o 
 o 
 o 
 
 A 
 
 
THE 
 
 FUTURE OF TRADE 
 
 BETWEEN 
 
 THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
 AND THE NETHERLANDS AND 
 
 ITS COLONIES 
 
 A SHORT STUDY 
 
 BY 
 H. A. VAN COENEN TORCHIANA 
 
 OF THE CALIFORNIA BAR 
 
 CONSUL GENERAL OF THE NETHERLANDS 
 
 FOR THE PACIFIC COAST STATES 
 
 8AN Francisco, Cal. 
 
 NOVEMBER 11. 1918 
 
 MARCH 11, 1919— THIRD EDITION 
 
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Table of Contents K^Ala J 
 
 Page 
 
 Foreword, by Mr. J. C. van Panthaleon Baron van Eck, 
 President Holland-American Chamber of Com- 
 merce for the Pacific Coast States 5 
 
 Chapter I. The Psychological Factors 7 
 
 Chapter 11. Trade with the Mother Country 23 
 
 Chapter III. Trade with the Netherlands East Indies. . 31 
 
 Chapter IV. Trade with the Netherlands West Indies. 45 
 
 Additional copies will he supplied to interested 
 parties hy applying in person or by letter to 
 the undersigned. 
 
 L. H. HYMANS, 
 
 Secretary of the 
 
 Holland - American Chamber of Commerce 
 
 ^55 Montgomery Street, 
 
 San Francisco, California. 
 
 397506 
 
Digitized by the Internet Archive 
 
 in 2007 with funding from 
 
 IVIicrosoft Corporation 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/futureoftradebetOOtorcrich 
 
Foreword 
 
 To Our Members and Friends: 
 
 It affords us great pleasure to present in pamphlet form 
 two articles written at the request of the "New York Com- 
 mercial" by Mr. H. A. van Coenen Torchiana, the Netherlands 
 Consul General at San Francisco. They deal with the future trade 
 relations of the United States and the Netherlands and its Colonies. 
 
 The author kindly consented that we make such use of the 
 articles as we might deem advisable. 
 
 The subject treated is most opportune, for questions of 
 international trade command just now the attention of the 
 entire commercial and industrial world. 
 
 Readjustments of far-reaching importance in commercial 
 relations will take place in the near future, for the post-war 
 channels of trade will be materially changed. 
 
 The horizon of the new international commerce is steadily 
 broadening, and now presents a far-flung view to those who 
 can read the signs and act accordingly. 
 
 The necessities of war gave rise to more extensive trade 
 and shipping relations between the United States of America and the 
 Netherlands East Indies. These relations should be expanded, not 
 contracted. All the opportunities for such an expansion are there. 
 Will those opportunities be realized? 
 
 As many points of great importance, bearing upon this 
 question, are discussed in the following articles, we hope that by 
 their further publication and wider distribution we shall assist 
 in the furtherance of these trade relations. 
 
 Holland- American Chamber of Commerce 
 
 FOR THE Pacific Coast States. 
 
 By J. C. VAN Panthaleon van Eck, 
 
 President. 
 
Chapter I. 
 
 The Psychological Factors 
 
 Half a dozen years ago, if I had been requested 
 by the Foreign and Export Editor of the "New York 
 Commerciar* to give my views as to the future 
 development of business relations between the United 
 States of America and the Netherlands and its Col- 
 onies, the answer would have been comparatively easy, 
 for the problem involved would by no means have been 
 as complex as it is to-day. 
 
 Prior to the outbreak of the great World Strug- 
 gle, the question, broadly speaking, would have in- 
 volved financial and commercial problems pure and 
 simple, unaffected by general world spiritual condi- 
 tions. At that time it would have involved study and 
 analysis of the resources, past and present, of those 
 countries, their colonial, financial and commercial 
 relations, their logical development of these resources 
 and of their maritime possibilities. It would not 
 have been difficult to arrive at a reasonable conclusion 
 as to the development to be expected in the future. 
 Formerly, as a matter of course, one would have 
 turned to statistics; statistics partly contained in 
 official documents — for instance. Departmental and 
 Consular reports — which statistics, as a rule, are 
 based on close observation and logical deduction from 
 solid facts, and also to statistics furnished by semi- 
 public organizations, such as Chambers of Commerce, 
 Boards of Trade, Merchants and Manufacturers 
 
Associations, etc. — the latter statistics sometimes 
 based, partly on facts and partly on local civic pride 
 and hopeful discounting of futures. All these sta- 
 tistics would have furnished a wealth of information 
 which, once classified and submitted to the acid test 
 of common logic, would, without much travail, give 
 birth to a reasonable forecast as to the future develop- 
 ment of the relations under consideration. 
 
 But bold indeed would be the man who, in the 
 present state of the world's political conscience, would 
 still believe these material facts and considerations to 
 be the only determining factors of the situation. The 
 psychological factor must enter very largely into the 
 situation as soon as peace is declared and conditions 
 have been steadied. He who questions this has only 
 to read of the avowed determination of the British 
 Seamen's Union, so forcibly expressed by J. Have- 
 lock Wilson, its President, to boycott, to the fullest 
 extent, German goods in British ships, not to allow 
 any British ship to carry these goods in any shape or 
 form, nor to allow any German ship in British 
 harbors. 
 
 Truly, after the political peace has been con- 
 cluded and signed by statesmen and ratified by the 
 duly constituted Governments, the People's World 
 Conscience will speak out loud and persistently. 
 Future trade will depend largely on this people's 
 voice. The answer which will be demanded will be 
 an answer to the persistent and pertinent question: 
 How did you stand as a whole during the struggle, 
 and where and how do you stand now? 
 
 For, even after the present conflict has been set>> 
 tied to the satisfaction of the Governments involved. 
 
insofar as such a struggle and all its crimes and hor- 
 rors can ever be satisfactorily settled, the people of 
 each country as a unit will very largely disregard 
 even necessary official pronunciamentos, and will de- 
 mand an accounting of the stewardship of the rights 
 and duties involved, as well of belligerents as of 
 neutrals, during the period of the struggle. This 
 accounting will not be tested merely by the rules of 
 International Law, or finely spun international 
 sophistries. It must be such an accounting as twelve 
 good men and true, sitting on a jury, could unre- 
 servedly accept as being consonant, not only with the 
 rules of law, but with the edicts of equity and good 
 conscience. 
 
 For public opinion will act very largely as a jury 
 on future trade relations, and after the conclusion of 
 the common peace, that jury will demand that the 
 nations come into Court with clean hands. 
 
 That the public opinion prevailing in the United 
 States of America will have a decided say in this 
 high court is a matter of course. Furthermore, that 
 the world at large as far as international trade rela- 
 tions is concerned, is going to be a pronounced Allied 
 world — if I may use this word — is equally a fore- 
 gone conclusion. 
 
 The question arises at the present time — What 
 will American public opinion be as to Holland's 
 actions during the war waged at its very frontiers? 
 Basing my opinion on an intimate knowledge of the 
 American people, a knowledge gained by thirty years 
 of residence and twenty-five years of citizenship, a 
 knowledge gained by practicing for years in the State 
 and Federal Courts, and by taking part in American 
 
business enterprises — knowing, therefore, the fair- 
 ness, justness and sense of honor of the American 
 people — I do not hesitate to say that once all facts are 
 known and the tremendous difficulties under which the 
 Netherlands and its Colonies have labored, are under- 
 stood, the American verdict will be: "Well done. 
 Sister! You, like us, have eaten sorrow out of a large 
 spoon during this cataclysm. We know that you have 
 labored under difficulties which have seldom fallen to 
 the lot of a small but proud people. We under- 
 stand that anxieties have beset you, dangers threat- 
 ened, and shadows overcast you during all these 
 years — yes, even during the first two years of the 
 struggle when we ourselves were entirely carefree 
 and safe. We understand that during all these years 
 there was a scarcity of food, even hunger in your 
 country; that fuel supplies were exhausted during 
 your long winters; that you have constantly kept an 
 army under the colors, an army even greater in pro- 
 portion to your population than our own army at the 
 height of its development. You shared your abund- 
 ance, then your poverty, with hundreds of thousands 
 of refugees. Your people stood the hardest test in the 
 world — that is, you stood armed and marking time, 
 without being able to go into action, but ready to 
 shed your last drop of blood for your dearly bought 
 independence. Hemmed in by belligerents, you felt 
 that the terrific blow might fall at any time, but 
 through it all you maintained with sternness — yes, 
 with dignity — your neutrality and independence. You 
 did even-handed justice to thousands within and with- 
 out your borders. Therefore you are welcome as 
 
 10 
 
friends and true men at the common table of Inter- 
 national Intercourse." 
 
 It is not within the scope of my present article 
 to write a justification of the conduct of the Nether- 
 lands. It may truly be said that its conduct needs no 
 justification. When the history of this war is writ- 
 ten on broad, international and philosophical lines, 
 the historian will once more point, as historians 
 have so often pointed in the past, to the fact that 
 liberty and righteousness often find their strongest 
 champions in small countries, and that it is not 
 geographical size but strength of national character 
 which fixes a country's place in the family of nations. 
 And the historian will prove this contention by citing 
 the example of the Netherlands. American public 
 opinion will do justice to the Netherlands and its 
 people for two reasons: Because this public opinion 
 is American, and therefore Fair, and because the 
 Netherlands people deserve it. 
 
 Do many of our American citizens realize through 
 what agonizing days and nights the Queen of the 
 Netherlands and her Government have passed? And 
 what anxieties must have beset the venerable and 
 learned Premier Cort van der Linden? Do they 
 realize that the young girl whom they took to their 
 national heart when she mounted the throne, has 
 borne years of untold anxiety with real regal dignity, 
 as only a good and noble woman knows how? And 
 do many realize that the former Minister and Envoy 
 of this Queen, John Loudon (himself married to a 
 most estimable American lady), he who was loved 
 so much during his years in Washington, was during 
 these difficult years the Queen's Foreign Minister, 
 
 11 
 
and that history is bound to point to him as one 
 of the great neutral statesmen who performed an 
 almost impossible task in a most successful, yes, in 
 a most lofty way? 
 
 The only reason these statements are made here 
 is because I firmly believe that it is impossible to give 
 even an approximate forecast of the trade relations 
 between two countries, unless you first grasp the 
 psychological side of the question. 
 
 Those who are versed in the matter must many 
 times have been deeply disappointed at the blindness 
 of the critics of the Netherlands. No fair-minded 
 person will deny for a moment that it is not only the 
 right but the duty of the United States to prevent a 
 part of its stores of supplies from going to a neutral 
 country if there is any possibility that these supplies, 
 either in kind or in modified form, may cross that 
 neutral country's boundaries into the country of the 
 enemy. And no fair-minded person will deny that 
 even if these supplies remain in toto in the neutral 
 and friendly country, but their importation makes 
 other supplies available for export to the enemy coun- 
 try, the Government's first duty to its citizens is to 
 prevent the creation of such a condition. And no 
 fair-minded person will deny that it is the absolute 
 right of any country to keep all its supplies, either at 
 home or reserved for its Allies, simply because it 
 needs those supplies for its own or allied purposes. 
 
 It would therefore be a violation of common 
 sense for the historian to take exception to the actions 
 of the United States, actions predicated on the above 
 rules. But how foolish, yes, how deplorable and un- 
 dignified, was the outburst of wrath in this country, 
 
 12 
 
voiced generally in the public press, shortly after the 
 entry of the United States into war, when it was 
 ascertained that the Netherlands did export some of 
 its surplus foodstuffs to Germany. Certainly, all fair- 
 minded men must object to the measurement by two 
 different standards — one standard for one's own 
 actions and another for the actions of one's neigh- 
 bors. The Netherlands was doing as a neutral sim- 
 ply, and with far more justification in necessity, what 
 the Republic of the United States had done likewise 
 as a neutral. 
 
 The principle of International Law, giving neu- 
 trals the right to trade with any belligerent who can 
 get at the neutral market, was vigorously and rightly 
 defended in this country. It has become justly a part 
 of the principles and doctrines as laid down by Amer- 
 ican declarations. When before the entry of this 
 Republic into the war, the German Government, yes, 
 even American citizens sympathizing with the German 
 course, protested against the exportation of large war 
 supplies from the United States to Allied countries, it 
 was firmly stated that so important a rule of Inter- 
 national Law could not be changed during the struggle, 
 for if this were done, it would be tantamount to 
 depriving one of the belligerents of a vested right, the 
 exercise of which was made possible by its supremacy 
 of the seas. If Germany could not get to our mar- 
 kets, it was not the fault of this Republic, but Ger- 
 man's misfortune. Finally when Germany, for the 
 purpose of trying to put a stop to the trade of this 
 country with the Allies, used its murderous weapon 
 of the submarine, the United States in vindication of 
 
 13 
 
the above-mentioned International principle, went to 
 war. 
 
 Then why this indignation? The Netherlands 
 did not trade for profit in ammunitions, guns or rifles. 
 She traded simply out of sheer necessity. She traded 
 foodstuffs, in order to obtain absolute necessaries of 
 life. For instance coal, which she could only draw 
 from Germany and which was necessary for the na- 
 tional existence, as otherwise the people would freeze 
 to death. She therefore followed only in a mild form 
 the same international rights which were so thor- 
 oughly and vigorously protected in the case of the 
 United States of America. 
 
 While many objections were made in the Amer- 
 ican press to the Hollanders exporting cheese and but- 
 ter to Germany, the fact was hardly ever mentioned 
 that for every hundred pounds of animal fat so 
 exported from the Mother Country to Germany, a ton 
 of vegetable fats, such as copra, cocoanut and peanut 
 oils, was imported by Holland merchants from the 
 East Indian Colonies into the United States. If the 
 cheese which the merchants of the Mother Country 
 imported into Germany was not used for direct 
 human consumption, it was only used for making 
 combs and buttons, etc., while the vegetable fats im- 
 ported from the Netherlands East Indies, if not used 
 directly for human consumption, could be made avail- 
 able for such uses as the American manufacturers of 
 war material are thoroughly acquainted with. But 
 still, in the eyes of many American editors, how 
 thoroughly anti-Ally those Holland traders were when 
 they exported this surplus cheese to Germany! 
 
 Whenever, during the last couple of years, such a 
 
 14 
 
question arose the query was generally made: But 
 what is the majority of the Dutch people anyhow — 
 pro- Ally or pro-German? 
 
 Granting fully that during this world struggle 
 no intelligent person, no matter what his station in 
 life may be, could be sincere and claim to be strictly 
 neutral in sympathies, it did not seem to occur to 
 many Americans — themselves the most patriotic peo- 
 ple in the world — that the overwhelming majority of 
 the Netherlanders were staunchly pro-Holland before 
 anything else. 
 
 It was not only vegetable fats that the Nether- 
 lands Colonies supplied to the American markets. 
 Tons of rubber, tin, sisal, quinine and other very 
 important supplies were brought from the Nether- 
 lands Colonies to the ports of America. To give only 
 one instance, the imports through the customs district 
 of San Francisco from the Netherlands East Indies 
 show the total value in 1915 of $50,000 and in 1917 
 of $43,000,000. 
 
 Some time the historian, unbiased by too much 
 national zeal, will also write of the seizures of the 
 Holland ships in Allied ports. Possibly he will be 
 puzzled how to reconcile the evident facts with the 
 principles of International Law. He will delve into 
 the records of the conferences held in Washington 
 and London (it was at London that the decision was 
 finally taken). Having more leisure than the states- 
 men of the present day who are beset with anxieties 
 and tremendous responsibilities, he may reflect that 
 the law of Angary is after all only the weak inter- 
 national sister of its older and better established rela- 
 tive in Municipal Law, known as the law of eminent 
 
 15 
 
domain. He will reflect that both these laws rest on 
 the underlying principle of absolute necessity. That 
 the necessity must be established first by declaration. 
 That the declaration must be supported by facts. 
 That the necessity cannot be established if this im- 
 portant element is lacking, namely, that the seizing 
 or appropriating party has no property of its own 
 with which to satisfy the demand. He also may 
 reflect that this requirement of necessity is not a 
 blanket requirement, but a specific requirement which 
 must attach to individual cases. And then this his- 
 torian may wonder how ships in the Pacific Oriental 
 trade, flying national or Allied flags, remained undis- 
 turbed. Especially when he remembers that of the 
 six lines which were serving this trade five were 
 under Allied flags and remained free from seizure, 
 which the ships of the only line under a friendly neu- 
 tral flag were "Angarized," I think he will conclude 
 that the indignation and resentment which flared up 
 in the Netherlands after the seizure of these Nether- 
 lands ships, especially the ships in the Pacific-Oriental 
 trade, was after all not a sign of anti-Ally sentiment, 
 but a protest against what Netherlands public opinion 
 considered an unwarranted wrong. 
 
 Some time, too, the historian may be able to 
 view with an unbiased eye the many difficulties which 
 beset the negotiators who endeavored to harmonize 
 the necessity of Netherlands shipping, the vital ne- 
 cessity of its Colonies, with the demand of the Allies. 
 Through the shipping interest of the Netherlands 
 flows the very heart blood of that country. The 
 Netherlands ships connect the Mother Country with 
 her colonies, and the Colonies with the outside world* 
 
 16 
 
In those Colonies a handful of Europeans, through 
 their wise and beneficent Government, are able to pre- 
 serve order, peace and content among fifty million 
 natives. But it is absolutely necessary for the very 
 existence of these island Colonies, that communication 
 with the outside world be undisturbed. If these ships 
 are destroyed their payment in money would recom- 
 pense the individual owners, but would give no relief 
 to the crying National want. Neither Denmark, 
 Sweden, Norway nor Spain had such a potent problem 
 staring her in the face. Taking this into considera- 
 tion, the historian will think about the exasperating 
 delays and vexations caused by overlapping authori- 
 ties, misunderstandings, inability to catch the other 
 party's standpoint, and other complications, and he 
 may then be able to present the case to the public. 
 And the public, having regained its balance, will, I am 
 sure, judge justly and understandingly. 
 
 Surely it will then be understood that the appli- 
 cation of the drastic right of Angary is the application 
 of a strictly utilitarian doctrine in International Law, 
 and that the application of such a utilitarian doctrine 
 by a mighty nation which has been looked up to as 
 the exponent of idealism in international relations, 
 naturally caused a severe shock to the sensibilities of 
 a small but proud and liberty-loving people. 
 
 At present the American public is somewhat 
 puzzled why their government arrived at a satisfac- 
 tory understanding with the Governments of such 
 neutral countries as Norway, Denmark, Switzerland 
 and Spain, while the negotiations with the Nether- 
 lands Government dragged without arriving, in a rea- 
 sonable time, at a satisfactory economic settlement. 
 
 17 
 
The public, rightly knowing that its Government de- 
 sired to be, above all, just, jumps at the conclusion 
 that the questions involved were identical. It would 
 be impossible to enter into a discussion of this ques- 
 tion here, even in a cursory way. I am not writing of 
 international politics. Suffice it to say that it would 
 be well to withhold any judgment on this matter, until 
 all the conditions are accurately known. 
 
 The political, as well as the commercial friend- 
 ship of the United States of America with the Nether- 
 lands, fortunately rests not only on a broad historical 
 basis, but on a thorough understanding, born from the 
 fact that both peoples have almost identical political 
 aspirations and ideals. 
 
 I must confess that it has often impressed me 
 painfully, that during the shipping difficulties, ref- 
 erences have been made by well meaning but over- 
 zealous Hollanders to the historical political duty 
 which the people of the United States are presumed 
 to owe to the people of the Netherlands. I have al- 
 ways considered these assertions in very doubtful 
 taste and lacking that delicacy which is so necessary 
 to foster amity amongst nations. Some Hollanders 
 have considered it necessary to remind the Govern- 
 ment of this great Republic what old Holland did for 
 her during her infancy. While every historian readily 
 agrees as to this debt of the past, I believe that every 
 Netherlander who truly loves liberty, is convinced 
 that the United States of America is at the present 
 time repaying it liberally, though indirectly. While it 
 may be an everlasting cause for satisfaction for 
 American citizens of Netherlands descent to know 
 that the red, white and blue are the National colors 
 
 18 
 
of both countries, that the seven stripes in Old Glory 
 are a fitting emblem of the seven provinces of the Old 
 Republic of the United Netherlands, the birthplace 
 of so many American ideals, still it is more to the 
 point to know that the same intense love of personal 
 and political liberty which animated the inhabitants 
 of the Lowlands centuries ago, is to-day the guiding 
 star of the peoples of both countries, and that the 
 same ideals which made it possible for Benjamin 
 Franklin to say of the Netherlands, "In love of lib- 
 erty and in the defense of it, she has been our exam- 
 ple," and for Thorold Rogers to say, "To the true 
 lover of liberty, Holland is the Holy Land of modem 
 Europe and she must be held sacred," are still flour- 
 ishing with undiminished vigor. 
 
 But, as I said before, I consider it of doubtful 
 propriety, especially at the present time, to harp on 
 this historical indebtedness, and I would rather quote 
 what was said by the Belgian, Gustav Jaspaers, in 
 his recent publication, "The Belgians in Holland from 
 1914 to 1917": 
 
 "In 1914, Holland could, for motives of personal 
 safety, have closed her frontier to the flood of Belgian 
 refugees fleeing from fire and sword. Certainly it 
 would have been an act of egoism, but no one could 
 have found fault with it. We have seen how the 
 Government and the people of the Netherlands chose 
 a finer way, and how they welcomed us. Afterwards 
 they could have sent back the destitute among us to 
 Belgium, or at all events not troubled about them. 
 They did nothing of the kind. To the contrary, and 
 in spite of the fact that it was faced by exceptionally 
 difficult problems, strategic and economic, the Govern- 
 
 19 
 
ment did not for one moment abandon the Belgians 
 to their sad fate. By this humane policy the Nether- 
 lands compelled the admiration of the entire world, 
 which applauded the action so magnanimous and com- 
 passionate of a little country that interpreted so 
 generously the high sentiment of solidity. Holland 
 has not been unfaithful to her past. As always she 
 has remained the hospitable country for the unfor- 
 tunate, for the persecuted, for the exiles. The Bel- 
 gians who were the first to benefit by this hospitality, 
 will certainly be the last to forget." 
 
 And Mme. de Nimal-Berryer, sister of the Bel- 
 gian Minister Berryer, wrote as follows : 
 
 "What, however, did surprise and astonish me 
 beyond words, was the admirable generosity of the 
 inhabitants of this country, this traditional and quite 
 natural charity, so simple, frank, general and spon- 
 taneous, flowing like a stream.'' And again, "The 
 generous, simple, hospitable and essentially paternal 
 welcome always reserved in this country for foreign 
 exiles, constitutes one of the most touching mani- 
 festations of this spirit of mutual help and assistance 
 rooted in the heart of all the Netherlanders.'' 
 
 It is significant that the same charge which has 
 often been made erroneously against the people of 
 the United States (the most idealistic people in the 
 world), the charge of "dollar hunting'' — ^has often 
 been leveled at the people of the Netherlands. We 
 find the same Mme. de Nimal writing as follows : 
 
 "Our exile has enabled us to become better 
 acquainted with Holland and the Dutch whom we did 
 not know any better than the Dutch knew Belgium 
 and the Belgians. With us the Dutch had the reputa- 
 
 20 
 
tion of being solely absorbed in the idea of making 
 money. Now we know their purse, like their heart, 
 was opened very wide for the glorious misery of the 
 Belgians. The disinterestedness of our hosts is, more- 
 over, so lofty and so proud that they will permit 
 us only to manifest our gratitude to all in general 
 rather than to each in particular and to tender our 
 thanks to their country for the material help and 
 moral comfort that it gave us in the most terrible trial 
 humanity has ever known." 
 
 Again Mr. Jaspaers says: 
 
 "At any moment Holland, like Belgium, might be 
 involved, her fields devastated, her historical and 
 artistic treasures pillaged and burned. Our hosts in 
 their generosity thought less of the dangers threaten- 
 ing themselves, than of their self-imposed duty of 
 alleviating our sufferings." 
 
 And again : ''Besides, have those who reproached 
 Holland for not having thrown herself head foremost 
 into the melee asked themselves what would have then 
 become of those thousands of Belgians who, having 
 lost everything in Belgium, have been lucky in finding 
 here a shelter, which, if it does not give them all 
 the comforts of the ruined hearth, gives them at any 
 rate, precious peace?" 
 
 Between 700,000 and 1,000,000 Belgian refugees 
 entered Holland. That was one-sixth of Holland's 
 own population. It was as though 15,000,000 desti- 
 tute foreigners invaded the United States. And still 
 this comparison is not just, because Holland is a close- 
 ly populated country, room is far scarcer, employ- 
 ment is more difficult to obtain and the per capita 
 wealth is considerably less than in the United States. 
 
 21 
 
But all these matters can be left for the future 
 historians. American people at the present time, I 
 am sure, know enough of the tremendous stress and 
 difficulties under which the Netherlands, the Govern- 
 ment and her Queen have labored, to sense, almost 
 by intuition, the true state of affairs and the true 
 attitude of the Netherlands. And so American pub- 
 lic opinion will invite this brave and independent peo- 
 ple to an honored place at the common table of inter- 
 national commerce and intercourse. Therefore it may 
 be said that the psychological side of the question 
 does not seem to offer any obstacle, but only encourage- 
 ment. Broadly speaking, for that reason alone, the 
 trade relations of the United States with the Nether- 
 lands and its Colonies, have a bright future. In the 
 next article I shall sketch in a more detailed way the 
 material side of this question. 
 
 22 
 
Chapter II. 
 
 Trade with the Mother Country 
 
 In the previous article, I stated that the future 
 Commercial World Empire will be largely an Allied 
 Empire, and that the psychological problem will be 
 a large factor in the determination of world relations 
 for years to come. 
 
 The events which have developed not only within 
 the last few years, but within the last couple of 
 months, and are developing now, must be kept in mind 
 in order to visualize the future trade relations of the 
 different countries. For these events will have a de- 
 termining effect on the new International Trade 
 Conscience. 
 
 It may be a painful shock to realize, as many are 
 bound to realize, that the recent "peace celebrations" 
 were rather premature, and bold indeed would be the 
 man who would undertake to prophesy when the 
 world's trade will resume its normal course. 
 
 Revolt, Bolshevikeing, anarchy, etc., let loose in 
 one country, very often spread like epidemics to neigh- 
 boring countries. So a good deal of blood may yet be 
 shed in Europe, even in the neutral countries adjoin- 
 ing the belligerents, before world peace is finally 
 restored. But the time is bound to come, sooner or 
 later, when the industrial and trading people of the 
 world will have recovered their poise, and normal 
 relations can be resumed. 
 
 The future Netherlands trade is bound to be 
 divided — as in the past — into three main branches : 
 
 23 
 
First: The trade with the Mother Country in 
 Europe, the Netherlands proper. 
 
 Second: The trade with the Netherlands East 
 India Colonies in Asia. 
 
 Third: The trade with the Netherlands West 
 Indies. 
 
 Several factors, both physical and psychological, 
 indicate that the trade mentioned under subdivision 
 two is destined to see the greatest development, to 
 overshadow in importance the trade with the Mother 
 Country, while the trade with the Netherlands West 
 Indies, on account of their limited area, is destined to 
 be a minor factor. 
 
 From the very nature of her geographical situa- 
 tion, Holland's trade has been partly international- 
 domestic and partly international-transito, if I may 
 use these words. 
 
 When conditions become normal trade between 
 the United States and the Netherlands proper — inter- 
 national-domestic trade — will not be subject to great 
 disturbances, either by contraction or expansion. 
 
 The Mother Country's population is about six 
 and a half millions. While the country boasts of some 
 very important industries, still the Dutch people are 
 essentially a trading, agricultural and seafaring na- 
 tion and not primarily a manufacturing nation, as 
 Belgium was. The country raises a good deal of what 
 it needs for the immediate consumption of its popula- 
 tion and parts of its needs for war material are sup- 
 plied from its own Colonies. Therefore we cannot 
 expect important fluctuations in its trade balances 
 once they are established on a sound economic base. 
 
 But, during the war, the Netherlands having been 
 
 24 
 
compelled to depend largely on its own industries, has 
 developed new manufacturing resources and possi- 
 bilities formerly unexpected or at least dormant. 
 Sheer necessity has taught her and her people that 
 a great many manufacturing resources existed in the 
 country which were unemployed before the war. 
 
 The question naturally arises: How will these 
 products of the Netherlands industries be welcome in 
 the American market, assuming they can be laid down 
 at attractive prices? 
 
 The answer involves the psychological phase 
 formerly referred to. 
 
 It is safe to assume that for a great many years 
 to come, articles of German manufacture will be 
 unwelcome in the extensive markets of the United 
 States, and it is also safe to assume that the German 
 manufacturing interests will endeavor to import these 
 articles, making it appear that they were manufac- 
 tured in friendly countries. This can be done in 
 several ways. Small parts of a complicated article 
 may be manufactured in Germany, then imported as 
 such to the Netherlands and assembled as a Nether- 
 lands product. On the other hand, we must remember 
 that several large American importers had and pre- 
 sumably still have, important manufacturing interests 
 in Germany, and that formerly their products were 
 shipped through the port of Rotterdam, mainly to 
 the port of New York. How can these unwelcome 
 goods be recognized from those which will be welcome; 
 in other words, how can the commercial goats be 
 separated from the sheep? This will depend very 
 largely on the good faith of Netherlands manufac- 
 turers. They must not mark goods as being of purely 
 
 25 
 
Netherlands manufacture, if these goods are manu- 
 factured by a Dutch corporation which is Dutch in 
 name only, but really under alien control. 
 
 Several agencies are already in existence in the 
 Netherlands which by extending their activities could 
 materially assist in commanding that confidence in 
 the integrity of the Dutch trade marks so necessary 
 to command the respect of the American buying pub- 
 lic. There is in the Netherlands a society known as 
 "Nederlandsch Fabrikaat.'' This society has on its 
 membership role only those who manufacture and 
 offer for sale purely Dutch articles. It was organ- 
 ized to stimulate home industry. Its main office is 
 at The Hague, but it has branches in the principal 
 manufacturing cities of the Netherlands. It has 
 adopted an official brand or trade mark with which 
 goods of purely Dutch manufacture are stamped or 
 labeled, and while the original idea was to stimulate 
 the purchase of Netherlands articles in the Mother 
 Country, very likely its activities could be extended 
 to export trade, to the great benefit of Netherlands 
 industries. A rigid inspection exercised by such a 
 semi-official body, and if necessary, legal enactments 
 to punish the wrongful use of its identification mark, 
 would inspire that confidence in the origin of the im- 
 ported articles without which the American importer 
 will be unwilling to do business. 
 
 The success or failure of Netherlands articles in 
 the American market will, in my opinion, largely 
 depend on the extent to which a similar control is 
 exercised over all manufactured articles offered for 
 sale to American wholesalers. 
 
 There is no reason to believe that the spirit which 
 
 2^ 
 
prompted several toy houses* in this country to refuse 
 a share of the consignment of Christmas toys and 
 china which arrived recently on a steamer of the 
 Holland American Line and which were German goods 
 shipped into Holland and bought and paid for long 
 before the outbreak of the war, will in any way be 
 modified after the conclusion of the peace. Rather, 
 it will be intensified. The Netherlands merchants 
 may also see the advantage of centralizing both im- 
 ports and exports, the first through the now famous 
 N. 0. T. (Netherlands Overseas Trust Company) and 
 the latter through the equally well known N. U. M. 
 (Netherlands Uitvoer Maatschappy [Netherlands Ex- 
 port Society]). 
 
 The Netherlands Government may deem it ad- 
 visable to give these organizations semi-public powers. 
 While these centralizations may very beneficially 
 affect the control above mentioned, incidentally they 
 ought to assist considerably in the stabilization of the 
 rates of exchange, something which will assist in 
 keeping business on a sound basis. 
 
 Statistics as to the imports and exports between 
 the two countries are confusing unless one keeps in 
 mind the International-transito commerce heretofore 
 referred to. 
 
 For instance, the report of the American Consul 
 General at Rotterdam gives us these figures for total 
 exports to the United States from the Netherlands : 
 
 1914 $37,363,000 
 
 1917 24,870,502 
 
 while the official publication of the Department of 
 Commerce and Navigation of the United States for 
 
 27 
 
1917 gives these total exports to the Netherlands 
 from the United States : 
 
 1914 $112,215,673 
 
 1917 100,082,108 
 
 The statistics for 1918 (ending June 30) are not 
 yet at hand, but it is safe to assume that 1918 will be 
 very much less favorable, that is to say, that both the 
 imports to and exports from the United States, but 
 especially the latter, will show a very marked decrease. 
 
 In 1917, more than one-half of the total exports 
 passed through the New York Custom District ($65,- 
 000,000). Those through the Maryland District were 
 about $20,000,000. Through the Philadelphia Dis- 
 trict, $8,000,000. Through the New Orleans District, 
 $9,000,000. The balance passed through the various 
 other districts. This shows conclusively the over- 
 whelming importance of New York and vicinity in 
 this Home trade. The figures for the import trade 
 from the Netherlands strengthen this position, for of 
 a total value of $31,842,144, New York alone stands 
 credited with almost $28,000,000. 
 
 The same reasons which assure New York's 
 permanent supremacy in export business with the 
 Netherlands proper, will make the Pacific Coast Dis- 
 trict eventually supreme in the Colonial trade. Com- 
 merce follows its natural geographical channels, vin- 
 dicating the principle that location more than any 
 other factor will eventually dominate trade relations. 
 
 The list of articles imported to the United States 
 contains many items ; the principal are tobacco, plants 
 and bulbs, hides and skins, chemicals, drugs and dyes, 
 polished diamonds, pickled herring, cocoa and cocoa 
 
 28 
 
butter, paints and colors, seeds, spirits, electric lamps, 
 glue and glue size, paper stock and rags. 
 
 The list of articles exported from the United 
 States to the Netherlands contains such items as: 
 Soda ash, vinegar, drugs, ores, machinery, automo- 
 biles, wheat, rye, barley, maize, oats, beans, rice, lum- 
 ber, skins and hides, cotton, coal, fertilizers, iron and 
 steel, oils, cattle feed, meat, copper, lead, starches, 
 tobacco, turpentine, sulphur, etc. 
 
 That the trade balance between the United States 
 and the Netherlands is heavily in favor of the former 
 country is evident. Partly is this due to the fact that 
 the Netherlands even without reshipment would from 
 the very necessity of the country always import more 
 from the United States than export to this country. 
 But, taking this natural permanent situation into 
 consideration, still, so small a country as the Nether- 
 lands could not afford such a large trade balance in 
 its disfavor, if it were not for the fact that a great 
 deal of these goods were only imported in transit and 
 were ultimately destined to other countries, principally 
 South Germany, either in kind or in a modified manu- 
 factured form. 
 
 I say South Germany, for it is a well known fact 
 that all American merchandise destined for Prussia 
 and North Germany generally was imported through 
 Hamburg, Bremen and other North Germany ports, 
 this trade rule being strongly fostered by the German 
 Government as well as by private German enterprise. 
 That the transito commerce has suffered heavily 
 is also shown by the same consular report which states 
 that the port traffic of Rotterdam declined last year 
 to one-tenth of what it was in 1913, and that the 
 
 29 
 
number of Rhine vessels especially had greatly de- 
 creased. 
 
 Will these conditions be restored to normal? Will 
 they surpass the old normal figures? 
 
 As far as the American trade factor is concerned, 
 I must conclude that the future trade relations be- 
 tween the Netherlands Mother Country and the United 
 States of America will very largely depend on the 
 measures which will be taken in the Mother Country 
 to stimulate the above-mentioned confidence, and even 
 if this is accomplished, much must be left to semi- 
 official and personal endeavor. The large business 
 which has been transacted between the port of New 
 York and the port of Rotterdam, insofar as this busi- 
 ness was based on the transito commerce between the 
 United States of America and the German Empire, 
 will be subject to far more drastic re-adjustment than 
 the trade proper between the United States and the 
 Netherlands. 
 
 That the Government and the merchants of the 
 Netherlands are awake to the general situation is 
 proved by the activities of the different Chambers of 
 Commerce, at home as well as abroad, and also by 
 the fact that under the patronage of the Government 
 a special commission has been appointed known as 
 "the Netherlands Commission for commercial policies*' 
 which will study the different phases of the law and 
 economic problems, and advise the Government and 
 private interests. The personnel of this Commission 
 gives assurance of the thoroughness with which its 
 work will be done. 
 
 30 
 
Chapter III. 
 
 Trade with the Netherlands East Indies 
 
 The commerce between the United States and the 
 Netherlands East Indies offers quite a different prob- 
 lem. Before entering into the discussion of these 
 trade relations it may be well first to make a short 
 statement of what these Colonies really are, both from 
 a geographical and historical standpoint. 
 
 The whole Malay Archipelago, also known as 
 Insulindia, is a possession of the Netherlands, with 
 the exception of the northern part of Borneo, which 
 is in British hands, and one-half of the Island of 
 Timor, which belongs to Portugal. 
 
 The Dutch East Indies have a combined area of 
 778,154 square miles. To make a comparison, the 
 great State of California has an area of 153,650 
 square miles, which is about the same area as the 
 Island of Sumatra. 
 
 The total population is, roughly speaking, about 
 40,000,000 of which the Island of Java has about 
 32,000,000. 
 
 The Island of Java, therefore, which has only 
 about 50,554 square miles, or less than 7 per cent of 
 the total surface area, has something like 75 per cent 
 of the total population. 
 
 The population is legally divided into two groups. 
 The first is composed of Europeans and those holding 
 the same rights as Europeans, all naturalized for- 
 eigners belonging to this group. The second group is 
 
 31 
 
composed of natives and those enjoying the same 
 rights as natives, such as Arabs, Moors, Chinese, Mo- 
 hammedans and all non-Christians. 
 
 The whole first group does not consist of more 
 than 100,000, all the rest of this tremendous island 
 population belonging to the second group. 
 
 A great part of the Europeans are employed in 
 or have retired from the government service. Next 
 in number are the planters, merchants and manu- 
 facturers. 
 
 The Arabs, Chinese and other Orientals are al- 
 most all tradesmen and shopkeepers, with the excep- 
 tion of a rather large number of Chinese who work 
 as laborers on the tobacco estates on the east coast 
 of Sumatra. All told, there are about 600,000 Chinese 
 in the East Indies. Some of these are enormously 
 wealthy. 
 
 That order can be maintained and prosperity 
 fostered by so small a white population amongst so 
 many natives speaks volumes for the wisdom of the 
 Netherlands East Indian Government. 
 
 The overwhelming majority of the population is 
 native, of which 75 per cent are tillers of the soil, 
 either on their own account or as agricultural labor- 
 ers on estates, while about 25 per cent of the native 
 population, especially in Java, make a living as shop- 
 keepers, craftsmen, fishermen and in domestic service 
 as coachmen, chauffeurs, etc. 
 
 The first European to visit the East Indies was 
 Marco Polo, the Venetian, who in 1292, on his home 
 voyage from China, touched at the northern part of 
 Sumatra. 
 
 In the Middle Ages spices were carried from this 
 
 32 
 
island, partly by way of Egypt and Asia Minor in 
 Italian ships, and partly by a caravan route. 
 
 It was in 1498 that the Portuguese Vasco da 
 Gama landed in India, and a few years afterwards 
 Portuguese ships, commanded by d' Albuquerque, vis- 
 ited the Indian Archipelago. These of course trans- 
 ported the Indian wares in Portuguese ships to Lis- 
 bon. It was only in 1596, a hundred years after the 
 advent of the Portuguese, that Dutch ships arrived in 
 Java, yet by 1602 the great Dutch East Indian Com- 
 pany was established. This company remained in 
 existence till 1798, when its possessions fell to the 
 State. From the year 1619, when the great Malay- 
 Javanese stronghold "Jacatra" (now Batavia) was 
 stormed and taken, the Islands have been under Dutch 
 control. 
 
 In the nineteenth century, modern ideas of colon- 
 ization generally prevailed, and the administration 
 was zealously reorganized according to western prin- 
 ciples. 
 
 Americans who study governmental systems may 
 well consider that the Dutch Government has always 
 drawn a sharp line between "colonies" and "posses- 
 sions," and so has the British Government. To throw 
 a ready-made western civilization boldly on to an 
 Oriental people who have neither desire nor aptitude 
 for it, is a mistake which has not been committed by 
 the Government of the Netherlands. 
 
 The foregoing matters should be kept in mind, 
 because the query propounded, How can trade rela- 
 tions between the United States and the Netherlands 
 East Indies be extended and improved? — may be put 
 more lucidly this way: How can trade relations be- 
 
 33 
 
tween the great American ports and their great bee- 
 hive of human industry, and especially native human 
 endeavor, be placed on a solid footing? 
 
 I use the words ^^bee-hive of human industry*' 
 advisedly, in justification of which the following tabu- 
 lation : 
 
 The total value of the exports in the year 1914 
 was about 650,000,000 guilders, as against a total 
 value of exports in the year 1895 of 200,000,000; or 
 to put it in American money, in 1895 the total value of 
 the exports was $80,000,000, while twenty years later 
 it was, roughly speaking, $260,000,000. An increase 
 of 320 per cent. 
 
 The chief product exported from the country is 
 sugar. The value of this commodity alone, in 1914, 
 was over $70,000,000. 
 
 Tobacco comes next with $26,000,000 to its credit, 
 then copra with $24,000,000, Java tea $10,000,000, 
 coffee $9,000,000, pepper $5,000,000, rubber $12,000,- 
 000, rice $2,500,000, maize or corn about $2,000,000, 
 kapok $2,500,000, cassava products, $2,500,000, and 
 tin about $15,000,000. 
 
 These figures, of course, are approximate, but 
 the exact amounts can be had on request. 
 
 To give an idea of the importance of these figures 
 let me state that in proportion to their population the 
 Netherlands East Indies have a larger trade than 
 either China or Japan, actually exceeding the total 
 export from China in 1914 by $19,000,000, while the 
 total Japanese exports in the same year were only 
 slightly in excess of the Netherlands East Indies. And 
 still Japan has a population almost twice as large as 
 the Indies. 
 
 34 
 
What share did the United States have in this 
 tremendous export trade? 
 
 The United States did not take, in 1914, quite 
 $6,000,000 worth of goods, or very little over 2 per 
 cent. War conditions have since made a remarkable 
 change in this situation as will be shown later. 
 
 As to the imports : 
 
 We find that in 1914 the total imports in the 
 Dutch Archipelago amounted to about $180,000,000, 
 of which the United States furnished about $3,750,- 
 000, likewise a little over 2 per cent. And this, not- 
 withstanding that by the extension and development 
 of agriculture in the East Indies the demand for 
 machinery and steam engines has greatly increased, 
 thereby placing the American exporter in an especially 
 favorable position. 
 
 Prior to the war the Americans neglected the 
 opportunity to obtain and hold this trade. War con- 
 ditions suddenly changed the whole situation. 
 
 This was not due by any means to the foresight 
 or energy of the American merchant, but to the 
 activities of the German submarines and the inability 
 of the Netherlands merchant marine to follow its cus- 
 tomary trade routes, first through the Suez Canal 
 and afterwards around the Cape of Good Hope and 
 Durban. 
 
 When navigation through coaling necessities and 
 the closing of former markets suddenly veered towards 
 the American continent, the following results were 
 obtained : 
 
 Imports from the Dutch East Indies to the United 
 States : 
 
 35 
 
1913 $ 6,221,954 
 
 1914 5,334,361 
 
 1915 9,245,784 
 
 1916 27,716,589 
 
 1917 62,011,236 
 
 Exports to the Netherlands East Indies from the 
 United States: 
 
 1913 $ 3,151,603 
 
 1914 3,676,805 
 
 1915 2,711,779 
 
 1916 7,401,026 
 
 1917 21,139,305 
 
 When these figures are analyzed the Pacific Coast 
 shows a decidely different position in this trade from 
 the position of American trade with the Mother Coun- 
 try. While the latter was almost monopolized by 
 the Eastern seaboard, quite another condition pre- 
 vails as to the East Indian trade. 
 
 Of the total import of $62,011,236, San Fran- 
 cisco's share was $18,294,183, while of the total ex- 
 ports of $21,139,305, San Francisco's share was 
 $5,501,859. The figures of 1918 will show that the 
 import and export trade of San Francisco with these 
 Colonies is equal to, if it does not surpass, that of the 
 Eastern seaboard, for the imports rose from $18,294,- 
 183 to $43,660,161 and the exports from $5,501,859 
 to $10,481,707. 
 
 This is but natural, for the distance from New 
 York to Batavia, via Suez Canal, is 10,182 miles; and 
 via the Cape of Good Hope 11,855 miles; while the 
 distance from San Francisco is only 7800 miles. Thus 
 
 36 
 
the West is considerably nearer to the Dutch East 
 Indies than New York or Boston and this should prove 
 an important factor in the respective trade relations. 
 
 The list of products which the islands produce 
 and which can be exported, is a very lengthy one. 
 Amongst the minerals may be mentioned : Tin and tin 
 ore, mineral oils and petroleum products, gasoline, 
 benzine and motor spirit, kerosene, turpene, solar oil, 
 diesel oil, batching (spindle) oil, liquid fuel, lubricants 
 and greases, parafRne wax, batik wax, candles, as- 
 phalt, coal and coke, marble, gold, silver, diamonds 
 and other precious stones, manganese, mercury, cop- 
 per iodide, sulphur, tungsten, lead, cement and cement 
 products, tiles, scrap metal. 
 
 Plants and vegetable products : Rattan and ma- 
 lacca sticks, bamboos; timber — teakwood, ebony, san- 
 dalwood, palisanderwood, rootwood, ironwood; iron- 
 wood roofing; fibres — kapok, cotton, manila hemp, 
 sisal hemp, cantala fibre, cocoanut fibre, areng palm, 
 vegetable silk; hats — ^pandan hats, bamboo hats and 
 manila hats, imitation panama hats; cane sugar in 
 its various grades; molasses; cattle food — molascuit, 
 oil cake ; paper stock, various timbers and fibres, corn, 
 rice polished and unpolished; cocoa beans, indigo, to- 
 bacco, cigars and cigarettes; tea, tanning material — 
 gambier, cutch, penang nuts, cassis, barks; coflfee, 
 cocoanuts, copra, cocoanut oil; other oleaginous ker- 
 nels and vegetable fats — peanuts and peanut oil, ka- 
 pok seed and oil, cottonseed and oil, ricinus seeds; 
 castor oil, soya beans, candlenuts; vegetable ivory; es- 
 sential oils — citronella oil, lemongrass oil, canaga oil, 
 cajeput oil, sandalwood oil, palmrose oil; perfumery, 
 drugs — ^Peruvian bark, quinine salts, native drugs 
 
 37 
 
and herbs; gutta percha, rubber and similar kinds of 
 latex, tapioca products, sago and sago flour, gums and 
 rosins, alcohol — arrack and spirits; spices — nutmeg, 
 mace, cloves, black and white pepper, cubebs, chiles, 
 cinnamon and cassia, vanilla and vanilline; fruit — 
 native delicacies and foodstuffs. 
 
 Chinese delicacies ; hides and skins — buffalo hides, 
 cow hides, goat and sheep skins; leather, horns, bone- 
 dust, beeswax, ceresine, shells, mother-of-pearl, etc. 
 
 Surely a bewitching variety of commodities. 
 
 Of those articles which would especially appeal to 
 the American exporter to the Islands, I mention: Ale 
 and beer, biscuits, butter, natural; butter, margarine 
 and artificial; candles, cement, cheese, chemicals, all 
 kinds; copper and brassware, cordage and twines, 
 cotton goods, drugs and medicines, flour, wheaten; 
 glass and glassware, india rubber goods, iron and 
 steel, ironware, machines and machinery, matches, 
 milk, condensed; milk, sterilized; mineral water, mo- 
 tor cars, paints, colors and varnishes; paper, writing; 
 paper, all other; perfumery; railway material, not in- 
 cluding rails; rice, husked; sewing machines, soap, 
 all kinds ; typewriters, yarns, all kinds ; woolens, goods 
 and mix. 
 
 At the present time the means of communication 
 between New York and San Francisco and the East 
 Indian ports are ample, being maintained by several 
 Netherlands steamship companies. 
 
 The distance between the most westerly and the 
 most easterly points in the Dutch East Indies is 3000 
 miles. To accommodate the traffic between the islands 
 there is a packet steamboat company which has fifty- 
 
five larger and smaller boats, some with a tonnage of 
 5000 and with a total of 168,257 tons. 
 
 The great question is: In how far the present 
 relations can not only be placed on firm footing, but 
 extended, so that this rich treasure house of the East 
 Indies may yield part of its abundance of wealth to 
 New York and San Francisco? 
 
 With the closing of the North Sea, with the shut- 
 ting off of the German markets, with the French, Brit- 
 ish and other factories employed in making war ma- 
 terials, the Netherlands East Indies have been forced 
 to come here with products which were formerly ex- 
 ported to Europe. Export trade with the Netherlands 
 East Indies, before the war, as we have shown, was 
 negligible; with the disturbed political conditions it 
 has grown tremendously, as undoubtedly last year's 
 statistics, and especially this year's statistics will 
 prove. 
 
 What has the American business man done to 
 make this trade permanent? 
 
 I fear that in most cases the answer will be — lit- 
 tle or nothing. 
 
 I do not mean to say that a great many merchants 
 have not used energy to capture the present trade; I 
 speak from a broader standpoint. 
 
 "Spot cash" for goods was demanded either in 
 San Francisco or New York; or C. L F. (cost, insur- 
 ance, freight) Java^ which of course works out as 
 **cash payment against surrender of documents in 
 Java." But will this work when, for instance, other 
 merchants will again offer long-time credits, three 
 months and more? 
 
 There are excellent trade opportunities in the 
 
 39 
 
present rush of American goods to the East Indies and 
 in the equally great rush of Netherlands East India 
 goods to the ports of New York and San Francisco. 
 But is the American merchant playing for permanent 
 relations, or only for immediate trade? 
 
 Present world-conditions have given American 
 business men an opportunity in the East India Trade 
 almost in spite of themselves. 
 
 But, it may be asked, will the activities of the 
 American merchants and firms be welcome in the 
 Netherlands East Indies? 
 
 The Dutch, with the tolerance which has made 
 them famous throughout history, have not only no 
 fear of foreign relations or domination through the 
 introduction of foreign capital in the business of the 
 Colonies, but, on the contrary, welcome the invest- 
 ment of foreign, and, above all, American capital. 
 
 They would welcome a further extension of 
 American capital because the islands are still of such 
 rich potential strength that they are still open to 
 tremendous further development. 
 
 Any foreign organization can do business in the 
 East Indies, provided it incorporates a branch under a 
 Dutch charter and appoints a resident Hollander di- 
 recting manager. Before the war German enterprise, 
 especially, had grown tremendously. The business 
 world in the East Indies present a decidedly cos- 
 mopolitan aspect. Even the Holland Government em- 
 ploys a great many foreigners in its service. 
 
 The Dutch East Indies are not only a great co- 
 lonial but a great commercial empire, for no other 
 Asiatic country has a greater production per capita. 
 
 No other country or possession in Asia offers 
 
 40 
 
greater, safer or better advantages for investment 
 of American capital. 
 
 But it will take determined effort and energy, 
 knowledge and broad views to capture permanently a 
 considerable part of this magnificent trade and place 
 it on a solid footing. 
 
 Where American banking accommodations do not 
 exist, where no American ships transport goods under 
 the American flag, and where only a comparatively 
 small American capital is invested in the Indies, it 
 will be most difficult, if not impossible, not only to de- 
 velop but even to hold, under normal conditons, a 
 trade established under peculiar conditions. 
 
 American capital has to a moderate extent been 
 invested in rubber plantations. There is no country 
 that uses more rubber than the United States, There 
 is no country that produces better rubber than the 
 Netherlands East Indies. On account of the proxim- 
 ity of the East Indies to the port of San Francisco 
 this port should be a great rubber market. 
 
 American capital should be especially attracted to 
 the production of raw materials for which there is 
 such a demand at the present time, and those manu- 
 facturers who are vitally interested in the finished 
 product are the logical persons to be interested in the 
 production and importation of the raw materials. 
 
 In the year 1914 there was invested in the Neth- 
 erlands East Indies $120,000,000 in rubber planta- 
 tions, of which about one-half was in Java and the 
 balance divided between Sumatra and Borneo. This 
 total was roughly divided as follows : 
 
 41 
 
Netherlands capital $53,000,000 
 
 English capital 55,000,000 
 
 Belgian, French, German and 
 
 Swedish capital, about 12,000,000 
 
 The grand total of American capital invested was 
 nothing in Java, nothing in Borneo and $400,000 in 
 Sumatra. In the last few years there has been some 
 improvement in this respect, but nothing compared 
 to what it should be. 
 
 Two more industries in which American capital 
 could be engaged with exceeding profit are oil-bearing 
 plants, especially oil-bearing palms and sisal. 
 
 Pre-eminent amongst the exports of oil-bearing 
 substances, especially for the making of oleomar- 
 garine, stands copra, which has an oil percentage of 
 60 to 75 per cent, in fact the highest oil percentage 
 of any known vegetable material. Large amounts of 
 copra and cocoanut oil are now being imported to the 
 United States. 
 
 Exports of copra from the Netherlands East 
 Indies in the year 1914 amounted to about 250,000 
 tons. The export of cocoanut oil was in that year com- 
 paratively negligible, but has grown very much since. 
 The increase of the export from 1909 to 1914 was 
 about 50 per cent. 
 
 One half of this copra was exported to the Nether- 
 lands ports, while the other half was divided over a 
 number of ports, the main ones being Marseilles, 
 Hamburg and Singapore; but the total imports to the 
 United States from the Netherlands East Indies was 
 about 300 tons. 
 
 Are these conditions going to return? 
 
 42 
 
The answer is, Yes, they will, to a large extent, 
 unless American merchants and American capital 
 will take more interest, not only in the trade of these 
 articles but also in their production. They must take 
 a kindly interest in these colonies and their industries, 
 and not merely figure what they can make on a 21/^ or 
 5 per cent commission business. If they don't, others 
 will. 
 
 "Henequen," from which sisal is derived — ^the 
 fibre used largely by our American farmers in tying 
 their grain — must appeal to them. 
 
 Sisal is very largely imported from Yucatan at 
 the present time. 
 
 The recent history of this commodity in the 
 American markets is well known. The combined 
 growers in Yucatan practically dictate to the Amer- 
 ican twine manufacturers the price of raw fibre, 
 which in 1914 was 5% per cent, and which was 
 lately about 16^/2 per cent. The United States manu- 
 facturers will pay this year more than forty million 
 dollars for the same raw material for which they paid 
 thirteen million dollars prior to 1915. 
 
 There is no American import tariff on sisal, but 
 Yucatan has an export tariff of $40 a ton. There is 
 nothing which prevents this country or Mexico from 
 increasing that tariff. 
 
 The grain binders cannot tie and cut soft fibre 
 made from cotton, Kentucky hemp or fiax fibre. In 
 order to cut a soft twine a mechanism with scissors 
 would be required, and the wear and tear over rocky 
 grain fields makes this impracticable. 
 
 Twine made of sisal, on the other hand, is hard 
 
 43 
 
and stiff and can be drawn across the edge of a 
 bar which breaks it. 
 
 There is only one area in the United States 
 where one can grow sisal satisfactorily: a very small 
 part of Florida. Sisal, how^ever, cannot be grown 
 commercially in small amounts, for it takes extensive 
 machinery to handle the crop, and large tracts are not 
 available in Florida for that purpose. Then there is 
 also the labor question. 
 
 The Netherlands East Indies offer an excellent 
 field for this purpose. 
 
 The product has not been grown to a great ex- 
 tent in the East Indies for the reason that the greatest 
 dem.and came from the American market, and this 
 market was supplied by the Yucatan growers. 
 
 The continued disturbance in the political situa- 
 tion of Mexico, however, has given rise to the ex- 
 orbitant export duty on this article, all of which the 
 ultimate consumer must pay. 
 
 Lands can be obtained and plantations operated 
 without difficulty. There is an abundance of labor 
 on hand and political conditions are not to be feared. 
 Verily, the Netherlands East Indies offers a tempting 
 field for this as well as for other cultures. 
 
 44 
 
Chapter IV. 
 
 Trade with the Netherlands West Indies 
 
 The commerce between the United States and the 
 Netherlands West Indies can be divided into two main 
 subdivisions : 
 
 1. Trade with the Colony of Curacao; and 
 
 2. Trade with the Colony of Suriname. 
 
 (1.) The Netherlands Colony of Curacao con- 
 sists of six islands in the Caribbean Sea, north of 
 South America. They are divided into two groups, viz, 
 Curacao, Bonaire and Aruba which lie in the neigh- 
 borhood of Venezuela, and Saint Eustache, Saba and 
 Saint Martin (the latter being partly Netherlands, 
 partly French territory), formerly part of the Lee- 
 ward Islands or Lesser Antilles. 
 
 In 1634 the Netherlands West Indian Company 
 took possession of Curacao; afterwards it passed to 
 the State and has ever since been Netherlands terri- 
 tory. During the war of American Independence 
 Willemstad, the capital, became a very important 
 factor in the trade of the neighboring commercial 
 countries. 
 
 The comparatively limited size of these islands, 
 and therefore their restricted production and power 
 of consumption, make it unlikely that they will ever 
 become big factors in American overseas trade de- 
 velopment. 
 
 We may note the important straw hat industry 
 
 45 
 
of Curacao, the growing of cotton in Saint Eustache 
 and Saint Martin, and a few other cultivations, as for 
 instance that of the agava sisalana, also the salt and 
 phosphate production, all of which may attain con- 
 siderable importance. But the main interest, for 
 years to come, must be the shipping facilities which 
 these islands offer. 
 
 Of these islands Curacao is the most important. 
 Here is the seat of government of the Colony; it is 
 the largest in size, and has the most numerous popula- 
 tion, and it also occupies a strategical position in the 
 world's trade routes. The harbor of its principal city, 
 Willemstad, is one of the very finest in the world. 
 
 The temperature is tropical, but is tempered by 
 trade winds, Willemstad being one of the healthiest 
 harbor towns in the West Indies. 
 
 The harbor is benefited by its situation outside 
 of the dreaded hurricane zone, and a great many ves- 
 sels often take refuge there during the so-called 
 hurricane months. After steamship navigation had 
 largely displaced sailing ships, some decline was 
 noticed, but the opening of the Panama Canal and the 
 expected large increase in shipping through the Carib- 
 bean Sea is bound to bring this harbor again to its 
 former prominence. 
 
 Willemstad is situated only 695 geographical 
 miles from Colon, and near the route of ships com- 
 ing from the North American coast, from Africa and 
 the Mediterranean Sea, bound for the Panama Canal. 
 
 Also, a very large portion of the shipping from 
 the harbors of the west coast of North and South 
 America, through the Canal to the Atlantic Ocean, 
 |)a3se? Curacao. 
 
 46 
 
The Government of the Islands, foreseeing these 
 conditions, provided extensive quays, excellent coaling 
 depots, good water and ice supplies, and very low 
 harbor fees. The Colony is in cable and wireless 
 communication with the rest of the world. 
 
 Extensive harbor improvements are now under 
 way for the purpose of making the harbor comply 
 with the requirements of modern traffic. Especially 
 as a coaling station will the harbor increase in im- 
 portance for the American trade. The price of coal 
 is relatively cheap, in fact cheaper in comparison 
 with other West Indian harbors, and the quality is 
 excellent. Furthermore, the labor for coaling is cheap, 
 and taking into consideration that Curacao, on ac- 
 count of its climatic conditions, is an excellent harbor 
 of refuge, it does not take a very vivid imagination 
 to forecast its future importance as a link in Amer- 
 ican sea trade. 
 
 That American authorities agree as to the facili- 
 ties offered by this harbor is evidenced by the fact that 
 several years ago the American Navy Department 
 stated that "Curacao has the advantage of possessing 
 one of the finest and most commodious harbors of the 
 West Indies.^' (See "The Navigation of the Gulf of 
 Mexico and Caribbean Sea," Vol. II, No. 64; 1907.) 
 
 (2.) Suriname is the name of Netherlands 
 Guiana, situated on the east coast of South America. 
 It lies between British and French Guiana, and is the 
 only possession of the Netherlands on the American 
 Continent. It came into Netherlands ownership after 
 the second war between England and the Republic of 
 the United Netherlands. By the Peace of Breda in 
 
 47 
 
1667 it was confirmed in the possession of the Re- 
 public. 
 
 Though trade with this Colony must be modest 
 compared to American trade with the Netherlands 
 East Indies, still it is in no sense of the word a negligi- 
 ble factor now, and the possibilities in the future are 
 great. 
 
 An obstacle to the proper economic development 
 of this Colony, by Nature so richly endowed, is its 
 lack of population. At the present time the total 
 population does not exceed 100,000 people, and the 
 City of Paramaribo, its capital, has a population of 
 35,000. 
 
 For a long time efforts have been made to stimu- 
 late outside interest in this Colony, and to induce 
 sufficient immigration for labor and sufficient capital 
 to develop its very rich resources. Native labor is 
 unsatisfactory in many respects, and Dutch capital 
 was preoccupied with the development of the East 
 Indies. These efforts have met so far with only a 
 modest success. 
 
 It is not within the scope of this article to enter 
 into an extensive discussion of the causes of the com- 
 paratively small development of Suriname, nor to 
 suggest a modus operandi for improvement. I wish 
 only to suggest the role which American capital may 
 play in the development of these rich resources on the 
 continent of one of the Americas. 
 
 At the present time most of the products of Suri- 
 name, such as coffee, balata (rubber) and cocoa, find 
 a ready market in the United States, but only after 
 more capital and more competent and expert, and also 
 more common plantation (coolie) labor are invested 
 
 48 
 
in the Colony, can the trade with the American ports 
 rise to its just level. 
 
 The soil is as rich as any in the world, and with 
 American methods of exploitation and cultivation 
 Suriname would soon double and triple its present 
 production, not only agricultural but also mineral, 
 especially gold. There is no reason, except lack of 
 capital and labor, why this Colony should not be as 
 prosperous as Guatemala, San Salvador or any of the 
 other Central American republics. 
 
 Investment of American capital is safe, both 
 from a financial and political standpoint. The planta- 
 tion labor question will eventually be solved by the 
 importation of either Hindu labor from the British 
 East Indies or Javanese labor from the Netherlands 
 East Indies. Both kinds of labor have already been 
 imported, on a limited scale, for the last few decades 
 and have proven satisfactory, both from the stand- 
 point of the employer and of the laborer. The British 
 and the Netherlands governments exercise a strict 
 supervision over the welfare of their nationals. 
 
 This Colony needs financial investments on a large 
 scale. Sooner or later this financial development is 
 bound to come from the United States, and then Suri- 
 name will be in a position to obtain the bulk of its 
 necessaries in the American market. The establish- 
 ment in Paramaribo of a branch of one of the large 
 Eastern American banks would be a leading factor in 
 this development and would prove a very profitable 
 investment. 
 
 49 
 
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