HERMkS
OR
A PHILOSOPHICAL INQVIRY
CONCERNING
VNIVERSAL GRAMMAR
BY IAMES HARRIS E
XI2IENAI APfOYNTAS EINAI rAl" KAI ENTAT0A 0EOT2
THE SECOND EDITION
REVISED AND CORRECTED
LONDON
PRINTED FOR IOHN NOVRSE
AND PAVL VAILLANT
M DCC LXV
f
To the Right Honourable
PHILIP Z/W HARDWICKE,
Lord High Chancellor of Great
Britain * 4
My Lord,
AS no one has exercifed
the Powers of Speech
with jufter and more univerfal
applaufe, than yourfelf ; I
have prefumed to infcribe the
following Treatife to your
Lordfhip, its End being to
inveftigate the Principles of
thofe Powers. It has a far-
ther claim to your Lord-
fliip's Patronage, by being
conne&ed in fome degree with
that politer Literature, which,
in the moft important fcenes
A a of
* The above Dedication is printed as it originally flood,
the Author being defirous that what he intended as real Re-
fpeft to the noble Lord, when living, fhould now be co^-
fidered, as aTeftimony c-f Gratitude to his Memory.
2223271
. .
Ill
iv DEDICATION.
of Bufinefs, you have ftill
found time to cultivate. With
regard tomyfelf,ifwhat I have
written be the fruits of that
Security and Leifure, obtained
by living under a mild and free
Government; to whom for this
am I more indebted, than to
your Lordfhip, whether I con-
fider you as a Legiflator, or
as a Magiftrate, the firft both
in dignity and reputation?
Permit me therefore thus pub-
licly to aflure your Lordfhip,
that with the greateft gratitude
and refpe& I am, My Lord,
Tour Lordjhips mofl obliged*
and mofl obedient humble Servant,
Ghfe of Salifiury t
Of. i, 1751,
James Harris.
rHE chief End, propofed by the.
Author of this Treatife in mak-
ing it pub lie ) has been to excite his
Readers to curiofay and inquiry \
not to teach them himfelf by prolix
and formal Letfures, (from the effi-
cacy of which he has little expeElation)
but to induce them, ifpafftble, to be-
come- Teachers to themfelves, by an im-
partial ufe of their own underftand-
ings. He thinks nothing more abfurd
than the common notion of InJlruElion^
as if Science were to be poured into
the Mind, like water into a ciftern,
that pajjively waits to receive, all that
comes. The growth of Knowlegz he.
rather thinks to refemble the growth
of Fruit ; however external caufes
may in fome degree co-operate, '//V
the internal vigour, and virtue of
A 3 the
vi PREFACE.
the tree, that muft ripen the juices to
their jujl maturity.
*fhis then, namely, the exciting
men to inquire for tbemf elves into
fubjeEls worthy of their contemplation,
this the Author declares to have been
his firft and principal motive for
appearing in print. Next to that,
as he has always been a lover of
Letters, he would willingly approve
his Jludies to the liberal and inge-
nuous. He has particularly named
thefe, in diftinElion to others ; becaufe,
as his Jludies were never profecuted
with the lea ft regard to lucre, fo they
are no way calculated for any lucra-
tive End. 'The liberal therefore and
ingenuous (whom he has mentioned
already) are thofe, to whofe perufal
he offers what he has written. Should
Mr
they judge favourably of his attempt, .
he may not perhaps hejitate to confefs,
{-Joe jurat et melli eft.
For
P R E F A C <
For tho be hopes, he cannot be charged
with the foolijh love of vain Praife^
he has no dejire to be thought indif-
ferent, or infenfible to honeft Fame.
From the influence of thefe fenti-
ments, he has endeavoured to treat his
fubjett with as much order, correft-
nefs, and perfpicuity as in his power \
and if he has failed, he can fafely
*/ ./ J ,/ <Jr
fay (according to the vulgar phrafe)
that the failure has been his misfor-
tune, and not his fault. He fcorns
thofe trite and contemptible methods
of anticipating pardon for a bad per-
formance, that u it was the hafty
fruits of a few idle hours ; written
merely for private amufement ;
never revifed ; publifhed againjt
confent, at the importunity of
"friends, copies (God knows how)
" having by ftealth gotten abroad*"
with other ft ale jargon of equal fal-
JJjood and inanity. May we not ajk
fuch Prefacers, If what they allege
A be
cc
cc
(C
cc
viii PREFACE,
be true, what has the world to da
with them and their crudities ?
As to the Book itfelf^ it can fay
this in its behalf, that it does not
merely confine itjelf to what its title
fromifes, but expatiates freely into
whatever is collateral-, aiming on
every occajion to rife in its inquiries^
and to pafs, as far as pojjibk, from
fmall matters to the greatefl. Nor
is it formed merely upon fentiments
that are now in fajhion^ or fupported
only byfuch authorities as are modern.
Many Authors are quoted^ that now
d-days are but little ftudied ; and
fome perhaps , whofe very names are
hardly known.
The Fate indeed of antient Authors
(as we have happened to mention them)
is not unworthy of our notice. A
few of themfurvive in the Libraries
of the learned^ where fome venerable
Folio, that ftill goes by their name,
J u ft
PREFACE. ix
juft fuffices to give them a kind of
nominal exiftence. 'The reft have
long fallen into a deeper obfcurity^
their very names , 'when mentioned^
(iffeEling us as little, as the names y
when we read them, of thofe fubordi-
yiate Heroes,
Alcandrumque, Haliumque, No-
emonaque, Prytanimque.
Now if an Author^ not content
with the more eminent of antient
Writer S) Jhould venture to bring his
reader into fuch company as thefe
loft, among people (in the fafiion-
able phrafe) that no body knows ;
what ufage, what quarter can he
Jjave reajon to expeB ? Should the
Author of thefe fpeculations have
done this (and *tis to be feared he
has) what method had he bejl take in
a cir cum fiance fo critical? Let us
fuppofe him to apologize in the beft
manner he can^ and in confequeme
of this ^ to fuggeft q$ follows
He
PREFACE.
He hopes there will be found a
pleafure in the contemplation of an-
tient fentiments, as the view of an-
tient ArchiteElure, tho in ruins, has
fomething venerable. Add to this,
what from its antiquity is but little
known, has from that very circum-
Jlance the recommendation of novelty ;
fo that here, as in other inflames,
Extremes may be faid to meet.
Farther ftill, as the Authors, whom
he has quoted, lived in various ages,
and in diftant countries ; fome in the
full maturity of Grecian and Roman
Literature \ fome in its declension ;
and others in periods ftill more bar-
barous, and depraved; it may afford
perhaps no unpleafing f peculation, to
fee how the SAME REASON has at all
times prevailed', how there is ONE
TRUTH, like one Sun, that has en-
lightened human Intelligence through
every age, and faved it from the
darknefs both of Sophijiry and Er-
ror.
Nothing
PREFACE. xi
Nothing can more tend to enlarge
the Mind, than thefe extenfive views
of Men, and human Knowlege ; no-
thing can more effectually take us off
from the foolijh admiration of what
is immediately before our eyes, and
help us to a jufter eftimate both of
prefent Men, and prefent Litera-
ture,
9 Tis perhaps too much the cafe with
the multitude in every nation, that as
they know little beyond themf elves, and
their own affairs, fo out of this nar-
row fphere ofknowlege, they think no-
thing worth knowing. As we BRITONS
by our Jituation live divided from the
whole world, this perhaps will be
found to be more remarkably our cafe.
And hence the reafon, that our ftudies
are ufually fatisjied in the works of
our own Countrymen ; that in Philo-
fophy, in Poetry, in every kind of
fubjeEi, whether ferious or ludicrous,
whether f acred or profane, we think
2
xn PREFACE.
perfection 'with ourf elves, and that 'tis
juperfluous to fear ch farther.
The Author of this *freatife would
by no means detract from the jufl
honours due to t/iofe of bis Country-
men, who either in the prefent, or
preceding age, have fo illujlrioujly
adorned it. But tho he can with
pleafure and Jin cerity join in celebra-
ting their deferts, he would not have
the admiration of thefe, or of any
other few, to pafs thro' blind excefs
into a contempt of all others. Were
fuch Admiration to become univerfal,
an odd event would foliow ; a few
learned men, without any fault of
their own, would contribute in a man-
ner to the extin&ion of Letters.
A like evil to that of admiring
only the authors of our own age, is
that of admiring only the authors of
one particular Science. Tliere is in-
deed if; this taji prejudice fomething
pecu-
PREFACE. xiii
peculiarly unfortunate^ and that h y
the more excellent the Science, the
more likely it will be found to produce
this effeft.
There are few Sciences more in-
trinjically valuable > than MATHE-
MATICS. '70 hard indeed to fay ^
to which they have more contributed^
whether to the Utilities of Life, or to
the fublimejl parts of Science. They
are the nollefl Praxis of LOGIC, or
UNIVERSAL REASONING. *Tis thro
them we may pet~ceive y how the ftated
Forms of Syllogifm are. exemplified in
one Subjeft^ namely the Predicament
of Quantity. By marking the force
of thefe FormS) as they are applied
here 3 we may be enabled to apply
them of ourf elves el fe where. Nay
farther Jlill by viewing the MIND,
during its procefs in thefe fyllogiftic
employments, we may come to know
in part^ what kind of Being it is ;
Jince MIND, like ether Powers^ can
be
xiv PREFACE.
be only known from its Opera t ion $<
Whoever therefore will ftudy Mathe-
matics in this viewy will become not
only by Mathematics a more expert
Logician, and by Logic a more ra-
tional Mathematician, but a wifer
Philofopher^ and an acuter Reafoner^
in all the pojfible fubjetts either of
fctence or deliberation.
But when Mathematics, inflead of
being applied to this excellent purpofe^
are ujed not to exemplify Logic, but
to fupply its place ; no wonder if
Logic pafs into contempt^ and if
Mathematics, inflead of furthering
fcience, become in faEl an obftacle.
For when men^ knowing nothing of
that Reafoning which is univerfal,
come to attach themfelves for years
to a {ingle Species, a fpecies wholly
involved in Lines and Numbers
only ; they grow infenjibly to believe
thefe laft as in fep arable from all Rea-
as the poor Indians thought
every
PREFACE.
e very hcrfeman to be infeparable from
his horfe.
And thus we fee the ufe, nay tht
mceffity of enlarging our literary
views, left even Knowlege itfelf
Jhould obflruB its own growth^ and
perform in feme meafure the part of
ignorance and barbarity.
Such then is the Apology made by
the Author of this Treatife, for the.
multiplicity of antient quotations^
with which he has filled his Book. If
he can excite in his readers a proper
fpirit of curiofity ; if he can help in
the leajl degree to enlarge the bounds
of Science ; to revive the decaying
tajle of antient Literature^ to leffen
the bigotted contempt of every thing
not modern ; and to ajfert to Authors
of every age their juft portion of
ejteem ; if he can in the leaft degree
contribute to thefe ends^ he hopes it
may be allowed, that he has done a
fervice
xvi PREFACE.
fervice to mankind. Should this fey*
vice he a reafon for his Work to fur-
vive, he has confefl already^ ^twould
be no unpleajing event. Should the,
contrary happen, he mujl dcquiefce
in its fate, and let it peaceably de~
part to thefe deflined regions, where
the productions of modern Wit are
every day departing,
in vicum vendentem tus et
odores.
H B
THE
CONTENTS,
BOOK I.
Chapter I. Introduction. Defign of ths
'whole. p a g e i
Chap. II. Concerning the Analyzing of Speech
into itsfmallejl Parts. p. 9
Chap. III. Concerning the federal Species of
thofe fmallefi Parts. p. 23
Chap. IV. Concerning Subftantives, properly
fo called. p. 37
Chap. V. Concerning Siibjianti'ves of the Se-
condary Or o'er, p. 63
Chap. VI. Concerning Attributives, andfrft
concerning Verbs* p. 87
Chap. VII. Concerning 'Time, and Tenfes,
p. 100
Chap. VIII. Concerning Modes. p. 140
Chap. IX. Concerning Verbs, as to their Spe-
cies and other remaining Pro-
perties, p.
xviii CONTENTS.
Chap. X. Concerning Participles and Ad-
jecJives. p. 184
Chap, XI. Concerning Attributives of the
Secondary Order. p f 192
BOOK II.
Chapter I. Concerning Definitives, page 213
Chap. II. Concerning Connectives, and firft
thofe called Conjunctions, p. 237
Chap. III. Concerning thofe other Connec-
tives, called Prepojitlons. p. 261
Chap. IV. Concerning Cafes. p. 275
Chap. V. Concerning Interjections Recapi-
tulation Conclufion. p. 289
BOOK III.
Chapter I. Introduction Divifion of the
Subject into its principal Parts.
page 305
Chap. II. Upon the Matter or common Sub-
ject of Language. p. 3 1 6
4 Chap.
CONTENTS. xix
Chap. III. Upon the Form, or peculiar Cha-
racter of Language. p. 327
Chap. IV. Concerning general or univerfal
Ideas. p. 350
Chap. V. Subordination of Intelligence Dif-
ference of Ideas, both in particu-
lar Men, and in whole Nations
Different Genius of different
Languages Character of the
Englifh, the Oriental, the La-
tin, and the Greek Languages
Superlative Excellence oftheLajl
-Conclufion p. 403.
HER-
HERMES
OR A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY
CONCERNING UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR
BOOK. L
CHAP. I.
INTRODUCTION.
Dejign of the Whole.
IF Men by nature had been framed Ch. I.
for Solitude, they had never felt an
Impulfe to converfe one with an-
other: And if, like lower Animals, they
had been by nature irrational, they could
not have recognized the proper Subjects
of Difcourfe. Since SPEECH then is the
joint Energie of our beft and nobleft Fa-
culties (a), (that is to fay, of our Rea-
B fen
(a] See V. I. p. 147 to 169. See alfo Note xv.
p. 292, and Note xix, p. 296. of the fame Volume,
2 HERMES.
.
Ch. I.fin and our facial Affeftion) being withal
our peculiar Ornament and Diftinction, as
Men y thofe Inquiries may furely be deemed
interefting as well as liberal, which either
fearch how SPEECH may be naturally re-
Jolted; or how, when refolved, it may
be again combined.
HERE a large field for fpeculating opens
before us. We may either behold SPEECH,
as divided into its conftituent Parts, as a
Statue may be divided into its feveral
Limbs j or elfe, as refolved into its Matter
and Form, as the fame Statue may be re-
folved into its Marble and Figure.
THESE different Analyzings or Refo-
lutions conftitute what we call * PHILO-
SOPHICAL, or UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR.
WHEN
() Grammaticam etiam bipartitam ponsmus, ut alia
(it literaria, alia philofophica &?<:. Bacon, de Augm.
Sdent. VI. i. And foon after he adds Verumtamen
hoc ipfa re moniti, cogltatione complexi fumus Grammati-
cam quondam, qua non analoglam verborum ad inviccm,
fed analoglam Inter verba et res Jive rationem fedufo in*
guirat.
WHEN we have viewed SPEECH thus Ch. I.
Analyzed, we may then confider it, as
compounded. And here in the firft place
We may contemplate that (c) Synthefis,
which by combining Jimp le 'Terms produces
a Truth -, then by combining two 'Truths
produces a third-, and thus others, and
others, in continued Demonftration, till
we are led> as by a road, into the regions
of SCIENCE.
Now this is that fuperior and moft ex-
cellent Syntbefis, which alone applies itfelf
to our Intellect or Reafon, and which to
B 2 conduct
(c} Arijlotle fays T v dc sola (w&p.ioiv. O-J/A-
^t'^Et, vtxa Of thofe words
which are fpoken without Connettion^ there is no one
either true or falfe ; as for injlance^ Man^ white,
runneth, conquereth. Cat. C. 4. So again in the
beginning of his Treatife DC Interpretation, w^\
r^ feen in Compaction and Divijion.
Compofition makes affirmative Truth, Divifion makes
negative, yet both alike bring Terms together, and io
far therefore may be called fynthetical.
4 HERMES.
Ch. I. conduct according to Rule, conftitutes
the Art of LOGIC.
AFTER this we may turn to thofe
(d) inferior Competitions, which are pro-
ductive
(d) Ammonius in his Comment on the Treatife
n^I />/*).''?, P. 53- gives the following Extradt
from TheophraJJuS) which is here inferted at length, as
well for the Excellence of the Matter, as becaufe it is
not (I believe) elfewhere extant.
rj rt IIPO N TOT~2
'AKPOnMENOTS, oT? *r. <ru/**w TI, x) r? f
nPO'S TA V HPA'rMATA, vnlf uv c \fyuv Tsrsr.
ecu TXfsorfliirou ra? ax^oa;/xvf, -arfpi JUK ?y rr^y <r^-
TOT'S 'AKPOATA'2 xa7-
AAa p*) ra xoivtx
. 9 ffu//7rAXii otA-
A^Aoif, wpe J^ja rvruv *y TWV TJJTCIJ 7ro ( utfa)V, oio
<ra(pnvftf, ^A-JXUTTIT^, x] TWV aAAxu i'jcuv, m TE
jixaxooAoj/ja; >^ (3^a^uAo5/ia;, xa?a xat^o^v ta-aiTa;u T!ra-
paAaj(ASai/o/Auju, or<ra' TE tti ax^oar^i/, xj IxTrA^at.
xj srpo; T)itf -orfi'Sw ^ei^wfilVJa ip^av T^ Jf ^e IIPO N S
TAOPATMATA T Ao'j/ ox l/<rfM ? ^tAoVo^'
B'^ci)'/*wfc)? iTT^AtArjcrflaj, TO, TE 4/Euj*^ JiiA/^uv^
3
THE FIRST. $
dudive of the Pathetic, and the Pka- Ch. I.
Jaut in all their kinds. Thefe latter Com-
pofitkms
xj TO a\r$iq aTroJfixyu'?. The Relation of Speech be-
ing twofold (as the Philofopher Theophrajlus hath
fettled it ) one to the HEARERS, to whom it explains
fomething, and one to the THINGS, concerning which
the Speaker propofes to perfuade his Hearers : With
refpeft to the firjl Relation, that -which regards the
HEARERS, are employed Poetry and Rhetoric. Thus
it becomes the bufmefs of thefe two, to felefl the moft
refpeflable Words, and not thofe that are common and
of vulgar ufe, and to conneft fuch Words harmonioujfy
one -with another, fa as thro* thefe things and their
conferences, fuch as Perfpicuity, Delicacy, and the
other Forms of Eloquence, together with Copioufnefs and
Brevity, all employed in their proper feafon, to lead
the Hearer, and Jlr'ike him, and hold him vanquished by
the power of Perfuaf.cn. On the contrary, as to the
Relation of Speech to THINGS, here the Philofspher
will be found to have a principal employ, as well in
refuting the Falfe, as in demcnjlrating the True.
Sanclius fpeaks elegantly on the fame Subject.
Creavit Dcus hominem rationis participem j cw, quia
Sociabilem ejje voluit, magno pro mun.ere dedit Ser-
monem. Sermoni autem perficiendo tres opifices adhi-
buit. Prima ejl Grammatica, qua ab oratione folce-
cifmos tf barbarifmos expel/it ; fecunda Dialeftica,
qua in Sermonis veriiate verfatur ; tertia Rhetorica,
ques ornatum Sermonis tantum exquirit, Min. 1, J,
f 2,
B 7
HERMES.
Ch. I. pofitions afpire not to the Intelled, but be-
ing addrefTed to the Imagination, the Af-
feftions, and the Senje, become from their
different heightnings either RHETORIC
or POETRY.
NOR need we neceflarily view thefe
Arts diftinctly and apart j we may ob-
ferve, if we pleafe, how perfectly they
co-incide. GRAMMAR is equally requifite
to every one of the reft. And though
LOGIC may indeed fubfifl without RHE-
TORIC or POETRY, yet fo necefTary to
thefe laft is a found and correct LOGIC,
that without it, they are no better than,
warbling Trifles.
Now all thefe Inquiries (as we have faid
already) and fuch others arinng from them
as are of ftill fublimer Contemplation, (of
which in the Sequel there may be poffibly
not a few) may with jufKce be deem'd
Inquiries both interefting and liberal.
AT
Bo O K T HE FlR S T. J
AT prefent we fhall poftpone the whole Ch. I.
Synthetical Part, (that is to fay, Logic and
Rhetoric} and confine ourfelves to the
analytical, that is to fay UNIVERSAL
GRAMMAR. In this we fhall follow the
Order, that we have above laid down,
firfl dividing SPEECH, as a WHOLE into its
CONSTITUENT PARTS; then refolving it,
as a COMPOSITE, into its MATTER and
FORM; two Methods of Analyiis very
different in their kind, and which lead
to a variety of very different Specula*
tions.
SHOULD any one object, that in the
courfe of our Inquiry we fometimes de-
fcend to things, which appear trivial and
low; let him look upon the effeds, to
which thofe things contribute, then from
the Dignity of the Confequences, let him
honour the Principles.
THE following Story may not impro-
perly be here inferted. When the Fame
B 4 < of
HERMES.
Ch. I. <f of Heraclitus was celebrated through-*
" out Greece, there were certain perfons,
" that had a curiofity to fee fo great a
" Man. They came, and, as it happened,
" found him warming himfelf in a
*' Kitchen. The Meannefs of the place
" occaiioned them to ftop; upon which
." the Philofopher thus accofted them
" ENTER (fays he) BOLDLY, FOR HERE
TOO THERE ARE GoDS
WE /hall only add, that as there is no
part of Nature too mean for the Divine
Prefence $ fo there is no kind of Subject,
having its foundation in Nature, that is
below the Dignity of a philofophical In-
quiry.
(/) See Arijlot. de Part. Animd. 1. 1. p. 5.
CHAP.
BOOK THE FlRST. M
CHAP. II.
Concerning ike Analyfing of Speech into
its fmallejl Parts.
THOSE things, which are/r/? to Na- Ch. II.
ture, are notjr/? to Man. Nature
begins from Caufes, and thence defcends
to Effetfs : Human Perceptions firft open
upon Effetfs, and thence by flow degrees
afcend to Caufes. Often had Mankind
feen the fun in Eclipfe, before they knew
its Caufe to be the Moon's Interpolition ;
much oftner had they feen thofe unceafing
Revolutions of Summer and Winter, of
Day and Night, before they knew the
Caufe to be the Earth's double Motion (a).
Even
(a) This Diftin&ion of prior to Man and prior to
Nature, was greatly regarded in the Peripatetic Phi-
lofophy. See Arijl. Phyf. Aufcult. 1. i. c. I. Tlxmif-
tius's Comment on the fame, Pojler. Analyt. 1. i.
C. 2. De Anima^ 1. 2. c. 2. It leads us, when pro-
perly regarded, to a very important Diftin&ion be-
tween
HERMES.
Ch. II. Even in Matters of Art and human Crea-
tion, if we except a few Artifls and cri-
tical
tween Intelligence Divine and Intelligence Human.
GOD may be faid to view the Firft, as firft ; and the
Laft, as laft; that is, he views Effefts thro' Caufes
in their natural Order. MAN views the Laft, as
firft ; and the Firft, as laft ; that is, he views Caufes
thro' EffeSls-t in an inverfe Order. And hence the
Meaning of that Pafiage in Arljlotle : utrmf
arw Tr,; riy.STtpot$ /u^r,- o
rot T? (py<rt Qoi-jtcuTxl<x, uravlt-v. jfs are the Eyes of
Bats to the Light of the Day^ fa is Mans Intelligence
to thofe Ol'jefls, that are by Nature the brightejl and
vnojl confpicuous of all Things , Metaph. 1. 2. c. I. See
alfo 1. 7. c. 4. and Ethic. Nicorn. 1. i. c. 4. Ammomus^
reafoning in the fame way, fays very pertinently to
the Subject of this Treatife ' A'yscTrr,-o-j T^ 0pw-
TfXfiOTjoo: srpoifvat' ra y-x,p
, *)
Aoj/ov,
XTI. Human Na-
ture may be well contented to advance from the more
imperfett and complex to the more Jimpie and perfect ;
for the complex Sitbjefls are more familiar to j, and
fatter known. Thus therefore it is that even a Child
knows how to put a Sentence together, and fay ^ Socrates
walke;h j
BOOK THE FIRST, 11
tical Obfervers, the reft look no higher Ch. II.
than to the Practice and mere Work>
knowing nothing of thofe Principles, on
which the whole depends.
THUS in SPEECH for example All
men, even the loweft, can fpeak their
Mother-Tongue. Yet how many of this
multitude can neither write, nor even
read ? How many of thofe, who are thus
far literate, know nothing of that Gram-
mar, which refpeds the Genius of their
own Language ? How few then muft be
thofe, who know GRAMMAR UNIVER-
SAL; that Grammar -, which without re-
garding the feveral Idioms of particular
Languages, only refpefts thofe Principles^
that are effential to them all?
'Tis our prefent Defign to inquire about
this Grammar; in doing which we Ihall
follow
Walketh ; but how to refolve this Sentence into a Naun
and Verb, and thefe again into Syllable^ and Syllables
into Letters or Elements^ here he is at a Isfs. Am. in
Com. de Pnedic. p. 28. 4
12 HERMES.
Ch. II. follow the Order confonant to human Pcr-
ception, as being for that reafon the more
eafy to be under flood.
WE mall begin therefore firft from a
Period or Sentence, that combination in
Speech, which is obvious to all, and thence
pafs, ifpoffible, to thofe \\sprimary Parts,
which, however eflential, are only ob-
vious to a few.
WITH refpect therefore to the dif-
ferent Species of Sentences, who is there
fo ignorant, as, if we addrefs him in his
Mother-Tongue, not to know when 'tis
we offer t, and when we queftion-, when 'tis
we command, and when we fray or tvijh?
FOR example, when we read in Shake*
fpeare *,
*The Man, that hath no mujic in himfelf.
And is not movd with concord of fweet
founds,
Is ft for Treafons
Or
* Merchant
BOOK THE FIRST* 13
Or in Milton *, ch - IL
O Friends, I hear the tread of nimble
feet*
Hafting this 'way
'tis obvious that thefe are affertrve Sen-
tences, one founded upon Judgment, the
other upon Senfation.
WHEN the Witch in Macbeth fays to
her Companions,
Whenjhall we three meet again
In thunder, lightning and in rain ?
this 'tis evident is an interrogative Sen-
tence.
WHEN Macbeth fays to the Ghoft of
Eanquo,
' ' Hence, horrible Shadow,
Unreal Mock'ry hence !
he fpeaks an imperative Sentence, founded
upon the paffion of hatred.
WHEN
* P. L. IV. 866.
14 HERMES,
Ch. II. WHEN Milton fays in the character of
his Allegro,
Haft et bee, Nymph, and bring with thec
Jeji and youthful polity ',
he too fpeaks an imperative Sentence, tho*
founded on the paffion, not of hatred but
of love.
WHEN in the beginning of the Para*
dife Loft we read the following addrefs,
And chiefly thou, O Spirit, that doft prefer
Before all temples tti upright heart, and
pure,
Inftruft me, for thou know'ft-**
this is not to be called an imperative
Sentence, tho' perhaps it bear the fame
Form, but rather (if I may ufe the Word)
'tis a Sentence precative or optative*
WHAT then (hall we fay ? Are Sen-.
tences to be quoted in this manner without
ceafing, all differing from each other in
their
BOOK THE FIRST. i
their ftamp and character ? Are they no Ch. II,
way reducible to certain definite ClafTes ?
If not, they can be no objects of rational
comprehenfion. Let us however try.
'Tis a phrafe often apply 'd to a man,
when fpeaking, that he fpeaks his MIND )
as much as to fay, that his Speech or Dif-
courfe is a publifhing of fame Energie or
Motion of bis Soul. So it indeed is in every
one that fpeaks, excepting alone the Dif-
fembler or Hypocrite ; and he too, as fat
as poffible, affects the appearance.
Now the POWERS OF THE SOUL (over
and above the meer-f- nutritive) may be in-
cluded all of them in thofe of PERCEP-
TION, and thofe of VOLITION. By the
Powers of PERCEPTION, I mean the
Senfes and the Intelktt ; by the Powers of
VOLITION, I mean, in an extended fenfe,
not only the Will, but the feveral Pajfions
and Appetites ; in mort, all that moves to
Action, whether rational or irrational.
IP
f Vid. Ariftot, de An. If. 4,
16 HERMES.
Ch. II. I F *hen t* 16 leading Powers of the Soul
be thefe two, 'tis plain that every Speech
or Sentence, as far as it exhibits the Soul,
muft of courfe refpec~l one or other of
thefe.
IF we affert 9 then is it a Sentence which
refpeds the Powers of PERCEPTION. For
what indeed is to ajfert, if we confider the
examples above alleged, but to publifh
fame Perception either of the Senfes or
thelntelhtt?
Ac EN, if we interrogate, if we com-
mand, if we pray, or if we 'wijh, (which
in teems of Art is to fpeak Sentences in-
terrogative, imperative, precative, or op'
tative) what do we but publifh fb many
different VOLITIONS ? For who is it that
questions ? He that has a De/ire to be in-
formed. Who is it that commands ? He
that has a Will, which he would have
obey'd. What are thofe Beings, who
either wife or pray? Thofe, who feel
certain
BOOK THE FlR ST. Ij
certain wants either for themfelves, or Ch. II.
others.
IF then the Soul's leading Powers be the
two above mentioned, and it be true that
all Speech is a publication of thefe Powers,
it will follow that EVERY SENTENCE WILL
BE EITHER A SENTENCE OF ASSERTION,
OR A SENTENCE OF VOLITION. And
thus, by referring all of them to one of
thefe two clafTes, have we found an expe-*
dient to reduce their infinitude ^.
fcv OTI TY,;
IXZC-KI; Jliva/.tn?, ra? fji.lv ^uuoxa?, TO? JE
toe,; x) c'^xljjcjf? AfloaEUaj* (A)/C<) $1
toe,
6
vav
fSa TWW aiaSa!'; 1 ^ TII/ &vruv % TWW
a MEN Tt~1a.(:& tiSvi T A^a (ra waoa
iresoy cc7rorejro/.'-fj'/)j (rov G'jp.fioix't.s&tyo.
T6 1 tvp/rTy ftjj 9fflW?) x) y'rOs Ao^ov Trap
C i
HERMES.
Ch. II. THE Extenfions of Speech are quite In-
definite, as may be feen if we compare*'
the
iv T DTSMATIKOT
EPflTHMATIKOT xaXx/xEvx AC'^K, r TO-p
, wWfp ITT! T KAHTIKOT, -mo?
aul? Grcotjrtvq* ttj rauTTjf, >i cJf -nrfltca xgjrrlov^*, wj 7ri
T*i? ETXHS, '/) WJ TffXOX P^|)OVOJ, WJ 7Tt T8 X'JplW?
xXv,ucvti; JIPOSTAHEni' .ao'vov A E r A II O-
Jjf yv l )ou.vr l q v rp-j pHtnuf ruv
^ <paJDOjW.ZVWf, J'iO x) |!XOVO TJJTO
xo sov aA^Qft'a? J ;}/uJi<r, rwy Jg aAAuw a&'y. The
Meaning of the above paflage being implied in the
Text, we take its tranflation from the Latin Interpre-
ter. Dicendum igitur ejl^ cum anima nojlra dupllcem
potejlatem habeat^ cognitionis^ & vlta^ qua ttiam appe-
titionis ac cupiditatis appdlatiir ; qua vero cognitionis eft t
vis eft) qua res fingulas cogrujiiittus, lit mens, cogitati<7 9
cp'mioy pbantafia, fenfus : appetitus vero facultai ejt y qua
bona^ vcl qua funt^ vel qua videntur* concupifchmts, ut
funt voluntaS) con/ilium, ira, cupiditas : quatuor orathnis
1'pecieS) prater enunciantem, a partibus animi proficifcun-
tur, qua concupijcunt ; non cum animus ipje per fe agit,
fed cum ad alium fe convertit> qiii el ad confequendum iJ y
quod cupit, canducere pojje -vidcatur ; atque etiam vel ra-
tiontm ab to exquirit t ut in Qrat'wWy quam Percunftan-
tern,
BOOK THE Fl R3T.
the Eneid to an Epigram of MartlaL But Ch. II,
the longeft Extenfion, with which Gram-
mar has to do, is the Extenfion here con-
iider'd, that is to fay a SENTENCE. The
greater Extenfions (fuch as Syllogifms, Pa-
ragraphs, Sections, and complete Works)
belong not to Grammar, but to Arts of
higher order; not to mention that all of
them are but Sentences repeated.
Now a SENTENCE (c) may be fketch'd
in the following defcription a compound
C 2 Quantity
tern, out Interrogantem vacant ; vet rem : fique rem,
vel cum ipfum confequi cupit, qincum loquitur^ ut in op-
tante oratione, vel aliquam ejus aklicntm : atque in hac t
lid ut a prafianthre, ut in Deprecatione ; vel ut ab in-
feriore, ut In <?<?, qui proprie Juflus nominatur. Sola
autem Enuncians a cogmfcendi facultate profidfcitur :
bezcque nunciat rerum cognit'wnem, quee in nobis eft, ant
veram, aut fimulatam. Itaque Haec fola verum falfutn-
que capit : praterea vero nulla. Ammon. in Libr. de
Interpretatione.
x9' aura o-jjuaij/fj T/. Arift. Poet, c. 2Q. See
alfo de Interpret, c. 4.
20 HERMES.
Ch. II. Quantity of Sound Jignific ant, of which cer-
tain Parts are themfehes alfo fignificant .
THUS when I fay [the Sunjhineth] not
Only the whole quantity of Sound has a
meaning, but certain Parts alfo, fuch as.
[Sun] and [Jhineth.]
BUT what fhall we fay? Have thefe
Parts again other Parts, which are in like
manner iignificant, and fo may the pro-
grefs be purfued to infinite ? Can we fup-
pofe all meaning, like Body to be divi-
fible, and to include within itfelf other
Meanings without end ? If this be abfurd,
then muft we neceflarily admit, that there
Is fuch a thing as a Sound Jignificant, of
'which no Part is of itfelf fignific ant. And
this is what we call the proper character
of a (a 1 ) WORD-. For thus, though the
Words
De Poetic, c. 20. De Interpret, c. 2.
Prifclan's, Definition of a Word (Lib. 2.) is as
follows
BOOK THE FIRST. i
Words [Sun] and \J1nneth\ have each a Ch. II.
Meaning, yet is there certainly no Mean-
ing in any of their Parts, neither in the
Syllables of the one, nor in the Letters of
the other,
IF therefore ALL SPEECH whether in
profe or verfe, every Whole, every Se&-
tion, every Paragraph, every Sentence,
imply a certain Meaning, droipblc into other
Meanings, but WORDS imply a Meaning,
which is not fo diyifible : it follows that
WORDS will be the fmalleji parts of fpeech,
in as much as nothing lefs has any Mean-
ing at all.
fc&lows-^-Difiio eft par 3 minima orationis conftruftee, id
fft, in ordine compojita. Pars autem, quantum ad totum
intelligendum, id eft, ad totius fenfus intellettum. Hoc
autem ideo dictum ejl, nequis conetur vires in duas paries
dividers, hoc eft, in vi iff res ; nan enim ad totum intelli~
gendum hac fit divifto. To Prifcian we may add TIico*
dore Gaza. AS^JJ Jf, (*fg'& faAjyr* xar sdnofcn
Ao'j/a. IntroJ. Gram. 1. 4. Plato (hewed them this
chara&eriftic of a Word Sep Cratylus, p. 385. Edit.
HERMES.
Ch. II. 70 know therefore the fpecies of Words
muft needs- contribute to the knowledge of
Speech) as it implies a knowledge of its
minuteft Parts.
THIS therefore muft become our next
Inquiry.
CHAP.
BOOK THE FIRST.
CHAP. III.
Concerning the fpecies of Words, tbefmal/eft
Parts of Speech.
LE T us firft fearch for the Species of Ch.IIL
Words among thofe Parts of Speech,
commonly received by Grammarians. For
example, in one of the paflages above
cited.
Man y that hath no mufic in himfelf,
And is not mov'd with concord of fiyeet
founds,
Is Jit for treafons-
Here the Word [The] is an ARTICLE ;
[Man] [No] [Mufic} [Concord] [Sweet]
[Sounds] [Fit] [Treafons] are all NOUNS^
fome Subftantive, and fome Adjective*
[That] and [Himfelf] are PRONOUNS
[Hath] and [is] are VERBS [moved] a
PARTICIPLE [Not] an ADVERB [And]
a CONJUNCTION [In] [with] and [For]
4 are
24 HERMES.
Ch.III. are PREPOSITIONS. In one fcntence we
have all thofe Parts of Speech, which the
Greek Grammarians are found to acknow-
ledge. The Latins only differ in having
no Article, and in feparating the INTER-
JECTION, as a Part of itfelf, which the
Greeks include among the Species pf Ad-
verbs.
WHAT then mall we determine ? why
are there not more Species of Words ? why
fo many ? or if neither more nor fewer,
why thefe and not others ?
To refolve, if poflible, thefe feveral
Queries, let us examine any Sentence that
comes in our way, and fee what differences
we can difcover in its Parts. For exam-
ple, the fame Sentence above,
Man that bath no mufic, &c.
ONE Difference foon occurs, that fome
Words are variable, and others invariable*
Thus the Word Man may be varied into
^lans and Men ; Hath, into Have, Haft,
2 Had*
BOOK THE FIRST. 25
Had,kc. Sweet into Swceter^nd Sweeteft; Ch III.
Fit into Fitter and Fitteji. On the con-
trary the Words, The, In y And, and fome
others, remain as they are, and cannot be
altered.
AND yet it may be queflioned, how far
this Difference is elTential. For in the firfl
place, there are Variations, which can be
hardly called neceffary, becaufe only ibme
Languages have them, and others have
them not. Thus the Greeks have the dual
Variation, which is unknown both to the
Moderns and to the ancient Latins. Thus
the Greeks and Latins vary their Adjectives
by the triple Variation of Gender, Cafe,
and Number ; whereas the Englifi never
vary them in any of thofe ways, but thro*
all kinds of Concord preferve them flill
the fame. Nay even thofe very Variations,
which appear moft neceffary, may have
their places fupplied by other methods ;
fome by AuxiUars, as when for Bruti, or
firitio we fay of Brutus, to Brut us; fome
ly
*6 H E R M E S.
Ch.III. by meer Pofition, as when for Erutum ama*
i}jf Coffins, we fay, Caffius lovd Brutus.
For here the Accufative, which in Latin
is known any where from its Variation, is
in Eng/?fi> only known from its Pojltlon or
place.
IF then the Diftin&ion of Variable and
Invariable will not anfwer our purpofe, let
us look farther for fome other more ef-
fential.
SUPPOSE then we fhould diflblve the
Sentence above cited, and view its feveral
Parts as they ftand feparate and detached.
Some *tis plain Jlill preferve a Meaning*
(fuch as Man, Mufic, Sweet, &c.) others
on the contrary immediately lofe it (fuch as,
And, The, With, &c.) Not that thefe lafl
have no meaning at all, but in fad: they
never have it, but when in company, or
officiated.
Now it mould feem that this Diftinc^
if any, was eflential. For if all
Words
BOOK T HE Fl RS T. 27
Words are fignificant, or elfe they wou'd Ch III.
not be Words ; and if every thing not ab-
Jblute t is of courfe relative ; then will all
Words be fignificant either abfolutely or
relatively,,
WITH refpect therefore to this Diftino
tion, the firft fort of Words may be call'd
fignificant by themfefoes ; the latter may be
call'd Jignificant by relation -, or if we like
it better, the firft fort may be call'd Prin-
cipals, the latter AcceJJories. The firft are
like thofe ftones in the balis of an Arch,
which are able to fupport themfelves, even
when the Arch is deftroyed > the latter are
like thofe ftones in its Summit or Curve,
which can no longer {land, than while the
whole fubiifts (e.)
Tim
(e) dpollonius of Alexandria (one of the acuteft Au-
thors that ever wrote on the fubje of Grammar) il-
luftrates the difFerent power of Words, by the differ-
f fit power of Letters. "Ert ov rpowop TUV
,usv f i (wvrjfVTCSj x S*UT<%
\
r
28 HERMES.
Ch III. THIS Diftindion being admitted, we
thus purfue our Speculations. All things
what-
uirep avfu ruv uvr,iuv x t^t
' TOV auTov r^oVoy *ov iVjvoTxrat xam
In the fame manner, as of the Elements or Letters fame
are fcwels, which of themfelves complete a Sound; ethers
are Confonants, which without the help of Jewels have no
e)fprefs Vocality^ fo likewife may we conceive as to the na-
ture of Words. Sojne of 'them , like Vowels , are of 'them -
felves exprefjive, as is the cafe of Verbs y Nouns, Pro-
nouns^ and Adverbs ; others, like Confonants, wait for
their Vowels, being unable to become exprejffive by their
fzyn proper Jlrength, as is the cafe of Prepofetions, Arti-
cles, and Ctnjunfiions ; for thofe parts of Speech are al~
ways Confignificant, that is, are only f.guificant, when of-
ficiated to fomething fife. Apollon. de Syntax!. L. I.
c. 3. Itaque quibufdam philofophis placuit NOMEN ^
VERBUM SOLAS ESSE PARTES ORATiONis ; catcra
vero, ADMINICULA vcl JUNCTURAS earum: quomodo
navium partes funt tabula & trabes, cat era autem (ideft 9
, Ji-uppa, & claui & f;jrjlia) vincula & cwglutina-
BOOK THE FIRST. 29
whatever either exift as the Energies, or Ch.III,
AffeSlions of fome other thing, or without
being the Energies or Affections of fome
other thing. If they exift as the Energies
or Affettions of fome thing elfe, then are
they called ATTRIBUTES. Thus to
think is the attribute of a Man ; to be
white, of a Swan ; to fly* of an Eagle ;
to be four-footed, of a Horfe. If they
exift not after this manner, then are they
call'd SUBSTANCES*. Thus Man,
Swan, Eagle and Horfe are none of
them Attributes, but all Subftances, be-
caufe however they may exift in Time
and Place, yet neither of thefe, nor of
any thing elfe do they exift as Energies
or Affections.
AND
tiones parttum navis, (hoc eft^ tabularum & trablum) non
partes navis dicuntur. Prifc. L. IX. 913.
SUBSTANCES] Thus Ariftotle. Nuv f*u Sv TVITU
\C/,f \\/l>
r t^w r\ itna, on TO fAy xa UTroxfi-
a xaS' rci a^Aa. Metaph. Z. y. p. 106.
Ed. Sylb.
*
HERMES,
Ch III. AND thus all things whatfoever being
either (f) Subftances or Attributes, it fol-
lows of courfe that all Words, which are
fignificant as Principals, muft needs be
fignificant of either the one or the other.
If they are Jignificant of Subftances, they
are call'd Subftantives -, if of Attributes,
they are call'd Attributives. So that ALL
WORDS whatever, fignificant as Princi-
pals, are either SUBSTANTIVES or AT-
TRIBUTIVES.
AGAIN, as to Words, which are only
fignificant as Acceffbries, they acquire a
Signification either from being aflbciated
to one Word, or elfe to many. If to one
Word alone, then as they can do no more
than in fome manner define or determine,
they may juftly for that reafon be called
DE-
(/) This divifion of things into Sulfance and Acci-
dent feems to have been admitted by Philofophers of all
Se&s and Ages. See Categor. c, 2. AJetapbyf. L. VII,
c. i. DeCalo, L. III. c. I.
BOOK THE FIRST. 31
DEFINITIVES. If to many Words at Ch.IIL
once, then as they ferve to no other pur-
pofe than to connect, they are call'd for
that reafon by the name of CONNEC-
TIVES.
AND thus it is that all WORDS what-
ever are either Principals or Acceffories ;
or under other Names, either Jignificant
from tbemfehes, or fignificant by relation.
If Jignificant from themf elves, they are
either Subftantives or Attributives*, if
fignificant by relation, they are either
Definitives or Connectives. So that un-
der one of thefe four Species, SUB-
STANTIVES, ATTRIBUTIVES, DE-
FINITIVES and CONNECTIVES, are
ALL WORDS, however different, in a
manner included.
IF any of thefe Names feem new and
unufual, we may introduce others more
ufual, by calling the Subftantivts, NOUNS ;
the Attributives, VERBS'; the 'Definitives,
i ARTI-
32 H E R M E S-
Ch.III. ARTICLES; and the CoTme&ivfs, CON-
JUNCTIONS.
SHOU'D it be a/k'd, what then be-
comes of Pronouns, Ad^erls, Prcpojitions,
and Interjections; the anfwer is, either
they muft be found included within the
Species above-mentioned, or elfe muft be
admitted for fo many Species by them-
felves.
TriERE were various opinions in an-
cient days, as to the number of thefe Parts,
or Elements of Speech.
Plato in his * Sophift mentions only
two, the Noun and the Verb, Arijlotle
mentions no more, where he treats of
f- Proportions. Not that thofe acute Phi-
lofophers were ignorant of the other Parts,
but they fpoke with reference to Logic or
Dia*
* Tom. I. p. 261. Edit* Ser,
f De Xntcrpr. c. 2 & 3.
BOOK THE FIRST. 33
Dialectic (g)> confidering the EfTence of Ch.IIL
Speech as contain'd in thefe two, becaufe
tbefe alone combin'd make a perfect offer*
five Sentence, which none of the reft with-
out them are able to effect. Hence there-
fore Artftotle in his * treatife of Poetry
(where he was to lay down the elements
of
Paries igitur orationis funt fecundum Dialefticos
y NOMEN & VERBUM ; quia h<e folte etiam per
fe conjuntta plenum faciunt orationem ; alias autem paries
evTxoflityofJifHKru, hoc eft, confignificantia appellabant.
Pn'fcian. 1. 2. p. 574. Edit. Putfchii. Exijiit hie qua-
darn qutsjiio, cur duo ionium, NOMEN &" VERBUM,
fe (dri/loteles fc.) determinare promittat, cum plures par-
ies orationis ejfe videantur. )uibus hoc dlcendum eft, tan*
turn Arijlotelem hoc libra diffiniffe, quantum illi ad id t
quod injlituerat traclare^ fuffedt. Traclat namque de
ftmplici enuntiativa oratione^ quee fcilicet bujufmodi eft, ut
junftis tantum Verbis ^f Nominibus componatur htare
juperfiuutn ejl quarere, cur alias quoque, quts videntur
orationis partes, non propofuerit y qui non totius Jimpliciter
orationis, fed tantum Jimplicis orationis injlituit elcmenta
partiri. Boetius in Libr. de Interpretat. p, 295.
Aptllonius from the above principles elegantly calls the'
NOUN and VERB, ru, l^^orona. jue^n ru Ao}/s<, the
mojl animated parts of Speech. De Syntaxi 1. r. c. 3,
p. 24. See alfo Plutarch, ghiaft. Platen, p, 1009.
* Poet. Cap. 20.
D
34 HERMES.
Ch-III. of a more variegated fpeech) adds the Ar-
ticle and Conjunction to the Noun and
Verb, and fo adopts the fame Parts, with
thofe eftablifhed in this Treatife. To
Ariftotles authority (if indeed better can
be required) may be added that alfo of
the elder Stoics (h}.
THE latter Stoics inftead of four Parts
made five, by dividing the Noun into the
Appellative, and Proper. Others increas'd
the number, by detaching the Pronoun
from the Noun; the Participle and Ad-
verb from the Verb ; and the Prepojition
from the Conjunction. The Latin Gram-
marians went farther, and detach'd the In-
terjection from the Adverb, within which
by the Greeks it was always included, as a
Species.
WE
(/;) For this we have the authority of Dionyfius of Ha~
iicarnaj/us, De Struft. Oral. Seft. 2. whom >uintilian
follows, liijl. /.I. c. 4. Diogenes Laertius and Prifdan
make them always to have admitted five Parts. See
Prijfian 9 as. before, and Laertius, Lib. VIL Segm. 57.
Boo K T HE FIRST. 35
WE are told indeed by (/) Dionyfius of Ch.III.
HaJicarnaffus and Quintilian, that Ariftotlc>
with fbeodettes, and the more early wri-
ters, held but three Parts of fpeech, the
Noun y t\ie Verb, and the Conjunction. This,
it mail be own'd, accords with the oriental
Tongues, whofe Grammars (we are (k)
told) admit no other. But as to Arifio-tle,
we have his own authority to afiert the
contrary, who not only enumerates the
four Species which we have adopted, but
afcertains them each by a proper Defini-
nition *.
D 2 To
(z) See the plates quoted in the note immediately
preceding.
( k] Antiquljjima eorum eft opinio, qu'i trcs claffis fa-
tiunt. ' Eftque htec Arabum qtwque fentemia Hebrai
quoque (qui, cum Arabes Grammaticam fcribere dcfmerent^
art em earn demum fcribere coeperunt, quod ante annos conti-
git cirdter quadringentos) Hebrcei, inquam hac in fe fecuti
funt magiftros fuos Arabes. Immo vero tritim clafjlum nu-
merum alia etiam Orientis linguee retinent. Dubium, utrum
ea In re Orientates imitati funt antiques Greecorum^ an hi
potius fecuti funt Orientalium exemplum. Utut ejl, etiam
vetcres Grcecos tres tantum paries agnovijje, non folum au-
tor eft DionyfiuS) &c. VofI*. de Analog. 1. i. c. I. See
alfo Sanftii Miner. /. i . c . 2.
* Sup. p. 34.
36 HERMES.
Ch.III. To conclude the Subjeft of the fol-
lowing Chapters will be a diftincl: and fe-
parate coniideration of the NOUN, the
VERB, the ARTICLE, and the CONJUNC-
TION; which four, the better (as we ap-
prehend) to exprefs their refpedive na-
tures, we chufe to call SUBSTANTIVES,
ATTRIBUTIVES, DEFINITIVES and CON-
NECTIVES.
CHAP.
BOOK THE FIRST. 37
CHAP, IV.
Concerning Subftantives, properly fo called.
SUBSTANTIVES are all thofe principal Ch.lV
Words, which are Jignificant of Subv
Jiancesy conjidered as Subftancef.
THE firft fort of Subftances are the NA-
TURAL, fuch as Animal, Vegetable, Man,
Oak.
THERE are other Subftances of our own
making. Thus by giving a Figure not na-
tural to natural Materials we create fuch
Subftances, as tjoufe, Ship, Watch, Te-
Jefcope, &c,
AGAIN, by a more refirid operation of our
Mind alone t we abftraft any Attribute from
its neceflary fubjecl:, and confider it apart,
devoid of its dependence. For example,
from Body we abftracl: to Fly -, from Sur-
P 3 face,
38 HERMES.
Ch.IV. face, the being White, from Soul, the be-
ing temperate.
AND thus 'tis we convert even Attri-
butes into Subjlances, denoting them on
this occafion by proper Subftantives, fuch as
Flight, Whitenefs, Temper ante ; or elfe by
others more general, fuch as Motion, Co-
lour, Virtue. Thefe we call ABSTRACT
SUBSTANCES ; the fecond fort we call
ARTIFICIAL.
Now all thofe feveral Subflances have
their Genus, their Species, and their In-
dividuals. For example in natural Sub-
fiances, Animal is a Genus ; Man, a Spe-
cies; Alexander, an Individual, ^arti-
ficial Subilances, Edifice is a Genus ; Pa-
lace, a Species ; the Vatican, an Individual.
Jn abftraSt Subflances, Motion is a Ge-
nus 5 Flightt a Species ; this Flight or that
Flight are Individuals.
As
BOOK THE FIRST. 3.9
As therefore every (a) GENUS may be Ch.TV.
found whole and intire in each one of Its
Species-, (for thus Man, Horfe, and Dog
are each of them diftinctly a complete and
intire Animal) and as every SPECIES may
be found whole and intire in each one of its
Individuals -, (for thus Socrates, Plato, and
Xenophon are each of them completely and
.diftindtly a Man) hence it is, that every
Genus, tho' ONE, is multiply'd into MANY;
and every Species, tho' ONE, is alfo mul-
tiply'd into MANY, by reference to thofe
beings, which are their proper fub or dinates.
Since then no Individual has any fuch Sub-
ordinates, it can never in ftrictnefs be con-
fidered as MANY, and fo is truly an IN-
DIVIBUAL as well in Nature as in Name.
D 4 FROM
(a) This is what Plato feems to have exprefs'd in
a manner fomewhat myfterious, when he talks of
U.\X) lOzZV OiOt, 'STOAAcOi', EVOf tX.%~# fit
VTTO
>
>opbjft. p. 2<?. Edit. Serrani.
3 ' ' I J 1 -J \J
For the common definition of Genus and Species, fee the
Jfagoge or Introduction of Porphyry to AriftrtlSs Logic,
40 HERMES.
Ch-IV. FROM thefe Principles it is, \hziWords
following the nature and genius of Things,
fuch Subjlantives admit of NUMBER as de-
note Genera or Species, while thofe, which
denote (3) Individuals, in ftrictnefs admit
it not,
BESIDES
(b) Yet fometimes Individuals have plurality or Num-
ber, from the caufes following. In the firft place the
Individuals of the human race are fo large a multitude
even in the fmalleft nation, that 'twould be difficult to
invent a new Name for every new born Individual.
Hence then inftead of one only being call'd Marcus, and
one only Antontus^ it happens that many are called Mar-
cus and many call'd Antonius ; and thus 'tis the Romans
had their Plurals, Marci, and Anicnii, as we in later
days have our Marks and our Anthohies. Now the Plu-
rals of this fort may be well caUed accidental, becaufe
'tis meerly by chance that the Names coincide.
There feems more reafon for fuch Plurals, as the
Ptslcmies, Scipios, Catos, or (to inftance in modern
names) the Howards^ Pelhams, and Montagues-, bc-
caufe a Race or Family is like a f mailer fort of Species ;
fo that the family Name extends to the Kindred, as the
fpecific Name extends to the Individuals,
A third caufc which contributed to make proper
Names become plural, was the high Character or Emi-
nence of (ome one Individual, whofe Name became af-
terwards a kind of common Appellative ', to denote all
2 thofe,
BOOK THE FIRST.
BESIDES Number, another charter- ChJV.
iftic, vilible in Subftances, is that of SEX.
Every Subftance is either Male or F e male 5
or both Male and Female ; or neither ene
nor the other, So that with refped: to Sexes
and their Negation, all Subftances conceive-
able are comprehended under thisfourfola*
eonflderation.
Now the exiftence of Hermaphrodites
being rare, if not doubtful ; hence Lan-
guage* only regarding thofe diftin&ions
which
thofe, who had pretenfions to merit in the fame way.
Thus every great Critic was call'd an Arijlarcbus j every
great Warrior, an Alexander ; every great Beauty, a He-
len, &c.
A Daniel come to 'Judgment ! yea a Daniel,
cries Shylock in the Play, when he would exprefs the
wifdom of the young Lawyer.
$o Martial in that well known verfe,
Sint Mfgcenatef, non deerunt, Flacce, Marones.
So Lucilius,
monies, JEthnts twines, afperi Atbones.
ovTig, Aitfxa^i'woif . Lucian in Timon.
P- ic8.
42 HERMES.
Ch.IV. which are more obvious, confiders Words
denoting Subftances to be either MASCU-
LINE, FEMININE, or NEUTER *.
As to our own Species and all thofe
animal Species, which have reference to
commsn Life, or of which the Male and
the Female, by their fize, form, colour,
&c . are eminently diftinguijhed, mod Lan-
guages have different Subftantives, to de-
note the Male and the Female. But as to
thofe animal Species, which either lefs fre-
quently occur, or of which one Sex is lefs
apparently diftinguljked from the other, in
thefe a fmgle Subftantive commonly ferves
for both Sexes,
IN
* After this manner they are diftingulfhed by Arijlo-
$e. Tcov ovo[Att,Twv rot. fj.iv apptvot, TK cl ^r>Xsx^ rot Je
|weTau. Poet. cap. 21. Protagoras before him had
eftablifhed the fame Diftin&ion, calling them upptvx,
S- -A:*, ^ ffxe'ju. Ariftot. Rhet. L. III. c. 5. Where
mark what were afterwards called sVmoa, or Neijters,
were by thefe called rot
BOOK THE FIRST. 43
4- IN the Englijh Tongue it feems a ge- Ch.IV.
neral rule (except only when infringed by
a figure of Speech) that no Subftantive is
Mafculine, but what denotes a Male ani-
mal Subftance ; none Feminine, but what
denotes a Female animal Subftance ; and
that where the Subftance has no Sex, the
Subftantive is always Neuter.
BUT 'tis not fo in Greek, Latin, and
many of the modern Tongues. Thefe all
of them have Words, fome mafculine,
fome feminine (and thofe too in great
multitudes) which have reference to Sub-
ftances, where Sex never had exiftence.
To give one inftance for many. MIND
is furely neither male, nor female ; yet is
NOTE, in Greek, mafculine, and MENS,
in Latin, feminine.
IN
f Nam quicquid per Naturam Sexui non adfignatur,
neutrum haberi oporteret, fed id drs &c. Confent. apud
Putfch. p. 2023, 2024.
The whole Railage from Genera Hominum, quee na-
juralia funt &c, is worth perilling.
HERMES.
Ch.IV. IN fome Words thefe diftinftions feem
owing to nothing elfe, than to the meer
cafual ftrudure of the Word itfelf : 'Tis
of fuch a Gender, from having fuch a
Termination j or from belonging perhaps
to fuch a Declenfion. In others we may
imagine a more fubtle kind of reafoning, a
reafoning which difcerns even in things
'without Sex a diftant analogy to that great
NATURAL DISTINCTION,?^/^ (accord-
ing to Milton) animates the
IN this view we may conceive fuch
STANTIVES to have been conlidered, as
MASCULINE, which were " confpicuous
" for the Attributes of imparting or com-
" municating; or which were by nature
" active, ilrong, and efficacious, and that
" indifcriminately whether to good or to
" ill ; or which had claim to Eminence,
" either laudable or otherwife."
THE
J Mr. Linnant) the celebrated Botanift, has traced
the Dijlinftion of Sexes throughout the whole Vegetable
and made it the Bafis of his Botanic Method*
BOOK THE FIRST. 45
i
THE FEMININE on the contrary were Ch.IV.
fuch, as were confpicuous for the At- ^ J >~~"
" tributes either of receiving, of contain-
" ing, or of producing and bringing forth ;
" or which had more of the paffive in
" their nature, than of the active; or
" which were peculiarly beautiful and
" amiable ; or which had refpecl: to fuch
" Exceffes, as were rather Feminine, than
" Mafculine."
UPON thefe Principles the two greater
Luminaries were confidered, one as Maf-
culine, the other as Feminine; the SUN
("H?u-, So!) as Mafcu/me, from commu-
nicating Light, which was native and ori-
ginal, as well as from the vigorous warmth
and efficacy of his Rays 3 the MOON (g-
Aifvij, Luna) as Feminine, from being the
Receptacle only of another's Light, and
from (hining with Rays more delicate and
foft.
THUS
46 HERMES.
Ch.IV. THUS Milton,
Firjl in H i s Eaft the glorious Lamp wasfeem
Regent of Day, and all t/j Horizon round
Invefted with bright rays ~, jocund to run
His longitude thro Heav'ns high road:
the gray
Dawn, and the Pleiades before HIM danc'd,
Shedding fweet influence. Lefs bright the
Moon
But oppofite, in level? d Weft was fet,
His mirrour 3 with full face borrowing HER
Light
From H i M - y for other light SHE needed none*
P.L. VII. 370.
BY Virgil they were corifidered as Bro-
ther and Sifter, which ftill preferves the
fame diflindion.
Afo FR ATRIS
G.I. 396.
THE SKY or ETHER is in Greek and
Latin Mafculine, as being the fource of
thofe fhowers, which impregnate the Earth.
The
BOOK THE FlRST. 47
* The EARTH on the contrary is univer- Ch.IV.
fally Feminine, from being the grand Re-
ceiver, the grand Container, but above all
from being the Mot her (either mediately or
immediately) of every fublunary Subftance,
whether animal or vegetable.
THUS Virgil,
Turn PATER OMNIPOTENS fcecundis im-
bribus ./ETHER
CONJUGIS in gremium LJETJE defcendit,
G? omnes
Magnus alit magno commixtus corporefcetus*
G.JI. 325.
THUS Shakefpear,
J COMMON MOTHER, Thou
Whofe Womb unmeafurable, and infinite
Breafl
Teems and feeds all Tim. of Athens.
S o Milton,
Whatever Earth, ALL-BEARING MOTHER,
yields. P. L. V.
So
* SenecsNat. ^uajl. III. 14.
Tee, Grec. Anth. p. 281,
48 HERMES,
Ch.IV. So rtrgil,
Non jam MATER a/if TELL us, litre fqut
minijlrat (c). jfEn. XI. 71.
AMONG artificial Subftances the SHIP
(Nauf, Navt's) \sfeminine, as being fo
eminently a Receiver and Container of va-
rious things, of Men, Arms, Provifions,
Good>, &c. Hence Sailors, fpeaking of
their VciTel, fay always, " SHE rides at
" anchor ^ " SHE is under fail"
A CITY (rioA/?, Chit as] and a COUN-
TRY (UftrMf, P atria} are feminine alfo,
by being (like the Ship) Containers and
Receivers, and farther by being as it were
the Mothers and NurJ'es of their refpe&ive
Inhabitants.
THUS
(c} &o % tv TU oAw rrv THS (ptW, ccc 0H AT
^ MKIE'PA fe/Ai'^TW 'OTPA> T O X N <? j^"HAIOV t
xj ri TWV aA^cov ruy TCJJJTCCV, cJ? rENfl""NTAZ xj
ITA'TEPAS zBveofl-ayoff-Vi. Arift. de Gener. Anlm,
1. I. C. 2.
BOOK THE FlRST. 49
THUS Virgil, Ch.IV.
Salve, MAGNA PARENS FRUGUM, Satur*
nia Tellus,
MAGNA VIRUM - Geor. II. 173.
So, in that Heroic Epigram on thofe
brave Greeks, who fell at Charonea,
iitx. Ss IIxTpig e%et xoXTroig ruv 'sr\f'<^a. xa-
Their PARENT COUNTRY in HER bofom
holds
Their wearied bodies.- *
So Milton,
The City, which Thou fe eft, no other deem
Than great and glorious Rome, QtfEEN of
the Earth. Par. Reg. L. IV.
As to the OCEAN, tho' from its being
the Receiver of all Rivers, as well as the
Container
. * Demofth. in Orat. de Corona.
E
50 H E R M E S.
Ch IV. Container and Produftrefs of fo many Ye-"
getables and Animals, it might juftly have
been made (like the Earth) Feminine -, yet
its deep Voice and boifterous Nature have, in
fpight of thefe reafons, prevailed to make
it Male. Indeed the very Sound of Homer's
p-eyx. cQev* * Sly.ttx.vciO ,
would fuggeft to a hearer, even ignorant
of its meaning, that the Subject was in-
compatible with female delicacy and foft-
nefs.
TIME (XpoiX-) from his mighty Efficacy
upon every thing around us, is by the Greeks
and Englifo juftly confidered as Mafculine.
Thus in that elegant diftich, fpoken by a
decrepit old Man,
' 'O 'yap Xpov@o ft eKapfye, TSKJUV <ro$oz,
Me TIME hath bent, that for ry Artift, HE
T^hat furely makes, iv bat e'er he handles,
tvorfe.
So
* II X^ovf, ra>%w* ^wjjuv vatvrariffiurrt
Graec. Anth. p. 290.
t Stob. Eel. p. 591.
BOOK THE FIRST*
So too Shakefpear, fpeaking likewife of Ch IV.
TIME,
Orl. Whom doth HE gallop withal?
Rof. With a thief to the gallows.*
As you like it.
THE Greek Qdvonfe* or"Aidy$, and the
Englifh DEATH, feem from the fame ir-
refiftible Power to have been conlidered as
Mafculine. Even the Vulgar with us are
fo accurtomed to this notion, that a FE-
MALE DEATH they would treat as ridi-
culous
. TAKE a few Examples of the mafctt-
line Death.
E 2 Galli-
(d] Well therefore did Milton in hrs Paradife Loft
not only adopt DEATH as a Perfon^ but coniider hini
as Mafculine : in which he was fo far from introducing
a Phantom of his own, or from giving it a Gender not
fupported by Cujlom ; that perhaps he had as much the
Sanfiion cf national Opinion for his Mafculine Deaths, as
the ancient Poets had for many of their Deities.
II E.R M E S.
Ch IV. Callimachus upon the Elegies of his
.Friend Her adit us
- yet thy fiveet warbling Jlrains
Still live immortal, nor on tbemfoall DEATH
Hi s hand ere /ay, tho Ravager of all.
IN the Akejlis of Euripides, a:aro
or DEATH is one of the Perfons of the
drama ; the beginning of the play is made
up of dialogue between Him and Apollo >
and towards its end, there is a fight be-
tween Him and Hercules, in which Her-
cules is conqueror, and refcues Alcejlis
from his hands.
'Tis well known too, that SLEEP and
DEATH are made Brothers by Homer.
'Twas to this old Gorgias elegantly allud-
ed, when at the extremity of a long life
he lay flumbering on his Death-bed. A
Fjiend afked him, " How he did?" -
" SLEEP
BOOK THE FIRST. 53
" SLEEP (replied the old Man) isjuft upon C3i.IV.
" deliver ing me over to the care of his
BROTHER (e)."
THUS Sbakefpear, fpeaking of Life,
merely 'Thou art Death's Fool-,
For HIM fbou labour ft by thy flight to
Jhun,
And yet run ft towrds HIM ft ill.
Meaf. for Meaf.
So Milton,
Dire was the tojfing, deep the groans ;
Defpair
Blended t he Jick, bujieftfrom couch to couch:
And over them triumphant DEATH HIS
dart
Shook -, but delay d to ftrike
P. L. XI. 489 (/).
THE
[i] "Hc$V jus O "TO NO-
T'AA E A $ If I. Stob. Eel. p. 600.
(f) Suppofe in any one of thefe examples we intro-
duce a female Death \ fuppofe we read,
E 3 And
54 HERMES.
Ch.IV. THE fupreme Being (GoD, GeoV, Deits t
J)ieu, &c.) is i-n all languages Mafculme,,
in as much as the mafculine Sex is the fu-
perior and more excellent ; and as He is
the Creator of all, the Father of Gods and
Men. Sometimes indeed we meet with
fuch words as To npurov, To @eTov, Nu-
men, DEITY (which laft we Eng/t/hjoin to
a neuter, faying Deity itfelf) fometimes I
fay we meet with thefe Neuters. The
reafon in thefe inftances feems to be, that
as GOD is prior to all things, both in dig-
nity and in time, this Priority is better
characterized and expreft by a Negation^
than by any of thofe Diftinctions which
are co-ordinate ivitbfome Oppo/ite, as Male
for
And over them triumphant Death HER dart
What a falling off? How are the nerves and ftrength
of the whole Sentiment weakened ?
BOOK T HE Fi R s T. 55
for example is co-ordinate with Female, Ch.IV.
Right with Left, &c. &c. (g),
VIRTUE ('A/jg-nJ, Virtus] as well as moll
of its Species are all Feminine, perhaps
from their Beauty and amiable Appearance,
which are not without efFed even upon
the moft reprobate and corrupt.
E 4 abaftid
(g) Thus AmmoniuS) fpeaking on the fame Subject
ro' nrrfTON A^USV, ty* 3 ^ A v Six
/txv0oAo}/a ErowaJo'yTtov ^an/ rocg
TW
U* TO (L J gC TO)) (? II A N T H I
'A n A fl~ 2 'A I T 1' n I vlm-Xjw ajfv. aAAa >^
T O v N E O^ N o
TO ffSUVOTtpOV TUV JtlVUV TH l
aurow TS-poira^opsuo^Ey. PRIMUM dic'inuis, quod nemo
etiam eorum, qui theologiam noils fabularum integumentis
obvolntam tradiderunt^ vel mar is velfaemime fpefie finvsre
aufuseft: idque merito : conjugatym eniip mznfasmini-
num eft. CAUS^: autem omnino ABSOLUTE AC SIM-
PLICI riihil ejl conjugaium. Imms vero cum DEUM
mafcullno genere appellamus^ ita ipfum nominamus,, genus
pr&Jlantius fub?nijjo afque humi/i prcsferenics. Ammon.
in Lib. de Intcrpr. p. 30 b. a -yap IVXI/TIQV TW
tty. Ariftot. Metaph, A. p. 210. Sylb. ,
56 HERMES.
Ch.IV. d,aJKd the Devi! flood,
Andfelty how awful Goodnefs is, and Jaw
VIRTUE in her fiape how lovely, Jaw.,
and pin d
His lofs - -
P. L. IV. 846.
THIS being allowed, VICE (Kax/a) be-
comes Feminine of courfe, as being, in
the (ru<j-o/%/a or Co-ordination of things,
Virtue's natural Oppofite (b).
THE Fancies, Caprices, and fickle
Changes of FORTUNE would appear but
awkardly under a Character, that was
Male : but taken together they make a
very
(/>) They are both reprefented as Females by Xeno-
phon, in the celebrated Story of Hercules, taken from
'Prodicus. See Mcmorab. L. II. C. I. As to the
frOf"**X** here motioned, thus Varro. Pythagoras
S ami us ait omnium rerum initia ejje Una : ut finitum fff
infmitum, bonum & malum, vitam iff mortem, diem &
nottem. De Ling. Lat. L. IV. See alfo drift. Me-
taph L.I. 0.5. and Ecclefiafticus, Chap. Ixii. ^.24.
B O O K T H E F I R S T. 57
very natural Female, which has no fmall Ch.IV,
refemblance to the Coquette of a modern
Comedy, beflowing, withdrawing, and
/hifting her favours, as different Beaus
fucceed to her good graces.
c Tranfmutat incertos bonores,
Nunc mihi, nunc alii benigna. Hor.
WHY the FURIES were made Female,
is not fo eafy to explain, unlefs it be that
female Paffions of all kinds were confi-
dered as fufceptible of greater excefs, than
male Paffions ; and that the Furies were
to be reprefented, as Things fuperlatively
outrageous.
Talibus Alecjo dittis exarfit in iras.
At Juveni oranti fubitus tremor occupat
artus :
piriguere oculi : tot Erinnys fibilat Ply-
dris,
f ant aque fe fades aperit $ turn flammed
tor-quern
2 Lumina
5 3 HERMES.
Ch.IV. Lumina cunftantem Gf qucerentem dicere
plura
Reppullf, G? geminos erexlt crinibus an~
gues,
Verberaque infonuit, rabidoque hcec ad*
didlt ore :
En! Ego vitta fitu, &c.
JEn. VII. 445 (/).
HE,
(;) The Words above mentioned, Time, Death,
Fortune, Virtue, &c, in Greek, Latin, French, and
moft modern Languages, though they are diverfified
with Genders in the manner defcribed, yet never vary
the Gender, which they have once acquired, except in
a few inftancej, where the Gender is doubtful. We
cannot fay oi^l-ri or o a'7u\ hose Virtus or hie Vir-
tus, la Vertu or le Vertu, and fo of the reft. But 'tis
otherwife in Englijh. We in our own language fay,
Virtue is its own Reward, or Virtue is her own Re-
ward ; Time maintains its wonted Pace, or Time
maintains bis wonted Pace.
There is a fingular advantage in this liberty, as it
enables us to mark, with a peculiar force, the Diftjnc-
ton between the fevere or Logical Stile, and the orna-
mental or Rhetorical. For thus when we fpea)c of the
above Words, and of all others naturally devoid of Sex,
2 as
BOOK THE FlRST. 59
HE, that would fee more on this Sub- Ch.IV.
je6t, may confult Ammonlus the Peripate-
tic
as Neuters, we fpeak of them as they are, and as be-
comes a logical Inquiry. When we give them Sex, by
making them Mafculine or Feminine, they are from
thenceforth perfonified ; are a kind of intelligent Beings,
and become, as fuch, the proper ornaments either of
Rhetoric or of Poetry.
Thus Milton,
Tlie Thunder
Wingd with red lightening and impetuous rage,
Perhaps hatbffent Hisjhafts P. Loft. I. 174.
The Poet, having juft before called the Hall, and
Thunder, God's Minijlers of Vengeance, and fo perfoni-
fied them, had he afterwards faid its Shafts for his
Shafts, would have deftroyed his own Image, and ap-
proached withal fo much nearer to Profe.
The following Paflage is from the fame Poem.
Should intermitted Vengeance arm again
His red right hand P. L. II. 173.
- In this Place His Hand is clearly preferable either to
Her's or It's, by immediately referring us to God him-
felf the Avenger,
60 HERMES.
Ch.IV. tic in his Commentary on the Treatife de
Interpretatione, where the Subject is treat-
ed at large with refped: to the Greek
Tongue. We mall only obferve, that as
all fuch Speculations are at bed but Con-
jectures, tfiey mould therefore be received
with
I (ball only give one inftance more, and quit this
Subject.
At bis command /// up-rooted Hills retired
Each to HIS place: they heard his voice and went
Obfequiotis : Heav'n His wonted face renew '</,
And with frejh founts Hill and galley JmH'd.
P. L. VI.
See alfo y. 54, 55, of the fame Book.
Here all things are perfonified ; the Hills hear^ the
Valleys fmile, and the Face of Heaven is renewed.
Suppofe then the Poet had been neceflitated by the laws
of his Language to have faid Each Hill retired to ITS
Place Heaven renewed its wonted Face how profaic
and lifelefs would thefe Neuters have appeared j how
detrimental to the Profopopeia, which he was aiming to
eftablilh ? In this therefore he was happy, that the
Language, in which he wrote, impofed no fuch necef-
f;ty ; and he was too wife a Writer, to impofe it on
himfelf. 'Twere to be wifhsd, his Ccrre&ors had been
us wife on their parts.
BOOK THE FIRST. 6t
with candour, rather than fcrutinized Ch.IV.
with rigour. F'arro's words on a Subject
near akin are for their aptnefs and elegance
well worth attending. Non mediocres enim
tenebrce in Jilva-y ubi hcec captanda -, nequf
eo t quo pervenire volumus, femitce tritte ;
neque non in tramitibus qutedam objefta,
qiuz euntem retinere pofl'unt *.
To conclude this Chapter. We may
collect, from what has been faid, that
both NUMBER and GENDER appertain to
WORDS, becaufe in the firft place they
appertain to THINGS ; that is to fay, be-
caufe Subftances are Many, and have either
Sex, or no Sex ; therefore Su&ftarttives have
Number, and are Mafculine, Feminine, or
Neuter. There is however this diffe-
rence between the two Attributes : NUM-
BER in flricT:nefs dcfcends no lower, than
to
* De Linjj. Lat. L. IV.
62 HERMES.
Ch.IV. to the loft Rank of Species (&): GENDE*
on the contrary flops not here, but de-
fcends to every Individual, however diver-
fified. And fo much for SUBSTANTIVES,
PROPERLY SO CALLED.
(^) The reafon, why Number goes no lower, is,
that it does not naturally appertain to Individuals j the
caufe of which fee before, p. 39.
CHAP,
Bo K T HE Fl RS T. 63
CHAP. V.
Concerning Subftantives of the Secondary
Order.
WE are now to proceed to a SECON- Ch. V.
DARY RACE of SUBSTANTIVES,
a Race quite different from any already
mentioned, and whofe Nature may be ex-
plained in the following manner.
EVERY Object, which prefents itfelf to
the Senfes or the Intellect, is either then
perceived for the Jirft time, or elfe is re-
cognized, as having been perceived be-
fore. In the former cafe 'tis called an
Object -rvjq w^tiTitf yvuKTtus, of the Jirft
knowledge or acquaintance (a) ; in the lat-
ter
(a} See Apoll. de Syntaxi, 1. i. c. 1 6. p 49. 1. 2
c. 3. p. 103. Thus Prifcian Intereft autem inter de-
monjhationem tff rdatlonem hoc-, quod demorftratio, in-
ferrogathni reddita, Primam Cognkicnecn cftendlt ;
Qms
64 HERMES.
Ch. V. ter 'tis called an Object TTJ$
cf the fecond knowledge or acquaint
ance.
Now as all Converfation pafTes between
Particulars or Individuals, thefe will often
happen to be reciprocally Objects rijf -srgu-
r^q yvu<rito$ t tbat is to fay, //// that injlant
unacquainted with each other. What then
is to be done ? How mall the Speaker ad-
<irefs the other, when he knows not his
Name ? or how explain himfelf by his own
Name, of which the other is wholly igno-
rant ? Nouns, as they have been defcribed,
cannot anfwer the purpofe. The firfr, ex-
pedient upon this occafion feems to have
been AerJ/f, that is, Pointing, or Indica-
tion by the Finger or Hand, fome traces of
which are ilill to be obferved, as a part of
that Action, which naturally attends our
fpeaking. But the Authors of Language
were
Quls fecit r Ego : relatio vero Secundam Cognitio-
ntm ffrmfaat, ut, Is, de quo jam dixi. Lib. XII.
p 936. Edit. Putfibii.
BOOK THE FlRST.
Were not content with this. They in- Ch. V*
vented a Race of Words to fvpfly this
Pointing; which Words, as -they always
flood for Subftantives or Nouns, were cha-
racterized by the Name of 'Avruvvpiat, or
PRONOUNS (). Thefe alfo they diftin-
guifhed into three feveral forts, calling
them Pronouns of the Firft, the Second,
and the hird Pe rfon, with a view to cer-
tain diflinctions, which may be explained
as follows.
SUPPOSE the Parties converting to be
wholly unacquainted, neither Name nor
Countenance on either fide known, and
the
() 'EXE^O y 'Avrwwp'a, TO jtAE-ra A E' I s E H 2
^ avoe^o^ac 'AN TO NOMAZO'M ENON. Apoll.
de Synt. L. II. c. 5. p. 106. Prifcian feems to con-
fider them fo peculiarly deftined to the exprefllon of In-
dividuals, that he does not fay they fupply the place of
any Noun, but that of the proper Name only. And
this undoubtedly was their original, and ftill is their
true and natural ufe. PRONOMEN eft pars oratiwis,
tfutr pro nomine proprio uniufcujufque accipiiur. Prifc.
L, XII. See alfo Apoll. L. II. 0.9. p. 117, 118.
" F
66 HERMES.
Ch. V. the Subjedl of the Converfation to be tkt
Speaker himfelf. Here, to fupply the place
of Pointing by a Word of equal Power,
they furnifhed the Speaker with the Pro-
noun, I. I write, I fay, I dejire, Sec. and
as the Speaker is always principal with re-
fpe<fl to his own difcourfe, this they called
for that reafon the Pronoun of the Firft
Perfon.
AGAIN, fuppofe the Subject of the Con-
verfation to be the Party addreft. Here
for fimilar reafons they invented the Pro-
noun, THOU. *Thou writ eft, Thou walkeft,
&c. and as the Party addreft is next in
dignity to the Speaker, or at leaft comes
next with reference to the difcourfe ; this.
Pronoun they therefore called the Pronoun
of the Second Perfon.
LASTLY, fuppofe the Subject of Con-
verfation neither the Speaker, nor the
Party addreft, buty^ third Qbjeft, dif-
ferent from both. Here they provided an-
other Pronoun, HE, SHE, or IT, which
in
BOOK TrfE FtRT. 67
in diftindtion to the two former was called Ch. V,
the Pronoun of the 'Third Perfon,
AND thus it was that Pronouns came to
be diflinguifhed by their refpective PER-
SONS fi
As
(c) The Defcription of the different PERSONS here
given is taken from Prifcian y who took it from Apollo-
nius. Perfena Prsnominum funt tres y prima, fecunda*
tertia. Prima eft, cum ipfa, qua loquitur ', de fe pronun-
tiat ; Secunda, cum de ea pronuntiat, ad quam direcio
fermone loquitur ; Tertia, cum de ea t quae nee loqui-
tur, nee ad fe diredtum accipit Sermonem. L. XII.
p. 940. Theodore Gaza gives the fame diftin&ions.
HCUTOV (uT^oo-coTrov fc.) u -srfpi laula (ppoifyi
Jif'ulf^OV, S TS-tf] T, TT^Sf $V Ao^f^" Tf JTCV, U
Gaz. Gram. L. IV. p. 152.
This account of Perfom is far preferable to the com-
mon one, which makes the Firft the Speaker j the Se-
cond, the Party addrejl ; and the Third, the Subjeff.
For tho' the Firft and Second be as commonly defcri-
bed, one the Speaker, the other the Party addreA ; yet
till they become fubjecls of the difcourfe, they have no
cxiftence. Again as to the Third Perfon's being the
fvbjefi, this is a character, which it /hares in common.
F 2 with
* HERMES*
Ch. V. As to NUMBER, the Pronoun of each
Perfbn has it : (I) has the plural (WE),
becaufc
with both the other Perfons, and which can never there-
fore be called a peculiarity of its own. To explain by
an inftance or two. When Eneas begins the narrative
cf his adventures, the fecond Perfon immediately appears,
becaufe he makes Dido, whom he addrefles, the imme-
diate fubjed of his Difcourfe.
Infandum* Regina, jubes, renovare ddorem*
From hence forward for 1500 Verfes (tho' fhe be all
that time the party addreft) we hear nothing farther of
this Second Perfon, a variety of other Subjects filling up
the Narrative.
In the mean time the Fir/I Perfon may be feen every
where, becaufe the Speaker every where is himfelf the
Subject. They were indeed Events, as he fays him$
felf,
qu&que ipfe miferrima ijidi 9
Et quorum pars magnafui
Not that the Second Perfon, does not often occur in the
courfe of this Narrative ; but then it is always by a Fi-
gure of Speech, when thofe, who by their abfence arc
M frft fo many Third Perfons, are converted into Sc-
I cond
BOOK THE FIRST.
becaufe there may be many Speakers at
once of the fame Sentiment ; as well as
one, who, including himfelf, fpeaks the
Sentiment of many. (THOU) has the
plural (YOU), becaufe a Speech may
be fpoken to many, as well as to one.
(HE) has the plural (THEY) becaufe
the Subject of difcourfe is often many at
once.
BUT tho' all thefe Pronouns have Num-
ber, it does not appear either in Greek, or
Latin, or any modern Language, that
thofe of the firft and fecond Perfon carry
f
the diftindions of SEX. The reafon feems
F 3 to
fond Perfons by being introduced as prefent. The real
Second Perfon (Dido) is never once hinted.
Thus far as to Virgil. But when we read Eudid y
we find neither Flrjl Perfon, nor Second in any part of
the whole Work. The reafon is, that neither Speaker
nor Party addreft (in which light we may always view
the Writer and his Reader) can pofiibly become the
Subject of pure Mathematics, nor indeed can any thing
clfe, except abftraft Quantity, which neither fpeaks
nor is fpoken to by another.
70 HERMES.
Ch. V. to be, that the Speaker and Hearer being
generally prefent to each other, it would
have been fuperfluous to have mark'd a
difUn&ion by Art, which from Nature and
even Drefs was commonly (d] apparent on
both fides. But this does not hold with
refpecl: to the third Perfon, of whofe Cha-
racter and Distinctions, (including Sex
among the reft) we often know no more,
than what we learn from the difcourfe.
And hence it is that in moft Languages the
third Perfon has its Genders, and that even
JLngliJh (which allows its Adjectives no
Genders at all) has in this Pronoun the
triple (e) diftinction of He y Sbe> and It.
HENCE
{d} DemorJIratio ipfa fecam genus oflixdit. Prifcian.
L. XII. p. 942. See A$oll. de Syntax. L. II. c. 7.
p. 109.
(e) The Utility of this Diftintion may be better
found in fuppofifig it away. Suppofe for example we
jbotj!d read in hiftory thefe words He caufed him
BOOK THE FIRST. 71
HENCE too we fee the reafon why a Ch. V.
fingle Pronoun (f) to each Perfon, an I
F 4 to
t o dejlroy him and that we were to be informed the
[He], which is here thrice repeated, flood each -time
for fomething different, that is to fay., for a Man, for
a Woman, and for a City, whofe Names were Alex-
ander y Thais^ and PerfepoKs. Taking the 'Pronoun in
this manner, divefted of its Genders, how would it ap-
pear, which was deftroyed j which was the deftroyer ;
and which the caufe, that moved to the deftrution ?
But there are no fuch doubts, when we hear the Gen-
ders diftinguifhed ; when inftead ,of the ambiguous
Sentence, He caufed him to deftroy him, we are told
with the proper distinctions, that SHE caufed HIM to
dejlroy IT. Then we know with certainty, what
before we could not ; that the Promoter was the
Woman ; that her Inftrument was the Hero ; and
that the Subject of their Cruelty was the unfortunate
City.
(f) Quaritur tamen cur prtma quidem Perfona &?
fecunda fingula Pronomina habeant^ tertiam vero fex di-
verfae indicent voces? Ad quod reffondcndum ejl, quod.
prima quidem f? fecunda Perfona ideo non egent diver/is
vocibusy quod femper praefentes inter fe funt, & demm-
Jhratvuec ; tertia vero Perfona modo demonjirativa ejl, ut 9
Hie, Ifte; modo relativa, ut Is, Ipfe, &c. Prifcian,
L. XII. P . 933.
7.2 HERMES.
Ch. V. to the Firft, and a Thou to the Second, arc
abundantly fumcient to all the purpofes of
Speech. But 'tis not fo with refpect to the
tfhird Perfon. The various relations of
the various Objects exhibited by this (I
mean relations of near and diftant, pre-
fent and abfent, fame and different, de-
finite and indefinite, &c.) made it necef-
&ry that here there mould not be one,
b.ut many Pronouns, fuch as U,e> Tfo's,
that*. Other, A)?y, Some, &c,
IT mufl be confeit indeed, that all
thefe Words do not always appear as Pro*
nouns* When they fland by themfelves,
and reprefent fome Noun, (as when we
fay, THIS is Virtue, or &$&$, Give
me THAT) then are they Pronouns. But
when they are alfociated to fome Noun
(as when we fay, THIS Habit is Virtue;
or Setx/iKus, THAT Man defrauded me)
then as they fupply not the place of a
Noun, but only ferve to afcertain one,
they fall rather into the Species of De-
fnitives or Articles, 'f hat there is in-
deed
BOOK THE FIRST. 73
deed a near relation between Pronouns Ch. V.
and Article^ the old Grammarians have
all acknowledged, and fome words it has
been doubtful to which Clafs to refer.
The beft rule to diftinguifli them is this
The genuine PRONOUN always Jlands
by itfelf, afTuming the Power of a Noun,
and fupplying its place The genuine
ARTICLE never Jlands by itfelf, but
appears at all times aflbciated to fome-
thing elfe, requiring a Noun for its fup-
porr, as much as Attributives, or (g) Ad-
jectives.
(g) To "ApQgov pilot Qvop.otl& 9 x? r? *
uT ovo[A*l>. TH ARTICLE Jlands WITH a
Noun ; but THE PR o,N o u N Jinnds F OR a Nairn.,
L. I. C. 3. p. 22. 'Aola 5v ra ^9^, rxiV
Jtrnnu^ua (MniwiirTn* ^Vijw. Articles
$emfefoe$, when they quit thtir Cor.neftlm with Ny
pafs into fuch Pronoun^ as is proper upon the occafion.
Ibid. Again -"Orai* TO "A^^pov /ur, /*sr' ovo'^ar^
HERMES.
Ch. V. As to the Coalefcence of thefe Pro-
nopns, it is, as follows. The Firft or
Second
), fit sraar/f a.vd'yw; u; av1wuuu/av
f'fyi ix. tyfuo y.tvo-j (UET* ovo/ACtT^
$> -srxgthriQQy. When the Article is ajjumed
without the Noun, and has (as we explained before) the
fame Syntax, which the Noun has ; it mujl of absolute ne-
cejfity be admitted for a Pronoun, becaufe it appears -with-
out a Noun, and yet is in power ajjumed for one. Ejufd.
L. II. c. 8. p. 113. L.I. 0.45. p. 96. Inter Pro-
jiomina iff Articuks hoc inter ejl, quod Prononjina ea pu
lantur, qua, cum fola fmt, vicem nominis complent, ut
C^uis, ILLE, ISTE: Articuli vero cum Pronominibus t
siut Nominibus, out Participiis adjunguntur. Donat,
Gram. p. 1753.
Prifcian, fpeaking of the Stoics, fays as follows :
ARTICULIS out em PRONOMINA connumerantes 9 FI-
VITOS ea ARTICULOS apfeUabanti iffos out em Ar-
ticuks, quibus nos car emus, iNFiNiros ARTICULOS
dicebant, Vel, ut alii d'uvnt, Articuks connumerabant
Pronominibus, & ART ICUL ARIA eos PRONOMINA
Oocabant, &c. Prifc. L. I. p. 574.. Varro, fpeaking
of Quifque and Hie, calls them both ARTICLES,
the firft indefinite, the ftcond definite. De Ling. Lot.
L'VIL See alfo L. IX. p. 132. T'ofcius indeed in
his Analogy (L. L c. I.) oppofts this Doctrine, be-
Hic has not the fame power with the Greek Ar-
tic!e f
BOOK THE FlRST. 75
Second will, either of them, by them- Ch. V.
felves coalefce with the Third, but not
with each other. For example, 'tis good
fenfe, as well as good Grammar, to fay
in any Language I AM HE THOU
ART HE but we cannot fay I AM
THOU nor THOU ART I. The reafon
is, there is no abfurdity for the Speaker to
be the Subjeff alfo of the Difcourfe, as
when we fay, I am He ; or for the Perfon
addreft ; as when we fay, 'Thou art He.
But for the fame Perfon, in the fame cir-r
cumftances, to be at once the Speaker,
and the Party addreft, this is impoflible ;
and fo therefore is the Coalefcence of the
Firft and Second Perfon.
AND now perhaps we have feen enough
of Pronouns, to perceive how they differ
from
tide, o. But he did not enough attend to the antient
Writers on this Subject, who confidered all Words, as
ARTICLES, which being officiated to Nouns (and not
Jianding in their place) ferued in any manner to
4/ind determine their Signification.
76 HERMES.
Ch. V. from other Substantives. The others are
i
Primary t thefe are their Subftitutes ; a
kind of fecondary Race, which were taken
in aid, when for reafons already () men-
tioned the others could not be ufed. 'Tis
moreover by means of thefe, and of Ar-
ticles, which are nearly allied to them,
that
(h) See thefe reafons at the beginning of this chap-
ter, of which reafons the principal one is, that " no
" Noun, properly fo called, implies its own Prefence.
" 'Tis therefore to afcertain fuch Prefence, that the Pro-
noun is taken in aid ; and hence 'tis it becomes
< equivalent to Jel^fi-, that is, to Pointing or Indication
c by the Finger." 'Tis worth remarking in that Verfe
of Perfius,
Sedptilchrtim eft DIGITO MONSTRAi^i, &? atf 9
HlC EST,
how the <JeI^if, and the Pronoun are introduced toge-
ther, and made to co-operate to the fame end.
Sometimes by virtue of <3flif the Pronoun of tfct
iibird Perfon ftands for the/;/?.
Quodfi militibus parcfs y frit Hie quoque Miles,
Th Jt is, / alft will be a Soldier.
Tibul. I,. II. 51.6. v.;.
BOOK THE FIRST.
that " LANGUAGE, tho'initfelf only fig- Ch. V,
nificant of general Ideas, is brought down
* to denote that infinitude of Particulars,
' which are for ever arifing, and ceaiing
" to be." But more of this hereafter ia
a proper place.
As to the three orders of Pronouns al-
ready mentioned, they may be called Pre-
fofitive, as may indeed all Subftantives,
becaufe they are capable of introducing
cr leading a Sentence, without having
reference to any thing previous. But be-
fides thofe there is ANOTHER PRONOUN
(in
It may be r obferved too, that even in Jtpiilolary
Correfpondence, and indeed in all kinds of Writing,
where the Pronouns I and You make their appear-
ance, there is a fort of implied Prefence, which they
are fuppofed to indicate, though the Parties are in fat
at ever fo great a diftance. And hence the rife of
that diftin&ion in Apollonius-, ra? [*& TIJ? caj^w? <
$IEJ?, TXS S\ TV v, that fame Indications are ocu-
lar, and fame are mental. De Syntaxi, L. II. c. 3.
p. K4*
HERMES.
Ch. V. (in Greek og, 05-1? (/') ; in Latin, Qui i frt
Engli/h, Who, Which, T/jaf) a Pronoun,
having a character peculiar to itfelf, the
nature of which may be explained as fol-
lows.
SUPPOSE I was to fay LIGHT is a
Body, LIGHT moves with great celerity.
Thefe
(/) The Greeks, it muft be confeft, call this Pro-
noun uV$Tax7ixo\ a'fOcoy, the fuljunftive Article. Yet,
as it fliould feem, this is but an improper Appella-
tion. Apollonius, when he compares it to the -GTOG-
<7-ox7*xo x v or true prepofithe Article, not only confefles
it to differ, as being expreft by a different Word,
and having a different place in every Sentence ; but
in Syntax he adds, 'tis wlxlly different. De Syntax.
L. I. c. 43. p. 91. Theodore Gaza acknowledges
the fame, and therefore adds ofifv Sri ^ a xupJwj
v ?>) aoQpov TK-jli" fer thefe reafom this (meaning
the Subjunfthf) cannot properly be an Article. And
juft before he (ays, KVffetf ^f ( uw uflpov TO wporax7i-
xo y however properly fpeaking 'tis the Prepojitive it
the Article. Gram. Introd. L. IV. The Latins there-
fore have undoubtedly done better in ranging it with
the Pronouns.
BOOK THE FlRST. 70
Thefe would apparently be two diilinft Ch. V.
Sentences. Suppofe, inftead of the Se-
cond, LIGHT, I were to place the prepo^
fitive Pronoun, IT, and fay LIGHT is a
Body, IT moves with great celerity the
Sentences would ftill be diftinct and two.
But if I add a Connective (as for Example
an AND) faying LIGHT is a Body, AND
it' moves 'with great celerity I then by
Connection make the two into one, as
by cementing many Stones I make one
Wall.
Now 'tis m the united Powers of a Con-
ne&ive, and another Pronoun -, that we may
fee the force, and character of the Pro-
noun here treated. Thus therefore, if
in the place of AND IT, we fubflitute
THAT, or WHICH, faying LIGHT is a
Body, WHICH moves with great celerity
the Sentence ftill retains its Unity and
Perfection, and becomes if poflible more
compact than before. We may with juft
reafon therefore call this Pronoun the
SUBJUNCTIVE, becaufe it cannot (like
the
So HERMES,
Ch. V. the Prepoiitivc) introduce an original Sen*
tence, but only femes tofubjoin one tofom*
Other, which is previous (),
THE
() Hence we fee why the Pronoun here mentioned
is always necejjarily the Part of fome compbx Sentence,
which Sentence contains, either expreft or underftood,
two Verbs, and two Nominatives.
Thus in that Verfe of Horace^
Qui metuens vivit> liber mibi non erit unquam.
Hie non frit liber is one Sentence ; qui metuens vivit-*
is another. Hie and Qui are the two Nominatives i
Erit and Vvuit* tht two Verbs j and fo in all other in-
ftances.
The following paflage from dpoUonius ( though
fomewhat corrupt in more places than one) will ferve
to fhew, whence the above Speculations are taken.
To U7TOTax7xow eipQpQV ITT] fr.tj.ot "$nn (pf6froit t (Ttujf-
A* TJJf olvxtyopClS TW STfOKllfJ-iVUI OVCjtAaTi* Xp
y oi-jrXvv hcyov srapij-a'vn xala trv -ruv ^uo fr,-
jj.druv G"jtfoL$w (AfJ/w TI? Iv ru evo^uxrt, ^ tr* w
TW afl9fl) oTrtf TS-^AJV urapf/TTfTC TW KAI
Kovs\> pi* (lege TO KAI J'fitp xoivcv j^r.-)
BOOK THE FIRST. Si
THE Application of this SUBJUNCTIVE, Ch. V.
like the other Pronouns, is univerfal. It
may
TO OVOU.X TO
j 'tTtpov pypy, zirapjAa/ASayf, >c, aro> TO, II A-
PEFENETO O T P AiM M AT I KO S, OS
AIEAEHATO, faa/cui TO X W norti aTi-mAsI* T
(forf.rw) O FPAMMATIKOS nAPETENE-
TO, KAIAIEAEEATO. 77* fubjunffive Article
(that is, the Pronoun here mentioned) is applied to a Verb
of its own^ and yet is connected withal to the antecedent
Noun. Hence it can never ferue to conjlitute a fimpie
Sentence, by reafsn of the Syntax of the two Verbs^ I mean
that which refpefls the Noun or Antecedent^ and that
which refpefts the Article or Relative. The fame too fol-
lows as to the Conjunction, AND. This Copulative af-
fumes the Antecedent Noun, which is capable of being ap-
plied to many Subjefls, and by connecting to it a new Sen-
tence^ of neceffity ajjumes a new Verb alfo. And hence 'tis
that the Words - the Grammarian came, WHO dif-
courfed -form in power nearly the fame fentence^ as if
we were to fay - the Grammarian came, AND dif-
courfed. Apdl. de Syntaxi, L. I. c. 43. p. 92. See
alfo an ingenious French Treatife, called Grammaire
generate & raifonnee^ Chap. IX.
The Latins^ in their Structure of this Subjunctive,
feem to have well reprefented its compound Nature of
part Pronoun ) and part Connective y in forming their
G QUI
S2 HERMES.
Ch. V. may be the Subftitute of all kinds of Sub-
ilantives, natural, artificial, orabilrai; as
well as general, fpecial, or particular. We
may fay, the Animal, Which, &c. the Man,
Whom, &c. the Ship, Which, &c. Alex-
ander, Who, &c. Bucephalus, That, &c.
Virtue, Which, &c. &c.
NAY, it may even be the Subftitute of
all the other Pronouns, and is of courfe
therefore expreflive of all three Perfons.
Thus we fay, I, WHO now read, have near
finijhed this Chapter; THOU, WHO now
rcadeft ; HE, WHO now readcth, &c. &c.
AND thus is THIS SUBJUNCTIVE truly
a Pronoun from its Subjlitution, there be-
ing
& QUIS from QJ/E and is, or (if we go with Sca~
llger to the Greek] from KA1 and 'OS, KA1 and
-*O. Seal, de Cauf. Ling. Lot. c, 127.
HOMER alfo exprefies the Force of this Subjxnftivt
Pronoun or Article, by help of the Prepofitive and a
Connefiive, exadlly confonant to the Theory here efta
blifhed. See Iliad. A. ^. 270, 553. N. 571. II.
54> I57> '58.
BOOK T HE FIRST. $3
ing no Subftantive exifting, in whofe place Ch. V,
it may not ftand. At the fame time, it is
ejentially dtflinguijhed from the other Pro-
nouns, by this peculiar, that 'tis not only
a Subjtitute, but withal a Conneffive (/).
AND
(/) Before we quit this Subject, it may not be im-
proper to remark, that in the Greek and Latin Tongues
the two principal Pronouns, that is to fay, the Firft
and Second Perfon, the Ego and the Tu are implied in.
the very Form of the Verb itfelf (J^a^w, J'pa'cpfif,
fcribo, fcribis) and are for that reafoa never exprejly
unlefs it be to mark a Contradiftinclidn ; fuch as in
Virgil*
Nos patriam fugimus > Tu, Tityre, kntus in umbra
Formofam refonare daces &c.
This however is true with refpeft only to the Cafus
refius) or Nominative of thefe Pronouns, but not with
refpecl to their oblique Cafes, which muft always be
added, becaufe tho' we fee the EGO in Amo^ and the
Tu in Amasy we fee not the TE or ME in Amaty or
Amant.
Yet even thefe oblique Cafes appear in a different
manner, according as they mark Contradifiinclion,
or not. If they contradiitinguifh, then are they com-
monly placed at the beginning of the Sentence, or at
l.caft before the Verb, or leading Subftantive.
G Thus
84 HERMES.
Ch. V. AND now to conclude what we have
faid concerning Subftantives. All SUB-
STANTIVES
Thus Virgil*
- >uid Thefea^ magnum
Quid memorem bidden? Et Mi genus ab Jovefummo.
Thus Homer,
C T M I" N jt*i Ssoi tow -
$\ M O T Ado-are (/Xw - IA. A.
where the 'Yp~v and the Mol ftand, as contradiftin-
guifhed, and both have precedence of their refpective
Verbs, the 'T^ni even leading the whole Sentence.
In other inftances, thefe Pronouns commonly take their
place behind the Verb, as may be feen in examples
every where obvious. The Greek Language went far-
ther (till. When the oblique Cafes of thefe Pronouns
happened to contradiftinguifti, they aflumed a peculiar
Accent of their own, which gave them the name of
ooOoTO'jtfusWj, or Pronouns uprightly accented. When
they marked no fuch oppofition, they not only took
their place behind the Verb, but even gave it their Ac-
cent ^ and (as it were) inclined themfelves upon it. And
hence they acquired the name of E^xAi-nxa-, that is,
Leaning or Inclining Pronouns. The Greeks too had in
the firft perfon 'E ( ua, 'Ewo/, 'E ; ui for Contradijlincliijes*
and Ma, Mo', ME for Enclitics. And hence 'twas that
dpollonius contended, that in the paflage above quoted
from the firft Iliad, we fhould read walfo J' 'EMOT,
for
Bo OK THE FlR ST. 85
STANTIVES are either Primary, or Se- Ch. V.
condary, that is to fay, according to a Lan-
guage more familiar and known, are ei-
ther NOUNS or PRONOUNS. The NOUNS
denote Subftances, and thofe either Na-
tural, Artificial, or Abjlraft *. They
moreover denote Things either General, or
Special, or Particular. The PRONOUNS,
their Substitutes, are either Prepofitfae,
or Subjunctive. THE PREPOSITIVE is
diftinguifhed into three Orders called the
Firft, the Second, and the Third Perfon.
THE SUBJUNCTIVE includes the powers
G 3 of
for -aouSit $\ MOf, on account of the Contradiftino
tion, which there occurs between the Grecians and
Chryfes. See Jpoll. de Syntaxi L. I. c. 3. />. 20.
L. II. C. 2. p. 102, 103.
This Diverfity between the Contradiftinctive Pro-
nouns, and the Enclitic, is not unknown even to the
Englijh Tongue. When .we fay, Give me Content,
the [Me] in this cafe is a perfect Enclitic. But when
we fay, Give Me Content, Give Him his tboufands^ the
(Me") and (Him] are no Enclitics, but as they (land in
oppofition, aflume an Accent of their own, and fo be-
come the true o
* See before p. 37, 38,
86 HERMES.
Ch. V. of all thofe three, having fuper added, as
* ' of its own, the peculiar force of a Con-
HAVING done with SUBSTANTIVES,
we now proceed to ATTRIBUTIVES,
BOOK THE FIRST. 87
CHAP. VI.
Concerning Attributives.
ATTRIBUTIVES are all thofe princi- Ch.VI.
pal Words, that denote Attributes,
conjidered as Attributes. Such for exam-
ple are the Words, Black, White, Great,
Little, Wife, Eloquent, Writeth, Wrote,
Writing, &c (a}.
How-
(0) In the above lift of Words are included what
Grammarians called Adjectives, Verbs, and Participles^
in as much as all of them equally denote the Attributes
of Subjlance. Hence 'tis, that as they are all from
their very nature the Predicates in a Propofition (being
all predicated of fome Subject or Subftance, Snow is
white, Cicerp writeth, fcc.) hence I fay the Appella-
tion PBJMAor VERB is employed by Logicians in an
extended Senfe to denote them all. Thus AmniQnius ex-
plaining the reafon, why Arijlotle in his Tra6l de /-
terpretatione calls Atvxo's a Verb, tells us Trzctxu a-jw,
opov iv 7rcoTa<rf srojaor^, *PH~MA
that every Sound articulate, that forms the
G 4
88 HERMES.
Ch.VI. HOWEVER, previoufly to thefe, and to
every other poffible Attribute, whatever a
thing may be, whether black or white,
fquare or round, wife or eloquent, wri-
ting or thinking, it muft^r/? of neceffity
EXIST, before it can poffibly be any thing
elfe. For EXISTENCE may be confidered
as an univerfal Genus, to which all things
of all kinds are at all times to be referr'd.
The Verbs therefore, which denote it,
claim precedence of all others, as being
elTential to the very being of every Pro-
pofition, in which they may frill be found,
either expreft, or by implication ; expreft,
as when we fay, Ihe Sim is bright-, by
im-
Predicate In a Propofetion^ is called a VERB. p. 24.
Edit. Ven. Prifcian's obfervation, though made on
another occafion, is very pertinent to the prefent. Nan
Declination fed proprietas excutienda eft fegmficationis.
L. II. p. 576. And in another place he fays ncn
Jtmilitudo dedinationis omnimado conjungit vel difcernit partes
orationis inter ff } fed vis ipfius Jignijicetion:s, L. XIII.
p. 970,
BOOK THE FIRST. 89
implication, as when we fay, The Sun Ch-VI.
rifes, which means, when refolved,
Sun is rijing (b).
THE Verbs, Is, Growetb, Becometb t
Eft, Fit, virapxti, *, TireXstf yfyvsrcci, are
all of them ufed to exprefs this general
Genus. The Latins have called them
Verba fubftantiva, Verbs fubftantrue, but
the Greeks 'PypaToi vTragxIiKK, Verbs of
Exiftence, a Name more apt, as being
of greater latitude, and comprehending
equally as well Attribute, as Subftance.
The principal of thofe Verbs, and which
we (hall here particularly coniider, is the
Verb, 'Erf, Eft, Is.
Now all EXISTENCE is either abfo-
lute or qualified abfolute, as when we
fay, B is ; qualified, as when we fay, B
is AN ANIMAL; B is BI.ACK, is ROUND,
WITH
(*) See Metaphyf. Art/lot. L.V. c. 7. Edit. Du-Vall
9Q HERMES.
Ch.VI. WITH refpeft to this difference, the
Verb (is) can by itfelf exprefs abfolute
Exiftence, but never the qualified, with-
out fubjoining the particular Form, be-
caufe the Forms of Exiftence being in
number infinite, if the particular Form
be not cxpreft, we cannot know which is
intended. And hence it follows, that
when (is) only ferves to fubjoin fome
fuch Form, it has little more force, than
that of a mere Ajjertion. 'Tis under the
fame character, that it becomes a latent
part in every other Verb, by exprefling
that Aflertion, which is one of their EG-
fentials. Thus, as was obferved juft be-*
fore, Rifetb means, is rijing; Writetb,
is writing.
AGAIN As to EXISTENCE in gene~
ral, it is either mutable, or immutable', mu-
table, as in the Objects of Senfation -, im~>
mutable, as in the Objetts of Intellettion
and Science. Now mutable Objects exifl
ail in Time, and admit the feveral Di-?
ftinctions
BOOK THE FIRST. 91
flin&ions of prefent, pad, and future. Ch.VI,
But immutable ObjeSls know no fuch Di-
Jiin&ions, but rather {land oppofed to all
things temporary.
AND hence two different Significations
of the fubftantive Verb (is) according
as it denotes mutable, or immutable Be-
ing.
FOR example, if we fay, This Orange
is ripe, (is) meaneth, that it exifteth fo
now at this prefent, in oppofition to pafl
time, when it was green, and to future
time, when it will be rotten.
BUT if we fay, The Diameter of the
Square is incommen fur able with its Jide,
we do not intend by (is) that it is incom-
menfurable" now, having been formerly
commenfurable, or being to become fo
hereafter -, on the contrary we intend that
Perfection of Exiftence, to which Time
and its Diftinttions are utterly unknown.
Tis under the fame meaning we employ
this
92 HERMES.
Ch.VI. this Verb, when we fay, TRUTH is,
or, GOD is. The oppofition is not of
I'ime prefent to other Times, but of neccf-
fary Exijience to all temporary Exiftence
whatever (<:). And fo much for Verbs of
'Exijience, commonly called Verbs fubjlan-
tive.
WE are now to defcend to the com-
mon Herd of Attributives, fuch as black
and white, to write, to fpeak, to walk,
&c. among which when compared and
oppofed to each other, one of the moft
eminent difUn&ions appears to be this.
Some, by being joined to a proper Sub-
ftantive,
(c) Cum enim dicimus, DEUS EST, non eum dicimus
NUNC ESSE, fed tantum IN SUBSTANTIA ESSE, ut
hoc ad immutabilitatem potirtt fubftant'ue, quam ad tempus
aliquod rtferatur. Si autem dicimus, DIES EST, adnul-
lam diet fubjlantiam pertlnet, nifi tantum ad temper is con-
Jiituticnem ; hoc enim, quod fignifcat, tale e/1, tanquam
ft dicamus, NUNC EST. ^uare cum dicimus ESSE, ut
jubjlantiam defignemus, fimpllciter EST addimus ; cum
vero tta ut aliquid prafens fignlficctur, fecundum Tempus.
Boeth. in Lib. de Interpr. p. 307. See alfo Plat. Tim.
p. 37, 38. Edit. Serrani.
BOOK THE FIRST. 93
ftantive make without farther help a per- Ch.VL
feft affertive Sentence j while the
tho' otherwife perfect, are in this refpeft
deficient.
To explain by an example. When
we fay, Cicero eloquent, Cicero wife, thefe
are imperfect Sentences, though they de-
note a Subftance and an Attribute. The
reafon is, that they want an Affertion,
to mew that fuch Attribute appertains to
fuch Subftance. We muft therefore call
in the help of an AiTertion elfewhere, an
(is) or a (WAS) to complete the Sentence,
faying, Cicero is wife, Cicero WAS elo-
quent. On the contrary, when we fay,
Cicero ivritetb, Cicero lualketh, in inflan-
ces like thefe there is no fuch occafion,
becaufe the Words (tvritetb) and (ivalk-
etb} imply in their own Form not an At-
tribute only, but an Afiertion likewife.
Hence 'tis they may be refolved, the one
into Is and Writing, the other into Is
and Walking.
Now
94 HERMES.
Ch.VI. Now all thofc Attributives, which have
this complex Power of denoting both an
Attribute and an Aflertion, make that
Species of Words, which Grammarians
call VERBS. If we refolve this complex
Power into its diftinft Parts, and take the
Attribute alone without the AlTertion, then
have we PARTICIPLES. All other Attri-
butives, betides the two Species before,
are included together in the general Name
of ADJECTIVES.
AND thus is k, that ALL ATTRIBU-
TIVES are either VERBS, PARTICIPLES,
or ADJECTIVES.
BESIDES the Diflinctions abovemen-
tioned, there are others, which deferve
notice. Some Attributes have their Ef~
fence in Motion ; fuch are to walk, tofy,
to ftrikty to live. Others have it in the
privation of Motion ; fuch are to flop, to
reft, to ceafe, to die. And laftly, others
have it in fubjects, which have nothing to
2 dt
BOOK THE FIRST. 95
do with either Motion or its Privation ; Ch.VI.
fuch are the Attributes of, Great and Lit-
tle, White and Black, Wife and Foolijh,
and in a word the feveral Quantities, and
Qualities of all Things. Now thefe laft
are ADJECTIVES -, thofe which denote
Motions, or their Privation, are either
VERBS or PARTICIPLES.
AND this Circumflance leads to a far-
ther Diflinction, which may be explain'd
as follows. That all Motion is in Time,
and therefore, wherever it exifls, implies
*rime as its concomitant, is evident to all
and requires no proving. But befides this,
all Re/I or Privation of Motion implies Time
likewife. For how can a thing be faid to
.reft or flop, by being in one Place for one
Inflant only ? fo too is that thing, which
moves with the greatefl velocity. f- To
flop therefore or reft, is to be in one Place
for more than one Inflant, that is to fay,
during
t Thus Proclus in the Beginning of his Treat ife
concerning Motion. Hpe.uSV er* TO WT'OOV x) Zrs.o:
& TW a'trw TO'TTW ov, ^ ay, xj T * /pr. '
96 HERMES.
Ch.VI. -during an Extenjion between two Inftants,
and this of courfe gives us the Idea of
TIME. As therefore Motions and their Pri-
vation imply Time as their Concomitant, fb
VERBS, which denote them, come to de-
note TIME alfo (d}. And hence the Origin
and Ufe of TENSES, " which -are fo many
" different Forms, affigned to each Verb,
cc to mew, without altering its principal
" Meaning, the various TIMES in which
" fuch Meaning may exifr.." Thus Sen-
bit, Scrip/it, Scripferat, and Scribet, denote
all equally the Attribute, To Write, while
the difference between them, is, that they
denote Writing in different Times.
SHOULD
(d) The antient Authors of Diale&icor Logic have
well defcribed this Property. The following is part
of their Definition of a Verb pripot. Si o TO ETJHXT-
ffr^cilvov X,r"-> a ^ er ^ " fometbing^ -which fignifiei
Time OVER AND ABOVE (for fuch is the force of the
Propofition, Oco,-.) If it fhould be afked, over and
above what? It may be anfwered over and above its
principal Signification, which is to denote fome moving
and energizing Attribute. See Arift. de Interpret c. 3.
together with his Commentators Ammonias and Boe-
thius. 3
SHOULD it be afked, whether Time it- Ch.VL
felf may riot become upon occafion the
Verb's principal Signification ; 'tis anfwei>
ed, No. And this appears, becaufe the
fame Time may be denoted by different
Verbs (as in the Words, writeth and/te/-
etb) and different Times by the fame Verb
(as in the Words, writetb arid wrote] nei- 1 -
ther of which could happen, were 'Time
any thing more, than a meer Concomitant.
Add to this, that when Words denote
Time, not collaterally* but principally,
they ceafe to be Verbs, and become either
Adjectives, or Subftantives. Of the Ad-
jeftive kind are Timely, Yearly, Dayly,
Hourly, 5cc. of the Subftantive kind are
Time, Tear, Day, Hour, &c.
THE moft obvious Diviiion of TIME is
into Prefent, Paft, and Future, nor is any
Language complete, whofe Verbs have
not TENSES, to mark thefe Diftindions.
But we may go ftill farther. Time paft
and future are both infinitely extended.
H Hence
98 HERMES.
Ch.VI. Hence 'tis that in univerfal Time paft we
may aflume many particular 'Times paft,
and in univerfal Time future, many parti-
cular Times future, fame more, fome lefs
remote, and correfponding to each other
under different relations. Even prefent
Time itflf is not exempt from thefe Dif-
ferences, and as neceffarily implies fome
degree of Extenfion, as does every given
Line, however minute.
HERE then we are to feek for the
Reafon, which firft introduced into Lan-
guage that variety of Tenfes. It was not
it feems enough to denote indefinitely (or
by Aorifts) mere Prefent, Paft, or Future,
but 'twas necefTary on many occafions to
define with more precifion, what kind of
Paft, Prefent, or Future. And hence
the multiplicity of Futures, Prasteritsr,
and even Prefent Tenfes, with which all
Languages are found to abound, and
without which it would be difficult to af-
certain our Ideas.
V
How-
BOOK THE FIRST. 99
HOWEVER as the Knowledge of TENSES Ch.VI.
depends on the Theory of TIME, and this
is a fubjed: of no mean Speculation, we
fhall referve it by itfelf for the following
Chapter.
H 2 CHAP.
loo HERMES.
CHAP. VII.
*
Concerning Time, and Tenfes.
C. VII. r t * IME and SPACE have this in com-
J- mon, that they are both of them by
nature things continuous, and as fuch they
both of them imply Extenjion. Thus be-
tween London and Salt/bury there is the
Extenfion of Space, and between Tejlerday
and To-morrow, the Extenfion of Time.
But in this they differ, that all the Parts of
Space exift at once and together ; while thofe
of Time only exift in Tranfition or Sue-
cejjlon (a). Hence then we may gain fome
Idea of TIME, by confidering it under the
notion
(a] See Vol. I. p. 275. Note XIII. To which we
may add, what is faid by Ammonius odl yx.% o xpo;>
cA0 J //.a u<piV~<xra, AA' i\ X.Z.TO. woiaw TO NT N*
e-j yy.% TW yivszQat ^ (pQt'fisQou TO tivxi, p/si. TIME
doth not fubfift the whole at ance^ but only in a fingk Now
arlNSTANTj for it hath its Exijience in becoming and in
ctafing to bt, Amm, in Preo'icam. p. 82. b.
BOOK THE FIRST. 101
notion of a tranjient Continuity. Hence C.VII.
alfo, as far as the affections and proper-
ties of 'TranSition go, Time is different
from Space; but as to thofe of Exten-*
fion and Continuity, they perfectly co^
incide.
LET us take, for example, fuch a part
of Space, as a Line. In every given LINE
we may aflame any where a Pointy and
therefore in every given Line there may be
aflumed infinite Points. So in every given
TIME we may aflame any where a Now
or Inflant, and therefore in every given
'Time there may be aflumed infinite Nows
or Inftants.
FARTHER ftill A POINT is the Bound
of every finite Line; and A Now or IN-
STANT, of every finite Time. But altho'
they are Bounds, they are neither of them
Parts, neither the Point of any Line, nor
the Now or Inflant of any Time. If this
appear ftrange, we may remember, that
the Parts of any thing extended are necef-
H 3 farily
HERMES.
C.VH.farify extended alfo, it being efTential to
their character, that they jhould meafure
their Whole. But if a Point or Now were
extended) each of them would contairT
within it felf infinite other Points, and in-
fnite other Nows (for thefe may be aflumed
infinitely within the minuteft Extenfion)
and this, 'tis evident, would be abfurd and
impoffible.
THESE AfTertions therefore being ad-
mitted, and both Points and Nows being
taken is Bounds ', but notasP<zr/j-(^), it will
follow,
TO NT~N 78 X$ <t '" y *
Tf,q 'yfcxtAui.ri;'. aj c 'y^cx.jjt.fj.cn t^o
-rij? p/af [j.oiz. 'Tis evident that A Now or Injiant is
no more a part of Time, than POINTS are of a Lint.
The Parts indeed of one Line are two other Lines. Natur.
Auic. L. IV. c. 17. And not long before. To cl
xatr9i &r TO oAov ix. rm pfouit' o c XPO'NOS a
&xr o-u'^Jcwo-fiaj sx Tfcv N T~N. ^ Now no Part of
Time ; for a Part is able to meafure its Whole^ and the
lyiwle is necejjarily made up of its Parts; but TIME dotb
not appear to bt made tip of Nows. ibid. c. 14.
BOOK THE FIRST. 103
follow, thatin the fame manner as the fame C.VII,
Point may be the End of one Line, and the
Beginning of another, fo the fame Now or
Inftant may be the End of one Time,
and the Beginning of another. Let us
fuppofe for example, the Lines. A B, B C.
B
A C
I fay that the Point B, is the End of the
Line A B, and the Beginning of the Line,
B C. In the fame manner let us fuppofe
A B, B C to reprefent certain Times, and
let B be a Now or Inftant. In fuch cafe
I fay that the Inftant B is the End of the
Time A B, and the Beginning of the Time,
B C. I fay likewife of thefe two Times,
that with refpedl to the Now or Inftant,
which they include, the firfl of them is
neceffarily PAST TIME, as being previous
to it; the other is necelfarily FUTURE, as
being fu&feyuent. As therefore every Now
H 4 or
J04 HERMES.
C.VJI. or INSTANT always exifls in Time, and
without being Time, is Times Bound-, the
Bound of Completion to the Paft, and the
Bound of Commencement to the Future;
from hence we may conceive its nature or
epd, which is to be the Medium of Conti-
nuity between the Paft and the Future, fo as
to render Time, thro' all its Parts, one In-
tire and Perfeft Whole (c\
FROM the above Speculations, there
follow ibme Conclufions, which may be
perhaps called Paradoxes, till they have
been attentively confidered. In the firil
place there cannot (flridly fpeaking) be any
Jucb
(c) To $ NT~N to <r
6)J' ffVJt^tl 'y&f TOV P^pOVOV, TO^ TZaptl^Q'jTOt. xj i(TO]W.-
vov, ^ O'AWJ w^f %pova ir'w' ff~i yee,f T* fj.\v ^^,
Ta (Jt TtAfuTii. A Now or Injiant is (as was faid be-
fore) the Continuity or holding together of Time ; for it
makes Time continuous^ the pa/1 and the future, and is in
general its Boundary^ as being the Beginning of one Tine
and- the Ending of another. Natur. Aufcult. L. jy.
c. 19. 2-jyp^ti: in this place means not Continuity^ as
Banding for Extcnfion^ but rather that 'Junction or Hold-
i n S toge(hfr^ by which Extenfion is imparted to othaf
BOOK THE FIRST. 105
fucb thing as Time prefent. For if all Time C. VII.
be tranjient as well as continuous, it cannot
like a Line be prefent all together, but part
will neceflarily be gone, and part be com-
ing. If therefore any portion of its Con-
tinuity were to be prefent #/ once, it would
fo far quit its tranfient nature, and be Time
no longer. But if no Portion of its Con-
tinuity can be thus prefent, how can Time
pofiibly be prefent, to which fuch Conti-*
nuity is effential ? -
FARTHER than this If there be no
fuch thing as Time Prefent, there can be no
Senfation of Time by any one of the Senfes.
For ALL SENSATION is of 'the "j- Prefent only,
the Paft being preferved not by Senfe but by
Memory, and the Future being anticipate4
by Prudence only and wife Fore/igbt.
BUT if no Portion of Time be the ob-
ject of any Senfation -, farther, if the Pre-
fent
"f" TVT5? yap (aiT^JXTfJ fC.) O'JTf TO jUfAAOVj OUTS
fJtftj A/\as TO -srxpQV po'.O'J,
A. a.
106 HERMES.
C. VII. fent never exifl ; if the Paft be no more ;
if the Future be not as yet -, and if thefe
are all the Parts, out of which TIME is
compounded : how ftrange and fhadowy
a Being do we find it ? How nearly ap-
proaching to a perfect Non-entity (d] ?
Let us try however, fince the Senfes fail
us, if we have not Faculties of higher
power, to feize this fleeting Being.
THE World has been likened to a va-
riety of Things, but it appears to refem-
ble no one more, than fome moving Spec-
tacle
"On
ax. trt* TO Js //AAn, x) 7rw t'r '' " ol TXTUV
av V9lsufftU' TO
o aTTfj^ x o act
TO ^' X |1A CVTWV rU
8<ri?. TXa/ therefore TIME ^xj/?5 wo/ <7/ a//,
tfi but a faint and obfcure exijlence, one may
fuftettfrom hence. A part of it has been^ and is n mo^e ;
a part of it is coming* and is not as yet ; and out of tbefc
is made that infinite Time, which is ever to be a/umedjlill
farther and farther. Now that which is made up of no-
thing but Non- entities, itjhouldfeem was impoffible ever to
participate of Entity. Natural. Aufc. L. IV. c. 14.
See alfo Philop. MS. Com. in Nicomach. p. 10.
BOOK THE FIRST. 107
tacle (fuch as a Procefiion or a Triumph) C. VII.
that abounds in every part with fplendid
Obje&s, fome of which are ftill departing,
as fail as others make their appearance.
The Senfes look on, while the fight pafles,
perceiving as much as '^immediately prefent 9
which they report with tolerable accuracy to
the Soul's fuperior Powers. Having done
this, they have done their duty, being con-
cerned with nothing, fave what is prefent
and instantaneous. But to the Memory, to
the Imagination, and above all to the Intel-
left, the feveral Nows mlnjtants are not loft,
as to the Senfes, but are preferved and made
Objects ofy?cY7<-/}/comprehenfion, however in
their own nature they may be tranjitory and
faffing. " Now 'tis from contemplating two
" or more of thefe Inftants under one view,
" together with that Interval of Continuity,
" which fubfifts between them, that we
" acquire infenfibly the Idea of TIME (e)."
For
( d ) To'tf
io8 HERMES.
C.VIJ. For example: The Sun rifes; this I re-
member j // rifes again -, this too I remem-
ber. Thefe Events are not together -, there
is
Jty aAAo ^Tro/^y^iiv aura, ^
'tTioo'j' OTXV 'yxp toi axpot, 'titpx 72
j Juo STTU r ^PC'' T * NT~N, TO juty sr ( -<mcv,
v, rote xj rz TO (pafj.lv tlvxi XPO'NON.
^ y2?>' /^Y;T /;<?j /w TIME, w^ w* ffl ac-
quire a Senfation of prior and fubfequent in Motion. But
we dijiinguij]) and fettle tbefe two^ by confidcring one firft^
then the ether, together i^ith an interval betivecn them dif-
ferent frcm both. For as often as -we conceive the Extremes
to be different from the Mean^ and the Soul talks of two
Nows, one prior and the ether fubfequent , then 'tis we fay
there is TIME, and this 'tis we call TIME. Natural.
Aufcult. L. IV. c. 1 6. Themifiiuis Comment upon
this paflage is to the fame purpofe. "Orw n /^ o v.??
o Gi
toTt KJ yoovov tdvs iv&or^ev, i/Vo ray
vfy. oTcv Vo z?j>&rw jitTv ^ tru
Mind^ remembring the Now,
?t'/^/V^ // talked cf yeftcrday, talks again of another Now
to-day^ then 'tis it immediately has an idea of TIME, ter-
minated by thcfe iivo News* as by two Boundaries > and
thus is it enabled to fay, that the Quantity is of fifteen, or
of fixteen hours, as if it were to fever a Cubit's length
from c:i infinite L,ine by two Points, Themift. Op. edit,
Aid!, p. 45. b.
BOOK THE FIRST. 109
is an Extenfion between them not how- C. VII.
ever of Space, for we may fuppofe the Place
of fifing the fame, or at lead to exhibit no
fenfible difference. Yet ftill we recognize
feme Extenfion between them. Now what
is this Extenflon, but a natural D } ay '? And
what is that, but pure Time ? 'Tis after the
fame manner, by recognizing two new
Moons, and the Exteniion between thefe:
two vernal Equinoxes, and the Extenfion
between thefe ; that we gain Ideas of other
Times, fuch as Months and Years, which are
all fo many Intervals, defcribed as above >
that is to fay, pajjing Intervals of Continuity
between two Injlants viewed together.
AND thus 'tis THE MIND acquires the
Idea of TIME. But this Time it muft be
femembred is PAST TIME ONLY, which
is always fazjirft Species, that occurs to
the human Intellect. How then do we
acquire the Idea of Ti M E FUTURE? The
anfwer is, we acquire it by Anticipation.
Should it be demanded flill farther, And
ivhat is Anticipation ? We aniwer, that in
2 this
no HERMES.
C. VII. this cafe 'tis a kind of reafoning by analogy
from fimilar to fimilar ; from Succelfions
of Events, that are pad already, to fimilar
Succeffions, that are prefumed hereafter.
For example : I obferve as far back as my
.memory can carry me, how every day has
been fucceeded by a night ; that night, by
another day ; that day, by another night ;
and fo downwards in order to the Day that
is now. Hence then I anticipate a fimilar
Succeffion from the prefent Day, and thus
gain the Idea of Days and Nights in futu-
rity. After the fame manner, by attending
to the periodical Returns of New and Full
Moons ; of Springs, Summers, Autumns
and Winters, all of which in Time paft I
find never to have failed, I anticipate a
like orderly and diver/ified Succeffion, which
makes Months, and Seafons, and Years,
in Tim? future.
WE go farther than this, and not only
thus anticipate in thefe natural Periods, but
even in matters of human and civil concern.
For example : Having obferved in many
paft
BOOK. THE FIRST. in
paft inftances how Health had fucceeded C. VIL
to Exercife, and Sicknefs to Sloth; we an-
ticipate future Health to thofe, who, being
now fickly, ufe exercife -, 2&& future Sick-
nefs to thofe, who, being now healthy, are
flothful. 'Tis a variety of fuch obferva-
tions,all refpedting one fubject, which when
fyftematized by juft reafoning, and made
habitual by due practice, form the charac-
ter of a Matter- Artift, or Man of prattical
Wifdom. If they refpedt the human Body
(as above) they form the Phyfician; if mat-
ters military, the General ; if matters na-
tional, the Statefman ; if matters of private
life, the Moralift ; and the fame in other
Subjects. All thefe feveral Characters in
their refpedive ways may be faid to poflefs
a kind of prophetic difcernment, which not
only prefents them the barren profpeft of
Futurity (a profpect not hid from the mean-
eft of Men) but mews withal thofe Events,
which are likely to attend it, and thus en-
ables them to act with fuperior certainty
and rectitude. And hence it is, that (if we
except thofe, who have had diviner aflift-
i ances)
ii2 HERMES.
C. VII. ances) we mayjuftly fay, as was faidof olcf,
He's the beft Prophet, who conjectures
well (/).
FROM
(/ ) Ma'm? <T a^i
So Milton.
Till old Experience do attain
To fomething like Prophetic Strain."
Et facile exijllmari potejl, Prudcntiam ejje quodarfi-
modo Divinationem.
Corft. Nep. in Vit. Attici.
There is nothing appears fo clearly an object of the
MIND or INTELLECT ONLY, as the Future does, finte
we can find no place for its exiftence any where elfe.
Not but the fame, if we confider, is equally true of the
Pajl. For tho' it may have once had another kind of
being, when (according to common Phrafe) it aftually
was, yet was it then fomething Prefent, and not fome-
thing Pa/I. As Pajt, it has no exiftence but in THE
MIND or MEMORY, fmce had it m fa& any other, it
could not properly be called Paft. 'Twas this- intimate
connection between TIME, and the SOUL, that made
fome Philofophers doubt, whether if there was no Sou/,
there could be any Time, fmce Time appears to have its
Being in no other region. Tlonoov <Js py iVijf ^v%r,s
tjr) oiii 6 %co\io: 9 cZTropvcreitv alv TJ?, >c. T. A. Natur.
Aufcult. L. IV. c. 20. ThemiJiiuS) who comments
the above pallage, exprefles himfclf more pofidvety.
E TB/onw ^X W ^ At^-ETat TOTE c^jU,>5T&v ^ TO a.cw[*.v~
O aptOjUiiTcv JjiA^J/- oyvottisij TO <? tv-
>*A siv tnrCrx-Wy (tv vrdf ri -pt9jt*r-
B o o K THE FIRST. 113
FROM what has been reafoned it ap- C.VIT.
pears, that Knowledge of the Future
eomes from Knowledge of the Paft ; as
does Knowledge of the Paft from Know-
ledge of the Prefect, fo that their Order
to us is that of PRESENT, PAST, and
FUTURE.
OF thefe Species of Knowledge, that of
the Prefent is the loweft, not only zsfirft in
perception, but as far the more extenlive,
being necefTarily common to all animal Be-
iags, and reaching even to Zoophytes, as.
far as they polTefs Senfation. Knowledge
of the Paft comes next, which is fuperior
to the former, as being confined to thofe
Animals, that have Memory as well as
Senfes. Knowledge of the Future comes
laft,
eovro; fxr.Tj juvotftft pyre Ivtpyntt 9 fyxvepo'J w? oux ow o
2poyc ^'i ? w*i y^Jif U^'JV*!?. * hern. p. 48' -l^dit.
AWi. Vid. etiam ejufd. Comtn. in Lib. de An. p. 94,
1
ii4 HERMES,
C. VII. lad, as being derived from the other two,
Arid, de an ^ which is for that reafon the moft ex-
An - n - 3- cellent as well as the moft rare, fince Na-
p. 25. 9
ture in her fuperadditions rifes from worfe
always to better, and is never found to
fink from better down to worfe*.
AND now having feen, how we acquire
the Knowledge of Time paft, and Time
future-, which is firft in perception, which
firft in dignity -, which more common,
which more rare ; let us compare them
both to the prefent Now or Inftant, and
examine what relations they maintain to-
wards it.
IN the firft place there may be Times
both paft and future, in which the pre-
fent Now has no exiftence, as for example
in Tefterday, and To-morrow.
AGAIN,
Sec below, Note (r) of this Chapter,
BOOK THE FIRST.
AGAIN, theprefent Now may fo far be- C. VII.
long to 'Time of either fort, as to be the
End of the paft, and the Beginning of the
future ; but it cannot be included within
the limits of either. For if it were poffible,
let us fuppofe C the prefent Now included
A B C D E
within the limits of the paft Time A D.
In fuch cafe C D, part of the paft Time
A D, will be fubfequent to C the prefent
Now, and fo of courfe be future. But
by the Hypothecs it is paft, and fo will be
both Paft and Future at once, which is
abfurd. In the fame manner we prove
that C cannot be included within the li-
mits of a future Time, fuch as B E.
WHAT then (hall we fay of fuch Times,
as this Day, this Month, this Year, this
I 2 Cen-
ti6 HERMES,
C.VII. Century, all which include within them
the prefent Now? They cannot be paft
'Times or future, from what has been
proved ; and prefent 'lime has no exigence,
as has been proved likewife *. Or mall
\ve allow them to be prefenf, from 'the
prefent Now, which exifts within them ;
fo that from the Prefence of that we call
thefe alfo prefent, tho' the fhorteft among
them has infinite parts always abfent ? If
fo, and in conformity to cuftom we allow
fuch Times prefent, as prefent Days, Months,
Years, and Centuries, each mufl of necef-
fity be a compound of the P aft and the Future,
divided from each other by fome prefent
Now or Inftant,andy0/W/ycalled PRESENT,
'while that Now remains within them. Let us
fuppofe for example the Time X Y, which
f XABCDEY
/ . . . - g
let
Sup.
BOOK THE FIRST, 117
let us call a Day, or a Century ; and let C. VII.
the prefent Now or Inftant exift at A.
I fay, in as much as A exifts within
XY, that therefore X A is Time paft,
and A Y Time future, and the whole
X A, AY, Time prefent. The fame
holds, if we fuppofe the prefent Now to
exift at B, or C, or D, or E, or any
where before Y. When the prefent Now
exifts at Y, then is the whole X Y Time-
pajl) and ft ill more fo, when the Now
gets to g, or onwards. In lifce manner
before the Prefent Now entered X, as
for example when it was at f, then was
the whole X Y Time future ; 'twas the
fame, when the prefent Now was at
X. When it had paft that, then XY
became Time prefent. And thus 'tis that
TIME is PRESENT, while pafling, in its
PRESENT Now or INSTANT. 'Tis the
fame indeed here, as it is in Space. A
Sphere paffing over a Plane, and being
for that reafon prefent to it, is only pre-
fent to that Plane in afingle Point at once,
\ 3 while
Ji8 HERMES.
C.VII. while during the whole progreflion its
Parts abfent are infinite (g).
FROM what has been faid, we may
perceive that ALL TIME, of every deno-
mination,
(g) PLACE, according to the antients, was either
mediate, or immediate. I am (for example) in Europe^
becaufe I am in England; in England, becaufe in //'/#-
fare; in TViltJhlre^ becaufe in Salt/bury; in Salijbury t
becaufe in my own houfe j in my own h;ufe^ becaufe in
myjludy. Thus far MEDIATE PLACE. And what is
my IMMEDIATE PLACE? 'Tis the internal Bound of
that containing Body (whatever it be) which co-incidcs
with the external Bound of my own Body. T srff ;/"-
' fl' rt ' "> / XT
TOf 7C"eaj, xatj o uTfpit^fi TO ic"f5i5^/cijWioy. IN'ow as
this immediate Place is included within the limits of all
the former Places, 'tis from this relation that thofe me-
diate Places alfo are called each of them my Place, tho'
the leaft among them fo far exceed my magnitude. To
apply this to TIME. The Prcjent Century is prefent in
the prefent Tear ; that, in the prefent Month ; that, in
the prefent Day ; that, in the prefent Hour ; that, in the
prefent Minute. 'Tis thus by circumfcription within
circumfcription that we arrive at THAT REAL AN T D
INDIVISIBLE INSTANT, which by being itfelf the wv
f.JJ'ence of the Prcjcnt, difiufcs PRESENCE throughout
3 a!J
BOOK THE FIRST. 119
nomination, is divifible and extended. But C. VII.
if fo, then whenever we fuppofe a definite
Time, even though it be a lime prefent, it
muft needs have a Beginning, a Middle,
and an End. And fo much for TIME.
Now from the above Do&rine of TIME,
we propofe by way of Hypothecs the fol-
lowing Theorie of TENSES.
THE TENSES are ufed to mark Prefent,
Part, and Future Time, either indefinitely
I 4 with-
all, even the largeft of Times, which are found to in~
dude it within their refpeftive limits. Nicephorus Blem-
mides fpeaks much to the fame purpofe.
NT N*
ffuvfj-wf, YJ ^ja TJJW z<r^o? TO xu^iw? NT"N 'yiil
NT"N Xtyopwoq ^ utfos. PRESENT TIME
^r*? V that which adjoins to the REAL Now or INSTANT
on either fide, being a limited Time made up of Pajt and
Future, and from its vicinity to that REAL Now faid to
be Now alfo itfelf. 'ETiYl. pu<nxij K(>. S'. See alfo
Artft. Phyjic. L.IV. c,6. L.VI. 0.2,3, ^
120 HERMES.
. VII. without reference to any Beginning,
die, or End j or elfe definitely, in reference
to fuch diflinctiqns.
IF Indefinitely y then have we THREE
TENSES, an Aorift of the Prefent, an
Aorift pf the Pad, and an Aprift of the
Future. If definitely) then have we three
Tenfes to mark the Beginnings of thefe
three Times ; three, to denote their Mid-
dles; and three to denote their Ends -, in,
all NINE.
THE three firft of thefe Tenfes we
pall the Inceptive Prefent, the Inceptive
Part, and the Inceptive Future. The
three next, the Middle Prefent, the Mid-
dle Paft, and the Middle Future. And
the three laft, the Completive Prefent,
the Completive Paft, and the Completive,
Future,
AND thus 'tis, that the TENSE sin their
naturaj Number appear to be TWELVE 4
BOOK THE FIRST. J2I
three to denote Time abfolute, and nine to C.VII.
.denote it under its rejpetfive diftinffions.
Aorift of the Prefent,
Scribo. I write.
Aorift of the Paft f
a. Scripfi. I wrote.
Aorift of the Future.
, Scribam. I mall write.
Inceptive Prefent.
ypuqtiv. Scripturus fum. I am
going to write.
Middle or extended Prefent.
Tvyxdvu ygctQuy. Scribo or Scribens
fum. I am writing.
Completive Prefent.
5. Scripfi. I have written.
Inceptive Paft.
ypoQew. Scripturus eram. I
was beginning to write.
Middle
122 H E R M E S.
C. VII. Middle or extended Paft.
'Eypatpov or eTvTxotvov ypaQuv. Scribebam*
I was writing.
Completive Paft.
'EyeypxQetv. Scripferam. I had done
writing.
Inceptive Future.
Me\Xr,<ru ypa$iv. Scripturus ero. I
(hall be beginning to write.
Middle or extended Future.
*E<roftott ypctQav. Scribens ero. 1 fhall
be writing.
Completive Future.
"ErcfMii ytypuQui;. Scripfero. I ftiall
have done writing.
IT is not to be expedled that the above
Hypothefis fhould be juftified through all
inftances in every language. It fares with
Tenfes,
BOOK THE FIRST. 123
Tenfes, as with other Affections of Speech - y C. VII.
be the Language upon the whole ever fo
perfect, much muft be left, in defiance of
all Analogy, to the harfli laws of mere
Authority and Chance.
IT may not however be improper to
inquire, what traces may be difcovered in
favour of this Syftem, either in Languages
themfelves, or in thofe authors who have
written upon this part of Grammar, or
laflly in the nature and reafon of things.
IN the firft place, as toAoRisTS. Aorifts
are ufually by Grammarians referred to the
Paft; fuch are vjxdov, I went; bnurw, IfcH>
&c. We feldom hear of them in the Fu-
ture, and more rarely ftill in the Prefent.
Yet it feems agreeable to reafon, that
wherever Time isjignified without any far-
ther circumfcription, than that of Simple
prefent paji or future, the lenfe is AN
AORIST,
THUS
124 HERMES.
C.VII. THUS Milton,
Millions of fpiritual creatures WALK the
earth
Unfeen, both when we wake, and when
wejleep. P. L. IV. 277.
Here the Verb (WALK) means not that
they were walking at that inftant only,
when Adam fpoke, but wjifus indefinitely,
take any inftant whatever. So when the
fame Author calls Hypocrify,
the only Evil, that WALKS
Invifible, except to God alone,
the Verb (WALKS) hath the like aorijlical
or indefinite application. The fame may be
faid in general of all Sentences of the Gno~
mologic kind, fuch as
Ad poenitendum PROPERAT, cito qut
judicat.
Avarus, niji cum moritur, nil rcfte
FACIT, &c.
ALL
BOOK THE FIRST.
ALL thefe Tenfes are fo many AORISTS C. VII,
OF THE PRESENT.
Gnomologic Sentences after the fame
manner make likewife AORISTS OF THE
FUTURE.
Tif nihil ADMITTES in te, formidine
pceruz. Hor.
S o tooLegi/Iative Sentences, T^hou SHALT
not killy Thou SHALT not jleal, &c. for this
means no one particular future Time, but
is a prohibition extended indefinitely to
very part of Time future (b).
(b) The Latin Tongue appears to be more than or-
dinarily deficient, as to the article ofderi/is. It has no
peculiar Form even for an Aor'ijl of the Pajl^ and there-
fore (as Pnfdan tells us) the Prateritum is forced to dp
the double duty both of that Aorift* and of the perftft
Prefentj its application in particular inftaqces being to
ia6 HERMES.
C.VII. WE p a f s from Aorifts, to THE INCEP-
TIVE TENSES.
THESE may be found in part fupplied
(like many other Tenfes) by Verbs au-
xiliar. ME'AAXl ypccQeiv. Scripturus SUM.
I AM GOING to write. But the Latins go
farther, and have a Species of Verbs, de-
rived from others, which do the duty of
thefe Tenfes, and are themfelves for that
reafon called Inchoatives or Inceptive*.
Thus from Caleo, I am warm, conies Ca-
lefco, I begin to grow warm ; from Tumeoy
1 fwell, comes Tumefco, I begin to fwelL
Thefe Inchoative Verbs are fo peculiarly
appropriated to the Beginnings of Time,
that they are defective as to all Tenies,
which denote it in its Completion^ and
there-
be gathered from the Context. Thus 'tis that FECI
means (,as the fame author informs us) both S^TTO^/.X
and 7TciVa, 1 have done /V, and I did it; VIDI both
twpajca and fiSov, I have jujl feen //, and, Ifawlton^e.
Prifc. Gram, L. VIII. p. 814^ 838, Edit. Putfch.
BOOK THE FIRST. 127
therefore have neither Perfedtum, Plus C.VII.
quam-perfetum,or Perfcdl Future. There
is likewife a fpecies of Verbs called in Greek
'E<per/>c, in Latin Dejiderativa, the Deji-
deratives or Meditative*, which if they are
not ftri<5lly Inceptive*, yet both in Greek
and Latin have a near affinity with them.
Such are Ts-oXB^treiu, Bellaturio, I have a
dejire to make war-, @pu<rw, Efurio, I
long to eat (/). And fo much for THE
INCEPTIVE TENSES.
THE two laft orders of Tenfes which re-
main, are thofe we called (k] THE MIDDLE
TENSES (which exprefs Time as extended
and
(*') As all Beginnings have reference to what is fu-
ture, hence we fee how properly thefe Verbs are formed,
the Greek ones from a future Verb, the Latin from a
future Participle. From sroAtyiiic-w and (3owcru> come
iffo\ffji.ntTici} and j3pwico ; from Bellaturus and Efurus
come Eellaturia and Efurio. See Macrobius, p. 691.
Ed. Var. J Tffdw }( /j.e v vv Aj TE AA2 E'lONTA
I5rorira$ 5/eXa'irai. PJato in Phaedone.
(^) Care muft be taken not to confound thefe middle
Tenfes, with the Tenfes of thofe Verbs, which bear
the fame name among Grammarians,
HERMES.
C. VII. zn&pqfling) and the PERFECT or COMPLE-*
TIVE, which exprefs its Completion or End.
Now for thefe the Authorities are
many. They have been acknowledged
already in the ingenious Accidence of*
Mr. Hoadty, and explained and confirmed
\yyDr.SamuelClarke, in his rational Edition
of Homer s Iliad. Nay, long before either
of thefe, we find the fame Scheme in Sea-
liger, and by him (/) afcribed to -j- Gro-
cinus, as its Author. The learned &azd
(who
(/) Ex bis perdpimus Grocinum acute adnwdum Ten-
pora divijtje, fed minus commode. Trla enim conjlituit^
Mt nis,fed qua bifariamfecat^ Perfeclum &? Imperfefium :
fa) Prateritumimperfeftum, Amabam : Prateritum per-
feftum, Amaveram. Recife fane. Et Prtsfem imperfec-
tum, Amo. R.ele baftenus ; continuat enim aniorem, ne-
qrte abfohit. At Prafens perfeflum, Amavi : quh hoc
dicat ? De Futuro auttm ut nan male fentlt^ ita controver-
fum eft. Futurum, inquit, imperfeRum^ Amabo : Perfec-
turn, Amavero. Non-male, inquam : figriijicat enim Ama-
vero, arnoremfuturum& abfolutitm iri : Amabo perfec-
titnem nullam indicat. De Cauf. Ling. Lat. c. 113.
f His Name was William Grocin^ an Englijhman,
contemporary with Erafmus, and celebrated for hi's
Learning. He went to Florence to ftudy under Landiti 9
and was Prqfeflbr at Oxford. Spec. Lit. Flor, p. 205..
BOOK THE FtRST. 129
(who was himfelf a Greek, and one of the C. VII
ableft reftorers of that language in the
weflern world) characterizes the Tenfes
in nearly the fame manner (m). What
Apollonius hints, is exactly confonant ().
Prlfcian
(m} ThePRESENTTENSE (as this Author informs
us in his excellent Grammar) denotes TO iK-etj*t90t *y
arfAt?, that which is now inftant and incomplete; TH
PERFECTUM, TO TD-aaAtiAuOc? ap-n, x) iJlt^ts rz
ifff-WT0?, that which is now immediately paft, and is the
Completion of the Prefent j THE IMPERFECTUM, TO
'&rz9!z7t'',(x.u.tvov KJ oiTfhls TK I 5raow^>jjw./ii, the extended
and incomplete part of the Pajly and THE PLUSQUAM-
PERFECTUM, TO & xo shy \-j$o$ isrciXai) >^ lT>f T
m*ftotitfug*. that which is pajt long ago, and is the com-
pletion of the prateriium. Gram. L. IV.
Brrtuvn 61 zcra9o<ASa O'T; a ura
rry yt ue9ft tvs~UToi,v
Hence we are perfuaded that the Perfeflum dcth not jig-
nify the completion of the Pajl^ but PRESENT COMPLE-
TION. Apolhn. L. III. c. 6. The Reafon, which per-
fuadtd him to this opinion, was the application and ufe
of the Particle a,, of which he was then treating, and
which, as it denoted Potentiality or Contlngence, would
aflbrt (he fays) with any of the pafiing, extended, and
incomplete Tenfes, but never with this PERFECTUM,
becaufe this implied fuch a complete and indefeafille ex-
iftence, as never to be qualified into the nature of a Con-
tingent,
K
H E R M E S.
C.VII. Prifdan too advances the fame Doctrine
from the Stoics, whofe authority we efleem
greater than all the reft, not only from the
more early age when they lived, but from
their fuperior Ikill in Philofophy, and their
peculiar attachment to Dialectic, which
naturally led them to great accuracy in
thefe Grammatical Speculations (p).
BEFORE
(0} By thefe Philofophers the vulgar prefent Tenfe was
called THE IMPERFECT PRESENT, and the vulgar
Prateritum, THE PERFECT PRESENT, than which
nothing can be more confonant to the fyftem that we
favour. But let us hear Prifcian, from whom we learn
thefe fats. PR^SENS TEMPUS proprie dicitur, cujus
pars jam prater iit y pars futura eft. Cum enim Tempus,
Jiuvii more, injlabili vohatur curfu, vix punflum habere
poteft in prteftnti) hoc eft y in inftanti. Maxima igitur pars
fjus (ficut diflum eji) vel prater iit vel futura eft. Unde
STOICI jure HOC TEMPUS PRESEKS etiam IMPER-
FECT UM vocalant (ut difium eft) eo quod prior ejus pars,
qua pratcriit, tranfafta eft, deejl cmtcm fequens, id eft,
futura. Ut fi in media vcrfu dicam, fcribo verfurn, pri~
ere ejus parte fcripta^ cut adbuc deejl extrema pors, pra-
finti utor verbo, dicendo, fcribo verfum : fed IMPERFEC-
TUM */?, quod deejl adbuc verfu:, qncd firibatur Ex
eodem igitur Prerjcnti nafcitur etiam PerfcElum. Si cnlm
ad finem pemeniat inceptum, Jlatim utimur PR^ETKRITO
PERFECTO ; continue enim, fcripto ad fmem verfu, flica,
fcripfi verfuoi. And icon after fpeaking of the Latin
Per-
BOOK THE FIRST. 131
BEFORE we conclude, we mall add a C. VII.
few mifcellaneous obfervations, which
will be more eafily intelligible from the
Hypothefis here advanced, and ferve withal
to confirm its truth.
AND firft the Latins ufed their Prtzte-
ritum Perfeclum in fome inftances after a
very peculiar manner, fo as to imply the
very reverfe of the Verb in its natural fig-
nification. Thus, VIXIT, fignified, is
DEAD; FUIT, fignified, NOW is NOT, is
NO MORE. 'Twas in this fenfe that Cicero
addreffed the People of Rome, when he
had put to death the leaders in the Cata-
linarian Confpiracy. He appeared in the
K 2 Forum,
Perfefium, he fays, -fciendum tamen, quid Romani
PRJETERiToPfiRFECTO non folttm in re modo completd
utuutur, (in quo vim habet ejus, qut apud Gracos -srctoz-
x.f uxmj vocatur> quern STOICI TEAEION ENEI-
TI1TA nominaverunt) fed etiam pro 'Ao^'r* accipitur,
&c. Lib. VIII. p. 812, 813, 814.
HERMES.
C.VII. Forum, and cried out with a loud voice,
* \^XERUNT. So Virgil,
|] FUIMUS Troes, FUIT Ilium &
ingens
Gloria Dardanidum ^n. II.
And
* So among the Romans, when in a Caufe all the
Pleaders had fpoken, the Cryer ufed to proclaim, Dix-
ERUNT, i.e. they have done fpeaking. Afcon. Pad. in
Verr. II.
j| So Til'uttus fpeaking of certain Prodigies and evil
Omens.
H/fc fuerint dim. Sed tu, jam mitis^ dpollo,
Prodigia indomltis merge fub tsquoribus.
Eleg. H. 5. J. 19.
Ld thefe Events HAVE vEEvindoys of old ; by Im-
plication therefore But HENCEFORTH let them be no
more.
So Eneas in Virgil prays to Pbcebus.
Hoc Trojana tenus fuerit fortuna fecuta.
Let Trojan Fortune (that is, adverfe, like that of Troy,
and its Inhabitants,) HAVE fo far FOLLOWED us. By
Implication therefore, But let it follow us 'no farther,
Here let it end^ Hie fit Finis, as Servius well obferves
in the Place.
In which Inftances, by the way, mark not only the
Force of the Tenfe, but of the Mood y the PRECATIVE
or IMPERATIVE, not in the Future but in the PAST.
beep. 154, 155, 156.
BOOK THE FIRST.
And again,
Locus Ardea quondam
l5tus avis, & nunc magnum manet
Ardea nomen,
Sed for tuna F u i T , uEn, VII.
THE reafon of thefe Significations is de-
rived from THE COMPLETIVE POWER of
the Tenfe here mentioned. We fee that
the periods of Nature, and of human af-
fairs are maintained by the reciprocal fuc-
ceflion of Contraries. 'Tis thus with Calm
and Tempeft ; with Day and Night ;
with Prosperity and Adverfity; with Glory
and Ignominy j with Life and Death.
Hence then, in the inilances above, the
completion of one contrary is put for the
commencement of the other, and to fay,
HATH LIVED, Or, HATH BEEN, has the
fame meaning with, is DEAD, or, is NO
MORE.
K 3 IT
* Cert us in hofpitibus non eft amor ; errat, ut ipjt:
Cumque nilnl fperes firmius ejje, FUJT.
Epift. Ovid. Helen. Paridj. jfr. 190.
She erimus, feu nys Fata FUISSE volent.
Tibull.III. 5.32.
134 H E R M E S.
C.VII. IT is remarkable in * Virgil, that he
frequently joins in the fame Sentence this
complete and perfect Prefent with the ex-
tended and pajjing Prefent ; which proves
that he confidered the two, as belonging
to the fame Species of 'Time, and there-
fore naturally formed to co-incide with
each other.
- - \fihijam brachia contrahit ardens
Scorpios, & cceli jnftd plus parte reliquit.
G.I.
'Terra tremit ; fugereyrra G. I.
Prtzfertimji tempejlas a verticejyhis
Incubuit, glomeratque ferens inccndia
ventus. G. II.
- ilia noto citius, 'uolucriquefagittd,
Ad t err am fugit, Gf portu fe condidit
alto. jEn. V.
IN
* See alfo Spenfer** Fairy gueen, B.I. C. 3. St. 19.
C. 3. St. 39. C. 8. St. 9.
He hath his Shield redeem'd,
And forth his Sword he draws.
BOOK THE FIRST, 135
IN the fame manner he joins the fame C.VII.
two modifications of 'Time in the Paft, that
is to fay, the complete and perfeft Paft with
the extended and pajjing.
Inruerant Danai, & teftum omne
tenebant. JEn. II.
Tris imbris torti radios, tris nubis aquofa
Addiderant, rutuli tris ignis, & alitis
auftri.
Fulgores nunc terrificos, fenitumque me-
tumque
Mifcebant operi, flammifque fequacibus
iras (p). ^En.VIII.
As
(p] The Intention of Virgil may be better feen, in
rendering one or two of the above pafikges into Eng-
HJb.
-Tibijam bracbia contrahit ardens
Scorpios, & coeli jujld plus parte reliquit.
For tbee the Scorpion is NOW CONTRACTING his daw,
and HATH ALREADY LEFT tbee more than a juji por-
tion of Heaven. The Poet, from a high ftrain of poetic
adulation, fuppofes the Scorpion fo defirous of admitting
Augujlus among the heavenly figns, that though he has
already made him more than room enough, yet he Jlill
K 4 cm"
136 H E R M E S.
C.VII. As to the IMPERFECT UM, it is feme-
times employed to denote what is ujual
and cuftomary. Thusfurgebat andfcrtbe-
bat fignify not only, be WAS ri/ing, he
WAS writing, but upon occafion they fig-
nify, be USED to rij'e, he USED to write.
The reafon of this is, that whatever is
cuftomary, mufl be fomething which has
\$wn frequently repeated. But what has been
frequently repeated, muft needs require an
Ext en/ion of 'Time pa/1, and thus we fall iri-
fenfibly into the TENSE here mentioned.
AGAIN,
continues to be making him more. Here then we have
two A<ts, one perfeft, the other pending, and hence the
Ufe of the two different Tenfes. Some editions read
relinquit ; but reliquit has the authority of the celebrated
Medlcean manufcript.
Ilia noto fit/us, volucrique fagitta,
Ad terrain fugit, & portu fe condidit alto.
<TheJhip, quicker than the wind, or a fwift arrsiv, CON-
TINUES FLYING to land, and is HID within the lofty
harbour. We may fuppofe this Harbour, (like many
others) tp have been furrounded with high Land.
Hence the Vcfle), immediately on entering h, was com-
pletely hid from thofe Spectators, who had gone out to
fee
BOOK THE FIRST. 137
AGAIN, we are told by Pliny (whofe C.VIL
authority likewife is confirmed by many
Gems and Marbles ilill extant) that the
ancient Painters and Sculptors, when they
fixed their names to their works, did it
pendenti titulo, in a fufpenfive kind of In-
feription, and employed for that purpofe
the Tenfe here mentioned. 'Twas '
motet, Apelles faciebat,
w, Polycletusfaciebaty and never s
or fecit. By this they imagined that they
avoided the fhew of arrogance, and had in
cafe of cenfure an apology (as it were) pre-
pared, fince it appeared from the work it-
felf, that // was once indeed in hand, but no
pretenfion that it was ever JlniJJoed (q).
IT
fee the Ship- race, but yet mighty?/// continue falling to-
wards the fhore within.
Inruerant Danai^ b" teftum omne tenebant.
Tl)e Greeks HAD ENTERED, and WERE THEN POSSES-
SING the whole Houfe ; as much as to fay, they bad en-
ter ed^ and that was over, but their Poflcffion continuedjlill.
(q] Plln. Nat. Hi/I. L. I. The firft Printers (who
were moft of them Scholars and Critics) in imitation of
2 the
138 HERMES.
C. VII. IT is remarkable that the very manner,
in which the Latins derive thefe Tenfes
from one another, mews a plain reference
to the Syftem here advanced. From the
paffing Prefent come the patting Paft, and
Future. Scribo,Scribebam,Scribam. From
the perfect Prefent come the perfect Paft,
and Future. Scripji, Scripferam, Scrip-
fero. And fo in all inftances, even where
the Verbs are irregular, as from Fero come
Ferebam and Per am ; from Yu/i come Tu-
leram and Tulero.
WE fhall conclude by obferving, that
the ORDER of the Tenfes, as they ftand
ranged by the old Grammarians, is not a
fortuitous Order, but is conlbnant to our
Perceptions, in the recognition of Time,
according to what we have explained al-
ready
the antient Arttfts ufed the fame Tenfe. Excudebat H.
Strphanus. Excudebat GuiL Morelim. dbfohebat Joan,
Btntnaius, which has been followed by Dr. Taylor in hh
late valuable edition of Dtmsjlbcnes.
BOOK THE FIRST. 139
ready (r). Hence it is, that the Prefent C.VII.
enfe ftands firft ; then the Paft Tenfes ;
and laflly the Future.
AND now, having feen what authorities
there are for Aorifts, or thofe Tenfes,
which denote Time indefinitely -, and what
for thofe Tenfes, oppofed to Aorifts, which
mark it definitely ; (fuch as the Inceptive,
the Middle, and the Completive) we here
finim the fubject of TIME and TENSES, and
proceed to confider THE VERB IN OTHER
ATTRIBUTES, which 'twill be necefTary
to deduce from other Principles.
(r) See before p. 109, nc, in, 112, 113. Scali-
ger's obfervation upon this occafion is elegant.- 1 Or do
vutem (Temporum fcil.} al'tter /?, quam natura eorum.
Quod enim prater lit, prius /?, quam quod ejl, itaque pri-
mo loco debere poni videbatur. Verum^ quod primo quoque
tempore offertur nobis, id creat primas fpecies in animo :
quamobrem Prcsfens Tempus primum locum occupavit ; ejl
enim commune omnibus animalibus. Prtzteritum out em in
tanturri) qua memorid pradita funt. Futurum vero etiam
paucioribus, quippe quibus datum eft prudentia officium.
De Cauf. Ling. Lat. c, 1 1 3. See alfo Seneca Epijl.
124. Mutum animal fenfu comprebcndit prafentia ; prte-
t &c.
CHAP.
i 4 o HERMES.
CHAP. VIII.
Concerning Modes.
C.VIII. TT TE have obferved already (a) that
V V the Soul's leading Powers are thofe
of Perception and thofe of Volition, which
words we have taken in their mofr. com-
prehenfive acceptation. We have obferved
alfo, that all Speech or Difceurfe is a pub-
lijhing or exhibiting fome part of our Soul,
either a certain Perception, or a certain
Volition. Hence then, according as we
exhibit it either in a different part, or af-
ter a different manner, hence I fay the va-
riety of MODES or MOODS (b\.
IF
(a] Sec Chapter II.
(b] Gaza defines a Mode exactly confonant to this
doctrine. He fays it is fizhypu, 'uT xv traSii/xa
xJ^/t'iVi <na y>v*j ni/uaua/ACv?! a Petition or Affelion
of the Soul, fignified through fome Voice, or Sound articu-
late. Gram. L. IV. As therefore this is the nature of
Modes, and Modes belong to V r erbs, hence 'tis dpollo-
nius
BOOK THE FIRST. 141
IF we fimply declare, or indicate fome- C.VIIL
thing to be, or not to be, (whether a Per-
ception or Volition, 'tis equally the fame)
this conftitutes that Mode called the DE-
CLARATIVE or INDICATIVE.
A Perception.
Nosco crinis> incanaque menta
Regis Romanl - Virg. ^En. VI.
A Volition.
In nova PERT ANIMUS mutatas die ere
formas
Corpora Ovid. Metam. I.
IF we do not ftrictly affert, as of fome-
thing abfolute and certain, but as of fome-
thing poffible only, and in the number of
Con-
nius obferves tol? pi^uww (
"X^y.?! (fiafifo-ic the Soul's Difpofitisn is in an eminent de-
gree attached to Verbs. De $ynt. L. III. c. 1 3. Thus
too Prifcian : Modi funt diverfie INCLINATIONES
AN i MI, quas varia confequitur DEC LIN* AT jo
L. via. P . 821.
i 4 2 HERMES.
C.VIII. Contingents, this makes that Mode, which
Grammarians call the POTENTIAL ; and
which becomes on fuch occafions the lead-
ing Mode of the Sentence.
Sed tacit us pafciji poffet Corvus, HA-
BERET
Plus dapisy &c. Mor.
YET fometimes 'tis not the leading
Mode, but only fubjoined to the Indica-
tive. In fuch cafe, it is moftly ufed to
denote the End, or final Caufe -, which
End, as in human Life it is always a Con-
tingent, and may never perhaps happen
in defpite of all our Forefight, is there-
fore expreft moft naturally by the Mode
here mentioned. For example,
Uf JUGULENT homines, fur gunt de nofte
latroncs. HOR.
Tbieves rife by night, that they may cut
tnens throats.
HERE
BOOK THE FIRST. 143
HERE that they rife, ispojitfoefy offer ted C.VIII.
in the Declarative or Indicative Mode ; but
as to their cutting mens throats, this is only
delivered potentially, becaufe how truly fo-
ever it may be the End of their fifing, it is
fKllbut ^Contingent ; ,that may never perhaps
happen. This Mode, as often as it is in this
manner fubjoined,is called byGrammarians
not the Potential, but THE SUBJUNCTIVE.
BUT it fb happens, in the Conftitution
of human affairs, that it is not always fuffi-
cient merely to declare ourfelves to Others.
We find it often expedient, from a con-
fcioufnefs of our Inability, to addrefs them
after a manner more interefting to our-
felves, whether to hzvefome Perception in-
formed, or fome Volition gratified. Hence
then new Modes of fpeaking ; if we inter-
rogate, 'tis the INTERROGATIVE MODE >
if we require, 'tis the REQUISITIVE. Even
the Requifitive itfelf hath its fubordinate
Species : With refpeft to inferiors, 'tis
an IMPERATIVE MODE with refpedtto
2 equals
144 HERMES.
C.VIII. equals and fuperiors, 'tis a PRECATIVE or
OPTATIVE*,
AND thus have we eftablifhed a variety
of Modes; the INDICATIVE or DECLARA-
TIVE, to affert what we think certain ; the
POTENT i AL,for the Purpofes of whatever
we think Contingent, THE INTERROGA-
TIVE, when we are doubtful y to procure us
Information; and THE REQ^JISITIVE, to
ajjijl us in the gratification of our Volitions.
The Requifitive too appears under two
diflinft Species, either as 'tis IMPERA-
TIVE to inferiors, or PRECATIVE to fu-
periors (c].
As
* It was the confounding of this Diftinction, that
gave rife to a Sophifm of Protagoras. Homer (fays he)
in beginning his Iliad with Sing, Mufe, the Wrath,
when he thinks to pray, in reality commands, "'jyjt-
crOai olou.fvoc 9 IzrrraVta. Ariftot. Poet. c. 19. The
Solution is evident from the Divifion here eflablifhed,
the Grammatical Form being in both cafes the fame.
(c) The Species of Modes in great meafure depend
on the Species of Sentences. The Stoics increafed the
number of Sentences far beyond the Peripatetics, Be-
fides thofe mentioned in Chapter II. Note (/>) they had
many
BOOJC THE FIRST. 145
As therefore all thefe feveral Modes C. VIII.
have their foundation in nature, fo have
certain
many more, as may be feen in Ammtmius de Interpret.
p. 4. and Diogenes Laertius, L. VII. 66. The Peri-
patetics (and it feems too with reafon) confidered all
thefe additional Sentences as included within thofe,
which they themfelves acknowleged, and which they
made to be five in number, the Vocative, the Impera-
tive, the Interrogative, the Precative, and the Aflertive.
There is no mention of a Potential Sentence, which may
be fuppofed to co-incide with the Aflertive, or Indica-
tive. The Vocative (which the Peripatetics called the
but the Stoics more properly srooraj/o-
was nothing more than the Form of Addrefs
in point of names, titles, and epithets, with which we
apply ourfelves one to another. As therefore it feldom
included any Verb within it, it could hardly contribute
to form a verbal Mode. Ammcnius and Boethius, the
one a Greek Peripatetic, the other a Latln^ have illu-
ftrated the Species of Sentences from Homer and Virgil,
after the following manner.
T* Ao>w/7s usu-j, T re KAHTIKOT", w? ,
*n
rS nPOSTAKTlKOlf, ; T\
HERMES.
C.VIII. certain marks or flgns of them been Intro-
duced into Languages, that we may be
enabled
T? 'EPHTHMATIKOT", u? TO,
TV?, nro0y j? a'vJflwu j
j T 'ETKTIKOT", utT$ 9
* j T TZTKTfp -
i AnO$ANTIKOT*', xaS' ou
(fix.ivoy.sQz, Uf^l OTOUSU TWV s
- 0foi J 1 / re zzrayra
o?, &C. El? TO srfpi 'E^. p. 4.
Boetbius's Account is as follows. Perfeftarum vero
Orationum paries qulnque funt : DEPRECATIVA, /,
Jupiter omnipotent, precibusfi fefleris ullis,
Da dcinde auxilium, Pater, atque hac ominafrma.
IMPERATIVA, ut 9
Vade age, Nate, vyca Zephyros, ^3* iabere pennis.
INTERROGATIVA, ut,
Die mihi, Damcsta, cujum pecus ?
\*OCATIVA, ftf,
O I Pater, O ! bominum rerumque aterna poteftas.
ENUNTIATIVA, in qua Veritas vel Falfitas invenitur, ut,
Prindpio arborilus varia ejl natura creand'n.
Boeth. in Lib. dc Interp. p. 291.
In
BOOK THE FIRST. 147
enable by our difcourfe to fignify them, C.VIII.
one to another. And hence thofe various
MODES or MOODS, of which we find in
common Grammars fo prolix a detail, and
which are in fact no more than " fo many
" literal Forms, intended to exprefs thefe
" natural Diftindtions" (d).
ALL
In Milton the fame Sentences may be found, as fol-
lows. THE PRECATIVE,
Univerfal Lord ! be bounteous foil
To give us nought but Good
THE IMPERATIVE,
Go then, Thou migbtiefl, in thy Father's might.
THE INTERROGATIVE,
Whence, and what art thou, execrable Shape ?
THE VOCATIVE,
Adam, earth's hallow* d Mold,
Of God infpir'd
THE ASSERTIVE OR ENUNTIATIVE,
The conquer' d alfo and enjlav'dby "war
Shall, with their freedom hjl, all virtue loje,
(d) The Greek Language, which is of all the moft
elegant and complete, exprefles thefe feveral Modes,
L 2 2nd
148 HERMES.
C.VIII. ALL thefe MODES have this in com-
mon, that they exhibit fome way or other
the
and all diftin&ions of Time likewife, by an adequate
number of Variations in each particular Verb. Thefe
Variations may be found, fome at the beginning of the
Verb, others at its ending, and confift for the moft part
cither in multiplying or diminijbing the number of Sylla-
bles, or elfo in lengthening or Jhortenlng their refpe&ive
Quantities, which two methods are called by Gram-
marians the Syllabic and the Temporal. The Latin,
which is but a Species of Greek fomewhat debafed, ad-
mits in like manner a large portion of thofe Variations,
which are chiefly to be found at the Ending of its Verbs,
and but rarely at their Beginning. Yet in its Depo-
nents and Paffives 'tis fo far defective, as to be forced to
have recourfe to the Auxiliar,fum. The modern Lan-
guages, which have ftill fewer of thofe Variations, have
been neceflitated all of them to aflume two Auxiliars
at leaft, that is to fay, thofe which exprefs in each Lan-
guage the Verbs, Have, and Am. As to the Englljh
Tongue, it is fo poor in this refpect, as to admit no
Variation for Modes, and only one for Time, which
we apply to exprefs an Aorift of the Part. Thus from
Write cometh Wrote ; from Give, Gave ; from Speak,
Spake, &c. Hence to exprefs Time, and Modes, we
are compelled to employ no lefs than feven Auxiliars,
viz. Do, Am, Have, Shall, Will, May and Can ; which
we ufe fometimes fingly, as when we fay, I am writ-
ing,
BOOK THE FIRST. 1 49
the SOUL and its AFFECTIONS. Their CVIII.
Peculiarities and Diftindtions are in part,
as follows.
THE REQJLJISITIVE and INTERROGA-
TIVE MODES are diftinguifhed from the
Indicative and. Potent ial> that whereas thefe
loft feldom want a Return, to the two for-
mer it is always necejary.
IF we compare THE REQUISITIVE
MODE with THE INTERROGATIVE, we
{hall find thefe alfo difiinguimed, and that
not only in the Return, but in other Pe-
culiarities.
To
ing, I have written ; fometimes two together, as, I
have been writing, I Jhotdd have written ; fometimes HO
lefs than three, as I might have been loft, he could have
been preferved. But for thefe, and all other Specula-
tions, relative to the Genius of the Englijh Language,
we refer the Reader, who wifhes for the moft authen-
tic information, to that excellent Treatife of the learned
Dr. Lovjtke, intitled, A ftiort Introduction to E-nglijl
Grammar.
HERMES.
C.VJII. The Return to the Requi/itive is fome-
times made in Words, Jbmetimes in Deeds.
To the Requeft of Dido to Eneas
a prima die, hofpes, origine nobis
Injidias Danaum
the proper Return was in Words, that is,
in an hiftorical Narrative. To the Requeft
of the unfortunate Chief date obohtm
Belifario the proper Return was in a
Deed, that is, in a charitable Relief. But
with refpec~l to the Interrogative, the Re-
turn is necejfarily made in Words alone, in
Words, which are called a Refponfe or An-
fwer, and which are always actually or
by implication fome definitive affertive
Sentence. Take Examples. Whofe Verfes
are thefe? the Return is a Sentence
T^heje are Verfes of Homer. Was Brutus
a worthy Man ? the Return is a Sen-
tence Brutus was a worthy Man.
AND hence (if we may be per-
mitted to digrefs ) we may perceive
,
2 the
BOOK THE FIRST. 151
the near affinity of this Interrogative Mode CVIII.
with the Indicative, in which laft its Re-
iponfe or Return is moftly made. So near
indeed is this Affinity, that in thefe two
Modes alone the Verb retains the fame
Form (e), nor are they otherwife diflin-
guimed, than either by the Addition or
Abfence of fome fmall Particle, or by fome
minute change in the collocation of the
Words, or fometimes only by a change in
the Tone, or Accent (/*).
BUT
x<xr!p#<nv
C^t'pft tf( TO M/a; o^r>t>f. The Indicative Mode, of
which we fpeak^ by laying afide that Ajjertlon^ which by
its nature it implies, quits the name of Indicative when it
rtaj/umes the AJJertion^ it returns again to its proper Cha-
racter. Apoll. de Synt. L. III. c. 21. Theodore G^za
fays the fame, Introd. Gram, L. IV.
(f) It may be obferved of the INTERROGATIVE,
that as often as the Interrogation is Jimple and definite^
the Refponfe may be made in almoft the fame Words,
L 4 by
152 H E R M E S.
CVIII. BUT to return to our comparifon be
tween the Interrogative Mode and the Re
THE
by converting them into a fcritence affirmative or nega-
tive, according as the Truth is either one or the other.
For example Are thefe Ferfes of Homer ? Refponfe
Thefe Ferfes are of Homer. Are tbofe Ferfes of Virgil ?
Refponfe Thofe are not Ferfes of Virgil. And here
the Artifts of Language, for the fake of brevity and
difpatch, have provided two Particles, to reprefent all
fuch Refponfes, YES, for all the affirmative} No, for
all the negative.
But when the Interrogation is complex, as when we
fay Are thefe Ferfes of Homer, or of Virgil ? much
more, when it is indefinite, as when we fay in general
Whofe are thefe Ferfes ? we cannot then refpond
after the manner above mentioned. The Reafon is,
that no Interrogation can be anfwered by a fimple Tes y
or a fimple No, except only thofe, which are themfelves
fo fimple, as of two pollible Anfwers to admit only one.
Now the leaft complex Interrogation will admit of four
Anfwers, two affirmative, two negative, if not perhaps
of more. The reafon is, a complex Interrogation can-
not confift of lefs than two fimple ones ; each of which
may be feparately affirmed and feparately denied. For
inftance
BOOK TH^FIRS T. 153
THE INTERROGATIVE (in the Ian- C. VIII.
guage of Grammarians) has all Perfons
of
inftance Are thefe Verfes Homer's, or Virgil's? (i.)
They are Homer's (2.) They are not Homer's (3.)
They are Virgil's (4.) They are not Virgih we may
add, (5.) They are of neither. The indefinite Interro-
gations go ftill farther j for thefe may be anfwered by
infinite affirmatives, and infinite negatives. For in-
ftance Whofe are thefe Verfa ? We may anfwer affir-
matively They are Virgil's, They are Horace's, They
are Ovid's, &c, or negatively They are not Virgil's,
They are not Horace's, They are not Ovid's, and fo on,
cither way to infinity. How then fhould we learn from
a fingle Yes, or a fingle No t which particular is meant
among infinite Poffibles ? Thefe therefore are Interro-
gations which muft be always anfwered by a Sentence.
Yet even here Cuftom hath confulted for Brevity, by
returning for Anfwer only \htfingle ejfential charatterijlic
Word> and retrenching by an Ellipfis all the reft, which
reft the Interrogator is left to fupply from himfelf.
Thus when we are afked How many right angles equal
the angles of a triangle ? we anfwer in the fhort mo-
nofyllable, Two whereas, without the Ellipfis, the
anfwer would have been Two right angles equal the
angles of a triangle*
The
154 H E a M E S.
C.VIII. of both Numbers. The REQUISITIVE
or IMPERATIVE has no firft Perfon of
the fmgular, and that from this plain
reafon, that 'tis equally abfurd in Modes
for a perfon to requeft or give commands
to bimfrlfj as it is in Pronouns, for the
Speaker to become the fubjett of his own
addrefs *.
AGAIN, we may interrogate as to all
'Times, both Prefent, Paft, and Future.
Who WAS Founder of Rome ? Who is
&/? ^ China ? Who WILL DISCOVER
the Longitude ? But Intreating and Com-
manding (which are the EfTen.ce of the
Re-
The Antients diftinguifhed thefe two Species of In-
terrogation by different names. The fimple they called
'fioiT^a, Interrogatlo j the complex, -sruV^ta, Percon-
tatio. Ammonius calls the firft of thefe 'E^COTTJTIJ <Ja-
\t*[rt& ; the other, 'E^wrrxn; zruir^aTJXJj. See Am.
in Lib. de Interpr. p. 160, Diog. Laert. VII. 66.
/. //?. IX. 2.
* Sup. p. 74, 75.
BOOK THS FIRST. 155
Requijitive Mode) have a neceflary re- CVIIF.
fpeft to the future (g) only. For indeed
what
(g) dpellonius's Account of the Future, implied in
ill Imperatives, is worth obferving. 'E?n y<*$ ^ y\-
TW n' nPOSTAHIS* T* ^ a
i, MEAAONTO'2 to. A COMMAND
w re/pffl to thofe things which either are not doing^ or
have not yet been done. But thofe things, which being not
now doing, or having not yet been done, have a natural
aptitude to exifl hereafter, may be properly faid to apper-
tain to THE FUTURE, DeSyntaxi, L.I. 0.36. Soon
before this he fays "ATTOIVTX rx, crpor'ajclixa i
TO, 'O TTEANNOKTONH2A2 TIMA20I2,
TW , TIMH0HIETAI, xara T w ^oi/a
v. All IMPERATIVES ^w ^2 difpofjtion within
them, which refpetfs THE FUTURE with regard there-
fore to TIME, 'tis the fame thing to fay, LET HIM,
THAT KILLS A TYRANT, BE HONOURED, or, HE,
THAT KILLS ONE, SHALL BE HONOURED j the dif-
ference being only in the Mode, in as much as one is IM-
PERATIVE, the ether INDICATIVE or Declarative.
Apoll. de Syntaxi, L. I. c. 35. Prifcian feems to al-
low Imperatives a (hare of Prefent Time, as well as
future. But if we attend, we fhall find his Prefent to
be
156 HERMES.
C.VIIL what have they to do with the prefent or
the paft, the natures of which are im-
mutable and neceflary ?
'Tis
be nothing elfe than an immediate Future^ as oppofed to
a more diftant one. Imperathus vero Pr&fem & Futu-
rum \fTempus] natural: quddam neccjjitate videtur poj/e
accipere. Ea etenim imperamus, qua vel in prafenti Jiu-
titn volumus fieri fine aliqud dilatione, velinfuturo. Lib.
VIII. p. 8c6. '
'Tis true the Greeks in their Imperatives admit cer-
tain Tenfes of the Paft, fuch as thofe of the Perfefiuni)
and of the two Aorijls. But then thefe Tenfes, when
fo applied, either totally lofe their temporary Character,
or elfe are ufed to infmuate fuch a Speed of execution^
that the deed fhould be (as it were) done t in the very
inftant when commanded. The fame difference feems
to fubfift between our Englijh Imperative, BE GONE,
and thofe others of, Go, or BE GOING. The firft (if
we pleafe) may be (tiled the Imperative of the Perfettum^
as calling in the very inftant for the completion of our
Commands ; the others may be ftiled Imperatives of tht
Future, as allowing a reafonable time to begin firft, and
finifh afterward*
'Tis thus ApolloniuS) in the Chapter firft cited, diftin-
guiflies between (rxaTrl/rw T? a'/ATrjAac;, Go to digging
the Vincs^ and (rxa^rw ra? ,u7rA?, Get the Vines
3 dug.
BOOK THE FIRST. 157
*Tis from this connexion of Futurity C-VIII.
with Commands, that the Future Indica-
tive is fome times ufed for the Imperative,
and that to fay to any one, You SHALL
DO THIS, has often the fame Force with
the Imperative, Do THIS. So in the
Decalogue THOU SHALT NOT KILL
THOU SHALT NOT BEAR FALSE
WITNESS
dug. The firft is fpoken (as he calls it) ' ?
ly way of Extenfan, or allowance of Time for the work ',
the fecond, tlf <nimA<wony, with a view to immediate
Completion. And in another place, explaining the dif-
ference between the fame Tenfes, Sxaiirle and
he fays of the laft, povov TO py /fvo pevov
AX, x, ro juvouewv iv votfceraptt obwQ>t*iori, that it
not only commands fomttbing, which has not been yet done,
but forbids alfo that, which is now doing in an Extenfan,
that is to fay, in a flow and lengthened progrefs. Hence,
if a man has been a long while writing, and we are wil-
ling to haften him, 'twould be wrong to fay in Greek,
TPA'$E, WRITE (for that he is now, and has been
long doing) but TPA'^ON, GET YOUR WRITING
DONE; MAKE NO DELAYS. See Apoll. L. III. .24.
See alfo Macrobius de Dlff. Verb. Grac. iff Lot. p. 68c.
Edit, Parlor, Latini non ajlimaverunt, &c.
158 HERMES.
C. VIII. WITNESS which denote (we know)
the ftri&eft and moft authoritative Com-
mands.
As to the POTENTIAL MODE, it is
diftinguifhed from all the reft, by itsfub-
ordinate or Jtyfun&rve Nature. It is alfo
farther diftinguifhed from the "Reqtiifttfoe
and Interrogative, by implying a kind of
feeble and weak Ajfcrtwn, and fo becom-
ing in fome degree fufceptible of Truth
and Falmood. Thus, if it be faid po-
tentially, This may be, or, 'This might
have been, we may remark without ab-
furdity, yf Tis true, or 'fisfalfe. But if it
be faid, Do this, meaning, Fly to Hea-
ven, or, Can this be done? meaning, to
fquare the Circle, we cannot fay in either
cafe, 'tis true or 'tis falfe, though the
Command and the Queflion are about
things impoffible. Yet jflill the Potential
does not afpire to the Indicative, becaufe
it implies but a ditHous and conjectural
Aflertion,
BOOK THE FIRST.
Aflertion, whereas that of the Indicative C-VIIL
is abfolute, and without referve.
THIS therefore (the INDICATIVE 1
mean) is the Mode, which, as in all Gram-
mars 'tis the firft in order, fo is truly
firft both in Dignity and Ufe. 'Tis this,
which publifhes our fublimefl Percep-
tions 5 which exhibits the Soul in her
pureft Energies, fuperior to the Imper-
fection of Deilres and Wants j which in-
cludes the whole of Time, and its mi-
nuteft Distinctions ; which, in its various
Paji Tenfes, is employed by Hiftory, to
preferve to us the Remembrance of for-
mer Events; in its Futures is ufed by
Prophecy, or (in default of this) by wife
Forefight, to inftruct and forewarn us, as
to that which is coming ; but above all
in its Prefent Tenfe ferves Philofophy
and the Sciences, by juft Demonftra-
tions to eftablifh ntceffary Truth-, THAT
TRUTH, whichf from its nature only ex-
160 H E R M E S.
C.VIIL ijls in the Prefent -, which knows no di-
ftindtions either of Paft or of Future,
but is every where and always invariably
one ().
THROUGH
(h) See the quotation, Note (<), Chapter the Sixth.
Cum enim dicimus y DEUS EST, non eum didmus nunc
&c.
Bsetbius, author of the fentiment there quoted, was
by birth a Raman of the firft quality ; by religion, a
Chriftian ; and by philofophy, a Platonic and Peripate-
tic } which two Setts, as they fprang from the fame
Source, were in the latter ages of antiquity commonly
adopted by the fame Perfons, fuch as Tliemijlius^ Por-
phyry, Iamb!ichus t Ammonlus^ and others. There were
no Se&s of Philofophy, that lay greater Strefs on the
diftin&ion between things exifling in Time and not in
Time, than the two -above-mentioned. The Doctrine
of the Peripatetics on this Subject (fmce 'tis thefe that
Boethius here follows) may be partly underftood from
the following Sketch.
THE THINGS, THAT EXIST IN TIME, are
" thofe whofe Exijhnce Time can meafure. But if their
" Exiftence may be meafured by Time, then there
" may be aflumed a Time greater than the Exiftence
*' of any one of them, as there may be afiumed a
** number greater than the greateft multitude, that is
<* capable
BOOK THE FIRST. 161
THROUGH all the above Modes, with C.VIII.
their refpe&ive Tenfes, the Verb being
con-
" capable of being numbred. And hence 'tis that
* e things temporary have their Exiftence, as it were //-
' mited by Time ; that they are confined within it, as
** within fome bound j and that in fome degree or other
*' they all fubm'it to its power t according to thofe com-
" mon Phrafes, that Time is a dejlroyer; that things
" decay through Time ; that men forget in Time, and lofe
*' their abilities, and feldom that they improve, or grow
<c young, or beautiful. The truth indeed is, Time al-
" "Ways attends Motion. Now the natural effect of M<j-
" tion is to put fsmething, which now is t out of that
" Jiate, in ivhich it now is, and fo far therefore to de-
" ftroy that State.
" The reverfeof all this holds with THINGS THAT
<' EXIST ETERNALLYi Thefe exift not in Time, be-
<c caufe Time is fo far from being able to meafure their
" Exiftence, that no Time can be ajjumed, which their
" ExiJJence doth not furpafs. To which we may add,
" that they feel none of its ejfefts^ being no way ob-
" noxious either to damage or diflblution.
" To inftance in examples of either kind of Being,
" There are fuch things at this inftant, as Stonehenge
tc and the Pyramids, 'Tis likewife true at this inftant,
" that the Diameter of toe Square is incommenfurable
" ivith its fide. What then Ihall we fay ? Was there
M " ev^r
162 HERMES.
C.VIII. confidered as denoting an ATTRIBUTE,
has always reference to fome Perfon, or
SUBSTANCE. Thus if we fay, Went y or 9
Go, or Whither goeth, or, Might have gone,
we muft add a Perfon or Subftance, to
make the Sentence complete. Cicero
'went ; Caefar might have gone ; whither
goeth the Wind? Go! Thou Traitor! But
there is a Mode or Form, under which
Verbs fometimes appear, where they have
no reference at all to Perfons or Sub-
fiances. For example To eat is pleafant ',
but
< c ever a Time, when it was not incommenfurable, as
" 'tis certain there was a Time, when there was no
*< Stonehenge, or Pyramids ? or is it daily growing lefs
<c incommcnjurable^ as we are aflured of Decays in both
" thofe mafly Structures ?" From thefe unchangeable
Truths, we may pafs to their Place, or Region ; to the
imceafing Intellection of the univerfal Mind, ever perfect,
ever full, knowing no remiffions, languors, &c. See Nat.
Jufe L. IV. c. 19. Metaph. L. XIV. c. 6, 7, 8, 9,
10. Edit. Du Val. and Vol.1, p. 262. Note VII.
The following Paflage may deferve Attention.
Tou yp No? 5 f*f mli tvtyvxtn, xj f*ij vow' o Jt x^ tr/pfXf,
icj fosT. aX/\* xj ofTOf OVTTU rt^io;, v f*>j orfoo'6^ elvra TO xj
osr s, xj oaVriz o-Jv, cj fi-/j aXAsrt XX. wre i" ikTiX/ra-
TOJ o oo;y e', xj tsdvriz, xj i'a. Max. Tyr. Di/T. XVII.
p. 201. Ed. Lond.
BOOK THE FIRST. 163
but to f aft is wbolefome. Here the Verbs, To C.VIII.
eat) and, To faft y ftand alone by them-
felves* nor is it requifite or even pradlica-
ble to prefix a Perfon or Subftance. Hence
the Latin and modern Grammarians have
called Verbs under this Mode, from this
their indefinite nature, INFINITIVES.
Santtius has given them the name of Im-
perfonah -, and the Greeks that of 'ATra^ep-
<para. from the fame reafon of their not
dijcovering either Perfon or Number.
THESE INFINITIVES go farther. They
not only lay afide the character of Attribu-
fives, but they alfo afTume that of Sub/Ian-
//?w,and as fuch themfelves become diftin-
guimed with their feveral Attributes. Thus
in the inftance above, Pleafant is the At-
tribute, attending the Infinitive, To Eat;-
Wholefome the attribute attending the In-
finitive, To Fafl. Examples in Greek and
Latin of like kind are innumerable.
Dulce & decorum eft pro patria MORI.
&CIRE tuum nibil eft
M 2 'O
164 HERMES.
C.VIII. Ou xurQave'iit yap Setvov, XX*
.
THE Stoics in their grammatical inqui-
ries had this Infinitive in fuch efteem, that
they
(;') 'Tis from the INFINITIVE thus participating the
nature of a Noun or Subftantive, that the beft Gram-
marians have called it fometimes 'Oi/o ( u p'^aTiXov,
A VERBAL NOUN; fometimes"Ovo i ua p^arc?, THE
VERB'S NOUN. The Reafon of this Appellation is in
Greek more evident, from its taking the prepofitive Ar-
ticle before it in all cafes j TO j^a^m, ra ^a>m,
T ypxnv. The fame conftru&ion is not unkndwn
in Englijh.
Thus Spgnccr,
For tiot to have been dipt in Lethe lake 4
Could fave the Son ofThetls FROM to DIE
aVo T Savelv. In like manner we fay, He did it, tt>
le rich, where we muft fupply by an Ellipfis the Prepo-
fition, FOR. He did it, for to be rich, the fame as if
we had faid, He did it for gain mxa ra zrATn>,
&xa TB xf'p&f in French, pour Jenricher. Even
when v/e fpeak fuch Sentences, as the following, /
cboofe TO PHILOSOPHIZE, ratkr than TO BE RICH,
TO >Xo<7<4>fv |3aAo ( u,ai, ^Trsp TO zrXyri'iv, the Infini-
tives are in nature as much Accufatives, as if we were
to fay, I ckoofe PHILOSOPHY rather than RICHES, rr,
BOOK THE FIRST.
they held this alone to be the genuine CVIIL
PHMA or VERB, a name, which they
denied to all the other Modes. Their rea-
foning was, they confiderefl the true ver-
bal character to be contained fimple and
unmixed in the Infinitive only. Thus the
Infinitives, Tbwxafiwi Ambulare, To walk,
meanjimpfy that Energy, and nothing more.
The other Modes, befides exprefiing this
Energy, fupcradd certain Affettions^ which
refpect Perfons and Circumftances. Thus
Ambulo and Ambula mean not firnply To
Ik 9 but mean, I walk, and, Walk Tbou.
M 3 And
v f&AfpMN, *j7r*p TO X I uj-Aarcy. Thus too
Prifeian, fpeaking of Infinitives CURRERE enlm eft
CURSUSJ & SCJUBERE, ScRIPTURA ; yLfiGERE,
LECTIO. Jtaque frequenter y Nominilus adjunguntitr,
& aliis cafualibus y more Nominum j ut Perjiu! t
Sfd pukrum ejl digits monftrari^ & dicier, hie ejl.
And foon after Cum enlm dico, BONUM EST LE-
OERE, nikil aliud fignifico, niji, BON A EST LECTIO.
Jv. XVIII. p. 1130. See alfo Apoll. L. I. c. 8. Gaza
Gram. L. IV. To
TOf X. T. A.
j66 HERMES.
p.VlIL And hence they are all of them refolvable
into the Infinitive, as their Prototype, toge^
ther wiihfome Sentence or Word, expreffive
of their proper Character, Ambitlo, I walk-,
that is, Indico me ambulare, I declare myfelf
towalk. Ambula^ WalkThou-, lh&tis,Impero
te ambulare, I command thee to 'walk ; and
fo with the Modes of every other Species,
Take away therefore the Affertion, the Com-
mand, or whatever elfe gives a Character
to any one of thefe Modes, and there re-
mains nothing more than THE MERE IN-
FINITIVE, which (as Prifcian fays)Jignifi-
cat Jpfam rem, quam continet Verbum (/),
THE
(,) See Apdlon. L. III. 13.
etTro TJVOJ x. T. A. See alfo Gaza, in the note
before. Igitur a ConJlruEliane quoque Vim rei Verborum
(tale/}, Nominis, quad fignificat jpfcm ran) habere IN-
?INITIVUM paj/umus dignofcere j res autem in Perfonas
diftributa^f/V alios verbi motus. Itaque omnes modi
in hunc, ideft^ Jnfinitivum, tranfumuntur five refolvun-
tur. Prifc. L. XVIII. p. 1131. From thefe Princi-
ples dpollontus calls the Infinitive 'P? ( ua
2nd Prifcian, Verbum gencrale.
BOOK THE FIRST. 167
THE Application of this Infinitive is C.VIU.
fomewhat fingular. It naturally coalefces
with all thofe Verbs, that denote any en-
dence, Defire, or Volition of the Soul, but
not readily with others. Thus 'tis Senfe
as well as Syntax, to fay fixXopai yv, Cu-
pio vivere, I dejlre to live-, but not to fay
'E<r9tu yv, Edo vtvere, or even in Eng-
lijh, I eat to five, unlefs by an Ellipfis,
inftead of, / eat for to tive; as we fay
evKu TV "tjiv, or pour vivre. The Rea-
fon is, that though different Affions may
unite in the fame Subjeft, and therefore
be coupled together (as when we fay, He
'walked and difcourfed} yet the Actions
notwithftanding remain feparate and di-
ftincl. But 'tis not fo with refpect to
Volitions, and Aftlons. Here the Coalef-
cence is often fo intimate, that the Voli-
tion is unintelligible, till the Affiion be
expreft. Cuplo, Volo, Dejidero I defire,
1 am willing, I want What ? The fen-
tences, we fee, are defective and imperfect.
M 4 We
HERMES.
C.V1II. We muft help them then by Infinitives,
which exprefs the proper Actions to which
they tend. Cupio legere, Volo difcere, De-
Jidero vidffe, I defire to read, I am willing
to Ifae, I 'want to fee. Thus is the whole
rendered complete, as well in Sentiment,
as in Syntax (/),
AND fo much for MODES, and their fe-
veral SPECIES. Were we to attempt to
denominate them according to their moft
eminent Characters, it may be done in the
following manner. As every neceflary
Truth, and every demonftrative Syllogifm
(which laft is no more than a Combina-
tion of fuch Truths) mufl always be ex-
prefl under poiitive AiTertions, and as po-
fitive
(/) Prifcian calls thefe Verbs, whirh naturally pre-
cede Infinitives, Verba Voluntatha ; they are called in
Greek FboaisETixa. See L. XVIII. 1129. but more
particulaily fee Jpollonius, L. III. c. 13. where this
whole dodrine is explained with great Accuracy. See
nlfo Macrabius de Dif. Verb. Gr. & L0t. p. 685. Ed.
Var.
*Nec orr.ne f*W/A$arff cuicunque Verbo, &c.
> x
BOOK THE FIRST. IP9
{Ltive Affertions only belong to the Indi- G.VIII.
fative, we may denominate it for that rea-
fon the MODE OF SCIENCE (m). Again,
as the Potential is only converfant about
Contingents, of which we cannot fay with
certainty that they will happen or not, we
may call this Mode, THE MODE OF CON-
JECTURE. Again, as thofe that are ig-
norant and would be informed, mufl aik
of thofe {hat already know, this being the
natural way of becoming Proficients-, hence
we may call the Interrogative, THE MODE
OF PROFICIENCY.
Inter cuntta leges, & PERCONTABERE
dottos,
Qua ratione queas traducere Jenifer avum,
Quid pure tranquil let, &c. Hor.
Farther flill, as the higheft and moft ex-
cellent ufe of the Requi/itive Mode is le-
giilativc
(02) Ob nobilitatem praivit INDICATIVES, felus Mo-
dus aptus Scientiis, folm Pater Veritatis. Seal, cle Cauf.
3L. Lat. c, 1 16. 3
i 7 o HERMES.
C.VIII. giflative Command, we may flile it for this
reafon THEMODE OF LEGISLATURE. Ad
Dhos adeunto cafle> fays Cicero in the cha-
radter of a Roman law-giver ; Be it there-
fore enattedy fay the Laws of England, and
in the fame Mode fpeak the Laws of every
other nation. 'Tis alfo in this Mode that
the Geometrician, with the authority of a
Legiflator, orders lines to be bifefted, and
circles defcribed, as preparatives to that
Science, which he is about to eftabliih.
THERE are other fuppofed Affections of
-Verbs, fuch as Number and Perfon. But
thefe furely cannot be called a part of
their Eflence, nor indeed are they the
EfTence of any other Attribute, being in
fact the Properties, not of Attributes, but
of Subftances. The moft that can be
faid, is, that Verbs in the more elegant
Languages are provided with certain Ter-
minations, which refpect the Number and
Perfon of every Subjlantivey that we may
2 know
BOOK THE FIRST. 171
know with more precifion. in a complex C.VIII.
Sentence, each particular Subftance, with
its attendant verbal Attributes. The fame
may be faid of Sex, with refpect to Ad-
jectives. They have Terminations which
vary, as they refpect Beings male or fe-
male, tho' Subftance s paft difpute are alone
fufceptible of fex (). We therefore pafs
over thefe matters, and all of like kind,
as
() 'Tis fomewhat extraordinary, that fo acute and
rational a Grammarian as Sanflius, fliould juftly deny
Genders, or the diftinction of Sex to Adjeftives, and yet
make Perfons appertain, not to Suifiantivcs, but to Verbs.
His commentator Perizonius is much more confident,
vr ho fays At veroji rem refte confident) ipfa Nominibus
& Pronominibus vel maxime y inio unite inejl ipfa Pcrfo-
na ; & Verba fs habent in Perfonarum ration ud Nomina
plane ficuti Adjeftiva in ratione Generum ad Subjlantiva^
quibus foils autor (Sanclius fcil. L. I. c. 7.) &f refe Ge~
nus adfcribit, eydujis Adjetti'vis. Sancl. Minerv. L. I,
c. j 2. There is indeed an exaft Analogy between the
Accidents of Sex and Perfon. There are but two Sexes^
that is to fay, the Male and the Female ; and but two.
Perfons (or Characters efTential to difcourfe) that is to
fay, the Speaker, and the Party addreft. The third
Sex and third Perfon are improperly fo called, being in
fact but Negations of the other two,
I 7 2 H E -R M E S.
C.VIII as being rather among the Elegancies, than
the ElTentials of Language, which Eflen-
tials are the Subject of our prefent Inquiry.
The .principal of thefe now remaining is
THE DIFFERENCE OF VERBS, AS TO
THEIR SEVERAL SPECIES, which WC en-
.deavour to explain in the following man.-
CHAP.
BOOK THE FIRST.
CHAP. IX.
Concerning the Species of Verbs, and their
other remaining Properties.
ALL Verbs, that are ftriclly fo called, Ch.IX.
denote (a) Energies. Now as all
Energies are Attributes, they have reference
of courfe to certain energizing Subftances.
Thus 'tis impofiible there fhould be fuch
Energies, as To love, to fly, to wound, &c.
if there were not fuch Beings as Men,
Birds, Swords, &c. Farther, every Ener-
gy doth not only require an Energizer,
but is neceflarily converfant about fome
Subjett. For example, if we fay, Brutus
/ove j- we muft needs fupply loves Cato,
Cajjius,
(a) We ufe this word ENERGY, rather than Mo-
tion^ from its more comprehenfive meaning ; it being a
fort of Genus, which includes within it both Motion and
its Privation, See before, p. 94, 95.
H E R M E S.
Ch.IX. Coffins, Portia, or fome one. *The Sword
ivounds i. e. wounds Heftor, Sarpedon*
Priam, or fome one. And thus is it, that
every Energy is necefTarily fituate between
two Subftantives, an Energizer which is
aftive, and a Subject which is paj/ive.
Hence then, if the Energizer lead the
Sentence, the Energy follows its Charac-
ter, and becomes what we call A VERB
ACTIVE. -Thus we fay Brutus amat,
Brutus loves. On the contrary, if the paf-
live Subject be principal, it follows the
Character of this too, and then becomes
what we call A VERB PASSIVE. Thus
we fay, Portia amatur, Portia is loved;
'Tis in like manner that the fame Road be-
tween the Summit and Foot of the fame
Mountain, with refpect to the Summit is
Afcent, with refpect to the Foot is Defcenf.
Since then every Energy refpects an Ener-
gizer or a paffive Subject ; hence the Rea-
fon why every Verb, whether active or
paffive, has in Language a necefTary Re-
ferenc
BOOK THE FIRST. 175
ference to fome Noun for its Nominative Ch.IX*
Cafe (b}.
BUT to proceed fUll farther from what
has been already obferved. Brutus loved
Portia. Here Brutus is the Energizerj
loved, the Energy, and Portia, the Sub-
jett. But it might have been, Brutun
loved Cato, or Coffins, or the Roman Re-
public -, for the Energy is referable to
Subjects infinite. Now among thefe infi-
nite Subjects, when that happens to occur,
which is the Energizer alfo, as when we
fay Brutus loved bimfelf, flew bimfelf, &c.
in fuch Cafe the Energy hath to the fame
Being a double Relation, both Active and
Paflive. And this 'tis which gave rife
among
(/>) The doctrine of Imperfonal Verbs has been juftly
rejected by the beft Grammarians, both antient and mo-
dern. See Sana. Min. L.I. c. J2. L. III. c. I. L.IV.
c. 3. Prifcian. L. XVIII. p. 1134. Jpoll. L.III. fub
fin. In all which places they will fee a proper Nomi-
native fupplied to all Verbs of this fuppofed Character.
176 HERMES.
Ch.IX. among the Greeks to that Species of Verbs,
called VERBS MIDDLE (c), and fuch was
their true and original Ufe, however in
many in fiances they may have fmce hap-
pened to deviate. In other Languages
the Verb ftill retains its active Form, and
the paffive Subject (fe or bimfelf) is ex-
preft like other Accufatives.
AGAIN, in fome Verbs it happens that
the Energy always keeps within the Ener-
gizer, and never paffes out to any foreign
extraneous Subject. Thus when we fay,
walketb, Ccefar fttteth, 'tis impofli-
blc
T
farts, called Verbs middk^ admit a Coincidence of the ac*
five and paffive Cbarafter. Apollon. L. III. c. 7. He
that would fee this whole Dc&rine concerning the
power of THE MIDDLE VERB explained and confirmed
with great Ingenuity and Learning, may confult a fmall
Treatife of that able Critic . Kuftcr, entitled, De vero
Ufu Vcrborum Mediorum. A neat edition of this fcarce
piece has been lately publifhed.
BOOK THE FIRST* 177
ble the Energy Jhould pafs out (as in the Ch.IX.
cafe of thofe Verbs called by the Gram-
marians VERBS TRANSITIVE) becaufe
both the Energizer and the Pqffrve Su&-
jecl are united in the fame Perfon. For
what is the Caufe of this walking or fit-
ting ? .Tis the Will and Vital Powers
belonging to Ctefar. And what is the
Subjecl, made fo to move or to fit ?
'Tis the Body and Limbs belonging alfo
to the fame Cccfar. 'Tis this then forms
that Species of Verbs, which Gramma-
rians have thought fit to call VERBS NEU-
TER, as if indeed they were void both of
Action and P^b^when perhaps (likeVerbs
middle) they may be rather faid to imply
both. Not however to difpute about names,
as thefe Neuters in their Energizer always
difcover their pq/ive Subject (c] t which
other
(<) This Character of Neuters the Greeks very hap-
pily exprefs by the Terms, \AuT07ra0f >a and 'L?o7ra0ej,
which Prifcian renders, qua ex ff in feipfd fit intrinfecus
PaJJia. L. VIIL 790. Confentll An apud Puiftb. p.
2051.
N It
178 HERMES.
Ch.IX. other Verbs cannot, their paffive Subjects
being infinite; hence the reafon why 'tis
as fuperfluous in thefe Neuters to have the
Subject expreft, as in other Verbs it is ne-
cefiary, and cannot be omitted. And thus
'tis that we are taught in common Gram-
mars
It may be here obferved, that even thofe Verbs, called
Aclives, can upon occafion lay afide their tranfitive Cha-
racter ; that is to fay, can drop their fubfequent Accu-
fative, and aflame the Form of Neuters, fo as to ftand by
themfelves. This happens, when the Difcourfe refpects
the mere Energy or Affeflion only, and has no regard to
the Subject, be it this thing or that. Thus we fay, *
o?&v uiatymiffxtn Tor, This Man knows not how to read,
fpeaking only of the Energy, in which we fuppofe him
deficient. Had the Difcourfe been upon the Subjects of
reading, we muft have added them. '* GIJSV wayi-
DMTXfHi T 'O/^'pif, He knows not how to read Homer,
or Virgil^ or Cicero, &c.
Thus Horace,
Qui CUPIT out METUIT, jtfuat ilium Jfc domut
out res,
Ut lippum pifla tabula
He that DESIP.ES or FEARS (not this thing in parti-
cular nor that, but in general he within whofe breaft
thefe
BOOK THE FIRST. 179
mars that Verbs Attive require an Accu- Ch.IX.
fative, while Neuters require none.
OF the above Species of Verbs, the
Middle cannot be called neteffary, becaufe
moft Languages have done without it.
THE SPECIES OF VERBS therefore re-
maining are the ACTIVE, the PASSIVE
and the NEUTER, and thofe feem eflen-
tial to all Languages whatever (J).
N 2 THERE
thefe affe&ions prevail) has the fanu joy in a Houfe or
Eft ate ^ as the Man with bad Eyes has in fine Pittures. So
Cafar in his celebrated Laconic Epiftle of, VENI, Vi-
DI, Vici, where two A&ives we fee follow one Neu-
ter in the fame detached Form, as that Neuter itfelf.
The Glory it feems was In the rapid Sequel of the Events.
Conqueft came as quick, as he could come himfelf, and
look about him. Whom he faw, and whom he conquered,
was not the thing, of which he boafted. See A^oll,
L. Ill, c. 31. p. 279.
(d] The STOICS, in their logical view of Verbs, as
making a part in Propofitions, confidered them under
the four following Sorts,
When
i8o HERMES.
Ch.IX. THERE remains a Remark or two far-
ther, and then we quit the Subject of
Verbs. 'Tis true in general that the
greater Part of them denote Attributes of
Energy
When a Verb^ co-inciding with the Nominative of
fame Noun, made without further help a perfect aflertive
Sentence, as Zwxtfarjjf -srie 7rcmr f Socrates walketh j
then as the Verb in fuch cafe implied the Power of a
perfect Predicate, they called it for that reafon Kari-
7/opn/xa, a Predicable ; or elfe, from its readinefc <TJ/X-
av, to co-indde with its Noun in completing the Sen-
tence, they called it 2u^^a, a Co-incider.
When a Verb was able with a Noun to form a per-
fect aflertive Sentence, yet could not aflbciate with fuch
Noun, but under fome oblique Cafe, as Zuxf?'rci pirot.-
/y.fXft, Socratem p&nitet : Such a Verb, from its mar
approach to jujl Co-incidence, and Predication, they called
or
When a Verb, though regularly co-inciding with a
Noun in its Nominative, Jiill required^ to complete the
Sentiment, fome other Noun under an oblique Cafe, as
nXarwu (p^t? Aiwva, Plato loveth Dio, (where without
Dia or fome other, the Verb Loveth would reft indefi-
nite :).-
BOOK THE FIRST. 181
Energy and Motion. But there are fome Ch.IX,
which appear to denote nothing more,
than a merejimple Adjective, joined to an
AfTertion, Thus *Va'< in Greek, and
JLqualleth in JLngliJh, mean nothing more
N 3 than
nite:J Such Verb, from this Defect they called Sj T 7<
r> rvpCctjua, or % xaT3/oti ( ua, fometbing lefs than a
Co-incider, or lefs than a Predicable.
Laftly, when a Verb required two Nouns in oblique
Cafes, to render the Sentiment complete j as when we
fay Zwxparsi 'AAxja<?8? /xgAtt, Tadet me Vita, or the
like : Such Verb they called yrlov, or fAarloy srapa-
<rJ/^f zpa, or v\ Tira^ax.aT^o^ua, fometbing lefs than an
imperfeft Co-incider, or an im$erfel Predicable.
Thefe were the Apellat'ions which they gave to Verbs,
when employed along with Nouns to the forming of
Propofitions. As to the Name of f p H~M A, or VERB,
they denied it to them all, giving it only to the Infini-
tive, as we have fhewn already. See page 164. See
alfo Amman, in Lib. de Interpret, p. 37. Apollon. de
Syntaxi L. I. c. 8. L. III. c. 31. p. 279. c. 32. p.
295. Theod. Gaz. Gram. L. IV.
From the above Doctrine it appears, that all Verbs
Neuter are Sv^Cc^ala; ; Verbs Active, r7o-, 1
182 HERMES.
Ch.IX. than 7<ros l$i, is equal. So Albeo in Latin
is no more than albus fum.
Campique ingentes -offibus albent. Virg.
THE fame may be faid of^fumeo. Mons
tumefy i. e. t ut nidus eft, is tumid. To ex-
prefs the Energy in thefe instances, we
mufl have recourfe to the Inceptives.
uti prmo cceft cum ALBESCERE
Vento.
Freta ponti
Jnciplunt a git at a TUMESCERE. Virg.
THERE are Verbs alfo to be found,
which are formed out of Nouns. So that
as in Abftratt Nouns (fuch as Whitenefs
from White, Geodnefs from Good) as alfo
in the Infinitive Modes of Verbs, the Attri-
butive is converted into a Subjlantive ; here
the Subftantive on the contrary is converted
into an Attributive. Such are Kwt'getv from
to acJ the part of a Dog, or be a Cy-
nk 4
BOOK THE FIRST. 183
nlc; QiXtKirigetv from <I>/A7rcr0>, to Philip- Ch.IX.
pize, or favour Philip ; Syllaturire from
Sylla, to meditate atting the fame part as
Sylla did. Thus too the wife and virtuous
Emperour, by way of counfel to him-
felf vpu ^M\ <x.7roKai<rccpu6y<;, beware thou
beefl not BEC^SAR'D ; as though he
faid, Beware, that by being Emperor, thou
dofl not dwindle into A MERE C^SAR (e).
In like manner one of our own witty Poets,
STERNHOLD himfelf he OUT-STER-
HOLDED.
And long before him the facetious Fuller,
fpeaking of one Morgan, a fanguinary Bi-
fhop in the Reign of Queen Mary, fays of
him, that he OUT-BONNER'D even BON-
NE R himfelf. *.
AND fo much for that Species of AT-
TRIBUTES, calledVERBs IN THE STRICT-
EST SENSE.
( e ) Marc." Antonin. L. VI. . 30.
* Church Uift. B. VIII. p. 21.
N 4 CHAP.
1 84 HERMES.
CHAP. X.
Concerning thofe other Attributives,
Participles and Adjectives.
Ch. X. rr-v H E Nature of Verbs being under-
JL flood, that of PARTICIPLES is no
way difficult. Every complete Verb is
expreffi ve of an Attribute ; of Time ; and
of an AJ/ertion. Now if we take away
the Ajjertion, and thus deftroy the Verb,
there will remain the Attribute and the
Time, which make the Eflence of a PAR-
TICIPLE. Thus take away the AfTer-
tion from the Verb, Y^n, Writeth, and
there remains the Participle, rpcfouv, Writ-
ing, which (without the AJ/ertion) denotes
the fame Attribute, and the fame Time.
After the fame manner, by withdrawing
the AJ/ertion, we difcover rpatyas in'^^a-
4/f> rpcQuv in rpcQet, for we chufe to re-
fer to the Greek, as being of all languages
the
BOOK THE FIRST. 185
the moft complete, as well in this refpeft, Ch. X.
as in others.
AND fo much for PARTICIPLES (a).
THE
(a] The Latins are defective in this Article of Par-
ticiples. Their Active Verbs, ending in or y (com-
monly called Deponents) have Active Participles of all
Times (fuch as Loquens, Locutus^ Locuturus) but none
of the Paffive. Their Actives ending in 0, have Par-
ticiples of the Prefent and Future (fuch as Scribens^ and
Scripturus] but none of the Paft. On the contrary,
their Paflives have Participles of the Paft (fuch as Scrip-
tits} but none of the Prefent or Future, unlefs we ad-
mit fuch as Scribaubn and Docendus for Futures, which
Grammarians controvert. The want of thefe Partici-
ples they fupply by a Periphrafis for yptycv; they fay,
cum fcripfijjet for y^atpcjwEvor, dum fcribitur t &c. In
Englijb we have fometimes recourfe to the fame Peri-
phrafis ; and fometimes we avail ourfelves of the fame
Auxiliars, which form our Modes and Tenfes.
The Englljh Grammar lays down a good Rule with
refpeft to its Participles of the Paft, that they all ter-
minate in D, T, or N. This Analogy is perhaps lia-
ble to as few Exceptions, as any. Confidering there-
fore how little Analogy of any kind we have in our
Lan-
Ch. X. THE Nature of Verbs and Participles
being underftood, that of ADJECTIVES
becomes eafy. A Verb implies (as we
have faid) both an Attribute, and Time,
( afld an Affcrtion -, a Participle only implies
an Attribute, and Time-, and an ADJEC-
TIVE only implies an Attribute-, that is to
fay, in other Words, an ADJECTIVE has
no AffertioTit and only denotes fuch an At-
tribute, as hath not its Eflence either in
Motion or its Privation. Thus in general
the Attributes of Quantity, Quality, and
Relation (fuch as many tti&few, great and
little,
Language, it Teems wrong to annihilate the few Traces,
that may be found. It would be well therefore, if all
Writers, who endeavour to be accurate, would be care-
ful to avoid a Corruption, at prefent fo prevalent, of
faying, ;'/ was wrote, for, it was written ; he was drove,
for, be was driven ; I have went, for, I have gone, &c,
in all which inftances a Verb is abfurdly ufed to fupply
the proper Participle, without any neceffity from the
want of fuch Word.
BOOK THE FIRST. 187
little* black and 'white, good and bad, dou- Ch. X.
ble, treble, quadruple, &c.) are_all denoted
by ADJECTIVES.
IT mult indeed be confeffed, that fome-
times even thofe Attributes, which are
wholly foreign to the Idea of Motion, af-
fume an AfTertion, and appear as Verbs.
Of fuch we gave inftances before, in al-
beo, tumeo, l<ra,u, and others. Thefe
however, compared to the reft of Verbs,
are but few in number, and may be caU
led, if thought proper, Verbal Adjettiines.
'Tis in like manner, that Participles in-
fenfibly pafs too into Adjedives. Thus
Do ft us in Latin, and Learned in Engliffj
lofe their power, as Participles, and mean
a Perfon pofTefTed of an habitual QuaHty,
Thus Vir eloquent means riot a man now
fpeaking, but a man, who po/e/es the ha-
ti f f fpeaking, whether he fpeak or no.
So when we fay in Englifi, he is a Think-
ing Man, an Underjlanding Man, we mean
not a perfon, whofe mind is in atfual
Energy^
i88 HERMES.
Ch. X. Energy, but whofe mind is enriched with a
larger portion of tbofe powers. 'Tis indeed
no wonder, as all Attributives are homo-
geneous, that at times the feveral Species
mould appear to interfere, and the Dif-
ference between them be fcarcely percep-
tible. Even in natural Species, which
are congenial and of kin, the fpecific
Difference is not always to be difcerned,
and in appearance at leaft they feem to
run into each other.
WE have fhewn already (fr) in the In-
ftances of ifanMrttHr 9 Syllaturire, 'ATTO-
ituuretfuQilvui, and others, how Subftan~
fives may be transformed into Verbal At-
tributives. We mail now mew, how
they may be converted into Aajeftives.
When we fay the Party of Pompey, the
Stile of Cicero, the Philofophy of Socrates,
in
(/>) Sup. p. 182, 183.
BOOK THE FIRST. 189
in thefe cafes the Party, the Stile, and the Ch. X*
Philofophy fpoken of, receive a Stamp
and Character from the Perfons, whom
they refpect. Thofe Perfons therefore
perform the part of Attributes, that is,
{tamp and characterize their refpective
Subjects. Hence then they actually pafs
into Attributes 9 and aflame, as fuch, the
Form of Adje&tves. And thus 'tis we
fay, the Pompeian Party, the Ciceronian
Stile, and the Socratic Philofophy. 'Tis
in like manner for a Trumpet of Brafs,
we fay a Brazen Trumpet ; for a Crown
of Gold 9 a Golden Crown, &c. Even Pro-
nominal Subflantives admit the like muta-
tion. Thus inftead of faying, the Book
of Me, of Thee, r.nd of Him, we fay My
Book, Thy Book, and His Book -, inftead
of faying the Country of Us, ofTou, and
of Them, we fay, Our Country, Tour
Country, and Their Country; which
Words may be called fo many Pronominal
Adjeftfoes.
IT
i 9 o HERMES.
Ch. X. IT has been obferved already, and muft:
needs be obvious to all, that Adjedives, as
marking Attributes, can have no Sex (<:).
And yet their having Terminations con-
formable to the Sex, Number, and Cafe
of their Subftantive, feems to have led
Grammarians into that ftrange Abfurdity
of ranging them with Nouns, and fepa-
rating them from Verbs, tho' with relped:
to thefe they are perfectly homogeneous;
with refpecl: to the others, quite contrary.
They are homogeneous with refped: to
Verbs, as both forts denote Attributes -,
they are heterogeneous with refped to
Nouns, as never properly denoting Sub-
ftances. But of this we have fpoken be-
fore (d).
THE
(<:) Sup. p. 171.
(d] Sup. C. VI. Note (a}. See alfo C.I1I. P , 28,
'
BOOK THE FIRST.
THE Attributives hitherto treated, that Ch.
is to fay, VERBS, PARTICIPLES, and
ADJECTIVES, may be called ATTRIBU-
TIVES OF THF FIRST ORDER. The
reafon of this Name will be better un-
derftood, when we have more fully dif-
cuiTed ATTRIBUTIVES OF THE SECOND
ORDER, to which we now proceed in the
following Chapter.
C H A P.
292 .HERMES.
CHAP. XL
Concerning Attributives of the Second
Order.
Ch.XI. A S the Attributives hitherto men-
L ~~ i ' r ~ ajl A\. tioned denote the Attributes of
Subflances, fo there is an inferior Clafs of
them, which denote the Attributes only of
Attributes.
To explain by examples in either kind
1 when we fay, Cicero and Pliny were both
of them eloquent ; Statius and Virgil both of
them wrote; in thefe inftances the Attribu-
tives, 'Eloquent, and Wrote, are immediately
referable to the Subftantives, Cicero, Virgil,
&c. As therefore denoting THE ATTRI-
BUTES OF SuBSTANCES,wecall them AT-
TRIBUTIVES OF THE FIRST ORDER. But
when we fay, Pliny was moderately eloquent 9
but Cicero exceedingly eloquent ; Statius wrote
indifferently, but Virgil wrote admirably,
in
BOOK THE FIRST. 193
in thefe inftances, the Attributives, Mb- Ch.XI,
derately, Exceedingly^ Indifferently) Ad-
mirably, are not referable to Buffiarzfives',
but to other Attributives , that is, to the
words, Eloquent, and Wrote. As there-
fore denoting Attributes of Attributes, we
call them ATTRIBUTIVES OF THE SE-
COND ORDER.
GRAMMARIANS have given them the
Name of 'Evfftftfftetreti AD VERB i A, AD-
VERBS. And indeed if we take the word
P^tta, or, Verb, in its moil: compre/jen/ive
Signification, as including not only Verbs
properly fo called, but alfo Participles and
Adjectives [an ufage, which maybe juili-
fied by the beft authorities (a)} we fhall
find
(a] Thus Ariftotle in his Treat ife de Interpretation ,-
inftances "A-jQauTro; as a Noun, and Asuxo? as a Verb.
DO Ammomus x.ra raro TO <TYiiAOt.iJO[j.;v<JV t ro pt<i
KAAOS ^ A1KA1O2 ^ oV To.aura 'PHMATA
}>ij>evQoci >% x 'ONOMATA. According to this Signi-
fication (that is of denoting the Attributes of Subflance,
O and
194 HERMES.
Ch.XI. find the name, Er/jwtyto, or ADVERB, to
be a very juft appellation, as denoting A
PART OF SPEECH, THE NATURAL AP-
PENDAGE OF VERBS. So great is this
dependence in grammatical Syntax, that
an Adverb can no more fubfift without its
Verb, than a Verb can fubfift without its
Subftantrvt* 'Tis the fame here, as in cer-
tain natural Subjecls. Every Colour for
its exiftence as much requires a Superfi-
cies, as the Superficies for its exiftence re-
quires a folid Body (<).
AMONG
and the Predicate in Proportions) the words, FAIR,
JUST, and the like^ are called VERBS, and net N o u N s .
Am. in libr. de Interp. p. 37. b. Arift. dz Interp, L.I.
c. i. See alfoof this Treatife, c.6. Note (a}, p. 87.
In the fame manner the Stoics talked of the Partici-
ple. Nam PARTICIPIUM connumerante* Verbi^ PAR-
TICIPIALE VERBUM vocabant vel CASUALE. Prif-
dan. L. I. p. 574.
(//) This notion of ranging the Adverb under the fame
dnui with the Verb (by calling them both Attributives)
and of explaining it to be tbe VerUs Epithet or Adjeflive
(by
BOOK THE FIRST. 195
AMONG the Attributes of Subftance are Ch.XI.
reckoned Quantities, and Qualities. Thus
we fay, a white Garment ', a high Mountain*
Now fome of thefe Quantities and Quali-
ties are capable of Intention, ana Remif-
lion. Thus we fay, a Garment EXCEED-
INGLY white; a Mountain TOLERABLY
O 2 bigb 9
(by calling it the Attributive of an Attributive) is con-
formable to the bed authorities. Theodore Gaza defines
an ADVERB, as follows /W.ECO? Ao'^a aTrlwTov, xarct
n i-rriXt'yofj.twu pn^.txn 9 Xj oiov t7ri
A Part of Speech devoid of Cafes^ predi-
cated of a Ferby or fubjoined to it, and being as it were the
Verb's Adjeftive. L. IV. (where by the way we may
obferve, how properly the Adverb is made an Aptote^
fmce its Principal fometimes has cafes, as in Falde Sa-
piens; fometimes has none, as in Falde amat), Prifdan's
definition of an Adverb is as follows ADVERBIUM eft
pars orationis indeclinabilis^ cujus fignificatio Ferbis ailjui-
tur. H.QC enim perficit Adverbium Ferbis additum^ quod
adjefliva nomina appellativis nominibus adjunfia J" ut pru-
dens homo j prudenter eglt ; felix Fir ; feliciter vivit.
L. XV. p. 1003. And before, fpeaking of the Strict,
he fays Etiam AD VE RBI A Nominibus vel VERB is
CONNUMERABANT, fcf qitafi ADJECTIVA VEREO-
RUM nominabant. L.I. p. 574, See alfo Apoll. de Synt.
L. I. c. 3- fub fin.
H E R M E S.
Ch.XI. high, or MODERATELY high. Tis plain'
therefore that Intention and Remiffion are
among the Attributes of fuch Attributes,
Hence then one copious Source of feeon-
dary Attributives, or Adverbs, to denote
thefe two, that is, Intenfion, and Remi/Jio?2.
The Greeks have their avpct$us, ^dxi^a,
44*#$ wigoi ,* the Latins their valde, vebe-
menter, maxime, fatis, inediocriter , the
Engtifi their greatly, vaftfy, extremely,
fitfficiently, moderately, tolerably, indiffer-
ently, &c.
FARTHER than this, where there are
different Intenfions of the fame Attribute,
they may be compared together. Thus if
the Garment A be EXCEEDINGLY White,
and the Garment B be MODERAXTELY
White, we may fay, the Garment A is
MORE white than the Garment B.
IN thefe inftances the Adverb MORE
not only denotes Intenfion, but relative
Intenfion* Nay we ftop not here. We
not
Bo OK THE FIRST, 1 97
not only denote Intention merely relative, Ch.XI r
but relative Intenfion, them which there is
none greater. Thus we not only fay the
Mountain A is MORE high than the Moun-
tain B, but that 'tis the MOST high of all
Mountains. Even Verbs, properly fo called,
as they admit Jimple Intentions, fo they
admit alfo thefe comparative ones. Thus
in the following Example Fame he
LOVETH MORE than Riches , but Virtue of
all things he LOVETH MOST the Words
MORE and MOST denote the different com-r
parative Intenfwns of the Verbal Attribu-r
tive, Lovetb.
AND hence the rife of COMPARISON,
and of its different Degrees-, which can-
not well be more, than the two Species
above mentioned, one to denote Simple
Excefs, and one to denote Superlative.
Were we indeed to introduce more degrees
than thefe, we ought perhaps to introduce
infinite, which is abfurd. For why ftop
at a limited Number, when in all fubjects,
O 3 fuf,
198 HERMES.
Ch.XI. fufceptible of Intention, the intermediate
ExcefTes are in a manner infinite ? There
are infinite Degrees of more White, be-
tween the Jirft Simple White, and the Su-
perlative, Whitejl -, the fame may be faid
of more Great, more Strong, more Minute,
6?f . The Do&rine of Grammarians about
three fuch Degrees, which they call the
Pofitive, the Comparative and the Superla-
tive, muft needs be abfurd ; both becaufe
in their Pofitive there is -f- no Comparifon at
all, and becaufe their Superlative is a Com-
parative, as much as their Comparative it
felf. Examples to evince this may be found
every where. Socrates 'was the MOST WISE
of all the Athenians Homer wot the MOST
SUBLIME of all Poets.
Cadit et Ripbeus, JUSTJSSIMUS UNUS
^uifuit in Teucris-*- Virg.
IT
t Qyi (f c 'l- Gra^us Pofoivus) quonicr'. perfsfius
a qmliujdam in mtmero Graduum r.on cc:"*~tt~"* C
fc\U\ Ars apud Putfch. p. 2022.
BOOK THE FIRST. 1-99
IT muftbeconfefled thefe Comparatives, Ch.XI.
as well thejtmpkj as thcfeferlatrvf, feem
fometimes to part with their relative Na-
ture, and only retain their intenfi've* Thus
in the Degree, denoting fanp/e Excefs,
Triftior, et lacrumls oculos fuffiifa ni-
tentes. Virg.
Rufticior paulo eft Ilor.
IN the Superlative this is more ufual.
Vir doftiffiniiiSi Virfortijjimus, a mofl learned
Man, a moft brave Man, that is to fay,
not the bra^eft and moft learned Man, that
ever exifted, but a Man pofTeffing thofe
Qiialities in an eminent Degree.
THE Authors of Language have con-
trived a method to retrench thefe Compa-
rative Adverbs, by expreffing their force in
the Primary Attributive. Thus inftead of
More fair, they fay FAIRER; initead of
Moft fair y FAIREST, and the fame holds
4 true
20 9 H E R M E S.
Ch.XI. true both in the Greek and Latin. This
Pra&ice however has reached no farther
than to Adjefthcs, or at leaft to Participles^
Jharing the nature of Adjectives. Verbs
perhaps were thought too much diverfified
already, to admit more Variations without
perplexity.
As there are fome Attributives, which
admit of Comparifon, fo there are others,
which admit of none. Such for example
are thofe, which denote that Quality of
Bodies arifmgfrom their Figure ; as when
we fay, a Circular Table, a Quadrangular
Court, a Conical Piece of Metal, &c. The
reafon is, that a million of things, partici-
pating the fame Figure, participate it equal-
ly, if they participate it at all. To fay there-
fore that \yhile A and B are both quadran-
gular, A is more or lefs quadrangular than
J3, is abfurd. The fame holds true in all
Attributives, denoting definite Quantifies,
whether continuous or difcrete, whether ab-
fotute or relative. Thus the two-foot Rule
A
BOOK THE FIRST. 201
A cannot be more a two-foot Rule, than any Ch.XI.
other of the fame length. Twenty Lions
cannot be more twenty, than twenty Flies.
If A and B be both triple, or quadruple to
C, they cannot be more triple, or more qua-
druple, one than the other. The reafon of
all this is, there can be no Comparifon with-
out Intenfion and Remi/fion ; there can be
no Intenfion and Remiflion in things al-
ways definite-, and fuch are the Attribu-*
tives, which we have lad mentioned.
IN the fame reafoning we fee the caufe,
why no Subftantive is fufceptible of thefe
Comparative Degrees. A Mountain cannot
be faidMORE TO BE, or TO EXIST, than
a Mole-hill, but the More and Lefs muft be
fought for in their Quantities. In like
manner, when we refer many Individuals
to one Species, the Lion A cannot be
called more a Lion, than the Lion B, but
if more any thing, he is more Jierce, more
fpeedy,Qi exceeding in fome fuch Attributes.
So again, in referring many Species to one
Genus,,
202 HERMES.
Ch.XI. Genus, a Crocodile is not more an Ani-
mal, than a Lizard; nor a Tiger, more
than a Cat, but if any thing, they are
more bulky, more ftrong, &c. the Excefs,
as before, being derived from their Attri-
butes. So true is that faying of the acute
Stagirite that SUBSTANCE is not fufcep-
tible of MORE tfWLzss (c). But this by
way of digreflion, to return to the fubject
of Adverbs.
OF the Adverbs, or fecondary Attribu-
tives already mentioned, thefe denoting
Intention or Remiffion mav be called Ad-
verbs of Quantity continuous -, Once, Twice,
Thrice, are Adverbs of Quantity difcrete-,
More and Mojl, Lejs and Leaft, to which
may be added Equally, Proportionally, Gfr .
are
TO
(f) x KV tirdtftoiTO ri aen'a TO jtxaAAoy
Categor. c. 5. Sec alfo Sanflius, L. I. c. 1 1. L. II.
c. 10, u. where the Subject of Comparatives is treated
in a very mafterly and philofophical manner. See alfo
Prifclan, p. 598. Derhantur igilur Comparative a No-
minibus jtdeftivit, &c.
BOOK THE FIRST. 203
are Adverbs of Relation. There are others Ch.XI.
of Quality, as when we fay, HONESTLY
induftrious, PRUDENTLY brave, t hey f ought
BRAVELY, he painted FINELY, a Portico
form'd CIRCULARLY, a Plain cut TRI-
ANGULARLY,
AND here 'tis worth while to obferve,
how the fame thing, participating the
fame Effence, affumes different gramma-
tical Forms from its different relations.
For example, fuppofe it mould be afked,
how differ Honeft, Honeftly, and Honejly.
The Anfwer is, they are in Effence the
fame, but they differ, in as much as Ho~
neft is the Attributive of a Subftantive j
Honeftly, of a Verb ; and Honejiy, being
diverted of thefe its attributive Relations,
affumes the Power of a Subftantive, fo as
to fland by itfelf.
THE Adverbs, hitherto mentioned, are
common to Verbs of every Species ; but
there
3
204 H E R M E S.
Ch.XI. there are fome, which are peculiar to Verbs
properly fo called* that is to fay, to fuch as
denote Motion or Energy, with their Pri-
vations. All MOTION and REST imply
TIME and PLACE, as a kind of neceflary
Coincidents. Hence then, if we would
exprefs the Place or Time of either, we
mufl needs have recourfe to the proper
Adverbs ; of Place, as when we fay, he
flood THERE -, he went HENCE ; he travelled
FAR, &c. of Time, as when we fay, be
Jlood THEN; be 'went AFTERWARD; be
travelled FORMERLY, &c. Should it be
afked why Adverbs of Time, when
Verbs have Tenfes ? The Anfwer is, tho'
Tenfes may be fufficient to denote the
greater Di{linclions of Time, yet to de-
note them all by Tenfes would be a per-
plexity without end. What a variety of
Forms, to denote Tefterday, To-day, To-
morrow, Formerly, Lately, Juft now,
Now, Immediately, Prefently, Soon, Here*
after, &c. ? 'Twas this then that made
the
c
BOOK THE FIRST.
the 'Temporal Adverbs neceflary, over and Ch.XL
above the Tenfes.
To the Adverbs juft mentioned may be
added thofe, which denote the Intenjions
and Remiffions peculiar to Motion, fuch as
Jpeedily, ha/lily* fwiftly, flowly, &c. as alfo
Adverbs of Place, made out of Prepo/i-
J *S ^ */
tions, fuch as oivu and KKTU from avci and
fcara, in EngHfo upward and downward,
from up and down. In fome inftances the
Prepofition fuffers no change, but be-
comes an Adverb by nothing more than
its Application, as when we fay, CIRCA
equltat, he rides ABOUT; PROPE N cecidif*
be was NEAR falling ; Verum ne POST
confer as culpam in me, Bnf do not AFTER
lay the blame on me (d).
(d] Sofip. Cbarifu In/}. Gram. p. 170. Terent.
Adk. II. Sc. 3.
206 HERMES.
Ch.XI. THERE are likewife Adverbs of Interro-
gation, fuch as Where, Whence, Whither,
How 3 of which there is this remarkable,
that when they lofe their Interrogative
power, they aflame that of a Relative, fo
as even to reprefent the Relative or Sub-
junttive Pronoun, Thus Ovid,
Et Seges eft, UBI Trojafuit
tranflated in our old Englifo Ballad,
And Corn doth grow, WHERE Troy town
flood.
That is to fay, Seges eft in eo loco, IN Q^yo,
. Corn groweth in that place, I N w H i c H,
. the power of the Relative, being im-
plied in the Adverb. Thus Terence,
Hujufmodi mihi res femper comminifcere,
UBI me excarmifices Heaut.IV. 6.
where UBI relates to res, and flands for
quibus rebus.
Tis
BOOK THE FIRST.
207
'Tis in like manner that the Relative Ch.XI.
Pronoun upon occafion becomes an Inter-
rogative, at leaft in Latin and Englifh*
Thus Horace,
QJLIEM Virum aut Heroa lyra, ve! acri
Tibia fumes celebrare, Clio ?
So Milton,
WHO firft feducd them to that' foul re
-volt ?
THE reafon of all this is as follows.
*tbe Pronoun and Adverbs here mentioned
are all alike, in their original character,
RELATIVES. Even when they become
Interrogatives, they Icle not this character,
but are ftill Relatives, as much as ever.
The difference is, that without an Interro-
gation, they have reference to a Subject,
which is antecedent, definite and known',
with an Interrogation, to a- Subject which
isfubfequsnt, indefinite, and unknown, and
which
2o8 HERMES.
Ch.XI. which 'tis expelled that the Anfaer fliould
exprefs and alcertain,
Vfnofirftfcduc'd them ?
The very Queftion itfelf fuppofes'a Sedu-
cer, to which, tho' unknown, the Pro-
noun, WHO, has a reference.
Tb' infernal Serpent-
Here in the Anfwer we have the Subject
which was indefinite, afcertained-, fo that
the WHO in the Interrogation is (we fee)
as much a Relative, as if it had been faid
originally, without any Interrogation at
all, 'Twas the Infernal SERPENT, WHO
firfl f educed them.
AND thus is it that Interrogative* and
Relatives mutually pafs into each other.
AND fomuch for ADVERBS, peculiar to
Verbs properly fo called. We have al-
ready fpoken of thofe, which are common
to all Attributives. We have likewife at-
2 tempted
BOOK THE FISST. 209
tempted to explain their general Nature, Gh.Xf.
which we have found to confift in being"^"
the Attributes of Attributes. There re-
mains only to add, that ADVERBS may be
derived from almojl every Part of Speech :
from PREPOSITIONS, as when from dfter
we derive Afterwards^ from PARTICI-
PLES, and through thefe from Verbs t as
when from Know we derive Knowing, and
thence Knowingly; from Scie, Sciens, and
thence Scienter from ADJECTIVES, as
when from Virtuous and Vicious, we derive
Virtuoujly and Vicioujly from SUBSTAN-
TIVES, as when fromn/^xO^, an Ape y we
derive niQfawy fatirziv, to look APISHLY ;
from Atuv, a Lion, AeovjuSug, Leomnely-~
nay even from PROPER NAMES, as when
from Socrates and Demojihenes y we derive
Socratically and Demojlhenically. 'xwas
Socratically reajoned, we fay ; 'twas De-
mojlhenically fpoken *. Of the fame fort
P are
* Ariftotle hrvs Kvx^.c-nxi-f Cyclopicallyj from
a Cyclops. Eth. Nic. X, 9.
210 HERMES.
Ch.XI. are many others, cited by the old Gram-
marians, fuch as Catiliniter from Catitina,
Sijenniter from Sifenna, Tulliane from
&c. (e).
NoR are they thus exteniive in Deriva-
tion, but in Signification alfo. Theodore
Gaza in his Grammar informs us (f),
that ADVERBS may be found in every
one of the Predicaments, and that the
readieft way to reduce their Infinitude,
was to refer them by clafTes to thofe ten
univerfal Genera. The Stoics too called
the ADVERB by the name of IlavJixJitf,
and that from a view to the fame multi-
form Nature. Omnia infe capit quaji col-
lata per fat ir am, conceffa fibi rerum varid
fotejlate. 'Tis thus that Sofipater explains
the
(*) See Prife. L. XV. p. 1022. Sof. Charif. 161.
Edit. Putfchii.
'traj UUM4C) <rav, oroiOVj STCKTOV, ypof rt 9
x, T. A. Gram. Introd. L. II. ,
BOOK THE FIRST. 211
the Word (g), from whofe authority Ch.XL
we know it to be Stoical. But of this
enough.
AND now having finifhed thofe PRIN-
CIPAL PARTS of Speech, the SUBSTAN-
TIVE and the ATTRIBUTIVE, which are
SIGNIFICANT WHEN ALONE, WC pro-
ceed to thofe AUXILIARY PARTS, which
are ONLY SIGNIFICANT, WHEN ASSO-
CIATED. But as thefe make the Subject
of a Book by themfelves, we here con-
clude the firft Book of this Treatife.
(?) Sojjp. Char, p, 175. Edit. Putfcbiu
P 2 HER-
[ 2I 3
HERMES
OR A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY
CONCERNING UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR
BOOK. II.
CHAP. I.
Concerning Definitives.
WHAT remains of our Work, Ch. I.
is a matter of lefs difficulty,
it being the fame here, as in
fome Hiftorical Picture , when the prin-
cipal Figures are once formed, 'tis an eafy
labour to defign the reft.
P 3 DE.
214 H E P v M E S.
I, DEFINITIVES, the Subject of the pre-
fent Chapter, are commonly called by
Grammarians, ARTICLES, ARTICULI,
*A*fya. They are of two kinds, either
thofe properly and Jlriclly Jo called, or elfe
tilt Pronominal Articles, fuch as 'This, '
&c.
WE fhall firft treat of thofe Articles
more ftriffily fo denominated, the reafon and
ufe of which may be explained, as fol-
lows,
THE vifible and individual Subftances
of Nature are infinitely more numerous,
than for each to admit of a particular
Name. To fupply this defecl:, when any
Individual occurs, which either wants a
proper Name, or whofe proper Name is
not known, we afcertain it, as well as
\ve can, by referring it to its Species ;
pr ? if the Species be unknown, then at
leaft
BOOK THE SECOND. 215
leaft to fome Genus. For example a Ch. I.
certain Object occurs, with a head and
limbs, and appearing to poffefs the pow-
ers of Self-motion and Senfation. If we
know it not as an Individual, we refer
it to its proper Species, and call it Dog,
or Horfe, or Lion, or the like. If none
of thefe Names fit, we go to the Genus,
and call it, AnimaL
BUT this is not enough, The Thing,
at which we are looking, is neither a Spe-
cies, nor a Genus. What is it then ? An
Individual. Of what kind? Known, or
unknown ? Seen now for the firft time,
or feen before, and now remembred ?
'Tis here we {hall difcover the ufe of the
two Articles (A) and (THE). (A) re-
fpecls our primary Perception, and dc-
notes Individuals as unknown ; (THE)
refpects our fecondary Perception, and
denotes Individuals as known. To ex-
plain by an example I fee an object pafs
p 4 by
216 HERMES.
Ch. I. by, which I never faw till then. What
do I fay ? There goes A Beggar, with A
long Beard. The Man departs, and re-
turns a week after. What do I fay then ?
'There goes THE Beggar with THE long
Beard. The Article only is changed, the
reft remains un-altered.
YET mark the force of this apparently
minute Change. The Individual, once
vague^ is now recognized as fomething
known, and that merely by the efficacy of
this latter Article, which tacitly infinuates
a kind of previous acquaintance-, by refer-
ring the prefent Perception to a like Per-
ception already paft (a).
THE Truth is, the Articles (A) and
(THE) are both of them definitives, as
tthey circumfcribe the latitude of Genera
an4 Species, by reducing them for the
mod
(a) See B. I. c. 5. p. 63,
BOOK THE SECOND, 217
moft part to denote Individuals. The Ch. I.
difference however between them is this ;
the Article (A) leaves the Individual itfelf
unascertained, whereas the Article (THE)
after tains the Individual alfo, and is for
that reafon the more accurate JDefinitiva
of the two.
'Tis perhaps owing to the imperfect
manner, in which the Article (A) de-
fines, that the Greeks have no Article
correfpondent to it, but fupply its place,
by a negation of their Article, C O. 'O
THE man fell - i/-
A Man fell t without any
thing prefixed, but only the Article with-
drawn (<). Even in Engtifo, where the
Article
() Ta yap a'o^ra^ TJOTI voxpsvx, y T otoQp
nra^aOfo-i? UTTO ofifpov T ixr^oo-WTry a^et, Thofe things,
which are at times underjlood indefinitely^ the addition of
the Article makes to be definite as to their Perfon. Apoll.
l IV. c. i. See of the fame author, L. I. c. 6, 36.
VffMt
218 HERMES.
Ch. I. Article (A) cannot be ufed, as in plu-
rals, its force is expreft by the fame Ne-
gation. Thofe are THE Men, means thofe
are Individuals, of which we poiTefs fome
previous Knowledge. 'Thofe are Men, the
Article apart, means no more than that
they are fo many vague and uncertain In-
dividuals, juft as the Phrafe, A Man, in
the fingular, implies one of the fame
number.
BUT
(TO v Af0Ov (c.)
|u r*7 <n,VTaff oTou 11 /u
JiKE, a.Svt\w Ta KvQpuirov Xtyii* EI SI O AN-
QPnnOS, ^JjAov, Tffoosyjua-pt-jcv j/ap riva oiv^uTroi
frf'yii. TBTO ^ auro jSsAovrai xj e (fizirxovTi? t 0,0-
^/f eaufes a Review within tJje Mind of jomething known
before in the texture of the Difcourfe. Thus if any one
PU7r&> nx?, MAN CAME (which is the farm ,
we fay in Englifh A man came) it is not evident,
ef whom be fpeaks. But if be fays e> $(>- J }ir<& ?xf,
THE MAN CAME, then 'tis evident; for lie f peaks ef
fome Perfon known before. And this is what thofe mean,
who fay that the Article is exprejjive of the Firft and Sf-
CQnd Knowledge together* Thcod. Gazje, L. IV,
BOOK THE SECOND. 219
BUT tho' the Greeks have no Article Ch. I.
correipondent to the Article (A,) yet no-
thing can be nearer related, than their *O,
to the Article, THE. 'O jSac-Aiuj, THE
King-, TO S lupov, THE Gift, &c. Nor
is this only to be proved by parallel ex-
amples, but by the Attributes of the
Greek Article, as they are defcribed by
Apollonius, one of the earlieft and moil
acute of the old Grammarians, now re
maining.
totov apQpuv TJ avcttpopa, t\ egi
I/ivy -zrpoc-uTTK sroipKg-cx.riK^.^-N'ow the p
liar Attribute of the Article, as we have
JJjewn elfewbere, is that Reference, which
implies fame certain Perfon already men-?
tioned. Again 'On yap cijys TO,
1% oturuv av&tpopdcv isrocpi^c'iv, 64 [*r,
&oisv TO apdpov, efcctipBTos tgiv r,
For Nouns of themfehes imply not
220 HERMES.
Ch. I. Reference, unlefs they take to them the Ar-
ticle, whofe peculiar Character is Reference.
Again To apQpov 5rpov$t$uG'ocv yvunv yXoi
The Article indicates a pre-eftablifoed
acquaintance (c].
His reafoning upon Proper Names is
worth remarking. Proper Names (he
tells us) often fall into Homonymie, that
is, different Perfons often go by the fame
Name. To folve this ambiguity, we have
recourfe to Adjectives or Epithets. For
example there were two Grecian Chiefs,
who bore the name of Ajax. 'Twas not
therefore without reafon, that Meneftbeus
ufes Epithets, when his intent was to
diftinguiih the one of them from the
other.
(c) Apoll. dc Sync. L. I. c. 6, 7. His account of
REFERENCE is as follows 'iJVwjua a'jzfy-^zi; -sr^oxa-
tii\iypw<i uTfoo-wTTB oVj-r^a "yjuTts. The peculiar cba-
ratter of Reference is the fecond or repeated Knowledge of
feme Perfon already mentioned. L. II. c. 3.
BOOK THE SECOND. 221
Ch.L
Horn.
If both Ajaxes (fays he) cannot be fpared,
at leaft alone-
Let mighty Telamonian Ajax come.
Apollonius proceeds 'Even Epithets
themfelves are difFufed thro' various Sub-
jeds, in as much as the fame Adjective
may be referred to many Subflantives.
IN order therefore to lender both Parts
of Speech equally definite, that is to fay
the Adjeclive as well as the Subftantive,
the Adjective itfelf aiiumes an Article be-
fore it, that it may indicate a Reference to
fome Jingle Pcrfon only, (Mvoioatvi civcx.qopoc,,
according to the Author's own Phrafe.
And thus 'tis we fay, TpvQuv
KOf, Trypbo THE Grammarian; Aw
$ag$&* o Ku^voil^y Apollo dor us THE Cyre-
nean, 5cc. The Author's Conclufion of
this
2
222 HERMES.
Ch. I. this Section is worth remarking.
rug ocpx > KOCTK TO
(TVVl$l(zliT(X, TO eTTlQ^TiKCV TW XVplW
'Tit with reafon therefore that
the Article is here alfo added, as it -brings
the Adjective to an Individuality > as pre-*
cife, as the proper Name (</).
WE may carry this reafoning farther,
and mew, how by help of the Article
even common Appellatives come to have
the force of proper Nanies y and that un-
affifted by epithets of any kind. Among
the Athenians TIXoTov meant Ship ; "Evtitxu,
Eleven ; and *AvQpu7r<&>, Man. Yet add
but the Article, and T3 nxorov, THE SHIP>
meant that particular Ship, which theyfent
annually to Delos -, 'Oi "EvSexa, THEELEVEN,
meant, certain Officers of yuftice) and 'O
"AvQpuTT*, THE MAN, meant their public
Executioner. So in Englijh, City, is a
Name
(d] See Apoll. L. I. c. 12. where by miftake Mene-
laus is put for Alencjibeus,
BOOK THE SECOND. 223
Name common to many places ; and Ch. I.
Speaker, a Name common to many Men.
Yet if we prefix the Article, THE CITY
means our Metropolis; and THE SPEAK-
ER, a high Officer in the Britifh Parlia-
ment.
AND thus 'tis by an eafy tranfition, that
the Article, from denoting Reference, cornea
to denote Eminence alfo > that is to fay,
from implying an ordinary pre-acquain-
tance, to prefume a kind of general and
univerfal Notoriety. Thus among the
Greeks 'O noiyrys, THE POET, meant Ho-
mer(e}; and 'O Sryt^rif, THE STAGI-
RITE, meant Arijtotle-, not that there were
not
(<) There are fo few exceptions to this Obfervation,
that we may fairly admit it to be generally true. Yet
Arijlotle twice denotes Euripides by the Phrafe o sro^lr,^
once at the end of the feventh Book of his Nicomacbean
Ethics, and again in his Phyfics, L. IL 2. Plato alfo
in his tenth Book of Laws (p. 901, Edit. Strr.) denotes
the fame manner.
224 H E R M E S.
Ch. I. not many Poets, befide Homer ; and many
Stagirites,befide./4r//?0//<?j but none equally
illuftrious for their Poetry and Philofo-
pby.
J Tis on a like principle that Arlftotk
tells us, 'tis by no means the fame thing
to aflert etvai ryv rjovyv auyo&lv, or, TO N
dya.Qcv that, Pleafurc is A GOOD, or,
THE GOOD. The firft only makes it a
common Qbjett of De/ire, upon a level
with many others, which daily raife
our wiflies ; the laft fuppofes it that fu-
preme and fovereign Good, the ultimate
Scope of all our Adlions and Endea-
vours (/).
BUT to purfue our Subject. It has been
faid already that the Article has no mean-
ing, but when affociated to fome other
word. To what words then may it be
aflbciated ? To fuch as require defining,
for
(f] Analyt. Prior. L. I. c. 40.
BOOK THE SECOND. 225
for it is by nature a Definitive. And Ch. I.
what Words are thefe ? Not thole which
already are as definite, as may be. Nor
yet thofe, which, being indefinite, cannot
properly be made otherwife. It remains
then they muft be thofe, which though in-
definite ', are yet capable, through the Article,
of becoming definite.
UPON thefe Principles we fee the reafon,
why 'tis abfurd to fay, O Em, THE I, or
O XT, THE THOU, becaufe nothing can.
make thofe Pronouns more definite, than
they are (g). The fame may be afierted
of
(<?) ^5*^W"W makes it part of the Pronoun's Defi
nition, fo refufe co-alefcence with the Article.
w a ffv,frt TO agfiflw. 7fl/ therefore is a Pro-
noun, which with Indication or Reference is put for a
Noun, and WITH WHICH THE ARTICLE DOTH
NOT ASSOCIATE. L. II. 0.5. So Gaza, fpeaking
of Pronouns flaVIn Js .j/x iir&xunM ufyw. L.IV.
Prifctan fays the fame. Jan? ///; #/>*/ Gr*C9t prtma
'Q. .r
226 H E k M E S.
Ch. I. of Proper Names, and though the Gre'eks
fay o Swx^arij?, if Hav^TTTn?, and the like,
yet the Article is a mere Pleonafm, unlefa
perhaps it ferve to diftinguifh Sexes. By
the fame rule we cannot fay in Greek
OI AMflOTEPOI, or in Englijh, THE
BOTH, bccaufe thefe Words in their own
nature are each of them perfectly defined,
fo that to define them farther would be
quite fuperfluous. Thus if it be faid, /
have read BOTH Poefs, this plainly indicates
a definite pair, of whom fome mention
has been made already -, Auaj lyvuc^vi}, a
knfavn Duad, as Apollonins exprefles him-
felf, (fj) when he fpeaks of this Subject.
On the contrary, if it be faid, I have read
Two Poets, this may mean any Pair out
of
tt fecunda perfcna pronominum, qua fine dulio demoriftra-
ti-urt funt, art i culls adjungi non poffunt ; nee iertia, qnando
demonjlrativa ejl. L.XII. p. 938. In the beginning of
the fame Book, he gives the true reafori of this. Supra
omnes alias partes orationis FIN IT PER SON AS PRONO-
MEN.
(/>) A^tllm. L. I. c. 1 6.
Booic THE SECOND* 227
of all that ever exifted. And hence this Ch. I.
Numeral, being in this Senfe indefinite (as
indeed are all others, as well as itfelf ) is
forced to a/ume the Article, whenever it
would become definite *. And thus 'tis,
THE Two in Englijh, and OI A TO in
Greek, mean nearly the fame thing, as
BOTH or AMOOTEPOI. Hence alib it
is, that as Two, when taken alone, has
reference to fome primary and indefinite
Perception, while the Article, THE, has
reference to fomzfecondary and definite -j- ;
hence I fay the Reafon, why 'tis bad Greek
to fay ATO OI ANGPnnOI, and bad
Englifh, to fay Two THE MEN. Such
Syntax is in fad: a Blending of Incompati-
ties,
* This explains Servhn on the XII th ./Eneid. v. 51 r.
where he tells us that Duorum is put for Amborum. In
Englijh or Greek the Article would have clone the bufi-
nefs, for the Twe, or TOJU <Jlo~v are equivalent to Both
or p$7Ej<*, but not fo Daorum, becaufe the- Latins
have no Articles to prefix.
t Sup. p. 215, 216,
HERMES.
Ch. I. bles y that is to fay of a defined Subjlanthc
with an undefined Attributive. On the
contrary to fay in Greek AM<I>OTEPOI
OI ANGPXinOI, or in Englijh, BOTH
THE MEN, is good and allowable, becaufe
the Subftantive cannot poffibly be lefs apt,
by being defined, to coalefce with an At-
tributive, which is defined as well as it-
felf. So likewife, 'tis correct to fay, OI
A|TO ANOPnnOI, THE TWO MEN,
becaufe here the Article, being placed
in the beginning, extends it's Power as
well through Subftantive as Attributive,
and equally contributes to define them
both.
As fome of the words above admit of
no Article, becaufe they are by Nature as
definite as may be^ fo there are others,
which admit it not, becaufe they are not
to be defined at all. Of this fort are all
INTERROGATIVES. If we queftion about
Sub/lances, we cannot fay O TIL OT-
TOS, THE WHO is THIS; but Til
OT-
BOOK THE SECOND. 229
OTTOS, WHO is THIS? (/). The fame Ch. I.
as to Dualities and both kinds of Quantity*
We fay without an Article nOIO, nO-
OI, HHAIKOS, in Englijh, WHAT
SORT OF, HOW MANY, HOW GREAT.
The Reafon is, that the Articles O, and
THE refpedt Beings already known; Inter-
rogatives refpect Beings, about 'which ive
are ignorant-, for as to what we know,
Interrogation is fuperfluous.
IN a word the natural AJJociators ivith
Articles are all thofe common Appellatives,
which denote the feveral Genera and Spe-
cies of Beings. 'Tis thefe, which, by af-
fuming a different^fr//<:/^,ferve either to ex-
plain an Individual upon its firfb being per-
ceived, or elfe to indicate, upon its return,
a Recognition, or repeated Knowlege (/).
WE
(?) Apollonius calls TIZ,
a Part of Speech, mojl contrary, mojl aver fe to Article* .
L. IV. c. i.
(k] What is here faid refpecls the two Articles,which
we have in Englijh. In Greek, the Article does no more,
than imply a Recognition. See before p. 21 6, 217,218.
230 H E R M E S.
Ch. I. WE ihall here fubjoin a few Inftances
of the peculiar'Power of ARTICLES.
EVERY Proportion confifts of a Su&jetf,
and a Predicate. In Engli/h thefe are di-
fKnguiflied by their Pofition, the Subject
ftanding^r/?, the Predicate la/I. Happinefs
is Pleafure Here, Happinefs is the Sub"
jeci i P/eafure, \hz Predicate. If we change
their order, and fay, Pleafure is Happinefs ;
then Pleafure becomes the SubjecJ, and
Happinefs the Predicate. In Greek thefe
are diftinguifhed not by any Order or Po-
tion, but by help of the Article, which
the Subject always affumes, and the Predi-
cate in moft inftances (fome few excepted)
rejects, Happinefs is Pleafure* jJJow} ij lu-
icx. Pleafure is Happinef-^fi yooyy lu-
tat Fine things are difficult %aAs7ra
rot jt&Xa, Difficult things arejine~7e<, %#-
BOOK THE SECOND. 23;
IN Greek 'tis worth attending, how in Ch. I.
the fame Sentence, the fame Article, by
being prefixed to a different Word, quite
changes the whole meaning. For exam-
ple 'O riroXs^a;;^ yvfx.vac-ixpxya'ots eriuyQi}
Ptolemy, having pref^ded over the Games,
was publickly honoured. The Participle
yvpvoc.<riot,p'xr l <rots has here no other force,
than to denote to us the Time, ivhen Ptole-
my was honoured, viz. after having pre-
fjded over the Games. But if, inftead of
the Subftantive, we join the Participle to
the Article, and fay, 'O
IlToXg^a;/* itt/fcifftfc our meaning is
The Ptolemy, who prejided over the Games,
was honoured. The Participle in this cafe,
being joined to the Article, tends tacitly to
indicate not one Ptolemy but many, of
which number a particular one participated
of honour (/).
(/} Jpolkn. L. I. c. 33, 34.
Ch. I. IN Engitfi likewife it deferves remark-
ing, how the Senfe is changed by chang-
ing of the Articles, tho' we leave every
other Word of the fentence untouched.-
And Nathan Jaid unto David, THOU ART
THE MAN*. In that Tingle, THE, that
diminutive Particle, all the force and effi-
cacy of the Reafon is contained. By that
alone are the Premifes applied, and fo
firmly fixed, as never to be fhaken. 'Tis
polfible this AfTertion may appear at firffc
ibmewhat ftrange; but let him, who doubts
it, only change the Article, and then fee
what will become of the Prophet and his
reafoning. And Nathan faid unto David,
THOU ART A MAN. Might not the King
v/ell have, demanded upon fo impertinent
a pofition,
Non dices bodie, quorfum b<zc tarn putlda.
tendant ?
BUT
El O A NH P. BwriA. B'.
BOOK THE SECOND. 233
BUT enough of fuch Speculations. The Ch. I
only remark, which we {hall make on
them, is this -, that " minute Change in
" PRINCIPLES leads to mighty Change in
" EFFECTS; fo that well are PRINCIPLES
" intitled to our regard, however m ap-
" pearance they may be trivial and low."
THE ARTICLES already mentioned are
thofe Jiriftly fo called ; but befides thefe
there are the PRONOMINAL ARTICLES,
fuch as Tfa's, That, Any, Other, Some; All,
No, or None, &c. Of thefe we have fpoken
already in our Chapter of Pronouns (m),
where
(m) See B.I. 0.5. p. 72, 73. It feems to have been
fome view of words, like that here given, which in-
duced Quintilian to fay of the Latin Tongue Nojler
fermo Articulos non dcfiderat ; ideoque in alias paries ora-
tionis fparguntur. Inft. Orat. L. I. c. 4. So Scaliger.
His declarath, fails conftat Grtscorum Articulos non neg-
leflos a nobis, fed eorum ufitm fuperfaum. Nam ubl ali-
quid preefcribendwn cjl, quod Graci per articulum efficient
(&EOI o JaAsc) exflstnr a Laiinis psrls ant Ii^LE \ Is,
auf
234 HERMES.
Ch. I. where we have (hewn, when they may be-
taken as Pronouns, and when as Articles.
Yet in truth it muft be confefled, if the
EfTence of an Article be to define and af cer-
tain t they are much more properly Arti-
cles, than any thing elfe, and as fuch mould
be confiaered in Univerfal Grammar.
Thus when we fay, THIS Pitfure I ap-
prove, but THAT I dijlike, what do we per-
form by the help of thefe Definitives, but
bring down the common Appellative to
denote two Individuals, the one as the more
near, the other as the more diflant ? So when
we fay, SOME men are 'virtuous, but ALL
men are mortal, what is the natural Effect
of this ALL and SOME, but to define
that Untverfah'fy, and Particularity, which
would remain indefinite, were we to take
them
eut, Illc fervus dixit, ds quo firvo aniea faEla menth fa,
aut qui olio quo patfo notus fit. jSd&tur enim Art'uulus
ad rei memoriam renovandam, cujm antea non nefdi fumus,
(tut ad prafcribendam intclletticnem, qua latitis paters
aueat ; velut't cum dicimus, C. Csefar, Is qui poftea dic-
tator fuit. Nam alii fuere C. Cafares. Sic Gr&s
o KjrtxoxTUQ. De Cauf. Ling. Lat. c. 131.
BOOK THE SECOND.
them away ? The fame is evident in fuch
Sentences, as SoMEfubftances havefenfa-
tion -, OTHERS want it~Chufe ANY way of
afting, and SOME men will find fault , 5cc.
For here SOME, OTHER, and ANY, ferve
all of them to define different Parts of a
given Whole -, SOME, to denote a definite
Part-, ANY, to denote an indefinite-, and
OTHER, to denote the remaining Part,
when a Part has been aflumed already.
Sometimes this laft Word denotes a large
indefinite Portion, fet in oppofition to fome
Jingle, definite, and remaining Part, which
receives from fuch Oppofition no fmall^de*
gree of heightening. Thus Virgil,
Excudent A.LII fpirantiq moUius tzra*,
(Credo e quid em) vivos ducent de mar mart
vultus ;
Orabunt caufas melius, ctzlique meatus
Defcribent radio, et furgentia fidsra
dicent ;
Tu regere imperio fopulos, ROMANE,
memento t &c.
236 HERMES.
Ch. I. NOTHING can be ftronger or more fub-
lime, than this Antithefis -, one Act fet as
equal to many other Afts taken together ;
and the Roman fmgly (for it is 7# Romane,
not Vos Romani] to all other Men ; and yet
this performed by fo trivial a caufe, as the
juft oppofition of ALII to Tu.
BUT here we conclude, and proceed to
treat of CONNECTIVES.
CHAP,
BOOK THE SECOND. 237
CHAP. II.
Concerning Connectives, and firjl thofe
called Conjunctions.
CONNECTIVES are the fubject of what Ch. II.
follows -, which, according as they
conned: either Sentences or Words, are cal-
led by the different Names of CON JUNC-
TIONS, or PREPOSITIONS. Of thefe Names,
that of the Prepojition is taken from a mere
accident, as it commonly ftands in connec-
tion before the Part, which it connects.
The name of the Conjunction, as is evident,
has reference to its effential character*
OF thefe two we (hall confider the CON-
JUNCTION firft, becaufe it connects, not
Words, but Sentences. This is conform-
able to the Analyfis, with which we be-
gan this inquiry *, and which led us, by
parity
* Sup. p. u, 12%
HERMES*
Ch. II. parity of reafon, to coAfider Sentences them*
' i
fehes before Words. Now the Definition
of a CONJUNCTION is as follows a Part
tf Speech, void of Signification itfelf, but
fo formed as to kelp Signification, by making
i wo or more figmfic ant Sentences to be ONE
Jignifaant Sentence (#).
THIS
{a] Grammarians have ufually confidered the Cort-
jun&ion as connefting rather fmgle Parts of Speech, than
whole Sentences, 1md that too with the addition of like
with like, Tenfe with Tenfe, Number with Number,
Cafe with Cafe, &c. This Sanfliits juftly explodes.
Conjimflio ncqxc cafus, ncyue alias paries oratisnis (at im-
periti docent) conjungit^ Ipfce enim paries inter fe conjun~
guntur -fed conjunttio Orationcs inter fe conjunglt. Miner.
L. III. c. 14. He then eftablifnes his do6lrine by a
variety of examples. He had already faid as much,
L.I. c. 1 8. and in this he appears to have followed
Scaliger^ who had afferted the fame before him. Con-
junttionis autem notionem veteres paullo inconfultius prodi-
dere ; neque enim, quod aiunt, partes alias conjunglt (ipfa
enim partes per fe inter fe conjunguniur)fed Conjunfli*
tfl, quee conjunct Oratiotus plures. De Cauf. Ling. Lat.
c. 165.
This
BOOK THE SECOND. 239
THIS therefore being the general Idea of Ch. II.
CONJUNCTIONS, we deduce their Species
in
This Do&rine of theirs is confirmed by
who in the fcveral places, where he mentions the Con-
junction, always considers it in Syntax as connecting
Sentences, and not Words, though in his works now ex-
tant he has not given us its Definition. See L. I. c. 2.
p. 14. L. II. c. 12. p. 124. L. III. c. 15. p. 234.
But we have fironger authority than this to fupport
Scaltger and SanfliuS) and that is Arljltfles Definition,
as the PafTage has been corrected by the beft Critics
and Manufcripts. A Conjunction, according to him, is
fpunJ5 acrfljuoj, IK rAjoyu;v /usu fyavuv |ut?, <njway7ixu
if, zsroiEw uTf^uxya pun (puvw fnnmltxvf. An arti-
culate Sound) devoid of Signification^ which is fe formed
fii to make ONE fignificant artitulaU Sound out of feveral
articulate Sottnds^ which are each of them fignlficant. Poet.
c. 20. In this view of things, the one figmficant arti-
culate Sound, formed ly the Conjunction^ is not the Union
of two or more Syllables in one fimple Word, nor even
of two or more Words in one fimple Sentence, but of
two or more finish Sentences in one complex Sentence,
which is confidercd as ONE, from that Concatenation
of Meaning effe&ed by the Conjunctions. For exam-
ple, let us take the Sentence, which follows. If Men
gre'fy nature focialy 't'n their Inter ejl to be juji, though it
were
HERMES.
Ch. II. in the following manner. CONJUNCTIONS,
while they conneft fentences, either conncft
were not fo ordained by the Laws of their Country. Here
are three Sentences, (i.) Men are by nature facial.
(2.) 'Tis Mans Interejl to be jujl. (3.) 'Tts not or-
dained by the Laws of every Country that Men fhould be
jujl. The firft two of thefe Sentences are made One
by the Conjunction, IF ; thefe, One with the third
Sentence, by the Conjunction, THO' ; and the three,
thus united, make that (pwi/w piz ruptwriJM), that one
ftgntficant articulate Sound, of which Anjhtle fpeaks,
and which is the refult of the conjunctive Power.
This explains a paflage in his Rhetoric, where he
mentions the fame Subject. 'O yap G-Ju
T uToXAa* &T I&.M tfcxipsty;^ ri\ov on
TO ? isroXAa. The Conjunction makes many, ONE ; fo
that if it be taken away, 'tis then evident on the contrary
that one will be MANY. Rhet. III. c. 12. His inftance
of a Sentence, diverted of its Conjunctions, and thus
made many out of one, is, ^Afiov, airvfara, SfojxinL
veni, occurri, rogavt, where by the way the three Sen-
tences, refulting from this Diflblution, ( for rA6ov,
ATrj&lnr&j and i*;-'ur,->, are- each of them, when un-
connefled, fo many perfect Sentences) prove that thefe
are the proper Subjects of the Conjnnilion\ connective
faculty.
BOOK THE SECOND. 241
a//b their meanings, or not. For exam- Ch. II.
pie : let us take thefe two Sentences
Rome was enjlaved Ctefar was ambitious
and connect them together by the Con-
j unction, BECAUSE. Rome was enjlaved,
BECAUSE Ctefar was ambitious. Here the
Meanings, as well as the Sentences, appear
to be connected. But if I fay, Manners
muft be reformed, OR Liberty will be loft*
here the Conjunction, OR, though it join
the
Ammowtiss account of the ufe of this Part of Speech
is elegant. AJO V >^ ruv Atfyajv o plv vTrizpfciv fj.!xv <m-
o xvp*W fi?, dvx\o'yr i av */, rw priotTru TJT-
'JAw, KJ J'j* TSTO EVJ Af^OjUEvw' o
voii -srajf JbxVj avaAo^er rv} vn\ ry EX
pavrj uAwv, uW Js TCOV ^oiCpcop
vw<rtv. O/" Sentences that, -which denotes one Exljlence
Jirxply, and which is JlnSlly ONE, may be confidered a:
analogous to a piece of Timber not yet fever W, and called
en this account One. That^ which denotes feveral Exift-
ences, and which appears to be made ONE by feme Conjunc-
tive Particle, is aualagws to. a Ship, made up of many pieces
of Timber, and which by means of the nails has an apparent
Unity. Am. in Lib. de Interpret, p. 54, 6.
R
242 HERMES.
Ch. II. the Sentences, yet as to their refpe&ive
Meanings, i a perfect Disjunffruf. And
thus it appears, that though all Conjunc-
tions conjoin Sentences, yet with refpedt to
the Senfe, fome are CONJUNCTIVE, and
fome DISJUNCTIVE -, and hence (b) 'tis
that we derive their different Species.
THE Conjunctions, Ivhich conjoin both
Sentences and their Meanings, are either
COPULATIVES, or CONTINUATIVES.
The principal Copulative in Englijh is,
AND. The Continuatives are, IF, BE-
CAUSE, THEREFORE, THAT, &c. The
Difference between thefe is this The
Copulative does no more than barely couple
Sentences, and is therefore applicable to all
Subjects, whofe Natures are not incompa-
tible. Continuatives, on the contrary, by
a more intimate connection, confolidate
I Sen-
() Thus Scaliger. Aut ergo Senfum conjungunt, a
Vtrba.', out Verio, tantum conjungunt, Senfum vero dif-
De C, L. Lat. c. 167.
BOOK THE SECOND. 243
Sentences into one continuous Whole, and Ch. II.
are therefore applicable only to Subjects,
which have an effential Co-Incidence.
To explain by Examples 'Tis no way
improper to fay, Lyjippus was a Statuary -,
AND Prifcian 'was a Grammarian T6e
Sunjhinetb, AND the Sky is clear becaufe
thefe are things that may co-exift, and yet
imply no abfurdity. But it would be ab-
furd to fay, Lyjippus was a Statuary, BE-
CAUSE Prifcian was a Grammarian-, tho*
not to fay, the Sun Jhinetb, BECAUSE the
Sky is clear. The Reafon is, with refpect
to the firft, the Co-incidence is merely ac-
cidental ; with refpect to the laft, tis effen-
tial, and founded in nature. And fo much
for the Distinction between Copulatives
and Continuatfoes (c].
As
(r) Copulatha eft, qua copulat tarn Verba^ quam Sen-
fum. Thus Prifcian, p. 1026. But Scaliger is more
explicit-^// Senfum cwjungunt (conjunftinnesfi.) ant ne-
R 2
244 HERMES.
Ch. II. As to Continuatives, they are either
SUPPOSITIVE, fuchas, IF; or POSITIVE,
fuch as, BECAUSE, THEREFORE, As.Gfc.
Take Examples of each you will live
happily, IF you live hone/lly -you live hap-
pily ', BE CAUSE you five honeftly. The Dif-
ference between thefe Continuatives is this
~-The Suppofiti-ves denote Connexion, but
afTert not actual Exiflence; the Pojitives
imply both the one and the other
FARTHER
o) out nan necejjario : &*, finon necejjario ^ turn fittnt
s^ &c. De C. Ling. Lat. c. 167. Prifcian^
ownaccount of Continuatives isas follows. Continuativa
font, qua cantinuatifnem & confequentiam rcrurt fignificant
ibid. Scaliger's account hcauj/am out preeftituunt^
autfubdunt. Ibid. c. 1 68. The Greek name for the
Copulative was iJv^o-jU^ ru^rAntTixoc -, for the Con-
t'rnuative, <nva7r7j>wV ; the Etymologies of which words
juftly diftinguifli their refpedtive characters.
(d) The old Greek <3rammarians confined the name
i, and the Latins that of Cont'muativa to thofe
Cow-
BOOK THE SECOND. 245
FARTHER than this, the Pofitives above Ch. II.
mentioned are either CAUSAL, fuch as,
BECAUSE, SINCE, As, &c. or COLLEC-
TIVE, fuch as, THEREFORE, WHERE-
FORE, THEN, &c. The Difference be-
tween thefe is this the Caufals fubjoin
Caufes to Effefts T^he Sun is in Eclipfe,
BE-
Conju nations, which we have called Suppojttive or Con-
ditional^ while the Pofitive they called sraparjvaTrljxo),
or Subcontinuatha:. They agree however in defcribing
their proper Characters. The firft according to Gaza
are, <H uVap^ju jtxsv , axoA6/au Si nvoc >cj TKW Ji-
AWf? L. IV. Prifcian fays, they fignify to us, qua-
ils eji wdinatio & natura rerum, cum dubitatione aliqua
effentits rerum p. 1027. And Scaliger fays, they con-
join fine fubjiflentia neceffarid ; poteji enim fubfijlere fcf non
jubfiftere ; utrumque enim admittunt. Ibid. c. 168. On
the contrary of the Pofltive, or TzrapatruvaTrlixol (to ufe
his own name) Gaza tells us, o' T j K, vTrocotw ptroi
Totfctw <xnpMiWrn vrmyi And Prifcian fays, caufam
(ontinuationis ojlendunt confequentem cum tffentia rerum
And Scaliger, non fx typothefi, fed ex eo > quod fubfjft.it ',
(onjungunt. Ibid.
R 3 It
246 HERMES.
Ch. II. ZECAVSE t&e Moon mtervenes~~T&e Collec-
tives fubjoin EJfetts tQ Caufes^The Moon
intervenes, THEREFORE the Sun is in
ILclipfe. Now we ufe Caufah in thofe
inftances, where, the Effeft being con-
fpicuous, we feek its Caufe ; and Collec-
tives, in Demonftrations, and Science pro*
perly fo called, where the Caufe being
known
It may feem at firft fomewhat ftrange, why the Pafi-
the Conjunctions fhould have been confidered as Sub-
ordinate to the Suppofitive, which by their antient Names
appears to have been the fa&. Is it, that the Pofitive
are confined to what afiually is ', the Suppofitive extend
to PoJ/ibleSj nay even as far as to ImpoJJibles ? Thus 'tis
falfe to affirm, At it is Day> it is Light, unlefs it a&ually
be Day. But we may at midnight affirm, If it be Day,
it is Light, becaufe the, IF, extends to Poflibles alfo.
Nay we may affirm, by its help (if we pleafe) even Im-
pofiibles. We may fay, If the Sun be cubical^ then ii
the Sun angular ; If the Sky fall, then jhall we catch Larks.
Thus too Scaliger upon the fame occafion amplitudi-
ncm Continuativts percipi ex eo, quod etiam impojjibile ali-
quando prafupponit. De C. L. Lat. C. 168. In this
fenfe then the Continuative, Suppofitive or Conditional
Conjunlion is (as it were) fuperior to the Pofitive, as
being of greater latitude in its application.
BOOK THE SECOND. 247
known firft, by its help we difcern confe- Ch. II.
* i
quences (e).
ALL thefe Confirmative* are refolvable
in to Copulatives. Inftead of, BECAUSE it is
Day, it is light, we may fay, // is Day,
AND it is Light, Inftead of, IF it be Day,
it is Light, we may fay, 'T/f at the fame
time neceffary to be Day, AND to be Light,
and fo in other Inflances. The Reafon i%
that the Power of the Copulative extends
to all Connections, as well to the effential,
as to the cafual or fortuitous. Hence there-
fore the Continuative may be refolved into
a Copulative and fomet Ling more, that is to
fay, into a Copulative implying an effential
Co-incidence (/") in the Subjects conjoined.
R 4 As
(*) The Latins called the Caufals, Caufales or Cau-
fativa ; the Collectives, ColleRiva or Illathts : The
Greeks called the former 'AiTjoAo^jxoi, and the latter
(f) Refolvuntur autem in Copulative omnes b<s, j>rof>-
terea quod Caufa cum Effettu Snaptt naturd conjunSa eft
. de C. L. Lat. c. 169.
HERMES.
Ch. II. As to Caufal Conjunctions (of which
we have fpoken already) there is no one
of the four Species of Caufes, which they
are not capable of denoting : for example,
THE MATERIAL CAUSE- The Trumpet
founds, BECAUSE 'tis made of Metal THE
FORMA L The Trumpet founds, BECAUSE
'tis long and hollow THE EFFICIENT
The Trumpet founds, BECAUSE an Artift
blows it THE FINAL The Trumpet
founds, THAT it may raife our courage.
Where 'tis worth obferving, that the three
firft Caufes are expreft by the ftrong affir-
mation of the Indicative Mode, becaufe if
the Effect actually be, thefe muft of ne-
ceffity be alfo. But the laft Caufe has a
different Mode, namely, the Contingent
or Potential. The Reafon is, that the
Final Caufe, tho' it may be^yfr/2 in Specu-
lation, is always laft in Event. That is to
fay, however it may be the End^ which
fet the Artift firjft to work, it may ftill be
an End beyond his Power, to obtain, and
which
BOOK THE SECOND. 249
which like other Contingents, may either Ch ; II.
happen, or not (g.) Hence alfo it is con-
nected by Conjunctions of a peculiar kind,
fuch as, THAT, *V, UT, &c.
THE Sum is, that ALLCONJUNCTIONS,
which connect both Sentences and their Mean-
ings, are either COPULATIVE, or CONTI-
NUATIVE; the Continuatives are either
Conditional, or Poftive -, and the Pofitives
are either Caufal or Collective.
AND now we come to the DISJUNC-
TIVE CON JUNCTIONS, a Species of Words
which bear this contradictory Name, be-
caufe, while they disjoin the Senfe, they
conjoin the Sentences ().
WITH
(g) See B.I. c. 8. p. 142. See alfo Vol. 1. Noto
p. 27 1. For the four Caufes fee Vol. I. Note
XVII. p. 280.
(b) *0. SI
Gaza
Gram.
250 HERMES.
Ch. IT. WITH refpeft to thefe we may obferve,
that as there is a Principle of UN i o N difFufed
throughout all things, by which THIS
WHOLE is kept together, and preferved
from Diflipation ; fo there is a Principle of
DIVERSITY difFufed in like manner, the
Source of Diftinction, of Number, and of
Order (/).
Novr
Gram. L. IV. Disjunctive funt, qua, quamvis difti-
enes ccnjungant, fenfum tatnen disjuntlum habent. Prifc.
L. XVI. p. 1029. And hence it is, that a Sentence,
connected by Disjunctives, has a near rcfemblance to a
ftmple negative Truth. For though this as to its Intel-
lection be disjunctive (its end being to disjoin the Sub-
ject from the Predicate) yet as it combines Terms to-
gether into one Proportion, 'tis as truly fynthetical, as
any Truth, that is affirmative. See Chap. I. Note ().
P-3-
(/') The DIVERSITY, which adorns Nature, maybe
faid to heighten by degrees, and as it pafles to different
Subje&s, to become more and more intenfe. Some
things only differ, when confidered as Individuals, but if
we recur to their Species^ immediately lofe all Diftinc-
tion : fuch for inftance are Socrates and Plato. Others
ilffir as to Species, but as to Gtnut are the fame : fuch
arc
BOOK THE SECOND. 251
Now 'tis to exprefs in fome degree tie Ch. IT.
Modifications of this Diverfity, that DIS-
JUNCTIVE CONJUNCTIONS fecm firft to
have been invented.
OF thefe DISJUNCTIVES, ibme are
SIMPLE, fome ADVERSATIVE Simple,
as when we fay, EITHER it is Day, OR it
is
are Man and Lion. There are others again, which dif-
fer as to Genus, and co-incide only in thofe tranfcenden-
tal Comprehenfions of Ens, Being, Exiftence, and the
like : fuch are Quantities and j^opJrfwr, as for example
an Ounce, and the Colour, IWnte. Laftly ALL BEING
whatever differs, as Being, from Non-being.
Farther, in all things different, however moderate
their Diverfity, there is an appearance of OPPOSITION
with refpedt to each other, in as much as each thing it
if [elf, and not any of the reft. But yet in all Subje&s
this Oppofition is not the fame. In RELATIVES, fuch
as Greater and Lefs, Double and Half, Father and Son,
Caufe and Effect:, in thefe 'tis more ftriking, than in or-
dinary Subjects, becaufe thefe always fhew it, by necef-
fqrily inferring each other. In CONTRARIES, fuch as
Blade and White, Even and Odd, Good and Bad,
Virtuous
252 'HERMES.
Ch. II. is Night Adverfative, as when we fay, If
is not Day, BUT it is Night. The Differ-
ence between thefe is, that the limple do
no more, than merely disjoin ; the Adver*
fatiiie disjoin, with an Oppofition concomi-
tant. Add to this, that the Adverfative
are definite -, the Simple, indefinite. Thus
when we fay, he Number Three is not
an
Virtuous and Vitious, in thefe the Oppofition goes ftill
farther, becaufe thefe not only differ, but are even de-
Jlruftive of each other. But the mojl potent Oppofition is
that of 'Ai/liipaio-j?, or CONTRADICTION, when we
oppofe Proportion to Proportion, Truth to Faljhood, af-
ferting of any Subjeft, either it is, or is not. This in-
deed is an Oppofition, which extends itfelf to all things,
for every thing conceivable muft needs have its Nega-
tive, though multitudes by nature have neither Rela-
tives, nor Contraries.
Befides thefe Modes of DIVERSITY, there are others
fliat deferve notice; fuch for inftance, as the Diverfity
between the Name of a thing, and its Definition ; be-.
tween the various Names, which belong to the fame thing,
and the various things, which are denoted by the fame
Name ; all which Diverfities upon occafion become a
Part of our Difcourfe. And fo npuch, in fhort, for $he
Subject of DIVERSITY.
BOOK THE SECOND, 253
an even Number, BUT an odd, we not only Ch. II.
disjoin two oppofite Attributes, but we de-
finitely affirm one, and deny the other.
But when we fay, I'be Number of the Stars
is EITHER even OR odd, though we aflert
one Attribute to be, and the other not to
be, yet the 'Alternative notwithftanding is
left indefinite. And fo much for Jimpk
Disjunctives (&).
As
() The fimple Disjun&ive *, or Vel 9 is tnoftly ufed
indefinitely fo as to leave an Alternative. But when it
is ufed definitely^ fo as to leave no Alternative, 'tis then
a perfect Disjunctive of the Subfequent from the Pre-
vious, and has the fame force with xj , or, Et non*
"Tis thus Gaza explains that Verfe of Homer.
IA. A.
That is to fay, / defer e the pecple Jhould be fayed, AND
NOT be deftroyed? the Conjunction n being avai^TixaV*
w fublative. Jt muft however be % confeft, that this Verfe
is otherwife explained by an Ellipfis, either of
r auTjf, concerning which fee the Commentators'.
Ch. II. As to Muer/afive Disjunctives, it has
been faid already that they imply OPPO-
SITION. Now there can be no Oppofition
of the fame Attribute, in the fame Subject,
as when we fay, Nireus was beautiful ;
but the Oppofition muft be either of the
fame Attribute in different Subjetfs, as when
we fay, Brutus was a Patriot, BUT Cafar
was not or of different Attributes in the
fame Subjeft, as when we fay, Gorgias was
a Sopbift, BUT not a Phihfopber or ofdif-
ferenf Attributes in different Subjects, as
when we fay, Plato was a PMofof&er,x\JT
Hippias was a Sophtft.
THE Conjunctions ufed for all thele pur-
pofes may be called ABSOLUTE ADVER-
SATIVES.
BUT there are other Advcrfatives, be-
fides thefe ; as when we fay, Nireus was
more beautiful, THAN Acbillei Virgil was
A9
BOOK THE SECOND. 255
AS great a Poet, AS Cicero was an Orator. Ch. II.
The Character of thefe latter is, that they
go farther than the former, by marking
not only Oppofition* but that Equality or
Excefs, which arifes among Subjects from
their being compared. And hence 'tis they
may be called ADVERSATIVES OF COM-
PARISON.
BESIDES the Adverfatives here men-
tioned, there are two other Species, of
which the mod eminent are UNLESS and
A L T H o*. For example *froy will be taken*
UNLESS the Palladium be preferred Tr^y
will be taken, A L T H o' Hettor defend It. The
Nature of thefe Adverfatives may be thus
explained. As every Event is naturally allied
to itsCaufe, fo by parity of reafon'tis oppofed
to its Preventive. And as every Caufe ii
either adequate (/) or in-adequate (in-ade-
quate,
(7) This Diftin&ion has reference to common Opinion^
and the form of Language^ ccnfonant thereto. In ftricl
naetaphyfical truth, jtf Coufe^ tiat is not edfquatt t it
*ny Cauje at aJL
256 H E R M E 3.
Ch, II. quate, when it endeavours, xvithout being
effectual) fci in like manner is every Preven-
tive. Now adequate Preventives are expreft
by fuch Adverfatives, as u N L E s s Troy will
be taken y UNLESS the Palladium bepreferved,
that is, 'This alone is fufficient to prevent
it. The In-adequate are expreft by fuch
Adverfatives, as ALTHO'- Troy will be
taken , ALTHO' Heft or defend it; that is>
Heft or s Defence will prove in-effecluaL
.
THE Names given by the old Gram-*
marians to denote thefe laft Adverfativesy
appear not fufficiently to exprefs their Na-
tures (m). They may be better perhaps
called ADVERSATIVES ADEQUATE, and
IN-ADEQJJATE.
AND thus it is that all DISJUNCTIVES,
that is CONJUNCTIONS, which conjoin Sen-
tences,
(m) They called them for the moil part, without
fnfficient Diftinclion of their Species, AdycrfotivtSi or
BOOK THE SECOND. 257
fences, but not their Meanings, are either Ch. II
SIMPLE or ADVERSATIVE; and that all
AD VERSATIVES are either Abfolute or Com-
parative -, or elfe Adequate or In-adequate.
WE fhall finifh this Chapter with a few
mifcellany Obfervations.
IN the firft place it may be obferved,
through all the Species of Disjunctives,
that the fame Disjunctive appears to have
greater or lefs force, according as the Sub-
jects, which it disjoins, are more or lefa
disjoined by Nature. For example, if
we fay, Every Number is even, OR odd
Every Proportion is true, o^falfe nothing
feems to disjoin more Jlrongly than the
Dirjuntfrve, becaufe no things are in Na-
ture more incompatible than the Subjects*
But if we fay, That Qbjett is a "Triangle,
OR Figure contained under three right lines
the (OR) in this cafe hardly feems to
disjoin, or indeed to do more, than di-
ftincily to exprefs the Thing, firft by its
S Name,
258 H E R M E S.
Ch. II. Name, and then by its Definition. So if we
fay, T^hat Figure is a Sphere, OR a Globe,
OR a Ball the Disjunctive in this cafe,
tends no farther to disjoin, than as it di-
ftinguifhes the feveral Names, which be-
long to fazfame Thing (n).
AGAIN the Words, When and Where,
and all others of the fame nature, fuch as,
Whence, Whit her, Whenever, Wherever, &c,
may be properly called ADVERBIAL CON-
JUNCTIONS, becaufe they participate the
nature both of Adverbs and Conjunctions
of Conjunctions, as they conjoin Senten-
ces ;
(n} The Latins had a peculiar Particle for this occa-
iion, which they called Subdisjunfiiva, a Subdisjunclive - f
and that was SIVE. Alexander five Paris ; Mars Jive
Movers. The Greek'Eir *v leems to anfwer the fame
end. Of thefe Particles, Scaliger thus fpeaks Etfant
nomen Subdisjunftivarum rettc accept um /?, neque enim
tarn plane disjungit, quam Disjunftiva. Nam Disjunc-
tive ftint in Contrariis Subdisjunflivts autern etlam in
non Contrariis, fed Diver/is tantum ; ut, Alexander ftvt
Paris. DeC. L. Lat. c, 170.
BOOK THE SECOND. 259
ces ; of Adverbs, as they denote the At- Ch. II.
tributes either of Time, or of Place.
AGAIN thefe Adverbial Conjunttions,
and perhaps moft of the Prepofitions (con-
trary to the Chara&er of accejjory Words,
which have^ftriclly no Signification, but
when aflbciated with other words) have a
kind of obfcure Signification, when taken
alone, by denoting thofe Attributes of
Time and Place. And hence 'tis, that
they appear in Grammar, like Zoopbites
in Nature; a kind of (o) middle Beings,
of amphibious character, which, by ha-
ring the Attributes of the higher and the
lower, conduce to link the Whole toge-
ther (/>).
AND
jUiroaiwnx, fi ofnrnrstren TT TII/U/V,
^ov 7i (pyroV ThemijL p. 74. Ed. Aid. See alib
Arijl. de Animal. Part. p. 93. 1. 10. Ed. Syll.
(/>) 'Tis fomewhat furprizing that the politeft and
moft elegant of the Attic Writers, and Plato above all
S 2 the
260 HERMES.
Ch. II. ANDfo muchfor CONJUNCTIONS, their
Genus, and their Species.
the reft, fhould have their Works filled with Particles
of all kinds, and with Conjunctions in particular; while
in the modern polite Works, as well of ourfelves as of
our neighbours, fcarce fuch a Word as a Particle, or
Conjunction is to be found. Is it, that where there is
Connexion in the Meaning, there muft be Words had to
tonnefl ; but that where the Connection is little or none,
fuch Connectives are of little ufe ? That Houfes of Cards,
without cement, may well anfwer their end, but not
thofe Houfes, where one would chufe to dwell ? Is this
the Caufe ? or have we attained an Elegance, to the
Antients unknown ?
Venlmus adfummamfortuna^ &c.
CHAP*
BOOK THE SECOND. 261
CHAP. III.
Concerning thofe Connectives, called
Prepojitions.
PREPOSITIONS by their name exprefs Ch.IIL
their Place, but not their Character.
Their Definition will diftinguifti them
from the former Connectives. A PRE-
POSITION is a Part of Speech, devoid iff elf
of Signification, but Jo formed as to unite
two Words that arejignificant, and that re-
fufe to co-alefce or unite \ of themselves (a).
This
(a) The Stoic Name for a Prepofition was
TIJCO? Su'vtfVuos-, Prapofitiva ConjunSlio, A Prepofttlve
Conjunction. 'lij [j.\v y^ KXTU, rots aAAa?
sii &\f]x<; IIoo9fTi>c^f Sv
Now in what manner even in other applications (befides
the prefent) Prepofitions give proof of their Conjunctive
Syntax, we have mentioned already ; whence too the Stoics
S 3 took
262 H E R M E S.
Ch.III- This connective Power, (which relates to
Words only, and not Sentences] will be bet-
ter underftood from the following Specu-
lations.
SOME things co-alefce and unite of
themfehes-, others refufe to do fo without
help, and as it were compulfion. Thus in
Works of Art, the Mortar and the Stone
co-alefce of themfelves ; but the Wainfcot
and the Wall not without Nails and Pins.
Jn Nature this is more confpicuous. For
example j all Quantities, and Qualities co-
alefce immediately with their Subftances.
Thus 'tis we fay, a fierce Lion, a <vaft Moun-
tain-, and from this Natural Concord of Sub-
ject bnd Accident, arifes the Grammatical
Concord of Subftantrue and Adjeftfae. In
like
took occafton to call them PREPOSITIVE CONJUNCTI-
ONS. Apollcn. L. IV. c. 5. p. 313. Yet is this in fad
rather a defcriptive Sketch, than a complete Definition,
fince there are other Conjunctions, which are Prepofi-
five as well as thefc. See Gaz. L. IV. de Praepofit.
frijc, I, XIV. p. 983. 4
BOOK THE SECOND. 263
like manner Adlions co-alefce with their Ch.III.
Agents, and Paffions with their Patients.
Thus 'tis we fay, Alexander conquers-, Da-
rius is conquered. Nay, as every Energy is
a kind of Medium between its Agent and
Patient, the whole three, Agent, Energy,
and Patient, co-alefce with the fame facil-
ty ; as when we fay, Alexander conquers Da.
rius. And hence, that is from thefe Modes
of natural Co- alefcence, arifes the Gra?nma-
tical Regimen of the Verb by its Nominative,
and of the Accufative by its Verb. Farther
than this, Attributives themfelves may be
mod of them characterized ; as when we fay
of fuch Attributives as ran, beautiful, learn-
ed, he ranfwiftly, me was very beautiful,
he was moderately learned, Sec. And hence
the Co-alefcence of the Adverb with Verbs,
Participles, and Adjectives.
THE general Conclufion appears to be
this. " THOSE PARTS OF SPEECH UNITE
" OF THEMSELVES IN GR AMM AR,WHOSE
" ORIGINAL ARCHETYPES UNITE OF
84 " THEM-
264 HERMES.
Ch.III. <( THEMSELVES IN NATURE." Towhich
we may add, as following from what has
been faid, that the great Objetts of Natural
Union are SUBSTANCE and ATTRIBUTE.
Now tho' Subjlances naturally co-incide
with their Attributes, yet they abfolutely
refufe doing fo, one with another (b]. And
hence thofe known Maxims in Phyfics,
that Body is impenetrable -, that two Bodies
cannot poj/efs the fame place -, that the fame
Attribute cannot belong to different Sub-
Jlances, &c.
FROM thefe Principles it follows, that
when we form a Sentence, the Subftantfae
without difficulty co-incides with the Verb,
from the natural Co-incidence of Subftancf
and Energy THE SUN WAR MET H. So
Jikewife the Energy with the Subjetf, on
which
(b) Caufa^ propter quam duo Subftantha ncn ponuntu?
fine copula^ e Phiiofopbia petenda eji : neque tnim duo fub-
Jlantiaiiter umim ejje pote/i, ficut Subfttnttia et Accident \
itaque non duas> CAESAR CATO PUQNAT. Seal, de
Cauf. Ling. Lat. c. 177.
BOOK THE SECOND. 265
which it operates WARMETH THE Ch.IIL
EARTH. So likewife both Subjlance and
Energy with their proper Attributes.
THE SPLENDID SUN, GENIALLY WARM-
ETH THE FERTILE EARTH. But fup-
pofe we were defirous to add other Sub-
ftantives, as for inftance, AIR, or BEAMS.
How would thefe co-incide, or under what
Character could they be introduced ? Not
as Nominatives or AccuTatrv&i for both
thofe places are already filled; the Nomi-
native by the Subftance, SUN -, the Accu-
fative by the Subftance, EARTH. Not as
Attributes to thefe laft, or to any other
thing ; for Attributes by nature they nei~
ther are, nor can be made. Here then we
perceive the Rife and Ufe of PREPOSI-
TIONS. By thefe we connect thofe Sub-
ftantives to Sentences, which at the time
are unable to co-alefce of themfehes. Let
us affume for inftance a pair of thefe Con-
nectives, THRO' and, WITH, and mark
their Effect upon the Subftances here men-
tioned. Theffkndid Sun WITH his Beams
genially
266 HERMES.
Ch.III. genially warmeth THRO' the Air the fertile
Earth. The Sentence, as before, remains
in fire and one-, the Subjlantwes required
are both introduced-, and not a Word,
which was there before, is detruded from
its proper place.
IT muft here be obferved that moft, if
not all Prepofitions feem originally formed
to denote the Relations of PL ACE (<:). The
reafon is, this is that grand 'Relation, which
Bodies or natural Subjiances maintain at all
times one to another, whether they are
contiguous or remote, whether in motion,
or at reft.
IT may be faid indeed that in the Con-
tinuity of Place they form this UNIVERSE
or
(c] Omne corpus out movetur out quiefcit : quare opus
fuit aliqud nota, quec T O x II O T*" fignificaret, frue ejjet
inter duo extreme, inter qua motus ft, feue cflet in alters
extremorum, in quibusfit qules. Hinc eliciemus Prapofitio-
nis effentialem defnit'tonem. Seal, de Cauf. Ling. Lat.
c,
BOOK THE SECOND. 267
or VISIBLE WHOLE, and are made as Ch.IIL
much ON F,by that general Comprehenfion,
as is confiftent with their feveral Natures,
and fpecific Diftindions. Thus 'tis we
have Prepolitions to denote the contiguous
Relation of Body, as when we fay, Caius
walked w i T H a Staff] the Statue flood UPON
a Pedeftal ; the River ran OVER a Sand ,
others for the detached Relation, as when
we fay, He is going T o Italy ; the Sun is
rifen ABOVE the Hills; theje Figs came
FROM T^urky. So as to Motion and Reft,
only with this difference, that here the Pre-
pofition varies its character with the Verb.
Thus if we fay, that Lamp hangs FROM
the Ceiling, the Prepofition,FROM, affumes
a Character of Quiefcence. But if we fay,
that Lamp is falling FROM the Ceiling, the
Prepofition in fuch cafe affumes a Charac-
ter of Motion. So in Milton,
Tofupport uneajie Steps
OVER the burning Marie Par. L.I,
Here OVER denotes Motion.
Again
268 HERMES.
Ch.lII. Again
He with looks of cordial Love
Hung OVER her enamour d Par. L.IV.
Here OVER denotes Reft.
BUT though the original ufe of Prepofi-
tions was to denote the Relations of Place,
they could not be confined to this Office
only. They by degrees extended them-
felves to Subjects incorporeal, and came to
denote Relations, as well intellectual, as
local. Thus, becaufe in Place he, who is
above, has commonly the advantage over
him, who is below^ hence we transfer OVER
and UNDER to Dominion and Obedience -, of
a King we fay, he ruled OVER his People-,
of a common Soldier, he ferved UNDER
fuch a General. So too we fay, with
Thought ; without Attention ; thinking
over a. Subject; under Anxiety; fromFear;
out of Love ; through Jealoufy, &c. All
which inftances, with many others of like
kind,
BOOK THE SECOND. 269
kind, fhew that the firfi Words of Men, Ch-III.
like their^/fr/? Ideas, had an immediate re-
ference tofenfible Qbjefts, and that in after
days, when they began to difcern with
their Intellect, they took thofe Words,
which they found already made, and
transferred them by metaphor to intellec-
tual Conceptions. There is indeed no
Method to exprefs new Ideas, but either
this of Metaphor, or that of Coining new
Words, both which have been pradlifed
by Philofophers and wife Men, accord-
ing to the nature, and exigence of the oc-
calion (d).
IN
(d) Among the Words new coined we may afcribe
to Anaxagoras^ 'Opoioptonx ; to Plato, UOIOT^ ; to
Cicero, g^talitas ; to Anjlotle, 'EflsA^a ; to the
Stoics, ^Oj-n?, Kauris, and many others. - Among
the Words transferred by Metaphor from common to
fpedal Meanings, to the Platonics we may afcribe '!&% ;
to the Pythagoreans and Peripatetics, KxTfyootx, and
YLatTrty^eiv ; to the Stoics, KaraAvJ;i{, y
fin'xov j to the Pyrrhoni/ls, "?n, Ij
And
270 HERMES.
Ch.III. IN the foregoing ufe of Prepofuions,
we have feen how they are applied jcara
TtrotftaQea-iv, by <way of f juxta-pojition j that is
to fay, where they are prefixt to a Word,
with-
And here I cannot but obfervc, that he who pretends
to difcufs the Sentiments of any one of thefe Philofo-
phers, or even to cite and translate him (except in trite
and obvious Sentences) without accurately knowing the
Greek Tongue in general ; the nice differences of many
Words apparently fynonymous ; the peculiar Stile of the
Author whom he prefumes to handle; the new coined
Words, and new Significations given to old Words,
ufed by fuch Author, and his Seel j the whole Philo-
fophy of fuch Set, together with the Connections and
Dependencies of its feveral Parts, whether Logical,
Ethical, or Phyfical; He, I fay, that, without this
previous preparation, attempts what I have faid, will
fhoot in the dark ; will be liable to perpetual blunders ;
will explain, and praife, and cenfure merely by chance ;
and though he may poffibly to Fools appear as a wife
Man, will certainly among the Wife ever pafs for a
Fool. Such a A'lan's Intellect comprehends antient
Philofophy, as his Eye comprehends a diftant Profpecl.
He may fee perhaps enough, to know Mountains from
Plains, and Seas from Woods; but for an accurate dif-
cernment of particulars, and their character, this with-
out farther helps 'tis impoffible he fhould attain.
BOOK THE SECOND. 271
without becoming a Part of it. But they Ch-IIL
may be ufed alfo jcara rwQtewt by 'way of
Compojition, that is, they may be prefixt to
a Word, fo as to become a real Part of
it (e]. Thus in Greek we have 'Eirtfctfffau,
in Latin, IntelUgere, in Englifh, to Under-
ftand. So alfo, to foretel, to overaff, to
undervalue, to outgo, &c. and in Greek and
Latin, other Inftances innumerable. In
this cafe the Prepositions commonly trans-
fufe fomething of their own Meaning into
the Word, with which they are compound-
ed; and this imparted Meaning in molt
inftances will be found ultimately refolv-
able into fome of the Relations of PLACE,
(f) as ufed either in its proper or metapbo*
rical acceptation.
LASTLY,
(e} See Gaz. Gram. L. IV. Cap. de Praepofitione.
(f) For example, let us fuppofe fome given Space.
E & Ex fignify out of that Space; PER, through it,
from beginning to end; IN, within it j SUB, under it.
Hence
272 HERMES.
Ch.III. LASTLY, there are times, when Prepo-
fitions totally lofe their connective Nature,
being
Hence then E and PER in compofition augment ; Enor-
mhj fomething not fimply big, but big in excefs ; fome-
thing got cut cf the rule, and beyond the meafure j Dico,
\fyfpeak \ Edico, tofpeakout; whence Ediflum an Edifl?
fomething fo effectually fpokcn, as all are fuppofed to
hear, and all to obey. So Terence^
Dico, Edlco vobis Eun. V. 5. 20.
which (as Donatus tells us in his Comment) is an
Fari, tofpeak; Effari, to fpeak out hence
an Axiom, or felf--evident Propofition, fome-
thing addrefled as it were to all men, and calling for
univerfal Aflent. Cic. Acad. II. 29. Permagnus^ Per'
uti/is, great throughout, ufeful through every part.
On the contrary, IN and SUB diminifh and leflen.
InjufluSj IniquuS) unjujl^ inequitable^ that lies within
Juftice and Equity, that reaches not fo far, that falls
Jhort of them ; Subniger, blackifo j Subrubicundus, red-
dijh; tending to black, and tending to red, but yet
under the flandard, and behw perfection.
Emo originally fignified to take away ; hence it came
to fignify to buy, becaufe he, who buys, takes away
his purchafe. INTER, Between^ implies Difcontinu-
4. ance %
BOOK THE SECOND. 273
being converted into Adverbs, and ufed in Ch.III.
Syntax accordingly. Thus Homer,
And Earth fmil'd all around,
IX. T. 362.
But of this we have fpoken in a preceding
Chapter (g). One thing we rnufr, how-
ever obferve, before we nnifh this Chap-
ter, which is, that whatever we may be
told of CASES in modern Languages,
there are in fact no fuch things ; but their
force and power is exprefl by two Me-
thods,
y for in things continuous there can nothing lie
between. From thefe two comes, Inter imo, 'to kilt,
that is to fay, to take a Man away in the mid/I of Life,
by making a Difcontinuance of his vital Energy. So alfo
Perimoy to kill a Man, that is to fay, to take him away
thoroughly ; for indeed what more thorough taking
away can well be fuppofed ? The Greek Verb, 'Avav,
and the Engli/h Verb, To take ofi feem both to carry
the fame allufion. And thus 'tis that Prepofitions be-
come Parts of other Words.
(g] See before p. 205.
T
274 HERMES
Ch-IIL thods, either by Situation, er by Prepofi-
tions \ the Nominative and Accufathe Cafes
by Situation ; the reft, by Prepofitions.
But this we (hall make the Subject of a
Chapter by itfelf, concluding here our In-
quiry concerning Prepofitions.
CHAP.
BOOK THE SECOND. 275
CHAP. IV.
Concerning Cafes.
AS CASES, or at leaft their various Ch.IV.
Powers, depend on the knowledge
partly of Nouns, partly of Verbs, and partly
of Prepojitions ; they have been referved,
till thofe Parts of Speech had been ex-
amined and difcufled, and are for that
reafon made the Subject of fo late a Chap-
ter, as the prefent.
THERE are "no CASES in the modem
i.
Languages, except a few among the pri-
mitive Pronouns, fuch as I, and ME j ]E,
and MOY ; and the E?iglijh Genitive,
formed by the addition of s, as when
from Lion, we form Lions -, from Ship,
Ship's. From this defect however we may
be enabled to difcover in fome instances
what a Cafe is, the Periphrajts, which fup-
T 2 plies
276 HERMES.
Ch.IV. plies its place, being the Cafe (as it were)
unfolded. Thus Equiis analized into Du
Cbeval, Of the Horfe 5 Equo into Au Che-
vat, To the Horfe. And hence we fee
that the GENITIVE and DATIVE CASES
imply the joint Power of a Noun and a
Prepo/ition, the Genitive's Prepofition be-
ing A, De, or Ex, the Dative's Prepofi-
tion being Ad, or Verfus*
WE have not this affiflance as to the
ACCUSATIVE, which in modern Languages
(a few inftances excepted) is only known
from its pofition, that is to fay, by being
fubfequent to its Verb, in the collocation
of the words.
THE VOCATIVE we pafs over from its
little ufe, being not only unknown to the
modern Languages, but often in the an-
tient being fupplied by the Nominative.
THE ABLATIVE likewife was ufed by
the Romans only ; a Cafe they feem to have
adopted
BOOK THE SECOND.
277
adopted to officiate with their Prepo/itions, Ch.IV.
as they had deprived their Genitive and>#-
tfae of that privilege -, a Cafe certainly not
neceflary, becaufe the Greeks do as well
without it, and becaufe with the Romans
themfelves 'tis frequently undiftinguifhed.
THERE remains the NOMINATIVE,
which whether it were a Cafe or no, was
much difputed by the Antients. The Peri-
patetics held it to be no Cafe, and likened
the Noun, in this its primary and original
Form, to a perpendicular Line, fuch for
example, as the line A B.
B
The Variations from the Nominative, they
confidered as if A B were to fall from its
perpendicular, as for example, to A C, or
A D. Hence then they only called thefe
Variations, riTHSEIS, CASUS, CASES, or
T 3 FAL-
278 HERMES.
Ch.IV. FALLINGS. The Stoics on the contrary,
and the Grammarians with them, made the
Nominative a CA s E alfo. Words they con-
iidered (as it were) to fall from the Mind,
or difcurfive Faculty. Now when a Noun
fell thence in its primary Form, they then
called it UTCII.IT, OP0H, CASUS REC-
TUS, AN ERECT, Or UPRIGHT CASE Or
FALLING, fuch as A B, and by this name
they diftinguifhed the Nominative. When
it fell from the Mind under any of its varia-
tions, as for example in the form of a Geni-
tive, a Dative, or the like, fuch variations
they called DTHSEIS nAATIAI, CA-
SUS OBLIQUI, OBLIQUE CASES, Or SIDE-
LONG FALLINGS (fuch as AC, or AD) in
oppofi tion to the other (that is A B) which
was erecl: and perpendicular (a). Hence
too Grammarians called the Method of
enumerating the various Cafes of a Noun,
r, DECLINATIO, a DECLENSION,
it
(a) See dtnmen. in Libr. de Interpr. p. 35.
BOOK THE SECOND. 279
it being a fort of progress Defcent from Ch.IV.
the Nouns upright Form thro its various
declining Forms, that is, a Defcent from
AB, to AC, AD, &c.
OF thefe CASES we fhall treat but of
four, that is to fay, the NOMINATIVE,
the ACCUSATIVE, the GENITIVE, and
the DATIVE.
IT has been faid already in the pre-
ceding Chapter, that the great Objects of
natural Union are SUBSTANCE and AT-
TRIBUTE. Now from this Natural Con-
f<?n/arifes the Logical Concord of SUBJECT
and PREDICATE, and the Grammatical
Concord of \> BST ANTIVE and ATTRIBU-
TIVE (b). Thefe CONCORDS in SPEECH
produce PROPOSITIONS and SENTENCES,
as that previous CONCORD in NATURE
produces NATURAL BEINGS. This being
T 4 admitted,
(b) See before, p. 264.
28o H E R M E S.
Ch.IV. admitted, we proceed by obferving, that
when a Sentence is regular and orderly,
Nature s Subftance, the Logicians Sufyetf,
and the Grammarian s Subftantlve are all
denoted by that Cafe, which we call the
NOMINATIVE. For example, CJESAR
pugnat, jf'Es fingltur, DOMUS cedificatur.
We may* remark too by the way, that the
Character of this Nominative may be learnt
from its Attributive. The Action implied
in pugnat, fhews its Nominative CAESAR
to be an Active efficient Caufe; the Paffion
implied mfngltur^ mews its Nominative
js to be a Paffive Subjedl:, as does the
Paflion in tedificatur prove DOMUS to be
an Effect.
As therefore every Attributive would
as far as pofiible conform itfclf to its Sub-
flantive, fo for this reafon, when it has
Cafes, it imitates its Subftantive, and ap-
pears as a Nominative alfo. So we find it
in fuch in fiances as CICERO eft ELO-
QJJENS; VlTlUM eft TURPE; HoMO eft
4 ANIMAL,
BOOK THE SECOND. 281
ANIMAL, &c. When it has no Cafes, Ch.IV.
(as happens with Verbs) it is forced to
content itfelf with fuch affimilations as it
has, thofe of Number and Perfon * ; as
when we fay, CICERO LOQUITUR -, NOS
LOQUIMUR; HOMINES LOQ.UUNTUR.
FROM what has been faid, we may
make the following obfervations that as
there can be no Sentence 'without a Sub-
Jiantive, fo that Subftantive, if the Sen-
tence be regular, is always denoted by a
Nominative that on this occalion all the
Attributives, that have Cafes, appear as
Nominatives alfo that there may be a re-
gular and perfedl Sentence 'without any of
the other Cafes, but that without one Nomi-
native at leaji, this is utterly impoffible.
Hence therefore we form its Character and
Defcription THE NOMINATIVE is that
Cafe, without which there can be no regu-
lar
1 What fort of Number and Perfon Verbs have, fee
before, p. 170, 171.
282 HERMES.
Ch.IV. lar (c) and perf eft Sentence. We are now
to fearch after another Cafe.
WHEN the Attributive in any Sentence
is fome Verb denoting Attion, we may be
allured the principal Subjiantive is fome
active efficient Caufe. So we may call
Achilles and Lyfippus in fuch Sentences as
Achilles vulneravit, Lyfippus fecit. But
though this be evident and clearly under-
ftood, the Mind is flill infufpence, and finds
its conception incomplete. ACTION, it well
knows, not only requires fome Agent, but
it muft have a SubjecJ alfo to work on, and
it muft produce fome Effecl. 'Tis then to
denote one of thefe (that is, the SubjecJ
or the Effefi) that the Authors of Lan-
guage
(c] We have added regular as well as ptrfefi, becaufe
there may be irregular Sentences, which may be perfeft
without a Nominative. Of this kind are all Sentences,
made out of thofe Verbs, called by the Stoics Ilafa-
or Tlotfax.zTi'i'yogypoiTix, fuch as Dwx^Tfi
t, Socratem pcenitet, &c. See before, p. 180.
BOOK THE SECOND. 283
guage have deflined THE ACCUSATIVE. Ch.IV.
Achilles vu/neravifHECTOREM here the
Accufative denotes the Subject. Lyjippus
fecit STATUAS here the Accufative
denotes the Effect. By thefe additional
Explanations the Mind becomes fatisfied,
and the Sentences acquire a Perfection,
which before they wanted. In whatever
other manner, whether figuratively, or
with Prepofitions, this Cafe may have
been ufed, its firft deftination feems to
have been that here mentioned, and hence
therefore we (hall form its Character and
Defcription THE ACCUSATIVE is that
Cafe, which to an efficient Nominative and
/ ' */
a Verb of ASlion fubjoins either the Effeff
or the pajfive Subjeft. We have ftill left
the Genitive and the Dative, which we
jnveftigate, as follows.
IT has been faid in the preceding Chap-
ter (</), that when the Places of the No-
minative
(d) See before, p. 265.
284 HERMES.
Ch.IV. minative and the Accufathe are filled by
proper Subftantives, other Subftantives are
annexed by the help viPrepofitions. Now,
though this be fo far true in the modern
Languages, that (a very few inflances ex-
cepted) they know no other method -, yet
is not the rule of equal latitude with re-
fpedt to the Latin or Greek, and that from
reafons which we are about to offer.
AMONG the various Relations of Sub-
ftantives denoted by Pfepofitions, there
appear to be two principal ones ; and thefe
are, the 'Term or Point, which fomething
commences FROM, and the Term or Point,
which fomething tends TO. Thefe Re-
lations the Greeks and Latins thought of
fo great importance, as to diftinguifh them,
when they occurred, by peculiar termina-
tions of their own, which expreft their
force, without the help of a Prepofition.
Now 'tis here we behold the Rife of the
antient Genitive, and Dative, the GENI-
TIVE being formed to expreft all Relations
BOOK THE SECOND. 285
commencing FROM itfelf > THE DATIVE, Ch.IV.
all Relations tending TO itfelf. Of this
there can be no ftronger proof, than the
Analyfis of thefe Cafes in the modern
Languages, which we have mentioned
already (e}.
'Tis on thefe principles that they fay in
Greekteopcct SOT, MSapi SOI, OF
thee I ajky To thee I give. The reafon
is, in requefts the perfon requefted is one
whom fomething is expected from ; in
donations, the perfon prefented, is one
whom fomething paffes to. So again
{f) neTTGiyToti \i$v, 'tis made of Stone. Stone
was the paffive Subject, and thus it appears
in the Genitive, as being the Term from,
or out of 'which. Even in Latin, where
the Syntax is more formal and flricl, we
read -
Implentur
(e] See before, p. 275, 276.
(/) Xouo-ou srfTTonj^Ei/of , xj Ixi^o.-Jlog^ made of Gold
and Ivory. So fays Paufanias of the Olympian Jupiter.,
L. V. p. 400. See alfo Horn. Iliad. i\ 574.
HERMES.
Implentur veteris Bacchi, pinguifque fe-
rinez. Virg.
The old Wine and Venifon were the funds
or flores, of or from which they were
filled. Upon the fame principles, n/i/w T
I'Jarof, is a Phrafe in Greek ; and, Je bois
de 1'eau, a Phrafe in French, as much as
to fay, Itakefome or a certain part, FROM
or OUT OF a certain whole.
WHEN we meet in Language fuch Ge-
nitives as the Son of a Father-, the Father
of a Son -, the Picture of a Painter ; the
Painter of a Picture, &c. thefe are all
RELATIVES, and therefore each of them
reciprocally a Term or Point to the other,
FROM or OUT OF which it derives its Ef-
face, or at leaft its Intellect ion (g).
THE
(g) All Relatives are faid to reciprocate, or mutually
infer each other, and therefore they are often expreft
by this Cafe, that is to fay, the Genitive. Thus Ari-
Jiotlf, nVJ* & rot wgo'j TJ wfof aJ*rgfp1
BOOK THE SECOND. 287
THE Dative, as it implies Tendency to, Ch.IV.
is employed among its other ufes to denote
the FINAL CAUSE, that being the Caufe
to which all Events, not fortuitous, may be
faid to tend. 'Tis thus ufed in the follow-
ing inftances, among innumerable others.
TIB i fuaveis dtedala tellus
Submit tit fores Lucret .
TIB i brachia contra bit ardens
Scorpios Virg. G. I.
TIBI ferviat ultima Thute.
Ibid.
/
AND fo much for CASES, their Origin
and Ufe ; a Sort of Forms, or Termina-
tions,
JfOTTTOTg <?sA<^, xj SffflTQTM
TTif Xeytroti twctiy x} TO J'jTrAao'icu ^u/o-f^
jc, TO vj^tiru ^TrAac-ja wfAurv,. Omnia vero, quce funt ad
aliquid, referuntur ad ea, qua reciprocantur. Ut fervus
dicitur domini fervus j et dominus, fervi dominus ; necnon
duplum, dimidii duplum-, et dimidium, dtipli dimidium.
Categor. C. VII.
288 HERMES.
Ch.IV. tions, which we could not well pafs over,
from their great importance (>6) both in
the Greek and Latin Tongues > but which
however, not being among the EfTentials
of Language, and therefore not to be
found in many particular Languages, can
be hardly faid to fall within the limits of
our Inquiry.
(h] Annon et illud obfervatione dignum (licet nobh mo-
dernh fpiritus nonnibil redundat ) antiquas Linguas, ple-
na s deilinationum, cafuum, conjugatimwn, et fimilium fu-
ijje\ modernas, hh fere dejlitutas^ plurima per prespofi-
tiones et verba auxiliaria fegniter expedire ? Sane facile
quis conjiciat (utcunque nobh ipfi placeamus ) ingenia pri-
orum feculorum noftris fuilFe multo acutiora et fubtili-
ora. Bacon, de Augm. Scient. VI. i.
CHAP.
BOOK THE SEC6ND.
CHAP. V.
Concerning Interjections 'Recapitulation
Conclujion.
BESIDES the Parts of Speech before Ch. V.
mentioned, there remains THE IN-
TERJECTION. Of this Kind among the
Greeks are *\Q, Osu, *A*, &c. among the
Latins, Ah! Heu! Hei ! &c. among the
Englijh, Ah! Alas I Fie! 5cc. Thefe
the Greeks have ranged among their Ad-
verbs , improperly, if we confider the Ad-
verbial Nature, which always co-incides
with fome Verb, as its Principal, and to
which it always ferves in the character of
an Attributive. Now INTERJECTIONS
co-incide with no Part of Speech, but are ei-
ther uttered alone, or elfe thrown into a Sen-
tence, without altering its Form, either in
Syntax or Signification. The Latins feem
therefore to have done better in -j- fepa-
rating
T """"" *
f Vid. Servium in JEncid XII, v. 486.
u
HERMES.
Ch. V. rating them by themfelves, and giving
them a name by way of diftincTion from
the reft.
SHOULD it be aik'd, if not Adverbs,
what then are they ? It may be anfwered,
not fb properly Parts of Speech, as adven-
titious Sounds; certain VOICES OF NA-
TURE, rather than Voices of Art, expref-
ling thofe Paflions and natural Emotions,
which fpontaneoufly arife in the human
Soul, upon the View or Narrative of in-
terefting Events (a).
" AN*
INTERJECTIONES aGracis ad Adverbia reft-
^ alque eos jequitur etiam l&etbiuf* Et rette qui-
de ///, quando cafum regunt. Sed quando oratitni
felitm infer untur y ut not a affcftus^ velut fujpirii out iru-
ius, vix vidtntur ad dajjem aljquam pertinre> ul qua
N AT u RALES fat NOTJE; non, (iliarum vocum in/1ar t
tx injlitutv fignifaent. Voff. de Anal. L.I. c. I. IN-
TER jECTio ejl Vox affeftum mentis fignifovm^ a( citra
wbi sptm fententiam complens. ibid. c. 3. Re/tat claf-
Jtusn extrema^ iNTf RJECTIO. Hujus afpdlatia nan
5 /-
BOOK THE SECOND. 291
*' AND thus we have found that ALL Ch. V.
" WORDS ARE EITHER SIGNIFICANT BY
" THEMSELVES, OR ONLY SIGNIFICANT,
U 2 " WHEN
fimi liter fe habet ac ConjunSlionis. Nam cum hcsc dicatur
Conjunclio^ quia conjungat ; Interjettio tamen, non quia
inter jacet, fed quia interjicitur, nomen accepit. Nee tamen
de Vi'a ejus eft, ut interjiciatur ; cumber fe compleat fen-
tt-ntiam, nee raro ab ea incipiat oratio. Ibid. L. IV.
c. 28. INTERJECTIONEM non eJJ'e partem Orationisfic
ojlendo : Quod naturale ejl^ idem eji afrud omnes : Sed ge~
rnitus & figna l&titice idem funt a^ud omnes : Sunt igitur
naturales. Si vero naturales, non funt paries Orationis.
Nam ees paries, fecundum Arijlotelem^ ex injlituto, nan
naturd, detent conjlare. Interjettionem Grad Adverliis
adnumerant ; fedfalfo. Nam neque^ &c. San<5l. Miner.
L.I. c. 2. INTERJECTIONEM Graci inter AdvcrLia
ponunt, quoniam hcsc quoque vsl adj'angitur verbis, vel
verba ei fubaudiuntur. Ut Ji di:am-~ Papas ! quid vi-
deo ? vel per fe Papae ! ciiamfi non addaiur^ Miror ;
babet in fe ipfeus verbi figntficaticnem. Qua res maxims
fecit Romanarum artium Scriptsres fcparatim bane partem
ab Aduerliiis accipere j quia vidctur affeftumkabere in f eft
Verli, et plenam motus animi figmjkatiorum, etiamfi non
addatur Verbum, demonjirare. Interjettio tamen non folum
ilia, qua dicunt Graci <TyjTXiy.<r>*ov, ftgnifaat ', fed etiam
Voces, qua cujufcunque tajfmnis animi pulfu per exdama*-
tiwsm interiiciuntur. Prilc. L, XV.
HERMES.
WHEN ASSOCIATED that thofe (ivni-
mS *S O
Jicant by themfefoes, denote either SUB-
' STANCES or ATTRIBUTES, and are cal-
" led for that reafcn SUBSTANTIVES and
ft ATTRIBUTIVES that the Subftantives
fc are either NOUNS or PRONOUNS that
" //^ATTRIBUTIVES are either PRIMARY
" or SECONDARY that the Primary At-
" fr^u fives are either VERBS, PARTICI-
" PLES, or ADJECTIVES; the Secondary,
" ADVERBS Again, that the Parts of
" Speech, only Jignific ant when ajjbciated, are
" either DEFINITIVES or CONNECTIVES
that the Definitives are either ARTI-
'< CULAR, or PRONOMINAL and that
"the Connectives are either PREPOSITIONS
" or CONJUNCTIONS."
AND thus have we refolved LANGUAGE,
AS A WHOLE INTO ITS CONSTITUENT
PARTS, which was the firft thing, that we
propofed, in the courfe of this Inquiry ().
BUT
(1} See before, p. 7.
BOOK THE SECOND. 293
BUT now as we conclude, methinks I Ch. V.
hear fome Objector, demanding with an
air of pleafantry, and ridicule " Is there
< l nofpeakmg then without all this trouble?
" Do we not talk every one of us, as well
" unlearned, as learned; as well poor Pea-
t( fants, as profound Philofopk^rs ?" We
may anfwer by interrogating on our part
Do not thofe fame poor Peafants ufe
the Levar and the Wedge, and many
other Inftruments, with much habitual
readinefs ? And yet have they any con-
ception of thofe Geometrical Principles,
from which thofe Machines derive their
Efficacy and Force ? And is the Ignorance
of thefe Peafants ; a reafon for others to
remain ignorant; or to render the Subject
a lefs becoming Inquiry? Think of Ani-
mals, and Vegetables, that occur every
day of Time, of Place, and of Motion
of Light, of Colours, and of Gravita-
tion of our very Senfes and Intellect,
by which we perceive every thing elfe -
U ? THAT
294 HERMES.
Ch. V. THAT they are, we all know, and arc
perfectly fatisfied WHAT they are, is
a Subject of much obfcurity and doubt.
Were we to reject this lail Queftion, be-
caufe we are certain of the firft, we fhould
banifh all Philofophy at once out of the
world (<:).
BUT a graver Objector now acccjfts us,
" What (fays he) is the UTILITY?
" Whence the Pro/iff where the Gain?"
Every Science whatever (we may an-
fwer) has its Ufe. Arithmetic is excel-
lent
(\ *'" . ^ ~ " 1 \\ >
C) AAX i izokXx, TCUV ou/un, a rm ptv
^ d'yvu$~OTtx.Triv JE rr.v
o TO'TTOJ, ETJ Jt juacA
TO ^uew tva 'yvwpipov
* Tij ? 770TJ Ov auTWv r sVia, TWV
E>car*i T'a TTWP TO ^ue
p. 142.
BOOK THE SECOND. 295
lent for gauging of Liquors ; Geometry, Ch. V.
for meafuring of Eftates ; Aftronomy, for
making of Almanacks ; and Grammar
perhaps, for drawing of Bonds and Con-
veyances.
THUS much to the Sordid If the
Liberal zfa for fomething better than this,
we may anfwer and allure them from the
beft authorities, that every Exercife of the
Mind upon Theorems of Science, like
generous and manly Exercife of the
Body, tends to call forth and ftrengthen
Nature's original Vigour. Be the Sub-
ject itfelf immediately lucrative or not,
the Nerves of Reafon are braced by the
mere Employ, and we become abler Ac-
tors in the Drama of Life, whether our
Part be of the bufier, or of the fedater
kind.
1} 4 PERHAPS
296 HERMES.
PERHAPS too there is a Pleafure even in
Science itfelf, diftind from any End, to
which it may be farther conducive. Are
not Health and Strength of Body defirable
for their own fakes, tho' we happen not
to be fated either for Pprters or Draymen ?
And have not Health and Strength of
Mind their intrinfic Worth alfo, tho' not
condemned to the low drudgery of fordid
Emolument ? Why mould there not be
a Good (could we have the Grace to re-
cognize it) in the mere Energy of our In-
telleff, as much as in Energies of lower
degree ? The Sportfman believes there is
ood in his Chace ; the Man of Gaiety,
in his Intrigue ; even the Glutton, in his
Meal. We may juflly afk of thefe, why
they put foe fuch things ; but if they an-
fwer, they purfue them, becaufe they art
GOOD, 'twould be folly to afk. them far-
ther, WHY they PURSUE what is GOOD.
It might well in fuch cafe be replied on
8 their
BOOK THE SECOND. 297
their behalf (how ftrange foever it may Ch. V.
at firft appear) that if there was not fome-
thing GOOD, which was in no refpeSl USE-
FUL, even things ufeful tbemfehes could not
$ojjibly have exiftence. For this is in faft
no more than to afTert, that fome things
are ENDS, fome things are MEANS, and
that if there were NO ENDS, there could
be of courfe NO MEANS.
IT mould feem then the Grand Queflion
was, WHAT is GOOD that is to fay,
what is that which is *dejirable, not for
fofnething elfe, but for itfelf; for whe-
ther it be the Chace, or the Intrigue, or
the Meal, may be fairly queftioned, fince
Men in each inflance are far from being
agreed,
IN the mean time 'tis plain from daily
experience, there are infinite Pleafures,
Amufements, and Diverfions, fome for
Summer, others for Winter ; fome for
Country,
H E R M S.
Ch. V. Country, others for Town ; fome, eafy,
indolent and foft ; others, boifterous, ac-
tive, and roughj a multitude diverfified to
every tafte, and which for the time are
enjoyed as PERFECT GOOD, 'without a
thought of any End, that may be farther
obtained. Some Objects of this kind are at
times fought by all men, excepting alone
that contemptible Tribe, who, from a
love to the Means of life wholly forget-
ting its End, are truly for that reafon
called Mifers, or Miferable.
IF there be fuppofed then a Pleafure,
a Satisfaction, a Good, a Something valu-
able for its felf without view to any thing
farther, in fo many Objects of the fub-
ordinate kind ; mail we not allow the fame
praife to \hefublimcft of all Objects ? Shall
THE INTELLECT alone feel no pleafures
in its Energy, when we allow them to the
groffeft Energies of Appetite, and Senfe ?
Or if the Reality of all Pleafures and Goods
were
BOOK THE SECOND. 299
were to be controverted, may not the In- Ch. V.
telkftual Sort be defended, as rationally as
any of them ? Whatever may be urged in
behalf of the reft (for we are not now
arraigning them) we may fafely affirm of
INTELLECTUAL GOOD, that 'tis " the
" Good of that Part, which is moft ex-
" cellent within us ; that 'tis a Good ac-
(f commodated to all Places and Times;
" which neither depends on the will of
" others, nor on the affluence of external
" Fortune j that 'tis a Good, which de-
" cays not with decaying Appetites, but
" often rifes in vigour, when thofe are no
* more (//)."
THERE is a Difference, we muft own,
between this Intellectual Virtue, and Moral
Virtue. MORAL VIRTUE, from its Em-
ployment, may be called more HUMAN,
as
See Vol.1, p. 119, 120, &c.
3co HERMES.
Ch. V. as it tempers our Appetites to the purpofes
of human Life. But INTELLECTUAL
VIRTUE may be furely called more DI-
VINE, if we confider the Nature and Sub-
limity of its End.
INDEED for Moral Virtue, as it is al-
mofr. wholly converfant about Appetites,
and Affections, either to reduce the natural
ones to a proper Mean, or totally to expel
the unnatural and vitious, 'twould be im-
pious to fuppofe THE DEITY to have oc-
cafion for fueh an Habit, or that any
work of this kind mould call for his at-
tention. Yet GOD Is, and LIVES. So
we are afTured from Scripture it felf.
What then may we fuppofe the DIVINE
LIFE to be? Not a Life of Sleep, as
Fables tell us of Endymion. If we may
be allowed then to conjecture with a be-
coming reverence, what more likely, than
A PERPETUAL ENERGY OF THE PUREST
INTELLECT ABOUT THE FIRST, ALL-
eOM.PREIIENSJVE
BOOK THE SECOND. 301
COMPREHENSIVE OBJECTS OF INTEL- Ch. V.
LECTION, WHICH OBJECTS ARE NO
OTHER THAN THAT INTELLECT IT-
SELF ? For in pure INTELLECTION it
holds the reverfe of all Senfation, that
THE PERCEIVER A N D TH I N G PER-
CEIVED are ALWAYS ONE AND THE
SAME (e).
TWAS
(>) 'j ID
&a - jjuar"ou' ti ft juaAAoy, m
co<5f, x) ^w?5 <Js ys uVa^fi* rf j/ap Na v/t^ynx^ t^ur'
'ExEivoj Je, ?5 tvt^fia* Ivipyua. $s n xad' a-jruv, '
^corj dgirn ^ a/'dioj. ^^aEw JE TOW sou i/at
'^.f '' t5\\\ \\
TW fu- TOTTO j/ap O 0EOI. TcTi;
ra {^uo- A'. ^. 'Tis remarkable in Scripture
that GOD is peculiarly characterized as A LIVING
GOD, in oppofition to all falfe and imaginary Deities,
f whom fome had no pretenfions to Life at all ; others
to none higher than that of Vegetables or Brutes ; and
the beft were nothing better than illuftrious Men, whofe
exiftence was circumfcribed by the fhort period of Hu-
manity.
To
302 H E R M E S.
Ch. V. 'TWAS Speculation of this kind con-
cerning THE DIVINE NATURE, which
induced one of the wifefl: among the
Antients to believe " That the Man,
" who could live in the pure enjoyment
" of his Mind, and who properly culti-
" vated that divine Principle, was bappieft
" in him/elf, and moft beloved by the Gods.
" For if the Gods had any regard to
" what paft among Men (as it appeared
'.' they had) 'twas probable they mould
" rejoice in that which ICY/J- moft excellent,
<c and by nature the moft nearly allied to
te themjefoes -, and, as this was MIND,
" that they fhould requite the Man, who
*' moft loved and honoured T^/J, both
" from his regard to that which was
" dear
To the paflage above quoted, may be added another,
which immediately precedes it. 'A-JTOV J voif o a
wtn- wr TATT^N NOT 2 KAI NOHTON.
BOOK THE SECOND. 303
" dear to themfelves, and from his aft- Ch. V.
" ing a Part, which was laudable and
right (/)."
AND thus in all SCIENCE there is
fomething valuable for itfelf, becaufe it
contains within it fomething which is
divine.
C K'.
End of the SECOND BOOK:.
HER-
OR A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY
CONCERNING UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR
BOOK III.
CHAP. I.
Introduction Divifion of the SubjeEl into
its principal Parts.
SOME things the MIND performs Ch. I.
thro' the BODY; as for example,
the various Works and Energies of
Art. Others it performs without fucb Me-
dium ; as for example, when it thinks,
and reafons, and concludes. Now tho'
the Mind, in either cafe, may be called
the Principle or Source, yet are thefe laft
X more
306 HERMES.
Ch. I. more properly its own peculiar Ads, as
being immediately referable to its own in-
nate Powers. And thus is MIND ulti-
mately the Caufe of all; of every thing at
leaft that is Fair and Good*
AMONG thofe Acts of Mind more im-
mediately its own, that of mental Separa-
tion may be well reckoned one. Corporeal
Separations, however accurate otherwife,
are in one refpect incomplete, as they may
be repeated without end. The fmalleft
Limb, fevered from the fmalleft Animal-
cule (if we could fuppofe any inftrument
equal to fuch difleftion) has ftill a triple
Extenlion of length, breadth, and thick-
nefs j has a figure, a colour, with perhaps
many other qualities ; and fo will continue
to have, tho' thus divided to infinity. But
(a) the Mind furmounts all power of Con-
cretion,
(a) Itaque Natura faclenda ejl prorfus Solutio ft Sepa-
rate; nonper Ignem certe, fed per Mentem^ tanquam ig-
rem divinum. Bacon. Nov. Organ* Lib. II. 16.
THE THIRD. 307
trftion, and can place in the fimpleft Ch. I.
manner every Attribute by itfelf -, convex
without concave; colour without fuper-
ficies; fuperfkies without Body; and Body
without its Accidents ; as diftindlly each
one, as tho' they had never been united.
AND thus 'tis that it penetrates into the
recefles of all things, not only dividing
them, as Wholes, into their more confplcuous
Parts, but perfifting, till it even feparate
thofe JLlementary Principles, which, being
blended together after a more myfterious
manner, are united in the mlnutejl Part>
as much as in the mlghtleft Whole (b}.
Now if MATTER and FORM are among
thefe Elements, and deferve perhaps to be
efteemed as the principal among them, it
may not be foreign to the Defign of this
Treatife, to feek whether thefe, or any
things analogous to them>, may be found in
X 2 SPEECH
(b] See below, p. 3151,
308 HERMES.
Ch. I. SPEECH or LANGUAGE (c). This there-
fore we fhall attempt after the following
method,
EVERY
(c) See before p. 2. 7. MATTER and FORM (in
Greek TAH and EIAOZ) were Terms of great
import in the days of antient Philofophy, when things
were fcrutinized rather at their Beginning than at their
End. They have been but little regarded by modern
Philofophy, which almoft wholly employs itfelf about
the laft order of Subftance, that is to fay, the tangible,
corporeal or concrete, and which acknowledges no fepara-
tions even in this, but thofe made by mathematical In-
ftruments or Chemical Procefs.
The original meaning of the Word TAH, wat
SYLVA, a WOOD. Thus Homer,
j TAH,
A* Neptune pa/I, the Mountains and the WOOD
Trembled beneath the God's immortal Feet.
Hence as WOOD was perhaps the firft and mod
ufeful kind of Materials, the Word "TA, which de-
noted it, came to be by degrees extended, and at length
to denote MATTER or MATERIALS in general. In
this fenfe Brafs was called the "T An or Matter of a Sta-
tue ; Stone, the "TAu or Matter of a Pillar j and fo in
other inftances. The Platonic Cbalcidius, and other
Authors
BOOK THE THIRD. 309
EVERY thing in a manner, whether Ch. I.
natural or artificial, is in its conftitution
corn-
Authors of the latter Latinity ufe SYLVA under the
fame extended and comprehenfwe Signification.
Now as the Species of Matter here mentioned,
(Stone, Metal, Wood, &c.} occur moft frequently in
common life, and are all nothing more than natural
Subftances or Bodies, hence by the Vulgar, MATTER
and BODY have been taken to denote the fame thing;
Material to mean Corporeal; Immaterial, Incorporeal,
&c. But this was not the Sentiment of Philofophers
of old, by whom the Term Matter was feldom ufed
under fo narrow an acceptation. With thefe, every
thing was called TAH, or MATTER, whether cor-
poreal or incorporeal, which was capable of becoming
fomething elfe, or of being moulded into fomething elfe,
whether from the operation of Art, of Nature, or a
higher Caufe.
In this fenfe they not only called Brafs the *TAj of
a Statue, and Timber of a Boat, but Letters and
Syllables they called the "TAai of Words j Words or
fimple Terms, the "TAa< of Propofitions j and Propo-
fitions themfelves the r 'TAai of Syllogifms. The States
held all things out of our own power ( T '* ip r'pty
fuch as Wealth and Poverty, Honour and Dishonour,
X 3 Health
3 io HERMES.
Ch. I. compounded of fomething COMMON, ancl
fomething PECULIAR; of fomething Com-
mon,
Health and Sicknefs, Life and Death, to be the"TA;,
or Materials of Virtue or Moral Goodnefs, which had its
eflence in a proper conduclt with rcfpecl: to all thefe.
(Vid."^rr. Epift. L.I. 0.29. Alfo Vol. the fir ft of
thefe mifcellaneous Treatifes, p. 187, 309. M. Ant.
. 29. VII. 29. X. 18, 19 where the 'TAtxop and
are oppofed to each other). The Peripatetics,
tho' they exprefsly held the Soul to be aVw/xaro?, or
Incorporeal* yet ftill talked of a N$ 'TAjxi?, a mate-
rial Mind or Intellect. This to modern Ears may pof-
fibly found fomething harm. Yet if we translate the
Words, Natural Capacity^ and confider them as only
denoting that original and native Power of Intelle&iori,
which being previous to all human Knowledge, is yet
neceflary to its reception ; there feems nothing then to
remain, that can gives us offence. And fo much for
the Idea of T A H, or MATTER. See Alex. Aphrod.
de Anim. p. 144. b. 145. drift. Metapb. p. 121, 122,
141. Edit. Sylb. Prod, in Euclid, p. 22, 23.
As to EIAOT, its original meaning was that of
FORM or FIGURE, confidered as denoting vijible* Sym-
metry, and Proportion ; and hence it had its name from
FJou tofee. Beauty of perfon being one of the nobleft,
and moft excellent Objefls of Sight. Thus Euripides,
TlfUTOV fJ.IV El?0? ft^lOV Tl/flaVVl'Jo?.
fair FORM to Empire gave the fir/l pretence.
BOOK THE THIRD. 311
mon, and belonging to many other things ; Ch. I.
and of fomething Peculiar, by which it
is
Now as the Form or Figure of vifible Beings tended
principally to dijlinguijb them, and to give to each its
Name and Eflencej hence in a more general fenfe,
whatever of any kind (whether corporeal or incorporeal)
was peculiar, eflential, and diftindtive, fo as by its
acceffion to any Beings, as to its "TAu or Matter, to
mark them with a Character, which they had not be-
fore, was called by the Antients EIAO2 or FORM.
Thus not only the Shape given to the Brafs was called
the ElSog or Form of the Statue ; but the Proportion af-
figned to the Drugs was the EtiToj or Form of the Me-
dicine j the orderly Motion of the human Body was the
E?(5of or Form of the Dance j the jujl Arrangement of
the Propofitions, the ETJo? or Form of the Syllogifm.
In like manner the rational and accurate Conduct of a
wife and good man, in all the various Relations and Oc-
currences of life, made that Eio$ or Form, defcribed
by Cicero to his Son, -FoRMAM quidem ipfam, Marce
Jilt, et tanquam faciem HONES TI vides : qua, Ji oculis
cerneretur, mirabiles amores (ut ait Plato) excitaret fa^
pientia, &c. De Offic. I.
We may go farther ftill THE SUPREME INTEL-
LIGENCE, which pafles thro' all things, and which is
the fame to our Capacities, as Light is to our Eyes,
X 4 this
312 HERMES.
Ch. I. is diftinguifhed, and made to be its true
and proper felf.
HENCE
this fupreme Intelligence, has been called EIAOS
EIAflN, THE FORM OF FORMS, as being the
Fountain of all Symmetry, of all Good, and of all
Truth ; and as imparting to every Being thofe ejjential
and dijlinftive Attributes, which make it to be itfelf^
and not any thing elfe.
And fo much concerning FORM, as before concern-
ing MATTER. We (hall only add, 'tis in the uniting
of thefe, that every thing, which is generable, may be
faid to Commence ; as on the contrary, in their Separa-
tion^ to perijh and be at an end that while they co-exift,
'tis not by mere juxta-pojition, like he ftones in a wall,
but by a more intimate Co-incidence^ complete in the
minuteft part that hence, if we were to perfift in di--
viding any fubftance (for example Marble) to infinity,
there would ftill remain after every fe&ion both Matter
and Form, and thefe as perfectly united, as before the
Divifion began laftly, that they are both pre-exijhnt
to the Beings, which they conftitute ; the Matter being
to be found in the world at large ; the Form^ if artifi-
cial, pre-exifting within the Artificer^ or if natural,
within the fupreme Caufe, the Sovereign Artift of the
Univerfe,
Pulchrum pulcherrimus ipfe
Mundum mente gerens, ftmilique in imagine forman:.
Even
BOOK THE THIRD. 313
HENCE LANGUAGE, if compared ac- Ch. I.
cording to this notion to the murmurs of
a
Even without fpeculating fo high as this, we may fee
among all animal and vegetable Subftances, the Form
pre-exifting in their immediate generating Caufe ; Oak
being the parent of Oak, Lion of Lion, Man of Man,
fife.
Cicero's account of thefe Principles is as follows.
MATTER.
Sedfubjeflam put ant omnibus fine ulla fpecie, atque ca~
rentem omni ilia qualitate (fadamus enim trattando ufita-
tius hoc verbum et tritius) MATERIAM quandam, ex
qua omnia exprejja atque effiflafint : (qua iota omnia ac-
cipere pojjit^ omnibufque modis mutari atque ex omni parte)
ebque etiam interire, nan in nihUum y &c. Acad. I. 8.
FORM.
Sed ego fie Jlatuo, nihil ejje in ulk gen ere tarn pul-
(hrum, quo non pulcbrius id fit, unde illud^ ut ex ore ali-
quo, quafi imago^ exprimatur^ quod neque oculis, neque
auribus, neque ullo fenfu per dpi potejl : cogitations tantitm
et mente compleftimur. H ASRERUM FORMAS^-
pellat Ideas ille non intelligent folum, fed etiam dicendi
gravij/imus auftor et magijler^ Plato : eafque gigni negat,
et aitfemper ej/e, ac ratione et inteliigentid contineri : ca
tera nafe, occidert, Jiuere^ labi ; nee diutius ejje uno et
eodem
3H HERMES.
Ch. I. a Fountain, or the darnings of a Catarad:,
has in common this, that like them, it is
a SOUND. But then on the contrary it has
in peculiar this, that whereas thofe Sounds
have no Meaning or Signification, to Lan-
guage a ME AN ING or SIGNIFICATION is
effentlal. Again, Language, if compared
to the Voice of irrational Animals, has in
common this, that like them, it has a
Meaning. But then it has this In peculiar
to diftinguim it from them, that whereas
the Meaning of thofe Animal Sounds is
derivedfrom NATURE, that of Language
is derived, not from Nature, but from
COMPACT (</).
FROM
eodemftatu. hidquid eft igitur, de quo ratione et vid
difputetur, id eji ad ultimamfui generis Formam fpeciem-
que redigendum. Cic. ad M. Brut. Orat.
(d) The Peripatetics (and with juft rcafon) in all
their definitions as well of Words as of Sentences,
made it a part of their character to be fignificant xara
cwflr'xviv, by Compatt. See AriJIot. de Interp. c. 2. 4.
Boethius tranflates the Words xara <7ui6r'xt]v, adplaci-
BOOK THE THIRD. 315
FROM hence it becomes evident, that Ch. I.
LANGUAGE, taken in the mod compre-
hend ve view, implies certain Sounds, having
certain Meanings-, and that of thefe two
Principles, the SOUND is as the MATTER,
common (like other Matter) to many dif-
ferent things; the MEANING as that pecu-
liar and chara&eriftic FORM, by which
the Nature or Eflence of Language be-
comes complete.
turn, or fecundum placitum, and thus explains them in
his comment SECUNDUM PLACITUM vero ejl^ quod
fecundum quondam pojltionem^ placitumque ponentis apta-
tur : nullum enim nomen naturaliter con/lit utum eft, neque
unquam^ Jkut fubjefta res a natura /?, ita quoque a na-
turd veniente vocabulo nuncupaiur. Sed hominum genus,
quod et rations, et orations vigeret, nomina pofuit^ eaque
quibus libuit litcris fyllabifque conjungens, fingulis fubjefla-
rum rerum fubjiantils didit. Raeth. in Lib. de Interpret,
p. 308.
CHAP.
316 HERMES.
CHAP. II.
Upon the Matter, or common Subjeft of
Language.
Ch. II. ' I ^ KE YAH or MATTER OF LAN-
JL GU AGE comes firft to be confidered,
a Subject, which Order will not fuffer us
to omit, but in which we fhall endeavour
to be as concife as we can. Now this
TAH or Matter is SOUND, and SOUND is
that Senfation peculiar to the Senfe of Hear-
ing, 'when the Air hath felt a PercuJJion*
adequate to the producing fuch Effect (a),
As
(a] This appears to be Prifcian's Meaning when
he fays of a VOICE, what is snore properly true of
SOUND in general, thai it is -fuum fenfibile aurium, id
(ft, quod proprie auribus accidlt. Lib. I. p. 537.
The following account of the Stoics, which refers
the caufe of SOUND to an Undulation in the Air propa-
gated circularly i as when we drop a ftone into a Ciftern
of water, feems to accord with the modern Hypothefis,
and
BOOK THE THIRD. $\j
As the Caufes of this Percuflion are Ch. II.
various, fo from hence Sound derives the
Variety of its Species.
FARTHER, as all thefe Caufes are either
Animal or Inanimate, fo the two grand
Species of Sounds are likewife Animal of
Inanimate.
THERE is no peculiar Name for Sound
Inanimate-, nor even for that of Animals,
when made by the trampling of their Feet,
the fluttering of their Wings, or any other
Caufe, which is merely accidental. But
that,
and to be as plaufible as any 'Axou'av ot, T
T2 T (pcovcwTOf xj TS axsovTO? a/tfcf T^AtjTlo^/y;
joEtscofj tirx x'JuxroUjiAEW, >tj Ta^ ajtsalf TTPSC
TO?, wj x^warsT^j TO iv TV s%otu,tvv Wwa xardt
e ^\ * ^ * 4
JTO TS ( utA?$u'To? AiO P^rro audirt) cum is, qui mt-
dius inter loquentem, et audientem ejl^ aer verberatur or-
bicular it er, deinde agitatus auribus inftuit, quemadmodum
et cijlcrnce aqua per orbes injefto agitatur lapide.
Lacrt. VII. 2
318 HERMES.
Ch. II. that, which they make by proper Organs,
in confequence of fome Senjation or inward
Impulfe, fuch Animal Sound is called a
VOICE.
As Language therefore implies that
Sound called HUMAN VOICE; we may
perceive that to know the Nature and
Powers of the Human Voice, is in fa<ft to
know THE MATTER or common Subjefl of
Language.
Now the Voice of Man, and it mould
feem of all other Animals, is formed by
certain Organs between the Mouth and
the Lungs, and which Organs maintain
the intercourfe between thefe two. The
Lungs furnim Air, out of which the
Voice is formed ; and the Mouth, when
the Voice is formed, ferves to publifh it
abroad.
WHAT thefe Vocal Organs precifely
are, is not in all refpeds agreed by Philo-
fophers
BOOK THE THIRD. 319
fophcrs and Anatomifts. Be this as it Ch. II.
will, 'tis certain that the mere primary and
Jlmple Voice is completely formed, before ever
it reach the Mouth, and can therefore (as
well as Breathing) find a Paflage thro' the
Nofe, when the Mouth is fo far ftopt, as
to prevent the leaft utterance.
Now pure andjtmp/e VOICE, being thus
produced, is f as before was obferved )
transmitted to the Mouth. HERE then, by
means of certain different Organs, which
do not change its primary Qualities, but
only fuperadd others, it receives the Form
or Character of ARTICULATION. For
ARTICULATION is in fad: nothing elfe,
than that Form or Character, acquired to
Jimple Voice, by means of the Mouth and
its federal Organs, the 'Teeth, the 'Tongue,
the Lips, &c. The Voice is not by Ar-
ticulation made more grave or acute, more
loud or foft (which are its primary Qua-
lities) but it acquires to thefe Characters
2 certain
320 HERMES.
Ch. II. certain others additional, which are per-
fectly adapted to exift along with them (b).
THE
(b) The feveral Organs above mentioned not only
ferve the purpofes of Speech, but thofe very different
ones likewife of Majllcation and Refpiration ; fo frugal
is Nature in thus afligning them double duty, and fo
careful to maintain her character of doing nothing in
vain.
He, that would be informed, how much better the
Parts here mentioned are framed for Difcourfe in Man y
who is a Difcurfive Animal, than they are in other Ani-
mals, who are not fo, may confult Ariftotle in his Trea-
tife de Animal. Part. Lib. II. c, 17. L. III. c. I. 3.
De Amma. L. II. c. 8. . 23, &c.
And here by the way, if fuch Inquirer be of a Genius
truly modern, he may poflibly wonder how the Philo-
fopher, confidering (as 'tis modeftly phrafed) the Age
in which he lived, fhould know fo much, and reafon
fo well. But if he have any tafte or value for antient
literature, he may with much jufter caufe wonder at the
Vanity of his Contemporaries, who dream all Philofophy
to be the Invention of their own Age, knowing nothing
of thofe Antients ftill remaining for their perufal, tho'
they are fo ready on every occafion to give the Pre-
ference to themfches.
The following Account from Ammonium will fhew
whence the Notions in this Chapter are taken, and
what
BOOK THE THIRD. 321
THE fimplejl of thefe new Chara&ers Ch. II.
are thofe acquired thro' the mere Openings
f
what authority we have to diftinguifh VOICE from
mere SOUND j and ARTICULATE VOICE from SIM-
PLE VOICE.
Kai
X; TIJ U'zrf^'iX, r/roi TW t ystp'yxpeu-ji 9
THN AIAAEKTON awyxawv crv,
w. Ejique SON us, z'^wi flmj j/ auditufen-
tltur : Vox <z/^^z ejl fonus^ quern animam edit^ cum per
tboracis comprejjlonem aer attraftus a pubnone 9 elifusftmul
totus in artfriam, quarn afperam vacant^ t palatum^ out
gurgulionem impingit 9 et ex iclu fonum quendam fenfibilem
pro animi quodam impetu perficit. Id quod in injlrumentis
qu<s quia infant^ idea l^arwtfai a muficis dicuntur^ ufu
venit, ut in tibiis, ac fijlulis continuity cum lingua? denies^
labiaque ad loquelam necejjaria Jint, ad vocem vero fimpli-
cem nom omnino conferant. Ammon. in Lib. de Interpr.
p. 25. b. Vid, eiiAmBoerhaave Inftitut. Medic* Sejt.
. 630.
Y It
HERMES.
Ch. IJ. of the Mouthy as thefe Openings differ in
giving the Voice a Paflage. 'Tis the Va-
riety of Configurations in thefe Openings
only, which gives birth and origin to the
feveral VOWELS , and hence 'tis they de-
rive their Name, by being thus eminently
Vocal (c), and eafy to be founded of them-
fehes alone.
THERE are other articulate Forms, which
the Mouth makes not by mere Openings,
but by different Contacts of its different
parts -, fuch for inftance, as by the Junc-
tion of the two Lips, of the Tongue with
the
It appears that the Stoics (contrary to the notion of the
Peripatetics] qfed the word <&Ii N H to denote SOUND
in general. They defined it therefore to be-r-To W
&JJTOV axoiif, which juftifies the definition given by
Prifcian, in the Note preceding. ANIMAL SOUND
they defined to be 'Arp WTO oppr,/; TztTrXr,'yfj.t-jos y Air
Jlruck (and fo made audible) by feme animal impulfe ; and
HUMAN or RATIONAL SOUND they defined "Evap-
&*o? xj otTTO Jwzvo'ta? tX7rf j a7rO|U. / yr, Sound articulate and
deritydfrom the difcurfae faculty. >iog. Laert. VII. 5,
((}
BOOK THE THIRD. 323
the Teeth, of the Tongue with the Palate, Ch. II.
and the like.
Now as all thefe feveral Conta&s, un-
lefs fome Opening of the Mouth either
immediately precede, or immediately fol-
low, would rather lead to Silence, than
to produce a Voice ; hence 'tis, that with
fome fuch Opening, either previous or
fubfequent, they are always connected.
Hence alfo it is, that the Articulations fo
produced are called CONSONANTS, becaufe
they found not of themfelves, and from
their own powers, but at all times in com-
pany with fome auxiliary Vowel ().
THERE are other fubordinate Diftinc-
tions of thefe primary Articulations, which
to enumerate would be foreign to the de-
fign of this Treatife.
'Tis enough to obferve, that they are
all denoted by the common Name of ELE-
Y 2 MENT
(d)
324 HERMES.
Ch. II. MENT (e), in as much as every Articu-s
Jation of every other kind is from them de-
rived, and into them refolved. Under their
fmallejj: Combination they produce a Sylla-
ble-, Syllables properly combined produce
a Word-y Words properly combined pro-
duce a Sentence ; and Sentences properly
combined produce an Oration or Difcourfe.
AND thus is it that to Principles appa-
rently & trivial (f), as about twenty plain
ele-
(<?) The Stoic Definition of an ELEMENT is as fol-
lows - -"Ef* <Jf S~0PEiOV, E OU T&gUTa J"H/ETai Ti-< J/JVO-
fxfna, x) tlj ? fV^arov KvaXisroti. An ELEMENT ;V
Mc^, c/ of which) as their firjl Principle^ things gene-
fated are made, and into which) as their lajl remains^
they are refolved. Diog. Laert. VII. 176. What
Arijlctle fays upon ELEMENTS with fefpeft to the Sub-
je<5t here treated, is worth attending to Qxovr.s roi-
"i:* 1 wu
The ELEMENTS OF ARTICULATE VOICE are
thofe t kings y out of which the VOICE is compounded, and
into whichy as its Lift remains , it is divided : the Elements
themfeives being no farther divifible into other articulate
Voices , differing in Species from them. Metaph. V. 0.3.
(f) The Egyptians paid divine Honours to the In-
of Letters, and Regulator of Language^ whom
they
BOOK THE THIRD;
elementary Sounds, we owe that variety Ch.
of articulate Voices, which have been fuf-
ficient to explain the Sentiments of fo in-
numerable a Multitude, as all the prefent
and paft Generations of Men.
IT
they called THEUTH. By the GREEKS he was wor-
fh'ipped under the Name of HERMES, and reprefented
commonly by a Head alone without other Limbs, ftand-
ihg upon a quadrilateral Bajis. The Head itfelf was
that of a beautiful Youth, having on it a Petafai or
Bonnet, adorned with two Wings.
There was a peculiar reference iri this Figure td the
EPMHS AOTIOS, THE HERMES OF LAN-
GUAGE OR DISCOURSE. He poflefled no other part
of the human figure but the HEAD, becaufe 1 no other
was deemed requijite to rational Communication. Words
at the fame time, the medium of thid Communication,
being (as Homer well defcribes them) ETTIX -srlioMTz,
Winged Words, were reprefented in their Velocity by the
WINGS of his Bonnet.
Let us fuppofe fuch a HERMES, having the Front of
hh Bafts (the ufual place for Infcriptiona) adorned with
feme old Alphabet, and having a Veil flung acrofs, by
which that Alphabet is partly covered. Let A Yourrt
be feen drawing off this Vtil\ and A NYMPH, near the
Youth, transcribing what She there difcoven.
Such a Defign would eafily indicate its Meaning.
THE YOUTH we might imagine to be THE GENIUS
Y 3 of
326 HERMES,
Ch. II. IT appears from what has been faid,
that THE MATTER or COMMON SUBJECT
OF LANGUAGE is that Species of Sounds
called VOICES ARTICULATE.
WHAT
OF MAN (Natura Deus humana y as Horace ftileshim;)
THE NYMPH to be MNHMO2TNH, or ME-
MORY > as much as to infmuate that " MAN, for the
* Prefervation of his Deeds and Inventions* was necef-
** farily obliged to have recourfe to LETTERS ; and that
" MEMORY, being confeious of her own Insufficiency^
" was glad to avail herfelf of fo valuable an Acquifi-
" tion."
MR. STUART, well known for his accurate and
elegant Edition of the Antiquities j/'Athens, has adorned
this Work with a Frontifpiece agreeable to the above
Ideas, and that in a Tafte truly Attic and Simple^ which
no one poflelFes more eminently than himfelf.
As to HERMES, his Hiftory, Genealogy, Mytholo-
gy, Figure, fcrV. Vid. Platan. Pbileb. T. II. p. 18.
Edit.Serran. Diod. Sic. L.I. Herat. Od. X. L.I.
Hefodt Theog. V. 937. cum Comment. Joan. Diaconi*
Tkycid. VI. 27. et Scholiajl. in loc. Pighium epud Gro--
nov. Thejaur. T. IX. p. 1 1 64.
For the value and importance of Principles, and the
difficulty in attaining them, fee Arijlot. de SophiJI.
Elench. c. 34.
BOOK THE THIRD. 327
WHAT remains to be examined in the Ch. II".
following Chapter, is Language under its
characteristic and peculiar FORM , that is
to fay, Language confidered, not as a
Sound, but as a Meaning.
Y 4 CHAP.
328 H E R M E S-.
CHAP. III.
.
Upon the Form t or peculiar Character of
Language.
Ch.III. TTTHEN to any articulate Voice
V V there accedes by compatf a Mean-
ing or Signification, fuch Voice by fuch
acceflion is then called A Wo R D -, and
many Words, pofleffing their Significa-
tions (as it were) under the fame Compact
(a), unite in contouring a PARTICULAR
LANGUAGE.
It
(a] See before Note (c] p. 314. See alfo Vol. I.
Treatife II. c. i. Notes (0) and (c}.
The following Quotation from Ammonias is remark-
able KaOxTTfp Sv TO ply XXTCZ TC/TTOW xmTc&aj, ^iVfj,
TO Si OC^tkSjiJ, ^EiTEi >^ y.XTOt 0"Uv6j7)tV, xj TO jlAEU u-
AOV, (p^!Tf<, '/, .$U>a, S P (Ti* ^TOJ xj TO
v EV 5tjw.ni ovvoiptuv 5/vwoxwv,
v o a;9
BOOK THE THIRD. 329
IT appears from hence, that A WORD Ch.III.
may be defined a Voice articulate, andfig-
nificant by CompaEt and that LANGUAGE
may be defined a Syftem of fuch Voices, fo
Jignificant*
IT is from notions like thefe concern-
ing Language and Words, that one may
be
ffvy-
goi; T^Y <7 ( ua<r/v, (ax/ft
lpSTQV p^JU TZT^OJ TO,
, J'toVi ^ /uoi/^ TW?
. / /^ y^w^ manner therefore^ as local
Motion is from Nature, but Dancing is fomething pofi-
the ; fltf^/ <7i Timber exi/is in Nature, but a Door is
fomething pofoive ; y2 ;'i ffo Power of producing a vocal
Sound founded in Nature, but that of explaining eurfelvfs
by Nouns, or Verbs, fomething pofitive. And hence it is,
that as to thejimple power of producing vocal Sound (which
is as it were the Organ or Instrument to the Soul's facul-
ties ofKnowIege or Volition) as to this vocal power I fay,
Man feems to poj/ffs it from Nature, in like manner as
2 irra-*
330 HERMES.
Ch.IIL be tempted to call LANGUAGE a kind of
PICTURE OF THE UNIVERSE, where the
Words are as the Figures or Images of all
particulars.
AND yet it may be doubted, how far
this is true. For if Pictures and Images
are all of them Imitations, it will follow,
that whoever has natural faculties to know
the
irrational animals : but as to the employing of Nouns, or
Merits, or Sentences compofed out of them, in the explana-
tion of our Sentiments (the things thus employed being
founded not in Nature, but in Pojition) this he feems to
poffefs by way of peculiar eminence, becaufe he alone of all
mortal Beings partakes of a Sou/, which can move itfelf y
and operate artificially ; fo that even in the Subject of
Sound his artificial Power fyews itfelf ~; as the various
elegant Compactions both in Metre, and without Metre,
abundantly prove. Ammon. de Interpr. p. 51. a.
It muft be obferved, that the operating artificially ,
(iL/fo^fii/ Tf^i/xwf ) of which Ammonius here fpeaks, and
which he confiders as a diftin&ive Mark peculiar to the
Human Soul, means fomething very different from the
mere producing works of elegance and dejign ; elfe it could
never be a mark of DiftincTion between Man, and many
other Species of Animals, fuch as the Bee, the Beaver,
the Swallow, &c. See Vol.1, p. 8, 9, 10, 158, 159,
Vc. 2
BOOK THE THIRD. 331
the Original, will by help of the fame Ch-HI.
faculties know alfo its Imitations. But it
by no means follows, that he who knows
any Being, fhould know for that reafon
its Greek or Latin Name.
THE Truth is, that every Medium,
through which we exhibit any thing to
another's Contemplation, is either derived
from Natural Attributes, and then it is
an IMITATION; or elfe from Accidents
quite arbitrary, and then it is a SYM-
BOL (^).
: >
Now,
i R TO OMOIHMA T SYMBO-
AOT, xa6oVo TO [*.lv opoix^x, TW ^Jutrty avrrv TX
XT TO
y y ax EOtf tfy* ^r auTo jaeraTrAatrai* TO yap tv TIJ
SJKOUI 'ye'y^xft.fji.svK TS Sw^arK? ofMiupXy it pr, xai T
> TO" <rt*o N y x TO s
ix ju.ov>i; u!pr'*/Avotf T^ yptTzoofS ETrtvoiaj' o.'ov,
332 H E R M E S.
Ch.III. N6w, if it be allowed that in far the
greater part of things, riot any of their
natural Attributes are to be found in arti*
culate Voices, and yet thro' fuch Voices
are things of every kind exhibited, it will
follow that WORDS mitft of neceffity be
SYMBOLS, becaufe k appears that they
cannot be Imitations.
BUT here occurs a Queflion, which de-
fcrves attention " Why in the common
" intercourfe of men with men have
." Imitations been negleded, and Symbols
" pre-
v^/a.- A REPRESENTATIOI-? er
RESEMBLANCE differs from ^SYMBOL, / #* OTW^ <?j
/^ Refemblance aims as far as pcjjille to reprefent the
very nature of the thing, nor is it in cur power to Jhift or
vary it. 'Thus # REPRESENTATION intended for So-
crates in a Pitfure, if it have not thofe c ir cum/lances pe-
tuliar
BOOK THE THIRD. 333
<s preferred, although Symbols are only Ch.III.
Xt known by Habit or Inftitution, while
ft Imitations are recognized by a kind of
et natural Intuition ?" To this it may be
anfwered, that if the Sentiments of the
Mind, like the Features of the Face, were
immediately vifible to every beholder, the
Art of Speech or Difcourfe would have
been perfectly fuperfluous. But now,
while our Minds lie inveloped and hid,
and the Body (like a Veil) conceals every
thing but itfelf, we are neceffarily compel-
led, when we communicate our Thoughts,
to
culiar to Socrates, the bald, the Jlat-nofed, and tie prs-
jefting Eyes, cannot properly be called a Reprefeniatian of
him. But a SYMBOL or SIGN (for the Pkilofopber
Ariftotle ufes both names) is wholly in our our own pow-
er, as depending Jingly for its exi/Jence on our imagina-
tion. Thus for example, as to the time when two armies
Jhoitld engage, the Symbol or Sign may be the founding of
a Trumpet, the throwing of a Torch, (according to what
Euripides fays,
But when the flaming Torch was hurl'd, thefign
Of purple fight, as when the Trumpet founds, &C.J
or elfe one may fuppofe the elevating of a Spear, the dart-
ing of a Weapon, and a thoufand ways befides. Ammon,
in Lib, de Jnterp. p. 17. b.
334 HERMES.
Ch.III. to pafs them to each other through a Me-
dium which is corporeal (c). And hence it
is that all Signs, Marks, Imitations, and
Symbols muft needs bzfenjible, and ad-
drefied as fuch to the Senfes (d). Now
THE SENSES, we know, never exceed
their natural Limits; the Eye perceives
no Sounds; the Ear perceives no Figures
nor Colours. If therefore we were to
converfe, not by Symbols but by Imitations,
as far as things are characterized by Fi-
gure
A; xj/jp^al otl 5 ( uTflaj, 'yvf/.v&i fj.lv
yi'vacjTO $S aurwv TWV vor)jtx,<XTv
rai, iy.w viits STEoixzXvTrxa'iv OIVTUV TO vooov, f.-
Qr.ffay ruv cto ( uaTwv, h* uv cri/x,aiy(rt aAA/Aa? ra
aoa.'yij.cit.rtx.. Animi nojlri a corporis compage fecret'i res
vicijjim ani mi ccnceptionibus fignificare pojjent : cum au-
tem corporibus involuii Jinf, perinde ac nebula, ipforum
jntelligendi vis obtegitur : quccirca opus eis fuit nomini-
-tus, quibus res inter fe Jignifaartnt, Amman, in Praedi-
cam. p. 18. a.
(d) ^iiicquid fcindi pojffit in differ enti as fatis nume-
rofas, ad notion urn varietatem explicandam (modo differ-
entia illte fenfui perceptibilesy^/J fieri potejl vebiculum
cogitationum de bcmine in bominem. Bacon, de Augm.
Sclent. VI. i.
BOOK THE THIRD. 335
gure and Colour, our Imitation would be Ch.III.
necefTarily thro' Figure and Colour alfo.
Again, as far as they are characterized by
Sounds, it would for the fame reafon be
thro* the Medium of Sounds. The like
may be faid of all the other Senfes, the
Imitation ftill (hifting along with the Ob-
jects imitated. We fee then how compli-
cated fuch Imitation would prove.
IF we fet LANGUAGE therefore, as a
Symbol y in oppolition tofuc/j Imitation -, if
we confider the Simplicity of the one, and
the Multiplicity of the other; if we con-
fider the Eafe and Speed, with which
Words are formed (an Eafe which knows
no trouble or fatigue; and a* Speed, which
equals the Progrefs of our very Thoughts)
if we oppofe to this the difficulty and
length of Imitations ; if we remember
that fome Objects are capable of no Imi-
tations at all, but that all Objects univer-
fally may be typified by Symbols ; we may
plainly
See before p.
336 HERMES.
Ch.III. plainly perceive an Anfwer to the Queftion
here propofed " Why, in the common
*' intercourfe of men with men, Imita-
" tions have been rejected, and Symbols
tf preferred."
HENCE too we may perceive a Reafon,
ivhy there never was a Language, nor in-
deed can pojjibly be framed one, to exprefs
the Properties and real Rffences of things,
as a Mirrour exhibits their Figures and
their Colours. For if Language of itfelf
imply nothing more, than certain Species
of Sounds with certain Motions concomitant -,
if to fome Beings Sound and Motion are
no Attributes at all ; if to many others,
where Attributes, they are no way eiTen-
tial (fuch as the Murmurs and Wavings
of a Tree during a ftorm) if this be true
'tis impoffible the Nature of fuch Beipgs
fhould be exprefled, or the leaft efTential
Property be any way imitated, while be-
tweeen the Medium and tbemfehes (here is
nothing CONNATURAL (e).
Tis
See Vol. I. Treatife JI. c, 3. p. 70.
337
'Tis true indeed, when Primitives were Ch.III.
once eftablimed, 'twas eafy to follow the
Connection and Subordination of Nature,
in the juft deduction of Derivatives and
Compounds. Thus the Sounds, Water,
and, Fire, being once annexed to thofe
two Elements, 'twas certainly more natural
to call Beings participating of the firft,
Watry, of the laft, Fiery, than to com-
mute the Terms, and call them by the
reverfe. But why, and from what natu-
ral Connexions the Primitives themfelves
might not be commuted, 'twill be found,
I believe, difficult to affign a Reafon, as
well in the inftances before us, as in moft
others. We may here alfo fee the Reafon,
why ALL LANGUAGE is FOUNDED IN
COMPACT, and not in Nature; for fo are
all Symbols, of which Words are a certain
Species.
THE Queflion remains if WORDS are
Symbols, then SYMBOLS OF, WHAT?
Z If
338 HERMES.
Chill. If it be anfwered, OF THINGS, the Que-
ftion returns, OF WHAT THINGS ? If it
be anfwered, of the federal Individuals of
Senfe, the various particular Beings, ivbicb
exift around #j to this, 'tis replied, may
be raifed certain Doubts. In the firft place
every Word will be in fact a proper Name.
Now if all Words are proper Names, how
came Lexicographers, whofe exprefs buii-
nefs is to explain Words, either wholly to
omit proper Names, or at leaft to explain
them, not from their own Art, but from
Hiftory ?
AGAIN, if all Words are proper Names,
then in ftrictnefs no Word can belong to
more than one Individual. But if fo,
then, as Individuals are infinite 9 to make
a perfect Language, Words mujl be infinite
alfo. But if infinite, then incompreben-
fible, and never to be attained by the wifeft
Men; whole labours in Language upon
this Hypothecs would be as idle as that
ftudy of infinite written Symbols, which
Million-
BOOK THE THIRD. 339
Mifiionaries (if they may be credited) at- Ch.III.
tribute to the Chinefe.
AGAIN, if all Words are proper Names,
or (which is the fame) the Symbols of
Individuals ; it will follow, as Individuals
are not only infinite, but ever paffing, that
the Language of thofe, who lived ages
ago, will be as unknown now, as the very
Voices of the Speakers. Nay the Lan-
guage of every Province, of every Town,
of every Cottage, muft be every where
different, and every where changing, fince
fuch is the Nature of Individuals, which
it follows.
AGAIN, if all Words are proper
the Symbols of Individuals, it will follow
that in Language there can be no General
Proportion, becaufe upon the Hypothecs
all Terms are particular ; nor any Affirma-
tive Propojltion^ becaufe no one Individual
in nature is another. It remains, there can
be no Proportions, but Particular Nega-
Z 2 fives.
340 HERMES.
Ch.III. fives. But if fo, then is Language inca-
pable of communicating General Affirma*
the Truths If fo, then of communicating
Dcmonftration If fo, then of communi-
cating Sciences, which are fo many Syftems
of Demonftrations If fo, then of com-
municating Arts, which are the Theorems
of Science applied practically- If fo, we
{hall be little the better for it either in
Speculation or in Practice (e). And fo
much for this Hypothefis ; let us now try
another.
IF WORDS are not the Symbols of ex-
ternal Particulars, it follows of courfe,
they muft be THE SYMBOLS OF OUR
IDEAS : For this is evident, if they are not
Symbols
(e] The whole of Euclid (whofe Elements may be
called the bafis of Mathematical Science) is founded
upon general Terms, and general Proportions , moft of
which are affirmative. So true are thofe Verfes, how-
ever barbarous as to their ftile,
Syllogizari non ejl ex Particular!,
Neve Nfgativis, refit concludcre ft vis.
BOOK THE THIRD. 341
Symbols of things without, they can only Ch.III.
be Symbols of fomething within.
HERE then the Queftion recurs, if SYM-
BOLS OF IDEAS, then of WHAT IDEAS ?
OF SENSIBLE IDEAS. Be it fo, and
what follows ? Every thing in fad:, which
has followed already from the fuppofition
of their being the Symbols of external
Particulars; and that from this plain and
obvious reafon, becaufe the feveral Ideas,
which Particulars imprint, mud needs be
as infinite and mutable, as they are them-
felves.
IF then Words are neither the Symbols
of external Particulars, nor yet of parti-
cular Ideas, they can be SYMBOLS of no-
thing elfe, except of GENERAL IDEAS, be-
caufe nothing elfe, except thefe, remains.
And what do we mean by GENERAL
IDEAS? We mean SUCH AS ARE COM-
MON TO MANY INDIVIDUALS; not only
to Individuals which exifl now, but which
3 exiiled
342 HERMES.
Ch.III. exiilcd in ages paft, and will exifl in ages
future -, fuch for example, as the Ideas
belonging to the Words, Man, Lion, Cedar.
Admit it, and what folio ws? It fol-
lows, that if Words are the Symbols of fuch
general Ideas, Lexicographers may find
employ, though they meddle not with
proper Names.
IT follows that one Word may be, not
bomonymoiifly, but truly and effentially com-
mon to many Particulars, pad prefent and
future; fo that however thefe Particulars
may be infinite, and ever fleeting, yet Lan-
guage notwithstanding may be definite and
Jleady. But if fo, then attainable even by
ordinary Capacities, without danger of in-
curring the Chinefe Abfurdity *.
AGAIN, it follows that the Language
of thofe, who lived ages ago, as far as it
{rands
* See p. 338, 339.
HOOK THE THIRD. 343
Rands for the fame general Ideas, may be as Ch.IH,
intelligible now, as it was then. The like
may be faid of the fame Language being
accommodated to diflant Regions, and
even to diftant Nations, amidft all the va-
riety of ever ne-w and ever changing Ob-
jects.
AGAIN, it follows that Language may
be expreffive of general Truths ; and if fo,
then of Demonftration, and Sciences, and
Arts j and if fo, become fubfervient to
purpofes of every kind (f).
Now if it be true " that none of thefe
" things could be afTerted of Language,
" were not Words the Symbols of genera!
" Ideas and it be further true, that thefe
" things may be all undeniably aflerted
" of Language" it will follow (and that
neceiTarily) that WORDS ARE THE SYM-
BOLS OF GENERAL IDEA?.
Z 4 AND
(/) See before Note (e^
344 HER M E S,
AND yet perhaps even here may be an
Objedion. It may be urged, if Words are
the Symbols of general Ideas, Language
may anfvver well enough the purpofe of
Philofophers, who reafon about general,
and abflratt Subjects but what becomes
of the bufinefs of ordinary Life ? Life we
know is merged in a multitude of 'Particu-
lars, where an Explanation by Language
is as requilite, as in the higheft Theorems.
The Vulgar indeed want it to no other End.
How then can this End in any refpeft be
anfwered, if Language be exprefTive of
nothing farther than general Ideas ?
To this it may be anfwered, that Arts
furely reipect the bufinefs of ordinary Life;
yet fo far are general Terms from being
an Obftacle here, that without them no
Art can be rationally explained. How
for inftance mould the meafuring Artift
afcertain to the Reapers the price of their
labours, had not he firft through general
2 Terms
<j i
BOOK THE THIRD. 345
Terms learnt thofe general Theorems, that Ch.III.
re(pe<5l the dodlrine and practice of Men-
furation ?
BUT fuppofe this not to fatisfy a perfe-
vering Obje&or fuppofe him to infift,
that, admitting this to be true, there were
Jlill a multitude of occajions for minute
particularizing, of which 'twas not poffible
for mere Generals to be Jufceptible fup-
pofe, I fay, fuch an Objection, what mould
we anfwer ? That the Objection was
jufl ; that 'twas necefTary to the Perfec-
tion and Completion C/'LANGUAGE, that
it Jhould be exprejfive of PARTICULARS,
as well as ^ GENERALS. We muft how-
ever add, that its general Terms are by
far its moft excellent and eflential Part,
iince from thefe it derives " that com-
f prehenfive Univerfality, that juft pro-
" portion of Precifion and Permanence,
" without which it could not pombly be
" either learnt, or underftood, or ap-
!' plied to the purpofes of Reafoning and
" Science ;"
346 HERMES.
Ch.III. " Science ;" that particular Terms have
their Utility and End, and that therefore
care too has been taken for a fupply of
thefe.
ONE Method of exprerTing Particulars,
is that of PROPER NAMES. This is the
lead artificial, becaufe proper Names be-
ing in every diftridt arbitrarily applied,
may be unknown to thofe, who know the
Language perfectly well, and can hardly
therefore with propriety be confidered as
parts of it. The other and more artificial
Method is that of DEFINITIVES or AR-
TICLES (g), whether we affume the/>r0-
nominal, or thofe more ftrictly fo called.
And here we cannot enough admire the
exquiiire Art of Language, which, with-
out ivandring into infinitude, contrives how
to denote things injinite -, that is to fay in
other words, which, by the fmall Tribe
of Definitives properly applied to general
Terms,
(g) See before p. 72, &c. 233, &c.
BOOK THE THIRD. 347
Terms, knows how to employ thefe laft, Ch.III.
tho' in number finite, to the accurate ex-
preffion of infinite Particulars.
To explain what has been faid by a
fingle example. Let the general Term be
MAN. I have occafion to apply this Term
to the denoting of fome Particular. Let
it be required to exprefs this Particular,
as unknown ; I fay, A Man known ; I fay,
THE Man indefinite; ANY Man definite-,
A CERTAIN Man prejent and near ; THIS
Man prefent and dijlant ; THAT Man
like to fome other ; SUCH A Man an inde-
finite Multitude; MANY Men a definite
Multitude ; A THOUSAND Men; t be ones
of a Multitude, taken throughout ; EVERY
Man the fame ones, taken with diftinclion;
EACH Man taken in order ; FIRST Man,
SECOND Man, &c. the whole Multitude
of Particulars taken collefthely, ALL Men
the Negation of this Multitude ; NO Man.
But of this we have fpoken already, when
we inquired concerning Definitives.
THE
348 HERMES.
Ch.III. THE Sum of all is, that WORDS ARE
THE SYMBOLS OF IDEAS BOTH GENERAL
AND PARTICULAR; YET OF THE GENE-
RAL, PRIMARILY, ESSENTIALLY, AND
IMMEDIATELY; OF THE PARTICULAR,
ONLY SECONDARILY, ACCIDENTALLY,
AND MEDIATELY.
SHOULD it be afked, " why has Lan-
" guage this double Capacity ?" May we
not afk, by way of return, Is it not a kind
of reciprocal Commerce, or Intercourfe of
our Ideas? Should it not therefore be
framed, fo as to exprefs the whole of our
Perception ? Now can we call that Per-
ception intire and whole, which implies
either INTELLECTION without Se?ifation t
or SENSATION without Intelk&ion ? If
not, how ihould Language explain the
iL-bclc of our Perception, had it not Words
to exprefs the Objects, proper to each of
the two Faculties ?
To
BOOK THE THIRD. 349
To conclude As in the preceding ChJIL
Chapter we confidered Language with a
view to its MATTER, fo here we have
confidered it with a view to its FORM. Its
MATTER is recognized, when 'tis confi-
dered as a Voice ; its FORM, as 'tisjignifi-
cant of our federal Ideas ; fo that upon the
whole it may be defined A SYSTEM OF
ARTICULATE VOICES, THE SYMBOLS
OF OUR IDEAS, BUT OF THOSE PRIN-
CIPALLY, WHICH ARE GENERAL OR
UNIVERSAL.
CHAP.
350 HERMES.
CHAP. IV.
Concerning general or unmerfal Ideas.
Ch.IV. 71 /T UCH having been faid in the pre-
i. * JL ceding Chapter about GENERAL
OR UNIVERSAL IDEAS, it may not perhaps
be amifs to inquire, by what procefs we
come to perceive them, and what kind of
Beings they are; fince the generality of
men think fo meanly of their exigence,
that they are commonly confidered, as
little better than Shadows. Thefe Sen-
timents are not unufual even with the
Philofopher now a days, and that from
caufes much the fame with thofe, which
influence the Vulgar.
THE VULGAR merged in Se?ife from
their earlieft Infancy, and never once
dreaming any thing to be worthy of pur-
fuit, but what either pampers their Appe-
tite, or fills their Purfe, imagine nothing
to
3
BOOK THE THIRD. 351
to be real, but what may be tafted, or Ch.IV.
touched. THE PHILOSOPHER, as to thefe
matters being of much the fame Opinion,
in Philofophy looks no higher, than to
experimental AmufementS) deeming nothing
Demonftration, if it be not made ocular.
Thus inftead of afcending from Senfe to
Intellect (the natural progrefs of all true
Learning) he hurries on the contrary into
the midft of Senfe, where he wanders at
random without any end, and is loft in a
Labyrinth of infinite Particulars. Hence
then the reafon why the fublimer parts of
Science , the Studies of MINP, INTELLEC-
TION, and INTELLIGENT PRINCIPLES,
are in a manner neglected ; and, as if the
Criterion of all Truth were an Alembic or
an Air-pump, what cannot be proved by
Experiment, is deemed no better than
mere Hypothecs.
AND yet 'tis fomewhat remarkable,
amid the prevalence of fuch Notions, that
there fhould ftill remain two Sciences in
famion,
352 HERMES.
Ch.IV. faflnon, and thefe having their Certainty
of all the leaft controverted, which are not
in the minutejl article depending upon Expe-
riment. By thefe I mean ARITHMETIC,
and GEOMETRY (a). But to come to our
Subject concerning GENERAL IDEAS.
MAN'S
(a] The many noble Theorems (fo ufeful in life,
and fo admirable in themfelves) with which thefe two
SCIENCES fo eminently abound, arife originally from
PRINCIPLES, THE MOST OBVIOUS IMAGINABLE ;
Principles, fo little wanting the pomp and apparatus of
EXPERIMENT, that they are felf- evident to every one,
poflefled of common fenfe. I would not be underftood,
in what I have here faid, or may have faid elfewhere, to
undervalue EXPERIMENT ; whofe importance and uti-
lity I freely acknowlege, in the many curious Noftrums
and choice Receipts, with which it has enriched the
necefTary Arts of life. Nay, I go farther I hold all
jujlifialle Practice in every kind'of Subjefl to be founded
in EXPERIENCE, which is no more than the refiilt of
many repeated EXPERIMENTS. But I muft add with-
al, that the man who a6ls from Experience alone, tho'
he act ever fo well, is but an Empiric or ^uack^ and
that not only in Medicine, but in every other Subject.
'Tis then only that we recognize ART, and that the
EMPIRIC quits his name for the more honourable one
of ARTIST, when to his EXPERIENCE he adds
SCIENCE,
353
MAN'S FIRST PERCEPTIONS arethofe Ch.IV.
of the SENSES, in as much as they com-
mence from his earlieft Infancy. Thefe
Perceptions, if not infinite, are at leaffc
indefinite, and more fleeting and tranfient,
than the very Objedts, which they exhibit,
becaufe
SCIENCE, and is thence enabled to tell us, not only,
WHAT is to be done, but WHY 'tis to be done; for ART
is a compojite of Experience and Science, Experience
providing it Materials, and Science giving them A
FORM.
In the mean time, while EXPERIMENT is thus ne-
ceflary to all PRACTICAL WISDOM, with refpe& to
PURE and SPECULATIVE SCIENCE, as we have
hinted already, it has not the leaft to do. For who
ever heard of Logic, or Geometry, or Arithmetic being
proved experimentally ? 'Tis indeed by the application
of thefe that Experiments are rendered ufeful j that they
are aflumed into Philofophy, and in fome degree made
a part of it, being otherwife nothing better than puerile
amufements. But that thefe Sciences themfelves fhould
depend upon the Subje&s, on which they work, is, as
if the Marble were to fafhion theChizzle, and not the
Chizzle the Marble.
354 HERMES.
Ch.IV. becaufe they not only depend upon the
exijlence of thofe Obje&s, but becaufe
they cannot fubfift, without their imme-
diate Prefence. Hence therefore it is, that
there can be no Senfation of either Paft or
Future, and confequently had the Soul no
other Faculties, than the Senfes, it never
could acquire the lead Idea of TIME (^).
BUT happy for us we are not deferted
here. We have in the firft place a Faculty,
called IMAGINATION or FANCY, which
however as to its energies it may be fub-
fequent to Senfe, yet is truly prior to it
both in dignity and ufe. THIS 'tis which
retains the fleeting Forms of things, when
Things themfelves are gone, and all Senfa-
at an end.
THAT this Faculty, however connected
with Senfe, is ftill perfectly different, may
be
(i>] See before p. 105. See alfo p. 112. Note (/).
BOOK THE THIRD. 355
be feen from hence. We have an Imagi- Ch.IV.
nation of things, that are gone and ex-
tinct ; but no fuch things can be made ob-
jects of Senfation. We have an eafy com-
mand over the Objects of our Imagina-
tion, and can call them forth in almoft
what manner we pleafe ; but our Senfa-
tions are necefTary, when their Objects are
prefent, nor can we controul them, but
by removing either the Objects, or our-
felves (c).
As
(r) Befides the diftinguifhing of SENSATION from
IMAGINATION, there are two other Faculties of the
Soul, which from their nearer alliance ought carefully
to be diftinguifhed from it, and thefe are M N H M H,
and ANAMNH2I2, MEMORY, and RECOL-
LECTION.
When we view fome rtlift of fenfation repofed within
us, without thinking of its rife^ or referring it to any fcn-
fible Objeft, this is PHANSY or IMAGINATION.
When we view fome fuch relifl^ and refer it withal
to that fenfible Object, which in time pa/t ivas its caufe and
original^ this is MEMORY.
A a 2 Laftly
356 HERMES.
Ch.IV. As the Wax would not be adequate
to its bufmefs of Signature, had it not a
Power to retain, as well as to receive ; the
fame holds of the SOUL, with refpeft to
Senfe and Imagination. SENSE is its re-
ceptive
Laftly the Road, which leads to Memory through a
feries of Ideas, however connected whether rationally or
cafually, this is RECOLLECTION. I have added ca-
fually, as well as rationally, becaufe a cafual connection
is often fufficient. Thus from feeing a Garment, 1
think of its Owner ; thence of his Habitation ; thence
of Woods ; thence of Timber j thence of Ships, Sea-
fights, Admirals, 3V.
If the Diftin&ion between Memory and Phanfy be
not fufficiently underftood, it may be illuflrated by be-
ing compared to the view of a Portrait. When we
contemplate a Portrait, without thinking of whom it is
the Portrait, fuch Contemplation is analogous to
PHANSY. When we view it with reference to the Ori-
ginal, whom it represents, fuch Contemplation is analo-
gous to MEMORY.
We may go farther. IMAGINATION or PHANSY
may exhibit (after a manner) even things that are to
tome. 'Tii here that Hope and Fear paint all their plea-
fant, and all their painful Pictures of Futurity. But
MEMORY is confined in the ftricteft manner to thepajt.
What
i
Boeic THE THIRD. 357
ceptive Power; IMAGINATION, its re- Ch.IV.
tentivc. Had it Senfe without Imagina-
tion, 'twould not be as Wax, but as Wa-
ter, where tho' all Impreffions may be
inftantly made, yet as foon as made they
are as inftantly loft.
THUS then, from a view of the two
Powers taken together, we may call SENSE
(if we pleafe) a kind of tranfient Imagina-
tion ; and IMAGINATION on the contrary
a kind of permanent Senfe (d).
Now
What we have faid, may fuffice for our prefent pur-
pofe. He that would learn more, may confult Arijlot.
de Anima^ L. III. c. 3, 4. and his Tre'atife de Mem. et
Reminifc.
(^) T TOWVV
St? V6t"iv iv nu.'iv diro ruv ivi
iOB Tjvlo
v
A a 3
HERMES.
Ch.IV. Now as our Feet in vain venture to
walk upon the River, till the Froft bind
the Current, and harden the yielding Sur-
face; fo does the SOUL in vain feek to exert
its higher Powers, the Powers I mean of
REASON and INTELLECT, till IMAGI-
NATION firft fix ihzjluency of SENSE, and
thus provide a proper Bafis for the fupport
of its higher Energies.
AFTER
^ TOV TOJKTOU u<nrep TITTOV, <&AN-
TAIIAN xaXscnv. Now what PHANSY or IMA-
GINATION *V, we may explain as follows. We may
conceive to be formed within us, from the operations of our
Senfes about fenjible Subjefts, feme bnprejjion (as it were)
or Pifture in our original Senforiwn, being a relift of that
motion caused within us by the external objett \ a relitt^
which when the external objett is no longer prefent, remains
and is Jlill preferved y being as it were its Image, and
which, by being thus preferved, becomes the caufe of our
having Memory. Now fuch a fort of relief and (as it
were) ImpreJJion they call PHANSY or IMAGINATION.
//<?*. dpbrod. de Animd^ p. 135. t>. Edit. Aid.
BOOK THE THI R D.
AFTER this manner, in the admirable Ch.IV.
Oeconomy of the Whole, are Natures fub-
ordinate made fubfervient to the higher.
Were there no Things external, the Senfes
could not operate ; were there no Senfa-
tions, the Imagination could not operate ;
and were there no Imagination, there could
be neither Reafoning nor Intellettion, fuch
at lead as they are found in Man, where
they have their Intenfions and Remiffions
in alternate fucceflion, and are at firft no-
thing better, than a mere CAPACITY or
POWER. Whether every Intellect begins
thus, may be perhaps a queftiofi -, eipe-
cially if there be any one of a nature more
divine, to which " Intention and Remiffion
" and mere Capacity are unknown (e)."
But not to digrefs.
'Tis
(e) See p. 162. The Life, Energy, or Manner of
MAN'S Exiftence is not a little different from that of
the DEITY. THE LIFE OF MAN has its Eflence in
A a 4 MOTION.
360 H E R M E S.
Ch.IV. 'Ti5 then on thefe permanent Phantafms
that THE HUMAN MIND firft wprks, and
by
MOTION. This is not only true with refpect to that
lower and fubordinate Life, which he fhares in com-
mon with Vegetables, and which can no longer fubfift
than while the Fluids circulate, but 'tis likewife true ig
that Liffj which is peculiar to him as Man. Objects
from without frjl move our faculties, and thence we
jnove of ourfelves either to Practice or Contemplation.
But the LIFE or EXISTENCE of GOD (as far as we
can conjecture upon fo tranfcendent a Subject) is not
only complete throughout Eternity, but complete in
every Inftanf, and is for that reafon IMMUTABLE and
SUPERIOR TQ ALL MOTION.
'Tis to this diftirjftion that Arijloth alludes, when
be tells us Ou 'yu.f povw xjvv'oWf is-n tvip'yiuxy aAAa
x, ax'j>)(7i5* *y flJciw juaAAov iv rpi^ix. tr*'v, i 'w xtvr,-
fAfraSoA^ $t TS-dvTuv J'Auxu, xara TO-J < sroijT?*y,
o# fVtxjf . ^r /^r<f w <?/ ^^ tf Energy of MO-
TION, ^/ fl/" IMMOBILITY ; <7<f PLEASURE ^r FE-
LICITY exiji* rather in REST than in MOTION ;
Change of all things being fweet (according to the Poet)
from a principle of Pravity in thofe who believe fo. For
n
BOOK THE THIRD. 361
by an Energy as fpontaneous and familiar Ch.IV.
to its Nature, as the feeing of Colours is
familiar to the Eye, it difcerns at once
what
in the fame manner as the bad man is one fickle and change-
able, fo is that Nature bad that required Variety^ in as
much as fuch Nature is neither fimple nor even. Eth.
Nicom. VII. 14. & Ethic. Eudem. Vl.fubfin.
'TJS jtO this UNALTERABLE NATURE OF THE
PEITY that Boethius refers, when he fays in thofc
elegant verfes,
..... Tempus
Ire jubes, STABILISQUE MANENS das cuntta
moveri.
From this fingle principle of IMMOBILITY, may be
derived fome of the nobleft of the Divine Attributes ;
fuch as that of IMPASSIVE, INCORRUPTIBLE, IN-
CORPOREAL, &c. Vide Arijltf. Phyfic. VIII. Me-
taphyf. XIV. c. 6, 7, 9, 10. Edit. Du-Val. See alfo
Vol. I. of thefe Treatifes, p. 262 to 266 alfo p. 295,
where the Verfes of Boethius are quoted at length.
It muft be remembred however, that tho' we are not
Goo's, yet as rational Beings we have within us fome-
thing Divine, and that the more we can become fupe-
rior to our mutable, variable, and irrational part, and
place our welfare in that Good, which is immutable,
per-
362 HERMES.
Ck.1V. what in MANY is ONE; what in things
DISSIMILAR and DIFFERENT is SIMILAR
and the SAME {/). By this it comes to
behold
permanent, and rational, the higher we {hall advance
in real Happinefs and Wifdom. This is (as an antient
writer fays) 'OpwurK TU S-EW xara TO Juvarov, the
becoming tike to GOD, as far as in our power. To~? ^
sojf lira? o J3/-* /txaxjr ' PL&" TO/? avQ
For to THE GODS (as fays another antient) /
/" ///^ M on^ continued bappinefs ; ^w/ ^ MEN, 'tis fo far
happy 9 as it rifes to the refemblance offo divine an Energy.
See Plat, in Thesetet. Arift. Eth. X. 8.
(/) This CONNECTIVE ACT of the Soul, by
which it views ONE IN MANY, is perhaps one of the
principal A6ts of its moft excellent Part. 'Tis this re-
moves that impenetrable mifr, which renders Objefls of
Intelligence invifible to lower faculties. Were it not for
this, even ti\t fenfible World (with the help of all our
Senfations) would appear as unconnected, as the words
of an Index. 'Tis certainly not the Figure alone, nor
the Touch alone, nor the Odour alone, that makes
the Rofe, but 'tis made up of all thefe, and other at-
tributes UNITED ; not an unknown Conftitution of in-
fenftble Parts, but a known Conftitution offenfible Parts,
unlefs we chufe to extirpate the poffibility of natural
Knowlege.
WHAT
BOOK THE THIRD. 363
behold a kind offaperior Objects ; a new Ch.IV.
Race of Perceptions, more comprebenfive
than
WHAT then perceives this CONSTITUTION or
UNION ? Can it be any of the Senfes ? No one of
thefe, we know, can pafs the limits of its own pro-
vince. Were the Smell to perceive the union of the
Odour and the Figure, it would not only be Smell,
but it would be Sight alfo. 'Tis the fame in other
inftances. We muft neceffarily therefore recur to
fome HIGHER COLLECTIVE POWER, to give us a
profpecl of Nature, even in thefe her fubordinate IPJioles,
much more in that comprehenfive Whole, whofe Sym-
pathy is univerfaJ, and of which thefe fmaller Wholes
are all no more than Parts.
But no where is this colletting^ and (if I may be al-
lowed the expreflion) this unifying Power more con-
fpicuous, than in the fubjects of PURE TRUTH. By
virtue of this power the Mind views One general Idea
in many Individuals ; One Proportion in many general
Ideas ; One Syllogifm in many Propofitious ; till at length
by properly repeating and connecting Syllogifm with
Syllogifm, it afcend into thofe bright andjleady regions
of SCIENCE,
)uas neque concutlunt vcnti^ neqne nubila nimbis
Adfpergunt, &c. Lucr.
Even
364 HERMES.
Ch.IV. than thofe of Senfe ; a Race of Percep-
tions, each one of 'which may be found in fire
and
Even negative Truths and negative Conclufions can-
rot fubfift, but by bringing Terms and Propofitions
together, fo necejjary is this UNITING Power to every
Species of KNOWLEGE. See p. 3. 250.
He that would better comprehend the diftinlion be-
tween SENSITIVE PERCEPTION, and INTELLEC-
TIVE, may obferve that, when a Truth is fpoken, it
is heard by our Ears, and underflood by our Minds.
That thefe two A<5h are different, is plain, from the
example of fuch, as bear the founds, without know-
ing the language. But to fhew their difference ftill
ftronger, let us fuppofe them to concur in the fame
Man, who (hall both hear and under/land the Truth
propofed. Let the Truth be for example, Tut Angles
of a Triangle are equal to two right Angles. That this
is ONE Truth, and not two or many Truths, I believe
none will deny. Let me afk then, in what manner
does this Truth become perceptible (if at all) to SEN-
SATION ? The Anfwer is obvious j 'tis by fucceffive
Portions of little and little at a time. When the firft
Word is prefertt, all the fubfequent are abfent ; when
the laft Word is prcfent^ all the previous are abfent ;
when any of the middle Words arc prefent^ then are
there fome alfent y as well of one fort as the other.
No more e.xifts at once than a fmgle Syllable, and the
Remainder as much not, (to Senfation at leaft) as
tho'
BOOK THE THIREU 365
end iv hole in the feparate individuals of an Ch.IV.
infinite and fleeting Multitude, without de-
parting
tho' it never had been, or never was to be. And fo
much for the Perception of SENSE, than which we fee
HOthing can be more dijjlpated t fleeting^ and detached.
And is that of the MIND, fimilar ? Admit it, and
what follows ? It follows, that one Mind would no
more recognize one Truth, by recognizing its Terms
fuccejjively and apart, than many diftarit Minds would
recognize it, were it diftributed among them, a dif-
ferent part to each. The cafe is, every TRUTH is
ONE, tho' its TERMS are MANY. It is in no refpet
true by parts at a time, but 'tis true of neceflky at
ctift, and in an inftant. What Powers therefore re-
cognize this ONENESS or UNITY? Where even
does it refide, or what makes it ? Shall we antwer
with the Stagirite, To c\ EN ITOIOTN TTO o
NOT 2 Exarov If this be allowed, it fhould feem,
where SENSATION and INTELLECTION appear to
concur, that Senfation was of MANY, Intellection was
of ONE; that Senfation was temporary , divifible and
fuccej/rue j Intellection, inftantantous, indhifible, and at
once.
If we conflder the Radii of a Circle, we {hall find
at the Circumference that they are MANY ; at the
Center that they are ONE. Let us then fuppofe SENSE
and MIND to view the fame Radii, only let Senfe
view them at the Circumfereme, Mind at the Center ;
and
366 HERMES.
Ch.IV. parting from tbe unity and permanence of
its own nature.
AND
and hence we may conceive, how thefe Powers differ,
even where they jointly appear to operate in perception
of the fame object.
There is ANOTHER ACT OF THE MIND, the
very reverfe of that here mentioned ; an A&, by
which it perceives not one in many, but MANY IN
ONE. This is that mental Separation, of which we
have given fome account in the firft Chapter of this
Book ; that Refolution or Analyfis, which enables us
to investigate tbe Caufes, and Principles, and Elements of
things. 'Tis by Virtue of this, that we are enabled
to abftraft any particular Attribute, and make it by
itfelf the Subject of philofophical Contemplation.
Were it not for this, it would be difficult for particu-
lar Sciences to exift ; becaufe otherwife they would be
as much blended, as the feveral Attributes of fenfible
Subftances. .How, for example, could there be fuch
a Science as Optics, were we neceffitated to contem-
plate Colour concreted with Figure, two Attributes,
which the Eye can never view, but aflbciated ? I men-
tion not a multitude of other fenfible qualities, fome
of which ftill prefent themfelves, whenever we look on
any cohurcd Body.
Thofc
BOOK THE THIRD. 367
AND thus we fee the Procefs by which Ch.IV.
we arrive at GENERAL IDEAS -, for the
Per-
Thofe two noble Sciences, ARITHMETIC and
GEOMETRY, would have no bafis to ftand on, were
it not for this feparative Power. They are both con-
verfant about QUANTITY ; Geometry about CONTI-
NUOUS Quantity, Arithmetic about DISCRETE. EX-
TENSION is eflential to continuous Quantity} MO-
NADS, or UNITS, to Difcrete. By feparating from
the infinite Individuals, with which we are furrounded,
thofe infinite Accidents, by which they are all diverji-
fied> we leave nothing but thofe SIMPLE and PER-
FECTLY SIMILAR UNITS, which being combined
make NUMBER, and are the Subject of ARITHME-
TIC. Again, by feparating from Body every poffible
fubordinate Accident, and leaving it nothing but its
triple Extenfion of Length, Breadth, and Thicknefs, (of
which were it to be deprived, it/ would be Body no
longer) we arrive at that pure and unmixed MAGNI-
TUDE, the contemplation of whofe properties make*
the Science of Geometry*
By the fame analytical or feparative Power, we in-
veftigate DEFINITIONS of all kinds, each one of
which is a developed Word, as the fame Word is an in-
V eloped Definition.
To conclude IN COMPOSITION ANJ> DIVISION
CONSISTS THE WHOLE OF SdSNCJE, CoMPOSI-
4 TION
368 H fi R M E S.
Ch.IV. Perceptions here mentioned are in facl no
other. In thefe too we perceive the ob-
jects of SCIENCE and REAL KNOWLEGE^
which can by no means be, but of that
which is general, and definite, and fat (g).
Here
TION MAKING AFFIRMATIVE TRUTH, AND
SHEWING US THINGS UNDER THEIR SIMILARI-
TIES AND IDENTITIES; DIVISION MAKING NE-
GATIVE TRUTH, AND PRESENTING THEM TO
US UNDER THEIR DISSIMILARITIES AND Dl*
VERSITIES.
And here, by the way, there occurs a Queftion.
If all Wifdom be Science, and it be the bufinefs of
Science as well to compound as tofeparate, may we not
fay that thofe Philofophers took Half of Wifdom for
the Whole, who diftinguifhed it from Wit, as if WIS-
DOM only fepara ted, and WIT only brought together?
Yet fo held the Philofopher of Malmejbury, and the
Author of the EJJay on the Human Under/landing.
(g) The very Etymologies of the Words EIII-
TTHMH, SCIENTIA, and UNDERSTANDING,
may fefve in fome degree to {hew the nature of thefe
Faculties, as well as of thofe Beings, their true and
proper Objects. EIIIZTHMH fcU/xrj, Ji TO
2 T A I N *) 'ov TWP Br
fe O O K T ti E T H I ft D. 369
Here too even Individuals, however of Ch.lV.
themfelves unknowable, become obje&s of
Knowlege^
WV ir
Z7Ti$-wu.ri wsjl ret xaSoAa
SCIENCE (EFI12THMH) has itsnamefrom
bringing us (Efll XTA2IN) TO SOME STOP W
BOUNDARY of things ^ taking us away from the unbounded
nature and mutability of Particulars ; for it is converfant
about Subjefls, that are general, and invariable. Niceph.
Blem. Epit. Logic, p. 21.
This Etymology given by Blemmides, and long be-
fore him adopted by the Peripatetics^ came originally
from Pfaio, as may be feen in the following account of
it from his Cratylus* In this Dialogue Socrates, having
firft (according to the Heraclitean Philofophy which
Cratyliis favoured) etymologized a multitude of Words
vrith a view to that Flow and tlnceajing Mutation, fup-
pofed by Heraditus to run thro' all things, at length
changes his Syfteffi, and begins to etymologize from'
another, which fuppofed fomething in nature to be per-
manent and fixed. On this principle he thus proceeds
riy t ot'jruv avaXusOVTig STCWTOU [ji.iv
tr iv EniSTHMHNj ; a
EH I roif GT'
*'
Let us confider then (fays he) fame of the very
B b
37 HERMES.
Ch.IV. Knowlege, as far as their nature will per-
mit. For then only may any Particular
be
Words already examined-, and in the firji place, the Word
SCIENCE ; how difputable is this (as to its former Ety-
mology^ how much more naturally does it appear to ftgni-
fy t that IT STOPS THE SOUL AT THINGS, than
that it is carried about with them. Plat. Cratyl. p. 437.
Edit. Serr.
The difputable Etymology, to which he here al-
ludes, was a ftrange one of his own making in the for-
mer part of the Dialogue, adapted to the flowing Sy-
ftem of Heraclitus there mentioned. According to this
notion, he had derived EITJ2THMH from iTrtSoii
and HASI/SJV, as if it kept along with things, by perpetu-
al \y following them in their motions. See Plato as be-
fore, p. 412.
As to SCIENTIA, we are indebted to Scaliger for
the following ingenious Etymology. RATJOCINA-
TIO, mot us quidam ejl ; SCIENTIA, quies : unde et no-
men^ turn apud Gracos, turn etiam nojlrum. Uctcst TO
Eni I2TA20AI, EIIIZTHMH. Siflitur enim
mentis agitatio^ et Jit fpecies in animo. Sic Latinum
SCIENTIA, Sn yutreu 2 X ESI 2 TOT ONTO X.
Nam Latini, quod nomen entis fimplex ab ufu abjecerunt
atque repudiarunt^ omnibus aflivis participiis idem ad-
junxerunt. Audicns, axouww uv. Sciens t o^wv u\>.
Seal, in Thcophr. de Caufts Plant. Lib, I. p. 17.
The,
BOOK THE THIRD. 371
be faid to be known, when by aflertin^ it Ch.lV.
to be a Man, or an Animal, or the like,
we
The Englijb Word, UNDERSTANDING, means
not fo properly Knowlege, as that Faculty of the Sou!,
where Knowlege refides. Why may we not then
imagine, that the framers of this Word intended to re-
prefent it as a kind of firm Bo/is, on which the fair
Structure of Sciences was to reft, and which was fup-
pofed to STAND UNDER them, as their immoveable
Support ?
Whatever may be faid of thefe Etymologies, whe-
ther they are true or falfe, they at leaft prove their
Authors to have confidered SCIENCE and UNDER-
STANDING, not vs. fleeting powers of Perception, like
Senfe, but rather as Jleady, permanent^ and durable
COMPREHENSIONS. But if fo, we muft fomewhere
or other find for them certain Jieady, permanent^ and
durable OBJECTS; fince if PERCEPTION OF ANY
KIND BE DIFFERENT FROM THE THING PER-
CEIVED, (whether it perceive ftraight as crooked, or
crooked as ftraight ; the moving as fixed, or the fixed
asmoving)sucHPERCEPTiON MUST OF NECESSITY
BE ERRONEOUS AND FALSE. The following paf~
fage from a Greek Platonic (whom we fhall quote again
hereafter) feems on the prefent occafion not without
its weight ' 15-} yvuviq a,Koi^E$-tc>!x, TI? ajtSijrfwr,
T&;y j^>)Twv. If there bt
Bb 2 A
372 HERMES.
Ch.IV. we refer it to fome fuch comprehenjive, or
general Idea.
Now 'tis of thefe COMPREHENSIVE and
PERMANENT-IDEAS, THE GENUINE PER-
CEPTIONS OF PURE MIND, that WORDS
of all Languages, however different, arc
the SYMBOLS. And hence it is, that as
the PERCEPTIONS include, fo do thefe their
SYMBOLS
A KNOWLEGE more accurate than SENSATION ; there
mujl be certain OBJECTS of fuch knowlege MORE TRUE
THAN OBJECTS OF SENSE.
The following then ^re Queftions worth confider-
ing, What thefe Objects are ? Wlxre they refide ?
And how they are to. be difcovered ? Not by expe-
rimental Philofophy 'tis plain j for that meddles with no-
thing, but what is tangible, corporeal, and mutable
nor even by the more refined and rational fpeculation
of Mathematics ; for this, at its very commencement,
takes fuch Objects for granted. We can only add,
that if they refide in our own MINDS, (and who, that
has never looked there, can affirm they do not ?) then
will the advice of the Satirift be no ways improper,
-s NEC T QUJESIVERIS EXTRA.
P,rf.
BOOK THE THIRD. 373
SYMBOLS exprefs, not this or that fet ofCh.IV.
Particulars only, but all indifferently, as
they happen to occur. Were therefore the
Inhabitants of Sali/bury to be transferred
to Tork, tho' new particular objects would
appear on every fide, they would ftill no
more want a new Language to explain
themfelves, than they would want new
Minds to comprehend what they beheld.
All indeed, that they would want, would
be the local proper Names ; which Names,
as we have faid already *, are hardly a part
of Language, but muft equally be learnt
both by learned and unlearned, as often
as they change the place of their abode.
*Tis upon the fame principles we may
perceive the reafon, why the dead Lan-
guages (as we call them) are now intelli-
gible ; and why the Language of modern
England is able to defcribe antient Rome -,
B b 3 and
* Su p- P- 345> 346.
374- H E R M E S.
Ch.IV. and that si ancient Rome to defcribe modern
England (6). But of thefe matters we
have fpoken before.
. 2. AND now having viewed the
Procefs, by which we acquire general Ideas t
let us begin anew from other Principles,
and try to difcover (if we can prove fo
fortunate) whence 'tis that theje Ideas origi-
nally come. If we can fucceed here, we
may difcern perhaps, what kind of Beings
they are, for this at prefent appears ibme-
what obfcure.
LET
(h] As far as Human Nature, and the primary Ge-
nera both of Sub/lance and Accident are the fame in all
places, and have been fo thro' all ages j fo far all Lan-
guages fhare one common IDENTITY. As far as pe-
culiar fpecies of Sub/lance occur in different regions ; and
much more, as far as the pofitive Injlitutions of religious
and civil Polities are every -where different ; fo far each
Language has its peculiar DIVERSITY. To the Caufes
of Diverfity here mentioned, may be added the di/iin-
guijhing Character and Genius of every Nation t concern-
ing which we {hall fpeak hereafter,.
BOOK THE THIRD. 375
LET us fuppofe any man to look for Ch IV.
the firft time uponfome Work of Art, as
for example upon a Clock, and having
fufficiently viewed it, at length to depart.
Would he not retain, when abfent, an Idea
of what he had feen ? And what is it, to
retain fticb Idea? 'Tis to have A FORM
INTERNAL correfpondent to THE EXTER-
NAL ; only with this difference, that the
Internal Form is devoid of the Matter-, the
External is united with it, being feen in
the metal, the wood, and the like.
Now if we fuppofe this Spectator to
view many fuch Machines, and not limply
to view, but to confider every part of them,
fo as to comprehend how thefe parts all
operate to one End , he might be then
faid to poffefs a kind of INTELLIGIBLE
FORM, by which he would not only un-
derflana, and know the Clocks, which he
had feen already, but every Work alfo of
like Sort, which he might fee hereafter.
B b 4 Should
HERMES.
Ch.IV. Should it be afk'd " which ofthefeForm*
is prior, the External and Senjible -, or
" the Internal and Intelligible-" the Anr
fwer is obvious, that the prior is the Sen-
THUS then we fee, THERE ARE iNr
TELLIGIBLE FORMS, WHICH TO THE
SENSIBLE ARE SUBSEQUENT.
BUT farther ftill If thefe Machines be
allowed the Work not of Chance, but of
&i Artifl, they mud be the Work of one,
who knew what he was about. And what
is it, to work, and know what one is about ?
'Tis to have an Idea of what one is
doing-, to poffefs A FORM INTERNAL, cor-
refpondent to the EXTERNAL, to which ex-
ternal it fervesfor an EXEMPLAR ^AR-
CHETYPE.
HERE then we have AN INTELLIGI-
BLE FORM, WHICH is PRIOR TO THE
SENSIBLE FORM; which> being truly prior
BOOK THE THIRD. 377
as well in dignity as in time, can no more Ch.IV,
become fubfequent, than Caufe can to Effect.
THUS then, with refpedt to Works of
ART, we may perceive, if we attend, A
TRIPLE ORDER OF FORMS ; one Order,
intelligible and previous to thefe Works ;
zfecond Order, fenjible and concomitant;
and a third again, intelligible zn&fubfequenf.
After the firft of thefe Orders the Maker
may be faid to 'work ; thro' the fecond,
the Works themfelves ex?/}, and are what
they are -, and in the third they become.
recognized, as mere Objects of Contempla-
tion. To make thefe Forms by different
Names more eafy to be underflood ; the
firft may be called THE MAKER'S FORM;
the fecond, that of THE SUBJECT ; and the
third, that of THE CONTEMPLATOR.
LET us pafs from hence to Works of
NATURE. Let. us imagine ourfelves view-
ing fome diverfified Profpect ; ' a Plain,
f for example, fpacious and fertile ; a
* c river
378 HERMES.
Ch.IV. " river winding thro' it; by the banks
" of that river, men walking and cattle
" grazing ; the view terminated with
<l diftant hills, fome craggy, and fome
" covered with wood." Here 'tis plain
we have plenty of FORMS NATURAL.
And could any one quit fo fair a Sight,
and retain no traces of what he had be-
held ? And what is it, to retain traces
of what one has beheld? 'Tis to have cer-
tain FORMS INTERNAL correfpondent to
the EXTERNAL, and refembling them in
every thing, except the being merged in
Matter. And thus, thro' the fame reten-
tive and collective Powers, the Mind be-
comes fraught with Forms natural, as be-
fore with Forms artificial. Should it be
afked, " ivhicb of thefe natural Forms are
" prior, the External ones viewd by the
" Senfes, or the Internal exijling in the
" Mind" the Anfwer is obvious, that
the prior are the External.
THUS
BOOK THE THIRD. 379
THUS therefore in NATURE, as well as Ch.IV
in ART, THERE ARE INTELLIGIBLE *"
FORMS, WHICH TO THE SENSIBLE ARE
SUBSEQUENT. Hence then we fee the
meaning of that noted School Axiom, Nil
eft in INTELLECTU, quod non prius fuit in
SENSU - y an Axiom, which we muft own
to be fo far allowable, as it refpedls the
Ideas of a mere Contemplator*
BUT to proceed fomewhat farther Are
natural Productions made BY CHANCE, or
BY DESIGN ? Let us admit by Defign,
not to lengthen our inquiry. They arc
certainly* more exquifite than any Works
of ART, and yet thefe we cannot bring
ourfelves to fuppofe made by Chance.
Admit it, and what follows ? We muft of
necejjity admit a MIND alfo, becaufe DESIGN
implies MIND, wherever 'tis to be found.
Allowing therefore this, what do we
mean
* Arijl, de Part. Animal. L.I. c, i.
380 HERMES.
Ch.IV. mean by the Term, MIND ? We mean
Jomething, which, when it atfs, knows what
it is going to do -, fomething Jlored with Ideas
of its intended Works, agreeably to which
Ideas thofe Works are fajhioned.
THAT fuch EXEMPLARS, PATTERNS,
FORMS, IDEAS (call them as you pleafe)
muft of necejfity be, requires no proving,
but follows of courfe, if we admit the
Caufe of Nature to be A MIND, as above
mentioned. For take away thefe, and
what a Mind do we leave without them ?
CHANCE furely is as knowing, as MIND
WITHOUT IDEAS ; or rather, MIND
WITHOUT IDEAS is no lefs blind than
CHANCE.
THE Nature of thefe IDEAS is not diffi-
cult to explain, if we once come to allow
a poffibility of their Exiftence. That they
are exquifitely beautiful, various, and or-
derly, is evident from the exquifite Beauty,
Variety, and Order, feen in natural Sub-
ftances,
BCXOK THE THIRD. 381
fiances, which are but their Copies or Pic- Ch.IV.
tures. That they are mental is plain, as
they are of the Efence ofMixv, and con-
fequently no Objects to any of the Senfes,
nor therefore circumfcribed either by Time
or Place.
HERE then, on this Syftem, we have
plenty of FORMS INTELLIGIBLE, WHICH
ARE TRULY PREVIOUS TO ALL FoRMS
SENSIBLE. Here too we fee that NATURE
is not defective in her TRIPLE ORDER,
having (like Art) her FORMS PREVIOUS*
HER CONCOMITANT, and HER SUBSE-
QJJENT (/).
THAT
(/') SimplicitiSy in his commentary upon the Predica-
ments, calls theory? Order of thefe intelligible Forms,
ra zD-flo TTK fAfQ^f&K, thofe previous to Participation*
and at other times, v> ifyoypew xttNrnr, the transcendent
Univerfality or Samemfs; the fecond Order he calls r*
lj jtAs6f?fi, thofe which exi/i in Participation^ that is,
thofe merged in Matter; and at other times, he call*
them y xxTZTtTz'yp&r) Konornfj the fubordinate Univer-
faUty or Semenefi ; laftly, of the third Order he fays,
that
382 HERMES.
Ch.IV. THAT the Previous may be juftly fb
called is plain, becaufe they are eflentlatty
prior
that they have no independent exiftence of their own,
but that i^r? a^eAo'vTf? aura iv ru,~q nprrtpous sv-
oizi; 9 xaS* laura UTrej-iKrji/Afv, we curfelves abjlrafting
them in our own Imaginations , have given them by fuch ab~
Jlrattion an exigence as of themfelves. Simp, in Praedic.
p. 17. In another place he fays, in a language fome-
what myfterious, yet ftill comformable to the fame
do&rine Mysore Sv rpirlo-j >.Ji7r1/ov TO xoivcv, TO fj.iv
v ray x6' Vxaj-a, ^ UITICV Tns in eivrtSf xoi-
KOtrOt, TW [AlWJ ttXVTU (^VffJV, WffTTfp X,' TTtf $IX-
XT TW croAvfiJr] nrfo'Arj-J/u Jtirftov $t tft
TO
- TP
TPTOK
ov - Perhaps therefore we mujl admit a TRIPLE
ORDER OF WHAT is UNIVERSAL AND THE
SAME ; that of the firjl Order^ tranfcendent andfuperior
to Particulars^ which throi* its uniform nature is the taufe
of that Samenefi exifting in them^ as tljro* its multiform
pre- conception it is the caufe of their Diverfity that of
ihefecond Order, what is infufcd from the firjl universal
Caufe into the various Species of Beings , and which has its
exijlence in thofe feveral Species that of the third Order,
what fubfifts by abftrattion in cur own* Under/landings,
being offubjlqucnt crign to the other tivo* Ibid, p, 2 1 .
To
BOOK THE THIRD. 383
prior to all things elfe. The WHOLE visi- Ch.IV.
BLE WORLD exhibits nothing more, than
fo
To Simplidus we fhall add the two following Quota-
tions from Ammoniut and Nicephorus Blemmides^ which
we have ventured to tranfcribe, without regard to theii
uncommon length, as they fo fully eftablifli the Doc-
trine here advanced, and the works of thefe Authors
are not eafily to be procured.
roaruv
Wa -nroAAa Kccgotx.tipEva' o c\
er^aj't^ETw TO - JJ x!s; tsravjoj 1 iff-fcov Je
u xj &tiant[Ari>QC TO. y.wia, tTris-ytrxi; o'rt
vo'f iV<y ExIuTr^aaro?, l^ TU> ^^p' UTW TO
^ hzvotx. *H TOI'/JV <r^^^;? 11 sv TU Jax-
TJA/W Alyerai FIFO TflN HOAAHN sTvai- ij j
v TO?? xufwif, EN TO IS nOAAOIS- r JE cv
ro/xa^^ufva, EHI TOI2 nOAAOIT,
TOUTO cy blWti&M >^ ITT* TWW J/fuwy xa
V o yoip AJJWICU^O?, T^OJCOV zzravra,
laurw ra vavrwv z3 - a^aJt)'fAaTa* cicv, zroiaiv
' ' sraoj o
TW Ayjjuiow^w ra stjjj acxouru raura, wf o
j//ov^Er, -^ EtJ'co; ra yV aCr tupnw*
x ii^*<r. 'AAA' ^w ^jj" C T W,-, oJx ^
TK 5^^p > /*AAav amifCM TJ
384 H E R M E 8.
Ch.1V. fo many pajfing Pi&ures of thefe immutdbU
Archetypes; Nay thro' thcfe it attains even
a
j ov yoi^ w? fyifj aAoj/w
Xto? TW ^i/VOOUlw) 'Ef J 1 / TJ X
TO \T\iQi\(fl VTT
* \VA c *-v v ?" ^ *
*i JtT OilOWTTOV 00f TiJOiej OJOf TO U7T
5/;9/vo^i/oy* u o^ oiJiv o TOOUJ, auTo'Ot eTr^Acv, cof
sv TW AJI^JKOU^W T JJjj. "Ert <Te TO Tj!?o? tv TU
^ w? 6 t'v TW JaxluAiw TU'TTOJ' x
TTO to v liJo? nPO THN HOAAfiNj x
*Eo <? TO TiJbf T a'pOwVa E'K TOUT
cf T* iu rc?
rot TOIKUTU EN TOII HOAAOIS
tin Ta b'rifov EAfic'vTo,, xat iource.p.ix ra.
t.t^at tUvro tv ry Jiavoia* xal
EHI TOI2 nOAAOIZ, fi>ou
xal Jj-f;o^fVf. Intelligatur annulus, qui alicitjus^ t<t-
pote ^chillis, imaglneyi infculptam babeat : multa infupef
(erafinty et ab annulo imprimantur : veniat de'mde qu:f-
piam, videatque ceras omnes utiius annuli imprejjione for-
matas, annullque imprejjionem in mente contineat : figillum
annulo infculptttm^ ANTE MULTA dicetur : in cerulis
imprejjum^ in MULTIS : quodvero in ill'ius, qui illo ve-
rnal intclligentiu remanferit, PO^T MULTA, et poflr-
. riw
BOOK THE THIRD. 385
a Semblance of Immortality, and con- ChJV.
tmues
rius genitum dicetur. Idem in generibus et formis intelli-
gendum cenfeo : eten'tm ille optimus procreator mundl Deus,
omnium rerum formas, atque exempla habet apudfe : utji
kominem efficere velit, in hominis for mam ^ quam habet y
intueatur, et ad illius exemplum cat eras facial omnes. At
fi quis rejliterit, dicatque rerum formas apud Creatorem
non ejje: quafo lit diligent er attendat : Opifex, qua facit t
vel cognofcit, vel igncrat : Jed is, qui nefeiet, nunquam,
quicquam fadct : quis enim idfacere aggreditur^ quod fa-
cere ignorat ? Neqite enim facultate quadam rationis ex-
perte aliquid aget, prout agit natura (ex quo conficitur,
ut natura etiam agat, etfi qua faciat^ non adver'tat :) Si
vero ralione quadam aliquid facit^ quodcunque ab eo fac-
tum ejl omnino cognovit. Si igitur Deus non pejore ra-
tione, quam homo, facit quid? qu<e fecit cognovit : fi cog-
novit qua fecit) in ipfo rerum formas ejje perfpicuum eft.
Forma autem in opifice funt perinde ac in annulo figillum*
hacque forma ANTE MULTA, et avulfa a materia dici-
tur. Atqui hominis fpecies in unoquoque hcmine ej} y quern-
Qdmodum etiam ftgilla in ceris ; et IN MULTis, nee avulfa
a materia dicitur. At cumjingulos hominet animo confpi-
cimuS) et eandem in unoquoque formam atque effigiem vide-
muS) ilia effigies in mente nojlra injidens POST MULTA,
et pofterius genita dicetur : veluti in ilk quoque dicebamus,
qui ?nulta Jigilla in cera unv et eodem annulo imprejfe con-
fpexerat. Amman, in Porphyr. Introducl. p. 29. b.
C C Afynlxt
386 HERMES.
Ch.IV. tinues throughout ages to be SPECIFI-
CALLY
SI roc yivit xal rx tlfa II PO TUN
nOAAiiN, EN TOI2 nOAAOII, EIII
TO IS IIOAAOIZ* oToi) swot&u rt <r^a
iw xai ixlt'Jrto.z TO TUOV l ou xWa izroAA*
oAw? TO G$
ra v o*f TO H^vm^URf
isaivlot T aurSf (AITIXJIHTIV txIuTrwwaT^, xa
T
rai HPO TliN HO A A UN' TO <f wf
EN TO 1 2 nOA'AOII' TO tTc ^ aurwi;
A-^Ofv, xat xara Jiavoiay &uAwf U7ros-v, EEEI TOIS
IlOAAOir. "O'JTW? ^ x*\ ra
JIPO TUN noAAiiN ^ Ei
y'tfj Jtara TW?
xa wpow^((re xa
srv.pfiyat.ytv vlfits-iwivai & htyovlou ra y'tvy xal T
S^ EN TOIS nOAAOII, ACT* i TO?C
to TK atidaJTTH fiJ'oj to xa)
TO T
tVwoi?, xat TO^ aAAojf
XJM TOif
f t TO CJttOlT Xtf
BOOK THE THIRD. 387
CALLY ONE,- amid thofe infinite parti- Ch.lV-
cular
ti TO Jf/axJ/v^W el <& ffvv TO?? f
7n<rxo7r~v xai T av/ua TO"
TO TJCWTOV yiv^ (p<x,v~TOii xat Q/fvixcoTalcv xa
eVrco /ASV EN TOI2 HOAAOIZ u'<pfc-ixe T* Jn
^ ra ysuTj. KaTaXaoajv Si TJJ Ix r0* xara /x*^^ av-
T^W d'JTUV QvTIVy Tti'i Ce,'^ft'j}7rOT7lTOe, 3 X J's TWU
yr^tf TV jTrTrorijTa, xa< T&) TOW
xal TOP xa9oA iTTTrey ETrtvorjiraj' xat
TO x9oAa wov Jx rwy x
xal TO xaOo'Aii OU&JJTJXOV, xa
TO xa9eAa <rwu, xat Tr ; y
aTravTwv <rjAAoyt7a | ufy0- > , o TotaTl^ Iv T
V5 T ^-1/7] xj Ta Tj atfAu? wV/j-nirev E II I
TOI2 nOAAOIZ, THT/O, jwfra T -aroA-
Aa xi Jj-fPo^vuf. Genera vero et Species dlcuntur
ejje ANTE MULTA, IN MULTIS, POST
MULT A. Ut puta y intelligatur figlllum^ quamtibet figu-
ram baben^ ex quo multee cera ejufdem figura fmt parti*
cipes, et in medium aliquis has proferat y nequaquam pra-
vifo figilk. Cum autem vidiffit eas ceras in quibus figura
exprimitur^ et animadvertijjet omnes eandem figuram par-
ticipare, et qua videbantur mult a , ratione in unum coegif-
Jet) hoc in mente teneat. Nempe figillum didtur ejfifpccies
ANTE MULTA j ilia vero in ceris^ IN MULTIS; qu<
vero ab Us defumitur, et in mente immaterialiter fubji/iit^
POST MULTA. Sic igitur et Genera et Species ANTE
MULTA in Creator t funt^ fecundum ratlines efficients.
C 2 In
3*8 HERMES.
Ch.IV. cular changes, that befal it every mo-
ment ().
MAY
In Deo enim rerum effeflrices rationes una et ftmpliciter
pree-exijlunt-, fecundum quas rationes ille fupra-fubjlantia-
lis omnes res et pradeftinavit et produxit. Exiftere autem
dicimtur Genera et Species IN MULTIS, quoniam in fm-
gulis hominibus hominis Species, et in fmgulis equis equi
Species ejl. In hominibus aque ac in equis et a His ani-
malibus Genus invenitur harum fpecierum, quod ejl ani-
mal. In animalibus etiam una cum Zoophytis magis uni-
verfale Genus, nempe fenfitivum exquiritur. Additis vero
plantis, fpeclatur Genus animatum. Si vero una cum ani-
matis quifquam vdit perfcrutari etiam inanimate, totum
Corpus perfpiciet. Cum autem entia incorporea conjunfta
fuerint Us modo traflatis, apparebit primum et generalijji-
tnum Genus. Atque it a quidem IN MULTIS fub/iftunt
Genera et Species. Comprebendens vero quifquam ex fm-
gulis hominibus naturam ipfam bumanam, et ex fmgulis
equis ipfam equinam, atque (ta univcrfalem hominem et
univerfalem equum conftderans, et univerfale animal exjin-
gulis raiione colligens, et univerfale fenfitivum, et univer-
fale animatum, et univerfale corpus, et maxime univerfale
ens ex omnibus colligens, hie, inquam, in fuamente Genera,
et Species immaterialitcr conjlituit E II I TOI2 ITOA-
AOIE, hoc ejl, POST MULTA, et po/ierius genita.
Nicepb. Blem. Log. Epit. p. 62. Vid. etiam Alcin.
in Platonic. Philofoph. Introduft. C. IX. X.
(>) THE following elegant Lines of Virgil vet worth
attending to, tho' applied to no higher a fubjet than
Bees.
Ergt
BOOK T HE TH i R D.
MAY we be allowed then to credit thofe Ch.IV.
fpeculative men, who tell us, *' 'tis In
" thefe
Ergo ipfas quamvis angufti terminus ecvi
Excipiat : (neque enim plus feptima dudtur at as)
AT GENUS IMMORTALE MANET - G. IV.
The fame Immortality, that is, . the Immortality of the
Kind may be feen in all perijkable fubftances, whether
animal or inanimate; for tho' Individuals perijh, the
fever al Kinds Jlill remain. And hence, if we take Ti Si E , '
as denoting the fyftem of things temporary, we may col-
left the meaning of that paflage in the Timteus, where
the Philofopher defcribes TIME to be - pz
CCIM( v vi xar a^ijuov b-<rav iwviov tiwvot.
nitatis in uno permanentis Jmaginem quandam, certis nu-
merorum articulis progredientem. Plat. V. III. p. 37.
Edit. Serrqn.
We have fubjoined the following extract from Boe-
tbius, to ferve as a commentary on this defcription of
TIME. - JE TERNITAS igitur eft, interminabilis vita
totajimul et perfcfla pojjejjio. Quod ex collatione tefnpora-
Hum clarius liquet. Nam quidquid vivit in TEMPO RE,
id prafens a pr&teritis in futura procedit : nihi'que eft in
tempore ita conjlitutum, quod totum vitts fute fpatium pa-
riter pojjit ampleRi ; fed crajiinum quidem ncndum appre-
hendit, befternum vero jam perdidit. In hodicrna quoque
ifitd nvn amflius vhitis > quam in illo mob'Ji tranfityrisque
C c 3 ma~
390 HERMES.
Ch.IV. " t '-hefe permanent and comprebenjivel? 'OR MS
that THE DEITY views at once, without
ct looking abroad, all pofjible productions
" both prefent, paft, and future that this
" great and Jlupendous View is but a View
-" of himfelf, where all things lie inveloped
" in their Principles and Exemplars, as be-
" ing
momenta. Quod Igltur Temporis patitur conditionem, licet
illudyjicut de mundo cenfuit Arijloteles^ nee caper it unquam
ej/e, nee definat, vitaque ejus cum temporis infinitate tenda-
fwr, nondum tamen tale eft, ut tzternum effe jure credatur.
Non enim totum fimul infinite licet vita: fpatium compre-
hendlt, atque compleflitur, fed futura nondum tranfafla
jam non habet. Quod igitur interminabilis vit<s plenitu-
dlnem totam pariter comprehendit* ac pojjidet, cut neque
futuri quidquam ab/it, nee pmteriti fluxerit, id JETER-
NUM ejje jure perbibetur : idque necejje ejl^ et Jut compos
prafemfibi femper ajjijlere^ et infimtatem mobilis temporis
habere prajentem. Unde quidam non recTe^ qul cum au-
diunt vifum Platoni^ mundum hunc nee habuijje initium,
nee babiturum ejje defettum, hoc modo conditori conditum
mundum fieri co~aternum putant. Aliud ejl eni*i PER
INTERMINABILEM DUCJ VITAM, ( quod Mundo
Plato tribuit) aliud INTERMINABILIS VIT^E TOTAM
PARITER COMPLEXAM ESSE PRJESENTIAM, quod
Divinae Mentis proprium ejje manifejlum eft. Neque enim
Dem
BOOK THE THIRD. 391
f < ing ejjential to thefulnefs of his unroerfal Ch.IV.
" Intelkttion T ' If fo, 'twill be proper,
that we invert the Axiom before men-
tioned. We muft now fay -Nil eft in
SE N s u, quod non priusfuit in IN T E L L E o
TU. For tho' the contrary may be true
with refpe& to Knowledge merely human,
vet never can it be true with refped: to
C c 4 Know-*
De us conditis rebus antiquior videri debet temporis quanti-
tate, Jed fimplicis potius proprietate natures. HUNC
ENIM VIT./E IMMOBILIS PR JESENTARIUM STA-
TUM, INFINITUS ILLE TEMPORALIUM RERUM
MOTUS IMITATUR ; cumque eum effingere, atqus aqvare
nenpojjit) ex immobilitate deficit in motitm ; ex Jimplicitate
fresfentia decrefcit in infinitam futuri ac prater iti quanti~
tatem ; et , cum totam pariter vita fuae plenitudinem nt-
queat pojjidere^ hoc ipfo, quod allquo modo nunqttarn effe
defmlt^ illud y quod implere atque exprimere non poieft t
aliquatenus videtur amulari^ alligans Je ad qualemcunqite
prafentiam hujus exigui volucrifque momenti : quts^ quo-
niam MANENTIS ILLIUS PRJESENTI^ QUANDAM
GESTAT IMAGINEM, quibufcumque contigerit) id pr&~
Jlaty ut ESSE videantur. hioniam vero mature non pe-
tuit t infinltum Temporis iter arripuit : eoqtte tnodafaftum
/?, Ut CONTJNUARET YITAM EUNDO, CUJUS pknt-
tudinem complefli non valuit PERMANENDO.
^c. De Confolat, Philofoph. L. V.
392 HERMES.
Ch.IV. Knowlege univerfally, unlefs we give Pre+
cedence to ATOMS and LIFELESS BODY,
making MIND, among other things, to be
ftruck out by a lucky Concourfe.
. 3. 'Tis far from the defign of this
Treatife, to infinuatc that Atheifm is the
Hypothefis of our later Metaphyfkians,
But yet 'tis fomewhat remarkable, in their
feveral Syftems, how readily they admit
of the above Precedence*
FOR mark the Order of things, accor-
ding to their account of them. Firfl
comes that huge Body, thefenjible World*
Then this and its Attributes beget fenfibl*
Ideas. Then out of fenfible Ideas, by a
kind of lopping and pruning, are made
Ideas intelligible, whether fpecific cr gene-
ral. Thus, mould they admit that MIND
was coeval with BODY, yet till BODY gave
it Ideas, and awakened its dormant Pow-
Crs, it could at beft have been nothing
more
393
more, than a fort of dead Capacity, for Ch.IV.
INNATE IDEAS it could not pojjibly have
any.
AT another time we hear of Bodies fo
exceedingly jine, that their very Exility
makes them fufceptible of fenfation and
knowledge -, as if they mrunk into Intellect
by their exquifite fubtlety, which rendred
them too delicate to be Bodies any longer.
'Tis to this notion we owe many curious
inventions, fuch as fubtle JEther, animal
Spirits, nervous Duts y Vibrations, and the
like; Terms, which MODERN PHILOSO-
PHY, upon parting with occult Qualities y
has found expedient to provide itfelf, to
fupply their place.
BUT the intellectual Scheme, which ne-
ver forgets Deity, poftpones every thing
corporeal to the primary mental Caufe. 'Tis
bere it looks for the origin of intelligible
Ideas, even of thofe, which exift in human
Capacities. For tho' fenfible Objects may
be
HERMES.
Ch.IV. be the deftined medium, to awaken the
dormant Energies of Ato's Understanding,
yet are thofe Energies themfelves no more
contained in Senfe, than the Explofion of
a Cannon, in the Spark which gave it
fire (/).
IN
(/) The following Note is taken from a Manufcript
Commentary of the Platonic Olympiodorus, (quoted be-
fore p. 371.) upon the Pk<zdo of Plato ; which tho' per-
haps fome may object to from inclining to the Doctrine
of Platonic Reminifcencc, yet it certainly gives a better
account how far the Setifes aflat in the acquifition of
Science, than we can find given by vulgar Philofophers.
rx y^n'cw x) Stvrspot KWXI v\ amof
xara rauTW ^ -njv moiay titTa* xai TO iv Tt-
OT Ji' ev/&;j xai
things, which are inferior and fe-
twdary, are by no means the Principles or Caufes of the
more excellent ; and tho' we admit the common interpreta-
tions, and allow SENSE to be a Principle <T/" SCIENCE,
vie muji however call it a Principle^ not as if it was thf
efficient
BOOK THE THIRD. 395
IN fhort ALL MINDS, that are, are Si- Ch.IV-
and CONGENIAL ; and fo too are
their
efficient Caufe, but as it roufes our Soul to the Recollefiion
of general Ideas. According to the fame way of thinking
is it f aid in the Timaus, that through the Sight and Plear-
ing we acquire to ourfelves Philofophy, becaufe we pafs
from Objetts of SENSE to REMINISCENCE or RE-
JCOLLECTION.
And in another paflage he obferves
J //^ SOUL, by containing the Princi-
ples of all Beings, is a fort of OMNIFORM REPRE-
SENTATION or EXEMPLAR; when It is rcuzed by
objefts of Senfe, it recollects thofe Principles, which it
contains ivithin^ and brings them forth.
Georgius Gemijlus, otherwife called Pletho^ writes
upon the fame fubjecl in the following manner.
T^X'?" ?* a(rti; o* T^ ii^rt TiQty.tvvi dvxXx.[4 Sav
;J? iv roij a<&J!
J. Oj ^'' ay -.idaa ^AAc'Si
396 H E R M E S.
Ch.IV- their Ideas, or intelligible Forms. Were
it otherwife, there could be no intercourfe
between
OVTWV /uv, )*.\uv SI XZT* aAAwtf li
xara TO ooQov J/wjjtx/vac.
T<vo> (pafffajf oraXXw ETJ Kff/rlovo? TE xj
<P}XH TV X^!J^/W TO TfXWTfl3U TBTO T
77^ who fuppofe IDEAL FORMS,
/^ yZv aj/umes, for the purpofes of
Science, thofe Proportions, which exijl in fenfible objects,
pvjfrjfcs them with a fuperior accuracy and perfection, than
teat to -which they attain in thofe fenfible objefts. Now
tiiis fupcrior Perfection or Accuracy the Soul cannot have
from fenfible objefts, as it is in faEi not in them ; nor yet
can Jhe conceive it herfelf as from herfelf, without its
having exijlence any where elfe. For the Soul is not
formed fo as to conceive that, tubicb has exijlence no where^
face evenfucb opinions, as are falfe, are all cf 'them com-
pofitions irregularly formed^ not cfmere Non-Beings, but
ef various real Beings, one ^uith another. It remains
therefore that this Pcrfeclion, which is fuperior to the
Proportions exiting in fenfible objefis, mujl defcend to the
Soul from SOME OTHER NATURE, WHICH is BY
MANY DEGREES MORE EXCELLENT AND PER-
TECT. Plcth. de Arijlctcl. et Platonic. Philofoph.
Diff. Edit. Paris 1541.
The AOTOI or PROPORTIONS, of which Ge-
mifius here fpeaks, mean not only thofe relative Pre-
I portions
BOOK THE THIRD. 397
between Man and Man, or (what is more Ch.IV.
important) between Man and God.
FOR
portions of Equality and Inequality , which exift in Quan-
tity, (fuch as double, fefquLalter, &c.) but in a larger
fenfe, they may be extended to mathematical Lines,
Angles^ Figures^ &c. of all which AOJ/OJ or Proportions^
tho' we pofTefs in the Mind the moft clear and precife
Ideas, yet it may be juftly queftioned, whether any one
of them ever exifted in thefenfible World.
To thefe two Authors we may add Boethius, who,
after having enumerated many acts of the MIND or
INTELLECT, wholly diftinft from Senfatian, and inde-
pendent of it, at length concludes,
Hac eft efficient magis
Longe caujj'a potentior,
)uam quee materiee mod*
ImpreJ/as patitur notas.
Prtscedit tamen excitans,
Ac vires animi movens,
Vivo in corpore pajjlo.
Cum vel lux oculos ferit^
Vel vox auribus injlrepit ;
'Turn MENTIS VIGOR excitus^
QUAS INTUS SPECIES TENET,
Ad motus Jimileis vocans,
Notts applicat extiris,
INTRORSUMQJJE RECONDITIS
FOR MIS mifcet imagines.
De Confolat. Philo/bph. L. V.
398 HERMES.
Ch.IV. FOR what is Converfation between Mart
and Man ? 'Tis a mutual intercourfe of
Speaking and Hearing. To the Speaker,
'tis to teach ; to the Hearer, 'tis to learn.-
To the Speaker, 'tis to defcend from Ideas
to Words ; to the Hearer, 'tis to afcend
from Words to Ideas. If the Hearer, in
this afcent, can arrive at no Ideas, then is
he faid not to underjland; if he afcend to
Ideas diflimilar and heterogeneous, then is
he faid to mij underjland. What then is
requifite,that he may be faid to underjland?
That he mould afcend to certain Ideas,
treafured up within him/elf, correfpondent
and fimilar to thofe within the Speaker.
The fame may be faid of a Writer and a
Reader; as when any one reads to day or to
morrow, or here or in Italy, what Euclid
wrote in Greece two thoufand years ago.
Now is it not marvelous, there mould
b&fo exaft an Identity of our Ideas, if they
3 were
BOOK THE THIRD. 399
were only generated from Jen/lble Objefts, Ch.IV,
infinite in number, ever changing, diftant
in Time, diftant in Place, and no one
Particular the fame with any other ?
AGAIN, do we allow it poflible for GOD
to iignify his wit/to Men ; or for MEN to
fignify their wants to GOD ? In both thefe
cafes there muft be an Identity of Ideas, or
elfe nothing is done either one way or the
other. Whence then do thefe COMMON
IDENTIC IDEAS come? Thofe of Men,
it feems, come all from Senfation. And
whence come God's Ideas? Not furely
from Senfation too -, for this we can hardly
venture to affirm, without giving to Body
that notable Precedence of being prior to the
Intellection of even God bimfelf. Let them
then be original; let them be connate, and
effentialto the divine Mind. If this be true,
is it not a fortunate Event, that Ideas. of
corporeal rife, and others of mental, (things
derived from fubjetfsfo totally dijlintt ) Jhould
fi
400 HERMES.
Ch.lV.Ja happily co-incide in the fame wonderful
Identity ?
HAD we not better reafon thus upon (b
abftrufe a Subjeft ? Either all MINDS
have their Ideas derived-, or all have them
original-, or fame have them original, and
fome derived. If all Minds have them de-
rived, they muft be derived from fome-
thing, which is iff elf not Mind, and thus
we fall infenfibly into a kind of Atheifm.
If all have them original, then are all
Minds divine, an Hypothefis by far more
plaufible than the former. But if this
be not admitted, then muft one Mind (at
leaft) have original Ideas, and the reft
have them derived. Now fuppofing this
laft, whence are thofe Minds, whofe Ideas
are derived, moft likely to derive them ?
From MIND, or from BODY ? From
MIND, a thing homogeneous; or from
BODY, a thing heterogeneous ? From
MIND, fuch as (from the Hypothefis) has
' original
Book THE THIRD. 401
original Ideas i or from BODY, which we Ch.IV.
cannot difcover to have any Ideas at all? (/)
An Examination of this kind, purfued
with accuracy and temper, is the moft
probable method of folving thefe doubts.
*Tis thus we fhall be enabled with more
aflurance to decide, whether we are to
admit the Doctrine of the Epicurean
Poet,
^
CORPOREA NATURA anlmum conjlare,
animamque ;
or truft the Mantuat2 Bard, when he fings
in divine numbers,
Igneus eft oil is vigor,
Se minibus. >
BUT
(/) NGTN & *'<?
rx ANOHTA NOTN ^w<roi ; No BODY pro-
duces MIND : for bow fiould THINGS DEVOID OF
M i N D produce MIND? Sallujl de Dili et Mundo, c. 8.
D d
402 HERMES,
Ch.IV. BUT 'tis now time, to quit thefe Specu-
lations. Thofe, who would trace them
farther, and have leifure for fuch ftudies,
may perhaps find .themfelves led into re-
gions of Contemplation, affording them
profpecls both interefting and pleafant.
We have at prefent faid as much as was
requifite to our Subject, and mall there-
fore pafs from hence to our concluding
chapter.
CHAP,
So OK THE THIRD. 403
CHAP. V.
Bub-ordination of Intelligence Diffidence
of Ideas* both in particular Men, and in
whole Nations Different Genius^ of dif-
ferent Languages Character of the
Englifti, the Oriental, the Latin, and
the Greek Languages Superlative Ex~
cellenct of the Lajl Conclujion.
ORIGINAL TRUTH (a], having the
moft intimate connection with the
fupre?ne Intelligence, may befaid (as it were)
to
(a] Thofe Philosophers, whofe Ideas of Being and
Knovjlcge are derived from Body and Senfation y have a
ihort method to explain the nature of TRUTH. 'Tis
a .faffitioju thing, made by every man for himfelf j
which comes and goes, juft as 'tis remembred and for-
got; which in the order of things makes its appearance
the loft of any, being not only iubfequent to fenjlble Ob-
jedts, but even to our Senfatiotu of them. According
to this Hypothefis, there are many Truths, which have
been, and are no longer j others, that will be, and have
D d 2 not
404 HERMES.
Ch. V. to (Line with unchangeable fplendour, en-
lightening throughout the Univerfe every
poffible Subject, by nature fufceptible of
its benign influence. Paffions and other
obftacles may prevent indeed its efficacy,
as clouds and vapours may obfcure the
Sun -, but it felf neither admits Diminu-
tion, nor Change, becaufe the Darknefs re-
ipects only particular Percipients. Among
thefe therefore we muft look for ignorance
and
not been yet ; and multitudes, that poffibly may never
exift at all.
But there are other Reafoners, who muft furely have
had very different notions ; thofe 1 mean, who repre-
ferit TRUTH not as the /#/?, but the firjl of Beings ;
who call it immutable, eternal, cmniprefent ; Attributes,
that all indicate fomething more than human. To
thefe it muft appear fomewhat ftrange, how rricn
fhould imagine, that a crude account of the method
bow they perceive Truth, was to pafs for an account of
Truth itfelf; as if to defcribe the road to London, could
be called a Defcription of that Metropolis.
For my own part, when I read the detail about Scr>
fation and Reflection, and am taught the procefs at
large how my Ideas are all generated, 1 teem to view
the
BOOK THE THIRD. 405
and errour, and for that Subordination cfCh. V.
Intelligence, which is their natural confe-
quence.
WE have daily experience in the works
of ART, that a partial Knowlege will fuf-
fice for Contemplation, tho' we know not
enough, to profefs ourfelves Artifts. Much
more is this true, with refped: to NA-
TURE ; and well for mankind is it found
D d 3 to
the human Soul in the light of a Crucible, where Truths
are produced by a kind of logical Chemiftry. They
may confift (for aught we know) of natural materials,
but are as much cratures of our own, as a Bolus or
Elixir.
If Milton by his URANIA intended to reprefcnt
TRUTH, he certainly referred her to a much more an-
tient, as well as a far more noble origin.
Heav'nly born !
Before the hills appear' d, >or fountains floiu'dy
'Thou with eternal Wifdom didji converfe^
Wifdom thy Sifter ; and with her didji play l
In prefence of th' almighty Father , pleas' d
With thy celejiid Song. P. L. VII.
See Proverbs VIII. 22, &c. Jeremiah X. 10.
Marc Antwin. IX. i.
HERMES.
Ch. V. to be true, elfe never could we attain any
natural Knowlege at all. For if the con-
Jlituthe Proportions of a Clock are fo fub-
tle, tbat few conceive them truly, but the
Artift himfelf j what (hall we fay to thoje
feminal Proportions, which make the ef-
fence and character of every natural Su6-
jeft? Partial views, the Imperfections of
Senfe; Inattention, Idlenefs, the turbu-
lence of Paffionsj Education, local Senti-
ments, Opinions, and Belief, confpire in
many inftances to furnifli us with Ideas,
fome too general, fome too partial, and
(what is worfe than all this) with many
that are erroneous, and contrary to Truth.
Thefe it behoves us to correct as far as
poffible, by cool fufpence and candid ex-
amination.
AND thus by a connection perhaps lit-
tle expected, the Caufe of LETTERS, and
that
BOOK THE THIRD. 407
that of VIRTUE appear to co-incide, it Ch. V.
being the buiinefs of both to examine our
Ideas> and to amend them by the Standard
of Nature and of Truth (6).
IN this important Work, we {hall be
led' to obferve, how Nations, like fingle
Men, have their peculiar Ideas; how thefe
peculiar Ideas become THE GENIUS OF
THEIR LANGUAGE, fince the Symbol muft
of courfe correfpond to its Archetype (c) ;
D d 4 how
(1} How ufeful to ETHIC SCIENCE, and indeed to
KNOWLEGE in general, a GRAMMATICAL Dis-
QU I s I T I o N i nto the Etymology and Meaning of Wo R D s
was efteemed by the chief and ableft Philofophers, may
be feen by confulting Plato in his Cratylus ; Xcnopb.
Mem. IV. 5, 6. Arrlan. Epift. I. 17. II. 10. Marc.
Anton.lll. ii. V. 8. X. 8.
(c} H00TE XAPAKTHP r r a-^fuTra
A O T O I. Stob. Capiwitur Signa baud levin, fed ob-
fcrvatu digna (quod fortaffe qulfpiam non putarit) de in-
gen'ris ci moribus populornm ft natlonum ex lingua ipfcrum.
Bacon de Augm. Sclent. VI. i. Vid. etiain Qunftil.
L. XI. p. 675. Edit. Capperon. Diag. L.I. P- 58. et
Menag. Com. 7ufc. Difp. V. 1 6.
408 H E R M E S.
Ch. V. how the ivifeft Nations, having the tnoft
and bejl Ideas, will confequently have the
heft and mo ft copious Languages ; how others,
whofe Languages are motley and com-
pounded, and who have borrowed from
different countrys different Arts and Prac-
tices, difcover by WORDS, to whom they
are indebted for THINGS.
To illuftrate what has been faid, by a
few examples. WE BRITONS in our time
have been remarkable borrowers, as our
multiform Language may fufficiently (hew.
Our Terms in polite Literature prove, that
this came from Greece ; our Terms in
Mujic and Painting, that thefe came from
Italy, our Phrafes in Cookery and War,
that we learnt thefe from the French ; and
our Phrafes in Navigation, that we were
taught by the Flemings and Low Dutch.
Thefe many and very different Sources of
our Language may be the caufe, why it is
fo deficient in Regularity and Analogy. Yet
have this advantage to compenfate the
BOOK THE THIRD. 409
defect, that what we want in Elegance, we Ch. V.
gain in Copioufnefs, in which laft refpect
few Languages will be found fuperior to
LET us pafs from ourfelves to the RE-
GIONS OF THE EAST. The (d) Eaftern
World, from the earlieft days, has been at
all times the Seat of enormous Monarchy.
On them fair Liberty never fhed its genial
influence. If at any time civil Difcords
arofe among them (and arife there did in-
numerable) the contefl was never about
the Form of their Government -, (for this
was an object, of which the Combatants
had no conception ;) 'twas all from the
poor motive of, who foould be their MASTER,
whether
to r ol JUEV
TWV 'AA-^o;y, c'j ol TS-epl Tr,v Atrixv TUV Tsreai
VTTO^SO-I rr.v $e<nroT wv a.o%ri<j, zlv
For the Barbarians by being more Jlavijb
in their Manners than the Greeks, and thofe of Afia than
thofe of Europe, fubmit to dcfpotic Government without
or difcontcnt. Arift. Polit. III. 4.
4 io HERMES.
Ch, V. whether a Cyrus or an Artaxerxes, a Ma-
homet or a Muftapba.
SUCH was their Condition, and what
was the confequence ? Their Ideas be-
came confonant to their fervile State, and
their Words became confonant to their
fervile Ideas. The great Diftindion, for
ever in their fight, was that of Tyrant and
Slave ; the moft unnatural one conceiva-
ble, and the mod fufceptible of pomp, and
empty exaggeration. Hence they talk'd
of Kings as Gods, and of themfelves, as
the meaneft and moft abjecl: Reptiles.
Nothing was either great or little in mode-
ration, but every Sentiment was heightened
by incredible Hyperbole. Thus tho' they
fometimes afcended into the Great and
Magnificent (e}, they as frequently dege-
nerated
(e) The trueft Sublime of the Eaft may be found in
the Scriptures, of which perhaps the principal caufe is
the intrinfic Greatnefs of the Subjects there treated 9
the Creation of the Univerfe, the Difpenfatior.s of di-
vine Providence, &c. i
BOOK THE THIRD. 411
nerated into the 'Tumid and Bumbaft. he Ch. V.
Greeks too ofAfia became infedted by their
neighbours, who were often at times not
only their neighbours, but their mafters ;
and hence that Luxuriance of the Afiatic
Stilf, unknown to the chafte eloquence
and purity of Athens. But of the Gree&swe
forbear to fpeak now, as we {hall fpeak of
them more fully, when we have firft confi-
dered the Nature or Genius of the Romans.
AND what fort of People may we pro-
nounce the ROMANS ? A Nation engaged
in wars and commotions, fome foreign,
fome domeftic, which for feven hun-
dred years wholly engrolTed their thoughts.
Hence therefore their LANGUAGE be-
came, like their Ideas , copious in all Terms
expreffive of things political, and well
adapted to the purpofes both of Hijlory
and popular 'Eloquence. But what was
their Pbilofcpby ? As a Nation, 'twas
none, if we may credit their ableft Writers.
And hence the Unfitnefs of their Language
to
412 HERMES.
Ch. V. to this Subject ; a defect, which even C/-
cero is compelled to confefs, and more fully
makes appear, when he writes Philofo-
phy himfelf, from the number of Terms,
which he is obliged to invent (f). Virgil
feems
(/) See Cic. de Fin. I. C. i, 2, 3. III. C. i, 2, 4,
&c. but in particular Tufc. Difp. I. 3. where he fays,
PHILOSOPHIA jacuit ufque ad bane at at em y nee ullum
babuit lumen LITERARUM LATINARUM ; qua il-
luftranda et excitanda nobis ejl ; utjiy &c. See alfo Tufc.
Difp. IV. 3. and Acad. I. 3. where it appears, that 'till
CICERO applied himfelf to the writing of Pbilofophy 9
the Romans had nothing of the kind in their language,
except fome mean performances of Amafanius the Epi-
curean^ and others of the fame fe&. How far the Ro-
mans were indebted to Cicero for Philofophy, and with
what induftry, as well as eloquence, he cultivated the
Subjet, may be feen not only from the titles of thofe
Works that are now loft, but much more from the
many noble ones {till fortunately preferved.
The Epicurean Poet LUCRETIUS, who flourifhed
nearly at the fame time, feems by his filence to have
over- looked the Latin writers of his own Seel ; deriv-
ing all his PhiJofophy, as well as Cicero, from Grecian
Sources; and, like him, acknowleging the difficulty of
writing Philofophy in Latin, both from the Poverty of the
Tongue, and from the Novelty of the Subject.
Net
BOOK. THE THIRD. 413
fcems to have judged the moft truly of his Ch. V.
Countrymen, when admitting their infe-
riority in the more elegant Arts, he con-
cludes at laft with his ufual majefty,
Ntc me animtfalliti GRAIOSUM olfcura reperta
Difficile inlujlrare LATINIS verftbus ejje^
( Multa novis rebus pr&fertim quomfit agendum,)
Propter EGESTATEM LINGUA et RERUM NO-
VITATEM :
Sfd tua me virtus tamen, et fperata voluptas
Suavis amicitits quemvis perferre laborem
Suadet- Lucr. I. 137.
In the fame age, VARRO, among his numerous
works, wrote fome in the way of Philofophy ; as did the
Patriot BRUTUS, a Treatife concerning Firtue^ much
applauded by Cicero ; but thefe Works are now loft.
Soon after the Writers above-mentioned came HO-
RACE, fome of whofe Satires and Epiftles may be juftly
ranked among the moft valuable pieces of Latin Pbilo-
fopky, whether we confider the Purity of their Stile, or
the great Addrefs, with which they treat the Subject.
After Horace, tho' with as long an interval as from
the days of Augujlus to thofe of Nero, came the Saiirift
PERSIUS, the friend and difciple of the Stoic Corr.utus ;
to whofe precepts as he did honour by his virtuous Life,
fo
HERMES.
REGERE IMPERIO POPULOS, Ro-
manf f memento,
(Ha tibi erunt artes) pactfque importer e
morem y
Parcerejubjeftis, et debellarefupcrbos.
FROM
fo his works, tho' fmall, fhew an early proficiency in
the Science of Morals. Of him it may be faid, that
he is almoft the {ingle difficult writer among the Latin
Claffics, whofe meaning has fufficient merit, to make
it worth while to labour thro' his obfcurities.
In the fame degenerate and tyrannic period, lived alfo
SENECA ; whofe character, both as a Man and a Wri-
ter, is difcufled with great accuracy by the noble Au-
thor of the Cfaraften/tiu, to whom we refer.
Under a milder Dominion, that of Hadrian and the
jfntoninesy lived AULUS GELLIUS, or (as fome call
him) AGELLJUS, an entertaining Writer in the mif-
cellaneous way ; well fkilled in Criticifra and Antiqui-
ty ; who tho' he can hardly be entitled to the name of
a Philofcpber, yet deferves not to pafs unmemioned here,
from the curious fragments of Fhilofophy interfperlcd
in his works.
With Auhis Gell'ius we range MACROBIUS, not be-
caufe a Contmporaiy, (foe he is fuppofed to have lived
under
BOOK THE THIRD. 415
FROM confidering the Romans, let us Ch. V.
pafs to THE GREEKS. THE GRECIAN
COMMON-
under Honnrius and Theodofms] but from his near refem-
blance, in the chara&er of a Writer. His Works,
like the other's, are mifcellaneous ; filled with Mytho-
logy and antient Literature, fome Philofophy being in-
termixed. His Commentary upon the Somnium Scipio-
nis of Cicero may be confidered as wholly of ihefbi/o-
fcphical kind.
In the fame age with Aldus Gettius, flourifhed APU-
LEIUS of Madaura in Africa, a Platonic Writer, whofe
Matter in general far exceeds his perplexed and affected
Stile, too conformable to the falfe Rhetoric of the Age
when he lived.
Of the fame Country, but of a later Age, and a
hai {her Stile, was MARTIANUS CAPELLA, if indeed
he deferve not the name rather of a Philologift, than of
a Pbilofopher.
After CV?/*//tf, we may rank CHALCIDIUS the Pla-
tonic, tho' both his Age, and Country, and Religion
are doubtful. His manner of writing is rather more
agreable than that of the two preceding, nor does he,
appear to be their inferior in the knowlege of Philofo-
phy, his work being a laudable Commentary upon the
Timaus of Plato.
The
4i6 HERMES*
Ch. V. COMMON WEALTHS, while they maintained
their Liberty, were the moft heroic Con-
federacy, that ever exifted. They were
the
The laft Latin Philofopher was BOETHIUS, who
was defcended from fome of the nobleft of the Roman
Families, and was Conful in the beginning of the fixth
Century. He wrote many philofophical Works, the
greater part in the Logical way. But his Ethic piece, On
the Confutation of Phllofophy^ and which is partly profe,
and partly verfe, deferves great encomiums both for the
Matter, and for the Stile j in which laft he approaches
the Purity of a far better age than his own, and is in
all refpe&s preferable to thofe crabbed Africans already
mentioned. By command of Tbeoderic king of the
GothS) 'twas the hard fate of this worthy Man to fuffer
death ; with whom the Latin Tongue, and the laft re-
mains of Roman Dignity, may be faid to have funk in
the weftern World.
There were other Romans, who left Philofophical
Writings; fuch as MUSONIUS RUFUS, and the two
Emperors, MARCUS ANTONINUS and JULIAN ; but
as thefe preferred the ufe of the Greek Tongue to their
own, they can hardly be confidered among the number
of Latin Writers.
And fo much (by way of fketch) for THE LATIN'
AUTHORS OF PHILOSOPHY; a fmall number for fo
vaft an Empire, if we confider them as all the produft
of near fix fucceffive centuries.
BOOK THE THIRD. 4-17
the politeft, the braveft, and the wifeft of Ch. V,
men. In the fhort fpace of little more
than a Century, they became fuch Statef-
men, Warriors, Orators, Hirtorians, Phy-
ficians, Poets, Critics, Painters, Sculptors,
Architects, and (laft of all) Philofophers,
that one can hardjy help confidering THAT
GOLDEN PERIOD, as a Providential Event
in honour of human Nature, to mew
to what perfection the Species might af-
cend (g)<
Now
If we except Homer , Hefiod^ and the Lyric
Poets, we hear of few Grecian Writers before the e?i-
pedition of Xerxes. After that Monarch had been dc-"
feated, and the dread of the Perfian Power was at art
end, the EFFULGENCE OF GRECIAN GENIUS (if
I may ufe the exprefiion) broke forth, and fhone till
the time of Alexander the Macedonian, after whom it
difappeared, and never rofe again. This is that Golden
Period fpoken of above. I do not mean that Greece
had not many writers of great merit fubfequent to that
period, and efpecially of the philofophic kind ; but the
Great) the Striking^ the Sublime (call it as you pleafe)
attained at that time to a height, to which it nevef
eould afcend in any after age.
E e The
4i8 HERMES.
Ch. V. Now THE LANGUAGE or THESE
GREEKS was truly like themfelvcs , 'twas
con-
The fame kind of fortune befel the People of Rome.
When the Pttnic wars were ended, and Carthage their
dreaded Rival was no more, then (as Horace informs
us) they began to cultivate the politer arts. 'Twas
foon after this, their great Orators, and Hiftorians,
and Poets arofe, and Rome, like Greece, had her Golden
Period^ which lafted to the death of Oftavius Ca-
far.
I call thefe two Periods, from the two greateft Ge-
niufes that flouriflied in each, one THE SOCRATJC
PERIOD, the other THE CICERONIAN.
There are ftill farther analogies fubfifting between
them. Neither Period commenced, as long as follici-
tude for the common welfare engaged men's atten-
tions, and fuch wars impended, as threatned their de-
ftrudlion by Foreigners and Barbarians. But when
once thefe fears were over, a general fecurity foon en-
fued, and inftead of attending to the arts of defence
and felf-prefervation, they began to cultivate thofe of
Elegance and Pleafure. Now, as thefe naturally pro-
duced a kind of wanton infolence (not unlike the vi-
tious temper of high-fed animals) fo by this the bands
of union were infenfibly diffolved. Hence then among
3 tlic
BOOK THE THIRD. 419
conformable to their tranfcendent and Ch. V.
univerfal Genius. Where Matter fo
abounded,
the Greeks that fatal Peloponnefian War, which toge-
ther with other wars, its immediate confequence, broke
the confederacy of their Commonwealths j wafted their
ftrength ; made them jealous of each other ; and thus
paved a way for the contemptible kingdom of Macedon
to inflave them all, and afcend in a few years to uni-
verfal Monarchy.
A like luxuriance of profperity fowed difcord among
the Romans ; raifed thofe uhappy contefts between the
Senate and the Gracchi j between Sylla and Marius ;
between Pempey and Cafar ; 'till at length, after the
laft ftruggle for Liberty by thofe brave Patriots Brutus
and CaJJius at Pbilippi, and the fubfequent defeat of
Antony at Afiium y the Romans became fubje&s to the
dominion of a FELLOW-CITIZEN.
It muft indeed be confefled, that after Alexander and
Oflavius had eftablifhed their Monarchies, there were
many bright Geniufes, who were eminent under their
Government. Ariftotle maintained a friendfhip and
epiftolary correfpondence with Alexander. In the time
of the fame Monarch lived Ybtopbrajha* and the Cy-
nic, Diogenes. Then alfo Demojlhenes and &fchines
fpoke their two celebrated Orations. So likewife in the
time of Oflavius, Virgil wrote his Ens'id^ and with
E e 2 Horace^
420 HERMES.
Ch. V. abounded, Words followed of courfe, and
thofe exquilite in every kind, as the Ideas
for which they flood. And hence it fol-
lowed, there was not a Subject to be
found, which could not with propriety be
expreft in Greek.
HERE were Words and Numbers for
the Humour of an Ariftophanes -, for the
native
Horace^ Varius^ and many other fine Writers, partook
of his protection and royal munificence. But then it
muft be remembrcd, that thefe men were bred and edu-
cated in the principles of a free Government. 'Twas
hence they derived that high and manly fpirit, which
made them the admiration of after ages. The Suc-
ceflbrs and Forms of Government left by Alexander and
Oflavius, foon ftopt the growth of any thing farther in
the kind. So true is that noble faying of Longinus -
Q-s'xJ/a; Tf J/ap Ixoc-w TX (pcovr.ponz ruv /
tj EAEY0EPI.A, x} 7; \7n'<rai, ^ c!.
(>AOTJ^I:X.:. 'Tis LIBERTY that is formed te
nurfe the fcntiments of great Geniufes ; to injpire them
with hope ; to pufi) forward the propenfity of conteft cne
luith another, end the generous emulation of being the firjl
in rank. DC Subl. Sedt. 44.
BOOK THE THIRD. 421
native Elegance of a Philemon or Me- Ch. V.
nander, for the amorous Strains of a Mim-
nejrmus or Sappho ; for the rural Lays of a
Theocritus or Eion; and for the fublime
Conceptions of a Sophocles or Homer. The
fame in Profe. Here Ifocrates was enabled
to difplay his Art, in all the accuracy of
Periods, and the nice counterpoife of
Diction. Here Demoftbenes found mate-
rials for that nervous Compofition, that
manly force of unaffected Eloquence,
which rufhed, like a torrent, too impe-
tuous to be withftood.
WHO were more different in exhi-
biting their Pbilofophy, than Xenophon,
Plato* and his difciple, Ariftotle? Dif-
ferent, I fay, in their character. of Com-
pojition ; for as to their Philofophy itfdf>
'twas in reality the fame. Ariftotk>
ftrict, methodic, and orderly; fubtle in
Thought; fparing in Ornament; with
little addrefs to the Paffions or Ima-
gination ; but exhibiting the whole with
E e 3 fuch
422 HERMES.
Ch. V. fuch a pregnant brevity, that in every
fentence we feem to read a page.
How exquifitely is this all performed in
Greek ? Let thofe, who imagine it may
be done as well in another Language,
fatisfy themfelves either by attempting to
tranflate him, qr by perufing his tranfla-
tions already made by men of learning.
On the contrary, when we read either
Xenofbon or Plato, nothing of this me~
tbod and ftrift order appears. The For-
mal and Didatfic is wholly dropt. What-
ever they may teach, 'tis without profef-
fing to be teachers -, a train of Dialogue
and truly polite Addrefs, in which, as
in a Mirrour, we behold human Life,
adorned in all its colours of Sentiment
and Manners.
AND yet though thefe differ in this
manner from the Stagirife, how differ-
ent are they likewife in character from
each other ? Plato, copious, figura-
tive,
BOOK THE THIRD. 423
tive, and majcftic -, intermixing at times Ch. V.
the facetious and fatiric j enriching his
Works with Tales and Fables, and the
myftic Theology of ancient times. Xe-
nopbon, the Pattern of perfect fimpli-
city; every where fmooth, harmonious,
and pure ; declining the figurative, the
marvelous, and the myftic ; afcending
but rarely into the Sublime ; nor then
fo much trufling to the colours of Stile,
as to the intriniic dignity of the Sentiment
itfelf.
THE Language in the mean time, in
which He and Plato wrote, appears to fuit
fo accurately with the Stile of both, that
when we read either of the two, we can-
not help thinking, that 'tis he alone, who
has hit its character, and that it could not
have appeared fo elegant in any other
manner.
AND thus is THE GREEK TONGUE,
from its Propriety and "Univerfality* made
E e 4 for
424 HERMES.
Ch. V.for all that is great, and all that is beauti-
' fuf, in every Subject ^ and under every Form
of writing.
GRATIS ingenium, GRAIIS dedit ort
rotundo
Mufa loqui. f
'TWERE to be wimed,thatthofeamong{l
us, who either write or read, with a view
to employ their liberal leifure (for as to
fuch, as do either from views more fordid,
we leave them, like Slaves, to their deftined
drudgery) 'twere to bewifhed, I fay, that
the liberal (if they have a relifh for letters)
would infpect the fmimed Models of Gre-
cian Literature; that they would not
wafte thofe hours, which they cannot re-
call, upon the meaner productions of the
French and Englijh Prefs ; upon that fun-
gous growth of Novels and of Pamphlets,
where 'tis to be feared, they rarely find
4
BOOK THE THIRD. 425
any rational pleafure, and more rarely Ch. V.
ftill, any folid improvement.
To be competently (killed in antient
learning, is by no means a work of fuch
infuperable pains. The very progrefs it-
felf is attended with delight, and refem-
bles a Journey through fome pleafant
Country, where every mile we advance,
new charms arife. 'Tis certainly as eafy
to be a Scholar, as a Gamefter, or many
other Characters equally illiberal and low.
The fame application, the fame quantity
of habit will fit us for one, as completely
as for the other. And as to thofe who
tell us, with an air of feeming wifdom,
that 'tis Men, and not Books we muft
ftudy to become knowing; this I have
always remarked from repeated Experi-
ence, to be the common confolation and
language of Dunces. They fhelter their
ignorance under a few bright Examples,
whofe tranfcendent ^abilities, without the
common
426 HERMES.
Ch. V. common helps, have been fufficient of
themfehes to great and important Ends.
But alas !
Decipit exemplar ijitiis imitabile
IN truth, each man's Underftanding,
when ripened and mature, is a compofite
of natural Capacity > and of fuper-inductd
Habit. Hence the greateft Men will be
neteflarily thofe, who poffefs the beft Ca-
pacities, cultivated with the bejl Habits.
Hence alfo moderate Capacities, when
adorned with valuable Science, will far
tranfcend others the mod acute by na-
ture, when either neglected, or applied
to low and bafe purpofes. And thus for
the honour of CULTURE and GOOD
LEARNING, they are able to render a
man, if be 'will take the pains, intrinfi-
catty more excellent than his natural Supe-
riors.
AND
BOOK THE THIRD. 427
AND fo much at prefentasto GENERAL Ch. V,
IDEAS; bow we acquire them; whence
they are derived-, what is their Nature ;
and what their connection with Language.
So much likewife as to the Subject of this
Treatife, UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR.
End of the THIRD BOOK.
AD-
ADVERTISEMENT.
rr*HE following Notes are either Tran-
Jlations of former Notes, or Additions
to them. The additional are chiefly Ex-
trafts from Greek Manufcripts, 'which
(as the Author has faid already concern-
ing others of the fame kind) are valua-
ble both for their Rarity, and for their
intrinfic Merit*
ADDITIONAL NOTES.
PAG. 95. - TO STOP, &V."J The Quotation
from Proclus in the Note may be thus rendred
- THAT THING is AT REST, -which FOR A TIME
PRIOR AND SUBSEQUENT IS IN THE SAME PLACE,
btth itfelf, and its Parts.
P. 105. In the Note, for yi'y-.ofj.iwit read
and render the paflage thus For by this Fatuity (nameiy
the Faculty of Senfe) rue neither know the Futur % nor
the Pafti but the Prefent only.
P. 106. NOTE (^).j The pafiage of
here referred to, but by mi/lake omitted, has refpe& to
the notion of beings corporeal and fenjible^ which were
(aid to be nearly approaching to Non-Entitys. The Au-
thor explains dais, among other reafons, by the fol-
lowing - flw; $t TO?? f*v *<n "ytrnui^ti ; Ilfwrcv
ri wrauOa TO wafl?x9&v 10 J TO /wfAXov, rau
ovra* TO y.tv yxp r,^)Ji-^s~on >ej ax m to, TO Ji
Pvov J'f rr?
Haw therefore is if that thfy approach nearly to Non-Enti-
tys? In the firjl place ^ becaufe HERE (where they exift)
exifls THE PAST a^/ THE FUTURE, and thefe art
NON-ENTITYS; for the one is 'uanijhed^ and is nt
more, the other is not as yet. Now all natural Subftan&s
pafi away along with TIME, or rather 'tis upon their
Motion that TIME is an Attendant.
P.
432 ADDITIONAL NOTES.
P. 119 in the Note here fubjoined mention is madd
of the REAL Now, or INSTANT, and its efficacy.
To which we may add, that there is not only a necejjary
Connection between Exigence and the Prefent Injtant,
becaufe no other Point of Time can properly be faid to
be, but alfo between Exigence and Life, becaufe what-
ever lives, by the fame reafon neceflarily Is. Hence
Sophocles, fpeaking of Time prefent, elegantly fays of it
THE LIVING, and Now prefent TIME.
Trachin. V. 1185.
P. 227. The Paffage in Virgil, of which Servius
here fpeaks, is a defcription of Turnus's killing two
brothers, Amycus and Diores ; after which the Poet fays
of him,
- curru abfciffa DUORUM
Sufpendit capita- -
This, literally tranflated, is he hung up on his cha-
riot the heads of Two perfons, which were cut off,
whereas the Senfe requires, of THE Two perfons, that
is to fay, of Amycus and Diores. Now this by Ambo-
rum would have been expreft properly, as Amborum
means THE Two ; by Duorum is expreft improperly,
as it means only Two indefinitely.
P. 259. The Paflage in Note (<?) from Tbemijlius,
may be thus rendered - Nature in many in/lances ap-
pears to make her tranfition by little and little, fo that in
fome Beings it may be doubted, whether they are Animal,
tr Vegetable.
P.
ADDITIONAL NOTES. 433
P. 294. Note (c] There are in the number of things
toiany, which have a mojl known EXISTENCE, bvtamo/l
unknawn ESSENCE ; fuchfor example as Motion, Place
and more than, either of them, Time. The EXISTENCE
of each of thefe is known and indifputable, but what their
ESSENCE is, or Nature, is among the moft difficult things
to difcern. The Soul alfo is in the fame Clafs : that it is
Something, is mojl evident j but what it is, is a matter
not ft eafy to learn. Alex. Aphrod. p. 142.
P. 340. LANGUAGE INCAPABLE OF COMMU-
NICATING DEMONSTRATION.] See Three Trea-
tifes, or Vol. I. p. 220, and the additional note on the
words, The Source of infinite Truths, &c<
P. 368 in the Note yet fo held the Philofepttir <rf
Malmefbury, and the Author of the Effay, &c. J
Philoponus, from the Philofophy of Plato and Pytha-*
goras, feems to have far excelled thefe Moderns in his
account of WISDOM or PHILOSOPHY, and its Attri-
butes, or ejfential CharaSJers. "iJtov
TO Iv TO~? -zsroAAoiV ^X 8<rt Jixtyopctv $?
j^ TO tv ToTj ZB'oXAo:? i%v<ri xojvojui'ay Sii'fccu rivi
8 "yotp Jy^e^t? TO JsJ^at (>Tvr;,- (legff (^xrlrt
fcilWVMWj (TSCCJ\I y&p trcavrlov) aAA*
TO StdtydPOV TTWU llTTtTv' (? X'JUi? Xy 7ri
AAa ti xoivou spi7W. IT IS THE PRO-
PER BUSINESS CF PHILOSOPHY TO SHEW IN
MANY THINGS, WHICH HAVE DIFFERENCE,
WHAT is THEIR COMMON CHARACTER ; and IN
MANY THINGS, WHICH HAVE A COMMON CHA-
HACTER, THRO* WHAT 'TIS THEY DJFFER. It
F f it
434 ADDITIONAL NOTES.
is indeed no difficult matter to foew the common Character
of a Wood-Pigeon and a Dove, (for this is evident t$
every one) but rather to tell where lies the Difference ; nor
to tell the Difference between a Dog and a Horfe, but ra-
ther to Jhew^ what they poffefs in common. Philop. Com.
MS. in Nicomach. Arithm.
P. 379 THEY ARE MORE EXQUISITE THAN,
&fc.] The Words of Arijt 'otle, here referred to, arc
thefe ~ /uaAAoy $' to TO a Vvtxg > TO xaAov tv TO~S
T*if tyvaiws toyotf, i) tv TOIJ T]j Tfyv>;f. THE PRIN-
CIPLES OF DESIGN and BEAUTY are more in the
Works ^NATURE, than they are in thofe of ART.
P- 379 WE MUST or NECESSITY ADMIT A
MIND, &c.] The following quotation, taken from
the third book of a manufcript Comment of Proclus on
the Parmenides of Plato, is here given for the fake of
thofe, who have curiofity with regard to the doctrine
of IDEAS, as held by antient Philosophers.
El S\ Sit VWrO/UVC I ITTl'lV TVfll OttTlOtV TTlf TijV lolUV U7TC-
OTl T1
* >
7TO
X; aiTas, x m tTa?,
x^/r7c) TWW aflp/uv, ufoV TU x^ o (f>j(rr; o *Aflij~OTAi;
fi OU-
'
TO
?ro TCfJlopotTV TyctvGvTigo-j ay ?y TO xa/ aiT/av, t<
ihfre-
ADDITIONAL NOTES. 435
therefore we are to relate concifely the Caufe, why THE
HYPOTHESIS OF IDEAS pleafed them (namely Parme-
nides, Zeno, Socrates, &c.) we mujl begin by observing
that all the 'various vifible objefls around us, the hea-
venly as well as the Jublunary, are either from CHANCE,
or according to a CAUSE. FROM CHANCE is IM-
POSSIBLE j for then the more excellent things (fuch as
Mind, andReafon, and Caufe, and the Effetts of Caufe)
will be among thofe things that come lajl, andfo the END-
INGS of things will be more excellent than their BEGIN-
NINGS. To which too may be added what Ariftotley^yj;
that ESSENTIAL CAUSES OUGHT TO BE PRIOR TO
ACCIDENTAL, in a s much as EVERY ACCIDENTAL
CAUSE is A DEVIATION FROM THEM; fo that
whatever is the Effeft of fuch ej/ential Caufe [as is indeed
every work of Art and human Ingenuity] mujl needs
be prior to that which is the Effett of Chance, even tho'
we were to refer to Chance the mojl divine of vifible ob~
jefts, [the Heavens themfelvesj.
The Philofopher, having thus proved a definite Caufe
of the World in oppofition to Chance, proceeds to {hew
that from the Unity and concurrent Order of things
this Caufe muft be ONE. After which he goes on, as
follows.
- EJ atv sv Ao/ov TKTO a,T07rw i<r&i yap Tt
10
ov, x T
foi;, 6 tfn oiir a'iT/f aAo^a TOTO. 'i ol
lauro ^-/ITTK TW
atnou ov, n TKTO ^yov, ct^i/on<re *rr\v
Ff 2
436 ADDITIONAL NOTES.
TO flay, x) rv1 t v 70 Day, v I
Kal ii TSTC, TO i\f lauro ^a j3A<To,', >
, cJf ra jur' &UT9. Aoycis ago. ^ TicWiv au-
Jlav, x) ?riv tv UTI^I rd Ilau, wj
IF THIS CAUSE BE VOID OF REA-
SON, that indeed would be abfurd ; fc r then again there
would befimething among thofe things , which come lajl
in order , more excellent than their Principle or Caufe. I
mean by more excellent, fomething operating according to
Reafon and Knowlege, and yet within that Univerfe, and
a Part of that Whole y which is, what it is, from a Caufc
devoid of Reafon.
But if> on the contrary, THE CAUSE OF THE UNI-
VERSE BE A CAUSE, HAVING REASON and know-
ing itfelf, it of courje knows itfelf to be the Caufe of all
things ; elfe being ignorant of this, it would be ignorant
of its own nature. But if it know, that from ITS VERY
ESSENCE IT is THE CAUSE OF THE UNIVERSE,
and if that, which knows one part of a Relation definite-
ly, knows alfo of necejjity the other, it knows for this rea-
fon definitely the thing of which it is the Caufe. IT
KNOWS THEREFORE THE UNIVERSE, and all
things out of which the Univerfe rs compofed, of all which
alfo it is the Caufe. But if this be true, 'tis evident that
BY LOOKING INTO ITSELF, AND BY KNOWING
ITSELF, IT KNOWS WHAT COMES AFTER IT-
SELF, AND is SUBSEQUENT. 'Tis therefore, through
certain REASONS and FORMS DEVOID OF MATTER
that
ADDITIONAL NOTES. 437
that it knows thofe mundane Reafons and Forms, out of
"which the Univerfe is compcfed, and that the Univerfe is in
it y as hi a Caufe, di/linft from and without the Matter.
P. 380 - AGREEABLE TO WHICH IDE.AS THESE
WORKS ARE FASHIONED, &c.] 'Tis upon thefe
Principles that Nicomachus in his Arithmetic, p. 7.
calls the Supreme Being an Artijl - i\> TV? T* TE^V/TS.
0-5 ojavo:a, in Dei artificis mente. Where Philo-
ponus, in his manufcript Comment, obferves as follows
- TfYWT1J (pj)<T TOV &}f<JV, W TffXVIUV TX; TS-fUtTOtf J.
r/af Y.Z.} T\ Xoyea; aurwu -^ov7. He calls GOD <?
ARTIST, as poffejjlng within himfelf the frft Caufes of
all things, and their Reafens or Proportions. Soon after
fpeaking of thofe Sketches, after which Painters work,
and finifh their Pictures, he fubjoins -- WO-TTEQ ?y
fifths, fV T TOIOOJTX cyux.'y^y.^uot.ra. |3A7rou7ff, aroi-
tspsv roil T, 8Tw xal o 3t)fi.Hifty9{ t arj( Xu/a Vo-
ASTTCOV, ra TJ;^? WKvjct Y.v/^y^.'f^a' AA r~/5y, O'T* ra
S'EW AO'^OJ aa^/T'j7ro x^l 5sy.v]iXti<>i iunv. As there-
fore we, looking upon fuch Sketches as thefe, make fuch
andfuch particular things, fa alfo the Creator, looking at
thofe Sketches of his, hath formed and adorned with beauty
all things here below. We mujl remember however, that
the Sketches here are imperfefl ; but that the others, thofe
REASONS or Proportions, which exijl in GOD, are
ARCHETYPAL ^/^ALL-PERFECT.
'Tis according to this Philofophy, that Milton repre-
fents God, after he had created this vifible World,
contemplating
F f 3 - how
438 ADDITIONAL NOTES.
-- how it Jhow'd
In profpefi from bis throne, bow goody how fair ,
ANSW'RING HIS GREAT IDEA -
P. Loft VII. 556.
Proclus proves the Exiftence of thefe GENERAL
IDEAS or UNIVERSAL FORMS by the following Ar-
guments. - f TOJ'VI/V j-)v atria TV crav7o; atrra> TW
TO <? aurw TW Itvat
TO
WW; xat o tVi cr^Twr, S'duxri TW av(Vju,vu Jst/T/tfa;?*
iou TO 7iru) xa SI&WGI Siu.oTrilx. aXAw xa) 10
TOI> oyeVj ocra av
aiTtov ^y T varrc aVru TOJ Ttvat -srotBy TTO
& ?Tp o xocr/xoj rjTpcdj. fi o xo ( ao>
-j, xal a'vfifWTrcp U7rj~j<rf, xal
T>) atT/a T sravloV, aXAo; A<oj
0vrw> T
X#T* Toy u^Attf* Aoj/ov, y Tr) //.i T
? atTia ic-o : J7ra^oy7a;. If therefore THE CAUSE
OF THE UNIVERSE Ztf a Caufe which operates merely
by exi fling^ and if that which operates meerly by txiftingj
operate from its own proper EjJ'cnce^ SUCH CAUSE is
PRIMARILY, WHAT ITS EFFECT IS SECONDARI-
LY, and that, which it is primarily, it giveth to its f~
feflfccondarily. 'Tis thus that Fire loth giveth Wamith
3 *
ADDITIONAL NOTES.
toflmething elfe, and is itfelf warm ; that the Soul giveth
Life, and pojjejjeth Life j and this reafoning you may per-
ceive to be true in all things whatever , which operate merely
by exifting. It follows therefore, THAT THE CAUSE
OF THE UNIVERSE, operating after this manner, is
THAT PRIMARILY, WHICH THE WORLD IS SE-
CONDARILY. If therefore the WORLD be the ple-
nitude 0/"FoRMs of all Sorts, thefe FORMS MUST
ALSO BE PRIMARILY IN THE CAUSE OF THE
WORLD, for 'twas the fame Caufe, which conjlituted the
Sun, and the Moon, and Man, and Horfe, and in gene*
ral all the Forms exijllng in the Univerfe. Thefe therefore
txiji primarily in the Caufe of the Univerfe ; another Sun
bejides the apparent, another Man, and fo with refpefl to
tvery Form elfe. 7 he FORMS therefor*, PREVIOUS to
the fenfible and external Forms., and which according to
this reafoning are their ACTIVE arid EFFICIENT CAU-
SES, are to be found PRE-EXISTING IN THAT ONE
AND COMMON CAUSE OF ALL THE UNIVERSE.
Prodi Com. MS. in Plat. Parmenid. L. 3.
We have quoted the above paflfages for the fame
reafon, as the former ; for the fake of thofe, who may
have a curiofity to fee a fample of this antient Philofo-
phy, whjch (as fome have held) may be traced up
from Plato and Socrates to Parmenides, Pythagoras, and
Orpheus himfelf.
If the Phrafe, to" operate meerly by exifting, fhould ap-
pear queftionable, it muft be explained upon a fuppofv-
tion, that in the Supreme Being no Attributes zrcjecon-
dary, intermittent, or adventitious, but all original, ever
perfefl and ejjential. See p. 162, 359.
F f 4 That
440
That we fhould not therefore think of a blind
fcious operation, like that of Fire here alluded to, the
Author had long before prepared us, by uniting Know-
lege with natural Efficacy ', where he forms the Chara&er
of thefe Divine and Creative Ideas.
But let us hear him in his own Language.
\OlpS'J TJJW IJlOTlfllX. OtVTUV (f~C. L^SCy)
10. TWU < yvugi[j.urieuv 9 KTTO [jt.tv rwy
TO CSUTW TW won Tro^-nxoy, Sv <?/?
a?ro d rwy TJVJXWI/ TO VMOXOV coy
f x,
/*w
the peculiar char after of IDEAS ^y
<? aj ^^ tbemfehes, let us affume
jrom NATURAL PRINCIPLES THE POWER OF EF-
FECTING, MEEKLY BY EXISTING, all the things that
theyeffett-, and from ARTIFICIAL PRINCIPLES THE
POWER OF COMPREHENDING all that they effett^
although they did not effeft them meerly by exijling; and
then uniting ihofe two, let us fay that IDEAS are at once
the EFFICIENT and INTELLIGENT CAUSES of all
things produced according to Nature. From book the fe-
cond of the fame Comment.
The Schoolman, Thomas Aquinas^ a fubtle and acute
writer, has the following fentence, perfectly cor-
refponding with this Philofophy. Res omnes comparan-
tur ad Divinum Intelleflum, ftcut artijiciata ad Artem.
The
ADDITIONAL NOTES. 441
The Verfes of Orpheus on this fubje& may be found
in the tradl De Mundo, afcribed to Arif.otle, p. 23.
Edit* Sylburg.
Ztvs tig<rw yivsTO } Zfyj x, T. A.
P. 39! WHERE ALL THINGS LIE INVELOPED,
o<rcc -nrlp so T A II O A A A xara <Jij TWX
ov, rocraoTa xai TO EN IKMO "nr^o ra
TO -srotyrri Kps^iq' v < yxf Vv, w? sAa^trotf, xa-
o 27TU(7i7r7roj ^o A^-tv, aAA EN, fi 2
IIANTA. -^ numerous as is THE MULTITUDE
OF INDIVIDUALS by Partition, fo numerous alfo is that
PRINCIPLE OF UNITY by umverfal Impartiality. For
it is not ONE, as a minimum is one, (according to what
Speucippusfeemedtofay,) but it is ONE, as being ALL
THINGS. Damafcius zs-fol 'A^wv, MS.
P. 408 THE WISEST NATIONS THE MOST
COPIOUS LANGUAGES.] 'Tis well obferved by Mu-
retus - NuUi unquam, qul res ignorarent, nomina,
quibus eas exprimerent, qu&Jierunt. Var. Let. VI. i.
P. 411 - BUT WHAT WAS THEIR PHILOSO-
PHY ?] The fame Muretus has the followin'g paflage
upon the ROMAN TASTE FOR PHILOSOPHY.- -
Beati autem illi, et opulent i, et omnium gentium vi flares
ROM AN I, in petendls honor ibus, et in prenfandis civibus y
ft in exteris nationibus verbo componendis, re compilandis
occupati-i philofophandi curam fcrvis out libertis fuis> et
Grteculis efurientibus rellnquebant. Ipfi, quod ab avari-
tia,
ADDITIONAL NOTES.
tia y quod ab ambltione^ quod a voluptatibus reUquum erat
temporis, ejus ft partem aliquam out ad audiendum Gra-
cum quempiam philofophum^ out ad aliquem de philofophia
llbellum vel legendum vel fcribendum contulijjent, jqmfe ad
eruditionh culmen pervenijfe, jam vittam a fe et profliga^
jam jactre Grtcciam fomniabant* Var. Le6l, VI. x.
IN-
INDEX.
A.
ADJECTIVE, how it differs from other Attribu-
tives, fuch as the Verb, and the Participle, 186.
verbal, 187. pronominal, 189. ftri&ly fpeaking can
have no Genders, 190
ADVERBS, their charafl.-r and ufe, 192 to 194. Ad-
verbs of Interifion and Remifiion, 195. of Compa-
rifon, 19610 '99. of Time, and Place, and Mo-
tion, 204, 205. made out of Prepofitions, 205. Ad-
verbs of Interrogation, 206. affinity between thefe
laft, and the Pronoun relative, 206 to 208. Adverbs
derived from every Part of Speech, 209. found in
every Predicament, 210. called by the Stcits ITav-
A'jclwf, ibid.
./ESCHINES, 419
ALEXANDER APHRODISIENSIS, 294, 310, 433. his
account of Phanfy or Imagination, 357
ALEXANDER and THAIS, 71. his influence upon the
Greek Genius, 4 J 9> 420
AMAFANIUS, 412
AMMONIUS, his account of Speech, and its relations,
4. of the progrefs of human Knovvlege from Com-
plex to Simple, 10. of the Soul's two principal Pow-
ers, 17. of the Species of Sentences, ibid, his notion
of GOD, 55. quoted, 59. his notion of a Verb, 87,
193. his notion of Time, 100. illuftrates from Ho-
mer the Species of Modes or Sentences, 145. quoted,
154. his notion of conjunctive Particles, and of the
Unity which they produce, 241. quoted, 2/8. his
account of Sound, Voice, Articulation, &c. 321,
328.
INDEX.
328. of the diftinction between a Symbol and a Re-
femblance, 331. what he thought the human Body
with refpect to the Soul, 334. his triple order of
Ideas or Forms, 382
Analyfis and Syntkefo, 2, 3, 367. analyfis of Cafes,
275, 276, 285
ANAXAGORAS, 269
ANTHOLOGIA GR. 47, 50
ANTONINUS, 183, 310, 405, 407, 416
APOLLONIUS, the Grammarian, explains the Species
of Words by the Species of Letters, 27. his elegant
name for the Noun and Verb, 33. quoted, 63. his
idea of a Pronoun, 65,67. quoted, 70. explains the
Diftinction and Relation between the Article and
the Pronoun, 73, 74. his two Species of A -~I>- or
Indication, 77. holds a wide difference between the
Prepofitive and Subjunctive Articles, 78. explains
the nature of the Subjunctive Article, 80. corrects
Homer from the doctrine of Enclitics, 84', 85. his
notion of that Tenfe called the Prateritum perfec-
tum^ 129. holds the Soul's difpofition peculiarly ex-
plained by Verbs, 141. his notion of the Indicative
Mode, 151. of the Future, implied in all Impera-
tives, 155. explains the power of thofe part Tenfes,
found in the Greek Imperatives, 156. his idea of the
Infinitive, 165. his name for it, 166. quoted, 168,
175. his notion of middle Verbs, 176. quoted, 179,
181, 195. explains the power and effect of theGm-^
Article^ 217 to 222. holds it efiential to the Pronoun
not to coalefce with it, 225 to 228. {hews the dif-
ferent force of the Article when differently placed in
the fame Sentence, 231. quoted, 238, 239. his idea
of the Prepofition, 26 1
4 APU-
INDEX.
APULEIUS, fhort account of him, 415
AQUINAS, THOMAS, quoted 440
Argument a priori & a pofteriori, 9, 10. which of the
two more natural to Man, ibid.
ARISTOPHANES, 420
ARISTOTLE, his notion of Truth, 3. quoted, 8. his
notion of the difference between things abfolutely
prior, and relatively prior, 9, 10. quoted, 15. his
Definition of a Sentence, 19. of a Word, 20. of
Subftance, 29. divides things into Subftance and Ac-
cident, 30- how many Parts of Speech he admitted,
and why, 32,33, 34, &V. his notion of Genders,
42. his account of the metaphorical ufe of Sex, 48.
quoted, 55, 56, 89. his Definition of a Verb, 96.
his notion of a Now or Inftant, 102. of Senfation li-
mited to it, 104, 105,431. of Time, 106, 107. of
Time's dependence on the Soul, 112. quoted, 119,
193. his notion of Subftance, 202. calls Euripides
o -GroiyTrig^ 223. himfelf called the Stagirite, why,
ibid, a diftinftion of his, 224. his definition of a Con-
junction, 239. a paflage in his Rhetoric explained,
240. his account of Relatives, 286. his notion of the
divineNature, 301. whom he thought'twas probable
the Gods fhould love, 302. his notion of Intellect and
intelligible Objects, ibid, held Words founded in
Compact, 314, 315. quoted, 310, 320. his account
of the Elements or Letters, 324. his high notion of
Principles, 325. quoted, 357, 379, 434. his notion
of the difference between moveable and immoveable
Exiftence, 360. between intellectual or divine Plea -
fure, and that which is fubordinate, ibid, quoted,
361. his notion of the divine Life or Exiftence, com-
pared with that of Man, 362. of the difference be-
tween
INDEX.
tween the Greeks and the Barbarians, 409. his cha*
rader as a Writer, compared with Plato and Xeno-
phtm, 421. correfponds with Alexander ^ 419
Arithmetic^ founded upon what Principles, 352. (See
Geometry.) its fubjed, what, 367. owes its Being to
the Mind, how, ibid.
Arty what, andArtift, who, - in, 352
ARTICLES, 31. their near alliance with Pronouns,
73. of two kinds, 214. the firft kind, 214 to 232.
the fecond kind, 233 to 236. Englijh Articles, their
difference and ufe, 215. Greek Article, 219. Articles
denote pre -acquaintance, 218, 220. thence eminence
and notoriety, 222 to 224. with what words they af-
ibciate, with what not, 224 to 229. Greek Article
marks the Subject in Proportions, 230. Articles, in-
flances of their effect, 231, 232. Articles pronomi-
nal, 72, 73, 233. inftances of their effect, 235, 236,
347. Subjun&ive Article, fee Pronoun relative or fur>
jundive.
Articulation^ fee Voice.
ASCONIUS, 132
ATTRIBUTIVES, 30, 31. defined, 87. of the firft or-
der, 87 to 191. of the fecond order, 192 to 211.
S^VERB, PARTICIPLE, ADJECTIVE, ADVERB.
AULUS GHLLIUS, fliort account of him as a Writer,
414
B.
BACON, his notion of Univerfal Grammar, 2. of*-
tient Languages and Geniufes, compared to modern^
288. of mental Separation or Divifion, 306. of Sym-
bols, to convey our thoughts, 334. of the Analogy
be-
INDEX,
between the Geniufes of Nations and their Lan*
guages, 47
Being* or Exigence, mutable, immutable, 90, 371.
temporary, fuperior to Time, 91,92. See7rf,
GOD.
BELISARIUS, 150
BLEMMIDES, NICEPHORUS, his notion of Time pre*
fent,H9. his Etymology of 'Eiris*npr), 368. his triple
order of Forms or Ideas, 386
Body, Inftrument of the Mind, 305. chief Object of
modern Philofophy, 308. confounded with Matter,
309. human, the Mind's veil, 333. Body, that or
Mind, which has precedence in different Syftems,
392 393
BOERHAAVE, 32!
BOETHIUS, how many Parts of Speech he admitted as
neceffary to Logic, 33. his idea of GOD'S Exiftence,
92. illuftrates from Virgil the Species of Modes or
Sentences, 146. quoted, 312. held Language found-
ed in Compact, 315. refers to the Deity's unaltera-
ble Nature, 361. his notion of original, intelligible
Ideas, 397. of the differer.ee between Time (how-
ever immenfe) and Eternity, 389. fhort account of
his Writings, and character, 416
Both, differs from Two, how, 227
BRUTUS, 413, 419
C.
CAESAR, C.JuLius, his Laconic Epiftle,
CffiSAR, OCTAVIUS, influence of his Government
upon the Roman Genius, ^ 4 X 9> 4 2
CALUMACHUS, 52
CASES,
I N D E X,
CASES, fcarce any fuch thing in modern Languages,
273. name of, whence, 277. Nominative, 27910
282. Accufative, 282, 283. Genitive and Dative,
284 to 287. Vocative, why omitted, 276. Abla
live, peculiar to the Romans, and how they employed
lt * 276, 277
Caufes, Conjunctions connect the four Species of, with
their effects, 248. final Caufe, firft in Speculation,
but laft in Event, ibid, has its peculiar Mode, 142;
peculiar Conjundion, 248. peculiar Cafe, 287
CHALCIDIUS, 301. fhort account of him, 415
Chance ', fubfequent to Mind or Reafon, 434, 435
CHARISIUS, SOSIPATER, 205, 210
CICERO, 132, 170, 269, 272, 311, 313, 407. com-
pelled tq allow the unfitnefs of the Latin Tongue
for Philofophy, 411. one of the firft that introduced it
into the Latin Language, 412. Ciceronian and Sacra-
lie Periods, 4I g
City, Feminine, why, , 4 g
CLARK, Dr. SAM. I2 8
COMPARISON, degrees of, 197 to 199. why Verbs
admit it not, 200. why incompatible with certain
Attributives, ibid, why with all Subftantives, 201
CONJUNCTION, 32, its Definition, 238. its two
kinds, 240, 241. Conjunctions Copulative, 242.
Continuative, ibid. Suppofitive, Pofitive, 244. Cau-
fal, Collective, 245, 246. Disjunctive Simple, 252.
Adverfative, ibid. Adverfative abfolute, 254. of
Comparifon, 255. Adequate, ibid. Inadequate, 256.
Subdisjundtive, 258. Some Conjunctions have an
obfcure Signification, when taken alone, 259
CONNECTIVE, 30, 31. its two kinds, 237. its firft
kind, ibid, to 260. its fecond, 261 to 274. See
CONJUNCTION, PREPOSITION,
CON-
INDEX.
CONSENTIUS, his notion of the Neuter Gender, 43*
of middle Verbs, 177. of the pofitive Degree, 198.
Confonant, what, and why fo called, 323
Contraries, pafs into each other, 1 32. deftructive of
each other, > 251
Converfation, what, 398
Converfwn, of Attributives into Subftantives, 38. of
Subftantives into Attributives, 182, 189. of Attri-
butives into one another, 187. of Interrogatives into
Relatives, and vice versa, 206,207. of Connectives
into Attributives, 205, 272
CORN. NEPOS, 212
Country, Feminine, why, 48
D.
DAMASCIUS, his notion of Deity, 44!
Death, Mafculine, why, 51. Brother to fleep, 52
Declenfjon, the name, whence, 278
DEFINITIVE, 30,31,214. See ARTICLES.
Definitions, what, 367
A*I?, 64, 76
DEMOSTHENES, 49,419,421
Derivatives, more rationally formed than Primitives,
why, 336
Defign, neceflarily implies Mind, 379, 434
DIOGENES, the Cynic, 419
DIOGENES LAERTIUS, 34, 145, 154, 317, 322, 324,
407
DIONYSIUS of HalicarnaJJus, 34> 35
Diverjtty, its importance to Nature, 250. heightens by
degrees, and how, ibid, to 252
DONATUS, 74, 272
G g E,
INDEX.
E.
Feminine, why, 47
ECCLESIASTICUS, 56
Element, defined, 324. primary Articulations or Let-
ters fo called, why, ibid, their extenfive application,
325. See Letters.
Empiric , who, 352
Enclitics, among the Pronouns, their character, 84, 85
ENGLISH Tongue, its rule as to Genders, 43. a pecu-
liar privilege of, 58. expreffes the power of contra-
diftincHve and enclitic Pronouns, 85. its poverty as
to the expreffion of Modes and Tenfes, 148. its an-
alogy in the formation of Participles, 185, 186.
neglected by illiterate Writers, ibid, force and power
of its Articles, 215 to 233. fhews the Predicate of
the Propofition by pofition, as alfo the Accufative
Cafe of the Sentence, 26, 274, 276. its character,
as a Language, 408
EPICTETUS, 310, 407
E7nrruj, its Etymology, 368
Ether, Mafculine, why, 46
EUCLID, a difference between him and Virgil, 69. his
Theorems founded upon what, 340
EURIPIDES, 52, 310, 331
Exigence, differs from EJfence how, 294, 433
Experience, founded on what, 352
Experiment, its utility, 352. conducive to Art, how,
ibid, beholden to Science, tho' Science not to that,
353
F.
.Form and Matter, 2, 7. elementary Principles, 307.
myfterioufly blended in tkeir co-exiftence, ibid, and
312.
INDEX.
312. Form, its original meaning, what, 310. trans-
ferred from lower things to the higheft, 311. pre-
exiftent, where, 312. defcribed by Cicero , 311, 313.
in Speech what, 315, 326, 327, &c. Form of
Forms, 312. triple order of Forms in Art, 374. in
Nature, 377. intelligible or fpecific Forms, their
peculiar charader, 364, 365, 372, 380, 396, 436,
438.
Fortune, Feminine,' why, 57
FULLER, - 183
G.
GAZA, THEODORE, his Definition of a Word, 2 I.
explains the Perfons in Pronouns, 67. hardly admits
the Subjunctive for an Article, 78. his account of
the Tenfes, 129. of Modes, 140. quoted, 151.
calls the Infinitive the Verb's Noun, 165. quoted,
181. his Definition of an Adverb, 195. arranges
Adverbs by clafles according to the Order of the
Predicaments, 210. explains the power of the Arti-
cle, 2 1 8. quoted, 225. explains the different pow-
ers of conjunctive Particles, 245. of disjunctive,
249. his fingular explanation of a Verfe in Homer,
253. quoted, 262, 271
GEMISTUS, Georgius, otherwife Pletho, his doctrine
of Ideas or intelligible Forms, 395
Genders, their origin, 41. their natural number, 42.
(See Sex.) why wanting to the firft and fecond Pro-
noun, 69
Genus and Species, why they (but not Individuals) ad-
mit of Number, 39.
Geometry, founded on what Principles, 352. that and
Arithmetic independent on Experiment, ibid. (See
G g 2 Science.)
INDEX.
Sdtwe.) its Subjeft, what, 367. beholden for it to
the Mind, how, - ibid.
GOD, exprefled by Neuters, fuch as TO $tuv, Numen,
. &c. why, 54, 55. as Mafculine, why, ibid, immu-
table, and fuperior to Time and its Diftin&ions, 92.
all wife, and always wife, 301. immediate objects of
his Wifdom, what, ibid, whom among men he may
be fuppofed to love, 302. Form of Forms, fovereign
Artift, 312, 313, 437. above all Intentions and Re-
millions, 162, 359, 439. his Exiftence different
from that of Man, how, 360, 362. his divine At-
tributes, 361. his Exiftence neceflarily infers that
of Ideas or exemplary Forms, 379,380, 436. ex-
quifite Perfection of thefe divine Ideas or Forms,
380, 437. his ftupendous view of all at once, 389,
390,442. region of Truth, 162,391,403, 405.
in Him Knowlege and Power unite, 440
Goody above all utility, and totally diftindt from it,
297. fought by all men, 296, 298. confidered by
all as valuable for itfelf, ibid, intellectual, its cha-
racter, 299. See Science, GOD.
GORGIAS, 52
Grammar, philofophical or univerfal, 2. how eflen-
tial to other Arts, 6. how diftinguifhed from other
Grammars, n
Grammarians, error of, in naming Verbs Neuter, 177.
in degrees of Comparifon, 198. in the Syntax of
Conjunctions, 238
GREEKS, their character, as a Nation, 415, &c.
dfiatic Greeks, different from the other Greeks, and
why, 410. Grecian Genius, its maturity and decay,
417, fcfr.
GREEK
INDEX.
GREEK Tongue, how perfect in the expreflion of Modes
and Tenfes, 147. force of its imperatives in the paft
tenfes, 156. wrong in ranging Interjections with
Adverbs, 289. its character, as a Language, 418,
423
GROCINUS, his Syftem of the Tenfes, 128
H.
HERACLITUS, Saying of, 8. his Syftem of things,
what, 369, 370
HERMES, his Figure, Attributes, and Character, 324,
325, 326. authors, who have writ of him, 326
HESIOD, called o TS-OW,;?, the Poet, by Plato, 223
HOADLY'S Accidence, 128
HOMER, 50, 52, 82, 84, 145, 149, 221, 223, 235,
253. 2 73> 28 5 3 8 > 4i7> 42i
HORACE, 57, 80, 125, 142, 163, 169, 178, 199,
207, 232, 260, 413, 424, 425
I.
Ideas, of what, Words the Symbols, 341 to 347. , if
only particular were to exift, the confequence what,
337 to 339- general, their importance, 341^ 342.
undervalued by whom, and why, 350. of what fa-
culty the Objects, 360. their chara6ter, 362 to 366,
390. the only objects of Science and real Know-
lege, why, 368. acquired, how, 353 to 374. de-
rived whence, 374, &c. their triple Order in Art,
376. the fame in Nature, 381. eflential to Mind,
why, 379, 380. the firft and higheft Ideas, cha-
racter of, 380, 440. Ideas, their different Sources,
dated, 400. their real fource, 434, 438
INDEX.
JEREMIAH, 405
Imagination, what, 354. differs from Sen fe, how, 355.
from Memory and Recollection, how, ibid.
Individuals, why fo called, 39, 40. quit their cha-
racter how and why, 40, 41. their infinity, how
exprefled by a finite number of Words, 214 to 21 7,
234, 346. become objedts of Knowlege, how, 369
INSTANT, See Now.
Intellect, See Mind.
INTERJECTIONS, their application and effect, 289.
no diftinft Part of Speech with the Greeks, though
with the Latins, 289. their character and defcrip-
tion, ' 290
Interrogation, its fpecies explained and illuftrated, 151
to 154. Interrogatives refufe the Article, why, 228
JOANNES GRAMMAT. See PHILOPONUS.
IsOCRATES, 421
JULIAN, 416
K.
KUSTE.R, 176
Knowlege, if any more excellent than Senfation, the
confequence, 37 J >37 2
L.
LANGUAGE, how conftituted, 327. defined, 329.
founded in Compact, 314, 327. (See Speech.] fym-
bolic, not imitative, why, 332 to 355. impoflible
for it to exprefs the real Eflences of things, 335. its
double capacity why necefTary, 348. its Matter,
what, 349. its Form, what, ibid, its Precifion and
Permanence derived whence, 345. particular Lan-
guages,
INDEX.
guages, their Identity, whence, 374. their Diver-
lity, whence, ibid. See Englijh, Greek, Latin, Ori-
ental.
LATIN Tongue, deficient in Aorifts, and how it fup-
plies the defect, 125. its peculiar ufe of the Prateri-
tum Perfeffum, 131. has recourfe to Auxiliars, for
fome Modes and Tenfes, 148. to a Periphrafis for
fome Participles, 185. in what fenfe it has Articles,
233. the Ablative, a Cafe peculiar to it, 276. right
in feparating Interjedtions from the other Parts of
Speech, 289, 290. its character, as a Language,
411. not made for Philofophy, ibid. 412. funk with
Boethius, 416
Letters, what Socrates thought of their inventor, 325.
divine honours paid him by the Egyptians, ibid. See
Element.
Liberty, its influence upon Mens Genius, 420
Life, connected with Being, 300, 301, 432
LiNN.ffius, 44
Literature, its caufe and that of Virtue, connected,
how, 407. antient, recommended to the Study of
the liberal, 424. its peculiar effet with regard to a
man's character, 425, 426
Logic, what, 3, 4
LONGINUS, noble remark of, ' - 420
LUCIAN, 41
LUCILIUS, ibid.
M.
MACROBIUS, ihort account of him, 414. quoted
127, 157, 168
G g 4 Man,
INDEX.
Alan, rational and focial, i,'2. his peculiar ornament,
what, 2. firft or prior to Man, what, 9, 269. his
Exiftence, the manner of, what, 359. how moft
likely to advance in happinefs, 362. has within him
fomething divine, 302. his Ideas, whence derived,
393 to 401. Medium, thro' which he derives them,
what, 359, 393. his errors, whence, 406. to be
corrected, how, ibid.
Manufcripts quoted, of OLYMPIODORUS, 371, 394,
395. ofPniLOPONUs, 431,433,437. of PRO-
CLUS, 434,435,438,440. ofDAMASCIUS, 441
MARCIANUS CAPELLA, fhort account of him, 415
Majler Artijl, what forms his character, 1 1 1
Matter joined with Form, 2, 7. its original meaning,
confounded by the Vulgar, how, 309. its extenfive
character according to ancient Philofophy, 308. de-
fcribed by Cicero, 313. of Language, what, 315.
defcribed at large, 316, &c.
MAXIMUS TYRIUS, his notion of the Supreme In-
tellect, 162
Memory and Recolleflion^ what, 355. diftinguifhed
from Imagination or Phanfy, how, ibid.
Metaphor ', its ufe, >. 269
JMetaphyficians modern, their Syftems, what, 392
MJLTON, 13, 14, 44, 45, 47, 49, 51, 53, 56, 59,
60, 112, 124, 147, 207, 267, 268, 404, 437
jVliND (notSenfe) recognizes time, 107 to JI2. uni-
verfal, 162, 311, 312, 359. differs not (as Senfe
does) from the objects of its perception, 301. acts
in part through the body, in part without it, 305.
its high power of fcparation, 306, 366. penetrates
into all things, 307. Nov? *T> i;:cV, what, 310.
Mind differs from Senfe, how, 364, 365. the fource
pf
INDEX.
of Union by viewing One in Many, 362 to 365.
of Diftin&ion by viewing Many in One, 366. with-
out Ideas, refembles what, 380. region of Truth
and Science, 371, 372. that or Body, which has
precedence, 392, &c. Mind human how fponta-
neous and eafy in its Energies, 361, 362. all Minds
fimilar and congenial, why, 395
MODES or MOODS, whence derived, and to what end
deftined, 140. Declarative or Indicative, 141. Po-
tential, 142. Subjunctive, 143. Interrogative, ibid.
Inquifitive, ibid. Imperative, 144. Precative or Op-
tative, ibid, the feveral Species illuftrated from Ho-
mer, Virgil, and Milton, 145 to 147. Infinitive
Mode, its peculiar character, 162,163. how digni-
fied by the Stoics, 1 64. other Modes refolvable into
it, 166. its application and coal efcence, 167. Mode
of Science, of Conjecture, of Proficiency, of Le-
giflature, 16810170. Modes compared and diftjn-
guifhed, 14910160. Greek Imperatives of the Paft
explained, and illuftrated, 156, 157
Moon, Feminine, why, 45
jdetiotiy and even its Privation necefTarily imply Time,
95
MURETUS, quoted, 441, 442. his notion of the Ro-
mans, Hid,
MUSONIUS RUFUS, . 416
N.
Names, proper, what the confequence if no other
words, 337 to 339. their ufe, 345. hardly parts
of Language, 346, 373
J^ATHAN and DAVID, 232
INDEX.
Nature, firft to Nature, firft to Man, how they differ,
9,10. frugality of, 320. Natures fubordinate fub-
fervient to the higher, .
NICEPHORUS, See BLEMMIDES.
NICOMACHUS,
NOUN, or Subftantive, its three Sorts, 37. what
Nouns fufceptible of Number, and why, 39. only
Part of Speech fufceptible of Gender, 41, iy i,
A Now or INSTANT, the bound of Time, but no
part of it, 101, 102. analogous to a Point in a geo-
metrical Line, ibid, its ufe with refpedl: to Time,
104. its minute and tranfient prefence illuftrated,
117. by this Prefence Time made prefent, 116,
117, 1 1 8. See Time, Place, Space.
Number, to what words it appertains, and why, 39,
40
O.
Objeftors, ludicrous, 293. grave, - 294
Ocean, Mafculine, why, 49
OLYMPIODORUS, quoted from a Manufcript, as to
his notion of Knowlege, and its degrees, 371, 372.
of general Ideas, the objects of Science, 394, 395
ONE, by natural co-incidence, 162, 173, 192, 241,
262 to 265. by the help of external connectives,
241, 265
Oriental Languages, number of their Parts of Speech,
35. their character and Genius, 409
ORPHEUS, 441
OVID, 132, 141, 206
P.
INDEX.
P,
PARTICIPLE, how different from the Verb, 94, 184.
its eflence or character, 184. how different from
the Adje&ive, 186. See Attributive, LATIN and
ENGLISH Tongues.
Particular^ how though infinite, expreffed by Words
which are finite, 346. confequence of attaching
ourfelves wholly to them, 35 r
PAUSANIAS, 285
Perception and Volition, the Soul's leading Powers, 15,
17. Perception two-fold, 348. In Man what firft,
9, 10, 353, 359. fenfitive and intellective differ,
how, 364, 365. if not correfpondent to its objects,
erroneous, * 37 r
Period^ See Sentence.
PERIPATETIC Pbilofophy, in the latter ages com-
monly united with the Platonic, 160. what fpecies
of Sentences it admitted, 144. its notion of Cafes,
277. held Words founded in Compact, 314
PERIZONIUS, his rational account of the Perfons in
Nouns and Pronouns, 171
PERSIUS, 76, 163, 372. fliort account of his charac -
ter, 413
Perfons, firft, fecond, third, their Origin and Ufe,
65 to 67
Phanjy, See Imagination.
PHILOPONUS, his notion of Time, 431. of the bu-
fmefs of Wifdom or Philofophy, 433. of God, the
Sovereign Artift, 437
Philofophy, what would banifh it out of the World,
293, 294. its proper bufmefs, what, 433. antient
4 differs
INDEX,
differs from modern, how, 308. modern, its chief
object, what, - * ibid.
Pbilofophers, ancient, who not qualified to write or
talk about them, 270. provided words for new Ideas,
how, . 269
Philofophers, modern, their notion of Ideas, 350.
their employment, 351. their Criterion of Truth,
ibid, deduce all from Body, 392. fupply the place
of occult Qualities, how, 393
P/ace, mediate and immediate, 118. applied to ill u-
ftrate the prefent Time, and the prefent Inftant,
ibid, its various relations denoted, how, 266,271.
its Latitude and Univerfality, 266
PLATO, 21. how many Parts of Speech he admitted,
32. his account of Genus and Species, 39. quoted,
92. his Style abounds with Particles, why, 259.
new- coined Word of, 269. quoted, 325. in what
he placed real happinefs, 362. his two different, and
oppofite Etymologies of 'EmoiVw, 3^9> 37' nis
Idea of Time, 389. quoted, 407. his character, as a
XVriter, compared with Zenophoi and Arijloth^ 422
PLETHO, SeeGEMisrus.
PLINY, his account how the antient artifts infcribed
their names upon their Works, 136
PLUTARCH, 33
Poetry^ what, 5, 6,
PORPHYRY, 39
Pofition, its force in Syntax, 26, 274, 276, 230
PREPOSITIONS, 32. defined, 261. their ufe, 265.
their original Signification, 266. their fubfequent
and figurative, 268. their different application, 270,
271. force in Com pofition, 271,272. change into
Adverbs, . 272, 205
Priii-
INDEX.
Principles, to be eftimated from their confequences, 7,
232, 236, 325. of Union and Diverfity, their dif-
ferent ends and equal importance to the Univerfe,
250. (See ONE, Union, Diverfity) elementary Prin-
ciples myfterioufly blended, 307. their invention
difficult, why, 325. thofe of Arithmetic and Geo-
metry how fimple, 352
PRISCIAN, defines a Word, 20. explains from Philo-
fophy the Noun and Verb, 28, 33. quoted, 34. ex-
plains how Indication and Relation differ, 63. the
nature of the Pronoun, 65. of pronominal Perfons,
67. his reafon why the two firft Pronouns have no
Genders, 70. why but one Pronoun of each fort,
71. ranges Articles with Pronouns according to the
Stoics, 74. a pertinent obfervation of his, 88. ex-
plains the double Power of the Latin Prateritwn y
125, 131. his doctrine concerning the Tenfes, 130.
defines Moods or Modes, 141. his notion of the
Imperative, 155. of the Infinitive, 165, 166. of
Verbs which naturally precede the Infinitive, 168.
of Imperfonals, 175. of Verbs Neuter, 177. of the
Participle, 194. of the Ad verb, 195. of Compara-
tives, 202. quoted, 210. his reafon why certain
Pronouns coalefce not with the Article, 225, 226.
explains the different powers of Connectives which
conjoin, 243, 244, 245. of Connectives which dif-
join, 250. quoted, 262. his notion of the Interjec-
tion, 291. of Sound or Voice, 316
PROCLUS, his Opinion about Reft, 95,431. quoted,
310. explains the Source of the Doctrine of Ideas,
434, 435 43 6 43 8
PRONOUNS, why fo called, 65. their Species, or Per-
fons, 65, 66. why the firft and fccond have no Sex,
3 69,
INDEX.
69, 70. referable Articles, but how diftinguimed,
73. their coalefcence, 74,75. their importance in
Language, 77. relative or fubjunclive Pronoun, its
nature and ufe, 78 to 83. thofe of the firft and fe-
cond perfon when exprefTed, when not, 83. 'Ey-
xXiliJcal and ofloTovvpevoii, how diftinguifhed, 84.
Primitives, refufe the Article, why, 225
PROTAGORAS, his notion of Genders, 42. a Sophifm
of his, - -- 144
Proverbs of Solomon , A 05
PUBLIUS SYRUS, -
0,
QUINTILIAN, 154, 233, 407
Dualities occult, what in modern Philofophy fupplies
their place, ^ ... 30,3
R.
i
Relatives, mutually infer each other, 251, 286.
their ufual Cafe, the Genitive, ibid.
Rhetoric* -what, 5, 6
ROMANS, their character as a Nation, 411. Roman
Genius, its maturity and decay, 418, &c.
S.
SALLUSTIUS PHILOSOPH. - 401
SANCTIUS, his elegant account of the different Arts
refpe&ing Speech, 5. quoted, 36, 163, 171. re-
jects Imperfonais, 175. quoted, 202. his notion of
the Conjunction, after Scaliger, 238. of the Inter-
SCA-
INDEX.
SCALIGER, his Etymology of >uis, 82. his notion of
Tenfes from Grodnus, 128. his elegant obfervation
upon the order of the Tenfes, 138. upon the pre-
eminence of the Indicative Mode, 169. his account
how the Latins fupply the place of Articles, 233.
his notion of the Conjunction, 238. his fubtle ex-
plication of its various powers, 242 to 247, 258.
his reafon from Philofophy why Subftantives do not
coalefce, 264. his origin of Prepofitions, 266. his
Etymology of Scientia, 370
Science, 5. its Mode the Indicative, and Tenfe the
Prefent, why, 159. its Conjunction the Collective,
why, 246. defended, 295. valuable for its confe-
quences, ibid, for itfelf, 296 to 303. (See GOD)
pure and fpeculative depends on Principles the moft
fimple, 352. not beholden to Experiment, though
Experiment to that, 353. whole of it feen in Com-
pofition and Divifion, 367. its Etymology, 369.
refidence of itfelf and objects, where, 372. See
Mind.
Scriptures? their Sublimity, whence, 410
SENECA, 47, 139, 414
Senfation, of the Prefent only, 105, 107, 139. none
of Time, 105. each confined to its own Objects,
333, 369. its Objects infinite, 338, 353. Man's
firft Perception, ibid, coniequence of attaching our-
felves wholly to its objects, 351. how prior to In-
telledion, 379. how fubfequent, 391
Sentence, definition of, 19, 20. its various Species in-
veftigated, 14, 15. illuftrated from Milton, 147,^.
connection between Sentences and Modes, 144
Separation, corporeal inferior to mental, why, 306
SERVIUS, 132, 227, 432
Sex,
INDEX.
Sex, (See Gender.} transferred in Language to Beings,
that in Nature want it, and why, 44, 45. Sub-
ftances alone fufceptible of it, . jyj
SHAKESPEAR, 12,13,23,41,47,51,53
Ship, Feminine, why, . ^g
SIMPLICIUS, his triple Order of Ideas or Forms,
3 8 *> 382
SOPHOCLES, 432
Soul, its leading Powers, 15, 5V.
Sound, fpecies of, 314, 317. the C/ TA or Matter of
Language, 315. defined, 316. See Voice.
Space, how like, how unlike to Time, ioo. See
Place.
Speech, peculiar Ornament of Man, i, 2. bow re-
folved or analyzed, 2. its four principal Parts, and
why thefe, and not others, 281031. its Matter and
Form taken together, 307 to 315. its Matter taken
feparately, 316 to 326. its Form taken feparately,
327 to 359. neceflity of Speech, whence, 332, 333.
founded in Compact, 3H> 327
SPENSER, 134, 164
Spirits animal, fubtle Ether, nervous Du&s, Vibra-
tions, &c. their ufe in modern Philofophy. See
totalities occult.
STOICS, how many Parts of Speech they held, 34.
ranged Articles along with Pronouns, 74. their ac-
count of the Tenfes, 130. multiplied the number of
Sentences, 144. allowed the name of Verb to the
Infinitive only, into which they fuppofed all other
Modes refolvable, 164 to 166. their logical view of
Verbs, and their Diftin&ions fubfequent, 179 to
181. their notion of the Participle, '194. oftheAd-
vcrb, 195. called the Adverb zcW/x.V:, and why,
210.
INDEX.
called the Prepofition
261. invented new Words, and gave new Signified
tions to old ones, 269. their notion of Cafes, 278;
of the "TAj or Matter of Virtue, 309, 310. of
Sound, 316. bf the Species of Sound, 322. their
Definition of an Element, 324
Subjeft and Predicate, how diftinguifhed in Gr&x, 230;
how in Englijh, ibid, analogdui to what in nature,
27$
Subftance and Attribute, 29. the great Objects of natu-
ral Union, 264. Subftance fufceptible of Sex, 171,
41. of Number, 40. coincides, not with Subftance,
264. incapable of Intenfiori, and therefore of Com-
parifon, - - 201, 202
SUBSTANTIVE, 30, 31. defcribed, 37. primary, ilid:
to 62. fecondary, 6310 67. (See NOUN, PRO-
NOUN.) Subftantive and Attributive, analogous in
Nature to what, - 27$
Sun, Mafculine, why, 45
Sylva, a peculiar Signification of, 308, 309
Symbol, what, 330. differs from Imitation, how, ibid.
preferred to it in conftituting Language, whyj 332
T.
their natural Number, and why, li^, lid.
Aorifts, 123. Tenfes either paffing or completive,
what authorities for thefe DiftindYions, 128 to 130.
Prateritum perfcfium of the Latins, peculiar ufes of, 1
131 to 134. Imperfefium, peculiar ufes of, 135 t
137. order of Tenfes in common Gram mars not for-
tuitous, . - - 138
H h TtRENCEj
INDEX.
TERENCE, 205, 206, 272
THE and A, See ARTICLE.
THEMISTIUS, 9. his notion how the Mind gains the
idea of Time, ic8. of the dependance of Time on
the Soul's exigence, 112. of the latent tranfition of
Nature from one Genus to another, 259, 432
THEODECTES, - - 35
THEOPHRASTUS, his notion of Speech under its va-
rious Relations, 4. mentioned, 419
THEUTH, inventor of Letters, 324. See HERMES.
TIBULLUS, - 76, 132, 133
Time* Mafculine, why, 50. why implied in every
Verb, 95, 96. gave rife to Tenfes, ibid, its moft
obvious divifion, 97. how like, how unlike to Space,
ico to 103. ftrictly fpeaking no Time prefent, 105.
in what fenfe it may be called pfefent, 116, 117,
432. all Time divifible and extended, 118, 100,
ior. no object of Senfation, why, 105. how faint
and fhadowy in exiftence, 106,431. how, and by
what power we gain its idea, 107. Idea of the paft,
prior to that of the future, 109. that of the future,
how acquired, 109, no. how connected with Art
and Prudence, in. of what faculty, Time the pro-
per Object, 112. how intimately connected with
the Soul, ibid, order and value of its feveral Species,
i 13. what things exift in it, whatnot, 160 to 162.
its natural effect on things exifting in it, 161, 50.
defcribed by Plato, as the moving Picture of perma-
nent Eternity, 389. this account explained by Eot-
tk'uts, ibid. Sec Now or INSTANT.
< Tr;tth t necefiary, immutable, fuperior to all diftinctions
of prefent, paft and future, 90, 91, 92, 159, 160,
404, 405. (See Being, GOD ) its place or region,
162*
INDEX.
162, 372. feen in Composition and Divifion, 3,
367. even negative, in fome degree fynthetical, 3,
250, 364. ever)' Truth One, and fo recognized,
how, 364, 365. factitious Truth, 403
V.
VARRO, 56,61,74,413
VERB, 31. its more loofe, as well as more fttidt
acceptations, 87, 193. Verb ftri&ly ib called, its
character, 93, 94. diftinguifhed from Participles,
94. from Adjectives, ibid, implies Time, why, 95.
Tenfes, 98, 119. Modes or Moods, 140, 170.
Verbs, how fufceptible of Number and Perfon, 170.
Species of Verbs, 173. active, 174. paffive, ibid.
middle, 175, i~6. tranfitive, 177, neuter, ibid, in-
ceptive, 126, i?2. defiderative or meditative, 127.
formed out of Subftantives, 1 82, 1 83. (See 77m?,
;, MODES.) Imperfonals rejected, 175
Subflantivesy their pre-eminence, 88. eflential to
every Proportion, ibid, implied in every other Verb,
90, 93. denote exiftence, 88. vary, as varies the
exiftenceor Being, whkh they doiiote 3 Q,I S 92. See
Being> Truth ^ GOD.
Verfes, logical, 340
Vicey Feminine, why, - 56
VIRGIL, 46, 47, 48, 49, 57, 68, 83, 132. his pecu-
liar method of coupling the paifing and compktive
Tenfes, 133 to 136. quoted, 141, i82> J^S* 199,
306, 235, 286, 287, 389,401, 432. bis idea of
the R smax Genius, - -'"- 235.^4131
ftrtue y Feminine, why, 55. moral ajid tnteHe&ual <iif-
fer s how, 2o/9> ^oo. its Matter^ what s $p<fr 3
Hh 2
INDEX.
its Form, what, 311. conne&ed with Literature,
how, - - 407
Under/landing* its Etymology, 369. human Under-
itanciing, a compofite of what, 425
IJnhn, natural, the great objeds of, 264, 279. per-
ceived by vyhat power, 363. in every truth, whence
. derived, -~ .1 . 365
See fForld.
defined, 318. fimple, produced how, 318, 319.
differs from articulate, how, ibid, articulate, what,
319 10324. articulate, fpecies of, 321 to 323. See
Vowel, Confonant) Element.
Volition^ See Perception.
Vossius, 35, 75, 290
Vowel, what, and why fo called 321, 322
Utility, always and only fought by the fordid and illi-
beral, 294, 295, 298. yet could have no Being,
were there n.ot fomething beyond it, 297. See
W.
Whole and Partf^ - 7
ffffelomy how fomq Philofophers thought it diflinguifh-
ed from Wit, 368, 433
\VORDS, defined, 20, 21, 328. the feveral Species of,
23 to 31. fignificant by themfelves, fignificant by
Relation, 27. variable, invariable, 24. fignificant
by themfelves and alone, 3710211. by Relation
and aflbciated, 213 to 274. fignificant by CompacT:,
314, 327. Symbols, and not Imitations, 332. Sym-
bols, of what not, 33710341. Symbols, of what,
341 to 349, 372. how, though in Number finite,
f t>I? ^o expjefs infinite Particulars, 346, 372, 373
INDEX.
^ vifible and external, the pafling Pi&ure of
what, 383, 437. preferved one and the fame, though
ever changing, how> 384, 385. its Caufe not void
ofReafon, 436
Writer^ antient polite differ from modern polite, in
what and why, 259, 260
X.
XENOPHON, 56, 407. his character as a writer, com-
pared with Plato and Arljlotle 9 422, 423
Y.
*TAw, 308. See Matter , Sylva.
FINIS.
ERRATA.
Page 4. for arftrftiilzi, read, tvyvrMtla.!. P. 29. fir Piifc. L. IX.
rtad, Prifc. L. XI. P. 87. for XAiuyofuptvQi, read, *ij*y,tifi}jumt. P.
96. fur Proposition, read, Piepofition. P. 107. Note /or (d) riad (e).
P. 259. Ncte/tr A\x3, */, (WK\*x* P>zfa' firMotttr, red,
Mcrien
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