INTRODUCTORY PHILOSOPHY
J. F. SOLLIER, S.T.D.,
Provincial S.M.
Smprimatttt :
^ JOHN CARDINAL FARLEY,
Archbishop of New York.
February 7th, 1912.
INTRODUCTORY
PHILOSOPHY
A TEXT-BOOK
FOR COLLEGES AND
HIGH SCHOOLS
BY
CHARLES A. DUBRAY, S.M., PH. D.
PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY AT THE
MARIST COLLEGE, WASHINGTON, D.C.
LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.
FOURTH AVENUE & 30rn STREET, NEW YORK
LONDON, BOMBAY AND CALCUTTA
1912
COPYRIGHT, IQI2, BY
LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO,
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
THB. PLIMPTON-PRESS
[ W D O ]
NORWOOD. MASS'U'S'A
PREFACE
THE efforts which have been made in recent years to provide
the beginner in philosophy with a text-book suited to his needs
are justified both by the importance of the subject and by the
requirements of educational method. It is obvious that an intro-
duction should really introduce, in other words that it should
present philosophy in such a way as to arouse the student's interest,
give him a firm grasp of essentials, and encourage him to further
study. But how these results are to be secured is still an open
question. The books that have so far appeared have, each from
its own point of view, distinct advantages either as outlining the
history of philosophical problems, or as setting forth the claims of
rival systems, or as explaining the principles which serve as the
foundation of some special system and a basis of criticism in dis-
cussing variant theories. An introduction that will combine these
several utilities seems to be our present need.
Dr. Dubray's aim in this volume is to lead the student by easy
approaches into the field of philosophy and to show him its divisions
with their several problems and the solutions which these have
received. In accordance with the principles of correct method,
the knowledge which the student has already acquired is made to
serve as the starting-point, and from this he is led on to the con-
sideration of more abstract philosophical concepts and theories.
These again are presented in clear statement and orderly sequence,
with sufficient indication of outstanding questions, yet without the
excess of detail which sometimes destroys proportion or results in
narrowness of view. At the same time, definite conclusions are
presented with the evidence on which they rest, so that the student
may get from his use of the book not merely a lot of vague question-
ings, but a certain amount of positive knowledge and critical
direction for later investigation.
247041
VI PREFACE
Students of Catholic philosophy will appreciate both the form
and the content of this manual. While adhering to the principles
of Scholasticism, the author has kept steadily in view the develop-
ment of modern philosophy and the recent advances of science.
It is not possible of course to effect a conciliation all along the line
where the aim is rather to open up the whole subject. But impor-
tant service, can be rendered by illustrating the method by which
the old and the new may be combined. This feature of the book
is the more helpful because the student, working simultaneously in
other departments of knowledge, is sure to come upon problems
which lead up to philosophy. This is true not only of the physical
and biological sciences, but also of the social and historical. In
each of these, whatever be the special subject of study, there is
needed a certain seasoning of philosophical principle and method
in order that the student may see scientific facts, not in their first
crudeness or isolation, but as parts of a larger truth. In this way
he will not only give to each item of knowledge its proportionate
value, but will also form the habit of philosophical thinking, which
in itself is the best result that can be derived from an introductory
course.
In Catholic colleges, importance has always been attached to
the study of philosophy both as a means of culture and as a source
of information regarding the great truths which are influential in
supporting Christian belief and in shaping character. It is rightly
considered essential for every graduate to have a training in logic
and in the fundamentals of psychology, ethics, and metaphysics.
But if this training is to be successful, philosophy must be presented
not as a complex of abstruse speculations on far-off inaccessible
topics, but as a system of truths that enter with vital consequence
into our ordinary thinking and our everyday conduct. For be-
ginners especially it is not the best plan to take up first the science
and art of reasoning where the formal treatment predominates.
On the other hand, the study of logic itself becomes more attractive
when it follows that of ethics or psychology. There is yet consider-
able difference of opinion as to which of the philosophical disciplines
should have precedence; but if the choice is to be made with due
regard to the scientific subjects which have previously been studied,
PREFACE Vll
psychology would seem to have the strongest claim. The recogni-
tion of the value of its empirical methods is quite compatible with
the philosophical discussion of its central problems, and its own
conclusions find numerous applications in other fields of research.
Teachers of philosophy realize that the difficulties encountered
in an introductory course can, in part at least, be overcome by the
use of a suitable text-book. As it is not desirable that the student ,y
should memorize a set of formulae for the purpose of recitation orr
examination, it is also unwise to expand each topic in such lengthy'
fulness that no margin is left for individual thinking. The con-
ciseness that marked the writings of the great Schoolmen is an
art that may yet be revived. It leaves the teacher scope to de-
velop the text, to suggest new points of view, and to select special
topics for discussion. The best features of the lecture method may
in this way be added to the ordinary class exercise and the student
be gradually led on to examine each statement in the light of
established principles and with a single eye for the truth which
is the attitude and temper of the really critical mind.
Dr. Dubray has profited by his experience as a teacher, and in
this volume he offers the results with the hope that they may be
useful to others. He has certainly contributed his share toward
encouraging the beginner in philosophy and has indicated a line
of approach which is neither too steep nor too easy. If it smoothes
out some of the hard places, it leaves ample room for hard thinking.
EDWARD A. PACE
THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA
March 7, 1912
CONTENTS
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
I. THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY 3
1. What has been done already 3
2. What remains to be done 4
3. Definition of philosophy 7.*
4. Division of philosophy 9
5. Method of philosophy n
II. GENERAL VIEW OF THE WORLD AND OF MAN 13
1. The self and the not-self 13
2. The not-self and its obvious characteristics . . . . . . . 15
3. Relations of the self with the external world 17
4. Obvious characteristics of the self 19
PSYCHOLOGY, OR THE EMPIRICAL STUDY OF
THE MIND
INTRODUCTION
I. THE NATURE OF PSYCHOLOGY 22
1. Definition and subject-matter 22
2. Method of psychology . 26
3. Division of mental processes 27
II. THE GENERAL LAWS OF THE MIND 29
1. A danger to be avoided 29
2. General processes and attitudes of the mind 31
3. General laws of the mind 35
CHAPTER I
KNOWLEDGE
PRELIMINARY REMARKS 40
ARTICLE I. SENSE PRESENTATION
I. SENSATION 44
1. Sensation in general 44
2. Internal or general sensations 46
iz
X CONTENTS
3. External sensations 46
(a) Smell and taste 47
(6) Touch 49
(c) Hearing 5 1
(d) Vision 52
4. Number and comparison of the senses 53
5. Psychophysics and psychophysiology 56
II. PERCEPTION 62
1. Analysis and genesis of sense-perception 62
2. Perceptions of smell and taste 64
3. Auditory perceptions 65
4. Tactual perceptions 66
5. Visual perceptions 67
ARTICLE II. SENSE REPRESENTATION
I. THE MENTAL IMAGE 71
1. Nature of the image 71
2. Properties of the image 73
3. Association and its laws 76
II. IMAGINATION 78
1. Nature of imagination 78
2. Importance of imagination 79
3. Training of the imagination 81
III. MEMORY 83
1. Nature of memory 83
2. Qualities and conditions of a good memory ....... 85
3. Culture of memory 86
4. Time-perception 88
IV. ILLUSIONS or THE SENSES 89
1. Nature of illusions and hallucinations 89
2. Main causes of illusions and hallucinations 90
ARTICLE III. CONCEPTION
I. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CONCEPT 92
1. Various terms explained 92
2. The essential characteristics of the concept 94
II. GENESIS OF THE CONCEPT 9 8
1. Various proposed systems 08
2. Discussion of the systems , . , 102
ARTICLE IV. JUDGMENT
I. NATURE OF THE JUDGMENT I07
1. The psychological process I0 y
2. Various kinds of judgments IO 8
CONTENTS xi
II. GENESIS OF THE JUDGMENT no
1. General no
2. Genesis of necessary judgments .112
3. Genesis of mediate judgments. Inference. Reasoning . . . 115
4. The processes of judging and reasoning in ordinary life . . . 117
ARTICLE V. LANGUAGE
I. THE FUNCTION OF LANGUAGE 122
1. Signs in general. Signs of mental processes 122
2. Special signs of intellectual ideas. Language 124
II. LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT 126
1. In the speaker or writer 126
2. In the hearer or reader 128
REMARKS ON THIS CHAPTER .129
1. General conspectus of cognitive faculties 129
2. Genesis of some ideas and principles 131
3. Development of intellectual cognition 133
CHAPTER II
FEELING
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 137
ARTICLE I. FEELINGS OF PLEASURE AND PAIN
I. NATURE AND LAWS OF THESE FEELINGS 139
1. Nature of the feelings 139
2. Laws of feelings 140
II. IMPORTANCE OF FEELINGS .142
ARTICLE II. EMOTIONS
I. SELF-REGARDING EMOTIONS 145
II. ALTRUISTIC EMOTIONS 148
ARTICLE III. SENTIMENTS
I. INTELLECTUAL SENTIMENTS 153
II. ^ESTHETIC SENTIMENTS 155
III. MORAL SENTIMENTS . 157
IV. RELIGIOUS SENTIMENTS 158
CONCLUSION. IMPORTANCE AND CULTURE OF AFFECTIVE LIFE . . . 160
1. Importance of affective life 160
2. Cultivation of affective life 163
xil CONTENTS
CHAPTER III
ACTING AND WILLING
ARTICLE I. ACTION AND MODES OF ACTION
I. INTRODUCTION 166
1. Meaning of action 166
2. General modes of action 167
II. NON- VOLITIONAL ACTION 169
1. Random, automatic, and reflex movements . . . . . . . . 169
2. Impulsive and instinctive movements 171
III. VOLITIONAL ACTION 173
IV. HABIT 175
ARTICLE II. DETERMINANTS AND FREEDOM OF THE WILL
1. Determinants and motors of the will 177
2. Freedom of the will 178
CONCLUSION. CULTIVATION OF THE WILL 185
1. The qualities and defects of the will 185
2. Some principles to be used in will-culture 187
CHAPTER IV
SUPPLEMENTARY SOME SPECIAL RELATIONS AND
MODES OF MENTAL PROCESSES
I. MIND AND ORGANISM JQO
1. Mutual relations of dependence and influence 190
2. Cerebral localization I92
II. SOME SPECIAL MENTAL CONDITIONS 194
CONCLUSION OF PSYCHOLOGY CHARACTER AND PERSONALITY ... 203
LOGIC, OR THE NORMATIVE SCIENCE OF
THE INTELLECT
INTRODUCTION 205
CHAPTER I
REASONING
ARTICLE I. THE IDEA
I. NATURE OF IDEAS 2o8
i. The idea in logic 20 g
CONTENTS xiii
2. Intension and extension of ideas and terms . . . . . . . 211
3. Division of ideas and terms 212
II. DEFINITION AND DIVISION 215
1. Definition 215
2. Division 217
ARTICLE II. THE JUDGMENT
1. Nature of the judgment and proposition 219
2. Division of judgments and propositions 219
3. Related propositions 222
ARTICLE III. REASONING
I. THE PERFECT SYLLOGISM 226
1. Nature of the syllogism 226
2. Figures and moods of the syllogism 227
3. Rules of the syllogism 228
II. VARIOUS KINDS OF ARGUMENTS 230
III. PRINCIPLES OF THE SYLLOGISM 233
CHAPTER II
METHOD
OBJECT OF THIS CHAPTER 237
ARTICLE I. THE TERMINI
I. THE END TO BE REACHED 238
1. The nature of science 238
2. Classification of sciences 240
II. THE STARTING-POINT . 243
ARTICLE II. THE PROGRESS
I. THE VALUE OF THE ARGUMENTS 244
1. Demonstration 244
2. Probable arguments 246
II. THE Two GENERAL METHODS 250
. Induction 251
2. Deduction 254
III. OBSTACLES 256
1. Fallacies 256
2. Error 260
CONCLUSION OF LOGIC . 262
xiv CONTENTS
AESTHETICS, OR THE NORMATIVE SCIENCE OF
THE FEELINGS OF THE BEAUTIFUL
INTRODUCTION 265
1. What is aesthetics? 265
2. The place of aesthetics 266
CHAPTER I
BEAUTY
1. Subjective aspect 270
2. Objective conditions 271
CHAPTER II
THE FINE ARTS
1. Nature of the fine arts 275
2. Art and nature 276
3. The production of works of art 277
4. Classification of the fine arts 279
ETHICS, OR THE NORMATIVE SCIENCE OF
THE WILL
INTRODUCTION
I. THE MEANING OF ETHICAL SCIENCE 2 g r
1. Facts 2 gj.
2. The science of ethics 2 gx
II. PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITIONS OF MORALITY I 287
y
Knowledge * 2 g 7
, - Feelings 288
\ 3- Will 28o
CHAPTER I
FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS
ARTICLE I. THE MORAL NORMS OR LAWS
i. Definition and divisions
CONTENTS XV
2. Characteristics of the moral law 294
3. Existence of the moral law 295
II. CONSCIENCE 299
1. Nature of conscience 299
2. Value of conscience as the rule of actions 300
ARTICLE II. THE MORAL STANDARD
I. THE QUESTION STATED 303
1. The object of the present article 303
2. Different views classified 304
II. THE QUESTION DISCUSSED 306
1. Positive determination of the moral good 306
2. Morality based on a special sentiment 309
3. Morality relative to pleasure and utility 313
4. Morality dependent on reason 319
5. The ultimate foundation of the moral law 323
6. Conclusion 326
CHAPTER II
APPLIED ETHICS
RIGHT AND DUTY 328
ARTICLE I. PERSONAL ETHICS OR DUTIES TOWARD ONESELF
EXISTENCE OF DUTIES TOWARD ONESELF 331
I. DUTIES REFERRING CHIEFLY TO THE MIND 332
1. Personal dignity 332
2. Intelligence 333
3- Will 334
4. Conclusion 336
II. DUTIES REFERRING CHIEFLY TO THE BODY 337
1. Negative duties 337
2. Positive duties 341
ARTICLE II. SOCIAL ETHICS OR DUTIES OF MAN TOWARD
OTHER MEN
EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF THESE DUTIES 341
I. DUTIES TOWARD INDIVIDUAL MEN 344
1. Duties toward the person of Others 344
2. Duties toward the property of others 347
II. SOCIAL DUTIES 352
1. The family 353
2. The state 354
CONCLUSION OF ETHICS 360
XVI CONTENTS
EPISTEMOLOGY, OR THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
INTRODUCTION
I. THE NATURE OF EPISTEMOLOGY 362
II. FACTS AND PROBLEMS 364
1. Facts 364
2. Problems 368
III. METHOD 369
CHAPTER I
IS CERTITUDE JUSTIFIED?
1. Scepticism 373
2. Agnosticism 376
3. Dogmatism 377
CHAPTER II
CERTITUDES
1. Facts 380
2. Empiricism 382
3. Rationalism 383
CHAPTER III
WHAT IS KNOWLEDGE?
I. FACT OF KNOWLEDGE 385
II. VALUE OF THE REPRESENTATIVE ASPECT OF KNOWLEDGE . . . 386
1. In general 386
2. The external world 389
3. Ideal truths 395
4-~ Summary and corollaries 399
CHAPTER IV
THE CRITERIA OF VALID KNOWLEDGE
I. THE ULTIMATE CRITERION 403
i. Theories of a criterion extrinsic to both the knowing mind and
the object known by this mind 403
CONTENTS Xvii
2. Theories of a subjective criterion, intrinsic to the knower, but
extrinsic to the object 405
3. Theory of a criterion intrinsic to the object and, in a certain
sense, also to the knower 411
II. DERIVATIVE CRITERIA 414
1. Personal faculties coming in direct contact with the known object 414
2. Indirect relation of the mind with the known object 417
CONCLUSION OF EPISTEMOLOGY 421
COSMOLOGY, OR THE METAPHYSICAL STUDY OF
THE PHYSICAL WORLD
INTRODUCTION 422
CHAPTER I
INORGANIC SUBSTANCES
I. PROPERTIES 425
II. CONSTITUTION 426
1. The question stated . 426
2. Discussion of the systems 428
CHAPTER II
LIVING BEINGS
I. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF LIFE 432
1. In general 432
2. Manifestations of life 434
II. NATURE OF THE LIVING BEING 436
1. Theories 436
2. Discussion 436
CHAPTER III
ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION
I. THE QUESTION STATED 439
II. THE INORGANIC WORLD 441
III. THE ORGANIC WORLD 441
1. The origin of life 442
2. The origin of the various forms of life 443
xviii CONTENTS
CHAPTER IV
THE COSMOS
INTRODUCTORY 448
I. SPACE AND TIME 449
1. Space 449
2. Time 451
II. THE LAWS OF NATURE 452
1. Meaning and properties 452
B. Efficiency and teleology 454
CONCLUSION OF COSMOLOGY 457
RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY, OR PHILOSOPHY OF
THE HUMAN MIND
INTRODUCTION 458
CHAPTER I
SUBSTANTIALITY
1. Meaning of substantiality 460
2. Proofs of the substantiality 461
3. Phenomenalism 463
4. Multiple personality 465
CHAPTER II
SPIRITUALITY
1. The question stated 469
2. The simplicity of the soul 470
SPIRITUALITY OF THE HUMAN SOUL 471
1. Specific human activities 471
2. Spirituality of the human soul 474
3. Psychological materialism 476
CHAPTER III
THE UNION OF THE SOUL WITH THE BODY
I. THE UNION ITSELF 480
1. The question stated . . 480
2. Man, one composite substance 483
II. CONSEQUENCES OF THE UNION 487
CONTENTS XIX
CHAPTER IV
ORIGIN OF THE SOUL AND OF MAN
I. THE HUMAN ORGANISM 490
1. The evidence 490
2. Conclusions 491
II. THE HUMAN SOUL 492
1. The first human soul 492
2. Subsequent human souls 493
III. MANKIND 495
1. Specific unity of mankind 495
2. Antiquity of man 496
CHAPTER V
IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL
I. THE QUESTION STATED 498
1. Death 498
2. The question of immortality 500
II. POSSIBILITY AND FACT OF IMMORTALITY 501
1. Possibility 501
2. Proofs of immortality 503
CONCLUSION or THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND. HUMAN PERSONALITY . 509
THEODICY, OR THE STUDY OF GOD
INTRODUCTION 511
CHAPTER I
THE EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF GOD
I. EXISTENCE OF GOD 514
1. The question stated 514
2. The argument 516
II. THE NATURE OF GOD 521
1. Distinction of God from the world 521
2. Fundamental or primary attributes 525
3. Derived or secondary attributes 528
4. Value of these conclusions 529
XX CONTENTS
CHAPTER II
GOD AND THE WORLD
I. GOD IN RELATION TO THE WORLD 534
II. THE WORLD IN ITS RELATION TO GOD 538
1. The universe 538
2. Man 538
CONCLUSION or THEODICY 541
OUTLINES OF HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
INTRODUCTION 542
CHAPTER I
ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY
I. ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY 544
II. GREEK PHILOSOPHY 548
1. Pre-Socratic schools 548
2. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle 551
3. Post- Aristotelian philosophy 555
III. GRECO-ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY . . .557
CHAPTER II
MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY
TRANSITION. PATRISTIC PHILOSOPHY 559
I. FIRST PERIOD 561
1. Beginnings 561
2. The problem of universals 562
3. Mysticism and pantheism 565
4. Oriental philosophy 565
II. SECOND PERIOD 567
1. General 567
2. Philosophy in the earlier part of the thirteenth century . . . 568
3. Thomistic philosophy 568
4. Scotistic philosophy 570
5. Other schools and philosophers 570
III. THIRD PERIOD 571
CONTE NTS XXI
CHAPTER III
MODERN PHILOSOPHY
TRANSITION. RENAISSANCE 574
I. FIRST PERIOD 577
1. Bacon and Descartes 577
2. Development of British empiricism 579
3. Development of Cartesian rationalism 582
II. SECOND PERIOD 584
1. German philosophy 584
2. Scottish philosophy 588
3. French philosophy 589
4. Italian and Spanish philosophy 590
5. English and American philosophy 591
CONCLUSION OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 593
GENERAL CONCLUSION
1. The universe 595
2. Man 597
3- God 597
APPENDIX 601
INDEX 613
INTRODUCTORY PHILOSOPHY
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
I. THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY
AS the study of philosophy takes place at the end of the
college course, it will be useful to outline the relations of
philosophy to the knowledge already acquired by the student.
I. WHAT HAS BEEN DONE ALREADY
i. Special Results. During the college years numerous studies
have been pursued, and little by little the physical universe has
unfolded its secrets.
(a) Chemistry has reduced material substances to their finest
elements and revealed the laws by which their various combina-
tions are governed. Biology has manifested the special properties
of living beings, and the human organism has been the special
subject-matter of anatomy and physiology. The whole earth has
been described in the sciences of geography and geology, while
astronomy pointed to millions of other worlds which, in their con-
stitution and evolution, bear a striking resemblance to the world
which we inhabit. From physics we also know that, however
near or distant they may be, all the beings of the universe
are ruled by natural laws which all obey and which produce
order and harmony in the world.
(b) Mathematical and geometrical sciences deal with the prop-
erties and laws of quantity; namely of numbers, surfaces, and
volumes. Wherever applied, these relations, once ascertained,
will always be verified.
(c) Events of the past recorded in history have also been memo-
rized, and from the comparison of the present with the past the
mind is now able to draw useful lessons. We know the deeds of
great men in war and peace, and we are able to follow the succes-
3
4 GENERAL INTRODUCTION
sive steps by which nations have reached their actual standing in
the world.
(d) Not only knowledge has been acquired, but also the apti-
tude to express it by speech and writing. The study of grammar
and of the various languages and literatures enables man not only
to manifest his own thoughts to others, but also to profit by the
thoughts of other men and to admire the beauties found in the
various forms of literature.
(e) Religious science has taught us how to revere and serve
God. The principles of morality are the guides of human actions
and behavior.
2. More General Results. In addition to the mastering of
the various sciences, another result has been attained. Gymnastic
exercises do not merely develop one muscle or another; their
purpose is not only to make man go through a certain series of
motions, but chiefly to strengthen and develop the whole organism.
So also the mental efforts made in the different studies have con-
tributed to the general and harmonious growth of the mind. Mem-
ory is stronger; the power of attention has been increased; habits
of study and reflection have been developed. The faculties of
judgment and reasoning have been strengthened. The discipline
of college life, the obligation to follow a rule, the constant relations
with other students, have been important factors hi the formation
of character and the acquisition of social virtues.
Hence if we had to summarize in a few words the mental results
of college years, we might say that the mind has been furnished
with a numerous array of facts grouped and classified, and that
it has grown or increased in power and energy.
II. WHAT REMAINS TO BE DONE
Great and important as it is, the knowledge acquired so far is
insufficient. Certain things have been neglected altogether and
the knowledge of the others needs a complement.
i. New Knowledge to be Acquired. (a) There is a whole
world, as varied and as complex as the physical world, which has
been left aside almost completely, or, at least, has not been the
NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY 5
object of any systematic study. It is the inner world of the self,
of our own mind, with its constant changes, its successive states,
its growth and development, and its conditions of activity. You
have learned your lessons, but what is it to learn? What is the
power of acquiring knowledge with which the mind is endowed,
and how is such a power exercised? How should it be exercised?
What is knowledge itself? And when judgments and conclusions
are called true or false, questions are suggested immediately con-
cerning the nature of truth, the possibility of reaching it and of
distinguishing it from error, and the method of doing this most
effectively.
(b) In your studies you made use of your memory, judgment,
reasoning, reflection, etc., so many words which now call for further
explanation, and which suggest numerous problems concerning
the functions of the senses, the memory, and the intellect. Fre-
quently you have relied on the testimony of others; you have
learned a text-book and taken it for granted that the author was
right. How could you do otherwise, for instance, for historical
or geographical statements? But this method, which was the only
possible one, must not now lead to an exaggerated reverence for
all that is found in books or newspapers. For, how many errors
are published and how many fallacies are taken for truths simply
because they appear in print, or even because they are spoken in
brilliant language accompanied by fine gestures. It is necessary to
learn how to use one's own reason and to practise the difficult art of
criticism so as to distinguish truth from falsity, and thus to become
able to steer one's own mental life, to think for oneself, and no
longer depend too exclusively on the thinking of others.
(c) Other questions may be raised which so far have received
no answer. You have made efforts and acted for the best: herein
are included such notions as those of end, purpose, motive, choice,
activity, habit, etc., which have to be elucidated.
(d) When the working of man's organic and mental life is
understood, when we know its conditions and laws, there still
remain the problems of our own constitution. We speak of body
and mind. What are they and what are their mutual relations?
What is the origin and what will be the destiny of the human
6 GENERAL INTRODUCTION
soul? What is the end of man? Even if our Christian faith has
given us answers to these questions, what is the attitude of reason
toward our belief?
These are a few of the many problems which so far have
received no solution.
2. The Knowledge already Acquired must be Completed.
Even in sciences that have been mastered, there remain many
incomplete conclusions. They are good as far as they go, but
they do not go far enough.
(a) At the very outset, when we learn to read and write, and
when later we learn to express our thoughts correctly, accurately,
and clearly, how many problems present themselves: the nature
of thought, of correct and consistent thought; the possibility of
expressing it by means of symbols and of understanding others;
the general relations of body and mind, since, in speaking, writing,
or making signs, bodily movements are supposed to be controlled
by the mind and to represent mental processes or ideas.
(b) Historical and social sciences lead to such problems as the con-
ditions, motives, and value of human activity. We pass judgments
on the actions of others, approve them as right or condemn them
as wrong; what, then, is right and wrong? We rely on human testi-
mony and historical records; what is their value as signs of truth?
(c) Sciences that deal with the material world leave also many
notions unexplained. The very word "matter" is an enigma,
and "force" is hardly clearer. We are told of a being acting
on another in a certain way and under certain conditions, and pro-
ducing such or such results. Because these are everyday occur-
rences which have become familiar, they seem clear, and we do
not even think that they may need an explanation. And yet
if we are asked to define what is meant by activity, action, and
cause in general, and how action and causality are possible, we
find that the task is not an easy one, and that, at every step,
many obscurities and difficulties are met with. If all this were
understood, there would still remain questions which are altogether
beyond the reach of natural science; namely, those concerning
the first origin and cause of the world, the nature and necessity
of the laws that govern it.
NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY 7
(d) Religion requires a basis. It does not consist in blindly
believing certain things as true or following certain arbitrary
practices. To reason belongs the task of proving the existence
of God and of explaining his attributes as far as possible.
To sum up: The task of philosophy is to complete and unify
knowledge by showing how all the things which we know are related
together, and by examining certain notions which have a wide
range of application and cover numerous cases, such as those of
substance, cause, activity, matter, mind, etc.
III. DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY
If we consider the name itself, we find that philosophy means the
love of wisdom (<&os friend, o-o</u'a wisdom). The first Greek
philosophers did not call themselves "friends of wisdom," but
"wise" (o-o^ot). Cicero says that Pythagoras was the first to
take the name of philosopher because, according to him, the gods
alone should be called wise.
1. For the ancients philosophy included both science, i.e. the
knowledge and explanation of things, and wisdom, i.e. prudence,
the practice of virtue, and the right conduct of life. As a science
it was not limited to any special object, but included the sum total
of all knowledge. Thus Cicero: "Nee quidquam aliud est philo-
sophia, si interpretari velis, quam studium sapientiae. Sapientia
autem est (ut a veteribus philosophis definitum est) rerum divi-
narum et humanarum causarumque quibus hae res continentur
scientia" (De Offic. II. ii).
2. To-day, owing to the increase of human knowledge and the
multiplication of sciences, philosophy can no longer be a universal
science in the same sense as formerly, (i) Sometimes the word is
still applied to any reasoned doctrine or science, the main sur-
viving use being the name "natural philosophy," which is some-
times given to the science of physics. (2) More frequently to
say of a man that he is a philosopher, or that he takes things
philosophically, indicates a habit or disposition, especially in
practical matters, to refer things to higher principles and to govern
8 GENERAL INTRODUCTION
the senses and the feelings by reason. (3) Strictly speaking,
however, the name philosophy applies to the science of the higher
principles of things, to the elucidation of those concepts and laws
which are common to several sciences and which are used by them
without being subjected to any special investigation.
It is not a mere classification of the sciences, it has special
questions to answer and special problems to solve. Sciences reduce
phenomena to general laws; philosophy tries to further unify the
various sciences by taking a higher point of view and going to the
principles common to many or to all sciences.
3. Relation of Philosophy to the Other Sciences. Hence it is
easy to understand the relations of philosophy to the other sciences.
It considers the same objects, but from a different and higher stand-
point. It uses the same methods, at least essentially, although the
processes of observation and experiment have a considerably smaller
importance, whereas reasoning is given greater prominence.
(a) Philosophy completes the other sciences, (i) It considers
higher principles and causes which are neglected by them. (2) It
examines critically the value of the principles which they pre-
suppose, e.g. the principle of causality which is used by all natural
sciences, but tested by none. (3) It links and connects the different
sciences, because it considers the common principles that pervade
them all and on which they rest.
(b) On the other hand philosophy depends on the other sciences,
for it must constantly keep in touch with the facts and laws which
they manifest. Otherwise it would be a mere random play of the
mind, in which any vagary could find a place.
(c) The relation of philosophy to the sciences may be conceived
diagrammatically as follows. If we have a large circle the cir-
cumference of which represents the facts of experience, its surface
will represent the sciences dealing with different groups of facts,
and more or less closely related. These sciences may be repre-
sented by sectors the number and dimensions of which vary with
the progress of sciences and their differentiations. The circle
itself is constantly being enlarged as new facts are discovered.
Within this circle let us draw another concentric with it which will
represent philosophy. It may also vary in size; originally it was
NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY 9
co-extensive with the circle of sciences, but is now considerably
smaller. Beginning at the outer circumference, sciences may go
higher and higher, be more or less
general, give a more immediate
or a more remote explanation of
the facts, stop at one or the other
of the dotted circles; all converge
toward philosophy. Can we
reach a centre O which would
give us one general principle, or
one key applying to all sciences?
This is a question which we can-
not attempt to answer at present.
The human mind craves unity;
sciences are subordinate to one another and lead to a higher sci-
ence. All finally lead to philosophy, which always, whatever be
the extension of the questions assigned to it, occupies a central
position and from this vantage-ground surveys in its own general
way the whole field of human knowledge.
IV. DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY
i. The Various Branches of Philosophy. (a) Since the ex-
tension of the field of philosophy has varied so much in history,
and since even to-day not all philosophers are agreed on this point,
it is impossible to give a division of philosophy into its various
branches that will be acceptable to all and that may claim to be
finally and forever settled. Not long ago logic, psychology, and
ethics had still an undisputed place in philosophy. To-day many
look upon them as independent sciences, and only some of their
higher problems are turned over to philosophy.
For our purpose in the present course it matters little how much
ground philosophy strictly so-called should cover. Our point of
view is a practical one, and hence we shall treat of those ques-
tions which have been neglected heretofore and yet are necessary
to complete the knowledge acquired so far and prepare the student
for further studies.
10
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
(b) Philosophy comes after the study of physical sciences;
hence the name "metaphysics" (//.era TO, c^vo-wca, after-physics),
which is frequently given to philosophy or to a branch of it.
(i) The philosophical study of realities, i.e. of existing objects,
includes cosmology, or the general study of the world;
biology, or the more special study of living organisms; psychology,
or the still more special study of the human mind; theodicy, or the
study of God as the first cause of the world. (2) Besides the real
we have to consider the ideal, i.e. the rules to which thought must
conform in order to be consistent (logic); the expression of ideals
to realize something beautiful ((esthetics); the guidance of
our actions in conformity with the rules of morality (ethics).
(3) Epistemology holds an intermediate place between the science
of the real and that of the ideal. It examines whether and how
far our ideas correspond to external reality. Hence the following
synopsis :
Philosophical study of the
real
world = cosmology.
man = psychology and philosophy
of the mind.
God = theodicy,
relations of knowledge with reality
= epistemology.
ideal
of thought = logic.
of expression = aesthetics.
of action = ethics.
2. Division of this Course. In itself the order just mentioned
would seem to be the best. But it is not the most practical nor
the most useful because it requires too many a priori postulates
and obliges one to admit too many presuppositions which are to
be justified only later. Moreover it is true that the mind is first
objective, that it knows other things before knowing itself. But,
in order precisely to develop habits of reflection, it seems preferable
to begin with psychology. Hence the following order is better
adapted to our present purpose, because it enables the mind to
proceed step by step without supposing and taking too much
for granted at the outset. We shall begin with the psychological
processes of knowledge, feeling, and. action; then proceed to examine
NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY II
the rules of these three groups of processes. After examining the
value of knowledge we shall pass to the study of the world, of man,
and of God. The synopsis of the present course is therefore as
follows:
I. The empirical study of the self = psychology.
1. Cognitive consciousness = knowledge.
2. Affective consciousness = feeling.
3. Conative or active consciousness = activity and will.
II. The normative sciences
1. of the intellect = logic.
2. of expression of ideals to arouse certain feelings
= aesthetics.
3. of will and action = ethics.
III. Epistemology, or the study of the relations of cognitive processes
to real world; a transition to the following.
IV. Philosophical study = metaphysics.
1. of the world = cosmology.
2. of man = philosophy of mind.
3. of God = theodicy.
V. THE METHOD OF PHILOSOPHY
The central rule to be observed for the profitable study of
philosophy is: Use your own judgment and reason under the guid-
ance of your professor and text-book.
1. Eagerness to Know. (a) The main cause that prompts
men to philosophize, as Plato and Aristotle already pointed out,
is wonder or admiration. The mind wonders as long as a given
fact has not been given an explanation and assigned adequate
causes. It endeavors to discover causes and principles so as to
account for experience. Out of this desire philosophy was born;
in this desire it finds its incentive.
(b) Hence an essential quality of the mind is to be inquisitive,
to question and investigate, and never to feel at rest so long as a
satisfactory explanation has not been found. It must compare
facts, gather solutions, discuss, criticise, and harmonize them.
2. Personal Reflection. (a) This work must be a personal
work of understanding, not the mere memorizing of the words of
the professor or of books. It is true that without books or pro-
12 GENERAL INTRODUCTION
fessor the student could do very little; he would grope in the dark,
uncertain of the direction to be taken and of the value of the
progress already made. But nevertheless these are only aids for
the student's thinking, and their teaching would be of little value
if the mind did not verify it and appropriate it. If exaggerated
self-confidence is a serious defect, if man must listen to the opinions
of others, be somewhat diffident of his own intellect, and proceed
cautiously, it is also a serious defect for the mind to remain
inactive and to take for granted everything that is said without
understanding the truth of it.
A lesson in philosophy is not like a lesson in geography or history.
When I am told that Peking is in China and London in England,
I believe it at once; my activity consists only in memorizing a
fact which I cannot verify and on which all agree. But in philoso-
phy it is always necessary first to understand and verify the
truth of a statement; the work of memorizing comes last. Never
try to memorize anything which is not understood thoroughly. A
nurse is a help to the child who begins to walk; she guides his
first steps, but cannot take the place of the child's own activity;
the walking process must be that of the child. So also the beginner
in philosophy needs guidance, but this can never dispense with his
own activity. To be genuine and to deserve its name, philosophy
must be the mind's own philosophy; not in the sense that the mind
has discovered all the truths which it possesses, but in the sense
that it has appropriated and digested them and thought them for
itself.
(b) Habits of reflection must be acquired. Man is not, or should
not be, a machine to be moved at will by an engineer; he
must act for himself. This is not a book of ready made formulas,
but rather a book of suggestions for the student's thought.
(c) The study of philosophy should make man cautious in
affirming and denying, in approving and condemning the opinions
of others. If those men are not to be admired and imitated who
are never able to take a resolution, to side for or against a proposi-
tion, and to give a straight answer, still less are those to be com-
mended who have ready made ideas on all questions, unchangeable
and categorical solutions for all problems, and whom no amount
THEWORLDANDMAN 13
of proofs, however cogent, can ever induce to modify their views.
The most affirmative are also frequently the most ignorant.
In one word, at the time when the body is acquiring its full
development, let the mind also grow, and, by its own efforts under
the guidance of those who are more skilful and experienced, proceed
in the acquisition, or rather in the building up for itself, of a sound
philosophy.
II. GENERAL VIEW OF THE WORLD AND OF MAN
I. THE SELF AND THE NOT-SELF
Sciences group and classify the various beings of the world accord-
ing to their resemblances and differences. But there is one division
which they overlook; a division which, though it is most important
and should be most striking, is frequently neglected or receives
little attention; a division the members of which are most unequal
in number and extension, for it opposes one individual to the rest
of the world. On one side I place myself; on the other, all the
other beings of the world. The division of the universe into self
and not-self is a primary one, as it brings into opposition beings
that are endowed with irreducible characters.
i. Their Opposition. (a) What I call myself is that centre
around which the whole world seems to be grouped. I am con-
stantly acting, perceiving, imagining, thinking, feeling, etc.; yet
this conscious activity, this inner life, is directly perceivable only
for myself. It is my inalienable property which no amount of
effort will enable me to transfer to another. I may, by certain
gestures, speech, or writing, manifest my thoughts to others,
but they remain mine, and are experienced by me alone. Nothing
but a sign or a symbol of them can reach another mind.
(b) Far different are the objects of the world; any number of ob-
servers may study and examine them; they are not "private,"
but " public" property. If I know the existence of other minds
like mine, of other selves, it is only because I see elsewhere the
same manifestations by which I make mine known, but I am not
aware of them directly. In themselves they have the same strict
privacy which I enjoy.
14 GENERAL INTRODUCTION
(c) My self is a sanctum into which I alone can penetrate, a
within which I constantly oppose to a without, i.e. to the world
which reflects itself in my mind.
2. The Self is Primary. (a) Although it is so small when
compared to the universe, yet my self is for me the primary and
most important reality in the whole world, and, in a certain sense,
coextensive with it, since all the knowledge which I have of the
world is in my mind. All other things and selves act on my self
and are acted on by my self. I thus become a centre toward which,
from my point of view, all converge. I know, it is true, of the
interaction between them, but the chief point of interest is how
they behave, not toward one another, but toward me. In this
sense, we are all, and we cannot help being, egoists. I move and
act amid other material beings and amid other persons, but my
own motion and action is what concerns me most. The world
is my world as I know it and as it affects me.
(b) Nor does it take long for me to notice that my world, i.e.
the world as known by me, is not perfectly identical with the world
of my neighbor. My views differ from his; the thoughts and feel-
ings aroused by one and the same object are not the same for my
mind and for his. In the same circumstances we are not affected
in the same manner, and the ensuing actions are different. In
all such cases I cannot but place myself first; for what I am pri-
marily interested in is my own, and not anybody else's, knowledge
and activity.
3. The Objective World is Known First. Self and not-self
form an antithesis which is not known clearly to the individual
at the beginning of his mental life. The child lives almost exclu-
sively in an objective world. His power of reflection is not strong
enough to be concentrated on the subject or self. The distinc-
tion is for him vague and indistinct, but becomes clearer as the
mind develops.
A similar remark applies to the beginnings of philosophy. The
first philosophers of Greece deal with the objective, not the sub-
jective, world. Their theories are cosmologic, cosmogonic, theo-
gonic; the self is neglected. They are concerned primarily with
the origin of things, the constitution and the elements of the uni-
THEWORLDANDMAN 15
verse, not with the nature and functions of the self. We must
wait till the time of Socrates to find the attention directed toward
the subject, toward the internal world of ideas, feelings, and activ-
ities, together with the rules these ought to obey: " Socrates autem
primus philosophiam evocavit e coelo, et in urbibus collocavit, et
in domos etiam introduxit, et coegit de vita et moribus, rebusque
bonis et malis quaerere." (Cicero, Tusc., V. iv.)
II. THE NOT-SELF AND ITS OBVIOUS CHARACTERISTICS
1. Diversity. If we consider the not-self, i.e. the material
world around us, we are amazed at the number, variety, and com-
plexity of the beings that compose it. Their multitude is beyond
our power of understanding. Moreover, all have different natures,
sizes, qualities, etc. Whether we can find in the whole world two
beings exactly and in all details alike is a question which cannot
be answered. Try to find in nature two things perfectly similar,
even if they are the most common, like two leaves, or two
blades of grass, or even two particles of dust, and you will at once
find it very difficult. Even when you think you have succeeded,
a more minute examination, a dissection, the use of the microscope,
or certain modes of analysis will reveal numerous differences.
2. Likeness. At the same time we observe many common
features, many points of similarity which enable us to classify
things.
(a) In the first place, there are other men to whom I attrib-
ute a nature essentially similar to mine. I believe that they also
are selves. Not that it is possible for me to be directly aware
of the fact, for, although I see their organisms, their minds are,
as stated already, their own private property; but, in their whole
behavior, these organisms are so similar to mine that, by analogy,
I cannot fail to infer that they are also related to minds like my
own. I hold myself responsible for my actions, and worthy of
praise or blame; I experience a number of feelings and impulses,
and I attribute the same to my fellow-men. I cannot believe
that they are governed by the same laws as physical things. I do
not blame the stone that hurts me by its fall, but I condemn the
16 GENERAL INTRODUCTION
man who throws it at me; I judge his motives and intentions, and
treat him differently from any other being. The physical laws
that govern matter are fatal and inevitable, but man is capable of
education; he subjugates nature and uses it for his own purposes.
(b) Below man in nature I find animals with their infinite vari-
eties. To them also I attribute a mind with sensations, memory,
feelings of pain and pleasure, etc. But their mind is of an infe-
rior order; they manifest no ideas by speech or writing, and are
capable of but little progress.
(c) Men, animals, and plants, however different, may never-
theless be classed together as living organisms. They possess
certain common properties of nutrition, growth, and reproduction,
and by these differ from inorganic substances. An organism
originates from a similar organism ; it assimilates foreign substances
and transforms them into its own substance.
(d) In opposition to organisms we find the manifold beings
which belong to the inorganic world. They exist in three differ-
ent states, liquid, solid, and gaseous, and present many different
properties and activities.
(e) Obvious as are these main classifications theoretically, since
they are based on marked differences between the classes, and on
marked similarities among members of the same class, their con-
crete applications sometimes offer great difficulties. If I compare
a higher animal with a tree or a mineral, the points of difference
are clear. But when we come to the confines of two kingdoms,
it may be impossible to determine whether a given specimen is
an animal or a plant, a plant or a mineral. The principle of the
continuity of nature finds an application everywhere. In many
respects nature is like the spectrum, the colors of which pass insen-
sibly from one to the other. I see the different colors, and yet
cannot point out the exact limit where one begins and the other
ends. Between two extremes clearly differentiated are to be
found numerous transitional forms.
3. Change. All beings, organic and inorganic, undergo mani-
fold changes.
(a) They pass from place to place, sometimes with slow and
hardly perceptible motion, and sometimes with great rapidity.
THE WORLD AND MAN 17
There are motions of the smallest particles of matter and of the
tiniest microscopical organisms, and there are motions of the earth,
of the stars, and of the whole universe, carrying with them all
things, even those that seem to be at rest.
(b) Changes in size and quantity, in quality, color, tempera-
ture, activity, etc., also take place constantly. And besides the
changes which we may observe ourselves, many others are recorded
in history or inferred from science. At all times and in all things
change is a law of the world.
(c) Nevertheless the order, harmony, and unity of the world
are preserved. It is important to keep in mind this unity of
nature. We are obliged to study things separately, to analyze,
divide, and dissect, but we must not lose sight of the unity which
results from the various relations between all these elements of
the universe.
Changes are not produced at random, but form a continuous
and uninterrupted chain of events, each link of which depends on
the preceding and contributes to the production of the following;
or rather it is a continuous network ramifying in all directions.
This is another aspect of the unity of nature, a unity resulting
from harmonious succession, and which must be added to that
which was mentioned above resulting from the harmonious co-
existence of manifold realities. Not only do the beings of the world
form a series the members of which are close to one another, they
also form one continuous network of activity and causality. Every
event is determined by antecedent events. Sometimes the thread
which links them is plainly visible; sometimes also we become
lost in the investigation and are unable to trace the manifold ram-
ifications of causes and effects. Yet we never doubt that such
connections exist, even if they are unknown to us. The task of
science is to discover them.
III. RELATIONS OF THE SELF WITH THE EXTERNAL WORLD
i. Knowledge and Action. All the relations which the self
has with the various objects of the world may be reduced to two
groups: knowledge of, and action on, them. These two terms are
3
l8 GENERAL INTRODUCTION
not mutually exclusive, for I am conscious that, in knowing, I am
not merely passive and receptive, but that I also exercise some
activity, and that I contribute my share to the final result. But
such an activity is essentially immanent, that is, it remains within
myself and in no way modifies the known object.
(a) The object is perceived through its substitute, the idea,
but my invincible inclination is to suppose that, known or
unknown, it remains permanent and identical. I alone, not the
object, undergo a change when I acquire a new idea. In cog-
nition the primary direction of activity is from the known object to
the knowing mind, since the object is appropriated in the form of
an idea within the mind under the action or stimulation coming
from the object. We naturally and spontaneously believe that
we know things as they are; yet, a little reflection suffices to con-
vince us that exaggeration is very easy on this point, and that,
since frequently men have different views of the world or of parts
of it, all views cannot correspond exactly to the supposedly iden-
tical reality. This problem will be examined in epistemology.
(b) Besides immanent activity such as that of the mind in know-
ing, there is another form, namely, transitive activity, when the
modification is received in a being different from the agent. This
is what is meant by action as opposed to knowledge. In action
the primary direction is from the self to other things or persons.
That we have many such relations is evident, for every use which
we make of things implies for them changes of place, shape, qual-
ities, relations, etc. We adapt them to our purposes, and in
many ways, voluntarily or involuntarily, modify them.
2. Further Determination of Knowledge and Action. The
self's twofold relation with the world is obvious. We know some
realities of the world, and are known by some, namely, by other
minds. We act on them and are acted upon by them. There
are many forms of knowledge, from sense-perception to the high-
est form of reasoning, from the weakest opinion or belief to the
strongest certitude. There are also many forms of action, from
those which we accomplish without, or even against, our will to
the highly deliberative and intentional actions. But the essen-
tial characteristics of knowledge and action remain the same.
THEWOELDANDMAN ig
One is an acquisition, an incoming, the other, a giving out or out-
going. The two, however, are closely related. As stated already,
some kind of action is implied in knowledge; one transitive, from
the object to the mind; the other immanent in the mind. More-
over, knowledge is frequently a principle or motive of human actions.
Thus in knowledge, the object is to be looked upon as a centre
acting in different directions, and its activity, when received in a
responsive mind, produces knowledge. The sun sends its light
all around; it is perceived by a number of minds which might be
increased or decreased without changing the nature or amount of
the light itself, and without modifying the perception of any indi-
vidual mind. In action, on the contrary, the self is considered as
a centre radiating its energy in various directions, sometimes at
random, sometimes also for a purpose and in a chosen direction
in order to obtain a certain response and produce a determined
result.
IV. OBVIOUS CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SELF
The obvious characteristics of the self may be reduced to the
following: (i) Its states are manifold, complex, ever flowing, and
ever changing. (2) Something one, permanent, and identical
is the common centre of all mental states.
i. Diversity. (a) The variety which is observed in the mate-
rial world is little when compared to that of the spiritual world
of the mind. Since knowledge is but the mental representation
of things, it is clear that every difference between objects perceived
in the external world is accompanied by a correlative difference in
the ideas that represent them. It is true that there is in the world
more variety than can be known by the mind, since our knowl-
edge is necessarily limited. But of unnoticed variety nothing
can be said, and all the variety which is noticed has its correla-
tive in the mind. In other words, if we assume as common-
sense obliges us to assume that ideas are representations of
things, it must be admitted that, on this ground, there is at least
as much diversity in the representing mind as in the represented
objects.
But the mind offers another kind of diversity which is not
20 GENERAL INTRODUCTION
shared by things and is the mind's exclusive feature. Conscious-
ness is not limited to representative states; it extends to imaginary
ideas, to feelings of pleasure and pain, emotions of fear and anger,
pride and sympathy, hope and despair, etc., to moral, aesthetic,
and religious sentiments, to attention, effort, mental struggle,
will, etc. A little reflection suffices to show in all these an endless
variety. At times, the field of consciousness is large and varied,
but, at other times, it is more restricted and uniform. Conscious-
ness itself may become more and more feeble till apparently it dis-
appears altogether in a dreamless sleep, or in certain abnormal
states such as epilepsy or swoons.
(6) Moreover, mental processes are always very complex and
depend on many factors, as will be made clearer when we study
them in detail. Their elements cannot be taken apart in the same
way that an organism is dissected, but reflection reveals their
presence by showing that a mental state, even after it has disap-
peared, nevertheless influences those that follow. This is clear
for memory, imagination, and habit. It is hardly less evident
that mental processes are conditioned by past experience, surround-
ings, and education. Here the complexity of the mind baffles
all attempts at analysis. Common language seems to recognize
this normal complexity and diversity of the mind, since the name
"simple-minded " is applied to those whose minds are weak and
defective.
(c) To be constantly flowing and changing is also a law of the
human mind, and this feature is even more striking in the mind
than in the outer world. Things change, it is true, sometimes
rapidly and sometimes imperceptibly. Yet many things seem to
have great permanence; they may be observed year after year
without noticing the slightest change in place, color, shape, size,
or any other respect. As to mental processes, all are short-lived.
Ideas are in constant flux; they succeed one another rapidly, and
no sooner has one appeared than it is pushed out of conscious-
ness by another. A persistent idea is not normal. Try to keep
the same idea for some time in the field of consciousness, and you
will see how short an interval elapses before a distracting thought
enters the mind.
THE WORLD AND MAN 21
2. Unity. Under the complexity, variety, and flux of mental
states are found unity, identity, and permanence. There is unity,
for all these states belong to the same self; however diverse they
may be, all are referred to the same centre, and attributed to the
same ego from whose activity they proceed. There is identity
and endurance, for, under the constant flux of its conscious states,
the self remains, and, under the undulating surface, a deeper real-
ity is found. Such facts as memory and recognition of the past,
responsibility for past deeds, remorse and self-approval, just
reward and punishment, show that after the passing away of one
state something remains, more stable and more enduring; some-
thing related to, yet distinct from, the ever-changing surface of
consciousness.
PSYCHOLOGY OR THE EMPIRICAL
STUDY OF THE MIND
INTRODUCTION
I. THE NATURE OF PSYCHOLOGY
I. DEFINITION AND SUBJECT-MATTER
i. The Meaning of Psychology. Psychology (faxy and Ao'yos)
means etymologically the science of the psyche or soul. Formerly
it embraced all the knowledge concerning the soul, its manifesta-
tions or processes, its nature, origin, and destiny. Nor was it
restricted to the soul as the principle of conscious life; it ex-
tended to all vital activities, and dealt with life in all its forms.
But the meaning of psychology, like that of a number of sciences,
has been more and more restricted. Psychology is the study of
mental processes. The higher questions concerning the nature
of the mind or soul are referred to what is known as rational psy-
chology or the philosophy of mind. Psychology is an empirical
science, that is, its statements and laws may be tested and veri-
fied by an appeal to some form of experience. Like physics and
chemistry, which deal with material facts and laws without con-
sidering the essence and origin of matter, it considers only mental
processes, but not the first principle from which they originate.
When the term "psychology" is used without qualification,
(i) it applies only to the study of the human mind. When applied
to the study of lower minds, such terms as " animal psychology "
or "comparative psychology " are used. (2) It applies only to the
study of mental life, and does not extend to the functions of organic
life. Organic processes, however, may be considered as influencing
and determining conscious processes, and this gives rise to the
various problems of physiological psychology. (3) It deals chiefly
22
NATURE OF PSYCHOLOGY 23
with the normal manifestations of the human mind, the others
being considered in abnormal psychology or mental pathology.
2. The Subject-Matter of Psychology is what is called con-
sciousness, mind, mental processes, or mental states. These terms
cannot be denned; they denote facts which must be experienced.
All that can be done is to call attention to these facts, classify
them and explain them.
(a) Consciousness is internal or subjective experience. It
includes all those states which a man calls his own, and which
are experienced by him alone. It is the fact of being aware of
something. It includes the complex and manifold experiences
by which the state of wakefulness is different from that of a dream-
less sleep. Seeing, hearing, thinking, feeling, wishing, desiring,
willing, etc., are states of consciousness. However different they
may be, all share the common characteristic of being internal
experiences. Even in what is called external experience two ele-
ments must be distinguished, one, objective or common, the other,
subjective or private. A multitude of persons may see the same
picture or listen to the same concert. All perceive the same object,
but each has his own perception of it in his own consciousness,
distinct from the perception in every other consciousness. This
perception of the same thing arouses in one mind ideas, judgments,
feelings, and appreciations different from those aroused in other
minds. How different the world would appear to a man if it were
possible to substitute for his own consciousness the consciousness
of another man.
(b) The terms conscious process and conscious state are often
used synonymously; their meaning, however, is not quite iden-
tical. Conscious or mental state applies to the contents of the
mind at any given time and apart from their essential flux (static
point of view). Conscious or mental process represents better
the ever-moving and ever-changing character of consciousness
(dynamic point of view).
(c) Variations are observed in the extension of the field of con-
sciousness, the intensity of mental processes, and the rapidity of
their succession.
(i) The field of consciousness, i.e. the number of ideas actually
24 PSYCHOLOGY
present, varies greatly. One idea only may be present, or perhaps
a multitude of ideas try to crowd themselves together in the
mind. Sometimes consciousness is concentrated on a very nar-
row field, whereas at other times it is, as it were, diffused over a
number of objects.
(2) The intensity of consciousness, both as a whole and in its
several processes, undergoes marked changes. We may pass
almost insensibly from vivid consciousness to unconsciousness,
and vice versa. It is like the bright light of the evening sun which
decreases little by little till finally it leaves us in the complete
darkness of night. As to individual conscious processes, they
may at first occupy the very focus or centre of the field of
consciousness, and gradually move toward the border till they
finally disappear altogether out of consciousness; or, on the con-
trary, they may move from the dim borders of the field toward
its bright centre. Thus at any time the field of consciousness
is composed of a central bright part or focus, and of a multitude
of other more obscure elements which have been termed the fringe
of consciousness. It is a fact of frequent experience that an idea,
and especially a feeling, even when not actually thought of, con-
tinues nevertheless to influence, tinge, or shade subsequent mental
processes.
(3) The rapidity with which mental processes succeed one an-
other is also variable. Sometimes the stream seems to pass through
a level region; the current is slow and weak, and constant efforts,
frequently unsuccessful, are necessary to stimulate the mind and
bring up ideas. In other cases, on the contrary, one has to deal
with a mighty torrent which no effort can stay. Ideas succeed
one another with amazing rapidity, and it is almost impossible to
stop any of them. Not only may every one notice these varia-
tions in his own consciousness, but certain minds are habit-
ually and naturally slow and sluggish, whereas others are quick,
impetuous, and precipitate.
(d) The term mind (and the corresponding adjective mental)
has several meanings. In general it is opposed to matter, which
is external and located in space, while mind is internal, subjective,
and without spatial relations. A body is always located some-
NATURE OF PSYCHOLOGY 25
, Here, and has definite relations with other material substances.
An idea, on the contrary, has no size, and, for instance, cannot be
said to be on the right or the left of another. " Mind " has a
greater extension than "consciousness," for it includes not only
actual conscious processes, but also whatever has been or may
become conscious, and, in general, it is the capacity for experien-
cing conscious processes. A narrower signification is given to
the term " mind " when we say of a man that he is strong or weak
minded, or that he has a great mind.
3. Relations of Psychology to Other Sciences. Psychology
endeavors to determine the laws, conditions, relations, etc., of
conscious processes. From this are derived its differences from
other sciences.
(a) It is needless to mention how psychology differs from sci-
ences which consider the world external to man; what was said
above concerning its subject-matter is sufficient. The distinc-
tion from the sciences which consider the human organism, such
as anatomy, physiology, morphology, histology, hygiene, is also
obvious. The organism is an object external to the mind, al-
though intimately connected with it. Hence psychology is not
directly interested in it, but only indirectly: in general, because
the organism influences the mind and is in some manner united
with it, and, in particular, because some of its processes are accom-
panied by, and are indispensable conditions of, consciousness.
As to other sciences which also deal with internal and conscious
facts, they differ from psychology primarily in the points of view
from which they regard these facts. Psychology alone considers
conscious processes in themselves, as events, to find out their nature
and the conditions of their appearance. The other mental sci-
ences compare them with something else to which they have to
conform. They do not examine what these processes are in them-
selves and how they happen, but how they should happen in order to
reach intended results. Thus logic teaches us how to use rational
faculties, deals with intellectual processes only, and lays down the
rules that must be observed in order to have consistent thinking.
Epistemology examines the relations between knowledge and ex-
ternal reality, and endeavors to indicate whether and how far the
26 PSYCHOLOGY
former is the representation of the latter. Ethics considers
voluntary processes with the purpose of determining their con-
formity with certain laws and rules, i.e. of ascertaining whether
they are right or wrong. Thus the same mental process, as stud-
ied by psychology, may be, for logic, good or fallacious reasoning;
for epistemology, true knowledge or error; for ethics, worthy of
praise or blame. For psychology, it is simply a mental event.
(b) Psychology, however, needs the other sciences in so far as
they may throw some light on mental processes. The sciences
that study the human organism are especially very useful, as they
explain some of the essential conditions of consciousness. Hence
it will be necessary to study, or at least to recall to mind, the essen-
tials of physiology, especially concerning the brain, the nervous
system, and the sense-organs.
4. The Utility and Importance of psychology need not be in-
sisted upon. The maxim, "Know thyself," which was inscribed
in the temple of Apollo at Delphi, is a fundamental one. Self-
knowledge is indispensable both for one's private conduct and for
one's dealings with other men. M any sciences and arts, such as
logic, ethics, pedagogy, rhetoric, medicine, politics, history, etc.,
are based on, or largely indebted to, psychology. All need a thor-
ough acquaintance with the working of the human mind. Success
in social or business relations, even those of the most ordinary
nature, will always be found to depend greatly on the practical
and applied knowledge of psychological laws.
II. METHOD OF PSYCHOLOGY
Psychology uses a twofold method, one subjective or introspec-
tive, based on the observation of one's own mental states, the
other objective, based on the observation of the mental states of
other men.
(a) The introspective method is primary and fundamental, because
the experience of a mental process is the only way we have of know-
ing its nature. Thus no amount of explanation and description
will ever give the faintest idea of a sensation of color to the man
born blind, or of hearing to the man born deaf. If, from the ac-
tions, words, and signs of other men we are enabled to know
NATURE OF PSYCHOLOGY 27
always imperfectly what mental states they experience, it is
only in an indirect manner, from the analogy with those we have
experienced ourselves. Hence an important remark for the stu-
dent. Nowhere is reflection more essential than in the study of
psychology. To try to understand psychology by merely reading
a description of mental states, without verifying this descrip-
tion by introspection, as far as possible, is prejposterous. The
text-book and the professor are useful guides in directing intro-
spection, but they cannot take its place. The first and most
indispensable text-book of psychology is one's own mind
(b) Introspection must be supplemented and controlled by the
objective method, i.e. by the study of other minds. In psychology,
as in every other science, the observation of one instance and
we can observe directly one mind only is not always a sufficient
basis for a valid generalization. The mental processes of others
are inferred from the oral or written account which is given of
them, or from more or less decisive physiological manifestations.
Physiology, pathology, and medicine may give valuable assist-
ance in gathering data.
(c) These two sources of information must be used together.
Psychology starts from observed facts and endeavors to formu-
late the laws that govern them. It uses, therefore, what will be
called in logic the inductive method.
III. DIVISION OF MENTAL PROCESSES
The classification of mental processes, and the division of psy-
chology which depends on it, may be made from a philosophical
or from a psychological point of view.
i. Philosophical Point of View. (a) If the distinction and
opposition of mind and body were taken for granted, and if it
were presupposed that some processes are at once and essentially
both organic and mental, whereas others are essentially and exclu-
sively mental and spiritual, we might be justified in distinguishing
and opposing also these two groups of processes. But this dis-
tinction, even if true and legitimate in itself, is not legitimate as
a starting-point because it is far from self-evident. Later on we
shall see whether it is a valid conclusion based on observed facts.
28 PSYCHOLOGY
Here we are not justified in presupposing a dividing line be-
tween sense (organic) and intellect (spiritual), or between lower
tendencies (organic) and will (spiritual).
(b) If the distinction of faculties as specific energies of the mind
were admitted, we might again be led to a bipartite division into
what the scholastics called knowledge and tendency (appetitus),
or what others term intellectual and active powers. According
to this, feelings, emotions, and sentiments do not form a separate
group, but share in the nature of both knowledge and appetitus
without being adequately distinct from appetitus. The pleasant-
ness or unpleasantness of a known object is nothing but its con-
formity or disagreement with tendencies, i.e. a special aspect of
appetitus. The whole affective life is a resultant of the two specific
energies, knowledge and appetitus. But here again it must be
noted that the doctrine of faculties, when assumed to mean any-
thing beyond the mere classification and grouping of mental proc-
esses, is not empirical, and hence cannot be used at the outset of
psychology.
2. Psychological Point of View. Modern psychology does not
attempt to explain philosophically, but simply to classify, mental
processes. The classification which it offers may be more or less
superficial and arbitrary, and nevertheless be more useful for,
and better adapted to, a mere description of facts without any
underlying philosophical assumption.
Although exceptions are to be found, psychologists generally
reduce mental processes to three groups: processes of cognition, of
feeling, and of conation. The prominence given to feelings by mak-
ing them a separate class is due to the recognition of their special
characteristics and of their importance in the whole psychological
life. Feeling is the outcome of the exercise of all forms of activity,
and, on the other hand, exercises a very great influence on action.
(a) Knowledge is the presence in the mind of the idea of an ex-
ternal object; it has both an active and a passive phase; the mind
must be first acted upon, and then exercise its own activity. Feel-
ing is subjective; it manifests no external reality, and is chiefly
passive. Yet it is a powerful incentive to action. If it is too in-
tense, it tends to exclude knowledge and intellectual application.
GENERAL LAWS OF MIND 29
Moreover, feeling is of itself concerned chiefly with the present,
and is largely spontaneous and necessary. Conation is essentially
active and directed toward the future in order to produce, pre-
serve, or remove a mental state according as it is found desirable
or undesirable.
(b) These feelings may undergo different variations. The same
sound or song (knowledge), at first agreeable (feeling), may, if
prolonged (same knowledge), become tedious and thoroughly
annoying and painful (different feeling). As a consequence, and
according to the complex motives and circumstances influencing
human actions, the will may assume diverse attitudes, e.g. it may
determine the listener to stay or to leave, to encourage or stop
the singer, to make this or that remark, etc.
(c) Knowledge of the same thing, because it is more objective,
and especially sense-perception, will be more similar in the same
and in different minds. Affections are more subjective and
changing. Volition is also less permanent and more variable
because it may struggle with different feelings.
Such are the main reasons for distinguishing, in psychology,
three groups of mental processes; but this is merely a working psy-
chological classification, useful for purposes of study; and it must
be remembered that there is a constant overlapping of one group
upon the others.
II. THE GENERAL LAWS OF THE MIND
I. A DANGER TO BE AVOIDED
i. Necessity of Analysis. (a) The human intellect cannot
reach at once the complete knowledge of anything. Every real-
ity is so complex, its aspects and relations are so numerous, that
the mind is always obliged to decompose it, to proceed by analysis,
and to take successively different points of view. The physicist,
the chemist, the geologist, have to examine separately the vari-
ous properties and energies of material substances. The histo-
rian and the sociologist must consider one after another the differ-
ent phases of human events. In proportion as an object is more
30 PSYCHOLOGY
complex, the necessity of analysis becomes greater. See, for
instance, how the human organism has to be analyzed, and how its
parts and organs must be studied successively, in order to reach
even a superficial knowledge of its functions. We cannot acquire
a thorough knowledge of the human organism as a whole without
studying first separately the different organs that compose it.
(b) Nowhere is this necessity of analysis greater than in psychol-
ogy, (i) The mind is more varied and more complex than any
material reality. Yet recourse to dissection or actual separation is
impossible. Nor can we take apart for single consideration one
mental process and hold it in the mind for special examination.
A mental process, as it occurs actually, is said to be complex and
composed of elementary processes. But these cannot be really
separated in the same manner that it is possible to dissect an organ-
ism. (2) Material substances are permanent, whereas mental
processes are essentially fleeting and disappear rapidly. Mental
analysis can only be an abstraction and a process of inference.
Unlike chemical elements, which are really set apart when the
compound is analyzed, elementary mental processes, though influ-
encing actual complex processes, are not experienced by themselves
in consciousness.
2. Danger of Analysis. Such a necessity for the human intel-
lect to proceed analytically is not without danger. The danger
consists in resting satisfied with partial views, without reconstruct-
ing again by synthesis the complete reality, and in studying the
parts chosen more or less arbitrarily as units, without perceiving
their relations to the whole. This danger again is greater in the
study of the mind than in any other study because solidarity and
continuity are most striking in the mental world. One might be
led to consider a mental process such as sensation, memory, pleas-
ure, love, anger, desire, choice, action, as isolated, as taking place
apart from the others, and even sometimes independently of them,
and thus to view, so to say, a dead and unreal mind, not the liv-
ing, complex, and ever-changing mind. The mind is one. Even
if it is endowed with distinct energies or faculties, it must be
remembered that these are energies of one and the same mind,
that they do not act independently of one another, but that the
GENERAL LAWS OF MIND 31
activity of one is always mixed with, and influenced by, that of
the others.
It is in order to obviate these difficulties, and guard the student
against these dangers, that a short outline is given here of some
general laws of the mind which must never be lost sight of while
studying separately the different mental processes. On this
condition only is the knowledge of the real living mind possible.
II. GENERAL PROCESSES AND ATTITUDES OF THE MIND
Several mental attitudes and processes, which will receive a
more extensive treatment elsewhere, run through the three groups
of mental processes and influence all. Hence a few words will
be said of them here. They are attention and association, which
are of a most general nature; memory and imagination, which refer
especially to the cognitive aspect of consciousness; habit, which
refers chiefly to activity in all its forms.
i. Attention. (a) By attention is meant the focussing of the
mind on a special object or conscious process. It includes pri-
marily a mental and sometimes also secondarily an organic atti-
tude, like " stretching the ears," "fixing the gaze," "holding the
breath " in expectation. In attention the energy of the mind is
more concentrated, less diffused, and hence intensified with regard
to the object to which it is applied. This attitude may be com-
pared to the focussing of the sun-rays with a lens. Distraction,
therefore, is not the contrary of attention, but rather a form of it,
for it is attention to an object against the will, the inclination or
intention. Distraction, however, may bear on many ideas and
thus be equivalent to diffusion or dispersion of mental energy,
which is the mental attitude opposed to attention. In attention
the mind looks at one thing intensely; in dispersion it looks at
many things, but less intensely at each one.
Attention is not restricted to knowledge, but extends to feelings
and actions. Thus a man may concentrate his mind on his sor-
rows, sufferings, or joys; he may act with or without care, and care-
fulness is but a form of attention. The power of attention is an
indispensable condition of success in any pursuit. The man who
32 PSYCHOLOGY
cannot pay attention to his own thoughts, actions, or feelings, and
to surrounding objects or persons, is doomed to failure.
(b) The capacity for arousing attention is called interest. Inter-
est depends both on certain conditions of the object and on the
dispositions of the subject. Thus I may study a lesson because I
like it and find it interesting; or because, although I dislike it,
I am prompted by a sense of duty, or I feel that this study,
uninteresting though it may be in itself, is useful or necessary.
Hence, if we consider the cause that produces it, attention is of
two kinds: (i) One is the result of objective interest alone. The
will has no part in it, or may even oppose it. A concert may be
found very interesting, and attention is naturally given to it; or
an idea may be present in the focus of consciousness in spite of
the efforts of the will to banish it. (2) The other is voluntary;
the interest may be partly in the object, but it is chiefly subjec-
tive. The will itself influences the mental activity, and applies
it to the consideration of an idea or to a certain action. Thus
even things which are found uninteresting in themselves are
paid attention to for subjective reasons of utility, necessity,
duty, etc.
(c) The most important laws of attention are the following:
(i) Attention is proportional to interest, objective and subjective.
Sometimes one, and sometimes the other, is predominant. The
presence of the subjective factor accounts for the fact that one and
the same thing will be of interest to one man and not to another,
nor even to the same man at different times. The object remains
identical, but the mental dispositions are different. (2) In the
object interest results from several qualities or properties, among
which may be mentioned newness, unusualness in size, color,
intensity, change, etc. In the subject it depends on education,
habits, character, actual dispositions of the mind, ideals, as-
pirations, etc. When a man wants to call the attention of others
to anything, he has to take all these into account. A good illus-
tration may be found in the art of advertising. (How? . . .
Where? . . . When? ... By what means? ... is advertising
done?) A more particular instance is that of the orator
who varies the intensity and pitch of his voice and the
GENERAL LAWS OF MIND 33
nature of his gestures. Sometimes a thundering voice and
sometimes a low whisper will be effective in making the
listener attentive. (Why?) (3) Attention does not remain con-
stant in the same direction for a long period of time. Little
by little it decreases and disappears unless its object changes or
some new aspect is discovered in it (e.g. ...?). (4) The intensity
of attention varies in inverse ratio to the number of objects attended to:
"Pluribus intentus minor est ad singula sensus." Jugglers know
how to divert the spectator's attention so that the way in which
they perform their tricks of legerdemain will not be detected.
Pickpockets choose the psychological moment at which their pro-
spective victim's attention is absorbed. . . . (Why? . . . Find
other instances.)
(d) From these principles it is clear that, besides physical and
physiological obstacles to attention, such as surroundings, tempera-
ment, health, etc., which it is not always possible to remove,
there are psychological obstacles, such as mental restlessness or the
incapacity for the mind of applying itself to one object, mental
sluggishness or the incapacity of making an effort in order to bring
the energy of the mind into play. It is important to correct these
defects and to cultivate the power of attention. For children
the only source of attention is objective interest, and the teacher
must always remember it in his lessons and explanations. As
the mind develops it becomes capable also of voluntary attention,
which is the more important since by it we attend for a purpose
and in order to reach an end. The power of attention must be
increased by daily practice. How many fail hi life because they
"notice" nothing, and are unable to concentrate their mental
energy on the objects which should be of interest to them!
2. Memory and Imagination. After it has been experienced,
a mental state can be recalled into the mind. Not that the same
identical process which took place in the past can again take place
at present; in this sense that which is passed never comes back.
But I may be aware that the process which I now experience is
similar to the one which I experienced yesterday; that I now see,
hear, consider, or feel the same thing as formerly. This power of
reproduction is exercised in memory (when the mind is aware of
4
34 PSYCHOLOGY
the fact of reproduction), and in imagination (when in fact there
is reproduction, but without the consciousness of the fact that it
is a reproduction). Not only knowledge, but also feelings and
conscious activities, may be reproduced in the mind.
3. Association of Ideas. Memory and imagination depend on
association. We know from personal experience that an idea is
not recalled at random, but is suggested by others which call it
back to consciousness. Ideas seem to be linked together so that,
if one is reproduced, it has a tendency to reproduce another. Like
memory and imagination, association refers chiefly to knowledge,
yet an idea will recall not only another idea with which it is
connected, but also the feeling or action by which it was accom-
panied. The sight of an enemy yesterday was accompanied by
a feeling of anger. To-day the thought of the event tends to
call forth not merely the idea that I was angry, but also this
feeling itself.
4. Habit. What association does for ideas habit does for
actions. In fact, habit and association present the same essen-
tial features, and association is but one form of habit. The action
which has become habitual is performed automatically, without
effort, frequently even without distinct consciousness. Before
acquiring the habit of piano-playing, for instance, every single
action (vision, hearing, appropriate motions) of which the com-
plete series is composed, required a distinct effort. When the
action has become habitual, the result is more perfect and obtained
more easily. Once the series is started, all the other com-
plex elements follow in their order. Habit has also a close resem-
blance with that form of memory which consists in learning by rote.
The schoolboy who repeats his lesson several times in order to
memorize it establishes a number of associations between words
as written or spoken, and between the physiological processes
necessary to utter them, so that words uttered by him follow one
another in order and automatically. Both mental and organic
activities are subject to the law of fixation or habit. We not only
have habits of movement, but also habitual views, associations,
and mental attitudes.
GENERAL LAWS OF MIND 35
III. GENERAL LAWS OF THE MIND
Besides the general processes and attitudes just mentioned,
there are general laws that govern processes belonging to different
groups. They are the laws of solidarity, continuity, and unity
amid multiplicity. These laws should be constantly kept in mind,
as applications of them will be found at every step.
i. Solidarity. By solidarity is meant the mutual dependence
of all mental processes.
(a) The use of the analytical process in psychology may be the
source of great errors, if one fails to notice that it isolates arti-
ficially that which is in reality always connected and associated.
The mind is like an organism or a well-ruled society in which all
organs or all classes depend on the others for their functions or
their subsistence. Mental life, in its various manifestations, is
one, and none of its manifestations is independent of the others.
(b) All psychical phenomena are dependent on, and influenced
by, the general processes and attitudes mentioned above: atten-
tion, memory, association, and habit. The whole progress and
development of the mind is conditioned by them.
(c) All mental processes influence one another, (i) Cognition
is the basis of most feelings. We are pleased or displeased, and
experience various emotions according to the ideas that are pres-
ent in the mind. Moreover, to know, or to study in order to
know, is in itself an important source of feelings. The will is
essentially guided by motives, i.e. by the results of reflection and
reasoning. The actions which are not voluntary are frequently
the consequences of impulses resulting from inferior forms of
knowledge. (2) Feelings, being a source of interest, are also a
source of attention and application, and hence very important
in 1 acquiring knowledge. They also often influence opinions and
beliefs. What a man likes is readily accepted by him as true; he
is willing to believe the calumnies which he hears about an enemy,
but admits his good qualities more reluctantly. It is no less clear
that feelings influence activity, since we act in order to obtain some
good and for the satisfaction of some desire. How much greater
and more effective is our activity for a task which we like than for
36 PSYCHOLOGY
one which we are compelled to do against our inclination. (3)
The will is the power that rules more or less perfectly the
other mental energies. It controls attention, commands a patient
and impartial research, or, by its precipitation, causes the mind
to assent without sufficient grounds, and is thus partly responsible
for resulting errors. On the other hand, man endeavors to con-
form his actions to his thoughts. Although the will has not
perfect control over the feelings, it nevertheless exercises a great
power in checking, suppressing, or fostering them.
(d) Finally, there is a solidarity between the mind and the organism.
(1) The conditions of the organism, age, sex, temperament, food
and drink, health or disease, present physiological condition and
disposition, have their counterpart in the activities of the mind.
(2) The mind influences the organism in many ways, e.g. emotions
are accompanied by various physiological phenomena; mental
application may cause a headache; the will controls many move-
ments of the body, etc.
2. Continuity. (a) In the perpetual flux of mental life we
distinguish certain waves as more prominent, and consider them
separately. This conception of mental states may be misleading,
and it must be remembered that consciousness is not made up of
parts, but is always flowing like a stream. In the state of wake-
fulness at least, mental processes are always going on without inter-
mission, even if, for purposes of study, only the most prominent
and those that are better characterized are attended to. The
break which seems to occur in a dreamless sleep, epilepsy, fainting,
and similar states, is bridged over by memory which connects
the part preceding with the part following the interruption.
(b) At any one time the contents of consciousness are complex,
including a focus and a fringe. Thus while I am writing, my
mind is concentrated upon the ideas to be expressed the school-
boy's mind might be concentrated on the manner in which he has
to hold the pen and form every letter; at the same time I have
an indistinct consciousness of papers and books around me, of
the little noise of the pen as it runs over the paper, the ticking of
the clock, the singing of the birds outside; of sensations of touch
in the fingers holding the pen, the arm resting on the table, the
GENERAL LAWS OF MIND 37
parts of the body that are in contact with other objects; of tempera-
ture; of my whole organic disposition; of images fleeting through
my mind; of an emotion experienced a short time ago, etc.
(c) Generally the contents of consciousness are not renewed all
at once; its elements pass from the focus to the fringe, and vice
versa; some disappear altogether, while others persist and enter
the succeeding complex mental state. As an instance of such
persistence may be mentioned a violent emotion, e.g. of anger,
which may remain in the background of consciousness for a long
time and continue to influence more or less apparently many suc-
cessive processes. In this respect, the mind is somewhat like the
organism, the whole of which is renewed after a certain length of
time, but through changes that take place gradually, more rapidly
in some parts, more slowly in others.
(d) As a consequence of this fact, it follows that the nature of
the contents of consciousness depends on previous contents. This
is true even where the direction of the stream seems to be modi-
fied suddenly. The new state is different according as it follows
different thoughts, emotions, or mental efforts. For instance,
the impression produced by a sudden clap of thunder varies accord-
ing to the circumstances in which I find myself when I hear it.
Differences in the contents of my mind will cause me to experi-
ence different feelings when a friend calls on me unexpectedly.
Not only is there continuity between immediately succeeding
states, but habit, memory, and generally subconsciousness, are
like so many permanent links of continuity, making mental life
one uninterrupted whole, or like so many reservoirs into which
all mental activities bring some modifying element, and owing to
which, accordingly, every new mental activity is modified. Thus
the mind may be compared to a water reservoir into which all
ingoing streams would bring their own special and constantly
changing qualities, and from which outgoing streams would in
consequence derive these new qualities. We cannot experience
two mental states perfectly identical, since, on the one hand, the
actual mental background is always different in some respects,
and, on the other, the new state is modified by past influences.
(e) When in a series of objects arranged according to gradually
38 PSYCHOLOGY
increasing diversity two extremes are compared, the differences
are striking; but if two objects placed in immediate succession are
compared, the differences are hardly noticeable. Between any
two colors, intermediate tinges may be inserted passing insensibly
from one to the other; between a giant and a dwarf a series of men
with slowly decreasing sizes make an easy transition, etc. The
same is true of the mind: between extremes a number of transi-
tional forms are found. The abstract definitions of mental atten-
tion and mental dispersion are easily understood, and their
concrete applications also are easily verified when two attitudes far
apart in this respect are compared. But if the diffusion be re-
stricted gradually, it is impossible to point out the beginning of
the attentive attitude. Sensations of vision, sound, taste, smell,
temperature, etc., may be arranged in series varying imperceptibly
according to quality or intensity. Perfect memory and complete
forgetfulness are extremes between which may be inserted an
infinite number of partial, more or less vague and obscure, remem-
brances. In a more complex sphere, the insane man in an asy-
lum has mental defects by which he clearly differs from what he
was when normal; yet if his condition has developed gradually,
we cannot indicate the precise moment where insanity began.
And in a series of minds passing from a normal to an abnormal
condition, extremes alone are recognizable; the limit separating
the normal from the abnormal cannot be indicated. Examples
could be multiplied for all transitions from one process or series of
processes to another.
3. Unity amid Multiplicity, (a) From what is manifold in
nature one conscious state may result, e.g. a large number of vibra-
tions of ether, air, or molecules, produces in consciousness one
sensation of light, sound, or temperature. Moreover, the mind
strives to unify external experiences by constantly reducing them
to more general laws and principles.
(b) The mind tends to homogeneity and consistency. Self-contra-
diction, i.e. the presence in the mind of irreconcilable judgments,
is painful. Attempts are made to find the means of reconciling
them or to see which should be eliminated. Moreover, the mind
strives after harmony between itself and the external world of
GENERAL LAWS OF MIND 39
things and persons, either by trying to conform its ideas to the
reality of things and to adapt itself to surroundings, or by trying
to conform the environment to its own desires and purposes.
Consistency, harmony, uniformity, are sources of pleasure; dis-
sension is a source of unhappiness.
(c) Attention has been called to the complexity, variety, changes,
and succession of mental states. It is a fact of experience, how-
ever, that these always form a part of a group which is personal.
There is no mental process which is not somebody's, and which is
not claimed by some person as his own. Isolated as they are from
mental processes which belong to other minds, my own mental
processes are all within the unity of my own self.
(d) Hence the thinking subject is one. Consciousness is not
simply the existence of thought, but also of my thinking, and I
am the centre to which all thoughts are referred and attributed
as their source and as the subject toward which all converge.
This holds for past as well as for present states. The self appears
not only as one, but also as identical under many changes. To
say " / think " is true, but it is also true to say " I thought." Obvi-
ously there is something underlying the stream of consciousness.
A man remembers his past, feels responsible for his actions, pre-
pares his future. Memory, responsibility, foresight, are signs
that, even if the states of mind disappear, the mind itself is a more
permanent and a deeper reality.
CHAPTER I
KNOWLEDGE
PRELIMINARY REMARKS
i. What is Knowledge? (a) The mental state called know-
ing cannot be denned strictly. It is obvious to all men, and a
definition would be useful only ina3much as it would be known,
i.e. inasmuch as it would imply the experience of the very state
to be defined. The following explanations are given only to make
this experience clearer. To know is to be aware of something which
is called the object of knowledge. In every cognitive process is
implied essentially an antithesis of something (object) which faces
or lies opposite to (ob-iacere) the mind and of the knowing mind
or subject (sub-iacere) which is modified by the knowing process,
that is, which acquires a new idea or the perception of a new
relation.
(b) The object of knowledge may be internal or external; it in-
cludes not only external things, but also mental states. Thus a
feeling or an emotion may not only be experienced as such, i.e.
felt, but it may be analyzed, studied, recognized, and known; and
the same is true of actions. It may be impossible in many cases
to draw a well-defined line separating knowledge from other men-
tal processes which are objects of knowledge, but nevertheless we
understand the distinction between feeling and knowing that we
feel, acting and knowing that we act. And even in cases of intense
feeling or activity, the awareness or knowledge of them may almost
disappear; a man feels and acts, and his whole consciousness
seems to be absorbed in these processes so that he does not even
reflect that he is experiencing them.
(c) In knowledge, subject and object are opposed, yet closely
related. In fact, the known object must, hi some manner, be
40
KNOWLEDGE 41
present within the knowing subject, not according to its natural
reality, but in a special mental or ideal form. To know a thing
is to have in the mind an idea or representation of it. The fact of
its being known changes in no way the reality of the object; the
mind alone is modified by the acquisition of an idea which it did
not possess previously.
2. There are Several Kinds of Knowledge. (a) Knowledge is
actual when the idea is present in consciousness; habitual when the
idea which has disappeared from consciousness can be recalled.
In the former case a man actually thinks of what he knows; in the
latter, he does not actually think of it, but can do so. Immedi-
ately upon completing the demonstration of a geometrical theorem
I have the actual knowledge of its truth. The following day,
when my mind is occupied with other matters, I still know it
although actually thinking of something else.
(b) (i) To know may mean simply to be acquainted with, to
be able to recognize. Thus I know a man by sight after meeting
him more or less frequently; I know his character after a more
or less prolonged intercourse with him. This form of knowledge
reaches the object directly; it implies perception and recognition.
(2) To know means also to understand. In this sense knowledge
reaches the object indirectly; it supposes the work of intellectual
comparison, judgment, and reasoning. Thus I may know many
things about a man whom I have never seen. A blind man who
never perceived light may nevertheless know several things about
it, like its laws of reflection or refraction.
(c) The term " knowledge " is applied sometimes to the process
of knowing (subjective sense), and sometimes to the known object
(objective sense). I may speak of my knowledge of chemistry,
and of the science of chemistry as a body of knowledge.
(d) Knowledge is frequently opposed to opinion and belief.
The former is more certain and has a stronger and firmer ob-
jective basis; the latter is more subjective and depends also on
personal mental dispositions.
(e) The cognitive faculties are (i) presentation (sensation and
perception), (2) representation (memory and imagination), (3)
conception or abstract representation, (4) judgment, which is
42 PSYCHOLOGY
obtained either immediately (intuitive) or mediately by reason-
ing. Hence the division of the present chapter into four articles,
to which a fifth will be added on language, which is the expression
of knowledge.
A simple representation as such is neither true nor false, but
only in so far as it is truly or falsely affirmed or denied to be
the accurate representation of such or such an object. Hence
knowledge proper is found only in judgment.
3. Complexity of Knowledge. It must be kept in mind that
the cognitive processes just mentioned are not isolated, but work
together. A simple and commonplace instance may be given to
illustrate the complexity of knowledge and of the many processes
which it implies. "I see my friend speaking to a policeman."
This is about as simple an experience as can be imagined. It takes
place all at once. Without reflection or hesitation, in what seems
to be one single act of perception, I affirm that "I see my friend
talking to a policeman." What is so simple now is in reality very
complex in its analysis and genesis. If the many elementary
processes are not now present in consciousness, it is owing to habit
and to what will be called later the education of the senses. As
we shall see more clearly in the following articles, it has not always
been so. Let us now briefly analyze our statement; the analysis
will be justified later.
"/ see" Directly and primitively vision gives to the mind
only sensations of light and color. In the present case, if by "I
see " I mean a sensation, i.e. a primitive and elementary process,
what I see is a certain surface colored in this or that way. But
the educated eye reports much more than this. There are addi-
tions to the primitive fact, that make the present mental state
much more complex.
" My friend." A certain familiarity and habit make me recog-
nize the form of a man, and, although I see only about one half,
my imagination readily supplies the part which I do not see.
Moreover, certain signs, e.g. the fact of his being in the street, of
moving the limbs or lips, of facing another person, etc. (facts
which are also perceived owing to a number of past associations
and to the education of the senses), make me infer that I have before
KNOWLEDGE 43
my eyes a real man, and not a mere image or statue of a man.
My imagination again supplies implicitly a whole group of sensa-
tions of sound, touch, etc., of which this man, under certain cir-
cumstances, would be the cause for me. All this supposes that
I have seen, heard, etc., other men before.
When I refer to this man as "my friend," I suppose an act of
recognition. This is not simply a man, but it is this man with
whom I had such or such relations, with whom I am in sympathy,
who did this or that, etc. Many signs may help me to recognize
him, but, strictly speaking, I do not see my friend; I see only cer-
tain colors and shape, I perceive a man, and I recognize or infer
that it is my friend. It is evident that the relation of friend-
ship cannot be perceived by any sense: it is an implicit judgment
supposing many mental elements past and present.
"Speaking" I may hear a sound, I cannot see it. Here I
perceive certain attitudes, gestures, and motions which, in my
experience, are associated with sensations of hearing. We have
here again an inference, an induction, an implicit reasoning, which,
stated explicitly, would run thus: " Such or such visual sensa-
tions in the past have always been accompanied by corresponding
auditory sensations when I was within hearing distance. Now I
experience the same visual sensations. Therefore the man is
speaking, although, on account of the distance, I do not hear
him."
" To a policeman" Here again we have a very complex per-
ception, as may be gathered from the preceding remarks.
This is a very short and summary analysis of a simple state-
ment, and every statement which we make is of the same com-
plex nature. Let us now proceed to examine the various stages
of cognition, and thereby see how the mind passes from simple to
complex processes of knowledge.
44 PSYCHOLOGY
ARTICLE I. SENSE PRESENTATION
I. SENSATION
I. SENSATION IN GENERAL
1. The Nature of Sensation. Sensation is the first or element-
ary mental process; first, because mental life begins with sensa-
tion; elementary, because other mental states are based on and
suppose sensation. Sensations are therefore real constituents of
complex states, but they are only abstractions when considered
in themselves as simple, and apart from the complex states. The
normal adult does not experience simple sensations; his so-called
sensations are always complex processes, and are influenced by
other past or present sensations of the same or of different kind.
Perception is the reference of sensations to an external object. It
supposes several presentative and representative elements, and
includes not only primitive data of the senses, but also results
from the education of the senses. The knowledge which we have
of sensations is not obtained directly from introspection, but rather
from inferences based on introspection. Frequently, however,
the distinction between sensation and perception is not observed
in ordinary language, and both terms are used indifferently.
2. Definition of Related Terms. (i) Sense denotes the ability
to experience a certain class of sensations. Thus we speak of the
sense of vision or of the sense of touch. (2) The being which is
capable of experiencing sensations is called sentient or sensitive,
and this is opposed to inanimate or vegetal. There are evidently
many degrees of perfection in sensitive life. In a more general
way, sentient and sensitive are synonymous with conscious, and
refer to any form of consciousness. (3) Sensitive frequently refers
also to one who is excitable, impressionable, or who is easily affected
by external influences. When applied to a special sense, it denotes
a special keenness. (4) The adjective sensible is more ambigu-
ous on account of its several meanings. It may be synonymous
with sentient; or it denotes a sound judgment and a prudent esti-
mate of things, persons, and events. Again, a man is sensible
SENSATION 45
of a thing when he is aware or persuaded of it. Finally, the
term "sensible " may be used objectively of a thing that can be
perceived by the senses. (5) Sensuous means that which pertains
to the senses. Thus we speak of sense-perception or of sensuous
perception. (6) Sensual applies especially to one who indulges
in the lower tendencies and pleasures of the senses. (7) Sensi-
bility, sentiency, sensitivity and sensitiveness may be used to denote
the capacity of experiencing sensations, but sensibility signifies
more particularly a special susceptibility to pleasure, pain, and
emotion, while sensitiveness denotes a special mental or nervous
excitability or keenness of the senses.
3. Internal and External Sensations. Sensations are com-
monly classified into internal and external, but the meaning given
to internal sensations to-day is not the same as formerly. Exter-
nal sensations are those by which the mind enters into direct rela-
tion with external things, e.g. seeing, hearing, etc. They are
exercised through sense-organs located at the periphery of the
organism.
Formerly, internal sensations meant the mental processes by which
the mind enters into relation directly with something mental,
and indirectly with external concrete realities. Their organ is
internal, namely, the brain. Thus memory and imagination
were called internal senses because they deal immediately with
mental images, and only mediately with the things of which they
are images. To these two internal senses two others were added,
the sensus communis or central sense which gathers together the
various impressions received from the external senses, and the
aestimativa which enables the mind to discern the good or bad,
useful or harmful qualities of objects (akin to instinct in animals).
To-day, by internal sensations are meant those sensations which
do not refer to the external world, but to some internal states,
especially of the organism, like hunger, thirst, fatigue, etc. They
are vague, hard to localize, and generally indicative of physical
conditions and needs. Hence they are also more subjective than
external sensations. The division of sensations into internal and
external almost coincides with the division into special and gen-
eral or organic sensations. Internal sensations are closely related
46 PSYCHOLOGY
to the affective life, and in many cases they are feelings rather
than cognitions.
II. INTERNAL OR GENERAL SENSATIONS
1. Characteristics. These sensations are called internal and
organic because the information which they give refers to states
and changes within the body; general or common because they have
no special end-organs and are hard to localize. Ccenesthesis is a
more technical term to express the same idea. Internal sensa-
tions are numerous, complex, vague, difficult to analyze, localize,
and discriminate. As cognitions they are in themselves of but
little value; yet habit and experience enable us to assign to them
external or internal causes, e.g. we may know what food has caused
a painful digestion, where nervousness or fatigue comes from,
etc.
2. The Main Groups of internal sensations are: (i) The vital
sense, or general sensations of life, of the whole living organism,
of its position and changes of position, its general condition of
strength or weakness, activity or sleepiness, etc. (2) Sensations
connected with the nervous system, its excitability and tension,
or, on the contrary, inactivity and laziness, nervousness and neuras-
thenia. (3) Sensations connected with the muscular system.
Some are more general, like the tension or relaxation of the muscles,
and general fitness or fatigue. Others are more special, like local
fatigue, or the sensations experienced in executing various move-
ments. (4) Sensations connected with the digestive system;
hunger, thirst, repletion, nausea, easy or difficult digestion. (5)
Sensations connected with the respiratory system, such as facility
or difficulty in breathing, abundance or scarcity of air, its qual-
ities, like purity or foulness, choking, stifling, etc. (6) Sensations
connected with the circulatory system, like those of blushing or
growing pale, of active circulation in the whole organism or in
some of its parts.
III. EXTERNAL SENSATIONS
(a) External sensations are experienced through the sense-
organs. A sense-organ includes three essential elements: (i) a
SENSATION 47
peripheral apparatus, like the eye, ear, nerve-endings in the skin,
etc.; (2) a sensory or afferent nerve connecting the peripheral
structure with (3) the centre, which is some determined portion of
the brain. The study of the anatomy and functions of these
belongs to physiology, and, while studying sensations, it will be
useful to review the physiology of the senses as well as the physics
of sound, light, etc.
(b) The factors of sensation are: (i) Physical, i.e. something
external (e.g. vibrations of ether or air) which acts on the organ-
ism. It is called the stimulus of sensation, and its action on the
appropriate organ is the stimulation. (2) Physiological. The
organ at the periphery is especially adapted to receive the stimu-
lation proper to each sense, and the impression thus received is
transmitted to the brain by the afferent nerve. (3) Psychological.
Consciousness is intimately connected with, and depends on, the
physiological processes. Yet it cannot be identified with them,
for consciousness is something altogether different from a move-
ment, a vibration, or a chemical change, such as take place in the
organism.
External senses are reduced to five classes: smell, taste, touch,
hearing, and vision.
A. SMELL AND TASTE
i. Common Features. (i) These two senses are closely
connected and generally work together. Smell, however, is more
independent of taste than taste of smell. It has been ascertained
that when the sense of smell is impaired taste is also less perfect,
and in some cases it is difficult to say whether a sensation is due
primarily to smell or to taste, e.g. spices are "tasted" chiefly
through the sense of smell. (2) In both cases the sensations
are vague and lack definiteness. Feeling, i.e. their pleasantness
or unpleasantness, is the predominant feature. (3) These sensa-
tions are not easily classified, and the reason why a substance
smells or tastes differently from another is not known. (4) As
verbs, the terms "smell " and "taste " are transitive or intransi-
tive; as substantives, they apply to both the sensation or mental
state and to the physical stimulus. I speak not only of my sensa-
48 PSYCHOLOGY
tions of smell and taste, but also of the smell of a rose or the taste
of an orange. (5) Smell and taste are not so useful for intellec-
tual life as the other sensations, but are very useful for organic
life, especially in animals. Their very position at the entrance
of the respiratory and digestive systems is suggestive of these
functions. Thus the sense of smell may give warning of the pres-
ence of impure or poisonous air; that of taste, of the presence of
some injurious element in food.
2. Smell. Its organ is the mucous membrane lining the
upper part of the nasal cavity where the olfactory nerves are
distributed.
(a) Odors are the object of the sense of smell. It is impossible
to classify them and to give definitions of the several odors. When
we speak of them, we refer them to the substances to which they
generally belong. Thus we say of a substance that it smells like
the rose or the violet, or we use general terms like "fragrant,"
"nauseous," etc.
(b) In order to have sensations of smell, emanations from odor-
ous substances must be carried to the olfactory organs through the
air. Liquids as such, if they come in contact with the organs of
smell without air, produce no olfactory sensation. Breathing
draws these emanations through the nasal fossae, and this is done
more effectively by sniffing. A very small amount of an odorous
substance is sufficient to produce a sensation of smell. Thus the
smallest particle of musk will give its characteristic smell to
clothes for years. The action of the odorous substance on the
olfactory organs is probably of a chemical nature.
(c) One of the important features of the sense of smell is that
it easily becomes fatigued. The same continuous stimulation
makes it dull with regard to this special odor. When entering a
kitchen or a room filled with foul air, we are conscious at first of
certain sensations which we cease to experience after some time
spent there.
3. Taste. Organ: The papillae of the mucous membrane
covering the superior surface of the tongue. The circumvallate
papillae at the base of the tongue seem to be the most important.
(a) Savors or flavors are the object of the sense of taste. For
SENSATION 49
want of a better division they are commonly reduced to four types:
sweet, bitter, acid, and salt. Their action on the organ of taste
is also probably of a chemical nature.
(b) In order to have sensations of taste, the sapid substance
must be soluble. Only fluids, i.e. dissolved substances, are per-
ceived. The saliva, and the act of pressing the substance against
the palate or the gums with the tongue, help the process of
solution.
(c) Like the sense of smell, the sense of taste is subject to fatigue.
It is also greatly affected by contrast. Every one may notice, for
instance, that the same cup of tea which has a very sweet taste
while eating meat, bread, or pickles, seems almost bitter while
eating candy or sweets.
B. TOUCH
The sense of touch includes three main groups of sensations:
sensations of contact and pressure, sensations of temperature,
and kinesthetic sensations. For contact and pressure, and for
temperature, its organ consists of the papillae of the derma or true
skin. For kinesthetic sensations, it consists of the numerous
nervous fibrillae found in the muscular system. The distinction
of the organs of contact and pressure from those of temperature
is not clear physiologically, that is, organs special to each group
cannot be pointed out. Yet they seem to be distinct, for, in
certain diseases, the sense of touch proper may disappear while
the sense of temperature persists, and vice versa.
i. Contact and Pressure. These two sensations go together.
Evidently there can be no pressure without contact, and most
sensations of contact are also accompanied by some pressure.
(a) The qualities perceived by contact are hardness and soft-
ness, roughness and smoothness. All these may be reduced to
resistance; hardness and softness are degrees of resistance; rough-
ness and smoothness are its qualities and its localization on the
same surface.
(b) The different parts of the body are not equally sensitive.
The points of a pair of dividers kept at the same distance from
each other will be felt as two or as one according to the place to
5
50 PSYCHOLOGY
which they are applied. This has been called discriminative sen-
sibility, or the skin's sense of locality. It varies from about i mm.
(0.039 inch) for the tip of the tongue to about 68 mm. for the skin
of the middle of the back, the upper arm and leg. Discriminative
sensibility may be greatly improved by exercise.
2. Temperature. (a) "Hot " and " cold " are terms used in re-
lation to our own temperature. Sensations of temperature depend
on the physiological zero, i.e. the temperature of the skin on
the part of the body where the sensation is experienced. An
object having this temperature is felt as neither hot nor cold.
The physiological zero is not identical with blood temperature,
but may be higher or lower.
(b) Contrast is an important factor in the appreciation of tem-
perature. The temperature of a room which one enters seems
colder or warmer according as one comes from a warmer or a colder
place. The same water may be almost burning for a cold hand,
and only warm for the hand which has just experienced a higher
temperature.
(c) Within certain limits, the sense of temperature is subject
to adaptation. The water which at first seemed very hot to the
hand becomes more tolerable if the contact be prolonged. Some
heat being imparted to the organism, the contrast disappears,
and thus it is seen that this phenomenon is connected with the one
just mentioned.
(d) Temperatures most readily appreciated are those between
10 and 45 degrees Centigrade (50-111 Fahrenheit). Extreme heat
and cold produce painful sensations in many respects similar.
The finger dipped in boiling water or in liquid air experiences a
sensation which might be called "burning " in both cases.
(e) The organs for heat seem to be different from those for cold.
There are "cold spots " and "heat spots," as may be ascertained
easily by pressing gently on the skin with the point of a lead pencil.
In some spots no distinct sensation of temperature is experienced ;
in other spots there is a sensation of cold. Or if the point be previ-
ously warmed, sensations of heat are experienced only in some spots.
3. Kinesthetic or Muscular Sensations may be reduced in part
to internal sensations (e.g. muscular tension), and in part to
SENSATION 51
external sensations (when they give information concerning the
external world, e.g. weight). They include two main groups:
sensations of movement, including the sensations of skin, joints,
muscles, and tendons; sensations of strain or resistance, e.g.
muscular effort in lifting a weight.
C. HEARING
1. The Organs of Hearing consist of the ear; external ear
(pinna or auricle, and auditory canal or meatus)-, middle ear or
tympanum, separated from the external ear by the membrana
tympani and including the three auditory bones; internal ear or
labyrinth (vestibule, semicircular canals, and cochlea) communi-
cating with the middle ear by the two foramina.
The external ear gathers air vibrations and transmits them to
the middle ear by vibrating the membrana tympani. The middle
ear serves for the transmission of vibrations, the ossicles dimin-
ishing their amplitude but increasing their intensity. The organ
proper of hearing is the internal ear where the acoustic nerve is
distributed, partly in the semicircular canals, and partly in the
cochlea in which the complex and interesting organ of Corti is
found.
2. Sound is the stimulus of the sense of hearing. Physically
it consists of air vibrations. According as these follow one an-
other in regular or irregular succession, we have musical sounds
or noises.
(a) Sound possesses: (i) Intensity or loudness, which depends
on the force or amplitude of the vibrations. (2) Pitch, which
depends on the number of vibrations in a given unit of time. The
number of perceivable vibrations, i.e. the range of hearing, is from
about 16 to 38,000 a second for an ordinary ear. (3) Quality,
timbre, or, as it is sometimes called, the color of the tone, which
depends on the combination of secondary vibrations or overtones
with the fundamental tone.
(b) The discrimination of sounds of different pitch is susceptible
of great improvement by exercise. For simultaneous sounds the
sensitiveness is not so great as for successive sounds. With a
little exercise the average ear may perceive the difference in pitch
52 I PSYCHOLOGY
etween two successive sounds whose number of vibrations are in
the ratio 200: 201. A very keen ear may perceive the difference
when the number of vibrations is in the ratio 1000: 1001.
D. VISION
1. The Organ of Vision is the Eye. (i) The enclosing mem-
branes, protective and nutritive, are the sclerotic (in front, cornea)
and the choroid (in front, iris). (2) The refracting media are the
aqueous humor, the crystalline lens, and the vitreous humor.
(3) Accessory structures are the various muscles both of the eye-
ball and the interior eye (especially those which regulate the con-
vexity of the lens and the aperture of the pupil), the eyelids, and
the lachrymal glands. (4) The organ proper of vision is the retina,
and among the eight or nine layers which are distinguished in the
retina that of rods and cones is the most important. The retina
is the expansion of the optic nerve spreading within the eyeball
close to the choroid. The macula lutea or yellow spot, and chiefly
the pit in its centre or fovea centralis, is the place where the rays
of light fall in clear vision. The blind spot is the entrance itself
of the optic nerve in the eyeball. Rays of light falling there are not
perceived.
2. The Stimulus of Vision is light, which physically consists
of ether vibrations.
By refraction the white light of the sun is decomposed into the
seven colors of the spectrum. The differences in color depend on
the rapidity and length of the waves, these two being in inverse
ratio. Substances are white or black according as they reflect
all or none of the rays of light. They are variously colored accord-
ing as they absorb some rays of the spectrum and reflect others.
The union of the seven spectral colors is not necessary to pro-
duce white. Two colors, called complementary, give the same
result: red and bluish-green, orange and greenish-blue, yellow
and ultramarine blue, greenish-yellow and violet.
3. Special Features. (a) The sensation of vision does not
disappear immediately after the stimulus is withdrawn, but con-
tinues for a short time; e.g. the fiery trail of a shooting-star; a
luminous point rotating rapidly, as the end of a kindled stick,
SENSATION 53
produces the impression of a luminous disk. If you look intensely
at a bright lamp for a few seconds, and put out the light, you
will continue to see the flame in the dark.
(b) Color blindness, or the incapacity of the eye to discern one
or several colors, is more frequent than is commonly supposed.
Red is the color for which blindness is more generally found. Hence
the necessity of careful tests for locomotive engineers and others
who have to distinguish colored signals.
(c) An after-image is a phenomenon of vision produced after
the stimulus has disappeared. The after-image may be posi-
tive, as in the cases mentioned above (under a), or negative, due
to the fatigue of the retina. The negative after-images of dark
objects are relatively bright, and vice versa; those of colored objects
present the complementary color. After gazing fixedly at the
bright window about a half minute, turn your eyes toward the
white wall or ceiling, and you will see the window again, but
the pane will be darker than the frame. After looking intensely
at a bright and glossy red cardboard triangle, look again at the
white ceiling; a green triangle will be seen, the dimensions of
which will vary according to the distance of the wall which is used
as a screen. If the wall or ceiling is not white, the color of
the after-image will be different.
(d) Contrast in brightness and colors is very important, and the
harmonious arrangement of colors is to be observed in painting,
decorating, dressing, etc.
IV. NUMBER AND COMPARISON OF THE SENSES
i. Number. The question of the number of the senses is
limited to external senses. On account of their complexity and
vagueness, no attempt is made to number internal senses, and
psychologists follow different classifications. For the external
senses, on the contrary, we have the traditional division into five
senses as mentioned above. Some psychologists, however, pay
little or no attention to this classification which they find inade-
quate. The present question is secondary and of minor impor-
tance, yet it may be of interest to see how solutions have been
attempted.
54 PSYCHOLOGY
(a) If we take a psychological basis of division, namely, the dif-
ferent qualities of sensations as mental states, we are at once con-
fronted with the difficulty of determining the meaning of quality
when applied to sensations. A sensation of red is qualitatively
different from a sensation of blue; the sound of the flute from that
of thunder, etc. It is asserted even that every change in intensity
is also a change in quality. Hence on this basis alone a classifica-
tion is impossible. Perhaps quality may be used in a generic
sense, all colors forming one kind of quality; all sounds, another,
and so on. But this is not purely psychological; sensations here
are said to have the same generic quality because they are experi-
enced through the same sense organ (physiology), or because their
stimuli are of the same nature (physics).
(b) If we take a physiological basis of division, namely, the
number of the different sense organs, we have first to define what
is meant by a special organ. Double organs like eyes and ears
are counted as one. Why? Partly because they have the same
structure and functions, partly also because they are affected by
the same stimuli (this is not physiological, but physical). More-
over, what is one special organ? Physiologists commonly hold
that there are within the eye special organs for the perception
of each of the fundamental colors, that the organs of touch are
distinct from those of temperature, that different qualities of taste
are perceived through different papillae, etc. Hence the number
of sense organs can hardly be determined. We may, however,
admit five generic kinds of organs, counting as one those that are
close together and have the same outer and accessory structures.
For instance, even if every fundamental color is perceived through
different retinal endings, the eye is one organ with only one set
of enclosing membranes, refracting media, etc.
(c) To argue from the number of distinct physical stimuli is to
beg the question, since we are aware of the stimulus only through
the sensation. To say that there are five groups of irreducible
stimuli simply means that we experience five kinds of sensations,
and this is the very question at issue. Physical sciences, however,
lend us assistance by reducing all colors to ether vibrations, heat
to molecular vibrations, etc.
SENSATION 55
(d) Let us conclude that the commonly received division of
the external senses may be retained on condition that it be under-
stood as a generic division under which are found distinct sub-
classes. As such it corresponds to the generic division of physical
stimuli and of organs. All colors are referred to the sense of vision
because, although blue differs from red, both are ether vibrations,
and, although each may have special organs in the retina, these
organs belong to the same structure and are parts of the whole
complete organ, which is the eye. The same remarks apply to
the other sensations.
(e) As to the possibility of some other sense altogether different
from those we have now, it has been asserted by some; but it
can be neither proved nor disproved. The question is an idle one.
(i) To have a new sense, there should be another stimulus differ-
ent from those that are known at present. Its existence can only
be asserted gratuitously. (2) In certain abnormal states, like
somnambulism or hypnotism, a man may perceive things which
he does not perceive normally, or in a manner different from that
of the normal mind. But no new quality of things is manifested;
there is only a special keenness of the senses, or a new mode of
perceiving the same qualities. (3) Granting this supposition of
another sense, it could not be inferred that things would seem dif-
ferent from what they are now. The new information would not
contradict, but complete, the information which we have at pres-
ent. In the same way, if the power of vision is given to the man
born blind, he becomes aware of qualities hitherto unknown to him,
but this knowledge does not contradict or invalidate that which
he has acquired through the other senses.
2. The Comparison of the Senses may be made from different
points of view.
(a) In reference to usefulness, (i) Taste and smell are more
closely related to organic sensations and less definite. They give
less information concerning the external world. Hence, whereas
they may be very useful for organic life, especially in some kinds of
animals, they are of little use for intellectual life. (2) Touch,
hearing, and sight are the "intellectual" senses; from them are
derived the data necessary for the higher mental functions.
56 PSYCHOLOGY
Through hearing we receive oral information, which is essential
both in early education and in the whole course of life. Touch is
the sense on which, in many cases, the other senses depend for
the confirmation of the reality of their perceptions; it is of great
value in educating them, as will be seen hereafter. In adult life,
however, sight seems to be the chief sense, because it enables the
mind to receive written information, and, as will be shown when we
speak of perception, it embodies the results of touch and the other
senses.
(b) With regard to the mode of stimulation, it may be said that
some kind of actual contact is required of the appropriate stimu-
lus with the sense organ. Ether waves, air vibrations, emana-
tions, etc., must act on the organ. Yet a distinction is to be made,
if not for the simple sensation, at least for perception. An object
cannot be tasted or touched without actual contact with it.
On the contrary, it is possible to smell, hear, or see distant odorous,
sounding, or luminous bodies, the reach of sight being far greater
than that of any other sense.
(c) As to the evolution of the senses, touch comes first, (i) It
is the foundation of the other senses, since all require some contact.
(2) It is the most universal. Lower animals which do not have
all the other senses have at least the sense of touch. There is no
known instance of the presence of other senses where this one is
absent. (3) In the same individual man, touch is the first sense
to be exercised.
V. PSYCHOPHYSICS AND PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY
i. Facts of Common Experience. (a) Sensations are called
weak, strong, moderate, etc., i.e. their intensity varies. A sound
may be loud or hardly perceptible; temperature may be increased
or decreased; and thus for all the senses, (i) Generally to an
increase in the stimulus corresponds an increase in the intensity
of the sensation. Fifty candles give more light than one; lifting a
hundredweight gives a more intense sensation of muscular tension
than lifting twenty pounds, etc. (2) Yet ordinary experience
shows also that the sensation does not increase in the same abso-
lute proportion as the stimulus. One singer's voice added to a
SENSATION 57
numerous chorus does not produce the same increment of sensa-
tion as if it were added to one or two singers only. In a very bright
room, the addition of one candle is not so striking as it would be
in a dimly lighted room, etc. Therefore, in order to produce a
noticeable difference in the sensation, the necessary increment of
stimulus, must be proportioned to the already existing stimulus,
i.e. it must be greater or smaller according as the original stimu-
lus is itself greater or smaller.
(b) A certain amount of physical stimulus is required to produce
a sensation. A violin string may be vibrating without my hear-
ing any sound, either because the vibrations are too feeble, or
because, owing to the distance, they do not reach my ear. At a
certain distance, the ticking of a clock may be heard whereas
that of a watch is not. A small amount of a given substance
diluted in a glass of water may not give it a noticeable taste; if it
be increased a little the taste will be perceived. The initial point
of sensation is called its threshold or its lower limit. There is also
an upper limit or acme of sensation, but it cannot be determined,
because some perceptible stimuli (e.g. some odors and savors)
cannot be increased beyond certain limits, and chiefly because the
sensations become too painful and dangerous; e.g. too high a tem-
perature, too bright a light, too intense a sound, too great a con-
tact and pressure are productive of pain rather than of external
sensation, and injure the organism.
2. Experimental Science tries to determine more accurately
these facts of common experience.
(a) Sensations cannot be measured directly and in themselves.
Evidently no physical unit can be applied to mental states. Nor
can any mental process be taken as a unit, because mental states
are of widely different nature (a sensation of color or smell can-
not be estimated in sound-units) ; and also because, even within the
same class of processes, no unit can be applied. I may know
that a sound is louder than another, but it is impossible for con-
sciousness to determine whether it is exactly three or four times
louder. The relative intensity of sensations cannot be measured
by introspection.
(b) Only an indirect measurement is possible. A sensation can
58 PSYCHOLOGY
be measured, not in itself, but in its relation to something else
which is under control and which can be measured accurately,
(i) I cannot, it is true, say whether a sensation of sound is three
or four tunes more intense than another, but I can know that the
number of vibrations producing it is three or four times larger
than another. This relation of the sensation to the physical
stimulus is the problem which psychophysics undertakes to solve.
Its two main questions are those of the threshold of sensations,
i.e. the minimum quantity of stimulus that can be perceived, and
of the smallest differences of sensations, i.e. the minimum incre-
ment of stimulus necessary to produce a difference in conscious-
ness. (2) All mental states are accompanied by organic processes.
Physiological psychology endeavors to measure these organic
changes in blood-circulation, secretion, muscular activity, tem-
perature, etc., in order to see how they are correlated to various
mental states. (3) Mental processes require time. Between
the application of a given stimulus and a corresponding reaction
an interval of time elapses which psychometry tries to analyze and
measure.
N.B. Of these various problems, the first applies only to sen-
sation and perception, for the stimulus must be external and
under control, and such is not the case in other mental states like
memory, emotion, volition. The second applies to all mental
states, for all have correlates in the organism; but it is impossible
to measure all organic processes. Some, like nervous processes,
are central and cannot be reached. All are variable; what affects
the circulation in one may affect the secretions in another; one
grows pale where another would blush or tremble, etc. The third
applies also to all mental states, but it is difficult to analyze
and measure exactly every one of the elementary processes of a
reaction.
3. Methods. (a) To determine the threshold of sensation
two methods are followed, (i) Begin with too weak or too dis-
tant a stimulus, and gradually increase it or bring it nearer until
it is perceived. (2) Begin with a certainly perceivable stimulus,
and gradually decrease it or move it farther until it ceases to be
perceived. N.B. The latter method will generally give a lower
SENSATION 59
threshold than the former, i.e. weaker or more distant stimuli
will be perceived; hence averages must be taken.
(b) To determine the smallest perceptible difference, three meth-
ods are used, (i) The method of least observable difference, which
is applied in four ways. Begin with two equal stimuli, and grad-
ually (a) increase or (b) decrease one till the precise moment when
the difference is noticed. Begin with stimuli perceived as unequal,
and gradually (c) increase the weaker or (d) decrease the stronger
till no difference is felt. (2) The method of correct and mistaken
cases. Slightly different stimuli are used, and after comparing
them the subject pronounces on their relative differences. (3)
The method of average error. One fixed stimulus is taken, and
others more or less different are tried until one is found which
appears to be equal to the first.
N.B. In all these methods, which it is advisable to use together
whenever possible in order to correct one by another, several
experiments are made and averages taken. Without compli-
cated apparatus they can be easily applied to certain sensations,
e.g. weight, temperature, taste.
(c) The methods of physiological psychology are very complex
and require an elaborate apparatus to record and measure organic
changes.
(d) The same must be said of experiments in reaction-time.
The general procedure, however, is as follows : In simple reaction-
time or physiological time, the subject reacts by an easy and
familiar movement generally cutting off an electric current by
pressing on a key to a simple sensation which he expects. In
complex reaction-time, which is longer, there is a choice in the mode
of reaction according to the nature of the stimulus, or there is
uncertainty as to the nature or quality of the sensation which will
be experienced. The duration of the complex mental process is
calculated by subtracting the physiological time from the total
duration of the whole process.
4. Results. (a) Special results and numerical formulae which
have been arrived at in these various experiments cannot be given
here. Only some of the most general points will be mentioned.
(b) Experiments on the threshold of sensation give different
60 PSYCHOLOGY
results according to the nature and distance of the stimuli used.
Experiments on the minimum of perceptible increase have led to
the formulation of the law known as " Weber's law," which is but a
formula for both common and scientific experience: "The intensity
of a sensation increases by absolute magnitudes when the stimulus
increases by relatively constant magnitudes." Or: "Equal in-
crements of sensation result from relatively equal increments of
stimulus." Absolute increment means the addition of the same
quantity; relative increment means the addition of a quantity
compared to the already existing amount to which it is added.
This law was given a more mathematical formulation by Fechner:
"If the sensation must increase in arithmetical progression, the
stimulus must increase in geometrical progression." Or: "The
sensation increases as the logarithm of the stimulus."
Thus, for instance, to say that the smallest perceptible incre-
ment is, for sound J, for weight iV, and for light T&TT, means that,
in order to perceive the increment of stimulus, we must add ^,
tV, Totf, of the preceding stimulus. The difference between 100
and 101 candles will be the minimum perceptible. If the first
stimulus be 200 or 300, then we must have, in order to perceive a
difference, not 201 or 301 candles, but 200 -f- f $J, or 202, and
300 -f f U, or 303.
(c) Experiments in physiological psychology show the influence
of various mental states on organic processes, the effects of fatigue,
emotions, dispositions, etc.
(d) Reaction-time has led to determine the rate of transmission
of the nervous current, and hence the duration of more complex
cerebral processes. Even so-called simple reaction-time is in real-
ity complex, for it includes the action of the stimulus on the end-
organs, the transmission to the nervous centre, either to the brain
directly or to the brain through the cord, the passage from a sen-
sory to a motor process in the brain centre, the transmission of
the motor excitation through the brain, cord, and motor nerves,
and the production of muscular contraction.
5. Value of the Results of Experiments. We shall limit our-
selves to a general appreciation.
(a) Weber's law has been discussed and criticised, and the
SENSATION 61
conclusion seems to be that it holds good provided it be accepted
only as an approximation and applied only to sensations of mod-
erate intensity. Hence Fechner's formula is too strict and too
mathematical.
(b) Experiments give different results according to the methods
used, the aptitudes of the subject, his training, power of attention,
habits and disposition. Hence the results obtained by different
psychologists do not always agree, and they must always be
understood as averages, not as invariable formulae.
(c) Experimental psychology is a young science. The first
psychological laboratory was founded by Wundt at Leipzig (1878),
but Weber's and Fechner's investigations had taken place before
that time. It has developed rapidly, and to-day psychological
laboratories are found in all leading universities. By some, experi-
mental psychology has been hailed as the only true psycholog-
ical science in which alone progress is possible. By others, it has
been condemned unreservedly as a vain and fruitless attempt from
which no results useful to psychology have been obtained, and
from which none are to be expected. It is not psychology at all,
but physiology. It has even been identified with materialistic
psychology.
(d) The truth is to be found between these two extreme views.
Experimental psychology in itself is not materialistic. It has
nothing or little to do with the metaphysical problem of the nature
of the mind. It is only one branch or one method of psychology.
It does not reach all mental processes, and considers only some as-
pects of those which it does reach. Its limitations are in its range
of application, in the restricted value of the results, and in the need
which it has of other psychological methods to coordinate its
results.
Its value is both theoretical and practical. It makes of psy-
chology a more exact science, helps us to understand better the
nature and effects of certain mental attitudes and processes, like
attention, emotions, expectation, and shows more clearly the rela-
tions of mind and organism. The influence of sex, fatigue, heredity,
drugs, etc., is ascertained more accurately and verified. The laws
of habit, education, training, distraction, etc., are also determined
62 PSYCHOLOGY
more strictly. Hence experimental psychology is useful to medi-
cine, physiology, and may become very valuable for pedagogy
by finding better methods of teaching, in stricter accordance with
the laws of the mind and the organism. The results so far obtained
are imperfect, but they are sufficient to give hopes of greater,
better, and more useful results in the future.
II. PERCEPTION
I. ANALYSIS AND GENESIS OF SENSE PERCEPTION
i. Analysis. (a) Perception is the consciousness of things,
whereas sensation is merely the consciousness of qualities. Per-
ception refers these qualities to objects. Thus in adult life I do
not merely hear a sound, but I hear the church bell or the whistle
of the engine, I see a man, I smell a rose, I touch the table, etc.
(b) Perceptions have not always the same degree of clearness.
I may hear a sound without being able to ascertain its source;
perceive an unknown tree, or a machine which I never saw before
and the use of which I do not know, or an animal different from
all those with which I am familiar. In such cases there is per-
ception, although indistinct, for I am conscious not only of a
quality, but also in some manner of a distance, direction, etc.,
and chiefly of an object to which I refer such qualities. Percep-
tions become more and more perfect with age, education, and
mental development, because they embody a more accurate and
more complete knowledge of the perceived objects.
(c) Consequently it is in perception that sensations acquire a
meaning. If I hear somebody speaking in a language unknown
to me, his words have no meaning for me; they are simply sounds,
since I cannot grasp the underlying thought which they are in-
tended to manifest. In the same manner sensations by themselves
are meaningless, and perception unites them into a coherent
whole.
(d) Perception is synthetic and coordinates several sensations.
In the statement "I see the dog asleep over there," are implied
many sensations past and present. I see simply a certain color,
and I supply the rest from past associations. Many sensory, and
PERCEPTION 63
perhaps intellectual, elements enter into my complete perception
of the dog, and only a few of these are actually given in my act
of vision. All are now synthetized in the one perception of the
sleeping dog.
(e) Hence perception implies: (i) A synthesis of several simul-
taneous sensations, although sometimes only one sense is used.
Thus I refer to the same bell the sensations of vision, sound, hard-
ness, etc. (2) A synthesis of present sensations with past sensa-
tions of the same or of other senses, i.e. memory and recognition.
Thus, although I have no actual experience of it, I know how the
boiling water which I see would affect my sense of touch if I dipped
my finger in it, and the knowledge that it is boiling is itself the
result of past experiences. Imagination and habit may even pre-
vent us from perceiving things as they are really, for instance,
when a word in which a letter is missing is read without the mis-
print being noticed. Or they complete the perception, as when I
see a ball and perceive that it is spherical, although I really see
only half of it. (3) The substitution of one sense for another, or of
one sense for a more complex act of judgment and inference.
For instance, I see that the table is hard and the pillow soft (touch),
or I see that the dog is living (inference from its behavior).
(/) We may recall an old distinction which applies here.
Sensile per se proprium.
commune,
per accidens.
By sensile or obiectum sensibile is meant the object about which
the senses give information. The sensile per se is perceived
directly. The sensile per accidens is not perceived in itself, but
only because of some connection with the sense to whose percep-
tion it is attributed. Color, sound, odor, taste, tactile qualities,
are sensilia per se and propria, i.e. special to each sense. Size,
number, shape, movement, rest, are sensilia per se but communia,
as they may be perceived by more than one sense. Thus distance
may be perceived by touch, vision, hearing, and even smell.
To see the hardness of an object; to see a friend; to see that a dog
is alive or dead, that a man is sad or joyful, healthy or sick; to
64 PSYCHOLOGY
hear that the bell is broken; to know by taste that a fruit is of such
or such a kind; to enter a room and learn by smell that the win-
dows have not been opened for a long time, etc., are examples of
sensilia per accidens. These qualities or objects are not perceived
directly by the sense to which they are attributed, but inferred by
habitual association.
2. Genesis. The first sensations are very vague, but, little
by little, images left by them in the mind associate with sensations
and images of the same or of different kind so as to enable the
mind to identify and discern objects. The senses become educated.
Applied to the senses, education means: (i) Their development and
perfection for their immediate and original sensations. By exercise
they acquire a greater keenness and accuracy. (2) The acquisi-
tion by a given sense of perceptions which are not original (sensilia
communia and sensilia per accidens). (3) The correction of errors
and illusions. The main psychological factors in the education of
the senses are attention, association, imagination and memory,
intellect and will. Physiological factors are the habituation of
the nervous system and the whole organism, the development,
growth, and adaptation of sense organs, the development of the
brain, hygiene, and the proper care and use of the sense organs.
3. The Most Important Perceptions are those of sight, for, in the
adult, sight is in many cases a substitute for the other senses, and
reaches objects at a greater distance. It enables the mind to com-
municate with others by gestures and writing. Touch, as we shall
see, contributes greatly to the education of the other senses,
especially of sight. Hearing has a great importance because it
makes it possible to exchange ideas by means of speech. Smell
and taste occupy the lowest place.
II. PERCEPTIONS OF SMELL AND TASTE
Both senses can be developed so as to reach a wonderful degree
of keenness, e.g. in professional tasters. But even when educated,
they give but little information concerning the external world.
By experience, however, we learn to associate many odors and
savors with the objects from which they proceed, and thus can
recognize certain substances by these senses alone. Smell may also
PERCEPTION 65
indirectly, and more or less accurately, give information concerning
the distance, direction, and even size of the odorous object.
III. AUDITORY PERCEPTIONS
1. Nature of Objects. By association, sensations of hearing
are ascribed to their causes and referred to such or such objects.
A certain sound becomes the sound of a bell, and even of the
church bell, the engine bell, the school bell . . . , because this sen-
sation of hearing has been associated with other visual or tactual
sensations, and because it has been noticed in what respects the
sound of a bell in general differs from every other sound, and the
sound of a particular bell from that of other bells. In the same
way I come to know that a certain tune is played on the violin,
the cornet, or the trombone, even when I do not see these instru-
ments. (Let the student endeavor to indicate more in detail and
more concretely the genesis of such perceptions.) Mention must
also be made of the auditory perceptions of tempo, rhythm, and
cadence in music, speech, poetry, etc., which are the sources of so
much enjoyment.
2. The Localization of Sounds in space includes the perceptions
of direction and distance.
(a) Perception of Direction, (i) The use of the senses of sight
and touch is fundamental in acquiring and developing this percep-
tion, and, even for the educated ear, these senses are frequently
necessary to ascertain the direction accurately and to confirm the
auditory perception. (2) Binaural perception is an index of direc-
tion, because the intensity of sounds coming from the right or the
left is different for the right and the left ear. Hence it is that in
order to perceive the direction of a sound we generally turn the
head around. Experience shows that the direction of sounds
coming from the right or the left is more readily ascertained than
that of sounds coming from objects in front or back of the hearer.
(3) It is probable that the sensitiveness of the skin of the external
ear and meatus, and the position of the semicircular canals, have
something to do with the perception of direction.
(b) Perception of Distance. The distance of a sonorous object
is known by comparing the intensity of the present sound with the
6
66 PSYCHOLOGY
intensity of the same sound at greater or shorter known distances.
To this end, the nature of the sonorous object and the intensity
of its sound at a given distance must be already known. Atmos-
pheric conditions, like the direction of the wind, the presence of
fog, etc., must be taken into consideration. The distance of un-
usual or unfamiliar sounds is much more difficult to determine.
IV. TACTUAL PERCEPTIONS
The information received from the sense of touch concerns the
primary qualities of matter which are most fundamental, namely,
quantity, extension, number, shape, etc. Moreover, touch is the
sense to which appeal is generally made when other senses do not
seem to agree, e.g. by grasping the object, walking toward or around
it. Through cultivation it is capable of acquiring a wonderful
and almost incredible degree of perfection, as, for instance, in per-
sons born blind. In all cases active touch, e.g. " feeling " with the
hands, is much more useful than mere passive touch, because
to the simple contact of the latter it adds sensations of muscular
activity and movement, and it gives several simultaneous and
successive sensations. The knowledge of the shape, dimensions,
and qualities of a knife will be more accurate after handling it
than after merely touching it. Tactual perceptions may be reduced
to those of our own body and those of other material substances.
i. Perception of One's Own Organism. (a) There seems to
be some native but very vague consciousness of the organism.
In the beginning, tactual sensations including contact and
pressure, temperature, sensations of muscles and joints are
vaguely localized in the organism, and discriminative sensibility
is very imperfect. The numerous and complex vital sensations,
the various contacts of the organism with surrounding objects, the
experience of pain, etc., contribute to make the perception more
definite. So also the fact that objects produce different impres-
sions according to their size and qualities, and according to the
parts of the body with which they come in contact.
(b) More effective are the sensations of double contact. When
a part of the organism, e.g. the hand, touches another, a double
sensation of touch is experienced, and thus by passive and chiefly
PERCEPTION 67
by active touch the limits and parts of the organism are soon
ascertained.
(c) The sense of sight is a help in localizing more accurately
the sensations of touch.
2. Perception of Other Material Substances. (a) Sensations
of single contact, as opposed to those of double contact, contribute
to the consciousness of the distinction between one's organism and
other bodies. The same is true of the pain felt in one part of the
organism or in two according as the child strikes some external
substance or his own body.
(b) Size, figure, and distance are perceived chiefly by active touch,
and by the muscular sensations experienced in passing the hands
on or around the object, and in walking toward or around it.
Measurements of size and distance are effected by a comparison
with a known unit, with parts of our own body, or with our bodily
movements. It is noteworthy that the interpretation of visual
sensations of size and distance is frequently done in terms of touch.
A thing is so many " steps " away, so many " feet " or " cubits "
long; it is at the distance of " a stone's throw," of " a two-hour
walk," etc. In such expressions the standard unit is taken from
the human body and its movements.
(c) Weight depends largely on the strength, exercise, and educa-
tion of the muscular sense. In consequence it is greatly relative,
unless the habit has been acquired of referring it to a fixed unit,
such as ounce, pound, etc. Active touch especially is important
in the determination of the number and the movements of objects.
(d) Combined sensations and perceptions of touch may in some
cases give the knowledge of the very nature of an object. Thus a
certain group of sensations will indicate a metal, and even this or
that metal; another group will indicate marble or wood, oil or
water, etc.
V. VISUAL PERCEPTIONS
i. Erect and Single Vision. The phenomena of erect vision
although the image formed on the retina is inverted, and of single
vision although we have two eyes, belong chiefly to the domain of
physiology.
68 PSYCHOLOGY
(a) With regard to erect vision, habit may be an important fac-
tor, for, even if originally we had a tendency to see things inverted,
habit acquired by touch would correct this tendency. It is possible
also that, in the transmission from the retina to the brain, spatial
relations are not preserved. But the more probable explanation
is that the image on the retina is not perceived at all, and in fact
we are not directly aware of it. The rays of light are perceived in
the direction from which they come because in vision there seems
to be a double movement, one of the object toward the eye through
the refracting media, producing the inverted image on the retina,
the other from the eye, projecting the image in its erected position.
This activity from the eye is manifest in projected after-images.
In photography, on the contrary, the object is simply received on
the film, which is passive, and hence is found inverted.
(b) As to single perception: (i) The greater part of the field of
vision is common to both eyes, as can be easily verified by using
each separately. The same is not true of fishes, birds, or other
animals whose eyes are found on the sides of the head. (2) If
we look simultaneously at two objects unequally distant from the
eye, for instance, at two pencils held vertically before the eyes, one
at a distance of seven or eight inches, the other seven or eight inches
farther, the nearer pencil will appear double if the eyes are accom-
modated for and fixed upon the more distant, and vice versa. Or
hold a finger before your eyes, and look at the ceiling or sky : two
fingers will be seen, although vaguely. (3) Some animals cer-
tainly have single perceptions from the beginning, e.g. the chick,
which immediately pecks the grain of corn. But they are precisely
those whose eyes are divergent, and for which therefore the majority
of objects perceived simultaneously are perceived by one eye only.
(4) Physiologists commonly hold that single perception is based
on the corresponding points of the retina, i.e. points situated in
the same relative position with regard to the fovea centralis, both
being on the right of it, or on the left, or up, or down. Hence, for
instance, the nasal half of one retina has no corresponding point in
the nasal half of the other retina, but in its temporal half. Rays
of light falling on corresponding points are perceived as single,
otherwise as double. From what precedes it would seem that
PERCEPTION 69
both a native disposition and also education and exercise are factors
in the phenomenon of single vision.
2. Perception of Surface. Against pure empiricists who claim
that the perception of surface is not original and primitive, but
acquired by experience, it seems certain that original perceptions
of vision include in a vague manner that of surface and extension,
(i) It seems impossible to perceive a color without perceiving at
once some colored extension. (2) In fact, in the few instances of
persons born blind and made to see in adult age, these persons
perceive at once some colored surface, but no distance or solidity.
(3) Some animals, e.g. the chick which does not miss its aim, as
already mentioned, have originally not only the perception of
extension, but also that of distance.
The superficial shape, if small, is perceived at one glance; if
large, by the movements of the eye around the object.
3. Perception of Distance. (a) The perception of distance is
not original, but acquired. A nativistic view cannot be accepted
here, as it was for the perception of surface, (i) A man born
blind and operated upon for cataract reports objects as being in
contact with the eye, or at most perhaps at a vague distance which
cannot be estimated. (2) A child shows that it cannot appre-
ciate distances, e.g. when it tries to grasp objects, like the
moon, which are far beyond its reach. These reasons show at
least that distances cannot be estimated at first, even should
the object be perceived as vaguely distant and distinct from the
eye.
(b) The mam factors in the perception of distance are: (i) The
sensations of accommodation, as various structures of the eye adapt
themselves differently according as the object is far or near. (2)
The visual angle, that is, the apparent size of an object when its
real size is known. A man appears smaller at the distance of one
mile than at the distance of ten feet, i.e. the visual angle the
angle formed from the eye as vertex between lines directed toward
the extremities of the perceived object is smaller. Hence
illusions of distance will produce illusions of size, e.g. in panoramas.
(3) The fact that an object covers another totally or in part, and
the number of intervening objects, are signs of their relative distances.
70 PSYCHOLOGY
(4) The apparent brightness of the object, the distinctness of its
parts and outlines. (5) The changes in the relative positions of
different objects, and the rapidity with which these changes take
place when one moves the head or the whole body. On a train,
nearer objects seem to " move " much faster than the more distant
ones. (6) The degree of convergence of the axes of both eyes,
which is greater for near objects. This applies only to distances
under one fourth of, or perhaps half, a mile. For greater distances
the convergence is the same. (7) The similarity and dissimilarity of
the separate vision of each eye, which vary according to the distance
of the object. (8) Touch and locomotion, which make it possible
to estimate distances accurately and are necessary to train the eye.
With the use of one eye only, vertically hold a pin or a pencil
in each hand, one higher, the other lower, and without the help
of the sense of touch try to bring the point of the higher pencil
or pin exactly on top of the point of the lower, and see how you
will succeed. Try again. Try with the use of both eyes. Do
you succeed better? Why?
4. The Perception of Solidity, Relief, and Depth is but an
application of the perception of distance. It depends chiefly on
binocular vision helped by touch. Monocular perception of
solidity is always imperfect. Unless an object, e.g. a book, is at
too great a distance (of over twenty or thirty feet), one eye does
not perceive it in exactly the same way as the other. The right
eye perceives more on the right side of the object, and the left
eye more on the left side. Hold a pencil or rod about one foot
long horizontally before the eyes, the nearer end being about six
inches from the face, and at the height of the mouth; look at it
with the right eye, it is seen as / ; look with the left eye, it is seen
as \ ; look with both eyes fixed on the nearer end, it is seen as V ;
fixed on the farther end, it is seen as \ ; fixed on the middle, it is
seen as X . The factors in the perception of relief are the same as
for distance. In paintings and drawings many illusions of distance,
solidity, and relief are produced by the proper arrangement of light,
colors, shades, perspective, sizes, etc. Two pictures may be
taken of the same object, but slightly different, one as it appears
to the right, the other as it appears to the left eye. In the stereo-
THE MENTAL IMAGE 71
scope, by means of lenses, both are made to be seen in the same place
as one picture, and thus produce the illusion of solidity and relief.
5. The Perception of the Size or Magnitude of surfaces and
solids is acquired in different ways.
(a) Near objects may be compared to the human body or to
parts of it, and this comparison is facilitated by touch and locomo-
tion. Or they may be compared to other bodies the size of which
is already known. Hence in drawing the sketch of a building,
an architect will place near it drawings of men, trees, carriages, or
other familiar objects, so as to make it easier to estimate the
height of the building.
(b) By means of the visual angle, the distance, if known, makes
it possible to form an idea of the real size of objects. Thus I may
know that the man twenty feet away is taller than another at a
distance of ten feet, although the latter, judged only by the visual
angle, seems taller.
(c) Important also are the muscular sensations experienced in
moving the eyeball or head in order to follow the outlines of the
object.
ARTICLE II. SENSE REPRESENTATION
I. THE MENTAL IMAGE
I. NATURE OF THE IMAGE
i. Psychological. (a) Representation does not mean that
the same object or quality which has been perceived is again pre-
sented and perceived in the same way, but only as a likeness, a
copy, or, better, an image (imago, from the root im in imitor). It
is a fact of daily experience that we can " imagine " absent things,
that is, recall to mind the images of things perceived in the past.
Image, which in common usage refers to the sense of vision, applies
here to all senses. Not only are there visual images, but auditory,
tactual, etc., images as well. Mental imagery is the collection of
images in the mind.
(b) An image necessarily implies that something has been left
over by the preceding perception which it represents. Where
72 PSYCHOLOGY
there has been no sensation, there is no image; a blind man may
form images of sounds, but not of colors. This residue of the
preceding perception is not the image itself, for image applies only
to the representation actually present in consciousness, not to
the unconscious retention of something intermediary between the
perception and the image. This residue is therefore more com-
monly called a disposition, i.e. a capacity or aptitude resulting
from a permanent modification, which enables the mind to revive
images of things perceived formerly. Three stages are included
in representation: (i) perception; (2) retention of an unconscious
disposition, sometimes called latent image; (3) actual revival and
presence of the image in the mind.
(c) The following characteristics differentiate the image from
the percept, i.e. from the result of the act of perception. We
shall speak later of abnormal cases in which images are taken for
percepts (hallucination) (i) The percept is antecedent in time,
and independent of the resulting image; the image is posterior to,
and dependent on, perception. (2) The percept is vivid and at-
tributed to the presence of a real object; the image is fainter, and
is not referred to an object actually present. (3) Perception is
dependent on the presence of external objects for its possibility,
nature, appearance, or disappearance. The image is possible in the
absence of the external object; it appears or disappears of itself, or
under the influence of the will; its nature even maybe modified so as
to be either a true or a more or less fanciful representation. If my
eyes are normal and open, I cannot help seeing objects within my
field of vision, and I can see no other. But even in the dark or with
my eyes closed, some visual images may come spontaneously or be
called to the mind; others may be excluded or modified purposely.
(d) A few remarks will be useful on the meaning of certain
terms used in connection with the present question. " Idea "
applies to both images and concepts, i.e. to all mental representa-
tions, whether concrete or abstract. By the scholastics any
image or mental picture was called phantasma, and the faculty of
retaining images was the phantasia (<aiVw, to appear). To-day
the terms "phantasm" and "phantasy" are seldom, if ever,
used in this sense. Phantasy or fancy indicates something illusory,
THE MENTAL IMAGE 73
odd or whimsical, " fanciful " or " fantastic." Phantasm is applied
especially to forms or spectres of an hallucinatory nature which
appear in various forms of mental excitation and exaltation, or
under the influence of certain drugs. Sometimes, chiefly in spirit-
istic literature, it is restricted to the true or supposed apparitions
of disembodied spirits.
2. Physiological. (a) Certain facts make it clear that the
mental image has a physiological basis, (i) Experimental re-
searches and pathological observations have shown that injury
to, and disease of, certain parts of the brain destroy or impair the
power of reviving certain groups of mental images. (2) The
restoration or cure of these parts has been followed by the restitu-
tion of the missing images. (3) The easier acquisition of images
in early age is generally explained, in part at least, by the fact
that the nervous centres are more plastic than in old age. (4) On
the other hand, physiological experiments show that a nerve,
once it has been excited, acquires some facility for receiving again
the same excitation, that is, every excitation leaves some trace
or residue in the nervous system. Whether this is a persisting
movement and vibration, or a permanent impression and modifica-
tion, or a latent disposition, is secondary. These three hypotheses
are not mutually exclusive. Persisting vibrations and persisting
imprints may coexist, and both account for the resulting aptitude
or disposition. Sensations produce some modification in the
nervous substance, and hence leave special dispositions.
(b) Physiological dispositions cannot dispense with mental
dispositions. A movement, vibration, or chemical change in the
organism can no more account for the image than for the perception
itself. Consciousness cannot be reduced to material properties.
To speak of organic memory, or of the memory of a violin, because
it improves by usage, is objectionable because memory is a
psychological term implying consciousness.
II. PROPERTIES OF THE IMAGE
The image is representative (psychological), and motor (physio-
logical).
i. The Image is Representative. (a) According as it repre-
74 PSYCHOLOGY
sents an object as it was really perceived, or is combined with
other images, the image is called simple or complex. In a certain
sense, it is true that all images are complex, since perception itself
is complex. But simplicity and complexity here refer to the
image considered either as reproducing only one perception, or as
reproducing together several, or parts of several, perceptions.
The complexity of images results from the combination of several
images into one, or from the dissociation of the elements of one
image, and their grouping with parts of other images. I may
imagine, for instance, a dog with feathers, or a bird with hair and
four feet. In the simple image no new elements are introduced,
but it may be a more or less complete representation of the object.
(b) Images become fused, that is, images partly similar and
partly dissimilar may be, as it were, superposed in the mind so as
to strengthen common features, and blur individual features.
By taking successively on the same plate photographs of, let us
say, six members of a family, each one receiving only one sixth of
the total necessary exposure, a composite photograph is obtained
in which common features are reinforced, whereas individual
characteristics are weak. The fusion of images has a similar result.
For instance, the features common to all dogs, like the facts of
having two ears and eyes, four legs, a certain general appearance,
etc., remain prominent; but individual features, like size, definite
color, etc., are in the background. These are included in the image
of an individual dog, but are generally replaced by averages, or
are hardly noticed, when we simply think of a dog without referring
the image to this or that individual.
(c) Complexity and fusion give one simultaneous result, namely,
one composite or vague image. Association gives a successive
result. It means a linking together of two or more images in a
series as antecedents and consequents, so that the revival of an
image is likely to produce the revival of another image with which
it is associated. Of association we shall soon speak more in detail.
(d) An image has intensity. Not in the same sense as sensation,
for the images of thunder or of a dazzling light may be fainter than
those of a whisper or a candle; but in the sense that it is more or
less vivid, clear, distinct, and similar to the original.
THE MENTAL IMAGE 75
(e) Complexity, fusion, association, and vividness of images
sometimes require no effort of the will, sometimes also are under
the control of the will and are intended for special purposes.
2. The Image is Motor. This important aspect of ideas has
a more direct reference to the chapter on conative faculties than
to the present chapter on cognitive faculties.
(a) All perceptions are accompanied by various organic pro-
cesses which are more or less conscious. Hence by association
mental images are accompanied by the images of these processes.
In playing the piano, or the trombone, or any other instrument,
the sensations of sound are accompanied by the movements of
the arms, hands, and fingers, necessary to produce these sounds.
In listening to music played by others, the performer's motions
may also be perceived and associated with the auditory sensations.
Or the listener may be aware of certain definite or indefinite motions
in his own organism, e.g. of the tendency to dance, beat time, mark
the rhythm by certain gestures, etc. In reproduction all these
images tend to come back together.
(b) A perception or image of a movement is accompanied by
an inchoative execution of such a movement, which in many cases
is conscious. When I follow the pianist's motions with the eyes,
my hands themselves have a tendency to move with those of the
player. I feel a beginning of the necessary innervation and
muscular adaptation, the strength of which varies with the nature
of the stimulus, and with subjective dispositions and habits.
When I recall a tune which I have played, there is some inchoation
of those movements which were required to play it. If it is a
march or a dance, there is a tendency to take a certain bodily
attitude and to execute appropriate movements. The image of a
circle includes certain eye changes in order to follow its outline.
The image of a word produces inchoative movements in the organs
of speech to utter it, or in the hands and fingers to write it, etc.
Hence, in general, an image always implies a motor tendency to
realization.
(c) This tendency may be so strong, for instance in the case of
habits, that an idea is immediately and almost automatically
accompanied by complete motor processes. Or it may be reduced
76 PSYCHOLO G Y
to a feeble and imperceptible change in the nerve centres, without
any external manifestation. If there is only one idea in the mind,
as happens in a hypnotized subject, the tendency to realization is
irresistible, because the mind is deprived of other ideas which
normally would hold this one in check. If, for instance, while the
subject is in reality eating something sweet and agreeable, the idea
is suggested to him that he is eating something loathsome, his
face will show an expression of disgust, and his stomach may be so
upset as to cause vomiting. When, on the contrary, several ideas
are present in the mind, either they will evoke a series of coordi-
nated movements, if they are in harmony, or, if they are opposed,
they will remain in equilibrium, or form antagonistic groups, one of
which will finally prevail. Higher mental faculties also contribute
to foster or check the motor tendencies of ideas.
(d) Not only does the idea suggest the movement, but the move-
ment or attitude suggests the idea. Thus the attitude of prayer
suggests the idea of praying, clenching the fist is suggestive of
revenge, etc.
(e) This motor property of ideas accounts for many facts attri-
buted to imitation. The perception of actions performed by
another suggests the idea of this action, which is in turn followed
by the appropriate movements. It also accounts for many facts
attributed to mind-reading. Slight movements and muscular
contractions are real, although unconscious, and they can be
detected by a skilled and sensitive person. Thus, for instance,
an object is concealed, and only one person knows where. This
person is taken by the hand and led almost immediately to the
hiding-place. Such mind-reading amounts simply to perceiving
and interpreting some slight muscular contractions performed
unconsciously and involuntarily by the subject, as he is led toward
or away from the place where the object is to be found. The
whole expression of the face, especially of the eyes, is also of great
help in such experiments.
III. ASSOCIATION AND ITS LAWS
i. Meaning. (a) As already remarked, association does not
mean a process of combination by which several images would
THE MENTAL IMAGE 77
unite so as to become one. It refers to the succession of ideas in
the mind, and means that images are not revived independently
and at random, but that their revival depends on actual perceptions
or on the presence of other ideas in the mind. Images are grouped
or linked together so that the revival of one tends to bring about
the revival of another or of several others.
(b) Sometimes we are clearly aware of this connection; we can
follow the " train " of ideas and perceive their nexus. In other
cases we are unable to see why one idea is revived; it seems to
flash into the mind without being called for and of its own accord.
But frequently in such cases further reflection reveals the hidden
thread which bound ideas together. After a conversation, the
beginning and the end of which deal with totally different subjects
that seem to have nothing in common, it is very interesting to trace
back the trend of the conversation in order to see the connection
between the various topics, and examine how one led to another.
(c) Association has no laws properly so-called. Every individual
mind has its own associations, and the same idea or perception
will revive different ideas in different minds; it " reminds " one of
one thing, and another of another thing. Moreover, even in the
same mind, manifold associations exist, and it is impossible before-
hand to say which idea will be revived. Hence it occurs fre-
quently that we fail when trying to " give the clue " to another,
and that a " hint " is not always taken. The so-called laws of
association simply indicate how groups of ideas are formed, and
how one idea suggests another.
2. The Laws of Association have been enumerated in various
ways. Some psychologists mention three, others two, and others
one, reducing all to the law of contiguity in consciousness. Here
the various modes of association are indicated without any attempt
to examine whether they are reducible to one or two laws.
(a) An idea may be revived owing to the likeness which it has
with another already present in consciousness. The similarity
may be total or partial, and the common features are more or
less numerous. Examples: likeness of two tunes, of two words in
spelling or pronunciation, of a copy and its original, of two houses,
of two smells or tastes, etc.
78 PSYCHOLOGY
(b) Contrast contributes to the revival of images, e.g. a hot
summer day and a cold winter day, a giant and a dwarf, a good
and a bad action. It is clear that contrast in some respects and
similarity in other respects frequently exist together between the
same objects.
(c) Association also takes place on account of the contiguity in
space or time. Thus my thought of a building in a city may recall
that of another building in the same city; a state may suggest a
neighboring state. The thought of a historical event may recall
other contemporary or immediately preceding and following events
or personages.
Similarity, contrast, and contiguity are the three main laws of
association.
(d) Among other important factors of association must be
mentioned: (i) The vividness of the impression or impressions, and
hence their interest, the attention voluntarily or involuntarily
given to them, their emotional aspect, etc. (2) Recentness;
generally images fade away with time unless they are recalled.
(3) General and special dispositions, organic and mental, perma-
nent and transitory, acquired and natural.
(e) An idea may be linked with others in more than one way,
and in this case the chances of its being recalled are greater.
(/) Associations and groupings of ideas may be cooperative or
conflicting. In the struggle for persistence and revival, the law
which, for organisms, has been called the law of " the survival of the
fittest," applies to ideas. An idea may have several advantages
over its competitors, both in itself and on account of the group to
which it belongs. In this case it stands a better chance of survival.
Others, on the contrary, being weak, soon become weaker still;
they fall into subconsciousness, never perhaps to be revived.
II. IMAGINATION
I. NATURE OF IMAGINATION
i. Meaning of the Term. Imagination sometimes means the
power, sometimes the process itself, of forming mental images,
and sometimes the result of this activity, namely, the mental image.
IMAGINATION 79
The term " imagination " is also used in a more restricted sense
for the constructive imagination, i.e. the forming of images that
are not in conformity with reality, as when, after listening to a
yarn, we say; " That's all imagination." This last meaning is
more properly that of fancy, which is more superficial, playful,
false, and artificial.
2. Kinds of Imagination. (a) Imagination is called passive
or active according as images recur spontaneously, or as an effort
is made to recall them.
(b) Imagination is simply reproductive, or constructive, according
as it merely represents (more or less completely) the object as
perceived, or combines images into one composite image. The
" construction " may be merely mechanical and spontaneous, or
it may be purposive, for instance, in inventions and works of art.
To the constructive imagination may be reduced the power of
magnifying and minimizing things.
(c) Constructive imagination includes two main processes,
isolating and combining. By the former ideas are dissociated into
several parts; by the latter the parts thus obtained are united in
different ways to form composite images.
(d) Imagination deals with reproduction, but not necessarily,
nor even primarily, with faithful reproduction. Nevertheless all
the elements of a composite image are found scattered in preceding
sense-perceptions.
II. IMPORTANCE OF IMAGINATION
The importance of imagination, both for good and for bad, can
hardly be overestimated; it is a useful, yet dangerous power.
i. For Organic Life. Imagination exercises a great influence
on the health of the organism because ideas are not only representa-
tive but also motor. Many illustrations of this could be given.
Do we not see frequently imaginary ills leading to real sickness?
To imagine that you are sick is one of the best ways to become
truly sick, and to avoid thinking of your real sickness frequently
proves to be a powerful help in the cure. The use of an appropriate
remedy is in itself very beneficial, but the conviction that it is
beneficial and that it will produce a certain result makes it twice
8o PSYCHOLOGY
as effective. Imagination without the remedy may even produce
the desired result. Cases might be cited of persons who felt sure
they had taken a certain medicine, and indeed experienced the
results of it, and who later found the pill which, in fact, they had
forgotten to take. There is a better chance for the man who has
made up his mind to get well than for the one who imagines that
he will die and despairs.
2. Intellectual Life. (a) General. Perception supposes imag-
ination; it is from images left by past experiences that we supply
the elements of the object which are not actually perceived by the
senses. The higher forms of mental life, conception, judgment,
and reasoning, are dependent on imagination, as will be shown
later. To a certain extent the imagination helps to concentrate
the mind on an object; but it may also be the source of fickleness
and of a constant wandering of the mind.
(b) Special. Imagination helps the understanding of abstract
truths because it furnishes concrete examples and illustrations.
It may also become a danger, because thought cannot always take
the form of images, and some are inclined to identify understanding
with imagining. Under the guidance of reason, imagination is the
principle of inventions, for it furnishes the mind with the complex
images of certain effects to be expected and realized. It helps to
frame and test hypotheses, and here it is very important to imagine
all possible cases, e.g. for a general to think of all the possible move-
ments of the enemy, since to omit one may cause defeat; or for a
scientist to think of all the possible causes of a phenomenon,
otherwise he is in danger of being mistaken.
The danger of attaching too much importance to imaginary
conceptions, and of mistaking them for realities, is to be avoided.
One must beware especially of " complementary " imagination
by which things are perceived, not as they really are, but as they
should be in order to meet one's expectations and views. See, for
instance, in how many different ways the same fact is interpreted
and reported by different observers, every one coloring it according
to his own fancy.
(c) In arts, imagination creates ideals, types, fictions, etc., which
the artist endeavors to realize and express.
IMAGINATION 8l
3. In Daily Practical Life, imagination has a very complex role.
Success depends largely on imagination and forethought, since it
requires the idea of the end to be reached and of the means to reach
it, the prevision of the possible good and bad results of an enter-
prise, etc. Failure is frequently due to an excess or a lack of
imagination. Imagination exercises a great influence in making
human life happy or miserable, for it causes us to magnify or
minimize its goods and evils, and to compare our lot with the
worse or the better lot of others. It thus gives an optimistic or a
pessimistic view of the world and of life, and changes the aspect of
things. In the relations with others, it may so blind one to reality
that nothing but good will be seen in certain persons, and nothing
but evil in others. Motives will be supplied rightly or wrongly,
and " complementary " imagination will make it almost impossible
to pass a sound judgment on the actions of others.
4. In Moral Life, imagination may usurp the place of reason
as the guide of human actions, but it may also be used to construe
the means of doing good, and to form ideals and examples.
5. In Religious Life, imagination helps to grasp the highest
spiritual truths and to express them by appropriate symbols.
But it is also the source of errors, prejudices, and superstitions.
III. TRAINING OF THE IMAGINATION
i. General Principles. (a) As imagination may be both very
useful and very harmful according to the use which is made of it,
it is important to pay attention to its development. Imagination
must be cultivated on account of its utility, and controlled on account
of its dangers. Certain features must be strengthened, others
must be checked.
(b) The main principle is that imagination should be a useful
servant. Hence it should never be allowed to reign over other
faculties and activities, or to guide human actions and behavior;
it must remain under the guidance and control of reason. To
do this is a serious task which requires constant effort and vigilance,
and, notwithstanding these, imagination from time to time will still
work mischief in the mind; it will still deceive and mislead man.
With persevering attention it is possible to train and control the
7
82 PSYCHOLOGY
imagination, to increase its usefulness by developing it along certain
lines and checking its excessive activity. Imagination must not
be allowed free scope to wander at random. Images which should
not occupy the mind remember that they are motor must be
banished and held in check by calling forth other images and
ideas.
2. The General Factors in the development of the imagination
are psychological and physiological, (i) Acquired or innate
dispositions, temperament, sex, character, age, etc. (2) The
relative development and keenness of the senses. (3) Surround-
ings, mode of life, occupations, business, etc. (4) Habits. (5)
The use of narcotics and stimulants.
(a) From these result the various types of imagination: visual,
auditory, tactual, and motor. A type of imagination consists in
a special tendency to revive images of one sense in preference to
those of other senses. Thus in reciting a lesson which they have
memorized, some pupils will see it on their books, follow it line
after line, remember the first words of each page and paragraph,
etc. Others are led rather by the sequence of sounds; others, by
the motions necessary to utter the words. In consequence, some
will learn their lesson by simply reading it with the eyes; others,
by reading it aloud; others, by going through the motions of the
organs of speech, especially of the lips and tongue, without uttering
any sound. The revival of the image of a band concert may consist
primarily of the visual images of the players, their respective
positions, their uniforms, motions, etc.; or of the various sounds
and tunes; or of certain motor phenomena, marching or dancing,
which lead to remember the tunes.
(b) More special features may be developed for certain purposes
according to various conditions of life, for business, arts, and
sciences. This is effected by attention and concentration of mind.
Thus the chauffeur has to remember roads; the car conductor,
persons; the business man, merchandise, etc. The musician im-
agines sounds in preference to colors; the painter, colors and visual
features in preference to sounds, etc.
To conclude: Keep the faculty of imagination alive, but apply
MEMORY 83
it according to reason. Develop it, but control and direct it, and
do not be led by it in your judgments and actions.
in. MEMORY
I. NATURE OF MEMORY
i. Distinction of Memory and Imagination. It is difficult to
draw a strict dividing line between memory and imagination.
The main differences, however, are the following:
(a) Imagination is more fanciful and constructive, whereas
memory reproduces the image of an experience as it really occurred.
Whatever is added or changed, whether consciously or uncon-
sciously, belongs to imagination. It must be noted, however, that,
in order to belong to memory, it is not necessary for the image to
represent all details. This is generally impossible, and the memory
of some features co-exists with the oblivion of some others. The
image may be true without being complete. Yet it cannot be
called a faithful reproduction if essential features are left out;
but, according to different points of view, different features may
be looked upon as essential,
(b) Memory implies a reference to the past, and includes recogni-
tion; imagination refers chiefly to the present or future, and includes
no recognition. An image may be present in the mind without
the awareness that it is an image and therefore a reproduction.
Or I may perceive a thing for the second or third time without
remembering former perceptions; it is altogether " new " to me.
This is true not only of images that are built up by the constructive
imagination, and the elements of which are found scattered in
past perceptions, but even of simple images. The mind may be
incapable of referring them to the original, and is not conscious
that they are copies. Or it may stop at the consideration of the
present image, without thinking at all of the past perception.
Or finally it may apply itself chiefly to the future realization of such
an image or ideal. This is not enough for memory, which requires
that the image be referred to its original, and that the mind
recognize it as a representation of some past perception.
(c) Hence memory supposes at least the implicit knowledge
84 PSYCHOLOGY
that the ego or subject who now recognizes the image is the same
who experienced the original corresponding perception. It leads
one to acknowledge the fact of the persistence of the self and of
self-identity, since the same mind is at once forming the present
image and referring it to its own past experience.
2. Two Kinds of Memory. According to the mode of this
reference two kinds of memory must be distinguished, (i) One
is the recall of an individual event which has occurred only once or a
few times, at such or such a date, in these or those circumstances.
Thus I may clearly remember an event which I witnessed, an
action which I performed, a conversation which I held, a speech
which I heard, etc. (2) The other is acquired by a series of
repetitions made for the purpose of learning. The child who
memorizes his lesson for the next day reads it and repeats it to
himself one, two, . . . ten times, in succession, or at several intervals
of time, and on the next day, when he recites it, the individual read-
ings are of no importance for him; he is attentive only to the
present conformity of his words with those of the book. This
memory is very close to habit and consists of many habitual associa-
tions.
3. The Three Stages of Memory are retention, reproduction,
and recognition. The former two are common to memory and
imagination, the latter is special to memory.
(a) Images are retained in the mind as unconscious dispositions.
Images must not be conceived as " stored up " in the mind or the
brain, as though the mind or brain were like a storehouse, box, or
receptacle in which they can be gathered and preserved. Since
image means a conscious representation, the retention of images
is but a metaphorical expression. What is retained is the latent
disposition or aptitude to call forth an image.
(b) Reproduction, or the actual revival in consciousness, depends
on (i) association with, or suggestion from, present perceptions
or images; (2) recollection, that is, the voluntary effort to recall
an idea that has been partially forgotten, and some elements of
which are now present in consciousness. In recollection we
endeavor to reach back in the past and to recall the whole idea
or group of ideas by the use of the laws of association.
MEMORY 85
(c) Recognition, or the reference of the present to the past, is
of two kinds, as already indicated. The child who recites a lesson
learned by successive repetitions endeavors to reproduce the
ideas or words of the book. This implies some recognition, namely,
the recognition of the similarity of the present recitation with the
original. Yet this recognition is rather secondary, for now the
child is hardly aware of the past, he is all intent on the present
recitation, and recognition is, in this case, little more than a general
and vague sense of familiarity. Perfect and properly so-called
recognition will occur only if there is a special reason directing the
attention to the past. Thus, if a child be asked why he does not
know the lesson, whether he has studied it, or how many times he
has read it, his mind will begin to think of the past. Each attempt
at learning, with its circumstances of time, space, succession,
success or difficulty, etc., will be brought back to the mind. This
is recognition proper, i.e. the identification of a present image with
its corresponding original, and it may be more or less perfect, more
or less accurate and complete. Thus, for the time, I may recall
the day, or the week, or the month, or the year in which an event
took place; for the place and circumstances, details may be
remembered with varying degrees of perfection.
II. QUALITIES AND CONDITIONS OF A GOOD MEMORY
i. The Main Qualities of Memory are: (a) Ease and facility in
acquiring knowledge, i.e. in receiving in the mind ideas capable
of future recall.
(b) Tenacity in retaining. The forgetful mind easily loses the
traces of past experiences, of promises made, and of advice received.
Once an experience has disappeared from consciousness, its recall
is difficult. Some learn rapidly, but forget almost immediately.
Others need a longer time to learn, but the knowledge once acquired
is not so easily forgotten.
(c) Readiness of revival. It is not enough to have many ideas
in the mind. In order to be serviceable, these ideas must be at
the mind's disposal, ready to come back when called for.
(d) Faithfulness of revival, that is, the absence of purely im-
aginary elements, and the completeness of the mental representa-
86 PSYCHOLOGY
tion. Many memories are defective in this respect. Sometimes,
even in perfect good faith, events, chiefly when complex, are
distorted and misrepresented owing to subjective additions and
changes.
2. Conditions of Memory. Memory depends chiefly on: (i)
The plasticity of the brain; hence in old age it is more difficult to
learn, or to change ideas acquired formerly. (2) Natural endow-
ments and mental education, including the various types of
imagination and memory. (3) The laws of association, and conse-
quently the interest of the event, the intensity, vividness, recentness,
and repetition of mental processes. (4) The influence of intellect
and will.
III. CULTURE OF MEMORY
i. General Principles. (a) Important as it may be to have
a good memory, care must be taken not to develop it at the expense
of judgment; the two must go together, and be developed and
exercised together. This is true especially of rational sciences,
in which the work of the understanding, not that of memory,
is of primary importance. Nothing must be committed to
memory before seeing whether it is worth retaining and before
understanding it.
(b) The development of memory coincides in a great measure
with the development of the thinking powers, the growth of atten-
tion, the faculty of properly correlating events, etc. Hence, to
improve memory, special attention should be given to these
faculties.
(c) In general we must remember the law of " the survival of
the fittest " ideas. The training of memory must have for its
object to make ideas which we want to survive " fitter " than the
others. Do what we may, it is certain that we shall forget a great
many things; we must know what may be allowed to fall into
oblivion and what should be preserved. The art of forgetting
goes along with the art of remembering. The fitness of an idea
consists in its strength, vividness, interest, and in its association
with strong groups of ideas by strong ties, for then it has the strength
of the whole group to which it belongs.
MEMORY 87
2. Special Rules. (a) Attention and concentration of mind
contribute to make a deeper impression, a more vivid and better
defined perception and image.
(b) Do not begin with something too complex, because the mind is
puzzled by too great an abundance of details. This is why to a
child who, for instance, has to learn the whole course in grammar,
history, or geography, a primer is given first, containing only the
essentials without the encumbering minor details, rules, and ex-
ceptions which cannot yet be mastered. In the same way, for
private study, try to analyze a complex lesson into simpler elements.
The degree of simplification and analysis which is required depends
on the stage of mental development and on personal aptitudes.
What is simple enough for one mind may be far too complex for
another.
(c) Associate, i.e. organize ideas. An idea by itself is weak, but
associated with others it acquires strength and vitality. The
motto might apply here: "United we stand, divided we fall." In
reading, study the objective sequence of ideas, and subjectively
associate them in your mind.
(d) Repetition strengthens ideas. A certain number of repetitions
is required to learn a lesson, but it will be found preferable, after
going over the lesson attentively several times, to allow some
interval to elapse between following repetitions. To revive ideas
at intervals of time, the duration of which varies with the nature of
these ideas and the special dispositions of mind, is better than to
revive them the same number of times in immediate succession.
(e) Use as many faculties as possible so as to form several images
of the same object. An idea which, at the same time, belongs to
an auditory, a visual, and a logical group is more firmly seated in
the mind and has more numerous associations. Real, not merely
verbal, knowledge should be insisted on; learn ideas primarily,
not words. Simple and obvious as this is, it is too often forgotten
in practice. Of the several senses sight seems to be the most
important, as it is a substitute for the other senses, especially for
the sense of touch.
(/) Use simultaneously reason and the senses. Know what to
retain and what to forget. Group ideas logically around a central
88 PSYCHOLOGY
idea which is the most important, and which, when recalled, will
tend to recall the whole group. In a speech, article, or lesson, see
the logical connections, the main ideas, their organization and
sequence. One attentive and intelligent reading will do much
more than many mechanical repetitions.
N.B. All so-called mnemonic systems and methods of never
forgetting are but applications of the above rules.
IV. TIME-PERCEPTION
Since memory refers the present to the past and implies suc-
cession, a few words will be said here of time-perception. Evidently
we are not concerned at present with the abstract idea of time and
its definition; nor even with the concrete, but objective and artifi-
cial, division of time into years, months, days, hours, minutes, and
seconds. We deal only with the concrete subjective experience of
time or duration; with time as recorded in the mind, not as recorded
in nature by the course of the sun or the revolutions of the hands of
a watch.
(a) In the very beginning of mental life there is a succession of
processes which, however, is hardly conscious. It takes some time
to notice by reflection the facts of change, endurance, and recurrence,
and thus to acquire the conscious distinction of a now, or present,
and a then, or past. The memory of rhythmic changes like respira-
tion, pulse, need of food or sleep, is probably of great importance
in the development of time-perception. Little by little the vague
notion of time or succession becomes clearer and develops into a
time-appreciation.
(b) The appreciation of time is to a great extent relative. It is a
fact of daily experience that certain lapses of time objectively
equal pass more or less rapidly. We are surprised that an hour
has already passed in a conversation with a friend, the reading of
an interesting book, or some amusement; and we are equally
surprised that it is only ten minutes since we began studying an
uninteresting lesson or listening to a tedious speech.
These variations depend on: (i) The number of intervening
experiences. When these are many and varied, time passes away
more rapidly than when they are few. In retrospect, on the con-
ILLUSIONS AND HALLUCINATIONS 89
trary, intervals almost empty of experiences, as a week spent in
bed, seem shorter because we have no memory of any events with
which to fill up the interval. This is the source of a frequent
historical fallacy which consists in jumping from century to century
without distinction, because we have only a few events to record;
hence the beginning and the end of a century seem nearer than
they are in reality, and men who lived at great intervals of time
are looked upon as contemporary. (2) The interest of intervals;
if they are pleasant, time passes more rapidly. (3) Suspense,
expectation, and anticipation; a future event which is desired anx-
iously and has to be waited for does not come quickly enough;
but once it has come, it passes off very rapidly. The youth sees
a long, long life before him; behind him the old man sees only a
short duration. Any one may compare the day or year that pre-
cedes an expected and desired event with the day or year that
follows it, and see how much shorter the latter seems.
(c) Localization in time may be vague or accurate, definite or
indefinite. It seems to depend chiefly on the importance of events
and on associations between ideas.
IV. ILLUSIONS OF THE SENSES
I. NATURE OF ILLUSIONS AND HALLUCINATIONS
Illusions and hallucinations are generally dependent on repro-
ductive activity. They may be partly presentative and partly
representative phenomena.
i. Definitions. (a) Frequently common-sense draws a sharp
distinction between illusion and normal perception, as if illusion
were always something abnormal and indicative of a special defect
in the mind. This meaning is inaccurate; there are illusions that
are natural, ordinary, and common to all men.
(b) Illusion may be defined in general as the acceptance as real
by the mind of anything which is unreal. In this broad sense it
includes delusion, error, and hallucination. More strictly, illusion
is the acceptance as real by the mind of something unreal, but
on the basis of some real data. Sense illusion is commonly re-
stricted to errors of sense perception that are normal, regular,
QO PSYCHOLOGY
persistent, and common to all. Delusion applies rather to a false
belief which implies reasoning processes, is persistent, and can
be removed only with great difficulty.
(c) Hallucination cannot always be distinguished from illusion.
In general it differs from illusion because it lacks the basis of real
data which is present in illusion, or at least because real data
contribute but little and remotely to the present mental state which
is mistaken for a perception. To see a stick where there is no stick
at all is a hallucination; to see a stick as broken in the water, when
in reality it is straight, is an optical illusion. To see the moon when
there is none would be a hallucination; to see the moon as gliding
behind the clouds is an illusion.
2. Classification. Sense illusions can hardly be classified except
by referring them to the different senses. The most frequent are
optical illusions of color, shape, distance, size, and movement.
Hallucination is (i) positive or negative, according as it makes one
perceive the unreal, or prevents one from perceiving the real which
under normal conditions should be perceived; (2) simple or complex,
according as it affects only one sense or several senses. The senses
most subject to hallucinations are sight and hearing and also
ccenesthesis.
II. MAIN CAUSES OF ILLUSIONS AND HALLUCINATIONS
We speak of the causes of these two phenomena together because
many are common to both. By indicating their causes, the means
of correcting illusions and hallucinations will also be indicated.
In general an illusion or hallucination is corrected by removing
its causes when possible, and by testing the report of one sense by
the use of other senses.
i . The Constitution, Keenness, and Fatigue of the Sense Organs ;
their defects, either special to some or common to all individuals,
are sources of illusions. After-images, lack of discriminative
sensibility of the skin, color blindness, double vision, etc., come
from such causes. Thus if a man with his eyes closed is touched
gently on the hand with the point of a pencil, and is asked, always
without looking, to indicate the exact spot with the point of another
pencil, he will generally fail, and, if he succeeds, the success will
ILLUSIONS AND HALLUCINATIONS 91
B
be purely accidental. The reason is that, on the back of the hand,
the discriminative sensibility is about i inches; hence within that
distance the two impressions are felt as one.
2. Nature of the Surroundings. (a) The newness of an object
and the lack of familiarity with it c
tend to make imagination complete
and interpret it.
(b) Various circumstances, such as
incompleteness, e.g. equivocal figures
which are capable of being in-
terpreted in different ways, thus
the planes ABCD or EFGH may
be seen in the front or in the back
of the figure; amount of light, e.g.
with a clear atmosphere a mountain i
seems nearer than with a misty
atmosphere; in the fog, a lamp post may be mistaken for some-
thing else; darkness is the source of many illusions; intervening
objects; presence or absence
of materials for comparison. HlllllllllllllllHllllllllllllH
Compare a straight line
crossed by perpendiculars with its continuation of the same
length but without such cross lines. Which part seems longer?
H
D
Or again compare .x
and
The moon seems larger at the horizon than at the zenith because
the number of intervening objects makes it look more distant,
and consequently the same
visual angle is interpreted
as corresponding to a
larger object; the angles
are equal, but their sides
seem to extend farther., In a picture, the eyes always seem to
follow the spectator because the pupil is always in view as if
directed toward him (absence of relief).
(c) Contrast in sizes, colors, shapes, etc., is likely to influence
the judgment. (Instances. . . . )
92 PSYCHOLOGY
(d) The use of instruments like colored glasses, lenses, mirrors,
etc.
3. Mental Influences. (i) Memory, inference, association,
suggestion, and habit. It is well known how sensations can be
affected by these influences. (2) Lack of attention. (3) Ex-
pectation, desire, and fear.
4. Diseases, strong emotions, weakness, exhaustion, delirium,
epilepsy, insanity, the use of certain drugs, hypnosis, etc., produce
illusions and hallucinations.
ARTICLE III. CONCEPTION
I. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CONCEPT
I. VARIOUS TERMS EXPLAINED
Before describing the distinctive features of the concept, it will
be useful to compare this term with some other closely related
terms.
1. Thought. (i) Frequently the term " thought " is applied
to all conscious activities and representations. To think of the
events of yesterday is to bring them back to memory. When
asked for information which I do not actually remember, I
am likely to say: " Let me think a little." To think is also used
to express mere opinion as distinct from certitude; for instance,
when I say: " I think so." (2) Yet other current expressions point
to another more restricted meaning. When we say of a man:
"He never thinks," or of another: "He is or was a great
thinker," we refer to something different from the mere power
of memory and imagination. To think is to examine, com-
pare, judge, classify, elaborate the data of the senses so as to
see their logical relations. It is from present and past experiences
to foresee and prepare the future; to find out the laws that govern
events and the conditions of phenomena; to rise from the con-
crete instance which is experienced to the abstract law or principle
common to this and to similar instances.
2. Intellect. In this narrower sense, thinking is generally
attributed to man alone, and referred to the faculty known as
CHARACTERISTICS OF CONCEPT 93
intellect. Animals are frequently called more or less intelligent,
and by this we refer to their greater or smaller aptitude to adapt
means to an end, or to be trained. But it will be seen in another
place that this requires no thought in the stricter meaning; it is
explainable by the senses and the retentive powers. In fact we
do not speak of the intellect of animals, and thus we make a differ-
ence between intelligence, or the taking of means appropriate to
an end, and the intellect, or the superior mode of knowledge by
abstraction, generalization, and logical sequence. Thought proper,
or intellectual knowledge, includes three steps: the formation of
abstract and general ideas, judgment, and reasoning. From these
spring other manifestations, especially language, written or
spoken.
3. Concept. Abstract and general ideas are properly called
concepts. " Idea " is thus a more general term applying to all
forms of mental representations, images, and judgments. I say,
for instance: " I have no idea how that building looks; I never saw
it; " or " I have no clear idea on this matter," that is, " I cannot
form a satisfactory judgment, or reach certitude." As percept
corresponds to perception, so the concept is the result of the process
of conception.
We have seen that sensations are gradually elaborated into per-
ceptions. The perception, for instance, of a horse, resulting from
many presentations and representations, is always concrete. I see
this horse, with this color, size, etc., in this direction and at this
distance. When I say: " It is a horse," I apply to this concrete
object an abstract and general idea, or a concept. For not only of
this, but of any other animal of the same kind, wherever it may be,
and whatever its color and size, I may also say: " It is a horse."
I therefore am led to distinguish something which is common to
all horses and which I consider by itself apart from individual
determinations. As a percept, horse is always an individual con-
crete reality ; as a concept it is an idea common and applicable to
all horses, and it can be so only because it is abstract, namely, be-
cause it does not include all the distinctive features of this or that
individual. Hence abstraction is the fundamental process in the
formation of the concept.
94 PSYCHOLOGY
II. THE ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CONCEPT
i. Abstraction. The first characteristic of the concept is to
be abstract. The concept does not represent the object as it exists
in nature, with all its individual qualities and determinations, but
it considers certain features and leaves out the others (abs-trahere) .
Here evidently the question is not that of a physical, but only of a
mental or ideal separation.
Mental abstraction is of several kinds, (a) In the same object
there are many qualities, each of which may be perceived by a
special sense, the color by the eye, the sound by the ear, the resist-
ance by touch, etc. Hence by its very nature every sense is ab-
stractive; it perceives only one out of many qualities belonging to
the same object. Or sense-abstraction may be due to voluntary
attention, when, in an object, a quality or group of qualities is of
special interest, e.g. the taste of an apple, the sound of a musical
instrument.
(b) There is also a process of abstraction in imagination and its
various types, in the association and fusion of images, and in mem-
ory. Some features of the images are considered while others are
left out.
(c) In language, spoken or written, one may consider the ideas
represented, i.e. the meaning of words and sentences, or one's
attention may be directed to the words themselves from the differ-
ent points of view of etymology, declension, spelling, pronunciation,
etc.
(d) The concept is called abstract in a stricter sense. That
which it represents is, or should be, only the features that are
absolutely essential to the object and therefore common to all
objects of the same kind, leaving out all unessential and particular
features. The concept, for instance, will represent something
essential and common to all movements (change of place), to all
causes (production), to all squares (the fact of having four equal
sides and four right angles). The individual determinations, con-
ditions, circumstances, ... of this or that movement, cause, and
square are left out of consideration. In the same concrete object,
however, we may consider different aspects and find different
CHARACTERISTICS OF CONCEPT 95
concepts. Thus in my free action I may find the concepts of
freedom, cause, motion, action, responsibility, and change.
2. Derived Characteristics. Because the concept is abstract,
it also possesses three other main characteristics.
(a) It is not restricted to one individual, but may be applied
to several; it is universal because it does not include individual-
izing determinations. My perception of a man, because it is con-
crete, applies only to the one man whom I perceive; my concept of
man applies to all men ; the same is true of the concepts of color,
weather, circle, etc., as compared to perceptions.
(b) The concept is not restricted to individuals actually exist-
ing. If it represents only that which is really essential in many
cases, as we shall see, it is not so it is necessary, and indepen-
dent of actual existence which is contingent. The acquisition of
it depends on the perception of concrete existing things, but, in
some cases, no concrete object may be found in which the concept
thus formed is actually realized. Thus my concepts of a circle,
of a triangle, of two parallels, represent in my mind that which is
the essential and necessary constituents of these, although per-
haps such elements are neither represented nor perfectly repre-
sentable physically on the blackboard or on paper. I have the
concept of a man perfect physically and mentally, although such
a man may never be found. The formation of the concept of life
supposes the perception of living beings, but this concept, once
acquired, is indifferent to the various forms according to which
life is actually realized, and even to any realization of life in the
world.
(c) Hence it follows that the concept is not dependent on the
conditions of space and time, which are always determinations of
concrete things.
3. Various Degrees of these Characteristics. These charac-
teristics of the concept, and primarily its abstraction, are not
always found in the same degree nor in the same manner.
(a) By intension or connotation of a concept are meant its con-
stituent notes. By its extension or denotation is meant the number
of individuals to which it applies. Thus I may have the concept
of a plane geometrical figure limited by four equal straight lines
g6 PSYCHOLOGY
parallel two by two and intersecting at right angles. This is the
intension of my concept of a square, and this concept denotes all
squares. If in the definition I leave out the idea "equal," I de-
crease the intension, but the concept will apply to a greater num-
ber of figures, namely, to all rectangles. The connotation may be
further decreased by leaving out the condition of intersection at
right angles; the denotation will be increased, since the concept
will apply to all parallelograms. Further still the condition of
parallelism may be omitted, and the concept applies to all quad-
rilaterals, and so on. Thus it is seen that intension and extension
vary in opposite directions. To increase one is to decrease the other,
and vice versa.
(b) This also shows that the concept may be more or less com-
plete, accurate, and comprehensive. It is true but incomplete
to say that the essence of the square is to be a rectangle or a par-
allelogram. In these latter concepts we reach a higher degree of
abstraction, a lessening of the connotation, and an addition to
the extension. Again, I may conceive the cow as a large herbiv-
orous animal; this is true but insufficient. By the complete
essence of a thing is meant that which includes all the constituent
elements of the species to which it belongs, and that which
distinguishes it from anything belonging to any other class.
(c) In many, if not in most cases, we know the essences of things
very imperfectly. For the child, a cat may be essentially black
or white, and it is only later, after seeing cats of different colors,
that this notion is corrected. The same frequently occurs in
sciences; tentative and provisional definitions are used which must
be revised by future progress along the same line of investigation.
4. The Concept and the Image Compared. From what pre-
cedes, and from what has been said on imagination, the differ-
ences between the concept and the image may be inferred. Since
the concept is general, it is clear that it differs essentially from the
simple image, which represents a single perception. Some claim
that the concept is but a generic image in which the essential fea-
tures, because they are common to many images, are prominent,
whereas individual features are blurred. This account, however,
is insufficient.
CHARACTERISTICS OF CONCEPT^ 97
(a) Like the composite photograph, the generic image is concrete.
It is true that it does not represent exclusively this or that indi-
vidual which has been perceived before. To some extent it is
vague and indetermined, but yet it is an individual picture, rep-
resenting perfectly one individual only, which, it is true, has not
been perceived and probably does not exist, but which is one and
concrete. Because it is vague, it may be applied to several indi-
viduals, but to all imperfectly and only in part; to none perfectly.
The concept, on the contrary, is applicable perfectly to all the indi-
viduals. As a concept, movement means simply a change of place;
as an image, it is always this movement with this special direction
and velocity. The concept of a circle includes no definite dimen-
sions; the image of a circle cannot be without them. In other
words, the composite image is an average picture, and an average
here, as in mathematics, is always something concrete. In fact,
every image, however complex, represents an object with certain
dimensions, shape, size, color, etc.
(b) Hence an image can always be outlined, or painted, or
described in some manner; the concept cannot. The concepts of
triangle, man, or color apply to all triangles, men, and colors. An
image always represents one triangle, one man, one color. It is
true that the concept is generally accompanied by some shadowy,
vague, and indistinct mental image. But as soon as we turn the
attention to it, the image becomes clearer and assumes definite
determinations. It was vague because attention was not concen-
trated upon it.
(c) A concept may be clear and distinct while the correspond-
ing image is obscure or even impossible. I understand perfectly
what is meant by a chiliagon or a geometrical figure of a thousand
sides, and how it differs from another figure with a thousand and
one sides. Yet my imagination is powerless to give me a mental
picture of these. The same may be said in general of very large
and of very small things, like the distance between the sun and
the earth, and the size of a cell -5^-3 of an inch in diameter. I
understand what the mathematician tells me when he says that
a quantity may be multiplied and divided ad infinitum, but I can
imagine it in no concrete case. A familiar instance may be taken
98 PSYCHOLOGY
from those animals which are called myriapods (etymologically
10,000 feet), among which are centipeds (etymologically 100 feet).
To understand is not to imagine; intellect is not imagination.
(d) We have concepts of things immaterial which can in no way
be represented by imagination, like virtue, justice, duty, truth,
etc. There are virtuous and just actions, but I do not perceive at
all with the senses the goodness or justice of a concrete action.
This concept, therefore, though derived from, and realized only
in, individual actions, has a source distinct from the senses and the
imagination. Or again, I see one thing succeeding another, but
I do not see the causality or production, and yet I have not only
the concept of succession, but also that of cause.
II. GENESIS OF THE CONCEPT
I. VARIOUS PROPOSED SYSTEMS
The systems proposed to explain the origin of concepts may be
reduced to three, two extreme and one intermediate, (i) At one
extreme are found those who claim that the formation of the con-
cept can be accounted for completely by the senses presentation
and representation and their various complex functions; no
special activity is required. (2) At the other extreme are found
those who claim that the senses have nothing to do with the
formation of the concept. It must be attributed to a special inde-
pendent mental power. (3) Between these two are found those
who claim that the senses are both necessary and insufficient to
account for the concept. Intellectual knowledge begins with the
senses, but rises higher and cannot be completed by them.
i. First Extreme or Generally Sensism. (a) It is clear that
if no other existence than that of matter is admitted, every form
of knowledge must be reduced to the properties of matter. This
was the conclusion of the older and cruder materialists, Emped-
ocles, Leucippus, Democritus, Epicurus, who explained knowledge
by the entering into the sense organs, of small material particles
coming from the objects themselves. It is also the conclusion of
the new and more elaborate materialism of the latter half of the
eighteenth century in France and of the middle of the nineteenth
GENESIS OF CONCEPT 99
century in Germany. Thought in all its forms is the manifesta-
tion of some material energy.
(b) The name of Sensationalism is given especially to the systems
of Locke and Condillac. According to Locke, all ideas come from
experience, and experience is twofold: sensation by which external
objects are perceived, and reflection by which we are aware of
concrete mental processes. Ideas thus acquired are complex or
simple according as they are repeated and combined with others
or not. Condillac rejects reflection as a distinct source of knowl-
edge. For him there is only one source, sensation together with
its various transformations, which are attention or application to
sensations, reflection or attention to successive sensations, memory
or the power of recall, comparison or attention to simultaneous
sensations and memories, judgment or perception of their rela-
tions of likeness and difference, imagination or the combination
of ideas, reasoning or the inference of a judgment from other
judgments.
(c) More recently the theory reducing all ideas to images has
been and is still advocated, but as a more complete and more
elaborate system, (i) The main point which is insisted on is
the fusion of images by which, as in composite photographs, com-
mon features are made to stand prominent, while individual
features are not apparent. There is thus a double process, disso-
ciation and combination, the causes of which are either external
and involuntary, especially the identity and dissimilarity of cer-
tain features, or internal, like elective attention, mental types,
and special purpose. This process of addition and subtraction,
or, perhaps better, of multiplication and division, gives the ab-
stract and general idea which represents only common features.
This is Associationism (Stuart Mill, Bain). (2) Others say that
the idea remains really concrete, but we look upon it as abstract
and general when it is expressed by a universal term, or common
name, applying to a group of similar images. The label only,
not the real content of the mind, is abstract and universal. This is
Nominalism (Taine). (3) Finally, the process may be completed
by accumulating the experiences and associations not only of the
individual, but of his ancestors. Thus the individual is born, if
100 PSYCHOLOGY
not with ready-made ideas, at least with the capacity and apti-
tude for forming them immediately, because he profits by the work
of mental combination of images which has taken place before and
the results of which he inherits. This is Evolutionism added to
Associationism (Spencer). And here, as in so many other instances,
extremes meet, and this view comes close to innatism, which
belongs to the aprioristic group of theories.
2. Second Extreme or Generally Apriorism. It has four chief
forms: Innatism, Transcendentalism, Ontologism, Traditionalism.
(a) According to innatism concepts are not acquired. All,
or at least some, are inborn in the mind, (i) For Plato, this
world is essentially changing and contingent; consequently our
necessary ideas cannot be derived from sense-perception. There
exists another world of which this visible world is only a partic-
ipation, an appearance and a shadow, namely the world of ideas,
in which are found, for instance, justice-in-itself, beauty-in-itself,
virtue-in-itself, etc., whereas in our world are found only things
that partake of these in various degrees, i.e. just things, beautiful
things, virtuous actions, etc. Before being united with a body in
this world, the soul preexisted as a pure spirit in the world of ideas,
and had the intuition of them. Its union with the organism
which is a punishment deprives the soul of this intuition.
The perception of things by the senses revives in the mind
ideas acquired previously, but forgotten. Pure ideas are really
remembrances.
(2) Descartes recognizes three kinds of ideas: adventitious,
(from sense-perceptions), fictitious (built up by the imagination),
and innate (universal and purely intellectual ideas). What Des-
cartes means by innate ideas is not clear. Sometimes he speaks
of them as actual and ready-made ideas or representations; some-
times, when pressed by the objections of his adversaries, he
speaks of them as faculties or virtualities or even unconscious
ideas.
(3) According to Leibniz, the soul having "neither doors nor
windows," i.e. being incapable of communicating in any way with
the external world, all ideas must be innate. But, of themselves,
innate ideas are not yet conscious, not yet "apperceptions." They
GENESIS OF CONCEPT IOI
are rather inclinations, dispositions, habits, or, better, germs
which will evolve into conscious perceptions.
(4) Rosmini claimed that one idea at least, namely, the idea
of being which is implied in every concept, must be innate.
(b) According to Kant, the mind must find in itself the "forms "
according to which it knows things. The characters of universal-
ity and necessity which are found in some ideas cannot be derived
from individual contingent objects; hence they come from the
mind alone. Things-in-themselves exist, but, as such, are unknow-
able. They are necessarily known according to the mind's natural
and inborn "a priori forms." We know things-as-they-appear
to the mind (phenomena)-, to reach the thing-in-itself (noume-
non) is impossible. This system is known as transcendentalism,
(c) For ontologism Malebranche and a few Catholic philos-
ophers of the nineteenth century we know all things in God,
the source not only of all being, but also of all knowledge. God
alone is intelligible, and things are intelligible only through the
divine intelligence.
(d) Traditionalism another system of some Catholic phi-
losophers: De Bonald, Lamennais, etc., in the nineteenth century
supposes that general ideas cannot be formed by the mind;
they must be taught and transmitted by tradition, and
therefore traditionalists have recourse to a primitive divine
revelation.
3. Intermediate System. The formation of concepts depends
on, and begins with, the senses, but is completed by a special fac-
ulty, the intellect, distinct from them, (i) We have no innate
ideas, and, in forming concepts, the intellect depends on sense-
perception and images. The senses are thus the necessary point
of departure of intellectual knowledge. (2) All sense-perceptions
and images are representations of concrete and individual objects.
To be elaborated into concepts they require a special operation,
namely, abstraction, by which the material, individual, and con-
crete features of the image are, so to say, removed so as to leave
only the essential and consequently common features. (3) Hence
the formation of abstract and general ideas requires in the intel-
lect a double function, one of activity, the other of receptivity.
102 PSYCHOLOGY
By the former the sense-products are elaborated; by the latter
the act itself of intellectual knowledge is performed.
II. DISCUSSION OF THE SYSTEMS
It will be easier to begin with the last-mentioned system. Its
very position between two extremes seems already to be in its
favor. If it is true that "In medio stat virtus" it is frequently
true also that "In medio stat veritas." A system is not advo-
cated by serious thinkers without good reasons, and when serious
thinkers advocate systems that are diametrically opposed, it is
generally safe to infer that there is some misunderstanding and
some one-sidedness in their respective points of view. If another
system can avail itself of the reasons in favor of both extremes,
and avoid their shortcomings, it has a chance to stand nearer to
the truth.
i. Intellectual Knowledge Begins with, but is npt Completed
by, the Senses. Let us briefly give reasons for this proposition.
(a) Intellectual knowledge depends on the senses. In this we agree
with the first extreme system and differ from most of the advocates
of the second. By senses here we mean chiefly images with their
various associations and fusions. The formation itself of the con-
cept seems to depend ultimately on some corresponding image.
For instance, to form the concept of a dog, I must have had the
perception of a dog, or of animals closely akin to it, or I must
have its appearance and nature explained to me. But once the
concept has been acquired, any sign or image may recall it by asso-
ciation. Thus the word itself, "dog," which is a purely arbitrary
and conventional term, is sufficient to recall my concept. Again,
although the concept of a circle may be acquired without having
ever seen a perfect geometrical circle, yet the elements which com-
pose this complex concept depend ultimately on sense-perception
from which the ideas of point, line, curve, etc., are formed.
The main reasons for asserting this dependence are based on
the following facts: (i) The condition of the organism, especially
of the brain, influences the highest mental functions, and, in many
cases, mental disorders are traced back to organic, and especially
cerebral, lesions and diseases. The influence of certain drugs
GENESIS OF CONCEPT 103
and intoxicants is also too well known. (2) When some sense is
lacking, no concept of things referring to this sense is possible.
The man born blind may have ideas of mechanical vibrations, but
not of colors as such. (3) Experience shows that the highest con-
ceptions are greatly facilitated by the use of images, symbols,
diagrams, etc.
(b) If the materials for forming concepts are found in percep-
tions and images, these materials must be elaborated. This is but
the conclusion of what was said above (p. 96) on the impossi-
bility of reducing the concept to the image. The senses always
give representations that have individual, contingent, and con-
crete characters. A special power of abstraction must be used
to elaborate these into a necessary and universal concept. The
universal is radically in things, since they have an essence which
may be looked upon as common when considered apart from the
individual nqtes with which it is really found in nature; but, as
a universal, it exists only in the mind. The image gives the
necessary basis on which the concept can be formed.
(c) Knowing the starting-point, i.e. the senses, and the result,
i.e. the concept, the question remains: How can the bridging over
be effected? Here we need a special activity, or "intellectus
agens," whose function is abstraction and the elaboration of the
data of the senses into some higher idea whose nature is purely
intellectual. This process of abstraction is also called illumina-
tion, as it throws light on certain features and leaves others in
darkness. Thus is formed the abstract concept, which is a special
mental representation deprived of the material and individual
features found in the mental image, and which consequently
may be applied to all individuals that belong to the same
class.
2. Sensism. (a) In general sensism rightly recognizes the
necessity of the senses for intellectual knowledge; but it 'does not
go far enough in its account, for it denies the radical distinction
which exists between the concept and the image. A defect in the
method used may be pointed out: Sensists generally try to ex-
plain the origin of concepts without examining first their specific
characteristics. They seem to take it for granted a priori that the
104 PSYCHOLOGY
concept must be reduced to some activity of the senses. It is
true that the general law of continuity applies here, and that the
passage from the image to the concept is gradual, but this does not
prevent the two from being different and irreducible. Sometimes
even metaphysical preoccupations concerning the nature of the
soul and its spirituality seem to be found at the start of this
investigation. It may also be noted that sensists often implicitly
assume the existence of a special faculty of elaboration, even when
they deny it.
To all forms of sensism the following objections apply: (i)
They fail to recognize the distinction between concept and image.
(2) Either, if they are consistent, they cannot account for the
special characteristics of the concept; or, if they do, it is by intro-
ducing tacitly the special activity which they deny. In fact,
when carefully considered, sensistic theories are seen to introduce
special activities, reflection, the power of transforming the sensa-
tions, the power of elective attention or elaboration, and the like.
(3) Frequently sensism is only a consequence or application of a
wider philosophical view, materialism, positivism, etc.
(b) The features special to some systems do not obviate these
difficulties, (i) Reflection is only the consciousness of the mind's
own individual and concrete activities. (2) The transformation
of the sensation either does not account for the formation of the
concept, or, if it accounts for it, requires a special elaborative
faculty. (3) The association, or, better, fusion, of images may give
a composite image; but this cannot be identified with the concept,
even if we give it the accumulated associations of centuries. (4)
The name, it is true, may be common and applicable to all individ-
uals of the same class. Yet the name as written or uttered is
always concrete; it is abstract and common only because it ex-
presses an abstract and general idea. Suppress the abstract idea
which it manifests, and the word is then a mere concrete utter-
ance, at such a time, with such a sound, and in such circumstances.
Far from giving to the image its abstract character, the name
must itself receive it from the idea for which it stands. When I
apply the name " triangle " to all triangles, it is because I have
already recognized that which is essential to a triangle, and con-
GENESIS OF CONCEPT 105
sidered this apart from the determinations with which it is always
accompanied in the perceived or imagined triangle, of such an area,
right-angled or otherwise, scalene or otherwise, with sides of a
definite length, angles of definite dimensions, etc.
3. Apriorism. As aprioristic systems are widely different,
they must be considered separately. In general, all rightly rec-
ognize the impossibility of deriving the concept from mere sense-
experience, but wrongly fail to recognize the dependence of the
concept on the senses.
(a) Ontologism and traditionalism were systems designed by
Catholic philosophers to counteract extreme materialistic, sen-
sistic, and rationalistic tendencies in the past century. Both were
condemned by the Church and soon disappeared. Hence a few
remarks will suffice here. Ontologism is gratuitous and in oppo-
sition to the testimony of consciousness. Ontologists took a great
deal of trouble to explain the intuition of God, which, according
to them, we must necessarily possess; but their explanation is
satisfactory neither to the philosopher nor to the theologian.
Traditionalism contains much that must be accepted. Un-
doubtedly tradition transmitted by language is a great help in
acquiring ideas. For the most part, our ideas are received from
others, and, if our individual minds were left to their own activ-
ity, all ideas would remain very imperfect. But it does not fol-
low that no idea can be acquired otherwise. In fact, in order to
convey ideas to the hearer or reader, language must be understood,
and understanding supposes in the hearer or reader the ideas
which the words represent. If words presuppose ideas, it is clear
that they cannot be the exclusive source of ideas.
(b) The theory of innate ideas is a purely gratuitous and lazy
theory, since there is no consciousness of them, and their innateness
is not the only way of accounting for their presence in the mind.
On the contrary, we are conscious of the mental activity by which
we elaborate concepts from the data of the senses, and of a con-
tinuity, not of a break, between the senses and the intellect. To
say that ideas are ready-made and conscious is obviously false.
To say t-hat they are ready-made, yet unconscious, is to say
nothing intelligible. To say that they are mere faculties and
106 PSYCHOLOGY
virtualities is to deny that they are innate and to fall back into
another system admitting only the power of forming concepts.
(c) Kant's special views on the present problem are but parts
of his whole philosophy, and cannot be discussed fully here. His
solution cannot be proved to have any real value, as it may be
nothing but a result of a priori forms of the mind. It is difficult
to understand the meaning of these a priori forms which are empty
until they receive experiences from the external world, and, after
receiving them, form with them the complete knowledge. Nor
does it seem possible to demonstrate the necessity of their exist-
ence. The principle: " Whatever is necessary and universal in
knowledge must come from the mind, and not from the object,"
is gratuitous until it has been shown that these characteristics
are not radically in objects themselves, and therefore can in no
way be found in them. Thus we are told that, since all things
are perceived in space, and all mental processes in time, space
and time are presupposed to any perception; they must preexist
in the mind as a priori forms of external and of internal sensibil-
ity. It would be equally reasonable to say that they do not pre-
exist, but simply coexist, and, in this case, the ideas of space and
time may be derived from things and processes themselves. From
the fact that all things are perceived in space, I may simply con-
clude that all things are in space, and are perceived as they are.
The same may be said of all a priori forms; their existence is not
to be admitted if facts can be accounted for otherwise.
4. Conclusion. From what has been said we conclude that,
of the two extreme systems proposed to explain the origin of con-
cepts, one starts rightly but stops too low, the other ends rightly
but starts too high. The intermediate system has the advantage
of being in better conformity with experience, and of giving a
sufficient explanation with a minimum of a priori elements.
NATURE OF JUDGMENT 107
ARTICLE IV. JUDGMENT
I. NATURE OF THE JUDGMENT
I. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESS
1. What is Judgment? (a) Human thinking essentially
takes the form of judgments; judgment alone has a meaning and
is true or false. I may have the idea of four miles, and the idea
of the distance from a place A to another place B. There is no
meaning, no truth or falsity, in these ideas taken separately, but
only when I compare them and think or say that the distance from
A to B is, or is not, four miles. This is a judgment, and the new
essential element which has been introduced is the connecting
link between two ideas, by which I pronounce on their agreement
or disagreement. A mere list of words gives no meaning, unless
these words are so connected as to form judgments. Con-
versations, writings, scientific formulae, speeches, etc., all express
judgments, and not merely ideas, although idea is sometimes
used in the sense of judgment (cf. p. 93). Strictly, an idea is a
mere representation of an object. When we speak of a true or of
a false idea according as it does or does not correspond to reality,
we really speak of an implicit judgment pronouncing on this con-
formity. Judging is essentially affirming the relations between
things or ideas, relations which may be of agreement or disagree-
ment, of affirmation or negation.
(b) Hence the distinction between positive and negative judg-
ments, however true it may be from a certain point of view, and
useful for certain purposes, is not strictly applicable to the psycho-
logical act of judging, which is always essentially positive. The
judgment: "Peter is not attentive," is negative from the point of
view of grammar and logic; yet, if I consider only the nature of
the mental process, it consists essentially of the positive act by
which I pronounce or judge that there is a lack of attention in
Peter's mind. The mental attitude opposed to this would be
rather ignorance or doubt.
2. Elements and Conditions of a Judgment. A judgment
108 PSYCHOLOGY
always implies: (i) The presence of two ideas in the mind,
namely, the subject, of which something is affirmed or denied,
and the attribute or predicate, which is affirmed or denied of
the subject. (2) A comparison of these two ideas. (3) The
affirmation of their agreement or disagreement, which is the
judgment itself.
The judgment may be reached very rapidly as soon as the two
ideas are brought in presence of each other. The comparison is
only implicit and needs no special attention, as, for instance, when
I say that the whole is greater than any of its parts. Or it may
necessitate a more or less complex process of comparison of the
ideas with other ideas and judgments, as, for instance, when I say
that the sum of the three angles of a triangle is equal to two
right angles. This cannot be affirmed immediately, but only after
demonstrating it.
3. Judgment and Concept Compared. We may now under-
stand the relations between judgment and conception. A concept
is one notion standing apart from other notions. A judgment
necessarily implies at least two notions or groups of notions, and
the perception of their relation. But a notion which is the neces-
sary element of a judgment depends itself on previous judgments.
Our first concepts are vague and most general ; they become clearer
and clearer, more and more connotative, in proportion as they
embody the results of more judgments. Thus my primitive
idea of "water " as a flowing something, or a transparent liquid,
may be perfected by the judgment that it is composed of oxygen
and hydrogen, or that it has certain definite physical properties.
These new elements in my idea of water are the results of a great
many comparisons and judgments. The botanist's notion of a
plant is more complex and more accurate than that of the
ordinary man because it embodies many elements acquired by
study, i.e. by a series of judgments.
II. VARIOUS KINDS OF JUDGMENTS
N.B. We mention only the most important divisions of judg-
ments from the psychological point of view. Other divisions
belong to logic.
NATURE OF JUDGMENT IOQ
1. Singular and General. According as the subject is an indi-
vidual or a class, a concrete or an abstract idea, the judgment is
singular or general, concrete or abstract. Thus, "This man is
tall," or "This rose is red," are individual and concrete judgments.
"Man is made to live in society," or "Roses are fragrant," are
judgments referring to a class, and their predicates are attributed,
not to any special individual, but to all. General judgments are
also abstract, since the class as such does not exist, but is realized
only in the concrete individuals. Universal judgments refer to
all concrete individuals of a class, e.g. "All men are made to live in
society," "All roses are fragrant." Partial judgments pronounce
only on a part of the whole class. Thus, "Some men are white."
2. Analytic and Synthetic. When the predicate is already
contained in the nature or essential relations and properties of
the subject, the judgment is called analytical; the predicate may
be inferred from the consideration of the subject. When the pred-
icate adds something new to the subject, that is, something which
no amount of analysis of the subject would reveal, the judgment
is synthetical. The analytic judgment unfolds the subject, and
states explicitly that which was already implied in it and in its
essential relations. The synthetic judgment gives a knowledge
which could not be derived from the essence of the subject.
We must distinguish between the subject itself of the judgment
and the knowledge which we have of it. A judgment may be
analytic in itself, and yet synthetic for a given individual; and a
judgment which is synthetic for one may be analytic for another
who possesses a more complete knowledge of the subject. Thus
the judgments "Two and two are four," or "The whole is greater
than any of its parts," are obvious for all those who understand
the meaning of the terms used. The same cannot be said of these
judgments: "n multiplied by 12 is 132," or "The sum of the
angles of a triangle equals two right angles." In themselves
these judgments are analytic, yet all men do not see why the pred-
icate belongs essentially to the subject. On the contrary, such
judgments as "This man is six feet tall," or "This iron is hot,"
are synthetic, because the predicate is not essentially contained
in the analysis of the subject.
110 PSYCHOLOGY
Hence analytical judgments are also called necessary, because
they suffer no exception; absolute, because they do not depend on
any condition; a priori, because they need not be known by ex-
perience before their truth is accepted. Thus, after demonstration,
the theorem "The sum of the three angles of a triangle is equal to
two right angles," is seen to express an essential property of all
kinds of triangles, true of all triangles without exception and under
all circumstances. It is not necessary to measure the angles of any
given triangle to see that the theorem applies to it. Synthetical
judgments are called contingent, hypothetical, and a posteriori,
because they are based directly on experience, and are true only
of the cases observed, or within the limits of a valid generaliza-
tion. Experience alone can justify the statements: "This book
has five hundred pages; " "This man is learned; " "This triangle
is isosceles."
3. Intuitive and Deliberative. Considering the manner in
which they are arrived at, judgments are intuitive or delibera-
tive. An intuitive or immediate judgment is a judgment which
is reached immediately as soon as both terms are compared. The
intuition may be a sense intuition, as in the judgment "This iron
is hot," or a direct perception of consciousness, as "I am suffering,"
or a rational intuition, as "The whole is greater than its part."
A deliberative or mediate judgment is a judgment which cannot
be passed at once, but requires a more or less prolonged considera-
tion, study, and reasoning, e.g. the formulation of physical and
chemical laws and properties.
II. GENESIS OF THE JUDGMENT
I. GENERAL
N.B. We do not speak here of extra-intellectual factors in
the formation of judgments, such as feelings, prejudices, personal
dispositions, etc. They will be mentioned later.
i. Analysis and Synthesis in the Judgment. (a) Judgment
supposes the power of abstraction. Frequently the subject is
abstract and stands, not for something individual and concrete,
but for an abstract quality or a class, as "Virtue is to be prac-
GENESIS OF JUDGMENT III
tised," "Iron is a metal." Generally the predicate is abstract,
the only exception being for judgments in which there is a per-
fect identity between the subject and the predicate, as when I
say, "This man is Peter Smith." In other cases the predicate is
the concept of a class to which the subject belongs or not, of a
quality which is affirmed or denied of it.
(b) The same judgment may often be considered both as an
analysis and a synthesis of the subject. I say, for instance, "This
paper is white." As explained above, this is a synthetic judg-
ment; the mere analysis of the notion "paper " will not give me
the predicate "white," but I have to verify it by experience.
This judgment is therefore the synthesis of two terms, "paper"
and "white." Yet, in another sense, this same judgment is really
the result of my one perception of white paper, which I have first
to disjoin or analyze into two elements in order to form the above
judgment, i.e. in order to synthetize them again. However, a
judgment based immediately on sense-perception differs from this
perception, because the perception is concrete, " this-white-paper,"
whereas in the judgment "This paper is white " the predicate is
abstract and general.
2. Experience and Reason in the Judgment. In all syn-
thetic judgments some perception or experience is required to
ascertain the relation between the subject and the predicate.
Not that the experience need be repeated in every individual
case; it is not necessary to decompose all drops of water to pro-
nounce with certitude that they are composed of the same defi-
nite proportions of hydrogen and oxygen. Natural laws like those
of physics and chemistry are universal, although they have not
been verified experimentally for all individual cases. But all
rest on some experience interpreted with the help of reason. They
never reach the same degree of certitude which we attribute to
certain other principles, for we conceive that the laws that govern
the world might be different, whereas we cannot conceive of a
whole not being equal to the sum of its parts. This leads us to
examine the genesis of a priori and necessary principles.
112 PSYCHOLOGY
II. GENESIS OF NECESSARY JUDGMENTS
i. Meaning. Necessary judgments as understood here are
those that are simple, clear, primitive, and immediate, needing
no demonstration, and self-evident as soon as their terms are
understood. They are a priori and analytical admitted inde-
pendently of their verification by experience; necessary the nega-
tion of them is absurdity; universal both in regard to the knowing
mind, which cannot fail to perceive their truth, and in regard to
their range of application, for they admit of no possible exception
at any time or in any place. Hence we do not speak here of all
analytic judgments, but only of those that are obvious and require
no demonstration. That is, we speak of principles, or judgments
that stand in the very beginning of intellectual life, and that are
admitted even before or without verification by experience. Thus
the principles of identity: "A is A," or "A thing is what it is ";
of excluded middle: "A is or is not"; of contradiction: "The
same thing cannot be and not be at the same time "; of sufficient
reason: "Whatever exists has a sufficient reason accounting for its
existence or happening." Thus also in geometry such principles
as: "The whole is greater than any of its parts, and equal to the
sum of its parts "; "Two things which are equal to the same third
are equal to each other;" "A straight line cannot enclose a space."
These principles are not formulated explicitly by all minds,
but they are implicitly recognized by all. The child may know
nothing of the explicit statement called the principle of contradic-
tion, yet he does not fail to recognize that one of two assertions
which he knows to be contradictory is a falsehood. A man may
not be aware that he is applying the principle of causality and of
sufficient reason when he concludes that the house has not built
itself, but requires an architect; yet he will consider it absurd to
require proofs for his assertion. Ask a child to give you half his
apple, and try to convince him that he will lose nothing by it and
that what will be left is as big as the whole apple.
Now the question is: Wherefrom do such principles derive their
characters of necessity and universality so as to admit of no
exception?
GENESIS OF JUDGMENT 113
2. Theories. We need not discuss theories of apriorism and
innatism. If there is no reason for asserting the existence of innate
ideas, still less is there any for asserting the innateness of principles.
Two main systems remain, intuitionalism and empiricism, (i)
According to the former, the senses furnish the mind with the
concrete materials out of which are elaborated abstract ideas, or
concepts, representing the essences of things. The mind is thus
enabled to perceive and affirm their essential and necessary rela-
tions. Thus the concepts of whole and of part are not given in
pure experience; they are abstractions and elaborations from experi-
ence. The relation between them is at once clear to the mind
independently of the actual concrete perception of a whole and its
parts. (2) According to the empirical theory, or associationism,
principles are simply the results of many associated experiences
in which they have been constantly verified. The individual's
experience is strengthened by the experiences of his ancestors,
which were accumulated in the course of ages and transmitted
by heredity. Such judgments may perhaps seem intuitive to us
now, but their formation has required many concrete experiences
of instances in which they were applied.
3. Criticism of Associationism. (a) A mere empirical theory is
inadequate to give a satisfactory account of necessary judgments
and axioms. Experience manifests only that which exists, but
does not reveal whether things are necessarily or not. We are
not concerned at present simply with what happens or is true,
nor even with what always happens or is always true, but with
what happens and is true necessarily so that it could never be
otherwise. This character of necessity cannot be found in experi-
ence. A man may not have seen many or even any straight lines,
yet he knows a priori that two straight lines cannot enclose a
space. He may never have seen parallels, yet he will not hesi-
tate to pronounce that parallels can never meet, because the prin-
ciple of contradiction is implied here: Lines always at the same
distance cannot at the same time change their respective
distances.
(b) In order to have any reliable, orderly, and organized experi-
ence, certain principles, like those of identity and contradiction,
9
114 PSYCHOLOGY
are already required; they cannot therefore result exclusively
from experience. How is any experience possible if the same thing
can at the same time be and not be, be perceived and not
perceived, true and not true, white and not white, etc.?
(c) Finally, it may be noted that, for such principles, no trace
whatever of any increase of evidence or firmness is found either
in the individual or the race. At all times they are accepted as
clear and self-evident, and repeated experience does not strengthen
them. Ever since men have been, their thinking has implied cer-
tain principles admitted as necessary and universal; their experi-
ence has constantly testified to the regular succession of day and
night resulting from the apparent revolution, of the sun around
the earth. Yet such constant experience does not show this regu-
lar succession every twenty-four hours as necessary and universal.
The empiricist may say that this is due to the known possibility
of different experiences on the earth or on other planets, as re-
vealed by science. But his explanation implies the very dis-
tinction of the necessary and the contingent which is not
given in experience, but derived from some other source. In
experience we never find necessity, but at most universal con-
tingency.
4. Conclusion. Hence we say that principles are neither
a priori, if by this we mean innate and without any empirical
factor, nor yet a posteriori, if by this we exclude the rational fac-
tor. They are both. Experience is necessary to form the abstract
ideas the relations of which are affirmed by these principles; and
it is useful for their reflex knowledge, formulation, and applica-
tion to concrete instances. But this experience is not necessarily
so frequent and repeated as to produce invincible associations,
as empiricists claim. The terms being known, the mind has at
once the intuition of their necessary relation of agreement or dis-
agreement. Knowing things, not only in their individual and
concrete existence, but in their abstract, general, and essential
aspects, the mind is also capable of perceiving the essential
relations which exist between them.
GENESIS OF JUDGMENT 115
III. GENESIS OF MEDIATE JUDGMENTS. INFERENCE.
REASONING
i. Nature of the Reasoning Process. (a) Thinking consists
essentially in judging, and is complete only when we can affirm
or deny. We frequently say: "I think so," by which we implicitly
formulate a judgment. We also say: "Let me think a minute," by
which we mean that a little reflection and consideration is needed
before we can express an opinion, make an assertion, and see the
relation between ideas, i.e. pass a judgment. In this latter
sense thought is equivalent to inference or reasoning. The imme-
diate or intuitive judgments of sense or reason are few when com-
pared to the number of judgments obtained by explicit or implicit
reasoning. In an intuitive and immediate judgment, no reason can
be given except that the truth is seen at once, and that the judgment
is self-evident. In the mediate judgment, obtained by reasoning
reasoning is only a means toward judging a reason can be
given on which it rests and on which its truth depends; the link
between two or several judgments is perceived.
(b) Hence we see the difference between reasoning and associa-
tion. In association also one idea or judgment is linked with an-
other, but without dependence as far as the truth of the second
judgment is concerned. One idea gives rise to another, but it is
a mere succession. Thus, if I see John sick with a cold, a number
of ideas may be recalled to my mind by association; of boys run-
ning, drinking cold water, being careless . . . ; of remedies and drug
stores . . . ; of coughing, staying in bed . . . ; of other diseases,
other persons . . . etc. This is not reasoning. But, if I say:
" John is sick because he remained in a draught of cold air," or:
"This remedy will cure him because it has cured Peter and
Henry in the same circumstances," then I perceive a relation
of dependence between two judgments; I conceive one as being the
foundation of another. This is reasoning.
(c) It is clear that the great majority of our judgments are
based on some inference, sometimes explicit, sometimes also exist-
ing implicitly in the mind, and ready to express itself in the form
of a "because." When a judgment is not immediate, it is always
Il6 PSYCHOLOGY
accepted because of something else. Whether the psychological
process be valid or not from the point of view of logic and epis-
temology, the psychological process is the same.
2. Elements of the Reasoning Process. (a) From what has
just been said, it is easy to understand that the elements of reason-
ing are not only several ideas, but several judgments, which must
be present explicitly or implicitly in the mind, and one of which
is considered as a consequence of the others. This consequence
may be expressed last: "He who wilfully injures his neighbor is
worthy of blame; Peter has stolen, and to steal is wilfully to injure
one's neighbor; consequently Peter is blameworthy." Or it may
be expressed first: "Peter is blameworthy because he has stolen,
thereby injuring his neighbor." Or it may find an intermediate
place: "Peter has stolen; he is therefore blameworthy, since who-
ever wilfully injures his neighbor is blameworthy." In Logic we
shall see how these may be reduced to perfect syllogisms. For
the present we are concerned with the process of syllogism as we
generally use it.
(b) The foregoing examples show that reasoning always includes
a universal element or law, and a more special instance or applica-
tion. Even in cases in which we seem to pass from one particular
or individual instance to another a general statement is implied.
Thus: "This remedy is likely to do good to John because it
did good to Peter," implies that in both cases the diseases are of
the same nature, and that in the same circumstances the same
remedy will produce the same effect. Again, when I say : " We shall
have rain because such clouds are forming and the wind comes
from such a direction," I seem to derive my conclusion from
concrete facts of past experience. Yet I suppose the general
principle that such a direction of the wind and such clouds
are generally followed by rain.
3. Inductive and Deductive Reasoning. (a) When the gen-
eral principle or law is the goal reached or the conclusion, the rea-
soning is inductive. When it is the starting-point or the reason,
the reasoning process is called deductive. If I have been deceived
by one, then by another, and by a third man with whom I dealt,
I say rightly or wrongly, it matters not for our present purpose
GENESIS OF JUDGMENT 117
"All men, or at least all men of this class, are liars " (induction).
Now when I say: "Beware of A, he will tell you all sorts of stories,
for, you know, he is engaged in such or such a profession," I pro-
ceed deductively. Again, it is by induction or generalization that
the chemist pronounces that all water is composed of oxygen and
hydrogen. It is by deduction that he applies this to a glass of
water which he has never analyzed. These two processes com-
plete each other. We proceed from the observed facts to the law,
and from the law to the unobserved facts.
(b) Induction is primarily analytic; deduction, primarily syn-
thetic. By analysis is meant the resolution of the complex into
that which is more simple; by synthesis, the combination of simple
elements into something more complex. A general proposition
is simpler than the individual fact, because it does not include
the concrete determinations special to each instance. "All bod-
ies attract one another in direct ratio to their masses and in inverse
ratio to the square of the distances " is a simpler statement than
that which determines all the particulars in the case of this body
whose mass is A, and this other body whose mass is B, the
distance between the two being C.
IV. THE PROCESSES OF JUDGING AND REASONING IN
ORDINARY LIFE
i. There are Three Ways of Forming Judgments. (i) As
stated already, some judgments are intuitive, i.e. accepted in view
of their self-evidence. I say that snow is white because I see that
it is so; that two and two are four because I understand that it
cannot be otherwise. (2) Other judgments are accepted on the
authority of other men. I know that Napoleon was emperor of
the French, that Columbus discovered America, and that Peking
is a city in China. For these and a multitude of other judgments
I depend on the testimony, and therefore on the knowledge and
truthfulness of other men who either exist now or have existed
in the past. The same is true of many scientific statements.
Empirical science need not always be a science based on one's
own experience. Little progress would be made if, before accept-
ing the report of an experiment, one always had to perform the same
Il8 PSYCHOLOGY
experiment. There are facts that occur only once or a few times,
and cannot be observed by all. (3) A third way of forming a
judgment is to reason it out. For instance, I find two contradic-
tory statements, say, on a political or religious question. I en-
deavor to get the data on both sides, weigh the arguments, use my
own intelligence, and form my own judgment. In all sciences and
in daily life many statements are based on personal inference.
And even when a truth is based on authority, its acceptance sup-
poses inferences concerning the value of the testimony of others.
It is evident that judgments reached by these methods are
not considered as having always the same value; and, within
the same method, judgments are more or less certain, probable,
or doubtful. The process by which they are reached may be
short and simple, or require long and difficult demonstrations.
2. Prejudices. (a) Reflection shows that frequently assent
is given to judgments that do not deserve it. Things considered
as certainly true, and never before suspected of being even doubt-
ful, may be rejected later as certainly false. As a result of more
careful study and greater mental development, it is found that a
number of judgments must be revised. Statements that were
not self-evident were accepted without reason, or for insufficient
reasons. Early education gives the child a number of ideas and
beliefs which are accepted on authority or insufficient inference,
and even are the results of misunderstanding and misinterpreta-
tion. One may find many misrepresentations in former beliefs
now outgrown, arising from various causes and circumstances.
See how many popular maxims, proverbs, and sayings concerning
health, happiness, social life, and even the weather, are accepted
without reflection. Even when disproved by science and per-
sonal experience, they still hold their ground; favorable occur-
rences strengthen them; contrary occurrences are looked upon as
exceptions. Surroundings, daily intercourse with other men,
bodily and mental dispositions, contribute to form a nucleus of
knowledge which, little by little, is developed and increased, and
which is the centre toward which all knowledge converges.
(b) We become accustomed to these judgments. Like all habits
they become stronger, and take a deeper root by daily acceptance
GENESIS OF JUDGMENT 119
and by the uses or applications at least implicit which are
made of them. They form a bulk of supposedly known and
ascertained truths, and become the standard to which we refer
and by which we judge new propositions offered for our accept-
ance. If we reach a pleasant conclusion, little or no trouble is
taken to verify it. Mere hearsay becomes the highest source of
certitude. But sometimes the most cogent arguments do not
succeed in leading to the acceptance of an unpleasant conclusion.
See, for instance, how ready a man is to accept as true the
slanders he hears about his enemy, and how reluctantly he
admits the good qualities that are attributed to him. An obvious
fact or argument against one's fixed ideas may convince for the
time being. If it does not frequently reenter the mind so as to
strengthen its impression, it soon loses its hold on the mind. A
few days or months later it may have been forgotten, and the
conviction may have vanished. The new and unexpected takes
root with difficulty; it rather tends to remain at the surface
and wither, because the mental soil is already occupied by deep-
rooted judgments which are not easily torn away.
(c) In all cases the value of new judgments is tested by compar-
ing them with other judgments accepted as certain and used as
norms. And as man is loath to break with inveterate habits and
to discard long-standing opinions, so is he likely to reject, or at
least to suspect a priori, whatever conflicts with his previous views.
(d) Because these judgments are habitual and familiar they
attract no attention or reflection. It hardly occurs to the mind
to question or test them until some strong evidence is offered
against their validity. Even in this case they cling to the mind
until obliged to retreat a step which, like the breaking of
an old habit, is always more or less painful. Because they are
unnoticed they are the more dangerous.
(e) A large number of habitual views and opinions are true,
but many also are narrow and belong to an individual man or a
special group of men as a result of their education. They arouse
the curiosity, sometimes the suspicion and hatred, of other indi-
viduals or groups of men. They are sources of misunderstanding,
frequently without any ill-will on either side, but too often with
120 PSYCHOLOGY
the imputation of ill-will on the part of those whose opinions are
different. A man cannot be educated by, or associate with, other
men without reflecting in some degree their views and opinions.
This is true especially of children and young people, because their
minds are more receptive and more easily influenced. Hence the
importance of a good early intellectual education cannot be over-
estimated; its influence extends to the whole life. All judgments
acquired without sufficient justification, whether they be true or
false, influence following judgments. For good or for bad, they are
prejudices.
3. Knowledge and Belief. (a) This leads us to recognize
an important distinction between what may be called impersonal
and personal truths. Impersonal truth is that which is so evident
that it imposes itself on all. The reasons for accepting it are
cogent, and appeal to all minds to whom they are presented.
Personal truths have not the same evidence; they are accepted
owing to both objective and subjective influences. Generally
they are truths which carry with them practical consequences
and are the sources of certain rules of conduct. To this class
belong many judgments in the religious, moral, political, and
social orders.
(b) This distinction corresponds to a distinction which is fre-
quently made between knowledge and belief. Knowledge is based
on immediate or mediate evidence and is essentially rational.
Belief refers to that which is not evident, or at least not clearly
so; thus it is partly rational, partly emotional, and partly voli-
tional in its causes. In the acceptance of a statement, the propor-
tion of objective and subjective influences may vary; a truth is
more or less impersonal and more or less personal.
(c) With truths of the first class, e.g. a theorem of geometry,
only the intellect is concerned. In truths of the second class the
whole man is interested, and all the faculties contribute to influ-
ence the judgment. "Thy wish was father, Harry, to that
thought " (Henry IV, P. II, act iv, sc. iv) is applicable to many
thoughts, and, at times, all of us are so many Harries. As a mat-
ter of fact we are not concerned at present with what should
be, but with what is judgments are influenced by motives which
GENESIS OF JUDGMENT 121
do not come simply from reason, but from prejudices, feelings,
desires, and will. These blind man, and either prevent him from
accepting reasons at all, or act as convex or concave lenses through
which reasons are seen in such a way that their real value is exag-
gerated or minimized. Even in truths that are of themselves
impersonal it may happen that, because a man has a theory which
he cherishes, he will rather close his eyes than examine facts
which, if admitted, would be irreconcilable with the theory accepted
so far.
To sum up: In the majority of our assents we are not simply drawn
by objective light and evidence, but also impelled and prompted by
subjective and internal motives which may or may not be explicitly
recognized in consciousness.
4. Three Uses of Reasoning. Man, being reasonable, is not
satisfied until he can give to himself and to others a reason for his
judgments. Reasoning and proving may be used for three pur-
poses, to form judgments, to test those that are already accepted,
and to convince others.
(a) When the truth is not known, we endeavor to find it by in-
vestigating, comparing, and weighing the evidence for and against
it. This is chiefly the work of reason; but, as mentioned already,
reason is sometimes guided or rather misguided and blinded
by preconceived ideas and prejudices.
(b) When a judgment is already accepted, and we want to
examine whether it is sufficiently justified, reasoning is again used
as a test to revise the motives and arguments and estimate their
value. Too frequently again, especially in matters of practical
interest, reasoning is used to justify rather than to test. An opin-
ion is already accepted, and only motives that can make it appear
reasonable are considered, or their value is magnified, while the
value of antagonistic motives is lessened. In such cases, judg-
ments are not based on reasons, but rather reasons are adapted to
suit our judgments. They are like the pretexts which are some-
times found to justify in one's own eyes, and, if possible, in the
eyes of others, a course of action which one has already determined
to follow.
(c) When reasoning is used to convince other men, two things
122 PSYCHOLOGY
must be kept in mind: the nature of the truth itself, and the men-
tal dispositions of the man or of the audience addressed.
According as the statement which is presented has an impersonal
or a personal character in the sense explained above, the process
of argumentation will assume a more rigid and more formal aspect,
or a warmer and more highly colored tone. In one case, reason
alone, in the other case, all human activities and feelings, will be
appealed to. A political principle is not demonstrated in the
same way as a theorem of geometry. According as the audience
is well disposed or hostile, fair or prejudiced, the speaker will
again assume different attitudes. In every case, since the truth
must enter the mind, it is necessary first to remove obstacles,
then to prepare the mind for its reception and assimilation, and
finally to present the truth in the best adapted manner. The
same truth presented differently, by different persons, to different
hearers, in different ways, and different circumstances, will
produce an innumerable variety of results. Hear, for instance,
the simple statement: "Miss So-and-So was in church yesterday,"
and listen to the comment started by the mention of such a fact.
ARTICLE V. LANGUAGE
I. THE FUNCTION OF LANGUAGE
I. SIGNS IN GENERAL. SIGNS OF MENTAL PROCESSES
Mental processes are essentially private and personal. They
are not manifested directly by the action of one mind upon
another, but indirectly by means of signs. I know the opinion of
another man because he told me or because I read it. I know
his grief or joy because I see him weeping or laughing. Words,
spoken or written, tears, laughter, are so many signs of mental
processes.
i. Meaning of Sign. A sign is whatever manifests something
else because of some relation between the two, like similarity,
causality, association, or convention among men. A certain
position of the semaphore is a sign of danger for the engineer.
A certain form of clouds, direction of the wind, peculiarity of the
THE FUNCTION OF LANGUAGE 123
atmosphere, are signs of an impending storm. The sign is per-
ceived directly, and the thing signified, indirectly. The same thing
may be a sign for one man and not for another, according as the
relation between it and something else is known or not. The
interpretation of signs is the work of mental association and
judgment.
2. Division of Signs. (a) A sign is natural when its relation
with the thing it signifies comes from nature itself. When this
relation is one of similarity the sign is called formal. Thus cer-
tain clouds are the natural signs of coming rain; smoke is the nat-
ural sign of fire; a picture is the natural and formal sign of the
individual whom it represents. On the contrary, the sign is con-
ventional when its signification is based merely on an agreement
between men. Such are the signals for trains or vessels, the tele-
graphic codes, the flags of the different nations, the red, white, and
blue striped pole to indicate a barber shop, etc. A sign may be
neither strictly natural nor strictly conventional but share in the
nature of both. Thus a sword is the emblem of war; a crown,
the emblem of royalty, etc.
(b) Signs are more or less certain, or equivocal, according as they
are clear and refer to one thing only, or are vague and may refer
to several things. Thus a symptom may be the certain sign of a
special disease; smoke the certain sign of fire; a sentence the cer-
tain sign of a meaning. But a tower is not certainly the sign of
a church; perspiration not necessarily a sign of hot weather;
constant reading not always a sign of science or of studiousness.
Different signs may signify the same thing, or the same sign
different things.
(c) Signs may be perceived by any of the five senses. I see a
certain badge and I know that the man wearing it is a policeman;
I hear a bell and become aware that the church service is about
to begin; I touch a patient and his temperature is a sign of fever;
I smell tobacco smoke and am sure it is coming from a good cigar;
I taste an apple and am sure that it may do me harm because it
is not ripe.
3. The Signs of Mental Processes may be: (a) Natural or
conventional, or partly natural and partly conventional. Thus
124 PSYCHOLOGY
crying is the natural sign of pain; laughing the natural sign of
mirth; clenching the fist the natural sign of anger. Some words
in onomatopoeia may also be considered as natural signs,
but they are exceptions, for words generally have a purely conven-
tional meaning. The form of letters, the spelling and pronuncia-
tion of words are also conventional. Some gestures are natural,
e.g. pointing toward a certain direction to call attention to an
object; others are artificial, e.g. the language-signs of the deaf and
dumb; others seem to depend both on nature and convention,
e.g. many of the gestures of an orator.
(b) Certain or doubtful. Some words and sentences have a
clear meaning; others are equivocal. The expression on the face
is not always easy to interpret, and the corresponding feelings
cannot always be inferred. The modes of salutation vary with
different countries; the same gesture or action may be a sign of
respect in one place, and an insult in another. Signs are frequently
misunderstood owing either to the nature of the sign itself, and
the circumstances in which it is used, or to the ignorance,
distraction, and mental preoccupation of the man to whom it is
given. .
(c) Visual, auditory, and tactual. Touch is not a frequent
sign of mental processes except for the blind. Hence normally
there remain two classes of signs: auditory, like cries, speech,
singing; visual, like certain physiognomical expressions, gestures,
writing.
II. SPECIAL SIGNS OF INTELLECTUAL IDEAS. LANGUAGE
i. Nature of Language. The term "language" applies to a
system of rational and conventional signs which express abstract
and general ideas and the various relations between these ideas. It
manifests thought in the strict sense, and thus does not refer to the
manifestations of emotions and feelings, such as crying, laughing,
or blushing. Animals may give signs of their mental states, but
language proper belongs to man alone. The same words may be
uttered by a man and a parrot, but in the former case only do they
manifest ideas; in the latter they are the results of sensory asso-
ciations and have no conscious meaning. Man alone has devised
THE FUNCTION OF LANGUAGE 125
rational means of communication with other men. Bugle calls,
cannon and gun reports, ringing of bells, blowing of whistles, etc.,
are, or may be, so many auditory signs of orders and ideas. Sema-
phores, flag signals, lights of certain colors, bodily gestures, etc.,
are so many visual signs which manifest thoughts or inferences;
for instance, that a train has passed the station recently and
consequently is still within a short distance, thus making it
dangerous for the present train to proceed.
However important these signs may be, there are two means of
communication which are more common, more usual, and of greater
value: one auditory, spoken language; the other visual, written
language. In fact, all the others may be reduced to these. The
signs of the deaf and dumb stand for alphabetical letters, the
bugle call for a definite sentence or order, the red lantern for a
warning of danger, etc.
2. Speech and Writing Compared. (a) Speech has several
advantages over writing, (i) The visual field extends only in a
certain direction and is intercepted by opaque bodies. Sounds
can be heard from any direction, and are not so easily intercepted.
Hence sound attracts the attention more easily. (2) Visual signs
depend on light; sounds are heard even in obscurity. (3) Speech,
especially when combined with facial expression and gestures, is
more living than writing, and expresses better the feelings that
accompany the ideas.
(b) On the other hand, writing has several advantages over speech.
(i) It is more permanent. (2) It can be transmitted more
easily, and with less danger of alteration. (3) Hence it can reach
a greater number of persons, especially by printing.
(c) In certain modes of writing, such as hieroglyphics, the sign
is directly the sign of the thing or rather of the idea of the thing.
But in modern writing, the sign represents directly the sound.
Thus a certain group of signs stands for the sound "cat," which
in turn stands for the idea.
3. Acquisition of Language. In the acquisition of language
the child is helped greatly by the fact that there are other speak-
ing men to teach him. At first the exercise of the limbs and of the
vocal organs is spontaneous; movements and cries manifest only
126 PSYCHOLOGY
sensations and feelings. These signs become rational little by
little as reason itself develops. The main factors in this acquisi-
tion of language are:
(a) Natural signs. The attention of the child is called to cer-
tain objects by appropriate gestures, and their names are pro-
nounced until the association between the sound and the thing
is established. Easy names are learned first, like "papa," "bow-
wow," etc.
(b) On the part of the child there are also certain natural mani-
festations of painful or agreeable states, and to these correspond
certain actions on the part of the mother or the nurse. Another
association is formed, and the desire to have his mother come may
induce the child to cry or utter certain sounds.
(c) The child tends to imitate both rational beings and the
phenomena of inanimate nature.
(d) Little by little, from purely emotional, and, we might say,
concrete expressions, the child passes to rational language. Signs
are used to manifest concepts and their relations. Definitions,
reading, intercourse with other men, constantly perfect the knowl-
edge and use of language.
(e) Even without the help of others, man, endowed with reason
and reflection, would soon find the means to communicate his
thoughts, however imperfect these might be at first.
H. LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT
I. IN THE SPEAKER OR WRITER
i. Language Presupposes Thought. (a) Since the function
of language is to express and communicate thought, it follows
that language is not the source of ideas, but presupposes them.
The child has ideas before being able to express them, and even
the adult frequently has thoughts for which he can hardly find any
expression. The child at first uses natural signs to express his
desires and feelings, and later is gradually initiated to conventional
language which he learns from others. This process of learning
evidently supposes ideas in the child's mind, for otherwise language
would be absolutely unintelligible, and words would have no mean-
LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT 127
ing. Nature gives only, so to speak, the instruments of speech;
it is reason that gives to words their soulfand their real intellectual
value.
(b) It is true, however, that thought and speech develop together
and in close dependence, and that we hardly ever think without
speaking to ourselves within our own mind. In Greek, the word
Xoyos means both reason and speech, and in scholastic philosophy,
the mental word or verbum mentale means the idea itself or concept.
To think is really to speak to oneself; to speak is to think
aloud and for others.
(c) Hence the importance of clear and methodical thought.
Without clear thought it is impossible to express oneself clearly,
and what is clear in the mind is usually clear in the expression.
2. Language Perfects Thought. If language is the instrument
of reason and reflection, it must be admitted also that it greatly
contributes to improve thought and reason.
(a) By transmitting thought, it is the basis of all social relations.
It is also the means of preserving the knowledge accumulated by
the individual and by generations.
(b) It facilitates attention by giving stability and permanence
to the thought, which is naturally transient and unstable. Hence
it also facilitates memory by embodying the idea in a sensible sym-
bol, which is the condition of thought, since, as we have seen,
we never think without some image or some sense-perception.
The best way to master ideas is to endeavor to express them, and
this attempt frequently shows that ideas which seemed clear are
really far from being so. A compendium of philosophy made by
the student himself is not only a memorandum; it also contrib-
utes to the understanding of the subject. Reading is much more
profitable when it is done with a pencil or pen in hand to take notes.
(c) Language is an instrument of analysis, for it serves to decom-
pose the complex thought into its various elements, and to fixate
every one of these elements. By the very fact that we can speak
only successively we are obliged to express separately ideas which
are together in the mind. When I say: "Peter is coming," I
decompose the one act of perception, by which I see at once
"Peter-and-his-coming," into two elements.
128 PSYCHOLOGY
(d) At the same time it is an instrument of synthesis, combina-
tion, and classification. A word, because it is general, applies
to a multitude of individuals. It includes in one single expres-
sion all their common features which are found scattered in many
individuals amid a multitude of other features.
II. IN THE HEARER OR READER
We shall simply call attention to a few general principles, easily
understood, yet too frequently forgotten in practice.
1. Speech Signifies the Ideas of the Speaker, not those of the
hearer. The word or sentence, in the mind and intention of the
man who uses it, may not always stand for exactly the same idea
which it stands for in the mind of the man who hears or reads it.
Hence arise frequent misrepresentations. Hence also frequent
complaints on the part of writers and speakers that they have
been misunderstood and misquoted.
2. Changes in the Meaning of Words. Language is sometimes
equivocal, that is, the meaning may be uncertain. Meaning may
also vary with the various countries, regions, and times. Like a
living organism, a language is constantly changing. Many influ-
ences are always at work to modify it with regard to the
signification of words, their pronunciation and spelling, the rules
of grammar, etc. The language that does not change and is
crystallized is rightly called a dead language.
3. Consequences. It is important to keep these principles
in mind. The word is only a symbol of the speaker's mind; it
must not therefore be interpreted in the light of the hearer's or
reader's ideas. How many discussions, oral or written, would
be avoided if, on one side, the speaker were careful to make his
meaning clear, and, on the other, the hearer were careful to get
the right meaning. How many long and bitter controversies
end or should end by: "If this is what you mean, I agree with
you." Perhaps there is mental agreement all the time, and the
disagreement is only a verbal one. Be sure then of the meaning
of those to whom you listen or whose writings you read.
Interpret expressions according to their obvious meaning, but
always taking into account by whom and in what circumstances
DEVELOPMENT OF KNOWLEDGE 129
they were used. Ask for further explanation, when possible,
especially in cases of different opinions, and you will frequently
avoid many difficulties and discussions.
CLOSING REMARKS ON THIS CHAPTER
I. GENERAL CONSPECTUS OF COGNITIVE FACULTIES
i. Summary. (a) The present chapter has led us through
the various successive steps of cognition. Beginning with the
simplest elements we have risen to more and more complex acts.
The elaboration of knowledge requires a multitude of processes of
ever-increasing complexity, each process depending on those that
have preceded. Analysis and synthesis, separation and combina-
tion, resolution and construction, go together and give each other
mutual help. The highest mental processes of the intellect
pervade, complete, and perfect the data of the senses, and the
senses are necessary to the highest mental processes.
(b) Continuity and solidarity are found at every stage. Sensa-
tion, perception, retention and reproduction, conception, judg-
ment and reasoning, are all interwoven in cognitive processes.
What is now a direct perception may have been in the beginning a
judgment and an act of reasoning now embodied in one and the
same act. When I say that I see my friend Peter, think how many
acts of sensation, perception, comparison, and judgment, perhaps
even scientific conclusions reached by a long process of reasoning,
are summed up in that one word "friend.'*
(c) Yet it must be kept in mind that continuity does not neces-
sarily mean that all cognitive acts come from and must be attrib-
uted to the same principle. If we admit, as common-sense leads
us to admit, a radical distinction between inorganic and organic
substances, and between plants and animals, we must also admit
that there is in the plant a special mode of activity which is not
found in inorganic matter, and in the animal some special property
which is not found in the plant. Nevertheless it may be impos-
sible to determine, in concrete cases, where one kingdom begins
and where the other ends. From what has been said especially
10
130 PSYCHOLOGY
on the origin and the formation of concepts, one may already
suspect that sense and intellect are two distinct and irreducible
faculties. This point must now be made clearer.
2. Senses and Intellect. Man is endowed with two kinds of
faculties or powers, irreducible to each other, the senses and the
intellect. At present we shall simply indicate the main reasons
for this assertion, as we intend to come back to the same subject
and determine the nature of intellectual processes when we study
the philosophy of the human mind.
(a) We acquire concepts that are abstract and universal, not
determined therefore by the concrete circumstances of space and
time. The concept has been shown already to be irreducible
to the image. Through an organic or material process we can
know only the material, concrete, and actual reality. The senses,
therefore, however complex or composite the image may be, can
give only the knowledge of concrete objects determined in space
and time.
(b) The judgment supposes the concept. It does not simply
consist in a juxtaposition, in a resemblance or a difference between
two ideas, but it consists essentially in the perception and affirma-
tion of such relations. In the case of necessary judgments, that
is, of judgments which not only are true as matters of fact, but
must be true at all times, everywhere, and for all minds, no sense
can ever give to any judgment, or perceive in any reality, this
character of necessity. It comes from a higher source.
(c) Probably the most marvellous power of the human mind
is the power of reflection or self -consciousness. The mind not
only thinks objects external to itself, but thinks its own thought,
observes its own sensations, emotions, volitions, and desires, com-
pares them with one another, and notices their differences or re-
semblances. Under all these we are aware of the identity of the
agent from whose activity they proceed and to whom all are attrib-
uted. An organic or material action cannot thus perceive itself.
Vision does not see itself, hearing does not hear itself, etc. An
organ cannot be reflected, or folded back on itself. If this fea-
ture belongs to higher mental manifestations, it points to a power
superior to the senses. It is only a supra-sensuous power of thought
DEVELOPMENT OF KNOWLEDGE 131
that can bind together the passing states of mind, and recognize
the identity and permanence of the self under its passing proc-
esses.
II. GENESIS OF SOME IDEAS AND PRINCIPLES
We give here a short outline of the way in which we acquire
some fundamental concepts and judgments which others imply,
or which are of most frequent use. The present point of view is
exclusively psychological. Some of these ideas and principles
will have to be examined elsewhere from other points of view, in
Logic, Epistemology, Cosmology, etc.
i. Ideas. The most important ideas to be mentioned are
those of being, self, substance and accident, cause and effect,
finite and infinite, relative and absolute.
(a) The notion of being is the first which the human mind ac-
quires. It is the most general since it applies to everything,
hence also the most indetermined and the most imperfect. It is
at the basis of all other notions, for, whatever is known is known
as something, i.e. as some form of being.
(b) The knowledge of self is acquired by reflection. The facts
of memory and recognition lead to the idea of self-identity. Com-
parison and the perception of difference and similarity between
mental processes indicate a judging unity under the multiplicity
of mental states. Moreover, the consciousness of power manifests
the self as an active principle. It is not merely a centre or
support for its passing states, but an agent from which they
spring.
(c) Consciousness gives me the testimony that I am a substance,
namely, that I exist in myself as an individual. On the con-
trary, it gives the testimony that the ideas, feelings, emotions,
desires, etc., a which I experience are mine. They do not stand by
themselves, and I cannot think of a thought which is not some
mind's thought. Another contrast is apparent, namely, the con-
trast of the permanent ego with the transitory states of the ego,
which again leads to the recognition of a distinction between
the ego as a substance, and its states as accidents. This is
also verified in external objects. The same thing changes in
132 PSYCHOLOGY
various respects. These two ideas of sameness and yet of
successive variety are indications that, in external things, a dis-
tinction must also be made between substance and accidents or
properties.
(d) Internal experience reveals the self as an agent. There
are changes and successions of mental states, or even bodily move-
ments, whose happening is the result of volition. We feel that,
sometimes at least, we are not merely spectators, but agents and
causes of the sequence of our mental processes; that we dispose
of and use a certain energy which is in ourselves, and that we
are capable of effort. Through external experience we observe
similar facts of change and succession in the outside world. These
changes take place according to laws which science endeavors
to discover. In the same circumstances, the same antecedent is
always followed by the same consequent. Reason is naturally led
to inquire why these changes are produced, and to attribute them
to the activity of causes from which they proceed. A cause is
not merely an antecedent; it not only precedes in time, but it
exercises an influence in the production of the consequent.
(e) The senses of vision and touch give perceptions of surface
and solidity, that is, of concrete extension and dimension. By
abstraction, the concepts of extension, matter, and body in general
are formed. Moreover, we perceive the various relations of dis-
tance, the respective positions of bodies and their changes of place,
and we look upon space as one immense receptacle in which all
things are and move.
(/) The perception of succession, i.e. of the fact that events,
internal and external, do not all take place at once, but one after
the other, leads to the idea of time, or of a present instant preceded
by a past and to be followed by a future.
(g) Everywhere in the world we find limitations in extension,
power, activity, and perfection. From these we form the idea of
limitation; and by removing all limitations we form the idea
always imperfect of the unlimited, of the perfect and the infinite.
I can do only certain things, the Omnipotent or Infinite Power can
do all things. My knowledge is imperfect and limited, the Infi-
nite Knower reaches perfectly every truth, etc. In the same man-
DEVELOPMENT OF KNOWLEDGE 133
ner, knowing that we are dependent on many other persons and
things, both for our very existence and for our activity; knowing
that all beings are thus dependent on one another and that they
have manifold relations, we conceive the idea of the perfectly
independent or Absolute.
2. Principles. From primitive concepts are formed primary
judgments or principles which are necessary, universal, and funda-
mental in experimental and rational sciences. The most important
are: The principle of identity: "What is is," or "A is A." The
principle of contradiction: "The same thing cannot be and not be
at the same time; " or, applied to cognition: "The same thing can-
not be affirmed and denied at the same time and in the same
sense." The principle of substantiality: "There is no mode or phe-
nomenon without a substance." The principle of causality and
sufficient reason: "Nothing begins to exist without an adequate
cause." The principles of space and time: "All bodies are in space,"
and "All events take place in time." The principle of the abso-
lute: "The relative supposes an absolute; the imperfect supposes
the perfect; the finite supposes the infinite." The principle of
morality: "Right and wrong differ essentially," "Moral obligation
must be fulfilled, and moral evil must be avoided."
III. DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLECTUAL COGNITION
i. Intellectual Development. Let us first ask the question:
In what does intellectual development consist? As has been
indicated already, the first notions acquired by the intellect are
very vague, indistinct, and general. The intellect is developed
and perfected little by little, and its perfection consists mainly in
the three following qualities:
(a) The extension of knowledge, that is, the number of things
that are known, of sciences that are mastered, and of facts, laws,
and details with which the mind is acquainted.
(b) Far more important than the quantity of knowledge is its
quality, its distinctness, clearness, accuracy, and thoroughness.
To know much is good; to know well is better. Persons are found
who have acquired varied and extensive information on a number
134 PSYCHOLOGY
of subjects; they have a smattering of everything. But it is all
vague and hazy, all a-peu-pres, without any clearness or definite-
ness. They may astonish the ignorant, but to the really learned
their display of knowledge appears as an addition of conceit to
ignorance.
(c) More important still and more fruitful is what may be called
the synthesis of knowledge, that is, the perception, not merely of
individual objects, but of their relations, both ontological and log-
ical. Things and events are related by similarity, difference,
analogy, causality, etc., and, both in speculative and in practical
thinking, success depends on the power of the mind to grasp these
relations. What are scientific and popular classifications but
groupings of things according to likeness and difference? On what
does the success of an enterprise depend, if not on the power of
grasping beforehand the possible sources of success and failure,
and the relations of one event to another? In business, in sci-
ence, in war, in politics, in commerce, everywhere, the powerful
mind is the mind that does not see or foresee merely one side of
reality, but that embraces at once all its complex aspects. Look
not only at the individual; look at the whole to which it belongs
and with which it has manifold relations. It is necessary for
the mind to analyze, but it must later replace every object of
knowledge in its true relations.
2. Main Factors in Intellectual Development. (a) Much
assistance is received from others, but it is necessary to control
human testimony and authority. I make no difficulty in believ-
ing my friend, whom I know to be truthful, when he tells me of
things he has seen and of events he has witnessed. If, however,
he speaks to me on other matters, before I assent I must weigh
his reasons and test their value. To act differently would be to
renounce the highest and noblest human prerogative.
(b) Besides this external assistance, several internal helps must
be mentioned, (i) The intellect depends on the senses; therefore
it is necessary to give to the senses the greatest possible perfection,
and, within proper limits, to cultivate memory and imagina-
tion. Hence also the importance of explaining and illustrating
abstract notions by concrete examples. (2) Attention must be
DEVELOPMENT OF KNOWLEDGE 135
given to the various aspects of sense-experience. Judgment and
reasoning are to be used with caution and prudence. Care must
be taken not to be misled by prejudices and habits of thought.
The principle or law must be based on facts, and the facts must
not be denied or distorted in order to fit in with a preconceived
theory. (3) The habits of introspection and reflection are neces-
sary, as self-knowledge is essential in all aspects of life. (4) The
connections and relations between objects of knowledge are to be
examined. The endeavor should not be so much to acquire mani-
fold and varied information as to group it and arrange it in the
mind. On this condition only will knowledge be available. A
business man who has many things in his store but without any
order, and who does not keep his accounts carefully, is not likely
to succeed. The same is true of a mind in which many ideas are
scattered at random without order and method.
3. Main Dangers to be Guarded Against. (a) The illusion
of clearness is frequent. A word or sentence is heard or read fre-
quently, and, because it becomes familiar, the mind never stops
to consider its accurate meaning. A word altogether new will
strike the mind and lead us to consult the dictionary. Yet many
familiar words are not thoroughly understood; we have only a
vague and hazy idea of their signification. Try to read a page of
a novel or of any easy book. Stop carefully to ponder every word
and try to give a definition of it, and you will see how many do
not convey a clear and distinct idea to your mind.
(b) Imagination, prejudices, a priori theories, blind the intellect,
prevent it from seeing things in their true light, and even make it
incapable of observing facts without bias. They are like colored
glasses which change the visual appearance of everything, or like
lenses which, according as they are convex or concave, magnify
or reduce the apparent size of objects.
(c) Some have an exaggerated credulity with regard to the state-
ments of a favorite author, orator, friend, etc., without even
examining their value; or, on the contrary, a disposition to
disbelieve anything which another man may state. A priori the
former are always right; the latter always wrong.
(d) In general, mental passivity and laziness make the mind
136 PSYCHOLOGY
merely receptive instead of active. An easy-going intellectual
life, satisfied with any kind of reason, frightened at the very idea
of research, scrutiny, questioning, and reflection, incapable of
advancing one step unless it is pushed, is the surest sign of
mental weakness and atrophy.
CHAPTER II
FEELING
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
1. Meanings of the Term "Feeling." The term "feeling"
has several meanings, (i) Sometimes it is used to denote general
or internal sensations: a man feels hungry, tired, nervous, unwell,
etc. (2) It is also applied to specific external sensations, especially
those of touch: a man feels the contact and qualities of an exter-
nal object, or he feels cold. (3) It expresses a form of cognition
or belief which it is difficult to account for and justify by reason:
a man feels that a certain action is right or wrong, that a certain
man is not reliable or friendly, although the reasons therefor may
not be clear and defined. (4) As opposed to knowing and willing,
it denotes in general what is called the affective life, i.e. certain
states of consciousness, or mental attitudes, known as pleasure
and displeasure, satisfaction and dissatisfaction, etc., which
result from the manner in which objects affect us. (5) It has a
more restricted meaning applying only to pleasure and pain, that
is, to the elementary processes of affective life.
Here we speak of feelings in meanings (4) and (5). In meaning
(4) it includes, and in meaning (5) it is opposed to, the other mani-
festations of affective life, namely, emotions and sentiments.
2. Meaning of Other Terms. An emotion is a mental state
of an affective nature, more complex than the mere feeling of pleas-
ure and pain. It is the way in which the mind is affected by a
complex situation which it apprehends. By passion is generally
meant a strong emotion or emotional tendency, uncontrolled
and violent. A sentiment is of a higher and still more complex
nature. It has its source in the higher mental processes of knowl-
edge. Appetite implies a tendency, craving, or desire, and applies
i37
138 PSYCHOLOGY
especially to organic and periodical needs, chiefly the need of
food, which refer to the preservation of the individual and the
species. Thus the modern use of this term is far more restricted
than that of the term appetitus in mediaeval philosophy, where
appetitus included the whole affective and active life. Love,
anger, enjoyment, desire, satisfaction, will, etc., were all reduced
to appetitus.
These definitions, or rather descriptions, may be made clearer
by an example. A wound on my body produces a feeling of pain.
If I am aware that it has been inflicted intentionally by an enemy,
I may feel an emotion of anger which will prompt me to take
revenge. But just then I may experience a moral or religious
sentiment which will make me forgive. Pain is felt by the infant,
but he does not experience any emotion when slandered or insulted,
since this requires understanding. Some emotions, however, are
experienced in very -early childhood; the sentiments develop
later.
3. Classification. No classification of the processes of the
affective life is perfectly satisfactory. It is difficult to analyze
these processes. They are very complex, and frequently it would
be impossible to say whether a concrete affective process belongs
to feelings, or emotions, or sentiments. Each group generally
includes elements which belong to another group. However,
for purposes of study a classification is needed, and the following
will be used with the understanding that it is not adequate:
I. Feelings proper, in the strict sense.
II. Emotions: (i) self-regarding, personal, or individual; (2)
altruistic, sympathetic, or social.
III. Sentiments: (i) of truth, intellectual; (2) of beauty,
aesthetic; (3) of right and wrong, moral; (4) of relations with
God, religious.
PLEASURE AND PAIN 139
ARTICLE I. FEELINGS OF PLEASURE AND PAIN
I. NATURE AND LAWS OF THESE FEELINGS
I. NATURE OF THE FEELINGS
1. Definitions. The term "pain" and the term "pleasure"
cannot be denned; their meaning can only be experienced. As
no idea of color can be imparted to the man born blind, so no idea
of pleasure and pain could ever be imparted to a man who had
never felt them. But no definition is necessary since, in a gen-
eral way at least, everybody knows the general character of each
feeling and the difference between them. With regard to the use
of these two terms it may be noted that "pain " applies chiefly
to feelings resulting from certain organic conditions, for instance,
a wound, a soreness, an ache. Yet some other mental states
due to other causes are also called painful. "Unpleasantness"
is a more general term and applies to all phases of mental life. It
indicates less than pain, and many states of consciousness to which
we could hardly apply the term "painful " may be called "unpleas-
ant." The same distinction is also applied, but less generally,
to the terms "pleasure " and "pleasantness." "Agreeable " and
"disagreeable" have a meaning which is very close to that of
pleasant and unpleasant.
2. Psychological Nature. (a) Whatever be said concerning
their cause and their ontological nature, from the point of view
of psychology both pleasure and pain are positive feelings. Even
if pain be considered as negative in itself, i.e. as resulting from the
lack of a due perfection, from a defect or a privation; if, for
instance, a stomach ache results from the absence of certain normal
conditions necessary for the proper functioning of this organ;
or if the unpleasantness of a sensation is caused by the lack of
adaptation of the sense organ to a certain stimulation, it is true,
nevertheless, that, in consciousness, the feeling of pain or unpleas-
antness is a feeling no less positive than pleasure and pleasantness.
(b) Pleasure results from the healthy, vigorous, normal, and har-
monious exercise of the various activities. Inactivity and rest,
140 PSYCHOLOGY
as such, are not pleasurable. The most agreeable rest is a change
in the nature and intensity of activity. Pain and unpleasantness
result from excessive exercise or excessive restraint. The com-
plete inactivity of a faculty like the eye, the ear, the muscles,
imagination, etc. especially if prolonged, becomes very painful.
Think of being always in complete darkness or remaining with
closed eyes, of making no motion, of not thinking of anything; it
would be unbearable. On the other hand, excessive exercise is
also painful. Too bright a light, too loud a sound, too great a
muscular effort are sources of pain. Moderate and appropriate
efforts are rather pleasurable, and to assert, with pessimists like
Schopenhauer, that activity and effort are essentially painful is
to go directly against the clear testimony of consciousness.
3. Variations. Feelings vary in intensity, and their varia-
tions depend both on subjective conditions and on objective factors.
(i) According as the mind is disposed, the same perception or
image may be pleasant or unpleasant. The present occupation,
the mental contents, the preceding sensations, etc., exercise an
influence on the way in which the mind is affected. We also know
that the same stimulus may produce an agreeable feeling in one
individual and a disagreeable feeling in another. (2) On the
other hand, certain objects naturally produce an agreeable, others
a painful feeling. Some sensations of taste, sound, etc., are
pleasant, while others are unpleasant, for practically all individ-
uals. The following laws will specify this general principle.
II. LAWS OF FEELINGS
1. Law of Stimulation. The stimulus may be suitable for the
sense, or unsuitable; proportioned, or too great, or too small. Too
weak a stimulus for instance, too feeble a light, a scarcely au-
dible whisper requires too much effort and tension. Too great
a stimulus for instance, a dazzling light, a shrill sound, a
suffocating odor, extremes of heat and cold is also painful. A
sensation is agreeable only when the stimulation remains within
certain limits of intensity.
2. Law of Duration, Change, and Contrast. When pleasure
is prolonged unduly it ceases to be felt, and even may be succeeded
PLEASURE AND PAIN 141
by unpleasantness. The same activity which was agreeable in
the beginning becomes tedious. The same piece of music which
was pleasing when heard for the first time becomes tiresome if it
is repeated too frequently. See how rapidly the popularity of a
song, even of a "hit," decreases and dies. The same dainty food
becomes unbearable. We have "too much of a good thing."
Hence the necessity of variety and of change: (i) In the kind of
stimulus, even if we remain within the same group of sensations,
e.g. change of visual surroundings. (2) In the degree of stimula-
tion; in many cases the pleasure will continue up to a certain level
if the stimulus be increased. The persistent admiration of real
masterpieces is due to some kind of change. The more we see or
hear them, the more also do we appreciate them, because we under-
stand them better and find new beauties in them. (3) In the
kind of activity. The monotony due to repeating certain actions
is painful; hence the importance of varying exercises, and of passing
from one mode of occupation to another.
Contrast affects the nature and intensity of the feelings. Pleas-
ure following pain is more keenly felt, and vice versa.
3. Law of Accommodation. This law works in two ways,
either toward pleasure or toward pain, as will be verified easily
from personal experience, (i) Things which at first were very
disagreeable may become indifferent and even pleasurable; smok-
ing, eating certain foods or condiments, studying according to
certain methods, may serve as illustrations. Taste for what is
disagreeable may be acquired. We first "get used to " them, and
later derive real pleasure from them. This is due largely to
the influence of habit. (2) But accommodation may also lessen
the pleasure. After a certain time of constant use, more condi-
ment, more cigars, more amusements, etc., may be required to
cause the same amount of pleasure. An activity which at first
was accompanied by a pleasurable feeling, by repetition may
become indifferent and tedious. (3) When an action or a stimu-
lation has become habitual, even if it is the source of no special
pleasure, the interruption of it, or interference with it, is painful.
If I am used to the ticking of the. clock in my room, I "miss " it
when it stops. The interference with habitual activities, move-
142 PSYCHOLOGY
ments, religious or moral opinions and accustomed modes of
thought, is disagreeable.
4. Laws of Mutual Furtherance or Hindrance of Activities,
and of Harmony or Antagonism between Mental States. As
was said above, pleasure and pain depend largely on subjective
dispositions. The same behavior toward me may be agreeable
or disagreeable according as I am dealing with a man whom I
like or with one whom I dislike. In the same manner, when work-
ing in behalf of a friend, I find pleasure in actions which would
cause me annoyance if I had to perform them under other condi-
tions. When a man is occupied with an important or interesting
task, interruption, even in the form of an otherwise agreeable
conversation or recreation, will be unwelcome. What furthers
the present purpose and is in harmony with the present state of
mind and disposition will, as the case may be, cause more pleas-
ure or less displeasure than what is antagonistic to them and
hinders them.
II. IMPORTANCE OF FEELINGS
All men naturally and without exception crave for happiness.
They may differ as to the means of obtaining it; they may look
merely for present enjoyment, or work for future pleasure; they
may seek the pleasures of the senses or those of the mind and the
moral aspirations; they may work for happiness in this life or in
the next; but the innate desire to be happy is universal. Hence
the importance of feelings as springs of action.
1. For Happiness. Pleasure and pain are the main factors
in human happiness and misery. The amount of happiness in
life is measured by the amount of pleasure found in it. But such
pleasure must not be estimated in reference to the present alone.
An action which would be otherwise painful may become agree-
able on account of the pleasure to which it is expected to lead.
Frequently the same complex process will have pleasant and un-
pleasant aspects, for instance, the satisfaction of the senses, and
remorse of conscience; present pleasure, and anticipation of future
pain. ,
2. For Mental Life. Pleasure and pain are very important
IMPORTANCE OF FEELINGS 143
in intellectual life and affect the whole mental attitude and be-
havior. Pleasure or the anticipation of pleasure is a powerful
incentive to study. What the mind likes is much more easily
attended to and assimilated. From this fact important peda-
gogical conclusions may be inferred. The child's reason is not
yet sufficiently developed to control his feelings and direct his
conduct. It is necessary, therefore, to give him lessons and exer-
cises that will interest him, and from which he will derive some
pleasure. He must be made to like his work and studies; and
means, such as change, variety, concrete applications, etc., must
be adapted to this end. Even for the adult, agreeable work is
much easier. A great amount of will power is required to over-
come repugnances and become proficient in a science for which one
feels nothing but dislike. Pleasantness facilitates and quickens
attention, and increases mental energy.
3. For Ordinary Behavior. Feelings play an important part
in daily life, (i) Pleasure is often a guide, but not an infallible
one, to the real good. Certain agreeable sensations of smell and
taste may be signs of the healthfulness of aliments, and repug-
nance is frequently a sign of danger. This is true especially of
animals; man depends more on artificial conventions, and less on
nature. Even for higher activities, pleasures to be obtained or
pains to be avoided are ordinary motives of action. (2) Bodily
pain is a warning and calls attention to a diseased organism. Were
it not for pain, how many would die before knowing that they
were sick at all. It also tells us when to stop the exercise of cer-
tain activities; a soreness of the eyes or a headache may be a warn-
ing that continuing to read will be injurious. (3) Pleasure and
pain influence man's whole behavior and character. Suffering and
enjoyment, whether transitory or permanent, affect the ordinary
mental attitude. Reflection will show that the influence of
feelings on the whole human conduct is much greater than is
commonly supposed.
4. For Development and Progress. Pleasure and pain are
prominent factors in the progress and development both of the
individual and of the race, (i) What is the best educator for the
child? His own experience. According as it is pleasurable or
144 PSYCHOLOGY
unpleasant there will be a tendency to repeat or to avoid it. Burn-
ing his fingers will make him very careful when he sees fire again.
Receiving a reward or a punishment will tend to make him per-
form or refrain from certain actions. In adult age, reason becomes
more important, yet reflection will show that the motives derived
from reason are generally reducible to the obtaining of what is
pleasurable and the avoiding of what is painful. (2) Civilization,
that is, the progress realized by mankind in useful sciences and
arts, is due to a constant effort toward decreasing pain, fatigue,
and whatever else is disagreeable, and toward increasing pleasure
and comfort. Inventions tend to make life easier and more
agreeable.
5. For Morality. In the higher sphere of moral life we shall
mention only the following: (i) Pleasure and pain, whether
immediate or future, supply motives of conduct, good or bad.
Theft and almsgiving, murder and 'disinterested love, etc., have
reference to present or future pleasure and pain of the agent or
of his fellowmen. (2) They contribute to the practice of indi-
vidual virtues, the development of the will, courage, self-respect,
etc., and (3) of social virtues, charity, sympathy, self-sacrifice,
almsgiving, etc.
6. For Religion. Religion and religious practices depend
greatly on the feelings of pleasure and pain. Reward or punish-
ment is always presented as the outcome of a good or a bad life.
During life, suffering shows man his nothingness and the vanity
of pleasures, and it makes him look forward to a future and bet-
ter life. Evil and the fear of evil are incentives to prayer and
divine worship so as to obtain the divine assistance. Christian
religion is full of references to happiness, riches, and pleasures,
to misery, poverty, and sufferings. It supplies higher motives
and views both in the examples and in the teachings of its
Founder.
ARTICLE II. EMOTIONS
As already indicated, the emotions are more complex than the
feelings of pleasure and pain. They always include pleasurable
or painful elements, and sometimes a mixture of both; these vary
SELF-REGARDING EMOTIONS 145
with different individuals, and even with different manifestations
of the same emotion in the same individual. Hence it is difficult
to analyze an emotion, because its elements are closely interwoven
and form a very complex and intricate state of mind. To this
may be added that, at least when an emotion is strong and vio-
lent, the power of reflection is lessened or suppressed. After the
emotion has abated or ceased, what remains is the memory of it,
not the emotion itself as it appeared in consciousness. And
in the memory of an emotion it is almost impossible to dis-
tinguish from the purely emotional elements the ideational and
volitional processes which preceded, accompanied, or followed
them.
We shall consider successively the egoistic or self-regarding
emotions referring to and centring around the self; and the al-
truistic emotions referring to, caused by, or tending to others.
I. SELF-REGARDING EMOTIONS
i. Their Nature. These emotions refer to the personal good
of the individual. When they are called egoistic, this term is
not given the odious meaning which it frequently has, namely,
that of an excessive self-love which makes one forget other
men; it only indicates that these emotions refer primarily to the
self. All are based on the innate tendency to self-preservation,
self-assertion, and development. Man wants to preserve himself,
that is, he wants to protect his life, not only the life of the body,
but also his mental faculties, reputation, and character. Man
wants to assert and develop his life and his faculties, to manifest
his various energies, to increase and perfect them. Hence two
general features of these emotions. Some refer to things that
are conducive to the fundamental ends of man, and therefore
objects of love; others refer to things that are antagonistic to them,
and therefore objects of aversion. We shafl mention the most
important.
Bodily appetites need not detain us; they are physiological
needs which manifest themselves in consciousness by a painful
craving, like hunger, thirst, need of air or of exercise, etc., and
ii
146 PSYCHOLOGY
the satisfaction of which causes a special pleasure. They refer
primarily to the conservation of individual organic life.
2. Self-importance is a fundamental emotion which takes an
explicit form with the power of reflection, clear germs of which,
however, manifest themselves in very early childhood. It assumes
several forms, (i) Self-esteem and self-love; man knows his own
qualities, true or apparent, and is aware of the good there is, or
he thinks there is, in himself. This leads to (2) self-complacency,
that is, pleasure at the thought of his excellence, and (3) self-
respect, which influences conduct in an honorable direction so as
to preserve his dignity. (4) Self-reliance results from the con-
sciousness of power, intellectual, moral, social, political, muscular,
etc. It is based on self-esteem, that is, on the good opinion which
a man has of himself. (5) Pride, in its ordinary meaning, is an
excessive self-esteem, and a desire for superiority, which are not
justified by real merits and excellence.
These emotions are mostly pleasurable, but they may be closely
associated with displeasure, if others do not concur in the opinion
which we have of ourselves. Self-pity is a feeling of weakness and
inferiority experienced when the lack of a desirable attainment
is recognized. It may assume many forms and is chiefly painful.
3. The Love of Approbation is the natural consequence of self-
assertion and self-importance. It refers to the self, and includes
also a social element. We want others to recognize our excel-
lence or our superiority; we want their esteem and respect; we feel
pleasure when we succeed and pain when we fail. Frequently
pleasure and pain will be experienced together, because the ap-
proval of all men, and even the approval of the same person for
all actions, cannot be obtained. According as one is held in greater
esteem, his approval gives greater satisfaction, and his disapproval
greater pain. The esteem and love for a person may be so great
that his approval alone seems sufficient, and what others may
think is indifferent.
This emotion easily leads to vanity or vainglory, which seeks
undue praise or esteem, and deems very important that which
is really worth little or nothing, like birth, dress, ornaments,
wealth, etc.
SELF-REGARDING EMOTIONS 147
4. Love of Activity. (a) The love of activity and power fol-
lows from the natural desire to exercise our faculties, that is,
from the emotions of self-importance and self-esteem. The con-
sciousness of power manifests itself especially in successful efforts
to overcome obstacles which are met when endeavoring to reach
an end (ambition). A social influence frequently manifests it-
self, namely, the love of superiority over others. The feelings of
restraint of activity, or of incapacity to overcome a difficulty, are
painful.
(b) The love of activity and superiority produces emulation
and rivalry, which are so important in all concerns of life, in intel-
lectual development, in business, in politics, etc. Individuals
and nations in all their various pursuits, serious or sportive, seek
to display their activity and power, and to outshine one another.
There is pleasure in the hope and anticipation of victory and
approval, and in the conflict itself that is expected to lead to them.
Pain may result from failure and from the consciousness of
inferiority. This emotion, in itself, is legitimate and noble. It
stimulates the ardor and multiplies the activity. But it may
also be the source of envy, hatred, anger, antipathy, and injustice
in the use of the means.
5. Fear is primarily egoistic, yet it may also refer to others.
It is produced by the painful anticipation of some evil. This emo-
tion depends on some previous painful experience which has been
stored up in memory, or on a complexity of experiences which have
been associated or constructed by imagination. I am afraid of
fire because I have experienced sensations of burning. I am
afraid of a strange animal, of darkness, of an unknown object,
of a sudden and unexpected noise or sight, because they suggest
danger.
The physical effects of fear vary with individuals. In general,
they are depressive and consist of a lowering of vitality and con-
trol paleness, trembling, perspiration, chattering of the teeth,
etc. Fear may have very serious, and even fatal, results. Men-
tal functions are also impaired. Judgment, reasoning, reflection,
and attention are suspended or disordered. In some cases the
will, or rather the impulse to act, will be quickened, and strength
148 PSYCHOLOGY
increased in order to escape the object of fear. In other cases
fear will paralyze every effort. It must not be forgotten that the
fear of punishment simply deters from evil, and that, while it
is a useful means of education, other means must be taken to
promote good aspirations.
Fear is legitimate and unavoidable, but must not be allowed
to turn into cowardice, that is, groundless or exaggerated fear,
out of proportion with the impending evil. The objective causes
of it are generally beyond control, but its subjective causes fre-
quently ignorance, ill-health, nervousness, laziness, imagination
may be removed little by little.
6. Anger, like fear, is primarily egoistic, but may also refer to
others. It results from a sense of injury, either bodily or mental.
Hence it includes a painful element, namely, the consciousness
of a wrong which is suffered, and of a failure on the part of others
to respect our own persons or possessions. Anger is a stimulant
for activity, and creates a desire to retaliate. It multiplies the
energy, accelerates the circulation and respiration, quickens the
heart, etc., but prevents the exercise of attention, judgment, and
reason. It may include a pleasurable element in the exercise of
activity, and the success in retaliating. Anger takes several forms.
It may be a sudden involuntary outburst, or premeditated anger.
It may lead to revenge, or take the form of a natural, persistent
antipathy, and even hatred. Malevolence takes pleasure in inflict-
ing pain on others.
7. Remorse, Shame, and Self-Condemnation are painful feelings
resulting from the consciousness of having done something wrong
which lowers us in our own eyes or in the eyes of others. They
are therefore opposed to the pleasurable feelings of self-importance
and love of approbation. Remorse comes especially from self-
disapproval, while shame is rather the result of feeling oneself
disapproved by other men.
II. ALTRUISTIC EMOTIONS
i. Their Existence. (a) Man does not suffice to himself,
he needs others and is made to live in society. He is also endowed
by nature with certain feelings that refer to his fellowmen. The
ALTRUISTIC EMOTIONS 149
distinct existence of these feelings has been denied or doubted by
some psychologists. For them every feeling is essentially selfish.
When we do good to others, it is because we expect a return and
thus have in view our own good. When we feel sympathy for
others, we imagine how we should suffer if their afflictions were
thrown upon ourselves. When we revere and respect others, it
is self-regard and the desire of esteem and approval that prompt
us. Whatever feeling is experienced toward other men is always
reducible to a self -regarding emotion.
(b) This view cannot be accepted. A man, it is true, may
perform charitable actions, give alms or encouragement, for selfish
motives and in the hope of deriving therefrom certain personal
advantages, (i) But the inner feelings of compassion, respect,
and sympathy are frequently experienced without being mani-
fested at all, and therefore without being able to bring any return.
(2) It is a fact of consciousness that sometimes disinterested feel-
ings are experienced, and that actions springing from motives
of compassion or of the love of others are performed without any
expectation or prospect of reward or personal satisfaction. (3)
Such feelings are universal, found in all men, beginning at an
early age, extending not only to our fellowmen, but even to the
imaginary characters described in novels or plays.
(c) It must be admitted that in many cases personal satisfac-
tion accompanies these feelings, but what is claimed here is that
this satisfaction is not always what the agent has in view, and that
there are sympathetic emotions which are completely orientated
toward others, not toward self. Altruistic emotions may pre-
suppose personal experience without being selfish in their nature.
The love of others does not exclude self-love, but self-love does
not account for all emotions and is not always primary. The as-
sertion that there are altruistic emotions does not exclude their
close contact with egoistic emotions. Emotions referring to others
are more or less developed, but one of the worst insults that can
be addressed to a man is to say that he has no feeling, no regard,
and no sympathy for others.
We shall not speak here of the blameworthy feelings toward
others, such as hard-heartedness, hatred, cruelty, scorn, etc. These
150 PSYCHOLOGY
come rather from a lack of feeling for others, from exaggerated
and overbearing self-love and self-conceit, and from egoism, in
the bad sense in which this word is generally used.
2. Sympathy. The fundamental altruistic emotion is sym-
pathy. Etymologically this word means a "feeling with "; it
indicates, therefore, an understanding and a sharing of the feelings
of others, of their pleasures and pains, of their joys and afflictions.
Its chief factors are: (i) A natural and instinctive tendency from
the earliest age. (2) Association and imagination. We associate
certain modes of expression with certain feelings, recall similar
feelings experienced by ourselves, and imagine feelings which we
have not experienced. Thus a man who never had his meal delayed
more than a few hours will nevertheless imagine the feelings of a
man whom he sees starving. Imagination is frequently misleading,
because it interprets the feelings of others according to the dis-
positions of the sympathizer himself, and hence may magnify or
minimize them. (3) The intellect also is an important factor in the
observation and interpretation of the manifestation of feelings.
3. The Main Determinants of Sympathy are the following:
(i) Its intensity varies with both the subjective dispositions
temperament, friendship, love, etc. and the objective condi-
tions, that is, the greatness, real or imagined, of the feeling experi-
enced by others. (2) It always supposes some similarity and
community between the sympathizer and the object of his sym-
pathy. This community may be merely one of nature, between
all human beings; or of interests, between members of the same
civil, industrial, commercial, society; or of purposes; or of family
relations. In proportion as it is closer, the feelings of sympathy
are more easily aroused and more intense. Differences and con-
trasts in education, religion, social position, and character are
frequently obstacles to sympathy. (3) Sympathy has a tendency
to increase in proportion to the activity used in expressing it.
Works generate love. Thus all things being otherwise the same
a mother will frequently love the more a sickly child who has
required more care. (4) Sympathy is communicative and, as
it were, contagious. The best means to win the sympathy of a
person is to manifest sympathy toward him.
ALTRUISTIC EMOTIONS 151
4. The Main Effects of Sympathy are the following: (i) It not
only makes man share the joys and sorrows of his fellowmen, but
tends to make him increase the former and lessen the latter. Hence
arise benevolence, which is the desire of the good of others, and benef-
icence, charity, commiseration, etc., which are practical endeavors
to procure it. (2) There is a tendency, sometimes unconscious,
to imitate those for whom sympathy is felt, to love what they love,
and to share their interests. Members of the same family and the
same community generally have many common features. (3)
Respect and reverence are manifestations of sympathy toward
persons who have some special merit and perfection. Respect is
due to all in various degrees. Reverence is due to those who have
some superiority in virtue, position, character, etc. Both imply
some affection, otherwise they pass into mere formality, wonder,
awe, and even fear.
5. Forms of Sympathy. Sympathetic feelings take several
forms according to their range and nature. They are less intense
in proportion as they refer to a greater number of individuals
at the same time.
(a) Love and friendship are selective; a special choice is made
of the person who is their object. The former is generally more
intense, less durable, more sensitive, more blind; the latter more
reflective, more intellectual, more lasting. Friendship is always
reciprocal and requires mutual esteem; love may be one-sided.
Besides this meaning as an emotion, love has also a more general
meaning applicable to feelings which we should have toward all
men: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself."
(b) Family affections bind together by mutual sympathy
husband and wife, parents and children, and children among
themselves. There is a natural sympathy for members of the same
family, which, unhappily, certain uncongenialities of temperament,
or other causes, may sometimes prevent.
(c) Local interests, business, and neighborhood bring men into
special contact with some other men, and unite them for certain
purposes, especially those referring to the good of the community.
Thus in the cases of members of the same church, of the same
political party, of the same commercial enterprise, etc.
152 PSYCHOLOGY
(d) Patriotism, or love of one's country, is still more extensive.
It is based on a common consent to promote the interests of the
nation. The community of tongue, religion, authority, laws,
customs, history, etc., cements the wills of the citizens and unites
their efforts. ^*
(e) Philanthropy is sympathy for mankind in general. On
the mere ground of their community of nature, all men are entitled
to the sympathy and respect of their fellowmen.
ARTICLE III. SENTIMENTS
Their Nature. Sentiments are superior, more rational, more
complex, and also more disinterested feelings.
(a) They are based on higher needs, and hence can hardly ever
be satiated. They manifest aspirations toward ideals which
are never fully realized. The ideals of truth, beauty, goodness,
and religion seem always to recede from us in our search for them.
For instance, for the satisfaction and pleasure of discovering one
truth, there is the pain and anxiety of finding several new unsolved
problems and unanswered difficulties. As we proceed, new horizons
are opened before us. Based on the higher mental processes, they
are also the best incentives to the perfection of these processes.
(b) Because they are of a more refined nature, they are also
less Common, at least in their nobler manifestations. They depend
more on education and general culture than the feelings proper
and the emotions. The same wound will produce about the same
pain in several individuals. An insulting remark is likely to pro-
duce emotions of anger in all men, although, for emotions, the
variations are already of great importance, and the laws much
less strict. In the sentiments still greater variations will be ob-
served. Some men will experience no aesthetic sentiment when
looking at a perfect painting, or reading a beautiful poem. Some
may even prefer the ragtimes of the street-organ to a classical
piece played by a first-class orchestra, and the funny pictures of
the Sunday paper to a masterpiece of a great artist. Sentiments
are so complex that the whole mental structure of every individual
must be taken into account.
INTELLECTUAL SENTIMENTS 153
I. INTELLECTUAL SENTIMENTS
1. Love of Truth. The basis of the intellectual sentiments
is the love of truth. Man is naturally eager to know, and although
this tendency is not explicit at first, it manifests itself in many
ways, such as questions, investigations, attempts at generaliza-
tion and explanation. Men do not always require the same
accurate and scientific explanation, but all want to link facts and
events together under the same general laws. In its highest
form, the love of truth is disinterested, pursuing knowledge for
its own sake, and apart from practical and utilitarian motives
like the love of fame, the hope of remuneration, the satisfaction
of ambition, and the like. In its earlier stages, especially, this
sentiment is associated with, and results from, other feelings.
The child learns his lesson in order to please his teacher and parents,
or in order to avoid punishment and obtain reward. Later he may
come to see the necessity of learning in order to attain success in
life, and, later still, he will learn because of the pleasure which he
finds in knowing.
2. Ignorance. (a) Since man likes to know, it follows that
the awareness of ignorance and perplexity is painful. To see some-
thing which cannot be understood creates a certain feeling of want
and a sense of uneasiness, especially if that thing is of interest.
This general feeling of ignorance and confusion, however, may
sometimes be accompanied by pleasurable elements, like novelty,
surprise, and wonder.
(b) Novelty implies either an objective change, or the discovery
by the mind of a new aspect in the object. It is likely to produce
a certain amount of pleasure. Surprise indicates not only a change,
but a sudden and unexpected change. Wonder refers to something
which is unexpected because it is out of the ordinary, or which
seems strange on account of its unusually large or small size, its
peculiar unwonted characteristics, its excellence or depravity, etc.
Hence it is a very complex state, in which pleasurable and unpleas-
urable elements may be combined.
(c) Ignorance, perplexity, wonder, naturally arouse the curios-
ity and the desire to know. Curiosity is one of the mainsprings of
. 154 PSYCHOLOGY
mental activity. It prompts to inquire, investigate, and question.
At a more developed stage it can be sustained longer, because
the love of truth is deeper. In the child the feeling of curiosity
would soon be forgotten, were not the interest kept up and revived.
Curiosity is very useful; it must be encouraged, and, as much as
possible, satisfied. It is the sign of an inquisitive mind and of
eagerness to know. Hence, in repressing the excessive and objec-
tionable forms of this feeling, care must be taken not to discour-
age or rebuke the child, or in any way to repress the natural and
useful tendency of the mind to know what it has the duty or right
to know.
3. Curiosity Leads to Investigation. At this stage are expe-
rienced various feelings of pursuit, discovery, assimilation, and
possession; or of incapacity, disappointment, and failure.
(a) Pursuit, as an exercise of activity, is a source of pleasure.
This character, however, may be modified at every step by the
hope of success or the fear of failure, the sense of power or of
incapacity.
(b) Discovery is a source of great pleasure, and, when confusion
and perplexity have preceded, when the pursuit has been arduous
and strenuous, the pleasure of final success is enhanced by con-
trast. How much greater is the joy of finding a solution for one-
self than that of being told without having made any effort. A
success which has cost more labor is more pleasurable. The
failure to find a solution is always unpleasant.
(c) The knowledge thus acquired is assimilated with the knowl-
edge already at hand. It is compared to and incorporated with
the other mental possessions. The feeling of logical consistency,
that is, of agreement with previous experience and knowledge,
is very pleasant. On the contrary, the awareness of contradiction
and inconsistency is distressing and produces a new state of per-
plexity; either the new knowledge is invalid and the mind has
gone astray, or previously acquired knowledge has to be rejected.
Besides the feelings of which we have spoken may be mentioned
some others that have both an intellectual and an ethical aspect,
like fairness, impartiality, disinterestedness, or, on the contrary,
intellectual bias, prejudice, and prepossession. When these are
AESTHETIC SENTIMENTS 155
experienced in ourselves or perceived in others, they naturally
produce complex agreeable or disagreeable sentiments.
II. /ESTHETIC SENTIMENTS
Certain persons, things, and actions which we call beautiful,
pretty, graceful, sublime, harmonious, melodious, witty, ludi-
crous, etc., produce in the mind a pleasurable impression, whereas
others recognized as ugly, inharmonious, improportionate, etc.,
produce a disagreeable feeling. This is called the aesthetic sen-
timent, and the special faculty for experiencing it, or the suscepti-
bility to it, is called the aesthetic taste. The beautiful is always
agreeable, but the agreeable is not always beautiful.
i. Elements of the ^Esthetic Sentiment. The objective ele-
ments of beauty will be examined in ^Esthetics. On the subjec-
tive side, the one of interest to psychology, the elements of the
aesthetic sentiments are:
(a) Sensory. Objects that produce aesthetic sentiments are
perceived by two senses: (i) sight natural objects, such as land-
scapes, sceneries, rivers, seas, mountains, etc.; artificial objects,
such as paintings, monuments, sculptures, etc.; (2) hearing
singing of birds, music, rhythm, poetry, etc. Some sensations of
color, light, sound, etc., in themselves are agreeable and pleasant
for all men. This purely sensuous feeling which results from a
suitable stimulation of the sense-organ disposes and contributes
to the aesthetic pleasure, but stops at its lowest degree.
(b) Perceptive and intellectual. Details must be perceived in
their mutual relations, so as to give rise to the perception of the
object as a whole. The aesthetic sentiment is due chiefly to
this perception of details or units forming one harmonious
whole.
(c) Associative and ideal. Things which of themselves might
not arouse any special aesthetic sentiment do so on account of
the memories which they recall or the ideas which they suggest.
Historical places where important events have occurred, or places
associated with legends, will, on account of these associations,
arouse sentiments more readily. Or again, a certain scenery will
156 PSYCHOLOGY
suggest ideas of danger, power, or strength, which contribute
to the production and special aspects of sentiments. It is not so
much on account of their melodies as on account of the associa-
tions which they suggest that the national hymn or patriotic songs
are able to arouse enthusiastic feelings.
2. Special Features. Among the special features of the aes-
thetic sentiments two must be mentioned.
(a) ^Esthetic taste is capricious, and the old proverb "De gus-
tibus non disputandum " does not only apply to the sense of
taste, but indicates also that diverse feelings may be aroused in
several individuals by the perception of the same object. These
differences come partly from native dispositions, emotional
tendencies and character, and partly from the cultivation of
taste in a certain direction.
(b) However, there is a standard of taste which varies within
broader or narrower limits according as it is applied to a more or
less numerous class of men. Thus there are things which cannot
be considered as aesthetic in any place or at any time, but they
are few. The standard is more uniform for the same epoch, still
more so when applied only to a nation, a class having the same
education, a school within the class, a closely related group within
the school.
These questions will be developed more at length in ^Esthetics.
Some points concerning the subjective or psychological aspect
of the aesthetic feelings will find there a more suitable place, as
they will help to determine the nature of objective beauty.
3. Forms of the Esthetic Sentiment. The sentiments thus
far analyzed in their generality take several forms according to
the nature of the object by which they are aroused, (i) Sublim-
ity implies greatness, superiority, and power. Hence the corre-
sponding feeling is mingled with awe, fear, admiration, and a sense
of inferiority and weakness. Thus something immense and impos-
ing in space or time, the power of the sea in a tempest, an heroic
deed, etc. (2) Prettiness, on the contrary, refers to something
small, tiny, or weak. (3) The feeling of the ludicrous, wit, humor,
is produced by something unexpected, surprising, incongruous, or
undignified. It is expressed by laughter and mirth.
MORAL SENTIMENTS 157
III. MORAL SENTIMENTS
1. Their Nature. The moral sentiments refer to voluntary
human actions in so far as they are good or bad, right or wrong.
(1) Voluntary actions are the only ones which we call moral.
Merely physical happenings have no moral aspect, and the same
must be said of accidental results produced unintentionally, and
of spontaneous actions in man, like the organic vital functions.
The will has no control over these. We condemn as wrong the
mere intention and desire to do wrong, even if it be not carried out.
(2) In so far as they are right or wrong. Other feelings may refer
to the same actions in other respects; other sciences may try to
give them another special direction. The point of view here is
that of the moral value, i.e. of the Tightness or wrongness of the
actions, their comparison with a rule, a standard, and an ideal to
which they ought to conform.
2. The Fundamental Form of the Moral Sentiment is the feeling
of right and wrong in conscience, that is, a feeling of obligation to
do or avoid certain actions. It imposes a reference to some law,
authority, and command which tell us absolutely: "Thou shalt,"
or "Thou shalt not." Whatever source be assigned to this cate-
gorical imperative, and however great be the differences in the
standards of morality among different nations and at different
times, all men recognize that some actions must, and others must
not, be performed. Hence this sentiment is a powerful spring of
action.
The sentiment of right and wrong must be distinguished from
that of mere utility or from the conditional imperative. If I fail
to profit by a good business opportunity, I may blame myself,
but not as having done wrong morally. According to the moral
character of the action a man feels satisfaction, pleasure, and
self-approval, or remorse, shame, guilt, and self-condemnation.
All this supposes the sentiment of responsibility and free-will.
We experience satisfaction and remorse only for those actions
which we feel we could perform or avoid. If I kill a man
accidentally and unavoidably, I may, of course, be very sorry,
but I do not feel responsible for it.
158 PSYCHOLOGY
3. Factors in the Concrete Sentiment of Morality. This is
not the place to speak of the value of the moral law, which will
be explained in Ethics. But one cannot fail to notice a great
diversity of standards according to individuals, places, and times.
What one would be thoroughly ashamed of will be indifferent for
another. What is considered wrong in one locality, or at one
time, may be considered right elsewhere and at another time.
Few, if any, are the actions which have been regarded as wrong
at all times and by all men. Without speaking of the objective
value of actions, and of the true rule to which they ought to con-
form, we merely enumerate the main psychological factors that
influence concrete moral feelings, (i) The importance of intel-
lectual faculties in supplying motives and intentions, and in deter-
mining the moral value of actions, is self-evident. (2) Custom,
association, imagination, and habit exercise a very great influence.
What a man has been accustomed to do, even if known intellec-
tually to be wrong, will hardly excite any feeling of shame or
remorse. The inveterate drunkard or criminal are good illustra-
tions of this. Again, what is customary in a locality arouses
no surprise and no moral feeling for those who live there, though
it may shock outsiders. (3) Human passions may blind man's
understanding and pervert his will. Thus avarice and greed will
easily lead to theft, hatred to murder, and so on. The feeling ex-
perienced may vary in nature and intensity according to the
prompting passions and the derived advantages.
IV. RELIGIOUS SENTIMENTS
i. Their Nature. Religious sentiments, manifestations, and
practices are found in all places and at all times, but take many
different forms. The conceptions regarding the attributes of the
object or objects of religious worship, and the nature of religious
practices, have been and are still varied almost beyond imagina-
tion. One has but to recall the practices of polytheism and
fetichism to understand the truth of this statement. In some reli-
gions, the dominant feeling is that of fear, and, in order to placate
the terrible divinities, practices of an inconceivable cruelty are
RELIGIOUS SENTIMENTS 159
frequently adopted. In others the dominant feeling is love, and
all good gifts are lavished by the Creator on His creatures. These
feelings may assume numberless forms and give rise to many others.
It would be an endless task to go through their analysis, and to
enter into the enumeration of the actions performed for religious
motives. Some elements, however, are common to all forms of
the religious sentiment.
Independently of particular creeds, there is in all religions a
sentiment of dependence, a recognition of God's greatness and power,
and of man's littleness and weakness when compared to God.
According to the nature which is ascribed to God, this feeling will
take the forms of love, confidence, fear, resignation, prayer, etc.,
and express itself in the offering of various sacrifices. In its high-
est stage of development, the feeling of the greatness s of God
becomes that of the divine Infinity which brings man face to face
with an unfathomable mystery.
2. Main Forms of Religious Sentiments. The religious sen-
timent will tend to make man view things in their relations to
God, as coming from Him, directed by Him, returning to Him,
and, in the case of man, accountable to Him. It ennobles our
views of things and events by referring them to their source and
ultimate goal. It even creates the desire of a union with God by
knowledge and possession. Hence come many of the ideas of re-
ward and punishment in the next life. Hence also the ideas of
being in peace with God when we have not offended Him, and
of enmity when we have not complied with His law. It is easy to
see how complex these feelings are, how numerous their elements,
and how difficult their analysis. They vary in nature, eleva-
tion, and refinement according to the nature and elevation of the
ideas concerning God, the divine attributes, and the divine laws
and sanctions.
3. Psychological Factors. These feelings manifest themselves
by religious worship, that is, by a multitude of religious practices
which in turn are the sources of many other feelings. The main
factors in the determination of these practices are: (i) Reason,
which examines the foundation of beliefs and the value of religious
practices. (2) Habit; what we are used to seems right, whereas
160 PSYCHOLOGY
novelty arouses suspicion. A new belief that contradicts accus-
tomed ways of thinking, or which is merely added to them, is
sometimes difficult to accept. Unwonted practices are generally
unwelcome until the sense of novelty has passed. On the contrary,
an unfounded or superstitious belief and practice, if habitual,
stands firm. It is easy to notice how great a difficulty is found in
changing the habitual religious ideas and customs of thoroughly
religious people. (3) The senses, association, and imagination;
certain surroundings, times, and places are more favorable to
religious practices and to religious manifestations. Looking at reli-
gious pictures, statues, symbols, etc., hearing or singing religious
hymns, are incentives to the religious feelings. (4) Other emotions
and sentiments; thus suffering and need are motives for having
recourse to God by prayer. How much more fervent is prayer in
time of danger! The beauty of religious temples, and the solem-
nity of rites and ceremonies, also contribute to the experience
of religious sentiments.
CONCLUSION
IMPORTANCE AND CULTURE OF AFFECTIVE LIFE
I. IMPORTANCE OF AFFECTIVE LIFE
Affective life is very important both for the individual himself
and in his relations with other men. In general it may be said
that feelings give to human life its distinctive character, its tone,
its happiness or unhappiness, its enjoyment or irksomeness. Hence
judgments passed on other men refer in a large measure to their
character and their various modes of feeling. The esteem in
which some men are held, and the reprobation which is given
others, are due to their conduct in so far as this conduct manifests
their sentiments.
i. In the Development of Intellectual Life, as already pointed
out, feelings are important factors, (i) They incite to the search
of truth, the enjoyment of the pursuit and of the success. They
may also be the sources of error and bias, when interest is found
CULTURE OF AFFECTIVE LIFE l6l
in one solution rather than in its opposite. They magnify or min-
imize reasons that tend to prove a conclusion which a priori is found
to be favorable or unfavorable, and which accordingly one desires
to have demonstrated or disproved. (2) Feelings are frequently
made use of in convincing others. In many cases an appeal to pure
reason, though it be cogent, will fail, whereas an appeal to the
feelings will be successful. If a speaker wants to bring his audi-
ence to practical conclusions, he has not only to convince but to
move and touch them; hence he must appeal to their ambitions,
desires, interests, egoistic or altruistic emotions, and higher
sentiments. (Cf. p. 117 ff.)
2. In Regard to Moral Life. (i) Feelings themselves may have
a moral value according as they are or are not regulated and con-
trolled. One may be blameworthy for failing to repress certain
emotions or passions. (2) Feelings are powerful springs of action.
As a motive of action, a mere intellectual idea is weak; its strength
is greatly increased by feelings. The notion that an action is good
or bad will not go far toward making one perform or avoid it,
unless there is at the same time in consciousness the love of the
good and the hatred of the bad, the sense of duty, and the pleas-
ure in complying with the rules of morality. (3) Feelings exer-
cise a great influence on responsibility. A murder committed coolly
and deliberately is judged more severely than a murder com-
mitted in a passion. Certain feelings blind the understanding
and prevent it from throwing its searching light on the value of
an action.
3. Religious Life is largely dependent on the affective life. A
revealed creed, especially one that includes mysteries to be believed,
will be accepted with difficulty by a proud intellect. Under the
influence of feelings, how frequently is the accidental in religion
preferred to the essential, the optional to the obligatory! The
choice of religious practices which are not regarded as obligatory
will be largely a matter of feelings prompting to one mode of prayer,
devotion, offering, sacrifice, rather than to another. Some saints
are austere and unsympathetic; others are mild, and excite not
only our admiration, but also our sympathy and love. The former
are directed chiefly by fear of the judgments of God, the latter by
162 PSYCHOLOGY
confidence in His mercy. According to our own feelings, we are
inclined to imitate the former or the latter.
4. For Success and Happiness. The importance of affective
life in daily affairs and for general happiness is very great.
(a) Feelings are not all of the same importance, nor are they
necessary to all men in the same degree this depends on the
special conditions of life and culture, yet some are fundamental,
especially those of joy, hope, cheerfulness, fear, grief, gloominess,
etc., since they are the main factors of happiness or misery in life,
and contribute so much to man's character, and to his view of
things. Emotions, and especially passions, are the source of the
greatest good, and of the greatest evil. A good conscience
makes a man happy, remorse leaves him no rest.
(b) Personal moods and dispositions, inclinations, or aversions
are due to feelings, and experience teaches how much influence
they exercise for success and failure.
(c) Other men are to be dealt with according to their temper
and character, that is, chiefly according to their affective peculiar-
ities. Success in dealing with others depends principally on a cer-
tain insight into the propensities of those with whom we come in
contact. The successful man knows that each individual must
be treated differently from all others, that each has a special
"touchy " or "sensitive " spot, etc.
(d) General happiness is partly objective, and due to the enjoy-
ment of external goods; but it is chiefly subjective. Frequently
we see the poor happier than the rich, the man who has only the
necessaries of life more cheerful than the one who has all possible
luxuries. Happiness is the satisfaction of desires. Desire little,
and little will suffice to make you happy. Be resigned to the in-
evitable, and accept cheerfully that which, however painful, can-
not be averted. Let your mind be hopeful, and always strive for
better things, but let it not lose courage and equanimity if failure
follows your efforts. All things, even the worst, have some brighter
aspect; look at them from this point of view, and this bright-
ness will be a source of light for your reason and of agree-
able warmth for your heart. In all circumstances, cultivate
"happy " feelings and dispositions, throw away melancholy
CULTURE OF AFFECTIVE LIFE 163
and gloomy views; life will bring you greater comfort, pleasure,
and success.
II. CULTIVATION OF AFFECTIVE LIFE
1. Its Necessity. The importance of feelings in general suffi-
ciently shows the necessity of cultivating them.
(a) This culture is general of the affective life in its most general
manifestations, or special of particular feelings and emotions,
for instance, of the religious sentiment, aesthetic taste, sympathy,
etc. All feelings are not equally necessary in all conditions of life.
(b) Nor are all feelings capable of the same degree of culture
and control. This varies with subjective dispositions, natural
endowments, character, and temperament, which cannot be
changed altogether. The more refined feelings are not accessible
to all classes in their perfection. Yet for all, within variable lim-
its, progress is possible. Even physical suffering which seems
inevitable can be alleviated by physical and mental means.
(c) The culture of affective life is negative when it has for its
object the repression or suppression of feelings; positive when it
tends to increase or acquire them.
(d) It may also be personal, for the individual himself who
applies himself to it; or it may be the culture of feelings in others,
especially in children, by education. The child's affective life
must be cultivated very early. Even when objectionable, feelings
may be utilized, transformed, and elevated by making them serve
nobler purposes and giving them worthy objects.
2. General Principles. (a) Difficult though it is, cultivation
is possible and necessary. Feelings can and must be regulated,
acquired or suppressed, increased or decreased, according to the
dictates of reason, and within just limits. Some are praiseworthy,
others shameful. Even feelings that are good may be excessive,
e.g. self-love, sympathy, etc. Hence all must be controlled.
(b) No fixed standard can be assigned, for it varies within exten-
sive limits according to conditions in life. In the case of more
fundamental and more necessary feelings, like sympathy, love,
fairness, etc., the limits, though wide, are narrower than for the
others. Moreover, it is impossible for all men to be moulded
164 PSYCHOLOGY
according to the same pattern. Every individual's personality
must be preserved. This world would be a dull world if it were
otherwise.
(c) Generally speaking, the egoistic feelings tend to excess and
should rather be repressed; altruistic feelings tend to defect and should
rather be developed. Higher sentiments are to be cultivated ac-
cording to education and special dispositions.
(d) Feelings are connected. Hence cultivating one group will
also affect the others; cultivating the more general will affect the
more special. Thus developing sympathy will develop compas-
sion, esteem, and respect.
(e) Feelings arise from ideas, hence controlling the ideas will
naturally modify the resulting feelings. Feelings are also closely
associated with their physical expression; control of the physical
expression will be a help in controlling the feeling itself. The
law of adaptation and habit and the law of change have been
mentioned already.
(/) Feelings are contagious. For instance, to be with a congre-
gation praying fervently helps the attitude of prayer; panic is a
fear which spreads rapidly; the indignation and cruelty of a mob
are communicated sometimes without any reason.
(g) A special illusion must be guarded against, that of mistak-
ing the strong expression of a feeling for strenuous action. The
man who vents his displeasure and inveighs vehemently against
this or that evil, may come to the belief that he is doing much to
relieve the situation, whereas he merely expresses his dissatisfac-
tion without trying to find the causes of the evil or the suitable
remedies.
3. A Few Special Applications of these general principles will
be mentioned here.
(a) To repress a feeling: (i) Avoid occasions in which you know
from experience that it would be aroused. (2) If it is aroused,
combat it by positive efforts of reason and will. (3) Give rise
to contrary feelings by calling to mind contrary ideas. In most
cases this is the most effective means. (4) Procure yourself diver-
sion and distraction by thinking of other things which have enough
interest to keep the mind's attention. (5) Control the emotional
CULTURE OF AFFECTIVE LIFE 165
expression, or create an antagonistic one. To check all manifes-
tations of anger helps to decrease the feeling itself. To whistle
at night will help to remove fear. A noble and proud behavior
will tend to do away with excessive timidity. Expressions of
sympathy will reduce excessive selfishness, and so on.
(b) To create or stimulates, feeling: (i) Call forth suitable ideas,
objects, circumstances, or situations. (2) Cultivate certain modes
of attention, reflection, and imagination. (3) Produce the suit-
able expression. Clenching the fist is likely to stimulate anger;
trembling, fear; kneeling, prayer; an humble deportment, humil-
ity. Actors have been seen to feel really and with great inten-
sity the sentiments and emotions which they merely sought to
express.
In all this the purpose is to make the affective life an auxil-
iary in striving for the noblest aims.
CHAPTER III
ACTING AND WILLING
ARTICLE I. ACTION AND MODES OF ACTION
I. INTRODUCTION
I. MEANING OF ACTION
1. Definition of Terms. It would be as impossible to explain
action to one who had never exercised any activity were such
a case possible as it is to explain color to the man born blind,
or sound to the man born deaf. No definition of action can be
given. Nor is a definition necessary, for all men understand
what it is to "do" and to "be active" and to "exercise one's
energy." The term conation denotes all the active aspects of con-
sciousness, or rather that which is common to them all, namely,
a tendency to induce, preserve, or change a state of mind or body.
Thus conation applies to those processes which we call desiring,
craving, longing, endeavoring, trying, making effort, striving,
wishing, willing, and the like.
2. Meaning of Action. (a) In a broad sense first extreme
activity is a general condition of all our faculties, and all men-
tal states have an active aspect. To think, to judge, to perceive,
to reason, to feel . . . are actions, or, perhaps better, reactions.
The mind is not exclusively passive; it is first acted on, but must
also, in response, exercise its own activity. Thus knowledge has a
twofold aspect, one representative, and the other active. So far
we have considered only its representative aspect. Even feelings
and passions, though primarily passive, are also in this sense active.
(b) In a very strict sense second extreme action refers
only to external actions, i.e. to movements of the organism. Thus
we oppose action to thought and feeling, both of which are inter-
166
ACTION 167
nal and subjective. Thus also we oppose the man of science,
thought, contemplation, meditation, ... to the man of action, who
uses his energy in some external and visible manner, and for tan-
gible results. The man who spends his days in study and reflec-
tion, although he is at work, and hence really active all the time,
is not called a man of action.
(c) Between these two extremes, terms denoting exercise and
activity are applied to a multitude of processes. My stomach
acts on the food to digest it. My brain and my mind are active
during study, reflection, reasoning, deliberation, and choice. I
am active in interpreting or paying attention to my sensations
and perceptions, but I should rather be inclined to call myself
inactive when simply receiving sensations and perceptions with-
out making any effort to interpret and understand them. Thus
we say of a boy in class that he is merely passive and does nothing,
when he is present without making any personal effort.
II. GENERAL MODES OF ACTION
N.B. What we say here of positive action must be applied also
to inhibition, i.e. the checking of an activity which would natu-
rally manifest itself. Inhibition is but another form of effort and
activity.
1. Personal and Impersonal. There are actions which I am
conscious of as^coming from, and attributable to, myself. They
may be called personal. Others, on the contrary, take place
within myself, but do not spring from my own ego. They may be
called impersonal. Thus my digestion, my winking of the eye
when some object suddenly approaches too near, my wounding
or killing a man accidentally and unavoidably, the thoughts that
come to my mind of themselves and inadvertently, etc., are not
my own doings. Applying my mind purposely to a certain object
or study, my killing a man premeditately and intentionally, my
voluntarily going to a certain place, etc., spring from my own
personal activity.
2. Actions are Conscious or Unconscious. (a) While I am
now conscious of reading and writing, I am not conscious of a mul-
titude of processes that take place within the organism, and that
l68 PSYCHOLOGY
might be conscious, like breathing; nor of the pain which I felt a
moment ago, and which I know I should feel if I were not absorbed
in something else; nor of the ticking of my clock, although I must
hear it in some way, since, if it stops, I become immediately aware
of the fact.
(b) Conscious actions are not always personal. For instance,
I may be conscious of the beating of my heart, of my respiration,
of the winking of my eyes, the stretching forward of my arms
when I feel I am going to fall, or of thoughts suddenly occurring
to my mind. Yet I know that I am not the cause, but only the
witness, of such actions. They take place within me, but I am
not accountable for them. Conscious actions therefore may be
impersonal.
On the other hand, hi order to be personal, must an action be
conscious? Or can there be personal, yet unconscious, actions?
An action cannot actually spring from myself and be personal with-
out my being aware of it. The man who is so thoroughly intoxi-
cated, or in such a passion that he no longer knows what he is
doing, does not perform any personal actions. Not himself, but his
state and condition, are the true agents if, for instance, he kills
another man. Such an action is not actually and immediately
personal. Yet it may be called indirectly, remotely, and causally
personal, if the man consciously and voluntarily induced the
state of intoxication or the passion, and at the same time had
some consciousness or prevision of what was likely to happen when
he would no longer be himself and no longer capable of acting as
a person. Hence all personal actions suppose consciousness, if
not actual, at least antecedent.
3. Voluntary, Non- Voluntary, and Involuntary. From what
precedes we see that there are three degrees in our mode of acting.
Some actions are unconscious; others are simply conscious but
without personal will; others finally are volitional.
With regard to the attitude of the person toward the action,
we may have (i) voluntary, (2) non-voluntary, (3) involuntary
action, according as it (i) is intended, and proceeds from a posi-
tive act of the will; or (2) is independent of the will, the will neither
producing nor opposing it; thus I may let my mind wander at lei-
NON-VOLITIONAL ACTION 169
sure without doing anything to induce or check the train of thought;
or (3) finally takes place against the will. My arm may be moved
by force notwithstanding my efforts to the contrary; I may be
obliged to stay in some place because of paralysis; or I may
be unable to banish a certain thought or feeling from my mind.
II. NON-VOLITIONAL ACTION
We shall speak here only of organic activity and movement.
There are also many non-voluntary mental actions such as
perception, reproduction of images, association, feeling, etc., but
these have been examined elsewhere. They are the spontaneous
or automatic working of the mind. Non-volitional movements
may be divided into two general classes according as (i) they are
performed not only without a command and direction of the will,
but, even, as sometimes happens, without preceding or accompany-
ing consciousness of purpose (random, automatic, and reflex move-
ments) ; or, on the contrary, (2) are performed for an end and with
some consciousness of a purpose (impulsive and instinctive move-
ments). There is no strict line of demarcation between the two
classes; actions pass gradually from the former to the latter. It
may be noted also that authors do not always agree in defining
the terms mentioned here.
I. RANDOM, AUTOMATIC, AND REFLEX MOVEMENTS
1. Spontaneous or Random Movements include a great number
of movements of the limbs in the child, and few in the adult. As
far as can be known, they are not provoked by external impres-
sions or internal states of mind, but are purposeless, and seem to
be merely spontaneous overflows of energy.
2. Automatic Movements are purposive and necessary for life,
although the purpose may be unconscious. They require no stimu-
lation from without, but are spontaneous discharges of energy
from the nerve-centres. The most common examples are those of the
regular beating of the heart, respiratory movements, the processes
of digestion and assimilation. These are automatic from the be-
ginning. Some are or may be conscious; others are unconscious.
170 PSYCHOLOGY
To these may be added others that become automatic by habit.
In the beginning they require consciousness, attention, and effort;
but, later on, these factors are no longer necessary, and, as soon
as the series is initiated, all the movements follow of themselves,
being perfectly automatic in some cases, and in others, nearly so.
As examples may be mentioned walking, dancing, speaking, etc.
These have also been called acquired reflexes. More will be said
about them when we speak of habit.
3. Reflex Action differs from automatic action chiefly in this,
that, whereas the latter has its origin within the organism itself,
the reflex action is due to a stimulation from without. It is a motor
process due directly to a sensory process, but without will, desire,
conscious effort, or conscious purpose. The action itself, however,
may be performed consciously or unconsciously. Thus if the sole
of the foot be tickled, the foot is immediately withdrawn from its
place, whether the person be asleep or awake. In both cases the
action is reflex; in the former it is unconscious, in the latter con-
scious. Reflexes are due to motor centres which are excited by
an external sensory stimulation, the afferent nerve and the effer-
ent nerve being connected in the nerve-centres of the brain or of
the spinal cord.
Some reflexes are original and natural; they tend chiefly to the
preservation of life, like sneezing, swallowing, winking. Others
are acquired and depend on association and education. These
suppose generally some conscious state to start the whole series.
Thus the sight of the notes by the pianist determines immedi-
ately the appropriate movements for striking the keys.
Animals, the spinal cord of which has been severed, or the brain
removed, perform reflex actions. A decapitated frog will jerk
away its leg or scratch it if some acid be put on it. These actions
depend on the nerve-centres in the cord, and, although they are
not conscious, they are nevertheless seemingly purposive. They
correspond directly and immediately to the stimulation, just as
if there had been a conscious sensation.
In normal life, such actions as sneezing, winking, vomiting,
secreting saliva, withdrawing the hand from a burning object,
extending the arms forward when in danger of falling, etc., are
NON-VOLITIONAL ACTION 171
reflex actions. Although they are generally accompanied and
even preceded by consciousness, they are not determined by any
effort, nor produced under the guidance of the will.
II. IMPULSIVE AND INSTINCTIVE MOVEMENTS
1. Impulsive Actions are those which proceed immediately from
the presence of an idea in the mind, and from the consciousness of
an end to be reached. There is no deliberation, no reflection, no
multiplicity of tendencies, and no choice. The primary impulses
are toward pleasure and freedom from pain. But, as the work of
education proceeds and habits are contracted, impulses are diver-
sified, and become as numerous as the things themselves from which
pleasure and pain are derived in the physical, the intellectual,
the moral, and the religious spheres. Hence the impulses of sev-
eral men in the same circumstances will be widely different. For
instance, a murder may be committed impulsively when the mind
is so obsessed by one idea that the action follows immediately
without any deliberation. Again, upon hearing a noise in my room
at night, my impulse may be to run away, or to speak and ask
questions, or to grasp my revolver and fire, etc.
To impulsive movements may be reduced imitative movements
which originate from an impulse excited by the perception of these
movements as performed by others. Children especially have a
tendency to imitate the actions of others, like smiling, pouting,
talking, etc.
2. Instinctive Actions are found chiefly in animals; their num-
ber is small in man. They are more complex than impulsive
actions, do not always suppose the clear idea of the end to be
reached, have a more remote purpose, and do not vary so much
with the individuals, but are common to the species, and are trans-
mitted by heredity. Thus the migratory habits of birds, their
building of nests, the constructing of wax cells by bees, the swim-
ming of the young duck, etc. These actions are prompted by
sensations or images of some kind, and tend to a purpose,
but sometimes for instance, when the bird builds a nest for the
first time the representation of this purpose can only be a
vague one.
172 PSYCHOLOGY
SUMMARY
We may sum up briefly the main characteristics of the various
forms of action mentioned so far. All agree in being fatal and
necessary, that is, there is no conflict of motives and no delibera-
tion. The tendency to act is all in one direction. The will may
sometimes interfere with them, foster or inhibit them, but, in this
case, the action becomes more or less voluntary.
(a) Random movements are purposeless, and centrally initiated.
Automatic movements are purposive, and adapted to an end which,
however, is not a determinant of the movement; they also are
centrally initiated. Reflex movements are purposive, but periph-
erally initiated. Their purpose is an immediate one, and hence
reflex differ from instinctive actions.
(b) Impulsive movement supposes only one idea in the mind,
and generally follows this idea immediately; it varies with the indi-
viduals. Instinctive action is not always accompanied by the dis-
tinct consciousness of the end; it implies a greater complexity of
ideas and elements, and is the same for all individuals of the same
species^'. Both impulsive and instinctive actions are ordinarily
more complex than random, automatic, and reflex actions, and in-
volve a series of movements coordinated in order to reach an end.
They always suppose some consciousness, whereas the others
may be conscious or unconscious. They are not so mechanical,
but require some intelligent adaptation and coordination.
(c) In the young child we find only the forms of movement men-
tioned so far. Voluntary or controlled movements, that is, move-
ments consciously directed and adapted to a known end, are evolved
little by little as the mental and the organic faculties become more
developed. The main factor in this development seems to be the
mental association of certain uncontrolled actions with the sensa-
tions of pleasure or pain resulting from them. Some random,
impulsive, automatic, and instinctive actions yield a pleasant
result; others are unpleasant. Hence the tendency to repeat the
former, and to abstain from the latter. Hence also arise tentative
efforts to do so; and little by little the control of more and more
complex movements is secured.
VOLITIONAL ACTION 173
in. VOLITIONAL ACTION
i. Elements of Volitional Actions. Volitional action is directed
to an end known and intended. Hence it implies the following steps
which, however, have not the same importance in all actions, and
may require more or less time according to the different cases. Some
even may not be explicit at all, but merely implied in others or pre-
supposed, because they have already taken place at other times.
(a) The mind must have the idea of an end to be reached, i.e.
of a good to be obtained or of an evil to be avoided. To become
rich, successful, learned, or influential; to enjoy oneself, to be up-
right and virtuous, etc., may be so many ends. They appear as
good, and create in the mind the desire of reaching them. There
may be in the mind several alternatives of ends to be reached or
of means to reach them, of actions to be performed or omitted,
of means to be taken or rejected, of conduct to be followed or
avoided.
(b) The reasons for choosing one end rather than another, for
instance, duty rather than pleasure; and, when the end has been
chosen, the reasons for taking some means in preference to others,
are examined, compared with one another, and weighed. In some
cases, this takes a long time; in other cases, it is a short process,
because either the merits of the various alternatives are clear
enough, or it is urgent to act at once, or the decision is imprudent
and hasty. This process is called deliberation.
(c) Choice follows the examination of motives. A course of
action is selected, and an alternative accepted. This is decision or
volition.
(d) Finally comes the execution. At the command of the will,
the mental or organic faculties are applied to perform the action
that has been chosen.
From this analysis it is easy to see how voluntary actions
differ from those mentioned above. Example: A young man has
to choose a profession . . . must learn . . . goes to college . . .
applies himself to study, etc. See how many alternatives pre-
sent themselves at every step, and how every step is taken in
accordance with the analysis just made.
174 PSYCHOLOGY
2. Desire. (a) We have mentioned the term " desire." Desire
must be distinguished from volition; it is the transitional step
from knowledge to volition. Desire is a tendency to, or craving
for, something which appears good. It includes cognitive ele-
ments, presentative and chiefly representative, by which the idea
of the object arouses the idea of some pleasurable feeling con-
nected with it. Hence it contains also elements of feelings, and
the intensity of the desire is in proportion to the greatness of the
pleasure which is anticipated.
(b) (i) Desire is blind and fatal. We cannot help finding cer-
tain things good and agreeable. (2) Desire may refer to things
that are independent of the will e.g. good weather and even
to unattainable things which one would like to possess e.g.
good health. (3) With regard to the same thing, we may have
contradictory desires, desire in one respect, and aversion in an-
other. I may at the same time desire to enjoy a certain pleasure
because it is agreeable, and to turn away from it because it is for-
bidden. Two things may be desired at the same time e.g. a
walk outside and an entertainment indoors although one only
is possible.
(c) In opposition to these characteristics of desire, (i) the will
is reasonable and controllable. (2) It applies only to things
that seem attainable and that are in our power. (3) Of several
incompatible alternatives one only can be willed. (4) It may be
added that the will is not always proportioned to the desire.
Some men seem to be almost incapable of carrying out their plans.
Their desires may be strong, but their will is weak. They " would
like " to do certain things, but have not enough determination to
say: "I will do it."
3. Decision concerning a certain action may be positive or neg-
ative, a volition or a nolition; it may produce or inhibit a move-
ment. As psychological processes, however, both are positive,
and nolition is called negative only with regard to the result.
Inhibition is as frequent and as necessary as the initiation of action.
It may check the desire and impulse to action, as when we desire
to perform certain actions which, for better reasons, we decide
not to perform. It is implied in any decision where a choice is
HABIT 175
made between conflicting desires. It may also interrupt an action
already begun, and prevent it from being completed. Like action,
arrest of action is more or less volitional, sometimes being entirely
or almost automatic, and sometimes resulting from deliberation.
IV. HABIT
Recall to mind your first lessons in writing, and compare them
with the facility which you have at present. Writing has now
become habitual. In examining the nature, genesis, and impor-
tance of habits, constantly keep before your mind the instance
just given, or any other habit which you have acquired.
1. Nature of Habit. (a) Experience shows that, after being
performed several times, organic and mental actions become eas-
ier, and require less attention and effort. Hence habit is a disposi-
tion to reproduce certain actions and to act in the same way under
the same circumstances. The perfectly habitual action is not
actually voluntary in the strict sense, because it is performed
without reflection and deliberation, and even with little or no
consciousness. This, however, is true only of actions that proceed
exclusively from habit. In many cases habit and will together
play a more or less important part. Habitual actions differ
also from instinctive actions because they are not results of innate
dispositions, but acquired by repetition. They are more diverse,
and are not perfect from the beginning, but become more and
more so by repetition.
(b) A habit may be contracted voluntarily or involuntarily.
In the former case, the resulting action, although presently non-
voluntary, is nevertheless voluntary in its cause. In the latter
case, the action cannot be voluntary since the habit itself is not.
2. Genesis of Habits. (a) Habit begins with the first act,
and grows with every repetition. If no disposition were left by
the first act, there would be no reason why habit should begin
with the second or any subsequent act. Every action leaves a
trace or disposition, which, however, may disappear if it is not
again excited within a certain time. The trace left is more im-
portant in proportion to the interest, attention, application, etc.
(b) The strength of the habit increases in proportion to the
176 PSYCHOLOGY
frequency of the actions, their duration, their intensity, the inter-
val between them, and chiefly the accompanying attention and
feelings. How frequent, how long, and how intense the actions
and repetitions should be cannot be determined except by ex-
perience. This varies with the nature of the actions, and the
subjective dispositions.
(c) Habits decrease in strength, or even disappear, through lack
of exercise, and chiefly, when possible, through opposite actions.
Will and effort to resist the habit are more or less effective accord-
ing to the strength of the habit and the amount of effort.
3. Importance. (a) Habit is important because of the range
of its application and influence which include every aspect of
human life. The organism becomes habituated to certain modes of
activity, to foods, stimulants, narcotics, climate, diet, etc. Its
various movements are perfected, or vitiated, by habit. On the
mental side, we find habits of perception, memory, imagination,
association, judgment, conduct, feelings, will, etc., all this framing
man's character and personality.
(b) The effects of habit are chiefly the following: (i) Habitual
actions, good and bad, are more perfect and easier than others.
(2) They require less attention, and are performed, so to say,
automatically. (3) Habit is a great economy of energy and time;
instead of having to make an effort for every detail of the action,
the series of details follows of itself, and meanwhile attention
may be directed to something else. (4) Habits enable one to do
things which would be otherwise impossible.
(c) If you examine your daily actions, you will see how many
are performed by force of habit and routine, without conscious-
ness or attention, whereas in the beginning they required many
distinct efforts. Dressing, eating, walking, speaking, writing, in
fact, every ordinary action has been made as easy as it is by habit.
Hence habit has rightly been called a second nature, and man has
been termed a bundle of habits. Hence also the importance of
learning to do all things well from the beginning, for a bad habit
is hard to overcome, and every false step means a great waste of
energy.
DETERMINISM AND FREEDOM 177
ARTICLE II. DETERMINANTS AND FREEDOM OF
THE WILL
I. DETERMINANTS AND MOTORS OF THE WILL
i. Motives. (a) A motive is that for which we act. It is
always the idea of something good, i.e. of something useful, pleasur-
able, noble, honest, etc., which we want to obtain. Motives may
be subordinated to one another. Thus I take my umbrella to
avoid getting wet. I want to avoid getting wet in order not to
fall sick, or not to spoil my new straw hat, or not to feel uncom-
fortable, etc. I want to preserve my health in order to do my work,
and so on. Whatever is done voluntarily is done on account of
some good to be derived from the action. It is impossible for
man to act otherwise; he cannot choose to do something which
appears altogether, and from all points of view, evil and unpleas-
urable. He may be mistaken in his estimate, and pursue an appar-
ent for a real good, but there is at least the appearance, that is,
the idea, of something good.
(b) The first motor of the will, therefore, is the tendency to happi-
ness, which is implied in every action. Happiness is the ultimate
goal which all men want to reach. They do not agree in their con-
ception of the concrete realization of happiness. Some may place
it in riches, others in glory, others in pleasure, others in the ful-
filment of duty, etc. Some may expect it in this life, others hi a
future life. But the desire of happiness in general is always the
mainspring of every form of activity. Hence the most gen-
eral and the most uniform tendencies of man are toward those
things that are conceived as necessary to happiness: life, health,
reputation, the normal exercise of faculties, etc.
(c) If all men had the same conception of concrete happiness,
and if there were only one possible means of reaching it, all would
be determined to act in the same way. Thus, whenever a man has
chosen to reach a certain end, and he has only one possible way of
doing so, he necessarily takes this one means. If I have deter-
mined to go to Europe, there is as yet no other means but to take
a vessel. Hence to do this is necessary, although there are several
13
178 PSYCHOLOGY
vessels to be chosen from. If I really want to learn, and see that
the only means is to study, I certainly will study. To neglect
study is a sure sign that one has at most a desire, not the will, of
acquiring science. As concrete ends vary, and as even the same end
may be reached by different means e.g. I may earn a living in
different ways; I may, as a Christian, sanctify myself by the prac-
tice of different virtues a great variety of actions will result,
but all with the same underlying motive of reaching some form of
happiness.
(d) Ends may be conflicting, like acquiring wealth by what-
ever means, and observing the rules of justice. In such a case the
will abandons one in so far as it is incompatible with the other.
Some will abandon honesty and become rich by whatever means;
others will remain poor rather than go against the dictates of
their conscience.
2. Relative Force of Motives. Thus we see that we follow a
certain line of action because the motives for it appear prepon-
derant, and because it seems to be a greater good than another.
What makes a motive preponderant? To a great extent it is its
objective worth. But it is also, and perhaps to a greater extent,
the subjective dispositions of the agent. Both internal experience
and the observation of other men make it clear that we act as we
are, and that we are what we are on account of heredity, tempera-
ment, habit, surroundings, education, etc. When we know a man,
we generally can guess pretty accurately how he will behave under
certain circumstances. The views entertained of things during
deliberation, and the attention given to one motive for instance,
the religious or moral aspect of an action rather than to another
for instance, personal interest or gratification of the senses
are due largely to circumstances, to personal character, and to
the manner in which a man has been educated. We may not be
aware of it at all times, but to a great extent we are what all these
circumstances have made us, and our actions follow our nature.
II. FREEDOM OF THE WILL
i. Meaning of the Question. When we ask whether the will
is free, we ask whether the motors mentioned above so completely
DETERMINISM AND FREEDOM 179
determine the will that the choice which it makes is always made
necessarily; or whether the will, notwithstanding these, can deter-
mine itself, choose freely, and subtract itself from the necessity of
acting in one way only, (i) Hence we do not speak here of
physical liberty, or liberty of execution, for it is certain that I may
choose to do a thing and be prevented by force. I may want to
go out and may be locked in, or refuse to go out and be carried out
by force. Here we speak of the volition itself. (2) Nor do we
speak of various liberties, political or economic, as when we speak
of a free citizen, a free nation, a free country, free thought, free
trade, free port, free goods, free of cost, etc. These liberties
imply the absence of some external obligation, restraint or duty.
(3) By freedom of the will we mean the power of the will to be its
own determinant and to originate action. The question^ there-
fore, is this: Are objective motives and subjective influences the
only adequate causes of all actions, or is the will itself a power,
capable of self-determination?
2. Limits of Freedom. (a) (i) From what has been said above
it is clear that freedom does not mean caprice, or the power of act-
ing without motives. On the contrary, only those actions can
be free that are voluntary, and imply some implicit or explicit
deliberation and weighing of the motives. Hence habitual ac-
tions, and actions proceeding from a violent passion or from igno-
rance, are not free unless there is nevertheless enough attention
and reflection given to them. (2) Many organic actions are not
and can never be free because they are not under the influence
of the will. (3) We can be free only with respect to what seems
possible and attainable. Thus the strong or the learned may at-
tempt what is not possible for the weak or th ignorant. Hence
freedom is limited both in regard to the nature itself of freedom
which is present or absent, greater or less in different individuals,
and in the same individual with regard to different actions.
(b) From habits, education, temperament, etc., life has a gen-
eral direction which, however, may have been taken freely to some
extent, and perhaps even now may be changed. Because a man
is engaged in a certain business in which he wants to succeed, he
will not act in the same manner as the man who is in another line
l8o PSYCHOLOGY
of business. Certain actions are determined by the end one wants
to reach. But the end itself may have been chosen freely in the
past. The will is like a vessel sailing on a river and kept between
the two banks so that she can move only within them; or like a
man walking on the deck of a steamer, having his own limited
movement, and, at the same time, carried on by the general move-
ment of the vessel. Every individual has to steer his own vessel,
but the general direction toward happiness cannot be changed,
although all do not expect to find happiness in the same port.
3. The Consciousness of Freedom. (a) When we deliberate,
we are conscious that we can choose one of two or more alterna-
tives that are offered to the mind. The power of choice supposes
the absence of determinism. The stone thrown up in the air has
no choice between staying up or falling down; it falls necessarily.
Moreover, we are conscious that we are not mere spectators,
but actors, in the deliberation; that, by voluntary attention,
we may strengthen one motive or underrate its value, and that
we may even suspend the deliberation, shorten it, or exclude certain
reasons and considerations. Thus all the time we are conscious
that the final decision is in our power. The motives are weighed
in the balance, but their weight depends partly on the mind.
(b) The decision itself comes from the individual, and the result-
ing action seems to be free. Not only are we conscious of no de-
termination, but we are conscious of indetermination. We make
a clear distinction between a necessary and a free volition, between
the cases where we can choose freely and those where we cannot,
between an action performed in a passion and one performed
calmly and deliberately. We do not deliberate and decide whether
we shall try to be happy, but we do deliberate and decide by
what means we shall endeavor to reach happiness.
(c) Sometimes deliberation manifests an action as obligatory;
there is a sense of duty and obligation. Duty is an imperative inde-
pendent of pleasure and usefulness, and duty supposes freedom.
I cannot feel obliged to respect my fellowmen, or to abstain from
theft and murder, unless it is in my power to do so. To act neces-
sarily against what I feel to be now my duty is an impossibility.
If I must, I can; if I can, I have the power and am free.
DETERMINISM AND FREEDOM l8l
(d) After acting we feel that we have been prudent or impru-
dent, and that we might have done otherwise. If the action has a
moral character, we feel worthy of praise or blame. This again
is inexplicable if the action was not free. I deserve neither esteem
nor blame for what I could not have done otherwise. I clearly
distinguish between a just and an unjust punishment according as
I failed voluntarily and freely, or, on the contrary, "could not
help it." We deplore and regret actions that are evil and neces-
sary as we deplore and regret accidents or bodily deformities.
These do not cause any feeling of shame nor any desert of blame.
(e) That all men have the same consciousness of freedom is evi-
denced by their behavior, especially in their deliberations, and in
the blame or praise which they give to others. A man cannot be
blamed unless it is supposed that he acted freely. I do not blame
the stone that hits me, but I blame the man who threw it, inasmuch
as such an action was free and could have been avoided. All
men have the idea of a just punishment, and a just punishment
supposes freedom. Indeed, even if committed necessarily, a
crime might be punished to deter others from committing it, or
to train the wrongdoer as we tram an animal. Such a pun-
ishment is only useful, not just. It is intended to have good re-
sults in the future, but cannot be merited by the past deed. In
fact, the law makes a difference between free and necessary actions;
it punishes the criminal, but not the insane.
In a word, the testimony of consciousness is summed up in the
awareness that certain actions are personal, that they come from
me, that I am their cause, that the ego is, in part at least, respon-
sible for the occurrence, that the action is really mine, not only
because it takes place in me, but because it originates from me.
(/) The reason why the will is free is found in the relations of
concrete goods to perfect happiness. All concrete goods are lim-
ited and imperfect; they even have some evil aspects, such as the
difficulty of obtaining them, the uncertainty of the success, the
necessity of parting with them perhaps in life, and certainly at
death, and the fact that we cannot have all at once. Hence none
satisfies the will fully, for the will craves for perfect happiness.
4. Value of this Testimony of Consciousness. This testimony
182 PSYCHOLOGY
seems clear, and, if we are really free, it is difficult to see how the
fact could be perceived with greater evidence. We must say imme-
diately that a clear testimony of direct consciousness cannot eas-
ily be invalidated, and should not be rejected except for cogent
reasons. Yet, in the present instance, it has been rejected by some
psychologists.
(a) Stuart Mill asserts that the consciousness of freedom is
impossible. We have the consciousness only of what occurs, not
of what perhaps could, but in fact does not, take place. The con-
sciousness of actual processes alone is possible, and the conscious-
ness of freedom would be the consciousness of processes which
could be, but are not actually, performed.
Answer: Consciousness does not perceive what is not, but it
perceives the actual power which the individual possesses of deter-
mining himself, namely, it perceives the act as it is, as indeter-
mined and as coming from an agent who acts as he chooses.
(b) The consciousness of freedom is illusory; it is simply the
ignorance of determinant motives. Not being conscious of the
motives that determine us necessarily, we believe falsely that we
determine ourselves.
Answer: We are not only unconscious of determining motives,
but positively conscious of our own active power in the decision.
Moreover, if the objection were true, the sense of freedom would
be in inverse ratio to the knowledge we have of the motives. But,
on the contrary, it is when there has been no deliberation and
when we do not know why we have acted that the action seems
necessary and that we feel no responsibility for it.
(c) In fact, we know that a hypnotized subject acts necessa-
rily and cannot refuse to execute the command of the hypnotizer.
Yet he feels and asserts that he is free. Consciousness of freedom
is again illusory.
Answer. The following remarks will answer this difficulty,
(i) The subject may assert his freedom, but he shows no sign of
the consciousness of freedom; there is no deliberation before the
action, and no joy or shame after it. Moreover, he will not always
assert his freedom; in some cases he will say that he acted neces-
sarily, although he may be unable to account for this necessity.
DETERMINISM AND FREEDOM 183
When he falsely asserts it, he may do so by force of habit, because
he generally has the real sense of freedom, or because the answer
has been suggested to him, or finally because he knows what
answer is wanted. Many excuses of irresistible hypnotic influ-
ences have been brought before the courts. (2) From abnormal
and exceptional cases one cannot validly base an inference apply-
ing to all, even normal, cases. Because a man is sick or insane,
it cannot be inferred that all men are in the same condition. The
objection, therefore, consists in depriving a man of his freedom
and concluding that no men are free. The illusion of the subject
who is made to believe that he is an emperor does not prove that
there are no real emperors, although he is not one. And the fact
that some men have not the use of their legs does not prove that
no men can walk. The reason why the hypnotized subject is
deprived of his freedom is easy to find. For him there can be no
choice of motives, since only such ideas enter his mind as are al-
lowed by the hypnotizer. (3) The question of the existence of
freedom in a hypnotized person, and his power to resist the orders
that are given to him, is one on which there is no complete
agreement.
(d) Character, habits, temperament, education, and in general
subconscious factors determine the will. The actions of other
men can be foreseen with enough accuracy, and, were our knowl-
edge of other minds more perfect all actions could be fore-
seen with certainty. In a word, as was admitted above, we act
as we are.
Answer. To the first statement we say that: (i) All these may
sometimes be necessitating, but not always. We feel that we can
resist them and we do resist. A man struggles against himself
and changes his natural dispositions. (2) They give a general
impulse which does not determine all concrete actions, but leaves
some room for freedom. (3) Subconscious factors exercise an
influence only when they appear at the surface in consciousness,
and their action results in a conscious impulse.
To the second statement we say that: (i) We may foresee a
free action of other men, because men act for reasonable motives^
have the same essential nature, and are influenced by their char-
184 PSYCHOLOGY
acter. (2) This foresight is in most cases only a conjecture, and
we are frequently mistaken. (3) Our foreknowledge generally
bears on external, spontaneous, indeliberate, and hence necessary
actions. (4) Our behavior toward other men in bestowing praise
or blame shows that we recognize some of their actions as free.
(5) "We act as we are." Even if this were true, we must say that
we are not only what circumstances make us, but also what we make
ourselves. Emotional tendencies, dispositions, character, strength
or weakness of will, etc., depend greatly on ourselves, on the will,
and on the good or bad use which is made of it.
(e) It is affirmed that the strongest motive determines the will.
It would be unreasonable to act without a motive, or to choose a
less good when a greater good is offered.
Answer. As was said above, it must be admitted that a free
action is always performed for a motive, but it does not necessa-
rily follow that the greatest objective good is always and neces-
sarily chosen, (i) We may also admit that the strongest motive
determines the will, for we have no other means of determining
which motive is the strongest except that it finally prevails. There
is no common measure to estimate objectively the weight of dif-
ferent motives such as duty and pleasure. Evidently the prepon-
derant motive is the one according to which we act. But do we
act necessarily or freely? This is the question. (2) The will
contributes to make a motive preponderant, and gives it its final
victory over the others. As already stated, the will is not like the
indicator of a balance, inert and passive, but living and active.
It makes a given motive stronger and prevalent. But, it may be
asked, why does it do so? Sometimes, because we have already
"made up our minds," either deliberately and freely, or indelib-
erately and necessarily. Sometimes, owing to the influence of
subjective dispositions and habits which may, more or less, be
dependent on the past or present exercise of the free will. Some-
times, with the full consciousness that it is doing right or wrong,
yielding to the call of duty or to that of pleasure, and doing it
freely.
(/) The objection taken from the constancy of human statistics
births, marriages, crimes, etc. need not detain us. Statistics
CULTIVATION OF THE WILL 185
apply to communities, not to individuals; nor are they abso-
lutely constant. They simply point to a uniformity of motives
by which men in general are prompted to act; whether freely or.
necessarily, statistics cannot indicate.
Hence, although it is true that the large majority of human
actions are not actually free, in a number of cases the conscious-
ness of freedom remains a valid testimony.
CONCLUSION
CULTIVATION OF THE WILL
I. THE QUALITIES AND DEFECTS OF THE WILL
i. Importance of the Will. (i) A man is himself in proper- ,
tion as he is his own master, has control of his actions, and with-
draws himself from external determining influences to command
his own actions. (2) A man who has self-control, who possesses
a strong, persevering, and well-directed will, is not only his
own master, he will also subdue inanimate nature, succeed in his
undertakings, and be the leader of his fellowmen. To be the mas-
ter of others, a man must first be master of himself. Nothing
resists a strong will. The man who has taken a firm resolution,
and takes the proper means to carry it out, will seldom fail, or,
after a first failure, he will try again until his efforts are rewarded
with success. (3) Even intellectual value depends to a great
extent on the will. Application, attention, perseverance, are so
many conditions of success, and the will is the power that com-
mands them. (4) Moral character, habits, even feelings, and hence
personality, are largely dependent on the will. The will is the
supreme power, the mainspring of human activities, and the gov-
erning authority. To it must be attributed to a great extent man's
success or failure in his various undertakings, and in general,
man's worth.
No man, it is true, can ever be independent of external sur-
roundings and of internal dispositions, innate or acquired, per-
manent or temporary, which influence his thought and action.
PSYCHOLOGY
Nor is such an independence what we mean by freedom and
mastery over oneself. But, whereas the weak will is the tool
.of these influences and is unable to resist them, the strong will
utilizes some, resists others, directs and controls all. Influences
known to be good are accepted knowingly and willingly; those
that are misleading are excluded. Thus the man who is his own
master does not blindly follow the example of others or his own
impulses, but he examines first whether they are worth following.
He is able to check the natural impulse to act until he has
reached a prudent decision based on calm judgment, and, when
the occasion requires it, he is also able to muster all his energies
and make them subservient to the realization of his ideals.
^V'2. The Main Qualities of the Will are the following: (i) There
should be no hastiness in the deliberation or decision, but the whole
process should be calm and without passion. Be slow, take as
much time as is required and as circumstances will allow accord-
ing to the importance of the step which you want to take and
the difficulty which you experience. Precipitation in speaking or
acting is often the source of subsequent regrets. (2) Yet the neces-
sity of reflection must not cause one to postpone the decision and
action indefinitely. Do not remain all the time hesitating, fluc-
tuating, and deferring. When all the evidence is at hand, take
your decision accordingly, and carry it out. (3) Execute your
decision promptly. Be not satisfied with desires that are never
realized. When you have seen what you ought to do, do it with-
out useless delay. Remember that "desires kill the slothful,
for his hands have refused to work at all. He longeth and desir-
eth all the day." (Prov. xxi, 25.) He will keep his resolution
"to-morrow," or the next time," and the more he procrastinates,
the weaker he becomes. (4) Do not "change your mind " on the
slightest pretext, but be constant and persevering. To abandon
one's prudent plans without sufficient reason is a sign of fickleness
and a presage of failure.
3. The Defects of the Will come from two causes, and are in
two opposite directions, excess and defect, (i) The will may be
too strong, when it shows, not prudent, but imprudent firmness,
constancy, and perseverance. This is obstinacy and stubborn-
CULTIVATION OF THE WILL 187
ness. A man who is stubborn will abide by his former decision
in spite of new contrary and convincing evidence. (2) The will
may be too hasty, impulsive, rash, and impatient. Instead of re-
flecting attentively, a man will at once rush into action on the
impulse of the moment. The power of inhibition seems insuffici-
ent to apply the brakes in time and to prevent impulses from
passing at once into action. (3) Some, on the contrary, have
not enough will power. Without speaking of extreme cases of
aboulia which are pathological, some persons are unable to take
a decision. They are always hesitating and cannot resolve to
adopt a plan. Others "want to do," but always find an excuse.
"I know," they will say, "that I ought to do it, but I can't." In
every pursuit man needs light and intelligence, but he needs also
a good, strong, and persevering will. Truly and sincerely to
say "I will" implies generally "I can," whereas to say "I
cannot " is to make an action almost impossible.
II. SOME PRINCIPLES TO BE USED IN WILL CULTURE
In general, try to acquire the qualities and to avoid the defects
mentioned above. Here we must limit ourselves to a few of the
most general principles regarding the intellect, the feelings, and
the will itself.
1. Intellect. The common principles "Nil volitum nisi prae-
cognitum," and "Ignoti nulla cupido," express the evident truth
that the will does not tend to any unknown good, but must neces-
sarily have something apprehended as good presented to it. But
the intellect by itself is a weak motor, and mere ideas have but
little influence on the determination. How many know what is
good, noble, and right, and yet seem to have no inclination for it,
or, if they have an inclination, seem incapable of making it pass
into action. They know their duty, but do not love it. They may
even desire to fulfil it, but do not will it.
2. Feelings. Therefore ideas must be associated with feelings.
What we ardently love and want sets the energy into action. The
meditation on the motives must not be cold and purely rational;
it must be warm, and tend to excite not only the knowledge, but
also the love of the good. Consider not only the truth, but also
l88 PSYCHOLOGY
the utility, pleasure, peace, etc., that will result. See the examples
of heroes and saints, and let them instil in you courage, confidence,
and enthusiasm. At every step, keep in mind the necessity and
advantages of your action. Attention to the end, attention to
the means, attention to the results, will lead to strength and per-
severance. It has been said that ideas lead the world. This is
not exact; what leads the world is not so much the ideas as the
love for certain ideas. Hence the necessity of feelings and of
enthusiasm.
If you find it impossible to perform an action or conquer a habit
immediately, proceed gradually and step by step, but always
take clear-cut resolutions bearing on a well-determined point.
The resolution to do good in general is too abstract, and does not
excite a concrete love. But take the resolution to do this speci-
fied kind of good, in this special circumstance, under these special
conditions.
3. Will. (a) As to the will itself, see what should be devel-
oped and what should be repressed, where there is excess and
where there is defect. It is very important to acquire good habits,
for a habit is a ready mechanism which needs only a first impulse
to unfold immediately a whole series of actions. Habit prevents
the diffusion of energy in various useless directions, and the dis-
persion of strength. The whole energy goes straight to performing
the action. How much conscious and organic energy is dispersed,
for instance, in the first piano lesson. Later on, it is concentrated
unconsciously and tends to the perfect result. Hence the impor-
tance of acquiring immediately the habit of performing a series of
movements in the manner which is the shortest and the best
adapted to the intended result. Watch constantly lest you should
acquire bad habits, for it is very difficult to uproot them. Apply
yourself chiefly to the acquisition of those habits which you need
most, and especially of the four moral habits that have such
an importance in the whole course of life: prudence, justice,
temperance, and courage.
(b) Always keep your will on edge; exercise it constantly; find
something to do that requires effort. If you simply let yourself
go down the stream, carried along by the current of your habits
CULTIVATION OF THE WILL 189
and character, even if they do not lead you astray, you will
find that you will not have strength enough to overcome
obstacles and change your course if it becomes necessary to
do so. Like our muscles, our will weakens if it is not exercised.
Hence every day impose on yourself some task and effort. A
great fault to be avoided is to fail to carry out a good resolution
once it has been taken, for every voluntary failure is a weakening
defeat. It is better to take no resolutions than to take them reluc-
tantly and without trying to keep them by all possible means.
Yet let not your failures discourage you, but rise again, strengthen
your resolution, and try to do better. Let not a single day pass
without making some useful effort, without using your will, and
using it well.
CHAPTER IV
SUPPLEMENTARY. SOME SPECIAL RELATIONS
AND MODES OF MENTAL PROCESSES
I. MIND AND ORGANISM
I. MUTUAL RELATIONS or DEPENDENCE AND INFLUENCE
Although the mind is distinct from the organism, and conscious-
ness cannot be reduced to any form of movement, it is certain
that the two are very closely united and influence each other.
i. Influence of the Organism on the Mind. (a) In general,
mental processes depend on the conditions of the organism, (i)
Sensations depend on the transmission through an afferent nerve
to the brain, of an impression received by the peripheral appa-
ratus. Cut the transmitting nerve, or let the nerve or the brain
centre be diseased, and no sensation is experienced. (2) Imagina-
tion, memory, intelligence, depend on brain centres; if these are
destroyed or impaired, there follows a loss or a disturbance of these
faculties. Moreover, intellectual faculties cannot be exercised
until the brain reaches a certain minimum of development. (3)
Feelings depend largely on organic dispositions, especially of the
nervous system. (4) The exercise of activity commanded by the
will can be carried out only if the organism is in the normal
condition. Thus the paralytic is unable to execute a volition of
movement.
(b) In a more special manner, we mention the concomitant
variations of mental processes with the dispositions of the organ-
ism: (i) health and illness; (2) food and drink; (3) special or-
ganic modifications caused by mental processes like memory,
imagination, emotions, etc.
(c) Finally we note the following influences: (i) Age; the child,
the adult, and the old man have not the same views, the same
190
MIND AND ORGANISM 191
sensibility, and the same constancy. The youth is more impetu-
ous and more changing, the mature man more circumspect and
prudent, the old man generally weaker. These differences are
due largely to differences in the irritability of the nerves, the
strength of the muscles, the plasticity of the whole system, the
quality of the blood, and the vital functions. (2) Sex; women have
generally more sensitiveness, more delicacy, more changeableness;
men, more strength, constancy, and intelligence. (3) Tempera-
ment; strong or weak according as the mental energy is greater
or smaller, and in consequence the mental states are more or less
intense; quick or slow according as the mental states succeed one
another rapidly or slowly. The strong temperaments are the
choleric and melancholic; the weak temperaments, the sanguine
and phlegmatic; the quick temperaments, the choleric and san-
guine; the slow temperaments, the melancholic and phlegmatic.
Strong temperaments are inclined to great emotions, and yield
more easily to painful impressions. Weak temperaments have
little emotion, and are rather disposed to enjoyment. Quick tem-
peraments have rapid changes, are intent on the present, and re-
quire additional strength to do more work. Slow temperaments
change slowly, are rather inclined to look toward the future, and
require additional time to do more work. We may also note
that the choleric and phlegmatic temperaments chiefly refer to
action; the sanguine and melancholic, chiefly to feelings. Tem-
peraments are seldom found with these exclusive features; they
include elements belonging to several groups, and are determined
by their predominant features. (4) Climate; mental dispositions
vary with different atmospheric conditions, and there is a notice-
able difference between the inhabitants of cold and those of hot
countries. (5) Heredity of certain organic traits.
2. Influence of Mental Processes on the Organism (a)
Ideas and images of movements tend to produce those movements.
In general, as explained above, the image is both representative
and motor. The thought of something terrible may cause trem-
bling; the thought of something disgusting may cause vomit-
ing, etc. Imagination may contribute to induce and increase
sickness, and many an apparent remedy has acted with as
IQ2 PSYCHOLOGY
much efficacy as a real one. In such cases, there is generally a
combination of images and feelings.
(b) Feelings, and chiefly strong emotions, are naturally expressed
in the organism by certain modifications; circulatory blushing,
turning pale, acceleration or decrease of pulsations, etc.; res-
piratory cries, meanings, acceleration of respiration, etc.;
movements of eyes; secretions, e.g. tears; facial nerves, physiog-
nomy; and other nerves trembling, spasms, etc. Moreover,
emotions may affect all vital functions, secretion, digestion, etc.
If too violent, they may cause serious troubles, swoonings, and
even death.
(c) The will causes motions in the organism; some are directly
under its control, but it can reach indirectly all organs and func-
tions, for instance, digestion by allowing only a certain quantity
or quality of food.
Hence, in a general way, organic habits, health, features, etc.,
are to a certain extent signs of habits of mind. Physiognomy is
frequently an unsafe and misleading guide, yet its value, especially
in certain cases, cannot be denied. Although unsafe when used
alone, and when relied on too securely, judging a person "by
his looks " may sometimes be of great utility.
II. CEREBRAL LOCALIZATION
Besides the general relations of mind and body, there are others
of a more special nature. Certain mental functions have their
seat, or are localized, in certain parts of the organism.
i. Phrenology generally applies to the systems of Gall and
Spurzheim, in the beginning of the nineteenth century. They sup-
pose the innateness of all mental faculties or qualities, and their
adequate manifestation through the brain, which, according to
them, has as many special organs as there are distinct faculties.
Hence, according as a certain area of the brain is more developed
this is manifested externally by the shape of the skull a men-
tal aptitude will be predominant. The number of distinct facul-
ties varies from twenty-six, according to Gall, to thirty-five,
according to Spurzheim, and even more according to others.
Phrenology is completely discredited to-day. The methods
MIND AND ORGANISM 193
used are unscientific, and some of the fundamental principles are
false, for instance, that the development of a mental power always
depends on the size of the corresponding organ it depends rather
on qualitative properties; that mental tendencies are innate
and unmodifiable; that the shape of the skull always manifests
the relative development of the corresponding parts of the brain,
the convolutions of the brain, which are very important, can-
not be manifested by the shape of the skull. The division of fac-
ulties is arbitrary and fanciful; and to assign a special part of the
brain to every faculty is impossible. The main objection against
phrenology, however, is the progress of modern psychological and
physiological sciences which have disproved the tenets of phre-
nologists concerning the functions of the brain, and, in some cases,
have established cerebral localizations different from those which
phrenology mapped out.
2. Scientific Localization. (a) The methods used to deter-
mine the localization of functions in the brain are: (i) Experi-
mentation. Either stimulate chiefly by an electric current
certain areas of the brain cortex, and see what movements take
place or what results are obtained. Or extirpate certain por-
tions of the brain, and see what loss or disturbance in motion or
in sensory processes follows. Such experiments are performed
on animals, and, by analogy, the results are applied to man. (2)
Pathology. Man does not experiment on the human brain. But
it happens that lesions or pathological affections occur which are
observed in post-mortem examinations, and thus the cause of the
motor or sensory troubles which had been manifested is ascer-
tained. In some cases the skull has been trepanned, and a tumor,
piece of bone, or lesion has been found where it was supposed to
be. (3) Comparative anatomy and histology. The higher the
organization of animals, the greater the number of localized func-
tions. Hence localizations verified in the highest vertebrates
are applied to man with great probability. Histology is making
progress toward following the nerve-tracts through the brain to
the cortex. (4) These methods are generally used cumulatively,
and the evidence is compared.
(b) The student is referred to text-books of physiology for the
14
194 PSYCHOLOGY
details of cerebral localization. The most general and best estab-
lished are the following: (i) The motor centres are found on both
sides of the fissure of Rolando. It is noteworthy that motor
centres of one hemisphere are related to the other side of the body
the right hemisphere controls the left limbs, and the left hemi-
sphere, the right limbs. (2) The sensory centres are not all ascer-
tained. The visual centre is in the occipital lobes; the auditory,
in the temporal lobes, as also probably the olfactory and the
gustatory. The tactile centres are probably in the parietal
lobes.
(c) These localizations are not restricted to a well-defined spot,
mathematically circumscribed. Neighboring centres, so to speak,
interpenetrate. Moreover, if one part becomes incapable of per-
forming its functions, other parts either corresponding parts
of the other hemisphere, or neighboring parts in the same hemi-
sphere sometimes may take its place.
II. SOME SPECIAL MENTAL CONDITIONS
The following mental conditions are related to special organic
conditions, many of which are but very imperfectly known.
i. Insanity. The mind as well as the body has its diseases.
They form the object of the sciences known as abnormal psychol-
ogy; mental pathology, i.e. the science of the diseases of the mind;
psychiatry (etymologically, the healing of the soul). Some of
these diseases, like hallucination and aboulia, are partial and
affect a special faculty. Others are of a more general nature and
seem to affect the whole or almost the whole mental life. Again,
some are of small importance and little apparent. Others are more
manifest and deeper. The term "insanity" although etymolog-
ically meaning any disease (in-sanitas) is restricted to the most
general and best characterized forms of mental disease. Hardly
any definition or classification of its various forms can be given.
In general, insanity is not applied to temporary mental derange-
ment, like that due to a strong emotion; yet this usage seems to
become current in criminal courts where temporary insanity is
made the plea for the defence. Nor is it applied to a slight dis-
SPECIAL MENTAL CONDITIONS 195
turbance or irregularity of functions, but to a serious defect of
thought, emotion, or rational activity.
Dementia is a weakened condition of the mental powers. It
denotes feebleness, inactivity, and incapacity, rather than ab-
normal functioning. It supposes that the faculties have been
stronger before, whereas idiocy and imbecility or feeble-minded-
ness are congenital.
The causes of insanity may be general dispositions or accidental
events. The most important are heredity, worry, a melancholic
temperament, various hereditary and acquired dispositions and
defects of the organism, and especially of the nervous system.
Many accidents, bodily injury, strong emotions, intemperance,
drug-habits, etc., may bring about insanity.
2. Sleep and Dream. Sleep is a temporary dementia, and in-
sanity has been termed the dream of the waking man. In fact,
there is more than one point of resemblance between these two
states. In dream and in insanity we observe the same incoher-
ence, irrational sequence of ideas and images, and the same
absence of control of the inferior mental powers by the higher
faculties.
(a) Psychologically, sleep is the suspension or t at least, the lowering
of consciousness. If we rely on the testimony of memory, we may
think that consciousness is totally suspended at least during some
periods of sleep, for we are not aware of dreaming all the time.
However, this testimony is not necessarily reliable, for we have
dreams which we do not remember, or which are recalled later
owing to some accidental association. It seems also that whenr
ever we wake up, if we can take immediate cognizance of our
state we are conscious of waking from a dream which may be
weak, and the memory of which, after a few instants, disappears
beyond recall.
(b) The physiological causes of sleep are not certain. To a great
extent they seem to be changes in the blood circulation in the
brain. The work of the day fatigues the brain and accumulates
waste-matter. Hence the need of rest, during which this is elim-
inated. The main conditions contributing to induce sleep are
fatigue, monotonous impressions, the influence of cold and heat,
196 PSYCHOLOGY
certain organic functions like digestion, or organic morbid dis-
positions, and chiefly the absence of ordinary sensory stimuli, that
is, darkness, silence, and tranquillity. Waking may result from
the sufficiency of rest, from a stimulus, either internal, like pain,
or external, like sound, light, or touch, especially if the stimulus
is strong, or if, though weak, it corresponds to a special attention
of the subject. Thus a mother perceives the slightest cry of a
sick child, the fireman hears the sound of the alarm bell, etc.
The stopping of accustomed regular movements or noises may
also cause one to arouse from sleep.
(c) Conscious processes during sleep are called dreams. Be-
tween the state of wakefulness and the dreaming state we may men-
tion " reverie," in which little or no attention is paid to external
things, and free play is allowed to the imagination. As all mental
faculties maybe, or at least may seem to be, suspended during sleep,
so also all may be exercised. There is imagination and memory;
feeling e.g. fear in a nightmare; judgment and reasoning,
no matter how uncouth and unreasonable these may be; will, or
at any rate something akin to it, for instance, when one wants to
run away, speak, etc. There is even some kind of sensation, as
we shall see when we speak of the causes of dreams. However,
a dream is a continuous hallucination. Images, no matter how
ridiculous from the point of view of the waking state, are taken
for realities. This is due to the fact that such images are not cor-
rected by perceptions or by reason. They are not under the con-
trol of attention and will, and follow their own capricious course.
No account is taken of time. Observations have shown that, in
a few seconds, one may dream of a succession of events that would
occupy a very long time.
(d) The main causes of dreams are: (i) Sensations. Thus a little
touch or smart may be magnified and represented in consciousness
by huge weights or wounds. (2) Organic conditions like indiges-
tion, difficult breathing, etc. (3) Mental states going on before
sleep and continued during it. (4) General tendencies and pre-
occupations which contribute to modify the dreaming tendencies.
3. Somnambulism etymologically, walking asleep is a state
of mental activity during sleep, or perhaps quasi-sleep, accompa-
SPECIAL MENTAL CONDITIONS 197
nied by perceptions, movements, and purposive actions. It has
been called the acting of one's dream. In somnambulism there is
activity and coordinated movement, e.g. walking, speaking, writ-
ing. Frequently there is also sequence and coherence in the ideas.
The somnambulist may speak or write very sensibly, and even do
intellectual work, solve problems, write essays, and find solutions
which had been sought in vain during the state of wakefulness.
The senses are awake, and the somnambulist walks and avoids
obstacles on his way, or carries on a conversation. The senses
are even generally keener than in the waking state, especially
the muscular sense. The somnambulist performs dangerous
actions which he would never be able to perform when awake.
At the same time, the senses are selective, and their field is narrower.
Frequently certain objects only are perceived, namely, those that
are connected with the train of ideas, while the others are over-
looked. There is thus an exaggerated form of what, in the wak-
ing state, would be called distraction. Whereas we may have a
very vivid recollection of dreams, actions performed in the somnam-
bulistic state are not remembered in the state of wakefulness, but
may be recalled in a new somnambulism.
4. Duality or Multiplicity of "Selves " or "Personalities " is a
term frequently used, although what it expresses is in reality a
dissociation of the centres, chiefly of the memory centres.
(a) In some cases, a person has had, so to speak, two or three
different successive or alternating personalities which, though suc-
ceeding one another, form in consciousness two continuous series
and are generally more or less independent:
In the series A, the events of the series B are not remembered,
nor are those of the series A in the series B. Sometimes, however,
one series is privileged, and includes the other, but not vice versa.
Something, e.g. language, knowledge of persons, etc., may be,
but is not always, common to both series. If one "personality "
has any knowledge of the other, it will generally refer to it
in the third person. It also may happen that in one series the
198 PSYCHOLOGY
character and aptitudes are greatly different from those in the
other series.
(b) Two simultaneous "personalities " may also be found.
For instance, while the subject is engaged in conversation with
another person, a third person may ask questions which will be
answered rationally by automatic writing. In more general
terms, two simultaneous series of rational actions will go on inde-
pendently. It is remarkable that, when the subject writes auto-
matically while carrying on a conversation, the "writer" will
refer to the " speaker " in the third person, and even may refer
to him as a stranger or an enemy.
Such facts which of course are rare occur chiefly in cases
of hysteria. Hysteria is a very complex organic and mental dis-
ease, having several points in common with somnambulism, chiefly
the hyperaesthesia of certain senses.
5. Suggestion is very closely allied to imagination.
(a) In a broad sense, to suggest is to impart an idea, especially
with a view to determine some action. It is of daily occurrence
and use. A striking instance will be found in advertising. The
purpose of advertising is to arouse in the mind the idea of certain
wants, and hence the desire to satisfy them by buying the recom-
mended article. The symptoms of a disease will be described
so as to suggest that you have that disease. Conclusion: buy the
patent medicine. The more completely an idea takes possession
of the mind and is prominent, the greater is its motor power,
and the greater the chances of its being effective. Hence if
it is the only idea present in the mind, or if other ideas are
made to strengthen it, or if, finally, other antagonistic ideas
have no time to counteract it, the suggested action is certain to
follow.
(b) This necessary determination of an action by an idea is
suggestion in the strict sense. The determined process may be
sensory hallucination, illusion, etc., motor, inhibitory, emo-
tional, or ideal. Suggestibility in the broad sense is common to
all men. In the strict sense it is found chiefly in certain abnormal
states, especially in hypnotism. Hetero-suggestion, or simply
suggestion, is given by the words, gestures, or signs of some one
SPECIAL MENTAL CONDITIONS 199
else. Auto-suggestion comes consciously or unconsciously from
the agent himself.
6. Hypnotism (VTTVOS, sleep) is the art, theory, or practice of
hypnosis. Hypnosis is a mental state in many respects similar
to somnambulism.
(a) Hypnosis is produced in many different ways: gazing at a
bright object, listening to a monotonous sound, passes before the
eyes and on the body, suggestion or command to go to sleep.
(b) The main psychological features of the deep and complete
hypnosis are: (i) Suggestibility. All kinds of illusions and hallu-
cinations occur at the will of the hypnotizer. Present things or
persons are not perceived, or absent things and persons are imag-
ined to be present. The subject changes his attitude and behav-
ior accordingly. Actions are performed when and as commanded
whether always irresistibly seems uncertain. Post-hypnotic
suggestions are suggestions made during the hypnotic state, but
to be carried out only at an appointed time, after the subject has
been aroused. (2) Alterations of memory. Actions performed
during hypnosis generally are not recalled in the normal state,
but may be recalled in a subsequent hypnosis. (3) The " rapport "
of the subject with the hypnotizer is a special relation of the two,
to the exclusion of every other person unless the hypnotizer allows
the subject to communicate also with others.
(c) The causes and mechanism of hypnotism are very uncer-
tain. Some analogies and hints are found in other mental condi-
tions already mentioned; but an adequate explanation is not
possible with our actual knowledge.
(d) All serious psychologists and hypnotists agree that the prac-
tice of hypnotism is dangerous. It weakens the intellect and will,
and generally has a harmful influence on the nervous system, not
to mention the immoral or criminal influences that may be exer-
cised by unscrupulous hypnotizers. In some cases, however,
hypnotism may be useful to correct mental or organic defects.
Only competent and upright physicians should be allowed to
practice hypnotism, and under restrictions and conditions which
obviate its dangers.
7. Clairvoyance, Mental Suggestion, Telepathy. (a) Clair-
200 PSYCHOLOGY
voyance is the alleged power to see things through opaque bodies,
or at great distances. If the facts alleged are true, perhaps other
facts, such as radio-activity, wireless telegraphy, and wireless
telephony, may throw some light on these abnormal phenomena.
Certain rays penetrate opaque bodies, and can affect special
photographic plates. Is it impossible that the eye should be
adapted to receive and perceive them? All that is required
is that the eye should allow such rays to pass through its
various refracting media which it does not ordinarily and
that the retina be sensitive to them. As to the vision of past
and future events, if true, it can be explained to some extent by
memory even though the event was not consciously known,
or by guesses and inferences from known causes.
(b) Mental suggestion is a suggestion made immediately from
mind to mind without any sensible sign, word, or gesture. Sev-
eral hypotheses have been proposed to explain such facts, suppos-
ing them to be authentic. None seems satisfactory, or, at least,
sufficiently based on known mental or physical properties. Is it
possible for an idea to correspond to certain brain processes which
would be transmitted to and interpreted by another brain? Here
again 'recent discoveries in physical sciences must make us hesi-
tate in denying this possibility. As we do not know all the prop-
erties of matter, so we do not know all the properties of organized
matter, nor of mind. Investigations seem to point out that men-
tal work produces something like emanations or radiations. At
certain tunes two brains may be in special relations of sympathy,
so that one of them is apt to receive and interpret the other's
messages.
(c) Telepathy is the communication between two minds without
the help of the senses, and generally at a great distance. The
alleged facts consist chiefly of apparitions of persons dying far
away, of a sense of uneasiness when some absent relative or friend
meets with an accident, and of certain premonitions of danger.
Whether and how such facts can be explained, it is not possible
at present to say. The indications given for mental suggestion
or thought-transference apply also to some of the facts of
telepathy.
SPECIAL MENTAL CONDITIONS 2OI
8. Spiritism, sometimes called spiritualism, which is to-day
so much in evidence, includes many marvellous facts: table- turning
in order to receive answers to questions asked, motions of furni-
ture, light or sounds coming from unknown and unseen causes,
apparitions, etc. It is noteworthy that the presence of a
medium is required, that is, of a specially sensitive person
through whom the "spirits" manifest themselves. Frequently
the medium gives answers by speech or automatic writing.
(a) Many of the so-called spiritistic phenomena are frauds
which have been exposed more than once. However, there seems
to remain a certain number of well-ascertained facts, and, even
if there is much more fraud than truth, this is not a sufficient rea-
son for denying everything, especially when we have honest,
serious, and competent witnesses. These facts are not at present
explicable. We simply note that the facts of objectivated dreams,
hallucinations, hypnotism, double personality, and somnambu-
lism can probably account for some of the medium's powers, and
perhaps for all those which he really possesses. Thought-trans-
ference, if possible, would also be a clue toward an explanation.
It is significant that the same "spirit" does not speak in the same
manner, nor are his opinions the same, when given through differ-
ent mediums, and that the medium impersonates the "spirits"
and transmits messages purporting to come from them according
to the knowledge he has of such "spirits." Significant also
is the fact of the "trance" of the medium during his supposed
communication with the spirit, as we know that hypnotism
predisposes one to play a r61e or a second personality.
(b) What has been said of the dangers of hypnotism applies to
spiritism, and here even the dangers are much greater, as experi-
ence teaches. Moreover, there may be moral and religious rea-
sons for avoiding all spiritistic practices. As a religious system
based on supposed revelations of the "spirits," spiritism is in open
contradiction with the Christian religion.
N.B. It is impossible to enter here into a more detailed account
of these extraordinary facts. We caution the student against
too great a credulity with regard to the multitude of stories cir-
culated on these topics, and against hasty inferences and theories.
202 PSYCHOLOGY
It may also be noticed that these facts form a continuous series.
The passage from one to the other is gradual; there is no sudden
jump and no gap. But psychology is unable at present to explain
them all. Finally, it must be recalled that continuity does not
necessarily mean identity in nature or in the causes of the ex-
tremes that are linked by many intermediaries.
CONCLUSION
CHARACTER AND PERSONALITY
i. Character. (a) Etymologically, character signifies a dis-
tinctive mark, and accordingly means the most salient features
in every individual's mental structure and functions, that which
makes him to be so or so. In this broad sense it denotes something
very complex, namely, the general relations between mental ten-
dencies, their relative importance, the inferiority or predominance
of some. The most obvious distinctive feature in man is his con-
duct, his mode of acting, especially in such actions as are volun-
tarily purposive. Hence character refers chiefly to the active
aspect of life, that is, to the tendencies and feelings, inasmuch as
they prompt to certain lines of action.
(b) In a narrower signification, as when we speak of a man of
character, or say that a man has no character, we refer especially
to the unity and consistency of his mental processes, together
with some independence and strength of will. A character is
thus dependent on the qualities of intelligence, especially reflec-
tion, and on the emotional nature, especially the control of the
emotions by the will. Although character depends largely on
heredity, environment, early education, and surroundings, it
refers chiefly to the acquired habits of will. We*act according to
our habits. The early formation of character is very important.
Parents and teachers can never give too much attention and care
to it. They must use innate tendencies to help the formation of
right habits and the uprooting of wrong ones, and to suggest noble
motives and ideals.
(c) Temperament and disposition are closely related to char-
acter. Temperament is chiefly dependent on inherited organic
conditions, and can be reformed less easily than character. Dis-
position is also mostly innate and hereditary. It refers to emo-
203
204 PSYCHOLOGY
tional and active tendencies. Thus a man is said to have a happy
disposition, an excitable disposition, a sluggish disposition, etc.
We have spoken above (p. 191) of the four temperaments; char-
acters cannot be classified satisfactorily; according to their domi-
nant features they are referred to as weak, obstinate, inconstant,
selfish, etc.
2. Personality. In its psychological not philosophical
sense, personality is almost the same as character; it denotes a
strong and marked individuality. Man alone is a person, and
he is personal when he performs certain actions that spring from
himself. To be a person is to emerge above the universal deter-
minism of matter, to conquer and not be conquered, to possess
oneself. The self is the centre of attribution of voluntary activ-
ities, the responsible agent, that which in us is worthy of respect
and which, therefore, is the foundation of social ethics. The
psychological self changes and is modified by circumstances and
chiefly by effort. We say of a man: "He is not what he used to
be; " and of the man who acts according to his character, and accord-
ing to our expectation, we say: "That is just like him." Of a man
whom we suppose to have acted under such a strong or sudden
impulse that his will was prevented from inhibiting the action, we
say: "He was not himself." To be oneself is to be one's own mas-
ter. Hence let your primary and chief endeavor be to develop
in you good habits, good dispositions, and a good character.
Always strive after what is worth your best effort. Ascertain
the direction to be taken, and, when you know that your efforts
are directed toward right and noble ideals, be strong, constant,
and invincible. In all things and actions, be a personality; be
yourself.
LOGIC OR THE NORMATIVE
SCIENCE OF THE INTELLECT
INTRODUCTION
i. Main Conclusions from Psychology, which it is necessary to
recall here, (i) Truth is found in the judgment, that is, in the
affirmation or negation of the agreement of two notions. A simple
idea in itself has no truth, but only when its relation to another is
asserted (p. 107). (2) Judgments are immediate and self-evident,
or mediate and reached through a process of reasoning (p. 112,
115 fL). (3) Judgments are true or false according as they
affirm that which is or is not in conformity with reality. Men
reform some of their judgments, considering as false what they
previously considered as true, and vice versa. Again, they look
upon the judgments of other men as true or false, and as more or
less certain or uncertain (p. 117 ff.). (4) The mind may be in a
state of ignorance, when it has no knowledge whatever of an object,
and hence can form no judgment; of error, when a false judgment
is accepted; of doubt, when the mind, although knowing something
about an object, finds no sufficient reason for affirming or denying;
of opinion, when the mind assents to a judgment, but does not
give a firm assent because there are reasons to fear lest such a
judgment be false; of certitude, when the truth appears with evi-
dence, and a judgment is assented to unreservedly. It may be
noticed that in common usage ignorance is often used for doubt
and error, and doubt for opinion, or rather for the fear of error.
(5) We have also called attention to the distinction between assent
and consent, convincing and persuading, knowing intellectually
and practically accepting the truth with all its consequences.
The former regards the intellect alone, the latter concerns the
whole man (p. 120 ff.).
205
206 LOGIC
2. Meaning of Logic. (a) The names of many sciences
end in -logy psychology, cosmology, geology, etc. The term
Aoyos signifies primarily word, and secondarily thought, and also
science. "Logic" comes from the same Greek term. In ordinary
language it refers to the power of reasoning, and to the consistency
either between the thoughts of an individual, or between his
thoughts and his mode of action. To be logical is to be reasonable.
(b) As used here, the term "logic" means the normative science
of the intellectual faculties. Certain modes of thought are invalid.
There are judgments that are incompatible and exclude one an-
other. Others are compatible, but independent of one another,
and have no logical relation. Others are compatible and log-
ically related as principles and conclusions, one being inferred from
others. The purpose of logic is to indicate the rules of valid infer-
ence so as to facilitate the progress of the mind in the pursuit of
truth and the freedom from error. In other words, logic tries to
dispose the materials found in the mind into harmonious struc-
tures, and to indicate the way toward the acquisition of new
knowledge.
3. Definition of Logic. The truth which is considered here
is logical truth. The intrinsic value of the materials used is not
examined, but only their valid sequence in the mind. For instance,
"All men are white; Peter is a man; therefore Peter is white,"
is a true and valid syllogism from the point of view of logic,
although the first proposition is not in conformity with reality.
The logical value of a syllogism is independent of the truth of its
propositions, as will be explained more in detail later on. Hence
logic has frequently been defined as the science of the formal laws
of thought.
By "thought" is meant chiefly discursive thought or reasoning.
The "laws of thought" are the norms of valid reasoning, and of
inference in general. By "formal" laws is meant that logic deals
with the process of reasoning apart from its contents or materials,
considering only the validity of the process, no matter what the
contents may be.
Hence logic differs from psychology, which studies also the proc-
esses of thought, but in their nature and genesis apart from their
NATURE OF LOGIC 207
validity; from epistemology, which examines the value of the con-
tents of judgments; from oratory, which tries not only to convince
but chiefly to persuade; from grammar, which deals with the
correct expression of thought.
4. Utility of Logic. Logic is a very useful science, since it
teaches the proper use of intellectual faculties in finding and teach-
ing the truth and in guarding against error. It has been called
rightly the science of sciences, or the instrument of sciences. All
men have a natural logic; all know what it is to contradict one-
self; all use arguments and detect fallacies. Scientific logic
develops this natural aptitude. It strengthens the intellectual
faculties by exercising them methodically and contributing to the
acquisition of good habits of thought. It assists the mind in find-
ing the truth and testing the value of judgments. It makes it
easier to detect the numerous fallacies which, consciously or uncon-
sciously, creep into books, conversations, speeches, and articles.
The logical mind is not drawn so irresistibly by an appeal to
prejudices, passions, and emotions. It looks for the reasons and
the inner value of the arguments used.
5. Division of Logic. This treatise will be divided into two
chapters. The first will consider the instruments which the mind
uses to reach truth, the most important of which is reasoning.
The second will deal with the proper use of these instruments,
their value, and orderly arrangement.
CHAPTER I
REASONING
Knowledge is generally discursive. Except in the case of self-
evidence, truth is acquired by proceeding from some known judg-
ment to another. This is called reasoning, by means of which a
judgment, unknown or less known before, is reached. Hence rea-
soning is the main instrument by which knowledge is acquired,
and consequently the primary object of this chapter. However,
as reasoning supposes judgments, and judgments suppose ideas,
it is also necessary to consider these elements of reasoning. Begin-
ning with the simplest, we have the three following articles: (i)
Idea. (2) Judgment. (3) Reasoning.
ARTICLE I. THE IDEA
I. NATURE OF IDEAS
I. THE IDEA IN LOGIC
i. How Logic Considers Ideas. From what has been said in
psychology we know that an idea is a simple mental representa-
tion, i.e. something in the mind, holding the place of or represent-
ing some object. This representation is called simple because it
includes no affirmation or negation, and in this differs from the
judgment. Logic does not consider the idea in all its aspects; it
leaves its genesis to psychology, and its conformity with the object
to epistemology. It considers the idea only as the element sub-
ject or predicate of the judgment. An idea may be attributed
to another according to various modes, and their connection may
be more or less necessary. On the other hand, all possible ideas
are reducible to certain higher classes in which they are contained.
208
IDEAS AND TERMS
209
Hence the necessity of speaking of predicables and of predicaments
or categories. To predicate (praedicare) means to affirm the
relation of an attribute to a subject.
2. Predicables. (a) An idea may be conceived: (i) As con-
stituting the complete essence, and only the essence of a class of
individuals, e.g. the idea of man as applied to Peter, Paul, John,
etc., or the idea of a plane figure bounded by four straight lines as
applied to all quadrilaterals. (Species.) (2) As common to sev-
eral classes of individuals and constituting their essence incompletely.
Thus I say that a man, a horse, a robin, a fly, etc., are animals.
(Genus.) (3) As something differentiating this common idea or
genus. Thus every class of animals just mentioned has essential
characteristics by which it differs from the others. (Specific
dijfference.) (4) As necessarily connected with, and flowing from,
the essence, although not constituting it. Thus in man the power
of expressing ideas by speech or writing. (Property.) (5) As
present in fact, but with no necessary connection, so that it might be
absent. Thus for man to be white, learned, tall, strong, etc.
(Accident.)
(b) Hence we have Jive predicables, that is, five modes according
to which ideas may be predicated of others: species, genus, spe-
cific difference, property, and accident. The predicates of all
judgments are attributed to the subject in one of these five ways.
Hence the following synopsis.
Predication
(i) necessary
(a) constituting the essence
(1) completely = Species
(2) incompletely,
(a) as the more com-
mon element = Genus
(6) as the restricting
element = Difference
(b) resulting from the essence = Property
(2) unnecessary = Accident
(c) Hence several individuals may agree or differ specifically.
Individuals within the same species necessarily agree in species,
genus, specific difference, and properties. Individuals within
the same genus always have some common essential note.
2IO
LOGIC
N.B. We speak here of property in the strict sense, as that
which belongs to all individuals of the same class, and to these
individuals alone. In common language other meanings are fre-
quently used.
(d) The same idea may often be considered both as genus and
as species from different points of view. Thus animal is a species
of living substances specifically different from plants which are
also living, and at the same time it is the genus of man and of
irrational animals. The genus supremum is the first division of
the most general notion, that of being. The species infima is the
last species under which individuals only are found. The follow-
ing list is known as the tree of Porphyry (a philosopher, A.D.
Substance
1
== Highest genus
= Specific difference
= Subaltern genus, also species
= Specific difference
= Subaltern genus, also species
= Specific difference
= Subaltern genus, also species
= Specific difference
= Lowest species. (Irrational animals or
brutes have other species)
= Individuals
Corporeal
~1
Incorporeal
Body
Organic
Inorganic
1
Living
Sentient
1
Non-sentient
1
Animal
1
Rational
1
Irrational
Man
1
Peter
1 I 1
Paul John Etc.
N.B. We suppose that there is no genus above substance. The
idea of being alone is above it, and this is not a genus, since, what-
ever difference that might be added to it is something or some
being, and therefore already contained in the notion of being.
IDEAS AND TERMS 211
Ideas may be within the same proximate, or only within the same
remote genus. Thus man and stone are within the same genus
of material substances or bodies, but not within the same prox-
imate genus.
3. Predicaments or Categories are the genera suprema, or high-
est genera to which all possible ideas are reducible. Aristotle
numbered ten categories: substance, quantity, quality, relation,
action, passion, place, time, situation or posture, habit or bear-
ing. All ideas certainly can be reduced to one of these groups.
The nine last together form the group known as accident. Acci-
dents are conceived, not as existing in themselves, but as being
received in and modifying the substance. Probably a further re-
duction of the categories is possible into: substance, quantity,
quality, and relation, all other accidents being reduced to rela-
tions; or into: substance existing in itself, as man, gold, etc.;
accident existing in the substance as science, color, size,
etc.; and relation referring a thing to another as cause and
effect, similarity, right or left, etc. N.B. Notice the difference
in the meaning of accident as a predicament and as a predicable.
4. Terms. A term is a word, spoken or written, used to express
an idea. The function of language has been explained in psychol-
ogy (p. 122 ff.). Since it is a sign, the term stands for something
else. This is called its supposition. The term may stand for
itself as written or spoken, for instance, "man is spelt m-a-n," or
"man is a monosyllable." This is called material supposition.
Or the term may stand for an idea that exists only in the mind,
e.g. a genus or species, for instance, "Man is a species of animal."
This is called logical supposition. Or, finally, it may stand for a
reality existing outside of the mind, e.g. "This man is wise."
This is called real supposition.
II. INTENSION AND EXTENSION OF IDEAS AND TERMS
i. Meaning. In the Porphyry tree above, higher notions
are not so complex as lower ones. Thus animal includes the
ideas of substance, material, organic, and sentient; living in-
cludes only the ideas of substance, material, and organic; body
includes only the ideas of substance and material. On the
212 LOGIC
contrary, as we go higher, the number of individuals contained
under the notion grows larger. There are more living substances
than animals, and more bodies than living substances. The total-
ity of the necessary elements of an idea, that is, of the simpler ideas
that are implied in it, is called its connotation, comprehension, inten-
sion, or contents. The totality of the individuals to which such an
idea applies is called its denotation, extension, or sphere of applica-
tion.
2. Law. From what precedes it is apparent that extension
and intension vary in opposite directions, that is, the greater the
extension, the smaller the intension, and vice versa. Since increas-
ing the intension means adding a new difference, it means forming
two or several sub-classes, each of which cannot include the same
number of individuals as all taken together. And since widening
the extension means enlarging the number of individuals, it means
removing some barrier, i.e. some difference by which the former
class was separated from neighboring classes. Thus, there are
more men than white men, more books than bound books, etc.
"White" and "bound" are new differences or new ideas intro-
duced in the connotation, and restricting men and books to fewer
applications. The addition of "tallness" to white men or of
"leather binding" to bound books would still further reduce
their extension, and so on. We suppose, however, that such
connotative additions are not already contained essentially in
the former idea so as to apply to all individuals; e.g. "trilateral
triangle" has the same extension as triangle. (Cf. p. 95.)
III. DIVISION or IDEAS AND TERMS
i. Division of Ideas. An idea is: (i) Clear, if the object which
it represents can be discerned from every other; obscure, if this is
not possible. For instance, I know clearly a bird in general, but
I may not be able to distinguish certain kinds of birds from cer-
tain others. My generic knowledge is clear, but my specific knowl-
edge is obscure. (2) Distinct, if the distinctive essential notes
are known; vague, if they are not known. Thus I may know the
scientific characteristics of a bird, or simply know it as an animal
that flies in the air. N.B. A distinct notion is always clear,
IDEAS AND TERMS 213
but a clear notion may be vague, because accidental features
may be sufficient to distinguish clearly one thing from another.
Closely connected with this division is the division of ideas into
generic, specific, and individual, the nature of which results from
what has been said on the genus, species, and individual. (3) Ade-
quate, if it represents all the object's features; inadequate, if it does
not. In the strict sense no human idea is adequate, i.e. none rep-
resents all that can be known about an object. In a relative
sense an adequate idea is one that represents as much about an
object as the present state of science allows.
2. Division of Terms. The main division special to terms is
into univocal, equivocal, and analogous.
(a) A term is univocal when it applies to several things in ex-
actly the same sense, i.e. without any change in its connotation.
Thus "man" is applied univocally to all individual men.
(6) It is equivocal when it stands for two or several different
ideas, i.e. when the connotation is not at all the same. Terms may
be equivocal (i) in sound only equivocation in speech e.g.
"right," "rite," "wright"; (2) in spelling only equivocation
in writing e.g. "lead" and "lead," "tear" and "tear"; (3) in
both sound and spelling, e.g. "pen" (writing instrument, and
cattle enclosure), "mean " (average, and vulgar).
(c) It is analogous when the sense is neither totally different nor
totally identical, i.e. when there is some connection between the
several meanings of a term, and hence its connotation is partly
the same and partly different. Such a relation may be one of
causality; thus we speak of a healthy man (enjoying health), of
a healthy food or climate (producing health), and of a healthy
appearance (caused by health). Or it may be a relation of sim-
ilarity, as when the term " fox " is applied to an animal, or to a
man because of his cunning. Such terms as "sweet, brilliant,
terrible, awful, smart," etc., have many analogous uses.
3. Division of Both Terms and Ideas. (a) Considering their
object, we have the following: (i) Positive and negative, according
as they mean the presence or the absence of a reality. "Good,"
"man," "organic," . . . are positive. "Immature," "abnor-
mal," "inorganic," ... are negative. If the reality which is
214 LOGIC
absent ought to be present, the term is called privative, e.g. "deaf,"
"dumb," or "blind," when applied to man. It must be noted
that certain terms are positive in appearance, yet really negative,
like "bad," "blind," etc. Others are negative in appearance,
i.e. preceded by a negation or by negative prefixes like im, in, a,
dis, etc., or followed by negative suffixes like less and yet in real-
ity positive, because they are the negation of a negation, e.g.
"immortal." "Death" (mors) is the cessation of a reality (life),
hence negative; and "immortal" is thus really positive. Some
terms may be regarded as positive or negative according to the
point of view. Thus "unpleasant" may mean simply "that
which is not pleasant," or "that which produces a painful feeling."
(2) Categorematic or syncategorematic, according as they can or
cannot stand alone as subjects or predicates in a judgment.
"Man," "good," white," . . . are categorematic; "very," "with,"
" through," . . . and in general, conjunctions, adverbs, prepositions,
and interjections are syncategorematic. (3) Concrete or abstract,
according as they mean a subject, or a determination without
its subject. "Man," "white," ... are concrete; "humanity,"
"whiteness," ... are abstract. N.B. Adjectives are always
concrete, for they apply to a subject. (4) Substantive or adjec-
tive, according as they represent a thing as existing in itself, e.g.
"man," "blueness," "humanity," or in a subject, e.g. "blue,"
"human." (5) Real or logical, according as the object repre-
sented can or cannot exist independently of the mind. Names of
individuals are real; genera and species are logical.
(b) Considering their relations to other terms, some terms may
be associated together, like "man" and "wise," "man" and
"white," "paper" and "blue." Others are opposed to and exclude
one another, like "white" and "black," "cold" and "hot,"
"square" and "circle." Opposition may be (i) contradictory,
when a term simply denies the other, i.e. when one is positive and
the other negative, e.g. "white" and "not-white"; (2) privative,
in the sense already explained; (3) contrary, when one implies more
than is necessary to deny the other, e.g. "white" and "black,"
"good," and "bad." Between contradictory terms there is no
middle; a thing is white or not-white. Between contrary terms
DEFINITION AND DIVISION 215
there are intermediates. Between white and black there are vari-
ous shades of gray; between good and bad there is indifference.
(c) Considering their extension, (i) Singular terms apply only
to one individual, and are indicated by a proper name, or by a
demonstrative with a common name; particular terms apply to a
part of a whole class, and are indicated by such particles as " some,"
"those," "a part of," . . . ; universal terms apply to all individ-
uals of the same class. (2) A distinction must also be made
between the distributive term, applying to all taken individually,
e.g. "soldier," "book," . . . and the collective term, applying to
all taken together, e.g. "army," "library." ... A collective
term may also be used universally: "All armies are composed of
soldiers"; particularly: "Some armies are composed of volun-
teers"; or singularly: "This army is commanded by General
X." But with regard to the soldiers that compose it, army is
always a collective term. Not the individual soldiers, but only
the aggregate can be called an army.
II. DEFINITION AND DIVISION
In psychology attention has been called to the confusion that
may arise from language. It is very important both to under-
stand the meaning intended by other men, and to use expressions
that will manifest clearly one's own ideas. The use of definition
and division is intended to make the meaning of terms clearer, and
also to make the ideas themselves more distinct.
I. DEFINITION
1. Meaning of Definition. In general, to define (de-finire,
finis) is to assign limits. Hence to define a thing is to say what
it is, so as to distinguish it from everything else. To define a
word is to explain its meaning by indicating its comprehension.
Complex ideas become clearer when their total comprehension is
analyzed and reduced to simpler ideas.
2. Kinds of Definition. A definition is nominal when it ex-
presses the meaning of a term; real, when it expresses the nature
of an object.
2l6 LOGIC
(a) Nominal definition is (i) Private and conventional when a
man uses a new term, or when he assigns a special meaning to an
already existing term; (2) common when it gives the accepted
meaning or meanings as found in dictionaries. A nominal defini-
tion consists in describing the idea which a term expresses in such
a way that it will be distinguished from all others. To the nominal
definition are reduced etymology which is sometimes misleading,
e.g. in "physiology," "geology," "geometry," the use of syn-
onyms the meaning of which is better known, and the translation
into another language in which the meaning of the equivalent term
is known.
(b) Real definition is perfect or essential when it indicates com-
pletely the essential elements of an idea and of the things which
the idea represents, i.e. the genus proximum and differentia speci-
fica. These elementary ideas in turn, if not clear, may have to
be defined again until some simple and therefore indefinable idea
is reached. Hence some ideas cannot be defined because of their
simplicity; others, on the contrary, because of their complexity
and of the great number of elements entering into their com-
prehension. Thus individuals cannot be defined perfectly. In
such cases we have to be satisfied with some of the following
imperfect modes of definition, which are frequently used, because
a perfect definition supposes that the thing to be defined is
known completely and definitely, which is seldom the case.
A descriptive definition gives a certain number of accidental
features sufficient to make the object distinctly recognizable, e.g.
shape, color, density, properties, etc.
A genetic definition indicates the process by which a thing is
produced, e.g. the materials and manufacturing process of alcohol,
paper, cigars, etc., or the factors of a psychological process.
An analytic definition indicates the materials out of which a
thing is made. Chemistry commonly uses such definitions.
A definition by the effects indicates what a thing is capable of
doing, e.g. the explosion of a chemical substance, or the purpose
of a mechanism.
All kinds of definitions agree in pointing out some feature com-
mon to several things, and some specific characteristics , that is, some
DEFINITION AND DIVISION 217
agreement and some difference which in the perfect definition are
expressed by the genus proximum and the differentia specifica.
Thus I define water as a compound (common notion) of oxygen
and hydrogen in certain definite proportions (difference) ; or a pen
as an instrument (common notion) to write with (difference which
is also common to pencils) by letting the ink flow regularly on the
paper (more special difference), etc.
3. Rules of Definitions. (a) Definitions must be reciprocal,
i.e. there must be a complete identity of the thing defined with its
definition. In other words, the definition must apply "omni et
soli definite," and be coextensive with the object. Examples. . . .
(b) Definitions must be clear, i.e. convey a definite idea of the
term to be defined. Hence, as far as possible, (i) Do not use
merely negative terms which indicate, not what a thing is, but
what it is not. (2) Use neither metaphors, nor obscure, ambig-
uous, and vague expressions. (3) Avoid the "circulus in defi-
niendo," i.e. in the definition do not use the term itself to be
defined. Examples. . . .
4. Place of Definition. What is the place of the definition in
the process of knowledge? Nominal definitions are presupposed in
the beginning of any investigation. As to the essential defi-
nition, it is the very purpose of the investigation. Hence, except
in cases in which the definition is clear, and used as a principle
(e.g. in geometry), its place is at the end, since it supposes a com-
plete and perfect knowledge of the object. If it is placed at the
beginning, it is only as a hypothesis to be verified.
II. DIVISION
i. Meaning of Division. (a) To define is to analyze or unfold
the comprehension of a term, and to go up to less complex, but more
extensive, notions. To divide is to analyze or unfold the extension
of a term, and to go down to more complex because new differ-
entiae are added but less extensive notions. If "man" is
defined by the genus "animal," and the differentia "rational," divi-
sions will be obtained by adding new differences like white and
colored, young and old, etc.
2l8 LOGIC
(b) We speak here of the logical division, by which a logical
whole, an abstract representation, a genus or class, is divided into
the species or sub-classes which are contained under it, and which
are formed by adding new specific or accidental differences. Thus
I divide the class "book" into bound or unbound; scientific and
non-scientific; quartos, octavos, etc. "Scientific books" again
may be subdivided into books dealing with theoretical and books
dealing with practical sciences, and so on. Hence we do not speak
here of (i) physical division by which the actual physical whole,
made up of parts really united in the physical world, is divided
into its component parts, e.g. the dissection of an organism; (2)
metaphysical division by which the actual metaphysical whole,
made up of ideas that are not separate except in our conception,
is divided into these ideas; e.g. the division of "animal" into life
and sensation. If these ideas are the essence of the object, meta-
physical division is the same as perfect definition, otherwise it is
the same as imperfect descriptive definition.
2. Main Rules of Logical Divisions, (i) Each process of divi-
sion must have only one basis or principle, i.e. the differentia which is
added must be the same. Thus "man" should not be divided
into "white, learned, and tall." The basis of division varies with
the purposes for which the division is made. (2) As a conse-
quence, the sub-classes of the same degree must be mutually exclu-
sive according as the new difference is present or absent. (3)
The division must be adequate, i.e. all the parts must be mentioned,
and no individual of the general class must be found which will
not have a place in one of the sub-classes. In other words, the
parts taken together must be coextensive with the whole, and
none separately must be coextensive with it. (4) The processes
of division and subdivision must be gradual, proceed without jumps,
always going to the immediately following sub-classes. (Find
instances.)
JUDGMENTS AND PROPOSITIONS 2IQ
ARTICLE II. THE JUDGMENT
I. NATURE OF THE JUDGMENT AND PROPOSITION
In Psychology (p. 107 ff) we have spoken of the process of judg-
ing. It consists in pronouncing on the agreement or disagreement
of two ideas. Hence its elements are (i) two ideas, the subject
that of which something is affirmed or denied and the
predicate which is affirmed or denied; these two ideas are
called the matter of the judgment; (2) the copula, that is, the
affirmation or denial; it is called the formal element of the
judgment.
A proposition is the expression of a judgment, and hence has, at
least implicitly, the same three elements as the judgment. The
one Latin word "amo" expresses a judgment: "ego" (subject)
"sum" (copula) "amans" (predicate). All grammatical sen-
tences are not logical propositions; for instance, interrogative,
imperative, optative sentences, as such, express no judgment.
From the point of view of logic the subject and predicate are
not always the same as from the point of view of grammar. Log-
ically, a proposition contains nothing but the subject, the predi-
cate, and the copula, and always contains these. Thus in " Dogs
bark," "bark" is not the predicate, but contains both the copula
"are" and the predicate "beings that bark." When I say: "The
boy who learns his lesson is worthy of praise," the logical sub-
ject is "the boy who learns his lesson," and the predicate is "worthy
of praise." Whatever is found in a proposition besides the cop-
ula, which is invariably the verb "to be," is always logically
reducible to the subject or the predicate.
II. DIVISION OF JUDGMENTS AND PROPOSITIONS
i. If we Consider the Quantity, i.e. the extension of the subject,
judgments are singular, particular, collective, or universal. Ex-
amples: "Paul is tall." "Some men are virtuous." "The fam-
ily is numerous." "All men are mortal." N.B. In logic, the
singular proposition is considered as universal, since the subject is
220 LOGIC
in fact taken in its total extension. Hence it has the same prop-
erties as the universal proposition.
2. If we Consider the Connection between the Subject and the
Predicate : (a) Judgments are contingent or necessary according
as the relation which is affirmed between the subject and the predi-
cate can or cannot be otherwise. Thus, "The part is not so large
as the whole" is necessary. "The part is one-third of the whole"
is contingent.
(b) In a closely related sense, but with special reference to the
mode of acquisition, a judgment is a priori, when it is not based
directly on sense-perception, e.g. "The whole is greater than its
part," or a posteriori, when experience is required, e.g. "This line
is four inches long."
(c) If the relation between the subject and the predicate is per-
ceived immediately, either by reason or by experience, the judg-
ment is intuitive; if mediately, the judgment is discursive. "I am
suffering," "This paper is white," "Two and two are four," are
intuitive. "The soul is immortal " is discursive. For further
development, and for the distinction between analytic and syn-
thetic judgments, see Psychology (p. 109).
(d) The absolute judgment simply affirms or denies. In the
conditional judgment, the affirmation or denial depends on a sup-
position. "I am pleased" is absolute; "If he comes back I shall
be pleased " is conditional. To the conditional proposition may
be reduced the disjunctive proposition, when it is affirmed or de-
nied that the subject is this, or that, or . . . ; and the conjunctive
proposition, when it is affirmed that this, and that, and . . . can-
not belong to the subject at the same time. For instance, "To-day
is either Sunday, or Monday, or Tuesday, or . . . " is disjunctive.
"A man cannot be sitting and standing at the same time" is con-
junctive. More will be said on these propositions when we speak
of the syllogism.
3. From the Point of View of Unity and Simplicity. (a)
Simple propositions are those in which there is only one subject
and one predicate, e.g. "The rose is fragrant."
(b) If various explicative or restrictive terms or propositions
are used to qualify the one subject or predicate, the proposition
JUDGMENTS AND PROPOSITIONS 221
becomes complex. It may include several propositions, one prin-
cipal, and the others subordinate. For instance: "The rose which
you gave me" (subject) is "the most beautiful I have ever seen"
(predicate).
(c) If the proposition has two or several principal subjects or
predicates, it is called compound, and is equivalent to a number of
propositions equal to the number of the subjects multiplied by the
number of the predicates. Thus : " Exercise and pure air are neces-
sary to health " is equivalent to two propositions, each with one
of the two subjects. "Peter and Paul are tall and strong" is
equivalent to four propositions: "Peter is tall," "Paul is tall,"
"Peter is strong," "Paul is strong." A proposition may be both
complex and compound.
4. If we Consider their Quality, i.e. their formal element or cop-
ula, propositions are affirmative or negative.
Looking at both the quantity and quality of propositions, we have
four kinds of propositions symbolized by four vowels:
Universal affirmative, A (affirmo)
Universal negative, E (nego)
Particular affirmative, I (afftrmo)
Particular negative, O (nego)
As already noted, individual propositions are reduced to uni-
versal.
5. Intension and Extension of the Terms in Propositions. It
is very important to know what are the extension and intension
of the terms in a proposition.
(a) In a proposition A like "All birds are vertebrates," it is clear
that the subject is taken according to its complete extension.
But it is not taken according to its whole intension, for there are
elements in it e.g. living, animal, egg-laying, etc. to which
the predicate "vertebrate" cannot be attributed.
As to the predicate "vertebrates," it is taken according to its
whole intension, since, in order to be truly called vertebrates,
birds must have all the essential characteristics of vertebrates.
But it is not taken according to its whole extension, for, besides
birds, there are other vertebrates. In other words, birds do not
222 LOGIC
exhaust the extension of vertebrates; they are only some of the
vertebrates.
It would be easy to show similarly that in a proposition 7 as
"Some men are prudent," the subject is taken according to its
partial extension and comprehension, and the predicate according
to its partial extension, but according to its whole comprehension.
Hence the first general rule of the predicate: In affirmative prop-
ositions the predicate is undistributed, i.e. not universal in exten-
sion, but must be taken according to its complete intension. This
is always true in formal logic. However, if we consider the con-
tents or matter of the proposition, it may happen that the predi-
cate has the same extension as the subject, namely, in cases of
definitions. E.g. " Logic is the science of the formal laws of
thought," "A triangle is a plane figure bounded by three straight
lines."
(b) If we take a proposition E, as "No mollusks are verte-
brates," the subject is universal in extension, but its comprehen-
sion is limited e.g. the idea of "animal," which is an essential
element of it, does not exclude the predicate "vertebrates."
The predicate is taken according to its whole extension
"mollusks are none of the vertebrates," i.e. the whole class of ver-
tebrates is excluded, but not according to its whole comprehen-
sion, for certain ideas included essentially in that of "vertebrates "
e.g. the idea of "animal " may also belong to mollusks.
In the same manner, in a proposition O, as "Some elements are
not metals," the subject is taken according to a part of its exten-
sion and comprehension; the predicate, according to its whole
extension, but not according to its whole comprehension.
Hence the second general rule of the predicate: In negative
propositions, the predicate is distributed, i.e. universal in extension,
but taken only according to a part of its comprehension.
III. RELATED PROPOSITIONS
Propositions are related in several manners, namely, as opposed,
obverted, converted, contraposed, and immediately inferrible.
i. Opposition. In the strict sense, propositions are opposed
when the same predicate is affirmed in one and denied in the
JUDGMENTS AND PROPOSITIONS 223
other, of the same subject, in the same sense, and from the same
point of view. In a broader sense, propositions are opposed when
they differ in quantity, or in quality, or in both. If they differ
in both, they are contradictory, A and O, E and /. If they differ
in quality only, when universal, they are contrary, A and E; when
particular, they are subcontrary, 7 and 0. If they differ in quan-
tity only, they are subalterns, A and 7, E and 0, the universal
A or E being the "subalternans," and the particular 7 or being
the "subalternate."
There is a strict opposition only between contradictories and
between contraries. Subalterns have the same quality. In
subcontraries, there is not necessarily identity of subject, for the
part of which the predicate is affirmed may not be the same as
that of which it is denied. The following diagram shows the vari-
ous kinds of opposition.
A E
All men are wise Contrary No men are wise
1 ; s
\ X X. o
Some men are wise Subcontrary Some men are not wise
2. Obversion consists in negativing both the copula and the
predicate of a proposition, i.e. in changing the quality of the
proposition, and giving it as predicate the term contradictory of
the former predicate. Thus, Obvertend: "All men are mortal";
Obverse: "No men are not-mortal." Again, Obvertend: "No birds
are quadruped "; Obverse: "All birds are not-quadruped." Obver-
tend: "Some men are unhappy." Obverse: "Some men are not
not-unhappy," or "Some men are not happy."
3. Conversion consists in transposing the subject to the place
of the predicate, and the predicate to the place of the subject,
without changing the quality of the proposition, and without
distributing an undistributed term. A distributed term in the
convertend may be undistributed in the converse, for what was
affirmed or denied of the whole may evidently be also affirmed
224 LOGIC
or denied of its various parts. N.B. In the following, S stands
for Subject, P for Predicate.
(a) A proposition E is susceptible of simple conversion, i.e. of a
conversion in which the same quantity is retained. SP(e) becomes
PS(e), for both terms are universal in both propositions, one as
the subject of a universal proposition, the other as the predicate
of a negative proposition.
A proposition / also is susceptible of simple conversion. SP(i)
becomes PS(i), for both terms are particular in both propositions,
one as the subject of a particular proposition, the other as the
predicate of an affirmative proposition.
(b) A proposition A cannot be converted except by limitation,
i.e. from a universal SP(a) (convertend) it becomes a particular
PS(i) (converse). For, in the convertend, P is particular as the
predicate of an affirmative proposition, and it must remain par-
ticular in the converse.
(c) A proposition cannot be converted at all, because S is par-
ticular, and if it became the predicate of a negative proposition
it would become universal. SP(o) can only be contraposed.
N.B. Let the student find applications and concrete instances
of these and of other rules of formal logic.
4. Contraposition consists in negativing the copula and the
predicate, and then converting the proposition. In other words:
First obvert, then convert. E.g. "All men are mortal "; /'No men
are not-mortal"; "No immortal beings are men" (contraposed).
"Some men are not just "; "Some men are not- just "; "Some un-
just beings are men " (contraposed). From what precedes it
follows that a proposition 7 has no contrapositive, since by obver-
sion it becomes O, which is not convertible.
5. Immediate Inference is the immediate passage from one
proposition to another. Knowing or supposing the truth or fal-
sity of a proposition we may be able to infer at once the truth or
falsity of certain others.
(a) Inferences owing to the opposition of propositions, (i) Of
two contradictories one must be true and the other false. Hence if
one is known or supposed to be true, the other is false. If one is
known to be false, the other is true. If, for instance, it is true to
JUDGMENTS AND PROPOSITIONS 225
say that "some men are just" (/), it is false to say that "no men
are just" (E). If it is false to say that "all men are just" (A),
it is true to say that "some are not just" (O).
(2) Of two contraries one must be false, and both may be false.
If one is known to be true, the other is false; but if one is known
to be false, the truth of the other cannot be inferred. If I know
the truth of "All men are mortal" (4), I know the falsity of "No
men are mortal " (). But if I know the falsity of "All men are
just" (A), I cannot infer the truth of "No men are just" (E).
The reason is that, between these two extreme propositions, there
is room for a third assertion in which alone perhaps truth is to be
found, namely, "Some men are just" (7).
(3) In the case of two subalterns, the truth of the subalternans
implies the truth of the subalternate, and the falsity of the subalter-
nate implies the falsity of the subalternans, because what is true of the
whole is a fortiori true of the part, and what is false of the part is
a fortiori false of the whole. But we cannot say that what is true
of the part is also true of the whole, nor that what is false of the
whole, is also false of the part. From the truth of "Some men
are just" (7), I cannot infer the truth of "All men are just" (A).
From the falsity of "All men are unjust" (A), I cannot infer
the falsity of "Some men are unjust" (7). It must be remarked
that logically, in such sentences as "Some men are just," we con-
sider only that which is affirmed, not that which is frequently
implied and meant, namely, that some others are not just.
(4) Of two subcontraries one must be true, and both may be true.
If one is known to be false, the other is true; but if one is known to
be true, it cannot be inferred that the other is false. If it is false
to say "Some men are immortal" (7), it is true to say "Some
men are not immortal " (O). The first proposition 7 is false, as
we suppose; then E is true as being its contradictory, and also a
fortiori O as the subalternate of E. But both 7 and may be
true, for the predicate which is affirmed or denied does not neces-
sarily apply to the same subject in each proposition. The part
of which it is affirmed in 7 may be different from the part of which
it is denied in 0. E.g. "Some men are virtuous"; "Some men
rirt
16
226 LOGIC
(b) From the obvertend, the obverse may be inferred, and vice
versa.
(c) From the convertend, the converse may be inferred, and vice versa;
except in the conversion by limitation, for SP(a) gives PS(i),
which can be converted only into SP(i).
(d) From a proposition its equivalent is inferred, for instance,
when synonyms are used, e.g. "Peter is not just," and "Peter is
unjust."
(e) Inferences are also obtained by the use of determinants, "All
metals are chemical elements," "All heavy metals are heavy
chemical elements"; and by complex conception, "All metals are ele-
ments," "A mixture of metals is a mixture of elements." Great
care must be taken in this process of inference, as frequently the
determinant has not the same relative meaning when added to
the predicate and when added to the subject. For instance,
"Voters are men," "The majority of voters is the majority of
men"; "Flies are animals," "Big flies are big animals."
ARTICLE III. REASONING
I. THE PERFECT SYLLOGISM
I. NATURE OF THE SYLLOGISM
i. Reasoning and Syllogism. As explained in Psychology
(p. 115 ff), reasoning is a mediate inference. It consists in proceed-
ing from two or several known judgments to another unknown
or less known judgment. It may be denned: The logical infer-
ence of a judgment from two or several others. An argument
means either the mental process of reasoning or its expression.
We have seen also in psychology that, if the mind proceeds from
a general law or principle to particular or individual instances, the
process is deductive, i.e. the individual or sub-class is derived
(de-duco) from the more general class in which it is contained.
If the mind proceeds from individual or particular instances to a
general law or principle, the process is inductive, i.e. individuals
or sub-classes are classified under, or put in (in-duco), a more
general class.
THE PERFECT SYLLOGISM 227
A syllogism is a perfect form of deductive reasoning. The pres-
ent article will deal only with the syllogism, and with other forms
of reasoning reducible to it. The laws of the syllogism are gener-
ally applicable to inductive reasoning. But the latter is a more
complex process in which the series of steps to be taken is more
numerous. We shall speak of it in the second chapter.
2. Elements of the Syllogism. The formal element of the syl-
logism and of any reasoning is the consequence, that is, the right
to assert the conclusion, owing to the nexus between the inferred
proposition and those from which it is inferred.
The material elements of the syllogism are:
proximate: three propositions
j antecedent or premises
remote: three terms
major proposition
minor proposition
conclusion, consequent
major term, the predicate of the conclusion
minor term, the subject of the conclusion
middle term, not found in the conclusion, but in both
premises
The conclusion expresses the relation of a predicate with a sub-
ject after they have been compared with the same third (middle)
term in the premises. The predicate of the conclusion, having
generally a greater extension than the subject, is called the major
term, and the subject is called the minor term. The premise in
which the third or middle term is compared with the major term
is called the major premise, and that in which it is compared with
the minor term, the minor premise.
All virtues are praiseworthy; Major premise t .
Prudence is a virtue; Minor premise
Therefore prudence is praiseworthy. Conclusion
II. FIGURES AND MOODS OF THE SYLLOGISM
i. Figures. Syllogisms are divided into four figures according
to the four places which the middle term may occupy in the premises,
namely, as (i) Subject in the major and predicate in the minor.
(2) Predicate in both. (3) Subject in both. (4) Predicate in
the major and subject in the minor. Or as a Latin mnemonic
228 LOGIC
verse expresses it: "Sub prae, turn prae prae, turn sub sub, denique
prae sub." (Sub stands for subiectum, prae for praedicatum.)
Representing the major term by P, the minor by S, the middle
by Af, we have:
ist fig.
2d fig.
3d %
4 th fig.
Major premise
MP
PM
MP
PM
Minor premise
SM
SM
MS
MS
Conclusion
SP
SP
SP
SP
2. Moods. The moods of the syllogism are the various man-
ners according to which the three propositions in a syllogism may be
arranged considering their quantity and quality. If for the present
no attention is paid to the validity of the syllogism, the four kinds
of propositions (A, E, I, 0) may occupy one of three positions
(major, minor, conclusion). With a proposition A as major, we
may have a minor A and four conclusions, A, E, /, or 0; or a minor
E and the same four conclusions; or a minor 7 and four conclu-
sions; or a minor O and four conclusions, giving us sixteen moods
for this one major. The same will be true for majors E, I, and O,
giving a total of sixty-four moods. Combining these now with
the four figures we find a total of two hundred and fifty-six moods.
But the majority of these are against the rules of the syllogism.
Only nineteen are valid, some of which are seldom used:
istfig. AAA, All, EAE, EIO
2 dfig. AEE, AGO, EAE, EIO
3d fig. AAI, All, EAO, EIO, IAI, OAO
4th fig. AAI, AEE, EAO, EIO, IAI
N.B. Let the student construct syllogisms according to the
various moods and figures, and, after studying the rules of the
syllogism, indicate why the other moods are not valid.
III. RULES OF THE SYLLOGISM
There are eight rules of the syllogism, four of which refer to the
terms, and four to the propositions.
i. Rules for the Terms:
(a) ist. Terminus esto triplex, maior, mediusque, minorque.
THE PERFECT SYLLOGISM 229
There must be three terms, only three, and they must be used with
the same meaning. From the very nature of the syllogism two
terms only are not sufficient, and if there are more than three, there
can be no comparison of two with the same third. Hence it is
necessary to pay attention to the meaning of the terms to see
whether it is the same, since a term used with two different mean-
ings is equivalent to two terms; e.g. " All men are mankind; Peter
is a man; therefore Peter is mankind." "All men," i.e. taken
together. Peter is only "one" man.
(b) 2d. Latins has quam praemissae conclusio non wit. No
term must have a greater extension in the conclusion than in the
premises, otherwise the conclusion contains a surplus which is
not justified by the premises, since this surplus was not compared
with the middle term. E.g. "Liars are not to be believed; liars
are men; men are not to be believed."
(c) 3d. Nequaquam medium capiat conclusio fas est. The middle
term must be found only in the premises, not in the conclusion,
where it has nothing to do. It can only vitiate the conclusion.
"This boy is poor; this boy is a ball player; this boy is a poor ball
player."
(d) 4th. Aut semel aut iterum medius generaliter esto. Once
at least the middle term must be taken according to its whole
extension. Otherwise the two parts to which it refers might be
different in each premise, and thus there would be in reality no
common middle term. The syllogism would have four terms.
"Thieves are men; saints are men; therefore saints are thieves."
2. Rules for the Propositions:
(a) 5th. Ambae affirmantes nequeunt generare negantem. If
both premises assert the agreement of the subject and of the pred-
icate with the same middle term, the conclusion must evidently
assert the agreement of the subject with the predicate.
(b) 6th. Utraque si praemissa neget nil inde sequetur. No
conclusion can be inferred from two negative premises, because
two ideas disagreeing with the same third may or may not agree
with each other.
(c) yth. Peiorem sequitur semper conclusio partem. The"peior"
or weaker part is the negative as compared to the affirmative,
232 LOGIC
in order to be true. But, if there are more than two members,
and one member is affirmed or denied in the minor, all the others
must be denied or affirmed disjunctively in the conclusion. E.g.
"To-day is either Sunday, or Monday, or ... Saturday; it is
Sunday; therefore it is neither Monday, nor Tuesday, nor . . . ";
or, "it is not Sunday; therefore it is either Monday, or Tuesday,
or . ..." The disjunctive syllogism may also be reduced to
the conditional and the categorical syllogism.
(d) A dilemma is a disjunctive argument in which, whichever
member of the disjunction be selected, something is inferred against
an adversary. E.g. "Speaking irreverently of Holy Scripture is
done either in jest or in earnest; if in jest, it is not respectful; if in
earnest, it is not good." Rules: (i) The disjunction must be com-
plete. (2) The consequences inferred from each member must
be valid.
2. Imperfect and Incomplete Syllogisms, (a) The enlhymeme
is an abbreviated argument, either one of the premises or the
conclusion being understood. E.g. "He must be sick, for he has
not come."
(6) The epicheirema is an argument in which to one or both of
the premises its reason or proof is added immediately. E.g.
"Order requires an intelligence, for chance does not produce
order; there is order in the world, otherwise it could not continue
to exist as it is; therefore the world requires an intelligence."
(c) The polysyllogism is a series of complete syllogisms in which
the conclusion of one is assumed immediately as the major of the
following. "A is B\ B is C; therefore A is C; C is D-, therefore A
is A"
(d) The sorites is a series of incomplete syllogisms or enthy-
memes in which only one conclusion, the last, is expressed. It
includes as many complete syllogisms as there are propositions
minus two. To test its validity, it is useful to reduce it to com-
plete syllogisms. "A is B\ B is C\ C is Z>; D is ; therefore A is
." There are two special rules for the sorites: (i) Only one par-
ticular premise is allowable, namely, the first; otherwise the argu-
ment is against the 4th rule of the syllogism. (2) Only one
negative premise is allowable, namely, the last major; otherwise
PRINCIPLES OF THE SYLLOGISM 233
the argument is against the 2d rule. The student may ver-
ify for himself that, if any premise except the first is particular,
the middle term will be undistributed in one of the syllogisms,
and, if any premise except the last is negative, the major term will
have a greater extension hi one of the conclusions than in the major
premise of the same syllogism.
N.B. Sometimes in order to reduce an argument to a perfect
syllogism it is necessary to use equivalent propositions. E.g.
"Those who are not good will not be rewarded; Peter is not good;
therefore Peter will not be rewarded. " Both premises are appar-
ently negative, and yet the syllogism is certainly valid, because in
reality the minor, as compared to the major, is affirmative. Again
this syllogism contains apparently four terms: (i) "those who
are not good," (2) "rewarded," (3) "Peter," (4) "good." By
using equivalents, we have "Men in the class not-good will not
be rewarded; Peter is in the class not-good; therefore he will not
be rewarded." Again "Iron (i) is a useful metal (2); this bridge
(3) is made of iron (4) ; therefore this bridge (3) is made of a useful
metal (5)." Here we have apparently five terms. But it must
be noticed that besides the mediate inference by reasoning, we
have an immediate inference by complex conception (p. 226) and
the argument is perfectly valid. This type of reasoning is used
very frequently.
III. PRINCIPLES OF THE SYLLOGISM
i. Points of View of Extension and of Comprehension. In
a syllogism, the propositions may be considered from the point
of view of comprehension or from that of extension. The predi-
cate may be looked upon as an idea contained in the comprehension
of the subject, or as a class containing the subject. "All men are
mortal," interpreted from the point of view of comprehension
means "Mortal is an attribute of all men," or "Man owing to his
nature is mortal." Interpreted from the point of view of exten-
sion it means "Man is a sub-class of the class mortal," or "Man
is one of the mortal beings." In the former case it is meant that
man has a greater comprehension than mortal; in the latter, that
232 LOGIC
in order to be true. But, if there are more than two members,
and one member is affirmed or denied in the minor, all the others
must be denied or affirmed disjunctively in the conclusion. E.g.
"To-day is either Sunday, or Monday, or ... Saturday; it is
Sunday; therefore it is neither Monday, nor Tuesday, nor . . . ";
or, "it is not Sunday; therefore it is either Monday, or Tuesday,
or ... ." The disjunctive syllogism may also be reduced to
the conditional and the categorical syllogism.
(d) A dilemma is a disjunctive argument in which, whichever
member of the disjunction be selected, something is inferred against
an adversary. E.g. "Speaking irreverently of Holy Scripture is
done either in jest or in earnest; if in jest, it is not respectful; if in
earnest, it is not good." Rules: (i) The disjunction must be com-
plete. (2) The consequences inferred from each member must
be valid.
2. Imperfect and Incomplete Syllogisms, (a) The enthymeme
is an abbreviated argument, either one of the premises or the
conclusion being understood. E.g. "He must be sick, for he has
not come."
(b) The epicheirema is an argument in which to one or both of
the premises its reason or proof is added immediately. E.g.
"Order requires an intelligence, for chance does not produce
order; there is order in the world, otherwise it could not continue
to exist as it is; therefore the world requires an intelligence."
(c) The polysyllogism is a series of complete syllogisms in which
the conclusion of one is assumed immediately as the major of the
following. "A is B\ B is C; therefore A is C; C is Z); therefore A
is D."
(d) The sorites is a series of incomplete syllogisms or enthy-
memes in which only one conclusion, the last, is expressed. It
includes as many complete syllogisms as there are propositions
minus two. To test its validity, it is useful to reduce it to com-
plete syllogisms. "A is B\ B is C; C is D\ D is E\ therefore A is
.E." There are two special rules for the sorites: (i) Only one par-
ticular premise is allowable, namely, the first; otherwise the argu-
ment is against the 4th rule of the syllogism. (2) Only one
negative premise is allowable, namely, the last major; otherwise
PRINCIPLES OF THE SYLLOGISM 233
the argument is against the 2d rule. The student may ver-
ify for himself that, if any premise except the first is particular,
the middle term will be undistributed in one of the syllogisms,
and, if any premise except the last is negative, the major term will
have a greater extension in one of the conclusions than in the major
premise of the same syllogism.
N.B. Sometimes in order to reduce an argument to a perfect
syllogism it is necessary to use equivalent propositions. E.g.
"Those who are not good will not be rewarded; Peter is not good;
therefore Peter will not be rewarded." Both premises are appar-
ently negative, and yet the syllogism is certainly valid, because in
reality the minor, as compared to the major, is affirmative. Again
this syllogism contains apparently four terms: (i) "those who
are not good," (2) "rewarded," (3) "Peter," (4) "good." By
using equivalents, we have "Men in the class not-good will not
be rewarded; Peter is in the class not-good; therefore he will not
be rewarded." Again "Iron (i) is a useful metal (2); this bridge
(3) is made of iron (4) ; therefore this bridge (3) is made of a useful
metal (5)." Here we have apparently five terms. But it must
be noticed that besides the mediate inference by reasoning, we
have an immediate inference by complex conception (p. 226) and
the argument is perfectly valid. This type of reasoning is used
very frequently.
HI. PRINCIPLES OF THE SYLLOGISM
i. Points of View of Extension and of Comprehension. In
a syllogism, the propositions may be considered from the point
of view of comprehension or from that of extension. The predi-
cate may be looked upon as an idea contained in the comprehension
of the subject, or as a class containing the subject. "All men are
mortal," interpreted from the point of view of comprehension
means "Mortal is an attribute of all men," or "Man owing to his
nature is mortal." Interpreted from the point of view of exten-
sion it means "Man is a sub-class of the class mortal," or "Man
is one of the mortal beings." In the former case it is meant that
man has a greater comprehension than mortal; in the latter, that
234 LOGIC
mortal has a greater extension than man. This is in agreement
with what has been mentioned concerning the relations of inten-
sion and extension.
2. Principles of the Syllogism. (a) From the point of view of
comprehension the eight rules of the syllogism are based on the
following principle: "Quod dicitur de continente dicitur etiam de
con ten to." That which is predicated affirmatively or nega-
tively of that which contains must be predicated also of that
which is contained. If "mortal" is contained explicitly or
implicitly in the comprehension of "man," and "man" in the
comprehension of "Peter," "mortal" is also contained in the
comprehension of "Peter."
(b) From the point of mew of extension, the principle of the syl-
logism is stated briefly as "Dictum de omni " and "Dictum de
nullo." Whatever is predicated affirmatively or negatively
of the genus or class must also be predicated of the species, sub-
classes, and individuals under this genus or class. If "man" is
a sub-class of "mortal," and "Peter " is an individual man, Peter
is also mortal.
(c) More generally the principles of the syllogism are three,
(i) Two terms agreeing with one and the same third agree with
each other. (2) Two terms one of which agrees and the other
disagrees with the same third disagree with each other. (3) Two
terms neither of which agrees with the same third cannot be
said to agree or to disagree with each other. It would be
easy to show that all the rules of the syllogism are but applica-
tions of these principles.
N.B. It may be found useful to represent syllogistic processes
by means of circles which diagrammatically show their value (see
on opposite page two illustrations showing how this can be done).
By applying the rules given for the quantity of the predicate,
one may verify which inferences are valid, and which are invalid.
3. Quantitative Syllogisms. So far we have spoken only of
the logical or qualitative syllogism. There is also a mathemat-
ical or quantitative syllogism based on quantity, succession,
equality of relations, etc. For instance: "A is equal to B; B is
equal to C; therefore A is equal to C." "A is greater than B;
PRINCIPLES OF THE SYLLOGISM 235
B is greater than C; therefore A is greater than C." "A (a
musical instrument) is in tune with B; B with C. . . ." "A is
a brother of B. . . ." " A lived before 5. . . ." In each of these
arguments we have four terms. Yet they are valid, because they
are based on quantitative self-evident relations: "Two things equal
to the same third are equal to each other "; "The greater than the
Point of view of extension Point of view of comprehension
MP(a); SM(a); Conclusion: SP(a)
MP(e); SM(i); Conclusion: SP(o)
greater is greater than the great," etc. In the syllogism: "A is
greater than B; B greater than C; therefore A is greater than C,"
if A's greatness is a, B's greatness b, and C's greatness c, we have:
a = b + x; b = c -f y; therefore a = c + y + x.
4. Primary Laws of Thought. All the principles and rules
of the syllogism are ultimately reducible to three primary laws
of thought implied in all affirmations, negations, and processes of
236 LOGIC
reasoning, (i) Law of identity: "A thing is what it is." Or
logically: "Every subject is its own predicate"; "A is A." (2)
Law of contradiction: "The same thing cannot at the same time and
from the same point of view be and not be." Or logically: "The
same predicate cannot at the same time and in the same sense be
affirmed and denied of the same subject." (3) Law of excluded
middle: "A thing is or is not." Or logically: "Of two contradic-
tory attributes one must be affirmed and the other denied of the
same subject." These laws are the basis on which the syllogism
rests, and are implied in every process of thinking and judging.
CHAPTER II
METHOD
OBJECT OF THIS CHAPTER
1. Meaning. Method (68os ftera, road or way toward) in gen-
eral signifies the adaptation of means in order to do something and
to reach safely a determined end. In logic, it signifies the adap-
tation of means in order to reach scientific truth, i.e. the knowl-
edge of things from their causes and in their relations to other
things. To know, in the strict sense, is not simply to apprehend
a fact or an event, but also to perceive the reasons, laws, causes,
and relations of facts and events. Methodology teaches how to
proceed in order to acquire science. In every syllogism there is
a progress from the premises to the conclusion. Knowledge is
generally acquired by a series of reasonings. Hence, although a
method is required for one single reasoning, method as understood
here applies to a more complex progress in which arguments of
different value and from different sources are used.
2. Importance. It is important to proceed methodically,
(i) Unless the road is known, one is likely to go astray, or at least
to lose much time in finding the way. This will be made clear if
you compare, with regard to both quantity and quality, the work
of two men, one of whom proceeds methodically, and the other
does not. (2) It is necessary to proceed gradually, not by jumps;
precipitation is likely to mislead the mind. (3) What is acquired
with method, and orderly arranged, is more easily memorized, and
only such a methodical arrangement of ideas deserves the name of
knowledge.
Thus, whereas the first chapter of logic indicated how to make
a valid formal syllogism, and as such is indispensable, there re-
mains to show (i) the value of the premises used; if the form be
correct, but the materials weak, the whole edifice lacks solidity;
237
238 LOGIC
(2) the use to be made of the syllogism, and the mode of proceed-
ing step by step from one conclusion to another; (3) the danger of
fallacies which may come either from the form or the matter of
the syllogism.
3. Division of this Chapter. Method being a progress supposes
two extremes: one, the starting-point; the other, the end to be
reached. As the direction of any movement or progress is derived
from the term to which it tends, "motus specificatur a ter-
mino " we must begin with the end to be reached, for it is from
this end that the process derives its orientation. As to the proc-
ess itself from the starting-point to the terminus, it supposes that
we know the value of the instruments to be used, the various kinds
of methods, and the wrong ways, fallacies or errors. Hence our
division: (i) The extremes; (a) the terminus ad quern, or end to
be reached, (b) the terminus a quo, or starting-point. (2) The
progress itself; (a) the value of the arguments, (b) the two main
general methods, (c) the obstacles.
ARTICLE I. THE TERMINI
I. THE END TO BE REACHED
Man's intelligence strives after science, that is, a certain mode
of knowledge to which his innate curiosity instinctively impels
him. Man not only wants to see things and events, but he is
anxious to know their "how" and "why" two words which
are frequently used by both the child and the adult.
I. THE NATURE OF SCIENCE
The term "science" is used with both a subjective and an
objective meaning. It signifies the knowledge and the object of
knowledge, and we speak of the science which a man possesses,
and of the various sciences which he studies.
i. Characteristics of Scientific Knowledge. Science is always
knowledge, but knowledge in its broad sense is not always sci-
ence, (i) Sense-perception, of itself, is not scientific knowledge.
(2) Things known directly and immediately by the intellect, i.e.
SCIENCE 239
self-evident principles, are not said to be known scientifically,
but are the bases of science. Scientific knowledge is essentially
the knowledge of things through their causes and their common prin-
ciples. It possesses the three following characteristics:
(a) // is certain. It starts from something certain, and uses valid
inferences that lead to certitude. This certitude is based on rea-
sons and justified by proofs. Unscientific knowledge is frequently
doubtful and accepted without proof.
(b) It is general. The fact or individual as such is not the object
of science. Science has for its object the causes common to several
happenings, the types common to several beings, the laws com-
mon to several phenomena. To know that a man died is not sci-
ence; to know that he died on account of his swallowing a certain
poison which, under the same circumstances, is capable of killing
not only this man, but any other man, because it has such or
such effects on the organism, is scientific. To see a dog is not
science; to know its nature and essential features belongs to sci-
ence. To perceive that the stone thrown up in the air falls down
is not science; the law of gravitation gives a scientific explanation
of the fact.
(c) It is systematic. Facts are only the materials of science.
They are not science itself any more than the materials of a house
are a house. The materials become a house by their adjustment
according to certain relations. So also facts become science only
when their connections and relations are perceived, and when they
are reduced to common principles and laws.
2. Two Meanings of Science. (a) If stress is laid on the knowl-
edge of causes and on certitude , it may be insisted that such causes
give necessary conclusions, i.e. conclusions which, under existing
circumstances, the mind conceives as incapable of being otherwise.
Mathematical sciences are the best types of this meaning of
science.
(b) If stress is laid on the element of systematization, the limits
of science are widened and may be made to include not only con-
clusions that are certain, but also others that are more or less
conjectural and hypothetical. These, it is true, do not consti-
tute science in the strict sense; they are called scientific because
240
LOGIC
they are obtained methodically, connected with strictly ascer-
tained conclusions, and, for the present, offer a plausible explana-
tion of facts. Many such conclusions are found in empirical
sciences.
3. Advantages of Scientific Knowledge. From the charac-
teristics of scientific knowledge its advantages are easily
derived.
(a) It enables the mind to understand and explain things; to
know not only what happens, but also why it happens.
(b) It makes it possible to foresee the future, so that measures
may be taken accordingly. Certain events, like an eclipse of the
sun or an explosion of dynamite, may be foreseen and predicted
with certitude. Others, like a storm, human actions, political
events, etc., can be foreseen only with varying degrees of prob-
ability. Besides freedom which is found in human actions, the
reason of this difference is the complexity of the causes that con-
tribute to produce a given phenomenon, and the difficulty of
knowing them all in their various relations.
(c) It increases our power over nature, for, when the causes that
produce a thing are known, they may be brought about, or avoided,
or combined in a thousand ways, so as to give rise to intended
results. Machinery is an obvious instance. It is the adaptation
of many causes, laws, and principles for certain purposes. To
know the cause of a disease is the first step toward curing it. To
know the character of a man is of great importance in dealing
with him.
II. CLASSIFICATION OF SCIENCES
i. Distinction and Subordination. (a) Sciences are distin-
guished and classified according to their formal objects, that is, not
according to the object itself of which they treat considered in its
totality (material object), but according to the special point of
view which they take of it (formal object). Thus many sciences
have the human body for their material object : anatomy, physiol-
ogy, pathology, histology, hygiene, etc. . They are distinct
sciences because they do not study the human body under the
same aspect.
SCIENCE 241
(b) Sciences may be subordinated in several ways, (i) // we
consider their objects, some are more general, and the knowledge
of them is supposed by the more special. Thus ethics supposes
psychology; trigonometry supposes geometry, etc. This does not
mean that the higher sciences must always be studied first; some-
times the inferior and more special sciences may be a necessary
means toward the superior. (2) // we consider their utility, some
sciences are speculative, and others more immediately practical.
As a rule practical sciences are based on theoretical sciences.
(3) // we consider their origin, empirical sciences come or should
come first, since psychologically experience comes before general-
ization. (4) // we consider their excellence, the higher the object,
the nobler the science. Thus the knowledge of God and of the
human soul is higher than that of nature.
2. Classification. It is difficult, not to say impossible, to
give a satisfactory classification of sciences, (i) In fact, scien-
tists do not agree in all details. (2) The number of distinct
sciences increases with experience, and mere chapters of former
sciences little by little become special sciences. (3) The limits
separating distinct sciences are largely artificial. Since all the
objects of nature, and all aspects of these objects, are in close con-
nection, it is not possible for any science to be independent; it
must necessarily go beyond its own limits into the domain of other
sciences.
Without stopping to consider the merits of other classifications,
the following seems sufficiently complete and satisfactory. Gen-
eric sciences alone will be mentioned, and these again may be
subdivided.
I. Physical and natural sciences, i.e. sciences of the material
world.
i. Inorganic
(a) General properties of matter, Physics
Nature, composition, and special properties
of elements and compounds, Chemistry
(c) Minerals, Mineralogy
(d) Description of the earth, Physical Geography
(e) Constitution of the earth, Geology
(/) Other mundane bodies, Astronomy, Cosmogony, etc
242
LOGIC
2. Organic
(a) Life in general,
(b) Plant life,
(c) Animal life,
Biology
Botany
Zoology
N.B. Both botany and zoology are subdivided into
the study of
(a) General structure of organisms,
(&) Minute structure,
(c) Functions,
(J) Diseases,
(e) Early development,
(/) Fossil remains,
Anatomy
Histology, Cystology
Physiology
Pathology
Embryology
Paleontology
truth,
duty,
beauty,
Psychology
Logic and Episte-
mology
Ethics
Msthetics
II. Sciences of man considered as intelligent, free, and social,
either as an individual or in his social relations.
:. Individual (a) Conscious processes,
(6) Normative sciences of
2. Social (a) Language, Philology
(b) Wealth, Political Economy
(c) Social ethics and politics, Law and Jurisprudence
(d) Description of States, Political Geography
(e) Past events, History and Historical Sciences, e.g.
Epigraphy, Archeology, etc.
(/) Early human development, Anthropology
(g) Human races, Ethnology
III. Mathematical sciences, i.e. sciences of abstract quantity.
1. Of numbers,
2. Of extension,
|3. Of movement and force,
Arithmetic, Algebra
Geometry, Trigonometry
Mechanics
IV. Metaphysical sciences, i.e. higher constitution and nature,
1. Of material substances,
2. Of the human soul,
3. Of God,
Cosmology
Philosophy of mind
Theodicy
THE STARTING-POINT 243
II. THE STARTING POINT
1. Doubt. Any question and any desire for learning suppose
in the mind both knowledge and doubt; namely, the knowledge,
however vague and imperfect, of something concerning the object
we want to study, for, if man were altogether ignorant of it, he
would not even suspect that any question may be asked about it;
and a doubt with regard to the special points to be examined and
the answer to the questions proposed. This doubt, however,
bears on a special point. It is not universal, for, if everything,
including sense-experience, the value of the faculties of knowledge,
and the first principles be doubted, it becomes absolutely impos-
sible ever to reach anything certain. Since they are primary,
self-evident facts and principles cannot be reconstructed out of
anything else.
Descartes began by a universal doubt, but did not reach certi-
tude except through inconsistencies, implicitly admitting later
on what he had formerly rejected as doubtful. He warns us him-
self that his example is not to be followed indiscriminately. Log-
ically, certitude can come only from certitude, universal doubt can
beget only doubt, since the conclusion must be contained in the
premises. Moreover, it is impossible to demonstrate everything,
for, if a proposition M be demonstrated by L, L by K, K by /,
and so on, without ever reaching a proposition standing by itself
and on its own merits, no certitude can ever be obtained.
2. Positive Data. The process may be analytical or synthet-
ical. In the former case, the positive starting-point will be a fact
or a series of facts; in the latter, it will be self-evident and indemon-
strable principles. Facts will be gathered from internal or external
experience. Principles will be either general, or special to each
science. Thus the principle of sufficient reason is general; the
axioms and definitions of geometry are more special. In all these
are contained implicitly or explicitly the fact of the subject's
existence, which is implied in every conscious process; the
subject's power to know which is implied in the act itself of
knowledge; the primary laws of thought identity, contra-
244 LOGIC
diction, and excluded middle without which consistent thinking
is an impossibility.
ARTICLE II. THE PROGRESS
I. THE VALUE OF THE ARGUMENTS
Method is the way to make progress from the known to the
unknown, or from the better known to the less known. Hence
the importance of knowing the value of inferences and reasonings.
These may be (i) certain, i.e. start from premises that are certain,
and lead to conclusions that are also certain; (2) more or less prob-
able and worthy of assent; (3) false, either because the premises
are false, or because the rules of the syllogism are not observed.
Only the first two classes belong here as instruments of science,
and as yielding scientific results, permanent or provisional. The
last class, on the contrary, is an obstacle to science, and will be
considered later.
I. DEMONSTRATION
1. Nature of Demonstration. Demonstration is a process of
reasoning in which from premises known to be certain a conclu-
sion which is also certain is inferred. Hence two conditions are
required: (i) The formal validity of the process of reasoning;
(2) the certainty of the premises, either because they are self-evi-
dent, or because they are ultimately reducible to self-evident
facts and principles, since, as was said above, the process of demon-
stration requires indemonstrable principles. Thus the last the-
orems of Euclidean geometry are based on the preceding ones, and
ultimately on principles, axioms, and definitions.
2. Various Kinds of Demonstration. A demonstration is:
(a) (i) Direct, when it proceeds by positive arguments, and shows
positively that the predicate does or does not belong to the sub-
ject. (2) Indirect, when it shows the falsity of the contradic-
tory or of opposite propositions. To prove the freedom of the will
from consciousness is to proceed directly; to prove it from the
consequences of determinism is to proceed indirectly.
(b) (i) A priori, synthetic, or deductive, when it proceeds from
VALUE OF ARGUMENTS 245
that which is in reality prior, namely, from the cause to the effect,
from the essence to the property, from the law to the phenomenon.
(2) A posteriori^ analytic, or inductive, when it proceeds from that
which is in reality posterior, namely, from the effect to the cause,
from the property to the essence, from the phenomenon to the law.
To prove the immortality of the soul from the soul's spirituality
is to proceed a priori; to prove the existence of God from the world
is to proceed a posteriori. In natural sciences, these two methods
are generally combined. We proceed first from the effects to the
cause, and the knowledge of the cause leads again to the knowledge
of other effects.
N.B. Prioriness and posterioriness here are taken in the natural,
not in the logical, order, since logically the premises, whatever
be their natural relation to the conclusion, are always prior to the
conclusion. In the a posteriori demonstration, the fact is better
known than, or logically prior to, the law, although in the natural
order it is but an application of the existing law.
(c) (i) Perfect propter quid, 8m, "why" when it gives
the necessary, proximate, special, and adequate reasons or prin-
ciples of the conclusion. Hence it is always a priori. (2) Imper-
fect quia, on, "that " when it shows simply the existence of
a thing, or does not give its intrinsic, special, or proximate reasons.
N.B. Causes and reasons are necessary when they make it
impossible for the conclusion to be otherwise; proximate and spe-
cial when there is no link omitted between the conclusion and its
premises; adequate when they give the complete reason of the
conclusion. The perfect demonstration is possible chiefly in math-
ematics, logic, and metaphysics, where it can start from the
axioms of quantity, and from self-evident principles considered
either as laws of thought or as principles of being and existence.
(d) (i) Absolute when the premises are true in themselves and
for all men. (2) Relative, or ad hominem, when the premises are
admitted by an adversary, although they may not be certain.
The former is valid for all, not the latter. To base a demonstra-
tion on principles or facts which are admitted by an opponent,
but known to be false by the one who uses them, is a lack of intel-
lectual honesty. Probabilities are frequently used in this way.
246 LOGIC
II. PROBABLE ARGUMENTS
i. Nature of Probable Arguments. (a) Probable arguments
are those in which one of the premises is, or both premises are,
probable, and lead to a probable conclusion. Probability means
likelihood, approach to truth, or greater force of argument. It
refers to the object, and produces in the mind the state of opin-
ion, that is, an assent without the firmness of certitude. Degrees
of probability are numberless, and the corresponding states of
opinion are more or less firm, nearer to, or farther from, doubt and
certitude. In fact, doubt and certitude exist only in one point,
at each extreme of the line of mental assent; doubt is the absence
of assent; certitude is full, complete, and unrestricted assent.
Opinion with its various degrees occupies the whole range between
these two extremes. Probability is much more frequent than
certitude, especially in practical matters, in historical, moral,
social, political, and even natural sciences. But in many cases,
as explained in psychology, subjective motives are added to objec-
tive evidence, and make one consider as certain that which pru-
dently and logically should be considered only as probable (p.
117 ff.).
(b) The general rule of probable arguments is that the conclu-
sion cannot have a greater probability than the weaker premise. We
must understand in this sense also the general rules: "Latius hos
quam . . . ." and: "Peiorem sequitur semper. ..." If in a
series of arguments, or in the same argument, two or several prop-
ositions are only probable, the conclusion represents their combined
weakness. A mathematical example will illustrate this: In toss-
ing a coin, the chances of turning tails are ^; the chances of turning
tails twice in succession are i X i, i.e. , for there are four chances
in all, two for tails and two for heads. In the same way probabil-
ity means a chance for truth. If to this be added another chance,
the probability of both chances coinciding with truth is smaller
than it would be if only one proposition were probable.
However, probabilities, when independent, form a cumulative
evidence, and may produce certitude. Thus a coincidence of inde-
pendent facts, each one only probable in itself, may show the guilt
VALUE OF ARGUMENTS 247
of an accused person, because his guilt is the only sufficient reason
of this coincidence. Cumulative evidence is frequently used in
all sciences.
The main probable arguments are analogy and example, statis-
tics, hypothesis, and authority.
2. Analogy and Example. (a) Analogy applies to an object
what is known to apply to another object having with the former
one or several points of resemblance. From certain features
known to be common certain other features are inferred to be also
common. Example and analogy are closely related, and these
terms are frequently used for each other. Strictly speaking,
however, analogy argues from one instance to another by passing
through a general law; it is inductive and deductive. Example
goes directly and conjecturally from one instance to another.
Thus, knowing that a certain disease is produced by micro-organ-
isms, I infer by analogy that another disease having some similar
symptoms is also due to a similar cause. Here is implied the gen-
eral principle that the same symptoms are due to the same cause.
To deter a man from excess in drinking, I may point out to him the
example of this or that man who is an habitual drunkard.
(b) Analogy and example are of frequent use in all sciences and
in daily life. They are the starting-point of many discoveries,
by suggesting solutions which later on may be proved true. Their
value depends on the number and character of the observed re-
semblances, and thus ranges anywhere from certitude to zero.
Hence extreme caution is necessary in using and admitting these
arguments. They are sources of metaphors and allegories which
must not be taken as true beyond the legitimate value of the
inference. Points of resemblance must not cause one to over-
look the differences.
3. Statistics consist in noting the absolute and relative fre-
quency of certain happenings. All happenings of a certain nature
and within a certain period are numbered, and averages are taken
and compared with various circumstances which are conjectured
to be the causes of these happenings. Thus I may note the number
of divorces for a whole nation or for a certain class of people dur-
ing a certain period of time, compare their increasing or decreas-
248 LOGIC
ing rate with changes in social, political, and religious conditions,
and thus find out the causes which influence their frequency.
Statistics are of frequent use in social sciences, for mortality,
births, diseases, crimes, accidents, suicides, etc., and also in many
other sciences, e.g. for harvests, money circulation, mineral and
agricultural products, etc. Statistics are very useful because ob-
served coincidences help to find the causes of phenomena, or at
least the various influences under which they happen. But they
are difficult both to make and to interpret correctly because the
causes and influences of events may be very complex and
varied. There is danger of mistaking a mere fortuitous coinci-
dence for the true cause, and of overlooking some important
factors.
4. Hypothesis (Greek, "placing under") in general consists in
supposing (Latin, sub-positio) or presuming the solution looked
for, and dealing with it as if it were known. It is, therefore, a
tentative explanation to be verified.
(a) When a fact or a series of facts has been observed, we may
not know its law immediately. Or even if the law is known in
its generality, we may not know all its determinations. A
hypothesis consists in supposing the law to be true, and in working
on this assumption so as to ascertain whether it is true and justi-
fied. The principle which impels to frame hypotheses is the prin-
ciple of sufficient reason which applies to all phenomena. The
faculty that frames them is the imagination under the guidance
of reason.
(b) The main utilities of hypotheses are, (i) to offer a more or
less probable solution of a problem which perhaps cannot be solved
definitively, or which has not yet received a satisfactory solution;
(2) to coordinate and group results already obtained, and to sys-
tematize them into a class that will be more or less permanent;
(3) to incite to work in a certain direction in order to ascertain if
the hypothesis is verifiable; (4) to throw many side-lights on the
problem, even if the hypothesis is disproved, and to point the way
to a true solution.
(c) The conditions of a scientific hypothesis are the following:
(i) It must not be taken as an end, but as a means; not as a prop-
VALUE OF ARGUMENTS 249
osition to be proved, but as a proposition to be tested. (2) It must
not contradict any well-ascertained facts, conclusions, or principles,
but sometimes may overthrow conclusions hitherto accepted as
certain. (3) It must not be gratuitous, but based on facts. (4) It
must be adequate, i.e. applicable to all the observed phenomena,
and assign to them what is, or seems to be, a sufficient explana-
tion. A hypothesis which certainly contradicts one fact which is
certain, ceases to be valid. (5) It must be capable of some veri-
fication or disproof, for its value consists chiefly in the hope of
testing it.
5. Authority. Historical sciences are based on human author-
ity. In all other sciences, as well as in daily life, men frequently
rely on the authority of others. Few are the beliefs and actions
prompted exclusively, and even principally, by personal reflec-
tion, when compared with the number of those prompted by the
authority of others, common opinion, education, individual ad-
vice and suggestion.
(a) In general it may be said that the value of human author-
ity as such ordinarily does not go beyond probability, for any man
may be deceived or be a deceiver. Yet there may be found such
guarantees in one single witness or in several independent wit-
nesses cumulative probability as to give a moral certitude.
On questions of facts, especially of facts that are easily observable,
it is possible in many cases to reach certitude, but in other cases
probability alone can be obtained. On questions of doctrine and
systems, a competent man has greater authority; yet none is
infallible, and for a man who can appreciate and weigh the
reasons that are given, an authority is worth these reasons.
(b) Hence two extremes must be avoided: (i) Making of sci-
ence a mere study and repetition of the opinions of others. This
does not give a scientific knowledge; it is a lazy process dis-
pensing with private research and progress. (2) Neglecting
completely what others have said. We may profit by their
discoveries and discussions, avoid doing the same work twice,
proceed more safely where they have groped and, perhaps,
lost their way, appropriate the conclusions of science already
acquired.
250 LOGIC
II. THE TWO GENERAL METHODS
1. Induction and Deduction. The two general methods are
induction and deduction. Induction goes from the particular to
the universal, from the effect to the cause, from the phenomenon
to the law. It tries to generalize, to find uniformities and general
truths. Deduction follows the reverse process. Hence, consid-
ering the real order of things, induction is regressive; deduc-
tion, progressive. The cause is prior to the effect, but the effect
may be known better than the cause (cf. p. 116.). The chief
instrument of induction is analysis; of deduction, synthesis.
2. Analysis and Synthesis. By analysis (re-solutio) is meant a
decomposing, a passing from the more complex to the simpler.
By synthesis (com-positio) is meant a putting together, a passing
from the simpler to the more complex. The whole which is decom-
posed by analysis, and the parts that are put together by synthesis,
are to be understood, not according to extension, but according to
comprehension. Thus the human organism is more complex than
a single organ, since it includes this organ, and others besides. The
fact is more complex than the law, since it is a concrete appli-
cation of the law, i.e. it is the law plus some individual determina-
tions. In general, analysis proceeds from the conditioned to the
condition; synthesis, from the condition to the conditioned.
(a) In the case of facts or of concrete realities, analysis reduces
the whole to its parts or components; either really, as, for instance,
water to oxygen and hydrogen; white light to the colors of the
spectrum; the organism, plant or animal, to its organs, tissues,
etc.; or mentally, as, for instance, in psychology we have tried to
analyze the complex mental states into their elements which do
not exist separately as simple. Synthesis proceeds in the opposite
direction.
(b) In the case of ideas or mental truths, e.g. in mathematics,
analysis proceeds from a more complex to a more simple statement
until known principles are reached. Synthesis starts from the
principles, and deduces consequences from them. Thus when I
consider the theorem "The sum of the angles of a triangle is equal
to two right angles," I may ascend from it to simpler principles
INDUCTION AND DEDUCTION 251
(analysis), or, as is commonly done in learning geometry, descend
toward it from the simpler principles (synthesis).
I. INDUCTION
We do not speak here of complete induction, or induction per
enumerationem simplicem, which consists in affirming of the
whole in the conclusion that which has been affirmed of all the
parts enumerated separately in the premises. E.g. "It rained
Sunday, Monday, Tuesday . . . and Saturday; but these are all
the days of the week; therefore it rained every day of the
week." "Peter, Paul, John ... are under thirty; but Peter,
Paul, John . . . are all the men here present; therefore . . . ."
Such an induction is not scientific, and leads to no new result. It
is a mere process of addition based on the principle that the total-
ity equals the sum of its parts. We speak only of incomplete in-
duction, e.g. "This water is composed of oxygen and hydrogen;
therefore all water is composed of oxygen and hydrogen."
i. Description of the Inductive Process. The inductive proc-
ess includes three steps: knowledge of individual facts, generaliza-
tion, verification.
(a) The knowledge of facts, internal or external, is acquired by
observation and experiment. Experiment is a special mode of,
and includes, observation. To observe is to watch attentively
phenomena as they occur in nature when it is left to itself. To
experiment is to question nature. It consists in varying and con-
trolling circumstances so as to see what results will follow. When-
ever possible, experiment is superior to simple observation, because
it creates circumstances, and consequently results which other-
wise might never occur. I may simply observe the behavior of
an animal, or experiment with drugs to see how the animal's be-
havior will be affected by them. Observation and experiment
are very important. If the facts are not observed correctly, the
theory based on them cannot fail to be weak for lack of sufficient
foundation.
The qualities required are: (i) On the object's side (a) precision
as to the circumstances; (b) the variation of these circumstances
in a precise manner; (c) the isolation, as far as possible, of the
252 LOGIC
phenomenon under observation from other phenomena. (2) On the
observer's side, (a) physiological and physical conditions: health and
normal state of organs; use of good instruments; (b) intellectual:
attention to all circumstances and to analogies; desire to know;
(c) moral: patience, impartiality, carefulness to discriminate accu-
rately between what is observed and what is inferred, between
what is really perceived and what is imagined.
(b) When a fact or a sufficient number of facts have been ob-
served, their uniformities are noted, and their laws assigned, first
generally in a tentative way.
(c) The theory must be verified by new observations and exper-
iments.
2. Methods of Induction. Observation ?.nd experiment are
made according to four methods known as the four inductive
methods. All inductions, both in science and in daily life, depend
on the use of one or several of these methods by which experience
is interpreted.
(a) Method of agreement. When a phenomenon occurs in two
or several cases which agree only in one circumstance, this circum-
stance is probably the cause of, or at least causally related to, the
phenomenon. In other words, if, in several instances where a
phenomenon occurs, there is only one common antecedent, this
antecedent is the cause. The value of the conclusion depends on
the constancy and multiplicity of coincidences under varying
circumstances. Thus, if after eating a certain food whatever
other food I may also take with it I invariably feel sick, this
article of food is very likely the cause of my sickness.
(b) Method of difference. Two or several instances are observed,
one in which the phenomenon occurs, and the others in which it
does not. If all the circumstances except one are the same in
all cases, this one circumstance is probably the cause. In other
words, the one difference in the antecedent is the cause of the dif-
ference in the result. Thus sickness or death is ascribed to a cer-
tain poison because, everything else being identical, the taking of
the poison is followed by ackness or death.
N.B. The joint method of agreement and difference combines
these two methods.
INDUCTION AND DEDUCTION 253
(c) Method of residues. It is a modification of the method of
difference. When in a group of consequents, a, b t c, d, some, for
instance, a, b, c, are known to be due to certain antecedents A, B,
C, the residual consequent d is probably caused by a residual
antecedent D. If I have bought three articles, a, b, c, and know
how much I have spent in all and how much a and b cost, I can find
the cost of c. Knowing what effects are due to the presence of
certain elements in a compound, a new effect is ascribed to the
presence of a new element.
(d) Method of concomitant variations. If variations of a phe-
nomenon occur simultaneously with variations in the antecedent,
it is probable that these two variations are causally related. Thus
the concomitant variations of the number of vibrations with the
pitch of a sound, or of the thermometer with the temperature,
show that these phenomena are causally related.
N.B. As much as possible these methods must be used to-
gether to test, correct, verify, and strengthen one another. The
experiments in each must be varied and multiplied according to
the nature of the case.
3. The Principle of Induction. (a) In induction, the conclu-
sion has a greater extension than the premises, since from observed
particular instances a general conclusion is drawn applying to un-
observed instances. If the process is valid, there must be some
principle that makes this passage legitimate. Observation and
experiment are always limited to few cases, and, by themselves,
justify only the affirmation of the facts observed. Nor is the
association of ideas sufficient to justify this passage.
According to associationists, as mentioned in Psychology (p.
113), because several times a man has observed that the same ante-
cedents were followed by the same consequents, he is led to expect
this succession in every case. Little by little these associations
and partial uniformities lead to the formation by the mind of the
general principle of the uniformity of the laws of nature: "Nature
always acts in the same manner under the same circumstances."
In addition to its psychological difficulties, this view is open to
the following objections: (i) This principle would have only a
subjective and relative value; it could be changed by subsequent
254 LOGIC
experiences and habits. (2) A law is frequently discovered after
one observation, or very few observations, and hence not through
constant associations. On the contrary, sometimes induction
corrects long-standing prejudices due to associations and habits
of thought. (3) The number of cases in which constant uniform-
ities are perceived by the senses is very small when compared to
the number of cases in which they are not observed.
(b) Some other criterion is needed since experience can never
account for the universality and necessity of knowledge. In fact,
the principle of induction is the principle of the uniformity of nature:
"The same causes produce the same effects," or "Causal relations
are constant," or "Nature is governed by constant laws." This
principle is not derived from mere sense association, but rests imme-
diately on the principle of sufficient reason, which in turn is but an
application of the principle of contradiction. Not only does every
single fact require a sufficient reason without which it could not
occur, but a series of coincidences, or harmonious and constant
occurrences, must be assigned an adequate reason. A single fact
requires a proportionate cause. The recurrence of the same fact
requires the sameness of natural inclination and of energy, which
alone can explain the observed uniformities, and from which we
are led to know future and unobserved uniformities. Wherever
there is the same nature, i.e. the same source of activity, there
also the same effects will necessarily occur.
II. DEDUCTION
i. Description of the Deductive Process. (a) Deduction
starts from principles, and goes to their special applications. These
principles may either be self-evident, like the axioms and defini-
tions of geometry, or result from a previous inductive process, like
the various laws of natural sciences. Deduction is used especially
in abstract sciences, the best types of which are mathematics and
geometry. In physical sciences it is used to demonstrate that
which has been found to be the truth. The professor may some-
tunes proceed deductively in proving what he has discovered by
induction. Generally speaking, however, the method of demon-
stration should be essentially the same as the method of invention.
INDUCTION AND DEDUCTION 255
(b) Deduction includes three steps: (i) Definition, i.e. the unfold-
ing of the intension of the terms, and the indication of the exact
meaning in which they are used. (2) Division, i.e. the unfolding
of the extension of the terms, and classification. (3) Proof, i.e.
the assigning of the reasons, or demonstration proper.
2. Utility of Deduction. Two main objections are raised by
Stuart Mill against the usefulness of the deductive syllogism.
(a) It is sterile, and teaches nothing new, since the major already
contains the conclusion. In the following syllogism, "All men are
mortal; Socrates is a man; therefore Socrates is mortal," in order to
be able to affirm the major, I must already be certain of the conclu-
sion, for, the major would not be true if Socrates were not mortal.
Answer: (i) The conclusion may be contained only virtually
and implicitly in the premises. The syllogistic process makes
it explicit. Who can say that deduction is sterile in geometry,
and that he who knows the principles knows also all the theorems
which these principles serve to prove? (2) Deduction teaches the
reason why the conclusion is true. I might know that Socrates
was mortal because in fact he died, that the number 275 is
divisible by 5 because I have tried the division, and that the
square built on the hypothenuse of a right-angled triangle is
equal to the sum of the squares built on both its sides because
I have measured them. But demonstration will give me the
reason of these truths, show not only that they are so, but why
they are so, and why they are universal.
(b) The syllogism is a petitio principii; in affirming the major
we already suppose the truth of the conclusion.
Answer, (i) In the example given by Mill, the major is not
taken extensively, but comprehensively. "All men are mortal"
does not mean primarily "All men numerically are mortal," but
"mortal" belongs to the comprehension of "man," or "Human
nature implies mortality," an assertion which is based on the
knowledge of human nature acquired by an inductive process.
(2) Hence induction does not require the complete enumeration
of all cases.
(c) Mill also says that, in fact, we do not argue from the general
to the individual, but from the individual to the individual. For
256 LOGIC
instance, a matron unhesitatingly prescribes a remedy for her
neighbor's child simply because it has cured her own child.
Answer. Universal principles are implied here; that the same
symptoms are signs of the same disease; and that what has cured
the disease in one case is likely to cure it in all cases. The matron
would give the same advice to anybody else, thus showing that,
in the case of her neighbor's child, she only applies a general
principle.
3. Induction and Deduction Compared. In conclusion we
may briefly compare the uses of induction and of deduction.
(a) Induction gives to deduction many of its principles. It is
the main method of the sciences of nature. But with the progress
of sciences, more laws are discovered, and deduction of particular
instances from these known laws is more frequent.
(b) Deduction is necessary even in the inductive process. It is
by deduction that hypotheses are verified, and laws applied to
particular cases.
(c) Some sciences are chiefly deductive; others, chiefly induc-
tive; others, like politics, political economy, ethics, make frequent
use of both processes. Thus I may demonstrate the advantages
of a certain form of government either from facts or from principles.
N.B. Find concrete applications of these methods hi the
sciences which you have studied.
III. OBSTACLES
Besides the difficulties inherent in the problems themselves, the
main obstacles met with in an investigation are fallacies, which,
together with other causes to be mentioned later, are sources of
error. As to controversy, contradiction, and discussion, they may
also be obstacles, or may become great helps, according to the use
which is made of them.
I. FALLACIES
i. Nature of Fallacies. (a) A fallacy (fallacia, fallere, to
deceive) is an erroneous argument, or a reasoning which, for some
reason, fails to lead to a valid conclusion. The term "fallacy" is
more general than the terms "paralogism" and "sophism." A
OBSTACLES 257
paralogism supposes in the logical form of the reasoning a defect
which is apt to deceive the reasoner himself. As generally used,
the term sophism, and its derivatives, have an ethical implication,
namely, that the reasoner is aware of the weakness of the argu-
ment, but nevertheless uses it with an intention to deceive.
(b) It is difficult to give a satisfactory classification of fallacies.
The following, though imperfect, is sufficient for the present prac-
tical purpose.
Fallacy
(i) of simple inspection, or a priori
(2) of inference
(a) logical or formal
purely logical and formal
semilogical, verbal, or in dic-
tione
(&) real or material, or extra dictionem
(c) special fallacies of induction
2. Fallacies of Simple Inspection, or a priori fallacies, in
general consist in the acceptance of certain principles, maxims,
and generalizations without sufficient evidence. By some these
fallacies are said to be wholly a priori, i.e. accepted without any
reasoning. It seems truer, at least in most cases, to say that
such principles are accepted on the strength of an implicit reason-
ing, hasty and insufficient induction, or common acceptance and
authority. They are looked upon as self-evident and as requiring
no proof, and many inferences are based on them.
Many are popular, like omens, the interpretation of dreams,
prognostics, superstitions, lucky or unlucky days or numbers,
prejudices, etc. They are found in the most ordinary assents of
daily life, and in the highest pursuits like religion and morality.
Others have a higher character in science, philosophy, and religion,
like such ambiguous principles as: "All men are born equal;"
"Progress and evolution are the law of nature"; "Man is essen-
tially truthful"; "Nature and the supernatural cannot meet";
"All religions are equally good"; "It is enough for man to live
honestly"; and a multitude of other maxims either admitted
almost universally or special to a certain region or class of men.
To avoid them it is necessary to exercise constant watchfulness.
Because they are common to all or to many, and because they
18
258 LOGIC
are habitual, they attract no attention. Yet they need to be
explained, tested, and verified. Observe the conversation of
certain persons, and see how many principles of this kind are
appealed to. (Cf. p. 118 ff.)
3. The Formal or Purely Logical Fallacies are those which
result from violating any of the logical rules of propositions and
reasonings. The most frequent are: (i) In immediate inferences:
the confusion of contrary and contradictory terms and proposi-
tions; the violation of the rules of opposition, conversion, and
contraposition. (2) In mediate inferences: the fallacy of four
terms, of undistributed middle, of the illicit process or undue
extension of either the major or the minor term, of negative
premises, and of the consequent, i.e. the violation of the rules of
hypothetical syllogisms.
4. Verbal Fallacies fallacies in dictione, or fallacies of language
arise from the use of terms. They include a defect in the
form of the syllogism, and consequently a violation of its rules,
but this defect comes from the matter, that is, from the terms
which are used. Hence they are also called semilogical fallacies.
The most important are:
(a) Amphibology, or the use of ambiguous grammatical struct-
ures and sentences, e.g. "The noble hound the wolf hath slain,"
or this sign at the entrance of a store: "Why go elsewhere to be
cheated? Come in here."
(b) Equivocation, or the use of a term more frequently of
the middle term in two senses, so that the syllogism has really
four terms: "What produces intoxication is evil, and should be
prohibited; the use of alcoholic liquors produces intoxication;
therefore it should be prohibited." Distinctions should be made
between the various alcoholic beverages, their various uses, and
the various circumstances in which they may be used.
(c) Composition, or affirming of the totality that which is true
only of the parts taken distributively; "All the angles of a triangle
are less than two right angles " is true of any angle taken separately,
not of their sum.
(d) Division, or affirming of the parts distributively that which
is true only of the totality. "All the angles of a triangle are equal
OBSTACLES 259
to two right angles " is true of the totality, not of any one angle.
From the collective vote, i.e. the vote of the majority of Congress,
or from the verdict of a jury, I cannot infer the votes of the
various members taken individually.
(e) Accent, or the ambiguity arising from the difference in the
stress laid on a particular syllable of a word, or on a special word
in the sentence.
5. Real Fallacies fallacies extra dictionem, or material fal-
lacies depend not so much on the form as on the matter of
the syllogism. Hence they suppose the knowledge, not only
of the rules of syllogism, but also of the subject with which
the syllogism deals.
(a) The fallacy of accident a dicto simpliciter ad dictum
secundum quid consists in the erroneous inference of a special
or conditional statement from a general and unconditional state-
ment. " In a republican government, subjects have the right to
vote; criminals are subjects; therefore they have the right to vote."
(6) The converse fallacy of accident a dicto secundum quid ad
dictum simpliciter is the reverse of the preceding. "We must
avoid intoxication; wine produces intoxication ; therefore we must
not drink wine." Only a certain use, or rather abuse, of wine
produces intoxication.
(c) Begging the question petitio principii is a fallacy in
which the truth of the conclusion itself is presupposed in the
premises, that which is to be proved being assumed as the very
ground of proof. This occurs frequently when the principle of
proof is a popular axiom accepted a priori and without question-
ing. "Nothing exists but what the senses can perceive; the
senses cannot perceive God; therefore God does not exist." The
major cannot be true unless we already suppose the conclusion
that an invisible God does not exist. This fallacy is also called
circulus in probando, vicious circle, or argument in a circle. The
really identical propositions are generally separated by several
intermediate steps, and expressed in different forms, so that the
fallacy is not always easy to detect.
(d) Irrelevant reasoning, or evading the question ignoratio
elenchi consists in arguing perhaps validly to the wrong
260 LOGIC
point; in proving a conclusion which was not in question, in such
a way that the right conclusion seems to have been proved. If
a man is accused before the court, the lawyer may praise his
family, his moral and civic virtues and qualities, or appeal to
feelings, instead of proving that he is not guilty of the offence for
which he is tried. It is the great resource of those who have a
weak cause to defend, and is used in many ways.
6. Special Fallacies of Induction. (a) Referring to observa-
tion, (i) Non-observation of instances. We are inclined to notice
affirmative rather than negative instances, coincidences rather
than their absence, especially when they suit a preconceived
theory. Or certain relevant facts or groups of facts may be over-
looked. (2) Non-observation of circumstances. One may neglect
the circumstance which is the true cause, or which is important
for the explanation of a fact. (3) Mai-observation, either because
of the imperfection of the senses and instruments, or because of
intellectual dispositions which make man see what he is anxious
to find, and prevent him from seeing what he does not want to
find. This leads to the fallacy of the false cause non causa
pro causa, post hoc ergo propter hoc which considers as the true
cause a fact or circumstance which is a mere accidental coinci-
dence. One must always be careful to distinguish between
what is really perceived or observed, and what is inferred from
such observations.
(b) False analogy and example, or the exaggeration of the
points of likeness or difference, as " Ab uno disce omnes. )y
(c) The wrong application of inductive methods; hastiness; the
exaggeration of the value of theories and hypotheses.
II. ERROR
i. Causes. Error is a false judgment. Its mam causes may
be assigned as follows:
(a) External causes, (i) In the object: The difficulty and
complexity of the object under investigation. Hence the neces-
sity of a long, complex, and manifold process of inference at any
step of which error may creep in and vitiate all subsequent results.
(2) In the means used to reach the object: The reliance on incompe-
OBSTACLES 261
tent authority and on customary views; language, which may be
ambiguous, and hence a source of many misunderstandings; the
impossibility of reaching the same certitude and of using the same
methods in all sciences.
(b) Internal or subjective causes (see Psychology), (i) Intel-
lectual: (a) In general, the weakness and fallibility of the human
mind; its dependence on organic conditions; preconceived ideas,
prejudices, and intellectual surroundings; education and the result-
ing habits of thought, (b) In a more special manner, the senses
and imagination which should be, but are not always, guided
by the understanding; the defects of memory, forgetfulness and
inaccurate memory; the lack of attention and of the power of
observation and inference; irreflection and hastiness in judging
things and persons. (2) Moral: In general, the passions, which
prevent us from seeing things in their true light; especially pride
and exaggerated self-confidence, which cause a man to affirm or
deny rashly, and make him loath to abandon a position once he has
taken it; love and hatred, that make him exaggerate or mini-
mize; the will, in things that are practical; the desire to prove
instead of investigating, owing to which the value of reasons is
overestimated, and facts are adapted so as to fit in with a pre-
conceived theory.
2. Remedies. The main remedies of error are easily inferred
from what has just been outlined concerning its causes, (i) Try
to apply the rules of logic, both of induction and deduction. Use
definitions and divisions. (2) Pay attention to the validity of
every step you take. (3) Without falling into scepticism, be
careful in receiving information from others, and be not always
ready to swear by it. In matters where proofs are possible and
where you can appreciate them, ask for them. Always examine
the value of a testimony before you accept it. (4) Acquire habits
of reflection, calmness of judgment, steadiness and seriousness of
study. They are indispensable to success. (5) Endeavor to
develop intellectual feelings, especially a great disinterestedness
and a sincere love of truth.
CONCLUSION
Main Rules to be Observed in Controversies and Discussions.
Discussions arise from the diversity of opinions. They are very
useful when carried on with the proper spirit and disposition. But
in many cases, a discussion becomes a dispute and an intolerant
altercation, in which the purpose is not so much to find the truth
or inculcate it as to triumph over and to down an opponent, cost
what may, and even should the truth suffer thereby. In some
cases, on certain subjects, or with certain persons, it will be much
more profitable to avoid any discussion, because it is sure to be
useless, and may be harmful. Some rules will be stated to be
followed before, during, and after a written or oral discussion.
i. Before. "Id faciam quod in principio fieri in omnibus
disputationibus oportere censeo, ut quid illud sit de quo disputa-
tur explanetur, ne vagari et errare cogatur oratio, si ii qui inter
se dissenserint non idem esse illud de quo agitur intelligant"
(Cicero, De Oratore, I, c. 48). This precept is very prudent, and,
if it were always followed, many discussions would become need-
less. It often happens that, for lack of previous understanding,
two bitter opponents come to find out, at the end, that they fight
for almost the same ideas. Hence (i) Ascertain the meaning of the
terms, especially of those that are vague and ambiguous. (2)
Ascertain the meaning of the propositions on both sides. See
whether they are universal or particular, or restricted in any
manner, etc. (3) To avoid the ignoratio elenchi and the petitio
principii, see to what school of science, philosophy, religion, etc.,
the adversary belongs, so as to start from principles admitted on
both sides. Against an atheist I cannot suppose the existence of
God. Against a rationalist I may suppose the existence of God,
but I cannot argue from divine revelation, and so on with other
classes of men. No discussion is possible unless it is based on
principles common to both parties.
262
RULES OF DISCUSSION 263
2. During. Logical and moral rules are to be observed.
(a) Logical, (i) Take care that all the rules of logic are ob-
served on both sides. Keep a close watch on all the facts brought
forward and on all the principles used. Examine whether they
are clear and certain. (2) Frequently facts and personal inter-
pretation of facts are presented together as one. Keep them
distinct. (3) Keep yourself and your opponent to the point at
issue. A man who feels the weakness of his position frequently
will tend to shift the problem to some other point, and drift away
from the main question. (4) Avoid, and make your opponent
avoid, verbosity, that is, an abundant flow of words making up
for the paucity of ideas. Hence, after a long presentation, sum
up the ideas expressed, and reduce them to stricter forms of syllo-
gism in order to test their value more easily. See also that the
same terms are always used in the same sense. (5) When con-
tending against a view, beware of the common tendency to go too
far, to fall into the opposite extreme, and to try to prove too much.
(6) While following the preceding recommendations, avoid the
ridicule of rigid formalism that wants to use none but perfect
syllogisms, and affects pedantry.
(b) Moral, (i) Practise moderation. Avoid the anxiety to
make your opinion prevail. Look for light, not for triumph.
(2) Avoid anger and impatience. To abuse an adversary is
not to prove the truth of one's contention; on the contrary, it is
frequently a sign of weakness. Truth stands in no need of in-
jurious and ungentlemanly remarks and abusive epithets. More-
over, passion has for its effect to blind the mind and prevent it
from seeing things in their true light. (3) Avoid intolerance.
All men are fallible. Practise the great principle: "In dubiis
libertas." Do not try to impose your view simply because it is
yours, but because you are convinced that it is true. (4) Honesty
and fairness must be practised all the time. It is always dis-
honest knowingly to use inaccurate statements or distorted facts
in order to prove one's contention. It is the more so when arguing
against uneducated persons, who cannot see the falsity of such
assumptions, and are more easily misled.
3. After. (a) If victorious, practise modesty. Nothing is
264 LOGIC
more cowardly than to abuse a defeated opponent. Arrogance is
a sign of conceit, and indicates that a man loves his own satis-
faction more than the truth, (b) Be not depressed by defeat,
and be honest enough to accept the truth. Always remember
Cicero's maxim: "Cuiusvis hominis est errare, nullius nisi insipi-
entis in errore perseverare " (Philipp. XII, c. 2).
AESTHETICS OR THE NORMATIVE
SCIENCE OF THE FEELINGS
OF THE BEAUTIFUL
INTRODUCTION
I. WHAT is ^ESTHETICS?
1. The term "^Esthetics." Etymologically, "aesthetics"
(cu'sflijTiKi}, from alMvofjMi , to perceive) is an adjective form now
used substantively, and indicates that which has reference to
sensation or perception. Its meaning has been narrowed down
to a special kind of feelings or sentiments, namely those originating
from the perception of beauty. As an adjective, " aesthetic "
has either a subjective or an objective meaning. We speak of
an aesthetic taste, i.e. a just and keen appreciation or judgment
of beauty; and we also speak of a thing as being more or less
aesthetic. As a substantive, "aesthetic," or more frequently
"aesthetics," is objective, and includes the science of beauty, the
rules of taste and of art. It is the normative science of the cesthetic
feelings.
2. ^Esthetic Feelings. If we examine the whole group of
mental states known as feelings or the affective life, we find that
the feelings proper pleasure and pain cannot be assigned
any special norm. Experience and association manifest which
things or uses of things are pleasurable, and which are painful.
All that can be done is to seek the former and avoid the latter.
To a great extent emotions are also subjective. In so far as they
can be controlled and governed, they fall under the rules of morality,
politeness, decency, sociability, etc. Besides these general norms,
265
266 AESTHETICS
no other can be assigned to either self-regarding or altruistic emo-
tions. The will to subdue them if they are wrong or excessive,
and the will to acquire them if they are good and lacking; in every
case, the will to control them as explained in psychology -
is about the only rule that can be given for this class of feelings.
Intellectual, moral, and religious sentiments must be governed in
accordance with the principles of logic, ethics, and religion.
There remain therefore the aesthetic feelings which require a
special treatment here, but which can be allowed but a few pages
in this elementary course.
3. The Science of Esthetics. ^Esthetics is the science which
tries to determine the conditions of beauty, to analyze the elements
that constitute it and enable it to produce aesthetic feelings.
Beauty may be natural or artificial; aesthetics deals with both.
Because tastes and appreciations differ, it has been said that
aesthetics cannot be a science, and that no rules Can be given for
aesthetic feelings. But the fact that, notwithstanding many
divergences, there are certain objects which practically all men
agree in finding beautiful, and others which all agree in finding
ugly, shows that there must be some reason in the subject, or in
the object, or in both, for this uniformity. Moreover, without
considering how other individuals are affected, I find different
types of beauty, and I may ask in what respect those different
objects a piece of music, a statue, a building, a person, a poem,
etc. agree so as to deserve the common adjective "beautiful"
which I apply to them. Undoubtedly there is a science of the
beautiful. Even if conclusions are not always clear and cogent,
there are reasons accounting for the aesthetic feeling. Esthetics
is not a strict science like mathematics or even like physics. The
rules of art cannot compare with the laws of chemical combina-
tion. Yet certain principles must be observed, although they
may be applied differently, and much is left to individual con-
ception and interpretation.
II. THE PLACE OF ^ESTHETICS
The object of logic is the true, that of ethics, the moral good,
that of aesthetics, the beautiful. Logic is the normative science
NATURE OF .ESTHETICS 267
of the intellect, ethics, of the will, aesthetics, of the feelings of the
beautiful. This leads us to inquire into the relations of the beau-
tiful with the true and the good.
i. Relations Between Beauty and Truth. (a) Beauty can-
not be identified with truth. Some beautiful things, like poetry,
romance ... are not true, but fictitious. Others, without being
fictitious, cannot be called true, e.g. music. On the other hand,
some truths are not beautiful, or may be positively ugly. We
do not find any beauty in the truths "four and four are eight ";
"the straight line is the shortest distance between two points";
"it rained yesterday "; "John Smith died last week," etc.
(b) Yet there are relations between the true and the beautiful,
(i) That which is false, unlikely, and unnatural is not beautiful.
A picture in which the proportions are not kept, a novel in which
events appear impossible or unlikely, produce a disagreeable im-
pression. A statue or drawing with certain defects and depart-
ures from nature will be pronounced ugly, etc.
(2) Many truths of the intellectual order, when taken together
systematically, are beautiful for those who can understand and
penetrate them. There may be no beauty in a geometrical axiom,
yet the science of geometry, with its numerous deductions, is not
without beauty. There may be no beauty in a single physical
conclusion, e.g. that heat expands metals, or that matter attracts
matter in direct ratio to its mass, and in inverse ratio to the square
of the distances. But certainly physical sciences reveal the beauty
and harmony of the material world, either in the largest bodies
(like astronomy), or in the smallest (like the science of radio-
activity).
(3) The effort, success, and power of certain minds in grasping
the truth, in passing from truth to truth and in perceiving rela-
tions, is also worthy of admiration.
(4) The perceived beauty of a science is an incentive to its
pursuit. The man who^ admires the laws of nature, the marvellous
structures of living organisms, etc., will become more enthusiastic
for the study of physical and biological sciences, because every
new step discovers some new harmony and some new beauty.
(5) However, even where the true and the beautiful coincide,
268 ESTHETICS
the formal reason of the true and the formal reason of the beauti-
ful are not identical, and the effects produced on the mind by these
two aspects are not the same. I may perceive the truth without
admiring the beauty, or admire the beauty without reference to
the truth.
2. Relations Between Beauty and Goodness. Good means
(i) agreeable, (2) useful, (3) conformable to the rules of morality.
(a) The sentiment of beauty is always pleasant and agreeable,
but many things are agreeable without being beautiful. The
taste of an apple, a walk in the country, the smell of a rose, rest
after fatigue, etc., are agreeable, yet not beautiful. Beauty is
one special source of pleasure. An object is not beautiful because
it is agreeable; it may be agreeable because it is beautiful.
(b) The useful is not always beautiful; instruments, tools,
clothes, etc., are useful; they frequently are not beautiful. On
the other hand, many beautiful things have no practical use in
themselves besides satisfying man's aesthetic taste or giving him
some recreation, e.g. a statue, a picture, a flower-bed, etc. Or
they may be useful indirectly by reminding one of noble examples,
and inciting to follow them. It may even happen that the beauty
of a thing seems to make it less useful, as certain architectural
ornaments, or the hart's antlers which hinder him. Even where
the two coincide in the same thing, the reason why it is beautiful
is not the same as that for which it is useful. Beauty is an end
in which the mind rests without looking beyond. The feeling of
beauty is disinterested and stops at the contemplation and enjoy-
ment of its object. Utility is essentially the quality of a means.
A thing is not useful purely and simply; it is useful for this or that
end. A plain dress, a simple house may be as useful as, and even
more useful than, other dresses and residences which are much
more beautiful. Where beauty and utility are combined, beauty
is added as something distinct from utility.
(c) Not all actions morally good are beautiful. To speak the
truth, to return a lost article to its owner, to respect one's parents,
to give alms, are good actions which, under ordinary circumstances,
excite in us no feelings of admiration. On the contrary, certain
hideous characters in a novel or a drama, moral monsters, may
NATURE OF AESTHETICS 269
contribute by contrast to foster the total aesthetic satisfaction.
But immorality as such cannot be beautiful either in real life or
in works of art.
The close relations of beauty and morals were emphasized by
the Greeks, who frequently put together the beautiful and the
good. They speak of KoXos K&ya06s, or even in one word
KoAoKayatfos. To/caXov is frequently moral beauty or virtue, and
in fact the Stoics identified the two. Without going to this
extreme, the influence of artistic beauty on morals cannot be
denied. The beautiful, being agreeable and attractive, is a spring
of action. To represent the immoral as beautiful and attractive
is therefore morally wrong. Art may be of great service in moral-
izing, as is clear from experience, and from the principles laid down
in psychology concerning the influence of imagination and feelings
on the passions, the will, and the character. Art need not always
be at the service of morals, and all works of art need not be under-
taken for the purpose of teaching lessons. (But at least art must
never be immoral, nor represent that which is wrong under the
aspect of beauty, j
By way of comparison and elimination, the preceding considera-
tions have already given some ideas concerning the nature of
beauty. We shall now proceed to a more positive analysis.
CHAPTER I
BEAUTY
Whatever is agreeable is not thereby beautiful. Yet the aes-
thetic feeling is one of the forms of agreeable feelings. What are
its special characteristics? Both a subjective and an objective
analysis will help in finding them.
I. SUBJECTIVE ASPECT
We shall recall and complete what has been said in psychology
on the aesthetic feeling (p. 155).
i. Several Mental Factors contribute to produce aesthetic
feelings.
(a) The senses through which the beautiful object is perceived.
They are sight and hearing.
(b) The imagination and, with it, the association of ideas and
suggestion. The perceived object arouses in the mind images of
objects already perceived or constructed by the imagination, and
ideals formed by the higher mental powers. All these give a
certain coloring to the actual perception. Hence the feeling of
beauty is the combined result of the actual perception and of the
images and ideals which the object recalls or suggests.
(c) The intellect. The object must not only be perceived, but,
to some extent, understood. Its elements must be known in their
mutual relations. The harmonies of the world are beautiful only
for those who understand them. The intellectual element appears
also in the absolute judgment which every man, rightly or wrongly,
has a tendency to pass on the aesthetic qualities of an object.
When perceived, beauty seems to have such a character of evi-
dence that one is inclined to suffer no contradiction on this point.
(d) Activity. What is so simple and obvious as to leave no
room for personal activity produces no feeling of beauty. This
270
BEAUTY 271
feeling is greater when the beauty is discovered little by little, and
when it requires a certain application to perceive it. If we are
almost exclusively passive, to glance rapidly at a painting, or to
listen distractedly to a musical composition, will produce little or
no aesthetic feeling. A man must work his own way into the
object in order to grasp its inner beauty.
2. Essential Factor. From the preceding remarks we infer
that the feeling of beauty results from the harmonious activity of
several mental faculties. However, the fundamental, or rather
essential, process seems to be the understanding of the object, which
depends on natural endowments and on aesthetic education.
Why is it possible for children, and even for a number of adults,
to find the music of the street-organ as beautiful as perhaps
more beautiful than the first-class performance of a master-
piece? Undoubtedly because they cannot understand the latter.
In the same way some will derive more aesthetic satisfaction from
a ten-cent picture with glaring colors than from a real work of art.
The aesthetic feeling is greater in proportion as the object is under-
stood better and as the relations of its parts among themselves
and with the totality are grasped and mastered more completely.
3. Diversity of Esthetic Judgments. The diversity of these
individual factors in different persons accounts for the diversity
of aesthetic judgments. Appreciations vary with individuals,
countries, races, degrees of civilization, and periods of time. With-
out referring to the caprice of fashion in dress and ornamentation,
it is otherwise evident that tastes vary. The source of this diver-
sity is to be found in the complexity of mental factors that influ-
ence the feeling of beauty. Every individual has his own ideals
to which he refers objects, and his own images with their different
associations. As a consequence, actual perception will arouse
various ideas and images in the mind. Education, surroundings,
character, habit, novelty, etc., will also exercise a marked influence
on the aesthetic judgment.
II. OBJECTIVE CONDITIONS
Besides these subjective factors, objective elements must
admitted. Certain things are beautiful for all men and at all
272 AESTHETICS
times, although their beauty may not always be fully appreciated.
Moreover, men are agreed that there is a good and a bad taste.
The possibility of developing the aesthetic taste means again that
there are some rules for the beautiful. It was said above that the
chief source of aesthetic pleasure is the understanding; but the
understanding of what? Not of the truth of the object, since
the beautiful is not to be identified with the true. There are
therefore other aspects in the object which account for the sub-
jective feeling. To these we now pass.
/ i. Three Conditions are Required in the Object: (i) Ful-
lness, perfection, and completeness, (2) unity amid variety, (3)
\splendor and clearness.
(a) To be beautiful, an object must not lack any of its essential
parts, functions, or elements. // must possess a certain perfection,
completeness, energy, and life, varying of course with the type to
which it belongs. Incompleteness and deformity are always ugly
and displeasing. The application of this is clear in the natural
order. See why one horse is pronounced beautiful, and another
not; why a fertile cornfield, or a forest with abundant vege-
tation, or a high mountain, etc., are beautiful, whereas the field
with brambles or a few corn-stalks, the small elevation and hill,
produce no such impression. We rather call pretty (not to say
cute) that which is of small proportions. The elements or aspects
of the whole object may be considered apart, and found beautiful,
e.g. the facade of an edifice, the face of a hunchback, etc., but then
they are considered as complete in themselves. Again, and for
the same reason, an ugly person may perform a beautiful action;
in an ordinary composition there may be found beautiful passages,
etc. What is true of material objects is true also of intellectual
and moral beauty. It requires some perfection, power, or special
greatness.
(b) Variety means a multiplicity of parts, or a successive change.
There is variety in an edifice because it has several parts, several
ornaments, windows, doors, columns, etc. There is variety in
poetry or in a novel because different ideas, events, circumstances
... are evolved successively. There is variety in music because
there is at the same time a multiplicity of combined sounds, and
BEAUTY 273
successive changes of sounds, tempo, rhythm, etc. Generally,
monotony, sameness, and lack of change are tedious and disagree-
able. The variety and number of parts must be in proportion to
the nature of the object, and must not be exaggerated. Too
many parts, too many successive changes, a superfluity of orna-
ments, decorations, and colors are also opposed to beauty, because
generally they are obstacles to the unity which is also required.
It is not enough to have many elements, they must harmonize
together in some unity. Many disparate things, unconnected parts
and incoherent details, are not beautiful; there must be symmetry,
proportion, order, and adaptation. A common centre, a unity
of action and of plan are required to prevent the attention from
being diffused. This harmony must be found not only between
the parts of the object, but also between the object and its surround-
ings. A statue or ornament will produce a different effect accord-
ing to the objects found around it. High-flown eloquence is out
of place in conversation. A beautiful frame may not be adapted
to a certain painting, etc.
(c) Finally, a certain splendor, neatness, or clearness is required.
The qualities mentioned above must be sufficiently apparent.
There must be enough light to see a picture or a drawing; its lines
and colors must be visible without too much strain, etc. The
unity amid variety should be perceived without too great an
effort and tension.
2. There are Various Types of Beauty. (a) Ideal beauty is
a type or, as the word itself indicates, an ideal according to which
beautiful concrete objects are judged, or which the artist strives
to realize and express. Real beauty is that which is found in
existing objects. It is more or less perfect according as it realizes
more or less completely the conceived ideal.
(b) Beauty is natural or artificial according as it is found in
nature without man's intervention, or, on the contrary, is the
work of man. The sea, mountains, animals, the songs or colors
of birds, are natural. Statues, buildings, music . . . are artificial.
Man may embellish nature, and the result is partly natural and
partly artificial.
(c) Physical beauty is expressed in matter; intellectual beauty
19
274 AESTHETICS
results from the exercise of reason; moral beauty depends on the
mode of exercise of free activities.
(d) Finally, we mention again the distinction already explained
in psychology between the simply beautiful, the sublime, and
the pretty (p. 156). We need not discuss the question whether
these objects produce more or less intensive forms of the same
feeling, or specifically distinct feelings.
CHAPTER II
THE FINE ARTS
I. NATURE or THE FINE ARTS
1. Meaning of Art. In general, art means a collection of rules
or of activities necessary for the skilful production of certain works.
Art is frequently contrasted with nature ,and artificial with natural.
The former is produced by human activity, the latter without it.
Art is also opposed to science. The fundamental difference
between them is that science refers to knowledge; art, to practice.
Hence arise two other points of difference, (i) True science is
based on universal laws, and is valid for all men and at all times.
Art is more personal, and more changeable according to times
and places. (2) Science is acquired by study; art, chiefly by
practice. Science also, it is true, may have a practical purpose,
and in fact certain sciences, e.g. logic, medicine, etc., may also
be arts, but the formal difference remains. As sciences they deal
with what is, with the truth, and with the reasons of things. As
arts they deal with the production of what does not yet exist,
with the practice and the action. A man may have the com-
plete science of medicine without ever applying it. He knows the
causes and remedies of diseases without using this knowledge.
On the contrary, a man may possess only the art of medicine. His
own experience or that of others may have taught him the value
of certain plants or remedies which he may use to good effect
without knowing the reasons why they are beneficial.
2. Meaning of Fine Arts. Arts are divided into useful or
mechanical, and aesthetic or fine arts. The former tend to the
production of something useful; the latter to the production of
something beautiful. The artisan will select materials such as
wood, steel, or stone in order to make something useful, a table,
275
276 AESTHETICS
a saw, or a house. This object itself is destined to serve a purpose;
it is a means to something else, not an end in itself. The artist
tries to produce something which is an end in itself, and not simply
a means. It is often difficult to draw the line between the two
because the beautiful is also frequently useful, e.g. a building;
but, as already indicated, the two aspects must be distinguished.
From what precedes it may be inferred that eloquence is not,
strictly speaking, one of the fine arts, for it aims at persuading
others. The same is true of the history of heroic deeds, and the
lives of the saints, which are written for the purpose of instruction.
However, these may become arts if the grace of the gestures, the
harmony of vocal inflections, the charms of the style and composi-
tion, etc., are intended. Fine arts tend primarily to the produc-
tion of beautiful works without regard to any other purpose except
the satisfaction of the mind's aspirations toward beauty.
II. ART AND NATURE
i. Realism and Idealism. Beauty is found both in nature
independently of human intervention, and in art, that is, in works
which are intentionally produced by man. Moreover, we have
said that beauty always supposes two elements, one sensible and
real, the other ideal and intelligible. Hence the questions: Must
artificial beauty be a simple imitation of natural beauty? Must
it reproduce the real and the sensible of nature as closely as possi-
ble? Or, on the contrary, must the artist overlook nature so as
to form higher and independent ideals? Realism chooses the first
alternative; idealism, the second. In their extreme forms, both
are to be rejected, and the true answer is found between them.
Works of art must be based on nature and inspired from it. Yet
they must not be mere imitations or copies, but idealized repre-
sentations.
(a) Art borrows its materials sounds, colors, etc. from
nature. Moreover, what is against nature is never beautiful, e.g.
a statue without due proportions. Finally, pure idealism tends to
abstraction, i.e. to the absence of reality and life, and therefore
has less power to arouse aesthetic feelings.
(b) But art cannot be a sterile imitation of nature, (i) Music
THEFINEARTS 277
is not a mere imitation of natural sounds; nor architecture, of
natural forms. Painting and sculpture are not the same as photo-
graphing and casting. (2) Nor can art, if it merely imitates nature,
be as beautiful as nature, for, in many cases, it is incapable of repre-
senting the details, greatness, life, and movement that are found
in nature. It represents only some of the realities of nature.
(3) Not everything in nature is beautiful; nor is any object per-
fectly beautiful, for none realizes completely the type of beauty
of the class to which it belongs.
(c) Art, therefore, must borrow its materials and objects from
nature, but also idealize, purify, and refine them, making abstrac-
tion of certain features and emphasizing others.
2. Advantages of Art over Nature. Art cannot reproduce
all the realities of nature. Thus sculpture reproduces forms, but
not colors. Art, however, has several advantages.
(a) It is not subject to the same laws of space and time that
are found in nature. A landscape covering in reality many square
miles, which cannot be embraced at a single glance, may be repre-
sented on a small canvas where its harmonious beauty will be
grasped at once. A multitude of events which would require a
long period of time may be condensed in a theatrical play. The
deterioration which occurs in nature, especially in living organ-
isms, is avoided in art, etc.
(b) Art is not subject to the physical laws which prevent nature
from realizing a complete and perfect type. Art supposes abstrac-
tion, and represents only certain features which it idealizes.
III. THE PRODUCTION OF WORKS OF ART
We shall examine the conditions required in the work itself and
the processes by which the artist produces it.
i. Qualities Required in the Work. The object must be one,
true and good, and, in general, have the qualities of the beautiful.
(a) We have already spoken of unity in variety as one of the
conditions of beauty. Thus, in an edifice we require the unity
of style and architecture, and the proportion of the various parts,
for if the style is not the same, or if the parts are out of proportion,
the result is not harmonious. In a play or a novel we require the
278 AESTHETICS
unity of composition one plot around which other events are
centred. In a picture we require things that are not disparate,
but can associate together to form one complete whole. In a
volume of essays we do not expect one unit, but several. We
expect a sequence throughout a novel.
(b) Truth does not mean that the work of art must be a mere
imitation of nature, for art idealizes nature. Yet it must be what
we generally call natural or likely. Thus a personage supposed
to be gifted with a certain quality, to have a certain character, or
to be subject to a certain passion, must be made to speak and act
naturally, i.e. in conformity with these endowments. To fail in
this, or to exaggerate beyond measure, shocks the aesthetic feelings.
The statue or painting of a man need not represent any man who
exists or ever existed, but it must represent a human form with
all its essential features.
(c) Vice and immorality as such cannot be beautiful. If they
cause pleasure, it is either on account of the skill of the artist, or
because of the passions of those who perceive such works. It is
not allowable to represent as beautiful and worthy of admiration
that which is in opposition to the rules of morality. But, with
due caution, it may be represented as an object of aversion
which, by contrast, makes virtue more beautiful.
2. The Realization of Beauty. The artist must form an ideal,
find the means of expressing it, and use these.
(a) The conception of an ideal is based on the study of nature.
Before applying the colors to the canvas, the painter must have
in his mind the representation of the figure or the objects which
he wants to paint. Before starting to write, the poet, novelist,
or playwright must know what human passion he will describe,
what plot he will unravel, and what circumstances he will
represent. This ideal is higher or lower according to the artist's
power to understand the beauties of nature, rise above them, and
abstract the beautiful features from the common, insignificant, or
ugly features with which they are mixed. The nature and loftiness
of the ideals and interpretations will vary with the personal
qualities of the artist.
In their relation to nature, the artist and the scientist have an
THE FINE ARTS 279
altogether different attitude. The scientist's aim is to know what
is, and his mind must, as far as possible, grasp the whole reality
in all its complex details. He must express his knowledge accu-
rately, neglecting nothing, and describing facts, events, and things
in their various aspects. In scientific books, illustrations are not
necessarily beautiful, they may even be positively repugnant, for
instance in books on medicine, but they must be true to nature.
The artist selects only what suits his purpose, and is free to change
and adapt the materials found in nature. He is original, and
supplies something out of his own mind. In this process of con-
ception, imagination, sensibility, and artistic taste are the most
prominent factors.
(b) The artist must find the means and materials best adapted
to express his ideal. He follows general rules already mentioned,
and more special rules like those of concord and discord, rhythm
and tempo in music; unity, rhythm, and rhyme in poetry, etc.
In this process of finding and choosing the means, the main faculties
necessary are imagination and memory, association, attention,
sensibility, and the aesthetic taste which directs the selection.
(c) Execution is the expression itself of the ideal. To a great
extent it is a question of practice and of the proper use of instru-
ments. The artist's purpose is to reproduce in matter that which
he has conceived in his mind, and the perception of which will
produce in others the same emotions and arouse the same ideals.
Hence, as far as possible, the work of art must be animated,
resplendent, and have a soul that reveals itself through sense-
perception.
IV. CLASSIFICATION OF THE FINE ARTS
i. General. (a) It is difficult to give a satisfactory classi-
fication of the fine arts; difficult also, and even impossible, to give
a complete enumeration of them, for it is not always possible to
establish a clear distinction between several minor subdivisions;
nor is it always possible to determine whether a given art should
be counted among the fine arts.
(b) It is generally admitted that there are five principal fine
arts : architecture, sculpture, painting, music, and poetry. Among
280 ESTHETICS
the secondary or auxiliary fine arts, mention may be made of
dancing, which is subordinate to, though widely different from,
music; acting, which is auxiliary to poetry; embroidery, pottery,
jewelry, gardening, park-making, dress-making, house-ornament-
ing, cabinet-making, etc., which are subsidiary to painting, sculpt-
ure, and architecture. We shall not attempt to give any definition
of these several arts, still less their special technical rules. Their
mutual relations will be shown best by indicating the most impor-
tant principles of classification which have been proposed.
2. Principles of Classification. (a) The first and most com-
mon distinction is derived from the senses by which the work of
art is perceived. These are vision and hearing. Hence there
are: (i) Visual arts sculpture, architecture, and painting. (2)
Auditory arts music and poetry. Acting and dancing are visual
and also auditory, since they are subsidiary to music and poetry.
(b) In a similar way are distinguished: (i) The arts of repose,
plastic or formative, in which all the parts may be perceived simul-
taneously. (2) The arts of motion and speech, in which the parts
are successive and can be perceived only after one another. The
former have reference chiefly to space; the latter, to tune.
(c) Considered in their relation to nature, arts are either imita-
tive (representative), or non-imitative (presentative), according as
they imitate natural objects painting, sculpture, poetry, drama;
or are in a stricter sense creative music and architecture.
(d) We have seen above that beauty is essentially distinct from
utility. Yet, although the special point of view of beauty is always
different from that of utility, the two may be combined in the
same object. A new principle of classification may be derived
from this fact. Architecture is generally serviceable. Even if
there are exceptions for certain monuments, its object is generally
to build that which is both useful and beautiful. The other
principal arts are primarily non-serviceable. Of the minor arts,
many are serviceable, like pottery, embroidery, jewelry, glass-
making, dancing, and many others which tend to produce or
ornament objects which have a practical use.
ETHICS OR THE NORMATIVE
SCIENCE OF THE WILL
INTRODUCTION
I. THE MEANING OF ETHICAL SCIENCE
I. FACTS
Certain facts of internal and external experience with which
ethics is concerned must first be mentioned.
i. The Ethical Aspect of Human Actions. (a) Besides their
psychological aspect, i.e. their nature as processes and the mode
of their actual production, human actions have other important
aspects or relations. Besides the manner in which they are per-
formed and actually take place, there is the manner in which they
should take place in order to reach certain ends, and to have
certain qualities that are considered as good or advantageous.
In other words, there are rules or norms of action.
In the ball player, it is not so much the psychological or physio-
logical processes that are of interest as their special adaptation to
the end in view, which is to score or help team-mates to score runs,
and to prevent the opposing team from scoring, according to the
rules of the game. The value of the complex actions performed
on the diamond is judged by this standard. We speak, not only
of what is done, but of what should be or should have been done.
Again, to be successful, the merchant must act according to certain
principles. We call men good or bad in their respective occu-
pations, fit or unfit for their business, prudent or imprudent in
their transactions, when we compare what they do with what
they ought to do, and when we examine their action to see whether
it is adapted to the end which they have in view.
281
282 ETHICS
(b) There is another sense the ethical or moral sense in
which actions are called good or bad, right or wrong, praiseworthy
or blameworthy. Whatever this may mean a question to be
examined later on it does not appear at first sight to have an
immediate reference to utility or advantage, at least not in the same
sense as the actions mentioned above. However useful it may hap-
pen to be for an individual, stealing is wrong, and helping those
who are in need is right, even if giving alms imposes some sacrifice.
I do not consider in the same light the failure to avail myself of
a good business opportunity, and the failure to keep my contract
made with, or even my word given to, my fellowman.
(c) All actions which, considering all circumstances, are wrong
must always be omitted. I must never commit perjury or act
unjustly. But all right actions do not appear obligatory. Some,
it is true, seem to impose themselves on man in such a way that to
omit them is to fail in one's duty. Others, on the contrary, seem
to be optional; to perform them is good; to omit them is not
wrong. Thus, even if I do not comply with the obligation, I
consider myself obliged to restore that which is clearly somebody
else's property, and to abide by my valid contract. I do not feel
obliged in all cases to give alms to every poor man whom I meet on
the street, or, if I have the means, to endow hospitals or educational
institutions, although all this is good.
(d) The question here is not: Which actions are good, and
which are bad; which are obligatory, and which are free? The
standards vary with the different degrees of culture and with differ-
ent classes of persons. History also shows that there has been a
great diversity in the past. The question is: Are some actions
morally good, and others morally bad? The fact is universally
true that man, everywhere and at all times, recognizes the distinc-
tion of right and wrong, and has a sense of duty.
The consequence of this sense of obligation is the feeling of re-
morse or satisfaction which is experienced according as one has
acted wrongly or rightly, and the bestowing of blame or praise
on other men.
2. Moral Law. From what precedes, the common notions of
good, obligation, and duty are sufficiently clear as facts. Now
NATURE OF ETHICS 283
there is no obligation without a principle of obligation, without a
law , and consequently without a lawgiver. At this point, if asked for
an explanation, the ordinary man, and very frequently even the
most learned, will hardly be able to give a satisfactory answer.
Of course it is wrong to exceed the speed limit with your motor
car and to sell certain articles without a license. But wrongness
here means rather imprudence and liability to the penalty pro-
vided by the law in such cases. I do not mean the same when I
say that it is morally wrong for me to set fire to my neighbor's
house, or to steal his purse.
Hence what is commonly called the law, namely the civil law,
is not always assumed and accepted as the standard of moral
obligation. Who then is the judge of this moral obligation?
What is its standard? And when you tell another man: You
must not do this, it is morally wrong; or when you accuse him of
being unjust, on what authority do you pronounce? How do you
know that it is so? What is your standard? And is your standard
necessarily the same as his, or any other man's? Is it universal
and must it be accepted by all? In a word, what is the supreme
court that is to decide on the question of right and wrong? This
is an important problem suggested by obvious facts.
3. Conscience. It is clear that, in order to make its deci-
sions known, the law or supreme tribunal, whatever it may be
ultimately, must do so through the human mind. When applied
to human actions, the decision must always appear in human
consciousness in the form of a judgment. This is what we call
conscience, the application to a concrete action of the general
principles concerning its moral character. Conscience is the
actual judgment regarding the morality of actions, and every indi-
vidual man has his own conscience just as he has his own under-
standing. In the same way that, if I do not see, I may rely on,
and be guided by, those who do, and that my eyes may be treated
by the oculist, and my errors corrected by others or by my own
deeper study and reflection, so my moral judgment may be based
on another man's authority, changed, improved, and corrected;
but I can no more judge with another man's conscience than I
can see with his eyes.
284 ETHICS
4. Meaning of Morality. The special relation of an action
to the rules of right and wrong is what we call its morality.
"Moral" comes from the Latin "mos" (plural, "mores"), which
signifies habit. Applied to actions, it means, (i) that which has
relation to the rules of duty and obligation, (2) that which is in
conformity with these rules.
(a) In the first sense, moral is opposed to non-moral, that is, to
that which has no reference whatever to any rules of right and
wrong. Only human actions are called moral. A stone or bullet
that kills a man is not blamed, but the man who wilfully threw
the stone or fired the pistol is considered as having done wrong.
Morality supposes some psychological conditions which are not
found in beings inferior to man. Nor are all human actions moral,
but only those of which man is truly the cause and the free agent,
and which he commits with sufficient knowledge and freedom.
The man who is under coercion, and, for instance, is carried to a
certain place against his will, is not the real agent; the action is
not his, and, for him, is not moral. (Cf. p. 167 ff.) There is no
morality in the actions of a man who accidentally falls and kills
himself, or who speaks and walks in his sleep. Such actions are
non-moral.
(b) In the second sense, moral is opposed to immoral, that
is, to that which is in opposition to the rules of morality and
therefore is bad and wrong. In order to be moral in the second
sense, or immoral, it is clear that an action must be moral in
the first sense.
II. THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS
i. Nature of Ethical Science. (a) Ethics (from i}0os,
character) means the same as moral science, namely, the science of
right and wrong, or the science of right conduct. It endeavors
to account for the facts which have been indicated above, and to
explain their nature, origin, and bearings. It also endeavors to
direct human actions, to find the general moral laws by which they
should be governed, and to apply these laws to the various cir-
cumstances of life. Hence ethics includes two parts, or has two
functions; one is essentially practical, and tries to determine what
NATURE OF ETHICS 285
we should do and avoid; the other is more speculative, and tries
to determine why ultimately we should do or avoid it.
(b) From this it follows that, as a whole, ethics is a normative
science. It deals with human actions, to find out, not how they
are actually performed, but whether and how they should be per-
formed. History and psychology are not directly normative
sciences. They simply state what takes or took place, and how
events or processes occur or occurred. Ethics passes a judgment
on the moral value of these actions and determines whether they
are right or wrong.
(c) The term "law" does not apply to human actions and to
physical events in the same sense. Physical laws are abstractions
for the facts; they are not rules to which events ought to conform,
but to which we see that events do in fact conform. And when
what was thought to be a law is found to conflict with facts that
are certain, the law has to be abandoned or modified. Not so
with moral laws. They are ideals to which human actions do not
necessarily conform, but to which they should conform in order
to be good.
2. Importance of Ethics. From the scope of ethics its impor-
tance may be inferred. In order to live well, perform his duty,
and shape his conduct aright, man must first know in what these
consist. It is true that there is innate in every man a certain moral
sense which tells him his duty, but, on many points, it is vague,
and, even where it is clear, one must examine whether and why
its dictates are legitimate. It is not enough to feel that an action
is right or wrong, one must know that it is so. Moreover, the moral
feeling, precisely because it is a feeling, is often uncertain and mis-
leading. It has to be interpreted, justified, and directed. Although
knowledge is insufficient for good conduct, one may know the
good and fail to practise it it is an essential condition of morality.
3. The Relations of Ethics to Other Sciences will now be
understood easily.
(a) Physical sciences have only a remote relation to ethics,
inasmuch as the knowledge or ignorance of physical laws may
change the morality of an action by modifying the intention,
motives, and foresight of the agent. Thus, according as one is,
286 ETHICS
or is not, aware of the poisonous nature of a certain substance, the
morality of giving it to a fellowman to swallow will differ. Bio-
logical sciences also are indirectly connected with ethics. Many
obligations refer to human life and health, but generally they may
be known and discussed without any detailed physiological knowl-
edge.
(b) Psychology is much more closely related to ethics, and for this
reason a few pages will be devoted to the psychological implica-
tions of morality. At present we shall limit ourselves to pointing
out the difference between psychology and ethics. The psychol-
ogist studies human actions as processes, to find out how mental
functions are related. The moralist tries to regulate human actions.
Psychology gives to ethics its materials, but ethics does not place
the same value upon all. The psychologist is like the botanist
who studies the growth, nature, and characteristics of all plants.
The moralist is more like the gardener who arranges certain plants
according to an order, cultivates some and carefully excludes
others. No action is moral which is not also in some way
psychological.
(c) Pedagogy and ethics should also be kept in close contact.
A complete education trains the whole man, and moral character
is essential to man. Man must be accustomed not only to think
consistently, but also to act rightly.
(d) ^Esthetics and logic, although different from ethics, agree
with it in being normative sciences, or in dealing with ideals and
standards, the first with the ideals of beauty, the second of truth,
the third of moral goodness. Frequently terms are transferred
from one science to another. A man who is true to himself is one
who acts according to his principles; a beautiful soul or character
is one that includes certain moral characteristics, etc.
(e) Sociology is also related to ethics, since it considers man in
his social aspect, which is the source of many duties. Society is
an important factor in the morality of individuals on account of
the laws by which it is ruled and of the mere fact of men
associating with one another.
N.B. We shall see later that ethics is also related to meta-
physics and religion.
CONDITIONS OF MORALITY 287
4. Division of This Treatise. Ethics will be divided into two
parts; the first more speculative and more formal, dealing with
duty in general, its nature and conditions; the other more practi-
cal, more detailed, and dealing with the various duties and obliga-
tions. Before passing to these, however, it is necessary to indicate
the main psychological conditions of moral life.
II. PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITIONS OF MORALITY
Psychological conditions and influences may be grouped under
the three headings of knowledge, feeling, and will.
I. KNOWLEDGE
1. Knowledge Necessary to Morality. In general, from what
was said above and in Psychology on the relations of intellect and
will, it is evident that knowledge is a condition without which
an action cannot be voluntary. A man cannot be morally bound
by an obligation unless this obligation is known to him. It is
impossible to conceive that a man should be responsible for failing
in a duty of which he has no knowledge. Moreover, a man must
be aware of what he is doing. For instance, he is not responsible
for an action performed automatically during sleep. The killing
of a man by the accidental discharge of a pistol which was thought
to be unloaded may be the result of imprudence, but, as such, it
is not morally imputable. Hence a twofold knowledge is required,
(i) of what one is doing, (2) of the relations of this action to
the rules of morality. These general principles need a little
further explanation.
2. Effects of Ignorance. (a) Ignorance may be involuntary
or voluntary. It may be unsuspected and unavoidable, when
sufficient care has been taken to know one's duty; or it may, to
some extent, be due to negligence in investigating one's duty when
there was a suspicion of it, or, worse still, when the investigation
was omitted precisely in order to act more freely and without
restraint. The action due to involuntary ignorance is itself invol-
untary, and the will has no share in it. The action due to volun-
tary ignorance is not voluntary in itself, yet the will has a share in
288 ETHICS
it inasmuch as the ignorance from which it proceeds was voluntary.
Hence such an action is called voluntary in its cause. Thus the
physician who is aware of his incapacity and incompetence, either
in general or in special cases, is accountable for the lives he loses
since he knows that he lacks the sufficient knowledge of his art.
It is clear that the amount of diligence to be used depends on the
importance of the interests in question, the time at one's disposal,
the qualifications and opportunities for investigating, the urgency
of the action to be performed, and so on.
(b) The effects of ignorance are the same whether it affects the
nature and consequences of an action, or the existence of a law
which commands or prohibits it. I may speak an untruth in
good faith thinking that it is the truth ignorantia facti or
may fail to see that in the present circumstances lying is wrong
ignorantia iuris.
(c) In order to prevent possible confusion, it must be noted
that we, speak here of the moral obligation, and not merely of the
obligation to obey the civil law in any concrete case. When duly
promulgated, the civil law is supposed to be known by all the
citizens for whom it is intended. Hence a penalty may be inflicted
on a man for breaking a law of which he was bona fide ignorant.
But if the ignorance is involuntary, there is no moral wrong,
although the civil law may be the source of a moral obligation
and bind in conscience.
II. FEELINGS
Feelings exercise a great influence on the intellect and the will.
Among them the most important in the present question seem to
be love, fear, and anger. A great love or passion blinds the mind
more or less completely. The fear of losing that which one loves,
or the anger caused by a sense of injury, frequently influences man
to take a certain course of action. This action is less voluntary
than it would be if performed coolly and deliberately. It will
perhaps be performed with greater vehemence and stronger incli-
nation, but this inclination proceeds from feeling, not from reason.
In the case of the fear of an impending danger, however, a man
may freely and deliberately choose a less evil, e.g. promise a liberal
CONDITIONS OF MORALITY 289
reward to his rescuer, although he would not otherwise do so. How
far, in concrete instances, responsibility is lessened by passions and
emotions is frequently impossible to determine exactly. Their
influence varies from the slightest, and even imperceptible, im-
pulse to a complete blinding of the mind, absence of mastery over
oneself, and consequently of freedom and responsibility.
III. WILL
1. Coercion. An action may be due to violence or coercion.
Instead of proceeding from the command of the will, it may pro-
ceed from some external power opposed to the will. Such an action
is therefore involuntary. The real agent is the external power,
and if this be a person, he alone incurs the responsibility. Thus
a man may be dragged to a forbidden place, or compelled to per-
form unjust actions. Provided of course that he resists as much
as the nature of the case allows, the action cannot be attributed to
him. The gravity of the obligation to offer resistance varies with
the nature and circumstances of the case, the chances of success
in overcoming the violence, and the necessity of showing one's
opposition and reluctance. If the possible resistance is not
offered, the action is voluntary to some extent, and the responsi-
bility remains in varying degrees. The physical violence of which
we speak here is actual, and must not be understood in the sense
of a mere fear referring to the future, which, as said above, generally
leaves the action voluntary.
2. Habit. (a) As explained in Psychology (p. 175 ff.), habit
produces uniformity of action, facility and pleasure in acting.
Hence it lessens the control of the will, both because the action
proceeding from a habit is frequently performed without conscious-
ness, or at least without distinct consciousness, and because,
even if there is distinct consciousness, the impulse toward the
action is greater, and consequently more difficult to overcome,
in proportion as the habit is stronger and more inveterate. The
influence exercised by habit varies in nature and intensity accord-
ing to the nature, origin, and strength of the habit.
(b) A habit may be (i) acquired and preserved wilfully; (2)
acquired wilfully and preserved unwilfully, when one is making
20
2QO ETHICS
serious efforts to overcome it; (3) acquired and preserved unwil-
fully. The "wilfulness" in all these cases is itself more or less
perfect.
In the first instance the morality of the habitual action is not
diminished by the fact itself of habit. "Qui vult causam vult et
effectum"; the actions due to habit are rightly attributed to the
man who consents to the good or bad habit from which they pro-
ceed. In the second, the morality is lessened in various degrees
according to the strength of the habit, the actual consciousness
and consent, and the amount of effort made to resist and uproot
it. In the third, the morality is still more reduced, and may even
be totally destroyed. The liquor habit may be given as an illus-
tration of these various cases. A man may acquire this habit
knowingly and freely, and indulge in it although he realizes that
it is bad. Or he may acquire it almost without noticing it, owing
to physiological conditions, to circumstances, to the presence of
alcohol in medicine which he had to use, etc. As soon, however,
as he becomes aware of it, he is under the obligation of resisting it
and of taking the proper means to overcome it.
(c) Habit is a very complex factor in human actions, and it is
frequently impossible to trace back all its antecedents in all their
details and ramifications. A habit may be so strong as to be
almost invincible. But generally it can be overcome by good
resolutions and the use of proper means. Even when the individual
declares it invincible, in most cases his "I cannot" is to be inter-
preted as meaning "I do not want to." The man who is not
willing to try seriously and use his best effort shows that, in reality,
he consents to the habit.
3. Freedom is an indispensable condition of the moral char-
acter of human actions. This has been indicated already in
Psychology (p. 180 ff.), and only a few considerations will be
added here.
(a) At all ages and in all places mankind has recognized two
distinct orders of facts. Some are necessary and worthy of neither
blame nor praise. Others are free, and their agents are held account-
able for them. A man is not blamed for being sick or for acci-
dentally hurting himself. He is blamed for wilfully killing his
CONDITIONS OF MORALITY 291
fellowman, stealing his neighbor's property, indulging in vices
which caused the disease or accident.
(b) Obligation supposes the power to do or omit the obligatory
action, and hence postulates freedom. There can be no obliga-
tion if human actions are necessarily determined and are ruled by
laws as necessary as those which are found in the physical world.
Obligation is an absurdity if man is not the master of his own
actions, and if all are strictly and necessarily determined.
(c) The same consideration applies to the notions of right and
duty as correlative. A man has a right when he can exact some-
thing from his fellowman; he has a duty when he ought to give
that which is exacted. The right to exact and the duty to give
suppose the actual power to give what is exacted.
(d) Responsibility, merit, virtue or vice, self-satisfaction and
remorse suppose freedom.
(e) Hence freedom is at the very basis of the essential factors of
morality. Without it, the terms "obligation," "responsibility,"
"right" and "wrong," are meaningless, and every action takes place
with the same necessity with which the stone falls to the earth
and obeys the law of gravitation. Such actions can neither be pre-
scribed nor forbidden; they are neither right nor wrong, and deserve
neither blame nor praise. It is true that some actions performed
by man are necessary, but neither does he feel himself responsible,
nor is he held responsible for them. If they are bad, he regrets
them as he would regret an unavoidable misfortune or bodily
deformity, not in the same way that he is sorry for an action
known to be wrong, and yet freely committed. On this point the
practice of determinists agrees with the practice of those who
admit freedom. The inconsistency of the former is a sign of the
connection which exists between the fact of freedom and the
facts and elements of morality.
CHAPTER I
FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS
The object of this chapter is to indicate the bases on which
morality rests, and to discuss briefly the problems suggested by
the obvious facts mentioned above. Although this chapter is
rather theoretical, its practical importance is evident, since, hi
order to be effective, the rules of morality must rest on secure
foundations.
ARTICLE I. THE MORAL NORMS OR LAWS
The idea of obligation supposes that of a law to which actions
should conform, and of a rule which they should follow. This
rule may be considered in its external reality, as a law properly so
called, and in its internal application or conscience.
I. LAW
I. DEFINITION AND DIVISIONS
i. Meaning of Law. In general, law signifies a constant or
uniform rule according to which actions take place. A distinc-
tion is to be made between physical, civil, and ethical laws. The
first apply only to material beings, the second and third to men
as intelligent and free agents.
(a) Physical laws are abstract expressions or formulae for the
constant, necessary, and uniform mode of happening of phenomena;
thus the laws of gravitation, attraction, chemical affinity, etc.
Ethical laws do not express what necessarily and constantly hap-
pens, but what should happen. They are not indicative, but
imperative formulae.
(b) When asked why I have certain documents signed before
2Q2
THEMORALLAW 293
a notary public, or why I do not build a house without a permit
from the city authorities, I answer that it is the law, and that its
violation would make me liable to a penalty. This answer refers
to what is called the civil law, i.e. a set of rules promulgated by
competent authorities, varying with different countries and govern-
ments, and the violation of which is punished in different ways.
Were I in another state or country, or at another time, I would
not have on this point the same obligations under which I am
now.
(c) If asked why I do not steal my neighbor's property, or kill
my innocent fellowman, I may also answer: Because the law for-
bids it. But I feel that the meaning is not the same as above,
that the obligation is of a higher character, that it would follow
me everywhere and at all times, and that it would continue to
exist even did the civil code make no mention of it and inflict no
penalty for its transgression. It is based on human nature itself,
and for that reason called natural law.
(d) The civil law supposes the natural law. In certain cases
it is only the expression or enforcement of what human reason it-
self dictates, as when it forbids to kill. In other cases, it is reason
again that requires obedience to any just command of the civil
power, and to any law enacted by the proper authority for the
welfare of the subjects.
2. The Natural or Moral Law in the strict sense is that which
imposes a universal and strict obligation. It indicates an ideal
to be realized, and, although one may fail to submit to its com-
mands, yet, in failure, one always has the consciousness of a dis-
order and of a lack of harmony between what is done and what
should be done. As the term indicates, the natural law is derived
from our rational nature itself; it is based on man's essential rela-
tions to other beings, and manifested by the light of reason. Some
of its fundamental and general precepts are self-evident, like: "Do
good and avoid evil; " "Do unto others as you would like to have
others do to you." Others are less general and already touch
upon something concrete like: " Honor thy father and thy mqther ";
" Thou shalt not kill " ; " Thou shalt not bear false witness." Other
points, finally, are very complex, and, in many concrete cases,
2Q4 ETHICS
their morality may seem doubtful, e.g. lying to procure a great
advantage; committing suicide to avoid shame, etc.
Natural law and moral law have almost the same meaning,
yet the latter term seems to have a greater extension, for civil
laws may also impose a strict moral obligation. But, even here,
this obligation is based on the natural law commanding to obey
superiors when they give just orders. The civil law rules only on
matters that refer to the public material welfare. The moral
law reaches a number of other actions, even internal feelings like
hypocrisy, dissimulation, and evil desire; and some external
actions like ingratitude, egoism, gluttony, which the civil law does
not consider. What follows applies strictly to the natural law.
II. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MORAL LAW
The moral law is given in consciousness with the following
characteristics.
1. Obligation. The moral law is not, like physical laws, the
expression of what happens fatally and unavoidably, not merely
a generalized fact. It is a rule which does not register a fact,
but commands, although, even when acknowledging this rule,
man may depart from it and disobey. Obligation is distinct both
from the determinism of the laws of nature, and from a mere
attraction, desirability, or counsel, which does not command strictly
in the form of a "Thou shalt . . . ." In a word, it is an imper-
ative.
2. Absoluteness. The moral law is a categorical, not a
hypothetical, imperative. A law is conditional when it enjoins
a certain means to reach an end. It is absolute when it enjoins a
thing as an end in itself independently of any condition. In the
former case the obligation may be shirked by renouncing the con-
ditioning end. In the latter, the obligation, even if not complied
with, is unavoidable. Thus, "Thou shalt not steal," "Thou shalt
not kill," are absolute commands. But if I say: "You must work
in order to preserve your health, or to become rich," or "Avoid
defrau<Jing others if you want to increase your business," I use a
conditional form, and the command depends on a supposition which
may or may not be verified. The moral imperative imposes itself
THE MORAL LAW 295
simply because it is good and necessary, and because doing other-
wise is acting against one's nature, reason, and conscience. I may
not feel obliged to be a healthy or rich man, but I feel obliged to
act as a man. This is expressed by the proverb: "Do your duty,
come what may."
3. Universality. (a) The moral law is independent of indi-
vidual character, persons, countries, and times. It may pre-
scribe different things according to different circumstances, but it
is independent of personal interests and passions. Its principles
are unchangeable, since they are based on human nature itself.
Interests, pleasures, and desires vary with every individual. Not
so the moral law which Kant sums up in this maxim: "So act that
the maxim of thy will can at the same time be valid as the prin-
ciple of universal legislation," i.e. act in such a manner that all
men can act in the same manner; or again, in a more personal way:
Do unto others as you would have them do unto you. Thus even
if it were my own interest to steal, I do not wish others to steal
from me. I know the law, and may not wrongfully make an
exception in my own favor.
(b) It is true that practical applications vary almost endlessly
with times and places. The law: "Thou shalt not kill," may be
interpreted in many ways, and admit of many excuses. More-
over, it may seem to conflict with other principles and thus become
obscured. Thus in certain tribes it is deemed lawful to kill parents
in old age so as to avoid their falling into the hands of the enemy,
or to shorten their sufferings. These excuses are understood as
applications of the law which obliges us to love parents and do
them good. Variations in practice are accounted for by (i) the
misinterpretation of certain principles; (2) the real or apparent
conflict of several principles; (3) the difficulty in agreeing on some
points of morality which are obscure in themselves; (4) the deprav-
ity of the will which makes it disobey known laws; (5) habits and
customs which modify or deprave the moral sense.
III. EXISTENCE OF THE MORAL LAW
In the second article we shall speak of the basis on which
the distinction between right and wrong rests. For the present
296 ETHICS
we want to show that such a distinction exists. Two points
must be established, (i) that this distinction is recognized in
consciousness; (2) that it is valid.
i. Testimony of Consciousness. To formulate the moral
law and explain its characteristics is already to demonstrate its
existence. The distinction between right and wrong conduct is
as natural and as evident for man as the distinction between true
and false assent. Both impose themselves with the same cogent
force, and neither can be denied without renouncing human
reason itself. Let us, however, sum up a few facts which will
illustrate this conclusion.
(a) Everywhere and at all times we find this distinction recog-
nized, praise or blame bestowed, honor or disgrace attached to cer-
tain actions. In all languages expressions are found for these ideas.
Standards differ, it is true, yet the fact at issue is admitted, for
we are not concerned at present with the practical determination
of what is right and what is wrong, but only with the fact that there
are right and wrong actions.
(b) The testimony of individual consciousness is equally clear.
The consciousness of freedom is inseparable from the conscious-
ness that freedom is restricted by the moral law which it may trans-
gress. Sometimes at least, before acting, there is a feeling that
one of two possible courses of action is right and honorable, the
other wrong and dishonorable. After acting, feelings of self-
approval or self-blame are experienced. These feelings are not
merely feelings of joy and regret, such as might be experienced on
the occasion of some fortunate or unhappy event, success or fail-
ure, luck or accident. In these latter cases, unforeseen circum-
stances, or even personal imprudence, may be deplored, but we
do not feel that our real value, moral worth, intrinsic and genuine
honorableness, have been lost or lessened.
From being rich a man may become poor, and in consequence
receive less external honors; he may regret the loss of wealth,
advantages, and honors, but he may feel nevertheless that his own
personal worth remains what it was before. On the contrary, the
man who, from being poor, becomes rich by using unjust means,
may receive honors; yet he has lost some of his essential worth,
THE MORAL LAW 297
and feels it unless he has stifled his moral sense by depraved habits
of thought and will. It is possible to hush the voice of conscience
and become hardened against its warnings. Monsters are found
in the moral as well as in the physical world, men who commit
the greatest crimes without experiencing any shame or remorse.
A man may be born sickly, or deprived of some external sense;
or disease and the loss of a sense may develop later. So also a
man may be born a moral monster owing to organic or mental
defects; or he may little by little allow his moral sense to be
destroyed. These are exceptions, and no more proofs against
the reality of the moral law than the existence of insane or sick
persons is a proof against the reality of sanity and health.
2. Attempts to Explain Away This Fact. How will these feel-
ings or data of consciousness be accounted for? Can we ascribe
to them an artificial origin, or must we say that they are nat-
ural, innate, and rooted in human nature itself? Some facts are
important and must be admitted.
(a) Education contributes to develop and direct the moral
sense. According as the child is taught by word and example,
he will in life consider certain things as right or wrong. The
influence of education on morality is an obvious fact.
(b) Owing to habit and custom, actions which, at first, shock the
moral sense in time appear quite natural and indifferent; or actions
performed previously without any sense of wrong-doing appear
blameworthy. Hence attempts have been made to explain the
moral law by education, habits, surroundings, and by the exist-
ence of the civil law.
(c) According to the schools of positivism and associationism,
all actions are originally indifferent. Some become indissolubly
associated with pleasurable or displeasurable feelings and with
useful or harmful results. Gradually such associations of actions
with their consequences cause men to look upon the actions as
good or bad in themselves. These estimates of the value of actions
are transmitted by education. Parents, instructed by their own
experience, give orders to their children, and rulers lay down laws
for their subjects; or contracts are made by which men bind them-
selves to behave in certain ways toward their fellowmen. These
298 ETHICS
associations become necessary and indissoluble, and thus are
explained the universality and absoluteness of the moral law.
3. The Preceding Explanation is Insufficient. (a) Education
may make the child look upon certain actions as good, and upon
certain others as bad. It may direct the moral sense, but supposes
already in the child's mind the distinction between right and wrong,
between praiseworthy and blameworthy actions. It influences it,
strengthens it, and directs it, but does not create it. The animal
may be "educated," or trained, but it can be taught only the util-
itarian expediency of certain actions, because it lacks the necessary
foundation for morality. Moral education is not simply a matter
of prudence, expediency, or interest. These are at most hypothet-
ical imperatives, not moral laws. Moreover, wherefrom would
the educator derive the idea of obligation, morality, and responsi-
bility? No associations can change the idea of useful into that of
right, nor the idea of harmful into that of wrong. As a matter of
fact at present we deal with morality only as a fact conscious-
ness refuses to identify these two aspects of human actions. Edu-
cation is for morality what logic is for the intellect. Logic supposes
the distinction of truth and falsity, but does not create it. Moral
education also supposes the distinction of right and wrong.
(b) We need not insist on the supposition that the sense of obli-
gation arises from contracts. It is clear that contracts presuppose
the obligation of observing them. What is the use of giving my
word, if I feel that it is indifferent to break it? Justice alone, i.e.
moral law, can unite human wills in one common agreement.
(c) Finally, the civil law gives no satisfactory explanation,
(i) The civil law may be just or unjust, tyrannical or advanta-
geous; it may respect or disregard individual rights, etc. To say
this is to appeal to a higher law as criterion. (2) The authority of
the civil law is derived from the natural law, which tells us that it
is good and obligatory to obey legitimate authorities. If obedience
is not already due to a civil law, it ceases to be a law at all. (3)
There are good and evil actions, both internal and external, about
which the civil law says nothing. (4) If morality is derived from
the civil law, the door is opened to all forms of tyranny, since,
in this case, there is no higher standard of morality than this law.
CONSCIENCE 299
(d) In conclusion, if morality had an artificial origin, the notion
of moral obligation would vanish from the mind as soon as one
would come to know this fact. On the contrary, it always persists,
thus showing that it comes from human nature itself.
H. CONSCIENCE
I. NATURE OF CONSCIENCE
What has been said so far applies as much to conscience as to
moral law. Even if the moral law is imposed on man from without,
' a question which is out of consideration here, it remains cer-
tain that it cannot reach and affect man except through the knowl-
edge of it, that is, through conscience. And the arguments which
prove the existence of the moral law do so by proving at the same
time the fact of moral conscience. What then is conscience?
i. Conscience Implies Two Elements, one belonging to the
intellect, the other to the feelings.
(a) Conscience appreciates the moral value of human actions.
This judgment is not merely logical, it is imperative. It does not
simply state what takes place, it dictates what should take
place.
(b) Conscience produces feelings of joy or blame according as
the recognized obligation has been complied with or not. This
element is the consequence of the former, which is the more
important.
(c) Hence conscience may be defined as the practical judgment
which dictates what is good and what is bad, what is obligatory and
what is optional, in every individual case. Such at least is the strict
meaning of the word. But frequently it is used to denote, not so
much the act of judging as the habit of forming correct judgments
on the morality of actions. Thus we say of a man that his con-
science is erroneous on certain points, meaning that he habitually
has misconceptions of their moral aspect. Sometimes also con-
science refers to the agreement between a man's conduct and his
principles. To say of a man that he has no conscience generally
implies that he knows what he ought to do, but fails to act
300 ETHICS
accordingly. Conscientious and conscientiousness refer also to
the same idea.
2. Conscience and Reason. From what precedes, conscience
is not simply, nor even primarily, "moral feelings," or "moral
sense." An action is not primarily looked upon as good or bad
because it is attractive or repulsive, or because it produces feel-
ings of self-approval or self-blame, but rather these are felt because
the action is judged to be good or bad. Moral judgment, or con-
science, is an intellectual judgment proceeding from reason, based
on implicit or explicit, actual or habitual, deliberation, compari-
son, and reasoning, and capable of truth and error. In order to
answer the question : Is this action which I propose to do right or
wrong? I appeal to reason and try to solve my doubt by making
use of higher, better known, and more certain principles. All this
is essentially the function of reason.
II. VALUE OF CONSCIENCE AS THE RULE OF ACTIONS
i. In General, since conscience is a function of reason, its dic-
tates are not necessarily true. The very fact that judgments on the
morality of the same action vary with times and places indicates
that some must be false. Sometimes also personal experience
shows clearly how difficult it is to reach a conclusion, and how
uncertain this conclusion may remain after the most careful investi-
gation. But from these facts it cannot be inferred that conscience
has no value at all, and that its dictates are always arbitrary and
never to be relied on. To reason this way is no more justifi-
able than to disclaim the validity of all scientific conclusions be-
cause some are false, or to deny absolutely that highly probable
conclusions have any value because they are not certain.
In some cases duty is certain, and conscience manifests it clearly.
As to the variations in moral estimates, they do not apply to the
first principles of morality, such as the distinction of right and
wrong, the obligation to avoid moral evil, and so on. The differ-
ences in their practical applications are due to habits, circum-
stances, modes of life, civil law, and chiefly to the real or apparent
conflict of duties. The murder of enemies taken as prisoners
may seem legitimate to tribes which are constantly at war; weak
CONSCIENCE 301
children or old people may be looked upon as hindrances to public
welfare, etc. (cf. p. 295).
2. Various Kinds of Conscience. Conscience may be true or
false; ignorant, doubtful, or probable. It is important to note the
difference between speculative and practical reason. The solution
of a problem of mathematics or natural science may be postponed
indefinitely, or even never be reached. But action cannot always
wait. In a concrete circumstance, I must do one thing or abstain
from it, perform one action or another. To doubt is possible;
to do nothing is not always possible, and may be wrong.
(a) If conscience is certain, leaves no doubt, and shows clearly
what should be done, it must be followed. What it commands
must be done; what it forbids must be omitted; what it allows may
be done or omitted. This is true even in the case of unsuspected
or invincible error. When a man, after taking all prudent avail-
able means available means will of course vary with the intel-
lectual capacity and special disposition of the agent, and with
the urgency of the action judges bona fide that he should do
so or so, he is obliged to follow his conscience, since it is the only
rule he can apply to his actions. Nor is absolute certitude required
such as would exclude completely every doubt, but only such as
would exclude every prudent doubt. In moral questions it would
be useless to look for mathematical certitude. A greater certitude
is required in actions which have more serious consequences.
(b) Where no certitude is possible and yet it is necessary to take
a course of action, man must do his best. An obligation which
is strictly doubtful cannot be said to be a real obligation and there-
fore to bind. In such cases, especially where great interests are
at stake, the best rule is to take the course which appears the
safest and least likely to injure anybody's rights and interests.
But it is always necessary to ascertain carefully which course
should be pursued, and, if possible, to delay until this has been
done. How is it to be done?
3. The Formation or Education of Conscience is general or spe-
cial, (a) The general education of conscience consists in the habit
of forming correct practical judgments. Besides the external
helps, such as studying, reading, consulting, inquiring on ethics
302 ETHICS
in general or on special matters, it is important for the individual
to be careful about the acquisition of intellectual, volitional, and
emotional habits, since all these, as explained previously, influence
moral judgments.
(b) In special cases, when a man doubts whether a given action
is right or wrong, he must, as far as time allows, reflect, consider,
and consult. Especially when one's own interests are engaged, and
when, in consequence, there is danger of passing a less correct
and less impartial judgment in one's own cause, the consultation
of trustworthy and prudent persons is preferable to reflection.
We may and must consult competent moralists as we may and
must sometimes consult a physician, lawyer, or scientist. The
more important the action, the greater must be the diligence in
ascertaining its morality.
4. Determinants of Concrete Morality. From the preceding
doctrine it follows that the morality of a concrete action depends
on several factors, the nature itself of the action, the intention,
and the circumstances.
(a) Since certain actions in themselves are good, and others bad,
it is clear that morality depends on the nature of the action itself,
that is, on its relation with human reason. From this exclusive
point of view a number of actions are neither good nor bad in
themselves, but indifferent, or, rather, non-moral, like walking,
sitting, singing, etc. But they become moral, i.e. good or bad,
owing to the intention of the agent and the circumstances in which
they are performed.
(b) For instance, walking to relieve a poor man is good; walking
to commit a theft is wrong. It may even be said that the inten-
tion is the primary determinant of concrete morality, since con-
science is the immediate norm of human actions. The final
purpose, being that on which the will is fixed, is really the directive
principle of everything else. This must not be understood in
the sense that the end justifies the means, or that any means,
even those that are wrong, may be taken in order to reach a
good end, but in the sense that means known to be indifferent in
themselves derive their morality from the end in view.
(c) Circumstances of time, place, person, quantity, quality,
OPINIONS ON MORAL STANDARD 303
etc., may also increase, diminish, or change the morality or immo-
rality of an action. We often hear the plea of aggravating or
extenuating circumstances. To kill unjustly is wrong; to kill in
self-defence is lawful. To give alms is right in general; to give
alms when a bad use will certainly be made of it is wrong.
ARTICLE II. THE MORAL STANDARD
I. THE QUESTION STATED
I. THE OBJECT OF THE PRESENT ARTICLE
1. Necessity of a Rule. The proximate rule of morality is
the actual dictate of conscience. But on what basis does this
dictate itself rest? Or rather, on what basis should it rest?
Men act for certain motives, and in order to secure certain
ends, and yet some of these motives and ends are approved as
good, noble, and moral, while others are condemned as bad, base,
and immoral. A man who always acts for his own personal satis-
faction, in whose conduct no place is found for a disinterested
motive and for self-sacrifice, will generally be looked upon as a low
type of morality to be shunned and despised. There are there-
fore rules that govern conscience and guide it in pronouncing on
the morality of the end which a man proposes to himself. There
is a standard to which we do and must refer human actions, mo-
tives, intentions, and ends. Why are some actions morally good,
and others morally wrong?
2. What is a Rule? (a) In a material sense, a rule or ruler
is a straight-edged instrument used as a measure, or as a guide in
drawing straight lines. A standard is a measure or value estab-
lished by law or by universal consent, to which other things are
referred. By analogy these material meanings are applied to
immaterial things, and especially to human actions. In the school,
the child uses his ruler to draw a straight line. If the pen or pencil
fails to follow it, the line is no longer straight; it becomes crooked
or curved. So also the action which deflects from the rules of
morality is crooked and wrong. Measures are referred to a stand-
304 ETHICS
ard. The length of all foot-rules must agree with the standard
foot accepted by law.
(b) When we speak of morality there is no positive law, nor
universal agreement establishing a moral standard. In fact, we
shall see that philosophers have proposed different systems. This
is not to be wondered at, as we deal here with ideals, the determina-
tion of which is influenced by many circumstances, and especially
by the whole complex psychology of the individual. Sometimes
also, apparent contradictions are only at the surface, while at
bottom there is essential agreement. Some divergences may be
radical; others may come either from the incomplete expression
of a view, or from laying too much stress on what is only a
secondary aspect of the question. Thus theories become one-sided.
3. Conditions Required in the Standard. The moral stand-
ard cannot be: (i) A mere consequence of morality. Thus remorse
and self-approval are only effects of moral actions, and cannot be
the standard we are now looking for. (2) Something variable and
changing. Morality is not something dependent on individual
peculiarities, interests, or character. There is not one morality
for one man, and another for another man. The ultimate stand-
ard of morality is universal. (3) Something merely optional
which man can accept or renounce. The laws of morality are
frequently obligatory. In some cases, it is true, they are per-
missive, but in others, man is not given the moral choice between
doing or omitting; he is under the obligation of acting so or so,
and of omitting such or such an action.
II. DIFFERENT VIEWS CLASSIFIED
i. Logical Classification. It is almost impossible to give a
logical classification of the various systems of morality. They
merge insensibly into one another.
(a) In the first place one may claim that we have a direct appre-
hension, or intuitive knowledge, or feeling, of morality. But evi-
dently, if a man claims to know in the strict sense, he may be asked
for the grounds of his knowledge, and unless he appeals to imme-
diate evidence in which case he will be in near agreement with
some feeling-theory he will appeal to some form of reasoning.
OPINIONS ON MORAL STANDARD 305
If, on the contrary, a man claims that he feels an action to be right
or wrong in the same way that he feels an impression to be pleas-
urable or painful, no more questions can be asked him, although
such an assertion may be discussed.
In the second place, morality may be determined by a calcula-
tion of, or reasoning upon, the fitness of an action to reach a certain
end which is conceived as a bonum in se. From this point of
view it is clear that the discussion of the criterion of morality
centres around the end itself which determines the morality of
actions.
(b) Looking at the question from another point of view, all
will agree that, in acting, man always looks for some good, since by
all it is admitted that morality enables us to classify actions as
good or bad, and goodness is the quality which all must strive
to realize. This good may be (i) the satisfaction of the senses
or that of reason; (2) my own good (egoism) or the good of others
(altruism). Hence the following synopsis.
I. According to the mode of knowledge of morality. The dis-
tinction between right and wrong may be known
(i) immediately. Intuitionalism
emotional
intellectual
(2) mediately
by reason. Rationalism
by experience. Empiricism
II. According to the good which morality must realize. This
good is
(1) the pleasure of the senses. Sensualistic ethics
(2) the satisfaction of rational aspirations. Rational ethics.
In either case one may seek
(1) personal good. Egoism l rrj ,.,.. .
. \ Utthtanamsm
(2) the good of others. Altruism }
2. Order of the Following Questions. Combining these dif-
ferent aspects and points of view, we shall examine successively
(i) the true nature and foundation of duty and moral obligation,
and we shall try to determine the true standard and criterion of
morality; (2) the other systems, which contain only a part of the
306 ETHICS
truth, or one aspect of the answer, and which, therefore, may be
false in their exclusiveness, i.e. not so much in what they as-
sert as in what they deny. Here we shall consider the theories
basing morality on (a) feelings; (b) pleasure and utility; (c)
reason. (3) Finally, we shall attempt to determine the ultimate
foundation of morality.
H. THE QUESTION DISCUSSED
I. POSITIVE DETERMINATION OF THE MORAL GOOD
i. The Notion of End. (a) All actions which belong to mo-
rality are purposive, and frequently the reason why they are good or
bad is that the purpose is good or bad. The purpose or end toward
which an action is directed may be objective, or subjective, or
both. Thus an action may be wrong because it leads of itself to
some bad result, or because the agent intends to produce some re-
sult which he looks upon as bad; and if this estimation is cor-
rect, the action is both objectively and subjectively wrong. The
science of ethics determines objective morality. It cannot
reach subjective morality, which depends on psychological, and
therefore individual, factors.
(b) Since morality is determined by the nature of the purpos-
ive action, the notion of end is essential in the question of the moral
good. If an action, by its very nature, deprives my fellowman of
an essential right, this result makes the action wrong. Thus, load-
ing a pistol and firing are wrong, if the result of it is murder by
which an individual is deprived of his essential right to live.
In this case, the several actions leading to the final result are
coordinated by a preconceived mental purpose.
(c) To answer the question: What is the standard of morality?
it is necessary to answer this other question : What are the legit-
imate ends of human actions? To what final result must they
tend? Ends may be proximate or remote according as they are
reached immediately or only after a succession of coordinated
actions. One may eat to support the body, thereby to make men-
tal work possible in order to acquire riches and finally enjoy one-
self. For the present we shall limit ourselves to natural ends,
DISCUSSION OF MORAL STANDARD 307
attainable on this earth, as our previous studies do not yet en-
title us to speak of God as the natural end of man, still less of the
supernatural end to which man has been raised.
2. Morality Relative to Human Nature. Whenever man acts
as a man that is, uses his faculties with a sufficient knowledge
of what he is doing, and a sufficient consent of the will what he
seeks is always the satisfaction of some of his aspirations and
desires, i.e. the reaching of some end. But human aspirations
correspond to human faculties and, like them, are very com-
plex. Man desires happiness, but this may be the happiness of
sensual pleasure or that of reason; it may be his own selfish hap-
piness or also that of others. For, not only is man complex within
himself, but living, as he does, amid complex social surroundings,
many new relations arise from this social aspect of life. It is im-
possible to satisfy all human faculties because frequently they
stand in opposition to one another. Reason and the senses are
in many cases antagonistic, reason dictating duties which impose
a restriction on the senses, and the senses craving for gratifications
which reason condemns. If man had only one faculty, the devel-
opment and perfection of this faculty would be his duty and the
source of his legitimate happiness. In the real complexity and
frequent opposition of his faculties, what is he to do? To "fol-
low nature " may be a good precept, but what is it to follow nature
when nature is so complex?
(a) Human nature is human owing to that which distinguishes
it from other natures. It possesses certain properties identical with
or analogical to those of other beings. Like the stone, the human
body obeys the law of gravitation. Like the plant, it assimilates
foreign substances, grows, etc. Like the animal, man sees, hears,
remembers, etc. These faculties, therefore, are not special to man;
they do not make of man a being distinct from other beings. As
we proceed upwards in the scale of beings, we find that every su-
perior degree shares in the properties of the preceding one and adds
something to them. The perfection of every being consists prima-
rily in the degree of perfection of its specific properties and
faculties.
(b) The perfection of man consists, therefore, not in the satis-
308 ETHICS
faction of such faculties as he possesses in common with lower
beings, but of such as are special to him, that is, reason and will,
together with the sense of obligation and duty which is based on
these. The body, the senses, and the feelings have their claims,
it is true, but they must always be subordinated to those of rea-
son, and, in case of conflict, the former, not the latter, must yield.
Whatever man does he does in order to complete and perfect his
nature, since he does it in order to satisfy a desire and an as-
piration, i.e. in order to fill a deficiency. Every desire and aspi-
ration is essentially the avowal of the lack of something. A man
can desire only what he does not yet possess, and his actions tend
to acquire it.
(c) Hence the primary duty of man is to preserve in himself the
essential harmony and subordination of his faculties. Both in
the individual and in society reason discovers a certain order which
imposes itself. Every faculty in the individual and every member
in the society have their proper nature and place. Reason commands
us to respect this order, and to give to every faculty and to every
fellowman their dues. From this general principle are derived
the complex duties relating to self or to other men. Concrete
moral good includes both that which is necessary and that
which is permitted according to the general principle just
mentioned.
3. Morality is not Obedience to Law, whether external or inter-
nal. This is a consequence of what has been said above, since
law, whatever it may be, is itself the expression of a good, and
obligatory only in so far as it commands some good. Obedience
to law is itself dictated by reason, and hence not primary. More-
over, laws, divine or human, contain points which are evidently
of unequal importance, and which may come to conflict with one
another. Thus the law forbidding homicide may conflict with
the duty of self-preservation. This is true not only of external
law, but also of the internal law or conscience, for conscience is
largely a matter of education, feeling, and habit, and these may con-
flict with reason. If, however, by conscience be meant reason it-
self as applied to a line of conduct, we come back to the solution
given above. In practice the separation of reason from other
DISCUSSION OF MORAL STANDARD 309
mental faculties is never perfect; hence the diversity of moral
standards.
To sum up : The moral good for man is to live in accordance with
his specific nature, to perfect it as much as possible, to respect the
nature of other beings, to treat his own faculties and every other
being according to the place which they occupy. This is the ideal
which one cannot conceive without feeling the obligation of realiz-
ing it as far as possible. Whatever system does not take all this
into consideration will be false or incomplete, as will appear more
clearly from the following discussion.
II. MORALTTY BASED ON A SPECIAL SENTIMENT
i. Importance of Feelings. (a) Undoubtedly feelings are
very important in morality. Merely to perform one's duty, or to
perform it reluctantly, hesitatingly, and faint-heartedly, is less
easy and less noble than to love it and perform it with readiness.
Not that all duties are agreeable, but the sense of duty and the love
of whatever is known to be right make man fulfil it with the pleas-
ure of doing right, and the satisfaction of obeying conscience.
When duty is found agreeable, this feeling can in no way destroy
the value of the action by which it is accomplished. Man is not
merely a rational being, but a feeling being as well, and even if
the ideal of morality does not consist in acting for pleasure, yet
the pleasure found in right conduct is a sign that the principles
of morality are interwoven with other elements in the human
mind.
Feelings increase the energy, and make it possible to accomplish
actions that would otherwise be above human strength. St.
Augustine's words express a truth which is daily experienced:
"Ubi amatur non laboratur, aut si laboratur labor amatur." A
cold idea has but little motor power, but it derives much strength
from the feeling that accompanies it. All noble and heroic ac-
tions proceed from the idea of duty, the will to accomplish it, and
also a certain passion that impels to it. To try to eliminate all
feelings from morality, and look upon them as obstacles to be
removed, as the Stoics and Kant did; to look upon duty as being
3io
ETHICS
by its very nature a burden to be carried painfully and by dint of
effort; to place the ideal of man in a state of perfect calmness and
rest undisturbed by any feeling or emotion, is to misunderstand
human nature, to overlook human psychology, and to give a rule
unfit to guide men, since it fails to take men as they are essentially.
(b) But if feelings play an important r61e, this role must not
be exaggerated, (i) Feelings are blind; they must be controlled
and guided, and hence cannot be the standard of morality. (2)
They attract, but do not command or create any obligation. (3)
They are not universal, but vary with every individual. (4) What
is agreeable to all men is not thereby obligatory. (5) It must be
noted especially that moral feelings presuppose the idea of morality.
Why do we experience moral pleasure, if not because we know that
we are doing right? Why do we experience moral displeasure,
if not because we know that our actions are against our duty?
Why do we love duty, if not because duty appears to us as good?
Feelings do not explain the moral standard, but presuppose it.
They are not its basis, but its derivatives. Yet certain theories
propose feelings as the very basis of morality. To these we now
pass.
2. Moral Sense. (a) Some philosophers like Shaftesbury,
Hume, and especially philosophers of the Scottish school, after
Reid, assert the existence of a special moral sense which intuitively
distinguishes right from wrong in about the same way that the
sense of taste distinguishes bitter from sweet, and the sense of
vision, blue from red. It is a kind of natural instinct which reveals
what is good and what is bad. It may also be compared to the
aesthetic sense or taste which at once makes us find certain objects
beautiful, and others ugly. Among Greek philosophers we already
find the identification of the good with the beautiful, and it must
be admitted that ethics and aesthetics have many points of con-
tact. Some actions are beautiful or sublime on account of their
moral excellence and they cause feelings of admiration akin to
purely aesthetic feelings.
(b) Criticism. It must be admitted that the habit of respect-
ing the moral law, and the spirit of obedience to it, contribute to
develop in man something like an instinct, a kind of moral taste,
DISCUSSION OF MORAL STANDARD 311
or moral sense, by which, in ordinary cases, he is guided in the
choice between right and wrong actions without any effort of
reasoning. Education and social surroundings create in man a
second nature, moral as well as psychological.
But, precisely because it is a second nature, it cannot be looked
upon as primary. It depends on something else. As it is neither
obligatory nor constant, this taste cannot be the moral standard.
Still less can it decide which of two feelings must prevail in case
the same action is both agreeable or disagreeable from different
points of view. Thus a physician may have to choose between
self-sacrifice in relieving the sufferings of a man having a conta-
gious disease, and the love of his own life and of his family. In
such cases appeal must be made to some other norm and ideal.
In other words, we may speak of moral taste, but a rational ex-
planation of it must be given. It must be determined why certain
actions are in conformity with, and others in opposition to, the
moral sense. Thus it becomes possible to criticize the actions of
others, and to refer them to certain rules which are not, like indi-
vidual feelings, subject to endless variations. In fact, all admit
that there is a depraved and a correct moral taste, and therefore
refer it to some higher norm.
3. Benevolence. (a) According to Hutcheson, man is moved
by two kinds of affections, self-love and benevolence. In case of
conflict between them, the moral sense decides in favor of benevo-
lence, for it approves actions which follow from a desire to do good
to others without regard to any personal advantage to be derived
from them.
(b) Criticism. This is only one side of the question. It leaves
out the duties toward self, and fails to account for the obligatory
character of the moral law. If self-abnegation is sublime, its foun-
dation should be the more secure, since the principle of obligation
must be more certain in proportion as the sacrifice imposed is
greater. And are there no duties toward those with regard to
whom no benevolent feelings are experienced, but who excite
feelings of antipathy, often unexplainable?
4. Sympathy. (a) Adam Smith proposes the feeling of sym-
pathy as fundamental in ethics. By sympathy is meant the ten-
312 ETHICS
dency to share the feelings of others, to suffer when they are
afflicted, and to rejoice when they are joyful. It is a fact that
man naturally sympathizes with other men, and chiefly wants
them to sympathize with him. According to Smith, sympathy
is not only a fact, but a principle of morality. To approve or
condemn the actions of others is simply to recognize that we are,
or are not, in sympathy with them, and that we also should feel
right or wrong if we performed the same actions. The sentiment
of obligation is simply the fear of exciting antipathy in others.
Hence one must endeavor to have the sympathy of the greatest
possible number of men. As those who judge the value of actions
may be more or less depraved and prejudiced, and as the danger
of prejudice is greater when a man passes a judgment on the value
of his own actions, an appeal must be made to an ideal onlooker,
disinterested and impartial. It is his sympathy which man must
try to deserve.
(b) Criticism. Sympathy as the rule of moral conduct is
insufficient, (i) Like all other feelings it varies with indi-
viduals and their surroundings. Those who live in corrupt com-
pany would win their fellowmen's sympathy by doing wrong.
(2) It is not obligatory. It is at most a fact, not a law. To make
it a guide is to expose oneself to the danger of going astray, for
not all forms of right excite sympathy, nor all forms of wrong,
antipathy. (3) To appeal to an impartial onlooker and judge is
hardly consistent with Smith's theory. This ideal judge is pre-
cisely one in whom abstraction is made of the feelings of sympathy
and antipathy. He is a judge who bases his judgment on delib-
erate reasonable evidence. Hence the criterion of feeling is aban-
doned for that of reason. How can I know that my action will be
approved by an ideal and impartial onlooker? The only means
is to reason out for myself whether it is worthy of praise or of
blame, that is, to find out by reason whether it is morally good
or bad.
5. Honor. (a) What has been said so far applies also to all
theories which base morality on a sense of honor. Honor is a
vague term, but, in its most common meaning, it applies to a
man's reputation as based especially on social relations. Every
DISCUSSION OF MORAL STANDARD 313
condition of life has its own special line of honor. The soldier's
honor, the gentleman's honor, the citizen's honor, nay, even the
thief's honor, are not according to the same standard. These
meanings, however, are not strictly ethical not all, at any rate
but conventional. They are based on custom, etiquette, habit,
etc. If they are ethical, they do not refer to the basis of moral-
ity, but only to certain applications of it, to some special virtue
or behavior characteristic of this or that profession. Hence honor
is neither a universal nor a constant norm. Nor is it obligatory
in all cases; frequently one feels that its precepts are not at all
moral obligations, but simply rules established by custom and
convention. There is also the danger of making of this sense of
honor a purely external affair, and of paying no attention to secret
wrong-doing as long as reputation is intact.
(b) This, it is true, is a false and hypocritical sense of honor.
True and genuine honor is based on human dignity. It refers to
self-approval and is not satisfied with merely external decorum.
As such again, it is not fundamental. True honor is distinguished
from false honor by reason, not by feeling. To live according to
true honor and true human dignity is to live according to duty
and reason. The sense of honor, although it must be inculcated
and cultivated as early and as carefully as possible, will always
remain something accessory and require another basis.
III. MORALITY RELATIVE TO PLEASURE AND UTILITY
i. Theories Outlined. (a) There is no a priori reason to
oppose duty and morality to pleasure and utility. There seem
to be no contradictory elements in these two notions. Nor is there
any reason a posteriori, i.e. from experience. The accomplish-
ment of duty is frequently pleasurable, and may become so by
practice and habit. Even when the action is difficult and cannot
be performed without checking some natural tendency, it produces
the nobler and purer happiness resulting from the satisfaction
of the sense of duty, whereas acting in a contrary manner will
produce the painful feeling of remorse and self-condemnation.
(b) From this it does not follow that pleasure and duty are
identical. There are many kinds of pleasure, all of which per-
314 ETHICS
haps are not in conformity with duty. Even if it should be proved
that in all circumstances duty is pleasurable, the two notions
would nevertheless be distinct. Duty imposes itself as an obli-
gatory end; pleasure does not. Even where right conduct is
pleasant, consciousness testifies that it is not right because it is
pleasant, but pleasant because it is right.
(c) Hedonism (^So^, pleasure) is a doctrine identifying the
moral with the pleasurable, and holding that actions are good or
bad according to their pleasurable or painful results. It has two
main forms: (i) Egoistic or individual hedonism, which considers
only the agent's personal happiness. (2) Altruistic or universal
hedonism, which considers the happiness of others, or of the great-
est number of men. This latter form has been called Utilitarian-
ism by Stuart Mill, its chief exponent.
2. Egoistic Hedonism. (a) We need not insist on systems
looking upon morality as an affair of personal pleasure, chiefly
of sensual pleasure. These systems have come to be condemned
universally as lowering man to the level of the brute, (i) In
antiquity, Aristippus of Cyrene gives as a rule to look only for the
present and immediate pleasure to be derived from an action.
The end of man is happiness, and, as the future is uncertain,
man must always follow the instinct that prompts him to strive
after the greatest sum of pleasure in the present. The same doc-
trine found advocates among the French materialists of the eigh-
teenth century. (2) Epicurus insists more on the happiness of
life as a whole. True happiness does not consist so much in sen-
sual pleasure as in the calmer, purer, and more lasting pleasure
of the soul. Hence, although pleasure is the end of man, not all
pleasures are to be placed on the same level, because many pleas-
ures are followed by pain, and pain is often followed by pleasure.
Prudence and judgment are necessary to know which pleasures
are to be chosen, and which pains are to be avoided. Hence,
also, the necessity of virtue, temperance, honesty, justice, etc.,
which are conditions of true pleasure. This moral principle is
much higher and nobler than that of Aristippus.
(b) Criticism, (i) To identify lightness with the pleasure of
the senses is to vilify human nature, to look merely at its lowest
DISCUSSION OF MORAL STANDARD 315
aspect, and to neglect its highest aspirations. (2) Pleasure is
not an end but a means; not a principle but an effect. The end
of man is to act in conformity with his nature, and thus to exercise
his activity and develop his faculties. Pleasure may result from
this, and the desire of pleasure may stimulate it, but it is not the
end. (3) Consciousness shows that pleasure is not obligatory,
absolute, and universal, hence not a standard of morality. Fre-
quently pleasure is followed by remorse of conscience. (4) To
apply this principle of hedonism is to open the door to all abuses.
If pleasure is the end, it has to be sought and enjoyed at whatever
price, and in whatever circumstances. No room is left for dis-
interested motives and self-sacrifice. Personal pleasure may be
procured, even should pain be thereby inflicted on others.
3. Bentham's System is fundamentally egoistic and seconda-
rily altruistic. His main principles are the following:
(a) Pleasure is the only good; pain, the only evil. From this
principle is to be derived the only standard of the value of actions.
An action is useful, and consequently good, when the sum of its
pleasurable consequences is greater than the sum of its painful
consequences.
(b) Pleasures are to be chosen prudently. Attention must be
paid to their (i) intensity; (2) duration; (3) certainty or uncer-
tainty; (4) propinquity or remoteness; (5) fecundity, i.e. capacity
of producing other pleasures; (6) purity, according as they are,
or are not, mixed with pain; (7) extent, i.e. the number of per-
sons who enjoy them. On these bases Bentham builds an arith-
metical determination of good and bad actions, of virtues and
vices, according to the quantity of pleasure and pain that results.
(c) Personal and universal utility are inseparable. Man can-
not live and be happy except in society. Hence it is necessary
to procure pleasure for others in order to receive some from them.
Altruism is a condition of true egoism.
Criticism. (a) To this system are opposed all the reasons
given against making pleasure the standard of morality. Per-
sonal interest is not: (i) Obligatory absolutely, but only hypothet-
ically. In order to succeed, perhaps the merchant must be honest,
but he is not obliged to succeed. (2) Absolute and universal.
316 ETHICS
It is hardly possible to find anything more changeable according
to persons, conditions, times, and places. (3) Practical. Often
the consequences are unforeseen before acting, and yet it is from
them alone that the action is supposed to derive its whole value.
(4) Safe. If personal utility and pleasure are always the goal of
man, it will not always be true that "honesty is the best policy."
It will be true only when the lack of honesty would be known to
others so as to become a source of pain.
(b) Bentham's arithmetic of pleasures is impossible because
there is no common measure applying to all. Pleasures vary with
individuals. Consequently Bentham's calculations to show, for
instance, that drunkenness is immoral because, notwithstanding
the pleasures which it procures, the pains of which it is the source
are more numerous, will fail to convince a large number of indi-
viduals who will calculate on a basis different from that of Bentham.
This whole arithmetic is a matter of personal taste.
(c) From egoism it is impossible to derive altruism. Even if
praise and reward, or blame and punishment are sources of pleas-
ure and pain, and if man must seek the former and avoid the lat-
ter, the following facts remain, (i) Secret actions, like theft or
murder, would be good if productive of pleasure. (2) If self-
interest is primary, it is primarily worthy of praise. Frequently
a man knows his action to be right or wrong before being praised
or blamed for it. (3) Why should men be so inclined to praise
self-sacrifice and benevolence? Benevolence or altruism is not to
be derived from a purely egoistic starting-point. In this view, it
always remains a means toward egoism and toward securing per-
sonal pleasures. It is at most an indirect altruism in the service
of egoism.
4. Stuart Mill. While admitting also that happiness is the
end of man and the supreme test of morality, Stuart Mill modifies
the hedonistic doctrine on two important points.
(a) It is not enough to pay attention to the quantity of pleasure,
as Bentham had done, but pleasures also differ in quality. Some
are higher, nobler, and more refined, and hence to be preferred to
others, not because they are greater, but because they are superior
in quality. This qualitative determination depends both on the
DISCUSSION OF MORAL STANDARD 317
pleasurable object and on the faculty in which the feeling resides.
"It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig sat-
isfied; better to be a Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.'*
(Utilitarianism, ch. II.)
(b) It is not true that individual and general interests are insep-
arable; they may conflict. The aim of man is to work, not for any
personal interest, nor even for the private interest of a family or
a nation, but for the general good of humanity. The standard of
morality is the greatest and truest happiness taken altogether.
Hence "to do as you would be done by, and to love your
neighbor as yourself, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian
morality." (Utilitarianism, ch. II.)
(c) Mill's system of morality must be taken together with his
psychological doctrine of associationism. Moral feeling, duty,
conscience, self-approbation, remorse, etc., result from the asso-
ciations of certain actions with the subsequent feeling of pleasure
or displeasure. Hence actions performed at first for the sole mo-
tive of personal interest, are little by little considered as good.
Morality is thus largely, if not exclusively, dependent on associa-
tion and habit, and consequently arbitrary and artificial, varying
with times, places, and other circumstances.
Criticism. This conception of morality is nobler than that of
Bentham, and, on many points, will give a satisfactory line of
conduct. Yet it is insufficient.
(a) To appeal to a distinction between the quantity and the
quality of pleasure is to renounce the principle that pleasure is
the end of man and the norm of morality. Some pleasures are
said to be more desirable than others, not on account of their pleas-
antness, but on account of their purity, nobleness, disinterested-
ness, beauty, etc., i.e. on account of something else which is itself
primarily desirable. How shall we know which pleasures are
qualitatively superior unless we appeal to reason, which, indepen-
dently of the pleasant character of experiences, pronounces that the
satisfaction of some faculties and aspirations is preferable to that
of others? How shall we convince the thief and the sensual man
that their pleasures are inferior in nature to other pleasures unless
we go beyond the hedonistic principle?
3l8 ETHICS
(b) If interest is the only standard, why should an individual
prefer the general good to his own private advantage? This can-
not be shown to be obligatory without introducing again some
higher standard. If pleasure is the end of man, my pleasure is
my end, and it is what / am entitled to reach) even if I do not thereby
foster the happiness of mankind. On a mere utilitarian basis,
nobody can show me that I am, in any circumstance whatsoever,
obliged to sacrifice myself for the good of others. It is necessary
in this case to show that there is an absolute order, an ideal of
reason, and a duty different from pleasure. The principle of altru-
istic utilitarianism throws no light on the duties of man toward
himself. Even with regard to altruistic duties, it is far from clear,
for it is difficult to estimate what will be the good of mankind in
general.
(c) Undoubtedly the association of ideas is an important factor
in ethics, and on it, to a great extent, current ideas of morality
depend. But it is insufficient, (i) Certain principles of morality
are demonstrable, and based on reason. As was shown in Psychol-
ogy mere habitual sequence will not of itself produce the feeling of
"oughtness" any more than it can produce a universal and neces-
sary judgment. When I reflect on it, the habit of lying does not
destroy the conviction that it is wrong, even though lying
should bring me some advantage. On the other hand, the habit of
washing one's face and hands every morning, of smoking tobacco,
etc., produces no feeling of moral obligation. Moral obligation,
therefore, rests on something else. (2) If habits are the very start-
ing-point of morality, they are of themselves indifferent or non-
moral. Hence I may change them as I please. Thus it becomes
perfectly lawful to stifle the voice of conscience and to refuse to
heed remorse, since all these are simply results of non-moral asso-
ciations. Conscience will disappear by the same means which
gave rise to it, and with equal right.
5. Spencer's addition to utilitarianism, namely, the position
he gives it in his general scheme of universal evolution, does not
remedy its intrinsic weakness. According to him, primitive man
is exclusively egoistic. Soon he perceives that his own personal
interest will gain by associating with others, and doing them good.
DISCUSSION OF MORAL STANDARD 319
Little by little, altruistic feelings arise and struggle with egoism.
This is the present state of humanity, but the day will come when
altruism will have conquered, and be natural to man. Then,
and only then, will Comte's fundamental principle of ethics be
realizable: "Live for others."
This system does not explain the character of obligation. It
tells us what conscience dictates; it cannot tell us why it has the
right to dictate. Moreover, as was remarked against Mill, if
the moral views which man has to-day are the artificial products
of evolution and of adaptation to surroundings, man cannot be
obliged morally to respect them. There can be at most a certain
organic and mental necessity resulting from habit. All that man
can do is to follow blindly his hereditary tendencies, good and bad,
and this is precisely against true morality.
6. Solidarity. A word must also be said of solidarity. It is
a fact that no man is independent. All men form one body, and
receive advantages from the other members of society. Hence
man is obliged to return these, to work for others as others have
worked for him, to behave, not merely as an individual, but as a
part of a whole. He must respect others, as well as himself.
There is much that is true in this view; but it presupposes a
deeper basis. Even if solidarity is a fact, it is not a duty until
appeal is made to higher principles of justice which oblige a man
to return what he receives. And even this justice and obligation
must rest on some other principle of reason antecedent to the
fact of solidarity.
IV. MORALITY DEPENDENT ON REASON
Morality is dependent on reason, but how? We have now to
examine briefly the various systems proposed in this direction.
"Morality for its own sake, and independently of the results which
the moral action may have," such would be the motto of those
moralists whom we are to study. They stand at the opposite ex-
treme of those according to whom, as we have seen, morality
depends primarily on the results of human actions. The moral
action is an end, not a means subordinate to something else, as
hedonists assert. Resulting pleasure and utility have nothing
320 ETHICS
to do in the determination of the moral aspect of an action. The
norm of morality is reason alone with its practical dictates.
1. Stoics. (a) According to the Stoics, virtue, i.e. action in
conformity with the laws of human nature, is the only good, and
vice, i.e. action against the laws of human nature, the only evil,
(i) Since human nature consists essentially in reason, which dif-
ferentiates it from other natures, virtue is a mode of action in con-
formity with reason. (2) Virtue must be sought for its own sake, and
is its own reward and the only happiness. To act for any ulterior
end and any other reward or happiness is wrong. (3) All other
things, sometimes called good, like health, reputation, pleasure, etc.,
are not really so; nor are pain, disease, ignominy, etc., real evils.
They are given no attention by the wise. (4) All feelings and
emotions are opposed to reason. To subdue them, and reach a
complete apathy is the duty of man. The wise man is not subject
to, or rather not affected by, pleasure or pain, fear or desire, etc.
Even the pleasure found in the practice of virtue should never
be an end, but only a consequence of virtue.
(b) This view, however much truth it may contain, is based on
an incomplete psychology. Virtue is necessary to happiness, but
other conditions are also required. The man who suffers physi-
cally or mentally is not completely happy. Pain is a true evil,
although not a moral one. Moreover, human nature includes emo-
tions no less essentially than it includes reason. That feelings should
be controlled is true. That they should be suppressed is against
reason itself, which must recognize them, and finds in them,
sometimes enemies, it is true, but sometimes also allies.
2. Kant. The essential points in Kant's fundamental ethics
may be summarized as follows:
(a) The existence of the moral law is a primitive fact of con-
sciousness, universal and necessary. "Oughtness" manifests it-
self clearly to the mind. It is not derived from any motive like
pleasure or happiness, but is autonomous, and imposes itself for
its own sake, independently of anything else.
(b) Hence the moral law is a categorical imperative. An imper-
ative because it does not merely advise or recommend, but
commands strictly, and imposes an obligation. A categorical
DISCUSSION OF MORAL STANDARD 321
imperative because it is unconditional. A conditional imperative
would make the command dependent on a condition, as "Trans-
act this business in such or such a way if thou wouldst be
successful." But the categorical imperative is subject to no
condition, and, for instance, without any restriction or ulterior
end, commands: "Thou shalt not lie."
(c) The only moral action is that which is performed out of
respect for the moral law itself, and disregards all other ends and
results. "Good-will," i.e. the will to act in conformity with duty,
is the only real good. Goodness or Tightness is not antecedent,
but consequent to obligation. An action is not obligatory because
it is good, but it is good because it is obligatory and performed out
of respect for the moral law.
(d) The two most important principles which must be kept in
mind for the concrete determination of moral actions are: (i) "So
act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of
any other, in every case as an end withal, never as a means only."
Reasonable and free will is that which constitutes essentially human
personality, and since it is absolute, it should never be made an
instrument destined to gratify passions or desires. (2) "So act
that the maxim of thy will can always at the same time 'hold good
as a principle of universal legislation," i.e. Never perform an action
which thou wouldst not allow to be performed by everybody else.
Thus, in my individual case, breaking a promise is wrong, because,
if it were admitted to be right for me, it should be right for all
men. Hence there could be no faith at all in promises. Promises
themselves would therefore cease to be made, and the maxim that
promises may be broken lawfully would thus destroy itself. Hence,
since it is not lawful for all men to break promises, it is not lawful
in my individual case. This principle is the practical test of mo-
rality, and its application will lead to the realization of the
supreme moral ideal, a "republic of ends," in which men will re-
spect and help one another out of pure respect for the moral law.
Criticism. Kant's system contains a great number of true and
noble principles. He brings duty to the foreground instead of
making it a mere result derived from utility, and subordinated
to it. He shows the dignity of the human person and insists on
22
322 ETHICS
its intrinsic value. Without showing here the place of ethics in
Kant's whole system of philosophy, we shall limit ourselves to
some remarks concerning his moral teaching.
(a) Human nature, precisely because it is reasonable, will always
ask for the reason why any command should be obeyed. To obey
blindly a law which man finds within himself, without inquiring
if the law is valid and binding, is not reasonable. The law must
exhibit its claim to man's obedience. To examine this claim is
to examine something anterior to the law, some good which the law
presupposes but does not create. The principle that this law
makes the goodness of actions is therefore in contradiction with
reason. Far from being autonomy, as Kant calls it, it is pure
despotism.
(b) Moreover, if the will is autonomous, it is so for all men,
good or bad; for all consciences, right or wrong; and Kant has no
means of proving the existence of the categorical imperative which
he experiences to another man who does not experience it. Even
when the categorical imperative is accepted, since man is autono-
mous, and since the will is the only principle of obligation, he may
transgress its commands without any injustice. Hence Kant's
categorical imperative is really hypothetical: "Obey duty if thou
wilt live conformably to reason." Why should I treat humanity
in myself and in others as an end, and not as a means, if not because
this is recognized as good before my practical reason commands it?
(c) Good-will, says Kant, is the will of performing duty for its
own sake, independently of any feeling. This exclusion of pleas-
ure as vitiating morality is excessive. A mother attends to her sick
child because she loves him. Who will condemn her on that
ground? And who will say that the philanthropist is not perform-
ing moral actions, or that his will is not good, when he helps his
fellowmen out of sympathy and pity?
(d) Kant's ethics fail to distinguish between the obligatory
and the non-obligatory good. There are things which I may do,
although I am not obliged to do them, like helping the ordinary
poor man on the street, or giving him more than he strictly needs.
Even if the categorical imperative clearly commands or forbids
certain actions, conscience does not merely command; some-
DISCUSSION OF MORAL STANDARD 323
times it permits or counsels, and this is no less an immediate
fact than the categorical imperative. To fulfil all strict obliga-
tions is only one aspect of morality. Many morally good actions
are not obligatory.
(e) The norm of the morality of individual actions, namely, the
possibility of their being universalized into general principles, good
as it is as a negative guide telling what to avoid, is insufficient
as a positive guide telling what to do. In short, Kant has not taken
a complete view of man and of all the exigencies of human nature.
V. THE ULTIMATE FOUNDATION OF THE MORAL LAW
1. Human Nature. The moral good consists essentially in
the conformity of an action with human nature considered both in
itself and in its relations with other men. Human nature is not
merely reason, nor feelings, nor will, and on this ground we reject
the systems mentioned above. All contain some truth, but con-
sider only one aspect of human nature. Their point of view is
too narrow. Emphasizing the claims of the feelings, utilitarians
neglect those of reason. They fail to see the intrinsic value of
actions, and look only at the value of their results. Kant, on
the contrary, considers only reason and will, and has no regard
whatever for the results of actions.
The view which was explained above recognizes the claims of
both. It is more complete, and more in accordance with human
nature as a whole. It alone accounts for the distinction between
that which is obligatory and that which is good without being
imposed, because certain things are strictly required by human
nature, while others are in accordance with it, but not necessary.
Right and wrong are known by comparing actions with the exi-
gencies of man's rational nature. This is the true norm or stand-
ard according to which the morality of actions should be judged.
2. Reason Not Autonomous. Hence morality rests on human
reason as the standard according to which the value of human ac-
tions is measured. But is reason the ultimate and self-sufficient
foundation of morality? To this question we must answer that,
while reason manifests what is right and what is wrong, what is
obligatory and what is optional, it does not make it so. It shows
324 ETHICS
in what direction we should act, but does not create the obliga-
tion. We have here something similar to what takes place
in the knowledge of truth. Reason is not free to declare certain
things true or false, but it must conform to evidence. It perceives
truths that exist independently of itself. In the same way, the
moral good is not made, but only perceived, by reason. Hence
in neither case can reason be called autonomous, since it must
conform to the nature of things.
3. The Ultimate Basis of Morality. (a) Can we say that the
will is autonomous and, of itself, obliges man to act according to
the dictates of reason? In other words: Why is the moral good,
in some cases at least, obligatory ? Whence comes the strict duty of
acting in conformity with our rational nature? No man can give
me a binding order without showing his credentials, and without
being my superior. I will not consider a law as valid unless it is
enacted by the proper authority. There is no law without a law-
giver. Who is the lawgiver in the moral order? (i) Some
answer that obligation results from the very nature of the moral
good, which is sufficient to give rise to a strict duty. (2) Kant,
on the contrary, asserts that duty is the primitive fact, and that
an action is good because it is prescribed. (3) In both cases,
reason is looked upon as independent of any higher authority,
and as the sufficient and ultimate source of obligation.
(b) This view cannot be accepted. The moral law is not explain-
able finally without rising above human nature to God Himself as
the author of human nature and of every reality, and as the
supreme ruler of the world. Duty necessarily implies two terms,
an authority and a subject, a superior who imposes the law and an
inferior who must comply with it. Hence man cannot be his own
lawgiver. An obligation which would arise primarily from human
reason or will leaves man alone with himself, and consequently
ceases to be a real obligation. "It is good" does not mean the
same as "You ought." An action is good because it is in conform-
ity with human nature, but the duty to live in conformity with
human nature supposes a superior intelligence as the source of the
moral order, and a superior will as the lawgiver who commands
us to respect this order.
DISCUSSION OF MORAL STANDARD 325
(c) We are thus led to this dilemma: Human reason either
makes the law or simply perceives it. In the first supposition,
the law ceases to be authoritative and stable. What reason has
done it can undo and modify; duty no longer exists. We must
therefore accept the second supposition, that reason knows a law
which is universal, superior to the reason that perceives it and to
the will on which it is imposed; and which, consequently, comes
from God Himself. It is in my power to break the moral law, but
I know that it persists even when it is violated. If the moral
order does not rest on God, it is but an abstraction, an idea of the
human mind, and why should we bow before it? Shall we be
accountable to a mere idea for our actions? If this idea is able
to rule, and to impose an obligation, it is because it is the idea of
God Himself, the source of the moral order.
(d) Hence God is not necessary as the criterion of our knowledge
of right and wrong, but as the only foundation on which the moral
law can rest ultimately. Without knowing God, I may know
my duty, but I cannot account for it. God's law is not given
from without except in the case of positive divine law, with
which we are not concerned here but from within, through
our reasonable nature. Yet this natural law must rest on,
and derive its validity from, the eternal law, i.e. the wisdom
of God ordering all things, and the will of God commanding
that this order be preserved. The binding force of conscience
can come only from the fact that it is the voice of God within
ourselves.
4. Summary. We may therefore conclude that psycholog-
ical analysis alone does not suffice to furnish us with the ultimate
foundation of morality. Good as far as it goes, it necessarily
leaves something unexplained. Human reason gives only the
contents or material elements of morality: namely, it tells us what is
right and what is wrong. The formal element of morality, or duty,
which is known through reason, can be derived only from God. Hence
ethics is intimately bound to metaphysics and religion. An im-
manent obligation, i.e. an obligation which is recognized within
oneself, supposes a transcendent ruler, i.e. a superior being dis-
tinct from human reason and will. To discover a true law, a true
326 ETHICS
obligation, is ipso facto to find oneself in presence of a higher
intelligence and will, in presence of God Himself.
VI. CONCLUSION
1. Responsibility. From the existence of duty follows respon-
sibility, i.e. the imputability to the agent of the actions which he per-
forms. Responsibility presupposes the knowledge of the morality
of an action, and freedom in performing it. Hence responsibility
varies with the degree of freedom and knowledge. Whatever
affects these conditions affects also responsibility. As these
conditions are not known to any one but the agent, it follows that
others, while being justified in passing judgment on the value of
an action in itself, should abstain from passing judgment on the
agent. "Judge not," since you have no sufficient data to judge
others. You know what they do, but you are ignorant of the
hidden springs that prompt them to act.
2. Virtue is the habit of doing right; vice, the habit of doing
wrong. Virtue has many degrees. It may stop at that which is
strictly obligatory, or may extend to actions that are good, but not
prescribed. In every case, it must avoid extremes. The prin-
ciples "Ne quid nimis " and "In medio stat virtus " express an
important truth. In all things, not only defect, but also excess,
is reprehensible.
3. Sanction. (a) Every law must have a sanction; rewards
for those who respect it, and penalties for those who violate it.
A sanction is a necessity of justice, since, without it, the law can
be violated with impunity. To be perfect, it should be universal,
i.e. reach all men and all actions, and be proportionate to the
degree of merit or demerit.
(b) The main sanctions of the moral law are: (i) The legal
sanction, i.e. that which, in some cases, comes from the civil law.
(2) The social sanction, i.e. of public opinion. (3) The natural
sanction, i.e. the various physical, physiological, and mental ad-
vantages and disadvantages resulting from the observance or
neglect of moral laws. (4) The moral sanction, i.e. satisfaction
and remorse.
(c) That none of these sanctions is sufficient is almost self-
DISCUSSION OF MORAL STANDARD 327
evident, for they are neither universal nor proportionate. Human
justice can reach neither all men nor all actions, and is sometimes
mistaken. The same is true of public opinion, of natural sanctions,
and of satisfaction and remorse. Their value depends on habit
and on the delicacy of one's conscience. Nor are such sanctions
in proportion to merit. Hence, if there is a true sanction, if
ultimately all things are to be righted, there must be a final
sanction beyond this life. Otherwise the moral world lacks
rationality and order. And here again we are led to God as the
Supreme Judge, who alone, in His infinite science and justice, can
give to every man what he has merited by his deeds. It is not to
himself, nor to other men, but to God, as the author of the moral
order, that man is ultimately accountable for his actions.
CHAPTER II
APPLIED ETHICS
We shall now endeavor to indicate man's most important duties,
and this determination will be based on the principle enunciated
above, namely, the exigencies of the rational nature of man as the
basis of his rights and duties. First, however, it is necessary to
say a few words about rights and duties in general.
RIGHT AND DUTY
1. Meaning of Right and Duty. All men and societies insist
on their rights. Disputes, lawsuits, and wars are undertaken in
order to protect real or imaginary rights. Less, perhaps too little, is
heard about the correlative of right, namely, duty, and we are more
prone to assert our rights than to think of our duties. As a sub-
stantive, a right is the moral power which a person has to do, omit,
or exact certain things. Duty corresponds to right. Whenever a
man has a right, others have the duty to leave him free in the
exercise of it. Duty, therefore, is the moral obligation to do or
omit certain things.
A right is called a moral, not a physical, power. Yet rights
may be exacted; and the power of coercion, especially by legal
authority, is a consequence of the moral power. Duty is also a
moral obligation, not a physical necessity. Man is free to fulfil
it or not. A right is inviolable, i.e. even if another man fails to
respect it, it nevertheless remains; for instance, stolen property
continues to belong to the original owner.
2. Division of Rights and Duties. (a) Rights are:
(i) natural, i.e., resulting from human nature itself, and the essential
order of things; hence they are equal in all men. They are the rights
(a) to be, i.e. to life and the necessaries of life.
(b) to do, i.e. to the free exercise of one's faculties within due limits.
(c) to have, i.e. to the possession of the means of living.
328
II.
III.
I.
RIGHT AND DUTY 329
(2) acquired, e.g. the right to own a determined property, to exact cer-
tain work from a hired servant, to exact wages for one's labor, etc.
(1) absolute, which involve duties on the part of all other persons, e.g.
the right of ownership of a certain property.
(2) relative, which involve duties only on the part of some, e.g. the
rights of parents with regard to their children, of a buyer with
regard to the vender, etc.
(1) real, i.e. to possess a thing already acquired.
(2) personal, i.e. to acquire a thing by compelling a person to give it.
In the former case, the object is mine, in the latter, I can force a
person to do certain things in my behalf.
Duties are:
(1) positive, when they command what must be done.
(2) negative, when they forbid what must not be done.
N.B. Many duties may be expressed in both a positive and a
negative way. Positive duties bind to act in such or such a way
only at the time for which the action is commanded. Negative
duties oblige at all tunes. For instance, it is never lawful to steal,
whereas a man is not bound to give alms all the time. Negative
duties are more elementary; they simply forbid evil. Positive
duties command to do good.
II.
(1) natural, based on natural rights.
(2) positive, depending on positive laws.
Note the two meanings of positive, one opposed to negative,
the other to natural.
III.
(1) personal, toward self.
(2) social, toward others.
IV. regarding (i) external goods (property).
(2) bodily goods (e.g. life, health).
(3) spiritual goods (e.g. truth, dignity, freedom).
N.B. The duties toward God, which are the most important,
should occupy the first place here. As, however, they suppose
330 ETHICS
some knowledge of the nature of God and of the relations
of man to God, it will be more convenient to speak of them in
Theodicy.
3. Relations of Rights and Duties, (a) In the same person,
right and duty are intimately connected. A right is generally
based on a duty, and man has the duty before he has the right.
In other words, the reason why man has rights is that their
exercise is necessary to fulfil certain duties. Thus the rights of
parents are based on their duty to educate their children; the
rights of civil authorities are based on their duties toward
society, etc. All rights are based on the fundamental duty of
every man to reach his rational end.
(b) In different persons, right and duty are correlative, in such
a way that a right is prior to the corresponding duty, since the
duty is the obligation to respect the rights of others. To all rights
correspond duties. To all duties do not necessarily correspond
rights in the strict sense, but only to duties based on justice.
Thus it may be my duty to give alms, yet another man has not,
on this ground, any right to my property, nor can he, for instance,
exact it before the courts.
(c) Rights are subordinated, not opposed. Hence in the case of
apparent conflict, one predominates, namely, the stricter e.g.
life compared to property; the more extensive e.g. social
compared to individual good; the clearer e.g. parents have a
clearer claim to be helped by their children than strangers. The
same is true of duties. Sometimes they seem to be opposed and
cannot be fulfilled at the same time. In this case, their relative
value or excellence and their extension must be considered, and the
more important must prevail. Thus moral is to be preferred to
temporal good, life to riches, etc.
4. The Subjects of Rights and Duties are only persons, i.e. in-
telligent and free agents. Rights and duties suppose a capacity
for moral obligation and moral power. Hence, strictly speaking,
animals have no rights, and man has no duties toward them.
However, man owes to himself and to his reasonable nature to
treat animals according to their nature, not to ill-treat them or
make them suffer uselessly, etc.
DUTIES TOWARD SELF 331
The two following articles will deal with personal and with
social ethics.
ARTICLE I. PERSONAL ETHICS OR DUTIES TOWARD
ONESELF
EXISTENCE OF DUTIES TOWARD ONESELF
1. Has Man any Duties to Fulfil toward Himself? (a) Since
man is obliged to act in conformity with reason, and to respect
in himself the dignity of the moral person, he is obliged to use his
faculties in the manner which reason dictates. As Kant expresses
it, he must treat human nature, wherever found, as well in himself
as in others, as an end, not as a means.
(b) Some duties toward others suppose duties toward oneself;
for instance, unruly passions like anger, intemperance, sloth,
carelessness, are obstacles to the fulfilment of duties of justice and
charity toward others.
(c) The objection that man, being identical with himself, can-
not be obliged toward himself has no value, for man is bound
always to act reasonably. Nor can man renounce all his rights,
as some of these are essential, and to renounce them is to renounce
his own reason. Nor, finally, can it be said that man, by fail-
ing in his duties toward himself, injures himself alone, and is
at liberty to do so. On account of the law of solidarity among
members of a society, on account also of heredity, scandal, etc.,
the harm of one member is also the harm of others. Moreover,
the neglect of duties toward self tends to make man incapable of
fulfilling duties toward others, as was said above. Finally, the
moral law does not merely forbid to injure oneself, it commands us
to perfect our own nature. It may be added that these duties
are closely related to, and based on, man's duties toward God, for
man owes it to God to make good use of the faculties received
from Him.
2. Basis of These Duties. The primary root of man's duties
toward himself is the duty of self-respect. Self-love is a natural
fact which cannot be eradicated; but self-love must be according
to reason. Man is a very complex being, and he must love in him-
332 ETHICS
self that which is loveworthy, and in the relative degree in which
it is loveworthy. "Charity begins at home" is a very ill-used
proverb, yet it is true that, unless we first know, revere, and perfect
human nature in ourselves, we shall never do so in others.
I. DUTIES REFERRING CHIEFLY TO THE MIND
I. PERSONAL DIGNITY
i. Self -Respect. (a) By his reason, will, and freedom, man
is superior to other beings. He must always keep in mind this
dignity, and not lower himself, nor suffer himself to be lowered,
to their level. Hence self-respect will always make man place
duty before pleasure, reason before the senses, and the will before
the lower appetites and tendencies. It will prevent him from
being arrogant and proud, and from exacting from his fellowmen
more than is due to him, and even from claiming every possible
advantage and pleasure which he may think himself entitled to.
It is hi conformity with human dignity to forbear and overlook a
great many things. This shows better man's mastery over himself.
But there is one thing which it would be against his essential dig-
nity to surrender, namely, the right and freedom to perform his
duty, whatever it may be. This right, man must vindicate against
all who would prevent its exercise.
(b) Due self-respect and self-esteem will proceed from self-knowl-
edge. Cicero says: "Illud IVaifli o-eavrov noli putare ad arrogan-
tiam minuendam solum esse dictum, verum etiam ut bona nostra
norimus " (Epist. ad Q. Fratrem, III, 6). Self-knowledge makes
man aware of what is respectworthy in himself, chiefly his moral
nature, and prevents him from lowering or allowing anybody to
lower his human personality. At the same time it prevents him
from glorying in small advantages which neither come from him
nor add anything to his real worth. Pride and vanity not only
cause men to place their dignity in those advantages in which it
does not consist, but tend to make them "trust in themselves
and despise others," and thus neglect in others the esteem due to
their human dignity. Bodily advantages, wealth, dress, etc.,
DUTIES REFERRING TO MIND 333
should be of small importance to a man who knows himself and
his true value. Both in yourself and in others, respect and esteem
the human person. Humility is truth, and while making man
aware of his own weakness, failings, and defects, it must not make
him forget his prerogatives.
2. Honor and Reputation. "A good name is better than great
riches" (Prov. xxii, i). Man must be jealous of his honor and
good name. He must not do anything that would lessen the
good opinion others have of him. We speak here of true honor,
that is, of the homage due primarily to genuine excellence, sec-
ondarily to old age, excellence, authority, etc. We do not speak
of the worldly praise bestowed too often on external and vain
advantages. Frequently the sense of honor degenerates into a
base human respect which makes one pay undue attention to prej-
udices and fashions, and even, in consequence, omit what is known
to be one's duty. At times human judgments are based on ap-
pearances, wealth, etc., while the real value is overlooked. Hence
too much attention is not to be paid to the opinions of men.
Perhaps a man will not be honored when he deserves it, but he
must be honorable. His endeavor, according to St. Thomas, must
be "ut studeat facere ea quae sunt honore digna, non tamen sic ut
pro magno aestimet humanum honorem " (Summa Theologica,
II-II, Q. 129, Art. i ad 3).
II. INTELLIGENCE
i. In General. Since intelligence is a fundamental prerog-
ative of man, and on it depends his whole reasonable conduct, it
is important to cultivate it, both negatively and positively. Neg-
atively, by avoiding everything that would tend to obscure it and
prevent its legitimate exercise, like the undue influence of pas-
sions or imagination. Positively, by exercising the intelligence,
developing habits of attention and reflection, and acquiring the
science of general duties common to all men, and of duties special
to every man's vocation. All men need not and cannot have
the same instruction, but all men must know (i) the general
duties of all men toward God, themselves, and their fellowmen,
(2) the special duties incumbent upon them on account of their
334 ETHICS
condition in life, e.g. the duties of a lawyer, physician, professor,
etc. The more a man knows, the better able he is to discharge
his obligations, and be useful to his fellowmen. (Cf. p. 133 ff.)
2. Veracity, Sincerity, Intellectual Honesty, must always be
practiced. Man ought not to deceive others, still less deceive him-
self, by his imprudence and temerity. Avoid temerity in assent-
ing, dissenting, and doubting; in thinking and reading. Above all,
avoid stifling the voice of conscience, and making up your mind
that your action is right and legitimate simply because you want
to perform it.
As to veracity toward others, it is not necessary in every case
to speak the whole truth, still less to try by all possible means
to make one's opinions prevail, but dissimulation and lying make
a man abominable in the eyes of others, and should make him
abominable in his own eyes. On this duty more will be said
later.
3. Prudence is essentially an intellectual virtue which enables
man to know where his true interests and those of others are to
be found. It supposes habits of deliberation, discernment, and
rectitude of judgment. It excludes rashness and precipitation.
The greater the interests at stake, the more prudent should one
be in finding out the means to safeguard them. Intuitions of
genius are rare. In most cases the rule is that man does not at
once see the path to be followed, but has to reflect, consult, and
deliberate. Little by little the mind acquires habits of perspicac-
ity, sagacity, and sound judgment. The subordination of inter-
ests is always to be kept in mind, so that lower interests will be
subordinated to higher ones, (i) Prudence makes man foresee.
It is not enough to see present advantages or disadvantages.
Attention must be given to consequences so as to compare the pres-
ent with the future, and, later on, to have no occasion to be sorry.
(2) Profit by every experience, happy or unhappy, so as to compare
the present issue with past success or failure.
III. WILL
The will must always follow reason, hence avoid precipitation
and obstinacy. It is above the senses, the passions, and the imag-
DUTIES REFERRING TO MIND 335
ination, hence let it guide and rule them. Its main prerogative
is freedom, hence it must not allow itself to be enslaved by external
surroundings and human respect, nor by internal influences like
passions and lower tendencies. (Cf. p. 185 ff.)
1. The Will must be Strong. The coward who fears to assert
himself when duty requires it, and has not enough courage to fol-
low the dictates of his conscience, is despicable if his weakness is
voluntary, and worthy of pity if it is not voluntary.
(a) Courage is necessary not only to the soldier on the battle-
field, nor is it the exclusive virtue of some classes of men; it is
necessary everywhere, since everywhere there are duties to perform,
and obstacles to overcome in order to fulfil these duties. To resist
corruption and bribery, to attend to one's duties notwithstanding
perhaps the attacks and mockery of others, to resist the tempta-
tion of human respect, to acknowledge one's mistakes and wrongs,
to watch constantly and resist energetically the lower tendencies
of human nature, in a word, to proceed manfully along the path of
duty in spite of all contrary influences, requires courage at every
instant, a courage which is not the result of a transitory impulse
or of the hope of glory, but of a calm deliberation, a determined
will, and strong moral habits. In every condition of life, courage
and strength of will are indispensable.
(b) Courage is needed also, not merely to act, but to suffer.
Patience, equanimity, and strength in adversity are signs of a strong
mind. The will must strive to create better conditions, but
the inevitable cannot be remedied. The will shows courage hi
accepting it with resignation.
(c) Perseverance in spite of difficulties is an enduring courage,
both in action and resignation. Courage and perseverance are
not obstinacy. If a man comes to see that he is wrong, his duty is
to come back to the right path, and, at times, this also may require
an uncommon courage.
2. Moderation and Equality of Temper are signs that the will
controls the lower tendencies. Irascibility and passion show that
man is subject to, and ruled by, them. Exuberant joy in prosper-
ity and depression in adversity indicate the undue influence of
external circumstances on the will.
336 ETHICS
Temperance, both in its most general sense as the avoidance of
every form of excess, and in its more special application as the
avoidance of excess in drinking, is an indispensable virtue. Noth-
ing is more degrading to man than the abuse of intoxicating
beverages which ruin his health, obscure his mind, weaken his
will, are sources of innumerable evils both individual and social,
and lower him to the level of the lowest brute. "Principiis
obsta," for, chiefly on account of the physiological effects of alco-
hol, the habit of excess is easily contracted. Gradually a need is
created which soon becomes too strong for the will. "Modera-
tion in all things" should be the principle guiding all men, since
lack or excess are opposed to the dictates of reason.
3. Self-Control. All the duties concerning the will may be
reduced to mastery of and control over oneself. The man who is
even-tempered, whom prosperity, favor, praise, and success do
not blind or make proud and arrogant; whom adversity, contra-
diction, and failure do not make impatient, angry, or discouraged;
the man who tries to overcome all obstacles that oppose his prog-
ress on the road of duty; the man who truly possesses his own soul
and mind and is his own master, this man is truly great and worthy
of the admiration of all.
IV. CONCLUSION
i. Realization of a Moral Ideal. One must have a high moral
ideal, and constantly keep it before his eyes. It will be realized,
or at least approached, by constant effort and work. Work,
mental or bodily, is both a pleasure and a necessity, and the idle
man is a danger to himself and to society. Idleness lessens the
will's strength, and leaves it unprepared for the time of struggle.
Like tools which become rusty for lack of use, the faculties be-
come dull for lack of exercise. All men have duties to fulfil,
and to fulfil them requires work and effort. In themselves all
useful works are noble, and all occupations, intellectual or manual,
praiseworthy. The first place must be given to necessary work,
then to useful work, and finally leisure may be employed in agree-
able work, in healthy and becoming recreation which rests the
mind and the body, and prepares them for further labor.
DUTIES REFERRING TO BODY 337
2. Self -Examination. It is necessary for success to keep busi-
ness accounts. It is no less necessary to keep ethical accounts.
Know how you stand with regard to your duties and resolutions;
verify your gains and losses so as to repair mistakes and prepare
the future. Examine your conscience frequently, and always
strengthen your will more and more by new resolutions and by
fidelity in keeping them. Know your principal defect, and coura-
geously lay the axe to the root of the tree. Resist your evil
habits, and endeavor to contract only those that are praiseworthy.
Know yourself, and always keep your eyes turned on the feelings
and desires of your heart.
Thus by constant attention in cultivating his faculties and per-
fecting his nature will man rise higher and higher, and enjoy the
happiness which comes from the satisfaction of fulfilling his duties,
and from the feeling that he is truly the master of all that is in
himself.
II. DUTIES REFERRING CHIEFLY TO THE BODY
These duties do not refer to the organism independently of the
mind, but in so far as the organism is the necessary condition of
life, and therefore of the fulfilment of all duties. Health, strength,
and life are valuable as instruments of the human person. Duties
referring to the body are negative or positive.
I. NEGATIVE DUTIES
The chief negative duty of man is to avoid taking his own life
by suicide.
i. Suicide is direct and intentional self-murder committed on
one's private authority. We say "direct and intentional" to
indicate that the natural result of the action is the destruction of
life, and that, in fact, no matter what reason or motive one may
have, such is the purpose for which the action is performed. Hence
it is not suicide for a man to endanger his own life when there is
a sufficient reason to do so, or a higher duty to fulfil. The soldier
on the battlefield, the physician treating contagious diseases, the
man who exposes his life in order to save that of another, do not
23
338 ETHICS
directly kill themselves, but indirectly, by exposing themselves
to danger. Nor do they intend to do away with their lives, but
they have in view the good of their country and of their fellow-
men, which requires this sacrifice. In some cases this sacrifice is
obligatory, namely, when required by one's strict duty. In other
cases it is praiseworthy, and may be an act of heroism. Suicide,
instead of proceeding from noble feelings of self-sacrifice on behalf
of others, generally proceeds from egoism, fear, weakness, and
false honor. It has been excused by the Epicureans, the Stoics,
and some modern philosophers, as at least a remedy against the
evils of life. When life becomes unbearable, they say, man is
at liberty to renounce it.
2. The Reasons Against Suicide are of two kinds. Some may
be used as arguments ad hominem because they are suited to the
frame of mind and principles of certain individuals. Others are
more fundamental and apply to all men. Among the former may
be mentioned the following. For the Christian, this life is but a
preparation for a future endless life. Man must not pay too
much attention to the transitory sufferings of this life which are
means of purification for his immortal soul. Moreover, man is
not the master of his own life. It belongs to God who gave it to
him, and reserves for Himself the right of life and death. He has
assigned a post to every man, and man has no more right to aban-
don it than the soldier has the right to abandon the post assigned to
him by his superiors. Frequently, also, suicide may be shown to be
an act of cowardice; the motives that prompt to it may be proved
to be valueless, and the need which others have of one's life may
be pointed out.
The following reasons apply to all. (a) The natural wish to
live, which is experienced by all, prevents man from committing
suicide as long as life is enjoyable. Suicide is committed in order
to avoid shame, misery, or suffering of some kind. But to leave
man free to take his own life in such cases is to constitute him a
judge in his own cause, and no man can be a good judge in his
own cause and therefore permit suicide whenever, for any
reason, a man is tired of life.
(b) Man's life has a moral purpose, and the moral law is
DUTIES REFERRING TO BODY 339
absolute and categorical. Suicide withdraws man from all these
duties, and therefore makes the moral law merely hypothetical;
it commands if man does not choose to shirk its obligations. Man
thus fails to respect in himself the moral person; he makes it a
mere instrument; a thing instead of a person.
(c) To commit suicide is to injure others, for it is a bad example;
it deprives society of one of its members who might still be useful,
were it only as an example of courage, patience, and resignation.
The mam reasons against suicide are derived from religious
considerations, as God positively forbids it. Those we have just
given will be made clearer by answering the main objections.
3. Objections. (a) Suicide is a courageous action. Answer.
In reality it is cowardice, for it is a sign that man lacks
strength and energy to bear the trials and difficulties of life.
The suicide avows himself vanquished since he abandons the
struggle.
(b) Life is miserable; sufferings are too great; the disease is
incurable, or the failure irretrievable. In short, life is an unbear-
able burden for the individual and for society. Answer. The
purpose of this life is not immediate happiness. Moreover, suffer-
ing is made intolerable largely because it is thought to be so. The
patience of a number of men amid the greatest and most excruciat-
ing pains and afflictions shows that, with courage, everything is
possible. As St. Paul wrote (II Cor. vii, 4) : " I exceedingly abound
with joy in all our tribulation." And such patience is always a
great edification for others, while for the sufferer it is a source of
moral perfection.
(c) Death is preferable to shame. Answer. Suicide adds
another shame to the former. If a man has done nothing wrong,
the testimony of his conscience is enough, and life will give him
the means of proving his innocence. If he has committed some
blameworthy action, life will be an expiation, and will enable
him to give an example of repentance and of effort toward a
better life.
(d) Man may desire death, therefore he may cause it. Answer.
It is true that in some cases death appears as a deliverance; but as
the soldier may wish to be relieved from a certain duty, and yet
340 ETHICS
is not free to leave it, so man cannot, on his own authority, renounce
his own life.
4. The Main Causes of Suicide are: (i) Insanity, perpetual or
temporary. The mind may be so disturbed as to lose its freedom.
This insanity make take the form of despondency and melancholia,
which deprive the mind of energy; or that of exaltation and pas-
sion, which blind the mind and deprive it of the power of reflec-
tion. Ordinary dispositions and character, temperament, nervous
diseases, as well as other special circumstances, may lead to suicide.
A good moral education of the intellect and the will, a physician's
care, bright surroundings, healthy exercise and distraction, sound
advice and encouragement, will be useful to do away with ideas
of suicide. (2) A sensual life, which looks for present happiness,
prefers it to duty, and makes man too weak to bear disap-
pointment and suffering. (3) The example of others. Suicides,
especially sensational suicides, when published, are generally fol-
lowed by others. It becomes like a contagious disease. Avoid
sensational reading.
To counteract these, religious and moral education showing the
true value of life both in its present and future aspects, the culti-
vation of the will by the practice of true virtue and courage, will
prove auxiliaries.
5. Self-Neglect. For the same reasons for which suicide is
immoral, any mutilation of the body and unjustified danger of
death are also forbidden. Hence temperance, sobriety, modera-
tion, etc., are duties based on the duty of self-preservation. There
are cases, however, where it is necessary to remove a part of the
body in order to save life; and there are circumstances in which
the temporary loss of reason, e.g. by the use of anaesthetics, is
also necessary. The body is the instrument of the soul, and must
be treated as such, i.e. preserved in its integrity and normal condi-
tion unless the higher interests of life require that a part of it be
sacrificed. Nor is this duty opposed to the discreet and prudent
use of mortification and austerity by which the will is strengthened,
and the spirit of self-renunciation and self-sacrifice is acquired.
A little violence to one's natural inclinations, even if they are not
bad, prepares man for the greatest acts of virtue.
DUTIES TOWARD OTHER MEN 341
II. POSITIVE DUTIES
1. Care of Life. Man must not only avoid whatever would
injure his health, he must also preserve it by hygiene, cleanliness,
exercise, etc. He must take ordinary care and precaution when
sick. Extraordinary means, such as very expensive cures or dan-
gerous operations, are not obligatory. Two extremes must be
avoided: (i) excessive care and fear, which make one indulge in
every little comfort, and dread the slightest privation and
inconvenience; (2) excessive carelessness and negligence, which
make one abuse one's strength by intemperance, privation of
sleep, unnecessary exposure to heat and cold, etc. In all things,
the body is to be treated according to its nature, as inferior to the
mind, and as an instrument which must serve the mind, but also
as the mind's auxiliary, and as the condition necessary for the mind
to fulfil its duties.
2. External Appearance. What is true of the health of the
body is true also of its external appearance. Extremes are to be
avoided by the practice of modesty and moderation. If neglect,
carelessness, and lack of cleanliness are to be avoided, to put
one's pride in external advantages and ornaments is no less to be
blamed. The mind manifests itself in these details. Show that
yours is orderly and careful, yet withal simple, unostentatious,
and that its first care is for internal beauty and nobleness, in which
man's real worth consists.
ARTICLE II. SOCIAL ETHICS OR DUTIES OF MAN
TOWARD OTHER MEN
EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF THESE DUTIES
i. In General. Man does not and cannot live alone. From
his necessary intercourse with his fellowmen a great number of
duties arise, some toward all men in general, others toward mem-
bers of the same group or society. The former may be called social
duties, social indicating a special reference to all men. It is
better, however, to refer to them as duties toward individual men
342 ETHICS
irrespective of the various groupings, and to reserve the term " so-
cial " for duties that arise from such groupings. Since all men have
the same essential nature, all have the same essential rights. Too
often man is inclined to look upon himself as a privileged person,
insisting on his own rights and on the duties of others, forgetting
that he must also consider their rights and his own duties toward
them. These duties may be summed up in the two fundamental
maxims: (i) "Do not to others what you would not have them
do to you." (2) "Do to others what you would have them do
to you." These two maxims are but the application of the
Christian precept: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself."
2. Justice and Charity. (a) The first maxim refers especially
to duties of justice. Justice is the respect of the strict rights of
others, and rests on the equality of all men. The duties which it
commands are chiefly negative, and determined: "Thou shalt not
injure thy neighbor " is their general expression. They forbid any
action which would be against the rights of others, and hence are
strictly binding, always, in every case, and toward everybody;
and as a consequence they can be exacted.
(b) The second maxim refers especially to duties of charity,
which rest on the community of nature of all men, and on human
brotherhood. Charity consists in helping others and giving bodily
and spiritual assistance. Its duties are chiefly positive and in-
determined. "Thou shalt help thy neighbor" is their general ex-
pression. They prescribe some action, but do not oblige always,
nor in every case, nor toward everybody; and as a consequence,
they cannot be exacted. For instance, justice forbids killing or
stealing; charity commands to help a sick man and to give alms.
In the former case, I am forbidden to be an obstacle preventing
my neighbor from exercising his essential rights. In the latter,
I am bound to help him although he has no strict right to exact
this help from me or from any determined man. I must pay my
debts exactly and at the appointed time. There is no fixed amount
or time for my obligation of giving alms. However, as noted
already, the same duty may be both positive and negative from
different points of view. I am obliged to pay a debt (positive
action) because I must not keep my fellowman's property (nega-
DUTIES TOWARD OTHER MEN 343
tive). Moreover, there are also positive duties arising from jus-
tice, and negative duties arising from charity.
(c) Distinct though they are, justice and charity are in close
relation. Charity supposes justice. Before helping others, it
is necessary to do them no harm; a man cannot steal in order to
give alms. A strict and determined obligation comes before a
general and indetermined one. Even in the exercise of charity
there may be some kind of justice or equity; certain persons, e.g.
members of the same family, have a special title to be assisted in
their needs. On the other hand, justice is not complete without
charity. Strict rights should not always be exacted, because in
some cases other men's rights would thereby be injured. Thus
for the rich man to refuse food to the hungry, or for the employer
to exact too hard or too long a labor from the workingman, is a
real injustice. Justice must always be tempered by equity, which,
before applying the strict rights of justice, considers all circum-
stances of time and person. In this sense Cicero quotes the ax-
iom: "Summum ius, summa iniuria" (De Officiis, I, c. 10). To
be strict to the extreme in matters of justice is to become unjust.
It may be noted that what is a duty of charity for one may be
a duty of justice for another on account of his special position.
An ordinary man is not bound in justice to prevent a criminal
from wrong-doing, but this is the strict duty of the policeman.
3. Love. (a) "He that loveth his neighbor hath fulfilled the
law" (Rom. xiii, 8). We do not speak here of the special love
due to some individuals who are "nearer" or more strictly "neigh-
bors" than others (cf. p. 151), but of the love due to all men in
general simply because they are men having the same nature as
ours, and moral persons enjoying the same prerogatives. Hence
this duty extends even to enemies, because of their human nature
with its inalienable rights, though not in the sense that we must
love their depravity or offences. The love of others excludes
hatred and the spirit of revenge, although a man may by lawful
means seek redress for the wrongs he has suffered. It also ex-
cludes scandal, bad advice, and in general whatever would lead
others to harm themselves in any manner.
(b) There are several degrees of love. i. Negative: (i) Not to
344 ETHICS
return evil for good, i.e. not to be ungrateful. This is the mini-
mum and the lowest degree. (2) Not to injure those who have
not injured us, i.e. to avoid injustice and cruelty. (3) Not to
return evil for evil, i.e. to avoid vengeance; a man's wrong-doing
is not excused or justified by that of others. All these duties
refer to strict justice. 2. Positive: (i) To return good for good
gratitude. (2) To do good to those who have done us neither
good nor evil charity and benevolence. (3) To return good
for evil. It is the most sublime degree of virtue. These duties
refer to charity.
I. DUTIES TOWARD INDIVIDUAL MEN
These duties may refer to their persons and personal faculties,
or to their property.
I. DUTIES TOWARD THE PERSON OF OTHERS
i. Life. The first right of man, and the condition of all other
rights, is the right to live. Hence the taking of human life on
one's private authority, and apart from the necessity of self-
defence, is always an injustice.
* (a) This does not apply to the killing of another man by public
authority, as in the case of the executioner, or of soldiers during
war. If the state has the right to inflict the death penalty
and to protect its rights by war, it also has the right to the
necessary means. The individual acts as the agent or instrument
of public authority.
(b) In the case of self-defence, the principle: "Prima sibi cha-
ritas " may be applied. As public justice would be too late in pro-
tecting my life and property, I may protect it myself, provided
the two following conditions be verified: (i) There must be actual
danger. If the danger is passed, there is no longer self-defence,
but homicide and vengeance. (2) The violation of the rights of
others must be as limited as possible. Whatever is not necessary
is unjustified; it is intentional wrong-doing. An adversary who
can no longer do any harm because he is wounded or without power,
ought not to be killed. This right of self-defence extends in
DUTIES TOWARD INDIVIDUALS 345
justice not only to the protection of life, but also to that of great
interests, fortune, freedom, or property; and in charity to
the defence of others.
(c) Duelling is the meeting of two parties in order to fight with
weapons apt to kill, after a private agreement as to the time, the
place, and the weapons. The motive of duels is generally to avenge
an insult. But this reason has no value whatever, and a duel
is a most unjust and unreasonable action. It can decide at most
which of the two adversaries is the more skilful or the stronger.
It can never decide on whose side right and justice are found. It is
an act of vengeance, which makes of justice a private affair, and
constitutes a man a judge in his own cause. It exposes him to the
danger of suicide by exposing his own life without reason, and
to that of homicide by exposing himself to the danger of killing
another on his own authority.
N.B. What has been said of the life of others applies also, in
varying degrees, to any action by which their body would be
injured, or their health impaired.
2. Dignity and Freedom. The respect for essential human dig-
nity forbids any action by which others would be deprived of the
legitimate use of their freedom.
(a) Slavery, which makes of man the thing or property of another
in such a way that the master may dispose of his slave as he pleases,
and almost without any restriction, is against morality. It lowers
man to the level of animals, and even of inanimate tools, deprives
him of his essential dignity, and prevents him from being a truly
human person.
(6) Man has the right to work, to choose his own profession,
exercise it, and enjoy the fruit of his labor, since work is but the
extension and product of his own faculties.
(c) Conscience, which applies in every case and for every man the
laws of morality, must not be violated. In things which are not
otherwise against the rights of other men, or against public order,
the individual is entitled to freedom of conscience. He may be
shown that he is mistaken, but, after due investigation, the voice
of his conscience is for him, and must be for others, sacred.
(d) Freedom of thought cannot mean that human intelligence is
346 ETHICS
free to accept anything as true or false as it pleases, but that man
has the right to use his faculties in order to discover the truth,
to examine the foundation of his beliefs, and to stand by his con-
clusions. It even implies the spreading of his opinions by publi-
cation. But this right is limited, because certain opinions, even if
adhered to honestly and bona fide, would be injurious to society,
for instance, when they encourage immorality or excite to crime
directly or indirectly.
3. Honor and Reputation. Man has a right to his honor and
reputation. Honor is based on excellence, and hence varies with
individuals. The same marks of honor are not due to a stran-
ger and to a high public official. Yet to all men some honor is
due. Reputation or good name is acquired. Hence, although
some honor is due to a stranger, he has no reputation with those by
whom he is not known.
Detraction, which reveals the real defects and faults of a man
to those who do not know them, and calumny, which falsely attrib-
utes defects or faults to others, are opposed to the right which all
men have to their reputation. Calumny is never lawful. In
some cases, and for serious reasons, it may be justifiable to reveal
the real wrong-doings of others, e.g. for the sake of good order, to
preserve the innocent, etc.
Rash judgment is against both the good use of our faculties and
the rights of others to our good opinion of them. A little reflection
will suffice to convince man that many of his judgments concerning
others are without sufficient basis, and therefore rash, for man is
ignorant of all the subjective conditions which influence the con-
duct of others. Only by one who would know all the hidden motives
and springs of action could an equitable judgment be passed. No-
body can determine how far another man is personally responsible
for his actions, and how much must be attributed to his surround-
ings, education, native disposition, and in general to circumstances
that do not depend on him. This should make man very careful
in judging, and especially in expressing unfavorable judgments.
4. Truthfulness. (a) Man owes it to himself and to others
to speak the truth. To himself, because it is a disorder to use
words that express ideas contrary to those that are present in the
DUTIES TOWARD INDIVIDUALS 347
mind. To others, because social relations and contracts are impos-
sible if man is allowed to lie. A man may deceive others in good
faith when he is himself mistaken. This is not a lie; to lie is to
speak intentionally against one's mind.
(b) The obligation to speak the truth does not always imply
the obligation to speak the whole truth. Discretion is also a neces-
sary virtue, and frequently a man would be wrong if he told all
he knew. Things are to be kept secret (i) on account of their
nature, when their revelation would be injurious to others, and
when the person whom they concern is known to be opposed to
their manifestation; (2) by promise, when the engagement has
been taken not to reveal a certain imparted information; (3) by
trust, when the information is given only on the expressed or im-
plied condition that it will not be communicated. Such are pro-
fessional secrets, e.g. of lawyers and physicians. All secrets must
be kept unless there should be serious reasons, proportionate to
the nature of the case, which make it obligatory to reveal them.
(c) Whenever a man speaks untruly without being questioned
he is guilty of lying. He also lies when he deceives those who
have the right to know the truth. But, for good reasons, the truth
may be concealed by giving the questioner to understand that
we are not at liberty to speak, or by using expressions which are
understood by all. Thus a servant answers that his master "is
not at home," meaning that he is not at home to receive visitors in
general, or this visitor in particular. Expressions even more mis-
leading may be used if the circumstances justify it. In the con-
flict of two rights, the right of my neighbor not to be deceived,
and my right to keep a secret, the former must yield, since, as we
suppose, my neighbor has no strict right to know the truth, whereas
I have a strict duty to keep a secret. But in all things acquire
habits of rectitude and truthfulness. You may not say everything
you think, but generally let everything you say be the true
expression of your thought.
II. DUTIES TOWARD THE PROPERTY OF OTHERS
i. Fact of Ownership. (a) Men look upon certain things as
their property (proprium, one's own exclusively). They claim and
348 ETHICS
exercise the right to use these things and dispose of them as they
please. This right is called the right of ownership, and the limits
of its exercise are determined by the natural laws of justice and
charity, and by civil laws such as those concerning contracts, wills,
etc.
(b) Ownership is private or public according as the property
belongs to the individual or to the community (municipality,
state, nation). Public property is sometimes used for specified
purposes and by certain individuals only (e.g. certain public
buildings and offices). Sometimes the free use of it is allowed to
all (e.g. streets, parks).
(c) Private ownership extends to whatever is useful or pleasur-
able and capable of being appropriated. It does not extend to
those things which are necessary to all and the supply of which is
sufficient for all, like air, the heat and light of the sun, etc. Ob-
jects of ownership may be reduced to (i) natural products, indepen-
dent of man's industry (e.g. fruit, fish, game) ; (2) the products of
labor and industry (e.g. machinery, manufactured articles); (3)
mixed products (e.g. domestic animals, vegetables in a garden,
land which is improved by culture). From another point of view
the objects of ownership are either non-productive, when they
are owned simply for the enjoyment which may be derived from
them; or 'productive (capital), when they are used as means of
production.
As a matter of fact such objects have been appropriated; whether
justly or not remains to be seen.
2. Socialism. It is needless to speak of the extreme views of
communism according to which not only should private ownership
be abolished, but the state should have perfect control of every-
thing, including labor, religion, social relations, marriage, etc.
Such theories are commonly abandoned to-day, even by the adver-
saries of private ownership, whose views are generally included
under the general term of socialism.
But it is very difficult, not to say impossible, to give a definition
of socialism because of the many forms which it takes. In general
it is the tendency to reduce individualism and to increase the rights
of the community in matters referring to ownership. It denies all
DUTIES TOWARD INDIVIDUALS 349
or some forms of private ownership. In general it allows it for
objects that are non-productive, e.g. books, pictures, food and
drink, etc. On the contrary, capital, that is, all means of pro-
duction, such as mines, canals, railroads, mails, telegraphs, land,
machinery, factories, etc., should be owned collectively, and man-
aged by the rulers of the community. Some, however, would allow
the private ownership of everything except land.
Thus primarily socialism advocates economical reforms. But
in many instances, it has also advocated moral and religious re-
forms, and manifested unequivocal hostility to Christian beliefs
and practices. With these extreme views we have nothing to do
at present.
3. Foundation of Private Ownership. The following rights
are natural to man, and must always be respected.
(a) Man has a strict right to the necessaries of life, not only for
the present, but also for the future, (i) Sickness and want may
come, and old age will certainly come. The prudent man fore-
sees and prepares the future in a stable and permanent manner.
(2) Moreover, the healthy man's work is not always actually
remunerative. Time is required for planning, trying, and experi-
menting. During this interval it is necessary for man to have
the means of subsistence. To permanent needs must correspond
permanent resources. (3) Finally, progress requires a certain
freedom from need, and even from the care concerning the means
of living. Frequently the best works of art "don't pay," and even
the most useful inventions are not recognized at once. Happiness
requires some leisure and freedom. If following always one's own
good pleasure is not the highest ideal, the other extreme, doing
always what pleases others, is still farther from giving satisfaction
to human aspirations.
(b) What is true of the individual is true also of the family.
Man must not only provide for himself, but for his wife and
children. To this end he needs property which he can keep
permanently and of which he can dispose.
(c) Any theory of property must safeguard these rights. It
seems evident that some kind of private ownership is required,
since otherwise man does not obtain the full value of his labor,
350 ETHICS
laziness and crime are encouraged, and it becomes impossible to
provide for one's own welfare. This is commonly accepted by
moderate socialists, who admit the private ownership of commod-
ities, but reject the private ownership of capital. The question
thus becomes chiefly a social and economical problem which
cannot be discussed at length here. Only a few indications will
be given.
4. Discussion. By capital is meant any source of wealth and
any means of production. That the state may own some of these
goes without saying. The state owns land. Monopolies are
restrictions of the rights of individuals to manufacture and sell
certain articles. Whether, how far, and in regard to what articles
state-monopoly is expedient is a question to which no general
answer can be given, as expediency varies with times, places, and
conditions. But the question is whether all means of production
should be common property administered by the state authorities.
(a) With regard to production, better care is taken of what is
one's own than of what is common property. More labor will be
given, and greater diligence will be used by the individual, if the
products are to remain his own than if they are to be shared in
common. The hope to turn again the fruit of one's labor into new
capital is a great incentive to work and application. Capital is
generally transformed labor. It is a surplus which the individual
does not need, and which belongs to him as the product of his own
faculties. Competition, notwithstanding its disadvantages, serves
a good purpose in stimulating activity and inventiveness.
(b) With regard to consumption and distribution, common owner-
ship is open to many objections. Will the products be divided
among all equally, or according to merit, or according to need? (i)
Equality will tend to make man lazy. Moreover, it seems unjust
to treat all men alike, whether they be diligent or careless. (2) On
the other hand, who will pronounce on respective merits and needs?
Here the door is open to innumerable abuses. How can the merits
be estimated? On the quantity or the quality of the work? In
both cases there will be dissatisfaction.
(c) With regard to the work to be done. Some kinds of work are
agreeable; others disagreeable. Some are looked upon as noble;
DUTIES TOWARD INDIVIDUALS 351
others as menial. How will it be possible to give satisfaction to
everybody? There is too much room for discrimination and
favoritism.
(d) The same arguments apply to land. Even if it is not to-
tally the fruit of labor, it has been improved by labor, and of itself
would produce very little. In many cases land has been acquired
with one's earnings. It must also be noticed here that the common
right to live does not mean the right to the same means and mode
of living. It is true that ultimately everything necessary to life
comes from the land, but man can live without actually owning
any land, for he can procure its products by exchange.
5. Conclusion. (i) In conclusion we may note that social-
ism tends to lessen individual freedom. (2) If the exclusive
right of ownership is unjust, socialism, which advocates state-
property, is also unjust. Even then property is held exclusively
by a certain group of men, and the same inequality which socialism
seeks to remove recurs on a larger scale. Logically socialism leads
to the abolition of national ownership. (3) Finally socialism
supposes falsely that, according to the doctrine of private owner-
ship, the rights of owners are unlimited, that the owner can use,
misuse, and abuse his property. It insists on present social evils
which cannot be denied, but suggests an extreme and dangerous
remedy, worse perhaps than the evil itself. Inequality and dis-
satisfaction will always be found, and perfection is not attainable.
Moreover, it is important to distinguish between (i) getting rich
by making others poorer, e.g. by theft, open or concealed; (2) get-
ting rich without changing the condition of others; (3) getting
rich while helping others, e.g. manufacturers, railroad companies.
Laws must be made to prevent the first of these modes, which is
strictly unjust, and to protect the interests of the working classes.
Present conditions may be bettered by wise legislation and by
the prudent intervention of the state. Owners must be reminded
of their duties of justice and charity. Generally a sound view
is to be found between extreme and radical theories.
6. Main Rights and Duties of Proprietors. (a) Rights: (i)
To give, exchange by contract, and bequeath by will. This right
is not unlimited, but restricted by the natural laws of justice and
352 ETHICS
charity, as well as by civil laws enacted for the common good.
(2) To exclude others. Hence theft, open robbery, fraud, cheat,
are against justice. (3) These rights must be exercised according
to reason, and with due respect for the rights of others.
(b) Duties: (i) All men have a strict right to live. Hence in
case of extreme necessity they may appropriate what they strictly
need, and this help cannot be refused without injustice. (2) In
labor contracts both parties must stand by their mutual agreement.
The workingman must respect his employer's person and property,
and use diligence in fulfilling his duties. The employer must give
a just salary to the workingman, respect his human dignity, and
consequently give him necessary rest, as well as the time and
opportunity to fulfil all his duties. (3) Charity commands alms-
giving and beneficence. (4) Those who are rich and influential
are more strictly obliged to give good example.
II. SOCIAL DUTIES
Society in General. (a) Social duties result from man's condi-
tion as a member of society. As understood here, society is the
permanent union of several men working together to reach a
common end. (i) Members of the society supply the capital,
will, energy, activity, etc., necessary to the common purpose.
(2) The permanence that is required varies with the different kinds
of societies. A mere fortuitous meeting and cooperation do not
constitute a society. (3) The community of end brings about
the union, but this union cannot subsist without some authority
which will preserve it, prevent abuses, keep the members together,
and give to all a uniform direction. Without it, individual
members could never cooperate effectively.
(b) Societies differ: (i) According to their origin. They are
natural when required by human nature itself, like the family;
conventional when based on a free agreement, e.g. a scientific
or industrial association. (2) According to their purpose. They
may be religious, moral, scientific, benevolent, commercial, etc.
(3) According to the mode of union. They may be based on
justice, when the members have strict rights, e.g. partnership,
SOCIAL DUTIES 353
insurance companies, etc.; or on merely friendly or charitable
relations, when the union can be broken without injustice because
the members have no strict rights.
Here two societies only deserve our attention, the family and
the state, which are natural societies. The others are more
arbitrary, and depend on special free agreements.
I. THE FAMILY
i. Nature. (a) Sometimes the term " family" denotes a group
or succession of persons connected by blood relationship, and
includes even distant relatives and ancestors. It may even be
restricted to a distinguished and ancient lineage. Properly it
means a natural group of persons consisting of parents and chil-
dren, especially children who still live with their parents.
(b) A family is constituted by marriage, i.e. by a contract which
unites a man and a woman for the special purpose of raising chil-
dren, (i) Marriage is a union contracted freely, to which neither
party is compelled. (2) In most civilized countries marriage is
contracted between one man and one woman. Polyandry or plu-
rality of husbands is not practised. Polygamy or plurality of
wives is recognized in a few nations, but is opposed not only to
peace and harmony in the family, but to the dignity of the
woman, who is bound where the man is free.
(c) Marriage is a lasting and permanent union, for both parents
are necessary to the welfare and education of their children. Di-
vorce, however, is not strictly, essentially, and in all cases, opposed
to the essential purpose of marriage, (i) Indissoluble marriage
is better, and almost indispensable for the nurture and education
of children. (2) The possibility of divorce suggests the adoption
of the means necessary to secure it. (3) Most domestic troubles
would be adjusted if divorce were impossible. Marriage would not
be looked upon as so light and easy an affair, nor contracted so
carelessly. (4) Divorce is a source of dissension among families;
it lowers the sense of duty and responsibility.
N.B. Looking at marriage as a sacrament under the legisla-
tion of the Church, absolute divorce with the freedom to marry
again is unlawful.
24
354 ETHICS
2. Duties of the Members of the Family. (a) Duties of
married persons, (i) Before marriage great care must be taken
by them to know each other well, and not to be prompted by mere
motives of passion. They must also preserve their health and
purity, and do nothing which they would be ashamed to have the
other party know. (2) After marriage they must keep the mutual
faith which they have pledged to each other. Disguised or secret
polygamy is an injustice for both the husband and the wife, who
have the same rights. They also owe to each other mutual love
and assistance. The husband, because he is stronger, contrib-
utes more to the material means of living and to the protection
of the family. He is the head, but must remember that the wife
in her household duties, does a work equally essential, that she is
not a slave, but a companion equal in rights and dignity. Finally,
husband and wife must always keep in view the essential end of
marriage and do nothing that would be opposed to it.
(b) Duties of parents. Children require the care of their parents
for their physical, mental, and moral development. Hence the
natural duties of parents are to give to their children the neces-
saries of life, instruction, moral and religious education. They
must remember the importance of good example and of the early
education of both the intelligence and the will. On these the
child's future depends. The authority of parents decreases as
the child grows older and better able to guide and direct himself.
(c) Duties of children. Children owe their parents (i) love,
respect, and gratitude; (2) obedience, except where the command
would be opposed to morality and the dictates of conscience; (3)
help and assistance in their need. Moreover, duties of charity
bind children of the same family among themselves in a special
manner.
II. THE STATE
i. Nature. (a) Obvious facts, (i) Men live in certain groups
determined by territories with natural or conventional limits, by
community of language and of interests, etc. (2) Some of these
groups are under the same government. They vary in size, popu-
lation, and form of government. (3) A state is one of these groups,
SOCIAL DUTIES 355
with a certain number of men, in the same territory, and under the
same authority.
(b) Explanation of terms. The Greeks used the word TroXts for
both the city and the state. (Cf. "policy," "politic," and deriva-
tives.) The Roman " civitas " was the body of citizens, and also the
city as the nucleus of the state. (Cf . " citizen," " civil," and deriva-
tives.) The res publica referred to the good of the state in general,
and did not, like our term "republic," mean a special form of gov-
ernment distinct from monarchy. (Cf. the English term "common-
wealth.") To-day the term "state," which originally means any
condition, is appropriated to mean the political organization, and
chiefly those who exercise authority. "Nation" refers to all
aspects of the state's collectivity, and "people" to the persons
living in the same state. These terms, however, are frequently
used for one another. Other terms like "empire," "kingdom,"
"republic," "country," "land," "fatherland," have a more re-
stricted meaning.
(c) The essential elements of a state are: (i) A plurality of men
and families, the number of which varies greatly. (2) A unity
and cohesion under the same common authority and with the same
organization. (3) A fixed territory. Nomadic peoples are not
or rather were not perfect states. (4) Independence and
freedom in administration and government. Colonies are not
perfect states, and, as in our Republic individual states have only
a limited autonomy under the same constitution and the same
federal authorities for points determined by their mutual agree-
ment, the "United States" is the true and perfect state and
nation.
2. Origin. Without discussing at length the various theories
concerning the origin of civil society, it may not be without interest
and utility to mention briefly the most important.
(a) Hobbes, in England, and Rousseau, in France, are the most
conspicuous advocates of the theory according to which the origin
of civil society is not to be sought in human nature itself, but in
a free agreement or social contract.
Starting from the principle that the end of man is pleasure and
happiness, and that every man is the judge of what makes him
356 ETHICS
happy, Hobbes infers that man has a natural right to whatever is
conducive to happiness. Hence all men have natural rights to
all things. This necessarily creates an antagonism, or "the war
of every man against every man." Such an individualism is
natural to man, and the state of society is against nature. This
condition, however, being an obstacle to happiness, men, by mutual
agreement, surrender their rights and establish a power which
must be strong enough to paralyze individual forces. Hence the
stronger, the more extensive, and the more absolute the power
of the state, the better will it be able to fulfil the purpose for
which it was instituted. Thus are justified the most abso-
lute despotism and tyranny which man can no longer resist or
change, since he permanently renounced his rights.
According to Rousseau, all men are equal by nature, and no
man has the right to command another. Society which sup-
poses superiors and inferiors cannot therefore be natural. It
originates from a free contract by which men surrender their
individual rights to a common authority constituted, not necessarily
by all men unanimously, but by the majority. Hence Rousseau's
conclusion is diametrically opposed to that of Hobbes: Au-
thority is binding only as long as the individuals want it. What
the majority has done it can undo at will, and the state is
complete and absolute democracy.
(b) What is to be thought of these views? (i) Historically
they are gratuitous for there is no record of such a contract;
and false for history shows that man, at all times and every-
where, lived in society, and traces back the state to an extension
and a development of the family. (2) The assumptions of the
system are either contradictory or impossible. Thus the right of
every man to everything amounts to the negation of rights, since
a man cannot have a right unless other men have the duty to
respect it. That all men are born equal is true only if we speak of
an equality of nature; but is there equality of health, intelligence,
will, capacities, power, etc.? That all men are born free is true of
psychological freedom, not of moral freedom. The very nature
of man imposes duties on him. (3) Such a contract is impossible, or
rather invalid, both because the parties did not know the extent
SOCIAL DUTIES
357
of the obligations which they were assuming, and because, in order
to be binding, a contract supposes at least some general duties of
justice, and the general obligation of abiding by contracts. But
this is impossible if, as it is claimed, the social contract is the
principle of all determined rights and duties. (4) The conse-
quences of the system are either despotism (Hobbes), or anarchism
(Rousseau).
(c) To live in society is natural to man, i.e. required by man's
very nature, (i) At all times, history shows man living in society.
(2) Social organization is needed for the complete physical and
mental development of the individual. Otherwise the individual
and the family are left to their own private resources, which are
uncertain and frequently insufficient. In other words, human
progress requires organization, diversity and subordination of
functions, analogical to those which take place in the human
organism. (3) Freedom, far from being destroyed by the social
organization, is really preserved. Without such an organization,
the weaker is at the mercy of the stronger; his life and property
are insecure. (4) The social feelings of love, sympathy, etc.,
manifest the nature of man. Progress and civilization in their
various aspects result from combined efforts.
3. Civil Authority. (a) As civil society is natural to man,
so also is civil authority, for there can be no organization without
a directive power. The persons in whom such authority will be
vested are designated by the community. The methods of designa-
tion and of transmission of power vary with the different political
constitutions, the power being sometimes hereditary, sometimes
elective. The people are not the government, but simply indicate
those who will govern.
(b) There are three elementary types of government: (i) Mon-
archy, when the authority resides in one man. (2) Aristocracy,
when it resides collectively in several citizens. (3) Democracy,
when all the citizens take a more or less direct part in the govern-
ment. These elementary forms may be combined in varying
manners and degrees. Absolute monarchy has disappeared from
the civilized world. The monarch's power is limited by a
constitution, and by parliaments composed of the people's repre-
358 ETHICS
sentatives. Every one of these forms has its advantages and
disadvantages, and consequently it is impossible to determine
universally which is the best. It depends on the aptitudes,
aspirations, traditions, etc., of the various nations.
(c) The government includes the legislative power, i.e. the power
to make laws; the executive power, which enforces these laws and
takes the means to have them respected; the judicial power, which
applies the laws to particular cases and punishes the offenders.
(See the Constitution of the United States.)
4. Functions and Rights of the State. (a) The function of
the state is twofold: (i) To protect the rights of individuals and
families by imposing the respect of these rights, determining them
when they are uncertain, and settling the various conflicts of rights.
(2) To help and promote public interests in the intellectual and
the economic order.
(b) The state has the rights necessary to the exercise of these
two functions, namely, the rights: (i) To impose certain conditions
respecting contracts, sales, wills, etc., and to make other regulations
for the public good; to settle disputes, e.g. between capital and
labor; and to determine and protect the rights of all. (2) To
promote public welfare by encouraging private enterprises, and by
undertaking what is impossible for individuals, e.g. roads, canals,
etc. (3) To help parents in the fulfilment of their duties referring
to the physical, intellectual, and moral education of their children.
(4) To punish all infractions of laws by inflicting just penalties,
proportionate to the gravity of the offence, and capable of pro-
tecting society. As far as possible penalties must be of such a
nature as to deter others, repair the wrong caused, and give the
offender chances and opportunities to amend. Whether or not
the death penalty is advisable depends on how far it is neces-
sary to prevent crime. (5) To protect the rights of the whole nation
by war. But war being a duel of nations, the same objection
already given against the duel applies here also. War manifests the
strength, wealth, and military organization, not the moral right
or wrong, of a nation. Moreover, the harm done by war is in-
calculable, and for this reason, war, especially offensive war, is
not to be undertaken except for the gravest reasons. It is to be
f
v/
SOCIAL DUTIES 359
hoped that some other means of settling international disputes
will soon be universally agreed upon.
(c) What are the limits of the rights of the state ? How far must
it allow individual liberty? This question cannot be given an
answer applying to all nations. It must vary with the circum-
stances, traditions, degrees of civilization, modes of government,
and a number of other influences. What would be looked upon as
tyranny in one nation may be the wisest course in another.
5. The Rights and Duties of Citizens are especially the follow-
ing:
(a) To obey laws and respect the authority of those whose duty
it is to enforce them. A law is for the common good, and enacted
by those to whom the people themselves have delegated the legis-
lative power. The only exception is for obviously unjust and
tyrannical laws.
(b) To pay taxes. The state needs resources to protect the
rights and freedom of the citizens, and to foster their welfare.
(c) To show their patriotism, both in time of peace and in time
of war; to love and revere the flag which is the emblem of the
nation.
(d) To take part in government a/airs as much as the constitu-
tion allows; hence, in a democratic state, to vote for worthy
officers and representatives.
Although, in general, obedience is due to civil authority, resist-
ance becomes lawful when the government is habitually tyrannical
and unable to fulfil its functions. However, there must be a
chance of success, and all possible moderation is to be used. A
government which is no longer fit to fulfil its mission, which
destroys instead of building up, is no longer for the good of
the people. (Cf. Declaration of Independence of the United
States.)
CONCLUSION
The faithful fulfilment of all his duties increases man's moral
worth. Acting according to the dictates of his conscience cannot
fail to make man better. This increase constitutes essentially
what is called merit. Merit is also frequently used to mean
the right to the retribution due to good and to bad actions. The
degrees of merit vary in proportion to (i) the importance of the
duty which is fulfilled and of the good which an action realizes;
(2) the difficulty of the duty and of the effort which it requires;
(3) the intention of the agent. Thus it is more meritorious to
sacrifice oneself for common than for private interests; to give
alms out of pure charity than out of vanity; to resist a strong
passion than to do good without effort, etc. It is more blamable
to kill than to hurt a man; to hate one's parents than to hate
strangers; to fail in one's duty through malice and wickedness,
than to do so out of weakness and human respect, etc.
Virtue is the habit of acting according to the dictates of con-
science. It is not merely an external appearance, but an intrinsic
reality. It does not make man act well "in order to be seen by
men," but out of respect for the moral law; not because otherwise
he would be punished, but because the dictates of his conscience are
higher for him than anything else. The moral law extends farther
than the civil law, and governs even the hidden motives and secret
thoughts. The virtuous man does not ask himself whether human
justice can and will reach him. He simply acts according to what
he knows to be his duty. Virtue is susceptible of progress, and,
since the noblest prerogative of man is his moral nature, his highest
ambition should be to become greater, worthier, more and more
perfect, and to be instrumental in helping others toward the same
end.
From what has been said in psychology and in the present
treatise, the student will easily infer the importance of giving an
360
CONCLUSION 361
early attention to the moral nature of man, and the most important
means by which this should be done. The facts of imitation and
example, the influence of early impressions, the necessity of con-
sistency between a man's principles and his conduct, cannot be
insisted upon too strongly. The good should not only be known,
but loved and practised. Let every man work constantly; effort
strengthens the will and increases the energy. Let the effort be
generous; it cannot fail to bring its reward.
EPISTEMOLOGY OR THE THEORY
OF KNOWLEDGE
INTRODUCTION
I. THE NATURE OF EPISTEMOLOGY
i. The Aim of Epistemology. (a) Among the various mani-
festations of conscious activity psychology numbers cognitive
processes, and examines their nature and development. Logic
deals with the rules to which such processes must conform in order
to avoid contradiction and reach valid conclusions. But neither
psychology nor logic touches upon the question of the relation of
ideas and judgments in the mind to the reality of things outside
the mind. Both remain confined within the mind itself. They
do not examine whether knowledge, which they assume to be
objective, is so in reality; whether, how far, and under what
circumstances we may be said truly to know extramental objects;
whether the facts and principles which are looked upon as true are
anything but a dreamlike mental play, a product of our own facul-
ties, springing from the very nature of our minds; whether, in
other words, we do not know things as we are rather than as
they are.
(b) Both hi the course of ages as well as at the same period of
time, the ceaseless contradictions of men on almost every point
of science and philosophy, the changes of opinion that take place
in the same mind and on the same subject, the numerous illusions
of both senses and intellect, the influence of a multitude of cir-
cumstances, especially of intellectual surroundings and education,
on all our judgments, arouse in the mind the suspicion that perhaps
knowledge in its totality, not only needs a thorough revision, but
362
NATURE OF EPISTEMOLOGY 363
is only an illusion of the mind that mistakes for objective realities
that which is merely subjective. The purpose of epistemology is to
ascertain the validity of knowledge and the conditions of this validity.
2. The Term "Epistemology." Etymologically, epistemology
(eTrwrriJ/xT;, knowledge or science, and Aoyo?, speech or thought)
means the science of knowledge, i.e. the part of philosophy which
deals with the value of human knowledge. It is also called the
"Theory of Knowledge," "Criteriology," or "Critical Philosophy,"
because its aim is to criticise the faculties of knowledge and to
indicate the signs or criteria of valid knowledge. The names of
"Applied," "Material," or "Critical Logic" are unsatisfactory
because logic, as understood to-day, deals exclusively with the
formal laws of thought. Nor is epistemology to be identified with
metaphysics. It is rather an introduction to metaphysics which
studies reality in order to determine its true nature. Epistemology
completes psychology and logic, and leads into metaphysics, since
the value of knowledge can hardly be examined without saying
something on the objects of knowledge. Here epistemology will
be treated as a transition from the subjective to the objective world.
3. The Importance of Epistemology can hardly be overesti-
mated, although, as a special science, it is of comparatively recent
origin. Partial discussions are found in older philosophers, but
Locke is the first clearly to state the problem, and Kant the first
to attempt its solution on epistemological and critical principles.
In the beginning of philosophical speculation, as well as in the
beginning of the individual man's cognitive life, knowledge in
general is accepted as valid without any discussion. Soon, how-
ever, contradiction, error, conflicts of opinion, the necessity of
discarding as worthless some assents formerly looked upon as valid,
lead the mind to compare, test, and revise these assents. If what
was thought to be a truth is later on proved to be an error, it
becomes necessary to find out whether there is any kind of knowl-
edge which is certainly valid, and what are the tests of valid truths.
This is the fundamental problem of epistemology and the basis
of every investigation, rational or religious. That opinions change
on a great number of points is undeniable. A truth for one is
an error for another. A truth at one time is an error at another
364 EPISTEMOLOGY
time. Does everything change? Are there truths the assent to
which is and always should be unanimous? If so, what are they?
II. FACTS AND PROBLEMS
I. FACTS
All men desire to know, but not the same things, nor through
the same means; there is no man whose curiosity is not frequently
aroused, and who is not eager to see, hear, understand, obtain
information, reach the truth, do away with doubt and perplexity.
In order to be understood, this fact supposes some definitions of
truth and certitude not final and forever settled definitions;
this is impossible now but definitions of the terms as commonly
understood by all men.
i. Truth. The term "truth," clear as it may seem at first,
is difficult to define, and has several meanings. Thus we say of
a man that he is a true orator; of a metal that it is true or genuine
gold; of a man that he knows the truth, i.e. that his ideas corre-
spond to reality and are such as they should be; of a man that he
is truthful, i.e. that he speaks according to what he thinks. We
are thus led to distinguish three kinds of truth, every one of which
consists in the relation of something extramental to something mental.
(a) Moral truth, referred to in ethics, is the conformity of the
expression with the thought. We need not stop to consider this
meaning.
(b) Ontological truth is a relation of conformity between a thing,
as existing outside the mind, and the representation of it in the
mind. True wine is for me what I consider as essential to wine,
namely, a certain composition, certain properties, etc. True gold
is a substance corresponding really to the definition given by the
physicist. I may mistake an adulterated product for wine, or
another metal for gold, or an imitation for a precious stone. The
error will be in the mind, yet the thing itself will be truly what
it is.
(c) Logical truth is the conformity between the subjective or
mental representation and the objective reality or ontological
FACTS AND PROBLEMS 365
truth. Thus, if adulterated wine is offered as true or genuine, and
I accept it as such, my judgment is false; if I recognize it as an
adulteration, my judgment is true. If I believe that true gold
is only an imitation, I am mistaken; if I admit its genuineness,
I judge truly.
(d) Thus ontological truth resides primarily in things; logical
truth, primarily in the mind. The former, however, implies the
comparison of a concrete object with something mental, namely,
with a definition, an abstract type, and certain characteristics
conceived by the mind as essential. The latter implies the com-
parison of a concrete idea with things themselves as known, for
instance, by the manufacturer in the examples given above. A
true photograph or statue represents faithfully the features of the
original; a true Murillo is a painting which is really the work of
this artist; true wine is really made of grapes, etc. True in this
sense may be synonymous with such terms as genuine, original,
faithful, etc. It always implies that a thing is what it should be
when judged according to a certain mental standard or ideal,
which, of course, may vary indefinitely. A true judgment is one
that corresponds to the fact or the thing as it is. Thus I buy a
picture as a true Murillo, and if it is so in reality my judgment
is true.
(e) The epistemological problem goes farther than these simple
facts. Epistemology investigates whether our standards them-
selves have anything objective, and how much; whether what we
conceive as true is in reality what it seems to be. Soluble or
insoluble, this problem has been raised and must be examined.
(/) From what has been said it follows as a conclusion that both
forms of truth consist in a certain conformity between external
things and the mind, a relation which goes from things to the mind
hi ontological truth, and from the mind to things in logical truth.
Primarily ontological truth is found in things; logical truth, in
the mind. With regard to the logical truth contained in a given
judgment, mental attitudes vary greatly and include many degrees
of confidence or distrust. The assent or dissent may be more or
less firm and stable. There may be certitude or incertitude. In
other words, the attitude of the mind varies.
366 EPISTEMOLOGY
2. Mental Attitudes. (a) Before a question or fact is pre-
sented to my mind: "Is it so or not so? " I am in the state of com-
plete ignorance concerning such a question or fact. "I don't
know," and I am not even aware of my ignorance on this special
point, since, in order to be aware of it, I should at least be aware
that such a question or problem may be raised.
(b) As soon as the question is asked, I may have no reason to
affirm or deny; I answer again: "I don't know." Properly
speaking, this is negative doubt, frequently also called ignorance,
the state of a mind totally ignorant of the reasons pro and con,
and hence unable to give any assent owing to the lack of evidence
on both sides.
(c) Reasons may be given in favor of one alternative, which
would sway the mind in this direction, were it not for reasons
equally strong on the opposite side. As it is, reasons pro and con
balance each other, and again the same answer is given: "I don't
know." Although I do know a great deal, perhaps even all that
can actually be known on the subject, I cannot' give my assent
either to the affirmation or to the negation. This is positive doubt,
a state of suspense because the mind is unable to pronounce
on account of the equal weight of reasons for the opposite
alternatives.
(d) The reasons on one side may clearly outweigh those on the
other. The latter, however, retain some force, and, when I give
my adhesion to the former alternative, it cannot be an unlimited
and perfectly secure adhesion. I may answer that "I know,"
but, strictly speaking, I should answer that "I think it is so," or
that "I believe it." This is opinion, the state of a mind assenting
to a proposition (which is called probable), knowing that the
opposite proposition has also good reasons in its favor, and, in
consequence, fearing lest the judgment it pronounces be erroneous.
Frequently this will be expressed by saying: "I think so, but
have some doubts about it."
(e) Finally, I may see the truth clearly and evidently. There
are no reasons against my adhesion, or these reasons have lost
their value so completely that they can in no way influence my
assent. Now properly I say: "I know it is so," or "I am certain
FACTS AND PROBLEMS 367
and sure," "It is beyond doubt." This is certitude, the state
of a mind assenting unreservedly, fearlessly, without thinking that
it is possible for it to be mistaken.
3. Various Kinds of Certitude. (a) I say that "I am cer-
tain," and also that " Something is certain." "Certain" applies
both to the mind or subject, and to the proposition or object.
Thus a first distinction is to be made between subjective certitude
or simply certitude, and objective certitude or rather certainty.
Compare the three statements: "It is true"; "It is certain";
"I am certain that it is true," and see their relations.
(b) I may be certain either spontaneously or after mature
reflection. Hence certitude is direct or reflex. Reflex, philosoph-
ical, or epistemological certitude is the certitude to be examined
here, for reflection changes many spontaneous certitudes into
incertitudes. Frequently spontaneous certitude is hardly a certi-
tude at all, but an assent which may be changed readily. Thus
I have no doubt about the news which I read in the morning news-
paper, although I am ready to disbelieve it if denied in another
paper, or in a later issue of the same paper.
(c) Certitude is immediate or mediate according as it is obtained
immediately as when I say: "This is my friend John," because
I see him; or mediately as when a conclusion is reached through
a process of reasoning.
(d) Finally, certitude, although always excluding the fear of
error, has various degrees according to the nature of the objects to
which it applies. All objects are not capable of the same evidence,
and, in a long series of reasonings, the evidence may become less
and less clear. I may be certain, on the one hand, that two and
two are four, that the whole is greater than any one of its parts,
or that the man I see is John; and, on the other, that a personal
God exists, that Napoleon campaigned in Egypt, or that honesty
is the best policy. Yet, owing to the nature of the mental processes
by which I know the truth of the latter propositions, I feel that
there is a difference in the assent given to them, and the assent
given to the former.
4. How the Epistemological Problems Arise. As a fact,
spontaneous certitude must be accepted. It is the natural
368 EPISTEMOLOGY
tendency of the mind. Doubt arises only later through reflection.
But is certitude justified? Such is the question suggested by many
facts equally certain, and already mentioned in Psychology and
Logic (pp. 117 ff. 256 ff.). Whatever is mental depends on many
psychological variations due to heredity, education, environ-
ment, etc. We think as we are, and, to a great extent, we are
what circumstances and surroundings have made us. What is
truth for one individual is error for another; and what is accepted
at one time of life is rejected at another time. Even the senses,
on which the whole mental life depends, are subject to illusions,
and always depend on the physiological conditions of the organism.
Defects of vision, such as color-blindness, long or short sightedness,
etc., prevent a man from seeing things as others do. Certain
diseases, drugs, or conditions will change the trend of mental life,
and affect assent and dissent, certitude and incertitude. Hence
arise epistemological problems.
II. PROBLEMS
Since, in many known cases, the mind is certain where it should
not be, is it not so in every case? Since frequently it tinges reality
with its own coloring, does it not always do so? Since the subjec-
tive mingles so closely with the objective, is not all knowledge
subjective? And where shall we stop? Where and how shall
we draw the line between the objective and the subjective? We
distrust the man who has deceived us several times. Should we
not distrust our faculties that have also misled us? It may be
the very nature of the mind to represent things as it does, and to
picture them, not as they are, but after its own fashion. Even the
normal mind, apart from external influences, always mixes its own
activity with objective reality, and in a proportion which cannot
be determined. What we are aware of is always a mixture of
subjective and objective elements, and, in a mixture, the pro-
portion of the elements cannot be determined unless the elements
are known separately. Here we know only the total result, or
combination of the two elements. The object can never be known
except in the subject.
(a) The first question then is: Does reflection justify certitude?
METHOD 369
Is man capable of certain knowledge? In a general way, dogma-
tism answers, "Yes," scepticism, "No," while agnosticism
endeavors to define the limits of the knowable beyond which
lies the unknowable.
(b) This leads to a second problem: Which certitudes survive
the scrutiny of reflection ? If there is any valid knowledge, how can
it be acquired, and what kind of knowledge is valid? The data
of experience alone are declared valid by empiricism, while the
claims of reason are urged by rationalism.
(c) Strange as it may seem to have postponed this question so
far, we have now to ask: What is knowledge? Since knowledge
as a mental function is within the mind, yet with a peculiar essen-
tial relation to some extramental reality, it becomes necessary to
examine the value of this representative aspect. Idealism claims
that it is merely the result of the mind's inner activity, while
realism admits some external reality which is reflected in the mind.
And, if such an external reality exists, what can be known about
it? What is the relation between the idea in the mind and the
thing outside?
(d) Even if knowledge some knowledge at least is valid,
since error is also undeniable, how will truth be distinguished from
error? How shall we ascertain which certitudes are justified?
What are the signs or criteria of truth? Such systems as intellec-
tualism, mysticism, pragmatism, traditionalism, etc., offer different
answers.
Before studying these problems, a few words on the method to
be followed are necessary.
III. METHOD
i. Positive Starting-point. (a) Epistemology starts with the
obvious fact of spontaneous certitude, which cannot be denied. By
a critical and reflective analysis it endeavors to find out if this certi-
tude is legitimate. Unless we start with this fact, no solution can
ever be reached. But we neither affirm nor deny that this certitude
is valid, or that our mind can reach objective truth. Nor do we
pretend to investigate whether the mind can know things-in-them-
25
370 EPISTEMOLOGY
selves, as they are in reality, and apart from their mental represen-
tations. First to isolate the mind from external reality, and then
ask how it can nevertheless come in contact with this reality, makes
the problem forever insoluble.
(b) Hence Locke's principle that "knowledge is conversant
only about our ideas" is opposed to facts. Knowledge is essen-
tially representative. The idea imposes itself as the idea of some
reality. Knowledge becomes conversant with ideas later, by
reflection. For any unprejudiced mind, knowledge is conversant
primarily with external things.
(c) To speak of things-in-themselves, i.e. apart from the ideas
we have of them, is nothing short of an absurdity, since evidently
the mind can only reach things-in-the-mind, i.e. things as repre-
sented. As the Scholastics so often repeat, knowledge, being an
act of the mind, partakes of the nature of the mind: "Cognitum
est in cognoscente ad modum cognoscentis." The idea is one
thing; the object represented is another; but the object is never
reached by the mind except through the idea. Hence the question
is whether the idea, though conforming to the nature of the
knowing mind, conforms also to the nature of the known object,
or whether, on the contrary, it is a mere mental product.
2. Descartes' Universal Doubt. (a) In order to examine
the problem of certitude, Descartes begins by emptying the mind
completely of all that it had formerly accepted as valid knowledge.
Reflecting that we are frequently mistaken, he rejects every form
of knowledge as uncertain, so as to be sure that the mind, being
emptied of all its contents, will be free from every source of error.
This universal doubt, it is true, is not real, final, or sceptical, but
methodical. It is an expedient in order to find a safer basis for
certitude. This basis Descartes finds in the undeniable fact that
he thinks and therefore exists: "Cogito, ergo sum."
(b) This method has for its most serious defect that it makes
any subsequent certitude impossible. In fact it is only through a
glaring inconsistency that Descartes emerges out of his doubt.
Like everything else, the fact of thought may be a dream, and the
necessary connection between thinking and existing may be illusory.
How in fact can such a necessity be asserted without assuming the
METHOD 371
principle of contradiction which, with every other principle, has
been rejected by Descartes? Consistent thinking can never take
place without supposing the laws of thought. If the facts of
thought and personal existence lawfully emerge out of a universal
doubt, a number of other facts have the same right, because their
evidence is no less clear. And if the necessity of the connection
between existing and thinking is admitted, a number of other
necessary principles must also be accepted. As it is, Descartes'
method necessarily goes around in a circle (circulus in probando).
Starting then from the obvious fact of spontaneous certitude,
we shall examine successively the problems mentioned above.
CHAPTER I
IS CERTITUDE JUSTIFIED?
The fact has already been pointed out that a distinction is to
be made between the spontaneous or natural certitude of the mind
and its reflective certitude which persists even after its value has
been tested. Reflection may show that the mind was mistaken,
and that assent has to be refused to propositions to which it
had been given formerly. More frequently it will be found that
former certitudes are only opinions; truths, only probabilities.
Generally speaking, mankind is misled, not by too much doubt,
but by too much certitude, or rather by states of mind which man
spontaneously calls certitude, and which even a summary
analysis reveals to be only more or less firm opinions, accompanied
by a great deal of doubt. Both for speculative, and chiefly for prac-
tical, truths, man has to be satisfied in the majority of cases with
assents that fall short of perfect certitude, and that may be called
either highly probable opinions, or perhaps "moral" certitudes.
Assents are morally certain when they are warranted by sufficient
evidence, although there is some very remote possibility of
their being given wrongly. Thus opinion gradually merges into
certitude, and no strict line can be drawn between them.
The questions to be examined now are not: Of what truths can
we be certain? Are they many or few? Which certitudes are
justified? and the like; but simply: Is the state of mind called
certitude ever justified? Can we be certain of anything? Strictly
speaking, only two answers can be given: (i) "Yes," and (2)
"No "; or rather, since even a negative answer implies the certi-
tude of the impossibility of certitude, (i) "Yes," or "No," and
(2) "I do not know." For the present we shall speak briefly of
Scepticism, Agnosticism, and Dogmatism, but many questions
372
CERTITUDE 373
referring to these systems will necessarily have to be left over for
subsequent chapters.
I. SCEPTICISM
1. Meaning. (a) The many uses of the terms "scepticism,"
"sceptical," etc., make it almost impossible to give any definition
of them. I call a man sceptical when he does not believe my
present assertion of which I am certain. Again I call sceptical a
man who is generally hard to convince, requires strict proofs, and
discusses every point before he gives his assent. I also call scepti-
cal the man who says that nothing is certain, disbelieves every-
thing, is inclined to disregard the opinions of other men, and is
generally ready to answer "I don't know," to every question.
(b) Etymologically, "scepticism " is a Greek word (oveetyt?,
doubt, from <rK7nre<r0at, to look at carefully, to scrutinize),
which even in philosophy has more than one meaning. In general
it is opposed to dogmatism, and denotes the doctrine denying the
aptitude of the mind to reach truth, or at least to be aware that it
has reached it, so that no certitude can be justified.
(c) Theoretically, we may imagine a man who professes to be
certain of nothing, not even of his existence, of the first principles
of reason, of the distinction between the state of sleep and the state
of wakefulness, nor of his own doubt. This, however, is merely
an abstract supposition. The existence of such out-and-out
sceptics seems impossible, and no instance justifies it historically.
As it presents itself in history, scepticism is only relative. It
admits some facts and principles as certain, otherwise thought and
speech are utter impossibilities. The very fact that sceptics argue,
discuss, and write, shows that they pretend to know something,
were it only that knowledge is not possible. Scepticism, however,
is distinct from agnosticism. The latter admits the validity of
some forms of knowledge, but draws a strict line beyond which
everything is unknowable. The former attacks knowledge and
certitude in general, and tries to show the incapacity of all cognitive
faculties, senses as well as reason.
2. Historical Outline. (a) The Sophists, especially Protagoras
and Gorgias, point to the contradictions of earlier philosophers,
374 EPISTEMOLOGY
and reach the practical conclusion that, in regard to any ques-
tion, both the negative and the affirmative answers are equally
plausible.
(b) Pyrrho professes that real things are inaccessible to human
knowledge because, on the one hand, the senses manifest only
appearances, and on the other, reason rests on custom, habit, and
education. Hence man must abstain from pronouncing on any-
thing. To abstain from denning and judging (CTT^O/) will give
peace to the mind (aTo/xx&a), and hence true happiness.
(c) Arcesilaus and Carneades also reject the possibility of knowl-
edge and certitude, but admit that some probability, sufficient in
practice, may be attained. Since, according to them, the criterion
of truth is perception, and perception may be irresistibly false, it
follows that unreserved assent must always be refused.
(d) The main school of scepticism is that of Alexandria, with
^Enesidemus, Agrippa, and Sextus Empiricus, who systematize
scepticism, and, under the name of tropes, classify the reasons
leading to doubt. All conclude that assent should always be
withheld. Scepticism proper is restricted almost entirely to Greek
philosophy. Elsewhere doubt assumes a special character, and
applies only to certain forms of knowledge.
3. Criticism. Nothing could be said to a man whose answer
to every question would be: "I don't know." A common ground
which is indispensable for every discussion could never be found.
It may be added that any such sceptic could be placed in constant
contradiction with himself, both in his practical life and in his
theoretical views. The man who knows nothing has no right to
think or speak. Finally, as the fact of spontaneous certitude is
undeniable, it suffices briefly to examine the objections of scepticism
against the validity of knowledge.
(a) Fact of error. It is certain that sometimes man mistakes
falsity for truth, and adheres to error with the same tenacity with
which he adheres to truth. Both the senses and reason are sources
of transitory or permanent error.
Answer. To this it may be answered that error supposes truth.
Since these two ideas are correlative, if nothing is true, nothing is
false. If sometimes man recognizes that he errs, it is a sign that
CERTITUDE 375
sometimes also he knows that he does not err. From the fact that
we sometimes err nothing can be inferred, except that we should
be prudent in affirming and in giving our unreserved assent.
The same is true for probability. It is a participation of, or an
approach to, certainty; and the certainty of some propositions is
the only ground for affirming that others are more or less probable.
Thus the certitude that a bag contains more red than white balls
is the only ground for affirming that the probability of drawing a
red ball is greater than the probability of drawing a white one.
There could be no participation if there was nothing to be parti-
cipated in, no justifiable probability if there was no justifiable
certitude.
(b) Facts of contradictions and of the diversity of human opinions;
in space different contemporary individuals; in time succes-
sion of opinions; in objects science, politics, religion, morality,
etc. ; in the same individual changes in his views. All are
convinced that they possess the truth, yet it is certain that some
do not, since contradictories cannot be true at the same time.
Answer. (i) There is agreement on certain general truths,
principles, axioms, and facts. Thus men have in common the per-
ceptions of color, solidity, etc. All are certain of their own exist-
ence and of the immediate data of consciousness. All admit some
principles of reason; for instance, all look for the causes of what-
ever happens (principle of causality). There is also agreement
on many points of abstract sciences, e.g. of mathematics. (2)
As stated elsewhere, on many questions, especially in practical
matters, we have to be satisfied with more or less probable opinions.
Contradictions are more numerous in proportion as these questions
are more complex and more influential on practical life.
(c) Diallelus, or Circulus in Probando. The reliability of
human faculties cannot be proved except by using these same
faculties whose validity is still doubtful. Some reason must be
given for admitting the value of human faculties. This reason
itself, since it proceeds from the same faculties, must rest on
another reason, and so on ad infinitum.
Answer. (i) This argument leads to absolute and universal
scepticism, which is absurd. The sceptic uses his reason to prove
376 EPISTEMOLOGY
the weakness of reason, and hence also supposes its validity. To
be consistent, he must doubt even his own doubt. (2) The
objection assumes wrongly that demonstration is the only source of
certitude. Demonstration is only an indirect means of throwing
light on a hidden truth. Where there is full light, such a means
is unnecessary. While most propositions do not at first clearly
appear as true or false, others have in themselves the stamp of
truth or error, which is obvious to all men. It must be admitted
that the reliability of human faculties cannot be proved, but it
need not be. In some cases the use of them is its own justification.
II. AGNOSTICISM
i. Meaning. (a) Like the term "scepticism," the term
"agnosticism" is vague, and applies to different views and sys-
tems. Etymologically it means the attitude of one who does not
know (a and yvoxrriKos), and thus would denote something even
more radical than scepticism, since the sceptic is simply one who
"examines." As used to-day, however, agnosticism is a milder
term than scepticism, and, whereas scepticism is looked upon as a
term of reproach, many pride themselves on being called agnostics.
(b) The term "agnosticism," coined by Huxley in 1869, has
been applied to the views of thinkers whose opinions were and are
greatly at variance on many points. The feature common to all
is an attitude of doubt or denial toward certain objects of knowl-
edge. The agnostic assigns limits to the mind's knowing powers,
beyond which lies an unknowable region. There is light up to a
certain point which can be determined, and beyond which the human
mind finds itself in complete darkness. The recognition of some
unknowable seems to be the essential feature of agnosticism. But
the dividing line between the knowable and the unknowable
occupies different places according to different agnostics.
(c) Thus, in its mildest form, agnosticism joins hands with
gnosticism this term being taken here in its etymological signifi-
cation since every man must confess that many things are
beyond the human grasp. The man who says: "I do not know,"
and chiefly, "I cannot know," or, "Nobody can know," assigns
limits to human faculties of knowledge. The agnostic goes farther.
CERTITUDE 377
He has found the exact boundaries of the realm of the knowable,
and the range of human faculties. Beyond the knowable objects
there are others which the mind cannot reach.
(d) For all agnostics, that which is primarily unknowable is the
Absolute, the First Cause, the unconditioned Reality, God. Hence
sometimes agnosticism has .been identified with atheism. Yet
they are distinct. An agnostic, Spencer for instance, may admit
the existence of the Absolute, although he denies the mind's power
to know its nature. Frequently also agnosticism coincides with
.positivism and empiricism. It admits the value of empirical
science, and denies that of every form of metaphysics.
2. Critical Remarks. A thorough criticism of agnosticism
would include the whole of epistemology, together with meta-
physics and theodicy. Here we shall limit ourselves to a few
remarks of a general nature.
(a) The agnostic attitude is attractive on account of its apparent
humility . In reality it includes a great presumption, that of deter-
mining exactly how far human reason can go. There is some
humility in saying: "I do not know," but it is quite different to
say: "It is unknowable."
(b) In fact, how can one say of a thing that it is unknowable
without having made a comparison of it with the capacity of the
human mind, and therefore without having already some accurate
knowledge, not only of the mind's power, but also of the object
which is supposed to transcend this power?
(c) Can we know the existence of a thing, and at the same time
be utterly ignorant of its nature? Do not the facts by which it
manifests its existence necessarily manifest also something of its
nature? The same mental processes used in natural science will
necessarily lead higher into metaphysics. The knowledge of
physical causes will lead to the First Cause, and so on.
III. DOGMATISM
i. Meaning. (a) As understood here, dogmatism is opposed
to scepticism, and means the system that admits some principles
or facts as certain, or more generally, the possibility of certitude.
In a more restricted sense, which is in frequent use, dogmatism
378 EPISTEMOLOGY
applies to systems or assertions that are altogether uncritical,
make unnecessary assumptions, and fail to give proofs where they
are needed. In this sense dogmatism is a term of reproach, whereas
in the former sense, which alone will be used here, it simply stands
for the admission of valid knowledge.
(b) Dogmatism does not claim that everything can be proved, for
this would involve an endless regressive process of demonstration.
It admits that certain principles or facts need no proof, but stand on
their own merits. To prove is to borrow light from principles,
so as to throw it on the conclusion which otherwise would remain
in the dark. These principles either have light in themselves
or derive it from some other source. Ultimately principles must
be reached whose light is not derived from any other principle,
which shine of themselves, are clearly seen by the mind, and
shed their light around on other objects. We say: "It is as clear
as daylight," to mean something which everybody must admit.
We are certain of these principles because their truth manifests
itself directly and immediately to the mind, and because it mani-
fests itself in the same way to all men.
(c) Nor can it be said that, in such cases, the mind knows things,
not as they are, but as it is, and that cognition is determined only
by the mind's nature. We are conscious that such truths are
imposed on the mind from without. My judgment must agree
with the reality of things, otherwise it is pure fiction, and all men
make the distinction between fiction and reality. The present
question, however, is not that of the nature of knowledge, but
that of certitude. No matter whence this certitude comes, reflec-
tion, as well as spontaneous adhesion, justifies it. Why?
2. Two Classes of Judgments are Pronounced with Certitude.
Some are facts. Thus I say: "I am as sure as if I had seen it
with my own eyes," or "I am certain that I did or said so and so."
Others are principles. Thus I say: "I am as certain of this as I
am of the proposition: two and two are four." In both cases I
oppose my knowledge, as true, to something fictitious. I appeal
to propositions which everybody must accept, to a standard which
all men admit and on which all are agreed.
These facts and principles are true because I see that they are,
CERTITUDE 379
because they shine to my mind like daylight to my eyes. No
amount of reflection can ever make me depart from them. To
deny them is to commit mental suicide, and to place oneself in the
absolute incapacity of ever thinking and speaking. That I exist,
think, and act; that two and two are four; that the whole is
greater than any of its parts, etc., are truths that are certain and
beyond the possibility of any doubt, although men may dispute
as to the real meaning of such propositions, and examine what
correspondence is found between the mental representation and
the objective reality. This is a different question, which will be
raised later on, when we shall examine the nature of knowledge.
At present the fact of certitude stands the test of reflection. If
the extent of certitude has been questioned, we may say that its
existence has never been doubted seriously. All men hold some
truths as certain, nor can they be thinking men without certitude.
CHAPTER II
CERTITUDES
I. FACTS
i. Existence of Certitude. (a) Upon reflection many spon-
taneous certitudes resolve themselves into higher or lower proba-
bilities, that is, into incertitudes. The absence of doubt was due
to the fact that the value of the evidence had not been weighed
with sufficient accuracy, or evidence to the contrary had been
neglected, or the possibilities of error overlooked. But, as was
said in the preceding chapter, there are certitudes which persist,
and which even the most radical sceptic cannot but imply in his
very denials. These certitudes belong to two groups: Facts of
experience and principles of reason. In any scientific investigation,
both are combined in varying degrees. Thinking is not a merely
mental function, proceeding independently, and free to follow its
own caprice. It must conform to something which is extramental.
I am not free to think that two and two are four. This truth
imposes itself on my mind from outside. I do not make it, but
recognize it.
(b) Truth is the right which a certain proposition has to be accepted,
and this right, like the right of ownership, persists even when it is
ignored or violated. In some cases this right is not clear, and, even
after a diligent investigation, may not become evident. In other
cases, it is in itself shining for the mind, and immediately mani-
fest. Facts, i.e. concrete experiences, both internal and external,
and principles, i.e. self-evident propositions, are the necessary
bases of thought. If they are rejected, nothing is left but to stop
thinking altogether or go to an asylum.
Not that some propositions may not at first seem self-evident
without being so; nor that facts may not be investigated to dis-
tinguish true immediate experience from the interpretation which
380
CERTITUDES 38!
the mind may rashly add to it. But even after this sifting is done,
there is left a residue of facts and laws, of concrete experiences and
abstract principles, which are absolutely certain, and about which
no other state of mind is possible but certitude.
(c) Later on we shall have to examine whether and how far
the mental representation corresponds with external reality. For
the present we simply observe that the mental attitude is one of
absolute and unreserved certitude which nothing can shake. " Two
and two are four"; "a straight line is shorter than a curve uniting
the same two points"; "the same thing cannot at once be one
way and the contradictory way"; "I am now thinking and writ-
ing"; "the paper on which I am writing is white, and the ink
I use black;" "I experience a headache," etc., are so many
assertions of which I am so certain that, should any one try to
destroy or even weaken this certitude, I should at once suspect
his seriousness or his mental sanity.
2. Facts of Experience and Principles of Reason. (a) Under
certain conditions, inferences from self-evident facts and principles
lead to unreserved certitude, while, in other cases, the conclusions
are accepted with more or less fear of error. In many circum-
stances, I may be certain that my fellowmen do not deceive me
in what they claim to have seen, heard, or experienced. Although
the fact itself to which they testify is not directly evident for me,
I can entertain no doubt about it. Again, once the demonstration
is understood, I am certain that the sum of the three angles of a
triangle equals two right angles, because the connection of this
assertion with self-evident principles is clear. Once I have studied
physics and chemistry, I cannot doubt that this pure water, which
I have not analyzed, and which I have never seen frozen, is com-
posed of oxygen and hydrogen in the proportion 1:2, and that it
will freeze at 32 degrees Fahrenheit. Should the event prove
otherwise, it would be a sign for me that the water is not pure,
or that my thermometer is at fault. Few perhaps are the laws
established beyond doubt, but the certainty of some cannot be
denied.
(b) The mind proceeds, and this very advance supposes some-
thing fixed and settled, both as a starting-point and as a guiding
382 EPISTEMOLOGY
light. Remove these, and science becomes at once an impossibility,
man must renounce thinking, since every step would involve him
in a contradiction. Or rather there is no vagary which could not
be indulged in, since there would remain nothing to go by, no
directive principle. Whether we proceed from experience as
in the sciences of nature or from self-evident principles as
in geometry the starting-point must be stable, firm and certain.
In its inductive and deductive processes, the mind has to avoid
contradiction and be guided by the sidelights of truth and facts
already ascertained. Certitudes of abstract principles must
always be verifiable in all concrete instances, and facts must be
organized with the help of principles.
But are facts and principles irreducible to each other? If so,
will either one suffice, or are the two necessary?
II. EMPIRICISM
1. Meaning. As its name indicates, empiricism derives all
valid knowledge from experience (e/x7rapia), either internal or
external. It is opposed to innatism, which admits innate ideas
independent of experience, and to rationalism, which admits that
the mind possesses some knowledge, which, even if it depends
on the senses, is irreducible to sense-knowledge. According to
empiricism, the knowledge of universal and necessary principles
is simply a strong association which, by repetition, has become
indissoluble. Every form of knowledge is ultimately reduced to
concrete experience, the laws of the mind being alone responsible
for their abstract, general, and necessary character.
2. Criticism. (a) In Psychology we have shown the irre-
ducibility of the concept to the image (p. 94 ff. 102 ff.) and of
necessary judgments to associations, (p. 112 ff.). Only a few
words will be added here. The perception of what is cannot give
the certitude of what must be. Knowledge of what happens cannot
give the knowledge of what will necessarily happen. The empiricist
takes it for granted that concrete knowledge alone is true knowl-
edge. But this a priori assertion is far from self-evident, and no
argument is forthcoming to demonstrate it. There are, on the con-
trary, self-evident principles which we do not even think of testing
CERTITUDES 383
by experience, because their certitude is immediate. Two and two
are known to be four as soon as the terms are understood, and this
assertion is at once accepted as applying universally, at all times
and everywhere. It is known simply by comparing the predicate
with the subject.
(b) To become orderly and scientific, experience constantly needs
principles which are not given in experience, like those of con-
tradiction, causality, etc. Experience and reason are not used
successively, that is, reason does not only continue, surpass, and
transcend experience. In any science, the use of the two is
simultaneous, and they compenetrate each other at every step.
Scientific experience is impossible without the use of principles
transcending experience.
III. RATIONALISM
1. Meaning. We are certain of concrete facts, but there is
another certitude, namely, that of principles, which is acquired as
the result of a direct intuition of the intellect. As understood
here, rationalism is opposed to empiricism, and denies that every
form of knowledge can be reduced to experience. It admits the
radical difference between the concrete and the abstract, and
refuses to identify the universal with the collective. It asserts
that the certitude of principles is not the direct result of experience,
but of an intuition of the understanding. It is the theory ex-
plained in Psychology when we spoke of the origin of necessary
principles (p. 112 ff.).
Hence rationalism here does not mean the abuse of rationalism,
which consists in relying exclusively on reason and neglecting
experience, or in relying exclusively on human reason and denying
the possibility, fact, or usefulness of a divine revelation. Ration-
alism may or may not admit the innateness of ideas and principles.
This is an independent question which has been answered in Psy-
chology. Rationalism is not opposed to the legitimate use of
experience, but admits the certitude of principles transcending
experience. The union of the two is indispensable in science.
2. Value. Rationalism is the only satisfactory explanation
of the certitude which we have of principles. (See Psychology.)
384 EPISTEMOLOGY
Nor does it lessen the value of knowledge, since it does not profess
to create anything new, but simply to apprehend aspects of reality
which are already found in sense-experience, hidden, as it were,
under the concrete envelope which limits such reality in space
and time. Reason goes deeper, to the core itself, which, once the
outer envelope is removed, is no longer restricted to one individual.
CHAPTER III
WHAT IS KNOWLEDGE?
So far we have simply analyzed our certitudes and shown that
the human mind cannot possibly remain in the state of doubt,
but that, even in its denials, it implies the power to know with
certitude. There remains the crucial question of epistemology:
What is it to know? And what is the value of the relation estab-
lished in knowledge between a knowing mind and a known object?
I. FACT OF KNOWLEDGE
i. Nature of Knowledge. (a) Knowledge is essentially the
awareness of an object, i.e. of anything fact or principle which
may in any manner be reached by our cognitive faculties. The
existence, size, and color of the tree out there, a geometrical theo-
rem, the existence of God, etc., may be so many objects of knowl-
edge. Knowledge always implies both the antithesis of a knowing
activity and of a known object, and their close union. The known
object must in some way be present within the knowing subject.
I can know the tree out there only in so far as it acts on me, and
thereby contributes to produce in my mind a representation of
it. Any activity which may be conceived as purely subjective
can never be a cognitive process, and any attempt to identify the
object of knowledge with the subjective experience by which it is
known, leads to destroying the fact itself of knowledge, which
implies the object as essentially as it does the subject.
(b) This objective relation is expressed in an implicit or explicit
judgment by which the perception or intuition is referred to the
object. Thus in sense-perception, there is implied the assertion
that my sensations refer to this or that object. "I see a tree out
there" means that the color-sensations which I experience are
referred to an object with certain characteristics, which I call a
26 385
386 EPISTEMOLOGY
tree, and which is located in a certain direction, and at a certain
distance. (Cf. Psychology, p. 62 ff.).
2. Truth and Certitude are Conditions of Knowledge. (a)
A man may be under the irresistible illusion that he knows, when
he mistakes error for truth, and gives an unconditional assent to
a false statement. Here we have only the appearance of knowledge.
The man thinks that he knows, but a better informed man is aware
of the mistake. Even if the error is common to all men, it remains
true that the knowledge is not real, but only apparent.
(b) As long as a serious doubt remains in his mind, a man
cannot say that he knows. "I think so" is far from meaning "I
know it is so." The mental attitude of a man who "thinks so"
is that of opinion, not that of certitude, and for this reason he does
not strictly know. He passes a judgment on an object, it is true,
but a judgment which is always subordinated to the implicit
condition: "If I apprehend this object correctly."
II. VALUE OF THE REPRESENTATIVE ASPECT OF
KNOWLEDGE
There is agreement on the fact that knowledge as a conscious
process is essentially objective, as has been explained above, but
the questions remain : What is the meaning of " objective "? What
is the object of knowledge? What is the value of the claim of the
knowing mind that it apprehends an extramental reality?
I. IN GENERAL
i. The Question Stated. As remarked already, the object
of knowledge may be something concrete internal or external,
or something abstract either a physical law, found and verified
through experience, or a self-evident principle admitted simply
because of the rational intuition of its truth. This object seems
to exist apart from the knowing process, to impose itself on the
mind from without, and to have an existence and a nature inde-
pendent of the fact that it is known. On the other hand, the
knowledge of an object depends also on the mind. Otherwise
how would the fact of error be explainable, and how would it be
OBJECTIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE 387
possible to change one's judgment? These facts have led to
theorizing on the real meaning of the "object of knowledge,"
and the solutions that have been proposed may be reduced to
three: Idealism, Criticism, Realism.
2. Idealism. It is almost impossible to define idealism. It
presents so many varieties sometimes hardly reconcilable with
one another; it receives so many qualificatives which indicate
every individual author's point of view, that any attempt to give
a definition is sure to fall short of embracing the various meanings
of the term.
(a) If we proceed etymologically, "idealism " applies primarily
to Plato's view, according to which this world which we perceive
with the senses is only a shadow of the real world, or world of
ideas. In the world of ideas, the types like beauty, goodness,
virtue of which the concrete realities of our world are only dim
participations, are really existent. This, however, is realism par
excellence, recognizing the true and exclusive reality of objective,
absolute, and self-existent ideas.
(b) It is on our own mental and subjective ideas that idealism
insists. Its motto is Berkeley's: "Esse est percipi." The whole
reality of a thing consists in the idea which we have of it. It
starts from Locke's principle that "knowledge is conversant only
with ideas," or that "the mind in all its thoughts and reasonings
hath no other immediate object but its own ideas which it alone
does or can contemplate" (Essay concerning Human Under-
standing, IV, I, i). Hence the idea, it is true, has a character
of objectivity, but, as the object is within the knowing subject,
and as the subject cannot go out of himself, it follows that human
knowledge is necessarily limited to the knowledge of the mind's ideas.
(c) Should ideas have any objects outside of the mind these
objects could never be reached by the mind, since the mind is
necessarily confined within its own sphere, and can never go out-
side of it. Ideas are objective, but the object itself has no reality
outside of the idea. What we call the external world is a mental
idea, or rather a system of ideas; and what we call truth is the
consistent working of the mind in this complexity of ideas. What-
ever we know, we know in and through the mind. To know a
388 EPISTEMOLOGY
thing is to have an idea of it. But as the idea is the only reality
we are aware of, no matter what it represents or claims to represent,
it follows that knowledge is only a series of conscious representa-
tions. There is nothing else, for, what reason could there be to
assert the existence of what we know absolutely nothing
about? Not only is the mind active in knowledge, but it alone
is active.
3. Realism. (a) Realism admits that objects exist outside
the mind, and that ideas represent them. Not only in the mind,
but also in nature, the tree is green and occupies such or such a
place. Not only in the mind, but in reality also, two and two
whatever objects they may be applied to are four. It is true
that my knowledge is in myself, that it is a part of my mind; but
what I know exists independently of the fact that I happen to
know it. Its "esse" is not its "percipi." It would be, even if
it were not perceived. In this case it would not be for me, since it
would have no relation to my mind, but it would be in itself
as an external reality.
(b) Realism does not claim that we know things in their absolute
reality for, evidently the known object must be in relation with
the mind but that we really know things which, in addition to
their mental existence as ideas, have also an existence outside the
mind, and that, finally, the fact of its being known does not make
or change the object of knowledge. There is an external world which
we really perceive in experience how and how far will be seen
later. And there are absolute truths which the understanding
apprehends by a direct intellectual intuition.
4. Criticism. (a) Criticism is the name given to the philoso-
phy of Kant. In itself it signifies neither realism nor idealism, but
a method which consists in criticising our faculties of knowledge
in order to test their objective value. Kant speaks of his own
system as "transcendental idealism," and also as "empirical
realism," thus indicating that it partakes of both idealism and
realism. In fact Kant admits the existence of something external,
but this is, and will forever remain, ^an unknown X, because it
cannot be reached except through a priori mental forms or cate-
gories. The mind does not conform to things, but our knowledge of
OBJECTIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE 389
things conforms to the mind. We do not think objects according
to their laws, but according to the laws of our minds.
(b) Whatever appears necessary and universal in knowledge
cannot come from experience, which is always contingent; it comes
from the mind itself. Thus space and time, which are necessary
and universal elements of sensation, are not real attributes of
things-in-themselves, but a priori forms of sensibility. Facts
given in experience are coordinated and unified in thought by the
categories, or a priori forms of the understanding, which estab-
lish relations, e.g. of causality, inherence, etc. between the
various phenomena given in sensation. Hence knowledge is always
a synthesis of two elements, one of which is given from outside and
the other is an a priori mental form through which the former
is perceived. The result is the "phenomenon," or thing-as-it-
appears, the only thing that we can know. The " thing-in-itself "
is forever unknowable, since we cannot think except through the
mind's a priori forms.
II. THE EXTERNAL WORLD
1. The Problem. Knowledge begins with the senses, and the
senses are commonly assumed to manifest the existence and prop-
erties of an external world. All men agree in making a distinction
between their own bodies and other bodies; to both they attribute
reality and materiality. Solid matter around us is believed to
manifest itself primarily through the sense of touch, and later by
association, through other senses, especially sight. To fall on the
ground, to receive a blow, to strike some part of one's body against
something else, show with clearness the hardness and resistance of
both. Through the other senses this matter manifests itself as
colored, sonorous, hot, etc. Are these perceptions manifestations
of real objects and qualities? Sense-perception is in the mind. It
is a conscious state, and how can a conscious state represent any-
thing material, when the antagonism and irreducibility of mind
and matter are facts admitted by all?
2. Arguments for Realism. The arguments on which realism
is based are but an emphasis of the fact itself of knowledge as
manifested in consciousness. Even if this fact is mysterious;
3QO EPISTEMOLOGY
even if no good account of it can be given, it cannot for this reason
be denied.
(a) Both common and scientific experience make a distinction
between ideas and things, between the mental and the physical
world, (i) There is a real book here on the table, nine by six
inches, with a red binding, near another book, etc. When I grasp
it, I grasp something real. When I read it, I believe that the
black characters are really printed on the white paper. (2) The
scientist always assumes that his studies are about real matter,
and that the laws which he discovers or applies e.g. the laws
of gravitation or of chemical composition are not mere mental
formulas, but expressions of the way according to which things
really happen in nature. Science can foresee and generalize, not
On mental laws, but on natural laws.
My idea of a foot is not longer than that of an inch. Yet every
man with his senses knows that the foot is twelve times as long
as the inch. The association of ideas in the mind produces
expectation, but the expected result takes place in nature. It is
to physical, not to mental, realities that knowledge is referred
in perception, and every man is convinced naturally that his
mind comes in contact it may be difficult for him to say how
with material objects outside of it.
(b) Mental processes are essentially private. They may even
differ in regard to the same object. But objects are common.
Even if my idea of an object which we are now looking at is differ-
ent from yours, it will never occur to anybody to say that we are
not looking at the same object. Even if other minds do not
perceive exactly as I do, they nevertheless perceive the same world.
No amount of effort can ever make two men walking together
think that they are not perceiving the same objects with their
respective minds.
(c) The distinction between percepts and images is an evident
one. My images are largely dependent on my will. By imagi-
nation I may travel where I please, as I please, with more or less
rapidity; or I can see and hear things which I choose to recall to
my mind, and as I choose to recall them. Perception is indepen-
dent of me. I must travel where and when the train carries me,
OBJECTIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE 391
and my various perceptions are dependent on something external
which determines what I shall see, hear, or experience. I cannot,
by taking thought, change the color of the paper before me, nor
the sound of the church bell. I light the fire, place a kettle of
water on it, go away, and come back a little later. During my
absence, while I had no perception of it, there was a real action
of the fire on the water, which is now boiling. Independently of
perceptions, material beings persist and act upon one another.
Before there was any human mind at all, these beings were evolving
toward their present condition, as astronomy, geology, and other
sciences now teach.
(d) In perception, consciousness testifies that the mind is
passive, i.e. acted on by something else. This can be accounted
for only if there is something outside the mind, capable of acting
on it.
(e) Unless I fall into absolute solipsism, and deny the existence
of any mind except my own, a step which no sane man will
be willing to take I must admit that I am not alone. Besides
myself there are other men. How do I know it? Minds do not
communicate with one another immediately, but only through
the organism, by speech, writing, or gestures. If I admit that
there are other men, with bodies like mine, I admit also that the
report of the senses which manifest their bodies is valid. The
senses therefore give me valid information about the external
world, of which the bodies of my fellowmen are a part.
(/) Psychology whether of realists or of idealists admits a
certain correlation between mental processes and brain processes.
The brain and its processes are assumed by the idealist to be
mere representations in consciousness. For him, to say that
mental processes depend on cerebral processes simply amounts
to saying that a conscious process, e.g. a sensation, depends on
another conscious representation, e.g. of a motion or change
in the idea called brain. This surely is not the meaning of psy-
chologists, who distinguish the relations of mind and organism
from a mere association of ideas, and claim that the organism
is really the physical instrument of sensations.
3. Objections. It seems to be almost a defiance to common-
3Q2 EPISTEMOLOGY
sense to reject these arguments for realism. Yet the objections
of idealists oblige us to emphasize them. We shall briefly exam-
ine some of the objections of idealism, and thus see how a man may
come to contradict so openly common-sense and experience.
(a) The main argument of idealism is the supposed impossibil-
ity for perception, as a conscious process, to reveal anything exter-
nal to the mind. The mind is aware only of its own contents, i.e.
of ideas. And since it can no more step out of its own mental
limits than the organism out of its skin, it follows that we are for-
ever restricted to the awareness of conscious processes, which are
toto coelo different from any external and material reality.
Answer, (i) Were the fact unexplainable, no right would be
given thereby to deny it. Here the fact is obvious. When, for
instance, I shake hands with, and speak to, a friend, I cannot
doubt his real presence; I feel his touch, and he feels mine; I hear
him and he hears me.
(2) The mind perceives external objects through the organism
with which it is united intimately. Obviously man is not a pure
spirit separated from the organism, but a living organism united
to a mind. What we perceive as external is not only extramental,
but also extraorganic.
(3) The mind does not know only its own ideas. It does not even
know them primarily, but through reflection. What I am aware
of primarily in perception is an external reality, and subsequently,
by reflection, I consider the mental process of perception.
(4) The perception of external objects is immediate because ex-
ternal objects act on the organism. The organism is not simply
a physical reality, but matter animated by the soul. To a great
extent idealism is the outcome of the Cartesian doctrine relegating
the soul to some part of the brain, and thus cutting it off from every-
thing external. But, in fact, the "action" of the external object
is at the same time the "passion" of the organ. Both are one,
since they are united in this common process, and the "patiens"
need not go out of himself to perceive the foreign action which is
in himself at the time of sensation. The abyss between the sub-
ject and the object is imaginary. Imaginary also, therefore, the
need of a bridge which idealism declares to be an impossibility.
OBJECTIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE 393
This fact is clear in perceptions of touch, but from psychology we
know that the other senses also require some immediate contact.
The organic stimulation is not a mere mechanical process, for the
soul is wherever the animated organ is, as we shall see in the
Philosophy of Mind (p. 480 ff.).
(5) Consciousness, it is true, takes place only when the external
impression has been conveyed to the brain through the sensory
nerve. Yet it is the hand that feels, the eye that sees, etc. The
brain is necessary, but of itself insufficient for sensation. The
complete organ includes the peripheral apparatus, the afferent
nerve, and the brain centre.
(6) If it were not so, the objectivation or exteriorization of sen-
sations, i.e. the fact that they are spontaneously referred to an
external reality, would be unexplainable. (a) The habit of exteri-
orization supposes a first exteriorization, which is impossible,
(b) The association of internal images can never give anything
but complex internal images, (c) An inference, by which ideas
would be referred to some external object as their only adequate
cause, already supposes the knowledge of an objective cause, and
of the existence of something real, external, distinct from the
mind, material, and capable of acting. Hence these three
theories which have been proposed to account for the fact are
insufficient.
Briefly: It is true that the external world is not known except
through sensations, but it is true also that a sensation is always an
experience of the external world.
(b) Mental dispositions influence perception. Perception is dif-
ferent according as the organs are in a normal, or in a more
or less abnormal, condition. It varies with mental attitudes,
feelings, actual contents of the mind, etc.
Answer, (i) Even then sensations are always referred to
external objects. (2) The mind has its share in determining
the nature of perception, but is not the only factor. (3) In most
cases we can point out the physiological or mental causes that
modify perception. Moreover, we are not concerned here with
determining where and when the senses are trustworthy.
(cj What appears in consciousness as color, sound, heat, etc.,
394 EPISTEMOLOGY
is reduced by physical science to vibrations of ether, air, and
molecules, differing in length and number, and totally unlike the
sensations.
Answer, (i) At present we are concerned only with the exist-
ence of the external world, not with the nature of the properties
manifested in sensation. This is a task for inductive science.
But it is clear that if there is movement, there is something mov-
ing, and that if there are vibrations, there is something vibrating.
(2) It is by using their senses that scientists come to know the real
nature of physical qualities. To admit the validity of this objec-
tion is, therefore, sheer contradiction for the idealist. (3) Other
qualities, like resistance, relative size, etc., cannot be reduced to
something depending on the percipient organism. I see plainly
that a foot is longer than an inch. For all men it is true that
water is composed of oxygen and hydrogen.
4. Kant's View. A few words will suffice on Kant's view of
external perception. According to him, two elements are found
in external perception, one varying with every perception, the
other necessary and common to all perceptions, namely, space.
The same is true of the consciousness of every mental process,
the invariable element being time. Hence the ideas of space and
time are not derived from experience. They are conditions of ex-
perience, and a priori mental forms. The ideas of space, extension,
geometrical figure, etc., cannot be derived from the perception
of bodies; nor those of "before" and "after" from the con-
sciousness of mental processes. Things and processes cannot be
perceived without these spatial or temporal relations, which are
therefore in the mind as a priori forms antecedently to sensations.
Answer, (i) The "where" and "when" are given in percep-
tion, and spontaneously attributed to things and events. This event
took place at such a date, before this, and after that. Historical
events are not given their dates by the mind. It is not through
any a priori form that President Taf t succeeded Roosevelt, or that
the discovery of America took place before George Washington
commanded the troops of the United States against the forces of
England. Again, this object is really square, higher or lower, on
the right or on the left of this other object; its relative position is
OBJECTIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE 395
independent of the mind. Such, at any rate, is the universal
consent of men.
(2) That sensations necessarily manifest things in space and time
may be accounted for by the fact that things really are always in
space and time, as well as by any a priori forms. Both are pos-
sible explanations, and the former is the one which experience
suggests.
(3) In fact, we make a distinction between objective space and
time and our 'perception of it. I want to measure a stick with a
real objective foot. The same for time: my perception of duration
may differ greatly from objective duration.
(4) Kant fails to distinguish space and time as (a) real, i.e. the
spatial relations of a body and the real successive duration of a
movement; (b) ideal, i.e. the general concepts of space and time;
(c) imaginary, i.e. imagined to exist before or after there was or
will be any real succession, or beyond any real occupation of space.
In perception, real space and time are given ; the concepts of space
and time are elaborated by the mind; imaginary space and time
are altogether unreal, as we shall see in Cosmology (p. 449 ff.).
III. IDEAL TRUTHS
i. Analytic and Synthetic Judgments. (a) The difference
between analytic and synthetic judgments was explained in Psy-
chology (p. 109). The former are obtained by the analysis of
the terms themselves, which leads to the immediate intuition of
their relation. Such judgments are not adhered to because they
are verified in experience. They are pronounced to be true inde-
pendently of their application to concrete objects. Even if there were
actually no divisible substances, it would still be true that the whole
is greater than any of its parts. Even if there are no perfect
geometrical triangles, the sum of the angles in any triangle equals
two right angles. A synthetic judgment depends essentially on
experience. Analyzing its terms will not reveal their relation, but
it is necessary to perceive concrete existing objects. The judg-
ments: " Water boils at 212 degrees"; " birds are oviparous";
"Havana tobacco is good," etc., are synthetic.
(b) Analytic judgments are very important, not only in rational
396 EPISTEMOLOGY
sciences, like mathematics, which, starting from them, derive other
judgments equally necessary and analytic, but also in empirical
sciences which, as was explained above (p. 383). require principles
transcending experience. Here we shall not speak of synthetic
judgments, as they have been dealt with in the preceding ques-
tion on the knowledge of the external world (p. 389 ff.). Nor need
we come back to empiristic theories concerning analytic judgments,
as they have been discussed in our second chapter (p. 382), and
in Psychology (p. 112 ff.). A few words must be said on Kant's
views, but we shall first establish the value of analytic judgments,
so as to dispose of idealistic subjectivism, which claims that such
principles are not objective, but simply laws of the mind.
2. Objectivity of Analytic Judgments. Analytic judgments
are objective, that is, in accepting them, the mind knows truths
which are independent of the mind itself, and which it does not
create according to the laws of its own nature. The analysis of
the conscious process itself is the proof of this assertion. When I
say: "The whole is greater than any of its parts," I do so because
I see clearly the relation between the subject and the predicate
of this proposition. The understanding of the terms is enough
to perceive that such a proposition is true, certain, and necessary,
and that objectively the whole cannot be equal to, or smaller
than, but must be greater than, a part. I do not merely see that
it is so, nor is any other relation simply inconceivable and incom-
prehensible, but it is clearly impossible, and contradictory to the
terms themselves of the proposition. "The sum of the angles
in a triangle equals two right angles," or "8 X 13 = 104." These
propositions may not at first be accepted as true. But as soon as
they are analyzed, the agreement of the subject with the predicate
becomes clear, and the assent is given in consideration of this objec-
tive evidence. As long as I have not perceived this objective evi-
dence, I refuse my assent. Or the evidence may appear gradually,
and the mind passes from doubt to certitude through varying
degrees of opinion.
3. Kant's View. Kant admits two kinds of universal and nec-
essary judgments: analytic and synthetic. The former are those
in which the predicate is contained in the comprehension of the
OBJECTIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE 397
subject. They have no scientific value, since they manifest noth-
ing new; they are mere repetitions or tautologies. Synthetic
judgments may be simply matter-of-fact, contingent, a posteriori
and empirical, like: "This man is tall." Or they may be neces-
sary and a priori like: "7 -f- 5 = 12 " (mathematical) ;" the straight
line is the shortest distance from one point to another " (geomet-
rical); "through all changes in the material world the quantity of
matter is constant"; "in every transmission of motion, action and
reaction must be equal to each other" (physical); "everything
that begins to exist has a cause " (metaphysical).
These judgments, according to Kant, are not analytic. They
really combine or synthetize a subject with a predicate taken out-
side of the comprehension of the subject. Hence they are syn-
thetic. As, however, the synthesis is not given a posteriori, i.e.
from experience, since experience cannot give universality and
necessity they are a priori, and suppose in the mind the exist-
ence of categories or a priori forms of the understanding. Such
judgments are the most important in science, which is universal
and necessary.
Criticism. (a) An analytic judgment is not merely that in
which the predicate is already contained in the subject, but also
that in which, from the analysis of the subject and predicate in
their essence and essential properties, their necessary relation is
perceived by the mind. (Cf. Psychology, p. 109.)
(b) Such judgments are not acquired from experience alone, but
by the mind abstracting and generalizing, i.e. elaborating the
data of experience.
(c) With his a priori forms, Kant cannot explain the fact that
sometimes we arrive at the knowledge of analytic truths little by
little and through various stages of opinion. The only explana-
tion of this fact is that the objective light is seen more or less
clearly.
(d) There is no room for synthetic a priori judgments. All
judgments are either analytic, a priori, and independent of their
empirical verification; or synthetic, a posteriori, and dependent on
experience. The examples given by Kant do not prove his con-
tention, (i) The judgment "7 + 5 = 12" is analytic. It does
398 EPISTEMOLOGY
not mean, as Kant claims, that 7 + 5 is a sum which experience
alone can verify to be 12, but it means that 7 + 5 and 12, when
compared together, are necessarily found to be equal. In fact,
it means (1+1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1) +(1 + 1 + 1 + 1 +
i)=i + i + i-f-i + i + i-fi-{-i + i-fi + i + i, which
shows the judgment to be analytic and pronounced on objective
evidence. (2) "A straight line is the shortest distance from one
point to another" is also analytic. It means that, compared to
other lines, the straight line is the shortest, and this is evident
when we consider that not to go straight is to cover more space.
In the straight line we have only one spatial relation and the same
direction throughout, whereas in the curve the direction changes
at every point, and, in the broken line, at every angle. (3) Both
principles taken from physical science are synthetic, but not at all a
priori. There is no a priori contradiction in denying them. As far
as they are to be admitted, these principles are verified by experi-
ence. (4) The principle of causality is analytic, and based directly
on the principle of identity, " A = A," which means that, of itself,
a being is always itself, and that there must be some foreign addi-
tion or subtraction to make it more or less. Thus when we have
o = o, we cannot have o = i unless to o we add a new factor,
o + x = i. The predicate is not contained formally in the sub-
ject, but is seen to be essentially and necessarily connected with it.
4. Objectivity of Concepts. Ideal truths express the rela-
tions of agreement or disagreement between concepts. What is
the value of concepts? For Kant, the intelligible object is unreal
because the activity of the mind consists precisely in creating ap-
pearances or phenomena. As long as judgments are referred only
to phenomena, they are correct, but the noumena or things-in-them-
selves are unknowable. In Psychology we have discussed the
theories proposed to explain the concept (p. 98 fL). From the
conclusions reached there it may be inferred that concepts are not
mere names (nominalism) or labels to which no idea corresponds
in the mind; nor merely collective and associated perceptions
(associationism)', that concepts are not simply ideas in the mind
without any corresponding reality (conceptualism) ; that con-
cepts do not correspond to realities as they exist outside of the
,-
OBJECTIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE 399
mind (exaggerated realism)] but that nevertheless some reality
corresponds to concepts (moderate realism).
Concrete reality is determined and individual, while, owing to
mental abstraction, concepts are abstract and universal. When
the notes which individualize an object are mentally removed,
what remains is abstract, and no longer restricted to one individual.
The concrete is real, and really contains the object of our concepts.
This man, with all his concrete determinations, is a being, a sub-
stance, a living organism, etc. Hence the objects of these
abstract concepts are really found in the concrete man, but under
a multiplicity of other characteristics.
IV. SUMMARY AND COROLLARIES
\J i. What is Knowledge? (a) To know is to be aware of an ob-
*ject, concrete or abstract, individual or universal, which does not
exist in the mind alone, but is a reality independent of the fact
that it is known. The mind does not make the truth, but becomes
aware of it; facts and laws are imposed on it from without. That
knowledge is a conscious process is true, but it is only a part of
the truth. Knowledge is a mental process conditioned by external
evidence. The right of a proposition to be accepted as true persists
even when the mind fails to accept it. The law of gravitation
was true before it was discovered by Newton.
(b) Knowledge may be intuitive or discursive, more or less cer-
tain, and more or less immediate. The really objective may be
difficult to disentangle from subjective influences. Yet it is there,
and under proper conditions may be found. To be known, the
object must be present in the mind, but ideas and judgments
truly represent objects. The mind contributes its share in the
act of knowledge, but is not the only factor.
2. The Relativity of Knowledge. Knowledge is necessarily
proportioned to the capacity of the mind and the manifestation of
the object.
(a) Owing to native and acquired dispositions, minds both
senses and intelligences differ in keenness, perspicacity, and
power. Not all men have the same keenness of vision or hearing,
nor the same intellectual aptitudes. Certain animals are endowed
400 EPISTEMOLOGY
with keener senses than those of man. We may imagine senses
much more perfect than those with which we are acquainted.
We may even imagine that the material world is endowed with
properties which none of our senses is adapted to perceive.
Understandings more powerful than ours would discover laws
and relations of which we are ignorant.
These limitations do not invalidate the knowledge which we
acquire with the faculties with which we are endowed, any more
than a man's horizon, or the presence of fog which bounds his
view, prevents him from seeing more or less distinctly the objects
found within his range of vision. The fact that we do not know all
things is no justification for the assertion that we know nothing.
It is true also that knowledge depends on subjective conditions,
but this must not be exaggerated. Men agree on many proposi-
tions both of the ideal and of the empirical order. They differ
not so much on objects of knowledge as on objects of opinion; not
so much on what they really know as on what they think they
know; not so much on immediate evidence as on more remote con-
clusions reached after difficult and complex processes of inference.
In immediate sense-perception or intellectual intuition, the
"fringe" of consciousness may vary with the different mental
attitudes and acquired dispositions, but the "focus" is essentially
the same for all minds.
(b) Reality manifests itself in different ways. Sometimes it is
bright in itself. Sometimes light must be thrown on it from else-
where by reasoning, analogy, etc. One professor may give clearer
explanations than another. Text-books on the same matter are
not equally suited to meet the needs of students. A landscape is
seen better on a clear day than through a misty atmosphere.
The manifestation of the object must be adapted to the mind. A
demonstration which is clear for one mind may not be sufficient
for another. Some truths are hidden and to be sought for. In a
word, truths are more or less easily accessible.
3. The Limits of Knowledge. Knowledge is limited. We do
not and cannot know everything. Nor can we know any object
perfectly, in all its relations, and with all its properties. Human
knowledge is always inadequate. But, with the agnostic, to assign
OBJECTIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE 401
clearly defined limits to our power of knowing is unjustifiable.
Without break we gradually pass from one object of knowledge
to another. The limits of both the range and the perfection of
knowledge vary with every individual mind. Yet the same prin-
ciples which the agnostic uses in acquiring what he admits to be
valid knowledge will necessarily lead him higher into regions to
which he arbitrarily applies the name of unknowable. Starting
from self-evident facts or principles, we may proceed, inductively
or deductively, as far as we can. As we go along, the progress will
become more and more complex and difficult; dangers of error
will be greater. Hence greater caution will be needed. But no
one has the right to say: "Thus far shalt thou go and no farther."
Objects of knowledge are common property, and we may always
go farther in exploring them.
27
CHAPTER IV
THE CRITERIA OF VALID KNOWLEDGE
The Meaning of Criterion. (a) The human mind is nat-
urally qualified to know. As, however, the facts of error, of
change in the successive assents of the same mind, and of dissent
among several individuals, are undeniable, there must be a stand-
ard or test by which truth is distinguished from error. In fact,
we make a constant use of such tests. I say: "Such a man is tall,
black-haired; his voice is deep, etc." "How do you know?"
some one asks. "Because I saw and heard him." Again:
"Water freezes at 32 degrees." "How do you know? " - "Be-
cause I have observed it in a sufficient number of cases and condi-
tions to warrant this general assertion." Again: "The sum of the
angles in a triangle is equal to two right angles."- "How do
you know?" "Here is the demonstration." And so on.
A criterion (/c/ai'veiv, to judge) is necessary as the distinctive sign of
truth, and as the basis on which it rests. In the instances just
given, different criteria were used: the testimony of the senses,
induction, and demonstration, which justified my assertions. But
why are these criteria accepted? Are they self-sufficient, or do
they themselves rest on something else?
(b) This leads us to^distinguish two kinds of criteria, one supreme,
ultimate, universal, and applicable to all kinds of truths; the other
derived, proximate, and applicable only within a restricted field.
How do I know that Peking is a city of China? Because witnesses
have told me. Why do I believe them? Because they are trust-
worthy. Why are they trustworthy? Because they know and
would not deceive me. Why? . . . Why? ... In a series of
"whys " the ultimate criterion is the answer to the last. All the
others, like senses, induction, demonstration, derive their value
402
ULTIMATE CRITERION 403
from it. It is common to all, and, without it, proximate criteria
would serve no purpose. Hence the division of this chapter.
I. THE ULTIMATE CRITERION
Three theories or groups of theories are to be examined. Some
claim that the supreme criterion is to be found outside both the
knowing subject and the known object. Others place it within
the subject, but outside the object. Others finally make it both
subjective and objective, intrinsic to both the knower and the
object of knowledge.
I. THEORIES OF A CRITERION EXTRINSIC TO BOTH THE KNOWING
MIND AND THE OBJECT KNOWN BY THIS MIND
1. Traditionalism. Various systems, which we may group
together under the name of traditionalism, agree in asserting the
radical incapacity of personal reason for knowing with certitude
either any truth at all, or at least the truths of the metaphysical,
religious, and moral order. Hence appeal is made to tradition,
i.e. to universal reason, to the consent of mankind, or of the
majority of men, which manifests a primitive divine revelation
made to man. The ultimate criterion is a divine revelation. Ac-
cording to Lamennais the sign of this revelation is the common
agreement of men, i.e. general, as opposed to individual, reason.
De Bonald argues from the fact that man has the power of speech.
According to him, speech is indispensable to, and precedes, thought,
and consequently could not have been acquired by man. It must
have been revealed by God together with the ideas which it
expresses.
2. Criticism of Traditionalism. It is true that divine revela-
tion is a great help to the human mind in acquiring moral and reli-
gious truths. True also that in many cases individual reason feels
uncertain, whereas the agreement with other men increases its
confidence, and, under certain conditions to be mentioned later,
may become a sign of truth. Actual knowledge is the accumu-
lated wisdom of preceding ages. Man's plight would be a sad one,
could he not avail himself of the results obtained by those who have
404 EPISTEMOLOGY
gone before him. Yet tradition cannot be the ultimate criterion
of truth.
(a) In general, (i) This system is opposed to the testimony
of consciousness, which certifies that, in some cases at least, knowl-
edge is acquired independently of any external teaching. (2) Cer-
titude cannot be based on faith in a divine revelation. This faith
is either certain or uncertain. In the latter case, it cannot be the
criterion of certain knowledge. In the former, it supposes the cer-
titude of God's existence, of His knowledge and truthfulness, and
of the fact itself of a revelation, hence of reason by which these
are demonstrated. (3) This criterion, even if admitted, is not
universal. It does not apply, for instance, to conscious facts,
actual experiences, historical events, etc. Hence all other cri-
teria are not participations of this one. No authority, divine or
human, can be the final test of truth.
(b) With De Bonald we may admit that without speech thought
would be very difficult. But it does not seem true to say that
it would be absolutely impossible. Moreover, if it were not asso-
ciated already with the thought it expresses, language would be a
mere physical sound. Hence thought precedes language. (Cf.
Psychology, p. 126 ff.). Finally, even if God revealed language,
He would not necessarily reveal ready-made propositions. Lan-
guage may express error as well as truth.
(c) Common consent, however useful it may be, cannot be the cri-
terion we are now looking for. Even if it is a criterion, it is de-
rived, not ultimate, (i) It supposes the reliability of the senses
through which a man is aware of the existence of other men, and
the certitude that, under some circumstances, and under these only,
the unanimous consent of man is an infallible source of truth.
Hence personal reason precedes universal reason as a test of truth.
(2) The reason of all men is but the sum of the reasons of every
individual. If all individually are incapable of certain knowledge,
how can the collection give certitude? (3) How can this unanim-
ity or quasi-unanimity be ascertained? A whole lifetime would
be spent before any truth would be known with certitude. Must
it be understood of all men at all times? Then the task is utterly
impossible. Must it be understood of all men living together at
ULTIMATE CRITERION 405
the same time? Then history shows that common and universal
errors are possible.
II. THEORIES OF A SUBJECTIVE CRITERION, INTRINSIC TO THE
KNOWER, BUT EXTRINSIC TO THE OBJECT
Traditionalism failed to recognize the fact that, since the mind
knows by its own faculties, the criterion must be intrinsic to the
mind. We pass now to subjective theories.
1. Common Sense and Feelings. (a) Some philosophers
have appealed to a blind impulse or instinct which prompts man
to accept spontaneously the truthfulness of his faculties. It
is a common law of our nature, and no account of it can be given.
Reid speaks of a "common sense," i.e. of an invincible propen-
sity common to all men; Jacobi, of a "feeling," or affective disposi-
tion of the mind, which makes it assent to the reality of what the
senses and reason manifest.
(b) This criterion is insufficient. Everybody, even the sceptic,
admits this natural impulse, but the question remains whether it
is justified or not. If it is not, it cannot be a criterion. If it is,
an appeal must be made to something else by which it is justified.
This view is rather a refusal to meet the epistemological issue than
a solution of it. The fact manifested in consciousness is that we
are certain, not because a blind impulse makes us assent, but
because we see the truth. While we may be aware of impelling
motives within us, we are also aware that we are not only impelled
from within, but also drawn from without. Many subjective
motives, like interest, utility, habits of thought, education, etc.,
may impel man to accept error, and there must be something
whereby he may recognize the object itself as true or false.
2. Clear Idea and Divine Veracity. (a) Descartes emerged
from his methodical doubt through the affirmation: "I think,
therefore I am," which he accepts because, in the fact of thinking,
he clearly sees the necessary implication of being. Hence the
general rule that "whatever things we conceive very clearly and
very distinctly are true." According to Descartes, the guarantee
of truth is ultimately the perfection, wisdom, and veracity of God,
who cannot be the cause, of error, and cannot endow us with
406 EPISTEMOLOGY
faculties that would deceive us. Ontologists asserted that all
things are seen in God, who is known to man immediately.
(b) Criticism, (i) The clearness of an idea as such cannot be
the criterion of truth. It is merely subjective, and varies with
individuals. It is not primitive, but must itself be tested. More-
over, if clear means certain, nothing is explained. If it means dis-
tinct, the fact that we may be certain of things which we do not
perceive distinctly and adequately is overlooked. (2) The guar-
antee mentioned by Descartes is insufficient. The existence and
perfections of God are not known intuitively, but by demonstra-
tion; and demonstration must be based on principles that are
certain. If the certitude of these principles is said to depend also
on God's veracity, we are involved in a petitio principii. If it is
said to depend on something else, certitude may be derived from
our own faculties. (3) The same applies to ontologism. We do
not see God immediately, but know Him only by a process of
reasoning.
3. Consistency, and Inconceivability of Negation. (a) Con-
sistency, i.e. the harmony between judgments, has been proposed
as the criterion of truth by certain philosophers imbued with ideal-
istic or agnostic tendencies. If knowledge is limited to our own
mental states, what other criterion can be given? Spencer writes:
" There is no mode of establishing the validity of any belief except
that of showing its entire congruity with all other beliefs. ... If,
by discovering a proposition to be untrue, we mean nothing more
than discovering a difference between a thing expected and a thing
perceived, then a body of conclusions in which no such difference
anywhere occurs must be what we mean by an entirely true body
of conclusions." (First Principles, 40.)
Yet Spencer himself goes farther, and gives another criterion,
namely, the inconceivability of the negation of a proposition. This
inconceivability comes from hereditary associations, so strong
that the associated ideas can no longer be thought of as separated.
"To assert the inconceivableness of its (a cognition's) negation is
at the same time to assert the psychological necessity we are under
of thinking it, and to give our logical justification for holding it
to be unquestionable." (Principles of Psychology, 426.)
ULTIMATE CRITERION 407
(b) Criticism. Inconsistency is a sign that one of the incon-
sistent propositions is false. Consistency is a useful, but second-
ary, test of validity. Nor is it infallible. A whole system of
errors may be consistent, the falsity being at the starting-point.
Consistency shows that the rules of logic have been observed,
not that knowledge possesses objective validity. If it must be
the criterion of validity, it must have something else to rest on.
Moreover, several facts or principles may be perceived sepa-
rately, so that their consistency will not be known. They may
nevertheless be true.
As to inconceivability: (i) Sometimes Spencer confounds it with
the incapacity for imagining. Many things are conceivable for
the intellect without being imaginable, e.g. a polygon with a thou-
sand sides. And the impossibility of imagining the contradictory
of a statement is no sign of the truth of that statement. (2) In-
tellectual inconceivability may be subjective or objective, i.e. it may
depend on the mind's lack of power to unite both terms of a judg-
ment, or on the fact that these terms are mutually exclusive. In
the former case, it is purely negative and proves nothing. The
incapacity to see how a thing could be otherwise than it is con-
ceived does not prove that it cannot really be otherwise. What is
inconceivable for one mind may be conceivable for a more perfect
mind. In the latter case, the inconceivability is positive, and we
see why a thing cannot be otherwise. In this supposition, incon-
ceivability is a criterion of truth, but not the first criterion. It
supposes that we know the necessity for the object of being as it
is conceived. Two and two are four, and it is inconceivable that
it should be otherwise. Why inconceivable? Because I perceive
the necessary equality of "two plus two" and of "four." The
truth of this statement is not tested by the inconceivableness
of its opposite, but this inconceivableness results from the clear
perception of the truth.
4. The Exigencies of Practical Life. (a) The conclusion of
Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" is the mind's utter incapacity
to acquire valid knowledge. We must be satisfied with knowing
things-as-they-appear, and they appear in consciousness accord-
ing to the mind's a priori forms or categories. Kant, however,
408 EPISTEMOLOGY
does not stop at this sceptical conclusion, but emerges out of
his doubt in the "Critique of Practical Reason." On the fact of
the categorical imperative as a foundation (see Ethics, p. 320 ff.)
Kant builds up again three central truths: the freedom of the will,
the existence of God, and the immortality of the soul, which are
necessary postulates of the categorical imperative as given in con-
sciousness. Of these truths Kant professes to have a true cer-
titude which nothing can shake, but not a scientific certitude
reached by demonstration. He calls it "moral" certitude, faith,
or "belief of reason."
(b) The many contradictions of thinkers have led some modern
philosophers to doubt the ability of human reason to reach cer-
tain knowledge. There is a wide-spread tendency to follow Kant
in attributing to practical reason a superiority over pure reason.
This tendency manifests itself in various ways which are more or
less divergent, but all of which start from the same assumption
of the weakness of reason, and tend to the same end of reconstruct-
ing knowledge on a practical basis; on action rather than in-
tellect, on practice rather than speculation. Since all this is
dynamic and ever-changing; since, moreover, the mind's relations
to objects of knowledge may change, the term belief rather
than the term knowledge is held by many to express the mind's
attitude in regard to truth.
(c) The main aspects of this general tendency are the following:
(i) Since the intellect is unable to give certitude, and yet moral
life has imperious exigencies, the will is the main cause of our as-
sents. Such is the position of Neo-criticism, with Renouvier, and
of many who advocate a voluntaristic as opposed to an intellectual-
istic primacy. (2) Not only the will, but all the complex exigen-
cies of human nature lead man to assent, and a great prominence
is given to the satisfaction of human feelings and aspirations^
especially of the need of belief and certitude. (3) Action may also
be made the central element. Thought, they say, cannot reach
objects, because it is immanent in the mind. But action reaches
external reality, and establishes the contact with it, which is
impossible to reason. The consciousness of activity leads to
the knowledge of objects. This view is completed again by the
ULTIMATE CRITERION 409
theory of the primacy of the will. (4) Somewhat along the same
lines, Pragmatism claims that the criterion of truth consists in
practical results. By these are meant not only external useful
results, but also subjective satisfaction, consistency, good influ-
ence on moral life, etc. An assertion is worth its results. It is
to be tested by its effects; and its meaning itself can be expressed
only in terms of its practical results.
Criticism. (a) Kant's attempt at reconstructing certitude with
practical reason alone is a failure. In practical as well as in spec-
ulative matters, the same reason judges and decides. There are not
two reasons in man, but only one reason with a twofold function,
speculative and practical. If liberty, immortality, and God are
realities, the categorical imperative on which they rest must itself
be, not only an appearance, but a reality, and the nexus between
these truths and the imperative must also be real. How is all
this perceived with certitude? The postulates of practical rea-
son resort naturally and necessarily to the logic of pure reason.
Morality cannot be blind; it must be enlightened and reasonable.
If the noumena are not accessible to the pure reason, they cannot
be accessible to the practical reason.
(b) We shall not discuss the general question of the primacy of
will and intellect. It has too many points of view from which
it may be considered, and according to which the answers must
vary. In epistemology, when we speak of the test of truth and
certitude, and of the justification of our assents, it is impossible
to give our preference to will, action, or practice. We always find
ourselves in the same dilemma: Either these are enlightened or
blind. If blind, they can give no certitude of the truth. If en-
lightened, tested, and shown to be correct, where is the light, and
where is the test? Of itself, the will is blind, and what we mean
by mental light is the knowledge of the "why" of an assent, i.e
the objective reason of its truth, not the subjective motives of
the assent.
(c) The intellect is falsely declared incapable of giving any cer-
titude. Few, perhaps, are the legitimate certitudes, but it has
been shown that, in some cases, they are possible. Moreover,
why should the will impose on the mind's assent inevident certi-
410 EPISTEMOLOGY
tude? Experience teaches that we are not free to think as we
please. Our assents are motived by something which is not within
us, and the will cannot force us to accept the uncertain. Certain
truths are accepted because they are evident for the intellect.
(d) It must be admitted that truth satisfies the exigencies of
human nature. We need certitude. Scepticism is opposed to the
very nature of the mind. But it is also the nature of the mind
to require that this certitude be justified intellectually. At
times, truth, even opposed to feelings, imposes itself on our accept-
ance. Why, if not because it has rights which we may be forced
to recognize, and because primarily our assents are rational?
(e) We have discussed already the postulate that thought is
immanent in the mind, and cannot reach external reality. How
can action, which alone is supposed to place the mind in contact
with external objects, be taken cognizance of, if not by an intel-
lectual process of reflection and thought? Here again the intel-
lect must be called in as the ultimate test, unless we rest satisfied
with a blind assent.
(/) Pragmatism seems to identify truth with goodness or use-
fulness, and this is, to say the least, a gratuitous postulate. More-
over, granting that truth always has good results, it does not
follow that it is to be identified with them, but rather that it is
distinct from them as a cause from its effects. A statement is not
true because it is useful, but rather it is useful because it is true.
Many subjective influences impel us to believe or assent. But re-
flection is not satisfied with spontaneous assents. In order to
test their value, the mind endeavors to rid itself of these influ-
ences and to consider the object on its own merits. It may be
added that, in order to know which results and consequences are
good, a test distinct from them, or another criterion, is required.
Finally, self-evident statements are accepted independently of
whatever results they may have, simply because they are seen to
be true.
5. Conclusion. The conclusion seems now justified that
subjective criteria, whatever they may be, are insufficient as tests
of objective truth, and cannot produce more than probable beliefs.
In fact, among those who propose them, many claim no more
ULTIMATE CRITERION 411
than a higher or lower degree of probability for all our knowl-
edge. However, it must be recognized that these various systems
which insist on practical reason, will, action, etc., rightly empha-
size the great influence of subjective dispositions on all assents,
and the necessity for man of seeking the truth with his whole mind.
If we deal with practical truths, it is not enough for the intellect
to accept them, the whole man must comply with them. Will,
action, feelings, too frequently prevent man, not only from acting
according to his knowledge, but even from seeking or accepting
the truth. All this, however, is the psychological, not the episte-
mological, point of view. (Cf. p. 117 ff.) When applied as tests
of truth, these systems fail. They do not show where the truth
is, but only why, how, and by what process we accept certain
things as true.
III. THEORY OF A CRITERION INTRINSIC TO THE OBJECT AND, IN
A CERTAIN SENSE, ALSO TO THE KNOWER
As the criterion which we seek must be the distinctive sign of
truth, it must be in the object which it distinguishes from others,
and on which it imprints the characteristic stamp of truth. It
must also be somehow in the subject, since it is the motive
justifying certitude. This is possible if we look upon knowl-
edge as the vital union of subject and object in the cognitive act.
i. Nature of Evidence. (a) Evidence (e, videre) etymolog-
ically refers to the light of truth, and hence to its visibility. Many
current expressions are borrowed from the sense of vision. After
giving an explanation, a man asks: "Now do you see? " that is, do
you understand? Or one says: "See how this tastes," or "Let us
see how these men sing, play, etc.," i.e. let us hear, etc. To see
is used of every sense-perception and of every function of the
understanding. Evidence is the property of truth fact, prin-
ciple, or argument by which it is enlightened so as to be
perceived by a knowing power. It includes three elements: an
object, its light, and the mind's perception of such light. Evidence
is the object itself, shining and manifesting itself to the mind so as
to determine the mind's assent.
412 EPISTEMOLOGY
(b) Evidence may mean the proof by which a claim is established,
or a claim which needs no proof because it is self-evident. In other
words, it may be mediate or immediate, according as the object
possesses full light in itself, or must borrow it from other sources.
In any discursive process, the self-evident must ultimately be
reached, and there are different degrees of evidence according as
a statement is more or less closely connected with something
self-evident, and the nexus itself perceived more or less clearly.
2. Evidence is the Criterion of Truth. (a) This is hardly more
than a corollary of the preceding pages in which scepticism, ideal-
ism, and various theories of criteria were discussed. Subjectively
we know that our assents must be justified, and rest on some
foundation distinct from ourselves. We feel that we have to con-
form, not only to the laws of thought, but also to the laws of things.
We are compelled to accept truth as it is. Objectively we per-
ceive clearly at times the necessity of truth. We see it because it
is shining, and we can no more see it otherwise than we can see as
red the wall which is white.
(b) Hence it is always to evidence, mediate or immediate,
that we appeal when asked to give an account of our assents. To
justify a statement, I may say: "It is so because I see that it
cannot be otherwise, because it clearly manifests itself." Or I may
answer by a series of "becauses," the last one of which will be
something self-evident. The mind may see more or less clearly,
and the firmness of its assent should be in proportion to the degree
of evidence. But surely we need not ask ourselves why we see in
broad daylight. We see because we have the power of vision,
and the proper external conditions are verified. Asking the reason
of self-evidence would be tantamount to asking to light a candle
in order to see the light of the sun.
3. Difficulties Examined. This will be made clearer by answer-
ing a few difficulties.
(a) Evidence may be apparent and illusory, as it is in hallucina-
tion and delusion. A man may mistake subjective phenomena
for objective facts and truths, and invincibly believe that he has
full and satisfactory evidence.
Answer. These are abnormal cases in which the causes of
ULTIMATE CRITERION 413
error are frequently known and traceable to some definite organic
defect. They may be corrected by other evidences. For instance,
a visual hallucination may be corrected by using the sense of
touch, or even the sense of vision itself when it recovers its nor-
mal condition. The problem here is psychological rather than
epistemological.
(b) How, then, can the mind be sure of objective evidence? As
noted already, evidence cannot be proved; it is perceived, (i)
One must be careful not to exaggerate it. Frequently rashness
impels to assents which objective light does not warrant. (2) It
must be ascertained that the object perceived is really external.
Judgment must control the data of the senses, and the under-
standing must proceed with caution. (3) A complex object
must be analyzed, and every one of its elements examined. As
remarked in Logic, one small error at a given point of the process
may ultimately lead far astray.
(c) If evidence is the test of truth, how can there be error ? Dif-
ferences of opinions, as remarked elsewhere, are chiefly on matters
in which we have only probabilities, and they depend on innate
and acquired dispositions. On evident truths there is agree-
ment. We are not concerned at present with their number. Even
if they are few, they are accepted because of their evidence. Error
may come from rashness, and from subjective dispositions which
blind man, and impel him to assent without sufficient evidence.
This will happen especially in questions which have a practical
bearing. Moreover, owing to the complexity of the object, the
need of long demonstrations, the difficulty experienced in extri-
cating various elements of a complex process, the mind may
be led astray without being aware of it. But the progress of
science consists largely in ascertaining, verifying, and correcting
conclusions already reached.
In many cases we must rest satisfied with a greater or smaller
probability, and admit the possibility of error. He is a wise man
who does not give to his assents more firmness than evidence
entitles them to, and knows how to doubt when there is not
enough light.
Error may be caused by the nature of the object, or by influ-
414 EPISTEMOLOGY
ences within the subject. It is a judgment which exceeds that
which is really given in intuition or reasoning. But the fact that
all men speak of error indicates that all have a test of truth. Error
could never be mentioned if truth were unknowable. The proc-
ess of detecting error always consists in applying evidence, in its
various forms, as the criterion of truth.
H. DERIVATIVE CRITERIA
As the ultimate criterion, evidence manifests itself to different
faculties, and in various ways. We shall now speak of these de-
rived criteria. They may be reduced to two groups according
as the truth is reached by one's own personal effort and seen
in itself, or, on the contrary, is reached only through mediate
contact, i.e. through another mind that has perceived it in itself.
I. PERSONAL FACULTIES COMING IN DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE
KNOWN OBJECT
i. Senses. (a) The reliability of the senses has already been
asserted against idealism. They rightly testify to the existence
of our own body and of an external world. The subject and the
external object being united in the "action" of the object which
is at the same time the "passion " of the subject, no bridge is neces-
sary between the two, and no transformation of the physical
cause into a psychical result.
Each sense manifests only some aspects of objects. Knowl-
edge is thus acquired in a fragmentary way, but the intellect
combines these fragments and reaches a more complete knowledge
of reality. It is true also that individual perceptions may differ
owing to the condition and the degree of perfection of the senses,
but this does not invalidate perception. The distinction must
also be remembered between what is actually perceived and what
is imagined or inferred. We naturally interpret and complete
perceptions. (See Psychology, pp. 62 ff., 79 ff., nS ff.)
(b) Some conditions are necessary for the trustworthiness of the
senses, (i) Each sense is fully reliable only within its own spe-
cial sphere, for what has been called in psychology its sensile
DERIVATIVE CRITERIA 415
per se proprium. The sensile commune should be ascertained by
more than one sense. As to the sensile per accidens, it may be
the occasion of many errors. Wrong habits and accidental causes
of error are frequent; hence great caution is required in inferring
the nature of objects. The eye may mistake salt for sugar owing
to their common whiteness. The ear may mistake one man's
voice for another man's owing to their likeness, etc. (2) The
object must be within due limits of distance, intensity, etc., and
there should be no obstacle between the object and the sense.
Owing to its distance, the moon looks like a disk, and not like a
sphere. Owing to a refracting medium, a stick half-dipped in
water, not perpendicularly, appears broken to the eye, and rightly
so, since, in fact, the rays are refracted. (3) The organ must be
in a normal condition. Many physiological influences modify
perception. Error is due to rashness in judging hastily that
sensations are objective.
(c) Induction must complete the immediate data of the senses
to ascertain the physical nature of the perceived qualities, cor-
rect illusions, and verify the reports of an "educated" sense by
those of another. The evidence in sense-perception is sometimes
direct and intuitive, sometimes indirect and mediate.
2. Consciousness, by which we become aware of our own in-
ternal states, ideas, emotions, volitions, etc., is an infallible cri-
terion. I may err in referring these processes to wrong causes,
but, as far as consciousness manifests my present subjective experi-
ences, e.g. my feeling of pain, my thinking, imagining, doubting,
etc., its evidence is intuitive, and can be denied by no one, not
even by the out-and-out sceptic. Illusions and hallucinations are
real for consciousness; the images are really present in the mind.
The error consists in referring them wrongly to external objects,
and in judging that they are faithful representations of exter-
nal reality. Consciousness also apprehends vaguely the ego or
subject, but not its nature.
3. Memory. (a) Memory includes both the recall of the past
and its recognition as past. Its veracity is to be admitted, and in
many cases can be verified. I may, for instance, note my impres-
sions, and later on compare what my memory recalls with what
416 EPISTEMOLOGY
I have written. Or I may compare my impressions with those of
others who have perceived the same object. Without memory,
comparing, identifying, distinguishing, reasoning, etc., would be
impossible. The validity of memory is thus shown in its
very exercise, and may be tested by experiments proving its
agreement with past perception.
(b) However, it has its limitations. We do not recall at will
everything we have perceived or known; and we may recall an
image of the past without recognizing it. But these limitations
are negative, and do not affect the trustworthiness of memory, as
far as memory goes, any more than the ignorance of certain things
affects the validity of the knowledge one possesses.
(c) It is also to be admitted that there are not only limitations,
but also positive errors of memory. Memory may combine a repro-
duction of the past with fanciful additions and changes, and yet
we may be led to think that the whole is a faithful copy. This
simply shows that an imprudent use of memory is possible, and
that, owing to habit, lack of care, of exactness and reflection,
one fails to verify the elements of an image before passing a judg-
ment on its value. Because of the close relation between memory
and imagination, great caution is necessary. But, if proper care
is taken, in normal conditions at least, the evident testimony of
memory is reliable. If it remains doubtful and frequently it
should be held as such assent must be suspended until further
research by means of the laws of association brings full light.
4. Reason. Enough has been said on the objective value of
concepts and of intuitive necessary judgments. As to judgments
derived by inductive or deductive reasoning from self-evident
facts or principles, the degree of their validity depends on the
necessity by which they are connected with the self-evident
starting-point. The nearer such judgments are to self-evidence
and the more necessary their connection, the greater also is their
evidence, and consequently the firmer should be the mind's assent.
Here, as well as in the use of other cognitive faculties, error does not
come from the instrument itself of knowledge, but from the bad
use that is made of it. In inference we connect facts and principles
with other facts and principles. Not only must these be certain
DERIVATIVE CRITERIA 417
and valid, but the application of them must be made with pru-
dence. In a series of inferences, principles that are not demon-
strated, and yet that are far from self-evident, are sometimes
used or implied, and the rules of logic also may be violated.
(Cf. Psychology, pp. 115 ff.)
II. INDIRECT RELATION OF THE MIND WITH THE KNOWN
OBJECT
i. Authority. (a) Agreement with others always strengthens
personal conviction. But there are cases in which the testimony
of others does not merely strengthen, but also is a valid motive of,
assent. A truth may not have been perceived directly by me,
yet I accept it because it has been perceived by others who tell
me, i.e. I accept it on their authority. For me, the evidence is
not in the object itself, since none of my cognitive faculties has
come in direct contact with it. What must be evident is (i) that
those who tell me really know, and (2) that their testimony is
reliable. By far the greater part of human knowledge is acquired
on the authority of others. Not only is history in all its branches
dependent on it altogether, but even the majority of contempo-
rary facts, events, and circumstances are known from the rela-
tion of others. Personal experience is restricted within narrow
limits, and would give but little knowledge, if it were not possible
to profit by the experience or science of others who live at present
or have lived in the past. Personal experience lasts only a short
time and extends to only a small space.
(b) In practical as well as in scientific life, man must believe
his fellowmen. The physician believes the chemist; the chemist
trusts the physician's knowledge; the physicist accepts the conclu-
sions of the mathematician, and so on. Even the greatest sci-
entist and philosopher is obliged to believe his cook on many
points. All records of transactions between individuals or na-
tions depend on testimony. The decisions of courts are given in
view of the testimony of witnesses. At all its stages, education
depends on the authority of parents and teachers. History is
essentially based on human testimony. Faith in other men is
implied in every endeavor of life, and without it progress would
2$
418 EPISTEMOLOGY
be an impossibility. Who can estimate the influence of the daily
newspaper or the magazine on human assents and on human con-
duct? Think a moment of the number of things which we have
to take on authority, and of the number of things which we do take
on authority so as to save ourselves the trouble of ascertaining
them.
(c) (i) Belief is the assent given to testimony. It may be
certain, but frequently is more or less probable. (2) Testimony is
the communication of some information by a witness. (3) The
authority of a witness, or his reliability, is based on the fact that he
knows, or is not deceived, and that he speaks the truth, or does not
deceive. (4) The matter of his testimony may be a universal law
e.g. that water is composed of oxygen and hydrogen; a per-
manent fact e.g. that Washington City is on the Potomac; or a
transient fact, e.g. an eclipse, a battle, an earthquake. (5) These
facts may be contemporary or more or less remote. (6) The wit-
ness may be an eye-witness (immediate), when he has been present
at the occurrence which he relates, or he may rely on the testi-
mony of others (mediate witness). (7) Finally, the testimony
may be given in speech, writing, or in the form of monuments,
coins, statues, etc.
2. On Questions of Fact. (a) The nature of the fact itself
must be taken into account, and compared with the competence
of the witness to observe it. The observation of some facts and
experiments requires a special training of the observer's mind.
Furthermore, if the fact is unlikely and extraordinary, a higher
authority or a greater number of witnesses will be required.
(b) If there is only one witness, his qualifications must be ascer-
tained. Some men lack the power of attention, judgment, and
memory. Others have it only along certain lines. Hence the
special aptitudes and dispositions of the witness must be consid-
ered in reference to the special fact which he relates. His verac-
ity is also to be ascertained. To this end it may be necessary to
know his moral character, to find out whether he had any interest
in deceiving, etc. When there is only one witness, greater
severity is required in testing his authority.
(c) Several unanimous and independent witnesses give a greater
DERIVATIVE CRITERIA 419
certitude than one witness. If they disagree, it is necessary not
so much to number those on each side as to weigh their author-
ity. They must be independent, i.e. not prompted by the same
interests or passions, nor following the same original witness,
for otherwise there is really only one testimony Frequently the
impossibility of deception is certain, for instance, when wit-
nesses relate important contemporary events, and their testimony
has not been contradicted. In general, the greater the number
of witnesses, their independence, and their competence to observe
the fact, the greater also the certitude.
3. On Questions of Doctrine, human authority has less value
than on questions of fact, because the human mind is more fallible
in its deductions and inductions than in ordinary easy observa-
tions, and because there is less agreement among men. Yet in
every discussion, men appeal to authorities, and rightly so, for a
specialist has more chance to reach the truth in his special branch
than another man. However, the general principle to be applied
here is that the authority of a man is worth the reasons which he
gives, at least for one who can understand these reasons. As to
those who cannot understand, they must accept the statements
with more or less reserve according to the qualities, fairness, prej-
udices, etc., of the man who makes them. The common consent
of mankind, in questions on which man in general is competent,
shows, not only the propensity of human nature, but also objective
evidence.
4. Oral Tradition is a difficult criterion because it is too vari-
able. By passing from man to man, the same fact may become
gradually distorted by additions, subtractions, and changes.
Experience shows that if the same fact is narrated by one person
to another, by this one to a third, and so forth, the narration made
by the tenth person may be greatly different from the original.
Hence the greatest care must be used in distinguishing truth from
legend. Yet, as a rule, even after a long time of oral tradition,
there remains a nucleus of truth which may be disentangled by
controlling oral tradition with the help of written documents,
and comparing one line of oral tradition with other lines indepen-
dent of it. If the tradition happens to be mentioned in writing,
420 EPISTEMOLOGY
the circumstances of the writing are to be taken into considera-
tion. Moreover, the nature of the fact must be examined, as also
the customs and characteristics of the people by whom the tradi-
tion has been preserved. When the tradition is a popular one,
known to all, adulterations are less likely to occur, because the
statement of one man is corrected by the statement of others on
the same point.
5. Written Documents. The conditions required in a written
document are its authenticity, integrity, and veracity.
(a) The authenticity or genuineness of a book, that is, the fact
that it has been written by the author whose name it bears, is es-
tablished by (i) internal evidence: its style as compared to the
style of works that are certainly genuine; the agreement of its
contents with the time and place at which it is supposed to have
been written; the agreement of its contents with the author's
views and opinions, etc.; (2) external evidence: the testimony of
other writers, oral tradition, the silence of those who would be
interested in denying its authenticity, etc.
(b) The integrity of a book, that is, the freedom from additions,
subtractions, or changes, is proved by different circumstances:
the multiplicity of independent editions, the comparison with
manuscripts, the difficulty of introducing interpolations or mutila-
tions, the importance of the contents, the comparison with other
documents, etc.
(c) The veracity is ascertained by showing the author's knowl-
edge and fairness, and by comparing the book with other docu-
ments.
N.B. A general principle to be observed in the application of
the criterion of authority is that one must always guard against
both excessive credulity and exaggerated scepticism. Few
sciences are more difficult than history, which endeavors to find
out the truth of facts related in written documents or oral
traditions.
To discuss here the question of the authority of divine revela-
tion would be to anticipate a number of conclusions on the exist-
ence and the attributes of God, and on the criteria of revelation.
All we can say at present is that, granting God's omniscience and
CONCLUSION 421
sanctity, and also the fact of revelation, divine faith gives to man
the highest possible certitude.
CONCLUSION
The conclusion of this treatise is that certitude is possible for
man, but that it requires some conditions. Not only is certitude
possible, but it is the indispensable condition of thought. Knowl-
edge is a complex process. It always needs correction and read-
justment, but its bases are secure. Man's endeavor should be to
build as strong and as high an edifice as possible on the twofold
foundation of facts and principles that are certain. He must
know the limitations, and imperfections of his own mind, and hence
be satisfied with opinion and even doubt where certitude is not
justified. He must also proceed cautiously, and use all possible
tests of his knowledge. But the field to be explored has no lim-
its, and, provided the mind starts from evidence and proceeds with
evidence, there is no reason to assign any border line beyond
which would lie the unknowable. What is unknown for the
science of to-day may be known for the science of to-morrow.
COSMOLOGY OR THE METAPHYS-
ICAL STUDY OF THE
PHYSICAL WORLD
INTRODUCTION
i. General Introduction to Metaphysics. (a) The name
"metaphysics" owes its origin to the arrangement of Aristotle's
works by Andronicus of Rhodes (first century B.C.), who gave the'
general title of TO. ^era TO, <vo-iKa to all the treatises that fol-
lowed Aristotle's treatise on Physics. The name given by Aris-
totle himself was that of " First Philosophy." Metaphysics
means the science which rises higher than physical sciences, and
considers things from a more abstract, hence more general, point
of view.
All sciences are more or less abstract, and all suppose general
principles. But physical sciences use experience as their chief
instrument, and call upon experience to test and verify their con-
clusions. Moreover, every science considers only certain classes of
beings, and from a special point of view. Metaphysics endeavors
to complete special sciences by a higher unification. Thus all
physical sciences deal with material substances; but what is matter
which is common to all? They use the principle of causality;
but what is a cause? and so on. Physical sciences are empirical;
the present science is metempirical or metaphysical. Its con-
clusions cannot be verified directly by experience, yet must be
based on it and harmonize with it. Metaphysics is not, and
cannot be, divorced from physical science.
(b) That its object is real has been shown in epistemology, and
those who claim that metaphysics is an impossibility, or deals
422
NATURE OF COSMOLOGY 423
with the unknowable, do so on account of preconceived ideas on
the nature of knowledge. In a series of subordinated "whats"
the mind is not satisfied till it reaches the last. What is ice? . . .
What is water? . . . What are oxygen and hydrogen? . . . What
is an element? . . , What is matter? . . . And although it is
more abstract, the object of metaphysics is nevertheless real.
Hence metaphysics is not a mere science of words and ideas, and
the discredit into which it has fallen is due to agnostic tendencies,
and also to the abuse which has sometimes been made of meta-
physics, by asking and trying to solve idle questions, or by making
it a purely a priori and ideal construction.
(c) The objects of metaphysics may be reduced to three main
groups: the physical world, the human soul, and the ultimate
ground of all things. Hence we shall have three parts: Cos-
mology, Philosophy of Mind, and Theodicy. The method will
be both inductive and deductive, i.e. .proceed from experience and
from self-evident principles. But everywhere we shall keep in
touch with concrete reality.
2. Cosmology (KOO-/AOS, mundus, universe) is the philosophical
science of the physical world, (i) It deals with the physical
world, and, in this respect, its object is the same as that of natural
sciences, with this difference, however, that it deals with all physi-
cal realities, while each of them is concerned only with certain
groups. (2) It is a philosophical science, and, in this, its point
of view differs from that of the other sciences. Thus physics
deals with the common properties of matter; chemistry with its
changes; mineralogy with the description and classification of
minerals; geology with the formation of the crust of the earth,
etc. None touches upon the higher questions of the intimate and
ultimate constitution of matter. They assume that matter exists,
and they show its various properties and activities, but do not
consider its essential nature.
Cosmology, therefore, completes natural sciences. It endeavors
to answer questions which they do not answer. Yet it evidently
depends on them, since it tries to explain the real world. Its method
is chiefly inductive, starting from common experience or from
scientific conclusions, and rising to higher generalizations, by
424 COSMOLOGY
the use especially of the principles of causality and of sufficient
reason.
3. Division of Cosmology. (a) To be complete, cosmology
should include the following subjects: (i) Inorganic beings;
their properties and nature. (2) Organic beings; life in general;
plants, and animals. (3) Man; his activities and nature. (4)
Genesis and evolution of the world, both of the individual beings
that compose it and of the universe as a whole; of life and of the
various forms of life; of man. (5) The end or purpose of the
world. (6) The cosmos, or the universe considered as a whole,
and the relations by which its unity is realized.
(b) Of these questions, however, some, like the question of
evolution, belong chiefly to natural sciences, and cannot receive
a full treatment here. Others, like the ultimate efficient or final
cause, will find a more suitable place in Theodicy. The questions
referring to man, owing to their special importance, will be the
special object of the next treatise. Hence we shall have the four
following chapters: (i) Inorganic beings. (2) Life. (3) Origin
and evolution. (4) The Cosmos.
CHAPTER I
INORGANIC SUBSTANCES
I. PROPERTIES
The properties of inorganic substances may be reduced to two
groups, passive and active properties, or extension and energy.
1. Extension. (a) All material substances are endowed with
extension. Such, at any rate, is the constant testimony of the
senses of touch and vision. Such also is the assumption of sciences,
like mechanics, physics, and chemistry. Psychology itself would
be at a loss to account for the perception of extension, if extension
were a reality neither in the external world nor in the organism.
For the present it is enough to note that the phenomenon of ex-
tension is undeniable. Whether extension be real or not, its
appearance at least will have to be explained.
(jb) However, extension cannot constitute the whole essence
of bodies, as Descartes claimed. He based this conclusion on the
fact that, even if all qualities temperature, shape, resistance,
etc. of a material substance be changed, its extension always
remains. But (i) when, for instance, a stone is broken into several
parts, every part has the same essential nature as the whole,
although not the same extension. Large or small, it has the same
essence. (2) When we want to distinguish one substance from
another, we never do so by its extension alone, but by other prop-
erties, which, therefore, are more characteristic than extension.
(c) In consequence of their extension, bodies occupy a certain
space, have a multiplicity of parts distributed hi this space, and
although, in a continuous body, such parts are mutually exclusive,
they exist only potentially before an actual division takes place.
The right is not the left, but actual division alone makes a
determined number of parts.
2. Activity. Material substances act, i.e. are endowed with
425
426 COSMOLOGY
forces and energies by means of which they cause changes in other
substances. Thus electricity, heat, etc., are powerful agents;
the forces of attraction, resistance, repulsion, etc., are constantly
at work. Substances act upon one another in a multitude of ways,
and man strives to master and control these forces so as to make
them subservient to his ends. That these forces are real is evi-
dent from the testimony of consciousness, for we are aware of the
actions heat, resistance, electricity, etc. of external bodies
on our own, and from the testimony of external senses which mani-
fest the interaction of all material substances. These forces are
distinct from extension, and physicists commonly oppose matter
to energy.
II. CONSTITUTION
I. THE QUESTION STATED
i. The Problem. The present problem is that of the ulti-
mate constitution of material substances in general; not of this
or that special substance, but of all bodies. Chemistry resolves
certain substances, called compounds, into others which can be
analyzed no further, and are called simple substances or elements.
Both physics and chemistry agree in admitting that material
substances are not continuous, but composed of distinct molecules
(smallest units of compound), and atoms (smallest units of ele-
ments). And even what until recently was looked upon as the
atom, i.e. the indivisible unit, is now, owing to the discovery of
radio-activity, looked upon as made up of a number of corpuscles
or electrons.
Our point of view here is different from that of physical and
chemical sciences. The element is a specific material substance.
The atom or electron is also a physical reality. Hence concerning
both the element and the atom the questions may be raised: What
are they? What is their nature? These questions cannot be
answered by natural sciences, for their methods will always lead
them to something physical, and what we want to know is whether,
starting from physical facts, reason cannot proceed farther in the
mental analysis of substances, and discover principles which,
although they may be inseparable, are nevertheless distinct.
CONSTITUTION OF MATTER 427
2. Theories. The theories may be reduced to three, two of
which advocate one single principle, whilst the other advocates a
twofold principle. One insists on quantitative properties, ad-
mits extension, and denies real energies. The other insists on
energy, and denies real extension. The third tries to account for
extension, energy, and specific properties.
(a) As a philosophical system, atomism not only admits the
physical reality of atoms endowed with extension, but asserts
that we can proceed no farther in our rational analysis. The
atom is the ultimate reality of matter. Atomism is a very
ancient theory, advocated in Greece by Leucippus, Democritus,
and Epicurus, and in Rome by Lucretius. These philosophers
hold that atoms are eternal, infinite in number, and that their
fortuitous meeting formed the various substances. Gassendi
modified the theory on minor points in order to reconcile it with
Christian dogmas, but admitted also a pure atomism. To-day,
owing to the discredit into which metaphysical investigation has
fallen, there is a tendency to stop at the atoms as physical units,
without pushing the analysis any further. Atomism may attempt
to explain everything with atoms of the same kind, endowed with
various motions (mechanical atomism), or it may admit different
kinds of atoms, with specific properties (dynamic atomism).
(b) Dynamism in general holds that matter consists essentially
of simple, and consequently indivisible, units or forces. Extension
is not real, but only apparent. The first vestiges of dynamism
may probably be found in the school of Pythagoras. It is only
later, however, that this doctrine is held explicitly by some Arabian
philosophers. In more recent times, Leibniz claims that matter
is composed of "monads," i.e. of simple substances without parts
or extension, all dissimilar, and endowed only with an internal
activity. Matter can never act on other matter. Boscovich
reduces matter to an aggregate of homogeneous points without
extension, which, by their different numbers, groupings, distances,
and interaction, produce the diversity of so-called material sub-
stances. To-day many scientists advocate an electrotonic theory
of matter according to which matter is ultimately reduced to elec-
trons which have no real extension. Under the name of energetism,
428 COSMOLOGY
an attempt is also made to reduce the concept of matter to that
of energy.
(c) Hylomorphism, or physical dualism, holds that no theory
can account for all the properties of matter by one principle only.
It admits a twofold principle, matter, or rather primary matter
(vXr;), and form (pop<i>iq). This applies to all substances, even
to the "elements" of chemistry, and the "atoms" of physics and
chemistry. Matter is the principle of quantity, but is of itself
indetermined, the same in all substances, and incapable of exist-
ence apart from the form. The form is the specific or determining
principle, the source of all determinations. The union of both
principles, each of which is incomplete in itself and inseparable from
the other, gives the complete specific material substance. The
two always go together, and cannot be perceived separately by
the senses. What we call matter in the usual sense is always
primary matter together with the substantial form with which it
is intimately united. This theory was proposed by Aristotle.
It was the common doctrine of the scholastics in the Middle
Ages, after which it was almost forgotten until recently.
II. DISCUSSION OF THE SYSTEMS
i. Atomism has the general defect of not answering the question
proposed. To say that what we call matter, and what appears to
the senses as one material substance, is in reality composed of a
multitude of smaller bodies leaves the problem without solution,
for this problem refers to the smallest body or atom as well as to
the largest. Physical division cannot here substitute itself for
reasoning. The atom is one and supposedly indivisible. Yet,
however small it may be, it occupies space, has different parts,
and a point on its surface is not the same as another point. Atoms
are real, but their reality must be explained.
(a) If different forces and properties are admitted, one may
ask: Where do these come from? What is their ultimate source?
If the atoms are of different size, why are all equally indivisible?
(b) Mechanical atomism rejects all specific properties, admits
that atoms are all of the same nature, and tries to explain all the
facts by their different motions. But it fails in this attempt. To
CONSTITUTION OF MATTER 429
mention only a few facts: (i) Chemical affinity, in virtue of
which certain elements combine only with certain others, and
always in definite proportions, supposes laws which the atoms
invariably obey, and which their motions alone cannot account
for. (2) Whatever explanation be given of the difference between
a chemical mixture and a chemical compound, this difference
implies in the elements the presence of specific properties which
do not manifest themselves in a simple mixture, but only in a com-
bination. If the elements have been completely altered in the
compound, how do they always reappear in the analysis? If
they have not been altered, where do the new properties come from?
(3) Affinity, cohesion, molecular and molar attraction, cannot
be explained satisfactorily by mechanism. They suppose an
internal principle of tendency. (4) In a word, chemical and
physical laws are not reducible to mere mechanical movements.
(5) Even if they were, mechanism would still be inadequate, for
motion itself cannot be communicated without supposing intrinsic
forces. The communication of a movement supposes in the mobile
an aptitude and power which is actualized by the impulsion of
the motor. When the actual impact of the two has taken place,
and the mobile keeps on moving, its motion cannot actually come
from the motor, with which it is no longer in communication. It
is therefore the unfolding of an intrinsic energy. (6) In general,
as will be explained later, there is in every substance an internal
principle of tendency. (Cf. pp. 452, 455.)
2. Dynamism. (a) Dynamism cannot explain real exten-
sion. It is clear that a multitude of "naughts" of extension put
together can never give a positive quantity. If points without
extension are supposed to touch one another, all necessarily coin-
cide in the same point. If they are supposed to be at a distance
from one another, it becomes necessary to admit an actio in distans,
the possibility of which is generally denied by physicists. More-
over, this would not give real, but only apparent, extension, and it
is difficult to understand this appearance or illusion of extension,
if there is no extension anywhere, not even in the sense-organs.
(b) It is true that matter does not manifest itself to the senses
except through its activities (radiations, vibrations, resistance,
430 COSMOLOGY
heat, etc.), but it does not follow that real extension is to be denied.
Without matter it is difficult to understand energy, for in this
case, what is it that moves, rotates, vibrates?
(c) The recent discoveries in radio-activity are not given the
same interpretation by all. Some deny, while others admit,
that the electron has extension, and it is difficult, if not impossible,
to answer this question from the physical standpoint.
3. Hylomorphism. (a) We distinguish the matter and form
i.e. the materials and shape of any object, e.g. of a marble
statue. We may go farther, and ask what the substance which
we call marble is itself composed of. We shall find that it is
composed of carbon, calcium, oxygen, etc. These may be vari-
ously combined with other elements so as to form new compounds,
with properties different from those of the former compound, and
from those of the component elements themselves. The element has
in itself a principle which may indifferently be this or that spe-
cific substance, and which is called "primary matter" as opposed
to " secondary matter" (marble or any other substance). That
by which it is determined as marble, and not anything else, is
the "substantial form," as opposed to "accidental forms," i.e.
the various determinations like shape and physical properties,
which the marble may receive.
Thus physical matter is composed of a deeper reality, indeter-
mined, and capable of being indifferently one substance or another
(primary matter), and of a determining principle by which it is
a special kind of substance (substantial form). The many changes
which the same elements undergo in forming different compounds
lead to the admission of a twofold principle. The element itself
always has a principle of indetermination, and a determining
principle; a principle common to all substances, and a specific prin-
ciple which differentiates one substance from another; a principle
of passivity capable of receiving successively different modifica-
tions, and a principle which makes it to be what it is.
(b) It is true that, understood in this way, matter and form
are only abstractions. They do not exist separately as physical
realities, and cannot be perceived by the senses. But, like all
abstractions, they are not purely mental products; they are
CONSTITUTION OF MATTER 431
realities that compose the physical substance and cannot exist
apart from each other.
In fact, even atomism and dynamism are obliged to admit that
homogeneous units, by their movements, groupings, and activities,
form substances that are widely different in their properties. Hence
they must admit some kind of a form or law according to which
these differentiations take .place. Should various substances
ultimately consist of only one kind of elements, that is, should it
be ascertained that the elements of chemistry are reducible to
identical units like the electrons, it would still be necessary to
explain how these ultimate identical materials are what they are,
and how they unite to form the various substances. They always
obey certain laws which indicate a true determination or formal
principle. Hence this would always lead to a dualism of the
indetermined and the determinant, of the common and the specific,
of a substratum and its superstructure, of matter and form.
CHAPTER II
LIVING BEINGS
I. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF LIFE
I. IN GENERAL
i. Common Idea of Life. (a) A distinction is made by all
men between certain beings animals and plants which are
called living, and certain others which are called lifeless. It may
not always be possible to indicate which beings have life, and
which are deprived of it especially in the case of micro-organ-
isms where the biologist himself is not always able to make this
distinction with certainty yet a sharp distinction is always
recognized between living and dead, and between organic and
inorganic matter.
(b) The common basis of this distinction is the presence or the
absence of movements or changes which originate within the being,
that is, the principle or cause of which is not, or at least does not
seem to be, external. Thus an animal is distinguished from an
automaton because the latter must be pushed or "wound up."
Were not this necessary condition known, the automaton would
easily be mistaken, e.g. by the child or ignorant man, for a living
being. An animal or a man ceases to live when he ceases to move,
when the respiratory process stops, when the heart ceases to beat,
etc. A plant ceases to live when the sap no longer circulates,
when ordinary changes in the growth, foliage, etc., no longer take
place. Many metaphorical expressions are derived from this fact.
We speak of a living fountain as opposed to stagnant water; we
say of a man, animal, or plant that they are full of life when they
change rapidly. (Compare such expressions as "lively imagina-
tion," "living faith," "live wire," "live coal," "the company was
alive," etc.)
To live, therefore, is to move, and to undergo changes due to an
432
CHARACTERISTICS OF LIFE 433
internal principle, although an external stimulus may be present,
as in the case of a rabbit running away from a dog. In the same
circumstances, lifeless matter would not move or change. It
must be pushed or acted upon by some mechanical force.
(c) The changes that are most commonly taken as signs of life
are local movements of the whole being, or of some of its parts
(heart, head, arms, etc.); the functions of nutrition and growth,
and various modifications in the general appearance (foliage,
flowers, fruits, etc.); a certain shape, size, and organization;
and consciousness, which some of these changes manifest.
2. Scientific Conception of Life. The following points sum-
marize the differences which biological science observes between
living and inorganic substances.
(a) Chemical composition. Evidently living matter as such
cannot be analyzed, since the process of analysis deprives it of
life. The analysis of an organism yields primarily the following
elements: carbon, oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen, sulphur, and phos-
phorus. In living beings, the elements unite to form proteids,
and these compounds are always highly unstable and constantly
changing. A mere glance at the formulae of organic and of in-
organic chemistry shows how much more complex the former are
than the latter, and how many more atoms are required.
(b) Shape and structure, (i) Whereas the organism always
has a special determined shape according to its kind, the mineral
has no determined shape, except in crystals. The shape of crystals
is always angular; angles are generally excluded from the shape
of the whole organism and of its elementary structures. The
outlines, both of the organism and of its parts, are generally curve
lines. (2) The mineral is homogeneous; the organism is differ-
entiated. This is clear for higher organisms, in which a cross
section will reveal a multitude of different tissues. It is true of the
lowest also, for the cell, which constitutes the whole of unicellular
organisms, and which is the last unit in multicellular organisms,
is itself already heterogeneous and very complex in its structure.
Its natural shape is spheroidal, and it possesses the essential
properties of nutrition, growth, multiplication, irritability, etc.
(c) Origin. Life cannot be produced in the laboratory. The
29
434 COSMOLOGY
rule is general: "Omne vivens ex vivo," or "Omnis cellula ex
cellula." A crystal is but a special regular arrangement of a
substance under certain conditions. - 1
(d) Nutrition, growth, duration, (i) Living substances alone
have the power of assimilation, i.e. they manufacture proteids out
of inorganic matter, and elaborate foreign substances which they
incorporate into their own. (2) Minerals are stable, and inorganic
matter always tends to the most stable equilibrium. Living
matter changes constantly. A continual decay and a continual
repair take place within it. Living matter returns to the inorganic
world, and, from the inorganic world, new living substances are
formed. (3) The growth of minerals is not limited to any size
or shape. Living matter has a maximum for every species, and
is always shaped according to a specific type. (4) The growth of
minerals crystals included takes place by accretion, i.e.
juxtaposition of particles; that of living beings takes place by
intussusception, i.e. assimilation. (5) Inorganic substances, of
themselves, have no limited or definite duration-, they change
only when they are acted upon by external agents. In living sub-
stances, the period of growth and of life itself is subject to laws
varying with the different species.
3. Philosophical Notion of Life. If we now try to find out the
essential characteristics of living beings, all the special properties
of living beings have the following points in common, (i) They
imply changes that are constant and uninterrupted, owing to the
unstable equilibrium of living matter. This is the fundamental
characteristic of nutrition which is the first vital function. (2)
They are immanent, i.e. they modify and perfect primarily the
living substance itself. There are many transitive activities, but
the final term of these is within the organism itself. Inorganic
substances, on the contrary, (i) tend to the most stable combina-
tion and equilibrium; (2) act only on one another. They do not
modify or perfect themselves, but other substances.
II. MANIFESTATIONS OF LIFE
i. Hylozoism (ZXrj, matter, and o>ij, life) asserts that matter is
essentially living, and hence that even so-called inorganic matter
CHARACTERISTICS OF LIFE 435
possesses a very low degree of life. This name is sometimes re-
stricted to the system according to which, not only some degree of
life, but also some degree, of consciousness, must be attributed to
all forms of matter. Proposed in various forms by ancient philoso-
phers, this view has been advocated recently under various names
like the German " Allbeseelung " (all-animation), or Panpsychism.
From the point of view of science, this assertion is evidently
gratuitous, and even contrary to facts. It is advocated on a priori
grounds, such as monism, or the assumed identity of all things;
evolution, or the assumed necessity for life and consciousness to
have originated from lower forms of matter; and the endeavor
to exclude every intervention of God. The main differences
pointed out above between living and non-living substances show
their irreducibility to each other.
2. Plants and Animals. Living beings may be divided,
according to their complexity, into unicellular and multicellular;
according to their size, into visible and miscroscopic. But the
main division, according to their functions, is into plants, animals,
and men. The reason for assigning to man a special place will be
given in rational psychology. There are many differences between
plants and animals. The main difference, however, consists in
the absence or the presence of consciousness. Animals, at least the
higher forms of animals, give unmistakable signs of consciousness.
They have sense-organs, and respond to stimuli in the same way
as man. By analogy, we know that they experience sensations,
that they have imagination, memory, feeling, and instinct. Other-
wise their behavior is unexplainable. Plants, on the contrary,
give no signs of consciousness. They have no nervous system,
with which consciousness is always connected in animals, and
there is no reason whatsoever to attribute to them what they do
not manifest. Sometimes, it is true, the scientist may not be
certain whether a living being (especially among microbes) is a
plant or an animal, but this can in no way be given as an objection
against the distinction of both kingdoms. The degrees of conscious-
ness vary greatly in animals, but the question may always be asked,
if not answered: Is consciousness present? Then we have an
animal. Is consciousness absent? Then we have a plant.
436 COSMOLOGY
II. NATURE OF THE LIVING BEING
I. THEORIES
Sometimes a distinction is made between living beings that are
endowed with consciousness and those that are deprived of it,
As consciousness has characteristics irreducible to those of matter,
it must also require a distinct principle. This conclusion seems
correct, but, for the present, we limit ourselves to the lowest degree
of life, vegetative life, the main manifestations of which have been
described above.
(a) Some refuse to admit the existence of a special principle
of life. Life is explained adequately by the general properties of
matter, either by its mechanical motions, or by its physical and
chemical properties, which manifest themselves in various ways
according to the adaptation of the various organs. But the point
on which all agree is that life results simply from the greater com-
plexity of matter in living beings, and from the natural play of
its mechanical, physical, and chemical energies.
(b) Others admit that special forces are necessary to explain
life. These vital forces are distinct from, irreducible and fre-
quently antagonistic to, the ordinary properties of matter. As
inorganic forces rather tend to destroy life, vital forces must
constantly resist them. Some look upon this special energy as a
spiritual, intelligent, and directive force (Stahl); others, as in-
herent in matter, but yet superadded to its ordinary properties
(vitalism). All agree that organized matter and the vital principle
are two distinct realities, irreducible to each other.
(c) Others finally take a middle course. Life is not merely the
result of mechanical forces; nor does it require any special forces.
The living substance is composed, like every other material being,
of a twofold principle, matter and form. The form, or vital prin-
ciple, is united with matter, and, together with it, constitutes only
one complete living substance.
II. DISCUSSION
i. Physical Energies in Living Beings. Not only does life
depend on the various energies of matter, but there seems to be no
NATURE OF LIVING BEINGS 437
necessity for admitting in the organism the presence of any energies
distinct from ordinary physical energies, still less for admitting ener-
gies antagonistic to these. There is no real opposition or struggle
between vital phenomena and physico-chemical phenomena. On
the contrary, we see the physical and chemical properties of matter
utilized by the living substance, and working together to main-
tain life. In every vital process, the chemical laws of affinity,
attraction, cohesion, combination, etc., and the physical laws
concerning heat, gravity, osmosis, capillarity, levers, etc., are
obeyed, and numberless applications of them could be made to
the processes of digestion, assimilation, respiration, circulation,
etc. As biology proceeds farther in its explanation of vital proc-
esses, it succeeds better in showing that these processes presuppose
no forces distinct from the ordinary properties of matter. The
general laws of the conservation of matter and of the conservation
of energy seem to hold in the organic as well as in the inorganic
.world. Nothing is created; nothing annihilated. In the living
substance, and in the laboratory, changes obey the same laws of
equivalence, and are subject to the same conditions. The dis-
tinctive property of life, therefore, is not the presence of special
forces, but the special mode according to which these converge to
the same end which is the life of the individual.
2. Their Insufficiency. (a) Life is not explained by me-
chanical, physical, and chemical energies alone. Even in the
lowest organism, they are many and complex; and yet all serve
the same purpose, the life of the organism. It is precisely this
harmony and this unity of direction which suppose a directive
principle. How, for instance, do these forces work together so
as to form a highly differentiated organism, with very complex
parts (eye, ear, digestive apparatus, etc.), out of one single primi-
tive cell with which all organisms begin? How are the physical
materials elaborated so as to furnish every organ with the elements
it needs? This requires a guiding principle; a principle of unity,
presiding over the functions of the whole organism; and a prin-
ciple of formation, presiding over the development of the organism
itself. And here it would serve no purpose to appeal to the elabo-
ration of organic substances in the laboratory. Organic they may
438 COSMOLOGY
be called, but they are not living, and they lack the essential
principle of life.
(b) This principle of unity, directing and subordinating the
various organs and functions, is not distinct from the living being
itself. It is an internal principle, tending to the creation and
preservation of the organism. The living being is one, but, like
the inorganic being, it is composed of a twofold principle, matter
and form. The substantial form, principle of determination, unity
and activity, is, in the living being, the "soul," as Aristotle called
it, i.e. the vital or animating principle. It is not something ex-
trinsic to living matter, guiding it as the pilot steers his vessel,
but it is an intrinsic determining principle of matter, which together
with it forms one complete liwng substance. (Cf. pp. 428, 430.)
CHAPTER III
ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION
I. THE QUESTION STATED
One of the most striking tendencies of modern science and
philosophy is to take a dynamic and genetic rather than a static
and descriptive view of things. Attention is given to the questions:
What can a thing do? How does it come to be what it is? Things
are looked upon as moving, changing, becoming. The passage
from the simple to the complex is followed closely. This tendency
manifests itself, for instance, in biology, by the questions concern-
ing the origin of life and of the different forms of life ; in astronomy
and cosmology, by the questions of the formation of the earth and
the universe; in the various branches of psychology, by the study
of mental development, and the genesis of various mental mani-
festations. This tendency is one of the characteristics of the
nineteenth century, and continues to manifest itself in the
twentieth.
i. The Problems. (a) The problems of the origin and
development of the universe are partly scientific and partly philo-
sophical. Both contributions may be completed by information
from a higher source, namely, divine revelation, which we have
not to deal with here, (i) Science records many changes. It
also examines the origin, natural or artificial, of many things,
inorganic and organic, and follows their development. In many
cases it can form, and, to a certain extent, test hypotheses. (2)
Science always presupposes the existence of matter and its energies.
The very first origin of things belongs to philosophical research.
(b) The problem may refer to (i) the world as a whole; (2)
the earth as a whole, its origin and formation; (3) life on the earth,
either the individual living beings, or the first origin of life, or the
various differentiated forms of life as they exist to-day.
439
440 COSMOLOGY
(c) It will be useful here to recall a few methodological remarks,
(i) Many arguments being analogical, it is important that the
analogy should not be carried farther than the facts justify. (2)
All aspects of the beings under consideration must be examined.
(3) Care must be taken to distinguish the facts from the interpre-
tation which they may receive (e.g. the fact of the successive
appearance of the forms of life from its interpretation as filial
descendance). This is necessary especially when an author is
known to have preconceived ideas. (4) Ascertained conclusions
of all sciences must be kept in mind. (5) The problems, and chiefly
the theories, are still young, and many are still under discussion.
Enthusiasm is frequently a characteristic of youth; hence rash
assertions must be guarded against.
2. Meaning of Evolution. It is important at the outset to
define the term "evolution" (e-volvere, to unfold), which is so
frequently met with, and which is applied to a great number of
different things.
(a) Formerly it was used in the sense of " pref ormation " to
mean the theory according to which the living germ already con-
tains, in miniature proportions, all the organs of the fully developed
individual. This is opposed to the view now scientifically estab-
lished of "epigenesis," according to which the organs become
differentiated little by little out of a primitive cell. This meaning
pref ormation of evolution is universally abandoned to-day.
(b) At present evolution refers not so much to the individual as
to a successive group of individual substances or processes, the
complexity and differentiation of which go on increasing from the
first to the last. It implies succession, becoming, filiation, descent.
Thus we have cosmic evolution, organic evolution, evolution of
morality, of religion, etc.
(c) Sometimes, it is used for "monism," i.e. for the theory of the
substantial unity of all things, deriving life from inorganic matter,
and man from lower forms of life, and rejecting any intervention
at any stage, of a supramundane agency, both as the first origin
and cause of the world, and as a factor in its evolution.
(d) Frequently it is applied more particularly to organic evo-
lution. In this sense, it is synonymous with " transf ormism "
THE INORGANIC WORLD 441
or the " theory of descent." "Evolution" refers to the race
(phylogenesis), whereas "development" applies to the individual
(ontogenesis).
(e) Hence evolution is not, as sometimes popularly misunder-
stood, the theory according to which "man originated from a
monkey." Nor is it the same as atheism, for God may be admitted
as the first cause of the existence of beings, and of their tendency
to evolve. Nor is it the same as Darwinism, which is only one of
the theories concerning the mode of evolution. Nor, finally, is
it the same as universal progress; in some cases evolution may be
regressive.
II. THE INORGANIC WORLD
We shall merely mention the question of the evolution of
the inorganic world, which belongs to natural sciences (physics,
chemistry, geology, astronomy). Our earth was at one time
an incandescent mass which, together with the other planets,
was detached from the original matter forming the solar sys-
tem, and the crust of which little by little cooled off and became
solid. As to the solar system, its matter was originally spread
throughout the space it now occupies. It had a very low den-
sity, and as yet formed no special bodies. It was endowed with
a movement of rotation, and parts of it separated, forming groups
independent to some extent, and yet in constant relation with the
others (movement , gravitation , etc.) . Little by little these separate
groups cooled off and formed solid bodies, while the central por-
tion, the sun, is still incandescent. This nebular hypothesis,
which, in its essentials, is commonly received, is extended to all
stars, which are so many suns. This theory leaves without explana-
tion the first origin of matter, of the laws by which it is governed,
and of its first rotary motion. We pass now to the origin of living
beings on the earth.
III. THE ORGANIC WORLD
Two questions must be distinguished: the origin of life itself,
and the origin of its various forms.
442 COSMOLOGY
I. THE ORIGIN OF LIFE
1. At Present. (a) Common experience shows that at least
the higher organisms invariably come from parents of the same
species, but it does not extend to all forms of life (parasites, insects,
infusoria, etc.). On the other hand, science teaches that many
organic products can be manufactured in the chemical laboratory,
and that the analysis of protoplasm yields only a few inorganic
elements. Hence the questions: Does life always originate from
life? Does a living being always originate from a living being of
the same species, or can parasites, for instance, originate from a
different organism? Can dead matter give rise to inferior forms
of life?
(6) In antiquity and in the Middle Ages, spontaneous genera-
tion and generation from dead matter were commonly accepted as
facts. Recipes were given to generate such highly organized beings
as mice, birds, snakes, etc. In 1668, Redi of Florence showed
that meat, if exposed to the air, is soon full of maggots, but that,
if it is screened, no maggots are produced. The reason is that
their germs have been excluded. Little by little the production of
other animals, such as parasites and others, was also traced back
to germs. The discovery of bacteria revived the problem, which,
however, was definitely solved by Pasteur (about 1860), who showed
that, when germs were effectively excluded, no life appeared.
(c) Hence the law is accepted to-day: "Omne vivens ex vivo,"
and to this rule no exception is known. Notwithstanding all
efforts, no transitional form from the inorganic to the organic
world has ever been found. The modes according to which genera-
tion takes place are different according to the diversity of organisms,
but "biogenesis," or the origin of every living organism from a
living organism of the same kind, is the universal law. There
is no "spontaneous generation."
2. First Origin of Life. How far can we go back in this regres-
sive process, i.e. how far can we trace back the ascending series of
ancestors? Somewhere we must find an absolute beginning, for
we know that life did not always exist on the earth, since at one
time the earth was incandescent, and therefore unfit for life and for
EVOLUTION IN ORGANIC WORLD 443
the preservation of any germs of life. To say, with Lord Kelvin,
that germs were brought down from stars or planets through cosmic
dust or aerolites, is no solution. How did life originate there?
Some evolutionistic monists, however, claim that what does not
take place to-day, namely, spontaneous generation, must have
taken place in the past. Otherwise, how could life have arisen?
And Haeckel describes at length the origin and evolution of the
"moneron" or primitive form of life. This assertion is anti-
scientific, and rests on the preconception that there is no personal
God, that the world is not His work, and that spontaneous genera-
tion is the only possible way of accounting for the existence of life.
As far as science goes, the origin of life is a mystery. Even should
life ever come to be produced artificially, only a minor advantage
would be gained by monism, for the existence of a Creator does
not hinge on this point.
II. THE ORIGIN OF THE VARIOUS FORMS OF LIFE
i. The Problem. (a) That the forms of life are manifold
is evident, (i) Plants and animals constitute two distinct king-
doms, and within each kingdom the greatest diversity is observed
as to size, shape, organization, etc. (2) A still greater diversity is
observed if the present is compared with the past. The science
of paleontology, which deals with fossil remains of organisms,
shows that the species actually existing did not always exist, and
that many species now extinct have succeeded one another in the
past. (3) Although living organisms are generated by organisms
of the same kind, the offspring differs more or less from the parents,
and certain features are transmitted by heredity. Gardeners and
breeders constantly use this fact to improve races and create new
varieties. Hence the questions: How did successive species
arise? How did life come to be differentiated as it is to-day?
Are successive species new creations (theory of the fixity, con-
stancy, or immutability of species), or are they, not only the
successors, but also the descendants of former species (theory of
organic evolution, descent, or transformism)?
(b) The fact itself of transformism must be distinguished from
the theories by which this fact is explained. There may be
444 COSMOLOGY
agreement on the fact without agreement on the influences that
caused it. And the fact may stand even if it cannot be explained.
(c) For the present we shall not speak of monism, which not
only admits transformism, but asserts that life originated from
inorganic matter, and that the passage from the lowest to the high-
est forms of life, man included, took place without any extra-
mundane intervention. We cannot speak of man until we know
his nature, and this will be considered in our next treatise. As to
the passage from the vegetable to the animal kingdom, from the
absence to the presence of consciousness, it is impossible. No
reality comes from nothing. From unconsciousness consciousness
cannot arise. So we limit ourselves to transformism within each
kingdom. Scientists are not agreed as to the number of original
types. Some admit only one (monogenesis) ; others, several
(polygenesis). As to the mode of evolution, some admit slow
variations; others the sudden appearance of new features.
2. Historical Outline. Only the most prominent names will
be mentioned here. The history of transformism begins with the
nineteenth century. Before this time we find only hints and vague
suggestions which have no scientific basis.
(a) Lamarck denies the fixity of, and the sharp limits between,
species. Changes in the environment create new needs. New
needs call forth new activities and create new organs to meet these
needs. The use of organs perfects them, while their disuse allows
them to become atrophied. These various modifications are
transmitted by heredity.
(b) Geoffrey Saint-Hilaire, as partisan of the mutability of
species, and Cuvier, as partisan of their fixity, opposed each other,
the latter being victorious over his adversary.
(c) In his "Origin of Species" (1859) Charles Darwin advocates
the theory of organic evolution by natural selection. The variations
which occur in certain cases, if useful to the individual, give it
an advantage over its competitors in the "struggle for life." Hence
such an individual survives, while others become extinct. It is
the "survival of the fittest." Later Darwin admitted also other
factors. In his "Descent of Man" (1871), he applies the theory
of transformism to man. Among other prominent transformists
EVOLUTION IN ORGANIC WORLD 445
of the same period must be mentioned Wallace, Huxley, Spencer,
and Haeckel.
(d) To-day the fact of evolution is commonly accepted, and is
hardly ever discussed, although this position seems to be some-
what rash and premature. The main discussions are on the modes
and factors of evolution. Darwinism (i.e. the theory of natural
selection) is generally looked upon as inadequate.
3. The Reasons for Transformism will only be indicated here.
Their study belongs to natural sciences.
(a) Living organisms are plastic, and become modified under
the influence of (i) surroundings, climate, food, etc.; (2) artificial
selection, especially in domestic plants and animals; (3) natural
selection, which accentuates useful variations; (4) unknown causes
which sometimes produce in the offspring sudden variations or
mutations. To this it is added that, in the beginning, organisms
must have been more plastic, and the causes of change more active
owing to greater geological disturbances. Moreover, the divi-
sions of races within the same species are arbitrary, and many
races would be looked upon as distinct species, were not their
common origin known (e.g. the various races of dogs).
Remarks. This variability is limited, moves around a certain
fixed average, and frequently a modified type tends to return to
the primitive type. Moreover, as even with the best efforts, only
varieties are produced artificially, how could new species arise
naturally? There is no proof that a new species has ever been
produced in this way. And if it had, have we the right to extend
the fact to all species? Hence this argument does not prove the
fact of transformism, but offers only a possibility.
(b) Mutual affinities of organic beings, (i) Morphology. The
various groups (e.g. vertebrates) are built according to the same
plan, and, from the lowest class to the highest, a gradual increase
in complexity is observed. The reason is that all have developed
by successive differentiations from less differentiated types.
Remarks. The analogies must not make one overlook the differ-
ences. Moreover, it remains to be proved that a closer resemblance
is due to a closer relationship by descent. (2) Embryology.
During the period of embryonic development, higher forms of
446 COSMOLOGY
life pass successively through inferior stages resembling lower
forms of life, and little by little become more differentiated.
Hence ontogeny, or the development of the individual, is a
recapitulation of phylogeny, or the evolution of the species.
Remarks. In many cases, the resemblance of the embryo with
lower forms of life has been grossly exaggerated (especially by
Haeckel). Moreover, resemblances are to be expected in the
development of organisms of the same type, since all begin with a
simple cell and develop in similar surroundings. (3) Rudimentary
organs, and incipient or nascent organs. In many higher forms
of life organs are found which are now useless because they are too
small and undeveloped, e.g. the eyes of the mole, the rudimentary
hind legs of boas and whales, etc. These must be remnants of
organs once fully developed and useful. Remarks. The con-
clusion might be true without proving transformism. The ances-
tors may have been of the same species, though with certain
organs more developed than those of actual forms. Moreover,
the uselessness of all such organs at all stages of life is not
demonstrated.
(c) Geological distribution or paleontology. Paleontology shows
that various species have succeeded one another on the earth.
Although the geological record is very imperfect and difficult to
decipher, owing to numerous perturbations in the strata of the earth,
in a general way the lower forms of life appeared first, and little
by little more differentiated forms succeeded them. In some
cases, especially that of the horse, a series of closely allied forms
can be traced back, leading progressively to actually existing
species. As research progresses, "missing links," forming transi-
tions between different species, are discovered.
Remarks. Sometimes also, forms of life are found which do
not progress in one sequence, but, as it were, in parallel lines. Nor
can succession, when verified, be identified with descent; paleon-
tology gives only the fact of succession. Moreover, this progressive
succession is established only in very few cases of species closely
similar. When we try to apply it to larger groups, evidence is
lacking, and there is not even a semblance of proof which would
allow us to connect together all forms of life. To appeal to the
EVOLUTION IN ORGANIC WORLD 447
imperfection of the record and the difficulty of the task is no
proof. Conclusions can be based only on the data at hand, not
on data which possibly may or may not be gathered in the
future.
4. Conclusion. Philosophy has nothing to say for or against
evolution. It is a scientific question to be answered by a patient
investigation of the facts. As a scientific conclusion it is, as yet,
not demonstrated. It is a hypothesis, which, on the strength of
established facts, extends only to closely allied species. To make
evolution a universal law by which all forms would ultimately be
differentiations of one primitive type, is to proceed far beyond the
conclusions justified by actual evidence.
CHAPTER IV
THE COSMOS
INTRODUCTORY
1. Unity and Multiplicity in the World. There is plurality
and variety in nature, yet, in many cases, multiplicity is reduced
to unity. According to the point of view from which it is regarded,
the same reality may be spoken of as one or as many. The process
of unification has degrees, and is more or less inclusive. Thus I
speak of the earth as one when I oppose it to other planets or
heavenly bodies. From the point of view of geography, many
mountains, valleys, oceans, are on the one earth. From Oie point
of view of geology, many rocks of different nature form one moun-
tain. Every rock in turn may be looked upon as composed of
many elements, and ultimately reduced to atoms. The same is
true of the one human organism composed of many organs, every
organ composed of many tissues, etc. Thus according as we look
at things in one way or another, the same reality is called one or
many. We know that some processes of unification are only
mental or logical. The genus under which species are classified
exists only in the mind. Other processes of unification are based
on real relations of causality, dependence, influence, subordina-
tion, etc. The many existing beings in some way form one universe.
2. Terms Defined. (i) Cosmos (Greek equivalent of Latin
mundus) means the world conceived as an orderly and harmonious
system of many things, and is opposed to chaos, disorder, or law-
lessness. (2) Universe means the collection of all material things,
and indicates completeness and all-inclusiveness. Sometimes it
is used so as to include even God. (3) World may generally be
used for cosmos or universe, but its meaning is more vague. Fre-
quently it is made to apply especially to our earth, or to what is
448
SPACE AND TIME 449
nearer to us on the earth. Frequently also it is restricted to special
systems, not necessarily material, e.g. the living world, the world
of art, religion, literature, fashion, etc. (4) Nature has several
meanings. It applies either to the whole universe or to the indi-
vidual beings that compose it. We speak of nature in general,
e.g. the works of nature, or of the nature of this or that being.
Nature always has a special reference to dynamic principles which
enable beings to act in various ways and to modify other beings.
It is the intrinsic principle of activity.
The many form one, not through an identity of substance, but
through their many interrelations which prevent them from being
isolated. The most important of these relations are space, time,
causality, teleology, and the various laws of nature. Hence the
following titles.
I. SPACE AND TIME
Few notions are more usual than those of space and time. We
speak daily of things as occupying a definite part of space, and of
events as occurring at a certain time. Yet, simple and clear as
they seem to be, these notions become difficult to explain as soon
as we try to give an accurate definition.
I. SPACE
i. Place. Space and place are closely connected. When we
are asked in what place an object is located, we answer by assigning
a determined portion of space which it occupies, or by referring it
to other objects the place of which is known, i.e. by defining its
spatial relations. Place then is a determined part of space. We
may distinguish the external and the internal place.
(a) When I say: "The fish is in the water, and the water is
in the jar," I assign the place of the fish and of the water in refer-
ence to something external to them, namely, in reference to the
immediate surface of the water that surrounds the fish, or of the
jar that contains the water. Not the whole water is, strictly
speaking, the locus of the fish, but only that which comes in imme-
diate contact with it. This is the locus proprius. Sometimes a
30
450 COSMOLOGY
locus communis is assigned, as when I say that the chair is in the
room together with many other things.
(b) I may consider the space occupied by an object without
reference to anything external, but simply as the space occupied
within the object's limits and dimensions, as when I say that the
volume of a body is so many cubic feet. This is the locus internus,
which remains the same even when, owing to some motion, external
spatial relations change. The fish occupies the same space, whether
in the water or out of it.
2. Space. (a) In general, space implies (i) distance; thus
we say that there is so much space between two objects, or that
the train flies through space; (2) capacity and aptitude to contain;
as when I say that the room is very spacious, or that the stars are
scattered in space; (3) relative emptiness; thus I say that there
is no more space in the room, i.e. its capacity is already exhausted
because it is completely occupied. This emptiness is only relative
to the use which is to be made of space.
Space, therefore, supposes bodies with distances between them,
and consists essentially in the interval, the distance, the capacity,
the volume occupied. It almost coincides with place, except
that the term " place " emphasizes the bounding surface, while
" space " emphasizes the voluminal capacity.
(b) (i) Concrete space is thus a relation of distance in a threefold
dimension, or a voluminal distance. It is not the body itself, but
a special aspect of it. It may refer to individual bodies, but is
frequently applied to the immense receptacle in which all things
are contained, i.e. to the sum of all individual spaces. (2) Ideal
space, or the concept of space, is an abstract idea. It does not
refer to this or that space, with such or such dimensions, but only
to an indetermined distance, capacity, or volume. Like all abstract
and universal concepts, it exists only in the mind, but is based on
the concrete perception of space. (3) Imaginary space is the space
which we imagine to exist beyond the limits of the real world
if the world be limited and which we suppose to extend ad
infinitum even where there is nothing.
(c) Hence real space is not an a priori form of external sensi-
bility (Kant), but an aspect of real extension; nor the divine
SPACEANDTIME 451
attribute of immensity (Newton, Clarke), for God has no extension
and is not material; nor a distinct reality, an immense receptacle
independent of bodies (Gassendi); nor finally the extended body
as such (Descartes). Real space is a special relation based on the
threefold dimension of matter. It does not exist independently,
as a special reality in itself, but is directly based on reality, namely,
on really existing bodies which have a real extension.
II. TIME
i. Nature of Time. Time has many analogies with space.
We may state immediately that time, like space, is not an inde-
pendent existing reality, but that it is based on something really
existing. Whereas space is based on extension and co-existing
parts, time essentially implies succession, and is always moving
on. Its parts if it may be said to have parts never co-exist.
Another obvious fact is that what we commonly call time is meas-
ured by spatial relations, e.g. of the sun, the hands of a watch, etc.
(a) In the realities of the world we find duration and change,
permanence and succession. Things endure, and yet undergo
successively many modifications in place, quantity, and qualities.
It is in this fact of succession that we find the idea of time which
represents a continuous flowing, which never stops, but proceeds
uniformly while the real changes are not always continuous for
the senses, and do not take place uniformly. Hence time is the
same reality as movement or change, but viewed from the special
aspect of succession, i.e. of an "after" and a "before." The
perception of time evidently supposes in the mind the power of
memory.
(b) Thus conceived, time is composed of the past, present, and
future. The present alone exists actually; it is an indivisible
point constantly moving and becoming past. The past has been,
the future will be, the present instant constantly moves into the
future, and as soon as we try to think of it, it is already passed.
Psychologically, however, we give to the present a greater or
smaller duration.
2. Various Meanings of Time. (a) The various meanings
of time are analogical to those of space, (i) Intrinsic concrete
452 COSMOLOGY
time is the time based on varying concrete changes of concrete
realities. Every substance has its own time. (2) Extrinsic con-
crete time is the one which has been adopted as a standard unit to
measure other durations, namely, the revolutions of the earth
around its own axis (day), and around the sun (year). This time
is divided into years, months, weeks, days, hours, etc. Although
it is in itself no more real than intrinsic time, it is, owing to its
regularity and constancy, more obvious for us, and hence is
understood as time par excellence. Psychological time is the
apparent duration as perceived by the mind. (See Psychology,
p. 88.) (3) Abstract or conceptual time is the idea of time apart
from all determinations with which changes occur concretely in
the beings of the world. (4) Imaginary time, in the supposition
that the world had a beginning and will have an end, is the time
which we imagine to be prolonged ad infinitum both before the
world existed and after it will have ceased to exist.
(b) Hence real time is not an a priori mental form (Kant),
but is based on something objective; nor the divine attribute of
eternity (Newton, Clarke) ; nor a reality independent of changing
concrete realities (Gassendi); nor the successive duration as such
(Descartes). It is not a reality as such in itself, but is directly
based on the real succession of the changes which take place in the
various beings of the world.
II. THE LAWS OF NATURE
I. MEANING AND PROPERTIES
i. Meaning. (a) A law means either a norm for human
actions, or the constant mode of action of physical agents. (Cf.
p. 292.) Here we deal with physical laws. A law indicates the
behavior of certain beings in various circumstances. It reduces
every manifestation of their activity to more or less comprehensive
formulae which apply in all cases.
The term " nature" has special reference to the dynamic aspect
of beings, and means the substance inasmuch as it is a principle
of action. Sometimes it applies to individual beings, as when we
say of a thing that it is natural for it to act so or so, and that every
LAWSOFNATURE 453
being acts according to its own nature. Sometimes it applies to the
whole universe, as when we speak of the beauties of nature, the
order of nature, etc. A law of nature means a uniformity more
or less comprehensive of physical activity in a given being or
in the whole universe.
(b) The existence of natural laws needs no demonstration. The
uniformity of action in nature is both an obvious fact and a con-
dition of science. We daily see that the same agents, in the same
conditions, produce the same effects, and the endeavor of science
is to formulate the laws according to which these results occur.
Were there no laws, science could not foresee and predict results.
"Accidental" effects prove nothing against the existence of
natural laws, for, although they are not constant and uniform,
they result from an unforeseen meeting of several causes, every
one of which acts according to its own laws. Man may act inten-
tionally, and, in order to realize his purpose, he uses the "natural"
activities of various instruments and materials. Physical beings
act naturally in the same way. But if several physical beings
combine to produce a result both unusual, because this combina-
tion seldom occurs, and unforeseen, because unusual, we call this
result accidental, although it is due to natural causes. Thus death
in a mine explosion is an accident, although it results from natural
activities, the presence of which was unknown. The killing of a
man with a bullet, when the shooter was not even aware of his
presence, is also called accidental, although it happens in perfect
accordance with natural laws. Accidental is therefore a relative
term which applies to results due to an unfamiliar and unforeseen
concourse of circumstances.
2. Properties. Natural laws are necessary and yet contingent.
We shall explain briefly these two apparently conflicting properties.
(a) The laws of nature are necessary, i.e. invariable and immu-
table, as appears both from experience and from reason. From
experience, because, for instance, everywhere at sea level pure
water boils at a temperature of 212 degrees, and will always be
analyzed into the same constant proportions of oxygen and hydro-
gen. A stone thrown up in the air will always fall down. Fire
always burns, etc. From reason, because the mode of activity
454 COSMOLOGY
must correspond to the very mode of being, and hence every
individual nature is so determined as to exercise a certain kind
of activity.
This activity requires certain conditions, and unless these are
verified, the result does not follow. Thus conditions of contact,
temperature, pressure, etc., are necessary for oxygen and hydrogen
to combine into water. If a piece of wood be covered with asbestos,
fire will not consume it. If the stone be held up in the air, it will
not fall down, etc. Thus the necessity of the laws of nature is
not absolute, but hypothetical. The conditions must be verified.
(b) Yet these laws are contingent. They have no absolute
a priori necessity, but are discovered by experience. They might
be otherwise than they are. In geometry, reason will discover
certain properties, e.g. of triangles which are absolutely
necessary, and cannot be otherwise. But, in physics or chemistry,
no analysis of gunpowder will ever show that it is necessary for it
to have the power of exploding; and no analysis of oxygen will
ever reveal a necessary affinity for hydrogen in certain proportions.
Moreover, we can see no necessity why things themselves should
exist, and, in fact, if certain conditions had not been verified, this
individual man, horse, stone, water, etc., would not have existed.
If certain other circumstances had been realized, other individuals
would have existed. The laws of nature, therefore, are not derived
from the essence of things, but rather the essence of things is
inferred from their properties and laws.
N.B. From this we may simply hint at the possibility of an
intervention of the Creator and Ruler of the world, who can supply
or withdraw the conditions necessary to the activity of various
substances, and thus produce miraculous events.
II. EFFICIENCY AND TELEOLOGY
The chief laws of nature refer to the mode of activity or efficiency
of physical agents, and this in turn implies teleology. Hence the
present question.
i. Efficiency. (a) The senses perceive only the succession of
phenomena, i.e. antecedents and consequents; hence for empiri-
cism causality is nothing but succession. As soon, however, as
LAWSOFNATURE 455
we observe a regularity of succession, and an invariability of
sequence, we are led to admit that there is not only a secession,
but a real influence of the antecedent on the production of the
consequent. If the consequent did not depend on the antecedent,
there would be no reason why it should not appear without it, or
after any other antecedent. As it is not so, the conclusion imposes
itself that the consequent depends on the antecedent, and that the
antecedent, by its activity, is the cause of the consequent.
(6) There may be a series of subordinated causes; hence
the distinction between proximate and remote causes. Causes
may exercise a more or less direct influence, but the existence of
true efficiency is attested for man by his own consciousness, and
for other beings by the rational interpretation of external experi-
ence. Many causes may and do contribute to the same result.
Which will be called the cause will depend frequently on the point
of view one takes. Thus, the photographer, the film, the light,
the object, etc., are causes of the photograph. The decomposition
of the blood, the bullet, the powder, the firing, the murderer, etc.,
are causes of death. Any effect is thus the result of a series of
causes which contribute their share in various ways. The com-
plete causation includes both a number of causes, and of conditions
without which their activity could not be exercised.
2. Teleology. (a) Teleology or finality is opposed to mechan-
ism. It affirms the existence of final causes, that is, of ends, or
purposes, which efficient causes tend to realize. Mechanism affirms
that everything is simply the result of mechanical forces acting
without any presupposed direction, (i) The question is not
whether there are efficient causes or final causes, but whether, in
addition to efficient causes, there are also final causes; that is,
whether the activity of efficient causes is directed to certain ends.
The aeroplane flies because it is constructed in such or such a
way; from this point of view, flying is but a result of mechanical
causes. But at the same time, the aeroplane is built in this way
in order to fly; from this point of view, flying is an end. The
same is true of the works of nature, e.g. the wings of birds. (2)
Again, the question is not that of conscious and intelligent finality
such as is revealed in human purposive activities, but of physical
456 COSMOLOGY
finality, which is revealed by the constancy of the manner in which
physical beings act.
(b) Finality is extrinsic when the activity of a substance pro-
duces results that are useful to other substances. Thus the
mineral is utilized by the plant, the plant by the animal. Or
again, the heat of the sun is a source of growth and development.
But we cannot see everywhere such an adaptation of means to an
extrinsic good, for the good of one is frequently an evil for another.
The plant is destroyed by the animal that eats it. The thriving
of microbes may result in the death of the organism. Yet, in a
general way, the order and harmony of the universe cannot be
denied. But this order is realized by individual beings acting
according to their own nature.
(c) Hence primarily finality is intrinsic or immanent. This
means that every being is endowed with an internal tendency
to realize its own end, and to strive for its own good and perfec-
tion. This finality manifests itself clearly in the organic world,
where we see the ovum or primitive cell developing according to
the general type of the species, and little by little evolving into the
complete organism. It also manifests itself in the struggle which
the organism undertakes against destructive or harmful agents.
Even in the inorganic world, the constancy of the laws of nature
shows that nothing happens at random or by chance, for chance
cannot explain stability, but that there is an internal principle of
direction and orientation which is no other than the nature of every
being. The existence of final causes is required to account for
the orderly and harmonious sequence of phenomena, and for the
convergence of diverse activities toward harmonious results which
persist notwithstanding the manifold changes that take place in
the world.
CONCLUSION
Cosmology leaves many questions without an answer. It as-
sumes the existence of things, but why, how, and whence are they?
What is the ultimate ground of reality, i.e. of things individual
and of the totality of things? The beings of the world are many
and diverse, and yet compose one universe. Every being exists
only in dependence on other beings, for nothing in the world is
absolute and self-sufficient. Since unity cannot come out of
manifoldness without some principle which is itself one, where
must we look for the principle of order and harmony? What is
the ultimate reason of the laws of nature, and of the internal
teleological principle which they manifest? How have differen-
tiation and order arisen from the primitive nebular chaos? How
have highly differentiated organisms evolved out of more general
types? How did life itself arise?
Thus many questions spring from the study, scientific or philo-
sophical, of the material world. In general, has the world in itself
a sufficient reason of its existence and laws, or must we look for
a sufficient reason in some higher being above the world? When
things have been explained by their immediate causes, there re-
mains to explain these causes themselves. Hence the necessity
to proceed to Theodicy, and examine whether the ultimate reality,
the Absolute, or First Cause, is immanent in the world, or tran-
scends the world. The method will be to go from the world to
God: "For the invisible things of Him from the creation of the
world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are
made; His eternal power also and divinity." (Rom. i, 20.)
457
RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY OR
PHILOSOPHY OF THE
HUMAN MIND
INTRODUCTION
1. Subject-Matter of This Treatise. Psychology deals with
the empirical study of the mental functions of cognition, affection,
conation, and describes the various mental processes. We must
now inquire about the nature of the principle of these functions.
Mind and matter, subject and object, consciousness and motion,
have irreducible characteristics, and yet are connected intimately.
Hence the questions naturally arise: What is the mind? How is
it related to the organism? On the solution of these two problems
will depend the answer to be given to the questions: What is the
origin of the human mind or soul? What is its destiny?
Hence the following division: (i) Is the mind a substance?
(2) Is it spiritual? (3) How is it united to the organism? (4)
What is its origin? (5) Is it immortal? It is needless to
insist on the importance of such questions, both from a merely
speculative, and from a practical point of view.
2. Method. (a) The knowledge of the nature of the mind is
not intuitive but must be inferred from facts of experience. Hence
the method to be followed is chiefly inductive. It starts from
facts, and assigns to them an adequate explanation. But once
the nature of the soul is known, we may proceed deductively, in
part at least, and base on its nature conclusions concerning its
origin and destiny. The main principle to be used is that of
sufficient reason. A cause must be assigned which will be sufficient
and strictly required to explain all the facts. To avoid imperfect
and one-sided conclusions, all facts must be considered. Erro-
458
INTRODUCTION 459
neous views may arise from considering exclusively conscious
processes, or exclusively physiological functions. This caution
is important here owing to the great complexity of the subject-
matter.
(b) We cannot agree with Spencer and other agnostics when
they assert the unknowableness of the nature, origin, and destiny
of the mind, and consequently the futility of the present investiga-
tion. It must be granted that our knowledge of the mind remains
imperfect, but the same principles that are used in all other sciences
will be used here, and will carry us beyond mere empirical facts.
No science is possible without the use of the principle of causality
and of sufficient reason, and it is this principle which we shall
constantly appeal to: The effect is a sign of the power and nature
of its cause.
CHAPTER I
SUBSTANTIALITY
The existence of mental states, manifold and varied, is an obvi-
ous fact of experience which has been the subject-matter of psy-
chology. These processes are spontaneously ascribed to one mind
as their permanent and active centre. What is the correct inter-
pretation of the facts? Is the mind a reality distinct from the
mental states, or is the collection of mental states the whole mind?
Phenomenalism asserts that the mind is but a common name, a
genus logicum, an abstraction. The only reality is the series of
mental processes. Whatever else we may add to these is illusory.
Substantialism asserts that the mind is a deeper concrete reality
of which mental states are only the surface. It is this latter
position which we shall now explain and defend.
I. MEANING OF SUBSTANTIALITY
i. What is a Substance? (a) Beings are divided into sub-
stances and accidents, i.e. into beings existing in themselves, and
beings existing in others. Some realities are, as it were, weak;
they need a support in which they are and to which they are
attributed. This character belongs to mental processes; a mental
process does not exist in itself, but in the mind. It is mine, or
yours, or his, etc. Other realities stand by themselves, exist in
themselves, are not attributed to any other, but are supports
of qualities or accidents. There is no "white" in itself, but
"white" is a quality attributed to some substance (paper, cloth,
paint, etc.).
(b) Hence primarily substance means that which subsists in it-
self. It also has secondary characters, (i) It is a principle of
activity. A substance without activity would be altogether un-
knowable, meaningless, and unthinkable. If it is necessary to
conceive the substance as a strong being, as a support, it is also
460
SUBSTANTIALITY OF THE MIND 461
necessary to conceive it as a power, an active principle, which
manifests its energies. (2) It is something more or less perma-
nent, although this is not so essential. Here permanence means
that the mind endures and remains identical notwithstanding the
constant flux of processes.
2. Further Determination. To complete this explanation, it
is necessary to make a few remarks as to what the assertion " the
mind is a substance" does not mean.
(a) The present question is not to be identified with other
questions to be examined later: What is the nature of the mind-
substance? Is it material or spiritual? What are its relations
to the organism?
(b) To assert that the mind is a substance is not to assert that
it is a hidden substratum, inert and permanent, under the visible
surface of conscious processes, or that it is a concrete being distinct
from concrete accidents, and separable from them. There is
only one concrete being composed of substance and accidents, and
the mind-substance is known only through its accidents or activ-
ities. The mind and its modifications are perceived in the same
experience. To argue, with Spencer (Principles of Psychology,
59), that we can never know the unmodified substance of the mind
is correct, but substantialists never made such a claim. Accord-
ing to them, what is known is the modified substance of the mind.
The surface is, as it were, transparent, so that to perceive actions
at the surface is to perceive at once the mind as acting. In gen-
eral, to perceive the accidents is also to perceive at once the
substance in which they inhere and from which they proceed.
II. PROOFS OF THE SUBSTANTIALITY
i. Facts. We may first insist on some psychological facts
which imply the substantiality of the mind.
(a) Consciousness clearly testifies that I am the subject of sen-
sations and of other mental processes, that I am the agent which
produces certain actions, that I am distinct from everybody and
everything else, and that I subsist in myself. That is, not only
does consciousness manifest the surface, or mental processes, it
also manifests that all converge to, and start from, the same
462 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
identical centre, notwithstanding the manifoldness and the changes
at the circumference. The same intuition reveals both the proc-
esses walking, thinking, feeling, etc. and the subject to which
they are attributed my walking, thinking, and feeling. And
not only the present, but the past, and, to some extent, the future
are referred to the same substance.
(b) Consciousness testifies that I am active, that I am the cause,
not merely the witness, of certain activities; not a simple spec-
tator, but an agent and an active source of energy. "I did this,
and I shall do that, etc."
(c) The mind is identical and permanent, as shown by the fact
of memory. Mental processes succeed one another rapidly, yet
memory preserves, reproduces, and recognizes them. Without
a permanent subject, this would be impossible, for the reference
of a present image or perception to a past experience supposes
that the same mind is the witness of both. The act of memory
implies the consciousness of self -identity, that is, of the sameness
of the mind under the perpetual flux of its processes. The same
conclusion is reached from the various modes of thought which
imply succession, and consequently memory. In judging and
reasoning, the mind thinks successively several terms or proposi-
tions, and holds them together so as to perceive their relations.
2. Reality of the Substance of the Mind. (a) These psycho-
logical facts cannot be looked upon as illusory without falling into
out-and-out scepticism. Since they are real, they require not
merely an apparent or logical subject, but a real subject; not indeed
a subject separable from conscious processes, but nevertheless a
subject underlying the processes through which it is known. The
"permanent possibility of sensations," of which phenomenalists
speak, is a fact, but, as this possibility is real, it supposes some real
being on which it is based. There can be no possibility with-
out an agent on which the possibility depends. To say that
an event is possible is to say that there are causes capable of
producing it.
(b) The concrete reality of the mind is therefore a substance
plus its modifications, theQwo being indissolubly united both in
reality and in our knowledge of them, yet being distinct. To
SUBSTANTIALITY OF THE MIND 463
refuse to accept this conclusion is to make of the processes them-
selves so many substances, proceeding from no agent, inhering
in no subject, and self-subsisting. It is to overlook the essential
fact of the unity of the mind under its many processes. It is to
make the supposed illusion of a substantial reality impossible,
since this illusion itself presupposes the real unity of the onlooker.
III. PHENOMENALISM
The foregoing view will be made clearer by discussing phe-
nomenalism in its various forms. In general, as its name indicates,
phenomenalism is the theory reducing the mind to phenomena
or appearances, and denying its substantial reality. It is a very
common view to-day, owing to the prevalent fear of "metaphys-
ical entities." A mind-series is substituted for the mind-sub-
stance. The mind is reduced to the collection, aggregate, or
succession of mental states.
1. The Present Mental State. The mind cannot be merely
the present mental state, (i) This state itself must be explained,
and there can be no thought without a thinking principle, no
action without an agent. (2) The present state is transitory,
and the facts of memory and recognition require something per-
manent to account for the possibility of recall. (3) As far as
experience informs us, we do not always think, but sometimes
thought seems to be interrupted, e.g. in sleep, swoons, etc. Yet
something must remain, since the past is known again when
consciousness reappears.
2. The Series of Mental States. The mind cannot be merely
the series of mental states, whether it be described as a "bundle"
or "collection of different perceptions" (Hume), or as the "sum of
our inner experiences " (Hoffding), or as "a thread of conscious-
ness supplemented by believed possibilities of consciousness,"
"a series of feelings with a background of possibilities of feelings "
(Stuart Mill). Many modern psychologists hold similar views.
Ebbinghaus illustrates his position by the following comparison.
As the plant is composed of various parts (roots, branches, leaves,
flowers, etc.) united into a whole, each one supported by, acting
and depending on, the others, and their totality constituting the
464 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
plant, which, however, is not a substance distinct from these
parts, so the mind is simply a system of numerous realities of
consciousness, closely united, and causally related. James speaks
of the mind as a stream of consciousness, in which the ego is
nothing but the "real, present, onlooking, remembering, judging
thought," which appropriates and embodies hi itself all past
experiences.
(a) A series implies three things, a multiplicity of elements, their
succession in time or space, and the connection, real or logical, of
the several units. One thing cannot form a series; nor is a bundle
or heap of things a series; nor finally do disparate and disconnected
things form a series, (i) The mind-series has to be explained,
and, with it, the facts already mentioned of personal identity,
memory, judgment, reasoning, etc. Each unit of the series re-
quires a support and an active principle, since it is not a self-sub-
sisting reality. (2) The awareness of the series as such supposes a
permanent and identical subject, witness of the present and of the
past. If there is no mind-substance, not only the series, but even
the possibility of speaking of the mind as a series, is to be denied,
since the awareness of manifoldness, succession, and connection
supposes something distinct from the units that form the series.
We do not deny that there is a mental series of processes, but at
the same time we assert that something else is required to make it
possible. (3) The addition of a "permanent possibility" is not
enough, since possibility means the presence of an adequate cause
by which certain effects become possible. There must be a reason
for every possibility.
(b) Taine says that, as two or three horses may be able to draw
a cart which one horse is insufficient to draw, so several states to-
gether may stand without a support or substance, even if one alone
cannot do so. Or it may be said that, although one blade of grass
by itself cannot stand up straight, a bundle of them will stand.
Ebbinghaus's comparison mentioned above belongs to about the
same type, (i) Horses taken individually are real powers, and
each blade of grass has some power of resistance. The parts of the
plant are material and substantial, and thus can support one
another. But mental states are transitory processes, and in the
SUBSTANTIALITY OF THE MIND 465
line of substance every one of them is a zero. To add them will
not make them able to stand by themselves. If a certain quan-
tity is required to obtain a given result, the addition of positive
quantities will eventually give the necessary amount. But the
addition of ciphers will never give a positive quantity. (2) The
plant is a "complex," as Ebbinghaus says, but not so much a com-
plex of processes and functions as of parts or organs. So also the
mental processes and functions do not form the "mental complex,"
except through the unity of the mind whose functions they are.
(c) The mind may be a "stream of consciousness," but it must
be more, (i) It cannot be proved to be an everflowing and never-
interrupted stream. If it is interrupted, something must remain
in the interval to connect the section preceding the interruption
with the section that follows it. (2) The comparison with a stream
would lead us to admit a source from which the stream originates.
(3) To say that a mental state, i.e. a function, appropriates
all those that have taken place before is to give it a substan-
tiality which of itself it has not. It is true, as James says, that
the same herd may be transmitted rapidly to different owners.
But the difference between this and our case is that the herdsman
and the cattle co-exist, whereas here the mental states are succes-
sive. Moreover, the herdsman is a substance distinct from the
cattle, not a mere process. (4) Appropriation, even if possible,
would not yet be memory and recognition, and would offer no
sufficient explanation of them.
In conclusion we may state that phenomenalism, which may be
sufficient for the psychologist, is not an ultimate or philosophical
explanation. Either it cannot account for all the facts of mental
life; or, against the testimony of consciousness and the common
consent of psychologists, it makes of mental states so many sub-
stances; or finally it surreptitiously introduces in fact what it
denies in words, a mind-substance or something which is supposed
to fulfil its functions.
IV. MULTIPLE PERSONALITY
i. Facts. (See Psychology, p. 197). (i) In some abnormal
cases, persons have, as it were, two, or even more, different, suc-
31
466 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
cessive, and apparently independent existences which we may
represent as A, B, Ai, Bi, A2, B2, A$, 3, etc., the series A
forming one continuous existence, and the series B another. In
the state An, the subject remembers the whole series A } but knows
nothing of the series B. In the state Bn, the series B is remem-
bered, while all the A periods are so many blanks. In each series
mental dispositions may be widely different; A will speak of B in
the third person, etc. Hence the natural conclusion: The mind
cannot be one substance identical with itself at all times. (2)
The same conclusion is inferred from certain conditions in which
two "persons " seem to appear simultaneously. Thus while a
man is wholly intent on a rational conversation, his arm will
write something else, also very rational, and the person himself
will not even be conscious of this action. There are two groups of
intellectual activity proceeding independently.
2. Explanation of the Facts. The facts themselves must be
accepted. As to their explanation, it requires some general and
some more special remarks.
(a) General remarks, (i) It is admitted by all that these facts
are extraordinary, rare, and abnormal. We must always be
careful in basing any theory on such facts, and in leaving the clear
testimony of normal consciousness for the obscure testimony which
it may seem to give in abnormal cases.
(2) The/ac/ (ontological) of identity must be distinguished from
the consciousness (psychological) of identity. There may be a
real, yet unperceived, identity, i.e. there may be at the surface
different manifestations of the same deeper reality. The ego
must be distinguished, although it cannot be separated, from the
states of the ego.
(3) We may compare these abnormal cases with normal cases
to see if any hints can be found leading to the understanding of
the former, (a) In normal cases, the conscious conflict of ten-
dencies, and the ensuing struggle, rather go to prove the identity
of the ego who witnesses the two impulses, and who experiences
the conflict, (b) There are slow and gradual changes in charac-
ter, and sometimes we may say of a man whom we knew formerly
that he has changed completely, that he has reformed, that he is
SUBSTANTIALITY OF THE MIND 467
no longer what he used to be, etc. (c) There are also more sud-
den and more radical changes for better or for worse, sudden con-
versions and downfalls, (d) Many things are forgotten, either
individual experiences or whole series of experiences, (e) At
times, we may even assume different "personalities " which are
illusory, e.g. hi dream, somnambulism, hallucination, hypno-
tism. (/) Actions and experiences during hypnosis may be for-
gotten altogether in the normal state, but recalled hi subsequent
hypnosis. The hypnotizer may suggest different "personalities"
to the subject.
(b) More special remarks, (i) Even if the consciousness of
identity disappears, we have reasons for saying that the fact itself
remains, (a) Frequently in one of the series there is the memory
of some of the things that have been experienced in the other.
(b) Sometimes one of the series predominates and includes the
knowledge of what happens in the other, (c) These series are not
altogether strangers. Generally there is something common to
both (knowledge of language, persons, objects, or localities).
(d) Frequently also A will speak of B as a stranger and in the
third person, and this is a sign that A knows B and is aware of the
change, (e) The fact that A2 is linked with Ai after an interval
during which B has appeared shows that something has persisted
to link the present with the past. (2) Simultaneous manifesta-
tions are automatic and due probably to the dissociation of cer-
tain cerebral or spinal centres from the others. (3) Hence what
we have here is in reality a disease of memory with illusions and
hallucinations. These phenomena are due to organic causes which
cannot as yet be assigned definitely. (4) What has disappeared
is not the ego, but only the consciousness of identity. There are
indications that the surface only has changed, not the deeper
reality.
Hence from these facts no objection can be derived against the
unity, permanence, and substantiality of the mind. The term
"personality" is wrongly applied here, and psychologists generally
have come to recognize that, from these abnormal facts, nothing
can be inferred against the unity of the mind. We adhere there-
fore to the testimony of normal consciousness, and hold that the
468 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
mind is not only the collection or series of conscious states, but
their common centre, subject, and agent, a real substance known by
the same indivisible act of consciousness which manifests the surface
or circumference, i.e. the processes or accidents.
CHAPTER II
SPIRITUALITY
I. THE QUESTION STATED
1. Its Importance. It is not enough to know that the human
mind is more than the series of mental states, and that it is a sub-
stantial and permanent principle. We must now examine its
nature more closely. That it is bound to, and dependent on,
the organism is an obvious fact. For the present we shall not
examine the nature of this union, but only the question whether
the mind itself is some form of matter or of material energy, and
whether, in all its processes, it acts with the intrinsic cooperation
of the organism. This question is of primary importance, for on
it depends the answer to the questions of the origin and destiny of
the soul. If in some of its actions the soul is found to act by it-
self, and not through the organism, it will not necessarily share
all the vicissitudes of the organism.
2. Meaning of the Terms " Material " and " Immaterial." (a)
A thing is material when it has extension and is composed of sev-
eral parts. This is matter itself. Or a thing is material when,
although it is not matter itself, it cannot exist and manifest itself
except through matter. Physicists oppose matter to energy,
although, in this latter sense, energy itself must be called material
since it is the energy of matter. The vital principle, as seen in
Cosmology, must also be called material in this sense, since all
functions of the living organism are exercised in and through
matter.
(b) Hence immateriality may mean: (i) Simplicity, i.e. the ab-
sence of composition, of parts, and of quantity, even though there
be an essential dependence on matter for existence and the
exercise of activity. (2) Spirituality, i.e. simplicity plus independ-
469
470 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
ence from matter, or the aptitude to exist and act without mat-
ter. It is important to keep this distinction in mind, for a thing
may be immaterial in the first sense, and yet altogether depend-
ent on matter in every respect. The characteristic features of
the mind are generally accepted to be irreducible to those of mat-
ter. The physical and the mental are acknowledged to be alto-
gether different. Yet, without identifying mind and matter,
many psychologists do not admit a spiritual soul, independent of
the organism in some of its activities.
II. SIMPLICITY OF THE SOUL
Little space will be given to the simplicity of the soul because it
is not the exclusive characteristic of the human soul, and, while
differentiating the soul from matter, it does not show whether or
not it is so essentially bound to matter as to be unable to exist
and act except hi and through the body.
1. Ideas. (a) Thought is simple and indivisible. There is
no half idea or third of an idea. The idea as a whole is either pres-
ent in or absent from the mind. Even when it is composed of
several logical elements, the idea is indivisible. If one of its essen-
tial elements be absent, the idea ceases to be. The idea of "man "
or "triangle," for instance, may be acquired and perfected by vari-
ous mental processes; it is a synthesis of several essential notes.
But, whether it be complete or imperfect, as an idea it is a single
and indivisible mental process.
(b) Were the mind composed of parts, this would not be possible.
Suppose these parts to be A and B. Either A and B singly would
apprehend the whole idea, and in this case there would be two
ideas. Or A would apprehend some, and B other elements of the
same idea, and this again is contrary to experience which testi-
fies that the idea is one and indivisible, as well as the process by
which it is made present in the mind. Even if this latter suppo-
sition were accepted, we must go farther and deeper beyond A
and B, to a simple and indivisible unity which gathers these
elements into a single perception and apprehension.
2. Judgment and Reasoning. The same argument holds for
judgment, reasoning, and volition. The same mind, or simple
SPIRITUALITY OF THE SOUL 471
reality, must apprehend both the subject and the predicate, and
their relation of agreement or disagreement. The same mind
also must apprehend three judgments, and see that the conclu-
sion follows from the premises. The act of choice is one and
simple, although several alternatives are present in con-
sciousness.
3. Reflection shows that the mind is not composed of parts.
A material substance is not capable of reflecting upon itself. A
part may come in contact with, and act on, another, but not
reflect totally upon itself.
4. The Mind, not in Space. Wherever there is matter, there
are also spatial relations. But conscious processes are not in space.
An idea or feeling is not on the right or on the left of another. It
is not taller or shorter, greater or smaller, similar or different in
shape, etc., because it is free from all quantitative determinations.
SPIRITUALITY OF THE HUMAN SOUL
Not only the human, but also the animal mind is immaterial,
for consciousness can never be reduced to matter. To examine
the question whether the human soul is spiritual necessitates a
comparison with the animal mind so as to ascertain if these two
differ essentially, for we hold that the human mind alone is
spiritual.
I. SPECIFIC HUMAN ACTIVITIES
i. General Remarks. (a) Great caution is necessary in inter-
preting the behavior of animals. Even when their actions are
similar to human actions, it would not always be justifiable to
suppose that they are prompted by the same motives. A dog may
show signs of "remorse" because it remembers past experiences of
punishment, whereas in man remorse springs from moral and reli-
gious ideas. Again, the so-called education of animals is the result
of sensory associations, whereas human education is due to per-
sonal effort and the possession of universal ideas. The difficulty
of knowing the animal mind is greater owing to the absence of
language, for we know the mental processes of other men chiefly
472 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
from what they tell us. The principle to be applied is that no
faculties are to be attributed to animals unless they are necessary
to explain their mode of activity.
(b) We need not stop to consider the theory of Descartes, who
denies that animals have any consciousness, and considers them
as pure physical mechanisms. The presence of consciousness in
animals is as clear as its presence in men other than ourselves.
Although they cannot speak, they give unmistakable signs of per-
ception, feeling, memory, etc., and by analogy we conclude with
certainty that they are endowed with consciousness. Their
organism also presents many analogies with the human organism,
especially in regard to the nervous system, which is the physical
accompaniment of consciousness.
(c) The primary and fundamental difference between man and
animal is the presence in the former, and the absence in the latter,
of abstract, universal, and necessary knowledge.
2. That Man Possesses Such Knowledge is evident from psy-
chology, (i) No man, however ignorant and uncivilized, fails to
recognize certain universal and necessary principles, e.g. the prin-
ciple of contradiction, or the truth that two and two are four.
(2) Language is not the expression of concrete feelings, but of
thought and of universal ideas. However imperfect and, from
our point of view, ungrammatical, such expressions may be, and
even if they are but simple gestures, they nevertheless manifest
universal ideas. They are rational in their origin and character.
(3) Progress, realized by passing from principles to consequences,
from laws to facts, from causes to effects, etc., manifests itself in
many ways. Civilization, science, both speculative and practical,
etc., are the results of combined processes of induction and deduc-
tion. (4) Man is not a mere automaton. Even in many activ-
ities that are common to him and to animals, he can use self-
control derived from reflection. (5) Morality and religion suppose
the knowledge of fundamental principles, of universal laws, the
sense of obligation, the demonstration of God's existence and of
man's relations with Him.
3. That Animals Do not Possess Universal Knowledge is
evidenced by the following facts: (i) They have no language.
SPIRITUALITY OF THE SOUL 473
Although some are capable of articulate sounds, it is clear that the
manner in which they use the few sentences which they have
learned from man manifests only concrete associations. They do
not know the meaning of what they say, but simply remember the
result which is wont to follow. No other kind of rational communi-
cation, e.g. by gestures or the use of signs and symbols, is ever used
by animals. Their cries and movements express only concrete ideas
and feelings. (2) The behavior of animals, their "progress" and
"education," manifest no reason. They adapt means to ends,
but there is not the slightest indication that they do so from
any abstract knowledge of the end and of the aptitude of the
means to reach it. Everything can be accounted for by sense-
perception, memory, and association. The wonderful tales of
animal "intelligence" never require the power of reasoning, nor
any abstract knowledge of cause and effect. (3) Moreover, ani-
mals act in a uniform manner according to their species. They
do not use tools or instruments, nor sow to reap a harvest, and,
after many attempts to teach them, they do not even know how to
light a fire to protect themselves from the cold. To a certain
extent they may adapt themselves to their environment, but man
alone knows how to adapt his environment to himself. (4) They
manifest no morality or religion of any kind, no freedom, and,
in fact, we do not hold them morally responsible, nor attribute to
them right or wrong, virtue or vice, etc., in the moral sense of
these terms.
4. Conclusion. Hence, after a period of great enthusiasm in
favor of animal "intelligence." during which all human faculties,
at least in a rudimentary form, were attributed to animals, a more
accurate study of their behavior has led the most serious investi-
gators to conclude that animals do not reason, that they have no
"intellect," no abstract and universal ideas. We are therefore
justified in saying that between the cognitive faculties of man and
those of animals, there exists not only a difference in degree, but a
difference in kind. Similar in many respects, and having many
activities in common, man and animal differ radically on some
essential points. If, on this account, certain prerogatives must
be attributed to man, they need not belong to animals.
474 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
II. SPIRITUALITY OF THE HUMAN SOUL
Two groups of activity, namely, intellect and will, show that the
soul is spiritual.
i. Intellect. (a) It has been shown in Psychology that the
fundamental function of the intellect is abstraction, and that the
abstract nature of the concept is the source from which its other
characteristics necessity, universality, independence of space
and time flow (pp. 92 ff.). It has been shown also that this
abstraction cannot be identified with a mere association or
fusion of images by addition or subtraction. Now this function
cannot be the function of a material organ. A material organ
can perceive only that which acts upon it, i.e. that which is mate-
rial, concrete, determined in space and time. It cannot perceive
the abstract, universal, and immaterial, or the object divested of
its material concrete conditions of existence. To the concrete
function of a material organ can correspond only a concrete object.
No material organ can perceive the general ideas of triangle, man,
virtue, justice, beauty, love, friendship, freedom, relation, pos-
sibility, etc., because these cannot act upon the organ. Still less
could a material organ perceive an object purely spiritual like
God or the human soul.
(b) The existence and nature of necessary judgments has also
been examined in Psychology (p. 112 ff.). Now a material organ
can perceive only what is. The necessity and universality of knowl-
edge, the logical sequence of a reasoning, cannot be derived from
concrete perceptions. Necessary judgments are not the result
of material activity.
(c) The human mind is self-conscious; it knows its own knowl-
edge and its own knowing activity; it thinks its own thought and
the thinking subject itself. Self-consciousness cannot be organic.
A particle of matter acts on another particle, but not on itself,
It cannot fold itself back so as to perceive itself and its own activ-
ity. It cannot penetrate itself so as to be conscious of itself.
Self-consciousness is therefore essentially spiritual, since it is
directly opposed to what we know of matter.
(d) The mode of exercise of the intellect is different from that
SPIRITUALITY OF THE SOUL 475
of the senses. If stimulated by too great a stimulus (light, sound,
heat, etc.), the senses are so fatigued as to become dull or impaired.
The intellect never finds the evidence, clearness, or brightness
of a conception or truth too great.
2. Will. (a) The will does not tend only to concrete goods,
but primarily to abstract good, i.e. to the ratio boni incorporated
in every concrete good; not only, for instance, to an individual
good action, but to the general class of good actions. This ten-
dency, like the corresponding knowledge in the intellect, is a sign
of spirituality, for an organ could only tend to concrete sensible
good.
(b) The will tends to the immaterial, the possession of truth,
virtue, justice, patriotism, etc. These are man's noblest aspira-
tions which cannot be rooted in the organism and exercised through
an organ. The fact of conscience, the sentiment of an obligation,
also transcends every form of sense-experience.
(c) Freedom is a sign of spirituality, for matter is governed by
necessary laws, and the sequence of causes and effects is invari-
able. Hence a free volition, a choice, cannot be the function of a
material organ. The freedom of the will, known as a fact from
psychology, finds its only possible explanation in the spirituality
of the soul.
3. Summary. The human mind transcends matter. It has
activities which are not merely different from those of matter, but
are in opposition to the known properties of matter, and there-
fore are not exercised through the material organism. These
are therefore spiritual, and since every being necessarily acts as
it is, and according to its own nature, that is, since there must be
a proportion between a being and its activities, it follows that the
soul which exercises certain activities independently of matter is
itself independent of matter or spiritual. The nature of this spirit-
uality, however, must now be explained more accurately, by
indicating exactly what the above arguments prove.
4. Nature of This Spirituality. (a) The spirituality of the
soul is not manifested by all its operations, but only by those of
intellect and will. Consciousness in general is no sign of spirituality,
because certain forms of consciousness are essentially and intrin-
476 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
sically bound to the organism so as to be the functions, not of the
mind alone, but of the organism as well. Later on we shall see
how the soul is related to the organism.
(b) Even for intellectual and volitional activities, spirituality
does not mean absolute and complete independence of the soul from
matter. As was explained in Psychology (p. 98 ff.), intellectual
processes start with the data of the senses which they elaborate.
Common experience shows the influence of the organism even on
the highest mental functions. (Cf. p. 190.) The intellect is, as it
were, a new faculty grafted on the senses, and giving new products
for which the senses are inadequate. Hence the spirituality of the
soul means that the subject exercising the operations of intellect
and will is not material, and consequently not organic; that its
dependence on the organism is not a subjective, intrinsic, or imme-
diate one, but a mediate and extrinsic dependence, due to the
intellect's necessity of deriving its materials from the senses.
III. PSYCHOLOGICAL MATERIALISM
i. Meaning. (a) Materialism in general asserts that there is
no other reality than matter and its essential forces. In psychol-
ogy, materialism rejects the existence of the soul as a distinct
reality, and claims that all mental processes are functions of the
organism. The cruder and older forms of materialism denied
even the simplicity of the mind. The more recent are satisfied
with denying its spirituality. There are many forms, not only of
obvious and avowed, but also of disguised, materialism, and to-day
many theories that go by other names are materialistic. They
assert an intrinsic dependence of the mind on the organism,
especially on the brain, a dependence which is affirmed as the
conclusion of scientific facts.
(b) In ancient times may be mentioned Leucippus and Democ-
ritus, Epicurus and Lucretius. The French materialism of the
eighteenth century is represented especially by De La Mettrie,
Helvetius, D'Holbach, and Cabanis. According to the latter,
"thought is a secretion of the brain." The German materialism
of the nineteenth century is represented especially by Vogt, who
holds that brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile and as
SPIRITUALITY OF THE SOUL 477
the kidneys secrete urine; Moleschott, who holds that thought
is an inexplicable motion of brain matter; and Biichner, who denies
that thought is anything material like a secretion, but claims that
it is the activity itself of the brain. To-day this crude material-
ism is commonly rejected; the irreducibility of mind and matter
is recognized, and thought is not conceived as anything material,
or as a product, movement, or activity of matter. We shall see
later on, however, that some systems, like epiphenomenalism,
parallelism, monism, are frequently materialistic.
2. Criticism. The fundamental argument of materialism as
applied to the mind is as follows: Where there is no brain there is
no thought. Where there is a brain there is thought. Varia-
tions in consciousness depend on the quantity and quality of brain
matter, and whatever affects the brain affects also even the high-
est forms of intellectual thought. Moreover, certain forms of
thought are localized in certain portions of the brain. What
more, according to the rules of induction, is required to justify
the conclusion that thought is essentially and intrinsically depend-
ent on the brain? that it is a function of the brain? that the brain
is the organ of thought?
We shall begin with a few remarks on the general value of this
argument, (i) If by function of the brain is meant "mathemat-
ical" function, i.e. concomitance of variations, we may allow the
expression, although even then a strict concomitance may be ques-
tioned and cannot be proved. If "physiological" function is
meant, i.e. production, nothing proves that thought is a function
of the brain. On the contrary, sound reason disproves it. (2)
The assertion that the brain is the organ of thought is true of sensi-
tive functions, not of intellectual functions as such. Yet, even in this
latter case, the brain is the organ which furnishes the intellect with the
materials necessary to the exercise of its spiritual activity. (3) Con-
comitant variations, even if they were proved to be always verified
they are not show a dependence, but not necessarily an imme-
diate and intrinsic one. The instrument by itself does not pro-
duce the music, and yet the quality of the music depends on the
quality of the instrument, that is, of the materials which are at
the musician's disposal. In order to prove that thought is
478 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
material it is not enough to show that it has material ante-
cedents, concomitants, and consequents; its nature must be
examined in itself. Beware of the fallacy: "Post hoc, ergo
propter hoc." We may now come to the more specific assertions
of materialism.
(a) Although we must admit that, in a general way, intelli-
gence depends on the brain, this fact, as already indicated, proves
nothing in favor of materialism. Moreover, no strict parallelism
can be asserted. Attempts to make the amount of intelligence
dependent on the quantity of brain matter have failed mis-
erably, both for the whole animal series and for different men.
Intelligence is in proportion neither to the absolute weight of the
brain, nor to its weight compared to the total weight of the organ-
ism, or of the nervous system, or of the encephalon; nor finally is
it in proportion to the dimensions of the brain. This is recog-
nized to-day by all physiologists. The same is true of the attempts
to make intelligence essentially dependent on the qualities of the
brain, e.g. (the amount of phosphorus; the number, depth, and vari-
ety of the convolutions). No equation is to be found.
(b) The influence of the organism, especially the brain, on the
intellect is certain, and has been outlined in Psychology (p. 102).
It is accounted for by the fact that changes hi the brain affect the
quality of the materials offered to the intellect.
(c) Psychophysics and physiological psychology measure only
the physiological concomitants of mental states.
(d) Cerebral localization applies only to movements, and to
sensory functions on which the intellect depends and from which
it cannot be separated. In fact, higher mental functions are
localized nowhere in the brain.
3. Conclusion. Hence we may conclude that the arguments of
materialists are not proofs against the spirituality of the soul.
They were known to all spiritualists, even those of the Middle
Ages. Thus it is Saint Thomas who wrote that "it is necessary
for man to have a brain larger in proportion to his body than all
the other animals." Why? "To facilitate the activity of inter-
nal senses that are necessary to intellectual activity" (Summa
Theol., I, 91, 3 ad i). He knows that if, owing to organic troubles,
SPIRITUALITY OF THE SOUL 479
memory or imagination be impaired, intellectual faculties are
also impaired, even with regard to the use of the knowledge already
acquired (I, 84, 7). All this, because "the organism is necessary
to intellectual activity, not as the organ through which such activ-
ity is exercised, but on account of the materials on which it is
exercised" (I, 75, 2 ad 3). These expressions sum up the main
ideas and arguments of the present chapter.
CHAPTER III
THE UNION OF THE SOUL WITH THE BODY
That the human soul is in some manner united with an organism,
and that mind and body exist together and in mutual dependence,
are obvious facts. The nature of this union and its consequences
are the problems to be examined in the present chapter.
II. THE UNION ITSELF
I. THE QUESTION STATED
i. Union Defined. Several things are said to be united when,
in some respect, they may truly be called one. According to the
nature of the resulting unity there are several kinds of union.
(a) If we consider the place in which things are located, their
mere juxtaposition produces some unity; thus many stones or
bricks together form one heap. This unity is more striking when
the juxtaposition realizes a plan, like that of the stones or bricks
which are used to build one house.
(b) If we consider their activities, several things may again be
united in several ways, (i) There may be several actions, all of
the same kind, and, as it were, on the same level, and tending to
the same result. Thus several horses unite their strength to pull
a heavy wagon. (2) The several actions tending to the same end
may be on different levels and subordinated. Thus we have the
pilot steering his vessel, or the rider guiding his horse. (3) The
union may consist in an interaction, each substance acting on the
other. Thus the fire communicating its heat, or a man struggling
with another. (4) There may be similarity or parallelism of action,
due to the fact that both actions result from, or are influenced by,
the same causes. Thus the hands on several dials may be moved
480
UNION OF SOUL WITH BODY 481
by the same clock-mechanism. (5) Causality and dependence
also produce some unity, e.g. one family, one dynasty, etc.
(c) If we consider the perfection or complement which one reality
receives from another we have two kinds of union: (i) The union
of a quality or attribute with a substance, e.g. the shape of a mate-
rial substance, the science or virtue of a man. (2) The union of
two principles to form only one substance, e.g. matter and form,
as explained in Cosmology, or two elements forming one chemical
compound.
(d) Here the problem will be restricted to this: Are body and
soul united substantially, i.e. in such a way that only one sub-
stance results from their union? Or are they united accidentally,
i.e. in such a way that, being two ' distinct substances, they are
united merely by their juxtaposition or their interaction? It
is clear that this question is identical with the question: What is
man? Is he primarily (i) a spirit united accidentally with an
organism? Or (2) an organism with an accidental adjunct of
consciousness and intelligence? Or finally (3) both mind and
organism united by interaction, or by a substantial union, or
by the fact that both are only appearances or modes of the same
deeper reality?
2. Theories. The opinions concerning the nature and mode of
the union of body and soul are chiefly the following:
(a) According to Malebrahche (Occasionalism, or Theory of
Divine Assistance) and Leibniz (Preestablished Harmony), the
union is more apparent than real. Both agree on the general
principles that body and soul are two distinct and complete sub-
stances, and that no created substance can ever act on another.
According to Malebranche, the apparent interaction is due to
God's intervention in each and every case; according to Leibniz,
to the internal evolution of body and mind respectively, an evo-
lution which at every step corresponds in both substances, and
proceeds harmoniously owing to the Creator's infinite wisdom.
For Malebranche, soul and body proceed together like two inde-
pendent clocks that keep the same time because, whenever the
hands of one move, God moves the hands of the other correspond-
ingly. On the occasion of some organic processes, God produces in
32
482 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
the mind the corresponding conscious process, and, on the occa-
sion of some volition, God produces in the organism the correspond-
ing change. For Leibniz, soul and body proceed together like two
independent clocks that keep the same time because from the begin-
ning they were so constructed, so regulated, and endowed with such
an initial motion that they always agree, and that all the move-
ments of both correspond. The soul and the organism have
been set and regulated together from the beginning, and their
apparent interaction is but a harmony, and a perfect agreement
preestablished by God, the creator of both.
To-day, psychophysical parallelism is the offspring of these
views. Body and mind, or rather the bodily and the mental series,
parallelists are also phenomenalists proceed like two parallel
lines, keep the same pace, and yet never come in contact by any
interaction. Parallelism, as a psychological theory, is generally
explained philosophically on a monistic basis: Body and mind
are only appearances or modes of the same underlying reality.
(b) According to Descartes, man is essentially the soul or
spirit. The soul is essentially thought, and matter is essentially
extension. How are body and soul united? Descartes's answer
is not always consistent, (i) Sometimes, especially when answer-
ing objections, he speaks of this union as substantial. (2) Some-
times also he speaks of the interaction of two distinct substances.
The soul, located in the pineal gland, receives impressions from
the various parts of the organism, and sends back responses.
(3) Sometimes, unable to understand the possibility of an inter-
action between spirit and matter, he seems to give up the problem
as hopeless. To-day by those who admit the substantiality and
spirituality of the soul, interactionism is frequently given as the
bond of union, although it is not explainable.
(c) A few philosophers, like Cudworth (1617-1688) and Leclerc
(1657-1736), advocate a third substance, or plastic medium, as a
means of union. It partakes of both the spiritual and the mate-
rial nature, and serves to unite these opposites. To-day, some
spiritists also assume a body composed of a very subtle matter,
which they call the astral body.
(d) Psychological monism admits only one substance, which
UNION OF SOUL WITH BODY 483
manifests itself in two ways, consciousness and extension. These
are only modes and appearances of one and the same reality which
is unknown and unknowable, and which is neither body nor mind.
Some, however, give preference to the mind: The one substance
must be conceived rather as mind than as matter. Others give
preference to the organism, which is a conscious automaton, and
would act in exactly the same way, even without the accidental
adjunct of consciousness which is an epiphenomenon, or a light
thrown off by certain activities of the nervous system. Suppress
this adjunct, and the world will go on just as before, since conscious-
ness cannot act on the organism.
(e) Aristotle and the scholastics hold that body and soul are
two principles united in one complete substance, as matter and
form. Like every other material being, man is a composite sub-
stance, neither body nor soul separately, but the one substance
resulting from the intimate union of both. This one substance
is not, as in monistic theories, a primitive unknown substance with
two manifestations, but the result of the union of two co-principles.
This view is monistic in admitting a unity of substance; dualistic
in admitting two principles necessary to constitute this substance.
(Cf. above, pp. 428, 430, 436 ff.).
II. MAN ONE COMPOSITE SUBSTANCE
i. Man One Substance. (a) Among the functions and activ-
ities which man calls his own some are unconscious, at least
generally, like digestion, secretion, and circulation. Others are
conscious, either purely spiritual, or psychophysical, i.e. either inde-
pendent of, or dependent intrinsically on, the organism. All
these are attributed to the same subject: I live, walk, eat; I see,
hear, feel; I think, understand, reflect. I speak of my body and
of my mind, thereby implying that neither is my complete being.
This fact of consciousness shows that the complete man is not
simply the organism, nor simply the soul, but something one result-
ing from the union of both. It may be admitted that the soul is
the nobler part, but to say that it is the whole man, using the body
as an instrument, guiding and directing it, is to overlook one part
of the truth, for when we speak of ourselves or of other men, we
484 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
also refer to the organism. The fact that all functions, material
and spiritual, belong to the same person is inexplicable if the ego,
including body and soul, is not one.
(b) Moreover, the harmony of bodily and mental functions, and
their mutual dependence, suppose that man is one being composed
of body and soul, one nature tending to develop all its activities
for the good of the whole ego. Why should an intense mental
function affect organic processes, and vice versa, if mind and
organism are distinct substances? Why should mental work after
a meal interfere with the digestion if bodily and mental energies
are altogether distinct?
(c) These facts are overlooked by all theories of two distinct
substances, (i) We need not stop at the theories of occasional-
ism and preestablished harmony. Both are based on the false
assumption that creatures are incapable of activity. The mar-
vellous structure of the organism becomes meaningless, and all
the facts of physiological psychology are unexplainable. (2) A
plastic mediator will not restore man's substantial unity. Fur-
thermore, it is an impossibility, for, in order to serve as a binding
link between matter and spirit, it should be both spiritual and mate-
rial, and this involves a contradiction. (3) As to interaction, su-
perior though it is to the other theories, it does not explain man's
real unity, and it makes of the body an instrument of the soul
instead of an intrinsic part of man. Moreover, there is the insu-
perable difficulty of understanding how a spiritual substance and
matter can act on each other, since no contact is possible between
them. The soul, therefore, is not united to the organism like the
musician to his lyre, or the pilot to his vessel (Plato), and man is
not simply an intelligence that uses an organism. The union of
body and soul is more intimate, so as to form one substance which
is man.
2. Union of Body and Soul. (a) The only mode of union
which will account for this fact is that according to which the soul
is the substantial form of the body. If body and soul are two
complete substances, they may be brought close together, and
conceived as acting upon each other, but they will always remain
two distinct beings. Hence body and soul must be looked upon
UNION OF SOUL WITH BODY 485
as substantial principles, as primary matter and substantial form,
each one incomplete in itself, and calling for the other.
(b) Between the human composite and other material beings,
however, there is an important difference. In man the "forma
substantialis " is itself a spiritual substance, which is not altogether,
and for all its operations, intrinsically bound to matter. Other
forms, and inferior "souls," i.e. the vital principles of plants and
animals, exercise no activity except in and through matter. All
the activities of plants and animals are functions neither exclu-
sively of matter nor exclusively of the vital principle, but of both
together, i.e. of the animated organism, or, if you choose, of the
animating soul.
But, while the whole energy of the human body comes from the
soul as substantial form, the soul is not altogether immersed in
matter. In addition to vital and sensory activities which are
exercised through the animated organism, the soul has also spirit-
ual activities which are not exercised through any sense-organ.
However, even for its spiritual activities, the soul is not a pure
spirit. It requires the organism, since the senses are necessary
to supply the materials of spiritual activities. (Cf. p. 475.)
This union is not against, but in strict conformity with, the
nature of the human soul.
3. Double-Aspect Theory. (a) Descartes estranged body and
mind from each other, and united them only by an interaction.
Spinoza made of them two attributes of one and the same sub-
stance, and to-day monism or new Spinozism advocates the same
view. There is, and there can be, no interaction of mind and mat-
ter. Yet, as science shows the correspondence of both series of
processes, they must be called parallel. As they are different in
nature, they can never come in contact with each other. So far
this view is psycho physical parallelism, at which many psychologists
stop without going farther.
(b) But philosophy asks the reason of this parallelism. The
answer is given in the identity-hypothesis or double-aspect theory.
Neither the body nor the mind are substances; they are only
appearances of the same two-sided reality. They are like the
two aspects of the same curve, which is concave from within
486 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
and convex from without, or like the same story told in two
languages, or the same sum of money which is a debt for
one man and a credit for another. This psychophysical monism
is connected with panpsychism, universal monism, evolutionism,
and agnosticism. Frequently also it is but a covert material-
ism, when the one reality is identified with some form of matter,
and when a dependence is admitted of the mind on the organism,
but not of the organism on the mind.
Criticism, (a) The expression "psychophysical parallelism" is
objectionable; how can we speak of two utterly different series as
being parallel? They cannot be so in space since mental processes
are not spatial, and nothing proves that they are so in time, since
nothing proves that the mental series is continuous. If to every
mental process corresponds an organic process, there are appar-
ently many organic, and even cerebral, processes that are not
accompanied by any consciousness. Many parallelists inconsist-
ently admit that the psychical series is determined by the physio-
logical. Moreover, if it is completed by the identity-theory,
parallelism admits that parallels do meet in the unity of their
common substance.
(b) As to the "double-aspect" theory, it has to answer the ques-
tion: Is the double aspect universal for all kinds of matter, or is
the mental aspect to be found only in certain beings? If, with
some monists, we admit panpsychism without a shred of evi-
dence we have nevertheless to explain how two irreducible
series can come from the same principle. If, with others, we
reject panpsychism, the appearance of the psychical aspect
remains unexplained.
(c) To make of man a conscious automaton is opposed to con-
sciousness, which testifies that certain movements are undertaken
in consequence of visual, auditory, etc., perceptions, and of other
states of consciousness. Moreover, the evolution of the individual
and of the race, civilization, inventions, etc., are due to the desire
of producing certain pleasurable feelings of comfort and pleasure,
and of avoiding painful feelings. Finally, the existence of other
minds is known only indirectly from the various organic expres-
sions that are supposed to manifest mental states.
CONSEQUENCES OF UNION 487
(d) The expression "identity-theory" is also to be rejected.
I am not conscious of a universal substance, identical with the
one substance of all other things, but of my own substance, includ-
ing body and mind. And I distinguish this substance from all
other inanimate or animate substances. Here monists take ref-
uge in an agnostic position. The one substance of all things is
unknown and unknowable, and when safely intrenched there,
monists are proof against all attacks, for no question can be asked
them concerning what they declare to be unknowable. But is it
logical to make the unknowable account for things known? Many
things are in reality unknowable, but the unknowable must not
be made contradictory either with itself or with known facts and
the clear testimony of consciousness. This whole question will
have to be touched upon again from a more general standpoint
when we speak of monism as a world-wide theory.
II. CONSEQUENCES OF THE UNION
1. Only One Soul in Man. The arguments presented above
not only show that man is one substance, and that the soul is
the substantial form of the body, but also that there is only one
soul in man, which is at once the principle of spiritual activities,
of sensitive processes, and of vegetative, i.e. vital functions. Some
philosophers hold that there is a special vital principle, distinct
from the principle of consciousness. This seems to break the sub-
stantial unity of man as manifested in consciousness, and to offer
no satisfactory explanation of the intimate relations between the
two lives. A violent emotion may disturb the organism, and
even destroy life. In a number of ways the dependence of life
on the mind, and vice versa, is manifest. (See Psychology, pp. 190
ff.) This strengthens the testimony of consciousness that one
and the same substance lives and is also conscious.
2. The Seat of the Soul. We cannot speak of the locus, place,
or seat of the soul in the same way that we speak of the place
which a material being occupies, because the soul, being spiritual,
has no spatial relations (right, left, between, surrounded by, etc.).
Hence, when we ask where the soul is, we do not speak of a
488 PHILOSOPHYOF MIND
material localization, or of a contact, but simply of a substantial
and active presence, which cannot be imagined since the soul
cannot be perceived by the senses but only understood, and
even this imperfectly, owing to our habits of thinking of every-
thing in terms of matter.
Since the soul is the substantial form and the principle of life
of the human organism, it follows that it is not only in one part
of the body, but in the whole body which it animates, not as water
in a sponge, or blood in the veins, but as a co-principle, an indivis-
ible substance exercising its activity through the organism. The
soul, however, does not exercise its whole activity through the whole
organism. Different functions require different organs, and hence
are localized in these respective organs : vision in the visual, hear-
ing in the auditory, organs; memory in the brain, etc. As to the
spiritual activities, they are not exercised through the intrinsic
cooperation of the material co-principle, but by the soul alone,
as explained above.
3. Faculties. (i) The soul is one and, together with the
organism, forms the human substance. (2) As it is simple and
indivisible, faculties cannot be parts of the soul. (3) As it is the
principle of all determinations and activities in the body, faculties
cannot mean distinct agents, independent of the soul, acting and
reacting upon one another like so many substances. But with-
out meaning this, faculties may mean more than mere classifica-
tions or labels of functions. They mean the various modes of
activity of the soul, exercised either by the soul alone spiritual
faculties or by the soul and the organism united in one
common principle faculties of the compositum.
From what has been said on the seat of the soul in the organism,
it is clear that organic faculties are classified according to the vari-
ous functions of different organs. Hence some persons have
the exercise of faculties lacking in others. Vision is absent
in the blind because the necessary conditions are not verified.
If these were restored, the radical faculty would become capable
of exercise. It is impossible to determine the number of distinct
faculties; we can only group them according to different points
of view. Thus from one point of view we may have vegetative,
CONSEQUENCES OF UNION 489
sensitive, and intellectual faculties; from another, knowledge,
feelings, and will; from another, faculties of immanent or of
transitive activity, etc.
4. Mutual Dependence of Organism and Mind. In Psychol-
ogy (p. 190 ff.) mention was made of the reciprocal influences of
body and mind. We understand now how they must be conceived.
Not as if body and mind were two distinct substances, or two
distinct agents, acting upon each other. They rather act together.
Their union does not consist in an interaction, or mutual influ-
ence, but their mutual influence is the result of their substantial
union. We have not so much an interaction as a " simulaction,"
since body and mind form one man and one complete principle of
activity. Owing to this intimate union, whatever affects one also
affects the other.
5. Definitions. (i) The human soul is not only thought, or
the power of thinking, as Descartes claimed. It has other func-
tions equally essential. It is a spiritual substance, in the sense
already explained, destined, however, to be essentially united
with, and to give life to, the body. (2) Man is not merely a spirit
or intelligence; nor simply an organism, but the one substance
composed of two principles. He is body and mind united in one
complete substance.
CHAPTER IV
ORIGIN OF THE SOUL AND OF MAN
The Problem Stated. (a) In the problem of origin several
questions must be distinguished. Owing to its spiritual nature,
the soul's origin must be studied apart from that of the organism.
Moreover, the problem may refer either to the origin of individual
men organism or soul now, in the present condition of man;
or to the origin of the first man. Hence the following questions:
(i) Origin of the human organism. (2) Origin of the human soul.
(3) Antiquity and specific unity of mankind.
(b) The main suppositions that can be made are the following:
(i) The first man was created by God, both as to his body and as
to his soul. At present, however, the organism arises by way of
generation, and the soul (a) arises also by generation, or (b) is
directly created by God. (2) The first man's soul was created
by God and subsequent souls originate in either way mentioned
above. His organism was the result of an evolution from lower
forms of animal life. (3) The whole man, body and soul, is a
product qf evolution.
I. THE HUMAN ORGANISM
It is clear that actually the human organism arises by a process
of generation similar to that which takes place in other living
beings. Arising from a primitive cell, it gradually develops into
a complete organism. Hence the present question refers only to the
appearance of the first human organism. We know that man did
not always exist. Did his organism arise by a direct creation of
God, or by an evolution from other types which existed before man
appeared on the earth?
I. THE EVIDENCE
N.B. Transformists do not claim that man evolved out of any
actually existing type, but that man and the higher apes, known
490
ORIGIN OF ORGANISM 491
as anthropoid, sprang from a common ancestor less differen-
tiated than either man or ape.
1. Arguments for Descent. It must be admitted that many of
the arguments brought forward in Cosmology in favor of the the-
ory of transformism apply also to man, and the remarks made
there on the value of these arguments must be kept in mind.
Thus there is a morphological resemblance on the main lines
between the human and other vertebrate organisms. A similar
chemical composition of the blood and the tissues may also be
pointed out. Rudimentary organs may be indicated. Embry-
ology may show that the human organism develops in a manner
closely resembling that of other vertebrates. When all this has
been done and it has frequently been done in a one-sided way
in order to prove a thesis the fact of descent remains unproved,
and transformism, when applied to man, as well as in the case of
many other forms of life, is a mere hypothesis.
2. Difficulties. (a) Resemblances must not make us overlook
differences, among which may be mentioned the vertical attitude,
and the adaptation of the lower limbs for this purpose; the relative
length of arms, much shorter in man than in the ape; the general
morphology of the head; the absence of hair, etc.; and especially
the quantitative and qualitative development of the brain.
(b) The main stumbling-block of the theory of descent is the
absence of paleontological evidence, notwithstanding the fact
that man is of comparatively recent origin, hence that remains
of forms of transition should be found more easily, and that dili-
gent research has been made in this direction, in order to find the
much sought for "missing link." That such "missing link "
between man and ape does not now exist is admitted. As to its
existence in the past, much ado has been made about the discov-
ery of certain fossils, especially skulls, which, however, more calm
and reflective science has shown to belong certainly either to apes
or to well-developed races of men.
II. CONCLUSIONS
i. Scientifically, i.e. judging only from the facts at hand, the
theory of descent as applied to the human body is not proved,
492 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
but remains a mere hypothesis with insufficient evidence. This
is acknowledged by the best scientists, who are not led by a priori
conceptions, but want their conclusions to rest on established facts.
To give more or less vivid pictures of "primitive man," and of
his evolution out of inferior organisms to the present form, to
indulge in numberless suppositions, is to pass from the realm of
science to that of imagination, and to take dreams for realities.
2. Philosophically there is nothing contradictory or unlikely
in the theory of descent as applied to the human organism any
more than in the general theory of evolution. It is a question of
fact which is not to be answered a priori.
II. THE HUMAN SOUL
By zoologists man is classified and rightly as a vertebrate
and a mammal with certain anatomical and physiological charac-
teristics. Rightly, I say, because zoology considers only one aspect
of man, namely, his organism. But there is something more in
man. The reason for differentiating him essentially from animals
is not his organism, but his soul. Zoology is not competent to
pass a final judgment on the place of the whole man in nature, for
it leaves out of consideration man's nobler part, namely, his mind.
I. THE FIRST HUMAN SOUL
i. Not a Result of Evolution. (a) Starting either from zoolog-
ical considerations or from monistic views of a universal evolution,
certain philosophers are led to assert that the whole man, body
and mind, is the result of evolution. Hence, for them, the necessity
of admitting between the human and the animal mind, not a spe-
cific difference, but only a difference of degree. Animals must
have at least rudiments of whatever mental manifestations are
found in man. Either the human mind is animalized, i.e. lowered
so as to show that all its activities are reducible to sensory activ-
ities, and that, in consequence, it is not spiritual; or the animal
mind is humanized, i.e. raised so as to show that it possesses
at least in some degree the specifically human activities. By
this twofold process the human mind is successfully (?) linked
to the animal mind, and the obstacle to evolution removed.
ORIGIN OF SOUL 493
(6) But, as was shown when we spoke of the soul's spirituality,
to interpret the actions of animals humano modo, i.e. to assert
that animals act in the same way, and from the same motives as
man, should not be done when we have evidence to the contrary.
To any fact only the minimum of necessary cause should be as-
cribed, since the surplus, i.e. that which is over and above the strict
requisite, is asserted gratuitously. After a great deal of talk about
animal intelligence, it is commonly accepted to-day that the power
of abstract and universal thought remains the fundamental dis-
tinctive feature of the human mind. It constitutes an impas-
sable gulf between animal and man.
2. Created by God. How could this gulf be bridged over?
How could a difference in kind arise? How could the first man's
spiritual soul be produced? Some simply assert that they do not
know, and that some cause unknown to science must have been
at work. This is a strictly scientific position. Others, from the
point of view of philosophy, recognize the intervention of God's
creative power. Only an infinite cause can bring to existence some-
thing out of nothing. The spiritual cannot arise from the mate-
rial. Hence, whatever be said of the human organism, the human
soul at least is the direct work of God. This view supposes, of
course, what will be said in Theodicy concerning God's existence
and nature.
II. SUBSEQUENT HUMAN SOULS
i. Various Opinions. If God's creative act was necessary for
the production of the first human soul, is it so for subsequent
human souls? Or can the parents transmit to their offspring, not
only organic life, but also the spiritual soul which animates the
organism, and yet in some of its activities is independent of it?
This problem is distinct from the preceding, for in the present case
the parents are endowed already with a spiritual soul. Two
main solutions are offered: (i) Every individual soul is created
directly by God. (2) The soul of the offspring comes from the
parents either (a) by the material organic process of generation, or
(b) by a kind of spiritual generation in which the offspring's soul
is derived from the parental soul. Of these solutions (i), or
494 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
creationism, is commonly accepted by Catholic philosophers and
theologians; (2, a), or traducianism, was held by Tertullian; (2,
Z>), or generationism, was held by a few Catholic theologians,
especially Froschammer, who was reproved by the Church.
2. Criticism. (a) (i) Traducianism is impossible. Either it
denies the spirituality of the soul; or, if it admits it, it does not
assign to the soul an adequate cause, since spirit cannot arise from
matter. (2) Generationism is also impossible. A spiritual semen
would suppose the division of the parents' soul, and this is opposed
to the very spirituality and indivisibility of the soul. (3) Hence,
since the soul cannot originate from any preexistent reality,
whether material or spiritual, the only possible mode of production
of the soul is a production out of nothing, i.e. a creation. Is there
any other possibility which the necessity hi which we are of think-
ing of spiritual substances according to material analogies pre-
vents us from knowing? To this no answer can be given.
(b) We may note that (i) the divine creation of every individual
soul is not a miracle, but an action strictly in accordance with the
laws of nature, since it is the nature of the soul to be unproducible
in any other way; (2) the parents are really parents since their
action is the cause of a human being, just as we say that the mur-
derer kills a man although he does not destroy his soul, which,
as we shall see, is immortal; (3) heredity is easily explained by
the dependence of the mind on the organism.
3. Time of Origin. At what tune does the soul begin to exist?
Some suppose that souls exist before the organism. Thus Plato,
many Origenists, and Leibniz. This theory of preexistence is
frequently held in connection with metempsychosis (Pythagoras),
or the doctrine of reincarnation advocated by Eastern thinkers,
and by theosophists. But we say that the soul is produced only at
the time of its union with the organism. Preexistence is a purely
gratuitous assertion without the slightest evidence. Moreover,
since the soul is naturally the form of the body, it follows that it
must begin to exist when the time comes for it to "inform " the
body. When is this time? Is it immediately at conception, so
that the first principle of life is the spiritual soul? Or is it some
time later so that at first the principle of life is of an inferior kind,
MANKIND 495
and animates the organism until it is sufficiently developed to
receive the spiritual soul? This cannot be determined, but the
former opinion is the more common to-day.
III. MANKIND
The questions of the specific unity and antiquity of mankind
are to be answered by geological, ethnological, and anthropolog-
ical sciences. Here we shall simply give the main conclusions
without entering into the detailed account of the facts on which
they are based.
I. SPECIFIC UNITY OF MANKIND
The question of the specific unity of mankind is not identical
with the question of the community of origin from the same first
ancestors. Both questions, however, are closely connected. If
all men belong to the same species, it is at once, if not demonstrated,
at least highly probable, that all come from the same first parents.
And, in fact, historically the two questions have been looked upon
as correlative.
i. Races. Some differences are always found between indi-
vidual men. Much more striking are the differences between cer-
tain groups of men forming what has been called different races
e.g. differences in color, size, relative development of certain parts,
hair, etc. Many attempts have been made to classify the vari-
ous races of mankind according to some characteristic feature.
As a basis some have taken the color of the skin ; others the facial
angle; others the peculiarities of the hair; others the geographical
distribution; others the language, etc. It is admitted that none
of these classifications is perfectly satisfactory, as there is no clear-
cut distinction between the many human types.
However, such classifications are useful, and among the main
ones may be mentioned the following. Blumenbach distinguishes
five races: Caucasian (white), Mongolian (yellow), Ethiopian
(black), American (red), and Malay (brown). Cuvier distinguishes
three races: Caucasian (white), Mongolian (yellow), and Negro
(black). Huxley admits four races: Australioid, Negroid, Mongo-
loid, and Xantocroic (white). Others have admitted many more
496 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
distinct races, while those who admit a smaller number are obliged
to subdivide them.
2. Unity of Species. While we must admit several races or vari-
eties of men, there is absolutely no reason for admitting several
species. Facts, on the contrary, show the specific unity of
mankind.
(a) All men have the same anatomical organization and physio-
logical functions (upright attitude, blood temperature, number of
teeth and bones, general structure, etc.). Interracial fecundity is
also general, and the offspring of parents belonging to different
races are also prolific. Finally all have the same essential and
fundamental characteristics of intelligence, e.g. language, use of
tools, religion, capacity for progress, etc.
(b) The differences between human races are less important than
the differences within certain animal and vegetable groups the
common origin of which is beyond doubt. These differences can
be explained easily by the influence of surroundings, climate, food,
isolation from, or association with, other men, etc. The main
differences between men do not indicate a specific diversity.
Everywhere and at all times man is truly man, and has the same
essential characteristics.
II. ANTIQUITY OF MAN
i. The Question. History cannot tell us how long man has
existed on the earth, because it always refers to groups of men
already in existence. Moreover, the chronology of early histor-
ical documents is most uncertain. Hence recourse must be had
to natural sciences, especially geology, so as to find traces of
man in the form either of fossil remains or of tools and results of
human activity. This can never lead to an accurate chronology,
because geologists differ widely as to the time necessary for the for-
mation of the various strata of the earth. The existence of man in
the tertiary era is, to say the least, very doubtful. The first un-
mistakable signs of the existence of man are found at the begin-
ning of the quaternary era. How long a time has elapsed since then
it is impossible to determine. Some give as high a number as 2 50,000
or 300,000 years, but without sufficient foundation, as this lapse of
MANKIND
497
time does not seem necessary to explain the transformations of
the earth. Nothing certain can be said on this point.
2. Primitive Man. There is no evidence that the primi-
tive state of man was a state of savagery, but rather that the state
of savagery is one of degradation and degeneration from a higher
condition. Evolutionists generally hold the contrary. For them,
the savage is the backward man, less evolved, nearer to primitive
man, and therefore to animality. It is impossible to reach any
general law applicable to all cases. We may, however, state the
following facts.
(a) Through the successive ages of man's existence, no essential
physical differences are observed in human fossils, and the differ-
ences between races now extinct and those existing to-day are not
greater than the differences between the various actual races.
(b) Unmistakable signs of true intelligence, and of a truly human
mind, are found wherever primitive man existed. That he did
not have so much science, comfort, or what we call civilization, is
certain; but it is no less certain that he had the use of reason as
well as we have, based on the same power of abstract and univer-
sal knowledge. And even to-day, whether a child will be a simple
countryman or a great scientist depends greatly on circumstances,
and the countryman may have more intelligence than the scien-
tist, even if he lacked the opportunity to develop or manifest it.
Hence neither on the organic nor on the mental side can any
transitional type be found between man and animal.
(c) Some of the savage races actually existing are known
historically to have come from more civilized races (e.g. the Fue-
gians, Bushmen). Others give clear signs that they are degen-
erates, either by the traces of an ancient civilization (monuments,
paintings, etc.), like those of the American Indians, especially in
Mexico; or by their language, which, like that of the Australians
and the Fuegians, is very rich in words, declensions, and gram-
matical forms. When thrown into unfavorable circumstances, the
most highly civilized man returns promptly to a kind of savage
condition.
33
CHAPTER V
IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL
The last problem to be examined is that of the destiny of man,
and especially of his soul. After stating the question, we shall
examine successively the possibility and the fact of immortality.
I. THE QUESTION STATED
I. DEATH
1. The Law of Death. Common experience shows that, after
a longer or shorter time, organisms cease to live. The law of
death applies to all living beings, at least to all those that are more
highly differentiated. Certain unicellular beings are reproduced
by simple fission. Death does not occur, but the mother-cell,
by fission, gives rise to two independently living cells. This, how-
ever, cannot be called true immortality, because nothing proves
that the individual mother-cell persists in its own life; it may
disappear when giving rise to two different individuals. At any
rate, although this kind of immortality would be "natural," death
would result from a number of accidental causes. Limiting our-
selves to higher organisms, and with special reference to man, we
see that, sooner or later, life disappears, and the organism becomes
a corpse.
2. The Duration of Life varies greatly with the different species
of organisms, both vegetal and animal. Although there is more
constancy within the same species, yet, even there, great varia-
tions are observed. It must also be noted that physiologists
agree that comparatively few men die a natural death. The major-
ity die of some special disease before the system is worn out.
If we ask why, apart from accidental death, one man lives longer
than another, we find that the length of life depends on many
IMMORTALITY 499
factors. Among the most important are natural endowments
and heredity: a man is born with a strong or a weak constitution;
the struggle for life (climate, food-supply, labor, struggle against
micro-organisms, etc.); the mode of life (kind of work, use and
abuse of certain foods and drinks, drugs, pleasures, etc.); mental
life in its various aspects; the rest or unrest of organic and
mental activity: some live "faster" than others.
But when this has been said, the question remains: Why is
death a necessity of nature? Why cannot the same organism that
has grown and developed hold its own instead of decaying? Why
cannot the same vital principle or soul continue the work which it
was formerly capable of doing? It must be confessed that death,
like generation, is a mystery. When we have said that it is a law
of nature hardly anything more can be said. We simply note
that no objection can be drawn from this fact against the exist-
ence of the vital principle or soul. Vital functions are essentially
dependent on matter. It is matter that lives, and the difficulty
confronts not only those who admit a principle of life, but also
those who try to explain life simply by physical and chemical
forces. Why cannot these forces do always what they do in the
beginning?
3. The Main Signs of Death are the lividity of the face; the cold-
ness and rigidity of the muscles; the absence of certain reflexes
(e.g. of the contraction of the pupil when a light is brought near
the eyes); the absence of muscular contraction, respiration, and
circulation; in a word, the cessation of characteristic vital functions.
These signs, however, are not infallible, for there are cases in
which life remains latent without manifesting itself; hence the pre-
cise time of death cannot be determined. The only certain sign
of death is the decomposition of the organism, first into cells that
may for some time continue to live independently, and lastly
into inorganic particles, which again may enter into the composi-
tion of new organisms. In the first stage, certain vital functions
may still be performed: secretion, digestion, reflexes, nutrition
(e.g. by blood transfusion), growth of hair and nails, etc. But the
principle of unity in the organism is absent, and after a relatively
short time all manifestations of life cease.
500 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
II. THE QUESTION OF IMMORTALITY
1. Meaning of Immortality. (a) At death, the principle of
life in plants and animals disappears, since it was only an essential
part of the compositum, and had no existence or activity except
in and through matter. It simply ceases to be, as the spherical
shape of a wax ball disappears when the wax is given another shape,
or, more properly, as the substantial form of any substance dis-
appears when this substance is changed into another. Hence the
present question of immortality applies only to the human
soul.
(b) The assertion that the human soul is immortal means that
the soul does not cease to exist with the body, but that, after death,
it continues to exist forever as an active and conscious reality, (i)
We are not satisfied, therefore, with the poor substitute offered
by materialists and positivists who admit only a metaphorical
immortality, consisting in a man's enduring works, his influence,
glory, good name, the love and admiration of mankind. What is,
for us, the use of all this, if we are no longer? And can we say
that future glory given by posterity is in proportion to man's worth?
(2) Nor are we satisfied with the pantheistic conception of immor-
tality, according to which, it is true, the soul survives forever,
but without its consciousness and personality being absorbed in
the Great All, a part or emanation of which it is, or engulfed
in the great ocean of unconsciousness and inactivity like the
Buddhistic Nirvana.
2. The Attitudes Regarding Immortality are affirmation, nega-
tion, and doubt.
(a) The affirmation of immortality may be based on (i) purely
rational grounds: the nature of the soul, and its aspirations; (2)
chiefly ethical grounds: the fact of morality and the necessity of a
future sanction; (3) religious grounds: the existence and nature of
God, and (4) the fact of a divine revelation; (5) empirical grounds:
the facts of spiritism, in which the departed souls are supposed to
manifest themselves. The first two lines of argument go together.
The third also completes them as far as the rational knowledge
of God is concerned. The argument from divine revelation,
THE SOUL IS IMMORTAL 501
which does not belong to philosophy, is distinct altogether. So
also is the empirical argument.
(b) The denial of immortality may be based on an analogy
with the general laws of nature, e.g. the law of death for every
organism; the nature of the soul, its dependence on the organism,
and its consequent incapacity to exist and act by itself.
(c) The agnostic position is an attitude according to which neither
the affirmation nor the negation of immortality is sufficiently
justified. We do not know; at most we may be allowed to have
hopes. This view may be based on many grounds, among which
the positivistic claim that nothing is certain except what
experience can verify.
N.B. (i) The present problem is closely related to ethical prob-
lems and to the existence and nature of God. Here we assume
the theistic position which will be justified in Theodicy, that
is, the existence of a personal God, creator of the world, infinitely
wise, good, and just. (2) The various reasons for immortality
must not be considered separately as complete and independent
arguments, but rather as forming together one whole and com-
plete argument.
II. POSSIBILITY AND FACT OF IMMORTALITY
I. POSSIBILITY
i. Dependence of the Soul on the Organism. (a) An objec-
tion is suggested immediately by the fact that the soul is the sub-
stantial form of the organism, that the two together form only
one complete nature, and have only one existence. How, then,
can the soul survive the organism? Moreover, does not the soul
share all the organic changes and vicissitudes? It begins with
the organism, grows with it, becomes old with it. It must also
cease to exist with it.
(b) We must remember that, if the soul is the substantial form
of the organism, it is nevertheless a spiritual substance. All that
the organism is, it owes to its union with the soul. But it is not
true to say of the human soul that all it is, it owes to its union
502 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
with the organism. This is true of the soul only as the
principle of life and sensation, not as the principle of intel-
lectual and volitional activities which, in themselves, are spirit-
ual. In this sense alone is it true to say that the soul shares the
fate of the organism. Owing to their dependence on the senses,
intellectual activities seem to grow with the organism, and they
may be impaired for the same reason. But frequently intellec-
tual activities are exercised as perfectly as ever when the organ-
ism has become old, weak, and diseased.
2. Activities of the Soul. (a) The dependence of the soul on
the organism, whether it be extrinsic or intrinsic, must make it
impossible for the soul to act at all once it is separated from the
organism. If it remains, it cannot be said to survive, that is, to
outlive the organism, since life, i.e. activity, consciousness, intel-
lection, becomes impossible. And what would be the good of such
a bare and dead persistence?
(b) We admit that such a persistence is not what we seek, nor
what we claim. We want a living and active survival. It is cer-
tain also that the functions which the soul exercises in common
with the organism cannot remain, except, we may say, "in radice";
i.e. the soul retains these faculties as mere "potentiae." Suppos-
ing that the essential conditions of their exercise be verified again,
the soul will be able to exercise them.
But what about its own spiritual activities? The soul separated
from the body cannot acquire ideas in the same way that it does
now, by elaborating materials furnished by the senses; nor can it
express ideas by language. We must remember that the depend-
ence of the spiritual soul on the organism is only extrinsic, and that
intellectual activity itself is spiritual. Hence if materials can be
secured elsewhere, this activity can be exercised.
Where can these be found? The soul can preserve ideas acquired
in the present life. Moreover, by reflection it can know itself and
its own processes, and from these acquire many ideas. By the
elaboration of these ideas many others may be inferred. Finally,
by communication with other souls and spirits, much knowledge
may be acquired. The love of the good, and admiration for
perfection, will follow knowledge. Moreover, it may safely be
THE SOUL IS IMMORTAL 503
said that, if God keeps the soul in existence, He will give it the
means of knowing all that interests it, even things and events of
this world. Of course, reason alone cannot carry us very far,
since our knowledge of spiritual substances is very imperfect.
It can show only that it is not impossible for certain activities of
the soul to be exercised, although we do not understand positively
the manner of this exercise, nor the mode of communication
between spirits.
II. PROOFS OF IMMORTALITY
The proofs of immortality may be reduced to three: teleolog-
ical, ethical, and ontological. To these some secondary proofs
are added.
i. Teleological. The end, purpose, and destiny of any being
are known from its structure, aptitude, tendency, and activity.
Man has capacities, aspirations, tendencies, and activities which
are not realized or fulfilled in this life. Therefore they point to a
future life.
(a) The major of this argument is the principle of teleology or
finality, which is used extensively, especially in biological sciences.
It states the universal law that a being's destiny is known from its
activity. In organisms there is always a correlation between an
organ and its function and the mode of this function. The
presence of an organ is always taken as a sign of an appropriate
activity, and of an adaptation of all other organs in conformity
with this activity. From one single fossil bone, the structure of
the whole animal to which it belongs may be inferred by the nat-
uralist. If one organ is modified, others are modified accordingly.
The organization manifests the mode of life, the kind of food used,
the various instincts, and so on. Man must be included in the
same law, and his destiny will be known from his activities.
(b) The minor of the argument states that man has aspirations
which are not fulfilled here on earth. It rests on psychological
facts of intellect and will.
(i) Intellect. In the first place human thought is not enclosed
within any temporal or spatial limits, nor within the limits of con-
tingent, actual, finite beings. It rises above space and time.
504 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
Beyond the present it foresees the future, and has the idea of an
endless duration. It longs for what is perfect, necessary, and uni-
versal. It conceives the possibility of a life free from the many
physical and moral evils of the present life. Moreover, the human
intellect seeks for truth, and will never be satisfied with fragments
of truth. And yet how little is known now! The knowledge which
we acquire moves a little farther the boundaries of our ignorance,
but opens new unexplored regions and increases our desire to know.
Sciences are not sufficient, we want science, full, complete, and
perfect, free from incertitude, and all-embracing. If the human
intellect has a destiny, it is the possession of such truth.
(2) Will. Man inevitably seeks happiness, not partial, but
complete. No goods satisfy him; he wants the good, the perfect
and unmixed good, the fulness of life, the satisfaction of all human
desires. Evidently such happiness is found nowhere in this
life. Neither wealth, nor art, nor science, nor anything else can
give it. We find only aspects or parts of happiness, which increase
our craving for a more perfect happiness.
(c) (i) The conclusion is that, if man's mind moves in the per-
fect, the eternal, and the infinite, it is because it is destined to the
perfect, the eternal, and the infinite. Otherwise man is an exception
on the earth. The animal's instincts and cravings find their own
satisfaction in nature. How can man's highest aspirations be
baffled? Is he alone in creation endowed with aimless tenden-
cies and with needs which he cannot satisfy? (2) The argument
is more forcible if we consider that these higher aspirations are
stronger in proportion as man is more perfect. As man acquires more
knowledge and happiness, it would seem that he should be better
satisfied, and that his cravings should decrease. We know that
the reverse takes place. The greatest scientists, artists, and saints
are those whose aspirations and desires are the strongest for truth,
beauty, and virtue. (3) This merely rational consideration is
strengthened when we look upon God as the author of human
nature. Since He is all wise and all good, He must satisfy the
yearnings which He has given to man.
(d) This argument points to a future life, conscious and per-
sonal, and without end since no happiness is perfect if there is
THE SOUL IS IMMORTAL 505
the fear of losing it. It does not apply to infants, and applies
less perfectly to men whose minds are less developed. It also
leaves out of consideration the punishment for the wicked, whose
aspirations after happiness will never be satisfied if their chastise-
ment is eternal. Here, however, we touch upon the ground of
apologetics and theology.
2. Ethical. There is a moral order. This order requires a
future life. Therefore the soul survives after death.
(a) The existence of the moral order, including the sense of obli-
gation, the essential distinction of right and wrong, the categor-
ical imperative, the fact of conscience, etc., has been shown in
Ethics.
(b) How does this order require a future life? (i) Because
otherwise it would not be order, but disorder; not a rational, but
an irrational condition. Obedience to the dictates of conscience
cannot ultimately have an evil result. Compliance with the moral
law cannot ultimately result in man's unhappiness; otherwise man
would be a contradiction to himself. Right conduct cannot
be man's condemnation to misery. The accomplishment of duty
cannot be the cause of man's unhappiness. In other words,
honesty and dishonesty, the practice of justice and of injustice,
virtue and vice, cannot have the same final issue, otherwise moral-
ity itself is but an illusion, and the natural conclusion is: "Enjoy
yourself here on earth, no matter by what means; the rascal's
and the saint's final condition is the same." The sacrifices which
a man has to impose on himself to obey the voice of conscience
cannot make his lot worse than that of the debauchee. (2) We
have seen in Ethics that no satisfactory sanction is found in this
life. Yet, if there is justice and reason in the world, good must
be rewarded and evil punished.
(c) Hence the conclusion that, if the moral order is rational,
a future life is necessary. This conclusion becomes still more
forcible in the theistic conception of an infinitely just God on
whom ultimately morality rests, and who will not fail to give to
every man according to his merits.
(d) This argument shows the necessity of a future life, conscious
and personal, but it does not show that such a life must be
506 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
endless. Temporary rewards and punishments might suffice. Nor
does it apply to infants, or to those who, owing to mental defects,
are not capable of morality.
3. Ontological. The human soul, either in itself or on account
of its dependence on the organism, has no principle of destruc-
tion. Moreover, no external cause will destroy it. Therefore it
will endure forever.
(a) In itself the soul is a simple and spiritual substance, hence
not divisible. It cannot be resolved into parts or principles. Its
dependence on the organism is not intrinsic. Being spiritual, the
soul can exist and act without the organism. It does not, there-
fore, perish on account of its union with the organism. This is
but a consequence of what was said above (pp. 501 ff., 474 ff.).
(b) The only external cause that could destroy the soul is God.
Although this is, absolutely speaking, possible to God, we have
reasons to assert that it will not take place. In His wisdom, He
will not annihilate a substance which He has made incorruptible
by nature. In His goodness, He will not frustrate man's highest
and noblest aspirations. In His justice, He will not leave man
without retribution for his deeds. In His holiness, He will not
suffer vice to be finally equal to virtue.
(c) This argument shows the soul's ability to survive the
organism, and when completed by considerations from theodicy,
psychology, and ethics, it acquires its full force.
4. Secondary and Insufficient Proofs. (a) Notwithstanding
the lack of empirical evidence for immortality it is a fact that
belief in it is universal among men, past and present, civilized
and barbarous, ignorant and learned, as their writings, practices,
funeral rites, etc., show. This belief is a sign of truth, as it can
be explained only by the naturalness and necessity of immor-
tality. This consideration is important, but only secondary,
because this common belief is ultimately based on the arguments
given above, explicitly or implicitly recognized. Moreover, the
unanimity is only moral. Numerous individual exceptions are
to be found, and some nations, especially in the East, do not seem
to admit a personal, perhaps not even a conscious, immortality.
(b) The organism is not annihilated; how can the nobler part
THE SOUL IS IMMORTAL '507
of man perish? It is true that the law of the conservation of mat-
ter must be admitted, but the organism as such is destroyed. Its
elements are changed and enter new combinations. To be worth
anything, this consideration must be based on the soul's substan-
tiality and spirituality.
(c) The proof from a natural desire of perpetual life is included
in the proof from the aspirations of man.
(d) Plato's argument from the eternal preexistence of the soul
must be rejected, as has been said when speaking of the origin of
the soul.
(e) We cannot admit the empirical proof given by spiritists,
as the nature of spiritistic manifestations is far from known.
Do any spirits manifest themselves, and, if so, who are they?
These questions are not answered satisfactorily at present.
5. Cumulative Value of the Arguments. We cannot here
speak ex cathedra and state what absolute value these arguments
have, and how they must be received by everybody. Evidently
they produce no mathematical certitude. They do not give a
direct and immediate knowledge of the soul's immortality. But,
when taken together, they give more than a mere probable hope.
The more we look upon it, the more wisely and rationally con-
structed this universe seems to be, and the more impossible it ap-
pears that the soul should perish. It may be added that the
three main arguments presented separately show the same thing
from different angles, namely, the nature of the soul; hence
all centre around the ontological proof to which they may be re-
duced. There is, however, a reason for distinguishing them, as
the first two are more easily understood, and do not presuppose
so many abstract reasonings on the nature of the soul. They seem
to be more living and more practical.
6. Conclusion. But how many questions these arguments
leave without answer, especially concerning the future state of
the soul. They show that this life is only a preparation; but a
preparation for what? What is the nature of the happiness which
the soul is destined to enjoy, and of the retribution for the good and
the wicked? Here divine revelation completes the proofs of rea-
son, and tells us what reason cannot see. The very dogma of the
508 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
resurrection of the body is in perfect accordance with the exi-
gencies of the human soul as the substantial form of the organism.
God has lifted the veil that covers the great beyond. We know
whither we are going, and the meaning of this life becomes clearer.
It is a time of trial and probation, short, and yet all-important.
Time is a preparation for eternity. We now live in the shadows,
grasp only parts and fragments of the truth, enjoy only partial
happiness, meet unjust treatment, etc. None of our highest fac-
ulties is fully satisfied. The full reality will come in the posses-
sion of the Infinite Truth, Goodness, and Justice.
CONCLUSION
HUMAN PERSONALITY
As we concluded Psychology by some general considerations on
character and personality, we may also conclude this treatise by
a more accurate definition of the meaning of person and person-
ality. Strictly speaking, although the distinction is not always ob-
served, person and personality stand in the same mutual relation
as white and whiteness, animal and animality, etc. One is con-
crete; the other, abstract. Personality includes the distinctive
characteristics of a person.
(a) For common experience, (i) Person is practically the same
as, and coextensive with, human being. Only men are persons,
and all men are persons. Infants are looked upon as persons in
somewhat the same manner that a tiger-whelp is looked upon
as a carnivorous animal, i.e. inchoatively. (2) Hence a person
includes both body and soul. A wax figure or a corpse is not a
person; nor is a disembodied soul a person, at least completely.
Yet some current expressions refer chiefly to the body, and others
to the mind (e.g. personal charms, a strong personality). (3)
Personification consists in attributing to things distinctly human
features, especially mental features. Might and power (thun-
der), usefulness or necessity (sun), mysteriousness (automata),
motion and apparent purpose (animals), order and harmony
(nature), are among the most important causes of the process
of personification.
(b) In psychology, which insists on the mental factors of per-
sonality, the main elements of a person are (i) self -consciousness;
(2) self-conscious memory, i.e. the awareness of personal iden-
tity; (3) activity, purpose, and will.
(c) In ethics, a person is (i) an agent, (2) having the knowledge
of right and wrong, and (3) a certain autonomy, freedom, and
509
510 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
responsibility. Hence not all men are persons, since not all have
these faculties (e.g. children, insane people). Nor are all actions
of persons always personal (e.g. actions performed during a blind-
ing passion).
(d) In law. (i) Person includes both body and mind (e.g.
murder and assault, slander and calumny are personal wrongs).
(2) Infants are persons, at least for certain rights which they
possess (e.g. life, property). (3) Some men are not persons with
regard to certain rights (e.g. outlaws). (4) Several men together
may be looked upon as one person in certain cases and for certain
purposes (e.g. corporations).
(e) Philosophically a human person is not merely consciousness
and memory, for these are personal activities, and hence already
suppose a person as the agent. It implies (i) a concrete human
nature, i.e. body and soul united in one complete substance, to-
gether with the activities springing from this nature; (2) an in-
communicability of essence, i.e. the distinction from everything
and from every other person.
THEODICY OR THE STUDY
OF GOD
INTRODUCTION
i. Subject-Matter of Theodicy. (a) We must now rise above
the visible or sensible world to the ultimate cause, principle, and
lawgiver of the world. We see that beings depend on one another,
are caused by one another, rest on one another, and this naturally
suggests the question: What is the first source of dependence and
causality? Is it in the world itself, or outside of it? This is
the problem of God, for by God has always been meant the
independent being, the cause and the ruler of the world.
Analogically with the names of many other sciences, this inves-
tigation would aptly be called "Theology" (0os, God, and Aoyos)
were not this term applied almost exclusively to a special mode of
the study of God and of divine things, namely, that which is based
on a revelation from God himself. The present investigation is
carried on with the exclusive light of reason. It may be called
" Rational," or " Natural Theology," but is more frequently called
"Theodicy" (#>s, and 8"% justification or judgment). It
starts from facts, and with the help of principles, establishes
(i) the existence of God, (2) His nature, (3) His relations to
the world.
(b) It is impossible at the outset to give a definition of God,
since this would suppose already the knowledge of God. We want
to find the sufficient and necessary explanation of the world, to
determine whether it must be looked for within or without the
world, and what nature belongs to this first principle. To start
with the supposition that God is an infinitely perfect being, dis-
tinct from the world, is to limit the range of the question, and also
5"
512 THEODICY
to anticipate the answer. Moreover, the only reason that could
justify such a starting-point would be the common use of the term
" God," and we know that the meaning of this term has not always
been the same, and is not always the same to-day. The gods of
ancient and modern polytheism, the god of India, the God of
Christians, etc., are not identical. Hence, as the term "God" is
not univocal, we abstain now from giving a definition. Here God
means the ultimate explanation of the whole universe of matter and
mind.
2. The Importance of Theodicy is evident from the nature of its
subject-matter, for, as long as we have not reached the ultimate
cause of the world, we have no final explanation. It completes
the sciences of the world of matter (physical and cosmological),
and of the world of mind (psychological and ethical), and
indicates the duties of man toward God.
Theodicy is a branch of metaphysics, and supposes what has been
said above on the possibility of metaphysics, and on the theory
and value of knowledge. Positivists and agnostics deny that such
an investigation is of any utility, since they claim that no knowl-
edge is possible except that of phenomena which is acquired
through experience. But we know that positivism is a one-sided
view, and that, while admitting the validity of experience only, it
is unable to account for this experience without implying and using
principles transcending experience. Science is the arrangement
and interpretation of experience by reason. Physical science,
not only leads to, but essentially implies in itself, some metaphysics.
N.B. This treatise should be supplemented by courses in
Apologetics and Religion. For this reason we shall limit ourselves
here to the statement and explanation of the most fundamental
principles.
CHAPTER I
THE EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF GOD
These Two Problems are Closely Related. (a) The two
questions of the existence and of the nature of God are intimately
related to each other, and can hardly be considered separately.
If the world is self-sufficient and self-explaining, there is no reason
for asking either question. Both become useless, and the vari-
ous physical sciences give the final answer to the problems which a
complete explanation of the world suggests. But, if it is found
that science does not give an ultimate explanation, and that the
existence and laws of the world postulate something beyond the
visible world itself, it seems impossible that the same principles
and arguments which lead us to admit the existence of a first cause
and lawgiver should not also manifest something of its nature.
In other words, the answer to the question of the nature of God is
but the unfolding of the conclusions by which His existence is
known.
(b) And, for this reason, an essential inconsistency is found in the
agnosticism of the Spencerian type, admitting the existence of
the unknowable. We shall see later in what sense we may admit
the unknowableness of God, but we remark now that we can,
neither directly nor indirectly, acquire the knowledge of the exist-
ence of any reality without acquiring at the same time some knowl-
edge however limited and vague of its nature. The "power
behind the phenomena," to use Spencer's expression, must have
some proportion to the phenomena. I may not know who rings
the door-bell, but I know that, in the causal series ending with
the ringing of the bell, every consequent has its raison d'etre in the
immediately preceding antecedent, and, no matter how far back I
go in this regressive series, that every antecedent the person
who rings the bell included is a cause which must be adequate
to explain the subsequent phenomenon. In every line of thought
34 Si3
514 THEODICY
by which God's existence is inferred, some aspect of His nature,
power, causality, intelligence, or will is also manifested.
(c) For clearness' sake, however, we shall first examine the exist-
ence of God, and secondly make the conclusions concerning His
nature and attributes more explicit. Let us keep in mind that this
is only a logical expedient and that the two questions are in reality
intimately connected.
I. EXISTENCE OF GOD
I. THE QUESTION STATED
i. Meaning of the Question. (a) The question of the exist-
ence of God is not merely the question whether all phenomena
in the world must be given a satisfactory explanation, for this is
admitted by everybody. But the question is whether the mate-
rial and mental world, both of the plain man and of the man of
science, finds in itself a sufficient explanation, i.e. whether we are
compelled or not to go beyond science in order to find, in the world
itself or out of the world, some reality which science cannot reach
with its methods, and which is nevertheless necessary to account
for scientific facts and laws.
(b) So again the question is not whether science leaves an unex-
plained residue; or whether, beyond its own field, there are found
unexplored regions; or whether science must leave certain prob-
lems without solution. This leads simply to the unknowable of
the agnostic. But the question is whether the known facts and
laws of science do or do not require some other specific reality
without which they could not themselves exist.
That scientific equations include many an unknown X is ad-
mitted by all. As science progresses, the value of these unknown
quantities becomes known little by little; the limits of science are
widened, and beyond these ever-receding limits is the unknown.
This is not enough. What we want to find out is whether all
scientific equations, with their many X's, do not of necessity
imply some higher reality without which the equations themselves,
with their known and unknown quantities, could not be given.
(c) Hence it is seen that the question of the existence of God is
EXISTENCE OF GOD 515
that of the existence of a reality superior to the world of phenom-
ena with which science deals, either immanent in it or transcending
it, i.e. either identical in reality with the phenomena the substance
of which it would be, or distinct from both the phenomena and
their substances. The question of identity or distinction will be
examined later.
Atheism denies the existence of God, and asserts the self-suffi-
ciency of the scientific universe. Pantheism and monism assert
that God is in reality the one substance of the world. Theism
admits the existence of a personal God distinct from, superior to,
and ruler of, the world.
N.B. The question of atheism is an unimportant one. The
problem to-day as at all times is not so much whether there
is a God, as what God's nature is, and whether God is distinct
from the world. Atheism has sometimes been understood as the
negation of a personal God distinct from the world, and then it
seems that pantheism and atheism coincide although the terms are
etymological ly opposed.
2. Method. (a) The method to be used is the inductive
method, starting from facts and interpreting them with the help
of the essential principles of reason. We shall not renew the
discussion with scepticism, empiricism, and criticism; we pre-
suppose the validity of rational knowledge as vindicated in
epistemology. We shall use chiefly the principle of causality with-
out which empirical science itself cannot advance one step. To
reject this principle is to fall into contradiction with the fundamen-
tal laws of thought. It is to make, not only metaphysics, but
physical science itself, impossible. And with sceptics no argument
is possible.
(b) The existence of God is not known directly, immediately,
and intuitively. It is true that the mere contact with the external
world and its succession of phenomena governed by constant laws,
as well as the aspirations and feelings of the mind, easily lead to
a spontaneous ascent of the mind to God. This, however, is not
intuition, but demonstration, at least implicit, and our present task
is to make it explicit, i.e. to test by reflection the spontaneous
admission of God's existence.
516 THEODICY
(c) A fact confronts us, namely, that many phenomena formerly
ascribed to the direct intervention of divinities now come within
the range of scientific explanation. Will not God be pushed, as
it were, farther and farther, and finally disappear from the world
as a useless agent, postulated formerly owing to the ignorance of
real scientific explanations? We repeat again that it is not from
the unknown that we prove God's existence, but from the known.
His existence is inferred not from the supposition of an unexplored
beyond, but from facts and laws of which we are certain. That igno-
rance has caused men to see the direct action of God where it was
not will be for us a warning not to argue from our ignorance of
causes, but, on the contrary, from the causes and laws which we
know. We shall not say: "The action of God is seen behind
phenomena which we cannot explain"; but: "The action and
presence of God are seen in phenomena themselves whose scientific
explanation as far as it can go is at hand."
II. THE ARGUMENT
i. General. (a) The terms "actus" and "potentia" were
used by the scholastics to translate Aristotle's eve/oyoa or evTeAexwa
and 8vra/us. No single word in English is an adequate rendering
of either. "Actus" includes the meanings of act, action, actual-
ity, perfection, determination; "potentia," those of potency,
potentiality, faculty, power, capacity. In general potentia means
an aptitude to change, to act or be acted upon, to give or receive
some new determination. Actus is the fulfilment of such an apti-
tude, the actual exercise or possession of that which before was only
in potentia. In a word, both in the physical and the mental world,
potentia is the determinable being, actus the determined being.
Since potentia means the actual non-existence of some determina-
tion and the capacity for acquiring it, it follows that it cannot be
known in itself, but only through the corresponding actus. The
aptitude to see, walk, understand, melt, solidify, etc., has no
meaning until the actus, vision, walking, etc., is known.
(b) A change of any kind whatsoever is the passage from poten-
tia to actus and vice versa, and the existence of manifold changes
EXISTENCE OF GOD
517
in the world is an obvious fact. Beings come to existence or dis-
appear, and those that exist undergo many changes as to size, place,
color, shape, temperature, activity, etc. Hence in every being
there are actus and potentia, i.e. actual determinations or perfec-
tions, and capacity for further determinations and perfections.
(c) It is true that in the same being the state of potentiality
precedes that of actuality. Before acquiring a determination, a
being must be capable of acquiring it. But, absolutely speaking,
actus must precede potentia, for, in order to change, a thing must
be acted upon, or actualized, i.e. it supposes a being which is in
actu. In other words, nothing passes from potency to act of it-
self, but only under the influence of something else. Hence change
supposes an antecedent actus.
(d) Now, since no being in the world has in itself a sufficient
reason of the actus which it possesses, if the world is to be explained
at all, we must proceed to another being in actu. If this being
is also mixed with potentiality, and subject to change, we must
go higher till we reach an "actus purus," without any potential-
ity. For, since no individual phenomenon or change has in itself
its raison d'etre, but is always "relative" to something else, the
whole series cannot have within itself such a raison d'etre. It
remains not only unexplainable, but impossible and contradic-
tory until somewhere, behind, under, or above the changes,
we find the unchangeable; beyond the imperfect, the perfect;
beyond the relative, the absolute; beyond potentiality, the "actus
purus."
(e) This general argument, in some form or other, is generally
admitted. But there are many controversies concerning the
nature of the Absolute and actus purus. We shall now indicate
a few applications of the general argument.
2. Causality. (a) There are in the world many kinds of
efficiency, activity, movement, and causality. The appearance
of every new reality, whether substantial or accidental, is always
conditioned by, and dependent on, something else. Hence no-
where in the world do we find a self-sufficient reality; nowhere con-
sequently a sufficient explanation. Therefore, since in the world
causes are only intermediary, i.e. caused as well as causing, we
518 THEODICY
must reach an unconditioned and independent reality, a first
uncaused cause.
(b) This is true, no matter how great the number of interme-
diary causes may be, no matter how far back in the past we may
proceed. The length of a river does not dispense with the neces-
sity of a source, and to push back difficulty farther and farther
is not to give a solution. Science refers us back to a primitive
nebula out of which the world evolved. The fact remains that
there was activity, hence a first source of activity; there was depend-
ence, hence somewhere the independent; there were relations, hence
somewhere the unrelated; there were conditions, hence somewhere
the unconditioned and the absolute.
(c) The world, they say, is eternal; from all eternity the same
processes went on, and these processes originate in the very nature
of things. We have nothing to do here with the eternity of the
world; nothing to say against its eternity. But to lengthen time
is not to assign a cause. If the time during which the cosmic
processes have been taking place had a beginning, the existence of
a first cause to explain their appearance is, of course, an absolute
necessity. If it had no beginning, the first cause is required from
all eternity, since, without it, there can be no other causes, and con-
sequently no sufficient reason for existing realities. A being, or a
series of beings, no matter how long it may be, which is not self-
sufficient, requires a self-sufficient principle, for its existence
always remains contingent and conditioned.
(d) We know from science that certain forms of existing real-
ities had a beginning. Life did not always exist, and man appeared
a long time after other forms of life. We have seen elsewhere that
life has no sufficient explanation in the preexistence of inorganic
matter, nor consciousness in unconsciousness, nor the spiritual
soul in any material activity (pp. 442, 492 ff.). Some higher
principle, therefore, is required to explain these new appearances
which cannot be explained by antecedents in nature.
N.B. This argument again is general, and special aspects
of it might be emphasized, e.g. movement, origin, contingency,
etc., and these new proofs would proceed in a direction parallel
to the one just indicated.
EXISTENCE OF GOD 519
3. Teleology. (a) There is order and harmony in the world;
the universe is not a chaos, but a cosmos. (See Cosmology, pp. 448,
455.) The various beings that compose it act according to de-
termined laws, and from this manifold interaction results a per-
manent order. We do not speak here so much of extrinsic finality,
that is, of the usefulness and adaptation of one being to another,
as of intrinsic finality, that is, the determination of a being by its
own nature to unfold its specific energies, every part contributing
to the existence and functions of the whole. Examples could be
multiplied in the inorganic as well as in the organic world, from the
smallest atom, and chiefly the cell in the organism, to the harmony
of heavenly bodies.
Efficient causes, it is true, explain the world, but only from one
point of view. They are not opposed to, but completed by, final
causes, ends, and purposes, as explained in Cosmology (p. 455).
Everywhere in the world we find manifold interaction, and the more
science progresses, the greater also the evidence for the existence
of order. The world, therefore, manifests an intention, a design,
hence an intelligence, a mind. Otherwise, what explanation can
be offered?
(b) They say: The cosmos is a result, not an end; it is what it
is, and acts as it does, because of the necessary laws that govern
it. True; but there is no opposition between the result of efficient
causes and the end or realization of a plan. The clock keeps time
as a result of its mechanism, and yet keeping time was the end
the clock-maker had in view in making it. Without ends and pur-
poses efficient causes acting at random will not produce stability
and order. Without ends and purposes the world will act as it
does supposing it to be what it is, but why is it what it is? Laws
govern the world, it is true, but a law is not an explanation; it is
only a systematic expression, or a formula of the facts.
We need not stop to consider the position that order is the result
of hazard or chance. Chance is but an avowal of ignorance as
to the coming together of several causes. It is without laws, and
essentially without stability, constancy, and regularity.
(c) There are also apparent disorders, it is true. I say apparent,
because they may belong to a more general and wider plan and
520 THEODICY
order. But even if they are real, they are exceptions, and simply
prove that the world, though orderly, is not perfect. One mis-
print does not destroy the order of the letters in the whole page;
and dissonant chords, when resolved properly, contribute to the
beauty of the harmony.
(d) Again many say: The world is harmonious, and progresses
harmoniously, because of the general law of evolution. This law
is universal; it is the great ruler which dispenses with any higher
intelligence. Let us repeat here that a law is not a cause; that
evolution is not a source, but only the mode according to which the
stream runs. And precisely this progressive and orderly evolu-
tion from a primitive nebula supposes a directive principle of evo-
lution. Evolution or no evolution, a principle of order is required.
If it is said that the world evolves unconsciously, like the plant
which grows and develops into an organism out of a simple seed,
we reply that unconscious finality is itself possible only on condi-
tion that there be somewhere a consciousness of the plan to be
realized.
(e) Appeal to nature and to natural laws is always legitimate;
science can go no farther. But nature and laws are not self-suffi-
cient, and must find elsewhere their explanation. We discover
meaning in the world, and do not put it there. The scientific and
philosophical study of nature is in fact a constant attempt to find
this meaning. If there is meaning in nature, there is a mind dis-
tinct from our own, with which our own tries to come in contact.
(Compare, for instance, the meaning of speech, of works of art
or machines for the student who, through them, endeavors to
know the author's mind.)
4. Morality. As a special application of the preceding con-
siderations, we may say that the moral order also is not self-suffi-
cient. Man, as was seen in Ethics (323 ff.),is not his own lawgiver,
and yet is subject to the moral law which it is not in his power
to change. The author of the moral order is therefore elsewhere.
Moreover, a sanction is required, and, as no sufficient sanction is
found in this life, there must be a judge to whom man is account-
able. God is the ultimate principle of the moral order as He is
the principle of human nature itself and of the physical world.
NATURE OF GOD 521
5. Universal Consent. A last, but secondary, argument is
taken from the consensus of mankind in admitting the existence
of God. Everywhere and at all times, the existence of God is
and has been admitted, although the conceptions regarding the
nature of God vary greatly. This shows at least the natural pro-
pensity of the human mind to rise from the world to the cause and
ruler of the world.
6. Conclusion. In conclusion we may say that the material
world as known by common experience and scientific investiga-
tion, and the mental and moral world, are not self-sufficient. The
universe requires a ground on which it may rest, which is inacces-
sible to experience and to physical science, and is a self-sufficient
reality. In this there is scarcely any dissension among philos-
ophers. But divergences become accentuated when questions
concerning the nature of God, and His distinction from the world,
are raised.
II. THE NATURE OF GOD
We shall now endeavor to outline it can only be a short out-
line the main points concerning the nature and attributes of
God. We shall first examine the distinction of God from the
world; secondly, His primary attributes, i.e. those that are looked
upon by us as constituting the divine nature; thirdly, the second-
ary attributes. Then we shall vindicate our conclusions against the
attacks of agnosticism. Hence the four following sections.
I. THE DISTINCTION OF GOD FROM THE WORLD
i. The Question Stated. (a) When we assert that God is
distinct from the world, we do not mean that God is estranged
from the world, far away from it, and that He has nothing to
do with it. The omnipresence of God, and His providence to
be mentioned later imply that God is present and acts every-
where. But nevertheless His being is not to be identified with
that of the world. The world is not the whole reality, and the
being of God is transcendent.
(b) The two opposed systems here are Theism and Pantheism
or Monism. Theism admits the existence of a personal God,
522 THEODICY
distinct from, yet cause and ruler of, the world. Pantheism in
general identifies God's being with the being of the world, so that
God and the world are one and the same substance. Hence the
term Monism (^ovos, one only), by which it is frequently called
to-day. Historically it had many forms and expressions which
cannot be discussed here. We shall limit ourselves to those forms
which are found at present.
(c) Monism is idealistic or realistic, (i) Idealistic monism
denies the objectivity of the conception of God as absolute and
infinite. God is an ideal which the world, through its successive
evolutions, little by little realizes without ever reaching it. He is
not to be found at the beginning of the world, but at the end;
not in the past, but in the future. Starting from indetermination
and imperfection, i.e. from a minimum of reality, the world pro-
gresses, and tends toward determination, perfection, and maxi-
num of reality, i.e. toward the realization of God. (2) Realistic
monism admits the actual existence of the absolute, but identifies
it with the universe, asserting either that the material elements
of the world are self-existing, and obey essential and self-sufficient
laws (materialistic and mechanical monism); or that the world as
we know it is only the surface, the phenomena, the modes or
aspects of the one common underlying substance (pantheistic
or monistic evolutionism).
(d) It may be noted here once more that extremes meet. Pan-
theism is close to atheism; to identify God with all things is
very nearly the same as to deny His reality. Pantheism must
naturalize God or divinize nature.
(e) The main reasons advanced by monism are the impossibility
of creation, the necessity for the infinite of including all things in
itself, and the existence of evil in the world, for evil cannot come
from a supposedly all-perfect and all-good cause.
2. Idealistic Monism. The assertion that God is merely an
ideal is directly opposed to the proofs for the existence of God,
since these, starting from real facts, show the real existence of a
first cause and of an actus purus } whereas the ideal God is prima-
rily potential. To start from indetermination or potentia is
to fall into the impossibility of ever reaching an actus, since the
NATURE OF GOD 523
passage from potentia to actus supposes a previous actus. The
progress and evolution of the world, its manifold changes, and its
activity require a sufficient principle, an actus purus, which exists
not only in the mind, but in reality. Becoming supposes being.
The order of the world requires a mind which unfolds a plan. We
need not be detained longer by this view which to-day is looked
upon by most philosophers and scientists as a dream, a confusion
of the logical with the real order, and a contradiction in terms and
in reality.
3. Mechanical Monism, which admits only material elements
and their "actual" motions, has already been touched upon in
the proofs given for the existence of God, and in Cosmology (pp.
428 ff., 436 ff., 454 ff.). The main objections against it are the fol-
lowing: (i) What is self -existing and necessary cannot change,
and all material elements are subject to many changes. (2) The
atom or material element is always dependent, relative, and con-
ditioned. Its location, the exercise of its activity, its movement,
etc., are contingent, since they constantly change dependently
on external conditions. The dependent, the conditioned, and the
relative suppose the independent, the unconditioned, and the
absolute. (3) The atom is indifferent in itself to this or that
combination, this or that motion, and as a consequence to this or
that result. How were the primordial chaotic elements I say
chaotic in comparison to what they are now of the nebula deter-
mined to arrange themselves so as to form the present world?
How were they placed in such positions, and endowed with such
movements as to lead to the present order? (4) If atoms exist
from all eternity, the present state of the world should have been
realized sooner. Why only now, and not yesterday or last year?
Or why did not the first differentiations of the nebula take place
earlier? (5) Mechanism looks only at efficient causes and neg-
lects teleology which is also real. (6) It is unable to account for
the origin of life, and chiefly for the origin of intelligence which is
spiritual. Mental ideals, true morality, freedom, etc., find no
place in such a system.
4. According to Pantheistic Evolutionism, or Monism, the abso-
lute, unconditioned, and necessary substance actually exists. It
524 THEODICY
is the only substance, and the various beings of the world are its
phenomena or manifestations. This substance is the one cause of
all realities, the one principle of energy, unfolding itself in diverse
ways especially as matter and as mind not intelligently or
freely, but according to its own essential, necessary, and intrinsic
law of evolution, like the germ evolving into the complete organ-
ism. Against common experience and scientific evidence, this
doctrine must deny all forms of interaction between bodies, and
between body and mind, since the One is also the whole energy.
(Hence the theories of parallelism and of double-aspect, with
their consequences, as mentioned in the Philosophy of Mind,
pp. 481 ff.)
(a) If the term "substance" is used to mean that which is neces-
sary and self-existing, it is clear that there is only one substance,
namely, the Absolute or God. But this is not the usual meaning of
substance. Substance is not that which exists from itself, or a se y
but that which exists in itself, or in se. As such it is opposed to
accidents which require a subject in which they inhere. It denotes
a being which, although it is dependent, conditioned, and relative,
yet is not inherent in something else. In this sense there may be
many substances.
(b) Among substances is found the human person, as conscious-
ness clearly testifies. Its esse-in-se, and non-in-alio, appears as
a fact, as well as its activity and autonomy. Distinct person-
ality and freedom find no place in monism.
(c) The absolute, self-existent, and necessary being cannot be
identified with the world because it is necessarily all that it is, and
hence cannot change, whereas changes in the world are evident
facts, and every change implies a dependence on certain condi-
tions necessary for it to take place.
(d) Why are not the cosmos and the actual order of the world
eternal? The only answer of science is that the conditions of the
present state were not always verified. But we cannot speak of
anything external conditioning the one reality. Since this reality
is the only one, it can depend on nothing different from itself.
Since then the absolute has in itself the totality of being, why did
it begin with the part? i.e. since it has the superior reality, why
NATUREOFGOD 525
did it begin with the inferior? Why is evolution a law of the
world?
(e) The comparison with the seed that develops into a complete
organism does not favor the monistic position. The germ is not
the whole plant. It has the power to develop into a plant, but
always dependency, for it requires other substances external to itself
which it assimilates, the influence of light, heat, moisture, etc.
Without these the evolution of the germ would be impossible.
The germ's change and development become intelligible precisely
by reason of this manifold dependence on external agencies. Either
the world depends on external conditions, and then it is not the
one substance, nor the absolute; or it is the absolute and neces-
sary substance, and then to speak of its change and evolution is
contradictory.
(/) Perhaps it will be said that the condition is not extrinsic,
but intrinsic to the one substance; that it is to be found in the very
nature of the absolute; that the obstacle is not from without but
from within. This supposition introduces into the one substance
a dualism of antagonistic and irreconcilable tendencies: the essen-
tial tendency to the realization of a state, and the essen-
tial obstacle to such a realization. Here, therefore, monism seems
to depart from its fundamental position.
We may conclude that the being of God is not to be identified
with that of the world, and that the first cause is not identical
with the world, but transcendent.
II. FUNDAMENTAL OR PRIMARY ATTRIBUTES
i, Self -Existence. The proof of the existence of God shows
that there must exist an absolute being, i.e. a being existing by itself,
a se, as the scholastics used to say, and independently of any higher
principle. A dependent cause cannot be the adequate explana-
tion of its effect, since that on which it depends also contributes
to it. The absolute, independent, and unconditioned cause alone
can be the final explanation of all things. All others are inade-
quate. And the absolute cause is self-existing, necessary, and
eternal, otherwise it would necessarily depend on something else
for its existence, and would involve a contradiction. Its only
526 THEODICY
sufficient reason is in itself. In one word again, God is the actus
purus, without any admixture of potentiality or dependence.
2. Perfection. (a) God is perfect and cannot acquire more
perfection, otherwise He would be in potentia with regard to the
perfections which He actually lacks. Moreover, God, as the first
cause, must possess in Himself all the perfections found in the
world, since He is their source. As we shall see, these perfections
need not be found in God in the same way as in beings of the world
where they are always accompanied by imperfection. But God
must possess at least something equivalent or analogical to
the perfections of the world. Finally, as the actus purus and the
plenitude of being, God must be infinite. He cannot be limited
by any other being without implying dependence on them; nor by
Himself, since He is essentially and from Himself all that He is.
(b) But if God is not all, how can He be really infinite? The
world is a reality, and if God is not the very substance of the world,
there are realities other than God. Hence a God who does not
include all things is not infinite, since His reality would be
increased if the beings of the world were added to Him.
This difficulty rests on a misunderstanding, which itself is due
to our incapacity of understanding the nature of God completely.
We use the same expression "to be" of God and of creatures,
but "being" does not apply univocally to God and to the world.
God alone "is" fully, i.e. by himself: "I am who am" (Exod.
iii, 14), that is, God is the fulness of being and of perfection. The
world "is" as a participation, a derivation, a shadow of the being of
God. Hence we cannot speak of the addition of the world to God,
since units of different kind cannot be added to each other. God
stands alone as the fulness of being, surpassing infinitely everything
else, containing all perfections eminently, and this infinite perfec-
tion is precisely what isolates God and forbids His identification
with the world. They are not on the same plane, nor in the same
genus even remote, but God stands alone on a higher plane, as the
first absolutely independent cause. With the addition of the
world, were this possible, there would be more "beings," but there
would not be more "being."
We have here something similar to the imparting of a science
NATUREOFGOD 527
to ignorant pupils by a great scientist. After they have learned a
few imperfect rudiments, there are more "knowings," but there is
not more " knowledge," and the addition of the pupils' science to
that of the master would not increase it, but rather make it less
perfect. The Infinite is transcendent. He is neither increased
nor decreased by the existence or non-existence of other realities
to which He gives their derived being.
3. Simplicity. There can be no composition in God; He is
absolutely simple. Hence He is not material, but a pure spirit.
The reason is that every composition implies potentiality which
must be excluded from God. (i) God cannot be material because
the changes in matter always occur in dependence on some agent,
whereas God is the first cause. (2) God cannot, like man, be
composed of two co-principles, matter and form, or body and soul,
because matter is essentially a potential and determinable principle.
(3) Nor can God be composed of substance and accidents, because
accidents rest on the substance and are dependent on it. The
human soul, for instance, has certain capacities which it exercises
successively. By the passage from potentia to actus it acquires
new perfections, and this is not possible for God.
Briefly, wherever there is composition there is also potentiality
and subsequent determination. The compound always depends
on its components and on the cause of their union. All forms of
potentiality must be excluded from the actus purus. We have to
speak of God and of His attributes as if they were distinct, but
this is owing to the imperfection of our understanding which
cannot grasp at once God's one and simple reality.
4. Unicity. God is one, because if there were several gods,
none of them would be the plenitude of being and perfection.
One would have some being not possessed by the others. The
tendency to unity is so marked to-day, both in philosophical and
natural sciences, that it is useless to insist on this point. No one
ever speaks of the " absolutes " in the plural. If there were several
first causes, the question would immediately be raised: How did
they act as one, and harmoniously, unless there were a higher cause
and principle of unity on which all others depended? These
several causes therefore would not be first causes, and we would be
528 THEODICY
led back to one first cause. The existence of evil, which is some-
times alleged as a proof for the dualism of causes, will be examined
later.
III. DERIVED OR SECONDARY ATTRIBUTES
1. Negative. (a) God is absolutely unchangeable or immutable,
because change implies acquisition, or loss, or both. Hence it
implies composition, since something remains permanent while
something is added to, or subtracted from, the substance. It
also implies potentiality with regard to the new acquired condi-
tion. But both composition and potentiality are excluded from
God.
(6) God is eternal, not only in the sense that He had no begin-
ning and will have no end, but in the sense that, existing at all
times, His existence is not, like ours, subject to a successive series
of elements, changes, activities, etc., i.e. to past and future, because
succession implies change and potentiality. God is free from all
temporal relations.
(c) God is immense, i.e. free from spatial relations. Being a
pure spirit, God cannot be "localized" like material substances.
He is omnipresent in the sense that His being and activity cannot
be restricted or limited. He is present wherever there is something,
present to every existing reality, for, wherever there is something
contingent and potential, there is required also its necessary
support, the absolute and pure actus.
These negative attributes exclude from God all "relations,"
since relative and absolute are essentially opposed.
2. Positive. (a) God is intelligent, because (i) He is not only
the principle of the material world, but also of the world of minds;
(2) we have seen that the world manifests an intelligence. But
God does not know like man by successive processes which imply
imperfection, but intuitively and without acquisition or passage
from potentia to actus.
Hence God's science is not (i) the exercise of an activity, but
it is identical with the activity itself, which, in turn, is not really
distinct from God's being, which is simple; nor (2) dependent on
the objects of knowledge, for there can be no dependence in the
NATURE OF GOD 529
absolute being; nor (3) discursive, for this implies successive
acquisition.
God knows perfectly and intuitively His own essence, and, in it,
everything that was, is, will be, or can be, since all finite existences
are but participations of the divine essence. In His eternal pres-
ent, God knows all things, past, present, and future, although He
knows them actually with their temporal modality. To say that
God acquires the knowledge of things only when they come to pass
would again introduce succession, dependence, and potentiality.
God, therefore, knows everything from all eternity.
(b) The same reasons that oblige us to attribute intelligence to
God also oblige us to attribute a will to Him. (i) The existence
of man, intelligent and free, requires that the first cause should
also have these perfections. (2) The world is a realized plan.
As the object of the will is always the good, the object of God's
will is primarily His own essence, which is the infinite goodness, and,
secondarily, whatever is a participation of the divine goodness.
God's freedom does not imply, as it does for us, changeableness,
fickleness, caprice, or disorder, but exists together with immutabil-
ity, sanctity, the knowledge of all things, and omnipotence.
(c) God is omnipotent, i.e. whatever is not intrinsically impos-
sible can be done by Him. Things that have no reality at all,
like a square circle, a triangle whose angles taken together are
not equal to two right angles, are intrinsically impossible, and,
hence are called impossible for God because in themselves they
involve a contradiction; and as they have no potential reality, it is
clear that they are not actually realizable. Since God is infinitely
perfect, He is also infinitely powerful. Since He is absolutely
simple, His power is identical with His will.
IV. VALUE OF THESE CONCLUSIONS
What is the value of our conclusions? It is objected that our
finite minds cannot know the Infinite (agnosticism), and that to
speak of it at all is necessarily to apply to it our human finite
concepts, and to conceive God as a perfected man (anthropomor-
phism). A few remarks on these objections will make the
preceding doctrine clearer.
35
530 THEODICY
i. Agnosticism. (a) The absolute exists, says Spencer, and
the belief in it "has a higher warrant than any other whatever";
but nothing more can be said of it, since human knowledge is essen-
tially relative. It "cannot in any manner or degree be known in
the strict sense of knowing." Yet its existence is certain as the
"fundamental reality which underlies all that appears," "the real-
ity which is behind the veil of appearance," and as the "omni-
present causal energy or power of which all phenomena, physical
and mental, are the manifestations." It is the "inscrutable power
manifested to us through all phenomena." (First Principles,
p. I, ch. 3, 4, 5-)
(b) It must be admitted that (i) God cannot be known per-
fectly or comprehensively. What we claim to know about God
is infinitely inferior to the reality. Our knowledge is largely
negative, i.e. the knowledge of what God is not and cannot be.
In its positive aspect this knowledge is analogical, i.e. we know
that there must be some proportion between the cause and the
effect. (2) God cannot be known apart from His manifestations,
and we know Him only in so far as He manifests Himself in the
world. All other aspects of His reality are unknown to us. (3)
God is known by our finite minds successively, disjunctively, and
relatively.
Hence we must admit that the little knowledge which we have of
God is as nothing when compared to the being itself of God. Yet
we claim that our concepts truly represent, though very imperfectly,
something of the divine reality. " That which is uncaused cannot
be assimilated to that which is caused," and there is between them
"a distinction transcending any of the distinctions existing be-
tween different divisions of the created." (First Principles, 24.)
We admit this. But without assimilating God as "uncaused,"
to the world as "caused," we may compare God as " cause"
to the world as "caused," and thus acquire some knowledge of
God from His works.
(c) Spencer's inconsistency is glaring. God cannot manifest
Himself without manifesting some aspect of His reality. A
"power" behind the phenomena implies continuous efficiency.
A "first cause" means self -existence, eternity, and activity. And,
NATURE OF GOD 531
if the same reality is behind both physical and mental phenomena,
how can Spencer speak of it merely as power, and not also as con-
sciousness, intelligence, and will? If God manifests Himself as
power or energy in the physical world, He must also manifest
Himself as mind through the mental phenomena.
(d) So God, it is true, is not definable. But between compre-
hensive knowledge and unknowableness there is an intermediary
term, namely, true, though imperfect and analogical knowledge.
Human works manifest some of the attributes and thoughts of
their authors; imperfectly, yet truly; incompletely, yet without
essential alteration. In the same way, the world bears the trace
of God's attributes, and, no matter how far beneath the reality our
interpretation must remain, it leads to the knowledge of God.
Spencer professes that he does not know whether the first
cause is conscious because it might have an attribute distinct
from both unconsciousness and consciousness, and infinitely supe-
rior to both. But between consciousness and unconsciousness there
is no middle term; we have to choose between the one and the other.
God must have something analogical to consciousness, though
infinitely above our consciousness. The only name we can give
it is consciousness, but we recognize that it applies to God with-
out the imperfections found in ourselves, and in a manner which
we cannot understand.
2. Anthropomorphism. (a) The agnostic urges again: What
do you do in all this but conceive God as a magnified man, and
attribute to Him human perfections, even if you do enlarge them?
You call them infinite, but cannot, with your finite mind, know
even the meaning of this term. In other words, we are accused
here of anthropomorphism: we predicate of the infinite essen-
tially human concepts, finite, and out of proportion to God. "Is
it not just possible that there is a mode of being as much tran-
scending intelligence and will as these transcend mechanical mo-
tion? " It is an erroneous assumption to suppose " that the choice
is between personality and something lower than personality;
the choice is rather between personality and something higher."
(First Principles, 31.)
(b) It must be admitted that, in our mode of conceiving God,
532 THEODICY
anthropomorphism is a real danger which has not always been
avoided with sufficient care. Sometimes human passions and
emotions, for instance, have been attributed to God without suffi-
cient discrimination. Moreover, some anthropomorphism is unavoid-
able. As we have no direct knowledge except of the external world
and of our own conscious states, it follows that we can think only
with the concepts acquired from these realities.
(c) However, when the philosopher applies these concepts to
God, he is aware that he cannot do so univocally, but only in an
analogical way, and that they are realized in God in a manner
which is transcendent and supereminent, yet not altogether
unlike the manner in which they are found in finite beings. He
does not simply enlarge the finite, but also recognizes a qualita-
tive difference which he can neither express nor conceive. The
agnostic's concepts of force, power, and cause are also derived
from experience, and yet applied to the absolute; this objection,
therefore, applies to him as well as to us. But the analogy used
by Spencer starts only from the lowest beings, those of the phys-
ical world, instead of including also, as it should, the highest beings,
those endowed with intellect, will, and personality.
3. The Personality of God is but a corollary of what precedes.
But it must be attributed to God only in an analogical way. It is
the best conception we can form of God's being; yet His personality
is as far above ours as His other perfections are above all those of
the world. Why is man a person? Because he is a complete
substance, sui iuris, and a conscious free agent. Now, God is
the Substance, distinct from other beings, it is true, yet supporting
them. Complete in His fulness of being and of perfection, abso-
lutely independent and unconditioned, He realizes in Himself the
plenitude of perfection. Infinite mind and free agent, He has
in Himself all that is required to be called personal, but personal
in a transcendent and incomprehensible sense, distinct from every-
thing else by His very infinity.
How poor are the substitutes that are offered for a personal
God. First, we are offered the Divine, i.e. a pure psychological
feeling to which nothing real corresponds; an adjective without a
substantive. How absurd to speak of the Divine, as some do,
NATURE OF GOD 533
if there is no God! Or will God be replaced by Nature, personified
with a capital initial, or by an indefinite World-Ground, or some
similar term? Of course nature and its laws explain the world,
but also need explaining. They give an immediate, not a final ex-
planation. Or shall we speak of the indefinite, the indetermined,
progress, evolution, and what not? All these are insufficient, as
we have seen. God exists, distinct from the world, infinite in all
perfections, perfectly independent; and yet, while acknowledg-
ing our incapacity to name Him, with the full conscious-
ness that the expression applies to Him in an infinitely superior
degree than it is possible for us to conceive, we rightly speak of
Him as a personal God.
4. Conclusion. (a) The knowledge we have of God is imper-
fect in many respects, (i) We have been obliged to analyze that
which is one and simple, and, owing to the very nature of our
mind, to consider as distinct, attributes which are in reality iden-
tical with the divine essence. (2) We have reached chiefly a
negative knowledge, the knowledge of what God is not, and we admit
that our positive knowledge of His nature is very imperfect. (3)
We have tried with our finite ideas to reach the infinite, but evi-
dently these ideas remain infinitely distant from their object.
(b) This knowledge, however, is not without value. Although
it is only analogical, it manifests something of the divine real-
ity. We have a positive starting-point, the perfections of the world,
and we know that the first cause must be adequate to account
for all these. This gives us a positive, though inadequate knowl-
edge. No matter how great we conceive God's perfections to be,
we must always remember that our conception remains infinitely
beneath the reality of the divine perfection. Yet there is in God
"something like" these perfections. As St. Gregory says: "Bal-
butiendo, ut possumus, excelsa Dei resonamus." Here below we
have to be satisfied with a knowledge which St. Paul calls "through
a glass," and "in a dark manner," but we live in the hope of one
day seeing God "face to face," and "as He is."
CHAPTER II
GOD AND THE WORLD
We rise to God from the visible world. There now remain
to be examined two questions: (i) What are the relations of God
to the world? and (2) What are and must be the relations of the
world to God?
I. GOD IN RELATION TO THE WORLD
Two points of view may be considered, being and becoming, i.e.
the being of God compared to the being and to the becoming of
the world. Hence two questions: (i) Those referring to the
"esse," especially the distinction of God from the world. (2)
Those referring to the "fieri," i.e. the origin and government of the
world. As the distinction of God from the world has already been
established, there remain only the questions of Creation and
Providence.
i. Creation. (a) The distinction of God from the world leads
to the conclusion that the world was created by God. Pantheism
makes of the world a manifestation of God, i.e. God produces
if we can use the word "produce" the world out of His own
substance. We have said already that this substantial identity
is impossible.
(b) Philosophical dualism, admitting eternal and increated
matter, coexisting with God, who thus becomes simply an intelli-
gent designer and architect using preexisting materials, is also
impossible, and finds no advocates to-day. The essential char-
acteristics of matter, its contingency and dependence, show that
it cannot be self-existent. In the dualistic hypothesis, God would
no longer be unconditioned, since His activity would depend on
preexisting matter.
534
GOD IN RELATION TO WORLD 535
(c) Hence there remains only creation, which means the produc-
tion of a thing out of nothing, i.e. the production of a thing which is
not simply a modification of some preexisting reality, but which
begins to exist as a reality. The workman or artist requires apt
matter on which to exercise his activity. Everything that is
produced now in the world, either by nature or by art, is produced
out of preexisting materials endowed with certain potentialities.
From nothing, nothing comes. When it is said that creation is a
production out of nothing, it is not meant that "nothing" is the
material out of which something is made, but simply that in His
creative act God is independent of any preexisting matter and
potentiality.
We cannot, it is true, comprehend the act of creation, but we
find an analogy in works of art, in which the artist realizes his
mental ideal. The greater the art and skill, the more perfect also
is the result obtainable from the same matter, and hence the less
the dependence on matter. We are thus led to conceive of a
supreme cause, and an infinite art of God, who is altogether
independent of matter.
2. Providence. After creation, God does not abandon His
works, but "provides" for His creatures the necessary conditions
for being and acting, and governs them. This divine government
is chiefly what is meant by Providence. It has been rejected by
Deists, who deny that, after creating, God has anything to do with
the world.
(a) Even when existing, the creature is contingent and dependent.
The first moment of its existence does not necessarily imply the
second and those that follow. Hence every being in the world
is at all times dependent for its very existence on the first self-
existent being. Not for its existence alone, but also for the exer-
cise of its activity, the creature depends on God. The motor
secundus depends on the motor primus immobilis; and the contin-
gent activity, on the first cause.
(b) Divine providence or God's government of the world is
but a consequence of what was said above. In the cosmos, every-
thing has its place in harmony with the rest, its own end in har-
mony with the general end of the world. This place and end are
536 THEODICY
assigned to it by the wisdom of the Creator, who thus realizes the
plan of creation. The infinite mind does not act without a plan and
purpose, and the infinite power is adequate to realize this plan
in all its details. So every being individually is subject to God,
who assigns to it its place and role.
But, if we speak of the actual direction or government of the
world, it must be said that God's action is rather general and
mediate with regard to individuals. God governs beings by one
another, subjects by superiors, physical beings by general laws
which contribute to produce and preserve order and harmony
in the world. The order of the world results immediately from
the efficiency and intrinsic finality of secondary causes. (Cf.
pp. 454 ff.)
3. Evil. The existence of evil in the world is urged as an
objection against creation, for, how can God, infinite in goodness
and power, produce or allow evil? and against providence, for,
how can a wise ruler tolerate evil which it is in his power to
eliminate? (Cf. above, teleological argument for the existence
of God.)
(a) The existence of evil cannot be denied, at least from our nar-
row point of view. There are destructions of inorganic and organic
substances by others. There is suffering in conscious beings.
There are uneasiness, affliction, and unsatisfied desires in the
human heart. There are disorder, perversity, and sin in the human
will. In general, it may be noted that evil manifests the good,
that disorder is a derogation from order, and hence that evil supposes
good, order, and harmony.
(b) Moreover, evil is seen frequently to serve a good purpose,
namely, a general higher order. For instance, if the reproductive
functions in plants and animals always obtained their results,
if the majority of seeds were not wasted, the means of subsistence
and co-existence of all living organisms would not be found. Yet
this co-existence is itself a perfection and a harmony. Again, the
animal, simply by walking, may destroy a number of plants and
insects, but walking is life, activity, and perfection. Where
there is manifold activity, there is antagonism, and can we
say that a lifeless, inactive, crystallized world would be better
GOD IN RELATION TO WORLD 537
than a living and active world? Evil is thus subordinated to a
higher good.
(c) Evil is an inevitable result of imperfection, and a creature is
necessarily imperfect. The finite is essentially imperfect, and the
present order freely chosen by God, good and harmonious though
it may be, could not be realized without imperfection and evil.
For instance, the death of some is the sine qua non of the existence
of others.
(d) More specifically, suffering is the inevitable lot of sensi-
tive beings whenever antagonistic activities are exercised on them.
Frequently suffering is caused by man's disorderly conduct, and
by the wrong exercise of his faculties. Finally, suffering has its
advantages; it is a warning against impending or existing disease;
it atones for sin, fortifies, purifies, and elevates the soul to higher
purposes, to a higher destiny, to God himself, since this life is only
a preparation for a future life.
(e) Moral evil is the consequence of freedom, which is a perfec-
tion. It is not God's, but man's, doing. Without freedom, man is
incapable of sin, but also of merit and virtue. Freedom is a good
which it is in man's power to use or misuse, but self -direction is
superior to determinism.
(/) Could not God have created a world in which there would
be less evil, less suffering, and less sin? We do not know. Let
us admit the mystery, and confess our ignorance of the divine
plan. God reigns supreme. The world, man, society, depend
on Him, and we have no right to investigate His secret ways. The
world is good without being the best possible. It has evils without
being the worst possible. God chose the present order; let us try,
as far as lies in our power, to preserve it. We know little of the
whole universe, and our knowledge of the divine plan, like that of
God himself, is only fragmentary. An ignorant man might find fault
with the most ingenious mechanism, and criticise some details from
his limited point of view. This would be due to his ignorance of
the complete plan and harmony. He would be an object of ridicule
for those who know better. And yet he would have more reason
for finding fault with human works than any man has to find fault
with the works of God.
538 TfiEODICY
II. THE WORLD IN ITS RELATIONS TO GOD
We shall briefly examine here the general relations of the uni-
verse, and more especially those of man, to God.
I. THE UNIVERSE
The various relations of dependence and subordination have
been indicated already. The world holds its existence from God
as its ultimate principle, and its preserver. It obeys the laws
given to it by the Creator. Only one more question may be
touched upon rapidly: The various beings of the world have ten-
dencies, and work toward ends. What is the ultimate end of the
universe as a whole? It may be summed up in these words: "The
Lord hath made all things for Himself" (Prov. xvi. 4), and "The
heavens shew forth the glory of God, and the firmament declareth
the works of His hands" (Ps. xviii. i). The only end which is
worthy of God is God Himself. The world, it is true, adds
nothing to God's perfection, excellence, and intrinsic glory. Yet
it is an external manifestation of the divine attributes in which
creatures participate.
But the tribute which creatures give to God, except that which
is given through man, is, as it were, dumb in itself. Man is the
spokesman of creation. His intelligence leads him from the con-
sideration of the world to the knowledge of the Creator. And as
he is endowed with reason and will, he can and must effectively
recognize the glory of God and his own dependence and subjec-
tion. Hence we must speak now of his main duties toward God.
II. MAN
i. General Duties Toward God. However imperfect our
knowledge of God may be, it suffices to show that we have cer-
tain duties toward Hun. These duties constitute what is called
religion. God is known as creator, providence, ruler, goodness,
wisdom, sanctity, etc., and this is enough to create in man cer-
tain corresponding obligations. It is true that God needs nothing
and is ever self-sufficient. But we need God, and must obey the
dictates of reason. The natural order of things requires that
WORLD IN RELATION TO GOD 539
we should know our place in the world, and fulfil our duties toward
God.
As He is the supreme being, infinitely perfect, we must recog-
nize our dependence. We must adore Him and revere His
name, love Him as the infinite good, respect Him as the infinitely
great, be thankful for what we have and are, since all comes
from Him, respect and obey conscience which is the divine voice
within ourselves, try to know God, the infinite truth, place Him
above all creatures in our thought, will, and love. Above, infi-
nitely above all creatures is His real place, and it is the place
which must always be assigned to Him in our minds and hearts.
2. Prayer. By prayer the soul rises to God to adore and
thank Him, to ask His help and assistance and to beg forgiveness
of offences.
(a) However natural it may seem for man to have recourse to
the infinite goodness and power of God, this aspect of prayer has
been objected to on the ground that (i) God knows all our needs,
(2) He is infinitely good, and must give the needed assistance
without being asked, (3) He is immutable, and prayer cannot
change His eternal decrees.
To this we answer: (i) We do not pray to God simply to make
our needs known to Him, but to acknowledge our insufficiency
and God's supreme power. This recognition of our dependence
is an expression of the truth, and therefore agreeable to God.
(2) God is infinitely good, but He requires our activity, intelli-
gence, will, and freedom, which are means and conditions of merit.
God does not work alone; He requires our humble cooperation.
(3) God's decrees are eternal and immutable, but formed in pre-
vision of the free actions of men, among which are his prayers.
(b) Prayer, then, in its general sense, is the natural and uni-
versal manifestation of man's feelings, the communion of man's
will with God's will, by which man submits to the decrees of the
infinite wisdom; acknowledges this wisdom even when it seems to
hide itself; accepts suffering and affliction in the hope of future
happiness; asks God to help him to wipe away sin and destroy its
evil consequences.
3. External Worship. (a) The internal worship of our intel-
540 THEODICY
ligence, feelings, and will naturally manifests itself by external
actions, attitudes, gestures, vocal prayers. It is a law of psychol-
ogy that mental attitudes tend to express themselves through the
organism. Moreover, these bodily actions tend to foster and
develop corresponding mental attitudes. Finally, not only the
mind, but the whole man, body and soul, must acknowledge God's
supremacy and excellence.
(b) It may be added that man, being essentially social, must
worship God, not only privately, but as a member of society.
Individual religion is strengthened by association with others.
Public worship unites men, places them above earthly things
by making them recognize more fully their community of origin
and destiny, and profess the supreme authority of God not merely
over individuals, but also over societies.
CONCLUSION
We need not repeat how little we know about God. Before the
Infinite, the proper attitude of the human mind is that of awe,
as it feels incapable of formulating the little knowledge it pos-
sesses; and that of astonishment at God's greatness and its own
littleness. This ought to make us readier to accept the mani-
festations of God, not merely through the mirror of His creatures,
but through His own revelation. Faith helps human reason,
and manifests in what way God wants to be served. We have
spoken only of natural religion ; positive revealed religion completes
it. As the infinite truth, God must be believed; as the infinite
ruler, He must be obeyed.
The little knowledge which we have of God shows enough to
make us understand that the greatness of God is above all that
we can think. It is much even to acknowledge that God is
incomprehensible and ineffable. Chiefly negative, this knowledge
contains, nevertheless, positive data concerning God's nature,
and it would be unreasonable to look upon it as valueless because
it is not complete.
God is the necessary solution of the enigmas of the world, the
supreme principle of truth and goodness, the necessary basis of
morality, the fulfilment of the aspirations of the human heart.
S4i
OUTLINES OF HISTORY OF
PHILOSOPHY
INTRODUCTION
1. Importance. The history of philosophy is the natural
complement of a course in philosophy, because it shows the prog-
ress of human thought in regard to both the statement and the
solution of philosophical problems, and it reveals the various
influences at work in the development of philosophy. Philosophy
is not crystallized, but living. It grows, and modules its points
of view. Hence it is important to see the causes of this growth
and development, and the various relations of philosophical sys-
tems to one another. Moreover, this study, while revealing
the many struggles of thinkers, will enable the student to under-
stand better the different systems of philosophy, to see the part
of truth which they include, and to judge where error begins,
and what causes led to it. We shall find frequent instances of
the axiom that extremes meet, that thought passes easily from one
extreme to another, and that here, as in physical science and in
political history, action brings about an equal reaction, till later
the equilibrium is reestablished.
2. Method. (a) Only a short outline of the history of phi-
losophy will be given. The principal names alone will be men-
tioned, and the main systems examined. While learning this
general summary, the student will do well to complete it by col-
lateral reading from the best historians of philosophy. This is only
a sketch, a skeleton. The various parts must be connected, so as
to give life and fulness to this outline. Our purpose is merely
to enable the student to place historically the various names and
systems mentioned in this course.
543
INTRODUCTION 543
(b) The method followed will be both logical and chronolog-
ical. Logical, tracing out the relationship and filiation of the vari-
ous systems. Chronological, following generally the successive
appearance of schools and philosophers.
(c) We shall divide the history of philosophy into three chap-
ters: (i) Ancient philosophy. (2) Mediaeval philosophy. (3)
Modern philosophy.
CHAPTER I
ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY
I. ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY
Oriental philosophy is originally and essentially religious, i.e.
connected with religious beliefs and practices. Speculation,
especially in India and China, developed from mythological leg-
ends and religious tenets.
1. Egypt. The Egyptians had two sets of doctrines: one
esoteric, hidden from the people and known only to the priests
what this mysterious wisdom consisted in is not known; the
other exoteric, common and public. According to this, there was
a multitude of gods; yet in this polytheism many indications of
an essential monotheism are found. One of the gods, different
according to different centres, was held to be superior to, or
even the principle of, the others. The world is their work, and
various gods produced various classes of beings. Besides his
body and soul, man also includes some kind of genius
which after death dwells in the statue or mummy of the dead,
and receives the offerings of the living. After death, the human
soul is judged according to its good and evil deeds, and either
receives its reward, after due purification, or is sent back to the
earth into other organisms, human or animal, or even into inani-
mate objects, to again go through a series of migrations. This
doctrine of metempsychosis is connected with the animistic be-
liefs of the Egyptians which made them attribute souls to the vari-
ous objects of nature, and also with their fetichism and animal-
worship. The moral precepts of the Egyptians seem to have been
of a high character, and recommended the practice of virtue,
both internal and external.
2. Babylonia and Assyria. In Mesopotamia, as in Egypt,
under polytheistic forms of worship may be found a form of mono-
544
ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY 545
theism. Among the Babylonians, Anu exercises dominion over
the other gods, and when Assyria had conquered Babylonia (about
1300 B.C.) Ashur was looked upon as the king and father of the
other divinities. The divinities participate in different ways
in the creation and government of the world. As early as
twenty- two or twenty-three centuries B.C. the Babylonians had
a code of high morality, the code of Hammurabi.
3. Persia. The sacred books of the Persians, still preserved
and used by the Parsees of Western India, form the Zend Avesta
(Avesta = sacred text; Zend = commentary). They were not
all composed at the same time, and their date is uncertain. A
part of them must be ascribed to Zoroaster or Zarathustra, the
great priest and reformer, who lived in the seventh and sixth cen-
turies B.C. A number of good and evil spirits were admitted, which
constantly struggle to prevail, the result being the many antin-
omies and oppositions of elements in the inorganic and the organic
world. Zoroastrianism reduces this multitude to a stricter dual-
ism. The chief deity is the principle of good, Ahura Mazda
(Ormuzd or Ormazd; hence Mazdeism), who is the god of light,
goodness, and holiness. The principle of evil is Anra Mainyu
(Ahriman), who is the spirit of darkness. From both proceed a
number of spirits, among which the evil ones produce moral and
physical disorder and suffering. The conflict will come to an end
after twelve thousand years, when the good will triumph, the world
will be purified, and a new era will begin. The human soul is
judged after death, and rewarded or punished for longer or shorter
periods of time according to its deeds.
4. India. (a) Among the sacred books of the Hindus the most
important are the Vedas (Rig-Veda, Sama-Veda, Yagur-Veda,
and Atharva-Veda). They include Hymns (Mantras), ritualistic
treatises (Brahmanas), and philosophical commentaries (Upan-
ishads). The commentaries were not composed at the same time,
but the oldest parts of the Vedas seem to date from fifteen or
twenty centuries B.C., although they were not written till much
later, being first transmitted by oral tradition. The philosophy
contained in the Vedas is based on a cosmic pantheism, (i)
Brahma or Atman is the absolute and infinite being who gave
36
546 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
rise to all other beings by an emanation from his own substance.
He is the only reality, so that everything conceived outside of
Brahma can only be an illusion. (2) The soul is immortal, and,
after death, migrates from one organism into another. Any
human deed (or karma) has an eternal value, and its consequences
endure forever. Every man is thus the maker of his own condi-
tion which corresponds to his deeds. (3) Ultimately the soul and
every other being are reabsorbed in Brahma, and again merged
into his universal being. Mortification and asceticism are neces-
sary as a preparation for this reabsorption. (4) Men are divided
into four classes or castes: priests (who came from the head of
Brahma); soldiers (from his chest); merchants (from his abdo-
men); slaves (from his feet). The rights and duties of every one
of these differ according to their relative dignity.
(b) From these doctrines arose several schools of rational and
speculative philosophy, which are based on the Vedas and try to
interpret them. The Sutras are maxims or aphorisms which
sum up these philosophical doctrines. There are found six main
schools of philosophy, which, however, go two by two, i and 2,
3 and 4, 5 and 6, thus forming three distinct groups, and both
schools of each group having essential points in common, (i) The
Purva-Mimamsa (= prior investigation), attributed to Jaimini
(place and date uncertain), is chiefly a system of apologetics refer-
ring to the authority of the Vedas and to casuistic ethics. (2)
The Uttara-Mimamsa (= posterior investigation) or Vedanta
(= Veda-end), composed or compiled by Badarayana, with com-
mentaries by Qankara (eighth and ninth centuries of our era), is
even to-day the most important system, and adheres closely to
the Upanishads. It admits the identity of all things, and espe-
cially of the soul, with Brahma; the illusory nature of our knowl-
edge of the phenomenal world; the transmigration of souls, and
the final absorption in Brahma. (3) The Sankhya, whose Sutras
bear the name of Kapila (place and date unknown), in its present
form, dates from the fourteenth century of our era. It recognizes
the essential dualism of spirit and matter. The world is real and
pluralistic, and knowledge (sense-perception, induction, authority)
is valid. This philosophy tends to, and perhaps professes, atheism.
ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY 547
(4) The Yoga of Patanjali (probably second century B.C.) is
rather theistic. (5) The Vaiceshika, attributed to Kanada (of
whom nothing is known), is essentially a philosophy of nature,
recognizing six padarthas (= world- things), or categories: sub-
stance, quality, action, genus or community, species or partic-
ularity, and coherence or inseparability. Substances are com-
posed of eternal, indivisible, and unalterable atoms. (6) The
Nyaya (= going back, hence syllogism), attributed toGotama, is
essentially a system of logic, destined to lead man to happiness by
the possession of knowledge.
(c) Buddhism was founded in the sixth century B.C. by Gotama,
a member of the Sakya clan, whence his name Sakya muni (muni
= solitary). Buddhism became popular largely owing to its
abolition of castes, but was finally driven out of India about the
fourteenth century. It flourishes chiefly in China, Thibet, Mon-
golia, etc. Although it denies the divine authority of the Vedas,
it borrowed largely from the atheistic Sankya of Kapila, and from
other common brahmanistic doctrines. Its main distinctive
philosophical tenets are the following: (i) A pessimistic view of
life. Suffering comes from the illusion of personal and separate
existence which inclines man to satisfy his personal desires. (2)
Hence the natural craving for individuality must be eradicated
by ascetic practices. (3) The supreme end to which man must
tend is Nirvana, which, if it is not complete annihilation, is at
least the loss of personality and individual consciousness.
(d) We simply mention the Jains, who still form a com-
munity in India, and whose doctrines have many points of
contact with Buddhism and with the Sankya and Vaiceshika
philosophies.
5. China. In the earliest traditional religion of the Chinese,
the supreme source of all things is the animated sky (Tien), person-
ified under the name of Shang Ti, or supreme ruler. Many spirits
were also worshipped, especially those of ancestors. The two
great philosophers of China, Lao-tsze and Kong-fu-tse, or Kong-
tse (Confucius), were almost contemporary.
(a) Lao-tsze (born about 604 B.C.) insists on the doctrine of
Tao (= way, hence course of nature). The Tao is the one sub-
548 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
stance, neither conscious nor unconscious, neither personal nor
impersonal, but transcending both modes of existence. He is
the source of all things, and also the moral type or ideal. To-day
Taoism is a popular form of religion in China, implying many
superstitious practices.
(b) Confucius (551-478) was a religious and political reformer.
He revised the sacred books of kings and composed some himself.
He insisted on the old Chinese traditions and developed an essen-
tially conservative system of ethics referring to the relations of
man with his fellowmen. His doctrine is still prevalent among
the higher classes of China.
(c) Among other Chinese philosophers must be mentioned
Yang-chu (fifth century B.C.) who advocates the ethics of pleas-
ure; Mih-tsze (fifth century B.C.), who recommends a universal
love of men; Meng-tsze (Mencius, 372-289), who contributed much
to the influence of Confucianism.
II. GREEK PHILOSOPHY
We shall leave out the first rudiments of philosophy found in
the poems of Homer and Hesiod, and begin with the appearance
of philosophy proper. Greek philosophy may be divided into three
periods, (i) Pre-Socratic, devoted exclusively to the study of
the external world. (2) Socratic, adding subjective studies, i.e.
psychological and ethical. (3) Post-Aristotelian, neglecting al-
most entirely the philosophy of nature and giving predominance
to ethical problems.
N.B. The Romans did not develop any original philosophy,
but borrowed from the Greeks. The few names to be mentioned
will come under the respective schools to which they belong.
I. PRE-SOCRATIC SCHOOLS
The early speculations of Greece were cosmological.
i. Early Ionian Philosophy. The earlier lonians (Ionia, a
Greek colony of Asia Minor) endeavor to give an answer to the
question: What is the ultimate substance of things? They agree
that matter is endowed with some kind of life (hylozoism), and
GREEK PHILOSOPHY 549
attempt to determine the nature of this first or primordial matter.
Tholes of Miletus (born about 640 B.C.) claims that it is water.
Anaximander of Miletus (born about 610 B.C.) admits an eternal
and infinite matter from which all things were produced by
processes of condensation and rarefaction. For Anaximenes
(born about 588 B.C.), the primordial principle of all things is
air, which is an infinite substance from which all things come
and to which all return.
2. Pythagoreans. Pythagoras (sixth century B.C.) was born
at Samos, and founded, at Crotona in the Greek colony of Italy, a
school in which he taught his religious and scientific doctrines.
The basis of all things is number, and the whole world is a har-
mony of odd and even numbers, which are all derived from the
unit. The one, unit, or monad, is God, from whom emanates
the dyad, i.e. matter and spirit. Pythagoreans admitted the trans-
migration of souls, and their doctrine included an elaborate code
of morality. Little is known with certainty about the meaning
of the Pythagorean theory of numbers, as we have but scant,
fragmentary, and second-hand references.
3. The Eleatic School. The Eleatic school takes its name from
Elea, a city of southern Italy (then a Greek colony). Eleatics
tend to identify the world with God and hence to attribute to the
world unity, eternity, and unchangeableness. Xenophanes (born
about 570 at Colophon in Asia Minor) admits only one God,
whom he identifies with the world. Hence the substance of the
world is immutable, and the changes affect only its surface. Par-
menides (born about 540 at Elea) denies the fact of change; the
testimony of the senses on this point is illusory. Real being is
one and absolutely immutable and unproduced; hence becoming
and change are impossibilities. Zeno (born about 490 at Elea)
was the disciple of Parmenides, and by his dialectics defended his
master's position.
4. Later Philosophers of Nature. (a) Heraclitus (born about
500 at Ephesus) opposes Parmenides. Far from being absolutely
unchangeable, the world is on the contrary always changing and
perpetually flowing. Nothing is, everything is becoming. The
primordial element is fire, out of which all things were made.
550 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
This is the turning-point in Greek speculation, shifting the prob-
* lem of nature from the question: What are things? to the question:
" How did things come to be what they are?
(b) Empedocles (born about 495 at Agrigentum, Sicily) admits
four elements: earth, water, air, and fire. Two antagonistic
forces, love and hatred, tend to combine and dissociate these
elements; hence the becoming.
(c) Anaxagoras (born about 500 at Clazomenae in Ionia) admits
an infinite number of elements which at first formed a chaos.
But the Spirit or Mind, endowed with knowledge and power,
gives them their orderly and harmonious motions.
(d) Leucippus, and Democritus of Abdera (about 460-370), pro-
fess a mechanistic atomism. Atoms are homogeneous in nature,
dissimilar in size and shape, infinite in number, and indivisible.
They move in an infinite vacuum, and, by their motions, every-
thing, even thought, must be explained.
5. Sophists. (a) The name "sophist," which etymologically
signifies a wise man, was at first honorable, but later, owing to
the abuse of dialectics leading to scepticism, it acquired a disrep-
utable meaning. The sophists dwelt little on metaphysics and
science, but chiefly on grammar, rhetoric, and logic. They came
to dispute in order to prove any proposition, lost sight of objective
truth, and were led to scepticism. On the contradictions found
among early philosophers they based their arguments to show
that nothing can be known with certitude, and that the only useful
science is that which enables us to convince others. This method
already included a beginning of reflection on the value of knowl-
edge. It accustomed the people to philosophical discussions,
and thus formed a transition to the following period.
(b) The most important sophists are Protagoras of Abdera
(born about 480) and Gorgias (about 480-375). According to
the former, human knowledge Jdeals only with appearances and is
essentially relative, since what is true for one man is false for an-
other. According to the latter, nothing exists really; if anything
existed, we could not know it; and, supposing that we knew it, this
knowledge could not be communicated to other men, since the word
or sign, which is different from the idea, is the only thing that can
GREEK PHILOSOPHY 551
be perceived by others, and they interpret it according to their
own minds.
II. SOCRATES, PLATO, ARISTOTLE
These three names represent the most perfect epoch of Greek
philosophy.
1. Socrates. (a) Socrates of Athens (469-399) opposed the
Sophists and showed the method of true knowledge. He left no
writings, and we know his method and doctrine especially through
his disciples, Plato and Xenophon. His method is essentially
inductive, starting from concrete data, and from them leading
to a general idea or definition. He frequently consulted men of
all ages and conditions, and in his discussions with them employed
a twofold process: one destructive (irony), consisting in showing
that a definition given by an adversary led to absurd and ridicu-
lous consequences; the other positive or constructive (maieutic),
consisting in finding the true definition by an analysis and com-
parison of common concrete ideas. His doctrine is no longer con-
cerned with nature, but primarily with man, and is chiefly ethical.
Man is created for happiness, and he must first ascertain where
true happiness is to be found, for, as no man does wrong know-
ingly, to know the right is to be virtuous. Virtue is knowledge.
(b) Socrates exercised great influence, both by his example and
his teaching. Among the philosophers who were influenced by
him must be mentioned Antisthenes, Diogenes of Sinope, and the
other Cynics, who claimed that man must live according to nature,
practice virtue, and neglect conventional culture and customs;
Aristippus of Cyrene and the other Cyrenaics, who advocate hedon-
ism, i.e. the theory that pleasure is the sole basis of morality;
Euclid of Megara and the other Megarian philosophers, who used,
developed, and frequently abused the Socratic method. In meta-
physics they continue the tradition of the Eleatic school.
2. Plato. (a) Plato (427-347) is the most illustrious dis-
ciple of Socrates. After his master's death, he travelled through
Egypt, Sicily, Italy, etc., and went back to Athens, where he
taught philosophy in the gymnasium of Academus. Hence the
name of "Academy" given to his school. He wrote a great num-
552 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
her of works, in the form of dialogues. His doctrine may be clas-
sified under the three headings of dialectics, physics, and ethics.
(b) Dialectics, (i) True science deals not with the world of
the senses, which is concrete, changing, and unstable, but with the
universal, common, and unchangeable essences, independent of
their concrete realization in space and time. (2) These essences
or ideas are the real prototypes which concrete beings participate.
There are, for instance, individual beautiful beings, persons,
statues, landscapes, etc.; therefore there must exist from all eter-
nity a beauty-in-itself which these objects participate. Again, a
triangle may disappear, but the nature and properties of the tri-
angle are eternal and unchangeable. To every one of our ideas
corresponds a real prototype. (3) The world of suprasensible
ideas exists really, since sensible objects are real, and the sensible
world is but a reflection of the intelligible world. There could
be no good, virtuous, just, beautiful, etc., objects or actions, if
there did not exist really goodness-itself, virtue-itself, justice-
itself, beauty-itself. Thus universal ideas as such are objective;
they are principles not only of knowledge, but also of exist-
ence. (4) How does the mind pass from sense-knowledge to
intellectual knowledge? Since the ideas are not realized in the
sensible world, the mind cannot find them there. Plato explains
true knowledge by the theory of reminiscence. Before being
imprisoned in the body, the soul has preexisted in the suprasensible
world of ideas, from which it was expelled in consequence of some
sin. Sense-perception is the means by which the soul is led to
recall some of the ideas acquired before its union with the body.
(Cf. p. 100.) (5) The highest idea is God, the supreme good and
source of all perfection.
(c) Physics (including the science of the human soul), (i) The
three principles of the world are God, the soul of the world which
participates the divine nature, and matter which is eternal, and is
the principle of limitation and multiplicity. Matter is also de-
scribed as the immense receptacle of sensible phenomena. (2)
The soul is immortal, and its union with the body is against its
nature. (3) In addition to the intelligent soul, Plato seems to
have admitted two other souls, the sensitive and the vegetative.
GREEK PHILOSOPHY 553
(d) Ethics, (i) The supreme good is the contemplation of
pure ideas, the true, the good, and the beautiful. (2) Virtue is
identified with knowledge. (3) The individual exists for the state,
and the state has absolute rights over the citizen.
(e) Plato and his immediate disciples form the school known as
the Old Academy. The Middle Academy shows a tendency to
scepticism. It is represented especially by Arcesilaus (about
316-241), who claims that true knowledge or certitude is impos-
sible. In the Third Academy, Carneades (about 210-129) asserts
that certitude is impossible, and that man must be satisfied with
probability. The New Academy (second and first centuries B.C.)
with Philo of Larissa and Antiochus of Ascalon returned to Plato's
dogmatism, which they combined with Aristotelian and Stoic
doctrines.
3. Aristotle. (a) Aristotle (384-322) was born at Stagyra
in Chalcidice, a Greek colony in Macedonia (hence the name of
Stagyrite frequently given him), and for twenty years studied
under Plato. In 342, Philip of Macedon called him to his court
and intrusted him with the education of his son Alexander (the
Great). In 335, Aristotle returned to Athens and, in the Lyceum,
opened a school of philosophy known as the Peripatetic School
(irf.pnra.Ttiv, to walk about) from the master's habit of walking with
his disciples while teaching. Aristotle wrote a large number of
works, logical, metaphysical, physical, and ethical. He agrees
with Plato in defining the scope of science, which is to deal with
the universal, the eternal, and the unchangeable, but differs from
him in claiming that these characters can be found by the mind
in the sensible world. Hence his philosophy is more inductive
and more scientific.
(b) Logic. Aristotle is the founder of scientific logic, and,
apart from the development which is given to induction owing to
the growth of empirical science, our logic to-day is essentially
that of Aristotle, (i) Scientific demonstration based on the
syllogism tends to find the universal causes and principles of things.
(2) It assumes some indemonstrable principles, which are not
innate, but acquired from the consideration of the world, and
applies them to concrete facts. (Cf. p. 383.) (3) Categories
554 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
are the general concepts under which we classify our knowledge.
There are ten categories (cf. p. 211), namely, substance, and
nine accidents. The categories are not simply classes of concepts,
but also classes of things.
(c) Metaphysics, (i) In every reality of the world there is
being and becoming, something stable and something changing.
(2) Change is the passage from one state to another. It implies
the distinction of "act" (evTeAexa) or actual possession of a deter-
mination, and "potency" (Svra/xis) or capacity for acquiring such
a determination. (3) The universal and necessary as such has
no existence apart from individual and contingent realities in which
it is found, not "actually," but "potentially." Actually it exists
only in the mind which elaborates sense-perception. (4) There
are four causes, material, formal, efficient, and final. The first
two are intrinsic and constitute the being itself; the latter tw- ,
extrinsic, the productive cause calling forth a being from potency
to act, and the end being the motive for which the agent exercises
its activity. (5) Act precedes potency, for, although in an indi-
vidual being the capacity for acquiring a determination precedes
the acquisition of it, yet the passage from potency to act always
requires a preexisting act. (6) Hence Aristotle is led to admit
the existence of the "Actus purus." (Cf. pp. 516 ff.)
(d) Physics (including the philosophy of mind), (i) All mate-
rial substances are composed of two principles, primary matter
and substantial form. (Cf. pp. 428 ff.) (2) The soul is the substan-
tial form of the human body. (Cf . pp. 483 ff .) (3) It is endowed
with five faculties, nutritive, sensitive, intellectual, appetitive,
and locomotive. (4) Intellectual knowledge reaches the object
apart from its individual features hi space and time. (5) The
intellect is immortal.
(e) Ethics, (i) The supreme good of man is happiness. It
consists essentially in the harmonious development of all his
faculties, especially of the highest, i.e. the intellectual. (2) Vir-
tue is a habit consisting in avoiding excess and defect. (3) The
highest virtues are intellectual virtues.
(/) Among the most important peripatetic philosophers must
be mentioned Theophrastus of Lesbos, contemporary of Aristotle,
GkEEK PHILOSOPHY 555
and later Apollonius of Rhodes (first century B.C.) who edited
Aristotle's works.
III. POST-ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY
1. Stoics. The main Stoic philosophers (from oroa, porch,
the place where Zeno taught) are Zeno of Citium in the island of
Cyprus (born about 340), the founder of the school; Cleanthes
(born about 300), his immediate successor, and Chrysippus (born
about 280), who, by his dialectics, contributed to the defense and
spread of the school. Later, the Stoic doctrines were propagated
among the Romans, especially by Seneca (3-65), Epictetus (died
about 117), and Marcus Aurelius (121-180).
According to the Stoics, (i) The only principle of knowledge is
sensation. (2) Matter alone is real, and what we call spirit
God and the soul is but a form of more subtle matter. (3) God
is the soul of the world, and must be conceived as a primordial
fire, principle of all activity and intelligence. The human soul
is but a transitory emanation from the divine spirit, or a spark
of the divine fire. (4) The whole world, including man, acts
according to an absolute determinism. (5) Virtue for man consists
in living according not only to his rational nature, but also to all
cosmic laws. This is man's end and true happiness, the only good
and its own reward. The wise man must be absolutely apathetic,
i.e. indifferent to all motives of action which do not spring from
pure reason. All passions and emotions, therefore, must be sub-
dued and annihilated. Bear patiently and without feeling what
cannot be avoided. Abstain from everything distinct from pure
reason: Abstine et sustine, sums up this ethical doctrine. (Cf.
p. 320.)
2. Epicureans. Epicurus (342 or 341-270) opened a school of
philosophy at Athens. His disciples added nothing important
to the master's doctrines, which were soon propagated in the Greek
and Roman world, their main representative at Rome being
Lucretius (95-51). The aim of philosophy is to procure happiness
for man, and everything is subservient to this end. (i) As the
world obeys necessary laws, man need not fear the gods. They
exist, but have nothing to do with the world or with man. The
556 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
deliverance from this fear will contribute to man's happiness.
Epicurus admits the essential principles of the mechanical atom-
ism taught by Democritus. (2) Knowledge is reduced to sen-
sation, and sensation is the only test and criterion of certitude.
(3) The soul is a subtle form of matter, originating and ceasing to
exist with the body; hence death is not to be feared. The will,
however, is free. (4) Personal happiness and pleasure is the
supreme good. It does not consist so much in anything positive as
in the absence of pain and the repose of the mind. Sensual pleas-
ure must be tempered and guided by reason. Not only the pres-
ent enjoyment, but also the future, must be considered. (Cf.
P- 314.)
3. Sceptics and Eclectics. (a) The earlier sceptics of the third
and second centuries agree with the Stoics and Epicureans that
the chief purpose of philosophy is to show the way to happiness,
and that happiness consists essentially in the peace and repose of
the mind. Hence man must abstain from researches and studies,
since they are not necessary to practical happiness, and disturb the
mind. The main sceptics of this period are Pyrrho of Elis (about
360-270), who holds that the wise man abstains from passing judg-
ment on anything; Arcesilaus and Carneades, already mentioned
as leaders of the Academy. (Cf. pp. 373 ff.)
(b) The Eclectics, like the Sceptics, do not pretend to reach
speculative certitude, but only to frame a working hypothesis on
which a system of practical conduct may be based. The knowl-
edge which they claim to have is sufficient for practical purposes;
it is felt instinctively rather than based on demonstration, and
is therefore more subjective than objective. Among the most
important eclectics are Seneca, already mentioned as a Stoic;
Philo of Larissa (of the Academy); Andronicus of Rhodes (of the
Peripatetic school), and, to some extent, Cicero (106-43).
(c) Eclecticism led again to scepticism, represented by Mnesi-
demus (first century B.C.), who denies the value of both sensitive
and intellectual knowledge, and asserts that all our mental
representations are subjective, and by Sextus Empiricus, who
gathered in his treatises all the objections of sceptics against
certitude.
GRECO-ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY 557
III. GRECO-ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY
The main centre of this period is Alexandria, where the western
world had frequent intercourse with the eastern world. Although
this movement occurred in the beginning of the Christian era, it
belongs to ancient philosophy, as Christianity had no influence
on it. In the present period, the most important doctrine is Neo-
Platonism, but we must speak first of Neo-Pythagorism and of
the Greco-Jewish philosophy that preceded Neo-Platonism. The
feature common to these is a mystical tendency to an ecstatic
union with the Divinity.
i. Greco- Jewish and Neo-Pythagorean Philosophy. (a) The
Jews endeavored to harmonize the views contained in their sacred
books with those of Greek philosophy. They had recourse to an
allegorical interpretation of the Scriptures in order to find therein
symbols and figures of the Greek philosophical doctrines. The
main attempt was made by Philo, an Alexandrian Jew (30 B.C.-
50 A.D.), according to whom (i) God, the first cause, so tran-
scends the world that, although we can know His existence, nothing
can be known of His nature and attributes. He is, however, good
and almighty. (2) The world was created by God, not immedi-
ately, but through certain intermediary "powers," which may be
identified with ideas, angels, demons, etc. They proceed from
God, yet are distinct from Him. (3) The primordial divine
"power" is the Logos, a kind of world-soul the nature of which is
not explained clearly. (4) The human soul is a divine principle,
or angel, united with a body which is a hindrance to its higher
activities. (5) By withdrawing itself more and more from the
influences of the organism, the soul may enter into immediate
communication with God by a mystical ecstasy.
(b) Neo- Pythagoreans also took their doctrines from the Greek
schools of philosophy, and combined them with the Pythagorean
symbolism and mystical aspirations. The main representatives
of this movement are Plutarch of Chaeronea (about 46-120),
Maximus of Tyre, and the works collected under the name of
Hermes Trismegistus (end of the third century).
558 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
2. Neo-Platonism develops the doctrine of religious mysticism,
or the union of man with the Infinite, based on a pantheistic
monism, God being the source from whom all things proceed
by emanation. With Plato's teachings as a basis, it combines
doctrines from the main Greek schools.
(a) Plotinus (205-270) holds that (i) All things emanate from
the One, i.e. the supreme being, world-transcending, indetermined
principle, without any attributes, without even intelligence and
will. (2) The first reality which emanates from the One is the
Mind (vovs), or pure intelligence; from this intelligence emanates
the soul of the world; from the soul of the world, particular souls;
and from these, matter. (3) The human soul is free and immortal,
but goes through a series of transmigrations. (4) The soul finally
returns to God by successively purifying and almost annihilating
itself, and ascending to the contemplation of the Mind, and the
ecstatic union with the One. Porphyry of Tyre (233-304) was
Plotinus's immediate disciple, and spread his master's doctrine.
(b) lamblicus of Syria (died about 330) also holds a theory of
emanation with a polytheistic and demonistic doctrine.
(c) At Constantinople the chief representative of Neo-Plato-
nism is Themistius (latter half of fourth century). At Athens,
Proclus (410-485) and Simplicius also teach the doctrine of a series
of emanations from the One.
CHAPTER II
MEDLEY AL PHILOSOPHY
TRANSITION. PATRISTIC PHILOSOPHY
The Fathers of the Church are primarily apologists. They
endeavor to explain Christian dogmas and to defend them against
both heresy and paganism. Hence whatever philosophy is found
in their writings is not presented systematically, but scattered
here and there as circumstances require. Two periods may be
distinguished. The first, ending with the council of Nice (325)
includes the first three centuries, during which the main dogmas
were established and defined. The second extends to the seventh
century, during which time theology became more systematic,
and consequently more attention was given to philosophy as an
auxiliary.
i. First Period. (a) The question of the origin of evil gave
rise to two heresies, Gnosticism in the second century, and Mani-
cheism (founded by Manes in the third century). Manicheism
holds an essential dualism of principles, one of good, the other of
evil, and a doctrine of emanation. Gnosticism had recourse to a
supposed esoteric doctrine of Christ, higher than revelation and
to which the name^JIraicrts was given. According to this (i) God
is the principle of all good, and from God emanates a series of ^Eons.
(2) Matter is the principle of evil, and the world results from the
union of the divine with the material principle. (3) All things
will ultimately return to God. (4) The Scriptures are to be inter-
preted allegorically. It is easy to see in this teaching a mixture
of elements borrowed from Philo and Plotinus.
(b) Among the Fathers of this period must be mentioned two
names, both belonging to the Christian school of Alexandria:
Clement of Alexandria (died about 216) and Origen (185-254).
Both insist on the doctrine that God is not to be identified,
559
560 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
with, but transcends, the world. The world is not an emanation
from God, but was created by Him. The soul is spiritual and
immortal.
2. Second Period. (a) We simply mention in passing the
names of Gregory of Nyssa (331-394), Basil (died 379), Ambrose
(340-397), and Gregory Nazianzen (born 330).
(b) Saint Augustine, born 354 at Tagaste in Numidia, was
converted by St. Ambrose. He became bishop of Hippo in 395,
and died in 430. The following works especially are of interest
for philosophy: "Confessiones"; " Retractationes " ; "Contra
Academicos"; "Soliloquia"; "De immortalitate animae"; "De
anima et eius origine"; "De libero arbitrio"; "De civitate Dei."
Augustine borrows from the Greek philosophers, especially from
Plato, but adapts their teaching to Christian dogmas, (i) God
exists as the one supreme being, simple, eternal, omniscient. He
is the creator of all things, and brought them out of nothing accord-
ing to His plan, ideas, or exemplars. (2) The soul is spiritual and
immortal. (3) Its main activity is intellectual knowledge. Cer-
titude is possible, and Augustine defends it against the probabil-
ism of the Academy. God is the source of all truth, and the first
light which illumines the human mind. (4) God is the supreme
good, hence man's ultimate end. Virtue is essentially the con-
formity of the human with the divine will, the fulfilment of God's
law, especially the law of love, in view of man's eternal destiny.
(c) Some works formerly attributed to Dionysius- the Areop-
agite, the disciple of St. PauL are now knc^pto have been writ-
ten at the end of the fifth or the beginning of the sixth century.
The philosophy of Pseudo- Dionysius is essentially Neo-Platonistic,
and reproduces the mysticism of Neo-Platonism, although it rejects
its pantheism.
Mediaeval or scholastic philosophy (thus called because it was
taught in the schools), although it was frequently systematized
along with theology, is nevertheless distinct from it, as it proceeds
on merely rational grounds. We shall divide it into three periods:
(i) The period of formation and growth (from the ninth to the
end of the twelfth century). (2) The period of perfection (thir-
FIRST MEDIEVAL PERIOD 561
teenth century). (3) The period of decline (from the fourteenth
to the sixteenth century).
I. FIRST PERIOD
I. BEGINNINGS
1. The Schools. (a) Before Charlemagne, the invasion of
the barbarians and the dismemberment of the Roman Empire
made it impossible to acquire and develop any branch of learning.
From the time of Charlemagne schools were founded: (i) palace
schools, at the court of rulers, especially of the French kings;
(2) monastic schools, annexed to monasteries, for the education
of both the religious and strangers; (3) cathedral schools, estab-
lished in the most important diocesan sees. The seven liberal
arts were taught in these schools, namely, the trivium (grammar,
rhetoric, and dialectic), and the quadriwum (arithmetic, geometry,
astronomy, and music). Little by little natural sciences, his-
tory, theology, and philosophy were added. Among the first
" scholastici " or masters of the schools may be mentioned Alcuin
(735-804) at the court of Charlemagne, and Rhabanus Maurus
(784-856) at the Benedictine school of Fulda.
(b) The teaching in the schools was chiefly in the form of com-
mentaries on the works of Greek philosophers (mostly in Latin
translations) and of Latin philosophers. Among these works the
most important were the Organon, i.e. the logical works of Aris-
totle, part of whMfcnly was known then; the Timaeus of Plato;
the Isagoge, i.e. the introduction^to Aristotle's Categories, by
Porphyry, and other commentaries of Plato and Aristotle; some
of the writings of Cicero, Seneca, an4 Lucretius; those of St.
Augustine, Pseudo-Dionysius, and some Fathers.
2. John Scotus Eriugena (born between 800 and 815) is the first
who tried to systematize philosophy. The doctrine contained in
his main work "De divisione naturae" is a mixture of Christian-
ity, Oriental pantheism, and Alexandrian mysticism. There is
only one being, namely, God, from whom all things proceed by
emanation. God remains the one substance of all things. In
this process of emanation, four stages must be distinguished.
37
562 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
(i) Uncreated and creating nature, i.e. God as the origin of all
things, unknowable both for us and for Himself. (2) Created
and creating nature, i.e. God as the principle and exemplar of all
things. (3) Created and not-creating nature, i.e. the world of
phenomena in space and time, all of which are participations of
the divine substance, and theophaniae, i.e. manifestations of God
and of the divine becoming. (4) Neither created nor creating
nature, i.e. God as the end of all things, to whom all things
ultimately return.
Other important names of this period are Remi of Auxerre
(died 904) and Gerbert (died 1003).
II. THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSALS
i. The Problem Stated. (a) Toward the middle of the elev-
enth century the problem of universals becomes the centre of
scholastic discussions. It is not the only problem, as we shall
see; from it radiate other psychological and metaphysical inqui-
ries, but it is the chief one. Nor is the discussion of this problem
an idle one, for it is the very question of the value of our universal
ideas, a question which, in some form or other, reappears through-
out the whole history of philosophy, and is still a vital one at the
present time.
(b) A passage in Porphyry's Isagoge which, in Boethius's trans-
lation, was the text-book of logic used in the schools, was the
starting-point of the discussion. Porphyry asks whether genera
and species exist in themselves as realities, or only in the mind that
conceives them. Are they objective things or mental abstractions?
Hence two answers are suggested, (i) Absolute realism: Uni-
versal concepts as such correspond to objective extramental
realities, which are universal independently of the mind. (2)
Conceptualism : The idea alone is universal, and there is no extra-
mental reality corresponding to it. Later on, a distinction was
made and two new systems were evolved. (3) Nominalism, more
radical than conceptualism, denies even the conception of the
universal by the mind, and attributes universality only to the
common name. (4) Moderate realism answers that, as such,
the universal exists only in the mind, that existing things are
FIRST MEDIAEVAL PERIOD 563
always individual, but that there is in things a " fundamentum "
for this universality, namely, their essence which the mind, by a
process of abstraction, may conceive apart from individual
features. (Cf. p. 398.)
2. Realism. (a) Scotus Eriugena and Remi of Auxerre,
already mentioned, were realists.
(b) In the twelfth century, William of Champeaux (1070-1120),
a disciple of St. Anselm and of Roscelin, whose teaching he op-
posed (see below, p. 564), held according to Abelard, his oppo-
nent, on whose authority we have to depend for this account that
universals are present in individual things. Hence individuals
are identical as to their essence and differ only in their accidents.
In other words, the essence of man, for instance, is one and iden-
tical in all men, and contained totally in every individual man.
In consequence of the ridicule heaped on this doctrine by Abe-
lard who objected that in this case Socrates at Rome, since he
contains the whole human essence, should also be at the same time
at Athens, where Plato, who also contains the whole human es-
sence, is William modified his view, and finally seems to have
abandoned realism altogether.
(c) A more reserved realism, called indifferentism, was taught
by Adelard of Bath (in the beginning of the twelfth century) and
Gauthier (Walter} of Mortagne (died 1174). In every individual
we must distinguish two classes of realities. Some constitute its
essential differences; others are specific and generic, i.e. common
to all individuals (indijferentes) , hence universal. It would seem
then that, according to the point of view one takes, the same
being may be looked upon as individual and as universal, but
the theory, as presented, is vague, and may receive various
interpretations.
(d) The school of Chartres Bernard of Chartres (died about
1125), Thierry of Chartres (died 1155), William of Conches (about
1080-1154), a disciple of St. Bernard teaches an absolute realism
similar to that of Plato. The true reality is universal, and the
sensible world is composed only of fleeting shadows. However,
this doctrine endeavors to avoid pantheism, and admits
creation.
564 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
3. Anti-Realism. (a) At the end of the eleventh century,
Roscelin of Compiegne affirms that reality belongs primarily to
the individual, and that universals are only names, "voces"
(nominalism), or at most mental conceptions to which nothing
real corresponds.
(b) In the twelfth century Abelard (1079-1142), a disciple of
Roscelin and of William of Champeaux, is the main figure in
philosophical and theological discussions, (i) He opposes both the
realism of William of Champeaux and the nominalism of Roscelin.
He does not seem to look upon universals as mere mental ideas
without any reality whatsoever in things. While he claims that
individuals alone exist, his doctrine seems to be that of a moderate
realism not yet formulated clearly. (2) He is essentially a ration-
alist, even in regard to Catholic dogmas and mysteries which, he
claims, can be understood and demonstrated by reason. (3) In
his " Sic et Non " he presents pros and cons on a number of ques-
tions, but stops at these statements without giving any posi-
tive answer. (4) He also gives some attention to cosmological,
psychological, and ethical problems.
(c) Gilbert de la Porree (1076-1154) admits that universal es-
sences exist only in individuals, and become universal in the mind
when the similarities between them are discovered by a process of
comparison.
4. Saint Anselm (1033-1109) deserves special mention on
account of the many questions which he touched upon, and of
his efforts to systematize the results reached by his predecessors.
He was influenced greatly by St. Augustine, (i) Faith is superior
to reason, yet reason is an independent source of knowledge.
(2) The real existence of God is proved by the idea which we have
of an infinitely perfect being, to whom, therefore, existence, as a
perfection, must belong. (This argument has been discussed and
found wanting as passing from the ideal to the real order.) (3)
Truth is eternal and unchangeable, and therefore based ultimately
on God. (4) Universals exist in things; yet St. Anselm does not
seem to teach an absolute, but a moderate realism. (5) Abstract
ideas are not innate, but have their origin in the data of the
senses.
FIRST MEDIAEVAL PERIOD 565
5. Eclectics and Synthetics. Efforts to sum up and coordi-
nate various doctrines were made by John of Salisbury (died 1180),
and Alanus of Lille (about 1128-1202). The former is a humanist,
historian, critic, and philosopher. The latter insists on dialec-
tics and applies himself chiefly to cosmology, psychology, and
metaphysics.
III. MYSTICISM AND PANTHEISM
1. Mysticism. In general mysticism admits that, at least
under certain conditions, there is for man a mode of knowledge of
God and of divine things higher than logical demonstration, namely,
the direct communication and union of the soul with God through con-
templation and love. The purpose of life is to develop these higher
faculties, and to make the immediate union with God closer and
more perfect. The main mystics are found in the abbey of Saint-
Victor (Paris), and among them especially the two abbots, Hugh
(1096-1141) and Richard (died 1173). Without despising reason
and dialectics, they look upon them only as a step to contemplation
which alone gives true science.
2. Pantheism. In the latter half of the twelfth century there
was a revival of pantheistic doctrines, (i) The pantheism of
the school of Chartres is represented by Bernard of Tours, who,
about 1150, wrote his "De mundi universitate," in which he
follows the Neo-Platonistic doctrines, and admits a theory of
emanation. (2) The pantheism of Amaury of Benes and his
disciples admits that God is immanent in all things, and that all
things are substantially identical with God. (3) The material-
istic pantheism of David of Dinant asserts that God is the primary
matter identical in all things. Three classes of substances are
distinguished, God, the soul, and matter, but they are only
one and the same being.
IV. ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY
i. Arabian Philosophy is based chiefly on Aristotle, whose works
were translated into Arabic from Syriac versions. Naturally
such translations were very defective. Arabian philosophers also
566 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
borrow doctrines of emanation and ecstasis from Neo-Platonism.
In the discussions which were raised about the Koran toward
the end of the eighth century, the Mutazilites were rationalists,
the Mutakallimun defended orthodoxy, and the Sufis gave promi-
nence to mysticism. Arabian philosophy proper is divided into
eastern and western.
(a) Main oriental Arabian philosophers, (i) Alkendi (died
about 870) wrote on logic, physics, metaphysics, medicine, magic,
etc. (2) Alfarabi (died 950), at the school of Bagdad, wrote
commentaries on Aristotle's logical works. In metaphysics he
admitted an emanationistic pantheism. (3) Avicenna (Ibn
Sina, 980-1036) wrote a great number of works in which he
abandons many of the Neo-Platonistic interpretations of Aristotle,
but still admits a theory of emanations or processions from God.
The last emanation is the "intellectus agens," which governs our
world. Matter is eternal and increated. (4) Gazali (Algazel,
1058-1111) opposed the philosophers and stood for the Koran.
He was one of the Sufis or mystics.
(b) Occidental Arabian philosophers lived in Spain. The most
important was Averroes (Ibn Roshd, 1126-1198), born at Cordova;
died at Morocco. He wrote many commentaries on Aristotle's
works, and also original works on philosophy, medicine, and
Astronomy, (i) Primary matter is eternal and contains all
forms in a germ-like fashion. (2) Human reason is impersonal,
one and identical in all men. Hence there is no personal immor-
tality.
2. Jewish Philosophy developed chiefly in Spain under the influ-
ence of Arabian philosophy. Amcebron or Avicebrol (Ibn Gebirol,
1020-1070), born at Malaga, reproduces many tendencies of the
Neo-Platonists. God is one and unknowable. All things, even
spiritual, are composed of matter and form. The soul must unite
itself to God by contemplation. Moses Maimonides (1135-1204)
tries to combine the teachings of Aristotle with Judaism. On many
points he agrees with the interpretation of Aristotle by Averroes.
Matter is not affirmed to be eternal. The human intellect is partly
innate (one and the same for all) and partly acquired (personal
and individual).
SECOND MEDIAEVAL PERIOD 567
II. SECOND PERIOD
I. GENERAL
i. Influences. The thirteenth century is the period of per-
fection of scholastic philosophy. An attempt is made to coordi-
nate all preceding doctrines in a complete synthesis. The main
influences at work were the introduction of hitherto unknown phil-
osophical writings, especially those of Aristotle; the foundation
and growth of universities, and the institution of religious orders.
(a) Before this time only the logical works of Aristotle were
known to the schoolmen. Now his other philosophical and scien-
tific works were translated into Latin, sometimes directly from the
Greek, more generally from Arabic translations. The translations
from the Arabic were frequently very imperfect, and, together
with Arabian commentaries, were causes of the misrepresentation
of the master's doctrine in a way which was often irreconcilable
with Catholic dogma. Hence prohibitions to read Aristotle's
works were enacted by the provincial council of Paris (1210) and
by the Pope's legate (1215). This prohibition, however, applied
only to the University of Paris. Little by little, when Aristotle
became better known through more accurate translations, this pro-
hibition ceased to be applied, and Aristotle became the undisputed
master in the University.
(b) Universities gave to philosophy an important place in their
teaching. The University of Paris was founded early in the thir-
teenth century, or rather grew out of the union of the cathedral
schools. The University of Oxford, which already existed, was
definitely organized in the thirteenth century, and, to a great
extent, modelled after that of Paris. The University of Cambridge
was founded in the latter half of the thirteenth century.
(c) It is also at this time that the Dominicans and Franciscans
were founded. Their teaching, both in their monasteries and in
universities, had a stimulating influence on account of the learn-
ing of the men who gave it, and of the controversies which arose
between seculars and regulars, and between the various religious
schools.
568 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
2. Division. We shall consider successively (i) the philoso-
ophy of the earlier part of the thirteenth century; (2) Thomistic
philosophy; (3) Scotistic philosophy; (4) some other more or less
independent schools and philosophers.
II. PHILOSOPHY IN THE EARLIER PART or THE THIRTEENTH
CENTURY
In general, the beginning of the thirteenth century is a period of
transition. The influence of Aristotle is already very important,
but far from exclusive. Many elements are borrowed from other
sources, especially from St. Augustine, (i) William of Au-
vergne (died 1249), professor at the University of Paris, and later
bishop of Paris, attempts to reconcile Aristotle with Plato and
St. Augustine. (2) Among the Franciscans must be mentioned
Alexander of Hales (died 1245) and St. Bonaventure (1221-1274).
Alexander's philosophy is essentially Aristotelian, although it still
retains some traditional Augustinian elements. St. Bonaventure
was Alexander's disciple. In his metaphysics, psychology, theod-
icy, etc., the growing influence of Aristotle is manifest. He also
taught a form of mysticism akin to that of the Victorine school.
The world presents to the mind the "vestiges" of God, and the
soul is an "image" of God. The knowledge of God's vestiges
and image must lead to the immediate contemplation of God
Himself.
III. THOMISTIC PHILOSOPHY
1. Albert the Great (1193-1280), a Dominican, professor at
Cologne and Paris, was St. Thomas's master, and began the great
synthesis completed by his disciple. He contributed to spread
the influence of Aristotle. Remarkable as a theologian and phi-
losopher, Albert is still more remarkable as a scientist. He was
familiar with all the sciences of his time, zoology, botany, phys-
iology, medicine, geography, astronomy, mineralogy, and even
alchemy. His philosophy, except on some minor points, is essen-
tially the same as that of St. Thomas, but less perfectly elaborated.
2. Saint Thomas of Aquino or Thomas Aquinas, called the
Angelic Doctor (1225-1274), entered the Dominican order in 1243,
SECOND MEDIAEVAL PERIOD 569
was the disciple of Albert the Great at Cologne and Paris,
began his public teaching at Paris about 1257, and later taught
at Rome, Bologna, Perugia, Naples, and other places.
(a) Besides a number of commentaries on Holy Scripture,
Aristotle, etc., he wrote "Opuscula," "Quodlibeta," "Quaesti-
ones disputatae," and especially "Summa contra gentiles" and
"Summa theologica." These constitute a theological and phil-
osophical encyclopaedia in which Aristotelian philosophy and Cath-
olic dogma are harmonized. Thomistic philosophy is essentially
Peripatetic, but on many points Aristotle's doctrine is modified.
Reason is a source of knowledge distinct from revelation, but
allied with it, and St. Thomas always distinguishes natural from
supernatural truth, and philosophy from theology.
(b) We shall mention only the fundamental points in the phi-
losophy of St. Thomas, (i) Material substances are composed of
matter and form, potentiality and actuality. (Cf. pp. 426 ff.) The
world was created by God. (2) Man is also composed of matter
and form (cf . pp. 480 ff) , but the form or soul is substantial and
spiritual, hence directly created by God and immortal. (3) The
soul has faculties, some of which it exercises through the organism,
while others are spiritual. The intellect is spiritual, but depends
extrinsically on the senses. From sensory knowledge we arise to
intellectual knowledge by the abstractive activity of the intel-
lectus agens. (Cf. pp. 98 ff.) Intellectual or universal knowledge
alone constitutes true science. Universals exist in things "funda-
mentaliter," i.e. in their concrete essence, but in the mind "for-
maliter." (Cf. p. 398.) (4) The existence of God is known a
posteriori from the world, as also whatever may be known concern-
ing His nature. But no finite mind can ever have a comprehensive
knowledge of God. (Cf. pp. 529 ff.) (5) The ultimate end of man
is perfect happiness which is to be found in the possession of God,
the infinite good. The moral character of actions is to be derived
from their relation to the ultimate end.
3. Thomists and Adversaries. Some of St. Thomas's doc-
trines were opposed very strongly, and the opposition succeeded
even in having some of them condemned at Paris and Oxford.
But, in 1278, the whole Dominican order accepted Thomism, which
570 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
thenceforth gained in favor. Among the main opponents of St.
Thomas are the Dominican Robert Kilwardby at Oxford and the
Franciscan Richard of Middletown at Paris. Among his main
partisans on the controverted questions are Giles of Lessines, and
some philosophers who were eclectics, but kept Thomism as a
central doctrine: Godfrey of Fontaines, Giles of Rome, and Henry
of Ghent.
IV. SCOTISTIC PHILOSOPHY
John Duns Scotus, the Doctor Subtilis (i 266 or 1 274-1308), a Fran-
ciscan, taught at Oxford (1294), Paris (1304), and Cologne (1308),
where he died. His philosophy is primarily critical and negative,
secondarily constructive. He attacks the main contemporary
systems of St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas, Giles of Rome, Henry
of Ghent, and others, (i) Philosophy and theology not only are
distinct, but may be opposed. The field of reason is narrowed
more than in St. Thomas. (2) All created beings are composed
of matter and form. Even spiritual substances have a common
and homogeneous substratum, the materia primo-prima. As to
the substantial form, it is not necessarily one in the same being,
but there may be together several subordinated forms. (3) Scotus
defends a moderate realism. However, the individual as such is
not made individual by its matter, as St. Thomas asserted, but by
a special reality called haecceitas or "thisness." In general, under
the name of formalities, Scotus distinguishes a number of prin-
ciples within the same individual, to which he attributes reality,
although their distinction seems merely logical. (4) Both in God
and in man, the will is superior to the intellect. It may be noted
that, notwithstanding the differences, Scotus's philosophy agrees
with that of St. Thomas on many fundamental points. It found
many exponents and defenders, especially among Franciscans, but
Scotus's influence never equalled that of St. Thomas, who remains
the greatest of all scholastics.
V. OTHER SCHOOLS AND PHILOSOPHERS
i Averroism. The commentaries on Aristotle by Averroes
were introduced at Paris at the same time as Aristotle's works.
THIRD MEDIAEVAL PERIOD 571
Condemned in 1210 and 1215, Averroism revived especially with
Siger of Brabant (died at the end of the thirteenth century), and
was again condemned in 1270 and 1277. At this period, Averroism
holds that the active intellect is impersonal and identical in all men.
Hence there is no personal immortality. It also denies the provi-
dence of God and asserts a mediate creation, God having first
created separate intelligences who, in turn, created material sub-
stances. Finally it divorces reason from faith, so that a philo-
sophical truth may be a falsehood in theology, and vice versa.
2. Roger Bacon (about 1210-1294) was a Franciscan who
taught at Oxford and Paris. He attaches great importance to
natural sciences and uses experimental methods. He appeals to
observation and experience against authority and a priori deduc-
tions. His learning was very extensive and embraced physics,
mathematics, geography, astronomy, alchemy, and linguistics. In
philosophy he borrows from Aristotle, early Franciscan tradi-
tions, and Arabian philosophers. His violent polemics against
acknowledged authorities contributed to lessen his influence.
3. Raymond Lully (1235-1315) was also a Franciscan, and
opposed Averroism. He held that reason and faith, far from being
opposed, always go together. Faith is essentially rational, and
reason can demonstrate all revealed truths. Thus the difference
between the natural and the supernatural is suppressed. His
"Ars Magna" contains a kind of logical mechanism in which
various letters and symbols representing ideas are combined in
different ways so as to lead to formulas and conclusions that are
supposed to correspond to reality.
HI. THIRD PERIOD
i. General Causes of Decline. The third period of scholastic
philosophy, including the fourteenth and the first half of the
fifteenth century, is a period of decline. Several causes con-
tributed to this decline. As, on the one hand, Albert the
Great and Roger Bacon had failed in their attempt to
foster the scientific spirit and develop experimental methods;
and as, on the other hand, the work of harmonizing philos-
572 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
ophy and theology, reason and faith, had been perfected,
philosophers indulged in mere verbal questions, abused dialectics,
and discussed idle subtleties. They ceased to think for them-
selves, and limited themselves to commenting on the works of their
predecessors. Hence frequently arose animated discussions on
points of little or no importance. Moreover, these obscure thoughts
were often expressed in more obscure terminology. All this con-
tributed to a general decline of studies, and the high level which
universities had attained in the thirteenth century was consider-
ably lowered. Two main movements characterize this period, the
revival of nominalism and of mysticism.
2. Terminism. (a) The formalism of the Scotistic school
multiplied metaphysical entities, and led to an extreme reaction in
which everything was simplified as much as possible. Thus was
revived nominalism which had generally been abandoned in the pre-
ceding century. Durandus of St. Pourqain (died about 1332) and
Peter d'Auriol (Aureolus, died 1322) are the precursors of Ockham
(about 1280-1347), who taught at Paris and was the true author
of the revival of nominalism. According to him, only individuals
exist, and to universal notions no reality whatever corresponds in
nature. Ideas are signs or terms of the things which they signify,
but intuitive knowledge alone represents things that have any
reality outside the mind. Abstract concepts have no objective
value whatsoever. They are termini, conceptions of the mind,
and substitutes for a number of individual realities. This theory
is neither Roscelin's nominalism nor Abelard's conceptualism, but
rather terminism. In addition to this, Ockham manifests sceptical
tendencies, and professes an extreme voluntarism.
(b) Ockham's terminism was in great favor during the fourteenth
and fifteenth centuries. Notwithstanding many prohibitions by
the University of Paris, it became predominant at Paris, Vienna,
Cologne, and Heidelberg. The most prominent followers of Ock-
ham were John Buridan (died about 1358), rector of the University
of Paris, Marsilius of Inghen (died 1396), rector of the University
of Heidelberg, and Peter d'Ailly (1350-1425).
3. Mysticism. The abuse of dialectics brought about, as a
reaction, a revival of mysticism and the distrust of reason. Among
THIRD MEDIEVAL PERIOD 573
those who professed a mysticism consistent with Catholicism are
John Ruysbrceck (1293-1381), Gerard Groot (1340-1384), Thomas a
Kempis (1380-1471), Denys the Carthusian (1402-1471), and
especially John Gerson (1364-1429), chancellor of the University of
Paris, whose doctrine has many points in common with that of
St. Bonaventure. Among those who professed a mysticism in-
consistent with Catholicism, on account especially of a leaning
toward pantheism, are Eckhart (about 1260-1327), who holds that
God is the very existence and actuality of the world, but tries to
defend himself from accusations of pantheism; Henry Suso (about
1300-1366); John Tauter (1290-1361).
CHAPTER III
MODERN PHILOSOPHY
TRANSITION. RENAISSANCE
i. General Features. The philosophical doctrines that suc-
ceeded scholasticism have little in common besides an opposition
to scholastic philosophy. They develop in many different direc-
tions, show much confusion and little originality. Some tendencies,
however, manifest themselves; a separation of philosophy from
dogmatic teaching, a complete independence of theology and
revelation, an alliance of philosophy with natural sciences, and a
return to antiquity.
Among the causes which brought about this break with the past
the most important were the following:
(a) The movement known as humanism, i.e. the study of Greek
and Latin classics, especially from the point of view of the per-
fection of the form which was contrasted with that of the scholas-
tics. Naturally this artistic renaissance affected philosophical
thought, for it is not possible to attend to the form without feeling
the influence of the ideas. The contact of Italy and the western
world with Greece contributed to develop this tendency, especially
as a number of learned Greeks fled to Italy when Constantinople
was captured (1453) and Europe was threatened by the Turks.
The invention of the art of printing facilitated the spread of
literature.
(b) Religious reformation, which implied essentially a doing away
with the authority of the Church, and an advocating of the
supremacy of individual thought.
(c) The progress of natural sciences, in which new discoveries
gave rise to new problems. The heliocentric system replaced the
geocentric view (Copernicus, 1473-1543; Tycho-Brahe, 1546-
1601; Kepler, 1571-1631; Galileo, 1564-1642). The laws of the
574
RENAISSANCE 575
movements of heavenly bodies were discovered. Anatomy,
physiology (Vesalius, 1514-1564; Servet, 1509-1553), and mathe-
matics (Galileo, Tartaglia) made a rapid advance. America was
discovered, etc. All these opened new horizons, suggested new
questions, and necessitated the use of new methods.
(d) The formation of nationalities out of a formerly united Chris-
tian empire, and the abolition of the feudal system. Hence ques-
tions concerning individual and national rights and liberties grew
in importance.
(e) The failure of scholastic philosophy, which had weakened
considerably in its period of decline, to adapt itself, as it could
and should have done, to these new circumstances and needs. Its
dry verbal discussions could not withstand the opposition which
raged against it. Many important problems had been raised, and
there was no time to lose in idle discussions.
2. Revival of Greek Schools. (a) The revival of Platonism,
favored by the beauty of form and diction found in Plato's writings,
was encouraged especially by the Platonic Academy of Florence
founded by Cosmo de' Medici in 1460. Plato, frequently with a
Neo-Platonic interpretation, was preferred to Aristotle, especially
by Gemistus Pletho (1355-1450), a Byzantine scholar, Cardinal
Bessarion (1403-1472), and Pico delta Mirandola (1463-1494), who
combined Neo-Platonism with the Jewish Cabala.
(b) Pomponatius (1462-1524) is the chief Aristotelian of this
period, but Aristotle's doctrine is frequently misinterpreted, and
becomes again the subject of many discussions.
(c) Stoicism finds a great number of advocates, especially
Justus Lipsius (i 547-1606) . Epicureanism in its essentials is revived
by Gassendi (1592-1655).
3. Naturalism. The study of natural sciences was based
largely on observation. But at this early stage of scientific investi-
gation, whenever real causes were not at hand, occult forces were
frequently called in to explain facts. Hence a tendency to magic
and astrology. A tendency to pantheism was favored by the
admiration of the order of nature, (i) Bernardino Telesio (1508-
1588) is an opponent of Aristotelian philosophy, and devotes his
life to the study of natural sciences. According to him. the uni-
576 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
verse results from the combination of matter with two immaterial
forces, heat and cold. The principle of life, or spiritus, is a mani-
festation of heat. (2) Tommaso Campanella (1568-1639) was
influenced chiefly by Telesio, and added metaphysical and political
doctrines to his master's teaching. (3) Paracelsus (1493-1541), a
physician, mingles science with alchemy, magic, and astrology.
(4) Nikolaus of Cusa (1401-1464) manifests a tendency to mysti-
cism, and his doctrine, although it avoids pantheism, contains the
germs of it. (5) Giordano Bruno (1548-1600) teaches that the
universe, infinite in time and space, is but an unfolding of the
being of God. The universe is one living organism, vivified by an
intelligence or anima mundi. There is no freedom and no personal
immortality.
4. Mysticism. The private interpretation of Scripture, which
is a fundamental tenet of Protestantism, cannot fail to lead differ-
ent individuals to contradictory beliefs, which, in turn, must be
harmonized with philosophical ideas. Hence the rise of Protestant
philosophies and mysticism. Luther (1483-1546) irreducibly
opposes reason, as a function of the flesh, to faith, as a function of
the spirit, and thus professes an exaggerated psychological dualism.
Zwingli (1484-1531), in his pantheistic doctrine of the immanence
of God in all things, combines Neo-Platonic and Stoic elements.
Melanchthon (1497-1560) follows chiefly Aristotle. The mystics
proper are Sebastian Franck (1499-1542) and Jakob Boshme (1575-
1624). The latter explains the existence of evil by assuming that
Hn God Himself the opposition of good and evil is essential and
necessary.
5. Political Philosophy. (i) Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527),
in Italy, professes a sort of political utilitarianism. The ethical
distinction of justice and injustice, of right and wrong, is not valid.
Whatever means are useful to the state must be adopted. Not
only Christian ethics, but even natural law is worthless. (2)
Thomas More (1478-1535), in England, besides advocating a kind
of communistic view of property, professes the mutual indepen-
dence and indifference of church and state. (3) Hugo Grotius
(de Groot, 1583-1645), in the Netherlands, claims that human
society originated from a social contract by which individuals
FIRST MODERN PERIOD 577
transferred their rights to the state. Natural rights are those
which reason discovers to be essential to man.
6. Scholasticism. Among the scholastic philosophers of this
period are the commentators of St. Thomas, Ferrara (1474-1528)
and Cajetan (1468-1534); the Spanish philosophers Banez (1528-
1604) and John of St. Thomas (1589-1644), both Dominicans;
the Jesuits Fonseca (1528-1597) and Suarez (1548-1617). But,
notwithstanding their efforts, scholastic philosophy soon lost all
prestige and succumbed to the attacks directed against it. It
failed to adapt itself to new needs, to keep abreast of scientific
progress, to modify itself according to new discoveries. Hence
its downfall. '
7. Scepticism. The confusion of ideas and contradictory
systems soon brought about a revival of scepticism represented by
Montaigne (1533-1592), Charron (1541-1603), and Sanchez (1562-
1632). All this in turn opened the way to the philosophical
reforms of Bacon and Descartes.
In the modern period of philosophy, the work of construction
begins anew. New systems appear, and original syntheses are
completed. The break with the past and with dogmatic authority
becomes more and more accentuated; problems and schools are
multiplied.
We shall divide the history of modern philosophy into two
periods, (i) The Pre-Kantian period, in which a rational current
starts from Descartes, and an empirical current from Bacon. (2)
The Kantian and Post-Kantian period, in which criticism, i.e. the
problem of the origin and value of knowledge, becomes central.
I. FIRST PERIOD
I. BACON AND DESCARTES
With Bacon and Descartes originate two distinct movements
which, in a more or less direct manner, influence subsequent
philosophy, namely, empiricism and rationalism, the supremacy
of experience and the supremacy of reason.
38
578 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
1. Francis Bacon (1561-1626), baron of Verulam, after
occupying several high political positions, was condemned for
receiving bribes, and deprived of his office. His two works, "De
dignitate et augmentis scientiarum," and "Novum organon" (the
latter incomplete), were the first two parts of the Instauratio magna
which he had planned. After proposing and expounding a classi-
fication of sciences based on a tripartite division of mental faculties
(memory, imagination, and reason), he insists on the necessity of
method, and opposes his Novum organon to the Organon, or logical
works, of Aristotle.
The method which he proposes consists essentially of the fol-
lowing points: (i) The syllogistic method is absolutely worthless,
and experience alone is a sure criterion (cf. p. 382); respect for
antiquity is an obstacle to progress. (2) The sources of error, or
"idols," must be eliminated, namely, "idola tribus," based on
human nature itself and common to all men; " idola specus,"
arising from individual tendencies; "idola fori," arising from the
contact with other men through language; "idola theatri," arising
from the various systems of philosophy and the authority which
they exercise. (3) The constructive work is based on scientific
induction, in which facts are classified in three groups, called
tabulae praesentiae, absentiae, graduum. From the facts, gradu-
ally, and always with great caution, the passage is effected through
theories and probabilities to certitude as to the causes of the
facts. One must beware of prejudices, and all judgments must
be based only on the comparison of facts. N.B. Most of these
rules were applied before Bacon without being formulated; Bacon
was the first clearly to state the inductive methods.
2. Rene Descartes (Cartesius, 1596-1650) travelled extensively,
and entertained relations with the most prominent scientists of
his time. His main philosophical works are the "Discourse on
Method"; " Meditationes de prima philosophia"; "Principia
philosophiae."
(a) Method, (i) Descartes begins with a universal methodic
doubt bearing on whatever knowledge he had acquired previously,
and looks for a truth the evidence of which is so clear that doubt
about it will be impossible. (Cf. pp. 243, 369 ff.) (2) He finds
FIRST MODERN PERIOD 579
this truth in the intuition of his own thought, and consequently
of his existence: "Cogito, ergo sum." As this idea imposes itself
as true on account of its clearness, he infers that, in general, the
clearness of an idea is the criterion of its truth. (Cf. p. 405.)
(3) Finding in his mind the idea of an infinitely perfect being,
Descartes concludes that God exists, because existence, being a
perfection, must belong to the Infinite, and also because this idea
itself of the Infinite can come only from God Himself. Moreover,
the idea of an infinite perfection includes that of infallible verac-
ity. Hence God, being the principle of all things, cannot deceive
man who invincibly believes in the reliability of his faculties. The
perceptions of the mind are therefore truthful. (4) Descartes
is now ready for his constructive work, which he undertakes with
the help of four guiding precepts: Require clearness and evidence;
proceed first by analysis; then by synthesis; always proceed
gradually and cautiously.
(b) Psychology, (i) From his starting-point: "Cogito, ergo
sum," Descartes infers that he is a thinking spiritual substance,
the essence of which is thought. (Cf. p. 489.) (2) Ideas are of
three kinds, innate (especially that of God), acquired, or formed
by the imagination. The first two classes are objective. (Cf.
pp. 100, 102 ff.) (3) The organism is a mere automatic machine
which the soul, located in the pineal gland, moves, and from
which it receives external impressions.
(c) Cosmology, (i) Matter consists essentially in extension,
and is thus opposed to thought or spirit. (2) Movement is always
mechanical, and we know nothing of final causes. Its first source
is God, who in creating the world endowed it with a certain
quantity of movement which remains invariable.
V
II. DEVELOPMENT OF BRITISH EMPIRICISM
i. Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), a friend and disciple of Bacon,
advocates Bacon's empiricism. Yet his philosophy is also influ-
enced by Descartes, with whom he became acquainted at Paris.
His main works are "Leviathan " and "Elementa philosophiae."
(i) Sensation is the only source of knowledge; hence whatever
exists is material, and universals are only names. As a coitee-
580 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
quence, science and philosophy can deal only with matter. (Cf.
pp. 380 ff.) (2) Qualities perceived by the senses have no reality
outside of the mind. They are simply mechanical motions in things
and in the brain. (3) The natural condition of man is not to live
in society, but to live in a state of war against everybody else.
The disadvantages of this condition brought about a social compact
by which individuals transferred absolutely all their rights to the
authority of the state. This authority is therefore absolute and
unlimited. Right and wrong result only from positive laws.
(Cf. pp. 355 ff.)
2. John Locke (1632-1704) in the four books of his main work,
"An Essay concerning Human Understanding," examines the
human faculties of knowledge, (i) There are no innate ideas,
since there are no ideas that are present in the minds of all men.
All ideas are acquired by experience. (2) This experience is two-
fold: sensation, i.e. the mental representation of the external
world, and reflection, i.e. the consciousness of mental activities.
By combining simple ideas derived from these two sources, the
mind forms complex ideas. (Cf. pp. 99, 103 ff.) (3) The qual-
ities which are attributed to bodies are either primary, like exten-
sion, figure, motion, etc., or secondary, like color, odor, sound, etc.
Primary qualities exist really in things; secondary qualities exist
only in the mind. (4) We do not know directly external things,
but mental representations or ideas. (Cf. pp. 369, 387.) (5)
Among complex ideas is found that of substance. Substances
exist (bodily, spiritual, and divine), but their nature is unknown
and unknowable. (6) Generality and universality belong only
to names. (7) Reason alone cannot prove the spirituality of the
soul.
3. George Berkeley (1685-1753), bishop of Cloyne in Ireland,
in his "New Theory of Vision," "Principles of Knowledge," and
"Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous," starts from Locke's
assumption that we know directly only our ideas, and, from this,
endeavors to refute scepticism, materialism, and atheism, (i)
Not only secondary, but also primary, qualities are mere ideas. For
instance, the shape (primary) is known through visual sensations,
and is no more objective than color, which is perceived through
FIRST MODERN PERIOD 581
the same sensations. Extension, far from being the essence of
matter, as Descartes held, is not objective at all. (2) All ideas,
even abstract and universal, are derived from concrete impressions
which are products of the mind alone. (3) Matter is not per-
ceived directly by the senses, for these perceive only qualities;
nor is its existence known by demonstration, since, on the one
hand, passive matter cannot be the active cause of sensations,
and, on the other, ideas cannot result from an inert substance
such as matter. Matter is a contradictory notion leading to scep-
ticism. (4) The external world, therefore, is not material. The
cause of its order and harmony is God, since this order shows that
the world is but an idea of God manifesting itself to the human
mind. The world is a mental representation esse est percipi
it is not matter, but spirit. (Cf. pp. 387, 389 ff.)
4. David Hume (1711-1776), especially hi his "Treatise on
Human Nature," and his "Enquiry concerning Human Under-
standing," carries the consequences of empiricism to their extreme
limits. (Cf. pp. 98, 113, 382.) (i) Nothing exists except what
is given in experience, and as experience manifests no substances
at all, it follows that no substance exists. Hume denies not only
the existence of material substances, as Berkeley had done, but of
spiritual as well. As matter is but a collection of phenomena, so
the mind is but a collection of mental states. (Cf. pp. 460, 463
ff.) (2) As experience does not manifest any causality, but only
the succession of phenomena, the idea of cause is not objective,
and the regular sequence of cause and effect is not one of ontolog-
ical dependence. It is owing to habit that we expect this
sequence. Hume's position is thus phenomenalistic and sceptical.
(Cf. p. 454.)
5. Moralists. As a reaction against Hobbes, many moral-
ists admit a universal moral law, natural to all men, and altruistic
as well as egoistic. Among them are Ralph Cudworth (1617-1688)
and Richard Cumberland (1632-1718). Others base morality on a
special innate feeling (cf. pp. 309 ff.), which is either an aesthetic
sense (Shaftesbury, 1671-1713), conscience (Joseph Butler 1692-
1752), or a moral sense distinct from reason (Francis Hutcheson,
1694-1747). Others, finally, apply empiricism to morals (cf. p.
582 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
311) and are led to utilitarianism (Mandeville, 1670-1733; A dam
Smith, 1723-1790).
III. DEVELOPMENT OF CARTESIAN RATIONALISM
1. Direct Influences. From Descartes's principles Arnold
Geulincx (1625-1669) and Nicolas M alebranche (1638-1715) deduce
the doctrines of occasionalism and ontologism, which, however,
are neither so clearly expressed nor so fully evolved in the former
as in the latter. According to Malebranche, (i) God alone can
be a cause; hence the activity of creatures is only apparent. In
the various changes that occur there is only a coincidence which
is due to God's direct intervention. This also explains the union
of body and soul (occasionalism; cf. p. 481.) (2) Since finite
beings do not act, our ideas cannot be caused by them. They
come from God, in whom we see everything (ontologism; cf. p.
405).
2. More Remote Influences. Spinoza and Leibniz are influ-
enced by Cartesianism, but introduce many new elements and
develop the system in new directions.
(a) The main works of Baruch Spinoza^(i6$2-i6'j f j) are "Ethica
more geometrico demonstrata," "De intellectus emendatione,"
"Tractatus politicus." In them is revealed the influence of Car-
tesianism, Neo-Platonism, and of the pantheism of Bruno and
Maimonides. (i) The Cartesian substantial dualism, and oppo-
sition of extension and thought, is reduced to a dualism of attri-
butes of one and the same substance, namely, God. (2) The
divine substance, indetermined and unknowable in itself, unfolds
itself through attributes, two of which are known to us, viz.,
extension and thought. (Cf. pp. 521 ff.) (3) These attributes are
manifested through a number of modes, which are the finite deter-
minations of the divine infinite substance. (4) Everything in the
physical and the mental world takes place necessarily, and there
is no room at any stage for freedom.
(b) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) is an eclectic who bor-
rows from Descartes, Plato, Aristotle, and adds many personal
ideas. His main works are "Essais de theodicee," "La monado-
logie," "Nouveaux essais sur Pentendement humain" (an answer to
FIRST MODERN PERIOD 583
Locke's Essay), (i) Descartes was wrong in identifying spiritual
substances with thought, and material substances with extension.
There are in the soul perceptions which are almost unconscious,
and which cannot be called thought in the Cartesian sense. As
to extension, it is the principle of multiplicity and composition.
But composition ultimately supposes simple and indivisible units.
Substance means essentially a principle of activity, a force.
Thought and extension are modes of substances. (2) The sub-
stantial unit is the monad, immaterial, eternal, and active. Bodies
are aggregates of simple monads, while souls are simple monads.
(3) The activity of the monad consists essentially in representa-
tion, i.e. every monad is like a mirror reflecting the whole universe
more or less perfectly according to the degree of its perfec-
tion. In the lowest monads this representation is unconscious;
in the highest it is conscious, and the degrees of clearness vary
with the perfection of every monad. God, the increated monad,
knows everything perfectly. (4) Monads do not act on one an-
other; their development is only from within, every monad unfold-
ing its own energies. The order of the world is the result of a
divinely preestablished harmony, (cf. p. 481) working in the best
possible world, since God, infinitely perfect, would have acted
without a sufficient reason if He had not created the best possible
world. (5) Every monad is different from every other. There
is a gradual transition by infinitesimal differences from one degree
of perfection to another. (6) There are no innate actual ideas;
yet, in a certain sense, all ideas are innate, namely, in the innate
power of acquiring them. (Cf. pp. 100 ff.)
Christian von Wolff (1679-1754) expounded and systematized
the philosophy of Leibniz.
3. A Reaction against Rationalism was due largely to the influ-
ence of British empiricism, and contributed to the changes
which took place at this time in French political and religious
conditions.
(a) Etienne Bonnot de Condillac (1715-1780) follows Locke and
teaches a psychological sensationalism. Instead of two sources
of ideas admitted by Locke (sensation and reflection) he admits
only one. External sensation is the primitive mental fact which
584 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
by various successive modifications gives rise to the most complex
mental states. (Cf. pp. 98, 103 ff.)
(b) Materialistic empiricism is represented by La Mettrie (1709-
1751), who attacks especially the existence of the soul, and by the
Encyclopedists (editors of, or writers in, the Encyclopedic), namely,
Diderot (1713-1784), d'Alembert (1717-1783), d' Holbach (1723-
1789), Cabanis (1757-1808). (Cf. p. 476.)
(c) These views opened the way to atheism, or at least deism,
which is represented especially by Voltaire (1694-1778).
(d) Ethical sensualism, which reduces morality to egoistic pleas-
ure, has for its main advocate the materialist Helvetius (1715-
1771).
(e) Political philosophers of this period are chiefly Montesquieu
(1689-1755) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778). The lat-
ter refers the origin of society to a social contract. (Cf . pp. 3556.)
II. SECOND PERIOD
I. GERMAN PHILOSOPHY
i. Kant. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), born at Koenigsberg,
was successively a student and a professor in the university of his
native city. In the first period of his philosophical life, he studied
and taught the leading ideas of Leibniz, Wolff, Newton, and later
became acquainted' with the writings of Locke and Hume. Owing
to these manifold influences, Kant's own doctrine was evolving
gradually. It was made public in the second period of Kant's
life, by the publication of his main works: "The Critique of Pure
Reason," (1781), "The Critique of Practical Reason," (1788),
"The Critique of the Faculty of Judgment" (1790). Here we
shall deal only with this latter period, or period of Kant's critical
philosophy, in which, he says, he was aroused from his dogmatic
slumber by Hume's scepticism.
(a) Critique of pure reason. Knowledge consists essentially
in judgment, not analytic, since in analytic judgments the predi-
cate is already contained in the subject, and therefore such judg-
ments have no scientific value; nor synthetic a posteriori, since
SECOND MODERN PERIOD 585
such judgments refer only to concrete experience, and therefore
cannot give the universal and necessary knowledge, which alone is
scientific. It consists in synthetic a priori judgments, in which
the predicate is neither contained in the subject, nor affirmed of
the subject simply on the ground of experience, but on account
of the very structure of our faculties, hence necessarily and uni-
versally. (Cf. pp. loi, 106, 109, 395 ff.) Kant passes now to
the three parts of his work, transcendental aesthetic, transcen-
dental analytic, and transcendental dialectic.
(1) Transcendental (Esthetic (i.e. study of sense-knowledge).
External objects always appear to us in space, and internal experi-
ences always in time. Space and time are a priori forms of our
minds, and cannot be applied to things-in-themselves (cf. p.
394). Things are only the matter of knowledge, unknowable
in themselves, since, in order to be known, they must reach the
mind, and can reach it only through its a priori forms.
(2) Transcendental analytic. Sense-knowledge is elaborated by
the understanding which perceives manifold relations between
various sense-experiences, and thus makes them scientific. These
relations also depend on a priori forms or categories, twelve hi
number: unity, plurality, totality (referring to the quantity of
judgments), reality, negation, limitation (referring to their quality);
subsistence and inherence, causality and dependence, reciprocity
(referring to their relations); possibility, existence, necessity,
and their opposites (referring to their modality). Here again
the conclusion is that we know only phenomena, but not nou-
mena, i.e. things-as-they-appear, but not things-in-themselves.
(Cf. pp. 396 ff.)
(3) Transcendental dialectic. This knowledge in turn is re-
duced by reason to three ideas, the world, the soul, and God,
which are also a priori ideas. To take them for realities leads to
antinomies or contradictions.
(b) Critique of practical reason. The critique of pure reason led
Kant to assert the impossibility of knowing the noumena. He
turns now to practice and action, which is different from, and
independent of, pure reason, (i) The moral law is absolute,
universal, and necessary. It is expressed in conscience by the
586 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
categorical imperative that dictates independently of any condi-
tion and of any utilitarian or agreeable motive. (Cf. pp. 320 ff.)
(2) The existence of the moral law postulates freedom, since "Thou
must" implies "Thou canst"; immortality, since virtue requires
an adequate sanction; and the existence of a personal God as
perfect holiness and justice. (3) Although these are noumena or
things-in-themselves, and although they are unknowable for
pure reason, they are nevertheless certain, because without
them the moral law is impossible. (Cf. pp. 407 ff.)
(c) Critique of the faculty of judgment. This faculty is inter-
mediate between pure reason and practical reason. It applies to
the phenomena of pure reason some a priori forms of practical
reason, special to free agents, (i) Teleological judgments refer
external phenomena to a purpose, and look upon them as adapted
to an end. They serve to order and unify experience. (2) Es-
thetic judgments refer external phenomena to our own subjective
feelings of the beautiful and the sublime. All these judgments
depend on the structure of the human mind.
(d) Influence of Kant; immediate disciples and opponents. Of all
the influences exercised on philosophy in the nineteenth century
that of Kant is certainly the greatest, and most of the currents
of thought that subsequently appeared were either developments
of the Kantian theories or reactions against them. Among the
immediate disciples of Kant are Reinhold (1755-1823), and the
poet Schiller (1759-1805), the latter upholding especially Kant's
aesthetic doctrines. Among his opponents are Herder (1744-
1803), and Jacobi (1743-1819).
(e) Kant admitted two elements in knowledge, one material,
the thing-in-itself; the other formal, the a priori form or category.
But how can the phenomenon come from the noumenon? How
can the objective and the subjective be reconciled? This dualism
gave rise to two currents, critical idealism reducing even the thing-
in-itself to a mental product, and critical realism reasserting the
existence of the thing-in-itself.
2. Idealism. ..Three names especially are prominent, Fichte,
Schelling, and Hegel.
(a) Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) places the whole reality
SECOND MODERN PERIOD 587
in the subject, which is essentially activity and consciousness,
(i) The ego, i.e. the universal self-consciousness, posits itself,
that is, knows itself as existing and self-identical (thesis). (2) By
reflection on its own activity, the ego posits the non-ego within
itself, merely as an object of mental representation (antithesis).
(3) The ego is aware that it is limited by the non-ego, and that
the non-ego is limited by the ego (synthesis). In this whole
process, the ego is the only reality, since the non-ego is but a
modification of the ego.
(b) Friedrich Schelling (1775-1854) taught at Jena with Fichte.
His thought varied in the course of his life, and he seems to have
defended successively no less than five different systems. The
most important and characteristic of these is the philosophy of
identity, in which the subject and the object are identified in the
same common reality, or Absolute, which is of itself indifferent to
both the objective and the subjective point of view, and evolves
into both.
(c) Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel^ (1770-1831) was Schelling's
disciple at Jena, but soon abandoned his master's doctrine to
develop his own absolute idealism. The object is not derived
from the ego, as Fichte supposed, but from the absolute. This
absolute is not indifferent, as Schelling claimed, it is thought and
idea, since the rational element is the whole reality of things.
This idea, however, is not necessarily, but only accidentally,
conscious. In its abstract state it is the object of logic; in its exte-
riorization, the object of the philosophy of nature; in its self-con-
scious aspect, the object of the philosophy of mind, which studies
the individual manifestations of the universal spirit, the evolu-
tion of mankind and society (objective mind), and art, religion,
and philosophy (absolute mind). Everything becomes, and the
Idea or Spirit unfolds its potencies according to laws that are
absolutely necessary.
Among Hegel's followers some belong to the right party (Goe-
schel, Rosenkranz, Erdmann), and admit the existence of a per-
sonal God and the soul's immortality; others belong to the left
(Strauss, Feuerbach), and are pantheists.
3. Realism reasserts the existence of the thing-in-itself. (a)
588 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
Herbart (1776-1841), professor at Gottingen, teaches the exist-
ence and irreducible manifoldness of things. One of these Real-
ities (Realen) is the individual human soul whose essential function
is representation. Things external are unchangeable and iden-
tical. It is the mind alone that establishes between them the many
relations which we perceive. Prominent among the Herbartians
are Drobish, Steinthal, and Lazarus.
(b) Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860), professor at Berlin,
admits a priori forms of knowledge, namely, space, time, and
causality. The thing-in-itself is essentially will, which is one and
independent of a priori forms. In everything the fundamental
reality is the will-to-be, or the will-to-live, and this will unfolds
itself through existing things. In addition to this, Schopenhauer
develops a pessimistic philosophy. One of his most important
disciples is Von Hartmann.
4. Materialism, as a reaction against idealism, was defended
by Karl Vogt (1817-1895), Jakob Moleschott (1822-1893), and
Ludwig Buchner (1824-1899), while Ernst Backet (born 1834)
defends an evolutionary monism. (Cf. pp. 476, 521.)
5. Lotze (1817-1881) and Paulsen are Neo-Kantians, and
Trendelenburg (1802-1872) tends to Aristotelianism. Baader,
Froschammer, Gunther, Gorres, who flourished in the middle of the
nineteenth century, were Catholic philosophers, though they dif-
fered on many important points. The distinctly neo-scholastic
movement is represented by Kleutgen, Stockl, Tilmann Pesch,
etc., in Germany.
II. SCOTTISH PHILOSOPHY
Like Kantian philosophy, Scottish philosophy was a reaction
against Hume's scepticism and Berkeley's idealism. Scottish
philosophers base their dogmatism and their ethics on some innate
sense or instinct, and claim that we know external things. Thomas
Reid (1710-1796) asserts that "common sense" is the basis on
which philosophy must be built, and common sense is not compat-
ible with scepticism or idealism. Dugald Stewart (1753-1828)
holds essentially the same view, as also Thomas Brown (1778-
1820) and James Mackintosh (1765-1832). William Hamilton
SECOND MODERN PERIOD 589
(1788-1856) tries to combine the doctrines of Reid with those of
Kant. (Cf. pp. 405, 310.)
III. FRENCH PHILOSOPHY
1. Spiritualism and Eclecticism. The French materialism
of the latter part of the eighteenth century was followed by a
spiritualistic reaction. The distinction of reason from sense-knowl-
edge, the spirituality of the soul, the existence of a personal God,
and the spiritual basis of morality were recognized. The main
representatives of this school were Maine de Biran (1766-1824),
who emphasizes the importance of the will; Royer-Collard (1763-
1845), who introduced into France the leading principles of the
Scottish school; Victor Cousin (1792-1867), who sought to combine
the mam systems of philosophy into one harmonious synthesis,
and hence gave a prominent part to the history of philosophy. He
was thus the head of the school known as Eclecticism. Among
his main followers were Theodore Jouffroy (1796-1842), Damiron
(1794-1862), Gamier (1801-1864), Paul Janet (1823-1899).
2. Traditionalism was a Catholic reaction against materialism
and rationalism. It minimized the value of personal reason and
advocated the common consent of mankind, based on a divine
revelation, as a safer basis of certitude. Joseph de Maistre (1754-
1821) dealt chiefly with political and religious problems. De
Bonald (1754-1840) is looked upon as the founder of the tra-
ditionalistic school. Besides expounding the Catholic doctrine
of society in opposition to the principles of the French Rev-
olution, he claimed that language is absolutely prerequired
for thought, and as a consequence, that it must have been revealed
by God, and together with it, the truths which it expresses. Hence
the criterion of truth is tradition based on primitive revelation.
Felicite de Lamennais (1782-1854) holds that the criterion of truth
is universal tradition or collective reason. Traditional principles,
sometimes in a mitigated form, were also held by Bautain (1796-
1867), Bonnetty (1798-1879) and others who mingled it with some
tenets of ontologism, that is, of a system developed chiefly in Italy,
and according to which we know all things in God. (Cf. pp. 105,
126, 403.)
5QO HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
3. Positivism is but a slightly modified form of sensational-
ism and empiricism, insisting chiefly on the epistemological aspect
of knowledge. Its founder is Auguste Comte (1798-1857), who, in
his "Cours de philosophic positive," claims that human thought
passed through three successive stages: (i) The theological stage,
in which phenomena are explained by the activities of divinities
and supernatural agents. (2) The metaphysical stage, in which
they are explained by abstract principles, such as essences, causes,
substances, forms, souls, etc. (3) The positive stage, in which
they are explained by their concrete antecedents and laws. This
is the only valid knowledge, limiting itself to facts and their rela-
tions. Metaphysical, religious, and moral questions are idle
when they try to transcend facts. Later on, Comte founded
a positive religion, or religion of humanity. Among the main
positivists are Littre (1801-1881) and Taine (1828-1893).
4. Various Tendencies. (i) Social questions are in the fore-
ground to-day. Among the precursors of modern socialism (cf.
pp. 347 ff.) may be mentioned Saint-Simon (1760-1825), Charles
Fourier (1772-1837), Pierre Leroux (1797-1871), who propose
more or less radical, social, and industrial reforms. (2) Neo-
scholasticism finds many representatives, and its influence is
felt even where it does not predominate. (3) Neo-criticists
(Renouvier, Secretan, etc.) modify Kant's doctrine in a dogmatic
direction, at least with regard to certain metaphysical truths.
IV. ITALIAN AND SPANISH PHILOSOPHY
In Italy, Galuppi (1770-1846) professed a kind of criticism which,
on many points, is akin to that of Kant. Rosmini (1797-1855)
teaches that the intuition of the ideal and universal being is the
form of thought. Hence it does not come from experience, but
is innate. Although Rosmini rejects ontologism and pantheism,
his system seems to lead to these consequences. Ontologism is
the doctrine that we have a direct primitive intuition of God, by
means of which all other things are known. It is represented
especially by Gioberti (1801-1852). Among the pioneers of neo-
scholastkism are Liberatore (1810-1892), Cornoldi (1822-1892),
Sanseverino (1811-1865).
SECOND MODERN PERIOD 591
In Spain, Balmes (1810-1848) and Donoso Cortes (1809-1853)
defend spiritualistic philosophy, and harmonize philosophy and
religion.
V. ENGLISH AND AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY
1. Associationism. Among associationists are David Hart-
ley (1705-1757) and Joseph Priestly (1733-1804), whose doctrine
shows a marked tendency toward materialism; James Mill (1773-
1836) and his son John Stuart Mill (1806-1873); Alexander Bain
(1818-1903). All reduce even the highest forms of knowledge
to associations of images. (Cf. pp. 96 ff., 99, 112 ff.) As we
can know nothing which is not given in experience, associationism
leads to empiricism and positivism. (Cf. p. 382.) Moreover,
whatever transcends experience is unknowable; hence agnosti-
cism. In addition to their theory of knowledge, Stuart Mill and
Bain advocate a utilitarian morality, as had been done before by
Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832). (Cf. pp. 315 ff.)
2. Evolutionism. The theory of evolution started with La-
place (1749-1827) for the inorganic world (nebular hypothesis),
and Lamarck (1744-1829) for the organic world. Both were
French. But it was in England that the main impetus was given
to transformism (cf. pp. 444 ff.) by Charles Darwin (1809-1882)
and his followers, Alfred Russell Wallace (born 1822), George Ro-
manes (1848-1894), Thomas Huxley (1825-1895), Saint George
Mivart (1827-1900) and Herbert Spencer (1820-1903).
Spencer, in his "Synthetic Philosophy," covers a far wider
ground, (i) Under the phenomena lies an unknowable reality,
whose modes only are knowable (agnosticism. Cf. pp. 376,
513, 530.) (2) The same universal force manifests itself through-
out all phenomena. Sensation is ultimately a nervous shock,
and the highest knowledge is but an association of ideas (asso-
ciationism. Cf. pp. 96, 99, 112.) (3) Not only are physical
and mental processes results of a universal evolution, but to
evolution must also be reduced all social moral, and religious
developments (evolutionism).
3. Idealism is represented by Thomas Carlyle (1795-1881),
John Caird (1820-1898), Thomas Green (1836-1882).
5Q2 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
4. American Philosophers. Among American philosophers,
exclusive of those now existing, mention must be made of Jona-
than Edwards (1703-1758); Benjamin Franklin (1706-1790);
James McCosh (1811-1894) who defended a theory of knowledge
akin to that of Reid; Noah Porter (1811-1892), who also adheres
to many tenets of the Scottish School; Orestes Brownson (1803-
1876), who, after being successively a member of several Protes-
tant denominations, became a Catholic; John Fiske (1842-1901),
who adheres to cosmic evolutionism.
CONCLUSION
(a) The history of philosophy, presenting, as it does, a succes-
sion of so many systems, frequently completing one another, fre-
quently also antagonistic and irreconcilable, might well make one
doubt whether philosophical truth can ever be reached. Are so
many efforts fruitless? Is the human mind condemned forever
to seek the truth without ever finding it? From this point of view
it is true that the constant conflict of philosophical schools is rather
disheartening. But there is another point of view. Light comes
from the friction of two stones. So also in philosophy, the conflict
of systems tends to show in what respect they may be defective or
exaggerated, and to make the element of truth which they con-
tain more secure. Without asserting that every error is but an
incomplete truth, it may safely be asserted that every erroneous
system contains a great many truths.
(b) Notwithstanding, or rather owing to, the incessant clash of
systems, philosophy progresses, and, slow as it is, its advance is
nevertheless real. Throughout the ages, the same problems
come back incessantly, and the attempts to solve them present
the same divergences. Any actual system or theory can be traced
back to past systems and theories, but every reappearance of a
view and tendency shows a development. The human mind does
not turn around like a squirrel in its cage to come back to exactly
the same point. Its movement is rather spiral-shaped, always
widening, embracing more and more, and yet ever turning so as
to face again the same problems.
(c) Will philosophy ever be one? Will philosophers ever agree
at least on a group of essential principles? If we forecast the
future by what we know of the past, this is not likely. Too many
influences are at work. As the highest science, philosophy receives
contributions from too many sources, and these respective contri-
butions affect different minds in too many different ways to make
39 593
594 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
the epoch of philosophical agreement one whose near advent
can be predicted. Conflict will remain as a proof of the weakness
of the human mind, but also as an element of progress. It con-
tributes to the accuracy of expression, and to the revision of opinions
which were not sufficiently examined nor subjected to a thorough
criticism.
(d) Hence historical contradictions, while showing errors of the
human mind, should also be a source of encouragement toward a
sincere and honest search for truth. They can frequently be
traced back to prejudices, one-sided views, and exclusive atten-
tion to one aspect of a complex problem. To recognize the source
of an error is the first step toward correcting it. To free the mind
from error, to proceed farther and farther, and to rise higher and
higher, must be the aim of every man. The unwearying search
for truth must be the endeavor of every human intelligence, with
the help of the "true light which enlighteneth every man coming
into this world."
GENERAL CONCLUSION
The problems outlined in this course of philosophy are so nu-
merous, so complex, and so varied that it is impossible to view
them at one glance. Yet it is interesting to retrace the general
lines of this vast panorama. The observer on the top of a hill
has on all sides a wide horizon within which a number of objects
are visible: a forest, a town, a road, a field, a meadow, etc. But
only the main outlines are seen, and in a general way; the details
cannot be perceived. The observer may go down, and observe
a group of objects more in detail, e.g. the general appearance of the
forest or city, by moving around or through it. Again, one tree
may be selected for a more special examination ; then each part of
it, till, through the help of the microscope and other instruments,
its finest details are known. What we want now is to observe
from the summit of the hill, so as to glance at the most general
outlines of the philosophical horizon, including the physical
universe, man, and God.
I. THE UNIVERSE
i. Unity Amid Diversity. How little man knows about the
universe, about those millions of worlds in which our earth is but
an atom! To look at the stars fills the mind with amazement,
and yet we see nothing of their details, and a great number are
altogether invisible. How little we know even about the planet
on which we live! We see only its surface. Its past and future
are hidden from us, and every one of the various beings that
compose it, or live on it, includes countless mysteries.
Yet what we know is enough to manifest at the same time a most
harmonious variety and a most diversified unity. Variety in
the inorganic and the organic world. Unity because we see every-
where harmonious action and interaction, and gradual transitions.
595
596 GENERAL CONCLUSION
Far as it is from the other planets and from the sun, the earth is
in close relation with them and with the rest of creation. Nothing
in the world is isolated, but everywhere all things are related.
On the earth these relations are seen more in detail. Things
change more or less rapidly, but they change constantly. In-
organic matter is assimilated by organisms to return again to
the inorganic world. Everything serves a purpose. Everywhere
activities are exchanged.
2. Laws and Causes. All changes take place according to
fixed laws which govern their occurrence. These laws are expres-
sions of the mode of causality of various beings. What is a cause?
It is a being applying, consciously or unconsciously, its energy to
the production of some result. Here again, how narrow the
point of view of man who is obliged to place certain stops
in the uninterrupted flux of things. Why did A die? Because
B shot him, we say, and we are satisfied with the answer. Yet
the immediate cause of death was the internal hemorrhage, or
some other similar organic result due to the presence of the bul-
let. The pulling of the trigger, the explosion of the powder, the
impulse given to the bullet, etc., are so many intermediaries be-
tween the murderer and death. And beyond the murderer, in
his feelings at the time of the deed, and away back in his past, in
his early education, in the dispositions which he inherited, etc.,
many causes have contributed to the present result.
The same is true of every occurrence. We are obliged to look
at things from the point of view from which they interest us most,
and according to the limitations of our knowledge as to time and
space; limitations which make man incapable of seeing all
influences, of tracing back the series of causes in nature, and of
following all their results. The list of "whys," "wherefroms,"
"wheretos," even of the smallest events is inexhaustible, and
hence our necessity of stopping without ever knowing anything
completely.
Natural laws and causes are utilized by man for his own
purposes. Freedom does not change them, but simply adapts
them. Art always supposes and is based on nature, without
ever modifying its intrinsic energies and laws.
THE UNIVERSE, MAN, GOD 597
II. MAN
1. In Himself. Not only does nature present many mysteries
to man; man is the greatest mystery to himself, so complex in struc-
ture, so manifold in activity, that the study of self is a never-end-
ing task, and yet the condition of true progress. Physiological
and mental functions, lower and higher faculties, organic and
mental complexity, make of him one harmonious whole, different
from everything else. Faculties of knowledge, feeling, and activity
are intimately correlated, all originating from the same substan-
tial unity composed of matter and spirit. Earthly by his organ-
ism, heavenly by his soul, man is obliged to cling to the earth,
and yet cannot help feeling that his destiny is higher and nobler
than that of other organisms.
2. In the Universe. The earth is small when compared to the
rest of the universe; man is small on the earth. What is one man
among the countless men who now exist or who have existed in
the past? Yet how great when we consider his faculties, and his
spiritual soul which is a spark of the Eternal Light. Man, it is
true, is the plaything of nature, powerless in the face of its tremen-
dous energies. And yet man is able, in many things, to conquer
and subdue natural agencies, and make them serve his own ends.
Rising above space and tune, his intelligence reaches abstract and
universal laws, and it is this mode of knowledge which is the basis
of specifically human activities. Similar to animals in his physio-
logical functions, he is different from them because some of his
activities escape the determinism of matter. Hence man alone is
capable of morality, for he alone can know the distinction between
right and wrong conduct, and he alone is responsible for his actions.
And all these activities point to the fact that this life on earth is
not complete, but calls for a complement hereafter. It is chiefly
this hope which in all circumstances gives to life its full value, and
truly makes it worth living.
III. GOD
i. Supreme Cause. (a) God is the first cause of nature and
of its laws, distinct from it and transcending it. And not only
598 GENERAL CONCLUSION
must He be placed at the beginning of the world, but He is still
governing and ruling His works whose activity and energy sup-
pose His, and are derived from His. Whatever exists in the uni-
verse, whatever is real, is a derived reality, and this derivation
from the common source of all things leads man to some knowledge
of God's perfections, however imperfect such knowledge must
remain. Yet the beauty and perfections of the effect must evi-
dently be attributed to the cause, even when this cause is so far
above its effects that these present only dim indications of its
infinite perfection.
(b) God is the first principle of truth. Not in the sense that
truth depends exclusively on God's will, as Descartes claimed,
in such a way that if God had willed it otherwise, two and two
would not be four; but in the sense that true and real are identical,
and that God being the principle of reality is also the principle of
truth. God could not make two plus two to equal five because
this supposed relation expresses nothing real. It is not so, and
hence cannot be derived from the principle of reality. God knows
Himself first, and in Himself, the various realities or truths that
are finite realizations of the divine mind's exemplars.
(c) It is also God who is the first principle of the moral law. All
essences, including man, are ultimately based on the divine es-
sence. The moral law, therefore, which governs man according
to his rational nature, is based on God, the author of nature, and
the infinite good from which every other good is derived.
(d) Finally, God is the cause of the social order, since man
naturally lives in society, and society requires an authority. Yet
no man has of himself the right to give orders to his fellowmen.
For a man to obey another man is to debase himself. But "let
every soul be subject to higher powers, for there is no power but
from God, and those that are ordained by God" (Rom. xiii. i).
When those who command are looked upon as representatives of
God, submission to them becomes honorable.
2. Ultimate End. In creating, God could propose to Him-
self no other end but Himself. "The heavens shew forth the
glory of God." Even inanimate creation manifests the divine
perfections, but man is the spokesman of creation. He can know
THE UNIVERSE, MAN, GOD 599
his maker, and must entertain toward Him the feelings of rever-
ence, praise, thanksgiving, etc., which are due to Him. Reason
shows only in an imperfect way the final relations of man to God,
but revelation completes the data of reason; the supernatural order
is added to the natural, and perfects it; man knows his higher
destiny and is given the means to reach it. Of the whole universe
in general, and of man in particular, God is the First Cause and
the Ultimate End, " Alpha and Omega, the first and the last, the
beginning and the end" (Apoc. xxii. 13).
APPENDIX
IT is important that the student's mind should be trained to
personal thinking. For this reason the following thoughts are
suggested as topics for papers and discussions. Many of them are
true; others are false; all must be explained and interpreted. A
number of other subjects can easily be found in connection with
the different lessons of the text-book. Some of those that are
given here may be found too difficult, but, however imperfect at
first the student's attempt to treat them may be, they will oblige
him to think for himself, and thereby contribute to his mental
development.
From time to time the whole class may be given the same sub-
ject, thus affording an opportunity for the comparison of different
viewpoints. Generally it will be found profitable to assign the
paper to one student perhaps two who should be given ample
time to think it out and write it. He should then read it in class
and, under the professor's direction, the other students should
express their views on both the paper and the subject itself.
Special attention should be given to clearness of thought and
expression, logical sequence of ideas, careful preparation of the
plan, etc.
1. Studium philosophiae non est ad hoc quod sciatur quid homines
senserint, sed qualiter se habeat veritas rerum. ST. THOMAS, In lib.
I de Coelo, lect. XXII.
2. Nec vero probare soleo id quod de Pythagoreis accepimus: quos
ferunt, si quid affirmarent in disputando, cum ex eis quaereretur quare
ita esset, respondere solitos: Ipse dixit; "ipse" autem erat Pythagoras.
CICERO, De nat. deor. I, 5.
3. Errare malo cum Platone quam cum istis vera sentire. CICERO,
Tusc. Quaest. I, xvii, 39.
Though both [Plato and truthl are dear to me, it is my duty to prefer
truth. ARISTOTLE, Eth. Nic. I, vi, i.
601
602 APPENDIX
4. I think ... I can make it plain . . . that there are at least six per-
sonalities distinctly to be recognized as taking part in that dialogue
between John and Thomas.
1. The real John; known only to his Maker.
2. John's ideal John; never the real one, and often
Three Johns.
Three Thomases.
very unlike him.
Thomas's ideal John, never the real John, nor
John's John, but often very unlike either.
1. The real Thomas.
2. Thomas's ideal Thomas.
3. John's ideal Thomas.
O. W. HOLMES, The Autocrat of the Breakfast Table, III.
5. Noli nimis hi sensu tuo confidere, sed velis etiam libenter aliorum
sensum audire. Imit. Christi, I, ix, 2.
6. Qui bene seipsum cognoscit sibi ipsi vilescit. Imit. Christi, I, ii, i.
7. Illud yvwOt <reavr6v noli putare ad arrogantiam minuendam solum
esse dictum, verum etiam ut bona nostra norimus. CICERO, Ad Q,
fratrem, III, 6.
8. Ita natura comparatum est ut altius iniuriae quam merita des-
cendant, et ilia cito defluant, has tenax memoria custodiat. SENECA,
De benef. I, i.
9. Things without all remedy
Should be without regard; what's done is done.
SHAKESPEARE, Macbeth, III, 2.
What's gone, and what's past help,
Should be past grief.
Id. Winter's Tale, III, 2.
10. Pleasure and action make the hours seem short. SHAKESPEARE,
Othello, II, 3.
11. A man should never be ashamed to own he has been in the wrong,
which is but saying in other words that he is wiser to-day than he was
yesterday. SWIFT, Thoughts on Various Subjects.
12. Tell (for you can) what is it to be wise?
'Tis but to know how little can be known,
To see all others' faults, and feel our own.
POPE, Essay on Man, IV, 261.
13. Non enim tarn auctoritatis in disputando, quam raticnis,
momenta quaerenda sunt. Quinetiam obest plerumque iis qui discere
volunt auctoritas eorum qui se docere profitentur. CICERO, De nat.
deor. I, 5.
SUBJECTS FOR PAPERS 603
14. (Hi non viderunt) hoxninem ad duas res, ut ait Aristoteles, ad
intelligendum et ad agendum esse natum. CICERO, De fin. II, 13.
15. I find the great thing in this world is not so much where we stand
as in what direction we are moving. HOLMES, The Autocrat of the
Breakfast Table, IV.
1 6. Onerat discentem turba [librorum], non instruit; multoque
satius est paucis te auctoribus tradere quam errare per multos.
SENECA, De tranquil, an. IX.
Non refert quam multos [libros], sed quam bonos, habeas; lectio certa
prodest, varia delectat. Id. Epist. 45.
17. Read not to contradict and confute; nor to believe and take for
granted; nor to find talk and discourse; but to weigh and consider.
BACON, Essays, Of Studies.
1 8. A man may have a great mass of knowledge, but if he has not
worked it up by thinking it over for himself, it has much less value than
a far smaller amount which he has thoroughly pondered. SCHOPEN-
HAUER, Essay On Thinking for One's Self.
19. Homo autem (quod rationis est particeps per quam consequentia
cernit, causas rerum videt, earumque progressus et quasi antecessiones
non ignorat, similitudines comparat, et rebus praesentibus adiungit
atque annectit futuras) facile totius vitae cursum videt, ad eamque
degendam praeparat res necessarias. CICERO, De offic. I, 4.
20. Scilicet et fluvius, qui non est maximus, ei est
Qui non ante aliquem maiorem vidit; et ingens
Arbor, homoque videtur, et omnia de genere omni,
Maxima quae vidit quisque, haec ingentia fingit.
LUCRETIUS, De rerum nat. VI, 674.
21. Neque hoc quidquam est turpius quam cognitioni et per-
ceptioni assensionem approbationemque praecurrere. CICERO, Acad.
1,12.
22. The heart has its own reasons of which reason has no knowledge.
PASCAL, Pensees, P. II, art. xvii, 62.
23. Causarum ignoratio in re nova mirationemfacit; eadem ignoratio
si in rebus usitatis est, non miramur. CICERO, De divinat. II, 22.
24. A great mistake: for a man to think himself greater than he is,
and to value himself less than he deserves. GOETHE, Maxims.
25. There is danger in showing man his equality with animals with-
out showing him his greatness. There is danger also in insisting too
much on his greatness without showing him his littleness. There is
a still greater danger in leaving him in the ignorance of both. But
604 APPENDIX
there is a great advantage in showing him both. PASCAL, Penstes, P. I,
art. iv, 7.
26. Quid importat sollicitudo de futuris contingentibus? . . . Vanum
est; et inutile de futuris conturbari vel gratulari quae forte nunquam
evenient. Imit. Christi, III, xxx, 2.
27. Past, and to come, seem best; things present, worst. SHAKE-
SPEARE, // Henry IV, I, 3.
28. With regard to the estimation of a man's greatness, mental
nature obeys a law which is the reverse of that of physical nature. The
former is increased, the latter decreased, by distance. SCHOPENHAUER,
Parerga und Paralipomena, II.
29. Self-love ... is not so vile a sin as self -neglecting. SHAKESPEARE,
Henry V, II, 4.
30. To business that we love we rise betime,
And go to J t with delight.
SHAKESPEARE, Anthony and Cleopatra, IV, 4.
31. If all the year were playing holidays,
To sport would be as tedious as to work.
SHAKESPEARE, I Henry IV, I, 2.
32. Two principles in human nature reign:
Self-love to urge, and reason to restrain.
POPE, Essay on Man, II, 54.
33. Communi fit vitio naturae ut invisis, latitantibus atque incognitis
rebus magis confidamus, vehementiusque exterreamur. CAESAR, De
bello civ. II, 4.
34. Plus dolet quam necesse est qui ante dolet quam necesse est.
SENECA, Epist. 95.
35. Suave, man magno turbantibus aequora ventis,
E terra magnum alterius spectare laborem.
Non quia vexari quemquam est iucunda voluptas,
Sed quibus ipse malis careas quia cernere suave est.
LUCRETIUS, De rerum nat. II, i.
36. Hoc modo magnanimitas est circa honores, ut videlicet studeat
ea facere quae sunt honore digna, non tamen sic ut pro magno aestimet
humanum honorem. ST. THOMAS, Sum. theol. II-II, Q. 129, art.
i, ad 3.
37. Male enim respondent coacta ingenia; reluctante natura, irritus
labor est. SENECA, De tranquillit. animi, VI.
38. Maiora cupimus quo maiora venerunt . . . ut flammae infinito
acrior vis est quo ex maiore incendio emicuit. Aeque ambitio non
SUBJECTS FOR PAPERS 605
patitur quemquam in ea mensura honorum conquiescere quae quondam
eius fuit impudens votum. . . . Ultra se cupiditas porrigit, et felicitatem
suam non intelligit, quia non unde venerit respicit, sed quo tendat.
SENECA, De benef. II, 27.
39. Endeavor to conquer yourself rather than fortune, and to change
your desires rather than the order of the world. DESCARTES, Discours
de la methode, P. Ill, 3d maxim.
40. Obstinacy is the result of the will forcing itself into the place of
the intellect. SCHOPENHAUER, Essays, Psychological Observations.
41. Men's thoughts are much according to their inclination; their
discourse and speeches according to their learning and infused opinions;
but their deeds are after as they have been accustomed. BACON,
Essays, Of Custom and Education.
42. Qui blandiendo dulce nutrivit malum
Sero recusat ferre quod subiit iugum.
SENECA, Hippolytus, I, 134.
43. For every animal, and more especially for man, a certain con-
formity and proportion between the will and the intellect is necessary
for existing or making any progress in the world. SCHOPENHAUER,
Essays, Psychological Observations.
44. Efficiendum est ut appetitus rationi obediant, eamque neque
praecurrant nee propter pigritiam aut ignaviam deserant, sintque
tranquilli atque omni perturbatione animi careant. CICERO, De
offic. I, 29.
45. Yet he who reigns within himself, and rules
Passions, desires and fears, is more a king.
MILTON, Paradise Regained, II, 466.
46. Resiste in principle inclination! tuae, et malam dedisce consue-
tudinem, ne forte paulatim ad maiorem te ducat difficultatem. Imit.
Christi, I, xi, 5.
47. Ad istud diligenter tendere debes . . . ut sis dominus actionum
tuarum et rector, non servus nee emptitius. Imit. Christi, III,
xxxviii, i.
48. Use almost can change the stamp of nature,
And either curb the devil or throw him out
With wondrous potency.
SHAKESPEARE, Hamlet, III, 4.
49. A little fire is quickly trodden out,
Which, being suffered, rivers cannot quench.
SHAKESPEARE, /// Henry VI, IV, 8.
606 APPENDIX
50. Certa viriliter; consuetude consuetudine vincitur. Imit.
Christi, I, xxi, 2.
51. "Tis education forms the common mind;
Just as the twig is bent, the tree's inclined.
POPE, Moral Essays, I, 149.
52. The will of man is by his reason sway'd. SHAKESPEARE, A
Midsummer Night's Dream, II, 3.
53. Naturam expellas furca, tamen usque recurret,
Et mala perrumpet furtim fastidia victrix.
HORACE, Epist. I, x, 24.
54. He that complies against his will
Is of his own opinion still.
BUTLER, Hudibras, III, 3, 547.
55. Principiis obsta; sero medicina paratur
Cum mala per longas convaluere moras.
OVID, Rented. Amor. 91.
56. Discipulus est prioris posterior dies. PUBLIUS SYRUS.
57. Viamque insiste domandi
Dum faciles animi iuvenum, dum mobilis aetas.
VERGIL, Georg. Ill, 164.
58. A man's nature is best perceived in privateness, for there is no
affectation; in passion, for that putteth a man out of his precepts; and
in a new case or experiment, for there custom leaveth him. BACON,
Essays, Of Nature in Men.
59. Vita hominum altos recessus magnasque latebras habet. PLINY
THE YOUNGER, Epist. Ill, 3.
60. No man can justly censure or condemn another, because indeed
no man truly knows another. BROWNE, Religio Medici, P. II, 4.
61. Children have neither past nor future; but, as scarcely
ever happens to us, they enjoy the present. LA BRUYERE,
Caracteres, II.
62. Oportet te igitur aliorum graviora ad mentem reducere ut levius
feras tua minima. Imit. Christi, III, xix, i.
63. They say best men are moulded out of faults. SHAKESPEARE,
Measure for Measure, V, i.
64. Some are born great; some achieve greatness, and some have
greatness thrust upon them. SHAKESPEARE, Twelfth Night, II, 5.
65. Men are the sport of circumstances, when
The circumstances seem the sport of men.
BYRON, Don Juan, Canto V, St. 17.
SUBJECTS FOR PAPERS 607
Man is not the creature of circumstances. Circumstances are the
creatures of men. DISRAELI, Vivian Grey, B. VI, ch. 7.
66. Ita vita est hominum, quasi cum ludas tesseris;
Si illud, quod maxime opus est iactu, non cadit,
Illud, quod cecidit forte, id arte ut corrigas.
TERENCE, Adelphi, IV, vii, 21.
67. The fire in the flint shows not till it be struck. SHAKESPEARE,
Timon of Athens, I, i.
68. Thoughts are but dreams till their effects be tried. SHAKE-
SPEARE, Lucrece, St. 51.
69. The moon being clouded presently is missed,
But little stars may hide them when they list.
SHAKESPEARE, Lucrece, St. 144.
70. Indeed man is a being wonderfully vain, complex and vacillating.
It is difficult to find in him a basis for a constant and uniform judgment.
MONTAIGNE, Essais, I, i.
71. (Montaigne recommends travelling in order that we may) "rub
and polish our brains against the brains of others." MONTAIGNE,
Essais, I, 24.
72. Nimium altercando veritas amittitur. PUBLIUS SYR us.
73. 'Tis with our judgments as our watches; none
Go just alike, yet each believes his own.
POPE, Essay on Criticism, 9.
74. What's in a name? That which we call a rose
By any other name would smell as sweet.
SHAKESPEARE, Romeo and Juliet, II, 2.
75. Give every man thine ear, but few thy voice;
Take each man's censure, but reserve thy judgment.
SHAKESPEARE, Hamlet, I, 3.
76. Veritatis simplex oratio est. SENECA, Epist. 49.
77. It is not enough to have a good understanding; the main thing
is to apply it properly. DESCARTES, Discours de la methode, I.
78. Nescire quaedam magna pars scientiae. PUBLIUS SYR us.
79. Videndum est non modo quid quisque loquatur, sed etiam quid
quisque sentiat, atque etiam qua de causa quisque sentiat. CICERO,
De offic. I, 41.
80. Idem enim vitii habet nimia quod nulla divisio; simile
confuso est quidquid usque in pulverem sectum est. SENECA,
Epist. 89.
81. One must know how to doubt where necessary, affirm where
608 APPENDIX
necessary, submit where necessary. To do otherwise is to misunder-
stand the role of reason. PASCAL, Pensees, P. II, art. vi, i.
82. If a man will begin with certainties, he shall end in doubts; but
if he will be content to begin with doubts, he shall end in certainties.
BACON, Proficience and Advancement of Learning, B. I.
83. Where men of judgment creep and feel their way,
The positive pronounce without dismay.
COWPER, Conversation, 145.
84. The will is one of the main instruments of belief; not that it is
the source of belief, but that things appear true or false according to the
point of view from which they are seen. PASCAL, Pensees, I, vi, 13.
85. Veritati aliquid extremum est; error immensus est. SENECA,
Excerpta.
86. Quod fere libenter homines id quod volunt credunt. C.ESAR,
De bello Gall. Ill, 18.
87. Veritas visu et mora, falsa festinatione et incertis valescunt.
TACITUS, Annal., II, 39.
88. Words are wise men's counters; they do but reckon by them;
but they are the money of fools. HOBBES, Leviathan, I, iv.
89. Nothing is so easy as to deceive oneself, for a man readily believes
what he wishes, but this belief is frequently in opposition with the facts.
DEMOSTHENES, Olynth. Ill, 19.
90. Be calm in arguing; for fierceness makes
Error a fault, and truth discourtesie.
G. HERBERT, The Temple, The Church Porch.
91. Qualis unusquisque intus est, taliter iudicat exterius. Imit.
Christi, II, iv, 2.
92. The fool doth think he is wise, but the wise man knows himself
to be a fool. SHAKESPEARE, As You Like It, V, i.
93. Sic est vulgus: ex veritate pauca, ex opinione multa aestimat.
CICERO, Orat. pro Q. Rose. Com. X.
94. Quid maiore fide porro quam sensus haberi
Debet? An ab sensu falso ratio orta valebit
Dicere eos contra, quae tota ab sensibus orta est?
Qui nisi sint veri, ratio quoque falsa fit omnis.
LUCRETIUS, De rerum nat. IV, 483.
95. Ut necesse est lancem in libra ponderibus impositis deprimi, sic
animum perspicuis cedere. CICERO, Acad. II, 12.
96. Non enim tarn auctores in disputando quam rationis momenta
quaerenda sunt. CICERO, De natura dear. I, 5.
SUBJECTS FOR PAPERS 609
97. Assiduitate quotidiana et consuetudine oculorum assuescunt
animi, neque admirantur, neque requirunt rationes earum rerum quas
semper vident; proinde quasi novitas nos magis quam magnitude rerum
debeat ad exquirendas causas excitare. CICERO, De nat. deor. II, 38.
98. Ipsa consuetude assentiendi periculosa esse videtur et lubrica.
CICERO, Acad. II, 21.
99. Duo cum idem faciunt, saepe ut possis dicere:
Hoc licet impune facere huic, illi non licet;
Non quod dissimilis res sit, sed quod is qui facit.
TERENCE, Adelphi, V, iii, 37.
100. Nescimus saepe quid possumus, sed tentatio aperit quid sumus.
Imit. Christi, I, xiii, 5.
101. Mane propone, vespere discute mores tuos. Imit. Christi,
I, xix, 4.
102. Saepe malum facilius quam bonum de alio creditur et dicitur;
ita infirmi sumus. Imit. Christi, I, iv, i.
103. Nam qualitercumque ordinavero de pace mea, non potest esse
sine bello et dolore vita mea. Imit. Christi, III, xii, i.
104. When men are friends there is no need of justice, but when they
are just, they still need friendship. ARISTOTLE, Eth. Nic. VIII, i.
105. If our virtues
Did not go forth of us, 'twere all alike
As if we had them not.
SHAKESPEARE, Measure for Measure, I, i.
106. The ruling passion, be it what it will,
The ruling passion conquers reason still.
POPE, Moral Essays, Ep. Ill, 153.
107. There is some soul of goodness in things evil,
Would men observingly distil it out.
SHAKESPEARE, Henry V, IV, i.
108. Reputation is an idle and most false imposition; oft got without
merit, and lost without deserving. SHAKESPEARE, Othello, II, 3.
109. To thine own self be true;
And it must follow, as the night the day,
Thou canst not then be false to any man.
SHAKESPEARE, Hamlet, I, 3.
no. Fine art is that in which the hand, the head, and the heart go
together. RUSKIN, The Two Paths, lect. 2.
in. Omnis ars imitatio est naturae. SENECA, Epist. 65.
Art is the perfection of nature. BROWNE, Religio Medici, I, 16.
40
6lO APPENDIX
112. Beggars mounted run their horse to death. SHAKESPEARE,
/// Henry VI, I, 4.
113. Were man but constant, he were perfect. SHAKESPEARE, The
Two Gentlemen of Verona, V, 4.
114. Striving to better, oft we mar what's well. SHAKESPEARE,
King Lear, I, 4.
115. Know thou this, that men
Are as the time is.
SHAKESPEARE, King Lear, V, 3.
116. There is no vice so simple but assumes
Some mark of virtue on his outward parts.
SHAKESPEARE, Merchant of Venice, III, 2.
117. That in the captain's but a choleric word
Which in the soldier is flat blasphemy.
SHAKESPEARE, Measure for Measure, II, 2.
1 1 8. Insani sapiens nomen ferat, aequus iniqui
Ultra quam satis est virtutem si petat ipsam.
HORACE, Epist. I, vi, 15.
NN ^ 119. The laws of conscience, which we say are born of nature, are
born of custom. MONTAIGNE, Essais, I, 22.
1 20. Est modus in rebus; sunt certi denique fines
Quos ultra citraque nequit consistere rectum.
HORACE, Sat. I, i, 106.
121. Quot homines tot sententiae; suus cuique mos. TERENCE,
Phorm. II, iv, 14.
122. Gloria nostra est testimonium conscientiae nostrae. ST. PAUL,
1 1 Cor. I, 12.
123. Mea mihi conscientia pluris est quam omnium sermo. CICERO,
Ad Attic. XII, 28.
124. Lex quaedam regula est et mensura actuum. . . . Regula autem
et mensura humanorum actuum est ratio. ST. THOMAS, Sum. theol.
I-II, Q. 90, art. i.
125. Omnino si quidquam est decorum, nihil est profecto magis quam
aequabilitas universae vitae turn singularium actionum; quam conser-
vare non possis si aliorum naturam imitans omittas tuam. CICERO,
De offic. I, 31.
126. Actio recta non erit nisi recta fuerit voluntas; ab hac enim est
actio. Rursus voluntas non erit recta nisi habitus animi rectus fuerit;
ab hoc enim est voluntas. SENECA, Epist. 95.
127. Maximum hoc habemus naturae meritum quod virtus in omnium
SUBJECTS FOR PAPERS 6ll
animos lumen suum permittit; etiam qui non sequuntur illam vident.
SENECA, De benef. IV, 17.
128. Aequam memento rebus in arduis
Servare mentem, non secus in bonis
Ab insolent! temperatam
Laetitia.
HORACE, Odes, II, 3.
129. Ira furor brevis est; animum rege, qui, nisi paret,
Imperat; hunc frenis, hunc tu compesce catena.
HORACE, Epist. I, ii, 62.
130. Non est, crede mihi, sapientis dicere: vivam.
Sera nimis vita est crastina; vive hodie.
MARTIAL, Epigr. I, 16.
131. Ut quisque est vir optimus, ita difficillime esse alios improbos
suspicatur. CICERO, Ad Q. fratrem, I, i, 4.
132. Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas. VERGIL, Georg. II,
490.
133. Prudens interrogatio quasi dimidium scientiae. BACON, De
augmentis scientiarum, V, 116.
134. Tamdiu discendum est quamdiu nescias, et, si proverbio credi-
mus, quamdiu vivas. SENECA, Epist. 76.
135. It is much easier to detect error than to find truth. The former
lies at the surface, and therefore is easily got at; the latter lies in the
depth, and to search for it is not every man's business. GOETHE,
Maxims.
136. Errors like straws upon the surface flow;
He who would search for pearls must dive below.
DRYDEN, All for Love, Prologue.
137. Nil ideo quoniam natum est in corpore ut uti
Possemus; sed quod natum est, id procreat usum.
LUCRETIUS, De rerum nat. IV, 833.
Nature adapts the organ to the function, and not the function to the
organ. ARISTOTLE, De part, animal. IV, xii.
138. What we train is not a soul, nor a body, but a man; the two
must not be separated. MONTAIGNE, Essais, I, xxvi.
139. Ratio et oratio. . . . conciliat inter se homines, coniungitque
naturali quadam societate. Neque ulla re longius absumus a natura
ferarum. CICERO, Definib. I, 16.
140. Sufficit ad id natura quod poscit. SENECA, Epist. 90.
141. Modus quo corporibus adhaerent spiritus omnino mirus est,
612 APPENDIX
nee comprehend! ab homine potest, et hoc ipse homo est. - ST AUGUS
TINE, De cimtate Dei, XXI, 10.
142. Ipsi animi magni refert quali in corpore locati sint; multa enim
acuant mentem> muita quae btundant -
143- Mutat enim mundi naturam totius aetas,
Ex alioque alius status excipere omnia debet;
Nee manet ulla sui similis res; omnia migrant;
Omnia commutat natura, et vertere cogit.
LUCRETIUS, De rerum nat. V, 826
144- Intrandum est in rerum naturam, et penitus quid ea postulet
pervidendum. CICERO, De finib. V, 16.
145. Non est causa efficiens, sed deficiens mali, quia malum non est
effectio, sed defectio. ST. AUGUSTINE, De cimtate Dei, XII 7
146. Omnia profecto cum se a coelestibus rebus referet ad humanas
excelsius magnificentiusque et dicet et sentiet. - CICERO, De Oratore
AAA1V, 119.
of Nature h * art of
I48 ' 'Tis but a base ignoble mind
That mounts no higher than a bird can soar.
SHAKESPEARE, // Henry VI, II. i
149. A little philosophy inclineth man's mind to atheism; but depth
in philosophy bringeth men's minds about to religion: For while the
mind of man looketh upon second causes scattered, it may sometimes
rest in them, and go no further; but when it beholdeth the chain of
them, confederate and linked together, it must needs fly to Providence
and Deity. BACON, Essays, Atheism.
I 5- Thy desire, which tends to know
The works of God, thereby to glorify
The great Work-Master, leads to no excess
That reaches blame, but rather merits praise
The more it seems excess.
MILTON, Paradise Lost, III, 694.
INDEX
INDEX
ABELARD, 564.
ABSOLUTE, existence of, 516 ff.
idea of, 132.
ABSTRACTION, nature of, 93, 94 ff
ACADEMY, 551, 553.
ACCIDENT, in logic, 209, 211.
ACTION, 17 ff., 166 ff.
automatic, 169, 172. f.
conscious and unconscious, 167.
impulsive and instinctive, 171, 172.*.
modes of, 167 ff.
moral aspect of, 281 ff.
motives of, 177.
personal and impersonal, 167.
random, 169, 172.
reflex, 170, 172. *
rules of, 303.
volitional, 173. *
ACTIVITY, love of, 147.
Acrus, 516.
ADELARD of Bath, 563.
/ENESIDEMUS, 374, 556.
/ESTHETIC sentiment, 155, 270.
/ESTHETICS, 265 ff.
AFFECTIVE life, 137 ff.
importance and culture of, 160 ft.
AGNOSTICISM, 376.
andknowablenessof God, 5 13, 5295.
D'AILLY, Peter, 572.
ALANTJS of Lille, 565.
ALBERT the Great, 568.
ALCUIN, 561.
D'ALEMBERT, 584.
ALEXANDER of Hales, 568.
ALEXANDRIA, school of, 374, 557.
ALFARABI, 566.
ALKENDI, 566.
AMAURY of Benes, 565.
AMBROSE, St., 560.
ANALOGY, argument from, 247.
and the knowledge of God, 529 ff.
ANALYSIS and synthesis, 117, 250.
in judgment, no.
in psychology, 29 ff.
ANALYTIC judgments, 109, 395 ff.
ANAXAGORA'S, 550.
ANAXIMANDER, 549.
ANAXIMENES, 549.
ANDRONICUS of Rhodes, 556.
ANGER, 148.
ANSELM, St., 564.
ANTHROPOMORPHISM, 529 ff.
ANTIOCHUS of Ascalon, 553.
ANTISTHENES, 551.
APOLLONIUS of Rhodes, 555.
APPETITE, 137.
APPETITUS, 28, 138.
APPROBATION, love of, 146.
APRIORISM and origin of concepts,
100, 105.
ARABIAN PHILOSOPHY, 565.
ARCESILAUS, 374, 553, 556.
ARISTIPPUS of Cyrene, 314, 551.
ARISTOTLE, 553.
ART, 275.
classification of fine, 279.
nature and, 275, 276.
science and, 275, 278.
works of, 277 ff.
ASSOCIATION of ideas, 34, 76, 115.
ASSOCIATIONISM
and necessary judgments, 113.
and origin of concepts, 99, 104.
and principle of induction, 253.
and the moral law, 297, 317, 318.
ASSYRIA, philosophy of, 544.
ATHEISM, 515.
ATOMISM, 427, 428.
ATTENTION, 31 ff.
AUGUSTINE, St., 560.
D'AURIOL, Peter, 572.
AUTHORITY, 417 ff.
argument from, 249.
as a criterion of truth, 417 ff.
civil, 357, 598.
AVERROES, 566.
AVICEBRON, 566.
AVICENNA, 566.
BAADER, 588.
BABYLONIA, philosophy of, 544.
BACON, Francis, 578.
6i6
INDEX
BACON, Roger, 571.
BADARAYANA, 546.
BAIN, 99, 591.
BALMES, 591.
BANEZ, 577.
BASIL, St., 560.
BAUTAIN, 589.
BEAUTY, 155, 270 ff.
and goodness, 268.
and truth, 267.
realization of, 277 ff.
types of, 273.
BEING, idea of, 131.
BELIEF, 120, 418.
BENEVOLENCE as basis of morality,
3".
BENTHAM, 315, 591.
BERKELEY, 580.
BERNARD of Chartres, 563.
BERNARD of Tours, 565.
BESSARION, 575.
BIRAN, Maine de, 589.
BOZHME, 576.
DE BONALD, 101, 403, 589.
BONAVENTURE, St., 568.
BONNETTY, 589.
BRAHMANISM, 545.
BROWN, 588.
BROWNSON, 592.
BRUNO, Giordano, 576.
BUCHNER, 477, 588.
BUDDHISM, 547.
BURIDAN, 572.
BUTLER, 581.
CABANIS, 476, 584.
CAIRO, 591.
CAJETAN, 577.
CALUMNY, 346.
CAMPANELLA, 576.
CANKARA, 546.
CARLYLE, 591.
CARNEADES, 374, 553, 556.
CATEGORY, in logic, 211.
CAUSE, 132.
efficient, 454, 596.
final, 455.
first, 517, 597.
CERTITUDE, 205, 366, 367, 372, 380.
kinds of, 367.
of facts and principles, 378, 381.
CHARACTER, 203.
CHARITY, duties of, 342.
CHARRON, 577.
CHILDREN, duties of, 354.
CHINA, philosophy of, 547.
CHRYSIPPUS, 555.
CICERO, 556.
CITIZENS, rights and duties of, 359.
CLAIRVOYANCE, 199.
CLEANTHES, 555.
CLEMENT of Alexandria, 559.
COMMON SENSE as criterion of truth,
405.
COMPREHENSION (see INTENSION).
COMTE, 590.
CONATION, 28, 29, 166.
CONCEPT, 93, 94 ff.
and image compared, 96 ff.
and judgment, 108.
genesis of, 98 ff.
objectivity of, 398.
CONDILLAC, 99, 583.
CONDITIONAL
argument, 230.
proposition, 220.
CONFUCIUS, 548.
CONJUNCTIVE
argument, 231.
proposition, 220.
CONNOTATION (see INTENSION).
CONSCIENCE, 283, 299.
as the rule of action, 300.
education of, 301.
CONSCIOUSNESS, 23 ff.
as criterion of truth, 415.
CONTINUITY of mental processes, 36.
CONTRACT, social, 355.
CONTRAPOSITION of propositions, 224.
CONTROVERSY, rules of, 262.
CONVERSION of propositions, 223.
CORNOLDI, 590.
CORTES, Donoso, 591.
COSMOLOGY, 423.
COSMOS, 448.
COUSIN, 589.
CREATION, 535.
of human soul, 493, 494.
of world, 534.
CRITERION, 402.
derivative, 414.
ultimate, 403.
CRITICISM and objectivity of knowl-
edge, 388 ff.
CUD WORTH, 581.
CUMBERLAND, 581.
CURIOSITY, 153.
CUVIER, 444.
CYNICS, 551.
CYRENAICS, 551.
INDEX
617
DAMIRON, 589.
DARWIN, 444, 591.
DAVID of Dinant, 565.
DEATH, laws and signs of, 498, 499.
DEDUCTION, 116, 250, 254 ff.
DEFINITION, 215 ff.
DEISM, 535.
DEMOCRITUS, 98, 476, 550.
DEMONSTRATION, 244.
DENOTATION (see EXTENSION).
DENYS the Carthusian, 573.
DESCARTES, 578.
methodic doubt of, 243, 370.
on criterion of truth, 405.
on origin of ideas, 100.
on union of body and soul, 482, 484.
DESIRE, 174.
DETERMINISM, and freedom of the
will, 177 ff.
DETRACTION, 346.
DIDEROT, 584.
DIFFERENCE, specific, 209.
DIGNITY, duties concerning, 332, 345.
DILEMMA, 232.
DIOGENES of Sinope, 551.
DION\SIUS, Pseudo-, 560.
DISCRETION, 347.
DISCUSSION, rules of, 262.
DISJUNCTIVE
argument, 231.
proposition, 220.
DISPOSITION, physiological and psy-
chical, 72, 73, 84.
DISTRACTION, 31.
DIVISION, 217.
DIVORCE, 353.
DOGMATISM, 377 ff.
DOUBT, 205, 366.
methodical, 243, 370.
DREAM, 195.
DROBISCH, 588.
DUEL, 345.
DURANDUS of St. Pourcain, 572.
DUTY, and right, 328 ff.
toward God, 538.
toward men, 341.
toward self, 331.
DYNAMISM, 427, 429.
ECKHART, 573.
EDWARDS, 592.
EFFICIENT CAUSALITY, 454, 596.
EGYPT, philosophy of, 544.
ELEATIC school of philosophy, 549.
EMOTION, 137, 144.
altruistic, 148.
self-regarding, 145.
EMPEDOCLES, 98, 550.
EMPIRICISM, 113, 297, 382.
ENTHYMEME, 232.
EPICHEIREMA, 232.
EPICTETUS, 555.
EPICURUS, 98, 314, 476, 555.
EPISTEMOLOGY, 362.
problems and method of, 368, 369.
ERDMANN, 587.
ERIUGENA, John Scotus, 561, 563.
ERROR, 205, 260.
causes of, 260, 413.
remedies of, 261.
ESSENCE, meaning of, 96, 209.
ETHICS, 281 ff.
EUCLID of Megara, 551.
EVIDENCE, 411.
as criterion of truth, 412.
self-, 376, 378, 41 2.
EVIL and divine providence, 519, 536.
EVOLUTION, 439, 440.
of inorganic world, 441.
of man, 490, 492.
of organic world, 441.
EXAMPLE, argument from, 247.
EXPERIENCE
as source of knowledge, 382.
in judgment, in.
EXPERIMENT, 251.
in psychology, 57 ff.
EXTENSION, and intension, 95, 211.
law of, 96, 212.
of terms in propositions, 221.
point of view of, in syllogism, 233
2., 255.
FACTS, certitude of, 249, 381, 418.
FACULTIES, 27 ff., 488.
FALLACIES, 256 ff.
FAMILY, 353.
FEAR, 147.
FEELING, 28, 29, 137.
and morality, 157, 161, 288, 309.
and will, 188.
as criterion of truth, 405.
classification of, 138.
importance and culture of, 160.
of pleasure and pain, 139.
FERRARA, 577.
FEUERBACH, 587.
FICHTE, 586.
FIGURES of syllogism, 227.
FISKE, 592.
6i8
INDEX
FONSECA, 577.
FORM and matter, 428, 430, 438, 483.
FOURIER, 590.
FRANCK, Sebastian, 576.
FRANKLIN, 592.
FREEDOM of will, 177 ff.
condition of morality, 290.
FROSCHAMMER, 494, 588.
GALUPPI, 590.
GARNIER, 589.
GASSENDI, 427, 575.
GAUTHIER of Mortagne, 563.
GAZALI, 566.
GEMISTUS PLETHO, 575.
GENERATIONISM, 494.
GENUS, meaning of, 209.
GERBERT, 562.
GERSON, 573.
GEULINCX, 582.
GILBERT de la Porre"e, 564.
GILES of Lessines, 570.
GILES of Rome, 570.
GIOBERTI, 590.
GNOSTICISM, 559.
GOD, 51 1, 597.
attributes of, 525, 528.
basis of moral order, 324 ff., 598.
distinct from the world, 521.
duties toward, 538.
existence of, 514 ff.
first cause, 517, 597.
knowableness of, 513, 529, 533.
nature of, 521.
personal, 532.
providence of, 535.
ultimate end, 538, 598.
GODFREY of Fontaines, 570.
GCESCHEL, 587.
GOODNESS, and beauty, 268.
GORGIAS, 550.
GORRES, 588. ;
GOTAMA, 547.
GOVERNMENT, forms of, 357.
GREEN, 591.
GREGORY Nazianzen, 560.
GREGORY of Nyssa, 560.
GROOT, Gerard, 573.
GROTIUS, Hugo, 576.
GtiNTHER, 588.
HABIT, 34, 175.
and morality, 289.
genesis of, 175.
importance of, 176, 188.
H^CKEL, 443, 588.
HALLUCINATION, 89.
HAMILTON, 588.
HAPPINESS, 163.
first motor of the will, 177.
HARTLEY, 591.
VON HARTMANN, 588.
HEARING, sense of, 51, 65.
HEDONISM, 314.
HEGEL, 587.
HELVETIUS, 476, 584.
HENRY of Ghent, 570.
HERACLITUS, 549.
HERBART, 588.
HERDER, 586.
HERMES TRISMEGISTUS, 557.
HISTORY of Philosophy, 542.
HOBBES, 355, 579.
D'HOLBACH, 476, 584.
HONOR, 333.
as basis of morality, 312.
due to others, 346.
HUGH of St. Victor, 565.
HUME, 310, 463, 581.
HUSBAND and wife, duties of, 354.
HUTCHESON, 311, 581.
HUXLEY, 591.
HYLOMORPHISM, 428, 430.
HYLOZOISM, 434.
HYPNOTISM, 199.
and freedom of the will, 182.
HYPOTHESIS, 248.
HYPOTHETICAL
argument, 230.
proposition, 220.
IAMBLICUS, 558.
IDEA, 72, 93.
association of, 34, 74, 76, 115.
genesis of fundamental, 131.
in logic, 208.
intension and extension of, 95, 211.
kinds of, 212.
IDEALISM, 387.
and knowledge of external world,
3Qi-
and knowledge of ideal truths, 396.
in aesthetics, 276.
IGNORANCE, 205, 366.
and morality, 287.
sentiment of, 153.
ILLUSION, 89.
IMAGE, mental, 71 ff.
and concept compared, 96 ff.
as motor, 75.
INDEX
619
IMAGE, continued.
as representative, 73.
physiological basis of, 73.
retention, reproduction, and recog-
nition of, 84.
IMAGINATION, 33, 78.
and memory compared, 83.
importance and culture of, 79.
types of, 82.
IMMORTALITY of the soul, 500 ff.
IMPERATIVE, categorical, 157, 294,
320.
INDIA, philosophy of, 545.
INDUCTION, 116, 250, 251.
fallacies of, 260.
methods of, 252.
principle of, 253.
INFERENCE, 115 ff.
immediate, 224.
mediate, 226.
INFINITE, idea of, 132.
God is, 526, 531.
INNATISM, and origin of concepts,
loo, 105.
INSANITY, 104.
INTELLECT, 92.
and imagination, 80.
and senses, 102, 130, 474.
and will, 188.
cultivation of, 133 ff., 333.
in man, not in animals, 471 ff.
INTELLECTUAL sentiments, 153.
INTELLIGENCE, 93.
INTENSION, and extension, 95, 211.
law of, 96, 212.
of terms in propositions, 221.
point of view of, in syllogism,
233, 255-
INTERACTION of body and soul, 482,
484, 489.
INTEREST, and attention, 32.
INTUITION of necessary judgments,
113, 412.
IONIAN school of philosophy, 548.
ACOBI, 405, 586.
AIMINI, 546.
ANET, 589.
OHN of St. Thomas, 577.
OHN of Salisbury, 565.
OUFFROY, 589.
UDGMENT, IO7, 219.
analysis and synthesis in, no.
analytic and synthetic, 109, 395,
396.
and concept compared, 108.
experience and reason in, in.
genesis of, no, 117.
kinds of, 108, 219.
rash, 326, 346.
JUSTICE, duties of, 342.
JUSTUS LEPSIUS, 575.
KANADA, 547.
KANT, 584.
on analytic and synthetic judg-
ments, 396.
on knowledge of external world,
394-
on morality, 320.
on objectivity of knowledge, 388.
on origin of concepts, 101, 106.
KAPILA, 546.
KLEUTGEN, 588.
KNOWLEDGE, 17, 28, 40, 385, 399.
and belief, 120.
and morality, 287.
conditions of, 386.
development of intellectual, 133.
faculties of, 41, 42, 129.
intellectual, and senses, 102.
limits of, 400.
objectivity of, 386.
of external world, 389.
of ideal truths, 395.
qualities of, 133.
relativity of, 399.
scientific, 238.
LAMARCK, 444, 591.
LAMENNAIS, 101, 403, 589.
LANGUAGE, 122, 124.
acquisition of, 125.
and thought, 126.
LAO-TSZE, 547.
LAPLACE, 441, 591.
LAW, 292.
civil, 283, 292, 294, 359.
moral, 282, 285, 293 ff.
of thought, 235.
physical, 285, 292, 452 ff., 596.
LAZARUS, 588.
LEIBNIZ, 100, 427, 481, 484, 582.
LEROUX, 590.
LEUCIPPUS, 98, 476, 550.
LlBERATORE, 590.
LIFE, 432 ff.
and physical energies, 436.
duties referring to one's own, 337 ff.
duties referring to, of others, 344.
620
INDEX
LIFE, continued.
in plants and animals, 435.
nature of, 436.
origin of, 442.
origin of forms of, 443.
LITTRE, 590.
LOCALIZATION, cerebral, 192.
LOCKE, 580.
on knowledge, 370, 387.
on origin of concepts, 99, 104.
LOGIC, 206.
LOTZE, 588.
LOVE, 151, 343.
of activity, 147.
of approbation, 146.
of truth, 153.
LUCRETIUS, 476, 555.
LULLY, Raymond, 571.
LUTHER, 576.
McCosH, 592.
MACHIAVELLI, 576.
MACKINTOSH, 588.
MAIMONIDES, 566.
DE MAISTRE, 589.
MALEBRANCHE, 101, 481, 484, 582.
MAN, 489.
antiquity of, 496.
greatness and smallness of, 597.
one substance, 483.
origin of, 490 ff.
MANDEVILLE, 582.
MANICHEISM, 559.
MANKIND,
antiquity of, 496.
primitive condition of, 497.
specific unity of, 495.
MARCUS AURELIUS, 555.
MARRIAGE, 353.
MARSILIUS of Inghen, 572.
MATERIAL, meaning of, 469.
MATERIALISM, 476, 523.
MATTER, and form, 428, 430, 438, 483.
constitution of, 426 ff.
idea of, 132.
properties of, 425.
MAXIMUS of Tyre, 557.
MECHANISM, 427, 428, 455, 523.
MELANCHTON, 576.
MEMORY, 33, 83 ff.
and imagination compared, 83.
as criterion of truth, 415.
culture of, 85.
kinds of, 34, 84.
MENCIUS, 548.
MENTAL, 22, 24.
attitudes regarding truth, 205, 366.
classification of, processes, 27 ff.
general laws of, processes, 35 ff.
MERIT, 360.
METAPHYSICS, 422.
METHOD, 237.
DE LA METTRTE, 476, 584.
MIH-TSZE, 548.
MILL, James, 591.
MILL, John Stuart, 99, 255, 316, 591.
MIND, 13, 17, 19, 22, 24.
and organism, 190, 489.
general laws of, 29, 35.
human and animal compared,
471 ff.
philosophy of, 458.
spiritual, 469, 471, 474.
substantial, 21, 39, 460 ff.
MIVART, 591.
MOLESCHOTT, 477, 588.
MONISM, 515, 522.
forms of, 522.
psychophysical, 482, 485.
MONTAIGNE, 577.
MONTESQUIEU, 584.
MOODS of syllogism, 228.
MORAL, 284.
law, 282, 285, 293 ff.
sanction of, law, 326.
sense, 310.
sentiments, 157.
standard, 303 ff.
MORALITY, 281, 284,
and feelings, 288, 309 ff.
and habit, 289.
and knowledge, 287.
and pleasure, 313.
and utility, 313.
and will and freedom, 289, 290.
based on human nature and reason,
307, 319, 323-
based ultimately on God, 323, 520,
598.
concrete sentiment of, 158.
determinants of concrete, 302.
existence of, 295 ff.
standard of, 303 ff.
MORE, Thomas, 576.
MOTIVES of action, 177, 178.
MURDER, 344.
MYSTICISM, 565.
NATURE, 449, 452.
and art, 275, 276.
INDEX
621
NATURE, continued.
human, as basis of morality, 307,
3i9, 323-
laws of, 452.
NIKOLAUS of Cusa, 576.
NOMINALISM, 99, 104, 398.
OBSERVATION and experiment, 251.
OBVERSION of propositions, 223.
OCCASIONALISM, 481, 484.
OCKHAM, 572.
ONTOLOGISM, 101, 105, 406, 590.
OPINION, 205, 366
OPPOSITION
of terms, 214.
of propositions, 222.
ORGANISM and mind, 190, 480, 489.
origin of human, 490.
ORIGEN, 559.
ORIGIN, problem of, 439.
of human organism, 490.
of human soul, 492.
OWNERSHIP, 347.
private, 348 ff.
PAIN (see PLEASURE).
PANTHEISM, 515, 521 ff.
PARACELSUS, 576.
PARALLELISM, psychophysical, 482,
485-
PARENTS, duties of, 354.
PARMENEDES, 549.
PASSION, 137.
PATANJALI, 547.
PATRIOTISM, 152, 359.
PAULSEN, 588.
PERCEPTION, 44, 62.
analysis of, 62.
auditory, 65.
genesis of, 64.
of external world, 65, 67, 69 ff.,
3?9.
of time, 88.
olfactory and gustatory, 64.
tactual, 66.
validity of, 389 ff., 414.
visual, 67.
PERIPATETIC school of philosophy, 553.
PERSIA, philosophy of, 545.
PERSONALITY, 204, 509.
double or multiple, 197, 465.
PESCH, 588.
PHENOMENALISM, and the human
mind, 460, 463.
PHIO of Larissa, 553, 556.
PHILO the Jew, 557.
PHILOSOPHY, 7 ff.
division of, 9.
history of, 542.
method of, n.
of mind, 458.
relation of, to sciences, 3 ff., 8.
PHRENOLOGY, 192.
Pico della Mirandola, 575.
PLATO, 100, 387, 551.
PLEASURE amfcpain, 139.
importance of, 142.
laws of, 140.
PLOTINUS, 558.
PLUTARCH, 557.
POLYSYLLOGISM, 232.
POMPON ATIUS, 575.
PORPHYRY, 210, 558.
PORTER, 592.
POSITIVISM, 590 (see EMPIRICISM).
POTENTIA, 516.
PRACTICE, as criterion of truth, 407 ff.
PRAGMATISM, 408, 410.
PRAYER, duty of, 539.
PREDICABLE, 209.
PREDICAMENT, 211.
PREESTABLISHED HARMONY, 481, 484.
PREJUDICES, 118, 135.
PRIESTLEY, 591.
PRINCIPLES, knowledge of, 133, 378,
381, 396-
PROBABILITY, 246, 366, 375.
PROCLUS, 558.
PROPERTY,
duties referring to, 347.
in logic, 209.
PROPOSITION, 219.
contraposition of, 224.
conversion of, 223.
immediate inference of, 224.
kinds of, 219.
ob version of, 223.
opposition of, 222.
PROTAGORAS, 550.
PROVIDENCE of God, 535.
PRUDENCE, 334.
PSYCHOLOGY, 22, 25, 26.
analysis in, 29 ff.
division of, 27 ff.
experimental, 56 ff.
PYRRHO, 374, 556.
PYTHAGORAS, 549.
RACES of mankind, 495.
RATIONALISM and certitude, 383.
622
INDEX
REALISM, 388.
and knowledge of external world,
389-
and knowledge of ideal truths, 395.
in aesthetics, 276.
REASON,
morality based on, 307, 319, 323.
practical, as criterion of truth, 407.
validity of, 416.
REASONING, 115, 116, 226.
inductive and deductive, 116.
uses of, 121.
REFLECTION, 471, 474.
in philosophy, n, 12.
in psychology, 26.
REED, 310, 405, 588.
REINHOLD, 586.
RELATIVITY of knowledge, 399.
RELIGION, 538.
RELIGIOUS sentiments, 158.
RMI of Auxerre, 562, 563.
RENOUVIER, 590.
REPUTATION,
of others, 346.
personal, 333.
RESPONSIBILITY, moral, 326.
RHABANUS MAURUS, 561.
RICHARD of Middletown, 570.
RICHARD of St. Victor, 565.
RIGHT and duty, 328 ff.
ROBERT KILWARDBY, 570.
ROMANES, 591.
ROSCELIN, 564.
ROSENCRANZ, 587.
ROSMINI, 101, 590.
ROUSSEAU, 355, 584.
ROYER-COLLARD, 589.
RULE of human actions, 303.
RUYSBRCECK, 573.
SAINT-SIMON, 590.
SANCHEZ, 577.
SANCTION of moral law, 326.
SANSEVERINO, 590.
SCEPTICISM, 373.
SCHELLING, 587.
SCHILLER, 586.
SCHOLASTIC philosophy, 560.
SCHOOLS in Middle Ages, 561.
SCHOPENHAUER, 588.
SCIENCE, 238.
and art, 275, 278.
classification of, 240.
SCOTUS, Duns, 570.
SECRETAN, 590.
SECRETS, obligation to keep, 347.
SELF, 13 ff.
-condemnation, 148.
-consciousness, 130.
-control, 185, 336.
-defence, 344.
duties toward, 331.
idea of, 131. (
-importance, 146.
-knowledge, 26, 337.
-love, 14, 331.
-neglect, 340.
obvious characteristics of, 19.
relations of, to external world, 13,
17-
-respect, 331, 332.
SENECA, 555, 556.
SENSATION, 44 ff.
auditory, 51.
external, 45, 46 ff.
internal, 45, 46.
measurement of, 56 ff .
muscular, 50.
of smell and taste, 47.
of temperature, 50.
of touch, 49.
perceptible difference of, 56, 59 ff .
threshold of, 57, 59.
visual, 52.
SENSATIONALISM, 99, 104.
SENSES, 44, 45.
and intellect, 102, 130, 474.
comparison of external, 55.
education of, 62, 64.
number of external, 53.
perception of (see PERCEPTION).
value of knowledge of, 414.
SENSISM, 98, 103.
SENTIMENT, 137, 152.
aesthetic, 155.
intellectual, 153.
moral, 157, 309.
religious, 158.
SERIES, mind as a, of processes,
463ff.
SEXTUS EMPIRICUS, 374, 556.
SHAFTESBURY, 310, 581.
SIGER of Brabant, 571.
SIGN, meaning and division of, 122,
123.
of mental processes, 123.
SIMPLICITY of the mind, 469, 470.
SIMPLICIUS, 558.
SINCERITY, 334, 346.
SLAVERY, 345.
INDEX
623 ,
SLEEP, 195.
SMELL and taste, 47, 48, 64.
SMITH, Adam, 311, 582.
SOCIAL CONTRACT, 355.
SOCIALISM, 348.
SOCIETY, nature of, 352.
SOCRATES, 551.
SOLIDARITY,
in ethics, 319.
of mental processes, 35.
SOMNAMBULISM, 196.
SOPHISTS, 373, 550.
SORITES, 232.
SOUL, 489.
immortality of, 500.
one in man, 487.
origin of, 492.
seat of, in organism, 487.
spiritual, 471.
union of, with body, 480.
SPACE, 132, 449.
SPECIES, 209.
evolution of (see TRANSFORMISM).
unity of human, 495.
SPEECH, and writing, 125.
SPENCER, 591.
on criterion of truth, 406.
on knowableness of God, 513,
530 ff.
on morality, 318.
on origin of concepts, 99.
SPINOZA, 582. ^
SPIRITISM, 201.
SPIRITUALITY of the soul, 469 ff.
STATE, 354.
functions and rights of the, 358.
origin of the, 355.
STATISTICS, 247.
STEINTHAL, 588.
STEWART, Dugald, 588.
STOCKL, 588.
STOICS, 320, 555.
STRAUSS, 587.
SUAREZ, 577.
SUBSTANCE, 131, 460, 524.
man is one, 483.
mind is a, 460.
SUGGESTION, mental, 198, 200.
SUICIDE, 337.
Suso, Henry, 573.
SYLLOGISM, 227.
figures and moods of, 227.
hypothetical, 230.
imperfect forms of, 232.
principles of, 233.
quantitative, 234. /
rules of, 228.
SYMPATHY, 150, 151.
as basis of morality, 311.
SYNTHESIS and analysis, 117, 250.
in judgment, no.
in psychology, 30.
SYNTHETIC judgments, 109, 395 ff.
TAINE, 99, 590.
TASTE and smell, 47, 48, 64.
TAULER, 573.
TELEOLOGY, 455.
and existence of God, 519.
and immortality of soul, 503.
TELEPATHY, 200
TELESIO, 575.
TEMPERAMENT, 191, 203.
TEMPERANCE, 336.
TEMPERATURE, sense of, 50.
TERM, 211.
intension and extension of, 95, 211,
221.
kinds of, 213.
supposition of, 211.
THALES, 549.
THEISM, 515, 521.
THEMISTIUS, 558.
THEODICY, 511.
THEOPHRASTUS, 554.
THIERRY of Chartres, 563.
THOMAS a Kempis, 573.
THOMAS, St., Aquinas, 568.
THOUGHT, 92.
and language, 126.
primary laws of, 235.
TIME, 132, 451.
-perception, 88.
TOUCH, sense of, 49, 66.
TRADITION, validity of oral, 419.
TRADITIONALISM, 101, 105, 403, 589.
TRADUCIANISM, 494.
TRANSCENDENTALISM, and origin of
concepts, 101, 106.
TRANSFORMISM, 443, 445.
applied to man, 490 ff.
TRENDELENBURG, 588.
TRUTH, 364, 380.
and beauty, 267.
knowledge of ideal, 395.
love of, 153.
moral, 334, 346.
personal and impersonal, 120.
TRUTHFULNESS, 334, 346.
624
INDEX
UNION, 480.
of body and soul, 481 ff,
UNIVERSALS, problem of, 398, 562.
UNIVERSE, 448, 595.
UTILITARIANISM, 297, 298, 314, 316.
VERACITY, duty of, 334, 346.
VIRTUE, 326, 360.
VISION, 52, 67.
VOGT, 476, 588.
VOLTAIRE, 584.
WALLACE, 591.
WALTER of Mortagne, 563.
WIFE and husband, duties of, 354.
WILL, 173 ff.
and desire, 174.
and feelings, 188.
and intellect, 188.
and morality, 289 ff.
freedom of, 177 ff.
importance and culture of, 185, 334.
WILLIAM of Auvergne, 568.
WILLIAM of Champeaux, 563.
WILLIAM of Conches, 563.
VON WOLFF, 583.
WORLD, 448.
knowledge of external, 389.
obvious characteristics of, 15 ff.
WRITING, and speech, 125.
WRITTEN documents, authority of,42o.
XENOPHANES, 549.
YANG-CHU, 548.
ZENO of Citium, 555.
ZENO of Elea, 549.
ZOROASTER, 545.
ZWINGLI, 576.