Governments of which I was the head. That here and there mistakes were made, things done which had better have been omitted, things omitted which might better have been done, is obviously true. It would be, in the unexampled circumstances in which we were placed, not only a marvel, but a miracle, if it had been otherwise. But that is not the case put 22 id ench ntradicts msdf. ; oil tern- ted vera eats. rd inch's arge. forward by Lord French, particularly with regard to the matter which forms the subject of the last and, I suppose, the most vitriolic of his chapters — I have not read them all — the allegation of deliberate apathy — that is what it comes to — of calculated and callous neglect, during the first year of the war, on the part of the Government, in the provision of an adequate supply of artillery ammunition for the Armies in the field. I am going to show to you that not only has that charge no foundation in fact, but that no one ought to know better that it has no foundation than Lord French himself. But before I deal with that, which will be my main theme, I must point out — because this is a question of authority and credibility — that there are in this narrative, dealing with other aspects of the early days of the war, things which might, and I think ought, to lead one to look with a good deal of, I will not say scepticism, but of close scrutiny, on Lord French's articles. In the first place he gives an account of the battle of Le Cateau which I find it wholly impossible to reconcile, not only with my recollection of the facts, but with his own published despatch on the same subject after the battle had taken place, and it is an account which differs very much from the other in that it reflects on the honour and military capacity of one of his own subordinates. There is another and still more serious illustration of the same thing. I pointed out the other day, when I was speaking at Newcastle, that Lord French's account of the visit paid to him in Paris by Lord Kitchener at the- end of the month of August is a travesty of the real facts. I am glad to know that all the contem- porary documents, which have happily been preserved, will very shortly be given to the world. But in the meantime let me say in regard to that transaction that the Government received a message from Lord French as to his contemplated movements, of which it is no exaggeration to say that it filled the whole Cabinet with consternation. There are several of my colleagues here who sat in that Cabinet, and they will bear me out. And why? Because the movements which it indicated would in our judgment have amounted in effect to leaving our Allies in the lurch in the moment of their extreme need ; and the consternation which we felt was shared and expressed to us in moving terms by the head of the French Government. It was in these circumstances that Lord Kitchener, at the unanimous request of his colleagues, undertook his mission to France, a mission which he successfully achieved, and which in my judgment saved our cause from an indelible reproach. What is the charge made by Lord French in this matter of munitions? He tells us his object was to make known some of the efforts he made to awaken both the Government and the public from that " apathy which means certain defeat " ; these efforts, he states, were continued for months, but his appeals fell upon deaf ears ; and finally, after reading my speech at Newcastle (I will come 23 to that presently), he lost all hope, and determined, at the risk of his own military future, by the aid of the Press and behind the back and without the knowledge of his own official chief, to destroy the apathy of the Government, and incidentally the Government itself, which, he says, had brought the Empire to " the brink of disaster." That is his case summarily put. As ycu see, it amounts to an allegation that, in spite of his warnings, the Government as a whole, and Lord Kitchener in particular, were criminally supine and negligent in a matter of capital importance for the conduct of the war. Let me for a moment ask you, for they are all public property, Tne Fac ts to recall the actual facts. Nobody questions that the Expeditionary Ammunition Force which we sent to France in August was fully equipped in all respects. Its artillery equipment was in excess of that which had been settled to be necessary in case of war. The losses which had to be made good after the retreat from Mons in the first Autumn, and the rapid and enormous increase through recruiting of the New Armies in the forces in the field, very soon began to put a strain, and a severe strain, on our machinery of production. From almost the first moment the matter engaged, and never ceased to engage for one day, the close and continuous attention of the Government. Lord Kitchener was assisted by a Committee of the Cabinet, and later on in the Spring of 1915 I appointed a Special Munitions . Committee of the Cabinet, independent of the War Office, and presided over by Mr. Lloyd George. A speech made the day after my famous speech, or infamous Mr. Lloyd speech, at Newcastle — made by Mr. Lloyd George in the House of £ eo , r .£ e ' 8 'Commons on April 21st, to which it is curious Lord French makes no reference, although I see he has dedicated his book to Mr. Lloyd George — surely he might have paid him the compliment of reading . bis speeches — this speech made on April 21st, the day after mine, was an expansion, but in entire harmony with what I said. Mr. Lloyd George described with perfect accuracy exactly what had been done by this " lethargic,' • " apathetic/' " negligent " Govern- ment. He pointed out that the area of the supply of production had been enormously extended by from 2,500 to 3,000 new firms, by which I mean firms not previously so employed who were brought into this particular industry ; that immense orders had been placed both in America and Canada; that legislation had been passed to enable the War Office and the Admiralty to take over engineering works : with the result that while the armies in the field between September and March had been multiplied by something, I suppose, between four and five-fold in number, the output of munitions in the same time had been multiplied, not four or five, but nineteen-fold. In the month of May, 1915, we were producing in three days the amount of ammunition usually produced before in a whole year. That is not a bad record. 24 Shrapnel and High Explosive' The field guns of our Army when war began were equipped, not with high explosives, but with shrapnel. That was a decision deliberately arrived at after a full inquiry by, our best experts, and no doubt largely as a result of our experience in the South African War. Lord French says that he was always an advocate of high explosives for our field guns, but that his demands were rejected. I have seen no more surprising statement. He was Chief of the Imperial General Staff. He was chief military adviser to the Government for years before the war, and this is the first time that I or anyone whom I have been able to consult has ever heard of any such demand. There is no trace of it in official records. No one knows better than Lord French that in his position — for, as I have said, he was the most trusted expert adviser of the War Office and of the Government in all military matters — if he attached serious importance to this proposal, and if it had been in fact what is vulgarly called " turned down " by the War Office, he could have brought it, as he constantly did bring these things, before the Committee of Imperial Defence, where it would have received the most attentive and respectful consideration. I can answer for it that no such thing was ever done. I do not want to occupy your time unduly, but I must say a little more about this question of high explosives. I have told you that our field guns were equipped with shrapnel, and not with high explosives. I am now going to read a short passage from a report which was made by Lord Kitchener immediately after the formation of the Coalition Government in June, 1915. It throws a light upon the history of this particular matter. Lord Kitchener says that early in September (1914) — that is to say, the month after the war began, the War Office took up the question of the design of shells of this nature (high explosives). In October, General Deville, the most distinguished French artillerist then living, and head of the French Ordnance, at our invitation, in this month of October, 1914, came over to discuss, amongst other things, this very matter, and the subject of high explosive shells for field guns, as well as the fuse to be employed, the pattern of the shell, and the nature of the filling, was discussed between us. General Headquarters in France were consulted, and replies were received indicating that opinions were divided out there. But they considered it desirable that some high explosives should be provided if this could be done without interfering with the supply of shrapnel. On October 19th the first thousand rounds of 18-pounder high explosive shell was sent to France for trial and report. This was in the first two months of the war, and steps were taken to proceed with further manufacture. On November 6th a favourable report was received on the shells, and we were asked by General Headquarters to supply in future, and as soon as we could procure it, 50 per cent, of shrapnel and 50 per cent, of high explosives. A week later a telegram was received asking that the percentage of high explosives should not be 50 per cent, but 25 per 25 cent. I earnestly hope this document will become a Parliamentary paper. I want to read to you what follows, at the risk of becoming Lord rather technical, because I want to show the country the great Kitchener's troubles with which we were concerned and our attempts to deal ers,0D « with them : — " At this stage, "says Lord Kitchener, " we had to consider whether machinery employed in producing 18-pounder shrapnel, which was so urgently required, should be stopped and turned on instead to high explosive shell. The adoption of this course would not have produced any high explosive shell for 10 weeks or more, and during this period, the provision of the absolutely necessary amount of ammunition for the fields guns would have been seriously imperilled just when Sir JoHn French was pressing for every round. Our expenditure of 18-pounder ammunition up to November 1st was 385,000 rounds, while our supply from manufacture was at that date approximately 45,000 a month. The stoppage of the supply of shrapnel would, in my opinion, have seriously affected the safety of the troops in the field, for we should thus have placed a large proportion of our .machinery out of work at the most critical period of the war in order later to have an article which, no doubt, would have been somewhat better for certain purposes than the shrapnel shells then being provided. Additional mste.nd of substi- tuted orders were therefore at once placed, not <>nly with the experienced armament firms but also with additional firms not previously engaged in this nature of manufacture, as well as in Canada and America." I think that is a conclusive vindication of the action which Lord Kitchener took up to that point. But we were not content with, that. As Mr. Lloyd George pointed out in the speech which lie made on April 21st, and as Lord Kitchener emphasises in this document, we had the advantage of having in this country in a high official position a man of the greatest scientific eminence— Lord Moulton, and he very) patriotically took up this subject of the manufacture and development of high explosives, and as Lord Kitchener says, writing in June, 1915 : — " Lord Moulton has not only provided explosives for our needs and Lord prepared for the large additional requirements we shall have to meet Moulton'? later when our ammunition grows to larger proportions, but he has \chieve- enabled us to give to all the Allies at various times, and notably France, "lent. sufficient explosives to enable them to continue the war." Lord French has referred to his letter of December 31st, 1914, in which he set out his requirements, and as an illustration of what he calls the " deplorable apathy " of the Home authorities he gives a wholly misleading account of the answer which was sent him from the War Office on January 19th. Therefore, I must in justice to the War Office and to Lord Kitchener do what Lord French has not done — cite textually the answer of the War Office. The suggestion is that all this time we were living in a sort of fool's paradise, stopping our ears, shutting our eyes, not listening to Lord French's 26 appeals, doing nothing to provide our Army with needed ammuni- tion. This is the War Office letter: — " I am commanded to inform you that the Army Council are fully alive to the urgent importance of increasing the supply of gun ammuni- tion for the Expeditionary Force, and have spared, and will spare, no effort to secure this end. In this connection the Council desire me to mention the serious labour questions to which the enhanced rates of output of all war materials have already given rise. It is hoped, for instance, that during the month of March as many rounds of 18-pounder ammunition will be produced in one week as would have been manufac- tured in 18 months in time of peace. This will entail very considerable development of our labour resources. . . . The Council desire to emphasise the fact that the orders for manufacture are not being limited by what they Ithink it necessary to supply, but are entirely conditioned by the highest possible output of the ordnanc3 factories throughout the Empire and the trade of England and the Allied and neutral countries of the world." Do not let it be supposed that the Government at this time and in the succeeding months were satisfied, or anything but disquieted, by the munitions situation. The contractors had promised more than they could perform ; they were terribly behind in their deliveries, particularly in the matter of high explosives. I will give you one figure to show you how serious these failures were. The Army ought to have received, according to contracts, by May 15th, 481,000 high explosive 18-pounder shells; instead of which only 52,000, very little more than one-tenth of the whole, were delivered. On the other hand, the increase of the forces in the field, and the changed character of the fighting, led to an expendi- ture of artillery ammunition far in excess of the calculations of any expert authority in any of the belligerent forces. In the fighting in and about Neuve Chapelle in the early spring of 1915, as Mr. Lloyd George pointed out in his speech, nearly as much artillery ammunition was spent by our Army as during the whole of the 2| years of the Boer War. How had they got such an enormous supply ? Entirely through the efforts which the Govern- ment had made in the preceding weeks and months. So far from being inattentive or careless, we were straining every nerve and resorting to every expedient to fill the gap. Here let me pause and digress from the main stream of my argument. It is high time it was dealt with — the legend long current in a certain section of the Press, to which Lord French seeks to give the weight of his authority — I will show you before I sit down what that is worth — the legend of an apathetic Government with a lethargic head. I am represented in this pictorial and romantic travesty of history as spending my time lolling in an armchair, occasionally arbitrating over disputes of different Depart- ments, waiting on the chapter of accidents, in the hope that somehow or other, and some way or other, the storm-tossed ship might drift safely into port. That is the picture which I believe finds credence 27 and acceptance among large numbers of the more backward parts of our population. What is the fact? I do not like, as you know, to speak very A Prime much about myself, but I am bound to do so. It is no exaggeration Minister's to say that, particularly in these early months of the war — in the Burden critical and decisive months of the war — everything depended on what was done then or what was left undone — it is no exaggeration to say that I was called upon almost every hour of every day to take on my own responsibility and initiative decisions which might be, and which often were, of the most momentous consequence. I had to deal, not only with military and naval operations, the recruiting of the New Army, transport, food supply, and Labour problems, but also with inter- Allied finance, and what at that time was a task of supreme difficulty and delicacy, Allied diplomacy. I had the devoted help of most loyal and efficient colleagues, some of whom I am glad to see sitting around me at this table. There is not one of them who did not habitually come to me to get the last word — sometimes even the first word — in cases of difficulty or doubt. And in the meantime what had this supine Government of sluggards and paralytics been doing? They had, in time of peace, prepared for any war on any scale that British statesmanship had ever contemplated. We were, and we remained throughout the war, perfectly secure, not only in these Islands but throughout our world-wide Empire, against any risk of invasion. No foreign soldier ever set his foot on one square yard of British ground. Our Expeditionary Force was ready to start fully equipped and with the necessary transport, at a moment's notice, as it did, to wherever it was most required. It soon, became apparent that this war was going to dwarf all Expanding previous experience. What did we do? We recruited, raised, War Po,ic T- equipped, and dispatched vast new armies, and we transported to the field of action the splendid contingents sent to our aid from all parts of the Empire all over the world. We cleared the seas of every German cruiser and merchantman. We carried through the long and delicate negotiations which secured for the Allies the co-opera- tion and the active support of gallant Italy. These were some of the things — it is not an exhaustive catalogue — which were actually done in the course of six months, and I say again, the record is not one of lethargy or apathy. But to come back to Lord French. I can only say for myself that, with all my other preoccupations, manifold and distracting as they were, this matter of the supply of munitions was rarely out of my thoughts. I used to see Lord Kitchener daily, often two or three times a day, and I believe hardly a day passed but I did not press him — not that he needed any pressure — to hurry on and increase production by every possible means. So dissatisfied and apprehen- sive did I become at the relatively slow rate of progress, as compared with our expectations and hopes, that I resolved to make a direct 28 personal appeal both to masters and to men. That was the object and the motive of my visit to Newcastle. But, observe, it was a very delicate business. I had to think, not only of our own people, but of our Allies, and still more of the enemy. Operations of great possible moment, as I knew, although I could not disclose it, were then impending, and it was of the utmost importance not to expose our own weaknesses or to give encouragement to the Germans to think that we could not hold our own or more than hold our own. I determined, therefore, to make sure of my ground, and instructed Lord Kitchener to send for Sir John French, to have him over here, and to get from him a concise report and survey of the then military situation, and to make his report to me before I spoke. Sir John French came over. He was seen by Lord Kitchener at the War Office, and they discussed the matter. I have here, it is an interesting historical document — at least, it may become so — the letter in Lord Kitchener's own hand- writing which he wrote to me immediately after the interview with Sir John French. It is as follows : — " My dear Prime Minister,— I have had a talk with French. He told me I could let you know that, with the present supply of ammunition, he will have as much as his troops will be able to use in the next forward movement." That isi dated April 14th, just Newcastle. I will read it asrain. a few days before T went to " I have had a talk with French. He told me I could let you know." — (That is what I wanted. I am blamed for relying on his word. I believed in making assurance doubly sure.) — " with the present supply of ammunition " • — (that is, the ammunition we had been accumulating) — " he will have as much as his troops will be able to use in the next forward movement." What more is to be said about that? I will say this — that Lord Kitchener in a subsequent communication, before I went to New T - castle, confirmed what is to be found in that letter. I therefore felt, because here I had got what I wanted, that I should be able to speak without giving encouragement to the enemy with regard to these delicate and dangerous operations whioh I knew were about to be launched. I felt not only entitled, but bound, at Newcastle to say what I did on that point. I quote my exact words. Lord French says he read my speech ; I wonder if he did. If he had read it with anything like decent care, he would not have given a most misleading travesty of what I said. I said : — " I saw a statement the other day that the operations, not only of our own Army, but of our Allies, were being crippled, or at any rate hampered, by our failure to provide the necessary ammunition. There is no truth in that statement." 29 Was I not justified in making that statement? Then I went on — Mr. Lloyd I am still quoting from my Newcastle speech ; then I went on to my George main theme of the extreme and perilous urgency of the situation s a ! me as regarded the future. That is the point I was on, and I may point out in passing that the very next night, in his speech in the House of Commons, Mr. Lloyd George said exactly the same thing — namely, that up to that moment, the moment at which he and I were speaking, the real point of danger and difficulty was the future. It M 7 as a long speech. I summed up the case in these words : — ''There is not a single naval or military authority among us who, in view of the proximate and prospective requirements " (observe these words) " does not declare that a large and rapid increase in the output of munitions has become one of the first necessities of the State. Lord Kitchener says so, Lord Fisher (who was then the First Sea Lord) I know would say so,' and Sir John French has said so. This, then, is what in the name of your King and Country we ask you to do — to • deliver the goods.' " That is the speech, the reading of which — for he says he did read " Overthrow it — caused Lord French to lose all hope of receiving help from the ° f the Government as then constituted, and set to work behind the back of his official chief to secure, in concert with outsiders, the overthrow of the Government. There was a time in the decadent days of the Roman Empire when the Praetorians, as they were called, and sometimes the armies in distant parts of the Empire, used to change Emperors. I confess I never knew, until I read Lord French's article, that it was to him, the Commander-in-Chief of our Armies in France, that we owed the blessings of a Coalition Government. But he says so, and to bring about this beneficent revolution in the conduct of our affairs he sent over here a versatile gentleman well known to many of us, Captain Guest. Providence works, as you know, in all kinds of mysterious ways. The combination of Lord French in his head- quarters in France and Captain Guest manipulating the Press and the politicians here had the desired result, and, as Lord French tells you, the Government fell. Well, I do not know which Lord French thinks was the chief villain of the whole piece, Lord Kitchener or myself. As it happens we both retained our old offices in the reconstructed Government, and while I should be the last — I shall always be the last— to belittle the splendid work which was subsequently done by the Ministry of Munitions, to the formation of which I was a party, and the principal party, and which in the early days, when there was a good deal of friction with the War Office, I strenuously backed with all my authority, yet Lord French appears to have forgotten that during: the whole of the time he remained in command in France, and for months afterwards, the British Army in France and in Flanders lived and fought with great determination and with many successes entirely on the ammunition ordered, before the Ministry of Munitions came into existence, by the old regime. 30 A Lord French's ridiculous suggestion that his action in this matter tidiculous ^ had som ething to do with his subsequent removal from the command ingestion. . g harQ ijy wort hy of serious notice. He remained in full command for more than six months, and though I heard strange rumours, which appear to have had more foundation in fact than I then believed, I never took the pains to inquire what part he had played, or whether he had played any part, in the newspaper campaign which he now claims to have inspired. When his retirement came, and I take myself the full and sole responsibility for it, it was for reasons that had no more to do with the supply of shells than with the next eclipse of the moon. I am afraid I have kept you a long time, but before I part with Lord French I have one word more to say. His whole case is that he was obliged to do what he did because in the highest interest of the Empire it was essential to get rid of an apathetic Government, negligent of its first duty to the Army, and presided over by a supine and lethargic head. I will refresh Lord French's memory on this point. I have here in my hand a letter in his own writing addressed to me from the Headquarters of the British Army in France, and dated — observe the date — May 20th, 1915. I say " Observe the date," because the Coalition Ministry, for which Lord French now claims a sort of paternal responsibility, was formed exactly three days earlier, on May 17th. It is a private letter to which I should certainly not have referred had not Lord French, who himself makes the freest use of secret and confidential documents, compelled me by his last article to do so. What I am about to read is only an extract, but I can assure you and the world that there is no qualifying context. As far as I am concerned the letter may be published in externa to-morrow. The letter reads: — " My dear Prime Minister, — For two days I have been hesitating to add an iota to the troubles and anxieties which must weigh upon you just now "— (" I was forming the Coalition Government," Mr. Asquith interpolated, amid laughter). " You have, however, shown me so much true, generous kindness throughout this trying campaign that I venture at this critical juncture to convey to you what is in my inmost thoughts. (*' Now comes the important part," said Mr. Asquith.) I am sure in the whole history of war no General in the field has ever been helped in a difficult task by the head of his Government as I have been supported and strengthened by your unfailing sympathy and encouragement." 31 PRESS COMMENTS ON THE SHELL CONTROVERSY. M Lord French is either the victim of delusions .so strange that his own written words are effaced from hie memory, or he is guilty of deliberate mutilation of fact in order to humiliate the dead and slander the living." — ' Daily Express, June 4th, 1919. " The documents brought forward by Mr. Asquith are too complete, too unreserved, too cordial, to admit of the idea that the writers had at the back of their heads a very serious charge against Mr. Asquith's Administra- tion." — Yorkshire Post, June 4th, 1919. * * * * " Mr. Asquith has not merely shown up contradictions between what Lord French said before and what Lord French says now. There are deeper implications. The whole conspiracy of the Northcliffe Press to bring down Mr. Asquith is shown to have been based on false pretences." — Daily Herald, June 4th, 1919. •X- * * * "The letters read by Mr. Asquith, one from Lord French and the other from Lord Kitchener, will indeed, take some explaining away. Perhaps the former was a mere expression of personal feeling, but, even so, it is difficult to cee how the man who signed it can have written the newspaper articles without laying himself open to a charge of inconsistency, or some- thing worse." — Sheffield Daily Telegraph, June 4th, 1919. * * * * " There is no ground for the accusation that either the Administration of the day or its responsible head failed in their conception of our obligations to our own armies or those of our Aliiesi, or in their efforts to discharge those obligations to the utmost extent. The Government of 1915 played its part resolutely, persistently, in building up and developing the resources of this land and in the securing of supplies from every available source, and neither it nor Mr. Asquith have ever received the credit that was really due to them." — North Mail, June 4th, 1919. ■* * * * 'Gc and bring the sledge-hammer,' said Sir Henry CainpbeL- Bannerman once to a colleague on the Treasury Bench when the new Liberal Administration was under attack by Mr. Balfour. The colleague jumped to the mission, and promptly returned with — Mr. Asquith. It was the sledge-hammer which was in operation yesterday in Mr. Asquith's reply to Lord French's 'journalistic serial,' and its smashing blow will rever- berate as long as the story of the Great War is told. A more direct and crushing answer was never made to a serious charge." — Yorkshire Observer, June 4th, 1919. * * * * " A month after the Newcastle speech, which Lord French now declares to have filled him with dismay and hopelesness, he confessed in a private letter to Mr. Asquith that never in the history of war had a general in the field been so helped in a difficult task by the unfailing sympathy and encouragement of the head of his Government. This wm the Government 11 32 H"IM1 Jl DEC 1 7 1929 U1L 29) ISSOTC UNlvfa^S'.TY O? C* which Lord French now convicts himself of scheming to overthrow. It i: no satisfaction to anyone to see a man of Lord French's character an^ position in so delicate and awkward and muddled a controversial situation.' —Liverpool Daily Post, June 4th, 1919. * * * * "In a letter to Mr. Asquith written on May 20th, 1915, Lord Frenc;' convicts 'himself beyond hope of acquittal. In that letter we find hinJ sending fulsome thanks to Mr. Asquith and. the Government he now claiinj to have overthrown for giving him support in the field such as no Britis' general had ever had before. What is there to be said of a person wT voluntarily, presents himself for public contempt in such a series of bas parts? Is it all an af terthought ? Is it to curry favour with the living that hj maligns the dead? Of one thing only the British public will be satisfied] It is that his retention of his present office is impossible." — Daily New; June 4th, 1919. * * * * " That intrigue, the so-called ' munition stunt ' of 1915, was a blacl] offence against the country. When it was undertaken we bad had a ba<] shortage of shells, it had been at once faced, and the means of raising on, munition supply to its subsequent abundance had been provided; at any rat their provision, and provision for their future growth, had. begun. All thaj was then required of public-spirited newspapers and politicians was tha they should not shriek into the ears of the enemy the news that we' had a] the moment very few shells — that is, that now was the time to attack and not shriek into the ears of neutrals that our war administration wa;i improvident and incompetent — that is, that we were an ally to avoid an< that we should probably lose the war. But nothing seems to have counted against the prospect of a raging and tearing * stunt/ and the teniptatioij to claim credit afterwards for having compelled the sowing of the tree whicl\ was already above ground and growing fast when the 'stunt' began. That] ' stunt,' with its repulsive detraction, of Kitchener, caused some disgust at home, and a deeper resentment, which has not yet ceased, among oui troops then in France." — Manchester Guardian, June 4th, 1919. * * * * " Wherever we dip into the records, they tell the same story : unceasin* toil, strain, anxiety on Lord Kitchener's part and that of the Govern- ment to meet unexampled demands to which no supply could be adequate; an inevitable but highly disturbing controversy going on all the time betweei the experts as to the merits of different kinds of munitions, frequent die j appointments in the supply, unremitting efforts to convert workshops an(" change the conditions of labour so as to increase the supply. Result that, as Mr. Lloyd George claimed in a speech to the House of Commons th( day after Mr. Asquith's Newcastle speech, a speech which repeated and| expanded the Newcastle speech, we had between September, 1914, and] March, 1915, increased the supply nineteenfold, and that in the month oi May, 1915. we w^ere producing in. three days the amount of ammunition usually produced before in a whole year. A few days before the Newcastle speech Lord Kitchener, after a talk with Lord French, reports to the Prinu Minister that Lord French has told him that ' with the present supply of j ammunition he will have as much as hie troops will be able to use in the} next forward movement,' and Lord French has further testified that after the month of May the ammunition question had ceased to cause serious] anxiety. Lord French, it is true, ascribes this sudden change to his own j heroic action in displacing a lethargic Government and procuring an active one to take its place, but no one who has the faintest idea what preliminary j labour a change or increase in the supply of munitions entails will take this explanation seriously. The simple truth is that the most difficult part of j the work had been done by the previous Government, and the organisation which it set up supplied the Army for a whole year, and eiipplied it most efficiently before the new Ministry of Munitions could start on its output! of shells'."— Westminster Gazette. June 4th, 1919. Published by the LIBERAL PUBLICATION DEPARTMENT (in connection with the] National Liberal Federation). 42, Parliament Street, Westminster, S.W., and Printed! by the National Press Agency Limited. Whitefriars House, London, E.C. 4. U.C. BERKELEY LIBRARIES CD55b8tSm 717653 Osir UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY