UC-NRLF 
 
 fl07 Lflfl 
 
 R1TTGR 
 
LIBRARY 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 
 DAVIS 
 
COMPLIMENTS OF WM. E. RITTER 
 Studies along the way 
 
BOOKS BY 
 WILLIAM EMERSON RITTER 
 
 THE HIGHER USEFULNESS OF SCIENCE. 
 THE PROBABLE INFINITY OF NATURE 
 AND LIFE. 
 
 THE UNITY OF THE ORGANISM, OR 
 THE ORGANISMAL CONCEPTION OF 
 LIFE. Two Volumes. Illustrated. 
 THE UNITY OF THE ORGANIC SPECIES, 
 WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE 
 HUMAN SPECIES. 
 
 WAR, SCIENCE AND CIVILIZATION. 
 AN ORGANISMAL CONCEPTION OF 
 CONSCIOUSNESS. 
 
 RICHARD G. BADGER, PUBLISHER, BOSTON 
 
AN ORGANISMAL THEORY 
 OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
 BY 
 
 WILLIAM EMERSON HITTER 
 
 Director of the Scrippa Institution for 
 
 Biological Research of the University 
 
 of California, La Jolla 
 
 California 
 
 BOSTON 
 
 RICHARD G. BADGER 
 
 THE GORHAM PRESS 
 
 LIBRARY 
 
COPYRIGHT, 1919, BY RICHARD G. BADGER 
 
 All Rights Reserved 
 
 Made in the United States of America 
 
 The Gorham Press, Boston, U. S. A. 
 
EXPLANATORY NOTE 
 
 This book is a reprint, with a few verbal changes neces- 
 sitated by its mechanical isolation, of the last chapter 
 (twenty-four), the preface, and the postscript of my larger 
 work, The Unity of the Organism, or The Organismal 
 Conception of Life. The title of the chapter is, Sketch 
 of an Organismal Theory of Consciousness and I wish to 
 emphasize the avowedly brief treatment of the subject as 
 indicated by the term "sketch." 
 
 My reason for publishing this much of The Unity as a 
 separate book is strategical. I hope the move will con- 
 tribute to the winning of earlier and wider attention to 
 the full treatise by two groups of students especially: 
 Philosophers who have broken away from subjectivist ideal- 
 ism ; and physiologists who have deeply sensed the meaning 
 of physical chemistry in its application to living beings. 
 To win more readers for the full work is my hope. And 
 should the thing happen which I realize is possible, to wit, 
 the usurpation by this chapter, which is primarily hypo- 
 thetical, of the place rightfully belonging to the entire book, 
 which as a whole is quite the reverse of hypothetical, I 
 should be chagrined indeed. 
 
 But I am counting on an influence even stronger than 
 the sense of fairness and consistency of students as a guaran- 
 tee against such an outcome. It seems to me western civil- 
 ization is entering on an era in which integrative concep- 
 tions and forces are going to determine the feelings, the 
 thoughts and the acts of men much more than they have 
 for the past three-quarters of a century. Already tenden- 
 cies of this can hardly be mistaken in industry, in labor, 
 in sociology and in government. 
 
 3 
 
4 Explanatory Note 
 
 Science, philosophy and religion have not as yet shown 
 much of this tendency. Specialization, particularly in the 
 material sciences, differentiation, analysis, separatism, and 
 isolation have dominated in these realms. Herbert Spencer 
 did indeed move nominally toward philosophic and scientific 
 unification. But his synthetic philosophy, so-called, par- 
 takes really more of the nature of a department store than 
 of a truly synthesized body of natural knowledge. 
 
 Spencer failed in his effort to make Evolution function 
 as a universally synthesizing principle for the simple reason 
 that he failed to perceive the fundamentally integrative na- 
 ture of the evolutionary process itself. 
 
 My enterprise as a whole, viewed as one in which the idea 
 of synthesis occupies a central place, may be stated thus : 
 So far as concerns all that vast expanse of living nature 
 which comes under natural history as understood by Charles 
 Darwin and his immediate predecessors and contemporaries, 
 my conception of biointegration is set forth descriptively and 
 factually, and with a very minimum of hypothesis in the 
 chapters preceding the last (the twenty- fourth) of The 
 Unity of the Organism. The discussion of psychic inte- 
 gration (chapters twenty-three and twenty-four) presents 
 the relevant facts in such fashion as to demonstrate, I be- 
 lieve, a connection between mind and body which leaves no 
 ground for the doctrine of psycho-physical parallelism to 
 stand on. 
 
 The causal hypothesis of psychic phenomena sketched in 
 the chapter here presented is one which links the animal 
 organism more closely and positively with inorganic nature 
 than any with which I am acquainted. 
 
 The proof or disproof of that hypothesis is dependent on 
 psychology and biochemistry, primarily. Hence my pur- 
 pose in making this chapter into a separate book may be 
 stated more specifically as that of hastening the proof or 
 disproof of my hypothesis of consciousness. 
 
Explanatory Note 5 
 
 But while the wish to promote the scrutiny and test of 
 this hypothesis is my main object, another object which 
 attaches itself to this is hardly less interesting to me. 
 
 I refer to the question of what effect on physical and 
 chemical conceptions themselves the application of physical 
 chemistry to organic beings is likely to have. 
 
 If my surmise that physical chemistry itself is at heart 
 hostile to atomism as materialistic metaphysics conceives it, 
 is justified, a still more rigorous application of it to bio- 
 logical phenomena, and especially in the psychical domain, 
 is likely to reveal that hostility more and more. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 EXPLANATOKY NOTE 3 
 
 PREFACE (To "The Unity of the Organism") 9 
 
 AN ORGANISMAL THEORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS 25 
 
 Remarks on the Hypothetical Character of this Chapter ... 25 
 
 The Natural History Method and the Study of One's Self ... 25 
 
 Formulation of the Central Hypothesis 29 
 
 Preliminary Justification of the Hypothesis as Such 30 
 
 More Systematic Justification of the Hypothesis 34 
 
 The Nature of "Outer" or Objective, and "Inner" or Subjective . 35 
 
 As to the Lowest Terms of Self-Consciousness 51 
 
 Instinct and Physical Organization 53 
 
 Emotion and Physical Organization 59 
 
 Glance at the Equilibrative Interaction Between " Body ' ' and " Soul " 66 
 
 Support of the Hypothesis by the Physico- Chemical Conception of 
 
 the Organism 67 
 
 Personality and Elementary Chemical Substances 70 
 
 On the Psychology of Subjective and Objective Personality ... 74 
 
 Personality and the "Breath of Life" Viewed in the Light of Physical 
 
 Chemistry of the Organism 79 
 
 Summed-up Statement of Justification of the Hypothesis ... 92 
 
 REFERENCE INDEX 93 
 
 POSTSCRIPT (To "The Unity of the Organism") 95 
 
 INDEX . 103 
 
PREFACE 
 
 (TO "THE UNITY OF THE ORGANISM") 
 right of any book to live must be determined finally 
 A by what is on its pages. Nevertheless, when the author 
 of a scientific book undertakes such a task as I have under- 
 taken in this one, his natural and acquired fitness for carry- 
 ing out his project ought to count in some measure toward 
 the determination. An attempt to speak with some degree 
 of originality and authority on subjects so remote from one 
 another as are the chemistry of organisms, heredity, human 
 consciousness, and the nature of knowledge, would be some- 
 what audacious even if made by an author of secure reputa- 
 tion as an investigator in one or more of these fields. When, 
 however, the attempt is that of a complete stranger to all 
 the fields, as thus judged, the attempt is no longer entitled 
 to be called "somewhat audacious." It is audacious out and 
 out, and if defensible at all is defensible in spite of its 
 audacity. But the very nature of the task I have attempted 
 seems to require me to contend that while it is audacious it 
 is yet not impossible, and to point out something of my own 
 qualifications for performing it. 
 
 Such professional fitness as I have rests primarily on my 
 being a general zoologist in the proper sense ; that is, a 
 student of the phenomena of the animal world without ex- 
 clusion of any aspect of that world from professional in- 
 terest and some measure of professional attention. These 
 facts of my vocation, and of my conception of the nature of 
 that vocation are crucial for the quality not only of this 
 book but all my general writings. 
 
 If once one becomes as deeply convinced as I am of both 
 the fundamental unity and the fundamental diversity of al] 
 
 9 
 
10 Preface 
 
 nature; if, in other words, he becomes convinced that the 
 whole of nature is, indeed, and not in mere expression, a 
 system, the conviction will carry with it the perception that 
 all specialized natural knowledge is absolutely dependent for 
 meaning on the relation it has to its appropriate larger body 
 of knowledge. Either analytic knowledge or synthetic knowl- 
 edge of nature would be wholly void of meaning were it to 
 be completely wrenched from the other. Most men of 
 science perhaps, and most philosophers probably, would ad- 
 mit that this is true as an abstract proposition. But what 
 about its truth when brought to the test of particular cases ? 
 
 The audacity of my enterprise really consists in my at- 
 tempting to act according to this general truth in a par- 
 ticular case the case, that is, of the phenomena of animal 
 life. I have gone on the assumption that knowledge of 
 animal chemistry, for example, at one extreme, and of 
 human consciousness at the other, would be simple blanks as 
 to meaning but for the relation of the two knowledges to 
 each other and to still more general knowledge of animal 
 life. Could we imagine a chimpanzee possessed of as much 
 laboratory knowledge of organic chemistry as an Emil 
 Fischer, that knowledge would be really meaningless were 
 the creature's mind that of a chimpanzee in all other re- 
 spects. 
 
 A systematic defense of a conception of zoology based on 
 a general theory of natural knowledge such as this, can not, 
 of course, be thought of in a preface. Indeed, such a con- 
 ception can not be fully justified by any argument merely 
 for it. The justification must be found largely in a worked- 
 out application of the conception itself. In other words, the 
 very fabric of this book must be the chief justification 
 sought. All I can wish to do in a preface is to mention 
 certain subsidiary ideas and principles that have been spe- 
 cially influential in determining the plans of my undertaking ; 
 and certain methods and disciplinary preparations and pres- 
 
Preface 11 
 
 ent conditions that have been specially useful in carrying 
 them out. 
 
 Probably no one zoological item has influenced me more 
 than the perception that the evolutionary interpretation of 
 man does not mean that man's derivation from the lower 
 animals made him something that is now not animal. It 
 means that man is just as much an animal to-day as were 
 his prehuman ancestors. The truth is exactly stated by 
 saying that when the transformation took place by which 
 man came into existence that transformation was from a 
 lower to a higher stage of animal life. The actual problem, 
 consequently, of man's nature is not as to what man is in 
 opposition to animals, but as to the kind, or species of ani- 
 mal he is. 
 
 With the distinction here made once fully grasped comes 
 the revelation that man is an object of zoological research 
 and treatment no less certainly than is a horse, a fish, a 
 lobster, or an amoeba. But since man's highest, that is his 
 psychical or spiritual attributes are the ones most decisive 
 of his kind, it is these attributes which make him particularly 
 interesting, zoologically speaking just as, for example, it 
 is the attributes of a horse as a horse, and not as an animal 
 generally that elicits our particular interest in the horse. 
 Zoology rightly understood is preeminent among all the 
 sciences as the science of particulars. This important truth 
 seems to have been first appreciated by Aristotle; and the 
 fact that one of the most fundamental differences between 
 him and his teacher, Plato, concerned the doctrine of Par- 
 ticulars as opposed to that of Universals, is probably con- 
 nected closely with Aristotle's great interest in and attention 
 to zoology. I have not seen any reference to this surmise 
 by writers on Aristotle and his philosophy, yet it appears 
 to me highly significant. 
 
 From these perceptions relative to the nature of man and 
 the science of animal life, it follows that when the zoological 
 
12 Preface 
 
 study of man is undertaken when the general zoologist 
 becomes for the time being an anthropological zoologist 
 all the best tested and most approved methods of that 
 science are taxed to their uttermost, simply because of the 
 great complexity of the species under examination. Now it 
 is absolutely beyond question, I believe, that of the methods 
 employed in the biological sciences, none are more important, 
 especially for the study of man, than those of description 
 and classification with their necessary accompaniment, com- 
 parison. The essay The Place of Description, Definition and 
 Classification in Philosophical Biology in my little book, The 
 Higher Usefulness of Science, treats of this subject some- 
 what at length. But that to which I attach much more 
 importance is that almost everything contained in the pres- 
 ent book, except the heart of Chapter 24, I regard as an 
 embodiment of the fundamental principles of descriptive and 
 classificatory biology as these principles are established by 
 modern research. 
 
 It seems to me I am privileged to claim that no reader of 
 this and other general writings of mine is in position to pass 
 judgment on them, except, of course, as touching trustworthi- 
 ness of observation and statement, and of dependability of 
 authorities cited, without having considered conscientiously 
 my position as to method. For instance, am I right or wrong 
 in holding (see the above mentioned essay) that far the 
 larger part of what is usually called explanation in dealing 
 with the phenomena of nature is really partial or tentative 
 or hypothetical description and classification? What justi- 
 fication and scope are there for my contention that the motto 
 "neglect nothing," which has long done good service in taxo- 
 nomic research based on morphology, must be extended to 
 all departments of structural and functional biology? Wha 
 grounding and applicability are there for my distinction 
 between synoptic and analytic description, and synoptic am 
 analytic classification? Not untU one has come to see that 
 
Preface 13 
 
 questions of this sort are necessary consequences of progress 
 in information about, and interpretation of living nature, 
 is he able to appreciate fully what I mean by chemical and 
 psychological zoology. Formal biochemistry and animal 
 psychology, that is, the chemistry and the psychology of 
 laboratories devoted to these subjects, are to my zoological 
 eyes really quite incidental and partial and crude, albeit 
 immensely important. Let one once feel the full weight of 
 the inductive evidence favorable to the hypothesis that every 
 organism whatever performs every jot and tittle of its ac- 
 tivities through chemico-physical agencies, and he must at 
 the same time feel the meagerness and crudity, compara- 
 tively speaking, of even the fullest and best laboratory 
 knowledge of those agencies by which he himself, let us say, 
 operates as he carries through and expresses in words an 
 argument like that now occupying us. 
 
 The absolute trustworthiness of the main findings of 
 laboratory biochemistry and its incalculably great impor- 
 tance, but at the same time its great imperfection as com- 
 pared with natural biochemistry, are what especially impress 
 me as I bring my best powers to bear on the deepest, most 
 distinctive problems of anthropological zoology; problems, 
 in other words, of the human animal. 
 
 Such an attitude toward biochemistry will, I hope, be 
 recognized even by biochemists as calculated to induce at 
 least a receptive frame of mind toward knowledge in this 
 domain. It should be one important qualification for "read- 
 ing up" in the domain. But certain it is that something 
 more than a receptive mind is essential to enable one disci- 
 plined in one field of science to be a successful gleaner of 
 ripened fruit in another field. It is not true that all the 
 domains of natural knowledge, highly developed as they now 
 are, are enough alike to make training in any one an ade- 
 quate preparation for acquiring second hand knowledge in 
 every other. At least a background of systematic instruc- 
 
14 Preface 
 
 tion in a particular science is requisite to make a highly 
 successful reader even in that science. 
 
 So far, then, as I am able to pass upon my own quali- 
 fication for making such use as I have made of biochemistry, 
 it is a question of whether I have a sufficient ground-work 
 of formal training to make me a safe chooser among authori- 
 ties and estimater of the significance of their results. 
 
 Although my chemical practice was limited to three years, 
 one of these as a student assistant, so much did I live in the 
 laboratories during that period, that even to-day the open- 
 ing of a book or journal on chemistry seems to fill my nose 
 with foul though pleasantly reminiscent odors and to en- 
 crust and stain my fingers with diverse corrosives all of 
 which may mean that I was more a musser in chemicals than 
 a real student of chemistry. Nevertheless I verily believe 
 the experience enabled me to be a more intelligent reader of 
 chemical writings. 
 
 As for the science of mind, I am obliged to own that I 
 have never spent a day in an experimental laboratory of 
 either animal behavior or human psychology. But I own 
 also that for this I am not regretful if such defect of train- 
 ing be an essential condition of escape from the narrowing 
 of interest in and conception of "behavior" which has at- 
 tended later work in this field. I do not believe, however, that 
 this is the only way of such escape. Zoologists must realize 
 before long, I am quite sure, that laboratory experimentation 
 in animal behavior can be only a rather minor agent for the 
 task of understanding the psychical life of the animal world 
 as a whole. 
 
 This leads to the remark I wish to make about the discus- 
 sion of psychic integration in the last chapters of this book. 
 One of the most important things accomplished by that dis- 
 cussion is, I estimate, the calling attention to the tendency 
 of instinctive activity to excessiveness over the actual needs 
 served by the activity. Why has this truth (for there can 
 
Preface 15 
 
 be no question that it is a truth) not received more atten- 
 tion from modern behavior specialists? There are probably 
 several reasons, but a particularly influential one seems to be 
 the fact that the very purpose, and the method of experimen- 
 tation involving the idea of control by the student are 
 such as to encourage overlooking the phenomena, and to 
 obscure their significance even if they are noticed. 
 
 Unorthodoxly enough from the standpoint of present 
 school psychology, my entrance into this realm was from 
 the side of the nature and the theory of knowledge. And so 
 far as my explorations in the realm have gone, two men, 
 Aristotle and the late Professor G. H. Howison have influ- 
 enced me so vitally that I must say a few words on the 
 subject. 
 
 For many years Aristotle was two distinct persons to me, 
 so far as any real influence upon my thinking was con- 
 cerned. On the one hand there was Aristotle the metaphysi- 
 cian to whom I had been formally introduced by Howison in 
 a private outside-of-hours University course (which with 
 great generosity he had given me), the medium of the in- 
 troduction being the De Anima. On the other hand was 
 Aristotle the zoologist, acquaintance with whom was at first 
 picked up in the usual naturalist fashion, but which had 
 later ripened into intimacy, as I like to characterize it, by 
 our common interest in marine zoology, his good description 
 of the anatomy of a tunicate being a special passport to my 
 affection. It would hardly be an exaggeration to say that 
 all my philosophizing in biology has aimed at fusing these 
 two Aristotles into one. I do not mean that this has been 
 my conscious and express aim. It has been so only instinc- 
 tively, or intuitively, or "at heart," or by "working hy- 
 pothesis," or by whatever expression one chooses for it. 
 And here comes the part played by Professor Howison : As 
 I take a bird's eye view now of what is set forth in this and 
 other general writings of mine, and contemplate the whole in 
 
16 Preface 
 
 the light of the preface to Howison's book, The Limits of 
 Evolution, and then look reflectively back over my thirty 
 years of contact with him and his teachings, most of it inci- 
 dental and fitful, but some of it rather close, a few influences 
 of his, some positive and some negative, stand out sharply 
 indeed. The positive influences I mention first. No other 
 influence contributed so much to my belief in the power of 
 reason ; that is, in a substratum of truth to the idealistic 
 philosophy. Again no other influence contributed more to 
 my belief in persons in the power of personality; that is, 
 in a substratum of truth to the Howisonian philosophy of 
 personal idealism. 
 
 A statement of the negative influence coming from the 
 same source takes us back to Aristotle. In the preface to 
 The Limits of Evolution Howison writes, referring to his 
 own theory of Personal Idealism, "The character of the 
 present theory, relatively to Aristotle, is to be found in its 
 attempt to carry out the individualistic tendencies in Aris- 
 totelianism to a conclusion consistently coherent." This 
 statement I could almost adopt word for word as a charac- 
 terization of the purpose that has animated all my general 
 thinking and writing. Yet how profoundly does the out- 
 come of my efforts differ from that resulting from Profes- 
 sor Howison's efforts ! And here is the kernel of my present 
 remarks: In commending to me the De Anima of Aristotle 
 and generously undertaking to guide me through it, as a 
 response to my appeal for help toward clarifying my mind 
 concerning the deeper, the philosophical meaning of bio- 
 logical evolution, my greatly learned and much esteemed 
 teacher had a purpose, I am now quite sure, that is impos- 
 sible of realization. That purpose was to show that Aris- 
 totle failed in his effort to recognize a "real world" through 
 combining "ideal form" with "real matter," because for him 
 a real world was more fundamentally a sense-experienceable 
 world than is actually the case. As I labored through the 
 
Preface 17 
 
 De Anima I recall that I was disturbed by the rather cavalier 
 fashion in which we disposed of those portions of the work 
 which treat of reproduction, nutrition and growth, and espe- 
 cially the portions dealing with the senses. At the stage 
 of scientific development I was then in, I knew little or noth- 
 ing of Aristotle's biological writings, and Howison referred 
 to them only in the most cursory way, if indeed he men- 
 tioned them at all. Certain it is he did nothing to arouse 
 my interest in them, or to indicate that he regarded them 
 as specially significant in connection with such important 
 views of Aristotle's as those on the relation of Body and 
 Soul. The question which now seems to me indispensable 
 for grasping the essense of the Aristotelian psychology and 
 philosophy that, namely, of why Aristotle was so greatly in- 
 terested in zoology, and devoted so much time to its study, 
 never came up during the course, I am quite sure. In sci- 
 ence and philosophy as in everything else, the character of 
 one's interests is a surer index to his general views and atti- 
 tude than is anything he can express verbally. There may 
 be ambiguity and error in Aristotle's theory of "synthetic 
 Entelechy." This theory may, probably does, "beset," as 
 Howison remarks, "all individual existence both behind and 
 before," thereby implying some theoretical derogation from 
 the real nature of personality. But over against this error 
 and ambiguity stands indubitable proof of Aristotle's prac- 
 tical faith in the Particular, the Individual, that proof be- 
 ing the vast labor he expended in learning and interpreting 
 the life of the animal world. The chief philosophic signifi- 
 cance of Aristotle's zoological works is not in any informa- 
 tion or theories they contain but in the fact that he pro- 
 duced them at all, since, as mentioned above, zoology is pre- 
 eminent as the science of particulars, and his doctrine of 
 Particulars as opposed to Universals was very close to the 
 heart of his whole philosophic system. 
 
 This prepares for my final remark about the influence upon 
 
18 Preface 
 
 my thinking of Professor Howison and the idealistic philoso- 
 phy generally. That philosophic Idealism, no matter of 
 what variety, contains elements that are fundamentally er- 
 roneous seems to me to be proved more conclusively by its 
 inadequacy for understanding the world in its entirety than 
 by any particular errors of fact or reasoning which it can 
 be shown to contain. Were all men philosophical idealists, 
 there would be no natural science, merely because in the 
 domain of learning men will not choose as their primary 
 life work what they fully believe to be of secondary im- 
 portance. 
 
 Fallaciousness or inconclusiveness of argument never de- 
 terred me half as much from embracing Professor Howison's 
 teachings in their entirety as did his usually dignified but 
 always-present presumption of professional self-superiority 
 over all his colleagues who did not come under the, to him, 
 sacred aegis of Philosophy. The reason why sincere humility 
 and the spirit of democracy are alien to all forms of idealis- 
 tic philosophy becomes clear once one attains a world view 
 which truly strives to include, but makes no pretense of hav- 
 ing already included, the whole world wholly in that view. 
 
 There remains the pleasant though difficult task of men- 
 tioning the few among my numberless obligations which are 
 so personal and weighty that to leave them unacknowledged 
 would be to brand me as ungrateful, more conspicuously than 
 I can endure. 
 
 First as to those persons and conditions which, during the 
 last ten years, have relieved me from the routine duties of a 
 University teacher, and also from most of the exactions 
 customarily attaching to an administrative post even in an 
 institution of scientific research, and have given me a status 
 the central purpose of which is scientific work. Whatever 
 be the quality and final significance of my life-work, could 
 these, I ask myself, have reached as high a level as they 
 have reached had I not come into my present position? Al- 
 
Preface 19 
 
 most certainly not, must be the answer. And beyond a doubt 
 the raising of the question involves principles of organization 
 for scientific research that lift it high above mere personal 
 concern. 
 
 No faith of mine is greater because none is rooted more 
 deeply in my scientific philosophy, than that in the ultimate 
 triumph of popular, that is of democratic principles in all 
 aspects of civilization. Indeed the facts not the theories 
 of organic unity and integration which have dominated all 
 my later work are the foundation of this faith. Whether 
 my particular hypotheses and theories of organismalism suc- 
 ceed or fail, there still are the raw data on which they rest. 
 These can not fail. If success does not crown my efforts in 
 handling the data it will crown those of others who shall 
 come after me. And when the principles for which I contend 
 shall have worked themselves more fully into the fabric of 
 civilization, the organizational, the administrative, and the 
 scientific policies aimed at in the Scripps Institution for Bio- 
 logical Research of the University of California will be 
 recognized as fundamentally sound. I will be specific here 
 to the extent of mentioning the policy of providing a special 
 business management for such institutions. 
 
 Although my indebtedness to my professional co-workers 
 and official associates of the Zoological Department and the 
 Museum of Vertebrate Zoology at Berkeley, Professors C. A. 
 Kofoid, S. J. Holmes, and Dr. Joseph Grinnell, is indicated 
 by special references in the body of this book, I should be 
 sorry to have these references taken to indicate the full ex- 
 tent of my obligation to them, or to indicate that these are 
 the only members of those departments to whom I am in- 
 debted. 
 
 It would be a source of keen regret to me, too, should my 
 single short reference to two of my biological associates on 
 the staff of the Scripps Institution, Mr. E. L. Michael and 
 Dr. C. O. Esterly, be taken as the full measure of what I 
 
20 Preface 
 
 owe to them. I hope that my reference to their work, brief 
 though it is, will be recognized as indicative of the high im- 
 portance I attach to what they have done and are doing. 
 
 But what about my indebtedness to professional associates 
 here in the home group of whose work no mention is made 
 in my text? How subtle and far-reaching and innumerable 
 are the influences which bear upon one from his daily co- 
 workers ! For example, by what unit of measurement could 
 be gauged the effects on my treatment of heredity, which have 
 come from my perpetual contact with the work of Dr. F. B. 
 Sumner and Mr. H. H. Collins ? But these men would prob- 
 ably resent the ascription to them of responsibility for my 
 main conclusions in this field. Again, not many "environ- 
 mental factors" have been more determinative of my present 
 feelings (I hardly dare call them views) relative to various 
 problems in geo-physics, and relative to quantitative meth- 
 ods in natural science, than have Dr. G. F. McEwen and his 
 oceanographic work. Yet I hesitate even to mention this 
 fact lest some one be led thereby to hold Dr. McEwen ac- 
 countable for crudities, actual or implied, I may manifest 
 in these domains. 
 
 Nor are my indebtednesses confined to the narrow circle 
 of my immediately professional and official co-workers. In- 
 deed I am keenly conscious of great debts beyond this circle. 
 These are so numerous and on the whole so general as to 
 make specification impossible, but I cannot pass by without 
 mentioning my debt to my long-time and much-cherished 
 friend, Professor G. M. Stratton, for the commentaries on 
 the chapters on psychic integration made by him while this 
 portion of the book was in an advanced though still forma- 
 tive stage. 
 
 For aid in structural labor, as it may be called, my de- 
 pendence upon Mr. Frank E. A. Thone, my secretary and 
 scientific assistant, has been varied and intimate, and of a 
 quality for which money can only partly pay. 
 
Preface 21 
 
 To Dr. Christine Essenberg, librarian and member of the 
 scientific staff of the Scripps Institution, I am indebted for 
 help on the index and glossary. 
 
 And finally, what can I say about the part played in the 
 creation of this and my other works by her to whom this 
 volume is dedicated? The extent to which her life is involved 
 with mine in these works only we two can know; but the 
 wording of my dedication indicates something of the char- 
 acter of that involvement. 
 
AN ORGANISMAL THEORY 
 OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
AN ORGANISMAL THEORY OF 
 CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
 Remarks on the Hypothetical Character of this Chapter 
 
 HYPOTHESIS and theory will dominate in the! task 
 upon which we now enter and in this respect the 
 present chapter will differ sharply from the preceding chap- 
 ters. Fact, description, classification, and restrained gen- 
 eralization have been the leading motives up to this point. 
 One main and several subsidiary hypotheses will be central 
 in the discussion. Into the presence of these will be sum- 
 moned many of the facts and generalizations previously set 
 forth. The purpose in this summoning will be on the one 
 hand to test the hypotheses by the facts and generalizations 
 and on the other hand to see how the facts will look in the 
 light of the hypotheses. 
 
 This announcement of the hypothetical and theoretical 
 character of the task now before us, will give us two advan- 
 tages: It will justify a dogmatic form of expression at times 
 which we should not otherwise feel privileged to use; and 
 will justify a brevity of treatment which would not be pos- 
 sible were we aiming at thorough generalization and demon- 
 stration. Hence the justification of undertaking to deal 
 with so vast and vital a subject in the limits of a sketch. 
 
 The Natural History Method and the Study of One's Self 
 
 Insistent as I have been on the importance of the natural 
 history way of approaching the phenomena of the living 
 world, in entering upon the present discussion I must em- 
 
 25 
 
6 An Organismal Theory of Consciousness 
 
 phasize this more than ever and must call attention to the 
 particular character of this importance in our present un- 
 dertaking. 
 
 The natural history method of viewing organic beings is 
 per se the comprehensive method, one of its best mottos 
 being, as we have repeatedly seen, "neglect nothing." That 
 knowledge of organisms separates itself sharply into de- 
 partments is no deterrent to the naturalist against utilizing 
 any knowledge he may come upon that will contribute to his 
 main aim that of understanding organisms. Who or what 
 shall restrain me from observing and carefully thinking 
 about any fact of my own being which promises to help me 
 on my road to such understanding? The foremost zoolo- 
 gists, of modern times especially, have amply recognized and 
 freely used this principle so far as all physical and some of 
 the lower psychical attributes are concerned. But when it 
 comes to man's higher psychical attributes, zoologists have 
 usually said, sometimes expressly, sometimes tacitly, that 
 these belong to a wholly different realm, a realm with which 
 we have little or nothing to do. And their position of 
 "hands off" as touching man's higher psychic life, has re- 
 ceived the readier, fuller sanction in that it has accorded 
 well with the prevalent views and practices of those students, 
 anthropologists, economists, sociologists, and ethicists who 
 have made these higher reaches of human life their special 
 fields of inquiry. But the course of nature can not be per- 
 manently thwarted. Such an attempt to wrench human life 
 asunder is bound to fail finally. In the several subdivisions 
 of biology, normal advance has tended to stay the wrenching 
 process, comparative psychology being notable in this ten- 
 dency. 
 
 The opposition to such organic disunion consistently 
 maintained throughout this book reaches its culmination in 
 these chapters on psychic integration. In what follows we 
 shall pass more freely than ever from one phase or aspect 
 
An Organismal Theory of Consciousness 27 
 
 to another, over the entire gamut of psychic life both in the 
 individual and in the animal kingdom. If facts of my own 
 subjective life will serve my purpose, I shall be as free to 
 requisition them as to requisition facts of any phase or as- 
 pect of my objective life. If the ethical or esthetic or social 
 attributes of the human animal will best illuminate a point, 
 these shall be brought in with as little misgiving as will be 
 anatomical or embryological or physiological or instinctive 
 attributes. 
 
 So great store do I lay on this catholicity of attitude 
 toward psychic life, that I shall show by a single instance 
 that at least a few other present-day zoologists have some- 
 what similar feelings about the zoological character of psy- 
 chical phenomena. Referring to the controversies which 
 have inevitably arisen over the problem of instinct, W. M. 
 Wheeler says that such controversy "is pardonable, at least 
 to some extent, since the subject itself presents no less than 
 four aspects, according as it is studied from the ethological, 
 physiological, psychological or metaphysical points of view." 
 "From the first two of these," the author continues, "in- 
 stinct is open to objective biological study in the form of 
 the 'instinct actions.' These may be studied by the physiol- 
 ogist merely as a regularly coordinated series of movements 
 depending on changes in the tissues and organs, and by the 
 ethologist to the extent that they tend to bring the organism 
 into effective relationship with its living and inorganic en- 
 vironment. But that these movements have a deeper origin 
 in psychological changes may be inferred on the basis of 
 analogy from our own subjective experience which shows us 
 our instincts arising as impulses and cravings, the so-called 
 'instinct- feelings* ; and these in turn yield abundant material 
 for metaphysical and ethical speculation." x From the 
 context of these sentences we may infer that Wheeler rec- 
 ognizes that the four aspects mentioned under which the 
 subject of instincts presents itself, represent the same num- 
 
8 An Organismal Theory of Consciousness 
 
 ber of valid departments of man's mental life. The point 
 I wish to make is that although a zoologist may recognize 
 without cavil that speculation on psychological, ethical, 
 and metaphysical problems which arise in connection with 
 instincts, are legitimate activities of man, and might prop- 
 erly deny that it is incumbent upon him to do much specu- 
 lating of this sort, yet it would be incumbent on him to take 
 due cognizance of these speculative attributes of the human 
 animal. A truly scientific zoology can not justify itself in 
 issuing a manifesto to the effect that certain attributes pre- 
 sented by some animals do not fall within its province. It 
 may more or less constantly neglect or refuse on practical 
 grounds, to deal with certain attributes ; but that is a very 
 different matter from a formal declaration such as in 
 present-day zoologists make, that with these attribute j 
 zoology has nothing to do. Such a declaration is self-stu I 
 ing, if not self-stultifying, in that it is a virtual self-inhi- 
 bition by zoology of its own growth. 
 
 These reflections may be terminated by defining the mo- 
 tives and the mental attitude with which I approach the 
 great problem of consciousness. I come to it not as a meta- 
 physician, not as a psychologist, not as a physiologist, not 
 even as an anthropologist, but as an anthropological zoolo- 
 gist ; as a zoologist who in course of his regular professional 
 work takes up the animal group of which he himself is a mem- 
 ber, chancing as he does to possess among other attributes 
 that of knowing his own life directly, that is, through sub- 
 jective or self-conscious experience, as well as indirectly 
 through objective experience. 
 
 Approaching the problem of consciousness in such an at- 
 titude and for such a motive, it is impossible to view it other- 
 wise than as one aspect of the larger problem of life gener- 
 ally.^ For while the psychologically and metaphysically im- 
 portant question of whether consciousness is coextensive 
 with life need not be raised by the naturalist, the indubitable 
 
An Organismal Theory of Consciousness 29 
 
 fact that at least a large sector of life is conscious; in other 
 words, the fact that consciousness is a part of life, he can 
 'lot ignore if he is to deal with consciousness at all. For the 
 naturalist, then, no hypothesis or theory of consciousness 
 can be satisfactory which is not clearly and expressly em- 
 bedded in and an essential part of an hypothesis or theory 
 of life generally. Our central hypothesis, drafted in ac- 
 cordance with these principles, may now be given. 
 
 Formulation of the Central Hypothesis 
 
 All the manifestations which in the aggregate we call 
 T We, from those presented by the simplest plants to those 
 consciously psychical nature presented by man and 
 numerous other animals, result from the chemical reaction 
 between the organism and the respiratory gases they take, 
 oxygen being almost certainly the effective gas for nearly 
 all animals. An essential implication of this proposition 
 is that every living individual organism has the value, 
 chemically speaking, of an elementary chemical substance. 
 
 Let us be promptly explicit in recognizing the character 
 of the two propositions contained in this hypothesis. They 
 are manifestly chemical in large part, and a complete demon- 
 stration of their truth is impossible without the aid of chem- 
 ical research focus sed directly upon them. But though 
 clearly chemical, equally clearly they go beyond far beyond 
 present chemical knowledge. To speak of a whole organ- 
 ism as equivalent to a chemical element seems at first sight 
 not only unwarranted by positive chemical knowledge, but 
 opposed by such knowledge. Furthermore, the term "re- 
 action" as used in the first proposition undoubtedly seems 
 quite foreign to the technical meaning which chemistry has 
 attached to the word. Indeed so remote to say the least, 
 are these fundamental propositions of the hypothesis from 
 definite chemical knowledge, that if they are entitled to rank 
 
30 An Organismal Theory of Consciousness 
 
 as constituting a legitimate scientific hypothesis, this must 
 be on grounds other than those of present-day technical 
 chemistry quite as much as on those of such chemistry. In 
 attempting, consequently, to establish the propositions on a 
 true and useful hypothetical basis, it will be permissible to 
 notice these other grounds first. 
 
 Preliminary Justification of the Hypothesis as Such 
 
 The proposition that each living individual has the chem- 
 ical value of an elementary substance, will receive attention 
 first, and the initial step will be to inquire what, in general, 
 the criterion is of an elementary chemical substance. Here, 
 for instance, is a lump of phosphorus. In virtue of what is 
 it declared to be such a substance? Not primarily, let us 
 specially notice, because the phosphorus is simple, that is 
 to say, is an element in the sense of not being reducible to 
 still simpler substances. Rather the basal criterion of its 
 being a chemical substance is that upon its being brought 
 into contact under certain conditions with certain other 
 chemical substances, oxygen for instance, there is produced 
 a third substance having very different attributes from either 
 of the original substances. Transformation of substances 
 chiefly through interaction upon one another is the founda- 
 tion fact which has brought it to pass that substances are 
 described as chemical. That is the fact upon which the 
 science of chemistry primarily rests. Facts and problems 
 of simplicity and complexity, relative and absolute, are 
 later and secondary. The task of chemistry "consists in the 
 investigation of substances and those of their processes by 
 which the physical attributes of the substances undergo 
 permanent changes." (Handworterbuch der Naturwissen- 
 schaft.) 
 
 Every adequate definition of chemistry and chemical sub- 
 stance and chemical action contains the idea of transforma- 
 
An Organismal Theory of Consciousness 81 
 
 tion in one form or another. Clearness on this point is in- 
 dispensable to our purpose. Chemistry is too often defined, 
 even in elementary text books and in dictionaries, as though* 
 the "composition of matter" were its initial and most es- 
 sential function. But this conception is surely contrary to 
 the history and most essential nature of the science. There 
 is, it seems, entire agreement among competent writers that 
 scientific chemistry is a direct descendant of Alchemy, and 
 a very imperfect knowledge of the history of Alchemy re- 
 veals the fact that the every-where present, normal trans- 
 formations in nature, particularly in inorganic nature, were 
 the foundation phenomena of this old art. One has only to 
 recall the place held by the idea of the transmutation of 
 metals, this idea having usually the practical aim of chang- 
 ing the "base metals" into "noble metals." The "phil- 
 osopher's stone" and the "great elixir" were magical some- 
 things by which the transmutations could be accomplished. 
 
 Greatly significant from our standpoint is the fact that 
 one of the objectives of Robert Boyle (middle of the seven- 
 teenth century), who, perhaps as much as any one man, is 
 entitled to be called the father of experimental chemistry, 
 was to rectify the false and mystical notions prevalent in his 
 time about "Elements," "Principles," "Essences," etc. "Tell 
 me what you mean by your Principles and your Elements," 
 Boyle demanded, "then I can discuss them with you as work- 
 ing instruments for advancing knowledge." 
 
 What is "behind" the transformations forces, elements, 
 principles, essences, spirits or what not is indeed an impor- 
 tant and, properly asked, a legitimate question. But and 
 here is the most vital fact of all it is a question which can 
 not be raised even, until after the transformations have been 
 observed, nor can an answer of objective value be given un- 
 less the whole round of observed phenomena, the substances 
 previous to transformation, the transformatory processes, 
 and the new substances, be accepted at their face value, that 
 
An Organismal Theory of Consciousness 
 
 is to sa}', at a value which is as near to ultimate truth as any 
 truth whatever, connected with the phenomena. 
 
 The elemental constitution of bodies is an inference, al- 
 ways and solely, drawn from their observed corporeal attri- 
 butes. And chemistry is the science which assumes the task 
 of drawing, elaborating, and systematizing these inferences 
 on the basis of the transformation of the attributes. The 
 meaning of the statement that chemistry is one of the natural 
 sciences is that chemistry is the science which uses its natural 
 history observations to penetrate still more deeply into the 
 constitution of bodies. Natura a natura vincitur, nature is 
 surrounded by, is contained in nature, is as fundamental a 
 truth for chemistry as for any other natural science. A 
 living being is as much a natural body as is a piece of phos- 
 phorus, and its obvious attributes, its outer-layer attributes, 
 are as essential to its nature as are its inner, its hidden 
 attributes. So any genuinely transformatory changes, and 
 genuinely new products arising through the reaction between 
 the living body and some other body is so far chemical in 
 nature, and the reacting bodies are so far chemical. 
 
 A long step toward justifying the proposition that each 
 individual living organism has the value, chemically, of an 
 elementary substance, will be taken if it can be shown that 
 any qualitatively new product whatever results from the 
 interaction between the organism acting as a unit, as one, 
 as an element, and some other element. Having regard to 
 the entire world of living beings, the chances for finding new 
 products which may have arisen in this manner are prac- 
 tically if not theoretically infinite. Manifestly, then, only a 
 very small sector of the entire range of such possible produc- 
 tions can be searched. It must, consequently, be our aim, as 
 always in handling inductive natural history evidence, to 
 choose for examination evidence which shall be most clear- 
 cut, most illustrative, and most convincing. 
 
 The sector of organic phenomena best capable of yielding 
 
An Organismal Theory of Consciousness 33 
 
 such evidence is, I believe, exactly this of psychic life. And 
 within the great range of this life, the higher conscious life 
 of man is most replete with the evidence we seek. Again 
 within the range of man's higher life, each individual's own 
 private life, even his subjective life, his consciousness, is the 
 evidence most certain and convincing. Translating this last 
 statement into familiar language, one sees that it is only 
 another way the scientific way of affirming the truth, that 
 the greatest of all certainties of which man is capable is that 
 of his own existence. I am saying, virtually, that when we 
 analyze, after the manner of objective science, this old fa- 
 miliar affirmation about certainty, and carry the analysis 
 as far as we are at present able to, we find that the sense, or 
 better, the feeling of certainty of self-existence and self- 
 identity is in last analysis one of the effects of a transforma- 
 tory interaction between ourselves and some substance (oxy- 
 gen?) in our breath, as stated in the first of our two propo- 
 sitions. 
 
 That proposition seems then to be hardly more than a 
 recognition that psychic phenomena containing at least the 
 germ of consciousness is a kind of chemical product which 
 has not heretofore been clearly recognized as such, the lack 
 of recognition being due to the strangeness of the product as 
 compared with any chemical products with which experimen- 
 tal chemistry has hitherto occupied itself. But looked at in 
 a really broad and deep way, is it any more difficult for me 
 to interpret a state of consciousness in myself to be a result 
 of chemical action between me and the air (oxygen?) I 
 breathe, than for me to interpret the dim greenish-white 
 luminosity of a piece of phosphorus to be a result of the 
 chemical action between the phosphorus and the air essential 
 to the glowing? From a purely chemical standpoint I do 
 not believe we have any ground for holding that some prod- 
 ucts of chemical reaction are more comprehensible or less 
 comprehensible than are others. 
 
34 An Organismal Theory of Consciousness 
 
 Chemically viewed the problem now on our hands is en- 
 tirely one of -fact fact as determined by observation alone, 
 and by observation with the aid of experimentation. If it 
 can be shown that each individual conscious being really does 
 behave like a chemical substance in the process of reacting; 
 and if the result of such reaction can be shown to have even 
 one of the essential marks of a chemical product, both propo- 
 sitions of my two-parted hypothesis are warrantable and the 
 hypothesis becomes genuinely scientific a genuine "working 
 hypothesis" one, that is, for bio-chemistry to take seri- 
 ously. 
 
 More Systematic Justification of the Hypothesis 
 
 That the propositions are demonstrable to the extent of 
 the demand just indicated is my contention. This conten- 
 tion I will now try to make good and will begin with a few 
 remarks on a question concerning the hypothesis which 
 ought to arise instinctively in the mind of every one. That 
 question is : Does such a conception of psychic life and con- 
 sciousness as that contained in our hypothesis imply any real 
 infringement upon or derogation from me, in the deepest 
 sense a real entity properly designated by the terms person 
 and personality? 
 
 On saying that this query ought to arise mstwctively, I 
 do not mean ought in the ethical sense, but in the organismal 
 sense. That is, in a sense which implies that the very nature 
 of the conscious organism is that it is not only self-existent 
 in a measure like every natural object, but that it is self-iden- 
 tifiable, and within certain bounds, self-determinative of its 
 own acts. Now recognizing it to be thus by its "very na- 
 ture" is only another way of recognizing that it is so in its 
 instincts as well as in its physical organization. But since 
 instinct is more fundamental, more deep-rooted in the or- 
 ganism than is intellect, as phylogenic and ontogenic psy- 
 
An Organismal Theory of Consciousness 35 
 
 chology make clear, if a pronouncement implying a de- 
 rogation from the reality and natural prerogatives of the 
 individual be issued from the intellect, a response of protest 
 and antagonism would be expected from instinct. This would 
 be expected as an ordinary organic impulse to self-defense 
 and self-preservation. 
 
 The Nature of "Outer" or Objective and "Inner" or 
 Subjective 
 
 What we have to do consequently is to scrutinize the con- 
 scious individual in order to see if it presents any uniqueness 
 of attributes and of transformatory power in reacting with 
 other bodies that is on a par with the uniqueness of an ordi- 
 nary chemical substance in the same respects. Now it is, 
 as suggested some pages back, exactly in the conscious, the 
 subjective life, that such uniqueness is most easily demon- 
 strable. There are several ways in which the conscious indi- 
 vidual manifests this uniqueness. A particularly convincing 
 way, I think, is in the relation between what are commonly 
 known as the objective, or "outer," and the subjective or 
 "inner" sides of mental life. This, consequently, will be the 
 approach to the subject chosen by us and we will enter upon 
 it by returning to Royce, first to his "Outlines of Psychol- 
 ogy," then a little later to some of his specifically philosophi- 
 cal writings. 
 
 In the first chapter of the Outlines, devoted to initial defi- 
 nitions and explanations, Royce states, simply and clearly, 
 a distinction "between our physical and mental life," which 
 elsewhere he has worked out with great elaboration. Thus : 
 "Physical facts are usually conceived as 'public property,' 
 patent to all properly equipped observers. All such observ- 
 ers, according to our customary view, see the same physical 
 facts. But psychical facts are essentially 'private property,' 
 existent for one alone. This constitutes the very conception 
 
36 An Orgamsmal Theory of Consciousness 
 
 of the difference between 'inner' psychical or mental, and 
 physical or 'outer' facts." 3 
 
 Ever-present, and obvious as is the comparison here made, 
 it nevertheless is of so great importance that we must stop 
 and reflect upon it, for we shall surely fail to grasp the full 
 measure of what is to follow if we are lukewarm toward one 
 of the elements of it. The element I refer to is the unique- 
 ness, the essentially personal character of inner as contrast- 
 ed with outer facts. Every normal person is ready enough 
 to insist that his thoughts, his feelings, his emotions and all 
 the rest of his higher psychical experiences are his and his 
 alone. The tremendous reality and force of the rights of 
 "private opinion," of "personal conscience" and so forth, 
 among civilized men, hardly need to be expatiated on. 
 
 The character of the uniqueness of these experiences, how- 
 ever, concerns practical living less vitally, so we give it less 
 attention. The whole vast range of my mental life, from 
 the lowest, simplest, vaguest sensations to the highest, most 
 bewildering complex emotions, passions, imaginings and 
 thoughts, are my own, absolutely, so far as other persons 
 are concerned. I cannot share them to the least extent with 
 another person. Of course I can let others, especially my 
 most intimate associates, my dearest friends, know a good 
 deal about these experiences of mine. But after all, gladly 
 as I would share many of them with these friends, it is utter- 
 ly impossible for me to do so. My experiences must remain 
 wholly outside of their consciousness. No two persons can 
 have the same experience any more than they can have the 
 same hands or stomachs. Nor is this all. If mental life is 
 subject to the general biological laws of variation into which 
 we have latterly gained much insight, I am obliged to sup- 
 pose that these experiences of mine, the whole retinue of sen- 
 sations, feelings, emotions and thoughts, differ somewhat 
 from the corresponding experiences of other persons. And 
 all observation confirms this supposition much of it strong- 
 
An Organismal Theory of Consciousness 57 
 
 ly. Inferential evidence could hardly be stronger than that 
 my particular emotional response to opera singing, for 
 example, is quite different from that of many other persons. 
 Obviously we are here skirting the edge of what modern 
 realism in formal philosophy calls pluralism, and deals with 
 in part as the question of whether percepts are strictly indi- 
 vidual and personal. No philosopher with whose views I 
 have become acquainted, has discussed this question so fully, 
 and in my opinion, so illuminatingly as Sellars. The follow- 
 ing sentences taken from his chapter, The Advance of the 
 Personal, show clearly, it seems to me, that the conclusions 
 he has reached, working from the purely philosophical side, 
 are essentially the same as those arrived at by me, advancing 
 from the biological side : "What may be called the sensory 
 content of our percepts is important, I do not wish to 
 be understood to belittle it, but so are the meanings which 
 arise in connection with our bodily activities and motor ad- 
 justments to stimuli. Here again, we are face to face with 
 individual factors in perception which even the idealist must 
 recognise and somehow explain. Evidently, perception is not 
 a mere passive presentation, but a construction whose gene- 
 tic elements can be partially traced. Finally, let us call to 
 mind that percepts are continuous with feelings and with the 
 so-called organic sensations. . . . Once vaguely objective, 
 feeling is now considered subjective or personal." Many 
 other sentences and paragraphs of like purport could be 
 quoted from this author. I have selected this for the two- 
 fold reason that it indicates the measure of my agreement 
 with his view as to the personal character of percepts and 
 the rest of conscious life; and at the same time indicates 
 wherein I shall have to out-do him in the matter of validat- 
 ing the individual. A part of our task, to be reached a little 
 later, will be to show that although feeling and all the rest 
 of psychic life is indeed subjectively personal, it is also 
 objectively personal. In other words, it will be my task to 
 
38 An Organismal Theory of Consciousness 
 
 remove, or at least to show the way to remove, the vagueness 
 which Sellars asserts, rightly, has hitherto clouded this 
 side of personality. To do this thing is, indeed, one of my 
 most important chances to contribute to a "better philosophy 
 of life." 
 
 But since our psychical life, especially our conscious life, 
 is a vast incalculably vast complex of experiences, of 
 "contents," sounds, sights, memories, feelings, ideas, many 
 of which are set off very sharply from the rest, are clearly 
 characterizable, and are wonderfully persistent; and since 
 innumerable of these are coming along all the while which 
 have much of genuine newness about them ; and since further, 
 these contents of consciousness are intertwined with and are 
 determinative of a vast complex of other contents called voli- 
 tions which in turn are linked up with and are more or less 
 directive of bodily activities of many kinds, some purely re- 
 flex and some instinctive, it seems impossible to escape recog- 
 nizing, even if one wanted to, that if the verb "to create" has 
 any definite meaning at all the normal, self-conscious animal 
 organism is about the most creative thing we know or can 
 conceive. Indeed it is altogether likely that the very notion 
 of creation, whether natural or supernatural, came initially 
 from the creative activity and the impulse to such activity, 
 of man himself. 
 
 We may justly say, I think, that we know all creativeness, 
 chemical creativeness with the rest, through being in our own 
 deepest natures creative, that is, transformative and trans- 
 formative in the way which we call chemical. We learn 
 about the processes of life and call some of the most essen- 
 tial of them chemical just by performing those processes as 
 some of our most essential attributes. A portion of the pro- 
 cess which goes on within us, together with the corresponding 
 product, constitutes what we call the science of bio-chemis- 
 try. This means that according to our hypothesis "objec- 
 tive" and "subjective," or "outer" and "inner" as applied to 
 
An Organismal Theory of Consciousness 39 
 
 life, are something quite different from what they have been 
 either in traditional philosophies, or in most, at least, of 
 recent psychology. "When we speak," Royce writes, "of 
 our physiological processes as internal, the word 'internal,' 
 although it here generally implies 'hidden, in whole or in part, 
 from actual outer observation', does not imply 'directly felt 
 by us ourselves." 5 My hypothesis implies a denial of the 
 correctness of this statement. I say that in the sum total 
 of the "contents of consciousness," a nether segment, as one 
 might call it, of physiological processes is "directly felt by 
 ourselves." There is no content of consciousness which does 
 not contain an element that is internal or subjective m what- 
 ever sense any other content of consciousness is internal or 
 subjective. And per contra, there is no content of conscious- 
 nets which is not objective to some extent, m whatever sense 
 any other content of consciousness is objective. The mind, 
 according to this conception, is not something which uses 
 the brain or any other part of the organism merely as a tool 
 with which to make thoughts and other contents of con- 
 sciousness. Nor on the other hand is consciousness of the 
 nature of a secretion, the gland for which is the brain, though 
 unquestionably the brain has an essential part in the pro- 
 duction of thought and the higher contents of consciousness. 
 Among the consequences of the reaction between the or- 
 ganism and the air we breathe are consciousness with its 
 marvellously rich and varied contents. 
 
 But at this point I must specially request the reader to 
 notice that I am not pretending to describe and explain all 
 the contents of consciousness. In other words it is not a 
 theory of knowledge, but a theory of consciousness that I 
 am sketching; and knowledge in the strict sense, and con- 
 sciousness are very different. They differ, according to my 
 understanding, much as the fully developed, physical organ- 
 ism differs from the living substance, or protoplasm, of 
 rhich the organism is composed. Consequently I am not 
 
40 An Organismal Theory of Consciousness 
 
 even concerned primarily with sensation in so far as this im- 
 plies sense organs or even nerves and nerve terminals of the 
 simplest kind. Rather I am dealing with the stages and con- 
 ditions antecedent to consciousness and in which it is latent, 
 in much such way as the cytologist when he studies the living 
 substance of all sorts of tissue-cells is not dealing with organs 
 and the organism in the full sense, but only with their sub- 
 strata. But although it is not knowledge, properly speaking, 
 either in its conceptual or perceptual aspect that I am dis- 
 cussing, since my enterprise does take me across the border 
 line and a short distance into the realm of knowledge, I must, 
 in the interest of historical continuity and setting, say a 
 little more than I have said about the general nature of 
 knowledge. 
 
 My assertion should be taken literally that there is no 
 content of consciousness which is purely either subjective or 
 objective, inner or outer, conceptive or perceptive, ideational 
 or impressional, or whatever form of expression be given the 
 antithesis here implied. That every content of consciousness 
 which exists or can be conceived has an essential element of 
 both members of the antithesis is exactly what I mean. To 
 illustrate, even the axioms, postulates, or whatever else may 
 be counted as most ultimate in mathematics contain an ele- 
 ment of the outer, or objective, as well as of the inner, or 
 subjective. These mathematical contents of consciousness I 
 single out to illustrate my meaning because they have been 
 clung to by philosophers and scientists more tenaciously than 
 any others as purely subjective or mental. And further 
 there is a strategic gain in this reference to mathematics in 
 that it brings into the open the fundamental opposition of 
 my hypothesis to one main root of Cartesian philosophy; 
 the philosophy, that is, from which the modern doctrine of 
 psycho-physical parallelism has grown. Our thinking, which 
 Descartes held proves our existence, really proves it only in 
 so far as it shows that among the activities essential to the 
 
An Organismal Theory of Consciousness 41 
 
 human organism thinking is one. In other words the "there- 
 fore" in "I think, therefore I am," is true only because "I 
 am, therefore I think," the reverse proposition, is also true 
 and includes the other truth. The lesser truth is true be- 
 cause it is an essential part of the larger truth, much in 
 the same way that the cells of a multicellular organism are 
 alive because they are essential parts of the organism. 
 
 We need not inquire how, from this serious shortcoming of 
 Descartes' description of psychic life Descartes went on to 
 the conclusion that "there is nothing really existing apart 
 from our thought" and that "neither extension, nor figure, 
 nor local motion, nor anything similar that can be attrib- 
 uted to body, pertains to our nature, and nothing save 
 thought alone; and, consequently, that the notion we have of 
 our mind precedes that of any corporeal thing, and is more 
 certain, seeing we still doubt whether there is any body in 
 existence, while we readily perceive that we think." 6 Nor 
 need we concern ourselves with the voluminous and tedious 
 reasonings by which a considerable number of moderns, fol- 
 lowing Descartes's lead, have convinced themselves that they 
 have "reduced" all reality or at least all reality that really 
 amounts to anything, to quantity. Enough now to remark 
 that every modern biologist who really accepts the basal data 
 of his science, must agree that "Psycho-physical paralellism 
 . . . stands to-day as the scandalous but irrefutable conse- 
 quence of postulating a material world without qualities and 
 a world of minds that lack spatiality and exists nowhere" 7 
 One way of characterizing my hypothesis would be to say 
 that it is an effort to remove this scandal by showing where- 
 in the postulation noted by Dr. Montague is not true. 
 
 The genetic relationships of my hypothesis can be still 
 farther indicated by coming on down from Descartes to 
 Hume then from Hume to Huxley and finally to G. F. Stout 
 and John Dewey as philosophers of to-day. Hume's nom- 
 enclature for the subjective and objective sides of man's 
 
42 An Organismal Theory of Consciousness 
 
 psychic life is "Relations of Ideas" for the first, and "Mat- 
 ters of Fact" for the second. Of the first kind says Hume, 
 "Are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra and Arithmetic ; and 
 in short, every affirmation which is intuitively or demonstra- 
 tively certain." . . . "That three times -five is equal to half 
 of thirty/ 9 is a simple illustration of the relation of 
 ideas. And, "Propositions of this kind are dis- 
 coverable by the mere operation of thought, with- 
 out dependence on what is anywhere existent in the uni- 
 verse." And further on, Part 2, same section, we read : 
 "It must certainly be allowed, that nature has kept us at a 
 great distance from all her secrets, and has afforded us only 
 the knowledge of a few superficial qualities of objects; while 
 she conceals from us those powers and principles on which 
 the influence of those objects entirely depends." Then Hume 
 goes into a discussion of the operations and relations of the 
 "superficial qualities" and "secret" powers of objects which 
 is so similar to my treatment of the relation of the organism 
 to the attributes of certain objects (chapters 20 and 21 this 
 book, and, more particularly, my essay Is Nature Infinite? 9 ) 
 that it seems as though his words must have been in my mind 
 when I thought out what I have there written, though I cer- 
 tainly was not conscious of Hume's views. And this sub- 
 conscious influence appears the more probable in that I have 
 almost conclusive proof of having read his argument not long 
 before my own was written. I am certain, however, that if 
 his statements were in my mind they were only in its pro- 
 conscious part and were not nor ever had been in its full- 
 conscious part. In other words, if I had read his words I 
 had not grasped their full significance. This probable in- 
 stance of the "sub-" or "pro"-conscious I refer to not so 
 much because of its interest in this instance, as because of its 
 bearing on my conception of the nature of consciousness. 
 The discussion by Hume to which I refer is that in which he 
 talka about the sensible qualities and the "secret powers" 
 
An Organismal Theory of Consciousness 43 
 
 of the bread we eat. "Our senses inform us of the color, 
 weight, and consistence of the bread," he says, "but neither 
 sense nor reason can ever inform us of those qualities which 
 fit it for the nourishment and support of a human body." 
 The particular puzzle upon which Hume comes in this 
 matter is the fact that although the examination here and 
 now of a natural object gives us absolutely no clue as to what 
 latent attributes ("secret powers," he calls them) the ob- 
 ject may possess, when we examine a second object of the 
 same kind we assume that the same secret powers are pos- 
 sessed by the second object. "If a body of like colour and 
 consistence with that bread, which we have formerly eat, 
 be presented to us, we make no scruple of repeating the ex- 
 periment, and foresee, with certainty, like nourishment and 
 support. Now this is a process of the mind, of thought," 
 Hume goes on to say, "of which I would willingly know the 
 foundation." "The bread," he says, a little farther on, 
 "which formerly I eat, nourished me; that is, a body of such 
 sensible qualities was, at that time, endued with such secret 
 powers : but does it follow that other bread must also nour- 
 ish me at another time, and that like sensible qualities must 
 always be attended with like secret powers? The conse- 
 quences seem nowise necessary. At least, it must be acknowl- 
 edged that there is here a consequence drawn by the mind; 
 that there is a certain step taken; a process of thought, 
 and an inference, which wants to be explained." Then after 
 a little further argument to show the necessity of recog- 
 nizing such a process we find this to me exceedingly interest- 
 ing passage: "There is required a medium, which may en- 
 able the mind to draw such an inference, if indeed it be drawn 
 by reasoning and argument. What that medium is, I must 
 confess, passes my comprehension; and it is incumbent on 
 those to produce it, who assert that it really exists, and is 
 the origin of all our conclusions concerning matter of fact." 
 The great merit here shown by Hume is his ability to push 
 
44 An Organismal Theory of Consciousness 
 
 the analysis of his problem to the very limit of the positive 
 information he had to go on, recognise exactly wherein his 
 information was lacking, and then stop without running off 
 into a purely speculative substitute for his deficient knowl- 
 edge. According to my hypothesis the unknown "medium" 
 which he saw must exist, the researches of a century and a 
 half since he wrote, in chemistry, physiology, general zoology 
 and botany, and psychology, have enabled us to see is the 
 individual animal organism reaching with the respiratory 
 substance (oxygen?) it takes in. In this one particular and, 
 from the standpoint to which we have been accustomed, very 
 peculiar case, the reaction is at one and the same time part 
 of the essence of both ideas and impressions in the Humean 
 sense, the reaction being the "medium" or the "certain step" 
 by which the inference is drawn, this inferring being possible 
 because of the continuity of the organism as a person, or 
 self, and the persistence of the respiratory substance as the 
 same identical thing from the past through the present into 
 the future. 
 
 We will now notice how Huxley, because of his much more 
 extensive knowledge of the structure and function of animals 
 than Hume possessed, was able to draw still closer than Hume 
 could to the heart of the old Mind-Body puzzle. The gist 
 of Huxley's position on, and contribution to, the problem 
 can conveniently be presented through his remarks on the 
 question of innateness of various aspects of psychic life, 
 these remarks occurring in his essay on Hume. After point- 
 ing out that neither Locke nor Hume seemed to know exact- 
 ly what Descartes, the originator of the modern conception 
 of innate ideas, meant by his phrase "idees naturelles," Hux- 
 ley quotes Descartes as follows: "I have used this term in 
 the same sense as when we say that generosity is innate in 
 certain families; or that certain maladies such as gout or 
 gravel, are innate in others ; not that children born in these 
 families are troubled with such diseases in their mother's 
 
An Organismal Theory of Consciousness 45 
 
 womb; but because they are born with the disposition or 
 faculty of contracting them." 10 Then after further quota- 
 tions to the same effect Huxley writes: "Whoever denies 
 what is, in fact, an inconceivable proposition, that sensations 
 pass, as such, from the external world into the mind, must 
 admit the conclusion here laid down by Descartes, that, 
 strictly speaking, sensations, and a fortiori, all the other 
 contents of the mind, are innate. Or, to state the matter in 
 accordance with views previously expounded, that they are 
 products of the inherent properties of the thinking organ, in 
 which they lie potentially, before they are called into exist- 
 ence by their appropriate causes." 
 
 The upshot of this clearly is that innate for Descartes and 
 Huxley means hardly anything else than hereditary, as ap- 
 plied to the psychical as well as to the physical attributes of 
 animals. The ample justification in our day of the view 
 that psychical attributes are hereditary should, it would 
 seem, restore to full standing in biology, the conception of 
 innate ideas only, of course, in a very different sense from 
 that into which later Idealists have perverted it. 
 
 It is in this discussion that Huxley makes one of the most 
 direct and unanswerable arguments against materialism that 
 can be made : "The more completely the materialistic posi- 
 tion is admitted, the easier it is to show that the idealistic 
 position is unassailable, if the idealist confines himself with- 
 in the limits of positive knowledge." 11 That is to say, if the 
 materialist insists that all traces of innateness of ideas and 
 other contents of the mind must be repudiated, he virtually 
 contends that heredity of whatever sort, whether of physical 
 or psychical attributes, must be repudiated. With this con- 
 ception of innateness in the entire psychic aspect of the 
 organism before him Huxley asks: "What is meant by ex- 
 perience?" 
 
 "It is the conversion," he replies, "by unknown causes, of 
 these innate potentialities into actual experiences." 12 Now 
 
46 An Orgamsmal Theory of Consciousness 
 
 these "unknown causes" are, according- to my view, essential- 
 ly the same as the "medium" which Hume recognized must 
 exist for making the "step" possible from the "superficial 
 qualities" to the "secret powers" of natural objects and from 
 the "secret powers" of one object to those of another. They 
 are, to repeat, the reaction of the organism in its latently 
 psychical aspect, with "the breath of life," that is, with the 
 oxygen, or whatever be the gaseous constituent of the air 
 which is active in respiration. And I believe we can see to 
 a considerable extent why Huxley considered these causes as 
 wholly unknown. It was because physiology and bio-chemis- 
 try in his day were not yet able to view the organism from 
 the standpoint of physical chemistry. Because of this ina- 
 bility Huxley nor any other physiologist of his period had 
 an adequate structural ground-work for thinking organis- 
 mally about living things. They were consequently obliged, 
 really, to think of all psychic phenomena, and consciousness 
 with the rest, as being restricted to the nervous system. 
 That such was. Huxley's view at any rate, we know from 
 his own words : "No one who is cognisant of the facts of the 
 case nowadays doubts," he writes, "that the roots of psychol- 
 ogy lie in the physiology of the nervous system." The im- 
 portant revision of this statement which our hypothesis calls 
 for is that while the roots of psychology are indeed in the 
 nervous system they are by no means in that system alone. 
 They pass through it to a much deeper level, so to speak, and 
 in passing draw great nutriment from it. 
 
 In a brief but important paper starting off with the prop- 
 osition that a philosopher can not legitimately question the 
 existence of the external world that all he can rightly do is 
 to inquire what that world is and how we can know it at all, 
 G. F. Stout comes to the kernel of the problem in considera- 
 bly the same way that Hume and Huxley came to it. "For 
 primitive consciousness and for our own unreflective con- 
 sciousness," he says, "sense experience and the correlative 
 
An Organismal Theory of Consciousness 47 
 
 agency which conditions it coalesce in one unanalysed total 
 object. They coalesce in such a way that the sense-presenta- 
 tion appears as possessing the independence of the not-self, 
 and the independent not-self seems to be given with the same 
 immediacy as the sense-presentation." And, "this complex 
 but unanalysed cognition," Stout continues, "is the germ 
 from which our detailed knowledge of matter develops." 13 
 If proved true my hypothesis would be a considerable for- 
 ward step, I believe, in analysing this "unanalysed cogni- 
 tion." For although Stout's assertion "the independent not- 
 self is not matter" seems at first sight to exclude oxygen or 
 any other constituent of our breath from such a place in 
 the external world of his conception as that which it has in 
 that world according to my conception this exclusion is, I 
 think, only seemingly so, for a sentence farther on the author 
 says matter "essentially includes the qualification of the in- 
 dependent not-self by the content of sense-experience." The 
 seeming discrepancy is probably due to the generality of the 
 term matter. I too would say that the "independent not- 
 self" is not matter were I to mean by matter the total sub- 
 stance of the external world. But in the sense that the effec- 
 tive respiratory gas (oxygen supposedly) is matter, my 
 hypothesis would require me to hold that the not-self has an 
 essential material component, which component is really the 
 attribute of the gas in virtue of which it reacts with the 
 organism in the peculiar way it does to produce conscious- 
 ness. It seems to me that what Stout seeks in/the "quali- 
 fication of the independent not-self by the content of sense- 
 experience" is the immediately consciousness-producing attri- 
 bute of the respiratory gas. We might state the point this 
 way: Oxygen (or the effective respiratory gas) has a double 
 status in human consciousness. First and most fundamental- 
 ly, it has the status of an immediate and essential participant 
 in producing all consciousness whatever; and second it has 
 the status of an indirect participant in producing the par- 
 
48 An Orgamsmal Theory of Consciousness 
 
 ticular consciousness which we call observational knowledge 
 of the gas. Our knowledge of this one gas is due to two 
 things, (1) to our reaction to it through our sense organs 
 in the usual psychological meaning of react; and () to our 
 reaction with it through the protoplasmic basis of all con- 
 sciousness, reaction in this case having the meaning which 
 chemistry has given the word. What the relation is be- 
 tween the attributes of the gas in virtue of which it reacts 
 with the organism in these two ways, and also what the rela- 
 tion is between the attributes of the organism in virtue of 
 which it reacts with the gas in these two ways, are questions 
 with which a theory of knowledge would deal but which lies 
 outside of the scope of this sketch, which, as has already 
 been said, restricts itself to a theory of consciousness. I 
 may, however, refer in passing to the fact that chemistry 
 appears to be all at sea on the problem of the relation be- 
 tween the chemical and the physical attributes of all sub- 
 stances whatever ; so the difficulties about oxygen in this one 
 particular are not an unshared difficulty. 
 
 Finally, to bring this exposition of the historical setting 
 of my hypothesis down to the present hour, I call attention 
 to the way the hypothesis connects with the best that formal 
 philosophy in our own day has done, or as I suspect is 
 competent to do, towards making out what "experience" is. 
 No philosopher with whom I have met has gone farther in 
 this direction than John Dewey. In his recent essay, A Re- 
 covery of Philosophy, we read: "Dialectic developments of 
 the notion of self-preservation, of the conatus essendi, often 
 ignore all the important facts of the actual process. They 
 argue as if self-control, self-development, went on directly as 
 a sort of unrolling push from within. But life endures only 
 in virtue of the support of the environment." The italics 
 are mine and mark the most vital part of the quotation for 
 us. And a page farther on: "Experience is no slipping 
 along in a path fixed by inner consciousness. Private con- 
 
An Organismal Theory of Consciousness 49 
 
 sciousness is an incidental outcome of experience of a vitally 
 objective sort; it is not its source. Undergoing, however, 
 is never mere passivity. The most patient patient is more 
 than a receptor. He is also an agent a reactor." . . . 
 Again the italics are mine. I take the liberty to end the quo- 
 tation at "reactor" though the remaining part of the sen- 
 tence is important for Dewey's particular purpose. But my 
 aim is different. I want to fix attention on the two state- 
 ments italicised for the purpose of showing how my hypo- 
 thesis connects with Dewey's general conception of experi- 
 ence. When Dewey says life endures only as supported by 
 the environment, he is speaking in very general terms, having 
 reference, I imagine, more to social and other bulk aspects 
 of environment. My hypothesis, on the contrary, makes the 
 dependence of life on environment exceedingly specific in that 
 it undertakes to show the particular thing in the environ- 
 ment, namely, the respiratory part of the atmosphere, which 
 is physiologically basal to self-development and self-pre- 
 servation. The Self which traditional philosophy has strug- 
 gled so hard to understand is literally, the human organism, 
 according to my hypothesis. And when in this discussion I 
 speak of it as reacting with the respiratory air to produce 
 consciousness, I am using the verb to react in a very specific, 
 physico-chemico-biological sense, while Dewey is using it in 
 a general sense, and explicitly at least, with only a psy- 
 chological implication. 
 
 The "self" which I am suggesting does indeed imply 
 "another" no less unequivocally than does the "self" of ad- 
 vanced social psychology. But the "self" and the "other" 
 implied by my hypothesis differ from those of current philo- 
 sophical theory in that the roots of both are not only in 
 the social relationships of the human species, but extend 
 right on through these into sub-human relationships, even 
 down into the very constitution of inorganic nature. The 
 "self" and the "other" of my conception are more personally 
 
50 An Organismal Theory of Consciousness 
 
 objective, and more cosmic in their affinities, than are the 
 "self" and the "other" of social psychology. 
 
 Continuing now with our examination of the foundation 
 of my hypothesis I find it convenient, especially because of 
 my reference a few pages back, to Huxley's unanswerable 
 contention for an essence of truth in both materialism and 
 idealism, to call attention to a natural history fact in the 
 higher mental life of man which I take to be a strong con- 
 firmation of the contention. This fact concerns the general 
 difference between what are commonly known as the mate- 
 rialistic and the idealistic attitudes of mind. This difference 
 comes, I believe, to the same thing finally, as the difference 
 between the objective and subjective attitudes, and is also 
 the difference, at bottom, between what in rather loose though 
 prevalent expression, is called the difference between the 
 scientific and the philosophic attitudes. It would seem that 
 the philosopher who declares himself to be an Absolute Ideal- 
 ist, as Royce does, is under heavy obligation, especially if 
 he enters the field of psychology, to explain the fact that the 
 originators of great interpretative ideas of nature have in- 
 variably recognized that their hypotheses must be "proved" ; 
 that is, that the subjective experience which constitutes the 
 hypothesis must be found to have its counterpart in the ex- 
 ternal world of sense. If "Reason creates the world," even 
 in the recondite meaning of Royce's philosophy, how hap- 
 pened it that Newton should have been so "restless" for evi- 
 dence of an objective, an external counterpart to the subjec- 
 tive result he had reached by mathematical reasoning, that 
 he held back his reasoned creation for sixteen years, waiting 
 for the proof, the sense-perceptual or at least the sense- 
 percept Wtf experience, that should round out his reasoned 
 truth? May not, I ask, the very kernel of the difference 
 between science at its best and philosophy at its best be in 
 this, that the typical scientist is somewhat deficient in "rest- 
 lessness," adopting Royce's terminology, for internal or sub- 
 
An Organismal Theory of Consciousness 51 
 
 jective reality; while the philosopher of the schools is some- 
 what deficient in restlessness for external or objective reality? 
 We could say with almost literal chemical accuracy that the 
 curiosity and eagerness of the naturalist for yet unobserved 
 objective truth is due to an unsatisfied affinity which is weak, 
 or in some instances, wholly lacking, in the subjective idealist. 
 The facts which seem to justify our chemico-organismal 
 hypothesis of conscious psychic life, seem also to imply a 
 complete interpenetration of objective science and idealistic 
 philosophy. 
 
 As to the Lowest Terms of Self -Consciousness 
 
 Let us now veer our course in examining self-conscious life, 
 and see what can be made out about its roots and rootlets 
 instead of about its fruitage. 
 
 We are often reminded that our knowledge about our in- 
 ternal organs, our heart, liver, lungs, et cetera, comes only 
 through observations by the anatomist and physiologist; 
 that we are quite unconscious of these organs in our own 
 bodies, especially if they are working normally. Now I 
 point out that to be perceptually conscious of a liver, let us 
 say, as a specialized morphological entity performing its 
 appropriate functions, is a very different matter from being 
 conscious of those primal, undifferentiated processes which 
 are basal to life itself, and so are common to all the tissues 
 whether liver, muscle, brain, or what not, so long as they are 
 actually living. That that which is truly organic, in the 
 sense of pertaining to the fully constituted organism, must 
 be regarded from this standpoint as well as from the stand- 
 point of their final state of differentiation, is one of the 
 common-places of modern biology. Let a person in as near- 
 ly perfect health as he ever experiences, do his best to elimi- 
 nate all external and internal stimuli of his specialized 
 sensory parts ; also all remembering, all feeling of the usual 
 
52 An Organismal Tlieory of Consciousness 
 
 kind, all imagining, and all thinking. Then let him answer 
 the question: How do I know I am alive? An undertaking 
 of this sort is wholly introspective in the sense of being 
 such that each person must engage in it for himself alone. 
 He can not show his results to anybody else. A good bit of 
 ingenuity may be exercised on it and the outcome will be 
 found to be rather surprising if not very conclusive as to the 
 purpose for which the experiment was tried. But the results 
 as reported may be of some value. Personally, I believe I 
 can follow my consciousness down to where I can recognize 
 its most basal remaining "content" to be an awareness of 
 what I may call extension without definite limitations. It 
 seems to me I can detect something to which I could not, 
 from its nature alone, apply the terms "I" or "me" as some- 
 thing differentiated from everything else. Possibly what I 
 note is wholly fanciful, but I seem to feel myself in about, 
 the condition of psychical life which I imagine a star fish is in. 
 
 Of course I realize how far such a statement is from being 
 purified of all thought and other ordinary mental elements. 
 Nevertheless, I believe it to be of some value as evidence 
 that consciousness is an attribute of the organism as a 
 whole, and can neither be held to contain an element which 
 can exist separately from the organism, nor be restricted 
 to any particular part of the organism as the brain or the 
 nervous system. There seems to be some evidence "directly 
 felt by us ourselves," and that evidence points to thj.s con- 
 clusion as to the nature and "seat" of consciousness. The 
 point is susceptible, I am quite sure, of rather rigid experi- 
 mental examination. However, the further experiments 
 which have suggested themselves to me involve difficulties 
 more formidable than I have thus far been in position to 
 attempt. 
 
 The reader acquainted with James's notable Chapter X, 
 "The Consciousness of Self" (The Principles of Psychology, 
 Vol. 1) will recognize the difference between such introspec- 
 
An Organismal Theory of Consciousness 53 
 
 tive experimentation as that here indicated, and that so il- 
 luminatingly described by James as tried on himself. While 
 James's undertaking was to give an account of the thought 
 and other processes in consciousness as he could observe them 
 in himself, what I want to accomplish requires me to get rid 
 of, to ignore as far as possible, the very things which James 
 was studying. I want to find whether any "content of con- 
 sciousness" remains after thought and the other usual men- 
 tal contents are out of the reckoning. I believe, however, 
 that James opens the way to such an hypothesis as mine. 
 Thus in a footnote we read, "The sense of my bodily exist- 
 ence, however obscurely recognized as such, may then be the 
 absolute original of my conscious selfhood, the fundamental 
 perception that / am. All appropriations may be made to 
 it by a Thought not at the moment immediately cognized by 
 itself. Whether these are not only logical possibilities but 
 actual facts is something not yet dogmatically decided in 
 the text." 15 
 
 Except for a little misgiving arising from uncertainty as 
 to the exact meaning of "Thought" in this quotation, I be- 
 lieve my hypothesis does what James says his text leaves un- 
 decided. 
 
 This foot-note of James's may serve as a switch key to 
 shift the current of our discussion from the psycho-con- 
 scious phase of life through the psycho-physical to the purely 
 physico-chemical phase. The course along which this shifting 
 will run can be designated thus: full-fledged intellect (al- 
 ready examined), instinct, emotion, bio-physico-chemical or- 
 ganization. 
 
 Instinct and Physical Organization 
 
 The discussion from which we have just turned of the 
 relation between "inner" and "outer," between "subjective" 
 and "objective," must be regarded as meeting the require- 
 
54 An Organismal Theory of Consciousness 
 
 ments of this sketch so far as the first member of the series 
 is concerned; and the relation between instinct and physical 
 organization will now receive attention. The evidence of 
 vital connection here is so abundant and clear-cut, and the 
 views of competent observers are so unanimous that the sub- 
 ject can be disposed of quite summarily. Probably the most 
 indubitable single block of evidence comes from nest-building 
 and cocoon-spinning insects. Many of the facts from this 
 field have been so much exploited for the very purposes to 
 which we now invoke them that a few quotations from and 
 remarks upon the writings of naturalists generally acknowl- 
 edged for learning and judicious thinking will suffice. 
 
 We turn first to W. M. Wheeler, and take to begin with, 
 words which he in turn quotes from Bergson: "As Bergson 
 says," we read, " 'It has often been remarked that most in- 
 stincts are the prolongation, or better, the achievement, of 
 the work of organization itself. Where does the activity of 
 instinct begin? Where does that of nature end? It is im- 
 possible to say. In the metamorphoses of the larva into the 
 nymph and into the perfect insect, metamorphoses which 
 often require appropriate adaptations and a kind of initia- 
 tive on the part of the larva, there is no sharp line of de- 
 marcation between the instinct of the animal and the organiz- 
 ing work of the living matter. It is immaterial whether we 
 say that instinct organizes the instruments which it is going 
 to use, or that the organization prolongs itself into the in- 
 stinct by which it is to be used.' " And Wheeler continues : 
 "The spinning of the cocoon by the larval ant is a good 
 example of the kind of instinct to which Bergson refers. 
 From one point of view this is merely an act of development, 
 and the cocoon, or result of the secretive activity of the seric- 
 teries and of the spinning movements of the larva, is a pro- 
 tective envelope. But an envelope with the same protective 
 function may be produced by other insect larvae simply as a 
 thick, chitinous secretion from the whole outer surface of the 
 
An Orgamsmal Theory of Consciousness 55 
 
 hypodermis. Here, too, we have an activity which, though 
 manifested in a very different way, is even more clearly one 
 of growth and development. And when the workers of 
 (Ecophylla or Polyrhachi* use their larvae for weaving the 
 silken envelope of the nest, as described in Chapter XIII, 
 we have a further extension and modification of the cocoon- 
 spinning activities. In this case the spinning powers of the 
 larva are utilized for the purpose of producing an envelope, 
 not for its individual self, but for the whole colony. In 
 conventional works this latter activity would be assigned a 
 prominent place as a typical instinct, the spinning of the 
 cocoon might also be included under this head, but the form- 
 ation of the puparium, or pupal skin, would be excluded 
 as a purely physiological or developmental process, yet thia 
 last, no less than the two other cases, has all the fundamental 
 characteristics of an instinct." 16 
 
 Then immediately follows this statement, especially signi- 
 ficant for the proposition of our hypothesis which assigns to 
 the individual organism the chemical value of an elementary 
 substance: "Viewed in this light there is nothing surprising 
 about the complexity and relative fixity of an instinct, for it 
 is inseparably correlated with the structural organization, 
 and in this we have long been familiar, both with the de- 
 pendence of the complexity and fixity of parts on heredity 
 and the modifiability of these parts during the life-cycle 
 of the individual. Fixed or instinctive behavior has its 
 counterpart in inherited morphological structure as does 
 modifiable, or plastic, behavior in well-known ontogenetic 
 and functional changes." 
 
 The statement that surprise is largely taken away from 
 such elaborate manifestations of instinct as those here de- 
 picted, by recognizing that the instincts are "inseparably 
 correlated with structural organization" and have their 
 "counterpart in inherited morphological structure," will, no 
 doubt, receive the assent of most zoologists, as will also the 
 
56 An Orgamsmal Theory of Consciousness 
 
 statement that our long familiarity with structural organi- 
 zation and morphological inheritance is what makes us re- 
 gard these without surprise, and, by inference, as compre- 
 hensible. It is not that the corporeal form and structure of 
 the worker ants and of the larvae which they manipulate as 
 spinning instruments and shuttles for making the nest, are 
 necessarily simpler and, on that account, more comprehen- 
 sible than are the instinctive acts of the workers, but that 
 during our whole lives we have been familiar with structure, 
 and ourselves exist as "structural organizations." This is 
 equivalent to saying that we have always been not only learn- 
 ing but directly experiencing interdependences and correla- 
 tions among the common body-parts and body-acts, and so 
 regard them as comprehensible, as explicable. To compre- 
 hend really an external complex of structures and activities 
 is to live the counterpart of it. To understand such a com- 
 plex scientifically is to understand it through a course of 
 observation and reasoning; that is, rationally. To explain 
 such a complex is to bring in, or recognize consciously one by 
 one the constituent elements of the complex, and recognize 
 all these as parts of the ensemble. It is to recognize the 
 elements in both their isolate and integrate capacities. 
 
 So much for the evidence of integration between instinct 
 and physical organization as presented by one carefully phil- 
 osophical naturalist. Several other naturalists have gone 
 nearly as far, but this single instance is so typical and conclu- 
 sive as to the objective facts that it will suffice. In com- 
 menting on the significance of being surprised at such rarely 
 witnessed performances as those furnished by these ants, 
 while we are not surprised at common structures and acts 
 of equal or greater complexity furnished by more familiar 
 animals and by ourselves, I go beyond, though only a little 
 beyond Wheeler. 
 
 The only other zoologist to whom I turn for evidence of 
 vital relation between instinct and structure is C. O. Whit- 
 
An Orgamsmal Theory of Consciousness 57 
 
 man. His testimony supplements Wheeler's in that it is 
 more exclusively and radically objective than is Wheeler's; 
 that is, it verges less toward the subjective- type of presenta- 
 tion and draws nearer to the bio-chemical ground work. Al- 
 though Whitman wrote relatively little on animal behavior, 
 that little seems to me to contain some of the most important 
 observations and conclusions which have been produced in 
 this branch of zoology. What I utilize is taken from his 
 address Animal Behavior. The animals upon which Whit- 
 man's chief studies were made were leeches of the genus Clep- 
 sine; a salamander (Necturus) ; and pigeons of several spe- 
 cies. Our purpose will be best served by quoting a few sen- 
 tences which go direct to the heart of the question in hand, 
 that namely of the vital connection of instinct and basal 
 physical structure. "The view here taken," Whitman writes, 
 "places the primary roots of instinct in the constitutional ac- 
 tivities of protoplasm and regards instinct in every stage of 
 its evolution as action depending essentially upon organiza- 
 tion." 17 Then, apparently to clarify and emphasize the last 
 clause about the dependence of instinct or organization, he 
 adds a footnote thus : "Professor Loeb refers instinct back 
 to '(1) polar differences in the chemical constitution in the 
 egg substance, and () the presence of such substances in the 
 egg as determine heliotropic, chemotropic, stereotropic, and 
 similar phenomena of irritability.' According to this view, 
 the power to respond to stimuli lies in unorganized chemical 
 substances, and the same powers exist in the adult as in the 
 egg, because the same chemical substances are present. Or- 
 ganization serves at all stages merely as a mechanical means 
 of giving definite directions to responses. 
 
 "The view I have taken regards instinctive action as 
 organic action, whatever be the stage of manifestation. The 
 egg differs from the adult in having an organization of a 
 very simple primary order, and correspondingly simple pow- 
 ers of response. Instinct and organization are, to me, two 
 
58 An Organismal Theory of Consciousness 
 
 aspects of one and the same thing, hence both have onto- 
 genetic and phjlogenetic development." 
 
 These statements show, as do those given in our discussion 
 of the cell-theory, how far Whitman went away from full- 
 fledged elementalism and toward organismalism. But his 
 treatment of instinct and animal behavior reveals what his 
 treatment of the cell-theory does not, at least so clearly; 
 namely, how far he also went on the way to the natural his- 
 tory mode as contrasted with the mechanistic mode of phil- 
 osophizing on biological phenomena. And this gives me a 
 pleasant opportunity to testify to the genuinely naturalist 
 current that ran through his life and work. An unforgettable 
 visit which I had with him among his pigeons not long before 
 he died, permitted me to see something of the character and 
 depth of his interest in those animals. His whole attitude 
 toward them his wonderfully broad information about, and 
 understanding of their general ways of life and personal 
 idiosyncrasies, his solicitude for them, and his measured af- 
 fection for them was such as is never displayed by any 
 one who has not very much of the real naturalist about him, 
 in his personality as well as in his knowledge. The individual 
 pigeons, many of them at any rate, appeared to be realities 
 to him in a deep sense and not merely "mechanical means for 
 giving definite directions to responses" of chemical sub- 
 stances. But after all this is said, it must also be said that 
 there is no evidence that Whitman ever grasped fully the con- 
 ception that the "constitutional activities of protoplasm" in 
 which he believed instincts to be rooted, must be the consti- 
 tutional activities of protoplasms (protoplasm in the plural 
 number), because no individual pigeon is either any other in- 
 dividual nor even exactly like any other; and also that the 
 existence of protoplasms is dependent upon the organisms 
 to which they belong as well as upon the chemical substances 
 of which they are composed. Whitman went so far on the 
 road toward organismalism as to believe genuinely in the 
 
An Organismal Theory of Consciousness 59 
 
 organic and organisation, but not far enough to make him 
 accept unreservedly individual organisms. 
 
 We are able to state definitely wherein lies the great and 
 rather unique merit of Whitman's investigations on animal 
 behavior. (1) By a judicious combination of pure observa- 
 tion and observation aided by experiment and conception, he 
 pushed psychic phenomena in the form of instinct down al- 
 most to the physico-chemical level; that is, to the proto- 
 plasmic level. () He at the same time remained positively 
 within the organic, the living realm. His merit is that of 
 restraint as well as of positive achievement. He did not per- 
 mit his enthusiasm for physical explanation to betray 
 him into adopting a phraseology which, while sounding like 
 an explanation of instinct, amounts in reality to a denial or 
 a repudiation of it. 
 
 So much for the evidence of vital connection between in- 
 stinct and organization. According to the schedule indi- 
 cated a few pages back for reviewing systematically this con- 
 nection through the entire range of psychic life, we have 
 next to glance at the connection between the emotions and 
 organization. 
 
 Emotion and Physical Organization 
 
 Approaching this subject as we now are from the direction 
 of psychology proper, the well-known James-Lange interpre- 
 tation of emotion comes immediately to mind. It will be 
 advantageous for our sketch not to focus attention too close- 
 ly on any theory or discussion but to take in as much as we 
 can of the entire field, keeping in the foreground our own 
 personal experiences and observations as contrasted with the 
 descriptions and views of authorities. What I mean is that 
 the reader shall take himself in hand for serious study as to 
 his emotional life, watching himself from hour to hour, day 
 to day, and year to year under all the varied conditions, 
 
60 An Organismal Theory of Consciousness 
 
 happenings, purposes, and impulses to which he is subject. 
 In doing this a special point should be made of looking back 
 scrutinizingly at experiences of particular satisfaction, ela- 
 tion, joy, sorrow, irritation, anger, fear, dread, humiliation, 
 and shame, as soon after their occurrence as possible that 
 they may be fresh in memory. But incidents and episodes 
 of one's remoter past which stand out with special vividness 
 from the intensity of the particular emotions when they were 
 experienced, or because of results which flowed from them, 
 will be found illuminating. 
 
 To what extent and in what particular fashion was our 
 bodily organization implicated in the feelings and emotions 
 we experienced, is our problem. Fortunately one can "live 
 over again" as we say ; can "work himself into" rather pro- 
 nounced emotional states, through a combination of memory 
 and imagination. That is, he can be much of a genuine dram- 
 atist when all alone, as touching events and scenes of his 
 own past experience. What happens to your body when you 
 do that sort of thing? is the central question before us. The 
 very criterion by which you answer this question you will 
 find will be that of how far the body-manifestations appro- 
 priate to the particular emotions are elicited through your 
 efforts. If your hands do not clinch somewhat, if many of' 
 your arm, leg, and abdominal muscles do not contract some- 
 what, if your respiration does not quicken somewhat, and 
 other manifestations, various corporeal indices of anger, do 
 not appear quite independently of direct intention on your 
 part, you will be sure you have not "worked up" a genuine 
 state of anger. The only real knowledge of an emotion is a 
 lived knowledge of that emotion. In order to be a true actor 
 your body parts must act, directly, automatically, spon- 
 taneously, so far as any rational purpose is concerned. And 
 what is true of anger is clearly true of all other emotions. 
 
 Our emotional activities may be described as instinctive 
 and reflex activities, the feeling-impulse of which comes 
 
 
 
An Organismal Theory of Consciousness 61 
 
 through intelligence, but is not of intelligence is not under 
 the direct guidance and control of intelligence. According 
 to this interpretation no animal, no matter how highly con- 
 stituted as to instincts and reflexes, could have emotion un- 
 less it had intelligence. Emotional activity is instinctive and 
 reflex activity of an intelligent organism, with, however, the 
 element of intellect eliminated or in abeyance for the time 
 being as regards these particular acts. This is what I would 
 call the natural history description of emotion. And I be- 
 lieve it is in essential accord with James's conception of emo- 
 tion, but his description is a psycho-physiological rather 
 than a natural history description. I am quite sure that 
 what I have just said means virtually the same as the follow- 
 ing: "// we fancy some strong emotion, and then try to ab- 
 stract from our consciousness of it all the feelings of its 
 bodily symptoms, we find we have nothing left behind, no 
 'mind-stuff' out of which the emotion can be constituted, 
 and that a cold and neutral state of intellectual perception 
 is all that remains." 18 
 
 I will now point out wherein I believe the natural history 
 description and interpretation of emotion are somewhat truer 
 and better than those given by James and other physiologi- 
 cal psychologists and, I may add very much truer and 
 better than those given by certain writers who approach the 
 subject from the physiological side pure and simple. James's 
 epigrammatic statements about being afraid because we 
 tremble when we meet a bear in the woods ; about being sorry 
 because we cry ; about being angry because we strike, do his 
 own position some injustice, I think. This is an instance in 
 which his gift for piquant writing succeeded too well. But 
 the fact ought to be noticed that what he actually says is 
 that as between the usual statement, namely, that we tremble 
 because we are afraid, cry because we are sorry, strike be- 
 cause we are angry, and his way of stating the case, his way is 
 "more rational." It is only relative, not absolute truth, he 
 
62 An Organismal Theory of Consciousness 
 
 is aiming at in these statements. Nevertheless, after due al- 
 lowance is made for an expressional miscue to some extent, 
 there is yet substantial defect in his presentation. Speaking 
 in general terms, the defectiveness is not so much in the 
 antithesis set up as in the restrictedness implied. Or, bring- 
 ing the criticism around toward our particular standpoint, 
 the statement falls short of being organismal. 
 
 W. B. Cannon has, I believe, indicated the direction in 
 which the adequate statement lies. He writes : "We do not 
 'feel sorry because we cry,' as James contended, but we cry 
 because when we are sorry or overjoyed or violently angry or 
 full of tender affection when any one of these diverse emo- 
 tional states is present there are nervous discharges by sym- 
 pathetic channels to various viscera, including the lachrymal 
 glands. In terror and rage and intense elation, for example, 
 the responses in the viscera seem too uniform to offer a satis- 
 factory means of distinguishing states which, in man at least, 
 are very different in subjective quality. For this reason I 
 am inclined to urge that the visceral changes merely contri- 
 bute to an emotional complex more or less indefinite, but 
 still pertinent, feelings of disturbance in organs of which 
 we are not usually conscious." What Cannon's criticism 
 amounts to, expressed in other language is : while freely 
 granting that organs and functions in the usual physiologi- 
 cal sense play an essential part in emotion, neither the vis- 
 ceral nor any other single set of organs is sufficient to account 
 for the whole of any emotion. Visceral changes contribute 
 to the "emotional complex," but the real source of the feel- 
 ings involved is embedded elsewhere and more broadly in the 
 organization. Cannon suggests : "the natural response is a 
 pattern reaction, like inborn reflexs of low order." "The 
 typical facial and bodily expressions," he writes, "automati- 
 cally assumed in different emotions, indicate discharge of pe- 
 culiar groupings of neurones in the several affective states." 
 
 Without stopping to examine this language in detail, our 
 
An Organismal Theory of Consciousness 63 
 
 aim will be achieved by pointing out that the more closely the 
 various emotions are scrutinized, and the more effort there 
 is made to refer them to their causes, the more varied are they 
 found to be, and the more widely are we led to search in the 
 organization for causal factors. The mental attitude of per- 
 fect openness toward any and all facts, both of effect and 
 cause, which may occur in a given organic situation, is one 
 of the leading characterizations of the organismal conception. 
 The assertion that the organism as a whole is the causal ex- 
 planation of an emotion or an "emotion complex" is justified 
 by two considerations: (1) Except for the organism viewed 
 alive and whole and under both its ontogenic and phylogenic 
 aspects, the emotion would not exist; and () so wide-spread 
 and subtle does common observation recognize the parts of 
 the organism involved to be in many of its emotional activi- 
 ties that for practical purposes, it is better to work on the 
 hypothesis that all parts of the organism are implicated than 
 to adopt the alternative hypothesis that certain parts only 
 are involved; that is, that some parts are not involved. 
 
 As a matter of fact, I believe that in spirit James' hypo- 
 thesis is organismal even though, probably from his training 
 and career in formal anatomy, physiology, and psychology, 
 he never became entirely free from the Body-Soul antithesis 
 and the dogmatisms of "nerve physiology," which have so 
 dominated modern physiology and psychology. This opinion 
 I base on the general tenor of his discussions particularly 
 of the emotions, rather than on his direct formulation of his 
 theory of emotion. I will quote a few passages that seem 
 particularly to trend in this direction. "No reader of the 
 last two chapters [The Production of Movement, and In- 
 stinct] will be inclined to doubt the fact that objects do 
 excite bodily changes by a preorganized mechanism, or the 
 farther fact that the changes are so indefinitely numerous 
 and subtle that the entire organism may be called a sound- 
 mg-board, which every change of consciousness, however 
 
64 An Organismal Theory of Consciousness 
 
 slight, may make reverberate. The various premutations and 
 combinations of which these organic activities are susceptible 
 make it abstractly possible that no shade of emotion, how- 
 ever slight, should be without a bodily reverberation as 
 unique, when taken in its totality, as is the mental mood it- 
 self. The immense number of parts modified in each emotion 
 is what makes it so difficult for us to reproduce in cold blood 
 the total and integral expression of any one of them. We 
 may catch the trick with the voluntary muscles, but fail with 
 the skin, glands, heart, and other viscera." 20 I ask the read- 
 er to make special note of the part of the quotation be- 
 ginning, "The various permutations" as we shall have more 
 to say about it a few pages farther on. 
 
 Again we read: "Our whole cubic capacity is sensibly 
 alive ; and each morsel of it contributes its pulsations of feel- 
 ing, dim or sharp, pleasant, painful, or dubious, to that sense 
 of personality that every one of us unfamiliarly carries with 
 him. It is surprising what little items give accent to these 
 complexes of sensibility." 21 I hope the reader will notice 
 how easy it would be for me to contend that these state- 
 ments come near to my statement about "inner" and "outer," 
 or subjective and objective; and also to my formal hypo- 
 thesis as to the nature of consciousness. However, I do not 
 wish to make too much of such a contention, though I shall 
 bring up the point again presently. All I want to do just 
 here is to make still clearer the meaning of my view that 
 James was organismal in spirit, though not wholly so in for- 
 mal statement. To me one of the strongest evidences of 
 this was his obvious effort, as indicated by these and many 
 other passages in many other writings than his Psychology, 
 to describe fully the phenomena with which he chanced to 
 deal. As I have remarked in substance so many times in this 
 book, one of the most unmistakable signs of the elementalist 
 attitude in biology is incomplete and more or less perverted 
 
An Organismal Theory of Consciousness 65 
 
 description. And nowhere, perhaps, in the whole biological 
 realm is there a better chance for description of the genuine- 
 ly natural history, organismal kind the kind a cardinal 
 motto of which is "neglect nothing," than in this very field 
 of human emotions, especially of one's own emotions. Nor 
 can I refrain from reminding the reader that one of the 
 master works in this field is Darwin's The Expression of the 
 Emotions in Man and Animals, and that while a leading 
 motive of its author was to interpret the emotions in ac- 
 cordance with the theory of descent and the natural selec- 
 tion hypothesis, probably the most lasting value of the work 
 is from its fullness and excellence as a natural history de- 
 scription of the emotions and their objective expression. 
 
 As to the fact of vital interdependence between psychic 
 life and physical life through the emotions, personal experi- 
 ence and observation, backed up and supplemented by many 
 authoritative writings, among which those of Darwin and 
 James stand out strongly, there seems no longer any room 
 for question. The role of the emotions as between "Body" 
 and "Soul" may be crudely likened to the splice which a skill- 
 ful sailor weaves into two pieces of rope in joining them so 
 that there shall be no knot and as great strength as in any 
 other part of the rope. In the recent period of psychology 
 of so-called physiological psychology we have frequently 
 heard about psychology "without a Soul;" and such an idea 
 has seemed repugnant to many persons. But if we could 
 show that this modern psychology is "without a Body" by 
 the same token that it is "without a Soul," the legitimate mis- 
 givings about the soullessness of the psychology ought to be 
 allayed. And really the organismal conception of psychic 
 life is seen, especially when we examine it in the phase of the 
 emotions, to amount to such a composition of the Body-Soul 
 antithesis. "Body" we can see, as it figured in the old psy- 
 chology, virtually signified what we usually mean by corpse, 
 
66 An Organismal Theory of Consciousness 
 
 or cadaver. "The Body," in that sense was not alive at all. 
 It was not alive because all the life was taken out of it (by 
 the theoretical antithesis) and put into "The Soul." 
 
 Glance at the Equilibrative Interaction Between "Body" and 
 
 "Soul" 
 
 Going forward from such predominantly observational 
 descriptions of psychic life in its emotional phase as those of 
 Darwin and James, to such experimental descriptions as 
 those being produced by the investigations of Pawlow, of 
 Crile, and especially of Cannon, we are getting considerable 
 insight into the rationale of how "Body" and "Soul" vitalize 
 each other. Modern researches on the physiology or the 
 psychology (which one calls it depends entirely on the direc- 
 tion of his approach) of psychic life is revealing something 
 of the why and how of the poet's instinctive perception, "Soul 
 needs Body as much as Body needs Soul." Only one aspect 
 of this "why and how" need be noticed in the present discus- 
 sion. That is the fact of the balancing off of antagonistic 
 emotions to make the normal emotional life just as reflex- 
 actions and instinctive actions are largely phenomena of 
 equilibration, or balancing-off. 
 
 It should be recalled that we have found this antagonistic- 
 equilibrative principle to run through the entire neuro-psy- 
 chic life. In the strictly reflex phase the mode of operation 
 of the opposing muscles, the flexors and extensors of the 
 limbs, as brought out by Sherrington, was cited as a good 
 illustration of the principle. A manifestation of the prin- 
 ciple in a broader way, as measured by the extent of organic 
 parts involved, was seen in the relation of the vagal (cranial) 
 and splanchnic (thoracico-lumbar) autonomies, as empha- 
 sized by W. B. Cannon (Chap. 19, this book) this illustra- 
 tion being chiefly in the reflex phase. In a yet higher 
 phase we saw, again from Cannon's work, the principle 
 
An Organismal Theory of Consciousness 67 
 
 in operation through the emotions (Chap. 28) thus bring- 
 ing it up to the phase of lower conscious life. 
 
 The reader should not forget the insistence throughout 
 our presentation of these antagonistic phenomena, that al- 
 ways the oppositions and antagonisms and competitions are 
 fundamentally constitutive as to the normal organism. Even 
 the most pronounced of them are yet in the interest of the 
 organism as a whole. They are always partial phenomena 
 relative to the whole organism. They have evolved in strict 
 accordance with and sub-ordination to the fundamental na- 
 ture of the organism in its totality. The opposing muscles 
 of our limbs can not break or tear one another under normal 
 conditions. Even antagonisms among the parts of the or- 
 ganism are possible because the parts belong to the organism. 
 The antagonisms of the parts do not produce the organism, 
 primarily, but are themselves produced by the organism, or 
 at least, are a portion of the means or methods by which the 
 organism lives and enlarges, develops and functions. All this, 
 be it noticed, holds not merely as touching purely physical 
 organization * but as to the entire gamut of psychic life, 
 at least up to and including instinctive and emotional life. 
 
 Support of the Hypothesis by the Physico-Chemical Con- 
 ception of the Organism 
 
 This prepares us for the final step of switching the discus- 
 sion from the psycho-conscious aspect of life to the bio- 
 physico-chemical aspect. The place in our discussion to 
 which this return naturally takes us is that wherein we con- 
 sidered the organism's chemical nature as interpreted by phy- 
 sical chemistry. That interpretation has been presented by 
 several physiologists but with special insight and cogency by 
 F. G. Hopkins. For example, our 1 citation in Chapter 4 
 
 * The discussions of growth and chemico- functional integration, chap- 
 ters 17, 18, and 19, The Unity of the Organism should be read in this 
 connection. 
 
68 An Organism^al Theory of Consciousness 
 
 of The Unity of the Organism, the statement that the con- 
 ception of the organism as a chemical laboratory "is rapid- 
 ly gaining ground," should be recalled, as should also the 
 opinion of Hopkins: "the chemical response of the tissues 
 to the chemical stimulus of foreign substances of simple 
 constitution is of profound biological significance," and 
 that further study of the phenomena "must throw vivid 
 light on the potentialities of the tissue laboratories." 22 
 So far this chemical laboratory conception of the tis- 
 sues may be said to be strictly chemical; but let us recall 
 what the interpretation is when it passes from chemistry in 
 the exclusive sense to physical chemistry and becomes more 
 specific as to the laboratory apparatus, as one may say, 
 through which the "tissues" work. In other words, recall 
 the conception of the cell and its mode of operating, as 
 viewed by physical chemistry. The quotations given in 
 Chapter 4* may well be repeated in part: ". . . the living 
 cell as we now know it is not a mass of matter composed of a 
 congregation of like molecules, but a highly differentiated 
 system ; the cell in the modern phraseology of physical chem- 
 istry, is a system of coexisting phases of different consti- 
 tutions." 23 Then from this review our own contention, set 
 forth especially in Chapter 7, that wherever in such state^ 
 ments as those just quoted from Hopkins "the term cell oc- 
 curs the term organism really ought to be used." 
 
 It is important for our cause generally that the full 
 weight of our argument in support of the view that on the 
 strictly physical plane, the organism rather than the cett 
 is really the equilibration system toward which physico- 
 chemical knowledge is tending, should be in the reader's con- 
 sciousness. At this point if, consequently, this is not so, 
 he is urged to read what is said on the point in Chapters 
 4 and 7 especially. 
 
 Our central purpose now is to show that the organismal 
 hypothesis of consciousness articulates directly and natur- 
 
An Organismal Theory of Consciousness 60 
 
 ally with the same conception of the organism. Undoubtedly 
 it is in the emotional phase of psychic life that this articu- 
 lation is most open to common observation. Compare, for 
 example, James' "Our whole cubic capacity is sensibly alive; 
 and each morsel of it contributes its pulsations of feeling, 
 dim or sharp, pleasant, painful, or dubious, to that sense of 
 personality that every one of us unfamiliarly carries with 
 him," with Hopkins' "On ultimate analysis we can scarcely 
 speak at all of living matter in the cell; at any rate, we 
 cannot, without gross misuse of terms, speak of the cell- 
 life as being associated with any one particular type of mole- 
 cule. Its life is the expression of a particular dynamic equil- 
 ibrium which obtains in a polyphasic system . . . 'life' as we 
 instinctively define it, is a property of the cell as a whole, 
 because it depends upon the organization of processes, upon 
 the equilibrium displayed by the totality of the coexisting 
 phases." 24 Also compare Hopkins' statement that among 
 the different "phases" of the cell in which its life inheres, 
 "are to be reckoned not only the differentiated parts of the 
 bio-plasm strictly defined (if we can define it strictly), the 
 macro-and-micro-nuclei, nerve fibers, muscle fibers, etc., but 
 the materials which support the cell structure, and which 
 have been termed metaplastic constituents of the cell," with 
 James' "each morsel" of our cubic capacity "contributes its 
 pulsations of feeling, etc." 
 
 The congruity of these statements is apparent even when 
 taken as here exhibited; that is, each as standing by itself 
 at about the two extremes of the scale of life. When, how- 
 ever, they are viewed in connection with my general argument 
 that "cell" in Hopkins' statement ought to be replaced by 
 "organism"; and in connection with what we have learned 
 from Cannon and others about the mechanism by means of 
 which the organism operates in the phase of conscious emo- 
 tion, it seems as though our organismal hypothesis of con- 
 sciousness comes near to a demonstration. And so far as 
 
70 An Orgamsmal Theory of Consciousness 
 
 ordinary descriptive natural history is concerned, I believe 
 this to be true. However, I recognize, keenly enough, that 
 from the standpoint of bio-chemistry, and physiology, and 
 also from that of philosophy in the traditional sense, that 
 demonstration is not only far away, but is attainable, if at 
 all, only by surmounting very formidable difficulties. So I 
 reassure the dubious reader that all I am claiming is that 
 my two propositions about the nature of consciousness to- 
 gether constitute a legitimate scientific hypothesis. 
 
 Personality and Elementary Chemical Substances 
 
 With both the physico-chemical aspect and the psychical 
 aspect of our hypothesis now before us more fully and 
 sharply than they have been hitherto we will examine an ob- 
 jection to it which I apprehend will be the most serious the 
 hypothesis will meet; namely that to the proposition that 
 each individual organism has the value in a chemical sense 
 of an elementary substance. And since this objection will 
 probably be more intolerant and stubborn from the side of 
 physics and chemistry than from that of natural history and 
 psychology I will adjust my remarks with reference to the 
 opposition as thus anticipated. 
 
 The considerations I am going to present might have been, 
 in strict expository coherence, presented as a part of my 
 discussion of the uniqueness of the individual consciousness 
 as marked by its necessary privacy and its difference from 
 all other individual consciousness. What we are now to 
 emphasize is the fundamentally of objective as contrasted 
 with subjective personality of such highly developed animals 
 as song birds, domesticable animals, and civilized man. 
 
 A complete definition of "personality" is not obligatory 
 for our purpose. Only this much need be said about the 
 meaning we shall give the word: First, we deny the right 
 claimed by some authors to make personality purely psy- 
 
An Organismal Theory of Consciousness 71 
 
 chical, or spiritual a thing of the "inner," or "deeper" 
 self; "Self" that is, in a thorough-going subjectivistic sense. 
 It is on this ground, as I understand, that some psycholo- 
 gists, as G. F. Stout, and, apparently C. Lloyd Morgan 25 
 deny personality to animals. All I will say on this question 
 here is that I am quite sure that every close observer of the 
 higher animals will recognize that if he undertakes to give a 
 truly full report of his observations on their behavior he will 
 have to speak of the personality of some at least of them 
 just as he would of the personality of observed human beings, 
 or he will be obliged to call the same thing by some other 
 name a kind of procedure against which we have spoken 
 strongly throughout this volume. For us, whatever person- 
 ality may be, we must conceive it to be founded upon, and 
 conformable to, the organism. "Organism" must be the more 
 inclusive term. "Person" must stand to "Organism" in the 
 logical relation of species to genus. 
 
 Another meaning of personality in this particular dis- 
 cussion will concern the uniqueness of each organism as to its 
 psychical attributes regarded in their totality. By unique- 
 ness I mean not merely the fact that each organism is itself, 
 perceptually regarded, but that it is not a replica, a dupli- 
 cate of any other. It is not only another organism but it is 
 in some measure a different other organism. For the benefit 
 of those physical- and metaphysical-minded readers who have 
 never informed themselves much about the facts of natural 
 history and have never tried seriously to think in the nat- 
 ural history manner I would remark that what I have just 
 said concerning the uniqueness of the individual organism 
 is only re-asserting in a more refined way what botany and 
 zoology have recognized more or less definitely since Dar- 
 win's time at least, and have partially expressed in the terms 
 "individual difference" and "individual variation." 
 
 With this we come to the cardinal point: // individual 
 animal organisms, especially individual humans under civi- 
 
72 An Organismal Theory of Consciousness 
 
 lization, be contemplated with due heed to the motto "neglect 
 nothing 99 the conviction will be reached that each and every 
 one has literally as much of uniqueness about it as has an 
 elementary chemical substance. 
 
 In order to bring out the truth of this statement we must 
 exhibit, in the regular natural history manner, the resem- 
 blances and differences between chemical elements on the one 
 hand and the resemblances and differences between human 
 beings on the other, and then pool the results of these com- 
 parisons. 
 
 To the carrying out of this enterprise the so-called peri- 
 odic law in chemistry is of very great importance. The 
 essence of this law, stated from the natural history stand- 
 point, is that the chemical elements range themselves into 
 natural species and genera after much the fashion that plants 
 and animals do ; and that the classification is based mostly on 
 the chemical attributes of the substances, but partly on their 
 physical attributes also. Thus the group of alkali metals, 
 that to which lithium, sodium, and potassium belong, is a 
 genus is the sense of descriptive natural history, its species 
 being the substances mentioned with others not enumerated. 
 Also the group often spoken of in chemical laboratories as 
 "the iron group" the genus containing the species iron, co- 
 balt, nickel, platinum, etc., illustrates the point. Two species 
 of the last genus, iron and nickel, will be used in our study. 
 Let us compare some household utensil made of iron with a 
 similar one made of nickel. For the ordinary uses to which 
 these implements would be put the difference between the sub- 
 stances of which they are made would hardly be noticed. 
 The higher specific gravity of nickel (8.5 plus) is so slight 
 as compared with that of iron (7.8) that the greater weight 
 of the nickel implement would probably not be noticed. Nor 
 would the slightly lower melting point of nickel nor its much 
 lower magnetic capacity be recognized. The most avail- 
 able distinguishing difference is in color, the ordinary house- 
 
An Orgamsmal Theory of Consciousness 73 
 
 keeper answering you, if you ask how she knows a nickel 
 from an iron implement, that the nickel piece is silvery bright 
 while the iron piece is black. 
 
 See now what this means. Actually, as is well known to 
 every beginning student in analytical chemistry, these two 
 metals are very similar in color as well as in other physical 
 attributes so much so, in fact, that some authors apply 
 the same term "silver white" to both. What a housekeeper 
 really means when she says she knows one implement to be 
 of nickel because it is bright and the other to be of iron 
 because it is black, is that she is depending on a chemical 
 rather than a physical attribute for a distinguishing mark ; 
 the attribute, that is, in virtue of which iron is acted upon 
 much more readily by oxygen in the presence of moisture 
 than is nickel. The much greater liability of iron than 
 nickel to tarnish and rust is a chemical rather than a phy- 
 sical difference between them. This fact, namely that of 
 the dependence of distinguishing differences between sub- 
 stances more upon chemical than upon physical attributes is 
 of very wide applicability in nature, and is greatly impor- 
 tant both scientifically and philosophically. 
 
 Now turn from comparing these two elementary chemical 
 substances to a comparison of any two human organisms, or 
 persons who might be members of a household to which 
 the implements might belong. And make the comparison first 
 on the basis of the physical attributes just as we began 
 comparing the implements of nickel and iron. Does any 
 reader doubt that he would find it much easier to distinguish 
 the persons than the metals? As to purely morphological, 
 that is, physical differences between almost any two persons 
 (with the possible exception of certain rare instances of 
 "identical" twins), there is no room for question. General 
 shape of head, face and features, and the size and propor- 
 tions of the various parts of the body furnish many unmis- 
 takable distinguishing attributes. 
 
74 An Orgamsmal Theory of Consciousness 
 
 On the Psychology of Subjective and Objective Personality 
 
 But unerring as are the differentiating marks on the 
 physical side, such marks are few as compared with those 
 on the psychical side. Noting first certain merely physico- 
 psychical differences think of the manners of speech and of 
 hand writing, to mention only two items ! Undoubtedly these 
 differences are to a considerable extent physical but no one 
 would seriously question that psychical factors come in all 
 along the line. This is perhaps most obvious in speech as 
 evidenced by voice modulations, intonations, gesticulations, 
 and facial and bodily expressions. Again, differentials are 
 everywhere recognizable in responses to sensory stimuli, 
 especially in the matter of reaction-time. There are the 
 quick and accurate persons, and the quick and inaccurate 
 ones ; and there are the slow and accurate and the slow and 
 inaccurate types, to go only a step in description and classi- 
 fication on this basis. 
 
 Then we proceed to compare the unequivocal psychical 
 phases of life: the feeling, the emotional, the esthetic, the 
 religious, and the intellectual phases. Here we pass into 
 a realm of what might properly be called objective privacy 
 in psychology, individuals for the study of which would be 
 largely the student's most intimate and most enduring friends 
 and associates, human and animal. Such a psychology would 
 be undeniably so particular and intimate that much of it 
 would be unpublishable even if it had an interest beyond 
 the few persons concerned. At the same time there are some 
 portions of it of great public importance, one such por- 
 tion being exactly what we are in need of in the present dis- 
 cussion. I refer to the exceedingly familiar but scientifically 
 much neglected definite and sustained psychical differences 
 of individuals who by reason of being members of the same 
 household or same small community are subject to nearly 
 identical influence so far as concerns such fundamental en- 
 
An Orgamsmal Theory of Consciousness 75 
 
 vironic factors as food in the narrow sense, drink, air, light 
 and temperature. The duty before us is that of testifying to, 
 of viseing, the objectively psychical individual as we did the 
 subjectively psychical individual earlier in this sketch. 
 "What is needed," writes Sellars, "is not vague statements to 
 the effect that individuals cannot be separated or that they 
 are aspects of one another, but definitions and analyses." 26 
 Sellars is here raising his voice against the tendency in 
 present-day social psychology to make the individual a kind 
 of incident in the social order, a by-product of Society. It 
 is a satisfaction that the regular course of my psychological 
 argument has brought me to where I also may contribute 
 something to the definition and analyses essential to check- 
 ing the tendency indicated by Sellars. If it can be shown 
 biologically and psychologically all in one that personality 
 is indubitably objective, both substantively and kinetically, 
 not only the Individual but Society will be the gainer, I am 
 very sure. For my contribution we will examine in outline 
 what may appropriately be called the action-system (adopt- 
 ing and expanding Jennings' term) as it manifests itself in 
 a small homogeneous group of human beings. Our study will 
 be, in other words, one in domestic and neighborhood psy- 
 chology. 
 
 The "material" in this instance must be my own household 
 and the handful of persons constituting the colony of the 
 Scripps Institution for Biological Research. This group 
 is rather specially favorable for such a study in that its 
 geographic severance from other groups, and its strictly 
 rural habitat give it an exceptionally natural, simple, and 
 uniform environment. The analysis might run along any 
 one or all of several axes ; but our purpose will be accom- 
 plished by following one only. That one shall be the reac- 
 tion, the behavior, of individual members of the group in 
 response to the stimulus of the world war. Were complete- 
 ness to be aimed at in the analysis, every individual in the 
 
76 An Organismal Theory of Consciousness 
 
 group would have to be considered. Such a treatment would 
 be highly instructive but space limitations forbid us going to 
 such length. We must restrict ourselves to a few of the 
 more pronouncedly individualistic behaviors and must treat 
 even these in a very sketchy fashion. To be remarked at 
 the outset is the fact that every member of the group is 
 deeply loyal to America and to the cause of the Allies. On 
 the very door-sill of the examination we recognize two well- 
 differentiated aspects to each person's action-system, namely 
 an aspect of commonality for nearly all members of the 
 group ; and an aspect of very pronounced differentially for 
 many of them. 
 
 Behaviors-in-common will receive attention first. In the 
 uniform growth, from the very beginning of the struggle in 
 August, 1914, of belief in the general Tightness of the cause 
 of the Entente ; of realization of the meaning of the struggle ; 
 and of sentiments and resolutions of devotion to the foreign 
 nations with which our nation is finally joined, these experi- 
 ences have been very much at one. To be sure this common- 
 ness has fallen far short of identity. But as to essentials 
 resemblance has been far greater than difference. For ex- 
 ample every adult has accepted unhesitatingly his and her 
 obligations to the Red Cross ; to the appeals for aid from 
 Belgium, France, and the other despoiled countries ; to the 
 increasing cost of living; to the buying of Government 
 Bonds ; and to the appeals and regulations of the Food Ad- 
 ministration. Naturally there has been difference in the 
 particular way and extent of response of each in these mat- 
 ters ; but in essence there has been nothing differential. 
 
 We turn now to behavior-not-in-common ; behavior, that 
 is, which has differentiated the members personally with 
 great sharpness. This examination is much more important 
 for the subject in hand. The reference here is to each one's 
 "bit" as the common phrase had it when our country was 
 first entering the conflict. The '%ar work" (as the expres- 
 
An Organismal Theory of Consciousness 77 
 
 sion has gradually become with the advance toward the cli- 
 max of the gigantic struggle) into which each has gravitated 
 has much the appearance of the naturalness and inevitability 
 presented by the falling of a stone or the flowing of water. 
 The case grows so significant at this point that I must par- 
 ticularize somewhat more than I have heretofore. A becomes 
 an acknowledged leader in "drives" for Red Cross funds, 
 Liberty Bond sales, etc. B becomes a regular consultant 
 on the knitting of Red Cross articles. C is a highly skilled 
 deviser and maker of dishes from "substitute" foods. D 
 is appointed an official of the National Food Administra- 
 tion. E becomes an official teacher of girls and women as to 
 the peculiar duties and obligations of their sex in war times. 
 F concentrates nearly the whole of his physical energy upon 
 an elaboration of the view that a victory over Germany and 
 her allies cannot be really complete without being spiritual 
 as well as material that the philosophy or theory of life 
 being fought for by Germany must be overthrown as well as 
 her armed forces. Of the forty adult members of the group 
 fully one-half have been incited in a special degree to some 
 activity that has a distinct personal character, some of these, 
 as above indicated, being very pronouncedly so. The per- 
 sonality of these reactions comes to view most distinctly in 
 the fact, absolutely certain to an observer whose acquain- 
 tance with the persons has been intimate and has extended 
 over some years, that no one of those who has settled into 
 one of the special, definite, and important pieces of work 
 could wholly replace any of the others in their special tasks. 
 Probably each could do something at the "job" of any of 
 the others were conditions such as to force him to try; but 
 success under such conditions would surely be partial, very 
 much so in some of the cases. 
 
 This automatic definition and classification of persons sub- 
 ject to a common major stimulus, with nearly the same gen- 
 eral environic conditions, and with almost complete freedom 
 
78 An Organismal Theory of Consciousness 
 
 of action so far as concerns the particular stimulus, seems 
 to me a phenomenon of very great importance since it de- 
 pends upon principles of organic beings, especially upon 
 principles of civilized man's "being," which are well-nigh if 
 not entirely universal, I am sure. Undoubtedly the phenom- 
 enon is often much obscured through counteracting ele- 
 ments in the environment, especially in social customs, eco- 
 nomic conditions and general education among civilized men. 
 But in spite of all these, attentive observation will nearly 
 always be able to recognize it. Highly significant is it as 
 bearing on this particular aspect of the matter, that the 
 niches finally found by most of the persons were obviously 
 determined to some extent by long continued previous activi- 
 ties and unmistakable natural "gifts." 
 
 Another noteworthy fact is the clear indication of not 
 mere acceptance, but positive satisfaction on the part of 
 most if not all the persons, once they are "settled" to their 
 "jobs," this satisfaction prevailing despite the strenuousness, 
 perplexity, and wear-and-tear entailed. During the first 
 weeks of America's plunge into the maelstrom the anxious 
 psychical casting about in our little group, as throughout 
 the whole land, presents to the anthropological biologist as 
 he looks back upon it a case of trial and error on a gigantic 
 scale, the scene being replete with jumbled elements of noble 
 zeal, splendid efficiency, mis-expenditure of strength and 
 funds, and ludicrous proposals. But out of this, as out of 
 this unprecedented instance of world-wide "struggle for ex- 
 istence," there is quite sure to come, indeed is coming, as one 
 of its first fruits, personality more real and powerful and 
 fuller of grandeur than ever. 
 
 While personalities come forth with special distinctness 
 of outline and forcefulness of expression during occasional 
 events of vast import to the race like the present war in- 
 volving literally the whole civilized portion of the human 
 species, yet I would insist that the difference between the 
 
An Organismal Theory of Consciousness 79 
 
 manifestations at such times and at ordinary times is al- 
 most entirely one of degree, rather than of essential nature. 
 The attentive observer will not fail to find personalities as 
 here understood always and everywhere, no matter how sim- 
 ple and lowly the lives, and monochrome the external condi- 
 tions. In little details of intelligent, but still more of reflex, 
 instinctive, and emotional life, all of which compounded to- 
 gether makes what we often call temperament, the keen and 
 sympathetic observer will always see persons in the deep 
 sense here indicated. Not the transcendent genuises merely, 
 the Aristotles, the Shakespeares, the Napoleons, have the 
 right to be called personalities, because of the unique powers 
 with which they are endowed ; but each and every one of civi- 
 lization's humblest-ranked myriads, and each and every 
 nature-tutored denizen of the virgin forest, of the untilled 
 plain, and of the unregenerate desert, have the same right- 
 in-kind. 
 
 Personality and the "Breath of Life" Viewed in the Light 
 of Physical Chemistry of the Organism 
 
 Swinging the discussion back now on the physico-chemical 
 aspect of the organism, I recall first the truth alluded to a 
 little while ago, namely, that it is preeminently the chemical 
 rather than the physical attributes of elementary inorganic 
 substances which furnish the distinguishing marks of these 
 substances. Even in the inorganic world we saw that sub^ 
 stances are most readily and decisively differentiated from one 
 another by the transformation-products resulting from the 
 reaction of the substances upon one another. "Transforma- 
 tion of energy," using a form of expression favored by the 
 disembodying tendencies in recent chemical theory, is the 
 most distinctive thing about all chemistry, inorganic as well 
 as organic. The oxidation and other chemically reactive 
 changes and products of nickel and iron, we noticed, are the 
 
80 An Orgamsmal Theory of Consciousness 
 
 most differentiative things about these metals. Let us push 
 the application of this criterion of difference a little farther 
 in comparing human persons. We give energy-transforma- 
 tion and work performed a leading place here also. And 
 being naturalistically chemical rather than chemically chem- 
 ical we are forced to touch the "high spots" only at first 
 regardless of what may be in between them. We are free to 
 seize upon the end or completed products of the reactions 
 and transformations. What reaction-products, I ask, of 
 nickel and iron towards any other substance or set of condi- 
 tions are more unlike than the reaction-products of an effi- 
 cient Department-of-Justice official, let us say and an ef- 
 ficient food conserving house-keeper, in this time of common 
 national danger? Yet these diverse products may come from 
 not only the same danger stimulus, but likewise from as nearly 
 identical physico-chemical environic stimuli as it is possible 
 to secure. Were official and house-keeper to eat of the same 
 food, drink of the same fluids, breathe of the same air, and 
 be subject to the same temperatures month in and month 
 out the difference in product would not be a whit less. 
 
 So stands the case when viewed in its "high places" only. 
 But the high places are as real places as any whatever. No 
 realities, it matters not how obscure or subtle, pertaining to 
 the intermediate places, can make the high places other 
 than what they are. Judging human beings by what they do, 
 by work done through the transformation of the substances 
 and energies which they take from the external world, their 
 personalities are surely not less well-attested than are the 
 individualities of elementary chemical substances.* But it 
 will not do to be satisfied with touching the high places in 
 this rather jaunty fashion. Some attention must be given to 
 
 * A rather full discussion of the point here touched may be found in 
 my essay, The Higher Usefulness of Science, where I raise and try to 
 answer the query, "What is nature because man is a part of it?" Per- 
 haps a less ambiguous way of asking the question would be, "What must 
 nature be in 'order that it may produce such an animal as man?" 
 
An Organismal Theory of Consciousness 81 
 
 the subtler aspects of the problem. The little we shall do 
 in this way may be introduced by the query, what reason 
 is there for including in our hypothesis the supposition that 
 it is "some substance in the air, almost certainly oxygen," 
 with which the organism reacts chemically, to produce con- 
 sciousness and all other phenomena of life? Why single out 
 this substance from the other elementary substances essential 
 to life, as for instance carbon or nitrogen? * My reply be- 
 gins by recalling the immemorial recognition of the "breath 
 of life" the "life giving air" and so on, of universal experi- 
 ence. It is well to recall likewise such semi-philosophic con- 
 ceptions as that of the pneuma or "psychical breath of life" 
 of later Greco-Roman philosophy. The inextricable en- 
 tanglement, historically, of breath and air with spirits is 
 also worth remembering, especially the continuance of this 
 into the modern period of scientific analysis, unmistakeable 
 traces of which are seen in the writings of William Harvey 
 and the foremost physiologists of the era to which he be- 
 longed. For example, the spiritus nitro-aereus of John 
 Mayow which, we now know, was his term for oxygen as 
 glimpsed first in the history of science, may be mentioned. 
 
 More important than any of these reminders from the his- 
 tory of knowledge is that of the familiar fact that the most 
 crucial evidences of truly independent or autonomous life of 
 the individual higher animal are respiratory. That the new 
 born human babe's first breathing-act is its first genuine in- 
 dependent life-act is one of the most commonplace of truths. 
 And recall how the "return of life" as we say of the nearly 
 drowned person, and of one who has "fainted dead away" 
 is marked by the resumption of respiratory activities. Cer- 
 tain reflexes, as those from stimulating the eyelids, and pos- 
 
 * The argument in answer to this query should be taken as an exten- 
 sion of, and in important respects a replacement of, that contained in 
 my essay, Is nature infinite? wherein I discuss the specificity of in- 
 dividual organisms as indicated by how they use their nutrient sub- 
 stances. 
 
82 An Organismal Theory of Consciousness 
 
 sibly certain heart flutterings, may be more persistent move- 
 ments than those connected with breathing. But these are 
 less certain signs of individual life. It is only to philosophy 
 of the elementalist sort that the mere twitch of a hand or an 
 eyelid or a trace of heart action would be a satisfactory 
 proof of life. Nor would it be to a philosopher of this school 
 should the "living substance" under observation happen to 
 pertain to a loved relation or friend. Satisfactory evidence 
 of life in this case would come only with the nearly simul- 
 taneous return of breathing and consciousness. A right 
 interesting section could be written at this point on the 
 importance of nutriment in the ordinary sense, and of drink, 
 as compared with air at the very beginning and ending stages 
 of the individual life. For instance such questions would 
 have to be considered as that of the independence of the new 
 individual for a while at the outset on food-yolk in many 
 animals below the mammals, and on placental connections in 
 mammals ; that is on material metabolically elaborated by 
 the older or parent individual. But such a discussion not 
 being indispensable to this sketch, must be foregone. Enough 
 here to emphasize the fact that while it may be entirely jus- 
 tifiable to regard oxygen as a food as some good modern 
 physiologists do the two important facts should never be lost 
 sight of that (1) oxygen (air) is the one and only ever- 
 present and never varying constituent of the dietary. In 
 other words that it is the one constituent which nature sup- 
 plies as by "free grace" to use a good old theological ex- 
 pression; and that (2) oxygen is the one and only food that 
 needs no digesting and so no digestive organs or tissues set 
 apart for its metabolic elaboration.* 
 
 Oxygen is the only food which passes directly as such to 
 
 *Were the view held by some physiologists, that the alveolar epithe- 
 lium of the lungs transmits atmospheric oxygen to the blood -by an active 
 process spoken of as a secreting, this statement would need modifying 
 somewhat. However, the view does not seem to be accepted by most 
 authorities. 
 
An Organismal Theory of Consciousness 83 
 
 every part of the organism. In oxygen the organism finds 
 one of its most fundamental food materials for which it does 
 not normally have to go in search or to compete with other 
 organisms. The familiar fact and its significance appear not 
 to have attracted the attention of biologists much. Even 
 L. J. Henderson who has written so illuminatingly on 
 many aspects of organic adaptiveness says nothing definite 
 on this point. These two facts are weighty reasons for my 
 proposal to look upon oxygen as one chemically elementary 
 substance and the organism as another, the reaction be- 
 tween which is basal in the production of consciousness and 
 all life phenomena. Consequently the problem of how, ex- 
 actly, the organism endowed with full-fledged consciousness 
 reacts toward oxygen is certainly one of the most important 
 of all problems on the purely physico-chemical side of life. 
 And, as said early in this sketch, it is just here that my the- 
 ory is most avowedly hypothetical. It would be quite out of 
 the question to present in the remaining pages of this book, 
 even had I the requisite knowledge for doing so, all that 
 might profitably be said on the subject. Consequently only 
 two or three of what seem to me the most crucial matters will 
 be mentioned. 
 
 In the first place I ask the reader to recall what has been 
 said in various of the preceding chapters which have brought 
 out the indubitable trend of the interpretation of life phe- 
 nomena according to the principles of physical chemistry, 
 away from the elementalistic conception of the organism. 
 The interpretation of the organic cell as a system of phases 
 in dynamic equilibrium, so strongly set forth by Hopkins 
 and Bayless will be remembered. And this will call to mind 
 the sharp way in which the new conception, with its appeal 
 to the role of surface-layers, membranes, and areas of con- 
 tact between all sorts of constituent substances, sets itself 
 over against such pseudo-objective conceptions as that of 
 biogens, not to mention the horde of out and out subjectivis- 
 
84< An Organismal Theory of Consciousness 
 
 tic "elements" of which pangens and determinants have per- 
 haps had the greatest vogue. The importance of the anti- 
 elementalistic tendency of physical chemistry when it comes 
 to be applied to biological problems is greatly enhanced, it 
 appears to me, by the circumstance that J. Willard Gibbs, 
 who was one of the very first to appreciate in a full scientific 
 sense the importance of massive as contrasted with minute- 
 particle phenomena in inorganic nature, and so was one of 
 the "fathers" of physical-chemistry, made no assumptions 
 about the invisible composition of substances in his treat- 
 ment of "Heterogeneous Equilibrium" and allied topics. 
 "Certainly," writes Gibbs, "one is building on an insecure 
 foundation who rests his work on hypotheses concerning the 
 constitution of matter." 27 If this is true as touching the 
 relatively simple structures and movements in the lifeless 
 world how much more obviously true is it as touching the liv- 
 ing world, and especially such life phenomena as human con- 
 
 sciousness ! 
 
 So we are able to requisition one of the admittedly most 
 important advances of modern times in inorganic science as 
 support for the supposition that the air we breathe, and 
 presumably its oxygen, contributes in some direct and funda- 
 mental way to the production of consciousness even though 
 this substance, if its "ultimate nature" is what inorganic 
 chemistry and physics have hitherto attributed to it, has lit- 
 tle or nothing to suggest that it possesses such a unique 
 latent attribute. The reader should not fail to recall here 
 Hume's recognition of the "secret powers" of substances. 
 
 But is it not possible that physico-chemical and physi- 
 ological knowledge of oxygen and air, the "breath of life," 
 do contain somewhat more to justify the supposition than is 
 usually recognized? In this connection I relate that one of 
 the most mentally adhesive statements I ever heard from a 
 bio-chemist, its adhesiveness depending largely on the fact 
 that the chemist was one of great experience as a laboratory 
 
An Organismal Theory of Consciousness 85 
 
 investigator, was to the effect that chemical analyses make 
 known what they find and absolutely no more. In other 
 words such analyses never exclude the possibility of sub- 
 stances other than those found. And this chemist asserted 
 furthermore that all organic analyses leave residues to some 
 extent. No manipulative methods are known, it appears, 
 capable of effecting a really complete analysis of any or- 
 ganic substance. Whether these restrictions on analyses 
 still hold I am not sure, though I have seen or heard nothing 
 which leads me to suppose they do not. 
 
 It is this general shadow of manipulative imperfection 
 which overhangs all formal physics and chemistry, coupled 
 with the advances being made from time to time in our 
 knowledge of oxygen and air which has led me to put into my 
 hypothesis a shade of doubt as to whether oxygen is the con- 
 stituent of the air the reaction of which with the organism 
 produces consciousness. The demonstration of helium and 
 argon, and probably neon, crypton, and xenon in atmos- 
 pheric air, all within a little more than two decades, has 
 influenced my thinking in the same direction. Besides, the 
 idea, become a commonplace of physics and chemistry in a 
 single night, figuratively speaking, that the "atom is as com- 
 plex as the solar system" has had its part in shaping my 
 conceptions ; as have also such well-credentialed conceptions 
 from the inorganic sciences as that "Uranium II" is "a long- 
 lived element" which is the "parent of the actinium series of 
 elements, but has no genetic connection with the uranium 
 series"; and that "in the lead pleiad there are seven ele- 
 ments" having quite different atomic weights." 28 
 
 The extent to which, as exemplified by this case, the inor- 
 ganic sciences have found themselves driven into the organic 
 realm for terms with which to express their new conceptions 
 must impress every thoughtful person. Earlier, what we 
 might describe as purely contemporaneous physical dynamics 
 had to borrow such terms as energy, power, force, work, 
 
86 An Organismal Theory of Consciousness 
 
 from the nomenclature of living beings. Later, with the per- 
 meation of all knowledge by the conception of the natural 
 or derivative origin of everything (a genuinely organic con- 
 ception, notice), has come even for elementary chemical sub- 
 stances, the induction into physics and chemistry of such 
 ideas as genetic relations, parenthood, and length of life. 
 So my suggestion that the air we breathe must be recognized 
 to possess latent attributes which by reacting with the or- 
 ganism produce consciousness, falls into a genetic series in 
 the history of the interpretation of nature. 
 
 The very important question, as already indicated, of ex- 
 actly how atmospheric or molecular oxygen operates in the 
 living being generally and the conscious being particularly, 
 is largely for the future to answer. One should never fail, 
 however, to couple this question with the same question as to 
 the behavior of oxygen, and for that matter of any other 
 chemical substance, in any reaction whatever. Exactly how, 
 for example, does oxygen operate with hydrogen to produce 
 the attribute of ref rangibility of water ; or with phosphorus 
 to produce the peculiar glow which that substance may ex- 
 hibit under some conditions? 
 
 Concerning the positive knowledge and the views as to 
 details of the action of oxygen in connection with the or- 
 ganism, only a little can be said here though that little may 
 be very important. Looked at from the standpoint of the 
 old, the orthodoxly atomistic chemistry, probably the most 
 anomalous thing about my hypothesis is that the organism 
 conceived as equivalent, chemically speaking, to an elemen- 
 tary substance, is the unquestioned fact that the organism is 
 not only composed of several chemical substances, but that 
 one of these is oxygen itself. Stated baldly, the anomaly is 
 that two chemical substances are supposed to react upon each 
 other, one of which (the organism) is known not only not 
 to be simple, but to contain the other substance. But even 
 the old chemistry with its "compound radicals," of which 
 
An Organismal Theory of Consciousness 87 
 
 cyanogen (CN) 2 is said to have been the first discovered, and 
 of which the unitedly-acting combinations of carbon and 
 hydrogen as methyl, CH 33 affords some slight support for 
 our conception so far as the mere matter of chemically uni- 
 tary compoundedness is concerned. In so far, however, as 
 technical chemistry can be drawn upon for supporting our 
 hypothesis, it is the new, or physical chemistry, as has 
 been repeatedly stated, that is our main reliance. Unless I 
 am greatly deceived, the real inwardness of that great move- 
 ment in inorganic science is against the age-old conception of 
 the ultimate adequacy of atoms to explain inorganic na- 
 ture, almost as positively as the organismal conception is 
 against the ultimate adequacy of any constituent element 
 whatever, to explain organic nature. The surface energies, 
 for example, developed at contact faces and giving rise to 
 the phenomena of adsorption * appear to be not a whit less 
 real and ultimate energies than are any that can be attrib- 
 uted to atoms and molecules taken as such. And, be it no- 
 ticed, one of the most distinctive things about these areal and 
 massive energies is that they dominate atomic and molecular 
 energies to a certain extent. This is just what the now uni- 
 versally recognized principle of "mass action" is in so far as 
 such action has been studied enough to make possible its for- 
 mulation into law; that is enough to learn how it influences 
 velocity and quantity of chemical change. But would any 
 careful physicist or chemist pretend to know to a certainty 
 that such action is restricted to influence of that sort? Surely 
 not. Are we certain for instance that it can not under any 
 
 * Adsorption is the loading of the surface of a solid body immersed in 
 a solution, with the dissolved substance. Thus it is by adsorption that 
 charcoal takes the coloring matter out of a colored solution. The action 
 results from the facts that there is surface tension at the interfaces be- 
 tween the charcoal and the liquid, and that this tension is lessened by 
 the presence of the dissolved color-substance in the liquid. The sub- 
 stance then moves to the place of lessened tension and concentrates on 
 the surface of the solid. 29 The principle has very wide application in 
 nature, particularly in organic nature, where colloidal substances and 
 water are in contact so extensively. 
 
88 An Organismal Theory of Consciousness 
 
 circumstances influence qualitative as well as quantitative 
 change? Surely we are not. This of course is far from 
 contending that mass action actually does influence quali- 
 ties. My sole point is that so long as there is lack of 
 certainty that it does not or may not exert such influence 
 any assumption which implies such certainty is unwarranted 
 and unscientific. 
 
 Putting together, then, the physically massive concep- 
 tions of inorganic chemistry and the organismal conceptions 
 of bio-chemistry what seems to follow touching the chemico- 
 substantive composition of organisms is that a portion of 
 all the substances essential to life, carbon, oxygen and others, 
 have been combined from all eternity (whatever be the mean- 
 ing of the phrase) in the peculiar way called organic, while 
 other portions have remained in the state called inorganic. 
 This leads me to remark, quite incidentally so far as this 
 discussion is concerned, that according to this view the as- 
 sumption would be that organisms have always existed, or at 
 least that they have existed as long as "matter" or anything 
 else of which we have any information or clear conception, 
 has existed. The warrantableness of this assumption I am re- 
 lieved from arguing here from having treated the problem 
 at some length in another place. (Are we obliged to suppose 
 the spontaneous generation of life ever occurred?)^ All 
 that need be said now about the outcome of that discussion is 
 that the warrantableness lies in the absence of any ground 
 for assuming the contrary. I take my position squarely on 
 the direct evidence in the case. All the evidence of that sort 
 we have and in that discussion I emphasize the fact of its 
 vast quantity is to the effect that organisms are produced 
 by other organisms known as parents and in no other way.* 
 
 * To the stock and rather vapid rejoinder that such a solution of the 
 problem of the origin of life is no solution at all, but only a putting oif of 
 the difficulty, the obvious reply from my standpoint is that I am making 
 no pretense of "solving the problem," as "solution" would be meant in 
 the anticipated rejoinder. From my standpoint, however, the everlast- 
 ingly-from-parents hypothesis would be a solution of the problem if the 
 hypothesis were proved true. 
 
An Organismal Theory of Consciousness 89 
 
 We can now state briefly as much more of the bio-chemical 
 aspect of the problem as seems indispensable to our present 
 argument. A few remarks on what the physiology of our day 
 often calls tissue respiration will compass what is in mind. 
 The key fact in this is of two- fold character: (1) The tissues 
 of the organism, not its blood or any other fluids, contain the 
 substance which is in the strictest sense living. () This 
 substance is called living because chemical changes of a very 
 distinctive sort are going on in it. These changes are of a 
 fundamentally double nature as regards atmospheric or 
 molecular oxygen; namely, combinative and incorporative 
 change, and separative and expulsive change. The last-men- 
 tioned, the separative and expulsive change, is known as oxi- 
 dation and manifests itself to ordinary experience in the dis- 
 charge of oxygen combined with carbon as carbon dioxide, 
 and in the setting free of energy in the form of muscular and 
 other work, and of heat. The first-mentioned, or incorpora- 
 tive change, consists in taking in and storing up oxygen, 
 "somehow," as the more carefully worded physiologies put 
 it. This statement may be taken as a very brief natural 
 history description of the most fundamental steps in what 
 formal physiology calls metabolism with its two aspects, the 
 constructive, or anabolic, and the destructive, or katabolic. 
 Probably no one will question that this conception of the 
 foundations of the life process for nearly, if not quite, all 
 animal life is that held by the best physiologists since the 
 time of C. Bernard at least. No physiologist whom I have 
 consulted has stated the nature of the process more definitely 
 than has Sir Michael Foster. "The Respiration," he writes, 
 "of the muscle then does not consist in throwing into the 
 blood oxidizable substances, there to be oxidized into car- 
 bonic acid and other matters ; but it does consist in the as- 
 sumption and storing up of oxygen somehow or other in its 
 substance, in the building up by help of that oxygen of 
 explosive decomposable substances, and in the carrying out 
 
90 An Organismal Theory of Consciousness 
 
 of decompositions whereby carbonic acid and other matters 
 are discharged first into the substance of the muscle and 
 subsequently into the blood." 31 And he points out in other 
 connections that what is true of muscle in this regard is es- 
 sentially true of all other tissue systems. In another still 
 more recent text book we read: "Nothing definite is known, 
 however, as to the nature of the probable combinations 
 formed by oxygen with the different materials for building 
 up muscles and other tissues, or of the intermediate anabolic 
 and katabolic forms through which it passes in combining 
 with carbon into carbonic acid." 32 And this author then 
 expresses what are, apparently, his own views, by quoting 
 from Foster as follows : "The whole mystery of life lies hid- 
 den in the story of that progress [that of construction and 
 destruction in the tissues] and for the present we must be 
 content with simply knowing the beginning and the end." 
 
 The kernel of my suggestion so far as metabolism is con- 
 cerned, is that the anabolic, or the assimilative, the truly 
 synthetic aspect of the complete operation, is the continual 
 renewal, or keeping up of the oxygen constituent of the 
 organism which comes to it by heredity, that is which has 
 always been in the "line of descent." It is the maintenance 
 of what might be spoken of as the original oxygen constitu- 
 ent of the organism. There would always then be operating 
 in the organism oxygen of two sources, that from the one 
 source designated, employing our well-established evolutional 
 terminology, phylogenic or hereditary oxygen ; and the other 
 ontogenic or individual oxygen. In general the same kind 
 of reasoning would hold for the other chemical simples, car- 
 bon, nitrogen, and so on; but these are in quite a different 
 status from oxygen owing to the fact that they are not 
 normally taken by the animal organism in the pure or uncom- 
 bined state, but only in some other organic combination, 
 as food in the ordinary sense. 
 
 Metabolically expressed, then, we may say in short that 
 
An Organismal Theory of Consciousness 91 
 
 the warrantableness for considering the individual organism 
 as a chemical element, is the fact that it maintains its identity 
 as regards all its elementary constituents except one, oxygen, 
 by wrenching these, so to speak, from other organic com- 
 pounds (by digesting these) and then by synthesizing the 
 elements into its own particular substance. Another way of 
 expressing the same conception is to say that the organism 
 is an element, chemically speaking, because it reacts directly 
 in a chemical sense with another element. 
 
 Did this chapter pretend to be anything more than a 
 sketch of a theory of consciousness a considerable discus- 
 sion of the "activation" of oxygen would naturally come in 
 somewhere, perhaps at this point. The essense of activation 
 is the fact that when oxygen passes into the organism by the 
 respiratory process it is somehow changed into a condition 
 which enables it to oxidize living tissue-substances as it 
 can not to any degree, seemingly, when brought into con- 
 tact with the same substances outside the organism. This 
 discussion would involve the various theories which have 
 been put forward to account for this phenomenon, as those 
 which make use of the principle of enzymes, of peroxides or 
 of some other. All that our aims here require us to notice 
 is that nothing conclusive as touching the nature of activa- 
 tion would come from the discussion. How unsatisfactory 
 a state this whole subject is in may be seen from the follow- 
 ing words of a foremost American biochemist: "It has been 
 a popular practice to appeal to hypothetical enzymes to 
 explain some of the obscure chemical transformations in the 
 organism. Thus we have been wandering through the mazes 
 of the oxidases, oxygenases, peroxidases, reductases, cata- 
 lases and other products of perplexing nomenclature in the 
 hope of escaping the uncertainties of intermediary meta- 
 bolism." 33 
 
92 An Organismal Theory of Consciousness 
 
 Summed-up Statement of Justification of the Hypothesis 
 
 The final gathering-up-and-putting-together may now be 
 made of all that has been said about the physico-chemical 
 aspect of the organism on the one hand, and about its psy- 
 chical aspect on the other. That is to say, we are now ready 
 to epitomize the results of our examination of the ancient 
 and honorable but withal unsolved problem of how Body and 
 Soul go together. As regards "body" or "the physical" we 
 have been led to the physico-chemical conception of the or- 
 ganism as a well-nigh inconceivably complex mass of sub- 
 stances, mostly in the colloidal state, operating as a system 
 of phases in dynamic or constantly changing equilibrium. 
 As regards "soul" or "the psychical," we have found also a 
 series of phases of activities, namely the phases of intellect 
 and reason, those of instinct, those of feeling and emotion, 
 those of the will, those of the tropisms and the "simple re- 
 flexes," and finally those of simple protoplasmic response. 
 According to my hypothesis, the phases of the bio-chemico- 
 physical sort and the phases of the psychical sort have com- 
 mon ground in the organism as a whole, the phases of in- 
 tellect and reason corresponding to the cerebro-spinal nerv- 
 ous system ; the phase of instinct corresponding probably to 
 the autonomic nervous system ; the phases of feeling and emo- 
 tion corresponding mainly to the glandular and visceral sys- 
 tems; those of the will to the body-muscular system; those 
 of the tropisms and simple reflexes to the receptor-conductor- 
 effector systems ; and finally those of simple protoplasmic 
 response to the fundamental protoplasmic mechanism of 
 response, whatever its structure. 
 
 According to the scheme presented in the sketch and 
 summed up here, just as physical functioning and physical 
 form reach back to the very dawning of animal life, both in 
 the individual and in the race or type, so consciousness with 
 its nether limits in what, following the terminology of em- 
 
An Organismal Theory of Consciousness 93 
 
 bryology (see section on the pro-morphology of the egg- 
 cell. Chap. 8 The Unity of the Organism), might be called 
 pro-consciousness, is an attribute of all animal organisms. 
 As comparative anatomy and physiology have made us 
 familiar with the physical aspect of the animal organism 
 existing as the fully realized or developed adult at one 
 end of the ontogenic series, and as the unrealized adult 
 or germ at the other end of the same series, exactly so 
 is psychology gradually familiarizing us with the real- 
 ized, or adult mind at one end of the ontogenic series, 
 and as the unrealized or germinal mind at the other end 
 of the same series. When we affirm that the completed 
 individual organism is latent in the germ, we must under- 
 stand that the psychical aspect no less than the physical 
 aspect is so latent. With very little doubt, it seems to me, 
 the real meaning of the so-called subconscious, and of 
 psycho-analysis as a method of investigating it, is that the 
 ontogenic stages of the psychic life of the human organism 
 are being discovered and that a method of investigating these 
 stages is being worked out. Freud and his followers have 
 been and still are somewhat in the dark, I think, as to just 
 what they are doing, albeit their discoveries and methods are 
 of the utmost importance. 
 
 REFERENCE INDEX 
 
 1. Ants, p. 519, by W. M. Wheel- cartes (Open Court Edition). 
 
 er (Columbia University Bio- 7. Consciousness a form of En- 
 logical series, Vol. 9). ergy, p. 120, by W. P. Mon- 
 
 2. A short History of Science, p. tague (in Essays Philosophi- 
 
 262, by W. T. Sedgwick and cal and Psychological in Hon- 
 
 H. W. Taylor. or of Wm. James). 
 
 3. Outlines of Psychology, p. 2, 8. An Enquiry Concerning Human 
 
 by J. Royce. Understanding, Sec. IV, prt. 
 
 4. Critical Realism, p. 75, by R. 1, by David Hume (Open 
 
 W. Sellars. Court Edition). 
 
 5. Outlines of Psychology, p 3, 9. The Probable Infinity of Na- 
 
 by J. Royce. ture and Life, by Wm. E. Rit- 
 
 6. The Principles of Philosophy, ter. 
 
 prt. 1, sec 8, by Ren< Des- 10. Hume with Helps to the Study 
 
An Organismal Theory of Consciousness 
 
 of Berkeley, p. 98, by T. H. 
 Huxley (authorized edition). 
 
 11. Ibid., p. 96. 
 
 12. Ibid., p. 100. 
 
 13. Things and Sensations, p. 680, 
 
 by G. F. Stout (Proc. British 
 Acad., 1905-6). 
 
 14. Creative Intelligence, p. 9, by 
 John Dewey. 
 
 15. The Principles of Psychology, 
 
 I, p. 341, by Wm. James. 
 
 16. Ants, p. 521, by W. M. 
 Wheeler. 
 
 17. Animal Behavior p. 310, by 
 C. O. Whitman (Woods Hole 
 Biological Lectures, 1898). 
 
 18. The Principles of Psychology, 
 
 II, p. 451, by Wm. James. 
 
 19. Bodily Changes in Pain, Hun- 
 
 ger, Fear and Rage, p. 282, 
 by W. B. Cannon. 
 
 20. The Principles of Psychology, 
 
 II, p. 450, by Wm. James. 
 
 21. Ibid., p. 451. 
 
 22. The Dynamic Side of Biochem- 
 
 istry, p. 217, by F. G. Hop- 
 kins. Nature, vol. 92. 
 
 23. Ibid., p. 220. 
 
 24. Ibid., p. 220. 
 
 25. Animal Behavior, p. 256, by C. 
 Lloyd Morgan. 
 
 26. Critical Realism, p. 75, by R. 
 W. Sellars. 
 
 27. Elementary Principles of Sta- 
 
 tistical Mechanics, pref. p. x, 
 by J. W. Gibbs. 
 
 28. Identity of Atomic Weights 
 among Different Elements, p. 
 442, by G. L. Wendt, Science, 
 Vol. 47. 
 
 29. A System of Physical Chem- 
 
 istry, II, p. 303, by Wm. C. 
 McC. Lewis. 
 
 30. The Probable Infinity of Na- 
 ture and Life, first essay, by 
 Wm. E. Ritter. 
 
 31. A Text-book of Physiology, p. 
 
 469, by Michael Foster. 
 
 32. Human Physiology, I, p. 395, 
 by Luigi Luciani (trans, by 
 Welby). 
 
 33. Oxidations and Reductions in 
 the Animal Body, p. 21, by L. 
 B. Mendel, Science, Vol. 37, 
 1913. 
 
POSTSCRIPT 
 
 (To "The Unity of the Organism") 
 
 THE argument in favor of the organismal way of viewing 
 living nature has now run what appears to me its natural 
 course, to its inevitable end. Yet I cannot bring myself to 
 write "Finis" without making a few remarks which though 
 connected vitally with the argument, do not seem an essential 
 part of it. 
 
 These remarks concern the general effect of the organismal 
 standpoint on those who may grasp it firmly and adopt it 
 unreservedly. Since, as pointed out in the "Historic Back- 
 ground" with which this book opens, the standpoint has been 
 recognized by biologists with varying degrees of fullness 
 from the time of Aristotle at least, there can be no doubt 
 that the human mind is naturally attuned, as one might say, 
 to this general type of response to organic phenomena. It 
 seems therefore fitting that a presentation like that which I 
 have made should be accompanied by a few words on the 
 probable influence of a wide prevalence of the organismal 
 view. The pertinent question will be asked, how could it 
 have come to pass that if the standpoint has been so long 
 in the world it should have missed full recognition and have 
 failed to exert its due influence? The reply is obvious to an 
 attentive reader of this book: At no time until the present 
 in the long historical growth of knowledge of the living world 
 has information been sufficient to make possible a rounded- 
 out statement of the conception. To illustrate, it is only in 
 the very last years that enough has been known of the 
 physical chemistry of the cell to engender such an interpre- 
 tation of this exceedingly important biological entity as that 
 which biochemists are just now reaching. Yet this interpre- 
 
 95 
 
96 Postscript 
 
 tation is indispensable to anything even approaching a full 
 development of the organismal view. 
 
 But nothing stands out more boldly from the pages of 
 this book than the insufficiency even yet, of actual knowledge 
 for making the standpoint complete. If therefore, I append 
 to my presentation a brief reference to the larger effect the 
 view has had on myself, and on this basis forecast what the 
 effect would be on thinking people generally were they to 
 make it their own, such a forecast will surely be in harmony 
 with the larger purpose of the book, even though the antici- 
 patory remarks have no place in the presentation itself. 
 
 The long and laborious gathering and arranging of facts, 
 and weighing of natural evidence and formal arguments 
 which has constituted the development of the standpoint in 
 my own mind, has compelled me to re-examine and re-assess 
 the whole frame and fabric of my spiritual life. Nothing, so 
 far as I can tell, has escaped. Not my scientific knowledge 
 alone my professional stock-in-trade but all my ideas and 
 beliefs touching religion, art, society, politics, industry, per- 
 sonal relations, and private living, have come in for their 
 share of scrutiny and renovation. 
 
 An exceedingly brief "synoptic" classification and char- 
 acterization * of the entire range of these effects can be 
 given in the terms of formal science and philosophy. 
 
 As to classification, the effects fall into a two-fold group- 
 ing. One of the groups appertains to the great province of 
 the nature of knowledge ; the other to the equally great 
 province of the nature of morals. 
 
 The characterization of effects on the nature of knowl- 
 edge which seems to me most inclusive and most practically 
 significant, may be stated thus : By the validation of ob- 
 jective knowledge, largely through the principle of what I 
 have called standardization of reality, but partly through 
 
 * See my essay, The Place of Description, Definition and Classifica- 
 tion (Hitter, 1918). 
 
Postscript 97 
 
 the organismal hypothesis of consciousness, such knowl- 
 edge is elevated to the rank of strict equality with "pure 
 thought," often so-called; that is, with subjective knowl- 
 edge. In this way mathematico-mechanistic science is de- 
 prived of the regal place it has claimed for itself since the 
 era of Descartes and Leibnitz, and is brought to the plane 
 of absolute equality as to importance and dignity, with 
 sense-experiential science. By thus adjusting the claims of 
 these two great realisms of science, an attitude toward the 
 infinite totality of nature, and a methodology for interpret- 
 ing it, which have hitherto borne the stamp of subjection 
 and inferiority assume their rightful places in the great 
 hierarchy of philosophical science. This leveling-down of 
 mathematical mechanics and the deductive method and level- 
 ing-up of observational knowledge and the inductive method, 
 implies the complete overthrow of psycho-physical dualism 
 in psychology, and the rescue of personality from bondage 
 to a theoretically infinite monotony of "Matter and Energy." 
 
 The characterization of the effects of the organismal view 
 on morals centers around the perception that in the establish- 
 ment of human personality the persons are organically in- 
 terdependent upon one another; that is, interdependent 
 through their "attributes of relation," this resulting in the 
 incorporation of men into a pluralistic universe far more 
 real and vital than philosophic pluralism has hitherto been 
 in position to grasp. Through a type of human conduct 
 guided by knowledge of these principles of personality and 
 the interdependence of personalities, and through supple- 
 menting mathematico-mechanistic methods of study by a 
 rigid application of observational and statistical methods, a 
 genuine science of morals, both theoretical and practical, 
 is made attainable. 
 
 That my enterprise of developing the organismal view is 
 only part and parcel of the general current of interpretation 
 of living nature which has flowed through the centuries seems 
 
98 Postscript 
 
 clear even from my meager acquaintance with the history of 
 philosophic thought. Thus we read in Windelband (A His- 
 tory of Philosophy, Eng. by Tufts,) : "For the decisive fac- 
 tor in the philosophical movement of the nineteenth century 
 is doubtless the question as to the degree of importance 
 which the natural-science conception of phenomena may 
 claim for our view of the world and life as a whole." (624). 
 Then after speaking of the sharp antithesis between the 
 Weltanschauung elaborated by the "Highly strained idealism 
 of the German Philosophy" of the early nineteenth century, 
 and the "materialistic Weltanschauung" of the later decades 
 of the same century, the author writes : "If we are to bring 
 out from the philosophical literature of this century and 
 emphasize those movements in which the above characteristic 
 antithesis has found its most important manifestation, we 
 have to do primarily with the question, in what sense the 
 psychical life can be subjected to the natural-science mode 
 of cognition." (p. 625). 
 
 That Part II of this book of mine, especially Chaps. 20 
 to 24, go a long way toward answering the cardinal question 
 formulated by Windelband appears to me certain. And, I 
 may add, it also seems quite clear to me that the gigantic 
 struggle at arms which that philosopher's nation has now 
 brought upon the world, is one of the strongest proofs that 
 philosophic thought and, following this, social and political 
 leadership in Germany have failed miserably to discover the 
 Via Media between the Weltanschauung of the "highly 
 strained idealism of the German Philosophy" and the mate- 
 rialistic Weltanschauung which has finally reached its nat- 
 ural climax in militaristic brutism, and is almost certainly 
 (Sept., 1918) approaching its overthrow. 
 
 Nothing could more fittingly end this book, devoted as it 
 is to demonstrating the operative nature of organic unity 
 in one of its great segments, than a reference to the fact 
 that the philosophy of life now determining German morals, 
 
Postscript 99 
 
 and which has drawn its inspiration largely from the hypo- 
 thesis of natural selection, has failed pathetically beyond 
 the power of words to express if done unintentionally; and 
 criminally in equal measure if done intentionally to under- 
 stand the real meaning of Darwin's teaching as a whole. 
 
 Certain it is that had the German philosophers of Macht- 
 politik recognized the place of unqualified supremacy as- 
 cribed by Darwin to the mental and moral endowments of 
 man, it would have been impossible for them to make the 
 dogma of survival of the fittest serve their ends in any such 
 way as they have made it, and done so honestly. Attentive 
 reading of The Descent of Man makes it perfectly plain 
 that Darwin simply accepted all the higher human attri- 
 butes moral, esthetic, and religious, no less than those of 
 the intellect as fundamental data in his reasoning about 
 man's evolution. His sole effort as touching these was merely 
 to see in how far they could be regarded either as helped 
 forward in their development by natural selection, or at least 
 as not inconsistent witlTit. Apparently it never even oc- 
 curred to him to regard his hypothesis as supreme-over-all, 
 so that all attributes whatever, the noblest ones of man with 
 the rest, must either be forced into conformity with it, or 
 their reality and power virtually denied. "I fully subscribe 
 to the judgment," runs the opening sentence of the chapter 
 on "The Moral Sense," etc., "of those writers who maintain 
 that, of all the differences between man and the lower ani- 
 mals, the moral sense or conscience is by far the most im- 
 portant." And, especially significant at this time, Darwin 
 quotes with obvious approval, an apostrophe to Duty by 
 Kant, in which this "Wondrous thought" is represented as 
 "holding up its naked law" in the soul, and demanding 
 reverence. Darwin's entire discussion in this part of the 
 Descent makes it clear that what he had in mind was to 
 discover as far as possible the germs of "conscience," of 
 "feeling of right and wrong," of an "inward monitor," of 
 
100 Postscript 
 
 "sympathy," of "parental and filial affection," of "social 
 affection," of the "instinct of self-sacrifice" and so on, in the 
 lower animals so as to have a starting point for these attri- 
 butes as they occur in civilized man. It was not at all his 
 purpose to show, as the German perversion of the struggle- 
 and-survival hypothesis holds, that the evolution of man 
 has consisted largely in a farther differentiation and intensi- 
 fication of the dominantly brute attributes, with an infusion 
 as a kind of by-product from the struggle for existence, of 
 certain "humanistic sentimentalities," which in reality are 
 signs of weakness and must be suppressed.* 
 
 And this perversion by German science and philosophy of 
 Darwin's teaching is rooted very deep in German culture and 
 character. The straightforward, common-sense descriptions 
 and inductions of the practical-minded, country-dwelling, 
 country-loving, unacademic English naturalist were alto- 
 gether too simple and unsophisticated to satisfy a Kultur 
 permeated through and through with the "highly strained 
 idealism" of Kant, Fichte, Hegel, and Schopenhauer. The 
 two worst errors committed by Darwin were his over-em- 
 phasis on the natural selection hypothesis, and his pro- 
 pounding of the gemmule-pangenesis hypothesis ; and it is 
 highly characteristic that it was in just these two "strained" 
 speculations that German biology and practical philosophy 
 should have taken up Darwinism the most ardently and over- 
 worked it the most absurdly and disastrously. 
 
 My examination of the germplasm-determinant theory of 
 Weismann in Part I of this book has revealed something of 
 the scope and nature which the gemmule fallacy was destined 
 to assume when it fell subject to German speculation. The 
 more subtle and far-reaching and humanly practical conse- 
 quences of the adoption and elaboration of the struggle-and- 
 
 *The effort which Dr. George Nasmyth has made in his book Social 
 Progress and the Darwinian Theory to set right Darwin's position in 
 this matter, ought to bear fruit after a while. 
 
Postscript 101 
 
 survival hypothesis by German speculation has not yet been 
 subjected to thorough-going biological criticism, though sev- 
 eral moves in this direction have been made. 
 
 Even the realism of recent German political and economic 
 theory and practice is a "highly strained" speculative real- 
 ism. This philosophical monstrosity is largely attributable, 
 demonstrably so I believe, to a cultural and governmental 
 system in which the principle of universal organic personality 
 is grossly violated. And what a price in misery and blood 
 and treasure the whole world, but old Europe particularly, 
 is paying for a consummation which a truer philosophy of 
 life would have foreseen and forestalled ! 
 
 Can the leaders of German Kultur be convinced of the 
 fundamental fallacy of their theory of human and national 
 life, only by discovering that their military establishment, 
 built up through many decades of patient, costly organiza- 
 tion and discipline, but under guidance of a philosophy of 
 mechanism and brutism, is yet incapable of overpowering a 
 military establishment, a large portion of which may be im- 
 provised in the course of a few months, if such improvision 
 be under guidance of a philosophy of personality and hu- 
 manism? 
 
INDEX 
 
 Adsorption, meaning of, 87 
 
 Air, in relation to consciousness, 
 33; breath, and spirit, 81 
 
 Alchemy, 31 
 
 Analysis, of organic substances, 
 85 
 
 Anger, 60 
 
 Animal, the human, 27 
 
 Anthropologist, 28 
 
 Ants, cocoon spinning by, 54 
 
 Attitudes, difference between sci- 
 entific and philosophic, 50; ele- 
 ments and emotions, 64 
 
 Attributes, ethical, 27; observed 
 corporeal, 32; physical and 
 chemical, 48; latent of oxygen, 
 84; latent, 86. 
 
 Axioms, of mathematics, 40 
 
 Biologist, anthropological, 78 
 Biology, subdivisions of, 26 
 Body, constitution of, 32; vs. 
 
 corpse or cadaver, 65; and 
 
 soul, 66 
 
 Boyle, Robert, 31 
 Bread, "secret powers" of, 43 
 "Breath of Life," 46, 79, 81 
 
 Cannon, W. B., on the autonomic 
 nervous system and adrenin and 
 emotions, 61, 66 
 
 Carbon, 81 
 
 Cause, unknown, of Experience, 
 46 
 
 Cell, physical chemistry concep- 
 tion of, 69 
 
 Chemical, criterion of, 32 
 
 Chemistry, definition of, 30; phys- 
 ical, 46, 79; periodic law of, 
 72; atomistic, 86. 
 
 Consciousness, and chemical ac- 
 tion, 33; theory of, and theory 
 of knowledge, 39; lowest terms 
 
 of, 51; attribute of the organ- 
 ism as a whole, 52; and physico- 
 chemical conception of the or- 
 ganism, 67; and pro-conscious- 
 ness, 93. 
 
 Descartes, R., and innate ideas, 44 
 Dewey, John, 41; on "self" and 
 
 environment, 48 
 Dramatist, 60 
 
 Emotion, and physical organiza- 
 tion, 59; James' conception of, 
 61 
 
 Energy, and substance, 80; and 
 power, force, work, 85; surface, 
 87 
 
 Essences, 31 
 
 Experience, subjective and objec- 
 tive, 28; unknown causes of, 46; 
 as to nature of, 48 
 
 Facts, matters of, 42 
 Forces, abuse of the term, 41 
 Foster, Sir Michael, 89 
 Freud, S., 93 
 
 Oibbs, J. W., on constitution of 
 
 matter, 84 
 "Gifts," natural, 78 
 
 Helium, 85 
 
 Henderson, L. J., 82 
 
 Higher usefulness of Science, 80 
 
 Hopkins, F. G., on life, cells, and 
 
 molecules, 69 
 Hume, David, on psychic life and 
 
 qualities of objects, 42 
 Huxley, T. H., on innate ideas, 
 
 41; against materialism, 45 
 Hypothesis, of consciousness 29; 
 
 "working," 34 
 
 103 
 
104 
 
 Index 
 
 Ideas, relations of in Hume's phi- 
 losophy, 42; innate, 44 
 
 Individual, fundamentality of, 75 
 
 Instinct, problem of, 27; "instinct 
 actions," "instinct feelings," 27; 
 and physical organization, 53 
 
 Intellect, 92 
 
 Iron, 72, 80 
 
 James, William, on consciousness 
 of self, 52; on nature of emo- 
 tion, 61, et seq. 
 
 Knowledge, theory of, not under 
 discussion in this work, 39; na- 
 ture of, 40 
 
 Lead, 84 
 
 Life, objective and subjective, 27 
 
 Mass action, 87 
 Materialism, Huxley against, 45 
 Mathematics, 40 
 Metabolism, katabolic, 89 
 Metals, 31 
 Metaphysics, 28 
 Mind, conception of, 39 
 Mind, "mind stuff," 61 
 Montague, W. P., on psycho-phys- 
 ical parallelism, 41 
 Morgan, C. Lloyd, 71 
 
 Natural History, method of study- 
 ing, 26 
 
 "Neglect nothing," as naturalist, 
 26, 72 
 
 Nervous system, as "roots of psy- 
 chology," 46 
 
 Objective, and "outer," 35 
 
 Organismal, theory of conscious- 
 ness, 25 
 
 Organization and instinct, 53; and 
 emotion, 59 
 
 Oxygen, as respiratory substance, 
 44; latent attributes of, 84; he- 
 ireditary, ontogenic, and indi- 
 vidual, 90; activation of, 91. 
 
 Parallelism, psycho-physical, his- 
 torical basis of, 40 
 
 Percepts, 37 
 
 Periodic law, in chemistry, 72 
 
 Personal consciousness, 35 
 
 Personality, 34, 37, 78; and ele- 
 mentary substances, 70 
 
 Phases of the cell, 69 
 
 Philosopher's stone, 31 
 
 Philosophy, Cartesian, 40 
 
 Phosphorus, 33; a "simple," 32; 
 glow of, 86 
 
 Physical chemistry, absence of in 
 earlier biology, 46; and person- 
 ality, 79; antielementalistic ten- 
 dency of, 84 
 
 Physico-chemical substances and 
 forces, in animal behavior, 55 
 
 Physiologist, 28 
 
 Pluralism, philosophical, 37 
 
 Postulates, 40 
 
 Powers, secret, of substances, 43 
 
 Principles, Alchemist's, 31 
 
 Private opinion, 35 
 
 Psychic life, man's higher, 26; 
 catholicity of attitude toward, 
 27. 
 
 Psycho-analysis, 93 
 
 Psychologist, 28 
 
 Psychology, without a soul and 
 without a body, 65; social and 
 domestic, 75 
 
 Radicals, compound, in chemistry, 
 
 86 
 
 Reaction, chemical and neural, 29 
 Reason, as creator of the world, 
 
 50 
 
 Respiration, life, and conscious- 
 ness, 29, et seq.; of muscles, 89 
 "Restlessness," mental, 50 
 Royce, J., on internal and exter- 
 nal, 39; as absolute Idealist, 50 
 
 Salamander, 54 
 
 Scientific attitude, difference be- 
 tween, and philosophic, 50 
 
 Scripps Institution, psychology of 
 colony of, 75 
 
 "Secret powers" of substances, 84 
 
 Self, and person, 44; control, 48; 
 development, 48 
 
Index 
 
 105 
 
 Sellars, R. W., individuality in 
 percepts, 37; the individual and 
 social psychology, 75 
 
 Society, and individual, 75 
 
 Soul, and body, interaction be- 
 tween, 66 
 
 Spirits, historical relation to es- 
 sences, 31; historical relation to 
 breath and air, 81 
 
 Stout, O. P., 41; unanalysed cogni- 
 tion in consciousness, 47; on 
 personality of animals, 71 
 
 Sub-conscious, 93 
 
 Subjective, and "inner," 35 
 
 Theory, of knowledge, 39; of con- 
 sciousness, 39 
 
 Transformation, of substances, 30 
 Transmutation of metals, 31 
 Truth, ultimate, 32 
 
 Ultimate truth, 32 
 Uranium, 85 
 
 Wheeler, W. M., on problem of 
 instinct, 27; on instinct and bod- 
 ily organization, 54 
 
 Whitman, C. O., on relation be- 
 tween instinct and structure, 57 
 
 Work, energy, power, force, 85 
 
 World, external, 46 
 
 Zoologist, anthropological, 28 
 
THIS BOOK IS DUE ON THE LAST DATE 
 STAMPED BELOW 
 
 RENEWED BOOKS ARE SUBJECT TO IMMEDIATE 
 RECALL 
 
 UCD LIBRARY 
 
 .3 197] 
 DEC 2 8 REC'Q 
 
 
 MAY22REC'D 
 
 LIBRARY, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, DAVIS 
 
 Book Slip-25w-6,'66(G3855s4)458 
 
N9 536220 
 
 Hitter, W.E. 
 
 An organ! smal theory 
 of consciousness. 
 
 QPUll 
 
 LIBRARY 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 
 DAVIS