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OUR AFGHAN POLICY 
 
 AND 
 
 THE OCCUPATION 
 
 OP 
 
 BY 
 
 D 
 
 LONDON: 
 WILLIAM BIDGWAY, 169, PICCADILLY, W. 
 
 1880. 
 
OUR AFGHAN POLICY 
 
 AND 
 
 THE OCCUPATION 
 
 OF 
 
 CANDABLAR 
 
 BY 
 
 JD. B. 
 
 LONDON: 
 WILLIAM RIDGWAY, 169, PICCADILLY, W. 
 
 1880. 
 
J)S 
 
 6? 
 
 LONDON : 
 
 (5. NO KM AN' AND SON, PRINTERS, MATDEN LANE, 
 COVEXT GARDEN'. 
 
OUR AFGHAN POLICY. 
 
 IT has never been seriously alleged, so far as I 
 am aware, that we were bound on grounds of 
 morality to invade, conquer, or annex Afghanistan, 
 and any justification of our recent action with 
 regard to that country must be based on the plea 
 that expediency demanded such action, and that, 
 at the most, morality did not forbid it. If the 
 invasion or annexation of Afghanistan or of any 
 portion of it be not expedient, it is unnecessary to 
 consider the morality of invasion or annexation, and 
 the task to which I address myself is the discussion 
 of the best policy to be followed in dealing with 
 Afghanistan, assuming that policy to be deter- 
 mined solely on grounds of expediency, or in 
 other words with exclusive reference to the 
 material interests of the British Empire. 
 
 I cannot hope to advance any novel arguments 
 on a subject which has been so long under dis- 
 cussion, but as the events of the last two years 
 have drawn public attention to the relations 
 existing between Russia, Afghanistan and India, 
 and as our failures, our difficulties, and our 
 successes during that period have thrown new light 
 
ov< the question, and are still fresh in the public 
 memory, I may not unreasonably hope that an 
 attempt to state 'clearly the conditions of the 
 problem and the conclusion to which they point 
 will not be altogether profitless. 
 
 I shall avoid controversial matter as far as 
 possible and eschew a priori reasoning altogether. 
 Any other course would tend to obscure the real 
 issues by raising profitless discussions on minor 
 points, and the complex questions connected with 
 Afghanistan cannot be solved by deductions 
 from a few general propositions not shown to be 
 universally true. 
 
 I have already stated that the invasion or 
 annexation of Afghanistan has never been justified 
 on the ground that annexation or invasion was 
 required in the interests of morality, and it may be 
 added that no one has ever recommended these 
 measures on the ground that they would be a 
 source of profit in themselves. Attempts have 
 been made to prove that war with Afghanistan 
 would not be costly, that it would not be very 
 costly, or that in time a considerable portion of 
 the outlay might be recovered from the country, 
 but the plea for war has never been based on these 
 grounds. Interference with Afghanistan can only 
 be justified on the ground that such interference is 
 necessary for the protection of India, and all 
 attempts to show that the annexation of a portion 
 of Afghanistan would not be costly have been 
 
intended to minimize the objections to annexation. 
 No one has ever justified the annexation of new 
 territory on the sole ground that annexation 
 would be profitable. If interference with Afghan- 
 istan can only be justified as a means of defence 
 for India our primary duty is to define accurately 
 the dangers, immediate or prospective, against 
 which we wish to guard, to ascertain the cost in 
 men and money of the remedies proposed, and 
 to consider the efficacy of these remedies against 
 the apprehended dangers. 
 
 The dangers against which we have to guard on 
 the north-west frontier of India belong to one or 
 other of two classes. 
 
 I. Dangers arising from the action of the Afghans. 
 II. Dangers arising from the action of Russia, 
 on, through, or in conjunction with the 
 Afghans. 
 
 It will be convenient to consider these two 
 classes of dangers separately, and I shall assume 
 that my readers possess some knowledge of the 
 nature and extent of the territory that lies between 
 the frontiers of Afghanistan, and that portion of 
 Russia which is a source of strength and not of 
 weakness to that country. I shall also assume that 
 they now possess a general knowledge of the nature 
 and extent of Afghanistan itself, and of the tribes 
 alike turbulent, warlike, treacherous, and fanatical, 
 who inhabit it, and who, above all other posses- 
 sions, value and cling to their independence. 
 
 1 * 
 
I. DANGERS ARISING FROM THE ACTION OF THE 
 AFGHANS. 
 
 Our Indian empire may be injured either by the 
 attacks of the independent, or semi-independent 
 tribes, along the north-west frontier of India, or 
 by an invasion under the leadership of the Ameer 
 of Afghanistan. 
 
 The tribes on the north-west frontier have 
 always been a source of trouble and annoyance. 
 To keep them in check has required the services 
 of a considerable force, composed partly of soldiers 
 and partly of a military police. The injuries which 
 we have received from them have, however, been 
 essentially local. They would be unable to face our 
 troops for five minutes in the open field, and they 
 are incapable of any such combined and prolonged 
 action as would render them a danger to the 
 Indian Empire. Our only serious difficulties with 
 them have arisen when a force has entered their 
 country to inflict punishment for border raids, or 
 other similar offences. 
 
 It would doubtless be more satisfactory if we 
 had peaceable and friendly neighbours on our 
 frontier, but we can hardly expect natural laws to 
 be everywhere set aside in our favour, and any 
 attempt to subdue the tribes would be excessively 
 costly, and would require a force at least five times 
 as great as that which for so many years was found 
 sufficient to protect our Punjab frontier. Moreover 
 
the conquest of the border tribes and annexation 
 of their territory would only bring us face to face 
 with another set of tribes, just as numerous and 
 turbulent, equally suspicious of our motives, and 
 prepared at all costs to maintain their savage 
 independence. No danger to the Indian Empire 
 need be apprehended from the border tribes, and 
 no advance of our frontier would diminish their 
 power to cause annoyance. 
 
 British India possesses a thoroughly organized 
 and strong central government. The term " or- 
 ganization " can hardly be applied to the 
 Afghan system, and the central government barely 
 maintains a precarious existence under a strong 
 ruler. India has about seventy times the revenue 
 of Afghanistan, and about fifty times her popula- 
 tion. The Indian army is incomparably greater 
 than that which the late Ameer of Afghanistan got 
 together by devoting the whole of his resources to 
 it for a series of years; and the more numerous 
 army is as superior to the Afghan army in organi- 
 zation, discipline, arms, supply of military stores, 
 and officers, as it is in numbers. Behind India lies 
 the sea, and a matchless navy ready to bear the 
 resources of England to her assistance. To enter- 
 tain any apprehension of an Afghan invasion is 
 therefore out of the question so long as the Indian 
 army remains faithful. 
 
 If we should ever be in extreme difficulties in 
 India owing to mutiny, rebellion, or war with the 
 
6 
 
 native princes, or from a combination of all three 
 causes, an invasion by the Afghans, even though 
 they should find it impossible to advance beyond 
 the Indus, would add materially to the dangers of 
 the position and I have little doubt that the 
 Afghans would invade India if they were once 
 satisfied they could do so with a fair chance of 
 success, and if our difficulties in India lasted for 
 a sufficient time to enable them to prepare for 
 invasion. 
 
 This danger is, however, one which, like the 
 liability to mutiny of the native army, we must 
 accept as a necessary result of our position in 
 India. It could only be averted by the complete 
 subjugation of Afghanistan arid its permanent 
 occupation by a force sufficiently strong to 
 overcome all possible combinations among the 
 Afghans, and composed of troops whose loyalty 
 was above suspicion. It is not easy to calculate 
 what it would cost to subdue and permanently hold 
 in subjection the whole of Afghanistan, but judg- 
 ing from recent experience the thorough occupation 
 of Afghanistan, including the Provinces of Cabul, 
 Candahar, Herat, and Afghan Turkestan by 
 troops who could under all circumstances be 
 depended on, would require the services of 60,000 
 English troops, and would cost about ten millions 
 sterling annually. It is out of the question, there- 
 fore, to attempt any such operation. England 
 would never consent to find even one -third of the 
 
men and money required for the purpose, and 
 to employ 60,000 English and 40,000 Native 
 troops in order to guard against a remote danger 
 which might never arise, and which if it did arise 
 would be amply met by a force of from 10,000 to 
 20,000 loyal troops acting within our own terri- 
 tory, is a proposal too preposterous to require 
 discussion. If in spite of all difficulties the 
 annexation of Afghanistan was completed and the 
 Indian frontier advanced from the Suliman Moun- 
 tains to the Oxus we should occupy in reference 
 to Russia somewhat the same position that we 
 have hitherto occupied with regard to the Afghans, 
 and the fear of invasion by 80,000,000 of Russians 
 would take the place of the fear of invasion by 
 (say) 4,000,000 of Afghans. 
 
 It has indeed been said that there is somewhere 
 a " scientific " frontier which we could easily take 
 up, and which a trifling force could defend against 
 all possible attacks. This frontier, however, has 
 never been accurately defined, nor are military 
 authorities by any means unanimous as to where 
 it may be found. I shall revert to the question of 
 a scientific frontier hereafter ; for the present it is 
 sufficient to say that the danger of invasion by the 
 Afghans is no greater than the danger of invasion 
 by any other weak power on our frontier in any. 
 part of the world, and that it is to be guarded 
 against by the simple means of treating the weaker 
 power with justice, avoiding interference with 
 
8 
 
 what does not concern us, and seeing that our 
 military power is not weakened by internal 
 disturbances. 
 
 II. DANGERS ARISING FROM THE ACTION OF RUSSIA, 
 ON, THROUGH, OR IN CONJUNCTION WITH, THE 
 AFGHANS. 
 
 There are four ways in which danger may come 
 to us in India through the action of Russia and 
 Afghanistan 
 
 A. Russia may incite the Afghans to attack 
 us. 
 
 B. Russia may conquer and permanently 
 occupy Afghanistan, and afterwards under- 
 take the invasion of India. 
 
 C. Russia may form an alliance with Afghan- 
 istan and march an army through Afghan- 
 istan as through a friendly country in order 
 to invade India. 
 
 D. Russia may acquire such a position in 
 Afghanistan as to be able to intrigue 
 successfully with any disaffected elements 
 in India, and thus menace the Indian 
 Empire. 
 
 A. Eussia may incite the Afghans to attack us. 
 
 This is a danger which we cannot avoid, but 
 fortunately it is neither a great nor a probable one. 
 An invasion of India by Afghans assisted by 
 Russian arms, money, and (possibly) officers, 
 
would no doubt be more formidable than an 
 invasion by Afghans unassisted by any foreign 
 power ; but, as I have already shown, a purely 
 Afghan army could make no impression on India 
 so long as our Indian army remained faithful. 
 Its appearance on Indian soil would simply be the 
 signal for its destruction. The danger would be 
 vastly greater if the invasion occurred at a time 
 when, from internal disturbance, we were in 
 difficulties in India ; but it is a remote danger, 
 depending on the simultaneous occurrence of war 
 with Russia, and of mutiny or rebellion in India. 
 The risk is reduced to a minimum if we rule 
 India in such a way as to avoid any serious 
 internal disturbance, if we take care that the 
 frontier districts shall always be held by a strong 
 European force, and if we scrupulously avoid the 
 appearance of aggression on the Afghans which 
 could only end by driving them into the arms of 
 Russian emissaries. If there are any who are not 
 content with the prospect of safety which these 
 precautions hold out, I would ask them, in the 
 first place, to recollect that there is no frontier in 
 the world which is, or can be made, absolutely 
 secure under all circumstances ; if we are disposed 
 to fret at the burden of defence imposed on us by 
 the existence of Russia and of Afghanistan beyond 
 our frontiers, what would be our state if we were 
 in the position of the French, the Germans, or the 
 Austrians ? And, in the next place 1 would ask what 
 
10 
 
 measures of aggression could we adopt that would 
 not increase an hundredfold the danger against 
 which we wish to guard ? Would it be easier 
 to invade, conquer, and permanently hold down 
 the whole Afghan people acting in Afghanistan, 
 than to defeat any Afghan army which might 
 attempt to find its way into India? Would a 
 mutiny or a rebellion in India, complicated by 
 an invasion of Afghans assisted by Russia, be 
 more dangerous than a mutiny or rebellion in 
 India and Afghanistan fomented by Russia and 
 complicated by a Russian invasion? Could we put 
 as large a force on the Oxus as we could on the 
 Indus ? What would it cost to maintain that force, 
 and what would be its fate in case of a reverse ? 
 
 Some hold that it would not be necessary to 
 annex all Afghanistan; that the occupation of a 
 commanding position in that country would be 
 sufficient to overawe the Afghans and prevent 
 them from yielding to Russian intrigues. He 
 must be deaf to all teaching who now holds any 
 such belief. Recent events have shown how little 
 influence our occupation of Candahar enables us 
 to exercise over the ruler of Herat, and the an- 
 nexation by England of any considerable portion 
 of Afghanistan simply means war with the whole 
 country. No doubt we should be successful in 
 that war, and it would be followed by a 
 sullen truce, lasting for a longer or a shorter 
 time. The burden of occupation alone would not 
 
11 
 
 be light, and every few years we should be 
 engaged in fresh and probably extensive operations, 
 while in case of a war with Kussia the whole 
 disposable force of India and a large portion of 
 that of England would be required to withstand 
 a united Afghan and Russian attack on our 
 advanced position in Afghanistan. I am unwilling 
 even to conjecture what the consequences might 
 be if the crisis were aggravated by a mutiny or 
 rebellion in India. Safety could only be pur- 
 chased by putting forth the whole strength of 
 England ; success would leave us exhausted by our 
 exertions, while no serious injury would have been 
 done to Russia, and the contest might be renewed 
 by that power again and again. Under any cir- 
 cumstances a war with Russia would probably be 
 attended with attempts at intrigue in Afghanistan, 
 and these intrigues might be so far successful 
 that they would compel us to keep a con- 
 siderable force on the Indus. So long as we 
 maintain our present frontier, however, the danger 
 would not be great, and at any rate we must 
 accept it just as Russia must accept the fact that 
 in case of war with her we can blockade the 
 Baltic coast in despite of anything she could do. 
 Any attempt to improve our position by an 
 advance into Afghanistan would merely render 
 it certain that the Afghans would attack us in 
 case of war with Russia, and would quadruple 
 their chances of success in the attack. 
 
12 
 
 B. Russia may conquer and permanently occupy 
 Afghanistan, and afterwards undertake the 
 invasion of India. 
 
 Indian territory, fertile, populous, and inter- 
 sected by railways, may be said roughly to extend 
 to the Afghan frontier. A morning march from 
 our chief military station in India is sufficient to 
 place our troops on Afghan soil. Eussia is 
 separated from Afghanistan by vast waterless 
 deserts, the less barren portions of which are held 
 by races bitterly hostile to Eussia, and either 
 independent or only half subdued. For two years 
 we have been at war with Afghanistan. The war 
 has cost 20,000,000 and given occupation to 
 every man who could be spared from the army in 
 India, native and European. We have suffered 
 two reverses, one of them very serious, and 
 gained half a dozen victories in which numbers and 
 fanaticism sometimes almost turned the scale 
 against superiority in arms, discipline, and military 
 skill. The result of our operations has been that we 
 have held in force two of the chief cities in Afghan- 
 istan, and dominated as much of the country round 
 them as was easily accessible to our troops. The 
 lines of communication between these cities and 
 India were with difficulty kept up by a strong 
 military force assisted by the lavish payment of 
 black mail to hostile tribes. I leave it to military 
 experts to estimate with exactness in the light of our 
 
13 
 
 last Afghan war what efforts on the part of India 
 and England would have been required if instead 
 of occupying the cities of Cabul and Candahar 
 we had attempted to annex and permanently 
 occupy the provinces bearing these names, as well 
 as the province of Herat, and the vast and little- 
 known territory which stretches from the Hindoo 
 Koosh to the Oxus. It took 50,000 men to hold 
 Cabul and Candahar. For all Afghanistan twice 
 that number would have been required, and the 
 expenditure would not have fallen short of 
 50,000,000. What then would have been the 
 difficulty of this conquest if we had been at war 
 with Russia, and if Russian gold, arms, and 
 officers were being poured into the country to 
 assist the Afghans, and if possibly a Russian force 
 threatened us on the Oxus and at Herat ? 
 
 England is much more favourably situated than 
 Russia, both for attempting the conquest of Afghan- 
 istan, and for assisting the Afghans against any 
 foreign invader, and it is therefore beyond doubt 
 that the conquest of Afghanistan by Russia is a 
 sheer impossibility so long as England is willing to 
 assist the Afghans. Any attempt at conquest by 
 Russia could end only in ruinous and discreditable 
 failure, while the exertions required from England 
 would be comparatively trifling. 
 
 The bitterest enemy of Russia could not desire 
 for her a worse fate than that she should seriously 
 undertake the invasion of Afghanistan. 
 
14 
 
 C. Russia may form an alliance with Afghanistan 
 and march an army through Afghanistan as 
 through a friendly country, in order to invade 
 India. 
 
 A Kussian invasion of India through Afghan- 
 istan would either be a serious attempt to overthrow 
 the Empire of England in India, or a diversion 
 intended to occupy our troops, and prevent them 
 from taking part in a more important conflict 
 elsewhere. If it were a serious effort to overthrow 
 the Indian Empire it would be necessary that not 
 less than 50,000 Russian troops should cross the 
 Indian frontier, exclusive of the Afghan contingent. 
 It would also be impossible for Russia, unless she 
 blindly courted destruction, to throw 50,000 men 
 into India without holding in force the line of 
 advance and retreat. 
 
 It would be tedious to consider all the routes by 
 which Russia might possibly advance. The route 
 by Merv, Candahar and the Bolan Pass, would 
 present not greater difficulties than any other, and 
 we may confine our attention to it alone. In ad- 
 vancing by this route it would be necessary for 
 Russia to hold Merv, Herat, and Candahar with 
 strong garrisons. Of 150,000 men landed on the east 
 coast of the Caspian, she could not expect to bring 
 more than 100,000 to Herat; while to garrison that 
 city and Candahar, to keep open the communica- 
 tions and provide for losses from all causes as far 
 
15 
 
 as the southern mouth of the Bolan, would require 
 50,000 men; an equal number would then be left, 
 assisted by an Afghan army, to undertake the 
 invasion of India. Before the first step towards 
 any such enterprise could be taken, the Afghans 
 must consent to admit into their country 100,000 
 foreign soldiers of a hated race and religion, and 
 permit them to occupy two of the chief Afghan 
 cities, as well as all forts and places of strength 
 along a line of 800 miles. The Afghans are sus- 
 picious of the motives of others to a degree seldom 
 equalled even among Asiatics, and their consent 
 could never be obtained to the entry of Russian 
 troops into their country in sufficient numbers to 
 afford the slightest chance of success in an attack 
 on -India. They are not wanting in intelligence, 
 and they would not believe that Russia, having 
 conquered India by a prodigious effort, would 
 make no attempt to recoup her outlay by 
 holding the country, and they would know that 
 Russia could not hold India without subduing and 
 permanently occupying Afghanistan. The invasion 
 of India is, therefore, not possible under the con- 
 ditions assumed. 
 
 Even if the consent and friendly co-operation of 
 the Afghans were assured, the physical conditions 
 of the country to be traversed are such that a 
 sufficient force could not be fed or supplied. Twice 
 has England with all the resources of India at her 
 disposal marched a considerable force along that 
 
16 
 
 portion of the route which lies between Jacobabad 
 and Candahar ; the first time under Sir John Keane, 
 and the second time under General Stewart. In 
 neither case was any organized opposition offered, 
 and the total force was inconsiderable compared 
 with the combined Kussian and Afghan army 
 which would be necessary for the invasion of India. 
 Yet Sir John Keane' s army almost perished 
 from want of supplies, while General Stewart's 
 force could only advance by driblets, and when, 
 after a prodigious loss of transport animals, he 
 arrived at Candahar, the greater portion of his troops 
 was forced to return to India, for the simple 
 reason that they could not be fed. No army 
 of any civilized nation has ever marched from 
 Herat to Candahar or vice versd, and the diffi- 
 culties to be encountered would certainly be very 
 great. 
 
 The fact that Ayoob Khan with from 6,000 to 
 8,000 men and 36 light guns lately marched from 
 Herat to Candahar, at the season when supplies 
 were most plentiful, is no proof that ten times the 
 number of Kussians could follow the same route. 
 Nor has the road from Merv to Herat ever been 
 followed by a modern army, while we know that 
 this is the second season during which the Russians 
 have been vainly endeavouring to push 10,000 
 men along the route to Merv from the Caspian. 
 The physical difficulties of the country alone are 
 sufficient to prevent an invasion of India by 
 
17 
 
 Russia, and a Russian Army marching through 
 unheard-of difficulties from the shores of the Cas- 
 pian to the Indus would not have the slightest 
 chance of success against an English force with its 
 base on the sea at Kurrachee, and carried by rail- 
 ways almost to the very field of battle. 
 
 If, however, we were at war with Russia and the 
 Afghans were willing to attack us, it is within the 
 bounds of possibility, though not probable, that 
 the Russians might be willing to risk a contingent 
 of 10,000 or 20,000 men to assist them, and it is 
 also possible, though not probable, that the Afghans 
 would admit a force of this* strength into their 
 country. No Afghan army assisted by 10,000 or 
 even by 20,000 Russian troops would be in the least 
 degree formidable on the plains of India so long as 
 the Indian army remained faithful. If the invasion 
 occurred at a time when our authority was shaken 
 by internal disturbance, as it was during the Mutiny 
 of 1857, the danger would be of the most serious 
 nature, and Russia could inflict incalculable damage 
 on England by the sacrifice of a comparatively small 
 force, though it is unlikely that any appreciable 
 position of the Russian force would under any 
 circumstances ever return through Afghanistan 
 to Russia. 
 
 Against this danger, which is a remote one 
 depending on the simultaneous existence of serious 
 internal disturbance in India, of a war with Russia, 
 of a desire by the Afghans to attack India, of their 
 
 2 
 
18 
 
 being prepared to do so, and of their consenting to 
 admit a Russian army into their country, England 
 can only provide by so ruling India that the 
 danger from internal disturbance shall be reduced 
 to a minimum, by abstaining from all measures of 
 aggression which would tend to make the Afghans 
 look to Russia for assistance, by adopting in the 
 Punjab those military precautions which are 
 necessary on a frontier exposed to attack, and by 
 maintaining a sufficient European force along the 
 frontier or close to it. 
 
 D. Dangers arising ^from the acquisition by liussia 
 of such a position in Afghanistan as would 
 enable her to intrigue successfully with any 
 disaffected elements in India, and thus menace 
 the Indian empire. 
 
 Before this branch of the question can be satis- 
 factorily discussed a clear idea must be formed of 
 the nature of the position which we fear that Russia 
 may acquire. Clearly it is not a position acquired 
 or retained by force of arms, for we have already 
 seen that any attempt to invade Afghanistan could 
 be successfully resisted by England with the most 
 disastrous results to the invader. Nor need we 
 fear any influence which the Russians might acquire 
 over the Afghans by threats or by the massing 
 of troops on or near the Afghan frontier. Any 
 such measures would merely drive the Afghans 
 into the arms of England, and a menace of war by 
 
19 
 
 Russia on the northern frontier of Afghanistan 
 would be a singular method of inducing that 
 country .to collect its troops on the southern 
 frontier for an invasion of India. What we have 
 to fear is that Russia should frame her action 
 towards the Afghans with such moderation and 
 foresight as to convince them (if it be at all possible 
 to do so) that their country was in no danger from 
 a Russian attack, and that no interference would be 
 practised with regard to their internal or foreign 
 policy, and should thereby induce them to 
 admit Russian agents into the chief cities of 
 Afghanistan. The danger arising from this state 
 of affairs would be that in case of a war with 
 Russia, that power would be in a somewhat better 
 position than before to foment disturbances in 
 India, to incite the Afghans to attack us, and pos- 
 sibly to induce them to allow a small Russian force 
 to march through Afghanistan and assist in the 
 attack on India. 
 
 The means of counteracting this danger are 
 obvious. We should respect the independence of 
 the Afghans and let them see that we do not covet 
 one rupee of their revenue, or one foot of their 
 territory ; we should not attempt to interfere with 
 their internal policy, or to dictate to them their 
 relations with foreign nations. Above all we should 
 recollect that the appearance of an English envoy 
 is considered in the East the sure prelude of war 
 and annexation, and we should never attempt to 
 
 2 * 
 
20 
 
 force English agents on an unwilling people. 
 If in spite of these precautions Russian agents 
 entered Afghanistan without our consent, pressure 
 should be put on Russia to withdraw them, and we 
 should carefully avoid playing the enemy's game 
 by invading Afghanistan. It was the adoption of 
 measures in every way the opposite of those I have 
 enumerated which led to the present Afghan war 
 in which we have made such heavy sacrifices, and 
 gained so little. 
 
 If war between Russia and England were immi- 
 nent when Russian Agents entered Afghanistan, 
 Russia doubtless would not withdraw them at 
 our bidding, and we might then have to face the 
 possibility of a Russo- Afghan attack on India. I 
 have already shown that no such attack would have 
 the slightest chance of success unless in case of 
 mutiny in India. The danger under this head is 
 briefly as follows: if we go to war with Russia, 
 and if we alienate the Afghans so that they become 
 willing to admit Russian Agents into their country, 
 and if they consent to attack India with Russian 
 assistance, and if they are able to excite mutiny 
 or rebellion in India before the war with Russia 
 is concluded, we may find ourselves in very great 
 difficulties in India; but this danger is one which 
 we have already examined, namely, that in case 
 of war with Russia, we may be exposed to a 
 combined Russian and Afghan attack, and it is 
 one which we must be prepared to meet when it 
 
21 
 
 arises. It has already been shown that an advance 
 into Afghanistan would render the danger certain 
 instead of barely possible, and would place us 
 in an infinitely worse position to meet it when 
 it did arrive. 
 
 I have now concluded my examination of the 
 dangers which may threaten us on the north-west 
 frontier of India, and shown that no serious injury 
 need be apprehended unless in case of an Afghan 
 or Russo- Afghan invasion made simultaneously 
 with an outbreak of mutiny or rebellion in India. 
 I have also shown that the danger is a remote and 
 improbable one, and that it can be met by so 
 ruling India as to reduce the chance of mutiny 
 or rebellion to a minimum, by respecting the 
 independence of Afghanistan, by showing the 
 Afghans that they have nothing to fear from us 
 so long as they do not cross our frontier, by 
 avoiding everything which could tend to make 
 them look to Russia for protection, by taking all 
 proper military precautions in the Punjab and 
 Scinde, and by maintaining in those provinces a 
 considerable European force at all events in case 
 of war with Russia. If this policy were steadily 
 followed we might securely await within our 
 Indian frontier the inevitable day when Russia 
 and Afghanistan would quarrel, and when, if she 
 invaded Afghanistan, Russia would deliver herself 
 into our hands for just so much punishment as we 
 might think the provocation she had given required. 
 
22 
 
 There is however a school of writers who have 
 never been content with a policy so cheap, so 
 simple, and to their minds so contemptible. It is 
 true that they are not agreed among themselves as 
 to what should be done, but on one point they are 
 unanimous ; the Indian frontier must be crossed 
 at all hazards and more or less of Afghan territory 
 occupied. Some of them have sketched the outlines 
 of a scheme for the defence against Russia of an 
 imaginary frontier, stretching from the Black Sea to 
 some point on the borders of China. Others would 
 be content with the annexation of all Afghanistan, 
 the garrisoning of Herat by a British army, and 
 the holding of the line of the Ox us in force. A 
 still more moderate party would annex Afghanistan 
 up to the Hindoo Koosh, and hold the cities of 
 Herat, Cabul, and Candahar. A fourth party 
 limits itself to the occupation of a commanding 
 position in Afghanistan. 
 
 I shall offer no further remarks on any of these 
 proposals. Recent events have shown how delusive 
 were the arguments on which they were put 
 forward. They all afford a swift and certain means 
 of establishing an intolerable drain of men and 
 money on India and England, and a serious 
 attempt to carry any of them into practice would 
 mean that we were content to place our position in 
 India at the mercy of Russia. 
 
 There remains for consideration only the scheme 
 of a " scientific frontier." It is held by some that 
 
23 
 
 if we only make up our minds to annex certain 
 portions of Afghan territory we can establish 
 a new frontier of such natural strength that a 
 moderate force would suffice to hold it against the 
 united attacks of Eussia and Afghanistan. It is 
 unfortunate for my purpose that this new frontier 
 has never been clearly and authoritatively defined, 
 and that we have never been told by what forces 
 it could be held and where they would be placed. 
 All we really know about the scientific frontier 
 is that it would necessitate the holding of the 
 Khyber Pass, the Kurram Valley, and the city 
 of Candahar. There has even been a want of 
 unanimity about the Khyber Pass and the Kurram 
 Valley. Military authorities of weight have held 
 that it was unnecessary and would even be injurious 
 to hold either of these places, but all who have 
 advocated a forward policy pin their faith to the 
 occupation of Candahar ; if England cannot be 
 persuaded to hold Candahar they would wish 
 as the next best thing to take up a position 
 as close as possible to that city. Eecent 
 events may have somewhat weakened their argu- 
 ments, but their faith is unshaken. Shere Ali can 
 no longer be put forward as the chosen of 
 Candahar, nor did the inhabitants of that 
 city and the neighbouring villages exhibit during 
 the retreat from Maiwand and the subsequent 
 siege that amount of good will for their con- 
 querors which we had been led to expect. 
 
24 
 
 Candahar, however, still stands where it did, and 
 the advocates of a scientific frontier allege that a 
 British force at that place would effectually block 
 the way to India. 
 
 It is admitted that the occupation of Candahar 
 would impose a burden on the army and finances 
 of India in quiet times, but this burden, it is said, 
 would be like the payments on a policy of assur- 
 ance, and a tenfold reward would be reaped in the 
 hour of invasion and danger. If, then, it can be 
 shown that the holding of Candahar would be a 
 positive addition to our risks in time of trial, I 
 may fairly claim to have shown that the scientific 
 frontier has no real existence. 
 
 The occupation of the city and province of 
 Candahar would require the services of not less 
 than 20,000 men, of whom we may assume 
 10,000 to be European troops. The total number 
 may seem large and the proportion of Europeans 
 excessive, but it must be recollected that the 
 province of Candahar is of immense extent, that it 
 has no natural frontiers which could be easily 
 defended, that it is exposed to attack from both 
 Cabul and Herat, that reliance can no longer be 
 placed on troops locally raised, that a considerable 
 force would be required to guard the railway 
 which would doubtless be extended to Candahar, 
 that Indian troops are most unwilling to serve in 
 Afghanistan, and that no risks must be run of 
 disasters like that of Maiwand or of the massacre 
 
25 
 
 of working parties and plunder of treasure and 
 baggage by the Murrees, or other predatory tribes. 
 The occupation of Candahar would then require 
 20,000 men, and would cost annually at least 
 2,000,000 sterling. 
 
 It has already been shown that India is in no 
 danger from Afghans or Eussians, or from both 
 combined, so long as the Indian army remains 
 faithful, and to ascertain the value of the occupa- 
 tion of Candahar we need only consider what gain 
 such occupation would bring to us in case of another 
 mutiny like that of 1857, In this case a large 
 proportion of the troops on the Candahar line 
 would be disaffected. The Mahommedan troops 
 would desert and join the Afghans. Some of the 
 Hindoos might remain faithful, but all would fall 
 under suspicion. The value of the loyal native 
 troops would be neutralized by the danger from 
 the disaffected, and they would probably all be 
 disarmed as on the whole the best and simplest 
 method of dealing with them. There would then 
 remain 10,000 men to hold the city and province of 
 Candahar, to protect the railway, and hold 
 the line of communication with India. So 
 favourable an opportunity for attack would not 
 be neglected by the Afghans, (smarting under a 
 hated yoke and the loss of their richest province) 
 and the 10,000 men would be forced to abandon 
 the open country, and would be blockaded in 
 Candahar, and in the various posts provided for 
 
26 
 
 the protection of the road to India. It is doubtful 
 whether with mutiny and rebellion surging through 
 India reinforcements could be sent to them, and if 
 not they would either be destroyed by want of 
 food and supplies, or be driven to attempt a disas- 
 trous retreat to India. If 10,000 loyal troops 
 could be added to them in time, they would 
 doubtless hold their ground, if they could be fed, 
 and would thus prevent any hostile Afghan attack 
 on India through the Bolan pass. It is not, how- 
 ever, through the Bolan pass that the Afghans 
 could make a really serious attack on India. Such 
 attacks would be made on the trans-Indus districts 
 of the Punjab, either by the border tribes or by a 
 force acting from the direction of Cabul, and the 
 troops on the Candahar line even if raised to 20,000 
 men, would be unable to prevent such attacks by 
 detaching a force sufficiently strong to threaten 
 Cabul. The occupation of Candahar would in short 
 be of not the slightest value to England in time of 
 danger, but would be a source of very great 
 additional risk. Under the most favourable 
 circumstances it would lock up 10,000 loyal troops, 
 and prevent them from affording any assistance in 
 pacifying India, or in resisting invasion by the 
 Afghans at the points where invasion is most to be 
 feared. And if the 10,000 men were riot to be 
 ultimately sacrificed the same number of equally 
 loyal troops must be sent to their assistance, and 
 the Indian Government deprived of the services of 
 
27 
 
 20,000 trustworthy soldiers at a time when every 
 man was required in India. 
 
 If war with Russia broke out simultaneously with 
 a mutiny in India the result would be still more 
 disastrous. I have conceded to the advocates of 
 a forward policy that in case of war with Russia a 
 Russian force of 10,000, or 20,000 men might 
 enter Afghanistan to assist the Afghans. An 
 attack on Candahar by the Afghans assisted 
 by 10,000 Russians advancing by way of Herat, 
 and by an equal number at Cabul would require 
 more than 20,000 British troops on the Candahar 
 line. In such case 35,000 men would be far 
 from excessive for the protection of that city, 
 and the loss of the services of 35,000 loyal 
 troops during a crisis in India would be an evil of 
 incalculable magnitude. 
 
 The case may be summed up as follows : 
 If we occupy Candahar we shall require for this 
 purpose in quiet times a force of 20,000 men, and 
 we must incur an annual expenditure of at least 
 two millions sterling; no such burden would fall 
 upon us if we kept within our own frontiers : if we 
 occupy Candahar we shall be liable to continual 
 attacks from time to time, which would not be 
 made if we kept within our own frontiers : if we 
 occupy Candahar and a mutiny breaks out in India 
 we shall certainly be attacked by the Afghans ; if 
 we kept within our own frontiers we should 
 probably avoid this danger as we did in 1857: if 
 
28 
 
 we occupy Candahar and engage in war with 
 Russia we shall certainly be attacked by the 
 Afghans assisted by the Russians ; if we kept 
 within our own frontiers we should probably not 
 be attacked at all : if we occupy Candahar and a 
 mutiny occurs in the native army we shall lose 
 the services of at least 10,000 loyal troops, and 
 possibly of twice that number; this would not be 
 the case if we kept within our own frontiers : if 
 we occupy Candahar and if war with Russia and 
 mutiny in India occur simultaneously, we must 
 either abandon Candahar at once or be prepared to 
 defend it with not less than 35,000 loyal troops 
 whose services would be lost for the purpose of 
 pacifying India ; if we kept within our own 
 frontiers these troops could be utilised for putting 
 down rebellion in the Punjab, they would 
 probably not have to meet a Russo- Afghan attack 
 at all, and under the most unfavourable circum- 
 stances they would be better supported, and 
 better placed for defence than if they held a 
 position at the extremity of a line of 400 miles, 
 extending through hostile, barren, and difficult 
 country, and requiring a force of 10,000 men to 
 keep it open. 
 
 To me these arguments appear conclusive 
 against the occupation of Candahar, or any portion 
 of Afghan territory whatever. Every day during 
 which we prolong our stay in Afghanistan we risk 
 the occurrence of some event which may render 
 
29 
 
 retirement more difficult. It is only by prompt 
 withdrawal at the earliest opportunity, and by the 
 careful avoidance of aggressive interference in 
 future, that we can hope to place India at some 
 remote period, if ever, in as secure a position as that 
 which she occupied before the reversal of the 
 policy which has been specially identified with the 
 name of the late Lord Lawrence. 
 
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