OUTLINES 
 
 OP 
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
 
 OUTLINES 
 
 OF 
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 FOR THE USE OF STUDENTS IN THE UNIVERSITY 
 OF EDINBURGH. 
 
 THE FIFTH EDITION. 
 
 EDINBURGH : 
 
 PRINTED FOR CADELI, & COMPANY, 
 
 STIRLING & KENNKY, AND JOHN FAIRBAIRN, 
 
 EDINBURGH; GEORGE CLARK, ABERDEEN ; 
 
 AND WHITTAKER & CO. LONDON. 
 
 1829.
 
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 My principal object, in this Publication, 
 is to exhibit such a view of the arrange- 
 ment of my Lectures, as may facilitate the 
 studies of those to whom they are addressed. 
 In a course which employs more than five 
 months, and which necessarily includes a 
 great variety of disquisitions, it is difficult 
 for a hearer to retain a steady idea of the 
 train of thought leading from one sul)ject 
 to another ; and, of consequence, the lec- 
 tures, by assuming the appearance of de- 
 tached discourses, are in danger of losing 

 
 VI 
 
 the advantages arising from connection and 
 method. The following Outlines will, I 
 hope, not only obviate this inconvenience ; 
 but will allow me, in future, a greater la- 
 titude of illustration and digression, than I 
 could have indulged myself in with pro- 
 priety, so long as my students were left to 
 investigate the chain of my doctrines by 
 their own reflections. 
 
 In the execution of this design, I have 
 attempted, at the same time, to state, under 
 each head, a few fundamental principles, 
 which I was either anxious to impress on 
 the memory of my hearers ; or which I 
 thought might be useful to them, by re- 
 lieving their attention during the discussion 
 of a long or a difficult argument. 
 
 The branch of Moral Philosophy which 
 relates to the Principles of Politics being 
 less abstract than the others, I have con-
 
 VII 
 
 tented myself with a simple enumeration 
 of the most important articles treated of 
 in the third part of my course. It is 
 scarcely necessary for me to mention, that, 
 in this enumeration, I have not aimed at 
 any thing approaching to systematical ar- 
 rangement ; and that, in illustrating the 
 titles it contains, I am obliged, by the 
 term prescribed to my academical labours, 
 to confine myself to very general sketches. 
 As soon as my other engagements allow 
 me sufficient leisure for such an undertak- 
 ing, I shall attempt a separate course of 
 lectures on this very extensive and difficult 
 subject. 
 
 With respect to my general plan, those 
 who are in the smallest degree conversant 
 with ethical writers, will perceive, that, in 
 its formation, I have been guided almost 
 entirely by the train of my own specula- 
 tions. In following the order which these
 
 Vlll 
 
 prescribed, I was far from proceeding on 
 the supposition, that it was likely to pos- 
 sess, in the opinion of the public, advan- 
 tages over the arrangements already pro- 
 posed : but it appeared to me reasonable to 
 think, that a plan resulting from my own 
 habits of thought, would probably be bet- 
 ter executed in my hands, than any one, 
 how perfect soever, suggested by the views 
 of another. 
 
 DUGALD STEWART. 
 
 College of Ej>inburgii, \ 
 Nov. 8. 1793. I
 
 IX 
 
 p. S. — Having, of late, carried into 
 execution (at least in part) the design an- 
 nounced in the foregoing Preface, by a 
 separate course of Lectures on Political 
 Economy, I have omitted, in this Edition 
 of my Outlines, the Articles which I for- 
 merly enumerated under that general title ; 
 substituting in their stead a few others, 
 calculated to illustrate the peculiar and in- 
 timate connection between this department 
 of Politics and the more appropriate objects 
 of Ethics. The observations which these 
 articles are meant to introduce, may be 
 useful, at the same time, in preparing the 
 minds of Students for disquisitions, the 
 details of which can scarcely fail to appear 
 uninviting to those, who are not aware of 
 the important conclusions to which they 
 are subservient. 
 
 Nov. 2, 1801.
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 Sect. Page 
 
 I. Of the Object of Philosophy, and the Method 
 
 of prosecuting Philosophical Inquiries, 1 
 
 II. Application of the foregoing Principles to the 
 
 Philosophy of the Human Mind, - 7 
 
 III. Causes of the slow Progress of Human Know- 
 ledge ; more particularly of the Philosophy 
 of the Human Mind, and of the Sciences 
 immediately connected with it, - y 
 
 SUBJECT AND ARRANGEMENT OF THIS TREATISE. 
 
 PART I. 
 
 of the intellectual powers of man. 
 Sect. 
 
 I. Of Consciousness, - - - 18 
 
 II. Of the Powers of External Perception, - 20 
 
 Art. 1. Of the Laws of Perception in the case 
 
 of our different Senses, - ib. 
 
 Art. 2. Of Perception in general, - 29
 
 Xll CONTENTS. 
 
 Sect. Page 
 
 III. Of Attention, . - . 36 
 
 IV. Of Conception, ... 38 
 
 V. Of Abstraction, - - - 40 
 
 VI. Of the Association of Ideas, - - 44 
 
 VII. Of Memory, - - - - 49 
 
 VIII. Of Imagination, - - - 51 
 
 IX. Of Judgment and Reasoning, - - 53 
 
 1. Of Intuitive Evidence, - 54 
 
 2. Of Deductive Evidence, - 56 
 X. Of Intellectual Powers and Capacities, form- 
 ed by particular Habits of Study or of 
 Business, - - - - 61 
 
 XI. Of certain auxiliary Faculties and Principles 
 
 essential to our Intellectual Improvement, 
 or intimately connected with it, - 67 
 
 1. Of Language, - - 68 
 
 2. Of the Principle of Imitation, 71 
 
 XII. Of the Intellectual Faculties of Man, as con- 
 
 trasted with the Instincts of the Brutes, 74 
 
 PART II. 
 
 OF THE ACTIVE AND OF THE MORAL POWERS OF MAN. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 CLASSIFICATION AND ANALYSIS OF OUH ACTIVE AND MORAL 
 POWERS. 
 
 Sect. 
 
 I. Of the Active Powers in general, - - 80 
 
 II. Of our Appetites, - - - 82
 
 CONTENTS. XIU 
 
 Sect. Page 
 
 III. Of our Desires, - - - 84 
 
 1. The Desire of Knowledge, - 85 
 
 2. The Desire of Society, - 86 
 
 3. The Desire of Esteem, - 88 
 
 4. The Desire of Power, - 90 
 
 5. The Desire of Superiority, - 94 
 
 IV. Of our Affections, ... 98 
 
 1. Of the Benevolent Affections, - hh. 
 
 2. Of the Malevolent Affections, 105 
 V. OfSelf-Love, - - - - 109 
 
 VI. Of the Moral Faculty, - - - 117 
 
 Art. 1. General Observations on the Mo- 
 ral Faculty ; tending^- chiefly to 
 shew, that it is an original Prin- 
 ciple of our Nature, and not re- 
 solvable into any other Principle 
 or Principles more simple, - ib. 
 
 Art. 2. Analysis of our Moral Perceptions 
 
 and Emotions, - - 126 
 
 1. Of the Perception of Right 
 
 and Wrong, - - 128 
 
 2. Of the Agreeable and Disa- 
 
 greeable Emotions, arising 
 from the Perception of what 
 is E-iojht and Wrong; in 
 Conduct, - - 141 
 
 3. Of the Perception of Merit 
 
 and Demerit, - - 144 
 
 Art. 3. Of Moral Obligation, - - 148
 
 XIV CONTENTS. 
 
 Sect. Page 
 
 VII. Of certain Principles which co-operate with 
 
 our Moral Powers in their Influence on 
 the Conduct, . _ - 154 
 
 1. Of Decency, or a regard to Character, 155 
 
 2. Of Sympathy, - - . 157 
 
 3. Of the Sense of the Ridiculous, 160 
 
 4. Of Taste, considered in its relation to 
 
 Morals, - - - - 162 
 
 VIII. Of Man's free Agency, - - - 166 
 
 PART II. 
 
 OF THE ACTIVE AND OF THE MORAL POWEKS OF MAN. 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 OF THE VARIOUS BRANCHES OF OUR DUTY. 
 
 Sect. 
 
 I, Of the Duties which respect the Deity, 171 
 
 [Preliminary/ Inquiry into the Principles of' Na- 
 tural Religioni~\ - - - - 1 72 
 
 Art. 1. Of the Existence of the Deity, ib. 
 
 1. Of the Foundations of our Rea- 
 
 soning from the Effect to the 
 Cause, and of the Evidences 
 of Active Power, exhibited in 
 the Universe, - - - 175 
 
 2. Of the Evidence of Design exhi- 
 
 bited in the Universe, - 185
 
 CONTENTS. XV 
 
 Skct. Page 
 
 Art. 2. Of the Moral Attributes of the 
 
 Deity, .... 203 
 
 1. Of the Evidences of Benevolent 
 
 Design in the Universe, . 205 
 
 2. Of the Evidences of the Moral 
 
 Government of the Deity, - 219 
 Art. 3. Of a Future State, - 222 
 
 1. Of the Argument for a Future 
 
 State, derived from the Nature 
 
 of Mind, - - - 224 
 
 2. Of the Evidences of a Future 
 
 State, arising from the Human 
 Constitution, and from the Cir- 
 cumstances in which Man is 
 placed, - . - 232 
 
 Continuation and Conclusion o/" Section I. 238 
 II. Of the Duties which respect our Fellow- 
 Creatures, ... 242 
 Art. 1. Of Benevolence, - - 243 
 Art. 2. Of Justice, - - - 249 
 
 1. Of Candour, - - 251 
 
 2. Of Uprightness or Integrity, 255 
 Art. 3. Of Veracity, - - - 2G4 
 
 III. Of the Duties which respect ourselves, . 272 
 Art. 1. General Remarks on this Class of 
 
 our Duties, - . - ih. 
 
 Art. 2. Of the Duty of employing the 
 Means we possess to promote 
 our own Happiness, - 275
 
 XVI CONTENTS. 
 
 Sect. Page 
 
 Art. 3. Of Happiness, - - 278 
 
 1. Opinions of the Ancients 
 
 concerning the Sovereign 
 Good, . - . 279 
 
 2. Additional Remarks on 
 
 Happiness, - - 285 
 IV, Of the different Theories which have been 
 formed concerning the Object of Moral 
 Approbation, - - - 803 
 
 V. Of the General Definition of Virtue, 305 
 
 VI. Of an Ambiguity in the words Right and 
 
 Wrong, Virtue and Vice, - - 308 
 
 VII. Of the Office and use of Reason in the 
 
 Practice of Morality, - - 312 
 
 Appendix, - - - - SI 5
 
 OUTLINES 
 
 OF 
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 OF THE OBJECT OF PHILOSOPHY, AND THE METHOD 
 OF PROSECUTING PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIIIIES. 
 
 1. All the different kinds of philosophical 
 inquiry, and all that practical knowledge 
 which guides our conduct in life, presuppose 
 such an established order in the succession of 
 events, as enables us to form conjectures con- 
 cerning the future, from the observation of 
 the past.
 
 2 OUTLINES OF 
 
 2. In the phenomena of the material world, 
 and in many of the phenomena of mind, we 
 expect, with the most perfect confidence, that 
 in the same combinations of circumstances the 
 same results will take place. The laws which 
 regulate the course of human affairs are inves- 
 tigated with much greater difficulty : But, 
 even in this class of events, such a degree of 
 order may frequently be traced, as furnishes 
 general rules of great practical utility; and this 
 order becomes the more apparent, in propor- 
 tion as we generalize our observations. 
 
 3. Our knowledge of the laws of nature is 
 entirely the result of observation and experi- 
 ment ; for there is no instance in which we 
 perceive such a necessary connection between 
 two successive events, as might enable us to 
 infer the one from the other by reasoning a 
 priori. We find, from experience, that cer- 
 tain events are invariably conjoined, so that 
 when we see the one, we expect the other ; 
 but our knowledge in such cases extends no 
 farther than to the fact.
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 3 
 
 4. To ascertain those established conjunc- 
 tions of successive events, which constitute 
 the order of the universe ; — to record the phe- 
 nomena which it exhibits to our observation, 
 and to refer them to their general laws, is the 
 great business of philosophy. — Lord Bacon 
 was the first person who was fully aware of 
 the importance of this fundamental truth. — 
 The ancients, considered philosophy as the 
 science of causes ; and hence were led to 
 many speculations, to which the human fa- 
 culties are altogether incompetent. 
 
 5. The ultimate object of philosophical in- 
 quiry is the same which every man of plain 
 understanding proposes to himself, when he 
 remarks the events which fall under his ob- 
 servation, with a view to the future regula- 
 tion of his conduct. The more knowledge of 
 this kind we acquire, the better can we ac- 
 commodate our plans to the established or- 
 der of things, and avail ourselves of natural 
 Powers and Agents for accomplishing our 
 purposes.
 
 4 OUTLINES OF 
 
 6. The knowledge of the Philosopher dif- 
 fers from that sagacity which directs unedu- 
 cated men in the business of life, not in kind, 
 but in degree, and in the manner in which it 
 is acquired. Isf, By artificial combinations of 
 circumstances, or, in other words, by exjwri- 
 ments, he discovers many natural conjunc- 
 tions which would not have occurred sponta- 
 neously to his observation, ^cUy, By investi- 
 gating the general Laws of Nature, and by 
 reasoning from them synthetically, he can of- 
 ten trace an established order, where a mere 
 observer of facts would perceive nothing but 
 irregularity. — This last process of the mind is 
 more peculiarly dignified with the name of 
 Philosophy ; and the object of the rules of 
 philosophizing is to explain in what manner 
 it ought to be conducted. 
 
 7. The knowledge which is acquired of the 
 course of Nature by mere observation, is ex- 
 tremely limited, and extends only to cases in 
 which the uniformity of the observed pheno- 
 mena is apparent to our senses. This happens.
 
 MOKAI. PHlLOSOrHY. 5 
 
 either when one single law of nature operates 
 separately, or when different laws are always 
 combined together in the same manner. In 
 most instances, however, when different laws 
 are combined, the result varies in every parti- 
 cular case, according to the different circum- 
 stances of the combination ; and it is only by 
 knowing what the laws are which are concern- 
 ed in any expected phenomenon, and by con- 
 sidering in what manner they modify each 
 other's effects, that the result can be predicted. 
 
 8. Hence it follows, that the first step in 
 the study of Philosophy is to ascertain the 
 simple and general laws on which the com- 
 plicated phenomena of the universe depend. 
 Having obtained these laws, we may proceed 
 safely to reason concerning the effect result- 
 ing from any given combination of them. — 
 In the former instance, we are said to carry on 
 our inquiries in the way of Analysis ; in the 
 latter in that of Synthesis. 
 
 9. To this method of philosophizing, (which
 
 6 UUTLINES OF 
 
 is commonly distinguished by the title of the 
 Method of Induction,) we are indebted for the 
 rapid progress which physical knowledge has 
 made since the time of Lord Bacon. The pub- 
 lication of his writings fixes one of the most 
 important seras in the history of science. — Not 
 that the reformation which has since taken 
 place in the plan of philosophical inquiry is 
 to be ascribed entirely to him : for although 
 he did more to forward it than any other in- 
 dividual, yet his genius and writings seem to 
 have been powerfully influenced by the cir- 
 cumstances and character of the age in which 
 he lived ; and there can be little doubt that 
 he only accelerated an event which was al- 
 ready prepared by many concurrent causes.
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 APPLICATION OF THE FOREGOING PRINCIPLES TO THE 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMAN MIND. 
 
 10. The reformation in the plan of philoso- 
 phical inquiry, which has taken place during 
 the two last centuries, although not entirely- 
 confined to physics, has not extended in the 
 same degree to the other branches of science ; 
 as sufficiently appears from the prevailing 
 scepticism with respect to the principles of 
 metaphysics and of moral philosophy. This 
 scepticism can only be corrected by applying 
 to these subjects the method of induction. 
 
 11. As all our knowledge of the material 
 world rests ultimately on facts ascertained by 
 observation, so all our knowledge of the hu- 
 man mind rests ultimately on facts for which 
 we have the evidence of our own conscious- 
 ness. An attentive examination of such facts
 
 8 OUTLINES OF 
 
 will lead in time to the general principles of 
 the human constitution, and will gradually 
 form a science of mind not inferior in certain- 
 ty to the science of body. Of this species of 
 investigation, the works of Dr Reid furnish 
 many valuable examples. 
 
 12. The objections which have been stated 
 by some writers of the present age to the 
 conclusions of those metaphysicians who have 
 attempted to apply the method of induction 
 to the science of mind, are perfectly similar 
 to the charge which was at first brought a- 
 gainst the Newtonian doctrine of gravitation, 
 as being a revival of the occult qualities of 
 the Aristotelians. In all our inquiries, whe- 
 ther they relate to matter or to mind, the bu- 
 siness of philosophy is confined to a reference 
 of particular facts to other facts more gene- 
 ral ; and our most successful researches must 
 always terminate in the discovery of some 
 law of nature, of which no explanation can 
 be given.
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 CAUSES OF THE SLOW PROGRESS OF HUMAN KNOW- 
 LEDGE ; MORE PARTICULARLY OF THE PHILOSOPHY 
 OF THE HUMAN MIND, AND OF THE SCIENCES IM- 
 MEDIATELY CONNECTED WITH IT. 
 
 13. Some of the chief of these may be re- 
 ferred to the following heads. 
 
 (1.) The imperfections of language, both as 
 I instrument o 
 communication. 
 
 an instrument of thought and a medium of 
 
 (2.) Mistakes about the proper object of 
 philosophy, and the method of prosecuting 
 philosophical inquiries. 
 
 (3.) A disposition to grasp at general prin- 
 ciples, without submitting to the previous 
 study of particular facts.
 
 10 OUTLINES, &C. 
 
 (4.) Difficulty of ascertaining facts, parti- 
 cularly in the sciences immediately connected 
 with the philosophy of the human mind. 
 
 (5.) The great part of life which is spent in 
 making useless literary acquisitions. 
 
 (6.) Prejudices arising from a reverence for 
 great names, and from the influence of local 
 institutions. 
 
 (7.) A predilection for singular or paradoxi- 
 cal opinions. 
 
 (8.) A disposition to unlimited scepticism.
 
 OUTLINES 
 
 OF 
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 SUBJECT AND ARRANGEMENT OF THIS 
 TREATISE. 
 
 1. The object of IVIoral Philosophy is to 
 ascertain the general rules of a wise and vir- 
 tuous conduct in life, in so far as these rules 
 may be discovered by the unassisted light of 
 nature; that is, by an examination of the 
 principles of the human constitution, and of 
 the circumstances in which man is placed. 
 
 2. In examining the principles of our con- 
 stitution with this view, our inquiries may
 
 12 OUTLINES OF 
 
 be arranged under three heads ; according an 
 they refer, 
 
 (1.) To the intellectual powers of man. 
 
 (2.) To his active and moral powers. And 
 
 (3.) To man, considered as the member of a 
 political body. 
 
 3. Of these articles, the two first coincide 
 with the common division of human nature 
 into the powers of the Understanding and 
 those of the Will ; a division of great anti- 
 quity, and which (abstracting from the effects 
 of political institutions) exhausts the whole 
 of Moral Philosophy. As man, however, ex- 
 cepting in his rudest state, has been always 
 found connected with a political community, 
 the principles which lay the foundation of this 
 species of union may be regarded as univer- 
 sal and essential principles of our constitution ; 
 and, without an examination of them, it is 
 impossible for us to have a just idea of our si-
 
 MORAL I'HILOSOPHY. IS 
 
 tuation in the world, and of the most import- 
 ant duties we owe to our fellow-creatures. 
 This last branch of the subject has, besides, a 
 more intimate connection with the other two 
 than might at first be apprehended : for it is 
 in the political union, and in the gradual im- 
 provement of which it is susceptible, that na- 
 ture has made a provision for a gradual deve- 
 lopement of our intellectual and moral powers, 
 and for a proportional enlargement in our ca- 
 pacities of enjoyment ; and it is by the par- 
 ticular forms of their political institutions, 
 that those opinions and habits which consti- 
 tute the Mcmners of nations are chiefly de- 
 termined. How intimately these are connect- 
 ed with the progress and the happiness of the 
 race will appear in the sequel. 
 
 4. An investigation of the Pleasures and 
 Pains of which we are susceptible, might fur- 
 nish the subject of a fourth view of man, con- 
 sidered as a sensitive being. But instead of 
 aiming at so great a degree of analytical dis- 
 tinctness, it will be found more convenient to
 
 14 OUTLINES, &C. 
 
 incorporate this part of the Philosophy of the 
 Human Mind with the other three which 
 have been already defined ; connecting what- 
 ever remarks may occur on our enjoyments 
 or sufferings, with those intellectual or moral 
 principles, from the exercise of which they re- 
 spectively arise.
 
 OUTLINES 
 
 OP 
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 PART I. 
 
 OF THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS OF MAN. 
 
 The most important of these are compre- 
 hended in the following enumeration : 
 
 (1.) Consciousness. 
 
 (2.) Powers of external perception. 
 
 (3.) Attention. 
 
 (4.) Conception.
 
 16 OUTLINES 01 
 
 (5.) Abstraction. 
 
 (6.) Association of ideas. 
 
 (7.) Memory. 
 
 (8.) Imagination. 
 
 (9-) Powers of judgment and reasoning. 
 
 5. Besides these intellectual faculties, which 
 in some de^ee are common to the whole 
 species, there are other more complicated 
 powers or capacities, which are gradually- 
 formed by particular habits of study or of 
 business. Such are, the Power of Taste; a 
 Genius for Poetry, for Painting, for Music, 
 for JMathematics ; with all the various intel- 
 lectual habits acquired in the different pro- 
 fessions of life. To analyze such compound- 
 ed powers into the more simple and general 
 principles of our nature, forms one of the 
 most interesting subjects of philosophical dis- 
 quisition.
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 17 
 
 6. To this branch of our constitution may 
 also be referred those auxiHary faculties and 
 principles, which are essential to our intel- 
 lectual improvement, or very intimately con- 
 nected with it ; in particular, the faculty of 
 communicating our thoughts by arbitrary 
 signs, and the principle of imitation.
 
 18 OUTLINES OF 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 CONSCIOUSNESS. 
 
 7. This word denotes the immediate know- 
 ledge which the mind has of its sensations and 
 thoughts, and, in general, of all its present 
 operations. 
 
 8. Of all the present operations of the 
 mind, Consciousness is an inseparable con- 
 comitant. 
 
 9. The belief with which it is attended has 
 been considered as the most irresistable of any ; 
 insomuch that this species of evidence has 
 never been questioned : and yet it rests on the 
 same foundation with every other kind of be- 
 lief to which we are determined by the con- 
 stitution of our nature.
 
 MORAL I'HILOSOPHY. 19 
 
 10. We cannot properly be said to be con- 
 scious of our own existence ; our knowledge 
 of this fact being necessarily posterior, in the 
 order of time, to the consciousness of those 
 sensations by which it is suggested. 
 
 11. From Consciousness and Memory we 
 acquire the notion, and are impressed with a 
 conviction, of our own personal identity.
 
 20 OUTLINES OF 
 
 SECTION II. 
 OF THE POWERS OF EXTERNAL PERCEPTION. 
 
 ARTICLE FIRST. 
 
 OF THE LAWS OF PERCEPTION IN THE CASE OF OUR 
 DIFFERENT SENSES. 
 
 12. Our external senses are commonly reck- 
 oned to be five in number, and the same enu- 
 meration has been adopted by the soundest 
 philosophers. An attempt has been made by 
 some writers to resolve all our senses into that 
 of feeling ; but this speculation has plainly 
 proceeded from over-refinement, and has no 
 tendency to illustrate the subject of inquiry. 
 
 13. Of our five senses there are two, m%. 
 Touch and Taste, in which there must be an 
 immediate application of the object to the
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 21 
 
 organ. In the other three, the object is per- 
 ceived at a distance, by the intervention of a 
 material medium. 
 
 1 4. In order to form an accurate notion of 
 the means by which we acquire our know- 
 ledge of things external, it is necessary to at- 
 tend to the distinct meanings of the words 
 Sensation and Percei:>tion, The former ex- 
 presses merely that change in the state of the 
 mind which is produced by an impression upon 
 an organ of sense ; (of which change we can 
 conceive the mind to be conscious, without 
 any knowledge of external objects :) the lat- 
 ter expresses the knowledge we obtain, by 
 means of our sensations, of the qualities of 
 matter. An indiscriminate use of these two 
 words has introduced much confusion into 
 philosophical disquisitions. 
 
 SMELLING, TASTING, AND HEARING. 
 
 15. The qualities perceived by Smelling 
 Tasting, and Hearing, are known to us only
 
 22 OUTLINES OF 
 
 as the causes of certain sensations ; and have 
 therefore been contradistinguished by the 
 name of Secondm-y Qualities^ from those of 
 which we learn the nature directly and imme- 
 diately from the sensations with which they 
 are connected. Of this last kind are Exten- 
 sion and Figure ; — to which (along with some 
 others) Philosophers have given the title of 
 the Primary Qualities of matter, 
 
 16. Abstracting from our other organs of 
 perception, Smelling, Tasting, and Hearing, 
 could give us no information concerning ex- 
 ternal objects. 
 
 17. Any one of these senses, however, 
 might suggest to the mind (or furnish the oc- 
 casions of our forming) the simple ideas or no- 
 tions of Number, Time, Causation, Existence, 
 Personal Identity, and many others.
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 23 
 
 TOUCH. 
 
 18. The sense of Touch is spread over the 
 whole surface of the body ; but the hand is 
 more particularly appropriated to this mode of 
 perception ; in consequence, partly, of its ana- 
 tomical structure, and partly of the greater de- 
 gree of attention we give to the impressions 
 which are made on it. 
 
 19. Some of the qualities perceived by this 
 sense are primary, others secondary. — In all 
 its different perceptions, however, there is one 
 common circumstance ; that we are not only 
 made acquainted with the existence of some 
 quality or other, but with the particular part 
 of the body to which the external object is 
 applied. It is probably owing to this, that 
 w^e refer to Touch a variety of sensations 
 which have little or no resemblance to each 
 other ; Heat, Itching, Pain, kc. All of these 
 suggest to us the local situation of their excit-
 
 24 OUTLINES OF 
 
 ing causes ; and hence we refer them to the 
 same class. 
 
 20. The hand is useful in two respects : 1. 
 For examining the properties of bodies, and 
 the laws of the material world ; of which pro- 
 perties and laws none of our other senses, un- 
 assisted by that of Touch, could convey to us 
 any accurate knowledge. 2. For the practice 
 of the mechanical arts. — The advantages we 
 derive from it in these respects are so great, 
 that some philosophers, fond of paradoxical 
 opinions, have ascribed to it entirely our in- 
 tellectual superiority over the brutes. 
 
 21. The importance of this organ to man 
 sufficiently intimates the intentions of nature 
 with respect to his ordinary posture ; and af- 
 fords a refutation of those theories which at- 
 tempt to class him with the quadrupeds.
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 25 
 
 SIGHT. 
 
 22. The description of the Eye, and of the 
 manner in which the pencils of rays, proceed- 
 ing from the different points of a visible ob- 
 ject, are collected by the refractive powers of 
 the humours, so as to form a picture on the 
 retina, belongs properly to optics ; but there 
 are many questions arising from this subject, 
 which are intimately connected with the phi- 
 losophy of the human mind, and which op- 
 tical writers have in vain attempted to resolve 
 on the common principles of their science. 
 Such are all the questions that relate to the 
 most simple and general laws of vision. 
 These laws are facts which the optician must 
 assume as the groundwork of his reasoning ; 
 not difficulties which he is called on to ex- 
 plain. 
 
 23. Among the phenomena of vision, more 
 immediately connected with the philosophy
 
 26 OUTLINES OF 
 
 of the human mind, the most important are 
 those which depend on the distinction be- 
 tween the original and the acquired percep- 
 tions of sight. Prior to experience, all that 
 we perceive by this sense is superficial ex- 
 tension and figure, with varieties of colour and 
 of illumination. In consequence, however, 
 of a comparison between the perceptions of 
 sight and of touch, the visible appearances 
 of objects, together with the correspondent 
 affections of the eye, become signs of their 
 tangible qualities, and of the distances at 
 v/hich they are placed from the organ. In 
 some cases our judgment proceeds on a va- 
 riety of these circumstances combined toge- 
 ther ; and yet, so rapidly is the intellectual 
 process performed, that the perception seems 
 to be perfectly instantaneous. 
 
 24. This distinction, between the original 
 and the acquired perceptions of sight, leads to 
 an explanation of many curious phenomena, 
 which had long puzzled those opticians who 
 confined their attention to the mathematical
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 27 
 
 principles of Dioptrics. But to the student 
 of Moral Philosophy it is interesting, chiefly 
 as it affords a palpable and an acknowledged 
 proof, that the mind may carry on intellect- 
 ual processes which leave no trace in the me- 
 mory. 
 
 25. Two other celebrated questions con- 
 cerning vision are intimately connected with 
 the philosophy of the mind, and furnish a fa- 
 vourable opportunity for illustrating the li- 
 mits wdiich nature has prescribed to our in- 
 quiries on the subject of perception. The 
 one relates to our seeing objects erect, by 
 means of inverted images on the retina ; the 
 other, to our seeing objects single with two 
 eyes. 
 
 26. Some of the qualities perceived by 
 sight are primary, others secondary. Exten- 
 sion and figure belong to the former class ; 
 colour and varieties of illumination, to the lat- 
 ter.
 
 28 OUTLINES OF 
 
 27. The foregoing article naturally leads 
 the attention to the general accommodation 
 of our animal frame to our intellectual fa- 
 culties. Under this head the following par- 
 ticulars may furnish matter for useful reflec- 
 tions. 
 
 (1.) The local distribution of our organs of 
 sense. 
 
 (2.) The adaptation of our perceptive powers 
 to the properties and laws of the material 
 world. 
 
 (3.) The relation of the stature and strength 
 of man to the physical arrangements on that 
 planet with which he is connected. 
 
 (4.) The versatility of his nature ; qualify- 
 ing him to subsist in every variety of climate.
 
 MORAL PHILOSOHY. 29 
 
 SECTION II. 
 OF THE POWERS OF EXTERNAL PERCEPTION. 
 
 ARTICLE SECOND. 
 OF PERCEPTION IN GENERAL. 
 
 28. Our notions both of body and of mind 
 are merely relative ; that is, we can define the 
 former only by the qualities perceived by our 
 senses, and the latter by the operations of 
 which we are conscious. 
 
 29. As the qualities of body bear no re- 
 semblance to the operations of mind, we are 
 unavoidably led to consider them as perfectly 
 distinct objects of our knowledge ; each of 
 which must be studied in its own peculiar 
 way : The one by attention to the subjects of 
 our Consciousness ; the other by attention to 
 the objects of our Perceptions. — This is not a
 
 30 OUTLINES OF 
 
 hypothesis, but a fact, which is implied in the 
 only notions of body and of mind that we are 
 capable of forming. 
 
 30. It appears, however, from the pheno- 
 mena of perception, and also from those of 
 voluntary motion, that the connection be- 
 tween body and mind is extremely intimate ; 
 and various theories have been proposed, to 
 explain the manner in which it is carried on. 
 All these theories relate to a subject placed 
 beyond the reach of our faculties ; and con- 
 cerning which it is impossible for us to ascer- 
 tain any thing, but the laws by which the 
 connection is resfulated. 
 
 '&' 
 
 31. According to the distinction formerly 
 stated between the primary and the seconda- 
 ry qualities of matter (15.), our notions of 
 the latter are merely relative ; the sensations 
 which correspond to them informing us of 
 nothing; but of the existence of certain un- 
 known causes by which they are produced. 
 What we know of the nature of these causes
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. SI 
 
 is the result of subsequent philosophical in- 
 vestigation. — The names of secondary quali- 
 ties are in all languages ambiguous ; the same 
 word expressing the sensation, and the un- 
 known cause by which it is excited. Hence 
 the origin of the Cartesian paradox with re- 
 spect to the non-existence of heat, cold, gmell, 
 sound, and colour. 
 
 32. The primary qualities of matter, (such, 
 for example, as Extension and Figure,) al- 
 though perceived in consequence of certain 
 sensations excited in our minds, are always 
 apprehended as external and independent ex- 
 istences ; and the notions of them we form 
 have in general no reference to the sensations 
 by which they are suggested. The truth 
 seems to be, that these sensations were intend- 
 ed by nature to perform merely the office of 
 signs, without attracting any notice to them- 
 selves ; and as they are seldom accompanied 
 either with pleasure or pain, we acquire an 
 habitual inattention to them in early infancy,
 
 32 OUTLINES OF 
 
 which is not easily to be surmounted in our 
 maturer years. 
 
 33. As our sensations have no resemblance 
 to the qualities of matter, it has puzzled phi- 
 losophers to explain in what manner our no- 
 tions of primary qualities are acquired. It is 
 this difficulty that has given rise to the mo- 
 dern scepticism concerning the non-existence 
 of matter. 
 
 34. According to the ancient theory of 
 perception, sensible qualities are perceived 
 by means of images or species propagated 
 from external objects to the mind, by the or- 
 gans of sense. These images (which since the 
 time of Descartes have been commonly called 
 Ideas) were supposed to be resemblances of 
 the sensible qualities ; and, like the impres- 
 sion of a seal on wax, to transmit their form 
 without their matter. This hypothesis is now 
 commonly distinguished by the title of the 
 Ideal Theory.
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 33 
 
 35. On the principles of this theory, Berke- 
 ley demonstrated that the existence of matter 
 is impossible : for, if we have no knowledge of 
 any thing which does not resemble our ideas 
 or sensations, it follows that we have no know- 
 ledge of any thing whose existence is indepen- 
 dent of our perceptions. 
 
 36. If the Ideal Theory be admitted, the 
 foregoing argument against the existence of 
 matter, is conclusive ; but the theory is un- 
 supported by evidence, and is even inconcei- 
 vable. That we have notions of external 
 qualities perfectly unlike to our sensations, or 
 to any thing of which we are immediately 
 conscious, is 2i fact ; nor ought we to dispute 
 the reality of what we perceive, because we 
 cannot reconcile this fact wath our received 
 philosophical systems. 
 
 37. Dr Reid, who first called the Ideal 
 Theory in question, offers no argument to 
 prove that the material world exists ; but con- 
 siders our belief of it as an ultimate fact in our 
 
 c
 
 34 OUTLINES OF 
 
 nature. — It rests on the same foundation with 
 our belief of the reality of our sensations, 
 which no man has disputed. 
 
 38. Beside the Ideal Theory, other attempts 
 have been made to explain in what manner 
 the communication between mind and matter 
 is carried on, in the case of perception. — Leib- 
 nitz's system of pre-established Harmony, ta- 
 king for granted the impossibility of any im- 
 mediate connection between two substances 
 essentially different, represents the human 
 mind and human body as two independent 
 machines, adjusted, at their first formation, to 
 an invariable correspondence with each other, 
 like two clocks made to correspond in all their 
 movements. — By means of the same hypothe- 
 sis, he endeavoured to account for the pheno- 
 mena of Voluntary Motion. 
 
 39. The following are the most important 
 general laws of our perceptions, as far as we 
 can infer them from acknowledged facts. 
 
 '&' 
 
 (1.) The object, either immediately, or by
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 35 
 
 means of some material medium, must make 
 an impression on the organ. 
 
 (2.) By means of the organ, an impression 
 is made on the nerves. 
 
 (3.) By means of the nerves, an impression 
 is made on the brain. 
 
 40. With respect, however, to the manner 
 in which this process is carried on, and even 
 with respect to the nature of the changes that 
 take place in the nerves and brain, in the case 
 of perception, we are hitherto ignorant ; nor 
 does there seem to be any probability that we 
 shall ever obtain satisfactory information. 
 Physiologists, as well as metaphysicians, have 
 in this instance, too frequently lost sight of the 
 just rules of philosophizing, and have proposed 
 many conjectures which afford no explanation 
 of the phenomena in question, and which have 
 sometimes led to dangerous conclusions.
 
 36 OUTLINES OF 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 OF ATTKNTION. 
 
 41. It appears from the acquired percep- 
 tions of sight, that a process of thought may 
 be carried on by the mind, without leaving any 
 trace in the memory ; and many facts prove, 
 that impressions may be made on our organs 
 of sense, and yet be forgotten next moment. 
 In such cases, our want of recollection is as- 
 cribed, even in ordinary conversation, to a 
 want of attention ; so that it seems to be a 
 principle sufficiently ascertained by common 
 experience, that there is a certain act or exer- 
 tion of the mind, necessary to fix in the me- 
 mory, the thoughts and the perceptions of 
 which we are conscious. This act is one of 
 the simplest of all our intellectual operations, 
 and yet it has been very little noticed by wri- 
 ters on pneumatology.
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 37 
 
 42. Having established the certainty of the 
 general fact, by an induction of particulars, 
 we are entitled, by all the rules of sound phi- 
 losophizing, to employ it as a principle for the 
 explanation of other phenomena. Many very 
 curious ones which are commonly referred to 
 other causes, are resolvable into this principle, 
 in a manner equally simple and satisfactory.
 
 38 OUTLINES OF 
 
 SECTION IV 
 
 OF CONCEPTION. 
 
 43. The lower animals, as far as we are able 
 to observe, are entirely occupied with their 
 present sensations and perceptions : but man 
 is possessed of a faculty by which he can re- 
 present to himself sensations of which he has 
 been formerly conscious, and external objects 
 which he has formerly perceived. This fa- 
 culty may be conveniently distinguished by 
 the name of Conception. 
 
 44. The objects of some senses are more 
 easily conceived than those of others ; above 
 all, the objects which are perceived by the eye. 
 The power of conception, however, may, in 
 the case of all our senses, be greatly improved 
 by experience.
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 39 
 
 45. It is commonly understood, that Con- 
 ception is accompanied with no belief of the 
 existence of its objects ; but various considera- 
 tions render this opinion somewhat doubtful. 
 
 46. This faculty has obviously a very inti- 
 mate connection with the body. The con- 
 ception of a pungent taste, produces a rush of 
 saliva into the mouth. The conception of an 
 instrument of torture applied to any member 
 of the body, produces a shock similar to what 
 would be occasioned by its actual application.
 
 40 OUTLINES OF 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 OF ABSTRACTION. 
 
 47. By our perceptive powers we are made 
 acquainted only with what is jyarticular or 
 individual ; but this description comprehends 
 a very small part of the subjects about which 
 our thoughts are employed. In by far the 
 greater number of instances, our reasonings 
 relate to classes or genera of objects or of 
 events. 
 
 48. The process of classification supposes a 
 power of attending to some of the qualities, 
 or circumstances of objects and events, and 
 of withdrawing the attention from the rest. 
 This power is called by logicians, Abstraction, 
 It may be defined, in more general terms, 
 " The Faculty by which the mind separates
 
 MORAL THILOSOrHY. 41 
 
 " the combinations which are presented to it, 
 " in order to simplify the objects of its consi- 
 " deration." 
 
 49. An appellative, or a generic word, is 
 a name applicable in common to a number of 
 individuals, which agree with each other in 
 some particulars, and differ in others. By- 
 means of such words, we are enabled to rea- 
 son concerning classes of objects and classes 
 of events, and to arrive at general conclusions, 
 comprehending under them a multitude of 
 particular truths. The use which is made in 
 algebra of the letters of the alphabet, affords 
 the best illustration of the nature of general 
 reasoning, and of the principles on which it 
 proceeds. These principles were long misun- 
 derstood by philosophers, who imagined that 
 a generic word expresses an actual existence 
 distinct from the individuals of which the jje- 
 nus is composed ; and that the mind has a 
 faculty of directing its attention to this ge- 
 neral IDEA or ESSENCE, Without the media- 
 tion of language. Hence much of the mys-
 
 42 OUTLINES OF 
 
 tery which still prevails in the abstract sci- 
 ences. 
 
 50. As it is by language alone that we are 
 rendered capable of general reasoning, one 
 of the most valuable branches of logic is that 
 which relates to the use of words. Too little 
 attention has hitherto been bestowed on this 
 subject. 
 
 51. It is not, however, sufficient that we 
 guard against error, in ascertaining the truth 
 of our general principles. However accurate- 
 ly just they maybe in themselves, considered 
 as speculative maxims ; they must always be 
 applied, in actual practice, with the utmost 
 caution. To illustrate the advantages result- 
 ing from the proper vise of them, and the mis- 
 takes produced by their abuse, would form 
 another very important article in a philosophi- 
 cal system of logic. 
 
 52. A habit of abstract speculation, uncor- 
 rected by experience ; and a habit of unen-
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 43 
 
 lightened practice, without the aid of gene- 
 ral principles ; are two opposite extremes, to 
 which we are liable, in the conduct of the un- 
 derstanding. Few men are to be found, who 
 have not acquired, in early life, a manifest 
 bias either to the one or to the other.
 
 44 OUTLINES OF 
 
 SECTION VI. 
 
 OF THE ASSOCIATION OV IDEAS, 
 
 53. The effect of custom in connecting to- 
 gether different thoughts, in such a manner, 
 that the one seems spontaneously to follow 
 the other, is one of the most obvious facts with 
 respect to the operations of the mind. To 
 this law of our constitution, modern philoso- 
 phers have given the name of the Association 
 of Ideas. — Of late, the phrase has been used 
 in a more extensive sense, to denote the ten- 
 dency which our thoughts have to succeed 
 each other in a regular train ; whether the 
 connection between them be established by 
 custom, or arise from some other associating 
 principle. 
 
 54. What the different circumstances are, 
 which regulate the succession of our thoughts, 
 it is not possible, perhaps, to enumerate com-
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 45 
 
 pletely. The following are some of the most 
 remarkable : Resemblance, Analogy, Contra- 
 riety, Vicinity in Place, Vicinity in Time, 
 Relation of Cause and Effect, Relation of 
 Means and End, Relation of Premises and 
 Conclusion. Whether some of these may not 
 be resolvable into others, is not very material 
 to inquire. — The most powerful of all the as- 
 sociating principles is undoubtedly Custom ; 
 and it is that which leads to the most import- 
 ant inquiries of a practical nature. 
 
 55. Among the associating principles al- 
 ready enumerated, there is an important dis- 
 tinction. The relations on which some of 
 them are founded are obvious ; and connect 
 our thoughts together, when the attention is 
 not directed particularly to any subject. 
 Other relations are discovered only in conse- 
 quence of efforts of meditation or study. Of 
 the former kind are the relations of Resem- 
 blance and Analogy, of Contrariety, of Vi- 
 cinity in Time and Place ; of the latter, 
 the Relations of Cause and Effect, of Means
 
 46 OUTLINES OF 
 
 and End, of Premises and Conclusion. It is 
 owing to this distinction that transitions, 
 which would be highly offensive in philoso- 
 phical writing, are the most pleasing of any in 
 poetry, 
 
 56. In so far as the train of our thoughts 
 is regulated by the laws of Association, it de- 
 pends on causes of the nature of which we 
 are ignorant, and over which we have no 
 direct or immediate controul. At the same 
 time it is evident, that the will has some in- 
 fluence over this part of our constitution. To 
 ascertain the extent and the limits of this in- 
 fluence, is a problem of equal curiosity and 
 importance. 
 
 57. We have not a power of summoning 
 up any particular thought, till that thought 
 first solicit our notice. Among a crowd, how- 
 ever, which present themselves, we can choose 
 and reject. We can detain a particular thought, 
 and thus check the train that would otherwise 
 have taken place.
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 47 
 
 58. The indirect influence of the will over 
 tlie train of our thoughts is very extensive. 
 It is exerted chiefly in two ways : 1. By an 
 effort of attention, we can check the spon- 
 taneous course of our ideas, and give efficacy 
 to those associating principles which prevail 
 in a studious and collected mind. 2. By 
 practice, we can strengthen a particular asso- 
 ciating principle to so great a degree, as to ac- 
 quire a command over a particular class of our 
 ideas. 
 
 59. The effect of habit, in subjecting to the 
 will those intellectual processes, which are the 
 foundation of wit, — of the mechcmical part of 
 poetry, (or, in other words, of the powers of 
 versification and rhyming), — of poetical fancy, 
 — of invention in the arts and sciences ; — and, 
 above all, its effect in forming a talent for ex- 
 tempore elocution, furnish striking illustra- 
 tions of this last remark. 
 
 60. Of all the different parts of our con- 
 stitution, there is none more interesting to the
 
 48 OUTLINES OF 
 
 student of Moral Philosophy than the laws 
 which regulate the Association of Ideas. From 
 the intimate and almost indissoluble combina- 
 tions, which we are thus led to form in infancy 
 and in early youth, may be traced many of 
 our speculative errors ; many of our most 
 powerful principles of action ; many perver- 
 sions of our moral judgment ; and many of 
 those prejudices which mislead us in the con- 
 duct of life. By means of a judicious edu- 
 cation, this susceptibility of the infant mind 
 might be rendered subservient not only to 
 moral improvement, but to the enlargement 
 and multiplication of our capacities of enjoy- 
 ment.
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 49 
 
 SECTION VII. 
 
 OF MEMOllV. 
 
 61. The theories which attempt to ticcount 
 for the phenomena of Memory, by means of 
 impressions and traces in the braii:. nre en- 
 tirely hypothetical ; and throw no light on 
 the subject which they profess to explain. 
 
 62. This faculty appears, indeed, to de- 
 pend much on the state of the body ; as may 
 be inferred from the effects oi ii.toxication, 
 disease, and old age. A collection of facts 
 with respect to these effects, as they are di- 
 versified in different instances, would form a 
 valuable addition to our knowledge, and 
 might lead to important conclusions. 
 
 63. On a superficial view of the subject, the 
 original differences among men, in their capa- 
 cities of memory, would seem to be immense. 
 
 But there is reason for thinking that these dif- 
 
 ])
 
 50 OUTLINES OF 
 
 ferences are commonly overrated ; and that 
 due allowances are not made for the diversity 
 of appearance which the human mind must 
 necessarily exhibit, in this respect ; in conse- 
 quence of the various walks of observation and 
 of study, to which mankind are led, partly by 
 natural propensity, and partly by accidental 
 situation. 
 
 64. Independent of any inequalities in the 
 original capacity, there are remarkable va- 
 rieties of memory, which lay the foundation 
 of important distinctions among individuals 
 in point of intellectual character. 
 
 65. These varieties arise chiefly from the 
 different modes in which the constituent qua- 
 lities of memory are combined in different in- 
 stances. The perfection of memory is to unite 
 Susceptibility, Retentiveness, and Readiness: 
 but such an vmion is rare ; and any extraordi- 
 nary improvement that is bestowed on one of 
 these qualities is generally purchased at the 
 expence of the others.
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 51 
 
 SECTION VI 11. 
 
 OF IMAGINATION. 
 
 66. The province of Imagination is to se- 
 lect qualities and circumstances from a variety 
 of different objects ; and, by combining and 
 disposing these, to form a new creation of its 
 own. In this appropriated sense of the word, 
 it coincides with what some authors have 
 called. Creative or Poetical Imagination. 
 
 67. This power is not a simple faculty, but 
 results from the combination of several differ- 
 ent ones. The effort, for example, of the 
 painter, in composing an ideal landscape, im- 
 plies conception, which enables him to repre- 
 sent to himself those beautiful scenes in na- 
 ture, out of which his selection is to be made ; 
 — Abstraction, which separates the selected 
 materials from the qualities and circumstances 
 connected with them in the memory ; — and 
 Judgment or Taste, which selects the mate- 
 rials, and directs their combination.
 
 52 OUTLINES OF 
 
 68. The nature and province of imagination 
 are most clearly exemplified, in the arts which 
 convey pleasure to the mind by new modifica- 
 tions and combinations of beauties originally 
 perceived by the eye. The operations of ima- 
 gination, in this particular instance, serve to 
 illustrate the intellectual processes, by which 
 the mind deviates from the models presented 
 to it by experience, and forms to itself new 
 and untried objects of pursuit, in those analo- 
 gous but less palpable cases, which fall under 
 the consideration of the moralist. It is in con- 
 sequence of such processes, (which, how little 
 soever they may be attended to, are habitually 
 passing in the thoughts of all men), that hu- 
 man affairs exhibit so busy and various a scene; 
 tending, in one instance, to improvement, and, 
 in another, to decline ; according as our no- 
 tions of excellence and of happiness are just 
 or erroneous.
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 5$ 
 
 SECTION IX. 
 
 OF .TUDGMENT AND REASONING. 
 
 69. Judgment is defined, by the writers on 
 logic, to be an act of the mind, by which one 
 thing is affirmed or denied of another ; — a de- 
 finition, which, although not unexceptionable, 
 is as good as the nature of the subject admits 
 of. 
 
 70. In some cases, our judgments are form- 
 ed as soon as the terms of the proposition are 
 understood ; or they result so necessarily from 
 the original constitution of the mind, that we 
 act upon them from our earliest infancy, with- 
 out ever making them an object of reflection. 
 In other cases, they are formed in consequence 
 of a process of thought, consisting of different 
 successive steps. Hence, a distinction of Evi- 
 dence into intuitive and deductive.
 
 54 OUTLINES OF 
 
 I. OF INTUITIVE EVIDENCE. 
 
 71. The most important, if not all the dif- 
 ferent species of intuitive evidence, may be 
 comprehended under the three following 
 heads : 
 
 (1.) The evidence of axioms. 
 
 (2.) The evidence of consciousness, of per- 
 ception, and of memory. 
 
 (3.) The evidence of those fundamental 
 laws of human belief, which form an essential 
 part of our constitution ; and of which our en- 
 tire conviction is implied, not only in all spe- 
 culative reasonings, but in all our conduct as 
 
 active beings. Of this class, is the evidence 
 
 for our own personal identity ; for the exist- 
 ence, of the material world ; for the continu- 
 ance of those laws which have been found, in 
 the course of our past experience, to regulate 
 the sviccession of phenomena. Such truths no
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 55 
 
 man ever thinks of stating to himself in the 
 form of propositions ; but all our conduct, and 
 all our reasonings, proceed on the supposition 
 that they are admitted. The belief of them 
 is necessary for the preservation of our animal 
 existence ; and it is accordingly coeval with 
 the first operations of the intellect. 
 
 72. The attacks of modern sceptics have 
 been chiefly directed against this last descrip- 
 tion of intuitive truths. They have been call- 
 ed .Principles of Cormjiofi Sense, by some late 
 writers, who have undertaken to vindicate 
 their authority. The conclusions of these 
 writers are, on the whole, solid and import- 
 ant : but the vagueness of the expression, 
 Conwion Sense, which is generally employed, 
 in ordinary discourse, in a sense considerably 
 different from that in which it was at first in- 
 troduced into this controversy, has furnished 
 to their opponents, the means of a specious 
 misrepresentation of the doctrine in question ; 
 as an attempt to shelter popular prejudices 
 from a free examination ; and to institute an
 
 56 OUTLINES OF 
 
 appeal, from the decisions of philosophy, to 
 the voice of the multitude. 
 
 II. OF DEDUCTIVE EVIDENCE. 
 
 73. Notwithstanding the commonly re- 
 ceived doctrine concerning the radical dis- 
 tinction between Intuition and Reasoning, it 
 may be doubted, if the one of these powers 
 be not implied in the other. If it be true, 
 that a perfect demonstration is constituted by 
 a chain of reasoning, in which all the links 
 are connected by intuitive evidence ; it will 
 follow, that the power of reasoning presup- 
 poses the power of intuition. On the other 
 hand, are not the powers of intuition and of 
 memory suixicient to account for those pro- 
 cesses of thought, which conduct the mind by 
 a series of consequences, from premises to a 
 conclusion ? 
 
 74. " When the mind (says Locke) per- 
 " ceives the agreement or disagreement of
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 57 
 
 " two ideas immediately by themselves, with- 
 " out the intervention of any other, its know- 
 " ledge may be called intuitive. When it 
 " cannot so bring its ideas together, as by 
 " their immediate comparison, and, as it 
 " were, juxtaposition, or application one to 
 " another, to perceive their agreement or dis- 
 " agreement, it is fain, by the intervention 
 " of other ideas, (one, or more, as it hap- 
 " pens), to discover the agreement or dis- 
 " agreement which it searches ; and this is 
 
 " what we call Reasoning.'" According to 
 
 these definitions ; supposing the equality of 
 tw o lines A and B to be perceived immediate- 
 ly, in consequence of their coincidence ; the 
 judgment of the mind is intuitive. Suppos- 
 ing A to coincide with B, and B with C ; the 
 relation between A and C is perceived by Rea- 
 soning. 
 
 « 
 
 75. This is certainly not agreeable to com- 
 mon language. The trutli of mathematical 
 axioms has always been supposed to be intui- 
 tively obvious ; and the first of these, accord-
 
 58 OUTLINES OF 
 
 ing to Euclid's enumeration, affirms ; that if 
 A be equal to C, and B to C ; A and C are 
 equal. 
 
 76. Admitting, however, Locke's defini- 
 tion to be just, it might easily be shewn, that 
 the faculty which perceives the relation be- 
 tween A and C, is the same with the faculty 
 which perceives the relation between A and 
 B ; and between B and C. When the rela- 
 tion of equality between A and B has once 
 been perceived, A and B become different 
 names for the same thin";. 
 
 "&• 
 
 77. That the power of reasoning (or, as it 
 has been sometimes called, the Discursive Fa- 
 culty) is implied in the powers of intuition 
 and memory, appears also from an examina- 
 tion of the structure of syllogisms. It is im- 
 possible to conceive an understanding so form- 
 ed, as to perceive the truth of the major and 
 minor propositions, and not to perceive the 
 truth of the conclusion. Indeed, as in this 
 mode of stating an argument, the mind is led
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 59 
 
 from universals to particulars, the truth of the 
 conclusion must have been known before the 
 major proposition is formed. 
 
 78. Deductive evidence is of two kinds, 
 Demonstrative and Probable. The former 
 relates to necessary, the latter to contingent 
 truths. An accurate examination and compa- 
 rison of these, are of great consequence to all 
 who engage in moral inquiries , But the sub- 
 ject is too extensive to be introduced here. 
 
 79. The process of the mind, in discovering 
 media of proof for establishing the truth of 
 doubtful propositions ; and also the process by 
 which we bring new truths to light, is proper- 
 ly called Invention. In this power, remark- 
 able inequalities are observable among differ- 
 ent individuals. In a capacity of understand- 
 ing the reasonings of others, all men seem to 
 be nearly on a level. 
 
 80. The word Logic is used by modern writ- 
 ers in two very different senses: 1. To ex-
 
 60 OUTLINES OF 
 
 press the scholastic art of syllogizing, which is 
 commonly referred to Aristotle for its invent- 
 or. 2. To express that branch of the philoso- 
 phy of the human mind, which has for its ob- 
 ject, to guard us against the various errors to 
 which we are liable in the exercise of our rea- 
 soning powers ; and to assist and direct the 
 inventive faculty in the investigation of truth. 
 The general aim of these two sorts of logic is 
 the same ; and they differ only in the justness 
 of the principles on which they proceed. The 
 inutility of the former is now pretty generally 
 acknowledged ; and it deserves our attention, 
 chiefly, as a curious article in the history of 
 science. The other is still in its infancy ; but 
 many important views have already been open- 
 ed into the subject by Lord Bacon and others.
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 61 
 
 SECTION X. 
 
 OF INTELLECTUAL POWERS OR CAPACITIES, FORMED 
 BY PARTICULAR HABITS OF STUDY OR OF BUSINESS. 
 
 81. The varieties of intellectual character 
 among men, result from the various possible 
 combinations and modifications of faculties, 
 which, in greater or less degrees, are common 
 to the whole species. Supposing these facul- 
 ties to be originally the same in every indivi- 
 dual ; infinite diversities of genius would ne- 
 cessarily arise, from the different situations 
 into which men are thrown by the accidents 
 of human life. 
 
 82. The intellectual habits that are formed 
 by the pursuits of science or of literature, are 
 widely different from those which are produ- 
 ced by the active engagements of business.
 
 62 OUTLINES OF 
 
 There are other peculiarities of a more delicate 
 nature, which originate from particular studies, 
 and which distinguish the different classes of 
 literary men from each other. The metaphy- 
 sician, the mathematician, the antiquary, the 
 poet, the critic, strengthen, by their respective 
 pursuits, particular faculties and principles : 
 while they suffer others to remain without due 
 cultivation. 
 
 83. An examination of the effects produced 
 on the understanding, by different sciences, 
 and by different active professions, would sug- 
 gest many important rules for the improve- 
 ment and enlargement of the mind, and for 
 preserving all its various powers in that just 
 proportion to each other, which constitutes the 
 perfection of our intellectual nature. 
 
 84. Quickness ; Acuteness ; Penetration ; 
 Presence of Mind ; Good Sense ; Sagacity ; 
 Comprehension ; Profoundness ; — all express 
 particular characteristics of intellect by which 
 individuals are distinguished from each other ;
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 63 
 
 and which present a subject of observation and 
 study, not more interesting to the philosopher, 
 than to those who take an active concern in 
 the business of the workl. — The mental de- 
 fects to which these qualities are respectively 
 opposed, are no less deserving of attention. 
 
 85. Nearly connected with these last specu- 
 lations, are those philosophical inquiries which 
 have for their object, to analyze, into their con- 
 stituent principles, the different kinds of in- 
 tellectual ability, which are displayed in the 
 different sciences and arts. Such inquiries not 
 only open a curious and interesting field of 
 disquisition, but have an obvious tendency to 
 lessen that blind admiration of original genius, 
 which is one of the chief obstacles to the im- 
 provement of the arts, and to the progress of 
 knowledge.
 
 64 OUTLINES OF 
 
 86. Among the intellectual powers, gra- 
 dually formed by a particular application of 
 our original faculties, the power of Taste is 
 one of the most important. It was formerly 
 treated by metaphysicans as a simple and 
 uncompounded principle of our constitution ; 
 and, notwithstanding the ingenious attempts 
 lately made to analyze it into its competent 
 elements, it continues still to be considered 
 by some as an ultimate fact in the constitu- 
 tion of the human mind. The extensive in- 
 fluence it possesses in such a state of society 
 as ours, not only over the pursuits of those 
 who devote themselves to the study of Litera- 
 ture and of the Fine Arts, but over the en- 
 joyments of every individual who partakes of 
 the general refinement of manners, might jus- 
 tify the allotment of a separate article to an 
 illustration of the intellectual process, by 
 which it is formed. Sucli a digression, how-
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 65 
 
 ever, would necessarily encroach on other dis- 
 cussions still more closely connected with the 
 object of this First Part of the Course ; and 
 the intimate relation between the Power of 
 Taste and our Moral Principles will furnish 
 another and a more convenient opportunity of 
 resuming the speculation. 
 
 87. It is sufficient, at present, to remark, 
 That although the ground-work of Taste 
 must be laid in the original qualities of the 
 mind, yet this power is the slow result of ex- 
 perience, habitually and attentively conver- 
 sant with a particular class of agreeable ob- 
 jects. The instantaneous rapidity of its de- 
 cisions gives it sometimes the appearance of 
 an immediate perception ; — and hence the 
 name which it has borrowed, in the languages 
 of modern Europe, from one of the external 
 senses. The use made in the French tongue 
 of the word Tact, to denote that delicate 
 sense of propriety which enables a man to 
 feel his ivay in the difficult intercourse of po-
 
 66 OUTLINES OF 
 
 lished society, seems to have been suggested 
 by similar considerations. This power, as 
 well as the other, is evidently an acquired 
 one ; and a comparison of the two might be 
 useful for illustrating the nature and genesis 
 of both.
 
 ;moiial philosophy. 67 
 
 SECTION XI. 
 
 OF CERTAIN AUXILIARY FACULTIES AXD PRINCIPLES, 
 ESSENTIAL TO OUR INTELLECTUAL IMPROVEMENT, 
 OR INTIMATELY CONNECTED WITH IT. 
 
 88. The form and posture of the human 
 body, and its various organs of perception, 
 have an obvious reference to Man's rational 
 nature ; and are beautifully fitted to encou- 
 rage and facilitate his intellectual improve- 
 ment. A similar remark may be extended 
 to many other parts of our constitution, both 
 external and internal: but there are two, 
 which more particularly claim our attention ; 
 the power of expressing our thoughts by Lan- 
 guage ; and the princip/p of Imitation.
 
 68 OUTLINES OF 
 
 I. OF LANGUAGE. 
 
 89. The connection of this subject with that 
 of the foregoing sections is sufficiently obvi- 
 ous. It is to the use of artificial signs, (§ 49.) 
 that we are indebted for all our general con- 
 clusions; and without it, our knowledge 
 would have been entirely limited to indivi- 
 duals. It is also to the use of artificial signs, 
 that we are indebted for all that part of our 
 information, which is not the immediate re- 
 sult of our own personal experience : and for 
 that transmission of intellectual acquisitions 
 from one race to another, which lays the foun- 
 dation of the progressive improvement of the 
 species. 
 
 90. The formation of an artificial lan- 
 guage, (as Dr Reid has remarked), presup- 
 poses the use of natural signs. These con- 
 sist in certain expressions of the countenance, 
 certain gestures of the body, and certain tones 
 of the voice.
 
 MORAL I'HILOSOPHY. 69 
 
 91. There seems to be, in man, a power of 
 interpreting instinctively some of these ex- 
 pressions. This, indeed, has been disputed of 
 late ; but various considerations might be 
 mentioned, which justify the common opinion 
 upon the subject, when stated with certain 
 corrections and limitations. 
 
 92. As ideas multiply, the imperfections 
 of natural language are felt ; and men find it 
 necessary to invent artificial signs, of which 
 the meaning is fixed by m\itual agreement. 
 In proportion as artificial language improves, 
 the language of nature declines ; insomuch, 
 that in such a state of society as ours, it re- 
 quires a great deal of reflection and study to 
 recover the use of it. This study is in a con- 
 siderable degree the foundation of the arts 
 both of the actor and of the orator. 
 
 93. Artificial signs may be divided, into 
 those which are addressed to the eye, and those 
 which are addressed to the ear. The latter 
 have formed, among all nations, the ordinary 
 medium of intellectual communication.
 
 70 OUTLINES OF 
 
 94. As we have no record of the steps, by 
 which any of the languages spoken among 
 men have arisen ; some writers have employ- 
 ed their ingenuity, in tracing, from the facul- 
 ties of the mind, the origin of the different 
 parts of speech ; and, in illustrating the gra- 
 dual progress of language, resulting from the 
 general progress of society. — Such conjectu- 
 ral speculations concerning the natural ad- 
 vances of the Species, in any particular line 
 of improvement, may be distinguished by 
 the title of Theoretical Histories. 
 
 95. The imperfections of those languages, 
 which have originated from popular use, have 
 suggested, to some philosophers, the idea of a 
 language expressly calculated for the pur- 
 poses of science. The failure of the at- 
 tempts hitherto made on this subject, are not 
 decisive against the practicability of such a 
 project. 
 
 96. The art of Writing is an important 
 step in the history of language ; and a power-
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY 71 
 
 ful aid to the intellectual progress of the 
 species. 
 
 97. The advantages with which it is ac- 
 companied, are wonderfully extended by the 
 art of Printing, which may be justly regard- 
 ed, not only as the happiest of all expedients, 
 for facilitating the intellectual commerce of 
 mankind, but as one of the most important 
 events that have occurred in the history of 
 human affairs. 
 
 II. OF THE PRINCIPLE OP" IMITATION. 
 
 98. Whenever we see any expression, or, 
 in general, any change, in the countenance 
 of another person ; we have a tendency to 
 assume the same expression, or the same 
 change, in our own countenance. Every 
 man is sensible of this, when he looks at an- 
 other in a rage, in a fit of laughter, or in a 
 
 deep melancholy. Kor is it the visible 
 
 appearance alone of others, that we have a 
 disposition to imitate. We copy instinctively
 
 72 OUTLINES or 
 
 the voices of our companions, their tones, 
 their accents, and their modes of pronuncia- 
 tion. 
 
 99. This tendency in our nature to imi- 
 tation is attended with important advantages. 
 It seems to be by means of it, that children 
 acquire the use of speech ; and that they 
 learn insensibly, to model their habits, on the 
 appearance and manners of those with whom 
 they are familiarly conversant. 
 
 100. As it is in early life, that the principle 
 of imitation is of greatest use to us, so it is in 
 infancy that we have the strongest tendency 
 to indulge it. — It is of this natural tendency, 
 which all men have in some degree, that mi- 
 mics avail themselves ; till, by repeated ef- 
 forts, they acquire a power of carrying it far- 
 ther than they could have done originally : 
 or, rather, perhaps, they only contrive to re- 
 tain through life, a faculty, which, in the case 
 of most men, disappears after the period of 
 childhood.
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 73 
 
 101. The contagious nature of insanity, of 
 convulsions, of hysteric disorders, of panics, 
 and of all the different kinds of enthusiasm, 
 seems to have an intimate connection with 
 the principle of imitation. To this class of 
 facts, an important addition has lately been 
 made in the course of the philosophical in- 
 quiries which took rise at Paris, in conse- 
 quence of the cures pretended to be effected 
 by means of animal magnetism.
 
 TJf OUTLINES OF 
 
 SECTION XII. 
 
 OF THE IXTELLECTUAL FACUT.TIES OF MAN, AS CON- 
 TRASTED WITH THE INSTINCTS OF THE BliUTES. 
 
 102. That the brutes are under the more 
 immediate guidance of nature, while man is 
 left to regulate, to a great degree, his own 
 destiny, by the exercise of his reason ; is a fact 
 too obvious to admit of dispute. In what 
 manner, indeed, nature operates, in this in- 
 stance, we are perfectly ignorant : but no- 
 thing can be more certain than this, that it 
 is not by a deliberate choice, analgous to 
 what we experience in ourselves, that the 
 lower animals are determined to the pursuit 
 of particular ends ; nor by any process analo- 
 gous to our reason, that they combine means 
 in order to attain them.
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 75 
 
 103. To that unknown principle, which 
 guides the operations of the brutes, we give 
 the name of Instinct. It is distinguished 
 from Reason by two circumstances: 1. By 
 the uniformity with which it proceeds, in all 
 individuals of the same species ; and, 2. By 
 the unerring certainty with which it performs 
 its office, prior to all experience. 
 
 104. But although we do not, in such cases, 
 ascribe reason or art to the brutes, the opera- 
 tions of instinct plainly indicate intelligence 
 in that being by whom they were formed ; 
 and who, by adapting their constitutions so 
 beautifully to the laws of the material world, 
 has evinced an unity of design, which proves 
 that all the different parts of the universe, 
 animate and inanimate, are the workmanship 
 of the same Author. 
 
 105. The wisdom of nature, as displayed 
 in the instincts of animals, is more particu- 
 larly conspicuous in those tribes which asso-
 
 76 OUTLINES OF 
 
 date in political communities ; — as the bee, 
 and the beaver. Here we see animals, who, 
 considered individually, discover but a small 
 degree of sagacity, conspiring together, under 
 the guidance of a blind impulse, in the ac- 
 complishment of effects, astonishing by their 
 magnitude, and by the complicated ingenuity 
 they exhibit. 
 
 106. Animals, however, are left to make 
 some small acquisitions, by experience ; as 
 sufficiently appears, in certain tribes, from 
 the sagacity of the old, when contrasted with 
 the ignorance of the young ; and from the 
 effects which may be produced on many of 
 them, by discipline and education. 
 
 107. In what, then, does the difference be- 
 tween man and the brutes consist ? Do their 
 faculties differ from each other in degree 
 only ; or is there an essential distinction, be- 
 tween the rational and the animal natures ?
 
 MORAL rniLOSOPHY. 77 
 
 108. The French philosophers of the Car- 
 tesian school adopted the latter opinion ; and 
 even carried it so far, as to consider the brutes 
 as mere machines. Their successors have, in 
 general, gone into the opposite extreme ; and 
 have employed their ingenuity, in attempting 
 to account for the boasted superiority of man, 
 by accidental circumstances in his bodily or- 
 ganization, or in his external condition. 
 
 109. In opposition to these doctrines of mo- 
 dern Materialists, a great variety of consider- 
 ations prove ; that, in respect of our intellect- 
 ual and moral principles, our nature does not 
 admit of comparison with that of any other 
 inhabitant of this globe; the difference be- 
 tween our constitution and theirs, being a dif- 
 ference, not in degree, but in kind. Perhaps, 
 this is the single instance, in which that regu- 
 lar gradation which we, every where else, ob- 
 serve in the universe, fails entirely. — The 
 subject is by far too extensive to be treated 
 in these OufUnes.
 
 OUTLINES 
 
 OF 
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 PAPvT II. 
 
 OF THE ACTIVE AND OF THE MORAL 
 POWERS OF MAN. 
 
 110. This part of the subject naturally 
 divides itself into two Chapters : The first re- 
 lates to the Classification and Analysis of our 
 Active and Moral Powers. The second, to 
 the various branches of our Duty.
 
 80 OUTLINES OF 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 CLASSIFICATION AND ANALYSIS OF OUR 
 ACTIVE AND MORAL POWERS. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 OF THE ACTIVE POWERS IN GENERAL. 
 
 111. The word Action is properly applied 
 to those exertions which are consequent on 
 volition ; whether the exertion be made on 
 external objects, or be confined to our mental 
 operations. Thus, we say the mind is active, 
 when engaged in study. In ordinary dis- 
 course, indeed, we are apt to confound toge- 
 ther action and motion. As the operations in 
 the minds of other men escape our notice, we 
 can judge of their activity, only from the sensi- 
 ble effects it produces ; and hence we are led to
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 81 
 
 apply the character of iVctivity, to those 
 whose bodily activity is the most remarkable ; 
 and to distinguish mankind into two classes, 
 the Active and the Speculative. — In the pre- 
 sent instance the word Activity is used in its 
 most extensive signification, as applicable to 
 every voluntary exertion. 
 
 112. The primary sources of our activity, 
 therefore, are the circumstances that influence 
 the will. Of these, there are some which 
 make a part of our constitution, and which, 
 on that account are called Active principles. 
 Such are. Hunger, Thirst, Curiosity, Ambi- 
 tion, Pity, Resentment. The most important 
 principles of this kind may be referred to the 
 following heads. 
 
 (1.) Appetites. 
 
 (2.) Desires. 
 
 (3.) Affections. 
 
 (4.) Self-Love. 
 
 (5.) The Moral Faculty.
 
 82 OUTLINES OF 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 OF OUR ArirETITES. 
 
 113. This class of our active principles is 
 distinguished by the following circumstances. 
 
 (1.) They take their rise from the body, 
 and are common to us with the brutes. 
 
 (2.) The are not constant but occasional. 
 
 (3.) They are accompanied with an uneasy 
 sensation, which is strong or weak, in propor- 
 tion to the strength or weakness of the appe- 
 tite. 
 
 114. Our appetites are three in number ; 
 Hunger, Thirst, and the appetite of Sex. Of 
 these, two were intended for the preservation 
 of the individual ; the third, for the continu- 
 ance of the species ; and without them, rea-
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 83 
 
 son would have been insufficient for these im- 
 portant purposes. 
 
 115. Our appetites can, with no propriety, 
 be called selfish, for they are directed to their 
 respective objects, as ultimate ends ; and they 
 must all have operated, in the first instance, 
 prior to any experience of the pleasure arising 
 from their gratification. — Self-love, too, is of- 
 ten sacrificed to appetite, when we indulge 
 ourselves in an immediate enjoyment, which 
 we know is likely to be attended with hurtful 
 consequences. 
 
 116. Beside our natural appetites, we have 
 many acquired ones. — Such are, an appetite 
 for tobacco, for opium, and for intoxicating li- 
 quors. In general, every thing that stimulates 
 the nervous system, produces a subsequent lan- 
 guor, which gives rise to a desire of repetition. 
 
 117- Our occasional propensities to action 
 and to repose are, in many respects, analogous 
 to oiu' appetites.
 
 84 OUTLINES OF 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 OF OUR DESIRES. 
 
 118. These are distinguished from our ap- 
 petites by the following circumstances. 
 
 (1.) They do not take rise from the body. 
 
 (2.) They do not operate periodically, after 
 certain intervals : and they do not cease upon 
 the attainment of a particular object. 
 
 119. The most remarkable active principles 
 belonging to this class are ; 
 
 (1.) The Desire of Knowledge, or the Prin- 
 ciple of Curiosity. 
 
 (2.) The Desire of Society.
 
 MORAL PHILOSOrHY. 85 
 
 (3.) The Desire of Esteem. 
 
 (4.) The Desire of Power ; or the Principle 
 of Ambition. 
 
 (5.) The Desire of Superiority ; or the 
 Principle of Emulation. 
 
 I. THE DESIUE OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 120. The principle of Curiosity appears, 
 in children, at a very early period, and is 
 commonly proportioned to the degree of ca- 
 pacity they possess. The direction too which 
 it takes, is regulated by nature, according to 
 the order of our wants and necessities ; being 
 confined, in the first instance, exclusively to 
 those properties of material objects, and those 
 laws of the material world, an acquaintance 
 with which is essential to the preservation of 
 our animal existence. In more advanced 
 years, it displays itself, in one way or another, 
 in every individual ; and gives rise to an in-
 
 86 OUTLINES OF 
 
 finite diversity in their pursuits. Whether 
 this diversity be owing to natural predisposi- 
 tion, or to early education, it is of little con- 
 sequence to determine ; as upon either suppo- 
 sition, a preparation is made for it in the ori- 
 ginal constitution of the mind, combined with 
 the circumstances of our external situation. 
 Its final cause is also sufficiently obvious ; as 
 it is this which gives rise, in the case of indi- 
 viduals, to a limitation of attention and study ; 
 and lays the foundation of all the advantages, 
 which society derives, from the division and 
 subdivision of intellectual labour. 
 
 121. The desire of knowledge is not a self- 
 ish principle. As the object of hunger is not 
 happiness, but food ; so the object of curiosity 
 is not happiness, but knowledge. 
 
 II. THE DESIRE OF SOCIETY. 
 
 122. Abstracting from those affections 
 which interest us in the happiness of others.
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 87 
 
 and from all the advantages which we our- 
 selves derive from the social union, we are led 
 by a natural and instinctive desire, to asso- 
 ciate with our own species. This principle 
 is easily discernible in the minds of children ; 
 and it is common to man with many of the 
 brutes. 
 
 123. After experiencing, indeed, the plea- 
 sures of social life ; the influence of habit, and 
 a knowledge of the comforts inseparable from 
 society, contribute greatly to strengthen the 
 instinctive desire : and hence some authors 
 have been induced to display their ingenuity, 
 by disputing its existence. Whatever opi- 
 nion we form on this speculative question, the 
 desire of society is equally entitled to be rank- 
 ed among the natural and universal principles 
 of our constitution. 
 
 124. How very powerfully this principle 
 of action operates, appears from the effects of 
 solitude upon the mind. We feel ourselves in 
 an unnatural state ; and, by making compa-
 
 88 OUTLINES OF 
 
 nions of the lower animals, or by attaching 
 ourselves to inanimate objects, strive to fill up 
 the void of which we are conscious. 
 
 125. The connection between the Desire of 
 Society and the Desire of Knowledge is very 
 remarkable. The last of these principles is al- 
 ways accompanied with a wish to impart our 
 information to others ; — insomuch, that it has 
 been doubted, if any man's curiosity would be 
 sufficient to engage him in a course of perse- 
 vering study, if he were entirely cut off from 
 the prospect of social intercourse. In this 
 manner, a beautiful provision is made for a 
 mutual communication, among mankind, of 
 their intellectual attainments. 
 
 III. THE DESIRE OF ESTEEM. 
 
 126. This principle discovers itself, at a 
 very early period, in infants ; who, long be- 
 fore they are able to reflect on the advanta- 
 ges resulting from the good opinion of others.
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 89 
 
 and even before they acquire the use of speech, 
 are sensibly mortified by any expression of 
 neglect or contempt. It seems, therefore, to 
 be an original principle in our nature ; that 
 is, it does not appear to be resolvable into rea- 
 son and experience, or into any other prin- 
 ciple more general than itself. An additional 
 proof of this is, the very powerful influence it 
 has over the mind ; — an influence more strik- 
 ing than that of any other active principle 
 whatever. Even the love of life daily gives 
 way to the desire of esteem ; and of an 
 esteem, which, as it is only to affect our me- 
 mories, cannot be supposed to interest our 
 self-love. — In what manner, the association of 
 ideas should manufacture, out of the other 
 principles of our constitution, a new prin- 
 ciple stronger than them all, it is difficult to 
 conceive. 
 
 127. As our appetites of Hunger and 
 Thirst, though not selfish principles, are yet 
 immediately subservient to the preservation 
 of the individual ; so the desire of Esteem,
 
 90 OUTLINES OF 
 
 though not a social or benevolent principle, 
 is yet immediately subservient to the good of 
 society. 
 
 IV. THE DESIKE OF POWER. 
 
 128. Whenever we are led to consider 
 ourselves as the authors of any effect, we feel 
 a sensible pride of exultation, in the consci- 
 ousness of Power ; and the pleasure is, in ge- 
 neral, proportioned to the greatness of the ef- 
 fect, compared to the smallness of our exer- 
 tion. 
 
 129. The infant, while still on the breast, 
 delights in exerting its little strength upon 
 every object it meets with ; and is mortified, 
 when any accident convinces it of its own 
 imbecillity. The pastimes of the boy are, 
 almost without exception, such as suggest to 
 him the idea of his power : — and the same 
 remark may be extended to the active sports,
 
 MORAL THILOSOPHY. 91 
 
 and the athletic exercises, of youth and of 
 manhood. 
 
 130. As we advance in years, and as our 
 animal powers lose their activity and vigour, 
 we gradually aim at extending our influence 
 over others, by the superiority of fortune and 
 of situation, or by the still more flattering 
 superiority of intellectual endowments : — by 
 the force of our understanding ; by the ex- 
 tent of our information ; by the arts of per- 
 suasion, or the accomplishments of address. 
 What but the idea of power pleases the ora- 
 tor, in the consciousness of his eloquence; 
 when he silences the reason of others by su- 
 perior ingenuity ; bends to his purposes their 
 desires and passions ; and, without the aid of 
 force, or the splendour of rank, becomes the 
 arbiter of the fate of nations ? 
 
 131. To the same principle we may trace, 
 in part, the pleasure arising from the disco- 
 very of general theorems. Every such dis- 
 covery puts us in possession of innumerable
 
 92 OUTLINES OF 
 
 particular truths, or particular facts ; and 
 gives us a ready command of a great stock of 
 knowledge to which we had not access be- 
 fore. The desire of pow^er, therefore, comes, 
 in the progress of reason and experience, to 
 act as an auxiliary to our instinctive desire of 
 knowledge. 
 
 132. The idea of power is, partly at least, 
 the foundation of our attachment to property. 
 It is not enough for us to have the use of an 
 object. We desire to have it completely at 
 our owii disposal ; without being responsible 
 to any person whatever. 
 
 133. Avarice is a particular modification 
 of the desire of power ; arising from the va- 
 rious functions of money in a commercial 
 country. Its influence as an active principle 
 is much strengthened by habit and associa- 
 tion. 
 
 134. The love of liberty proceeds, in part, 
 from the same source ; from a desire of being
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 93 
 
 able to do whatever is agreeable to our own 
 inclination. Slavery mortifies us, because it 
 limits our power. 
 
 135. Even the love of tranquillity and re- 
 tirement has been resolved by Cicero into the 
 same principle. " Multi autem et sunt, et 
 " fuerunt, qui eam, quam dico, Tranquillita- 
 " tem expetentes, a negotiis publicis se re- 
 " moverint, ad otiumque perfugerint. His 
 " idem propositum fuit, quod regibus ; ut ne 
 " qua re egerunt, ne cui parerent, libertate 
 " uterentur ; cujus proprium est, sic vivere, 
 " ut velis. Quare, cum hoc commune sit po- 
 " tentiae cupidorum cum iis, quos dixi, otio- 
 " sis ; alteri se adipisci id posse arbitrantur, 
 " si opes magnas habeant ; alteri, si content! 
 " sint et suo, et parvo." 
 
 136. The idea of power is also, in some 
 degree, the foundation of the pleasure of Vir- 
 tue. We love to be at liberty to follow our 
 own inclinations, without being subjected to 
 the controul of a superior ; but this alone is
 
 94 OUTLINES OF 
 
 not sufficient to our happiness. When we 
 are led, by vicious habits, or by the force of 
 passion, to do what reason disapproves, we are 
 sensible of a mortifying subjection to the in- 
 ferior principles of our nature, and feel our 
 'own littleness and weakness. A sense of free- 
 dom and independence, elevation of mind, 
 and the pride of virtue, are the natural senti- 
 ments of the man, who is conscious of being 
 able, at all times, to calm the tumults of pas- 
 sion, and to obey the cool suggestions of duty 
 and honour. 
 
 V. THE DESIRE OF SUPERIORITY. 
 
 137. Emulation has been sometimes class- 
 ed with the Affections : but it seems more 
 properly to fall under the definition of our 
 Desires. It is, indeed, frequently accompa- 
 nied with ill-will towards our rivals : but it 
 is the desire of superiority which is the active 
 principle ; and the malevolent affection is only 
 a concomitant circumstance.
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 95 
 
 138. A malevolent affection is not even a 
 7iecessary concomitant of the desire of supe- 
 riority. It is possible, surely, to conceive (al- 
 though the case may happen but rarely,) that 
 Emulation may take place betv/een men, who 
 are united by the most cordial friendship ; and 
 without a single sentiment of ill-will disturb- 
 ing their harmony. 
 
 139. When Emulation is accompanied with 
 malevolent affection, it assumes the name of 
 Envy. The distinction between these two 
 principles of action is accurately stated by Dr 
 Butler. " Emulation is merely the desire of 
 " superiority over others with whom we com- 
 " pare ourselves. To desire the attainment 
 " of this superiority, by the particular means 
 " of others being brought down below our 
 " own level, is the distinct notion of Envy. 
 " From whence it is easy to see, that the real 
 " end, which the natural passion, Emulation, 
 " and which the unlawful one, Envy, aims at, 
 " is exactly the same ; and, consequently, that 
 " to do mischief is not the end of Envy, but
 
 96 OUTLINES OF 
 
 " merely the means it makes use of to attain 
 " its end." 
 
 140. Some faint symptoms of Emulation 
 may be remarked among the lower animals ; 
 but the effects it produces among them are 
 perfectly insignificant. In our own race, it 
 operates in an infinite variety of directions, 
 and is one of the principal springs of human 
 improvement. 
 
 141. As we have artificial appetites, so we 
 have also artificial desires. Whatever con- 
 duces to the attainment of any object of na- 
 tural desire, is itself desired on account of its 
 subserviency to this end ; and frequently 
 comes, in process of time, to acquire, in our 
 estimation, an intrinsic value. It is thus, that 
 wealth becomes, with many, an ultimate ob- 
 ject of pursuit ; although it is undoubtedly 
 valued at first, merely as the means of attaining 
 other objects. In like manner, men are led
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 97 
 
 to desire dress, equipage, retinue, furniture, 
 on account of the estimation in which they 
 are supposed to be held by the public. Such 
 desires have been called, by Dr Hutcheson, 
 Secondary Desires. Their origin is easily ex- 
 plicable, on the principle of Association. 
 
 G
 
 98 OUTLINES OF 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 OF OUR AlFECTIONS. 
 
 142. Under this title are comprehended 
 all those active principles, whose direct and 
 ultimate object is the communication either 
 of enjoyment or of suffering, to any of our 
 fellow-creatures. According to this defini- 
 tion, Resentment, Hevenge, Hatred, belong 
 to the class of our affections, as well as Gra--^ 
 titude or Pity. Hence a distinction of the af- 
 fections into Benevolent and IMalevolent. 
 
 I. OF THP; BENEVOLENT AFFECTIONS. 
 
 143. Our Eenevolent affections are various; 
 and it would not, perhaps, be easy to enu- 
 merate them completely. The Parental
 
 MORAL THILOSOPHY. 99 
 
 and the Filial affections, — the affections of 
 Kindred, — Love, — Friendship, — Patriotism. 
 —Universal Benevolence, — G ratitude, — Pity 
 to the distressed,— are some of the most im- 
 portant. Besides these, there are peculiar 
 benevolent affections, excited by those moral 
 qualities in other men, which render them 
 either amiable, or respectable, or objects of 
 admiration. 
 
 144. In the foregoing enumeration, it is 
 not to be understood, that all the benevolent 
 affections particularly specified, are stated as 
 original principles, or ultimate facts in our 
 constitution. On the contrary, there can 
 be little doubt, that several of them may be 
 analyzed into the same general principle dif- 
 ferently modified, according to the circum- 
 stances in which it operates. This, however, 
 (notwithstanding the stress which has been 
 sometimes laid upon it), is chiefly a question 
 of arrangement. Whether we suppose these 
 principles to be all ultimate facts, or some of 
 them to be resolvable into other facts more
 
 100 OUTLINES OF 
 
 general ; they are equally to be regarded as 
 constituent parts of human nature ; and, up- 
 on either supposition, we have equal reason 
 to admire the wisdom with which that na- 
 ture is adapted to the situation in which it 
 is placed. — The laws which regulate the ac- 
 quired perceptions of Sight, are surely as 
 much a part of our frame, as those which re- 
 gulate any of our original perceptions ; and, 
 although they require, for their develope- 
 ment, a certain degree of experience and ob- 
 servation, in the individual ; the uniformity 
 of the result shews, that there is nothing ar- 
 bitrary nor accidental in their origin. 
 
 145. The question, indeed, concerning the 
 origin of our different affections, leads to some 
 curious disquisitions ; but is of very subordi- 
 nate importance to those inquiries, which re- 
 late to their nature, and laws, and uses. In 
 many philosophical systems, however, it seems 
 to have been considered as the most interest- 
 ing subject of discussion connected with this 
 part of the human constitution.
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 101 
 
 146. To treat, in detail, of the nature, 
 laws, and uses of our benevolent affections, is 
 obviously inconsistent with the brevity of a 
 treatise, confined by its plan, to a statement 
 of definitions and divisions, and of such re- 
 marks as are necessary for explaining the 
 arrangement on which it proceeds. The 
 enumeration already mentioned, (§ 143.), 
 suggests an order according to which this 
 subject may be treated in a course of lec- 
 tures on JMoral Philosophy. What follows 
 is equally applicable to all the various prin- 
 ciples which come under the general descrip- 
 tion. 
 
 147. The exercise of all our kind affections 
 is accompanied with an agreeable feeling or 
 emotion. So much indeed, of our happi- 
 ness is derived from this source, that those 
 authors, whose object is to furnish amuse- 
 ment to the mind, avail themselves of these 
 affections as one of the chief vehicles of plea- 
 sure. Hence, the principal charm of trage-
 
 102 OUTLINES OF 
 
 dy, and of every other species of pathetic 
 composition. How far it is of use, to sepa- 
 rate, in this manner, " the luxury of pity" 
 from the opportunities of active exertion, may 
 perhaps be doubted. 
 
 148. The pleasures of kind affection are 
 not confined to the virtuous. They mingle 
 also with our criminal indulgences ; and 
 often mislead the young and thoughtless, 
 by the charms they impart to vice and to 
 folly. 
 
 149. Even when these affections are dis- 
 appointed in the attainment of their objects, 
 there is a degree of pleasure mixed with the 
 pain : — and sometimes the pleasure greatly 
 predominates. 
 
 150. The final cause of the agreeable emo- 
 tion connected with the exercise of Benevo- 
 lence, in all its various modes, was evidently 
 to induce us to cultivate, with peculiar care.
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 103 
 
 a class of our active principles so immediate- 
 ly subservient to the happiness of human so- 
 ciety. 
 
 151. Notwithstanding, however, the plea- 
 sure arising from the indulgence of the bene- 
 volent affections ; these affections have no- 
 thing selfish in their origin — as has been 
 fully demonstrated by different writers. This 
 conclusion, although contrary to the systems 
 of many philosophers, both ancient and mo- 
 dern, is not only agreeable to the obvious ap- 
 pearance of the fact ; but is strongly confirm- 
 ed by the analogy of the other active powers 
 already considered. 
 
 152. We have found, that the preservation 
 of the individual, and tlie continuation of 
 the species, are not intrusted to Self-love and 
 Reason alone ; but that w^e are endowed 
 with various appetites, which, w^ithout any 
 reflection on our part, impel us .to tlieir re- 
 spective objects. We have also found, witli
 
 104 OUTLINES OF ~ 
 
 respect to the acquisition of knowledge, (on 
 which the perfection of the individual, and 
 the improvement of the species, essentially 
 depend) ; that it is not entrusted solely to 
 Self-love and Benevolence ; but that we are 
 prompted to it by the implanted principle of 
 Curiosity. It farther appeared, that, in ad- 
 dition to our sense of duty, another incentive 
 to v/orthy conduct is provided in the desire of 
 Esteem, which is not only one of our most 
 powerful principles of action, but continues 
 to operate in full force, to the last moment 
 of our being. Now, as men were plainly 
 intended to live in society, and as the social 
 union could not subsist, without a mutual in- 
 terchange of good offices ; would it not be 
 reasonable to expect, agreeably to the ana- 
 logy of our nature, that so important an end 
 would not be intrusted solely to tlie slow de- 
 ductions of Reason, or to the metaphysical 
 refinements of Self-love ; but that some provi- 
 sion would be made for it in a particular class 
 of active principles, which might operate,
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 105 
 
 like our appetites and desires, independently 
 of our reflection ? To say this of Parental Af- 
 fection or of Pity, is saying nothing more in 
 their favour, than what was affirmed of Hun- 
 ger and Thirst ; that they prompt us to par- 
 ticular objects, without any reference to our 
 own enjoyment. 
 
 II. OF THE MALEVOLENT AFFECTIONS. 
 
 153. The names which are given to these, 
 in common discourse, are various ; Hatred, 
 Jealousy, Envy, Revenge, Misanthropy ; — 
 but it may be doubted, if there be any prin- 
 ciple of this kind, implanted by nature, in the 
 mind, excepting the principle of Resentment ; 
 the others being grafted on this stock, by our 
 erroneous opinions and criminal habits. 
 
 154. Resentment has been distinguished 
 into Instinctive and Deliberate. The former 
 operates, in man, exactly as in the lower ani-
 
 106 OUTLINES OF 
 
 mals ; and was plainly intended to guard us 
 against sudden violence, in cases where reason 
 would come too late to our assistance. This 
 species of Resentment subsides, as soon as we 
 are satisfied that no injury was intended. 
 
 155. Deliberate Resentment is excited only 
 by intentional injury ; and, therefore, im- 
 plies a sense of justice, or of moral good and 
 evil. 
 
 156. The Resentment excited by an injury 
 offered to anotlier person, is properly called 
 Indignation. In both cases the principle of 
 action seems to be fundamentally the same ; 
 and to have for its object, not the communi- 
 cation of suffering to a sensitive being, but 
 the punishment of injustice and cruelty. 
 
 157. As all the benevolent affections are ac- 
 companied with pleasant emotions ; so all the 
 malevolent affections are sources of pain and 
 disquiet. This is true even of Resentment ;
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 107 
 
 how justly soever it may be roused by the 
 injurious conduct of others. 
 
 158. In the foregoing review of our active 
 powers, no mention has been made of our Pas- 
 sions. The truth is, that this word does not, 
 in strict propriety, belong exclusively to any 
 one class of these principles ; but is applicable 
 to all of them, when they are suffered to pass 
 the bounds of moderation. In such cases, a 
 sensible agitation or commotion of the body 
 is produced ; our reason is disturbed ; we lose, 
 in some measure, the power of self-command, 
 and are hurried to action by an almost irresist- 
 ible impulse. Ambition, the desire of Fame, 
 Avarice, Compassion, Love, Gratitude, Re- 
 sentment, Indignation ; may all, in certain 
 circumstances, be entitled to this appellation. 
 When we speak of ^j«*.s«o?2 in general, we com- 
 monly mean the passion of Resentment ; pro-
 
 108 OUTLINES OF 
 
 bably because this affection disturbs the rea- 
 son more, and leaves us less the power of self- 
 government, than any other active principle 
 of our nature.
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 109 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 OF SELF-LOVE. 
 
 159. The constitution of man, if it were 
 composed merely of the active principles hi- 
 therto mentioned, would be analogous to that 
 of the brutes. His reason, however, renders 
 his nature and condition, on the whole, essen- 
 tially different from theirs. 
 
 160. They are incapable of looking for- 
 ward to consequences, or of comparing toge- 
 ther the different gratifications of which they 
 are susceptible ; and accordingly, as far as 
 we are able to perceive, they yield to every 
 present impulse. But man is able to take a 
 comprehensive survey of his various prin- 
 ciples of action ; and to form a plan of con- 
 duct for the attainment of his favourite ob-
 
 110 OUTLINES OF 
 
 jects. Every such plan implies a power of 
 refusing occasionally to particular active prin- 
 ciples, the gratification which they demand. 
 
 161, According to the particular active 
 principle which influences habitually a man's 
 conduct, his character receives its denomina- 
 tion of Covetous, Ambitious, Studious, or 
 Voluptuous ; and his conduct is more or less 
 systematical, as he adheres to his general plan 
 with steadiness or inconstancy. 
 
 162. A systematical steadiness in the pur- 
 suit of a particular end, while it is necessary 
 for the complete gratification of our ruling pas- 
 sion, is far more favourable to the general im- 
 provement of the mind, than the dissipation of 
 attention resulting from an undecided choice, 
 among the various pursuits which human life 
 presents to us. Even the systematical volup- 
 tuary is able to command a much greater va- 
 riety of sensual indulgences, and to continue 
 them to a much more advanced age, than the
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. Ill 
 
 thoughtless profligate ; and, how low soever 
 the objects may be which occupy his thoughts, 
 they seldom fail, by engaging them habi- 
 tually in one direction, to give a certain de- 
 gree of cultivation to his intellectual facul- 
 ties. 
 
 163. The only exception, perhaps, which 
 can be mentioned to the last remark, is in the 
 case of those men Vv^hose leading principle of 
 action is Vanity ; and who, as their rule of 
 conduct is borrowed from without, must, in 
 consequence of this very circumstance, be per- 
 petually wavering and inconsistent in their 
 pursuits. — Accordingly, it will be found, that 
 such men, although they have frequently per- 
 formed splendid actions, have seldom risen to 
 eminence in any one particular career ; unless, 
 when, by a rare concurrence of accidental cir- 
 cumstances, this career has been steadily 
 pointed out to them through the whole of 
 their lives, by public opinion.
 
 112 OUTLINES OF 
 
 164. A systematical conduct in life, inva- 
 riably directed to certain objects, is more fa- 
 vourable to happiness, than one which is influ- 
 enced merely by occasional inclination and 
 appetite. Even the man who is decidedly 
 and uniformly unprincipled, is free of much 
 of the disquiet which disturbs the tranquillity 
 of those, whose characters are more mixed, 
 and more inconsistent. 
 
 165. There is another, and very import- 
 ant respect, in which the nature of man dif- 
 fers from that of the brutes. He is able to 
 avail himself of his past experience, in avoid- 
 ing those enjoyments, which he knows will 
 be succeeded by suffering ; and in submit- 
 ting to lesser evils, which he knows are to be 
 instrumental in procuring him a greater ac- 
 cession of good. He is able, in a word, to 
 form the general notion of Happiness, and to 
 deliberate about the most effectual means of 
 attaining it.
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 113 
 
 166. It is implied in the very idea of Hap- 
 piness, that it is a desirable object ; and there- 
 fore, Self-love is an active principle very dif- 
 ferent from those which have been hitherto 
 considered. These, for aught we know, may 
 be the effect of arbitrary appointment ; and 
 they have, accordingly, been called implanted 
 principles. The desire of happiness may be 
 called a ratio7ial principle of action ; being 
 peculiar to a rational nature, and inseparably 
 connected with it. 
 
 167. In prefixing to this section the title 
 of Self-love, the ordinary language of modern 
 philosophy has been followed. The expres- 
 sion, however, is exceptionable ; as it sug- 
 gests an analogy (where there is none in fact) 
 between that regard, which every rational be- 
 ing must necessarily have to his own happi- 
 ness, and those benevolent affections which 
 attach us to our fellow-creatures. — The simi- 
 larity, too, between the words. Self-love and 
 Selfishness, has introduced much confusion 
 into ethical disquisitions. 
 
 II
 
 114 OUTLINES OF 
 
 168. The word Selfishness, is always used 
 in an unfavourable sense ; and hence, some 
 authors have been led to suppose, that vice 
 consists in an excessive regard to our own 
 happiness. It is remarkable, however, that, 
 although we apply the epithet selfish to ava- 
 rice, and to low and private sensuality, we 
 never apply it to the desire of knowledge, or 
 to the pursuits of virtue, which are certainly 
 sources of more exquisite pleasure than Riches 
 or Sensuality can bestow. 
 
 169. The truth will probably be found, 
 upon examination, to be this ; that the word 
 Selfishness, when applied to a pursuit, has 
 no reference to the motive from which the 
 pursuit proceeds, but to the effect it has on 
 the conduct. Neither our animal appetites, 
 nor avarice, nor curiosity, nor the desire of 
 moral improvement, arise from Self-love : but 
 some of these active principles disconnect us 
 with society more than others ; and conse- 
 quently, though they do not indicate a great- 
 er regard for our own happiness, they betray
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 115 
 
 a greater unconcern for the happiness of our 
 neighbours. The pursuits of the miser have 
 no mixture whatever of the social affections : 
 On the contrary, they continually lead him 
 to state his own interest in opposition to that 
 of other men. The enjoyments of the sen- 
 sualist all expire within his own person : and, 
 therefore, whoever is habitually occupied in 
 the search of them, must of necessity neglect 
 the duties which he owes to mankind. It 
 is otherwise with the desire of knowledge, 
 which is always accompanied with a strong- 
 desire of social communication ; and with the 
 love of moral excellence, which, in its practi- 
 cal tendency, coincides so remarkably with 
 Benevolence, that many authors have at- 
 tempted to resolve the one principle into the 
 other. 
 
 170. That the word Selfishness is by no 
 means synonymous with a regard to our own 
 happiness, appears farther from this, that the 
 blame we bestow on those pursuits which are 
 commonly called selfish, is founded, partlyy
 
 116 OUTLINES OF 
 
 on the sacrifice they imply of our true inte- 
 rest, to the inferior principles of our nature. 
 When we see, for example, a man enslaved 
 by his animal appetites ; so far from consider- 
 ing him as under the influence of an exces- 
 sive self-love, we pity and despise him for 
 neglecting the higher enjoyments which are 
 placed within his reach.
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 117 
 
 SECTION VI. 
 
 OF THE MORAL FACULTY. 
 
 ARTICLE FIRST. 
 
 OKNERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE MORAL FACULTY ; TEND- 
 ING CHIEFLY TO SHEW, THAT IT IS AN ORIGINAL PRIN- 
 CIPLE OF OUR NATURE, AND NOT RESOLVABLE INTO ANY 
 OTHER PRINCIPLE OR PRINCIPLES MORE SIMPLE. 
 
 171. The facts alluded to in the last pa- 
 ragraph of the foregoing section, have led 
 some philosophers to conclude, that Virtue 
 is merely a matter of prudence, and that a 
 sense of duty is but another name for a ra- 
 tional self-love. This view of the subject 
 was far from being unnatural : for we find, 
 that these tv, o principles, in general, lead 
 to the same course of action ; and we have 
 every reason to believe, that if our know-
 
 118 OUTLINES OF 
 
 ledge of the universe were more extensive, 
 they would be found to do so, in all instances 
 whatever. 
 
 172. That we have, however, a sense of 
 duty, which is not resolvable into a regard to 
 our happiness, appears from various consider- 
 ations. 
 
 (1.) There are, in all languages, words 
 equivalent to Duty and to Interest, which 
 men have constantly distinguished in their 
 signification. They coincide, in general, in 
 their applications ; but they convey very dif- 
 ferent ideas. 
 
 (2.) The emotions arising from the con- 
 templation of what is right or wi'ong in con- 
 duct, are different, both in degree and in 
 kind, from those which are produced by a 
 calm regard to our own happiness. This is 
 particularly remarkable in the emotions ex- 
 cited by the moral conduct of others ; for 
 such is the influence of self-deceit, that few
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 119 
 
 men judge with perfect fairness of their own 
 actions. The emotions excited by charac- 
 ters exhibited in histories and in novels, are 
 sometimes still more powerful than what we 
 experience from similar qualities displayed 
 in the circle of our acquaintance ; because 
 the judgment is less apt to be warped by 
 partiality or by prejudice. The representa- 
 tions of the stage, however, afford the most 
 favourable of all opportunities for observing 
 their effects. As every species of Enthu- 
 siasm operates most forcibly when men are 
 collected in a crowd, our moral feelings are 
 exhibited on a larger scale in the theatre 
 than in the closet. And accordingly, the 
 slightest hint suggested by the poet, raises 
 to transport the passions of the audience ; 
 and forces involuntary tears from men of the 
 greatest reserve, and the most correct sense of 
 propriety. 
 
 (3.) Although philosophers have shewn, 
 that a sense of duty, and an enlightened re- 
 gard to our own happiness, conspire, in most
 
 120 OUTLINES OF 
 
 instances, to give the same direction to our 
 conduct, so as to put it beyond a doubt, that, 
 even in this world, a virtuous life is true wis- 
 dom, yet this is a truth by no means obvious 
 to the common sense of mankind, but deduced 
 from an extensive view of human affairs, and 
 an accurate investigation of the remote conse- 
 quences of our different actions. It is from 
 experience and reflection, therefore, that we 
 learn the tendency of virtue to advance our 
 worldly prosperity ; and, consequently, the 
 great lessons of morality, which are obvious 
 to the capacity of all mankind, cannot have 
 been suggested to them merely by a regard to 
 their own interest. 
 
 (4.) The same conclusion is strongly con- 
 firmed by the early period of life at which 
 our moral judgments make their appearance ; 
 — long before children are able to form the 
 general notion of happiness, and indeed in the 
 very infancy of their reason.
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 121 
 
 173. In order to elude the force of some 
 of the foregoing arguments, it has been sup- 
 posed, that the rules of morality were, in the 
 first instance, brought to light by the saga- 
 city of philosophers and politicians ; and that 
 it is only in consequence of the influence of 
 education, that they appear to form an origi- 
 nal part of the human constitution. — The di- 
 versity of opinions among different nations, 
 with respect to the morality of particular ac- 
 tions, has been considered as a strong confir- 
 mation of this doctrine. 
 
 174. But the power of education, although 
 great, is confined within certain limits ; for 
 it is by co-operating with the natural prin- 
 ciples of the mind, that it produces it effects. 
 Nay, this very susceptibility of education, 
 which is acknowledged to belong universally 
 to the race, presupposes the existence of cer- 
 tain principles which are common to all man- 
 kind.
 
 122 OUTLINES OF 
 
 175. The influence of education, in diver- 
 sifying the appearances which human nature 
 exhibits, depends on that law of our constitu- 
 tion, which was formerly called the Associa- 
 tion of Ideas : And this law supposes, in every 
 instance, that there are opinions and feelings 
 essential to the human frame, by a combina- 
 tion with which, external circumstances lay 
 hold of the mind, and adapt it to its accident- 
 al situation. 
 
 176. Education may vary, in particular 
 cases, the opinions of individuals with respect 
 to the beautiful and the sublime. But educa- 
 tion could not create our notions of Beauty or 
 Deformity, of Grandeur or Meanness. In 
 like manner, education may vary our senti- 
 ments with respect to particular actions ; but 
 could not create our notions of llight and 
 Wrong, of Merit and Demerit. 
 
 177. The historical facts which have been 
 alleged to prove, that the moral judgments 
 of mankind are entirely factitious, will be
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 123 
 
 found, upon examination, to be either the 
 effects of misrepresentation ; or to lead to a 
 concUision directly the reverse of what has 
 been drawn from them :— proper allowance 
 being made, 1*/ For the different circumstan- 
 ces of mankind in different periods of society ; 
 — 2f//y, For the diversity of their speculative 
 opinions ; — and, Sclly, For the different moral 
 import of the same action, under different 
 systems of external behaviour. 
 
 178. All these doctrines, how erroneous so- 
 ever, have been maintained by writers not 
 unfriendly to the interests of morality. But 
 some licentious moralists have gone much far- 
 ther, and have attempted to shew, that the 
 motives of all men are fundamentally the 
 same ; and that what we commonly call Vir- 
 tue is mere Hypocrisy. 
 
 179. The disagreeable impression, which 
 such representations of human nature leave 
 on the mind, affords a sufficient refutation of 
 their truth. If there be really no essential
 
 124 OUTLINES OF 
 
 distinction between virtue and vice, whence 
 is it, that we conceive one class of qualities to 
 be more excellent and meritorious than ano- 
 ther ? Why do we consider Pride, or Vanity, 
 or Selfishness, to be less worthy motives for 
 our conduct, than disinterested Patriotism, or 
 Friendship, or a determined adherence to 
 what we believe to be our duty ? Why does 
 our species appear to us less amiable in one 
 set of philosophical systems than in ano- 
 ther ? 
 
 180. It has been a common error among 
 licentious moralists, to confound the question 
 concerning the actual attainments of man- 
 kind, with the question concerning the rea- 
 lity of moral distinctions ; and to substitute a 
 satire on vice and folly, instead of a philoso- 
 phical account of the principles of our con- 
 stitution. Admitting the picture which has 
 been sometimes drawn of the real depravity 
 of the world to be a just one ; the gloom and 
 dissatisfaction which it leaves on the mind, 
 are sufficient to demonstrate, that we are form-
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 125 
 
 ed with the love and admiration of moral 
 excellence, and that this is enjoined to us, 
 as the law of our nature. " Hypocrisy it- 
 " self," (as Rochefoucault has remarked), " is 
 " an homage which vice renders to virtue."
 
 1^6 OUTLINES OF 
 
 SECTION VI. 
 
 OF THE MORAL FACULTY. 
 
 ARTICLE SECOND. 
 
 ANALYSIS OF OUR MORAL PERCEPTIONS AND EMOTIONS. 
 
 181. After establishing the universality 
 of moral perception, as an essential part of 
 the human constitution, the next question 
 that occurs, is, how our notions of Right and 
 Wrong are formed ? Are we to refer them to 
 a particular principle in our nature, appro- 
 priated to the perception of these qualities, 
 as our external senses are appropriated to the 
 perception of the qualities of matter ? — or 
 are they perceived by the same intellectual 
 power which discovers truth in the abstract 
 sciences ? — or are they resolvable into otlier
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 127 
 
 notions still more simple and general than 
 themselves ? All these opinions have been 
 maintained by authors of eminence. In order 
 to form a judgment on the point in dispute, 
 it is necessary to analyze the state of our minds, 
 when we are spectators of any good or bad ac- 
 tion performed by another person ; or when 
 we reflect on the actions performed by our- 
 selves. On such occasions, we are conscious of 
 three different things. 
 
 (1.) The perception of an action as Kight 
 or Wrong. 
 
 (2.) An emotion of pleasure or of pain ; 
 varying in its degree, according to the acute- 
 ness of our moral sensibility. 
 
 (3.) A perception of the merit or demerit of 
 the agent.
 
 128 OUTLINES OF 
 
 I. OF THE PERCEPTION OF RIGHT AND WRONG. 
 
 182. The controversy concerning the origin 
 of our moral ideas, took its rise in modern times 
 in consequence of the writings of Mr Hobbes. 
 According to him, we approve of virtuous ac- 
 tions, or of actions beneficial to society, from 
 self-love; as we know, that whatever promotes 
 theinterest of society, has, on that very account, 
 an indirect tendency to promote our own. — He 
 farther taught, that, as it is to the institution of 
 government we are indebted for all the com- 
 forts and the confidence of social life, the laws 
 which the civil magistrate enjoins are the ul- 
 timate standards of morality. 
 
 183. Dr Cudworth, who, in opposition to 
 the system of JMr Hobbes, first shewed in a 
 satisfactory manner, that our ideas of Right 
 and AVrong are not derived from positive 
 law ; referred the origin of these ideas to
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 129 
 
 the power which distinguishes truth from 
 falsehood : and it became, for some time, the 
 fashionable language among moralists to say, 
 that virtue consisted, not in obedience to the 
 law of a superior, but in a conduct conformable 
 to Reason. 
 
 184. At the time that Cudworth wrote, no 
 accurate classification had been attempted, 
 of the principles of the human mind. His 
 account of the office of reason, accordingly, 
 in enabling us to perceive the distinction be- 
 tween right and wrong, passed without cen- 
 sure, and was understood merely to imply, 
 that there is an eternal and immutable dis- 
 tinction between right and wrong, no less 
 than between truth and falsehood ; and that 
 both these distinctions are perceived by our 
 rational powers, or by those powers which 
 raise us above the brutes. , 
 
 185. The publication of I^ocke's Essay 
 introduced into this part of science, a preci-
 
 130 OUTLINES OF 
 
 sion of expression unknown before ; and 
 taught philosophers to distinguish a variety 
 of powers which liad formerly been very 
 generally confounded. With these great 
 merits, however, his work has capital defects ; 
 and, perhaps, in no part of it are these de- 
 fects more important, than in the attempt he 
 has made to deduce the origin of our know- 
 ledge entirely from sensation and reflection. 
 These, according to him, are the sources of 
 all our simple ideas ; and the only power 
 that the mind possesses, is to perform certain 
 operations of Analysis, Combination, Compa- 
 rison, &c. on the materials with which it is 
 thus supplied. 
 
 186. This system led Mr Locke to some 
 dangerous opinions, concerning the nature 
 of moral distinctions ; which he seems to 
 have considered as the offspring of Educa- 
 tion and Fashion. Indeed, if the words 
 Right and Wrong neither express simple 
 ideas, nor relations discoverable by reason, it
 
 MORAI, PHILOSOrHY. 131 
 
 will not be found easy to avoid adopting this 
 conclusion. 
 
 187. In order to reconcile Locke's account 
 of the origin of our ideas, with the immutabi- 
 lity of moral distinctions, different theories 
 were proposed concerning the nature of vir- 
 tue. According to one, for example, it was 
 said to consist in a conduct conformable to 
 the Fitness of things : According to another, 
 in a conduct conformable to Truth. — The 
 great object of all these theories may be con- 
 sidered as the same ; — to remove Right and 
 Wrong from the class of simple ideas, and to 
 resolve moral rectitude, into a conformity 
 with some relation perceived by reason or the 
 understanding. 
 
 188. Dr Hutcheson saw clearly the va- 
 nity of these attempts ; and hence he was 
 led, in compliance with the language of 
 Locke's philosophy, to refer the origin of 
 our moral ideas to a particular power of 
 ])erception, to which he gave the name of
 
 132 OUTLINES OF 
 
 the Moral Sense. " All the ideas, (says he), 
 " or the materials of our reasoning or judging, 
 " are received by some immediate powers of 
 " perception, internal or external, which we 
 " may call senses. Reasoning or intellect 
 " seems to raise no new species of ideas, but 
 " to discover or discern the relations of those 
 *' received." 
 
 189- According to this system, as it has 
 been commonly explained, our perceptions 
 of right and wrong are impressions, which 
 our minds are made to receive from particular 
 actions ; similar to the relishes and aversions 
 given us for particular objects of the external 
 or internal senses. 
 
 190. From the hypothesis of a moral sense, 
 various sceptical conclusions have been de- 
 duced by later writers. The words Right 
 and Wrong, it has been alleged, signify 
 nothing in the objects themselves to which 
 they are applied, any more than the words 
 sweet and bitter, pleasant and painful ; but
 
 MO UAL PHiLOSOPHV. 133 
 
 only certain effects in the mind of the spec- 
 tator. As it is improper, therefore, (accord- 
 ing to the doctrines of modern philosophy), 
 to say of an object of taste that it is sweet ; 
 or of heat, that it is in the fire ; so it is equal- 
 ly improper, to say of actions, that they are 
 right or wrong. It is absurd to speak of mo- 
 rality as a thing independent and unchange- 
 able : inasmuch as it arises from an arbitrary 
 relation between our constitution and particu- 
 lar objects. 
 
 191. In order to avoid these supposed con- 
 sequences of Dr Hutcheson's philosophy, an 
 attempt has been made by some later writers, 
 in particular by Dr Price, to revive the doc- 
 trines of Dr Cudworth, and to prove, that 
 moral distinctions, being perceived by reason 
 or the understanding, are equally immutable 
 Avith all other kinds of truth. 
 
 192. This is the most important question 
 that can be stated, with respect to the theory 
 of morals. The obscurity in which it is in-
 
 134 OUTLINES OF 
 
 volved arises chiefly from the use of indefinite 
 and ambiguous terms. 
 
 193. That moral distinctions are perceived 
 by a sense, is implied in the definition of a 
 sense which Dr Hutcheson has given, (§ 188.): 
 provided it be granted, (as Dr Price has done 
 explicitly), that the words Right and Wrong 
 express simple ideas, or ideas incapable of 
 analysis. 
 
 194. It may be farther observed, in justi- 
 fication of Dr Hutcheson, that the sceptical 
 consequences deduced from his supposition 
 of a moral sense, do not necessarily result 
 from it. Unfortunately, most of his illustra- 
 tions were taken from the secondary quali- 
 ties of matter, which, since the time of Des 
 Cartes, philosophers have been, in general, 
 accustomed to refer to the mind, and not to 
 the external object. But if we suppose our 
 perceptior of Right and Wrong to be analo- 
 gous to the perception of Extension and Fi- 
 gure, and other primary qualities ; the reality
 
 iMOKAL I'HILOSOrHY. 135 
 
 and immutability of moral distinction seems to 
 be placed on a foundation, sufficiently satis- 
 factory to a candid inquirer, (§ 31. and 32.) 
 
 195. The definition, however, of a sense, 
 which Hutcheson has given, is, by far, too ge- 
 neral, and was plainly suggested to him by 
 Locke's account of the origin of our ideas, 
 (§ 185.) The words Cause and Effect, Du- 
 ration, Number, Equality, Identity, and ma- 
 ny others, express simple ideas, as well as 
 the words Right and Wrong ; and yet it 
 would surely be absurd to ascribe each of 
 them to a particular power of perception. — 
 Notwithstanding this circumstance, as the 
 expression Moi'al Sense has now the sanction 
 of use, and as, when properly explained, it 
 cannot lead to any bad consequences, it may 
 be still retained, without inconvenience, in 
 ethical disquisitions. 
 
 196. To what part of our constitution, 
 then, shall we ascribe the origin of the ideas of 
 Right and Wrong ? Price says, — to the Un-
 
 136 OUTLINES OF 
 
 derstanding ; and endeavours to shew, in op- 
 position to Locke and his followers, that "the 
 " power which understands, or the faculty 
 " that discerns truth, is a source of new 
 " ideas." 
 
 197. This controversy turns chiefly on the 
 meaning of words. The origin of our ideas 
 of right and wrong, is manifestly the same 
 with that of the other simple ideas already 
 mentioned ; and whether it be referred to the 
 understanding or not, seems to be a matter of 
 mere arrangement ; provided it be granted, 
 that the words Right and Wrong express 
 qualities of actions, and not merely a power 
 of exciting certain agreeable or disagreeable 
 emotions in our minds. 
 
 198. It may perhaps obviate some objec- 
 tions against the language of Cudworth and 
 Price, to remark, that the word Reason is 
 used in senses which are extremely different. 
 Sometimes to express the whole of those 
 powers which elevate man above the brutes.
 
 MORAL PHILOSOrHV. 137 
 
 and constitute his rational nature ; — more 
 especially, perhaps, his intellectual powers. 
 Sometimes to express the power of deduc- 
 tion or argumentation. The former is the 
 sense in which the word is used in common 
 discourse ; and it is in this sense that it 
 seems to be employed by those writers wiio 
 refer to it the origin of our moral ideas. 
 Their antagonists, on the other hand, under- 
 stand, in general, by Reason, the power of de- 
 duction or argumentation ; an use of the 
 word which is not unnatural, from the simi- 
 larity between the words Reason and Rea- 
 soning, but w^hich is not agreeable to its or- 
 dinary meaning. " No hypothesis (says JDr 
 " Campbell) hitherto invented, hath shewn 
 " that, by means of the discursive faculty, 
 " without the aid of any other mental power, 
 ** we could ever obtain a notion of either the 
 " beautiful or the good*." The remark 
 is undoubtedly true ; and may be applied to 
 
 ' Philosophy of Rhetoric, vol. i. page 201.
 
 138 OUTLINES OF 
 
 all tiiose systems which ascribe to Reason 
 the origin of our moral ideas, if the expres- 
 sions, Reason and Discursive Faculty, be used 
 as synonymous. But if the word Reason be 
 used in a more general sense, to denote mere- 
 ly our rational and intellectual nature ; there 
 does not seem to be much impropriety in a- 
 scribing to it the origin of those simple no- 
 tions, which are not excited in the mind by 
 the immediate operation of the senses ; but 
 which arise in consequence of the exercise of 
 the intellectual powers upon their various ob- 
 jects. 
 
 199- A variety of intuitive judgments 
 might be mentioned, involving simple ideas, 
 which it is impossible to trace to any origin, 
 but to the power which enables us to form 
 these judgments. Thus, it is surely an intui- 
 tive truth, that the sensations of which I am 
 conscious, and all those I remember, belong to 
 one and the same being, which I call myself. 
 Here is an intuitive judgment involving the 
 simple idea of Identity.-— In like manner, the
 
 MORAL rniLOSOPHY. 139 
 
 changes which I perceive in the universe im- 
 press me with a conviction that some cause 
 must have operated to produce them. Here is 
 an intuitive judgment, involving the simple 
 idea of Causation. — When we consider the ad- 
 jacent angles made by a straight line standing 
 upon another, and perceive that their sum is 
 equal to two right angles, the judgment we 
 form involves the simple idea of Equality. — 
 To say, therefore, that Keason or the Under- 
 standing is a source of new ideas, is not 
 so exceptionable a mode of speaking as has 
 
 been sometimes supposed. According to 
 
 Locke, Sense furnishes our ideas, and Reason 
 perceives their agreements or disagreements. 
 But the truth is, that these agreements and 
 disagreements are, in many instances, simple 
 ideas, of which no analysis can be given ; and 
 of which the origin must therefore be refer- 
 red to Reason, according to Locke's own doc- 
 trine. 
 
 200. The opinion 'we form, however, on 
 this point, is of little moment, provided it be
 
 140 OUTLINES OF 
 
 granted, that tlie words Right and Wrong- 
 express qualities of actions. When I say of 
 an act of justice that it is right ; do I mean 
 merely that the act excites pleasure in my 
 mind, as a particular colour pleases my eye, 
 in consequence of a relation which it bears to 
 my organ ; or do I mean to assert a truth 
 which is as independent of my constitution, 
 as the equality of the three angles of a tri- 
 angle to two right angles ? Scepticism may 
 be indulged in both cases, about mathemati- 
 cal and about moral truth : but in neither 
 case, does it admit of a refutation by argu- 
 ment. 
 
 201. The immutability of moral distinc- 
 tions has been called in question, not only 
 by sceptical writers ; but by some philoso- 
 phers who have adopted their doctrine, with 
 the pious design of magnifying the perfec- 
 tions of the Deity. Such authors certainly do 
 not recollect, that what they add to his power 
 and majesty, they take away from his mo-
 
 MOllAL PHILOSOPHY. 141 
 
 ral attributes ; for if moral distinctions be 
 not immutable and eternal, it is absurd to 
 speak of the goodness or of the justice of 
 God. 
 
 II. OF THE AGREEABLK AND DISAGREEABLE EMOTIONS 
 ARISIXG FROM THE PERCEI'TION OF WHAT IS RIGHT 
 AND Wr.ONG IN' CONDUCT. 
 
 202. It impossible to behold a good ac- 
 tion, without being conscious of a benevolent 
 affection, either of love or of respect, to- 
 wards the agent ; and consequently, as all our 
 benevolent affections include an affreeable 
 feeling, every good action must be a source 
 of pleasure to the spectator. Beside this, 
 other agreeable feelings, of order, of utility, 
 of peace of mind, &c. come, in process of 
 time, to be associated with the general idea of 
 virtuous conduct. 
 
 203. Tliose qualities in good actions, which 
 excite agreeable feelings in the mind of the
 
 14)2 OUTLINES OF 
 
 spectator, form Avliat some moralists have call- 
 ed the Beauty of virtue. 
 
 204. All this may be applied, mntatifi mu- 
 tandis, to explain what is meant by the De- 
 formity of Vice. 
 
 205. Our perception of moral beauty and 
 deformity is plainly distinguishable from our 
 perception of actions as right or wrong : But 
 the distinction has been too little attended 
 to by philosophers. — Among the moderns, 
 in particular, some have confined their atten- 
 tion almost solely to our perception of actions 
 as right or wrong ; and have thereby render- 
 ed their works abstract and uninteresting. 
 Others, by dwelling exclusively on our per- 
 ception of Moral Beauty and Deformity, have 
 been led into enthusiasm and declamation, 
 and have furnished licentious moralists with 
 a pretext for questioning the immutability 
 of moral distinctions. 
 
 206. The emotions of pleasure and of pain
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 14-3 
 
 arising from the contemplation of moral beau- 
 ty and deformity, are so much more exquisite 
 than any that are produced by the percep- 
 tion of material forms, that some philosophers 
 have held, that the words Beauty and Subli- 
 mity express, in their literal signification, the 
 qualities of mind ; and that material objects 
 affect us only by means of the moral ideas 
 they suggest. This was a favourite doctrine 
 of the Socratic school, and has been support- 
 ed with great ingenuity by several modern 
 writers. 
 
 207. Whatever opinion we adopt on this 
 speculative question, there can be no dispute 
 about the fact, that good actions and virtuous 
 characters form the most delightful of all ob- 
 jects to the human mind ; and that there are 
 no charms in the external universe so power- 
 ful as those which recommend to us the cul- 
 tivation of the qualities, that constitute the 
 perfection and happiness of our nature.
 
 144 OUTLINES OF 
 
 208. It was a leading object of the ancient 
 moralists, to establish such an union between 
 philosophy and the fine arts, as might add to 
 the natural beauty of virtue every attraction 
 which the imagination could impart. The 
 effect which might be produced in this way 
 maybe easily conceived, from the examples we 
 daily see of the influence of association in con- 
 cealing the meanness and deformitv of fashion- 
 able vices. 
 
 III. OF THE PERCEPTION OF MEUIT AND DEMERIT. 
 
 209. The virtuous actions performed by 
 other men, not only excite in our minds a 
 benevolent affection towards them, or a dis- 
 position to promote their happiness ; but 
 impress us with a sense of the merit of 
 the agents. We perceive them to be the 
 proper objects of love and esteem, and that 
 it is morally right that they should receive 
 their reward. We feel ourselves called on, 
 to make their worth known to the world,
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 145 
 
 ill order to procure them the favour and re- 
 spect they deserve ; and if we allow it to 
 remain secret, we are conscious of injustice, 
 in suppressing the natural language of the 
 heart. 
 
 210. On the other hand, when we are wit- 
 nesses of an act of selfishness, of cruelty, or 
 of oppression ; whether we ourselves are the 
 sufferers or not ; we are not only inspired with 
 aversion and hatred tovv'ards the delinquent, 
 but find it difficult to restrain our indifvna- 
 tion from breaking loose against him. By 
 this natural impulse of the mind, a check is 
 imposed on the bad passions of individuals ; 
 and a provision is made, even before the esta- 
 blishment of positive laws, for the good order 
 of society. 
 
 211. In our own case; when we are con- 
 scious of doing well, we feel that we are en- 
 titled to the esteem and attachment of our 
 fellow-creatures ; and we know, with the evi- 
 dence of a perception, that we enjoy the ap-
 
 146 OUTLINES OF 
 
 probation of the invisible witness of our con- 
 duct. Hence it is, that we have not only a 
 sense of merit, but an anticipation of reward, 
 and look forwards to the future with increased 
 confidence and hope. 
 
 212. The feelings of remorse which accom- 
 pany the consciousness of guilt, involve, in like 
 manner, a sense of ill-desert, and an anticipa- 
 tion of future punishment. 
 
 213. Although, however, our sense of Me- 
 rit and Demerit, must convince the philoso- 
 pher of the connection which the Deity has 
 established between virtue and happiness, he 
 does not proceed on the supposition, that, on 
 particular occasions, miraculous interpositions 
 are to be made in his favour. That virtue is, 
 even in this world, the most direct road to hap- 
 piness, he sees to be a fact ; but he knows 
 that the Deity governs by general laws ; and 
 when he feels himself disappointed in the 
 attainment of his wishes, he acquiesces in 
 his lot, and consoles himself with the pro-
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 147 
 
 spect of futurity. It is an error of the vul- 
 gar to expect, that good or bad fortune are al- 
 ways to be connected, in particular instances, 
 with good or bad actions ; — a prejudice which 
 is a source of much disappointment in human 
 life, but of which the prevalence in all ages 
 and countries, affords a striking illustration of 
 the natural connection between the ideas of 
 virtue and of merit.
 
 148 OUTLINES OF 
 
 SECTION VI. 
 
 OF THE MORAL FACULTY. 
 
 ARTICLE THIRD. 
 
 OF MORAL OBLIGATION. 
 
 214. According to some systems, moral 
 obligation is founded entirely on our belief, 
 that virtue is enjoined by the command of 
 God. But how, it may be asked, does this 
 belief impose an obligation ? Only one of 
 two answers can be given. Either, that 
 there is a moral fitness that we should con- 
 form our will to that of the Author and 
 the Governor of the universe ; or that a ra- 
 tional self-love should induce us, out of pru- 
 dence, to study every means of rendering 
 ourselves acceptable to the almighty Arbiter
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 149 
 
 of happiness and misery. On the first sup- 
 position, we reason in a circle. We resolve 
 our sense of moral obligation into our sense of 
 religion ; and the sense of religion into that 
 of moral obligation. 
 
 215. The other system which makes vir- 
 tue a mere matter of prudence, although not 
 so obviously unsatisfactory, leads to conse- 
 quences which sufficiently shew that it is 
 erroneous. Among others, it leads us to con- 
 clude, 1. That the disbelief of a future state 
 absolves from all moral obligation, excepting 
 in so far as we find virtue to be conducive to 
 our present interest : — 2. That a being inde- 
 pendently and completely happy, cannot have 
 any moral perceptions, or any moral attri- 
 butes. 
 
 216. But farther ; the notions of reward 
 and punishment presuppose the notions of 
 right and wrong. They are sanctions of vir- 
 tue, or additional motives to the practice of
 
 150 OUTl.lNES OF 
 
 it ; but they suppose the existence of some 
 previous obligation. 
 
 217. In the last place ; if moral obligation 
 be constituted by a regard to our situation in 
 another life, how shall the existence of a fu- 
 ture state be proved by the light of nature ? 
 or hovv^ shall we discover what conduct is ac- 
 ceptable to the Deity ? The truth is, that the 
 strongest argument for such a state is deduced 
 from our natural notions of right and wrong, 
 of merit and demerit ; and from a comparison 
 between these and the general course of hu- 
 man affairs. 
 
 218. It is absurd, therefore, to ask, why 
 we are bound to practice virtue ? The very 
 notion of virtue implies the notion of obli- 
 gation. Every being, who is conscious of 
 the distinction between Right and Wrong, 
 carries about with him a law which he is 
 bound to observe ; notwithstanding he may be 
 in total ignorance of a future state. " What 
 " renders obnoxious to punishment, is not
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 151 
 
 " the foreknowledge of it, but merely the 
 " violating a known obligation*." 
 
 219. From what has been stated, it follows, 
 that the moral Faculty, considered as an ac- 
 tive power of the mind, differs essentially from 
 all the others hitherto enumerated. The 
 least violation of its authority fills us with 
 remorse. On the contrary, the greater the 
 sacrifices we make, in obedience to its sug- 
 gestions, the greater are our satisfaction and 
 triumph. 
 
 220. The supreme authority of conscience, 
 although beautifully described by many of 
 the ancient moralists, was not sufficiently at- 
 tended to by modern writers, as a fundamental 
 principle in the science of ethics, till the time 
 of Dr Butler. Too little stress is laid on it 
 by Lord Shaftesbury ; and the omission is the 
 chief defect of his philosophy. 
 
 Butler,
 
 152! OUTLINES OF 
 
 221. If this distinction between the moral 
 faculty and our other active powers, be ac- 
 knowledged, it is of the less consequence 
 what particular theory we adopt concerning 
 the origin of our moral ideas : and accord- 
 ingly Mr Smith, though he resolves moral 
 approbation ultimately into a feeling of the 
 mind, represents the supremacy of conscience 
 as a principle which is equally essential to all 
 the different systems that have been proposed 
 on the subject. " Upon whatever we suppose 
 ' our moral faculties to be founded, whe- 
 ' ther upon a certain modification of reason, 
 ' upon an original instinct, called a moral 
 ' sense, or upon some other principle of our 
 ' nature, it cannot be doubted that they were 
 ' given us for the direction of our conduct 
 ' in this life. They carry along with them 
 ' the most evident badges of this authority, 
 ' which denote that they were set up within 
 ' us to be the supreme arbiters of all our ac- 
 ' tions, to superintend all our senses, passions, 
 ' and appetites, and to judge how far each of
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 153 
 
 " them was either to be indulged or restrain- 
 " ed. — It is the peculiar office of these facul- 
 " ties to judge, to bestow censure or applause 
 " upon all the other principles of our nature."
 
 154 OUTLINES OF 
 
 SECTION VII. 
 
 OF CERTAIN PRINCIPLES WHICH C0-0PB:RATE WITH OUR 
 MORAL POWERS IN THEIR INFLUENCE ON THE CON- 
 DUCT. 
 
 222. In order to secure still more com- 
 pletely the good order of society, and to faci- 
 litate the acquisition of virtuous habits, nature 
 has superadded to our moral constitution a va- 
 riety of auxiliary principles, which sometimes 
 give rise to a conduct agreeable to the rules 
 of morality, and highly useful to mankind ; 
 where the merit of the individual considered 
 as a moral agent is extremly inconsiderable. 
 Hence, some of them have been confounded 
 with our moral powers, or even supposed to 
 be of themselves sufficient to account for the 
 phenomena of moral perception, by authors 
 whose views of human nature have not been 
 sufficiently comprehensive. — The most im-
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 155 
 
 portant principles of this description are, 1. A 
 regard to Character. 2. Sympathy. 3, The 
 sense of the Ridiculous. And, 4. Taste. — 
 The principle of Self-love (which was treated 
 of in a former section) co-operates powerfully 
 to the same purposes. 
 
 I. OF DECENCY, OR A REGARD TO CHARACTER. 
 
 223. It was before observed (126.), that 
 the desire of esteem operates in children be- 
 fore they have a capacity of distinguishing 
 right from wrong ; and that the former prin- 
 ciple of action continues for a long time to be 
 much more powerful than the latter. Hence, 
 it furnishes a most useful and effectual engine 
 in the business of education ; more particular- 
 ly, by training us early to exertions of self- 
 command and self-denial. It teaches us, for 
 example, to restrain our appetites within those 
 bounds which decency prescribes, and thus 
 forms us to habits of moderation and temper- 
 ance. And, although our conduct cannot be 
 denominated virtuous, so long as a regard to
 
 156 OUTLINES OF 
 
 the opinion of others is our only motive, yet 
 the habits we thus acquire in infancy and 
 childhood render it more easy for us, as we 
 advance to maturity, to subject our passions 
 to the authority of reason and conscience. 
 
 224. That our sense of duty is not resolv- 
 able into a desire of obtaining the good opi- 
 nion of our fellow-creatures, may be inferred 
 from the following considerations. 
 
 1. The desire of esteem can only be effec- 
 tually gratified by the actual possession of those 
 qualities for which we wish to be esteemed. 
 
 2. The merit of a virtuous action is always 
 enhanced in the opinion of mankind, when it 
 is discovered in those situations of life, where 
 the individual cannot be suspected of any view 
 to the applauses of the world. 
 
 3. When a competition takes place between 
 our sense of duty and a regard to public opi- 
 nion ; if we sacrifice the former to the latter,
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 157 
 
 we are filled with remorse and self-condem- 
 nation ; and the applauses of the multitude 
 afford us but an empty and unsatisfactory re- 
 compence; whereas a steady adherence to 
 the Hight never fails to be its own reward, 
 even when it exposes us to calumny and mis- 
 representation. 
 
 II. OF SYMPATHY. 
 
 225. That there is an exquisite pleasure an- 
 nexed to the sympathy or fellow-feeling of 
 other men, with our joys and sorrows, and even 
 with our opinions, tastes and humours, is a fact 
 obvious to vulgar observation. It is no less evi- 
 dent, that we feel a disposition to accommodate 
 the state of our own minds to that of our com- 
 panions, wherever we feel a benevolent affec- 
 tion towards them ; and that this accommoda- 
 ting temper is in proportion to the strength of 
 our affection. In such cases, sympathy would 
 appear to be grafted on benevolence ; and per- 
 haps it might be found, on an accurate ana- 
 lysis, that the greater part of the pleasures
 
 158 OUTLINES OF 
 
 which it yields, is resolvable into those which 
 arise from the exercise of kindness, and from 
 the consciousness of being beloved. 
 
 226. The same word sympathy is applied 
 in a loose and popular sense, to various phe- 
 nomena in the Animal Economy ; to the 
 correspondence, for example, in the motions of 
 the eyes ; and to the connection which exists 
 between different organs of the body, in re- 
 spect of health, or of disease. It is also ap- 
 plied to those contagious bodily affections 
 which one person is apt to catch from another ; 
 such as yawning ; stammering ; squinting ; 
 sore eyes ; and the disorders commonly dis- 
 tinguished by the name of Hysterical. 
 
 227. In all these different instances, there 
 is, no doubt, a certain degree of analogy ; 
 such as completely accounts for their being- 
 comprehended, in ordinary discourse, under 
 one general name ; but, where philosophical 
 precision is aimed at, there is ground for many- 
 distinctions. Hence the necessity of limiting,
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 159 
 
 by an accurate definition, the sense in which 
 this very vague and equivocal word is to be 
 understood, when it is introduced into any 
 scientific discussion. 
 
 228. The facts generally referred to sym- 
 pathy, have appeared to Mr Smith so import- 
 ant and so curiously connected, that he has 
 been led to attempt an explanation, from this 
 single principle, of all the phenomena of mo- 
 ral perception. 
 
 229. The large mixture of valuable truth 
 contained in this most ingenious Theory, and 
 the light which it throws on a part of our 
 frame, formerly very little attended to by 
 Philosophers, entitle the Author to the high- 
 est rank among Systematical Moralists ; but, 
 on a closer examination of the subject, it 
 will be found, that he has been misled, like 
 many other eminent writers, by an excessive 
 love of simplicity ; mistaking a subordinate 
 principle in our moral constitution (or rather 
 a principle superadded to our moral constitu-
 
 1 60 OUTLINES OF 
 
 tion, as an auxiliary to the sense of duty) for 
 that Faculty, which distinguishes Right from 
 Wrong ; and which (by what name soever 
 we may choose to distinguish it) recurs on us 
 constantly, in all our ethical disquisitions, as 
 an ultimate fact in the nature of man. 
 
 III. OF THE SENSK OF THE RIDICULOUS. 
 
 230. The natural and proper object of Ri- 
 dicule, is those smaller improprieties in cha- 
 racter and manners which do not rouse our 
 feelings of moral indignation, nor impress us 
 with a melancholy view of human depravity. 
 
 231. While this part of our constitution 
 enlarges the fund of our enjoyment, by ren- 
 dering the more trifling imperfections of our 
 fellow -creatures a source of amusement to 
 their neighbours, it excites the exertions of 
 every individual to correct those imperfec- 
 tions by which the ridicule of others is likely 
 to be provoked. As our eagerness, too, to
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. l6l 
 
 correct these imperfections may be presumed 
 to be weak in proportion as we apprehend 
 them to be, in a moral view, of trifling mo- 
 ment, we are so formed, that the painful feel- 
 ings produced by ridicule, are often more 
 poignant than those arising from the con- 
 sciousness of having rendered ourselves the 
 objects of resentment or of hatred. 
 
 232. The sense of the Ridiculous, although 
 it has a manifest reference to such a scene of 
 imperfection as we are placed in at present, is 
 one of the most strikino- characteristics of the 
 human constitution, as distinguished from that 
 of the lower animals ; and has an intimate 
 connection with its highest and noblest prin- 
 ciples. In the education of youth, nothing 
 requires more serious attention, than its proper 
 regulation.
 
 162 OUTLINES OF 
 
 IV. OF TASTE, CONSIDEllED IN ITS RELATION TO 
 MOKALS. 
 
 233. From the explanation formerly given 
 (202, 203, 204.) of the import of the phrases 
 Moral JBeauty, and Moral Deformity, it may 
 be easily conceived, in what manner the cha- 
 racter and the conduct of our fellow-creatures 
 may become subservient to the gratification 
 of Taste. The use which the Poet makes of 
 this class of our intellectual pleasures, is en- 
 tirely analogous to the resources which he 
 borrows from the charms of external nature. 
 
 234. The power of moral taste, like that 
 which has for its object the beauty of mate- 
 rial forms, and the various productions of the 
 fine arts, requires much exercise for its de- 
 velopment and culture. The one species of 
 taste also, as well as the other, is susceptible 
 of a false refinement, injurious to our own 
 happiness, and to our usefulness as members 
 of society.
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 163 
 
 235. Considered as a principle of action, 
 a cultivated moral taste, while it provides an 
 effectual security against the grossness neces- 
 sarily connected with many vices, cherishes a 
 temper of mind friendly to all that is amiable, 
 or generous, or elevated in our nature. When 
 separated, however, as it sometimes is, from a 
 strong sense of duty, it can scarcely fail to prove 
 a fallacious guide; the influence of fashion, and 
 of other casual associations, tending perpetually 
 to lead it astray. This is more particularly re- 
 markable in men to whom the gratifications of 
 Tasle in general form the principal object of 
 pursuit ; and whose habits of life encourage 
 them to look no higlier for their rule of judg- 
 ment, than the way of the world. 
 
 236. The language employed by some of 
 the Greek Philosophers in their speculations 
 concerning the nature of virtue, seems, on a 
 superficial view, to imply, that they supposed 
 the moral faculty to be wholly resolvable into 
 a sense of the Beautiful. And hence, Lord 
 Shaftesbury and others, have been led to adopt
 
 164 OUTLINES OF 
 
 a phraseology which has the appearance of 
 substituting Taste, in contradistinction to Rea- 
 son and Conscience, as the ultimate standard 
 of Right and Wrong. 
 
 237. From each of the four principles now 
 enumerated, unfortunate consequences result, 
 wherever it prevails in the character, as the 
 leading motive to action. Where they all main- 
 tain their due place, in subordination to the 
 moral faculty, they tend, at once, to fortify 
 virtuous habits ; and to recommend them, by 
 the influence of amiable example, to the imi- 
 tation of others. 
 
 238. A partial consideration of the phenome- 
 na of moral perception, connected with one or 
 other of these principles, has suggested some of 
 the most popular theories concerningtheorigin 
 of our moral ideas. An attention to the moral 
 faculty alone, without regard to the principles 
 which were intended to operate as its auxilia- 
 ries, and which contribute, in fact, so power-
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 165 
 
 fully to the good order of society, has led a few 
 Philosophers into an opposite extreme ; — less 
 dangerous, undoubtedly, in its practical ten- 
 dency, but less calculated, perhaps, to recom- 
 mend ethical disquisitions to the notice of 
 those who are engrossed with the active con- 
 cerns of life.
 
 166 OUTLINES OF 
 
 SECTION VIII. 
 OF man's free agency. 
 
 239. All the foregoing inquiries concerning 
 the moral constitution of man, proceed on the 
 supposition, that he has a freedom of choice 
 between good and evil ; and that when he de- 
 liberately performs an action wiiich he knows 
 to be wrong, he renders himself justly obnoxi- 
 ous to punishment. That this supposition is 
 agreeable to the common apprehensions of 
 mankind, will not be disputed. 
 
 240. From very early ages, indeed, the truth 
 of the supposition has been called in question 
 by a few speculative men, who have contended, 
 that the actions we perform are the necessary 
 result of the constitutions of our minds, operat- 
 ed on by the circumstances of our external si- 
 tuation ; and that what we commonlv call mo-
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY, l67 
 
 ral delinquencies are as much a part of our des- 
 tiny, as the corporeal or intellectual qualities 
 we have received from nature. — The argument 
 in support of this doctrine has been proposed 
 in various forms, and has been frequently urg- 
 ed with the confidence of demonstration. 
 
 241. Among those, however, who hold the 
 language of Necessitarians, an important dis- 
 tinction must be made ; as some of them not 
 only admit the reality of moral distinctions, 
 but insist, that it is on their hypothesis alone, 
 that these distinctions are conceivable. With 
 such men, the scheme of necessity may be a 
 harmless opinion ; and there is ground even 
 for suspecting, that it might be found to differ 
 from that of their antagonists, more in appear- 
 ance than in reality, if due pains were taken 
 to fix the meaning of the indefinite and am- 
 biguous terms, which have been employed on 
 both sides of the argument. 
 
 242. By otlier philosophers, the consequences 
 which are generally supposed to be connected 
 with this system, have been admitted in all
 
 168 OUTJ.INES OF 
 
 their extent ; or rather, the system has been in- 
 culcated, with a view to establish these conse- 
 quences. When proposed in this form, it fur- 
 nishes the most interesting subject of discus- 
 sion which can employ human ingenuity ; and 
 upon which our speculative opinions can hard- 
 ly fail to affect very materially both our con- 
 duct and our happiness. 
 
 243. Dr Cudworth, who wrote towards the 
 end of the seventeenth century, observes, that 
 " the scepticism which flourished in his time, 
 " grew up from the doctrine of the fatal ne- 
 " cessity of all actions and events, as from its 
 " proper root." The same remark will be 
 found to apply to the sceptical philosophy of 
 the present age. 
 
 244. It is sufficient, in these Outlines, to 
 mark the place which the question seems na- 
 turally to occupy in the order of study. De- 
 tached hints would throw but little additional 
 light on a controversy, which has been industri- 
 ously darkened by all the powers of sophistry.
 
 OUTLINES 
 
 OF 
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 PART II. 
 
 OF THE ACTIVE AND OF THE MORAL 
 POWERS OF MAN. 
 
 CHAP. 11. 
 
 OF THE VARIOUS BRANCHES OF OUR DUTY. 
 
 245. The different theories which luive 
 been proposed concerning the nature and es- 
 sence of Virtue, have arisen chiefly from at- 
 tempts to trace all the branches of our duty 
 to one principle of action ; such as a rational
 
 170 OUTLINES OF 
 
 Self-love, Benevolence, Justice, or a disposi- 
 tion to obey the will of God. 
 
 246. In order to avoid those partial views 
 of the subject, which naturally take their 
 rise from an undue love of system, the fol- 
 lowing inquiries proceed upon an arrange- 
 ment, which has, in all ages, recommended 
 itself to the good sense of mankind. This 
 arrangement is founded on the different ob- 
 jects to which our duties relate. 1. The 
 Deity. 2. Our Fellow-creatures. And, 3. 
 Ourselves.
 
 MOKAI, rilll.OSOPHY. 171 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 OF THE DUTIES WHICH RESPECT THE DEITY. 
 
 247. As our duties to God, (so far as they 
 are discoverable by the light of nature), must 
 be inferred from the relation in which we 
 stand to him as the Author and the Governor 
 of the Universe, an examination of the prin- 
 ciples of Natural Religion forms a necessary 
 introduction into this section. Such an exami- 
 nation, besides, being the reasonable conse- 
 quence of those impressions which his works 
 produce on every attentive and well-disposed 
 mind, may be itself regarded, both as one of 
 the duties we owe to Him, and as the expres- 
 sion of a moral temper sincerely devoted to 
 truth, and alive to the subliinest emotions of 
 gratitude and of benevolence.
 
 17^ OUTLINES OF 
 
 PRBI.IMINAHV INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES OF 
 NATURAL RELIGION. 
 
 ARTICLE FIRST. 
 OF THK EXISTENCE OF THE DEITY. 
 
 248. On this subject two modes of reason- 
 ing have been employed, which are common- 
 ly distinguished by the titles of the Argu- 
 ments a priori and a posteriori ; the former, 
 founded on certain metaphysical propositions 
 which are assumed as axioms ; the latter ap- 
 pealing to that systematical order, and those 
 combinations of means to ends which are 
 every where conspicuous in Nature. 
 
 249. The argument a priori has been enfor- 
 ced wdth singular ingenuity by Dr Clarke, 
 whose particular manner of stating it seems 
 to have been suggested to him by the fol- 
 lowing passage in Newton's Principia : " M- 
 " tenuis est et infinitus, omnipotens et om- 
 " nisciens ; id est, durat ab geterno in ater-
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 173 
 
 " num, et adest ab infinite in infinitum. — 
 " Non est aeternitas et infinitas, sed geternus 
 " et infinitus ; non est duratio et spatium, 
 " sed durat et adest. Durat semper, et 
 " adest ubiqiie ; et existendo semper et ubi- 
 " que, durationem et spatium constituit *." 
 Proceeding on the same principles, Dr Clarke 
 argues, that " space and time are only ab- 
 " stract conceptions of an immensity and e- 
 " ternity, which force themselves into our be- 
 " lief; and, as immensity and eternity are not 
 " substances, they must be the attributes of a 
 " Being who is necessarily immense and eter- 
 
 « nal." " These (says Dr Reid) are the 
 
 " speculations of men of superior genius ; but 
 " whether they be as solid as they are sub- 
 " lime ; or whether they be the wanderings 
 " of imagination in a region beyond the li- 
 " mits of human understanding, I am unable 
 " to determine." 
 
 250. Without calling in question the soli- 
 
 * Newton, Princ. Scholiiun jrenerale.
 
 174 OUTLINES OF 
 
 clity of Clarke's demonstration, we may be 
 allowed to say, that the argument a posteriori 
 is more level to the comprehension of ordina- 
 ry men, and more satisfactory to the philo- 
 sopher himself. Indeed, in inquiries of this 
 sort, the presumption is strongly in favour of 
 that mode of reasoning which is the most 
 simple and obvious, — " Quicquid nos vel me- 
 " liores vel beatiores facturum est, aut in a- 
 " perto, aut in proximo, posuit natura." 
 
 251. The existence of a Deity, however, 
 does not seem to be an intuitive truth. It re- 
 quires the exercise of our reasoning powers 
 to present it, in its full force, to the mind. 
 But the process of reasoning consists only 
 of a single step ; and the premises belong to 
 that class of first principles, which form an 
 essential part of the human constitution, 
 (§ 71. (3.). These premises are two in num- 
 ber. The one is, That every thing which 
 begins to exist must have a cause. The other. 
 That a combination of means conspiring to a 
 particular end, implies intelligence.
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 175 
 
 I. OF THE FOLMDATION3 OF OUR REASONING FROM THE 
 EFFECT TO THE CAUSE, AND OF THE EVIDENCES OF 
 ACTIVE POWER P:XHIB1TED IN THE UNIVERSE. 
 
 252. It was before observed, (Introd. § 3.) 
 that our knowledge of the course of nature is 
 entirely the result of observation and experi- 
 ment ; and that there is no instance in which 
 we perceive such a connection between two 
 successive events, as might enable us to infer 
 the one from the other as a necessary conse- 
 quence. 
 
 253. From this principle, which is now 
 very generally admitted by philosophers, Mr 
 Hume has deduced an objection to the ar- 
 gument a posteriori for the existence of the 
 Deity. After having proved that we cannot 
 get tlie idea of necessary connection, from 
 examining the conjunction between any two 
 events ; he takes for granted, that we have 
 no other idea of Cause and Effect, than of
 
 176 OUTLINES OF 
 
 two successive events which are invariably 
 conjoined ; that we have therefore no reason 
 to think, that any one event in nature is ne- 
 cessarily connected with another, or to infer 
 the operation of power from the changes 
 which we observe in the universe. 
 
 254. To perceive the connexion between 
 Mr Hume's premises and his conclusion, it is 
 necessary to recollect, that, according to his 
 system, " all our ideas are nothing but copies 
 " of our impressions ; or, in other words, 
 " that it is impossible for us to tliinh of any 
 " thing, w^hich we have not antecedently 
 ^^ felt, either by our external or internal 
 " senses." Having proved, therefore, that 
 external objects, as they appear to our senses, 
 give us no idea of power or of necessary con- 
 nection, and also that this idea cannot be co- 
 pied from any internal impression, (that is, 
 cannot be derived from reflection on the ope- 
 rations of our own minds), he thinks him- 
 self warranted to conclude, that we have no
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 177 
 
 such idea. " One event (says lie) follows 
 " another, but we never observe any tie be- 
 " tween them. They seem conjoined, but 
 " never connected. And as we can have no 
 " idea of any thing, which never appeared 
 " to our outward sense or inward sentiment, 
 " the necessary conclusion seems to be. That 
 " we have no idea of connection or power at 
 " all ; and that these words are absolutely 
 " without any meaning, when employed ei- 
 " ther in philosophical reasonings or common 
 « life." 
 
 255. Are we, therefore, to reject as per- 
 fectly unintelligible, a word which is to be 
 found in all languages ; merely because it ex- 
 presses an idea, for the origin of which we 
 cannot account upon a particular philosophi- 
 cal system ? Would it not be more reasonable 
 to suspect, that the system was not perfectly 
 complete, than that all mankind should have 
 agreed in employing a word which conveyed 
 no meaning ? 
 
 M
 
 178 OUTLINES OF 
 
 256. With respect to Mr Hume's tlieory 
 concerning the origin of our ideas, it is the 
 less necessary to enter into particular discus- 
 sions, that it coincides, in the main, with the 
 doctrine of Locke, to which some objections, 
 which appear to be insurmountable, were for- 
 merly stated, (§ 199.) Upon neither theory 
 is it possible to explain the origin of those 
 simple notions, which are not received im- 
 mediately by any external sense, nor derived 
 immediately from our own consciousness ; 
 but which are necessarily formed by the mind, 
 while we are exercising our intellectual powers 
 upon their proper objects. 
 
 257. These very slight hints are sufficient 
 to shew, that we are not entitled to dispute 
 the reality of our idea of power, because we 
 cannot trace it to any of our senses. The on- 
 ly question is, If it be certain, that we annex 
 any idea to the word power, dijtferent from 
 that of mere succession ? The following con- 
 siderations, among many others, prove, that
 
 MOllAI. PHILOSOPHY. 179 
 
 the import of these two expressions is by no 
 means the same. 
 
 (1.) If we have no idea of cause and effect 
 different from that of mere succession, it 
 would appear to us no less absurd to suppose 
 two events disjoined, which we have constant- 
 ly seen connected, than to suppose a change 
 to take place without a cause. The former 
 supposition, however, is easy in all cases what- 
 ever. The latter may be safely pronounced 
 to be impossible. 
 
 (2.) Our experience of the established con- 
 nections of physical events is by far too nar- 
 row a foundation for our belief, that every 
 change must have a cause. Mr Hume him- 
 self has observed, that " the vulgar always 
 " include the idea of Contiguity in place in 
 " the idea of causation ;" or, in other words, 
 that they conceive matter to produce its ef- 
 fects by impulse alone. If, therefore, every 
 change which had fallen under our notice, 
 had been preceded by apparent impulse, ex-
 
 180 OUTLINES OF 
 
 perience might have taught us to conclude, 
 from observing a change, that a previous im- 
 pulse had been given ; or, according to Mr 
 Hume's notion of a cause ^ that a cause had 
 operated to produce this effect. Of the 
 changes, however, which we see, how small 
 a number is produced by apparent impulse ? 
 And yet, in the case of every change, without 
 exception, we have an irresistible conviction 
 of the operation of some cause. How shall 
 we explain, on Mr Hume's principles, the 
 foundation of this conviction, in cases in 
 which impulse has apparently no share. 
 
 258. The question, however, still recurs ; 
 In w^hat manner do we acquire the idea of 
 Causation, Power, or Efficiency ? — But this 
 question, if the foregoing observations be ad- 
 mitted, is comparatively of little consequence; 
 as the doubts which may arise on the subject, 
 tend only (without affecting the reality of 
 the idea or notion) to expose the defects of 
 particular philosophical systems.
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 181 
 
 ^59. The most probable account of the 
 matter seems to be, that the idea of causation, 
 or of power, necessarily accompanies the per- 
 ception of change, in a way somewhat analo- 
 gous to that in which sensation implies a 
 being who feels, and thought, a being who 
 tliinks. A power of beginning motion, for 
 example, is an attribute of mind, no less than 
 sensation or thought ; and wherever motion 
 commences, we have evidence that mind has 
 operated. 
 
 260. Are we therefore to conclude, that the 
 divine power is constantly exerted to pro- 
 duce the phenomena of the material world, 
 and to suppose, that one and the same cause 
 produces that infinite multiplicity of effects 
 which are every moment taking place in the 
 universe ? 
 
 261. In order to avoid this conclusion, 
 which has been thought, by many, too ab- 
 surd to deserve a serious examination, various 
 hypotheses have been proposed. The most
 
 182 OUTLINES OF 
 
 important of these may be referred to the fol- 
 lowing heads. 
 
 (1.) That the phenomena of nature are the 
 result of certain active powers essentially in- 
 herent in matter. This doctrine is common- 
 ly called Materialism. 
 
 (2.) That they result from certain active 
 powers communicated to matter at its first 
 formation. 
 
 (3.) That they take place in consequence 
 of general laws established by the Deity. 
 
 (4.) That they are produced by " a vital 
 " and spiritual, but unintelligent and neces- 
 " sary agent, created by the Deity for the 
 " execution of his purposes *." 
 
 5. That they are produced by minds con- 
 nected with the particles of matter. 
 
 * Cud worth.
 
 MORAL PHILOSOrHY. 183 
 
 (6.) That the universe is a machine formed 
 and put in motion by the Deity ; and that the 
 multiplicity of effects which take place, may 
 perhaps have all proceeded from one single act 
 of his power. 
 
 262. These different hypotheses, (some of 
 which will be found, on examination, to re- 
 solve into unmeaning or unintelligible pro- 
 positions, and all of which are liable to in- 
 surmountable objections), have been adopted 
 by ingenious men, in preference to the simple 
 and sublime doctrine, w^hich supposes the or- 
 der of the universe to be not only at first esta- 
 blished, but every moment maintained, by the 
 incessant agency of One Supreme Mind ; — a 
 doctrine, against which no objection can be 
 stated, but what is founded on prejudices re- 
 sulting from our own imperfections. — This 
 doctrine does not exclude the possibility of 
 the Deity's acting occasionally by subordinate 
 agents or instruments.
 
 184 OUTLINES OF 
 
 263. The observations, indeed, hitherto 
 made, are not sufficient of themselves to autho- 
 rise us to form any conclusion with respect to 
 the unity of God ; but when properly illustra- 
 ted, they will be found to warrant fully the 
 following inference : That the phenomena of 
 the universe indicate the constant agency of 
 power which cannot belong to matter ; or, 
 in other words, that they indicate the con- 
 stant agency of Mind. AVhether these pheno- 
 mena, when compared together, bear marks 
 of a diversity or of an unity of design ; and, 
 of consequence, whether they suggest the Go- 
 vernment of one almighty Ruler, or of a plu- 
 rality of independent divinites, are inquiries 
 which belong to the next head of our argu- 
 ment.
 
 MORAI- PHILOSOPHY. 185 
 
 II. OF THE EVIDENCES OF DESIGN EXHIBITED IN THE 
 UNIVERSE. 
 
 264. The proof of the existence of God, 
 drawn from the Order of the universe, is com- 
 monly called the argument from Final Causes. 
 The expression (which was first introduced 
 by Aristotle) is far from being proper ; but is 
 retained in this treatise, in compliance with 
 established use. 
 
 265. It is justly remarked by Dr Reid, 
 that the argument from Final Causes, when 
 reduced to a syllogism, contains two pro- 
 positions. The major is, That Design may 
 be traced from its effects : The minor. That 
 there are appearances of Design in the uni- 
 verse. The antient sceptics, he says, granted 
 the first, but denied the second. The mo- 
 derns (in consequence of the discoveries in
 
 18G OUTLINES OF 
 
 natural philosophy) have been obliged to aban- 
 don the ground which their predecessors main- 
 tained, and have disputed the major proposi- 
 tion. 
 
 266. Amonp- those who have denied the 
 possibility of tracing design from its effects, 
 Mr Hume is the most eminent. According to 
 him, all such inferences are inconclusive, be- 
 ing neither demonstrable by reasoning, nor 
 deducible from experience. 
 
 267. In examining Mr Hume's argument 
 on this subject, Dr Heid admits, that the in- 
 ferences we make of design from its effects, 
 are not the result of reasoning, or of experi- 
 ence : but still he contends, that such infe- 
 rences may be made with a degree of cer- 
 tainty, equal to what the human mind is able 
 to attain in any instance whatever. The opi- 
 nions we form of the talents of other men, 
 nay, our belief that other men are intelligent 
 beings, are founded on this very inference of 
 design from its effects. Intelligence and de-
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 187 
 
 sign are not objects of our senses, and yet we 
 judge of them every moment from external 
 conduct and behaviour, with as little hesita- 
 tion as we pronounce on the existence of what 
 we immediately perceive. 
 
 268. Other philosophers have opposed the 
 major proposition of the syllogism, by an ar- 
 gument somewhat different. — In order to 
 judge of the wisdom of any design, it is ne- 
 cessary (they observe) to know, first, what 
 end the artist proposes to himself, and then, 
 to examine the means which he has employ- 
 ed to accomplish it. But in the universe all 
 we see is, that certain things are accomplish- 
 ed, without having an opportunity of com- 
 paring them with a plan previously proposed. 
 — A stone thrown at random must necessarily 
 hit one object or another. When we see, 
 therefore, such an effect produced, we are 
 not entitled, independently of other infor- 
 mation, to praise the dexterity of the marks- 
 man.
 
 188 OUTLINES OF 
 
 269. Among a great variety of considera- 
 tions, which might be urged in reply to this 
 objection, the following seem to deserve par- 
 ticular attention. 
 
 (1.) Although from a single effect, we 
 may not be entitled to infer intelligence in 
 the cause, yet the case is different, when we 
 see a number of causes conspiring to 07ie end. 
 We here see not only that an effect takes 
 place, but have an intuitive conviction, that 
 this was the very effect intended. From see- 
 ing a single stone strike an object, we may 
 not be authorised to conclude that this was 
 the object aimed at. But what conclusion 
 should we draw, if we saw the same object 
 invariably hit by a number of stones thrown 
 in succession ? 
 
 (2.) A multiplicity of cases might be men- 
 tioned, in which we have really an opportu- 
 nity of comparing the wisdom of nature with 
 the ends to which it is directed. Of this, 
 many remarkable examples occur in the eco-
 
 MORAI- PHILOSOPHY. 189 
 
 nomy of the human body. When any acci- 
 dent or disease injures our frame, it is well 
 known that the body possesses within itself a 
 power of alleviating or remedying the evil. 
 In such instances, we not only see an effect 
 produced ; but we see the operation of na- 
 tural causes directed to the particular pur- 
 pose of restoring the healthful state of the 
 system. 
 
 (3.) There are many cases, particularly in 
 the animal economy, in which the same ef- 
 fect is produced in different instances, by 
 very different means ; and in which, of con- 
 sequence, we have an opportunity of compa- 
 ring the wisdom of nature with the ends she 
 has in view. " Art and means (says Baxter) 
 " are designedly multiplied, that we might 
 " not take it for the effect of chance : and 
 " in some cases, the method itself is different, 
 " that we might see it is not the effect of 
 " surd necessity." — The science of compa- 
 rative anatomy, furnishes beautiful confir- 
 mations of the foregoing doctrine. From ob-
 
 190 OUTLINES OF 
 
 serving the effect produced by a particular 
 organ in the case of any one animal, we might 
 not perhaps be v/arranted to conclude, that it 
 was in order to produce this effect, that the 
 organ was contrived. But when, in the case 
 of different species of animals, we see the 
 same effect brought about by means extreme- 
 ly different, it is impossible for us to doubt, 
 that it was this common end which, in all 
 these instances. Nature had in view. — Nor is 
 this all. In comparing the anatomy of dif- 
 ferent tribes of animals, we find that the 
 differences observable in their structure have 
 a reference to their way of life, and the ha- 
 bits for which they are destined ; so that, 
 from knowing the latter, we might be able, 
 in particular cases, to frame conjectures a 
 priori concerning the former. 
 
 270. From the foregoing hints, it suffi- 
 ciently appears, that design may be inferred 
 from its effects ; and, also, that design may 
 be traced in various parts of the universe, 
 from an actual examination of the means em-
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 191 
 
 ployed to accomplish particular ends. — Ano- 
 ther inquiry, however, and a still more im- 
 portant, remains, — to consider the characters 
 of this design, as it is displayed in the uni- 
 verse ; or, in other words, to consider, how far 
 the design seems to indicate Wisdom ; and 
 whether it seems to operate in conformity to 
 One uniform plan. The first investigation is 
 useful, by its tendency to elevate our concep- 
 tions of the Supreme Being ; and the second is 
 necessary for the demonstration of his Unity. 
 
 271. The study of philosophy, in all its 
 various branches, both natural and moral, af- 
 fords, at every step, a new illustration of the 
 subject to which these investigations relate ; 
 insomuch that the truths of natural religion 
 gain an accession of evidence, from every 
 addition that is made to the stock of human 
 knowledge. Hence, in the case of those in- 
 dividuals who devote themselves, with fair 
 and candid minds, to the pursuits of science, 
 there is a gradual progress of light and con- 
 viction, keeping pace with the enlargement 
 of their information and of their views ; and
 
 192 OUTLINES OF 
 
 hence, a strong presumption that the influ- 
 ence which these truths have, even in the 
 present state of society, on the minds of the 
 multitude, will continually increase, in pro- 
 portion as the order of the material universe 
 shall be more fully displayed by the discove- 
 ries of philosophy, and as the plan of Provi- 
 dence in the administration of human affairs, 
 shall be more completely unfolded in the fu- 
 ture history of our species. 
 
 272. In considering the universe, with a 
 view to the illustration of the wisdom and 
 unity of God, it is, in a peculiar degree, satis- 
 factory to trace the relations which different 
 parts of it bear to each other, and to remark 
 the concurrence of things apparently uncon- 
 nected and even remote, in promoting the 
 same benevolent purposes. The following 
 hints may be of vise in suggesting reflections 
 on this subject. 
 
 (1.) The adaptation of the bodies and of 
 the instincts of animals to the laws of the ma-
 
 MOUAL PHILOSOPHY. 193 
 
 terial world : — Of tlie organs of respiration, 
 for example, and of the instinct of suction, to 
 the properties of the atmosphere ; — of the 
 momentum of light to the sensibility of the re- 
 tina ; — of the fabric of the eye to the laws of 
 refraction ; — of the size and strength of ani- 
 mals and vegetables to the laws of gravitation 
 and of cohesion. 
 
 (2.) The adaptation of the bodies, and of 
 the instincts of animals, to those particular 
 climates and districts of tlie earth, for which 
 they are destined. 
 
 (3.) The relations subsisting between parti- 
 cular animals and particular vegetables ; the 
 latter furnishing to the former, salutary food 
 in their healthful state, and useful remedies 
 in the case of disease. 
 
 (4.) The connection which appears, from 
 the pneumatical discoveries of modern che- 
 mistry, to exist between the processes of nature 
 
 in the animal and in the vegetable kingdoms. 
 
 N
 
 194 OUTLINES OF 
 
 (5.) The relations which different tribes 
 of animals bear to each other ; one tribe be- 
 ing the natural prey of another ; and each 
 of them having their instruments of offence 
 or defence provided accordingly. 
 
 (6.) The relations which the periodical in- 
 stincts of migrating animals bear to the state 
 of the season, and to the vegetable produc- 
 tions, of distant parts of the globe. 
 
 273. This view of the subject is peculiarly 
 striking, when we consider the relations which 
 subsist between the nature of man, and the 
 circumstances of his external situation. An 
 examination, of his perceptive faculties, in 
 particular, and of his intellectual powers, as 
 they are adapted to the structure and to the 
 laws of the material world, opens a wide field 
 of curious speculation. 
 
 274. The accommodation of the objects 
 around him to his appetites, to his physical 
 wants, and to his capacities of enjoyment, 
 is no less wonderful : and exceeds so far what
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 195 
 
 we observe in the case of other animals, as to 
 authorise us to conclude, that it was chiefly 
 with a view to his happiness and improve- 
 ment, that the arrangements of this lower 
 world was made. 
 
 275. There is another view of nature which 
 tends remarkably to illustrate that unity of 
 design, which is the foundation of our belief 
 of the unity of God ; — to trace the analogies 
 which are observable between the different 
 departments of the universe which fall under 
 our notice. — Of such analogies many instances 
 may be derived from a comparative examina- 
 tion ; 1. Of the structures of different tribes 
 of animals ; 2. Of the animal and of the ve- 
 getable kingdoms ; And, 3. Of the various 
 laws which regulate the phenomena of the 
 material world. 
 
 276. It is pleasing to consider, that this 
 uniform and regular plan has been found 
 to extend to the remotest limits to which the 
 inquiries of philosopliers have reached. The 
 ancients, in general, supposed, that the phe-
 
 196 OUTLINES OK 
 
 nomena of the heavens were reguhited by 
 laws perfectly unlike those which obtain with- 
 in the circle of our experience. The mo- 
 dern discoveries have shewn how widely they 
 were mistaken ; and indeed it was a conjec- 
 ture a priori, that their ideas on this subject 
 might perhaps be erroneous, which led the 
 way to the theory of gravitation. Every subse- 
 quent discovery has confirmed the conjecture. 
 
 277. Nor is it only the more general laws 
 of terrestrial bodies, which extend to the re- 
 mote parts of the universe. There is some 
 ground for suspecting, that the particular ar- 
 rangements of things, on the surfaces of the 
 different planets, are not wholly unlike those 
 which we observe on our own. 
 
 278. Amusing and interesting as these 
 physical speculations may be, it is still more 
 delighful to trace the uniformity of de- 
 sign which is displayed in the moral world ; 
 — to compare the instincts of men with 
 those of the brutes, and the instincts of the 
 different tribes of brutes, with each other ;
 
 MORAL THILOSOPHY. 197 
 
 and to remark, amidst the astonishing variety 
 of means which are employed to accomplish 
 the same ends, a certain analogy characterize 
 them all ; — or to observe, in the minds of dif- 
 ferent individuals of our own species, the 
 workings of the same affections and passions, 
 and to trace the uniformity of their operation 
 in men of different ages and countries. — It 
 is this which gives the great charm to what 
 v/e call nature in epic and dramatic composi- 
 tion ; when the poet speaks a language to 
 which every heart is an echo ; and which, a- 
 midst all the effects of education and fashion, 
 in modifying and disguising the principles of 
 our constitution, reminds all the various clas- 
 ses of readers or of spectators, of the exist- 
 ence of those moral ties which unite us to 
 each other, and to our common Parent. 
 
 279- Before leaving this subject, it is pro- 
 j)er to remark, that the metaphysical reason- 
 ings which have been occasionally employed 
 in the illustration of it, ought not to be con- 
 sidered as forming any part of the argument 
 for the existence of God ; which (as was alrca-
 
 198 OUTLINES OF 
 
 dy observed) is an immediate and necessary 
 consequence of the two principles formerly 
 mentioned (§ 251.) The scope of these rea- 
 sonings is not to confirm the truth of the pro- 
 position, but to obviate the sceptical cavils 
 which have been urged against it. 
 
 280. Reasoning and reflection are indeed 
 necessary to raise the mind to worthy con- 
 ceptions of the Divine attributes, and to cure 
 it of those prejudices which arise from limited 
 and erroneous views of nature. While men 
 confine their attention to detached and insu- 
 lated appearances. Polytheism offers itself as 
 the most natural creed ; and it is only by slow 
 and gradual steps that philosophy discovers 
 to us those magnificent views of the universe 
 which connect together all events, both phy- 
 sical and moral, as parts of one system, and 
 conspiring to one end. 
 
 281. Beside the sceptical objections, al- 
 ready mentioned, to the speculation concern-
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 199 
 
 ing Final Causes, some others have been 
 proposed with very different views. Des 
 Cartes, in particular, taking for granted the 
 existence of God, as sufficiently established 
 by other proofs, has rejected altogether this 
 speculation from philosophy, as an impious 
 and absurd attempt to penetrate into the 
 designs of Providence. Some observations, 
 much to the same purpose, occur in the works 
 of INIaupertuis and of Buffon. — To this class 
 of objections against Final Causes, a satisfac- 
 tory answer is given by Mr Boyle, in an essay 
 written expressly on the subject. 
 
 282. The authority of Lord Bacon has 
 been frequently quoted in support of the opi- 
 nion of these French philosophers. But if his 
 writings be carefully examined, it will be 
 found, that the censures he bestows on Aris- 
 totle and his followers, for their conjectures 
 concerning the ends and intentions of Nature, 
 are applicable only to the abuse of this doc- 
 trine in the Peripatetic scliool. It is a doc- 
 trine, according to him, which belongs pro-
 
 200 OUTLINES OF 
 
 perly to metaphysics or to natural theology, 
 and not to natural philosophy ; and which 
 contributed much to mislead the Peripatetics 
 in their physical inquiries. In a work, of 
 which it was the principal aim to explain the 
 true plan of philosophical investigation, it 
 was necessary to point out the absurdity of 
 blending physical and final causes together, 
 and of substituting conjectures concerning the 
 intentions of nature for an account of her 
 operations. Perhaps it was prudent even to 
 recommend the total exclusion of such con- 
 jectures from physics, in an age when the just 
 rules of inquiry were so imperfectly vmder- 
 stood. — That Bacon did not mean to censure 
 the speculation about Final Causes, when con- 
 fined to its proper place, and applied to its 
 proper purpose, appears clearly from a va- 
 riety of particular passages, as well as from 
 the general strain and tendency of his writ- 
 ings, 
 
 283. In the present age, when the true 
 method of philosophizing in physics is pretty
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 201 
 
 generally understood, it does not seem to 
 be so necessary as formerly to banish Final 
 Causes from that branch of science } provided 
 always they be kept distinct from Physical 
 Causes, with which there is now but little 
 danger of their being unw^arily confounded. 
 If this caution be attended to, the considera- 
 tion of Final Causes, so far from leading 
 us astray, may frequently be of use in guid- 
 ing our researches. — It is, in fact, a mode of 
 reasoning familiar to every philosopher, what- 
 ever his speculative opinions on the subject 
 of natural religion may be. Thus, in the stu- 
 dy of anatomy, every man proceeds on the 
 maxim, that nothins; in the bodv of an ani- 
 mal was made in vain ; and when he meets 
 with a part of which the use is not obvious, 
 he feels himself dissatisfied, till he discovers 
 some, at least, of the purposes to which it is 
 subservient. " I remember (says Mr Boyle) 
 " that, when I asked our famous Harvey 
 " what were the things that induced him to 
 '* think of a circulation of the blood ? he an- 
 " swered me, that when he took notice that
 
 202 OUTLINES OF 
 
 *' the valves in the veins of so many parts of 
 " the body were so placed, that they gave a 
 ** free passage to the blood towards the heart, 
 " but opposed the passage of the venal blood 
 " the contrary way ; he was invited to ima- 
 " gine, that so provident a cause as Nature 
 *' had not placed so many valves without de- 
 *' sign ; and no design seemed more probable, 
 " than that, since the blood could not well, 
 " because of the interposing valves, be sent 
 " by the veins to the limbs, it should be sent 
 " through the arteries, and return through 
 " the veins, whose valves did not oppose its 
 " course that way." 
 
 284. An explanation of the use and abuse 
 of the speculation concerning Final Causes, 
 in the study of natural philosophy, is still a 
 desideratum in science, and would form an 
 important addition to that branch of logic, 
 which professes to state the rules of philoso- 
 phical investigation.
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 203 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 OF THE DUTIES WHICH RESPECT THE DEITY. 
 
 PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES OF 
 NATURAL RELIGION. 
 
 ARTICLE SECOND. 
 OF THE MORAL ATTRIBUTES OF THE DEITY. 
 
 285. The observations made in the last 
 Article contain some of the principal heads 
 of the argument for the existence of God ; 
 and also for his unity, for his power, and for 
 his wisdom. Of the two last of these attri- 
 butes, we justly say that they are infinite; 
 that is, that our imagination can set no bounds 
 to them, and that our conceptions of tliem
 
 204 OUTLINES OF 
 
 always rise, in proportion as our faculties are 
 cultivated, and as our knowledge of the uni- 
 verse becomes more extensive. The writers 
 on Natural Religion commonly give a parti- 
 cular enumeration of attributes, which they 
 divide into the natural, the intellectual, and 
 the moral ; and of which they treat at length 
 in a systematical manner. This view of the 
 subject, whatever may be its advantages, 
 could not be adopted with propriety here. 
 The remarks which follow are confined to 
 the evidences of the Divine goodness and jus- 
 tice; — those attributes which constitute the 
 moral perfection of the Deity, and which 
 render him a proper object of religious wor- 
 ship.
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 205 
 
 I. OF THE EVIDEKCES OF BENEVOI-ENT DESIGN IN THlC 
 UNIVERSE. 
 
 286. Our ideas of the moral attributes of 
 God must be derived from our own moral 
 perceptions. It is only by attending to these, 
 that we can form a conception of what his at- 
 tributes are ; and it is in this way we are fur- 
 nished with the strongest proofs that they 
 really belong to him. 
 
 287. The peculiar sentiment of approba- 
 tion with which we regard the virtue of be- 
 neficence in others, and the peculiar satis- 
 faction with which we reflect on such of our 
 own actions as have contributed to the hap- 
 piness of mankind ; to which we may add 
 the exquisite pleasure accompanying the ex- 
 ercise of all the kind affections, naturally 
 lead us to consider benevolence or goodness
 
 ^206 OUTLINES OF 
 
 as the supreme attribute of the Deity. — It is 
 difficult, indeed, to conceive what other mo- 
 tive could have induced a Being, completely 
 and independently happy, to have called his 
 creatures into existence. 
 
 288. In this manner, without any exami- 
 nation of the fact, we have a strong presump- 
 tion for the goodness of the Deity ; and it is 
 only after establishing this presumption a prio- 
 ri, that we can proceed to examine the fact 
 with safety. It is true, indeed, that, inde- 
 pendently of this presumption, the disorders 
 we see would not demonstrate ill intention in 
 the Author of the universe ; as it would be 
 still possible that these might contribute to 
 the happiness and the perfection of the whole 
 system. — But the contrary supposition would 
 be equally possible ; that there is nothing ab- 
 solutely good in the universe, and that the 
 communication of suffering is the ultimate 
 end of the laws by which it is governed.
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 207 
 
 289. The argument for the goodness of 
 God, derived from our own moral constitu- 
 tion, and strengthened by the consideration 
 of our ignorance of the plans of Providence, 
 affords an answer to all the objections which 
 have been urged against this attribute of the 
 Deity. — And the answer is conclusive, what- 
 ever the state of the fact may be with re- 
 spect to the magnitude of the evils of which 
 we complain. 
 
 290. But although this answer miglit si- 
 lence our objections, something more is re- 
 quisite, on a subject so momentous, to sup- 
 port our confidence, and to animate our 
 hopes. If no account could be given of the 
 evils of life, but that they may possibly be 
 good relatively to the whole universe ; — still 
 more, if it should appear, that the sufferings 
 of life overbalance its enjoyments ; it could 
 hardly be expected, that any speculative rea- 
 soning would have much effect in banishing 
 the melancholy suggestions of scepticism. —
 
 208 OUTLINES OF 
 
 We are therefore naturally led, in the first 
 place, to inquire, whether some explanation 
 may not be given of the origin of evil, from 
 a consideration of the facts which fall under 
 our notice ? and, secondly, to compare toge- 
 ther the happiness and the misery which the 
 world exhibits. 
 
 291. The question concerning the origin of 
 evil, has, from the earliest times, employed 
 the ingenuity of speculative men : and va- 
 rious theories have been proposed to solve the 
 difficulty. The most celebrated of these are 
 the foUowins;. 
 
 '&• 
 
 (1.) The doctrine of Pre-existence. 
 
 (2.) The doctrine of the Manicheans. 
 
 (3.) The doctrine of Optimism. 
 
 292. According to the first hypothesis, 
 the evils we suffer at present are punishments
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 209 
 
 and expiations of moral delinquencies, com- 
 mitted in a former stage of our being. — This 
 hypothesis, it is obvious, (to mention no other 
 objection,) only removes the difficulty a little 
 out of sight, without affording any explana- 
 tion of it. 
 
 293. The Manicheans account for the mix- 
 ture of good and evil in the universe, by the 
 opposite agencies of two co-eternal and inde- 
 pendent principles. Their doctrine has been 
 examined and refuted by many authors, by 
 reasonings a jjriori ; but the most satisfactory 
 of all refutations, is its obvious inconsistency 
 with that unity of design which is every 
 where conspicuous in nature. 
 
 294. The fundamental principle of the Op- 
 timists is, that all events are ordered for the 
 best ; and that the evils which we suffer, are 
 parts of a great system conducted by almighty 
 power, under the direction of infinite wisdom 
 and goodness. 
 
 o
 
 210 OUTLINES OF 
 
 295. Under this general title, however, are 
 comprehended two very different descriptions 
 of Philosophers ; those who admit, and those 
 who deny, the freedom of human actions. 
 The former only contend, that every thing 
 is right, so far as it is the woi'k of God ; and 
 endeavour to show, that the creation of be- 
 ings endowed with free-will, and consequent- 
 ly liable to moral delinquency, — and the 
 government of the world by general laws, 
 from which occasional evils must result, — 
 furnish no solid objection to the perfection 
 of the universe. But they hold, at the same 
 time, that, although the permission of moral 
 evil does not detract from the goodness of 
 God, it is nevertheless imputable to man as a 
 fault, and renders him justly obnoxious to 
 punishment. This was the system of Plato, 
 and of the best of the ancient philosophers, 
 who, in most instances, state their doctrine in 
 a manner perfectly consistent with man's free- 
 will and moral agency.
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 211 
 
 296. By some modern authors, the scheme 
 of Optimism has been proposed in a form 
 inconsistent with these suppositions, and which 
 leads to a justification of moral evil, even 
 with respect to the delinquent. 
 
 297. It is of great importance, to attend 
 to the distinction between these two systems ; 
 because it is customary among sceptical wri- 
 ters to confound them studiously together, 
 in order to extend to both, that ridicule to 
 which the latter is justly entitled. — The 
 scope of the argument, as stated in the for- 
 mer system, may be collected from the follow- 
 ing hints. 
 
 298. All the different subjects of human 
 complaint may be reduced to two classes ; 
 Moral and Physical evils. The former com- 
 prehends those which arise from the abuse of 
 Free-will ; the latter those which result from 
 the established laws of nature, and which 
 man cannot prevent by his own efforts.
 
 212 OUTLINES OF 
 
 299. According to the definition now gi- 
 ven of moral evil, the question, with respect 
 to its permission, is reduced to this ; Why 
 was man made a free agent ? A question to 
 which it seems to be a sufficient reply : That 
 perhaps the object of the Deity, in the go- 
 vernment of the world, is not merely to 
 communicate happiness, but to form his 
 creatures to moral excellence; — or that the 
 enjoyment of high degrees of happiness may 
 perhaps necessarily require the previous ac- 
 quisition of virtuous habits. 
 
 300. The sufferings produced by vice are, 
 on this supposition, instances of the goodness 
 of God, no less than the happiness resulting 
 from virtue. 
 
 301. These observations justify Providence, 
 not only for the permission of moral evil, but 
 for the permission of many things which we 
 commonly complain of as physical evils. — How 
 great is the proportion of these, which are 
 the obvious consequences of our vices and our
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 213 
 
 prejudices; and which, so far from being a 
 necessary part of the order of nature, seem 
 intended to operate in the progress of human 
 affairs, as a gradual remedy against the causes 
 which produce them ! 
 
 802. Some of our other complaints with 
 respect to the lot of humanity will be found, 
 on examination, to arise from partial views of 
 the constitution of man, and from a want of 
 attention to the circumstances which constitute 
 his happiness, or promote his improvement. 
 
 303. Still, however, many evils remain, to 
 which the foregoing principles do not apply. 
 Such are those produced by what we com- 
 monly call the accidents of life : — accidents 
 from which no state of society, how perfect 
 soever, can possibly be exempted ; and which, 
 if they be subservient to any benevolent pur- 
 poses, contribute to none within the sphere of 
 our knowledge. 
 
 304. Of this class of pliysical evils, the ex-
 
 214 OUTLINES OF 
 
 planation must be derived from the general 
 laws by which the government of the Deity 
 appears to be conducted. The tendency of 
 these laws will be found, in every instance, 
 favourable to order and to happiness ; and it 
 is one of the noblest employments of philoso- 
 phy to investigate the beneficent purposes to 
 which they are subservient. — In a world, 
 however, which is thus governed, and where 
 the inhabitants are free agents, occasional in- 
 conveniencies and misfortunes must unavoid- 
 ably be incurred. 
 
 305. In the mean time, from this influence 
 of " Time and Chance," on human affairs, 
 salutary effects arise. Virtue is rendered dis- 
 interested, and the cliaracters of men are more 
 completely displayed. 
 
 306. Many of our moral qualities, too, are 
 the result of habits which imply the exist- 
 ence of physical evils. Patience, Fortitude, 
 Humanity, all suppose a scene, in which suf-
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 215 
 
 ferings are to be endured, in our own case ; 
 or relieved, in the case of others. 
 
 307. Thus it appears, not only that partial 
 evils mmj he good with respect to the whole 
 system ; but that their tendency is beneficial 
 on the whole, even to that small part of it 
 which we see. 
 
 308. The argument for the goodness of God, 
 which arises from the foregoing considera- 
 tions, will be much strengthened, if it shall 
 appear farther, that the sum of happiness in 
 human life far exceeds the sum of misery. 
 
 309. In opposition to this conclusion, the 
 prevalence of moral evil over moral good, in 
 the characters of men, has been insisted on 
 by many writers ; and in proof of it, an ap- 
 peal has been made to the catalogue of crimes 
 which sully the history of past ages. 
 
 310. Whatever opinion we may adopt, with 
 respect to the state of the fact, in this parti-
 
 216 OUTLINES OF 
 
 cular instance ; no objection can be drawn 
 from it to the foregoing reasonings ; for moral 
 evil is alone imputable to the being by whom 
 it is committed. There is, however, no neces- 
 sity for having recourse to this evasion. Cor- 
 rupted as mankind are, the proportion of 
 human life which is spent in vice, is inconsi- 
 derable when compared with the whole of 
 its extent. — History itself is a proof of this ; 
 for the events it records are chiefly those 
 w4iich are calculated, by their singularity, 
 to engage the curiosity, and to interest the 
 passions of the reader. — In computing, be- 
 sides, the moral demerit of mankind, from 
 their external actions, a large allowance ought 
 to be made for erroneous speculative opi- 
 nions ; for false conceptions of facts ; for pre- 
 judices inspired by the influence of prevail- 
 ing: manners ; and for habits contracted in- 
 sensibly in early infancy. 
 
 311. With respect to the balance of phy- 
 sical evil and physical good, the argument is 
 still clearer; if it be acknowledged, {§ 304.),
 
 MORAL PHILOSOrHV. 217 
 
 that the general laws of nature are beneficent 
 in their tendency, and that the inconveniencies 
 which arise from them are only occasional. 
 
 312. Of these occasional evils, too, no in- 
 considerable part may be traced to the obsta- 
 cles, which human institutions oppose to the 
 order of things recommended by nature. — 
 How chimerical soever the speculations of 
 philosophers concerning the perfection of le- 
 gislation may be, they are useful, at least, in 
 illustrating the wisdom and goodness of the 
 Divine government. 
 
 313. Nor is it only in those laws which re- 
 gulate the more essential interests of mankind, 
 that a beneficent intention may be traced. 
 What a rich provision is made for our enjoy- 
 ment in the pleasures of the understanding, 
 of the imagination, and of the heart ; and 
 how little do they depend on the caprice of 
 fortune ! — The positive accommodation of our 
 sensitive powers to the scene we occupy, is 
 still more wonderful : — Of the organ of smell,
 
 218 OUTLINES OK 
 
 for example to the perfumes of the vegetable 
 world : of the taste, to the endless profusion 
 of luxuries which the earth, the air, and the 
 waters afford ; of the ear, to the melodies of 
 the birds ; of the eye, to all the beauties and 
 glories of the visible creation. 
 
 314. Among these marks of beneficence in 
 the frame of man, the constitution of his 
 mind, with respect to Habits, must not be o- 
 mitted. So great is their influence, that there 
 is hardly any situation to which his wishes 
 may not be gradually reconciled ; nay, where 
 he will not find himself, in time, more com- 
 fortable, than in those which are looked up 
 to with envy by the bulk of mankind. By 
 this power of accommodation to external cir- 
 cumstances, a remedy is, in part, provided for 
 the occasional evils resulting from the opera- 
 tion of general laws. 
 
 315. In judging of the feelings of those 
 who are placed in situations very different 
 from our own, due allowances are seldom made
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 219 
 
 for the effects of habit ; and, of consequence, 
 our estimates of the happiness of life fall short 
 greatly of the truth. 
 
 II. OK THE EVIDENCES OF THE MORAL GOVERNMENT 
 OF THE DEITY. 
 
 316. It was before remarked (§ 286.), that, 
 as our first ideas of the moral attributes of God 
 are derived from our own moral perceptions, 
 so it is from the consideration of these, that 
 the strongest proofs of his attributes arise. 
 
 317. The distinction between Right and 
 Wrong, as was formely observed (§ 200.), 
 is apprehended by the mind to be eternal 
 and immutable, no less than the distinction 
 between mathematical Truth and Falsehood. 
 To argue, therefore, from our own moral 
 judgments, to the administration of the Deity, 
 cannot be justly censured as a rash extension, 
 to the Divine nature, of suggestions resulting
 
 220 OUTLINES OF 
 
 from the arbitary constitution of our own 
 minds. 
 
 318. The power we have of conceiving this 
 distinction, is one of the most remarkable of 
 those which raise us above the brutes ; and 
 the sense of obligation which it involves, pos- 
 sesses a distinguished pre-eminence over all 
 our other principles of action, (§ 219.)- I'o 
 act in conformity to our sense of rectitude, is 
 plainly the highest excellence which our na- 
 ture is capable of attaining ; nor can we avoid 
 extendinp- the same rule of estimation to all 
 intelligent beings whatever. 
 
 319. Besides these conclusions, with respect 
 to the divine attributes, (which seem to be im- 
 plied in our very perception of moral distinc- 
 tions), there are others perfectly agreeable to 
 them, which continually force themselves on 
 the mind, in the exercise of our moral judg- 
 ments, both with respect to our own conduct 
 and that of other men. The reverence, whicli 
 we feel to be due to the admonitions of Con-
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 221 
 
 science ; the sense of merit and demerit, which 
 accompanies our good and bad actions ; the 
 warm interest we take in the fortunes of the 
 virtuous ; the indignation we feel at the occa- 
 sional triumphs of successful villany ; — all im- 
 ply a secret conviction of the moral adminis- 
 tration of the universe. 
 
 320. An examination of the ordinary course 
 of human affairs adds to the force of these 
 considerations ; and furnishes a proof from the 
 fact, that, notwithstanding the seemingly pro- 
 miscuous distribution of happiness and misery 
 in this life, the reward of virtue, and the pu- 
 nishment of vice, are the great objects of all 
 the general laws by which the world is go- 
 verned. The disorders, in the mean time, 
 which, in such a world as ours, cannot fail to 
 arise in particular instances ; when they are 
 compared with our natural sense of good and 
 of ill desert, afford a presumption, that in a fu- 
 ture state, the moral government, whicli we 
 see begun here, will be carried into complete 
 execution.
 
 222 OUTLINES OF 
 
 SECTION I. 
 OF THE DUTIES WHICH RESPECT THE DEITY. 
 
 PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES OF 
 NATURAL RELIGION. 
 
 ARTICLE THIRD. 
 
 OF A FUTURE STATE. 
 
 321. The consideration of the Divine at- 
 tributes naturally leads our thoughts to the 
 sequel of that plan of moral administration, 
 which may be traced distinctly amidst all the 
 apparent disorders of our present condition ; 
 and which, our own moral constitution, joined 
 to our conclusions concerning the perfections 
 of God, afford us the strongest intimations, 
 will be more completely unfolded in some sub- 
 sequent stage of our being. The doctrine, in-
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 223 
 
 deed, of a future state, seems to be, in a great 
 measure, implied in every system of religious 
 belief; for why were we rendered capable of 
 elevating our thoughts to the Deity, if all our 
 hopes are to terminate here ; or why were we 
 furnished with powers which range through 
 the infinity of space and of time, if our lot is 
 to be the same with that of the beasts which 
 perish? — But although the doctrine of a future 
 state be implied in every scheme of religion ; 
 the truths of religion are not necessarily im- 
 plied in the doctrine of a future state. Even 
 absolute Atheism does not destroy all the argu- 
 ments for the immortality of the soul. Whe- 
 ther it be owing to an over-ruling intelligence 
 or not, it is 2ifact which no man can deny, that 
 there are general laws which regulate the 
 course of human affairs, and that, even in this 
 world, we see manifest indications of a con- 
 nection between virtue and happiness. — Why 
 may not necessity continue that existence it at 
 first gave birth to ; and why may not the con- 
 nection between virtue and happiness subsist 
 for ever ?
 
 224 OUTLINES OF 
 
 I. OF THE ARGUMENT FOR A FUTURE STATE DERIVED 
 FROM THE NATURE OF MIND. 
 
 322. In collecting the various evidences 
 which the light of nature affords for a future 
 state, too much stress has commonly been laid 
 upon the soul's Immateriality. The proper use 
 of that doctrine is not to demonstrate that the 
 soul is physically and necessarily immortal ; 
 but to refute the objections which have been 
 urged against the possibility of its existing 
 in a separate state from the body. Although 
 our knowledge of the nature of Mind may 
 not be sufficient to afford us any positive ar- 
 gument on this subject ; yet, even if it can be 
 shewn, that the dissolution of the body does 
 not necessarily infer the extinction of the soul; 
 and still more, if it can be shewn, that the pre- 
 sumption is in favour of the contrary supposi- 
 tion, the moral proofs of a future retribution 
 will meet with a more easy reception, when
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 225 
 
 the doctrine is freed from the metaphysical 
 difficulties which it has been apprehended to 
 involve. 
 
 323. It was before remarked (§ 28.), that 
 our notions both of body and mind are mere- 
 ly relative ; that we know the one only by its 
 sensible qualities, and the other by the opera- 
 tions of which we are conscious. — To say, 
 therefore, of Mind, that it is not material, is 
 to affirm a proposition, the truth of which is 
 involved in the only conceptions of Matter 
 and of Mind that we are capable of forming. 
 
 324. The doubts that have been suggested, 
 with respect to the essential distinction be- 
 tween Matter and Mind, derive all their plau- 
 sibility from the habits of inattention we ac- 
 quire in early infancy to our mental opera- 
 tions. It was plainly the intention of Nature, 
 that our thoughts should be habitually direct- 
 ed to things external ; and, accordingly, the 
 bulk of mankind are not only indisposed to 
 study the intellectual phenomena, but are inca-
 
 226 OUTLINES OF 
 
 pable of that degree of reflection which is ne- 
 cessary for their examination. Hence it is, 
 that when we begin to analyze our own inter- 
 nal constitution, we find the facts it presents 
 to us so very intimately associated in our con- 
 ceptions with the qualities of Matter, that it 
 is impossible for us to draw distinctly and stea- 
 dily the line between them ; and that when 
 Mind and Matter are concerned in the same 
 event, the former is either entirely overlooked, 
 or is regarded only as an accessory principle, 
 dependent for its existence on the latter. — The 
 tendency which all men have to refer the sen- 
 sation of colour to the objects by which it is 
 excited, may serve to illustrate the manner in 
 which the qualities of mind and body come 
 to be blended in our apprehensions. 
 
 325. If these remarks be well founded, 
 the prejudices which give support to the 
 scheme of Materialism, are not likely to be cu- 
 red by any metaphysical reasonings, how clear 
 and conclusive soever, so long as the judg- 
 ment continues to be warped by such obsti-
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 227 
 
 nate associations as have just been mentioned. 
 A habit of reflecting on the laws of thought, 
 as they are to be collected from our own con- 
 sciousness, together with a habit of resisting 
 those illusions of the fancy, which lead super- 
 fical inquirers to substitute analogies for facts, 
 will gradually enable us to make the pheno- 
 mena of Matter and those of Mind distinct 
 objects of attention ; and, as soon as this hap- 
 pens, the absurdity of Materialism must ap- 
 pear intuitively obvious. 
 
 326. It is entirely owing to our early fa- 
 miliarity with material objects, and our early 
 habits of inattention to what passes within 
 us, that Materialism is apt to appear at first 
 sight, to be less absurd than the opposite sys- 
 tem, which represents Mind as the only exist- 
 ence in the universe. Of the two doctrines, 
 that of Berkeley is at once the safest and the 
 most philosophical ; not only as it contradicts 
 merely the suggestions of our perceptions, 
 while the other contradicts the suggestions of 
 our consciousness ; but as various plausible
 
 228 OUTLINES OF 
 
 arguments may be urged in its favour, from 
 the phenomena of dreaming ; whereas no in- 
 stance can be mentioned, in which sensation 
 and intelligence appear to result from any 
 combination of the particles of Matter. 
 
 327- Besides the evidences for the exist- 
 ence of Mind, which our own conscious- 
 ness affords, and those which are exhibit- 
 ed by other men, and by the lower ani- 
 mals, there are many presented to us by 
 every part of the material world. We are 
 so constituted, that every change in it we 
 see suggests to us the notion of an efficient 
 cause ; — and every combination of means 
 conspiring to an end suggests to us the notion 
 of intelligence. And accordingly, the various 
 changes which take place in nature, and the 
 order and beauty of the universe, have, in 
 every age, been regarded as the effects of 
 power and wisdom ; that is, of the operation 
 of Mind. In the material world, there- 
 fore, as well as in the case of animated na- 
 ture, we are led to conceive Body as a pas-
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 229 
 
 sive subject, and Mind as the moving and go- 
 verning agent. And it deserves attention, 
 that, in the former class of phenomena, Mind 
 appears to move and arrange the parts of mat- 
 ter, vi^ithout being united with it as in the 
 case of animal life. 
 
 328. There are various circumstances which 
 render it highly probable, that the union 
 between soul and body, which takes place in 
 our present state, so far from being essential 
 to the exercise of our powers and faculties, 
 was intended to limit the sphere of our infor- 
 mation ; and to prevent us from acquiring, in 
 this early stage of our being, too clear a view 
 of the constitution and government of the uni- 
 verse. Indeed, when we reflect on the diffe- 
 rence between the operations of Mind and the 
 qualities of Matter, it appears much more 
 wonderful, that the two substances should be 
 so intimately united, as we find them actually 
 to be, than to suppose that the former may 
 exist in a conscious and intelligent state when 
 separated from the latter.
 
 230 OUTLINES or 
 
 329. The most plausible objections, never- 
 theless, to the doctrine of a future state, have 
 been drawn from the intimacy of this union. 
 From the effects of intoxication, madness, and 
 other diseases, it appears that a certain condi- 
 tion of the body is necessary to the intellec- 
 tual operations ; and, in the case of old men, 
 it is generally found that a decline of the fa- 
 culties keeps pace M'ith the decay of bodily 
 health and vigour. The few exceptions that 
 occur to the universality of this fact only 
 prove, that there are some diseases fatal to life, 
 which do not injure those parts of the body 
 with which the intellectual operations are 
 more immediately connected. 
 
 330. The reply which Cicero has made to 
 these objections is equally ingenious and solid. 
 " Suppose a person to have been educated, 
 " from his infancy, in a chamber where he 
 " enjoyed no opportunity of seeing external 
 " objects, but through a small chink in the 
 " window-shutter ; would he not be apt to 
 " consider this chink as essential to his vision ;
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 231 
 
 " and would it not be difficult to persuade 
 *' him that his prospects would be enlarged 
 " by demolishing the walls of his prison ?" 
 Admitting that this analogy is founded mere- 
 ly on fancy ; yet if it be granted that there 
 is no absurdity in the supposition, it furnishes 
 a sufficient answer to all the reasonings which 
 have been stated against the possibility of the 
 soul's separate existence, from the considera- 
 tion of its present union with the body. 
 
 331. In support of the foregoing conclu- 
 sions, many strong arguments might be de- 
 rived from an accurate examination and ana- 
 lysis of our ideas of Matter and its qualities. 
 But such speculations could not be rendered 
 intelligible, without a previous explanation 
 of some principles too abstruse to be introdu- 
 ced here.
 
 232 OUTLINES OF 
 
 II. OF THE EVIDENCES FOR A FUTURE STATE, ARISING 
 FROM THE HUMAN CONSTITUTION, AND FROM THE 
 CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH MAN IS PLACED. 
 
 332. The great extent of this subject ne- 
 cessarily confines the following remarks to an 
 enumeration of the principal heads of the ar- 
 gument. These are stated without any illus- 
 tration. 
 
 (1.) The natural desire of immortality ; and 
 the anticipations of futurity inspired by hope. 
 
 (2.) The natural apprehensions of the mind 
 when under the influence of remorse. 
 
 (3.) The exact accommodation of the con- 
 dition of the lower animals to their instincts 
 and to their sensitive powers ; — contrasted 
 with the unsuitableness of the present state of 
 things to the intellectual faculties of man, — 
 to his capacities of enjoyment, — and to the
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 233 
 
 conceptions of happiness and of ])erfection, 
 which he is able to form. 
 
 (4.) The foundation which is laid in the 
 principles of our constitution for a progressive 
 and an unlimited improvement. 
 
 (5.) The information we are rendered ca- 
 pable of acquiring, concerning the more re- 
 mote parts of the universe ; the unlimited 
 range, which is opened to the human ima- 
 gination through the immensity of space and 
 of time ; and the ideas, however imperfect, 
 which philosophy affords us of the existence 
 and attributes of an over-ruling Mind : — Ac- 
 quisitions, for which an obvious final cause 
 may be traced, on the supposition of a future 
 state ; but which, if that supposition be reject- 
 ed, could have no other effect than to make the 
 business of life appear unworthy of our regard. 
 
 (6.) The tendency of the infirmities of 
 age and of the pains of disease, to strengthen 
 and confirm our moral habits ; and the dif-
 
 234 OUTLINES OF 
 
 liciilty of accounting, upon the hypothesis of 
 annihilation, for those sufferings which com- 
 monly put a period to the existence of man. 
 
 (7.) The discordance between our moral 
 judgments and feelings, and the course of hu- 
 man affairs. 
 
 (8.) The analogy of the material world ; in 
 some parts of which the most complete and 
 the most systematical order may be traced ; 
 and of which our views always become the 
 more satisfactory, the wider our knowledge 
 extends. It is the supposition of a future state 
 alone, that can furnish a key to the present 
 disorders of the moral world ; and without it, 
 many of the most striking phenomena of hu- 
 man life must remain for ever inexplicable. 
 
 (9.) The inconsistency of supposing, that 
 the moral laws which regulate the course of 
 human affairs have no reference to any thing 
 beyond the limits of the present scene ; when 
 all the bodies which compose the visible uni-
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 235 
 
 verse appear to be related to each other, as 
 parts of one great physical system. 
 
 333. Of the different considerations now 
 mentioned, there is not one, perhaps, which, 
 taken singly, would be sufficient to establish 
 the truth they are brought to prove ; but ta- 
 ken in conjunction, their force appears irre- 
 sistible. They not only all terminate in the 
 same conclusion, but they mutually reflect 
 light on each other ; and they have that sort 
 of consistency and connection among them- 
 selves, which could hardly be supposed to 
 take place among a series of false propositions. 
 
 334. The same remark may be extended 
 to the other principles of Natural Religion. 
 They all hang together in such a manner, 
 that, if one of them be granted, it facilitates 
 the way for the reception of the rest. 
 
 3S5. Nor is it merely with each other that 
 these principles are connected. They have a 
 relation to all the other principles of Moral 
 Philosophy ; — insomuch, that a person who
 
 236 OUTLINES OF 
 
 entertains just views of the one, never fails to 
 entertain also just views of the other. Per- 
 haps it would not be going too far to assert, 
 that they have a relation to almost all the 
 truths we know, in the moral, the intellectual, 
 and the material worlds. One thing is cer- 
 tain, that, in proportion as our knowledge ex- 
 tends, our doubts and objections disappear ; 
 new light continually breaks in upon us from 
 every quarter, and more of order and system, 
 appears in the universe. 
 
 336. It is a strong confirmation of these 
 remarks, that the most important discoveries, 
 both in moral and physical science, have been 
 made by men friendly to the principles of 
 natural religion ; and that those writers, who 
 have affected to be sceptical on this last sub- 
 ject, have in general been paradoxical and 
 sophistical in their other inquiries. — This 
 consideration, while it illustrates the connec- 
 tion which different classes of truth have with 
 each other, proves, that it is to a mind well 
 fitted for the discovery and reception of truth
 
 MORAL rHILOSOPHY. 237 
 
 in general, that the evidences of Religion are 
 the most satisfactory. 
 
 337. The influence which the belief of a 
 future state has on the conduct and on the 
 enjoyments of mankind, also tends to con- 
 firm its credibility. This is so remarkable, 
 that it has led some to consider it merely as 
 an invention of politicians, to preserve the 
 good order of society, and to support the 
 feeble mind under the sufferings of human 
 life. But if it be allowed that it has really 
 such a tendency. Can it be supposed that the 
 Author of the universe should have left con- 
 sequences so very momentous, to depend on 
 the belief of a chimera, which was in time 
 to vanish before the light of philosophy ? Is 
 it not more probable, that the enlargement of 
 our knowledge, to which we are so power- 
 fully prompted by the principle of curiosity, 
 will tend to increase, and not to diminish, 
 the virtue and the happiness of mankind ; and 
 instead of spreading a gloom over creation, 
 and cxthiguishing the hopes which nature
 
 238 OUTLINES OF 
 
 inspires, will gradually unfold to us, in the 
 moral world, the same order and beauty we 
 admire in the material ? 
 
 338. After the view which has been given 
 of the principles of Natural Religion, little 
 remains to be added concerning the duties 
 which respect the Deity. To employ our fa- 
 culties in studying those evidences of power, 
 of wisdom, and of goodness, which he has 
 displayed in his works ; as it is the founda- 
 tion, in other instances, of our sense of reli- 
 gious obligation ; so it is, in itself, a duty in- 
 cumbent on us, as reasonable and moral be- 
 ings, capable of recognizing the existence of 
 an Almighty cause, and of feeling corres- 
 ponding sentiments of devotion. By those 
 who entertain just opinions on this most im- 
 portant of all subjects, the following practical 
 consequences, which comprehend some of the 
 chief effects of religion on the temper and
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 239 
 
 conduct, will be readily admitted as self-evi- 
 dent propositions. 
 
 339. In the first place : If the Deity be 
 possessed of infinite moral excellence, we 
 must feel towards him, in an infinite degree, 
 all those affections of love, gratitude, and 
 confidence, which are excited by the imper- 
 fect worth we observe among our fellow-crea- 
 tures ; for it is by conceiving all that is bene- 
 volent and amiable in man, raised to the high- 
 est perfection, that we can alone form some 
 faint notion of the Divine nature. — To culti- 
 vate, therefore, an habitual love and reverence 
 of the Supreme Being, may be justly consi- 
 dered as the first great branch of morality ; 
 nor is the virtue of that man complete, or 
 even consistent with itself, in whose mind 
 these sentiments of piety are wanting. 
 
 340. Secondly : Although lleligion can, 
 with no propriety, be considered as the sole 
 foundation of morality, yet, when we are 
 convinced that God is infinitely good, and
 
 240 OUTLINES OF 
 
 that he is the friend and protector of virtue, 
 this belief affords the most powerfid induce- 
 ments to the practice of every branch of our 
 duty. It leads us to consider conscience as 
 the vicegerent of God, and to attend to its 
 suggestions, as to the commands of that Being 
 from whom we have received our existence, 
 and the great object of whose government is 
 to promote the happiness and the perfection 
 of his whole creation. 
 
 341. Thirdly : A regard to our own hap- 
 piness in the future stages of our being (which 
 will be afterwards shown to constitute a mo- 
 ral obligation) ought to conspire with the o- 
 ther motives already mentioned, in stimulat- 
 ing our virtuous exertions. The moral per- 
 ceptions we have received from God, more 
 particularly our sense of merit and demerit, 
 may be considered as clear indications of fu- 
 ture rewards and punishments, which, in due 
 time, he will not fail to distribute. Religion 
 is therefore a species of authoritative law, en- 
 forced by the most awful sanctions, and ex-
 
 :M01iAL PHILOSOPHY. 241 
 
 tending not merely to our actions, but to our 
 thoughts. — In the case of tlie lower orders of 
 men, who are incapable of abstract specula- 
 tion, and whose moral feelings cannot be sup- 
 posed to have received much cultivation ; it 
 is chiefly this view of Religion, which is ad- 
 dressed to their hopes and fears, that secures 
 a faithful discharge of their social duties. 
 
 342. In the last place : A sense of Religion, 
 where it is sincere, will necessarily be attend- 
 ed with a complete resignation of our own 
 will to that of the Deity ; as it teaches us to 
 regard every event, even the most afflicting, 
 as calculated to promote beneficent purposes 
 which we are unable to comprehend ; and to 
 promote finally the perfection and happiness 
 of our own nature. 
 
 Q
 
 242 OUTLINES OF 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 OF THE DUTIES WHICH RESPECT OUR FEL 
 LOW-CREATURES. 
 
 343. Under this title, it is not proposed to 
 give a complete enumeration of our social 
 duties, but only to point out some of the 
 most important ; chiefly with a view to shew 
 the imperfection of those systems of morals, 
 which attempt to resolve the whole of virtue 
 into one particular principle. Among these, 
 that which resolves virtue into Benevolence is 
 undoubtedly the most amiable ; but even this 
 system will appear, from the following re- 
 marks, to be not only inconsistent with truth, 
 but to lead to dangerous consequences.
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 24:^ 
 
 ARTICLE FIRST. 
 
 OF BENEVOLENCE. 
 
 344. It has been supposed by some moral- 
 ists, that benevolence is the only immediate 
 object of moral approbation ; and that the ob- 
 ligation of all our moral duties arises entirely 
 from their apprehended tendency to promote 
 the happiness of society. 
 
 345. Notwithstanding the various appear- 
 ances in human nature, which seem at first 
 view to favour this theory, it is liable to in- 
 surmountable objections. If the merit of an 
 action depended on no other circumstance, 
 than the quantity of good intended by the 
 agent, it would follow, that the rectitude of 
 an action could be, in no case, influenced by 
 the mutual relations of the parties ; — a con- 
 clusion directly contrary to the universal judg- 
 ments of mankind, Avith respect to the obliga- 
 tions of Gratitude, of \''cracity, and of Jus- 
 tice.
 
 244 . OUTLINES OF 
 
 346. Unless we admit these duties to be 
 immediately obligatory, we must admit the 
 maxim, that a good end may sanctify what- 
 ever means are necessary for its accomplish- 
 ment ; or, in other words, that it would be 
 lawful for us to dispense Avith the obligations 
 of gratitude, of veracity, and of justice, when- 
 ever, by doing so, we had a prospect of pro- 
 moting any of the essential interests of society. 
 
 347. It may perhaps be urged, that a regard 
 to utility would lead, in such cases, to an in- 
 variable adherence to general rules; because in 
 this way more good is produced, on the whole, 
 than could be obtained by any occasional de- 
 viations from them ; — that it is this idea of 
 utility which first leads us to approve of the 
 different virtues, and that afterwards habit, 
 and the association of ideas, make us observe 
 their rules, without thinking of consequences. 
 But is not this to adopt that mode of reason- 
 ing, whicli the patrons of the Benevolent sys- 
 tem have censured so severely in those philoso- 
 phers who have attempted to deduce all our
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. . 245 
 
 actions from Self-love ; and may not the ar- 
 guments they have employed against their 
 adversaries be retorted upon themselves ? 
 
 348. That the practice of veracity and jus- 
 tice, and of all our other duties, is useful to 
 mankind, is acknowledged by moralists of all 
 descriptions ; and there is good reason for be- 
 lieving, that if a person saw all the conse- 
 quences of his actions, he would perceive that 
 an adherence to their rules is useful and ad- 
 vantageous on the whole, even in those cases 
 in which his limited views incline him to think 
 otherwise. It \s2y0ssihle, that in the Deity, be- 
 nevolence, or a regard to utility, may be the 
 sole principle of action ; and that the ultimate 
 end for which he enjoined to his creatures the 
 duties of veracity and justice, was to secure 
 their own happiness ; but still with respect to 
 man, they are indispensable laws ; for he has 
 an immediate perception of their rectitude. 
 And, indeed, if he had not ; but were left to 
 deduce their rectitude from the consequences 
 Avhich they have a tendency to produce, it may
 
 246 OUTLINES OF 
 
 be doubted if there would be enough of virtue 
 left in the world to hold society together. 
 
 349. These remarks are applicable to a con- 
 siderable variety of moral systems, which 
 have been offered to the world under very 
 different forms ; but which agree with each 
 other, in deriving the practical rules of vir- 
 tuous conduct, from considerations of Utility. 
 All of these systems are but modifications of 
 the old doctrine, which resolves the whole of 
 virtue into Benevolence. 
 
 350. But although Benevolence does not 
 constitute the whole of our duty, it must be 
 acknowledged to be, not only one of its most 
 important branches, but the object of a very 
 peculiar and enthusiastic admiration. The 
 plausibility of the systems, to which the pre- 
 ceding observations relate, is a sufficient proof 
 of the rank it is universally understood to 
 hold among the virtues. 
 
 351. It may be proper to add, that the
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 247 
 
 Benevolence which is an object of moral ap- 
 probation, is a fixed and settled disposition 
 to promote the happiness of our fellow-crea- 
 tures. It is peculiar to a rational nature, and 
 is not to be confounded with those kind af- 
 fections, which are common to us with the 
 brutes. These are subsidiary, in fact, to 
 the principle of Benevolence; and they are 
 always amiable qualities in a character : but, 
 so far as they are constitutional, they are 
 certainly in no respect meritorious. Where 
 they are possessed in an eminent degree, we 
 may perhaps consider them as a ground of 
 moral esteem ; because they indicate the 
 })ains which have been bestowed on their cul- 
 tivation, and a course of active virtue in 
 which they have been exercised and strength- 
 ened. A person, on the contrary, who wants 
 them, is always an object of horror ; — chiefly 
 because we know, that they are only to be 
 eradicated by long habits of profligacy ; and 
 partly in consequence of the uneasiness we 
 feel, when we see tlie ordinary covu'se of na- 
 ture violated in any of her productions.
 
 248 OUTLINES OF 
 
 352. Some of the writers who resolve vir- 
 tue into Benevolence, have not attended suf- 
 ficiently to this consideration. They fre- 
 quently speak of virtuous and vicious affec- 
 tions ; whereas these epithets belong, not to 
 affections, but to actions ; or, still more pro- 
 perly, to the dispositions and purposes from 
 which actions proceed. 
 
 353. Where a rational and settled Bene- 
 volence forms a part of a character, it will ren- 
 
 ,der the conduct perfectly uniform, and will 
 exclude the possibility of those inconsistencies 
 that are frequently observable in individuals, 
 who give themselves up to the guidance of 
 particular affections, either private or public. 
 In truth, all those offices, whether apparently 
 trifling or important, by which the happiness 
 of other men is affected ; Civility, Gentleness, 
 Kindness, Humanity, Patriotism, Universal 
 Benevolence ; are only diversified expressions 
 of the same disposition, according to the cir- 
 cumstances in which it operates, and the rela- 
 tions wliich the agent bears to others.
 
 ilOllAI. i'HILOSOPHY. 249 
 
 ARTICLE SECOND. 
 
 OF JUSTICE 
 
 354. The word Justice, in its most exten- 
 sive signification, denotes that disposition, 
 which leads us, in cases where our own tem- 
 per, or passions, or interest, are concerned, to 
 determine and to act, without being biassed 
 by partial considerations. 
 
 355. In order to free our minds from the 
 influence of these, experience teaches us ei- 
 ther to recollect the judgments we have for- 
 merly passed in similar circumstances, on the 
 conduct of others ; or to state cases to our- 
 selves, in which We, and all our personal con- 
 cerns, are left entirely out of the question. 
 
 356. But although expedients of this sort 
 are necessary to the best of men, for correcting 
 their moral judgments upon questions in which
 
 250 OUTLINES OF 
 
 they tiiemselves are parties, it will not there- 
 fore foilov/, (as some have supposed,*) that 
 our only ideas of right and wrong, with re- 
 spect to our own conduct, are derived from 
 our sentiments with respect to the conduct of 
 others. The intention of such expedients is 
 merely to obtain a just and fair view of the 
 circumstances ; and after this view has been 
 obtained, the question still remains, what con- 
 stitutes the obligation upon us to act in a par- 
 ticular manner? For it is of great conse- 
 quence to remark, that when we have once 
 satisfied ourselves with respect to the conduct 
 which an impartial judge would approve of, 
 we feel that this conduct is right for us, and 
 that we are under a moral obligation to act 
 accordingly. If we had had recourse to no 
 expedient for correcting our first judgment, 
 we should still have formed some judgment 
 or other, of a particular conduct, as right, 
 wrong, or indifferent ; and the only difference 
 
 See Mr Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments.
 
 MOllAL PHILOSOPHY. 251 
 
 would have been, that we should probably 
 have decided erroneously, from a false or a 
 partial view of the case. 
 
 857. As it vv^ould be endless to attempt to 
 point out all the various forms in which the 
 disposition of Justice may display itself in life, 
 it is necessary to confine our attention to a 
 few of its more important effects. These may 
 be arranged under two heads ; according as it 
 operates, — 1*^, in restraining the partialities of 
 the temper and of the passions ; and, 2I</, in 
 restraining the partialities of selfishness, where 
 a competition takes place between our inte- 
 rests and those of other men. These two 
 modifications of Justice may be distinguished 
 from each other, by calling the first Candour, 
 and the second Uprightness or Integrity. 
 
 I. OF CANDOUK. 
 
 .358. This disposition may be considered in 
 three points of view; as it is displayed.
 
 252 OUTLINES OF 
 
 (1.) Ill judging- of the talents of others. 
 
 (2.) In judging of their intentions. 
 
 (3.) In controversy. 
 
 359. The difficulty of estimating candidly 
 the Talents of other men, arises, in a great 
 measure, from the tendency of emulation to 
 degenerate into envy. Notwithstanding the 
 reality of the theoretical distinction between 
 these dispositions of mind (§ 139.), it is certain 
 that in practice nothing is more arduous than 
 to realize it completely ; and to check that 
 self-partiality, which, while it leads us to dwell 
 on our own personal advantages, and to magni- 
 fy them in our own estimation, prevents us 
 either from attending sufficiently to the merits 
 of others, or from viewing them in the most 
 favourable light. Of all this a good man will 
 soon be satisfied from his own experience; and 
 he will endeavour to guard against it as far as 
 he is able, by judging of the pretensions of a 
 rival, or even of an enemy, as he would have
 
 MORAL PHII.OSOrHY. 253 
 
 done if tliere bad been no interference between 
 his claims and theirs. In other words, he will 
 endeavour to do Justice to their merits ; and 
 to bring himself, if possible, to love and to ho- 
 nour that genius and ability which have eclips- 
 ed his own. — Nor will he retire in disgust from 
 the race, because he has been outstripped by 
 others, but will redouble all his exertions in 
 the service of mankind ; recollecting, that if 
 nature has been more partial to others than to 
 him in her intellectual gifts, she has left open 
 to all the theatre of Virtue ; where the merits 
 of individuals are determined, not by their ac- 
 tual attainments, but by the use and improve- 
 ment they make of those advantages which 
 their situation has afforded them. 
 
 360. Candour in judging of the Intentions 
 of others, is a disposition of still greater import- 
 ance. — Several considerations were formerly 
 suggested (§ 310.) which render it highly pro- 
 bable, that there is much less vice or criminal 
 intention in the world, than is commonly ima- 
 gined ; and that the greater part of the dis- 
 putes among mankind, arise from mutual mis-
 
 254 OUTIJNES OF 
 
 take or misapprehension. It is but an instance, 
 then, of tliat Justice we owe to others, to make 
 the most candid allowances for their appa- 
 rent deviations, and to give eVery action the 
 most favourable construction it can possi- 
 bly admit of. — Such a temper, while it ren- 
 ders a man respectable and amiable in society, 
 contributes perhaps, more than any other cir- 
 cumstance, to his private happiness. 
 
 361. Candour in controversy implies a strong 
 sense of Justice, united to disinterested love 
 of Truth ; two qualities which are so nearly 
 allied, that they can scarcely be supposed to 
 exist separately. The latter guards the mind 
 against error in its solitary speculations ; the 
 former imposes an additional check, when the 
 irritation of dispute disturbs the cool exercise 
 of the understanding. Where they are thus 
 displayed in their joint effect, they evince the 
 purity of that moral rectitude in which the 
 essence of both consists ; but so rarely is this 
 combination exhibited in human life, even in 
 the character of those who maintain the fairest 
 reputation for Justice and for V'eracity, as to
 
 MOKAL PHILOSOPHY. 255 
 
 warrant the conclusion, Tliat these virtues (so 
 effectually secured to a certain extent by com- 
 pulsory law, or by public opinion) are, in a 
 moral view, of fully as difficult attainment as 
 any of the others. 
 
 362. The foregoing illustrations are stated 
 at some length, in order to correct those par- 
 tial definitions of Justice, which restrict its 
 province to a rigorous observance of the rules 
 of Integrity or Honesty, in our dealings with 
 our fellow-creatures. So far as this last dis- 
 position proceeds from a sense of duty, unin- 
 fluenced by human laws, it coincides exactly 
 with that branch of Virtue which has been 
 now described under the title of Candour. 
 
 II. OF UPRIGHTNESS OR INTEGRITY. 
 
 363. These words are commonly employ- 
 ed to express that disposition of mind, v/hich 
 leads us to observe the rules of Justice, in cases 
 where our interest is supposed to interfere with 
 the rights of other men ; a branch of Justice so
 
 256 OUTLINES OF 
 
 important, tliat it has, in a great measure, ap- 
 propriated the name to itself, — The observa- 
 tions made by Mr Hume and Mr Smith on 
 the differences between Justice and the other 
 virtues, apply only to this last branch of it ; 
 and it is in this branch which properly forms 
 the subject of that part of Ethics which is 
 called Natural Jurisprudence. In the remain- 
 ing paragraphs of this article, when the word 
 Justice occurs, it is to be understood in the li- 
 mited sense now mentioned. 
 
 364. The circumstances which distinguish 
 Justice from the other virtues are chiefly two. 
 In the first place, its rules may be laid down 
 with a degree of accuracy, of which moral pre- 
 cepts do not, in any other instance, admit*. 
 Secondly, its rules may be enforced; inasmuch 
 as every breach of them violates the rights of 
 some other person, and entitles him to employ 
 force for his defence or security. 
 
 * Theory of Moral Sentiments.
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 257 
 
 365. Another distinction between Justice 
 and the other virtues is much insisted on by 
 Mr Hume. It is, according to him, an arti- 
 ficial and not a natural virtue ; and derives all 
 its obligation from the political union, and 
 from considerations of utility. 
 
 366. The principal argument alleged in 
 support of this proposition, is, That there is no 
 implanted principle prompting us by a blind 
 impulse to the exercise of Justice, similar to 
 those affections which conspire with and 
 strengthen our benevolent dispositions. 
 
 367- But granting the fact upon which 
 this argument proceeds ; nothing can be in- 
 ferred from it that makes an essential dis- 
 tinction between the obligations of Justice 
 and of Beneficence ; for, so far as we act mere- 
 ly from the blind impulse of an affection, our 
 conduct cannot be considered as virtuous. 
 Our aficctions were given us to arrest our 
 attention to particidar objects, whose happiness 
 
 is connected with our exertions ; and to ex- 
 it
 
 258 OUTLINES OF 
 
 cite and support the activity of the mind, 
 when a sense of duty might be insufficient for 
 the purpose : but the propriety or impropriety 
 of our conduct depends, in no instance, on the 
 strength or weakness of the affection, but on 
 our obeying or disobeying the dictates of rea- 
 son and of conscience. These inform us, in 
 language which it is impossible to mistake, 
 that it is sometimes a duty to check the most 
 amiable and pleasing emotions of the heart; — 
 to withdraw, for example, from the sight of 
 those distresses which stronger claims forbid 
 us to relieve, and to deny ourselves that ex- 
 quisite luxury which arises from the exercise 
 of humanity. — So far, therefore, as Benevo- 
 lence is a virtue, it is precisely on the same 
 footing with Justice ; that is, we approve of 
 it, not because it is agreeable to us, but be- 
 cause we feel it to be a duty. 
 
 368. It may be farther remarked, That 
 there are very strong implanted principles 
 which serve as checks on Injustice; the prin- 
 ciples, to wit, of Resentment and of Indigna-
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 259 
 
 tion, which are surely as much a part of the 
 human constitution, as pity or parental affec- 
 tion. — That these principles imply a sense of 
 Injustice, and consequently of Justice, was 
 formerly observed (§ 155.) 
 
 369. In one remarkable instance, too, Na- 
 ture has made an additional provision for keep- 
 ing alive among men a sense of those obliga- 
 tions which Justice imposes. That the good 
 offices which we have received from others con- 
 stitute a Debt which it is morally incumbent 
 on us to discharge by all lawful means in our 
 power, is acknowledged in the common forms 
 of expression employed on such occasions, both 
 by philosophers and the vulgar. As the obli- 
 gations of Gratitude, however, do not admit 
 (like the rules of honesty strictly so called) of 
 support from the magistrate. Nature has judg- 
 ed it proper to enforce their observance, by one 
 of the most irresistible and delightful impulses 
 of the human frame. According to this view 
 of the subject, Gratitude, considered as a moral 
 duty, is a branch of Justice, recommended to
 
 260 OUTLINES OF 
 
 US in a peculiar maimer, by those pleasing emo- 
 tions which accompany all the modes of benevo- 
 lent affection. It is, at the same time, a branch 
 of what was formerly called rational benevo- 
 lence ; not interfering with the duty we owe 
 to mankind in general, but tending, in a va- 
 riety of respects, to augment tlie sum of social 
 happiness. The casuistical questions to which 
 this part of Ethics has given rise, however, 
 perplexing some of them may appear in theory, 
 seldom, if ever, occasion any hesitation in the 
 conduct of those to whom a sense of duty is 
 the acknowledged rule of action: — Such is the 
 harmony among all the various parts of our 
 constitution, when subjected to the controul 
 of reason and conscience ; and so nearly allied 
 are the dispositions which prompt to the dif- 
 ferent offices of a virtuous life. 
 
 370. As the rules of Justice, when applied 
 to questions involving the rights of other 
 men, admit, in their statement, of a degree 
 of accuracy peculiar to themselves, that part 
 of Ethics which relates to them, has been
 
 MORAL PHlLOSOniY. 261 
 
 formed, in modern times, into a separate 
 branch of the science, under the title of Na- 
 tural Jurisprudence. 
 
 371. The manner in which tliis subject 
 has been hitherto treated, has been much in- 
 fluenced by the professional liabits of those 
 who first turned their attention to it. Not 
 only have its principles been delivered in the 
 form of a system of law ; but the technical 
 language, and the arbitrary arrangements of 
 the Roman code, have been servilely copied. 
 
 372. In consequence of this, an important 
 branch of the law of nature has gradually as- 
 sumed an artificial and scholastic appearance ; 
 and many capricious maxims have insensibly 
 mingled themselves with the principles of 
 universal jurisprudence. — Hence, too, the fri- 
 volous discussions with respect to minute and 
 imaginary questions, which so often occupy 
 the place of those general and fundamental 
 disquisitions that are suggested by the com-
 
 262 OUTLINES OF 
 
 mon nature, and the common circumstances, 
 of the human race. 
 
 373. A still more material inconvenience 
 has resulted from the professional habits of 
 the earliest writers on jurisprudence. Not 
 contented with stating the rules of Justice in 
 that form and language which was most fami- 
 liar to their own minds, they have attempted 
 to extend the same plan to all the other 
 branches of Moral Philosophy } and, by the 
 help of arbitrary definitions, to supersede the 
 necessity of accommodating their modes of 
 inquiry to the various nature of their subject. 
 Although Justice is the only branch of Vir- 
 tue, in which there is always a Right on 
 the one hand, corresponding to an Obligation 
 on the other, they have contrived, by fictions 
 of Imperfect and of External Rights, to treat 
 indirectly of all our different duties, by point- 
 ing out the rights which are supposed to be 
 their correlates. It is chiefly owing to this, 
 that a study, which in the writings of the 
 ancients is the most engaging and the most
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 263 
 
 useful of any, has become, in so great a pro- 
 portion of modern systems, as uninviting, and 
 almost as useless, as the logic of the school- 
 men. 
 
 374. Besides these defects in the modern 
 systems of jurisprudence, (defects produced by 
 tlie accidental habits of those who first cultiva- 
 ted the study), there is another essential one, 
 arising from the inaccurate conceptions which 
 have been formed of the object of the science. 
 Although the obligations of Justice are by no 
 means resolvable into considerations of Utility, 
 yet, in every political association, they are so 
 blended together in the institutions of men, 
 that it is impossible for us to separate them 
 completely in our reasonings ; and accordingly 
 (as Mr Hume has remarked) the writers on 
 jurisprudence, while they profess to confine 
 themselves entirely to the former, are conti- 
 nually taking principles for granted, which 
 have a reference to the latter. It seems, there- 
 fore, to be proper, instead of treating of juris- 
 prudence merely as a system of natural justice,
 
 264 OUTLINES OF 
 
 to unite it with politics ; and to illustrate the 
 general principles of Justice and of Expedien- 
 cy, as they are actually combined in the con- 
 stitution of society. This view of the sub- 
 ject, (which, according to the arrangement for- 
 merly mentioned (§ 2.), belongs to the third 
 part of Moral Philosophy,) will shew, at the 
 same time, how wonderfully these principles 
 coincide in their applications ; and how partial 
 those conceptions of utility are, which have 
 so often led politicians to depart from what 
 they felt to be just, in quest of what their li- 
 mited judgment apprehended to be expedient. 
 
 ARTICLE THIRD. 
 
 OF VERACITY. 
 
 375. The important rank which Veracity 
 holds among our social duties, appears from 
 the obvious consequences that would result, if 
 no foundation were laid for it in the constitu-
 
 MOllAL PHILOSOPHY. 265 
 
 tion of our nature. — The purposes of speech 
 would be frustrated, and every man's oppor- 
 tunities of knowledge would be limited to his 
 own personal experience. 
 
 376. Considerations of utility, however, do 
 not seem to be the only ground of the appro- 
 bation we bestow on this disposition. Ab- 
 stracting from all regard to consequences, 
 there is something pleasing and amiable in 
 sincerity, openness, and truth ; something dis- 
 agreeable and disgusting in duplicity, equivo- 
 cation and falsehood. Dr Hutcheson himself, 
 the great patron of that theory which resolves 
 all moral qualities into Benevolence, confesses 
 this ; for he speaks of a sen,se which leads us 
 to approve of Veracity, distinct from the sense 
 which approves of qualities useful to man- 
 kind *. As this, however, is, at best, but a 
 vague way of speaking, it may be proper to 
 analyze more particularly that part of our 
 constitution, from which oiu' ap])robation of 
 Veracity arises. 
 
 * Phil. ]\Ioral. Instit. Compend.
 
 266 OUTLINES OF 
 
 377. That there is in the human mind a 
 natural or instinctive principle of Veracity, 
 has been remarked by many authors ; — the 
 same part of our constitution which prompts 
 to social intercourse, prompting also to since- 
 rity in our mutual communications. Truth is 
 always the spontaneous and native expression 
 of our sentiments ; whereas, Falsehood im- 
 plies a certain violence done to our nature in 
 consequence of the influence of some motive 
 which we are anxious to conceal. 
 
 378. Corresponding to this instinctive prin- 
 ciple of Veracity, there is a principle (coeval 
 with the use of language) determining us to 
 repose faith in testimony *. Without such a 
 disposition, the education of children would 
 be impracticable; and accordingly, so far 
 from being the result of experience, it seems 
 to be, in the first instance, unlimited ; nature 
 intrusting its gradual correction to the pro- 
 gress of reason and observation. It bears a 
 
 * See Reid's Inquiry, chap. vi. sect. 24. ; and Smith's 
 Theory, &c. last edit. vol. ii. p. 326.
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 267 
 
 striking analogy, both in its origin, and in its 
 final cause, to our instinctive expectation of 
 the continuance of those laws which regulate 
 the course of physical events, (71. (3.). 
 
 379. In infancy, the former principle is, 
 by no means, so conspicuous as the latter ; 
 and it sometimes happens, that a good deal of 
 care is necessary to cherish it. — But in such 
 cases, it will always be found, that there is 
 some indirect motive combined with the de- 
 sire of social communication ; such as Fear, 
 or Vanity, or Mischief, or Sensuality. — An 
 habitual disposition, therefore, to deceit, may 
 be considered as an infallible symptom of 
 some more remote, and perhaps less palpable 
 evil, disordering the moral constitution. It 
 is only by detecting and removing this radi- 
 cal fault, that its pernicious consequences can 
 be corrected. 
 
 380. From these imperfect hints it would 
 appear. That every breach of Veracity in- 
 dicates some latent vice, or some criminal in-
 
 268 OUTI-INES OF 
 
 tention, which an individual is ashamed to 
 avow : — And hence the peculiar beauty of 
 openness or sincerity ; uniting, in some de- 
 gree, in itself, the graces of all the other mo- 
 ral qualities of which it attests the existence. 
 
 381. Fidelity to promises, which is com- 
 monly regarded as a branch of Veracity, is 
 perhaps more properly a branch of Justice : 
 but this is merely a question of arrangement, 
 and of little consequence to our present pur- 
 pose. 
 
 382. If a person give his promise, intending 
 to perform, but fails in the execution ; his 
 fault is, strictly speaking, a breach of Justice. 
 As there is a natural faith in testimony, so 
 there is a natural expectation excited by a 
 promise. Wlien I excite this expectation, 
 and lead other men to act accordingly, I con- 
 vey a right to the performance of my pro- 
 mise, and I act unjustly if I fail in perform- 
 ing it.
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHV. 269 
 
 383. If a person promises — not intending 
 to perform ; he is guilty of a complication of 
 injustice and falsehood ; for although a decla- 
 ration of present intention does not amount to 
 a promise, every promise involves a declara- 
 tion of present intention. 
 
 284. In the cases which have been hither- 
 to mentioned, the practice of Veracity is se- 
 cured, to a considerable extent, in modern 
 Europe, by the received maxims of Honour, 
 v/hich brand with infamy every palpable de- 
 viation from the truth in matters of fact ; or 
 in the fulfilment of promises. Veracity, how- 
 ever, considered as a moral duty, is not con- 
 fined to sincerity in the use of speech ; but 
 prohibits every circumstance in our external 
 conduct, which is calculated to mislead others, 
 by conveying to them false information. It 
 prohibits, in like manner, the wilful employ- 
 ment of sophistry in an argument, no less 
 than a wilful misrepresentation of fact. The 
 fashion of the times may establish distinctions 
 in these different cases ; but none of them
 
 270 OUTLINES OF 
 
 are sanctioned by the principles of mora- 
 lity. 
 
 385. The same disposition of mind, which 
 leads to the practice of Veracity in our com- 
 merce with the world, cherishes the love of 
 Truth in our philosophical inquiries. This 
 active principle (which is indeed but another 
 name for the principle of Curiosity) seems also 
 to be an ultimate fact in the human frame. 
 
 386. Although, however, in its first ori- 
 gin, not resolvable into views of utility, the 
 gradual discovery of its extensive effects on 
 human improvement, cannot fail to confirm 
 and to augment its native influence on the 
 mind. The connection between error and mi- 
 sery, between truth and happiness, becomes 
 more apparent, as our researches proceed ; 
 producing at last a complete conviction, that 
 even in those cases, where we are unable to 
 trace it, the connection subsists ; and encou- 
 raging the free and unbiassed exercise of our 
 rational powers, as an expression, at once, of
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 271 
 
 benevolence to man, and of confidence in the 
 righteous administration of the universe. 
 
 387. The duties which have been mention- 
 ed in this article, are all independent of any 
 particular relation between us and other men. 
 But there is a great variety of other duties 
 resulting from such relations ; The duties (for 
 example) of Friendship and of Patriotism ; 
 besides these relative duties which moralists 
 have distinguished by the titles of Economi- 
 cal and Political. To attempt an enumera- 
 tion of these, would lead into the details of 
 practical Ethics.
 
 272 OUTLINES OF 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 OF THE DUTIES WHICH RESPECT OURSELVES. 
 
 ARTICLE FIRST. 
 GENERAL REMARKS ON THIS CLASS OF OUR DUTIES. 
 
 388. Prudence, Temperance, and Forti- 
 tude, are no less requisite for enabling us to 
 discharge our social duties, than for securing 
 our own private happiness : but as they do 
 not necessarily imply any reference to our fel- 
 low-creatures, they seem to belong most pro- 
 perly to this third branch of Virtue. 
 
 389. An illustration of the nature and ten- 
 dency of these qualities, and of the means
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 273 
 
 by which they are to be improved and con- 
 firmed, although a most important article of 
 Ethics, does not lead to any discussions of so 
 abstract a kind, as to require particular atten- 
 tion in a work, of which brevity is a princi- 
 pal object. 
 
 390. It is sufficient here to remark, that, 
 independently of all considerations of utility, 
 either to ourselves, or to others, these qua- 
 lities are approved of, as right and becoming. 
 — Their utility, at the same time, or rather 
 necessity, for securing the discharge of our 
 other duties, adds greatly to the respect they 
 command ; and is certainly the chief ground 
 of the obligation we lie under, to cultivate 
 the habits by which they are formed. 
 
 391. A steady regard, in the conduct of 
 life, to the happiness and perfection of our 
 own nature, and a diligent study of the means 
 by which these ends may be attained, is ano- 
 ther duty belonging to this branch of virtue. 
 
 s
 
 274 OUTIJNES OF 
 
 It is a duty so important and comprehensive, 
 that it leads to the practice of all tlie rest ; 
 and is therefore entitled to a very full and 
 particular examination, in a system of Moral 
 Philosophy. Such an examination, while it 
 leads our thoughts " to the end and aim of 
 " our being," will again bring under our re- 
 view, the various duties already considered ; 
 and, by shewing how they all conspire in re- 
 commending the same dispositions, will illus- 
 trate the unitv of desis^n in the human con- 
 stitution, and the benevolent wisdom display- 
 ed in its formation. Other subordinate du- 
 ties, besides, which it would be tedious to 
 enumerate under separate titles, may thus be 
 placed in a light more interesting and agree- 
 able.
 
 MOllAL PHILOSOrilY. 275 
 
 ARTICLE SECOND. 
 
 OF THE DUTY OF EMPLOYING THE MEANS WE POSSESS 
 TO PROMOTE OUK OWN HAPPINESS, 
 
 392. According to Dr Hutcheson, our 
 conduct, so far as it is influenced by self-love, 
 is never the object of moral approbation. 
 Even a regard to the pleasures of a good con- 
 science he considered as detracting from the 
 merit of those actions which it encourages us 
 to perform. 
 
 393. That the principle of Self-love, (or, in 
 other words, the desire of happiness,) is neither 
 an object of approbation nor of blame, is suffi- 
 ciently obvious. It is inseparable from the 
 nature of man, as a rational and a sensitive 
 being, (§ 161.) 
 
 394. It is, however, no less obvious, on the 
 other hand, that this desire, considered as a
 
 276 OUTLINES OF 
 
 principle of action, has by no means an uni- 
 form influence on the conduct. Our animal 
 appetites, our affections, and the other inferior 
 principles of our nature, interfere as often 
 with Self-love as with benevolence ; and mis- 
 lead us from our own happiness as much as 
 from the duties we owe to others. 
 
 395. In these cases, every spectator pro- 
 nounces, that we deserve to suffer for our 
 folly and indiscretion ; and we ourselves, as 
 soon as the tumult of passion is over, feel in 
 the same manner. Nor is this remorse mere- 
 ly a sentiment of regret for having missed 
 that happiness which we might have enjoyed 
 We are dissatisfied, not with our condition 
 merely, but with our conduct ; — with our ha- 
 ving forfeited, by our own imprudence, what 
 we might have attained. * 
 
 396. It is true that we do not feel so warm 
 an indignation against the neglect of private 
 
 * See Butler's Dissertation on the Nature of Virtue.
 
 MORAL THILOSOPHY. 277 
 
 good, as against perfidy, cruelty, and injustice: 
 The reason probably is, that imprudence com- 
 monly carries its own punishment along with 
 it ; and our resentment is disarmed by pity. 
 — Indeed, as that habitual regard to his own 
 happiness, which every man feels, unless 
 when under the influence of some violent 
 appetite, is a powerful check on imprudence ; 
 it was less necessary to provide an additional 
 punishment for this vice, in the indignation 
 of the world. 
 
 397. From the principles now stated, it 
 follows, that, in a person who believes in a fu- 
 ture state, the criminality of every bad action 
 is aggravated by the imprudence with which 
 it is accompanied. 
 
 398. It follows also, that the punishments 
 annexed by the civil magistrate to particu- 
 lar actions, render the commission of them 
 more criminal than it would otherwise be ; — 
 insomuch, that if an action, in itself perfectly 
 indifferent, were prohibited by some arbitra-
 
 278 OUTLINES or 
 
 ry law, under a severe penalty ; the commis- 
 sion of that action (unless we were called to 
 it by some urgent consideration of duty) 
 would be criminal ; not merely on account 
 of the obedience which a subject owes to es- 
 tablished authority, but on account of the re- 
 gard which every man ought to feel for his 
 life and reputation. 
 
 ARTICLE THIRD. 
 
 OF HAPPINESS. 
 
 399. The most superficial observation of 
 life is sufficient to convince us, That happi- 
 ness is not to be attained, by giving every 
 appetite and desire the gratification they de- 
 mand ; and that it is necessary for us, to form 
 to ourselves some plan or system of conduct, 
 in subordination to which all other objects are 
 to be pursued.
 
 MORAL I'lIILOSOPHY. 279 
 
 400. To ascertain what this system ought 
 to be, is a problem wliich has, in all ages, 
 employed the speculations of philosophers. 
 Among the ancients, it was the principal sub- 
 ject of controversy which divided the schools ; 
 and it Avas treated in such a manner as to in- 
 volve almost every other question of Ethics. 
 The opinions maintained with respect to it 
 by some of their sects, comprehended many of 
 the most important truths to which the in- 
 quiry leads ; and leave little to be added, but 
 a few corrections and limitations of their con- 
 clusions. 
 
 I. OPINIONS OV THE AXCIEXTS, CONCERNING THE 
 SOVF.UEIGN GOOD. * 
 
 401. These opinions may be all reduced to 
 three ; those of the Epicureans, of the Stoics, 
 and of the Peripatetics. 
 
 * See Institutes of Moral Philosophy, by Dr Ferguson.
 
 280 OUTLINES OF 
 
 402. According to Epicurus, bodily plea- 
 sure and pain are the sole ultimate objects of 
 desire and aversion ; and every thing else is 
 desired or shunned, from its supposed tenden- 
 cy to procure the former, or to save us from 
 the latter. Even the virtues are not valuable 
 on their own account, but as the means of 
 subjecting our pleasures and pains to our own 
 power. * 
 
 403. The pleasures and pains of the mind 
 are all derived (in the system of this Philoso- 
 pher) from the recollection and anticipation 
 of those of the body ; but these recollections 
 and anticipations are represented as of more 
 value to our happiness, on the whole, than 
 the pleasures and pains from which they are 
 derived ; for they occupy a much greater 
 proportion of life, and the regulation of them 
 depends on ourselves. Epicurus, therefore, 
 placed the supreme good in ease of body and 
 
 * Cicero dc Finibus, i. 13.
 
 MOllAL rHILOSOrHY. 281 
 
 tranquillity of mind ; but much more in the 
 latter than in the former ; insomuch that he 
 affirmed, that a wise man might preserve his 
 happiness under any degree of bodily suffer- 
 ing. 
 
 404. Notwithstanding the errors and pa- 
 radoxes of this system, and the very danger- 
 ous language in which its principles are ex- 
 pressed, it deserves the attention of those who 
 prosecute moral inquiries, on account of the 
 testimony it bears to the connection between 
 Virtue and Happiness. And accordingly, Mr 
 Smith remarks, that " Seneca, though a Stoic, 
 " the sect most opposite to that of Epicurus, 
 " yet quotes this philosopher more frequent- 
 " ly than any other." 
 
 405. The Stoics placed the supreme good 
 in rectitude of conduct, without any regard 
 to the event. 
 
 406. They did not, however, recommend 
 an indifference to external objects, or a life
 
 282 OUTLINES OF 
 
 of inactivity and apathy ; but, on the contra- 
 ry, they taught, that Nature pointed out to 
 us certain objects of choice and rejection, and 
 amongst these, some as more to be chosen and 
 avoided than others ; and tliat virtue consist- 
 ed in choosing and rejecting objects according 
 to their intrinsic value. They only contend- 
 ed, that these objects should be pursued, not 
 as the means of our happiness, but because 
 we believe it to be agreeable to nature that 
 we should pursue them ; and that, therefore, 
 when we have done our utmost, we should 
 regard the event as indifferent. 
 
 407. The scale of desirable objects exhibit- 
 ed in this system, was peculiarly calculated 
 to encourage the social virtues. It taught, 
 that the prosperity of two was preferable to 
 that of one ; that of a city to that of a fami- 
 ly ; and that of our country to all partial con- 
 siderations. On this principle, added to a 
 sublime sentiment of piety, it founded its 
 chief argument for an entire resignation to
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 283 
 
 the dispensations of Providence. As all events 
 are ordered by perfect wisdom and goodness, 
 the Stoics concluded, that whatever happens 
 is calculated to produce the greatest possible 
 good to the universe in general. As it is a- 
 greeable, therefore, to Nature, that we should 
 prefer the happiness of many to that of a few, 
 and of all to that of many, they concluded, 
 that every event which happens, is precisely 
 that which we ourselves would have desired, 
 if we had been acquainted with the whole 
 scheme of the Divine administration. 
 
 408. While the Stoics held this elevated 
 language, they acknowledged the weaknesses 
 of humanity ; but insisted that it is the bu- 
 siness of the philosopher to delineate what is 
 perfect, without lowering the dignity of Vir- 
 tue, by limitations arising from the frailties 
 of mankind.* 
 
 * The most important doctrines of this school have been 
 illustrated by Dr Ferguson, with that depth and eloquence
 
 284 OUTLINES OF 
 
 409. In the greater part of these opinions, 
 the Peripatetics agreed with the Stoics. They 
 admitted, that Virtue ought to be the law 
 of our conduct, and that no other good was 
 to be compared to it ; but they did not re- 
 present it as the sole good, nor affect a total 
 indifference to things external. " Pugnant 
 " Stoici cum Peripateticis, (says Cicero) : 
 *' Alteri negant quidquam bonum esse nisi 
 " quod honestum sit ; alteri longe longeque 
 " plurimum se attribuere honestati ; sed ta- 
 " men et in corpore et extra esse quaedam 
 " bona. — Certamen honestum, et disputatio 
 " splendida." 
 
 410. On the whole, it appears, (to use the 
 words of Dr Ferguson), that " all these sects 
 
 which distinguish all his writings, in a work lately pub- 
 lished on the Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy. 
 
 The Reader may also consult the Account of the Stoical 
 System in Mr Smith's Theory, last edition ; and the notes 
 subjoined by Mr Harris to his Dialogue on Happiness.
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 285 
 
 " acknowledged the necessity of virtue ; or 
 " allowed, that in every well-directed pursuit 
 " of happiness, the strictest regard to morality 
 " was required. The Stoics alone maintain- 
 •' ed, that this regard itself was happiness ; 
 " or that to run the course of an active, stre- 
 " nuous, wise, and beneficent mind, w^as it- 
 " self the very good which we ought to pur- 
 " sue." 
 
 IT. ADDITIONAL REMARKS ON HAITINESS. 
 
 411. From the slight view now given of 
 the systems of philosophers, with respect to 
 the sovereign good, it may be assumed as an 
 acknowledged and indisputable fact, that hap- 
 piness arises chiefly from the Mind. The 
 Stoics perhaps expressed this too strongly, 
 when they said, that to a wise man external 
 circumstances are indifferent. Yet it must 
 be confessed, that happiness depends much 
 less on these than is commonly imagined ;
 
 286 OUTIJNES OF 
 
 and that, as there is no situation so prospe- 
 rous, as to exclude the torments of malice, 
 cowardice, and remorse ; so there is none so 
 adverse, as to withhold the enjoyment of a 
 benevolent, resolute, and upright heart. 
 
 412. If from the sublime idea of a perfect- 
 ly wdse and virtuous man, we descend to such 
 characters as the world presents to us, some 
 important limitations of the Stoical conclu- 
 sions become necessary. Mr Hume has re- 
 marked, that " as in the bodily system a 
 " toothach produces more violent convulsions 
 " of pain than a phthisis or a drops?/ ; so in 
 " the economy of the mind, although all 
 " vice be pernicious, yet the disturbance or 
 " pain is not measured out by nature with 
 " exact proportion to the degree of vice." — 
 The same author adds. That " if a man be 
 " liable to a vice or imperfection, it may of- 
 " ten happen, that a good quality which he 
 " possesses along with it, will render him 
 " more miserable than if he were completely 
 " vicious."
 
 MORAL PHn,0S01»HV. 287 
 
 413. Abstracting even from these considera- 
 tions, and supposing a character as perfect as 
 the frailty of human nature admits of, va- 
 rious mental qualities, which have no imme- 
 diate connection with moral desert, are ne- 
 cessary to insure happiness. In proof of this 
 remark, it is sufficient to consider, how nmch 
 our tranquillity is liable to be affected, 
 
 (1.) By our temper. 
 
 (2.) By our imagination, ' 
 
 (3.) By our opinions. And, 
 
 (4.) By our habits. 
 
 414. In all these respects, the mind may 
 be influenced, to a great degree, by original 
 constitution, or by early education ; and when 
 this influence happens to be unfavourable, it 
 is not to be corrected, at once, by the precepts 
 of philosophy. Much, however, may un- 
 doubtedly be done, in such instances, by our
 
 288 OUTLINES OF 
 
 own persevering efforts ; and therefore the 
 particulars now enumerated deserve our at- 
 tention, not only from their connection with 
 the speculative question, concerning the essen- 
 tials of happiness, but on account of the prac- 
 tical conclusions to which the consideration of 
 them may lead. 
 
 INFLUENCE OF THE TEMPER ON HAJ'PINESS. 
 
 415. The word Temper, which has various 
 significations in our language, is here used to 
 express the habitual state of the mind in point 
 of Irascibility ; — a part of the character inti- 
 mately connected with happiness, in conse- 
 quence of the pleasures and pains attached 
 respectively to the exercise of our benevolent 
 and malevolent affections, (§ 147, 157.) 
 
 416. Resentment was distinguished (§ 154.) 
 into Instinctive and Deliberate ; the latter 
 of which, it was observed (§ 155.), has always 
 a reference to the motives of the person a-
 
 MOUAL PHILOSOPHY. 289 
 
 gainst whom it is directed, and implies a sense 
 of justice, or of moral good and evil. 
 
 417. In some men, the animal or instinctive 
 impulse is stronger than in others. Where 
 this is the case, or where proper care has not 
 been taken in early education to bring it un- 
 der restraint, a quick or irascible temper is the 
 necessary consequence. It is a fault frequent- 
 ly observable in affectionate and generous cha- 
 racters; and impairs their happiness, not so 
 much by the effects it produces on their 
 minds, as by the eventual misfortunes to 
 which it exposes them. 
 
 418. When the animal resentment does 
 not immediately subside, it must be support- 
 ed by an opinion of bad intention in its ob- 
 ject: and, consequently, when this happens 
 to an individual, so habitually, as to be cha- 
 racteristical of his temper, it indicates a dis- 
 position, on his part, to put unfavourable con- 
 structions on the actions of others. In some 
 instances, this may proceed from a settled
 
 290 OUTLINES OF 
 
 conviction of the wortlilessness of mankind : 
 but, in general, it originates in self-dissatisfac- 
 tion, occasioned by the consciousness of vice or 
 folly ; which leads the person who feels it, to 
 withdraw his attention from himself, by re- 
 ferring the causes of his ill-humour to the 
 imaginary faults of his neighbours. 
 
 419. For curing these mental disorders, 
 nothing is so effectual, as the cultivation of 
 that candour with respect to the motives of 
 others, which results from habits of attention 
 to our own infirmities, and to the numerous 
 circumstances, which, independently of any 
 criminal intention, produce the appearance of 
 vice, in human conduct, (§ 360). 
 
 420. By suppressing, too, as far as possi- 
 ble, the external signs of peevishness, or of 
 violence, much may be done to produce a 
 gradual alteration in the state of the mind ; 
 and to render us not only more agreeable to 
 others, but more happy in ourselves. — So in-
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 291 
 
 timate is the connection between mind and 
 body, that the mere imitation of any strong 
 expression has a tendency to excite the cor- 
 responding passion ; and, on the other hand, 
 the suppression of the external sign has a ten- 
 dency to compose the passion which it indi- 
 cates. 
 
 421. The influence of the temper on hap- 
 piness is much increased by another circum- 
 stance ; That the same causes which alienate 
 our hearts from our fellow-creatures, are apt 
 to suggest unfavourable views of the course of 
 human affairs ; and lead, by an easy transi- 
 tion, to desponding scepticism. 
 
 422. As the temper has, in these instances, 
 an influence on the opinions ; so the views 
 we form of the administration of the universe, 
 and, in particular, of the condition and pro- 
 spects of man, have a reciprocal influence on 
 the temper. The belief of overruling wis- 
 dom and goodness communicates the most 
 heart-felt of all satisfactions ; and the idea of
 
 292 OUTLINES OF 
 
 prevailing order and happiness, has an habi- 
 tual effect in composing the discordant affec- 
 tions ; similar to what we experience, when, 
 in some retired and tranquil scene, we enjoy 
 the sweet serenity of a summer evening. 
 
 INFLUENCE OF THE IMAGINATION ON HAPPINESS. 
 
 423. One of the principal effects of a libe- 
 ral education, is to accustom us to withdraw 
 our attention from the objects of our present 
 perceptions, and to dwell at pleasure on the 
 past, the absent, and the future. How much 
 it must enlarge, in this way, the sphere of our 
 enjoyment or suffering, is obvious; for (not to 
 mention the recollection of the past) all that 
 part of our happiness or misery, which arises 
 from our hopes or our fears, derives its exist- 
 ence entirely from the power of Imagination. 
 
 424. In some men, indeed, imagination 
 produces little either of pleasure or of pain ; 
 its exercise being limited, in a great measure,
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 293 
 
 to the anticipation or recollection of sensual 
 gratifications. 
 
 425. To others it is an instrument of exqui- 
 site distress ; — Where the mind, for instance, 
 has been early depressed with scepticism, or 
 alarmed with the terrors of superstition. 
 
 426. To those whose education has been 
 fortunately conducted, it opens inexhaustible 
 sources of delight ; presenting continually to 
 their thoughts the fairest views of mankind 
 and of Providence; and, under the deepest 
 gloom of adverse fortune, gilding the pro- 
 spects of futurity. 
 
 427. The liveliness of the pictures which 
 imagination exhibits, depends probably, in 
 part, on original constitution ; but much more 
 on the care with which this faculty has been 
 cultivated in our tender years. The com- 
 plexion of these pictures, in point of gaiety or 
 sadness, depends almost entirely on the asso-
 
 294 OUTLINES OF 
 
 ciations which our first habits have led us to 
 form. 
 
 428. Even on those men whose imaginations 
 have received little or no cultivation, the in- 
 fluence of association is great; and enters more 
 or less into every estimate they form of the 
 value of external objects. Much may be done 
 by a wise education to render this part of 
 our constitution subservient to our happiness, 
 (§ 60.) 
 
 429. Where the mind has been hurt by 
 early impressions, they are not to be corrected 
 wholly by Reasoning. More is to be expected 
 from the opposite associations, which may be 
 gradually formed by a new course of studies 
 and of occupations, or by a complete change of 
 scenes, of habits, and of society. 
 
 INFLUENCE OF OPINIONS ON HAPPINESS. 
 
 430. By opinions are here meant, not mere- 
 ly speculative conclusions to which we have
 
 MORAL PHILOSOrHY. 295 
 
 given our assent, but convictions which have 
 taken root in the mind, and have an habitual 
 influence on the conduct. 
 
 431. Of these opinions a very great and im- 
 portant part, are, in the case of all mankind, 
 interwoven by education with their first ha- 
 bits of thinking ; or are insensibly imbibed 
 from the manners of the times. 
 
 432. Where such opinions are erroneous, 
 they may often be corrected, to a great de- 
 gree, by the persevering efforts of a reflect- 
 ing and a vigorous mind ; but as the number 
 of minds capable of reflection, is compara- 
 tively small, it becomes a duty on all who 
 have themselves experienced the happy ef- 
 fects of juster and more elevated principles, to 
 impart, as far as they are able, the same 
 blessing to others. — The subject is of too 
 great extent to be prosecuted in a treatise 
 of which the plan excludes all attempts at 
 illustration ; but the reader will find it dis- 
 cussed at great length, in a very valuable sec-
 
 296 OUTLINES OF 
 
 tion of Dr Ferguson's Principles of Moral and 
 Political Science. * 
 
 IXFLUEXCE OF HADITS ON HAPPINESS. 
 
 433. The effects of Habit in reconciling 
 our minds to the inconveniencies of our situa- 
 tion, was formerly remarked (§ 314.) : and an 
 argument was drawn from it in proof of the 
 goodness of our Creator, who, beside making 
 so rich a provision of objects suited to the 
 principles of our nature, has thus bestowed on 
 us a power of accommodation to external cir- 
 cumstances which these principles teach us to 
 avoid. 
 
 434. This tendency, however, of the mind 
 to adapt itself to the objects with which it 
 is familiarly conversant, may, in some instan- 
 ces, not only be a source of occasional suffer- 
 ing, but may disqualify us for relishing the 
 best enjoyments which human life affords. 
 
 * Part II. chap. i. sect. 8.
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 297 
 
 The habits contracted during infancy and 
 childhood are so much more inveterate than 
 those of our maturer years, that they have 
 been justly said to constitute a second na- 
 ture; and if, unfortunately, they have been 
 formed amidst circumstances over which we 
 have no controul, they leave us no security 
 for our happiness, but the caprice of for- 
 tune. 
 
 435. To habituate the minds of children 
 to those occupations and enjoyments alone, 
 which it is in the power of an individual, at 
 all times, to command, is the most solid foun- 
 dation that can be laid for their future tran- 
 quillity. These, too, are the occupations 
 and enjoyments, which afford the most ge- 
 nuine and substantial satisfaction : and if 
 education were judiciously employed to se- 
 cond, in this respect, the recommendations 
 of nature, they might appropriate to them- 
 selves all the borrowed charms, which the 
 vanities of the world derive from casual asso- 
 ciations.
 
 298 OUTLINES OF 
 
 436. With respect to pursuits which de- 
 pend, in the first instance, on our own choice, 
 it is of the last consequence for us to keep 
 constantly in view, how much of the happi- 
 ness of mankind arises from habit ; and, in 
 the formation of our plans, to disregard those 
 prepossessions and prejudices which so often 
 warp the judgment in the conduct of life. 
 *' Choose that course of action (says Pytha- 
 " goras) which is best, and custom will soon 
 " render it the most agreeable." 
 
 437. The foregoing remarks relate to what 
 may be called the essentials of happiness ; 
 — the circumstances which constitute the ge- 
 neral state or habit of mind, that is neces- 
 sary to lay a groundwork for every other en- 
 joyment. 
 
 438. This foundation being supposed, the 
 sum of happiness enjoyed by an individual
 
 MORAL PHII,OSOPHY. 299 
 
 will be proportioned to the degree in which 
 he is able to secure all the various pleasures 
 belonging to our nature. 
 
 439- These pleasures may be referred to the 
 following heads. 
 
 (1.) The pleasures of Activity and Repose. 
 
 (2.) The pleasures of Sense. 
 
 (3.) The pleasures of Imagination. 
 
 (4.) The pleasures of the Understanding. 
 
 (5.) The pleasures of the Heart. 
 
 440. An examination and comparison of 
 these different classes of our enjoyments is 
 necessary, even on the Stoical principles, to 
 complete the inquiry concerning happiness ; 
 in order to ascertain the relative value of the 
 different objects of choice and rejection.
 
 300 OUTLINES OF 
 
 441. Such an examination, however, would 
 lead into details inconsistent with the plan, 
 and foreign to the design, of these Outlines. 
 — To those who choose to prosecute the sub- 
 ject, it opens a field of speculation equally 
 curious and useful, and much less exhausted 
 by moralists than might have been expected 
 from its importance. 
 
 442. The practical conclusion resulting 
 from the inquiry is, That the wisest plan of 
 economy, with respect to our pleasures, is 
 not merely compatible with a strict observ- 
 ance of the rules of morality, but is, in a 
 great measure, comprehended in these rules ; 
 and, therefore, that the happiness, as well as 
 the perfection of our nature, consists in do- 
 ing our duty, with as little solicitude about 
 the event, as is consistent with the weakness 
 of humanity. 
 
 443. It may be useful, once more, to re- 
 mark, (§ 173. (3.) before leaving the subject, 
 That notwithstanding tliese happy effects of
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 301 
 
 a virtuous life, the principle of Duty and the 
 desire of Happiness are radically distinct from 
 each other. The peace of mind, indeed, 
 which is the immediate reward of good ac- 
 tions, and the sense of merit with which they 
 are accompanied, create, independently of ex- 
 perience, a very strong presumption in favour 
 of the connection between Happiness and Vir- 
 tue: but the facts in human life, which jus- 
 tify this conclusion, are not obvious to care- 
 less spectators ; nor would philosophers, in eve- 
 ry age, have agreed so unanimously in adopt- 
 ing it, if they had not been led to the truth, 
 by a shorter and more direct process, than an 
 examination of the remote consequences of 
 virtuous and of vicious conduct. 
 
 444. To this observation it may be added, 
 that if the desire of Happiness were the sole, 
 or even the ruling principle of action, in a 
 good man, it could scarcely fail to frustrate 
 its own object, by filling his mind with anxious 
 conjectures about futurity, and with perplex- 
 ing calculations of the various chances of good
 
 302 OUTLINES OF 
 
 and evil. Whereas he, whose ruling princi- 
 ple of action is a Sense of Duty, conducts him- 
 self in the business of life with boldness, con- 
 sistency, and dignity, and finds himself re- 
 warded by that happiness which so often 
 eludes the pursuit of those who exert every 
 faculty of the mind, in order to attain it.
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 303 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 OF THE DIFFERENT THEORIES WHICH HAVE 
 BEEN FORMED CONCERNING THE OBJECT 
 OF MORAL APPROBATION. 
 
 445. It was before remarked, (§ 245.), that 
 the different Theories of Virtue which have 
 prevailed in modern times, have arisen chief- 
 ly from attempts to trace all the branches of 
 our duty to one principle of action ; such as 
 a rational Self-love, Benevolence, Justice, or 
 a disposition to obey the will of God. 
 
 446. That none of these Theories is agree- 
 able to fact, may be collected from the rea- 
 sonings which have been already stated. The 
 harmony, however, which exists among our 
 various good dispositions, and their general 
 coincidence in determining us to tlic same
 
 304 OUTLINES OF 
 
 course of life, bestows on all of them, when 
 skilfully proposed, a certain degree of plausi- 
 bility. 
 
 447. The systenaatical spirit, from which 
 they have taken their rise, although a fertile 
 source of error, has not been without its use ; 
 inasmuch as it has roused the attention of 
 ingenious men to the most important of all 
 studies ; that of the end and destination of 
 human life. The facility, at the same time, 
 with which so great a variety of consequences 
 may be all traced from distinct principles, af- 
 fords a demonstration of that unity and con- 
 sistency of design, which is no less conspicuous 
 in the moral, than in the material world.
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 305 
 
 SECTION V. 
 OF THE GENERAL DEFINITION OF VIRTUE. 
 
 448. The various duties which have now 
 been considered, all agree with each other 
 in one common quality, that of being obli- 
 gatory on rational and voluntary agents ; 
 and they are all enjoined by the same autho- 
 rity ; — the authority of conscience. These 
 duties, therefore, are but different articles of 
 one law, which is properly expressed by the 
 word Virtue. 
 
 449. The same word (as will be more par- 
 ticularly stated in the next section) is em- 
 ployed to express the moral excellence of a 
 character. When so employed, it seems pro- 
 perly to denote a confirmed Habit of mind, as 
 distinguished from good dispositions operating 
 occasionally. It was formerly said (§ 161.), 
 
 u
 
 306 OUTLINES OF 
 
 that the characters of men receive their de- 
 nominations of Covetous, Vohiptuous, Ambi- 
 tious, &c. from the particular active principle 
 which prevailingly influences the conduct. 
 A man, accordingly, whose ruling or habitual 
 principle of action is a sense of Duty, or a re- 
 gard to what is Hight, may be properly de- 
 nominated Virtuous. — Agreeably to this view 
 of the subject, the ancient Pythagoreans de- 
 fined Virtue to be, 'E|/? rov kovrog : — the oldest 
 definition of virtue of which we have any ac- 
 count, and the most unexceptionable, perhaps, 
 which is yet to be found in any system of 
 philosophy. 
 
 450. These observations lead to an expla- 
 nation of what has at first sight the appear- 
 ance of paradox in the ethical doctrines of 
 Aristotle ; That where there is Self-denial 
 there is no Virtue. * That the merit of par- 
 ticular actions is increased by the self-denial 
 with which they are accompanied, cannot be 
 
 * Ancient Metaphysics, vol. iii. p. 12. of the Preface.
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 307 
 
 disputed : but it is only when we are learn- 
 ing the practice of our duties, that this self- 
 denial is exercised, (for the practice of mora- 
 lity, as well as of every thing else, is facilita- 
 ted by repeated acts) ; and, therefore, if the 
 word Virtue be employed to express that ha- 
 bit of mind, which it is the great object of a 
 good man to confirm ; it will follow, that, in 
 proportion as he approaches to it, his efforts 
 of self-denial must diminish ; and that all oc- 
 casion for them would cease, if his end were 
 completely attained.
 
 308 OUTLINES OF 
 
 SECTION VI. 
 
 OF AN AMBIGUITY IN THE WORDS RIGHT 
 AND AVRONG, VIRTUE AND VICE. 
 
 451. The epithets Kight and Wrong, Vir- 
 tuous and Vicious, are applied sometimes to 
 external actions, and sometimes to the inten- 
 tions of the agent. A similar ambiguity may- 
 be remarked in the corresponding words in 
 other languages. 
 
 452. The distinction made by some moral- 
 ists, between Absolute and Relative Recti- 
 tude, was introduced, in order to obviate the 
 confusion of ideas which this ambiguity has 
 a tendency to produce ; and it is a distinction 
 of so great importance, as to merit a particu- 
 lar illustration in a system of Ethics.
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. *09 
 
 453. An action may be said to be Abso- 
 lutely right, when it is in every respect suit- 
 able to the circumstances in which the a- 
 gent is placed : or, in other w^ords, when it 
 is such, as, with perfectly good intentions, 
 under the guidance of an enlightened and 
 well-informed understanding, he would have 
 performed. 
 
 454. An action may be said to be Relative- 
 ly right, when the intentions of the agent are 
 sincerely good ; — whether his conduct be suit- 
 able to his circumstances or not. 
 
 455. According to these definitions, an 
 action may be right, in one sense; and 
 wrong in another : — An ambiguity in lan- 
 guage, which, how obvious soever, has not 
 always been attended to by the writers on 
 morals. 
 
 456. It is the relative rectitude of an ac- 
 tion which determines the moral desert of 
 the agent ; but it is its absolute rectitude
 
 310 OUTLINES OF 
 
 which determines its utihty to his worldly 
 interests, and to the welfare of Society. — And 
 it is only so far as relative and absolute recti- 
 tude coincide, that utility can be affirmed to 
 be a quality of virtue. 
 
 457. A strong sense of duty will indeed in- 
 duce us to avail ourselves of all the talents we 
 possess, and of all the information within our 
 reach, to act agreeably to the rules of abso- 
 lute rectitude. And, if we fail in doing so, 
 our negligence is criminal. But, still in 
 every particular instance, our duty consists 
 in doing what appears to us to be right at 
 the time ; and if, while we follow this rule, 
 we should incur any blame, our demerit 
 does not arise from acting according to an er- 
 roneous judgment, but from our previous mis- 
 employment of the means we possessed, for 
 correcting the errors to which our judgment 
 is liable.
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 311 
 
 458. From these principles it follows, That 
 actions, although materially right, are not 
 meritorious with respect to the agent, unless 
 performed from a sense of duty. This sense 
 necessarily accompanies every action which 
 is an object of moral approbation.
 
 312 OUTLINES OF 
 
 SECTION VII. 
 
 or THE OFFICE AND USE OF REASON IN THE 
 PRACTICE OF MORALITY. 
 
 459. It was observed (§ 457.), that a strong 
 sense of duty, while it leads us to cultivate 
 with care our good dispositions, will induce 
 us to avail ourselves of all the means in our 
 power for the wise regulation of our external 
 conduct. The occasions on which it is neces- 
 sary for us to employ our reason in this way, 
 are chiefly the three following. 
 
 (1.) When we have groimd for suspecting 
 that our moral judgments and feelings may 
 have been warped and perverted by the pre- 
 judices of education.
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 313 
 
 (2.) When there appears to be an interfe- 
 rence between different duties, so as to ren- 
 der it doubtful in what the exact propriety 
 of conduct consists. — To this head may be 
 referred those cases in which the rights of 
 different parties are concerned. 
 
 (3.) When the ends at which our duty 
 prompts us to aim, are to be accomplished 
 by means which require choice and delibera- 
 tion. 
 
 460. It is owing to the last of these con- 
 siderations, that the study of happiness, both 
 private and public, becomes an important 
 part of the science of Ethics. Indeed, with- 
 out this study, the best dispositions of the 
 heart, whether relating to ourselves or to 
 others, may be in a great measure useless. 
 
 461. The subject of happiness, so far as 
 relates to the Individual, has been already 
 considered. The great extent and difficulty 
 of those inquiries, whicli Ikivo for their ob-
 
 314 OUTLINES. 
 
 ject to ascertain what constitutes the hap- 
 piness of a Community, and by what means 
 it may be most effectually promoted, make 
 it necessary to separate them from the other 
 questions of Ethics, and to form them into a 
 distinct branch of the science. 
 
 462. It is not, however, in this respect a- 
 lone, that politics is connected with the other 
 branches of Moral Philosophy. The provi- 
 sions which nature has made for the intel- 
 lectual and moral progress of the species, all 
 suppose the existence of the political union : 
 And the particular form, which this union 
 happens, in the case of any Community, to 
 assume, determines many of the most import- 
 ant circumstances in the character of the 
 people, and many of those opinions and habits 
 which affect the happiness of private life. 
 
 END OF THE SECOND PART.
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 OUTLINES 
 
 OF 
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 PART III. 
 
 OF MAN CONSIDERED AS THE MEMBER OF 
 A POLITCAL BODY. * 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 OF THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL SOCIETY. 
 
 Article I. 
 
 Of the Principles in Human Nature, and 
 of the Circumstances in the condition of Man- 
 kind, which lay the Foundation of the Politi- 
 cal Union. 
 
 * See Preface.
 
 316 OUTLINES OF 
 
 Article II. 
 Of the Principles and Circumstances, which 
 lay the Foundation of the Progress of Society. 
 
 Article III. 
 
 Of the Institution of Marriage ; and its 
 Consequences, Political and Moral. 
 
 Article IV. 
 Of the Condition and the Character of the 
 Sexes, as they are modified by different States 
 of Society. 
 
 Article V. 
 Of the History of Property, considered in 
 relation to Human Improvement and Happi- 
 ness. 
 
 Article VI 
 
 ii>ii 
 the Sciences 
 
 Of the Orio-in and Proi>Tess of the Arts and
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 317 
 
 Article VII. 
 Of the Origin and Progress of Commerce. 
 
 Article VIII. 
 Of the Origin and Progress of Government, 
 Rank, and Subordination. 
 
 Article IX. 
 Of the Origin and Progress of Municipal 
 Systems of Jurisprudence. 
 
 Article X. 
 Of Diversities in the History of the Species, 
 arising from the influence of Climate and Si- 
 tuation. 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LEGIS- 
 LATION AND GOVERNMENT. 
 
 SECT. I. 
 OF political (ECONOMY. 
 
 Article I. 
 
 Of the Writings of Grotkis and his Succes- 
 sors, on Natural Jurisprudence, and their in-
 
 318 OUTLINES OF 
 
 fliience in suggesting the Modern Speculations 
 concerning Political Economy. 
 
 Article II. 
 
 Of the Objects of Political Economy, and 
 the more important general Conclusions to 
 which the Study of it has lead. 
 
 Article III. 
 
 Of the Coincidence of the Principles of 
 Justice and of Expediency, in the Political 
 Conclusions to which they lead. 
 
 Article IV. 
 
 Of the Connection between just Views of 
 Political Economy, and the Intellectual and 
 Moral Improvement of Mankind.
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 319 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 SECT. II. 
 
 OF THE DIFFERENT FUNCTIONS OF GOVERN- 
 MENT ; AND OF THE VARIOUS FORMS IN 
 WHICH THEY ARE COMBINED IN THE CON- 
 STITUTIONS OF DIFFERENT STATES. 
 
 Article I. 
 
 Of the Legislative, Judicial, and Executive 
 
 Powers. 
 
 Article II. 
 
 Of the Simple Forms of Government, ac- 
 cording to the definitions of speculative Po- 
 liticians ; and of the Uses to whicli this theo- 
 retical view of the subject is subservient, in 
 the examination of actual Constitutions. 
 
 Article HI. 
 Of Mixed Governments. 
 
 Article IV. 
 Of the English Constitution.
 
 320 OUTLINES OF 
 
 Article V. 
 
 Of the Influence of Forms of Government 
 on National Character and Manners. 
 
 Article VI. 
 
 Of the Duties arising from the Political 
 Union. 
 
 Article VII. 
 
 Of the Political Relations of different States 
 to each other ; and of the Laws of Morality 
 as applicable to Nations. 
 
 FINIS. 
 
 AUCHIE, PRINTER, EDINBURGH.
 
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