UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 Mrs. SARAH P. WALSWORTH. 
 
 Received October, 1894. 
 Accessions No.\T*fJ&0.- Class No. 
 
RECONCILIATION 
 
 OF 
 
 SCIENCE AND RELIGION, 
 
 BY ALEXANDER WINCHELL, LL.D., 
 
 AUTHOR OF " SKETCHES OF CREATION," " THE DOCTRINE OF EVOLUTION," ETC. 
 
 NEW YORK: 
 HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS, 
 
 FRANKLIN SQUARE. 
 
 1877. 
 
 
 
Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 18T7, by 
 
 HARPER & BROTHERS, 
 In the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington. 
 
KITIRSITTI 
 
 i /*. 
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 WHAT are the natural relations between science and religion ? 
 This is a question in which the public has recently manifested 
 a profound interest. On this question a layman and scientific 
 teacher here ventures to offer some thoughts. The discussions 
 in which they are embodied aim to reach some of the ground- 
 principles on which the propositions of science and religion 
 alike rest. They enunciate a substantial basis of harmony and 
 mutual helpfulness, and disclose a promised synthesis of deep- 
 est scientific conviction and simplest religious faith. 
 
 The author has written as he felt profoundly moved to write. 
 He has made a record of honest and earnest convictions ; and 
 he flatters himself that his record nowhere betrays the spirit 
 of a partisan. 
 
 The thoughts here presented, though lying generally beyond 
 the peculiar domain of natural science, have mingled them- 
 selves, by a spontaneous interplay of the psychic powers, with 
 the dry details and lofty generalizations of strict science. They 
 have been to the author a source of enjoyment, consolation, 
 and assurance; and he hopes they may serve to ballast the 
 faith of others who have less opportunity for reflection, but 
 who must, nevertheless, if they think at all, grapple with the 
 inevitable and irrepressible questions which arise concerning 
 the validity of their religious beliefs. 
 
 The author has always entertained an unshaken conviction 
 of the unity of all truth ; and the right of all our faculties to 
 activity within limits prescribed or sanctioned by reason. He 
 
iv PREFACE. 
 
 holds that reason is the only criterion of truth, and must even 
 arbitrate the claims of an assumed divine revelation. He holds 
 that the religious faculties are not cognitive, but must be served 
 by the cognitive faculties ; and that, while religion is spontane- 
 ous, its grounds may be subjected to a rational authentication. 
 He holds that though history has shown that ecclesiastical sys- 
 tems unavoidably incorporate more or less of secular beliefs, 
 such beliefs are not thereby rendered sacred or essentially re- 
 ligious, and ought to be modified or rejected according to im- 
 proved knowledge. He holds that the religious sentiments 
 are co-ordinate with the knowing faculties, and demand from 
 intellect the concession of a free field for exercise ; and that 
 the phenomena of their activity, in the history of our race, 
 afford the data for an inductive philosophy of religion. He 
 holds that systems of science and religion approved alike by 
 rational tests must be found in complete harmony ; and that 
 the so-called conflict between science and religion is partly fic- 
 titious, and partly a conflict between science and religious or 
 ecclesiastical systems; while the conflict with these systems 
 reduces itself to a collision between the effete science which 
 they embody and the results of more advanced science. 
 
 The author likewise maintains that natural science, while af- 
 fording the data from which philosophy may reason to Deity, 
 does not, in its proper character, reach a theistic issue ; and 
 that, as a corollary, exclusive physicists and biologists incur 
 the danger of overlooking the importance of supramaterial and 
 transcendental verities. He composes himself, nevertheless, in 
 the conviction that no scientist, however exclusive, can possi- 
 bly reach a firm datum which is not on one of the many lines 
 of ratiocinative thought converging toward Deity and supra- 
 material realities. He holds that this position is confirmed by 
 the bearing of the profoundest results of recent science and 
 the declarations of its votaries. 
 
 In these and other dominant ideas pervading the various 
 
PREFACE. V 
 
 papers assembled in this volume is the disclosure of their es- 
 sential unity and continuity. In reference to the much mooted 
 scientific question of the derivative origin of species, the reader 
 will detect indications of a growing faith. A certain class of 
 proofs has been accumulating at a rapid rate ; and the author's 
 present conviction is that the doctrine of the derivation of 
 species should be accepted; and that the most tenable theory 
 of the causes, instrumentalities, and conditions of this deri- 
 vation is that propounded, in 1868, by Professor Edward D. 
 Cope. 
 
 These papers do not represent the author's conception of a 
 complete and systematic discussion of the relations of science 
 and religion. They are rather separate outcroppings of the re- 
 sults of much study and reflection, which have correlated and 
 consolidated themselves in the author's mind in a broad under- 
 lying system of which no opportunity has presented itself, as 
 yet, for a fuller exposition. 
 
 In the hope that the reasonings here presented may prove 
 helpful to young persons engaged in the serious work of fash- 
 ioning a system of belief ; corrective or strengthening to those 
 whose beliefs are matured; and admonitory to such as have 
 left their beliefs to the control of circumstance to student, 
 theologian, and scientist to all thoughtful persons, this essay 
 toward a good understanding between religion and science is 
 cordially and respectfully submitted. 
 
 THE AUTHOR. 
 
 ANN ARBOR, MICHIGAN, March, 1877. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 THE INTERACTION OF THE RELIGIOUS AND THE IN- 
 TELLECTUAL FACULTIES. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 I. NECESSARY RELATIONS OP THE RELIGIOUS AND THE INTELLECTUAL 
 
 FACULTIES 17 
 
 The Religious Nature of Man 19 
 
 Rise and Progress of Scientific Thought 26 
 
 Results of the Interaction of these Forces 36- 
 
 II. INTERACTION OF THE RELIGIOUS AND THE INTELLECTUAL FACULTIES 
 
 IN ORIENTAL AND GRECIAN PSYCHIC HISTORY 41 
 
 Laws of the Interaction of Faith and Intellect 42 
 
 Egyptian Psychic History 46 
 
 Chinese Psychic History 48 
 
 Indian Psychic History 51 
 
 Grecian Psychic History 55 
 
 III. INTERACTION OF THE RELIGIOUS AND THE INTELLECTUAL FACULTIES 
 
 IN CHRISTIAN PSYCHIC HISTORY 66 
 
 First Psychic Cycle 66 
 
 Second Psychic Cycle 72 
 
 Third Psychic Cycle ... 74 
 
 Fourth Psychic Cycle 82 
 
 SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY IN RELIGION. 
 
 IV. THE DOCTRINE OF CAUSALITY 87 
 
 1. Original Causation 87 
 
 The Notion of Causality 93 
 
 Implications of the Notion of Causality 101 
 
 V. THE DOCTRINE OF CAUSALITY Continued. 120 
 
 2. Causal Intermediation 120 
 
 Relation of Matter and Force 120 
 
 Philosophy of Cause applied to Science 134 
 
viii CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGH 
 
 VI. THE DOCTRINE OP INTENTIONALITY 150 
 
 Correlation in general 151 
 
 Homology 156 
 
 Fundamental Types of Animals 159 
 
 The Vertebrate Type 161 
 
 Membral Homologies of Vertebrates 166 
 
 Cosmical Homologies 174 
 
 VII. REASON FOR THE FAITH 178 
 
 Causes of Skepticism 179 
 
 I. The Necessity of some Religion is upon us 184 
 
 II. Constructive or Deductive Theistic Belief 191 
 
 III. Deductions from the Theistic Proposition 199 
 
 IV. The Christian Scriptures answer to these Deductions 203 
 
 V. Our Reasonable Duty 205 
 
 VIII. THE CONFLICTS OF FAITH 207 
 
 The Human Powers engaged 208 
 
 The Reconciliation 222 
 
 IX. THOUGHTS ON CAUSALITY, WITH REFERENCES TO PHASES OF RE- 
 CENT SCIENCE 231 
 
 X. Is GOD COGNIZABLE BY REASON ? 266 
 
 The Achievements of Greek Philosophy 271 
 
 Forms of Theistic Proof 292 
 
 XL GOD IN THE WORLD. ., . 304 
 
 GLIMPSES OF THE EVIDENCE, A POSTERIORI. 
 
 XII. GOD AND RELIGION IN NATURE. ILLUSTRATIONS OF INTENTION- 
 ALITY AND OF OTHER BlBLICAL TEACHING 333 
 
 I. Manifestations of Power in Creation 333 
 
 II. Manifestations of - Intelligence in Creation 337 
 
 III. Manifestations of Beneficence in Creation 342 
 
 IV. The Unity of Creation 347 
 
 V. The Religious Nature of Man 351 
 
 VI. Genesis and Geology 356 
 
 VII. The Mosaic Deluge 363 
 
 VIII. Man in the Light of Geology 368 
 
 IX. The Finiteness of the Existing Order of Things 373 
 
 X. The Bible in the Light of Nature 379 
 
 INDEX.. . 385 
 
ANALYSES. 
 
 NECESSARY RELATIONS OF INTELLECT AND FAITH. 
 
 Rights on both sides of the existing conflict, 18. The controversy one 
 of long duration, 18. Two imperishable forces antagonizing each other, 
 19. Religious characteristics innate in man. Proofs, 19-20. The signifi- 
 cance of a power native to humanity, 20-21. Generalizations from relig- 
 ious phenomena, 21-22. What is the religious nature ? Answer, 22. 
 Contrasted with the cognitive powers, 22-23. What is conscience ? An- 
 swer, 24. It is not a knowing faculty, 24. Sway of the religious feelings 
 in the life of man, 26. Incipient antagonism of the knowing faculties, 26. 
 Continued aggressions of the knowing faculties, 27. Fidelity of religious 
 faith to its objects, 27. Science seeks only truth true divinity, 28. Faith 
 accepts what science offers as true, and hallows it, 28. Faith tends to 
 conservatism ; science to progress ; hence strife, 29. Distinction betweeen 
 pure religious faith and its accessories, 29. The progress of science re- 
 forms the accessories, 30. Alternating ascendency of faith and intellect, 
 32. Explanation of the chronic conflict, 32. Religion necessary to the 
 welfare of science, 33. Antagonism a universal law in nature, 34. Faith 
 finds an avowed enemy in the depraved heart of man, 35. The antago- 
 nism of faith and intellect beneficent, 36. It has purified the religious sys- 
 tem, 36. The constant and the variable factor in religion, 37. Historical 
 development of the religious system, 37-39. Imperishability of religion, 
 39. 
 
 II. 
 
 OKIENTAL AND GRECIAN PSYCHIC HISTORY. 
 
 Periodicity in the dominance of faith and intellect, 41. Laws of the 
 interaction of faith and intellect, 42-43. Psychic cycles-, 44. Orbits of 
 faith and intellect, 44. Psychic epicycles, 45. Overlapping of phases, 46. 
 Bifurcation in cyclic movements, 46. EGYPTIAN PSYCHIC HISTORY : First 
 Psychic Cycle, embracing the era of Memphis, 46 ; Second Psychic Cycle, 
 embracing the period of the later monuments, 47 ; Third Psychic Cycle 
 dates from Alexander's conquest, 48 ; Fourth Psychic Cycle, from the con- 
 quest by the Arabians, 48: CHINESE PSYCHIC HISTORY : first Psychic Cy- 
 cle precedes Confucius, 48 ; Second Psychic Cycle, from Confucius to the 
 
 1* 
 
x ANALYSES. 
 
 overthrow of Taoism, 49 ; Third Psychic Cycle, from Wen-ti to the introduc- 
 tion of Buddhism, 49 ; Fourth Psychic Cycle, extending to the present, 50. 
 INDIAN PSYCHIC HISTORY : First Psychic Cycle, Brahmanism, 51 ; Second 
 Psychic Cycle, the Zoroastrian revolt, 52 ; Return to early simplicity and 
 purity, 52 ; Third Psychic Cycle, the Buddhistic schism, 53 ; Advancing 
 ceremonialism, 54 ; Psychic movements among the Hebrews, 55. GRECIAN 
 PSYCHIC HISTORY : First Psychic Cycle, Homeric, 55. Second Psychic Cycle, 
 Religious Phase, the Ionics and Pythagoreans, 56 ; Intellectual Phase, em- 
 bracing the Eleatics, Atomists, and Sophists, 57-60. Third Psychic Cycle, 
 Religious Phase, Socratic, 61 ; the Eleatics, Hedonists, and Platonists, 61- 
 62 ; Intellectual Phase, Aristotelians, 63 ; Stoics, 64 ; Epicureans, 64-65 ; 
 Skeptics, 65. 
 
 III. 
 
 CHRISTIAN PSYCHIC HISTORY. 
 
 First Psychic Cycle: Religious Phase, Eclecticism, 66 ; the New Academy, 
 66-67 ; Alexandrian-Jewish learning, 67 ; Neo-Pythagoreanism, 68 ; Pythag- 
 orizing and Eclectic Platonists, 68 ; the advent of Christ, 69. Intellectual 
 Phase, the Latin Skeptics, 69 ; Neo-Platonism, Alexandrian-Roman School, 
 69-70; Syrian School, 70 ; Athenian School, 70 ; Patristicism, 71 ; Gnosti- 
 cism, 71. Second Psychic Cycle: Religious Phase, Irenseus, and Tertullian, 
 72 ; First Council of Nice, 72. Intellectual reaction in Augustine, 73. 
 Third Psychic Cycle: Scholasticism, 74. Religious Phase, a divorce of 
 philosophy and faith, 74 ; Erigena, 75 ; Berengarius, 75 ; Roscellinus, 75 ; 
 Abelard, 75 ; supremacy of ecclesiasticism, 76 ; influence of Aristotle, 76 ; 
 Alexander of Hales, Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, Occam, Pompona- 
 tius, 76 ; Luther and the Reformation, 76-77. Intellectual Phase, Roger 
 Bacon, 78 ; Eckart, 78 ; " revival of letters," 78 ; Saracenic influence, 78 ; 
 poetry, 79 ; discovery, 79 ; science in Italy, 79-80 ; intellect begins to en- 
 croach, 80 ; Macchiavelli, Montaigne, Hobbes, Descartes, 80 ; Bayle, Locke, 
 Berkeley, Hartley, and Priestley, 80-81 ; French philosophy, 81 ; growing 
 arrogance of intellect, 81-82 ; culmination in the French Revolution, 82. 
 Fourth Psychic Cycle : Religious Phase, 82 ; Intellectual Phase dawns with 
 the "Vestiges of Creation," 83 ; Omens of the future, 83-84 ; a Synthesis of 
 Thought and Faith, 84. 
 
 IV. 
 
 ORIGINAL CAUSALITY. 
 
 
 
 Retrospect, 87-89. False theories of the origin of religious feeling, 
 89-90. Intuition as one origin of the theistic concept, 90. Extravagances 
 of the " Mystics," 91. Our notion of cause, 93. Denial of causation, 93. 
 Theories of the origin of the idea of causality, 93-94. Its origin not 
 empirical, 94. Only one species of cause, 96. The use of the term 
 " cause " in science, 96. Aristotelian and Scholastic " causes," 96. " Sec- 
 ondary " causation, 98. Implies a first cause, 98. Notion of primordial 
 
ANALYSES. xi 
 
 causality, 99 ; Causation implies the existence of real cause, 101. Chance, 
 101. Doctrine of the atomists not wholly atheistic, 102. Causative real- 
 ity antecedent to all its effects, 103-104. Causality implies correlative subject- 
 ivity and objectivity, 104. In creative causality the objectivity is potential, 
 104. The causal efficiency must possess consciousness, 105. There must be a 
 conception of a non-existent effect, 106. Limitations of foreknowledge, 106. 
 The consciousness of the principle of causality must arise, 107. Necessity 
 of motive, 107-108. Final cause in the history of speculation, 108-109. 
 Modern opinion becoming unanimous in its defense, 110. Its recogni- 
 tion a necessity of thought, 110. Limitations of our knowledge of final 
 causes, 112-113. Inconsequential assertions against final causes: Haeck- 
 el, 113-114. The question of final causes one of "common sense," not of 
 science, 115. A. contingency or condition may be discerned, 115. The influ- 
 ence of the contingency must be cognized, 116. Desire necessary to exertion of 
 efficiency, 116. Causality implies intention, 116. Causality implies volition, 
 117. Evolution of the concept of personality, 119. 
 
 V. 
 
 CAUSAL INTERMEDIATION. 
 
 Use of the term "cause," 120. No causality in matter, 120. Does 
 force inhere in matter? 120. The theory implies that all motion is a 
 search for equilibrium, 123. It implies a running-down of the material 
 system, 123. The inherent efficiency of matter unthinkable, 124. Cause 
 must be present in time and space, 125. Delegated force, 125. Matter 
 viewed as adynamic, 126. Matter viewed as the vehicle of primordial 
 force, 126. The theory implies the subsidence of molecular activities, 
 126. Matter viewed as the seat of a force momentarily renewed, 126. 
 Force viewed as the direct effort of Supreme Will, 127. Objections to 
 doctrine of divine immanence considered, 128. Matter regarded merely 
 as a manifestation of force, 128. The attributes of matter inhere in 
 some substance, 128. Relation of the dynami6 theory to pantheism, 130. 
 Theism not an outcome of science, 131. Divine immanence compatible 
 with law and order, 132. Intelligence the best explanation of order, 133. 
 Relations of science and philosophy, 134. No induction possible with- 
 out deduction, 135. What is implied in mediate causation, 137. The 
 principle of congruity, 138. The principles of efficiency and conditionally, 
 139. ERRORS IN SCIENTIFIC REASONING : 1. Subjective mistaken for objective 
 condition, and then mistaken for efficiency, 140 ; influence of the " environ- 
 ment," 141. 2. Subjective condition mistaken for efficiency, 142; evolution 
 a subjective condition, 143. 3. Objective condition mistaken for efficiency, 
 145 ; connection of mind and matter, 145 ; " unconscious cerebration," 
 145. 4. Instrumental relation mistaken for cause, 146 ; heredity an instru- 
 ment, not a cause, 147. 5. Cause arbitrarily assumed, 148. "Organized 
 experiences," 148. Origin of life, 149. 
 
xii ANALYSES. 
 
 VI. 
 THE DOCTRINE OP INTENTIONALITY. 
 
 Intentionality implied in causality, 150. And in correlations of plan, 
 161. Influence upon the mind of facts of intentionality, 151. Mechanic- 
 al correlations, 153. Modal correlations, 153-154. Evolution the method 
 of methods, 154. Homology, 156. Psychic teleology, 156. Heredity an 
 instrument of homology, 157. Fundamental types in the animal kingdom, 
 159. Persistent in all situations, 159. In all ages of the world, 161. 
 The Vertebrate type considered more particularly, 161-163. Modifications 
 of the archetype, 163-164. Its unfolding in geological time, 164. Inter- 
 pretation of the facts, 165. Centripetal and centrifugal forces in organ- 
 ization, 165. Theism of the hypothesis of derivation of species, 166. 
 Homologies of appendages of vertebrates, 166-168. Intelligence the only 
 explanation of correlations between environment and organs, 168. Ho- 
 mologies in the limbs of extinct American Iwrses, 168-169. Two possible 
 explanations, 170. Defects in the evidence for derivation, 172-173. 
 Homology in the field of cosmical existence, 174-176. Continuity of cos- 
 mical phenomena, 176. 
 
 VII. 
 
 REASON FOR THE FAITH. 
 
 Reason must be satisfied in accepting revelation, 179. Causes of skepti- 
 cism: 1. The evil heart, 179 ; 2. The progress of knowledge, 179 ; 3. Rash 
 generalizations in the interest of unbelief, 181 ; 4. Cowardice of believers, 
 182; 5. Mistaking non-essentials for fundamentals in theology, 183. 
 The reasons can not be defended, 183. I. The necessity of some Religion 
 is upon us, 184. The great religions of the world, 185-187. Inductive 
 generalizations from them, 187. Religious nature of savages, 188-189. 
 And of prehistoric peoples, 190. Religion a universal phenomenon of 
 humanity, 190. II. Constructive or Deductive Theistic JBelief, 191. Pri- 
 mary Beliefs, 191. They are spontaneous and native, 193. They are au- 
 thoritative, 193. Proofs, in brief, 193-195. Testimony of Fichte, 195- 
 196. Resume of the argument, 196. Fundamental intuitions of deduct- 
 ive theism: Real Being, 196. Causality, 197. Intelligence, 197-198. 
 Ethicality, 198. Goodness, 198-199. Integration of the intuitions, 199. 
 III. Deductions from tlie Theistic Proposition: Peace and rejoicing, 199- 
 200. The "unthinkable" and unsearchable known, 200. Grounds to 
 expect a verbal revelation, 201-203. Its relations to humanity, 203. 
 IV. TJie Christian Scriptures answer to our Deductions, 203. Tinctured 
 to some extent by the imperfections of the human medium, 203. But 
 still in consonance with the universal system of truth, 204. V. Our rea- 
 sonable Duty, 205-206. 
 
ANALYSES. xiii 
 
 VIII. 
 
 THE CONFLICTS OP FAITH. 
 
 The historical controversy, 207-208. The human powers in action, 208. 
 The religious sentiment, 208. Authority of both classes of intuitions, 
 209. Their different spheres, 210. Intellect progressive, religion con- 
 servative, 212. Faith clings fondly to its objects, 212. Intellect pro- 
 nounces some of them unreal, 212. Action and reaction of these forces, 
 212. Exemplifications strew the pathway of history, 213. Protagoras, 
 Aristarchus, Socrates, Christ, 213-214. The conflict in reality between 
 old science and new, 215. Periodicity in the interactions, 215. The con- 
 flict in the scholastic ages, 216. Slavery of intellect, 216. Two orders of 
 truth supposed, 217. Rebellion of Luther, 217. The emergence of intel- 
 lectual freedom gradual, 218. Champions of free thought, 218. The 
 other swing of the pendulum, 218. Champions of doubt, 218. Readjust- 
 ment after the French Revolution, 218-219. Later strides of intellect, 
 219. Doting faith still inclines to hug her idols, 220. And science is 
 again shaming her for it, 220. Resume, 221. Another renaissance of 
 faith, 221. The prospect of reconciliation, 221-222. The Biblical record 
 of creation, 222. The antiquity of the human race, 223. Its unity, 223- 
 224. The origin of species, 224. The origin of life, 224-225. Mental 
 physiology, 225-226. Rights of the religious nature, 227. Religion not 
 a human enactment, 227. Religion in schools, 227-228. The reconcilia- 
 tion to be sought, 229.. An incident from Casalis, 229-230. 
 
 IX. 
 
 THOUGHTS ON CAUSALITY. 
 
 Utterances of Tyndall, Huxley, and Haeckel, 231. Synopsis of Profess- 
 or Tyndall's Belfast address, 232. His "materialism" not atheistic, nor 
 pantheistic, nor antispiritualistic, 237. He recognizes the rights of the 
 religious nature, 237. Phenomena and realities, 240. Science and phi- 
 losophy defined, 240. Chance considered as the explanation of an event, 
 242. The Lucretian atomic hypothesis, 243. Increased knowledge dis- 
 closes mere effect in supposed cause, 243. Recession of real cause, 244. 
 Convergence of lines of causation, 245. Ineradicable belief in primary 
 causation, 245. Influence of monotheism, 246. Science does not attain 
 to real causes, 246-247. Antecedent not necessarily cause, 247. Induct- 
 ive and deductive procedures, 248. Law not efficient, 249. The law of 
 the "survival of the fittest," 249. Conditions are not causes, 250-251. 
 The "environment" only a condition, 251-252. Consecutiveness not a 
 causal relation, 252. Principle applied to the hypothesis of derivation of 
 species, 252-254. "Organically remembered" experiences, 254. Con- 
 comitancy not a causal relation, 255. "Unconscious cerebration," 255. 
 
xiv ANALYSES. 
 
 Where is the essential ground of force? 256. Not in dead matter, 257. 
 Nor in living matter, 257. Is force external to matter? 257. Its seat 
 in supreme intelligent will, 258. Significance of the position, 258. Or- 
 der explained by intelligence, not by its denial, 259. Force viewed as 
 a "mode of motion," 259-260. From human will to the all - causative 
 Will, 260. Different species of force, 261-262. Analysis of our concept 
 of primary causality, 263-264. 
 
 X. 
 
 IS GOD COGNIZABLE BY REASON? 
 
 Questionings of the age, 267. All truth belongs to Christianity, 267-268. 
 Influence of physical surroundings upon human character, 269. Criti- 
 cism of various philosophies of religious phenomena, 269-271. Religion 
 of the ancient Athenians, 271. I. The idea of God universal, 274. II. 
 Not an intuition independent of experience, 274. III. The universe de- 
 mands a God, 275. IV. Ideas of the Absolute and Infinite, 276. Criti- 
 cism of theories denying the cognoscibility of God by reason, 276. The 
 Pre-Socratic schools of philosophy, 278. The Socratic school, 279. Re- 
 sults of Greek philosophizing, 280. These appropriated by Christianity, 
 280. The preparatory office of Greek philosophy seen: I. In the field of 
 tlwstic conceptions, 282. 1. In weakening the power of polytheism, 282. 
 2. In formulating the theistic argument, 284. Forms of the argument, 
 284. II. In the department of ethical ideas, 286. III. In the field of relig- 
 ious sentiment, 287-289. Characteristics of Dr. Cocker's work, 290-291. 
 Modes of theistic proof, 292. I. The argument from common consent, 
 292. II. The argument from direct revelation, 294. III. The argument 
 from immediate intuition, 294. IV. The ^Etiological argument, 295. 
 V. The Teleological argument, 296. VI. The Homological argument, 296. 
 VII. The Ontological argument, 297. Ontological concepts, 297-299. 
 All arguments rest back on the Ontological, 299. Kant's critique of the 
 theistic proofs, 269. Possible predicates of the Unknowable, 300. Are 
 truths necessary to reason, absolute? 300-301. The direct way of Leib- 
 nitz, 302. The last datum of reason, simple belief, 302-303. Sacred sanc- 
 tion of the primary beliefs, 303. 
 
 XI. 
 
 GOD IN THE WORD. 
 
 Mistaken method of propagating religious truth, 304-305. Various 
 grounds of belief, 306. Beliefs possess various degrees of validity, 307. 
 Influence of religious feelings on belief, 308. Men differ in warmth of 
 religious feeling, 308. Religious belief as begotten by authority, 309. 
 Different teaching required where the religious predisposition is wanting, 
 310. Influence of allegations of conflict between religion and science, 310. 
 
ANALYSES. xv 
 
 A painful dilemma, 312. Character of Dr. Cocker's work, 312-314. 
 What is the First Principle of all things? 314. Cocker's views of time 
 and space, 315. A criticism, 316. Author's view of time and space, 
 317-318. Beginning and end of the cosmical order, 319. The highest 
 law of the universe a teleological idea, 320. Parallelism of Genesis and 
 geology, 320-322. A criticism, 320-322. Author's opinion on Gen. i., 2, 
 321-322. Theories of the relation of God to the world, 322. The world 
 not self-sustaining, 323. Immanent relation of God to the world, 324. 
 God's method with mankind, 325. Prayer considered from the stand-point 
 of science, 325-326. The moral government of the world, 326-328. 
 Cocker's view of conscience, 326. The author's view of conscience, 327. 
 General definition of religion, 328. Freedom of the will, 328. A speci- 
 men of successful authorship, 328-329. 
 
 XII. 
 
 GOD AND RELIGION IN NATURE. 
 
 I. MANIFESTATIONS OF POWER IN CREATION, 333. Power in the uplifting 
 of mountains, 333. The strain of the rocks revealed in the quarry, 324. 
 The power which molds and moves a planet, 334. This power the attri- 
 bute of some being, 335. Vastness of the sun's distance, 336. Cosmical 
 power exerted through measureless space, 336. II. MANIFESTATIONS OF IN- 
 TELLIGENCE IN CREATION, 337. Accidental and purposive arrangements con- 
 trasted, 337-338. The hand a purposive arrangement, 338. Its internal 
 mechanism consummate, 339. The plan of anterior appendages, 340-341. 
 The reflection of intelligence which is infinite, 342. III. MANIFESTA- 
 TIONS OF BENEFICENCE IN CREATION, 342. The vast and varied utilities of 
 coal, 342. All pre-arranged for man while yet in futurity, 343. Vastness 
 of the preparations, 344. The intelligibility of nature a beneficent provis- 
 ion, 345. Having relations only to man, 346. Man in his constitution pro- 
 vided with happiness, 346. IV. THE UNITY OF CREATION, 347. Vastness 
 of the empire of gravitation, 348. Gravitation is will acting according to 
 method, 348. Uniformities of the solar system, 348. Gravity active 
 among the fixed stars, 349. Light communicates between them and us, 
 349. One substance in earth, and sun, and star, 350. One common his- 
 tory, 350. One method, one empire in infinite time as in infinite space, 
 351. V. THE RELIGIOUS NATURE OF MAN, 351. All people devout before 
 the spectacle of the heavens, 351. The universal feeling of the divine, 
 352. Religious condition of lowest savages, 353. Religious manifesta- 
 tions of all cultured peoples, 353-354. The knowledge of God can not 
 be evaded, 354. Reason also leads from Nature to God, 354-355. VI. 
 "GENESIS" AND GEOLOGY, 356. Intellectual progress since the date of 
 King James's translation, 357. The Biblical account of creation poetical 
 but truthful, 358. Some things premised, 358. Seven successive periods 
 of geological history, 359-361. Seven corresponding periods in the sacred 
 
xvi ANALYSES. 
 
 account, 361. Supplementary note on the particle eth, 362. Note on the 
 interpretation of yom, 363. VII. THE MOSAIC DELUGE, 363. No geologic- 
 al record of a universal deluge, 363-364. Extensive emergences of lands 
 in human times, 364. Geological and traditional evidences of great local 
 deluges, 365. Chaldean, Chinese, Persian, and Greek traditions, 365-366. 
 Fijian, American, and Mexican traditions, 366. Six points of agreement, 
 367. The deluge was not universal, 367. VIII. MAN IN THE LIGHT OP 
 GEOLOGY, 368. 1. He belongs to the last fauna, 367. 2. Man's advent 
 comparatively recent, 369. Great events within the human period, 369- 
 370. 3. Man's birthplace in the Orient, 370. Evidence from continental 
 faunas, 371. Evidence from history and tradition,- 371. 4. Man's advent 
 the prophecy of the ages, 372. 5. Man the last term of the organic se- 
 ries, 372-373. IX. FINITENESS OP THE EXISTING ORDER OF THINGS, 373. 
 Changes in progress imply a beginning, 374. And an end, 374. 1. The 
 land wearing out, 374-375. 2. Terrestrial refrigeration impending, 375. 
 3. Solar refrigeration, 376. 4. Effect of the resisting medium, 377. The 
 fiery consummation predicted by St. Peter, 378. X. THE BIBLE IN THE 
 LIGHT OF NATURE, 379. Resume, 379-380. Biblical statements verified 
 by science, 381-382. The Bible proved truthful must be accepted as a 
 whole, 382. Antecedent probability of supernatural revelation, 383. Rev- 
 elation the recognized response to the want, 383-384. 
 
THE INTERACTION OF THE RELIGIOUS AND THE 
 INTELLECTUAL FACULTIES. 
 
'OP THB 
 
 UHX7B.ESXTY 
 
 EECONCILIATION 
 
 OP 
 
 SCIENCE AND RELIGION 
 
 i. 
 
 NECESSARY RELATIONS OF THE RELIGIOUS AND THE IN- 
 TELLECTUAL FACULTIES. 
 
 THE din of a great controversy sounds in our ears. Men 
 of thought have been summoned to choose their banner, and 
 range themselves upon one side or the other of the line of bat- 
 tle. It is the "conflict" between Religion and Science which 
 has thrown the world into commotion. 
 
 It might be expected that I should appear before you in a 
 militant character. I do not. I shall assume the office of a 
 mediator. It may mark a stronger character to love war ; but 
 when I see " a house divided against itself," I love peace. I 
 shall be reproached for weakness. We shall hear of somebody 
 " on the fence." Extremists will say I have no opinion, and 
 court the favor of both the combatants. I shall, nevertheless, 
 be brave enough to face such dangers ; and I shall deliberately 
 incur the risk of losing the favor of both combatants by re- 
 fusing to take sides with either. To be positive is not to be 
 strong ; to be dogmatic is not to be brave. To be right is to 
 be both strong and brave. I have a fancy there is some merit 
 in keeping cool while others are excited. It is easier to go 
 with the crowd than to resist it. It pampers our indolence to 
 
18 LAW OF CONFLICT. 
 
 adopt opinions; but to form opinions is better. Wherever 
 conflict is possible, neither side has all the right, nor all the 
 virtue, nor all the truth. Perpetuated conflict implies imper- 
 ishable life and vigor on both sides of the line of battle. 
 Conflict imbittered, uncompromising and cruel, implies ex- 
 cited passions and judicial blindness. Conflict arises through 
 a law of existence as broad as society as broad as nature. 
 Progress is the issue of conflict, in every realm of being. 
 Truth is a structure reared only on the battle-field of contend- 
 ing forces. Conflict is universal. Conflict is beneficent. But 
 progress does not arise out of the extermination of one of the 
 conflicting elements, but out of an arbitration which negatives 
 extravagant claims, brings to light forgotten truths, and settles 
 the contending elements in a temporary equilibrium. The 
 " golden mean " is formed of the genuine metal. . The judicial 
 attitude is not the neutral or apathetic one. I fancy it is regal 
 honorable to the loftiest intellect congenial to the purest 
 conscience. 
 
 The great " conflict " of our day is between the claims of 
 the religious nature and those of the intellect. On one side is 
 consternation over the supposed encroachments of a hostile sci- 
 ence ; on the other, exultation over a deliverance from fancied 
 bondage to religious credulity. I shall attempt to show that 
 this consternation is unreasoning and groundless, and this ex- 
 ultation short-sighted and delirious. 
 
 Every student of the history of mental activity must have 
 observed that a similar .strife has been in existence ever since 
 the dawn of reflective thought. Could we penetrate the pre- 
 historic periods, I am confident it might be traced back to the 
 very cradle of humanity. The religious instincts and the know- 
 ing faculties have always regarded each other with jealous eyes. 
 I can not believe that this enduring conflict has no appointed 
 place in the beneficent economy of a superintending Intelli- 
 gence. I am persuaded it has a profound significance; and 
 
RELIGIOUS NATURE INNATE. 19 
 
 it must be that a discovery of it will promote the interests of 
 peace, comity, and truth. 
 
 A careful scrutiny of the real forces concerned in this secular 
 controversy shows them to be the religious instincts and percep- 
 tions, on the one hand, and the cognitive powers on the other. 
 Each has been resisting the supposed encroachments of the oth- 
 er ; and, in resisting, has carried its pretensions beyond its own 
 legitimate territory. I have said that conflict implies a living 
 principle arrayed on each side of the line of battle. I repeat 
 that here are two living forces, which must strive in vain to ex- 
 terminate each other, or even to deprive each other permanently 
 of any of their natural rights. Why, then, are they always at 
 war? 
 
 From time immemorial we have heard denials of the relig- 
 ious nature of man. On the one hand, it has been imagined 
 that the importance of Christianity would be aggrandized if it 
 should appear that for all religious knowledge the world is in- 
 debted to Jewish and Christian inspiration. It was not per- 
 ceived that the denial of man's religious intuitions is the ex- 
 tinction of all power of apprehending any divine revelation, or 
 becoming the recipient of religious instruction. On the other 
 hand, it has been thought that the importance of Christianity 
 would be diminished if it should appear that no preparation 
 for religious teaching had been made in the plan of human 
 nature. The belief has always been in existence, however, that 
 some form of religious endowment is the characteristic of hu- 
 manity, in all the conditions of its existence. This belief will 
 be found supported by a great amount and variety of evidence. 
 
 1. The universality of religious belief and practice among 
 all the peoples of the earth is a fact of the utmost significance. 
 Its importance is enhanced by the fact that it has been com- 
 bated by the most powerful intellects, and the strength of that 
 array of debasing passions whose interests are alien to all the 
 teachings of religion. 
 
20 SOURCES OF EVIDENCE. 
 
 2. The religious nature of man is demonstrated by the prev- 
 alence of vast religious systems, which have embraced among 
 their adherents four -fifths of all the populations which have 
 ever lived. 
 
 3. Man's religious nature is evinced by the fact that nearly 
 all the poetry of the world is a clear reflection of it ; while all 
 the philosophy r , either of ancient or modern times, has had for 
 its object to find out the nature of the First Cause, recognized 
 as the centre of all ethical aspirations and the ground of all eth- 
 ical obligations, or else to unfold the law and order existing in 
 the world as the ordination of the Supreme Will. The collisions 
 between philosophy and religion, either in ancient or modern 
 times, have not involved denials of divine existence and moral 
 relations, but only of a particular mode of relations between 
 God and the world, and between God and man. 
 
 4. Man's religious nature is demonstrated by the essentially 
 religious character of certain observances among all the savage 
 tribes of the world. It is here that misapprehensions have 
 arisen ; but I am prepared to assert, after due examination, that 
 there are not a dozen tribes in existence among whom may not 
 be detected some belief or sentiment of an essentially religious 
 character. It may be very unchristian in its mode of manifes- 
 tation, but it will be found based on a recognition, more or less 
 clear, of superior creative, controlling existence, to which man 
 owes some sort of allegiance. 
 
 5. The existence of a religious nature is indicated by certain 
 relics of prehistoric times, which, so far as we can judge, admit 
 of no other than a religious interpretation. Such relics reach 
 back to the remotest epoch of the Stone Age. 
 
 I must content myself with indicating these sources of evi- 
 dence respecting the innate character of our universal religious 
 sentiments. I desire next to remind you of the significance 
 of any faculty, sentiment, or susceptibility found to be implant- 
 ed in the very ground of our being. In the first place, it must 
 
AUTHORITY OF INTUITIONS. 21 
 
 be good. The whole tenor and purport of Nature's plans 
 teaches that the parts are adjusted for the mutual benefit of 
 each other. In the next place, it can not be illusory. There 
 is not an instance in nature of the existence of one correlate 
 and the non-existence of its fellow. The echo implies the real 
 voice. Religious longings imply the reality of their object, as 
 the power of vision implies things visible. Not even are the 
 brutal instincts deceptive. Gratification answers to desire. The 
 insect care which arranges food for offspring still in the egg, 
 and only to be developed months after the death of the moth- 
 er which arranges it, is no more exempt from deception than 
 humanity's longing for its God, or the individual's cry for di- 
 vine help. Once establish the innate character of a sentiment, 
 a belief, or intuition, and we trace in it a divine purpose, a di- 
 vine utterance. 
 
 But I dismiss also the discussion of this theme. I have 
 reached convictions, after much study ; and my immovable be- 
 lief has been a source of consolation and calm. I would ear- 
 nestly commend to every thinker the study of the evidence in 
 support of the existence and authority of innate sentiments, be- 
 liefs, and intuitions. 
 
 I must pass over, similarly, all discussion of the generaliza- 
 tions induced from the religious phenomena of our race. The 
 following are the grand facts common to the religious faiths of 
 the world : 
 
 1. A Supreme "R^'nor, t.Tn* Author of all things in existence. 
 
 2. AJReyelation of the Supreme Being, either in sensible 
 things or in the intelligence of inspired men. 
 
 3. A System of Worship which is either instinctive and 
 aimless, or intended to propitiate the Deity, and win happiness 
 for the worshiper. This worship consists in the uplifting of 
 devout thoughts, sacrifices, feasts, fasts, prostrations, genuflec- ' 
 tions, singing, dancing, crossing, and a great number of other 
 practices suited to the intellectual condition of the worshiper. 
 
22 UNIVERSAL EELIGIOUS CONSTANTS. 
 
 4. Prayer the universal cry of humanity in distress. 
 
 5. Future existence. 
 
 6. Moral responsibility. 
 
 7. A system of Future Kewards and Punishments. 
 
 8. A Priesthood, charged with the direction of religious cere- 
 monies, and clothed with a special investiture of divine author- 
 ity and power. 
 
 These facts I find to be the constants in the varying faiths 
 of mankind. I will add that two other facts reveal themselves 
 in most of the religious systems of the world both the great- 
 er and the less. These are, 1st. A belief in the efficacy of vi- 
 carious expiation ; 2d. An expectation of a Kedeemer. This is 
 hinted in the philosophical writings of Plato and the later Pla- 
 tonists ; and was a belief cherished by the Aztecs, as it is by 
 the Pueblos, Mojaves, and various other savage tribes. Faith 
 in a system of divine incarnations, also, is found disseminated 
 through the religions of India, China, Persia, Egypt, and an- 
 cient Greece and Rome. 
 
 I maintain, from such evidence as I have referred to, that 
 man is endowed with an innate religious nature, which express- 
 es itself universally in a system of outward manifestations. 
 The discussion which I have in view requires that I should 
 point out precisely as possible what this religious nature is. I 
 shall aim to set it in antithesis with the cognitive powers. 
 That their true relations are antithetical is proved by the chron- 
 ic antagonism which they display. 
 
 Should we assert that the religious faculty of man is that 
 which recognizes divine existence, and recognizes religious and 
 moral obligations growing out of human relations to divine ex- 
 istence, we should furnish a current definition, but I think we 
 should fail to discriminate between that which is simply and 
 exclusively ethical and that which falls within the province of 
 the knowing faculties. Recognition implies cognition and re- 
 flection. These belong to the other term of the antithesis. 
 
RELIGIOUS FACULTY DEFINED. 23 . 
 
 Should we assert that the religious faculty is that which feels 
 the reality of the divine the reality of a standard of right, and 
 the duty to conform to it, it might be objected that we rele- 
 gate religion wholly to the realm of feeling, and thus throw re- 
 proach upon its character. Still, I might remind you that a 
 percipient element exists in all feeling, as well as a sensational 
 ^element in all cognition. When the lowest savage feels a mere 
 sentiment of the supernatural, he has, in truth, a species of cog- 
 nition of Deity ; and when he feels an impulse to refrain from 
 the commission of an atrocious deed, he must possess a percep- 
 tion of the principle of right and the law of duty. Thus, when 
 I speak of the feeling of the reality of divine existence, I in- 
 close in the expression that kind and degree of apperception 
 which are implied in all feeling. 
 
 This, however, it must be admitted, is not that clear cogni- 
 tion which belongs to the domain of the intellect, which appro- 
 priates the facts of the external world, and the inner realm of 
 consciousness ; which seizes and interprets the intelligible man- 
 ifestations of Deity, discusses the ground of moral obligation, 
 and weighs the circumstances which enter into the solution of 
 a moral problem. And yet, so far as I can discern, the essen- 
 tial nature of man's religious endowment must be differentiated 
 from this higher cognition. This determination, I think it will 
 appear, exalts the character of religion, exonerates it from a 
 multitude of reproaches, and places it in the position of a con- 
 trolling or motive power in- relation to the intellect. The cog- 
 nitive faculties bring us into intelligent relations to the cosmos 
 and all knowable existence ; the religious faculties prompt to 
 the search after the Author of the cosmos, and the discovery 
 of the relations of visible to invisible existence ; they thus 
 reach out beyond the sensible and the fleeting, and through 
 their instrument, intellect, take hold on absolute reality, endur- 
 ing relations, and future life. 
 
 Conscience, which. belongs to the group of ethical feelings, is 
 
 2 
 
24 CONSCIENCE DEFINED. 
 
 frequently treated as the faculty of -moral cognition. Greatly 
 as it would please me to fall in with this idea, I feel compelled 
 to deny to conscience proper the power of discrimination. Dis- 
 crimination is the judgment that two things cognized are dif- 
 ferent or incompatible. Now, if cognition and judgment be- 
 long to conscience, we must cease throwing the intellectual and 
 the moral powers into different categories. We must admit 
 that power of conscience is measured by strength of intellect. 
 Conscience, I must maintain, is a feeling of the existence of a 
 standard of right, and an accompanying impulse to bring the 
 actions into conformity to the standard. But conscience does 
 not discern that standard. Discernment is an attribute of in- 
 tellect. Intellect is fallible. Accordingly, the practical stand- 
 ard of one man or one tribe may not be the practical standard 
 of another. But conscience is true to its rule. Whatever is 
 set up as the standard of right, conscience whips its possessor 
 into submission. 
 
 We may confuse the subject by speaking of " moral judg- 
 ments." This expression, however, can only mean a judgment 
 upon a question of right and wrong. If we think conscience 
 pronounces this judgment, we deceive ourselves. The moral 
 criterion is not discovered by conscience, nor cognized by con- 
 science. It is discovered by the reason of humanity, and cog- 
 nized by the intellect of the individual. We are not to sup- 
 pose that this deprives us of fixed standards of morality. The 
 voice of humanity gives a consistent utterance. On the funda- 
 mental moral and religious questions it never contradicts itself. 
 It is true, that among some of the most degraded tribes, eth- 
 ical standards are but dimly discerned. Even religious percep- 
 tions may be clearer. The conscientious impulse, also, is cor- 
 respondingly feeble. But Livingstone tells us that among the 
 Hottentots, whose moral perceptions that is, whose percep- 
 tions of the data of moral determinations were exceedingly 
 perverted, there was still a confession that they really under- 
 
CONSCIENCE DISCRIMINATED. 25 
 
 
 
 stood the right as white men understood it, and had never en- 
 tertained different views on those subjects. 
 
 It is obvious that conscience, in the restricted sense, acts 
 only in correlation with other powers of the soul. The reason 
 of humanity recognizes certain necessary and infallible stand- 
 ards of right and wrong. The understanding apprehends rela- 
 tions subsisting between certain acts and these standards, and 
 the judgment affirms a compatibility or incompatibility. Now, 
 the conscience, in its essential character, becomes a wakened 
 sensibility, inflicting pain in case of an incompatibility, and 
 awaking pleasure if the contemplated act conform to the stand- 
 ard of right recognized in the reason. Now, we may style the 
 whole of this complex operation an act of the conscience ; but 
 if so, conscience means, not only a moral sensibility, but also 
 the set of mental activities concerned in the excitement of that 
 sensibility ; and then, for the moral sensibility the only thing 
 which is sui generis in the whole series of acts we have no 
 name whatever. I prefer to restrict the term conscience to the 
 moral element of a moral judgment. 
 
 Conscience is a constituent of the religious nature of man. 
 There can be no religious nature without a conscience; but 
 conscience in itself does not rise to God. There is a theistic 
 intuition dwelling in the soul, and there are theistic judgments 
 deduced from the myriad phenomena which surround us in nat- 
 ure, and arise within the field of the moral consciousness. It 
 is thus that the being of God stands revealed to us. All men 
 acknowledge it ; all men instinctively feel that they stand in 
 relations of dependence and obligation toward that being. 
 This intuition or feeling of God, and this sense of certain re- 
 lations toward him this is the essence of the universal relig- 
 ion. Conscience, the companion feeling, prompts to a dis- 
 charge of duty toward God, as well as toward man. This body 
 of feelings makes up all that is peculiar in the religious nature 
 of man. How infinitely less than a conflict between science 
 
26 RELIGION PRECEDES SCIENCE. 
 
 and this religion are the narrow contests that have been waged 
 over such dogmas as consubstantiation, the geocentric theory 
 in astronomy, the non-existence of other habitable worlds, the 
 immaculate character of the- sun's face, or the scholastic sub- 
 tleties of homoousianism, homoiousianism, and heterousianism ! 
 
 The religious feelings sway the life of man with transcend- 
 ent potency. Until the reflective intellect has been brought 
 into active and continued exercise, they dominate all his judg- 
 ments and all his acts. The earliest and strongest beliefs of the 
 race are religious ones. The agency of the Unseen Power is 
 recognized in every striking or inexplicable phenomenon ; and 
 it is the nature of the religious sentiments to find gratification 
 in every recognition of the presence of their object. An invis- 
 ible spirit broods in the midnight sky, smiles in the life-inspir- 
 ing sun, frowns in the dark mountain cliff, or rages in the tem- 
 pest of lightning and wind. 
 
 The development of habits of closer observation and reflec- 
 tion is accompanied by the discovery of certain invariable se- 
 quences in the order of physical phenomena. The necessary 
 idea of cause, dwelling in the mind, suggests the existence of a 
 causal relation subsisting between the terms of an invariable se- 
 quence. Certain events which, under the influence of the same 
 idea, had been attributed to the direct causation of the Unseen 
 Power, also revealed in the intuitive consciousness, are now ac- 
 cepted as the result of physical causes. This is the first step 
 in the road to science. The very first effort at reasoning upon 
 scientific data, therefore, deprives the religious nature of one of 
 its occasions to recognize the presence of its God. The relig- 
 ious sensibility surrenders this gratification reluctantly and com- 
 plainingly. It is easy to understand that those individuals in 
 whom intellect is most active, and those in whom the religious 
 sensibility is least susceptible, would be the first to take these 
 infantile steps in science. It is easy to understand that those 
 with intellects less exercised, or religious natures more quick- 
 
HOW CONFLICT AXISES. 27 
 
 ened, would look with a feeling of displeasure, or even of sharp 
 dissent, upon the opinions and consequent practices of their 
 neighbors. The murmur of heresy must have arisen while yet 
 our race was in its Oriental cradle. 
 
 But divine causation, thus far, would be removed but one 
 step from visible phenomenon. The soul of man would still 
 recognize divinity in the physical cause occupying the place of 
 invariable antecedent. With the progress of intellect, however, 
 this would be revealed as the invariable sequent of some other 
 physical antecedent; and some of the extraordinary and more 
 striking of nature's phenomena would also be traced to their 
 true physical causes. Religious faith, in the mean time, would 
 cling to its cherished objects ; and the strife with progressive 
 and iconoclastic intellect would be perpetuated. 
 
 Thus, step by step, religious faith, which casts its hallowing 
 mantle over everv object upon which it fixes, finds itself com- 
 pelled to recede farther and farther into the realm of things 
 and agencies unseen and mysterious ; privileged to hug and to 
 venerate only that which abides in the obscu^t^ far tVm tim^ 
 being unpierced by the rays of science. Its sacred things are 
 torn from it, vulgarized and bandied about from crucible to rc- 
 tort, till the divinity which was in them escapes in p^as, or steam r 
 or electricity. It is intelligible that religious faith, which seeks 
 only real divinity, should become jealous of science,, which cares 
 only for the reality of divinity. Faith is a blind love, and asks 
 no questions about fV worth of its object. Intellect, - q11 P Y P T 
 and has no heart to be touched bv the sorrows of a l^jphtf^ nf - 
 fection. So Faith recedes ? pierced with regrets, suffused with 
 tears ? sometimes with stubborn resistance, sometimes after a bit- 
 ter and prolonged conflicjb. 
 
 But Faith stands true to her God. She never, for a moment, 
 doubts that divinity abides immediately behind the veil. She 
 never falters in her veneration for the things still left to her 
 as revelations of the divine. Disappointed again and again by 
 
28 THE CENTRAL FAITH SECURE. 
 
 the substitution of physical causation for her supposed divinity, 
 she feels that divinity certainly exists, and that divinity must be 
 revealed in the world. Nor does science seek to strike a blow 
 at this central assurance. Keen as its vision may be, uncom- 
 promising as its methods are, its aim is truth ; and as no proof 
 has been found of the unreality of the divine, whose image is 
 mirrored in the universal consciousness, the voice of science has 
 never been heard disputing its dominion in the world. On the 
 contrary, philosophy, which builds upon the data disclosed by 
 science, has always started out with the divine existence as its 
 postulate, and has expended its loftiest efforts in seeking for 
 the mode of that existence, and the nature of its relations to 
 man and the world. 
 
 In saying this, I hold science and philosophy irresponsible 
 for the indiscretions of some of their devotees. The great ca- 
 lamities of the world have proceeded from the passion or mis- 
 judgment of individuals. It must be admitted that individuals 
 from the ranks of science and philosophy, with the perversity 
 and blindness of madmen, have, at intervals, dared to ignore 
 the divinity whose voice, even in their own hearts, they could 
 not silence, and have attempted to rob religious faith complete- 
 ly of its object. Exasperated by the faithful lash of conscience, 
 the wicked heart has sometimes driven the intellect to make 
 the rash and fatal declaration that there is no .God, no future, 
 no moral tribunal ; but the offended and indignant conscience 
 of the nations has rung out its withering reprobation of the 
 blasphemy, and the balance of rights has been momentarily 
 restored. 
 
 Religious faith, I have said, hallows and sanctifies all that it 
 can appropriate. This is its nature ; this is its excellence. Its 
 essential attitude is to assume the sacredness of divinity cloth- 
 ing every object, every event, every established belief. So far 
 as concerns religious faith in its pure simplicity, every thing 
 exists in direct relation to God. There is no system but relig- 
 
THE CREED REFORMED. 29 
 
 ion. There is no knowledge which is not a part of its theolo- 
 gy. There is no accepted belief which is not incorporated into 
 its confession. There is nothing secular. Accordingly, when 
 intellect, in the course of time, has attained to certain explana- 
 tions of physical phenomena, albeit under the perpetual protest 
 of the religious feelings, these feelings, submitting at length, 
 immediately incorporate the new beliefs in the religious creed, 
 and sprinkle the incongruous mass with holy water. Eeligious 
 faith now discovers, or thinks it discovers, new demonstrations 
 of divine agency in the natural world, and new corroborations 
 of the various articles of its creed. 
 
 Meantime science marches onward. (*) It is the law of intel- 
 lect to accumulate daily something new, and to rise daily to a 
 higher plane of observation. This is the excellence of intellect. 
 Intellect pioneers ; intellect piles up her accumulations. Faith 
 conserves and sanctifies what intellect gives her. It is not her 
 office to scrutinize, and assort the true and the false. The dis- 
 appointment and grief of Faith arise from the unreality and 
 worthlessness of much which she receives from the hands of 
 science. Science is an indefatigable reaper; but how many 
 tares do we find bound up with the wheat ! How many ex- 
 ploded theories have left their wrecks along the highway of 
 
 ( J ) "Faith is in its nature unchangeable, stationary. Science is in its 
 nature progressive ; and eventually a divergence between them, impossi- 
 ble to conceal, must take place. It then becomes the duty of those whose 
 lives have made them familiar with both modes of thought to present 
 modestly, but firmly, their views ; to compare the antagonistic pretensions 
 calmly, impartially, philosophically " (Draper, " Conflict of Science and Re- 
 ligion," Preface, p. vii.). But, earlier than Draper, the same ideas were set 
 forth by an English writer of great learning and ability. "Christianity," 
 he says, " being stationary and authoritative, thought progressive and in- 
 dependent, the causes which stimulate the restlessness of the latter inter- 
 rupt the harmony which ordinarily exists between belief and knowledge, 
 and produce crises, during which religion is re-examined " (Farrar, "A Crit- 
 ical History of Free Thought," p. 12). 
 
30 RUBBISH IN CREEDS. 
 
 time ! How many abandoned explanations and beliefs lie scat- 
 tered by the way-side ! These all have been the sacred vessels 
 of religious faith. Every fragment of these exploded systems 
 exhales the perfume of sanctifying incense. Nay, every wreath 
 of incense which has ascended from them -hollow and false 
 as these systems were has testified to Heaven the fidelity of 
 faith, and proclaimed to man the reality of its object. 
 
 Faith has been doomed a hundred times to pluck out the ef- 
 fete constituents of her creed. This is no more true in Chris- 
 tian countries than in those swayed by Pthah, Brahma, Bud- 
 dha, or Zoroaster, Jove or Mohammed. Faith has never yet 
 been able to refrain from incorporating in her creed current 
 beliefs of an extraneous and necessarily evanescent character. 
 These have embraced contemporary opinions on the institutions 
 of society, on the origin and rights of government, on the fig- 
 ure and age of the earth, on its relation to the heavenly bodies, 
 on the number of planets, and a hundred other subjects which 
 it is the rightful province .of science to investigate and deter- 
 mine, but about which faith is wisely created absolutely blind. 
 How often has faith, rasher than the atheism of science, staked 
 the credibility of her entire system upon the truth of an opin- 
 ion liable to be falsified by the discovery of a fossil bone, or by 
 the color of the solution in a test-tube !(*) 
 
 The gravest consequences to the interests of religious faith 
 have arisen from her devotion to effete dogmas of science long 
 
 (') "All religious theories, schemes, and systems," says Tyndall, with a 
 truthfulness which can not be gainsaid, " which embrace notions of cos- 
 mogony, or which otherwise reach into the domain of science, must, in 
 so far as they do this, submit to the control of science, and relinquish all 
 thought of controlling it " (" Belfast Address," Appletons' ed., p. 94). And, 
 again, " The facts of religious feeling are as certain to me as the facts of 
 physics. But the world, I hold, will have to distinguish between the feel- 
 ing and its forms, and to vary the latter in accordance with the intellect- 
 ual condition of the age " (Ibid., Preface, p. xxxiv.). 
 
CRUDITIES PURGED OUT. 31 
 
 supposed to be inculcated by texts of revelation. Here the au- 
 thority of Scripture was added to the sanction of faith's accept- 
 ance and adoption ; and the struggle to supersede the error was 
 correspondingly stubborn and acrimonious. Interpretations of 
 Scripture long suited to current apprehensions of natural phe- 
 nomcna have been unwisely insisted upon, long after science 
 had rendered her final verdict. The inexpediency of hazarding 
 the credibility of a pretended revelation on the truth of an opin- 
 ion not demonstrated true, is something which seems to me 
 self-evident; but the Church has had the infatuation to run 
 that hazard in a score of cases where the opinion was not even 
 presumptively true nay, where it had been already demonstra- 
 ted untrue as if she had madly resolved to commit the crime 
 of felo-de-se. But yet revelation stands; and religious faith re- 
 mains as deeply rooted as ever. Could there be a stronger 
 proof of the indestructibility of both ? The religious system, 
 invincible to the assaults of its enemies, has withstood equally 
 the suicidal daggers of its friends. 
 
 But religious faith, sooner or later, has receded from most of 
 its preposterous claims. Loaded and encumbered as it has 
 been by the debris of exploded science or effete philosophy, or 
 stale ecclesiasticism, or conventional dogmas, or absurd ceremo- 
 nials, or preposterous assumptions, or heathenish superstitions, 
 it has had to undergo many mortifications, many ablutions, many 
 rehabilitations ; and it comes now out of the conflicts of the 
 ages unchanged in its fidelity to God and duty, possessed of all 
 the fervor of its youth animating the sturdy strength of its 
 maturity, and clothed in cleaner and purer accessories of invest- 
 iture than it has ever possessed in all the history of our race. 
 
 It appears from a cursory acquaintance with the facts, that 
 faith and science have lived in perpetual strife. Faith has been 
 wont to appropriate whatever has fallen within her reach, and 
 science has declared, from time to time, that certain of her 
 claims were indefensible; and she has been compelled to re- 
 
 2* 
 
32 ACTION AND REACTION. 
 
 cede. Now, intellect, in the flush of victory, has pushed its an- 
 tagonist to the verge of tyranny, and the religious instincts 
 have revolted and regained their rights. Now, in turn, relig- 
 ious faith has maintained an ascendency over human opinion, 
 and has even given laws to science and philosophy. Such an 
 invasion of its dominion the intellect could not long endure. 
 Arising in the majesty of truth and justice, it has asserted its 
 freedom, broken its fetters, and, in turn, made reprisals upon 
 the religious system. The fortunes of the day have oscillated 
 like the swing of a pendulum, or the ebb and flow of the tide. 
 Sometimes the religious system has yielded to slow and steady 
 encroachments, until intellect assumed the airs of arrogance, 
 and loud assertions were sent forth that religion was a supersti- 
 tion, and faith was fed only by fables. Then, from SUCQ an ex- 
 treme of irreligion, the popular mind would swing back with a 
 revulsion, as it had, at other times, from the opposite extreme. 
 All this will be illustrated by a review of the facts of history, 
 which I hope to present in a subsequent lecture. 
 ^.^^ From our stand-point, it seems to me that these phenomena 
 are explicable without disparagement to the character either of 
 intellect or faith. The conflict exists between the conservatism 
 of faith and the progressiveness of intellect. It is the nature 
 of religion to be invariable, and this central character is trans- 
 ferred to all the accessories of the religious system. Religion 
 is based on the being and attributes of an unchanging Deity, 
 and the dominion ofunchanging principles. It implies that its 
 world of surroundings is unchanging, eternal, and divine. It is 
 no reproach to the religious sentiment that it can not discrimi- 
 nate between that which is fixed and true, and that which is 
 fleeting and false. If it had the power to make these discern- 
 ments, it would be intellect, and not religious sentiment. Intel- 
 lect is its eye it needs no other. If intellect proves an unre- 
 liable witness to the truth, faith shows its fidelity to its mission 
 by embracing the true and the false with impartial tenderness. 
 
AGGRESSIVE FAITH CONDITIONS PROGRESS. 33 
 
 It is the office of intellect to discover the truth, and vouch for 
 it to the other departments of the soul the religious, the aes- 
 thetic, and the pathematic. If intellect sometimes errs in the 
 interpretation of phenomena and the induction of general prin- 
 ciples, this is no reproach, since the penetration of the human 
 intellect is finite, and its utterances must be fallible. It still re- 
 mains loyal to truth. It seeks, also, to retrieve its errors, and, 
 though consecrated by a misled devotion, banish them from ex- 
 istence. The conflict, in truth, exists between new science and 
 the old ; and the only concern of faith in the controversy is to 
 prompt the old to resistance. 
 
 We may conceive of conditions under which this conflict 
 would never arise. Were the religious nature so constituted as 
 to content itself with appropriating only the central truths of 
 the religious system, science and philosophy, which recognize 
 these, would never attempt to drive faith from its positions. 
 The fact is otherwise, and this reveals the cause of the secu- 
 lar conflict. We can easily understand the reason why the fact 
 is as it is at least one of the reasons. Were the religious 
 nature content to hold fast simply the essential fact$ of relig- 
 ion, the proud and unmolested intellect, going on from con- 
 quest to conquest, would assume a dominating attitude. The 
 ethical perceptions and sentiments, though gifted with an un- 
 dying vitality, would exert but little influence over the lives of 
 men. This subjugation would be aided by the alliance of the 
 grosser passions of mankind. The name of God would be \ 
 almost forgotten, and his commandments be quite unheeded. ' 
 The law of might would assert supremacy among men ; civil- 
 ization would be strangled in its cradle ; the means and instru- 
 ments of intellectual culture would not be created, and the ex- 
 altation of man even of the intellect of man would be an 
 impossibility. As we understand the moral government under 
 which we live, it contemplates a perpetuated and vivid remem- 
 brance of God ; a perpetual communion with the spirit of God, 
 
34 PROGRESS THROUGH ANTAGONISM. 
 
 and a sensitive respect for the law of God. In view of the in- 
 tellectual and passional constitution of man's nature, it is need- 
 ful that the claims of God be frequently and vigorously assert- 
 ed to accomplish the purpose of his government over us. It is 
 necessary that those claims be made obtrusive and encroaching. 
 Thus the other powers are aroused, and the knowledge of God 
 and his law is kept alive in the soul. Thus, a living, grasping, 
 encroaching, religious consciousness is the condition of intel- 
 lectual and social advancement.^) Thus, even religious super- 
 stition and ecclesiastical tyranny, so generally deplored as the 
 mediaeval impediments to the march of civilization, may be, in 
 reality, the providential means of conserving the only condi- 
 tions which render human progress possible. 
 
 In the light of these considerations, we shall not contemplate 
 this conflict as a war of extermination. It is only a grand ex- 
 ample of progress through antagonism. It is subordinated to 
 the universal economy of God, exemplified in nature, in mor- 
 ds, and in individual experience. There is no excellence which 
 has not had a conflict, no virtue without temptation, no heav- 
 enly joy without a taste of earthly sorrow. In nature, the 
 law of antagonism rules everywhere. Attraction contends with 
 repulsion ; rarefaction, with condensation ; evaporation, with 
 precipitation ; centripetal force, with centrifugal force. The 
 whole cosmos is merely a panorama of the phenomena of a 
 transitory conflict between opposites struggling into a state of 
 ultimate rest. The attacks and reprisals of the religious and 
 intellectual forces are but a particular instance of the general 
 law. I prefer to regard these movements simply as the normal 
 action and reaction of moral forces, rather than a case of ab- 
 normal warfare. Instead of the conflict of religion and science, 
 I should prefer to speak of the interaction of the religious and 
 
 ( ! ) " Nations plunged in the abyss of irreligion must necessarily be na- 
 tions in anarchy " (Draper, " Intellectual Development of Europe," p. 103). 
 
ALLIANCE OF PASSIONS. 35 
 
 intellectual faculties. I deplore the view that this is a war in 
 which one of the combatants has no rights. I deplore the 
 spirit which seeks to put faith and science in deadly antago- 
 nism. This is a weakness of which representatives of both in- 
 terests must plead guilty. I deplore the spirit which continu- 
 ally represents religion as a superstition ; providential care as 
 the reign of arbitrary will, caprice, and disorder; law as ex- 
 cluding providence ; and creation as the " carpenter theory " of 
 existence. 
 
 Religion has always been compelled to wage a warfare of 
 quite another kind. The passions of men, not satisfied with 
 their legitimate gratification, clamor always for excessive indul- 
 gence. This demand is in sharp collision with the law' of the 
 religious nature, which, accordingly, offers unceasing resistance. 
 Naturally the repulses of faith at the hands of science have 
 brought cheer to the baser nature of man ; and naturally, too, 
 the baser nature has sometimes availed itself of the ascendency 
 of religious faith to bribe the spiritual power to serve its base 
 purposes. But the prostitution of faith is exceptional, and in- 
 tellect has never had fellowship with the vice which exults in 
 its victories. The final cause of the hostility of religion to 
 vice is easy to discover. Vice not only antagonizes the moral 
 law revealed in the soul, but its influence upon the individual 
 and upon society is fatal to all those ends involved in social 
 and intellectual elevation. 
 
 The conflict of religion with the evil passions of men has 
 engendered a special scries of oscillations in the fortunes of re- 
 ligion. Relapses from a condition of religious activity have 
 resulted, sometimes, from the steady seductive influence of the 
 baser nature, as well as from the quickened activity of intel- 
 lect, or its actual encroachments. Then the voice of the re- 
 former would be raised on high, and the universal conscience 
 would cry out in response. These have been occasions for the 
 rapid strengthening of the religious system sometimes for the 
 
36 PASSIONS DIRECTING POWER. 
 
 establishment of a spiritual tyranny, which, in turn, has pro- 
 voked intellect to manly resistance. The part which has been 
 performed by each of these antagonists of religious faith will 
 appear as we shall glance over the records of history. 
 
 If the sharp interaction of the religious and the intellectual 
 forces is the order of nature and of Providence, it is needful 
 and beneficent. We have nothing to fear from it, and may 
 calmly and confidently contemplate the progress of events and 
 anticipate the issue. There is no need of fear for the interests 
 of religion. All we have to fear is the evil to which human 
 passions may prompt. Ambition, and love of power, and sen- 
 suous gratifications, more than zeal for the faith, may nerve 
 the arm which rivets the fetters of an ecclesiastical despotism. 
 Pride of intellect or a vindictive disposition may prompt the 
 representative of science to affect an unconcern about religious 
 questions ; to feign a belief that Deity and his purposes must 
 remain unknowable, or even to oppress with ridicule and scorn 
 the character which remains faithful to the religious prompt- 
 ings of human nature. Our solicitude may be usefully turned 
 to the arrest of such encroachments upon the mutual liberties 
 and rights of the parties to this strife. 
 
 The results of the interaction of these forces are written upon 
 the pages of the religious history of our race. Whatever may 
 be the beneficent influences of the vital activities of the relig- 
 ious instincts upon the fortunes of intellectual progress, it is 
 apparent that the religious system, under the pruning and re- 
 straints of the cognitive faculty, has undergone a gradual ad- 
 vance.^) The proposition does not imply a progressive im- 
 provement or perfection of the religious nature. This is no 
 
 (') "Disorganization is the temporary result; theological advance the 
 subsequent. Whatever is evil is eliminated in the conflict ; whatever is 
 good is retained. Under the overruling of a beneficent Providence, antag- 
 onism is made the law of human progress " (Farrar, " A Critical History 
 of Free Thought," p. 12). 
 
RELIGIOUS CONSTANTS AND VARIABLES. 37 
 
 truer to the great realities which it represents in an age of civ- 
 ilization than in an age of barbarism. The progress consists in 
 a gradual excision of crudities, excesses, and meaningless ac- 
 cessories. The religious nature is a blind instinct feeling for 
 its object. It is an infant crying in the night for its food. It 
 accepts whatever the intelligence offers as real and true, and 
 consecrates it as the objective revelation of real divinity. The 
 body of accessory beliefs accepted at any particular period, ac- 
 creted around the central facts of religion, constitute, for the 
 time, the religious system. With the enlargement of the in- 
 tellectual horizon, the cruder accessories become eliminated. 
 The religious system always consists, therefore, of constants 
 and variables. Progress is incident only to the variable factor. 
 This is the human and finite and imperfect element of religion. 
 The constant factor is an eternal truth, resting on the Rock of 
 Ages. This is the infinite and perfect and unchanging element 
 in religion. The variable factor represents weak, struggling, 
 aspiring humanity ; the constant factor, the eternal All - suffi- 
 ciency. The former is practical or actual religion ; the latter 
 is the absolute or ideal religion. The former is the nearest ap- 
 proach which feeble humanity has been able to make toward 
 its perfect standard ; the latter is the perfect standard to which 
 humanity aspires. 
 
 In the infancy of intellect, the religious system is encumber- 
 ed by an environment of grossest crudities. Every motion in 
 nature reveals the agency of the supernatural. Every object is 
 the shrine of divinity. Benignant spirits award success in hunt- 
 ing or in war, while sickness and misfortune are the visitations 
 of malignant ones. These are propitiated and appeased by 
 dances, bowlings, brutal sacrifices, and sometimes beastly orgies. 
 This is the stage of Fetichism. The next stage in advance may 
 be styled Totemism. The intellectual mists have lifted from 
 the ground, and common things are discerned in their natural 
 relations. But supernaturalism reigns in all the realm above 
 
38 GROWTH OF RELIGIONS. 
 
 commonplace. The cataract thunders the power and majesty 
 of the Invisible ; the tempest is a paroxysm of divine rage ; the 
 foliage of the breezy forest hums the melodies of unseen sprites ; 
 and the rippling stream, as it floats the solemn worshiper in his 
 rude canoe, murmurs a spirit lullaby. With the further advance 
 of knowledge, divinity seems retired into the grand and myste- 
 rious abodes of nature. The mountains, with their serene and 
 inaccessible summits, are the homes of divinity ; or the sky 
 spreads a brazen floor in the court of the celestials, and the stars 
 beam with the radiance of divine intelligence. This may be 
 styled the stage of Shamanism. The system known as Magi- 
 anism is scarcely more advanced, but its worship recognizes a 
 more limited number of divine abodes or manifestations. The 
 elements permeate and constitute and dominate nature, and are 
 the fittest representatives of the All-powerful and All-pervading. 
 The sun is justly regarded as the great life-giving and control- 
 ling agent of the natural world ; and fire, its essential character- 
 istic, becomes the representative of the sun and the emblem of 
 the Supreme Efficiency. The Anthropomorphic stage may be 
 the next in advance. The intellect has discovered that thought 
 and purpose are not the attributes of inanimate objects. The 
 Being who plans and executes and ordains in the cosmic realm 
 must possess a nature akin to that which plans and wills in hu- 
 man affairs. The Deity must be an intelligence. Human in 
 his spiritual attributes, the groping intellect could scarcely es- 
 cape the assignment of human shape and human passions. 
 Higher attainments of reflective thought, however, would re- 
 veal the fact that bodily form is the accident of humanity ; that 
 it implies limitation and dependence. The Infinite Reason must 
 be incorporeal, without parts and without locality. This is 
 the stage of pure Spiritualism, which we have reached. Its 
 morning rays have illuminated the loftiest peaks of human spec- 
 ulation in ages surprisingly remote, and in nations unexpected- 
 ly separate. Yet the difficulty of a purely spiritual conception 
 
ANTHROPOMORPHISM INEVITABLE. 39 
 
 of God is so great that anthropomorphism has pervaded most 
 of the religious systems of the world, and even taints the purest 
 and best of the present age. We are not casting a taunt at any 
 system of religion in saying that it is adulterated with anthro- 
 pomorphism. It could not be otherwise. This is the ordina- 
 tion of Heaven, and is pleasing to Heaven ; just as the weak- 
 ness and shapelessness of the embryo are involved in the plan of 
 creation the very index and condition of progress the clear 
 promise of coming perfection. In anthropomorphism man con- 
 fers upon his God the highest attributes and the loftiest char- 
 acter of which he has any conception ; and if, on attaining the 
 stage of a pure spiritualism, he retains anthropomorphic and 
 anthropopathic images, symbols, and forms of speech, they serve 
 merely as a scaffolding over which his feeble thought climbs to 
 the lofty and dazzling and adorable truth. 
 
 Religious systems have changed, but religion remains as 
 changeless as the being of God. Religious systems have be- 
 come extinct ; but, like the integuments of the chrysalis, they 
 have infolded a living germ, the law of whose development 
 implies the casting -off of its effete accessories. The human 
 intellect has marched onward, unconsciously and unintentional- 
 ly purifying and spiritualizing the religious system ; while the 
 religious nature, perfect from the first, has yielded timidly and 
 reluctantly to the processes which have promoted the unpre- 
 meditated progress of the religious system. A progress unpre- 
 meditated by both of the agencies which have contributed to 
 its realization must be providential. In asserting that intel- 
 lect has not purposed the advancement of religion, I allude, of 
 course, to the purely secular nature of the search for truth 
 which is the office of intellect. If intellect search for the truth 
 respecting God, or duty, or future life, this manifests no relig- 
 ious character in intellect. The religious nature may appropri- 
 ate the results reached ; it may even prompt intellect, as it oft- 
 en does, to engage in researches which will yield religious fruit ; 
 
40 RELIGION SERVED BY INTELLECT. 
 
 nay, more, and finally, there is no truth attainable by intellect 
 which is not available to the religious nature ; there is no truth 
 which the religious nature can afford to despise ; and I venture 
 to utter a proposition which brings us back to the simple, di- 
 rect, and primitive faith of humanity : there is no truth which 
 is not an immediate reflection and revelation of God. 
 
 The service which intellect, under the promptings of religious 
 instinct, can render to the religious system will be indicated 
 in later lectures of this course. In the present lecture I have 
 enunciated general truths relating to the necessary interaction 
 of the religious and the intellectual faculties. These truths 
 may be regarded as deduced from the necessary laws of the 
 human mind ; but they must be amply exemplified in the his- 
 tory of the world : and I shall devote the next two lectures to 
 a rapid historical sketch of the so-called " conflicts " of religion 
 and science. I do this not only to present an inductive basis 
 for the generalizations already brought forward, but because 
 these conflicts have been unjustly made a ground of accusa- 
 tion against religion as the foe of science and of the civiliza- 
 tion which runs parallel with it. 
 
II. 
 
 INTERACTION OF THE RELIGIOUS AND THE INTELLECTUAL 
 
 FACULTIES IN ORIENTAL AND GRECIAN 
 
 PSYCHIC HISTORY. 
 
 I HAVE attempted to show that the essential natures of the 
 religious and the intellectual forces in man foreordain a species 
 of antagonism ; that this perpetual antagonism is not, neverthe- 
 less, an abnormal condition, but a grand example of the univers- 
 al economy of God, who has ordained antagonism as the con- 
 dition of progress in the natural and the moral worlds. I have 
 deduced from the necessary relation of the ethical and cognitive 
 powers a necessary series of oscillations in the relative domi- 
 nance of religious and intellectual influences in the lives of men ; 
 and have indicated that the exponent of these oscillations has 
 been, as it must be, a series of alternating periods of religious 
 and of intellectual activity and progress. Such alternations, 
 since the antagonizing forces belong to humanity as such, must 
 characterize the history of all nations, all races, and all times. 
 
 The present lecture will aim to show that the facts of the 
 religious and intellectual history of the human race illustrate 
 and confirm these deductions, and become, in reality, a broad 
 inductive basis on which these propositions may be rested as 
 valid generalizations. A prolonged and attentive study of the 
 facts which make up the religious and intellectual history of 
 our race has caused my attention to be directed to the follow- 
 ing facts subsidiary to the general inductions: 1. Religious 
 faith recedes from its normal condition to one of abnormal sub- 
 ordination, or advances to one of abnormal supremacy. 2. In- 
 tellect, from its normal condition, either advances to a haughty 
 
42 LAWS OF INTERACTION. 
 
 dictatorship, or falls into a condition of servitude. 3. These 
 movements of faith and intellect are reciprocal and responsive. 
 4. The direction of the movement is determined by the initia- 
 tive : if faith lead in activity, a religious phase succeeds ; if in- 
 tellect take precedence, religious pretensions shrink, and an in- 
 tellectual phase succeeds.. The two phases complete a psychic 
 cycle. 
 
 I proceed now to enunciate in advance the general principles 
 induced from a study of the facts of human history. 
 
 LAWS OF THE INTERACTION OF FAITH AND INTELLECT. 
 
 I. ABNORMAL STATES OF FAITH. 
 
 1. The abnormal states of Faith are insensibility, debility, 
 and overactivity. 
 
 II. THEIR CAUSES. 
 
 2. Moral insensibility results from the supremacy of evil 
 passions. This condition is not directly concerned in the in- 
 teraction of the religious and intellectual faculties. 
 
 3. The state of debility (disregarding moral causes) results 
 from intellectual encroachments. 
 
 4. The state of overactivity results from aggrandizements se- 
 cured through political power, or perhaps, sometimes, through 
 intellectual indolence. 
 
 III. RECIPROCAL MOVEMENTS OF FAITH AND INTELLECT. 
 (a) Toward the Norm. 
 
 5. From a state of debility, the moral norm is regained by a 
 moral reaction or revulsion arising in the religious nature. The 
 process is a moral revival. Concomitantly, intellect returns to 
 a state of soberness and sanity. The basis of the revival is laid 
 in a previous period of intellectual ascendency ; but its quick- 
 ening force is the religious consciousness. 
 
LAWS OF INTERACTION. 43 
 
 6. From a state of overactivity, the moral norm is reached 
 by a rebellion of the intellect. The result lifts intellect again 
 into a state of normal authority. The process is a reforma- 
 tion in the political and the religious system, or, at least, in the 
 latter. 
 
 7. The watch-word of a revival or a reformation is "primi- 
 tive faith ;" and to the strength and simplicity of the primi- 
 tive (normal) faith it struggles to return. 
 
 (b) from, the Norm. 
 
 . 8. From the primitive faith follows a divergence. Its sim- 
 plicity is succeeded, according to what seems a psychical law, 
 by a tendency to complexity, marked by a growing ritualism, 
 sacerdotalism, aggressiveness, intolerance, tyranny. 
 
 9. Against these excesses the intellect begins to rebel, and 
 the germs of a new reformation are planted. Meantime, intel- 
 lect is repressed, and ultimately falls into a state of complete 
 bondage. 
 
 10. The new reformation brings back faith to its normal sim- 
 plicity, and intellect to its normal action. 
 
 IV. RESUME. 
 
 11. Thus, when Faith takes the initiative in action, starting 
 from the state of simple (monotheistic) faith, we witness the 
 following series of results : 
 
 ( Faith simple : complex ) 
 
 Faith ascendant. . \ _ [ Revolution. 
 
 ( Intellect normal ; rebellious . ) 
 
 12. Revolution now throws the initiative upon Intellect, and, 
 starting from the coincident norm of intellect and faith, we 
 witness the following results : 
 
 ( Intellect normal ; dominant. . . ) _ 
 
 Intellect ascendant. .-< . ,,.,., [-Revival. 
 
 ( taith normal; debilitated. . . . ) 
 
 Both movements may be thrown into a diagrammatic form, 
 and more clearly illustrated to the eye : 
 
44 
 
 PSYCHIC CYCLES. 
 
 
 Duplex Psychic Cycle. Duplex Hemicycle. 
 
 FAITH. 
 
 Religious Phase. Intellectual Phase. Religious Phase. ^ 
 
 Normal. 
 
 Complex. "^ Normal. 
 
 Debilitated. ** Normal. 
 
 Complex. ' 
 
 INTELLECT. 
 
 Normal. 
 
 Rebellious, g Normal. 
 
 Dominant* 92 Normal. 
 PH 
 
 Rebellious, g 
 w 
 
 r% r& 
 FAITH ASCENDANT. P3 THOUGHT ASCENDANT. FAITH ASCENDANT. PH 
 
 The psychical history of our race presents, therefore, a suc- 
 cession of Religious and Intellectual Phases alternating with 
 each other. During the Religious Phase, Faith takes the initi- 
 ative in action, and is in the ascendant, while Intellect is in the 
 descendent. During the Intellectual Phase, thought takes the 
 initiative, and is in the ascendant, while Faith is in the descend- 
 ent. The Religious Phase supervenes on a Revival, and is ter- 
 minated by a Reformation ; the Intellectual supervenes on a 
 Reformation, and is terminated by a Revival. On the comple- 
 tion of a cycle, consisting of the two phases, Faith and Intel- 
 lect stand in the same relative positions as at first. 
 
 These movements may be otherwise illustrated. Faith and 
 Intellect move in two equal intersecting orbits, having a com- 
 mon centre. The norm is a plane bisecting the angle formed 
 by the planes of these orbits. The orbit of Faith is alternately 
 above and below the normal plane ; and the same is true of the 
 orbit of Intellect. The two orbits intersect each other in the 
 plane of the norm, and we have here two equipotencies. That 
 which occurs when Faith passes its ascending, and Intellect its 
 descending, node is a Revival Equipotence ; and that which 
 occurs when Faith passes its descending, and Intellect its as- 
 cending, node is a Reformative Equipotence. (See next page.) 
 
 This particular example of a deeply rooted tendency to pe- 
 riodicity in the psychic activities of mankind confirms the 
 
PSYCHIC CYCLES AND EPICYCLES. 
 
 45 
 
 truth of an adage long extant, that "History repeats itself." 
 The phenomenon is grounded on the psychical identity of the 
 race, and the uniformity of the physical laws under which phe- 
 nomena are wrought out, which become conditions of psychic 
 activity. Each individual's developmental experience repeats 
 the history of every other individual. Each tribe or civic com- 
 munity, beginning as a child, proceeds, with greater or less ra- 
 pidity, through a series of educational stages determined by the 
 psychic forces of an unchanging human nature, played upon 
 by the stimuli emanating from the presence and contact of a 
 material environment changeless in its mode of action. 
 
 It would not express the whole of the cyclic system to rep- 
 resent these cycles as either the only psychic cycles realized in 
 human history, or as movements sharply isolated and definable. 
 
 Within the sweep of one cycle have been evolved cycles of less 
 magnitude and salience; and this system of cycles and epicy- 
 cles has been embraced in grander cycles which represent 
 psychic movements which embrace entire races. Thus the 
 Indo-European race sweeps through three grand psychic cycles, 
 the first ending with the fall of the Persian Empire ; the sec- 
 ond, with the fall of the Roman Empire of the East ; and the 
 third, extending to our own times. 
 
46 CYCLIC IRREGULARITIES. 
 
 Further, it must be clearly stated that the religious and intel- 
 lectual phases are seldom quite consecutive. The latter arises 
 before the termination of the Religious Phase. Sometimes it 
 runs for centuries parallel with it, and sometimes even dies out 
 while yet the Religious Phase persists. The partial or com- 
 plete contemporaneity of the two phases implies a division of 
 the public into a religious section and an intellectual section. 
 
 The series of cyclic movements sometimes bifurcates, as in 
 the divergence of the Zoroastrian, and afterward the Buddhist, 
 system, from the Brahmanic. The Brahmanic continues its 
 cyclic development by itself, while the two others, each in turn, 
 begin a series of cyclic evolutions of their own ; and all three 
 reach to our own times. A similar phenomenon is seen in the 
 histories of Christianity and Islamism. 
 
 These grand movements in the field of psychical history are 
 not obscurely seen in the vicissitudes of the nations of remotest 
 antiquity. 
 
 Egyptian Psychic History. 
 
 Egyptian history, which, according to respectable authority, 
 stretches back to the remotest date (5004 B.C., according to 
 Manetho ; 3623 B.C., according to Bunsen ; 2700 B.C., according 
 to Poole), presents a series of vicissitudes which we may group 
 into four Psychic Cycles. The FIRST PSYCHIC CYCLE embraces 
 the first Ten Dynasties. As with the mythic periods of all 
 nations, the earliest, or prereflective, period of Egypt seems to 
 have been characterized by a dominance of the religious nature. 
 This is the first Religious Phase. We may regard it as preced- 
 ing the epoch of the culminating prosperity of Memphis. The 
 Intellectual Phase followed, and appears to be well marked; 
 though its remains have but recently been brought to the no- 
 tice of the world. These monuments, exhumed through the 
 industry and sagacity of M. Mariette, sustained by the enlight- 
 ened patronage of the Khedive, have been brought together 
 in magnificent collections at Boulak, in Upper Egypt, and at 
 
SECOND EGYPTIAN CYCLE. 47 
 
 Cairo. They are described as evincing a degree of artistic and 
 intellectual development superior even to that which is repre- 
 sented in the later and better-known monuments stored in the 
 museums of Paris and Berlin^ 1 ) 
 
 The SECOND PSYCHIC CYCLE embraces the period of these 
 later monuments. The Religious Phase covered the period of 
 the formation and prevalence of the ancient religion embodied 
 in the First Book of the Sacred Canon, as described by St. 
 Clement.( 2 ) This, like the most ancient book of the Vedas, 
 consisted of hymns to the gods. The complete Canon contain- 
 ed forty-two books, of which the Second treated of the whole 
 duty of a king's life. The celebrated " Book of the Dead," 
 belonging to the Eleventh Dynasty (2500 B.C.), is supposed to 
 have constituted a part of the Canon. This, nevertheless, must 
 be regarded as a foreshadowing of the next phase, since " it is 
 obviously the product of a matured sacerdotal philosophy 
 the Apocalypse of Egypt."( 3 ) The " Book of Transmigrations " 
 embodies similar doctrines, and probably belongs to the same 
 stage of development. The Intellectual Phase of this Cycle 
 is marked by the appearance of the later books of the Sacred 
 Canon. These seem to have constituted a complete encyclo- 
 pedia, and well exemplify the universal truth that all learning 
 among primitive peoples is turned over to the custody of re- 
 ligion priest and philosopher being one. In these books were 
 treatises on astronomy, hieroglyphics, cosmography, geography, 
 topography of Egpyt, and a particular description of the Nile. 
 All this knowledge was represented as derived from Thoth, the 
 first Hermes Trismegistus, by order of the Supreme God. The 
 preparation for this phase began 560 B.C., when Amosis gave 
 permission to Greeks to settle in Egypt. Jews had already 
 
 ( J ) Taylor, " Egypt and Iceland," chaps, ix., x. 
 
 ( 2 ) Clemens Alexandrinus, " Stromata," book vi., chap. iv. 
 
 ( 3 ) Moffat, "A Comparative History of Religions," p. 63. 
 
 8 
 
48 LATER EGYPTIAN CYCLES. 
 
 been there since the capture of Jerusalem by Nebuchadnezzar 
 (588 B.C.). 
 
 A THIRD PSYCHIC CYCLE of Egyptian history dates from the 
 conquest of Egypt by Alexander (332 B.C.). Though Egypt 
 has never since had an independent existence, and her psychic 
 development may be regarded rather as Greek, Horn an, Sara- 
 cenic, and Turkish, it is interesting to note that we still discern 
 the cyclical movement. The Religious Phase of this cycle was 
 clearly exemplified in Alexandrian Judaism and its later dis- 
 placement by Alexandrian Christianity ; while an Intellectual 
 Phase is strongly marked by the planting and development of 
 science and theosophy under the Ptolemies. 
 
 A FOURTH PSYCHIC CYCLE, beginning with the conquest of 
 Egypt by the Arabians (640 A.D.), presents a Religious Phase 
 in the bloody fanaticism of Mohammedanism, bearing down all 
 resistance; and an Intellectual Phase, which is dawning like 
 another " Renaissance " under the auspices of the present Egyp- 
 tian Viceroy the West discharging the obligations it incurred 
 to the East in the European Revival of Letters.^) 
 
 Chinese Psychic History. 
 
 We turn, next, to glance at the psychic history of the Chi- 
 nese. The FIRST PSYCHIC CYCLE may be taken as extending 
 from the epoch of the oldest records to the period of Confu- 
 cius. The Religious Phase begins with the date of the oldest 
 of the Sacred Writings, said to have been written by Fu-hi, 
 2800 B.C. This is known as the Yi-king, meaning "Transfor- 
 
 (') The light of learning has been reflected reciprocally between the East 
 and the West as between two mirrors. In earliest historic times, Egypt 
 Assyria, and Persia sent the light of learning to Greece. Greece reflected 
 it back to Egypt and Syria as a sequence of the Alexandrian conquests ; 
 Syria and Constantinople sent it again into Greece, Italy, and other parts 
 of Europe in the Middle Ages : and now, again, the learning of Europe is 
 seen reflected back upon Egypt, Constantinople, and Syria. 
 
CONFUCIUS AND LAO-TSE. 49 
 
 mations." The Second Book, or She-king, consists of chants of 
 a sublime and devotional character, like those of the Rig- Veda. 
 The Intellectual Phase grew up with the development of reflec- 
 tion, and was for a long period coincident with a declension of 
 moral and religious earnestness. Literature increased ; but the 
 teaching of the Sacred Books was neglected. 
 
 The SECOND PSYCHIC CYCLE was introduced by Confucius, 
 who, like other reformers, directed attention to the duties in- 
 culcated by the ancient religion. His period was between 551 
 and 479 B.C. Though Confucius did not return to the spiritu- 
 alism of the primitive faith, he revived religious interest, and 
 reinstated a respect for the Sacred Books in the hearts of his 
 countrymen. He collected together the fragments of the old 
 canon, and compiled and composed three additional books, 
 which constitute a portion of the Sacred Writings of the Chi- 
 nese. These books make no assumption of inspiration nor 
 support by miracles ; but their authors are regarded as excel- 
 ling in wisdom and goodness all others of their race. The 
 moral and religious revival introduced by Confucius signalizes 
 the Religious Phase of this Cycle. Almost simultaneously 
 arose another teacher, Lao-Tse (604 B.C.), who introduced the 
 religion of the supreme reason. The sum of his recorded in- 
 structions is embodied in the Tau-teh-king, the classic of rea- 
 son and virtue. Lao-Tse, the Schilling of China, planted the 
 germs of a transcendental philosophy, which, with the abate- 
 ment of the influence exerted by Confucius, gained sufficient 
 strength and acceptance to prompt the head of the dynasty of 
 Ts'in (220-200 B.C.) to doom the Sacred Books to destruction. 
 The reign of Taoism marks the Intellectual Phase of the Sec- 
 ond Cycle. 
 
 The THIRD PSYCHIC CYCLE was ushered in by the termina- 
 tion of the dynasty of Ts'in and the reproduction of the Sacred 
 Books under Wen-ti (135 B.C.). A new religious zeal spread 
 through the empire, marking a Religious Phase. Of its de- 
 
50 CHINESE BUDDHISM. 
 
 cline, and the invasion of the Intellectual Phase, I have learn- 
 ed nothing very specific. We know, however, that in the year 
 66 A.D. Buddhism made its advent into China, and awakened 
 the long-slumbering religious sentiments to the demands of a 
 system more spiritual, and more consonant with the simple in- 
 stincts of the soul, than the degenerate system which had super- 
 vened upon the revival under Wen-ti. This event, then, marks 
 the beginning of the Religious Phase of the FOURTH PSYCHIC 
 CYCLE in China. The later periods of Buddhist history, as 
 is well known, have been marked by a growing ceremonialism 
 and diminishing spirituality. China has shown signs of an in- 
 tellectual awakening, and the advent of an Intellectual Phase. 
 While the Buddhism of China has reached a degeneracy which 
 forebodes another religious revival, the intellectual aristocracy 
 of the empire, however small their minority numerically, are 
 steadily leading its institutions into the light and learning of 
 advanced civilization. 
 
 I have dwelt too briefly on the events of Chinese history to 
 convey a vivid impression of the fluctuations depicted in the 
 spiritual life of the people ; but the salient facts pointed out 
 teach us that the cyclic movements are real. The fact arrests 
 the attention of Moffat, who says: "Among the sacred books 
 of antiquity, outside of the Bible, there is no plainer recogni- 
 tion of the supreme authority of one personal God than in the 
 utterances of some of the Chinese monarchs. The progress of 
 natural religion, in China, as elsewhere, has been that of degen- 
 eracy, tending to a multiplication of gods, and the assumption 
 of objects of worship from various sources ; and then, the sep- 
 aration of the learned from the unlearned by a pantheistic or 
 otherwise godless philosophy." ( J ) 
 
 (') Hoffat, "A Comparative History of Religions," p. 179. 
 
EARLY BRAHMANISM. 51 
 
 Indian Psychic History. 
 
 We turn also, briefly, to the psychic history of India. The 
 FIRST PSYCHIC CYCLE is Hindoo, and the dominant religion is 
 Brahmanism. Its Religious Phase is stamped by primitive Ve- 
 daism, or the religion of the Rig- Veda Sanhita, whose epoch is 
 thought to be about 1400 B.C. Max Miiller and other Orient- 
 alists have made us well acquainted with the pure and exalted 
 devotion which characterizes the Mantras, or Hymns, of the Rig- 
 Veda Sanhita. Some of these Hymns are almost worthy to be 
 placed by the side of the loftiest Psalms of David. They illus- 
 trate in a most interesting manner the eminently religious char- 
 acteristics of a primitive people, and, at the same time, the sim- 
 plicity, beauty, and correctness of their theology. The human 
 mind in India, however, following a law which seems necessary, 
 began to gather about the primitive system a body of rites and 
 complications of a merely external character. However the in- 
 telligence failed to discover the significance and propriety of 
 empty forms, the religious nature, as everywhere, manifested a 
 proneness to ceremonials and unessentials. A burdensome rit- 
 ual grew up, embodied in the books known as the Brahmanas, 
 which are supposed to date back, approximately, to 1000 B.C. 
 In the lapse of time, other books, embodying other or more 
 elaborate directions for the conduct of religion, grew into exist- 
 ence, under the designation of Sutras. These are not later than 
 600 B.C. At this period, the Brahmanic priests had come into 
 the exercise of a sacerdotal despotism. As it must be, under 
 such circumstances, reflective minds had long felt a more or 
 less outspoken dissent. Though ritualistic tyranny was only 
 checked, not uprooted, and continued yet, through many cent- 
 uries, an Intellectual Phase was setting in. Hindoo speculation 
 was elaborating systems sometimes fanciful, sometimes pro- 
 found. To this period belongs the monistic theosophy of the 
 Vedanta the theoretical poetry of the Mimansa. Here, also, 
 
52 RISE OF ZOROASTRIANISM. 
 
 belongs the dualistic philosophy of the Sankya, which is at- 
 tributed to Kapila ; and the atomistic philosophy and theistic 
 school of Patangali. These systems mark clearly the phase of 
 thought and growing dissent which always succeeds a period of 
 religious encroachment, even when it does not terminate it by 
 a revolution. In this case, Brahmanic ritualism outlived skep- 
 tical philosophy, to awaken successive protests of a more relig- 
 ious kind, to undergo itself a revival incident to the expulsion 
 of an intrusive system, and then to lapse into a baser ritualism 
 than before, which lingers to our times, overlapped distinctly, 
 however, by an awakening of intellect which promises for Hin- 
 doostan an era of correct thinking and regenerated religion. 
 
 But, in the mean time, superimposed upon the tidal move- 
 ments of Brahmanic thought, two great cycles have revolved, 
 which stand forth so conspicuously as to constitute the charac- 
 teristic movements of Indian psychic history. These are, re- 
 spectively, Zoroastrian and Buddhistic. The first we may re- 
 gard as marking the SECOND PSYCHIC CYCLE in India. Its re- 
 ligion is that of the Avesta. It signalizes a sharp dissent from 
 the encroaching demands of the Brahmanic system. Though 
 arising long before Brahmanic ritualism had attained its culmi- 
 nation, and, perhaps, before the completion of the Brahmanas, 
 it constitutes a logical and real succession. It was, in its Re- 
 ligious Phase, an attempt to return to the simplicity of the 
 primitive monotheistic faith and worship. Its adherents, orig- 
 inally seceders from Brahmanism, increased most rapidly on 
 the north of the Himalayas, and ultimately made Zoroastrian- 
 ism the State religion of Persia. The vicissitudes of this relig- 
 ion are but a revolution of the wheel of thought. The Gathas 
 of the Yasna, constituting the oldest Book of the Avesta, give 
 expression to the simplest and purest and loftiest devotion. 
 The Vispered, the Second Book of the Avesta, discloses the 
 growth of a liturgical system. The next step shows the in- 
 weaving of the threads of speculation. The Third Book of the 
 
PIETY OF DARIUS. 53 
 
 Avesta is the Vendidad, which embraces the ethical philosophy 
 of Zoroastrianism. The degeneracy of this religion has never 
 become extreme. Though the religion of the State under such 
 absolute monarchs as Darius (500 B.C.) and Cyrus, it continued 
 to be characterized by a monotheism and purity which still ex- 
 cite our admiration. It was Darius Hystaspes who engraved 
 the famous inscription on the rocks of Behistun, ascribing his 
 successes as a ruler and general to the assistance of the Su- 
 preme God a bold and devout acknowledgment imperishably 
 sculptured on the face of a cliff, high - lifted before the gaze 
 of his own subjects and the populations which should succeed 
 even to the latest time. "A great God is Ahuramazda, who 
 made the earth, who made the heaven, who created men, and 
 provided blessedness for them, who made Darius king, the sole 
 king over many. * * * Through the might of Ahuramazda am 
 I king. * ** * Through the grace of Ahuramazda do I rule this 
 kingdom." This is the proclamation of a monarch mightier 
 than David. Cyrus acknowledged the same God ;(') and Cam- 
 byses, the great general, ridiculed the gods and idols of the 
 degenerate Egyptians. 
 
 This Religious Phase was followed by an Intellectual one, 
 not strongly marked, but signalized by the invasion of free 
 thought and the slow corruption of the ancient religion. This, 
 again, was succeeded by the development of Parseeism, which 
 persists feebly to the present day. 
 
 Meantime, however, the THIRD PSYCHIC CYCLE of Indian 
 history had begun. Its course has been somewhat parallel and 
 contemporaneous with the later history of Brahmanism and Zo- 
 roastrianism. It is a third religious system of Sanskrit-speak- 
 ing peoples. It is the religion of the Tripitaka. Buddhism 
 may be regarded as the reduplication of the Zoroastrian rebell- 
 ion against the excesses of Brahmanism. That was a diver- 
 
 (') Ezra i., 2. 
 
54 VICISSITUDES OF BUDDHISM. 
 
 gence; this was a schism. The revolt was absolute. It re- 
 jected the doctrines, the sacerdotalism, and the whole pantheon 
 of the Brahmanic system, and returned to the simple practices 
 of virtue, abstinence, and religious contemplation. The Relig- 
 ious Phase begins with the preaching of Buddha, about 550 
 B.C. Note, again, the circle of evolutions. The oldest books 
 of the Tripitaka are exclusively religious and ethical. The 
 Vinaya-Pitaka is a body of moral precepts. The Sutra-Pi taka 
 is a collection of the sayings of Buddha. Next, however, fol- 
 lows the Dharma-Pitaka, in which we recognize a growing de- 
 velopment of speculative thought. This book consists of dog- 
 matic philosophy, cosmology, and other secular learning. Next, 
 we see Buddhism (250 B.C.) becoming the State religion of In- 
 dia under Asoka. It degenerated, by degrees, into formalism, 
 idolatry, and unreasoning inanities. Then the revolt arose to 
 which I alluded in speaking of Brahmanism; and the latter 
 system, in a regenerated form, replaced Buddhism. The Bud- 
 dhists were expelled 250 A.D., and spread through China, Tarta- 
 ry, Corea, Japan, Burmah, Siam, and other regions, preaching 
 and propagating their religion with a missionary spirit quite 
 comparable with that which, during the same periods, was 
 spreading Christianity over the Western world. Buddhism in 
 the East, like Christianity in the West, has thus maintained a 
 dominant position in all the countries to which it spread, down 
 to the present day. This dispersion of the adherents of Bud- 
 dhism through so many countries has kept the system in the 
 perpetuated condition of a rising religion ; and it has been vi- 
 talized, through so many centuries, by that zeal which is the 
 condition and characteristic of the youth of a religious system. 
 Nevertheless, Buddhism has undergone its destined degenera- 
 cy in every country which it has possessed. It has become 
 encumbered with accreted forms and rites ; and heresies have 
 riven the body ecclesiastic to its centre. Several general coun- 
 cils have been held for the compilation of sacred books, the 
 
HEBREW CYCLES. 55 
 
 suppression of heresies, and the strengthening of the system ; 
 but the Intellectual Phase is marching on. Its rise may be 
 regarded as signalized by the appearance of the Abidharma, or 
 body of metaphysics ; and its march, by the entrance of West- 
 ern ideas and institutions into the inert mass of Chinese, Jap- 
 anese, and other Oriental polities. 
 
 I shall not occupy you with any detail of the psychic move- 
 ment among the Hebrews and Assyrians. In reference to the 
 former, it suffices to remind you that the bounds of such move- 
 ments are disclosed in Biblical history. The Book of Genesis 
 which stands before us, more properly, as eleven separate 
 compositions is the surviving monument of the earliest Relig- 
 ious Phase. This was the Bible of the Patriarchs. The relig- 
 ion was patriarchal. Intervening between the compilation of 
 the Book of Genesis and the birth of Moses was a decline of 
 faith, and an infusion of the literature and religion of the 
 Egyptians. A Second Religious Phase was ushered in with 
 the giving of the "Books of the Law," and endured to the 
 end of prophecy, when another decline set in and occupied the 
 interval to the birth of Christ. At this epoch a Third Relig- 
 ious Phase dawned upon the Hebrew nation, and its history 
 began to be merged into the common history of Europe. 
 
 These references to the salient epochs of Oriental thought 
 and religious emotion, so brief as almost to fall within the do- 
 main of statistics, demonstrate, I think, that the mode of in- 
 teraction of the religious and intellectual faculties is a reality, 
 in the form in which I have depicted it. But more interesting 
 exemplifications follow. 
 
 Grecian Psychic History. 
 
 Grecian psychic history is marked by a more luminous line 
 of light than that of any other ancient people. The FIRST 
 PSYCHIC CYCLE is Homeric. The priests and prophets of the 
 Religious Phase were such semi-mythical personages as Homer 
 
56 IONICS AND PYTHAGOREANS. 
 
 and Hesiod. The. theology and cosmology developed in their 
 writings, while revealing, like all primitive faiths, a knowledge 
 of one Supreme Divinity, disclose a bias toward polytheism 
 and gross religious perversions, which indicate that these writ- 
 ers lived in the corrupted decline of an older system, of which 
 we have no records, unless it be in the Orphic Hymns. These, 
 however, though anciently regarded as of older date, embody 
 speculations which mark a more developed stage of thought. 
 I prefer to consider them, with Aristotle, the exponents of a ris- 
 ing spirit of philosophy, which Pherecydes (548 B.C.) brought 
 to a fuller development. It involves speculations of a mystical 
 and pantheistical character, and gives expression to the Intel- 
 lectual Phase of the Homeric Cycle. 
 
 Overlapping this was the beginning of the SECOND PSYCHIC 
 CYCLE, whose Religious Phase embraced the Ionic and Pytha- 
 gorean Schools of Philosophy. The Ionic Philosophy was Hy- 
 lozoism, based on the fundamental principle of the animaliza- 
 tion of forms of inorganic matter not atheistic, nor even ma- 
 terialistic in the offensive sense, for its adherents were engaged 
 in the earnest pursuit after the One Principle, which, in their 
 consciousness, was the revelation of God. Thales (640 B.C.) 
 thought the first principle of all things was Water; Anaximan- 
 der (611 B.C.) thought it was TO aitEipov, the indefinite per- 
 haps the equivalent conception of Chaos, or the condition of 
 absolute homogeneity; Anaximenes (528-524 B.C.) thought he 
 had discovered the first principle in Air; while Heraclitus dis- 
 covered it in Fire. The " Fire " of this philosopher, however, 
 was an ethereal element, which he identifies with a pervasive 
 divine spirit or reason, which he conceived as eternal and im- 
 manent in the world. The Pythagoreans were charmed by the 
 harmony which they recognized in Creation. Numbers, which 
 exactly express the harmony and rhythm of nature, were re- 
 garded as the substance, or, at least, the symbols, of that har- 
 mony. Pythagoras, their founder, lived 582 B.C. His most 
 
EARLY GREEK ASPIRATIONS. 57 
 
 conspicuous disciples lived considerably later, and after the 
 rise of other schools of philosophy. Philolaus held that the 
 " world is eternal, and ruled by the ONE who is akin to it, and 
 has supreme might and excellence. The director and ruler of 
 all things is God. He is one and eternal, enduring and un- 
 movable, ever like himself, and different from all things beside 
 him. He encompasses and guards the universe.'^ 1 ) 
 
 Hicetas, who taught the axial revolution of the earth, and 
 Ecphantus, who taught the same, were still later Pythagoreans ; 
 and there was a revival of Pythagoreanism in the century be- 
 fore Christ. It is not needful, however, to reproduce details. 
 I desire only to fix upon the rise of Ionic and Pythagorean 
 philosophy as a real revival of correct religious thought and 
 feeling. I could quote extensively from the fragments of these 
 earnest and devout old philosophers, to prove that they felt the 
 evidence of the One Divine Existence within them ; felt the 
 evidence that man and the world proceeded from the Being 
 thus revealed ; and earnestly sought, throughout the world, for 
 the subtle essence which might be regarded as constituting that 
 energizing existence. How these early gropings of Grecian 
 speculation reveal the longing, and even the necessity, which 
 the human mind feels for something sensible to call its God, 
 or, at least, the shrine of its God ! And how such facts, re- 
 produced along the whole historic line of thought, palliate the 
 idolatry and image-worship which have defaced the records of 
 religious sentiment, and so often obscured or eclipsed the di- 
 vine reality which idols and pictures have symbolized ! 
 
 But the dawn of a phase of speculation less devout had al- 
 ready passed. The essence of the Eleatic doctrine was the im- 
 mutability of substance. The earlier Eleatics, who were monis- 
 tic, maintained the unity of substance; and, in their theistic 
 conceptions, brought themselves into relations to God, almost 
 
 (') Ueberweg, " History of Philosophy," vol. i., p. 49. 
 
58 THE ELEATIC DOCTRINE. 
 
 as simple and reverential as the Ionics and Pythagoreans ; and, 
 in their notions of divine personality, excelled them in clear- 
 ness. Xenophanes (569 B.C.) combats the anthropomorphism 
 of Homer and Hesiod, and enounces the doctrine of One God. 
 
 Etc Sf.bg iv TE Stolen kal avdp&TrotGt jueyioroe. 
 
 Parmenides of Elea (499-485 B.C.) founds the doctrine of uni- 
 ty on the conception of being. He was ahead of Hegel in pred- 
 icating being of thought, for he says, 
 
 To yap avro rotlv iariv TE /cat el vat. 
 
 Zeno of Elea (490-485 B.C.) marks the emergence of the skep- 
 ticism which was to swamp all faith. He denied the veracity 
 of sensuous perceptions, denied all motion, and denied all real- 
 ity of existence. Melissus of Samos put forth the aphorism 
 " Only the One is," disguising under this cover the doctrine 
 of the continuity of substance a sort of monistic pantheism. 
 Being, with him, is eternal, and will not perish ; it is infinite. 
 
 The later Eleatics were pluralistic holding to the distinc- 
 \ tion of matter and spirit. Empedocles (about 500 B.C.) taught 
 that Earth, Water, Air, and Fire are the four " roots " of things, 
 the moving principles of which are " love " and " hate." He 
 seems to have glimpsed those forces which have emerged in 
 modern science as " attraction " and " repulsion." Anaxagoras 
 of Clazomense (about 500 B.C.) opens wide the door for the ad- 
 vance of the Atomists. He maintained that there exists an un- 
 limited number of ultimate elements, which he calls " seeds " 
 (homo3omeria3 of Aristotle). These were originally in a state 
 of chaos ; but the divine mind (vovg), which he holds in antithe- 
 sis to matter, brought order out of them. All origin and decay 
 are thus a mingling and unmingling.^) Organic forms come 
 
 (') We have here the germ of a philosophy of the evolution of the het- 
 erogeneous by successive differentiation of the homogeneous. 
 
THE LATER ELEATICS. 59 
 
 into existence through the fecundation of the earth by germs 
 previously contained in the air. Anaxagoras has recourse to 
 the divine mind only in the domain of phenomena inexplicable 
 by known causes. For this, Aristotle reproaches him with the 
 suggestion that when his knowledge should have become more 
 extended, the divine mind could be dispensed with altogether. 
 This reminds one of the reputed atheism of Laplace, as distin- 
 guished from the theistic astronomers. We see, at least, that 
 the divine immanence recognized by the older philosophers 
 had, in Anaxagoras, shrunk to a remote and occasional relation. 
 This shrinkage of divinity was carried a step farther in the 
 Atomists. Leucippus posited the full and the void as princi- 
 ples of things. The full consists of indivisible primitive parti- 
 cles differing only in form, position, and arrangement. These 
 had no creator, for they existed from eternity. Their orderly 
 arrangements in the world do not result from "love" and 
 " hate," nor through all-ruling mind, but from natural necessi- 
 ty. Democritus (about 460 B.C.) is responsible for the fuller 
 development of a system which has seen its last renaissance in 
 recent times. (') He maintained that the atoms were endowed 
 with an eternal motion. He foreshadowed the Cartesian " vor- 
 tices " and perhaps the " nebular " cosmogony, in conceiving 
 the atoms to generate a vortical movement by the descent of 
 the heavier through the lighter, and attributing the evolution 
 of worlds to such movements. Organized beings were thought 
 to be generated in moist earth. 
 
 (') While the conception of atomicity enunciated by Professor Tyndall 
 bears a recognized analogy with the theories of Democritus and Bruno, it 
 is not, perhaps, exact to represent the later atomic doctrine as a revival of 
 the older ones. Tyndall's idea of " matter " is unique, and requires new 
 definitions, as he intimates. Indeed, it is doubtful whether his material- 
 ism, in spite of the phraseology, is not a view which annuls the distinction 
 between the natural and supernatural by disclosing deductively an ultimate 
 of iiniversal nature which lies quite beyond the domain of nature. 
 
60 THE SOPHISTS. 
 
 The progressive and aggressive movement of a daring and 
 profane intellectualism is still further exemplified in the philos- 
 ophy of the Sophists. They also exhibit a transition from the 
 cosmological speculations of their predecessors to the strictly 
 anthropocentric studies of the Socratic and Platonic schools. 
 They were egotists and rhetoricians some of them very vain 
 ones. It was one of their phrases that " might makes right." 
 Protagoras, their founder (born about 490 B.C.), is the author of 
 the saying, "man is the measure of all things" Travruv XPVP"' 
 Tb)v fjLtrpov uvOpw-iroQ. This was his fundamental theorem. He 
 held, with some modern thinkers, to the relativity of all truth ; 
 and even the existence of the gods he announced as a subject 
 so beset with difficulties, that it was impossible to arrive at the 
 fact. In this, however, he undoubtedly refers to the popular 
 divinities. Gorgias (483-375 B.C.) went quite over to nihilism. 
 " Nothing exists," he says. " If any thing existed, it would be 
 unknowable ; and if any thing existed and were knowable, the 
 knowledge of it could not be communicated to others." Hip- 
 pias taught that law is the tyrant of men. Prodicus says truly 
 that the men of the earliest time deified whatever was useful 
 to them bread, as Demeter ; wine, as Dionysus ; fire, as He- 
 phaestus, etc. ; but he falsely employs the fact to prove that all 
 notion of divinity is of human origin. The " Later Sophists " 
 were quite numerous, but need not be cited at length. Critias 
 said, " The belief in the gods was invented by a wise statesman 
 as a means of keeping the people in subjection." Xeniades 
 affirmed that " all is deception ; every idea and opinion false ; 
 and that whatever comes into being comes from nothing, and to 
 nothing returns' 1 '' a dogma which shows that the Aristotelian 
 " Ex nihilo nihil fit " is not a necessary datum of thought, as 
 exclusive of the concept of an original creation. 
 
 Thus we see demonstrably how the Second Cycle of Grecian 
 thought ended with a precipitation of philosophy into the bot- 
 tomless gulf of universal skepticism. Before this extremity had 
 
THE SOCRATIC SCHOOL. 61 
 
 been reached, the soul of man had summoned itself to an atti- 
 tude of oppugnance. The THIRD PSYCHIC CYCLE had begun. 
 Its Religious Phase stands forth in the history of thought, 
 adorned with the figure of Socrates uncouth in exterior, but 
 radiant with beautiful thought. Socrates was born about 471- 
 469 B.C. He went about the streets of scoffing Athens a mis- 
 sionary of the truth of the One God, and perished for his fidel- 
 ity to that truth. His system is too well known to require ex- 
 position. He held, in brief, that the world is governed by a 
 supreme divine Intelligence, and that a special Providence cares 
 for men in this life. The existence of contrivance in nature is 
 proof of a contriving mind. The Megaric, Elian, and Cynic 
 Schools, which succeeded Socrates, were Socratic, with modifi- 
 cations greater or less. Among the Megarics, Euclid united to 
 the ethical principle of Socrates the Eleatic theory of the One, 
 to which alone true being could be ascribed. Diodorus Cronus 
 taught that the necessary is real ; and only the real, possible. 
 Among the Cynics, Antisthenes (born 444 B.C.) taught a virtue 
 more rigorous than Socrates. "The essence of virtue," he truly 
 says, " lies in self-control." He accordingly carried self-control 
 to the extent of abstinence from things indifferent, and even a 
 resort to penal self-inflictions. He isolated himself from socie- 
 ty and government. Yet, as to the religious faith of the peo- 
 ple, he held it to be as little binding as their laws. This refers, 
 undoubtedly, to their polytheism. Diogenes of Sinope carried 
 Cynical asceticism to the most repulsive extreme, and became 
 more a " dog " than the brutes which his philosophy satirized. 
 Cynicism, in post -Stoic times, found, also, many adherents 
 among the Romans ; but it was rather Socratic in mildness. 
 
 The Cyrenaic School marks a strong divergence from So- 
 cratic teaching. It is an incident, however, of the Religious 
 Phase inaugurated by Socrates, and constitutes within it a sub- 
 ordinate cycle. The fundamental factor in their philosophy 
 is pleasure. It is hence called " Hedonism." Aristippus and 
 
62 PLATONISM. 
 
 his followers, however, maintained that it is wrong to be con- 
 trolled by pleasure. To the sensuous pleasures Anniceris added 
 the pleasures of sympathy, friendship, gratitude, piety toward 
 parents and fatherland, social intercourse, and the strife after 
 honors. It may be added that, in psychology, Aristippus was 
 a sensationalist ; in theology, Theodorus was atheist ; and Eu- 
 hemerus maintained that a belief in the gods began with the 
 veneration of distinguished men. Hedonism was on the high- 
 road to Epicureanism. Plato, however, towered so command- 
 ingly over his contemporaries that the full tide of religious phi- 
 losophy swept on for a hundred years. 
 
 Plato, the founder of the "Academy," or, by distinction, the 
 "Old Academy," was born 427 B.C., and wrote thirty-six com- 
 positions in fifty -six books. His philosophy centres in the 
 theory of "ideas." The "idea" of Plato is archetypal. The 
 highest idea is the idea of the " good," which is equivalent to 
 God. With Plato, the world is generated ; matter is eternal ; 
 order was introduced by God ; the soul is immortal ; the high- 
 est good is the greatest possible likeness to God. The "ideas" 
 of Plato have proved as undying as he really believed them. 
 Platonism, after running its first course, was revived, with mod- 
 ifications, in the Middle Academy, and again revived, with res- 
 torations, in the New Academy. Once again it was revived by 
 the Neo-Platonists of Alexandria, and mingled itself with the 
 Judaism, and, later, the Christianity which invaded that ancient 
 capital. It found a congenial lodgment in the breasts of many 
 of the early Christian Fathers, and contended with Aristotelian- 
 ism through all the Scholastic ages ; and has actually inspired 
 a school of philosophy in one of the modern English universi- 
 ties. Plato was, par excellence, the spiritual theist of antiquity. 
 The proofs of this are accessible to all. Some of his most dis- 
 tinguished followers, of the Old Academy, are Speusippus, who 
 leans pantheistically ; Xenocrates (339-314 B.C.), who identi- 
 fies ideas with numbers ; and Heraclides of Pontus, who taught 
 
CARNEADES AND ARISTOTLE. 63 
 
 the daily rotation of the earth from west to east, and the im- 
 mobility of the firmament of the fixed stars. 
 
 The middle portion of the fourth century before Christ wit- 
 nessed the dawn of another Intellectual Phase, and a period of 
 increasing secularism, irreligion, skepticism, and speculative rev- 
 eries. We notice the rise of five lines, or schools, of freethink- 
 ing. Earliest, and in some respects most orthodox, was the 
 Aristotelian ; but almost simultaneously, and still imbued with 
 the theological spirit of Socrates, were the Cyrenaics, whom I 
 have already grouped on the religious side of the boundary, 
 but followed by the Stoics, who, still honoring the teachings of 
 Socrates, were gradually led into peculiarities of principle and 
 practice which assign them to a fitting place on the speculative 
 side of the boundary. On one side of these, however, were the 
 philosophers of the Middle Academy, and, on the other, the 
 Epicureans, for whom history has found a place among the 
 scoffers at religious faith ; and, finally, the open Skeptics, the 
 central idea of whose misnamed philosophy was universal 
 doubt. A few comprehensive characterizations must bring 
 us to a dismissal of these philosophies. Arcesilaus (315-241 
 B.C.) was the founder of the Middle Academy, but Carneades 
 (214-129 B.C.), the skeptic, gave it its character and fame. He 
 declared knowledge to be impossible, and constructed a philos- 
 ophy of the probable. Aristotle, the Peripatetic (born 384 
 B.C.), was a monotheist, holding to the eternity of matter and 
 the world, in which the mind of God is expressed in harmonies 
 and in structural relations. God, he teaches, is a spirit, the first 
 principle in the world, existing " not merely as a form imma- 
 nent in the world, like the order in an army, but also as an 
 absolute, self-existent substance, like the general in an army." 
 Theophrastus, a disciple, leaned toward the doctrine of di- 
 vine immanence in nature ; while Aristotle inclined to a belief 
 in divine transcendence. Eudemus devoted himself to theolo- 
 gy. Strato of Lampsacus (288 B.C.) transformed the doctrine 
 
64 STOICS AND EPICUREANS. 
 
 of Aristotle into a consistent naturalism. " The formation of 
 the world," he affirmed, " is the result of natural forces." Aris- 
 totelianism outcropped in Alexandria, and exerted a powerful 
 influence there for five centuries. During the Scholastic peri- 
 od, the dialectic of Aristotle was the favorite instrument for 
 the defense of doctrines ; and, to this day, the founder of the 
 Peripatetic School is reputed the creator of the science of 
 zoology, as he was the real inaugurator of the inductive pro- 
 cedure in the search for truth. 
 
 The Stoical School was founded by Zeno of Cittium (350- 
 258 B.C.). They held that the working force in the universe is 
 God. The beauty and adaptation of the world can only have 
 come from a thinking mind. They incline to the immanence 
 of the divine force. They discriminated the agreeable and the 
 morally good. In philosophy, they were sensationalists. Phys- 
 ics includes cosmology and theology. Whatever is real is ma- 
 terial. Matter and force are the two ultimate principles. The 
 cosmos undergoes periodical destructions and renovations. The 
 human soul is a part of the Deity a doctrine which reminds 
 us of Orientalism, and one which was singularly persistent 
 through the Middle Ages. 
 
 Stoicism was honored with a crowd of disciples. Nearly the 
 oldest of these was Cleanthes, author of the celebrated Hymn 
 to Jupiter. Two hundred years later, it secured a powerful 
 hold upon the Roman mind, and numbered among its adher- 
 ents the well-known names of Seneca (3-65 A.D.), Lucan (39- 
 
 65 A.D.), Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius. 
 
 Epicurus (371-270 B.C.) marks a decided antireligious turn 
 of philosophic thought. In natural philosophy he was an At- 
 omist. In psychology, he held perceptions, representations, 
 and feelings to be criteria of truth. In respect to theology, he 
 held it to be useless, as God is an unnecessary explanation of 
 phenomena. Every thing proceeds from natural causes. As 
 nothing can come from non-existence, and nothing which exists 
 
THE PYRRIIONISTS. 65 
 
 can cease to exist, the atoms of -which all things are made, and- 
 the space in which they eternally move, have existed from eter- 
 nity. The soul is material, and composed of fine atoms, and 
 has no existence after death. In ethics, he followed the Cy- 
 renaics, holding' happiness to be synonymous with pleasure, 
 and virtue the only sure and possible way to happiness. Stand- 
 ards of ethics are not innate, nor arbitrarily imposed, but are 
 the best judgments of the wise and good as to what is useful 
 to society. Among the numerous adherents of Epicureanism 
 were Apollodorus, author of more than four hundred books ; 
 some of the Ptolemies of Alexandria, Phsedrus, Lucretius, the 
 author of the poem " De Rerum Natura," and Virgil, who sets 
 forth Lucretian views in the ^Eneid. 
 
 The aphelion of philosophic thought was reached again in the 
 Skeptics. Pyrrho of Elis (about 360-270 B.C.), professing to 
 be disgusted with the conflicting and mutually destructive opin- 
 ions of the philosophers, pretended that all beliefs are a matter 
 of equal indifference ; and that every thing depends on human 
 institutions and customs. Timon (325-235 B.C.) considered 
 all the Greek philosophers babblers, except Xenophanes, who 
 had sought for real truth, and Pyrrho, who had found it. Our 
 perceptions and representations of things are neither true nor 
 false, and can therefore not be relied upon. 
 
 The Skeptics thus mark the extreme swing of the pendulum 
 of thought. We listen here to the echoes of the same voices 
 which spoke in the philosophy of the Sophists. The Third 
 Cycle was completed by steps parallel with those of the Second 
 Cycle. Socrates and Plato mark its highest religious develop- 
 ment, as the Ionics and Pythagoreans had done in the pre- 
 vious Cycle. Thus, also, the Cyrenaics, Stoics, Peripatetics, 
 and the Middle Academy stand collectively for the phase rep- 
 resented in the Eleatics ; and the Epicureans answer to the At- 
 omists, as the Skeptics to the Sophists. The Third Psychic 
 Cycle of Grecian history was real and complete. 
 
III. 
 
 INTERACTION OF THE RELIGIOUS AND INTELLECTUAL FAC- 
 ULTIES IN CHRISTIAN PSYCHIC HISTORY. 
 
 THE Skeptical spirit which completed the Third Psychic 
 Cycle in Greece survived and struggled into a new develop- 
 ment in the later skeptics; but even now a revulsion was at 
 hand. Another cycle of Grecian thought had already dawned. 
 This dawn we must regard as the morning rays of the FIRST 
 PSYCHIC CYCLE of Christian history. Its meridian was more 
 than a century in the future. Its Religious Phase is manifest 
 in three points of resurgence from the chaos of doubt. First, 
 the Eclectics, of whom, perhaps, Cicero is chief (106-43 B.C.), 
 manifested the initial movement ; second, the New Academy 
 brought Platonism back to its pristine spirituality ; third, Ju- 
 daism, working in Alexandria, leavened the Greek philosophy 
 which had found its way thither. 
 
 Cicero's Eclecticism consisted in his adhesion to the Skep- 
 tical theory of cognition taught by the Middle Academy ; his 
 indifference to physics, and his wavering attitude in ethics, 
 between the doctrines of the Stoics and the Peripatetics. He 
 held to the certainty of moral consciousness, and the doctrine 
 of innate ideas, and hence maintained that the consensus gen- 
 tium is a criterion of truth. He is particularly attached, like 
 Socrates, to the belief in Providence and immortality. The 
 Sextians, originating at Rome, were also Eclectic, arising about 
 the epoch of Christ, and holding a position equidistant from 
 Pythagoreanism, Cynicism, and Stoicism. 
 
 A somewhat more decided revival was inaugurated by Philo 
 of Larissa, the founder of the New Academy, during the life- 
 
JUDAISTIC THEO SOPHY. 67 
 
 time of Cicero. It is sufficient to note that in him the spirit 
 of Plato re-appeared in many of its original lineaments. This 
 affords Draper the opportunity to date the decline of Greek 
 philosophy from the opening of the New Academy. Antio- 
 chus of Ascalon, a successor of Philo, betrays already another 
 falling-off, as his teaching approximates that of the Stoics. 
 
 The most signal manifestation of the religious revival was 
 discerned upon the southern shore of the Mediterranean. It 
 grew into existence, like most of the great events of history, 
 from an insignificant beginning. Nebuchadnezzar had razed 
 Jerusalem, and a few poor exiles from the captive city had set- 
 tled in Egypt by permission of the government. By the time 
 of Ptolemy Philadelphus (284-247 B.C.) they had exchanged 
 their native language for the Greek. The occasion thus arose 
 for a Greek version of the Jewish Scriptures. This was under- 
 taken under the patronage of Ptolemy the principal canonical 
 writings being completed under Ptolemy Euergetes, 247 B.C., 
 and the Hagiographa as late as 136 B.C., and perhaps later. 
 Hebrew literature was thus made accessible in the popular 
 tongue. Ptolemy also received the translators with the high- 
 est honors, sometimes entertaining them at his royal table. 
 Under such circumstances, the literature and institutions of the 
 Jews became a favorite arid fruitful study; and their excel- 
 lencies were ingrafted, by degrees, upon the Greek systems ex- 
 tant in Alexandria. Aristobulus (181-145 B.C.) had already 
 written a commentary on the Pentateuch, and dedicated it to 
 Ptolemy Philometer. His faith was a compound of Judaism, 
 Aristotelianism, and Stoicism. He regarded the power of God 
 which dwells in the world as distinguished from his extramun- 
 dane, absolute existence. The progress of Judaistic theosophy 
 is notable in the Second Book of Maccabees a mixture of 
 Alexandrian dogmas and Jewish doctrines; in the society of 
 Essenes, who combined, with aspirations after the spirit of 
 prophecy, the abstemiousness of the Cynics and something of 
 
68 ALEXANDRIAN PHILOSOPHERS. 
 
 the mysticism of the Parsees ; in the Therapeutes, who believed 
 in prophecy, magic, celibacy, demons, monasticism, and pre-ex- 
 istence; and, most of all, in Philo the Jew (born about 25 B.C.), 
 whose philosophy was a blending of Platonism and Judaism. 
 Philo was eminently theistic. He aspired after the spirit of 
 prophecy, and maintained that God is accessible by direct intu- 
 ition. A lower degree of certainty is attainable, he thought, 
 through the aesthetic, or moral, and the teleological view of the 
 world. He rejects the doctrine of the incarnation of the Lo- 
 gos, though he regards the Logos as the instrument through 
 whom God formed the world. 
 
 With other signs of the coming revival must be reckoned 
 Neo-Pythagoreanism, which arose in the first century before 
 Christ. Introduced by P. Nigridius Figulus of Alexandria, its 
 best-known adherent was Apollonius of Tyana, who held that 
 the one God must be distinguished from other gods, and that 
 no offerings should be made to him. He is sometimes repre- 
 sented as a miracle-worker and soothsayer, ascetic in his hab- 
 its, and desirous of introducing reforms in morals and religion. 
 Philostratus has compared him to Jesus. 
 
 The Pythagorizing and Eclectic Platonists constitute another 
 link in the series leading toward spiritual light. They renewed 
 and further developed the Platonic doctrine of transcendence, 
 in especial opposition to Stoic Pantheism and Epicurean Natu- 
 ralism. Their ranks are illustrious with many well-known 
 names. Thrasyllus (died 36 A.D.), the grammarian, and arranger 
 of the Platonic dialogues; Plutarch (50-125 A.D.), who op- 
 posed the monism of the Stoics, and postulated two cosmical' 
 principles, God and matter ; Maximus (146 A.D.), Apuleius (born 
 126-132 A.D.), and Galen are the names of thinkers groping 
 toward the twilight already shining in their heavens. Celsus, 
 of the same philosophic school, opposed Christianity, and Nu- 
 menius held to three Gods the Father, the Son, and the Grand- 
 son. 
 
CHRISTIANITY AND SKEPTICISM. 69 
 
 The advent of Christ, and the rapid spread of his teachings, 
 furnish the proof that Christianity was, at length, the form of 
 religious faith for which the world was longing and groping. 
 Now the spirit of religion rose rapidly to its culmination, and 
 its influence was quickly felt in all the civilized countries of the 
 world. What were the doctrines of this new teacher, I need 
 not indicate. He founded a school, humanly speaking, which 
 has flourished with a vigor and persistence with which even the 
 schools of Plato and Aristotle may not be compared ; since all 
 their learning has been useful only as the instrument of propa- 
 gating the learning of the School of Christ. 
 
 True it is, nevertheless, that the intellect of man was not per- 
 manently satisfied with the simple and normal pretensions of 
 the faith of primitive Christianity. The dawn of the Intellect- 
 ual Phase of this cycle was even now apparent. The outspok- 
 en Skeptics of the philosophic world were foremost in oppos- 
 ing all religious belief. JEnesidernus, in the first century after 
 Christ, was the leader of the Latin Skeptics, and he was fol- 
 lowed and indorsed by Sextus Empiricus (200 A.D.); while the 
 Roman Favorinus, who lived under Hadrian, made theology, 
 and especially the doctrine of Providence, the object of especial 
 attack. The learned Varro (100 B.C.-28 A.D.), who wrote four 
 hundred and ninety books, regarded the anthropomorphic gods 
 as mere emblems of the forces of matter. Though counted 
 with the Skeptics, his Skepticism was rather opposed to the 
 popular mythology than to the spirit of rising Christianity. 
 
 A more conspicuous, if not a more radical, lapse is noticea- 
 ble in the rise of Neo-Platonism. This was a theosophy which 
 waged a conflict with the increasing power of Christianity^ 1 ) 
 It was the expiring effort of Greek philosophy. It took its 
 stand first in Alexandria. Afterward it broke out in a Syrian 
 
 (') This period witnessed the "First Great Crisis " of the Christian faith 
 (Farrar, " History of Free Thought," Lecture II.). 
 
70 NEO-PLATONISM, 
 
 School, and, about the same time, planted itself in Athens. 
 The Alexandrian - Roman School was founded by Ammonius 
 Saccas (175-250 A.D.), who was brought up a Christian. Fol- 
 lowing him were Origen the Platonist, and Origen the Chris- 
 tian (185-254 A.D.), and Longinus the grammarian. Plotinus 
 (204-269 A.D.) taught at Rome, and brought Neo-Platonic doc- 
 trine to a system. He was an ascetic, and eat no flesh. He 
 carried idealism to an extreme. He was not, by any means, 
 an opposer of religion, but rather an erratic and vagarist. He 
 held that " the business of man is to return to God, whom he, 
 as a sensuous being, has estranged from himself. The means 
 by which this return is to be accomplished are virtue, philo- 
 sophic thought, and, above all, the immediate, ecstatic intuition 
 of God, and the becoming one with him." Porphyry (born 
 232-'33 A.D.), though holding that the end of philosophizing 
 is the salvation of the soul, and believing in the mysticism of 
 Plotinus, wrote a book against Christianity, opposing especially 
 the divinity of Jesus. 
 
 The Syrian School was simply a fanatic theurgy, with an 
 exuberance of religious faith misguided and superstitious 
 which makes it a smaller cycle superimposed upon the ascend- 
 ing aspect of the Intellectual Phase, which was now in progress. 
 Jamblichus (died about 330 A.D.) held fully to the polytheistic 
 cultus, and practiced magic and necromancy. Hypatia, the last 
 of this school (415 A. D.), though the teacher of Synesius, the 
 Christian Father, died, herself, in a Christian city, a martyr to 
 polytheism. 
 
 In the Athenian School of Neo-Platonism, the theoretical ele- 
 ment was again dominant. It was founded by Plutarch, son of 
 Nestorius (350-433) ; it embraced, among its successive schol- 
 archs, Proclus (born 411), who wrote a book against the Chris- 
 tians, and was expelled by them from Athens ; and ended with 
 Damascius, the last teacher of Greek philosophy at Athens. The 
 edict of Justinian closed the Athenian schools in 529 A.D. The 
 
GNOSTICISM. 71 
 
 teaching of Christianity closed over the chasm as if no void had 
 been produced by the extinction of a system which had reigned 
 in the world for eleven hundred years. 
 
 Meantime intellect had begun to assert itself as against the 
 claims of faith, even within the Church itself. The Intellectual 
 Phase here was Patristic ; and Patristicism was Neo-Platonistic. 
 It represents a unity of philosophy and faith. Early in the 
 second century after Christ, Neander tells us, a diminished 
 power and purity of the religious spirit had become apparent. 
 There was a striving after forms and norms -just as we see it 
 in the century succeeding Luther. Ritschl'thinks the Catholic 
 Church grew out of this struggle. 
 
 But especially did the spirit of speculation grow rife ; and 
 Gnosticism was one of its fruits. This was a theosophy an 
 attempt to advance from Christian faith to Christian knowl- 
 edge. It philosophized on the relation of Christianity to Ju- 
 daism and Hellenism. The various objects of religious belief 
 were made personal beings, and a semi - Christian mythology 
 was organized. In the more heterodox branch of Gnostics, we 
 rank Simon Magus ; Basilides, who elaborated a system of the- 
 osophy ; Valentinus (140 A.D.), who prepared an organon ; Car- 
 pocrates (160 A.D.), who taught a universalistic rationalism; 
 also the Ophites and Perates and the Bardessanes (154-224), 
 who simplified the Gnostic doctrine. In the more orthodox 
 branch, we reckon Flavius Justinus (150 A.D.), the philosophical 
 apologist for Christianity, who held that the idea of God is in- 
 nate, as well as the most general moral ideas ; and with him, 
 the other apologists, Quadratus, Aristides, Melito (170), Bishop 
 of Sardis, who declares Christianity to be a philosophy ; Apol- 
 lonius, Miltiades, Aristo, Tatian (160-170), who reviles Hellenic 
 literature and philosophy; and Athenagoras (176-177), who, 
 like Tyler and Lewis, appeals to Greek poets and philosophers 
 against polytheism, and makes a first attempt at a priori proof 
 of the unity of God. Among others concerned in the intellect- 
 
 4 
 
72 EARLY CHRISTIAN FATHERS. 
 
 ual movement may be mentioned Hermias (about 225 A.D.), a 
 quasi-eclectic Platonist, but a weak philosopher; Clement of 
 Alexandria, who appropriated what was good in Gnosticism ; 
 Origen (185-254), who elaborated the first body of Christian 
 faith ; Lactantius, author of " Institutiones Divine," and the 
 long list of theologians who engaged in the controversies re- 
 specting Monarchianism, Ebionitism, Patripassianism, Sabelli- 
 anism, and Arianism terms which are the signs of various 
 heresies respecting the Trinity. 
 
 Such progress of free thought, even within the body of the 
 Church itself, prompts us to the anticipation of another tide of 
 religious zeal. The theosophists, orthodox and heterodox, close 
 the FIRST PSYCHIC CYCLE of Christian history. 
 
 Irenaeus, Tertullian, and the First Council of Nice signalize 
 the Religious Phase of the SECOND PSYCHIC CYCLE. Irenseus 
 (140-202), famous as an opponent of the Gnostics, was one of 
 the chief founders of the Catholic Church, whose doctrines had 
 become consolidated about 175 A.D. Jews and Jewish Chris- 
 tians had been expelled from Jerusalem as early as 135 A.D., 
 after the rising under the lead of Bar-Kochba; and now Jew- 
 ish Christians were joined with ultra-Pauline Antinomians and 
 Gnostics in denunciation for heresy. Tertullian (160-220), the 
 extreme and merciless opponent of heretical thinking, had al- 
 ready prompted ecclesiastical authority to lift its voice. Phi- 
 losophy had been pronounced by him " the mother of heresies." 
 Jerusalem must be more completely separated from Athens 
 the Church from the Academy. It was Tertullian who reach- 
 ed the unenviable pinnacle of credulous folly in the saying, 
 Credo quia absurdum est. And yet, with all his passionate 
 and blindfold orthodoxy, he maintained that " all which is real 
 is material." Even God and the soul were composed of mat- 
 ter. Tertullian and Tatian went to the greatest extremes in 
 placing faith and philosophy in antagonism with each other. 
 
 In full consonance with 4he dogmatic spirit of Tertullian, 
 
PHILOSOPHIZING FATHERS. 73 
 
 the First Council of Nice, in 325 A.D., established a positive 
 rule of belief ; and by a relentless dictum crashed out heresies 
 which argument had not been able to silence. Gregory of 
 Nyssa (331-394) was the first to harness philosophy to the 
 service of establishing the complex of orthodox doctrines. In 
 the doctrine of the divine essence, as distinct from the persons 
 in the Trinity, he anticipates the School-men. With him we 
 associate Cyprian (200-258), Hilarius, the champion of Atha- 
 nasianism in the West yet holding to the materiality of the 
 soul ; Cassianus, Faustus, Bishop of Regium, and Gennadius, 
 all of like belief ; Gregory of Nazianzen, Basil the Great, and 
 Methodius, in whose hands philosophic thought became more 
 enslaved to ecclesiastical dogma. 
 
 Before the intellect, however, had been repressed to that 
 state of abject servitude which marks the scholastic % ages, we 
 witness a reaction which I note as the Intellectual Phase of 
 this cycle. Aurelius Augustine (354-430) was one of the pro- 
 foundest philosophers, as he was the most eminent theologian, 
 of Christian antiquity ; and while it is not necessary to repro- 
 duce the detail of his teaching, I deem it safe to adopt St. Au- 
 gustine as the exponent of a noble and manly movement in the 
 realm of thought. Synesius cut loose from the doctrines of 
 the final destruction of the world and the resurrection of the 
 dead, and inclined to a belief in pre-existence. Numenius, also 
 (about 450 A.D.), believed in pre-existence, and denied the final 
 catastrophe, while on other points he agreed with the Neo-Pla- 
 tonists and Aristotle. Multiplied were the labors, and many 
 the names, of the theologians who appeared upon the field be- 
 tween the years 500 and 800 A.D. such as ^Eneas of Gaza, the 
 Neo- Platonic Christian dogmatist; Joannes Philoponus, who 
 pronounced the ideas of Plato the thoughts of God ; Joannes 
 Damascenus (700 A.D.), who wrote a system of theology long 
 in use ; Boethius (470-526), the Neo-Platonic Christian ; Beda, 
 the Anglo-Saxon (673-735), and, finally, Alcuin (736-804), who 
 
74 SALIENT POINTS OF THIRD CYCLK 
 
 founded the " cloister schools," in which were taught the sep- 
 tem artes ac disciplince liberates. 
 
 The SECOND PSYCHIC CYCLE of Christian history here ends, 
 and the THIRD begins. The Third Cycle runs on through the 
 periods of transition to Scholasticism, the full dominion of 
 Scholasticism and the Renaissance, down to the epoch of the 
 French Revolution in 1790. The Religious Phase is signalized 
 by the strengthening, and, finally, complete ascendency of eccle- 
 siastical authority in matters of opinion, resisted occasionally 
 by individuals, at the peril of their personal liberty, and even 
 their lives, and provoking three historical revolts that of the 
 Albigenses, in 1207 ; that under Wiclif, in 1376 ; and that led 
 by Luther, who shattered the power of unreasoning tyranny, 
 and opened the way for the rehabilitation of free thought. 
 The Intellectual Phase may be regarded as beginning with what 
 is known as the Revival of Letters, quickened by new methods 
 of investigation ; rewarded and aggrandized by new discoveries 
 in geography, astronomy, geology, and other sciences ; strength- 
 ened and rationalized by the promulgation of the great philo- 
 sophic systems of Bacon, Descartes, Spinoza, Locke, Leibnitz, 
 and Wolf ; and, finally, according to the law of progressive as- 
 sumption and self-aggrandizement, reaching that pitch of 
 haughty domination over the cowed but indestructible relig- 
 ious nature of man which broke forth in the blasphemous and 
 bloody atheism of the " Reign of Terror." 
 
 This Religious Phase of Christian history exhibits a marked 
 tendency to a subjective divorce of philosophy and faith, ac- 
 companied by an outward subservience of philosophy to faith. 
 Hitherto they had been identical. The religious system had 
 been one which all reason could defend ; but, with the adop- 
 tion of articles of faith more or less extraneous and incongru- 
 ous, faith and philosophy came more and more frequently into 
 collision. The final establishment of an arbitrary standard of 
 belief left philosophy no field for exercise, except the defense 
 
PHILOSOPHIC vs. RELIGIOUS TRUTHS. 75 
 
 of dogmatic faith. Wherever philosophy and theology -came 
 into collision, philosophy must yield to the dictum of the 
 Councils ; and obedience was enforced even under pains of im- 
 prisonment, torture, and the fagot. But intellect was still 
 forced, by a law of its nature, to discern evidence and draw 
 conclusions. If the judgment were right, how could the con- 
 clusion be resisted ? The Church was infallible, and how could 
 its edicts be gainsaid ? Were there two orders of truth the 
 one apprehended by reason, the other promulgated by author- 
 ity and received by faith ? This was the despairing conclusion 
 of the thinkers of the Middle Ages. This conviction tacitly 
 runs through all their writings. Philosophy and science, they 
 say, teach thus and so ; but they do not reach to the domain 
 of religious truth. By faith we hold to such and such opin- 
 ions. Such a record has been left behind by Aquinas, Scotus, 
 and Newton. Such recognition of conflict was acted on, but 
 seldom avowed. Pomponatius (1495) openly declared that the 
 Catholic creed should not seek defense from reason that, in 
 fact, there are two species of truth ; and for this he was taken 
 in hand by the Lateran Council. 
 
 Erigena (born 800-820 A.D.) first taught that the dicta of 
 the Fathers must be adopted as law ; and, though he professes 
 to regard true philosophy as identical with true religion, he be- 
 trays the prevailing disposition to leave religion to determine 
 what is true philosophy. Toward the close of the eleventh 
 century arose a marked intellectual movement, represented by 
 such names as Berengarius (990-1088), who took rationalistic 
 views of the LordVsupper ; Roscellinus, who was led through 
 Nominalism to Tritheism ; and Abelard (1079-1142), who failed 
 in respect for the authority of the Fathers. But the ecclesias- 
 tical power was vigilant and ready. Roscellinus was summon- 
 ed before the Council of Soissons in 1092, and forced to re- 
 cant ; and Abelard was condemned by the Synod of Soissons 
 in 1121, and the Synod of Sens in 1140. The close of the epi- 
 
76 DOGMATIC AND RATIONAL FAITH. 
 
 cycle( 1 ) was marked by Amalric (died 1206-1207) and his 
 followers, who philosophized somewhat pantheistically. Their 
 doctrines were, however, condemned by the Synod of Paris in 
 1209, and the Lateran Council of 1215. A ban was also 
 placed on Erigena, and on the physics, and afterward the met- 
 aphysics, of Aristotle. 
 
 Ecclesiasticism was now installed in supreme power. The 
 dialectic of Aristotle, after serving the ends of the adversaries 
 of the Church for a thousand years, was gradually brought into 
 the service of the Church ; but not without many a misgiving, 
 and many a protest. Alexander of Hales (died 1245) set the first 
 conspicuous example. Albertus Magnus (born 1193) remodel- 
 ed the philosophy of Aristotle to suit the requirements of the 
 Church. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) drew out most sharp- 
 ly the antithesis between dogmatic and rational faith. Yet he 
 maintained that the dogmatic faith was simply unapproachable 
 by reason, not contrary to it. Duns Scotus (died 1308), while 
 not affirming the antagonism of reason and faith, goes beyond 
 Aquinas in relegating theological propositions to the category 
 of the unprovable. William of Occam (died 1347), however, 
 lifted his arm against the cherished axiom of the conformity 
 of faith to reason ; and, though his works were proscribed by 
 the University of Paris in 1339, the twofold character of truth 
 was generally recognized among Averroists and Alexandrists at 
 the end of the fifteenth century, especially in Northern Italy. 
 Among these, Pomponacci is most conspicuous and worthy. 
 The Lateran Council, nevertheless, in 1512, condemned the dis- 
 tinction between the two orders of truth, and pronounced ev- 
 ery thing false which was in conflict with revelation as inter- 
 preted by the Church. ( 2 ) Luther (1483-1546) broke the pow- 
 
 (') This period is styled by Farrar the Second Great Crisis in the history 
 of Christian Faith (Farrar, " History of Free Thought," Lecture III.). 
 ( 2 ) This claim of the consistency of faith and philosophy, at the same 
 
LUTHER, MELANCHTHON, AND CALVIN. 77 
 
 er of the Romish Church, without fully enfranchising human 
 thought. In his own person, he represents merely a change of 
 masters. " The Sorbonne," he complains, " has propounded the 
 extremely reprehensible doctrine that whatever is demonstrated 
 as true in philosophy must also be accepted as true in theolo- 
 gy." Toward philosophy and science Luther manifested a hos- 
 tility as fierce as had been shown by any of the Scholastics.^) 
 Melanchthon (1497-1560) also opposed philosophy at first; 
 but soon discovered that philosophy alone could reduce the 
 new religious movement to an effective system ; and Luther, at 
 a later period, acquiesced convinced perhaps by a reflex ac- 
 tion of the free spirit which he had himself evoked, and which 
 was destined to gather strength with the unfolding of the new 
 ideas which now began to fill the world. Of the intolerance 
 of Calvin and other apostles of the Reformation I need not 
 speak ; nor of the bitter and despairing contest waged by Ro- 
 manism with the rising power of science. ( 2 ) The characteristic 
 
 time that sheer authority pretends to dictate faith and enchain intellect, 
 is evidently equivalent to a confession of conflict between intellect and the 
 faith imposed upon it. This relation of the two great factors in psychic 
 history is, therefore, the reciprocal of that in which intellect, affirming, sim- 
 ilarly, a conflict with faith, presumes to prune the creed so far as to trench 
 upon beliefs which are universal and inoppugnable. Between these antip- 
 odal states of conflict lie two states in which the combatants observe an 
 armistice. In both, the full authority of reason is recognized ; but in one, 
 the authority of the Church is held of equal weight, and hence the system 
 of truth is conceived to be a duality ; in the other, the authority of the 
 Church is held to be null when it contravenes the dictates of reason, and 
 the system of truth is conceived as a unity. In the former, the combat- 
 ants agree to disagree ; in the latter, they recognize each other as allies. 
 
 (!) Ueberweg, "History of Philosophy," vol. ii., p. 17. Luther and Me- 
 lanchthon were both violently hostile to the Copernican system in astron- 
 omy. See the references in President White's exhaustive paper on " The 
 Warfare of Science," in The Popular Science Monthly for February, 1876, 
 p. 394, and in a later separate issue. 
 
 ( 2 ) On this subject see the paper by President White, already cited ; as 
 
78 REVIVAL OF LETTERS. 
 
 features of this prolonged Religious Phase gradually fade out 
 as the sun of modern science rises in the heavens ; and ecclesi- 
 astical authority recedes, at first, to its normal, unaggressive at- 
 titude, and then, in turn, crouches beneath the bitter and vin- 
 dictive revilings of a mad and resurgent spirit of freethinking. 
 
 The rise of the Intellectual Phase of this cycle may be traced 
 back to the time of Roger Bacon (1214-1294), who "prefer- 
 red to study nature rather than busy himself in scholastic sub- 
 tleties." He atoned, however, for his opposition to the spirit 
 of the times by ten years of imprisonment.^) Eckart (born 
 after 1250), a chief of the German Mystics, in his independ- 
 ent attitude, was a forerunner of modern science ; and, through 
 his ethics, prepared the way for the Reformation. He affirmed 
 that all religious truth lies within the sphere of human reason. 
 
 The " revival of letters " was now fairly inaugurated. The 
 new literary movement was largely due to the removal into 
 Italy of learned men from Greece and Constantinople. The 
 Greeks and Arabs had always kept alive an acquaintance with 
 the learning of antiquity. The Eastern Christians and the Mo- 
 hammedans had long since revolted against the decrees of the 
 early Church ; and the latter, especially, had developed an In- 
 tellectual Phase to which Europe now became largely indebted. 
 Alkendi (870), Alfarabi (died 950), Avicenna (born 980), and 
 Algazel (born 1059) in the East, and Averroes (1126-1198) in 
 the West, exerted an influence which had now spread over the 
 whole of the civilized world. Averroism, especially, asserted 
 
 well as Draper, " The Intellectual Development of Europe," and " The Con- 
 flict between Religion and Science." 
 
 (') Roger Bacon was one of the most remarkable intellects which the 
 world has produced. He is far more worthy than his pompous and pam- 
 pered namesake, of two centuries later, to be regarded as the restorer of 
 the inductive method of scientific investigation. For a full notice of Friar 
 Bacon and his " Opus Majus," see Whewell, " History of the Inductive 
 Sciences," vol. i., p. 512-522. 
 
INTELLECTUAL QUICKENING. 79 
 
 its presence in much of the philosophy and theology of the 
 world down to a recent period. Numerous contributions to 
 science were also introduced from Arabia. Now, also, occurred 
 a renewal of industrial and commercial activity. Now arose 
 free cities and free citizens. Now a new secular form of cult- 
 ure grew up. "All the natural and moral sentiments proceed- 
 ing from contact of man with man were brought into promi- 
 nence in poetry and increased in importance." To these re- 
 sults Dante (1265-1321), Petrarch (1304-1374), and Boccac- 
 cio (1313-1375) greatly contributed. A wonderfully increased 
 mental activity next resulted from the invention of the art of 
 printing, in 1440; and then the discovery of America thrilled 
 the civilized world with new ideas, new projects, and new ac- 
 tivities. In consonance with the developing spirit of original 
 inquiry, Vives (1492-1540), returning to the ancient method 
 of Aristotle, proclaimed, as Friar Bacon had done, that nature 
 could only be known through direct investigation by way of 
 experiment and observation. To make no further allusion to 
 the revolution endogenous within the field of philosophy and 
 theology, we can not overlook the influence of the external 
 pressure exerted upon the scholastic system by the develop- 
 ment of the germs of science which had been planted by Friar 
 Bacon, Vives, Cesalpino (1509-1603), Columbus (1435-1506), 
 and Vanini (1585-1619, burned at the stake for naturalism). 
 Cusanus (1401-1464) had revived the idea of the earth's axial 
 rotation. Copernicus (1473-1543) established the heliocentric 
 theory in astronomy. Kepler (1571-1630) discovered the fun- 
 damental laws of planetary motion. Leonardo da Vinci (1452 
 -1519), as Hallam says, "within the compass of a few pages 
 anticipated almost all the discoveries which have been made in 
 science from Galileo to the contemporary geologists." Gas- 
 sendi (1592-1655), the medieval Epicurean, is the stepping- 
 stone, in popular estimation, between Lucretius and Tyndall. 
 Telesio (1508-1588) abandoned the disputatious philosophy 
 
 4* 
 
 ' 
 
 * T ^T W Y* 
 
 ' 
 
80 A QUESTIONING SPIRIT ARISING. 
 
 for the original investigation of nature ; and founded at Na- 
 ples the Academia Telesiana, the prototype of all modern acad- 
 emies of science. Bruno (1548-1600) was another monadist 
 the prototype of Leibnitz ; for his monads were both psychical 
 and material. He suffered, however, for his pantheism ; for he 
 rotted several years in the dungeons of the Inquisition, and was 
 finally burned at the stake (1600). Thomas Carnpanella also 
 (1568-1639) was persecuted and imprisoned thirty years for 
 the heresy of maintaining that we have a twofold revelation of 
 God Nature and the Bible. The service of Galileo (1564- 
 1641) to modern science needs but mention. Sir David Brews- 
 ter regards him as possessed of greater merit than Lord Ba- 
 con in the establishment of an inductive philosophy ; and Biot 
 pronounces Bacon worthless in comparison. Newton (1642- 
 1727) may be regarded the last great light of science preceding 
 the French Revolution. 
 
 The independence of the modern philosophic spirit began 
 now to be sensibly felt. Persecutions for opinion's sake had 
 nearly ceased. Macchiavelli (1469) made war on the Church as 
 an obstacle to the unity and freedom of his country. Mon- 
 taigne (1533-1589), while admitting the necessity of a revela- 
 tion, attacked Christianity insidiously, and revived the spirit of 
 speculative skepticism. Taurellus (1547-1606) returned to the 
 Platonic attempt to rationalize the doctrines of the Trinity and 
 creation. Hobbes was a strict sensationalist, and a skeptic in 
 philosophy and religion. Descartes (1596-1650) made the 
 fact of thinking his point of departure for the erection of a 
 deductive system in this, following Augustine, Occam, and 
 Campanella. His doctrines were prohibited by the Synod of 
 Dordrecht in 1656, and his writings were placed in the "In- 
 dex Librorum Prohibitorum " at Rome in 1663 ; while in 1671 
 a royal order forbade the teaching of Cartesianism in the Uni- 
 versity of Paris. Bayle (1647-1706) employed the early Prot- 
 estant principle of the contradiction between reason and faith 
 
SKEPTICISM OUTSPOKEN. 81 
 
 always a blind and fatal admission to expose the absurd- 
 ities incorporated in the orthodox system. Spinoza (1632- 
 1677) transformed the Cartesian dualism into a pantheism, 
 whose fundamental conception was the unity of substance. 
 Locke (1632-1704), the eminent sensationalist, laid the founda- 
 tion on which Berkeley (1684-1753) erected his system of uni- 
 versal immaterialism or idealism; while Hartley (1704-1757), 
 on the same basis, reared a system of materialism ; and Priest- 
 ley (1733-1804) accepted this materialism without renouncing 
 the Christian faith. Leibnitz (1646-1716), while professing 
 a moderate orthodoxy, introduced into his monadology princi- 
 ples and assumptions which have rendered service to religious 
 doubters. He had a multitudinous following ; but is indebted 
 to Wolf (1679-1754) for the compilation of his system. Les- 
 sing (1729-1781) offered a rationalizing interpretation of the 
 Trinity and other Christian doctrines. 
 
 The skeptical bent of French philosophy was even more de- 
 cided than that of English and German thinking. The object- 
 ive point of attack was the system of received dogmas, and the 
 prevailing tyranny exercised both in Church and State. Fon- 
 tenelle (1657-1757), by his popular discourses on the Plural- 
 ity of Worlds, had rooted the new astronomy in the common 
 mind. Voltaire (1694-1778) had been foremost in populariz- 
 ing the Newtonian doctrines, and had brought the antagonism 
 of the Church (both Catholic and Protestant) to Copernican- 
 ism well-nigh to a bitter crisis. Maupertius (1698-1759), by 
 the measurement of a degree of latitude in Lapland, contrib- 
 uted to the prosperity of encroaching science. Montesquieu 
 (1689-1775) lifted up his voice against absolutism equally in 
 Church and State. Rousseau (1712-1778), a materialist and 
 pantheist, would raze all modern systems to the ground, and 
 start the work of reconstruction from a new chaos. Mettrie 
 (l 709-1 751), the forerunner of Bain and Maudsley, traced all 
 psychical activities to the bodily organization. Condillac (1715 
 
82 FliENCH SKEPTICS. 
 
 -1780) threw a substructure under this psychology, by surpass- 
 ing Locke in denominating all knowlege " but transformed sen- 
 sations." Bonnet (1720-1793) attempted to stand with one 
 foot on the land and one on the sea; but did not succeed to 
 the satisfaction of his generation. Diderot (1713-1784) and 
 D'Alembert, the editors of the " Encyclopedic," were brilliant 
 skeptics the former pantheistic, the latter revolutionary. Con- 
 dorcet (1743-1794) preached the gospel of pure reason. Ro- 
 binet (1735-1820) denied divine personality. Helvetius (1715 
 -1771) founded his ethics on self-love. Buffon (l 707-1 788) 
 cherished an unavowed belief in Naturalism, and cultivated 
 physiology and psychology in a materialistic sense. Hume 
 (1711-1777) was an empiric and a doubter denying the pos- 
 sibility of attaining to a knowledge of God's existence or the 
 soul's immortality. D'Holbach (1723-1789) wrote the chef- 
 d'oeuvre of materialism, embodying every thing which was het- 
 erodox in La Mettrie, Condillac, Diderot, and Helvetius. Fi- 
 nally, the fruitage of this luxuriant crop of skepticism ripened, 
 and the world beheld it in the carnage and blasphemy of the 
 Revolution of 1790, which Volney (1757-1820), impenitent to 
 the end, pronounced a just attempt to realize the ideal of the 
 rule of reason. 
 
 In this national and civil chaos we reach the end of the 
 Third Psychic Cycle of Christian history, and begin the FOURTH. 
 It will not be necessary to trace the course of the agencies and 
 the agents concerned in the revival of a normal religious faith. 
 Suffice it to say that the religious consciousness of the civilized 
 world manifested a revulsion. The tyranny of undevout reason 
 had passed the limits of endurance. God, as a personal power, 
 was again recognized ; pantheism in its protean forms was tram- 
 pled under righteous feet ; Deity and the soul ceased to be mon- 
 ads ; thought and volition were no longer the products of exos- 
 mose, endosmose, and secretion ; earthy slime ceased to gener- 
 ate worms, and the gospel of Lamarck was laid upon the shelf. 
 
RECENT INTELLECTUAL MOVEMENT. 83 
 
 The close of the Religious Phase, and the beginning of the 
 Intellectual one, may perhaps be ^regarded as marked by the 
 appearance of the anonymous "Vestiges of Creation" (1842) ; 
 and its march as denoted by the establishment of the geolog- 
 ical doctrine of the great age of the world ; uniformitarianism 
 and progressive development in the ancient history of the 
 world ; the unity of the history of the solar system, and, in 
 its methods, of the entire cosmos; the establishment of the 
 nebular theory ; the doctrine of the transmutation and conser- 
 vation of energy ; the unity of the material forces ; the theory 
 of the physiological origin of psychic phenomena; the doc- 
 trines of heterogenesis, derivation of species, and universal evo- 
 lution, with or without the exclusion of divine intervention. 
 These, however tenable or untenable some of the theories may 
 be, are the exponents of a recent intellectual movement, which, 
 if we interpret the history of thought correctly, has recurred 
 time and again in the experience of our race ; and is destined, 
 like other intellectual phases, to be superseded by the return 
 of a normal trust in the authority of our religious intuitions ; 
 a regenerated, a broader and stronger religious faith, and an 
 actual progress toward a standard of absolute truth. 
 
 The FIRST PSYCHIC CYCLE of Christian history was char- 
 acterized by the earnest search of Thought for a worthy form 
 of Religious Faith. Its Religious Phase was Apostolicism, 
 and its Intellectual Phase, Heresism. The SECOND PSYCHIC 
 CYCLE was characterized by the Unity of Thought and Faith. 
 Its Religious Phase was Tertullianism, and its Intellectual 
 Phase was Augustinism. The THIRD PSYCHIC CYCLE was 
 characterized by the Servitude of Thought to Faith. Its Re- 
 ligious Phase was Scholasticism, and its Intellectual Phase was 
 the Renaissance. The FOURTH PSYCHIC CYCLE has been char- 
 acterized by the Divorce of Thought from Faith. Its Relig- 
 ious Phase has been Protestantism, and its Intellectual Phase 
 Naturalism. The next Psychic Cycle, it seems to me, will wit- 
 
84 THE NEXT CYCLE. 
 
 ness a Synthesis of Thought and Faith a recognition of the 
 fact that it is impossible for reason to find solid ground that 
 is not consecrated ground; that all philosophy and all science 
 belong to religion ; that all truth is a revelation of God ; that 
 the truths of written revelation, if not intelligible to reason, 
 are nevertheless consonant with reason ; and that Divine agen- 
 cy, instead of standing removed from man by infinite intervals 
 of time and space, is, indeed, the true name of those energies 
 which work their myriad phenomena in the natural world 
 around us. This consummation at once the inspiration of 
 a fervent religion and the prophecy of the loftiest science is 
 to be the noontide reign of wedded Intellect and Faith, whose 
 morning rays already stream far above our horizon. 
 
SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY IN RELIGION. 
 
IV. 
 
 THE DOCTRINE OF CAUSALITY. 
 1. Original Causation. 
 
 THE lengthy, and yet synoptical, sketch of the historical 
 interactions of Intellect and Faith presented in the last two 
 lectures was little more than a bald digest of recorded facts. 
 Want of time prohibited, and still prohibits, the utterance of 
 many things calculated to qualify broad statements, to add to 
 the evidence, and strengthen the argument. It would have been 
 gratifying to note more particularly the progress of scientific 
 development in post-scholastic times ; the influence of the dis- 
 covery and settlement of America, and the successful war for 
 independence in the United States ; the great influence of mar- 
 itime discovery the doubling of the Cape of Good Hope, the 
 discovery of the Pacific Ocean, and the circumnavigation of 
 the globe. It would be gratifying, also, to note the real serv- 
 ice which was performed for literature and classical learning, 
 for philosophy and the dialectic art, by the Romish Church 
 during the Middle Ages; to trace the history of medieval 
 thought among the Nestorians, the Mohammedans, and the 
 Jews ; and, while illustrating the laws of the Interaction of the 
 two great forces of humanity, to acknowledge our indebtedness 
 to Eastern influences for the Revival of Letters. (') It would 
 
 (') Some of these topics are treated with great originality by Draper in 
 " The Intellectual Development of Europe." See, also, Whewell, " Histo- 
 ry of the Inductive Sciences." These two authorities, however, are wide- 
 ly apart in their estimate of the indebtedness of civilization to Arabian 
 thought. But see Hallam, " Literature of Europe," vol. i. 
 
88 THINGS UNSAID. 
 
 be agreeable, if not highly desirable, to guard myself against 
 misconstruction when, in sketching the progress of religious 
 phases, I have found myself under the necessity of tracing 
 them into ceremonialism and sacerdotalism, sometimes fanati- 
 cism, and of tener a rigorous surveillance over the intellect. It 
 might be well for me to guard myself against misinterpretation 
 when, in sketching the progress of an intellectual phase, I have 
 had to bring frecthinking, materialism, pantheism or some form 
 of recognized heresy, into an antithesis with religious excesses 
 as if sound intelligence must necessarily be heretical and anti- 
 religious. 
 
 In reference to this, I fall back upon the general proposi- 
 tions enunciated in my first lecture for explanation and de- 
 fense. Both these forces have the right to existence and free 
 , action. It is the law of faith to encroach upon intellect ; and 
 the law of intellect to assert its freedom, and even to retaliate. 
 This interaction is an ordination of Heaven, and is beneficent ; 
 it is the condition of the approximation of man toward high 
 ideals of religion and knowledge. These two forces must, nev- 
 ertheless, learn to respect each other ; and each, must feel that 
 its own welfare is bound up in the tolerance and highest activ- 
 ity of the other. Without intelligence, religion degenerates into 
 a fetichism, which is next to the negation of religion. With- 
 out religious faith dwelling and acting in the human heart, so- 
 ciety sinks to a level where even intelligence expires in the 
 ruins of public and private morality. There is a system of be- 
 neficent correlations and co-operations between Intellect and 
 Faith which all interests urge us to recognize and cherish. 
 There are services which intellect is able to render to religious 
 faith, which faith ought to be eager to secure ; and, dropping 
 all mediaeval fancies or fears in reference to possible contradic- 
 tions in the system of truth, cheerfully, cordially, and, interest- 
 edly accept the complete and indissoluble unity of truth, and, 
 as a corollary, the sacredness of all truth which God has ordain- 
 
BASIS OF CO-OPERATION. 89 
 
 cd to exist. On this platform we can bid investigation god- 
 speed, and hail with gratitude every trophy which it brings 
 back to us from the field of the unknown fearing nothing 
 which reason can prove true, but only that which reason is ca- 
 pable of proving erroneous assured always that the time will 
 come when all which science can establish will be counted an 
 indispensable auxiliary to a purified and robust faith. 
 
 I have not the vanity to think that, after all the earnest en- 
 deavor and loyal aspiration which have marked the twenty 
 centuries of reflective thought, I am the first to discover the 
 methods in which the interests of Faith may be subserved by 
 the efforts of Intellect. I venerate the names which shine in 
 the skies which have bent over other generations of men ; and 
 after the survey which I have taken of the profound intellect- 
 ual labors of the hundreds who have gone before, no less ear- 
 nest and far more able than I, it seems fitting that I should drop 
 the pen, and silence the tongue, and listen reverently to the 
 voices which come up from antiquity ; from the cloisters of the 
 Middle Ages ; from the retirement of the philosophers whose 
 wisdom has led us out into this light in which we exult, I fear, 
 with less of gratitude than of pride. But I can not rest inact- 
 ive. The throbs of brain, like the pulsations of the luminifer- 
 ous ether, can not be stilled. Be it better or worse than others 
 have done, the brain, as long as it lives, must work. May In- 
 finite Wisdom and Goodness open the way to eternal truth ! 
 
 I have said that faith in God is a living principle in the life 
 of humanity. Whence comes this faith ? 
 
 I deny, first, that it grows out of a superstitious fear of in- 
 visible powers, as taught by Hobbes, Comtc, Lubbock, Biich- 
 ner, and a few others. I deny, in the second place, that it is a 
 feeling descended from an ancient veneration for ancestors, or 
 for the wise and good, as taught by Euhemerus, Burton, and 
 some others. I deny, thirdly, that it is a faith inculcated or 
 enforced by those who peopled Olympus with divinities, to in- 
 
90 WHENCE THE IDEA OF GOD? 
 
 spire obedience to the laws of society and the State, as Critias, 
 Mutius Scaevola, Pyrrho, and others of the ancients asserted. 
 I deny, fourthly, that it is a sentiment derived originally from 
 inspired revelation, propagated by the chosen people of God, 
 and quite unfelt among tribes whom the messages of the Bible 
 have never reached. I hold, with nearly all the philosophers 
 of antiquity, with Spencer and Tyndall and Huxley, and near- 
 ly all the leading scientists and thinkers of modern times, that 
 the religious sentiment and belief arise spontaneously in the 
 human soul, and are absolutely the characteristic of universal 
 humanity. The grounds for these denials and this affirmation 
 have not received from me a casual attention. It is not my 
 purpose to spread them out in this connection ; but reference 
 has been made to them in a former lecture.^) 
 
 How comes this universal theistic conception into existence ? 
 My reply is that it comes through two channels: 1st. INTUI- 
 TION ; 2d. DEDUCTION. Intuition alone is almost the only light 
 of lowest savages ; but deduction along various brief lines of 
 thought comes to the aid of the mind in the feeblest infancy 
 of reflection, and strengthens its conclusions more and more, as 
 long as reflective thought continues to grow in breadth of grasp 
 and clearness of discernment. 
 
 There is no need to hesitate at the announcement of the stu- 
 pendous and humbling fact that God is revealed directly to hu- 
 man reason. This intuition of God is one of the common data 
 of human intelligence. We find it in us and in all men ; like 
 the intuition of the relation subsisting between the whole and 
 the sum of its parts ; but it is a tremendous fact, when we 
 pause to think upon its significance. Much could be adduced 
 to sustain the thesis that God reveals himself directly to human 
 consciousness. The very universality of theistic beliefs shows 
 that humanity can not dodge the divine presence ; more than 
 
 ( ! ) See, also, the Seventh Paper, "Reason for the Faith." 
 
INTUITION OF GOD. 91 
 
 this is the wide-spread belief among philosophers and theolo- 
 gians, that direct communion with God is both possible and 
 normal. I only need refer you to the doctrines of some of the 
 Pythagoreans, and especially the Neo-Pythagoreans ; to Socra- 
 tes ;(') to Plato and the Platonists, and especially the Neo-Pla- 
 tonists to Philo the Jew, Plotinus, and Jamblichus; to the 
 Neo-Piatonistic Fathers and Schoolmen; to Eckart and the 
 Mystics ; to Cusanus, Jacobi, Schleiermacher, Nitzsch ; to that 
 Oriental faith in divine communication manifest in Buddha 
 and the Buddhists, and again in Magianism and Parseeism; 
 and, finally, to the doctrine of Jewish and Christian inspiration, 
 and to the pretensions of the founders of nearly all religious 
 systems. It seems to me that the sentiment of the philosophic 
 world is strongly in support of a doctrine which, in recent 
 times, has sunk almost into forgetfulness, if not rejection. But 
 I shall not elaborate the evidences which sustain me in this 
 belief. 
 
 (*) " Pythagoras the Great always applied his mind to prognostication ; 
 and Abaris the Hyperborean, and Aristaeus the Proconnesian, and Epi- 
 menides the Cretan, who came to Sparta, and Zoroaster the Mede, and Em- 
 pedocles of Agrigentum, and Phormion the Lacedaemonian ; Polycrates, too, 
 of Thasus, and Empedotimus of Syracuse ; and, in addition to these, Socra- 
 tes the Athenian, in particular. ' For,' he says in the " Theages," ' I am at- 
 tended by a supernatural intimation which has been assigned me from a 
 child, by divine appointment. This is a voice which, when it comes, pre- 
 vents what I am about to do, but exhorts never ' " (Plato's " Theages," xi., 
 ad init.). Clement proceeds to name many others reputed to be prophets 
 and soothsayers (Clem. Alex., Strom., book i., xxi.). It is not imagined, of 
 course, that the pretense of soothsaying is any evidence of the intuition 
 of Deity ; but it seems certain that the wide prevalence of it among both 
 civilized and barbarous peoples may be cited as evidence of opinion re- 
 specting the possibility of intercourse with the power of the unseen world. 
 Clement further says : " By reflection and direct vision, those among the 
 Greeks who have philosophized accurately see God" (Strom., book i., chap, 
 xix.). The higher religious intuition Clement calls " self -operating wis- 
 dom" (Strom., book i., chap. xx.). 
 
92 CREDULITY EXPLAINED. 
 
 The doctrine of the immediate intuition of Deity suffers, at 
 first view, no little disparagement from the fact that so many 
 of its defenders have been carried away by a spirit of creduli- 
 ty or enthusiasm given to divination, astrology, alchemy, and 
 other mysteries, which, in the history of speculation, are set 
 down as characteristics or accessories of philosophic mysticism. 
 It is proper to bear in mind, nevertheless, that those possessing 
 an unusual development of any mental power are correspond- 
 ingly liable to fall into a certain class of failings not common 
 to the average mind. An excessively and exclusively logical 
 mind is abnormally slow of conviction under the force of moral 
 evidence. An unusually vivid imagination commits a multi- 
 tude of sins of which the prosaic individual would be incapa- 
 ble. And yet the logical faculty and the imagination are no- 
 ble and exalted faculties, not to be reproached for the sins and 
 errors which become possible under a development which may 
 be excessive relatively to the other powers of the mind. Even 
 excessive amiability has its concomitant and consequential fail- 
 ings ; and something similar may be said of morbid conscien- 
 tiousness, extravagant affection, or unbridled benevolence. Yet 
 none of these failings would be used as evidence that the pow- 
 ers from whose overdevelopment they arise are not useful and 
 beneficent ; still less that they do not really exist, or that their 
 objects are unrealities. So those in whom the divine intuition 
 is clearest may owe this excellence to auxiliary susceptibilities 
 which make them, in the actual world, the easy victims of cre- 
 dulity and error. 
 
 I reply, in the second place, that the universal theistic belief 
 comes into existence through simple processes of deduction. 
 There is more than one highway to the cognition of God, how- 
 ever single and narrow may be the road to heaven. The con- 
 census gentium, as Cicero says, is one of the grounds of belief. 
 What all mankind believe must be true. Vox populi, vox Dei 
 I do not mean the voice of the rabble or of the majority 
 
IDEA OF CAUSALITY. 93 
 
 but the voice of humanity, with no minority dissenting. Such 
 a faith can not be hollow without projecting discord into a 
 world where all else is harmony. But this, also, is a line of 
 thought which I propose to pass by. 
 
 Foremost of all, then, the intuition of causality affords the 
 most important datum for supporting a theistic. deduction. To 
 the discussion of this thesis I invite your attention. 
 
 The word CAUSE is one of the most familiar in the language. 
 Every person believes himself to know what it means, though 
 few persons have reflected with attention on the complete con- 
 tent of this concept, and its relation logically and historically 
 to the cognitive, sensitive, and voluntary powers of the soul. 
 That the idea or notion of causality is a universal datum of hu- 
 man thought all admit, as they must admit ; but whether it be 
 a mere acquired belief, or an endogenous and necessary and 
 characteristic power of the soul, is a question upon which en- 
 tire unanimity has not been reached. 
 
 It may illustrate the extravagance and bad logic of specula- 
 tive skepticism to state that the Middle Academy denied even 
 that causation is a possibility and thence concluded the inva- 
 lidity of the notion of causality. A cause is a relation, says 
 ^Enesidemus, for it is not to be conceived without that which 
 it causes ; but the relation has no existence except in thought. 
 Again, he argues that, in any case, cause and effect must be 
 either synchronous, or else cause or effect must precede. If we 
 suppose them synchronous, it is impossible to determine which 
 is cause. If we suppose effect to precede, an absurdity is at 
 once apparent. If, finally, we suppose cause to precede, this 
 is also an absurdity, since cause is no cause until effect exists ; 
 and this results in a synchronism which confounds cause and 
 effect, as under the first supposition. Such reasoning, like 
 Zeno's argument against the possibility of motion, is simply a 
 species of dialectic legerdemain. 
 
 The various theories respecting the origin of our notion of 
 
94 ORIGIN OF THE IDEA. 
 
 causality may, I think, be reduced to three : 1. That it is EX- 
 OGENOUS, or based on data derived from without. Hume says 
 it is habit which leads us to expect certain sequences from 
 given antecedents. Glanville says we do not experience, but 
 only infer, causation. J. S. Mill asserts that the idea of cause 
 is merely a general induction from facts of observation. He 
 gives the same explanation of all universal and necessary be- 
 liefs not excepting our belief in the axioms of mathematics.^) 
 
 2. The theory that the notion of causality is ENDOGENOUS, 
 or developed within, as held by Leibnitz, Kant, and Cousin. 
 Sir William Hamilton also maintained that our idea of cause 
 arises only from " a subjective necessity " our inability to con- 
 ceive of any thing except as an effect proceeding from a cause. 
 Spencer holds that universal ideas are the results of organized 
 experience, that is, the inherited experience of the race. 
 
 3. The theory that the notion of causality is INNATE, or 
 born within us an essential attribute of our mental being. It 
 is not implied in this view that the notion would ever arise in 
 consciousness, except under the influence of the co-ordinate ac- 
 tivity of the various departments of the mind. The notion 
 of cause, for instance, though innate, may not be awakened 
 into consciousness except by the discovery of uniform sequences 
 in the external world, as is rather commonly held ; or it may, 
 as Maine de Biran, Reid, and others have believed, be roused 
 into consciousness by observing the connection between acts of 
 volition and the mental states or external changes which fol- 
 low ; or, as Coleridge thought, by the perception of the activ- 
 ity of our imaginations and the accompanying results. A be- 
 lief in the innate character of the idea was entertained by Pla- 
 to, by Carneades, by the Realists among the Schoolmen, by 
 Descartes, and is held by the majority of modern metaphysi- 
 cians. 
 
 (') J. S. Mill, " Logic," book ii., chap. v. 
 
WHAT THE IDEA IMPLIES. 95 
 
 The distinction between the Innate and the Endogenous 
 origin of the idea does not seem to me important. In either 
 case it is a recognized and invariable characteristic of the mind 
 a universal datum of thought ; and, in either case, it is con- 
 sidered as emerging in the field of consciousness only on the 
 presentation of the appropriate occasion. 
 
 That the idea of causal relation is not the suggestion of 
 experience, seems to be extremely obvious. Experience could ' 
 afford only the idea of succession, or, at most, a fixed order 
 of succession, like that of the individuals in a procession. It 
 could never give rise to the notion of that relation between the 
 terms which we denominate causal. And, again, should the 
 concept of a causal relation arise as a general induction from a 
 countless number of sequences, it could never yield us that cer- 
 tain conviction which we possess, that every assignable event 
 proceeds from a cause. A moment's reflection upon our own 
 mental states must convince us that we feel a certainty beyond 
 all doubt that every event and every phenomenon is due to 
 the exertion of some causal efficiency. The relation between 
 cause and effect we feel to be more than a uniform sequence. 
 Some energy has been put forth by cause, or has proceeded 
 through, and emanates from, that which is called cause, to the 
 effect. 
 
 In contemplating the essential nature of the causal relation, 
 we perceive that it implies sequence, efficiency, adequacy, direc- 
 tion, and application. The potential cause exists before the 
 effect; it exerts an efficiency to produce the effect, and does 
 not stand simply as an invariable antecedent ; it exerts an ade- 
 quate efficiency, both in amount and kind ; its efficiency is di- 
 rected toward the effect still non-existent, and is applied to 
 that from which the effect is evolved. These are simple con- 
 stitutive ideas, whose shadowy and evanescent forms we can 
 recognize inclosed in, or dependent on, the notion of causa- 
 tion. 
 
 5 
 
96 WHAT IS EFFICIENT CAUSE. 
 
 Now, when we reflect that the naked and disentangled no- 
 tion of cause is simply the intuition and accompanying belief, 
 that every event proceeds from adequate efficiency, directed 
 toward, and applied to, that substance, actual or potential, from 
 which effect comes, it seems to me that we dismiss at once a 
 mass of dialectic and scholastic verbiage which has darkened 
 the discussion of causality ever since the days of Aristotle. 
 If we view the subject in the clear light of the intuition in our 
 own souls, it seems to be apparent that there can exist but one 
 species of cause, and that is efficient cause the entity in which 
 efficiency originates.^) That which prompts efficiency to its 
 exertion is motive, and not cause ; and we introduce confusion 
 to denominate it the " final cause." It is the " sufficient rea- 
 son." Its relation to effect is recognized as essentially differ- 
 ent from the relation between efficiency and effect. It is not 
 the causal relation ; and although the notion of motivity may 
 
 ( J ) The term " efficient cause " is employed here in a restricted sense. It 
 does not embrace, according to the views of Aristotle and the Schoolmen, 
 any antecedent of an effect which is not the fountain and source of the 
 efficiency on which the effect depends. Many modern physicists and nat- 
 uralists employ the term " efficient cause" in the scholastic sense; but meta- 
 physicians, though, for convenience, employing the term cause as the phys- 
 icists do, make a clear distinction. J. S. Mill says, "I most fully agree 
 with M. Comte that ultimate, or, in the phraseology of the metaphysicians, 
 efficient, causes, which are conceived as not being phenomena, nor percepti- 
 ble to the senses at all, are radically inaccessible to the human faculties. 
 * * * When I speak of causation, I have nothing in view other than those 
 constant relations " [of succession or of similarity] (" System of Logic," 
 book ii., chap, v., 9). Professor Jevons, who uses the term "cause" with 
 great latitude of meaning, and seems, moreover, to misunderstand both 
 Bacon and Mill, makes the same distinction, and for the same purpose : 
 "We must not confuse this supremely difficult question [Is there any 
 cause for the event?] with that into which inductive science inquires on 
 the foundation of facts " (" Principles of Science," vol. i., p. 257). Profess- 
 or Morris brings out the distinction with clearness (" The Final Cause," 
 Proc. Phil. Soc., London, 1875). 
 
UNREAL CAUSES EXCLUDED. 97 
 
 arise simultaneously with the notion of cause, the two notions 
 are clearly distinguishable. 
 
 Again, the material acted upon by efficiency, or from which 
 or within which effect arises, is in no sense a cause. It may 
 be an essential condition of the production of the effect, but 
 we confound ideas again to designate it the " material cause." 
 It sustains no causal relation to the effect. 
 
 Neither is the antecedent concept possessed by the causal 
 agent clothed with the attribute of efficiency. The so-called 
 " formal cause " is the preconception of the causal intelligence, 
 and constitutes one of the numerous conditions of the realiza- 
 tion of effect. Closely related to this is the " exemplary cause " 
 of Pythagoras and Plato. 
 
 Neither, again, can the changed results which succeed the 
 removal or change of an efficient cause be referred causally 
 to the negation. " Negative cause " is an imaginary quantity. 
 Effect proceeds from something real, and existent, and present, 
 and efficient. "Negative cause" is a mere verbal contradic- 
 tion. Nor is " modal cause " much more real ; since mode is 
 merely a state, or condition, or mode of action of that which 
 is efficient, " substantial " and real cause. 
 
 These exclusions render it necessary to restrict the " general 
 definition " of cause. The general idea of cause is not, as Aris- 
 totle affirms, "that without which another thing called effect 
 can not be ;" but rather, according to Wolf, " that which con- 
 tains in itself the reason why another thing exists Ens quod 
 in se continet rationem cur alterum existat. Motive, material, 
 intermediation, preconception, efficiency, being regarded as spe- 
 cific causes, we may abstract a general definition of cause ; and 
 we may render ourselves intelligible by using terms in such 
 senses ; but it must be constantly felt that " efficient cause," 
 in the sense as qualified, is the only cause which is underlaid 
 by our intuition of causality ; and that, though the other Aris- 
 totelian* and scholastic " causes " may be based on concepts, 
 
98 "SECOND CAUSES" RULED OUT. 
 
 some of which are invariable concomitants of our notion of 
 causation (cause in action), it should be the conceded prerog- 
 ative of the eliminated intuition of causality to sanction the 
 employment of the term " cause." I view cause, therefore, as a 
 single and irresolvable idea; and the use of such an expres- 
 sion as " cause in the general sense " is an setiological solecism. 
 
 Disencumbering myself of the verbal jargon of the past,(') 
 and recognizing only one species of cause, I wish to abolish, 
 further, except for mere convenience of phraseology, the dis- 
 tinction of " primary " and " secondary " causation. Secondary 
 cause is simply the intermediation through which primary 
 cause transmits efficiency. The very definition dethrones it as 
 cause. The millstone is, in no proper sense, the cause of the 
 flour. The hammer is not the cause of the contusion. These 
 are media, or instruments, for the transmission of efficiency by 
 primary causes. The naked intuition of causality is only an 
 intuition of the relation between effect and primary, original 
 moving cause. 
 
 In the next place, causal efficiency implies spontaneity. Dead 
 substance may serve as the medium, or instrument, for the trans- 
 mission of efficiency. Inanimate matter may occupy the place 
 of so-called secondary causes ; but a real or spontaneous cause 
 it can never be. A dozen terms of secondary causation may 
 intervene between effect and first cause, but first cause is neces- 
 sarily implied in every instance a first cause acting in and of 
 itself, having inherent energy, put forth under the mandate of 
 will, and consequently under the direction of intelligence. We 
 
 (') St. Clement says : " Now, all the causes may be shown in order in the 
 case of the learner. The father is the procatarctic cause of learning ; the 
 teacher, the synectic ; and the nature of the learner, the co-operating cause ; 
 and time holds the relation of cause sine qua non. * * * Causation is 
 predicated in four ways : the efficient cause, as the statuary ; and the ma- 
 terial, as the brass ; and the form, as the character ; and the end, as the 
 honor of the Gymnasiarch " (Clem. Alex., Strom., book viii., chap.ix.). 
 
IDEA OF FIRST CAUSE. 99 
 
 may think of efficient causation between the terms of the series 
 of natural phenomena ; but unless we can posit intelligence and 
 will in the antecedent, the thought is illusory. We may say 
 that the lightning has caused the destruction of a building ; 
 but unless we clothe lightning with the attributes of intelli- 
 gence and will, the phrase can imply no more than secondary 
 causation, which, as I have said, is no causation at all, in the 
 sense implied in the intuition. 
 
 To get back through the chain of secondary causes, so called, 
 to real or first cause, may demand the passage of a vast num- 
 ber of links nay, an indefinite number of links; but real, vol- 
 untary, and intelligent cause must be disclosed at last. In the 
 world of human activities, human will is seen standing as the 
 first term of series of results, each of which becomes the instru- 
 mental cause of the succeeding term. In the natural world, the 
 regress backward from phenomenon loses itself in a realm of 
 mystery and impenetrableness ; but human reason does not 
 abate one jot of its confidence in the presence of intelligent ef- 
 ficiency at the initial end of the series. The Arabian philoso- 
 pher Alfarabi says, as all change and all development must pro- 
 ceed from a cause, so the sum of all changes must flow from a 
 First Cause. Albertus Magnus, in the face of the prevailing 
 sentiment of antiquity, follows the instinct of causality to its 
 legitimate conclusion, and affirms that even matter is an effect. 
 Descartes denies that the regressus in infinitum affords the in- 
 tellect any relief, and feels impelle'd to posit primordial causa- 
 tion in eternity, as the logical antecedent of the cosmos. In- 
 deed, the notion of primordial causality is twin to the intui- 
 tion of cause. To say absolutely that nothing in the universe 
 exists except as an effect is to deny the possibility of all exist- 1 
 ence. The human mind promptly reposes itself on the idea of 
 uncreated and uncaused cause. Wandering off into the realm 
 of the undiscoverable, unable to climb the infinite steps which 
 descend from primal efficiency, it feels that First Cause reigns 
 
100 COGNITION OF DEITY. 
 
 at the beginning ; and, in spite of the axiom of reason which 
 dominates in all the cognizable realm, that "whatever exists 
 has been caused to exist," the soul which rises to such heights 
 as to gaze into the infinite and eternal, finds a supporting and 
 unimpeachable testimony arising out of the obscure ground of 
 its own consciousness, and affirming, in accents which interdict 
 all doubt, an eternal Self -existence, filling the immensity which 
 is mirrored in its own consciousness. Thus, I maintain that 
 the idea of primordial cause why may I not say the intui- 
 tion of Deity ? is a datum of reason as clear, as necessary, as 
 universal as the apperception of causality in the finite sphere. 
 
 This necessary idea of primordial causality is, to claim no 
 more, but one remove from the intuition of Deity. As soon as 
 reason recognizes the necessary truth of primitive causality 
 uncaused without a term beyond, it passes by the necessary 
 law of substance to the concept of real being in whom the at- 
 tribute of primordial causality inheres. Without the conscious- 
 ness of a process of thought, all which characterizes the abso- 
 lute and infinite reveals itself as the investiture of the primi- 
 tive causal existence, on whose will hangs all dependent exist- 
 ence. 
 
 This supreme datum ultimate and initial is not to be re- 
 garded as a mere possibility of thought. I do not embrace the 
 doctrine that whatever is possible in thought is a reality in ex- 
 istence, The specialty of this ultimate theistic concept is its 
 necessity and universality. Whether we be able to recognize 
 one, two, or three steps leading to the concept of Deity, every 
 step is taken in obedience to an inexorable law of the universal 
 reason. It is simply the primitive notion of causality leading 
 to the primitive notion of self-existent causality, combined with 
 the primitive belief that every attribute implies real existence 
 in which it inheres. Every link is a necessary and universal 
 belief of humanity ; and unless we are prepared to maintain 
 the deceitfulness of all primitive beliefs, we must accept the 
 
REAL CAUSE IMPLIED. 101 
 
 conclusion that these also answer to realities ; and the corre- 
 lates for which they stand are facts in the system of existence. 
 
 This conclusion means: 1st. That efficient causation is a fact; 
 2d. Air causation proceeds from intelligent volition; 3d. The 
 reality of an initial term in the series bound by a causal nexus ; 
 4th. A real existence at the beginning of things, clothed in all 
 the attributes implied in the existence, not only of the cosmos 
 of finite observation, but in the infinitudes of time and space 
 whose reality is mirrored in human reason. 
 
 Having eliminated the datum of primordial causality, I sus- 
 pend, for the moment, the claim that this becomes a necessa- 
 ry stepping-stone to the cognition of Deity, and invite your 
 attention to a systematic unfolding of the necessary truths 
 inclosed in the idea of efficient causation premising only 
 that such causation stands at the beginning of every series of 
 events ; that it implies intelligent will ; and that the first caus- 
 ative effort put forth in the realm of existence was a primor- 
 dial and creative one, and that nothing exists within the pur- 
 view of reason to preclude a conviction that creative causation 
 has been continuous. 
 
 Causation implies, FIRST of all, the existence of a real cause. 
 Nothing could come into existence in the absence of an enti- 
 ty clothed with causative efficiency. Chance is not a cause. 
 Cause is substantive ; chance is modal. The ascription of any 
 event or series of events to chance must be an act of io-no- 
 
 & 
 
 ranee; or it must be done with qualifications of the phrase 
 which deprive it of all meaning. There may be an indiffer- 
 ence or equipollency of probabilities, which leaves the determi- 
 nation of an event, in some cases, to conditions which can not 
 be foreseen ; and we may say there exist equal chances one 
 way or the other; or, by an accommodation of language, that 
 chance turns the scale, and causes the result which ensues. But 
 this is a misuse of terms ; since every one must perceive that 
 whatever result ensues is produced by real causes, in which 
 
102 ATOMISM AND CHANCE. 
 
 miscalled chances exert no more than a conditioning influence. 
 The structure, harmony, and order of the cosmos have been 
 ascribed to the "fortuitous concourse of atoms" having an 
 eternal existence and eternal motion ; and it has been assumed 
 that such an origin of the cosmos dispenses completely with 
 the doctrine of " creation " and an ordering intelligence. I do 
 not assert that such an exclusion of Deity has been contem- 
 plated by the school of atomists, from Leucippus to Epicurus, 
 and from Lucretius to Gassendi and Tyndall. Indeed, I believe 
 that every one of the leading atomists has recognized divine 
 existence, though some of them may have conceived his rela- 
 tion to the world as exceedingly remote and possibly unessen- 
 tial. Many recognized theists have equally- maintained the 
 eternity of matter, force, and motion ; though it is impossible 
 for me to comprehend how these postulates can be granted by 
 philosophy. So far as I am able to discern, the atomistic the- 
 ory demands Deity for its working. Its very data present 
 three things to be accounted for: 1st. The eternal atoms; 2d. 
 The eternal motions; 3d. The correlations presented by the 
 world correlations of structural part to structural part; cor- 
 relations of structure to intelligible end; correlations of struct- 
 ures to persistent plans or archetypes; 'and especially correla- 
 tions of an anticipatory character all necessarily interpreted 
 by reason in terms of intelligence, foresight, and beneficence. 
 Now, to admit the eternity of an atom does not abolish the 
 law of causality. An eternal atom needs a cause as truly as a 
 finite one, unless, indeed, we are prepared to ascribe to it all 
 those predicates which reason affirms of primordial, creative, 
 but self - existent cause. Leibnitz conceived of monads en- 
 dued with intelligence and will; but even such monads were 
 held to be created things. The same must be affirmed of eter- 
 nal motion. Its eternity does not strip it of the need of causa- 
 tion. An existence or a phenomenon persisting from eternity 
 is still the effect of adequate causation. I am ready to admit 
 
A TOMISM NOT A THEISTIC. 103 
 
 the expression " caused from eternity ;" though I should deny 
 the necessary existence of matter or motion from eternity, or 
 from any other assignable epoch. I can conceive that before 
 the beginning of the existence of the present cosmos, or even 
 its matter, Deity had ordained an infinite series of schemes of 
 existence, none of which involved the employment of what we 
 call matter. Thus, it seems to me, the fundamental postulate 
 of what we call atomism can only be granted by creation. 
 Still more does the existence of correlations in the world imply 
 the thought and providence of a Being clothed with such at- 
 tributes as creation implies. This thesis, however, which opens 
 a wide field in science and philosophy, will be taken up here- 
 after. Finally, it still remains to determine the nature of the 
 motions in the atomic universe; for it is important to know 
 whether these are simply propagated from a primordial im- 
 pulse, or generated from time to time as occasion demands; 
 and if propagated un diminished from the beginning of exist- 
 ence, we must inquire whether they vary in quantity, quality, 
 and direction, simply according to the mechanical laws of ac- 
 tion and reaction, or receive from time to time the impress of 
 extraneous power. The atomistic philosophy, therefore, is not 
 necessarily atheistical ; and the records show that it has not 
 been so regarded by its adherents ; while it must be confessed 
 that, to shallow thinking, it may seem to present the current 
 of events as a stream of flour ground out by the mechanical 
 revolutions of a mill, with all inquiry respecting the origin of 
 the mill and the grain conclusively silenced. Whatever aspect 
 such a cosmology may present, it must be admitted that the 
 fortuitousness of the concurrences and arrangements of the 
 atoms is not, after all, a cause which accounts for the move- 
 ments of the atoms. The atomistic theory, therefore, even if 
 a true cosmology, can not denude existence of a real causative 
 being. 
 
 In the NEXT place, causative reality must be antecedent to all 
 
104 . SUBJECTIVITY AND OBJECTIVITY. 
 
 its effects. To assert that effect can precede cause is to assert 
 that a cause can act before it exists; while I have just shown 
 that real existence is implied in the exertion of all causal effi- 
 ciency. Indeed, the proposition would require no proof, if it 
 had not been sometimes ignored in the attempt to thrust non- 
 existence or modal existence the negation of substantial ex- 
 istence into the position of cause. The universe, as an effect, 
 must be subsequent to its cause. The existence of matter can 
 not run parallel with the being of Deity. Matter may be eter- 
 nal in the mathematical sense ; but the being of God is prece- 
 dent both logically and historically. This is a necessary dic- 
 tum of reason. In this discussion, I am affirming only neces- 
 sary ideas. 
 
 In the THIRD place, the notion of causality implies correla- 
 tive subjectivity and objectivity the cause acting and the other- 
 ness toward which its efficiency is directed. In the field of or- 
 dinary human activity, man is the subjective factor, and matter 
 the objective one. Man only acts upon matter. If my causal 
 efficiency leave an impression upon wax, I act upon matter; 
 if it produce a picture in the imagination of another, this is 
 through the intermediation of matter the tongue or the gest- 
 ure on my part, and the auditory or optic nerve on the part of 
 the other person. If iny causal efficiency, in the form of a vo- 
 lition, produce a picture in my own imagination, the volition 
 first impresses itself upon the cerebral organism, and thence 
 succeeds the picture. I do not assert the absolute dependence 
 of mind upon matter : I deny it ; I only maintain that our nor- 
 mal at least, our usual mental acts are effected objectified, 
 through the intermediation of matter. 
 
 In the realm of creative activity, the objective datum is not 
 actual, but potential. While only creative efficiency exists, oth- 
 erness is a mere capacity of existence; and yet effectuation 
 must be directed objective ward. Potential effect must exist, 
 ideally differentiated from cause ; as, otherwise, cause, by the 
 
THE CAUSAL AGENT CONSCIOUS. 105 
 
 addition of effect to itself, would lose its identity ; or we must 
 accept the absurd proposition that creative action can take 
 place while yet causal existence is incomplete. Whether, in 
 this case, effect rise into existence ab extra, or be evolved from 
 creative cause, its relative objectivity is a necessity of thought. 
 The necessary sequence of effect, and the necessary differentia- 
 tion of cause and effect as subjective (and in se) uncondition- 
 ed existence, and objective conditioned existence, rends the 
 system of monism from centre to circumference. It is impos- 
 sible to comprehend how that which is self-existent, and in it- 
 self absolute and unconditioned, can be one with that which is 
 created, finite and dependent. If we assert the First Cause to 
 be homogeneous with matter, we are lacking in the first datum 
 of evidence that matter possesses a single one of the attributes 
 which characterize First Cause. If we assert that matter is 
 homogeneous with First Cause, we utter a simple hypothesis, 
 and one which not only lacks all support from the field of hu- 
 man knowledge, but is in conflict with modern science, and the 
 reflective thought of all time. We are bound to a dualism. 
 It is safe to fall back on the consensus gentium and the intui- 
 tions of humanity in accepting as an axiom the proposition 
 that the being who stands in the relation of cause is, in no 
 sense, to be confounded with that which is caused. 
 
 The notion of causality implies, in the FOURTH place, the 
 possession of consciousness by the causal efficiency. A cause 
 without consciousness would sleep forever in potentiality. In 
 order to become an actual cause, it must have knowledge of 
 its own existence, and of the possibility, at least, of other ex- 
 istence, and of the possession of efficiency. It must have a 
 further consciousness of all the relations subsisting between 
 cause and effect, and of all the conditions which modify its 
 causal activity. This necessity excludes the possibility of any 
 system which is a pure, unconscious materialism, or a pure, un- 
 conscious dynamism. A mechanism called into being may run 
 
106 EFFECT PRECONCEIVED. 
 
 on through indefinite ages without the intervention of con- 
 sciousness; but a conscious intelligence must have produced 
 the mechanical structure and animated it with propulsive pow- 
 er. Such a conception of the cosmos may remove creative 
 power to an indefinite distance from things present here and 
 now ; but yet it is not a godless scheme. How utterly and al- 
 most absurdly improbable it is, that a Being capable of creat- 
 ing a universe should never after exert his power in any way, I 
 need only to remind you. How much evidence exists that that 
 power is perpetually exerted, I hope will appear in the sequel. 
 
 In the FIFTH place, the notion of causation implies that the 
 causal agent shall be able to form a conception of a specific 
 non-existent effect, and shall form such a conception. This is 
 the "formal" causality of the Aristotelians. The production 
 of effect without premeditation does not develop the essen- 
 tial character of cause. If it were possible for me to produce 
 effect without the antecedent conception of effect, my act, like 
 the act of an unconscious thing, would be only an instance of 
 secondary or mechanical causation. This .is not to assert that 
 every specific result which flows from my causal endeavor must 
 have been previously discerned by me. Such claim would be 
 a claim to indefinite foreknowledge, and consequently absurd. 
 I do maintain, however, that in any case of causal effectiveness 
 on my part, I have an antecedent conception of some effect, 
 near or remote, at which I aim my efficiency, or which I con- 
 template as lying within the circumference of my efficiency. 
 What series of secondary effects may flow from this contem- 
 plated one, assuming the character of secondary causes, no 
 finite intelligence can completely foreknow. It is an incident 
 of human limitations that no human being is able clearly to 
 discern an end, and so gauge and direct his efficiency as not 
 to touch and disturb the world of existence which environs it. 
 It is, moreover, an incident of the ordained constitution of the 
 world, that the energy put forth by me shall not be gathered 
 
PlilNClPLE OF CAUSALITY COGNIZED. 107 
 
 up in an isolated effect, but shall run on in a stream of actions 
 and reactions, indefinitely prolonged. 
 
 With reference to the activity of that cause which imposes 
 conditions on all things, and is conditioned by nothing except 
 its own will, we can not affirm those qualifications of fore- 
 knowledge which limit man. In the realm of involuntary ex- 
 istence, we can not hesitate to affirm that the least and re- 
 motest event transpires according to foresight, calculation, and 
 purpose. This conclusion issues equally, whether we conceive 
 the relation of God to the world to be " transient," as in a 
 mechanical system, or " immanent," as held, pantheistically, by 
 Hegel, or dualistically by some others. In the realm of volun- 
 tary existence, the relation of divine foreknowledge to the vo- 
 lition of finite beings presents a problem which has buffeted 
 the world's attempts at a final solution ; and I need not argue 
 it here. My own belief holds to divine foreknowledge abso- 
 lutely unlimited. 
 
 In the SIXTH- place, the consciousness of the principle of cau- 
 sality must arise the possibility of connecting efficiency with a 
 given effect, and calling it from thought into actuality. How- 
 ever unnoticed may be our consciousness of subscribing to the 
 truth of the judgment of causality, such recognition of its truth 
 is implied in every act of volition. With complete ignorance 
 of the nexus joining cause and effect, it would never occur to 
 our intelligence that a contemplated effect, however desired, 
 could be brought into existence ; and all energy would lie as 
 uninspired and unmoved as if intelligence itself were blotted 
 out. 
 
 In the SEVENTH place, the effectuation of original causation 
 implies the presentation of motive. Before efficiency acts, it 
 must discern a reason why it should act. The motive to ac- 
 tion, it is sometimes asserted, may exist either objectively or 
 subjectively. If I extend my arm to shake the hand of a 
 friend, the motive is objective ; if I extend it to relieve a wea- 
 
108 CAUSALITY IMPLIES MOTIVE. 
 
 riness caused by long use of the pen, the motive is said to be 
 subjective ; still more, if I desist from writing to relieve a wea- 
 ried brain. But, as far as I can see, the motive, in every case, 
 is properly objective to the mind. The efficient cause is the 
 will, and the moving cause, or motive, must be something dif- 
 ferentiated from it, even if existent in my body or my mind. 
 In the last case the mind becomes subject-object, or object in 
 reference to its own activity. 
 
 Motive, ascribed to the activity of the First Cause, is com- 
 monly known as " Final Cause ;" and the doctrine of the exist- 
 ence of ends, or final causes in the world, is teleology. The 
 belief that such ends may be discovered has been generally 
 cherished since the most ancient times. The Old Testament 
 abounds in teleological passages. Socrates defended the be- 
 lief in divine existence from the structure of organized beings, 
 maintaining that whatever exists for a use must be the work of 
 intelligence. Aristotle based his proof of the existence of a su- 
 preme immaterial Spirit on the development in nature of ob- 
 jects whose form and structure indicate design, founding the 
 reasoning on the general principle that all transition (dv^aiq) 
 from the potential to the actual depends on an actual cause. 
 Again, he says, " All motion in nature is directed to an end." 
 " God and nature do nothing in vain." The Stoics maintained 
 that " the beauty and adaptation of the world can only have 
 come from a thinking mind, and prove, therefore, the exist- 
 ence of Deity." "Deum agnoscimus ex operibus ejus," said 
 Cicero( 1 ) (we know God from his works). Lactantius, in his 
 book " On the Workmanship of God ; or, The Formation of 
 Man," goes elaborately over the entire mechanism of the hu- 
 man body, and outdoes Paley in praising its utility, conven- 
 ience, and beauty. Galen, the celebrated physician, believed 
 that in the structural organization of animals is disclosed ade- 
 
 (') Cicero, I. Tuscul. 
 
BELIEVERS IN "DESIGN." 109 
 
 quatc proof of a designing intelligence. Gregory of Nyssa 
 grounded the belief in God on the art and wisdom displayed 
 in the order of the world. Cud worth, against the atheism of 
 Hobbes and his followers, " vindicated the right of final causes 
 to a place in physics ;" and Samuel Parker, of the same period, 
 " founded the belief in God's existence chiefly on the marks of 
 design manifest in the structure of natural objects." With 
 Newton, "the proof of God's existence is found in the exqui-* 
 site art and intelligence which are exhibited to us in the con- 
 struction of the world, and particularly in the organism of ev- . 
 ery living being." Locke held that the being of God is de- 
 monstrable by means of the cosmological and the teleological 
 arguments ; and Voltaire, agreeing with him, exclaims, " All 
 nature cries out to us that God exists." Herbart, with all his 
 skepticism, holds to the validity of the teleological argument 
 for the being of God. Galileo, throughout his works, loses no 
 opportunity to insist on final as well as efficient causes; and 
 Cuvier made the belief in " ends " the guiding principle which 
 conducted him to that marvelous insight of the structure and 
 habits of animals long extinct, which is set forth especially in 
 his " Ossemens Fossiles," and which conferred upon him, liter- 
 ally, the gift of seership. Such has been the general sentiment 
 of the philosophic world, and such it still remains^ 1 ) Kant, 
 
 (') Compare M'Cosh, "Typical Forms and Special Ends in Creation;" 
 Morris (G. S.), " The Final Cause as Principle of Cognition and Principle 
 in Nature," Jour. Trans. Victoria Institute, or Phil. Soc. of Great Britain, 
 1875 ; Cocker, "The Theistic Conception of the World;" Hartmann (Ed- 
 ward von), " Wahrheit und Irrthum in Darwinismus. Eine kritische Dar- 
 stellung der organischen Entwickelungstheorie," Berlin, 1875 ; Zeller, "Ue- 
 ber die Aufgabe der Philosophic," p. 20 f. ; Gyzicki (Georg von), " Philo- 
 sophische Consequenzen der Lamarck-Darwin'schen Entwickelungstheo- 
 rie," Leipzig und Heidelberg, 1876; Bianconi, "La Theorie Darwinienne 
 et la Cre'ation," 1874; Kronig, "Das Dasein Gottes," 1874; Wigand, "Der 
 Darwinismus und die Naturforschung Newtons und Cuviers," 2 Bde. ;" Duke 
 of Argyll, "Anthropomorphism in Theology," 1875; Rudolph Schmid, "Die 
 
110 TELEOLOGY REVIVED. 
 
 however, wliile accepting theism as an article of faith, cast 
 doubt on the validity of the teleological and other arguments 
 in support of that belief ;( J ) and the modern school of nescien- 
 tists, while accepting divine existence, or, at least, proclaiming 
 no argument against it, maintain that it is not competent for 
 finite intelligence to ascribe motives to the Unknowable ; and 
 hence make light of all attempts to interpret nature in a the- 
 istic sense. Nevertheless, the doctrine of Final Cause is regain- 
 ing its ground, both in science and philosophy. No assertions, 
 however deducible from the postulates of a system of philoso- 
 phy, can expel from credence a principle grounded in the nec- 
 essary implications of thought. Professor Huxley says : " Per- 
 haps the most remarkable service to the philosophy of biology 
 rendered by Mr. Darwin is the reconciliation of teleology and 
 morphology, and the explanation of the facts of both, which 
 his views offer."( 2 ) " The teleological and mechanical views of 
 nature are not, necessarily, mutually exclusive. On the con- 
 trary, the more purely a mechanist the speculator is, the more 
 firmly does he assume a primordial molecular arrangement, of 
 which all the phenomena of the universe are the consequences ; 
 and the more completely is he thereby at the mercy of the tele- 
 ologist, who can always defy him to disprove that this primor- 
 dial molecular arrangement was intended to evolve the phenom- 
 ena of the universe."( 3 ) Similarly Von Hartmann, with his usu- 
 al force : " Were the mechanism of the laws of nature not tele- 
 ological, it would not be by any means a mechanism of orderly 
 
 Darwinischen Theorien und ihre Stellung zur Philosophic, Religion und 
 Moral," 1876, p. 269-274. 
 
 ( 2 ) Kant maintains that we are compelled to contemplate the world un- 
 der the influence of the notion of final cause, but that this notion is only a 
 regulative principle of thought, subjective in its origin, and not necessarily 
 answering to objective reality. 
 
 ( 2 ) Huxley, "Critiques and Addresses," Am. ed., p. 272. 
 
 ( 3 ) Ibid., p. 274. 
 
GENERALLY ACCEPTED. Ill 
 
 laws, but a mindless chaos, an ox-headed, capricious power.'^ 1 ) 
 Gyzicki says: "A voice speaks to us from the Universe, I am 
 who is there, who was there, who will be there."( a ) Professor 
 Asa Gray's recent utterance is as follows : " Under the teleolog- 
 ical aspect, which was once thought to be expelled from natu- 
 ral history, but which has come back in full force, a bur is an 
 adaptation for the dissemination of seeds by cattle and other 
 animals."( 3 ) In short, at this moment little seems to be urged, 
 on the part of science and philosophy, against the doctrine of 
 Final Cause, save what we find in the late writings of L. Biich- 
 ner, D. F. Strauss, Haeckel, O. Schmidt, Helmholtz, and the 
 editor and some of the contributors of Das Ausland. 
 
 I join here in swelling the testimony of antiquity and of the 
 large majority of thinkers of all ages, that Deity is proclaimed 
 in the creation ; that it is legitimate to deduce divine motives 
 from the structure of the cosmos, and to point out motives as 
 the moving causes of divine activity. I stated that the intui- 
 tion of causality does not consider the magnitude of cause or 
 
 (!) "Ware der Mechanismus der Naturgesetzc nicht teleologisch, so ware 
 er auch gar kein Mechanismus geordneter Gesetze, sondern ein blodsinnig- 
 es Chaos stierkopfig eigensinniger Gewalten" ("Wahrheit und Irrthum in 
 Darwinismus "). See, also, Von Hartmann's earlier work, " Philosophic des 
 TJnbewussten," though he seeks here, by absurd reasoning, to deny the ex- 
 istence of a conscious subject of the design for which he argues. 
 
 ( 2 ) Gyzicki, " Philosophische Consequenzen," p. 85. 
 
 ( 3 ) American Naturalist, vol. x., p. 1, Jan., 1876. Of similar purport are 
 the utterances of Lyell, " Natural Selection not Incompatible with Natu- 
 ral Theology," London, 1861, pp. 29, 38; Owen, "Comparative Anatomy," 
 and Trans. Zocil. Soc. of London, vol. v., p. 90 ; A. Braun, " Bedeutung 
 der Entwickelung in der Naturgeschichte," p. 49 ; K. E. von Baer, " Stu- 
 dien aus dem Gebiete der Naturwissenschaften," 1876, II. "Ueber den 
 Zweck in den Vorgangen der Natur," p. 49-106, IV. "Ueber Zielstrebig- 
 keit in den organischen Korpern ins besondere," p. 170-234 (see, however, 
 a critical review of Von Baer by Seidlitz, " Beitrage zur Descendenz-The- 
 orie," Leipzig, 1876). 
 
112 DESIGN AND INTELLIGENCE. 
 
 effect. Effect may be infinite in magnitude or duration ; but 
 yet it demands a cause. So, I maintain, the intuition of in- 
 telligence from design does not consider the vastness of the 
 intelligence, or of the being possessing it: The correlation 
 between contrivance and intelligence is absolute. Wherever 
 we discover contrivance, we feel impelled to recognize intelli- 
 gence however small a portion of the whole intelligence our 
 apprehensions may grasp. It is intelligence, qualitatively, and 
 not quantitatively, considered, which the intuition proclaims. 
 I contemplate a structure in which part is shaped to part and 
 acts with part, and the whole action subserves a necessary and 
 beneficent end. Contemplating this, I proclaim intention and 
 intelligence. My intuition knows no more of the finite or 
 infinite character of its author than my hearers do before I 
 declare what this piece of mechanism is. It is the correla- 
 tion of parts, abstracted from authorship, in which I discern 
 intelligence. Now, when I declare this piece of mechanism 
 to be a model, with all the parts of a human hand -bones, 
 ligaments, nerves, vessels, and coverings every one exclaims, 
 " How admirable and ingenious a contrivance !" But when I 
 declare it to be the human hand itself, instead of a model from 
 the manikin, the exclamation becomes, " Oh, we know nothing 
 about any contrivance in that. Its Author is so superior to us 
 in knowledge and power, that possibly it was not intelligence 
 which planned the thing whose human copy reflects so much 
 intelligence." The sentiment of all time and of all humanity 
 is against such nonsense. It continues to see God's designs in 
 nature. The universal common sense will sweep such a bastard 
 affectation of philosophy into the realm of the " unknown " 
 and " unknowable." 
 
 I acknowledge that a profound consciousness of the limita- 
 tions of human thought and knowledge may suggest the indis- 
 cretion and the uncertainty of attributing designs to the cause 
 of existence whose height and depth and breadth are equally 
 
DESIGN A NECESSAB Y IDEA. 113 
 
 immeasurable and impenetrable. I confess that the specific 
 designs of omniscience, which, in some cases, we seem to have 
 discovered, may be fatally misconceived by us. The same might 
 be true of the product of human efforts. The question is not 
 as to the existence of a specific design, but as to the existence 
 of any design. I might grant, without detriment to the argu- 
 ment, that the ends of creation, if they exist, transcend so in- 
 finitely all human power of comprehension, that the full pur- 
 pose of no combination of parts has as yet been revealed to : 
 our intelligence. Imagine this to be the case ; would it be pos- 
 sible to suppress the conviction that the world and the parts of 
 the world exist for a purpose ? Could we even rid ourselves of 
 the belief that in the adjustments of the human hand we had 
 discovered at least a part of the purposes of that structure? 
 Could we conceive of (infinite) causality exerting itself without 
 a sufficient reason for so doing ? It seems to me the answer is 
 inseparable from the question. The denial of ends is the de- 
 nial of the possibility of causation the denial of all finite ex- 
 istence. 
 
 It is the custom of certain biologists to treat with levity the 
 doctrine of final causes. I have sought diligently for their ar- 
 guments, but I find only the reiterated assertion that the inva- 
 riable laws of development of the individual and of the species, 
 and the necessary influence of the environment, suffice for the 
 determination of all structures which exist. Coupled with this 
 is the customary disparagement of the attainments of those who 
 hold to the necessity of final cause, as a condition of the activ- 
 ity of efficient cause ;(') and, not unfrequently, the allegation 
 
 ( J ) As an example of the argumentation to which I allude, see one of 
 Hacckel's latest works, "Ziele und Wege dcr heutigen Entwickelungs- 
 geschichte," Jena, Oct., 1875, which is a rejoinder to several of the leading 
 opponents of his " monistic," pantheistic views. The most prominent feat- 
 ure of the book is his conspicuous contempt for all his foes. He does not 
 condescend to reply by citations of pertinent evidence, but assails their 
 
114 HAECKELISM. 
 
 that the defenders of final cause repel the doctrine Of efficient 
 
 competency, and their scientific and private characters, with a profusion 
 of sarcasm and a gay and reckless irony more worthy of a jester than 
 of a philosopher in search of the profoundest truth. The late Professor 
 Louis Agassiz, to whom all the world has paid its homage, is not more 
 honored with an argument than Wilhelm His, and Alexander Goette, and 
 Friederich Michaelis. The pages (78-85) devoted to a reply to Agassiz 
 are occupied with ridicule of his reverent spirit, and gross disparagement 
 of his scientific work and personal character. " Agassiz," says Haeckel, 
 "has been so prominently set forth in recent times by orthodox theology, 
 and specially by Christian philosophy, as the ' pious naturalist ' adorned 
 with the glory of a holy radiance, that we feel charmed to investigate a 
 little more closely, with the spectroscope, the true nature of its changing 
 Iris-hues." In place of argument and evidences to rebut the arguments 
 of one of the first naturalists of the age, Haeckel now proceeds to impugn 
 his honor, to charge him with dishonest appropriation of the work of oth- 
 ers, as being an " indefatigable knight of industry " and the practitioner 
 of " charlatanry." No cause can be so strong as not to suffer from such 
 defense. That Haeckel is not so completely " without sin " as to be en- 
 titled to throw stones, appears clearly from the recorded opinions of his 
 countrymen, and even his adherents. His affirms that some of Haeckel's 
 figures (in his " Anthropogenic ") purporting to be original are "theils 
 hochst ungetreu " (His, " Unsere Korperf orm und das physiologische Pro- 
 blem ihrer Entstehung," p. 170). Semper, who pronounces Haeckel "The 
 Apostle of a new Faith," and says that the gospel (Darwinism) according 
 to Haeckel "ought to be the religion of every naturalist," nevertheless af- 
 firms that he could cite many similar instances ; that, for instance, the seo- 
 tion of the embryo of an earth-worm, taken from Kowalevsky, is " com- 
 pletely falsified, and that of Amphioxus partly so " (Semper, " Der Haeck- 
 elismus in der Zoologie," Hamburg, 1874, p. 35). His accuses Haeckel of 
 a disposition to indulge in " a wanton sporting with facts, more dangerous 
 still than his sporting with words." "According to my judgment," His 
 continues, " he has, through his style of campaigning, himself forfeited 
 all right to be counted in the circle of earnest scientists as one of equal 
 birth." To which Semper adds, " I, on my part, indorse these words with 
 the fullest conviction" (op. cit., p. 36). Nevertheless, with such qualifica- 
 tions, I gladly concede to the researches of Haeckel a degree of origi- 
 nality, acuteness, and vigor which has seldom been equaled, and regard 
 him as the source of a powerful impulse in recent biological studies. 
 
SHALL W PHIL OSOPHY OF PROFO UND SCIENCE. 115 
 
 causes^ 1 ) Let it be understood that the recognition or denial 
 of the doctrine of final causes is a procedure lying exclusively 
 in the field of deductive thought ; and no amount of familiar- 
 ity with the details of animal structure could constitute the 
 slightest preparation for a decision. The most authoritative 
 decision must be that prompted by the most attentive study of 
 the laws of thought ; while it is evident that those who derive 
 the structural adaptations of nature from the orderly modes of 
 change and succession, which are so apparent, do not penetrate 
 to the discovery even of efficient cause, still less to a recogni- 
 tion of the infrangible law of " sufficient reason." They reach 
 no principle, necessary and all-underlying, which reveals an in- 
 compatibility with the doctrine of final cause, resting, on its 
 part, upon a universal datum of reason. They have discovered, 
 possibly, the method of effectuation of results, and have not the 
 discernment and candor to admit that method (law) is simply 
 modal, and not causal, and, instead of being the limit of a ra- 
 tional analysis, itself implies an ulterior principle as an efficient 
 datum ; and a reason why, as the condition of the actualization 
 of efficiency. The doctrine of derivation must be settled by an 
 appeal to the facts of biology ; it is a question of science. The 
 doctrine of final cause, like that of supramaterial causation, 
 must be settled by an appeal to the facts of reason ; it is a 
 question of philosophy. 
 
 In the EIGHTH place, the efficient cause, which, as we have 
 seen, must be self-conscious and intelligent, may discern a con- 
 tingency or condition which stands in some relation either to 
 cause or effect, and may modify the amount or direction of 
 the causal efficiency, or else the kind or amount of the effect. 
 
 ( l ) "On one side stand the Dualists and Teleologists, who seek the true 
 camcs of soul-life, as of organic development, in ideas acting in organic 
 bodies, consequently in purposive final causes " (Haeckel, " Ziele und Wege," 
 p. 5). This charge was in effect made by Kant and Laplace, according to 
 M'Cosh (" Typical Forms and Special Ends in Creation," p. 53, Eng. ed.). 
 
116 CONDITION, DESIRE, FREEDOM, INTENTION. 
 
 A contingency influencing the effect directly is simply a sec- 
 ondary cause, and will be discussed hereafter. Moreover, con- 
 tingency may be either disclosed or hidden. A contingency 
 influencing the cause simply annexes a new term to motive, 
 and constitutes a part of it. Such contingency must be dis- 
 closed, since nothing can constitute motive which is not cog- 
 nized. It is external, nevertheless, and indirectly influences 
 effect, through motive actuating cause. Under this analysis, 
 contingency loses its importance as a distinct concept in the 
 process of causation. 
 
 In the NINTH place, the influence of the contingency on the 
 motive must be cognized. This is simply implied in the fact 
 that the contingency becomes incorporated with the motive. 
 This, as I have just stated, could not be if the contingency re- 
 mained concealed. 
 
 In the TENTH place, the causal agent must be conscious of a 
 desire to direct efficiency toward the contemplated effect. It 
 must also be conscious of freedom to act according to desire. 
 Without freedom, causation is simply intermediation, or sec- 
 ondary causation. The effect flows from that which coerces 
 causal action. An act performed by an agent under constraint 
 is, for the agent, an act not performed. He is .merely the in- 
 strument in the hands of the will which controls. 
 
 In the ELEVENTH place, the concept of causality implies an 
 intention to direct efficiency toward the contemplated effect. 
 The intention to act must follow the consciousness of freedom 
 to act, and must necessarily follow the desire to act. The de- 
 sire can only be awakened in the presence of a known and 
 contemplated and desirable effect. The intention to put forth 
 causal efficiency implies also a cognition of cause as the neces- 
 sary antecedent of effect. Intentionality, therefore, implies and 
 incloses all these ideas. It follows that every effect, wheth- 
 er simple or complex, implies intentionality, and this implies 
 intelligence. From the moment when we recognize the world 
 
DEDUCTION TO DEITY. 117 
 
 as an effect* we arc compelled, by the necessary laws of thought, 
 to recognize also intelligence. I do not refer here to the char- 
 acter of the effect, but simply to the fact that the world is an 
 effect. I shall show, hereafter, that the composition of the 
 cosmical effect reveals an infinite realm of intentionality, and 
 explains why the human mind, in all ages, has felt forced to 
 recognize the existence of Supreme Intelligence as the correla- 
 tive of the world. The steps by which the universal reason 
 has ascended from the phenomena of nature to the creative 
 efficiency have been seldom noted. The common mind, which 
 is as richly furnished with intuitive judgments as the cultivated 
 mind, seems to reach supreme causation by a leap. I have 
 already expressed rny belief in a direct intuition of Deity ; but 
 here is another path by which the common mind, as well as 
 the philosophic mind, ascends to the very presence of the light 
 which had been seen sinning from without into the chambers 
 of the soul. Intuition of Deity is the diffused light. Deduc- 
 tion to Deity is the discovery of the certain path to a better- 
 comprehended existence. But yet this path is so short, the 
 steps are so easily and so dexterously taken, that the common 
 reason seems, even here, to leap, by one intuition, to God. 
 Philosophy, instead of discovering and pointing out this way 
 to God, plods and flounders in the very attempt to travel where 
 common sense skips along with more than the agility of a kid. 
 Philosophy has its use, however, in disclosing the fact that the 
 path is a real one, on solid ground, and that the common mind, 
 in rising habitually to God, is not winged by imagination to 
 a bright cloud which floats merely in the air. 
 
 FINALLY, the consummation of the causal act implies the ex- 
 ertion of will. There must be an executive determination of 
 conscious efficiency toward the contemplated effect which has 
 awakened desire and purpose. All the other causative steps 
 converge here. Will is the last condition of effect. Being the 
 last condition, Will always implies Intelligence and Sensibility. 
 
118 WILL AS SOLE CAUSE. 
 
 "Will is the synthesis of Reason and Power.'X 1 )- In strict 
 language, "intelligent will" is a tautological phrase. 
 
 Will is the only force in existence. Our earliest volitions 
 disclose the transformations of will into efficiency. We have 
 no revelation of any other source of efficiency. From will 
 proceeds all intermediation ; and back to will must be traced 
 every thing which can be cognized as an effect. As the results 
 of human volition are our earliest intimations of the nature of 
 force, so back to will we return after the most discriminating 
 analysis. Search the world through; consider the fall of an 
 apple moved by terrestrial gravitation ; the rush of the chem- 
 ical atoms marshaled by their affinities; the quiver of the needle 
 upon its pivot, struggling to maintain its fidelity to the pole ; 
 the reaction of the pent-up spring, actuating the mechanism 
 of the watch ; none of these energies find their explanation in 
 themselves, nor in the matter which is moved by them. Think 
 of the reaction of the spring as a phenomenon of inherent 
 force, and you can not fail to inquire, "Where are the evi- 
 dences of volition, of choice, of discernment, of desire, of pur- 
 pose which the very act of original causation implies?" That 
 energy is transmitted through the spring, and impinges upon 
 an object, is apparent enough ; but this still is but a sluice-way 
 of force, and not a repository of force. Elasticity, magnetism, 
 affinity these are modes of intermediation by which cause 
 reaches its ends. To this subject I intend to return.( 3 ) 
 
 (') Cocker, "Theistic Conception of the World," p. 197. 
 
 ( a ) " In the only case in which we are admitted into any personal knowl- 
 edge of the origin of force, we find it connected (possibly by intermediate 
 links untraceable by our faculties, but yet indisputably connected) with vo- 
 lition, and, by inevitable consequence, with motive, with intellect, and with 
 all those attributes of mind in which and not in the possession of arms, 
 legs, brains, and viscera- personality consists " (Sir John Herschel, "Fa- 
 miliar Lectures on Scientific Subjects," Amer. ed., p. 462). 
 
 " We can not predicate of any physical agency that it is abstractedly the 
 
CA USA TION IMPLIES PERSONALITY. 119 
 
 Will, then, closes the circuit of causation. Will completes 
 and implies the exercise of the three classes of psychic activi- 
 ties which characterize personality. Intellect, Sensibility, AVill 
 these are the prime factors of a personal differentiation from 
 the objective datum of causality. Once before we reached the 
 principle of duality. Now we perceive that one term of the 
 duality must be a personality. It is impossible to interpret 
 truly an effect without discovering Intellect, Sensibility, and 
 Will ; and it is impossible to think of these except as the at- 
 tributes of a personal existence. 
 
 The term personality, however, is unfortunate and mislead- 
 ing. It is weakly anthropomorphic. Adopted as the antithe- 
 sis of monism and pantheism, its associations carry the mind 
 irresistibly into a narrow field of view. We must banish all 
 thoughts of figure and locality ; we must not think of motion, 
 nor of body. Personality is not the alternative of divine im- 
 manence, as has been generally believed; but is compatible 
 with the recognition of divine agency in all the phenomena of 
 the natural world. This view, as we shall see, while it repro- 
 duces the simple theism of the primeval world, and those awe- 
 inspiring conceptions of nature which characterize our Jewish 
 Scriptures, promises to be the ultimate, but not distant, conclu- 
 sion of the most advanced science and philosophy. 
 
 cause of another ; and if, for the sake of convenience, the language of sec- 
 ondary causation be permissible, it should be only with reference to the 
 special phenomena referred to, as it can never be generalized" (Grove, 
 "Correlation of Physical Forces," Youmans's ed., p. 15). "An essential 
 cause is unattainable [in the study of phenomena]. Causation is the will, 
 Creation the act, of God" (ib., p. 199). See, for numerous other citations, 
 Cocker, " Theistic Conception of the World," p. 235-243 ; and the refer- 
 ences already made in the present paper. 
 
 6 
 
Y. 
 
 THE DOCTRINE OF CAUSALITY CONTINUED. 
 2. Causal Intermediation. 
 
 CAUSE is a word which I have used in a sense somewhat re- 
 stricted. I have not admitted as real cause any agency sup- 
 posed to be exerted, in the natural world, by what we call mat- 
 ter. The energy, however, which emerges from matter, and im- 
 pinges upon matter, has generally been taken as the type of 
 efficient causation. It has been assumed that energy may be 
 pocketed in portions of matter, to be let loose on certain occa- 
 sions, and produce effects. Not denying, for the moment, the 
 possibility that matter may become the repository of force, it 
 is impossible for me to conceive of matter as a fountain of 
 force. A thing which is itself an effect must be an effect in 
 all its parts and in all its attributes. All energy emanating 
 from an effect must be itself an effect ; and all results of its 
 efficiency must be results of the first or original cause. Now, 
 we may attach the term cause to that form of matter which 
 immediately precedes a given effect ;(') we may attach it to the 
 energy which proceeds from that form ; but it must be appar- 
 ent that the word cause, thus employed, means a very different 
 thing from that implied when we speak of the ultimate effi- 
 ciency which can not be viewed as an effect. It is a common 
 phraseology, in speaking of a succession of serially dependent 
 
 (') This is all that is meant by " cause " in the generality of discussions. 
 J. S. Mill expressly shuts out all consideration of " efficiency " in connec- 
 tion with causes, holding the attainment of knowledge respecting efficient 
 causes to transcend the powers of the human mind ("Logic," book ii., chap. 
 v, 2, 9). 
 
PHYSICAL ANTECEDENTS NOT CAUSAL. 121 
 
 events, to say that each is the effect Of its predecessor, and, at 
 the same time, the cause of its successor. To my mind, how- 
 ever, the difference of meaning between cause in this case and 
 cause in the case of voluntary agency, is so great that different 
 terms should be employed. The meanings are, indeed, antip- 
 odal. In the one case, we have intelligence and will ; in the 
 other, neither. In the one case, the energy is primitive ; in the 
 other, derivative. In the one case, the efficiency is self-moving ; 
 in the other, it is moved. In the one case we have that which 
 is exclusively cause ; in the other, that which is primarily effect. 
 The only escape from this antithesis is self-destruction. It 
 is the admission that matter itself is sentient, cognitive, and 
 voluntary. Heraclitus, it is true, conceived all matter to be 
 animated ; and Thales and other Hylozoists thought the world 
 to be an immense animal. Leibnitz, also, conceived all exist- 
 ence to be composed of sentient monads. God, with him, is a 
 monad ; the soul is a monad ; minerals are composed of mon- 
 ads. But Leibnitz is not a monist ; there are spiritual monads 
 as well as material ; and between these all gradations of sub- 
 stance. But none of these philosophers clothed matter with 
 absolute freedom of will. The Hylozoists recognized a su- 
 preme principle be it water, or air, or fire, or chaos, or mind, 
 as Anaxagoras suggested; and this principle introduced con- 
 trol, subordination, harmony, rhythm. The monads of Leib- 
 nitz, too, while capable of various degrees of thought, were con- 
 trolled in their movements by mechanical laws ; and the con- 
 sonance between the psychical and bodily motions was effected 
 only by a divine prearrangement or pre-established harmony. 
 Thus the assumption of independent, originative volition in 
 matter would be a new thing in philosophy a theory sound- 
 ing a dissonance with the tenor of human thought ; and awak- 
 ing in antagonism the historical instincts of humanity. More- 
 over, the investiture of matter with thinking and voluntary at- 
 tributes would summon us to the funeral of God and the soul. 
 
122 RELATION OF FORCE TO MATTER. 
 
 If matter thinks, there is no need to postulate spirit. If mat- 
 ter creates, and ordains, and co-ordinates, this is our god which 
 we trample under our feet and sweep from our door-sills. Here, 
 again, in reference to the insensibility of matter, the consensus 
 gentium has been standing steadily on the rock to which rea- 
 son must return, after long floundering in search of a more 
 royal standing-place. 
 
 It is perfectly safe to assume that matter is not self-conscious 
 and self -motive. Two alternatives remain. It may be con- 
 ceived as absolutely passive and adynamic a mere channel 
 for the transmission of energy from some original fountain of 
 force ; or, as is conceivable, at least as a formula of words, it 
 may be a repository of delegated force. The latter alternative 
 approaches the current conception ; which, however, represents 
 natural force as a blind energy resident in matter, and constitu- 
 ting an essential property of matter. Let me inquire, first, what 
 is involved in the popular idea that force inheres in matter. 
 Under the prevailing conception, the myriad motions of the 
 physical world are but the phenomena produced by the effort 
 of force to reach a state of equilibrium. Gravitation .is the 
 cause of myriads of movements. The vapor of the atmosphere, 
 condensed in rain-drops, descends to reach a resting-place which 
 it does not find in the air. Fluent as the waters are, they find 
 no rest on the hill-slope, but hurry off through rill and rivulet 
 to the lowest levels attainable ; and there they rest. There 
 they would rest to all eternity, but for the intervention of an- 
 other source of moving energy the sun. Warmed more or 
 less by the sun, vapory particles steal from the watery mass 
 into the superincumbent atmosphere absorbed, borne up, and 
 transported by it. The unequal distribution of solar heat, by 
 expanding portions of the atmosphere, changes their relative 
 weight, and they no longer counterpoise adjacent portions, but 
 are displaced by their lateral pressure. Hence arise vertical and 
 horizontal movements of the air. Hence the relations of hu- 
 
WHAT INHERENT FORCE IMPLIES. 123 
 
 midity to temperature are changed ; and under certain condi- 
 tions the excess of vapor is again disengaged as rain. Should 
 the sun cease to emit heat, the waters of the world would soon 
 settle to the lowest levels, and remain stagnant. The ascent of 
 vapor is simply an effort to attain a position where equilibrium 
 will ensue. The movement of winds is an effort to restore the 
 impaired equilibrium of different positions of the atmosphere. 
 The descent of rains and rivers is the search of the waters for 
 equilibrium. So the flash of lightning in the clouds is the 
 spiteful reaction of a disturbed equilibrium in the electric ele- 
 ments. The rebound of a spring of steel or a cylinder of com- 
 pressed air is the recovery of that state of equilibrium which 
 had been disturbed by some external agency. Reasoning in 
 this way from the sources of the motions and changes which 
 make np the world of physical phenomena, we are led to the 
 conviction that all which we witness is merely the ferment of 
 a set of forces struggling toward a state of rest, but mutually 
 jostling each other in their progress, and undoing work which 
 immediately must be done again. 
 
 These are the results supposed to be wrought out by the ac- 
 tivity of forces inherent in matter. On this assumption, I wish 
 to direct thought in two directions. The first thought is, that 
 if these undiscerning mechanical forces inhere in matter, they 
 must have been made inherent by some agent or cause. If so 
 made, the event must have transpired in time. The theory ne- 
 cessitates an intelligent, uncaused Author of matter, with its 
 properties. This is the current theistic conception. 
 
 The other thought is an anticipation of the end of this phys- 
 ical ferment, and the quest for some datum not involved in the 
 final subsidence of cosmical activities. The transmission of 
 heat from the sun to the earth, and from the earth's interior 
 to external space, has been the physical cause of the terrestrial 
 changes of millions of years. But the heat which escapes from 
 the earth never returns to it ; and the sun loses not only the 
 
124 INHERENT FORCE UNTHINKABLE. 
 
 thermal energy imparted to the earth and the other heavenly 
 bodies, but the infinitely greater amounts disseminated through 
 the unoccupied spaces of the universe. Hence the basis of the 
 doctrine of the " dissipation of energy.'^ 1 ) The epoch is sep- 
 arated from us by only a finite interval, when these great per- 
 ennial sources of physical activity shall have been exhausted, 
 and, however the ferment may be prolonged by agencies im- 
 possible to compute, the whole world, the whole solar system, 
 shall have settled at length into that condition of stagnation 
 and death toward which creation is daily marching with strides 
 as visible as the approach of those wintry frosts which are brown- 
 ing the meadows and shaking the scarlet leaflet to the ground. 
 This impending crisis marks an end of the cosmical ferment as 
 sharply as its historical purport pronounces a beginning ; and 
 leaves us at both extremities of existence, with no support but 
 the same All-sufficiency already revealed in the dependent nat- 
 ure of force and motion and matter. 
 
 Such conclusions are necessarily involved in the popular idea 
 that force inheres in matter. It remains to establish the pos- 
 sibility of the thesis. Is it thinkable, for instance, that a mole- 
 cule of inert matter should be made the repository of an en- 
 ergy which should perpetually draw its neighboring molecule 
 toward it, and of another energy which should perpetually 
 repel it; or that these two forces should act respectively at 
 certain distances, and cease to act at distances greater or less 
 than these ; or that, both forces acting, they should be found 
 in equilibrium at several different intervals of distance between 
 
 ( J ) The idea of the final refrigeration of the earth and sun, and, in short, 
 the ultimate complete stagnation of the material universe, was shadowed 
 forth by the author as an original speculation in the Michigan Journal of 
 Education in 1860, and more explicitly in the Ladies' Repository, Cincin- 
 nati, for November and December, 1863, and January, 1864. The doctrine 
 of the " dissipation of energy " seems to have been first broached by Sir 
 William Thompson, Trans. Roy. Soc. Edinb., 1852. 
 
ACTION AT A DISTANCE. 125 
 
 the molecules? Is it thinkable that either atomic or molar 
 matter is capable of exerting efficiency at a distance? Is it 
 not a necessity of thought that efficiency requires presence in 
 space as well as in time activity here as well as now?(^} I 
 confess that, with all my efforts at abstraction and invention, 
 I am unable to think "dead" matter for that is the kind of 
 which I speak as acting, or as the seat of a "dead" energy 
 which acts. If others can think this, and believe it, I com- 
 mend them to that thread of thought, already disclosed, which 
 leads hence, from this world of dependence, to the eternal Self- 
 supporter revealed already in their intuitive consciousness. 
 
 Of delegated force residing in matter I can form no other 
 conception than that it is actuated by the delegating power 
 a sort of form or husk, the substance and vitality within which 
 is imparted from some source superior to matter. This con- 
 ception, denying that force inheres in matter, presents it as 
 an exotic power, exerting a vicarious activity, without essential 
 dependence on its environment; but, like the hermit-crab, 
 using it merely as a seat of operations. If such force is dele- 
 gated, it is dependent, and destitute of autonomy ; and it can 
 
 (') Gravitation has been regarded an instance of the exertion of (sec- 
 ondary) efficiency at a distance ; but this was not the view of Newton. 
 He repels the charge that the theory of gravitation is in conflict with the 
 philosophical maxim that " a thing can not act where it is not." " It is 
 inconceivable," he writes to Dr. Bentley, "that inanimate brute matter 
 should, without the mediation of something else which is not material, 
 operate upon and affect other matter without mutual contact. * * * That 
 gravity should be innate, inherent, and essential to matter, so that one 
 body may act on another at a distance, through a vacuum, without the 
 mediation of any thing else, by and through which their action and force 
 may be conveyed from one to another, is to me so great an absurdity, that 
 I believe no man who, in philosophical matters, has a competent faculty of 
 thinking can fall into it. Gravity must be caused by an agent acting 
 constantly according to certain laws!" (Playfair, "Dissertation on the 
 Progress of Mathematics and Physical Science "). 
 
126 MATTER VIEWED AS ADYNAMIC. 
 
 only be a matter of mere speculation whether its accredited 
 power is enduring, or requires to be instantly renewed. In 
 any case, the very form of words implies a source of power 
 superior to matter and material energy, and no interest re- 
 mains in the question, save as a mere contingency of science. 
 
 The other alternative respecting the relation of matter to 
 force conceives matter as purely adynamic. In this view, all 
 natural force proceeds from a dynamic Intelligence superior 
 to matter. Two sub-alternatives present themselves here also. 
 Matter may serve merely as the vehicle which transmits pri- 
 mordial force ; or it may be the seat of an immanent and ever- 
 acting force. The first conception is not difficult to entertain. 
 The activities of force are subordinated to laws of a mechanical 
 and exact character. They come within the grasp of the science 
 of quantity. But for the complexity of their mutual pertur- 
 bations, it would be possible to chart their results for indefinite 
 periods of time. As it is, the movements of planetary bodies, 
 projectiles, tides, streams, and many other molar aggregates 
 have been reduced to numerical expression which is very exact. 
 Atoms and molecules elude our scrutiny, but chemistry is ver- 
 ging on an exact science, and we have some foreshadowings of 
 the subjugation of the whole realm of atomic physics to the 
 reign of calculable law. With such indications, it is eminently 
 conceivable that the omniscient Disposer should be able to so 
 discern the endless series of actions and reactions as to impart 
 an initial impulse which should thrill through the chain of be- 
 ing in predetermined effects. The line of thought, however, 
 here bifurcates again. Are the myriad phenomena of existence 
 the unfolding results of a single primordial impulse, or of an 
 impulse momentarily and instantly renewed? Either theory 
 is rational. The former supposes divine agency to be sepa- 
 rated from the present by the whole life-time of cosmic exist- 
 ence. The latter contemplates God as ever-presiding and ever- 
 energizing. If, however, the cycles of events roll forth from 
 
FORCE AND DIVINE VOLITION. 127 
 
 a primordial impulse, they must inevitably reach at last a con- 
 dition of rest. Phenomenon is but the disturbance of the equi- 
 librium of force. All disturbances tend to repose. No cycle 
 of motions can be self-perpetuating. To whatever extent we 
 widen the cycle, by annexing new realms of dynamic activity, 
 the widest realm is finite, and the universe of atomic agitations 
 must finally become quiet. This is the same outcome reached 
 when we reasoned on the molar activities of the cosmos. In 
 philosophy, all roads lead to God. If we conceive the contin- 
 uous renewal of the impulse applied at the periphery of exist- 
 ence, we bring Deity into intimate relations to the world sep- 
 arated from phenomenon only by a film of matter. In this case, 
 and indeed in either case, the question arises, Why should Dei- 
 ty choose to exert his energy from a distance ? In the latter 
 case, too, the human imagination is burdened with all the re- 
 luctance which is aroused in some minds at the contemplation 
 of Deity as ever active in the sustentation of his universe. If, 
 however, an active relation to the universe is admissible, the 
 view which follows seems simpler and more plausible. 
 
 This view is, that natural force has no existence except as the 
 direct effort of the Supreme Will. It supposes matter to be 
 absolutely inert and naked of energy. Every form of force is 
 a particular mode of divine activity. Every movement and 
 every change reveals directly the presence of the Supreme Pow- 
 er ; and man is surrounded by an array of admonitions of the 
 divine presence the most awe-inspiring possible. Nay, man 
 himself is the vehicle of the voice of God to his own sensori- 
 um. The changes of matter are in progress in our own bodies. 
 Infinite agency permeates our very selves, assorting our nutri- 
 tion, building us up, effecting repairs, wasting our tissues, and 
 carrying us into the grave nay, not forsaking us even there, 
 but tenderly bearing the effete molecules which we can use no 
 longer into new situations and collocations, to subserve other 
 predetermined uses in the economy of nature. 
 
 6* 
 
128 DIVINE IMMANENCE. 
 
 Either phase of the theory of divine immanence, though the 
 general doctrine, as I have said, has found many advocates, is 
 obnoxious to an objection proceeding from the impotence of 
 the human mind. It seems, at first, incompatible with the 
 majesty of God to think of him as ever active and careful and 
 cognizant of the affairs of the universe, and, most especially, 
 of all their subordinate details. The relation even of creator 
 and disposer, without the implication of immanent activity, 
 has brought down the reproachful phrase, " carpenter theory " 
 of the universe. Such misgivings and such reproaches are 
 prompted only by human finiteness and incapacity. Activity 
 is the central law of existence. Nothing exists for repose, but 
 every thing for work. Indolence is a human invention. The 
 only evidence of existence is action. Whatever ceases to act is 
 dead. God, the author of life and fountain of living force, 
 can not be less active than the modes of existence which rep- 
 resent him. But we must not overlook the meaning of om- 
 nipotence and omniscience and omnipresence. We must not 
 overlook the fact that, with Deity, willing is accomplishing. 
 We must not forget that God is without organs to be wearied 
 or wasted with use. With Omniscience, the knowledge of all 
 things is easier than, with us, the knowledge of one thing. 
 With Omnipotence, the accomplishment of all things is easier 
 than, with us, the accomplishment of one thing. After much 
 reflection, this seems to me the most philosophic conception of 
 the relation of the Supreme Being to the world. 
 
 The theories of matter and force which I have thus far dis- 
 cussed suppose matter to have a substantive existence. There 
 is a counter-theory which regards matter merely a manifesta- 
 tion of force. In this view, the so-called properties of matter 
 have no subjective ground. The resistances which it presents 
 are not resistances of a material substance. The last two views 
 presented divine immanence in matter and divine immanence 
 through matter suggest the query, What, then, can matter be ? 
 
D YNAMICAL VINW OF MA TIER. 129 
 
 If the energies emanating from matter do not appertain to mat- 
 ter, then those modes of energy known as resistance, elasticity, 
 adhesiveness, color, and the like, have no material ground. Ex- 
 tension and figure, which relate only to the space over which 
 the energies just mentioned are active, are not properties of 
 any material substances. Indeed, as all properties are but 
 modes of energy, the properties of matter are completely de- 
 tached from matter, and we are left to the conception of a sub- 
 stance without attributes.^) Such substance is a figment of 
 the imagination. We know nothing, and can know nothing, of 
 any substance save by its attributes. If the so-called proper- 
 ties of matter do not belong to matter, then matter as a ground 
 of phenomena has no existence. But the properties of matter 
 so called remain ; they can not be ignored. Those forces which 
 we have supposed to emanate from matter are realities. But it 
 is not possible to thought to substitute abstract force or forces 
 for all which we have regarded as forms of matter. Force can 
 only be exerted by a real agent. Attribute does not float about 
 creation without a substantial ground to rest on. Force is nei- 
 ther fatherless nor orphan, flitting about without haven and 
 without allegiance. Force is efficiency sent forth by substan- 
 tial existence. It is not force, indeed, which produces effects, 
 but the free-will whence dynamic influence proceeds. Force 
 is an attribute of will. Elasticity, resistance, color, which are 
 both impressions made upon our sensorium, and thus subject- 
 ive, and also energies exerted to produce those % impressions, and 
 thus objective these, also, are attributes of will. The dynam- 
 
 (') This view is less accepted than it has been. Professor F. Schneider 
 says, " The theory that the atoms have no extension in space and are mere- 
 ly centres of force * * * is, in view of the results of investigation in various 
 provinces of molecular physics, no longer tenable" (Meyer, " Jahrbuch," 
 for 1873). Nearly all physical speculations are now based on the assump- 
 tion of the atomic constitution of matter (see Barker's Address before the 
 Physical Section of the American Assoc. Adv. Science, Buffalo, 1876). 
 
130 DYNAMICAL THEORY PANTHEISTIC. 
 
 ical theory of matter, therefore, precipitates us immediately 
 and irretrievably upon divine agency. We may loosely speak 
 of atoms of matter as mere foci of force, and aggregates of 
 matter as mere spheres of resistance ; but such language is 
 empty and vain. There must be something which exerts force. 
 There must be something which resists.^) 
 
 Thus we find ourselves, by whatever path we pursue our ex- 
 plorations through the mysteries of matter and force, always 
 confronted by the divine presence. We can not flee from De- 
 ity. There is no way to invent a world which must not depend 
 first and last upon divine support. There is no way to think 
 of an atom of matter, or that which may be called an atom, 
 without conceiving it afloat in the breath of divine power. 
 
 Recapitulation of Possible Conceptions of Matter and Force. 
 
 A. The Dynamical conception of matter. 
 
 B. The Substantive conception of matter. 
 I. Matter self-motive (Hylozoistic). 
 
 II. Matter not self -motive. 
 1. Endowed with force. 
 
 (a) The force inherent (Popular view). 
 
 (b) The force delegated. 
 
 (*) Should the dynamical theory of matter become established, we should 
 be forced into a modified pantheism. The theory means that no material, 
 inert substance underlies the phenomena which we style the phenomena of 
 matter. But reason declares that all phenomena are manifestations of 
 some entity ; and hence, if there be no matter, material phenomena are 
 manifestations of Deity, and the substance or entity revealed by the prop- 
 erties of matter is Deity tJie material universe is Deity. But if we ever 
 find ourselves resting in this conclusion, we shall arise and re-affirm these 
 unimpeachable dicta of reason that reason which is the offspring of God : 
 1. Man possesses an independent identity and a free-will ; 2. The Being 
 whose activities constitute the phenomena of the universe, without the 
 veil of matter intervening, is a personality discerning ends, prompted by 
 motives, executing by volition. 
 
UNPHILOSOPHIZING SCIENCE. 131 
 
 2. A mere channel for transmission of force. 
 (a) The force initial or peripheral. 
 
 (aa) One primordial impulse. 
 
 (bb) Impulse constantly renewed. 
 (6) The force proceeds from an immanent cause. 
 
 Science is sometimes heard to object to these theistic con- 
 ceptions of matter and of the universe ; but this is only because 
 science does not philosophize. As I have before intimated, 
 there is no fact of science from which philosophy can not find 
 a path leading directly to God. If the scientist does not find 
 the path, it is because he does not seek it. He contents him- 
 self with partial knowledge, rather than go beyond the data 
 and the methods of science. Amusing himself with the means, 
 he loses sight of the end. He is a man^sent by the Almighty 
 to rear a temple ; and finding some prettily colored stones in 
 the quarry, he entertains himself with these, instead of laying 
 them in the massive wall. He is a child studying the alpha- 
 bet, who thinks the acquisition of the letters the end of all 
 learning. 
 
 The scientist sometimes declares that the admission of divine 
 will, divine motive, divine providence, is the introduction of 
 chaos or caprice into nature.^) All things, he says, move for- 
 
 (') " In the intellectual infancy of a savage state, man * * * regards all 
 passing events as depending on the arbitrary volition of a superior, but in- 
 visible, power " (Draper, " Intellectual Development of Europe," p. 2). "As 
 science demands the radical extirpation of caprice, and the absolute reli- 
 ance upon law in nature, there arose with the growth of scientific notions 
 a desire and determination to sweep from the field of theory this mob of 
 gods and demons " (Tyndall, " Belfast Address," Appletons' ed., p. 38). It 
 must be noticed, however, that when the order and certainty of phenomena 
 under natural law are brought into antithesis with divine agency, it is some 
 crude conception of supernaturalism which is disparaged the Greek or 
 mediaeval anthropomorphism and not the recognition of every kind and 
 mode of divine agency in the world. Such passages are not intended to 
 
132 LAW AND DIVINE A GENC Y. 
 
 ward with, regularity under the dominion of law.^) It is ab- 
 surd to attribute events to divine agency, when science demon- 
 strates them the effects of the forces of matter, acting accord- 
 ing to invariable law. The subjective natures of matter and of 
 force are admitted to be involved in mystery. We may make 
 it a matter of faith that divine agency has been concerned at 
 some time and in some way ; but the palpable phenomena and 
 the fixed sequences are so obtrusive that, like the child or the 
 savage, he is ready to recognize ultimate causal efficiency in the 
 last-discovered antecedent, and satisfy himself with that. Long 
 habituated to reason from sensible phenomena, he thinks noth- 
 ing is real which can not be measured or weighed ; or, if there 
 be other realities, they are matters of opinion, or conjecture, or 
 faith, which offer no reward for their search. 
 
 Now, I wish to assert emphatically, that, so far as I can dis- 
 cern, any theory of divine immanence does not conflict with the 
 doctrine of law, nor with the science based on the atomic doctrine. 
 
 That law reigns in the world is an admirable fact, which I 
 not only acknowledge, but argue, with rejoicing. The reign 
 of law, however, is modal, and not efficient. Law effectuates 
 
 be taken in an atheistic sense. Dr. Draper says, " It is a more noble view 
 of the government of this world to impute its order to a penetrating, primi- 
 tive wisdom, which could foresee consequences through a future eternity, 
 and provide for them in the original plan, at the outset, than to invoke the 
 perpetual intervention of an ever-acting, spiritual agency" ("Intellectual 
 Development of Europe," p. 74). Professor Tyndall says, " The profession 
 of that atheism with which I am sometimes so lightly charged would, in 
 my case, be an impossible answer to this question " (whether there are not 
 in nature manifestations of knowledge and skill superior to man's) ("Bel-, 
 fast Address, " appendix, Appletons' ed., p. 102). 
 
 (') " The investigation of the aspects of the skies in past ages, and all 
 predictions of its future, rest essentially upon the principle that no arbi- 
 trary volition ever intervenes, the gigantic mechanism moving impassive- 
 ly in virtue of a mathematical law " (Draper, " Intellectual Development of 
 Europe," p. 3). 
 
LA W IMPLIED MIND. 133 
 
 nothing'. Law is the method according to which a lawgiver 
 effectuates. Law never planned " equivalent proportions," and 
 " inverse squares," and " ratios of squares and cubes," and " ho- 
 mological relations." Lawgiver planned these things; and 
 whether he works or his dynamical agents work, it is lawgiver 
 who observes these uniform methods from which formulated 
 laws have been generalized. " The laws of nature," says Von 
 Baer, " are the permanent expressions of the will of a Creative 
 Principle.'^ 1 ) Even if it were conceivable that, in the absence 
 of cosmical intelligence, the cosmos should go harmoniously, it 
 is infinitely more rational to conceive correlation, fitness, utility, 
 beauty, regularity, to proceed from an ordering mind. An or- 
 dering mind in nature does not imply caprice ; it implies the 
 very order which we observe; it is the necessary correlative 
 and cause of order, harmony, law. It is supposable, certainly, 
 that intelligence may impose upon itself fixed modes of activ- 
 ity. As the world is constituted, the happiness of man and 
 beast depends upon fixed methods in nature. It is infinitely 
 more probable that mind has planned correlations than that 
 unguided force has fallen upon them by any chance. Mind is 
 a better explanation of the structural affinities of animals than 
 any principle of inheritance, unguided and unpurposed by 
 mind. Mind is the best explanation, and the only explanation 
 admissible in philosophy, of the complex of phenomena reveal- 
 ed in the panorama of nature. 
 
 Even should we receive the dynamical theory of matter, and 
 recognize every lump of earth as only a manifestation of force, 
 of which the real ground is the divine existence, still we may 
 continue to reason and to conclude in the same manner as if 
 the atomic constitution of matter were proved true. The the- 
 ory of the solar system has been established on the assumed 
 
 ( J ) K. E. Von Baer, "Studien aus dem Gebiete der Naturwissenschaft- 
 en," p. 232. 
 
134 THE SCIENTIFIC FIELD. 
 
 truth of the Newtonian doctrine of gravitation ; but a different 
 doctrine is supposable, and different doctrines are, indeed, un- 
 der discussion, (') which, while they would sweep the popular 
 theory of gravitation from existence, would leave the principles 
 of mathematical astronomy untouched, and would disclose no 
 fundamental proposition which must be unlearned. Though 
 the stone built into the dizzy tower of the cathedral be but a 
 bundle of resistent forces exerted directly by Infinite Will, we 
 have no cause to fear that Infinite Will is disposed to withdraw 
 that exertion of energy, or for one instant to cease acting ac- 
 cording to formulas prescribed from the beginning of the world. 
 
 I have discussed sufficiently the general relations of matter 
 and force. I have pointed out the inevitable tendency of 
 thought toward a theistic solution of the problem, under what- 
 ever aspect it may be presented. Thus I have reached certain 
 general principles which I desire to apply to certain dogmatic 
 propositions found in scientific literature. 
 
 Science proper is concerned only with the phenomena of 
 causal intermediation. With primary causation, or the nature 
 of efficiency in causation, it has nothing to do. Its data are, 
 especially, the phenomena of the physical world. To these 
 may be added the phenomena of society, the phenomena of 
 the psychical activities, and the primary data given in the uni- 
 versal reason. But social, psychical, and rational phenomena are 
 the data of science, in its recent acceptation, only so far as they 
 may be employed inductively. Induction is commonly regard- 
 ed the logic of science. Deduction is the logic of philosophy. 
 Nevertheless, deduction may be employed to develop scientific 
 qusesita. Such qusesita may belong to the realm of actuality 
 or to that of potentiality. If the former, deduction becomes 
 a seer ; if the latter, a prophet. The predictions of astronomy 
 
 (') See Cocker, " Theistic Conception of the World," p. 210-222, for 
 statements and references on this subject. 
 
DEDUCTION IN SCIENCE. 135 
 
 are prophetic deductions from principles induced from observa- 
 tion. The story of nebular geology is the revelation of a seer 
 drawn out by the thread of deduction. ( l ) On the basis of the 
 theory of descent from a common stock, Haeckel and other ev- 
 olutionists deductively infer the characters which the unknown 
 stock must bear, and infer, guided by scattered facts, what must 
 have been the nature of the ramifications. Such deductive 
 inferences have been often confirmed by actual discovery. 
 Marsh having traced, as he believed, the lineage of the one- 
 toed horse back in time to a four-toed horse, predicted that 
 from the deposits of some earlier geological period would be 
 obtained evidences of the existence of a five-toed horse. In 
 November, 1876, that prediction was fulfilled by the discovery 
 of Eohippus. 
 
 As there is a science of mind, so we have a philosophy of 
 science. Indeed, philosophy can not be strictly dissevered 
 from science ; as the annihilation of the data of science would 
 impoverish philosophy. Philosophy would thus become a 
 magnificent mill, with no corn to grind. It is unnatural, and 
 indeed impossible, to work science and philosophy in separate 
 fields ; for they are yoked together. Every step of scientific 
 reasoning employs a philosophic principle. Even induction, 
 the much-vaunted engine of science, binds conclusion to scien- 
 tific, or a posteriori, datum, by means of a philosophic, or a 
 priori, datum. For instance, take the generalized proposition 
 
 (') I have long protested against the exaggerated importance which, 
 since Bacon, science has been inclined to concede to the inductive method 
 of investigation ; noticing, as I have, that a large part of the reasoning of 
 science in fact, every thing which can properly be called reasoning pro- 
 ceeds on d priori grounds (see a lecture on " Scientific Education," de- 
 livered at the dedication of the Judd Hall of Science of the Wesleyan Uni- 
 versity, in July, 1870 ; also " Sketches of Creation," March, 1870, pp. 52, 66, 
 435, 436). It is, of course, gratifying to find similar views set forth in a 
 work of such authority as Jevons's " Principles of Science." 
 
136 INDUCTION LEANS ON DEDUCTION. 
 
 that the skins of Hottentots are black. The reasoning is skel- 
 etonized in the following syllogism : 
 
 Whatever color of skin is possessed by A, B, C, and a hun- 
 dred other Hottentots, must be the color of Hottentots 
 in general. 
 A, B, C, and a hundred other Hottentots, possess a black 
 
 skin. 
 
 Therefore, Hottentots in general possess black skins. 
 Now, it is an a priori datum of reason which validates the 
 passage from the particular to the general in the major premise. 
 Moreover, what is the ground of belief that A, B, C, and a 
 hundred other Hottentots, submitted to observation, are black ? 
 It is the antecedent and primitive belief that things are as our 
 senses report them to us. This, again, is an a priori datum ; 
 and we observe that it lies at the very root of the initial process 
 in all inductive or scientific reasoning the verification of facts. 
 No scientist thinks of the possibility of a flaw in his logic at 
 this point ; and, indeed, there is no occasion for it ; the proced- 
 ure is valid. I can not avoid adding, parenthetically, that the 
 veracity of consciousness is worth no more in this case than in 
 any other. The belief that objects exist as sense reports them to 
 us, is no more binding than the belief that intelligible correla- 
 tions imply intelligence. Accept the first proposition as true, 
 it is idiocy to reject the latter. Reject the latter, it is idiocy 
 to accept the first. Credibile in uno, credibile in omnibus. 
 
 Thus the antithesis of science and philosophy does not exist. 
 Nor are their fields entirely apart. The scientist is bound to 
 philosophize, and ought to philosophize, more than he does.^) 
 
 ( J ) The most eminent and original scientists feel least scruple at the em- 
 ployment of deductive data. Professor Tyndall says, " By an intellectual 
 necessity, I cross the boundary of the experimental evidence, and discern 
 in that matter which we, in our ignorance of its latent powers, and not- 
 withstanding our professed reverence for its creator, have hitherto covered 
 with opprobrium, the promise and potency of all terrestrial life " (Tyndall, 
 
IMPLICATIONS OF SECONDARY CAUSE. 137 
 
 The philosopher depends on the data of science, and ought to 
 be as profound a scientist- as the scientist who is no philosopher. 
 It is noteworthy that the most eminent philosophers have had 
 the largest command of the treasury of science : witness Aris- 
 totle, Leibnitz, Comte, Whewell, Sir William Hamilton, Spencer. 
 And the most eminent scientists have been most conversant 
 with the ideas of philosophy : witness Aristotle, Galileo, Bruno, 
 Gassendi, Newton, Cuvier, and Agassiz. Let science and phi- 
 losophy, wedded by nature, remain undivorced. 
 
 Now let us turn the discussion to the implications and legit- 
 imate uses of the facts of causal intermediation, which consti- 
 tute the peculiar data of science. Henceforward, I shall shape 
 my phraseology with especial, though not exclusive, reference 
 to physical science. 
 
 Causal intermediation or secondary causation implies, first, 
 primary causation as the antecedent and responsible and only 
 actual efficiency. 
 
 It implies, secondly, the absence, or latency, of the attributes 
 characterizing primary cause. That is, it implies the absence 
 of self-consciousness, cognition of the relation between cause 
 and effect, motivity, intentionality, volition, and personality. 
 These attributes do not belong to the world of natural phenom- 
 ena, so far as we regard matter itself the ground of dynamic 
 effort. If we posit in matter an exotheistic ground of energy, 
 we necessitate a materialistic, hylozoistic pantheism, against 
 
 " Belfast Address," Appletons' ed., p. 89). And Haeckel : " Wer noch 
 heute die Entwickelungsgeschichte als eine rein ' descriptive Wissenschaft ' 
 betrachtet (eine Contradictio in adjecto) wer noch heute den Unter- 
 schied zwischen Wissen und Wissenschaft, zwischen Kenntniss und Er- 
 kenntniss nicht kennt, der hat iiberhaupt unter den Vertretern wahrer 
 Wissenschaft nicht mitzureden ; und der verfolgt auch in der Entwickel- 
 ungsgeschichte nur eine unterhaltende ' Gemiiths- und Augen-Ergotzung,' 
 aber keine wahrhaf t wissenschaftlichen Ziele " (Haeckel, " Ziele und Wege," 
 p. 4-5). 
 
138 CONGRUITY OF TERMS. 
 
 which it is scarcely necessary to direct an argument. If we 
 posit in matter an endotheistic ground of energy, we reach a 
 position from which the explanation of phenomena is simple, 
 and consonant with the instincts of humanity and reason. It 
 is scarcely necessary to say that whether we assume the ex- 
 otheistic or endotheistic view of matter, its phenomena remain 
 equally the legitimate data of scientific processes. 
 
 Thirdly, causal intermediation implies a congruity between 
 antecedent and consequent. Like begets like. Modal activity 
 does not come from mechanical action, but only material form 
 and motion. Life is not generated by mire, nor thought se- 
 creted by brain ; though life may be generated in mire, and 
 from mire, by primary cause; and thought may issue from 
 brain, or through brain, emanating from a thinking cause. This 
 congruity is not necessary in original causation. Though mat- 
 ter, itself an effect, can not generate will, it may be generated 
 by will. Though the dislodgment of a rock on a distant 
 mountain - side might be repeated a thousand times, it could 
 never produce a psychic motion in me; still less, a psychic 
 power. Should psychic motion succeed, the fall of the rock 
 could be no more than occasion ; my will must be the cause. 
 But will can cause the fall of the rock. Sitting in my chair, I 
 can decree a train of instrumentalities which will dislodge the 
 granite from its socket ; as will may prompt a set of physical 
 preparations in Boston, or determine the movements of a hun- 
 dred thousand soldiers in the field. But even original cause, 
 if finite, can not create matter or force; as it is impossible 
 for finite intelligence to conceive how that event can be pro- 
 duced^ 1 ) 
 
 (*) I find this law of (secondary) causation enunciated by Coleridge. 
 "The law of causality," he says, " holds only between homogeneous things, 
 i. e., things having some common property " (" Biographia Literaria," chap. 
 8). So, also, Spinoza : " Quae res nihil commune inter se habent, earum una 
 alterius causa esse non potest " (" Ethica," book i.). J. S. Mill, however, 
 
EFFICIENCY AND CONDITIONALLY. 139 
 
 Fourthly, a relation of efficiency must subsist between the 
 antecedent and consequent, even in secondary causation. But 
 it does not follow that the antecedent is the source of the effi- 
 ciency ; it may only transmit it. In a question of secondary 
 causation, therefore, two separate quaesita exist. First, does a 
 relation of efficiency subsist between two given terms; second, 
 if so, is the efficiency original or transmitted? The last ques- 
 tion I have discussed generally, and have pointed out the vari- 
 ous views which it is possible to entertain respecting the pri- 
 mordiality of the force manifest in the natural world. I have 
 shown that there is but one possible view which does not con- 
 duct thought, setiologically and necessarily, to a Prime Mover, 
 the field of whose activity embraces not only matter, but every 
 possible mode of existence. 
 
 Fifthly, causal intermediation is susceptible of arrest, or de- 
 flection, or acceleration, by conditions. Unlike conditions in 
 primary causation, these exist only as a mechanical influence. 
 They are the objective, in distinction from the subjective, con- 
 ditions of primary causality. 
 
 These five principles are applicable in all reasoning from the 
 phenomena of nature, whatever view we may take of the nat- 
 ure of matter, or the relations subsisting between matter and 
 force. If we accept either phase of divine immanence, we 
 may assume that Deity conditions himself spontaneously by 
 the same laws as we are compelled to regard necessary laws, on 
 the hypothesis of the inherency of force in matter. 
 
 The principles of efficiency and conditionally are the two 
 rocks on which scientific reasoning has most frequently split. 
 Sometimes a relation of succession or concomitance has been 
 mistaken for an efficient relation. Sometimes a condition has 
 
 denounces the proposition as a fallacy (" System of Logic," p. 474). And 
 yet he qites some admirable instances of the supremacy of the principle of 
 congruity (p. 486-487). 
 
140 CONDITIONS NOT CAUSES. 
 
 been so mistaken. The line of false reasoning from neglect of 
 the principle of conditionality bifurcates. There are, as I have 
 before stated, two classes of conditions those which are sub- 
 jective to moving cause, and those which are objective. Condi- 
 tions which enter into the constitution of motive are subject- 
 ive. They co-exist with intentionality, and condition it. Con- 
 ditions which modify or annul the efficiency proceeding from 
 cause, either primary or secondary, are objective, and act me- 
 chanically. Organic conditions are objective; they are often 
 privative or permissive. It is a somewhat frequent error of 
 science to confound subjective and objective conditionality, as 
 well as to transmute condition into efficiency. Those who fail 
 or refuse to recognize intentionality in nature must consistently 
 ignore all but objective conditions. Still, on their own stand- 
 ing-plane, they practice false induction when they clothe con- 
 dition with efficiency. 
 
 I shall now attempt to point out and classify, by way of il- 
 lustration, some leading examples of false philosophy in the 
 methods of recent science. This task is difficult, and requires, 
 probably, more acumen than I possess; but I shall venture, 
 tentatively, to arrange these examples in five classes. 
 
 1. Subjective Condition mistaken for Objective Condition, and 
 then mistaken for Efficiency. 
 
 The coadaptation, which every one has remarked, between 
 organic nature and its physical environment has been the sub- 
 ject of different interpretations. De Maillet, Lamarck, Geof- 
 froy-St.-Hilaire, and many others, down to Darwin and his 
 disciples, have conceived the organism as impressed and fash- 
 ioned by the direct influence of the environment. That is, the 
 environment has been regarded as exerting an efficient causa- 
 tion, in the capacity of an objective condition. On the con- 
 trary, Cuvier, Agassiz, Dawson, and the whole line of believers 
 in " Final Causes," from Socrates to M'Cosh, have maintained 
 
ENVIR ONMENT NO T EFFICIENT. 141 
 
 that the organism is not the product* of the environment, but 
 a product which intelligence has correlated with the environ- 
 ment. In other words, the environment has been the existent 
 fact which has conditioned the INTENTION of the causal intelli- 
 gence. If this latter view be correct, Lamarckianism and kin- 
 dred theories, so far as they maintain that environment is the 
 seat of causal efficiency, have mistaken a subjective condition 
 for an objective one, and have then conceived it as exerting 
 causal efficiency. The correctness of the Darwinian view, un- 
 der the aspect just stated, it appears, depends on the proof of 
 efficiency proceeding from environment to organism. But this 
 does not seem to be probable. Admitting the environment to 
 bef, as it is in some cases, an objective as well as a subjective con- 
 dition, it is only a condition that is, it is a fact which stands 
 either in a permissive relation to efficient cause, providing the 
 possibility for the production of a certain result ; or else, if effi- 
 ciency emerges from it, it is only transmitted efficiency, the di- 
 rection of which it determines within certain limits. In either 
 case, efficiency does not reside in environment ; but the latter 
 case, moreover, is incapable of proof, since the efficient cause of 
 organic growth acts in the organism ; and the external condi- 
 tions obviously sustain only a permissive relation to this activi- 
 ty.^) If external conditions permit only a dwarfed develop- 
 ment, the efficient cause can proceed only to the limits assigned. 
 If external conditions do not permit the elaboration of color- 
 cells, the organism remains colorless. Often, however, we find 
 
 (!) This discrimination has already been made by Huxley. " Conditions 
 are not actively productive, but are passively permissive; they do not 
 cause variation in any given direction, but they permit and favor a tend- 
 ency in that direction which already exists (Huxley, " Critiques and Ad- 
 dresses," p. 276). I. II. Fichte, also, speaks pertinently to this point as a 
 philosopher : " Nothing extraneous to any individual existence can trans- 
 form it, but can only excite it to self-wrought development " (" Die Theis- 
 tische Weltanschauung," Leipzig, 1873, p. 225). 
 
142 ABSENT CONDITIONS. 
 
 structures in the organism which could not result from restrict- 
 ive or privative conditions such as the development of molars 
 for trituration in animals having a digestive apparatus suited to 
 a vegetable diet ; or elongated and prehensile organs, as in the 
 giraffe and the proboscideans, where the food is not attainable 
 with the ordinary structure ; or legs and lungs in aquatic em- 
 bryos developing for terrestrial life, where the influence of the 
 environment, if any were conceivable, would be exerted against 
 the development of the organ. A triturating molar, an elon- 
 gated tongue or snout, an unused pair of lungs growing in the 
 water these are not developments arrested by external condi- 
 tions, but developments invited by external conditions, actual 
 or future, and pushed forward by some force acting in the or- 
 ganism, and acting with a discernment of the character of the 
 environment, either actual or future. Thus the environment 
 exerts no efficiency whatever. It may condition in two ways, 
 by limitation and by solicitation; while, in some cases, the 
 structure is in anticipation of environment, though in these 
 cases as truly conditioned by environment as in any other case. 
 But all cases of conditioning environment are alike in failing 
 to yield the evidence of efficient causation, even of the second- 
 ary kind. This critique is equally applicable to the doctrine 
 of progressive improvement of animal life in geological time, 
 conceived as the product of the improving conditions of the 
 world. 
 
 2. Subjective Condition mistaken for Efficiency. 
 
 Here that which is a motive, or final cause, determining a 
 method of activity, is mistaken for a necessary mode of exist- 
 ence, growing out of the assumed efficiency of secondary causes. 
 One of the explanations of the fact of a method of evolution 
 in nature falls under this head. That a method of evolution 
 prevails can not, I think, be successfully disputed. It has 
 been remarked by scientists since the times of Leibnitz, La- 
 
EVOLUTION IN THE WORLD. 143 
 
 place, and Von Baer; by sociologists from Plutarch to Comte 
 and Buckle and Spencer ; by theologians from St. Clement to 
 modern thinkers. Some have attempted to explain evolution 
 as an issue emerging, in every case, from some necessary rela- 
 tions of matter and the material forces. But evolution is a 
 manifestation of order. Evolution implies foresight of an end 
 involved in a beginning. It is a predetermined and perma- 
 nent modality or mode of efficiency. A predetermined mode of 
 action impresses intentionality. The method of evolution is a 
 subjective condition. It conditions effectuation ; but it does 
 not effectuate.^) 
 
 A general method of evolution, in a world full of differen- 
 tiated sections of existence, implies various aspects of evolu- 
 tionary manifestation and agency. There must be evolution in 
 the cosmos ; evolution of continents and seas ; evolution of life 
 and organic types ; evolution of individuals ; evolution of civ- 
 ilization ; evolution of systems of education and of religion. 
 Everywhere must be a procedure, as Spencer phrases it, from 
 the more homogeneous to the more heterogeneous. Different 
 forms of force or modes of energy must be manifest under the 
 different circumstances. In the cosmos, speaking after the 
 usual fashion, mechanical forces may suffice ; in determining 
 the succession of organic forms in the individual, in the race, 
 or in the world, physiological forces may be instrumental ; in 
 sociology, education, and science, the force of ideas, variously 
 conditioned, may effectuate the orderly advance ; in the evolu- 
 tion of life, it is impossible to conceive of any thing short of 
 immediate creative power, since between life and not -life, or 
 between life and matter, is an incongruity which secondary 
 causation is incompetent to bridge over.( a ) 
 
 ( J ) " The whole process of evolution is the manifestation of a power ab- 
 solutely inscrutable to the intellect of man" (Tyndall, "Belfast Address," 
 Appletons' ed., p. 91). 
 
 ( 2 ) " If we look at matter as pictured by Democritus, and as defined for 
 
 7 
 
144 EVOLUTION MODAL, NOT CAUSAL. 
 
 But, admitting the reality of secondary efficiency proceeding 
 from the material forms which constitute or environ the evolu- 
 tionary series, I have shown that this implies primary causal- 
 ity and all which that concept incloses. If gravitation, and 
 centrifugal force, and thermal exchanges are the intermedia of 
 cosmic differentiations, there is a supreme Master whose will 
 they administer. If inheritance, effectuated through physiolog- 
 ical forces, results in specific deviations and race improvements, 
 these are not the results of the law of heredity, since that law, 
 like all others, marks only a rule of action ordained by a com- 
 petent lawmaker. If the principle, or, more properly, the mode, 
 designated as the " survival of the fittest " which is only an- 
 other phrase for " natural selection " and " sexual selection " 
 results in a slow improvement of the species, this is not because 
 a mode effectuates any thing. The forces of life are the posi- 
 tive agents, and whatever subject controls these is the real cause 
 of specific advance. And so, if successive acquisitions of ideas 
 lead to the unfolding of more complicated and more advanced 
 social systems, these ideas are but agencies employed by In- 
 telligence which has contemplated ends concealed from every 
 finite mind. As before intimated, however, I prefer to regard 
 Supreme Intelligence as acting without intervention. In the 
 evolution of life's beginnings, I again insist, no other concep- 
 tion is rationally possible. This is affirmed by Darwin and 
 Huxley ; and still more explicitly by the majority of those who 
 hold to the derivation of species, and the general doctrine of 
 evolution. 
 
 In the same category belong certain explanations offered of 
 
 generations in our scientific text-books, the notion of any form of life 
 whatever coming out of it is utterly unimaginable " (Tyndall, "Belfast Ad- 
 dress," Appletons' ed., p. 87). " Considered fundamentally, then, it is by 
 the operation of an insoluble mystery that life on earth is evolved, species 
 differentiated, and mind unfolded from their prepotent elements in the im- 
 measurable past" (?'>., p. 91). 
 
PHYSIOLOGICAL CONDITIONS NOT CAUSAL. 145 
 
 homological and teleological relations in the natural world ; but 
 I reserve my critique for a fuller discussion. 
 
 3. Objective Condition mistaken for Efficiency. 
 
 The universally recognized influence of physiological condi- 
 tions on the psychical activities has led some thinkers to the 
 extent of assigning these conditions to the position of cause of 
 psychical activities. Thus, the body is the basis of mental phe- 
 nomena, and mind is a figment. In reasoning against this view, 
 I desire to say, in limine, that the theory annihilates both soul 
 and immortality, and thus wars against the intuitions of hu- 
 manity. This has always been a warfare of a hopeless kind. 
 Next, the theory violates the principle of congruity. Unless 
 the body is a voluntary actor, we have matter, as secondary 
 cause, producing thought. This, as Tyndall insists, is incon- 
 ceivable.(') Obviously, bodily matter is only an objective con- 
 dition of the permissive or privative variety. In the order of 
 human nature, thought and will are manifest only through cer- 
 tain states of matter. The manifestation must be co-ordinated 
 to the degree of permission. Nothing further needs to be said. 
 
 The " unconscious cerebration " of Carpenter is a material- 
 istic phrase which seems to imply that brain is capable of elab- 
 orating thought during our periods of unconsciousness. Yet 
 this interpretation is contrary to the positive tenor of Dr. Car- 
 penter's teaching. By " unconscious cerebration " he means 
 exactly the same thing as Sir William Hamilton means by 
 " unconscious mental states " or " mental latency ;"( 2 ) and this 
 
 ( J ) "When we endeavor to pass * * * from the phenomena of physics 
 to those of thought, we meet a problem which transcends any conceivable 
 expansion of the powers we now possess " (Preface to the seventh ed. of 
 " Belfast Address," Appletons' ed., p. 28). " The passage from the phys- 
 ics of the brain to the corresponding facts of consciousness is unthinka- 
 ble" ("Scientific Materialism," Appletons' ed., p. 117). 
 
 ( a ) Hamilton, " Lectures on Metaphysics," Lect. XVIII. 
 
146 ENVIRONMENT A PERMISSIVE CONDITION. 
 
 means that the mind continues to act during suspended con- 
 sciousness, as in sleep ; and sometimes elaborates conclusions 
 whose processes have escaped our notice. " Unconscious cere- 
 bration " of thought, in the literal sense, is a hypothesis ame- 
 nable to all the objections just urged against the physiological 
 causation of thought. It is the same thing. 
 
 I should add that the environment of organic forms, which 
 plays so conspicuous a role in Lamarckian and Darwinian the- 
 ories, seems sometimes to stand in the relation of an objective 
 condition of the permissive variety. For instance, the exist- 
 ence of shell-bearing mollusks is permitted only by the exist- 
 ence of lime -yielding water. The growth of trees requiring 
 silica in their constitution is possible only in soils affording 
 silica; as a hundred other requirements or conditions of or- 
 ganic existence must be answered before each particular form 
 of existence is permitted. Now, what have these permissive 
 conditions to do with efficient causation ? Obviously, the cause 
 of whatever does grow acts in the organism, and co-ordinates 
 its action to the external conditions. Efficiency implies will, 
 which includes intelligence ; and co-ordination also implies in- 
 telligence. Hence the assertion that a forest of pines is caused 
 by a sandy soil is the acme of the illogical. 
 
 4. Instrumental Relation mistaken for Cause. 
 
 I have made allusion to a class of organic structures devel- 
 oped in antagonism to the environment, and hence, by no pos- 
 sibility, its product. It seems to be considered by some Dar- 
 winists a sufficient explanation of this phenomenon, that the or- 
 ganization is hereditary. The branchiae of the tadpole do not 
 disappear, and the lungs develop, during aquatic life, through 
 the influence of the surroundings, but in obedience to the law 
 of heredity. Well, this means that our tadpole acquires lungs 
 at the same time that it must use gills, because its ancestors 
 did this. But how did its ancestors get this peculiarity to 
 
HEREDITY MODAL, NOT CAUSAL. 147 
 
 transmit ? Did they acquire lungs in the water through the in- 
 fluence of the environment ? Oh no ; it was a hereditary tend- 
 ency with them also. But go back a hundred generations, or 
 a thousand ; go back to the first brood of tadpoles there must 
 have been a first brood was there any hereditary tendency in 
 them ? It seems to me, to whatever distance we remove the 
 acquisition of this hereditary tendency, we must necessarily 
 recognize a beginning, at which air-breathing organs were ac- 
 quired in the water without the impulse of heredity . We may 
 conceive the amphibian characteristics to have been gradually 
 assumed ; but always, just in the same degree as amphibian 
 characteristics began to develop, they began without the influ- 
 ence of heredity. The organic differential could never be so 
 small as to elude the necessity of a causal influence, which the 
 unfriendly element could not exert, and which, as each differ- 
 ential came first into existence, heredity could not be summon- 
 ed to explain. In the several increments of its origin, the am- 
 phibian character was necessarily independent of heredity ; in 
 its integral development, therefore, heredity has nothing to do. 
 The lungs of the tadpole can not be ascribed to the environ- 
 ment, whether we seek for its influence upon the individual or 
 upon the species; and when we trace the increments of the 
 organism, severally, back to their inception, the influence of 
 heredity is excluded by hypothesis. We demand some cause 
 which can originate a differential character de novo independ- 
 ently of heredity and in opposition to the influence of surround- 
 ings and, what is most significant of all, in anticipation of an 
 environment which, in the animal's plan of life, will surround 
 it at maturity. Heredity is but an instrument through which 
 a needful organism is brought into existence, in spite of ad- 
 verse influences, by some efficient cause capable of discerning 
 physical adaptations, and realizing them in a manner conform- 
 able to general plans. 
 
148 "ORGANIZED EXPERIENCES" IMAGINARY. 
 
 5. Cause arbitrarily assumed. 
 
 Here I would class Mr. Spencer's doctrine of " organized ex- 
 periences." By this phrase he means that those necessary 
 ideas, notions, beliefs, which I have shown to be innate, and 
 which only a small school of empiricists can recognize as 
 growth within the individual, are the result of a slow growth 
 within the race. Now, first of all, such an acquirement, if it 
 were such, would not be comparable with the inherited dispo- 
 sition of the pointer and setter, among dogs, since the latter is 
 a case of complete transmission in a single generation, and not 
 a gradually accumulated inheritance. Secondly, if these nec- 
 essary concepts were gradually accumulated and strengthened, 
 as the theory implies, they would be of different degrees of 
 strength and clearness in individuals or races reared under dif- 
 ferent conditions. But no such disparity exists ; nor is there 
 the least evidence that they have added a particle to their 
 strength since the date of earliest traditions. Thirdly, the hy- 
 pothesis of incrementation violates the principle of heredity. 
 Heredity transmits what it receives nothing more. Heredity 
 itself declares that these concepts have been transmitted from 
 the first man; and that declaration I accept, fourthly, the 
 hypothesis violates the principle of congruity. The forces of 
 heredity are physiological ; the concepts which Spencer places 
 at interest in their custody are ideas of the reason. " Men do 
 not gather grapes of thorns, nor figs of thistles." This doctrine 
 is a " non causa pro causa" 
 
 Under the same category I would range the doctrine of abi- 
 ogenesis, restricting the term to the generation of life by that 
 which is non-life. Have we not learned that "like begets 
 like ?" This, at the outset, is another violation of the princi- 
 ple of congruity ; and stands forth as such without a shred of 
 apology to cover the naked absurdity of hurling absolute iner- 
 tia into the chair of creative efficiency. 
 
MATTER CONCEIVED AS "GROSS." 149 
 
 May I ask you to note particularly the force of the terms 
 which I employ ? In this discussion I always conceive of mat- 
 ter as absolutely inert " gross " " brute " a different matter 
 from that pangenetic entity in which Professor Tyndall sees 
 every thing in potentiality. If we conceive matter self-efficient, 
 or exerting a delegated efficiency, we can conceive it the cause, 
 primary or mediate, of physical effects ; but life is an entity 
 which has nothing in common with matter ; and, though it 
 may be revealed in forms of matter styled organic, its com- 
 mencement demands a cause generically differentiated from 
 matter. This is not to assert that the cause of life acts invari- 
 ably through a pre-existent germ. The rule does not preclude 
 exceptions. We all believe, in fact, that life upon the earth 
 has descended from one or many absolute beginnings. If life 
 has been once or more introduced without the intervention of 
 germs, it may have been so introduced in a myriad instances, 
 running down to yesterday. But to conceive the potency of 
 life shut up in matter is either to wander from the accepted 
 signification of the term, or to confound simple material con- 
 comitance with efficient causation. 
 
 The views which have opened before me during the progress 
 of these discussions have rolled forth with a copiousness by 
 which I have felt embarrassed. Would that I had conceived 
 them with clearer eyes, and phrased them with more expressive 
 words ! I thought, when I assigned two lectures to the discus- 
 sion of the doctrine of causality, I should be able to exhaust 
 the well of my deepest convictions, and give ample attention 
 to those views, sometimes attributed to science, which impinge 
 against the eternal principles of truth revealed in human rea- 
 son. But I have only given you the conspectus of a discus- 
 sion. I have lifted the veil ; I have afforded a glimpse within 
 the adytum of truth ; I can do no more. I beg you to rend 
 the veil with your own hand ; enter and commune. 
 
YI. 
 
 THE DOCTRINE OF INTENTIONALITY. 
 
 IN my fourth lecture I stated, in effect, that faith in God 
 may be based on 
 
 I. The feeling or intuition of his existence. 
 
 II. The knowledge of his existence. 
 
 This knowledge I stated to be attainable in various ways, 
 among which are 
 
 1. The common consent of mankind. 
 
 2. The intuition of causality (^Etiological). 
 
 3. The evidence of intentionality in nature (Teleological). 
 It will be remembered that in the attempt to develop the 
 
 ideas inclosed in the necessary concept of original causality, I 
 enunciated intentionality as one of them ; and pointed out the 
 fact that in every effect where intention is manifest, mind is 
 implied. I also reminded you that the world is full of in- 
 stances of intentionality, since it is full of facts of co-ordina- 
 tion, which we necessarily apprehend as the result of intention. 
 
 Now, the intentionality of which I am to speak in particular 
 is not that of which we become convinced in viewing the world 
 simply as an effect. The mere fact of simple causation does 
 evince intentionality; but the fact of co-ordination of effects 
 evinces reflective intentionality. It yields additional evidence 
 of the activity of mind. It is this stronger evidence to which 
 I invite your attention. 
 
 Philosophically speaking, it is not necessary to spread before 
 you an extended array of examples. If that primitive judg- 
 ment is valid by which we deduce intelligence from correlation, 
 then the discovery of a single instance of correlation in all the 
 
INTUITION OF INTENTIONALITY. 151 
 
 universe makes just as strong a case in defense of theism as 
 the production of a hundred instances. The battle-ground, in 
 these times, is on the threshold of the teleological argument. 
 Nescience meets us at the door, and attempts to bar us com- 
 pletely upon the outside. It proposes to invalidate the very 
 basal proposition which lies deeper than Socrates, or Galileo, 
 or Butler, or Paley ever explored unconscious as they were 
 that all their reasoning assumed an antecedent truth which 
 could be challenged. The prior proposition of teleology is 
 the affirmation that intelligence is implied in intelligible corre- 
 lations. 
 
 The general tenor of my last two lectures is an argument 
 which may be applied to the support of this proposition. For 
 this reason, I shall not enter here upon any preliminary dis- 
 cussion. I need only remind you that the truth of this propo- 
 sition is revealed in the universal reason of humanity like the 
 truth of the axioms of geometry ; that, being a simple truth, 
 a first step in reasoning, there are no steps by which it is possi- 
 ble to reach it with an argument ; that, in the sphere of human 
 affairs, its validity has never been questioned, and that, in the 
 realm of nature, its invalidity is only the recent claim of a lim- 
 ited number of thinkers; that even these do not assert its inva- 
 lidity, but only its possible invalidity, since the effects which 
 we observe in the natural world emanate from a source which 
 entirely transcends our apprehensions ; and that these thinkers, 
 nevertheless, generally incline to recognize the world as the 
 product of intelligence akin to our own, while they regard it 
 most becoming to science and philosophy to restrict themselves 
 to the phenomena of the finite. I remind you, lastly, that this 
 intuition is one which takes no cognizance of the distinction 
 between finite and infinite; but renders its testimony as em- 
 phatically and unreservedly when it interprets a phenomenon 
 in the natural world as when it enters the shop of an artisan ; 
 that the impeachment of the authority of this intuition is an 
 
 7* 
 
152 VSE OF NUMEROUS INSTANCES. 
 
 
 
 implied impeachment of all, and the logical result is, to precip- 
 itate man into a wilderness of misleading and Fichtean unreali- 
 ties a very insanity of philosophy. 
 
 This is the skeleton of a treatment of the fundamental ques- 
 tion, which has been incidentally filled out, in parts, in the 
 progress of the last two lectures, and the full development of 
 which must satisfy the most exacting of the validity of the 
 basis of the teleological argument. 
 
 Though one instance of design is as good as a hundred in 
 fixing a philosophical conviction, it is not as good as a hun- 
 dred in moving the religious nature. There are two avenues to 
 religious conviction; one is the rational, the other the emo- 
 tional. Both are excellent ways; but some are too feeble to 
 pursue the rational, while others are too proud to pursue the 
 emotional. Both roads converge at the same end, and the 
 Judge who sits there never asks the individual by what route 
 he has traveled. Now, while a display of the economy of nat- 
 ure is not purely an appeal to the emotional, like the effort of 
 the religious exhorter, it is partly so. Every one is aware of 
 awakened emotions in contemplating nature. These spring 
 not simply from the beauty, or sublimity, or complexity, or 
 vastness of nature; but there is irresistibly mingled with the 
 sentiments which these characteristics awaken, a feeling of 
 reverence and awe, in view of the manifestation of God. And 
 can it be that the instinct is illusory which so quietly, so 
 universally, and so instantly ascends from the harmonies and 
 grandeur of the world to an adequate Author of these mani- 
 festations, already revealed in the soul? No. The very emo- 
 tions, then, which the contemplation of nature awakens imply 
 the truth of the fundamental principle of teleology. But be- 
 cause the wonders of the universe awaken emotions religious 
 emotions the multiplication of instances may strengthen a 
 religious nature which never dreams of the philosophic expla- 
 nation of its emotions, and is innocent of the possibility of re- 
 
MECHANICAL CORRELATIONS. 153 
 
 flective doubt. More than this, it may turn the balance in a 
 noble mind, in which religious faith is beginning to cower be- 
 fore the arrogant demeanor of a vigorous intellect. 
 
 The correlations discoverable in nature may, I think, be all 
 embraced under two general heads: MECHANICAL CORRELA- 
 TIONS and MODAL CORRELATIONS. The former are coadapta- 
 tions of parts of a structure intended for action ; they imply 
 contrivance, by which the principles of mechanics are made op- 
 erative and effective in forms shaped and coadjusted in the req- 
 uisite manner. The parts thus become either instruments or 
 the constituents of a machinery. Such are the chiseling beak 
 of the woodpecker, the climbing beak of the parrot, and the 
 straining beak of the duck. Such are the muscles which ex- 
 tend and flex the forearm, and that admirable bony and liga- 
 mentous structure which gives breadth and prehensile power 
 and marvelous dexterity to the human hand. But there is an- 
 other concept which coexists with that of contrivance in every 
 instance of natural mechanism. The mechanism subserves some 
 objective end. It generally subserves utility or beauty. The 
 sufficient reason for its existence is not subjective in the de- 
 signer, but objective in some sentient being whose happiness 
 is promoted by it. It might still be a mechanism demonstra- 
 tive of intelligence, if it sustained no relation to the happiness 
 of sentient beings the sufficient reason for its existence resid- 
 ing in the consciousness of the designer. I mention the rela- 
 tion of utility only as an objective fact, not as a necessary cor- 
 relation of contrivance. It enhances, however, the significance 
 of the contrivance to find not only its parts adapted to each 
 other, but the whole adapted to utility. As a mechanism, it 
 implies intelligence ; as a useful mechanism, it implies intelli- 
 gence twice-told. 
 
 Modal correlations are coadaptations of parts or wholes in 
 conformity to plan. They imply, 1st, the conception of a 
 plan; 2d, the ordering of effects so as to give expression to 
 
154 MODAL CORRELATIONS. 
 
 the plan. Plans in nature are as various as the fields in which 
 effects are displayed. We recognize them in the organization 
 of the body of man, in that of each of the types of animals, 
 and in the general conception of an animal at large.* We rec- 
 ognize them in the correlation of the intellectual faculties, in 
 the moral faculties, in the voluntary faculties, and in the in- 
 teractivities of all the faculties. We recognize plan in the sys- 
 tem of correlations between the psychic and bodily natures; 
 we discern it in the structure of the solar system, in the geo- 
 logical history of the world, in the interaction of the physical 
 forces, and in the progressive changes of the cosmos as a whole 
 and in its parts. We discover plan in the disengagement of 
 results through the method of evolution, and in the subordi- 
 nation and action of the various agencies employed by the 
 Prime Evolver in working the plan be those agencies physical 
 forces, heredity, natural selection, sexual selection, hybridity, 
 prolonged gestation, accelerated or retarded development of the 
 embryo, occasional extraordinary births, parthenogenesis, influ- 
 ence of the environment, or an inherent conative quality of nat- 
 ure.^) Each of these agencies, or systems of instrumental ef- 
 fectuation, has been set forth as operative, more or less, in the 
 evolution of organic series. I believe them all influential. I 
 believe the tendency of each of these agencies may be, gen- 
 erally, toward the evolutionary result. But I recognize each 
 system of agencies operated according to a method which reg- 
 ulates its particular activities; and, most of all, I recognize 
 higher plan in the thoughtful convergence of all these thought- 
 elaborated systems toward one harmonious, homogeneous re- 
 sult evolution. Evolution is the method of methods ; and is 
 
 (*) In a little work entitled " The Doctrine of Evolution," the present 
 writer has endeavored to give a popular exposition of the general subject, 
 and of the various opinions entertained respecting the Causes of the as- 
 sumed derivation of species. 
 
PLAN AND END. 155 
 
 one of the strongest possible attestations of the dominion of 
 thought in the universe. Evolution in itself, however, is only 
 a method of effectuation. It implies, 1st, a Designer of the 
 method ; 2d, an Operator of the method. Evolution possess- 
 es no efficiency. He who contents himself with discovering 
 this method in nature contributes nothing to the philosophy 
 of causality. He leads us along the rills of phenomena, but 
 only tantalizes the innate thirst to drink from the fountain of 
 truth.C) 
 
 In historical order, the recognition and study of mechanical 
 correlations long preceded the recognition of modal correla- 
 tions. The former were styled teleological, as they disclosed 
 an end, which seemed to be sought by a designer. Modal cor- 
 relations also disclose conformity to plan as an end to be 
 sought ; and hence may also be styled teleological. But the 
 end in one case is objective utility toward sentient beings ; in 
 the other, it is objective conformity to a subjective concept. 
 This conformity may, at the same time, be designed for a use- 
 ful end ; and thus, even the dominance of plan may reveal a 
 characteristically teleological character. But the distinction be- 
 tween mechanical teleology and modal is so clear and funda- 
 mental, and the term teleology has become so definitely restrict- 
 ed, by long usage, to the mechanical kind, that I shall employ 
 another term to express modal teleology. In the comparative 
 
 ( ! ) I have taken great pleasure in the perusal of a work by Kudolf 
 Schmid, Stadtpfarrer in Friedrichshafen, entitled " Die Darwin'schen The- 
 orien und ihre Stellung zur Philosophie, Religion und Moral," Stuttgart, 
 1876, in which the complete compatibility of the derivative hypothesis 
 with the Christian religion is intelligently maintained. Wigand's earlier 
 work (" Der Darwinismus und die Naturforschung Newtons und Cuviers, 
 Beitrage zur Methodik der Naturforschung und zur Speciesfrage," 2 Bd., 
 Braunschweig, 1874-1876) assumes, in this respect, a similar position. See, 
 also, K. E. Von Baer, " Studien aus dem Gebiet der Naturwissenschaf ten," 
 St. Petersburg, 1876, containing two papers on Teleology and one on Dar- 
 winism.- 
 
156 HOMOL OGT S UBSER VES TELEOL OGY. 
 
 study of organic structures, those which are built upon a com- 
 mon plan are said to be homologous. Thus nails, hollow horns, 
 hoofs, and hair are homologous, because equally outgrowths 
 from the dermis. Transferring the term to this discussion, ho- 
 mology is the doctrine that PLAN implies intelligence; while 
 teleology is the doctrine that CONTRIVANCE implies intelli- 
 gence. 
 
 The theologians of a recent period were reluctant to admit 
 the existence of plans and archetypes, through fear that they 
 might be incompatible with the doctrine of ends, so clearly sub- 
 stantiated. The execution of the plan might be claimed as 
 the sole end. But we have learned that the intervention of 
 the homological plan is the quickest way to the teleological end. 
 Homology supervenes on teleology. The two always co-exist. 
 No useful design is realized except in subordination to a gen- 
 eral method. The existence of the method does not nullify 
 the end which it subserves ; it sheds a light upon it and en- 
 hances its meaning. Moreover, in homological relations an ob- 
 jective end is discoverable, sharply distinct from the teleolog- 
 ical end, though co-existing with it. This is the influence of 
 intelligible plan upon the human intelligence, before 'which it 
 is wrought out. This might be termed psychic teleology, in 
 distinction from ordinary mechanical teleology. Psychic tele- 
 ology is further distinguishable into noetic (addressed to the 
 intelligence) and sesthetic (addressed to the consciousness of 
 the beautiful). I have long felt convinced that the revelations 
 of lofty thought and all-penetrating prescience, with which the 
 scheme of nature is enriched, were intended to stir the intellect 
 of man, and lift it up toward the realities which transcend the 
 sphere of sense. " God geometrizes," says Plato, beautifully 
 and truthfully. Let us strive to think the thoughts of God. 
 Not less have I been convinced that the beautiful in nature has 
 a teleological meaning. It implies man fore-ordained ; it im- 
 plies sesthetic cognition and sesthetic susceptibility ; and pur- 
 
HOMOL OGY SECURED THRO UGH HEREDITY. 157 
 
 poses by the exercise of this order of faculties to multiply the 
 sources of happiness. 
 
 The doctrine of homology in organic structures, after having 
 enjoyed great favor from the time of Goethe to Richard Owen, 
 has fallen, like teleology, into a degree of disfavor with a cer- 
 tain class of anatomists, who think the principle of heredity is 
 sufficient to account for all the affiliations of structure which 
 group forms together under the shadow of one plan. Now, let 
 us open the way for heredity, by all means. It is one of the 
 intelligible instrumentalities by which Intelligence effectuates 
 the objectization of plans. If animals belonging to different 
 species, genera, or orders exemplify an identical plan of struct- 
 ure, and it can be shown that they have descended from a com- 
 mon ancestry, then all hail heredity ! We have discovered the 
 method and agency by which directive Intelligence transmits 
 and perpetuates the objective expression of its conceptions. 
 But, let it be observed, first, that this conclusion must be based 
 on discovery, and not on conjecture ; and, secondly, that the dis- 
 covery will not be the disclosure of efficiency, but only of the 
 mode of activity of efficiency. Heredity accounts for nothing ; 
 it is only the objective condition of resemblances in structure. 
 
 The theological uses of teleology have been almost exhaust- 
 ively worked out by Paley.(') He has, indeed, employed but a 
 limited number of instances of design in nature, and has fol- 
 lowed in the path blazed out by Socrates and Xenophon twen- 
 ty-three centuries since; but he has selected admirable and 
 fruitful examples, and has pressed them on this side and that, 
 until it is impossible to extract further meaning from them, or 
 from any other example of the teleological class. Since Pa- 
 ley's time, however, the extension of our knowledge of organic 
 
 (') The design revealed in the structure of the human body was gone 
 over with singular fullness and elaborateness by Lactantius in his book on 
 the " Workmanship of God, or the Formation of Man." 
 
158 TELEOLOOICAL WRITERS. 
 
 structures, particularly the lower forms of animals, has vastly 
 enriched the treasury of examples to select from ; and Bell,^) 
 Owen,( 2 ) Balfour,( 3 ) Clark,( 4 ) Chadbourne( 5 ) and many others, 
 not omitting Cooke,( 6 ) in chemistry, have supplemented the 
 archdeacon's imperishable labors; while in the field of astron- 
 omy, Chalmers( 7 ) and Mitchel( 8 ) have continued the work be- 
 gun by Galileo, and Kepler, and Newton. ( 9 ) In the science of 
 geology, new facts and new views have shown to how large an 
 extent the physical and organic changes of the world have con- 
 stituted a preparation for man. 
 
 The field of homological correlations, for reasons already in- 
 dicated, has been less worked in the interests of theology, though 
 Dr. M'Cosh has ably broken the ground.( 10 ) I therefore invite 
 your attention to a few illustrative examples. 
 
 (') " Bridgewater Treatise." 
 
 ( 2 ) Exeter Hall Lecture : " The Power of God in his Animal Creation." 
 
 ( 3 ) " The Religion of Botany." 
 
 ( 4 ) " Mind in Nature." 
 
 ( 5 ) " Lectures on Natural Theology." 
 
 ( 6 ) " Religion and Chemistry." 
 
 ( 7 ) "Natural Theology," vol. i., book ii., chap. iii. : "A Series of Dis- 
 courses on the Christian Revelation, viewed in Connection with the Mod- 
 ern Astronomy." 
 
 ( 8 ) "The Astronomy of the Bible." 
 
 ( 9 ) Darwin in his various works has brought together a large fund of 
 instances of mechanical and modal adaptations in the organic world. 
 
 ( 10 ) " Method of the Divine Government," book ii. ; and " Typical Forms 
 and Special Ends in Creation." The theological significance of homol- 
 ogy has been fully appreciated by Richard Owen and by Louis Agassiz, 
 as may be learned from many of their writings. See, also, Whewell, 
 "Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences." Older writers recognizing the 
 theological bearing of homological relations of things are Plato, " Leges," 
 book iv. ; book x., cap. ix. ; book xii. ; book xiii., cap. xiii. ; Cicero, " De 
 Natura Deorum," lib. ii., cap. v., vli., xx., xxxii., xxxv., xliv. ; Plutarch, " De 
 Plac.," i., vi. ; Samuel Clark, " Demonstration of the Being and Attributes 
 of God ;" Newton, " Optics." Spinoza says, " The laws of nature are noth- 
 
DIVERSITY OF ANIMAL HOMES. 159 
 
 The first example is the existence of fundamental types of 
 animal structure. Cuvier, and most naturalists after him, 
 have recognized four Vertebrates, Articulates, Mollusks, and 
 Radiates. Whether, as some believe, more than these should 
 be recognized, or not, the persistence of these, from the dawn 
 of animal life upon the earth, (') is a fact of profound signifi- 
 cance. The existing world affords almost an infinitude of sit- 
 uations for the occupancy of animal forms. It is one of the 
 intelligible economies of nature to populate all these situations 
 with animal life. The solid land, the water, and the air teem 
 with tribes innumerable. The grassy plain, the reeking jungle, 
 the gloomy forest, the mountain solitude, the wilderness of 
 rifted granite blocks these all are the chosen retreats of air- 
 breathing animals, severally correlated, in all their structures 
 and instincts, to their diversified habitats. Not alone upon the 
 surface of the earth do forms of life declare the existence of 
 a co-ordinating intelligence. The woodchuck burrows in the 
 earth to find a place of shelter and protection ; the mole, to 
 abide there. The beaver resorts to the water for safety and 
 
 ing else than the eternal decrees -of God ;" and similarly K. E. Von Baer : 
 " Die Naturgesetze sind die permanenten Willensausserungen eines Schaf- 
 fenden Principes " (Studien, p. 232) ; and Montesquieu affirms, " Ceux qui 
 ont dit qu'une Fatalite aveugle a produit tous les effets que nous voyons 
 dans le monde, ont dit une grande absurdite ; car quelle plus grande ab- 
 surdite, qu'une fatalite aveugle qui aurait produit des etres intelligents ?" 
 (Those who have declared that a blind necessity has produced all the ef- 
 fects which we see in the world, have declared a grand absurdity; for 
 what greater absurdity than a blind necessity which should have produced 
 intelligent beings?) ("Esprit des Lois," L, i.) See, also, the references 
 under " Original Causality " in the present work. 
 
 (') I do not ignore the Dawn-animal (EoziJon), which, as far as we know, 
 was the earliest manifestation of life, and could not be ranged under any 
 one of the four types named. I speak generally, and conceive the dawn 
 of life to mean the appearance of the teeming populations of the Silurian 
 the first great age of animalization. 
 
160 EVERY CONDITION POPULATED. 
 
 for a home ; while the squirrel seeks his in the tree. Of the 
 water-breathing tribes, some seek fresh water, some brackish, 
 and some brine. Some thrive best in cold water; some in 
 mild. Certain animals are confined to shallow waters; others 
 retire to the dim and quiet depths of the ocean. Some are 
 fond of an agitated stream ; others loll in the stagnant pool. 
 Of those which inhabit the air, some discover the fitting condi- 
 tions near the town, some in the meadow, some in the forest, 
 and others among the lightning -blasted pines which cling to 
 the dizzy mountain-cliff. Even the types of insects are found 
 swarming in all conceivable situations darting like a beam of 
 light through the air, crawling over the ground, burrowing be- 
 neath the bark of a tree, diving under the water or dancing 
 upon its surface, fervid with activity at high noon, or flitting 
 among crepuscular shadows, or prowling about in the dead of 
 night. And thus, in respect to endurance of temperatures, how 
 varied are animal natures ! From the heats of the tropical 
 plain to the rigors of the arctic ice-floe ; from the bee hum- 
 ming in the sunny vale, to the coleopter skipping upon the 
 surface of high Alpine glaciers; from the infusorian which 
 withstands the temperature of boiling water, to the ovum lodged 
 in a crevice upon the bark of a tree, and resisting, without 
 injury, the piercing frost of a wintry night in all terrestrial 
 temperatures, as in all conceivable situations, the plan of ani- 
 mal life has found a suitable home for some percipient creat- 
 ure to dwell in. 
 
 And yet a world teeming with populations, conformed and 
 adapted to situations too various for enumeration, presents us 
 but four, or at most, but few, fundamental plans of animal 
 structure. Throughout the world over the vast stretch of 
 continents, through the awful depths of the oceans whatev- 
 er the emergencies, however extreme the situation, the scheme 
 of life clings to the few types. If this persistence of plan is 
 amazing, what shall be said of the fact that the same plans 
 
PERSISTENCE OF PLANS. 161 
 
 have persisted through all the ages of the habitable world 
 through the period of tepid oceans lashed by cyclic storms; 
 over the dripping shores just emerging from the briny ooze ; 
 under the shade of ferns and sigillarise nurtured by a carbon- 
 laden atmosphere, and reeking with the moisture of a conti- 
 nental jungle ; under all the changing phases and vicissitudes 
 of ever - widening land -areas, and ever - shrinking oceans, and 
 ever-upspringing mountains, and ever -wasting islands; in the 
 progress of appearing and disappearing populations; extinc- 
 tions of species and genera and families ; unfolding of compre- 
 hensive types, specialization of faunas, and gradual approxima- 
 tion to a fitness for the advent of man ? Is there not intelligi- 
 ble purpose here in such a restriction of plans to meet such 
 an infinitude of emergencies ? Why have not the external con- 
 ditions, in their revolutions, revolutionized the plans of animal 
 structure? Why has not the perpetual survival of the fittest 
 evolved a plan of life which would fail to recognize either of 
 the others as its remotest ancestor? If lines of descent, as der- 
 ivationists believe, have diverged from the molluscan to the 
 vertebrate type, how is it that the lowest orders of all the 
 types have persisted to the present, and each of the types, on 
 its first appearance in the world, was as clearly characterized 
 as after the lapse of hundreds of thousands of years? Because 
 Intelligence planned and ordained these types of structure ; 
 and to whatever uses heredity and natural selection have been 
 appointed, they have never had the license to override the pri- 
 mordial decree. 
 
 Contemplate one of these types with more particularity. 
 The skeleton may be taken as expressing the fundamental con- 
 ception of the vertebrate type. This, in man, presents an ex- 
 treme diversity of forms. In the vertebral column and in the 
 ribs we have series of similar forms; but the two pairs of 
 limbs would be regarded as dissimilar, while the cranium as a 
 whole, or in its several parts, seems to offer no hint of resem- 
 
162 THE VERTEBRATE PLAN. 
 
 blance to any other bones in the body. If, however, we com- 
 pare with this skeleton the skeletons of other vertebrates, in 
 descending order, to the fish, we observe that the bones of the 
 different parts of the body present a constantly diminishing 
 degree of differentiation from each other. We thus arrive at 
 the discovery that the entire length of the skeleton is but a se- 
 ries of similar segments, differently modified in different parts 
 of the body, to constitute the various bony bases of the organs 
 which subserve the needs of the animal. ( J ) We find that each 
 one of these segments taking no account of the modifications 
 consists essentially of a central, more or less cylindrical bone, 
 commonly known as " vertebra " (and, in human anatomy, as 
 " body of the vertebra "), supporting above a bony arch con- 
 sisting of two pieces on each side of the median line of the an- 
 imal, with a central piece, or key-stone, completing the arch, 
 and supporting below another bony arch similarly constituted. 
 When all these segments are placed together in a series, the 
 " centrums " form the mass of the " backbone ;" the upper, or 
 " neural," arches form the channel in which the spinal marrow 
 is lodged ; and the lower, or " haamal," arches inclose the cav- 
 ity which holds the visceral organs. The cranium embraces 
 four segments. The brain-box is made by the expansion and 
 flattening of the bones which enter into the constitution of the 
 four neural arches. As the brain is only a prolongation of the 
 spinal marrow, the skull is only a prolongation of the vertebral 
 column. The ribs are the lower, or haemal, arches of the body, 
 while the two jaws are the ha3mal arches of the two anterior 
 segments of the cranium. In the fish, the haBinal arches of the 
 three anterior segments of the cranium are distinctly seen in 
 the bones of the upper jaw, the lower jaw, and the tongue. 
 The limbs are viewed as appendages. The pelvis, when it ex- 
 
 ( ! ) For an elementary elucidation of this subject, see Owen, " The Skele- 
 ton and the Teeth ;" also Huxley, " Anat. Vert. Animals," chap. i. 
 
MODIFICA TIONS OF PLAN. 163 
 
 ists, is a haemal arch, and answers, like each of the jaws, to a 
 pair of ribs, including the cartilages, connecting them with the 
 sternum. Posteriorly, the haemal arches diminish by disap- 
 pearance of distal parts, and then disappear. Farther back, 
 the centrums of the vertebra generally diminish, as also the 
 neural arches, and so gradually dwindle into the caudal ap- 
 pendage. It is a plan of organic structure that tail and brain 
 are in inverse proportion. In mankind the tail is reduced to 
 the os coccygis. 
 
 The vertebrate " archetype," so called, is a series of bony 
 segments, consisting of centrums and upper and lower arches, 
 each formed of its several pieces. This, of course, has no act- 
 ual existence; but the skeleton of every actual vertebrate is 
 composed of more or less of the archetype, with the bony 
 pieces more or less varied in shape, though never varied in 
 their relative positions and connections. The ends of the an- 
 imal's existence are sometimes best effected with numerous 
 segments, as in the serpent ; sometimes with few, as in the 
 mammal. The abdominal haemal (lower) arches are sometimes 
 complete, with their five pieces, as in the alligator and the liz- 
 ard ; those of man, and most vertebrates, have two of the pieces 
 (one on each side) cartilaginous or wanting. In the latter case, 
 of course, the central piece is also wanting. In the alligator, 
 these arches become abbreviated, and their sides soldered to- 
 gether, beneath the tail, to constitute the "chevron" bones; 
 in the ox they are entirely obsolete. In most mammals, one 
 of the haemal arches is strengthened and consolidated into a 
 pelvis; in the fish the pelvis is absent. In reptiles, the verte- 
 brae which support the pelvis remain distinct; in mammals 
 they are consolidated in a " sacrum." In the fish, the pieces 
 which enter into the constitution of the skull remain distinct, 
 and thus aSord a clue to the archetypal constitution of all 
 skulls; in man, the pieces of the brain -box are so coalesced 
 that its conformity to the archetype is much obscured. In 
 
 
 
 :H!VEI!3IT7 
 
164 EVOLUTION OF THE SKELETON. 
 
 most vertebrates, two pairs of appendages are present ; in oth- 
 ers we find but one pair either anterior or posterior ; and in 
 still others both pairs are absent. In the fish we find the ante- 
 rior pair articulated to the posterior neural arch of the crani- 
 um ; in most vertebrates they are detached, and the proximal 
 pieces, or " scapula," are imbedded in the dorsal muscles of 
 the thorax. Thus the forms of the pieces of the skeleton are 
 endlessly varied, and their relative dimensions are equally so 
 as well as the extent to which contiguous pieces are consoli- 
 dated together, or " anchylosed." But every bone which is 
 present can always be recognized as a piece of the archetype, 
 and can be referred to its place in the archetypal segment. 
 
 This archetype expresses the plan of the vertebrate as far as 
 the bony structure is concerned ; but the nervous, vascular, re- 
 spiratory, nutritive, and other departments of the organism are 
 correlated with it, and, similarly, give expression to the plan. 
 Each of the other fundamental plans of animal structure might 
 be shown to manifest a similar conformity to an archetype. 
 Each class, also, conforms to a class-archetype, which is a me- 
 thodical and constant modification of the fundamental arche- 
 type. 
 
 The vertebrate skeleton, in the progress of geological time, 
 has undergone what may be described as a gradual develop- 
 ment or evolution. Fishes were the earliest representatives of 
 the type; and here the skeleton presented, as it still presents, 
 the minimum modification of the archetype. The different 
 segments approach most nearly to identity. Batrachian rep- 
 tiles next appeared, and then the tribes of scaly reptiles, with 
 the skeleton successively more differentiated. In birds, which 
 next came upon the scene, the skeleton was further specialized; 
 while in mammals, the last class in order of appearance, the 
 archetype, through the superadded modifications which it has 
 undergone, is thrown into a state of comparative, but not im- 
 penetrable, disguise. Nevertheless, the archetypal conception 
 
WHAT CONSERVES THE PLAN? 165 
 
 runs through the entire series of beings, stretching down 
 through eons of vast and unknown duration. 
 
 Now, what means this persistence of an idea this imperish- 
 ability of an abstract thought ? Shall we say that these forms, 
 having descended from a common stock, retain their funda- 
 mental resemblances through the influence of the law of inher- 
 itance ? Or shall we maintain, with Cuvier and Agassiz, that 
 the first representative of each class, ordinal, generic, and spe- 
 cific type is a new existence a special creation ? The latter 
 view seems, at first, more consonant with the theistic instincts 
 of man; but let us consider what the other view necessarily im- 
 plies. It is the law of inheritance to perpetuate identity. This 
 alone, then, would not account for continuous or periodical ac- 
 cretions of improvement. Moreover, if genetic affiliations run 
 from end to end of the vertebrate line, they must run from 
 end to end of the animal line ; and this conclusion vastly aug- 
 ments the magnitude of the obstacles, the least of which he- 
 redity is incompetent to surmount. If the hereditary lineage 
 is a fact, we must seek for some other cause to account for the 
 wide divergencies which conflict with the principle of heredity. 
 Shall we say that diversified conditions of existence have de- 
 flected the genetic line in various directions? These, I have 
 said, can not be regarded as real causes, nor, generally, the seat 
 of activity of real cause. The cause which effectuates what- 
 ever results in animal forms, acts in the animal organism exact- 
 ly where the principle of heredity operates, and through exact- 
 ly the same instrumentalities which heredity employs. There 
 exists in the animal, then, a tendency to persistence of form, 
 and an antagonizing tendency to divergence of form a force 
 centripetal and a force centrifugal. If we call the centripetal 
 force heredity, what name have we for the centrifugal ? Shall 
 we call it an inherent tendency to divergence, as heredity is an 
 inherent tendency to parallelism ? The character of inherent 
 tendency does not satisfy the requirements. This, like any 
 
166 DERIVATION A PERPETUAL CREATION. 
 
 other unintelligent force, must act in a straight line ; but the 
 divergences for which we seek to account are as sinuous as the 
 myriad conditions to which the structures of animals are co- 
 ordinated. The force producing them discerns the various con- 
 ditions, and varies its action to conform to them. Discernment 
 is an act of intelligence, and does not belong to matter. There 
 must be, consequently, an external intelligence acting, or direct- 
 ing activity, within the organism. How shall we dodge this 
 exit of the argument ? 
 
 The doctrine of derivation implies, then, that external intel- 
 ligence acts perpetually in the organism. The doctrine of suc- 
 cessive creations implies that intelligence acts periodically ; and 
 is, therefore, the less theistic view. Derivation necessitates con- 
 tinual creation ; and Descartes expressed this idea, long ago, in 
 reference to the perpetuation of his own existence; while the 
 Cuvierian view necessitates only occasional creations. Science 
 is not yet prepared to settle unreservedly upon either of these 
 views. There remain great, apparently not insuperable, diffi- 
 culties in the way of the doctrine of derivation of organic 
 forms; but, most assuredly, we may remain content to leave 
 science to work out the problem at its opportunity. 
 
 The persistence of the vertebrate idea means, therefore, the 
 overshadowing presence and efficiency of intelligence. The 
 homological conformities are ordered by intention. The tele- 
 ological subserviencies are arranged by intention. The whole 
 world-wide and time-long panorama of vertebrate life is a nev- 
 er-ceasing and never-dimming revelation of God. 
 
 I desire to unfold this view with other details. Consider a 
 particular portion of the vertebrate skeleton. The anterior ap- 
 pendages of vertebrates are composed, osteologically, of a def- 
 inite series of pieces scapula, humerus, radius and ulna, car- 
 pals, metacarpals, and phalanges. Preliminarily, observe that 
 the posterior appendages are composed of an identical series 
 of bones identically coadjusted. Now, when we consider the 
 
VARIATIONS OF MEMBRAL ARCHETYPE. 167 
 
 different uses of the anterior and posterior extremities, in many 
 of the vertebrates, especially in man, it is remarkable that the 
 same plan of structure is employed for both ; and we feel com- 
 pelled to admit that not alone the needs of the animal, nor the 
 conditions of its existence, have guided the efficiency which pro- 
 duced limbs ; but an abstract concept conformity to a plan 
 has also been a guiding motive. 
 
 Next, consider the variations which have been played upon 
 this membral archetype as a fundamental theme in the evolu- 
 tion of the anterior pair of extremities. We contemplate the 
 arm and hand of man, and deem the member admirably adapt- 
 ed to the function of grasping and lifting ; but the arm of the 
 cat or dog, which neither grasps nor lifts, but performs other 
 functions with admirable dexterity, has the same osteological 
 composition. The broad, shovel-like hand of the mole, affixed 
 to the extremity of a twisted fore-arm, shows us again the 
 same bones teleologically modified to serve the behests of a 
 different group of instincts, and the needs of a different bodily 
 system. In the ox and horse the same series of bones is te- 
 leologically modified for simple locomotion on the land ; and 
 this function is better performed with this species of extrem- 
 ity than would be possible with the modification existing in 
 the mole, the monkey, or almost any other quadruped. As 
 these herbivora are the predestined prey of carnivores, and prey 
 themselves upon no other animal, this endowment of fleetness 
 is something co-ordinated to their exposed situation, while, at 
 the same time, it becomes effective only through the further 
 co-ordination of instinctive alertness and timidity. Next, the 
 same membral archetype is further modified for aerial locomo- 
 tion. In the bat, a wing is formed by the extension of a thin 
 membrane over the elongated phalangeal frame-work. In the 
 bird, the phalangeal frame- work, on the contrary, is foreshort- 
 ened, consolidated, and obsolescent; and becomes, with the 
 fore-arm, a solid base of support for an expansion of quills and 
 
 8 
 
168 ENVIRONMENT NOT AN EXPLANATION. 
 
 feathers themselves a marvelous structure, presenting a maxi- 
 mum of surface and strength with a minimum of material and 
 weight. Lastly, the fish has wings for the watery element. Its 
 pectoral fins present a bony composition in which the membral 
 archetype is shadowed forth without ambiguity ; as the abdom- 
 inal fins answer, homologically, to the posterior extremities. 
 
 Now, it is futile to assert that, through all this range of con- 
 ditions and co-ordinated instincts and functions, the environ- 
 ment is the efficient cause of modifications. In the self -same 
 atmosphere, and sunlight, and temperature, the insectivorous 
 bat presents us one modification, the insectivorous swallow 
 another. So, under the same conditions, the honey -loving 
 humming-bird possesses the same plan of wing as the carri- 
 on-eating vulture, but a fundamentally different one from the 
 honey-loving butterfly ! The resemblances and the differences 
 exist in defiance of the nature of environment. There is a 
 more occult principle which reigns in the system of morphol- 
 ogy. It is not heredity; for that is essentially antagonistic 
 to variation. The whole problem resolves itself, as soon as we 
 recognize the existence of fundamental plans in nature, deflect- 
 ed endlessly, in conformity to the endless conditions which sur- 
 round animals founded upon the same or different fundamental 
 plans, class-plans, ordinal plans, family plans, or generic plans. 
 Intelligence is the solution of all problems which surround us. 
 
 It will be interesting to still further specialize our mention 
 of membral hornologies. The recent researches of Professors 
 Leidy, Marsh, and Cope have brought to light the former ex- 
 istence, in our Western regions, of several quadrupeds possess- 
 ing structural affinities with the domestic horse. In the Eo- 
 cene, or oldest Tertiary deposits of Wyoming and Utah, are 
 found the remains of equine quadrupeds of the size of a fox, 
 but having four hoofs in front (three behind). They belong 
 to the genus Orohippus. In the Miocene, or next following 
 stage, occur, in Oregon and Nebraska, the remains of Miohip- 
 
PLAN OF EQUINE EXTREMITIES. 
 
 169 
 
 pus and Mesohippus, about the size of a sheep, and having 
 three hoofed digits before, of which the middle one is the 
 largest. In the Pliocene, or next younger stage of the Tertia- 
 ry, we find the remains of the Anchippus, Hipparion, and Pro- 
 tohippus, having the bulk of an ass, and ranging from Oregon 
 through Nebraska to Texas. These genera are characterized 
 by the possession of a stout middle digit, and a lateral one 
 on each side not reaching the ground. There also occurs, in 
 the Pliocene of Nebraska, another generic type, Pliohippus, in 
 which the lateral hooflets have become reduced to a pair of 
 "splint-bones," as in the domestic horse. Lastly, the same 
 conformation exists in the remains of the genus Equus, discov- 
 ered in the Quaternary, and having the size of the domestic 
 horse, but belonging to a species which has become extinct. 
 
 We have here a chronological succession of forms possessing 
 the highest interest. Between Orohippus and Equus, the old- 
 est and newest of these equine genera, and representing the 
 two extremes in structure, we may interpolate Miohippus and 
 Protohippus, representing the intermediate structures. This 
 gradation is intelligibly set forth in the conformation of the 
 digits of the anterior extremity. 
 
 \n 
 
 Orohippus. 
 (Eocene.) 
 
 Miohippus. 
 (Miocene.) 
 
 m 
 
 Protohippus. Equus. 
 
 (Pliocene.) (Quaternary.) 
 
170 GENETIC RELATION SUGGESTED. 
 
 Here a certain order of change seems clearly to be establish- 
 ed ; and we may project the line of analogies deductively both 
 into the past and the future. It seems legitimate to antici- 
 pate that an equine genus of later origin may yet exist, in which 
 the "splint-bones" shall have completely disappeared; and to 
 conjecture, with Professor Marsh, (^ that, at some period ear- 
 lier than the epoch of Orohippus, an equine quadruped prob- 
 ably existed having five toes before and four behind ; and, at a 
 still earlier period, a genus possessing five toes before and five 
 behind, according to the norm of vertebrates. ( 3 ) 
 
 Two possible explanations of this series of phenomena pre- 
 sent themselves. Both must recognize the existence of correla- 
 tion of structure, which constitutes plan. We may assume that 
 these successive forms sustain no genetic relationship, but are 
 distinct creations the continuity subsisting only in thought ; 
 or we may assume that each is lineally descended from its pred- 
 ecessor. This idea is favored by the succession in time corre- 
 sponding to the gradation in type ; by the circumstance that 
 the several types are so related geographically as not to imply 
 improbable migrations ; and by the fact that with the manifest 
 progress in the structure of the anterior extremities co-existed 
 a regular advance in the assemblage of characters in the in- 
 creasing size ; in the relative enlargement of the brain ; in the 
 
 ( 1 ) Amer. Jour. Sci. and Arts, vol. vii., March, 1874, p. 257. Compare, 
 however, opposing considerations by Owen, " Anatomy of Vertebrates," vol. 
 iil, pp. 792, 793. 
 
 ( 2 ) It is a striking fulfillment of this prediction a fact as useful here 
 as in a scientific treatise that in November, 1876, Professor Marsh an- 
 nounced the actual discovery of an equine quadruped having rudiments 
 of the fifth digits behind, and, probably, also before (Amer. Jour. Sci. and 
 Arts [3], xii.,p. 401). Professor Marsh informed the writer that he sought 
 methodically for these remains among a vast quantity of material obtained 
 from the lowest Eocene beds (" Coryphodon beds ") of New Mexico, dis- 
 tinctly older than the strata which had yielded Orohippus. This new, 
 archaic, pentedactyl horse has been named Eohippus. 
 
FACTS FAVORING GENETIC RELATION. Ill 
 
 gradual elongation of the head and neck ; in the widening of 
 the " diastema " (space for the bit) ; in the disappearance of 
 the first premolars and of the fangs of the molars ; in the 
 lengthening of the crowns of the molars ; in the diminishing 
 size of the canines and the enlargement of the incisors, with the 
 acquisition of the characteristic pit of the modern horse. To 
 these indications must be added the analogies of embryonic de- 
 velopment, ( J ) and of similar series of forms in other orders of 
 animals and other geologic ages.( a ) 
 
 ( J ) " The embryonic life of man is almost an epitome of the animal 
 kingdom, beginning with characters common to the moners and the worms, 
 and ending with the Vertebrates " (Packard, " Life Histories of Animals, 
 including Man," p. 239). According to Haeckel, the stages of the human 
 embryo exemplify not less than twenty-two types of organization in a reg- 
 ular progression. These may be generalized as follows : Structureless 
 protoplasm (moner), egg, morula, planula, gastrula (sack-stage), ascidian 
 (exhibiting what some regard the homologue of a spinal marrow), amphi- 
 oxus, low shark, amphibian, monotreme, marsupial, lemuroid, tailed monk- 
 ey, tailless ape, Papuans ("Anthropogenic," Lectures XIV.-XIX.). 
 
 ( 2 ) Leidy, "The Ancient Fauna of Nebraska," Smithsonian Contribu- 
 tions to Knowledge, 1853 ; " Extinct Mammalia of Dakota and Nebraska," 
 in Journal Acad. Nat. Sci., Philadelphia, vol. vii., 1869; "Extinct Verte- 
 brate Fauna of the Western Territories," Hayden Survey, 1873. Cope, 
 " Extinct Batrachia and Reptilia of N. Amer. ;" Proc. Amer. Phil. Soc., 
 1869, Feb., 1873 ; Proc. Acad. Nat. Sci., Philadelphia, Jan., 1873, Feb., 
 1873, Aug., 1874, 1875 (p. 261), May, 1876, July, 1876; Bulletin U. S. 
 Geol. Surv. Territories, No. 1 ; Hayden Survey, Annual Rep., 1873, pp. 498, 
 519; Hayden Rep., vol. ii., 4to; Wheeler Survey, Systematic Catalogue, 
 Vertebrata, New Mexico, 1875 ; Ann. Rep. Chief of Engineers, 1874, p. 
 604. Marsh, Amer. Jour. Sci. and Arts (3), July, 1871, Sept., 1872, May, 
 1873, March, 1874, March, 1875, Nov., 1876; New York Tribune extra, 
 No. 8. The descent of the horse was discussed by Professor Huxley in 
 his New York lectures (see Tribune extra, No. 36). 
 
 The extinct Palceotlierium, Anchitherium, and Hipparion of the Old 
 World are similarly connected with the modern horse. Modern birds are 
 connected, through sundry intermediate forms, with the Dinosaurian rep- 
 tiles ; the Eocene Amblypoda (Cope) are a type connecting the elephantine 
 
172 SUCCESSIONAL FACTS INADEQUATE PROOFS. 
 
 I think, nevertheless, that we are not authorized to assume a 
 genealogical descent satisfactorily proved by the simple fact 
 of a graduated succession of forms ; and to proceed, as some 
 scientists do, on this basis of evidence, to discourse about the 
 genealogy of the horse with as little reserve as we feel in treat- 
 ing of the royal line of the Prince of Wales. This assumed 
 genealogy implies that one generic form may be derived from 
 another ; while all the facts which have fallen under our ob- 
 servation fail to supply a single species certainly derived from 
 another^ 1 ) While this is the case, the circumstance of con- 
 secutiveness falls far short of logical proof of descent. A link 
 
 and equine types with the regularly clawed quadrupeds; the Creodonta 
 are intermediate between Insectivores, Carnivores, and lowest Quadruma- 
 na; the Taeniodonta are intermediate between Creodonta, Edentates, and 
 Rodents; Anaptomorphus connects Lemurs and true Monkeys, and Tomi- 
 tJi&'ium connects Lemurs with Creodonta. Thus, as we trace the records 
 of mammalian life backward to the commencement of the Eocene, we find 
 forms presenting an ever -diminishing amount of differentiation forms 
 less and less distinct from each other forms more and more " gener- 
 alized," "synthetic," "comprehensive," or " undecomposed " forms ap- 
 proaching more and more closely to a small-brained, five-toed, plantigrade 
 stock or primitive ancestor, from which, according to derivative doctrine, 
 have 'diverged the various lines which terminate in the living types of 
 mammals. However we may interpret this retral convergence toward an 
 ancient Eocene stock, the fact is demonstrated (compare Dana, "Manual 
 of Geology," pp. 382, 597). 
 
 (') "I doubt whether any case of perfectly fertile hybrid animal can be 
 considered as thoroughly well authenticated " (Darwin, " Origin of Species," 
 Amer. ed., p. 223). " In extremely rare exceptions the fertility persists in 
 the offspring, but it is much diminished. It diminishes still more in the 
 grandchildren, and it is extinguished in the third or fourth generation at 
 the most" (Quatrefages, "Natural History of Man," Amer. ed., p. 25). On 
 the other hand, see Notes C, D, and E, by the editor of the above-named 
 work, in reference to unlimited fertility of hybrids of the common and the 
 Chinese goose, and of two species of woodpeckers. On these hybrids of 
 geese, as well as hybrid plants, see, also, Darwin, " Origin of Species," p. 
 222. On hybrid woodpeckers, see Baird, Pacif. R. R. Rep., ix., 122. 
 
A LOGICAL INCONSEQUENCE. 173 
 
 missing destroys the chain of evidence. The lack (if such re- 
 ally exists) of conclusive evidence of the possibility of the der- 
 ivation of a species is as total and fatal a failure of proof, 
 in this case, as if there were no order in the succession, or 
 as if the succession were one of inorganic instead of organic 
 structure. I attempted once to expose this fatal inconse- 
 quence by publishing an ironical jeu-tf esprit on the "Geneal- 
 ogy of Ships."( J ) My little projectile elicited a number of re- 
 sponses, ( 2 ) of which two maintained that my implied argument 
 was unsound in consequence of the disparity in the natures of 
 ships and animals. ( 3 ) Indeed, that disparity, which I was sup- 
 posed stupidly to have overlopked, furnished the very gist of 
 my little argument. It was that which gave the theory of der- 
 ivation (as far as proof from succession goes) a reductio ad ab- 
 surdum. 
 
 But suppose a genetic descent provable, as, in view of the 
 whole range of evidence, it seems to be. That alternative is 
 precisely as satisfactory to theology as the other. We shall 
 
 (') New York Tribune, May 16th, 1874. The idea had been previously 
 set forth by the writer in " The Doctrine of Evolution," 1874, pp. 90, 91. 
 
 ( a ) New York Tribune, May 25th, and June 2d, 1874. 
 
 ( 3 ) Still, Wallace asks, "Are not improved steam-engines or clocks the 
 lineal descendants of some existing steam-engine or clock?" ("Natural Se- 
 lection," p. 295). The analogy is also brought out by Von Hartmann, and 
 exactly the same point is made. " Wenn z. B. gesagt wird, dass der go- 
 thische Dom aus dem romanischen, dieser aus der Basilika, und diese aus 
 einer Art romischer Markthallen entstanden sei, wenn ferner zwischen den 
 genannten Typen fliissige Uebergangsformen aufgezeigt werden, so wird 
 doch niemand daraus folgern, dass etwa ein bestimmtes Bauwcrk im go- 
 thischen Baustil jemals durch effectiven Umbau der Rundbogen in Spitz- 
 bogen hervorgegangen sei" (Von Hartmann, "Wahrheit und Irrthum in 
 Darwinismus," 1875, pp. 12, 15, 16). It is a case exactly similar when 
 we affirm, as Von Hartmann does, and others before him, that the system- 
 atic relations of minerals are no proof of genetic affinity, or that the de- 
 rivatively related hyperbola, parabola, ellipse, circle, and right line have no 
 other than an ideal relation. 
 
174 EVOLUTION A SCHEME OF HOMOLOGIES. 
 
 then know that the intelligible plan of membral structure is 
 perpetuated by descent ; and that, instead of occasional crea- 
 tions to renew the expression of its existence, the method is, 
 to exert creative power perpetually y whenever and wherever the 
 activities which result in descent are in existence. 
 
 The class of homological relations may be legitimately ex- 
 tended beyond the range of organic structures. Homology im- 
 plies correlations which express plan. I have already said that 
 evolution is a vast plan ; and that the various series of instru- 
 mentalities through which evolution is effected give expression 
 to so many plans of effectuation, and imply in their separate 
 as well as their concerted action an ordering Intelligence. The 
 plan of world-life involves one of the grandest of these conspir- 
 ing series of effects. 
 
 The plan of world-life ! it is simply a process of cooling. 
 The plan of the cosmos ! it is simply a system of exchanges 
 of temperature in search of an equilibrium. The proofs of this 
 stupendous induction are excluded by the circumstances which 
 surround me. The great fact suffices to illustrate my argu- 
 ment. The primordial condition of cosmical matter is either 
 that of a fire-mist, or an antecedent non-luminous vapor which, 
 by condensation, becomes a fire-mist. This condition is exem- 
 plified in the irresolvable nebulae. Excess of heat is relieved 
 by escape of heat. Sometimes a curdled or discontinuous con- 
 dition of the fire-mist ensues, as exemplified in resolvable nebu- 
 lae. Sometimes a condensation about the centre gives rise to 
 a " planetary nebula." Sometimes a rotary motion is gener- 
 ated, which develops the form of the " spiral " nebula. Some- 
 times the curve of rotation returns to itself, and the mass, as a 
 total, is held in equilibrium while it rotates. In course of time, 
 the peripheral portion becomes segregated, and produces an 
 " annular " nebula. In the nebular history with which we are 
 best acquainted, annulation seems to be a normal stage of the 
 evolution. According to the theory which best harmonizes 
 
THE PLAN OF WORLD -LIFE. 175 
 
 with the facts, and best accounts for them, a succession of de- 
 tached rings, continuing to rotate, results, by successive rupt- 
 ures and condensation, in a series of planetary bodies, consti- 
 tuting a system. It is conceivable, as I have elsewhere sug- 
 gested^ 1 ) that a ring may preserve its equilibrium for an ex- 
 ceptionally prolonged period, during which a sort of stratifica- 
 tion ensues, segregating an indefinite number of rings, so that 
 the delayed rupture should result in an indefinite number of 
 small planetary bodies grouped at a somewhat uniform distance 
 from the centre of rotation. This might account for an aster- 
 oidal zone. The residual sphere of fire - mist remains all the 
 time a central sun. The planetary masses suifer cooling and 
 annulation, like the primary. Their annuli break up into sat- 
 ellites. In one case within our own system, we note the strati- 
 fication of the annulus, which I have suggested as a step toward 
 an asteroidal group. But the Saturnian rings have escaped the 
 contingency of rupture till they seem to have cooled to the con- 
 dition of dust. All the planets and satellites, self-luminous at 
 first, become incrusted and darkened. All suns are marching 
 toward the same goal. Before complete liquefaction ensues, 
 darkened clouds of cooler matters float in their fiery photo- 
 sphere, or ensue on the outburst of mineral vapors from the cen- 
 tral nucleus. A sun in this condition is a " variable star." 
 Such is our own sun. After the incrustation of a cosmical 
 body, a long period ensues, during which the consolidating 
 crust suffers many ruptures, permitting the imprisoned fires 
 to pour forth, and send an unwonted gleam through the uni- 
 verse. These are the " temporary stars." The " white " stars, 
 the " yellow " stars, and the " red," are only suns in progressive 
 
 (') " The Geology of the Stars," in " Half -hour Recreations in Popular 
 Science," No. VII., p. 285. In this essay the probable succession of cosmical 
 conditions is more fully set forth. See, also, articles in Methodist Quar- 
 terly Review for April, 1873, and January, 1874; also, "Sketches of Crea- 
 tion," where the terrestrial history is more especially dwelt upon. 
 
 8* 
 
176 GREAT MORPHOLOGICAL CONCEPTIONS. 
 
 stages of cooling, after which follow the variable stars and the 
 temporary stars. In the lapse of time, after the incrustation 
 of a cosmical body, clouds of watery vapor gather about it, and 
 a cyclical storm descends upon its surface. In such a condition 
 is Jupiter ; and such a condition has left its records upon our 
 earth. Then areas of dry land begin to emerge ; the storms 
 abate, and the procession of animals begins its march across 
 the scene. The zoic period is exemplified in our own earth, 
 and probably also, but more advanced, in Mars. In the lapse 
 of ages, the cosmical mass becomes cooled to the centre ; the 
 waters and the atmosphere are absorbed; organic existence is 
 swept from being, and the body hangs a mere fossil world, 
 like the moon, to admonish us of a fate impending over all 
 worlds. (') 
 
 Such, in most respects, is the best accepted view of the sweep 
 of cosmical events. What a picture to spread before the im- 
 
 (') It is a noteworthy circumstance that the three great morphological 
 conceptions of modern science have been broached by thinkers who are 
 commonly reputed to have been indifferent to religion, and who are even 
 popularly accused of presenting their hypotheses as substitutes for su- 
 pernatural creative activity. Goethe discovered that the leaf is the arche- 
 type of all the structures of the plant. Oken first exhibited a vertebra as 
 the archetype of a cranial segment. Laplace generalized the history of 
 planetary worlds. These three discoveries were equally regarded by re- 
 ligionists as atheistical in tendency, and were earnestly opposed ; but they 
 are now equally approved by science, and equally adapted to exalt our ap- 
 prehension of supreme wisdom and power. The doctrine in relation to 
 plants and animals is a morphology, and probably a phylogeny; in rela- 
 tion to planetary, and, as now completely generalized, to cosmical exist- 
 ence, it is also a morphology, and almost demonstrably a phylogeny or 
 material continuity. If the phylogenetic relations of plants and animals 
 shall ever be fully established, we shall have in that doctrine (the deriva- 
 tion of species) another example of a scientific doctrine first employed in 
 the interests of atheism (only, however, by the opponents of the doctrine), 
 then established, and found to be a weapon peculiarly available in the in- 
 terests of theism. 
 
COSMIC MQRPHOL OGY. 1 f V 
 
 agination ! What a generalization to address to the intellect ! 
 What a stupendous plan to utter the name of the Infinite, and 
 awaken the religious sentiments of the soul ! What an all- 
 embracing unity of method is here to proclaim one empire, 
 one lawgiver, one God !(') 
 
 It is time that I leave the discussion to your reflections. My 
 heart has burned with a desire to break through the crust of 
 sensible things, which obscures the spiritual eye-sight, and help 
 you to glimpse the sublime realities of the realm, of thought 
 and spirit, which " is not far from every one of us." How fee- 
 ble have been my efforts ! may the Source of Truth to whom 
 I have aspired forgive my failures ! But, however impuissant 
 may have been my endeavors to rise to the substantial First 
 Principle of all, may I exhort you to seek still its revelation in 
 the facts and thoughts of nature which lie around you. FEAR 
 NO TRUTH embrace all truth, for it is God's and yours ; and 
 as embassadors of God, take all His Truth, and use it to con- 
 vince the world. 
 
 (') Further illustrations of " intentionality " in nature will be found in 
 the last paper of this volume. 
 
VII. 
 
 EEASON FOR THE FAITH. (') 
 
 "It is of much more importance to give our assent to doctrines upon 
 grounds of reason and wisdom than on that of faith merely." ORIGEN, 
 Contra Celsum, book i., chap. xiii. 
 
 " Which subject he [Cyprian] did not handle as he ought to have done ; 
 for he [Demetrian] ought to have been refuted, not by the testimonies of 
 Scripture, which he plainly considered vain, fictitious, and false, but by ar- 
 guments and reason." LACTANTIUS, Institutiones Divince, book v., chap. iv. 
 
 TIME, which keeps all appointments, lias brought the anni- 
 versary of culminating interest in collegiate life. You who 
 have labored assiduously and long, through the rigorous cur- 
 riculum, have seen the events of the final trial and triumph 
 slowly rising in the horizon. We who have watched your ef- 
 forts and prayed for your success, experience more keenly than 
 ever the sense of responsibility for faithfulness to our trusts. 
 I feel it a relief that the present occasion affords an opportu- 
 nity to impress upon you, and all who hear me, a few words 
 of wisdom, which, of all the lessons you have learned, I would 
 commend to the deepest and warmest and most exclusive place 
 of lodgment in your heart. As our relations to the world of 
 invisible realities transcend in importance all other human in- 
 terests, I have thought it might be useful to bring before you 
 a systematic statement of the Reason of the Faith which, as 
 Christians, we entertain. I shall undertake, therefore, to pre- 
 sent a conspectus of the rationale of Christian belief. I shall 
 
 ( ! ) A baccalaureate address to the candidates for graduation in the Col- 
 lege of the Liberal Arts of the Syracuse University. 
 
CAUSES OF SKEPTICISM. 179 
 
 speak, not as a divine, resting on Scriptural authority, but as a 
 scientist and philosopher, seeking after the authority on which 
 Scripture itself rests. 
 
 I feel that an inquiry of this kind may be peculiarly appro- 
 priate to the intellectual mood of the times. It is a question- 
 ing, iconoclastic age, which holds nothing sacred because it has 
 been revered; and demands that even divine existence, divine 
 providence, and religious faith commend themselves to human 
 reason. I feel that I hazard nothing in accepting that issue. 
 Bishop Butler tells us, "Reason is the only faculty we have 
 wherewith to judge concerning any thing, even revelation it- 
 self." From that starting-point I see an open highway to a 
 theistic faith and a Christian life. 
 
 Many obstacles to the progress of our argument will dis- 
 appear on a summary statement of the causes of the modern 
 phase of skepticism. We shall see that these causes are emo- 
 j^onal, superficial, or inconsequential, andhence are not such 
 causes as he who appeals to logic can pronounce sum'cient; and 
 thatlie~lvfau pleads them ia not bLUilding squarely to the battle- 
 front, but is skulking under subterfuges. 
 
 The first cause of skepticism is the evil heart. It is the old 
 clamor of the appetites and passions to be released from the 
 restraints which all religions impose. It is, therefore, not pe- 
 culiar to our times ; but stands by perpetually to prompt and 
 abet the questionings of the intellect. 
 
 The second cause is the enforced abandonment of certain po- 
 sitions of traditional faith, necessitated by the progress of hu- 
 man ft/fifiwl.p.dgp Thus, it used to be maintained, by authority 
 of the Church, that the earth was the centre of the universe. 
 It was a heresy to assert the doctrine of the habitability of 
 other worlds. The Jesuit Scheiner was compelled to publish 
 anonymously his discovery of the spots on the solar disk. Not 
 yet wholly silenced are the murmurs of dissent from the doc- 
 trine of the high antiquity of the world; or the reality of 
 
180 SCIENTIFIC AND RELIGIOUS BELIEFS. 
 
 physical death before the sin of our first parents ; or the local 
 character of the Noachian deluge. Still more audible are the 
 sounds of disapproval when we assert that the history of plan- 
 ets is a slow evolution of results wrought out by forces still 
 active, and according to methods exemplified before our eyes. 
 And, again, how slow have we been to discern and admit the 
 fact that, to our apprehension, all spiritual manifestations are 
 conditioned by matter ! Yet on all these questions the Church 
 is taking, as it must take, an affirmative position. Men not 
 controlled by their religious instincts, seeing the abandonment 
 of old positions which it once defended with arguments and 
 anathemas, and sometimes with cruelties, hastily assume that 
 Christian faith has nothing whatever in it which can stand per- 
 sistently the tests of reason and science. But every one must 
 perceive the inconclusive character of such reasoning. In fact, 
 it is no reasoning at all, but an illogical generalization, like that 
 of a man who, from sundry unsuccessful attempts to digest a 
 supper of oyster-shells, should conclude that the human stom- 
 ach is not adapted to oysters. The most puerile intelligence 
 must discern that the position of the earth in the universe can 
 not be a question of religious faith, but is a question of obser- 
 vation and mathematical calculation. Whether other worlds 
 are habitable, must be inferred from data which address them- 
 selves to the intellect. Whether the procedure in world-mak- 
 ing has been slow, and according to the method of evolution, 
 is of no consequence in the question of divine existence, or of 
 creative and formative activity. It has been natural, in times 
 past, to associate all generally accepted doctrines and dogmas 
 with beliefs which are strictly religious; and then to forget 
 the distinctions among the beliefs incorporated in the religious 
 system. An age of intellectual sluggishness would favor such 
 confounding of doctrines ; an age of mental activity would be 
 sure to expose the fallacy, and involve religious and secular 
 truth in common peril. Against this we must guard. The 
 
ILL -ME A NT FALSE INDUCTIONS. 181 
 
 world truly moves, as Galileo asserted ; but prayer may still be 
 a human duty, as the Church maintained. 
 
 The third cause of skepticism is the habit of rash and disin- 
 genuous generalizations on the part of the evil-disposed. There 
 are those who would rejoice to see science and Christian faith 
 in irreconcilable conflict. There are others who sincerely be- 
 lieve that they sustain no natural relations to each other. Per- 
 sons of the former class make haste to seize upon every new 
 development, or suggestion, or intimation which makes its ap- 
 pearance in the field of science, and, without waiting for that 
 due certification which is the first canon of Baconian generali- 
 zation, they proclaim oracularly the final overthrow of the " su- 
 perstition of Christianity." Thus, when relics of pottery were 
 
 nt n pprfqin rlpptTi breath the alluvium pf 
 
 the JNile, all the world was at once informed that the Bible con- 
 tained egregious misstatftrnftnta respecting the antiquity of the 
 human race ; and the whole system based upon such authority 
 must be abandoned. It was not the careful scientist who made 
 this proclamation. It was the careful scientist, M. de Lanoye, 
 who proceeded to test the alleged fact, and was thereupon led 
 to publish to the world his conclusion, that geological Egypt is 
 an alluvium twenty-six feet in maximum thickness, laid upon 
 a bottom of marine sand; that of this alluvium four -tenths 
 (0.4134) of a foot is deposited in one hundred years; so that 
 the whole Nilotic deposit is but six thousand three hundred 
 and fifty years old. So, when human relics were exhumed from 
 the Mississippi delta, even Sir Charles Lyell was disposed to 
 yield to the plausible claim of immense antiquity for our race ; 
 but now Humphreys and Abbot, in their patient and masterly 
 study of the hydraulics of the Mississippi valley, formally enun- 
 ciate the conclusion that the entire delta does not exceed five 
 thousand years in age. So with the illogical claim that the dis- 
 covery of the perpetual conservation and convertibility of phys- 
 ical force proves the mechanism of the universe self-sustaining. 
 
182 COWARDICE OF BELIEVERS. 
 
 Suppose this true, does it prove that force is self-existent, and 
 self-convertible, and self-conservative ? Is it proved granting 
 heat to be " a mode of motion " that motion can take place 
 without a mover ? Is it proved granting the method of crea- 
 tion to be an evolution that there was no intelligence to de- 
 vise the method, no power to evolve ? The claim that this and 
 similar propositions, even supposing them proved, militate fa- 
 tally against religious faith is shallow, if it is not malignant. 
 The whole foundation of religious faith rests behind all these 
 questions, and too deep for their agitation to disturb. 
 
 The fourth cause of skepticism is the cowardice of believers. 
 Unwittingly, if not stupidly, they second the attacks of the 
 preceding class. The evil-wisher dogmatically asserts that such 
 and such conflicts exist. The weak-kneed believer is too prone 
 to admit that it appears to be so that it is so ; and then, as 
 he can not ignore his religious instincts, there is no alternative 
 but to arraign science as their foe. He acknowledges the sta- 
 tus belli; but then, instead of seizing his sword, he incases him- 
 self in coat of mail, and meekly stands the raps, to the infinite 
 contempt of those who feel that he ought to surrender his posi- 
 tion or defend it. Shame ! If I have ever felt indignation, it 
 has been at the sight of these believers cowed by such whips 
 of straw. Accept no unauthoritative interpretation of the facts 
 of nature, or application of them to matters of faith. Accept 
 no unattested statement of the facts. Be sure you stick to the 
 letter of the allegations of science, and avoid premature infer- 
 ences especially inferences made by third parties, who possess 
 no qualifications for scientific investigation. Do not attribute 
 to original scientists opinions which they do not avow. Your 
 field is too narrow to enable you to discern what theological 
 beliefs may seem most truthful to them. Stick to that which 
 the scientific world recognizes as well established ; and never 
 surrender your faith in religion or science at the bidding of 
 cither bully or upstart. 
 
NON-ESSENTIALS HELD ESSENTIAL. 183 
 
 A fifth cause of skepticism is the mistaking of the non-essen- 
 tial for the fundamental in matters of theology. How fatal and 
 how frequent has been this error ! The whole history of the- 
 ological dogma and hierarchical oppression is an illustration of 
 our point. The numerous attempts to which allusion has al- 
 ready been made, to decide questions of science by decree of 
 council or pope, have repeatedly involved the Christian faith 
 in confusion and reproach. It is hazardous to make Chris- 
 tianity sponsor for crude theorizers in natural science. Their 
 default becomes a stain upon her name. If she voluntarily 
 vouches for their opinions, and stakes her integrity upon their 
 soundness, the world will be inclined to leave her to the conse- 
 quences of their overthrow. Christian truth needs keep no 
 disreputable company. Even in the domain of ecclesiasticism 
 the Church has failed to preserve the distinction between hu- 
 man opinion and rational truth. As Socrates was condemned, 
 under a polytheistic religion, for asserting the heresy of mono- 
 theism, so modern bigots have inflicted persecutions for opin- 
 ions far less radical than that. For denying the spiritual su- 
 premacy of the pope, fifty thousand Protestants suffered death 
 on St. Bartholomew's ; and Servetus was burned at the stake by 
 his fellow Protestants for maintaining the homoiousian view of 
 the nature of Christ, in opposition to the orthodox homoousian. 
 In the same spirit we have seen Hyacinthe and Dollinger ex- 
 communicated and anathematized for denying the dogma of 
 infallibility. 
 
 We confess no approval of such deeds as these ; but yet are 
 there not modern and Protestant dogmas upon which men 
 ought to be permitted to differ, without the accusation of un- 
 christian heresy ? Does the safety of Christianity demand that 
 we all profess a uniform belief in respect to the specific unity 
 of the human races ; in respect to the method of human crea- 
 tion; in respect to the antiquity of man; in respect to the 
 spiritual condition of the heathen ; in respect to baptismal re- 
 
184 SOME RELIGION INEVITABLE. 
 
 generation ; in respect to predestination, .infant salvation, and 
 apostolical succession ? I hold it to be perilous to the interests 
 of fundamental truth to stake its credibility on the fortunes of 
 a human opinion. 
 
 Now, I think it will be admitted that radical skepticism, 
 founded on any such pretexts as above specified, has no right 
 to existence in the mind of any man who professes to follow 
 the leading of reason. The light of reason, when we discern 
 it, leads, as I think it can be shown, in quite the contrary di- 
 rection. Let us look about us in this light, and discover where, 
 in the realm of realities, we find ourselves situated. We shall 
 not attempt to elaborate the argument, but to take you to the 
 top of a mountain, whence you can survey the field. You 
 may explore it hereafter at your leisure. 
 
 I. The Necessity of Some Religion is upon us. 
 
 Few men have brought themselves to the point of denying 
 this. Yet this admission implies much. For the sake of learn- 
 ing how much, let us review the evidences. 
 
 Every one of us is conscious of the presence, in his own 
 mind, of certain religious notions, sentiments, and impulses. 
 These may differ, in different persons, in every particular ex- 
 cept two 1st, they exist; 2d, they are religious. They have 
 a Supreme Intelligent Power for their object, and tend to ex- 
 press themselves in certain religious acts. This religious con- 
 sciousness is something so universal in Christian communities, 
 that we might feel justified in pronouncing it an original and 
 indestructible constituent of human nature, like the notion of 
 number or of self-personality. But, as it is easy to assert that 
 all this is the result of education, let us take a wider view, and 
 attempt to discover the natural religious status of man with the 
 influence of education eliminated. 
 
 Taking a comprehensive view of peoples in the history of 
 the world who have attained to any considerable degree of in- 
 
EGYPTIAN AND CUSHITE RELIGIONS. 185 
 
 tellectual activity, we can not fail to be struck by the universal 
 exhibition of religious phenomena. The religious sentiment has 
 been no less conspicuous and controlling than the acquisitive 
 or the maternal. Out of the religious consciousness of the great 
 nations that have rested for ages in isolation from their neigh- 
 bors have grown up twelve great systems which have domi- 
 nated over nine-tenths of the populations of the world. Five 
 of these have originated with the Aryan race, three with the 
 Semitic, two with the Chinese, and one each with the Cushites 
 and the Egyptians. Besides these, the Peruvian and Aztec sys- 
 tems of religion, if we may rely upon the Spanish chroniclers, 
 are almost equally worthy to be embraced in the enumeration. 
 
 Egypt, the seat of. the oldest civilization which the world has 
 seen, was for centuries the theatre of the most elaborate cere- 
 monials. The very government of the country, as among all 
 primitive peoples, was hierarchical a fact which of itself dem- 
 onstrates the dominance of the religious sentiments in the an- 
 cient land of Mizraim. 
 
 The Cushites, who belonged, perhaps, to the Turanian race, 
 planted, 2700 years B.C., the first civilization known in the re- 
 gion of Susiana and Babylonia. Invaded and gradually ab- 
 sorbed by Phoenicians, Babylonians, and Assyrians, they be- 
 queathed their religion, as well as their civilization, to their Se- 
 mitic conquerors, and thus perpetuated their religious beliefs 
 and ceremonies through a period of twenty-five centuries. 
 
 At a date not long subsequent to the rise of Cushite civiliza- 
 tion, Abraham went out from Ur of the Chaldees, an old Cush- 
 ite city, into Egypt, and became the founder of the Jewish the- 
 ocratic system, which, as we all know, usurped all political func- 
 tions, and illustrated in Jewish history the potency of the re- 
 ligious factor of human nature. 
 
 Out of Judaism came forth Christianity, the second great 
 Semitic religion. We have nothing to do here with the divin- 
 ity of its founder. We cite Christianity as a secular phenom- 
 
186 SEMITIC AND ARYAN RELIGIONS. 
 
 enon, illustrating further the power of the religious instincts to 
 assert themselves and control the lives and destinies of millions 
 of subjects. According to Berghaus, nearly thirty -one per 
 cent, of the population of the globe are now adherents of this 
 system. 
 
 Islamism was the third great Semitic religion, springing up 
 six hundred years after Christ, and swaying the sceptre, at one 
 time, over Arabia, Persia, Syria, Jerusalem, Egypt, Spain, Gaul, 
 Asia Minor, and Turkey. In later periods it has extended into 
 the eastern and central parts of Africa, where its adherents 
 number one hundred millions of souls. It prevails in parts 
 of Russia, in Persia, Afghanistan, Beloochistan, Tartary, India, 
 China, and the Malay Archipelago, comprising at present nearly 
 sixteen per cent, of the population of the world. 
 
 Of Aryan religions, the oldest is Brahmanism, arising about 
 2000 B.C., spreading over India, and maintaining sway, in our 
 own times, over more than thirteen per cent, of the population 
 of the world. 
 
 Zoroastrianism appeared next. It was originally an improved 
 or restored Brahmanism, and is still perpetuated, to a limited 
 extent, in the form of Parseeism. It had, at one time, extend- 
 ed itself so far as to threaten to become the religion of the 
 East. Had the battles of Marathon and Salamis been lost, Ju- 
 piter might have succumbed to Ormuzd, and Magianism be- 
 come the worship of the peninsula and isles of Greece. 
 
 Buddhism was the third great Aryan religion. It rose in 
 the North of India about 477 B.C. It was the Protestantism 
 of the Brahmanic people, marking a revulsion of the religious 
 instincts of humanity from the corrupt and unsatisfying wor- 
 ship which had supplanted primitive Brahmanism. It holds 
 powerful sway in many of the surrounding countries, and, 
 though itself corrupted, counts among its adherents thirty-one 
 per cent, of the population of the world. 
 
 Hellenic mythology was a fourth system of Aryan religion, 
 
CONSTANT FACTORS IN ETHNIC RELIGIONS. 187 
 
 first embodied in forin by Hesiod, and afterward greatly en- 
 riched by Homer. Whatever we may think of it as a human- 
 itarian cultus, the religious character of Greek mythology can 
 not be gainsaid. Nor can there be a difference of opinion in 
 reference to the pervading character of its influence in society, 
 in literature, in art, and in political life, in all the regions to 
 which Grecian dominion extended. 
 
 Among religions of Mongolian origin, the first of which we 
 have any knowledge, is Tao-ism, founded by Lao-tse about 600 
 B.C. This, with Confucianism, which arose about 500 B.C., and 
 Buddhism, an Aryan religion, constitute the three great state 
 religions- of China and Japan, with their hundreds of millions 
 of adherents. 
 
 Now, in this phenomenon of vast, pervading, and persistent 
 religious systems, we have a fact which can not be otherwise 
 than full of significance. I think it may be fairly assumed 
 that no such general expression of religious feelings and beliefs 
 would have been at all likely to obtain, had there not been a 
 common religious principle or law implanted in human nature. 
 But scan the contents of these ethnic religions carefully, and 
 what do we find to be the common properties of all ? I have 
 analyzed these systems with care and candor, and, after elimi- 
 nating every thing of a circumstantial character, I have found 
 them to yield me the following constant factors : The first 
 great fact of the ethnic religions is Deity ; the second is the 
 sense of Moral Obligation; the third is faith in Immortali- 
 ty; the fourth is Prayer; the fifth is Sacred Symbolism; the 
 sixth is a body of Sacred Writings. These great facts the 
 preambles of the Christian system are no more the peculiar 
 property of Christianity than of Islam or Buddhism. These 
 primitive faiths are absolutely the common possession of hu- 
 manity if we neglect the tenth part of the race resting in a 
 state of savagism. We must feel compelled to admit that the 
 Author of our nature has implanted a body of intuitions, which 
 
188 RELIGIOUS NATURE OF SAVAGES. 
 
 lead universally and necessarily to the formulating* of a body of 
 doctrines which constitute the very marrow of the religion of 
 Christianity. 
 
 But we summon the barbaric hordes to render a similar tes- 
 timony. It has been repeatedly asserted that some of the low- 
 est tribes of savages are utterly destitute of religious ideas. 
 Now, if this were proved true, the state of the facts might be 
 that nine hundred and ninety-nine thousandths of the human 
 family are known to manifest such ideas, while one thousandth 
 are incapable of making any definable religious manifestations. 
 The nine hundred and ninety -nine thousandths embrace all 
 the normally developed representatives of humanity, while the 
 one thousandth consists of a few squalid, miserable outcasts, in 
 whom it is almost equally difficult to discern an intellect above 
 that of the brute. Now, who can honestly hesitate to decide 
 which fraction represents the norm of humanity ? Which frac- 
 tion has the right to testify for humanity ? 
 
 But I do not desire to leave the subject even in this position. 
 I have critically and patiently examined the evidences in re- 
 spect to all those tribes reported destitute of religious ideas, 
 and these are my conclusions on the general subject of the re- 
 ligion of savages : 
 
 1. Travelers report nearly all savages with whom they have 
 had intercourse as addicted to some kind of religious prac- 
 tices. 
 
 2. Christian missionaries have often reported savages desti- 
 tute of religion, when a careful study of the facts has shown 
 simply that their religious practices were abhorrent to Chris- 
 tianity. In citing and execrating these unchristian rites, these 
 missionaries do virtually testify to the existence of the religious 
 principle among them. 
 
 3. Other travelers, irreverent toward Christianity, have simi- 
 larly reported a destitution of all religion, because they have 
 failed to discern the essentially religious character of certain 
 
GRADES OF RELIGIOUS INTELLIGENCE. 189 
 
 rites and observances which to civilized eyes are vicious, cruel, 
 or absurd. 
 
 4. Of some tribes reported without religion, it is certain that 
 our information is yet insufficient to enable us to assert a neg- 
 ative opinion. 
 
 5. But three tribes are known to me, of whom I should con- 
 sider it a fair representation of the ascertained facts to assert 
 that no religious consciousness has been discovered. These are 
 the Andamaners, the Gran Chacos of South America, and the 
 Araf uras of Vorkay. 
 
 6. The religious condition of savages presents us, as might 
 be expected, a graduated scale of religious intelligence. The 
 higher savages recognize, more or less distinctly, the existence 
 of one supreme, beneficent Creator, with or without the notion 
 of a devil, but accompanied, generally, by a belief in many sub- 
 ordinate deities. In the next step below, the idea of one be- 
 neficent Deity becomes more or less vague ; but the belief in 
 good and evil spirits is controlling. In the third grade, all no- 
 tions of a beneficent Deity disappear, and the Supreme Power 
 assumes the character of a malignant divinity. This faith is 
 generally accompanied by a belief in subordinate divinities. In 
 the fourth grade, the evil deity is superseded by an undefined 
 faith in many evil but powerful spirits. In the fifth grade, the 
 notion of spirits of every kind becomes extremely vague, and 
 nothing remains but a sensus numinis an undefined senti- 
 ment of the supernatural. In the sixth and lowest grade, we 
 detect no trace of a consciousness of any existence above them- 
 selves and the material objects by which they are surrounded. 
 Through all these grades, except the lowest, a belief in future 
 existence accompanies the theistic concept ; and some form of 
 worship is everywhere present, varying from prayer and the use 
 of temples and altars, through adoration of sun, moon, stars, 
 mountains, elements, as the divine embodiments and interces- 
 sors, to rude sacrifices, sorcery, and witchcraft. 
 
190 RELIGION OF THE STONE -FOLK. 
 
 And all this is our conclusion in reference to that one-tenth 
 of the human family not embraced under the influence and con- 
 trol of one of the twelve great ethnic religions. 
 
 But my researches have led me even farther than this. We 
 have gained some intimations of the religious character of peo- 
 ples whose existence antedates all our histories and traditions. 
 Among the relics of the Hewn -stone Age we find ruined 
 hearths, with the remnants of the feasts which commemorated 
 the dead, in accordance with a custom still extant in China ; 
 and, mingled with the bones of the dead, are arrow-heads and 
 trinkets which, like the beads and hatchets of the American In- 
 dians, were undoubtedly votive offerings, intelligibly proclaim- 
 ing a belief that the departed had not passed beyond the sphere 
 of consciousness, but still lived in another land. In the Pol- 
 ished-stone Age these evidences become more positive, and are 
 accompanied by relics of rude inclosures which, to our eyes, 
 seem prophetic of the temple-building of later times. In the 
 Bronze Age we find, added to all the foregoing evidences, the 
 ruins of massive temples as at Stonehenge and Abury, in En- 
 gland in which primitive men seem to have assembled to pay 
 worship to the supreme power to whose mercy they consigned 
 their dead in the populous burial-places with which they sur- 
 rounded their rude temples. 
 
 This array of evidences, it seems to me, ought to be regard- 
 ed as conclusive that the religious instinct is native to man. 
 There are certain ethical propositions in which all mankind are 
 agreed. Man is gifted by nature with certain religious intui- 
 tions which, as all intuitions must do, have exerted a control- 
 ling influence over his life. In other words, man is created for 
 religion, adapted to religion, predisposed to religion ; and this 
 is the key to the religious phenomena of the race. It is futile 
 to ignore the evidences or resist the religious law of our being. 
 Whether there be a God or not ; whether prayer be futile or 
 not ; whether hope of hereafter be vain or not ; whether devo- 
 
THE INTUITIONS. 191 
 
 tions and rites be absurd or not, all this is contemplated and de- 
 termined and ordained in the constitution of our nature. And 
 so, I repeat, the necessity of some religion is upon us. 
 
 II. Constructive or Deductive Theistic Belief. 
 
 To most minds it would be sufficient to have proved that re- 
 ligion is the law of human existence. No question of the va- 
 lidity and binding character of the law would be entertained. 
 Deity, and the fundamental propositions which depend upon 
 divine existence, would be at once conceded. But, in reality, a 
 vast field of positive evidence remains to be examined. The 
 theistic proposition, with all its corollaries, may be built upon 
 the intuitions of the reason ; and I proceed to sketch the meth- 
 od by which the idea of God may be logically constructed. 
 
 By intuitions of the reason, we mean those apperceptions of 
 simple truths which are common to all human intelligences : 
 like the intuition of externality ; the intuition of self ; the in- 
 tuition of causality ; the intuition of reality or substance. They 
 are the most elementary propositions, like the axioms of math- 
 ematics, into which all complex knowledges, on analysis, resolve 
 themselves. Like the axioms of mathematics, these proposi- 
 tions are self-evident. They neither require proof nor admit 
 of proof. We do not believe them because they have been 
 proved or taught. We intuit the truth of them, and believe 
 them because we feel that we must. It is only a belief a 
 primitive elementary belief and yet we feel that it is knowl- 
 edge ; there is no knowledge of which we are more certain, or 
 upon which we feel it more safe to rest. 
 
 Great care must be exercised in determining what beliefs are 
 really primordial. The criteria generally relied upon are uni- 
 versality and necessity. 
 
 These beliefs, we say, are spontaneous. But we must have 
 the candor to admit that a certain school of philosophers, from 
 Locke to J. S. Mill, maintain that they come to us from with- 
 
 9 
 
192 THE INTUITIONS INNATE. 
 
 out. We can not, of coarse, argue the question at length, but 
 we may make note of the following points : 1. The onus pro- 
 bandi rests with the sensationalists. 2. These beliefs bear no 
 quantitative nor qualitative relation to experience; being as 
 clear and controlling in the infant as in the adult, in the 
 savage as in the philosopher. 3. If all primitive beliefs are 
 grounded in observation, certainty in any universal proposition 
 is an impossibility ; and yet no one asks to be more confident 
 of any truth than that " the whole of a thing is equal to the 
 sum of all its parts," or that "every change is the effect of 
 some adequate cause." 4. Since, on the sensational hypothe- 
 sis, we could not construct universal propositions possessing 
 absolute certainty, every step we should take in the progress of 
 an argument would lead us farther and farther from certainty. 
 And yet, in the demonstration of a proposition in geometry, 
 we feel that every step is immovably secure, and the conclu- 
 sion as certain as the axioms on which it rests. 5. On the sen- 
 sational hypothesis, I could have no certain knowledge of sub- 
 stance or reality. I should float in a world of appearances, 
 without being able to make a single affirmation that would 
 yield me the satisfaction of certainty. 6. Certain primitive 
 beliefs, like that in the existence of space and time, can not 
 possibly be the sequences of experience. Space and time are 
 not the objects of experience ; but, on the contrary, as Kant 
 has observed, they are the antecedent conditions of the possi- 
 bility of experience. 7. The idea of cause can not possibly be 
 referred to experience, since that, at best, would afford us only 
 a strong presumption that any given effect had a cause ; while, 
 in fact, we feel the most unreserved certainty that every effect 
 has a cause. 8. The whole doctrine of sensationalism rests 
 upon a petitio principii t since the primitive beliefs are the very 
 condition of the possibility of experience. Experience implies 
 that we know the consciousness has been impressed by some- 
 thing; but this knowledge is the very intuition which J. S. Mill 
 
AUTHORITY OF INTUITIONS. 193 
 
 proposes to set down as the result of experience. Now, it is 
 obvious that if intuition is the necessary antecedent of experi- 
 ence, it can not be the necessary sequent of experience. 
 
 For such reasons, briefly stated, I maintain that the primitive 
 beliefs found in existence in all minds are spontaneous, inborn, 
 and necessary. 
 
 The question of the authority of these beliefs is still another 
 one. Suppose they are inborn, what do they mean? Do they 
 correspond to realities? Do they represent things as they are? 
 If all men must believe in a world external to themselves, are 
 we certain that such a world is a reality? If I must believe 
 that every event or change implies a cause, have I warrant for 
 assuming that this belief corresponds to the reality of things? 
 This is a question of the utmost importance. Few philoso- 
 phers, whatever their opinion of the origin of these beliefs, 
 have had the temerity to impeach their authority. As before, 
 it is impracticable to argue the question here, but I may offer, 
 again, a few considerations. 
 
 1. There are some intuitions which can not be questioned 
 without involving the questioner in self -stultification. In every 
 act of consciousness there is a dual character first, the con- 
 sciousness of self as thinking; and, second, the consciousness of 
 something not self. The first belief in logical order is the be- 
 lief in the reality of the act of consciousness. Now, if I doubt 
 the reality of the act of consciousness, I must be conscious of 
 some contradiction or absurdity upon which I may base a 
 doubt ; so that, in the very act of denying the testimony of 
 consciousness, I must appeal to consciousness for proof. The 
 doubt annihilates itself. It is impossible to doubt the author- 
 ity of consciousness in this case. From similar considerations 
 appears the self -stultification of doubting the testimony of con- 
 sciousness in respect to the reality of that which is not self. 
 
 In regard to the contents pf consciousness, or the particular 
 knowledge or report brought by consciousness, this witness is 
 
194 AUTHORITY OF INTUITIONS. 
 
 not necessarily veracious ; and we have to examine its credibil- 
 ity. Our belief in its testimony is, however, one of the primi- 
 tive beliefs of the human mind ; and it must stand or fall with 
 the others. 
 
 2. The validity of the primitive beliefs ought to be pre- 
 sumed until the contrary is proved. The universal assent of 
 mankind, the impossibility of mental or bodily activity not 
 predicated on the validity of these beliefs, afford the strongest 
 presumption that they correspond to realities. 
 
 3. They exert the most absolute control over our lives. We 
 rest upon them with the most unreserved confidence. I believe 
 the external world a reality, and shape every act by that con- 
 viction. I have a representation of a past sensation, and call 
 it a recollection, and fully believe the representation truthful ; 
 I take my oath upon it ; I stake my life upon it. 
 
 4. These beliefs, or intuitions, are closely analogous to the 
 instincts of the lower animals. The instincts act as regulative 
 and controlling principles of the actions of the animal ; and no 
 one thinks of asserting that they do not answer to certain real- 
 ities to which they are correlated. The primitive beliefs are 
 equally regulative and controlling principles of human actions. 
 They are, in truth, a species of instinct of the reason, and we 
 are bound to presume they answer equally to realities in the 
 world in which we are placed. 
 
 5. The primitive beliefs establish a complex and wonderful, 
 but beneficent, correlation between man and the world in which 
 he seems to live ; or, rather, they give efficiency to a correlation 
 already existing. Now, can it be admitted that a body of be- 
 liefs, whose activity opens a field of co-ordinations so compli- 
 cated, so vast, so admirable, and so beneficent, and whose ac- 
 tivity only saves all that is from a state of nugatoriness, is, aft- 
 er all, but a body of beliefs which mislead us, and answer to 
 nothing which is real ? a vast machinery without a real object 
 to act upon, or a real end to be sought in its action ? 
 
CONSEQUENCE OF DENIAL. 195 
 
 6. If I deny the veracity of consciousness as to the external 
 world, I abandon all evidence that the world appears to me as 
 it is nay, I have no evidence of the existence of the external 
 world; I must ever remain in doubt whether these are real 
 trees, and skies, and persons, and voices, or merely images flit- 
 ting before my consciousness, like the phantasms of a diseased 
 vision. Nay, worse than this; if consciousness is a false wit- 
 ness in respect to external objects, it may be equally false in 
 respect to subjective reality. I do not know even that I suffer, 
 or move, or think. To my own existence even I can not cer- 
 tify. I seem to be something, surrounded by something, and 
 engaged in doing something ; but all this seeming may be illu- 
 sory. I can only assert that phantasms exist ; nay, I can not 
 even assert this, for my consciousness of phantasms may be il- 
 lusory. Alas ! could a more pitiable condition of a rational in- 
 telligence be conceived ? Yet this is the logical consequence of 
 denying, in a single particular, the authority of consciousness. 
 Hear what Fichte says, who followed out this dreary philoso- 
 phy to its issue : 
 
 " I know absolutely nothing of any existence, not even my 
 own. I myself know nothing, and am nothing. Images there 
 are; they constitute all that apparently exists; and what they 
 know of themselves is after the manner of images images 
 that pass and vanish without there being aught to witness their 
 transition that consist, in fact, of the images of images, with- 
 out significance and without aim. I am myself one of these 
 images ; nay, I am not even thus much, but only a confused 
 image of images." 
 
 It is scarcely necessary to state that no philosopher has car- 
 ried such a philosophy into consistent practice. Even in his 
 speculations, Fichte reached, at length, a sounder conclusion. 
 In his "Practical Philosophy," written later in life, he says: 
 " I have found the instrument by which to seize on this reality, 
 and therewith, in all likelihood, on every other. * * * The in- 
 
196 INTUITION OF DEITY VALID. 
 
 strument I mean is Belief. * * * All my conviction is only 
 Belief." And so the prince of doubters came around, in his 
 old age, to the position which we shall be safe in assuming at 
 the outset. 
 
 Now, let us make an application of the positions proved. 
 We have shown that the human mind finds itself in possession 
 of certain primitive beliefs, which are the ultimate constituents 
 of all that which we call knowledge. We have shown that 
 these beliefs arise spontaneously from within, and are not the 
 outgrowth or consequence of external conditions. We have 
 shown that it is necessary to accord them absolute authority; 
 and that, consequently, they correspond to realities, about which 
 it is futile, absurd, and impossible to entertain doubts. We 
 have shown that among the primitive and universal beliefs of 
 man is the belief in divine existence and its corollaries. It fol- 
 lows, therefore, that divine existence is a reality ; and all those 
 propositions of the ethnic religions which cluster around it and 
 flow out of it are propositions which answer to realities, and 
 which a sound philosophy calls upon us to accept. 
 
 I have assumed that the theistic notion is primitively a di- 
 rect intuition. I have reflected much upon the subject. I find 
 myself in accord with Jacobi and Schleiermacher, and probably 
 Sir William Hamilton, in this respect. I entertain a strength- 
 ening conviction that by no other means could rude savages 
 rise to any notion of divine existence. Yet there is a less di- 
 rect method by which reason may ascend through a brief, spon- 
 taneous, deductive process to the theistic concept. Let us ex- 
 amine the steps. 
 
 The intuition of real being leads to the affirmation of such 
 axiomatic judgments as the following: "Every quality im- 
 plies substance to which it belongs ;" " Every attribute implies 
 real being." A moment's reflection will show that it is im- 
 possible to conceive the contraries of such propositions. They 
 necessarily condition all thought. But, from what we have 
 
INTUITION OF CAUSALITY. 197 
 
 shown, these propositions must not only seem true, but must 
 be true. 
 
 The intuition of causality leads to the affirmation of the axi- 
 omatic judgment that " Every effect implies an adequate cause." 
 The intuition of effect as depending upon cause is accompa- 
 nied by the notion of conditioned existence. The relation of 
 effect to cause suggests a remoter cause of which the first cause 
 was the effect; and, similarly, the remoter cause is presented 
 as sustaining the relation of effect to a cause still more remote ; 
 and so on ad infinitum. The simple intuition of causality, 
 therefore, leaves us at last with an endless series of effects still 
 unaccounted for. Or perhaps, more correctly, we have no in- 
 tuition of real cause, but only of secondary cause, until we 
 reach the notion of primordial causation. This notion sat- 
 isfies the reason ; and, though we can give no account of its 
 mode of existence, we rest satisfied in the belief that efficient 
 or primordial causation is a fact. The notion of primordial 
 causation is accompanied by the notion of unconditioned exist- 
 ence ; and this is accompanied by the notion of infinity. I do 
 not mean to assert that this is the origin of the notion of in- 
 finity ; I only desire it to appear that this notion exists among 
 the notions which cluster around the intuition of causality. 
 
 We might pause here and apply these principles to the phe- 
 nomena of the universe. Here is a series of effects. Trace 
 them to their causes, and these, in turn, put on the character 
 of effects. Thus the universe appears, at first, an endless chain 
 of events sustaining mutually the relations of cause and effect. 
 But now arises the notion of primordial causation, uncondition- 
 ed existence, and infinity ; and the mind feels relief in ascribing 
 the chain of events to unconditioned primordial power. This 
 is the "^Etiological Argument." The ontological intuition now 
 assigns primordial power to real existence, and we have a faith- 
 ful concept of an Infinite, Unconditioned, Causative Being. 
 
 In the next place, the intuition of intelligence leads to the 
 
198 OTHER INTUITIONS. 
 
 affirmation of such axiomatic judgments as these : "Adaptation 
 of means to ends implies intelligence ;" " Contrivance implies 
 intelligence ;" " Correlation of ideas implies intelligence." Ap- 
 plying these principles to the universe, we are led to declare 
 that every instance of mechanism in the animal economy is the 
 product of intelligence. Organic contrivances are suited to par- 
 ticular ends, because intelligence so ordained. This is the " Te- 
 leological Argument." The ontological intuition transfers this 
 intelligence to real being, and we have an Intelligent Being as 
 the author of organic contrivances. Again, the relationships 
 of plan and method which subsist among animals of different 
 orders and classes, and between the successive stages of an evo- 
 lution in the organic or inorganic world, are evidences of the 
 exercise of intelligence ; and here we have what I have called 
 the " Homological Argument," which reaches real being, as be- 
 fore, through the ontological intuition. 
 
 Next, we have the intuition of ethicality, which leads to the 
 affirmation that certain acts are essentially right, and others es- 
 sentially wrong. This is accompanied by the notion of duty 
 or obligation ; and this implies a tribunal which imposes the 
 obligation an authority which must not be evaded. The on- 
 tological intuition implants this authority in real being, and we 
 reach the concept of supreme justice and a Moral Governor. 
 This law of justice we find exemplified in the world of jiature 
 and humanity. This may be styled the " Ethical Argument." 
 
 Finally, we discover in our minds the intuition of goodness 
 that is, goodness is a quality the notion of which arises sponta- 
 neously. It forms the rational basis of prayer, and supposes 
 that justice is approachable for forgiveness. We look about us 
 in the world of nature, and discover numerous relations exist- 
 ing which are distinctly beneficent. They are inwrought in the 
 contrivances and plans of creation. We affirm, therefore, that 
 here are not only evidences of intelligence, but also of good- 
 ness. Thus we reach an argument which may be styled the 
 
DEDUCTIVE CONCLUSION. 199 
 
 " Agaihologvcol" The intuition of real being transfers the at- 
 tribute of goodness to an entity, and we get the concept of a 
 Being possessed of goodness as vast as the creation. 
 
 Now, finally, summing up the results, we find that these four 
 primordial intuitions the intuition of causality, the intuition 
 of intelligence, the intuition of ethicality, and the intuition of 
 goodness, supply our minds with the necessary concepts of in- 
 finite power, infinite intelligence, infinite justice, and infinite 
 goodness ; while the intuition of real being affirms that these 
 are necessarily the attributes of a real being and that being, 
 endowed with these attributes, is God. The Deity, then, which 
 exists in the sanctions of the reason is a Real Being, a First 
 Cause, a Moral Governor, unconditioned and infinite in intelli- 
 gence and goodness, and approachable by prayer. 
 
 This, I confess, is but a bare outline of the method of the 
 rational argument. I fear the subject is too abstruse to be en- 
 tertaining, but I shall not regret it if I have given you occasion 
 for close attention and subsequent study. 
 
 III. Deductions from the Theistic Proposition. 
 
 We thus arrive at the formal proposition that God exists 
 God, infinite; unconditioned, without beginning of years; the 
 cause of all things ; the fountain of justice and of moral law ; 
 as infinite in goodness as in power ; pleased to cause happiness 
 or to remove distress ; apprecable by those who have merited 
 the frown of his justice, or have fallen into the pit of suffer- 
 ing. How much is implied in this conclusion ! And yet we 
 are bound to it. Whether an intuition direct, or a spontane- 
 ous, deductive conclusion from the axioms of reason, we know 
 not how to evade it. The conviction of its truth comes into 
 our minds imbeds itself there ; it sets up a dominion there ; 
 it sways a sceptre over our lives, and over all human lives. 
 And, still more, we are glad to receive it: we give it hospital- 
 ity, and it comforts us; it resolves our doubts; it dissipates 
 
 9* 
 
200 REAL DEITY, THOUGH "UNTHINKABLE." 
 
 our fears ; it affords a resting-place for the reason and the con- 
 science ; nay, we rejoice with joy unspeakable to have found a 
 way to a solution of the mysteries which surround us ; to have 
 reached a Being who is both a potentate and a friend, and 
 whose character answers to all the deepest longings of the hu- 
 man soul. Oh, how many millions have been comforted in 
 leaning upon this arm! How many hearts have been eased 
 in breathing the passionate or the tender requests of trusting 
 prayer ! How blank, and desolate, and utterly miserable would 
 the world of humanity be without this faith ! 
 
 How irrelevant, how heartless, to be reminded that all this 
 is something which we can not understand, and to which, there- 
 fore, we can not yield a rational assent ! What boots it that 
 the method of divine existence be all "unthinkable?" that the 
 act of creation from nothing is " unthinkable ?" that the world 
 is governed by immutable law, and our feeble prayers must be 
 futile ? Shall we abandon the citadel we have won because un- 
 able to carry it on our backs? We make no pretense of com- 
 prehending God and his ways ; but we feel certified of certain 
 predicates respecting God. Nor does reason demand that a 
 proposition shall be comprehended before we can yield it a ra- 
 tional assent. We have followed the lead of reason in reach- 
 ing a proposition which is "unthinkable." Indeed, we can 
 give to thought no exposition of the grounds of a single one 
 of our primitive beliefs. Shall we renounce them because their 
 ground is "unthinkable ?" Shall we deny infinite space because 
 "unthinkable," or infinite duration? Finite space and finite 
 duration are equally " unthinkable ;" and yet, are we not cer- 
 tain that time and space are either finite or infinite ? Let us 
 stick to our conquests ; we have won them fairly. 
 
 But we must go farther. We have found out a Being infi- 
 nitely powerful, wise, and good. We know another being finite, 
 imperfect, and consciously responsible to the first for all his 
 acts. We find this finite being infinitely correlated to the infi- 
 
PROBABILITY OF REVELATION. 201 
 
 nite one the product of his creation ; dependent ; an offender 
 against his justice ; the recipient of his goodness ; hopeful of 
 his mercy ; aspiring to present and future happiness. We find 
 him longing for communion with a loving God ; a loving God 
 desiring communion with him, and having all power at his con- 
 trol for opening communion with his feeble subject. What, now, 
 I ask, is probable in the case ? What is probable if we reason 
 as in a court of justice in reference to the influence of motives ? 
 
 1. It is probable that this communion will be established. 
 It will not be alone the voice of prayer ascending from the 
 subject to the ear of God. It will be also a response coming 
 down to the consciousness of the petitioner. It will be a com- 
 munication of good tidings, of good-will, and of providential 
 purposes. This will be the common privilege of humanity. In 
 exceptional cases it will become remarkably clear and complete. 
 
 2. It is probable that, in the history of the world, numerous 
 instances would occur in which these extraordinary communi- 
 cations would be put on record, and preserved as written reve- 
 lations from God ; and that bodies of such writings would be- 
 come the sacred books of the peoples to whom they were com- 
 municated. 
 
 3. There is no antecedent improbability that these commu- 
 nications would come to representatives of various races and 
 peoples. Infinite goodness would be as likely to favor one race 
 as another ; and no race would be expected to perform the su- 
 perhuman work of consulting the records of all the other races 
 in search of the mind of God. 
 
 " Who shall say that to no mortal 
 Heaven e'er oped its mystic portal, 
 Gave no dream or revelation 
 Save to one peculiar nation ? 
 Souls sincere, now voiceless, nameless, 
 Knelt at altars fired and flameless, 
 Asked of Nature, asked of Reason, 
 Sought through every sign and season, 
 
202 REVELATION TO THE "GENTILES." 
 
 Seeking God ; through darkness groping, 
 
 Waiting, striving, longing, hoping, 
 
 Weeping, praying, panting, pining, 
 
 For the light on Israel shining ! 
 
 Oh, it must be ! God's sweet kindness 
 
 Pities erring human blindness ; 
 
 And the soul whose pure endeavor 
 
 Strives toward God, shall live forever ; 
 
 Live by the great Father's favor, 
 
 Saved by an unheard-of Saviour.'^ 1 ) G. L. TATLOE. 
 
 4. It would unavoidably be the case that these communi- 
 cations would be somewhat tinctured by the human media 
 through which they should come. They would necessarily 
 suffer from the imperfections of the human intellect; the 
 cloudiness of the spiritual apprehensions which should take 
 hold on the thoughts of God, and the defects of human lan- 
 guages. It would follow that the most spiritually minded na- 
 tion or race would receive the purest and completest revelation 
 of the mind of Deity. 
 
 (') St. Clement of Alexandria regards the Greek philosophy as proba- 
 bly given by inspiration. " Perchance, too, philosophy was given .to the 
 Greeks directly and primarily, till the Lord should call the Greeks" 
 (Strom., book i., chap. v.). * * * " But all [the philosophers], in my opin- 
 ion, are illuminated by the dawn of light " (Strom., book i., chap. xiii.). * * * 
 "So, then, the barbarian and Hellenic philosophy has torn off a fragment 
 of eternal truth " (Strom., book i., chap. xiii.). In his " Exhortation to the 
 Heathen," after quoting admiringly from Plato, Antisthenes, Socrates, Xen- 
 ophon, Cleanthes, and the Pythagoreans, he concludes as follows : " For 
 the knowledge of God, these utterances, written by those we have men- 
 tioned, through the inspiration of God, and selected by us, may suffice " 
 (Cohortatio, chap, vii., adfinem). So Lactantius, after quoting with appro- 
 bation from Cicero's "Republic," adds: "Who that is acquainted with the 
 mystery of God could so significantly relate the law of God as a man far 
 removed from the knowledge of the truth has set forth the law ? But I 
 consider that they who speak true things unconsciously are to be regarded 
 as though they prophesied [divinent] under the influence of some spirit " 
 (" Institutiones Divinae," book vi., chap. viii.). 
 
MYSTERIES IN REVELATION. 203 
 
 5. I think it should be expected that the full import of the 
 communications would transcend the intelligence of the human 
 recipient, and would frequently transcend the general intelli- 
 gence of his race. The thoughts and methods of infinite wis- 
 dom, expressed in the plainest of human words, must some- 
 times remain inscrutable. Hence divine revelations might in- 
 volve some mysteries and some uninterpretable statements. 
 These should not be hastily rejected, but should be reverently 
 accepted on the authority of their author. This is the dictate 
 of the highest reason. As the very germs of all our knowl- 
 edge are but simple acts of faith, for which we can furnish no 
 grounds, so here, in the opposite direction, faith supersedes 
 knowledge, without robbing us of that sense of assurance and 
 satisfaction which is the proper attribute of knowledge. The 
 progress of human inquiry may be expected to resolve some of 
 these mysteries; but others must resist all efforts to penetrate 
 them. 
 
 IV. The Christian Scriptures answer to these Deductions. 
 
 1. They asstfme the idea of God pre-existent in the human 
 mind. Indeed, there could be no revelation from God to a race 
 not possessed already of some notion of God. It would be 
 like the attempt to explain the hues of the violet to a man 
 born blind. 
 
 2. The Christian Scriptures set forth, on the whole, such a 
 God as exists already in human thought the Creator and Pre- 
 server of all things ; infinite in wisdom, power, and goodness ; 
 the source of moral law ; the lover of men ; the hearer and an- 
 swerer of prayer. They inculcate the privilege and the duty of 
 prayer and devotion ; they teach the reality of spiritual exist- 
 ence, and promise a future life. 
 
 3. At the same time, we detect some of the stains and im- 
 perfections of humanity transmitted to the sacred record ; as 
 the color of the glass imparts its hues to the light which it 
 
204 CLAIMS OF OUR SC1UPTUKES. 
 
 transmits. The Hebrew people had not attained to that degree 
 of secular knowledge, and intellectual culture, and aesthetic re- 
 finement, which enabled their inspired writers to leave a record 
 which, in all its details of style, should commend itself to the 
 highest refinement the race was destined to attain. Vastly su- 
 perior as were their notions of Deity to any entertained by 
 contemporaneous peoples, yet they were unable to divest them- 
 selves, at times, of those very anthropomorphic conceptions 
 which disfigure the mythologies of the Greeks and other an- 
 cient nations. God is pictured sometimes as having human 
 organs ; as walking among men ; as arguing with men, indul- 
 ging in anger, and visiting his enemies with vengeance. We 
 must have the sagacity, however, to penetrate beneath the an- 
 thropomorphic garb of the sacred teachings, and discover there 
 the spiritual Being of purity and beneficence whose attributes, 
 in other portions of our Scriptures, are so adequately and so 
 eloquently described. These blemishes, which indeed play a 
 much less important part than has been pretended, have been 
 unwarrantably magnified and misunderstood; and have been 
 made the pretext for rejecting the whole body of written rev- 
 elation. We shall do ourselves injustice not to judge these 
 Scriptures candidly, and not to concede to them all that truth- 
 fulness and authority which comport with the antecedent pre- 
 sumptions which we have established. 
 
 4. After all that can be charged against the tracery of hu- 
 man imperfection which may be detected in the style of certain 
 portions of our Scriptures, we must not only acknowledge them 
 a general fulfillment of the antecedent presumptions, but we 
 must claim for them a wonderful degree of consonance with 
 the developments of truth which have come to the uninspired 
 mind of man in the progress of the ages. It is doubtful wheth- 
 er science can ever successfully impeach any important state- 
 ment of our Scriptures, when fairly interpreted. This is the 
 result which we had grounds to expect. This circumstance 
 
INFERENTIAL LESSONS. 205 
 
 alone, to the mind of one who has not examined the ground 
 we have been over, ought to be strong evidence of their super- 
 human origin. Written ages before the birth of the modern 
 sciences, there was the utmost liability for mere human author- 
 ship to fall into the most egregious misstatements respecting 
 the phenomena of the natural world ; but, in point of fact, 
 some of the statements of our Scriptures were so far in ad- 
 vance even of the science of the nineteenth century, that we 
 are only just beginning to understand them. Here is a har- 
 mony, at least, which answers to all the antecedent demands. 
 
 V. Our Reasonable Duty. 
 
 As pendants to the grand positions which we have establish- 
 ed, some most important lessons ought to follow. 
 
 1. The religious consciousness of man is an innate part of 
 his nature ; it inherits as high a nobility as the intellect ; and 
 honesty, and self-respect, and mental health, and reverence for 
 truth, unite their demands that the religious nature be exer- 
 cised and cultured. Devotion toward God is as much a law of 
 our being as attachment to a child. Prayer is as natural and 
 efficient an utterance of the human soul as the infant plead- 
 ings which move a mother's heart. Faith in the being and 
 providence and word of God is as rational as faith in that 
 primitive intuition which leads unresisting assent, through all 
 the grades of thinkable knowledge, to that other and upper 
 sphere of truth which faith only can touch. 
 
 2. If God has written his name upon every human heart, 
 then the feeblest and most inadequate gropings after the pres- 
 ence of God should command our respect ; and the rude dance 
 and ghastly sacrifice should excite our pity for those who, like 
 children crying in the night, feel that a comforter exists, though 
 they know not how to search. And though we can neither 
 bow the knee at mosque of Islam or shrine of Buddha, let it 
 be remembered that the adherents of these religious systems 
 
206 UNION OF SCIENCE AND RELIGION. 
 
 are moved by the self-same spirit of devotion as leads us to 
 the temple of Christian worship. 
 
 3. Cherish a veneration for our Christian Scriptures. They 
 embody the purest written revelation which God has ever im- 
 parted to man, and afford us precious lessons which can never 
 be reached by unaided efforts of the intellect. 
 
 4. Betray no fear that any word of truth will clash with any 
 other. Have faith in truth ; have faith in all truth. Be man 
 enough to treat truth with impartiality. Be as hospitable to a 
 moral truth as to an intellectual. Round out your spiritual nat- 
 ure with a just and generous nurture of all its faculties. Hon- 
 or God by honoring every department of the human nature 
 which he has constituted. 
 
 5. Be men of science, but be devout men. I exhort you to 
 this in no professional mood. We come up from a survey of 
 the deep and eternal foundations of truth, and proclaim that 
 on one basis rest the systems of theology and the systems of 
 science. If you would live the truth, be devout in being wise 
 nay, be wise in being devout. Honor philosophy, but do 
 not forget that this includes a religious philosophy. Enrich 
 the soul with religious emotions, that they may fertilize and 
 inspire the intellect. Seize upon every intellectual discovery 
 to strengthen, correct, and purify the religious faith. Labor 
 for the union of science and religion in all their aims. Thank 
 God, I see their slow approximation begun. They begin to un- 
 derstand each other. They begin to respect each other. They 
 begin to extend hands for a cordial greeting. The blessed day 
 of their wedding will come. I can discern the roseate dawn. 
 With prophetic ear I catch the strains of the rising epithalami- 
 um that shall bring rejoicing to the hearts of all the nations, 
 and shall be caught up by angels and archangels dwelling in 
 the sunlight of Eternal Truth. 
 
VIII. 
 
 THE CONFLICTS OF FAITH. (') 
 
 THIS day and tins occasion are consecrated equally to the 
 contemplation of those truths most intimately related to the 
 religious nature of man. These young persons whom I espe- 
 cially address are on the eve of the completion of a long and 
 earnest course of secular study ; and yet we desire to freight 
 our latest admonitions with thoughts which shall fortify those 
 faiths which take hold on the things unseen and unsecular. 
 We live in an age the most glorious and most to be desired 
 that has ever dawned in the history of man ; and yet, in this ad- 
 vanced and progressive age, we hear a strange and unexpected 
 clangor of arms in the world, proceeding from what at first ap- 
 pears to be a desperate conflict between the champions of re- 
 ligious faith and the champions of that learning which makes 
 our age so glorious ; and, in the midst of this din, we want to 
 ask you to stop, and go with us to a mount of observation and 
 contemplation, where we may dispassionately view the whole 
 field of the facts, and discern, if possible, the meaning of the 
 noisy conflict around us. 
 
 The Battle-fields of Faith have been many and bloody. They 
 are scattered along the whole march of human history. No 
 wonder the unphilosophic have deemed the conflict mortal, and 
 more than once declared that either religion or science must go 
 under ; that they can not live together in the same world in 
 peace. No wonder that, in a period of ecclesiastical ascend- 
 
 ( J ) A baccalaureate address to the graduating class of 1874, in the Col- 
 lege of the Liberal Arts of the Syracuse University. 
 
208 HUMAN POWERS IN THE CONFLICT. 
 
 ency, science has been clipped of her plumes and chained to an 
 effete and fungoid carcass. No wonder, again, that, in an in- 
 terval of strangulation of the voice of religious faith, secularism 
 should have trampled religion in the mud. 
 
 But religion still lives ; and science still marches on. What 
 does it mean ? In the economy of existence, may it not be 
 that both are ordained to live ? And may it not be that both 
 are ordained to live in amity and mutual respect ? Or is their 
 incessant conflict an, incident of the law of progress through 
 antagonism ? As affliction mellows the soul of man, and ad- 
 versity whets its powers, perhaps religion and science are ap- 
 pointed to be mutually whetstones to each other, and their col- 
 lisions are but the friction which sharpens and improves. 
 
 If we gaze for a moment at the human powers which prompt 
 to this incessant struggle, what do we see ? The religious phe- 
 nomena of the race are as universal and obtrusive as the intel- 
 lectual. The religious activities are equally uniform in their es- 
 sential nature ; the dominion of the religious instincts is equal- 
 ly controlling. Notions of supernatural creative power, of mor- 
 al government, of personal responsibility, are as universal accom- 
 paniments of human life as notions of reality, of causality, of 
 externality, or the distinction between self and not-self. The 
 prompting to prayer and sacrifice, and the confidence in their 
 efficacy, are factors of humanity as positive as the longing and 
 the seeking of the infant for its food, or the impulse of the 
 understanding to inquire after causes of things. The religious 
 sentiments, it may be rigorously shown, are a native endow- 
 ment of human nature. The promptings to prayer and wor- 
 ship, and the sense of accountability, by all the reasoning of 
 Lubbock and Darwin, and Burton and Comte, have not been 
 proved less a primordial constituent of man than are the intel- 
 lectual discernments which stand correlated to another sphere 
 of ideas. 
 
 We have, then, for our present purpose, two groups of intui- 
 
PRIMITIVE BELIEFS. 209 
 
 tions or feelings the intellectual and the moral. Among the 
 latter, let it be distinctly understood, must be ranged the sen- 
 timent of Deity, the sentiment of accountability, the sentiment 
 of right and wrong, the sentiment of prayer, the sentiment of 
 piacular offerings, the sentiment of future life. I am willing to 
 denominate these feelings as sentiments. In the lowest condi- 
 tions of the human mind, I confess they are but feeble senti- 
 ments ; and yet I desire to impress the psychological fact, that 
 the intuitions belonging to 1 the intellectual group are also but 
 feelings or affections of the mind. I desire also, by way of a 
 caution, to remark, that the vague sensus numinis which I here 
 denominate the sentiment of the supernatural is not our only 
 avenue to the cognition of Deity. 
 
 Among the intuitions of the intellect must be ranked such 
 as the following : A thing cannot exist and not exist at the 
 same time. That which impresses my senses is external to me. 
 It is also a reality. Every attribute implies substance ; every 
 effect, a cause. The whole is equal to the sum of all its parts, 
 and is greater than any of its parts. 
 
 It is not my purpose to prove that there are realities corre- 
 sponding to the primitive beliefs existing in the human soul. 
 I desire merely to remind you and that, only in passing 
 that we have the same ground for accepting the reality of the 
 correlates of the ethical beliefs as of the intellectual beliefs ; 
 that the universal and ineradicable beliefs in divinity, right, 
 and duty answer to verities as absolute as our beliefs in the 
 things testified by perception or memory. To impeach one 
 witness is to impeach all. To deny the validity of our primi- 
 tive beliefs is to plunge us into the fearful abyss of nihilism, 
 which is a suicide instigated by a metaphysical insanity. 
 
 We must admit that these two groups of mental powers are 
 absolutely co-ordinate in legitimacy, in authority, in signifi- 
 cance. This proposition, which I am not attempting to-day to 
 prove, can not be too profoundly pondered. The religious fac- 
 
210 ETHICAL AND INTELLECTUAL POWERS. 
 
 ulties of man have a right to existence and activity. No apol- 
 ogy is needed for their exercise none for the assertion of their 
 rights none for the imperious sway which they exert, and al- 
 ways have exerted, over the lives of men. But, though equal 
 and like in a certain sense, in another sense they are unequal 
 and unlike. Each group of powers has its sphere. The con- 
 science discerns the fact that right, and wrong, and duty, and 
 accountability exist, and prompts unremittingly to some line 
 of action in harmony with its discernments. But it does not 
 determine what line of action this shall be. The intellect must 
 discern the act most conformable to the law of right and duty. 
 This is a judgment. The ethical nature makes discernments, 
 and feels duty, and urges to right action ; but these states all 
 concern the abstract ; the intellect supplies the concretes the 
 particular things between which the discernments are to be 
 made, by which the feeling of duty is aroused, or toward which 
 action is to be urged. Moral discernments, duty, and obliga- 
 tion are verities of one class ; particular acts or particular facts 
 are verities of another. The ethical sentiments are a heart 
 yearning for a consummation ; the intellect is the eye which 
 discovers the way to it. The heart of man cries out for God ; 
 it feels the being of God ; it demands to be shown its God. 
 The infant intellect opens its eye, and, behold ! the glory of the 
 sun is everywhere ; the sun is the most powerful and glorious 
 object within reach of the senses : the intellect introduces the 
 sun to the religious consciousness as its God. The religious 
 nature accepts it, and pays it worship. In another land, the 
 supreme and terrible majesty of mountains impresses the intel- 
 lect as the grandest manifestation in the visible world, and these 
 become the gods on which the poor, blind heart wastes its 
 adoration. Again, it is the ocean, or the sky, or the storm which 
 the soul rests upon in its groping for the felt Deity. But 
 
 " The thoughts of men 
 Are widened with the process of the suns." 
 
HO W CONFLICT ARISES. 211 
 
 By-and-by, the intellect perceives that it does not belong to 
 material objects to exert the attributes of divinity ; and then 
 the sun and moon and mountains become the manifestations or 
 the abodes of divinity. The mind of the infant race could only 
 picture Deity as a human form, with human passions ; and, un- 
 der such guises, it represented Deity to the religious nature. 
 The fancies of anthropomorphism were hardly swept from the 
 minds of the Jewish writers or else they were permitted to 
 employ anthropomorphic language to suit their utterances to 
 the mental status of their times. 
 
 The religious nature is a set of impulses and accompanying 
 beliefs in the reality of their objects. It enacts its laws and 
 enforces them inexorably. No man may think he can evade 
 them. The intellectual powers take cognizance of the natural 
 truth which furnishes the means and modes of gratification of 
 the ethical powers. If the intellect be undeveloped, the relig- 
 ious mandates may drive mankind to fetichism, to idolatry, to 
 polytheism to juggernaut or the funeral pyre. The religious 
 nature must act. If intellect fail to open a rational avenue 
 for its exercise, it rushes blindly into imbecilities, superstition, 
 bigotry, dogmatism, persecution. But it has a right to act 
 according to the best light which reason affords; and when 
 it acts thus, it acts rightly, it acts righteously. Many a poor 
 Buddhist will enjoy a higher seat in heaven, I believe, than the 
 enlightened in our own ranks who are struggling to think their 
 religious promptings a superstition. 
 
 Hence arise the conflicts. The soul that has fixed its relig- 
 ious affections upon the sun or the mountain is loath to remove 
 them when assured that neither sun nor mountain can possibly 
 exert divine attributes. The intellect utters this disparaging 
 declaration, and the religious nature revolts at such profanity. 
 Out upon that knowledge which would rob us of our gods! 
 Such unbridled daring must be restrained. The intellect be- 
 holds the religious nature paying its devotions to a senseless 
 
212 SELF-REGULATIVE ANTAGONISM. 
 
 object, and derides its credulity. And yet the religious faith 
 remains subjectively legitimate and rational. It is only the 
 objective exercise of it which assumes an absurd form. After 
 a protest and a struggle, religious faith may settle upon an- 
 other form which, for the time, commends itself to the most 
 enlightened judgment of man ; and from this, in the further 
 progress of thought, it may also be driven. Thus, while intel- 
 lect is ever progressive, faith, like love, is conservative. Thus 
 intellect is ever pointing in derision at the fogyism of faith ; 
 and faith retaliates with scorn at the irreverence of intellect. 
 It is the nature of religious faith to recognize sacredness. That 
 with which divinity has been associated in our minds is sacred ; 
 and faith can learn, only by a painful effort, to count it oth- 
 erwise. Intellect cares only for the reality of things. It de- 
 thrones the idols of humanity the moment it discerns there is 
 no divinity in them. It takes no comfort in deceiving itself ; 
 it has no patience with deception. But its scope is finite ; its 
 discernments are often obscure, and its judgments erroneous. 
 It is well for man that his religious faith tends to immobility ; 
 it serves as ballast to a ship with too much canvas. 
 
 Thus the antagonism is self-regulative. When the sway of 
 the intellect is in excess, the religious nature revolts ; when the 
 religious nature runs riot, the intellect shames it back to sobri- 
 ety and reason. Faith has always been prone to commit the 
 error of clothing with sanctity things merely external and strict- 
 ly secular. Its creeds have enumerated too many particulars. 
 They have attempted to embody all the existing beliefs, and 
 have thus subjected themselves to many an unnecessary shock, 
 as the progress of intellect has disclosed their untenability. 
 No reproaches are to be cast for such reasons. Such is the. law 
 of human progress. Intellectual and ethical rights are equipol- 
 lent. Alternating secularism and superstition are but the vibra- 
 tions of a psychological balance caused by the accidents which 
 transpire in human affairs. 
 
ILL USTRA TIONS FE OM HIST OR T. 213 
 
 Such general views crowd themselves upon our candid atten- 
 tion. It does not remain to seek the illustrations, for they lie 
 before our minds already. We follow back the highway of 
 human history, and see the altars of religion smoking in an un- 
 broken series. We need not recede farther than the dawn of 
 Greek philosophy to note man's jealousy of the honor of his 
 gods. Oh, how sublime have been the intellectual struggles of 
 humanity ! How had honest thought tugged at the problems 
 of existence before yet our Saviour had appeared to shed upon 
 them the light of a new revelation ! The ever-present feeling 
 and the ever-present manifestation of divine existence and cau- 
 sation prompted the thoughtful Greek to seek for a closer 
 knowledge of the reality. Most of the Greek philosophers had 
 no doubt of the existence and unity of the ultimate Cause, but 
 its nature remained inscrutable. Protagoras, discouraged with 
 the search, proclaimed that truth is relative, and nothing can 
 be affirmed respecting divine existence. Athenian piety was 
 shocked. Protagoras was accused and condemned as an athe- 
 ist ; and private owners of copies of his work were commanded 
 to give them up to be burned in the market-place. 
 
 Aristarchus of Samos had the fortune to disquiet popular 
 orthodoxy by asserting that the earth is not the centre of the 
 universe, but revolves about the sun. This honest and correct 
 opinion earned him the charge of impiety from Cleanthes the 
 Stoic. It is not needful to rehearse the story of " Galileo with 
 his woes" to remind you how precisely the history of thought 
 revolves in an orbit. Aristarchus had not the appliances to 
 demonstrate the truth of the heliocentric theory, and conserv- 
 ative faith continued to hug, for nineteen hundred years, the 
 dead body of an effete astronomy. 
 
 Socrates is not generally reputed to have borne a character 
 less reverent toward divine things than the majority of his 
 Athenian countrymen. In fact, according to the pictures which 
 Plato and Xenophon have produced of their master, Socrates 
 
214 SOCRATES AND CHRIST ACCUSED. 
 
 struggled surprisingly near to the spiritual discernment, purity, 
 forbearance, and fortitude which have characterized sufferers 
 for the Christian faith. His very divergence from the preva- 
 lent theism of Athens his very approximation toward the 
 Christian stand-point was made the ground of the accusation 
 against him, and he died a noble martyr to his religious opin- 
 ions. It is instructive to note the language of the indictment : 
 "Socrates is a public offender in not recognizing the gods 
 which the State recognizes, introducing other and new divini- 
 ties ; he is also an offender in corrupting the youth." He was 
 not less honest, less conscientious, less pure, less devout ; but 
 his honesty, conscience, purity, and devotion were not conform- 
 ed to the dominant type ; and he reasoned with the youth of 
 Athens to teach them his purer and nobler and more rational 
 faith. But his sublime death was followed by a revulsion in 
 public sentiment. His prosecutors were themselves punished, 
 and his faith was nurtured to a splendid maturity in the phi- 
 losophy of Plato. 
 
 In its relation to our theme, the persecution and martyrdom 
 of Christ, viewed only as a witness to the truth, are full of il- 
 lustration. Teaching a purer morality and a loftier and more 
 spiritual devotion than his nation believed in, he was counted a 
 religious offender a heretic a defamer of the Mosaic law ; a 
 prof aner of the holy temple ; a violator of the Sabbath ; a tol- 
 erator of evil-doers ; a usurper of divine prerogatives ; and so 
 the conservatism of the national faith must vindicate the integ- 
 rity of the Jewish religion, even to the death of the Author of 
 our Christianity. But, as Jesus' teaching was the mind of God 
 as it demonstrated itself true it must prevail. Innocent blood 
 was again the nutriment of the truth, and Christianity was des- 
 tined to reign in the ascendant. 
 
 The struggles of religious faith have not always been with 
 the enemies of faith. Indeed, the general proposition may 
 be enunciated, that blank unbelief has seldom lifted its hand 
 
HARD DEATH OF OLD FAITHS. 215 
 
 against religious faith. The conflict has generally been be- 
 tween two factions of its own adherents. Old faiths have been 
 antagonized by new interpretations either of nature or of sa- 
 cred Scripture. Sometimes one of the combatants has profess- 
 ed comparative indifference for the interests of religion ; but, 
 as a rule, both parties have floated the banner of religious 
 belief. 
 
 Old faiths die hard. Though Judaism, andj still more, Chris- 
 tianity, commended themselves to the ethical and intellectual 
 natures of men, the popular Greek theology retained a won- 
 derful hold upon their minds; and powerful sects devoted 
 themselves to vain efforts to harmonize Greek mythology with 
 the purer religions. By a natural revulsion, the excessive spirit- 
 uality of Plato had been succeeded by earnest questionings, and 
 a gradual ascendency of theories more exclusively intellectual. 
 Thus followed, in graduated order, the Peripatetic philosophy, 
 the Stoic, the Epicurean, and then the Skeptical. It was now 
 time for the religious nature of man to assert itself again. Ju- 
 daism had assumed a prominent position, and its theocracy af- 
 forded a welcome relief for human faith oppressed by the in- 
 congruities of the old Hellenic myths. Philo accordingly at- 
 tempted to co-adapt the two ; and now for a period waged a 
 conflict between Jewish-Alexandrian theosophy, on one hand, 
 and pure Judaism and rising Christianity, on the other. 
 
 Gnosticism, in its various sects, marked a similar conflict of 
 faiths. In general, it was an attempt to reduce the Christian 
 system to a philosophy ; but Judaism, Hellenism, and Parsee- 
 ism were powerfully contending factors. At length the decree 
 of Justinian closed the schools of philosophy at Athens (529 
 A.D.) ; and out of the residual conflict between Judaizing Chris- 
 tianity and aristocratic Gnosticism came forth, at Rome, the 
 Catholic form of Christian faith. 
 
 It is not my purpose to present a history of the conflicts 
 which religious conservatism has waged with intellectual radi- 
 
 10 
 
216 DOGMATIC AND RATIONAL TRUTHS. 
 
 calism. I wish, however, to impress the thought already an- 
 nounced, that those conflicts have not been generally between 
 faith and skepticism, but between forms of faith. This is es- 
 pecially exemplified in the history of thought during the ages 
 of ecclesiastical supremacy commonly known as the scholastic 
 period. So firmly had the Christian system become established 
 that all intellectual efforts were directed to the harmonizing 
 with it of all science and philosophy. Science and philosophy, 
 for twelve hundred years, were but the molders and welders for 
 a stereotyped form of religious faith. It can not be supposed 
 that during this reign of tradition the intellect of man always 
 wore its chains with composure. On the one hand was the es- 
 tablished body of beliefs secular as well as religious to which 
 the Christian world had assented in the second century (about 
 175 A.D.) of our era. On the other hand were the products of 
 continued speculation and investigation. Many old views of 
 nature were antagonized by the progress of discovery. If the 
 new conclusions were tenable, the old faith must give way. If 
 the old faith must be maintained, the new views must be sup- 
 pressed. It has always been a painful dilemma. Who is able 
 to act as umpire between the high authority of intellect and 
 the imperious power of faith ? You well know the history of 
 these fearful collisions how, for a millennium, the sceptre was 
 in the hand of the Church, and intellect, free-born, crouched a 
 slave at her feet. Still, the utterances of intellect could never 
 be fully stifled. Her sober judgments stared every man in the 
 face. The Church might hold to the flatness of the earth, but, 
 somehow, sailors observed a distinct convexity, and Columbus 
 and other captains proved that it could be circumnavigated. 
 The Church might affirm the immaculate character of the sun's 
 face ; but whoever looked through the instrument of Galileo 
 must see the spots. The Church might deny the habitability 
 of other worlds ; but there was Mars revealed with its land and 
 waters, like our own globe, and the presumption of habitability 
 
TWO SPECIES OF TRUTH RECOGNIZED. 217 
 
 could not be resisted. How could these things be ? The ques- 
 tion must have presented itself to many minds with painful 
 urgency. Could there be two orders of truth ? The old views 
 of natural things seemed to be in accordance with the accepted 
 books of divine revelation. Could it be that the testimonies 
 of the senses and of reason are in discordance with these infal- 
 lible revelations? Even to such a conclusion did the mind's 
 distress impel it. Pomponatius maintained that there are two 
 orders of truth the philosophical and the theological, and that, 
 accepting all the dicta of the Church, he was still at liberty, in 
 the domain of reason, to subscribe to judgments which contra- 
 dicted them. The Church, however, condemned the doctrine. 
 It is analogous, nevertheless, to such tenets as those of Sir Wil- 
 liam Hamilton and Mansel in reference to the Unconditioned 
 and the Unknowable, which compel them, in view of a sup- 
 posed impotency of the reason, to attenuate our knowledge of 
 God into a mere faith, which, after all, philosophy does not 
 deign to indorse. 
 
 Against this mediaeval slavery of the intellect the great ref- 
 ormation of the sixteenth century was a rebellion. The men- 
 tion of this reformation recalls the fearful shocks of a commo- 
 tion which has hardly yet subsided. The intellect of man in- 
 stinctively sided with the reformers. But the absolute freedom 
 of thought ; the unity of truth ; the sacredness of natural truth ; 
 the correct view of the relative functions and prerogatives of 
 the rational and the religious consciousness these were attain- 
 ments too exalted above the condition to which the mind had 
 been consigned for a thousand years, to be reached by the ad- 
 vances of a single generation. Even Luther thought it incum- 
 bent upon him to anathematize the " reprehensible doctrine " of 
 the Sorbonne, that " whatever is demonstrated true in philoso- 
 phy must also be accepted as true in theology ;" while of Aris- 
 totle he declared, " If he had not been of the flesh, I should 
 not hesitate to affirm him to have been truly a devil." It is 
 
218 PSYCHIC ACTION AND REACTION. 
 
 due to Luther to state that he afterward modified these opin- 
 ions to a large extent. Melanchthon, his co-reformer, though 
 better disposed toward philosophy, was scarcely better prepared 
 to recognize freedom of opinion; for he applauded the exe- 
 cution of heretics, and pronounced the burning of Servetus a 
 " pious and memorable example for all posterity." 
 
 The rebellion against intellectual servitude being inaugurated, 
 many a valiant champion ventured to draw his sword. Bacon 
 and Hobbes though the latter, by a natural revulsion, went 
 too far have been regarded as the leaders in the final and full 
 emancipation of philosophy from its subserviency to ecclesias- 
 tical traditions. Descartes (1596-1650), Spinoza (1632-1677), 
 Leibnitz (1646-1716), Berkeley (1684-1 753), Voltaire (1694- 
 1778), Hume (1711-1776), Rousseau (1712-1778), and Kant 
 (1724-1804) are the great lights of what is generally known as 
 rationalistic religion recognizing the fundamental doctrines of 
 Christianity, but giving a free rein to speculation in every field, 
 and tending, in certain cases, toward materialism ; in others, to- 
 ward some form of pantheism. 
 
 The pendulum of thought was now vibrating toward the op- 
 posite extreme. Intoxicated with freedom, the intellect began 
 to hate its former master. It was now, in turn, the effort of 
 philosophy to degrade and enslave religion. Hobbes (1651) 
 and Lord Herbert (1624) began the attempt, and it was eagerly 
 followed up in France by Bayle, Diderot (1713-1784), D'Alem- 
 bert (1717-1783), Von Holbach (1723-1789), Volney (1751- 
 1820), and others; and a bloody revolution having thrown po- 
 litical power into the hands of the skeptics, the travesty of 
 government reached its climax in the enthronement of reason 
 and the attempt to efface every record of religion. 
 
 This terror was more than the religious instincts of man 
 could bear without revolt. They arose again in their majesty, 
 and regained an acknowledgment of their right to sway the 
 lives of men. For more than half a century religion and phi- 
 
NEW SCIENTIFIC ADVANCE. 219 
 
 losophy which had become now more exclusively a philoso- 
 phy of nature observed toward each other outwardly a decent 
 and somewhat cordial respect. Religious faith had marched 
 up to a position abreast of modern science, and science exer- 
 cised its full freedom to conquer new realms and make chaos of 
 old theories. But it was plain enough that the peace between 
 the two was not a complete entente cordiale; it was only an 
 armistice. Faith watched with jealousy the manoeuvres and 
 proclamations of science, and science made the existing faith, 
 at times, the subject of contemptuous remark. Both parties 
 congratulated themselves on the evidences of progress. Science 
 took just pride in her splendid superstructures of astronomy, 
 geology, and physics ; and religion felt relieved to have shaken 
 off the effete appendages and crude accessories of her system, 
 only to find its beauty and solidity more abundantly revealed. 
 But the reconciliation of science and religion was not yet. 
 
 During the last three decades, the human intellect has made 
 strides which have set the world agog. It is really amazed at 
 its own achievements. It has become self-complaisant, if not 
 self-conceited. It shows signs of overconfidence and usurpa- 
 tion. I speak of the human moods of some of the representa- 
 tives of this progress. Scientific positions which were deemed 
 impregnable less than a generation ago haye been swept by a 
 storm of new ideas. Many of the fogs and mists which have 
 always obscured the vision of the race have been dissolved, and 
 the intellectual atmosphere immediately around us has been 
 wonderfully clarified. True it is that still beyond are banks of 
 cloud darkly bounding the horizon, and new and loftier Alps 
 of thought which remain to be scaled ; and these revelations of 
 labors yet to achieve temper the mind's elation with humili- 
 ty ; but the advances of thought have been so general all along 
 the front line of the sciences, that he who holds wholly to the 
 scientific faiths of his father embraces forms as dead as Egyp- 
 tian mummies. Every system of belief educational, political, 
 
220 ESSENTIAL AND ADVENTITIOUS FAITHS. 
 
 religious which involved, or in any of its outposts rested on, 
 the interpretations of nature which were current a third of a 
 century since, must fail to-day to quadrate perfectly with the 
 existing body of recognized scientific truth. So it has hap- 
 pened that science, which, for the time being, is the dominant 
 phase of philosophy, is getting into a quarrel again with relig- 
 ious faith. 
 
 In spite of all the lessons of history, we still incline to em- 
 brace non-essentials in our creed. It is the law of religious 
 faith to consecrate and cherish all which the intelligence holds 
 true. Faith is a doting mother who lavishes indiscriminate af- 
 fection upon the proper members of her family and those who 
 are only adventitious comers ; and when she must relinquish the 
 latter, she clasps them in her arms, suffuses them with tears, 
 and yields only when the last entreaty fails. There is some- 
 thing touching in faith's fidelity to the objects it has loved. 
 But yet it seems to be true that even modern Christianity, as 
 Christlieb sagaciously concedes, has been willing, sometimes, to 
 make itself responsible for positions not at all vital to its inter- 
 ests, and the holding of which turns with to-morrow's think- 
 ing or to-morrow's experiment in the laboratory. Christianity 
 may be likened to a splendid palace which the great Builder 
 founded on a rock, digging deep, and bolting it to the granite. 
 When he had gone, those who were sent to occupy and defend, 
 built wings which spread themselves upon the sand; and the 
 floods came, and the sands were washed away, and the wings 
 crumbled into a ruin ; but the body of the palace stood un- 
 moved in its original strength and majesty. And others came 
 to occupy the palace, and they too built extensions, and the 
 tempest came and moved them from their place, and left them 
 crushed, chaotic masses; but the body of the stately palace 
 stood, for it was anchored to the rock. 
 
 It can not be denied that the world is witnessing to-day an- 
 other ebb-tide of religious sentiment. The reconciliation of 
 
PERILS OF UNTHINKING BELIEF. 221 
 
 our Scriptures and our faiths with existing knowledge must, in 
 some points, be effected by changed methods. It is sometimes 
 painful to admit it ; but it is always manly ; and with our 
 antecedent knowledge of both the imprescriptible rights and 
 the rational defenses of religious faith, and of the irrefragable 
 authority of the spirit of our written revelation, there is no 
 ground for apprehensions; and any undue reluctance to cor- 
 rect or prune is worse than a refusal to look through Galileo's 
 telescope lest we witness the crescent of Venus : it is a denial 
 of the crescent after having it demonstrated to our eyes. Such 
 reluctance will tend to avert the respect of the large number 
 whose convictions will ever be controlled by the data of secular 
 thought, and whose intelligence and respectability will, in turn, 
 control a large proportion of the unthinking masses, already 
 predisposed by their natures and indulgences to relieve them- 
 selves of the restraints of religion. 
 
 I have aimed to float your thoughts rapidly over the succes- 
 sive waves of religious manifestation which have diversified the 
 history of the civilized world. I have desired to make it clear 
 that the existing collision of new ideas with religious faith is 
 but a natural recurrence of the same phenomenon which the 
 world witnessed in the latter part of the last century, culminat- 
 ing in the bloody revolution of France; and, earlier, in the 
 great reformation under Luther ; and, still earlier, in the strug- 
 gle from which the early Catholic Church was born, and in 
 the crucifixion of our Lord, and in the Pyrrhonism of the post- 
 Socratic age, and in the atomism of the materialistic Leucip- 
 pus, following on the exalted spiritual philosophy of Anax- 
 agoras. I desire to inspire your minds with a confidence that 
 the interests of religion are by no means in peril. It is unman- 
 ly to be found quaking with fear. Faith is to experience an- 
 other renaissance. It may not be easy, it may not now be 
 possible, to explain how all discordances are to be reconciled ; 
 but I entertain the strongest confidence that all the conflicts of 
 
222 THE RECONCILIATION DISCERNED. 
 
 the passing hour will only result in the elimination of a body 
 of truth religious and secular more beautiful and lovely than 
 any upon which human thought has yet been fixed. I wish 
 you to feel brave. I wish you to feel strong. I wish you to 
 feel jubilant. I would like to lift my arm as high as heaven 
 to signify my steadfast faith in the fortunes of our Christiani- 
 ty. I would like to speak with a voice which all the terrified 
 should hear and take heart again. I would like to raise a shout 
 which should fill the world at the joy I feel over the coming 
 reconciliation of the contending forces, and the final establish- 
 ment of the harmony and sacredness of all that truth which 
 God has constituted us to accept for which philosophers have 
 thought, or poets dreamed, or martyrs bled. 
 
 But more than faith sustains me. I am not enveloped in 
 impenetrable fog. I have a prophetic discernment of the meth- 
 ods by which the new reconciliation is to be effected. It is not 
 a new faith that we are to receive ; it is the old, old faith in a 
 bright new vesture. Look, I pray you, at the tendencies of the 
 conflicts which the opposing battalions are waging to-day. Is 
 the strife between Moses and geology ? To my mind the in- 
 spired epic of Moses presents an accordance with the geological 
 history of the world which is almost, if not quite, supernatural ; 
 and is made more intelligible and more wonderful in the light 
 which science has thrown upon it. Even admitting the impos- 
 sibility of a circumstantial harmony, all conflict has forever van- 
 ished. 
 
 Is the strife waged over the antiquity of the human race? 
 Let us candidly arrange three preliminaries: 1. The absolute 
 age of Adam's race is not revealed, and has only been deduced 
 by human calculations based on an assumption of the continui- 
 ty of the genealogies given in Scripture an assumption which 
 is not insisted upon by all Christian theologians. 2. The Script- 
 ural authority bearing on this question may have exclusive ref- 
 erence to the Caucasian race, as Dr. M'Causland, Dr. Whedon, 
 
ELEMENTS OF GEE AT QUESTIONS. 223 
 
 and man} 7 others maintain ; and the antiquity of this race may 
 be much less than that of some other races, though there be a 
 blood affinity between them. On the scientific side, the fol- 
 lowing propositions may be maintained: 1. All science testifies 
 that the advent of our species is comparatively recent ; more 
 recent than any of the great revolutions of the globe ; more re- 
 cent than the advent of the other great types of organic life. 
 2. All the great changes which the Caucasian race have wit- 
 nessed may have transpired within a few thousand years. The 
 final disappearance of the continental glaciers; the extinction 
 of numerous animal and vegetal species ; the erosion and trans- 
 position of continental shores, and the desiccation of vast seas 
 and lakes these are all phenomena on which our race has 
 probably gazed ; but according to the chronometry of changes 
 transpiring before our eyes, they do not imply that the origin 
 of the race remounts to an antiquity exceeding eight to twelve 
 thousand years. But suppose twenty thousand years appear 
 more probable, what forbids ? 
 
 Is the strife over the destruction of men by a great deluge ? 
 I discover, first, that the Bible does not compel me to believe 
 it speaks of a deluge covering all the continents simultaneous- 
 ly ; and, secondly, that history, tradition, and geology preserve 
 the knowledge of post-Adamic deluges which brought destruc- 
 tion over all the world known to the sufferers. 
 
 Is the strife over the specific unity of human kind? Then 
 we may bear in mind these positions : 1. There is much reason 
 to believe, with M'Causland, that the Mosaic history of prime- 
 val man refers only to the Caucasian race, and that, consequent- 
 ly, the alleged consanguinity is no more than all people admit. 
 2. Even if this be true, anatomical and physiological science 
 demonstrate that all the races are still of one blood and one 
 structure, as every psychologist admits they are of one mental 
 and moral constitution. 3. If we hold to the common parent- 
 age of all the races, we assume a position far advanced toward 
 
 10* 
 
224 THEISM OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 the admission that still lower types of organization are, also, 
 but older or more divergent conditions of the common stock ; 
 and we become involuntary defenders of a doctrine of develop- 
 ment. 4.- If any theory of the derivative origin of species ever 
 becomes established, the unity of human kind follows as a cor- 
 ollary. 
 
 Is the existing conflict waged over the origin of species ? I 
 hold it to be exactly like a fight over the question of the origin 
 of coal. It is simply a question of fact. The truth is to be 
 found out by searching, and to be revealed to the understand- 
 ing. Keligious faith has no more to do with it than with the 
 .contents of a freight-car. But doesn't the Bible teach that God 
 created man and other forms of life ? Yes, and so does reason ; 
 and so, I believe, does science. It is impossible to conceive of 
 organic existence except as the result of supernatural creative 
 power. But is it not the miller who reduces wheat to flour 
 when he constructs a water-wheel, and causes it to turn the 
 stone which pulverizes the grain? And is it not God who 
 makes man when he arranges a line of genealogical succession 
 which ends in man ? And would not man still be the work of 
 Deity, if no supernatural power were interposed between the 
 initial act and the human result ? I think so ; and still I feel 
 at liberty to entertain a growing conviction that even if species 
 have a derivative origin, there is not one moment between the 
 initial act and the final result when the impress of intelligent 
 will is removed. In this view, not only is every species, but 
 also every individual, the result of direct creation ; but both are 
 creations according to preordained and uniform methods. But, 
 finally, I desire to say for myself that the derivative origin of 
 species seems not to be proved ; and hence, for the time being, 
 I must believe that each organic type is a primordial, and not 
 an indirect, creation. 
 
 Is the conflict to-day over the origin of life in general ? Do 
 Pouchet and Wyman and Bastian assert what I hold is not 
 
THEISM OF ARCHEGENESIS. 225 
 
 yet proved by observation that under certain circumstances 
 living animals and plants come into being without the inter- 
 vention of germs ? Well, that is the very thing for which we 
 contend in asserting that the first representatives of all organic 
 types were not generated, but created. Do you assert that this 
 so-called spontaneous origin of life does not answer to the the- 
 ological idea of creation ? Then I would ask two questions in 
 turn : What warrant has any one for denominating such an 
 origin of life spontaneous ? And, in case of any primordial 
 creation by supernatural agency, what set of circumstances and 
 appearances would you expect to witness? Would you look 
 for hands molding a microscopic animal form ? Or would you 
 not rather expect such form to be molded by agencies invisible 
 and immaterial? That is what the doctrine of archegenesis 
 asserts. It is not necessary to assume that forces which have 
 no basis but matter elaborate the living result. Human reason 
 affirms that every result proceeds from intelligent volition. And 
 so, when Dr. Bastian points us to a living form rising into be- 
 ing from a germless fluid, I wonld cry out, Behold the "fact of 
 creation ! Look upon the very presence of Deity ! 
 
 Does Maudsley, Bain, or Carpenter Biichner, Vogt, or Bar- 
 ker assert or imply that mental manifestations are so far de- ^ 
 termined by cerebral conditions that we are prompted to re- ' 
 gard thought a mere secretion of the brain mind but a func- 
 tion of matter ? Then I rise in the name of the universal con- 
 sciousness to denounce the absurdity. If it is only nervous 
 matter which thinks, then all the testimony of my being is per- 
 jury. Nature itself is a lie. But I am prepared to maintain 
 from the platform of science that no such doctrine as the uni- 
 fication of all species of force is established, short of an ulti- 
 mate synthesis of all in one supreme intelligent Will. In the 
 realm of inorganic matter we discover, besides the correlated 
 physical forces, a force of gravitation, a force of molecular at- 
 traction, and a force of molecular repulsion. In the world of 
 
226 MUCH ' CONFLICT ' ' IMA GIN AS Y. 
 
 organization we have revealed a force of vitality and a force of 
 Will. Now, here are forms of energy which have never yet 
 been mutually transformed. To say that a man's mental man- 
 ifestations are conditioned by the state of his brain, and this 
 by the food which he consumes, is only to state a truism which 
 the world has never denied. But does this prove that mental- 
 ity has no cause but brain ? The movement of the locomotive 
 is conditioned by the switch; but does this fact make the 
 switch the cause of the locomotive's motion? Its motion is 
 correlated to the switch, as mentality is to the bias which brain 
 gives it ; but neither motion in the one case, nor mentality in 
 the other, can be rationally referred to any influence the exer- 
 cise of which implies the antecedent and independent existence 
 of the thing influenced. 
 
 Now, to be candid, I am not aware that the physicists of the 
 day, save in one or two instances, have actually avowed a dis- 
 belief in the reality of spiritual forces. Some of them have 
 explicitly avowed the contrary; and I am inclined to think 
 most of them, if led to give expression on the subject at all, 
 would agree in substance with the positions I have assumed. 
 But that dreadful materialism ! Where does it come from ? 
 Why, it is the joint child of our ignorance and our fears. 
 Come, let us cease whining, and stand upon the prerogatives 
 of reason. We know that mind is a factor of existence, and 
 so does everybody. We will quit setting up ghosts to fright- 
 en ourselves withal. 
 
 Such are the principal fields of controversy between science 
 and religious faith at the present day. None of them appear 
 to me so bloody and desperate as to the eyes of some of my 
 friends. With an antecedent and immovable persuasion of the 
 indestructibility of the basis of our Christian faith, I contem- 
 plate this warfare with the loftiest and most serene composure. 
 Indifferent as to what may be proved true, I am only anxious 
 to know that it is true, and embrace it. I hold devoutly to 
 
RIGHTS OF THE RELIGIOUS NATURE. 227 
 
 the utterance of the Sorbonne, that whatever can be proved 
 true in philosophy must also be true in theology. It is of less 
 interest to know by what particular means the doctrines of sci- 
 ence can be harmonized with the spirit of the Bible, than to 
 know that complete harmony reigns, and that by the ordina- 
 tion of God. 
 
 I have attempted to vindicate the religious nature of man ; 
 to assert its right to activity ; to explain and illustrate its mode 
 of activity, and its relations to the intellect ; to commend to 
 you a profound respect for every form of religious manifesta- 
 tion ; to confirm you in an unalterable faith in the perpetuity 
 of our religion ; to guard you against superstition and bigotry, 
 and the entanglement of your faith with questions of human 
 opinion ; to make you strong Christians, valiant Christians, ever 
 ready to face your enemy and vindicate your faith ; to plant 
 you on a rock whence the storms of hell shall be unable to 
 move you. 
 
 If history and philosophy and psychology concur in proving 
 that man is not man without religion, then it follows that there 
 is no human relation from which the duties and observances of 
 religion ought to be excluded. We can no more shake off our 
 religion than our skin ; how, then, can there be a place where 
 it is proper to disown it ? In the operations of business, in the 
 halls of legislation, in the organization of states, in the universi- 
 ty, in the high school, in the primary school everywhere, ac- 
 cording to our reasoning, have the religious instincts the right 
 to assert themselves and qualify our determinations. Man, 
 however, is free to do violence to these instincts even to be- 
 lie and deny them ; but what right has such a man to object 
 to my compliance with the law of my being and the law of 
 humanity ? What right has he to interpose an unnatural and 
 monstrous protest against the recognition of the religious hem- 
 isphere of our being in any of the processes or stages of educa- 
 tion ? Education must be secularized ? It is unnatural. It is 
 
228 RELIGION IN SCHOOLS. 
 
 monstrous. It is impracticable. It is impossible. Do you say 
 that in a free country we should not impose our opinions upon 
 those who dissent ? Religion is not an opinion ; it is a law 
 of humanity, like respiration and hunger. It is Heaven that 
 imposes religion upon us all upon the objector as well as me. 
 And what shall we say of the man of religion who panders to 
 the feigned scruples of the objector, and joins with him in vot- 
 ing religion out of school? Whose mind does his vote rep- 
 resent in committing this impiety? Certainly not his own. 
 And does not the very principle of equality which he professes 
 to respect dictate that he give himself a representation instead 
 of affording a perverted nature a double one ? Oh, sacrilege ! 
 oh, blindness ! Never will a majority of sincere objectors ex- 
 pel religion from its rightful place in any of the affairs of men. 
 If it is ever done, it will be through the weakness and ignorance 
 of religious men. 
 
 Religious faith is an ineradicable constituent of human char- 
 acter. It is ordained to live and act as long as the race sur- 
 vives. But its mode of action is receptive, emotional, propul- 
 sive ; that of the intellect is cognitive, discriminating, directive. 
 Faith is tender, reverent, conservative, safe ; intellect is blood- 
 less, profane, iconoclastic, daring. Superficially viewed, they 
 have almost always been regarded as the antitheses of each 
 other. The true view 'is, that they mutually antagonize and 
 qualify each other to produce a whole which constitutes the ex- 
 cellence of a human soul as molecular attractions and repul- 
 sions in their eternal antagonism marshal quivering atoms into 
 stable masses ; as centrifugal and centripetal forces conspire, 
 by opposition, to create and maintain the circling harmonies of 
 the cosmos. 
 
 They are unlike, but not incompatible. Though each has its 
 sphere, it can never be admitted that faith and science must re- 
 main apart. " The mingling of science with religion," says Ba- 
 con, " leads to unbelief ; and the mingling of religion with science, 
 
THE PEACE OF MUTUAL RECOGNITION. 229 
 
 to extravagance." To all tins the drift of my arguments is op- 
 posed. One can appreciate the force of the aphorism in an 
 age when a set of arbitrary dogmas was called religion, and 
 fallible interpretation had power to disfranchise intellect ; but 
 strange it seems that men should still maintain that no neces- 
 sary or possible correlation can subsist between the thoughts 
 embodied in God's two revelations ; or that science is author- 
 ized to put faith in a test-tube, or theology to set stakes to 
 science. The peace to be established between the two is not 
 what Bacon intimates a sullen non - intercourse. It is the 
 peace of mutual recognition and mutual understanding. Re- 
 ligion will learn that whatever is true is hers, and must be in- 
 corporated into her system. Science will learn that many 
 things must be true in theology which can not be gauged by 
 her methods. Philosophy will yet convince her, when the ex- 
 hilaration of her heyday is past, that underneath the isolated 
 patch of ground on which she stands stretches the broad rock 
 of fundamental truth, that bears up, in equal majesty and equal 
 strength, the fabric of the Christian system. Then shall she 
 learn that the most imperious demand of philosophy is to ac- 
 cept some things which are above all philosophy and all science ; 
 that, in short, faith is the very apotheosis of reason. 
 
 There is a story told by Casalis, the African traveler, which 
 I have read and reread, and seldom without tears. It illustrates 
 and proves, better than all argument, how inseparable from hu- 
 manity is the feeling of religion ; and how deep and mysteri- 
 ous it is, even in the breast of the lowest savages. I present 
 you the account, and leave you to ponder its meaning. Ar- 
 brousset, the missionary, had been explaining the tidings of the 
 Gospel to one of the noblest of the savage Kaffirs, when he 
 raised himself up and made reply. " Your tidings," said he, as 
 reported by Arbrousset, " are what I want ; and I was seeking 
 before I knew you, as you shall hear and judge for yourselves. 
 Twelve years ago I went to feed my flocks. The weather was 
 
230 THE CRY OF INFANT HUMANITY. 
 
 hazy. I sat down upon a rock and asked myself sorrowful 
 questions ; yes, sorrowful, because I was unable to answer them. 
 * Who has touched the stars with his hands ? On what pillars 
 do they rest ?' I asked myself. ' The waters are never weary ; 
 they know no other law than to flow, without ceasing, from 
 morning till night, and from night till morning ; but where do 
 they stop? And who makes them flow thus? The clouds, 
 also, come and go, and burst in water over the earth. Whence 
 come they ? Who sends them ? The diviners certainly do not 
 give us rain, for how could they do it ? And why do I not see 
 them, with my own eyes, when they go up to heaven to fetch 
 it ? I can not see the wind ; but what is it ? Who brings it, 
 makes it blow and roar and terrify us ? Do I know how the 
 corn sprouts? Yesterday there was not a blade in my field; 
 to-day I returned to the field and found some. Who can have 
 given to the earth the wisdom and power to produce it ?' Then 
 I buried my face in both my hands." 
 
 This is the cry of infant humanity in the dark. This is the 
 call of nature for its God. This is the yearning which can 
 only be eased by a form of faith. This is the prayer of the 
 soul which Deity only can hush. This is the murmur of a 
 spiritual power which is mightier than ocean billows ; which 
 can no more be extirpated from existence than the energies 
 which hurl the planets in their circuits. Oh, let us be calm ! 
 Oh, let ns be trustful, and confident, and brave and wait rev- 
 erently for God to vindicate his own everlasting TRUTH ! 
 
IX. 
 
 THOUGHTS ON CAUSALITY, WITH REFERENCES TO PHASES 
 OF RECENT SCIENCE. 
 
 WHEN I was in London last July, I received an invitation to 
 participate in the approaching Belfast meeting of the British 
 Association for the Advancement of Science. Had I known 
 that the occasion was to be signalized by some of the most 
 notable utterances of the century, I might have resisted the 
 strong pressure which was urging me to the Continent. As it 
 was, I went from London to the Alps, while Tyndall proceed- 
 ed from the Alps to London. The latter, as President of the 
 British Association, delivered an address, the noise of which 
 reached me at Chamonix. It is only since my return to Amer- 
 ica, however, that I have had the opportunity to learn precise- 
 ly what the great physicist uttered, and how considerable a 
 commotion it occasioned in the newspapers of this country. 
 
 The gathering to which I refer was the scene of other nota- 
 ble utterances from a scientist no less distinguished, and no 
 less worthy of distinction. The two addresses of Tyndall and 
 Huxley exemplify well a characteristic of recent science, which, 
 by many, has been deplored as a tendency to positivism and 
 consequential materialism. To these two productions I might 
 add two recent and powerful works by Haeckel, of Jena, the 
 latest of which has also fallen into my hands since my return 
 to America. I refer to Haeckel's " Natural History of Crea- 
 tion,'^ 1 ) and his " Anthropogeny."( 2 ) 
 
 (*) "Natiirliche Schopfungsgeschichte, 4te. verbesserte Auflage," Ber- 
 lin, 1873, 8vo, pp. 688. 
 
 ( a ) " Anthropogenic, Entwickelungsgeschichte des Menschen," Leipzig, 
 1874, 8vo, pp. 732. 
 
232 TYNDALL AT BELFAST. 
 
 In studying these latest emanations from the evolutionist 
 school of science, I have been deeply impressed by four obser- 
 vations : 1. The great learning and scientific acumen of their 
 authors. 2. Their strict adherence to the study of material phe- 
 nomena, and their customary reticence upon questions which 
 receive no direct light from physical observations. 3. The 
 wide-spread popular misapprehension of these men in respect 
 to the subjects of their reticence, and of the bearing of their 
 scientific opinions upon those subjects. 4. The existence of 
 latent fallacies affecting in common, to a certain extent, some 
 of their fundamental positions. 
 
 With the view of eliciting into prominence the common fun- 
 damental principles of such writers, and applying to them what 
 I believe to be true philosophic and universal criteria of correct 
 thinking, I begin by presenting the line of reasoning embodied 
 in the address of Professor Tyndall. 
 
 This address is a panoramic survey of the history of thought 
 and speculation on the origin and substratum of phenomena, 
 and concludes that, so far as the inquiries of science are con- 
 cerned, there has always been manifest a tendency in leading 
 minds to rest, as an ultimate datum, upon the proposition that 
 atoms and molecules are ultimate existences, and their interac- 
 tion is the cause of all material and mental phenomena. Yet 
 the author repeatedly recognizes the necessity of admitting the 
 existence of some inscrutable energy farther back than the re- 
 motest cause attainable by human research. 
 
 The first efforts at reasoning traced events to superhuman 
 agency exerted by numerous beings called gods, but the con- 
 ception of whom was strictly anthropomorphic. Science was 
 born in the desire to find fixed and orderly energies with which 
 to replace the capricious wills of the primitive gods. While yet 
 in its cradle, science manifested a consciousness of its mission, 
 in attacking and destroying the contemporary religious faiths 
 and pretensions. In seeking from below, instead of above, 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHIC SPECULATION. 233 
 
 the causes of phenomena, ancient Greek speculation struck 
 into the fundamental idea that atoms and molecules are the ul- 
 timate constituents of the cosmos. Democritus, who is pro- 
 nounced a philosopher superior to Plato or Aristotle, first gave 
 precision and form to this idea. He held to the eternity of 
 the atoms, the materiality of the soul, and denied chance. He 
 first advanced the idea of vortices in the genesis of worlds. Em- 
 pedocles suggested that those combinations which were suited 
 to their ends maintain themselves from their very nature, and 
 thus launched the thought which has taken form, in our own 
 time, as the doctrine of the " survival of the fittest." Epicurus, 
 while actuated by an equal desire to discover law and order in 
 the phenomena of the universe, and thus dispel the supersti- 
 tions of the existing religions, did not reject the belief in di- 
 vine existence ; and was himself a worshiper of the gods. Lu- 
 cretius, if he admitted divine existence, maintained that the 
 world shows no proof of intelligent design, and that all things 
 have been caused by the shock of the atoms, while the fittest 
 combinations have persisted. He is thought to have suggest- 
 ed the nebular hypothesis to Karit. As to Socrates, Plato, and 
 Aristotle, they imposed a yoke on the human mind which re- 
 mains, to some extent, unbroken to the present day. 
 
 This auspicious inauguration of the advance of science was 
 arrested by the quickening of the religious feeling through the 
 introduction of Christianity, which made the mistake of adopt- 
 ing Biblical interpretation as the criterion of all truth. (*) The 
 
 (!) In the Second and Third lectures of the present work I have given a 
 summary of the facts connected with the relations subsisting between the 
 early Christian Church and contemporary systems of thought. I have 
 shown that it was only through the abnormal aggrandizement of the eccle- 
 siastical power that the councils of tJie Church (not Christianity, except so 
 far as implicated in the acts of those who professed it) attained to an atti- 
 tude where they were enabled to dictate terms to intellect ; and that, in do- 
 ing this, they violated not more the rights of intellect than the spirit of 
 primitive Christianity. 
 
234 PROGRESS OF ATOMIC THEORY. 
 
 philosophy of Aristotle sanctioned and aided the a priori meth- 
 ods of the schoolmen ; and, though science made positive ad- 
 vances in Arabia, the bond of tradition was not seriously 
 wrenched in Europe till the time of Copernicus and Bruno. 
 Bacon strengthened the incipient bias toward inductive meth- 
 ods ; and Descartes, though setting out from a first principle, 
 unconsciously abandoned it, to present the cosmos as a pure 
 mechanism. The full establishment of monotheism was favor- 
 able to the conception of the universe which presents it as a 
 system of physical effects ; and Gassendi signalized the possible 
 compatibility of theology with a revived Epicureanism. The 
 doctrine of atoms, which started with Democritus,( 8 ) has since 
 grown into general acceptance. But while Democritus con- 
 ceived the atoms dead, Gassendi, and, more recently, Clerk-Max- 
 well, have looked upon them as "prepared materials," thus sug- 
 gesting either the postulate or the inference of an antecedent 
 preparer. Tyndall agrees with Kant in denying the power of 
 reason to bridge the chasm which separates the atoms from 
 their Maker. 
 
 In an imaginary discussion between Bishop Butler and a dis- 
 ciple of Lucretius, the close correlation between states of mind 
 and conditions of the brain is pointed out ; but it is admitted 
 that the impinging of dead atoms upon dead atoms can never 
 result in sensation or any other phenomenon of consciousness. 
 This admission does not appear in the address as originally 
 published, but there is no reason to infer that the author's po- 
 sition has been changed. 
 
 Professor Tyndall, proceeding to the phenomena and the 
 problem of the succession of organic forms in geological time, 
 iterates his belief in the genealogical continuity of the series, 
 and follows with a sketch of the origin of the doctrine of 
 
 ( 2 ) Democritus, in fact, was a pupil of Leucippus, a disciple of the Ele- 
 atics. Leucippus seems to be the real originator of the atomic philosophy 
 (Ueberweg, "Hist. Phil.," vol. i., p. 67). 
 
PROGRESS OF DEVELOPMENT DOCTRINE. 235 
 
 transmutation or derivation of species, and of the grounds on 
 which the Darwinian phase of the doctrine reposes. Mr. Dar- 
 win and Professor Huxley receive high encomiums. Kepeti- 
 tions here would be irksome. It is asserted that variations 
 occur under domestication and in a state of nature; that in- 
 finitesimal variations transmitted through generations become 
 greatly accumulated and augmented; that the external condi-, 
 tions which are concomitant with these variations are "true 
 causes ;" that Darwin rejects teleology, even while bringing for- 
 ward some of the most striking examples of apparent design ; 
 that instincts are only inherited and accumulated experiences ; 
 and, finally, that Darwinism has become firmly rooted in the 
 convictions of thinking minds. 
 
 In the recent progress of scientific research, the doctrine of 
 the conservation of energy has become established ; and this 
 principle is held to embrace organic nature as truly as inorgan- 
 ic. Next, the origin of mind itself has come specially under 
 review ; and Spencer is maintained to have established for it a 
 developmental history parallel with. that established by Darwin 
 for the physical organism. Eyes and other organs of the senses 
 are but portions of a primitively homogeneous mass differen- 
 tiated by the influence of light and other external agents. The 
 tactual sense is observed to possess a development correlative 
 with the intelligence of animals ; and the inference is that it 
 determines such intelligence. Instincts and intuitions are but 
 the accumulated experience of races, transmitted from genera- 
 tion to generation. Space and time are " elements of thought," 
 or, as Kant phrases it, " forms of intuition," instead of object- 
 ive realities.( J ) 
 
 (') The phrase " elements of thought " as here used is too loose for phi- 
 losophy. Space and time are not the " elements," but the concomitants, 
 and probably the conditions, of thought. "Forms of intuition" is more 
 exact ; but still, " conditions of intuition," or " conditions of the possibility 
 of intuition and thought," would be better. 
 
236 "MATERIALISTIC" INDICATIONS. 
 
 The author now approaches the critical point of his discus- 
 sion. Having admitted that the scientist often feels himself 
 impelled to pass beyond the field of physical phenomena, and 
 from phenomena to induce an abstract generalization under 
 which an entire category of phenomena may be ranged as in 
 the case of the force of gravitation it is not strange that Lu- 
 cretius should have reached the generalization that his atoms 
 were endowed with life ; or that Darwin should have permitted 
 himself to be understood as abstracting creative power, exer- 
 cised in a limited number of initial cases, as the antecedent and 
 cause of the series of organized beings. Darwin, our author 
 thinks, should speak with clearness at this juncture, and assume 
 the responsibility of carrying derivative development back, not 
 only to one primitive stock, but to unorganized matter itself. 
 At the same time, he admits that the doctrine of spontaneous 
 generation is not yet proved, though he seems to regard that 
 achievement as not very remote. 
 
 We stand now in the presence of that matter so uniformly 
 defined as dead. We have traced life from its highest mani- 
 festations, through all its gradations, to granulated, vivified pro- 
 toplasm. Life is everywhere associated with matter. We know 
 nothing of life save as associated with matter. Is there any 
 terrestrial life which does not depend for its maintenance and 
 its origin upon matter ? " Here the vision of the mind author- 
 itatively supplements the vision of the eye. By an intellectual 
 necessity," he says, " I cross the boundary of the experimental 
 evidence, and discern in that matter which we, in our ignorance 
 of its latent powers, and notwithstanding our professed rever- 
 ence for its creator, have hitherto covered with opprobrium 
 the promise and potency of all terrestrial life." 
 
 Here, then, he reaches the goal toward which recent theories 
 in science seemed to impel him. This, indeed, is a sort of ma- 
 terialism ; but we must have the candor to permit the distin- 
 guished physicist to explain the sense in w^ich he embraces 
 
DEEPER FORCES RECOGNIZED. 237 
 
 materialism. In harmony with Spencer, and in opposition to 
 Mill, Fichte, Berkeley, and Hume, Professor Tyndall entertains 
 no question as to the existence of an external world; though 
 we have no evidence that it is as it seems to be. "Our states 
 of consciousness," he says, "are symbols of an outside entity 
 which produces them and determines the order of their suc- 
 cession, but the real nature of which we can never know. In 
 fact, the whole process of evolution is the manifestation of 
 a power absolutely inscrutable to the intellect of man.* * * 
 Considered fundamentally, then, it is by the operation of an 
 insoluble mystery that life on earth is evolved, species differ- 
 entiated, and mind unfolded, from their prepotent elements in 
 the immeasurable past" (p. 91). 
 
 The facts of the religious consciousness of man are repeat- 
 edly recognized. " The facts of religious feeling are to me 
 as certain as. the facts of consciousness" (p. 24, Appleton & 
 Co.'s ed.). "Physical science can not cover all the demands 
 of man's nature " (p. 42). Speaking of facts of consciousness 
 which have prescriptive rights quite as strong as those of the 
 understanding, he says, "There is also that deep -set feeling, 
 which, since the earliest dawn of history, and probably for ages 
 prior to all history, incorporated itself in the religions of the 
 world. You who have escaped from these religions into the 
 high and dry light of the intellect may deride them ; but in 
 so doing, you deride accidents of form merely, and fail to 
 touch the immovable basis of the religious sentiment in the 
 nature of man. To yield this sentiment reasonable satisfaction 
 is the problem of problems at the present hour" (p. 93). It 
 will be noticed that he relegates religion to the realm of emo- 
 tion. This force is something "capable of being guided to 
 noble issues in the region of emotion, which is its proper and 
 elevated sphere'^ 1 ) (p. 93). Finally, while claiming for sci- 
 
 . (') On this subject, see the present writer's views expressed in the First 
 Lecture, p. 22-25. 
 
238 NATURE OF TYNDALVS MATERIALISM. 
 
 ence a rightful and complete exemption from the restraints of 
 all religious theories, schemes, or systems, he asserts an equal 
 right of the ethical nature to free exercise. "The advance of 
 man's understanding in the path of knowledge, and those un- 
 quenchable claims of his moral and emotional nature which the 
 understanding can never satisfy, are here equally set forth " (p. 
 97). In an address delivered two months subsequently to his 
 Belfast manifesto, Professor Tyndall, raising the question wheth- 
 er there are not in nature manifestations, of knowledge and skill 
 superior to man's, replies, " My friends, the profession of that 
 atheism with which I am sometimes so lightly charged would, 
 in my case, be an impossible answer to this question" (p. 102). 
 The ethical bearing of scientific materialism is found further 
 set forth in an address delivered by the same speaker in 1868. 
 After explaining the invariable relation of physics to conscious- 
 ness, and alleging that, "given the state of the brain, the cor- 
 responding thought or feeling might be inferred ; or given the 
 thought or feeling, the corresponding state of the brain might 
 be inferred, he asks, " How inferred ? It would be at the 
 bottom not a case of logical inference at all, but of empirical 
 association.* * * The passage from the physics of the brain 
 to the corresponding facts of consciousness is unthinkable (p. 
 117).* * * In affirming that the growth of the body is me- 
 chanical, and that thought as exercised by us has its correlative 
 in the physics of the brain, I think the position of the mate- 
 rialist is stated as far as that position is a tenable one. I think 
 the materialist will be able, finally, to maintain this position 
 against all attacks ; but I do not think, in the present condi- 
 tion of the human mind, that he can pass beyond this position. 
 I do not think he is entitled to say that his molecular group- 
 ings and his molecular motions explain every thing. In real- 
 ity, they explain nothing. The utmost he can affirm is the as- 
 sociation of two classes of phenomena, of whose real bond of 
 union he is in absolute ignorance" (p. 118). 
 
TYNDALL NEITHER ATHEIST NOR PANTHEIST. 239 
 
 The foregoing digest indicates that the celebrated Belfast 
 address is an attempt to show that the most penetrating minds 
 of all ages have felt themselves borne toward the conviction 
 that the ultimate datum of scientific, and, perhaps, of philo- 
 sophic, investigation must be matter. It asserts that this is the 
 general, or at least the forming, conviction of men of science 
 at the present day ; that all activities in the realm of life and 
 mind, as well as in that of organization, are intimately connect- 
 ed sequents or concomitants of the interactions of the atoms, 
 and that back of this basis of phenomena, whatever we may 
 feel impelled to believe, there is nothing which can be reached 
 by real knowledge; though we are compelled to recognize a 
 profound and mysterious reality to which our ethical feelings 
 are co-ordinated. It is unfair to hurl at Professor Tyndall the 
 charge of atheism in the philosophic sense. He distinctly re- 
 pels the imputation. It is uncandid, after his careful qualifi- 
 cations, to charge him with materialism in that ordinary sense 
 which excludes the notion of Deity back of matter. When he 
 avows materialism, he means that within the region of the 
 data of science he discovers every thing originating from ante- 
 cedents under the recognized laws of matter and force. There 
 certainly is something, he says, behind matter and force ; but 
 he follows Spencer in refusing to subscribe to any predicates 
 respecting it. He is hardly a material pantheist, for he dis- 
 tinctly declares that sensation and thought can not come from 
 dead matter ; and implies that though existence emerges from 
 matter, its ground is farther back. He certainly belongs to 
 the nescience school of theists, in which Hamilton and Mansel 
 are older masters than Spencer ; and there seems little propri- 
 ety and less occasion for his assuming the burden of a confes- 
 sion so opprobrious as materialism. 
 
 I desire to make the analysis of this address the occasion for 
 shaping a statement of fundamental principles which ought to 
 
 11 
 
240 SOME FIRST PRINCIPLES. 
 
 regulate the procedures of scientist, philosopher, and theologian 
 alike. We are all equally attempting to cleave through the 
 dense darkness which environs us, to reach the truth of things. 
 That we live in a universe of phenomena is generally admitted. 
 We are therefore realities, and we all act on the assumption 
 that there are other realities shadowed forth in the realm of 
 appearances. No reasoning, nevertheless, can prove the exist- 
 ence of an external world; and the history of thought shows 
 that it is possible, in individual cases, to stifle the universal be- 
 lief that it exists. But if these phenomena represent realities, 
 we are still uncertain that they represent realities as they are. 
 Universal belief again affirms that 'they do ; and yet there is 
 room for doubt. 
 
 If we trust the indications of the shifting phenomena, the 
 world of realities is the theatre of perpetual movement, change, 
 and transformation. We find rooted in universal belief a con- 
 viction that all these changes are severally the results of appro- 
 priate causes ; and that the realities themselves are equally ef- 
 fects of adequate causation. It is a law of mind to look upon 
 every phenomenon as an effect, and to couple effect with cause. 
 It is the province of science to catalogue phenomena, to classi- 
 fy them, to note their relations of antecedence and sequence 
 and formulate laws; and, from observed uniformities of se- 
 quence, to lift the veil from the future and the past. It is the 
 province of philosophy to pass beyond the phenomenon and 
 inquire, not what is its antecedent, but what is its cause ; to 
 pass from immediate and accessible causes to remote ones, and 
 from these to ultimate, efficient causation. Philosophy, when 
 it has attained this limit, becomes theology. Theology is the 
 granary in which the fruitage of science and philosophy is 
 garnered. Religion is the activity of that department of our 
 nature which feels its ground and sanction in the supreme Re- 
 ality in which the successes of science, philosophy, and theolo- 
 gy converge. 
 
RELATIONS OF TRUTH- SEEKERS. 241 
 
 Though searchers after truth may be ranged as scientists, 
 philosophers, and theologians, it is seldom the case that either 
 shuts himself closely in his own field. The scientist from phe- 
 nomena induces laws ; and from the postulates of his own mind 
 deduces causes, such as gravitation, affinity, electricity. The 
 modern philosopher combines the data furnished in reason 
 with the conclusions yielded by science; and the theologian 
 pursues all paths and all methods which seem to tend toward 
 a last solution of the mystery of being and events. 
 
 It is a misfortune, as it seems to me, for either to restrict 
 his investigations to a single field. The practice begets in- 
 difference to certain classes of data, and ends in bigotry, mis- 
 understanding, and hostility. Our common nature covers, in 
 each individual, the whole ground, and it seems to me narrow 
 and pernicious for the truth-seeker to tie himself up to a single 
 method. 
 
 Science, in its modern acceptation, does not lead to causes 
 still less, to primordial cause. The search for these is the 
 legitimate object of philosophy. Science, strictly speaking, 
 knows only phenomena with their groupings and orders of se- 
 quence. It talks much of forces, but these are only hypothe- 
 ses, verbal symbols of unknown quantities which may be one 
 thing or another. Moreover, when the scientist steps into the 
 realm of abstract realities, he is playing the r6le of philoso- 
 pher.(') 
 I have said the bond between effect and cause is a universal 
 
 (') So natural and legitimate is philosophizing that the most emphasized 
 scientist finds himself continually tempted beyond the limits of science. 
 The earnest hunt for truth renders the mind oblivious of the boundary- 
 lines between the territories of science and philosophy. "y an intellect- 
 ual necessity," as Professor Tyndall truthfully admits, " it crosses the bound- 
 ary of the experimental evidence" and demands of philosophy the extradi- 
 tion of truth which had eluded pursuit in the realm of positive science. 
 See further on this subject in the Fifth Lecture. 
 
242 CHANCE DISCRIMINATED. 
 
 datum of reason. I think no modern philosopher will main- 
 tain that existence or phenomenon can be the product of 
 chance. In ruling chance, however, from the throne of the 
 universe, it may be well to offer an explanation and a discrim- 
 ination. We must recognize such a thing as chance ; and we 
 ought to understand what it is and what it is not. If I throw 
 down a couple of dice, it is impossible to calculate what will 
 turn up. We say the result is wholly a matter of chance. I 
 may chance to turn up one ace ; it may be two. But the con- 
 tingency of the result is not the cause of it. The two aces con- 
 cur by chance; but chance did not put forth the efficiency 
 which moved each dice precisely so far and no farther. The 
 movement of the dice is as absolutely the effect of the forces 
 exerted by my hand, by gravity, and by elasticity, as if I had 
 deliberately laid each one down with the ace up. I have not 
 the ability so to measure and adjust the force and direction of 
 my muscular effort as to produce a preappointed movement 
 and lodgment of the dice ; and there is, consequently, some 
 range of possible movement and possible place of rest for the 
 dice. But whatever movement transpires, and whatever may 
 result in the position of the dice, ordinary physical forces were 
 the cause the proximate cause of all. Chance, in this case, 
 is simply a field of possibility. It is a range of values of an 
 unknown quantity, within certain limits. It is a name for our 
 inability to gauge precisely the forces which act our ignorance 
 of the precise result which they will produce. 
 
 The case is not fundamentally altered when, for the dice, we 
 substitute the atoms of a universe. The field of possible re- 
 sults is inconceivably enlarged ; but we must feel equally cer- 
 tain that, whatever adjustment the atoms assume, there has been 
 some adequate cause or set of causes to move them to their 
 places. We say that any particular adjustment is the result of 
 chance ; but it is absolutely certain that, whatever the adjust- 
 ment, there were forces moving the atoms in such directions 
 
CHANCE NOT CAUSAL. 243 
 
 and with such velocities as to produce precisely that adjust- 
 ment. The chance of which we speak is no more a cause in 
 this case than in that of the dice. 
 
 Chance is essentially a negation of cause. The moment I 
 assert that a result is caused, the idea of chance is necessarily 
 excluded. Were there no cause but chance in the universe 
 even supposing the atoms of matter to exist every thing 
 would rest in a state of immobility, stagnation. There would 
 be no further effect than the birth of matter. 
 
 But suppose the existence of matter and orderly acting forces 
 to be granted, there is much more in the collocations of the 
 atoms of the universe than can be attributed to causes acting 
 without discernment. We are not authorized to assert that the 
 disposition of the atoms is the result even of blind attractions 
 and repulsions ; since, as can be shown, there are numberless 
 adjustments in which harmony, beauty, fitness, and utility have 
 been the directive or conditioning force ; and these are qual- 
 ities sustaining relations only to intelligence. 
 
 Whatever character, then, philosophy may authorize chance 
 to assume, she can not concede to it the character of cause. 
 Existence can not be the result of chance. No mode of exist- 
 ence can be the result of chance.^) 
 
 It is one of the results of science to prove that that which 
 had been regarded as a cause is only an effect. The more we 
 know, the longer the chain of intermediate causation seems to 
 be. Primitive man recognizes no interval between cause and 
 first cause. Every event in the natural world is looked upon 
 as the direct product of supernatural causation. This is not a 
 theoretical opinion, but a historical fact, which I have ascer- 
 tained after abundant research. The relics of this habit perpet- 
 
 ( ! ) On chance and probabilities, the reader may consult De Morgan, 
 "Probability," p. 23; Mill, "Logic," book iii., chap. xvii. ; M'Cosh, "Typ- 
 ical Forms," pp. 40, 41, etc. ; Venn, " Logic of Chance," 1876. 
 
244 PROGRESS OF CAUSAL RESEARCH. 
 
 uated themselves among the Greeks until the dawn of Greek 
 philosophy ; and we are assured by Draper and Tyndall, and 
 the professions of the philosophers themselves, that the aim of 
 philosophy, in which, in ancient times, all science was merged, 
 was, to demonstrate that events do not transpire through the 
 direct intervention of the gods, but according to the orderly 
 methods of physical law. With such gods as ruled in the 
 Greek pantheon, there must have been much to stimulate phi- 
 losophy and forward its aims. 
 
 Advancing from the lowest stage of barbarism, the first step 
 in reflection discloses the law of invariable antecedence and se- 
 quence among physical phenomena; and the mind attaches its 
 ineradicable notion of cause to the invariable antecedent. Here 
 arises the notion of physical causation. But the invariable an- 
 tecedent is now regarded the effect of first cause, acting in the 
 guise of a supernatural power. Here is one term interposed 
 between first cause and ultimate phenomenon. 
 
 The next step in reflection discloses the same fact in regard 
 to the observed physical cause as had been noted at first in re- 
 gard to the last phenomenon. This is also the effect of a phys- 
 ical cause ; and the mind now finds two terms of intermediate 
 causation interposed between assumed first cause and ultimate 
 phenomenon. The opportunity presents itself, at this stage, 
 for another observation which, in the development of science, 
 becomes extremely significant. The recognized intermediate 
 causes of two separate phenomena appear, in many cases, as 
 the effects of the same cause. The number of assumed first 
 causes is therefore much less than the number of intermediate 
 causes in the first order of remove from phenomenon. 
 
 With the further advance of reflection, it is ascertained that 
 the assumed first cause is again the effect of remoter causation ; 
 and so its aspect changes to that of an intermediate cause, and 
 we find three terms interposed between phenomenon and newly 
 assumed first cause. At the same time, it is observed that, in 
 
HUMANITY'S FAITH IN FIRST CAUSE. 245 
 
 many cases, two of the previously assumed first causes are, in 
 common, the effect of one first cause thus removed by three 
 terms from phenomenon. 
 
 Thus continues, through the instrumentality of researches of 
 the scientific kind, the process of interpolating new terms of 
 intermediate or secondary causation ; and parallel with the re- 
 treat of primary causation into the ever-dimmer distance is a 
 diminution in the number of assumed first causes. The tend- 
 ency of lines of causation or series of effects to converge has 
 been noted by every thinker. This zone of secondary causes 
 is the peculiar field of science. 
 
 Before proceeding further, one suggestive fact should be con- 
 spicuously held up to view. The human mind all along holds 
 fast to its notion of primary causation. Disappointed and de- 
 ceived a hundred times, its faith in the reality is not one whit 
 abated. Reluctantly and sorrowfully driven from post to post, 
 it moves on into the unexplored darkness, full of confidence 
 that the object of its trust will be found at last. Look, further, 
 at the notion which it always frames of the character of its 
 primary cause. True it is that the hue of humanity is reflect- 
 ed over it. The first cause does assume human attributes. In 
 the rude conditions of society, they are bodily as well as spirit- 
 ual ; but afterward purely spiritual. Man is conscious of the 
 exercise of a power of causation on his own part, and he knows 
 nothing of any other mode of essential causation. As long as 
 all that he sees and investigates in the universe is found co- 
 ordinated to the powers and methods of his own intellect, it 
 would be an impossible philosophy to assume that primary 
 cause, when discovered, should not exert its efficiency in a man- 
 ner harmonious with the indications of all the rest of the uni- 
 verse. The mind of humanity, therefore, invests its primary 
 cause with volition and intelligence. It may be said that hu- 
 manity's conceptions in this and many other things are desti- 
 tute of demonstrable foundation. I do not wish to meet the 
 
246 INFLUENCE OF MONOTHEISM. 
 
 objection now, but would suggest that sound reasoning de- 
 mands that we proceed from grounds which are strongly prob- 
 able, rather than from the total negation of them because not 
 demonstrated. The fallacy of asserting that a given position 
 can not be demonstrated true, and then proceeding to reason as 
 if it were demonstrated untrue, is a somewhat fashionable one, 
 and has served as the basis of a great deal of bulky and osten- 
 tatious, if not very substantial, philosophizing. 
 
 Another observation to be made at this point has reference 
 to the relative influence of polytheistic and monotheistic con- 
 ceptions upon the body and the march of science. It is the 
 characteristic of polytheism to stand ready to recognize an in- 
 definite number of first causes ; thus necessarily retarding, in- 
 stead of stimulating, the search for intermediate causes. Mono- 
 theism, while recognizing but one absolutely first cause, must 
 either favor the tendency of lines of causation to converge at a 
 point, by the continual interpolation of secondary causes, or 
 else must yield to the anthropopathic instinct of uncultured 
 mind, in assuming an indefinite number of points of applica- 
 tion of causal efficiency. This latter alternative would evident- 
 ly be the resort of a monotheism not yet sufficiently exalted in 
 scientific knowledge to be able to appreciate the full meaning 
 of that convergence toward a unity which is disclosed in the 
 genealogical lines of phenomena. To the first alternative it 
 would be driven by a clearer understanding of the significance 
 of the history of opinion ; and when once fully intrenched in 
 that position, it would contemplate with satisfaction, rather 
 than alarm, the progress of science in breaking through the un- 
 explored barriers which separate the last found causes from the 
 One Universal Cause. 
 
 We turn back now to scrutinize the field of secondary cau- 
 sation in which physical science occupies itself. It is purely 
 a phenomenal world. The data of physical science, strictly 
 speaking, do not consist of causes made manifest in sensible 
 
CAUSES NOT COGNIZED BY SCIENCE. 247 
 
 phenomena, but of sensible phenomena themselves, certain^ ones 
 of which sustain to each other the relation of invariable ante- 
 cedence and sequence.^) The body of positive science is re- 
 stricted to these. When, in obedience to a law of our minds, 
 we connect the necessary notion of causation with a given inva- 
 riable antecedence, we perform a legitimate act of philosophic 
 thinking ; but we neither know the modus operandi of the cau- 
 sation, nor whether the causation inheres in the antecedent or 
 acts through it, nor whether such causation is primary, or sep- 
 arated by an indefinite number of terms from primary cause. 
 It is only an accommodated and symbolical form of expression 
 when I say, for instance, that friction causes electrical phenom- 
 ena. I only know that electrical phenomena follow friction. 
 Friction may be the cause proximate, or it may not be. That 
 it is the first cause no one will pretend; but how many re- 
 moves separate it from first cause no one can conjecture. 
 
 Physical science may conveniently and harmlessly assume 
 that causation inheres in the antecedent; but the habit of so 
 doing must not generate a belief that the assumption represents 
 a verity. Science may forbear to inquire nay, in its own 
 character, it can not inquire whether efficient causation inhere 
 in the material substance back of the phenomenon which stands 
 as invariable antecedent ; or whether the remotest phenomenal 
 
 ( J ) Certain language which Professor Morris has published since this 
 paper was written (and published) is singularly coincident with some of 
 our expressions. It is a pleasure to learn that he has independently 
 thought the same thoughts, and to call attention to the acute analysis by 
 which he eliminates the principle of final cause as a necessary principle of 
 cognition and of the contemplation of nature. " The laws," he says, " of 
 such [mechanical] action are laws of phenomenal sequence, and not of 
 causation. So-called mechanical causes are not true causes " (" The Final 
 Cause as Principle of Cognition and Principle in Nature," in Jour. Phil. 
 Soc. of Great Britain, 1875). For further references, see the foot-note on 
 page 96 of the present work. 
 
 11* 
 
248 REAL CAUSATION -MET APHEN OMEN AL. 
 
 antecedent reached by science represents substantial first cause. 
 Should the scientist refrain from instituting such inquiries, he 
 should neither be reproached, on the one hand, with the charge 
 of apathy touching questions of primary causation, nor himself 
 commit the mistake, on the other, of assuming that inquiries 
 in his actual field have led him to real causes. Still less should 
 he dogmatically deny that real causation is posited outside of 
 the phenomenal world in which his labors are conducted be- 
 yond the last term which he has discovered with his microscope, 
 or dissolved in his alembic, or discerned with the Vorstellungs- 
 Jcraft of his imagination. 
 
 The method of science, I repeat, is chiefly inductive ; that 
 of philosophy, chiefly deductive. The science of antiquity and 
 of the Middle Ages was essentially a body of conclusions de- 
 rived deductively ; and the inevitable and glaring absurdities 
 of the method and its results, contrasted with the brilliant suc- 
 cesses of the inductive method of modern times, have caused 
 many scientists to look upon deductive processes with an un- 
 merited degree of distrust, or even disdain. This has led them, 
 since scientific induction can not be carried into the field of 
 first principles, to reject as unsafe and unworthy of considera- 
 tion the results of a priori reasoning. Hence has sprung up 
 the miscalled " positive philosophy." This tendency has gone 
 too far, and it is quite time to return to the natural method, 
 which appreciates and weighs with impartiality the evidence 
 afforded both by reason and the senses ; and does not refuse to 
 search for causes in the realm of immaterial things, because 
 there they would elude the verification of the crucible and the 
 balance. Deduction, dealing with necessary truths and admit- 
 ted principles, is a permissible and safe procedure, and so natural 
 and available, that not unfrequently the scientist himself falls 
 into the use of it, at the same time that he professes to observe 
 rigorously the canons of scientific induction. 
 
 The test of a physical truth that it must be capable of men- 
 
INEFFICIENCY OF "LAW." 249 
 
 tal presentation is legitimate ; but a moment's reflection will 
 convince any one that it is an "impossible test in the whole field 
 of abstract ideas. By what sort of process, for instance, would 
 Professor Tyndall bring before his mind's eye a Vorstellung of 
 cheapness, or ambition, or despair, or even the generalization 
 induced from a body of phenomena ? 
 
 In this phenomenal world science disposes its data accord- 
 ing to their resemblances, concomitancies, and sequences. An 
 observed invariable sequence is styled a law. In the general- 
 ized faith that a certain sequence will remain invariable, science 
 forecasts terms which lie in the future ; and, in a similar faith 
 that it has always been invariable, science retraces the pathway 
 of phenomena into the inaccessible past. But it is of the ut- 
 most importance to refrain from endowing the word law with 
 the notion of efficiency. We say loosely that the law of chem- 
 ical affinities causes the disengagement of carbonic acid when 
 chalk and sulphuric acid are brought together ; that it is a law 
 of life that the stomach should not be dissolved by its own 
 juices ; that it is the law of the " survival of the fittest" which 
 causes the progressive improvement (either assumed or proved) 
 in the successive generations of a species in the state of nature. 
 We are apt to think that when we have ranged a phenomenon 
 under its appropriate order of sequence, we have pointed out 
 its cause; whereas, laws are only uniformities of juxtaposition 
 of phenomena. There is no efficacy in law. It is not a force, 
 but only the method of activity of force or the order of its ef- 
 fects. The law which expresses the relations subsisting be- 
 tween the intensity of gravity and the masses and distances of 
 bodies, when applied to a certain assemblage of phenomena, 
 renders them intelligible in a certain sense ; it discloses the 
 consummate harmony subsisting among them, and reveals cor- 
 relations which seem to be the work of intelligence ; but we de- 
 ceive ourselves when we imagine that the law produces a single 
 result. The law itself is a result an induction from the order 
 
250 " CONDITIONS " NOT CA USAL. 
 
 of the phenomena which a mistaken science summons it to ex- 
 plain. If a progressive improvement of race is an outcome of 
 the continuous " survival of the fittest," then this order of se- 
 quence is a law ; and in accordance with it, we shall expect 
 every race left to itself to undergo a gradual improvement; 
 but such order of sequence is no more a cause in this case 
 than in any other. The immediate causes of this result are 
 the agencies which destroy the individuals not " fittest to sur- 
 vive," or, more accurately, the forces concerned in the contin- 
 uance of the species, under the conditions (extermination of the 
 weakest), through the surviving individuals. 
 
 Still employing the term cause in the symbolical sense cus- 
 tomary with science, there is another set of circumstances 
 which ought not to escape notice in scrutinizing the principles 
 of causality. I refer to conditions of causation sometimes 
 called conditioning causes. There are conditions indeed to the 
 efficiency of every cause conditions of its operativeness in 
 any degree ; and there are others which merely modify its op- 
 eration ; and, not unfrequently, the two characters are united 
 in one condition. There is danger of confounding conditions 
 with causes. I agree to write a book, for instance, on the con- 
 dition that my publishers will put it in print. It will not be 
 written with that condition left out. But the publisher does 
 not thereby become the author of my book. The dilute acid in 
 the battery will attack the zinc only on condition that you con- 
 nect the zinc and platinum externally by means of a conductor ; 
 but this does not render the conductor the agent which dis- 
 solves the zinc. I build a wall behind my grape-trellis, and I 
 find the ripening of the fruit accelerated ; but it is not the wall 
 which does the work: it is still, as before, the sun. The 
 amount of light emitted by my lamp is determined, within cer- 
 tain limits, by the height of the wick; but this does not ren- 
 der the wick the cause of the light. The varying wick is only 
 a varying condition of a varying result (oxidation) of a vary- 
 
< ' CONDITIONS " NOT CA VSAL. 251 
 
 ing activity of a constant physical cause chemical affinity be- 
 tween oil and oxygen. Similarly, the amount of thought which 
 I can evolve is conditioned by all the various affections and 
 conditions of the brain. My poetry and my philosophy are 
 indeed correlated to brain and blood and oxygen and beef- 
 steak, but only in the same way that my boots are correlated 
 to calf-skin and tan-bark and black-wax. These condition the 
 exercise of the boot-maker's skill ; beefsteak conditions the ex- 
 ercise of mine. It is quite true that the activity in both cases 
 has other conditions ; but it is also true that none of the con- 
 ditions can be elevated to the dignity of causes. The physical 
 scientist is sometimes hoodwinked by the exact graduation of 
 mental activity to the condition of the brain, and commits the 
 mistake of clothing condition with the character of cause. As 
 well assert that the wick secretes the light. 
 
 A similar departure from correct reasoning is the assignment 
 of the " environment " as the cause of organic modifications. 
 I shall not deny that organic modifications are generally corre- 
 lated to the environment, and vary with the environment, and 
 as a sequence of its variations. Though I have observed that 
 organism bears no fixed, and therefore necessary, relation to en- 
 vironment, and even sometimes ignores it, I will assume that 
 the correspondence is always as uniform as a certain school of 
 derivationists pictures it. What then ? This is, after all, but 
 a conditioning cause. It seems to me to imply a lack of close 
 discrimination to assert, for instance, that increased cold causes 
 an animal's fur to grow longer. If it grow longer with in- 
 crease of cold, and as a sequence of it, the immediate cause is 
 evidently the increased amount of assimilation at the growing 
 points of the hairs. That cold is the cause of this, there is no 
 ground for asserting. But if it were the cause, cold itself is 
 the effect of a remoter cause the diminution of heat-vibra- 
 tions ; and this is the result of a decrease of energy in the cause 
 of heat-vibrations, whatever that may be. When the common 
 
 Of TBS 
 
252 CONSECUTIVENESS AND CAUSAL NEXUS. 
 
 potato is grown in a dry and sterile soil, it deteriorates in size 
 and quality ; and the Darwinist would assert that these changes 
 are caused by the change in the environment ; while, in fact, 
 they are only conditioned by it. The change in the soil is the 
 condition of the assimilation of less material ; it is the condi- 
 tion of the less energetic action of the vital forces. Whatever 
 result ensues, it is these forces which cause it. The crane's 
 long legs and the duck's broad bill are co-ordinated to their en- 
 vironment, and have been fashioned as they are by some cause. 
 It is evident that the environment has been the condition with 
 reference to which the conformation was produced. But there 
 is no particle of proof that the environment produced them. 
 It would be interesting to contemplate Professor Tyndall in 
 the effort to represent to his mind's eye the process by which 
 pond water wove the web of a duck's foot ; or that by which 
 the consumption of clover-heads fashioned a persistent pulp in 
 the molar of the rabbit, while forest fruits determined a limit- 
 ed growth in the molar of its fellow-rodent, the squirrel. The 
 whole doctrine of organic transformations, or formations, 
 through the influence of external conditions, is infected with 
 this fallacy of reasoning. I am not denying the co-ordinations 
 alleged, but I choose to trace them to intelligible and real 
 causes. 
 
 The scientist, in pronouncing upon causal relations among 
 his phenomena, is in danger of committing the logical error of 
 post hoc, propter hoc. The fundamental conception of the doc- 
 trine of the derivation of species, under any of its aspects, is a 
 case of post hoc, propter hoc. While there is not an undoubted 
 instance of the derivation of a genuine species, its possibility is 
 a mere hypothesis ;(') and the assertion that all species are de- 
 
 ( J ) The author would be sorry to indulge in dogmatism on this question. 
 Recent observations have shown the possibility of structural changes of 
 great significance, one of the most interesting of which is cited from 
 the Zeitschrift fur Wissenschaftliche Zoologie, which represents a minute 
 
RECENT FACTS FAVORING DERIVATION. 253 
 
 rivative is a somewhat hazardous assumption. The direct ob- 
 servations which we have been able to make on the serial rela- 
 
 crustacean varying, with increase of the saltness of the water, from a spe- 
 cific form known as Artemia salina to another specific form known as Ar- 
 temia Milhauseni, and with decrease in the saltness of the water varying 
 inversely (Popular Science Monthly, vol. ix., p. 122). Even this is less 
 striking than the transformation of Siredon liclienoides (observed by Pro- 
 fessor Marsh) induced, under change of habitat, by which a transition was 
 effected not only from one supposed species to another, but from one rec- 
 ognized genus to another, and even from a group (Perennibranchiata) com- 
 monly regarded as of ordinal value, to another group (Caducibranchiata) 
 often regarded as a distinct order. Obviously, however, such examples 
 remain, for the present, open to the explanation that naturalists have over- 
 estimated or underestimated the relative value of different categories of 
 characters (mistaking certain ones for specific which are only varietal), or 
 have assumed as adult and ultimate states those which are merely devel- 
 opmental ; as in the remarkable instances of Medusae, where, as an illus- 
 tration, the embryonic stages of a single individual were described as four 
 genera, Scyphistoma, Strobila, Ephyra, and Aurelia (Packard, " Life Histo- 
 ries of Animals," p. 68 ; Clark, " Mind in Nature," p. 67-72). 
 
 Since the foregoing note was penned, the researches of American zoolo- 
 gists have made it appear that a large proportion of the recognized spe- 
 cies of birds, mammals, and fresh-water mollusks of our country are no 
 more than geographical varieties, having, of course, common origins. Yet 
 we have been no less positive about the fixity of these supposed specific 
 types than, on the same grounds, we might continue to be, in respect to 
 specific types still recognized. If we must admit that so many " good spe- 
 cies " have had common origins, we may as well admit that all good spe- 
 cies have been probably derived from common origins, and thus the bar- 
 rier to acceptance of the derivative hypothesis would be completely broken 
 down. In the judgment of the writer, the evidence for derivation has been 
 continually accumulating, and, part passu, the difficulties encountered by 
 it have disappeared. This admission, however, concerns the theory only 
 as a mode of succession of pJienomena and as an explanation of the material 
 conditions and physiological instrumentalities under which and through which 
 the succession is effectuated by some cause existing without the province 
 of science. It is made, also, in view of the entire range of evidence geo- 
 
2 54 " ORGANIC ALL T REMEMBERED " EXPERIENCES. 
 
 tions of species disclose the existence of obstacles which, so 
 far as we know, have never been surmounted. The fossil treas- 
 ures of our continent furnish us, in successive ages, a series of 
 equine quadrupeds with a progressively diminishing develop- 
 ment of toes, ending with the solidungulate horse. Derivation 
 assumes that these belong to one genealogical line ; while it is 
 perfectly obvious that this set of facts, taken by itself, is en- 
 tirely consistent with the creation hypothesis. The gigantic 
 basal inconsequence of a theory which deduces material conti- 
 nuity from a simple succession of terms is, nevertheless, great- 
 ly palliated by its harmony and parallelism with the phenom- 
 ena of embryonic development, and with recently established 
 facts of variability of species ; and I do not think any man 
 authorized to deny dogmatically that specific derivation is the 
 method of nature. 
 
 Equally unfounded in reason or science is Mr. Spencer's as- 
 sumption that instincts are inherited and accumulated experi- 
 ences " registered in the organism," and that our intuitive ideas 
 are " organically remembered " experiences. No glimmer of ev- 
 idence exists of any such connection between instinct or in- 
 tuition and ancestry ; while all attainable evidence shows that, 
 besides the absolute lack of qualitative resemblance between in- 
 stinct or intuition and its alleged cause, the instincts and intu- 
 
 logical, zoological, embryological, and morphological and not on the na- 
 ked evidence of a few nicely graduated successions of forms. 
 
 On the geographical variations of American species, see, for Birds, 
 Baird, " The Distribution and Migration of North American Birds," in 
 Amer. Jour. Sci. and Arts, vol. xli., Jan. and March, 1866 ; Allen, Proc. Bos- 
 ton Soc. Nat. Hist., vol. xv. ; Kidgway, Amer. Jour. Sci. (3), iv., Dec., 1872, 
 and vol. v. ; for Mammals, Baird, " Pacific R. R. Reports," vol. viii. ; Allen, 
 Proc. Boston Soc. Nat. Hist., 1874, vol. xv. ; for Birds and Mammals, Yar- 
 row, "Wheeler Survey," vol. v., chap, i., 1876; Morse, Popular Science 
 Monthly, Nov. and Dec., 1876 ; for Mollusks, Cooper, Proc. Cal. Acad. Nat. 
 Sci., vol. v., p. 128 ; Weatherby, Proc. Cincinnati Soc. Nat. Sci., June, 1876. 
 
CONCOMITANCE AND CAUSAL NEXUS. 255 
 
 itions are the most absolutely fixed and secularly invariable ele- 
 ments in the system of life, and are as distinctly operative in 
 the brute as in man. 
 
 Not unfrequently the phenomena which challenge our inves- 
 tigation sustain relations of simple concomitancy or parallel- 
 ism ; and when such relations appear tolerably uniform, it is 
 natural to suspect some intercausal connection between them, 
 while in truth nothing of the kind may exist ; and their par- 
 allelism may result from a common relation to some higher 
 cause. The improvement of the tactual sense in the ascending 
 series of animal forms proceeds pari passu, with improving 
 intelligence; and Mr. Spencer has assumed, accordingly, that 
 intelligence is developed by improved tactual organs. Now, 
 there is much better reason for affirming that improved intel- 
 ligence causes improved organs ; for it is obvious, from con- 
 siderations already presented, that external conditions are not 
 causes at all, but, at best, only conditions ; and still less could 
 they become the cause of a result qualitatively diverse ; while 
 intelligence, as we are conscious, is gifted with the power of 
 causation. But in truth neither is the cause of the other; 
 though superior intelligence is the condition of improved co- 
 ordinate faculties in the organism which is its instrument. 
 The whole catalogue of needs and accompanying instruments 
 for their gratification belongs to this category ; as well as the 
 parallel phenomena of mind and brain, from which Dr. Carpen- 
 ter has illogically generalized his strange doctrine of " uncon- 
 scious cerebration," while others have been led to conceive of 
 thought as a " secretion of the brain." 
 
 The assignment of an uncertified antecedent for cause is but 
 one degree worse than the assignment of an inadequate cause. 
 As no stream can flow higher than its source, so no cause can 
 produce an effect greater than itself. This recognized necessi- 
 ty of things is disregarded in that phase of the derivative the- 
 ory which contemplates organic traits ^augmented by inherit- 
 
256 LAWS AND FORCES. 
 
 ance. Inheritance transmits what it receives no more. If, in 
 the course of generations, a character become more and more 
 developed, we discover the action of a constant force loading 
 more and more into the vehicle of inheritance. 
 
 We must now endeavor to approach more closely to the real 
 objective ground of phenomena. We have assumed that an 
 external world is a reality. We all know that its phenomena 
 have been investigated by Science until the chain of causation 
 has been traced back to portions of matter which elude obser- 
 vation ; and, by a leap, she has concluded that divisibility ex- 
 tends to those inconceivably smaller portions called molecules 
 and atoms. These supposed atoms are, then, the ultimate real- 
 ities of science ; and all other forms and conditions of material 
 substance result from their mutual interactions. The interac- 
 tions of atoms and their resulting aggregates are admitted to 
 be the effects of causes. The universal and individual reason 
 would rebel against the converse hypothesis. Now, those causes 
 lying out upon the utmost verge of intellectual exploration 
 have been designated forces. Their modes of activity are their 
 " laws," and produce, severally, those correlate orders of phe- 
 nomenal sequence called the " laws " of phenomena. Now, 
 force, it must be perceived, is the name of an entity unknown 
 to science. It is another symbolical term employed for con- 
 venience, the symbolism of which, as in other cases, long usage 
 is liable to disguise. We are absolutely certain, nevertheless, 
 that the cause called force is a reality. 
 
 Where, now, does this reality reside ? I do not inquire where 
 it acts, but where, in reference to matter, is its own subjective 
 essence ? Here opinion bifurcates. A few maintain that mat- 
 ter itself is the subjective ground of force, while others believe 
 that force is external to matter. Suppose we assume matter 
 itself to be the author of energy. The supposition involves the 
 absurdity of confounding subject and object. Moreover, as 
 matter must be either -intelligent or unintelligent, we may sup- 
 
RELATION OF FORCE TO MATTER. 257 
 
 pose, at first, that it is unintelligent. If unintelligent, then the 
 interaction of dead atoms gives rise to a universe of phenome- 
 na among which are life, volition, and thought. I am willing 
 to consider as final the admissions of Tyndall and Dubois-Rey- 
 mond on this point, both of whom explicitly assert the impos- 
 sibility of eliciting intellectual fire from the collision of dead 
 atoms. (') If the force -atom is not unintelligent, it is intelli- 
 gent, and we have a universe with an infinitude of atomic in- 
 telligences, acting, nevertheless, in infinite and eternal harmony 
 among themselves ; or else the universe as a whole is one in- 
 telligence, and objectivity in respect to it is totally annihilated. 
 Every thing which is, is not a manifestation of the Supreme, 
 but a part of it. Of these two alternatives, the first is a more 
 startling hypothesis than that of the living monads of Leibnitz ; 
 since these were not the seat of ultimate cause, but subsisted 
 under it. It may be pronounced infinitely improbable, and dis- 
 missed from consideration. The second alternative, which iden- 
 tifies nature with one supreme intelligence, is pantheism, the 
 credibility of which I have no space, at present, to discuss, be- 
 yond the suggestion already laid down.( 2 ) 
 
 The other supposition which may be made in reference to 
 the ultimate seat of energy views it as external to matter 
 that is, an entity of which matter is neither a part nor the 
 whole. This entity may be considered as intelligent or unin- 
 telligent. If unintelligent, we have no cause for life, volition, 
 and intelligence more promising than when we sought it from 
 unintelligent atoms. If we suppose the ultimate ground of 
 force to be intelligent, we have an adequate explanation of vi- 
 
 (') Tyndall, "Belfast Address," pp. 68, 87; Dubois - Reymond, "Ueber 
 die Grenzen des Naturerkennens," pp. 20, 29. 
 
 ( 3 ) Helmholtz considers matter resting and inactive in itself, but yet, in 
 some strange way, as animated with varying forces. The definition im- 
 plies that the ultimate cause that is, the cause of the atomic forces with 
 which matter is endowed is something external to matter. 
 
258 INTELLIGENT PRIMORDIAL FORCE. 
 
 tal and mental phenomena in the world, and an immediate and 
 all-sufficient explanation of the rational method which knits 
 creation into a web of relationships. 
 
 This conception of supreme, intelligent power, enthroned at 
 the fountain head of phenomena, and displaying its activity in 
 force acting upon atoms and aggregates of matter, does not 
 differ, so far as this qualification goes, from the conceptions set 
 forth by Spencer. Huxley, Tyndall, and Dubois-Reymond. Or- 
 ganization, like crystallization, flows from an impulse imparted 
 to material atoms. 
 
 Now, let us look at the significance of this position. The 
 whole range of molecular activities proceeds from the exertion 
 of intelligent activity from without. That is, wherever and 
 whenever those activities exist, there such energy is exerted. 
 If molecular attraction and repulsion, which number organi- 
 zation among their results, are but force exerted from with- 
 out by supreme intelligent cause, then such cause has been act- 
 ive, not alone at the beginning of existence, but through the 
 whole history of molecular activities since the world began ; 
 and continues to act in the myriad phenomena of daily obser- 
 vation. The only alternative to this sweeping conclusion is that 
 which contemplates supreme cause as exerting only an initial 
 energy, the currents of which sweep through infinite years and 
 infinite existence. This would imply that the molecular forces 
 of the present are either exerted by dead matter, or are not 
 original, but simply transmitted, forces. The first supposition 
 is contrary to the premise. The second is the view commonly 
 entertained ; and it resolves the universe into a dead mechan- 
 ism. There are grave difficulties which oppose it. First, the 
 molecular activities of to-day are universally believed to be 
 identical in nature with those which have always been manifest 
 in matter, and hence, if the first motions were imparted by in- 
 telligent being, all are. Secondly, we have no knowledge or 
 room to conjecture that molecular force has undergone any 
 
DETHRONED DIVINITY ENTHRONED. 259 
 
 change since the morning of material existence. Thirdly, it is 
 out of harmony with the facts of the moral consciousness to 
 posit supreme causation at a point so remote from the present. 
 Fourthly, the molecular forces are .probably one : this is the 
 demand of philosophy and the foreshadowed verdict of science. 
 The atoms also, by the general admission of physicists, are of 
 one kind. Now, it is unreasonable to affirm that one identical,, 
 unintelligent, involuntary force or impulse, acting upon one un- 
 intelligent, involuntary set of atoms, can give rise to the varied 
 classes of material phenomena. It seems to me a far more ra- 
 tional resort to abandon the hypothesis of blind impulse run- 
 ning on in pursuance of an initial energy, and recognize, as Sir 
 William Thompson has himself suggested, the immediate pres- 
 ence of first cause in all the passing activities of the material 
 world. 
 
 This, of course, is a restoration of the very power which, 
 according to Tyndall, antiquity invoked science to overthrow. 
 But science herself has brought us to a situation which sug- 
 gests and commends this alternative. It does not follow, how- 
 ever, that the universe must be again subjected to the domin- 
 ion of capricious will. It is demonstrable that the universe is 
 not so ruled ; and, in view of the conclusion reached, it appears 
 that supreme spontaneity wills to act according to fixed meth- 
 ods. It is surely as easy to refer the regularity of phenomena 
 to discerning mind as to blind mechanism. 
 
 It is a common phraseology of science to speak of heat, 
 light, and other forms of energy as " modes of motion." This 
 form of expression is inexact, and opens the way to logical sub- 
 reptions and other fallacious procedures. A mode of motion 
 is some kind of motion, and, as such, implies a thing moved 
 and a mover. The thing moved is an atom or molecule ; the 
 mover is the real energy to which thought is habitually directed 
 when we speak of molecular force. Motion, instead of being 
 an ultimate physical cause, is merely an effect. Now, it is true 
 
260 INTELLIGENCE THE GROUND OF FORCE. 
 
 that the real cause may produce does produce, various modes 
 of motion, one of which may be styled heat ; another, light ; 
 and so on ; and these motions, in accordance with the law of 
 " continuity of motion," or." persistence of force," may be prop- 
 agated indefinitely along the lines which characterize respect- 
 ively the several species of energy so named. Used in this 
 sense, however, heat and light are no longer energies ; and ex- 
 act science should desist from discoursing about them as such. 
 
 Now, it seems to me that, by a defensible process of reason- 
 ing, the conclusion has been reached that the ultimate ground 
 of physical force is voluntary intelligence. This ground may 
 be reached from another datum. The only mode of causation 
 of which we have any knowledge is that of which we are con- 
 scious the exercise of free-will suggested by motive, prompt- 
 ed by desire, and directed by intelligence. By a compulsion of 
 the reason, we feel ourselves under the necessity, when thinking 
 of cause, to think of it as we know it. This mandate of the 
 universal reason possesses the same authority as any other ; and, 
 if we recognize at all the validity of our necessary intuitions, 
 or the authority of the common consent of humanity, we are 
 bound to recognize the truth of this indication of the nature 
 of causation. 
 
 Again, it is a datum of the universal consciousness that re- 
 lations of order, fitness, adaptation, utility, imply intelligence. 
 Now, the universe abounds in relations which, within the 
 sphere of human affairs, would be pronounced such relations ; 
 and hence, by a necessary law of reason, we affirm that the 
 cause of the universe is intelligent ; and this attribute, by the 
 necessary law of substance, we posit in real being.( ] ) 
 
 (*) It may be observed that Kant's opinion of the insufficiency of the 
 cosmological and teleological arguments for the existence of God is deter- 
 mined by his neglect of the " law of substance," or the ontological intui- 
 tion which carries the reason across the chasm which separates the world 
 of phenomena from the realm of real being. 
 
DIFFERENT SPECIES OF FORCE. 261 
 
 If, then, a voluntary intelligence is the ultimate ground of 
 all causation, and this intelligence chooses to act according to 
 methods so uniform that, as in the movements of a piece of 
 mechanism, sequences can be predicated on given relations of 
 things, it only remains to make two further important points. 
 The first is, that we discern more than a single mode of activ- 
 ity ; in other words, the forces of nature are not all mutually 
 convertible. Some of the molecular forces seem to be so. 
 Heat may perhaps be transformed into electricity ; electricity 
 into heat, and so on. And yet even among these we note a 
 want of similarity. Magnetism and electricity are polar forces ; 
 but it is not probable that heat, light, and affinity are such. 
 Though light and heat are both molecular vibrations, and hence 
 congeneric, they can hardly be regarded as conspecific, equiva- 
 lent, and intertransmutable, since they are vibrations of differ- 
 ent intensities. Electricity, magnetism, chemical and cohesive 
 attractions, though sustaining undoubted correlations with heat 
 and light, are not known to be vibrations or modes of motion ; 
 and it seems like a stretch of evidence to pronounce them con- 
 specific with phenomena which are such. Repulsion, more- 
 over, is a molecular force looming distinctly above the horizon 
 of discovery ; and there are indications that its intensity is in- 
 versely as the fifth power of the distance, while chemical affin- 
 ity varies inversely as the cube of the distance. Gravity is a 
 force varying inversely as the square of the distance ; and it is, 
 moreover, a force which has never, to our knowledge, resulted 
 from the transformation of any other force ; nor does it sustain 
 quantitative or any other correlations with any other force 
 seeming to be entirely unique, and the most mysterious of the 
 catalogue of forces. Here, then, in the field of inorganic nat- 
 ure, we find forces producing three classes of phenomena 
 attractions, repulsions, and vibrations. Of the attractions, cer- 
 tain ones affect aggregates, and others atoms and molecules ; 
 the former are again differentiated into non-polar (gravitation) 
 
262 PHYSICAL AND VITAL FORCES. 
 
 and polar (magnetism and electricity), while the latter embrace 
 cohesion and affinity. The vibrations, moreover, are different 
 intensities, as before stated. We have, therefore, three dif- 
 ferent genera of inorganic force, and at least five species. (') 
 Within a few years we confidently expected to find their re- 
 spective lines of sequence converging at the farther limit of 
 the phenomenal world; but here we are at that limit, and we 
 find five separate threads of causation emerging from the realm 
 beyond that boundary. 
 
 In addition to this, we have the phenomena of life, back 
 of which we discern a force which, so far as we know, is not a 
 transformation of any other form of force. True it is, that 
 the vehicle, and instrument, and sensible expression of life is a 
 material organism, whose building up is chiefly the work of 
 molecular forces. True it is, that the mode of expression and 
 manifestation of life is and must be co-ordinated to this sole 
 and material medium of expression. But that which we call 
 life plays the part of a force which conditions the activity of 
 the molecular forces ; has never been produced by the transmu- 
 tation of any of them ; can not be approached by any of the 
 methods of physics, nor brought, like a physical force, within 
 the grasp of numerical formulation. 
 
 The other point to be noted is, that the supreme, intelligent 
 Spontaneity, as we are thus led by science and reason to think 
 it, is revealed to us in our own mental constitution, whose laws 
 
 f Non-polar (inverse square) . . Gravitation. 
 
 ( Aggregates. < . In magne ts Magnetism. 
 
 (i ) Attractions I j In electrics Electricity. 
 
 between j Atoms and j Atoms, and like molecules Cohesion. 
 
 I Molecules, j Unlike molecules (inverse cube) . . .Affinity. 
 
 Repulsions (inverse fifth power). Repulsion. 
 
 ( Low intensity Heat. 
 
 Vlbratl nSOf I High intensity Light. 
 
 Mechanical force and motion, so far as I can see, are always effects of 
 one or more of the above forms of force, or of animal volition, or of vital 
 force. 
 
ELEMENTS OF CAUSAL CONCEPT. 263 
 
 afford us the only attainable ground of certainty ; whose dele- 
 gated spontaneity is a picture of the absolute Will ; whose in- 
 telligence takes hold on the thoughts expressed in the cosmos, 
 and finds them comprehensible, admirable, and satisfying ; and 
 whose conscience, while it finds among men the fitting theatre 
 for its activities, discovers, in the supreme entity which we have 
 disclosed, the sufficient ground for its authority and basis for 
 its hopes. 
 
 Let me now attempt, in a concise manner, by way of reca- 
 pitulation, to draw out in historical order the steps and circum- 
 stances in the genesis and constitution of our notion of causa- 
 tion in the existing universe. 
 
 1. I dismiss the consideration of all secondary causation. 
 The phrase is a misnomer. There is no real cause which can 
 be disclosed as an effect ; first cause is only cause. That must 
 be an intelligent spontaneity, and must act without intermedia- 
 tion or " instrumental causation." 
 
 2. The notion of causation implies correlative subjectivity 
 and objectivity a thing acting and a thing acted upon a 
 causative spontaneity and a possibility of its action otherwise 
 than in and upon itself. In all causation, except a primordial 
 creative act, objectivity is a reality in primordial creation it is 
 a potentiality. This dual necessity of subjective agent and ob- 
 jective possibility of effect implies, in every case of actual caus- 
 ative effort, a differentiation of active and passive existence; 
 and hence renders irrational the theory of " monism " and its 
 corollary " pantheism " under all its aspects. 
 
 3. The subject must be self-conscious conscious of its own 
 existence and power of determination. This necessity is the 
 ground of " personality ;" and it implies that the subject is a 
 " free agent." 
 
 4. The subject must form a concept of an effect a thing not 
 yet existing, or an event not yet enacted. 
 
 5. The subject must be conscious of the relation between effect 
 
 12 
 
264 ELEMENTS OF CAUSAL CONCEPT. 
 
 and cause the intuition of causality must arise in the con- 
 sciousness. This intuition certainly embraces the notion of ef- 
 ficiency and adequacy ; and, in all cases of intermediate cau- 
 sation, it implies, also, that the effect must be congeneric with 
 its cause. In intermediate causation we have merely a given 
 energy transmitted no new energy put forth. This must re- 
 tain through an indefinite series of terms the same quality and 
 quantity as belonged to the initial and only logically causative 
 act. Original causation, on the contrary, is not bound by any 
 qualitative relation between cause and effect though, in the 
 finite sphere, subject to other conditions which may variously 
 restrict the field of effects. 
 
 6. The subject must be conscious of motive prompting to 
 produce the effect conceived. There must always be a reason why 
 an intelligence acts one way rather than another. This neces- 
 sary " reason why " is often styled the " final cause." 
 
 7. The subject may cognize a contingency existing that is, 
 a fact constant or varying which sustains some established rela- 
 tion to the effect contemplated. Such fact, if it exist, becomes 
 a "condition" or "conditioning cause." 
 
 8. The subject must become conscious of the influence of the 
 contingency (if it exist) upon the conscious motive adding to 
 or taking from it. 
 
 9. The subject must next be conscious of a desire to produce 
 the effect conceived. This desire would be modified in a manner 
 co-ordinated with the contingently modified motive. 
 
 10. The subject must next be conscious of a formed in- 
 tention to produce the effect. " Intentionality," whose genesis 
 arises at this point, incloses all the mental acts which precede 
 self -consciousness, intuition of causal relation, motivity, percep- 
 tion of conditionality (if existing), and desire (conditionally 
 modified). 
 
 11. The subject must finally will the effect modified by the 
 contingent fact, if it exist. 
 
FINITE CAUSATION. 265 
 
 This is the whole process of original causation as represent- 
 ed in individual consciousness, which, unless the harmonies of 
 the universe be fatally misleading, is the finite reflection of the 
 method of infinite causation. 
 
 In the case, however, of finite causality, as in the human 
 will, every effect external to the mind itself must be reached 
 through instrumentalities. In most cases, the final determina- 
 tion does not reach immediately the external result toward 
 which volition is ultimately directed. It reaches, nevertheless, 
 another result which, however it may escape observation, is the 
 effect which figures in the foregoing account. This effect is a 
 muscular movement adapted to serve as the first term in the 
 series of intermediate causes. After this, the whole history of 
 causal efficiency, as above laid down, must necessarily be repeat- 
 ed for each separate term in the series of intermediate causes. 
 In the mean time, complications arise. The instruments em- 
 ployed become effective on condition that the forces of nature 
 prove regularly operative ; and thus supreme causation may be 
 summoned to conspire with human volition in the accomplish- 
 ment of the most trivial result. 
 
X. 
 
 IS GOD COGNIZABLE BY REASON ?(') 
 
 " Knowledge, accordingly, is characterized by faith ; and faith, by a kind 
 of divine, mutual, and reciprocal correspondence, becomes characterized by 
 knowledge." CLEMENS ALEX., Stromata, book ii., chap. iv. 
 
 " THE existence of God," writes one of the most original of 
 the scholastic fathers, who is said to have rescued Aristotle 
 from atheism and secured him for orthodoxy, "can be known 
 by natural reason, as is said in the first of Romans ; and this 
 and other truths of the same kind are not properly so much 
 articles of faith as preambles to these articles, our faith pre- 
 supposing natural knowledge, as grace presupposes nature."( 2 ) 
 This thought is the theme of the volume before us. 
 
 We have here a contribution to religious philosophy which 
 is an honor to American letters. The treatment is worthy of 
 the theme, and the theme is worthy of philosophy. It is an 
 essay at the old problem so profoundly pondered by Socrates 
 and Plato, Anselm and Leibnitz, Descartes and Newton, Bar- 
 row and Butler the attempt to construct a formal proof of an 
 affirmation which rises spontaneously in the human soul, and 
 around which cluster the profoundest emotions and the high- 
 est hopes of humanity. 
 
 The lapse of twenty-five centuries has not diminished the in- 
 terest of the human mind in the legitimate grounds of its irre- 
 
 ( J ) "Christianity and Greek Philosophy; or, the Relations between 
 Spontaneous and Reflective Thought in Greece and the Positive Teaching 
 of Christ and his Apostles." By B. F. Cocker, D.D., Professor of Moral 
 and Mental Philosophy in the University of Michigan. New York, 1870. 
 
 ( a ) Aquinas, "Suinma Theologize," art. Hi., Quaest. 2. 
 
IRREVERENCE OF MODERN THOUGHT. 267 
 
 sistible theistic faith. The keenness of the search has indeed 
 been sharpened. Every new unfolding of truth in the realm 
 of science or the empyrean of speculation is promptly ques- 
 tioned as to the testimony which it has to render respecting 
 the supreme ground of all truth. Modern thought holds no 
 system too sacred for its scrutiny. Decayed timbers must be 
 hewed out ; and, if the fabric fall in the excision, the remorse- 
 less axe must do its work. 
 
 It is a questioning, relentless, irreverent spirit. It strikes many 
 a blow heedlessly, recklessly, malignantly. Commissioned to 
 cut out the effete and the false, its appetite seems whetted for 
 mere destruction. Christianity appears before its bar to show 
 cause why it should not be expunged as a superstition; and 
 even the ancient religion of humanity is challenged again and 
 again to uncover its granite foundations, and demonstrate its 
 right to stand. 
 
 It is not an age in which Christian believers can rest secure- 
 ly upon their traditions. If Christian faith survives, it will not 
 be through the grace of its enemies, but the vigor of its de- 
 fenders. In the midst of the conflict, it does not need even 
 the weapon of an enemy to inflict a wound. Christian believ- 
 ers must arm themselves with the alertness and learning of 
 their times ; and it must ever be remembered that the antique 
 armor which once served for adequate defense is not a muni- 
 ment against the implements of modern warfare. No, the in- 
 tellectual activity of the age must pervade the ranks of Chris- 
 tianity. The Christian system, being grounded in reason, rests 
 securely beneath the a3gis of reason. Its field is as wide as the 
 realm of reason. All philosophy and all science are its legal 
 inheritance. 
 
 Christianity must recognize its alliance with all truth. It is 
 not, indeed, peculiarly a system of philosophy, but it is a fun- 
 damental tone to which all science and philosophy must be at- 
 tuned ; not because Christianity is our faith, but because under- 
 
268 METHOD OF CHRISTIAN DEFENSE. 
 
 neath Christianity lie the eternal foundations on which reposes 
 all that is true ; and any system resting on other foundation 
 floats in air. Because Christianity is co-ordinated with all real 
 truth, it is concerned in every discovery of truth, and stands 
 foremost in welcoming and assimilating results, and stimulating 
 original thought. For the same reason, the teacher or defend- 
 er of Christianity must place himself in relations with the 
 whole field of thought before he can discern the system in its 
 symmetry, or know what is alien to it, and what is its own. 
 The defense of Christianity, in our times, is a conflict located 
 upon the field reached in the march of modern thought. 
 Thunders, ex cathedra, are no longer heard in the camp of the 
 enemy. They are like the sounding of gongs over the heads 
 of the sappers attacking the deep foundations of the fortress, 
 or the scolding of cowards frightened to the covert of their 
 caves. Go out, strike the Philistines at Gath, and the God of 
 David will strengthen your arm. 
 
 The work of Dr. Cocker is, in effect, a brave defense of the 
 fundamental truths of Christianity. It is a grammar of relig- 
 ious thought, illustrated by citations from Grecian thinkers. 
 It is an attempt to introduce to personal consciousness the ax- 
 ioms of religious philosophy, and familiarize it with their char- 
 acteristics and implications. But the method is not alone ab- 
 stract. The necessary laws and tendencies of human thought 
 are illustrated by the history of Greek philosophy; and the 
 necessary relation of all correct thinking to a correct conception 
 of the Christian system is also exemplified in the gradual prepa- 
 ration of the philosophic mind of Greece for the reception of 
 ideas peculiarly Christian. 
 
 The work consists essentially of three parts: 1. The funda- 
 mental ideas of religious philosophy. 2. Illustration of these in 
 the results of Grecian speculation. 3. Christian revelation a 
 final disclosure divinely correlated to the religious instincts of 
 man and the previous education of the race. Such, at least, if 
 
PHYSICAL INFLUENCES ON MIND. 269 
 
 not the strict arrangement of the work, is a classification of its 
 ideas, of which we now proceed to give a condensed statement. 
 
 In the preliminary chapter, the author passes in review the 
 city and the men of Athens, and the physical features of the 
 Grecian peninsula in general. In commenting upon the con- 
 nection between national character and physical surroundings, 
 he takes occasion to remark that the latter are merely modify- 
 ing forces ; while human spontaneity reason and will in con- 
 nection with a superintending Providence, are the fundamental 
 forces which give direction to national development. Human 
 will impresses even the face of nature ;(') and, although great 
 men are generally mere mouth-pieces of their generation, they 
 seem sometimes appointed by Divine Providence to antagonize 
 the spirit of their age, and achieve moral revolutions. Still, 
 physical surroundings impart individuality to national charac- 
 ter; and this is well exemplified in the Hellenic traits. The 
 central position of Greece in the civilized world led to a com- 
 mercial development, and this was favored by a maritime cli- 
 mate. The configuration of the surface and the shore-line con- 
 tributed to individuality; its scenery impressed the aesthetic 
 character. The Athenians were ardent, vivacious, and of inde- 
 pendent spirit. Their intellect tended to observation and 
 thought, and their language was adapted to be the vehicle of 
 the highest philosophy, and the medium of the loftiest civiliza- 
 tion attainable without Christianity. 
 
 Before proceeding to discuss the religion of the Athenians, 
 our author furnishes a condensed and masterly exhibit of the 
 philosophy of religion in general. Defining religion as " a form 
 of thought, feeling, and action which has the Divine for its ob- 
 
 (') On the " Power of Mind over Nature," see Cocker, in Methodist Quar- 
 terly Review, January and April, 1870; and Marsh, "Man and Nature;" 
 and, on human will as an original spontaneous cause, see "Whedon on 
 the Will," p. 42, and elsewhere ; also Cocker, in Methodist Quarterly fie- 
 view, October, 1864. 
 
270 COMTE, HEGEL, JAG OBI. 
 
 ject, basis, and end," and enunciating the fact of history and 
 ethnology that " religious ideas and sentiments have prevailed 
 among all nations," he runs his scalpel through the joints of 
 the various theories of religious phenomena which do not recog- 
 nize their germs in the constitution of the human mind. This 
 chapter, by itself, is a neat, clean-cut monograph, and might 
 well be made a tract for more general reading. The Comtean 
 theory, that religious phenomena have arisen from the fear of 
 unseen powers, falls with the overthrow of Comte's theory of 
 the " law of the three states " in human development the the- 
 ological, the metaphysical, and the positive.^) The Hegelian 
 theory, that religion is a part of an evolution of the Absolute, 
 attaining its fullest self -consciousness in philosophy, next re- 
 ceives an exposition (if exposition be possible) and an expos- 
 ure^) for propositions which categorically contradict the ax- 
 ioms of reason ( 3 ) admit only of exposure, and not of refuta- 
 tion. The theory of Jacobi and Schleiermacher, that religion 
 has its foundation in feeling, is indefensible, since feeling can 
 not be the source of ideas ; and, farther, any cognition of Deity 
 alleged as correlated to the feeling of the Divine must be log- 
 ically preceded by ideas of reason.^) The theory of Cousin, 
 
 (*) P. 57-65. See, also, a sharp criticism of this fundamental position 
 in Huxley's "Lay Sermons, Addresses, and Reviews," p. 156-164; and 
 for a consummate dissection of the " Philosophic Positive," see Martineau's 
 "Essays," vol. i., p. 1-62. 
 
 ( 2 ) P. 65-69. 
 
 ( 3 ) Like this: "Being and nothing are identical." The fundamental 
 principle of Hegelianism is the paradox that " contraries are identical." 
 But, since the time of Aristotle, the " law of non-contradiction " has been 
 accepted by all logicians as a fundamental law of thought. 
 
 ( 4 ) P. 70-77. Is not this criticism based on a misconception of the 
 sense in which Jacobi employs the term " feeling ?" All mental states 
 may be regarded as " feeling." Brown uses " feeling " for consciousness 
 ("Philosophy of the Human Mind," xi.). All cognition involves a kind 
 of intellectual feeling the subjective factor of consciousness. J. S. Mill 
 
COUSIN, COCKER. 271 
 
 that religion has its outbirth in the spontaneous apperceptions of 
 the reason, is stated and substantiated as a rational account of 
 the genesis of the idea of God, but found defective as a philos- 
 ophy of the phenomena of religion (p. 78-86). Finally, the 
 theory that religious phenomena had their origin in external 
 revelation, is shown to be unsatisfactory, ( x ) because, 1. It is 
 improbable that truths so important should have been intrust- 
 ed to tradition alone ; 2. The theory does not account for the 
 universality of religious beliefs and practices ; 3. Verbal reve- 
 lation could convey no ideas to a being destitute of antecedent 
 notions of divine things (p. 86-95). 
 
 As the result of this survey, our author concludes with the 
 following proposition : " The universal phenomenon of religion 
 has originated in the a priori apperceptions of reason, and the 
 natural, instinctive feelings of the heart, which, from age to 
 age, have been vitalized, unfolded, and perfected by supernatu- 
 ral communications and testamentary revelations (p. 97). It 
 thus contains an element of KEASON, an element of FEELING, 
 and an element of REVELATION. 
 
 The way is now opened for a statement of the higher char- 
 acteristics of the religion of the Athenians. Numerous evi- 
 dences, presented to the eyes of St. Paul as he entered their 
 city, convinced him that they were " every way more than or- 
 
 uses the term in this sense, " Every thing is a feeling of which the mind 
 is conscious " (" System of Logic," American edit., p. 34). The sensus mi- 
 minis evidently is not supposed to be a distinct definable cognition, but 
 only the analogue of the sensus vagus, or vital sense, in the field of sensa- 
 tions. Jacobi calls it " Glaube" and compares it with our " faith " in the 
 intuitions of sense ; and, finally, in a later work (" Ueber das Unterneh- 
 men des Kriticismus, die Vernunft zu Verstande zu bringen," 1802), the 
 faculty which he had before called "Faith" he now names "Reason" 
 Vernunft. This would make the corresponding "feeling" something more 
 specific than the sensus vagus a real intuition of God. 
 
 O On this, see Cocker, in Mellwdist Quarterly Review, April, 1862. 
 
272 ATHENIAN RELIGION. 
 
 dinarily religious.'^ 1 ) This character the apostle had reason to 
 ascribe to them in a sense entirely strict and legitimate. Re- 
 ligion, in its essential character, being something more than a 
 system of dogmatic teaching, and consisting in "a mode of 
 thought, feeling, and action determined by our consciousness of 
 dependence on a Supreme Being" (p. 107), the numberless tem- 
 ples and shrines of Athens testified to their excessive " careful- 
 ness about religion." Leaving their idolatries and superstitions 
 for the moment in the background, certain noble and normal 
 outcrops of the religious nature were clearly discernible in the 
 religious philosophy of the Athenians. They had some faith 
 in the being and providence of God (p. 107-109). They felt 
 a consciousness of dependence upon God (p. 110-117). One 
 of their own poets (Aratus) had said : 
 
 " Jove's presence fills all space, upholds this ball ; 
 All need his aid ; his power sustains us all, 
 For we his offspring are."( 2 ) 
 
 The same sentiment had been hymned in the same city by 
 Cleanthes. This feeling of dependence and sense of obligation 
 lie at the foundation of all religion. The Athenians also pos- 
 sessed the religious emotions flowing from the feeling of depend- 
 ence fear of offending the divinity which they felt over them, 
 and an instinctive yearning after the Invisible. Finally, they 
 felt a consciousness of sin, and made piacular sacrifices. 
 
 But, turning to contemplate the dark side of the Athenian 
 religion, we are confronted by the shocking realities of poly- 
 theism and idolatry. Modern inquiry, however, in penetrating 
 beneath the exterior of these religious monstrosities, finds them 
 
 (') This is Cudworth's rendering of Kara iravra UQ Sei(ri3aifiovtospovg 
 (Acts xvii., 22), and with this exegetical writers substantially agree. The 
 first chapter on the religion of the Athenians appeared in the Methodist 
 Quarterly Review for April, 1869. 
 
 ( 2 ) Aratus, " The Phenomena," book v., 5. 
 
GREEK POLYTHEISM. 2*73 
 
 to be mere excrescences upon a purer and simpler faith a de- 
 generacy from a state of primitive monotheism which seems to 
 underlie the religion of humanity.^) And even during the 
 reign of these abominations, the elite in the realm of thought 
 looked upon them with horror, and denounced them with a 
 boldness tempered only by an instinctive respect for popular 
 opinions. The genesis and significance of the Greek mythology 
 are discussed in this connection in words which ought to be 
 made the preamble to every Christian text-book of the classical 
 authors (p. 128-160). We commend the discussion earnestly 
 to the attention of those bees in the world of thought who love 
 to extract the honey even of poisonous flowers. Our author 
 regards the Grecian mythology as a grand symbolic represen- 
 tation of the Divine as manifested in nature and Providence 
 
 We reach here the heart of the discussion : Is God cogniza- 
 ble by Reason ? If a religious nature and destination appertain 
 to man ; if certain fundamental principles are found underlying 
 the Grecian and all other religions ; if it be a clear presump- 
 tion that the reason of man is furnished with necessary ideas 
 or laws of thought correlated to the instinct and emotion of 
 worship, let us see whether it be possible to give these ideas an 
 articulate expression, and reproduce the spontaneous and in- 
 stantaneous deduction by which reason bridges the gulf which 
 
 (') This position is earnestly controverted by certain writers, who hold 
 that mankind has undergone a continuous and uniform development, re- 
 ligiously, from a state of fetichism, and that fetichism is incompatible with 
 a sense of theistic unity. Having given this subject, however, an inde- 
 pendent study, we have been surprised at the copiousness of the proof that 
 Dr. Cocker's position is a valid one. 
 
 ( 2 ) He draws largely from the learned dissertation on this subject by 
 Cudworth, " Intellectual System of the Universe," especially chap. iv. The 
 reader will fall upon a coincident line of thought in Miiller, " Chips from 
 a German Workshop," vol. ii.,p. 142-169. 
 
274 SPONTANEOUS COGNITION OF DEITY. 
 
 separate the changeful and finite from the permanent, infinite, 
 and eternal. 
 
 I. The idea of God is a common phenomenon of the uni- 
 versal intelligence. The proofs of this (pp. 89, 90) are found 
 in common observation, in the voice of history, and in the con- 
 current testimony of travelers among savage tribes. 
 
 II. The idea of God, in its completeness, is not held to be a 
 simple, direct, and immediate intuition of the reason alone, in- 
 dependently of all experience and all knowledge of the exter- 
 nal world. It is a complex idea a logical deduction from self- 
 evident truths given in sense, conscience, and reason. The log- 
 ical evolution of the theistic concept begins with the disengage- 
 ment of certain ideas formulating themselves in primitive judg- 
 ments which the mind intuitively perceives to be true necessa- 
 rily and universally. Such are " Every event implies a cause ;" 
 " Every attribute implies a substance." These a priori judg- 
 ments constitute the major premise of the theistic syllogism. 
 The minor premise is furnished by the facts of experience and 
 observation. From these facts, the a priori laws of reason ne- 
 cessitate, as a conclusion, the affirmation of a God as the only 
 valid explanation of the phenomena. Historically, or actually, 
 the process is reversed. The phenomena of experience first 
 come before the mind, and, in their presence, the latent laws of 
 thought or primitive ideas of the reason are roused into effi- 
 ciency, and the judgment, by a natural and spontaneous logic, 
 free from all reflection, and, consequently, from all possibility 
 of error, affirms a necessary relation between the facts of expe- 
 rience and the a priori ideas of the reason.^) The demonstra- 
 tion consists necessarily of a priori as well as a posteriori ele- 
 ments. It is of no use to point to the events and changes of 
 the material universe as proof of the existence of a First Cause, 
 
 (') For a lucid treatment of this subject, see Cocker, Methodist Quarter- 
 ly fieview, April, 1862. 
 
POSITIVISM INVOLVES TRANSCENDENTALISM. 275 
 
 unless we take account of the universal and necessary truth 
 that " every change refers itself to an adequate cause." There 
 is no logical conclusiveness in the assertion of Paley, that " ex- 
 perience teaches us that a designer must be a person," because, 
 as Hume justly remarks, our " experience " is narrowed down to 
 a mere point, and " can not be a rule for a universe ; but there 
 is an infinitude of force in that dictum of reason that " intelli- 
 gence, self-consciousness, and self-determination necessarily con- 
 stitute personality." 
 
 III. The universe demands a God as its adequate expla- 
 nation. The attempts of Positivism are futile and absurd. 
 Mankind can not be prevented from striving to pass beyond 
 phenomena. Positivism is possible only through transcend- 
 ental ideas. We can not even have a cognition of phenomena 
 without the play of the regulative ideas of the reason. No 
 notion of realities underlying phenomena can be given by the 
 phenomena themselves. It is given by reason in the presence 
 of phenomena. These a posteriori and a priori data mutually 
 condition each other. The relation between them is a law of 
 thought and a law of things. It is a universal and necessary 
 correlation which impels us to affirm that a living power is the 
 correlative of the changing phases of the sensible world ; and 
 intelligence the correlative of the order which we discover in 
 them. The author has given us an exhaustive table of the 
 facts of the universe, material and mental, which may be re- 
 garded as " hints and adumbration of the ultimate ground, and 
 reason, and cause of the universe" (p. 175-177). 
 
 It thus appears that the phenomena of the universe can not 
 be explained on the basis of Positivism ; and this, though we 
 admit, as Descartes, Pascal, Leibnitz, Saisset, Mahan, and others 
 have mistakenly and fatally done, that the universe is infinite. 
 Its infinity is only a mathematical infinity, which might more 
 correctly be styled indefinity. Infinity is not predicable of 
 quantity. This principle solves the problem of Kant's "Anti- 
 
276 ABSOLUTE IDEAS. 
 
 nomies," and constitutes a complete refutation of Hume on the 
 eternity of the universe. ( J ) 
 
 IV. In the field of consciousness are discovered elements 
 or principles which, in their regular and normal development, 
 transcend the limits of consciousness, and attain to a knowl- 
 edge of Absolute Being, Absolute Reason, Absolute Good that 
 is, God. The mind is in possession of universal, necessary, ab- 
 solute ideas, as the idea of space, the idea of cause. Reason, 
 distinct from sense, is the organ or faculty for the cognition of 
 these ideas. Their elimination from the mass of mixed knowl- 
 edge in the mind is a work which has engaged the attention 
 of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Cousin, and others, but it is yet in- 
 complete. Our author presents a neat, compact, and symmet- 
 rical table of the principal ideas of this class. Here, in two 
 pages, is the quintessence of the speculative thought of two 
 chiliads of years. 
 
 Our author next passes in review, through two chapters, 
 those philosophic theories which lead to the denial that God is 
 cognizable by reason. Our appropriate limits do not permit a 
 reproduction of even the gist of the discussion. J. S. Mill and 
 the Idealists, Comte and the Materialists, Hamilton and the 
 Nescientists, Watson and the Dogmatists, are taken in hand by 
 turns, and in a few incisive sentences, each of which reaches to 
 the marrow of the subject, each school is shown to be doing 
 violence to the inexorable laws of thought. Positivism infracts 
 the principle of causality in denying that we can proceed be- 
 yond a knowledge of phenomena and their laws. It dishonors 
 the principle of intention ality in affirming that we can only 
 know what is, and never why it is.( a ) 
 
 (') P. 178-184. This principle has been presented and applied with 
 masterly analysis and force by a writer in the North American Review, 
 No. CCV., art. iii., 1864. 
 
 ( a ) In this connection our author rather discredits the " nebular hypoth- 
 esis," fortifying himself with an array of authorities. It might be said, 
 
DENIAL OF DIVINE COQNOSCIBILITY. 277 
 
 The Hamiltonian philosophy of the unconditioned is shown 
 to involve a discrediting of one portion of the testimony of 
 consciousness, and thus a conflict with the fundamental princi- 
 ple of the natural-realistic school. The further examination of 
 this subject is especially able. The Dogmatic theologians are 
 shown to attack the principle of causality in affirming that 
 philosophy can only attain to the idea of an "eternal succes- 
 sion " of phenomena. They attack the principle of the uncon- 
 ditioned in denying that human reason passes spontaneously 
 from the finite to the notion of the infinite. They invalidate, 
 also, the principle of unity and the evidence of the moral in- 
 tuitions, and fail to discern the real meaning of certain passages 
 of Scripture.^) 
 
 The next six chapters are devoted to an examination of the 
 historical development of Greek philosophy. This may be re- 
 garded as another form of proof of the proposition that God 
 is cognizable by reason. An inductive generalization from the 
 facts of Greek speculation leads to the affirmation of the prop- 
 osition. More strictly speaking, however, this part of the work 
 
 however, that the first cited Sir William Herschel was the real origina- 
 tor of the hypothesis (Sir William Herschel in "Philosophical Transac- 
 tions" for 1811). If this theory is to be decided by a vote, we may cite 
 in the affirmative Arago, Dana, Dawson, Helmholz, Hunt (T. S.), Huggins, 
 Lockyer, Meunier, Mill ( J. S.), Newcomb, Nichol, Saemann, Schellen, Thom- 
 son (Sir William), Tyndall, Young, and the generality of geologists and as- 
 tronomers of the present day. Objectors and objections which date back 
 twenty-five years have lost all weight, in consequence of the new data (es- 
 pecially spectroscopic) furnished by recent science. The reader may con- 
 sult further the present writer's articles on the " Unity of the Physical 
 World," in the Metfwdist Quarterly Review for April, 1873, and Jan., 1874. 
 [It appears that the author himself (of the work under review) is inclined 
 to yield at the present time to the weight of authority in support of the 
 "nebular hypothesis." See "Theistic Conception of the World," pp. 104, 
 105, 143, etc.] 
 ( J ) For instance, Acts xvii., 27 ; Romans i., 19-21, 32. 
 
278 DIGEST OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 may be viewed as a citation of illustrations or confirmations of 
 the main thesis. 
 
 Following Zeller in the grouping of the schools of Greece, 
 we find that the Pre-Socratic were physical in the point of view 
 from which they contemplated the problems of speculative phi- 
 losophy ; the Socratic were psychological, and the Post-Socratic 
 were ethical. The first make the world the great centre of in- 
 quiry; the second, the "ideas" of things truth and being; 
 the third fall back upon the practical conduct of life as the 
 chief interest in philosophy. We can not follow the author 
 through his compact but lucid digest of the opinions of these 
 noble pioneers of thought. The six chapters form a neat and 
 concise compend of the history of Greek philosophy; not a 
 mere chronological table of facts, but a body of facts imbed- 
 ded in a matrix of thought such an exposition as discloses the 
 spinal marrow the common subjective, animating principle of 
 those three centuries qf manly mental struggle. We can only 
 make disconnected reference to some of the prominent conclu- 
 sions from this survey. 
 
 The bifurcation of speculative thought began in the Pre-So- 
 cratic age. The Ionian school, from their stand-point, tended 
 toward Sensationalism ; and the Italian, from theirs, toward 
 Idealism. The issue, theologically, was material pantheism, on 
 one hand, and ideal pantheism, on the other. These divergent 
 streams of thought had their common source in one fundament- 
 al principle or law of the human mind the intuition of unity, 
 or " the desire to comprehend all the facts of the universe in a 
 single formula, and consummate all conditional knowledge in 
 the unity of unconditioned existence." The radical error of 
 Sensationalism is the denial of the validity of the testimony of 
 consciousness in reference to suprasensuous phenomena ; while 
 the fatal fault of Idealism is a similar denial in reference to 
 sensuous phenomena. Both alike, by discrediting conscious- 
 ness in one affirmation, virtually discredit it in all, and set us 
 
SOCRATIC SCHOOL. 279 
 
 afloat in an atmosphere of phantoms. From such philosophy 
 no theistic result is possible, save universal skepticism. Ac- 
 cordingly, the Sophists signalize the completion of the first 
 cycle of philosophic thought. 
 
 It is interesting to note another evidence that, even in ab- 
 stract thinking, " there is nothing new under the sun." Hege- 
 lianism existed two thousand years before Hegel. Parmenides 
 of Elea held that all phenomenal existences are but modes of 
 the Absolute, and seems to have been the inventor of the aph- 
 orisms, "All is one, " "Thought and being are identical." We 
 might add, however, that Heraclitus had previously asserted 
 that contradictory propositions may be consistent.^) 
 
 Socrates, by the inductive use of the phenomena of con- 
 sciousness, was a patron of the inductive method a method 
 which Francis Bacon no more originated than he did the oth- 
 er laws of thought. Plato enunciated the " law of sufficient 
 reason" universally attributed to Leibnitz in these words: 
 " Whatever is generated is necessarily generated from a certain 
 atriav " ground, reason, cause " for it is wholly impossible 
 that any thing should be generated without a cause." The 
 Ontology of Plato, after having served as a starting-point for 
 other philosophers for a period of twenty centuries, remains 
 to-day nearly the most perfect system extant. The Aristote- 
 lian Organon has equally survived. the criticisms of the entire 
 course of philosophy. Aristotle proposed three forms of the- 
 istic proof: 1. The Ontological, based on our necessary idea 
 of an eternal and immutable substance. 2. The Cosmological, 
 based on our necessary idea of causality as the correlative of 
 effect, and intelligence as the correlative of harmony and con- 
 trivance.^) 3. The Moral. proof. 
 
 (!) Aristotle, "Ethic. Nic.," lib. viii., 1. 
 
 ( a ) Cosmological, as here used = JEteological, Cocker + Cosmological, 
 Cocker + Teleological, Cocker = Cosmological, Kant + Physio - Theological, 
 Kant. See sequel of this article. 
 
280 AIMS OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 
 
 Pyrrhonism marks the transition from the Socratic to the 
 Post-Socratic schools. In the latter, Epicureanism manifests a 
 decline of the spirit of ontological speculation, and Stoicism sig- 
 nalizes its almost complete supersedure by the ethical spirit. 
 
 For us, however, the most important aspects of Greek phi- 
 losophy are its theological results. These are gathered to- 
 gether in the last two chapters of the work under review. No 
 thoughtful person can glance over this summary without being 
 convinced that Greek philosophy had an important propaedeu- 
 tic office to perform for Christianity. ' The object of all philos- 
 ophy is to systematize the results of thought, and attain to a 
 basis of certainty. Its especial aim is the disclosure of the Su- 
 preme Reality which underlies the phenomenal world. The 
 correlation of the human mind to the Divine renders this a 
 hopeful effort. Again, the Author of nature is the Author of 
 revelation. The "true light which lighteth every man that 
 cometh into the world " " shone on the mind of Anaxagoras, 
 and Socrates, and Plato, as well as on the mind of Kahab, Cor- 
 nelius, and the Syrophenician woman, and in a higher form, 
 and with a clearer and richer effulgence, on the minds of Moses, 
 Isaiah, Paul, and John." No wonder, then, that in the teach- 
 ings of Socrates and Plato we find a striking harmony of senti- 
 ment, and even form of expression, with some parts of the 
 Christian revelation ; and in the speculations of Plato " catch 
 glimpses of a world of ideas not unlike that which Christianity 
 discloses, and hear words not unfamiliar to those who spake as 
 they were moved by the Holy Ghost " (p. 459). 
 
 Christianity, if its enunciations would not be nugatory, must 
 sustain some relations to human reason, and to the progressive 
 developments of human thought in the ages before Christ. 
 " Christianity did not break suddenly upon the world as a new 
 commandment, altogether unconnected with the past, and want- 
 ing in all points of sympathy and contact with the then pres- 
 ent. It proceeded along lines of thought which had been laid 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY PROPAEDEUTIC. 281 
 
 throngli ages of preparation ; it clothed itself in forms of speech 
 which had been molded by centuries of education ; and it ap- 
 propriated to itself a moral and intellectual culture which had 
 been effected by long periods of severest discipline. It was, in 
 fact, the consummation of the whole moral and religious histo- 
 ry of the world" (pp. 461, 462). Greek civilization sustained 
 direct preparatory relations to the Christian system. It was 
 the most perfect civilization which the world had yet witnessed, 
 and the highest attainable by human nature without the specif- 
 ic reinforcement of moral and religious ideas and demonstra- 
 tions which was now impending in Christianity. This civiliza- 
 tion the conquests of Alexander propagated from Antioch and 
 Alexandria. The Greek language, enriched by Plato and Aris- 
 totle, was not only the most copious and perfect of all tongues, 
 but was also the most perfectly adapted to serve as the vehicle 
 of moral and religious, and even Christian, ideas. Greek phi- 
 losophy, too, had gradually educated the human mind to the 
 contemplation of that purity, holiness, justice, and spirituality 
 which were to characterize pre-eminently the Christian teach- 
 ing. But philosophy had done its utmost, and mankind had 
 not yet attained to a full and impressive sense of the majesty 
 and holiness and presence of God. It was a moment of de- 
 spair. It was the grand climacteric in the life of humanity. 
 Paul appeared and preached Christ, and the heart of the Greek 
 bounded responsively. 
 
 Let us see a little more specifically what service Greek phi- 
 losophy rendered to Christianity. We have said it served as 
 an education of the intellect of the race, as Judaism served for 
 the discipline of the religious nature. But all logical training 
 of the intellect leads it toward the same Supreme Reality which 
 Hebrew revelation discloses directly. The growth of philoso- 
 phy is a reverent approximation toward God. Mankind, like 
 children, first accepted God with a spontaneous faith. Then, 
 like the youth, they plunged into misguided speculations, fruit- 
 
282 RELEASE FROM POLYTHEISTIC NOTIONS. 
 
 less sophisms, and distressing doubts. Lastly, like the man of 
 matured wisdom, they attained an age of reflective conscious- 
 ness, and glimpsed with clearer vision the God who had been 
 at first simply an object of blind faith. In the history of 
 Greece, the Homeric age was the national childhood ; the Pre- 
 Socratic the transitional, and the Post-Socratic the philosophic, 
 age. In these facts of intellectual and religious history we dis- 
 cern a true development and a progressive preparation. It is 
 discernible 
 
 I. In the field of theistic conceptions. In this field its tend- 
 ency was to dethrone the false gods and enthrone the true one. 
 This is seen 
 
 1. In the release of the popular mind from polytheistic no- 
 tions, and the purifying and spiritualizing of the theistic idea. 
 The idea of a Supreme Power is not the product of philoso- 
 phy. It is the immanent, spontaneous thought of humanity. 
 Without tuition, or suggestion, man sees God in the impressive 
 phenomena of nature transpiring around him. He translates 
 her mysterious manifestations in the light of the feeling of the 
 divine which bathes his soul. The sun, the mountain, and the 
 storm command his veneration as the manifestations of the felt 
 Deity. Then, in the lapse of time, he forgets their symbolical 
 character and worships them as gods, or as the dwelling-places 
 of gods. He becomes a polytheist ; and, in attempting to em- 
 body his necessarily anthropomorphic conceptions of his gods, 
 he is led into idolatry. But now, when the era of reflection 
 and inquiry arrives, he discovers the absurdity of many of his 
 theistic notions, and the stubborn inscrutableness of the divine 
 nature, and he begins to fear he has been wholly deluded. He 
 doubts. He surrenders himself to speculation ; he seeks for 
 that which must be the first principle of all things. He fan- 
 cies it discovered in " water," or " air," or "fire." Unsatisfied, 
 he seeks it in " numbers " or in purely abstract " ideas," or it 
 may be an Anaxagoras glimpses it in " mind." But the human 
 
PHILOSOPHY BECOME MONOTHEISTIC. 283 
 
 soul still longs for a personal God. " The heart of man cries 
 out for the living God." These abstractions are unsatisfying, 
 and humanity is again skeptical and restless. Now, Socrates 
 and Plato introvert the mental gaze, and, in the analysis of 
 thought, discover elements which at once announce themselves 
 to consciousness as out of necessary relation to the things of 
 time and sense ideas, truths which are seen to be necessary, 
 universal, and eternal truths which would beam in the firma- 
 ment of mind though the worlds cease to exist. These are rays 
 from the eternal source of truth. Here, in this world of ideas, 
 is the only solid ground on which faith and reason may em- 
 brace each other. In this eternal reality is the absolute ground 
 of all causality, all thought, all beauty, all goodness. 
 
 Such was the progress of theistic speculation in Greece. The 
 inevitable tendency toward a unity served to gradually under- 
 mine the popular polytheistic faith which had usurped the sim- 
 ple theism of the earlier ages. The Eleatics rejected the gross 
 anthropomorphism of the Homeric theology. Socrates held 
 that the Supreme Being is the immaterial, infinite Governor 
 of all; that the world bears the stamp of his intelligence, and 
 that he is the author and vindicator of all moral laws. Plato 
 earnestly inveighs against the anthropomorphism and polythe- 
 ism of the Greek mythology ; and having himself risen to purer 
 conceptions of the Deity, he insists that he ought to be repre- 
 sented as he is without imperfections, the author of all good, 
 and the punisher of sin. " There is no imperfection," says Pla- 
 to, "in the beauty or goodness of God;" "he is a God of truth, 
 and can not lie ;" " he is a being of perfect simplicity and truth 
 in deed and word."( J ) Aristotle, though less spiritual, enun- 
 ciates views entirely incompatible with the popular mythology 
 of the Greeks. Thus, the popular notions of divine existence 
 which had been current from the time of Orpheus and Homer, 
 
 (') Plato, "Republic," book ii., 18-21. 
 
284 THEISTIG ARGUMENTS. 
 
 were gradually dissipated, and the way was cleared for Christian 
 theism. 
 
 The preparatory office of Greek philosophy, in the region of 
 speculative thought, is seen 
 
 2. In the development of the theistic argument in a logical 
 form. The growth of Greek philosophy evolved in due succes- 
 sion every form of argument employed by modern writers in 
 proof of the being of God. Our author inclines to except the 
 "moral argument;" but we believe that Plato's ontological 
 proof of the existence of the Supreme Good ought to be re- 
 garded as involving the moral argument. This, as we shall at- 
 tempt to show, is but a single aspect or branch of the ontolog- 
 ical. We might add the statement more distinctly than Dr. 
 Cocker has presented it, that the argument from " Common 
 Consent " is as old as Socrates^ 1 ) Universal beliefs were made 
 by the Stoics an argument for the existence of God; and before 
 the Stoics, Alexander of Aphrodisias ascribed great authority 
 to widely prevalent beliefs, " since," he asserts, " mankind gen- 
 erally do not greatly err from the truth. "( 3 ) Cicero declares 
 that " in any matter whatever the consent of all nations is to 
 be reckoned a law of nature ;"( 3 ) and such opinions have re- 
 ceived the sanction of modern philosophy. ( 4 ) 
 
 The four arguments most conspicuously embodied in the phi- 
 losophy of the ancients are thus formulated by Dr. Cocker (p. 
 487-494) : 
 
 (1.) The ^3tiological( 6 ) proof, or the argument based on the 
 
 (>) Plato, "Apology," 32. 
 
 ( 2 ) " De Fato," ii. ; Ritter, " History of Ancient Philosophy," vol. iv., p. 
 242. 
 
 ( 3 ) Cicero, " Tuscul.," L, 13. 
 
 ( 4 ) Grotius, "De Jure Belli et Pacis," ii.; Butler, "Analogy" (Introduc- 
 tion); Quatrefages, Revue des Deux Mondes, 1860-1861; Saisset, "Essay 
 on Religious Philosophy" (Edinburgh translation), i., 33, note. 
 
 ( 5 ) This is the Cosmological proof of Kant. 
 
jETIOLOGICAL AND COSMOLOGICAL. 285 
 
 principle of causality, which may be presented in the following 
 form: 
 
 " All genesis, or becoming, supposes a permanent and un- 
 caused Being, adequate to the production of all phe- 
 nomena : 
 
 " The sensible universe is a perpetual genesis, a succession 
 of appearances ; it is always becoming, and never really 
 is: 
 
 " Therefore, it must have its cause and origin in a perma- 
 nent and unoriginated Being adequate to its produc- 
 tion." 
 
 This argument is enunciated more or less articulately by 
 most of the Greek philosophers, especially Pythagoras, Xenoph- 
 anes, Zeno of Elea, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, Plato, and Aris- 
 totle. 
 
 (2.) The Cosmological^) proof, or the argument based on 
 the principle of order, and thus presented : 
 
 "Order, proportion, harmony, are the product and expres- 
 sion of mind : 
 
 " The created universe reveals order, proportion, and har- 
 mony : 
 
 " Therefore, the created universe is the product of mind." 
 The fundamental law of thought which underlies this mode 
 of proof was clearly recognized by Pythagoras, and is also elab- 
 orated by Plato in his Philosophy of Beauty. 
 
 (3.) The Teleological(*) proof, or the argument based on the 
 
 (*) This is embraced under the Physico-theological of Kant. The pres- 
 ent, however, is a more legitimate use of the word than Kant has made 
 of it, since the primary (and, with the Greeks, the usual) signification of 
 KofffnoQ is " order." Moreover, as Pythagoras, who first applied KOO^OQ to 
 the universe, designed especially to express its (numerical) order, Kant 
 has clearly violated the rule of preoccupancy in the attempt to divert the 
 word to another use. 
 
 ( 2 ) Embraced under the Physico-theological argument of Kant. 
 
286 TELEOLOGIGAL AND IDEOLOGICAL. 
 
 principle of intentionality or final cause, and is presented in the 
 following form : 
 
 " The choice and adaptation of means to the accomplish- 
 ment of special ends suppose an intelligent purpose, a 
 designing mind : 
 "In the universe we see such choice and adaptation of 
 
 means to ends : 
 " Therefore, the universe is the product of an intelligent, 
 
 personal cause." 
 
 This is especially the Socratic proof; but it was also em- 
 ployed by Plato and Aristotle. 
 
 (4.) The Ontological or Ideological proof, or the argument 
 grounded on necessary and absolute ideas, which may be thrown 
 into the following syllogism : 
 
 " Every attribute or quality implies a subject, and absolute 
 
 modes necessarily suppose absolute being : 
 " Necessary and absolute truths or ideas are revealed in 
 
 human reason as absolute modes : 
 
 "Therefore, universal, necessary, and absolute ideas are 
 modes of the absolute subject that is, God, the foun- 
 dation and source of all truth." 
 This is especially the Platonic mode of proof. 
 The preparatory office of Greek philosophy is seen 
 II. In the department of ethical ideas and principles. 
 1. In the awakening and enthronement of conscience as a 
 law of duty, and the elevation and purification of the moral 
 idea. Here we find an order of succession in the evolution of 
 moral ideas corresponding with that observed in the field of 
 speculative thought. These stages are traceable equally in the 
 individual and the national mind. We recognize (1) in the 
 age of Homer, Hesiod, and the Gnomic poets, and the Seven 
 Wise Men, a period of " popular and unconscious morality ;" 
 (2) in the following age, beginning with Protagoras, a " tran- 
 sitional, skeptical, or sophistical period ;" and (3) in the So- 
 
GREEK PHILOSOPHY AND ETHICS. 287 
 
 cratic age " the philosophic or conscious " period of morality. 
 We must refer the reader to the pages of our author (p. 495- 
 505) for the illustrations and proofs. 
 
 2. In the fact that, by an experiment conducted on the 
 largest scale, it demonstrated the insufficiency of reason to elab- 
 orate a perfect ideal of moral excellence, and develop the moral 
 forces necessary to secure its realization. The moral idea in 
 Socrates, Plato, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, and Seneca rose to 
 a sublime height, and developed a noble and heroic character. 
 Yet the cardinal virtues of the ancient ethical systems are pru- 
 dence, justice, temperance, and courage. The gentler virtues 
 humility, meekness, forgiveness of injuries, love of enemies, 
 universal benevolence (" graces which give beauty to character 
 and bless society ") are scarcely known. The inculcation of 
 humility, forbearance, and forgiveness by Epictetus and Seneca 
 is not clearly an attainment of philosophy unillumined by the 
 spirit of contemporary Christianity. Socrates, " the noblest 
 of all the Grecians," had no world-wide sympathies which con- 
 cerned themselves with interests beyond the limits of his na- 
 tionality. " Plato, in his solicitude to reduce his ideal state to 
 a harmonious whole answering to his idea of justice, sacrificed 
 the individual. He superseded private property, broke up the 
 relations of family and home, degraded woman, and tolerated 
 slavery " (p. 507). Plato himself asserted the inadequacy of 
 human teaching and effort, and announced that " virtue is the 
 gift of God."(') 
 
 III. In the department of religious feeling and sentiment, the 
 propa3deutic office of Greek philosophy is further seen. 
 
 1. "It awakened in man the sense of distance and estrange- 
 ment from God, and the need of a mediator ' a daysman be- 
 twixt us that might lay his hand upon us both.' " The first 
 
 (') On the insufficiency of philosophy, see the concluding portion of 
 Farrar's "Seekers after God," p. 318-836. 
 
 13 
 
288 ANTICIPATIONS OF A REDEEMER. 
 
 stage of human history recognized the divine as near. Nature 
 was the supernatural. The second, or reflective, stage removed 
 God to the region of the unseen. It made him abstract and 
 difficult to discern. Man now longed for an approachable Fa- 
 ther, Counselor, Friend. Humanity was thus prepared for the 
 announcement of an incarnation. 
 
 2. It deepened the consciousness of guilt, and awakened a 
 desire for redemption. In the Homeric period the idea of 
 wrong-doing was certainly present, but it was vague and gross. 
 The sentiment uppermost in the great tragedians is the invinci- 
 bility of the moral law. " The sinner must suffer for his sins." 
 "But after the law comes the gospel. First the controversy, 
 then the reconciliation. A dim consciousness of sin and retri- 
 bution as a fact, and of reconciliation as a want, seems to have 
 revealed itself even in the darkest periods of human history. 
 This consciousness underlies not a few of the Greek tragedies " 
 (p. 516). Offended justice is appeased by divine interpositions. 
 The office assigned to Jove's son, Apollo, in the " Prometheus 
 Unbound," is certainly suggestive of the Christian doctrine of 
 reconciliation. Plato more than once betrays his longing for a 
 divine helper. The obstacles to virtue, as he says, are great, 
 and insurmountable to feeble man. Plato admits it with a 
 spirit of sadness, and says it is the work of God to restore fall- 
 en humanity. He lets fall obscure hints of a coming Conquer- 
 or of sin, an Assuager of pain, an Averter of evil ; but he in- 
 dulges rather in desires than in hopes. ( J ) The experience of 
 
 ( J ) Socrates, in express words, prophesies the future advent of some 
 heaven-sent Guide (Xenophon, " Memorabilia," I., iv., 14 ; Plato, "Alcib.," 
 ii.). In the " Republic " Plato employs these singularly suggestive words : 
 " Thus he who is constituted just shall be scourged, shall be stretched on 
 the rack, shall be bound, have his eyes put out ; and at last, having suffer- 
 ed all evils, shall be crucified " (cited from Clem. Alex., Strom., book v., 
 chap, xiv., where other foreshadowings of the Redeemer are referred to). 
 The expectation of a Redeemer seems to have been very wide-spread. Dr. 
 
PHILOSOPHY AND REVELATION HARMONIOUS. 289 
 
 Plato found its counterpart in the experience of Paul prior to 
 his conversion. "What I do, I approve not; for I do not 
 what I would, but what I hate." " Oh, wretched man that I 
 am ! who shall deliver me from the body of this death ?" But 
 Paul, conscious of deliverance, was enabled to say, u I thank 
 God, through Jesus Christ our Lord ;" while Plato could only 
 desire and hope and wait for the coming Deliverer. 
 
 The history of religions and philosophies is thus the confir- 
 mation of Christianity. (') We may, indeed, regard the revela- 
 tion of God in the human soul to be as genuine and authentic, 
 though not as clear and influential, as the revelation in the per- 
 son and teaching of Christ. These two revelations are harmo- 
 nious, and must be so. Greek philosophy had made the calcu- 
 lation, from the data of human consciousness, that a Saviour 
 was needed that a Saviour must be predicated. Paul came 
 to Athens, and pointed out the Saviour whose want had been 
 
 Curry has expressed the opinion that the idea of vicarious suffering is in- 
 tuitive (lecture before the students of Drew Theol. Sem., Feb. 4th, 1874). 
 However this may be, Dr. J. P. Newman cites it from the Japanese (see 
 letter on " Religion in Japan," in Christian Advocate, N. Y., Oct., 1873), 
 and from the Chinese (see letter on " Tauism in China," ibid., Feb. 19th, 
 1874) ; and it is notorious that the expectation of a deliverer was found ex- 
 isting among the Pueblos, Navajoes, Aztecs, and others ( Whipple, " Pacific 
 Railroad Reports," vol. iii., part iii., chap, iii., p. 46 ; ibid., p. 42 ; Pres- 
 cott's "Conquest of Mexico," vol. i., pp. 60, 312). On this subject com- 
 pare, also, M'Cosh, " Method of the Divine Government," book iv., chap. ii. 
 (*) " Philosophy," says Clement, " was a school-master to bring men to 
 Christ " (Clem. Alex., Strom., i., 28). " Philosophy, before the coming 
 of the Lord, was necessary to the Greeks for righteousness, and now it 
 proves useful for godliness, being in some sort a preliminary discipline 
 TrpoTraiSfia TIQ ovaa for those who reap the fruits of the faith through 
 demonstration" (ibid., i., 5, 28). "Philosophy was given as a peculiar 
 testament SiaOijKrjv to the Greeks as forming the basis of the Christian 
 philosophy" (ibid., Strom., vi., 8, 67 ; -see, also, " Cohortatio," chap. vi.). 
 Similar testimony has been abundantly rendered by Augustine, Origen, Lac- 
 tantius, and Justin Martyr. 
 
290 DR. COCKER'S STYLE. 
 
 felt giving sight to the blind instinct that had been feeling 
 after God, and preaching a Gospel which fulfilled the prophetic 
 longings of the struggling ages of Greek philosophy. 
 
 Such is the line of argument pursued by the author of " Chris- 
 tianity and Greek Philosophy." We must refer the reader to 
 the work itself for an idea of the fullness and symmetry with 
 which the discussion is evolved. We may yet state that it em- 
 braces in its compass neat monographic treatments of a num- 
 ber of subsidiary theses. Often, nevertheless, the full discus- 
 sion of a topic must be gathered from widely separated pages ; 
 and this, perhaps, is a defect in the arrangement of the work. 
 
 The work shows the signs of study and erudition upon every 
 page. But it is not simply a learned treatise, for the author 
 possesses a remarkably keen and penetrating insight into sub- 
 jects of speculative inquiry, and hews out, with trenchant blade, 
 and in rapid succession, clean-cut blocks of thought to fit into 
 the beautiful structure of his growing argument. His mind's 
 eye sees with the clearness of noonday in realms which are 
 thick darkness to ordinary vision. He revels, with playful un- 
 consciousness of effort, among the ponderous problems of met- 
 aphysical research, shedding upon each the light of a brilliant 
 intellect, transmitted through a style as pellucid as crystal. His 
 pages resound from beginning to end with the changes rung 
 upon his favorite ontological conceptions. Indeed, the only 
 fault of the book seems to arise from the circumstance that the 
 author is so completely possessed by his favorite thought that 
 it is always present in his mind, whatever subsidiary theme he 
 handles, and, like a ruling passion, always finds some avenue to 
 utterance. This leads sometimes to a premature broaching of 
 the heart of an impending discussion, and, by a division of 
 forces, somewhat weakens, in some cases, the effect of the pres- 
 entation. Thus, in treating Plato, he lets fall something of 
 Plato's ontology on almost every page. Quite a full statement 
 is presented three times : first, in treating of Plato's Psycholo- 
 
PREMATURE DENOUEMENTS. 291 
 
 gy ; second, under the head of Dialectic ; and, finally, under On- 
 tology proper. That the author's positive theistic system, ul- 
 timately argued out so lucidly in its various aspects, is consid- 
 erably scattered in presentation, will be apparent from the at- 
 tempt to make all the references on any leading topic as phi- 
 losophies of religious phenomena (p. 55-95, 172-176, 203-223) ; 
 the materialistic philosophy of religion (p. 55-65, 172-176, 203 
 -223, 293, 311) ; the Platonistic philosophy, and its relations to 
 Christianity (p. 328-387, 492-493, 502-504, 507-509, 517- 
 519); the doctrine of "Final Causes" (p. 211-223, 320-324, 
 405, 413, 489-491). Still, these peculiarities proceed from the 
 influence of a strongly dominant idea, and the tendency is to 
 make it a dominant idea in the reader's mind. In perpetual- 
 ly turning the subject over, he always exposes some new side. 
 Every presentation is in fresh phrase, and is brought forward 
 from a different direction. If the shadows of coming conclu- 
 sions are sometimes cast before, they at least serve, like " pro- 
 phetic types" in geological history, to proclaim a unity of 
 thought in the progress of the evolution. The style is digni- 
 fied, enriched with a copious vocabulary, forcible, sometimes 
 sententious, and always remarkably transparent. It is some- 
 what freighted with brief quotations and foreign words ; but 
 these almost always add some meaning to the text. The com- 
 prehensibility of the work would be improved if its skeletal 
 structure were a little less disguised ; though, in the subordi- 
 nate parts, the method is as noticeable as it is admirable. A 
 detailed analysis, showing the subordination of parts, would 
 very much aid the student and the general reader. This sug- 
 gestion is made under the conviction that it is a treatise which 
 might be studied with great profit by all intelligent clergymen 
 and candidates for the ministry. Indeed, as before stated, the 
 subjects treated and the views presented can not, in the pres- 
 ent age, be safely passed by without earnest study by the " de- 
 fenders of the faith." 
 
292 ARGUMENT FROM COMMON CONSENT. 
 
 In reviewing the work of Dr. Cocker we had purposed to 
 avoid any general discussion of the question of the knowability 
 of God through the powers of reason. Our estimate of this 
 work is so high that we thought it would prove a better serv- 
 ice to the reader to present simply a miniature portrait of its 
 method than to attempt an original discussion. We conclude, 
 therefore, by making a mere memorandum partly by way of 
 resume of the various forms of theistic proof, showing that 
 every proof inevitably hinges on the validity of a primitive be- 
 lief or intuition of reason. 
 
 I. THE ARGUMENT FROM COMMON CONSENT. We find re- 
 ligious impressions, faiths, and practices a universal fact of 
 humanity, (l) They existed, if we rightly interpret the in- 
 dications, even in the Stone Age of the life of humanity. (') 
 
 (2) They are abundantly exemplified in the existence and prev- 
 alence of great religious systems among those portions of the 
 human family that have risen above the stage of savageism.( 2 ) 
 
 (3) They characterize the life of the lowest savages. We are 
 aware of contradictory statements. ( 8 ) Formerly, missionaries 
 denied the lowest savages a spark of religious fire, through 
 zeal for the importance of written revelation. Recently, their 
 theological antipodes have made the same denial, for the pur- 
 
 (') Quatrefages, "Rapport sur le Progres de 1'Anthropologie," 1868; 
 Duke of Argyll, "Primeval Man;" Figuier, "Primitive Man;" and many 
 other authorities. This position is questioned (we think through the influ- 
 ence of preconceived opinions) by Lubbock, "Prehistoric Times," and " Or- 
 igin of Civilization ;" and Vogt, " Lectures on Prehistoric Man." 
 
 ( 2 ) See, for condensed and accessible accounts of these, (in addition to 
 the work of Dr. Cocker), Clark, " The Ten Great Religions " (to these ten 
 we would add Lao-tseism and the systems of the Aztecs and Peruvians) ; 
 Moffat, " A Comparative History of Religions ;" Miiller, " Chips from a Ger- 
 man Workshop," vols. i., ii., iii. ; and " Lectures on the Science of Religion, 
 with Papers on Buddhism." 
 
 ( 3 ) Sir John Lubbock's works, cited above ; Burton, " Abeokuta," vol. i., 
 p. 179 ; Darwin, " Descent of Man," etc. 
 
ARGUMENTS FROM COMMON CONSENT. 293 
 
 pose of undermining the foundations of Christianity. We 
 have examined the specifications and charges in detail, and our 
 judgment is, that the charges are "not proved." However 
 gratifying it would be to spread the facts before our readers, 
 we must forbear. ( J ) (4) The fact has impressed itself upon 
 the minds of thoughtful writers in all ages. We could quote 
 Alexander of Aphrodisias, Socrates, Plato, Zeno of Cittium, 
 Cicero, St. Paul, Augustine, Galen, Anselm, Descartes, Leibnitz, 
 Barrow, Butler, Herder, Ritter, Ad. Pictet, Carpenter, Calder- 
 wood, M'Cosh, Spencer, and many others, to prove that if the- 
 istic ideas do not exist fully formed in the minds of lowest 
 savages, they manifest, at least, a religious susceptibility and 
 predisposition which could not exist without a connatural 
 foundation. 
 
 But it is not necessary that these ideas, or even predisposi- 
 tions, should be established in every case. There are whole 
 tribes, as there are single individuals, which can not reasonably 
 be taken as tests and standards of normal humanity. We may 
 throw them out if we choose. 
 
 Could we go no farther, we have in these universal phenom- 
 ena the data for a " philosophy of religion." Why this com- 
 mon consent ? We have listened to the solution of Comte ; we 
 have strained our mental vision till we feel symptoms of stra- 
 bismus in endeavoring to reconcile the paradoxes of Hegel; 
 but we remain unsatisfied. The religious consciousness is a 
 characteristic of humanity, and we demand the sanction of its 
 affirmations. We feel borne toward the conclusion that the 
 voice of humanity is the voice of truth. This is the verdict of 
 the ages. Ilavrwv fierpov 6 avOpwiroc; vox populi vox Dei 
 the sentiment of humanity is the utterance of God. 
 
 (*) A summary of the results of a study of the religious nature of sav- 
 ages has been more recently given by the present writer in the Methodist 
 Quarterly Review for January and July, 1875. 
 
294 ARGUMENT FROM "REVELATION." 
 
 But is such an argument a demonstration ? It is, if the voice 
 of humanity is the voice of truth. The conclusion hinges on 
 the validity-of a primitive necessary belief. Is that which man- 
 kind necessarily believes to be taken as a presentation of the 
 reality of things ? 
 
 Let us see if it be possible to rise to a knowledge of God by 
 any chain of thought which does not involve this link. 
 
 II. THE ARGUMENT FROM DIRECT "REVELATION." Here, 
 it seems at first, is an unimpeachable demonstration. But sup- 
 pose ourselves in a position to witness the immediate manifes- 
 tations of the Divine presence, and to listen to the audible 
 voice of God, what proof have we that the phenomenon is not 
 an illusion of our senses ? or that any of our sensations are not 
 illusory? We receive an impression upon our sensorium, and 
 believe because we must; but that is all. What sanction has 
 our belief? Next, suppose we had the best of grounds for as- 
 suming the reality of something making the outward manifes- 
 tation, how could we know that reality to be such as mankind 
 conceives the nature of God to be? Without an antecedent 
 notion of God, the sensible manifestation could only announce 
 itself as a finite phenomenon. Whence the notions of intelli- 
 gence, goodness, infinity, rising up in the soul in presence of a 
 finite phenomenon? This "revelation," instead of imparting a 
 primordial knowledge of God, simply awakens into conscious- 
 ness a pre-existing knowledge. With us who no longer wit- 
 ness such sensible revelations of God, but receive them only by 
 tradition, it is obvious that the demonstration must be weak- 
 ened rather than strengthened. Revelation, therefore, can not 
 possibly be a revelation of God's existence and attributes ; and, 
 in order that it may become efficient at all, as a divine revela- 
 tion, there must be an antecedent concept of the Being reveal- 
 ed. We come round, then, to the point from which we started 
 Whence this concept, and what is its meaning ? 
 
 III. THE ARGUMENT FROM IMMEDIATE INTUITION. As all 
 
INTUITIONAL AND ^TIOLOQICAL ARGUMENTS. 295 
 
 men seem to themselves to know of the Divine, and are uncon- 
 scious of any process or effort by which they have attained to 
 this knowledge, have we not here a clear case of immediate in- 
 tuition ? To this question Jacobi and Schleiermacher and many 
 others respond affirmatively. This is probably the meaning 
 of the theism of Hamilton and Mansel ; and no other theism 
 was possible to Kant without virtual self-contradiction. We 
 refer to the pages of Dr. Cocker for an exposition and criticism 
 of this philosophy ; but for ourselves, we feel like confessing a 
 leaning toward it. We can not here argue the point ; nor do 
 we wish to intimate that there is not another avenue of ap- 
 proach to the theistic concept. We believe there is. But here 
 we are confronted still by the old question. Consciousness re- 
 ports directly (in this view) the reality of the Divine, and we 
 irresistibly believe the report. Now, what authority has con- 
 sciousness to report thus ? Does the presence of this necessary 
 belief imply a reality ? We must make a further effort to flank 
 this difficulty. 
 
 IV. THE ^ETIOLOGICAL ARGUMENT. We turn here into the 
 domain of necessary ideas. We place our feet on the princi- 
 ple of universal causality, and rise from the observation of con- 
 tingent causes to the concept of primordial causation. This 
 concept is a revelation of causation adequate to the formation 
 of the world and all the visible or conceivable universe. But 
 as nothing, quantitatively considered, can be infinite, but only 
 indefinite, this principle does not lift us to infinite causation. 
 The power is not that of an absolute cause, but only a world- 
 maker, a demiurge, and this does not answer to the human con- 
 ception of Deity. But, further, the argument only bears us to 
 the necessary idea of primary causality ; and though we do, in- 
 deed, discover beyond this the necessary idea, of absolute cause 
 self-existence it furnishes us no means to bridge the gulf 
 between necessary ideas and necessary realities. True, the rea- 
 son supplies us with the means of passing from mode to sub- 
 
296 TELEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT. 
 
 ject, but this is extraneous to the purlieus of the present ar- 
 gument. This method, therefore, of itself breaks oS before 
 reaching our objective point ; and, moreover, it will be noted 
 that, whatever the uses to which it may be put, its validity rests, 
 again, on the trustworthiness of that judgment which affirms 
 that every effect must have a cause. What sanction has reason 
 for affirming this judgment ? What validity appertains to our 
 belief in the principle of causality ? Let us make another tack. 
 
 Y. THE TELEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT. Restricting this to 
 cases of the mechanical sort, we affirm that the contrivances 
 discoverable in nature proclaim intelligence operative in nature. 
 Here we are met at the threshold by the objection that we 
 know nothing about designs in nature ;(') and the only reply 
 we can make is, that we feel fully persuaded that, contrivance 
 implies intention, and therefore intelligence, and tfiat we feel 
 this necessity to be the same in the domain of nature as in 
 that of humanity. Still, it is only a primitive belief. But 
 there is further difficulty. The evidence carries us, at best, 
 only to the idea of necessary intelligence as the adequate expla- 
 nation of the mechanism of the universe. This, again, apart 
 from any other proof, is not infinite intelligence, but only intel- 
 ligence indefinite in degree such intelligence as is demanded 
 by the system of nature and, in addition, it is only intelligence, 
 and nothing more. The argument does not lead us to the idea 
 of being and personality ; and so, like the preceding argument, 
 it leaves faith dangling in mid-heaven, and groping around des- 
 perately for a firm support. We hasten to the next alternative. 
 
 VI. THE HoMOLOGicAL( 2 ) ARGUMENT. As this phrase is 
 
 (') This " conclusion [that design is revealed in nature] could not bear, 
 perhaps, the strictest transcendental critique " (Kant, " Critique of Pure 
 Reason," English translation, p. 435). This objection is echoed and re- 
 echoed in the pages of Hamilton, Spencer, and others. 
 
 ( 2 ) This is the Cosmological argument of Cocker, or a branch of the 
 Physico-theological of Kant. 
 
HOMOLOGICAL AND ONTOLOOIGAL ARGUMENT. 297 
 
 a stranger in the category of theistic arguments, we explain the 
 meaning to be, an argument based on proofs of intelligence 
 drawn from the existence of intelligible methods plans in 
 nature. We need not amplify the explanation or the argu- 
 ment. It is at once apparent that, however convincing the 
 proofs of intelligence, the argument lands us exactly where the 
 teleological does, and faith still feels itself afloat without an 
 anchorage. 
 
 VII. THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT. Here we deal with es- 
 sential realities the ground and source of all cognizable modes 
 and attributes, whether contingent or uncontingent. We find 
 in our minds the necessary idea of existence reality and feel 
 impelled to predicate a necessary something distinct from the 
 world, and which constitutes the ground and reason of its ex- 
 istence. This is the only argument furnished by reason which 
 attains to real being. There are three orders of cognizable 
 manifestations, giving rise to three corresponding orders of on- 
 tological concepts : 
 
 1. Phenomena of the Objectivity (extension, form, color, etc.). 
 Ontological principles, applied to these phenomena, supply a 
 form of real being which is contingent, finite, and MATERIAL. 
 
 2. Phenomena of the Subjectivity (the mental states). Onto- 
 logical principles, applied to these phenomena, supply a form 
 of real being which is self-conscious, free, intelligent, moral, and 
 IMMATERIAL, but still finite and conditioned. 
 
 3. Necessary Ideas. These are not properly phenomena of 
 mind. The consciousness of their presence is such. No phe- 
 nomena of the finite can claim a necessary existence. Some 
 of the necessary ideas which reason discovers in its domain 
 are the following: The ideas of (l) Substance or Reality; (2) 
 Causality, with its derivatives, Will, Liberty, Motivity, Intelli- 
 gence, Unity, and Personality; (3) Intelligence; (4) Liberty; 
 (5) Ethicality the idea of right and wrong ; (6) Duty ; (7) 
 Personality ; (8) Unity ; (9) Infinity ; (10) Absolutivity. (Per- 
 
298 NECESSARY IDEAS. 
 
 haps the 10th is also derivable from the idea of causality. It 
 will be observed that while certain of our necessary ideas seem 
 to be primitive and intuitive, they may also arise through a 
 brief, spontaneous process of deductive derivation. Kant says 
 Liberty is not directly cognized, but only a deduction from the 
 concept of Duty ; but in this he contradicts himself and the 
 verdict of common consciousness. To us it seems, however, 
 that while the idea of Liberty is simple and spontaneous, it is 
 also summoned into the field of consciousness as a correlative 
 of the idea of causality coupled, or not, with the idea of 
 Duty.) 
 
 Ontological principles, applied to the existence of necessary 
 ideas, present them as modes of the absolute, proclaiming nec- 
 essary, infinite, and unconditioned Being as their subject. There- 
 fore, the ontological argument shows that if necessary ideas ex- 
 ist, there is a necessary subject to which they must be referred 
 as their adequate cause and ground. We repeat, then, that 
 necessary ideas exist 
 
 (1.) Arising spontaneously in our own minds in presence of 
 the phenomena of the external world, but transcending all which 
 we can conceive of the extent, duration, or degrees of contin- 
 gent existence, and clothing themselves with the attribute of 
 absolutivity. Such are our transcendental ideas of substantivi- 
 ty, causality, intelligence, etc. 
 
 (2.) Further illustrated and emphasized by a thoughtful con- 
 templation of the cosmos. For instance : 
 
 Intelligence is exemplified in (a) Relations of contrivance 
 (the Teleological proof) ; (6) Relations of plan (the Homolog- 
 ical proof) ; 
 
 Primordial causality and its derivatives : "| 
 
 Unity, are exemplified in relations of 
 
 Motivity, ^ > cause and effect (the JEtio- 
 
 Self-determination, V = Personality; logical proof). 
 Self-consciousness, J J 
 
EQUIVALENCIES OF THE ARGUMENTS. 299 
 
 These three and other( ! ) similar modes of argumentation 
 thus contribute predicates, which the Ontological argument 
 affirms of real being. These predicates, together with those 
 supplied directly and spontaneously by the mind, make up the 
 whole possible conception of Perfect Being, or DEITY. 
 
 We desire, in passing, to offer a few words in reference to 
 Kant's criticism of the theistic proofs from speculative reason, 
 lie is commonly represented as having visited them with a 
 Waterloo overthrow. He enumerates three arguments : (l) The 
 Physico- theological (=Teleological, Cocker -f- Cosmological, 
 Cocker = Socratic = Argument from "Final Causes ") ; (2) The 
 Cosmological ( ^Etiological, Cocker = Peripatetic or Aristote- 
 lian = Leibnitzian, in part) ; (3) The Ontological (= Ontologic- 
 al, Cocker = Platonic or Ideological, or argument from absolute 
 modes +Anselmian, or argument from Perfect Being = New- 
 tonian [as far as it goes], founded on space and time, viewed 
 [erroneously] as attributes of Deity and symbols of infinity = 
 Leibnitzian, founded on the principle of "sufficient reason"). 
 " More than these [proofs] there are not, and more, even, there 
 can not be."( 2 ) His criticisms of the first two are just ; and, it 
 ought to be added, his praise of the first is generous, though 
 reserved. His strictures of the Ontological argument are keen, 
 but, it seems to us, contradictory to reason, and even to some 
 of his own later Ontological propositions. He asserts that the 
 Ontological argument proves the necessity of something as the 
 
 ( ! ) Similarly we might frame an ethical argument, based on the princi- 
 ple of ethicality as major, and the demonstrations of justice in the world 
 as minor, premise ; also an agathological argument, based on the idea of 
 goodness and its manifestations in nature. But these arguments, guided 
 by nature, reach only to indefinite intelligence, causality, justice, and good- 
 ness, when we are obliged to turn to the reason to furnish the concepts of 
 absolute attributes ; and still another effort of reason is demanded to view 
 these absolutes as modes of being. 
 
 ( 2 ) Kant, "Critique of Pure Reason," Haywood's translation, p. 411. 
 
300 PREDICATES OF NECESSARY BEING. 
 
 ground of the necessary idea, but it renders demonstrable no 
 predicate of that necessary something. Is it substance, reali- 
 ty, necessity ? In his " Critique of Practical Reason " he admits, 
 similarly, the concept of Duty, and then asserts that it has an 
 objective, real existence. But, on the contrary, he holds that 
 Necessary Being remains only an idea. We can not pass from 
 the idea of Necessary Being to the qualitative, objective actu- 
 ality. This is simply, so far as we understand it, a confession 
 of the impotency of reason in all attempts to comprehend Nec- 
 essary Being. We reach here the idea of the undefinable, in- 
 comprehensible ("unknowable," Spencer, Hamilton, etc.) "some- 
 thing" which we can not render to our intelligence, except as 
 to its real and necessary existence ; and this impotency is sim- 
 ply the confession of all the theistic ages. 
 
 We pause to inquire whether it is essential that we be able 
 to go farther. Of this Necessary Being all predicates are pos- 
 sible which are not contradictory to reason ; and even if no 
 predicate were demonstrable, we should be precluded from the 
 possibility of speculative atheism, or the possibility of disproof 
 of any of the Christian predicates of Deity ; while the hypothe- 
 sis of a self-existent Creator and Father would remain the only 
 rational explanation of the world, and we should be bound to 
 accept it as an inductive generalization of the highest possible 
 degree of probability. 
 
 But we hold that there are predicates of the (so-styled) un- 
 definable which must be affirmed if we would not dishonor our 
 intuitions. If the world logically refer itself, through reason, 
 to Necessary Being, then the intelligence which Kant cheerfully 
 acknowledges revealed in the world so refers itself; and intel- 
 ligence is a necessary predicate of Necessary Being. 
 
 But the great transcendental philosopher raises a difficulty 
 deeper than this, which strikes the axe into the very roots of 
 the Ontological argument. That which appears necessary to 
 our reason may not be necessary absolutely. The necessity of 
 
THEISM OF KANT. 301 
 
 our judgments must be distinguished from the necessity of 
 things^ 1 ) " The principle of causality has no meaning at all, 
 and no sign of its use, excepting only in the sensible world." ( 2 ) 
 " The statement that a triangle must have three angles is only 
 a necessary judgment, and not a necessity of things. ( 3 ) From 
 this premise, it follows that we can not logically trace the chain 
 of causation beyond the limits of the existing world, and affirm 
 absolute primordial causality. We can affirm only causation 
 as a prefix of the existing order. Now, if this were all, it ap- 
 pears that the principle of causality possesses the same validity 
 and the same extent of dominion as the ideas of geometry. 
 That is, the theistic proposition, on the showing of Kant, is 
 just as demonstrable as a theorem in mathematics, though both 
 are propositions limited to the existing order of things, and not 
 depending as absolutes upon the necessity of things in totis 
 possibilibus. 
 
 This is certainly pushing a firm foot-hold for reasoning as far 
 as most minds would ask to carry it. If transcendental phi- 
 losophy goes to the limit of affirming an intelligent Creator of 
 the existing order of things, we may breathe freely ; that is as 
 far as any of our arguments have pretended to go ; and we set 
 down Kant as a speculative theist in the same sense as Butler 
 and Paley. His exceptions to the transcendental argument (for 
 the three or four so called are finally but one) lie entirely be- 
 yond any thing thought of by ordinary theists. Besides, most 
 
 ( J ) Thus also, Hamilton: "It is not competent to argue that what can 
 not be comprehended as possible by us is impossible in reality " (" Meta- 
 physics," p. 552). And Professor Stephen Alexander : " The relations of 
 things are matters of constitution and arrangement. * * * One part of 
 space is not diverse from another, nor does one day of the week of course 
 succeed another because we may choose to think so, but because the Creator 
 has formed (or conformed) them so " (Amer. Jour, of Science) [2], vii., 
 p. 180). 
 
 ( 2 ) Kant, op. tit., p. 413. ( 3 ) Ibid., p. 424. 
 
302 LEIBNITZIAN ARG UMENT. 
 
 thinkers will affirm the truths of mathematics to be a " necessity 
 of things," and the properties of a triangle to hold good under 
 any possible (not to say conceivable) constitution; and hence, 
 also, the principle of causality and the principle of intelligence 
 grow out of the necessity of things, and not the existing con- 
 stitution of things ; and hence, finally, the proof of an intelli- 
 gent Creator is the proof of Absolute Being. 
 
 After all, we are inclined to think, with Leibnitz, that there 
 exists a more direct road to the Absolute Intelligence, and that 
 it may be directly predicated on transcendental grounds.^) As 
 the existing order of things is not the only order conceivable 
 as a possibility, and as the relations of different possible orders 
 must be intelligent relations, there must be an Understanding 
 which lies back, not only of the existing intelligible world, but 
 of every possible constitution of things ; and this Understand- 
 ing must be the predicate of a real Being a Being thus un- 
 conditioned by any possible law Out of itself. 
 
 Finally, we desire to direct attention to the fact that on what- 
 ever ultimate the last predicate of reason rests, we are obliged to 
 accept it though we do it cheerfully and necessarily simply 
 because the denial of it appears absurd. Simple, primitive be- 
 lief, therefore, is the very root of the highest certainty attainable. 
 
 (*) Leibnitz, " Essais de Theodice," ad initium. The Leibnitzian argu- 
 ment, reduced to distinct propositions, is as follows : 1. " There must be a 
 first Reason of things (^Etiological) ; 2. The reason must be out of the 
 world, and a necessary self -existence (^Etiological) ; 3. It must also be in- 
 telligent. Proof: To understand the relation of all possible worlds and 
 the grounds of choice of this world (Cosmological, Cocker) ; 4. It must 
 have self-determination to make the choice (^Etiological) ; 5. It must have 
 power to render the choice efficient (^Etiological) ; 6. Power belongs to 
 substance it tends to Being (Ontological) ; 7. Wisdom or understanding 
 tends to truth [reality] (Ontological) ; 8. Will tends to goodness [the Per- 
 fect Good] (Ontological) ; 9. This Intelligent Cause tends to all that is pos- 
 sible therefore infinite every way (^Etiological) ; 10. There is only room 
 for ONE, as all is linked together (Ontological). 
 
VALIDITY OF PRIMITIVE BELIEFS. 303 
 
 Must we, then, confess that all our knowledge rests on a ba- 
 sis which admits of doubt ? Never was a more important ques- 
 tion raised in the whole annals of humanity. It is of supreme 
 importance to discern the absolute and irrecusable validity of 
 the primitive beliefs. They are the molecules of philosophy. 
 In the last analysis of our knowledge, we find an element which 
 we hesitate to pronounce knowledge, because it is only belief ; 
 and we are not satisfied to pronounce it belief, because we feel 
 that it is knowledge. All our knowledge resolves itself into 
 primitive judgments which we affirm, because we intuit the 
 reality. Intuitive knowledge is identical with primitive belief, 
 and philosophy is a deduction from intuitive knowledge. 
 
 It was not our purpose to attempt to enforce the authority 
 of the primitive beliefs, but merely to point them out as the 
 key-stones of human knowledge, and to remind the reader that 
 the impeachment of one is the dethronement of all. To attack 
 the authority of the belief in efficient causality is not only to 
 launch us upon a universe of chance, but to surround us, as 
 Fichte confessed, by a phantasmagoria of unrealities and illu- 
 sions. To dishonor our belief in Absolute Being as the ground 
 of our necessary idea of Absolute Being is, by a fell touch, 
 to break the electric communication which unites the world of 
 finite existence with the realm of eternal Realities, and plunge 
 the unhappy soul into the abyss of nihilism. On the contrary, 
 to assert the authority of our belief in the reality either of the 
 external world or of the world within ourselves, is, by implica- 
 tion, to announce the authority of that universal faith of hu- 
 manity which affirms Supreme Divinity ; it is to recognize in- 
 telligence, power, goodness, justice, in the ordinations of the 
 visible universe, and to make these attributes the predicates of 
 the Absolute and Perfect Being revealed in the inmost cham- 
 ber of human reason. 
 
XL 
 
 GOD IN THE WORLD.(') 
 
 " I am not oblivious of what is babbled by some, who in their ignorance 
 are frightened at every noise, and say that we ought to occupy ourselves 
 with what is most necessary, and which contains the faith ; and that we 
 should pass over what is beyond and superfluous, which wears out and 
 detains us to no purpose in things which conduce nothing to the great 
 end." CLEMENT OP ALEXANDRIA, Stromata, book i., chap. 1. 
 
 PEOPLE still live who sincerely believe that Mr. Moody's 
 method is the only one requisite to convince the world of re- 
 ligious truth. They have heard of the loudly proclaimed 
 "conflict between Science and Religion," but they maintain 
 that the only way to a pacification is through "evangelical 
 teaching." They have seen the young, in the formative stage 
 of opinion, yielding with an irresistible deference to the ev- 
 idences which science arrays before the human understand- 
 ing ; but they still proclaim that well-established science, in cer- 
 tain of its forms, is false, and must not be trusted. " Tynclall, 
 Huxley, Spencer, and Darwin" must be put down; and the 
 way to do it is to " preach the Lord Jesus Christ." These are 
 literal and recent quotations from the lips and pens of excel- 
 lent Christian divines, and are not made in any spirit of levity 
 or disparagement. ( 2 ) Nevertheless, we do not think it neces- 
 
 ( 1 ) "The Theistic Conception of the World: an Essay in Opposition to 
 Certain Tendencies of Modern Thought;" by B.F. Cocker, D.D., LL.D., Pro- 
 fessor of Moral and Mental Philosophy in the University of Michigan, au- 
 thor of " Christianity and Greek Philosophy," New York, Harper & Broth- 
 ers, 1875. 
 
 ( 2 ) While we write, a Doctor of Divinity is advertised as about to pub- 
 
MISTAKEN THEOLOGIANS. 305 
 
 sary to support our statements by giving names and places ; 
 while we have no right to attach names to opinions privately 
 expressed. We wish only to define a position which we think 
 wholly mistaken and indefensible. We shall be the last to ut- 
 ter a word of depreciation of evangelical efforts. By all means, 
 let them be assiduously promoted. We sincerely honor Mr. 
 Moody and his fellow-evangelists. We only maintain that a 
 large and increasing class of persons exists who can not be 
 reached by such efforts, as long as certain antecedent and fun- 
 
 lish " a series of masterly discourses * * * in opposition to the celebrated 
 doctrines and theories of all the celebrated materialists." * * * " He will 
 expose and refute the theories of Tyndall, Spencer, Huxley, Darwin, and 
 others of that school." If this divine undertake so broad a task, we fear 
 he will bring religion into renewed and unmerited disrespect. He is emi- 
 nently able to serve the cause of religious truth by " preaching the Lord 
 Jesus Christ," and convincing such as are accessible to his presentations; 
 but he will sorely disparage not science, but Christianity, by convincing 
 his auditors that an inherent alienation exists between the two. Should 
 he penetrate under standingly the subject-matter taught by " that school," 
 the " scales would fall from his eyes," and he would feel less eager to pa- 
 rade the assumed "materialism" of "Tyndall, Spencer, Huxley, Darwin, 
 and others." We do not say that these scientists are exemplars of fer- 
 vent piety ; we do not affirm that they are " evangelical ;" but we do main- 
 tain that they are not amenable to the charges of which multitudes think 
 them guilty. Our meaning will become obvious as we proceed, setting 
 forth, in our progress, the matured estimate of modern science which is 
 embodied in the work under review. 
 
 In similar error was another Doctor of Divinity whom we call to mind, 
 and who, during a meeting of the American Association for the Advance- 
 ment of Science, announced a Sunday sermon on the Warfare of Science 
 against Religion or something to that effect. At the same moment an 
 eminent scientist was advertised to speak on the harmony between science 
 and religion. Such harmony has been set forth time and again by mem- 
 bers of the Association on the Sunday occurring during the session ; and 
 scarcely a presidential address has been delivered during the existence of 
 the Association which did not, more or less at length, affirm the friendship 
 of science for the fundamental doctrines of the Christian faith. 
 
306 DIFFERENT GROUNDS OF BELIEF. 
 
 damental questions of evidence remain unsettled in their minds. 
 We will briefly explain our position. 
 
 The work of Dr. Cocker assumes that a conviction of -relig- 
 ious truth may be legitimately grounded on data disclosed as 
 the ultimate results of analytical inquiry. The existence of the 
 work implies that though the belief of the multitude may be 
 prompted by their feelings reverence for teachers, hope of 
 future happiness, devotional susceptibilities there is a con- 
 siderable number who demand the proofs of the realities which 
 must stand as correlates to the religious feelings. 
 
 Belief is a conviction of the truth of some proposition. 
 Conviction always rests on some ground ; there is some reason 
 why we believe. Sometimes its ground is testimony to a fact 
 observed. Sometimes it is simply authority. A entertains a 
 certain belief, and B, presuming A's belief to represent truth, 
 adopts it, and can give no other reason for his faith. Some- 
 times belief sincere belief is generated or biased by our in- 
 terests ; intellectual discernment becomes perverted, and the 
 grounds of belief are not revealed to us in their true light. 
 Sometimes belief is based on the results of a personal scrutiny 
 of evidence. George Smith, who has seen and deciphered the 
 Chaldean inscriptions, may feel a confidence in the veracity of 
 our ancient Scriptures no stronger perhaps even less unre- 
 served than that of the servant-girl who acquires it from her 
 faithful pastor ; but his belief rests on a basis not traditiona- 
 ry. We who have not deciphered these inscriptions may still 
 accept, without reserve, the testimony of the antiquary, and, 
 with a knowledge of the nature of the evidence, may build a 
 faith as firm and as logical as that of the original decipherer. 
 Similarly, the chemist notes the transformations which take 
 place in the test-tube, and acquires an original belief in the 
 principle of chemical affinities. He measures and weighs the 
 products of these reactions, and, finding that the compounds 
 present him with definite multiples of the simples, he attains 
 
PHILOSOPHIC BELIEF. 307 
 
 to a belief in the doctrine of " chemical equivalents," and the 
 doctrine of the atomic constitution of matter. The philoso- 
 pher, introverting his scrutiny, notes the facts of consciousness, 
 and grounds on direct observation his belief in the reality of 
 his conscious states. Here belief becomes knowledge ; there is 
 no normal contingency which can invalidate or qualify this in- 
 tuitive knowledge that he thinks and feels. He finds existent, 
 also, a belief that the something to which consciousness refers 
 its states is a reality, and such a reality as is represented in this 
 reference. This belief respecting the existence of an objective 
 reality, and its nature, is accepted by all men as knowledge. It 
 is knowledge exalted above all contingency. These ultimate 
 data disclose an absolute identification of knowledge and belief. 
 Once more, the philosopher discerns reflected in consciousness 
 certain other primary truths which exclude the possibility of 
 all conditionality such as the principle of causality, the prin- 
 ciple of substance, and the principle of intentionality. These 
 he feels to be more indestructible even than matter itself. All 
 knowledge, all science, is but a superstructure built up of these 
 ultimate atoms of truth. The ground of a primary belief is 
 neither testimony, nor authority, nor sensuous observation, nor 
 inductive inference, nor deductive consequence. It is a ground 
 more unassailable than any of these. It is a directness and a 
 singleness of intuition of one transcendental and eternal truth. 
 A religious belief is not secure from the attacks of doubt till, 
 by a process of reflection, it has been resolved into these ulti- 
 mate and adamantine elements. 
 
 Now, a moment's reflection suffices to show that men's be- 
 liefs possess various degrees of validity. Nor is the ardor of 
 belief graduated to its validity unless it be in an inverse ratio. 
 One man rests belief on grounds which would not be satisfac- 
 tory to another. Some persons, like children, willingly adopt 
 beliefs ; while others must themselves bring the grounds of be- 
 lief under the careful inspection, of the intellect. Some per- 
 
308 STRENGTH OF RELIGIOUS FEELINGS. 
 
 sons with warm feelings may be easily prepossessed by beliefs 
 which, in others of cooler natures, must be built on evidence 
 comprehended and weighed; and in persons of similar emo- 
 tional characteristics, proneness to take advice of the feelings 
 is inversely as the control of intellect. 
 
 The religious feelings hold the first place in respect to in- 
 fluence over the lives of men. They are not the product of 
 occasional concurrences of circumstances; their existence does 
 not depend on conditions of poverty or wealth, power or sub- 
 jection, sickness or health, age or sex : they sway the actions 
 of men through the presentation of interests which range not 
 alone over the entire period of mortal existence, but through 
 the dimly glimpsed vistas of an eternal life. All other interests, 
 all other motives, are limited by circumstances, and transitory 
 in duration, save as they condition the religious feelings which, 
 like the dome of the sky, cover and embrace all that there is in 
 human life. 
 
 Yet men differ no less in the intensity and dominance of 
 religious feeling than in intellect, or amiability, or physique. 
 Differences which exist absolutely may be counteracted or ex- 
 aggerated by the other differences which exist differences in 
 intellect, in education, in fortune, in personal associations. The 
 final resultant of all the forces which influence human actions 
 may be, in one case, an irrepressible religious predisposition; 
 in another, an emotionless, questioning, religious circumspec- 
 tion. The first individual will possess an exuberance of relig- 
 ious faith, though he may be unable to give a reason for it ; 
 but will remain legitimately cheerful and happy. The second 
 may deny all religion, though equally unable to give a reason 
 for his denial; but remain unsettled and anxious. Tertulli- 
 an could believe even because belief was impossible ;(') Pyrrho 
 
 (*) Tertullian seems to have been fond of paradoxes. Besides his Credo 
 quid impossible, which Sir Thomas Brown says he learned out of Tertul- 
 
CONVICTION THROUGH THE EMOTIONS. 309 
 
 would not believe even when doubt became absurd. Between 
 Tertullian and Pyrrho stand all gradations. 
 
 There is a class of individuals richly gifted with religious 
 susceptibilities, but yet subject to the strong influence of hab- 
 its of intellectual inquiry. In their ordinary moods, belief can 
 only exist under the previous sanction of intellect; but in a 
 roused condition of the religious nature, belief bursts into be- 
 ing at the bidding of the higher intuitions ; and ratiocinative 
 intellect comes afterward merely to sanction its existence. 
 
 The intelligent reader can not hesitate to give indorsement 
 to these propositions. Can there be any difficulty in apply- 
 ing them to the work of convincing men of religious truth? 
 The. religious predisposition exists in all men; in most men 
 it is strong. The great mass of people, then, need no argu- 
 ments; they need only persuasion; they need arrested atten- 
 tion, aroused religious emotions, quickened religious perceptions. 
 To accomplish this must be always the chief work of the relig- 
 ious teacher. It is legitimate ; for we maintain not only that 
 the essential propositions of the religion of Jesus are capable 
 of authentication by the most rigorous logic, but that there is 
 a higher apperception of their truth which is glimpsed most 
 clearly by those who attain to the sublimest conditions of re- 
 ligious exaltation. To convince through the emotions emo- 
 tions profound and pervading enough to be calm and clear 
 is to open the intuitional eye, and anticipate the affirmation of 
 reflective intellect. 
 
 True it is that the religious teacher whose own belief rests 
 on authority or religious predisposition, may throw the sanc- 
 tity of religion over tenets which are purely secular or even 
 
 lian, as an easy solution of knotty problems, the worthy father has left us 
 the following : Non pudet, quia pudendum est ; Prorsus credibile est, quia 
 ineptum est ; Cerium est, quia impossible (" De Cam., Christ.," v.) ; Merita 
 damnantur licet damnent ; Ad Icnoncm damnanda Christianum potius ad 
 leonem. 
 
310 THE COLD THINKERS. 
 
 baseless ; and lie may thus become the propagator of a volume 
 of crude, if not false and damaging, " theology." How sadly 
 is this danger illustrated in the history of even the modern 
 church! True it is, too, that the subject of religious exaltation 
 is sometimes simultaneously the subject of a nervous exaltation 
 which quickens the imagination and the whole range of sensi- 
 bilities ; and in consequence of this, the religious intuition be- 
 comes fogged, or even confounded with imaginative and physi- 
 ological impulses. These extravagances of both religious teach- 
 er and religious pupil are to be diligently corrected by invok- 
 ing the calm influences of intellect. 
 
 But a different phenomenon and a different demand are pre- 
 sented by that respectable minority of persons in whom the 
 religious predisposition can not be evoked. Though they do 
 not, by any means, embrace all the thinkers, they constitute, 
 on the whole, a thinking class. The ideas which elevate our 
 civilization, and the enterprises which advance the happiness of 
 the race, originate with them. They unite with strong motive, 
 executive power. They are accessible to argument as well as 
 persuasion. Their attitude toward the tenets and institutions 
 of Christianity will be determined by the claims and pretensions 
 of professing Christians ; by the results of a study of Christian 
 evidences ; by the awakening power which is brought to bear 
 upon them ; by education, example, friendships, or other acci- 
 dents. 
 
 Among the influences which will determine the attitude of 
 this class will be the allegations of conflict between the sys- 
 tem of religion and the system of knowledge. Science is at 
 work in dusky basement, and high tower, and scented field; 
 and now and then a new-fledged thought flies forth, like an- 
 other dove, to typify the mind of the All-Father. Then some 
 representative of the first class, from his lofty attitude of re- 
 ligious enthusiasm, and pellucid faith, and beautiful com- 
 munion, proclaims that the idea is out of harmony with the 
 
HO W THEOL OGY ALIEN A TES INTELLECT. 311 
 
 system which his faith has consecrated; it is a false idea; 
 it must be put down. Accordingly, he begins to denounce 
 " unsanctified " learning, and to preach "faith and repentance" 
 more earnestly than ever.( l ) Meantime the thoughtful minor- 
 ity examine the claims of this new announcement from the 
 laboratory or observatory. It seems sustained by evidence ; our 
 preacher has said nothing germane to this evidence ; if the sys- 
 tem which faith indorses is inconsistent with this, it must be in- 
 consistent with truth. We must consider the system more de- 
 liberately. We feel predisposed* toward it ; but if its apostles 
 affirm its incompatibility with what seems to us good reason, 
 we must hold aloof ; for reason, as one of the fathers has said, 
 is our only means of judging of the truth of any matter what- 
 ever, even of revelation itself. So argue the conservative mi- 
 nority. Do we not see half our young men standing in this 
 attitude ? The spirit of God may reach them ; but the heart's 
 door may even be bolted against the spirit of God. 
 
 Now, turning toward the author and propagator of this ter- 
 rible new teaching in science, tBey may, quite possibly, find a 
 man completely antipodal to him of exalted religious intuitions. 
 Whether from deficiency of religious endowment, or as the re- 
 sult of some mental revulsion caused by religious delinquen- 
 cies or extravagances in others, he may be seen preserving the 
 most inviolable reticence respecting his own faith and the bear- 
 ing of his new science upon the current faith of his neighbors. 
 Here is ground for painful apprehension. Our friend in the 
 minority the young man in college, the man shadowing forth 
 
 ( J ) " Some who think themselves naturally gifted do not wish to touch 
 either philosophy or logic ; nay, more, they do not wish to learn natural 
 science. They demand bare faith alone ".(Clemens Alex., Strom., book i., 
 chap. ix.). "But, as they say that a man can be a believer without learn- 
 ing, so, also, we assert that it is impossible for a man without learning to 
 comprehend the things which are declared in the faith" (ibid., book i., 
 chap. vi.). 
 
 14 
 
312 EELIQIOUS FAITH vs. RATIONAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 a creed to shape his life will certainly prolong his hesitance ; 
 his questionings will become bolder; he will recede visibly 
 from alliance with religion. But should the man of science 
 happen to be a doubting Xeniades or D'Alembert, or a scoffing 
 Von Holbach, or misanthropic Rousseau, he may even corrobo- 
 rate the fatal charge of the pure religionist, and leave our seek- 
 er after truth to ponder over the problem, What must be the 
 result when immovable religious faith is impinged upon by the 
 irresistible force of rational evidence ? 
 
 Here is a dilemma more painful than can be described, and 
 it seems to us that he who contributes to rescue the victim 
 from between the millstones of doubt performs a religious 
 service for his fellow-man. The verdict which comes from the 
 lofty elevation of a faith which ignores the grounds of doubt 
 is false. The verdict which comes from the sullen depths of 
 a doubt which ignores the grounds of faith is also false. The 
 conflict, friend, is imaginary. Heavenly faith will receive from 
 imperial science the kiss of reconciliation. 
 
 It is the effort to show that Christian faith sounds no dis- 
 sonance with the universal scheme of truth which occupies the 
 author of the work before us. He does not look unmoved 
 upon the wide paralysis of faith and hope caused by the perni- 
 cious influence of this uneducated crusade against science, and 
 this soulless contempt for religion. He presents us a concep- 
 tion of the world, as framed and sustained by profoundest sci- 
 entific investigation, and shows us that it implies God. Here 
 is the text -book for the wavering, and for those who would 
 counsel the wavering. Here is the resolvent for their scientific 
 doubts doubts which can not be dissipated by the fervor of a 
 hymn, nor exorcised by the authority of a sermon the most 
 stubborn and invincible of all the obstacles to religious life. 
 
 Let us examine this work. It is not a theory framed by the 
 author. It shows a thorough familiarity with all recent author- 
 ities in physical science ; and its copious array of citations, con- 
 
USE OF COPIOUS CITATIONS. 313 
 
 catenated together, would almost constitute a manual of science 
 in the words of the masters themselves. Indeed, we feel moved 
 to express our wonder, in limine, that an author so thoroughly 
 familiar with the questions discussed should feel it necessary 
 to fortify his statements by quoting so largely the dicta of 
 scientists and philosophers. Dr. Cocker, philosopher as he is, 
 is also a scientist, and he possesses the prerogative of speaking 
 by authority, yet he seems reluctant to rest his own logical 
 convictions on their merits. One feels sometimes disappointed 
 that he does not leave a well-reasoned and well-put truth to 
 rest without the bolster of authority. One is led to suspect he 
 may be deficient in the dogmatic spirit. He seems distrustful, 
 at times, of his judgments in matters of physical science ; but 
 no person can read the work without feeling that the author's 
 information and clearness of. head make him the equal of those 
 whom he cites for confirmation ; and this all the more when 
 it is remembered that the disputed points in physical science 
 lie rather within the territory of philosophy than of physics. 
 The explanation of this exuberance of literature is undoubtedly 
 to be found in the author's purpose to put the representatives 
 of science themselves upon the stand, to testify in their own 
 words, and thus forestall all charges of misinterpretation. This 
 purpose is judicious, and hastens the finality of the existing 
 controversy. But, aside from such object, the reader will thank 
 the author for opening so many avenues of collateral reading 
 and study. 
 
 Viewed as a whole in its conception, method, and argu- 
 ment the work is a finished product of broad philosophical 
 reflection, and sheds a genuine lustre upon American authorship. 
 It is a pure and lofty cosmic philosophy. It supplies the co- 
 hemisphere of his former work,^) and rounds out with com- 
 pleteness a sphere of cosmo-theistic reflection. He has given 
 
 ( l ) " Christianity and Greek Philosophy." 
 
314 THE FIRST PRINCIPLE OF THINGS. 
 
 us the relations of Christianity to ancient thought, and the re- 
 lations of Christianity to modern thought. In the former, he 
 has not developed as great detail as Cudworth in the "Intel- 
 lectual System of the Universe ;" in the latter, his details of 
 science occupy the physical rather than the organic field, as 
 in M'Cosh's "Typical Forms and Special Ends in Creation." 
 Cudworth and M'Cosh have diverged to great distances in cer- 
 tain directions and so, indeed, have Paley, and Butler, and 
 Chalmers, and the "Bridgewater Treatises;" but Dr. Cocker 
 has described a complete circumference by keeping himself 
 constantly near the central and fundamental position. He has 
 given a great range of proof ; others have adduced a greater 
 variety of illustrations. Spencer( 1 ) and Fisk,( 2 ) as far as com- 
 parisons may be made, have furnished each an admirable and 
 masterly organon, and Mahan( 3 ) has given a more ostentatious 
 metaphysic ; but we think the reader of these authors has need 
 to exercise a degree of discrimination between sound and un- 
 sound which is not required in the study of Dr. Cocker. 
 
 Starting with the fundamental inquiries which have exercised 
 the thinking world in all ages, the author leads us by steps of 
 reasoning, as lucid as logical, through the realms of philosophy, 
 science, and revelation, to the necessary and vivid conception 
 of a personal, Intelligent Will, as the originator, conservator, 
 and governor of the world. 
 
 Four answers, he tells us, have been given to the question, 
 What is the First Principle of all things ? " In the beginning 
 was MATTER ;" " In the beginning was FORCE ;" " In the be- 
 ginning was THOUGHT ;" " In the beginning was WILL." The 
 first and second answers coalesce with Atheism ; the third, with 
 Pantheism ; the fourth is the creed of Theism ; and this is the 
 answer which is rendered alike by our Sacred Scriptures and 
 by the testimony of recent science. 
 
 (') " A System of Philosophy." ( 2 ) " Cosmic Philosophy." 
 
 ( 8 ) "Natural Theology." 
 
CAUSE AND METHOD OF THE WORLD. 315 
 
 The idea of God is a common phenomenon of the universal 
 intelligence of our race. An inquiry into the essential nature 
 of the divine originative existence thus revealed discloses it as 
 "an unconditioned will, or self-directive power seeing its own 
 way, and having the reason and law of its action in itself alone." 
 Will is conceived as implying reason, affection, and efficiency. 
 This determination of the nature of the first principle is sanc- 
 tioned by both philosophy and science. Grove, Sir John Her- 
 schel, Carpenter, Wallace, the Duke of Argyll, Laycock, Mur- 
 phy, Challis, and even Comte, unite in affirming that intelli- 
 gent will is the only rational explanation of the existence and 
 order of the universe. All our acquired conceptions of God 
 fall into harmony with this idea. Whether contemplated un- 
 der the category of being, attribute, or relation ; whether in the 
 light of reason or of revelation ; our total conception of the Su- 
 preme Cause finds its synthetic expression in WILL. 
 
 In discussing the question, What conception are we to form 
 of the nature and mode of the first origination? the author 
 first considers it in its hermeneutical and metaphysical aspects, 
 arriving at the conclusion that it is the purpose of Scripture to 
 teach the absolute origination of all existence by the Power of 
 God, and that the same conclusion is the outcome of the most 
 defensible line of philosophic reasoning in respect to the exist- 
 ence of space and time, matter and force. The absolute ideas 
 of immensity and eternity he finds imbedded in the depths of 
 consciousness ; and he is led, by a subtle process of reason- 
 ing, to regard immensity and eternity as attributes of God ; 
 while space and time are relations between co-existing things 
 and successive events, and, apart from things and events, have 
 no reality. Matter, also, derives its existence from the divine 
 will produced, not out of nothing, but out of the eternal 
 potentialities of the divine nature. The establishment of the 
 conditionality of the existence of time, space, and matter re- 
 lieves natural theology of those fatal embarrassments involved 
 
316 NATURE OF SPACE AND TIME. 
 
 in the admissions of Chalmers, Martineau, Mahan, and others. 
 "The creative act was not conditioned by time, or space, or 
 matter." 
 
 The conclusion we freely indorse; but it seems to us the 
 discussion of the question respecting the nature of space and 
 time is not yet closed. The affirmation that space and time 
 have no reality apart from things and events is not thorough- 
 ly satisfying. It is difficult to apprehend how the existence of 
 body (we use the term for any entity possessing extension) can 
 condition the existence of space. If space, as we all agree, is 
 the condition of the existence of body, then the existence of 
 space is the logical antecedent of the existence of body, and it 
 must be possible to contemplate spatial existence abstracted 
 from bodily existence that is, with body non-existent. Let 
 the attempt be made ; think all material existence annihilated 
 except two atoms of matter. Space, as our author admits, still 
 exists. The~ space once occupied by matter annihilated, it 
 seems to us, also exists as before. Now think the last two 
 atoms annihilated, and space, our author says, exists no longer ; 
 nothing but the immensity of God remains, as before creation 
 began. But for us the space still exists. The fallacy in Dr. 
 Cocker's reasoning, if we may venture the opinion, is a fallacy 
 of definition; it consists in adopting an arbitrary definition, 
 and one which does not answer to the universal idea of space. 
 Space, he says, " is the relation of co-existing material things 
 that is, the relation of position, distance, direction, hereness, 
 thereness." Accordingly he says, " Let one atom of matter be 
 created, and we have extension." That we grant, for extension 
 is an essential property of matter. "Let a second atom be 
 created, and there is now a relation of distance, position, direc- 
 tion that is, there is space" The existence of the relations 
 alleged is obvious, but we appeal to the common consciousness 
 for the verdict that such relations are not space. Having as- 
 signed such a definition to space, the conclusion is self-evident 
 
SPACE AND TIME CREATED. 317 
 
 that space was created in the creation of matter, for the con- 
 clusion is embraced in the definition ; and (as similar reasoning 
 may be employed in reference to time) that time was created 
 in the creation of matter ; and that, as a corollary, space and 
 time have no eternal and necessary existence; and creative ef- 
 ficiency was in no way conditioned by them. These proposi- 
 tions are all but different forms of the definition. The last is 
 a most important conclusion for natural theology; nay, we 
 agree with the author, that a system of natural theology is 
 baseless which does not rest on this corner-stone. But we feel 
 fully persuaded of our title to this corner-stone, even if not de- 
 rived from the authority alleged: we possess a more valid title 
 than one resting on an erroneous definition. 
 
 What is that title ? it will be asked. Our first and highest 
 title is based on the necessary intuition of First Cause. The 
 universal intelligence entertains the idea of First Cause; ac- 
 cepts its reality ; can not be driven from a belief in it. There 
 must be one cause which does not exist as an effect. No ex- 
 istence can be prior to that which has the sole capacity to con- 
 fer existence. Neither space, time, matter, nor material force 
 can assert possession of that capacity. It is only when we at- 
 tempt to reconcile this spontaneous concept of the necessary lim- 
 itation of the existence of space, time, matter, and force with 
 the formulated processes and products of reflective thought, 
 that difficulty is discovered and doubt arises. But suppose the 
 method of this harmony undiscoverable ; we are not bound to 
 point it out. Our difficulty is disclosed in a deductive infer- 
 ence several removes, perhaps, from the first truths from which 
 we argue. Every step opens a possibility of fallacy. Our be- 
 lief in absolute creation is primary; it possesses higher author- 
 ity than any deduction still more, a deduction which conflicts 
 with it. 
 
 But we may endeavor to deduce conclusions which shall 
 quadrate with the highest law of belief. The existence of 
 
318 SPACE AND TIME DISCUSSED. 
 
 body implies the existence of space ; for there can be no ex- 
 tension not even an atom's extension without space. It also 
 implies the existence of time ; for we can not separate exist- 
 ence from duration : a thing whose existence has no duration 
 has no actual existence. Space and time, then, are concapaci- 
 ties of body the conditions of the possibility of body. Time 
 is the sole capacity of unextended being. But time and space 
 have no dependence on body or succession. Time exists logic- 
 ally before succession, and space before body ; and we are able 
 to think them as so actually existing. Neither time nor space 
 is the capacity or condition of absolute existence. As to abso- 
 lute being, we can not affirm that it exists in time or space 
 in eternity or immensity. God exists. Here and there, prior 
 and subsequent, have no meaning in relation to the Absolute. 
 Space and time, immensity and eternity, are not needed for 
 the existence of God ; nor are they attributes of God : they 
 are created to serve as the capacities of other existence, or the 
 conditions of the potentialities of other existence. Of the. non- 
 existence of space and time we can, indeed, form no conception 
 or idea ; our reason knows no denomination in which to for- 
 mulate that negation ; we are part of the same system as space 
 and time, and our intelligence is made the measure of the sys- 
 tem to which we belong, and not another unimaginable system 
 which may be possible with God. Nor is it necessary to form 
 the concept of divine existence manifest, cognizable in all space 
 and all time past and future, and yet characterized by activity 
 not transitive through time and space. There are few things 
 which may be confidently predicated of the Absolute by finite 
 intelligence; and we may be certain that of the legitimate 
 predicates of the Absolute, nearly all must transcend the grasp 
 of human reason to the same extent as his causality existing 
 out of relation to time and space. 
 
 We proceed, now, with our resume. A survey of the pass- 
 ing phenomena of the actual world soon transports thought 
 
FINITENESS OF THE EXISTING ORDER. 319 
 
 backward to a beginning. That the existing order had a be- 
 ginning, is a thesis less debatable than the creation of matter. 
 The leading representatives of science accord with each other 
 and with the showing of Sacred Scripture on this point. Lit- 
 tle less contrariety of conviction now obtains in reference to 
 the limitation of cosmical existence in the opposite direction. 
 Science and revelation with one voice prophesy an end. If 
 science conduct us backward to a condition of matter which, 
 for her, must be regarded as a beginning, what has she to testi- 
 fy in reference to the nature of matter, and thence, by inference, 
 in reference to the origin of matter ? This question affords the 
 author the opportunity to bring science to the witness-box ; and 
 the verdict made up from its testimony is alternative : Either 
 matter is simply a phenomenon of force, and therefore refera- 
 ble to an original creative entity as its ground, or else it is to 
 be regarded, in each of its atoms, as " a manufactured article 
 and a subordinate agent," "precluding the idea of its being 
 eternal and self-existent." This, let it be remembered, is the 
 verdict of recent science. Here let the person troubled about 
 the atheistical tendencies of modern science take hope again, 
 and trust to the voice of God which he hears, as Socrates heard 
 it,(') perpetually uttered in his own consciousness. Science 
 physical science affirms that all its data its ultimate data 
 are things created. 
 
 Holding, then, to the creation of time, space, and matter, 
 and to the finiteness of the existing order, what was the method 
 of its beginning? That some motive or sufficient reason for 
 creating was necessary to condition the divine will to activity, 
 is maintained both on purely metaphysical grounds and on the 
 admission of philosophers and scientists. The doctrine of 
 
 ( J ) " I am attended by a supernatural intimation which has been assigned 
 me from a child, by Divine appointment. This is a voice which, when it 
 comes, prevents what I am about to do " (Plato, " Theages," xi.). 
 
 14* 
 
320 SUPREME TELEOLOQICAL LAW. 
 
 final cause, then, instead of being exploded, is acquiring new 
 strength under the sanction of such names as Laycock, Sir 
 William Thomson, Bacon, Miiller, and even J. S. Mill. " The 
 highest law of the universe," concludes our author, " must be a 
 teleological idea to which all nature-forces and all causal con- 
 nections are subordinated. This ultimate purpose forms, as it 
 were, a complete net -work of higher teleological connections 
 above the web of mere aiteological connections which pervades 
 the universe." As to the nature of the supreme teleological 
 law of the universe, finite intellect may judge inadequately or 
 erroneously; but our Christian Scripture reveals its character 
 as a purpose to " communicate of the divine blessedness to in- 
 telligent personal being." Reasoning from this fundamental 
 principle, it must be inferred that the self-manifestation of God 
 in creation would be gradual, cumulative, conservative, and har- 
 monious. A critical examination of the sacred narrative, in 
 reference to its general purpose and its literary character, 
 shows that this a priori inference is sustained ; and an inqui- 
 sition of the facts and conclusions of science demonstrates a 
 complete consonance with the meaning educed from the sacred 
 text. 
 
 In drawing out the parallel chronologies of Genesis and ge- 
 ology, we notice but one point which is open to our adverse 
 criticism. With Lange and many others, Dr. Cocker recog- 
 nizes only the first verse of Genesis as belonging to the " exor- 
 dium " or " proemium ;" we feel quite confident the real exor- 
 dium embraces the first and second verses. What is the sub- 
 ject of the statement in the opening of the second verse ? The 
 EARTH. "And the earth was formless and empty." Now, ac- 
 cording to the author, this was before the creation of " light " 
 the luminosity of the matter out of which the earth was 
 to be fashioned. Is such an interpretation reasonable ? Next, 
 the succeeding clauses depict events in relation to the earth. 
 11 And darkness was upon the face of the abyss ; and the spirit 
 
PROEMIUM IN BIBLICAL COSMOGONY. 321 
 
 of God brooded upon the face of the waters.'^ 1 ) Now, this 
 was an "abyss" revealed in the condition of the earth, just 
 mentioned ; and these " waters " belonged to the earth, and not 
 to outer space. It is only in the third verse that the primeval 
 fact in creation is enunciated ; this is the beginning of the nar- 
 rative. The statements of the second verse are to be regarded 
 as detached glimpses foreshado wings of some of the mighty 
 events which are to pass before us in the hymn ; as when, in 
 the proemial passage of the " Paradise Lost," Milton sings, 
 
 " Of man's first disobedience, and the fruit 
 Of that forbidden tree whose mortal taste 
 Brought death into the world, and all our woes, 
 With loss of Eden," etc. 
 
 Here, as is universal with the epic poets, some salient facts of 
 the narrative are pre-announced. We always picture the sa- 
 cred writer as gazing upon an inspired vision. The first and 
 highest fact of all is the disclosure of God as absolute origina- 
 tor. Next, as the panorama of creation passes rapidly before 
 him, his attention is particularly arrested, 1. By the formless 
 and empty condition of the arid, scorching surface of the 
 primeval crust ; 2. By the chaos the disorder of, and the ab- 
 sence of correlations in, the features of that surface and the 
 promiscuity of the aerial envelope ; 3. The darkness which hid 
 the earth when the gathered mantle of aqueous vapors excluded 
 the ancient sunlight ; 4. The ocean precipitated, and myriad 
 
 (*) Our author says " vapors," and quotes Lange : " The * waters ' of 
 verse 2 is quite another thing than the water proper of the third creative 
 day; it is the fluid (or gaseous) form of the earth in its first condition." 
 Now, its first condition was not liquid if that is what is meant by " fluid " 
 and an incandescent gaseous fluid would be a singular condition of mat- 
 ter to which to apply a term immediately afterward applied to waters. 
 This is a virtual arraignment of the good discrimination, and, so far, the 
 authority, of the narrative. 
 
322 MODE OF CONSERVATION OF THE WORLD. 
 
 forms of life hatching from the waters vivified by the " brood- 
 ing " " spirit of God." Of these conspicuous features of the 
 divine work he makes a memorandum ; and then returns to 
 the beginning to recount the series of events in its complete- 
 ness and order. And thus he begins : " God said, ' Let light 
 be ;' and light was." 
 
 No difficulty arises from the use of the word " evening," on 
 the theory that the first " day " began with the creation of light. 
 "Evening" and "morning" are not here equivalent to dark- 
 ness and light ; they are poetically expressive of the " begin- 
 ning " and " end " of a demiurgic day. If the " evening " of 
 the first day means the darkness which preceded the creation 
 of light, what means the evening of the second day, which fol- 
 lowed the creation of light ? We think the interpretation here 
 suggested to be demanded equally by critical exegesis and by 
 science. 
 
 The next question which arises concerns the present relation 
 of the Creator to the creation. The key-note of the discussion 
 respecting the conservation of the world is struck in the copi- 
 ous citations from Sacred Scripture, and the authorities of the 
 Church, which represent God as continuously exerting a con- 
 serving efficiency, without which creation would sink immedi- 
 ately into non-existence. Divergent from such a recognition 
 of divine power are the views of certain " advanced thinkers," 
 which our author now proceeds to examine. The first school, 
 represented by such writers as Professor Tyndall, Dr. H. Bence 
 Jones, and Dr. Bastian, hold to " the absolute inseparability of 
 matter and force." While subscribing to the doctrine of pri- 
 mordial creation, they maintain that the phenomena of the uni- 
 verse are perpetuated through the inherent and unwasted ener- 
 gy imparted to matter in the beginning. The second school, 
 represented by such men as Professors Owen, Huxley, and Ba- 
 den Powell, " deny the ultimate distinction between matter and 
 force, and regard both as phenomenal manifestations of some 
 
RELATION OF GOD TO THE WOULD. 323 
 
 * unknown substratum ' a supramaterial PHYSIS (0v<ne), which 
 is identical with the divine substance." This is a phase of 
 thought which verges toward Pantheism. "A third and inter- 
 mediate school assumes the existence of a plastic nature (vis 
 formativa) intermediate between the Creator and his work, by 
 which the phenomena of nature are produced." This hypoth- 
 esis was propounded by Cudworth, and probably possesses a 
 close affinity with the old theory of the anima mundi ; but it 
 may be doubted whether the "animating principle" of Harvey, 
 the materice vita of Hunter, or the " organic force " of Miiller, 
 or " plastic force " of the Schoolmen, is similarly intended to 
 imply the existence of any separate intelligence. The theory 
 has been lately reproduced by Dr. Laycock and Mr. Murphy, 
 under the name of " unconscious organizing intelligence." To 
 what, it may be asked, does this intelligence pertain? If to 
 matter, the theory means Atheism ; if to spirit, it means Pan- 
 theism. 
 
 Now, every conception of the world which makes it self- 
 supporting, self-evolving, with Deity standing merely as a re- 
 mote, unapproachable prefix, however sanctioned by any theol- 
 ogy styling itself orthodox, is essentially atheistic and in con- 
 flict with Scripture ; but, iiappily, also, a conception which is 
 incompatible with the deductions which we are compelled to 
 draw from the data of reason and science. In the defense of 
 this thesis, our author displays an admirable familiarity with 
 the theories and speculations of physical science, and gives, we 
 think, the two most charming chapters of his work. Our lim- 
 its do not permit even an abstract of his method ; and we can 
 only commend this masterly discussion to the studious atten- 
 tion of those who desire to acquaint themselves with the real 
 positions of the scientists named, and the relations which their 
 science sustains to the Biblical doctrine of immanent divine 
 efficiency. 
 
 The forms under which Dr. Cocker discusses the leading 
 
324 DIVINE IMMANENCE DEDUCED. 
 
 theories which he opposes are: 1. The hypothesis of natural 
 law. 2. The hypothesis of active force communicated to mat- 
 ter at its creation. 3. The hypothesis of a plastic nature. His 
 own views may be summarized as follows: 1. Matter is not a 
 mere phenomenon of force, but is an entity of a purely passive 
 character, serving as the recipient and vehicle of force. 2. It 
 consists of ultimate continuous atoms or molecules. 3. Force 
 can not be a property of matter. It is an attribute of mind 
 or spirit alone; and spirit force is the only force in the uni- 
 verse. 4. All the forms of energy manifested in the universe 
 are only transformations^) of the one omnipresent force issu- 
 ing from the one fountain-head of power the Divine Will. 
 5. All the phenomena of molecular life (bioplasmic phenomena) 
 are the result of the immediate presence and direct agency of 
 God. 
 
 Thus the final conclusion is, that "God is not simply the 
 transitive, but the immanent, cause of the universe. * * * His 
 ceaseless energy produces all the phenomena of nature." Is 
 not this identification of the dynamical life of the universe 
 with God, Pantheism? To this question he replies: "The 
 theory which represents the Deity as the transitive cause of the 
 universe a Arj/jnovpyos mechanically fashioning the materials 
 supplied to his hands, and then leaving it to the working of its 
 own inherent forces is rank Deism. The hypothesis which 
 regards the Deity as no more than the dynamical life of the 
 universe an informing and organizing soul associated with 
 matter is naked Hylozoism. The theory that reduces all ex- 
 istence, material and mental, to phenomenal manifestations of 
 one eternal, self-existent substance, which evolves itself accord- 
 ing to an inward law of necessity, and which is elusively called 
 
 (!) On the theory of immanent divine agency the " different forms of 
 energy " are not " transformations " of one divine will-force ; they are the 
 divine Avill-force in its varied self-imposed modes of activity. 
 
DIVINE GOVERNMENT OF HUMANITY. 325 
 
 God, is Pantheism. But the doctrine which embraces the two 
 conceptions of transcendence and immanence, and while it teach- 
 es the immanence of God in matter, proclaims the infinite dis- 
 tinctness in essence between matter and God, and the infinite 
 omnipresence of a personal God above and beyond the limita- 
 tions of matter, is Christian Theism." 
 
 If we recognize the world as created and sustained by divine 
 power, and accept the testimony of revelation that the free and 
 loving impartation of happiness to other conscious beings was 
 the final cause of creation, we reach the inquiry, What has 
 been the method of God in the treatment of his rational creat- 
 ures? What are the phenomena and laws of the providence 
 of God in human history ? The conclusion developed from 
 the discussion of this question sets man as an objective point 
 in the geological transformations of the earth and its succes- 
 sive faunas and floras, and in the final configuration of the ter- 
 restrial surface ; and establishes a parallelism between the edu- 
 cational development of the race and that of the individual ; 
 transferring the work of human education, in each successive 
 stage, to a new theatre, until at length, the stages of Oriental, 
 Hebrew, Greek, and Roman civilization being passed, the Chris- 
 tian civilization seems destined to be fully unfolded and per- 
 fected upon a continent presenting, physically and politically, 
 the freest scope for the activity of the appointed agencies of 
 human perfection and happiness. 
 
 Descending to a discussion of the question of providence 
 and' prayer, the author strikes what he announces as " the most 
 sharply defined issue between Science and Religion in fact, 
 the only real issue at the present time." We are inclined to 
 think this statement quite correct. The old issues of atheism, 
 materialism, and pantheism have vanished in smoke, since we 
 discover it to be impossible to settle upon any well-accepted 
 doctrine of science from which a simple deductive inference 
 does not usher us into the presence of a personal and adorable 
 
326 DEFINITION OF CONSCIENCE. 
 
 Divinity. We shall continue to hear the old accusations hurled 
 against the citadel of science, but we may rest assured that 
 they proceed from combatants who live in the past. The dis- 
 cussion of prayer considered from the stand-point of science is 
 conducted with characteristic learning and conclusiveness ; and 
 we think any clergyman placed under the necessity of vindica- 
 ting prayer from the aspersions of Professor Tyndall may find 
 here a mine of pertinent suggestions. " In prayer," concludes 
 the author, " the intelligent believer does not invoke a different 
 Power from that which is manifested in all the forms of phys- 
 ical energy which are manifested in nature; he does but in- 
 voke the same Power, and the only Power which is the source 
 of all causation, and produces all the processions of phenom- 
 ena." 
 
 The last two chapters are devoted to a discussion of the 
 moral government of the world its ground, its nature, con- 
 ditions, method, and end. The first subjective condition of 
 moral government is intelligence. In discussing this condition 
 the author is led to place a definition upon conscience. He 
 does not view it as a distinct faculty of the mind, but rather as 
 the "common field in which is revealed the operation of all 
 our faculties in their especial relation to moral law." It is thus : 
 (1) "The reason intuitively apprehending universal moral ideas 
 and laws." * * * (2) The understanding apprehending the re- 
 lations in which we stand to God, to our fellow-beings, and to 
 self as a moral personality endowed with reason and freedom. 
 (3) The judgment comparing the acts of a voluntary agent 
 * * * with the immutable ideas and laws of the reason, and af- 
 firming this is right, and worthy of praise and reward, or that 
 is wrong, and deserving of blame and punishment. (4) A par- 
 ticular state of the sensibility the painful or pleasurable emo- 
 tions which spontaneously arise in the presence of right or 
 wrong in our actions or in the actions of our fellow-men." 
 
 In reference to this analysis, we can not avoid raising the 
 
CRITICISM AND REDEFINITION. 327 
 
 query, In what do the intelligential elements differ from reason, 
 understanding, and judgment, in their exercise upon non-ethical 
 data ? Is there any adequate ground for dissociating the moral 
 intuitions of the reason from intuitions concerning modality or 
 quantity except with the view to a classification of the intu- 
 itions ? And does the understanding, in seizing upon relations 
 which may constitute the data of an ethical decision, become a 
 different faculty from that exercised upon relations of utility, 
 efficiency, or congruity? Or does judgment, in rendering its 
 decisions? In every case, we respond negatively. There is 
 only a difference in the subjects upon which these faculties are 
 exercised. In the analysis of the author, the sensibility is the 
 only power which is sui-generis, and this he does not view as 
 subjectively distinct from the general sensibility. His concep- 
 tion of conscience is neat and intelligible ; and we quite agree 
 with him that such a conscience is not a separate faculty of the 
 soul ; it is only a certain co-ordination of activities upon ethical 
 data; it is a dethronement of conscience as an autonomy, and 
 a diluting and weakening of it to a mere complex of functions. 
 In all this the theory is a violation of the universal convictions 
 on this subject. We think, in respectful disagreement with 
 him, that the composite activity which he views as a conven- 
 tional conscience, does involve an element which constitutes the 
 natural conscience, and one for which we have no name unless 
 we call it conscience. There is no sensibility but this ethic- 
 al element which constitutes the feeling that " I ought," or 
 " ought not ;" and this becomes pleasurable or painful accord- 
 ing as act agrees or disagrees with that which judgment has 
 pronounce^ right. Conscience proper, we think, is not a dis- 
 cerning faculty, and pronounces no judgments ; but when once 
 the discernments have been made and the judgments pro- 
 nounced by the intellect, conscience, as a feeling( 1 ) of a pecul- 
 
 x- 
 
 (*) Religion may be defined as the feeling of the existence of the All- 
 
328 FREEDOM OF WILL. 
 
 iar kind, prompts to actions conformable to the judgments pro- 
 nounced, and accompanies the contemplation of an act with 
 pleasure or pain according to its conformity or non-conformity 
 with the prompting. 
 
 The second subjective condition of moral government leads 
 to a discussion of the freedom of the will, the outcome of which 
 (would that space permitted a complete outline of these two 
 chapters !) is as follows : Will is original, uncaused cause ; it is 
 not caused by motive ; " motives may be reason for action, con- 
 ditions under which it acts, but they are not causes of action ;" 
 or, in the language of Dr. Whedon, " for its own effect, will or 
 the willing agent is a complete cause; as complete a cause 
 as any cause whatever ; and every complete cause produces its 
 effect uncausedly" These enunciations, it seems to us, cut to 
 the marrow of the subject, and harmonize the fact of universal 
 motivity with the fact of conscious freedom. 
 
 One can not complete the thoughtful perusal of this work 
 without a feeling of high admiration and profound satisfaction. 
 There has passed before his mind a vision of heavenly beauty. 
 The grand conclusion shines in upon him like a divine illumi- 
 nation, and he feels absorbed in an atmosphere of supernal ra- 
 diance and tender love. It is a vision of God, of his own free- 
 
 Cause, and of his inevitable grasp upon us, and paternal interest in us. The 
 feeling is primarily intuitive knowledge ; it is strengthened and sanctioned 
 by ratiocinative knowledge. The grasp felt inspires reverence, awe, fear, 
 desire to please, supplication. The paternal interest prompts to gratitude, 
 love, praise, and prayer. The fear of God, in the ethnic religious scale, 
 must necessarily precede the love of God. The latter is based on a knowl- 
 edge of what God has done, and purposes to do for us. Hence the lowest 
 savages know only a malevolent deity. All the powers of the soul are 
 made ministers to the demands of the religious feeling. Hence religious 
 systems, rites, creeds, institutions, enterprises all inspired by the unvary- 
 ing religious feeling, but all reasoned out and executed by finite and erring 
 intelligence. 
 
GOD IN THE WOULD, 329 
 
 will resolving to create a world, and populate it with beings 
 physically adapted to it, but yet in his own spiritual image 
 beings to be made happy ; a vision of God in the world, main- 
 taining it, communing with it, admitting himself into the con- 
 sciousness of his beloved intelligences ; speaking to them in 
 the voiceless whisperings of reason, in the radiant beauties of 
 the field and the sky, or in the awful voices of the storm and 
 the earthquake and the collapse of planetary systems; God 
 with us Immanuel strengthening and cheering, lifting us 
 up and pitying us in our distresses, watching for the whispered 
 prayer, responsive to the hymn of adoration, infolding us with 
 his love through all the journey of mortal life, and then, when 
 the light of the cerulean heaven fades in our glazing eyes, re- 
 vealing us to ourselves in the midst of a light which mortal 
 eyes can not behold, and which floods with ineffable glories that 
 other world from which we are now shut not by distance, bat 
 by life. 
 
 An author who can bequeath his readers an impression like 
 this has earned a title to gratitude, to fame, to an eternal re- 
 ward. 
 
GLIMPSES OF THE EVIDENCE, A POSTERIORI. 
 
XII. 
 
 GOD AND RELIGION IN NATURE. 
 
 ILLUSTRATIONS OF INTENTIONALITY AND OF OTHER BIBLICAL 
 TEACHING. 
 
 I. Manifestations of Power in Creation. 
 
 WE propose to look out upon Nature, and see what there is 
 to suggest the idea of God and religion. If there be any thing 
 in the universe to prove or illustrate the being and attributes 
 of God, and to confirm our faith in the authority of the Sa- 
 cred Scriptures, let us endeavor to ascertain clearly what it is, 
 and what it teaches. 
 
 The most impressive and most comprehensible phenomena 
 of the Universe are manifestations of POWER. Those which 
 most readily excite our wonder and astonishment, when we 
 pause to consider them, are manifestations of physical power. 
 Among the works of human hands, we gaze with amazement 
 on the ponderous bulk of the Pyramids, and the majesty of St. 
 Peter's at Rome, and that marvel of modern engineering which 
 lifts a massive brick block of Chicago stores and moves it bod- 
 ily to a new location. But what are Pyramids to the Alps, 
 which have been lifted by some power to an altitude thirty- 
 three times the height of the largest Pyramid? And yet the 
 Alps are little more than half the height of the Andes, and not 
 more than the hundredth part of their mass. These ponderous 
 mountain chains have been upheaved bodily, tearing their way 
 through masses of solid rock miles in thickness, uplifting, 
 crushing, tilting, and dislocating the solid floor of half a conti- 
 nent. We must not forget that this is the work of physical 
 
334 DISPLAYS OF PHYSICAL POWER. 
 
 power. These are physical masses, moved by physical agencies, 
 and give expression to the efforts of physical power as really 
 as the conscious labors of human hands. 
 
 What, again, is the power of man in upheaving bodily a 
 massive, stone -built structure? No strain that man has ever 
 applied has compressed or stretched to a perceptible extent a 
 block of building-stone above an inch or two in diameter. The 
 builder makes no allowance for compression of the stones which 
 lie at the very base of the most ponderous edifices. Yet such 
 are the strains which nature exerts upon the rocky slabs built 
 into the hill-sides that they yield like india-rubber to the press- 
 ure ; and when, by quarrying, the strain is relieved, the crush- 
 ed rocks, with a groan, ease themselves back to their original 
 dimensions. Here is power which may well amaze us. We 
 must not forget, in our habit of thinking that these are the 
 phenomena of nature, that they are none the less the results of 
 p Ower such power precisely as man exerts in raising a pillar 
 or kneading a lump of clay. 
 
 But these, after all, are some of the feeblest of nature's 
 efforts. Look beyond the phenomena of uplifted mountain- 
 masses, deep-scooped ocean basins, forest-laying tempests, and 
 land-consuming waves. Look out into limitless space ! There 
 hang worlds of ponderous bulk, fashioned by some plastic hand, 
 upheld by some mighty agency, moved onward in their majes- 
 tic courses by some mysterious power. If we would know how 
 great the power which handles these spheres, think of the to- 
 tal bulk of our own world, and of the crash of matter which its 
 fall would occasion. There is the sun, the ancient mother of 
 the planets, but still fervid in the heat of youth, whose bulk is 
 so great that if its centre were placed where the earth's centre 
 is, the body of the sun would extend in every direction as far 
 as the moon nay, would extend beyond the moon a distance 
 equal to eight times the circumference of the earth. And 
 yet, so vast a globe of matter as this has been shaped by the 
 
POWER AN ATTRIBUTE OF BEING. 335 
 
 Power which operates in creation, and rolls the planets in their 
 yearly courses. Do not let the phraseology of science mislead 
 us. Science affirms that the spherical form is " natural " to 
 matter that its particles, gravitating equally toward the cen- 
 tre of gravity, spontaneously produce the sphere. But think 
 again. Is not the shaping of this tremendous mass a real 
 work ? Is not the force there which moves the particles, molds 
 the mass, enspheres the planet and the sun ? Is it less a stu- 
 pendous physical force because displayed in the field of nature ? 
 And then, again, what is this force? Is it matter acting for 
 itself? shaping itself? Or is the origin of force outside of 
 matter ? Science says " gravity " does these mighty deeds. If 
 nothing more could be said, its deeds are sufficiently amazing 
 to excite our attention and set us to thinking. But what is 
 " gravity ?" Whence proceeds that energy which science calls 
 by this name? Gravity is not a being to manifest the attribute 
 of force ; nor is it an attribute of the masses moved. These 
 masses are the objects acted upon by the source of power 
 which imparts a gravitating tendency. There must be some 
 being in whom the energy resides. And when we come to 
 think more closely, we find the conviction existing in our 
 minds that the fountain of all power is WILL. In human af- 
 fairs we witness no result which we do not necessarily assume 
 to have been produced by some human agency, prompted by 
 volition. And so, in the field of nature, every phenomenon 
 and event must rest back, for its ultimate cause, on some In- 
 telligent Will. This is a law of our minds. We recognize in 
 nature the same matter, the same forces, the same modes of ac- 
 tivity, the same reflections of intelligence, motive, and will, as 
 are disclosed in the finite field of the human body and human 
 activities. It is this which renders nature comprehensible to 
 any extent, and authorizes us to interpret nature as the expres- 
 sion of thought and volition. 
 
 Think, again, of the magnitude of the power exemplified in 
 15 
 
336 VASTNESS OF NATURE'S FORCES. 
 
 nature. Over what an inconceivable sweep of space it stretch- 
 es ! The dimensions of the great sun overpower us ; but the 
 attempt to take in his distance is almost paralyzing to the mind. 
 Ninety-two millions of miles ! This is a small thing in words ; 
 but try to realize its meaning. A railway train moves thirty 
 miles an hour ; but yet, if a railroad stretched from the earth 
 to the sun, a train would require three hundred and fifty years 
 to pass over it. Had the pilgrims from the Mayflower stepped 
 immediately aboard that train, their descendants this year would 
 not have reached the farther terminus of the road. Nay, the 
 distance remaining would be so vast that the great-great-grand- 
 children of the children of to-day would be the first to reach 
 that distant sun. As our thoughts stretch along over that line 
 of road, dimmer and dimmer and dimmer in the uncompassa- 
 ble distance, how the idea of its vastness oppresses us ! And 
 yet there is a power which stretches from the sun to the earth. 
 It bends the whole mass of the world from its straight course, 
 and compels it to career around the sun like a colt held by a 
 halter. It lifts the ocean into a broad tidal swell, and whips 
 the rocky shores with the stormy lash of the waves, before 
 whose power oaken ships are as straw, and granite cliffs but 
 lumps of chalk. How vast the power which reaches so far 
 and works such tremendous results ! 
 
 But this, too, is one of the least of the powers which busy 
 themselves in the universe stretched out before us. The whole 
 distance which separates the sun from the earth is so inconsid- 
 erable in the field of nature that light travels over it in eight 
 and a half minutes. The light by which the reader peruses 
 these lines started from the sun about the time when he read 
 the title of this article. Think now of a space so vast that 
 the same light must travel a hundred, a thousand, ten thousand 
 years, before it reaches its destination. The attempt to com- 
 pass with thought an interval like this is literally like the at- 
 tempt to comprehend God himself. And yet we must assert 
 
POWER AND INTELLIGENCE. 337 
 
 that light is flying over all these mighty intervals of space. 
 Some of the starlight which falls upon our eyes any night has 
 just arrived from a journey of a thousand years. The same 
 powers, also, which work at mountain -building on our earth, 
 and reach forth from the sun to all the planets, stretch even to 
 the remotest star, shaping it, rolling it, hurling it, as if it were 
 the veriest plaything of a child. Nay, it is a power so vast 
 as to seize the whole frame-work of stars and systems in one 
 infinite embrace and send it whirling and wheeling onward 
 through the depths of boundless space, like a handful of peb- 
 bles thrown through the air. 
 
 Do we need to carry our imaginations farther to be con- 
 vinced that the power working in nature has no measure, no 
 limits ? It is, indeed, infinite. Here, in nature, is at least a 
 demonstration of Infinite Power. 
 
 II. Manifestations of Intelligence in Creation. 
 
 Every person distinguishes between results produced without 
 intention, and results produced for a visible purpose. The 
 wild wind scatters the autumn leaves about the yard, or hurries 
 them along the street with restless haste, till they reach some 
 lodgment in a nook or corner, and there they lie. And what 
 is accomplished by all this ? One gust whisks them across the 
 street, and another whirls them back again. Their final resting- 
 place depends entirely on the accident of the wind. It makes 
 no difference where the fitful gust may leave the brown foliage 
 to decay. The place where a particular leaf shall lie, or even 
 a pile of leaves, is all a matter of chance ; and it is all a mat- 
 ter of complete indifference to every body. So, at least, do 
 people think. 
 
 But I walk out into my friend's garden, and there I see a 
 pile of leaves lying upon his bed of early flowering bulbs. 
 Upon the leaves, also, are a few bits of boards, which keep 
 the wind from blowing them away. Now, it occurs to me 
 
338 ADAPTATION HUMAN AND DIVINE. 
 
 that this is a useful covering for the bulbs in the soil. It will 
 keep the frost out of the ground, and the bulbs will remain 
 uninjured, and secure an early start in the spring. This ar- 
 rangement was not the result of accident. This covering was 
 probably placed here by my friend, and he did it because he 
 understood that it would protect his bulbs. In fact, it was his 
 good sense, his intelligence, which prompted him to do it. I 
 can understand this act, and perceive why it was performed. I 
 feel very certain that it illustrates my friend's intelligence. 
 
 A man walks along the street in the rain with an umbrella 
 over his head, and I feel sure that somebody contrived that 
 umbrella with an understanding of its use. It is intended for 
 rainy weather. It is adapted or correlated to rainy weather. 
 The key which unlocks my door sustains an intelligible correla- 
 tion to the lock, and all the countless contrivances which make 
 up the admirable improvements of civilized life are so many 
 manifestations of the intelligence of their contrivers. We can 
 not look upon the simplest invention or coadaptation of one 
 thing to another, without feeling compelled to regard it as the 
 product of intelligence. 
 
 The world is full of contrivances which were not made by 
 human hands nor invented by human brains. My hand, for 
 instance, with which I write these words, is a more admirable 
 machine than human ingenuity has ever devised. What is a 
 " walking doll " compared with the varied movements of which 
 the hand is capable? Think of all the pincers, pliers, forceps, 
 or tongs which man has invented, and answer whether one of 
 them could seize and move a pen as my fingers do it. I say 
 nothing of the mind which guides the fingers; I speak only 
 of the mechanism. If it requires intelligence to fashion the 
 pen, does it not require more intelligence to fashion the hand 
 which wields it ? Look at the joints of the fingers, and see 
 how admirably they close down upon an object. See how the 
 thumb stands opposed to the fingers. See the marvelous rapid- 
 
ORDERING MIND IN NATURE. 339 
 
 ity with which these fingers may be made to glide over the keys 
 of a piano, and the astonishing accuracy with which they elicit 
 a predetermined succession of sounds. Think of the number- 
 less varieties of activity to which they may be put. Is there 
 any human contrivance more exquisitely fitted for the work 
 intended to be performed ? Certainly there is none which can 
 perform such a variety of work. 
 
 Now, I think every one is ready to admit that the hand is 
 as much a work of intelligence as a pair of tongs. This, at 
 least, is the natural, instinctive admission. True, we have nev- 
 er seen the Author of nature engaged in making hands by any 
 such process as men employ ; but does that really make any 
 difference? Is it of any consequence to know by what in- 
 struments or means a device is carried into execution ? Is it of 
 any consequence to know whether a contrivance is the result 
 of human or divine agency ? If we can detect contrivance, do 
 we not irresistibly say, Here is mind ? 
 
 If mind was really concerned in the formation of the hand, 
 how consummate a mind it was ! Look into the internal struct- 
 ure of bone and nourishing marrow, joints, ligaments, sheaths, 
 juices, veins, arteries, lymphatics, nerves, muscular fibres, blood, 
 blood-corpuscles, skin, fat all, and more, entering into the con- 
 stitution of this little instrument ; all, and more, kept continu- 
 ally at work, each in its own way, to maintain this wonderful 
 hand in a state of perfect repair. Look deeper. This very 
 skin is composed of several layers ; the deeper layers, of count- 
 less little cells, visible only with the microscope ; underneath 
 are innumerable loops of nerve-fibres to give it sensibility, while 
 the whole integument is perforated by hundreds of thousands 
 of minute apertures for the escape of vapor, and for other uses ; 
 and every part, to the central bone, possesses a minute structure 
 revealed only to the microscope, which is just as elaborate, just 
 as perfect, just as carefully and complicately finished at the far- 
 ther limits of our powers of scrutiny as in the larger and more 
 
340 MECHANISM IN ANIMAL STRUCTURES. 
 
 visible parts. Down toward the infinitely small, these struct- 
 ural details may be traced ; and we have every reason to believe 
 that far beyond the powers of our vision are parts and coadap- 
 tations and activities as wonderful as those witnessed in the 
 larger movements of the fingers. Where is the human contriv- 
 ance displaying a thousandth part of this elaborateness? In- 
 deed, there is nothing to compare with it. The detail is bound- 
 less ; and the intelligence that could provide for all so far trans- 
 cends our human powers that to us it is infinite. 
 
 This is one way in which intelligence is manifested in nat- 
 ure. The end for which a contrivance is produced we style the 
 " final cause ;" and we deem it perfectly legitimate to argue in- 
 telligence from final causes in nature, because our minds are so 
 constituted that we are necessarily impelled to attribute a use- 
 ful collocation of parts to intelligent purpose. But intelligence 
 is also manifested in nature in quite another way. All the 
 work of nature is performed according to fixed methods ; and 
 the very idea of method implies systematic, thought-elaborated, 
 and intelligible order, according to which events are made to 
 transpire. 
 
 We were speaking of hands. Has not the reader remarked 
 the striking resemblance between the human hand and that of 
 the monkey ? Each is used nearly in the same way ; but what 
 is most decisive, each is composed of exactly the same number 
 of bones and joints, similarly connected together, and all the 
 internal fabric is almost identical in the two. In short, the 
 plan of the two hands is the same, and no one can fail to per- 
 ceive it. They are as much alike as a shovel and a spade. 
 
 But place, now, the monkey's hand by the side of the squir- 
 rel's. The squirrel is a vastly less knowing animal ; but he 
 uses his hand in a similar way, and it is easy to show that its 
 structure is substantially identical. The hands of the squirrel 
 and the monkey are built upon one plan. 
 
 But how does the hand of the cat differ from that of the 
 
PLANS IN ANIMAL STRUCTURES. 341 
 
 squirrel? True, the squirrel can handle a nut more skillfully 
 than a cat ; but examination shows that the bones of the two 
 hands are identical in number, form, and arrangement. No 
 one, again, would feel disposed to allege that the plan of the 
 cat's paw is materially different from that of the dog or the 
 bear. In fact, we feel compelled to admit that the fore-feet of 
 all these quadrupeds are constructed on the same plan as the 
 human hand. Now, extending our comparisons, we even find 
 the alligator and lizard and frog possessed of the same kind of 
 anterior extremity. The seal and the otter, to adapt them to 
 swimming, have the fingers webbed; and the whale exhibits 
 even a further shaping of the hand into the form of a fin, 
 which, lastly, in the fish, exhibits the lowest modification of a 
 plan which, in its highest development, is the admirable human 
 hand. The fin of a fish, the flipper of a whale, the paw of a 
 cat, the hand of a man, are only modifications of one set of 
 bones varied manifestations of one idea. 
 
 This is not all. Though we can not here employ the argu- 
 ment, nor appropriate the space to prove it, we may assert that 
 this identity of plan includes also the hoofed quadrupeds lit- 
 tle as the horse's foot resembles the hand which flits over the 
 keys of a piano-forte. But even this is but the beginning of 
 these wonderful resemblances. The entire arm of man is iden- 
 tical in plan with the anterior extremity of all other verte- 
 brates. The wing of a bird is only a human arm shaped and 
 consolidated to support an array of quills. The hinder extrem- 
 ities, also, of all back - boned animals are similarly related to 
 each other ; and every one must have observed how closely they 
 resemble the anterior extremities. 
 
 Thus we arrive at this remarkable conclusion, that all the 
 limbs of all quadrupeds, birds, reptiles, and fishes are but mod- 
 ifications of one plan, which in man we see adapted to the pur- 
 pose of seizing a pen, greeting a friend, or enforcing an idea by 
 means of a gesture. 
 
342 INFINITE MIND IN NATURE. 
 
 It is impossible that all these limbs should be thus connected 
 together by identity of plan unless intelligence had conceived 
 the connection and employed the means to realize it in these 
 various forms. Now, when we think of the countless tribes 
 and species of vertebrate animals, in all parts of the world, in- 
 habiting land, sea, and air, burrowing in the ground, sauntering 
 along the river-shore, climbing trees, and occupying every im- 
 aginable situation, we perceive that the mind which has planned 
 and executed all these adaptations according to one ideal con- 
 ception, must transcend inconceivably all the powers of human 
 intelligence. And when we know that these numberless adap- 
 tations have been perpetuated in existence for hundreds of thou- 
 sands of years before the creation of man, we feel that the intelli- 
 gence displayed in nature is practically, if not absolutely, infinite. 
 
 These are single examples. Could we speak of all, how 
 would our thoughts swell with the intelligible manifestations of 
 the omnipresence of infinite mind in nature ! 
 
 III. Manifestations of Ecneficence in Creation. 
 
 Sitting before my bright coal-fire this winter evening, I fell 
 into a kind of reverie, which, since it has a moral, I may be 
 pardoned for repeating. How comfortable is this warmth, I 
 mused with myself, and to what inconveniences we should be 
 subjected were we not provided with this anthracite ! Oak and 
 hickory wood, it is true, make admirable fires, but how rapidly 
 is the country undergoing exhaustion ! It is only on the front- 
 iers that we can now obtain cord-wood at a cheaper rate than 
 coal ; and, in the densely settled districts, the price of wood is 
 far above that of coal, and is rapidly increasing. Beyond all 
 question, the supply of wood is melting away ; and, unless we 
 had these stores of coal to draw upon, a pound of fuel would 
 soon command more money than a pound of wheat. And what 
 enormous quantities of this coal are consumed ! Look into those 
 coal -yards in any of our great cities; there are mountains of 
 
ANTICIPATIONS OF MAN IN COAL. 343 
 
 anthracite and bituminous coals piled up for the winter's con- 
 sumption. It is not alone in domestic fires that this substance 
 is made to yield us such supplies of heat. There are thousands 
 of steam-engines all over the country, sawing lumber, weaving 
 cloth, spinning cotton, making pins and buttons, propelling 
 locomotives and steamboats, and performing countless other 
 kinds of work ; and, if the supply of coal should fail, half of 
 these engines must cease from their labors. Yes, indeed, this 
 black and smutty article lies at the very foundation of domestic 
 comfort and modern civilization. 
 
 But what is it? I asked myself. And then my thoughts 
 ran over the series of steps by which the man of science has 
 attained to a knowledge of the nature and origin of this prod- 
 uct of the rocks. Why, this black, hard substance is, after all, 
 nothing but real wood. It is the vegetable growth of other 
 long-past ages. There was no man upon the earth to fell the 
 trees and utilize the forests, and so they were laid by and pet- 
 rified, and preserved till there should be a man to use them. 
 The forests of the human time, then far in the future, would 
 not suffice to supply the wants of the coming man, and so it 
 seems nature began to store away the material of the forests 
 hundreds of thousands of years before the world had reached 
 such a condition that man could subsist upon it. This coal 
 could not have been packed down for any other being than 
 man. The beasts of what use was coal to them? As to 
 spiritual intelligences which may inhabit the earth of what 
 use is coal to them ? unless to demonstrate to them, as it does 
 to us, that the Power which made the world had the intelli- 
 gence to know that man was coming, and the goodness to pro- 
 vide for his wants. Yes, I can not see it otherwise. As we 
 can not conceive of any thing done without an adequate mo- 
 tive, and we can discern no other reason why some of the 
 rocks were made combustible, it must have been so ordained 
 for the comfort and uses of man. 
 
344 GLIMPSE OF COAL-MAKING TIMES. 
 
 But if this was really so, what an amazing amount of work 
 has been done in nature for no other object than human uses ! 
 To grow millions of acres of forests and lay them down in beds 
 of coal was but a single one of the steps by which man has 
 been placed in possession of this fuel. All my reading and 
 study on this subject comes up to mind. I seem to sink back 
 into the twilight of the world's long history. The ocean is 
 here, and the land or, at least, a large part of it and the sea 
 is full of fishes and mollusks, and various other creatures. But 
 the land is desolate and tenantless. The work of creation has 
 come to a standstill. To this time the march of improvement 
 has been continuous ; but now no higher creature can be sum- 
 moned into being, because the air is irrespirable. It is filled 
 with carbonic acid gas, which is immediately fatal to every 
 animal which respires it. Will Infinite Power annihilate this 
 poison, and then call air-breathers into being ? Infinite Power 
 could have done both ; but Infinite Beneficence chose to wait. 
 All the Northern States except New England and New York 
 had just been lifted above the level of the sea; and all over 
 this area luxuriant forms of strange vegetation sprung into ex- 
 istence, fed on this atmospheric poison, fixed it in the form of 
 stem and leaf, and fell down at maturity, accumulating enor- 
 mous beds of peat. Now those regions subsided, and ocean 
 returned, and layers of mud and sand were strewed over the 
 beds of peat. Then another uplift poured off the ocean's wa- 
 ters, another growth of strange forests accumulated other peat- 
 beds, and another subsidence resulted in their burial. These 
 vicissitudes were continued many ages. At length, with one 
 grand throe, the Alleghany Mountains were brought up, and 
 the wide expanse of the Northern States lay spread out, a per- 
 manent home for future races of animals. But this was not 
 till the atmosphere had become purified. And now could be 
 ushered into being those advancing forms of animal life which 
 must breathe air. The end was secured, and the work of 
 
THE WORLD SHAPED TO HUMAN WANTS. 345 
 
 creation could continue. Yea, a greater end was secured, 
 which looked ages into the future, and provided for the wants 
 of human creatures in the nineteenth century of the Christian 
 era. And while the ages were rolling on, earthquake visita- 
 tions passed over the land, the deep rocky sheets were tilted, 
 and in places folded together, and the deep -hidden beds of 
 coal were exposed at the surface, lest man should fail to dis- 
 cover his store-house of fuel. 
 
 The ages still rolled on, and the lands became wasted for the 
 uses of the many tribes of animals which were marched across 
 the stage of being, before the advent of their master. Then, 
 again, Beneficence put forth its hand, summoned a continent- 
 wide glacier to plane it down, washed it once again in the sea, 
 and here was a bright, new, soil-covered surface for man's ex- 
 clusive use. 
 
 Now the promise of the ages was fulfilled. When man came 
 upon the earth, what more could have been devised to render 
 his home abundant in comforts ? Every element ministered to 
 his wants and enjoyments. Here were fruits and grains and 
 game to appease his hunger, and the very activities put forth 
 to secure them were pleasurable and healthful. Every func- 
 tion of his being brought delight. He looked forth upon the 
 green field, and its color pleased his eye. The evening cloud, 
 the tinted rainbow, the swaying bough, the painted violet's cup, 
 awakened responses in his soul which made him happy ; while 
 the awful precipice and the thunder-voiced tempest found an- 
 swering emotions which swelled his soul in the presence of 
 their sublimities. Even his questioning intelligence was re- 
 warded with answers in the revelations of truth which beamed 
 from the objects around him. Was he capable of reason here 
 were objects to be reasoned upon and to yield him the fruits 
 of thought. Nature had her secrets, but she was ready to re- 
 veal them when intelligently and persistently asked. And so 
 man worked out the story of the earth and was delighted. He 
 
340 RESPONSES TO INTELLECTUAL QUESTIONINGS. 
 
 lost no great fact of its wonderful history by being delayed in 
 his coming till countless ages of revolutions had passed. Cu- 
 rious with insatiate curiosity, he could gratify it by peering 
 into and through those long, dark ages lapsed, and glimpsing 
 the tremendous march of terrestrial events on a forming world. 
 What beneficence was here! With a yearning thirst for a 
 knowledge of the world and himself, how miserable would have 
 been his situation if no idea could have entered his mind ! but 
 how blessed, when the world was found stored with stimuli to 
 curiosity and the materials of thought! Of what avail were 
 suggestions to thought while the world was the home only of 
 brutes ? Of what need were they to incorporeal intelligences 
 who read directly the idea symbolized in the material form, 
 and have no relations of dependence upon matter? It was to 
 human intelligence, materially embodied, that all these things 
 were accommodated. These sources of enjoyment, these ma- 
 terial symbols of thought, these records of the ideas of God, 
 these intelligible relics of the long past, these myriad translat- 
 able signs of creative power and beneficence, which render the 
 world all luminous with the halo of divine thought these all 
 sustain no relations as material forms and objects to any other 
 being than man. They were provided for man countless ages 
 before the birth of our race. They were ordained to augment 
 human happiness, and to lift the thoughts to the unseen reali- 
 ties which underlie phenomena, and to lead them, by no uncer- 
 tain path, to that Supreme Reality in whom all being finally 
 centres. 
 
 Nor was this the end of my reveries; for thought floated 
 on over the circle of social relations as sources of happiness to 
 man over the religious sentiments and hopes, and the mate- 
 rials in nature for their activity and gratification the yearning 
 of the soul over the profound problems of the past and future 
 of its existence, and the data in our possession for the solution 
 of these great problems ; but everywhere rose up reminders of 
 
VNIVERSAL GRAVITATION. 347 
 
 the Beneficence which has exerted so controlling an influence 
 in the ordinations of the world of which man forms a part. 
 
 So the very light which beams from my comfortable fire re- 
 veals the record of long-continuod preparations for the comfort 
 of man ; and this is but the title-page of a volume filled with 
 recitals of the Beneficence which shines in nature. 
 
 IV. The Unity of Creation. 
 
 How vast is the empire of gravitation ! The acorn falls to 
 the ground in the forest, drawn by the same force which bends 
 the courses of the planets. A drop of water in the air assumes 
 the form of a little sphere, and so does the molten lead de- 
 scending from the summit of the shot-tower. How few of us 
 have realized that the great planet is only a larger sphere hurled 
 into space to assume its form under the same law as a drop of 
 rain ! 
 
 The spherical form is natural, we say. Right. It only 
 amounts to the same thing to say that it is the result of grav- 
 itation that force, whatever it may be, which draws all the 
 parts equally toward the centre, and which draws all matter to- 
 ward all other matter. We say it is & property of matter to do 
 this ; but really, we can only be certain that it is the method 
 according to which matter is moved. We do not know wheth- 
 er it is a property of matter to move itself according to this 
 method, or a property of something else to move matter. Now, 
 I think we know nothing about matter as itself acting ; nor 
 about force as itself acting in matter ; and all we can say is, 
 that force is exerted by living will. I am inclined to think 
 the only reasonable account we can give of that gravitating 
 force which causes the fall of an acorn is this: that some liv- 
 ing will is exerted upon it, and that it is a self-imposed method 
 of this will to act always in the same way under the same cir- 
 cumstances. This uniform method is its law ; it is what we 
 call a natural law. 
 
348 UNITY OF THE SOLAR SYSTEM. 
 
 Now, I would like to direct attention to the vastness of the 
 intervals of space and time through which this WILL has exert- 
 ed itself, and is exerting itself. We thought the distance of 
 the sun amazingly vast when we calculated that a train of cars 
 would require three hundred and fifty years to travel across 
 the interval ; but the distance of Neptune from the sun is such 
 that more than ten thousand years would be required. And 
 yet Neptune the farthest planet is not so remote from the 
 sun but he feels the sun's attraction, and is held, as it .were, by 
 a halter, careering around the controlling centre always at about 
 the same distance from it. This central attraction is the same' 
 which keeps all the planets from flying off in straight lines ; 
 and it is the same force which causes the fall of an apple in 
 the orchard. How vast the presence of a Being who can thus 
 exert his will in the orchard, and in the sun, and in the remotest 
 planet ! There are a hundred and sixty planets revolving about 
 the sun, all moved forward by a single impulse, and all bent 
 out of right lines and into regular orbits by the sun's attrac- 
 tion. There are little Jess than twenty satellites or moons re- 
 volving similarly about these planets. What further excites our 
 wonder is this: that all these bodies revolve in orbits which 
 are a little longer than broad (ellipses), and all lie nearly in the 
 same plane; that these bodies all move in the same direction, 
 from west to east ; that they all rotate on their axes from west 
 to east ; that they are all a little flattened at the poles ; that 
 such of them as we have been able to examine indicate a suc- 
 cession of seasons like our own ; and that they have land and 
 water, and clouds and storms, and sunrise and sunset. In short, 
 this little spot which we call our earth is, as it were, but one 
 nook in a vast farm, while all around is the same system of 
 fields and fences and crops and cultivation as we witness with- 
 in the bounds of our little nook. 
 
 But, after all, this is hardly the beginning of the vastness 
 of the empire over which gravitation exercises dominion. The 
 
UNITY OF THE STELLAR FIRMAMENT. 349 
 
 power of gravitation is felt in the stars. They, also, arc in mo- 
 tion. Hundreds of them are also revolving in orbits in ellip- 
 tical orbits such motions as can only be explained as we ex- 
 plain the fall of an acorn on the earth. The same power is 
 there the same WILL is there. The very nearest of those stars 
 is so remote that if we were to represent the distance of Nept- 
 une by ten inches, that star would be one mile away. And yet 
 other stars are two thousand times as remote as the nearest. 
 
 We should be still at home could we fly to those remotest 
 stars still in the house of our God. And could we take the 
 wings of light, we might travel over such intervals as we now 
 travel to San Francisco or Calcutta with this difference, that 
 while by cars we go but fifty feet a second, by light we should 
 go one hundred and eighty-six thousand miles a second. Still, 
 by light, some of our journeys would be rather prolonged. 
 Even by light we should require three and a half years to reach 
 that nearest star. 
 
 But then, though we can not go, light goes. There is a 
 highway for light even to the stars the farthest stars for 
 their light has traveled over it in coming to us. That is not 
 a foreign territory from which they glimmer down on us. 
 Those are our own skies in which they are set. One ether 
 bathes all the bodies within the visible universe, and is every- 
 where tremulous with one kind of vibration, regardless of the 
 luminous cause whether the fire on the hearth, the great sun, 
 or the most distant star. 
 
 There is even a closer union than this. The very dust of 
 our streets is made luminous in the sun. There is the same 
 iron which rusts in our garden hoe ; the same hydrogen which 
 we drink from the well ; the same lime which makes the crayon 
 with which we work our problems on the blackboard ; the same 
 sodium which forms the salt upon our tables, and salts the wa- 
 ter of the ocean. Indeed, we now know that the sun is made 
 of the same materials as the earth. How marvelous an achieve- 
 
350 UNITY OF PLANETARY HISTORY. 
 
 ment of science was that, to learn the very substance of the 
 sun ! But so it is. 
 
 And now, more amazing still, those vastly more distant stars 
 are one in substance with our sun ; one in substance with the 
 mold which grows our cabbages in the garden. We are surer 
 of this, by far, than we are of the distance of the moon from 
 the earth. How do these facts impress us with the feeling of 
 the unity of the realm of matter ! No foreign territory gloams 
 down upon us from sullen highlands over the border. All, all 
 is the dominion of one Will, one Intelligence, one God. 
 
 Our thoughts have been roaming among the worlds exist- 
 ing in our day. Let us send them roaming back through time, 
 among other scenes and other worlds. There is a pathway 
 which leads imagination back to a beginning. It is too long a 
 road for us to follow now.( J ) Let us fly back, in thought, to 
 that beginning of the existence of our world and all the other 
 worlds which rotate about our sun. How strange the scene ! 
 Instead of separate worlds, we behold one vast sphere of fiery 
 vapor, whose diameter is greater than that of the orbit of Nept- 
 une. This is the farthest limit to which science guides us back- 
 ward. Whence that fiery vapor, and whence the forces of mat- 
 ter which abide in it, science can not inform us; but as our 
 reason declares that even matter and force being dead, invol- 
 untary existences themselves must be but effects caused by 
 some living will, so now we fall back on the utterances of our 
 reason, and assert that God is the author of matter and force, 
 and we feel that that saying is true : " In the beginning God 
 created the heavens and the earth." 
 
 Now, in such a beginning all the bodies of the solar system 
 were merged in one common mass. All these bodies have 
 therefore come forth from a common mass have had a com- 
 
 (') See chap. v. ; also "Sketches of Creation," by the present writer; 
 also MetJiodist Quarterly Review for April, 1873, and January, 1874. 
 
UNITY OF CREATIVE INTELLIGENCE. 351 
 
 mon origin and a common history one method, one will guid- 
 ing all those wonderful changes which, in the long course of 
 ages, have resulted in separate worlds, with a common sun 
 shining down upon all their surfaces alike, and making one 
 scene of all the wide expanse of the solar system. 
 
 We have not space to recount the vicissitudes of that long 
 history through which planet after planet sprung into being; 
 and that long history of later times, during which our world 
 was undergoing a special preparation ; continents growing ; 
 mountains rising ; soils preparing ; and all with intelligible ref- 
 erence to the wants of a being then thousands of years in the 
 future. What we wish especially to impress is this : that hun- 
 dreds of thousands, and probably millions, of years were con- 
 sumed in the history over which our minds have glanced ; but 
 all the work proceeded according to one method. One set of 
 physical forces, under the mandate of the almighty Will, began, 
 continued, and completed the building of the world, and all the 
 worlds. 
 
 This firmly jointed fabric of the material universe, therefore, 
 with all its vastness, has foundations reaching back almost 
 through an eternity, which are as much a solid and connected 
 whole as the visible parts which rise above the horizon of time. 
 The power, intelligence, and goodness which we see developed 
 in the economy of nature are attributes of the same Being 
 through all the immensity of space and all the immensity of 
 time. 
 
 V. The Religious Nature of Man. 
 
 It has sometimes been held that man knows nothing of God 
 except through the written revelation ; but who can stand un- 
 der the canopy of the starry sky and gaze and ponder without 
 devotion ? Who can think of the magnitudes, the distances, 
 the complexities, the harmonies, which characterize the visible 
 creation on which he gazes, and not fee'l that there is a Power 
 
352 RELIGIOUS NATURE OF SAVAGES. 
 
 infinitely great which upholds and moves ; an intelligence infi- 
 nitely vast which plans and provides? The aspects of nature 
 have in all ages inspired men with awe and reverence. It is 
 not alone the Hebrew Psalmist who exclaims, "The heavens 
 declare the glory of God, and the firmament showeth his handi- 
 work." The sun, moon, and stars have always inspired devo- 
 tion ; and men in their ignorance have mistaken the heavenly 
 bodies for the real divinity apprehended in their inmost souls, 
 and .have worshiped them. Deeply impressed with the pres- 
 ence of superior power, savage tribes have worshiped mountains 
 and rivers, thunders and tempests. Other tribes, groveling in 
 deeper ignorance, have prostrated themselves before the croco- 
 dile or the serpent, the uncouth idol or the shapeless stock. 
 Alas that human beings should go so far astray from the true 
 God! 
 
 But there is a lesson in all this. Man must have an object 
 to worship. He feels the evidences of a power manifested 
 about him an invisible power greater than himself a power 
 whose displeasure he fears ; to whom he turns for succor when 
 in distress; to whom he feels himself accountable when he 
 sins. In the lowest stages of human condition, this feeling of 
 the divine is only a vague sentiment. In the next stage, it 
 suggests a personal deity or many deities. But underneath all 
 the polytheisms of the world, the human soul has always rec- 
 ognized a supreme Divinity, who is regarded as Creator and 
 Judge. The Greeks and Romans worshiped many deities, but 
 always either as mediatorial between man and Jove supreme, 
 or as subordinates, adequate to ordinary emergencies. The 
 ancient Brahmans worshiped fire, sun, and air, and many other 
 deities, but only as manifestations of the one supreme Deity. 
 The Egyptians, also, while polytheistic in their outward prac- 
 tices, held Kneph to be the King of Gods, the creator of all 
 things. Monotheism seems really to be the deepest faith of hu- 
 manity. 
 
RELIGIOUS SENTIMENTS UNIVERSAL. 353 
 
 I said that all peoples had, somehow, acknowledged the ne- 
 cessity of some being to worship. Worship, prayer, praise, 
 religious rites, religious symbolism these are part of the his- 
 tory of every people under the sun. The statement is not 
 made lightly. I have examined all the cases of savages alleged- 
 destitute of a religious nature, and I have been led to these 
 conclusions : In respect to many tribes, the charges are clearly 
 unfounded ; in respect to some, we have not sufficient informa- 
 tion to base any opinion upon them ; in regard to others, it is 
 only true that their religious notions are debased and shocking, 
 while still they are religious in their meaning, and argue the 
 existence of a real religious nature. Only in regard to three 
 tribes do I find the testimony such as to render it necessary to 
 admit that they appear to be without any religious sentiments. 
 These are the inhabitants of the Andaman Islands, the Gran 
 Chacos of South America, and the Arafuras of Vorkay, one of 
 the Aru Islands.^) 
 
 I hold that the united testimony, even of savage tribes even 
 of the most degraded tribes is in support of the doctrine of 
 the religious nature of man. But when we consider the his- 
 tory of the rest of mankind, how overwhelming becomes the 
 evidence ! Every nation that has attained to any degree of 
 culture has had its system of religion. The religions of Egypt 
 and Phoenicia; Judaism, Christianity (viewed merely as a his- 
 torical phenomenon), Islamism ; Brahmanism, Zoroastrianism, 
 Buddhism, and the Greek and Norse religions; Lao-tseism and 
 Confucianism ; and, in America, the religions of the Peruvians 
 and the Aztecs these fourteen great systems of religion have 
 controlled the thoughts, the hopes, the fears, and the destinies 
 of nine-tenths of all the people that have lived upon the earth. 
 
 ( J ) The writer has presented and discussed the facts here referred to in 
 two articles published in the Methodist Quarterly Review for January and 
 July, 1875. 
 
354 GOD'S NAME ON EVERY HEART. 
 
 And even philosophy, in its speculations, tends toward relig- 
 ious themes. It has been the ambition of all founders of phil- 
 osophic systems to show that they did not subvert prevailing 
 religious ideas. The very highest problems of all philosophy 
 and all science are about the cause of things the first cause 
 the origin of matter and force, and the orderly structure of the 
 universe. No one, it seems to me, can contemplate the histo- 
 ry of the human race and not be convinced that the religious 
 nature has ever been active, ever uppermost.^) 
 
 Such a long-continued manifestation of religious feeling, re- 
 ligious thought, and religious activity must be regarded as an 
 expression of the nature of man a demonstration that the re- 
 ligious faculties are as deeply seated in our constitution as the 
 intellectual. And then, if our natures impel us inevitably to 
 lift up the voice to God in prayer, there must be a God to hear, 
 or man is grievously mocked. If all mankind have felt im- 
 pelled to entertain a belief in the future life, there must be a 
 hereafter to man, or his very nature utters a lie. Now, if there 
 be not realities answering to the religious faculties of man, there 
 exists here a sad lack of co-ordination, not witnessed in any 
 other faculty or instinct, either of man or brute. 
 
 God thus writes his name on every heart. But if man be 
 too proud to confess the feeling of devotion, or if he deny that 
 God has left a testimony in the heart, he can not exercise his 
 intelligence without finding out God. We have already seen 
 how, in tracing back the history of our world, we find a begin- 
 ninga sphere of fiery vapor and have been reminded that 
 science can conduct us back no farther. Still, as reason asserts 
 that whatever exists has been caused to exist, we feel confident 
 that the primordial vapor had a cause ; and, as science can as- 
 sign no cause, we feel compelled to fall back on that cause 
 
 ( ] ) A very considerable exemplification of these positions appears in the 
 second and third chapters of the present work. 
 
DEDUCTION TO DEITY. 355 
 
 which the soul spontaneously and universally assigns as the an- 
 tecedent of all existence. Thus the principle of causality leads 
 thought up to God. 
 
 We have heretofore turned our attention to some of the 
 manifestations of intelligence in creation. We have read in- 
 telligence in numberless contrivances, as in the mechanism of 
 the hand or eye. We have also read intelligence in the admi- 
 rable plans discovered in the operations of nature. We have 
 seen, for instance, that the very plan of the human frame is 
 only a development and perfection of the structure of the low- 
 est vertebrated animal ; and that when the fish was first intro- 
 duced upon the earth, in remote geologic time, it was a germ 
 which was destined to expand into man ; it was, in reality, a 
 prophecy of man. Thought we have found inscribed every- 
 where upon the pages of nature. At least, we have found ev- 
 erywhere such evidences that, were we concerned with mere 
 human affairs, we should assert positively that they are proofs 
 of intelligence. But reason can not make a discrimination 
 here. There is no datum for discrimination. Mechanical 
 adaptations, order, utility, or other correlations, are everywhere 
 and necessarily proofs of intelligence. Hence the universe dis- 
 plays intelligence, and intelligence as much above human as the 
 universe exceeds a human work. 
 
 Again, man distinguishes between right and wrong. All 
 men do it. They feel that certain deeds are right and deserve 
 approval, and that other deeds are wrong and merit condemna- 
 tion. They feel that there is a moral law which can not be in- 
 fringed with impunity. Now, if there is a law, there is a Law- 
 giver. If punishment waits upon wrong-doing, there is a mor- 
 al Judge. If man exists under a government of moral law, 
 there sits a moral Governor on the throne. 
 
 So, reason from whatever datum we will, the conclusion is 
 GOD. And this conclusion of reason is only identical with the 
 intuition which animates every human heart. This proof that 
 
356 REVELATION PROBABLE. 
 
 the idea of God arises spontaneously in the human soul, wheth- 
 er as a direct intuition, a conclusion of a process of abstract 
 reasoning, or an impression conveyed by the phenomena of 
 the universe, creates a presumption in favor of a written revela- 
 tion claiming to come from God. If man knows beforehand 
 that there is a God, he feels predisposed to listen to his mes- 
 sages. This pre-existent knowledge of God is assumed by all 
 the Scriptural writers. They do not attempt to prove the ex- 
 istence of Deity they do not even assert it. Christ himself 
 did not introduce a religion foreign to human nature. Such a 
 religion could never have found a foot-hold. Christianity finds 
 a deep response in the soul of man. It is built upon a founda- 
 tion older than itself a foundation which can never be over- 
 thrown without uprooting the instincts of humanity. 
 
 Thus the voices of the universe, which utter perpetually the 
 name of God and magnify his power, wisdom, and goodness, 
 are found to be in harmony with the voices of the soul, which 
 whisper the name of God perpetually in our ears; and both 
 these voices chime with the Scripture which saith, " The Lord 
 God omnipotent reigneth ; let the earth rejoice." 
 
 VI. Genesis and Geology. 
 
 In the first chapter of Genesis we find a brief account of the 
 creation of the world. Until modern times, it was the popu- 
 lar opinion(') that this narrative taught that the earth and 
 
 (') It is well known that this has not been the universal opinion of phi- 
 losophers, or even of orthodox theologians. St. Augustine, to go no farther 
 back, maintained that all created things were created instantaneously, but 
 only potentially so, and as far as concerned the emission of original causal 
 efficiency ("potentialiter atque causaliter"); while following this primordial 
 creative volition, through a period of indefinite length, "per temporum 
 moras " (as he styles the " days " of Genesis) the forms of the world rose 
 slowly out of potentiality into actuality. Of this opinion St. Thomas Aqui- 
 nas says, "Et Iwcc opinioplus mihi placet" (2 Sent. Dist. 12, Quaest. 1, art. 2); 
 
THE "DAYS" OF GENESIS. 357 
 
 heavens were created during an interval of six literal days, and 
 that the work dates back but a few thousand years. These 
 views were entertained when our Bible was translated into En- 
 glish. Since that date, several sciences have sprung into ex- 
 istence which throw a va^t amount of light on the history of 
 creation; and if King James's translators had their work to 
 perform to-day, they would see meanings in Genesis which the 
 world had not dreamed of two hundred years ago ; and they 
 would make the translation read a little differently, in order to 
 make it agree more exactly with the original Hebrew. These 
 sciences especially geology and astronomy demonstrate that 
 this creation, though not eternal, has stood millions of years, 
 and that this world even required millions of years for its for- 
 mation. We know that the Infinite Being ivas able to create 
 this world in six days, but the evidences are that he did not ; 
 and if he did not, it would be folly to persuade ourselves oth- 
 erwise. It is infinitely better to learn how God really did pro- 
 ceed, than to turn our backs upon scientific evidence which no 
 candid mind can resist, and wrench our Bible to make it fit a 
 
 and St. Bonaventure says, " Multum rationabilis et valde subtilis ; and in 
 reference to his method calls it a " via philosophical while the contrary 
 opinion is pronounced " minus rationabilis quam alia " (Librura secund., 
 Sent. Dist. xii., Quacst. ii., art. 1, conclusio). Cardinal Noris, in 1673, vindi- 
 cating these views of Augustine, says he "subtilem prorsus ac se dignam 
 sententiam excogitavit, ncmpe dies illos intdligendos esse mysticc" etc. ; and the 
 cardinal then condemns the adverse opinions of Lusitanus and Charles 
 Moreau (" Vindiciae Augus.," c. iv., ix. ; see Migne, " Patrologia Cursus 
 Completus," torn, xlvii., p. 719). Other similar opinions, recorded before 
 the establishment of modern geological views, may be found in Albertus 
 Magnus, Denis the Carthusian (1470), Cardinal Cajetan (1530), Melchior 
 Canus (1560),Bannes (1580), Vincentius Contenson (1670), Macedo (1673), 
 Tonti (1714), Serry (1720), Berti (1740), and, more explicitly, in reference 
 to the days, St. Hildegard, Bertier, Berchetti, Ghici, Robebacher, and Bos- 
 suet. For these references I am indebted to Mivart, Contemporary Re- 
 view, January, 1872, where further particulars may be obtained. 
 
358 PRELIMINARIES TO THE HARMONY. 
 
 misconception of facts. The author of Genesis has given us an 
 account which, when rightly understood, conforms admirably to 
 the indications of latest science. At the same time, he has not 
 attempted to write a scientific history of creation. It possesses 
 a simple, though sublime, style, and is clothed in the thoughts 
 and molded in the structure of Oriental poetry. While poet- 
 ical, it is not an aimless reverie ; while unscientific, it does not 
 depart from the truth. While we have to interpret it in the 
 light of modern science, we have no occasion to reject it as 
 simply an Eastern myth, of no more significance than the le- 
 gends of the Ganges or of Yucatan. We can show that it ex- 
 emplifies a most impressive harmony between the utterances of 
 trusting inspiration and the generalizations of rigorous science. 
 In proceeding to explain this harmony, we must premise a 
 few things bearing on the import of a few words employed by 
 the author or authors of Genesis, which, for convenience, we 
 may ascribe to Moses: 1. The word translated "created," in 
 the first verse, refers to origination from non-existence. It is 
 of no consequence to assert that such creation is "unthinkable," 
 for not only does the text assert such creation, but human rea- 
 son demands such a resting-place for the chain of finite events. 
 2. There is a little particle (eth) in the Hebrew, not transla- 
 ted in our version, which (often, at least) means the substance 
 o/j and, standing before the words translated " heaven " and 
 " earth," expresses " the substance of the heaven and the sub- 
 stance of the earth." (*) 3. Instead of " heaven," our text 
 should read " heavens," and the allusion is apparently to other 
 firmaments of stars which Sir William Herschel discovered ly- 
 ing far beyond the confines of our starry firmament. 4. The 
 word translated " day " signifies a period of indefinite length 
 
 (') Dr. Strong informs us (privately) that he does not attribute such 
 force to this particle. But see the Appendix to this section of the pres- 
 ent paper. 
 
GASEOUS AND STORMY PERIODS. 359 
 
 as in Gen. ii., 11 ; Job xiv., 6 ; xviii., 20 ; Isa. xxx., 8 ; Ezek. 
 xxxi., 25 ; Prov. vi., 34. 5. The word translated "made" in the 
 sixteenth verse, often signifies "appointed," as in Psa. civ., 19. 
 
 Now, let us see what science indicates in reference to the 
 order of creation : 
 
 FIRST PERIOD. A Fiery Mist. All the matter of the sun, 
 moon, and planets existed primevally at a temperature so high 
 that it was not only fused, but converted into a luminous vapor, 
 and blended in one mass. Its pre-eminent characteristic was 
 luminosity. In this, no chemical affinities found play ; but the 
 law of cooling and consequent contraction, and also the laws of 
 gravitation and inertia, held sway. Accordingly, it began to 
 cool, and through a long process, which, however interesting, 
 we have not room to trace, it became divided up into a series 
 of planets and satellites a vast central mass remaining. The 
 smaller masses cooled rapidly, and attained a somewhat solidi- 
 fied and darkened state, while the central mass was so large 
 that it cooled more slowly, and continued (as it still does) to 
 emit supplies of light and heat for the benefit of planetary 
 bodies. 
 
 SECOND PERIOD. Descent of Rains, and Accumulation of 
 Sediments. Confining our view to a single planet our own 
 world a time came in the process of cooling when the chill 
 of the upper atmosphere condensed the vapor of water for the 
 first time, and clouds began to form. Now the light of the 
 sun, which had fallen upon the earth from the beginning of its 
 separate existence, was by degrees shut out, and total darkness 
 enshrouded the world. As these clouds held all the water be- 
 longing to our planet, they poured forth the most abundant 
 rains, which, by beating upon the rocky surface, and by the 
 wear of torrents, produced vast amounts of sediment, which 
 were spread over the bottom of the accumulated ocean. Chem- 
 ical reactions also took place in these waters which threw down 
 sheets of sediments, which mingled with those of mechanical 
 
 16 
 
360 LAND, AND RENEWED SUN-LIGHT. 
 
 origin. These sediments were the material from which the 
 oldest beds of rock were formed. By such a precipitation of 
 rains, the clouds were thinned twilight filtered through them, 
 and a separation was effected between the waters which were 
 above the earth and the waters which were upon the earth. 
 
 THIRD PERIOD. Uplift of Continents Appearance of Ma- 
 rine Plants. The continued cooling and shrinking of the 
 earth developed wrinkles in the crust (or solid exterior inclosing 
 the still heated interior), and these grew from age to age until 
 they became lands rising above the level of the ocean. All 
 the continents and islands of to-day have grown from those be- 
 ginnings. Continent-building commenced while yet the rainy 
 period continued, and, as soon as sufficient light penetrated the 
 waters of the ocean, sea-weeds appeared. 
 
 FOURTH PERIOD. Dispersion of the Clouds Appearance of 
 the Sun, Moon, and Stars Plant -growth. At length the 
 cooled world ceased to convert the ocean's waters into steam, 
 to be returned in perpetual rains, and so the clouds were dis- 
 persed. Now the sun shone again upon the earth. The scene 
 was changed. When the clouds first gathered, the earth was 
 partially self-luminous, and cast no shadow, and consequently 
 there was no night. Now the darkened world cast its shadow 
 behind, and, on the unveiling of the sun, the phenomena of 
 day and night were, for the first time, possible. Sunrise and 
 sunset now possessed a new significance. This is the Azoic 
 Period in geological science. 
 
 FIFTH PERIOD. Marine Animals, Aquatic Reptiles, and Birds. 
 The simplest possible forms of animal life next appeared, and 
 these were followed by higher and higher in regular succession 
 for many cycles of ages. For more than half this interval, an- 
 imals breathed only water; and when at length air-breathers 
 appeared, they were still doomed to inhabit the waters. They 
 were aquatic reptiles great monsters. Just at the close of 
 this period, winged reptiles and then real birds, made their ad- 
 
THE BIBLICAL "DAYS." 361 
 
 vent, and a great change passed over the life of the globe. 
 This period is composed of the Eozoic, Palaeozoic, and Mesozoic 
 periods of geology. 
 
 SIXTH PERIOD. The Reign of Mammals, followed by the 
 Advent of Man. When the long reign of reptiles had ended, 
 quadrupeds and monkeys appeared on the earth, and held ex- 
 clusive possession, till at last man arrived and assumed do- 
 minion. 
 
 SEVENTH PERIOD. The Period now passing. Such is the 
 accepted geological story condensed into a few sentences. 
 
 Now, turning to an analysis of the Biblical account, we find 
 it to stand thus : 
 
 THE THEME (verses 1, 2). 1. All existence flows from God. 
 2. A glimpse of the cloud-enveloped world in mid-development. 
 (See Second Period.) 
 
 FIRST DAY (verses 3-5). Creation of light. 
 
 SECOND DAY (verses 6-8). Firmament, or separation be- 
 tween the waters. 
 
 THIRD DAY (verses 9-13). Formation of dry land and 
 plants. 
 
 FOURTH DAY (verses 14-19). Appointment of sun, moon, 
 and stars. 
 
 FIFTH DAY (verses 20-23). Creation of aquatic animals 
 and birds. 
 
 SIXTH DAY (verses 24-31). Creation of land animals and, 
 lastly, man. 
 
 SEVENTH DAY (Gen. ii., 1-3). God rested his Sabbath. 
 
 Now compare the work of these " days " with the events of 
 the seven " periods " before indicated, and judge whether the 
 correspondence is not real, and, indeed, much greater than we 
 could expect of a history written in an age before the birth of 
 science, and (according to popular chronology), 2500 years aft- 
 er the close of the events which it narrates. On the old in- 
 terpretation, the Biblical account was irreconcilable with even 
 
362 ON THE MEANING OF fix. 
 
 popular information. How could light exist on the first day, 
 and plants vegetate upon the third, while the sun, the source of 
 light and of all organic activity, had no existence before the 
 fourth day ? Only a short-sighted faith will stake the credibil- 
 ity of its oracles on views of nature which have been proved 
 untenable and incredible. 
 
 [APPENDIX. To the foregoing article the following adden- 
 dum was made at a subsequent date. 
 
 The excessive brevity of this series of articles, necessitated 
 by the straitened limits of these pages, precludes the introduc- 
 tion of any thing but a meagre outline statement of conclu- 
 sions. Proofs, arguments, illustrations, citations, reflections, 
 must all be omitted. Many difficulties, apparent to every read- 
 er, must be left unexplained ; and no space remains to expose 
 the defenses of positions which the writer well knows before- 
 hand will be assailed by misdirected attacks. 
 
 For instance, we asserted that the particle Sitf, eth, used in 
 the first verse of Gen. i., signifies, in some situations, " the sub- 
 stance of " the thing mentioned. One competent and respect- 
 ed critic rightly asserts that certain authorities, whom he cites, 
 give no sanction to such a use of the word. On the contrary, 
 we might have cited the authority of Aben-Ezra, Kimchi, Ains- 
 worth, Buxtorf, Nordheimer, and others. In addition, the Syr- 
 iac translation so understands the particle; and St. Ephraem, 
 the learned apostle of the old Syriac Church, in his commen- 
 tary on this place, uses the same Syriac word A. -^ yoth, and un- 
 derstands it in the same way. And, finally, the verb tna, 6am, 
 used in connection, implies, in the Kal conjugation (according 
 to Gesenius), creation rather than formation ; and as creation, in 
 contrast with formation, is an origination of substance, the con- 
 text fully sanctions the meaning which we have attributed to 
 the particle nx, eth. 
 
 Again, another critic thinks that by giving dl'i, yom, the sig- 
 nification of a geological "period," we invalidate the grounds 
 for the enjoined observance of the Sabbath. We reply: 1. 
 Philology allows the meaning ; and cite for authorities, Augus- 
 
ON TEE MEANING 'OF t1\ ' 3G3 
 
 tine, Josephus, Philo Judacus, Tayler Lewis, M'Causland, besides 
 an array of scientific judges, as Whiston, Descartes, Cuvier, 
 De Luc, Parkinson, Jameson, Silliman, Miller, Dana, etc. 2. 
 The events described could not have transpired in sbc literal 
 days, according to all we know of the order of nature; and 
 the theory of the sudden creation of fossils and stratified rocks 
 lias long since been abandoned by intelligent critics. 3. The 
 Chalmerian hypothesis of a "chasm" of time between the 
 events of the first and second verses offers insuperable and 
 needless difficulties. 4. The Christian Sabbath is not invali- 
 dated by this means, for the Sabbath of God is now in prog- 
 ress. God is now resting from the works of creation to 
 which Moses refers. So man, upon the seventh of his days, is 
 commanded to imitate the example of his Creator. 
 
 But, in truth, the adequate defense of very intelligible conclu- 
 sions seems hardly suited to the pages of the Journal.] 
 
 VII. The Mosaic Deluge. 
 
 The authors of the Pentateuch inform us that in the ninth 
 generation after the introduction of Adam's race upon the 
 earth, the wickedness of man provoked the Lord to destroy 
 " all flesh " by a deluge, save Noah and his family. This del- 
 uge is represented as prevailing to such an extent that " all the 
 high hills that were under the whole heaven were covered." 
 
 Now, a deluge of this kind taking the language in its lit- 
 eral signification was a geological event, and geologists have 
 been called upon to declare what their science has to testify re- 
 specting such an occurrence. In the first place, it is one of the 
 fundamental principles of geology that the materials of nearly 
 all the stratified rocks have been laid down as sediments in the 
 bottom of the sea. There are few localities upon the land, 
 therefore, which do not testify to the former presence of the 
 sea ; and the time was, when this testimony was regarded as 
 confirming the doctrine of a universal deluge. In the next 
 place, the sea has at least once returned over the land since the 
 
364 GEOLOGICAL SUBMERGENCES. 
 
 great continental areas were completed. After the dissolution 
 of the great glaciers which once prevailed over the temperate 
 regions of America, Europe, and Asia, there occurred a gener- 
 al northern subsidence, which permitted the ocean's waters to 
 bury all the northern portions of the continents an event 
 which the most eminent geologists of the last generation re- 
 garded as constituting the deluge recorded by Moses. This 
 submergence, however, though it must have exterminated whole 
 races of animals, is now generally believed to have occurred be- 
 fore the appearance of man upon the earth ; and the Mosaic 
 narrative could have no reference to it. 
 
 Vast areas of the land-surface, however, have lain under water 
 during a later period ; and the human race has witnessed their 
 drainage, if it did not witness and suffer from the deluge and 
 destruction which followed the disappearance of the continent- 
 al glaciers. The great prairie region of Illinois is indicated, 
 by a number of evidences, to have been covered by an immense 
 lake until long after the representatives of our species had 
 found their way to America. A similar and corresponding re- 
 gion in the South of Russia, in Europe, was, not many centuries 
 since, the bed of a former extension of the Black Sea. This 
 region is the ancient Lectonia, which, in later times, was the 
 home of the warlike Scythians. It was probably drained by 
 the bursting of the barriers of the Thracian Bosphorus. It 
 has lately been shown that the entire country between the Cas- 
 pian and Black seas was under water until a period geological- 
 ly modern ;(') and even the ancient geographers detected the 
 evidences of the recent submergence of the region now covered 
 by the great Desert of Sahara. The ancestors of our race, we 
 may well believe, were spectators of the retreat of the waters 
 from all these regio'ns. Still, it is scarcely probable that the 
 
 ( J ) " Reunion de la Mer Caspienne et la Mer Noir," par le Docteur Berg- 
 strasser, conseiller d'etat et directeur des salines du gouvernement d'As- 
 trakan, Paris. 
 
DELUGES IN HUMAN TIMES. 365 
 
 inundation of any of these districts constituted the phenome- 
 non referred to by the sacred historian. It is safe to assume 
 that the water may have rested over these places before the ap- 
 pearance of man upon the earth. 
 
 We have, however, geological, traditionary, and even histor- 
 ical evidences of the occurrence of great inundations during 
 the human period. The gravel-beds of the Seine and Somme, 
 inclosing human remains, prove that enormous floods visited 
 Southern Europe after the advent of man. The Chinese rec- 
 ords testify to no less than eight or nine great changes in the 
 bed and outlet of the Hwang-ho River, by which means many 
 thousands of square miles of territory have been several times 
 inundated and devastated. The oldest deluge is fixed at twen- 
 ty-two hundred years before Christ ; and the latest great inun- 
 dation was during the Taiping rebellion, a few years ago. The 
 bed of the river has shifted from three hundred to four hun- 
 dred miles, and areas larger than all New England have been 
 buried beneath the water. Never was there a more literal 
 " breaking-up of the fountains of the great deep." An inun- 
 dation in India, in 1819, overwhelmed two thousand square 
 miles by an inroad of the sea ;. and a similar flood was experi- 
 enced, in 1872, upon the Western coast. 
 
 The Chaldeans preserved the memory of a great deluge in 
 which Xisuthrus and his friends and relatives were saved by a 
 warning of the Deity, in a vessel which also afforded protection 
 to multitudes of quadrupeds and birds, and which finally rest- 
 ed on a mountain. Many other incidents of the story as the 
 sending-out of birds once, twice, thrice ; the offering of sacri- 
 fices after the flood ; and the subsequent building of cities and 
 temples upon the plains of Babylon indicate that the Chal- 
 dean narrative relates to the same event as the Mosaic.^) Oth- 
 
 ( J ) Sec, on this subject, the late researches and publications of Mr. 
 George Smith, of the British Museum. 
 
366 TRADITIONS OF A DELUGE. 
 
 er Eastern peoples, as the Phoenicians, Phrygians, Syrians, Ar- 
 menians, and Scythians, had traditions of a similar deluge, 
 which have been perpetuated by various ancient writers. The 
 Chinese preserve the story of a deluge which dates back to 
 four thousand years before Christ, the particulars of which 
 strangely resemble those of the Noachian flood. In the books 
 of the Hindoos, also, are records of a devastating flood, located, 
 in some of the accounts, to the south of the Himalayas, but, 
 in the oldest one, to the north of those mountains, toward the 
 region which we now know was the original home of the Brah- 
 manic people, as well as the region of the Mosaic deluge. The 
 Persians, also, have preserved the recollection of a great deluge, 
 sent to punish mankind for their wickedness. In the tradi- 
 tions of the Greeks two deluges are mentioned that of Ogy- 
 ges and that of Deucalion. The story of Deucalion and Pyr- 
 rha, as narrated by Ovid, is impressively similar to the story 
 of Noah and his family, as told by Moses. In the mythologies 
 of the Scandinavians and Celts re-appear similar traditions. 
 
 Finally, traditions of a deluge are found in the islands of the 
 sea and among the natives of America. The Fijians narrate 
 that their islands were once flooded by a great rain, and only 
 a few of their people were saved, by the aid of two of their 
 deities, upon the island of Mbenga. The tribes of North 
 America and the West Indies had traditions of a deluge. The 
 various nations which inhabited Mexico at the time of the 
 Conquest preserved the memory of a great deluge, in which 
 Coxcox and his wife were saved in a floating vessel, which 
 rested, after the flood, upon the summit of a mountain. One 
 of the traditions approximates the Mosaic history in several 
 particulars. Not only is Coxcox saved, with his wife, but also 
 his children and several animals, and a supply of grain. The 
 waters abated at the orders of the Great Spirit. The first bird 
 sent out was a vulture. Other birds were sent, and, finally, a 
 humming-bird, which returned with a leafy branch in its beak. 
 
CONCURRENCE OF TRADITIONS. 367 
 
 It is singular to find such, coincidences on opposite sides of the 
 globe. 
 
 The geological evidences and the traditions of many nations 
 concur, therefore, in testifying to the occurrence of one or 
 more great deluges since the appearance of our race upon the 
 earth ; and the traditions are singularly harmonious in reference 
 to the occasion and principal incidents of the deluge. Thus, 
 they generally agree with each other and with Moses in affirm- 
 ing, 1. That the deluge was intended as a punishment for 
 man's wickedness ; 2. That it brought destruction to the an- 
 cestors of the nation perpetuating the tradition ; 3. That one 
 good man and his immediate relatives were saved in a float- 
 ing vessel ; 4. That certain quadrupeds and birds were also 
 preserved ; 5. That the vessel finally rested on a mountain ; 
 6. That birds were sent out at intervals to bring back indica- 
 tions of the progress of the retirement of the waters. We may 
 confidently assert, therefore, that the Mosaic narrative of the 
 deluge, in its essential features, is a correct historical statement. 
 
 That the deluge was universal we have not similar grounds 
 for believing. 1. There are no geological evidences of a gen- 
 eral inundation since the advent of man. It must be admit- 
 ted, however, that a deluge which lasted but three hundred and 
 sixty -four days could not have left very permanent records. 
 2. If the universal inundation were caused by a general subsid- 
 ence of the continents to the requisite extent, the evidences of 
 this must still exist ; but they have not been discovered. 3. If 
 it were caused by the addition of the requisite amount of water 
 to our globe, without a subsidence of the continents, the earth's 
 mass would be so much increased as to derange the harmonies 
 of the solar system. 4. It was impossible for Noah or any 
 number of men to gather zoological couples from all the vari- 
 ous continents still less to do it in the time indicated. It is 
 a work which has not been accomplished to this day by the 
 managers of all the zoological gardens of the world. 5. The 
 
 16* 
 
368 THE DELUGE NOT UNIVERSAL. 
 
 animals from different zones could not have endured the cli- 
 matic vicissitudes, especially if the ark rested on the summit of 
 a mountain reaching into the region of perpetual snow. 6. The 
 capacity of the ark was extremely inadequate for the accom- 
 modation of so many animals and a year's supply of food. 7. 
 The waters of a universal deluge rising five miles above the or- 
 dinary level of the sea could not evaporate in three hundred 
 and twenty-five days ; and if they could, the atmosphere would 
 be incapable of supporting them ; and hence there would be no 
 way of disposing of such a body of water over the land, except 
 by a change of relative levels, which we have stated to be geo- 
 logically improbable. 8. The deluge may have been " univers- 
 al " in respect to the descendants of Adam, and yet have been 
 geographically local. 9. The local character of the deluge has 
 for centuries been maintained by many eminent divines, simply 
 on linguistic and general grounds. 
 
 If it be asserted that a universal deluge, and all the other 
 events as formerly understood, could be accomplished by mi- 
 raculous agency, this must be admitted ; but it will be noticed 
 that Moses attributes the inundation to natural agencies great 
 rains and a " breaking-up of the fountains of the great deep." 
 
 While, therefore, the credibility of the Mosaic statements is 
 fully authenticated by secular evidences, the historian must be 
 regarded as speaking only of that quarter of the world which 
 had become populated by the descendants of Adam ; and such 
 expressions as " all flesh died " and " all the high hills that were 
 under the whole heaven " must be taken in an Oriental sense 
 (Gen. xli., 56; Deut. ii., 25; Luke ii., 1 ; Acts ii., 5), like so 
 many other passages of the Hebrew writings. 
 
 VIII. Man in the Light of Geology. 
 
 What has geology to testify concerning man ? 
 1. He belongs to the Last Fauna. No new types of animals, 
 so far as we know, have been introduced upon the earth since 
 
REGENT GEOLOGIC CHANGES. 369 
 
 his advent. All the remains of man are found in the last geo- 
 logical formation. There has been no great geological revolu- 
 tion since his appearance. In the rocks beneath the surface 
 are abundant records of older revolutions, and of older and ex- 
 tinct types of animal life ; but these types were all greatly in- 
 ferior to man. The testimonies of science, therefore, confirm 
 the statement of Moses, that God made man in the last great 
 period of creative activity. 
 
 2. Man's Advent is comparatively Recent. There are no au- 
 thentic discoveries of human remains in Tertiary deposits, or 
 any others older than the last period of glaciation. The geo- 
 logic events that have transpired since man's advent are not 
 such, therefore, as demanded many thousands of years for their 
 consummation. Some of the more prominent geological events 
 are the following: (1) The later stages of the dissolution of 
 the continental glaciers, and the floods which resulted from the 
 melting ice ; (2) The drainage of a vast region of plains north 
 of the Black Sea, and thence to the Caspian and Aral seas ; 
 (3) The drainage of the prairie region of the Mississippi Val- 
 ley ; (4) The wanderings of the Hwang-ho and Yang-tse rivers 
 of China over intervals of hundreds of miles, inundating many 
 thousands of square miles of territory; (5) The encroachment of 
 the Pacific upon the eastern shores of Asia, leaving the Japa- 
 nese islands and Formosa to mark the real limits of the conti- 
 nental mass; (6) The extinction of the cave-bear, cave-hyena, 
 two-horned rhinoceros, hippopotamus, hairy mammoth, and oth- 
 er quadrupeds; (7) The accumulation of peat -bogs in Den- 
 mark and Ireland to the depth of twenty or thirty feet ; (8) The 
 transformation of the forest growths of many parts of Europe. 
 Other probable events are the formation of Behring Strait be- 
 tween Asia and America, the excavation of the Straits of Dover 
 and of the gorge of the Niagara River. 
 
 But great as are these events, it appears that a few thousand 
 years suffice for their accomplishment. 1. The extinctions of 
 
370 DISAPPEARANCE OF GLACIERS. 
 
 quadrupeds are still in progress. The Irish elk existed till the 
 fourteenth century ; the urus lingered till the sixteenth century ; 
 the dodo, till the seventeenth ; the moa and epiornis gigantic 
 extinct birds of New Zealand have lived within the scope of 
 tradition ; as also the mammoth of North America. The great 
 auk of Arctic America has not been seen for fifty years. It 
 can not be that the other extinctions witnessed by men stretch 
 back to a very remote antiquity. 2. The stumps of the an- 
 cient glaciers are disappearing at such a rate that the entire 
 period of glacier-dissolution can not have been vast. The Mer 
 de Glace of Mont Blanc has lowered one hundred feet in twen- 
 ty years, and has receded at its lower border a quarter of a 
 mile, while the gravel moraines are burying it along its lateral 
 borders. The Glacier des Bossons has shrunken even more. 
 An ice-peak Jn the Tyrolese Alps has been observed to lower 
 eighteen and a half feet in a few years ; and the Alpine glaciers 
 generally are in process of diminution at their lower extremi- 
 ties. The Siberian glaciers, which inclose the well-preserved 
 carcasses of the hairy mammoth, are continually and rapidly 
 dissolving and releasing those carcasses, which are then sought 
 for their ivory. Stumps of the continental glacier of America 
 are preserved, half buried in dust and mountain debris, in some 
 of the gulches of the Sierra Nevada; and the epoch of the 
 prevalence of the great glacier is not so remote but some de- 
 tached fragments of it still persist in the "ice-wells" of Ver- 
 mont, New Hampshire, and Wisconsin. Other evidences of 
 the shortness of the post-glacial period are at hand, but we 
 have not the space for their presentation. The total age of 
 our race, therefore, is not necessarily much greater than is in- 
 dicated by a correct, or even the current, interpretation of the 
 Mosaic history of primeval times. 
 
 3. Man's Birthplace was in the Orient. We speak first of 
 purely geological evidences. The faunas, or animal assemblages, 
 existing on the different continents exhibit a gradation in point 
 
ORIENTAL CRADLE OF HUMANITY. 3Yl 
 
 of rank. The highest is that in the Orient (Europe, Asia, and 
 Africa), characterized by carnivores (flesh-eaters). Next is that 
 of North America, characterized by herbivores (plant -eaters). 
 The third is that of South America, whose leading types are 
 edentates (quadrupeds deficient in some of the sorts of teeth). 
 The fourth is that of Australia, whose mammals consist almost 
 exclusively of marsupials (pouched quadrupeds, like the kanga- 
 roo and opossum). This is a marked gradation of the conti- 
 nents; but it existed in the epoch preceding the advent of 
 man, as the latest fossil remains testify. Indeed, something of 
 the same gradation existed far back in geological time. The 
 highest attainments in organization were always in the Oriental 
 quarter of the world. The high rank of the Orient was a per- 
 petual prophecy that the ultimate culmination of the animal 
 series would be there. It always pointed to the Orient as the 
 destined cradle of the human race ; and there is no room for a 
 doubt that man first placed foot upon the earth in that quarter 
 to which our Scriptures assign the Garden of Eden. 
 
 But historical evidences and traditions point to the same 
 conclusion. All the migrations of our race have radiated from 
 the Orient first, eastward into China, and south-eastward 
 across the Himalayas ; then, from the same centre, westward, in 
 parallel streams and in successive swells, across the Urals and 
 the Bosphorus. The eastern stream, intercepted by the Pacif- 
 ic, continued its course across the isthmus anciently occupy- 
 ing the place of Behring Strait, and populated America ; the 
 western surged, at length, across the Atlantic, and met the 
 eastern on the opposite side of the globe. The streams of lan- 
 guages and dialects have, of course, followed the streams of 
 migration. The Orient, moreover, is the home of most of our 
 domesticated animals and plants, Of the seven hundred and 
 seventy plants used for food, fivo hundred and sixty-five come 
 from the Old World, and two hundred and four from the New. 
 Of the two hundred and thirty -seven starch -producing plants 
 
372 PROGRESS CONVERGING IN MAN. 
 
 used by man, one hundred and ninety-eight originated in the 
 Old World, and only forty -five in the New. It is perfectly 
 safe, therefore, in view of the secular evidences, to accept the 
 Biblical statement of the Oriental home of our first parents. 
 
 4. Man's Advent was the Prophecy of the Ages. The great 
 work of terrestrial preparation always implied man. The ever- 
 improving series of organic forms pointed always to an ulti- 
 mate consummation. The advance of a thousand ages was a 
 pledge of all possible advance. The earlier terms of the series 
 expressed a law which involved the highest term. Especially, 
 when vertebrate life began its existence in the fish, were the 
 prophecies of its ultimate fullest unfolding in man most dis- 
 tinctly uttered. When each succeeding type of vertebrates be- 
 came a farther step toward man, the name of man seemed ut- 
 tered in countless reptilian, bird-like, mammalian, and quadru- 
 manous forms. There was no mistaking the ultimate of such 
 a series. Thus man is the realization of an idea which was 
 kept resounding through the geologic ages. He is correlated 
 to the whole history of organization, and can not be contem- 
 plated except as a link in the chain of being which stretches 
 back through geologic eons. 
 
 But the whole course of physical preparations also looks to- 
 ward man. Every great revolution of the terrestrial crust con- 
 stituted a forward step in the fashioning and furnishing of an 
 abode for intelligent populations. The useful metals, elaborated 
 and eliminated through ages of geological activity, are suited 
 exclusively to human ends. The vast deposits of mineral coal 
 laid by thousands of ages before the creation of man sustain 
 no relations to any other than human existence. Thus man is 
 a consummation foreshadowed through countless ages of organ- 
 ic and inorganic preparations. 
 
 5. Man is the Last Term of the Organic Series. As all ge- 
 ological preparations point toward man, so they all converge in 
 man and reach their finality in him. Man signalizes the con- 
 
MAN A FINALITY. 373 
 
 summation of a plan the fulfillment of a prophecy the real- 
 ization of a long-foreshadowed ultimate. We can conceive of 
 no succeeding organism or intelligence to which the material 
 world and its history should stand in closer relations of corre- 
 spondence and fitness. So the foreshadowings of man in or- 
 ganic history point toward him as a finality. In him, the phys- 
 ical structure attains its highest conceivable perfection and va- 
 riety of adaptations to the external world. To man alone is 
 given the erect attitude, which is itself the last possible term 
 of a series of inclinations exemplified in the horizontal fish, the 
 head-uplifting reptile, the inclined bird, the neck-erecting quad- 
 ruped, and the half-upright monkey. To man alone is vouch- 
 safed the power to defy all physical conditions in his geograph- 
 ical range ; for while all his predecessors had been confined 
 within progressively narrowing limits, he first of all became a 
 cosmopolite, and possessed the whole world. There is no term 
 in the series beyond totality. Then, as if to emphasize the 
 completion of the work of organic improvement, and to mark 
 a grand pause in creative progress, nature superadded to the 
 most perfect organism, to a heavenward-looking mien, and the 
 absolute freedom of the world, an endowment of an intellectu- 
 al and moral nature not vouchsafed to any other animal. Thus 
 man is presented to all intelligences as the final consummation 
 of the long series of revolutions and advances whose records 
 are written upon the pages of science. 
 
 IX. The Finiteness of the Existing Order of Things. 
 
 We are informed in the Sacred Scriptures that the earth and 
 the entire system of nature had a beginning, and originated in 
 the creative activity of Elohim. We are also assured that the 
 world is destined to come to an end that the heavens shall be 
 " rolled together as a scroll," and the " elements shall melt with 
 fervent heat," and that ultimately there will be established " a 
 new heaven and a new earth." 
 
374 COSMICAL LIMITATION IN THE PAST. 
 
 Now, science is in possession of data which have a strong 
 bearing upon these doctrines. We see every thing in nature 
 undergoing a succession of changes. These changes are a prog- 
 ress toward something and a progress from something ; and 
 we are prepared to show that in tracing backward the series 
 of geological changes transpiring before our eyes, we reach 
 at last a remotest limit a beginning, anterior to which we 
 have no means of knowing or ground for believing that any 
 change was possible. Thus, the wastage of ocean beaches, the 
 deposition of ocean sediments, the measured escape of heat 
 from the earth, the increased heat experienced in penetrating 
 toward the earth's interior, the traces of ancient heat in many 
 of the rocks these all are indications of a long history whose 
 beginning, so far as we can judge, was a fiery vapor. We know 
 nothing of any state of matter more remote than this. Indeed, 
 as we understand the laws of matter, we are led to affirm that 
 there was no condition antecedent to this. The fire-mist, so 
 far as science can testify, was the first condition ; and as the 
 fire-mist must have begun to change as soon as it began to ex- 
 ist, it can not be an eternity since the series of material changes 
 began. Science, therefore, affirms that the existing order of 
 the universe has not continued from eternity, but is merely a 
 finite effect ; and the principles of reason declare that such ef- 
 fect must have been caused by an efficient agent existing before 
 the present universe existed. 
 
 If the series of events transpiring before our eyes is tending 
 toward something, we are prepared to show that it is an end 
 a finality, toward which it tends. There is more than one se- 
 ries of changes in progress which will bring the existing ter- 
 restrial order to an end, and render it physically impossible that 
 the human race should remain in existence upon the earth. 
 
 1. The land is wearing out. Every hill and mountain is un- 
 dergoing a slow disintegration under the influence of the ele- 
 ments. The oceans and the rivers are also eating up the land. 
 
DEOEADATIONAL AND REFRIGERANT LIMITS. 375 
 
 The materials resulting from these incessant erosions are de- 
 posited in lakes and seas. Small lakes have been filled within 
 a generation ; larger ones, within the memory of man. The 
 delta of the Mississippi is moving into the Gulf at the rate of 
 three hundred and thirty-eight feet a year. The Green Mount- 
 ains are sensibly lower than a generation back, and the Sierra 
 Nevada is visibly sinking. Some of the highest summits of 
 the Andes are two hundred and twenty feet lower than when 
 first measured by Humboldt, about seventy years ago. The 
 lowering of mountains may be largely due to a yielding of 
 their deep foundations, but no one can deny, on reflection, that 
 agencies are at work which are destined ultimately to rob the 
 land of its soils to sink the rivers into deep gorges, and drain 
 the continents to sterility, and, finally, to level their inequalities 
 and fill the ocean till again it envelopes nearly the whole earth. 
 2. It is an established doctrine of science that the world is 
 cooling, as it has been cooling through all the geologic ages. 
 We know of no cause to arrest its cooling. The crust, there- 
 fore, which now incloses an intensely heated nucleus is des- 
 tined to grow thicker, until refrigeration approaches the earth's 
 centre. Who can affirm that insufferable rigors will not pre- 
 vail upon the earth when frozen to the core? But, however 
 this may be, another cause will render the earth uninhabitable. 
 The water resting on the earth's surface percolates downward 
 till it reaches a heat which changes it to steam and sends it 
 toward the surface. The internal fires hold all the water be- 
 longing to the earth within a few miles of the earth's surface. 
 And yet there is no more water than we need. Suppose the 
 cooled crust were twice as thick ; the rocks would demand 
 twice the water to saturate them. Now, it has been demon- 
 strated that when the earth shall have been cooled to the cen- 
 tre, the pores of the rocks will have a capacity sufficient to 
 hold ten times the whole amount of water belonging to our 
 globe. They will then drink up the oceans, and the unfilled 
 
376 LIMITATION FROM SOLAR COOLING. 
 
 pores will suck in all the atmosphere ; and the world, with nei- 
 ther water nor atmosphere, will become utterly uninhabitable. 
 This is a condition already attained by our moon. That satel- 
 lite has cooled to this condition while yet the world is habita- 
 ble, because its mass is but one forty-ninth part of the terres- 
 trial mass. Yet the moon presents to-day a picture of desola- 
 tion and death which, in the natural course of events, will here- 
 after be exhibited by the earth. Here, then, is a limit to the 
 existing terrestrial order. 
 
 3. No one doubts that the sun's mass is intensely heated. 
 No one, on a moment's reflection, can fail to understand that 
 the sun loses an enormous amount of heat daily, and that it 
 must inevitably grow cooler, unless some means exist for re- 
 plenishment. Physicists have considered the problem of the 
 sun's heat and its future persistence with the most profound 
 interest and attention ; and though various suggestions have 
 been made, science is not to-day in possession of any facts 
 which render it improbable that the sun is actually cooling. 
 Indeed, the loftiest conclusions of the latest science present our 
 source of light and warmth as a waning, dying orb. Our 
 world was once a glowing sphere, and has reached its present 
 condition so much sooner than the sun because its mass is a 
 million times less. The sun is as certain as the earth or the 
 moon to attain, at length, a state of total refrigeration. It has 
 been a "white" star and a "yellow" star; it is now a " varia- 
 ble " star, and is destined to shine, in some future age, with the 
 ruddy glow of a " red " star a dying ember. It will become 
 incrusted. Then there will be disruptions and outflows of 
 glowing molten matter, and from time to time it will pour 
 forth a fitful gleam like the other " temporary " stars. But its 
 ultimate solidification is a conclusion which science knows not 
 how to avoid. It is a fearful condition of nature to contem- 
 plate, and fills the imagination with pictures of desolation ; but 
 the thought, the impending certainty, reveals the vastness of 
 
LIMITATION FROM ETHEREAL RESISTANCE. 377 
 
 the power which works these long -coming results, and re- 
 echoes the testimony of our Scriptures that the sun shall be 
 blotted out and the world shall come to an end. 
 
 4. There is a grander disturbing force which is destined to 
 interrupt the existence of the present terrestrial and cosmical 
 harmony. All space is filled with an inconceivably thin fluid 
 called ether, the vibrations of which give rise to the phenomena 
 of light and heat. Wherever light exists, there is ether. This 
 fluid is material. It must, therefore, oppose the movements of 
 all celestial bodies. Indeed, the effect of this resistance has al- 
 ready been recognized in the motions of some of those filmy 
 bodies, the comets. Encke's comet is continually approaching 
 the sun, and it is a simple problem in arithmetic to ascertain 
 when it will be drawn into the central luminary. If the ethe- 
 real medium is capable of affecting measurably, in a few months, 
 the motion of cometary bodies, it must necessarily affect, to 
 some extent, the motions of all the planets. The earth, conse- 
 quently, must be gradually approaching the sun, and must be 
 destined to ultimate precipitation upon that body. Here is an- 
 other crisis impending over terrestrial affairs. 
 
 But if the earth is destined to fall upon the sun, the same 
 destiny awaits every planet; and the time must arrive when 
 all the matter of the solar system will be aggregated in one 
 cold, darkened mass. This is the direction in which events are 
 tending. We say this is one of the results of the distant fut- 
 ure, if the forces of nature continue to act as they are acting. 
 Holding to the constancy of these forces, and believing that 
 no new force or mode of action capable of averting, even if it 
 could postpone, such a catastrophe, will ever be discovered, we 
 see no way to avoid it, save by miraculous interference, of 
 which science can take no account. 
 
 The course of nature, therefore, is tending toward an end. 
 This final aggregation will be a stage of total equilibrium and 
 stagnation of all the forces of matter. No heat, no light, no 
 
378 PARALLELISM WITH ST. PETER. 
 
 motion, no life, no change but the eternal death of the cos- 
 mical organism. Eternal ? What prevents the Omnific Hand 
 from being stretched forth to arouse the corpse of matter to a 
 new resurrection to inaugurate a new creation? This we 
 think probable ; and tlms may arise " a new heaven and a 
 new earth." 
 
 We must therefore contemplate the life-time of the universe 
 as limited by natural causes in both directions, and incapable 
 of sustaining itself indefinitely without the interposition of a 
 Power external to the universe, superior to it, and acting inde- 
 pendently of the forces of nature. 
 
 Is any one of these remote contingencies the mode of con- 
 summation of terrestrial affairs foreshadowed by St. Peter? 
 Perhaps not, but they involve the fiery catastrophe of the 
 apostle. 
 
 (l.) The end of the world, in the meaning of Peter, is that 
 catastrophe which will end its occupancy by human beings. 
 
 (2.) Vast stores of molten material remain imprisoned within 
 the crust of the earth. Geologists understand that the pro- 
 gressive changes of the earth have, time and again, involved 
 such disruptions of the crust as to cause the outflow of vast 
 quantities of this molten matter; and that, though the erup- 
 tions become less frequent with the lapse of ages, it may be 
 that occasional outbursts, as the rigid crust thickens, grow 
 necessarily more violent. The highest mountains have been 
 upheaved in the later ages of geological history. A devastating 
 outburst may yet occur which will destroy the present aspects 
 of the world. 
 
 (3.) The earth may be precipitated into the sun before the 
 period of its total refrigeration arrives. 
 
 (4.) Then, even if the sun be totally refrigerated, the impact 
 of the earth upon it would develop heat sufficient to reignite 
 the matter of the world. 
 
 (5.) The earth may reach, in its well-known movement with 
 
DIVINE ATTRIBUTES DEDUCED FROM NATURE. 379 
 
 the sun through space, a region so intensely heated as to an- 
 swer to a fulfillment of the prophecy of St. Peter. 
 
 Thus, there is no occasion whatever to feel diminished con- 
 fidence in the words of the apostle, or to hesitate to follow 
 natural causes to their ultimate issue, or to fear, in this connec- 
 tion more than elsewhere, that science or philosophy will attain 
 a valid conclusion which was not in full view of the Author of 
 inspiration when each word of our Sacred Scriptures was penned. 
 
 X. The Bible in the Light of Nature. 
 
 We are not proposing, in a brief article, to detail the coin- 
 cidences which exist between the teachings of the Bible and 
 the conclusions of science and reason. We propose, in view of 
 those coincidences, to maintain that the authenticity and au- 
 thority of the Bible may be rationally admitted, and that its 
 inspiration is the only explanation of these coincidences. 
 
 In the series of articles of which this is the conclusion, it has 
 been our object to set forth the great features of the harmony 
 between science and revelation. It has, of course, been done 
 very meagrely and unsatisfactorily ; but, so far as we have suc- 
 ceeded, it has been shown that the material universe presents 
 forms, adaptations, contrivances, correlations, which, judging it 
 as we do the products of human agency, exemplify various at- 
 tributes and dispositions existing on the part of its Author. 
 For instance, we involuntarily regard the upbuilding of mount- 
 ains and the movements of cosmical masses of matter as evi- 
 dences of the exercise of power. We involuntarily declare that 
 the mechanical contrivances witnessed in the eye, or the hand, 
 or the system of the heavens, are proofs of the exercise of in- 
 telligence. We can not resist the conviction that in a world 
 where almost every thing presents some unmistakable and oft- 
 en elaborate, and even anticipatory, adaptation to promote hap- 
 piness, and where so many things have no discoverable end, 
 if it be not to promote happiness, the attribute of benevolence 
 
380 ONE DEITY IN TWO REVELATIONS. 
 
 must have actuated the Planner of existing arrangements. We 
 regard the material world, therefore, as proof of the exercise of 
 power, intelligence, and beneficence ; and if we are met by the 
 objection that the works of nature so far transcend our com- 
 prehension that we can not be certain of the motives and pow- 
 ers through whose activity they came into existence, we imme- 
 diately and confidently reply that human reason affirms that 
 any product which can be pronounced a mechanism must have 
 had an intelligent contriver, who exercised sufficient power to 
 embody his idea, and must have acted from motives deducible, 
 to some extent, from the results of his activity. Any result 
 interpretable in terms of intellect and motive is the result of 
 intellect and motive. This is a law of reason which we can 
 not evade without self-stultification, and a total abandonment of 
 grounds of inference which are ingrained in human nature and 
 underlie all our actions. The data of science supplemented by 
 the data of reason do, therefore, establish the existence of such 
 a Creator as is portrayed in our Scriptures. 
 
 We have gone farther, and shown that such a unity of phys- 
 ical conditions and such a system of mutual dependencies ex- 
 ist throughout the limits of the visible universe, that it would 
 be eminently unreasonable to assume that the universe had 
 been the product of more than one intelligence ; and we have 
 shown that a unity no less intelligible and manifest connects all 
 present existence with the whole history of the past ; so that 
 it is impossible that indefinite time, any more than indefinite 
 space, should have witnessed the supremacy of more than one 
 intelligent power. And this revelation- of an infinite and eter- 
 nal God in nature is identical with the revelation given in our 
 Scriptures. The God of nature and the God of the Bible 
 (viewed in his relations to the natural world) are portrayed in 
 the same character; and this commits science to an indorse- 
 ment of every thing said in the Bible regarding those divine at- 
 tributes whose exercise is reflected in the phenomena of nature. 
 
SCIENCE AND SCRIPTURE PARALLEL. 381 
 
 We have adverted to the religious nature of man under all 
 conditions, and have shown that religious ideas, notions, or sen- 
 timents are universal and necessary, and therefore ineradicable 
 and innate. The constitution of human nature is, therefore, a 
 sanction of every thing which is revealed in the material world 
 or the Holy Bible respecting the being and attributes of Deity 
 and man's moral relations to him. 
 
 Not contenting ourselves with proving that science and 
 philosophy demand such a God as the Bible reveals, we have 
 shown that science also authenticates the Bible in respect to 
 some important statements which still might accord, or not, 
 with secular data. We have shown, for instance, that the re- 
 markable record of creation, generally ascribed to Moses, har- 
 monizes beautifully with the latest determinations of science, 
 and must have been wholly unintelligible, save in its spirit and 
 general purport, to former generations of men ; and we have 
 indicated certain remarkable statements in this connection, 
 which prove that the author of Genesis had information vastly 
 in advance of his nation or age, and which he could not have 
 possessed except through miraculous communication. We 
 have shown that the Biblical account of the deluge violates no 
 physical probabilities, while it is sustained by geological anal- 
 ogies, and by traditions extant among many nations and tribes. 
 We have shown that science testifies that man belongs, as the 
 Bible asserts, to the group of last -created animals; that that 
 creation was comparatively recent; that he made his first ap- 
 pearance in the Orient ; that he was, in a certain sense, a long- 
 premeditated consummation ; and that his advent and posses- 
 sion of the earth constitute a finality in the geological succes- 
 sion of animals. We have shown, finally, that, contrary to the 
 tenor of ancient philosophy, science declares that a beginning 
 of the present order of things is a necessity, and that a conclu- 
 sion is equally inevitable ; while abundant provision exists for 
 such a fiery consummation as St. Peter foreshadows. 
 
382 THE BIBLE AUTHENTICATED. 
 
 What does all this corroboration imply ? Not that the Bi- 
 ble needs the sanction of science and philosophy in the minds 
 of most men ; but that, if there be men who withhold their 
 acceptance of the Bible until they know whether science and 
 philosophy assent, they may feel assured that science and phi- 
 losophy demand their acceptance. It implies that if the per- 
 vading ideas and so many of the collateral statements of the 
 Bible are in full accord with the data and doctrines of science, 
 the whole body of documents may be accepted as authentic 
 and authoritative. It implies that the authors of these docu- 
 ments were in possession of light, even in secular affairs, which 
 did not belong to their times, and could only have come into 
 their possession through immediate intuition that is, the sa- 
 cred writers were inspired men. This proof establishes the 
 Bible as the utterance of God, the Author of all truth, and 
 therefore as an infallible authority even in matters transcend- 
 ing the limits of science and philosophy. 
 
 If it still be felt that this is admitting supernatural presence 
 and intervention in an affair where human agency may be 
 made to account for all the phenomena, we would further re- 
 ply: 1. It is incredible that the sacred writers should have 
 learned, save through inspiration, facts and methods which un- 
 inspired science has had to labor three thousand years to ac- 
 quire. 2. The admission of supernatural ism in inspiration is 
 no greater a strain than to admit it in creation. But the tend- 
 ency of science is to go even farther, and recognize the daily 
 processes of the organic world as but the result of the immedi- 
 ate activity of divine intelligence and power. We can not es- 
 cape the supernatural, either as an immediate presence or an 
 ultimate resting-point. 3. If such a God exists as the study 
 of nature proclaims, there is an antecedent probability that he 
 would make such a written revelation as our Scriptures profess 
 to be. A God of infinite goodness could not leave his creatures 
 to grope painfully after a knowledge of their origin, relations, 
 
THE SOUL'S PLEDGE OF A REVELATION. 383 
 
 and destiny, but, having implanted in them moral and religious 
 aspirations, would make a revelation of their appropriate ob- 
 ject. 4. The supernatural teachings of the Scriptures are suit- 
 ed to the constitution and wants of man. Though he may, 
 from nature, find out the existence of God, and may attain to 
 exalted conceptions of many of his attributes, there is a deep- 
 felt insufficiency in nature. Looking up toward the infinite 
 Beneficence to which man feels that he owes every enjoyment, 
 the spirit of prayer rises to his lips, and he would fain cry, " O 
 Lord, rescue me from this evil !" But how dares he enter into 
 the presence of Omnipotence unbidden ? With what expecta- 
 tion can he prefer a request from the King of kings? Does 
 not all nature declare that the purposes of Deity are ripening 
 through the ages, and a poor mortal must vainly interpose a 
 human-born motive to divine activity ? Will he not be spurn- 
 ed from the presence of the Almighty ? And yet he feels : 
 " Oh, if I could but interpose my petition ! Oh, if I could move 
 the divine Power to avert this calamity !" He feels that he 
 must approach God, and yet how dares he? And with what 
 prospect of a hearing ? Will the Infinite Beneficence leave his 
 creatures in this state of uncertainty, or this state of misery ? 
 No ; he will speak. And when we read the words, " Cast thy 
 burden upon the Lord," "Come unto me," "Ask and ye shall 
 receive," we recognize these as the very words for which the 
 soul was longing. These are words framed for the unsatisfied 
 heart. They fit the occasion ; they bear the stamp of authen- 
 ticity. They can be non,e but the word of God. 
 
 A revelation respecting man's moral relations and future state 
 must touch upon topics beyond the reach of science and phi- 
 losophy. The search for verities here leads into the inscruta- 
 ble thoughts and purposes of the Omniscient. Such a revela- 
 tion as science itself gives us ground for anticipating must be 
 a revelation involving important statements that transcend the 
 reach of demonstrations, and must be accepted solely on the 
 
 17 
 
384 FAITH IN THE UNKNOWABLE. 
 
 established authority of the Revelator. Faith is the logical 
 corollary of science and the highest flight of reason. 
 
 Thus we are led to believe that the cultivation of science and 
 philosophy is not only harmless, but leads the candid mind to 
 a reverent knowledge of God and an implicit faith in the most 
 mysterious utterances of his Sacred Word. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 ABARIS, 91. 
 
 Abelard, 75. 
 
 Abidharma, 55. 
 
 Abiogenesis, opposed to logic, 144 ; 
 not unseriptural, 225. 
 
 Abnormal states of faith, 42 ; causes 
 of, 42. 
 
 Abraham, 185. 
 
 Absolute attributes, 276. 
 
 Abury, 190. 
 
 Academia Telesiana, 80. 
 
 Academy, Old, 62 ; Middle, 93 ; New, 
 66. 
 
 Activity the law of existence, 128. 
 
 Advent of man recent, 223. 
 
 ^Eneas of Gaza, 73. 
 
 ^Enesidemus, 69, 93. 
 
 JEtiological argument, 139, 150, 197, 
 279 ; formulated, 284-285 ; view- 
 ed critically, 295. 
 
 Affinity, chemical, 261-262. 
 
 Agassiz, Louis, attacked by Haeckel, 
 114; philosopher and scientist, 
 137 ; on relation of organism and 
 environment, 141. 
 
 Agathological argument, 198, 299. 
 
 Ahuramazda, 53. 
 
 Air as first principle, 56. 
 
 Albertus Magnus, 76, 99, 357. 
 
 Albigenses, 74. 
 
 Alcuin, 73. 
 
 Alembert,d', 82, 2i8, 312. 
 
 Alexander of Aphrodisias, 284, 293. 
 
 Alexander of Hales, 76. 
 
 Alexander, Stephen, 301. 
 
 Alexander the Great, 48, 281. 
 
 Alexandria, Hebrew literature in, 67. 
 
 Alfarabi, 78, 99. 
 
 Algazel, 78. 
 
 Alkendi, 78. 
 
 Alps, upheaval of, 333. 
 
 Amalric, 76. 
 
 Amblypoda, 171. 
 
 America, discovery of, 79. 
 
 Ammonius Saccas, 70. 
 
 Amosis, 47. 
 
 Amphibian stage of embryo, 171. 
 
 Amphioxus stage, 171. 
 
 Anaptomorphiis (Antiacodon), 172. 
 
 Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, 58, 121, 
 
 221, 280, 282, 285. 
 Anaximander, 56. 
 Anaximenes, 56. 
 Anchippus, 169. 
 Anchit/ierium, 171. 
 Andaman islanders, 189, 353. 
 Andes, upheaval of, 333. 
 Animals become extinct, 370. 
 Anniceris, 62. 
 Anselm, 266, 293. 
 Anselmian argument, 299. 
 Antagonism, a law of progress, 34, 
 
 41; self -regulative, 212, 228; of 
 
 faith and philosophy, 72. 
 Anthropomorphic language, uses of, 
 
 39 ; found in Hebrew Scriptures, 
 
 204. 
 
 Anthropomorphic stage, 38, 282. 
 Anthropomorphism inevitable, 38, 
 
 245, 282. 
 
 Anticipation of use of organs, 142. 
 Anticipatory organs not produced by 
 
 heredity, 147. 
 Antinomians, 72. 
 Antiochus of Ascalon, 67. 
 Antiquity of human race, 222. 
 Antisthenes, 61. 
 
 'A-jrtipov (TO) as first principle, 56. 
 Apollodorus, 65. 
 Apollonius of Tyana, 68. 
 
386 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Apollonius the Grammarian, 71. 
 
 Apostolicism, 83. 
 
 Apuleius, 68. 
 
 Aquinas, 75, 76, 266, 356. 
 
 Arabs and ancient learning, 78 ; con- 
 tributing science, 79. 
 
 Arago, 277. 
 
 Arafuras of Vorkay, 89, 353. 
 
 Aratus, 272. 
 
 Arbitrary volition not implied by in- 
 telligence, 131. 
 
 Arbrousset, 229. 
 
 Arcesilaus, 63. 
 
 Archegenesis, Greek doctrine of, 59 ; 
 must be assumed, 149, 225. 
 
 Archetype, vertebrate, 163, 176; of 
 vegetable, 176. 
 
 Arguments, theistic, 197-199; equiv- 
 alences of, 279, 299; in Greek 
 philosophy, 284-286. 
 
 Argyll, Duke of, 109, 315. 
 
 Aristasus, 91. 
 
 Aristarchus of Samos, 213. 
 
 Aristides, 71. 
 
 Aristippus, 61. 
 
 Aristo, 71. 
 
 Aristobulus, 67. 
 
 Aristotelian argument, 299. 
 
 Aristotelianism, 63, 64 ; serving the 
 Church, 76. 
 
 Aristotle, 58, 59, 63, 64, 76, 96, 108, 
 137, 233, 276, 279, 283, 285, 286. 
 
 Armenian traditions of deluge, 366t 
 
 Artemia and Uranchipus, 253. 
 
 Articulates, 156. 
 
 Aryan religions, 186. 
 
 Asceticism of Antisthencs, 61. 
 
 Ascidian stage, 171. 
 
 Asoka, 54. 
 
 Asteroidal zone, 175. 
 
 Atheism not defended by Draper or 
 Tyndall, 132; contributing de- 
 fenses to theism, 176 ; rejected by 
 Tyndall, 238, 239. 
 
 Athenagoras, 71. 
 
 Athenians, religion of, 271. 
 
 Athenian school of Neo - Platonism, 
 70. 
 
 Athens and its people, 269. 
 
 Atomic universe, motions in, 103. 
 
 Atomism, held by Anaxagoras of Cla- 
 zomena?, 58 ; not necessarily athe- 
 
 istic, 102, 103, 234 ; requires cau- 
 sality, 102 ; implies creation, 103 ; 
 tendency to, 232. 
 
 Atomists: Leucippus, 59, 102; De- 
 mocritus, 59, 233, 234 ; Bruno, 59, 
 234; Tyndall, 59, 102, 232; Epi- 
 curus, 64, 102, 233 ; Lucretius, 65, 
 233, 236 ; Gassendi, 102, 234. 
 
 Atoms endowed with life, 236 ; not 
 explained by chance, 242 ; ulti- 
 mate realities of science, 256 ; ul- 
 timate constituents of matter, 324. 
 
 Attributes of Deity illustrated in nat- 
 ure, 333-351. 
 
 Augustine, Aurelius, 289, 293, 356, 
 362. 
 
 Augustinism, 83. 
 
 Aurelius, Marcus, 287. 
 
 Ausland, Das, 111. 
 
 Authority of primitive beliefs, 193. 
 
 Averroes, 78. 
 
 Averroism, 78 ; before Averroes, 64. 
 
 Averroists, 76. 
 
 A vesta, 52. 
 
 Avicenna, 78. 
 
 Aztecs, belief of, in a redeemer, 22 ; 
 religion of, 185, 353. 
 
 BACON, FRANCIS, 74, 218, 228, 234, 
 
 279, 320. 
 
 Bacon, Roger, 78, 79. 
 Baer, Von, 111, 133, 143, 155, 159. 
 Bain, Alexander, 225. 
 Baird, S. R, on hybrid woodpeckers, 
 
 172. 
 
 Balfour, 158. 
 Bannes, 357. 
 Bardessanes, 71. 
 Barker, George R, 129, 225. 
 Bar-kochba, 72. 
 Barrow, 266, 293. 
 Basil the Great, 73. 
 Basilides, 71. 
 Bastian, 224, 322. 
 Batrachian as a stage in evolution 
 
 of skeleton, 164. 
 Battle-fields of faith, 207. 
 Boyle, 80, 218. 
 Beauty has a teleological meaning, 
 
 156. 
 
 Beda, 73. 
 Behistun, inscription at, 53. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 387 
 
 Belief, affected by mental states, 92 ; 
 rational and emotional avenues 
 to, 152 ; various degrees of valid- 
 ity of, 307. 
 
 Bell, 158. 
 
 Beneficence illustrated in nature, 
 342-347. 
 
 Berchetti, 357. 
 
 Berengarius, 75. 
 
 Berghaus, 186. 
 
 Bergstrasser, Dr., 364. 
 
 Berkeley, 81, 218. 
 
 Berti, 357. 
 
 Bianconi, 109. 
 
 Bible, made the criterion of all 
 truth, 233 ; in the light of nature, 
 379-384; antecedently probable, 
 382 ; supernatural teachings of, 
 382-383. 
 
 Biblical cosmogony. (See Cosmogo- 
 ny-) 
 
 Biblical deluge. (See Deluge.) 
 
 Biran, Maine de, 94. 
 
 Bird a stage in evolution of verte- 
 brate skeleton, 164. 
 
 Birds, connected with reptiles, 171 ; 
 variations among, 254. 
 
 Boccaccio, 79. 
 
 Body in relation to space and time, 
 318-319. 
 
 Boethius, 73. 
 
 Bonaventure, St., 357. 
 
 Bonnet, 82. 
 
 " Book of the Dead," 47. 
 
 " Book of Transmigrations," 47. 
 
 Bosphorus, Thracian, 364. 
 
 Bossuet, 357. 
 
 Boulak, Egyptian antiquities at, 46. 
 
 Brahman as, 51. 
 
 Brahmanism, bifurcation of, 46 ; cy- 
 cles of, 51 ; one of the ethnic re- 
 ligions, 186, 353. 
 
 Brain secreting thought, 225, 255 ; 
 conditioning thought, 226, 250- 
 251. 
 
 Branchipus and Artemia, 253. 
 
 Braun, Adolf, 111. 
 
 "Bridgewater Treatises," 314. 
 
 Bronze Age, 190. 
 
 Brown, Thomas, 270. 
 
 Bruno, 59, 80, 137, 234. 
 
 Buchner, 89, 111, 225. 
 
 Buckle, 143. 
 
 Buddha, 54, 91. 
 
 Buddhism a bifurcation of Brahman- 
 ism, 46, 52 ; one of the ethnic re- 
 ligions, 186, 353; in China, 50; 
 in Persia, 53 ; in various countries, 
 54 ; missionary spirit of, 54 ; de- 
 generacy of, 54. 
 
 Buffon, 82. 
 
 Burton, 89, 208, 292. 
 
 Butler, Bishop, 151, 179, 234, 266, 
 293, 301, 314. 
 
 CAIRO, Egyptian antiquities at, 47. 
 
 Cajetan, Cardinal, 357. 
 
 Calderwood, 293. 
 
 Calvin, 77. 
 
 Cambyses, 53. 
 
 Campanella, 80. 
 
 Canus, Melchior, 357. 
 
 Carneades, 63, 94. 
 
 Carpenter, W. B., 145, 225, 293, 315. 
 
 Carpenter theory, 128. 
 
 Carpocrates, 71. 
 
 Cartesian vortices foreshadowed, 59. 
 
 Casalis, story told by, 229. 
 
 Cassianus, 73. 
 
 Catholic, Roman, form of faith ap- 
 pearing, 215. 
 
 Caucasian race perhaps the Adamic, 
 222, 223. 
 
 Causal intermediation, 120; the field 
 of scientific inquiry, 134, 241, 245 ; 
 modified by conditions, 139, 250. 
 
 Causal intermediation, or secondary 
 cause implies primary causation, 
 137; absence of primary cause, 
 congruity of antecedent and con- 
 sequent, 138; efficiency, 139. 
 
 Causality, intuition of, 26, 197, 242 ; 
 doctrine of, 87 ; intuition of, leads 
 to Deity, 93, 197; universality of 
 intuition, 93 ; its origin, 94 ; deriv- 
 atives of, 298. 
 
 Causal relation, implications of, 95, 
 101-119. 
 
 Causation implies, spontaneity, 98 ; 
 real cause, 101 ; relation of ante- 
 cedence, 104 ; correlative subject- 
 ivity and objectivity, 104, 263; 
 self - consciousness, 105, 263; ef- 
 fect conceived, 106, 263; con- 
 
388 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 sciousness of principle of causa- 
 tion, 107, 215; motive, 107, 264; 
 contingency, 115, 250, 264; influ- 
 ence of contingency cognized, 116, 
 264 ; desire to effectuate, 116, 264 ; 
 freedom, 116; intention, 116; will, 
 117, 260, 264; personality, 119, 
 263 ; in finite causation, 'instru- 
 mentalities, 265. 
 
 Causation, primordial, recession of, 
 27, 131, 243-245 ; always believed 
 real, 245. 
 
 Cause, denial of reality of, 93 ; but 
 one species of, 96 ; arbitrarily as- 
 sumed, 148 ; not attainable by sci- 
 ence, 131, 241. 
 
 Cause, potential, 95; material, 97; 
 formal, 97; negative, 97; exem- 
 plary, 97; modal, 97; physical, 
 120,134,240-241,249. 
 
 Cause physical or secondary not real 
 cause, 98 ; discriminated from ef- 
 ficient, 121, 247 ; when idea of, 
 arises, 244; assumed as efficient 
 in scientific language, 247. 
 
 Cause, primary, faith in, never aban- 
 doned, 245. 
 
 Causes of skepticism, 179-184. 
 
 Causes, true, recognized in environ- 
 ment by Tyndall, 235. 
 
 Celsus, 68. 
 
 Centrifugal force in organization, 
 165. 
 
 Centripetal force in organization, 
 165. 
 
 Cesalpinus, 79. 
 
 Chadbourne,P.,158. 
 
 Chaldean deluge, 365. 
 
 Challis, Professor, 315. 
 
 Chalmerian hypothesis, 363. 
 
 Chalmers, 158, 316. 
 
 Chance not causal, 101, 242 ; what it 
 means, 101, 102, 242-243. 
 
 Chaos as first principle, 56. 
 
 Chevron bones, 183. 
 
 Chinese psychic history, 48 ; religions, 
 187 ; traditions of deluge, 366. 
 
 Christ, signifies a culminating relig- 
 ious phase, 69 ; viewed as a mar- 
 tyr, 214. 
 
 Christian defense, proper spirit of, 
 267. 
 
 Christian psychic history, 66. 
 
 " Christianity and Greek Philoso- 
 phy," purpose of, 268 ; style of, 
 290. 
 
 Christianity, made sponsor for false 
 theories, 1 83 ; one of the ethnic 
 religions, 185, 383 ; to ally itself 
 with all truth, 267; concerned in 
 the discovery of all truth, 268; 
 grounded in human nature, 280. 
 
 Cicero, 66, 92, 108, 158, 284, 293. 
 
 Clark, H. James, 158, 253. 
 
 Clark, Samuel, 158. 
 
 Clarke, James Freeman, 292. 
 
 Cleanthes, 64, 213, 272. 
 
 Clement of Alexandria, 72, 91 ; on 
 the Sacred Canon, 47 ; on causes, 
 98 ; an evolutionist, 143 ; on in- 
 spiration of Greek philosophy, 
 202; on relations of faith and 
 knowledge, 266 ; on office of Greek 
 philosophy, 280 ; on the shallow- 
 minded, 304 ; on the necessity of 
 knowledge to sustain faith, 311. 
 
 Clerk-Maxwell, 234. 
 
 Cloister schools, 74. 
 
 Cocker, B. R, 109, 118, 134 ; " Chris- 
 tianity and Greek Philosophy," by, 
 266; "Theistic Conception of the 
 World," by, 304. 
 
 Cohesive attraction, 261-262. 
 
 Coleridge, 94, 138. 
 
 Columbus, 79, 216. 
 
 Comprehensive types in Eocene, 172. 
 
 Comte, 89, 137, 143, 208, 276, 293, 
 315. 
 
 Comtean theory of religion, 270. 
 
 Condillac, 81. 
 
 Condition, in causality, 115, 250; in 
 secondary causality, 139, 250; sub- 
 jective and objective, 140 ; organ- 
 ic, 140 ; permissive, 146 ; danger 
 of confounding with cause, 250. 
 
 Condition, objective, mistaken for 
 efficiency, 145. 
 
 Condition, subjective, mistaken for 
 objective, and then for efficiency, 
 140 ; mistaken for efficiency, 142. 
 
 Conditioned existence, 197. 
 
 Condorcet, 82. 
 
 Conflict between religious and intel- 
 lectual faculties, 18, 31, 34, 77, 208. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 389 
 
 Conflict, law of, 18, 34 ; how it arises, 
 26, 211 ; what it really is, 33, 215, 
 218, 233 ; why permitted to exist, 
 33 ; with human passions, 35 ; in 
 individual mind, 312. 
 
 Conflicts historically sketched, 46. 
 
 Conflicts of faith, 207. 
 
 Confucianism, 187. 
 
 Confucius, 49, 187. 
 
 Conglomeration of planets, 377. 
 
 Congruity, a law of secondary cau- 
 sation, 138; enunciated by Cole- 
 ridge, 138 ; opposed to doctrine of 
 organized experiences, 148 ; op- 
 posed to abiogenesis, 148. 
 
 Conscience, defined and discrimi- 
 nated, 23, 327; defined by Dr. 
 Cocker, 326 ; not a cognitive fac- 
 ulty, 23 ; a constituent of the re- 
 ligious nature, 25. 
 
 Consciousness of self implied in cau- 
 sality, 105 ; of causal relation im- 
 plied, 107; veracity of, 136. 
 
 Consensus gentium, 66, 92, 105. 
 
 Conservation of force, 181. 
 
 Conservatism of religious faith, 29 ; 
 an indirect cause of skepticism, 179. 
 
 Constants of religious systems, 37, 
 187. 
 
 Contenson, Vincentius, 357. 
 
 Continents uplifted, 360. 
 
 Continuity of motion, 260. 
 
 Contradiction between reason and 
 faith, 80. 
 
 Contrivance. (See Correlation.) 
 
 Conviction, grounds of, 306. 
 
 Cooke, Josiah, 158. 
 
 Cooling of the earth, 375; of the 
 sun, 376. 
 
 Cope, E. D., on fossil vertebrates, 171. 
 
 Copernicus, 79, 234. 
 
 Correlation implies intelligence, 112, 
 150-153. 
 
 Correlations, mechanical and modal, 
 153 ; mechanical, 153 ; modal, 
 154; conspicuous in nature, 154, 
 260 ; modal may be viewed as te- 
 leological, 155 ; imply intelligence, 
 260. 
 
 Cosmical history, 174-177. 
 
 Cosmogony, Biblical, 222, 320 ; pro- 
 emium in, 320-322, 961. 
 
 Cosmological argument, 279 ; formu- 
 lated, 285 ; equivalences of, 279- 
 299. 
 
 Council of Nice, 72, 73 ; of Soissons, 75. 
 
 Cousin, 94, 270. 
 
 Cowardice of believers, 182. 
 
 Coxcox, 366. 
 
 Cranium viewed homologically, 162. 
 
 Creation of the world, 220 ; Biblical 
 idea of, 358. 
 
 Creations, occasional and perpetual, 
 166. 
 
 Creeds, effete constituents of, 30, 31, 
 216; made to embrace non-essen- 
 tials, 212, 220; purified by con- 
 flict, 37, 228. 
 
 Creodonta, 172. 
 
 Critias, 60, 90. 
 
 Cudworth, 109, 272, 314, 323. 
 
 Curry, Daniel, 289. 
 
 Cusanus, 79, 91. 
 
 Cushite religion, 185. 
 
 Cuvier, Georges, 109, 137, 140, 159, 
 363. 
 
 Cycles in the fortunes of religion, 
 35,213-221. 
 
 Cycles, psychic. (See Intellectual 
 Phases; Religious Phases.) 
 
 Cyclical movements of faith and in- 
 tellect, 42, 212. 
 
 Cynic school, 61. 
 
 Cyprian, 73. 
 
 Cyrenaic school, 61, 62. 
 
 Cyrus the Persian, 53. 
 
 D'ALEMBERT, 82, 218, 312. 
 
 Damascenus, 73. 
 
 Damascius, last teacher at Athens, 
 70. 
 
 Dana, J. D., 277, 363. 
 
 Dante, 79. 
 
 Darius, 53. 
 
 Darwin, Charles, 110, 140, 144, 172; 
 208, 235, 236, 292. 
 
 Darwinism opposed by certain facts, 
 141, 142 ; violates principle of 
 congruity, 145 ; accepted by Tyn- 
 dall, 235; to be accepted with 
 qualifications, 166, 253-254, etc. 
 (See Derivation.) 
 
 Darwinists mistaking heredity for 
 cause, 146. 
 
390 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Dawson, J. W., 140, 2*77. 
 
 Days of Genesis, 320-322, 356-357, 
 359-362. 
 
 Deduction the special logic of phi- 
 losophy, 134 ; but legitimate in 
 science, 134, 248 ; examples of 
 use of, 135 ; employed by Tyn- 
 dall, 136. 
 
 Deductions from the theistic propo- 
 sition, 199. 
 
 Deductive theistic conclusion, 92, 
 117, 274. 
 
 Deductive theistic belief, 191, 274. 
 
 Deism, 324. 
 
 Deluge of Noah, 223, 363-368 ; not 
 universal, 367. 
 
 Deluges, post-glacial, 364 ; in China, 
 365; in Chaldea, 365; Greece, 
 366 ; other regions, 366-367. 
 
 Democritus, 59, 233. 
 
 Demon of Socrates, 319. 
 
 Demonstration of being of God. (See 
 Deduction, God, Religion.) 
 
 De Morgan, 243. 
 
 Denis the Carthusian, 357. 
 
 Derivative Theory, philosophical im- 
 plications of, 166 ; considerations 
 favorable to, 170-172, 253-254; 
 theism of, 174, 224; depending on 
 the whole range of evidence, 253- 
 254. (See Evolution and Darwin- 
 ism.) 
 
 Descartes, 74, 80, 94, 99, 166, 218, 
 234, 266, 275, 273, 363. 
 
 Desert of Sahara, 364. 
 
 Designs in nature, use of multiplied 
 instances of, 152 ; writers illustra- 
 ting, 158; ignored by Lucretius, 
 233; illustrations of, 333-342. 
 (See Final Cause; and Teleology.) 
 
 Desire implied in causality, 116. 
 
 Deucalion, deluge of, 366. 
 
 Dharma-Pitaka, 54. 
 
 D'Holbach, 82, 218, 312. 
 
 Diastema, 171. 
 
 Diderot, 82, 218. 
 
 Dinosaurians, 171. 
 
 Diodorus Cronus, 61. 
 
 Diogenes of Sinope, 61. 
 
 Discernment, of correlating forces, 
 142 ; in organization, 166. 
 
 Dissipation of energy, 124. 
 
 Divinity regarded as of human ori- 
 gin, 60. 
 
 Divorce of thought from faith, 83. 
 Dogmas, unscientific, 216. 
 Dogmatic theologians, 277. 
 Dollinger, 183. 
 Domesticated animals and plants, 
 
 371. 
 
 Dordrecht, Synod of, 80. 
 Draper, J. W., 29, 34, 66, 131, 132, 
 
 244. 
 
 Dualism inevitable, 105. 
 Dubois-Reymond, 257, 258. 
 Duns Scotus, 76. 
 Duty, religious, rationally deduced, 
 
 205. 
 Dynamic theory of matter, 128-129 ; 
 
 implies a modified pantheism, 130 ; 
 
 consequences, if admitted, 1 33. 
 Dynamism, unconscious, opposed by 
 
 idea of causality, 105. 
 
 ECCLESIASTICISM in the ascendant, 74, 
 76. 
 
 Eckart, 78, 91. 
 
 Eclecticism, 66. 
 
 Eclectic Platonists, 68. 
 
 Ecphantus, 57. 
 
 Effect, conception of, implied in cau- 
 sality, 106. 
 
 Efficiency in secondary causation, 
 139. 
 
 Efficient cause how the term is used, 
 96 ; the scholastic sense, 96 ; not 
 known in science, 96, 120. 
 
 Egyptian psychic history, 46. 
 
 Egyptian religion, 185, 353. 
 
 Eleatics, 57-58, 283. 
 
 Electricity, 261-262. 
 
 Elements of thought phrase criti- 
 cised, 235. 
 
 Embryonic development, 171. 
 
 Emotional conviction, 152. 
 
 Empedocles, 58, 91, 233, 285. 
 
 Empedotimus, 91. 
 
 Encke's comet, 377. 
 
 End of physical order, 123, 127. 
 
 Endogenous origin of idea of causal- 
 ity, 94, 95. 
 
 Environment, and organic correla- 
 tions, 140; viewed as impressing 
 organism, 140 ; contrary view, 
 
INDEX. 
 
 391 
 
 141 ; not efficient, 141 ; sometimes 
 an objective condition, 146; no 
 explanation of persistent plan, 
 168; regarded efficient by Tyn- 
 dall, 235. 
 
 Eocene animals, 168-172. 
 
 Eohippus, 135, 170. 
 
 Eozoic age, 361. 
 
 Epictetus, 64, 287. 
 
 Epicureanism, 280. 
 
 Epicurus, 64, 233. 
 
 Epioienides, 91. 
 
 Epicycles in psychic history, 45 ; in 
 Brahmanic thought, 52 ; in the 
 Socratic school, 61 ; in the scho- 
 lastic period, 75. 
 
 Equilibrium, tendency to, in nature, 
 122. 
 
 Equine animals, 166-170, 254. 
 
 Equivalence of forces, 261-262. 
 
 Equus, 169. 
 
 Erigena, 75, 76. 
 
 Essenes, 67. 
 
 Eternity discussed, 315. 
 
 Eternity of matter, 63 ; of universe, 
 276. 
 
 Etli, a Hebrew particle, 358, 362. 
 
 Ether, disturbing influence of, 377. 
 
 Ethical argument, 198, 284, 299. 
 
 Ethical influence of Greek philoso- 
 phy, 286. 
 
 Ethnic religions, 353 ; common facts 
 of, 21, 187 ; respect due to, 205. 
 
 Euclid, 61. 
 
 Eudemus, 63. 
 
 Euhemerus, 62, 82. 
 
 Evangelical efforts, 304-305. 
 
 Evening and morning in Genesis, 322. 
 
 Evolution a method of nature, 142 ; 
 a subjective condition, not a cause, 
 143 ; implies a real cause, 144 ; a 
 system of correlations, 154; the 
 method of methods, 154; a dem- 
 onstration of mind, 155; only a 
 method, 155; ideal and material, 
 170. 
 
 Evolution philosophy in Greece, 58. 
 
 Evolutionist school, 232. 
 
 Exemplary cause, 97. 
 
 Ex nihilo nihil fit not a necessary 
 datum, 60. 
 
 Exogenous origin, idea of cause, 94. 
 
 Experience not the origin of idea of 
 
 causality, 95. 
 
 Experiences accumulated, 235. 
 External world deniable, 237, 240; 
 
 rationally admitted, 240 ; exists as 
 
 it seems, 240. 
 Extinctions of animals, 370. 
 
 FAITH and intellect in reciprocal ac- 
 tion, 42. 
 
 Faith in God, origin of, 89. 
 
 Faith, religious, afflictions of, 27 ; 
 conservatism of, 29, 32, 220 ; some- 
 times defrauded by science, 29 ; 
 hallows all its objects, 28, 220 ; 
 should not embrace scientific opin- 
 ions, 30, 220; fidelity of, 27, 220; 
 rash stakes of, 30 ; indestructibil- 
 ity of, 31 ; aggressiveness of, 33. 
 
 False reasoning in science, 139, 140. 
 
 Farrar, A. S., 36, 76, 287. 
 
 Fathers, force of dicta of, 75 ; Neo- 
 latonistic, 91. 
 
 Faunas of continents graduated, 371. 
 
 Faustus, 73. 
 
 Favorinus, 69. 
 
 Fetichism, 37, 273. 
 
 Fichte, I. H., 141. 
 
 Fichte, J. G., 195. 
 
 Figuier, 272. 
 
 Fijian traditions of deluge, 366. 
 
 Final cause, 96 ; implied in causal 
 relation, 108 ; in Old Testament, 
 108 ; held by Socrates, Aristotle, 
 Stoics, Cicero, Lactantius, Galen, 
 108 ; by Gregory of Nyssa, Cud- 
 worth, and many others, 109 ; by 
 Huxley and Hartmann, 110; by 
 Owen and others, 111, 158; illus- 
 trations of, 337-342; mistaken 
 for efficient cause, 142. 
 
 Final cause, opposition to, 110, 111, 
 235, 283 ; treated with levity, 113 ; 
 opposition to, based on an assump- 
 tion, 151 ; question of, philosoph- 
 ical, not scientific, 115. 
 
 Finitencss of physical order, 123, 
 127, 319, 373-379. 
 
 Fire as first principle, 66. 
 
 Fire-mist and its evolutions, 74-176, 
 359. 
 
 First cause only cause, 99. 
 
 17* 
 
392 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Fish as expression of vertebrate idea, 
 164. 
 
 Fiske, John, 314. 
 
 Fontenelle, 81. 
 
 Force, reduced to will, 118, 127, 260 ; 
 viewed as delegated, 122, 125; 
 viewed as inherent, 122, 256, 322 ; 
 tending to equilibrium, 123; in- 
 herent, is unthinkable, 124 ; view- 
 ed as acting across space, 125; 
 viewed as transmitted through 
 matter, 126; instantaneously re- 
 newed, 126 ; viewed as identical 
 with divine will, 127, 260-261; 
 implies substance, 129, 260; con- 
 ceivable relations of, to matter 
 tabulated, 130 ; not known to sci- 
 ence, 256 ; viewed as exerted by 
 matter, 256-257; viewed as ex- 
 ternal to matter, 257-259 ; viewed 
 as initially applied, 258-259 ; not 
 a mode of motion, 259 ; viewed as 
 first principle, 314; viewed as a 
 phenomenon of the Unknowable, 
 323. 
 
 Forces, not all mutually convertible, 
 261-262; polar and non- polar, 
 261 ; vital, 262 ; classification of, 
 262 ; molar, 333. 
 
 Foreknowledge, divine, unqualified, 
 107. 
 
 Formal cause, 97, 106. 
 
 Freedom implied in causality, 116, 
 328. 
 
 French philosophy, 81. 
 
 Fu-hi, 48. 
 
 Future life and rewards, 22. 
 
 GALEN, 68, 293. 
 
 Galileo, 80, 109, 137, 151, 158, 181, 
 213, 216. 
 
 Gassendi, 79, 137, 234. 
 
 Gastrula stage, 171. 
 
 Gathas, 52. 
 
 Genealogy, of ships, 173 ; steam-en- 
 gines, clocks, etc., 173 ; Gothic 
 dome, conic sections, crystalline 
 forms, 173. 
 
 Genesis and science, 222, 356-363. 
 
 Genetic relation of equine animals, 
 170. 
 
 Gennadius, 73. 
 
 Geology and Genesis, 222, 320-322, 
 356-363. 
 
 Ghici, 357. 
 
 Glaciers, 370. 
 
 Glanville, 94. 
 
 Gnomic poets, 287. 
 
 Gnostics, 71, 215. 
 
 God, a fact of the ethnic religions, 
 21; conceptions of, 37-38; ac- 
 knowledged by Darius, 53 ; sought 
 in Greek philosophy, 56-58, 280- 
 288 ; origin of faith in, 89 ; view- 
 ed as a monad, 121 ; not attained 
 by natural science, 131 ; grounds 
 of faith in, 150; revealed in or- 
 ganic life, 166 ; knowable by nat- 
 ural reason, 266 ; idea of, univers- 
 al, 274, 282; idea of, complex, 
 274 ; demanded by the universe, 
 275 ; cognoscibility of, denied, 276 ; 
 attributes of, illustrated in nature, 
 333-351; unity of, 347-351; 
 name of, on every heart, 354. 
 (See Religion; Religious nature.) 
 
 God in the world, 304. 
 
 Gods of Greek mythology, 131 ; ob- 
 structed science, 232 ; discarded 
 by science and philosophy, 244 ; 
 origin of, 282. 
 
 Goethe, 157, 176. 
 
 Goette, 114. 
 
 Gorgias, 60. 
 
 Gran Chacos, 189, 353. 
 
 Gravitation, acting across space, 125 ; 
 Newton's view of, 125 ; questions 
 concerning, 134; not an original 
 force, 335. 
 
 Gray, Asa, 111. 
 
 Greek, philosophy, 57 ; psychic his- 
 tory, 55 ; language, spread of, 281 ; 
 mythology, 186, 353 ; traditions of 
 deluges, 366. 
 
 Gregory of Nazianzen, 73. 
 
 Gregory of Nyssa, 73, 109. 
 
 Grotius, 284. 
 
 Grove, W.R., 119,315. 
 
 Gyzicki, 109, 110. 
 
 HABITATS of animals, 169-160. 
 Haeckel, E., Ill, 113, 135, 137, 171, 
 
 231. 
 Haemal arches, 162. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 Hamilton, Sir William, 94, 137, 196, 
 217,239,276,295,301. 
 
 Hand illustrating design, 338. 
 
 Hartley, 81. 
 
 Hartmann, E. Von, 109, 1 10, 1 1 1, 1 73. 
 
 Harvey, 323. 
 
 Hasty generalizations, 181. 
 
 Heat, 261-262. 
 
 Heavens in Genesis, 358. 
 
 Hebrew literature in Alexandria, 67. 
 
 Hedonism, 61. 
 
 Hegel, 107, 293. 
 
 Hegelian, theory of religion, 270 ; 
 paradoxes, 270. 
 
 Hegelianism before Hegel, 279. 
 
 Hellenism blended with Christiani- 
 ty, 71 ; one of the ethnic religions, 
 186. 
 
 Helmholtz, H. L. F., Ill, 257, 277. 
 
 Helvetius, 82. 
 
 Heraclides of Pontus, 62. 
 
 Heraclitus, 56, 121, 279. 
 
 Herbart, 109. 
 
 Herbert, 218. 
 
 Herder, 293. 
 
 Heredity, a mode of intelligence, 144 ; 
 an instrument, not a cause, 146 ; 
 does not account for homologies, 
 157, 165 ; perpetuates identity, 
 165 ; transmits, but does not aug- 
 ment, 256. 
 
 Heresies in early Christianity, 72 ; 
 crushed by decrees, 73 ; among 
 later Christians, 183. 
 
 Heresism, 83. 
 
 Hermias, 72. 
 
 Herschel, Sir John, 118, 315. 
 
 Herschel, Sir William, 277, 358. 
 
 Hesiod, 56, 58, 187, 286. 
 
 Hewn-stone Age, 190. 
 
 Hicetas, 57. 
 
 Hilarius, 73. 
 
 Hildegard, St., 357. 
 
 Hindoo traditions of deluge, 366. 
 
 ffipparion, 169, 171. 
 
 Hippias, 60. 
 
 His, 114. 
 
 Hobbes,80, 89, 109,218. 
 
 Holbach, Von, 82, 218, 312. 
 
 Homer, 55, 58, 87, 286. 
 
 Homeric Age, 282, 288. 
 
 Homceomeriae, 58. 
 
 Homological argument, 198 ; critical- 
 ly viewed, 296. 
 
 Homology, 155, 156; opposed by 
 theologians, 156 ; harmonious with 
 theology, 156 ; opposed by certain 
 anatomists, 157; writers on, 158; 
 in vertebrate structures, 161-165; 
 in cranium, 162; in 05 coccygis, 
 163; in limbs, 166-170, 340; in 
 world -life, 174-177; exemplified 
 in the world, 260. 
 
 Horse, serial types of, 166-170, 254. 
 
 Hottentots, ethical perceptions of, 
 24. 
 
 Huggins, W., 277. 
 
 Humboldt, A., 375. 
 
 Hume, 82, 94, 218, 275, 276. 
 
 Humphreys and Abbot, 181. 
 
 Hunt, T. S., 275. 
 
 Hunter, 323. 
 
 Huxley, T. H., 90, 110, 141, 144, 171, 
 235; 258, 270, 322. 
 
 Hwang-ho, overflows of, 365-369. 
 
 Hyacinthe, Father, 183. 
 
 Hybridity, 172. 
 
 Hylozoism, 56, 121, 324. 
 
 Hypatia, 70. 
 
 ICE-WELLS, 370. 
 
 Ideas, necessary, 297. 
 
 Ideas of Plato, 62. 
 
 Ideological argument, 286 ; equiva- 
 lences of, 299. 
 
 Immanence, divine, 59 ; held by The- 
 ophrastus, 63 ; by the Stoics, 64. 
 
 Immanent relation of God to the 
 world, 107, 127, 258, 324; objec- 
 tions to, grounded in mental im- 
 potence, 128; does not conflict 
 with doctrine of law, 132. 
 
 Immensity discussed, 315. 
 
 Impotency of reason, 300. 
 
 Incarnations, ethnic beliefs in, 22. 9 
 
 Incrusted condition of a world, 176. 
 
 Index Librorum Prohibitorum, 80. 
 
 Indian psychic history, 51. 
 
 Indo-European race, 45. 
 
 Induction, the logic of science, 134 ; 
 uses d priori data, 135 ; exagger- 
 ated estimate of, 135 ; progress of, 
 234. 
 
 Inductive logic, 64. 
 
394 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Infinite series no substitute for 
 cause, 99. 
 
 Infinity, notion of, 197. 
 
 Inherent force, 122; consequences 
 of, 123 ; unthinkable, 124. 
 
 Inheritance a mode of intelligence, 
 144; law of, 165. (See also He- 
 redity.) 
 
 Innate origin of idea of causality, 94. 
 
 Innate sentiments, significance of, 20. 
 
 Inquisition, 80. 
 
 Inspiration, Jewish and Christian, 91. 
 
 Instrument mistaken for cause, 146. 
 
 Instrumentality employed in human 
 causation, 265. 
 
 Intellect, office of, 33 ; finds response 
 in the world, 346 ; may serve relig- 
 ion, 39, 210-211. 
 
 Intellectual phases, 44 ; in Egypt, 
 46-48 ; in China, 48 ; in India, 51 ; 
 among the Jews, 55 ; in Greece, 55, 
 278-280 ; in Christian history, 66 ; 
 existing, 83. 
 
 Intelligence, revealed in nature, 111, 
 112, 150, 332, 355 ; implied in in- 
 telligible correlations, 151,338. 
 
 Intention implied in causality, 116. 
 
 Intentionality, doctrine of, 150; im- 
 plied in causality, 264; revealed 
 in nature, 117, 150, 337 ; intuition 
 of, valid, 151,152. 
 
 Interactions of the religious and in- 
 tellectual faculties, 15, 32, 88, 215- 
 220; laws of, 42; beneficent, 36. 
 
 Intuition, of causality, 93, 197; of 
 substance, 196; of intelligence, 
 197, 338 ; of ethicality, 198, 355. 
 
 Intuition of God, 90, 294 ; believers 
 in, cited, 91, 196 ; credulous believ- 
 ers in, 92. 
 
 Intuitional eye, 309. 
 
 Intuitions, defined, 191 ; necessity of, 
 
 ,,192; authority of, 21, 193, 304, 
 
 354 ; analogous to instincts, 194. 
 
 Ionic school, 56, 278. 
 
 Irenaeus, 72. 
 
 Irreligion, consequences of, 34. 
 
 Isaiah, 280. 
 
 Islam, a bifurcation of Christianity, 
 46; the third Semitic religion, 
 186; spread of, 186. 
 
 Italian school, 278. 
 
 JACOBI, 91, 196, 270, 295. 
 
 Jamblichus, 70, 91. 
 
 Jameson, 363. 
 
 Jevons, W. S., 96, 135. 
 
 Jewish religion, 185, 353. 
 
 Jews in Egypt, 48, 67. 
 
 John, St., 280. 
 
 Jones, H. Bence, 322. 
 
 Jupiter in its stormy stage, 176. 
 
 Justin Martyr, 289. 
 
 Justinian closes Athenian schools^ 
 
 70, 215. 
 Justinus Flavius, 71. 
 
 KAFFIRS, 229. 
 
 Kant, 94, 109, 110, 115, 192, 218, 
 233, 234, 276, 285, 295 ; on theist- 
 ic arguments, 260, 296 ; his criti- 
 cism of theistic proofs examined, 
 299-302. 
 
 Kapila, 52. 
 
 Kepler, 79, 158. 
 
 Khedive of Egypt, 46, 48. 
 
 Kneph, 352. 
 
 Kronig, 109. 
 
 LACTANTIUS, 72, 108, 157, 178, 202^ 
 289. 
 
 Lange, 321. 
 
 Lanoye, De, on Nile deposits, 181. 
 
 Lao-tse, 49, 187, 353. 
 
 Lamarck, 140. 
 
 Land first formed, 360. 
 
 Laplace, 115, 142, 176. 
 
 Lateran Council, 75, 76. 
 
 Law the tyrant of men, 60. 
 
 Law, does not imply capricious in- 
 telligence, 132, 259 ; not efficient, 
 133, 249; implies 'intelligent will, 
 133 ; a self-imposed mode of ac- 
 tivity, 133, 139 ; not necessary ab- 
 solutely, 139; definition of, 249, 
 256 ; itself an effect, 249. 
 
 Laycock, 315, 320, 323. 
 
 Learning, light of, reflected recipro- 
 cally, 48. 
 
 Lectonia, 364, 369. 
 
 Leibnitz, 74, 81, 94, 102, 121, 137, 
 142, 218, 266, 279, 293. 
 
 Leibnitzian argument, 299, 302. 
 
 Leidy on fossil vertebrates, 168, 171. 
 
 Lemuroid stage, 171. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 395 
 
 Lessing, 81. 
 
 Leucippus, 59, 221, 234. 
 
 Lewis, Tayler, 363. 
 
 Liberty, idea of, 297-298. 
 
 Life, origin of, 224, 235, 236; in 
 monads, 102, 126 ; in atoms, 236 ; 
 an insoluble mystery, 237. 
 
 Light, distances passed over by, 336 ; 
 demonstrating unity of creation, 
 349. 
 
 Links, missing, recovered, 168-172. 
 
 Liturgical tendencies. (See Ritual- 
 ism.) 
 
 Locke, 74, 81, 109, 191. 
 
 Lockyer, J. N., 277. 
 
 Longinus, 70. 
 
 Love and hate, 58. 
 
 Lubbock, Sir John, 89, 208, 292. 
 
 Lucan, 64. 
 
 Luc, De, 363. 
 
 Lucretius, 65, 233, 236. 
 
 Lusitanus, 357. 
 
 Luther, Martin, 74, 76, 77, 217. 
 
 Lyell, Sir Charles, 111, 181. 
 
 MACCABEES, 67. 
 
 Macchiavelli, 80. 
 
 Macedo, 357. 
 
 " Made," in Gen. i., 16, 359. 
 
 Magianism, 38, 91. 
 
 Magnetism, 261-262. 
 
 Magus, Simon, 71. 
 
 Mahan,Asa, 275, 314,316. 
 
 Maillet, De, 140. 
 
 Maine de Biran, 94. 
 
 Mammals, variations among, 254 ; 
 reign of, 361. 
 
 Man, preparations for, 344-345; in 
 the light of geology, 368-373 ; be- 
 longs to the last fauna, 368 ; ad- 
 vent of, recent, 369 ; birthplace of, 
 370 ; the last term, 372. 
 
 Manetho, 46, 
 
 Mansel, 217, 239, 295. 
 
 Mantras of the Rig .Veda Sanhita, 51. 
 
 Marcus Aurelius, 64. 
 
 Mariette, Bey, 46. 
 
 Marine animals, period of, 360. 
 
 Mars in its habitable stage, 176. 
 
 Marsh, G. P., 269. 
 
 Marsh, 0. 0., 135, 170, 171; on 
 equine quadrupeds, 168, 170. 
 
 Marsupial stage, 171. 
 
 Martineau, James, 270, 316. 
 
 Material cause, 97. 
 
 Materialism of the Stoics, 64 ; Epi- 
 curus, 65 ; Tertullian, 72 ; Hilarius 
 and others, 73; Gassendi, 79; 
 Bruno, 80 ; Rousseau, 81 ; Met- 
 trie, de la, 81; Condillac, 81; 
 D'Holbach, 82 ; Democritus, 233 ; 
 Tyndall, 236-239. (See Atomism ; 
 Atomists.) 
 
 Materialism, more imaginary than 
 real, 226 ; limited by Tyndall, 238 ; 
 unconscious, opposed by idea of 
 causality, 105. 
 
 Mathematical truths, 302. 
 
 Matter and force, table of conceiva- 
 ble relations of, 130. 
 
 Matter, created, 99, 315-319; dead, 
 the kind here considered, 125, 149 ; 
 conscious, necessitates atheism, 
 122 ; theistically held eternal, 102; 
 conceived as animated, 121, 236, 
 257; not voluntary, 121, 257; 
 viewed as adynamic, 122, 126-127, 
 324 ; as the seat of inherent force, 
 122, 257-258 ; as the vehicle trans- 
 mitting primordial force, 126 ; as 
 a phenomenon of force, 128; as 
 possessed of the potency of life, 
 236; as first principle, 314; as 
 constituted of atoms, 324 ; identic- 
 al in different worlds, 349-350. 
 
 Maudsley, 225. 
 
 Maupertius, 81. 
 
 Maximus, 68. 
 
 Mbenga, 366. 
 
 M'Causland, Dr., 222, 223, 363. 
 
 M'Cosh, James, 109, 158, 243, 289, 
 293, 314. 
 
 Mechanical correlations, 153. 
 
 Mechanism implies intelligence, 112. 
 
 Medusa?, embryonic stages of, 253. 
 
 Megaric school, 61. 
 
 Melanchthon, 77. 
 
 Melissus of Samos, 58. 
 
 Melito, 71. 
 
 Mental latency, 145. 
 
 Mesohippus, 169. 
 
 Mesozoic age, 361. 
 
 Methodius, 78. 
 
 Mettrie, De la, 81. 
 
396 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Meunier, Stanislas, 277. 
 
 Mexican traditions of deluge, 366. 
 
 Michaelis, 114. 
 
 Middle Academy, 63. 
 
 Migrations of man, 371. 
 
 Mill, J. S., 94, 96, 120, 138, 191, 243, 
 270, 276, 277, 320. 
 
 Miller Hugh, 363. 
 
 Miltiades, 71. 
 
 Mimansa, 51. 
 
 Mind influenced by physical sur- 
 roundings, 269. 
 
 Miohippus, 168-169. 
 
 Missing links recovered, 167-172; 
 effect of non-recovery of, 173. 
 
 Mississippi delta, 181. 
 
 Mitchel, O.M., 158. 
 
 Mivart, St. George, 357. 
 
 Modal correlations, 153. 
 
 Modes of motion, 259-262. 
 
 Moffat, J. C., 292. 
 
 Mohammedans, 78. 
 
 Mojaves, 22. 
 
 Molecular groupings, 238. 
 
 Mollusks, 159; variations among, 
 254. 
 
 Monads of Leibnitz, 102, 121. 
 
 Monism, 105; favored by Tyndall, 
 233-238; said to be spreading, 
 239. 
 
 Monotheism, among the Greeks, 58, 
 61, 62, 63, 64 ; of Apollonius of 
 Tyana, 68 ; of Athenagoras, 71 ; 
 favorable to science, 234, 246 ; the 
 primitive religion of humanity, 
 273, 352. 
 
 Monotreme stage of embryo, 171. 
 
 Montaigne, 80. 
 
 Montesquieu, 81, 159. 
 
 Moody, methods of, 304. 
 
 Moon, condition of, 176. 
 
 Moral argument, 279. 
 
 Moral excellence, ideal of, in Greece, 
 287. 
 
 Moral government, 326. 
 
 Moral judgments, 24, 25. 
 
 Morality, standards of, 24. 
 
 Moreau, Charles, 357. 
 
 Morphological conceptions, 176. 
 
 Morris, G. S., 109, 247. 
 
 Morula stage of embryo, 171. 
 Moses, 280. 
 
 Motion an effect, not a force, 256. 
 Motive implied in causality, 107. 
 Miiller, Max, 273, 292. 
 Murphy, 3 15, 323. 
 Mutius Scaevola, 90- 
 Mystics, German, 78, 91. 
 Mythology, Greek, 186, 273, 353- 
 blended with Christianity, 71, 215. 
 
 NATURALISM, of Strato, 64 ; of Epicu- 
 rus, 64. 
 
 Natural selection a mode of intelli- 
 gence, 144 ; suggested by Emped- 
 ocles, 233. 
 
 Navajoes' expectation of a redeemer, 
 289. 
 
 Neander, 71. 
 
 Nebular cosmogony foreshadowed, 
 59 ; by Democritus, 233 ; by Lu- 
 cretius, 233. 
 
 Nebular history of the world, 174- 
 177, 350. 
 
 Nebular theory, attitude of Church 
 toward, 180; defenders of, 277. 
 
 Necessary being, 300. 
 
 Necessary ideas, 26, 297; relative 
 and absolute, 300. 
 
 Necessity of some religion, 184, 352. 
 
 Negative cause, 97. 
 
 Neo-Platonism, 62, 69, 91. 
 
 Neo-Pythagoreanism, 68, 91. 
 
 Nescience opposing teleology, 151. 
 
 Nescience school, 239. 
 
 Neural arches, 162. 
 
 Newcomb, S., 277. 
 
 Newman, J. P., 289. 
 
 Newton, Sir Isaac, 75, 80, 109, 137, 
 158, 266. 
 
 Newtonian argument, 299. 
 
 Nice, First Council of, 72, 73. 
 
 Nichol, J. P., 277. 
 
 Nigridius, 68. 
 
 Nihilism, of Gorgias, 60 ; of Fichte, 
 195. 
 
 Nile deposits, 181. 
 
 Nitzsch, 91. 
 
 Noachian deluge, 223. 
 
 Non-essentials in the creed, 220. 
 
 Non-essentials made essential, a 
 cause of skepticism, 183, 221. 
 
 Noris, Cardinal, 357. 
 
 Norm of faith and intellect, 42, 43. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 397 
 
 Norse religion, 353. 
 
 Numbers in Pythagoreanism, 56. 
 
 Numenius, 68, 73. 
 
 OBJECTIVITY, implied in causation, 
 104 ; phenomena of, 297. 
 
 Objective datum in creative causali- 
 ty, 104. 
 
 Occam, William of, 76. 
 
 Ogyges, deluge of, 366. 
 
 Oken, 176. 
 
 Ontological argument, 279 ; formu- 
 lated, 268; critically examined, 
 297 ; equivalences of, 299. 
 
 Ontological intuition, 260 ; neglected 
 by Kant, 260. 
 
 Ophites, 71. 
 
 Opinion, tyranny of unreasoning faith 
 over, 32. 
 
 Opinions falsely attributed to scien- 
 tists, 182. 
 
 Orbits of faith and intellect, 45. 
 
 Order a product of mind, 133. 
 
 Organism the seat of all transform- 
 ing agency, 142, 251 ; not modi- 
 fied causally by environment, 141, 
 251. 
 
 Organized experiences, 148. 
 
 Organs in anticipation of use, 142. 
 
 Oriental birthplace of man, 370. 
 
 Origen the Christian, 70, 72, 178, 289. 
 
 Origen the Platonist, 70. 
 
 Origin of species, 224 ; of life, 224. 
 
 Orohippus, 168-169, 170. 
 
 Orpheus, 283. 
 
 Orphic Hymns, 56. 
 
 Oscillations. (See Cycles.) 
 
 Os coccygis, 163. 
 
 Owen, Richard, 111, 157, 158, 170, 
 322. 
 
 PACKARD, A. S., 171,253. 
 
 Palaeotherium, 171. 
 
 Palaeozoic Age, 361. 
 
 Paley, 151, 157, 275, 301, 314. 
 
 Pantheism, of Melissus, 58 ; of Speu- 
 sippus, 62 ; implied in dynamism, 
 130; results from monism, 324. 
 
 Parker, Samuel, 109. 
 
 Parkinson, 363. 
 
 Paris, Synod of, 76 ; University of, 
 76, 80. 
 
 Parmenides of Elea, 58, 279. 
 
 Parseeism, 53, 91, 186, 215. 
 
 Passions prompting to tyranny, 36. 
 
 Patangali, 52. 
 
 Patristic intellectual phase, 71. 
 
 Paul, St., 280. 
 
 Perates, 71. 
 
 Peripatetic argument, 299. 
 
 Peripatetics, 63. 
 
 Persecutions for opinion's sake, 183, 
 213. 
 
 Persian religion, 52. 
 
 Persistence of force, 260. 
 
 Personality implied in causation, 
 119; not destroyed by a form of 
 pantheism, 130; not the alterna- 
 tive of divine immanence, 119. 
 
 Peruvian religion, 185, 353. 
 
 Petrarch, 79. 
 
 Phaedrus, 65. 
 
 Phases, religious and intellectual, 
 44 ; seldom quite consecutive, 46 ; 
 in Egypt, 46-48 ; in China, 48 ; in 
 India, 51 ; among the Hebrews, 
 55 ; in Greece, 55. 
 
 Phenomena the data of science, 134. 
 
 Pherecydes, 56. 
 
 Philolaus, 57. 
 
 Philo of Larissa, 66. 
 
 Philo the Jew, 68, 91, 363. 
 
 Philoponus, 73. 
 
 Philosophy, denounced by Tertullian, 
 72 ; divorced from faith, 74 ; op- 
 posed by Luther, 76, 217; logic 
 of, 134 ; inseparable from science, 
 135, 248; needs the data of sci- 
 ence, 137 ; regarded by Lactantius 
 as inspired, 202 ; made to serve 
 theology, 216; correcting science, 
 229; used by Tyndall, 236, 241 ; 
 province of, 240; relation of, to 
 theology, 240, 241 ; positive, 248 ; 
 religious, 266, 269-271 ; of the un- 
 conditioned, 277 ; founded on prim- 
 itive beliefs, 803. 
 
 Philosophy, French, 81. 
 
 Philosophy, Greek, 56 ; groping for 
 a sensible God, 57 ; essentially re- 
 ligious, 20 ; regarded by Clement 
 as inspired, 202 ; seeking for ulti- 
 mate cause, 213, 280 ; reached idea 
 of atoms and molecules, 233, 236 ; 
 
398 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 sketch of, 278-280; theological 
 results of, 280-288 ; shone upon 
 by the true light, 280 ; propaedeu- 
 tic to Christianity, 281-288 ; serv- 
 ice of, to Christianity, 281-288; 
 theistic arguments of, formulated, 
 284-286; moral ideas developed 
 by, 286-287; ideal of moral excel- 
 lence not attained by, 287 ; relig- 
 ious sentiments nurtured by, 287 ; 
 intercessor suggested by, 288. 
 
 Phoenician religion, 353 ; deluge, 366. 
 
 Phormion, 91. 
 
 Phrygian traditions of deluge, 366. 
 
 Phylogeny, 176. 
 
 Physical cause. (See Cause.) 
 
 Physical influences on mind, 269. 
 
 Physico- theological argument, 279, 
 285. 
 
 Pictet, Adolf, 293. 
 
 Planets, unity exemplified by, 347- 
 348. 
 
 Plans, conspicuous in nature, 154; 
 fundamental, in animal structures, 
 159. 
 
 Plant-growth, period of, 360. 
 
 Planula stage of embryo, 171. 
 
 Plastic nature, 323. 
 
 Plato, 62, 91, 92, 97, 156, 158, 213, 
 233, 276, 279, 280, 283, 285, 286, 
 287, 288. 
 
 Platonic argument, 299. 
 
 Pliohippus, 169. 
 
 Plotinus, 70, 91. 
 
 Plutarch of Athens, 70. 
 
 Plutarch of Cheronaea, 68, 143, 158. 
 
 Polar forces, 261-262. 
 
 Polished-stone Age, 190. 
 
 Polycrates, 91. 
 
 Polytheism, of Athenians, 272 ; ori- 
 gin of, 282; undermined, 283; 
 dominated by monotheism, 352; 
 of Egyptians, 352. 
 
 Pomponatius, 74, 76, 217. 
 
 Porphyry, 70. 
 
 Positivism involves transcendental 
 ideas, 275. 
 
 Post-Socratic schools, 280. 
 
 Pouchet, F. A., 224. 
 
 Powell, Baden, 322. 
 
 Power manifested in nature, 333. 
 
 Prairie regions, 364, 369. 
 
 Prayer, a fact of ethnic religions, 22 ; 
 rationality of, 325, 383. 
 
 Pre-established harmony, 121. 
 
 Prehistoric religion, 20, 190. 
 
 Prescott, 289. 
 
 Pre-Socratic schools, 278. 
 
 Priesthood in ethnic religions, 22. 
 
 Priestley, 81. 
 
 Primitive belief s, 191-196; influence 
 of, 194; analogous to instincts, 
 184; validity of, 209 ; involved in 
 every theistic argument, 293-303 ; 
 authority of, 303 ; strength of, 307. 
 
 Primordial causality, 99, 100. 
 
 Principle, first, of all things, 314. 
 
 Printing, discovery of, 79. 
 
 Procatarctic cause, 98. 
 
 Proclus, 70. 
 
 Prodicus, 60. 
 
 Progress through antagonism, 34. 
 
 Progressiveness of science, 29, 32. 
 
 " Prometheus Unbound," 288. 
 
 Propaedeutic office of Greek philoso- 
 phy, 281-288. 
 
 Protagoras, 60, 213, 286. 
 
 Protohippus, 169. 
 
 Psychic cycles, 44. 
 
 Psychic history, of Egypt, 46 ; Chi- 
 na, 48 ; India and Persia, 51 ; 
 Hebrews, 55; Greeks, 55; under 
 Christianity, 66. 
 
 Psychic teleology, 156. 
 
 Ptolemy Euergetes, 67. 
 
 Ptolemy Philadelphus, 65, 67. 
 
 Pueblos' expectation of redeemer, 22, 
 289. 
 
 Pyrrho of Elis, 65, 90, 221, 309. 
 
 Pyrrhonism, 280. 
 
 Pythagoras, 56, 97, 285. 
 
 Pythagorean school, 56, 91. 
 
 QUADRATUS, 71. 
 Quatrefages, 172, 284, 292. 
 
 RACE, human, antiquity of, 222 ; uni- 
 ty of, 223. 
 
 Radiates, 159. 
 
 Rahab, 280. 
 
 Rash generalizations a cause of skep- 
 ticism, 181. 
 
 Rationalistic religion, 218. 
 
 Realists among the Schoolmen, 94. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 399 
 
 Reason the sole criterion of truth, 17 9. 
 
 Reconciliation of science and relig- 
 ion, 206. 
 
 Redeemer, ethnic beliefs in, 22, 288- 
 289. 
 
 Red stars, 175. 
 
 Reformation, how effected, 43. 
 
 Regressm in infinitum, 99. 
 
 Reid, 94. 
 
 Relativity of truth, 60. 
 
 Religion, unchanging, 39 ; supposi- 
 tions as to origin of, 60, 270-271 ; 
 some form of, inevitable, 184; phi- 
 losophy of, 269-271 ; definitions 
 of, 271, 327-328; in school, 227- 
 228; without intelligence, 88, 211. 
 
 Religious beliefs, universality of, 19, 
 184-187,208,351-356. 
 
 Religious constants and variables, 
 37; constants, 187, 353. 
 
 Religious conviction, grounds of, 
 306-312. 
 
 Religious faiths, common facts of, 
 21,187,353. 
 
 Religious feelings, great influence of, 
 26, 308 ; recognized by Tyndall, 
 237; variations in intensity of, 
 308 ; nurtured by Greek philoso- 
 phy, 287 ; by all philosophy, 354. 
 
 Religious nature, innate, 19; evi- 
 dences, 19 ; contrasted with cog- 
 nition, 22, 210; defined and ex- 
 plained, 23, 27, 210-211 ; existing 
 in savages, 188-189, 229, 292, 353 ; 
 of prehistoric tribes, 190; univers- 
 al, 190; rights of , vindicated, 227, 
 238. 
 
 Religious phases. (See Phases.) 
 
 Religious predisposition wanting in 
 some, 310; influences felt by them, 
 310-311. 
 
 Religious progress of mankind, 37. 
 
 Religious system, early crudity of, 
 37 ; improved by conflict, 36, 37. 
 
 Religious teacher, responsibility of, 
 310. 
 
 Religious veneration, origin of, 60, 
 62, 270. 
 
 Renaissance, 83. 
 
 Reptile a stage in evolution of skele- 
 ton, 164. 
 
 Repulsion, force of, 261-262. 
 
 Response of world to intellect, 346. 
 
 Reticence of scientists, 248. 
 
 Revelation, antecedently probable, 
 201, 382 ; made to more than one 
 race, 201 ; tinctured by human 
 medium of transmission, 202, 203 ; 
 must embrace mysteries, 203, 383- 
 384 ; theistic argument from, 294 ; 
 not the origin of idea of God, 90, 
 203, 271, 294. 
 
 Right and wrong, intuition of, 355..' 
 (See Conscience.) 
 
 Rights of religious nature, 238. 
 
 Rig- Veda, 51. 
 
 Rings in world-making, 175. 
 
 Ritter, 293. 
 
 Ritschl, 71. 
 
 Ritualism, tendency to, 50, 51, 52. 
 
 Robebacher, 371. 
 
 Robinet, 82. 
 
 Rocks, strained by pressure, 334 ; 
 earliest sedimentary, 359. 
 
 Roman Church, services of, to learn- 
 ing, 87, 89. 
 
 " Roots of things," 58. 
 
 Roscellinus, 75. 
 
 Rotation of earth taught by Hera- 
 elides, 63. 
 
 Rousseau, J.J., 81, 218, 312. 
 
 SABBATH, 361, 363. 
 
 Saccas, Ammonius, 70. 
 
 Sacred Canon of Egypt, 47. 
 
 Sacred writings of the Egyptians, 47 ; 
 Chinese, 48-49. 
 
 Sacrum, 163. 
 
 Saemann, 277. 
 
 Sahara, desert of, 364. 
 
 Saisset, 275. 
 
 Sankya, 52. 
 
 Savages reputed destitute of relig- 
 ion, 188. 
 
 Savages, religious nature of, 188-189, 
 229-230. 
 
 Semitic religions, 185-186. 
 
 Sensationalism opposed, 192. 
 
 Sens, Synod of, 76. 
 
 Sentiment of the supernatural, 23. 
 
 Servetus,218. 
 
 Scaevola, Mutius, 90 ; 
 
 Scandinavian religion, 868 : deluge, 
 366. 
 
400 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Scapula, 164. 
 
 Scheiner, 174. 
 
 Schellen, H., 277. 
 
 Schleiermacher, 91, 196, 270. 
 
 Schmid, Rudolf, 109, 155. 
 
 Schmidt, Oscar, 111. 
 
 Schneider, F., 129. 
 
 Scholasticism, 74, 83, 216. 
 
 Schoolmen, Neo - platonistic, 91 ; on 
 the idea of causality, 94. 
 
 Science, origin of, 26, 232 ; harmless 
 toward central faith, 28 ; hostile 
 to unreasoning faith, 30; pro- 
 gressiveness of, 29, 32 ; new and 
 old in conflict, 33, 216; progress 
 of, conditioned by religion, 33 ; 
 does not lead to Deity, 131 ; deals 
 with phenomena, 134, 240, 246- 
 250 ; inseparable from philosophy, 
 135; progress of , an indirect ause 
 of skepticism, 179; interacting 
 with religion, 213-220; recent 
 progress of, 219; conflict of, with 
 church councils, 233; favored by 
 monotheism, 234 ; transcended by 
 Tyndall, 236, 241 ; discriminated 
 from philosophy, 240, 241 ; of 
 Middle Ages, deductive, 248 ; now 
 excessively "positive," 248; evi- 
 dences of, irresistible, 311; implies 
 the creation of matter, 319; har- 
 mony of, with Genesis, 356-363. 
 
 Scientific progress and religion, 33. 
 
 Scientific questions mistakenly made 
 theological, 180, 212. 
 
 Scientists, reticence of, 248 ; de- 
 mands of, 248. 
 
 Scotus, Duns, 75. 
 
 Scripture, answers anticipations, 
 203 ; supposed to uphold irration- 
 al faiths, 31. 
 
 Scythians, 364 ; traditions of deluge 
 among, 366. 
 
 Secondary causation unreal, 98. 
 
 Secular beliefs embodied in creeds, 
 30,31,212. 
 
 " Seeds of things," 58. 
 
 Seidlitz, 111. 
 
 Seine, gravel-beds of, 365. 
 
 Semper, 114. 
 
 Seneca, 64, 287. 
 
 Sensationalism of Zeno of Elea, 58. 
 
 Sensus numinis, 189, 209, 271. 
 
 Septuagint, 67. 
 
 Sequence not implying causal rela- 
 tion, 95. 
 
 Serry, 357. 
 
 Servitude of thought to faith, 83. 
 
 Seven Wise Men, 286. 
 
 Sextians, 66. 
 
 Sextus Empiricus, 69. 
 
 Sexual selection a mode of intelli- 
 gence, 144. 
 
 Shamanism, 38. 
 
 Shark-stage of embryo, 171. 
 
 She-king, 49. 
 
 Silliman, B., 363. 
 
 Simon Magus, 71. 
 
 Siredon lichenoides, 253. 
 
 Skepticism, causes of, 179-184; in 
 Greek philosophy, 60, 63, 65, 69. 
 
 Skeptics, the Latin, 69 ; Hobbes, 80 ; 
 Hume, 82. 
 
 Smith, George, 306, 365. 
 
 Socrates, 61, 91, 151-157, 183, 213- 
 214, 233, 266, 279, 280, 283, 284, 
 286, 287. 
 
 Socratic schools, 279. 
 
 Soissons, Council of, 75 ; Synod of, 
 75. 
 
 Somme, gravel-beds of, 365. 
 
 Soothsaying, 91. 
 
 Sophists, 60, 65, 279. 
 
 Sorbonne, 77, 217, 227. 
 
 Soul viewed as a monad, 121. 
 
 Space and time discussed, 316-319. 
 
 Species, origin of, 224. 
 
 Spencer, 90, 94, 137, 143, 237, 239, 
 258, 293, 314 ; on organized expe- 
 riences, 148, 254 ; on the origin of 
 mind, 235, 255 ; on connection of 
 intelligence and tactual sense, 254. 
 
 Speusippus, 62. 
 
 Spinoza, 74, 81, 138, 158, 218. 
 
 Splint-bones in horses, 170. 
 
 Spontaneous generation. (See Ar- 
 ch egenesis and Abiogenesis.) 
 
 Sutras, 51. 
 
 Stages of embryo, 171 ; of cosmical 
 life, 174-176. 
 
 Standards of morality, 24. 
 
 Stars in stages of progress, 175, 376 ; 
 remoteness of, 336. 
 
 St. Hilaire, Geoffrey, 140. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 401 
 
 Stoicism, 280. 
 
 Stoics, 63, 64, 108, 284. 
 
 Stonehenge, 190. 
 
 Stormy period of the world, 359. 
 
 St. Peter and final fires, 378. 
 
 Strato of Lampsacus, 63. 
 
 Strauss, 111. 
 
 Subjectivity in causality, 104. 
 
 Subjectivity, phenomena of, 297. 
 
 Substance, law of, 100 ; neglected by 
 Kant, 260. 
 
 Substance of the worlds, identity of, 
 349-350. 
 
 Succession of organic forms. (See 
 Derivation, Darwinism, Evolution.) 
 
 Sufficient reason, 96, 115, 279, 299. 
 
 Sun, moon, and stars revealed, 360. 
 
 Sun, remoteness of, 336 
 
 Sun-worship, 38. 
 
 Supernaturalism in national infancy, 
 26, 38. 
 
 Survival of the fittest, a mode of in- 
 telligence, 144 ; suggested by Em- 
 pedocles, 233; possesses no effi- 
 ciency as a law, 249-250. 
 
 Sutra-Pitaka, 54. 
 
 Synesius, 70, 73. 
 
 Synod of, Soissons, 75 ; Sens, 75 ; 
 " Paris, 76 ; Dordrecht, 80. 
 
 Synthesis of thought and faith, 84. 
 
 Syrian schools of Neo-Platonism, 70. 
 
 Syrian traditions of deluges, 366. 
 
 Syrophenician woman, 280. 
 
 TADPOLE acquiring lungs, 146-147. 
 
 Taeniodonta, 172. 
 
 Tao-ism or Tau-ism, 187, 353. 
 
 Tatian, 71,72. 
 
 Taurellus, 80. 
 
 Tau-teh-king, 49. 
 
 Teleological argument, 150, 198; 
 Kant's objections to, 260; equiv- 
 alences of, 279, 299; formulated, 
 285 ; viewed critically, 296. 
 
 Teleological facts recently multi- 
 plied, 157. 
 
 Teleological idea, highest law of uni- 
 verse, 320. 
 
 Teleology, explained, 108; meaning 
 of, restricted, 156; psychic, 156; 
 unavailable without d priori data, 
 274-275. 
 
 Teleology among the Greeks, 61, 63, 
 64 ; in Old Testament, 108 ; mod- 
 ern illustrators of, 158 ; said to be 
 rejected by Darwin, 235 ; familiar 
 illustrations of, 338-342. (See, 
 also, Final Cause ; Design.) 
 
 Telesio, 79. 
 
 Tertullian, 72; paradoxes of, 308- 
 309. 
 
 Tertullianism, 83. 
 
 Thales, 56, 121. 
 
 Theism, combines immanence and 
 transcendence, 325 ; deductively 
 reached, 191-199; sanctioned by 
 modern science, 319. 
 
 Theistic arguments, in Greek philos- 
 ophy, 284-286 ; in Kant's philos- 
 ophy, 299-302. 
 
 " Theistic Conception of the World," 
 characteristics of, 313, 328-329. 
 
 Theistic conceptions in Greek philos- 
 ophy, 282-286. 
 
 Theistic faith comforting, 199. 
 
 Theodoras, 62. 
 
 Theologians in error, 304-305. 
 
 Theophrastus, 63. 
 
 Theosophy, Judaistic, 67, 215; Neo- 
 Platonistic, 69 ; Gnostic, 71, 215. 
 
 Therapeutes, 68. 
 
 Thompson, Sir William, 124, 259, 
 277, 320. 
 
 Thoth, 47. 
 
 Thought, conditioned by brain, 226 ; 
 not a product of brain, 238, 255 ; 
 viewed as first principle, 314; 
 modern, relentless, 267. 
 
 Thrasyllus, 68. 
 
 Three Gods of Numenius, 68 ; of 
 Roscellinus, 75. 
 
 Time and space discussed, 316-319. 
 
 Timon a Pyrrhonist, 65. 
 
 TomitJierium (LimnotJwrium), 172. 
 
 Tonti, 357. 
 
 Totemism, 37. 
 
 Transcendence, divine, held by Aris- 
 totle, 63. 
 
 Transcendental, ideas, 298; argu- 
 ment, 301. 
 
 Transient relation of God to the 
 world, 107, 258. 
 
 Trinity, doctrine of Gregory of Nys- 
 sa on, 73 ; of Lessing, 81. 
 
402 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Tripitaka, 53. 
 
 Truth, an immediate revelation of 
 God, 40 ; sacredness and religious 
 value of, 40, 88, 206; to be ac- 
 cepted bravely, 206 ; two orders 
 of, 75, 76, 216. 
 
 Ts'in, dynasty of, 49. 
 
 Turanian religion, 185. 
 
 Tyndall, 90, 257, 258, 259, 277; on 
 the proper sphere of religious 
 faith, 30 ; on materialism, 59 ; on 
 atheism, 132 ; using deduction, 
 136, 236; on the cause of evolu- 
 tion, 143 ; materialism of, not ma- 
 terialism, 144, 149, 236 ; on rela- 
 tion of matter to thought, 145; 
 synopsis of Belfast address by, 
 231-238; materialism of, ex- 
 plained, 237 ; theory of, on inher- 
 ency of force, 322. 
 
 Types fundamental, in animal struct- 
 ures, 150 ; persistence of, geograph- 
 ically, 161 ; comprehensive, in Eo- 
 cene, 172. 
 
 Type, vertebrate, 161-166. 
 
 Tyranny of ecclesiastical power 
 prompted by passions, 36. 
 
 UNCONDITIONED existence, 197. 
 
 Unconditioned, the, 217, 277. 
 
 Unconscious cerebration, 145, 255. 
 
 Unconscious mental states, 145. 
 
 Unity, of mankind, 223 ; of thought 
 and faith, 83, 229. 
 
 Unity of the world, 347-351 ; illus- 
 trated in solar system, 347-348. 
 
 Universe, influence of contemplation 
 of, 152, 351-352 ; demands a God, 
 275 ; infinite mathematically, 275 ; 
 eternity of, 276. 
 
 University of Paris, 76, 80. 
 
 Unknowable, the, 217. 
 
 Unthinkable beliefs sometimes val- 
 id, 200. 
 
 VALENTINUS,71. 
 
 Vanini, 79. 
 
 Variable stars, 175. 
 
 Variations of species, 253. 
 
 Varieties of animals, 253-254. 
 
 Varro, 69. 
 
 Vastness of the universe, 347-351. 
 
 Vedanta, 51. 
 
 Vendidad, 53. 
 
 Veneration for ancestors, 89. 
 
 Venn, John, 243. 
 
 Veracity of consciousness, 183-196. 
 
 Vertebra, 162. 
 
 Vertebrate archetype, 163. 
 
 Vertebrates, 159. 
 
 Vertebrate skeleton, 162; evolved, 
 164. 
 
 Vertebrate type considered, 161-166 ; 
 the skeleton in, 162. 
 
 " Vestiges of Creation," 83. 
 
 Vibrations, molecular, 261-262. 
 
 Vicarious expiation in ethnic relig- 
 ions, 22. 
 
 Vinaya-pitaka, 54. 
 
 Vinci, Leonardo da, 79. 
 
 Virgil a Lucretian, 65. 
 
 Vispered, 52. 
 
 Vives, 79. 
 
 Vogt, Carl, 225, 292. 
 
 Voices of the universe, 356. 
 
 Volney,82,218. 
 
 Voltaire, 81, 109,218. 
 
 Vorstellung, 249. 
 
 Vortices suggested by Democritus, 
 233. 
 
 WALLACE, A. R., 173, 315. 
 
 Water as first principle, 56. 
 
 Watson, Richard, 276. 
 
 Wearing out of land, 374-375. 
 
 Wen-ti, a Chinese monarch, 49, 50. 
 
 Whedon,D.D.,222,328. 
 
 Whewell, William, 137, 158. 
 
 Whipple, Lieutenant, 289. 
 
 Whiston, 363. 
 
 White, A. D., on warfare of science, 
 77. 
 
 White stars, 175. 
 
 Wicked heart prompting to skepti- 
 cism, 28, 33, 35, 179. 
 
 Wiclif , 74. 
 
 Wigand, Albert, 109, 155. 
 
 Will, implied in causality, 117; im- 
 plies intelligence and sensibility, 
 117; the ground of all efficiency, 
 117; acting in gravitation, 134, 
 335 ; human, a picture of the di- 
 vine, .262-263 ; viewed as first 
 
INDEX. 
 
 403 
 
 principle, 314, 324; manifest 
 
 throughout the universe, 347-351. 
 William of Occam, 76. 
 Wolf, 74, 81, 97. 
 World, viewed as a mechanism, 126, 
 
 132, 258 ; not self-supporting, 323. 
 World-life, a process of cooling, 74, 
 
 359. 
 Worlds, identity of substance of, 
 
 349-350. 
 
 Worship in ethnic religions, 21. 
 Wyman, Jeffreys, 224. 
 
 XENIADES,60,312. 
 
 Xenocrates, 62. 
 
 Xenophanes, 58, 65, 285. 
 Xenophon, 157, 213. 
 Xisuthrus, 365. 
 
 YASNA, 52. 
 
 Yellow stars, 175. 
 
 Yi-king, 148. 
 
 Pom, meaning of, 362-363. 
 
 Young, C. A., 277. 
 
 ZELLER, 109, 278. 
 
 Zeno of Cittium, 64, 293. 
 
 Zeno of Elea, 58, 93, 285. 
 
 Zoroaster, 91. 
 
 Zoroastrianism, 46, 52, 186, 353. 
 
 JUlSHBAIHfl 
 
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