mm I9°6* gave expression to a similar thought. "It must ever be kept in mind," so the manly and inspiriting words ran, "that war is not merely justifiable, but imperative, upon honourable men and upon an honourable nation when peace is only to be obtained by the sacrifice of conscientious conviction or of national welfare. A just war is in the long- run far better for a nation's soul than the most prosperous peace obtained by an acquiescence in wrong or injustice. ... It must be remembered that even to be defeated in war may be better than not to have fought at all." To sum up these various views, we may say that ex- pediency in the higher sense must be conclusive in deciding whether to undertake a war in itself morally justifiable. Such decision is rendered more easy by the consideration that the prospects of success are always the greatest when the moment for declaring war can be settled to suit the political and military situation. It must further be remembered that every success in foreign policy, especially if obtained by a demonstration of military strength, not only heightens the power of the State in foreign affairs, but adds to the reputation of the Government at home, and thus enables it better to fulfil its moral aims and civilizing duties. No one will thus dispute the assumption that, under certain circumstances, it is the moral and political duty of the State to employ war as a political means. So long as all human progress and all natural development are based on the law of conflict, it is necessary to engage in such conflict under the most favourable conditions possible. When a State is confronted by the material impossibility of supporting any longer the warlike preparations which the power of its enemies has forced upon it, when it is clear that the rival States must gradually acquire from THE DUTY TO MAKE WAR 53 natural reasons a lead that cannot be won back, when there are indications of an offensive alliance of stronger enemies who only await the favourable moment to strike — the moral duty of the State towards its citizens is to begin the strug- gle while the prospects of success and the political circum- stances are still tolerably favourable. When, on the other hand, the hostile States are weakened or hampered by affairs at home and abroad, but its own warlike strength shows elements of superiority, it is impeartive to use the favourable circumstances to promote its own political aims. The danger of a war may be faced the more readily if there is good prospect that great results may be obtained with comparatively small sacrifices. These obligations can only be met by a vigorous, resolute, active policy, which follows definite ideas, and understands how to arouse and concentrate all the living forces of the State, conscious of the truth of Schiller's lines : "The chance that once thou hast refused Will never through the centuries recur." The verdict of history will condemn the statesman who was unable to take the responsibility of a bold decision, and sacrificed the hopes of the future to the present need of peace. It ' is obvious that under these circumstances it is ex- tremely difficult to answer the question whether in any special case conditions exist which justify the determination to make war. The difficulty is all the greater because the historical significance of the act must be considered, and the immediate result is not the final criterion of its justifi- cation. War is not always the final judgment of Heaven. There are successes which are transitory while the national life is reckoned by centuries. The ultimate verdict can only be obtained by the survey of long epochs.* The man whose high and responsible lot is to steer the fortunes of a great State must be able to disregard the ♦Treitschke, "Politik," i., § 2. 54 GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR verdict of his contemporaries ; but he must be all the clearer as to the motives of his own policy, and keep before his eyes, with the full weight of the categorical imperative, the teaching of Kant: "Act so that the maxim of thy will can at the same time hold good as a principle of universal legislation. "* He must have a clear conception of the nature and purpose of the State, and grasp this from the highest moral standpoint. He can in no other way settle the rules of his policy and recognize clearly the laws of political morality. He must also form a clear conception of the special duties to be fulfilled by the nation, the guidance of whose fortunes rests in his hands. He must clearly and definitely formulate these duties as the fixed goal of statesmanship. When he is absolutely clear upon this point he can judge in each particular case what corresponds to the true in- terests of the State; then only can he act systematically in the definite prospect of smoothing the paths of politics, and securing favourable conditions for the inevitable conflicts; then only, when the hour for combat strikes and the de- cision to fight faces him, can he rise with a free spirit and a calm breast to that standpoint which Luther once described in blunt, bold language: "It is very true that men write and say often what a curse war is. But they ought to con- sider how much greater is that curse which is averted by war. Briefly, in the business of war men must not regard the massacres, the burnings, the battles, and the marches, etc. — that is what the petty and simple do who only look with the eyes of children at the surgeon, how he cuts off the hand or saws off the leg, but do not see or notice that he does it in order to save the whole body. Thus we must look at the business of war or the sword with the eyes of men, asking, Why these murders and horrors? It will be shown that it is a business, divine in itself, and as needful and necessary to the world as eating or drinking, or any other work."* * Kant, "Kritik der praktischen Vernunft," p. 30. ♦Luther, "Whether soldiers can be in a state of salvation." THE DUTY TO MAKE WAR 55 Thus in order to decide what paths German policy must take in order to further the interests of the German people, and what possibilities of war are involved, we must first try to estimate the problems of State and of civilization which are to be solved, and discover what political pur- poses correspond to these problems. CHAPTER III A BRIEF SURVEY OF GERMANY'S HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT The life of the individual citizen is valuable only when it is consciously and actively employed for the attainment of great ends. The same holds good of nations and States. They are, as it were, personalities in the framework of collective humanity, infinitely various in their endowments and their characteristic qualities, capable of the most dif- ferent achievements, and serving the most multifarious purposes in the great evolution of human existence. Such a theory will not be accepted from the standpoint of the materialistic philosophy which prevails among wide circles of our nation to-day. According to it, all that happens in the world is a neces- sary consequence of given conditions; free will is only necessity become conscious. It denies the difference be- tween the empiric and the intelligible Ego, which is the basis of the notion of moral freedom. This philosophy cannot stand before scientific criticism. It seems everywhere arbitrarily restricted by the narrow limits of the insufficient human intelligence. The exist- ence of the universe is opposed to the law of a sufficient cause; infinity and eternity are incomprehensible to our conceptions, which are confined to space and time. The essential nature of force and volition remains in- explicable. We recognize only a subjectively qualified phenomenon in the world ; the impelling forces and the real nature of things are withdrawn from our understanding. A systematic explanation of the universe is quite impossible from the human standpoint. So much seems clear — although no demonstrable certainty attaches to this theory — that spiritual laws beyond the comprehension of us men govern 56 GERMANY'S DEVELOPMENT 57 the world according to a conscious plan of development in the revolving cycles of a perpetual change. Even the grad- ual evolution of mankind seems ruled by a hidden moral law. At any rate we recognize in the growing spread of civilization and common moral ideas a gradual progress towards purer and higher forms of life. It is indeed impossible for us to prove design and pur- pose in every individual case, because our attitude to the universal whole is too limited and anomalous. But within the limitations of our knowledge of things and of the inner necessity of events we can at least try to understand in broad outlines the ways of Providence, which we may also term the principles of development. We shall thus obtain useful guidance for our further investigation and procedure. The agency and will of Providence are most clearly seen in the history of the growth of species and races, of peoples and States. "What is true," Goethe once said in a letter to Zelter, "can but be raised and supported by its history; what is false only lowered and dissipated by its history." The formation of peoples and races, the rise and fall of States, the laws which govern the common life, teach us to recognize which forces have a creative, sustaining, and beneficent influence, and which work towards disintegra- tion, and thus produce inevitable downfall. We are here following the working of universal laws, but we must not forget that States are personalities endowed with very different human attributes, with a peculiar and often very marked character, and that these subjective qualities are distinct factors in the development of States as a whole. Impulses and influences exercise a very different effect on the separate national individualities. We must endeavour to grasp history in the spirit of the psychologist rather than of the naturalist. Each nation must be judged from its own standpoint if we wish to learn the general trend of its development. We must study the history of the German people in its connection with that of the other European States, and ask first what paths its development has hitherto followed, and what guidance the past gives for our future policy. From the time of their first appear- 58 GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR ance in history the Germans showed themselves a first- class civilized people. When the Roman Empire broke up before the onslaught of the barbarians, there were two main elements which shaped the future of the West, Christianity and the Ger- mans. The Christian teaching preached equal rights for all men and community of goods in an empire of masters and slaves, but formulated the highest moral code, and directed the attention of a race, which only aimed at luxury, to the world beyond the grave as the true goal of existence. It made the value of man as man, and the moral development of personality according to the laws of the individual conscience, the starting-point of all de- velopment. It thus gradually transformed the philosophy of the ancient world, whose morality rested solely on the relations with the State. Simultaneously with this, hordes of Germans from the thickly-populated North poured vic- toriously in broad streams over the Roman Empire and the decaying nations of the Ancient World. These masses could not keep their nationality pure and maintain their position as political powers. The States which they founded were short-lived. Even then men recognized how difficult it is for a lower civilization to hold its own against a higher. The Germans were gradually merged in the sub- ject nations. The German element, however, instilled new life into these nations, and offered new opportunities of growth. The stronger the admixture of German blood, the more vigorous and the more capable of civilization did the growing nations appear. In the meantime powerful opponents sprung up in this newly-formed world. The Latin race grew up by degrees out of the admixture of the Germans with the Roman world and the nations subdued by them, and separated itself from the Germans, who kept themselves pure on the north of the Alps and in the districts of Scandinavia. At the same time the idea of the Universal Empire, which the Ancient World had embraced, continued to flourish. In the East the Byzantine Empire lasted until a.d. 1453. In the West, however, the last Roman Emperor had been deposed by Odoacer in 476. Italy had fallen into the hands GERMANY'S DEVELOPMENT 59 of the East Goths and Lombards successively. The Visi- goths had established their dominion in Spain, and the Franks and Burgundians in Gaul. A new empire rose from the latter quarter. Charles the Great, with his powerful hand, extended the Frankish Em- pire far beyond the boundaries of Gaul. By the subjuga- tion of the Saxons he became lord of the country between the Rhine and the Elbe; he obtained the sovereignty in Italy by the conquest of the Lombards, and finally sought to restore the Western Roman Empire. He was crowned Emperor in Rome in the year 800. His successors clung to this claim ; but the Frankish Empire soon fell to pieces. In its partition the western half formed what afterwards became France, and the East Frankish part of the Empire became the later Germany. While the Germans in the West Frankish Empire, in Italy and Spain, had abandoned their speech and customs, and had gradually amalgamated with the Romans, the inhabitants of the East Frankish Empire, especially the Saxons and their neighbouring tribes, maintained their Germanic characteristics, language, and customs. A powerful German* kingdom arose which re- newed the claims of Charles the Great to the Western Roman Empire. Otto the Great was the first German King who took this momentous step. It involved him and his successors in a quarrel with the Bishops of Rome, who wished to be not only Heads of the Church, but lords of Italy, and did not hesitate to falsify archives in order to prove their pretended title to that country. The Popes made good this right, but they did not stop there. Living in Rome, the sacred seat of the world- empire, and standing at the head of a Church which daimed universality, they, too, laid hold in their own way of the idea of universal imperium. The notion was one of the boldest creations of the human intellect — to found and maintain a world-sovereignty almost wholly by the employ- ment of spiritual powers. i ♦German (Deutsch =3 diutisk) signifies originally "popular," opposed to "foreign" — e.g., the Latin Church dialect. It was first used as the name of a people in the tenth century a.p, 60 GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR Naturally these Papal pretensions led to feuds with the Empire. The freedom of secular aspirations clashed with the claims of spiritual dominion. In the portentous strug- gle of the two Powers for the supremacy, a struggle which inflicted heavy losses on the German Empire, the Imperial cause was worsted. It was unable to mould the widely different and too independent subdivisions of the empire into a homogeneous whole, and to crush the selfish par- ticularism of the estates. The last Staufer died on the scaffold at Naples under the axe of Charles of Anjou, who was a vassal of the Church. The great days of the German-Roman Empire were over. The German power lay on the ground in fragments. A peirod of almost complete anarchy followed. Dogmatism and lack of patriotic sentiment, those bad characteristics of the German people, contributed to extend this destruc- tion to the economic sphere. The intellectual life of the German people deteriorated equally. At the time when the Imperial power was budding and under the rule of the highly-gifted Staufers, German poetry was passing through a first classical period. Every German country was ring- ing with song; the depth of German sentiment found uni- versal expression in ballads and poems, grave or gay, and German idealism inspired the minnesingers. But with the disappearance of the Empire every string was silent, and even the plastic arts could not rise above the coarseness and confusion of the political conditions. The material pros- perity of the people indeed improved, as affairs at home were better regulated, and developed to an amazing extent ; the Hanseatic League bore its flag far and wide over the northern seas, and the great trade-routes, which linked the West and Orient, led from Venice and Genoa through Germany. But the earlier political power was never again attained. Nevertheless dislike of spiritual despotism still smoul- dered in the breasts of that German people, which had submitted to the Papacy, and was destined once more to blaze up into bright flames, and this time in the spiritual domain. As she grew more and more worldly, the Church had lost much of her influence on men's minds. On the GERMANY'S DEVELOPMENT 61 other hand, a refining movement had grown up in human- ism, which, supported by the spirit of antiquity, could not fail from its very nature to become antagonistic to the Church. It found enthusiastic response in Germany, and was joined by everyone whose thoughts and hopes were centred in freedom. Ulrich von Hutten's battle-cry, "I have dared the deed," rang loud through the districts of Ger- many. Humanism was thus in a sense the precursor of the Reformation, which, conceived in the innermost heart of the German people, shook Europe to her foundations. Once more it was the German people which, as formerly in in the struggle between the Arian Goths and the Orthodox Church, shed its heart's blood in a religious war for spiritual liberty, and now for national independence also. No struggle more pregnant with consequences for the de- velopment of humanity had been fought out since the Persian wars. In this cause the German people nearly dis- appeared, and lost all political importance. Large sections of the Empire were abandoned to foreign States. Germany became a desert. But this time the Church did not remain victorious as she did against the Arian Goths and the Staufers. It is true she was not laid prostrate; she still remained a mighty force, and drew new strength from the struggle itself. Politically the Catholic States, under Spanish leadership, won undisputed supremacy. But, on the other hand, the right to spiritual freedom was estab- lished. This most important element of civilization was retained for humanity in the reformed Churches, and has become ever since the palladium of all progress, though even after the Peace of Westphalia protracted struggles were required to assert religious liberty. The States of Latin race on their side now put forward strong claims to the universal imperium in order to suppress the German ideas of freedom. Spain first, then France: the two soon quarrelled among themselves about the pre- dominance. At the same time, in Germanized England a first-class Protestant power was being developed, and the age of discoveries, which coincided roughly with the era of the Reformation and the Thirty Years' War, opened 62 GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR new and unsuspected paths to human intellect and human energy. Political life also acquired a fresh stimulus. Grad- ually a broad stream of immigrants poured into the newly- discovered districts of America, the northern part of which fell to the lot of the Germanic, and the southern part to that of the Latin race. Thus was laid the foundation of the great colonial Empires, and, consequently, of world-politics. Germany remained excluded from this great movement, since she wasted her forces in ecclesiastical disputes and religious wars. On the other hand, in combination with England, the Low Countries and Austria, which latter had at the same time to repel the inroad of Turks from the East, she successfully curbed the French ambition for sovereignty in a long succession of wars. England by these wars grew to be the first colonial and maritime power in the world. Germany forfeited large tracts of territory, and lost still more in political power. She broke up into numerous feeble separate States, which were entirely void of any oommon sympathy with the German cause. But this very disintegration lent her fresh strength. A centre of Protestant power was established in the North — i. e., Prussia. After centuries of struggle the Germans had succeeded in driving back the Slavs, who poured in from the East, in wresting large tracts from them, and in completely Ger- manizing them. This struggle, like that with the niggard soil, produced a sturdy race, conscious of its strength, which extended its power to the coasts of the Baltic, and suc- cessfully planted Germanic culture in the far North. The German nation was finally victorious also against the Swedes, who disputed the command of the Baltic. In that war the Great Elector had laid the foundations of a strong political power, which, under his successors, gradually grew into an influential force in Germany. The headship of Protestant Germany devolved more and more on this State, and a counterpoise to Catholic Austria gradually grew up. This latter State had developed out of Germany into an independent great Power, resting its supremacy not only on a German population, but also on Hungarians and Slavs. In the Seven Years' War Prussia broke away from GERMANY'S DEVELOPMENT 63 Catholic Austria and the Empire, and confronted France and Iussia as an independent Protestant State. But yet another dark hour was in store for Germany, as she once more slowly struggled upwards. In France the Monarchy had exhausted the resources of the nation for its own selfish ends. The motto of the monarchy, Fetat c'est moi, carried to an extreme, provoked a tremendous revulsion of ideas, which culminated in the stupendous revolution of 1789, and everywhere in Europe, and more especially in Germany, shattered and swept away the ob- solete remnants of medievalism. The German Empire as such disappeared ; only fragmentary States survived, among which Prussia alone showed any real power. France once again under Napoleon was fired with the conception of the universal imperium, and bore her victorious eagles to Italy, Egypt, Syria, Germany, and Spain, and even to the inhos- pitable plains of Russia, which by a gradual political ab- sorption of the Slavonic East, and a slow expansion of power in wars with Poland, Sweden, Turkey, and Prussia, had risen to an important place among the European na- tions. Austria, which had become more and more a con- geries of different nationalities, fell before the mighty Cor- sican. Prussia, which seemed to have lost all vigour in her dream of peace, collapsed before his onslaught. But the German spirit emerged with fresh strength from the deepest humiliation. The purest and mightiest storm of fury against the yoke of the oppressor that ever honoured an enslaved nation burst out in the Protestant North. The wars of liberation, with their glowing enthusiasm, won back the possibilities of political existence for Prussia and for Germany, and paved the way for further world-wide his- torical developments. While the French people in savage revolt against spiritual and secular despotism had broken their chains and pro- claimed their rights, another quite different^revolution was working in Prussia — the revolution of duty. The assertion of the rights of the individual leads ultimately to individual irresponsibility and to a repudiation of the State. Immanuel Kant, the founder of critical philosophy, taught, in opposi- tion to this view, the gospel of moral duty, and Scharnhorst 64 GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR grasped the idea of universal military service. By calling upon each individual to sacrifice property and life for the good of the community, he gave the clearest expression to the idea of the State, and created a sound basis on which the claim to individual rights might rest. At the same time Stein laid the foundations of self-government in Prussia. While measures of the most far-reaching historical im- portance were thus being adopted in the State on which the future fate of Germany was to depend, and while revolution was being superseded by healthy progress, a German Empire of the first rank, the Empire of intellect, grew up in the domain of art and science, where German character and endeavour found the deepest and fullest ex- pression. A great change had been effected in this land of political narrowness and social sterility since the year 1750. A literature and a science, born in the hearts of the nation, and deeply rooted in the moral teaching of Protestantism, had raised their minds far beyond the boundaries of prac- tical life into the sunlit heights of intellectual liberty, and manifested the power and superiority of the German spirit. "Thus the new poetry and science became for many decades the most effectual bond of union for this dismembered peo- ple, and decided the victory of Protestantism in German life."* Germany was raised to be once more "the home of heresy, since she developed the root-idea of the Reforma- tion intp the right of unrestricted and unprejudiced in- quiry, "f Moral obligations, such as no nation had ever yet made the standard of conduct, were laid down in the phil- osophy of Kant and Fichte, and a lofty idealism inspired the songs of her poets. The intense effect of these spiritual agencies was realized in the outburst of heroic fury in 1813. "Thus our classical literature, starting from a different point, reached the same goal as the political work of the Prussian monarchy,"* and of those men of action who pushed this work forward in the hour of direct ruin. *Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte," i., p. 88. t Ibid., i., p. 90. tlbid. GERMANY'S DEVELOPMENT 65 The meeting of Napoleon and Goethe, two mighty con- querors, was an event in the world's history. On one side the scourge of God, the great annihilator of all survivals from the past, the gloomy despot, the last abortion of the revolution — a "Part of the power that still Produces Good, while still devising 111"; on the other, the serenely grave Olympian who uttered the words, "Let man be noble, resourceful, and good"; who gave a new content to the religious sentiment, since he conceived all existence as a perpetual change to higher conditions, and pointed out new paths in science ; who gave the clearest expression to all aspirations of the human intellect, and all movements of the German mind, and thus roused his people to consciousness ; who finally by his writ- ings on every subject showed that the whole realm of human knowledge was concentrated in the German brain; a prophet of truth, an architect of imperishable monuments which testify to the divinity in man. The great conqueror of the century was met by the hero of intellect, to whom was to fall the victory of the future. The mightiest potentate of the Latin race faced the great Germanic who stood in the forefront of humanity. Truly a nation which in the hour of its deepest political degradation could give birth to men like Fichte, Scharnhorst, Stein, Schiller, and Goethe, to say nothing about the great soldier-figures of the wars of Liberation, must be called to a mighty destiny. We must admit that in the period immediately succeeding the great struggle of those glorious days, the shortsighted- ness, selfishness, and weakness of its Sovereigns, and the jealousy of its neighbours, robbed the German people of the full fruits of its heroism, devotion, and pure enthusiasm. The deep disappointment of that generation found expres- sion in the revolutionary movement of 1848, and in the emigration of thousands to the free country of North America, where the Germans took a prominent part in the 5 66 GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR formation of a new nationality, but were lost to their mother-country. The Prussian monarchy grovelled before Austria and Russia, and seemed to have forgotten its na- tional duties. Nevertheless in the centre of the Prussian State there was springing up from the blood of the champions of free- dom a new generation that no longer wished to be the anvil, but to wield the hammer. Two men came to the front, King William I. and the hero of the Saxon forest. Reso- lutely they united the forces of the nation, which at first opposed them from ignorance, and broke down the selfish- ness and dogmatic positivism of the popular representatives. A victorious campaign settled matters with Austria, who did not willingly cede the supremacy in Germany, and left the German Imperial confederation without forfeiting her place as a Great Power. France was brought to the ground with a mighty blow; the vast majority of the German peo- ples united under the Imperial crown which the King of Prussia wore; the old idea of the German Empire was revived in a federal shape by the Triple Alliance of Ger- many, Austria, and Italy. The German idea, as Bismarck fancied it, ruled from the North Sea to the Adriatic and the Mediterranean. Like a phoenix from the ashes, the German giant rose from the sluggard-bed of the old Ger- man Confederation, and stretched his mighty limbs. It was an obvious and inevitable result that this awaken- ing of Germany vitally affected the other nations which had hitherto divided the economic and political power. Hostile combinations threatened us on all sides in order to check the further expansion of our power. Hemmed in between France and Russia, who allied themselves against us, we failed to gather the full fruits of our victories. The short- sightedness and party feuds of the newly-formed Reichstag — the old hereditary failings of our nation — prevented any colonial policy on broad lines. The intense love of peace, which the nation and Government felt, made us fall behind in the race with other countries. In the most recent partition of the earth, that of Africa, victorious Germany came off badly. France, her defeated opponent, was able to found the second largest colonial GERMANY'S DEVELOPMENT 67 Empire in the world; England appropriated the most im- portant portions; even small and neutral Belgium claimed a comparatively large and valuable share; Germany was forced to be content with some modest strips of Territory. In addition to, and in connection with, the political changes, new views and new forces have come forward. Under the influence of the constitutional ideas of Fred- erick the Great, and the crop of new ideas borne by the French Revolution, the conception of the State has com- pletely changed since the turn of the century. The patri- monial state of the Middle Ages was the hereditary posses- sion of the Sovereign. Hence sprung the modern State, which represents the reverse of this relation, in which the Sovereign is the first servant of the State, and the interest of the State, and not of the ruler, is the key to the policy of the Government. With this altered conception of the State the principle of nationality has gradually developed, of which the tendency is as follows : Historical boundaries are to be disregarded, and the nations combined into a political whole; the State will thus acquire a uniform na- tional chracter and common national interests. This new order of things entirely altered the basis of international relations, and set new and unknown duties before the statesman. Commerce and trade also developed on wholly new lines. After 181 5 the barriers to every activity — guilds and trade restrictions — were gradually removed. Landed prop- erty ceased to be a monopoly. Commerce and industries flourished conspicuously. "England introduced the univer- sal employment of coal and iron and of machinery into in- dustries, thus founding immense industrial establishments; by steamers and railways she brought machinery into com- merce, at the same time effecting an industrial revolution by physical science and chemistry, and won the control of the markets of the world by cotton. There came, besides, the enormous extension of the command of credit in the widest sense, the exploitation of India, the extension of colonization over Polynesia, etc." England at the same time girdled the earth with her cables and fleets. She thus at- tained to a sort of world-sovereignty. She has tried to 68 GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR found a new universal Empire; not, indeed, by spiritual or secular weapons, like Pope and Emperor in bygone days, but by the power of money, by making all material interests dependent on herself. Facing her, between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, link- ing the West and the East, the United States of North America have risen to be an industrial and commercial power of the first rank. Supported by exceptionally abun- dant natural resources, and the unscrupulously pushing character of her inhabitants, this mighty Empire aims at a suitable recognition of her power in the council of the na- tions, and is on the point of securing this by the building of a powerful navy. Russia has not only strengthened her position in Europe, but has extended her power over the entire North of Asia, and is pressing farther into the centre of that continent. She has already crossed swords with the States of the Mon- golian race. This vast population, which fills the east of the Asiatic continent, has, after thousands of years of dor- mant civilization, at last awakened to political life. The entrance of Japan into the circle of the great World Powers means a call to arms. "Asia for the Asiatics," is the phrase which she whispers beneath her breath, trusting in the strength of her demand. The new Great Power has emerged victoriously from its first encounter with a Euro- pean foe. China, too, is preparing to expand her forces outwardly. A mighty movement is thrilling Asia — the awakening of a new epoch. Dangers, then, which have already assumed a profound importance for the civilized countries of Europe, are threat- ening from Asia, the old cradle of the nations. But even in the heart of the European nations, forces which have slumbered hitherto are now awake. The persisting ideas of the French Revolution and the great industrial progress which characterized the last century, have roused the working classes of every country to a consciousness of their importance and their social power. The workers, originally concerned only in the amelioration of their material posi- tion, have, in theory, abandoned the basis of the modern State, and seek their salvation in the revolution which they GERMANY'S DEVELOPMENT 69 preach. They do not wish to obtain what they can within the limitations of the historically recognized State, but they wish to substitute for it a new State, in which they them- selves are the rulers. By this aspiration they not only per- petually menace State and society, but endanger in the separate countries the industries from which they live, since they threatn to destroy the possibility of competing in the international markets by continuous increase of wages and decrease of work. Even in Germany this movement has affected large sections of the population. Until approximately the middle of the last century, agri- culture and cattle-breeding formed the chief and most im- portant part of German industries. Since then, under the protection of wise tariffs, and in connection with the rapid growth of the German merchant navy, trade has marvel- lously increased. Germany has become an industrial and trading nation; almost the whole of the growing increase of the population finds work and employment in this sphere. Agriculture has more and more lost its leading position in the economic life of the people. The artisan class has thus become a power in our State. It is organized in trade unions, and has politically fallen under the influence of the international social democracy. It is hostile to the national class distinctions, and strains every nerve to undermine the existing power of the State. It is evident that the State cannot tolerate quietly this dangerous agitation, and that it must hinder, by every means, the efforts of the anti-constitutionalist party to effect their purpose. The law of self-preservation demands this ; but it is clear that, to a certain point, the pretensions of the working classes are justified. The citizen may fairly claim to protect himself from poverty by work, and to have an opportunity of raising himself in the social scale, if he willingly devotes his powers. He is entitled to demand that the State should grant this claim, and should be bound to protect him against the tyranny of capital. Two means of attaining such an object are open to the State: first, it may create opportunities of work, which se- cure remunerative employment to all willing hands; sec- ondly, it may insure the workman by legislation against 70 GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR every diminution in his capacity to work owing to sickness, age, or accident; may give him material assistance when temporarily out of work, and protect him against compul- sion which may hinder him from working. The economical prosperity of Germany as the visible result of three victorious campaigns created a labour mar- ket sufficiently large for present purposes, although with- out the conscious intention of the State. German labour, under the protection of the political power, gained a mar- ket for itself. On the other hand, the German State has intervened with legislation, with full consciousness of the end and the means. As Scharnhorst once contrasted the duty of the citizen with the rights of man, so the Emperor William I recognized the duty of the State towards those who were badly equipped with the necessaries of life. The position of the worker was assured, so far as circumstances allowed, by social legislation. No excuse, therefore, for revolutionary agitation now existed. A vigorous opposition to all the encroachments of the social democrats indicated the only right way in which the justifiable efforts of the working class could be reconciled with the continuance of the existing State and of existing society, the two pillars of all civilization and progress. This task is by no means completed. The question still is, How to win back the working class to the ideals of State and country? Willing workers must be still further pro- tected against social democratic tyranny. Germany, nevertheless, is in social-political respects at the head of all progress in culture. German science has held its place in the world. Germany certainly took the lead in political sciences during the last century, and in all other domains of intellectual inquiry has won a promi- nent position through the universality of her philosophy and her thorough and unprejudiced research into the nature of things. The achievements of Germany in the sphere of science and literature are attested by the fact that the annual ex- port of German books to foreign countries is, according to trustworthy estimates, twice as large as that of France, England, and North America combined. It is only in the GERMANY'S DEVELOPMENT 71 domain of the exact sciences that Germany has often been compelled to give precedence to foreign countries. German art also has failed to win a leading position. It shows, in- deed, sound promise in many directions, and has produced much that is really great; but the chaos of our political conditions is, unfortunately, reflected in it. The German Empire has politically been split up into numerous parties. Not only are the social democrats and the middle class op- posed, but they, again, are divided among themselves; not only are industries and agriculture bitter enemies, but the national sentiment has not yet been able to vanquish de- nominational antagonisms, and the historical hostility be- tween North and South has prevented the population from growing up into a completely united body. So stands Germany to-day, torn by internal dissensions, yet full of sustained strength; threatened on all sides by dangers, compressed into narrow, unnatural limits, she still is filled with high aspirations, in her nationality, her intel- lectual development, in her science, industries, and trade. And now, what paths does this history indicate to us for the future? What duties are enforced on us by the past? It is a question of far-reaching importance; for on the way in which the German State answers this question, de- pend not only our own further development, but to some extent the subsequent shaping of the history of the world. CHAPTER IV GERMANY'S HISTORICAL MISSION Let us pass before our mind's eye the whole course of our historical development, and let us picture to ourselves the life-giving streams of human beings, that in every age have poured forth from the Empire of Central Europe to all parts of the globe; let us reflect that rich seeds of in- tellectual and moral development were sown by the Ger- man intellectual life: the proud conviction forces itself upon us with irresistible power that a high, if not the high- est, importance for the entire development of the human race is ascribable to this German people. This conviction is based on the intellectual merits of our nation, on the freedom and the universality of the German spirit, which have ever and again been shown in the course of its history. There is no nation whose thinking is at once so free from prejudice and so historical as the German, which knows how to unite so harmoniously the freedom of the intellectual and the restraint of the prac- tical life on the path of free and natural development. The Germans have thus always been the standard-bearers of free thought, but at the same time a strong bulwark against revolutionary anarchical outbreaks. They have often been worsted in the struggle for intellectual freedom, and poured out their best heart's blood in the cause. Intellectual com- pulsion has sometimes ruled the Germans; revolutionary tremors have shaken the life of this people — the great peasant war in the sixteenth century, and the political at- tempts at revolution in the middle of the nineteenth century. But the revolutionary movement has been checked and directed into the paths of a healthy natural advancement. The inevitable need of a free intellectual self-determina- tion has again and again disengaged itself from the inner 72 GERMANY'S HISTORICAL MISSION 73 life of the soul of the people, and broadened into world- historical importance. Thus two great movements were born from the German intellectual life, on which, henceforth, all the intellectual and moral progress of man must rest : the Reformation and the critical philosophy. The Reformation, which broke the intellectual yoke, imposed by the Church, which checked all free progress; and the Critique of Pure Reason, which put a stop to the caprice of philosophic speculation by de- fining for the human mind the limitations of its capacity for knowledge, and at the same time pointed out in what way knowledge is really possible. On this sub-structure was developed the intellectual life of our time, whose deep- est significance consists in the attempt to reconcile the re- sult of free inquiry with the religious needs of the heart, and to lay a foundation for the harmonious organization of mankind. Torn this way and that, between hostile forces, in a continuous feud between faith and knowledge, man- kind seems to have lost the straight road of progress. Re- conciliation only appears possible when the thought of re- ligious reformation leads to a permanent explanation of the idea of religion, and science remains conscious of the limits of its power, and does not attempt to explain the domain of the supersensual world from the results of nat- ural philosophy. The German nation not only laid the foundations of this great struggle for an harmonious development of humanity, but took the lead in it. We are thus incurring an obliga- tion for the future, from which we cannot shrink. We must be prepared to be the leaders in this campaign, which is being fought for the highest stake that has been offered to human efforts. Our nation is not only bound by its past history to take part in this struggle, but is peculiarly adapted to do so by its special qualities. No nation on the face of the globe is so able to grasp and appropriate all the elements of culture, to add to them from the stores of its own spiritual endowment, and to give back to mankind richer gifts than it received. It has "enriched the store of traditional European culture with new and independent ideas and ideals, and won a position 74 GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR in the great community of civilized nations which none else could fill." "Depth of conviction, idealism, universality, the power to look beyond all the limits of a finite existence, to sympathize with all that is human, to traverse the realm of ideas in companionship with the noblest of all nations and ages — this has at all times been the German character- istic; this has been extolled as the prerogative of German culture."* To no nation, except the German, has it been given to enjoy in its inner self "that which is given to man- kind as a whole." We often see in other nations a greater intensity of specialized ability, but never the same capacity for generalization and absorption. It is this quality which specially fits us for the leadership in the intellectual world, and imposes on us the obligation to maintain that position. There are numerous other tasks to be fulfilled if we are to discharge our highest duty. They form the necessary platform from which we can mount to the highest goal. These duties lie in the domains of science and politics, and also in that borderland where science and politics touch, and where the latter is often directly conditioned by the results of scientific inquiry. First and foremost it is German science which must regain its superiority in unwearying and brilliant research in order to vindicate our birthright. On the one hand, we must extend the theory of the perceptive faculty; on the other, we must increase man's dominion over Nature by exploring her hidden secrets, and thus make human work more useful and remunerative. We must endeavour to find scientific solutions of the great problems which deeply concern mankind. We need not restrict ourselves to the sphere of pure theory, but must try to benefit civilization by the practical results of research, and thus create condi- tions of life in which a purer conception of the ideal life can find its expression. It is, broadly speaking, religious and social controversies which exercise the most permanent influence on human existence, and condition not only our future development, but the higher life generally. These problems have occu- pied the minds of no people more deeply and permanently ♦Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte," i., p. 95. GERMANY'S HISTORICAL MISSION 75 than our own. Yet the revolutionary spirit, in spite of the empty ravings of social democratic agitators, finds no place in Germany. The German nature tends towards a sys- tematic healthy development, which works slowly in op- position to the different movements. The Germans thus seem thoroughly qualified to settle in their own country the great controversies which are rending other nations, and to direct them into the paths of a natural progress in conformity with the laws of evolution. We have already started on the task in the social sphere, and shall no doubt continue it, so far as it is compatible with the advantages of the community and the working class itself. We must not spare any efforts to find other means than those already adopted to inspire the working class with healthy and patriotic ambitions. It is to be hoped, in any case, that if ever a great and common duty, requiring the concentration of the whole national strength, is imposed upon us, that the labour classes will not withhold their co-operation, and that, in face of a common danger, our nation will recover that unity which is lamentably deficient to-day. No attempt at settlement has been made in the religious domain. The old antagonists are still bitterly hostile to each other, especially in Germany. It will be the duty of the future to mitigate the religious and political antagonism of the denominations, under guarantees of absolute liberty of thought and all personal convictions, and to combine the conflicting views into a harmonious and higher system. At present there appears small probability of attaining this end. The dogmatism of Protestant orthodoxy and the Jesuitic tendencies and ultramontanism of the Catholics, must be surmounted, before any common religious move- ment can be contemplated. But no German statesman can disregard this aspect of affairs, nor must he ever forget that the greatness of our nation is rooted exclusively on Protestantism. Legally and socially all denominations en- joy equal rights, but the German State must never renounce the leadership in the domain of free spiritual development. To do so would mean loss of prestige. Duties of the greatest importance for the whole advance 76 GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR of human civilization have thus been transmitted to the German nation, as heir of a great and glorious past. It is faced with problems of no less significance in the sphere of its international relations. These problems are of spe- cial importance, since they affect most deeply the intel- lectual development, and on their solution depends the position of Germany in the world. The German Empire has suffered great losses of territory in the storms and struggles of the past. The Germany of to-day, considered geographically, is a mutilated torso of the old dominions of the Emperors; it comprises only a fraction of the German peoples. A large number of Ger- man fellow-countrymen have been incorporated into other States, or live in political independence, like the Dutch, who have developed into a separate nationality, but in lan- guage and national customs cannot deny their German an- cestry. Germany has been robbed of her natural bound- aries; even the source and mouth of the most characteris- tically German stream, the much lauded German Rhine, lie outside the German territory. On the eastern frontier, too, where the strength of the modern German Empire grew up in centuries of war against the Slavs, the posses- sions of Germany are menaced. The Slavonic waves are ever dashing more furiously against the coast of that Ger- manism, which seems to have lost its old victorious strength. Signs of political weakness are visible here, while for centuries the overflow of the strength of the German na- tion has poured into foreign countries, and been lost to our fatherland and to our nationality; it is absorbed by foreign nations and steeped with foreign sentiments. Even to-day the German Empire possesses no colonial territories where its increasing population may find remunerative work and a German way of living. This is obviously not a condition which can satisfy a powerful nation, or corresponds to the greatness of the German nation and its intellectual importance. At an earlier epoch, to be sure, when Germans had in the course of centuries grown accustomed to the degrada- tion of being robbed of all political significance, a large sec- tion of our people did not feel this insufficiency. Even GERMANY'S HISTORICAL MISSION 77 during the age of our classical literature the patriotic pride of that idealistic generation "was contented with the thought that no other people could follow the bold flights of Ger- man genius or soar aloft to the freedom of our world citizenship."* Schiller, in 1797, could write the lines: "German majesty and honour Fall not with the princes' crown; When amid the flames of war German Empire crashes down, German greatness stands unscathed."t The nobler and better section of our nation, at any rate, holds different sentiments to-day. We attach a higher value to the influence of the German spirit on universal culture than was then possible, since we must now take into con- sideration the immense development of Germany in the nineteenth century, and can thus better estimate the old importance of our classical literature. Again, we have learnt from the vicissitudes of our historical growth to recognize that the full and due measure of intellectual de- velopment can only be achieved by the political federation of our nation. The dominion of German thought can only be extended under the aegis of political power, and unless we act in conformity to this idea, we shall be untrue to our great duties towards the human race. Our first and positive duty consists, therefore, in zeal- ously guarding the territories of Germany, as they now are, and in not surrendering a foot's breadth of German soil to foreign nationalities. On the west the ambitious schemes of the Latin race have been checked, and it is hard to imagine that we shall ever allow this prize of victory to be snatched again from our hands. On the south-east the Turks, who formerly threatened the civilized countries of Europe, have been completely repulsed. They now take a very different position in European politics from that which they filled at the time of their victorious advance west- * Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte," i., p. 195. t Fragment of a poem on "German Greatness," published in 1905 by Bernhard Suphan. 78 GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR wards. Their power on the Mediterranean is entirely de- stroyed. On the other hand, the Slavs have become a formidable power. Vast regions which were once under German influence are now once more subject to Slavonic rule, and seem permanently lost to us. The present Rus- sian Baltic provinces were formerly flourishing seats of German culture. The German element in Austria, our ally, is gravely menaced by the Slavs; Germany herself is ex- posed to a perpetual peaceful invasion of Slavonic work- men. Many Poles are firmly established in the heart of Westphalia. Only faint-hearted measures are taken to-day to stem this Slavonic flood. And yet to check this onrush of Slavism is not merely an obligation inherited from our fathers, but a duty in the interests of self-preservation and European civilization. It cannot yet be determined whether we can keep off this vast flood by pacific precautions. It is not improbable that the question of Germanic or Slavonic supremacy will be once more decided by the sword. The probability of such a conflict grows stronger as we become more lax in pacific measures of defence, and show less de- termination to protect the German soil at all costs. The further duty of supporting the Germans in foreign countries in their struggle for existence and of thus keeping them loyal to their nationality, is one from which, in our direct interests, we cannot withdraw. The isolated groups of Germans abroad greatly benefit our trade, since by pref- erence they obtain their goods from Germany ; but they may also be useful to us politically, as we discover in America. The American-Germans have formed a political alliance with the Irish, and thus united, constitute a power in the State, with which the Government must reckon. Finally, from the point of view of civilization, it is im- perative to preserve the German spirit, and by so doing to establish foci of universal culture. Even if we succeed in guarding our possessions in the East and West, and in preserving the German nationality in its present form throughout the world, we shall not be able to maintain our present position, powerful as it is, in the great competition with the other Powers, if we are con- tented to restrict ourselves to our present sphere of power, GERMANY'S HISTORICAL MISSION 79 while the surrounding countries are busily extending their dominions, If we wish to compete further with them, a policy which our population and our civilization both entitle and compel us to adopt, we must not hold back in the hard struggle for the sovereignty of the world. Lord Rosebery, speaking at the Royal Colonial Institute on March i, 1893, expressed himself as follows: "It is said that our Empire is already large enough and does not need expansion. . . . We shall have to consider not what we want now, but what we want in the future. . . . We have to remember that it is part of our responsibility and heritage to take care that the world, so far as it can be moulded by us, should receive the Anglo-Saxon and not another character."* That is a great and proud thought which the English- man then expressed. If we count the nations who speak English at the present day, and if we survey the countries which acknowledge the rule of England, we must admit that he is justified from the English point of view. He does not here contemplate an actual world-sovereignty, but the predominance of the English spirit is proclaimed in plain language. England has certainly done a great work of civilization, especially from the material aspect; but her work is one- sided. All the colonies which are directly subject to Eng- lish rule are primarily exploited in the interest of English industries and English capital. The work of civilization, which England undeniably has carried out among them, has always been subordinated to this idea ; she has never justi- fied her sovereignty by training up a free and independent population, and by transmitting to the subject peoples the blessings of an independent culture of their own. With regard to those colonies which enjoy self-government, and are therefore more or less free republics, as Canada, Aus- tralia, South Africa, it is very questionable whether they will permanently retain any trace of the English spirit. They are not only growing States, but growing nations, and it seems uncertain at the present time whether England * This passage is quoted in the book of the French ex-Minister Hanotaux, "Fashoda et le partage de l'Afrique." 80 GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR will be able to include them permanently in the Empire, to make them serviceable to English industries, or even to secure that the national character is English. Neverthe- less, it is a great and proud ambition that is expressed in Lord Rosebery's words, and it testifies to a supreme na- tional self-confidence. The French regard with no less justifiable satisfaction the work done by them in the last forty years. In 1909 the former French Minister, Hanotaux, gave expression to this pride in the following words : "Ten years ago the work of founding our colonial Empire was finished. France has claimed her rank among the four great Powers. She is at home in every quarter of the globe. French is spoken, and will continue to be spoken, in Africa, Asia, America, Oceania. Seeds of sovereignty are sown in all parts of the world. They will prosper under the protection of Heaven."* The same statesman criticized, with ill-concealed hatred, the German policy: "It will be for history to decide what has been the leading thought of Germany and her Govern- ment during the complicated disputes under wrych the par- tition of Africa and the last phase of French colonial policy were ended. We may assume that at first the adherents to Bismarck's policy saw with satisfaction how France em- barked on distant and difficult undertakings, which would fully occupy the attention of the country and its Govern- ment for long years to come. Nevertheless, it is not certain that this calculation has proved right in the long-run, since Germany ultimately trod the same road, and, somewhat late, indeed, tried to make up for lost time. If that country deliberately abandoned colonial enterprise to others, it can- not be surprised if these have obtained the best shares." This French criticism is not altogether unfair. It must be admitted with mortification and envy that the nation vanquished in 1870, whose vital powers seemed exhausted, which possessed no qualification for colonization from want of men to colonize, as is best seen in Algeria, has yet created the second largest colonial Empire in the world, and prides ♦Hanotaux, "Fashoda et le partage de l'Afrique." GERMANY'S HISTORICAL MISSION 81 herself on being a World Power, while the conqueror of Gravelotte and Sedan in this respect lags far behind her, and only recently, in the Morocco controversy, yielded to the unjustifiable pretensions of France in a way which, ac- cording to universal popular sentiment, was unworthy alike of the dignity and the interests of Germany. The openly declared claims of England and France are the more worthy of attention since an etente prevails be- tween the two countries. In the face of these claims the German nation, from the standpoint of the importance to civilization, is fully entitled not only to demand a place in the sun, as Prince Biilow used modestly to express it, but to aspire to an adequate share in the sovereignty of the world far beyond the limits of its present sphere of in- fluence. But we can only reach this goal, by so amply securing our position in Europe, that it can never again be questioned. Then only we need no longer fear that we shall be opposed by stronger opponents whenever we take part in international politics. We shall then be able to exercise our forces freely in fair rivalry with the other World Powers, and secure to German nationality and Ger- man spirit throughout the globe that high esteem which is due to them. Such an expansion of power, befitting our importance, is not merely a fanciful scheme — it will soon appear as a political necessity. The fact has already been mentioned that, owing to political union and improved economic conditions during the last forty years, an era of great prosperity has set in, and that German industries have been widely extended and German trade has kept pace with them. The extraordinary capacity of the German nation for trade and navigation has once more brilliantly asserted itself. The days of the Hanseatic League have returned. The labour resources of our nation increase continuously. The increase of the population in the German Empire alone amounts yearly to a million souls, and these have, to a large extent, found remunerative industrial occupation. There is, however, a reverse side to this picture of splen- did development. We are absolutely dependent on foreign &2 GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR countries for the import of raw materials, and to a con- siderable extent also for the sale of our own manufactures. We even obtain a part of our necessaries of life from abroad. Then, again, we have not the assured markets which England possesses in her colonies. Our own colonies are unable to take much of our products, and the great foreign economic spheres try to close their doors to out- siders, especially Germans, in order to encourage their own industries, and to make themselves independent of other countries. The livelihood of our working classes directly depends on the maintenance and expansion of our export trade. It is a question of life and death for us to keep open our oversea commerce. We shall very soon see ourselves compelled to find for our growing population means of life other than industrial employment. It is out of the question that this latter can keep pace permanently with the increase of population. Agriculture will employ a small part of this increase, and home settlements may afford some relief. But no remunerative occupation will ever be found within the borders of the existing German Empire for the whole population, however favourable our international relations. We shall soon, therefore, be faced by the question, whether we wish to surrender the coming generations to foreign countries, as formerly in the hour of our decline, or whether we wish to take steps to find them a home in our own German colonies, and so retain them for the fatherland. There is no possible doubt how this question must be answered. If the unfortunate course of our history has hitherto prevented us from building a col- onial Empire, it is our duty to make up for lost time, and at once to construct a fleet which, in defiance of all hostile Powers, may keep our sea communications open. We have long underestimated the importance of colonies. Colonial possessions which merely serve the purpose of ac- quiring wealth, and are only used for economic ends, while the owner- State does not think of colonizing in any form or raising the position of the aboriginal population in the economic or social scale, are unjustifiable and immoral, and can never be held permanently. "But that colonization which retains a uniform nationality has become a factor GERMANY'S HISTORICAL MISSION 83 of immense importance for the future of the world. It will determine the degree in which each nation shares in the government of the world by the white race. It is quite imaginable that a country which owns no colonies will no longer count among the European Great Powers, however powerful it may otherwise be."* We are already suffering severely from the want of colonies to meet our requirements. They would not merely guarantee a livelihood to our growing working population, but would supply raw material and food-stuffs, would buy goods, and open a field of activity to that immense capital of intellectual labour forces which is to-day lying unpro- ductive in Germany, or is in the service of foreign interests. We find throughout the countries of the world German merchants, engineers, and men of every profession, em- ployed actively in the service of foreign masters, because German colonies, when they might be profitably engaged, do not exist. In the future, however, the importance of Germany will depend on two points: firstly, how many millions of men in the world speak German? secondly, how many of them are politically members of the German Em- pire? These are heavy and complicated duties, which have de- volved on us from the entire past development of our na- tion, and are determined by its present condition as regards the future. We must be quite clear on this point, that no nation has had to reckon with the same difficulties and hostility as ours. This is due to the many restrictions of our political relations, to our unfavourable geographical position, and to the course of our history. It was chiefly our own fault that we were condemned to political paralysis at the time when the great European States built them- selves up, and sometimes expanded into World Powers. We did not enter the circle of the Powers, whose decision carried weight in politics, until late, when the partition of the globe was long concluded. All which other nations attained in centuries of natural development — political union, colonial possessions, naval power, international trade — was denied to our nation until quite recently. What we * Treitschke, "Politik," i., § 8. 84 GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR now wish to attain must be fought for, and won, against a superior force of hostile interests and Powers. It is all the more emphatically our duty plainly to per- ceive what paths we wish to take, and what our goals are, so as not to split up our forces in false directions, and in- voluntarily to diverge from the straight road of our in- tended development. The difficulty of our political position is in a certain sense an advantage. By keeping us in a continually in- creasing state of tension, it has at least protected us so far from the lethargy which so often follows a long period of peace and growing wealth. It has forced us to stake all our spiritual and material forces in order to rise to every occasion, and has thus discovered and strengthened re- sources which will be of great value whenever we shall be called upon to draw the sword. CHAPTER V WORLD POWER OR DOWNFALL In discussing the duties which fall to the German nation from its history and its general as well as particular endow- ments, we attempted to prove that a consolidation and ex- pansion of our position among the Great Powers of Europe, and an extension of our colonial possessions, must be the basis of our future development. The political questions thus raised intimately concern all international relations, and should be thoroughly weighed. We must not aim at the impossible. A reckless policy would be foreign to our national character and our high aims and duties. But we must aspire to the possible, even at the risk of war. This policy we have seen to be both our right and our duty. The longer we look at things with folded hands, the harder it will be to make up the start which the other Powers have gained on us. "The mn of sense will by the forelock clutch Whatever lies within his power, Stick fast to it, and neither shirk, Nor from his enterprise be thrust, But, having once begun to work, Go working on because he must." Faust (translated by Sir Theodore Martin). The sphere in which we can realize our ambition is cir- cumscribed by the hostile intentions of the other World Powers, by the existing territorial conditions, and by the armed force which is at the back of both. Our policy must necessarily be determined by the consideration of these conditions. We must accurately, and without bias or timid- ity, examine the circumstances which turn the scale when 85 86 GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR the forces which concern us are weighed one against the other. These considerations fall partly within the military, but belong mainly to the political sphere, in so far as the politi- cal grouping of the States allows a survey of the military resources of the parties. We must try to realize this group- ing. The shifting aims of the politics of the day need not be our standard; they are often coloured by considerations of present expediency, and offer no firm basis for forming an opinion. We must rather endeavour to recognize the political views and intentions of the individual States, which are based on the nature of things, and therefore will con- tinually make their importance felt. The broad lines of policy are ultimately laid down by the permanent interests of a country, although they may often be mistaken from short-sightedness or timidity, and although policy some- times takes a course which does not seem warranted from the standpoint of lasting national benefits. Policy is not an exact science, following necessary laws, but is made by men who impress on it the stamp of their strength or their weakness, and often divert it from the path of true national interests. Such digressions must not be ignored. The statesman who seizes his opportunity will often profit by these political fluctuations. But the student who considers matters from the standpoint of history must keep his eyes mainly fixed on those interests which seem permanent. We must therefore try to make the international situation in this latter sense clear, so far as it concerns Germany's power and ambitions. We see the European Great Powers divided into two great camps. On the one side Germany, Austria, and Italy have con- cluded a defensive alliance, whose sole object is to guard against hostile aggression. In this alliance the two first- named States form the solid, probably unbreakable, core, since by the nature of things they are intimately connected. The geographical conditions force this result. The two States combined form a compact series of territories from the Adriatic to the North Sea and the Baltic. Their close union is due also to historical, national and political condi- WORLD POWER OR DOWNFALL 87 tions. Austrians have fought shoulder to shoulder with Prussians and Germans of the Empire on a hundred battle- fields; Germans are the backbone of the Austrian domin- ions, the bond of union that holds together the different nationalities of the Empire. Austria, more than Germany, must guard against the inroads of Slavism, since numer- ous Slavonic races are comprised in her territories. There has been no conflict of interests between the two States since the struggle for the supremacy in Germany was de- cided. The maritime and commercial interests of the one point to the south and south-east, those of the other to the north. Any feebleness in the one must react detrimen- tally on the political relations of the other. A quarrel be- tween Germany and Austria would leave both States at the mercy of overwhelmingly powerful enemies. The pos- sibility of each maintaining its political position depends on their standing by each other. It may be assumed that the relations uniting the two States will be permanent so long as Germans and Magyars are the leading nationalities in the Danubian monarchy. It was one of the master- strokes of Bismarck's policy to have recognized the com- munity of Austro-German interests even during the war of 1866, and boldly to have concluded a peace which ren- dered such an alliance possible. The weakness of the Austrian Empire lies in the strong admixture of Slavonic elements, which are hostile to the German population, and show many signs of Pan- Slavism. It is not at present, however, strong enough to influence the political position of the Empire. Italy, also, is bound to the Triple Alliance by her true interests. The antagonism to Austria, which has run through Italian history, will diminish when the needs of expansion in other spheres, and of creating a natural chan- nel for the increasing population, are fully recognized by Italy. Neither condition is impossible. Irredentism will then lose its political significance, for the position, which belongs to Italy from her geographical situation and her past history, and will promote her true interests if attained, cannot be won in a war with Austria. It is the position of a leading political and commercial Mediterranean Power. 88 GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR That is the natural heritage which she can claim. Neither Germany nor Austria is a rival in this claim, but France, since she has taken up a permanent position on the coast of North Africa, and especially in Tunis, has appropriated a country which would have been the most natural colony for Italy, and has, in point of fact, been largely colonized by Italians, It would, in my opinion, have been politically right for us, even at the risk of a war with France, to protest against this annexation, and to preserve the terri- tory of Carthage for Italy. We should have considerably strengthened Italy's position on the Mediterranean, and created a cause of contention between Italy and France that would have added to the security of the Triple Al- liance. The weakness of this alliance consists in its purely de- fensive character. It offers a certain security against hos- tile aggression, but does not consider the necessary de- velopment of events, and does not guarantee to any of its members help in the prosecution of its essential interests. It is based on a status quo, which was fully justified in its day, but has been left far behind by the march of politi- cal events. Prince Bismarck, in his "Thoughts and Remi- niscences," pointed out that this alliance would not always correspond to the requirements of the future. Since Italy found the Triple Alliance did not aid her Mediterranean policy, she tried to effect a pacific agreement with England and France, and accordingly retired from the Triple Al- liance. The results of this policy are manifest to-day. Italy, under an undisguised arrangement with England and France, but in direct opposition to the interests of the Triple Alliance, attacked Turkey, in order to conquer, in Tripoli, the required colonial territory. This undertaking brought her to the brink of a war with Austria, which, as the supreme Power in the Balkan Peninsula, can never tolerate the encroachment of Italy into those regions. The Triple Alliance, which in itself represents a natural league, has suffered a rude shock. The ultimate reason for this result is found in the fact that the parties con- cerned with a narrow, short-sighted policy look only to their immediate private interests, and pay no regard to the vital WORLD POWER OR DOWNFALL 89 needs of the members of the league. The alliance will not regain its original strength until, under the protection of the allied armies, each of the three States can satisfy its political needs. We must therefore be solicitous to pro- mote Austria's position in the Balkans, and Italy's interests on the Mediterranean. Only then can we calculate on find- ing in our allies assistance towards realizing our own politi- cal endeavours. Since, however, it is against all our in- terests to strengthen Italy at the cost of Turkey, which is, as we shall see, an essential member of the Triple Alliance, we must repair the errors of the past, and in the next great war win back Tunis for Italy. Only then will Bismarck's great conception of the Triple Alliance reveal its real mean- ing. But the Triple Alliance, so long as it only aims at negative results, and leaves it to the individual allies to pursue their vital interests exclusively by their own re- sources, will be smitten with sterility. On the surface, Italy's Mediterranean interests do not concern us closely. But their real importance for us is shown by the considera- tion that the withdrawal of Italy from the Triple Alliance, or, indeed, its secession to an Anglo-Franco-Russian entente, would probably be the signal for a great European war against us and Austria. Such a development would gravely prejudice the lasting interests of Italy, for she would for- feit her political independence by so doing, and incur the risk of sinking to a sort of vassal state of France. Such a contingency is not unthinkable, for, in judging the policy of Italy, we must not disregard her relations with England as well as with France. England is clearly a hindrance in the way of Italy's justifiable efforts to win a prominent position in the Medi- terranean. She possesses in Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Egypt, and Aden a chain of strong bases, which secure the sea-route to India, and she has an unqualified interest in commanding this great road through the Mediterranean. England's Mediterranean fleet is correspondingly strong and would — especially in combination with the French Mediter- ranean squadron — seriously menace the coasts of Italy, should that country be entangled in a war against England and France. Italy is therefore obviously concerned in 90 GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR avoiding such a war, as long as the balance of maritime power is unchanged. She is thus in an extremely difficult double position; herself a member of the Triple Alliance, she is in a situation which compels her to make overtures to the opponents of that alliance, so long as her own allies can afford no trustworthy assistance to her policy of de- velopment. It is our interest to reconcile Italy and Turkey so far as we can. France and Russia have united in opposition to the Cen- tral European Triple Alliance. France's European policy is overshadowed by the idea of revanche. For that she makes the most painful sacrifices ; for that she has forgotten the hundred years' enmity against England and the humilia- tion of Fashoda. She wishes first to take vengeance for the defeats of 1870-71, which wounded her national pride to the quick; she wishes to raise her political prestige by a victory over Germany, and, if possible, to regain that former supremacy on the continent of Europe which she so long and brilliantly maintained; she wishes, if fortune smiles on her arms, to reconquer Alsace and Lorraine. But she feels too weak for an attack on Germany. Her whole foreign policy, in spite of all protestations of peace, fol- lows the single aim of gaining allies for this attack. Her alliance with Russia, her entente with England, are inspired with this spirit; her present intimate relations with this latter nation are traceable to the fact that the French policy hoped, and with good reason, for more active help from England's hostility to Germany than from Russia. The colonial policy of France pursues primarily the ob- ject of acquiring a material, and, if possible, military su- periority over Germany. The establishment of a native African army, the contemplated introduction of a modified system of conscription in Algeria, and the political annexa- tion of Morocco, which offers excellent raw material for soldiers, so clearly exhibit this intention, that there can be no possible illusion as to its extent and meaning. Since France has succeeded in bringing her military strength to approximately the same level as Germany, since she has acquired in her North African Empire the possi- bility of considerably increasing that strength, since she has WORLD POWER OR DOWNFALL 91 completely outstripped Germany in the sphere of colonial policy, and has not only kept up, but also revived, the French sympathies of Alsace and Lorraine, the conclusion is obvious: France will not abandon the paths of an anti- German policy, but will do her best to excite hostility against us, and to thwart German interests in every quarter of the globe. When she came to an understanding with the Italians, that she should be given a free hand in Morocco if she allowed them to occupy Tripoli, a wedge was driven into the Triple Alliance which threatens to split it. It may be regarded as highly improbable that she will maintain honourably and with no arriere-pensee the obligations un- dertaken in the interests of German commerce in Morocco. The suppression of these interests was, in fact, a marked feature of the French Morocco policy, which was conspicu- ously anti-German. The French policy was so successful that we shall have to reckon more than ever on the hos- tility of France in the future. It must be regarded as a quite unthinkable proposition that an agreement between France and Germany can be negotiated before the question between them has been once more decided by arms. Such an agreement is the less likely now that France sides with England, to whose interest it is to repress Germany but strengthen France. Another picture meets our eyes if we turn to the East, where the giant Russian Empire towers above all others. The Empire of the Czar, in consequence of its defeat in Manchuria, and of the revolution which was precipi- tated by the disastrous war, is following apparently a policy of recuperation. It has tried to come to an understanding with Japan in the Far East, and with England in Central Asia; in the Balkans its policy aims at the maintenance of the status quo. So far it does not seem to have entertained any idea of war with Germany. The Potsdam agreement, whose importance cannot be over-estimated, shows that we need not anticipate at present any aggressive policy on Russia's part. The ministry of Kokowzew seems likely to wish to continue this policy of recuperation, and has the more reason for doing so, as the murder of Stolypin with its accompanying events showed, as it were by a flash 92 GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR of lightning, a dreadful picture of internal disorder and revolutionary intrigue. It is improbable, therefore, that Russia would now be inclined to make armed intervention in favour of France. The Russo-French alliance is not, indeed, swept away, and there is no doubt that Russia would, if the necessity arose, meet her obligations; but the tension has been temporarily relaxed, and an improvement in the Russo-German relations has been effected, although this state of things was sufficiently well paid for by the concessions of Germany in North Persia. It is quite obvious that this policy of marking time, which Russia is adopting for the moment, can only be transitory. The requirements of the mighty Empire irresistibly compel an expansion towards the sea, whether in the Far East, where it hopes to gain ice- free harbours, or in the direction of the Mediterranean, where the Crescent still glitters on the dome of St. Sophia. After a successful war, Russia would hardly hesitate to seize the mouth of the Vistula, at the possession of which she has long aimed, and thus to strengthen appreciably her position in the Baltic. Supremacy in the Balkan Peninsula, free entrance into the Mediterranean, and a strong position on the Baltic, are the goals to which the European policy of Russia has naturally long been directed. She feels herself, also, the leading power of the Slavonic races, and has for many years been busy in encouraging and extending the spread of this element into Central Europe. Pan-Slavism is still hard at work. It is hard to foresee how soon Russia will come out from her retirement and again tread the natural paths of her in- ternational policy. Her present political attitude depends considerably on the person of the present Emperor, who believes in the need of leaning upon a strong monarehial State, such as Germany is, and also on the character of the internal development of the mighty Empire. The whole body of the nation is so tainted with revolutionary and moral infection, and the peasantry is plunged in such economic disorder, that it is difficult to see from what elements a vivifying force mav spring up capable of re- storing a healthy condition. Even the agrarian policy of WORLD POWER OR DOWNFALL 93 the present Government has not produced any favourable results, and has so far disappointed expectations. The pos- sibility thus has always existed that, under the stress of internal affairs, the foreign policy may be reversed and an attempt made to surmount the difficulties at home by suc- cesses abroad. Time and events will decide whether these successes will be sought in the Far East or in the West. On the one side Japan, and possibly China, must be en- countered; on the other, Germany, Austria, and, possibly, Turkey. Doubtless these conditions must exercise a decisive in- fluence on the Franco-Russian Alliance. The interests of the two allies are not radical. While France aims solely at crushing Germany by an aggressive war, Russia from the first has more defensive schemes in view. She wished to secure herself against any interference by the Powers of Central Europe in the execution of her political plans in the South and East, and at the same time, at the price of an alliance, to raise, on advantageous terms in France, the loans which were so much needed. Russia at present has no inducement to seek an aggressive war with Ger- many or to take part in one. Of course, every further in- crease of the German power militates against the Russian interests. We shall therefore always find her on the side of those who try to cross our political paths. England has recently associated herself with the Franco- Russian Alliance. She has made an arrangement in Asia with Russia by which the spheres of influence of the two parties are delimited, while with France she has come to terms in the clear intention of suppressing Germany under all circumstances, if necessary by force of arms. The actually existing conflict of Russian and English interests in the heart of Asia can obviously not be termin- ated by such agreements. So, also no natural community of interests exists between England and France. A strong French fleet may be as great a menace to England as to any other Power. For the present, however, we may reckon on an Anglo-French entente. This union is ce- mented by the common hostility to Germany. No other reason for the political combination of the two States is 94 GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR forthcoming. There is not even a credible pretext, which might mask the real objects. This policy of England is, on superficial examination, not very comprehensible. Of course, German industries and trade have lately made astounding progress, and the German navy is growing to a strength which commands respect. We are certainly a hindrance to the plans which England is prosecuting in Asiatic Turkey and Central Africa. This may well be distasteful to the English from economic as well as political and military aspects. But, on the other hand, the American competition in the domain of commercial politics is far keener than the German. The American navy is at the present moment stronger than the German, and will henceforth maintain this precedence. Even the French are on the point of building a formidable fleet, and their colonial Empire, so far as territory is con cerned, is immensely superior to ours. Yet, in spite of all these considerations, the hostility of the English is pri- marily directed against us. It is necessary to adopt the English standpoint in order to understand the line of thought which guides the English politicians. I believe that the solution of the problem is to be found in the wide ramifications of English interests in every part of the world. Since England committed the unpardonable blunder, from her point of view, of not supporting the Southern States in the American War of Secession, a rival to Eng- land's world-wide Empire has appeared on the other side of the Atlantic in the form of the United States of North America, which are a grave menace to England's fortunes. The keenest competition conceivable now exists between the two countries. The annexation of the Philippines by America, and England's treaty with Japan, have accentu- ated the conflict of interests between the two nations. The trade and industries of America can no longer be checked, and the absolutely inexhaustible and ever-growing resources of the Union are so prodigious that a naval war with America, in view of the vast distances and wide extent of the enemies' coasts, would prove a very bold, and certainly very difficult, undertaking. England accordingly has al- ways diplomatically conceded the claims of America, as WORLD POWER OR DOWNFALL 95 quite recently in the negotiations about fortifying the Panama Canal; the object clearly is to avoid any collision with the United States, from fearing the consequences of such collision. The American competition in trade and industries, and the growth of the American navy, are tolerated as inevitable, and the community of race is borne in mind. In this sense, according to the English point of view, must be understood the treaty by which a Court of Arbitration between the two countries was established. England wishes, in any case, to avert the danger of a war with America. The natural opposition of the two rival States may, however, in the further development of things, be so accentuated that England will be forced to assert her position by arms, or at least to maintain an un- disputed naval supremacy, in order to emphasize her diplo- matic action. The relations of the two countries to Canada may easily become strained to a dangerous point, and the temporary failure of the Arbitration Treaty casts a strong light on the fact that the American people does not con- sider that the present political relations of the two nations are permanent. There is another danger which concerns England more closely and directly threatens her vitality. This is due to the nationalist movement in India and Egypt, to the grow- ing power of Islam, to the agitation for independence in the great colonies, as well as to the supremacy of the Low- German element in South Africa. Turkey is the only State which might seriously threaten the English position in Egypt by land. This contingency gives to the national movement in Egypt an importance which it would not otherwise possess ; it clearly shows that England intensely fears every Pan-Islamitic movement. She is trying with all the resources of political intrigue to undermine the growing power of Turkey, which she offi- cially pretends to support, and is endeavouring to create in Arabi a new religious centre in opposition to the Caliphate. The same views are partially responsible for the policy in India, where some seventy millions of Moslems live under the English rule. England, so far, in accordance 96 GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR with the principle of divide et impera, has attempted to play off the Mohammedan against the Hindu population. But now that a pronounced revolutionary and nationalist tendency shows itself among these latter, the danger is imminent that Pan-Islamism, thoroughly roused, should unite with the revolutionary elements of Bengal. The co- operation of these elements might create a very grave danger, capable of shaking the foundations of England's high position in the world. While so many dangers, in the future at least, threaten both at home and abroad, English imperialism has failed to link the vast Empire together, either for purposes of commerce or defence, more closely than hitherto. Mr. Chamberlain's dream of the British Imperial Customs Union has definitely been abandoned. No attempt was made at the Imperial Conference in 191 1 to go back to it. "A centrifugal policy predominated. . . . When the ques- tion of imperial defence came up, the policy was rejected which wished to assure to Great Britain the help of the oversea dominions in every imaginable eventuality." The great self-ruled colonies represent allies, who will stand by England in the hour of need, but "allies with the reser- vation that they are not to be employed wrongfully for objects which they cannot ascertain or do not approve."* There are clear indications that the policy of the dominions, though not yet planning a separation from England, is contemplating the future prospect of doing so. Canada, South Africa, and Australia are developing, as mentioned in Chapter IV., into independent nations and States, and will, when their time comes, claim formal independence. All these circumstances constitute a grave menace to the stability of England's Empire, and these dangers largely influence England's attitude towards Germany. England may have to tolerate the rivalry of North America in her imperial and commercial ambitions, but the competition of Germany must be stopped. If England is forced to fight America, the German fleet must not be *Th. Schiemann in the Kreusaeitung of July 5, 1911. WORLD POWER OR DOWNFALL 97 in a position to help the Americans. Therefore it must be destroyed. A similar line of thought is suggested by the eventuality of a great English colonial war, which would engage England's fleets in far distant parts of the world. England knows the German needs and capabilities of expansion, and may well fear that a German Empire with a strong fleet might use such an opportunity for obtaining that increase of territory which England grudges. We may thus explain the apparent indifference of England to the French schemes of aggrandizement. France's capability of expansion is exhausted from insufficient increase of population. She can no longer be dangerous to England as a nation, and would soon fall a victim to English lust of Empire, if only Germany were conquered. The wish to get rid of the dangers presumably threaten- ing from the German quarter is all the more real since geographical conditions offer a prospect of crippling the German oversea commerce without any excessive efforts. The comparative weakness of the German fleet, contrasted with the vast superiority of the English navy, allows a correspondingly easy victory to be anticipated, especially if the French fleet co-operates. The possibility, therefore, of quickly and completely getting rid of one rival, in order to have a free hand for all other contingencies, looms very near, and undoubtedly presents a practicable means of placing the naval power of England on a firm footing for years to come, of annihilating German commerce, and of checking the importance of German interests in Africa and Northern Asia. The hostility to Germany is also sufficiently evident in other matters. It has always been England's object to maintain a certain balance of power between the continental nations of Europe, and to prevent any one of them attaining a pronounced supremacy. While these States crippled and hindered each other from playing any active part on the world's stage, England acquired an opportunity of follow- ing out her own purposes undisturbed, and of founding that world Empire which she now holds. This policy she still 7 98 GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR continues, for so long as the Powers of Europe tie each other's hands, her own supremacy is uncontested. It fol- lows directly from this that England's aim must be to repress Germany, but strengthen France; for Germany at the present moment is the only European State which threatens to win a commanding position; but France is her born rival, and cannot keep on level terms with her stronger neighbour on the East, unless she adds to her forces and is helped by her allies. Thus the hostility to Germany, from this aspect also, is based on England's most important interests, and we must treat it as axiomatic and self-evident. The argument is often adduced that England by a war with Germany would chiefly injure herself, since she would lose the German market, which is the best purchaser of her industrial products, and would be deprived of the very considerable German import trade. I fear that from the English point of view these conditions would be an addi- tional incentive to war. England would hope to acquire, in place of the lost German market, a large part of those markets which had been supplied by Germany before the war, and the want of German imports would be a great stimulus, and to some extent a great benefit, to English industries. After all, it is from the English aspect of the question quite comprehensible that the English Government strains every nerve to check the growing power of Germany, and that a passionate desire prevails in large circles of the English nation to destroy the German fleet which is build- ing, and attack the objectionable neighbour. English policy might, however, strike out a different line, and attempt to come to terms with Germany instead of fighting. This would be the most desirable course for us. A Triple Alliance — Germany, England, and America — has been suggested.* But for such a union with Germany to be possible, England must have resolved to give a free course to German development side by side with her own, to allow the enlargement of our colonial power, and to offer no political hindrances to our commercial and in- *"The United States and the War Cloud in Europe," by Th. Schiemann, McClure's Magazine, June, 1910. WORLD POWER OR DOWNFALL 99 dustrial competition. She must, therefore, have renounced her traditional policy, and contemplate an entirely new grouping of the Great Powers in the world. It cannot be assumed that English pride and self-interest will consent to that. The continuous agitation against Ger- many, under the tacit approval of the Government, which is kept up not only by the majority of the Press, but by a strong party in the country, the latest statements of Eng- lish politicians, the military preparations in the North Sea, and the feverish acceleration of naval construction, are unmistakable indications that England intends to persist in her anti-German policy. The uncompromising hostility of England and her efforts to hinder every expansion of Ger- many's power were openly shown in the very recent Morocco question. Those who think themselves capable of impressing on the world the stamp of their spirit, do not resign the headship without a struggle, when they think victory is in their grasp. A pacific agreement with England is, after all, a will- o'-the-wisp which no serious German statesman would trouble to follow. We must always keep the possibility of war with England before our eyes, and arrange our political and military plans accordingly. We need not concern our- selves with any pacific protestations of English politicians, publicists, and Utopians, which, prompted by the exigen- cies of the moment, cannot alter the real basis of affairs. When the Unionists, with their greater fixity of purpose, replace the Liberals at the helm, we must be prepared for a vigorous assertion of power by the island Empire. On the other hand, America, which indisputably plays a decisive part in English policy, is a land of limitless possibilities. While, on the one side, she insists on the Monroe doctrine, on the other she stretches out her own arms towards Asia and Africa, in order to find bases for her fleets. The United States aim at the economic and, where possible, the political command of the American continent, and at the naval supremacy in the Pacific. Their interests, both economic and political, notwithstanding all commercial and other treaties, clash emphatically with those too GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR of Japan and England. No arbitration treaties could alter this. No similar opposition to Germany, based on the nature of things, has at present arisen from the ambitions of the two nations; certainly not in the sphere of politics. So far as can be seen, an understanding with Germany ought to further the interests of America. It is unlikely that the Americans would welcome any considerable addition to the power of England. But such would be the case if Great Britain succeeded in inflicting a political and military defeat on Germany. For a time it seemed as if the Anglo-American negotia- tions about Arbitration Courts would definitely end in an alliance against Germany. There has, at any rate, been a great and widespread agitation against us in the United States. The Americans of German and Irish stock reso- lutely opposed it, and it is reasonable to assume that the anti-German movement in the United States was a passing phase, with no real foundation in the nature of things. In the field of commerce there is, no doubt, keen competition between the two countries, especially in South America ; there is, however, no reason to assume that this will lead to political complications. Japan has, for the time being, a direct political interest for us only in her influence on the affairs of Russia, America, England, and China. In the Far East, since Japan has formed an alliance with England, and seems recently to have effected an arrangement with Russia, we have to count more on Japanese hostility than Japanese friendship. Her attitude to China may prove exceptionally important to our colonial possessions in East Asia. If the two nations joined hands — a hardly probable eventuality at present — it would become difficult for us to maintain an independent position between them. The political rivalry between the two nations of yellow race must therefore be kept alive. If they are antagonistic, they will both probably look for help against each other in their relations with Europe, and thus enable the European Powers to retain their possessions in Asia. While the aspiring Great Powers of the Far East cannot World power or downfall toi at present directly influence our policy, Turkey — the pre- dominant Power of the Near East — is of paramount importance to us. She is our natural ally ; it is emphatically our interest to keep in close touch with her. The wisest course would have been to have made her earlier a member of the Triple Alliance, and so to have prevented the Turco- Italian War, which threatens to change the whole political situation, to our disadvantage. Turkey would gain in two ways: she assures her position both against Russia and against England — the two States, that is, with whose hos- tility we have to reckon. Turkey, also, is the only Power which can threaten England's position in Egypt, and thus menace the short sea-route and the land communications to India. We ought to spare no sacrifices to secure this coun- try as an ally for the eventuality of a war with England or Russia. Turkey's interests are ours. It is also to the obvious advantage of Italy that Turkey maintain her com- manding position on the Bosphorus and at the Dardanelles, that this important key should not be transferred to the keeping of foreigners, and belong to Russia or England. If Russia gained the access to the Mediterranean, to which she has so long aspired, she would soon become a prominent Power in its eastern basin, and thus greatly damage the Italian projects in those waters. Since the English interests, also, would be prejudiced by such a development, the English fleet in the Mediterranean would certainly be strengthened. Between England, France, and Russia it would be quite impossible for Italy to attain an independent or commanding position, while the opposition of Russia and Turkey leaves the field open to her. From this view of the question, therefore, it is advisable to end the Turco-Italian conflict, and to try and satisfy the justi- fiable wishes of Italy at the cost of France, after the next war, it may be. Spain alone of the remaining European Powers has any independent importance. She has developed a certain an- tagonism to France by her Morocco policy, and may, there- fore, become eventually a factor in German policy. The petty States, on the contrary, form no independent centres of gravity, but may, in event of war, prove to possess a by 102 GERMANY ANt) THE NEXT WAR no means negligible importance: the small Balkan States for Austria and Turkey; Denmark, Holland, Belgium, and Switzerland, and eventually Sweden, for Germany. Switzerland and Belgium count as neutral. The former was declared neutral at the Congress of Vienna on Novem- ber 20, 181 5, under the collective guarantee* of the signa- tory Powers; Belgium, in the Treaties of London of November 15, 183 1, and of April 19, 1839, on the part of the five Great Powers, the Netherlands, and Belgium itself. If we look at these conditions as a whole, it appears that on the continent of Europe the power of the Central European Triple Alliance and that of the States united against it by alliance and agreement balance each other, provided that Italy belongs to the league. If we take into calculation the imponderabilia^ whose weight can only be guessed at, the scale is inclined slightly in favour of the Triple Alliance. On the other hand, England indisputably rules the sea. In consequence of her crushing naval superiority when allied with France, and of the geograph- ical conditions, she may cause the greatest damage to Ger- many by cutting off her maritime trade. There is also a not inconsiderable army available for a continental war. When all considerations are taken into account, our op- ponents have a political superiority not to be underestimated. If France succeeds in strengthening her army by large colonial levies and a strong English landing-force, this superiority would be asserted on land also. If Italy really withdraws from the Triple Alliance, very distinctly superior forces will be united against Germany and Austria. Under these conditions the position of Germany is extraordinarily difficult. We not only require for the full material development of our nation, on a scale correspond- ing to its intellectual importance, an extended political basis, but, as explained in the previous chapter, we are compelled to obtain space for our increasing population and markets for our growing industries. But at every step which we * By a collective guarantee is understood the duty of the con- tracting Powers to take steps to protect this neutrality when all agree that it is menaced. Each individual Power has the right to interfere if it considers the neutrality menaced. WORLD POWER OR DOWNFALL 103 take in this direction England will resolutely oppose us. English policy may not yet have made the definite decision to attack us ; but it doubtless wishes, by all and every means, even the most extreme, to hinder every further expansion of German international influence and of German maritime power. The recognized political aims of England and the attitude of the English Government leave no doubt on this point. But if we were involved in a struggle with Eng- land, we can be quite sure that France would not neglect the opportunity of atacking our flank. Italy, with her ex- tensive coast-line, even if still a member of the Triple Alliance, will have to devote large forces to the defence of the coast to keep off the attacks of the Anglo-French Mediterranean Fleet, and would thus be only able to employ weaker forces against France. Austria would be paralyzed by Russia ; against the latter we should have to leave forces in the East. We should thus have to fight out the strug- gle against France and England practically alone with a part of our army, perhaps with some support from Italy. It is in this double menace by sea and on the mainland of Europe that the grave danger to our political position lies, since all freedom of action is taken from us and all expan- sion barred. Since the struggle is, as appears on a thorough investi- gation of the international question, necessary and inevit- able, we must fight it out, cost what it may. Indeed, we are carrying it on at the present moment, though not with drawn swords, and only by peaceful means so far. On the one hand it is being waged by the competition in trade, industries and warlike preparations; on the other hand, by diplomatic methods with which the rival States are fighting each other in every region where their interests clash. With these methods it has been possible to maintain peace hitherto, but not without considerable loss of power and prestige. This apparently peaceful state of things must not deceive us; we are facing a hidden, but none the less formidable, crisis — perhaps the most momentous crisis in the history of the German nation. We have fought in the last great wars for our national union and our position among the Powers of Europe; we 104 GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR now must decide whether we wish to develop into and main- tain a World Empire, and procure for German spirit and German ideas that fit recognition which has been hitherto withheld from them. Have we the energy to aspire to that great goal? Are we prepared to make the sacrifices which such an effort will doubtless cost us? or are we willing to recoil before the hostile forces, and sink step by step lower in our economic, political, and national importance? That is what is involved in our decision. "To be, or not to be," is the question which is put to us to-day, disguised, indeed, by the apparent equilibrium of the opposing interests and forces, by the deceitful shifts of diplomacy, and the official peace-aspirations of all the States; but by the logic of history inexorably demanding an answer, if we look with clear gaze beyond the narrow horizon of the day and the mere surface of things into the region of realities. There is no standing still in the world's history. All is growth and development. It is obviously impossible to keep things in the status quo, as diplomacy has so often attempted. No true statesman will ever seriously count on such a possibility: he will only make the outward and temporary maintenance of existing conditions a duty when he wishes to gain time and deceive an opponent, or when he cannot see what is the trend of events. He will use such diplomatic means only as inferior tools; in reality he will only reckon with actual forces and with the powers of a continuous development. We must make it quite clear to ourselves that there can be no standing still, no being satisfied for us, but only progress or retrogression, and that it is tantamount to retrogression when we are contented with our present place among the nations of Europe, while all our rivals are straining with desperate energy, even at the cost of our rights, to extend their power. The process of our decay would set in gradually and advance slowly so long as the struggle against us was waged with peaceful weapons; the living generation would, perhaps, be able to continue to exist in peace and comfort. But should a war be forced WORLD POWER OR DOWNFALL 105 upon us by stronger enemies under conditions unfavorable to us, then, if our arms met with disaster our political downfall would not be delayed, and we should rapidly sink down. The future of German nationality would be sacrificed, an independent German civilization would not long exist, and the blessings for which German blood has flowed in streams — spiritual and moral liberty, and the profound and lofty aspirations of German thought — would for long ages be lost to mankind. If, as is right, we do not wish to assume the responsi- bility for such a catastrophy, we must have the courage to strive with every means to attain that increase of power which we are entitled to claim, even at the risk of a war with numerically superior foes. Under present conditions it is out of the question to attempt this by acquiring territory in Europe. The region in the East, where German colonists once settled, is lost to us, and could only be recovered from Russia by a long and victorious war, and would then be a perpetual incite- ment to renewed wars. So, again, the reannexation of the former South Prussia, which was united to Prussia on the second partition of Poland, would be a serious undertaking, on account of the Polish population. Under these circumstances we must clearly try to strengthen our political power in other ways. In the first place, our political position would be con- siderably consolidated if we could finally get rid of the standing danger that France will attack us on a favour- able occasion, so soon as we find ourselves involved in complications elsewhere. In one way or another we must square our account with France if we wish for a free hand in our international policy. This is the first and foremost condition of a sound German policy, and since the hostility of France once for all cannot be removed by peaceful over- tures, the matter must be settled by force of arms. France must be so completely crushed that she can never again come across our path. Further, we must contrive every means of strengthening the political power of our allies. We have already fol- lowed such a policy in the case of Austria when we declared 106 GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR our readiness to protect, if necessary with armed inter- vention, the final annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by our ally on the Danube. Our policy towards Italy must follow the same lines, especially if in any Franco-German war an opportunity should be presented of doing her a really valuable service. It is equally good policy in every way to support Turkey, whose importance for Germany and the Triple Alliance has already been discussed. Our political duties, therefore, are complicated, and dur- ing the Turco-Italian War all that we can do at first is to use our influence as mediators, and to prevent a transference of hostilities to the Balkan Peninsula. It cannot be decided at this moment whether further intervention will be neces- sary. Finally, as regards our own position in Europe, we can only effect an extension of our own political influence, in my opinion, by awakening in our weaker neighbours, through the integrity and firmness of our policy, the convic- tion that their independence and their interests are bound up with Germany, and are best secured under the protec- tion of the German arms. This conviction might eventually lead to an enlargement of the Triple Alliance into a Central European Federation. Our military strength in Central Europe would by this means be considerably increased, and the extraordinary unfavourable geographical configuration of our dominions would be essentially improved in case of war. Such a federation would be the expression of a natural community of interests, which is founded on the geographical and natural conditions, and would insure the durability of the political community based on it. We must employ other means also for the widening of our colonial territory, so that it may be able to receive the overflow of our population. Very recent events have shown that, under certain circumstances, it is possible to obtain districts in Equatorial Africa by pacific negotiations. A financial or political crash in Portugal might give us the opportunity to take possession of a portion of the Portu- guese colonies. We may assume that some understanding exists between England and Germany which contemplates a division of the Portuguese colonial possessions, but as never become publici ]uris. It cannot, indeed, be certain WORLD POWER OR DOWNFALL 107 that England, if the contingency arrives, would be prepared honestly to carry out such a treaty, if it actually exists. She might find ways and means to invalidate it. It has even been often said, although disputed in other quar- ters, that Great Britain, after coming to an agreement with Germany about the partition of the Portuguese colonies, had, by a special convention, guaranteed Portugal the pos- session of all her colonies. Other possible schemes may be imagined, by which some extension of our African territory would be possible. These need not be discussed here more particularly. If necessary, they must be obtained as the result of a success- ful European war. In all these possible acquisitions of territory the point must be strictly borne in mind that we require countries which are climatically suited to German settlers. Now, there are even in Central Africa large regions which are adapted to the settlement of German farmers and stock-breeders, and part of our overflow popu- lation might be diverted to those parts. But, generally speaking, we can only obtain in tropical colonies markets for our industrial products and wide stretches of culti- vated ground for the growth of the raw materials which our industries require. This represents in itself a consid- erable advantage, but does not release us from the obliga- tion to acquire land for actual colonization. A part of our surplus population, indeed — so far as pres- ent conditions point — will always be driven to seek a live- lihood outside the borders of the German Empire. Meas- ures must be taken to the extent at least of providing that the German element is not split up in the world, but remains united in compact blocks, and thus forms, even in foreign countries, political centres of gravity in our favour, markets for our exports, and centres for the diffusion of German culture. An intensive colonial policy is for us especially an absolute necessity. It has often been asserted that a "policy of the open door" can replace the want of colonies of our own, and must constitute our programme for the future, just because we do not possess sufficient colonies. This notion is only justified in a certain sense, In the first place, 108 GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR such a policy does not offer the possibility of finding homes for the overflow population in a territory of our own ; next, it does not guaarntee the certainty of an open and un- restricted trade competition. It secures to all trading nations equal tariffs, but this does not imply by any means competition under equal conditions. On the contrary, the political power which is exercised in such a country is the determining factor in the economic relations. The principle of the open door prevails everywhere — in Egypt, Man- churia, in the Congo State, in Morocco — and everywhere the politically dominant Power controls the commerce: in Manchuria Japan, in Egypt England, in the Congo State Belgium, and in Morocco France. The reason is plain. All State concessions fall naturally to that State which is practically dominant ; its products are bought by all the con- sumers who are any way dependent on the power of the State, quite apart from the fact that by reduced tariffs and similar advantages for the favoured wares the concession of the open door can be evaded in various ways. A "policy of the open door" must at best be regarded as a makeshift, and as a complement of vigorous colonial policy. The essential point is for a country to have colonies of its own and a predominant political influence in the spheres where its markets lie. Our German world policy must be guided by these considerations. The execution of such political schemes would certainly clash with many old-fashioned notions and vested rights of the traditional European policy. In the first place, the principle of the balance of power in Europe, which has, since the Congress of Vienna, led an almost sacrosanct but entirely unjustifiable existence, must be entirely dis- regarded. The idea of a balance of power was gradually developed from the feeling that States do not exist to thwart each other, but to work together for the advancement of culture. Christianity, which leads man beyond the limits of the State to a world citizenship of the noblest kind, and lays the foun- dation of all international law, has exercised a wide influence in this respect. Practical interests, too, have strengthened the theory of balance of power. When it was understood WORLD POWER OR DOWNFALL 109 that ihe State was a power, and that, by its nature, it must strive to extend that power, a certain guarantee of peace was supposed to exist in the balance of forces. The conviction was thus gradually established that every State had a cbse community of interests with the other States, with which it entered into political and economic relations, and was bound to establish some sort of understanding with them. Thus the idea grew up in Europe of a State- system, which was formed after the fall of Napoleon by the five Great Powers-^England, France, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, which latter had gained a place in the first rank by force of arms; in 1866 Italy joined it as the sixth Great Power. "Such a system cannot be supported with an approximate equilibrium among the nations." "All theory must rest on the basis of practice, and a real equilibrium — i.e., an actual equality of power — is postulated."* This condition does not exist between the European nations. England by her- self rules the sea, and the 65,000,000 of Germans cannot allow themselves to sink to the same level of power as the 40,000,000 of French. An attempt has been made to pro- duce a real equilibrium by special alliances. One result only has been obtained — the hindrance of the free development of the nations in general, and of Germany in particular. This is an unsound condition. A European balance of power can no longer be termed a condition which corre- sponds to the existing state of things; it can only have the disastrous consequences of rendering the forces of the continental European States mutually ineffective, and of thus favouring the plans of the political powers which stand outside that charmed circles. It has always been England's policy to stir up enmity between the respective continental States, and to keep them at approximately the same stand- ard of power, in order herself undisturbed to conquer at once the sovereignty of the seas and the sovereignty of the world. We must put aside all such notions of equilibrium. In its present distorted form it is opposed to our weightiest ♦Trcitschkc. no GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR interests. The idea of a State system which has common interests in civilization must not, of course, be abandoned; but it must be expanded on a new and more just basis. It is now not a question of a European State system but of one embracing all the States in the world, in which the equilibrium is established on real factors of power. We must endeavour to obtain in this system our merited position at the head of a federation of Central European States, and thus reduce the imaginary European equilibrium, in one way or the other, to its true value, and correspondingly to increase our own power. A further question, suggested by the present political position, is whether all the political treaties which were concluded at the beginning of the last century under quite other conditions — in fact, under a different conception of what constitutes a State — can, or ought to be, permanently observed. When Belgium was proclaimed neutral, no one contemplated that she would lay claim to a large and valuable region of Africa. It may well be asked whether the acquision of such territory is not ipso facto a breach of neutrality, for a State from which — theoretically at least — all danger of war has been removed, has no right to enter into political competition with the other States. This argument is the more justifiable because it may safely be assumed that, in event of a war of Germany against France and England, the two last-mentioned States would try to unite their forces in Belgium. Lastly, the neutrality of the Congo State* must be termed more than problematic, since Belgium claims the right to cede or sell it to a non- neutral country. The conception of permanent neutrality is entirely contrary to the essential nature of the State, which can only attain its highest moral aims in competition with other States. Its complete development presupposes such competition. Again, the principle that no State can ever interfere in the internal affairs of another State is repugnant to the highest rights of the State. This principle is, of course, * The Congo State was proclaimed neutral, but without guarantees, by Acts of February 26, 1885. WORLD POWER OR DOWNFALL in very variously interpreted, and powerful States have never refrained from a high-handed interference in the internal affairs cf smaller ones. We daily witness instances of such conduct. Indeed, England quite lately at- tempted tc interfere in the private affairs of Germany, not formally o: by diplomatic methods, but none the less in point of fact, on the subject of our naval preparations. It is, however, accepted as a principle of international inter- course that between the States of one and the same political system a stric\ non-interference in home affairs should be observed. The unqualified recognition of this principle and its application to political intercourse under all con- ditions involves serious difficulties. It is the doctrine of the Liberals, which was first preached in France in 1830, and of which the English Ministry of Lord Palmerston availed themselves for their own purposes. Equally false is the doctrine of unrestricted intervention, as promulgated by the States of the Holy Alliance at Troppau in 1820. No fixed principles for international politics can be laid down. After all, the relation of States to each other is that of individuals; and as the individual can decline the interfer- ence of others in his affairs, so, naturally, the same right belongs to the State. Above the individual, however, stands the authority of the State, which regulates the relations of the citizens to each other. But no one stands above the State; it is sovereign, and must itself decide whether the internal conditions or measures of another State menace its own existence or interests. In no case, therefore, may a sovereign State renounce the right of interfering in the affairs of other States, should circumstances demand. Cases may occur at any time, when the party disputes or the pre- parations of the neighbouring country become a threat to the existence of a State. "It can only be asserted that every State acts at its own risk when it interferes in the internal affairs of another State, and that experience shows how very dangerous such an interference may become." On the other hand, is must be remembered that the dangers which may arise from non-intervention are occasionally still graver, and that the whole discussion turns, not on an 112 GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR international right, but simply and solely on power and ex- pediency. I have gone closely into these questions of international policy because, under conditions which are net remote, they may greatly influence the realization of ou; necessary political aspirations, and may give rise to hos:ile compli- cations. Then it becomes essential that we do not allow ourselves to be cramped in our freedom of action by con- siderations, devoid of any inherent political necessity, which only depend on political expediency, and are not binding on us. We must remain conscious in all such eventualities that we cannot, under any circumstances, avoid fighting for our position in the world, and that the all-important point is, not to postpone that war as long as possible, but to bring it on under the most favourable conditions possible. "No man," so wrote Frederick the Great to Pitt on July 3, 1 761, "if he has a grain of sense, will leave his enemies leisure to make all preparations in order to destroy him ; he will rather take advantage of his start to put himself in a favourable position." If we wish to act in this spirit of prompt and effective policy which guided the great heroes of our past, we must learn to concentrate our forces, and not to dissipate them in centrifugal efforts. The political and national development of the German people has always, so far back as German history extends, been hampered and hindered by the hereditary defects of its character — that is, by the particularism of the individual races and States, the theoretic dogmatism of the parties, the incapacity to sacrifice personal interests for great national objects from want of patriotism and of political common sense, often, also, by the pettiness of the prevail- ing ideas. Even to-day it is painful to see how the forces of the German nation, which are so restricted and confined in their activities abroad, are wasted in fruitless quarrels among themselves. Our primary and most obvious moral and political duty is to overcome these hereditary failings, and to lay a secure foundation for a healthy, consistent development of our power. WORLD POWER OR DOWNFALL 113 It must not be denied that the variety of forms of intel- lectual and social life arising from the like variety of the German nationality and political system offers valuable advantages. It presents countless centres for the advance- ment of science, art, technical skill, and high spiritual and material way of life steadily increasing development. But we must resist the converse of these conditions, the trans- ference of this richness in variety and contrasts into the domain of politics. Above all must we endeavour to confirm and consolidate the institutions which are calculated to counteract and con- centrate the centrifugal forces of the German nature — the common system of defence of our country by land and sea, in which all party feeling is merged, and a strong national empire. No people is so little qualified as the German to direct its own destinies, whether in a parliamentarian or republican constitution; to no people is the customary liberal pattern so inappropriate as to us. A glance at the Reichstag will show how completely this conviction, which is forced on us by a study of German history, holds good to-day. The German people has always been incapable of great acts for the common interest except under the irresistible pressure of external conditions, as in the rising of 1813, or under the leadership of powerful personalities, who knew how to arouse the enthusiasm of the masses, to stir the German spirit to its depths, to vivify the idea of nationality, and force conflicting aspirations into concen- tration and union. We must therefore take care that such men are assured the possibility of acting with a confident and free hand in order to accomplish great ends through and for our people. Within these limits, it is in harmony with the national German character to allow personality to have a free course for the fullest development of all individual forces and capacities, of all spiritual, scientific, and artistic aims. "Every extension of the activities of the State is beneficial and wise, if it arouses, promotes, and purifies the independ- ence of free and reasoning men ; it is evil when it kills and 8 H4 GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR stunts the independence of free men."* This independence of the individual, within the limits marked out by the in- terests of the State, forms the necessary complement of the wide expansion of the central power, and assures an ample scope to a liberal development of all our social con- ditions. We must rouse in our people the unanimous wish for power in this sense, together with the determination to sacrifice on the altar of patriotism, not only life and prop- erty, but also private views and preferences in the interests of the common welfare. Then alone shall we discharge our great duties of the future, grow into a World Power, and stamp a great part of humanity with the impress of the German spirit. If, on the contrary, we persist in that dissipation of energy which now marks our political life, there is imminent fear that in the great contest of the na- tions, which we must inevitably face, we shall be dishonour- ably beaten; that days of disaster await us in the future, and that once again, as in the days of our former degrada- tion, the poet's lament will be heard : "O Germany, thy oaks still stand, But thou art fallen, glorious land !" Korner. * Treitschke, "Politik," i., § 2. CHAPTER VI THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ARMING FOR WAR Germany has great national and historical duties of policy and culture to fulfil, and her path towards further progress is threatened by formidable enmities. If we realize this, we shall see that it will be impossible to maintain our present position and secure our future without an appeal to arms. Knowing this^as every man must who impartially con- siders the political situation, we are called upon to prepare ourselves as well as possible for this war. The times are passed when a stamp of the foot raised an army, or when it was sufficient to levy the masses and lead them to battle. The armaments of the present day must be prepared in peace-time down to the smallest detail, if they are to be effective in time of need. Although this fact is known, the sacrifices which are required for warlike preparations are no longer so willingly made as the gravity of the situation demands. Every military proposal is bitterly contested in the Reichstag, fre- quently in a very petty spirit, and no one seems to under- stand that an unsuccessful war would involve our nation in economic misery, with which the most burdensome charges for the army (and these for the most part come back again into the coffers of the country) cannot for an instant be compared. A victorious war, on the other hand, brings countless advantages to the conqueror, and, as our last great wars showed, forms a new departure in economic progress. The fact is often forgotten that military service and the observance of the national duty of bearing arms are in themselves a high moral gain for our people, and 115 ti6 GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR improve the strength and capacity for work. Nor can it be ignored that a nation has other than merely economic duties to discharge. I propose to discuss the question, what kind and degree of preparation for war the great historical crisis through which we are passing demands from us. First, however, it will be profitable to consider the importance of preparations for war generally, and not so much from the purely military as from the social and political aspect; we shall thus strengthen the conviction that we cannot serve the true interests of the country better than by improving its military capabilities. Preparation for war has a double task to discharge. Firstly, it must maintain and raise the military capabilities of the nation as a national asset; and, secondly, it must make arrangements for the conduct of the war and supply the requisite means. This capability of national defence has a pronounced educative value in national development. As in the social competition the persons able to protect themselves hold the field — the persons, that is, who, well equipped intellectually, not shirk the contest, but fight it out with confidence anad certainty of victory — so in the rivalry of nations and States victory rests with the people able to defend itself, which boldly enters the lists, and is capable of wielding the sword with success. Military service not only educates nations in warlike ca- pacity, but it develops the intellectual and moral qualities generally for the occupations of peace. It educates a man to the full masterv of his body, to the exercise and improve- ment of his muscles ; it develops his mental powers, his self- reliance and readiness of decision ; it accustoms him to order and subordination for a common end; it elevates his self- respect and courage, and thus his capacity for every kind of work. It is a quite perverted view that the time devoted to military service deprives economic life of forces which could have been more appropriately and more profitably em- ployed elsewhere. These forces are not withdrawn from economic life, but are trained for economic life. ^ Military training produces intellectual and moral forces which richly THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ARMING 117 repay the time spent, and have their real value in subse- quent life. It is therefore the moral duty of the State to train as many of its countrymen as possible in the use of arms, not only with the prospect of war, but that they may share in the benefits of military service and improve their physical and moral capacities of defence. The sums which the State applies to the military training of the nation are distinctly an outlay for social purposes ; the money so spent serves social and educative ends, and raises the nation spiritually and morally; it thus promotes the highest aims of civilization more directly than achievements of me- chanics, industries, trades, and commerce, which certainly discharge the material duties of culture by improving the national livelihood and increasing national wealth, but bring with them a number of dangers, such as craving for pleas- ure and tendency to luxury, thus slackening the moral and productive fibres of the nations. Military service as an educational instrument stands on the same level as the school, and, as will be shown in a later section, each must complete and assist the other. But a people which does not willingly bear the duties and sacrifices entailed by school and military service renounces its will to live, and sacrifices objects which are noble and assure the future for the sake of material advantages which are one-sided and evanescent. It is the duty, therefore, of every State, conscious of its obligations towards civilization and society, remorselessly to put an end to all tendencies inimical to the full develop- ment of the power of defence. The method by which the maintenance and promotion of this defensive power can be practically carried out admits of great variety. It depends largely on the conditions of national life, on the geograph- ical and political circumstances, as well as on past history, and consequently ranges between very wide extremes. In the Boer States, as among most uncivilized peoples, the military training was almost exclusively left to the individual. That was sufficient to a certain point, since their method of life in itself made them familiar with carrying arms and with riding, and inured them to hard bodily exertions. The higher requirements of combination, n8 GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR subordination, and campaigning, could not be met by such a military system, and the consequences of this were felt disastrously in the conduct of the war. In Switzerland and other States an attempt is made to secure national defence by a system of militia, and to take account of political pos- sibilities. The great European States maintain standing armies in which all able-bodied citizens have to pass a longer or shorter period of military training. England alone keeps up a mercenary army, and by the side of it a terri- torial army, whose ranks are filled by volunteers. In these various ways different degrees of military ef- ficiency are obtained, but, generally, experience shows that the more thorough and intelligent this training in arms, the greater the development of the requisite military qualities in the units; and the more these qualities become a second nature, the more complete will be their warlike efficiency. When criticizing the different military systems, we must remember that with growing civilization the requisite mili- tary capacities are always changing. The duties expected from the Roman legionary or the soldiers who fought in line under Frederick the Great were quite different from those of the rifleman and cavalryman of to-day. Not merely have the physical functions of military service altered, but the moral qualities expected from the fighting man are al- tered . This applies to the individual soldier as much as to the whole army. The character of warfare has continually been changing. To fight in the Middle Ages or in the eighteenth century with comparatively small forces was one thing; it is quite another to handle the colossal armies of to-day. The preparations for war, therefore, in the social as well as military sense, must be quite different in a highly developed modern civilized State from those in countries, standing on a lower level of civilization, where ordinary life is full of military elements, and war is fought under relatively simple conditions. The crushing superiority of civilized States over people with a less developed civilization and military system is due to this altered form of military efficiency. It was thus that Japan succeeded in raising herself in a brief space to the supremacy in Eastern Asia. She now reaps in the THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ARMING 119 advancement of her culture what she sowed on the battle- field, and proves once again the immeasurable importance, in its social and educational aspects, of military efficiency. Our own country, by employing its military powers, has attained a degree of culture which it never could have reached by the methods of peaceful development. When we regard the change in the nature of military efficiency, we find ourselves on ground where the social duty of maintaining the physical and moral power of the nation to defend itself comes into direct contact with the political duty of preparing for warfare itself. A great variety of procedure is possible, and actually exists, in regard to the immediate preparations for war. This is primarily expressed in the choice of the military system, but it is manifested in various other ways. We see the individual States — according to their geographical posi- tion, their relations to other States and the military strength of their neighbours, according to their historic claims and their greater or less importance in the political system of the world — making their military preparations with more or less energy, earnestness, and expenditure. When we consider the complex movements of the life of civilized nations, the variety of its aims and the multiplicity of its emotions, we must agree that the growth or decrease of armaments is everywhere affected by these considerations. War is only a means of attaining political ends and of sup- porting moral strength. Thus, if England attaches most weight to her navy, her insular position and the wide oversea interests which she must protect thoroughly justify her policy. If, on the other hand, England develops her land forces only with the objects of safeguarding the command of her colonies, repelling a very improbable hostile invasion, and helping an allied Power in a continental war, the general political situation explains the reason. As a matter of fact, England can never be involved in a great continental European war against her will. So Switzerland, which has been declared neutral by po- litical treaties, and can therefore only take the field if she is attacked, rightly lays most stress on the social impor- 120 GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR tance of military service, and tries to develop a scheme of defence which consists mainly in increasing the security afforded by her own mountains. The United States of America, again, are justified in keeping their land forces within very modest limits, while devoting their energies to the increase of their naval power. No enemy equal to them in strength can ever spring up on the continent of America; they need not fear the invasion of any consider- able forces. On the other hand, they are threatened by oversea conflicts, of epoch-making importance, with the yellow race, which has acquired formidable strength op- posite their western coast, and possibly with their great trade rival England, which has, indeed, often made con- cessions, but may eventually see herself compelled to fight for her position in the world. While in some States a restriction of armaments is na- tural and justifiable, it is easily understood that France must strain every nerve to secure her full recognition among the great military nations of Europe. Her glorious past history has fostered in her great political pretensions which she will not abandon without a struggle, although they are no longer justified by the size of her population and her international importance. France affords a conspicuous ex- ample of self-devotion to ideals and of a noble conception of political and moral duties. In the other European States, as in France, external poli- tical conditions and claims, in combination with internal politics, regulate the method and extent of warlike prep- arations, and their attitude, which necessity forces upon them, must be admitted to carry its own justification. A State may represent a compact unity, from the point of view of nationality and civilization; it may have great duties to discharge in the development of human culture, and may possess the national strength to safeguard its in- dependence, to protect its own interests, and, under certain circumstances, to persist in its civilizing mission and poli- tical schemes in defiance of other nations. Another State may be deficient in the conditions of individual national life and in elements of culture; it may lack the resources necessary for the defence and maintenance of its political THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ARMING 121 existence single-handed in the teeth of all opposition. There is a vast difference between these two cases. A State like the latter is always more or less dependent on the friendliness of stronger neighbours, whether it ranks in public law as fully independent or has been proclaimed neutral by international conventions. If it is attacked on one side, it must count on support from the other. Whether it shall continue to exist a State and under what conditions must depend on the result of the ensuing war and the con- sequent political position — factors that lie wholly outside its own sphere of power. This being the case, the question may well be put whether such a State is politically justified in requiring from its citizens in time of peace the greatest military efforts and correspondingly large pecuniary expenditure. It will cer- tainly have to share the contest in which it is itself, perhaps, the prize, and theoretically will do best to have the largest possible military force at its disposal. But there is another aspect of the question which is at least arguable. The fight- ing power of such a State may be so small that it counts for nothing in comparison with the millions of a modern army. On the other hand, where appreciable military strength exists, it may be best not to organize the army with a view to decisive campaigning, but to put the social objects of military preparation into the foreground, and to adopt in actual warfare a defensive policy calculated to gain time, with a view to the subsequent interference of the prospec- tive allies with whom the ultimate decision will rest. Such an army must, if it is to attain its object, represent a real factor of strength. It must give the probable allies that effective addition of strength which may insure a superiority over the antagonist. The ally must then be forced to con- sider the interests of such secondary State. The forces of the possible allies will thus exercise a certain influence on the armament of the State, in combination with the local conditions, the geographical position, and the natural con- figuration of the country. It is only to be expected that, since such various con- ditions exist, the utmost variety should also prevail among the military systems; and such is, in fact, the case. 122 GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR In the mountain stronghold of Switzerland, which has to reckon with the political and military circumstances of Germany, France, and Italy, preparations for war take a different shape from those of Holland, situated on the coast and secured by numerous waterways, whose political independence is chiefly affected by the land forces of Ger- many and the navy of England. The conditions are quite otherwise for a country which relies wholly on its own power. The power of the probable antagonists and of the pre- sumable allies will have a certain importance for it, and its Government will in its plans and military preparations pay attention to their grouping and attitudes; but these prep- arations must never be motived by such considerations alone. The necessity for a strong military force is per- manent and unqualified ; the political permutations and com- binations are endless, and the assistance of possible allies is always an uncertain and shifting factor, on which no reliance can be reposed. The military power of an independent State in the true sense must guarantee the maintenance of a force sufficient to protect the interests of a great civilized nation and to secure to it the necessary freedom of development. If from the social standpoint no sacrifice can be considered too great which promotes the maintenance of national military effici- ency, the increase in these sacrifices due to political condi- tions must be willingly and cheerfully borne, in considera- tion of the object thereby to be gained. This object — of which each individual must be conscious — if conceived in the true spirit of statesmanship, comprises the conditions which are decisive for the political and moral future of the State as well as for the livelihood of each individual citizen. A civilization which has a value of its own, and thus forms a vital factor in the development of mankind, can only flourish where all the healthy and stimulating capa- cities of a nation find ample scope in international competi- tion. This is also an essential condition for the unhindered and vigorous exercise of individual activities. Where the natural capacity for growth is permanently checked by ex- f HE SIGNIFICANCE OF ARMING t4$ ternal circumstances, nation and State are stunted and in- dividual growth is set back. Increasing political power and the consequent multipli- cation of possibilities of action constitute the only healthy soil for the intellectual and moral strength of a vigorous nation, as is shown by every phase of history. The wish for culture must therefore in a healthy nation express itself first in terms of the wish for political power, and the foremost duty of statesmanship is to attain, safe- guard, and promote this power, by force of arms in the last resort. Thus the first and most essential duty of every great civilized people is to prepare for war on a scale com- mensurate with its political needs. Even the superiority of the enemy cannot absolve from the performance of this re- quirement. On the contrary, it must stimulate to the utmost military efforts and the most strenuous political action in order to secure favourable conditions for the eventuality of a decisive campaign. Mere numbers count for less than ever in modern fighting, although they always constitute a very important factor of the total strength. But, within certain limits, which are laid down by the law of numbers, the true elements of superiority under the present system of gigantic armies are seen to be spiritual and moral strength, and larger masses will be beaten by a small, well-led and self-devoting army. The Russo-Japanese War has proved this once more. Granted that the development of military strength is the first duty of every State, since all else depends upon the possibility to assert power, it does not follow that the State must spend the total of its personal and financial resources solely on military strength in the narrower sense of army and navy. That is neither feasible nor profitable. The military power of a people is not exclusively determined by these external resources ; it consists, rather, in a harmonious development of physical, spiritual, moral, financial, and mili- tary elements of strength. The highest and most effective military system cannot be developed except by the co-opera- tion of all these factors. It needs a broad and well-con- structed basis in order to be effective. In the Manchurian War at the critical moment, when the Japanese attacking iM GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAS strength seemed spent, the Russian military system broke down, because its foundation was unstable; the State had fallen into political and moral ruin, and the very army was tainted with revolutionary ideas. The social requirement of maintaining military efficiency, and the political necessity for so doing, determine the na- ture and degree of warlike preparations; but it must be remembered that this standard may be very variously esti- mated, according to the notion of what the State's duties are. Thus, in Germany the most violent disputes burst out whenever the question of the organization of the military forces is brought up, since widely different opinions prevail about the duties of the State and of the army. It is, indeed, impossible so to formulate and fix the po- litical duties of the State that they cannot be looked at from another standpoint. The social democrat, to whom agita- tion is an end in itself, will see the duty of the State in a quite different light from the political dilettante, who lives from hand to mouth, without making the bearing of things clear to himself, or from the sober statesman who looks to the welfare of the community and keeps his eyes fixed on the distant beacons on the horizon of the future. Certain points of view, however, may be laid down, which, based on the nature of things, check to some degree any arbitrary decision on these momentous questions, and are well adapted to persuade calm and experienced thinkers. First, it must be observed that military power cannot be improvised in the present political world, even though all the elements for it are present. Although the German Empire contains 65,000,000 in- habitants, compared to 40,000,000 of French, this excess in population represents merely so much dead capital, unless a corresponding majority of recruits are annually enlisted, and unless in peace-time the necessary machinery is set up for their organization. The assumption that these masses would be available for the army in the moment of need is a delusion. It would not mean a strengthening, but a distinct weakening, of the army, not to say a danger, if these untrained masses were at a crisis suddenly sent on active service. Bourbaki's campaign shows what is to be THS SIGNIFICANCE OF ARMING MJ expected from such measures. Owing to the complexity of all modern affairs, the continuous advance in technical skill and in the character of warlike weapons, as also in the increased requirements expected from the individual, long and minute preparations are necessary to procure the high- est military values. Allusion has already been made to this at the beginning of this chapter. It takes a year to com- plete a 30-centimetre cannon. If it is to be ready for use at a given time, it must have been ordered long beforehand. Years will pass before the full effect of the strengthening of the army, which is now being decided on, appears in the rolls of the Reserve and the Landwehr. The recruit who begins his service to-day requires a year's training to become a useful soldier. With the hasty training of sub- stitute reservists and such expedients, we merely deceive ourselves as to the necessity of serious preparations. We must not regard the present only, but provide for the future. The same argument applies to the political conditions. The man who makes the bulk of the preparations for war dependent on the shifting changes of the politics of the day, who wishes to slacken off in the work of arming because no clouds in the political horizon suggest the necessity of greater efforts, acts contrary to all real statesmanship, and is sinning against his country. The moment does not decide; the great political aspira- tions, oppositions, and tensions, which are based on the na- ture of things — these turn the scale. When King William at the beginning of the sixties of the last century undertook the reorganization of the Prus- sian army, no political tension existed. The crisis of 1859 had just subsided. But the King had perceived that the Prussian armament was insufficient to meet the requirements of the future. After a bitter struggle he extorted from his people a reorganization of the army, and this laid the foundations without which the glorious progress of our State would never have begun. In the same true spirit of statesmanship the Emperor William II. has powerfully aided and extended the evolution of our fleet, without being under the stress of any political necessity; he has enjoyed the cheerful co-operation of his people, since the reform at 126 GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR which he aimed was universally recognized as an indisput- able need of the future, and accorded with traditional Ger- man sentiment. While the preparation for war must be completed irre- spectively of the political influences of the day, the military power of the probable opponents marks a limit below which the State cannot sink without jeopardizing the national safety. Further, the State is bound to enlist in its service all the discoveries of modern science, so far as they can be applied to warfare, since all these methods and engines of war, should they be exclusively in the hands of the enemy, would secure him a distinct superiority. It is an obvious neces- sity to keep the forces which can be put into the field as up-to-date as possible, and to facilitate their military opera- tions by every means which science and mechanical skill supply. Further, the army must be large enough to con- stitute a school for the whole nation, in which a thorough- going and no mere superficial military efficiency may be attained. Finally, the nature of the preparation for war is to some degree regulated by the political position of the State. If the State has satisfied its political ambitious and is chiefly concerned with keeping its place, the military policy will assume a more or less defensive character. States, on the other hand, which are still desirous of expansion, or such as are exposed to attacks on different sides, must adopt a predominantly offensive military system. Preparations for war in this way follow definite lines, which are dictated by necessity and circumstances; but it is evident that a wide scope is still left for varieties of personal opinion, especially where the discussion includes the positive duties of the State, which may lead to an ener- getic foreign policy, and thus possibly to an offensive war, and where very divergent views exist as to the preparation for war. In this case the statesman's only resource is to use persuasion, and to so clearly expound and support his conceptions of the necessary policy that the majority of the nation accept his view. There are always and everywhere conditions which have a persuasive character of their own, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ARMING 127 and appeal to the intellects and the feelings of the masses. Every Englishman is convinced of the necessity to main- tain the command of the sea, since he realizes that not only the present powerful position of the country, but also the possibility of feeding the population in case of war, depend on it. No sacrifice for the fleet is too great, and every increase of foreign navies instantly disquiets public opinion. The whole of France, except a few anti-military circles, feels the necessity of strengthening the position of the State, which was shaken by the defeats of 1870-71, through re- doubled exertions in the military sphere, and this object is being pursued with exemplary unanimity. Even in neutral Switzerland the feeling that political in- dependence rests less on international treaties than on the possibility of self-defence is so strong and widespread that the nation willingly supports heavy taxation for its military equipment. In Germany, also, it should be possible to arouse a universal appreciation of the great duties of the State, if only our politicians, without any diplomatic eva- sion, which deceives no one abroad and is harmful to the people at home, disclosed the true political situation and the necessary objects of our policy. To be sure, they must be ready to face a struggle with public opinion, as King William I. did: for when public opinion does not stand under the control of a master will or a compelling necessity, it can be led astray too easily by the most varied influences. This danger is particularly great in a country so torn asunder internally and externally as Germany. He who in such a case listens to public opinion runs a danger of inflicting immense harm on the interests of State and people. One of the fundamental principles of true statesmanship is that permanent interests should never be abandoned or prejudiced for the sake of momentary advantages, such as the lightening of the burdens of the taxpayer, the temporary maintenance of peace, or suchlike specious benefits, which, in the course of events, often prove distinct disadvantages. The statesman, therefore, led astray neither by popular opinion nor by the material difficulties which have to be surmounted, nor by the sacrifices required of his country- 128 GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR men, must keep these objects carefully in view. So long as it seems practicable he will try to reconcile the conflicting interests and bring them into harmony with his own. But where great fundamental questions await decision, such as the actual enforcement of universal service or of the re- quirements on which readiness for war depends, he must not shrink from strong measures in order to create the forces which the State needs, or will need, in order to main- tain its vitality. One of the most essential political duties is to initiate and sanction preparations for war on a scale commensurate with the existing conditions; to organize them efficiently is the duty of the military authorities — a duty which belongs in a sense to the sphere of strategy, since it supplies the machinery with which commanders have to reckon. Policy and strategy touch in this sphere. Policy has a strategic duty to perform, since it sanctions preparations for war and defines their limit. It would, therefore, be a fatal and foolish act of political weakness to disregard the military and strategic standpoint, and to make the bulk of the preparations for war dependent on the financial means momentarily available. "No ex- penditure without security," runs the formula in which this policy clothes itself. It is justified only when the security is fixed by the expenditure. In a great civilized State it is the duties which must be fulfilled — sa Treitschke, our great historian and national politician, tells us — that de- termine the expenditure, and the great Finance Minister is not the man who balances the national accounts by spar- ing the national forces, while renouncing the politically in- dispensable outlay, but he who stimulates all the live forces of the nation to cheerful activity, and so employs them for national ends that the State revenue suffices to meet the admitted political demands. He can only attain this pur- pose if he works in harmony with the Ministers for Com- merce, Agriculture, Industries, and Colonies, in order to break down the restrictions which cramp the enterprise and energy of the individual, to make all dead values remune- rative, and to create favorable conditions for profitable busi- ness. A great impulse must thrill the whole productive and THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ARMING 129 financial circles of the State, if the duties of the present and the future are to be fulfilled. Thus the preparation for war, which, under modern con- ditions, calls for very considerable expenditure, exercises a marked influence on the entire social and political life of the people and on the financial policy of the State. CHAPTER VII THE CHARACTER OF OUR NEXT WAR The social necessity of maintaining the power of the na- tion to defend itself, the political claims which the State puts forward, the strength of the probable hostile com- binations, are the chief factors which determine the condi- tions of preparation for war. I have already tried to explain and formulate the duties in the spheres of policy and progress which our history and our national character impose on us. My next task is to observe the possible military combinations which we must be prepared to face. In this way only can we estimate the dangers which threaten us, and can judge whether, and to what degree, we can carry out our political intentions. A thorough un- derstanding of these hostile counter-movements will give us a clear insight into the character of the next war; and this war will decide our future. It is not sufficient to know the military fighting forces of our probable antagonists, although this knowledge con- stitutes the necessary basis for further inquiry ; but we must picture to ourselves the intensity of the hostility with which we have to reckon and the probable efficiency of our enemies. The hostility which we must anticipate is deter- mined by the extent to which mutual political schemes and ambitions clash, and by the opposition in national character. Our opinion as to the military efficiency of our rivals must be based on the latest data available. If we begin by looking at the forces of the individual States and groups of States which may be hostile to us, we have the following results: According to the recent communications of the French 130 THE CHARACTER OF OUR NEXT WAR 131 Finance Minister Glotz (in a speech made at the unveiling of a war memorial in Issoudun), the strength of the French army on a peace footing in the year 1910 amounted in round figures to 580,000 men. This included the "Colonial Corps," stationed in France itself, which, in case of war, belongs to the field army in the European theatre of war, and the "Service auxiliaire" — that is, some 30,000 non- efficients, who are drafted in for service without arms. The entire war establishment, according to the informa- tion of the same Minister, included field army and reserves, consists of 2,800,000 men available on mobilization. A re- duction from this number must be made in event of mo- bilization, which French sources put down at 20 per cent. The whole strength of the French field army and reserves may therefore be reckoned at some 2,300,000. To this must be added, as I gather from the same source, 1,700,000 Territorials, with their "reserve," from which a reduction of 25 per cent., or roughly 450,000 men, must be made. If it is assumed that, in case of war, the distribution of the arms will correspond to that in peace, the result is, on the basis of the strength of separate arms, which the Budget of 191 1 anticipates, that out of the 2,300,000 field and re- serve troops there must be assigned — to the infantry, about 1,530,000; to the cavalry, about 230,000 (since a consider- able part of the reservists of these arms are employed in the transport service) ; to the artillery, about 3810,000; to the pioneers, 70,000; to train and administration services (trains, columns, medical service, etc.), 90,000. No further increase in these figures is possible, since in France 90 per cent, of all those liable to serve have been called up, and the birth-rate is steadily sinking. While in 1870 it reached 940,000 yearly, it has sunk in 1908 to 790,000. Recourse already has been had to the expedient of requiring smaller qualifications than before, and of filling the numerous subsidiary posts (clerks, waiters, etc.) with less efficient men, in order to relieve the troops themselves. Under these conditions, it was necessary to tap new sources, and the plan has been formed of increasing the troops with native-born Algerians and Tunisians, in order i 3 2 GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR to be able to strengthen the European army with them in event of war. At the same time negroes, who are excellent and trustworthy material, are to be enrolled in West Africa. A limited conscription, such as exists in Tunis, is to be introduced into Algeria. The black army is at first to be completed by volunteers, and conscription will only be en- forced at a crisis. These black troops are in the first place to garrison Algeria and Tunis, to release the troops sta- tioned there for service in Europe, and to protect the white settlers against the natives. Since the negroes raised for military service are heathen, it is thought that they will be a counterpoise to the Mohammedan natives. It has been proved that negro troops stand the climate of North Africa excellently, and form very serviceable troops. The two black battalions stationed in the Schauja, who took part in the march to Fez, bore the climate well, and thoroughly proved their value. There can be no doubt that this plan will be vigorously prosecuted, with every prospect of suc- cess. It is so far in an early stage. Legislative proposals on the use of the military resources offered by the native Algerians and the West African negroes have not yet been laid before Parliament by the Government. It cannot yet be seen to what extent the native and black troops will be increased. The former Minister of War, Messimy, had advocated a partial conscription of the native Algerians. An annual muster is made of the Algerian males of eighteen years of age available for military service. The Commis- sion appointed for the purpose reported in 191 1 that, after the introduction of the limited service in the army and the reserve, there would be in Algeria and Tunisia combined some 100,000 to 120,000 native soldiers available in war- time. They could also be employed in Europe, and are thus intended to strengthen the Rhine army by three strong army corps of first-class troops, who, in the course of years, may probably be considerably increased by the formation of reserves. As regards the black troops, the matter is different. France, in her West African possessions combined, has some 16,000 negro troops available. As the black popula- THE CHARACTER OF OUR NEXT WAR 133 tion number 10,000,000 to 12,000,000, these figures may be considerably raised. Since May, 1910, there has been an experimental bat- talion of Senegalese sharp-shooters in Southern Algeria, and in the draft War Budget for 1912 a proposal was made to transfer a second battalion of Senegalese to Algeria. The conclusion is forced upon us that the plan of sending black troops in larger numbers to Algeria will be vigor- ously prosecuted. There is, however, no early probability of masses of black troops being transported to North Af- rica, since there are not at present a sufficient number of trained men available. The Senegalese Regiments 1, 2 and 3, stationed in Senegambia, are hardly enough to replace and complete the Senegalese troops quartered in the other African colonies of France. Although there is no doubt that France is in a position to raise a strong black army, the probability that black divisions will be available for a European war is still remote. But it cannot be questioned that they will be so some day. Still less is any immediate employment of native Moroc- can troops in Europe contemplated. Morocco possesses very good native warriors, but the Sultan exerts effective sovereignty only over a part of the territory termed "Mo- rocco." There cannot be, therefore, for years to come any question of employing this fighting material on a large scale. The French and Moroccan Governments are for the moment occupied in organizing a serviceable Sultan's army of 20,000 men to secure the command of the country and to release the French troops in Morocco. The annexation of Morocco may for the time being mean no great addition to military strength; but, as order is gradually established, the country will prove to be an excel- lent recruiting depot, and France will certainly use this source of power with all her accustomed energy in military matters. For the immediate future we have, therefore, only to reckon with the reinforcements of the French European army which can be obtained from Algeria and Tunisia, as soon as the limited system of conscription is universally adopted there. This will supply a minimum of 120,000 men, 134 GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR and the tactical value of these troops is known to any who have witnessed their exploits on the battlefield of Weissen- burg and Woorth. At least one strong division of Turcos is already available. Next to the French army, we are chiefly concerned with the military power of Russia. Since the peace and war establishments are not published, it is hard to obtain ac- curate statistics; no information is forthcoming as to the strength of the various branches of the service, but the totals of the army may be calculated approximately. Ac- cording to the recruiting records of the last three years, the strength of the Russian army on a peace footing amounts to 1,346,000 men, inclusive of Cossacks and Frontier Guards. Infantry and sharp-shooters are formed into 37 army corps (1 Guards, 1 Grenadiers, and 25 army corps in Europe; 3 Caucasian, 2 Turkistanian, and 5 Siberian corps). The cavalry is divided into divisions, independ- ent brigades, and separate independent regiments. In war, each army corps consists of 2 divisions, and is in round figures 42,000 strong; each infantry division con- tains 2 brigades, at a strength of 20,000. Each sharp- shooter brigade is about 9,000 strong, the cavalry divisions about 4,500 strong. On the basis of these numbers, we arrive at a grand total of 1,800,000 for all the army corps, divisions, sharp-shooter brigades, and cavalry divisions. To this must be added unattached troops and troops on frontier or garrison duty, so that the war strength of the standing army can be reckoned at some 2,000,000. This grand total is not all available in a European theatre of war. The Siberian and Turkistanian army corps must be deducted, as they would certainly be left in the interior and on the eastern frontier. For the maintenance of order in the interior, it would probably be necessary to leave the troops in Finland, the Guards at St. Petersburg, at least one division at Moscow, and the Caucasian army corps in the Caucasus. This would mean a deduction of thirteen army corps, or 546,000 men ; so that we have to reckon with a field army, made up of the standing army, 1,454,000 men strong. To this must be added about 100 regiments of Cos- sacks of the Second and Third Ban, which may be placed THE CHARACTER OF OUR NEXT WAR 135 at 50,000 men, and the reserve and Empire-defence forma- tions to be set on foot in case of war. For the formation of reserves, there are sufficient trained men available to constitute a reserve division of the first and second rank for each corps respectively. These troops, if each division is assumed to contain 20,000 men, would be 1,480,000 men strong. Of course, a certain reduction must be made in these figures. Also it is not known which of these forma- tions would be really raised in event of mobilization. In any case, there will be an enormous army ready to be put into movement for a great war. After deducting all the forces which must be left behind in the interior, a field army of 2,000,000 men could easily be organized in Europe. It cannot be stated for certain whether arms, equipment, and ammunition for such a host can be supplied in suf- ficient quantity. But it will be best not to undervalue an Empire like Russia in this respect. Quite another picture is presented to us when we turn our attention to England, the third member of the Triple Entente. The British Empire is divided from the military point of view into two divisions: into the United Kingdom itself with the Colonies governed by the English Cabinet, and the self-governing Colonies. These latter have at their dis- posal a militia, which is sometimes only in process of for- mation. They can be completely ignored so far as con- cerns any European theatre of war. The army of the parts of the Empire administered by the English Cabinet divides into the regular army, which is filled up by enlistment, the native troops, commanded by English officers, and the Territorial army, a militia made up of volunteers which has not reached the intended total of 300,000. It is now 270,000 strong, and is destined ex- clusively for home defence. Its military value cannot at present be ranked very highly. For a Continental European war it may be left out of account. We have in that case only to deal with a part of the regular English army. This is some 250,000 strong. The men serve twelve years, of which seven are with the colors and five in the reserve. The annual supply of recruits is 35,000. The regular re- 136 GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR serve is now 136,000 strong. There is also a special reserve, with a militia-like training, which is enlisted for special purposes, so that the grand total of the reserve reaches the figure of 200,000. Of the regular English army, 134 men are stationed in England, 74,500 in India (where, in combination with 159,- 000 native troops, they form the Anglo-Indian army), and about 39,000 in different stations — Gibraltar, Malta, Egypt, Aden, South Africa, and the other Colonies and Protecto- rates. In this connection the conditions in Egypt are the most interesting: 6,000 English are stationed there, while in the native Egyptian army (17,000 strong; in war-time, 29,000 strong) one-fifth of the officers are Englishmen. It may be supposed that, in view of the great excitement in the Moslem world, the position of the English is precarious. The 11,000 troops now stationed in South Africa are to be transferred as soon as possible to Mediterranean garrisons. In event of war, a special division will, on emergency, be organized there. For a war in Continental Europe, we have only to take into account the regular army stationed in England. When mobilized, it forms the "regular field army" of 6 infantry divisions, 1 cavalry division, 2 mounted brigades and army troops, and numbers 130,000 men, without columns and trains. The regular troops in the United Kingdom which do not form part of the regular field army are some 100,000 strong. They consist of a very small number of mobile units, foot artillery, and engineers for coast defence, as well as the reserve formations. These troops, with some 13,000 militia artillery and militia engineers, constitute the Home Army, under whose protection the Territorial field army is completing its organization. Months must certain elapse before portions of this army can strengthen the regular army. At the most 150,000 men may be reckoned upon for an English expeditionary force. These troops compose at the same time the reserve of the troops stationed in the Colonies, which require reinforcements at grave crises. This constitutes the weak point in the British armament. Eng- land can employ her regular army in a Continental war so long as all is quiet in the Colonies. This fact brings into THE CHARACTER OF OUR NEXT WAR 137 prominence how important it will be, should war break out, to threaten England in her colonial possessions, and es- pecially in Egypt. Against the powerful hosts which the Powers of the Triple Entente can put into the field, Germany can com- mand an active army of 589,705 men (on peace establish- ment, including non-commissioned officers) and about 25,500 officers ; while Austria has an army which on a peace foot- ing is 361,553 men and about 20,000 officers strong. The combined war strength of the two States may be estimated as follows: In Germany there were drafted into the army, including volunteers and non-combatants, in 1892, 194,664 men; in 1909, 267,283 men; or on an average for seventeen years, 230,975 men annually. This gives a total of 3,926,575 men. If we estimate the natural decrease at 25 per cent., we have 2,944,931 trained men left. By adding the peace es- tablishment to it, we arrive at an estimated strength of 3,534,636, which the French can match with about the same figures. The annual enlistment in Austria amounts to some 135,- 000. Liability to serve lasts twelve years, leaving out of account service in the Landsturm. Deducting the three years of active service, this gives a total of 1,215,000, or, after the natural decrease by 25 per cent., 911,250 men. To this must be added the nine yearly batches of trained Landsturm, which, after the same deductions, will come likewise to 911,250. The addition of the peace strength of the army will produce a grand total of 2,184,053 men on a war footing; approximately as many as Russia, after all deductions, can bring into the field in Europe. In what numbers the existing soldiers would in case of war be available for field formations in Germany and Austria is not known, and it would be undesirable to state. It depends partly on the forces available, partly on other circumstances which are not open to public discussion. How- ever high our estimate of the new formations may be, we shall never reach the figures which the combined forces of France and Russia present. We must rather try to nullify the numerical superiority of the enemy by the increased 138 GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR tactical value of the troops, by intelligent generalship, and a prompt use of opportunity and locality. Even the addi- tion of the Italian army to the forces of Germany and Austria would not, so far as I know, restore numerical equality in the field. In France it has been thought hitherto that two or three army corps must be left on the Italian frontier. Modern French writers* are already reckoning so confidently on * Colonel Boucher, "L'offensive contre l'Allemagne." the withdrawal of Italy from the Triple Alliance that they no longer think it necessary to put an army in the field against Italy, but consider that the entire forces of France are available against Germny. The peace establishment of the Italian army amounts, in fact, to 250,000 men, and is divided into 12 army corps and 25 divisions. The infantry, in 96 regiments, numbers 140,000; there are besides 12 regiments of Bersaglieri, with which are 12 cyclist battalions and 8 Alpine regiments in 78 companies. The cavalry consists of 29 regiments, 12 of which are united in 3 cavalry divisions. The artillery has a strength of 24 field artillery regiments and 1 mounted regiment of artillery, and numbes 193 field and 8 mounted batteries. Besides this there are 27 mountain batteries and 10 regiments of garrison artillery in 98 companies. Lastly, there are 6 engineer regiments, including a telegraph regi- ment and an airship battalion. The Gendarmerie contains 28,000 men. On a war footing the strength of the field army is 775,000. Some 70,000 men are enrolled in other formations of the first and second line. The militia is some 390,000 strong. The strength of the reserves who might be mobilized is not known. The field army is divided into 3 armies of 9 army corps in all, to which are added 8 to 12 divisions of the Territorial army and 4 cavalry divisions. As to colonial troops, Italy can command in Benadir the services of 48 officers and 16 non-commissioned officers of Italian birth, and 3,500 native soldiers ; in Eritrea there are 131 officers, 644 non-commissioned officers and privates of Italian birth, and 3,800 natives. Italy thus can put a considerable army into the field ; but THE CHARACTER OF OUR NEXT WAR 139 it is questionable whether the South Italian troops have much tactical value. It is possible that large forces would be required for coast-defence, while the protection of Tri- poli, by no means an easy task, would claim a power army if it is to be held against France. The Turkish military forces would be of great impor- tance if they joined the coalition of Central European Powers or its opponents. The regular peace establishment of the Turkish army amounts to 275,000 men. In the year 1910 there were three divisions of it: 1. The Active Army (Nizam) : Tnfantry 133,000 Cavalry 26,000 Artillery 43,ooo Pioneers 4,500 Special troops 7,500 Train formations 3,000 Mechanics . . . 3,000 A total, that is, of 220,000 men. 2. The Redif (militia) cadres, composed of infantry, 25,000 men. Within this limit, according to the Redif law, men are enlisted in turns for short trainings. 3. Officers in the Nizam and Redif troops, military em- ployes, officials, and others, more than 30,000. The entire war strength of the Turkish army amounts to 700,000 men. We need only to take into consideration the troops from Europe, Anatolia, Armenia, and Syria. All these troops even are not available in a European the- atre of war. On the other hand, the "Mustafiz" may be regarded as an "extraordinary reinforcement"; this is usually raised for local protection or the maintenance of quiet and order in the interior. To raise 30,000 or 40,000 men of this militia in Europe is the simplest process. From the high military qualities of the Turkish soldiers, the Turkish army must be regarded as a very important actor. The smaller Balkan States are also able to put consider- able armies into the field. Montenegro can put 40,000 to 45,000 men into the field, 140 GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR with 104 cannons and 44 machine guns, besides 11 weak reserve battalions for frontier and home duties. Servia is supposed to have an army 28,000 strong 01 a peace footing; this figure is seldom reached, and sinks in winter to 10,000 men. The war establishment consists of 250,000 men, comprising about 165,000 rifles, 5,500 sabres, 432 field and mountain guns (108 batteries of 4 guns); besides this there are 6 heavy batteries of 4 to 6 cannons and 228 machine guns available. Lastly come the reserve formation (third line), so that in all some 305,000 men can be raised, exclusive of the militia, an uncertain quantity. The Bulgarian army has a peace establishment of 59,820 men. It is not known how they are distributed among the various branches of the service. On a war footing an army of 330,000 is raised, including infantry at a strength of 230,000 rifles, with 884 cannons, 232 machine guns, and 6,500 sabres. The entire army, inclusive of the reserves and national militia, which latter is only available for home service and comprises men from forty-one to forty-six years of age, is said to be 400,000 strong-. Rumania, which occupies a peculiar position politically, form a power in herself. There is in Rumania, besides the troops who according to their time of service are per- manently with the colors, a militia cavalry called "Calarashi" (intelligent young yeomen on good horses of their own), whose units serve intermittently for short periods. In peace the army is composed of 5,000 officers and 90,000 men of the permanent establishment, and some 12,000 serv- ing intermittently. The infantry numbers some 2,500 of- ficers and 57,000 men, the permanent cavalry (Rosiori) some 8,000 men with 600 officers, and the artillery 14,000 men with 700 officers. For war a field army can be raised of some 6,000 officers and 274,000 men, with 550 cannons. Of these 215,000 men belong to the infantry, 7,000 to the cavalry, and 20,000 to the artillery. The cavalry is therefore weaker than on the peace footing, since, as it seems, a part of the Calarashi is not to be employed as cavalry. Inclusive of reserves and militia, the whole army will be 430,000 strong. There are 650,000 trained men available for service. THE CHARACTER OF OUR NEXT WAR 141 Although the Balkan States, from a military point of yiew, chiefly concern Austria, Turkey, and Russia, and only indirectly come into relations with Germany, yet the armies o^ the smaller Central European States may under some circumstances be of direct importance to us, if they are forced or induced to take part with us or against us in a European war. Of our western neighbours, Switzerland and Holland come first under consideration, and then Belgium. Switzerland can command, in case of war, a combined army of 263,000 men. The expeditionary force, which is of first importance for an offensive war, consists of 96,000 infantry and 5,500 cavalry, with 288 field guns and 48 field howitzers (the howitzer batteries are in formation), a total of 141,000 men. The Landwehr consists of 50,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry, with 36 12-centimetre cannons belonging to foot artillery. It has a total strength of 69,000 men. The Land- sturm finally has a strength of 53,000 men. The Dutch army has a peace establishment averaging 30,000 men, which varies much owing to the short period of service. There are generally available 13,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry, 5,000 field artillery, 3,400 garrison artillery, and 1,400 engineers, pontonniers, and transport troops. The field army in war is 80,000 strong, and is made up of 64,000 infantry, cyclist, and machine-gun sections, 2,600 cavalry, 4,400 artillery, and 900 engineers. It is formed into 4 army divisions each of 15 battalions, 4 squadrons, 6 batteries, and 1 section engineers. There is, further, a gar- rison army of 80,000 men, which consists of 12 active and 48 Landwehr infantry battalions, 44 active and 44 Land- wehr foot artillery companies, and 10 companies engineers and pontonniers, including Landwehr. The Dutch coast also is fortified. At Helder, Ymuiden, Hook of Holland, at Volkerack and Haringvliet there are various outworks, while the fortifications at Flushing are at present unimpor- tant. Amsterdam is also a fortress with outlying fortifica- tions in the new Dutch water-line (Fort Holland). Holland is thus well adapted to cause serious difficulties to an English landing, if her coast batteries are armed with 142 GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR effective cannons. It would easily yield to a German in- vasion, if it sided against us. Belgium in peace has 42,800 troops available, distributed as follows: 26,000 infantry, 5.400 cavalry, 4,650 field ar- tillery, 3.400 garrison artillery, 1,550 engineers and trans- port service. On a war footing the field army will be 100,000 strong, comprising 74,000 infantry, 7,250 cavalry, 10,000 field ar- tillery, 1,900 engineers and transport service, and is formed into 4 army divisions and 2 cavalry divisions. The latter are each 20 squadrons and 2 batteries strong; each of the army divisions consists nominally of 17 battalions infantry, 1 squadron, 12 batteries, and I section engineers. In addi- tion there is a garrison army of 80,000, which can be strengthened by the garde civique. Antwerp form the chief military base, and may be regarded as a very strong fort- ress. Besides this, on the line of the Maas, there are forti- fied towns of Liege, Huy, and Namur. There are no coast fortifications. Denmark, as commanding the approaches to the Baltic, is of great military importance to us. Copenhagen, the capital, is a strong fortress. The army, on the other hand, is not an important factor of strength, as the training of the units is limited to a few months. This State maintains on a peace footing some 10,000 infantry, 800 cavalry, 2,300 artillery, and 1,100 special arms, a total of 14,200 men ; but the strength varies between 7,500 and 26,000. In war-time an army of 62,000 men and 10,000 reserves can be put into the field, composed numerically of 58,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry, 9,000 artillery, and 2,000 special arms. Sweden can command eight classes of the First Ban, which comprises units from twenty-one to twenty-eight years of age, and is 200,000 strong, as well as four classes of the Second Ban, with a strength of 90,000, which is made up of units from twenty-eight to thirty-two years of age. There are also available 30,000 trained volunteers, students and ex-students from twenty-one to thirty-two years of age. The eight classes of the Landsturm are 165,000 men strong. It can, accordingly, be roughly calculated what THE CHARACTER OF OUR NEXT WAR 143 feld army can be raised in case of war. The entire First Bin certainly comes under this head. [n Greece, which does not signify much of a European war, but might in combination with the small Balkan States prove very troublesome to Turkey, and is therefore impor- tant for us, an active army of 146,000 men can be put into the 5eld; there are besides this 83,000 men in the Land- wehr and 63,000 men in the Landsturm. Spain has a peace army of 116,232 men, of whom 34,000 are permanently stationed in Africa. In war she can raise 327,000 men (140 active army, 154,000 garrison troops, 33,000 gendarmerie). The mobilization is so badly or- ganized that at the end of a month 70,000 to 80,000 men could at most be put into the field. As regard the naval forces of the States which concern us to-day, the accompanying table, which is taken from the Nauticus of 191 1, affords a comparative epitome, which applies to May, 191 1. It shows that, numerically, the English fleet is more than double as strong as ours. This superiority is increased if the displacements and the num- ber of really modern ships are compared. In May we possessed only four battleships and one armed cruiser of the latest type; the English have ten ships-of-the-line and four armed cruisers which could be reckoned battleships. The new ships do not materially alter this proportion. The comparative number of the ships-of-the-line is becoming more favourable, that of the armoured cruisers will be less so than it now is. It may be noticed that among our cruisers are a number of vessels which really have no fighting value, and that the coast-defence ironclads cannot be counted as battleships. France, too, was a little ahead of us in the number of battleships in May, 191 1, but from all that is hitherto known about the French fleet, it cannot be com- pared with the German in respect of good material and trained crews. It would, however, be an important factor if allied with the English. Let us assume that in event of war England as well as France must leave a certain naval force in the Mediterra- nean, which need not be stronger than the combined Italian and Austrian fleets, but might be smaller, in event of a 144 GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR Germany: Ready Voted or building England : Ready Voted or building France : Ready Voted or building Italy : Ready Voted or building Austria-Hungary : Ready Voted er building Russia : Baltic Fleet : Ready . . Voted or building . . Black Sea Fleet: Ready Voted or btfilding . Siberian Fleet United States : Ready Voted or building Japan: Ready Voted or building f M CO I M K> M Cn H t0 Co Co ^O 14* O004W Cm w 4* CO * $0 tOO 10 Cn K 5T BJ M M 4* * CO K) vj U) «p VOW -4 0\ \o O 00^ O CO | •£ O* ||»|U 4- to 4- C> CO 4> Cs CO . (0 * §1 f % II §1 S? II s i» i* 1 1 1 i i ii it ii ii \m 55 o Armoured Coast Defence Vessels from 3,ooo Tons to 5,000 Tons. 1 1 1 1 1 1 i 1 1 ii ii ii ii 1 1 If II II 1 II |H || || || | } M 55 p ifrl M 1 " I II 1 | II II II || (I B F sill? Icy! iff 4> CO | £ 1 as 1 co lo 1(0 ON 00 4> 8 55 p M M M K> M 4* M C*> 00 0\ M VJ m 4> 00 M <4<5 1 m III 4 * I 00 1 *° I "** Ux *" 1 ■*" gf 'I ""I 'f 'i 't ii i if H co to 1 «h to 1 to | 4* CO -P. CO -f» 1 o O ^ silo 55 p o| MW M h4> O m to mmm Cn O Cn to Cn vO |Cn ^P 1 V* | "^ 1 O Op i O **" V** I j* O *« ' » m 1 ON > » I Cn NO ' vj Co Cn 1 "U 83 | o° 8 "3 ^8-0 8=81 S if cn m 4* K mm o» m no\ mvj cn » mm KivO 4* • O + MmO O\O0 4"» Cn COM MOO 4>vj ni m It* \ t ' I v, 1 S ' S 1 g &$ 1 j 1 « 1 ^ ptfl MtO O vO CO v) J> MCO 1 vi co v) \OM Sw IS Number of Submarines. THE CHARACTER OF OUR NEXT WAR 145 change in the grouping of the States ; let us further assume that numerous cruisers will be detained at the extra-Eu- ropean stations — the fact, however, remains that England and France together can collect against Germany in the North Sea a fleet of battleships alone three times as strong as that of Germany, and will be supported by a vastly superior force of torpedo- vessels and submarines. If Rus- sia joins the alliance of these Powers, that would signify another addition to the forces of our opponents which must not be underestimated, since the Baltic Fleet in the spring of 191 1 contained two large battleships, and the Baltic fleet of cruisers is always in a position to threaten our coasts and to check the free access to the Baltic. In one way or the other we must get even with that fleet. The auxiliary cruiser fleet of the allies, to which England can send a large contingent, would also be superior to us. As regards materiel and training, it may be assumed that our fleet is distinctly superior to the French and Russian, but that England is our equal in that respect. Our ships' cannons will probably show a superiority over the English, and our torpedo fleet, by its reckless energy, excellent train- ing, and daring spirit of adventure, will make up some of the numerical disadvantage. It remains to be seen whether these advantages will have much weight against the over- whelming superiority of an experienced and celebrated fleet like the English. Reflection shows that the superiority by sea, with which we must under certain circumstances reckon, is very great, and that our position in this respect is growing worse, since the States of the Triple Entente can build and man far more ships than we can in the same time. If we consider from the political standpoint the probable attitude of the separate States which may take part in the next war against Germany, we may assume that the in- tensity of the struggle will not be the same in every case, since the political object of our possible antagonists are very different. If we look at France first, we are entitled to assume that single-handed she is not a match for us, but can only 10 146 GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR be dangerous to us as a member of a coalition. The tactical value of the French troops is, of course, very high; nu- merically the army of our neighbour on the west is almost equal, and in some directions there may be a superiority in organization and equipment ; in other directions we have a distinct advantage. The French army lacks the sub- ordination under a single commander, the united spirit which characterizes the German army, the tenacious strength of the German race, and the esprit de corps of the officers. France, too, has not those national reserves available which would allow us almost to double our forces. These are the conditions now existing. But if the French succeed in making a large African army available for a European theatre, the estimate of strength of the French army as compared with ours will be quite different. This possibil- ity must be borne in mind, for, according to the whole previous development of affairs, we may safely assume that France will leave no stone unturned to acquire, if only for a time, a military superiority over Germany. She knows well that she cannot reach her political goal except by a complete defeat of her eastern neighbour, and that such a result can only be obtained by the exercise of ex- traordinary efforts. It is certain that France will not only try to develop her own military power with the utmost energy, but that she will defend herself desperately if attacked by Germany; on the other hand, she will probably not act on the offen- sive against Germany unless she has increased her own efficiency to the utmost limit, and believes that she has secured the military supremacy by the help of active allies. The stakes are too high to play under unfavourable con- ditions. But if France thinks she has all the trumps in her hands, she will not shrink from an offensive war, and will stake everything in order to strike us a mortal blow. We must expect the most bitter hostility from this antagonist. Should the Triple Alliance break up — as seems probable now — this hour will soon have struck.* If the war then declared be waged against us in combination with England, it may be assumed that the allied Great Powers ♦Written in October, 191 1. THE CHARACTER OF OUR NEXT WAR 147 would attempt to turn our strategical right flank through Belgium and Holland, and penetrate into the heart of Ger- many through the great gap in the fortresses between Wesel and Flushing. This operation would have the con- siderable advantage of avoiding the strong line of the Rhine and threatening our naval bases from the land side. From the superiority of the combined Anglo-French fleet, the army of invasion could without difficulty have its base on our coasts. Such an operation would enormously facili- tate the frontal attack on our west frontier, and would enable the French to push a victorious advance onward to the Rhine, after investing Metz and Diedenhofen. England, with whose hostility, as well with that of the French, we must reckon, could only undertake a land war against us with the support of an ally who would lead the main attack. England's troops would only serve as rein- forcements; they are too weak for an independent cam- paign. English interests also lie in a quite different field, and are not coincident with those of France. The main issue for England is to annihilate our navy and oversea commerce, in order to prevent, from reasons already explained, any further expansion of our power. But it is not her interest to destroy our position as a Con- tinental Power, or to help France to attain the supremacy in Europe. English interests demand a certain equilibrium between the Continental States. England only wishes to use France in order, with her help, to attain her own special ends, but she will never impose on herself sacrifices which are not absolutely necessary, for the private advantage of her ally. These principles will characterize her plan of campaign, if she sees herself compelled by the political position and the interests of her naval supremacy to take part in a war against us. If England, as must be regarded probable, determines sooner or later on this step, it is clearly to her advantage to win a rapid victory. In the first place, her own trade will not be injured longer than necessary by the war; in the second place, the centrifugal forces of her loosely compacted World Empire might be set in movement, and the Colonies might consult their own separate interests, 148 GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR should England have her hands tied by a great war. It is not unlikely that revolutions might break out in India and Egypt, if England's forces were long occupied with a European war. Again, the States not originally taking part in the war might interfere in our favour, if the decision were much delayed. It was important for us in 1870-71 to take Paris quickly, in order to forestall any interference of neutrals. Similar conditions might arise in the case of England. We must therefore make up our minds that the attack by sea will be made with the greatest and most persistent vigour, with the firm resolve to destroy com- pletely our fleet and our great commercial centres. It is also not only possible, but probable, that England will throw troops on the Continent, in order to secure the co-operation of her allies, who might demand this guaran- tee of the sincerity of English policy, and also to support the naval attack on the coast. On the other hand, the land war will display the same kind of desperate energy only so far as it pursues the object of conquering and de- stroying our naval bases. The English would be the less disposed to do more than this because the German auxil- iaries, who have so often fought England's battles, would not be forthcoming. The greatest exertions of the nation will be limited to the naval war. The land war will be waged with a deflnitelv restricted obiect, on which its char- acter will depend. Tt is verv nuestionable whether the English armv is capable of effectivelv acting on the offen- sive against Continental European trooos. Tn South Africa the English regiments for the most part fought verv bnwelv and stood great losses : on the other hand, thev comnletelv failed in the offensive, in tactics as in operations, and with few exceptions the generalship was enuallv deficient. The last manoeuvres on a large scale, held in Ireland, under the direction of General French, did not, according' to avail- able information, show the English army in a favourable light so far as strategical ability went. If we now turn our attention to the East, in order to forecast Russia's probable behaviour, we must begin by admitting that, from a Russian standpoint, a war in the West holds out better prospects of success than a renewed THE CHARACTER OF OUR NEXT WAR 149 war with Japan, and possibly with China. The Empire of the Czar finds in the West powerful allies, who are im- patiently waiting to join in an attack on Germany. The geographical conditions and means of communication there allow a far more rapid and systematic development of power than in Manchuria. Public opinion, in which hatred of Germany is as persistent as ever, would be in favour of such a war, and a victory over Germany and Austria would not only open the road to Constantinople, but would greatly improve the political and economic influence of Russia in Western Europe. Such a success would afford a splendid compensation for the defeats in Asia, and would offer ad- vantages such as never could be expected on the far-distant Eastern frontiers of the Empire. Should Russia, then, after weighing these chances, launch out into an offensive war in the West, the struggle would probably assume a quite different character from that, for example, of a Franco-German war. Russia, owing to her vast extent, is in the first place secure against com- plete subjugation. In case of defeat her centre of gravity is not shifted. A Russian war can hardly ever, therefore, become a struggle for political existence, and cause that straining of every nerve which such a struggle entails. The inhabitants will hardly ever show self-devotion in wars whose objects cannot be clear to them. Throughout the vast Empire the social and also political education, especially among the peasants, is so poor, that any grasp of the problems of a foreign policy seems quite out of the question. The sections of the people who have acquired a little super- ficial learning in the defective Russian schools have sworn to the revolutionary colours, or follow a blind anti-pro- gressive policy which seems to them best to meet their in- terests. The former, at least, would only make use of a war to promote their own revolutionary schemes, as they did in the crisis of the Russo-Japanese War. Under the circumstances, there can be little idea of a united outburst of the national spirit which would enable an offensive war to be carried on with persistent vigour. There has been an extraordinary change in the conditions since 18 12, when the people showed some unanimity in repelling the invasion. 150 GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR Should Russia to-day be involved in a Western war * *h Germany and Austria, she could never bring her wL ,e forces into play. In the first place, the revolutionary ele- ments in the heart of the State would avail themselves f every weakening of the national sources of power to eftcct a revolution in internal politics, without any regard for ue interests of the community. Secondly, in the Far East, Japan or China would seize the moment when Russia's forces in the West were fully occupied to carry out their political intentions towards the Empire of the Czar *)y force of arms. Forces must always be kept in reserve for this eventuality, as we have already mentioned. Although Russia, under the present conditions, cannot bring her whole power to bear against Germany and Austria, and must also always leave a certain force on her European Southern frontier, she is less affected by de- feats than other States. Neither the Crimean War nor the greater exertions and sacrifices exacted by her hard- won victory over the Turks, nor the heavy defeats by the Japanese, have seriously shaken Russia's political prestige. Beaten in the East or South, she turns to another sphere of enterprise, and endeavours to recoup herself there for her losses on another frontier. Such conditions must obviously affect the character of the war. Russia will certainly put huge armies into the field against us. In the wars against Turkey and Japan the internal affairs of the Empire prevented the employment of its full strength; in the latter campaign revolutionary agitation in the army itself influenced the operations and battles, and in a European war the same conditions would, in all probability, make themselves emphatically felt, especially if defeats favoured or encouraged revolutionary propaganda. In a war against Russia, more than in any other war, c'est le premier pas qui coute. If the first operations are unsuccessful, their effect on the whole position will be wider than in any other war, since they will excite in the country itself not sympathetic feelings only, but also hostile forces which would cripple the conduct of the war. So far as the efficiency of the Russian army goes, the THE CHARACTER OF OUR NEXT WAR 151 R; a ^io-Japanese War proved that the troops fight with gr&tt stubbornness. The struggle showed numerous in- st?*?ces of heroic self-devotion, and the heaviest losses w&£ often borne with courage. On the other hand, the Russian army quite failed on the offensive, in a certain serine tactically, but essentially owing to the inadequacy of the commanders and the failure of the individuals. The method of conducting the war was quite wrong; indecision an LD — JA H 2 7 REGD " ^&#- EE&21WI C'V NOV 1 7 __.— — -ft'.toy'MBQ - -nJAN— - t;- LOJBtiimi^ General Library Unirersiry of California Berkeley J H I i3i U.C. BERKELEY LIBRARIES CD3flS3bQ3D g» l# 865820 J&6 /f/4-OL THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY