HERMkS 
 
 OR 
 A PHILOSOPHICAL INQVIRY 
 
 CONCERNING 
 VNIVERSAL GRAMMAR 
 
 BY IAMES HARRIS E 
 
 XI2IENAI APfOYNTAS EINAI rAl" KAI ENTAT0A 0EOT2 
 
 THE SECOND EDITION 
 REVISED AND CORRECTED 
 
 LONDON 
 
 PRINTED FOR IOHN NOVRSE 
 AND PAVL VAILLANT 
 
 M DCC LXV
 
 f
 
 To the Right Honourable 
 
 PHILIP Z/W HARDWICKE, 
 
 Lord High Chancellor of Great 
 
 Britain * 4 
 
 My Lord, 
 
 AS no one has exercifed 
 the Powers of Speech 
 with jufter and more univerfal 
 applaufe, than yourfelf ; I 
 have prefumed to infcribe the 
 following Treatife to your 
 Lordfhip, its End being to 
 inveftigate the Principles of 
 thofe Powers. It has a far- 
 ther claim to your Lord- 
 fliip's Patronage, by being 
 conne&ed in fome degree with 
 that politer Literature, which, 
 in the moft important fcenes 
 A a of 
 
 * The above Dedication is printed as it originally flood, 
 the Author being defirous that what he intended as real Re- 
 fpeft to the noble Lord, when living, fhould now be co^- 
 fidered, as aTeftimony c-f Gratitude to his Memory. 
 
 2223271 
 
 . . 
 
 Ill
 
 iv DEDICATION. 
 
 of Bufinefs, you have ftill 
 found time to cultivate. With 
 regard tomyfelf,ifwhat I have 
 written be the fruits of that 
 Security and Leifure, obtained 
 by living under a mild and free 
 Government; to whom for this 
 am I more indebted, than to 
 your Lordfhip, whether I con- 
 fider you as a Legiflator, or 
 as a Magiftrate, the firft both 
 in dignity and reputation? 
 Permit me therefore thus pub- 
 licly to aflure your Lordfhip, 
 that with the greateft gratitude 
 and refpe& I am, My Lord, 
 
 Tour Lordjhips mofl obliged* 
 
 and mofl obedient humble Servant, 
 
 Ghfe of Salifiury t 
 Of. i, 1751, 
 
 James Harris.
 
 rHE chief End, propofed by the. 
 Author of this Treatife in mak- 
 ing it pub lie ) has been to excite his 
 Readers to curiofay and inquiry \ 
 not to teach them himfelf by prolix 
 and formal Letfures, (from the effi- 
 cacy of which he has little expeElation) 
 but to induce them, ifpafftble, to be- 
 come- Teachers to themfelves, by an im- 
 partial ufe of their own underftand- 
 ings. He thinks nothing more abfurd 
 than the common notion of InJlruElion^ 
 as if Science were to be poured into 
 the Mind, like water into a ciftern, 
 that pajjively waits to receive, all that 
 comes. The growth of Knowlegz he. 
 rather thinks to refemble the growth 
 of Fruit ; however external caufes 
 may in fome degree co-operate, '//V 
 the internal vigour, and virtue of 
 A 3 the
 
 vi PREFACE. 
 
 the tree, that muft ripen the juices to 
 their jujl maturity. 
 
 
 
 *fhis then, namely, the exciting 
 men to inquire for tbemf elves into 
 fubjeEls worthy of their contemplation, 
 this the Author declares to have been 
 his firft and principal motive for 
 appearing in print. Next to that, 
 as he has always been a lover of 
 Letters, he would willingly approve 
 his Jludies to the liberal and inge- 
 nuous. He has particularly named 
 thefe, in diftinElion to others ; becaufe, 
 as his Jludies were never profecuted 
 with the lea ft regard to lucre, fo they 
 are no way calculated for any lucra- 
 tive End. 'The liberal therefore and 
 ingenuous (whom he has mentioned 
 already) are thofe, to whofe perufal 
 he offers what he has written. Should 
 
 Mr 
 
 they judge favourably of his attempt, . 
 he may not perhaps hejitate to confefs, 
 
 {-Joe jurat et melli eft. 
 
 For
 
 P R E F A C < 
 
 For tho be hopes, he cannot be charged 
 with the foolijh love of vain Praife^ 
 he has no dejire to be thought indif- 
 ferent, or infenfible to honeft Fame. 
 
 From the influence of thefe fenti- 
 
 ments, he has endeavoured to treat his 
 
 fubjett with as much order, correft- 
 
 nefs, and perfpicuity as in his power \ 
 
 and if he has failed, he can fafely 
 
 */ ./ J ,/ <Jr 
 
 fay (according to the vulgar phrafe) 
 that the failure has been his misfor- 
 tune, and not his fault. He fcorns 
 thofe trite and contemptible methods 
 of anticipating pardon for a bad per- 
 formance, that u it was the hafty 
 fruits of a few idle hours ; written 
 merely for private amufement ; 
 never revifed ; publifhed againjt 
 confent, at the importunity of 
 "friends, copies (God knows how) 
 " having by ftealth gotten abroad*" 
 with other ft ale jargon of equal fal- 
 JJjood and inanity. May we not ajk 
 fuch Prefacers, If what they allege 
 A be 
 
 cc 
 cc 
 
 (C 
 
 cc
 
 viii PREFACE, 
 
 be true, what has the world to da 
 with them and their crudities ? 
 
 As to the Book itfelf^ it can fay 
 this in its behalf, that it does not 
 merely confine itjelf to what its title 
 fromifes, but expatiates freely into 
 whatever is collateral-, aiming on 
 every occajion to rife in its inquiries^ 
 and to pafs, as far as pojjibk, from 
 
 fmall matters to the greatefl. Nor 
 is it formed merely upon fentiments 
 that are now in fajhion^ or fupported 
 only byfuch authorities as are modern. 
 Many Authors are quoted^ that now 
 d-days are but little ftudied ; and 
 
 fome perhaps , whofe very names are 
 hardly known. 
 
 The Fate indeed of antient Authors 
 (as we have happened to mention them) 
 is not unworthy of our notice. A 
 few of themfurvive in the Libraries 
 of the learned^ where fome venerable 
 Folio, that ftill goes by their name, 
 
 J u ft
 
 PREFACE. ix 
 
 juft fuffices to give them a kind of 
 nominal exiftence. 'The reft have 
 long fallen into a deeper obfcurity^ 
 their very names , 'when mentioned^ 
 (iffeEling us as little, as the names y 
 when we read them, of thofe fubordi- 
 yiate Heroes, 
 
 Alcandrumque, Haliumque, No- 
 emonaque, Prytanimque. 
 
 Now if an Author^ not content 
 with the more eminent of antient 
 Writer S) Jhould venture to bring his 
 reader into fuch company as thefe 
 loft, among people (in the fafiion- 
 able phrafe) that no body knows ; 
 what ufage, what quarter can he 
 Jjave reajon to expeB ? Should the 
 Author of thefe fpeculations have 
 done this (and *tis to be feared he 
 has) what method had he bejl take in 
 a cir cum fiance fo critical? Let us 
 fuppofe him to apologize in the beft 
 manner he can^ and in confequeme 
 of this ^ to fuggeft q$ follows 
 
 He
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 He hopes there will be found a 
 pleafure in the contemplation of an- 
 tient fentiments, as the view of an- 
 tient ArchiteElure, tho in ruins, has 
 fomething venerable. Add to this, 
 what from its antiquity is but little 
 known, has from that very circum- 
 Jlance the recommendation of novelty ; 
 fo that here, as in other inflames, 
 Extremes may be faid to meet. 
 Farther ftill, as the Authors, whom 
 he has quoted, lived in various ages, 
 and in diftant countries ; fome in the 
 full maturity of Grecian and Roman 
 Literature \ fome in its declension ; 
 and others in periods ftill more bar- 
 barous, and depraved; it may afford 
 perhaps no unpleafing f peculation, to 
 fee how the SAME REASON has at all 
 times prevailed', how there is ONE 
 TRUTH, like one Sun, that has en- 
 lightened human Intelligence through 
 every age, and faved it from the 
 darknefs both of Sophijiry and Er- 
 ror. 
 
 Nothing
 
 PREFACE. xi 
 
 Nothing can more tend to enlarge 
 the Mind, than thefe extenfive views 
 of Men, and human Knowlege ; no- 
 thing can more effectually take us off 
 from the foolijh admiration of what 
 is immediately before our eyes, and 
 help us to a jufter eftimate both of 
 prefent Men, and prefent Litera- 
 ture, 
 
 9 Tis perhaps too much the cafe with 
 the multitude in every nation, that as 
 they know little beyond themf elves, and 
 their own affairs, fo out of this nar- 
 row fphere ofknowlege, they think no- 
 thing worth knowing. As we BRITONS 
 by our Jituation live divided from the 
 whole world, this perhaps will be 
 found to be more remarkably our cafe. 
 And hence the reafon, that our ftudies 
 are ufually fatisjied in the works of 
 our own Countrymen ; that in Philo- 
 fophy, in Poetry, in every kind of 
 fubjeEi, whether ferious or ludicrous, 
 whether f acred or profane, we think 
 2
 
 xn PREFACE. 
 
 perfection 'with ourf elves, and that 'tis 
 juperfluous to fear ch farther. 
 
 The Author of this *freatife would 
 by no means detract from the jufl 
 honours due to t/iofe of bis Country- 
 men, who either in the prefent, or 
 preceding age, have fo illujlrioujly 
 adorned it. But tho he can with 
 pleafure and Jin cerity join in celebra- 
 ting their deferts, he would not have 
 the admiration of thefe, or of any 
 other few, to pafs thro' blind excefs 
 into a contempt of all others. Were 
 fuch Admiration to become univerfal, 
 an odd event would foliow ; a few 
 learned men, without any fault of 
 their own, would contribute in a man- 
 ner to the extin&ion of Letters. 
 
 A like evil to that of admiring 
 only the authors of our own age, is 
 that of admiring only the authors of 
 one particular Science. Tliere is in- 
 deed if; this taji prejudice fomething 
 
 pecu-
 
 PREFACE. xiii 
 
 peculiarly unfortunate^ and that h y 
 the more excellent the Science, the 
 more likely it will be found to produce 
 this effeft. 
 
 There are few Sciences more in- 
 trinjically valuable > than MATHE- 
 MATICS. '70 hard indeed to fay ^ 
 to which they have more contributed^ 
 whether to the Utilities of Life, or to 
 the fublimejl parts of Science. They 
 are the nollefl Praxis of LOGIC, or 
 UNIVERSAL REASONING. *Tis thro 
 them we may pet~ceive y how the ftated 
 Forms of Syllogifm are. exemplified in 
 one Subjeft^ namely the Predicament 
 of Quantity. By marking the force 
 of thefe FormS) as they are applied 
 here 3 we may be enabled to apply 
 them of ourf elves el fe where. Nay 
 farther Jlill by viewing the MIND, 
 during its procefs in thefe fyllogiftic 
 employments, we may come to know 
 in part^ what kind of Being it is ; 
 Jince MIND, like ether Powers^ can 
 
 be
 
 xiv PREFACE. 
 
 be only known from its Opera t ion $< 
 Whoever therefore will ftudy Mathe- 
 matics in this viewy will become not 
 only by Mathematics a more expert 
 Logician, and by Logic a more ra- 
 tional Mathematician, but a wifer 
 Philofopher^ and an acuter Reafoner^ 
 in all the pojfible fubjetts either of 
 fctence or deliberation. 
 
 But when Mathematics, inflead of 
 being applied to this excellent purpofe^ 
 are ujed not to exemplify Logic, but 
 to fupply its place ; no wonder if 
 Logic pafs into contempt^ and if 
 Mathematics, inflead of furthering 
 fcience, become in faEl an obftacle. 
 For when men^ knowing nothing of 
 that Reafoning which is univerfal, 
 come to attach themfelves for years 
 to a {ingle Species, a fpecies wholly 
 involved in Lines and Numbers 
 only ; they grow infenjibly to believe 
 thefe laft as in fep arable from all Rea- 
 as the poor Indians thought 
 
 every
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 e very hcrfeman to be infeparable from 
 his horfe. 
 
 And thus we fee the ufe, nay tht 
 mceffity of enlarging our literary 
 views, left even Knowlege itfelf 
 Jhould obflruB its own growth^ and 
 perform in feme meafure the part of 
 ignorance and barbarity. 
 
 Such then is the Apology made by 
 the Author of this Treatife, for the. 
 multiplicity of antient quotations^ 
 with which he has filled his Book. If 
 he can excite in his readers a proper 
 fpirit of curiofity ; if he can help in 
 the leajl degree to enlarge the bounds 
 of Science ; to revive the decaying 
 tajle of antient Literature^ to leffen 
 the bigotted contempt of every thing 
 not modern ; and to ajfert to Authors 
 of every age their juft portion of 
 ejteem ; if he can in the leaft degree 
 contribute to thefe ends^ he hopes it 
 may be allowed, that he has done a 
 
 fervice
 
 xvi PREFACE. 
 
 fervice to mankind. Should this fey* 
 vice he a reafon for his Work to fur- 
 vive, he has confefl already^ ^twould 
 be no unpleajing event. Should the, 
 contrary happen, he mujl dcquiefce 
 in its fate, and let it peaceably de~ 
 part to thefe deflined regions, where 
 the productions of modern Wit are 
 every day departing, 
 
 in vicum vendentem tus et 
 
 odores. 
 
 H B
 
 THE 
 
 CONTENTS, 
 
 BOOK I. 
 
 Chapter I. Introduction. Defign of ths 
 'whole. p a g e i 
 
 Chap. II. Concerning the Analyzing of Speech 
 into itsfmallejl Parts. p. 9 
 
 Chap. III. Concerning the federal Species of 
 thofe fmallefi Parts. p. 23 
 
 Chap. IV. Concerning Subftantives, properly 
 fo called. p. 37 
 
 Chap. V. Concerning Siibjianti'ves of the Se- 
 condary Or o'er, p. 63 
 
 Chap. VI. Concerning Attributives, andfrft 
 concerning Verbs* p. 87 
 
 Chap. VII. Concerning 'Time, and Tenfes, 
 
 p. 100 
 
 Chap. VIII. Concerning Modes. p. 140 
 
 Chap. IX. Concerning Verbs, as to their Spe- 
 cies and other remaining Pro- 
 perties, p.
 
 xviii CONTENTS. 
 
 Chap. X. Concerning Participles and Ad- 
 jecJives. p. 184 
 
 Chap, XI. Concerning Attributives of the 
 Secondary Order. p f 192 
 
 BOOK II. 
 
 Chapter I. Concerning Definitives, page 213 
 Chap. II. Concerning Connectives, and firft 
 thofe called Conjunctions, p. 237 
 Chap. III. Concerning thofe other Connec- 
 tives, called Prepojitlons. p. 261 
 
 Chap. IV. Concerning Cafes. p. 275 
 
 Chap. V. Concerning Interjections Recapi- 
 tulation Conclufion. p. 289 
 
 BOOK III. 
 
 Chapter I. Introduction Divifion of the 
 
 Subject into its principal Parts. 
 
 page 305 
 
 Chap. II. Upon the Matter or common Sub- 
 ject of Language. p. 3 1 6 
 
 4 Chap.
 
 CONTENTS. xix 
 
 Chap. III. Upon the Form, or peculiar Cha- 
 racter of Language. p. 327 
 
 Chap. IV. Concerning general or univerfal 
 Ideas. p. 350 
 
 Chap. V. Subordination of Intelligence Dif- 
 ference of Ideas, both in particu- 
 lar Men, and in whole Nations 
 Different Genius of different 
 
 Languages Character of the 
 
 Englifh, the Oriental, the La- 
 tin, and the Greek Languages 
 Superlative Excellence oftheLajl 
 -Conclufion p. 403. 
 
 HER-
 
 HERMES 
 
 OR A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 
 CONCERNING UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR 
 
 BOOK. L 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 Dejign of the Whole. 
 
 IF Men by nature had been framed Ch. I. 
 for Solitude, they had never felt an 
 Impulfe to converfe one with an- 
 other: And if, like lower Animals, they 
 had been by nature irrational, they could 
 not have recognized the proper Subjects 
 of Difcourfe. Since SPEECH then is the 
 joint Energie of our beft and nobleft Fa- 
 culties (a), (that is to fay, of our Rea- 
 B fen 
 
 (a] See V. I. p. 147 to 169. See alfo Note xv. 
 p. 292, and Note xix, p. 296. of the fame Volume,
 
 2 HERMES. 
 
 . 
 
 Ch. I.fin and our facial Affeftion) being withal 
 our peculiar Ornament and Diftinction, as 
 Men y thofe Inquiries may furely be deemed 
 interefting as well as liberal, which either 
 fearch how SPEECH may be naturally re- 
 Jolted; or how, when refolved, it may 
 be again combined. 
 
 HERE a large field for fpeculating opens 
 before us. We may either behold SPEECH, 
 as divided into its conftituent Parts, as a 
 Statue may be divided into its feveral 
 Limbs j or elfe, as refolved into its Matter 
 and Form, as the fame Statue may be re- 
 folved into its Marble and Figure. 
 
 THESE different Analyzings or Refo- 
 lutions conftitute what we call * PHILO- 
 SOPHICAL, or UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR. 
 
 WHEN 
 
 () Grammaticam etiam bipartitam ponsmus, ut alia 
 (it literaria, alia philofophica &?<:. Bacon, de Augm. 
 Sdent. VI. i. And foon after he adds Verumtamen 
 hoc ipfa re moniti, cogltatione complexi fumus Grammati- 
 cam quondam, qua non analoglam verborum ad inviccm, 
 fed analoglam Inter verba et res Jive rationem fedufo in* 
 guirat.
 
 WHEN we have viewed SPEECH thus Ch. I. 
 Analyzed, we may then confider it, as 
 compounded. And here in the firft place 
 We may contemplate that (c) Synthefis, 
 which by combining Jimp le 'Terms produces 
 a Truth -, then by combining two 'Truths 
 produces a third-, and thus others, and 
 others, in continued Demonftration, till 
 we are led> as by a road, into the regions 
 of SCIENCE. 
 
 Now this is that fuperior and moft ex- 
 
 cellent Syntbefis, which alone applies itfelf 
 
 to our Intellect or Reafon, and which to 
 
 B 2 conduct 
 
 (c} Arijlotle fays T v dc sola (w&p.ioiv. O-J/A- 
 
 ^t'^Et, vtxa Of thofe words 
 which are fpoken without Connettion^ there is no one 
 either true or falfe ; as for injlance^ Man^ white, 
 runneth, conquereth. Cat. C. 4. So again in the 
 beginning of his Treatife DC Interpretation, w^\ 
 
 r^ feen in Compaction and Divijion. 
 Compofition makes affirmative Truth, Divifion makes 
 negative, yet both alike bring Terms together, and io 
 far therefore may be called fynthetical.
 
 4 HERMES. 
 
 Ch. I. conduct according to Rule, conftitutes 
 the Art of LOGIC. 
 
 AFTER this we may turn to thofe 
 (d) inferior Competitions, which are pro- 
 ductive 
 
 (d) Ammonius in his Comment on the Treatife 
 n^I />/*).''?, P. 53- gives the following Extradt 
 from TheophraJJuS) which is here inferted at length, as 
 well for the Excellence of the Matter, as becaufe it is 
 not (I believe) elfewhere extant. 
 
 rj rt IIPO N TOT~2 
 'AKPOnMENOTS, oT? *r. <ru/**w TI, x) r? f 
 nPO'S TA V HPA'rMATA, vnlf uv c \fyuv Tsrsr. 
 ecu TXfsorfliirou ra? ax^oa;/xvf, -arfpi JUK ?y rr^y <r^- 
 TOT'S 'AKPOATA'2 xa7- 
 
 AAa p*) ra xoivtx 
 
 . 9 ffu//7rAXii otA- 
 
 A^Aoif, wpe J^ja rvruv *y TWV TJJTCIJ 7ro ( utfa)V, oio 
 <ra(pnvftf, ^A-JXUTTIT^, x] TWV aAAxu i'jcuv, m TE 
 jixaxooAoj/ja; >^ (3^a^uAo5/ia;, xa?a xat^o^v ta-aiTa;u T!ra- 
 paAaj(ASai/o/Auju, or<ra' TE tti ax^oar^i/, xj IxTrA^at. 
 xj srpo; T)itf -orfi'Sw ^ei^wfilVJa ip^av T^ Jf ^e IIPO N S 
 TAOPATMATA T Ao'j/ ox l/<rfM ? ^tAoVo^' 
 B'^ci)'/*wfc)? iTT^AtArjcrflaj, TO, TE 4/Euj*^ JiiA/^uv^ 
 
 3
 
 THE FIRST. $ 
 
 dudive of the Pathetic, and the Pka- Ch. I. 
 Jaut in all their kinds. Thefe latter Com- 
 
 pofitkms 
 
 xj TO a\r$iq aTroJfixyu'?. The Relation of Speech be- 
 ing twofold (as the Philofopher Theophrajlus hath 
 fettled it ) one to the HEARERS, to whom it explains 
 fomething, and one to the THINGS, concerning which 
 the Speaker propofes to perfuade his Hearers : With 
 refpeft to the firjl Relation, that -which regards the 
 HEARERS, are employed Poetry and Rhetoric. Thus 
 it becomes the bufmefs of thefe two, to felefl the moft 
 refpeflable Words, and not thofe that are common and 
 of vulgar ufe, and to conneft fuch Words harmonioujfy 
 one -with another, fa as thro* thefe things and their 
 conferences, fuch as Perfpicuity, Delicacy, and the 
 other Forms of Eloquence, together with Copioufnefs and 
 Brevity, all employed in their proper feafon, to lead 
 the Hearer, and Jlr'ike him, and hold him vanquished by 
 the power of Perfuaf.cn. On the contrary, as to the 
 Relation of Speech to THINGS, here the Philofspher 
 will be found to have a principal employ, as well in 
 refuting the Falfe, as in demcnjlrating the True. 
 
 Sanclius fpeaks elegantly on the fame Subject. 
 Creavit Dcus hominem rationis participem j cw, quia 
 Sociabilem ejje voluit, magno pro mun.ere dedit Ser- 
 monem. Sermoni autem perficiendo tres opifices adhi- 
 buit. Prima ejl Grammatica, qua ab oratione folce- 
 cifmos tf barbarifmos expel/it ; fecunda Dialeftica, 
 qua in Sermonis veriiate verfatur ; tertia Rhetorica, 
 ques ornatum Sermonis tantum exquirit, Min. 1, J, 
 f 2, 
 
 B 7
 
 HERMES. 
 
 Ch. I. pofitions afpire not to the Intelled, but be- 
 ing addrefTed to the Imagination, the Af- 
 feftions, and the Senje, become from their 
 different heightnings either RHETORIC 
 or POETRY. 
 
 NOR need we neceflarily view thefe 
 Arts diftinctly and apart j we may ob- 
 ferve, if we pleafe, how perfectly they 
 co-incide. GRAMMAR is equally requifite 
 to every one of the reft. And though 
 LOGIC may indeed fubfifl without RHE- 
 TORIC or POETRY, yet fo necefTary to 
 thefe laft is a found and correct LOGIC, 
 that without it, they are no better than, 
 warbling Trifles. 
 
 Now all thefe Inquiries (as we have faid 
 already) and fuch others arinng from them 
 as are of ftill fublimer Contemplation, (of 
 which in the Sequel there may be poffibly 
 not a few) may with jufKce be deem'd 
 Inquiries both interefting and liberal. 
 
 AT
 
 Bo O K T HE FlR S T. J 
 
 AT prefent we fhall poftpone the whole Ch. I. 
 Synthetical Part, (that is to fay, Logic and 
 Rhetoric} and confine ourfelves to the 
 analytical, that is to fay UNIVERSAL 
 GRAMMAR. In this we fhall follow the 
 Order, that we have above laid down, 
 firfl dividing SPEECH, as a WHOLE into its 
 CONSTITUENT PARTS; then refolving it, 
 as a COMPOSITE, into its MATTER and 
 FORM; two Methods of Analyiis very 
 different in their kind, and which lead 
 to a variety of very different Specula* 
 tions. 
 
 SHOULD any one object, that in the 
 courfe of our Inquiry we fometimes de- 
 fcend to things, which appear trivial and 
 low; let him look upon the effeds, to 
 which thofe things contribute, then from 
 the Dignity of the Confequences, let him 
 honour the Principles. 
 
 THE following Story may not impro- 
 perly be here inferted. When the Fame 
 B 4 < of
 
 HERMES. 
 
 Ch. I. <f of Heraclitus was celebrated through-* 
 " out Greece, there were certain perfons, 
 " that had a curiofity to fee fo great a 
 " Man. They came, and, as it happened, 
 " found him warming himfelf in a 
 *' Kitchen. The Meannefs of the place 
 " occaiioned them to ftop; upon which 
 ." the Philofopher thus accofted them 
 " ENTER (fays he) BOLDLY, FOR HERE 
 
 TOO THERE ARE GoDS 
 
 WE /hall only add, that as there is no 
 part of Nature too mean for the Divine 
 Prefence $ fo there is no kind of Subject, 
 having its foundation in Nature, that is 
 below the Dignity of a philofophical In- 
 quiry. 
 
 (/) See Arijlot. de Part. Animd. 1. 1. p. 5. 
 
 CHAP.
 
 BOOK THE FlRST. M 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 Concerning ike Analyfing of Speech into 
 its fmallejl Parts. 
 
 THOSE things, which are/r/? to Na- Ch. II. 
 ture, are notjr/? to Man. Nature 
 begins from Caufes, and thence defcends 
 to Effetfs : Human Perceptions firft open 
 upon Effetfs, and thence by flow degrees 
 afcend to Caufes. Often had Mankind 
 feen the fun in Eclipfe, before they knew 
 its Caufe to be the Moon's Interpolition ; 
 much oftner had they feen thofe unceafing 
 Revolutions of Summer and Winter, of 
 Day and Night, before they knew the 
 Caufe to be the Earth's double Motion (a). 
 
 Even 
 
 (a) This Diftin&ion of prior to Man and prior to 
 Nature, was greatly regarded in the Peripatetic Phi- 
 lofophy. See Arijl. Phyf. Aufcult. 1. i. c. I. Tlxmif- 
 tius's Comment on the fame, Pojler. Analyt. 1. i. 
 C. 2. De Anima^ 1. 2. c. 2. It leads us, when pro- 
 perly regarded, to a very important Diftin&ion be- 
 tween
 
 HERMES. 
 
 Ch. II. Even in Matters of Art and human Crea- 
 tion, if we except a few Artifls and cri- 
 tical 
 
 tween Intelligence Divine and Intelligence Human. 
 GOD may be faid to view the Firft, as firft ; and the 
 Laft, as laft; that is, he views Effefts thro' Caufes 
 in their natural Order. MAN views the Laft, as 
 firft ; and the Firft, as laft ; that is, he views Caufes 
 thro' EffeSls-t in an inverfe Order. And hence the 
 Meaning of that Pafiage in Arljlotle : utrmf 
 
 arw Tr,; riy.STtpot$ /u^r,- o 
 rot T? (py<rt Qoi-jtcuTxl<x, uravlt-v. jfs are the Eyes of 
 Bats to the Light of the Day^ fa is Mans Intelligence 
 to thofe Ol'jefls, that are by Nature the brightejl and 
 vnojl confpicuous of all Things , Metaph. 1. 2. c. I. See 
 alfo 1. 7. c. 4. and Ethic. Nicorn. 1. i. c. 4. Ammomus^ 
 reafoning in the fame way, fays very pertinently to 
 the Subject of this Treatife ' A'yscTrr,-o-j T^ 0pw- 
 
 TfXfiOTjoo: srpoifvat' ra y-x,p 
 , *) 
 Aoj/ov, 
 
 XTI. Human Na- 
 ture may be well contented to advance from the more 
 imperfett and complex to the more Jimpie and perfect ; 
 for the complex Sitbjefls are more familiar to j, and 
 fatter known. Thus therefore it is that even a Child 
 knows how to put a Sentence together, and fay ^ Socrates 
 
 walke;h j
 
 BOOK THE FIRST, 11 
 
 tical Obfervers, the reft look no higher Ch. II. 
 than to the Practice and mere Work> 
 knowing nothing of thofe Principles, on 
 which the whole depends. 
 
 THUS in SPEECH for example All 
 men, even the loweft, can fpeak their 
 Mother-Tongue. Yet how many of this 
 multitude can neither write, nor even 
 read ? How many of thofe, who are thus 
 far literate, know nothing of that Gram- 
 mar, which refpeds the Genius of their 
 own Language ? How few then muft be 
 thofe, who know GRAMMAR UNIVER- 
 SAL; that Grammar -, which without re- 
 garding the feveral Idioms of particular 
 Languages, only refpefts thofe Principles^ 
 that are effential to them all? 
 
 'Tis our prefent Defign to inquire about 
 this Grammar; in doing which we Ihall 
 
 follow 
 
 Walketh ; but how to refolve this Sentence into a Naun 
 and Verb, and thefe again into Syllable^ and Syllables 
 into Letters or Elements^ here he is at a Isfs. Am. in 
 Com. de Pnedic. p. 28. 4
 
 12 HERMES. 
 
 Ch. II. follow the Order confonant to human Pcr- 
 ception, as being for that reafon the more 
 eafy to be under flood. 
 
 WE mall begin therefore firft from a 
 Period or Sentence, that combination in 
 Speech, which is obvious to all, and thence 
 pafs, ifpoffible, to thofe \\sprimary Parts, 
 which, however eflential, are only ob- 
 vious to a few. 
 
 WITH refpect therefore to the dif- 
 ferent Species of Sentences, who is there 
 fo ignorant, as, if we addrefs him in his 
 Mother-Tongue, not to know when 'tis 
 we offer t, and when we queftion-, when 'tis 
 we command, and when we fray or tvijh? 
 
 FOR example, when we read in Shake* 
 fpeare *, 
 
 *The Man, that hath no mujic in himfelf. 
 And is not movd with concord of fweet 
 founds, 
 
 Is ft for Treafons 
 
 Or 
 
 * Merchant
 
 BOOK THE FIRST* 13 
 
 Or in Milton *, ch - IL 
 
 O Friends, I hear the tread of nimble 
 
 feet* 
 
 Hafting this 'way 
 
 'tis obvious that thefe are affertrve Sen- 
 tences, one founded upon Judgment, the 
 other upon Senfation. 
 
 WHEN the Witch in Macbeth fays to 
 her Companions, 
 
 Whenjhall we three meet again 
 In thunder, lightning and in rain ? 
 
 this 'tis evident is an interrogative Sen- 
 tence. 
 
 WHEN Macbeth fays to the Ghoft of 
 Eanquo, 
 
 ' ' Hence, horrible Shadow, 
 Unreal Mock'ry hence ! 
 
 he fpeaks an imperative Sentence, founded 
 upon the paffion of hatred. 
 
 WHEN 
 * P. L. IV. 866.
 
 14 HERMES, 
 
 Ch. II. WHEN Milton fays in the character of 
 his Allegro, 
 
 Haft et bee, Nymph, and bring with thec 
 Jeji and youthful polity ', 
 
 he too fpeaks an imperative Sentence, tho* 
 founded on the paffion, not of hatred but 
 of love. 
 
 WHEN in the beginning of the Para* 
 dife Loft we read the following addrefs, 
 
 And chiefly thou, O Spirit, that doft prefer 
 Before all temples tti upright heart, and 
 
 pure, 
 Inftruft me, for thou know'ft-** 
 
 this is not to be called an imperative 
 Sentence, tho' perhaps it bear the fame 
 Form, but rather (if I may ufe the Word) 
 'tis a Sentence precative or optative* 
 
 WHAT then (hall we fay ? Are Sen-. 
 tences to be quoted in this manner without 
 ceafing, all differing from each other in 
 
 their
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. i 
 
 their ftamp and character ? Are they no Ch. II, 
 way reducible to certain definite ClafTes ? 
 If not, they can be no objects of rational 
 comprehenfion. Let us however try. 
 
 'Tis a phrafe often apply 'd to a man, 
 when fpeaking, that he fpeaks his MIND ) 
 as much as to fay, that his Speech or Dif- 
 courfe is a publifhing of fame Energie or 
 Motion of bis Soul. So it indeed is in every 
 one that fpeaks, excepting alone the Dif- 
 fembler or Hypocrite ; and he too, as fat 
 as poffible, affects the appearance. 
 
 Now the POWERS OF THE SOUL (over 
 and above the meer-f- nutritive) may be in- 
 cluded all of them in thofe of PERCEP- 
 TION, and thofe of VOLITION. By the 
 Powers of PERCEPTION, I mean the 
 Senfes and the Intelktt ; by the Powers of 
 VOLITION, I mean, in an extended fenfe, 
 not only the Will, but the feveral Pajfions 
 and Appetites ; in mort, all that moves to 
 Action, whether rational or irrational. 
 
 IP 
 
 f Vid. Ariftot, de An. If. 4,
 
 16 HERMES. 
 
 Ch. II. I F *hen t* 16 leading Powers of the Soul 
 be thefe two, 'tis plain that every Speech 
 or Sentence, as far as it exhibits the Soul, 
 muft of courfe refpec~l one or other of 
 thefe. 
 
 IF we affert 9 then is it a Sentence which 
 refpeds the Powers of PERCEPTION. For 
 what indeed is to ajfert, if we confider the 
 examples above alleged, but to publifh 
 fame Perception either of the Senfes or 
 thelntelhtt? 
 
 Ac EN, if we interrogate, if we com- 
 mand, if we pray, or if we 'wijh, (which 
 in teems of Art is to fpeak Sentences in- 
 terrogative, imperative, precative, or op' 
 tative) what do we but publifh fb many 
 different VOLITIONS ? For who is it that 
 questions ? He that has a De/ire to be in- 
 formed. Who is it that commands ? He 
 that has a Will, which he would have 
 obey'd. What are thofe Beings, who 
 either wife or pray? Thofe, who feel 
 
 certain
 
 BOOK THE FlR ST. Ij 
 
 certain wants either for themfelves, or Ch. II. 
 others. 
 
 IF then the Soul's leading Powers be the 
 two above mentioned, and it be true that 
 all Speech is a publication of thefe Powers, 
 it will follow that EVERY SENTENCE WILL 
 BE EITHER A SENTENCE OF ASSERTION, 
 OR A SENTENCE OF VOLITION. And 
 thus, by referring all of them to one of 
 thefe two clafTes, have we found an expe-* 
 dient to reduce their infinitude ^. 
 
 fcv OTI TY,; 
 
 IXZC-KI; Jliva/.tn?, ra? fji.lv ^uuoxa?, TO? JE 
 toe,; x) c'^xljjcjf? AfloaEUaj* (A)/C<) $1 
 
 toe, 
 
 6 
 
 vav 
 
 fSa TWW aiaSa!'; 1 ^ TII/ &vruv % TWW 
 
 a MEN Tt~1a.(:& tiSvi T A^a (ra waoa 
 
 iresoy cc7rorejro/.'-fj'/)j (rov G'jp.fioix't.s&tyo. 
 T6 1 tvp/rTy ftjj 9fflW?) x) y'rOs Ao^ov Trap 
 
 C i
 
 HERMES. 
 
 Ch. II. THE Extenfions of Speech are quite In- 
 definite, as may be feen if we compare*' 
 
 the 
 
 iv T DTSMATIKOT 
 EPflTHMATIKOT xaXx/xEvx AC'^K, r TO-p 
 
 , wWfp ITT! T KAHTIKOT, -mo? 
 aul? Grcotjrtvq* ttj rauTTjf, >i cJf -nrfltca xgjrrlov^*, wj 7ri 
 
 T*i? ETXHS, '/) WJ TffXOX P^|)OVOJ, WJ 7Tt T8 X'JplW? 
 
 xXv,ucvti; JIPOSTAHEni' .ao'vov A E r A II O- 
 
 Jjf yv l )ou.vr l q v rp-j pHtnuf ruv 
 
 ^ <paJDOjW.ZVWf, J'iO x) |!XOVO TJJTO 
 
 xo sov aA^Qft'a? J ;}/uJi<r, rwy Jg aAAuw a&'y. The 
 Meaning of the above paflage being implied in the 
 Text, we take its tranflation from the Latin Interpre- 
 ter. Dicendum igitur ejl^ cum anima nojlra dupllcem 
 potejlatem habeat^ cognitionis^ & vlta^ qua ttiam appe- 
 titionis ac cupiditatis appdlatiir ; qua vero cognitionis eft t 
 vis eft) qua res fingulas cogrujiiittus, lit mens, cogitati<7 9 
 cp'mioy pbantafia, fenfus : appetitus vero facultai ejt y qua 
 bona^ vcl qua funt^ vel qua videntur* concupifchmts, ut 
 funt voluntaS) con/ilium, ira, cupiditas : quatuor orathnis 
 1'pecieS) prater enunciantem, a partibus animi proficifcun- 
 tur, qua concupijcunt ; non cum animus ipje per fe agit, 
 fed cum ad alium fe convertit> qiii el ad confequendum iJ y 
 quod cupit, canducere pojje -vidcatur ; atque etiam vel ra- 
 tiontm ab to exquirit t ut in Qrat'wWy quam Percunftan- 
 
 tern,
 
 BOOK THE Fl R3T. 
 
 the Eneid to an Epigram of MartlaL But Ch. II, 
 the longeft Extenfion, with which Gram- 
 mar has to do, is the Extenfion here con- 
 iider'd, that is to fay a SENTENCE. The 
 greater Extenfions (fuch as Syllogifms, Pa- 
 ragraphs, Sections, and complete Works) 
 belong not to Grammar, but to Arts of 
 higher order; not to mention that all of 
 them are but Sentences repeated. 
 
 Now a SENTENCE (c) may be fketch'd 
 
 in the following defcription a compound 
 
 C 2 Quantity 
 
 tern, out Interrogantem vacant ; vet rem : fique rem, 
 vel cum ipfum confequi cupit, qincum loquitur^ ut in op- 
 tante oratione, vel aliquam ejus aklicntm : atque in hac t 
 lid ut a prafianthre, ut in Deprecatione ; vel ut ab in- 
 feriore, ut In <?<?, qui proprie Juflus nominatur. Sola 
 autem Enuncians a cogmfcendi facultate profidfcitur : 
 bezcque nunciat rerum cognit'wnem, quee in nobis eft, ant 
 veram, aut fimulatam. Itaque Haec fola verum falfutn- 
 que capit : praterea vero nulla. Ammon. in Libr. de 
 Interpretatione. 
 
 x9' aura o-jjuaij/fj T/. Arift. Poet, c. 2Q. See 
 alfo de Interpret, c. 4.
 
 20 HERMES. 
 
 Ch. II. Quantity of Sound Jignific ant, of which cer- 
 tain Parts are themfehes alfo fignificant . 
 
 THUS when I fay [the Sunjhineth] not 
 Only the whole quantity of Sound has a 
 meaning, but certain Parts alfo, fuch as. 
 [Sun] and [Jhineth.] 
 
 BUT what fhall we fay? Have thefe 
 Parts again other Parts, which are in like 
 manner iignificant, and fo may the pro- 
 grefs be purfued to infinite ? Can we fup- 
 pofe all meaning, like Body to be divi- 
 fible, and to include within itfelf other 
 Meanings without end ? If this be abfurd, 
 then muft we neceflarily admit, that there 
 Is fuch a thing as a Sound Jignificant, of 
 'which no Part is of itfelf fignific ant. And 
 this is what we call the proper character 
 of a (a 1 ) WORD-. For thus, though the 
 
 Words 
 
 De Poetic, c. 20. De Interpret, c. 2. 
 Prifclan's, Definition of a Word (Lib. 2.) is as 
 
 follows
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. i 
 
 Words [Sun] and \J1nneth\ have each a Ch. II. 
 Meaning, yet is there certainly no Mean- 
 ing in any of their Parts, neither in the 
 Syllables of the one, nor in the Letters of 
 the other, 
 
 IF therefore ALL SPEECH whether in 
 profe or verfe, every Whole, every Se&- 
 tion, every Paragraph, every Sentence, 
 imply a certain Meaning, droipblc into other 
 Meanings, but WORDS imply a Meaning, 
 which is not fo diyifible : it follows that 
 WORDS will be the fmalleji parts of fpeech, 
 in as much as nothing lefs has any Mean- 
 ing at all. 
 
 fc&lows-^-Difiio eft par 3 minima orationis conftruftee, id 
 fft, in ordine compojita. Pars autem, quantum ad totum 
 intelligendum, id eft, ad totius fenfus intellettum. Hoc 
 autem ideo dictum ejl, nequis conetur vires in duas paries 
 dividers, hoc eft, in vi iff res ; nan enim ad totum intelli~ 
 gendum hac fit divifto. To Prifcian we may add TIico* 
 dore Gaza. AS^JJ Jf, (*fg'& faAjyr* xar sdnofcn 
 Ao'j/a. IntroJ. Gram. 1. 4. Plato (hewed them this 
 chara&eriftic of a Word Sep Cratylus, p. 385. Edit.
 
 HERMES. 
 
 Ch. II. 70 know therefore the fpecies of Words 
 muft needs- contribute to the knowledge of 
 Speech) as it implies a knowledge of its 
 minuteft Parts. 
 
 THIS therefore muft become our next 
 Inquiry. 
 
 CHAP.
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 Concerning the fpecies of Words, tbefmal/eft 
 Parts of Speech. 
 
 LE T us firft fearch for the Species of Ch.IIL 
 Words among thofe Parts of Speech, 
 commonly received by Grammarians. For 
 example, in one of the paflages above 
 cited. 
 
 Man y that hath no mufic in himfelf, 
 And is not mov'd with concord of fiyeet 
 
 founds, 
 Is Jit for treafons- 
 
 Here the Word [The] is an ARTICLE ; 
 [Man] [No] [Mufic} [Concord] [Sweet] 
 [Sounds] [Fit] [Treafons] are all NOUNS^ 
 fome Subftantive, and fome Adjective* 
 [That] and [Himfelf] are PRONOUNS 
 [Hath] and [is] are VERBS [moved] a 
 PARTICIPLE [Not] an ADVERB [And] 
 a CONJUNCTION [In] [with] and [For] 
 4 are
 
 24 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.III. are PREPOSITIONS. In one fcntence we 
 have all thofe Parts of Speech, which the 
 Greek Grammarians are found to acknow- 
 ledge. The Latins only differ in having 
 no Article, and in feparating the INTER- 
 JECTION, as a Part of itfelf, which the 
 Greeks include among the Species pf Ad- 
 verbs. 
 
 WHAT then mall we determine ? why 
 are there not more Species of Words ? why 
 fo many ? or if neither more nor fewer, 
 why thefe and not others ? 
 
 To refolve, if poflible, thefe feveral 
 Queries, let us examine any Sentence that 
 comes in our way, and fee what differences 
 we can difcover in its Parts. For exam- 
 ple, the fame Sentence above, 
 
 Man that bath no mufic, &c. 
 
 ONE Difference foon occurs, that fome 
 Words are variable, and others invariable* 
 Thus the Word Man may be varied into 
 ^lans and Men ; Hath, into Have, Haft, 
 
 2 Had*
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 25 
 
 Had,kc. Sweet into Swceter^nd Sweeteft; Ch III. 
 Fit into Fitter and Fitteji. On the con- 
 trary the Words, The, In y And, and fome 
 others, remain as they are, and cannot be 
 altered. 
 
 AND yet it may be queflioned, how far 
 this Difference is elTential. For in the firfl 
 place, there are Variations, which can be 
 hardly called neceffary, becaufe only ibme 
 Languages have them, and others have 
 them not. Thus the Greeks have the dual 
 Variation, which is unknown both to the 
 Moderns and to the ancient Latins. Thus 
 the Greeks and Latins vary their Adjectives 
 by the triple Variation of Gender, Cafe, 
 and Number ; whereas the Englifi never 
 vary them in any of thofe ways, but thro* 
 all kinds of Concord preferve them flill 
 the fame. Nay even thofe very Variations, 
 which appear moft neceffary, may have 
 their places fupplied by other methods ; 
 fome by AuxiUars, as when for Bruti, or 
 firitio we fay of Brutus, to Brut us; fome 
 
 ly
 
 *6 H E R M E S. 
 
 Ch.III. by meer Pofition, as when for Erutum ama* 
 i}jf Coffins, we fay, Caffius lovd Brutus. 
 For here the Accufative, which in Latin 
 is known any where from its Variation, is 
 in Eng/?fi> only known from its Pojltlon or 
 place. 
 
 IF then the Diftin&ion of Variable and 
 Invariable will not anfwer our purpofe, let 
 us look farther for fome other more ef- 
 fential. 
 
 SUPPOSE then we fhould diflblve the 
 Sentence above cited, and view its feveral 
 Parts as they ftand feparate and detached. 
 Some *tis plain Jlill preferve a Meaning* 
 (fuch as Man, Mufic, Sweet, &c.) others 
 on the contrary immediately lofe it (fuch as, 
 And, The, With, &c.) Not that thefe lafl 
 have no meaning at all, but in fad: they 
 never have it, but when in company, or 
 officiated. 
 
 Now it mould feem that this Diftinc^ 
 if any, was eflential. For if all 
 
 Words
 
 BOOK T HE Fl RS T. 27 
 
 Words are fignificant, or elfe they wou'd Ch III. 
 not be Words ; and if every thing not ab- 
 Jblute t is of courfe relative ; then will all 
 Words be fignificant either abfolutely or 
 relatively,, 
 
 WITH refpect therefore to this Diftino 
 tion, the firft fort of Words may be call'd 
 fignificant by themfefoes ; the latter may be 
 call'd Jignificant by relation -, or if we like 
 it better, the firft fort may be call'd Prin- 
 cipals, the latter AcceJJories. The firft are 
 like thofe ftones in the balis of an Arch, 
 which are able to fupport themfelves, even 
 when the Arch is deftroyed > the latter are 
 like thofe ftones in its Summit or Curve, 
 which can no longer {land, than while the 
 whole fubiifts (e.) 
 
 Tim 
 
 (e) dpollonius of Alexandria (one of the acuteft Au- 
 thors that ever wrote on the fubje of Grammar) il- 
 luftrates the difFerent power of Words, by the differ- 
 f fit power of Letters. "Ert ov rpowop TUV 
 
 ,usv f i (wvrjfVTCSj x S*UT<% 
 
 \ 
 r
 
 28 HERMES. 
 
 Ch III. THIS Diftindion being admitted, we 
 thus purfue our Speculations. All things 
 
 what- 
 
 uirep avfu ruv uvr,iuv x t^t 
 ' TOV auTov r^oVoy *ov iVjvoTxrat xam 
 
 In the fame manner, as of the Elements or Letters fame 
 are fcwels, which of themfelves complete a Sound; ethers 
 are Confonants, which without the help of Jewels have no 
 e)fprefs Vocality^ fo likewife may we conceive as to the na- 
 ture of Words. Sojne of 'them , like Vowels , are of 'them - 
 felves exprefjive, as is the cafe of Verbs y Nouns, Pro- 
 nouns^ and Adverbs ; others, like Confonants, wait for 
 their Vowels, being unable to become exprejffive by their 
 fzyn proper Jlrength, as is the cafe of Prepofetions, Arti- 
 cles, and Ctnjunfiions ; for thofe parts of Speech are al~ 
 ways Confignificant, that is, are only f.guificant, when of- 
 ficiated to fomething fife. Apollon. de Syntax!. L. I. 
 c. 3. Itaque quibufdam philofophis placuit NOMEN ^ 
 VERBUM SOLAS ESSE PARTES ORATiONis ; catcra 
 vero, ADMINICULA vcl JUNCTURAS earum: quomodo 
 navium partes funt tabula & trabes, cat era autem (ideft 9 
 , Ji-uppa, & claui & f;jrjlia) vincula & cwglutina-
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 29 
 
 whatever either exift as the Energies, or Ch.III, 
 AffeSlions of fome other thing, or without 
 being the Energies or Affections of fome 
 other thing. If they exift as the Energies 
 or Affettions of fome thing elfe, then are 
 they called ATTRIBUTES. Thus to 
 think is the attribute of a Man ; to be 
 white, of a Swan ; to fly* of an Eagle ; 
 to be four-footed, of a Horfe. If they 
 exift not after this manner, then are they 
 call'd SUBSTANCES*. Thus Man, 
 Swan, Eagle and Horfe are none of 
 them Attributes, but all Subftances, be- 
 caufe however they may exift in Time 
 and Place, yet neither of thefe, nor of 
 any thing elfe do they exift as Energies 
 or Affections. 
 
 AND 
 
 tiones parttum navis, (hoc eft^ tabularum & trablum) non 
 partes navis dicuntur. Prifc. L. IX. 913. 
 
 SUBSTANCES] Thus Ariftotle. Nuv f*u Sv TVITU 
 
 \C/,f \\/l> 
 
 r t^w r\ itna, on TO fAy xa UTroxfi- 
 a xaS' rci a^Aa. Metaph. Z. y. p. 106. 
 Ed. Sylb. 
 
 *
 
 HERMES, 
 
 Ch III. AND thus all things whatfoever being 
 either (f) Subftances or Attributes, it fol- 
 lows of courfe that all Words, which are 
 fignificant as Principals, muft needs be 
 fignificant of either the one or the other. 
 If they are Jignificant of Subftances, they 
 are call'd Subftantives -, if of Attributes, 
 they are call'd Attributives. So that ALL 
 WORDS whatever, fignificant as Princi- 
 pals, are either SUBSTANTIVES or AT- 
 TRIBUTIVES. 
 
 AGAIN, as to Words, which are only 
 fignificant as Acceffbries, they acquire a 
 Signification either from being aflbciated 
 to one Word, or elfe to many. If to one 
 Word alone, then as they can do no more 
 than in fome manner define or determine, 
 they may juftly for that reafon be called 
 
 DE- 
 
 (/) This divifion of things into Sulfance and Acci- 
 dent feems to have been admitted by Philofophers of all 
 Se&s and Ages. See Categor. c, 2. AJetapbyf. L. VII, 
 c. i. DeCalo, L. III. c. I.
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 31 
 
 DEFINITIVES. If to many Words at Ch.IIL 
 once, then as they ferve to no other pur- 
 pofe than to connect, they are call'd for 
 that reafon by the name of CONNEC- 
 TIVES. 
 
 AND thus it is that all WORDS what- 
 ever are either Principals or Acceffories ; 
 or under other Names, either Jignificant 
 from tbemfehes, or fignificant by relation. 
 If Jignificant from themf elves, they are 
 either Subftantives or Attributives*, if 
 fignificant by relation, they are either 
 Definitives or Connectives. So that un- 
 der one of thefe four Species, SUB- 
 STANTIVES, ATTRIBUTIVES, DE- 
 FINITIVES and CONNECTIVES, are 
 ALL WORDS, however different, in a 
 manner included. 
 
 IF any of thefe Names feem new and 
 unufual, we may introduce others more 
 ufual, by calling the Subftantivts, NOUNS ; 
 
 the Attributives, VERBS'; the 'Definitives, 
 
 i ARTI-
 
 32 H E R M E S- 
 
 Ch.III. ARTICLES; and the CoTme&ivfs, CON- 
 JUNCTIONS. 
 
 SHOU'D it be a/k'd, what then be- 
 comes of Pronouns, Ad^erls, Prcpojitions, 
 and Interjections; the anfwer is, either 
 they muft be found included within the 
 Species above-mentioned, or elfe muft be 
 admitted for fo many Species by them- 
 felves. 
 
 TriERE were various opinions in an- 
 cient days, as to the number of thefe Parts, 
 or Elements of Speech. 
 
 Plato in his * Sophift mentions only 
 two, the Noun and the Verb, Arijlotle 
 mentions no more, where he treats of 
 f- Proportions. Not that thofe acute Phi- 
 lofophers were ignorant of the other Parts, 
 but they fpoke with reference to Logic or 
 
 Dia* 
 
 * Tom. I. p. 261. Edit* Ser, 
 f De Xntcrpr. c. 2 & 3.
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 33 
 
 Dialectic (g)> confidering the EfTence of Ch.IIL 
 Speech as contain'd in thefe two, becaufe 
 tbefe alone combin'd make a perfect offer* 
 five Sentence, which none of the reft with- 
 out them are able to effect. Hence there- 
 fore Artftotle in his * treatife of Poetry 
 (where he was to lay down the elements 
 
 of 
 
 Paries igitur orationis funt fecundum Dialefticos 
 y NOMEN & VERBUM ; quia h<e folte etiam per 
 fe conjuntta plenum faciunt orationem ; alias autem paries 
 evTxoflityofJifHKru, hoc eft, confignificantia appellabant. 
 Pn'fcian. 1. 2. p. 574. Edit. Putfchii. Exijiit hie qua- 
 darn qutsjiio, cur duo ionium, NOMEN &" VERBUM, 
 fe (dri/loteles fc.) determinare promittat, cum plures par- 
 ies orationis ejfe videantur. )uibus hoc dlcendum eft, tan* 
 turn Arijlotelem hoc libra diffiniffe, quantum illi ad id t 
 quod injlituerat traclare^ fuffedt. Traclat namque de 
 ftmplici enuntiativa oratione^ quee fcilicet bujufmodi eft, ut 
 junftis tantum Verbis ^f Nominibus componatur htare 
 juperfiuutn ejl quarere, cur alias quoque, quts videntur 
 orationis partes, non propofuerit y qui non totius Jimpliciter 
 orationis, fed tantum Jimplicis orationis injlituit elcmenta 
 partiri. Boetius in Libr. de Interpretat. p, 295. 
 Aptllonius from the above principles elegantly calls the' 
 NOUN and VERB, ru, l^^orona. jue^n ru Ao}/s<, the 
 mojl animated parts of Speech. De Syntaxi 1. r. c. 3, 
 p. 24. See alfo Plutarch, ghiaft. Platen, p, 1009. 
 * Poet. Cap. 20. 
 
 D
 
 34 HERMES. 
 
 Ch-III. of a more variegated fpeech) adds the Ar- 
 ticle and Conjunction to the Noun and 
 Verb, and fo adopts the fame Parts, with 
 thofe eftablifhed in this Treatife. To 
 Ariftotles authority (if indeed better can 
 be required) may be added that alfo of 
 the elder Stoics (h}. 
 
 THE latter Stoics inftead of four Parts 
 made five, by dividing the Noun into the 
 Appellative, and Proper. Others increas'd 
 the number, by detaching the Pronoun 
 from the Noun; the Participle and Ad- 
 verb from the Verb ; and the Prepojition 
 from the Conjunction. The Latin Gram- 
 marians went farther, and detach'd the In- 
 terjection from the Adverb, within which 
 by the Greeks it was always included, as a 
 Species. 
 
 WE 
 
 (/;) For this we have the authority of Dionyfius of Ha~ 
 iicarnaj/us, De Struft. Oral. Seft. 2. whom >uintilian 
 follows, liijl. /.I. c. 4. Diogenes Laertius and Prifdan 
 make them always to have admitted five Parts. See 
 Prijfian 9 as. before, and Laertius, Lib. VIL Segm. 57.
 
 Boo K T HE FIRST. 35 
 
 WE are told indeed by (/) Dionyfius of Ch.III. 
 HaJicarnaffus and Quintilian, that Ariftotlc> 
 with fbeodettes, and the more early wri- 
 ters, held but three Parts of fpeech, the 
 Noun y t\ie Verb, and the Conjunction. This, 
 it mail be own'd, accords with the oriental 
 Tongues, whofe Grammars (we are (k) 
 told) admit no other. But as to Arifio-tle, 
 we have his own authority to afiert the 
 contrary, who not only enumerates the 
 four Species which we have adopted, but 
 afcertains them each by a proper Defini- 
 
 nition *. 
 
 D 2 To 
 
 (z) See the plates quoted in the note immediately 
 preceding. 
 
 ( k] Antiquljjima eorum eft opinio, qu'i trcs claffis fa- 
 
 tiunt. ' Eftque htec Arabum qtwque fentemia Hebrai 
 
 quoque (qui, cum Arabes Grammaticam fcribere dcfmerent^ 
 
 art em earn demum fcribere coeperunt, quod ante annos conti- 
 
 git cirdter quadringentos) Hebrcei, inquam hac in fe fecuti 
 
 funt magiftros fuos Arabes. Immo vero tritim clafjlum nu- 
 
 merum alia etiam Orientis linguee retinent. Dubium, utrum 
 
 ea In re Orientates imitati funt antiques Greecorum^ an hi 
 
 potius fecuti funt Orientalium exemplum. Utut ejl, etiam 
 
 vetcres Grcecos tres tantum paries agnovijje, non folum au- 
 
 tor eft DionyfiuS) &c. VofI*. de Analog. 1. i. c. I. See 
 
 alfo Sanftii Miner. /. i . c . 2. 
 
 * Sup. p. 34. 

 
 36 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.III. To conclude the Subjeft of the fol- 
 lowing Chapters will be a diftincl: and fe- 
 parate coniideration of the NOUN, the 
 VERB, the ARTICLE, and the CONJUNC- 
 TION; which four, the better (as we ap- 
 prehend) to exprefs their refpedive na- 
 tures, we chufe to call SUBSTANTIVES, 
 ATTRIBUTIVES, DEFINITIVES and CON- 
 NECTIVES. 
 
 CHAP.
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 37 
 
 CHAP, IV. 
 
 Concerning Subftantives, properly fo called. 
 
 SUBSTANTIVES are all thofe principal Ch.lV 
 Words, which are Jignificant of Subv 
 Jiancesy conjidered as Subftancef. 
 
 THE firft fort of Subftances are the NA- 
 TURAL, fuch as Animal, Vegetable, Man, 
 Oak. 
 
 THERE are other Subftances of our own 
 making. Thus by giving a Figure not na- 
 tural to natural Materials we create fuch 
 Subftances, as tjoufe, Ship, Watch, Te- 
 Jefcope, &c, 
 
 AGAIN, by a more refirid operation of our 
 Mind alone t we abftraft any Attribute from 
 its neceflary fubjecl:, and confider it apart, 
 devoid of its dependence. For example, 
 from Body we abftracl: to Fly -, from Sur- 
 P 3 face,
 
 38 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.IV. face, the being White, from Soul, the be- 
 ing temperate. 
 
 AND thus 'tis we convert even Attri- 
 butes into Subjlances, denoting them on 
 this occafion by proper Subftantives, fuch as 
 Flight, Whitenefs, Temper ante ; or elfe by 
 others more general, fuch as Motion, Co- 
 lour, Virtue. Thefe we call ABSTRACT 
 SUBSTANCES ; the fecond fort we call 
 
 ARTIFICIAL. 
 
 Now all thofe feveral Subflances have 
 their Genus, their Species, and their In- 
 dividuals. For example in natural Sub- 
 fiances, Animal is a Genus ; Man, a Spe- 
 cies; Alexander, an Individual, ^arti- 
 ficial Subilances, Edifice is a Genus ; Pa- 
 lace, a Species ; the Vatican, an Individual. 
 Jn abftraSt Subflances, Motion is a Ge- 
 nus 5 Flightt a Species ; this Flight or that 
 Flight are Individuals. 
 
 As
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 3.9 
 
 As therefore every (a) GENUS may be Ch.TV. 
 found whole and intire in each one of Its 
 Species-, (for thus Man, Horfe, and Dog 
 are each of them diftinctly a complete and 
 intire Animal) and as every SPECIES may 
 be found whole and intire in each one of its 
 Individuals -, (for thus Socrates, Plato, and 
 Xenophon are each of them completely and 
 .diftindtly a Man) hence it is, that every 
 Genus, tho' ONE, is multiply'd into MANY; 
 and every Species, tho' ONE, is alfo mul- 
 tiply'd into MANY, by reference to thofe 
 beings, which are their proper fub or dinates. 
 Since then no Individual has any fuch Sub- 
 ordinates, it can never in ftrictnefs be con- 
 fidered as MANY, and fo is truly an IN- 
 DIVIBUAL as well in Nature as in Name. 
 
 D 4 FROM 
 
 (a) This is what Plato feems to have exprefs'd in 
 a manner fomewhat myfterious, when he talks of 
 
 U.\X) lOzZV OiOt, 'STOAAcOi', EVOf tX.%~# fit 
 
 VTTO 
 
 > 
 
 >opbjft. p. 2<?. Edit. Serrani. 
 
 3 ' ' I J 1 -J \J 
 
 For the common definition of Genus and Species, fee the 
 Jfagoge or Introduction of Porphyry to AriftrtlSs Logic,
 
 40 HERMES. 
 
 Ch-IV. FROM thefe Principles it is, \hziWords 
 following the nature and genius of Things, 
 fuch Subjlantives admit of NUMBER as de- 
 note Genera or Species, while thofe, which 
 denote (3) Individuals, in ftrictnefs admit 
 it not, 
 
 BESIDES 
 
 (b) Yet fometimes Individuals have plurality or Num- 
 ber, from the caufes following. In the firft place the 
 Individuals of the human race are fo large a multitude 
 even in the fmalleft nation, that 'twould be difficult to 
 invent a new Name for every new born Individual. 
 Hence then inftead of one only being call'd Marcus, and 
 one only Antontus^ it happens that many are called Mar- 
 cus and many call'd Antonius ; and thus 'tis the Romans 
 had their Plurals, Marci, and Anicnii, as we in later 
 days have our Marks and our Anthohies. Now the Plu- 
 rals of this fort may be well caUed accidental, becaufe 
 'tis meerly by chance that the Names coincide. 
 
 There feems more reafon for fuch Plurals, as the 
 Ptslcmies, Scipios, Catos, or (to inftance in modern 
 names) the Howards^ Pelhams, and Montagues-, bc- 
 caufe a Race or Family is like a f mailer fort of Species ; 
 fo that the family Name extends to the Kindred, as the 
 fpecific Name extends to the Individuals, 
 
 A third caufc which contributed to make proper 
 Names become plural, was the high Character or Emi- 
 nence of (ome one Individual, whofe Name became af- 
 terwards a kind of common Appellative ', to denote all 
 2 thofe,
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 
 
 BESIDES Number, another charter- ChJV. 
 iftic, vilible in Subftances, is that of SEX. 
 Every Subftance is either Male or F e male 5 
 or both Male and Female ; or neither ene 
 nor the other, So that with refped: to Sexes 
 and their Negation, all Subftances conceive- 
 able are comprehended under thisfourfola* 
 eonflderation. 
 
 Now the exiftence of Hermaphrodites 
 being rare, if not doubtful ; hence Lan- 
 guage* only regarding thofe diftin&ions 
 
 which 
 
 thofe, who had pretenfions to merit in the fame way. 
 Thus every great Critic was call'd an Arijlarcbus j every 
 great Warrior, an Alexander ; every great Beauty, a He- 
 len, &c. 
 
 A Daniel come to 'Judgment ! yea a Daniel, 
 cries Shylock in the Play, when he would exprefs the 
 wifdom of the young Lawyer. 
 
 $o Martial in that well known verfe, 
 
 Sint Mfgcenatef, non deerunt, Flacce, Marones. 
 So Lucilius, 
 
 monies, JEthnts twines, afperi Atbones. 
 
 ovTig, Aitfxa^i'woif . Lucian in Timon. 
 P- ic8.
 
 42 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.IV. which are more obvious, confiders Words 
 denoting Subftances to be either MASCU- 
 LINE, FEMININE, or NEUTER *. 
 
 As to our own Species and all thofe 
 animal Species, which have reference to 
 commsn Life, or of which the Male and 
 the Female, by their fize, form, colour, 
 &c . are eminently diftinguijhed, mod Lan- 
 guages have different Subftantives, to de- 
 note the Male and the Female. But as to 
 thofe animal Species, which either lefs fre- 
 quently occur, or of which one Sex is lefs 
 apparently diftinguljked from the other, in 
 thefe a fmgle Subftantive commonly ferves 
 for both Sexes, 
 
 IN 
 
 * After this manner they are diftingulfhed by Arijlo- 
 $e. Tcov ovo[Att,Twv rot. fj.iv apptvot, TK cl ^r>Xsx^ rot Je 
 |weTau. Poet. cap. 21. Protagoras before him had 
 eftablifhed the fame Diftin&ion, calling them upptvx, 
 S- -A:*, ^ ffxe'ju. Ariftot. Rhet. L. III. c. 5. Where 
 mark what were afterwards called sVmoa, or Neijters, 
 were by thefe called rot
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 43 
 
 4- IN the Englijh Tongue it feems a ge- Ch.IV. 
 neral rule (except only when infringed by 
 a figure of Speech) that no Subftantive is 
 Mafculine, but what denotes a Male ani- 
 mal Subftance ; none Feminine, but what 
 denotes a Female animal Subftance ; and 
 that where the Subftance has no Sex, the 
 Subftantive is always Neuter. 
 
 BUT 'tis not fo in Greek, Latin, and 
 many of the modern Tongues. Thefe all 
 of them have Words, fome mafculine, 
 fome feminine (and thofe too in great 
 multitudes) which have reference to Sub- 
 ftances, where Sex never had exiftence. 
 To give one inftance for many. MIND 
 is furely neither male, nor female ; yet is 
 NOTE, in Greek, mafculine, and MENS, 
 in Latin, feminine. 
 
 IN 
 
 f Nam quicquid per Naturam Sexui non adfignatur, 
 neutrum haberi oporteret, fed id drs &c. Confent. apud 
 Putfch. p. 2023, 2024. 
 
 The whole Railage from Genera Hominum, quee na- 
 juralia funt &c, is worth perilling.
 
 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.IV. IN fome Words thefe diftinftions feem 
 owing to nothing elfe, than to the meer 
 cafual ftrudure of the Word itfelf : 'Tis 
 of fuch a Gender, from having fuch a 
 Termination j or from belonging perhaps 
 to fuch a Declenfion. In others we may 
 imagine a more fubtle kind of reafoning, a 
 reafoning which difcerns even in things 
 'without Sex a diftant analogy to that great 
 NATURAL DISTINCTION,?^/^ (accord- 
 ing to Milton) animates the 
 
 IN this view we may conceive fuch 
 STANTIVES to have been conlidered, as 
 MASCULINE, which were " confpicuous 
 " for the Attributes of imparting or com- 
 " municating; or which were by nature 
 " active, ilrong, and efficacious, and that 
 " indifcriminately whether to good or to 
 " ill ; or which had claim to Eminence, 
 " either laudable or otherwife." 
 
 THE 
 
 J Mr. Linnant) the celebrated Botanift, has traced 
 the Dijlinftion of Sexes throughout the whole Vegetable 
 and made it the Bafis of his Botanic Method*
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 45 
 
 i 
 
 THE FEMININE on the contrary were Ch.IV. 
 fuch, as were confpicuous for the At- ^ J >~~" 
 " tributes either of receiving, of contain- 
 " ing, or of producing and bringing forth ; 
 " or which had more of the paffive in 
 " their nature, than of the active; or 
 " which were peculiarly beautiful and 
 " amiable ; or which had refpecl: to fuch 
 " Exceffes, as were rather Feminine, than 
 " Mafculine." 
 
 UPON thefe Principles the two greater 
 Luminaries were confidered, one as Maf- 
 culine, the other as Feminine; the SUN 
 ("H?u-, So!) as Mafcu/me, from commu- 
 nicating Light, which was native and ori- 
 ginal, as well as from the vigorous warmth 
 and efficacy of his Rays 3 the MOON (g- 
 Aifvij, Luna) as Feminine, from being the 
 Receptacle only of another's Light, and 
 from (hining with Rays more delicate and 
 foft. 
 
 THUS
 
 46 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.IV. THUS Milton, 
 
 Firjl in H i s Eaft the glorious Lamp wasfeem 
 Regent of Day, and all t/j Horizon round 
 Invefted with bright rays ~, jocund to run 
 His longitude thro Heav'ns high road: 
 
 the gray 
 
 Dawn, and the Pleiades before HIM danc'd, 
 Shedding fweet influence. Lefs bright the 
 
 Moon 
 
 But oppofite, in level? d Weft was fet, 
 His mirrour 3 with full face borrowing HER 
 
 Light 
 
 From H i M - y for other light SHE needed none* 
 
 P.L. VII. 370. 
 
 BY Virgil they were corifidered as Bro- 
 ther and Sifter, which ftill preferves the 
 fame diflindion. 
 
 Afo FR ATRIS 
 
 G.I. 396. 
 
 THE SKY or ETHER is in Greek and 
 Latin Mafculine, as being the fource of 
 thofe fhowers, which impregnate the Earth. 
 
 The
 
 BOOK THE FlRST. 47 
 
 * The EARTH on the contrary is univer- Ch.IV. 
 fally Feminine, from being the grand Re- 
 ceiver, the grand Container, but above all 
 from being the Mot her (either mediately or 
 immediately) of every fublunary Subftance, 
 whether animal or vegetable. 
 
 THUS Virgil, 
 Turn PATER OMNIPOTENS fcecundis im- 
 
 bribus ./ETHER 
 CONJUGIS in gremium LJETJE defcendit, 
 
 G? omnes 
 Magnus alit magno commixtus corporefcetus* 
 
 G.JI. 325. 
 
 THUS Shakefpear, 
 J COMMON MOTHER, Thou 
 Whofe Womb unmeafurable, and infinite 
 
 Breafl 
 Teems and feeds all Tim. of Athens. 
 
 S o Milton, 
 
 Whatever Earth, ALL-BEARING MOTHER, 
 yields. P. L. V. 
 
 So 
 
 * SenecsNat. ^uajl. III. 14. 
 
 Tee, Grec. Anth. p. 281,
 
 48 HERMES, 
 
 Ch.IV. So rtrgil, 
 
 Non jam MATER a/if TELL us, litre fqut 
 minijlrat (c). jfEn. XI. 71. 
 
 AMONG artificial Subftances the SHIP 
 (Nauf, Navt's) \sfeminine, as being fo 
 eminently a Receiver and Container of va- 
 rious things, of Men, Arms, Provifions, 
 Good>, &c. Hence Sailors, fpeaking of 
 their VciTel, fay always, " SHE rides at 
 " anchor ^ " SHE is under fail" 
 
 A CITY (rioA/?, Chit as] and a COUN- 
 TRY (UftrMf, P atria} are feminine alfo, 
 by being (like the Ship) Containers and 
 Receivers, and farther by being as it were 
 the Mothers and NurJ'es of their refpe&ive 
 Inhabitants. 
 
 THUS 
 
 (c} &o % tv TU oAw rrv THS (ptW, ccc 0H AT 
 ^ MKIE'PA fe/Ai'^TW 'OTPA> T O X N <? j^"HAIOV t 
 xj ri TWV aA^cov ruy TCJJJTCCV, cJ? rENfl""NTAZ xj 
 ITA'TEPAS zBveofl-ayoff-Vi. Arift. de Gener. Anlm, 
 
 1. I. C. 2.
 
 BOOK THE FlRST. 49 
 
 THUS Virgil, Ch.IV. 
 
 Salve, MAGNA PARENS FRUGUM, Satur* 
 
 nia Tellus, 
 MAGNA VIRUM - Geor. II. 173. 
 
 So, in that Heroic Epigram on thofe 
 brave Greeks, who fell at Charonea, 
 
 iitx. Ss IIxTpig e%et xoXTroig ruv 'sr\f'<^a. xa- 
 
 Their PARENT COUNTRY in HER bofom 
 
 holds 
 Their wearied bodies.- * 
 
 So Milton, 
 
 The City, which Thou fe eft, no other deem 
 Than great and glorious Rome, QtfEEN of 
 the Earth. Par. Reg. L. IV. 
 
 As to the OCEAN, tho' from its being 
 the Receiver of all Rivers, as well as the 
 
 Container 
 
 . * Demofth. in Orat. de Corona. 
 
 E
 
 50 H E R M E S. 
 
 Ch IV. Container and Produftrefs of fo many Ye-" 
 getables and Animals, it might juftly have 
 been made (like the Earth) Feminine -, yet 
 its deep Voice and boifterous Nature have, in 
 fpight of thefe reafons, prevailed to make 
 it Male. Indeed the very Sound of Homer's 
 
 p-eyx. cQev* * Sly.ttx.vciO , 
 
 would fuggeft to a hearer, even ignorant 
 of its meaning, that the Subject was in- 
 compatible with female delicacy and foft- 
 nefs. 
 
 TIME (XpoiX-) from his mighty Efficacy 
 upon every thing around us, is by the Greeks 
 and Englifo juftly confidered as Mafculine. 
 Thus in that elegant diftich, fpoken by a 
 decrepit old Man, 
 
 ' 'O 'yap Xpov@o ft eKapfye, TSKJUV <ro$oz, 
 
 Me TIME hath bent, that for ry Artift, HE 
 T^hat furely makes, iv bat e'er he handles, 
 tvorfe. 
 
 So 
 
 * II X^ovf, ra>%w* ^wjjuv vatvrariffiurrt 
 Graec. Anth. p. 290. 
 t Stob. Eel. p. 591.
 
 BOOK THE FIRST* 
 
 So too Shakefpear, fpeaking likewife of Ch IV. 
 TIME, 
 
 Orl. Whom doth HE gallop withal? 
 Rof. With a thief to the gallows.* 
 
 As you like it. 
 
 THE Greek Qdvonfe* or"Aidy$, and the 
 Englifh DEATH, feem from the fame ir- 
 refiftible Power to have been conlidered as 
 Mafculine. Even the Vulgar with us are 
 fo accurtomed to this notion, that a FE- 
 MALE DEATH they would treat as ridi- 
 culous 
 
 . TAKE a few Examples of the mafctt- 
 line Death. 
 
 E 2 Galli- 
 
 (d] Well therefore did Milton in hrs Paradife Loft 
 not only adopt DEATH as a Perfon^ but coniider hini 
 as Mafculine : in which he was fo far from introducing 
 a Phantom of his own, or from giving it a Gender not 
 fupported by Cujlom ; that perhaps he had as much the 
 Sanfiion cf national Opinion for his Mafculine Deaths, as 
 the ancient Poets had for many of their Deities.
 
 II E.R M E S. 
 
 Ch IV. Callimachus upon the Elegies of his 
 .Friend Her adit us 
 
 - yet thy fiveet warbling Jlrains 
 Still live immortal, nor on tbemfoall DEATH 
 Hi s hand ere /ay, tho Ravager of all. 
 
 IN the Akejlis of Euripides, a:aro 
 or DEATH is one of the Perfons of the 
 drama ; the beginning of the play is made 
 up of dialogue between Him and Apollo > 
 and towards its end, there is a fight be- 
 tween Him and Hercules, in which Her- 
 cules is conqueror, and refcues Alcejlis 
 from his hands. 
 
 'Tis well known too, that SLEEP and 
 DEATH are made Brothers by Homer. 
 'Twas to this old Gorgias elegantly allud- 
 ed, when at the extremity of a long life 
 he lay flumbering on his Death-bed. A 
 Fjiend afked him, " How he did?" - 
 
 " SLEEP
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 53 
 
 " SLEEP (replied the old Man) isjuft upon C3i.IV. 
 " deliver ing me over to the care of his 
 BROTHER (e)." 
 
 THUS Sbakefpear, fpeaking of Life, 
 
 merely 'Thou art Death's Fool-, 
 
 For HIM fbou labour ft by thy flight to 
 
 Jhun, 
 And yet run ft towrds HIM ft ill. 
 
 Meaf. for Meaf. 
 
 So Milton, 
 
 Dire was the tojfing, deep the groans ; 
 
 Defpair 
 
 Blended t he Jick, bujieftfrom couch to couch: 
 And over them triumphant DEATH HIS 
 
 dart 
 
 Shook -, but delay d to ftrike 
 
 P. L. XI. 489 (/). 
 
 THE 
 
 
 [i] "Hc$V jus O "TO NO- 
 
 T'AA E A $ If I. Stob. Eel. p. 600. 
 (f) Suppofe in any one of thefe examples we intro- 
 duce a female Death \ fuppofe we read, 
 
 E 3 And
 
 54 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.IV. THE fupreme Being (GoD, GeoV, Deits t 
 J)ieu, &c.) is i-n all languages Mafculme,, 
 in as much as the mafculine Sex is the fu- 
 perior and more excellent ; and as He is 
 the Creator of all, the Father of Gods and 
 Men. Sometimes indeed we meet with 
 fuch words as To npurov, To @eTov, Nu- 
 men, DEITY (which laft we Eng/t/hjoin to 
 a neuter, faying Deity itfelf) fometimes I 
 fay we meet with thefe Neuters. The 
 reafon in thefe inftances feems to be, that 
 as GOD is prior to all things, both in dig- 
 nity and in time, this Priority is better 
 characterized and expreft by a Negation^ 
 than by any of thofe Diftinctions which 
 are co-ordinate ivitbfome Oppo/ite, as Male 
 
 for 
 
 And over them triumphant Death HER dart 
 
 What a falling off? How are the nerves and ftrength 
 of the whole Sentiment weakened ?
 
 BOOK T HE Fi R s T. 55 
 
 for example is co-ordinate with Female, Ch.IV. 
 Right with Left, &c. &c. (g), 
 
 VIRTUE ('A/jg-nJ, Virtus] as well as moll 
 of its Species are all Feminine, perhaps 
 from their Beauty and amiable Appearance, 
 which are not without efFed even upon 
 the moft reprobate and corrupt. 
 
 E 4 abaftid 
 
 (g) Thus AmmoniuS) fpeaking on the fame Subject 
 
 ro' nrrfTON A^USV, ty* 3 ^ A v Six 
 
 /txv0oAo}/a ErowaJo'yTtov ^an/ rocg 
 
 TW 
 
 U* TO (L J gC TO)) (? II A N T H I 
 
 'A n A fl~ 2 'A I T 1' n I vlm-Xjw ajfv. aAAa >^ 
 T O v N E O^ N o 
 
 TO ffSUVOTtpOV TUV JtlVUV TH l 
 
 aurow TS-poira^opsuo^Ey. PRIMUM dic'inuis, quod nemo 
 etiam eorum, qui theologiam noils fabularum integumentis 
 obvolntam tradiderunt^ vel mar is velfaemime fpefie finvsre 
 aufuseft: idque merito : conjugatym eniip mznfasmini- 
 num eft. CAUS^: autem omnino ABSOLUTE AC SIM- 
 PLICI riihil ejl conjugaium. Imms vero cum DEUM 
 mafcullno genere appellamus^ ita ipfum nominamus,, genus 
 pr&Jlantius fub?nijjo afque humi/i prcsferenics. Ammon. 
 in Lib. de Intcrpr. p. 30 b. a -yap IVXI/TIQV TW 
 tty. Ariftot. Metaph, A. p. 210. Sylb. ,
 
 56 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.IV. d,aJKd the Devi! flood, 
 
 Andfelty how awful Goodnefs is, and Jaw 
 VIRTUE in her fiape how lovely, Jaw., 
 
 and pin d 
 His lofs - - 
 
 P. L. IV. 846. 
 
 THIS being allowed, VICE (Kax/a) be- 
 comes Feminine of courfe, as being, in 
 the (ru<j-o/%/a or Co-ordination of things, 
 Virtue's natural Oppofite (b). 
 
 THE Fancies, Caprices, and fickle 
 Changes of FORTUNE would appear but 
 awkardly under a Character, that was 
 Male : but taken together they make a 
 
 very 
 
 (/>) They are both reprefented as Females by Xeno- 
 phon, in the celebrated Story of Hercules, taken from 
 'Prodicus. See Mcmorab. L. II. C. I. As to the 
 
 frOf"**X** here motioned, thus Varro. Pythagoras 
 
 S ami us ait omnium rerum initia ejje Una : ut finitum fff 
 infmitum, bonum & malum, vitam iff mortem, diem & 
 nottem. De Ling. Lat. L. IV. See alfo drift. Me- 
 taph L.I. 0.5. and Ecclefiafticus, Chap. Ixii. ^.24.
 
 B O O K T H E F I R S T. 57 
 
 very natural Female, which has no fmall Ch.IV, 
 refemblance to the Coquette of a modern 
 Comedy, beflowing, withdrawing, and 
 /hifting her favours, as different Beaus 
 fucceed to her good graces. 
 
 c Tranfmutat incertos bonores, 
 
 Nunc mihi, nunc alii benigna. Hor. 
 
 WHY the FURIES were made Female, 
 is not fo eafy to explain, unlefs it be that 
 female Paffions of all kinds were confi- 
 dered as fufceptible of greater excefs, than 
 male Paffions ; and that the Furies were 
 to be reprefented, as Things fuperlatively 
 outrageous. 
 
 Talibus Alecjo dittis exarfit in iras. 
 
 At Juveni oranti fubitus tremor occupat 
 
 artus : 
 piriguere oculi : tot Erinnys fibilat Ply- 
 
 dris, 
 
 f ant aque fe fades aperit $ turn flammed 
 tor-quern 
 
 2 Lumina
 
 5 3 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.IV. Lumina cunftantem Gf qucerentem dicere 
 
 plura 
 Reppullf, G? geminos erexlt crinibus an~ 
 
 gues, 
 Verberaque infonuit, rabidoque hcec ad* 
 
 didlt ore : 
 En! Ego vitta fitu, &c. 
 
 JEn. VII. 445 (/). 
 HE, 
 
 (;) The Words above mentioned, Time, Death, 
 Fortune, Virtue, &c, in Greek, Latin, French, and 
 moft modern Languages, though they are diverfified 
 with Genders in the manner defcribed, yet never vary 
 the Gender, which they have once acquired, except in 
 a few inftancej, where the Gender is doubtful. We 
 cannot fay oi^l-ri or o a'7u\ hose Virtus or hie Vir- 
 tus, la Vertu or le Vertu, and fo of the reft. But 'tis 
 otherwife in Englijh. We in our own language fay, 
 Virtue is its own Reward, or Virtue is her own Re- 
 ward ; Time maintains its wonted Pace, or Time 
 maintains bis wonted Pace. 
 
 There is a fingular advantage in this liberty, as it 
 enables us to mark, with a peculiar force, the Diftjnc- 
 ton between the fevere or Logical Stile, and the orna- 
 mental or Rhetorical. For thus when we fpea)c of the 
 above Words, and of all others naturally devoid of Sex, 
 2 as
 
 BOOK THE FlRST. 59 
 
 HE, that would fee more on this Sub- Ch.IV. 
 je6t, may confult Ammonlus the Peripate- 
 
 tic 
 
 as Neuters, we fpeak of them as they are, and as be- 
 comes a logical Inquiry. When we give them Sex, by 
 making them Mafculine or Feminine, they are from 
 thenceforth perfonified ; are a kind of intelligent Beings, 
 and become, as fuch, the proper ornaments either of 
 Rhetoric or of Poetry. 
 
 Thus Milton, 
 
 Tlie Thunder 
 
 Wingd with red lightening and impetuous rage, 
 Perhaps hatbffent Hisjhafts P. Loft. I. 174. 
 
 The Poet, having juft before called the Hall, and 
 Thunder, God's Minijlers of Vengeance, and fo perfoni- 
 fied them, had he afterwards faid its Shafts for his 
 Shafts, would have deftroyed his own Image, and ap- 
 proached withal fo much nearer to Profe. 
 
 The following Paflage is from the fame Poem. 
 
 Should intermitted Vengeance arm again 
 
 His red right hand P. L. II. 173. 
 
 - In this Place His Hand is clearly preferable either to 
 Her's or It's, by immediately referring us to God him- 
 felf the Avenger,
 
 60 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.IV. tic in his Commentary on the Treatife de 
 Interpretatione, where the Subject is treat- 
 ed at large with refped: to the Greek 
 Tongue. We mall only obferve, that as 
 all fuch Speculations are at bed but Con- 
 jectures, tfiey mould therefore be received 
 
 with 
 
 I (ball only give one inftance more, and quit this 
 Subject. 
 
 At bis command /// up-rooted Hills retired 
 Each to HIS place: they heard his voice and went 
 Obfequiotis : Heav'n His wonted face renew '</, 
 And with frejh founts Hill and galley JmH'd. 
 
 P. L. VI. 
 See alfo y. 54, 55, of the fame Book. 
 
 Here all things are perfonified ; the Hills hear^ the 
 Valleys fmile, and the Face of Heaven is renewed. 
 Suppofe then the Poet had been neceflitated by the laws 
 of his Language to have faid Each Hill retired to ITS 
 Place Heaven renewed its wonted Face how profaic 
 and lifelefs would thefe Neuters have appeared j how 
 detrimental to the Profopopeia, which he was aiming to 
 eftablilh ? In this therefore he was happy, that the 
 Language, in which he wrote, impofed no fuch necef- 
 f;ty ; and he was too wife a Writer, to impofe it on 
 himfelf. 'Twere to be wifhsd, his Ccrre&ors had been 
 us wife on their parts.
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 6t 
 
 with candour, rather than fcrutinized Ch.IV. 
 with rigour. F'arro's words on a Subject 
 near akin are for their aptnefs and elegance 
 well worth attending. Non mediocres enim 
 tenebrce in Jilva-y ubi hcec captanda -, nequf 
 eo t quo pervenire volumus, femitce tritte ; 
 neque non in tramitibus qutedam objefta, 
 qiuz euntem retinere pofl'unt *. 
 
 To conclude this Chapter. We may 
 collect, from what has been faid, that 
 both NUMBER and GENDER appertain to 
 WORDS, becaufe in the firft place they 
 appertain to THINGS ; that is to fay, be- 
 caufe Subftances are Many, and have either 
 Sex, or no Sex ; therefore Su&ftarttives have 
 Number, and are Mafculine, Feminine, or 
 Neuter. There is however this diffe- 
 rence between the two Attributes : NUM- 
 BER in flricT:nefs dcfcends no lower, than 
 
 to 
 
 * De Linjj. Lat. L. IV.
 
 62 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.IV. to the loft Rank of Species (&): GENDE* 
 on the contrary flops not here, but de- 
 fcends to every Individual, however diver- 
 fified. And fo much for SUBSTANTIVES, 
 
 PROPERLY SO CALLED. 
 
 (^) The reafon, why Number goes no lower, is, 
 that it does not naturally appertain to Individuals j the 
 caufe of which fee before, p. 39. 
 
 CHAP,
 
 Bo K T HE Fl RS T. 63 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 Concerning Subftantives of the Secondary 
 Order. 
 
 WE are now to proceed to a SECON- Ch. V. 
 DARY RACE of SUBSTANTIVES, 
 a Race quite different from any already 
 mentioned, and whofe Nature may be ex- 
 plained in the following manner. 
 
 EVERY Object, which prefents itfelf to 
 the Senfes or the Intellect, is either then 
 perceived for the Jirft time, or elfe is re- 
 cognized, as having been perceived be- 
 fore. In the former cafe 'tis called an 
 Object -rvjq w^tiTitf yvuKTtus, of the Jirft 
 knowledge or acquaintance (a) ; in the lat- 
 ter 
 
 (a} See Apoll. de Syntaxi, 1. i. c. 1 6. p 49. 1. 2 
 c. 3. p. 103. Thus Prifcian Intereft autem inter de- 
 monjhationem tff rdatlonem hoc-, quod demorftratio, in- 
 ferrogathni reddita, Primam Cognkicnecn cftendlt ; 
 
 Qms
 
 64 HERMES. 
 
 Ch. V. ter 'tis called an Object TTJ$ 
 
 cf the fecond knowledge or acquaint 
 
 ance. 
 
 Now as all Converfation pafTes between 
 Particulars or Individuals, thefe will often 
 happen to be reciprocally Objects rijf -srgu- 
 r^q yvu<rito$ t tbat is to fay, //// that injlant 
 unacquainted with each other. What then 
 is to be done ? How mall the Speaker ad- 
 <irefs the other, when he knows not his 
 Name ? or how explain himfelf by his own 
 Name, of which the other is wholly igno- 
 rant ? Nouns, as they have been defcribed, 
 cannot anfwer the purpofe. The firfr, ex- 
 pedient upon this occafion feems to have 
 been AerJ/f, that is, Pointing, or Indica- 
 tion by the Finger or Hand, fome traces of 
 which are ilill to be obferved, as a part of 
 that Action, which naturally attends our 
 fpeaking. But the Authors of Language 
 
 were 
 
 Quls fecit r Ego : relatio vero Secundam Cognitio- 
 ntm ffrmfaat, ut, Is, de quo jam dixi. Lib. XII. 
 p 936. Edit. Putfibii.
 
 BOOK THE FlRST. 
 
 Were not content with this. They in- Ch. V* 
 vented a Race of Words to fvpfly this 
 Pointing; which Words, as -they always 
 flood for Subftantives or Nouns, were cha- 
 racterized by the Name of 'Avruvvpiat, or 
 PRONOUNS (). Thefe alfo they diftin- 
 guifhed into three feveral forts, calling 
 them Pronouns of the Firft, the Second, 
 and the hird Pe rfon, with a view to cer- 
 tain diflinctions, which may be explained 
 as follows. 
 
 SUPPOSE the Parties converting to be 
 wholly unacquainted, neither Name nor 
 Countenance on either fide known, and 
 
 the 
 
 () 'EXE^O y 'Avrwwp'a, TO jtAE-ra A E' I s E H 2 
 ^ avoe^o^ac 'AN TO NOMAZO'M ENON. Apoll. 
 de Synt. L. II. c. 5. p. 106. Prifcian feems to con- 
 fider them fo peculiarly deftined to the exprefllon of In- 
 dividuals, that he does not fay they fupply the place of 
 any Noun, but that of the proper Name only. And 
 this undoubtedly was their original, and ftill is their 
 true and natural ufe. PRONOMEN eft pars oratiwis, 
 tfutr pro nomine proprio uniufcujufque accipiiur. Prifc. 
 L, XII. See alfo Apoll. L. II. 0.9. p. 117, 118. 
 
 " F
 
 66 HERMES. 
 
 Ch. V. the Subjedl of the Converfation to be tkt 
 Speaker himfelf. Here, to fupply the place 
 of Pointing by a Word of equal Power, 
 they furnifhed the Speaker with the Pro- 
 noun, I. I write, I fay, I dejire, Sec. and 
 as the Speaker is always principal with re- 
 fpe<fl to his own difcourfe, this they called 
 for that reafon the Pronoun of the Firft 
 Perfon. 
 
 AGAIN, fuppofe the Subject of the Con- 
 verfation to be the Party addreft. Here 
 for fimilar reafons they invented the Pro- 
 noun, THOU. *Thou writ eft, Thou walkeft, 
 &c. and as the Party addreft is next in 
 dignity to the Speaker, or at leaft comes 
 next with reference to the difcourfe ; this. 
 Pronoun they therefore called the Pronoun 
 of the Second Perfon. 
 
 LASTLY, fuppofe the Subject of Con- 
 verfation neither the Speaker, nor the 
 Party addreft, buty^ third Qbjeft, dif- 
 ferent from both. Here they provided an- 
 other Pronoun, HE, SHE, or IT, which 
 
 in
 
 BOOK TrfE FtRT. 67 
 
 in diftindtion to the two former was called Ch. V, 
 the Pronoun of the 'Third Perfon, 
 
 AND thus it was that Pronouns came to 
 be diflinguifhed by their refpective PER- 
 SONS fi 
 
 As 
 
 (c) The Defcription of the different PERSONS here 
 given is taken from Prifcian y who took it from Apollo- 
 nius. Perfena Prsnominum funt tres y prima, fecunda* 
 tertia. Prima eft, cum ipfa, qua loquitur ', de fe pronun- 
 tiat ; Secunda, cum de ea pronuntiat, ad quam direcio 
 fermone loquitur ; Tertia, cum de ea t quae nee loqui- 
 tur, nee ad fe diredtum accipit Sermonem. L. XII. 
 p. 940. Theodore Gaza gives the fame diftin&ions. 
 HCUTOV (uT^oo-coTrov fc.) u -srfpi laula (ppoifyi 
 
 Jif'ulf^OV, S TS-tf] T, TT^Sf $V Ao^f^" Tf JTCV, U 
 
 Gaz. Gram. L. IV. p. 152. 
 
 This account of Perfom is far preferable to the com- 
 mon one, which makes the Firft the Speaker j the Se- 
 cond, the Party addrejl ; and the Third, the Subjeff. 
 For tho' the Firft and Second be as commonly defcri- 
 bed, one the Speaker, the other the Party addreA ; yet 
 till they become fubjecls of the difcourfe, they have no 
 cxiftence. Again as to the Third Perfon's being the 
 fvbjefi, this is a character, which it /hares in common. 
 F 2 with
 
 * HERMES* 
 
 Ch. V. As to NUMBER, the Pronoun of each 
 Perfbn has it : (I) has the plural (WE), 
 
 becaufc 
 
 with both the other Perfons, and which can never there- 
 fore be called a peculiarity of its own. To explain by 
 an inftance or two. When Eneas begins the narrative 
 cf his adventures, the fecond Perfon immediately appears, 
 becaufe he makes Dido, whom he addrefles, the imme- 
 diate fubjed of his Difcourfe. 
 
 Infandum* Regina, jubes, renovare ddorem* 
 
 From hence forward for 1500 Verfes (tho' fhe be all 
 that time the party addreft) we hear nothing farther of 
 this Second Perfon, a variety of other Subjects filling up 
 the Narrative. 
 
 In the mean time the Fir/I Perfon may be feen every 
 where, becaufe the Speaker every where is himfelf the 
 Subject. They were indeed Events, as he fays him$ 
 felf, 
 
 qu&que ipfe miferrima ijidi 9 
 Et quorum pars magnafui 
 
 Not that the Second Perfon, does not often occur in the 
 courfe of this Narrative ; but then it is always by a Fi- 
 gure of Speech, when thofe, who by their abfence arc 
 M frft fo many Third Perfons, are converted into Sc- 
 I cond
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 
 
 becaufe there may be many Speakers at 
 once of the fame Sentiment ; as well as 
 one, who, including himfelf, fpeaks the 
 Sentiment of many. (THOU) has the 
 plural (YOU), becaufe a Speech may 
 be fpoken to many, as well as to one. 
 (HE) has the plural (THEY) becaufe 
 the Subject of difcourfe is often many at 
 once. 
 
 BUT tho' all thefe Pronouns have Num- 
 ber, it does not appear either in Greek, or 
 Latin, or any modern Language, that 
 
 thofe of the firft and fecond Perfon carry 
 
 f 
 
 the diftindions of SEX. The reafon feems 
 F 3 to 
 
 fond Perfons by being introduced as prefent. The real 
 Second Perfon (Dido) is never once hinted. 
 
 Thus far as to Virgil. But when we read Eudid y 
 we find neither Flrjl Perfon, nor Second in any part of 
 the whole Work. The reafon is, that neither Speaker 
 nor Party addreft (in which light we may always view 
 the Writer and his Reader) can pofiibly become the 
 Subject of pure Mathematics, nor indeed can any thing 
 clfe, except abftraft Quantity, which neither fpeaks 
 nor is fpoken to by another.
 
 70 HERMES. 
 
 Ch. V. to be, that the Speaker and Hearer being 
 generally prefent to each other, it would 
 have been fuperfluous to have mark'd a 
 difUn&ion by Art, which from Nature and 
 even Drefs was commonly (d] apparent on 
 both fides. But this does not hold with 
 refpecl: to the third Perfon, of whofe Cha- 
 racter and Distinctions, (including Sex 
 among the reft) we often know no more, 
 than what we learn from the difcourfe. 
 And hence it is that in moft Languages the 
 third Perfon has its Genders, and that even 
 JLngliJh (which allows its Adjectives no 
 Genders at all) has in this Pronoun the 
 triple (e) diftinction of He y Sbe> and It. 
 
 HENCE 
 
 {d} DemorJIratio ipfa fecam genus oflixdit. Prifcian. 
 L. XII. p. 942. See A$oll. de Syntax. L. II. c. 7. 
 p. 109. 
 
 (e) The Utility of this Diftintion may be better 
 found in fuppofifig it away. Suppofe for example we 
 jbotj!d read in hiftory thefe words He caufed him
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 71 
 
 HENCE too we fee the reafon why a Ch. V. 
 fingle Pronoun (f) to each Perfon, an I 
 F 4 to 
 
 t o dejlroy him and that we were to be informed the 
 [He], which is here thrice repeated, flood each -time 
 for fomething different, that is to fay., for a Man, for 
 a Woman, and for a City, whofe Names were Alex- 
 ander y Thais^ and PerfepoKs. Taking the 'Pronoun in 
 this manner, divefted of its Genders, how would it ap- 
 pear, which was deftroyed j which was the deftroyer ; 
 and which the caufe, that moved to the deftrution ? 
 But there are no fuch doubts, when we hear the Gen- 
 ders diftinguifhed ; when inftead ,of the ambiguous 
 Sentence, He caufed him to deftroy him, we are told 
 with the proper distinctions, that SHE caufed HIM to 
 dejlroy IT. Then we know with certainty, what 
 before we could not ; that the Promoter was the 
 Woman ; that her Inftrument was the Hero ; and 
 that the Subject of their Cruelty was the unfortunate 
 City. 
 
 (f) Quaritur tamen cur prtma quidem Perfona &? 
 fecunda fingula Pronomina habeant^ tertiam vero fex di- 
 verfae indicent voces? Ad quod reffondcndum ejl, quod. 
 prima quidem f? fecunda Perfona ideo non egent diver/is 
 vocibusy quod femper praefentes inter fe funt, & demm- 
 Jhratvuec ; tertia vero Perfona modo demonjirativa ejl, ut 9 
 Hie, Ifte; modo relativa, ut Is, Ipfe, &c. Prifcian, 
 L. XII. P . 933.
 
 7.2 HERMES. 
 
 Ch. V. to the Firft, and a Thou to the Second, arc 
 abundantly fumcient to all the purpofes of 
 Speech. But 'tis not fo with refpect to the 
 tfhird Perfon. The various relations of 
 the various Objects exhibited by this (I 
 mean relations of near and diftant, pre- 
 fent and abfent, fame and different, de- 
 finite and indefinite, &c.) made it necef- 
 &ry that here there mould not be one, 
 b.ut many Pronouns, fuch as U,e> Tfo's, 
 that*. Other, A)?y, Some, &c, 
 
 IT mufl be confeit indeed, that all 
 thefe Words do not always appear as Pro* 
 nouns* When they fland by themfelves, 
 and reprefent fome Noun, (as when we 
 fay, THIS is Virtue, or &$&$, Give 
 me THAT) then are they Pronouns. But 
 when they are alfociated to fome Noun 
 (as when we fay, THIS Habit is Virtue; 
 or Setx/iKus, THAT Man defrauded me) 
 then as they fupply not the place of a 
 Noun, but only ferve to afcertain one, 
 they fall rather into the Species of De- 
 fnitives or Articles, 'f hat there is in- 
 deed
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 73 
 
 deed a near relation between Pronouns Ch. V. 
 and Article^ the old Grammarians have 
 all acknowledged, and fome words it has 
 been doubtful to which Clafs to refer. 
 The beft rule to diftinguifli them is this 
 The genuine PRONOUN always Jlands 
 by itfelf, afTuming the Power of a Noun, 
 
 and fupplying its place The genuine 
 
 ARTICLE never Jlands by itfelf, but 
 appears at all times aflbciated to fome- 
 thing elfe, requiring a Noun for its fup- 
 porr, as much as Attributives, or (g) Ad- 
 jectives. 
 
 (g) To "ApQgov pilot Qvop.otl& 9 x? r? * 
 uT ovo[A*l>. TH ARTICLE Jlands WITH a 
 Noun ; but THE PR o,N o u N Jinnds F OR a Nairn., 
 L. I. C. 3. p. 22. 'Aola 5v ra ^9^, rxiV 
 
 Jtrnnu^ua (MniwiirTn* ^Vijw. Articles 
 $emfefoe$, when they quit thtir Cor.neftlm with Ny 
 pafs into fuch Pronoun^ as is proper upon the occafion. 
 Ibid. Again -"Orai* TO "A^^pov /ur, /*sr' ovo'^ar^
 
 HERMES. 
 
 Ch. V. As to the Coalefcence of thefe Pro- 
 nopns, it is, as follows. The Firft or 
 
 Second 
 
 ), fit sraar/f a.vd'yw; u; av1wuuu/av 
 f'fyi ix. tyfuo y.tvo-j (UET* ovo/ACtT^ 
 
 $> -srxgthriQQy. When the Article is ajjumed 
 without the Noun, and has (as we explained before) the 
 fame Syntax, which the Noun has ; it mujl of absolute ne- 
 cejfity be admitted for a Pronoun, becaufe it appears -with- 
 out a Noun, and yet is in power ajjumed for one. Ejufd. 
 L. II. c. 8. p. 113. L.I. 0.45. p. 96. Inter Pro- 
 jiomina iff Articuks hoc inter ejl, quod Prononjina ea pu 
 lantur, qua, cum fola fmt, vicem nominis complent, ut 
 C^uis, ILLE, ISTE: Articuli vero cum Pronominibus t 
 siut Nominibus, out Participiis adjunguntur. Donat, 
 Gram. p. 1753. 
 
 Prifcian, fpeaking of the Stoics, fays as follows : 
 ARTICULIS out em PRONOMINA connumerantes 9 FI- 
 VITOS ea ARTICULOS apfeUabanti iffos out em Ar- 
 ticuks, quibus nos car emus, iNFiNiros ARTICULOS 
 dicebant, Vel, ut alii d'uvnt, Articuks connumerabant 
 Pronominibus, & ART ICUL ARIA eos PRONOMINA 
 Oocabant, &c. Prifc. L. I. p. 574.. Varro, fpeaking 
 of Quifque and Hie, calls them both ARTICLES, 
 the firft indefinite, the ftcond definite. De Ling. Lot. 
 L'VIL See alfo L. IX. p. 132. T'ofcius indeed in 
 his Analogy (L. L c. I.) oppofts this Doctrine, be- 
 Hic has not the fame power with the Greek Ar- 
 
 tic!e f
 
 BOOK THE FlRST. 75 
 
 Second will, either of them, by them- Ch. V. 
 felves coalefce with the Third, but not 
 with each other. For example, 'tis good 
 fenfe, as well as good Grammar, to fay 
 in any Language I AM HE THOU 
 ART HE but we cannot fay I AM 
 THOU nor THOU ART I. The reafon 
 is, there is no abfurdity for the Speaker to 
 be the Subjeff alfo of the Difcourfe, as 
 when we fay, I am He ; or for the Perfon 
 addreft ; as when we fay, 'Thou art He. 
 But for the fame Perfon, in the fame cir-r 
 cumftances, to be at once the Speaker, 
 and the Party addreft, this is impoflible ; 
 and fo therefore is the Coalefcence of the 
 Firft and Second Perfon. 
 
 AND now perhaps we have feen enough 
 of Pronouns, to perceive how they differ 
 
 from 
 
 tide, o. But he did not enough attend to the antient 
 Writers on this Subject, who confidered all Words, as 
 ARTICLES, which being officiated to Nouns (and not 
 Jianding in their place) ferued in any manner to 
 4/ind determine their Signification.
 
 76 HERMES. 
 
 Ch. V. from other Substantives. The others are 
 
 i 
 
 Primary t thefe are their Subftitutes ; a 
 kind of fecondary Race, which were taken 
 in aid, when for reafons already () men- 
 tioned the others could not be ufed. 'Tis 
 moreover by means of thefe, and of Ar- 
 ticles, which are nearly allied to them, 
 
 that 
 
 (h) See thefe reafons at the beginning of this chap- 
 ter, of which reafons the principal one is, that " no 
 " Noun, properly fo called, implies its own Prefence. 
 " 'Tis therefore to afcertain fuch Prefence, that the Pro- 
 noun is taken in aid ; and hence 'tis it becomes 
 < equivalent to Jel^fi-, that is, to Pointing or Indication 
 c by the Finger." 'Tis worth remarking in that Verfe 
 of Perfius, 
 
 Sedptilchrtim eft DIGITO MONSTRAi^i, &? atf 9 
 HlC EST, 
 
 how the <JeI^if, and the Pronoun are introduced toge- 
 ther, and made to co-operate to the fame end. 
 
 Sometimes by virtue of <3flif the Pronoun of tfct 
 iibird Perfon ftands for the/;/?. 
 
 Quodfi militibus parcfs y frit Hie quoque Miles, 
 Th Jt is, / alft will be a Soldier. 
 
 Tibul. I,. II. 51.6. v.;.
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 
 
 that " LANGUAGE, tho'initfelf only fig- Ch. V, 
 
 nificant of general Ideas, is brought down 
 
 * to denote that infinitude of Particulars, 
 
 ' which are for ever arifing, and ceaiing 
 
 " to be." But more of this hereafter ia 
 
 a proper place. 
 
 As to the three orders of Pronouns al- 
 ready mentioned, they may be called Pre- 
 fofitive, as may indeed all Subftantives, 
 becaufe they are capable of introducing 
 cr leading a Sentence, without having 
 reference to any thing previous. But be- 
 fides thofe there is ANOTHER PRONOUN 
 
 (in 
 
 It may be r obferved too, that even in Jtpiilolary 
 Correfpondence, and indeed in all kinds of Writing, 
 where the Pronouns I and You make their appear- 
 ance, there is a fort of implied Prefence, which they 
 are fuppofed to indicate, though the Parties are in fat 
 at ever fo great a diftance. And hence the rife of 
 that diftin&ion in Apollonius-, ra? [*& TIJ? caj^w? < 
 $IEJ?, TXS S\ TV v, that fame Indications are ocu- 
 lar, and fame are mental. De Syntaxi, L. II. c. 3. 
 p. K4*
 
 HERMES. 
 
 Ch. V. (in Greek og, 05-1? (/') ; in Latin, Qui i frt 
 Engli/h, Who, Which, T/jaf) a Pronoun, 
 having a character peculiar to itfelf, the 
 nature of which may be explained as fol- 
 lows. 
 
 SUPPOSE I was to fay LIGHT is a 
 Body, LIGHT moves with great celerity. 
 
 Thefe 
 
 (/) The Greeks, it muft be confeft, call this Pro- 
 noun uV$Tax7ixo\ a'fOcoy, the fuljunftive Article. Yet, 
 as it fliould feem, this is but an improper Appella- 
 tion. Apollonius, when he compares it to the -GTOG- 
 <7-ox7*xo x v or true prepofithe Article, not only confefles 
 it to differ, as being expreft by a different Word, 
 and having a different place in every Sentence ; but 
 in Syntax he adds, 'tis wlxlly different. De Syntax. 
 L. I. c. 43. p. 91. Theodore Gaza acknowledges 
 
 the fame, and therefore adds ofifv Sri ^ a xupJwj 
 
 v ?>) aoQpov TK-jli" fer thefe reafom this (meaning 
 the Subjunfthf) cannot properly be an Article. And 
 juft before he (ays, KVffetf ^f ( uw uflpov TO wporax7i- 
 
 xo y however properly fpeaking 'tis the Prepojitive it 
 
 the Article. Gram. Introd. L. IV. The Latins there- 
 fore have undoubtedly done better in ranging it with 
 the Pronouns.
 
 BOOK THE FlRST. 70 
 
 Thefe would apparently be two diilinft Ch. V. 
 Sentences. Suppofe, inftead of the Se- 
 cond, LIGHT, I were to place the prepo^ 
 fitive Pronoun, IT, and fay LIGHT is a 
 Body, IT moves with great celerity the 
 Sentences would ftill be diftinct and two. 
 But if I add a Connective (as for Example 
 an AND) faying LIGHT is a Body, AND 
 it' moves 'with great celerity I then by 
 Connection make the two into one, as 
 by cementing many Stones I make one 
 Wall. 
 
 Now 'tis m the united Powers of a Con- 
 ne&ive, and another Pronoun -, that we may 
 fee the force, and character of the Pro- 
 noun here treated. Thus therefore, if 
 in the place of AND IT, we fubflitute 
 THAT, or WHICH, faying LIGHT is a 
 Body, WHICH moves with great celerity 
 the Sentence ftill retains its Unity and 
 Perfection, and becomes if poflible more 
 compact than before. We may with juft 
 reafon therefore call this Pronoun the 
 SUBJUNCTIVE, becaufe it cannot (like 
 
 the
 
 So HERMES, 
 
 Ch. V. the Prepoiitivc) introduce an original Sen* 
 tence, but only femes tofubjoin one tofom* 
 Other, which is previous (), 
 
 THE 
 
 () Hence we fee why the Pronoun here mentioned 
 is always necejjarily the Part of fome compbx Sentence, 
 which Sentence contains, either expreft or underftood, 
 two Verbs, and two Nominatives. 
 
 Thus in that Verfe of Horace^ 
 
 Qui metuens vivit> liber mibi non erit unquam. 
 
 Hie non frit liber is one Sentence ; qui metuens vivit-* 
 is another. Hie and Qui are the two Nominatives i 
 Erit and Vvuit* tht two Verbs j and fo in all other in- 
 ftances. 
 
 The following paflage from dpoUonius ( though 
 fomewhat corrupt in more places than one) will ferve 
 to fhew, whence the above Speculations are taken. 
 To U7TOTax7xow eipQpQV ITT] fr.tj.ot "$nn (pf6froit t (Ttujf- 
 
 A* TJJf olvxtyopClS TW STfOKllfJ-iVUI OVCjtAaTi* Xp 
 
 y oi-jrXvv hcyov srapij-a'vn xala trv -ruv ^uo fr,- 
 jj.druv G"jtfoL$w (AfJ/w TI? Iv ru evo^uxrt, ^ tr* w 
 TW afl9fl) oTrtf TS-^AJV urapf/TTfTC TW KAI 
 Kovs\> pi* (lege TO KAI J'fitp xoivcv j^r.-)
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. Si 
 
 THE Application of this SUBJUNCTIVE, Ch. V. 
 like the other Pronouns, is univerfal. It 
 
 may 
 
 TO OVOU.X TO 
 
 j 'tTtpov pypy, zirapjAa/ASayf, >c, aro> TO, II A- 
 PEFENETO O T P AiM M AT I KO S, OS 
 AIEAEHATO, faa/cui TO X W norti aTi-mAsI* T 
 (forf.rw) O FPAMMATIKOS nAPETENE- 
 TO, KAIAIEAEEATO. 77* fubjunffive Article 
 (that is, the Pronoun here mentioned) is applied to a Verb 
 of its own^ and yet is connected withal to the antecedent 
 Noun. Hence it can never ferue to conjlitute a fimpie 
 Sentence, by reafsn of the Syntax of the two Verbs^ I mean 
 that which refpefls the Noun or Antecedent^ and that 
 which refpefts the Article or Relative. The fame too fol- 
 lows as to the Conjunction, AND. This Copulative af- 
 fumes the Antecedent Noun, which is capable of being ap- 
 plied to many Subjefls, and by connecting to it a new Sen- 
 tence^ of neceffity ajjumes a new Verb alfo. And hence 'tis 
 that the Words - the Grammarian came, WHO dif- 
 courfed -form in power nearly the fame fentence^ as if 
 we were to fay - the Grammarian came, AND dif- 
 courfed. Apdl. de Syntaxi, L. I. c. 43. p. 92. See 
 alfo an ingenious French Treatife, called Grammaire 
 generate & raifonnee^ Chap. IX. 
 
 The Latins^ in their Structure of this Subjunctive, 
 
 feem to have well reprefented its compound Nature of 
 
 part Pronoun ) and part Connective y in forming their 
 
 G QUI
 
 S2 HERMES. 
 
 Ch. V. may be the Subftitute of all kinds of Sub- 
 ilantives, natural, artificial, orabilrai; as 
 well as general, fpecial, or particular. We 
 may fay, the Animal, Which, &c. the Man, 
 Whom, &c. the Ship, Which, &c. Alex- 
 ander, Who, &c. Bucephalus, That, &c. 
 Virtue, Which, &c. &c. 
 
 NAY, it may even be the Subftitute of 
 all the other Pronouns, and is of courfe 
 therefore expreflive of all three Perfons. 
 Thus we fay, I, WHO now read, have near 
 finijhed this Chapter; THOU, WHO now 
 rcadeft ; HE, WHO now readcth, &c. &c. 
 
 AND thus is THIS SUBJUNCTIVE truly 
 a Pronoun from its Subjlitution, there be- 
 ing 
 
 & QUIS from QJ/E and is, or (if we go with Sca~ 
 llger to the Greek] from KA1 and 'OS, KA1 and 
 -*O. Seal, de Cauf. Ling. Lot. c, 127. 
 
 HOMER alfo exprefies the Force of this Subjxnftivt 
 Pronoun or Article, by help of the Prepofitive and a 
 Connefiive, exadlly confonant to the Theory here efta 
 blifhed. See Iliad. A. ^. 270, 553. N. 571. II. 
 54> I57> '58.
 
 BOOK T HE FIRST. $3 
 
 ing no Subftantive exifting, in whofe place Ch. V, 
 it may not ftand. At the fame time, it is 
 ejentially dtflinguijhed from the other Pro- 
 nouns, by this peculiar, that 'tis not only 
 a Subjtitute, but withal a Conneffive (/). 
 
 AND 
 
 (/) Before we quit this Subject, it may not be im- 
 proper to remark, that in the Greek and Latin Tongues 
 the two principal Pronouns, that is to fay, the Firft 
 and Second Perfon, the Ego and the Tu are implied in. 
 the very Form of the Verb itfelf (J^a^w, J'pa'cpfif, 
 fcribo, fcribis) and are for that reafoa never exprejly 
 unlefs it be to mark a Contradiftinclidn ; fuch as in 
 Virgil* 
 
 Nos patriam fugimus > Tu, Tityre, kntus in umbra 
 Formofam refonare daces &c. 
 
 This however is true with refpeft only to the Cafus 
 refius) or Nominative of thefe Pronouns, but not with 
 refpecl to their oblique Cafes, which muft always be 
 added, becaufe tho' we fee the EGO in Amo^ and the 
 Tu in Amasy we fee not the TE or ME in Amaty or 
 Amant. 
 
 Yet even thefe oblique Cafes appear in a different 
 manner, according as they mark Contradifiinclion, 
 or not. If they contradiitinguifh, then are they com- 
 monly placed at the beginning of the Sentence, or at 
 l.caft before the Verb, or leading Subftantive. 
 
 G Thus
 
 84 HERMES. 
 
 Ch. V. AND now to conclude what we have 
 faid concerning Subftantives. All SUB- 
 
 STANTIVES 
 
 Thus Virgil* 
 
 - >uid Thefea^ magnum 
 Quid memorem bidden? Et Mi genus ab Jovefummo. 
 
 Thus Homer, 
 
 C T M I" N jt*i Ssoi tow - 
 
 $\ M O T Ado-are (/Xw - IA. A. 
 
 where the 'Yp~v and the Mol ftand, as contradiftin- 
 guifhed, and both have precedence of their refpective 
 Verbs, the 'T^ni even leading the whole Sentence. 
 In other inftances, thefe Pronouns commonly take their 
 place behind the Verb, as may be feen in examples 
 every where obvious. The Greek Language went far- 
 ther (till. When the oblique Cafes of thefe Pronouns 
 happened to contradiftinguifti, they aflumed a peculiar 
 Accent of their own, which gave them the name of 
 ooOoTO'jtfusWj, or Pronouns uprightly accented. When 
 they marked no fuch oppofition, they not only took 
 their place behind the Verb, but even gave it their Ac- 
 cent ^ and (as it were) inclined themfelves upon it. And 
 hence they acquired the name of E^xAi-nxa-, that is, 
 Leaning or Inclining Pronouns. The Greeks too had in 
 the firft perfon 'E ( ua, 'Ewo/, 'E ; ui for Contradijlincliijes* 
 and Ma, Mo', ME for Enclitics. And hence 'twas that 
 dpollonius contended, that in the paflage above quoted 
 from the firft Iliad, we fhould read walfo J' 'EMOT, 
 
 for
 
 Bo OK THE FlR ST. 85 
 
 STANTIVES are either Primary, or Se- Ch. V. 
 condary, that is to fay, according to a Lan- 
 guage more familiar and known, are ei- 
 ther NOUNS or PRONOUNS. The NOUNS 
 denote Subftances, and thofe either Na- 
 tural, Artificial, or Abjlraft *. They 
 moreover denote Things either General, or 
 Special, or Particular. The PRONOUNS, 
 their Substitutes, are either Prepofitfae, 
 or Subjunctive. THE PREPOSITIVE is 
 diftinguifhed into three Orders called the 
 Firft, the Second, and the Third Perfon. 
 THE SUBJUNCTIVE includes the powers 
 G 3 of 
 
 for -aouSit $\ MOf, on account of the Contradiftino 
 tion, which there occurs between the Grecians and 
 Chryfes. See Jpoll. de Syntaxi L. I. c. 3. />. 20. 
 L. II. C. 2. p. 102, 103. 
 
 This Diverfity between the Contradiftinctive Pro- 
 nouns, and the Enclitic, is not unknown even to the 
 Englijh Tongue. When .we fay, Give me Content, 
 the [Me] in this cafe is a perfect Enclitic. But when 
 we fay, Give Me Content, Give Him his tboufands^ the 
 (Me") and (Him] are no Enclitics, but as they (land in 
 oppofition, aflume an Accent of their own, and fo be- 
 come the true o 
 
 * See before p. 37, 38,
 
 86 HERMES. 
 
 Ch. V. of all thofe three, having fuper added, as 
 * ' of its own, the peculiar force of a Con- 
 
 HAVING done with SUBSTANTIVES, 
 we now proceed to ATTRIBUTIVES,
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 87 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 Concerning Attributives. 
 
 ATTRIBUTIVES are all thofe princi- Ch.VI. 
 pal Words, that denote Attributes, 
 conjidered as Attributes. Such for exam- 
 ple are the Words, Black, White, Great, 
 Little, Wife, Eloquent, Writeth, Wrote, 
 Writing, &c (a}. 
 
 How- 
 
 (0) In the above lift of Words are included what 
 Grammarians called Adjectives, Verbs, and Participles^ 
 in as much as all of them equally denote the Attributes 
 of Subjlance. Hence 'tis, that as they are all from 
 their very nature the Predicates in a Propofition (being 
 all predicated of fome Subject or Subftance, Snow is 
 white, Cicerp writeth, fcc.) hence I fay the Appella- 
 tion PBJMAor VERB is employed by Logicians in an 
 extended Senfe to denote them all. Thus AmniQnius ex- 
 plaining the reafon, why Arijlotle in his Tra6l de /- 
 terpretatione calls Atvxo's a Verb, tells us Trzctxu a-jw, 
 opov iv 7rcoTa<rf srojaor^, *PH~MA 
 that every Sound articulate, that forms the 
 G 4
 
 88 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.VI. HOWEVER, previoufly to thefe, and to 
 every other poffible Attribute, whatever a 
 thing may be, whether black or white, 
 fquare or round, wife or eloquent, wri- 
 ting or thinking, it muft^r/? of neceffity 
 EXIST, before it can poffibly be any thing 
 elfe. For EXISTENCE may be confidered 
 as an univerfal Genus, to which all things 
 of all kinds are at all times to be referr'd. 
 The Verbs therefore, which denote it, 
 claim precedence of all others, as being 
 elTential to the very being of every Pro- 
 pofition, in which they may frill be found, 
 either expreft, or by implication ; expreft, 
 as when we fay, Ihe Sim is bright-, by 
 
 im- 
 
 Predicate In a Propofetion^ is called a VERB. p. 24. 
 Edit. Ven. Prifcian's obfervation, though made on 
 another occafion, is very pertinent to the prefent. Nan 
 Declination fed proprietas excutienda eft fegmficationis. 
 
 L. II. p. 576. And in another place he fays ncn 
 
 Jtmilitudo dedinationis omnimado conjungit vel difcernit partes 
 orationis inter ff } fed vis ipfius Jignijicetion:s, L. XIII. 
 p. 970,
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 89 
 
 implication, as when we fay, The Sun Ch-VI. 
 rifes, which means, when refolved, 
 Sun is rijing (b). 
 
 THE Verbs, Is, Growetb, Becometb t 
 Eft, Fit, virapxti, *, TireXstf yfyvsrcci, are 
 all of them ufed to exprefs this general 
 Genus. The Latins have called them 
 Verba fubftantiva, Verbs fubftantrue, but 
 the Greeks 'PypaToi vTragxIiKK, Verbs of 
 Exiftence, a Name more apt, as being 
 of greater latitude, and comprehending 
 equally as well Attribute, as Subftance. 
 The principal of thofe Verbs, and which 
 we (hall here particularly coniider, is the 
 Verb, 'Erf, Eft, Is. 
 
 Now all EXISTENCE is either abfo- 
 lute or qualified abfolute, as when we 
 fay, B is ; qualified, as when we fay, B 
 is AN ANIMAL; B is BI.ACK, is ROUND, 
 
 WITH 
 
 (*) See Metaphyf. Art/lot. L.V. c. 7. Edit. Du-Vall
 
 9Q HERMES. 
 
 Ch.VI. WITH refpeft to this difference, the 
 Verb (is) can by itfelf exprefs abfolute 
 Exiftence, but never the qualified, with- 
 out fubjoining the particular Form, be- 
 caufe the Forms of Exiftence being in 
 number infinite, if the particular Form 
 be not cxpreft, we cannot know which is 
 intended. And hence it follows, that 
 when (is) only ferves to fubjoin fome 
 fuch Form, it has little more force, than 
 that of a mere Ajjertion. 'Tis under the 
 fame character, that it becomes a latent 
 part in every other Verb, by exprefling 
 that Aflertion, which is one of their EG- 
 fentials. Thus, as was obferved juft be-* 
 fore, Rifetb means, is rijing; Writetb, 
 
 is writing. 
 
 AGAIN As to EXISTENCE in gene~ 
 ral, it is either mutable, or immutable', mu- 
 table, as in the Objects of Senfation -, im~> 
 mutable, as in the Objetts of Intellettion 
 and Science. Now mutable Objects exifl 
 ail in Time, and admit the feveral Di-? 
 
 ftinctions
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 91 
 
 flin&ions of prefent, pad, and future. Ch.VI, 
 But immutable ObjeSls know no fuch Di- 
 Jiin&ions, but rather {land oppofed to all 
 things temporary. 
 
 AND hence two different Significations 
 of the fubftantive Verb (is) according 
 as it denotes mutable, or immutable Be- 
 ing. 
 
 FOR example, if we fay, This Orange 
 is ripe, (is) meaneth, that it exifteth fo 
 now at this prefent, in oppofition to pafl 
 time, when it was green, and to future 
 time, when it will be rotten. 
 
 BUT if we fay, The Diameter of the 
 Square is incommen fur able with its Jide, 
 we do not intend by (is) that it is incom- 
 menfurable" now, having been formerly 
 commenfurable, or being to become fo 
 hereafter -, on the contrary we intend that 
 Perfection of Exiftence, to which Time 
 and its Diftinttions are utterly unknown. 
 Tis under the fame meaning we employ 
 
 this
 
 92 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.VI. this Verb, when we fay, TRUTH is, 
 or, GOD is. The oppofition is not of 
 I'ime prefent to other Times, but of neccf- 
 fary Exijience to all temporary Exiftence 
 whatever (<:). And fo much for Verbs of 
 'Exijience, commonly called Verbs fubjlan- 
 tive. 
 
 WE are now to defcend to the com- 
 mon Herd of Attributives, fuch as black 
 and white, to write, to fpeak, to walk, 
 &c. among which when compared and 
 oppofed to each other, one of the moft 
 eminent difUn&ions appears to be this. 
 Some, by being joined to a proper Sub- 
 
 ftantive, 
 
 (c) Cum enim dicimus, DEUS EST, non eum dicimus 
 
 NUNC ESSE, fed tantum IN SUBSTANTIA ESSE, ut 
 
 hoc ad immutabilitatem potirtt fubftant'ue, quam ad tempus 
 
 aliquod rtferatur. Si autem dicimus, DIES EST, adnul- 
 
 lam diet fubjlantiam pertlnet, nifi tantum ad temper is con- 
 
 Jiituticnem ; hoc enim, quod fignifcat, tale e/1, tanquam 
 
 ft dicamus, NUNC EST. ^uare cum dicimus ESSE, ut 
 
 jubjlantiam defignemus, fimpllciter EST addimus ; cum 
 
 vero tta ut aliquid prafens fignlficctur, fecundum Tempus. 
 
 Boeth. in Lib. de Interpr. p. 307. See alfo Plat. Tim. 
 
 p. 37, 38. Edit. Serrani.
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 93 
 
 ftantive make without farther help a per- Ch.VL 
 feft affertive Sentence j while the 
 tho' otherwife perfect, are in this refpeft 
 deficient. 
 
 To explain by an example. When 
 we fay, Cicero eloquent, Cicero wife, thefe 
 are imperfect Sentences, though they de- 
 note a Subftance and an Attribute. The 
 reafon is, that they want an Affertion, 
 to mew that fuch Attribute appertains to 
 fuch Subftance. We muft therefore call 
 in the help of an AiTertion elfewhere, an 
 (is) or a (WAS) to complete the Sentence, 
 faying, Cicero is wife, Cicero WAS elo- 
 quent. On the contrary, when we fay, 
 Cicero ivritetb, Cicero lualketh, in inflan- 
 ces like thefe there is no fuch occafion, 
 becaufe the Words (tvritetb) and (ivalk- 
 etb} imply in their own Form not an At- 
 tribute only, but an Afiertion likewife. 
 Hence 'tis they may be refolved, the one 
 into Is and Writing, the other into Is 
 and Walking. 
 
 Now
 
 94 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.VI. Now all thofc Attributives, which have 
 this complex Power of denoting both an 
 Attribute and an Aflertion, make that 
 Species of Words, which Grammarians 
 call VERBS. If we refolve this complex 
 Power into its diftinft Parts, and take the 
 Attribute alone without the AlTertion, then 
 have we PARTICIPLES. All other Attri- 
 butives, betides the two Species before, 
 are included together in the general Name 
 of ADJECTIVES. 
 
 AND thus is k, that ALL ATTRIBU- 
 TIVES are either VERBS, PARTICIPLES, 
 or ADJECTIVES. 
 
 BESIDES the Diflinctions abovemen- 
 tioned, there are others, which deferve 
 notice. Some Attributes have their Ef~ 
 fence in Motion ; fuch are to walk, tofy, 
 to ftrikty to live. Others have it in the 
 privation of Motion ; fuch are to flop, to 
 reft, to ceafe, to die. And laftly, others 
 have it in fubjects, which have nothing to 
 2 dt
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 95 
 
 do with either Motion or its Privation ; Ch.VI. 
 fuch are the Attributes of, Great and Lit- 
 tle, White and Black, Wife and Foolijh, 
 and in a word the feveral Quantities, and 
 Qualities of all Things. Now thefe laft 
 are ADJECTIVES -, thofe which denote 
 Motions, or their Privation, are either 
 VERBS or PARTICIPLES. 
 
 AND this Circumflance leads to a far- 
 ther Diflinction, which may be explain'd 
 as follows. That all Motion is in Time, 
 and therefore, wherever it exifls, implies 
 *rime as its concomitant, is evident to all 
 and requires no proving. But befides this, 
 all Re/I or Privation of Motion implies Time 
 likewife. For how can a thing be faid to 
 .reft or flop, by being in one Place for one 
 Inflant only ? fo too is that thing, which 
 moves with the greatefl velocity. f- To 
 flop therefore or reft, is to be in one Place 
 for more than one Inflant, that is to fay, 
 
 during 
 
 t Thus Proclus in the Beginning of his Treat ife 
 concerning Motion. Hpe.uSV er* TO WT'OOV x) Zrs.o: 
 & TW a'trw TO'TTW ov, ^ ay, xj T * /pr. '
 
 96 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.VI. -during an Extenjion between two Inftants, 
 and this of courfe gives us the Idea of 
 TIME. As therefore Motions and their Pri- 
 vation imply Time as their Concomitant, fb 
 VERBS, which denote them, come to de- 
 note TIME alfo (d}. And hence the Origin 
 and Ufe of TENSES, " which -are fo many 
 " different Forms, affigned to each Verb, 
 cc to mew, without altering its principal 
 " Meaning, the various TIMES in which 
 " fuch Meaning may exifr.." Thus Sen- 
 bit, Scrip/it, Scripferat, and Scribet, denote 
 all equally the Attribute, To Write, while 
 the difference between them, is, that they 
 denote Writing in different Times. 
 
 SHOULD 
 
 (d) The antient Authors of Diale&icor Logic have 
 well defcribed this Property. The following is part 
 
 of their Definition of a Verb pripot. Si o TO ETJHXT- 
 
 ffr^cilvov X,r"-> a ^ er ^ " fometbing^ -which fignifiei 
 Time OVER AND ABOVE (for fuch is the force of the 
 Propofition, Oco,-.) If it fhould be afked, over and 
 above what? It may be anfwered over and above its 
 principal Signification, which is to denote fome moving 
 and energizing Attribute. See Arift. de Interpret c. 3. 
 together with his Commentators Ammonias and Boe- 
 thius. 3
 
 SHOULD it be afked, whether Time it- Ch.VL 
 felf may riot become upon occafion the 
 Verb's principal Signification ; 'tis anfwei> 
 ed, No. And this appears, becaufe the 
 fame Time may be denoted by different 
 Verbs (as in the Words, writeth and/te/- 
 etb) and different Times by the fame Verb 
 (as in the Words, writetb arid wrote] nei- 1 - 
 ther of which could happen, were 'Time 
 any thing more, than a meer Concomitant. 
 Add to this, that when Words denote 
 Time, not collaterally* but principally, 
 they ceafe to be Verbs, and become either 
 Adjectives, or Subftantives. Of the Ad- 
 jeftive kind are Timely, Yearly, Dayly, 
 Hourly, 5cc. of the Subftantive kind are 
 
 Time, Tear, Day, Hour, &c. 
 
 
 
 THE moft obvious Diviiion of TIME is 
 into Prefent, Paft, and Future, nor is any 
 Language complete, whofe Verbs have 
 not TENSES, to mark thefe Diftindions. 
 But we may go ftill farther. Time paft 
 and future are both infinitely extended. 
 H Hence
 
 98 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.VI. Hence 'tis that in univerfal Time paft we 
 may aflume many particular 'Times paft, 
 and in univerfal Time future, many parti- 
 cular Times future, fame more, fome lefs 
 remote, and correfponding to each other 
 under different relations. Even prefent 
 Time itflf is not exempt from thefe Dif- 
 ferences, and as neceffarily implies fome 
 degree of Extenfion, as does every given 
 Line, however minute. 
 
 HERE then we are to feek for the 
 Reafon, which firft introduced into Lan- 
 guage that variety of Tenfes. It was not 
 it feems enough to denote indefinitely (or 
 by Aorifts) mere Prefent, Paft, or Future, 
 but 'twas necefTary on many occafions to 
 define with more precifion, what kind of 
 Paft, Prefent, or Future. And hence 
 the multiplicity of Futures, Prasteritsr, 
 and even Prefent Tenfes, with which all 
 Languages are found to abound, and 
 without which it would be difficult to af- 
 certain our Ideas. 
 
 V 
 
 How-
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 99 
 
 HOWEVER as the Knowledge of TENSES Ch.VI. 
 depends on the Theory of TIME, and this 
 is a fubjed: of no mean Speculation, we 
 fhall referve it by itfelf for the following 
 Chapter. 
 
 H 2 CHAP.
 
 loo HERMES. 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 
 * 
 
 Concerning Time, and Tenfes. 
 
 C. VII. r t * IME and SPACE have this in com- 
 J- mon, that they are both of them by 
 nature things continuous, and as fuch they 
 both of them imply Extenjion. Thus be- 
 tween London and Salt/bury there is the 
 Extenfion of Space, and between Tejlerday 
 and To-morrow, the Extenfion of Time. 
 But in this they differ, that all the Parts of 
 Space exift at once and together ; while thofe 
 of Time only exift in Tranfition or Sue- 
 cejjlon (a). Hence then we may gain fome 
 Idea of TIME, by confidering it under the 
 
 notion 
 
 (a] See Vol. I. p. 275. Note XIII. To which we 
 may add, what is faid by Ammonius odl yx.% o xpo;> 
 cA0 J //.a u<piV~<xra, AA' i\ X.Z.TO. woiaw TO NT N* 
 e-j yy.% TW yivszQat ^ (pQt'fisQou TO tivxi, p/si. TIME 
 doth not fubfift the whole at ance^ but only in a fingk Now 
 arlNSTANTj for it hath its Exijience in becoming and in 
 ctafing to bt, Amm, in Preo'icam. p. 82. b.
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 101 
 
 notion of a tranjient Continuity. Hence C.VII. 
 alfo, as far as the affections and proper- 
 ties of 'TranSition go, Time is different 
 from Space; but as to thofe of Exten-* 
 fion and Continuity, they perfectly co^ 
 incide. 
 
 LET us take, for example, fuch a part 
 of Space, as a Line. In every given LINE 
 we may aflame any where a Pointy and 
 therefore in every given Line there may be 
 aflumed infinite Points. So in every given 
 TIME we may aflame any where a Now 
 or Inflant, and therefore in every given 
 'Time there may be aflumed infinite Nows 
 or Inftants. 
 
 FARTHER ftill A POINT is the Bound 
 of every finite Line; and A Now or IN- 
 STANT, of every finite Time. But altho' 
 they are Bounds, they are neither of them 
 Parts, neither the Point of any Line, nor 
 the Now or Inflant of any Time. If this 
 appear ftrange, we may remember, that 
 the Parts of any thing extended are necef- 
 H 3 farily
 
 HERMES. 
 
 C.VH.farify extended alfo, it being efTential to 
 their character, that they jhould meafure 
 their Whole. But if a Point or Now were 
 extended) each of them would contairT 
 within it felf infinite other Points, and in- 
 fnite other Nows (for thefe may be aflumed 
 infinitely within the minuteft Extenfion) 
 and this, 'tis evident, would be abfurd and 
 impoffible. 
 
 THESE AfTertions therefore being ad- 
 mitted, and both Points and Nows being 
 taken is Bounds ', but notasP<zr/j-(^), it will 
 
 follow, 
 
 TO NT~N 78 X$ <t '" y * 
 
 Tf,q 'yfcxtAui.ri;'. aj c 'y^cx.jjt.fj.cn t^o 
 -rij? p/af [j.oiz. 'Tis evident that A Now or Injiant is 
 no more a part of Time, than POINTS are of a Lint. 
 The Parts indeed of one Line are two other Lines. Natur. 
 Auic. L. IV. c. 17. And not long before. To cl 
 
 xatr9i &r TO oAov ix. rm pfouit' o c XPO'NOS a 
 &xr o-u'^Jcwo-fiaj sx Tfcv N T~N. ^ Now no Part of 
 Time ; for a Part is able to meafure its Whole^ and the 
 lyiwle is necejjarily made up of its Parts; but TIME dotb 
 not appear to bt made tip of Nows. ibid. c. 14.
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 103 
 
 follow, thatin the fame manner as the fame C.VII, 
 Point may be the End of one Line, and the 
 Beginning of another, fo the fame Now or 
 Inftant may be the End of one Time, 
 and the Beginning of another. Let us 
 fuppofe for example, the Lines. A B, B C. 
 B 
 
 A C 
 
 I fay that the Point B, is the End of the 
 Line A B, and the Beginning of the Line, 
 B C. In the fame manner let us fuppofe 
 A B, B C to reprefent certain Times, and 
 let B be a Now or Inftant. In fuch cafe 
 I fay that the Inftant B is the End of the 
 Time A B, and the Beginning of the Time, 
 B C. I fay likewife of thefe two Times, 
 that with refpedl to the Now or Inftant, 
 which they include, the firfl of them is 
 neceffarily PAST TIME, as being previous 
 to it; the other is necelfarily FUTURE, as 
 being fu&feyuent. As therefore every Now 
 H 4 or
 
 J04 HERMES. 
 
 C.VJI. or INSTANT always exifls in Time, and 
 without being Time, is Times Bound-, the 
 Bound of Completion to the Paft, and the 
 Bound of Commencement to the Future; 
 from hence we may conceive its nature or 
 epd, which is to be the Medium of Conti- 
 nuity between the Paft and the Future, fo as 
 to render Time, thro' all its Parts, one In- 
 tire and Perfeft Whole (c\ 
 
 FROM the above Speculations, there 
 follow ibme Conclufions, which may be 
 perhaps called Paradoxes, till they have 
 been attentively confidered. In the firil 
 place there cannot (flridly fpeaking) be any 
 
 Jucb 
 
 (c) To $ NT~N to <r 
 
 6)J' ffVJt^tl 'y&f TOV P^pOVOV, TO^ TZaptl^Q'jTOt. xj i(TO]W.- 
 
 vov, ^ O'AWJ w^f %pova ir'w' ff~i yee,f T* fj.\v ^^, 
 Ta (Jt TtAfuTii. A Now or Injiant is (as was faid be- 
 fore) the Continuity or holding together of Time ; for it 
 makes Time continuous^ the pa/1 and the future, and is in 
 general its Boundary^ as being the Beginning of one Tine 
 and- the Ending of another. Natur. Aufcult. L. jy. 
 c. 19. 2-jyp^ti: in this place means not Continuity^ as 
 Banding for Extcnfion^ but rather that 'Junction or Hold- 
 i n S toge(hfr^ by which Extenfion is imparted to othaf
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 105 
 
 fucb thing as Time prefent. For if all Time C. VII. 
 be tranjient as well as continuous, it cannot 
 like a Line be prefent all together, but part 
 will neceflarily be gone, and part be com- 
 ing. If therefore any portion of its Con- 
 tinuity were to be prefent #/ once, it would 
 fo far quit its tranfient nature, and be Time 
 no longer. But if no Portion of its Con- 
 tinuity can be thus prefent, how can Time 
 pofiibly be prefent, to which fuch Conti-* 
 nuity is effential ? - 
 
 FARTHER than this If there be no 
 fuch thing as Time Prefent, there can be no 
 Senfation of Time by any one of the Senfes. 
 For ALL SENSATION is of 'the "j- Prefent only, 
 the Paft being preferved not by Senfe but by 
 Memory, and the Future being anticipate4 
 by Prudence only and wife Fore/igbt. 
 
 BUT if no Portion of Time be the ob- 
 ject of any Senfation -, farther, if the Pre- 
 fent 
 
 "f" TVT5? yap (aiT^JXTfJ fC.) O'JTf TO jUfAAOVj OUTS 
 
 fJtftj A/\as TO -srxpQV po'.O'J, 
 A. a.
 
 106 HERMES. 
 
 C. VII. fent never exifl ; if the Paft be no more ; 
 if the Future be not as yet -, and if thefe 
 are all the Parts, out of which TIME is 
 compounded : how ftrange and fhadowy 
 a Being do we find it ? How nearly ap- 
 proaching to a perfect Non-entity (d] ? 
 Let us try however, fince the Senfes fail 
 us, if we have not Faculties of higher 
 power, to feize this fleeting Being. 
 
 THE World has been likened to a va- 
 riety of Things, but it appears to refem- 
 ble no one more, than fome moving Spec- 
 tacle 
 
 "On 
 
 ax. trt* TO Js //AAn, x) 7rw t'r '' " ol TXTUV 
 
 av V9lsufftU' TO 
 
 o aTTfj^ x o act 
 
 TO ^' X |1A CVTWV rU 
 
 8<ri?. TXa/ therefore TIME ^xj/?5 wo/ <7/ a//, 
 tfi but a faint and obfcure exijlence, one may 
 fuftettfrom hence. A part of it has been^ and is n mo^e ; 
 a part of it is coming* and is not as yet ; and out of tbefc 
 is made that infinite Time, which is ever to be a/umedjlill 
 farther and farther. Now that which is made up of no- 
 thing but Non- entities, itjhouldfeem was impoffible ever to 
 participate of Entity. Natural. Aufc. L. IV. c. 14. 
 See alfo Philop. MS. Com. in Nicomach. p. 10.
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 107 
 
 tacle (fuch as a Procefiion or a Triumph) C. VII. 
 that abounds in every part with fplendid 
 Obje&s, fome of which are ftill departing, 
 as fail as others make their appearance. 
 The Senfes look on, while the fight pafles, 
 perceiving as much as '^immediately prefent 9 
 which they report with tolerable accuracy to 
 the Soul's fuperior Powers. Having done 
 this, they have done their duty, being con- 
 cerned with nothing, fave what is prefent 
 and instantaneous. But to the Memory, to 
 the Imagination, and above all to the Intel- 
 left, the feveral Nows mlnjtants are not loft, 
 as to the Senfes, but are preferved and made 
 Objects ofy?cY7<-/}/comprehenfion, however in 
 their own nature they may be tranjitory and 
 faffing. " Now 'tis from contemplating two 
 " or more of thefe Inftants under one view, 
 " together with that Interval of Continuity, 
 " which fubfifts between them, that we 
 " acquire infenfibly the Idea of TIME (e)." 
 
 For 
 
 ( d ) To'tf
 
 io8 HERMES. 
 
 C.VIJ. For example: The Sun rifes; this I re- 
 member j // rifes again -, this too I remem- 
 ber. Thefe Events are not together -, there 
 
 is 
 
 Jty aAAo ^Tro/^y^iiv aura, ^ 
 'tTioo'j' OTXV 'yxp toi axpot, 'titpx 72 
 j Juo STTU r ^PC'' T * NT~N, TO juty sr ( -<mcv, 
 v, rote xj rz TO (pafj.lv tlvxi XPO'NON. 
 ^ y2?>' /^Y;T /;<?j /w TIME, w^ w* ffl ac- 
 quire a Senfation of prior and fubfequent in Motion. But 
 we dijiinguij]) and fettle tbefe two^ by confidcring one firft^ 
 then the ether, together i^ith an interval betivecn them dif- 
 ferent frcm both. For as often as -we conceive the Extremes 
 to be different from the Mean^ and the Soul talks of two 
 Nows, one prior and the ether fubfequent , then 'tis we fay 
 there is TIME, and this 'tis we call TIME. Natural. 
 Aufcult. L. IV. c. 1 6. Themifiiuis Comment upon 
 this paflage is to the fame purpofe. "Orw n /^ o v.?? 
 o Gi 
 
 toTt KJ yoovov tdvs iv&or^ev, i/Vo ray 
 vfy. oTcv Vo z?j>&rw jitTv ^ tru 
 
 Mind^ remembring the Now, 
 ?t'/^/V^ // talked cf yeftcrday, talks again of another Now 
 to-day^ then 'tis it immediately has an idea of TIME, ter- 
 minated by thcfe iivo News* as by two Boundaries > and 
 thus is it enabled to fay, that the Quantity is of fifteen, or 
 of fixteen hours, as if it were to fever a Cubit's length 
 from c:i infinite L,ine by two Points, Themift. Op. edit, 
 Aid!, p. 45. b.
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 109 
 
 is an Extenfion between them not how- C. VII. 
 ever of Space, for we may fuppofe the Place 
 of fifing the fame, or at lead to exhibit no 
 fenfible difference. Yet ftill we recognize 
 feme Extenfion between them. Now what 
 is this Extenflon, but a natural D } ay '? And 
 what is that, but pure Time ? 'Tis after the 
 fame manner, by recognizing two new 
 Moons, and the Exteniion between thefe: 
 two vernal Equinoxes, and the Extenfion 
 between thefe ; that we gain Ideas of other 
 Times, fuch as Months and Years, which are 
 all fo many Intervals, defcribed as above > 
 that is to fay, pajjing Intervals of Continuity 
 between two Injlants viewed together. 
 
 AND thus 'tis THE MIND acquires the 
 Idea of TIME. But this Time it muft be 
 femembred is PAST TIME ONLY, which 
 is always fazjirft Species, that occurs to 
 the human Intellect. How then do we 
 acquire the Idea of Ti M E FUTURE? The 
 anfwer is, we acquire it by Anticipation. 
 Should it be demanded flill farther, And 
 ivhat is Anticipation ? We aniwer, that in 
 2 this
 
 no HERMES. 
 
 C. VII. this cafe 'tis a kind of reafoning by analogy 
 from fimilar to fimilar ; from Succelfions 
 of Events, that are pad already, to fimilar 
 Succeffions, that are prefumed hereafter. 
 For example : I obferve as far back as my 
 .memory can carry me, how every day has 
 been fucceeded by a night ; that night, by 
 another day ; that day, by another night ; 
 and fo downwards in order to the Day that 
 is now. Hence then I anticipate a fimilar 
 Succeffion from the prefent Day, and thus 
 gain the Idea of Days and Nights in futu- 
 rity. After the fame manner, by attending 
 to the periodical Returns of New and Full 
 Moons ; of Springs, Summers, Autumns 
 and Winters, all of which in Time paft I 
 find never to have failed, I anticipate a 
 like orderly and diver/ified Succeffion, which 
 makes Months, and Seafons, and Years, 
 in Tim? future. 
 
 WE go farther than this, and not only 
 thus anticipate in thefe natural Periods, but 
 even in matters of human and civil concern. 
 For example : Having obferved in many 
 
 paft
 
 BOOK. THE FIRST. in 
 
 paft inftances how Health had fucceeded C. VIL 
 to Exercife, and Sicknefs to Sloth; we an- 
 ticipate future Health to thofe, who, being 
 now fickly, ufe exercife -, 2&& future Sick- 
 nefs to thofe, who, being now healthy, are 
 flothful. 'Tis a variety of fuch obferva- 
 tions,all refpedting one fubject, which when 
 fyftematized by juft reafoning, and made 
 habitual by due practice, form the charac- 
 ter of a Matter- Artift, or Man of prattical 
 Wifdom. If they refpedt the human Body 
 (as above) they form the Phyfician; if mat- 
 ters military, the General ; if matters na- 
 tional, the Statefman ; if matters of private 
 life, the Moralift ; and the fame in other 
 Subjects. All thefe feveral Characters in 
 their refpedive ways may be faid to poflefs 
 a kind of prophetic difcernment, which not 
 only prefents them the barren profpeft of 
 Futurity (a profpect not hid from the mean- 
 eft of Men) but mews withal thofe Events, 
 which are likely to attend it, and thus en- 
 ables them to act with fuperior certainty 
 and rectitude. And hence it is, that (if we 
 except thofe, who have had diviner aflift- 
 i ances)
 
 ii2 HERMES. 
 
 C. VII. ances) we mayjuftly fay, as was faidof olcf, 
 He's the beft Prophet, who conjectures 
 well (/). 
 
 FROM 
 
 (/ ) Ma'm? <T a^i 
 So Milton. 
 
 Till old Experience do attain 
 To fomething like Prophetic Strain." 
 Et facile exijllmari potejl, Prudcntiam ejje quodarfi- 
 modo Divinationem. 
 
 Corft. Nep. in Vit. Attici. 
 
 There is nothing appears fo clearly an object of the 
 MIND or INTELLECT ONLY, as the Future does, finte 
 we can find no place for its exiftence any where elfe. 
 Not but the fame, if we confider, is equally true of the 
 Pajl. For tho' it may have once had another kind of 
 being, when (according to common Phrafe) it aftually 
 was, yet was it then fomething Prefent, and not fome- 
 thing Pa/I. As Pajt, it has no exiftence but in THE 
 MIND or MEMORY, fmce had it m fa& any other, it 
 could not properly be called Paft. 'Twas this- intimate 
 connection between TIME, and the SOUL, that made 
 fome Philofophers doubt, whether if there was no Sou/, 
 there could be any Time, fmce Time appears to have its 
 Being in no other region. Tlonoov <Js py iVijf ^v%r,s 
 tjr) oiii 6 %co\io: 9 cZTropvcreitv alv TJ?, >c. T. A. Natur. 
 Aufcult. L. IV. c. 20. ThemiJiiuS) who comments 
 the above pallage, exprefles himfclf more pofidvety. 
 E TB/onw ^X W ^ At^-ETat TOTE c^jU,>5T&v ^ TO a.cw[*.v~ 
 O aptOjUiiTcv JjiA^J/- oyvottisij TO <? tv- 
 >*A siv tnrCrx-Wy (tv vrdf ri -pt9jt*r-
 
 B o o K THE FIRST. 113 
 
 FROM what has been reafoned it ap- C.VIT. 
 pears, that Knowledge of the Future 
 eomes from Knowledge of the Paft ; as 
 does Knowledge of the Paft from Know- 
 ledge of the Prefect, fo that their Order 
 to us is that of PRESENT, PAST, and 
 FUTURE. 
 
 OF thefe Species of Knowledge, that of 
 the Prefent is the loweft, not only zsfirft in 
 perception, but as far the more extenlive, 
 being necefTarily common to all animal Be- 
 iags, and reaching even to Zoophytes, as. 
 far as they polTefs Senfation. Knowledge 
 of the Paft comes next, which is fuperior 
 to the former, as being confined to thofe 
 Animals, that have Memory as well as 
 Senfes. Knowledge of the Future comes 
 
 laft, 
 
 eovro; fxr.Tj juvotftft pyre Ivtpyntt 9 fyxvepo'J w? oux ow o 
 2poyc ^'i ? w*i y^Jif U^'JV*!?. * hern. p. 48' -l^dit. 
 AWi. Vid. etiam ejufd. Comtn. in Lib. de An. p. 94, 
 
 1
 
 ii4 HERMES, 
 
 C. VII. lad, as being derived from the other two, 
 Arid, de an ^ which is for that reafon the moft ex- 
 An - n - 3- cellent as well as the moft rare, fince Na- 
 
 p. 25. 9 
 
 ture in her fuperadditions rifes from worfe 
 always to better, and is never found to 
 fink from better down to worfe*. 
 
 AND now having feen, how we acquire 
 the Knowledge of Time paft, and Time 
 future-, which is firft in perception, which 
 firft in dignity -, which more common, 
 which more rare ; let us compare them 
 both to the prefent Now or Inftant, and 
 examine what relations they maintain to- 
 wards it. 
 
 IN the firft place there may be Times 
 both paft and future, in which the pre- 
 fent Now has no exiftence, as for example 
 in Tefterday, and To-morrow. 
 
 AGAIN, 
 
 Sec below, Note (r) of this Chapter,
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 
 
 AGAIN, theprefent Now may fo far be- C. VII. 
 long to 'Time of either fort, as to be the 
 End of the paft, and the Beginning of the 
 future ; but it cannot be included within 
 the limits of either. For if it were poffible, 
 let us fuppofe C the prefent Now included 
 
 A B C D E 
 
 within the limits of the paft Time A D. 
 In fuch cafe C D, part of the paft Time 
 A D, will be fubfequent to C the prefent 
 Now, and fo of courfe be future. But 
 by the Hypothecs it is paft, and fo will be 
 both Paft and Future at once, which is 
 abfurd. In the fame manner we prove 
 that C cannot be included within the li- 
 mits of a future Time, fuch as B E. 
 
 WHAT then (hall we fay of fuch Times, 
 
 as this Day, this Month, this Year, this 
 
 I 2 Cen-
 
 ti6 HERMES, 
 
 C.VII. Century, all which include within them 
 the prefent Now? They cannot be paft 
 'Times or future, from what has been 
 proved ; and prefent 'lime has no exigence, 
 as has been proved likewife *. Or mall 
 \ve allow them to be prefenf, from 'the 
 prefent Now, which exifts within them ; 
 fo that from the Prefence of that we call 
 thefe alfo prefent, tho' the fhorteft among 
 them has infinite parts always abfent ? If 
 fo, and in conformity to cuftom we allow 
 fuch Times prefent, as prefent Days, Months, 
 Years, and Centuries, each mufl of necef- 
 fity be a compound of the P aft and the Future, 
 divided from each other by fome prefent 
 Now or Inftant,andy0/W/ycalled PRESENT, 
 'while that Now remains within them. Let us 
 fuppofe for example the Time X Y, which 
 
 f XABCDEY 
 / . . . - g 
 
 let 
 
 Sup.
 
 BOOK THE FIRST, 117 
 
 let us call a Day, or a Century ; and let C. VII. 
 
 the prefent Now or Inftant exift at A. 
 I fay, in as much as A exifts within 
 XY, that therefore X A is Time paft, 
 and A Y Time future, and the whole 
 X A, AY, Time prefent. The fame 
 holds, if we fuppofe the prefent Now to 
 exift at B, or C, or D, or E, or any 
 where before Y. When the prefent Now 
 exifts at Y, then is the whole X Y Time- 
 pajl) and ft ill more fo, when the Now 
 gets to g, or onwards. In lifce manner 
 before the Prefent Now entered X, as 
 for example when it was at f, then was 
 the whole X Y Time future ; 'twas the 
 fame, when the prefent Now was at 
 X. When it had paft that, then XY 
 became Time prefent. And thus 'tis that 
 TIME is PRESENT, while pafling, in its 
 PRESENT Now or INSTANT. 'Tis the 
 fame indeed here, as it is in Space. A 
 Sphere paffing over a Plane, and being 
 for that reafon prefent to it, is only pre- 
 fent to that Plane in afingle Point at once, 
 \ 3 while
 
 Ji8 HERMES. 
 
 C.VII. while during the whole progreflion its 
 Parts abfent are infinite (g). 
 
 FROM what has been faid, we may 
 perceive that ALL TIME, of every deno- 
 mination, 
 
 (g) PLACE, according to the antients, was either 
 mediate, or immediate. I am (for example) in Europe^ 
 becaufe I am in England; in England, becaufe in //'/#- 
 fare; in TViltJhlre^ becaufe in Salt/bury; in Salijbury t 
 becaufe in my own houfe j in my own h;ufe^ becaufe in 
 myjludy. Thus far MEDIATE PLACE. And what is 
 my IMMEDIATE PLACE? 'Tis the internal Bound of 
 that containing Body (whatever it be) which co-incidcs 
 with the external Bound of my own Body. T srff ;/"- 
 
 ' fl' rt ' "> / XT 
 
 TOf 7C"eaj, xatj o uTfpit^fi TO ic"f5i5^/cijWioy. IN'ow as 
 this immediate Place is included within the limits of all 
 the former Places, 'tis from this relation that thofe me- 
 diate Places alfo are called each of them my Place, tho' 
 the leaft among them fo far exceed my magnitude. To 
 apply this to TIME. The Prcjent Century is prefent in 
 the prefent Tear ; that, in the prefent Month ; that, in 
 the prefent Day ; that, in the prefent Hour ; that, in the 
 prefent Minute. 'Tis thus by circumfcription within 
 circumfcription that we arrive at THAT REAL AN T D 
 INDIVISIBLE INSTANT, which by being itfelf the wv 
 f.JJ'ence of the Prcjcnt, difiufcs PRESENCE throughout 
 3 a!J
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 119 
 
 nomination, is divifible and extended. But C. VII. 
 if fo, then whenever we fuppofe a definite 
 Time, even though it be a lime prefent, it 
 muft needs have a Beginning, a Middle, 
 and an End. And fo much for TIME. 
 
 Now from the above Do&rine of TIME, 
 we propofe by way of Hypothecs the fol- 
 lowing Theorie of TENSES. 
 
 THE TENSES are ufed to mark Prefent, 
 
 Part, and Future Time, either indefinitely 
 
 I 4 with- 
 
 all, even the largeft of Times, which are found to in~ 
 dude it within their refpeftive limits. Nicephorus Blem- 
 mides fpeaks much to the fame purpofe. 
 
 NT N* 
 
 ffuvfj-wf, YJ ^ja TJJW z<r^o? TO xu^iw? NT"N 'yiil 
 NT"N Xtyopwoq ^ utfos. PRESENT TIME 
 ^r*? V that which adjoins to the REAL Now or INSTANT 
 on either fide, being a limited Time made up of Pajt and 
 Future, and from its vicinity to that REAL Now faid to 
 be Now alfo itfelf. 'ETiYl. pu<nxij K(>. S'. See alfo 
 Artft. Phyjic. L.IV. c,6. L.VI. 0.2,3, ^
 
 120 HERMES. 
 
 . VII. without reference to any Beginning, 
 
 die, or End j or elfe definitely, in reference 
 to fuch diflinctiqns. 
 
 IF Indefinitely y then have we THREE 
 TENSES, an Aorift of the Prefent, an 
 Aorift pf the Pad, and an Aprift of the 
 Future. If definitely) then have we three 
 Tenfes to mark the Beginnings of thefe 
 three Times ; three, to denote their Mid- 
 dles; and three to denote their Ends -, in, 
 all NINE. 
 
 THE three firft of thefe Tenfes we 
 pall the Inceptive Prefent, the Inceptive 
 Part, and the Inceptive Future. The 
 three next, the Middle Prefent, the Mid- 
 dle Paft, and the Middle Future. And 
 the three laft, the Completive Prefent, 
 the Completive Paft, and the Completive, 
 Future, 
 
 AND thus 'tis, that the TENSE sin their 
 naturaj Number appear to be TWELVE 4
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. J2I 
 
 three to denote Time abfolute, and nine to C.VII. 
 .denote it under its rejpetfive diftinffions. 
 
 Aorift of the Prefent, 
 Scribo. I write. 
 
 Aorift of the Paft f 
 a. Scripfi. I wrote. 
 Aorift of the Future. 
 , Scribam. I mall write. 
 
 Inceptive Prefent. 
 ypuqtiv. Scripturus fum. I am 
 going to write. 
 
 Middle or extended Prefent. 
 Tvyxdvu ygctQuy. Scribo or Scribens 
 fum. I am writing. 
 
 Completive Prefent. 
 5. Scripfi. I have written. 
 
 Inceptive Paft. 
 
 ypoQew. Scripturus eram. I 
 was beginning to write. 
 
 Middle
 
 122 H E R M E S. 
 
 C. VII. Middle or extended Paft. 
 
 'Eypatpov or eTvTxotvov ypaQuv. Scribebam* 
 I was writing. 
 
 Completive Paft. 
 
 'EyeypxQetv. Scripferam. I had done 
 writing. 
 
 Inceptive Future. 
 
 Me\Xr,<ru ypa$iv. Scripturus ero. I 
 (hall be beginning to write. 
 
 Middle or extended Future. 
 *E<roftott ypctQav. Scribens ero. 1 fhall 
 be writing. 
 
 Completive Future. 
 
 "ErcfMii ytypuQui;. Scripfero. I ftiall 
 have done writing. 
 
 IT is not to be expedled that the above 
 Hypothefis fhould be juftified through all 
 inftances in every language. It fares with 
 
 Tenfes,
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 123 
 
 Tenfes, as with other Affections of Speech - y C. VII. 
 be the Language upon the whole ever fo 
 perfect, much muft be left, in defiance of 
 all Analogy, to the harfli laws of mere 
 Authority and Chance. 
 
 IT may not however be improper to 
 inquire, what traces may be difcovered in 
 favour of this Syftem, either in Languages 
 themfelves, or in thofe authors who have 
 written upon this part of Grammar, or 
 laflly in the nature and reafon of things. 
 
 IN the firft place, as toAoRisTS. Aorifts 
 are ufually by Grammarians referred to the 
 Paft; fuch are vjxdov, I went; bnurw, IfcH> 
 &c. We feldom hear of them in the Fu- 
 ture, and more rarely ftill in the Prefent. 
 Yet it feems agreeable to reafon, that 
 wherever Time isjignified without any far- 
 ther circumfcription, than that of Simple 
 prefent paji or future, the lenfe is AN 
 AORIST, 
 
 THUS
 
 124 HERMES. 
 
 C.VII. THUS Milton, 
 
 Millions of fpiritual creatures WALK the 
 
 earth 
 Unfeen, both when we wake, and when 
 
 wejleep. P. L. IV. 277. 
 
 Here the Verb (WALK) means not that 
 they were walking at that inftant only, 
 when Adam fpoke, but wjifus indefinitely, 
 take any inftant whatever. So when the 
 fame Author calls Hypocrify, 
 
 the only Evil, that WALKS 
 
 Invifible, except to God alone, 
 
 the Verb (WALKS) hath the like aorijlical 
 or indefinite application. The fame may be 
 faid in general of all Sentences of the Gno~ 
 mologic kind, fuch as 
 
 Ad poenitendum PROPERAT, cito qut 
 
 judicat. 
 
 Avarus, niji cum moritur, nil rcfte 
 FACIT, &c. 
 
 ALL
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 
 
 ALL thefe Tenfes are fo many AORISTS C. VII, 
 
 OF THE PRESENT. 
 
 Gnomologic Sentences after the fame 
 manner make likewife AORISTS OF THE 
 FUTURE. 
 
 Tif nihil ADMITTES in te, formidine 
 pceruz. Hor. 
 
 S o tooLegi/Iative Sentences, T^hou SHALT 
 not killy Thou SHALT not jleal, &c. for this 
 means no one particular future Time, but 
 is a prohibition extended indefinitely to 
 very part of Time future (b). 
 
 (b) The Latin Tongue appears to be more than or- 
 dinarily deficient, as to the article ofderi/is. It has no 
 peculiar Form even for an Aor'ijl of the Pajl^ and there- 
 fore (as Pnfdan tells us) the Prateritum is forced to dp 
 the double duty both of that Aorift* and of the perftft 
 Prefentj its application in particular inftaqces being to
 
 ia6 HERMES. 
 
 C.VII. WE p a f s from Aorifts, to THE INCEP- 
 TIVE TENSES. 
 
 THESE may be found in part fupplied 
 (like many other Tenfes) by Verbs au- 
 xiliar. ME'AAXl ypccQeiv. Scripturus SUM. 
 I AM GOING to write. But the Latins go 
 farther, and have a Species of Verbs, de- 
 rived from others, which do the duty of 
 thefe Tenfes, and are themfelves for that 
 reafon called Inchoatives or Inceptive*. 
 Thus from Caleo, I am warm, conies Ca- 
 lefco, I begin to grow warm ; from Tumeoy 
 1 fwell, comes Tumefco, I begin to fwelL 
 Thefe Inchoative Verbs are fo peculiarly 
 appropriated to the Beginnings of Time, 
 that they are defective as to all Tenies, 
 which denote it in its Completion^ and 
 
 there- 
 
 be gathered from the Context. Thus 'tis that FECI 
 means (,as the fame author informs us) both S^TTO^/.X 
 and 7TciVa, 1 have done /V, and I did it; VIDI both 
 twpajca and fiSov, I have jujl feen //, and, Ifawlton^e. 
 Prifc. Gram, L. VIII. p. 814^ 838, Edit. Putfch.
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 127 
 
 therefore have neither Perfedtum, Plus C.VII. 
 quam-perfetum,or Perfcdl Future. There 
 is likewife a fpecies of Verbs called in Greek 
 'E<per/>c, in Latin Dejiderativa, the Deji- 
 deratives or Meditative*, which if they are 
 not ftri<5lly Inceptive*, yet both in Greek 
 and Latin have a near affinity with them. 
 Such are Ts-oXB^treiu, Bellaturio, I have a 
 dejire to make war-, @pu<rw, Efurio, I 
 long to eat (/). And fo much for THE 
 INCEPTIVE TENSES. 
 
 THE two laft orders of Tenfes which re- 
 main, are thofe we called (k] THE MIDDLE 
 TENSES (which exprefs Time as extended 
 
 and 
 
 (*') As all Beginnings have reference to what is fu- 
 ture, hence we fee how properly thefe Verbs are formed, 
 the Greek ones from a future Verb, the Latin from a 
 future Participle. From sroAtyiiic-w and (3owcru> come 
 iffo\ffji.ntTici} and j3pwico ; from Bellaturus and Efurus 
 come Eellaturia and Efurio. See Macrobius, p. 691. 
 Ed. Var. J Tffdw }( /j.e v vv Aj TE AA2 E'lONTA 
 I5rorira$ 5/eXa'irai. PJato in Phaedone. 
 
 (^) Care muft be taken not to confound thefe middle 
 Tenfes, with the Tenfes of thofe Verbs, which bear 
 the fame name among Grammarians,
 
 HERMES. 
 
 C. VII. zn&pqfling) and the PERFECT or COMPLE-* 
 TIVE, which exprefs its Completion or End. 
 
 Now for thefe the Authorities are 
 many. They have been acknowledged 
 already in the ingenious Accidence of* 
 Mr. Hoadty, and explained and confirmed 
 \yyDr.SamuelClarke, in his rational Edition 
 of Homer s Iliad. Nay, long before either 
 of thefe, we find the fame Scheme in Sea- 
 liger, and by him (/) afcribed to -j- Gro- 
 cinus, as its Author. The learned &azd 
 
 (who 
 
 (/) Ex bis perdpimus Grocinum acute adnwdum Ten- 
 pora divijtje, fed minus commode. Trla enim conjlituit^ 
 Mt nis,fed qua bifariamfecat^ Perfeclum &? Imperfefium : 
 fa) Prateritumimperfeftum, Amabam : Prateritum per- 
 feftum, Amaveram. Recife fane. Et Prtsfem imperfec- 
 tum, Amo. R.ele baftenus ; continuat enim aniorem, ne- 
 qrte abfohit. At Prafens perfeflum, Amavi : quh hoc 
 dicat ? De Futuro auttm ut nan male fentlt^ ita controver- 
 fum eft. Futurum, inquit, imperfeRum^ Amabo : Perfec- 
 turn, Amavero. Non-male, inquam : figriijicat enim Ama- 
 vero, arnoremfuturum& abfolutitm iri : Amabo perfec- 
 titnem nullam indicat. De Cauf. Ling. Lat. c. 113. 
 
 f His Name was William Grocin^ an Englijhman, 
 contemporary with Erafmus, and celebrated for hi's 
 Learning. He went to Florence to ftudy under Landiti 9 
 and was Prqfeflbr at Oxford. Spec. Lit. Flor, p. 205..
 
 BOOK THE FtRST. 129 
 
 (who was himfelf a Greek, and one of the C. VII 
 ableft reftorers of that language in the 
 weflern world) characterizes the Tenfes 
 in nearly the fame manner (m). What 
 Apollonius hints, is exactly confonant (). 
 
 Prlfcian 
 
 (m} ThePRESENTTENSE (as this Author informs 
 us in his excellent Grammar) denotes TO iK-etj*t90t *y 
 arfAt?, that which is now inftant and incomplete; TH 
 PERFECTUM, TO TD-aaAtiAuOc? ap-n, x) iJlt^ts rz 
 ifff-WT0?, that which is now immediately paft, and is the 
 Completion of the Prefent j THE IMPERFECTUM, TO 
 '&rz9!z7t'',(x.u.tvov KJ oiTfhls TK I 5raow^>jjw./ii, the extended 
 and incomplete part of the Pajly and THE PLUSQUAM- 
 PERFECTUM, TO & xo shy \-j$o$ isrciXai) >^ lT>f T 
 m*ftotitfug*. that which is pajt long ago, and is the com- 
 pletion of the prateriium. Gram. L. IV. 
 
 Brrtuvn 61 zcra9o<ASa O'T; a ura 
 
 rry yt ue9ft tvs~UToi,v 
 Hence we are perfuaded that the Perfeflum dcth not jig- 
 nify the completion of the Pajl^ but PRESENT COMPLE- 
 TION. Apolhn. L. III. c. 6. The Reafon, which per- 
 fuadtd him to this opinion, was the application and ufe 
 of the Particle a,, of which he was then treating, and 
 which, as it denoted Potentiality or Contlngence, would 
 aflbrt (he fays) with any of the pafiing, extended, and 
 incomplete Tenfes, but never with this PERFECTUM, 
 becaufe this implied fuch a complete and indefeafille ex- 
 iftence, as never to be qualified into the nature of a Con- 
 tingent, 
 
 K
 
 H E R M E S. 
 
 C.VII. Prifdan too advances the fame Doctrine 
 from the Stoics, whofe authority we efleem 
 greater than all the reft, not only from the 
 more early age when they lived, but from 
 their fuperior Ikill in Philofophy, and their 
 peculiar attachment to Dialectic, which 
 naturally led them to great accuracy in 
 thefe Grammatical Speculations (p). 
 
 
 
 BEFORE 
 
 (0} By thefe Philofophers the vulgar prefent Tenfe was 
 called THE IMPERFECT PRESENT, and the vulgar 
 Prateritum, THE PERFECT PRESENT, than which 
 nothing can be more confonant to the fyftem that we 
 favour. But let us hear Prifcian, from whom we learn 
 thefe fats. PR^SENS TEMPUS proprie dicitur, cujus 
 pars jam prater iit y pars futura eft. Cum enim Tempus, 
 Jiuvii more, injlabili vohatur curfu, vix punflum habere 
 poteft in prteftnti) hoc eft y in inftanti. Maxima igitur pars 
 fjus (ficut diflum eji) vel prater iit vel futura eft. Unde 
 STOICI jure HOC TEMPUS PRESEKS etiam IMPER- 
 FECT UM vocalant (ut difium eft) eo quod prior ejus pars, 
 qua pratcriit, tranfafta eft, deejl cmtcm fequens, id eft, 
 futura. Ut fi in media vcrfu dicam, fcribo verfurn, pri~ 
 ere ejus parte fcripta^ cut adbuc deejl extrema pors, pra- 
 finti utor verbo, dicendo, fcribo verfum : fed IMPERFEC- 
 
 TUM */?, quod deejl adbuc verfu:, qncd firibatur Ex 
 
 eodem igitur Prerjcnti nafcitur etiam PerfcElum. Si cnlm 
 ad finem pemeniat inceptum, Jlatim utimur PR^ETKRITO 
 PERFECTO ; continue enim, fcripto ad fmem verfu, flica, 
 
 fcripfi verfuoi. And icon after fpeaking of the Latin 
 
 Per-
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 131 
 
 BEFORE we conclude, we mall add a C. VII. 
 few mifcellaneous obfervations, which 
 will be more eafily intelligible from the 
 Hypothefis here advanced, and ferve withal 
 to confirm its truth. 
 
 AND firft the Latins ufed their Prtzte- 
 ritum Perfeclum in fome inftances after a 
 very peculiar manner, fo as to imply the 
 very reverfe of the Verb in its natural fig- 
 nification. Thus, VIXIT, fignified, is 
 DEAD; FUIT, fignified, NOW is NOT, is 
 NO MORE. 'Twas in this fenfe that Cicero 
 addreffed the People of Rome, when he 
 had put to death the leaders in the Cata- 
 linarian Confpiracy. He appeared in the 
 K 2 Forum, 
 
 Perfefium, he fays, -fciendum tamen, quid Romani 
 
 PRJETERiToPfiRFECTO non folttm in re modo completd 
 utuutur, (in quo vim habet ejus, qut apud Gracos -srctoz- 
 x.f uxmj vocatur> quern STOICI TEAEION ENEI- 
 TI1TA nominaverunt) fed etiam pro 'Ao^'r* accipitur, 
 &c. Lib. VIII. p. 812, 813, 814.
 
 HERMES. 
 
 C.VII. Forum, and cried out with a loud voice, 
 * \^XERUNT. So Virgil, 
 
 |] FUIMUS Troes, FUIT Ilium & 
 
 ingens 
 Gloria Dardanidum ^n. II. 
 
 And 
 
 * So among the Romans, when in a Caufe all the 
 Pleaders had fpoken, the Cryer ufed to proclaim, Dix- 
 ERUNT, i.e. they have done fpeaking. Afcon. Pad. in 
 Verr. II. 
 
 j| So Til'uttus fpeaking of certain Prodigies and evil 
 Omens. 
 
 H/fc fuerint dim. Sed tu, jam mitis^ dpollo, 
 Prodigia indomltis merge fub tsquoribus. 
 
 Eleg. H. 5. J. 19. 
 
 Ld thefe Events HAVE vEEvindoys of old ; by Im- 
 plication therefore But HENCEFORTH let them be no 
 more. 
 
 So Eneas in Virgil prays to Pbcebus. 
 
 Hoc Trojana tenus fuerit fortuna fecuta. 
 Let Trojan Fortune (that is, adverfe, like that of Troy, 
 and its Inhabitants,) HAVE fo far FOLLOWED us. By 
 Implication therefore, But let it follow us 'no farther, 
 Here let it end^ Hie fit Finis, as Servius well obferves 
 in the Place. 
 
 In which Inftances, by the way, mark not only the 
 Force of the Tenfe, but of the Mood y the PRECATIVE 
 or IMPERATIVE, not in the Future but in the PAST. 
 beep. 154, 155, 156.
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 
 
 And again, 
 
 Locus Ardea quondam 
 
 l5tus avis, & nunc magnum manet 
 
 Ardea nomen, 
 Sed for tuna F u i T , uEn, VII. 
 
 THE reafon of thefe Significations is de- 
 rived from THE COMPLETIVE POWER of 
 
 the Tenfe here mentioned. We fee that 
 the periods of Nature, and of human af- 
 fairs are maintained by the reciprocal fuc- 
 ceflion of Contraries. 'Tis thus with Calm 
 and Tempeft ; with Day and Night ; 
 with Prosperity and Adverfity; with Glory 
 and Ignominy j with Life and Death. 
 Hence then, in the inilances above, the 
 completion of one contrary is put for the 
 commencement of the other, and to fay, 
 
 HATH LIVED, Or, HATH BEEN, has the 
 
 fame meaning with, is DEAD, or, is NO 
 MORE. 
 
 K 3 IT 
 
 * Cert us in hofpitibus non eft amor ; errat, ut ipjt: 
 Cumque nilnl fperes firmius ejje, FUJT. 
 
 Epift. Ovid. Helen. Paridj. jfr. 190. 
 
 She erimus, feu nys Fata FUISSE volent. 
 
 Tibull.III. 5.32.
 
 134 H E R M E S. 
 
 C.VII. IT is remarkable in * Virgil, that he 
 frequently joins in the fame Sentence this 
 complete and perfect Prefent with the ex- 
 tended and pajjing Prefent ; which proves 
 that he confidered the two, as belonging 
 to the fame Species of 'Time, and there- 
 fore naturally formed to co-incide with 
 each other. 
 
 - - \fihijam brachia contrahit ardens 
 Scorpios, & cceli jnftd plus parte reliquit. 
 
 G.I. 
 
 'Terra tremit ; fugereyrra G. I. 
 
 Prtzfertimji tempejlas a verticejyhis 
 Incubuit, glomeratque ferens inccndia 
 ventus. G. II. 
 
 - ilia noto citius, 'uolucriquefagittd, 
 Ad t err am fugit, Gf portu fe condidit 
 alto. jEn. V. 
 
 IN 
 
 * See alfo Spenfer** Fairy gueen, B.I. C. 3. St. 19. 
 C. 3. St. 39. C. 8. St. 9. 
 
 He hath his Shield redeem'd, 
 And forth his Sword he draws.
 
 BOOK THE FIRST, 135 
 
 IN the fame manner he joins the fame C.VII. 
 two modifications of 'Time in the Paft, that 
 is to fay, the complete and perfeft Paft with 
 the extended and pajjing. 
 
 Inruerant Danai, & teftum omne 
 tenebant. JEn. II. 
 
 Tris imbris torti radios, tris nubis aquofa 
 Addiderant, rutuli tris ignis, & alitis 
 
 auftri. 
 Fulgores nunc terrificos, fenitumque me- 
 
 tumque 
 Mifcebant operi, flammifque fequacibus 
 
 iras (p). ^En.VIII. 
 
 As 
 
 (p] The Intention of Virgil may be better feen, in 
 rendering one or two of the above pafikges into Eng- 
 HJb. 
 
 -Tibijam bracbia contrahit ardens 
 Scorpios, & coeli jujld plus parte reliquit. 
 
 For tbee the Scorpion is NOW CONTRACTING his daw, 
 and HATH ALREADY LEFT tbee more than a juji por- 
 tion of Heaven. The Poet, from a high ftrain of poetic 
 adulation, fuppofes the Scorpion fo defirous of admitting 
 Augujlus among the heavenly figns, that though he has 
 already made him more than room enough, yet he Jlill 
 K 4 cm"
 
 136 H E R M E S. 
 
 C.VII. As to the IMPERFECT UM, it is feme- 
 times employed to denote what is ujual 
 and cuftomary. Thusfurgebat andfcrtbe- 
 bat fignify not only, be WAS ri/ing, he 
 WAS writing, but upon occafion they fig- 
 nify, be USED to rij'e, he USED to write. 
 The reafon of this is, that whatever is 
 cuftomary, mufl be fomething which has 
 \$wn frequently repeated. But what has been 
 frequently repeated, muft needs require an 
 Ext en/ion of 'Time pa/1, and thus we fall iri- 
 fenfibly into the TENSE here mentioned. 
 
 AGAIN, 
 
 continues to be making him more. Here then we have 
 two A<ts, one perfeft, the other pending, and hence the 
 Ufe of the two different Tenfes. Some editions read 
 relinquit ; but reliquit has the authority of the celebrated 
 Medlcean manufcript. 
 
 Ilia noto fit/us, volucrique fagitta, 
 Ad terrain fugit, & portu fe condidit alto. 
 
 <TheJhip, quicker than the wind, or a fwift arrsiv, CON- 
 TINUES FLYING to land, and is HID within the lofty 
 harbour. We may fuppofe this Harbour, (like many 
 others) tp have been furrounded with high Land. 
 Hence the Vcfle), immediately on entering h, was com- 
 pletely hid from thofe Spectators, who had gone out to 
 
 fee
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 137 
 
 AGAIN, we are told by Pliny (whofe C.VIL 
 authority likewife is confirmed by many 
 Gems and Marbles ilill extant) that the 
 ancient Painters and Sculptors, when they 
 fixed their names to their works, did it 
 pendenti titulo, in a fufpenfive kind of In- 
 feription, and employed for that purpofe 
 the Tenfe here mentioned. 'Twas ' 
 motet, Apelles faciebat, 
 
 w, Polycletusfaciebaty and never s 
 or fecit. By this they imagined that they 
 avoided the fhew of arrogance, and had in 
 cafe of cenfure an apology (as it were) pre- 
 pared, fince it appeared from the work it- 
 felf, that // was once indeed in hand, but no 
 pretenfion that it was ever JlniJJoed (q). 
 
 IT 
 
 fee the Ship- race, but yet mighty?/// continue falling to- 
 wards the fhore within. 
 
 Inruerant Danai^ b" teftum omne tenebant. 
 
 Tl)e Greeks HAD ENTERED, and WERE THEN POSSES- 
 SING the whole Houfe ; as much as to fay, they bad en- 
 ter ed^ and that was over, but their Poflcffion continuedjlill. 
 (q] Plln. Nat. Hi/I. L. I. The firft Printers (who 
 were moft of them Scholars and Critics) in imitation of 
 2 the
 
 138 HERMES. 
 
 C. VII. IT is remarkable that the very manner, 
 in which the Latins derive thefe Tenfes 
 from one another, mews a plain reference 
 to the Syftem here advanced. From the 
 paffing Prefent come the patting Paft, and 
 Future. Scribo,Scribebam,Scribam. From 
 the perfect Prefent come the perfect Paft, 
 and Future. Scripji, Scripferam, Scrip- 
 fero. And fo in all inftances, even where 
 the Verbs are irregular, as from Fero come 
 Ferebam and Per am ; from Yu/i come Tu- 
 leram and Tulero. 
 
 WE fhall conclude by obferving, that 
 the ORDER of the Tenfes, as they ftand 
 ranged by the old Grammarians, is not a 
 fortuitous Order, but is conlbnant to our 
 Perceptions, in the recognition of Time, 
 according to what we have explained al- 
 ready 
 
 
 the antient Arttfts ufed the fame Tenfe. Excudebat H. 
 Strphanus. Excudebat GuiL Morelim. dbfohebat Joan, 
 Btntnaius, which has been followed by Dr. Taylor in hh 
 late valuable edition of Dtmsjlbcnes.
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 139 
 
 ready (r). Hence it is, that the Prefent C.VII. 
 enfe ftands firft ; then the Paft Tenfes ; 
 and laflly the Future. 
 
 AND now, having feen what authorities 
 there are for Aorifts, or thofe Tenfes, 
 which denote Time indefinitely -, and what 
 for thofe Tenfes, oppofed to Aorifts, which 
 mark it definitely ; (fuch as the Inceptive, 
 the Middle, and the Completive) we here 
 finim the fubject of TIME and TENSES, and 
 proceed to confider THE VERB IN OTHER 
 ATTRIBUTES, which 'twill be necefTary 
 to deduce from other Principles. 
 
 (r) See before p. 109, nc, in, 112, 113. Scali- 
 ger's obfervation upon this occafion is elegant.- 1 Or do 
 vutem (Temporum fcil.} al'tter /?, quam natura eorum. 
 Quod enim prater lit, prius /?, quam quod ejl, itaque pri- 
 mo loco debere poni videbatur. Verum^ quod primo quoque 
 tempore offertur nobis, id creat primas fpecies in animo : 
 quamobrem Prcsfens Tempus primum locum occupavit ; ejl 
 enim commune omnibus animalibus. Prtzteritum out em in 
 tanturri) qua memorid pradita funt. Futurum vero etiam 
 paucioribus, quippe quibus datum eft prudentia officium. 
 De Cauf. Ling. Lat. c, 1 1 3. See alfo Seneca Epijl. 
 124. Mutum animal fenfu comprebcndit prafentia ; prte- 
 t &c. 
 
 CHAP.
 
 i 4 o HERMES. 
 
 CHAP. VIII. 
 
 Concerning Modes. 
 
 C.VIII. TT TE have obferved already (a) that 
 V V the Soul's leading Powers are thofe 
 of Perception and thofe of Volition, which 
 words we have taken in their mofr. com- 
 prehenfive acceptation. We have obferved 
 alfo, that all Speech or Difceurfe is a pub- 
 lijhing or exhibiting fome part of our Soul, 
 either a certain Perception, or a certain 
 Volition. Hence then, according as we 
 exhibit it either in a different part, or af- 
 ter a different manner, hence I fay the va- 
 riety of MODES or MOODS (b\. 
 
 IF 
 
 (a] Sec Chapter II. 
 
 (b] Gaza defines a Mode exactly confonant to this 
 
 doctrine. He fays it is fizhypu, 'uT xv traSii/xa 
 
 xJ^/t'iVi <na y>v*j ni/uaua/ACv?! a Petition or Affelion 
 of the Soul, fignified through fome Voice, or Sound articu- 
 late. Gram. L. IV. As therefore this is the nature of 
 Modes, and Modes belong to V r erbs, hence 'tis dpollo- 
 
 nius
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 141 
 
 IF we fimply declare, or indicate fome- C.VIIL 
 thing to be, or not to be, (whether a Per- 
 ception or Volition, 'tis equally the fame) 
 this conftitutes that Mode called the DE- 
 CLARATIVE or INDICATIVE. 
 
 A Perception. 
 
 Nosco crinis> incanaque menta 
 Regis Romanl - Virg. ^En. VI. 
 
 A Volition. 
 In nova PERT ANIMUS mutatas die ere 
 
 formas 
 Corpora Ovid. Metam. I. 
 
 IF we do not ftrictly affert, as of fome- 
 thing abfolute and certain, but as of fome- 
 thing poffible only, and in the number of 
 
 Con- 
 
 nius obferves tol? pi^uww ( 
 "X^y.?! (fiafifo-ic the Soul's Difpofitisn is in an eminent de- 
 gree attached to Verbs. De $ynt. L. III. c. 1 3. Thus 
 too Prifcian : Modi funt diverfie INCLINATIONES 
 AN i MI, quas varia confequitur DEC LIN* AT jo 
 
 L. via. P . 821.
 
 i 4 2 HERMES. 
 
 C.VIII. Contingents, this makes that Mode, which 
 Grammarians call the POTENTIAL ; and 
 which becomes on fuch occafions the lead- 
 ing Mode of the Sentence. 
 
 Sed tacit us pafciji poffet Corvus, HA- 
 
 BERET 
 Plus dapisy &c. Mor. 
 
 YET fometimes 'tis not the leading 
 Mode, but only fubjoined to the Indica- 
 tive. In fuch cafe, it is moftly ufed to 
 denote the End, or final Caufe -, which 
 End, as in human Life it is always a Con- 
 tingent, and may never perhaps happen 
 in defpite of all our Forefight, is there- 
 fore expreft moft naturally by the Mode 
 here mentioned. For example, 
 
 Uf JUGULENT homines, fur gunt de nofte 
 latroncs. HOR. 
 
 Tbieves rife by night, that they may cut 
 tnens throats. 
 
 HERE
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 143 
 
 HERE that they rife, ispojitfoefy offer ted C.VIII. 
 in the Declarative or Indicative Mode ; but 
 as to their cutting mens throats, this is only 
 delivered potentially, becaufe how truly fo- 
 ever it may be the End of their fifing, it is 
 fKllbut ^Contingent ; ,that may never perhaps 
 happen. This Mode, as often as it is in this 
 manner fubjoined,is called byGrammarians 
 not the Potential, but THE SUBJUNCTIVE. 
 
 BUT it fb happens, in the Conftitution 
 of human affairs, that it is not always fuffi- 
 cient merely to declare ourfelves to Others. 
 We find it often expedient, from a con- 
 fcioufnefs of our Inability, to addrefs them 
 after a manner more interefting to our- 
 felves, whether to hzvefome Perception in- 
 formed, or fome Volition gratified. Hence 
 then new Modes of fpeaking ; if we inter- 
 rogate, 'tis the INTERROGATIVE MODE > 
 if we require, 'tis the REQUISITIVE. Even 
 the Requifitive itfelf hath its fubordinate 
 Species : With refpeft to inferiors, 'tis 
 an IMPERATIVE MODE with refpedtto 
 2 equals
 
 144 HERMES. 
 
 C.VIII. equals and fuperiors, 'tis a PRECATIVE or 
 OPTATIVE*, 
 
 AND thus have we eftablifhed a variety 
 of Modes; the INDICATIVE or DECLARA- 
 
 TIVE, to affert what we think certain ; the 
 POTENT i AL,for the Purpofes of whatever 
 we think Contingent, THE INTERROGA- 
 TIVE, when we are doubtful y to procure us 
 Information; and THE REQ^JISITIVE, to 
 ajjijl us in the gratification of our Volitions. 
 The Requifitive too appears under two 
 diflinft Species, either as 'tis IMPERA- 
 TIVE to inferiors, or PRECATIVE to fu- 
 periors (c]. 
 
 As 
 
 * It was the confounding of this Diftinction, that 
 gave rife to a Sophifm of Protagoras. Homer (fays he) 
 in beginning his Iliad with Sing, Mufe, the Wrath, 
 when he thinks to pray, in reality commands, "'jyjt- 
 crOai olou.fvoc 9 IzrrraVta. Ariftot. Poet. c. 19. The 
 Solution is evident from the Divifion here eflablifhed, 
 the Grammatical Form being in both cafes the fame. 
 
 (c) The Species of Modes in great meafure depend 
 on the Species of Sentences. The Stoics increafed the 
 number of Sentences far beyond the Peripatetics, Be- 
 fides thofe mentioned in Chapter II. Note (/>) they had 
 
 many
 
 BOOJC THE FIRST. 145 
 
 As therefore all thefe feveral Modes C. VIII. 
 have their foundation in nature, fo have 
 
 certain 
 
 many more, as may be feen in Ammtmius de Interpret. 
 p. 4. and Diogenes Laertius, L. VII. 66. The Peri- 
 patetics (and it feems too with reafon) confidered all 
 thefe additional Sentences as included within thofe, 
 which they themfelves acknowleged, and which they 
 made to be five in number, the Vocative, the Impera- 
 tive, the Interrogative, the Precative, and the Aflertive. 
 There is no mention of a Potential Sentence, which may 
 be fuppofed to co-incide with the Aflertive, or Indica- 
 tive. The Vocative (which the Peripatetics called the 
 but the Stoics more properly srooraj/o- 
 was nothing more than the Form of Addrefs 
 in point of names, titles, and epithets, with which we 
 apply ourfelves one to another. As therefore it feldom 
 included any Verb within it, it could hardly contribute 
 to form a verbal Mode. Ammcnius and Boethius, the 
 one a Greek Peripatetic, the other a Latln^ have illu- 
 ftrated the Species of Sentences from Homer and Virgil, 
 after the following manner. 
 
 T* Ao>w/7s usu-j, T re KAHTIKOT", w? , 
 
 *n 
 
 rS nPOSTAKTlKOlf, ; T\
 
 HERMES. 
 
 C.VIII. certain marks or flgns of them been Intro- 
 duced into Languages, that we may be 
 
 enabled 
 
 T? 'EPHTHMATIKOT", u? TO, 
 
 TV?, nro0y j? a'vJflwu j 
 j T 'ETKTIKOT", utT$ 9 
 
 * j T TZTKTfp - 
 
 i AnO$ANTIKOT*', xaS' ou 
 
 (fix.ivoy.sQz, Uf^l OTOUSU TWV s 
 - 0foi J 1 / re zzrayra 
 
 o?, &C. El? TO srfpi 'E^. p. 4. 
 
 Boetbius's Account is as follows. Perfeftarum vero 
 Orationum paries qulnque funt : DEPRECATIVA, /, 
 
 Jupiter omnipotent, precibusfi fefleris ullis, 
 
 Da dcinde auxilium, Pater, atque hac ominafrma. 
 
 IMPERATIVA, ut 9 
 
 Vade age, Nate, vyca Zephyros, ^3* iabere pennis. 
 
 INTERROGATIVA, ut, 
 
 Die mihi, Damcsta, cujum pecus ? 
 
 \*OCATIVA, ftf, 
 
 O I Pater, O ! bominum rerumque aterna poteftas. 
 
 ENUNTIATIVA, in qua Veritas vel Falfitas invenitur, ut, 
 Prindpio arborilus varia ejl natura creand'n. 
 
 Boeth. in Lib. dc Interp. p. 291. 
 
 In
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 147 
 
 enable by our difcourfe to fignify them, C.VIII. 
 one to another. And hence thofe various 
 MODES or MOODS, of which we find in 
 common Grammars fo prolix a detail, and 
 which are in fact no more than " fo many 
 " literal Forms, intended to exprefs thefe 
 " natural Diftindtions" (d). 
 
 ALL 
 
 In Milton the fame Sentences may be found, as fol- 
 lows. THE PRECATIVE, 
 
 Univerfal Lord ! be bounteous foil 
 To give us nought but Good 
 
 THE IMPERATIVE, 
 
 Go then, Thou migbtiefl, in thy Father's might. 
 
 THE INTERROGATIVE, 
 
 Whence, and what art thou, execrable Shape ? 
 
 THE VOCATIVE, 
 
 Adam, earth's hallow* d Mold, 
 
 Of God infpir'd 
 
 THE ASSERTIVE OR ENUNTIATIVE, 
 
 The conquer' d alfo and enjlav'dby "war 
 Shall, with their freedom hjl, all virtue loje, 
 
 (d) The Greek Language, which is of all the moft 
 
 elegant and complete, exprefles thefe feveral Modes, 
 
 L 2 2nd
 
 148 HERMES. 
 
 
 
 C.VIII. ALL thefe MODES have this in com- 
 mon, that they exhibit fome way or other 
 
 the 
 
 and all diftin&ions of Time likewife, by an adequate 
 number of Variations in each particular Verb. Thefe 
 Variations may be found, fome at the beginning of the 
 Verb, others at its ending, and confift for the moft part 
 cither in multiplying or diminijbing the number of Sylla- 
 bles, or elfo in lengthening or Jhortenlng their refpe&ive 
 Quantities, which two methods are called by Gram- 
 marians the Syllabic and the Temporal. The Latin, 
 which is but a Species of Greek fomewhat debafed, ad- 
 mits in like manner a large portion of thofe Variations, 
 which are chiefly to be found at the Ending of its Verbs, 
 and but rarely at their Beginning. Yet in its Depo- 
 nents and Paffives 'tis fo far defective, as to be forced to 
 have recourfe to the Auxiliar,fum. The modern Lan- 
 guages, which have ftill fewer of thofe Variations, have 
 been neceflitated all of them to aflume two Auxiliars 
 at leaft, that is to fay, thofe which exprefs in each Lan- 
 guage the Verbs, Have, and Am. As to the Englljh 
 Tongue, it is fo poor in this refpect, as to admit no 
 Variation for Modes, and only one for Time, which 
 we apply to exprefs an Aorift of the Part. Thus from 
 Write cometh Wrote ; from Give, Gave ; from Speak, 
 Spake, &c. Hence to exprefs Time, and Modes, we 
 are compelled to employ no lefs than feven Auxiliars, 
 viz. Do, Am, Have, Shall, Will, May and Can ; which 
 we ufe fometimes fingly, as when we fay, I am writ- 
 ing,
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 1 49 
 
 the SOUL and its AFFECTIONS. Their CVIII. 
 Peculiarities and Diftindtions are in part, 
 as follows. 
 
 THE REQJLJISITIVE and INTERROGA- 
 TIVE MODES are diftinguifhed from the 
 Indicative and. Potent ial> that whereas thefe 
 loft feldom want a Return, to the two for- 
 mer it is always necejary. 
 
 IF we compare THE REQUISITIVE 
 MODE with THE INTERROGATIVE, we 
 {hall find thefe alfo difiinguimed, and that 
 not only in the Return, but in other Pe- 
 culiarities. 
 
 To 
 
 ing, I have written ; fometimes two together, as, I 
 have been writing, I Jhotdd have written ; fometimes HO 
 lefs than three, as I might have been loft, he could have 
 been preferved. But for thefe, and all other Specula- 
 tions, relative to the Genius of the Englijh Language, 
 we refer the Reader, who wifhes for the moft authen- 
 tic information, to that excellent Treatife of the learned 
 Dr. Lovjtke, intitled, A ftiort Introduction to E-nglijl 
 Grammar.
 
 HERMES. 
 
 C.VJII. The Return to the Requi/itive is fome- 
 times made in Words, Jbmetimes in Deeds. 
 To the Requeft of Dido to Eneas 
 
 a prima die, hofpes, origine nobis 
 
 Injidias Danaum 
 
 the proper Return was in Words, that is, 
 in an hiftorical Narrative. To the Requeft 
 
 of the unfortunate Chief date obohtm 
 
 Belifario the proper Return was in a 
 Deed, that is, in a charitable Relief. But 
 with refpec~l to the Interrogative, the Re- 
 turn is necejfarily made in Words alone, in 
 Words, which are called a Refponfe or An- 
 fwer, and which are always actually or 
 by implication fome definitive affertive 
 Sentence. Take Examples. Whofe Verfes 
 are thefe? the Return is a Sentence 
 T^heje are Verfes of Homer. Was Brutus 
 a worthy Man ? the Return is a Sen- 
 tence Brutus was a worthy Man. 
 
 AND hence (if we may be per- 
 mitted to digrefs ) we may perceive 
 
 , 
 2 the
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 151 
 
 the near affinity of this Interrogative Mode CVIII. 
 with the Indicative, in which laft its Re- 
 iponfe or Return is moftly made. So near 
 indeed is this Affinity, that in thefe two 
 Modes alone the Verb retains the fame 
 Form (e), nor are they otherwife diflin- 
 guimed, than either by the Addition or 
 Abfence of fome fmall Particle, or by fome 
 minute change in the collocation of the 
 Words, or fometimes only by a change in 
 the Tone, or Accent (/*). 
 
 BUT 
 
 x<xr!p#<nv 
 
 C^t'pft tf( TO M/a; o^r>t>f. The Indicative Mode, of 
 which we fpeak^ by laying afide that Ajjertlon^ which by 
 its nature it implies, quits the name of Indicative when it 
 rtaj/umes the AJJertion^ it returns again to its proper Cha- 
 racter. Apoll. de Synt. L. III. c. 21. Theodore G^za 
 fays the fame, Introd. Gram, L. IV. 
 
 (f) It may be obferved of the INTERROGATIVE, 
 
 that as often as the Interrogation is Jimple and definite^ 
 
 the Refponfe may be made in almoft the fame Words, 
 
 L 4 by
 
 152 H E R M E S. 
 
 CVIII. BUT to return to our comparifon be 
 tween the Interrogative Mode and the Re 
 
 THE 
 
 by converting them into a fcritence affirmative or nega- 
 tive, according as the Truth is either one or the other. 
 For example Are thefe Ferfes of Homer ? Refponfe 
 Thefe Ferfes are of Homer. Are tbofe Ferfes of Virgil ? 
 Refponfe Thofe are not Ferfes of Virgil. And here 
 the Artifts of Language, for the fake of brevity and 
 difpatch, have provided two Particles, to reprefent all 
 fuch Refponfes, YES, for all the affirmative} No, for 
 all the negative. 
 
 But when the Interrogation is complex, as when we 
 fay Are thefe Ferfes of Homer, or of Virgil ? much 
 more, when it is indefinite, as when we fay in general 
 
 Whofe are thefe Ferfes ? we cannot then refpond 
 
 after the manner above mentioned. The Reafon is, 
 that no Interrogation can be anfwered by a fimple Tes y 
 or a fimple No, except only thofe, which are themfelves 
 fo fimple, as of two pollible Anfwers to admit only one. 
 Now the leaft complex Interrogation will admit of four 
 Anfwers, two affirmative, two negative, if not perhaps 
 of more. The reafon is, a complex Interrogation can- 
 not confift of lefs than two fimple ones ; each of which 
 may be feparately affirmed and feparately denied. For 
 
 inftance
 
 BOOK TH^FIRS T. 153 
 
 THE INTERROGATIVE (in the Ian- C. VIII. 
 guage of Grammarians) has all Perfons 
 
 of 
 
 inftance Are thefe Verfes Homer's, or Virgil's? (i.) 
 They are Homer's (2.) They are not Homer's (3.) 
 They are Virgil's (4.) They are not Virgih we may 
 add, (5.) They are of neither. The indefinite Interro- 
 gations go ftill farther j for thefe may be anfwered by 
 infinite affirmatives, and infinite negatives. For in- 
 ftance Whofe are thefe Verfa ? We may anfwer affir- 
 matively They are Virgil's, They are Horace's, They 
 
 are Ovid's, &c, or negatively They are not Virgil's, 
 They are not Horace's, They are not Ovid's, and fo on, 
 cither way to infinity. How then fhould we learn from 
 a fingle Yes, or a fingle No t which particular is meant 
 among infinite Poffibles ? Thefe therefore are Interro- 
 gations which muft be always anfwered by a Sentence. 
 Yet even here Cuftom hath confulted for Brevity, by 
 returning for Anfwer only \htfingle ejfential charatterijlic 
 Word> and retrenching by an Ellipfis all the reft, which 
 reft the Interrogator is left to fupply from himfelf. 
 Thus when we are afked How many right angles equal 
 the angles of a triangle ? we anfwer in the fhort mo- 
 nofyllable, Two whereas, without the Ellipfis, the 
 anfwer would have been Two right angles equal the 
 angles of a triangle* 
 
 The
 
 154 H E a M E S. 
 
 C.VIII. of both Numbers. The REQUISITIVE 
 or IMPERATIVE has no firft Perfon of 
 the fmgular, and that from this plain 
 reafon, that 'tis equally abfurd in Modes 
 for a perfon to requeft or give commands 
 to bimfrlfj as it is in Pronouns, for the 
 Speaker to become the fubjett of his own 
 addrefs *. 
 
 AGAIN, we may interrogate as to all 
 'Times, both Prefent, Paft, and Future. 
 Who WAS Founder of Rome ? Who is 
 &/? ^ China ? Who WILL DISCOVER 
 the Longitude ? But Intreating and Com- 
 manding (which are the EfTen.ce of the 
 
 Re- 
 
 The Antients diftinguifhed thefe two Species of In- 
 terrogation by different names. The fimple they called 
 'fioiT^a, Interrogatlo j the complex, -sruV^ta, Percon- 
 tatio. Ammonius calls the firft of thefe 'E^COTTJTIJ <Ja- 
 \t*[rt& ; the other, 'E^wrrxn; zruir^aTJXJj. See Am. 
 in Lib. de Interpr. p. 160, Diog. Laert. VII. 66. 
 /. //?. IX. 2. 
 
 * Sup. p. 74, 75.
 
 BOOK THS FIRST. 155 
 
 Requijitive Mode) have a neceflary re- CVIIF. 
 fpeft to the future (g) only. For indeed 
 
 what 
 
 (g) dpellonius's Account of the Future, implied in 
 ill Imperatives, is worth obferving. 'E?n y<*$ ^ y\- 
 TW n' nPOSTAHIS* T* ^ a 
 
 i, MEAAONTO'2 to. A COMMAND 
 w re/pffl to thofe things which either are not doing^ or 
 have not yet been done. But thofe things, which being not 
 now doing, or having not yet been done, have a natural 
 aptitude to exifl hereafter, may be properly faid to apper- 
 tain to THE FUTURE, DeSyntaxi, L.I. 0.36. Soon 
 before this he fays "ATTOIVTX rx, crpor'ajclixa i 
 
 TO, 'O TTEANNOKTONH2A2 TIMA20I2, 
 TW , TIMH0HIETAI, xara T w ^oi/a 
 
 v. All IMPERATIVES ^w ^2 difpofjtion within 
 them, which refpetfs THE FUTURE with regard there- 
 fore to TIME, 'tis the fame thing to fay, LET HIM, 
 THAT KILLS A TYRANT, BE HONOURED, or, HE, 
 THAT KILLS ONE, SHALL BE HONOURED j the dif- 
 ference being only in the Mode, in as much as one is IM- 
 PERATIVE, the ether INDICATIVE or Declarative. 
 Apoll. de Syntaxi, L. I. c. 35. Prifcian feems to al- 
 low Imperatives a (hare of Prefent Time, as well as 
 future. But if we attend, we fhall find his Prefent to 
 
 be
 
 156 HERMES. 
 
 C.VIIL what have they to do with the prefent or 
 the paft, the natures of which are im- 
 mutable and neceflary ? 
 
 'Tis 
 
 be nothing elfe than an immediate Future^ as oppofed to 
 a more diftant one. Imperathus vero Pr&fem & Futu- 
 rum \fTempus] natural: quddam neccjjitate videtur poj/e 
 accipere. Ea etenim imperamus, qua vel in prafenti Jiu- 
 titn volumus fieri fine aliqud dilatione, velinfuturo. Lib. 
 VIII. p. 8c6. ' 
 
 'Tis true the Greeks in their Imperatives admit cer- 
 tain Tenfes of the Paft, fuch as thofe of the Perfefiuni) 
 and of the two Aorijls. But then thefe Tenfes, when 
 fo applied, either totally lofe their temporary Character, 
 or elfe are ufed to infmuate fuch a Speed of execution^ 
 that the deed fhould be (as it were) done t in the very 
 inftant when commanded. The fame difference feems 
 to fubfift between our Englijh Imperative, BE GONE, 
 and thofe others of, Go, or BE GOING. The firft (if 
 we pleafe) may be (tiled the Imperative of the Perfettum^ 
 as calling in the very inftant for the completion of our 
 Commands ; the others may be ftiled Imperatives of tht 
 Future, as allowing a reafonable time to begin firft, and 
 finifh afterward* 
 
 'Tis thus ApolloniuS) in the Chapter firft cited, diftin- 
 
 guiflies between (rxaTrl/rw T? a'/ATrjAac;, Go to digging 
 
 the Vincs^ and (rxa^rw ra? ,u7rA?, Get the Vines 
 
 3 dug.
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 157 
 
 *Tis from this connexion of Futurity C-VIII. 
 with Commands, that the Future Indica- 
 tive is fome times ufed for the Imperative, 
 and that to fay to any one, You SHALL 
 DO THIS, has often the fame Force with 
 the Imperative, Do THIS. So in the 
 Decalogue THOU SHALT NOT KILL 
 
 THOU SHALT NOT BEAR FALSE 
 
 WITNESS 
 
 dug. The firft is fpoken (as he calls it) ' ? 
 ly way of Extenfan, or allowance of Time for the work ', 
 the fecond, tlf <nimA<wony, with a view to immediate 
 Completion. And in another place, explaining the dif- 
 ference between the fame Tenfes, Sxaiirle and 
 he fays of the laft, povov TO py /fvo pevov 
 AX, x, ro juvouewv iv votfceraptt obwQ>t*iori, that it 
 not only commands fomttbing, which has not been yet done, 
 but forbids alfo that, which is now doing in an Extenfan, 
 that is to fay, in a flow and lengthened progrefs. Hence, 
 if a man has been a long while writing, and we are wil- 
 ling to haften him, 'twould be wrong to fay in Greek, 
 TPA'$E, WRITE (for that he is now, and has been 
 long doing) but TPA'^ON, GET YOUR WRITING 
 
 DONE; MAKE NO DELAYS. See Apoll. L. III. .24. 
 
 See alfo Macrobius de Dlff. Verb. Grac. iff Lot. p. 68c. 
 Edit, Parlor, Latini non ajlimaverunt, &c.
 
 158 HERMES. 
 
 C. VIII. WITNESS which denote (we know) 
 the ftri&eft and moft authoritative Com- 
 mands. 
 
 As to the POTENTIAL MODE, it is 
 diftinguifhed from all the reft, by itsfub- 
 ordinate or Jtyfun&rve Nature. It is alfo 
 farther diftinguifhed from the "Reqtiifttfoe 
 
 and Interrogative, by implying a kind of 
 feeble and weak Ajfcrtwn, and fo becom- 
 ing in fome degree fufceptible of Truth 
 and Falmood. Thus, if it be faid po- 
 tentially, This may be, or, 'This might 
 have been, we may remark without ab- 
 furdity, yf Tis true, or 'fisfalfe. But if it 
 be faid, Do this, meaning, Fly to Hea- 
 ven, or, Can this be done? meaning, to 
 fquare the Circle, we cannot fay in either 
 cafe, 'tis true or 'tis falfe, though the 
 Command and the Queflion are about 
 things impoffible. Yet jflill the Potential 
 does not afpire to the Indicative, becaufe 
 it implies but a ditHous and conjectural 
 
 Aflertion, 

 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 
 
 Aflertion, whereas that of the Indicative C-VIIL 
 is abfolute, and without referve. 
 
 THIS therefore (the INDICATIVE 1 
 mean) is the Mode, which, as in all Gram- 
 mars 'tis the firft in order, fo is truly 
 firft both in Dignity and Ufe. 'Tis this, 
 which publifhes our fublimefl Percep- 
 tions 5 which exhibits the Soul in her 
 pureft Energies, fuperior to the Imper- 
 fection of Deilres and Wants j which in- 
 cludes the whole of Time, and its mi- 
 nuteft Distinctions ; which, in its various 
 Paji Tenfes, is employed by Hiftory, to 
 preferve to us the Remembrance of for- 
 mer Events; in its Futures is ufed by 
 Prophecy, or (in default of this) by wife 
 Forefight, to inftruct and forewarn us, as 
 to that which is coming ; but above all 
 in its Prefent Tenfe ferves Philofophy 
 and the Sciences, by juft Demonftra- 
 tions to eftablifh ntceffary Truth-, THAT 
 TRUTH, whichf from its nature only ex-
 
 160 H E R M E S. 
 
 C.VIIL ijls in the Prefent -, which knows no di- 
 ftindtions either of Paft or of Future, 
 but is every where and always invariably 
 one (). 
 
 THROUGH 
 
 (h) See the quotation, Note (<), Chapter the Sixth. 
 Cum enim dicimus y DEUS EST, non eum didmus nunc 
 &c. 
 
 Bsetbius, author of the fentiment there quoted, was 
 by birth a Raman of the firft quality ; by religion, a 
 Chriftian ; and by philofophy, a Platonic and Peripate- 
 tic } which two Setts, as they fprang from the fame 
 Source, were in the latter ages of antiquity commonly 
 adopted by the fame Perfons, fuch as Tliemijlius^ Por- 
 phyry, Iamb!ichus t Ammonlus^ and others. There were 
 no Se&s of Philofophy, that lay greater Strefs on the 
 diftin&ion between things exifling in Time and not in 
 Time, than the two -above-mentioned. The Doctrine 
 of the Peripatetics on this Subject (fmce 'tis thefe that 
 Boethius here follows) may be partly underftood from 
 the following Sketch. 
 
 THE THINGS, THAT EXIST IN TIME, are 
 " thofe whofe Exijhnce Time can meafure. But if their 
 " Exiftence may be meafured by Time, then there 
 " may be aflumed a Time greater than the Exiftence 
 *' of any one of them, as there may be afiumed a 
 ** number greater than the greateft multitude, that is 
 
 <* capable
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 161 
 
 THROUGH all the above Modes, with C.VIII. 
 their refpe&ive Tenfes, the Verb being 
 
 con- 
 
 " capable of being numbred. And hence 'tis that 
 * e things temporary have their Exiftence, as it were //- 
 ' mited by Time ; that they are confined within it, as 
 ** within fome bound j and that in fome degree or other 
 *' they all fubm'it to its power t according to thofe com- 
 " mon Phrafes, that Time is a dejlroyer; that things 
 " decay through Time ; that men forget in Time, and lofe 
 *' their abilities, and feldom that they improve, or grow 
 <c young, or beautiful. The truth indeed is, Time al- 
 " "Ways attends Motion. Now the natural effect of M<j- 
 " tion is to put fsmething, which now is t out of that 
 " Jiate, in ivhich it now is, and fo far therefore to de- 
 " ftroy that State. 
 
 " The reverfeof all this holds with THINGS THAT 
 <' EXIST ETERNALLYi Thefe exift not in Time, be- 
 <c caufe Time is fo far from being able to meafure their 
 " Exiftence, that no Time can be ajjumed, which their 
 " ExiJJence doth not furpafs. To which we may add, 
 " that they feel none of its ejfefts^ being no way ob- 
 " noxious either to damage or diflblution. 
 
 " To inftance in examples of either kind of Being, 
 " There are fuch things at this inftant, as Stonehenge 
 tc and the Pyramids, 'Tis likewife true at this inftant, 
 " that the Diameter of toe Square is incommenfurable 
 " ivith its fide. What then Ihall we fay ? Was there 
 M " ev^r
 
 162 HERMES. 
 
 C.VIII. confidered as denoting an ATTRIBUTE, 
 has always reference to fome Perfon, or 
 SUBSTANCE. Thus if we fay, Went y or 9 
 Go, or Whither goeth, or, Might have gone, 
 we muft add a Perfon or Subftance, to 
 make the Sentence complete. Cicero 
 'went ; Caefar might have gone ; whither 
 goeth the Wind? Go! Thou Traitor! But 
 there is a Mode or Form, under which 
 Verbs fometimes appear, where they have 
 no reference at all to Perfons or Sub- 
 fiances. For example To eat is pleafant ', 
 
 but 
 
 < c ever a Time, when it was not incommenfurable, as 
 " 'tis certain there was a Time, when there was no 
 *< Stonehenge, or Pyramids ? or is it daily growing lefs 
 <c incommcnjurable^ as we are aflured of Decays in both 
 " thofe mafly Structures ?" From thefe unchangeable 
 Truths, we may pafs to their Place, or Region ; to the 
 imceafing Intellection of the univerfal Mind, ever perfect, 
 ever full, knowing no remiffions, languors, &c. See Nat. 
 Jufe L. IV. c. 19. Metaph. L. XIV. c. 6, 7, 8, 9, 
 10. Edit. Du Val. and Vol.1, p. 262. Note VII. 
 The following Paflage may deferve Attention. 
 
 Tou yp No? 5 f*f mli tvtyvxtn, xj f*ij vow' o Jt x^ tr/pfXf, 
 icj fosT. aX/\* xj ofTOf OVTTU rt^io;, v f*>j orfoo'6^ elvra TO xj 
 osr s, xj oaVriz o-Jv, cj fi-/j aXAsrt XX. wre i" ikTiX/ra- 
 TOJ o oo;y e', xj tsdvriz, xj i'a. Max. Tyr. Di/T. XVII. 
 
 p. 201. Ed. Lond.
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 163 
 
 but to f aft is wbolefome. Here the Verbs, To C.VIII. 
 eat) and, To faft y ftand alone by them- 
 felves* nor is it requifite or even pradlica- 
 ble to prefix a Perfon or Subftance. Hence 
 the Latin and modern Grammarians have 
 called Verbs under this Mode, from this 
 their indefinite nature, INFINITIVES. 
 Santtius has given them the name of Im- 
 perfonah -, and the Greeks that of 'ATra^ep- 
 <para. from the fame reafon of their not 
 dijcovering either Perfon or Number. 
 
 THESE INFINITIVES go farther. They 
 not only lay afide the character of Attribu- 
 fives, but they alfo afTume that of Sub/Ian- 
 //?w,and as fuch themfelves become diftin- 
 guimed with their feveral Attributes. Thus 
 in the inftance above, Pleafant is the At- 
 tribute, attending the Infinitive, To Eat;- 
 Wholefome the attribute attending the In- 
 finitive, To Fafl. Examples in Greek and 
 Latin of like kind are innumerable. 
 
 Dulce & decorum eft pro patria MORI. 
 
 &CIRE tuum nibil eft 
 
 M 2 'O
 
 164 HERMES. 
 
 C.VIII. Ou xurQave'iit yap Setvov, XX* 
 
 . 
 
 THE Stoics in their grammatical inqui- 
 ries had this Infinitive in fuch efteem, that 
 
 they 
 
 (;') 'Tis from the INFINITIVE thus participating the 
 nature of a Noun or Subftantive, that the beft Gram- 
 marians have called it fometimes 'Oi/o ( u p'^aTiXov, 
 A VERBAL NOUN; fometimes"Ovo i ua p^arc?, THE 
 VERB'S NOUN. The Reafon of this Appellation is in 
 Greek more evident, from its taking the prepofitive Ar- 
 ticle before it in all cafes j TO j^a^m, ra ^a>m, 
 T ypxnv. The fame conftru&ion is not unkndwn 
 in Englijh. 
 
 Thus Spgnccr, 
 
 For tiot to have been dipt in Lethe lake 4 
 
 Could fave the Son ofThetls FROM to DIE 
 
 aVo T Savelv. In like manner we fay, He did it, tt> 
 le rich, where we muft fupply by an Ellipfis the Prepo- 
 fition, FOR. He did it, for to be rich, the fame as if 
 
 we had faid, He did it for gain mxa ra zrATn>, 
 
 &xa TB xf'p&f in French, pour Jenricher. Even 
 
 when v/e fpeak fuch Sentences, as the following, / 
 cboofe TO PHILOSOPHIZE, ratkr than TO BE RICH, 
 TO >Xo<7<4>fv |3aAo ( u,ai, ^Trsp TO zrXyri'iv, the Infini- 
 tives are in nature as much Accufatives, as if we were 
 to fay, I ckoofe PHILOSOPHY rather than RICHES, rr,
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 
 
 they held this alone to be the genuine CVIIL 
 PHMA or VERB, a name, which they 
 denied to all the other Modes. Their rea- 
 foning was, they confiderefl the true ver- 
 bal character to be contained fimple and 
 unmixed in the Infinitive only. Thus the 
 Infinitives, Tbwxafiwi Ambulare, To walk, 
 meanjimpfy that Energy, and nothing more. 
 The other Modes, befides exprefiing this 
 Energy, fupcradd certain Affettions^ which 
 refpect Perfons and Circumftances. Thus 
 Ambulo and Ambula mean not firnply To 
 Ik 9 but mean, I walk, and, Walk Tbou. 
 M 3 And 
 
 v f&AfpMN, *j7r*p TO X I uj-Aarcy. Thus too 
 Prifeian, fpeaking of Infinitives CURRERE enlm eft 
 
 CURSUSJ & SCJUBERE, ScRIPTURA ; yLfiGERE, 
 
 LECTIO. Jtaque frequenter y Nominilus adjunguntitr, 
 & aliis cafualibus y more Nominum j ut Perjiu! t 
 
 Sfd pukrum ejl digits monftrari^ & dicier, hie ejl. 
 
 And foon after Cum enlm dico, BONUM EST LE- 
 
 OERE, nikil aliud fignifico, niji, BON A EST LECTIO. 
 Jv. XVIII. p. 1130. See alfo Apoll. L. I. c. 8. Gaza 
 Gram. L. IV. To 
 
 TOf X. T. A.
 
 j66 HERMES. 
 
 p.VlIL And hence they are all of them refolvable 
 into the Infinitive, as their Prototype, toge^ 
 ther wiihfome Sentence or Word, expreffive 
 of their proper Character, Ambitlo, I walk-, 
 that is, Indico me ambulare, I declare myfelf 
 towalk. Ambula^ WalkThou-, lh&tis,Impero 
 te ambulare, I command thee to 'walk ; and 
 fo with the Modes of every other Species, 
 Take away therefore the Affertion, the Com- 
 mand, or whatever elfe gives a Character 
 to any one of thefe Modes, and there re- 
 mains nothing more than THE MERE IN- 
 FINITIVE, which (as Prifcian fays)Jignifi- 
 cat Jpfam rem, quam continet Verbum (/), 
 
 THE 
 
 (,) See Apdlon. L. III. 13. 
 
 etTro TJVOJ x. T. A. See alfo Gaza, in the note 
 before. Igitur a ConJlruEliane quoque Vim rei Verborum 
 (tale/}, Nominis, quad fignificat jpfcm ran) habere IN- 
 ?INITIVUM paj/umus dignofcere j res autem in Perfonas 
 
 diftributa^f/V alios verbi motus. Itaque omnes modi 
 
 in hunc, ideft^ Jnfinitivum, tranfumuntur five refolvun- 
 tur. Prifc. L. XVIII. p. 1131. From thefe Princi- 
 ples dpollontus calls the Infinitive 'P? ( ua 
 2nd Prifcian, Verbum gencrale.
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 167 
 
 THE Application of this Infinitive is C.VIU. 
 fomewhat fingular. It naturally coalefces 
 with all thofe Verbs, that denote any en- 
 dence, Defire, or Volition of the Soul, but 
 not readily with others. Thus 'tis Senfe 
 as well as Syntax, to fay fixXopai yv, Cu- 
 pio vivere, I dejlre to live-, but not to fay 
 'E<r9tu yv, Edo vtvere, or even in Eng- 
 lijh, I eat to five, unlefs by an Ellipfis, 
 inftead of, / eat for to tive; as we fay 
 evKu TV "tjiv, or pour vivre. The Rea- 
 fon is, that though different Affions may 
 unite in the fame Subjeft, and therefore 
 be coupled together (as when we fay, He 
 'walked and difcourfed} yet the Actions 
 notwithftanding remain feparate and di- 
 ftincl. But 'tis not fo with refpect to 
 Volitions, and Aftlons. Here the Coalef- 
 cence is often fo intimate, that the Voli- 
 tion is unintelligible, till the Affiion be 
 expreft. Cuplo, Volo, Dejidero I defire, 
 1 am willing, I want What ? The fen- 
 tences, we fee, are defective and imperfect. 
 M 4 We
 
 HERMES. 
 
 C.V1II. We muft help them then by Infinitives, 
 which exprefs the proper Actions to which 
 they tend. Cupio legere, Volo difcere, De- 
 Jidero vidffe, I defire to read, I am willing 
 to Ifae, I 'want to fee. Thus is the whole 
 rendered complete, as well in Sentiment, 
 as in Syntax (/), 
 
 AND fo much for MODES, and their fe- 
 veral SPECIES. Were we to attempt to 
 denominate them according to their moft 
 eminent Characters, it may be done in the 
 following manner. As every neceflary 
 Truth, and every demonftrative Syllogifm 
 (which laft is no more than a Combina- 
 tion of fuch Truths) mufl always be ex- 
 prefl under poiitive AiTertions, and as po- 
 
 fitive 
 
 (/) Prifcian calls thefe Verbs, whirh naturally pre- 
 cede Infinitives, Verba Voluntatha ; they are called in 
 Greek FboaisETixa. See L. XVIII. 1129. but more 
 particulaily fee Jpollonius, L. III. c. 13. where this 
 whole dodrine is explained with great Accuracy. See 
 nlfo Macrabius de Dif. Verb. Gr. & L0t. p. 685. Ed. 
 
 Var. 
 
 *Nec orr.ne f*W/A$arff cuicunque Verbo, &c.
 
 > x 
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. IP9 
 
 {Ltive Affertions only belong to the Indi- G.VIII. 
 fative, we may denominate it for that rea- 
 fon the MODE OF SCIENCE (m). Again, 
 as the Potential is only converfant about 
 Contingents, of which we cannot fay with 
 certainty that they will happen or not, we 
 may call this Mode, THE MODE OF CON- 
 JECTURE. Again, as thofe that are ig- 
 norant and would be informed, mufl aik 
 of thofe {hat already know, this being the 
 natural way of becoming Proficients-, hence 
 we may call the Interrogative, THE MODE 
 OF PROFICIENCY. 
 
 Inter cuntta leges, & PERCONTABERE 
 
 dottos, 
 
 Qua ratione queas traducere Jenifer avum, 
 Quid pure tranquil let, &c. Hor. 
 
 Farther flill, as the higheft and moft ex- 
 cellent ufe of the Requi/itive Mode is le- 
 
 giilativc 
 
 (02) Ob nobilitatem praivit INDICATIVES, felus Mo- 
 dus aptus Scientiis, folm Pater Veritatis. Seal, cle Cauf. 
 3L. Lat. c, 1 16. 3
 
 i 7 o HERMES. 
 
 C.VIII. giflative Command, we may flile it for this 
 reafon THEMODE OF LEGISLATURE. Ad 
 Dhos adeunto cafle> fays Cicero in the cha- 
 radter of a Roman law-giver ; Be it there- 
 fore enattedy fay the Laws of England, and 
 in the fame Mode fpeak the Laws of every 
 other nation. 'Tis alfo in this Mode that 
 the Geometrician, with the authority of a 
 Legiflator, orders lines to be bifefted, and 
 circles defcribed, as preparatives to that 
 Science, which he is about to eftabliih. 
 
 THERE are other fuppofed Affections of 
 -Verbs, fuch as Number and Perfon. But 
 thefe furely cannot be called a part of 
 their Eflence, nor indeed are they the 
 EfTence of any other Attribute, being in 
 fact the Properties, not of Attributes, but 
 of Subftances. The moft that can be 
 faid, is, that Verbs in the more elegant 
 Languages are provided with certain Ter- 
 minations, which refpect the Number and 
 Perfon of every Subjlantivey that we may 
 2 know
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 171 
 
 know with more precifion. in a complex C.VIII. 
 Sentence, each particular Subftance, with 
 its attendant verbal Attributes. The fame 
 may be faid of Sex, with refpect to Ad- 
 jectives. They have Terminations which 
 vary, as they refpect Beings male or fe- 
 male, tho' Subftance s paft difpute are alone 
 fufceptible of fex (). We therefore pafs 
 over thefe matters, and all of like kind, 
 
 as 
 
 () 'Tis fomewhat extraordinary, that fo acute and 
 rational a Grammarian as Sanflius, fliould juftly deny 
 Genders, or the diftinction of Sex to Adjeftives, and yet 
 make Perfons appertain, not to Suifiantivcs, but to Verbs. 
 His commentator Perizonius is much more confident, 
 vr ho fays At veroji rem refte confident) ipfa Nominibus 
 & Pronominibus vel maxime y inio unite inejl ipfa Pcrfo- 
 na ; & Verba fs habent in Perfonarum ration ud Nomina 
 plane ficuti Adjeftiva in ratione Generum ad Subjlantiva^ 
 quibus foils autor (Sanclius fcil. L. I. c. 7.) &f refe Ge~ 
 nus adfcribit, eydujis Adjetti'vis. Sancl. Minerv. L. I, 
 c. j 2. There is indeed an exaft Analogy between the 
 Accidents of Sex and Perfon. There are but two Sexes^ 
 that is to fay, the Male and the Female ; and but two. 
 Perfons (or Characters efTential to difcourfe) that is to 
 fay, the Speaker, and the Party addreft. The third 
 Sex and third Perfon are improperly fo called, being in 
 fact but Negations of the other two,
 
 I 7 2 H E -R M E S. 
 
 C.VIII as being rather among the Elegancies, than 
 the ElTentials of Language, which Eflen- 
 tials are the Subject of our prefent Inquiry. 
 The .principal of thefe now remaining is 
 THE DIFFERENCE OF VERBS, AS TO 
 
 THEIR SEVERAL SPECIES, which WC en- 
 
 .deavour to explain in the following man.- 
 
 CHAP.
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 
 
 CHAP. IX. 
 
 Concerning the Species of Verbs, and their 
 other remaining Properties. 
 
 ALL Verbs, that are ftriclly fo called, Ch.IX. 
 denote (a) Energies. Now as all 
 Energies are Attributes, they have reference 
 of courfe to certain energizing Subftances. 
 Thus 'tis impofiible there fhould be fuch 
 Energies, as To love, to fly, to wound, &c. 
 if there were not fuch Beings as Men, 
 Birds, Swords, &c. Farther, every Ener- 
 gy doth not only require an Energizer, 
 but is neceflarily converfant about fome 
 Subjett. For example, if we fay, Brutus 
 /ove j- we muft needs fupply loves Cato, 
 
 Cajjius, 
 
 (a) We ufe this word ENERGY, rather than Mo- 
 tion^ from its more comprehenfive meaning ; it being a 
 fort of Genus, which includes within it both Motion and 
 its Privation, See before, p. 94, 95.
 
 H E R M E S. 
 
 Ch.IX. Coffins, Portia, or fome one. *The Sword 
 ivounds i. e. wounds Heftor, Sarpedon* 
 Priam, or fome one. And thus is it, that 
 every Energy is necefTarily fituate between 
 two Subftantives, an Energizer which is 
 aftive, and a Subject which is paj/ive. 
 Hence then, if the Energizer lead the 
 Sentence, the Energy follows its Charac- 
 ter, and becomes what we call A VERB 
 ACTIVE. -Thus we fay Brutus amat, 
 Brutus loves. On the contrary, if the paf- 
 live Subject be principal, it follows the 
 Character of this too, and then becomes 
 what we call A VERB PASSIVE. Thus 
 we fay, Portia amatur, Portia is loved; 
 'Tis in like manner that the fame Road be- 
 tween the Summit and Foot of the fame 
 Mountain, with refpect to the Summit is 
 Afcent, with refpect to the Foot is Defcenf. 
 Since then every Energy refpects an Ener- 
 gizer or a paffive Subject ; hence the Rea- 
 fon why every Verb, whether active or 
 paffive, has in Language a necefTary Re- 
 
 ferenc
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 175 
 
 ference to fome Noun for its Nominative Ch.IX* 
 Cafe (b}. 
 
 BUT to proceed fUll farther from what 
 has been already obferved. Brutus loved 
 Portia. Here Brutus is the Energizerj 
 loved, the Energy, and Portia, the Sub- 
 jett. But it might have been, Brutun 
 loved Cato, or Coffins, or the Roman Re- 
 public -, for the Energy is referable to 
 Subjects infinite. Now among thefe infi- 
 nite Subjects, when that happens to occur, 
 which is the Energizer alfo, as when we 
 fay Brutus loved bimfelf, flew bimfelf, &c. 
 in fuch Cafe the Energy hath to the fame 
 Being a double Relation, both Active and 
 Paflive. And this 'tis which gave rife 
 
 among 
 
 (/>) The doctrine of Imperfonal Verbs has been juftly 
 rejected by the beft Grammarians, both antient and mo- 
 dern. See Sana. Min. L.I. c. J2. L. III. c. I. L.IV. 
 c. 3. Prifcian. L. XVIII. p. 1134. Jpoll. L.III. fub 
 fin. In all which places they will fee a proper Nomi- 
 native fupplied to all Verbs of this fuppofed Character.
 
 176 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.IX. among the Greeks to that Species of Verbs, 
 called VERBS MIDDLE (c), and fuch was 
 their true and original Ufe, however in 
 many in fiances they may have fmce hap- 
 pened to deviate. In other Languages 
 the Verb ftill retains its active Form, and 
 the paffive Subject (fe or bimfelf) is ex- 
 preft like other Accufatives. 
 
 AGAIN, in fome Verbs it happens that 
 the Energy always keeps within the Ener- 
 gizer, and never paffes out to any foreign 
 extraneous Subject. Thus when we fay, 
 walketb, Ccefar fttteth, 'tis impofli- 
 
 blc 
 
 T 
 
 farts, called Verbs middk^ admit a Coincidence of the ac* 
 five and paffive Cbarafter. Apollon. L. III. c. 7. He 
 that would fee this whole Dc&rine concerning the 
 power of THE MIDDLE VERB explained and confirmed 
 with great Ingenuity and Learning, may confult a fmall 
 Treatife of that able Critic . Kuftcr, entitled, De vero 
 Ufu Vcrborum Mediorum. A neat edition of this fcarce 
 piece has been lately publifhed.
 
 BOOK THE FIRST* 177 
 
 ble the Energy Jhould pafs out (as in the Ch.IX. 
 cafe of thofe Verbs called by the Gram- 
 marians VERBS TRANSITIVE) becaufe 
 both the Energizer and the Pqffrve Su&- 
 jecl are united in the fame Perfon. For 
 what is the Caufe of this walking or fit- 
 ting ? .Tis the Will and Vital Powers 
 belonging to Ctefar. And what is the 
 
 Subjecl, made fo to move or to fit ? 
 
 'Tis the Body and Limbs belonging alfo 
 to the fame Cccfar. 'Tis this then forms 
 that Species of Verbs, which Gramma- 
 rians have thought fit to call VERBS NEU- 
 TER, as if indeed they were void both of 
 Action and P^b^when perhaps (likeVerbs 
 middle) they may be rather faid to imply 
 both. Not however to difpute about names, 
 as thefe Neuters in their Energizer always 
 difcover their pq/ive Subject (c] t which 
 
 other 
 
 (<) This Character of Neuters the Greeks very hap- 
 pily exprefs by the Terms, \AuT07ra0f >a and 'L?o7ra0ej, 
 which Prifcian renders, qua ex ff in feipfd fit intrinfecus 
 PaJJia. L. VIIL 790. Confentll An apud Puiftb. p. 
 2051. 
 
 N It
 
 178 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.IX. other Verbs cannot, their paffive Subjects 
 being infinite; hence the reafon why 'tis 
 as fuperfluous in thefe Neuters to have the 
 Subject expreft, as in other Verbs it is ne- 
 cefiary, and cannot be omitted. And thus 
 'tis that we are taught in common Gram- 
 mars 
 
 It may be here obferved, that even thofe Verbs, called 
 Aclives, can upon occafion lay afide their tranfitive Cha- 
 racter ; that is to fay, can drop their fubfequent Accu- 
 fative, and aflame the Form of Neuters, fo as to ftand by 
 themfelves. This happens, when the Difcourfe refpects 
 the mere Energy or Affeflion only, and has no regard to 
 the Subject, be it this thing or that. Thus we fay, * 
 o?&v uiatymiffxtn Tor, This Man knows not how to read, 
 fpeaking only of the Energy, in which we fuppofe him 
 deficient. Had the Difcourfe been upon the Subjects of 
 reading, we muft have added them. '* GIJSV wayi- 
 DMTXfHi T 'O/^'pif, He knows not how to read Homer, 
 or Virgil^ or Cicero, &c. 
 
 Thus Horace, 
 Qui CUPIT out METUIT, jtfuat ilium Jfc domut 
 
 out res, 
 Ut lippum pifla tabula 
 
 He that DESIP.ES or FEARS (not this thing in parti- 
 cular nor that, but in general he within whofe breaft 
 
 thefe
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 179 
 
 mars that Verbs Attive require an Accu- Ch.IX. 
 fative, while Neuters require none. 
 
 OF the above Species of Verbs, the 
 Middle cannot be called neteffary, becaufe 
 moft Languages have done without it. 
 THE SPECIES OF VERBS therefore re- 
 maining are the ACTIVE, the PASSIVE 
 and the NEUTER, and thofe feem eflen- 
 tial to all Languages whatever (J). 
 
 N 2 THERE 
 
 thefe affe&ions prevail) has the fanu joy in a Houfe or 
 Eft ate ^ as the Man with bad Eyes has in fine Pittures. So 
 Cafar in his celebrated Laconic Epiftle of, VENI, Vi- 
 DI, Vici, where two A&ives we fee follow one Neu- 
 ter in the fame detached Form, as that Neuter itfelf. 
 The Glory it feems was In the rapid Sequel of the Events. 
 Conqueft came as quick, as he could come himfelf, and 
 look about him. Whom he faw, and whom he conquered, 
 was not the thing, of which he boafted. See A^oll, 
 L. Ill, c. 31. p. 279. 
 
 (d] The STOICS, in their logical view of Verbs, as 
 making a part in Propofitions, confidered them under 
 
 the four following Sorts, 
 
 When
 
 i8o HERMES. 
 
 Ch.IX. THERE remains a Remark or two far- 
 ther, and then we quit the Subject of 
 Verbs. 'Tis true in general that the 
 greater Part of them denote Attributes of 
 
 Energy 
 
 When a Verb^ co-inciding with the Nominative of 
 fame Noun, made without further help a perfect aflertive 
 Sentence, as Zwxtfarjjf -srie 7rcmr f Socrates walketh j 
 then as the Verb in fuch cafe implied the Power of a 
 perfect Predicate, they called it for that reafon Kari- 
 7/opn/xa, a Predicable ; or elfe, from its readinefc <TJ/X- 
 av, to co-indde with its Noun in completing the Sen- 
 tence, they called it 2u^^a, a Co-incider. 
 
 When a Verb was able with a Noun to form a per- 
 fect aflertive Sentence, yet could not aflbciate with fuch 
 Noun, but under fome oblique Cafe, as Zuxf?'rci pirot.- 
 /y.fXft, Socratem p&nitet : Such a Verb, from its mar 
 approach to jujl Co-incidence, and Predication, they called 
 
 or 
 
 When a Verb, though regularly co-inciding with a 
 Noun in its Nominative, Jiill required^ to complete the 
 Sentiment, fome other Noun under an oblique Cafe, as 
 nXarwu (p^t? Aiwva, Plato loveth Dio, (where without 
 Dia or fome other, the Verb Loveth would reft indefi- 
 
 nite :).-
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 181 
 
 Energy and Motion. But there are fome Ch.IX, 
 which appear to denote nothing more, 
 than a merejimple Adjective, joined to an 
 AfTertion, Thus *Va'< in Greek, and 
 JLqualleth in JLngliJh, mean nothing more 
 N 3 than 
 
 nite:J Such Verb, from this Defect they called Sj T 7< 
 r> rvpCctjua, or % xaT3/oti ( ua, fometbing lefs than a 
 Co-incider, or lefs than a Predicable. 
 
 Laftly, when a Verb required two Nouns in oblique 
 Cafes, to render the Sentiment complete j as when we 
 
 fay Zwxparsi 'AAxja<?8? /xgAtt, Tadet me Vita, or the 
 like : Such Verb they called yrlov, or fAarloy srapa- 
 <rJ/^f zpa, or v\ Tira^ax.aT^o^ua, fometbing lefs than an 
 imperfeft Co-incider, or an im$erfel Predicable. 
 
 Thefe were the Apellat'ions which they gave to Verbs, 
 when employed along with Nouns to the forming of 
 Propofitions. As to the Name of f p H~M A, or VERB, 
 they denied it to them all, giving it only to the Infini- 
 tive, as we have fhewn already. See page 164. See 
 alfo Amman, in Lib. de Interpret, p. 37. Apollon. de 
 Syntaxi L. I. c. 8. L. III. c. 31. p. 279. c. 32. p. 
 295. Theod. Gaz. Gram. L. IV. 
 
 From the above Doctrine it appears, that all Verbs 
 Neuter are Sv^Cc^ala; ; Verbs Active, r7o-, 1
 
 182 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.IX. than 7<ros l$i, is equal. So Albeo in Latin 
 is no more than albus fum. 
 
 Campique ingentes -offibus albent. Virg. 
 
 THE fame may be faid of^fumeo. Mons 
 tumefy i. e. t ut nidus eft, is tumid. To ex- 
 prefs the Energy in thefe instances, we 
 mufl have recourfe to the Inceptives. 
 
 uti prmo cceft cum ALBESCERE 
 Vento. 
 
 Freta ponti 
 
 Jnciplunt a git at a TUMESCERE. Virg. 
 
 THERE are Verbs alfo to be found, 
 which are formed out of Nouns. So that 
 as in Abftratt Nouns (fuch as Whitenefs 
 from White, Geodnefs from Good) as alfo 
 in the Infinitive Modes of Verbs, the Attri- 
 butive is converted into a Subjlantive ; here 
 the Subftantive on the contrary is converted 
 into an Attributive. Such are Kwt'getv from 
 to acJ the part of a Dog, or be a Cy- 
 
 nk 4
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 183 
 
 nlc; QiXtKirigetv from <I>/A7rcr0>, to Philip- Ch.IX. 
 pize, or favour Philip ; Syllaturire from 
 Sylla, to meditate atting the fame part as 
 Sylla did. Thus too the wife and virtuous 
 Emperour, by way of counfel to him- 
 felf vpu ^M\ <x.7roKai<rccpu6y<;, beware thou 
 beefl not BEC^SAR'D ; as though he 
 faid, Beware, that by being Emperor, thou 
 dofl not dwindle into A MERE C^SAR (e). 
 In like manner one of our own witty Poets, 
 
 STERNHOLD himfelf he OUT-STER- 
 
 HOLDED. 
 
 And long before him the facetious Fuller, 
 fpeaking of one Morgan, a fanguinary Bi- 
 fhop in the Reign of Queen Mary, fays of 
 him, that he OUT-BONNER'D even BON- 
 NE R himfelf. *. 
 
 AND fo much for that Species of AT- 
 TRIBUTES, calledVERBs IN THE STRICT- 
 EST SENSE. 
 
 ( e ) Marc." Antonin. L. VI. . 30. 
 * Church Uift. B. VIII. p. 21. 
 
 N 4 CHAP.
 
 1 84 HERMES. 
 
 CHAP. X. 
 
 Concerning thofe other Attributives, 
 Participles and Adjectives. 
 
 Ch. X. rr-v H E Nature of Verbs being under- 
 JL flood, that of PARTICIPLES is no 
 way difficult. Every complete Verb is 
 expreffi ve of an Attribute ; of Time ; and 
 of an AJ/ertion. Now if we take away 
 the Ajjertion, and thus deftroy the Verb, 
 there will remain the Attribute and the 
 Time, which make the Eflence of a PAR- 
 TICIPLE. Thus take away the AfTer- 
 tion from the Verb, Y^n, Writeth, and 
 there remains the Participle, rpcfouv, Writ- 
 ing, which (without the AJ/ertion) denotes 
 the fame Attribute, and the fame Time. 
 After the fame manner, by withdrawing 
 the AJ/ertion, we difcover rpatyas in'^^a- 
 4/f> rpcQuv in rpcQet, for we chufe to re- 
 fer to the Greek, as being of all languages 
 
 the
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 185 
 
 the moft complete, as well in this refpeft, Ch. X. 
 as in others. 
 
 AND fo much for PARTICIPLES (a). 
 
 THE 
 
 (a] The Latins are defective in this Article of Par- 
 ticiples. Their Active Verbs, ending in or y (com- 
 monly called Deponents) have Active Participles of all 
 Times (fuch as Loquens, Locutus^ Locuturus) but none 
 of the Paffive. Their Actives ending in 0, have Par- 
 ticiples of the Prefent and Future (fuch as Scribens^ and 
 Scripturus] but none of the Paft. On the contrary, 
 their Paflives have Participles of the Paft (fuch as Scrip- 
 tits} but none of the Prefent or Future, unlefs we ad- 
 mit fuch as Scribaubn and Docendus for Futures, which 
 Grammarians controvert. The want of thefe Partici- 
 ples they fupply by a Periphrafis for yptycv; they fay, 
 cum fcripfijjet for y^atpcjwEvor, dum fcribitur t &c. In 
 Englijb we have fometimes recourfe to the fame Peri- 
 phrafis ; and fometimes we avail ourfelves of the fame 
 Auxiliars, which form our Modes and Tenfes. 
 
 The Englljh Grammar lays down a good Rule with 
 refpeft to its Participles of the Paft, that they all ter- 
 minate in D, T, or N. This Analogy is perhaps lia- 
 ble to as few Exceptions, as any. Confidering there- 
 fore how little Analogy of any kind we have in our 
 
 Lan-
 
 Ch. X. THE Nature of Verbs and Participles 
 being underftood, that of ADJECTIVES 
 becomes eafy. A Verb implies (as we 
 have faid) both an Attribute, and Time, 
 ( afld an Affcrtion -, a Participle only implies 
 an Attribute, and Time-, and an ADJEC- 
 TIVE only implies an Attribute-, that is to 
 fay, in other Words, an ADJECTIVE has 
 no AffertioTit and only denotes fuch an At- 
 tribute, as hath not its Eflence either in 
 Motion or its Privation. Thus in general 
 the Attributes of Quantity, Quality, and 
 Relation (fuch as many tti&few, great and 
 
 little, 
 
 Language, it Teems wrong to annihilate the few Traces, 
 that may be found. It would be well therefore, if all 
 Writers, who endeavour to be accurate, would be care- 
 ful to avoid a Corruption, at prefent fo prevalent, of 
 faying, ;'/ was wrote, for, it was written ; he was drove, 
 for, be was driven ; I have went, for, I have gone, &c, 
 in all which inftances a Verb is abfurdly ufed to fupply 
 the proper Participle, without any neceffity from the 
 want of fuch Word.
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 187 
 
 little* black and 'white, good and bad, dou- Ch. X. 
 ble, treble, quadruple, &c.) are_all denoted 
 by ADJECTIVES. 
 
 IT mult indeed be confeffed, that fome- 
 times even thofe Attributes, which are 
 wholly foreign to the Idea of Motion, af- 
 fume an AfTertion, and appear as Verbs. 
 Of fuch we gave inftances before, in al- 
 beo, tumeo, l<ra,u, and others. Thefe 
 however, compared to the reft of Verbs, 
 are but few in number, and may be caU 
 led, if thought proper, Verbal Adjettiines. 
 'Tis in like manner, that Participles in- 
 fenfibly pafs too into Adjedives. Thus 
 Do ft us in Latin, and Learned in Engliffj 
 lofe their power, as Participles, and mean 
 a Perfon pofTefTed of an habitual QuaHty, 
 Thus Vir eloquent means riot a man now 
 fpeaking, but a man, who po/e/es the ha- 
 ti f f fpeaking, whether he fpeak or no. 
 So when we fay in Englifi, he is a Think- 
 ing Man, an Underjlanding Man, we mean 
 not a perfon, whofe mind is in atfual 
 
 Energy^
 
 i88 HERMES. 
 
 Ch. X. Energy, but whofe mind is enriched with a 
 larger portion of tbofe powers. 'Tis indeed 
 no wonder, as all Attributives are homo- 
 geneous, that at times the feveral Species 
 mould appear to interfere, and the Dif- 
 ference between them be fcarcely percep- 
 tible. Even in natural Species, which 
 are congenial and of kin, the fpecific 
 Difference is not always to be difcerned, 
 and in appearance at leaft they feem to 
 run into each other. 
 
 WE have fhewn already (fr) in the In- 
 ftances of ifanMrttHr 9 Syllaturire, 'ATTO- 
 ituuretfuQilvui, and others, how Subftan~ 
 fives may be transformed into Verbal At- 
 tributives. We mail now mew, how 
 they may be converted into Aajeftives. 
 When we fay the Party of Pompey, the 
 Stile of Cicero, the Philofophy of Socrates, 
 
 in 
 
 (/>) Sup. p. 182, 183.
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 189 
 
 in thefe cafes the Party, the Stile, and the Ch. X* 
 Philofophy fpoken of, receive a Stamp 
 and Character from the Perfons, whom 
 they refpect. Thofe Perfons therefore 
 perform the part of Attributes, that is, 
 {tamp and characterize their refpective 
 Subjects. Hence then they actually pafs 
 into Attributes 9 and aflame, as fuch, the 
 Form of Adje&tves. And thus 'tis we 
 fay, the Pompeian Party, the Ciceronian 
 Stile, and the Socratic Philofophy. 'Tis 
 in like manner for a Trumpet of Brafs, 
 we fay a Brazen Trumpet ; for a Crown 
 of Gold 9 a Golden Crown, &c. Even Pro- 
 nominal Subflantives admit the like muta- 
 tion. Thus inftead of faying, the Book 
 of Me, of Thee, r.nd of Him, we fay My 
 Book, Thy Book, and His Book -, inftead 
 of faying the Country of Us, ofTou, and 
 of Them, we fay, Our Country, Tour 
 Country, and Their Country; which 
 Words may be called fo many Pronominal 
 Adjeftfoes. 
 
 IT
 
 i 9 o HERMES. 
 
 Ch. X. IT has been obferved already, and muft: 
 needs be obvious to all, that Adjedives, as 
 marking Attributes, can have no Sex (<:). 
 And yet their having Terminations con- 
 formable to the Sex, Number, and Cafe 
 of their Subftantive, feems to have led 
 Grammarians into that ftrange Abfurdity 
 of ranging them with Nouns, and fepa- 
 rating them from Verbs, tho' with relped: 
 to thefe they are perfectly homogeneous; 
 with refpecl: to the others, quite contrary. 
 They are homogeneous with refped: to 
 Verbs, as both forts denote Attributes -, 
 they are heterogeneous with refped to 
 Nouns, as never properly denoting Sub- 
 ftances. But of this we have fpoken be- 
 fore (d). 
 
 THE 
 
 (<:) Sup. p. 171. 
 
 (d] Sup. C. VI. Note (a}. See alfo C.I1I. P , 28, 
 
 '
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 
 
 THE Attributives hitherto treated, that Ch. 
 is to fay, VERBS, PARTICIPLES, and 
 ADJECTIVES, may be called ATTRIBU- 
 TIVES OF THF FIRST ORDER. The 
 
 reafon of this Name will be better un- 
 derftood, when we have more fully dif- 
 cuiTed ATTRIBUTIVES OF THE SECOND 
 ORDER, to which we now proceed in the 
 following Chapter. 
 
 C H A P.
 
 292 .HERMES. 
 
 CHAP. XL 
 
 Concerning Attributives of the Second 
 Order. 
 
 Ch.XI. A S the Attributives hitherto men- 
 L ~~ i ' r ~ ajl A\. tioned denote the Attributes of 
 Subflances, fo there is an inferior Clafs of 
 them, which denote the Attributes only of 
 Attributes. 
 
 To explain by examples in either kind 
 1 when we fay, Cicero and Pliny were both 
 of them eloquent ; Statius and Virgil both of 
 them wrote; in thefe inftances the Attribu- 
 tives, 'Eloquent, and Wrote, are immediately 
 referable to the Subftantives, Cicero, Virgil, 
 &c. As therefore denoting THE ATTRI- 
 BUTES OF SuBSTANCES,wecall them AT- 
 TRIBUTIVES OF THE FIRST ORDER. But 
 when we fay, Pliny was moderately eloquent 9 
 but Cicero exceedingly eloquent ; Statius wrote 
 indifferently, but Virgil wrote admirably, 
 
 in
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 193 
 
 in thefe inftances, the Attributives, Mb- Ch.XI, 
 derately, Exceedingly^ Indifferently) Ad- 
 mirably, are not referable to Buffiarzfives', 
 but to other Attributives , that is, to the 
 words, Eloquent, and Wrote. As there- 
 fore denoting Attributes of Attributes, we 
 call them ATTRIBUTIVES OF THE SE- 
 COND ORDER. 
 
 GRAMMARIANS have given them the 
 Name of 'Evfftftfftetreti AD VERB i A, AD- 
 VERBS. And indeed if we take the word 
 P^tta, or, Verb, in its moil: compre/jen/ive 
 Signification, as including not only Verbs 
 properly fo called, but alfo Participles and 
 Adjectives [an ufage, which maybe juili- 
 fied by the beft authorities (a)} we fhall 
 
 find 
 
 (a] Thus Ariftotle in his Treat ife de Interpretation ,- 
 inftances "A-jQauTro; as a Noun, and Asuxo? as a Verb. 
 DO Ammomus x.ra raro TO <TYiiAOt.iJO[j.;v<JV t ro pt<i 
 KAAOS ^ A1KA1O2 ^ oV To.aura 'PHMATA 
 }>ij>evQoci >% x 'ONOMATA. According to this Signi- 
 fication (that is of denoting the Attributes of Subflance, 
 
 O and
 
 194 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.XI. find the name, Er/jwtyto, or ADVERB, to 
 be a very juft appellation, as denoting A 
 PART OF SPEECH, THE NATURAL AP- 
 PENDAGE OF VERBS. So great is this 
 dependence in grammatical Syntax, that 
 an Adverb can no more fubfift without its 
 Verb, than a Verb can fubfift without its 
 Subftantrvt* 'Tis the fame here, as in cer- 
 tain natural Subjecls. Every Colour for 
 its exiftence as much requires a Superfi- 
 cies, as the Superficies for its exiftence re- 
 quires a folid Body (<). 
 
 AMONG 
 
 and the Predicate in Proportions) the words, FAIR, 
 JUST, and the like^ are called VERBS, and net N o u N s . 
 Am. in libr. de Interp. p. 37. b. Arift. dz Interp, L.I. 
 c. i. See alfoof this Treatife, c.6. Note (a}, p. 87. 
 
 In the fame manner the Stoics talked of the Partici- 
 ple. Nam PARTICIPIUM connumerante* Verbi^ PAR- 
 TICIPIALE VERBUM vocabant vel CASUALE. Prif- 
 dan. L. I. p. 574. 
 
 (//) This notion of ranging the Adverb under the fame 
 dnui with the Verb (by calling them both Attributives) 
 and of explaining it to be tbe VerUs Epithet or Adjeflive 
 
 (by
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 195 
 
 AMONG the Attributes of Subftance are Ch.XI. 
 reckoned Quantities, and Qualities. Thus 
 we fay, a white Garment ', a high Mountain* 
 Now fome of thefe Quantities and Quali- 
 ties are capable of Intention, ana Remif- 
 lion. Thus we fay, a Garment EXCEED- 
 INGLY white; a Mountain TOLERABLY 
 O 2 bigb 9 
 
 (by calling it the Attributive of an Attributive) is con- 
 formable to the bed authorities. Theodore Gaza defines 
 an ADVERB, as follows /W.ECO? Ao'^a aTrlwTov, xarct 
 n i-rriXt'yofj.twu pn^.txn 9 Xj oiov t7ri 
 A Part of Speech devoid of Cafes^ predi- 
 cated of a Ferby or fubjoined to it, and being as it were the 
 Verb's Adjeftive. L. IV. (where by the way we may 
 obferve, how properly the Adverb is made an Aptote^ 
 fmce its Principal fometimes has cafes, as in Falde Sa- 
 piens; fometimes has none, as in Falde amat), Prifdan's 
 definition of an Adverb is as follows ADVERBIUM eft 
 pars orationis indeclinabilis^ cujus fignificatio Ferbis ailjui- 
 tur. H.QC enim perficit Adverbium Ferbis additum^ quod 
 adjefliva nomina appellativis nominibus adjunfia J" ut pru- 
 dens homo j prudenter eglt ; felix Fir ; feliciter vivit. 
 L. XV. p. 1003. And before, fpeaking of the Strict, 
 he fays Etiam AD VE RBI A Nominibus vel VERB is 
 
 CONNUMERABANT, fcf qitafi ADJECTIVA VEREO- 
 
 RUM nominabant. L.I. p. 574, See alfo Apoll. de Synt. 
 L. I. c. 3- fub fin.
 
 H E R M E S. 
 
 Ch.XI. high, or MODERATELY high. Tis plain' 
 therefore that Intention and Remiffion are 
 among the Attributes of fuch Attributes, 
 Hence then one copious Source of feeon- 
 dary Attributives, or Adverbs, to denote 
 thefe two, that is, Intenfion, and Remi/Jio?2. 
 The Greeks have their avpct$us, ^dxi^a, 
 44*#$ wigoi ,* the Latins their valde, vebe- 
 menter, maxime, fatis, inediocriter , the 
 Engtifi their greatly, vaftfy, extremely, 
 fitfficiently, moderately, tolerably, indiffer- 
 ently, &c. 
 
 FARTHER than this, where there are 
 different Intenfions of the fame Attribute, 
 they may be compared together. Thus if 
 the Garment A be EXCEEDINGLY White, 
 and the Garment B be MODERAXTELY 
 White, we may fay, the Garment A is 
 MORE white than the Garment B. 
 
 IN thefe inftances the Adverb MORE 
 not only denotes Intenfion, but relative 
 Intenfion* Nay we ftop not here. We 
 
 not
 
 Bo OK THE FIRST, 1 97 
 
 not only denote Intention merely relative, Ch.XI r 
 but relative Intenfion, them which there is 
 none greater. Thus we not only fay the 
 Mountain A is MORE high than the Moun- 
 tain B, but that 'tis the MOST high of all 
 Mountains. Even Verbs, properly fo called, 
 as they admit Jimple Intentions, fo they 
 admit alfo thefe comparative ones. Thus 
 
 in the following Example Fame he 
 
 LOVETH MORE than Riches , but Virtue of 
 all things he LOVETH MOST the Words 
 MORE and MOST denote the different com-r 
 parative Intenfwns of the Verbal Attribu-r 
 tive, Lovetb. 
 
 AND hence the rife of COMPARISON, 
 and of its different Degrees-, which can- 
 not well be more, than the two Species 
 above mentioned, one to denote Simple 
 Excefs, and one to denote Superlative. 
 Were we indeed to introduce more degrees 
 than thefe, we ought perhaps to introduce 
 infinite, which is abfurd. For why ftop 
 at a limited Number, when in all fubjects, 
 O 3 fuf,
 
 198 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.XI. fufceptible of Intention, the intermediate 
 ExcefTes are in a manner infinite ? There 
 are infinite Degrees of more White, be- 
 tween the Jirft Simple White, and the Su- 
 perlative, Whitejl -, the fame may be faid 
 of more Great, more Strong, more Minute, 
 6?f . The Do&rine of Grammarians about 
 three fuch Degrees, which they call the 
 Pofitive, the Comparative and the Superla- 
 tive, muft needs be abfurd ; both becaufe 
 in their Pofitive there is -f- no Comparifon at 
 all, and becaufe their Superlative is a Com- 
 parative, as much as their Comparative it 
 felf. Examples to evince this may be found 
 every where. Socrates 'was the MOST WISE 
 of all the Athenians Homer wot the MOST 
 SUBLIME of all Poets. 
 
 Cadit et Ripbeus, JUSTJSSIMUS UNUS 
 ^uifuit in Teucris-*- Virg. 
 
 IT 
 
 t Qyi (f c 'l- Gra^us Pofoivus) quonicr'. perfsfius 
 a qmliujdam in mtmero Graduum r.on cc:"*~tt~"* C 
 fc\U\ Ars apud Putfch. p. 2022.
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 1-99 
 
 IT muftbeconfefled thefe Comparatives, Ch.XI. 
 as well thejtmpkj as thcfeferlatrvf, feem 
 fometimes to part with their relative Na- 
 ture, and only retain their intenfi've* Thus 
 in the Degree, denoting fanp/e Excefs, 
 
 Triftior, et lacrumls oculos fuffiifa ni- 
 
 tentes. Virg. 
 
 Rufticior paulo eft Ilor. 
 
 IN the Superlative this is more ufual. 
 Vir doftiffiniiiSi Virfortijjimus, a mofl learned 
 Man, a moft brave Man, that is to fay, 
 not the bra^eft and moft learned Man, that 
 ever exifted, but a Man pofTeffing thofe 
 Qiialities in an eminent Degree. 
 
 THE Authors of Language have con- 
 trived a method to retrench thefe Compa- 
 rative Adverbs, by expreffing their force in 
 the Primary Attributive. Thus inftead of 
 More fair, they fay FAIRER; initead of 
 Moft fair y FAIREST, and the fame holds 
 4 true
 
 20 9 H E R M E S. 
 
 Ch.XI. true both in the Greek and Latin. This 
 Pra&ice however has reached no farther 
 than to Adjefthcs, or at leaft to Participles^ 
 Jharing the nature of Adjectives. Verbs 
 perhaps were thought too much diverfified 
 already, to admit more Variations without 
 perplexity. 
 
 As there are fome Attributives, which 
 admit of Comparifon, fo there are others, 
 which admit of none. Such for example 
 are thofe, which denote that Quality of 
 Bodies arifmgfrom their Figure ; as when 
 we fay, a Circular Table, a Quadrangular 
 Court, a Conical Piece of Metal, &c. The 
 reafon is, that a million of things, partici- 
 pating the fame Figure, participate it equal- 
 ly, if they participate it at all. To fay there- 
 fore that \yhile A and B are both quadran- 
 gular, A is more or lefs quadrangular than 
 J3, is abfurd. The fame holds true in all 
 Attributives, denoting definite Quantifies, 
 whether continuous or difcrete, whether ab- 
 fotute or relative. Thus the two-foot Rule 
 
 A
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 201 
 
 A cannot be more a two-foot Rule, than any Ch.XI. 
 other of the fame length. Twenty Lions 
 cannot be more twenty, than twenty Flies. 
 If A and B be both triple, or quadruple to 
 C, they cannot be more triple, or more qua- 
 druple, one than the other. The reafon of 
 all this is, there can be no Comparifon with- 
 out Intenfion and Remi/fion ; there can be 
 no Intenfion and Remiflion in things al- 
 ways definite-, and fuch are the Attribu-* 
 tives, which we have lad mentioned. 
 
 IN the fame reafoning we fee the caufe, 
 why no Subftantive is fufceptible of thefe 
 Comparative Degrees. A Mountain cannot 
 be faidMORE TO BE, or TO EXIST, than 
 a Mole-hill, but the More and Lefs muft be 
 fought for in their Quantities. In like 
 manner, when we refer many Individuals 
 to one Species, the Lion A cannot be 
 called more a Lion, than the Lion B, but 
 if more any thing, he is more Jierce, more 
 fpeedy,Qi exceeding in fome fuch Attributes. 
 So again, in referring many Species to one 
 
 Genus,,
 
 202 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.XI. Genus, a Crocodile is not more an Ani- 
 mal, than a Lizard; nor a Tiger, more 
 than a Cat, but if any thing, they are 
 more bulky, more ftrong, &c. the Excefs, 
 as before, being derived from their Attri- 
 butes. So true is that faying of the acute 
 Stagirite that SUBSTANCE is not fufcep- 
 tible of MORE tfWLzss (c). But this by 
 way of digreflion, to return to the fubject 
 of Adverbs. 
 
 OF the Adverbs, or fecondary Attribu- 
 tives already mentioned, thefe denoting 
 Intention or Remiffion mav be called Ad- 
 
 
 
 verbs of Quantity continuous -, Once, Twice, 
 Thrice, are Adverbs of Quantity difcrete-, 
 More and Mojl, Lejs and Leaft, to which 
 may be added Equally, Proportionally, Gfr . 
 
 are 
 
 TO 
 
 (f) x KV tirdtftoiTO ri aen'a TO jtxaAAoy 
 Categor. c. 5. Sec alfo Sanflius, L. I. c. 1 1. L. II. 
 c. 10, u. where the Subject of Comparatives is treated 
 in a very mafterly and philofophical manner. See alfo 
 Prifclan, p. 598. Derhantur igilur Comparative a No- 
 minibus jtdeftivit, &c.
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 203 
 
 are Adverbs of Relation. There are others Ch.XI. 
 of Quality, as when we fay, HONESTLY 
 induftrious, PRUDENTLY brave, t hey f ought 
 BRAVELY, he painted FINELY, a Portico 
 form'd CIRCULARLY, a Plain cut TRI- 
 ANGULARLY, 
 
 AND here 'tis worth while to obferve, 
 how the fame thing, participating the 
 fame Effence, affumes different gramma- 
 tical Forms from its different relations. 
 For example, fuppofe it mould be afked, 
 how differ Honeft, Honeftly, and Honejly. 
 The Anfwer is, they are in Effence the 
 fame, but they differ, in as much as Ho~ 
 neft is the Attributive of a Subftantive j 
 Honeftly, of a Verb ; and Honejiy, being 
 diverted of thefe its attributive Relations, 
 affumes the Power of a Subftantive, fo as 
 to fland by itfelf. 
 
 THE Adverbs, hitherto mentioned, are 
 common to Verbs of every Species ; but 
 
 there 
 3
 
 204 H E R M E S. 
 
 Ch.XI. there are fome, which are peculiar to Verbs 
 properly fo called* that is to fay, to fuch as 
 denote Motion or Energy, with their Pri- 
 vations. All MOTION and REST imply 
 TIME and PLACE, as a kind of neceflary 
 Coincidents. Hence then, if we would 
 exprefs the Place or Time of either, we 
 mufl needs have recourfe to the proper 
 Adverbs ; of Place, as when we fay, he 
 flood THERE -, he went HENCE ; he travelled 
 FAR, &c. of Time, as when we fay, be 
 Jlood THEN; be 'went AFTERWARD; be 
 travelled FORMERLY, &c. Should it be 
 
 afked why Adverbs of Time, when 
 
 Verbs have Tenfes ? The Anfwer is, tho' 
 Tenfes may be fufficient to denote the 
 greater Di{linclions of Time, yet to de- 
 note them all by Tenfes would be a per- 
 plexity without end. What a variety of 
 Forms, to denote Tefterday, To-day, To- 
 morrow, Formerly, Lately, Juft now, 
 Now, Immediately, Prefently, Soon, Here* 
 after, &c. ? 'Twas this then that made 
 
 the 
 
 c
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 
 
 the 'Temporal Adverbs neceflary, over and Ch.XL 
 above the Tenfes. 
 
 To the Adverbs juft mentioned may be 
 
 added thofe, which denote the Intenjions 
 
 and Remiffions peculiar to Motion, fuch as 
 
 Jpeedily, ha/lily* fwiftly, flowly, &c. as alfo 
 
 Adverbs of Place, made out of Prepo/i- 
 
 J *S ^ */ 
 
 tions, fuch as oivu and KKTU from avci and 
 fcara, in EngHfo upward and downward, 
 from up and down. In fome inftances the 
 Prepofition fuffers no change, but be- 
 comes an Adverb by nothing more than 
 its Application, as when we fay, CIRCA 
 equltat, he rides ABOUT; PROPE N cecidif* 
 be was NEAR falling ; Verum ne POST 
 confer as culpam in me, Bnf do not AFTER 
 lay the blame on me (d). 
 
 (d] Sofip. Cbarifu In/}. Gram. p. 170. Terent. 
 Adk. II. Sc. 3.
 
 206 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.XI. THERE are likewife Adverbs of Interro- 
 gation, fuch as Where, Whence, Whither, 
 How 3 of which there is this remarkable, 
 that when they lofe their Interrogative 
 power, they aflame that of a Relative, fo 
 as even to reprefent the Relative or Sub- 
 junttive Pronoun, Thus Ovid, 
 
 Et Seges eft, UBI Trojafuit 
 
 tranflated in our old Englifo Ballad, 
 
 And Corn doth grow, WHERE Troy town 
 flood. 
 
 That is to fay, Seges eft in eo loco, IN Q^yo, 
 . Corn groweth in that place, I N w H i c H, 
 . the power of the Relative, being im- 
 plied in the Adverb. Thus Terence, 
 
 Hujufmodi mihi res femper comminifcere, 
 UBI me excarmifices Heaut.IV. 6. 
 
 where UBI relates to res, and flands for 
 quibus rebus. 
 
 Tis
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 
 
 207 
 
 'Tis in like manner that the Relative Ch.XI. 
 Pronoun upon occafion becomes an Inter- 
 rogative, at leaft in Latin and Englifh* 
 Thus Horace, 
 
 QJLIEM Virum aut Heroa lyra, ve! acri 
 Tibia fumes celebrare, Clio ? 
 
 So Milton, 
 
 WHO firft feducd them to that' foul re 
 -volt ? 
 
 THE reafon of all this is as follows. 
 *tbe Pronoun and Adverbs here mentioned 
 are all alike, in their original character, 
 RELATIVES. Even when they become 
 Interrogatives, they Icle not this character, 
 but are ftill Relatives, as much as ever. 
 The difference is, that without an Interro- 
 gation, they have reference to a Subject, 
 which is antecedent, definite and known', 
 with an Interrogation, to a- Subject which 
 isfubfequsnt, indefinite, and unknown, and 
 
 which
 
 2o8 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.XI. which 'tis expelled that the Anfaer fliould 
 exprefs and alcertain, 
 
 Vfnofirftfcduc'd them ? 
 
 The very Queftion itfelf fuppofes'a Sedu- 
 cer, to which, tho' unknown, the Pro- 
 noun, WHO, has a reference. 
 
 Tb' infernal Serpent- 
 
 Here in the Anfwer we have the Subject 
 which was indefinite, afcertained-, fo that 
 the WHO in the Interrogation is (we fee) 
 as much a Relative, as if it had been faid 
 originally, without any Interrogation at 
 all, 'Twas the Infernal SERPENT, WHO 
 firfl f educed them. 
 
 AND thus is it that Interrogative* and 
 Relatives mutually pafs into each other. 
 
 AND fomuch for ADVERBS, peculiar to 
 Verbs properly fo called. We have al- 
 ready fpoken of thofe, which are common 
 to all Attributives. We have likewife at- 
 2 tempted
 
 BOOK THE FISST. 209 
 
 tempted to explain their general Nature, Gh.Xf. 
 which we have found to confift in being"^" 
 the Attributes of Attributes. There re- 
 mains only to add, that ADVERBS may be 
 derived from almojl every Part of Speech : 
 from PREPOSITIONS, as when from dfter 
 we derive Afterwards^ from PARTICI- 
 PLES, and through thefe from Verbs t as 
 when from Know we derive Knowing, and 
 thence Knowingly; from Scie, Sciens, and 
 thence Scienter from ADJECTIVES, as 
 when from Virtuous and Vicious, we derive 
 Virtuoujly and Vicioujly from SUBSTAN- 
 TIVES, as when fromn/^xO^, an Ape y we 
 derive niQfawy fatirziv, to look APISHLY ; 
 from Atuv, a Lion, AeovjuSug, Leomnely-~ 
 nay even from PROPER NAMES, as when 
 from Socrates and Demojihenes y we derive 
 Socratically and Demojlhenically. 'xwas 
 Socratically reajoned, we fay ; 'twas De- 
 mojlhenically fpoken *. Of the fame fort 
 P are 
 
 * Ariftotle hrvs Kvx^.c-nxi-f Cyclopicallyj from 
 a Cyclops. Eth. Nic. X, 9.
 
 210 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.XI. are many others, cited by the old Gram- 
 marians, fuch as Catiliniter from Catitina, 
 Sijenniter from Sifenna, Tulliane from 
 &c. (e). 
 
 NoR are they thus exteniive in Deriva- 
 tion, but in Signification alfo. Theodore 
 Gaza in his Grammar informs us (f), 
 that ADVERBS may be found in every 
 one of the Predicaments, and that the 
 readieft way to reduce their Infinitude, 
 was to refer them by clafTes to thofe ten 
 univerfal Genera. The Stoics too called 
 the ADVERB by the name of IlavJixJitf, 
 and that from a view to the fame multi- 
 form Nature. Omnia infe capit quaji col- 
 lata per fat ir am, conceffa fibi rerum varid 
 fotejlate. 'Tis thus that Sofipater explains 
 
 the 
 
 (*) See Prife. L. XV. p. 1022. Sof. Charif. 161. 
 Edit. Putfchii. 
 
 'traj UUM4C) <rav, oroiOVj STCKTOV, ypof rt 9 
 x, T. A. Gram. Introd. L. II. ,
 
 BOOK THE FIRST. 211 
 
 the Word (g), from whofe authority Ch.XL 
 we know it to be Stoical. But of this 
 enough. 
 
 AND now having finifhed thofe PRIN- 
 CIPAL PARTS of Speech, the SUBSTAN- 
 TIVE and the ATTRIBUTIVE, which are 
 
 SIGNIFICANT WHEN ALONE, WC pro- 
 
 ceed to thofe AUXILIARY PARTS, which 
 are ONLY SIGNIFICANT, WHEN ASSO- 
 CIATED. But as thefe make the Subject 
 of a Book by themfelves, we here con- 
 clude the firft Book of this Treatife. 
 
 (?) Sojjp. Char, p, 175. Edit. Putfcbiu 
 
 P 2 HER-
 
 [ 2I 3 
 
 HERMES 
 
 OR A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 
 
 CONCERNING UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR 
 
 BOOK. II. 
 
 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 Concerning Definitives. 
 
 WHAT remains of our Work, Ch. I. 
 is a matter of lefs difficulty, 
 it being the fame here, as in 
 fome Hiftorical Picture , when the prin- 
 cipal Figures are once formed, 'tis an eafy 
 labour to defign the reft. 
 
 P 3 DE.
 
 214 H E P v M E S. 
 
 I, DEFINITIVES, the Subject of the pre- 
 fent Chapter, are commonly called by 
 Grammarians, ARTICLES, ARTICULI, 
 *A*fya. They are of two kinds, either 
 thofe properly and Jlriclly Jo called, or elfe 
 tilt Pronominal Articles, fuch as 'This, ' 
 &c. 
 
 WE fhall firft treat of thofe Articles 
 more ftriffily fo denominated, the reafon and 
 ufe of which may be explained, as fol- 
 lows, 
 
 THE vifible and individual Subftances 
 of Nature are infinitely more numerous, 
 than for each to admit of a particular 
 Name. To fupply this defecl:, when any 
 Individual occurs, which either wants a 
 proper Name, or whofe proper Name is 
 not known, we afcertain it, as well as 
 \ve can, by referring it to its Species ; 
 pr ? if the Species be unknown, then at 
 
 leaft
 
 BOOK THE SECOND. 215 
 
 leaft to fome Genus. For example a Ch. I. 
 certain Object occurs, with a head and 
 limbs, and appearing to poffefs the pow- 
 ers of Self-motion and Senfation. If we 
 know it not as an Individual, we refer 
 it to its proper Species, and call it Dog, 
 or Horfe, or Lion, or the like. If none 
 of thefe Names fit, we go to the Genus, 
 and call it, AnimaL 
 
 BUT this is not enough, The Thing, 
 at which we are looking, is neither a Spe- 
 cies, nor a Genus. What is it then ? An 
 Individual. Of what kind? Known, or 
 unknown ? Seen now for the firft time, 
 or feen before, and now remembred ? 
 'Tis here we {hall difcover the ufe of the 
 two Articles (A) and (THE). (A) re- 
 fpecls our primary Perception, and dc- 
 notes Individuals as unknown ; (THE) 
 refpects our fecondary Perception, and 
 denotes Individuals as known. To ex- 
 plain by an example I fee an object pafs 
 
 p 4 by
 
 216 HERMES. 
 
 Ch. I. by, which I never faw till then. What 
 do I fay ? There goes A Beggar, with A 
 long Beard. The Man departs, and re- 
 turns a week after. What do I fay then ? 
 'There goes THE Beggar with THE long 
 Beard. The Article only is changed, the 
 reft remains un-altered. 
 
 YET mark the force of this apparently 
 minute Change. The Individual, once 
 vague^ is now recognized as fomething 
 known, and that merely by the efficacy of 
 this latter Article, which tacitly infinuates 
 a kind of previous acquaintance-, by refer- 
 ring the prefent Perception to a like Per- 
 ception already paft (a). 
 
 THE Truth is, the Articles (A) and 
 (THE) are both of them definitives, as 
 tthey circumfcribe the latitude of Genera 
 an4 Species, by reducing them for the 
 
 mod 
 
 (a) See B. I. c. 5. p. 63,
 
 BOOK THE SECOND, 217 
 
 moft part to denote Individuals. The Ch. I. 
 difference however between them is this ; 
 the Article (A) leaves the Individual itfelf 
 unascertained, whereas the Article (THE) 
 after tains the Individual alfo, and is for 
 that reafon the more accurate JDefinitiva 
 of the two. 
 
 'Tis perhaps owing to the imperfect 
 manner, in which the Article (A) de- 
 fines, that the Greeks have no Article 
 correfpondent to it, but fupply its place, 
 by a negation of their Article, C O. 'O 
 THE man fell - i/- 
 A Man fell t without any 
 thing prefixed, but only the Article with- 
 drawn (<). Even in Engtifo, where the 
 
 Article 
 
 () Ta yap a'o^ra^ TJOTI voxpsvx, y T otoQp 
 nra^aOfo-i? UTTO ofifpov T ixr^oo-WTry a^et, Thofe things, 
 which are at times underjlood indefinitely^ the addition of 
 the Article makes to be definite as to their Perfon. Apoll. 
 l IV. c. i. See of the fame author, L. I. c. 6, 36. 
 
 VffMt
 
 218 HERMES. 
 
 Ch. I. Article (A) cannot be ufed, as in plu- 
 rals, its force is expreft by the fame Ne- 
 gation. Thofe are THE Men, means thofe 
 are Individuals, of which we poiTefs fome 
 previous Knowledge. 'Thofe are Men, the 
 Article apart, means no more than that 
 they are fo many vague and uncertain In- 
 dividuals, juft as the Phrafe, A Man, in 
 the fingular, implies one of the fame 
 number. 
 
 BUT 
 
 (TO v Af0Ov (c.) 
 |u r*7 <n,VTaff oTou 11 /u 
 JiKE, a.Svt\w Ta KvQpuirov Xtyii* EI SI O AN- 
 QPnnOS, ^JjAov, Tffoosyjua-pt-jcv j/ap riva oiv^uTroi 
 frf'yii. TBTO ^ auro jSsAovrai xj e (fizirxovTi? t 0,0- 
 
 ^/f eaufes a Review within tJje Mind of jomething known 
 before in the texture of the Difcourfe. Thus if any one 
 PU7r&> nx?, MAN CAME (which is the farm , 
 we fay in Englifh A man came) it is not evident, 
 ef whom be fpeaks. But if be fays e> $(>- J }ir<& ?xf, 
 THE MAN CAME, then 'tis evident; for lie f peaks ef 
 fome Perfon known before. And this is what thofe mean, 
 who fay that the Article is exprejjive of the Firft and Sf- 
 CQnd Knowledge together* Thcod. Gazje, L. IV,
 
 BOOK THE SECOND. 219 
 
 BUT tho' the Greeks have no Article Ch. I. 
 correipondent to the Article (A,) yet no- 
 thing can be nearer related, than their *O, 
 to the Article, THE. 'O jSac-Aiuj, THE 
 King-, TO S lupov, THE Gift, &c. Nor 
 is this only to be proved by parallel ex- 
 amples, but by the Attributes of the 
 Greek Article, as they are defcribed by 
 Apollonius, one of the earlieft and moil 
 acute of the old Grammarians, now re 
 maining. 
 
 totov apQpuv TJ avcttpopa, t\ egi 
 I/ivy -zrpoc-uTTK sroipKg-cx.riK^.^-N'ow the p 
 liar Attribute of the Article, as we have 
 JJjewn elfewbere, is that Reference, which 
 implies fame certain Perfon already men-? 
 tioned. Again 'On yap cijys TO, 
 1% oturuv av&tpopdcv isrocpi^c'iv, 64 [*r, 
 &oisv TO apdpov, efcctipBTos tgiv r, 
 For Nouns of themfehes imply not 

 
 220 HERMES. 
 
 Ch. I. Reference, unlefs they take to them the Ar- 
 ticle, whofe peculiar Character is Reference. 
 
 Again To apQpov 5rpov$t$uG'ocv yvunv yXoi 
 The Article indicates a pre-eftablifoed 
 acquaintance (c]. 
 
 His reafoning upon Proper Names is 
 worth remarking. Proper Names (he 
 tells us) often fall into Homonymie, that 
 is, different Perfons often go by the fame 
 Name. To folve this ambiguity, we have 
 recourfe to Adjectives or Epithets. For 
 example there were two Grecian Chiefs, 
 who bore the name of Ajax. 'Twas not 
 therefore without reafon, that Meneftbeus 
 ufes Epithets, when his intent was to 
 diftinguiih the one of them from the 
 other. 
 
 (c) Apoll. dc Sync. L. I. c. 6, 7. His account of 
 REFERENCE is as follows 'iJVwjua a'jzfy-^zi; -sr^oxa- 
 tii\iypw<i uTfoo-wTTB oVj-r^a "yjuTts. The peculiar cba- 
 ratter of Reference is the fecond or repeated Knowledge of 
 feme Perfon already mentioned. L. II. c. 3.
 
 BOOK THE SECOND. 221 
 
 Ch.L 
 
 Horn. 
 
 If both Ajaxes (fays he) cannot be fpared, 
 
 at leaft alone- 
 
 Let mighty Telamonian Ajax come. 
 
 Apollonius proceeds 'Even Epithets 
 
 themfelves are difFufed thro' various Sub- 
 jeds, in as much as the fame Adjective 
 may be referred to many Subflantives. 
 
 IN order therefore to lender both Parts 
 of Speech equally definite, that is to fay 
 the Adjeclive as well as the Subftantive, 
 the Adjective itfelf aiiumes an Article be- 
 fore it, that it may indicate a Reference to 
 fome Jingle Pcrfon only, (Mvoioatvi civcx.qopoc,, 
 according to the Author's own Phrafe. 
 And thus 'tis we fay, TpvQuv 
 KOf, Trypbo THE Grammarian; Aw 
 $ag$&* o Ku^voil^y Apollo dor us THE Cyre- 
 nean, 5cc. The Author's Conclufion of 
 
 this 
 2
 
 222 HERMES. 
 
 Ch. I. this Section is worth remarking. 
 
 rug ocpx > KOCTK TO 
 
 (TVVl$l(zliT(X, TO eTTlQ^TiKCV TW XVplW 
 
 'Tit with reafon therefore that 
 the Article is here alfo added, as it -brings 
 the Adjective to an Individuality > as pre-* 
 cife, as the proper Name (</). 
 
 WE may carry this reafoning farther, 
 and mew, how by help of the Article 
 even common Appellatives come to have 
 the force of proper Nanies y and that un- 
 affifted by epithets of any kind. Among 
 the Athenians TIXoTov meant Ship ; "Evtitxu, 
 Eleven ; and *AvQpu7r<&>, Man. Yet add 
 but the Article, and T3 nxorov, THE SHIP> 
 meant that particular Ship, which theyfent 
 annually to Delos -, 'Oi "EvSexa, THEELEVEN, 
 meant, certain Officers of yuftice) and 'O 
 "AvQpuTT*, THE MAN, meant their public 
 Executioner. So in Englijh, City, is a 
 
 Name 
 
 (d] See Apoll. L. I. c. 12. where by miftake Mene- 
 laus is put for Alencjibeus,
 
 BOOK THE SECOND. 223 
 
 Name common to many places ; and Ch. I. 
 Speaker, a Name common to many Men. 
 Yet if we prefix the Article, THE CITY 
 means our Metropolis; and THE SPEAK- 
 ER, a high Officer in the Britifh Parlia- 
 ment. 
 
 AND thus 'tis by an eafy tranfition, that 
 the Article, from denoting Reference, cornea 
 to denote Eminence alfo > that is to fay, 
 from implying an ordinary pre-acquain- 
 tance, to prefume a kind of general and 
 univerfal Notoriety. Thus among the 
 Greeks 'O noiyrys, THE POET, meant Ho- 
 mer(e}; and 'O Sryt^rif, THE STAGI- 
 RITE, meant Arijtotle-, not that there were 
 
 not 
 
 (<) There are fo few exceptions to this Obfervation, 
 that we may fairly admit it to be generally true. Yet 
 Arijlotle twice denotes Euripides by the Phrafe o sro^lr,^ 
 once at the end of the feventh Book of his Nicomacbean 
 Ethics, and again in his Phyfics, L. IL 2. Plato alfo 
 in his tenth Book of Laws (p. 901, Edit. Strr.) denotes 
 the fame manner.
 
 224 H E R M E S. 
 
 Ch. I. not many Poets, befide Homer ; and many 
 Stagirites,befide./4r//?0//<?j but none equally 
 illuftrious for their Poetry and Philofo- 
 pby. 
 
 J Tis on a like principle that Arlftotk 
 tells us, 'tis by no means the fame thing 
 to aflert etvai ryv rjovyv auyo&lv, or, TO N 
 dya.Qcv that, Pleafurc is A GOOD, or, 
 THE GOOD. The firft only makes it a 
 common Qbjett of De/ire, upon a level 
 with many others, which daily raife 
 our wiflies ; the laft fuppofes it that fu- 
 preme and fovereign Good, the ultimate 
 Scope of all our Adlions and Endea- 
 vours (/). 
 
 BUT to purfue our Subject. It has been 
 faid already that the Article has no mean- 
 ing, but when affociated to fome other 
 word. To what words then may it be 
 aflbciated ? To fuch as require defining, 
 
 for 
 
 (f] Analyt. Prior. L. I. c. 40.
 
 BOOK THE SECOND. 225 
 
 for it is by nature a Definitive. And Ch. I. 
 what Words are thefe ? Not thole which 
 already are as definite, as may be. Nor 
 yet thofe, which, being indefinite, cannot 
 properly be made otherwife. It remains 
 then they muft be thofe, which though in- 
 definite ', are yet capable, through the Article, 
 of becoming definite. 
 
 UPON thefe Principles we fee the reafon, 
 why 'tis abfurd to fay, O Em, THE I, or 
 O XT, THE THOU, becaufe nothing can. 
 make thofe Pronouns more definite, than 
 they are (g). The fame may be afierted 
 
 of 
 
 (<?) ^5*^W"W makes it part of the Pronoun's Defi 
 nition, fo refufe co-alefcence with the Article. 
 
 w a ffv,frt TO agfiflw. 7fl/ therefore is a Pro- 
 noun, which with Indication or Reference is put for a 
 Noun, and WITH WHICH THE ARTICLE DOTH 
 NOT ASSOCIATE. L. II. 0.5. So Gaza, fpeaking 
 of Pronouns flaVIn Js .j/x iir&xunM ufyw. L.IV. 
 Prifctan fays the fame. Jan? ///; #/>*/ Gr*C9t prtma 
 'Q. .r
 
 226 H E k M E S. 
 
 Ch. I. of Proper Names, and though the Gre'eks 
 fay o Swx^arij?, if Hav^TTTn?, and the like, 
 yet the Article is a mere Pleonafm, unlefa 
 perhaps it ferve to diftinguifh Sexes. By 
 the fame rule we cannot fay in Greek 
 OI AMflOTEPOI, or in Englijh, THE 
 BOTH, bccaufe thefe Words in their own 
 nature are each of them perfectly defined, 
 fo that to define them farther would be 
 quite fuperfluous. Thus if it be faid, / 
 have read BOTH Poefs, this plainly indicates 
 a definite pair, of whom fome mention 
 has been made already -, Auaj lyvuc^vi}, a 
 knfavn Duad, as Apollonins exprefles him- 
 felf, (fj) when he fpeaks of this Subject. 
 On the contrary, if it be faid, I have read 
 Two Poets, this may mean any Pair out 
 
 of 
 
 tt fecunda perfcna pronominum, qua fine dulio demoriftra- 
 ti-urt funt, art i culls adjungi non poffunt ; nee iertia, qnando 
 demonjlrativa ejl. L.XII. p. 938. In the beginning of 
 the fame Book, he gives the true reafori of this. Supra 
 omnes alias partes orationis FIN IT PER SON AS PRONO- 
 MEN. 
 
 (/>) A^tllm. L. I. c. 1 6.
 
 Booic THE SECOND* 227 
 
 of all that ever exifted. And hence this Ch. I. 
 Numeral, being in this Senfe indefinite (as 
 indeed are all others, as well as itfelf ) is 
 forced to a/ume the Article, whenever it 
 would become definite *. And thus 'tis, 
 THE Two in Englijh, and OI A TO in 
 Greek, mean nearly the fame thing, as 
 BOTH or AMOOTEPOI. Hence alib it 
 is, that as Two, when taken alone, has 
 reference to fome primary and indefinite 
 Perception, while the Article, THE, has 
 reference to fomzfecondary and definite -j- ; 
 hence I fay the Reafon, why 'tis bad Greek 
 to fay ATO OI ANGPnnOI, and bad 
 Englifh, to fay Two THE MEN. Such 
 Syntax is in fad: a Blending of Incompati- 
 
 ties, 
 
 * This explains Servhn on the XII th ./Eneid. v. 51 r. 
 where he tells us that Duorum is put for Amborum. In 
 Englijh or Greek the Article would have clone the bufi- 
 nefs, for the Twe, or TOJU <Jlo~v are equivalent to Both 
 or p$7Ej<*, but not fo Daorum, becaufe the- Latins 
 have no Articles to prefix. 
 
 t Sup. p. 215, 216,
 
 HERMES. 
 
 Ch. I. bles y that is to fay of a defined Subjlanthc 
 with an undefined Attributive. On the 
 contrary to fay in Greek AM<I>OTEPOI 
 OI ANGPXinOI, or in Englijh, BOTH 
 THE MEN, is good and allowable, becaufe 
 the Subftantive cannot poffibly be lefs apt, 
 by being defined, to coalefce with an At- 
 tributive, which is defined as well as it- 
 felf. So likewife, 'tis correct to fay, OI 
 A|TO ANOPnnOI, THE TWO MEN, 
 becaufe here the Article, being placed 
 in the beginning, extends it's Power as 
 well through Subftantive as Attributive, 
 and equally contributes to define them 
 both. 
 
 As fome of the words above admit of 
 no Article, becaufe they are by Nature as 
 definite as may be^ fo there are others, 
 which admit it not, becaufe they are not 
 to be defined at all. Of this fort are all 
 INTERROGATIVES. If we queftion about 
 Sub/lances, we cannot fay O TIL OT- 
 TOS, THE WHO is THIS; but Til 
 
 OT-
 
 BOOK THE SECOND. 229 
 
 OTTOS, WHO is THIS? (/). The fame Ch. I. 
 as to Dualities and both kinds of Quantity* 
 We fay without an Article nOIO, nO- 
 OI, HHAIKOS, in Englijh, WHAT 
 
 SORT OF, HOW MANY, HOW GREAT. 
 
 The Reafon is, that the Articles O, and 
 THE refpedt Beings already known; Inter- 
 rogatives refpect Beings, about 'which ive 
 are ignorant-, for as to what we know, 
 Interrogation is fuperfluous. 
 
 IN a word the natural AJJociators ivith 
 Articles are all thofe common Appellatives, 
 which denote the feveral Genera and Spe- 
 cies of Beings. 'Tis thefe, which, by af- 
 fuming a different^fr//<:/^,ferve either to ex- 
 plain an Individual upon its firfb being per- 
 ceived, or elfe to indicate, upon its return, 
 a Recognition, or repeated Knowlege (/). 
 
 WE 
 
 (?) Apollonius calls TIZ, 
 a Part of Speech, mojl contrary, mojl aver fe to Article* . 
 L. IV. c. i. 
 
 (k] What is here faid refpecls the two Articles,which 
 we have in Englijh. In Greek, the Article does no more, 
 than imply a Recognition. See before p. 21 6, 217,218.
 
 230 H E R M E S. 
 
 Ch. I. WE ihall here fubjoin a few Inftances 
 of the peculiar'Power of ARTICLES. 
 
 EVERY Proportion confifts of a Su&jetf, 
 and a Predicate. In Engli/h thefe are di- 
 fKnguiflied by their Pofition, the Subject 
 ftanding^r/?, the Predicate la/I. Happinefs 
 is Pleafure Here, Happinefs is the Sub" 
 jeci i P/eafure, \hz Predicate. If we change 
 their order, and fay, Pleafure is Happinefs ; 
 then Pleafure becomes the SubjecJ, and 
 Happinefs the Predicate. In Greek thefe 
 are diftinguifhed not by any Order or Po- 
 tion, but by help of the Article, which 
 the Subject always affumes, and the Predi- 
 cate in moft inftances (fome few excepted) 
 rejects, Happinefs is Pleafure* jJJow} ij lu- 
 icx. Pleafure is Happinef-^fi yooyy lu- 
 tat Fine things are difficult %aAs7ra 
 rot jt&Xa, Difficult things arejine~7e<, %#-
 
 BOOK THE SECOND. 23; 
 
 IN Greek 'tis worth attending, how in Ch. I. 
 the fame Sentence, the fame Article, by 
 being prefixed to a different Word, quite 
 changes the whole meaning. For exam- 
 ple 'O riroXs^a;;^ yvfx.vac-ixpxya'ots eriuyQi} 
 Ptolemy, having pref^ded over the Games, 
 was publickly honoured. The Participle 
 yvpvoc.<riot,p'xr l <rots has here no other force, 
 than to denote to us the Time, ivhen Ptole- 
 my was honoured, viz. after having pre- 
 fjded over the Games. But if, inftead of 
 the Subftantive, we join the Participle to 
 the Article, and fay, 'O 
 IlToXg^a;/* itt/fcifftfc our meaning is 
 The Ptolemy, who prejided over the Games, 
 was honoured. The Participle in this cafe, 
 being joined to the Article, tends tacitly to 
 indicate not one Ptolemy but many, of 
 which number a particular one participated 
 of honour (/). 
 
 (/} Jpolkn. L. I. c. 33, 34.
 
 Ch. I. IN Engitfi likewife it deferves remark- 
 ing, how the Senfe is changed by chang- 
 ing of the Articles, tho' we leave every 
 other Word of the fentence untouched.- 
 And Nathan Jaid unto David, THOU ART 
 THE MAN*. In that Tingle, THE, that 
 diminutive Particle, all the force and effi- 
 cacy of the Reafon is contained. By that 
 alone are the Premifes applied, and fo 
 firmly fixed, as never to be fhaken. 'Tis 
 polfible this AfTertion may appear at firffc 
 ibmewhat ftrange; but let him, who doubts 
 it, only change the Article, and then fee 
 what will become of the Prophet and his 
 reafoning. And Nathan faid unto David, 
 THOU ART A MAN. Might not the King 
 v/ell have, demanded upon fo impertinent 
 a pofition, 
 
 Non dices bodie, quorfum b<zc tarn putlda. 
 tendant ? 
 
 BUT 
 
 El O A NH P. BwriA. B'.
 
 BOOK THE SECOND. 233 
 
 BUT enough of fuch Speculations. The Ch. I 
 only remark, which we {hall make on 
 them, is this -, that " minute Change in 
 " PRINCIPLES leads to mighty Change in 
 " EFFECTS; fo that well are PRINCIPLES 
 " intitled to our regard, however m ap- 
 " pearance they may be trivial and low." 
 
 THE ARTICLES already mentioned are 
 thofe Jiriftly fo called ; but befides thefe 
 there are the PRONOMINAL ARTICLES, 
 fuch as Tfa's, That, Any, Other, Some; All, 
 No, or None, &c. Of thefe we have fpoken 
 already in our Chapter of Pronouns (m), 
 
 where 
 
 (m) See B.I. 0.5. p. 72, 73. It feems to have been 
 fome view of words, like that here given, which in- 
 duced Quintilian to fay of the Latin Tongue Nojler 
 fermo Articulos non dcfiderat ; ideoque in alias paries ora- 
 tionis fparguntur. Inft. Orat. L. I. c. 4. So Scaliger. 
 His declarath, fails conftat Grtscorum Articulos non neg- 
 leflos a nobis, fed eorum ufitm fuperfaum. Nam ubl ali- 
 quid preefcribendwn cjl, quod Graci per articulum efficient 
 (&EOI o JaAsc) exflstnr a Laiinis psrls ant Ii^LE \ Is, 
 
 auf
 
 234 HERMES. 
 
 Ch. I. where we have (hewn, when they may be- 
 taken as Pronouns, and when as Articles. 
 Yet in truth it muft be confefled, if the 
 EfTence of an Article be to define and af cer- 
 tain t they are much more properly Arti- 
 cles, than any thing elfe, and as fuch mould 
 be confiaered in Univerfal Grammar. 
 Thus when we fay, THIS Pitfure I ap- 
 prove, but THAT I dijlike, what do we per- 
 form by the help of thefe Definitives, but 
 bring down the common Appellative to 
 denote two Individuals, the one as the more 
 near, the other as the more diflant ? So when 
 we fay, SOME men are 'virtuous, but ALL 
 men are mortal, what is the natural Effect 
 of this ALL and SOME, but to define 
 that Untverfah'fy, and Particularity, which 
 would remain indefinite, were we to take 
 
 them 
 
 eut, Illc fervus dixit, ds quo firvo aniea faEla menth fa, 
 aut qui olio quo patfo notus fit. jSd&tur enim Art'uulus 
 ad rei memoriam renovandam, cujm antea non nefdi fumus, 
 (tut ad prafcribendam intclletticnem, qua latitis paters 
 aueat ; velut't cum dicimus, C. Csefar, Is qui poftea dic- 
 tator fuit. Nam alii fuere C. Cafares. Sic Gr&s 
 o KjrtxoxTUQ. De Cauf. Ling. Lat. c. 131.
 
 BOOK THE SECOND. 
 
 them away ? The fame is evident in fuch 
 Sentences, as SoMEfubftances havefenfa- 
 tion -, OTHERS want it~Chufe ANY way of 
 afting, and SOME men will find fault , 5cc. 
 For here SOME, OTHER, and ANY, ferve 
 all of them to define different Parts of a 
 given Whole -, SOME, to denote a definite 
 Part-, ANY, to denote an indefinite-, and 
 OTHER, to denote the remaining Part, 
 when a Part has been aflumed already. 
 Sometimes this laft Word denotes a large 
 indefinite Portion, fet in oppofition to fome 
 Jingle, definite, and remaining Part, which 
 receives from fuch Oppofition no fmall^de* 
 gree of heightening. Thus Virgil, 
 
 Excudent A.LII fpirantiq moUius tzra*, 
 (Credo e quid em) vivos ducent de mar mart 
 
 vultus ; 
 
 Orabunt caufas melius, ctzlique meatus 
 Defcribent radio, et furgentia fidsra 
 
 dicent ; 
 Tu regere imperio fopulos, ROMANE, 
 
 memento t &c.
 
 236 HERMES. 
 
 Ch. I. NOTHING can be ftronger or more fub- 
 lime, than this Antithefis -, one Act fet as 
 equal to many other Afts taken together ; 
 and the Roman fmgly (for it is 7# Romane, 
 not Vos Romani] to all other Men ; and yet 
 this performed by fo trivial a caufe, as the 
 juft oppofition of ALII to Tu. 
 
 BUT here we conclude, and proceed to 
 treat of CONNECTIVES. 
 
 CHAP,
 
 BOOK THE SECOND. 237 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 Concerning Connectives, and firjl thofe 
 called Conjunctions. 
 
 CONNECTIVES are the fubject of what Ch. II. 
 follows -, which, according as they 
 conned: either Sentences or Words, are cal- 
 led by the different Names of CON JUNC- 
 TIONS, or PREPOSITIONS. Of thefe Names, 
 that of the Prepojition is taken from a mere 
 accident, as it commonly ftands in connec- 
 tion before the Part, which it connects. 
 The name of the Conjunction, as is evident, 
 has reference to its effential character* 
 
 OF thefe two we (hall confider the CON- 
 JUNCTION firft, becaufe it connects, not 
 Words, but Sentences. This is conform- 
 able to the Analyfis, with which we be- 
 gan this inquiry *, and which led us, by 
 
 parity 
 
 * Sup. p. u, 12%
 
 HERMES* 
 
 Ch. II. parity of reafon, to coAfider Sentences them* 
 ' i 
 
 fehes before Words. Now the Definition 
 of a CONJUNCTION is as follows a Part 
 tf Speech, void of Signification itfelf, but 
 
 fo formed as to kelp Signification, by making 
 i wo or more figmfic ant Sentences to be ONE 
 
 Jignifaant Sentence (#). 
 
 THIS 
 
 {a] Grammarians have ufually confidered the Cort- 
 jun&ion as connefting rather fmgle Parts of Speech, than 
 whole Sentences, 1md that too with the addition of like 
 with like, Tenfe with Tenfe, Number with Number, 
 Cafe with Cafe, &c. This Sanfliits juftly explodes. 
 Conjimflio ncqxc cafus, ncyue alias paries oratisnis (at im- 
 periti docent) conjungit^ Ipfce enim paries inter fe conjun~ 
 guntur -fed conjunttio Orationcs inter fe conjunglt. Miner. 
 L. III. c. 14. He then eftablifnes his do6lrine by a 
 variety of examples. He had already faid as much, 
 L.I. c. 1 8. and in this he appears to have followed 
 Scaliger^ who had afferted the fame before him. Con- 
 junttionis autem notionem veteres paullo inconfultius prodi- 
 dere ; neque enim, quod aiunt, partes alias conjunglt (ipfa 
 enim partes per fe inter fe conjunguniur)fed Conjunfli* 
 tfl, quee conjunct Oratiotus plures. De Cauf. Ling. Lat. 
 c. 165. 
 
 This
 
 BOOK THE SECOND. 239 
 
 THIS therefore being the general Idea of Ch. II. 
 CONJUNCTIONS, we deduce their Species 
 
 in 
 
 This Do&rine of theirs is confirmed by 
 who in the fcveral places, where he mentions the Con- 
 junction, always considers it in Syntax as connecting 
 Sentences, and not Words, though in his works now ex- 
 tant he has not given us its Definition. See L. I. c. 2. 
 p. 14. L. II. c. 12. p. 124. L. III. c. 15. p. 234. 
 
 But we have fironger authority than this to fupport 
 Scaltger and SanfliuS) and that is Arljltfles Definition, 
 as the PafTage has been corrected by the beft Critics 
 and Manufcripts. A Conjunction, according to him, is 
 fpunJ5 acrfljuoj, IK rAjoyu;v /usu fyavuv |ut?, <njway7ixu 
 if, zsroiEw uTf^uxya pun (puvw fnnmltxvf. An arti- 
 culate Sound) devoid of Signification^ which is fe formed 
 fii to make ONE fignificant artitulaU Sound out of feveral 
 articulate Sottnds^ which are each of them fignlficant. Poet. 
 c. 20. In this view of things, the one figmficant arti- 
 culate Sound, formed ly the Conjunction^ is not the Union 
 of two or more Syllables in one fimple Word, nor even 
 of two or more Words in one fimple Sentence, but of 
 two or more finish Sentences in one complex Sentence, 
 which is confidercd as ONE, from that Concatenation 
 of Meaning effe&ed by the Conjunctions. For exam- 
 ple, let us take the Sentence, which follows. If Men 
 gre'fy nature focialy 't'n their Inter ejl to be juji, though it 
 
 were
 
 HERMES. 
 
 Ch. II. in the following manner. CONJUNCTIONS, 
 while they conneft fentences, either conncft 
 
 were not fo ordained by the Laws of their Country. Here 
 are three Sentences, (i.) Men are by nature facial. 
 (2.) 'Tis Mans Interejl to be jujl. (3.) 'Tts not or- 
 dained by the Laws of every Country that Men fhould be 
 jujl. The firft two of thefe Sentences are made One 
 by the Conjunction, IF ; thefe, One with the third 
 Sentence, by the Conjunction, THO' ; and the three, 
 thus united, make that (pwi/w piz ruptwriJM), that one 
 ftgntficant articulate Sound, of which Anjhtle fpeaks, 
 and which is the refult of the conjunctive Power. 
 
 This explains a paflage in his Rhetoric, where he 
 mentions the fame Subject. 'O yap G-Ju 
 T uToXAa* &T I&.M tfcxipsty;^ ri\ov on 
 TO ? isroXAa. The Conjunction makes many, ONE ; fo 
 that if it be taken away, 'tis then evident on the contrary 
 that one will be MANY. Rhet. III. c. 12. His inftance 
 of a Sentence, diverted of its Conjunctions, and thus 
 made many out of one, is, ^Afiov, airvfara, SfojxinL 
 veni, occurri, rogavt, where by the way the three Sen- 
 tences, refulting from this Diflblution, ( for rA6ov, 
 ATrj&lnr&j and i*;-'ur,->, are- each of them, when un- 
 connefled, fo many perfect Sentences) prove that thefe 
 are the proper Subjects of the Conjnnilion\ connective 
 faculty.
 
 BOOK THE SECOND. 241 
 
 a//b their meanings, or not. For exam- Ch. II. 
 pie : let us take thefe two Sentences 
 Rome was enjlaved Ctefar was ambitious 
 and connect them together by the Con- 
 j unction, BECAUSE. Rome was enjlaved, 
 BECAUSE Ctefar was ambitious. Here the 
 Meanings, as well as the Sentences, appear 
 to be connected. But if I fay, Manners 
 muft be reformed, OR Liberty will be loft* 
 here the Conjunction, OR, though it join 
 
 the 
 
 Ammowtiss account of the ufe of this Part of Speech 
 is elegant. AJO V >^ ruv Atfyajv o plv vTrizpfciv fj.!xv <m- 
 
 o xvp*W fi?, dvx\o'yr i av */, rw priotTru TJT- 
 'JAw, KJ J'j* TSTO EVJ Af^OjUEvw' o 
 
 voii -srajf JbxVj avaAo^er rv} vn\ ry EX 
 pavrj uAwv, uW Js TCOV ^oiCpcop 
 vw<rtv. O/" Sentences that, -which denotes one Exljlence 
 Jirxply, and which is JlnSlly ONE, may be confidered a: 
 analogous to a piece of Timber not yet fever W, and called 
 en this account One. That^ which denotes feveral Exift- 
 ences, and which appears to be made ONE by feme Conjunc- 
 tive Particle, is aualagws to. a Ship, made up of many pieces 
 of Timber, and which by means of the nails has an apparent 
 Unity. Am. in Lib. de Interpret, p. 54, 6. 
 
 R
 
 242 HERMES. 
 
 Ch. II. the Sentences, yet as to their refpe&ive 
 Meanings, i a perfect Disjunffruf. And 
 thus it appears, that though all Conjunc- 
 tions conjoin Sentences, yet with refpedt to 
 the Senfe, fome are CONJUNCTIVE, and 
 fome DISJUNCTIVE -, and hence (b) 'tis 
 that we derive their different Species. 
 
 THE Conjunctions, Ivhich conjoin both 
 Sentences and their Meanings, are either 
 COPULATIVES, or CONTINUATIVES. 
 The principal Copulative in Englijh is, 
 AND. The Continuatives are, IF, BE- 
 CAUSE, THEREFORE, THAT, &c. The 
 Difference between thefe is this The 
 Copulative does no more than barely couple 
 Sentences, and is therefore applicable to all 
 Subjects, whofe Natures are not incompa- 
 tible. Continuatives, on the contrary, by 
 a more intimate connection, confolidate 
 
 I Sen- 
 
 () Thus Scaliger. Aut ergo Senfum conjungunt, a 
 Vtrba.', out Verio, tantum conjungunt, Senfum vero dif- 
 De C, L. Lat. c. 167.
 
 BOOK THE SECOND. 243 
 
 Sentences into one continuous Whole, and Ch. II. 
 are therefore applicable only to Subjects, 
 which have an effential Co-Incidence. 
 
 To explain by Examples 'Tis no way 
 improper to fay, Lyjippus was a Statuary -, 
 AND Prifcian 'was a Grammarian T6e 
 Sunjhinetb, AND the Sky is clear becaufe 
 thefe are things that may co-exift, and yet 
 imply no abfurdity. But it would be ab- 
 furd to fay, Lyjippus was a Statuary, BE- 
 CAUSE Prifcian was a Grammarian-, tho* 
 not to fay, the Sun Jhinetb, BECAUSE the 
 Sky is clear. The Reafon is, with refpect 
 to the firft, the Co-incidence is merely ac- 
 cidental ; with refpect to the laft, tis effen- 
 tial, and founded in nature. And fo much 
 for the Distinction between Copulatives 
 and Continuatfoes (c]. 
 
 As 
 
 (r) Copulatha eft, qua copulat tarn Verba^ quam Sen- 
 
 fum. Thus Prifcian, p. 1026. But Scaliger is more 
 
 explicit-^// Senfum cwjungunt (conjunftinnesfi.) ant ne- 
 
 R 2
 
 244 HERMES. 
 
 Ch. II. As to Continuatives, they are either 
 SUPPOSITIVE, fuchas, IF; or POSITIVE, 
 fuch as, BECAUSE, THEREFORE, As.Gfc. 
 Take Examples of each you will live 
 happily, IF you live hone/lly -you live hap- 
 pily ', BE CAUSE you five honeftly. The Dif- 
 ference between thefe Continuatives is this 
 ~-The Suppofiti-ves denote Connexion, but 
 afTert not actual Exiflence; the Pojitives 
 imply both the one and the other 
 
 FARTHER 
 
 o) out nan necejjario : &*, finon necejjario ^ turn fittnt 
 s^ &c. De C. Ling. Lat. c. 167. Prifcian^ 
 ownaccount of Continuatives isas follows. Continuativa 
 font, qua cantinuatifnem & confequentiam rcrurt fignificant 
 ibid. Scaliger's account hcauj/am out preeftituunt^ 
 autfubdunt. Ibid. c. 1 68. The Greek name for the 
 Copulative was iJv^o-jU^ ru^rAntTixoc -, for the Con- 
 t'rnuative, <nva7r7j>wV ; the Etymologies of which words 
 juftly diftinguifli their refpedtive characters. 
 
 (d) The old Greek <3rammarians confined the name 
 i, and the Latins that of Cont'muativa to thofe 
 
 Cow-
 
 BOOK THE SECOND. 245 
 
 FARTHER than this, the Pofitives above Ch. II. 
 mentioned are either CAUSAL, fuch as, 
 BECAUSE, SINCE, As, &c. or COLLEC- 
 TIVE, fuch as, THEREFORE, WHERE- 
 FORE, THEN, &c. The Difference be- 
 tween thefe is this the Caufals fubjoin 
 Caufes to Effefts T^he Sun is in Eclipfe, 
 
 BE- 
 
 Conju nations, which we have called Suppojttive or Con- 
 ditional^ while the Pofitive they called sraparjvaTrljxo), 
 or Subcontinuatha:. They agree however in defcribing 
 their proper Characters. The firft according to Gaza 
 are, <H uVap^ju jtxsv , axoA6/au Si nvoc >cj TKW Ji- 
 AWf? L. IV. Prifcian fays, they fignify to us, qua- 
 ils eji wdinatio & natura rerum, cum dubitatione aliqua 
 effentits rerum p. 1027. And Scaliger fays, they con- 
 join fine fubjiflentia neceffarid ; poteji enim fubfijlere fcf non 
 jubfiftere ; utrumque enim admittunt. Ibid. c. 168. On 
 the contrary of the Pofltive, or TzrapatruvaTrlixol (to ufe 
 his own name) Gaza tells us, o' T j K, vTrocotw ptroi 
 Totfctw <xnpMiWrn vrmyi And Prifcian fays, caufam 
 (ontinuationis ojlendunt confequentem cum tffentia rerum 
 And Scaliger, non fx typothefi, fed ex eo > quod fubfjft.it ', 
 (onjungunt. Ibid. 
 
 R 3 It
 
 246 HERMES. 
 
 Ch. II. ZECAVSE t&e Moon mtervenes~~T&e Collec- 
 tives fubjoin EJfetts tQ Caufes^The Moon 
 intervenes, THEREFORE the Sun is in 
 ILclipfe. Now we ufe Caufah in thofe 
 inftances, where, the Effeft being con- 
 fpicuous, we feek its Caufe ; and Collec- 
 tives, in Demonftrations, and Science pro* 
 perly fo called, where the Caufe being 
 
 known 
 
 It may feem at firft fomewhat ftrange, why the Pafi- 
 the Conjunctions fhould have been confidered as Sub- 
 ordinate to the Suppofitive, which by their antient Names 
 appears to have been the fa&. Is it, that the Pofitive 
 are confined to what afiually is ', the Suppofitive extend 
 to PoJ/ibleSj nay even as far as to ImpoJJibles ? Thus 'tis 
 falfe to affirm, At it is Day> it is Light, unlefs it a&ually 
 be Day. But we may at midnight affirm, If it be Day, 
 it is Light, becaufe the, IF, extends to Poflibles alfo. 
 Nay we may affirm, by its help (if we pleafe) even Im- 
 pofiibles. We may fay, If the Sun be cubical^ then ii 
 the Sun angular ; If the Sky fall, then jhall we catch Larks. 
 Thus too Scaliger upon the fame occafion amplitudi- 
 ncm Continuativts percipi ex eo, quod etiam impojjibile ali- 
 quando prafupponit. De C. L. Lat. C. 168. In this 
 fenfe then the Continuative, Suppofitive or Conditional 
 Conjunlion is (as it were) fuperior to the Pofitive, as 
 being of greater latitude in its application.
 
 BOOK THE SECOND. 247 
 
 known firft, by its help we difcern confe- Ch. II. 
 
 * i 
 
 quences (e). 
 
 ALL thefe Confirmative* are refolvable 
 in to Copulatives. Inftead of, BECAUSE it is 
 Day, it is light, we may fay, // is Day, 
 AND it is Light, Inftead of, IF it be Day, 
 it is Light, we may fay, 'T/f at the fame 
 time neceffary to be Day, AND to be Light, 
 and fo in other Inflances. The Reafon i% 
 that the Power of the Copulative extends 
 to all Connections, as well to the effential, 
 as to the cafual or fortuitous. Hence there- 
 fore the Continuative may be refolved into 
 a Copulative and fomet Ling more, that is to 
 fay, into a Copulative implying an effential 
 Co-incidence (/") in the Subjects conjoined. 
 
 R 4 As 
 
 (*) The Latins called the Caufals, Caufales or Cau- 
 fativa ; the Collectives, ColleRiva or Illathts : The 
 Greeks called the former 'AiTjoAo^jxoi, and the latter 
 
 (f) Refolvuntur autem in Copulative omnes b<s, j>rof>- 
 terea quod Caufa cum Effettu Snaptt naturd conjunSa eft 
 . de C. L. Lat. c. 169.
 
 HERMES. 
 
 Ch. II. As to Caufal Conjunctions (of which 
 we have fpoken already) there is no one 
 of the four Species of Caufes, which they 
 are not capable of denoting : for example, 
 THE MATERIAL CAUSE- The Trumpet 
 
 founds, BECAUSE 'tis made of Metal THE 
 FORMA L The Trumpet founds, BECAUSE 
 'tis long and hollow THE EFFICIENT 
 The Trumpet founds, BECAUSE an Artift 
 blows it THE FINAL The Trumpet 
 
 founds, THAT it may raife our courage. 
 Where 'tis worth obferving, that the three 
 firft Caufes are expreft by the ftrong affir- 
 mation of the Indicative Mode, becaufe if 
 the Effect actually be, thefe muft of ne- 
 ceffity be alfo. But the laft Caufe has a 
 different Mode, namely, the Contingent 
 or Potential. The Reafon is, that the 
 Final Caufe, tho' it may be^yfr/2 in Specu- 
 lation, is always laft in Event. That is to 
 fay, however it may be the End^ which 
 fet the Artift firjft to work, it may ftill be 
 an End beyond his Power, to obtain, and 
 
 which
 
 BOOK THE SECOND. 249 
 
 which like other Contingents, may either Ch ; II. 
 happen, or not (g.) Hence alfo it is con- 
 nected by Conjunctions of a peculiar kind, 
 fuch as, THAT, *V, UT, &c. 
 
 THE Sum is, that ALLCONJUNCTIONS, 
 which connect both Sentences and their Mean- 
 ings, are either COPULATIVE, or CONTI- 
 NUATIVE; the Continuatives are either 
 Conditional, or Poftive -, and the Pofitives 
 are either Caufal or Collective. 
 
 AND now we come to the DISJUNC- 
 TIVE CON JUNCTIONS, a Species of Words 
 which bear this contradictory Name, be- 
 caufe, while they disjoin the Senfe, they 
 conjoin the Sentences (). 
 
 WITH 
 
 (g) See B.I. c. 8. p. 142. See alfo Vol. 1. Noto 
 p. 27 1. For the four Caufes fee Vol. I. Note 
 XVII. p. 280. 
 (b) *0. SI 
 
 Gaza 
 Gram.
 
 250 HERMES. 
 
 Ch. IT. WITH refpeft to thefe we may obferve, 
 that as there is a Principle of UN i o N difFufed 
 throughout all things, by which THIS 
 WHOLE is kept together, and preferved 
 from Diflipation ; fo there is a Principle of 
 DIVERSITY difFufed in like manner, the 
 Source of Diftinction, of Number, and of 
 Order (/). 
 
 Novr 
 
 Gram. L. IV. Disjunctive funt, qua, quamvis difti- 
 enes ccnjungant, fenfum tatnen disjuntlum habent. Prifc. 
 L. XVI. p. 1029. And hence it is, that a Sentence, 
 connected by Disjunctives, has a near rcfemblance to a 
 ftmple negative Truth. For though this as to its Intel- 
 lection be disjunctive (its end being to disjoin the Sub- 
 ject from the Predicate) yet as it combines Terms to- 
 gether into one Proportion, 'tis as truly fynthetical, as 
 any Truth, that is affirmative. See Chap. I. Note (). 
 
 P-3- 
 
 (/') The DIVERSITY, which adorns Nature, maybe 
 faid to heighten by degrees, and as it pafles to different 
 Subje&s, to become more and more intenfe. Some 
 things only differ, when confidered as Individuals, but if 
 we recur to their Species^ immediately lofe all Diftinc- 
 tion : fuch for inftance are Socrates and Plato. Others 
 ilffir as to Species, but as to Gtnut are the fame : fuch 
 
 arc
 
 BOOK THE SECOND. 251 
 
 Now 'tis to exprefs in fome degree tie Ch. IT. 
 Modifications of this Diverfity, that DIS- 
 JUNCTIVE CONJUNCTIONS fecm firft to 
 have been invented. 
 
 OF thefe DISJUNCTIVES, ibme are 
 SIMPLE, fome ADVERSATIVE Simple, 
 as when we fay, EITHER it is Day, OR it 
 
 
 
 is 
 
 are Man and Lion. There are others again, which dif- 
 fer as to Genus, and co-incide only in thofe tranfcenden- 
 tal Comprehenfions of Ens, Being, Exiftence, and the 
 like : fuch are Quantities and j^opJrfwr, as for example 
 an Ounce, and the Colour, IWnte. Laftly ALL BEING 
 whatever differs, as Being, from Non-being. 
 
 Farther, in all things different, however moderate 
 their Diverfity, there is an appearance of OPPOSITION 
 with refpedt to each other, in as much as each thing it 
 if [elf, and not any of the reft. But yet in all Subje&s 
 this Oppofition is not the fame. In RELATIVES, fuch 
 as Greater and Lefs, Double and Half, Father and Son, 
 Caufe and Effect:, in thefe 'tis more ftriking, than in or- 
 dinary Subjects, becaufe thefe always fhew it, by necef- 
 fqrily inferring each other. In CONTRARIES, fuch as 
 Blade and White, Even and Odd, Good and Bad, 
 
 Virtuous
 
 252 'HERMES. 
 
 Ch. II. is Night Adverfative, as when we fay, If 
 is not Day, BUT it is Night. The Differ- 
 ence between thefe is, that the limple do 
 no more, than merely disjoin ; the Adver* 
 fatiiie disjoin, with an Oppofition concomi- 
 tant. Add to this, that the Adverfative 
 are definite -, the Simple, indefinite. Thus 
 when we fay, he Number Three is not 
 
 an 
 
 Virtuous and Vitious, in thefe the Oppofition goes ftill 
 farther, becaufe thefe not only differ, but are even de- 
 Jlruftive of each other. But the mojl potent Oppofition is 
 that of 'Ai/liipaio-j?, or CONTRADICTION, when we 
 oppofe Proportion to Proportion, Truth to Faljhood, af- 
 ferting of any Subjeft, either it is, or is not. This in- 
 deed is an Oppofition, which extends itfelf to all things, 
 for every thing conceivable muft needs have its Nega- 
 tive, though multitudes by nature have neither Rela- 
 tives, nor Contraries. 
 
 Befides thefe Modes of DIVERSITY, there are others 
 fliat deferve notice; fuch for inftance, as the Diverfity 
 between the Name of a thing, and its Definition ; be-. 
 tween the various Names, which belong to the fame thing, 
 and the various things, which are denoted by the fame 
 Name ; all which Diverfities upon occafion become a 
 Part of our Difcourfe. And fo npuch, in fhort, for $he 
 Subject of DIVERSITY.
 
 BOOK THE SECOND, 253 
 
 an even Number, BUT an odd, we not only Ch. II. 
 disjoin two oppofite Attributes, but we de- 
 finitely affirm one, and deny the other. 
 But when we fay, I'be Number of the Stars 
 is EITHER even OR odd, though we aflert 
 one Attribute to be, and the other not to 
 be, yet the 'Alternative notwithftanding is 
 left indefinite. And fo much for Jimpk 
 Disjunctives (&). 
 
 As 
 
 () The fimple Disjun&ive *, or Vel 9 is tnoftly ufed 
 indefinitely fo as to leave an Alternative. But when it 
 is ufed definitely^ fo as to leave no Alternative, 'tis then 
 a perfect Disjunctive of the Subfequent from the Pre- 
 vious, and has the fame force with xj , or, Et non* 
 "Tis thus Gaza explains that Verfe of Homer. 
 
 IA. A. 
 
 That is to fay, / defer e the pecple Jhould be fayed, AND 
 NOT be deftroyed? the Conjunction n being avai^TixaV* 
 w fublative. Jt muft however be % confeft, that this Verfe 
 is otherwife explained by an Ellipfis, either of 
 r auTjf, concerning which fee the Commentators'.
 
 Ch. II. As to Muer/afive Disjunctives, it has 
 been faid already that they imply OPPO- 
 SITION. Now there can be no Oppofition 
 of the fame Attribute, in the fame Subject, 
 as when we fay, Nireus was beautiful ; 
 but the Oppofition muft be either of the 
 
 fame Attribute in different Subjetfs, as when 
 we fay, Brutus was a Patriot, BUT Cafar 
 was not or of different Attributes in the 
 
 fame Subjeft, as when we fay, Gorgias was 
 a Sopbift, BUT not a Phihfopber or ofdif- 
 
 ferenf Attributes in different Subjects, as 
 when we fay, Plato was a PMofof&er,x\JT 
 Hippias was a Sophtft. 
 
 THE Conjunctions ufed for all thele pur- 
 pofes may be called ABSOLUTE ADVER- 
 SATIVES. 
 
 BUT there are other Advcrfatives, be- 
 fides thefe ; as when we fay, Nireus was 
 more beautiful, THAN Acbillei Virgil was 
 
 A9
 
 BOOK THE SECOND. 255 
 
 AS great a Poet, AS Cicero was an Orator. Ch. II. 
 The Character of thefe latter is, that they 
 go farther than the former, by marking 
 not only Oppofition* but that Equality or 
 Excefs, which arifes among Subjects from 
 their being compared. And hence 'tis they 
 may be called ADVERSATIVES OF COM- 
 PARISON. 
 
 BESIDES the Adverfatives here men- 
 tioned, there are two other Species, of 
 which the mod eminent are UNLESS and 
 A L T H o*. For example *froy will be taken* 
 UNLESS the Palladium be preferred Tr^y 
 will be taken, A L T H o' Hettor defend It. The 
 Nature of thefe Adverfatives may be thus 
 explained. As every Event is naturally allied 
 to itsCaufe, fo by parity of reafon'tis oppofed 
 to its Preventive. And as every Caufe ii 
 either adequate (/) or in-adequate (in-ade- 
 quate, 
 
 (7) This Diftin&ion has reference to common Opinion^ 
 and the form of Language^ ccnfonant thereto. In ftricl 
 naetaphyfical truth, jtf Coufe^ tiat is not edfquatt t it 
 *ny Cauje at aJL
 
 256 H E R M E 3. 
 
 Ch, II. quate, when it endeavours, xvithout being 
 effectual) fci in like manner is every Preven- 
 tive. Now adequate Preventives are expreft 
 by fuch Adverfatives, as u N L E s s Troy will 
 be taken y UNLESS the Palladium bepreferved, 
 that is, 'This alone is fufficient to prevent 
 it. The In-adequate are expreft by fuch 
 Adverfatives, as ALTHO'- Troy will be 
 taken , ALTHO' Heft or defend it; that is> 
 Heft or s Defence will prove in-effecluaL 
 
 . 
 
 THE Names given by the old Gram-* 
 marians to denote thefe laft Adverfativesy 
 appear not fufficiently to exprefs their Na- 
 tures (m). They may be better perhaps 
 called ADVERSATIVES ADEQUATE, and 
 IN-ADEQJJATE. 
 
 AND thus it is that all DISJUNCTIVES, 
 that is CONJUNCTIONS, which conjoin Sen- 
 tences, 
 
 (m) They called them for the moil part, without 
 fnfficient Diftinclion of their Species, AdycrfotivtSi or 

 
 BOOK THE SECOND. 257 
 
 fences, but not their Meanings, are either Ch. II 
 SIMPLE or ADVERSATIVE; and that all 
 AD VERSATIVES are either Abfolute or Com- 
 parative -, or elfe Adequate or In-adequate. 
 
 WE fhall finifh this Chapter with a few 
 mifcellany Obfervations. 
 
 IN the firft place it may be obferved, 
 through all the Species of Disjunctives, 
 that the fame Disjunctive appears to have 
 greater or lefs force, according as the Sub- 
 jects, which it disjoins, are more or lefa 
 disjoined by Nature. For example, if 
 we fay, Every Number is even, OR odd 
 Every Proportion is true, o^falfe nothing 
 feems to disjoin more Jlrongly than the 
 Dirjuntfrve, becaufe no things are in Na- 
 ture more incompatible than the Subjects* 
 But if we fay, That Qbjett is a "Triangle, 
 OR Figure contained under three right lines 
 the (OR) in this cafe hardly feems to 
 disjoin, or indeed to do more, than di- 
 ftincily to exprefs the Thing, firft by its 
 S Name,
 
 258 H E R M E S. 
 
 Ch. II. Name, and then by its Definition. So if we 
 fay, T^hat Figure is a Sphere, OR a Globe, 
 OR a Ball the Disjunctive in this cafe, 
 tends no farther to disjoin, than as it di- 
 ftinguifhes the feveral Names, which be- 
 long to fazfame Thing (n). 
 
 AGAIN the Words, When and Where, 
 and all others of the fame nature, fuch as, 
 Whence, Whit her, Whenever, Wherever, &c, 
 may be properly called ADVERBIAL CON- 
 JUNCTIONS, becaufe they participate the 
 nature both of Adverbs and Conjunctions 
 
 of Conjunctions, as they conjoin Senten- 
 ces ; 
 
 (n} The Latins had a peculiar Particle for this occa- 
 iion, which they called Subdisjunfiiva, a Subdisjunclive - f 
 and that was SIVE. Alexander five Paris ; Mars Jive 
 Movers. The Greek'Eir *v leems to anfwer the fame 
 end. Of thefe Particles, Scaliger thus fpeaks Etfant 
 nomen Subdisjunftivarum rettc accept um /?, neque enim 
 tarn plane disjungit, quam Disjunftiva. Nam Disjunc- 
 tive ftint in Contrariis Subdisjunflivts autern etlam in 
 non Contrariis, fed Diver/is tantum ; ut, Alexander ftvt 
 Paris. DeC. L. Lat. c, 170.
 
 BOOK THE SECOND. 259 
 
 ces ; of Adverbs, as they denote the At- Ch. II. 
 tributes either of Time, or of Place. 
 
 AGAIN thefe Adverbial Conjunttions, 
 and perhaps moft of the Prepofitions (con- 
 trary to the Chara&er of accejjory Words, 
 which have^ftriclly no Signification, but 
 when aflbciated with other words) have a 
 kind of obfcure Signification, when taken 
 alone, by denoting thofe Attributes of 
 Time and Place. And hence 'tis, that 
 they appear in Grammar, like Zoopbites 
 in Nature; a kind of (o) middle Beings, 
 of amphibious character, which, by ha- 
 ring the Attributes of the higher and the 
 lower, conduce to link the Whole toge- 
 ther (/>). 
 
 AND 
 
 jUiroaiwnx, fi ofnrnrstren TT TII/U/V, 
 
 ^ov 7i (pyroV ThemijL p. 74. Ed. Aid. See alib 
 
 Arijl. de Animal. Part. p. 93. 1. 10. Ed. Syll. 
 
 (/>) 'Tis fomewhat furprizing that the politeft and 
 
 moft elegant of the Attic Writers, and Plato above all 
 
 S 2 the
 
 260 HERMES. 
 
 Ch. II. ANDfo muchfor CONJUNCTIONS, their 
 Genus, and their Species. 
 
 the reft, fhould have their Works filled with Particles 
 of all kinds, and with Conjunctions in particular; while 
 in the modern polite Works, as well of ourfelves as of 
 our neighbours, fcarce fuch a Word as a Particle, or 
 Conjunction is to be found. Is it, that where there is 
 Connexion in the Meaning, there muft be Words had to 
 tonnefl ; but that where the Connection is little or none, 
 fuch Connectives are of little ufe ? That Houfes of Cards, 
 without cement, may well anfwer their end, but not 
 thofe Houfes, where one would chufe to dwell ? Is this 
 the Caufe ? or have we attained an Elegance, to the 
 Antients unknown ? 
 
 Venlmus adfummamfortuna^ &c. 
 
 CHAP*
 
 BOOK THE SECOND. 261 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 Concerning thofe Connectives, called 
 Prepojitions. 
 
 PREPOSITIONS by their name exprefs Ch.IIL 
 their Place, but not their Character. 
 Their Definition will diftinguifti them 
 from the former Connectives. A PRE- 
 POSITION is a Part of Speech, devoid iff elf 
 of Signification, but Jo formed as to unite 
 two Words that arejignificant, and that re- 
 fufe to co-alefce or unite \ of themselves (a). 
 
 This 
 
 (a) The Stoic Name for a Prepofition was 
 TIJCO? Su'vtfVuos-, Prapofitiva ConjunSlio, A Prepofttlve 
 Conjunction. 'lij [j.\v y^ KXTU, rots aAAa? 
 
 sii &\f]x<; IIoo9fTi>c^f Sv 
 Now in what manner even in other applications (befides 
 the prefent) Prepofitions give proof of their Conjunctive 
 Syntax, we have mentioned already ; whence too the Stoics 
 S 3 took
 
 262 H E R M E S. 
 
 Ch.III- This connective Power, (which relates to 
 Words only, and not Sentences] will be bet- 
 ter underftood from the following Specu- 
 lations. 
 
 SOME things co-alefce and unite of 
 themfehes-, others refufe to do fo without 
 help, and as it were compulfion. Thus in 
 Works of Art, the Mortar and the Stone 
 co-alefce of themfelves ; but the Wainfcot 
 and the Wall not without Nails and Pins. 
 Jn Nature this is more confpicuous. For 
 example j all Quantities, and Qualities co- 
 alefce immediately with their Subftances. 
 Thus 'tis we fay, a fierce Lion, a <vaft Moun- 
 tain-, and from this Natural Concord of Sub- 
 ject bnd Accident, arifes the Grammatical 
 Concord of Subftantrue and Adjeftfae. In 
 
 like 
 
 took occafton to call them PREPOSITIVE CONJUNCTI- 
 ONS. Apollcn. L. IV. c. 5. p. 313. Yet is this in fad 
 rather a defcriptive Sketch, than a complete Definition, 
 fince there are other Conjunctions, which are Prepofi- 
 five as well as thefc. See Gaz. L. IV. de Praepofit. 
 frijc, I, XIV. p. 983. 4
 
 BOOK THE SECOND. 263 
 
 like manner Adlions co-alefce with their Ch.III. 
 Agents, and Paffions with their Patients. 
 Thus 'tis we fay, Alexander conquers-, Da- 
 rius is conquered. Nay, as every Energy is 
 a kind of Medium between its Agent and 
 Patient, the whole three, Agent, Energy, 
 and Patient, co-alefce with the fame facil- 
 ty ; as when we fay, Alexander conquers Da. 
 rius. And hence, that is from thefe Modes 
 of natural Co- alefcence, arifes the Gra?nma- 
 tical Regimen of the Verb by its Nominative, 
 and of the Accufative by its Verb. Farther 
 than this, Attributives themfelves may be 
 mod of them characterized ; as when we fay 
 of fuch Attributives as ran, beautiful, learn- 
 ed, he ranfwiftly, me was very beautiful, 
 he was moderately learned, Sec. And hence 
 the Co-alefcence of the Adverb with Verbs, 
 Participles, and Adjectives. 
 
 THE general Conclufion appears to be 
 this. " THOSE PARTS OF SPEECH UNITE 
 
 " OF THEMSELVES IN GR AMM AR,WHOSE 
 
 " ORIGINAL ARCHETYPES UNITE OF 
 84 " THEM-
 
 264 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.III. <( THEMSELVES IN NATURE." Towhich 
 we may add, as following from what has 
 been faid, that the great Objetts of Natural 
 Union are SUBSTANCE and ATTRIBUTE. 
 Now tho' Subjlances naturally co-incide 
 with their Attributes, yet they abfolutely 
 refufe doing fo, one with another (b]. And 
 hence thofe known Maxims in Phyfics, 
 that Body is impenetrable -, that two Bodies 
 cannot poj/efs the fame place -, that the fame 
 Attribute cannot belong to different Sub- 
 Jlances, &c. 
 
 FROM thefe Principles it follows, that 
 when we form a Sentence, the Subftantfae 
 without difficulty co-incides with the Verb, 
 from the natural Co-incidence of Subftancf 
 and Energy THE SUN WAR MET H. So 
 Jikewife the Energy with the Subjetf, on 
 
 which 
 
 (b) Caufa^ propter quam duo Subftantha ncn ponuntu? 
 fine copula^ e Phiiofopbia petenda eji : neque tnim duo fub- 
 Jlantiaiiter umim ejje pote/i, ficut Subfttnttia et Accident \ 
 
 itaque non duas> CAESAR CATO PUQNAT. Seal, de 
 
 Cauf. Ling. Lat. c. 177.
 
 BOOK THE SECOND. 265 
 
 which it operates WARMETH THE Ch.IIL 
 
 EARTH. So likewife both Subjlance and 
 Energy with their proper Attributes. 
 THE SPLENDID SUN, GENIALLY WARM- 
 ETH THE FERTILE EARTH. But fup- 
 pofe we were defirous to add other Sub- 
 ftantives, as for inftance, AIR, or BEAMS. 
 How would thefe co-incide, or under what 
 Character could they be introduced ? Not 
 as Nominatives or AccuTatrv&i for both 
 thofe places are already filled; the Nomi- 
 native by the Subftance, SUN -, the Accu- 
 fative by the Subftance, EARTH. Not as 
 Attributes to thefe laft, or to any other 
 thing ; for Attributes by nature they nei~ 
 ther are, nor can be made. Here then we 
 perceive the Rife and Ufe of PREPOSI- 
 TIONS. By thefe we connect thofe Sub- 
 ftantives to Sentences, which at the time 
 are unable to co-alefce of themfehes. Let 
 us affume for inftance a pair of thefe Con- 
 nectives, THRO' and, WITH, and mark 
 their Effect upon the Subftances here men- 
 tioned. Theffkndid Sun WITH his Beams 
 
 genially
 
 266 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.III. genially warmeth THRO' the Air the fertile 
 Earth. The Sentence, as before, remains 
 in fire and one-, the Subjlantwes required 
 are both introduced-, and not a Word, 
 which was there before, is detruded from 
 its proper place. 
 
 IT muft here be obferved that moft, if 
 not all Prepofitions feem originally formed 
 to denote the Relations of PL ACE (<:). The 
 reafon is, this is that grand 'Relation, which 
 Bodies or natural Subjiances maintain at all 
 times one to another, whether they are 
 contiguous or remote, whether in motion, 
 or at reft. 
 
 IT may be faid indeed that in the Con- 
 tinuity of Place they form this UNIVERSE 
 
 or 
 
 (c] Omne corpus out movetur out quiefcit : quare opus 
 fuit aliqud nota, quec T O x II O T*" fignificaret, frue ejjet 
 inter duo extreme, inter qua motus ft, feue cflet in alters 
 extremorum, in quibusfit qules. Hinc eliciemus Prapofitio- 
 nis effentialem defnit'tonem. Seal, de Cauf. Ling. Lat. 
 
 c,
 
 BOOK THE SECOND. 267 
 
 or VISIBLE WHOLE, and are made as Ch.IIL 
 much ON F,by that general Comprehenfion, 
 as is confiftent with their feveral Natures, 
 and fpecific Diftindions. Thus 'tis we 
 have Prepolitions to denote the contiguous 
 Relation of Body, as when we fay, Caius 
 walked w i T H a Staff] the Statue flood UPON 
 a Pedeftal ; the River ran OVER a Sand , 
 others for the detached Relation, as when 
 we fay, He is going T o Italy ; the Sun is 
 rifen ABOVE the Hills; theje Figs came 
 FROM T^urky. So as to Motion and Reft, 
 only with this difference, that here the Pre- 
 pofition varies its character with the Verb. 
 Thus if we fay, that Lamp hangs FROM 
 the Ceiling, the Prepofition,FROM, affumes 
 a Character of Quiefcence. But if we fay, 
 that Lamp is falling FROM the Ceiling, the 
 Prepofition in fuch cafe affumes a Charac- 
 ter of Motion. So in Milton, 
 
 Tofupport uneajie Steps 
 OVER the burning Marie Par. L.I, 
 
 Here OVER denotes Motion. 
 
 Again
 
 268 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.lII. Again 
 
 He with looks of cordial Love 
 Hung OVER her enamour d Par. L.IV. 
 
 Here OVER denotes Reft. 
 
 BUT though the original ufe of Prepofi- 
 tions was to denote the Relations of Place, 
 they could not be confined to this Office 
 only. They by degrees extended them- 
 felves to Subjects incorporeal, and came to 
 denote Relations, as well intellectual, as 
 local. Thus, becaufe in Place he, who is 
 above, has commonly the advantage over 
 him, who is below^ hence we transfer OVER 
 and UNDER to Dominion and Obedience -, of 
 a King we fay, he ruled OVER his People-, 
 of a common Soldier, he ferved UNDER 
 fuch a General. So too we fay, with 
 Thought ; without Attention ; thinking 
 over a. Subject; under Anxiety; fromFear; 
 out of Love ; through Jealoufy, &c. All 
 which inftances, with many others of like 
 
 kind,
 
 BOOK THE SECOND. 269 
 
 kind, fhew that the firfi Words of Men, Ch-III. 
 like their^/fr/? Ideas, had an immediate re- 
 ference tofenfible Qbjefts, and that in after 
 days, when they began to difcern with 
 their Intellect, they took thofe Words, 
 which they found already made, and 
 transferred them by metaphor to intellec- 
 tual Conceptions. There is indeed no 
 Method to exprefs new Ideas, but either 
 this of Metaphor, or that of Coining new 
 Words, both which have been pradlifed 
 by Philofophers and wife Men, accord- 
 ing to the nature, and exigence of the oc- 
 calion (d). 
 
 IN 
 
 (d) Among the Words new coined we may afcribe 
 to Anaxagoras^ 'Opoioptonx ; to Plato, UOIOT^ ; to 
 Cicero, g^talitas ; to Anjlotle, 'EflsA^a ; to the 
 Stoics, ^Oj-n?, Kauris, and many others. - Among 
 the Words transferred by Metaphor from common to 
 fpedal Meanings, to the Platonics we may afcribe '!&% ; 
 to the Pythagoreans and Peripatetics, KxTfyootx, and 
 YLatTrty^eiv ; to the Stoics, KaraAvJ;i{, y 
 fin'xov j to the Pyrrhoni/ls, "?n, Ij 
 
 And
 
 270 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.III. IN the foregoing ufe of Prepofuions, 
 we have feen how they are applied jcara 
 TtrotftaQea-iv, by <way of f juxta-pojition j that is 
 to fay, where they are prefixt to a Word, 
 
 with- 
 
 And here I cannot but obfervc, that he who pretends 
 to difcufs the Sentiments of any one of thefe Philofo- 
 phers, or even to cite and translate him (except in trite 
 and obvious Sentences) without accurately knowing the 
 Greek Tongue in general ; the nice differences of many 
 Words apparently fynonymous ; the peculiar Stile of the 
 Author whom he prefumes to handle; the new coined 
 Words, and new Significations given to old Words, 
 ufed by fuch Author, and his Seel j the whole Philo- 
 fophy of fuch Set, together with the Connections and 
 Dependencies of its feveral Parts, whether Logical, 
 Ethical, or Phyfical; He, I fay, that, without this 
 previous preparation, attempts what I have faid, will 
 fhoot in the dark ; will be liable to perpetual blunders ; 
 will explain, and praife, and cenfure merely by chance ; 
 and though he may poffibly to Fools appear as a wife 
 Man, will certainly among the Wife ever pafs for a 
 Fool. Such a A'lan's Intellect comprehends antient 
 Philofophy, as his Eye comprehends a diftant Profpecl. 
 He may fee perhaps enough, to know Mountains from 
 Plains, and Seas from Woods; but for an accurate dif- 
 cernment of particulars, and their character, this with- 
 out farther helps 'tis impoffible he fhould attain.
 
 BOOK THE SECOND. 271 
 
 without becoming a Part of it. But they Ch-IIL 
 may be ufed alfo jcara rwQtewt by 'way of 
 Compojition, that is, they may be prefixt to 
 a Word, fo as to become a real Part of 
 it (e]. Thus in Greek we have 'Eirtfctfffau, 
 in Latin, IntelUgere, in Englifh, to Under- 
 ftand. So alfo, to foretel, to overaff, to 
 undervalue, to outgo, &c. and in Greek and 
 Latin, other Inftances innumerable. In 
 this cafe the Prepositions commonly trans- 
 fufe fomething of their own Meaning into 
 the Word, with which they are compound- 
 ed; and this imparted Meaning in molt 
 inftances will be found ultimately refolv- 
 able into fome of the Relations of PLACE, 
 (f) as ufed either in its proper or metapbo* 
 rical acceptation. 
 
 LASTLY, 
 
 (e} See Gaz. Gram. L. IV. Cap. de Praepofitione. 
 
 (f) For example, let us fuppofe fome given Space. 
 E & Ex fignify out of that Space; PER, through it, 
 from beginning to end; IN, within it j SUB, under it. 
 
 Hence
 
 272 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.III. LASTLY, there are times, when Prepo- 
 fitions totally lofe their connective Nature, 
 
 being 
 
 Hence then E and PER in compofition augment ; Enor- 
 mhj fomething not fimply big, but big in excefs ; fome- 
 thing got cut cf the rule, and beyond the meafure j Dico, 
 \fyfpeak \ Edico, tofpeakout; whence Ediflum an Edifl? 
 fomething fo effectually fpokcn, as all are fuppofed to 
 hear, and all to obey. So Terence^ 
 
 Dico, Edlco vobis Eun. V. 5. 20. 
 
 which (as Donatus tells us in his Comment) is an 
 Fari, tofpeak; Effari, to fpeak out hence 
 an Axiom, or felf--evident Propofition, fome- 
 thing addrefled as it were to all men, and calling for 
 univerfal Aflent. Cic. Acad. II. 29. Permagnus^ Per' 
 uti/is, great throughout, ufeful through every part. 
 
 On the contrary, IN and SUB diminifh and leflen. 
 InjufluSj IniquuS) unjujl^ inequitable^ that lies within 
 Juftice and Equity, that reaches not fo far, that falls 
 Jhort of them ; Subniger, blackifo j Subrubicundus, red- 
 dijh; tending to black, and tending to red, but yet 
 under the flandard, and behw perfection. 
 
 Emo originally fignified to take away ; hence it came 
 
 to fignify to buy, becaufe he, who buys, takes away 
 
 his purchafe. INTER, Between^ implies Difcontinu- 
 
 4. ance %
 
 BOOK THE SECOND. 273 
 
 being converted into Adverbs, and ufed in Ch.III. 
 Syntax accordingly. Thus Homer, 
 
 And Earth fmil'd all around, 
 
 IX. T. 362. 
 
 But of this we have fpoken in a preceding 
 Chapter (g). One thing we rnufr, how- 
 ever obferve, before we nnifh this Chap- 
 ter, which is, that whatever we may be 
 told of CASES in modern Languages, 
 there are in fact no fuch things ; but their 
 force and power is exprefl by two Me- 
 
 thods, 
 
 y for in things continuous there can nothing lie 
 between. From thefe two comes, Inter imo, 'to kilt, 
 that is to fay, to take a Man away in the mid/I of Life, 
 by making a Difcontinuance of his vital Energy. So alfo 
 Perimoy to kill a Man, that is to fay, to take him away 
 thoroughly ; for indeed what more thorough taking 
 away can well be fuppofed ? The Greek Verb, 'Avav, 
 and the Engli/h Verb, To take ofi feem both to carry 
 the fame allufion. And thus 'tis that Prepofitions be- 
 come Parts of other Words. 
 
 (g] See before p. 205. 
 
 T
 
 274 HERMES 
 
 Ch-IIL thods, either by Situation, er by Prepofi- 
 tions \ the Nominative and Accufathe Cafes 
 by Situation ; the reft, by Prepofitions. 
 But this we (hall make the Subject of a 
 Chapter by itfelf, concluding here our In- 
 quiry concerning Prepofitions. 
 
 CHAP.
 
 BOOK THE SECOND. 275 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 Concerning Cafes. 
 
 AS CASES, or at leaft their various Ch.IV. 
 Powers, depend on the knowledge 
 partly of Nouns, partly of Verbs, and partly 
 of Prepojitions ; they have been referved, 
 till thofe Parts of Speech had been ex- 
 amined and difcufled, and are for that 
 reafon made the Subject of fo late a Chap- 
 ter, as the prefent. 
 
 THERE are "no CASES in the modem 
 
 i. 
 
 Languages, except a few among the pri- 
 mitive Pronouns, fuch as I, and ME j ]E, 
 and MOY ; and the E?iglijh Genitive, 
 formed by the addition of s, as when 
 from Lion, we form Lions -, from Ship, 
 Ship's. From this defect however we may 
 be enabled to difcover in fome instances 
 what a Cafe is, the Periphrajts, which fup- 
 T 2 plies
 
 276 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.IV. plies its place, being the Cafe (as it were) 
 unfolded. Thus Equiis analized into Du 
 Cbeval, Of the Horfe 5 Equo into Au Che- 
 vat, To the Horfe. And hence we fee 
 that the GENITIVE and DATIVE CASES 
 imply the joint Power of a Noun and a 
 Prepo/ition, the Genitive's Prepofition be- 
 ing A, De, or Ex, the Dative's Prepofi- 
 tion being Ad, or Verfus* 
 
 WE have not this affiflance as to the 
 ACCUSATIVE, which in modern Languages 
 (a few inftances excepted) is only known 
 from its pofition, that is to fay, by being 
 fubfequent to its Verb, in the collocation 
 of the words. 
 
 THE VOCATIVE we pafs over from its 
 little ufe, being not only unknown to the 
 modern Languages, but often in the an- 
 tient being fupplied by the Nominative. 
 
 THE ABLATIVE likewife was ufed by 
 the Romans only ; a Cafe they feem to have 
 
 adopted
 
 BOOK THE SECOND. 
 
 277 
 
 adopted to officiate with their Prepo/itions, Ch.IV. 
 as they had deprived their Genitive and>#- 
 tfae of that privilege -, a Cafe certainly not 
 neceflary, becaufe the Greeks do as well 
 without it, and becaufe with the Romans 
 themfelves 'tis frequently undiftinguifhed. 
 
 THERE remains the NOMINATIVE, 
 which whether it were a Cafe or no, was 
 much difputed by the Antients. The Peri- 
 patetics held it to be no Cafe, and likened 
 the Noun, in this its primary and original 
 Form, to a perpendicular Line, fuch for 
 example, as the line A B. 
 B 
 
 The Variations from the Nominative, they 
 confidered as if A B were to fall from its 
 perpendicular, as for example, to A C, or 
 A D. Hence then they only called thefe 
 Variations, riTHSEIS, CASUS, CASES, or 
 T 3 FAL-
 
 278 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.IV. FALLINGS. The Stoics on the contrary, 
 and the Grammarians with them, made the 
 Nominative a CA s E alfo. Words they con- 
 iidered (as it were) to fall from the Mind, 
 or difcurfive Faculty. Now when a Noun 
 fell thence in its primary Form, they then 
 called it UTCII.IT, OP0H, CASUS REC- 
 
 TUS, AN ERECT, Or UPRIGHT CASE Or 
 
 FALLING, fuch as A B, and by this name 
 they diftinguifhed the Nominative. When 
 it fell from the Mind under any of its varia- 
 tions, as for example in the form of a Geni- 
 tive, a Dative, or the like, fuch variations 
 they called DTHSEIS nAATIAI, CA- 
 SUS OBLIQUI, OBLIQUE CASES, Or SIDE- 
 LONG FALLINGS (fuch as AC, or AD) in 
 oppofi tion to the other (that is A B) which 
 was erecl: and perpendicular (a). Hence 
 too Grammarians called the Method of 
 enumerating the various Cafes of a Noun, 
 r, DECLINATIO, a DECLENSION, 
 
 it 
 
 (a) See dtnmen. in Libr. de Interpr. p. 35.
 
 BOOK THE SECOND. 279 
 
 it being a fort of progress Defcent from Ch.IV. 
 the Nouns upright Form thro its various 
 declining Forms, that is, a Defcent from 
 AB, to AC, AD, &c. 
 
 OF thefe CASES we fhall treat but of 
 four, that is to fay, the NOMINATIVE, 
 the ACCUSATIVE, the GENITIVE, and 
 the DATIVE. 
 
 IT has been faid already in the pre- 
 ceding Chapter, that the great Objects of 
 natural Union are SUBSTANCE and AT- 
 TRIBUTE. Now from this Natural Con- 
 f<?n/arifes the Logical Concord of SUBJECT 
 and PREDICATE, and the Grammatical 
 Concord of \> BST ANTIVE and ATTRIBU- 
 TIVE (b). Thefe CONCORDS in SPEECH 
 produce PROPOSITIONS and SENTENCES, 
 as that previous CONCORD in NATURE 
 produces NATURAL BEINGS. This being 
 T 4 admitted, 
 
 (b) See before, p. 264.
 
 28o H E R M E S. 
 
 Ch.IV. admitted, we proceed by obferving, that 
 when a Sentence is regular and orderly, 
 Nature s Subftance, the Logicians Sufyetf, 
 and the Grammarian s Subftantlve are all 
 denoted by that Cafe, which we call the 
 NOMINATIVE. For example, CJESAR 
 pugnat, jf'Es fingltur, DOMUS cedificatur. 
 We may* remark too by the way, that the 
 Character of this Nominative may be learnt 
 from its Attributive. The Action implied 
 in pugnat, fhews its Nominative CAESAR 
 to be an Active efficient Caufe; the Paffion 
 implied mfngltur^ mews its Nominative 
 js to be a Paffive Subjedl:, as does the 
 Paflion in tedificatur prove DOMUS to be 
 an Effect. 
 
 As therefore every Attributive would 
 as far as pofiible conform itfclf to its Sub- 
 flantive, fo for this reafon, when it has 
 Cafes, it imitates its Subftantive, and ap- 
 pears as a Nominative alfo. So we find it 
 in fuch in fiances as CICERO eft ELO- 
 
 QJJENS; VlTlUM eft TURPE; HoMO eft 
 
 4 ANIMAL,
 
 BOOK THE SECOND. 281 
 
 ANIMAL, &c. When it has no Cafes, Ch.IV. 
 (as happens with Verbs) it is forced to 
 content itfelf with fuch affimilations as it 
 has, thofe of Number and Perfon * ; as 
 when we fay, CICERO LOQUITUR -, NOS 
 LOQUIMUR; HOMINES LOQ.UUNTUR. 
 
 FROM what has been faid, we may 
 make the following obfervations that as 
 there can be no Sentence 'without a Sub- 
 Jiantive, fo that Subftantive, if the Sen- 
 tence be regular, is always denoted by a 
 Nominative that on this occalion all the 
 Attributives, that have Cafes, appear as 
 Nominatives alfo that there may be a re- 
 gular and perfedl Sentence 'without any of 
 the other Cafes, but that without one Nomi- 
 native at leaji, this is utterly impoffible. 
 Hence therefore we form its Character and 
 Defcription THE NOMINATIVE is that 
 Cafe, without which there can be no regu- 
 lar 
 
 1 What fort of Number and Perfon Verbs have, fee 
 before, p. 170, 171.
 
 282 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.IV. lar (c) and perf eft Sentence. We are now 
 to fearch after another Cafe. 
 
 WHEN the Attributive in any Sentence 
 is fome Verb denoting Attion, we may be 
 allured the principal Subjiantive is fome 
 active efficient Caufe. So we may call 
 Achilles and Lyfippus in fuch Sentences as 
 Achilles vulneravit, Lyfippus fecit. But 
 though this be evident and clearly under- 
 ftood, the Mind is flill infufpence, and finds 
 its conception incomplete. ACTION, it well 
 knows, not only requires fome Agent, but 
 it muft have a SubjecJ alfo to work on, and 
 it muft produce fome Effecl. 'Tis then to 
 denote one of thefe (that is, the SubjecJ 
 or the Effefi) that the Authors of Lan- 
 guage 
 
 (c] We have added regular as well as ptrfefi, becaufe 
 there may be irregular Sentences, which may be perfeft 
 without a Nominative. Of this kind are all Sentences, 
 made out of thofe Verbs, called by the Stoics Ilafa- 
 or Tlotfax.zTi'i'yogypoiTix, fuch as Dwx^Tfi 
 t, Socratem pcenitet, &c. See before, p. 180.
 
 BOOK THE SECOND. 283 
 
 guage have deflined THE ACCUSATIVE. Ch.IV. 
 Achilles vu/neravifHECTOREM here the 
 Accufative denotes the Subject. Lyjippus 
 
 fecit STATUAS here the Accufative 
 
 denotes the Effect. By thefe additional 
 Explanations the Mind becomes fatisfied, 
 and the Sentences acquire a Perfection, 
 which before they wanted. In whatever 
 other manner, whether figuratively, or 
 with Prepofitions, this Cafe may have 
 been ufed, its firft deftination feems to 
 have been that here mentioned, and hence 
 therefore we (hall form its Character and 
 Defcription THE ACCUSATIVE is that 
 Cafe, which to an efficient Nominative and 
 
 / ' */ 
 
 a Verb of ASlion fubjoins either the Effeff 
 or the pajfive Subjeft. We have ftill left 
 the Genitive and the Dative, which we 
 jnveftigate, as follows. 
 
 IT has been faid in the preceding Chap- 
 ter (</), that when the Places of the No- 
 minative 
 
 (d) See before, p. 265.
 
 284 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.IV. minative and the Accufathe are filled by 
 proper Subftantives, other Subftantives are 
 annexed by the help viPrepofitions. Now, 
 though this be fo far true in the modern 
 Languages, that (a very few inflances ex- 
 cepted) they know no other method -, yet 
 is not the rule of equal latitude with re- 
 fpedt to the Latin or Greek, and that from 
 reafons which we are about to offer. 
 
 AMONG the various Relations of Sub- 
 ftantives denoted by Pfepofitions, there 
 appear to be two principal ones ; and thefe 
 are, the 'Term or Point, which fomething 
 commences FROM, and the Term or Point, 
 which fomething tends TO. Thefe Re- 
 lations the Greeks and Latins thought of 
 fo great importance, as to diftinguifh them, 
 when they occurred, by peculiar termina- 
 tions of their own, which expreft their 
 force, without the help of a Prepofition. 
 Now 'tis here we behold the Rife of the 
 antient Genitive, and Dative, the GENI- 
 TIVE being formed to expreft all Relations
 
 BOOK THE SECOND. 285 
 
 commencing FROM itfelf > THE DATIVE, Ch.IV. 
 all Relations tending TO itfelf. Of this 
 there can be no ftronger proof, than the 
 Analyfis of thefe Cafes in the modern 
 Languages, which we have mentioned 
 already (e}. 
 
 'Tis on thefe principles that they fay in 
 Greekteopcct SOT, MSapi SOI, OF 
 thee I ajky To thee I give. The reafon 
 is, in requefts the perfon requefted is one 
 whom fomething is expected from ; in 
 donations, the perfon prefented, is one 
 whom fomething paffes to. So again 
 {f) neTTGiyToti \i$v, 'tis made of Stone. Stone 
 was the paffive Subject, and thus it appears 
 in the Genitive, as being the Term from, 
 or out of 'which. Even in Latin, where 
 the Syntax is more formal and flricl, we 
 read - 
 
 Implentur 
 
 (e] See before, p. 275, 276. 
 
 (/) Xouo-ou srfTTonj^Ei/of , xj Ixi^o.-Jlog^ made of Gold 
 and Ivory. So fays Paufanias of the Olympian Jupiter., 
 L. V. p. 400. See alfo Horn. Iliad. i\ 574.
 
 HERMES. 
 
 Implentur veteris Bacchi, pinguifque fe- 
 rinez. Virg. 
 
 The old Wine and Venifon were the funds 
 or flores, of or from which they were 
 filled. Upon the fame principles, n/i/w T 
 I'Jarof, is a Phrafe in Greek ; and, Je bois 
 de 1'eau, a Phrafe in French, as much as 
 to fay, Itakefome or a certain part, FROM 
 or OUT OF a certain whole. 
 
 WHEN we meet in Language fuch Ge- 
 nitives as the Son of a Father-, the Father 
 of a Son -, the Picture of a Painter ; the 
 Painter of a Picture, &c. thefe are all 
 RELATIVES, and therefore each of them 
 reciprocally a Term or Point to the other, 
 FROM or OUT OF which it derives its Ef- 
 face, or at leaft its Intellect ion (g). 
 
 THE 
 
 (g) All Relatives are faid to reciprocate, or mutually 
 
 infer each other, and therefore they are often expreft 
 
 by this Cafe, that is to fay, the Genitive. Thus Ari- 
 
 Jiotlf, nVJ* & rot wgo'j TJ wfof aJ*rgfp1
 
 BOOK THE SECOND. 287 
 
 THE Dative, as it implies Tendency to, Ch.IV. 
 is employed among its other ufes to denote 
 the FINAL CAUSE, that being the Caufe 
 to which all Events, not fortuitous, may be 
 faid to tend. 'Tis thus ufed in the follow- 
 ing inftances, among innumerable others. 
 
 TIB i fuaveis dtedala tellus 
 
 Submit tit fores Lucret . 
 
 TIB i brachia contra bit ardens 
 
 Scorpios Virg. G. I. 
 
 TIBI ferviat ultima Thute. 
 
 Ibid. 
 
 / 
 
 AND fo much for CASES, their Origin 
 and Ufe ; a Sort of Forms, or Termina- 
 tions, 
 
 JfOTTTOTg <?sA<^, xj SffflTQTM 
 
 TTif Xeytroti twctiy x} TO J'jTrAao'icu ^u/o-f^ 
 jc, TO vj^tiru ^TrAac-ja wfAurv,. Omnia vero, quce funt ad 
 aliquid, referuntur ad ea, qua reciprocantur. Ut fervus 
 dicitur domini fervus j et dominus, fervi dominus ; necnon 
 duplum, dimidii duplum-, et dimidium, dtipli dimidium. 
 Categor. C. VII.
 
 288 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.IV. tions, which we could not well pafs over, 
 from their great importance (>6) both in 
 the Greek and Latin Tongues > but which 
 however, not being among the EfTentials 
 of Language, and therefore not to be 
 found in many particular Languages, can 
 be hardly faid to fall within the limits of 
 our Inquiry. 
 
 (h] Annon et illud obfervatione dignum (licet nobh mo- 
 dernh fpiritus nonnibil redundat ) antiquas Linguas, ple- 
 na s deilinationum, cafuum, conjugatimwn, et fimilium fu- 
 ijje\ modernas, hh fere dejlitutas^ plurima per prespofi- 
 tiones et verba auxiliaria fegniter expedire ? Sane facile 
 quis conjiciat (utcunque nobh ipfi placeamus ) ingenia pri- 
 orum feculorum noftris fuilFe multo acutiora et fubtili- 
 ora. Bacon, de Augm. Scient. VI. i. 
 
 CHAP.
 
 BOOK THE SEC6ND. 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 Concerning Interjections 'Recapitulation 
 Conclujion. 
 
 BESIDES the Parts of Speech before Ch. V. 
 mentioned, there remains THE IN- 
 TERJECTION. Of this Kind among the 
 Greeks are *\Q, Osu, *A*, &c. among the 
 Latins, Ah! Heu! Hei ! &c. among the 
 Englijh, Ah! Alas I Fie! 5cc. Thefe 
 the Greeks have ranged among their Ad- 
 verbs , improperly, if we confider the Ad- 
 verbial Nature, which always co-incides 
 with fome Verb, as its Principal, and to 
 which it always ferves in the character of 
 an Attributive. Now INTERJECTIONS 
 co-incide with no Part of Speech, but are ei- 
 ther uttered alone, or elfe thrown into a Sen- 
 tence, without altering its Form, either in 
 Syntax or Signification. The Latins feem 
 therefore to have done better in -j- fepa- 
 
 rating 
 
 T """"" * 
 
 f Vid. Servium in JEncid XII, v. 486. 
 
 u
 
 HERMES. 
 
 Ch. V. rating them by themfelves, and giving 
 them a name by way of diftincTion from 
 the reft. 
 
 SHOULD it be aik'd, if not Adverbs, 
 what then are they ? It may be anfwered, 
 not fb properly Parts of Speech, as adven- 
 titious Sounds; certain VOICES OF NA- 
 TURE, rather than Voices of Art, expref- 
 ling thofe Paflions and natural Emotions, 
 which fpontaneoufly arife in the human 
 Soul, upon the View or Narrative of in- 
 terefting Events (a). 
 
 " AN* 
 
 INTERJECTIONES aGracis ad Adverbia reft- 
 ^ alque eos jequitur etiam l&etbiuf* Et rette qui- 
 de ///, quando cafum regunt. Sed quando oratitni 
 felitm infer untur y ut not a affcftus^ velut fujpirii out iru- 
 ius, vix vidtntur ad dajjem aljquam pertinre> ul qua 
 N AT u RALES fat NOTJE; non, (iliarum vocum in/1ar t 
 tx injlitutv fignifaent. Voff. de Anal. L.I. c. I. IN- 
 TER jECTio ejl Vox affeftum mentis fignifovm^ a( citra 
 wbi sptm fententiam complens. ibid. c. 3. Re/tat claf- 
 Jtusn extrema^ iNTf RJECTIO. Hujus afpdlatia nan 
 5 /-
 
 BOOK THE SECOND. 291 
 
 *' AND thus we have found that ALL Ch. V. 
 
 " WORDS ARE EITHER SIGNIFICANT BY 
 
 " THEMSELVES, OR ONLY SIGNIFICANT, 
 
 U 2 " WHEN 
 
 fimi liter fe habet ac ConjunSlionis. Nam cum hcsc dicatur 
 Conjunclio^ quia conjungat ; Interjettio tamen, non quia 
 inter jacet, fed quia interjicitur, nomen accepit. Nee tamen 
 de Vi'a ejus eft, ut interjiciatur ; cumber fe compleat fen- 
 tt-ntiam, nee raro ab ea incipiat oratio. Ibid. L. IV. 
 c. 28. INTERJECTIONEM non eJJ'e partem Orationisfic 
 ojlendo : Quod naturale ejl^ idem eji afrud omnes : Sed ge~ 
 rnitus & figna l&titice idem funt a^ud omnes : Sunt igitur 
 naturales. Si vero naturales, non funt paries Orationis. 
 Nam ees paries, fecundum Arijlotelem^ ex injlituto, nan 
 naturd, detent conjlare. Interjettionem Grad Adverliis 
 adnumerant ; fedfalfo. Nam neque^ &c. San<5l. Miner. 
 L.I. c. 2. INTERJECTIONEM Graci inter AdvcrLia 
 ponunt, quoniam hcsc quoque vsl adj'angitur verbis, vel 
 verba ei fubaudiuntur. Ut Ji di:am-~ Papas ! quid vi- 
 deo ? vel per fe Papae ! ciiamfi non addaiur^ Miror ; 
 babet in fe ipfeus verbi figntficaticnem. Qua res maxims 
 fecit Romanarum artium Scriptsres fcparatim bane partem 
 ab Aduerliiis accipere j quia vidctur affeftumkabere in f eft 
 Verli, et plenam motus animi figmjkatiorum, etiamfi non 
 addatur Verbum, demonjirare. Interjettio tamen non folum 
 ilia, qua dicunt Graci <TyjTXiy.<r>*ov, ftgnifaat ', fed etiam 
 Voces, qua cujufcunque tajfmnis animi pulfu per exdama*- 
 tiwsm interiiciuntur. Prilc. L, XV.
 
 HERMES. 
 
 WHEN ASSOCIATED that thofe (ivni- 
 
 mS *S O 
 
 Jicant by themfefoes, denote either SUB- 
 ' STANCES or ATTRIBUTES, and are cal- 
 " led for that reafcn SUBSTANTIVES and 
 ft ATTRIBUTIVES that the Subftantives 
 fc are either NOUNS or PRONOUNS that 
 " //^ATTRIBUTIVES are either PRIMARY 
 " or SECONDARY that the Primary At- 
 " fr^u fives are either VERBS, PARTICI- 
 " PLES, or ADJECTIVES; the Secondary, 
 " ADVERBS Again, that the Parts of 
 " Speech, only Jignific ant when ajjbciated, are 
 " either DEFINITIVES or CONNECTIVES 
 that the Definitives are either ARTI- 
 '< CULAR, or PRONOMINAL and that 
 "the Connectives are either PREPOSITIONS 
 " or CONJUNCTIONS." 
 
 AND thus have we refolved LANGUAGE, 
 AS A WHOLE INTO ITS CONSTITUENT 
 PARTS, which was the firft thing, that we 
 propofed, in the courfe of this Inquiry (). 
 
 BUT 
 
 (1} See before, p. 7.
 
 BOOK THE SECOND. 293 
 
 BUT now as we conclude, methinks I Ch. V. 
 hear fome Objector, demanding with an 
 air of pleafantry, and ridicule " Is there 
 < l nofpeakmg then without all this trouble? 
 " Do we not talk every one of us, as well 
 " unlearned, as learned; as well poor Pea- 
 t( fants, as profound Philofopk^rs ?" We 
 may anfwer by interrogating on our part 
 Do not thofe fame poor Peafants ufe 
 the Levar and the Wedge, and many 
 other Inftruments, with much habitual 
 readinefs ? And yet have they any con- 
 ception of thofe Geometrical Principles, 
 from which thofe Machines derive their 
 Efficacy and Force ? And is the Ignorance 
 of thefe Peafants ; a reafon for others to 
 remain ignorant; or to render the Subject 
 a lefs becoming Inquiry? Think of Ani- 
 mals, and Vegetables, that occur every 
 day of Time, of Place, and of Motion 
 of Light, of Colours, and of Gravita- 
 tion of our very Senfes and Intellect, 
 by which we perceive every thing elfe - 
 U ? THAT
 
 294 HERMES. 
 
 Ch. V. THAT they are, we all know, and arc 
 perfectly fatisfied WHAT they are, is 
 a Subject of much obfcurity and doubt. 
 Were we to reject this lail Queftion, be- 
 caufe we are certain of the firft, we fhould 
 banifh all Philofophy at once out of the 
 world (<:). 
 
 BUT a graver Objector now acccjfts us, 
 " What (fays he) is the UTILITY? 
 " Whence the Pro/iff where the Gain?" 
 Every Science whatever (we may an- 
 fwer) has its Ufe. Arithmetic is excel- 
 lent 
 
 (\ *'" . ^ ~ " 1 \\ > 
 
 C) AAX i izokXx, TCUV ou/un, a rm ptv 
 
 ^ d'yvu$~OTtx.Triv JE rr.v 
 o TO'TTOJ, ETJ Jt juacA 
 TO ^uew tva 'yvwpipov 
 * Tij ? 770TJ Ov auTWv r sVia, TWV 
 
 E>car*i T'a TTWP TO ^ue 
 
 p. 142.
 
 BOOK THE SECOND. 295 
 
 lent for gauging of Liquors ; Geometry, Ch. V. 
 for meafuring of Eftates ; Aftronomy, for 
 making of Almanacks ; and Grammar 
 perhaps, for drawing of Bonds and Con- 
 veyances. 
 
 
 THUS much to the Sordid If the 
 Liberal zfa for fomething better than this, 
 we may anfwer and allure them from the 
 beft authorities, that every Exercife of the 
 Mind upon Theorems of Science, like 
 generous and manly Exercife of the 
 Body, tends to call forth and ftrengthen 
 Nature's original Vigour. Be the Sub- 
 ject itfelf immediately lucrative or not, 
 the Nerves of Reafon are braced by the 
 mere Employ, and we become abler Ac- 
 tors in the Drama of Life, whether our 
 Part be of the bufier, or of the fedater 
 kind. 
 
 1} 4 PERHAPS
 
 296 HERMES. 
 
 PERHAPS too there is a Pleafure even in 
 Science itfelf, diftind from any End, to 
 which it may be farther conducive. Are 
 not Health and Strength of Body defirable 
 for their own fakes, tho' we happen not 
 to be fated either for Pprters or Draymen ? 
 And have not Health and Strength of 
 Mind their intrinfic Worth alfo, tho' not 
 condemned to the low drudgery of fordid 
 Emolument ? Why mould there not be 
 a Good (could we have the Grace to re- 
 cognize it) in the mere Energy of our In- 
 telleff, as much as in Energies of lower 
 degree ? The Sportfman believes there is 
 ood in his Chace ; the Man of Gaiety, 
 in his Intrigue ; even the Glutton, in his 
 Meal. We may juflly afk of thefe, why 
 they put foe fuch things ; but if they an- 
 fwer, they purfue them, becaufe they art 
 GOOD, 'twould be folly to afk. them far- 
 ther, WHY they PURSUE what is GOOD. 
 It might well in fuch cafe be replied on 
 8 their
 
 BOOK THE SECOND. 297 
 
 their behalf (how ftrange foever it may Ch. V. 
 at firft appear) that if there was not fome- 
 thing GOOD, which was in no refpeSl USE- 
 FUL, even things ufeful tbemfehes could not 
 $ojjibly have exiftence. For this is in faft 
 no more than to afTert, that fome things 
 are ENDS, fome things are MEANS, and 
 that if there were NO ENDS, there could 
 be of courfe NO MEANS. 
 
 IT mould feem then the Grand Queflion 
 was, WHAT is GOOD that is to fay, 
 what is that which is *dejirable, not for 
 fofnething elfe, but for itfelf; for whe- 
 ther it be the Chace, or the Intrigue, or 
 the Meal, may be fairly queftioned, fince 
 Men in each inflance are far from being 
 agreed, 
 
 IN the mean time 'tis plain from daily 
 experience, there are infinite Pleafures, 
 Amufements, and Diverfions, fome for 
 Summer, others for Winter ; fome for 
 
 Country,
 
 H E R M S. 
 
 Ch. V. Country, others for Town ; fome, eafy, 
 indolent and foft ; others, boifterous, ac- 
 tive, and roughj a multitude diverfified to 
 every tafte, and which for the time are 
 enjoyed as PERFECT GOOD, 'without a 
 thought of any End, that may be farther 
 obtained. Some Objects of this kind are at 
 times fought by all men, excepting alone 
 that contemptible Tribe, who, from a 
 love to the Means of life wholly forget- 
 ting its End, are truly for that reafon 
 called Mifers, or Miferable. 
 
 IF there be fuppofed then a Pleafure, 
 a Satisfaction, a Good, a Something valu- 
 able for its felf without view to any thing 
 farther, in fo many Objects of the fub- 
 ordinate kind ; mail we not allow the fame 
 praife to \hefublimcft of all Objects ? Shall 
 THE INTELLECT alone feel no pleafures 
 in its Energy, when we allow them to the 
 groffeft Energies of Appetite, and Senfe ? 
 Or if the Reality of all Pleafures and Goods 
 
 were
 
 BOOK THE SECOND. 299 
 
 were to be controverted, may not the In- Ch. V. 
 
 telkftual Sort be defended, as rationally as 
 
 any of them ? Whatever may be urged in 
 
 behalf of the reft (for we are not now 
 
 arraigning them) we may fafely affirm of 
 
 INTELLECTUAL GOOD, that 'tis " the 
 
 " Good of that Part, which is moft ex- 
 
 " cellent within us ; that 'tis a Good ac- 
 
 (f commodated to all Places and Times; 
 
 " which neither depends on the will of 
 
 " others, nor on the affluence of external 
 
 " Fortune j that 'tis a Good, which de- 
 
 " cays not with decaying Appetites, but 
 
 " often rifes in vigour, when thofe are no 
 
 * more (//)." 
 
 THERE is a Difference, we muft own, 
 between this Intellectual Virtue, and Moral 
 Virtue. MORAL VIRTUE, from its Em- 
 ployment, may be called more HUMAN, 
 
 as 
 
 See Vol.1, p. 119, 120, &c.
 
 3co HERMES. 
 
 Ch. V. as it tempers our Appetites to the purpofes 
 of human Life. But INTELLECTUAL 
 VIRTUE may be furely called more DI- 
 VINE, if we confider the Nature and Sub- 
 limity of its End. 
 
 INDEED for Moral Virtue, as it is al- 
 mofr. wholly converfant about Appetites, 
 and Affections, either to reduce the natural 
 ones to a proper Mean, or totally to expel 
 the unnatural and vitious, 'twould be im- 
 pious to fuppofe THE DEITY to have oc- 
 cafion for fueh an Habit, or that any 
 work of this kind mould call for his at- 
 tention. Yet GOD Is, and LIVES. So 
 we are afTured from Scripture it felf. 
 What then may we fuppofe the DIVINE 
 LIFE to be? Not a Life of Sleep, as 
 Fables tell us of Endymion. If we may 
 be allowed then to conjecture with a be- 
 coming reverence, what more likely, than 
 A PERPETUAL ENERGY OF THE PUREST 
 INTELLECT ABOUT THE FIRST, ALL- 
 
 eOM.PREIIENSJVE
 
 BOOK THE SECOND. 301 
 
 COMPREHENSIVE OBJECTS OF INTEL- Ch. V. 
 
 LECTION, WHICH OBJECTS ARE NO 
 OTHER THAN THAT INTELLECT IT- 
 SELF ? For in pure INTELLECTION it 
 holds the reverfe of all Senfation, that 
 
 THE PERCEIVER A N D TH I N G PER- 
 CEIVED are ALWAYS ONE AND THE 
 SAME (e). 
 
 TWAS 
 
 (>) 'j ID 
 
 &a - jjuar"ou' ti ft juaAAoy, m 
 
 co<5f, x) ^w?5 <Js ys uVa^fi* rf j/ap Na v/t^ynx^ t^ur' 
 'ExEivoj Je, ?5 tvt^fia* Ivipyua. $s n xad' a-jruv, ' 
 ^corj dgirn ^ a/'dioj. ^^aEw JE TOW sou i/at 
 
 '^.f '' t5\\\ \\ 
 
 TW fu- TOTTO j/ap O 0EOI. TcTi; 
 ra {^uo- A'. ^. 'Tis remarkable in Scripture 
 that GOD is peculiarly characterized as A LIVING 
 GOD, in oppofition to all falfe and imaginary Deities, 
 f whom fome had no pretenfions to Life at all ; others 
 to none higher than that of Vegetables or Brutes ; and 
 the beft were nothing better than illuftrious Men, whofe 
 exiftence was circumfcribed by the fhort period of Hu- 
 manity. 
 
 To
 
 302 H E R M E S. 
 
 Ch. V. 'TWAS Speculation of this kind con- 
 cerning THE DIVINE NATURE, which 
 induced one of the wifefl: among the 
 Antients to believe " That the Man, 
 " who could live in the pure enjoyment 
 " of his Mind, and who properly culti- 
 " vated that divine Principle, was bappieft 
 " in him/elf, and moft beloved by the Gods. 
 " For if the Gods had any regard to 
 " what paft among Men (as it appeared 
 '.' they had) 'twas probable they mould 
 " rejoice in that which ICY/J- moft excellent, 
 <c and by nature the moft nearly allied to 
 te themjefoes -, and, as this was MIND, 
 " that they fhould requite the Man, who 
 *' moft loved and honoured T^/J, both 
 " from his regard to that which was 
 
 " dear 
 
 To the paflage above quoted, may be added another, 
 which immediately precedes it. 'A-JTOV J voif o a 
 
 wtn- wr TATT^N NOT 2 KAI NOHTON.
 
 BOOK THE SECOND. 303 
 
 " dear to themfelves, and from his aft- Ch. V. 
 " ing a Part, which was laudable and 
 right (/)." 
 
 AND thus in all SCIENCE there is 
 fomething valuable for itfelf, becaufe it 
 contains within it fomething which is 
 
 divine. 
 
 C K'. 
 
 End of the SECOND BOOK:. 
 
 HER-
 
 OR A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 
 CONCERNING UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR 
 
 BOOK III. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 Introduction Divifion of the SubjeEl into 
 its principal Parts. 
 
 SOME things the MIND performs Ch. I. 
 thro' the BODY; as for example, 
 the various Works and Energies of 
 Art. Others it performs without fucb Me- 
 dium ; as for example, when it thinks, 
 and reafons, and concludes. Now tho' 
 the Mind, in either cafe, may be called 
 the Principle or Source, yet are thefe laft 
 X more
 
 306 HERMES. 
 
 Ch. I. more properly its own peculiar Ads, as 
 being immediately referable to its own in- 
 nate Powers. And thus is MIND ulti- 
 mately the Caufe of all; of every thing at 
 leaft that is Fair and Good* 
 
 AMONG thofe Acts of Mind more im- 
 mediately its own, that of mental Separa- 
 tion may be well reckoned one. Corporeal 
 Separations, however accurate otherwife, 
 are in one refpect incomplete, as they may 
 be repeated without end. The fmalleft 
 Limb, fevered from the fmalleft Animal- 
 cule (if we could fuppofe any inftrument 
 equal to fuch difleftion) has ftill a triple 
 Extenlion of length, breadth, and thick- 
 nefs j has a figure, a colour, with perhaps 
 many other qualities ; and fo will continue 
 to have, tho' thus divided to infinity. But 
 (a) the Mind furmounts all power of Con- 
 cretion, 
 
 (a) Itaque Natura faclenda ejl prorfus Solutio ft Sepa- 
 rate; nonper Ignem certe, fed per Mentem^ tanquam ig- 
 rem divinum. Bacon. Nov. Organ* Lib. II. 16.
 
 THE THIRD. 307 
 
 trftion, and can place in the fimpleft Ch. I. 
 manner every Attribute by itfelf -, convex 
 without concave; colour without fuper- 
 ficies; fuperfkies without Body; and Body 
 without its Accidents ; as diftindlly each 
 one, as tho' they had never been united. 
 
 AND thus 'tis that it penetrates into the 
 recefles of all things, not only dividing 
 them, as Wholes, into their more confplcuous 
 Parts, but perfifting, till it even feparate 
 thofe JLlementary Principles, which, being 
 blended together after a more myfterious 
 manner, are united in the mlnutejl Part> 
 as much as in the mlghtleft Whole (b}. 
 
 Now if MATTER and FORM are among 
 thefe Elements, and deferve perhaps to be 
 efteemed as the principal among them, it 
 may not be foreign to the Defign of this 
 Treatife, to feek whether thefe, or any 
 things analogous to them>, may be found in 
 X 2 SPEECH 
 
 (b] See below, p. 3151,
 
 308 HERMES. 
 
 Ch. I. SPEECH or LANGUAGE (c). This there- 
 fore we fhall attempt after the following 
 method, 
 
 EVERY 
 
 
 
 (c) See before p. 2. 7. MATTER and FORM (in 
 Greek TAH and EIAOZ) were Terms of great 
 import in the days of antient Philofophy, when things 
 were fcrutinized rather at their Beginning than at their 
 End. They have been but little regarded by modern 
 Philofophy, which almoft wholly employs itfelf about 
 the laft order of Subftance, that is to fay, the tangible, 
 corporeal or concrete, and which acknowledges no fepara- 
 tions even in this, but thofe made by mathematical In- 
 ftruments or Chemical Procefs. 
 
 The original meaning of the Word TAH, wat 
 SYLVA, a WOOD. Thus Homer, 
 
 j TAH, 
 
 A* Neptune pa/I, the Mountains and the WOOD 
 Trembled beneath the God's immortal Feet. 
 
 Hence as WOOD was perhaps the firft and mod 
 ufeful kind of Materials, the Word "TA, which de- 
 noted it, came to be by degrees extended, and at length 
 to denote MATTER or MATERIALS in general. In 
 this fenfe Brafs was called the "T An or Matter of a Sta- 
 tue ; Stone, the "TAu or Matter of a Pillar j and fo in 
 other inftances. The Platonic Cbalcidius, and other 
 
 Authors
 
 BOOK THE THIRD. 309 
 
 EVERY thing in a manner, whether Ch. I. 
 natural or artificial, is in its conftitution 
 
 corn- 
 
 Authors of the latter Latinity ufe SYLVA under the 
 fame extended and comprehenfwe Signification. 
 
 Now as the Species of Matter here mentioned, 
 (Stone, Metal, Wood, &c.} occur moft frequently in 
 common life, and are all nothing more than natural 
 Subftances or Bodies, hence by the Vulgar, MATTER 
 and BODY have been taken to denote the fame thing; 
 Material to mean Corporeal; Immaterial, Incorporeal, 
 &c. But this was not the Sentiment of Philofophers 
 of old, by whom the Term Matter was feldom ufed 
 under fo narrow an acceptation. With thefe, every 
 thing was called TAH, or MATTER, whether cor- 
 poreal or incorporeal, which was capable of becoming 
 fomething elfe, or of being moulded into fomething elfe, 
 whether from the operation of Art, of Nature, or a 
 higher Caufe. 
 
 In this fenfe they not only called Brafs the *TAj of 
 a Statue, and Timber of a Boat, but Letters and 
 Syllables they called the "TAai of Words j Words or 
 fimple Terms, the "TAa< of Propofitions j and Propo- 
 fitions themfelves the r 'TAai of Syllogifms. The States 
 held all things out of our own power ( T '* ip r'pty 
 fuch as Wealth and Poverty, Honour and Dishonour, 
 X 3 Health
 
 3 io HERMES. 
 
 Ch. I. compounded of fomething COMMON, ancl 
 fomething PECULIAR; of fomething Com- 
 
 mon, 
 
 Health and Sicknefs, Life and Death, to be the"TA;, 
 or Materials of Virtue or Moral Goodnefs, which had its 
 eflence in a proper conduclt with rcfpecl: to all thefe. 
 (Vid."^rr. Epift. L.I. 0.29. Alfo Vol. the fir ft of 
 thefe mifcellaneous Treatifes, p. 187, 309. M. Ant. 
 . 29. VII. 29. X. 18, 19 where the 'TAtxop and 
 are oppofed to each other). The Peripatetics, 
 tho' they exprefsly held the Soul to be aVw/xaro?, or 
 Incorporeal* yet ftill talked of a N$ 'TAjxi?, a mate- 
 rial Mind or Intellect. This to modern Ears may pof- 
 fibly found fomething harm. Yet if we translate the 
 Words, Natural Capacity^ and confider them as only 
 denoting that original and native Power of Intelle&iori, 
 which being previous to all human Knowledge, is yet 
 neceflary to its reception ; there feems nothing then to 
 remain, that can gives us offence. And fo much for 
 the Idea of T A H, or MATTER. See Alex. Aphrod. 
 de Anim. p. 144. b. 145. drift. Metapb. p. 121, 122, 
 141. Edit. Sylb. Prod, in Euclid, p. 22, 23. 
 
 As to EIAOT, its original meaning was that of 
 FORM or FIGURE, confidered as denoting vijible* Sym- 
 metry, and Proportion ; and hence it had its name from 
 FJou tofee. Beauty of perfon being one of the nobleft, 
 and moft excellent Objefls of Sight. Thus Euripides, 
 
 TlfUTOV fJ.IV El?0? ft^lOV Tl/flaVVl'Jo?. 
 
 fair FORM to Empire gave the fir/l pretence.
 
 BOOK THE THIRD. 311 
 
 mon, and belonging to many other things ; Ch. I. 
 and of fomething Peculiar, by which it 
 
 is 
 
 Now as the Form or Figure of vifible Beings tended 
 principally to dijlinguijb them, and to give to each its 
 Name and Eflencej hence in a more general fenfe, 
 whatever of any kind (whether corporeal or incorporeal) 
 was peculiar, eflential, and diftindtive, fo as by its 
 acceffion to any Beings, as to its "TAu or Matter, to 
 mark them with a Character, which they had not be- 
 fore, was called by the Antients EIAO2 or FORM. 
 Thus not only the Shape given to the Brafs was called 
 the ElSog or Form of the Statue ; but the Proportion af- 
 figned to the Drugs was the EtiToj or Form of the Me- 
 dicine j the orderly Motion of the human Body was the 
 E?(5of or Form of the Dance j the jujl Arrangement of 
 the Propofitions, the ETJo? or Form of the Syllogifm. 
 In like manner the rational and accurate Conduct of a 
 wife and good man, in all the various Relations and Oc- 
 currences of life, made that Eio$ or Form, defcribed 
 by Cicero to his Son, -FoRMAM quidem ipfam, Marce 
 Jilt, et tanquam faciem HONES TI vides : qua, Ji oculis 
 cerneretur, mirabiles amores (ut ait Plato) excitaret fa^ 
 pientia, &c. De Offic. I. 
 
 We may go farther ftill THE SUPREME INTEL- 
 LIGENCE, which pafles thro' all things, and which is 
 the fame to our Capacities, as Light is to our Eyes, 
 X 4 this
 
 312 HERMES. 
 
 Ch. I. is diftinguifhed, and made to be its true 
 and proper felf. 
 
 HENCE 
 
 this fupreme Intelligence, has been called EIAOS 
 EIAflN, THE FORM OF FORMS, as being the 
 Fountain of all Symmetry, of all Good, and of all 
 Truth ; and as imparting to every Being thofe ejjential 
 and dijlinftive Attributes, which make it to be itfelf^ 
 and not any thing elfe. 
 
 And fo much concerning FORM, as before concern- 
 ing MATTER. We (hall only add, 'tis in the uniting 
 of thefe, that every thing, which is generable, may be 
 faid to Commence ; as on the contrary, in their Separa- 
 tion^ to perijh and be at an end that while they co-exift, 
 'tis not by mere juxta-pojition, like he ftones in a wall, 
 but by a more intimate Co-incidence^ complete in the 
 minuteft part that hence, if we were to perfift in di-- 
 viding any fubftance (for example Marble) to infinity, 
 there would ftill remain after every fe&ion both Matter 
 and Form, and thefe as perfectly united, as before the 
 Divifion began laftly, that they are both pre-exijhnt 
 to the Beings, which they conftitute ; the Matter being 
 to be found in the world at large ; the Form^ if artifi- 
 cial, pre-exifting within the Artificer^ or if natural, 
 within the fupreme Caufe, the Sovereign Artift of the 
 Univerfe, 
 
 Pulchrum pulcherrimus ipfe 
 
 Mundum mente gerens, ftmilique in imagine forman:. 
 
 Even
 
 BOOK THE THIRD. 313 
 
 HENCE LANGUAGE, if compared ac- Ch. I. 
 cording to this notion to the murmurs of 
 
 a 
 
 Even without fpeculating fo high as this, we may fee 
 among all animal and vegetable Subftances, the Form 
 pre-exifting in their immediate generating Caufe ; Oak 
 being the parent of Oak, Lion of Lion, Man of Man, 
 fife. 
 
 Cicero's account of thefe Principles is as follows. 
 
 MATTER. 
 
 Sedfubjeflam put ant omnibus fine ulla fpecie, atque ca~ 
 rentem omni ilia qualitate (fadamus enim trattando ufita- 
 tius hoc verbum et tritius) MATERIAM quandam, ex 
 qua omnia exprejja atque effiflafint : (qua iota omnia ac- 
 cipere pojjit^ omnibufque modis mutari atque ex omni parte) 
 ebque etiam interire, nan in nihUum y &c. Acad. I. 8. 
 
 FORM. 
 
 Sed ego fie Jlatuo, nihil ejje in ulk gen ere tarn pul- 
 (hrum, quo non pulcbrius id fit, unde illud^ ut ex ore ali- 
 quo, quafi imago^ exprimatur^ quod neque oculis, neque 
 auribus, neque ullo fenfu per dpi potejl : cogitations tantitm 
 
 et mente compleftimur. H ASRERUM FORMAS^- 
 
 pellat Ideas ille non intelligent folum, fed etiam dicendi 
 gravij/imus auftor et magijler^ Plato : eafque gigni negat, 
 et aitfemper ej/e, ac ratione et inteliigentid contineri : ca 
 tera nafe, occidert, Jiuere^ labi ; nee diutius ejje uno et 
 
 eodem
 
 3H HERMES. 
 
 Ch. I. a Fountain, or the darnings of a Catarad:, 
 has in common this, that like them, it is 
 a SOUND. But then on the contrary it has 
 in peculiar this, that whereas thofe Sounds 
 have no Meaning or Signification, to Lan- 
 guage a ME AN ING or SIGNIFICATION is 
 effentlal. Again, Language, if compared 
 to the Voice of irrational Animals, has in 
 common this, that like them, it has a 
 Meaning. But then it has this In peculiar 
 to diftinguim it from them, that whereas 
 the Meaning of thofe Animal Sounds is 
 derivedfrom NATURE, that of Language 
 is derived, not from Nature, but from 
 COMPACT (</). 
 
 FROM 
 
 eodemftatu. hidquid eft igitur, de quo ratione et vid 
 difputetur, id eji ad ultimamfui generis Formam fpeciem- 
 que redigendum. Cic. ad M. Brut. Orat. 
 
 (d) The Peripatetics (and with juft rcafon) in all 
 their definitions as well of Words as of Sentences, 
 made it a part of their character to be fignificant xara 
 cwflr'xviv, by Compatt. See AriJIot. de Interp. c. 2. 4. 
 Boethius tranflates the Words xara <7ui6r'xt]v, adplaci-
 
 BOOK THE THIRD. 315 
 
 FROM hence it becomes evident, that Ch. I. 
 LANGUAGE, taken in the mod compre- 
 hend ve view, implies certain Sounds, having 
 certain Meanings-, and that of thefe two 
 Principles, the SOUND is as the MATTER, 
 common (like other Matter) to many dif- 
 ferent things; the MEANING as that pecu- 
 liar and chara&eriftic FORM, by which 
 the Nature or Eflence of Language be- 
 comes complete. 
 
 turn, or fecundum placitum, and thus explains them in 
 his comment SECUNDUM PLACITUM vero ejl^ quod 
 fecundum quondam pojltionem^ placitumque ponentis apta- 
 tur : nullum enim nomen naturaliter con/lit utum eft, neque 
 unquam^ Jkut fubjefta res a natura /?, ita quoque a na- 
 turd veniente vocabulo nuncupaiur. Sed hominum genus, 
 quod et rations, et orations vigeret, nomina pofuit^ eaque 
 quibus libuit litcris fyllabifque conjungens, fingulis fubjefla- 
 rum rerum fubjiantils didit. Raeth. in Lib. de Interpret, 
 p. 308. 
 
 CHAP.
 
 316 HERMES. 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 Upon the Matter, or common Subjeft of 
 Language. 
 
 Ch. II. ' I ^ KE YAH or MATTER OF LAN- 
 JL GU AGE comes firft to be confidered, 
 a Subject, which Order will not fuffer us 
 to omit, but in which we fhall endeavour 
 to be as concife as we can. Now this 
 TAH or Matter is SOUND, and SOUND is 
 that Senfation peculiar to the Senfe of Hear- 
 ing, 'when the Air hath felt a PercuJJion* 
 adequate to the producing fuch Effect (a), 
 
 As 
 
 (a] This appears to be Prifcian's Meaning when 
 he fays of a VOICE, what is snore properly true of 
 SOUND in general, thai it is -fuum fenfibile aurium, id 
 (ft, quod proprie auribus accidlt. Lib. I. p. 537. 
 
 The following account of the Stoics, which refers 
 the caufe of SOUND to an Undulation in the Air propa- 
 gated circularly i as when we drop a ftone into a Ciftern 
 of water, feems to accord with the modern Hypothefis, 
 
 and
 
 BOOK THE THIRD. $\j 
 
 As the Caufes of this Percuflion are Ch. II. 
 various, fo from hence Sound derives the 
 Variety of its Species. 
 
 FARTHER, as all thefe Caufes are either 
 Animal or Inanimate, fo the two grand 
 Species of Sounds are likewife Animal of 
 Inanimate. 
 
 THERE is no peculiar Name for Sound 
 Inanimate-, nor even for that of Animals, 
 when made by the trampling of their Feet, 
 the fluttering of their Wings, or any other 
 Caufe, which is merely accidental. But 
 
 that, 
 
 and to be as plaufible as any 'Axou'av ot, T 
 T2 T (pcovcwTOf xj TS axsovTO? a/tfcf T^AtjTlo^/y; 
 joEtscofj tirx x'JuxroUjiAEW, >tj Ta^ ajtsalf TTPSC 
 
 TO?, wj x^warsT^j TO iv TV s%otu,tvv Wwa xardt 
 
 e ^\ * ^ * 4 
 
 JTO TS ( utA?$u'To? AiO P^rro audirt) cum is, qui mt- 
 
 dius inter loquentem, et audientem ejl^ aer verberatur or- 
 bicular it er, deinde agitatus auribus inftuit, quemadmodum 
 et cijlcrnce aqua per orbes injefto agitatur lapide. 
 Lacrt. VII. 2
 
 318 HERMES. 
 
 Ch. II. that, which they make by proper Organs, 
 in confequence of fome Senjation or inward 
 Impulfe, fuch Animal Sound is called a 
 VOICE. 
 
 As Language therefore implies that 
 Sound called HUMAN VOICE; we may 
 perceive that to know the Nature and 
 Powers of the Human Voice, is in fa<ft to 
 know THE MATTER or common Subjefl of 
 Language. 
 
 Now the Voice of Man, and it mould 
 feem of all other Animals, is formed by 
 certain Organs between the Mouth and 
 the Lungs, and which Organs maintain 
 the intercourfe between thefe two. The 
 Lungs furnim Air, out of which the 
 Voice is formed ; and the Mouth, when 
 the Voice is formed, ferves to publifh it 
 abroad. 
 
 WHAT thefe Vocal Organs precifely 
 are, is not in all refpeds agreed by Philo- 
 
 fophers
 
 BOOK THE THIRD. 319 
 
 fophcrs and Anatomifts. Be this as it Ch. II. 
 will, 'tis certain that the mere primary and 
 Jlmple Voice is completely formed, before ever 
 it reach the Mouth, and can therefore (as 
 well as Breathing) find a Paflage thro' the 
 Nofe, when the Mouth is fo far ftopt, as 
 to prevent the leaft utterance. 
 
 Now pure andjtmp/e VOICE, being thus 
 produced, is f as before was obferved ) 
 transmitted to the Mouth. HERE then, by 
 means of certain different Organs, which 
 do not change its primary Qualities, but 
 only fuperadd others, it receives the Form 
 or Character of ARTICULATION. For 
 ARTICULATION is in fad: nothing elfe, 
 than that Form or Character, acquired to 
 Jimple Voice, by means of the Mouth and 
 its federal Organs, the 'Teeth, the 'Tongue, 
 the Lips, &c. The Voice is not by Ar- 
 ticulation made more grave or acute, more 
 loud or foft (which are its primary Qua- 
 lities) but it acquires to thefe Characters 
 2 certain
 
 320 HERMES. 
 
 Ch. II. certain others additional, which are per- 
 fectly adapted to exift along with them (b). 
 
 THE 
 
 (b) The feveral Organs above mentioned not only 
 ferve the purpofes of Speech, but thofe very different 
 ones likewife of Majllcation and Refpiration ; fo frugal 
 is Nature in thus afligning them double duty, and fo 
 careful to maintain her character of doing nothing in 
 vain. 
 
 He, that would be informed, how much better the 
 Parts here mentioned are framed for Difcourfe in Man y 
 who is a Difcurfive Animal, than they are in other Ani- 
 mals, who are not fo, may confult Ariftotle in his Trea- 
 tife de Animal. Part. Lib. II. c, 17. L. III. c. I. 3. 
 De Amma. L. II. c. 8. . 23, &c. 
 
 And here by the way, if fuch Inquirer be of a Genius 
 truly modern, he may poflibly wonder how the Philo- 
 fopher, confidering (as 'tis modeftly phrafed) the Age 
 in which he lived, fhould know fo much, and reafon 
 fo well. But if he have any tafte or value for antient 
 literature, he may with much jufter caufe wonder at the 
 Vanity of his Contemporaries, who dream all Philofophy 
 to be the Invention of their own Age, knowing nothing 
 of thofe Antients ftill remaining for their perufal, tho' 
 they are fo ready on every occafion to give the Pre- 
 ference to themfches. 
 
 The following Account from Ammonium will fhew 
 whence the Notions in this Chapter are taken, and 
 
 what
 
 BOOK THE THIRD. 321 
 
 THE fimplejl of thefe new Chara&ers Ch. II. 
 are thofe acquired thro' the mere Openings 
 
 f 
 
 what authority we have to diftinguifh VOICE from 
 mere SOUND j and ARTICULATE VOICE from SIM- 
 PLE VOICE. 
 
 Kai 
 
 X; TIJ U'zrf^'iX, r/roi TW t ystp'yxpeu-ji 9 
 
 THN AIAAEKTON awyxawv crv, 
 
 w. Ejique SON us, z'^wi flmj j/ auditufen- 
 tltur : Vox <z/^^z ejl fonus^ quern animam edit^ cum per 
 tboracis comprejjlonem aer attraftus a pubnone 9 elifusftmul 
 totus in artfriam, quarn afperam vacant^ t palatum^ out 
 gurgulionem impingit 9 et ex iclu fonum quendam fenfibilem 
 pro animi quodam impetu perficit. Id quod in injlrumentis 
 qu<s quia infant^ idea l^arwtfai a muficis dicuntur^ ufu 
 venit, ut in tibiis, ac fijlulis continuity cum lingua? denies^ 
 labiaque ad loquelam necejjaria Jint, ad vocem vero fimpli- 
 cem nom omnino conferant. Ammon. in Lib. de Interpr. 
 p. 25. b. Vid, eiiAmBoerhaave Inftitut. Medic* Sejt. 
 . 630. 
 
 Y It
 
 HERMES. 
 
 Ch. IJ. of the Mouthy as thefe Openings differ in 
 giving the Voice a Paflage. 'Tis the Va- 
 riety of Configurations in thefe Openings 
 only, which gives birth and origin to the 
 feveral VOWELS , and hence 'tis they de- 
 rive their Name, by being thus eminently 
 Vocal (c), and eafy to be founded of them- 
 fehes alone. 
 
 THERE are other articulate Forms, which 
 the Mouth makes not by mere Openings, 
 but by different Contacts of its different 
 parts -, fuch for inftance, as by the Junc- 
 tion of the two Lips, of the Tongue with 
 
 the 
 
 It appears that the Stoics (contrary to the notion of the 
 Peripatetics] qfed the word <&Ii N H to denote SOUND 
 in general. They defined it therefore to be-r-To W 
 &JJTOV axoiif, which juftifies the definition given by 
 Prifcian, in the Note preceding. ANIMAL SOUND 
 they defined to be 'Arp WTO oppr,/; TztTrXr,'yfj.t-jos y Air 
 Jlruck (and fo made audible) by feme animal impulfe ; and 
 HUMAN or RATIONAL SOUND they defined "Evap- 
 &*o? xj otTTO Jwzvo'ta? tX7rf j a7rO|U. / yr, Sound articulate and 
 deritydfrom the difcurfae faculty. >iog. Laert. VII. 5, 
 
 ((}
 
 BOOK THE THIRD. 323 
 
 the Teeth, of the Tongue with the Palate, Ch. II. 
 and the like. 
 
 Now as all thefe feveral Conta&s, un- 
 lefs fome Opening of the Mouth either 
 immediately precede, or immediately fol- 
 low, would rather lead to Silence, than 
 to produce a Voice ; hence 'tis, that with 
 fome fuch Opening, either previous or 
 fubfequent, they are always connected. 
 Hence alfo it is, that the Articulations fo 
 produced are called CONSONANTS, becaufe 
 they found not of themfelves, and from 
 their own powers, but at all times in com- 
 pany with fome auxiliary Vowel (). 
 
 THERE are other fubordinate Diftinc- 
 tions of thefe primary Articulations, which 
 to enumerate would be foreign to the de- 
 fign of this Treatife. 
 
 'Tis enough to obferve, that they are 
 
 all denoted by the common Name of ELE- 
 
 Y 2 MENT 
 
 (d)
 
 324 HERMES. 
 
 Ch. II. MENT (e), in as much as every Articu-s 
 Jation of every other kind is from them de- 
 rived, and into them refolved. Under their 
 fmallejj: Combination they produce a Sylla- 
 ble-, Syllables properly combined produce 
 a Word-y Words properly combined pro- 
 duce a Sentence ; and Sentences properly 
 combined produce an Oration or Difcourfe. 
 
 AND thus is it that to Principles appa- 
 rently & trivial (f), as about twenty plain 
 
 ele- 
 
 (<?) The Stoic Definition of an ELEMENT is as fol- 
 
 lows - -"Ef* <Jf S~0PEiOV, E OU T&gUTa J"H/ETai Ti-< J/JVO- 
 
 fxfna, x) tlj ? fV^arov KvaXisroti. An ELEMENT ;V 
 Mc^, c/ of which) as their firjl Principle^ things gene- 
 fated are made, and into which) as their lajl remains^ 
 they are refolved. Diog. Laert. VII. 176. What 
 Arijlctle fays upon ELEMENTS with fefpeft to the Sub- 
 je<5t here treated, is worth attending to Qxovr.s roi- 
 "i:* 1 wu 
 
 The ELEMENTS OF ARTICULATE VOICE are 
 thofe t kings y out of which the VOICE is compounded, and 
 into whichy as its Lift remains , it is divided : the Elements 
 themfeives being no farther divifible into other articulate 
 Voices , differing in Species from them. Metaph. V. 0.3. 
 
 (f) The Egyptians paid divine Honours to the In- 
 of Letters, and Regulator of Language^ whom 
 
 they
 
 BOOK THE THIRD; 
 
 elementary Sounds, we owe that variety Ch. 
 of articulate Voices, which have been fuf- 
 ficient to explain the Sentiments of fo in- 
 numerable a Multitude, as all the prefent 
 and paft Generations of Men. 
 
 IT 
 
 they called THEUTH. By the GREEKS he was wor- 
 fh'ipped under the Name of HERMES, and reprefented 
 commonly by a Head alone without other Limbs, ftand- 
 ihg upon a quadrilateral Bajis. The Head itfelf was 
 that of a beautiful Youth, having on it a Petafai or 
 Bonnet, adorned with two Wings. 
 
 There was a peculiar reference iri this Figure td the 
 EPMHS AOTIOS, THE HERMES OF LAN- 
 GUAGE OR DISCOURSE. He poflefled no other part 
 of the human figure but the HEAD, becaufe 1 no other 
 was deemed requijite to rational Communication. Words 
 at the fame time, the medium of thid Communication, 
 being (as Homer well defcribes them) ETTIX -srlioMTz, 
 Winged Words, were reprefented in their Velocity by the 
 WINGS of his Bonnet. 
 
 Let us fuppofe fuch a HERMES, having the Front of 
 hh Bafts (the ufual place for Infcriptiona) adorned with 
 feme old Alphabet, and having a Veil flung acrofs, by 
 which that Alphabet is partly covered. Let A Yourrt 
 be feen drawing off this Vtil\ and A NYMPH, near the 
 Youth, transcribing what She there difcoven. 
 
 Such a Defign would eafily indicate its Meaning. 
 
 THE YOUTH we might imagine to be THE GENIUS 
 
 Y 3 of
 
 326 HERMES, 
 
 
 
 Ch. II. IT appears from what has been faid, 
 that THE MATTER or COMMON SUBJECT 
 OF LANGUAGE is that Species of Sounds 
 called VOICES ARTICULATE. 
 
 WHAT 
 
 OF MAN (Natura Deus humana y as Horace ftileshim;) 
 THE NYMPH to be MNHMO2TNH, or ME- 
 MORY > as much as to infmuate that " MAN, for the 
 * Prefervation of his Deeds and Inventions* was necef- 
 ** farily obliged to have recourfe to LETTERS ; and that 
 " MEMORY, being confeious of her own Insufficiency^ 
 " was glad to avail herfelf of fo valuable an Acquifi- 
 " tion." 
 
 MR. STUART, well known for his accurate and 
 elegant Edition of the Antiquities j/'Athens, has adorned 
 this Work with a Frontifpiece agreeable to the above 
 Ideas, and that in a Tafte truly Attic and Simple^ which 
 no one poflelFes more eminently than himfelf. 
 
 As to HERMES, his Hiftory, Genealogy, Mytholo- 
 gy, Figure, fcrV. Vid. Platan. Pbileb. T. II. p. 18. 
 Edit.Serran. Diod. Sic. L.I. Herat. Od. X. L.I. 
 Hefodt Theog. V. 937. cum Comment. Joan. Diaconi* 
 Tkycid. VI. 27. et Scholiajl. in loc. Pighium epud Gro-- 
 nov. Thejaur. T. IX. p. 1 1 64. 
 
 For the value and importance of Principles, and the 
 difficulty in attaining them, fee Arijlot. de SophiJI. 
 Elench. c. 34.
 
 BOOK THE THIRD. 327 
 
 WHAT remains to be examined in the Ch. II". 
 following Chapter, is Language under its 
 characteristic and peculiar FORM , that is 
 to fay, Language confidered, not as a 
 Sound, but as a Meaning. 
 
 Y 4 CHAP.
 
 328 H E R M E S-. 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 . 
 
 Upon the Form t or peculiar Character of 
 Language. 
 
 Ch.III. TTTHEN to any articulate Voice 
 V V there accedes by compatf a Mean- 
 ing or Signification, fuch Voice by fuch 
 acceflion is then called A Wo R D -, and 
 many Words, pofleffing their Significa- 
 tions (as it were) under the fame Compact 
 (a), unite in contouring a PARTICULAR 
 LANGUAGE. 
 
 It 
 
 (a] See before Note (c] p. 314. See alfo Vol. I. 
 Treatife II. c. i. Notes (0) and (c}. 
 
 The following Quotation from Ammonias is remark- 
 able KaOxTTfp Sv TO ply XXTCZ TC/TTOW xmTc&aj, ^iVfj, 
 
 TO Si OC^tkSjiJ, ^EiTEi >^ y.XTOt 0"Uv6j7)tV, xj TO jlAEU u- 
 AOV, (p^!Tf<, '/, .$U>a, S P (Ti* ^TOJ xj TO 
 
 v EV 5tjw.ni ovvoiptuv 5/vwoxwv, 
 v o a;9
 
 BOOK THE THIRD. 329 
 
 IT appears from hence, that A WORD Ch.III. 
 may be defined a Voice articulate, andfig- 
 nificant by CompaEt and that LANGUAGE 
 may be defined a Syftem of fuch Voices, fo 
 Jignificant* 
 
 IT is from notions like thefe concern- 
 ing Language and Words, that one may 
 
 be 
 
 ffvy- 
 goi; T^Y <7 ( ua<r/v, (ax/ft 
 
 lpSTQV p^JU TZT^OJ TO, 
 
 , J'toVi ^ /uoi/^ TW? 
 
 . / /^ y^w^ manner therefore^ as local 
 Motion is from Nature, but Dancing is fomething pofi- 
 the ; fltf^/ <7i Timber exi/is in Nature, but a Door is 
 fomething pofoive ; y2 ;'i ffo Power of producing a vocal 
 Sound founded in Nature, but that of explaining eurfelvfs 
 by Nouns, or Verbs, fomething pofitive. And hence it is, 
 that as to thejimple power of producing vocal Sound (which 
 is as it were the Organ or Instrument to the Soul's facul- 
 ties ofKnowIege or Volition) as to this vocal power I fay, 
 Man feems to poj/ffs it from Nature, in like manner as 
 2 irra-*
 
 330 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.IIL be tempted to call LANGUAGE a kind of 
 PICTURE OF THE UNIVERSE, where the 
 Words are as the Figures or Images of all 
 particulars. 
 
 AND yet it may be doubted, how far 
 this is true. For if Pictures and Images 
 are all of them Imitations, it will follow, 
 that whoever has natural faculties to know 
 
 the 
 
 irrational animals : but as to the employing of Nouns, or 
 Merits, or Sentences compofed out of them, in the explana- 
 tion of our Sentiments (the things thus employed being 
 founded not in Nature, but in Pojition) this he feems to 
 poffefs by way of peculiar eminence, becaufe he alone of all 
 mortal Beings partakes of a Sou/, which can move itfelf y 
 and operate artificially ; fo that even in the Subject of 
 Sound his artificial Power fyews itfelf ~; as the various 
 elegant Compactions both in Metre, and without Metre, 
 abundantly prove. Ammon. de Interpr. p. 51. a. 
 
 It muft be obferved, that the operating artificially , 
 (iL/fo^fii/ Tf^i/xwf ) of which Ammonius here fpeaks, and 
 which he confiders as a diftin&ive Mark peculiar to the 
 Human Soul, means fomething very different from the 
 mere producing works of elegance and dejign ; elfe it could 
 never be a mark of DiftincTion between Man, and many 
 other Species of Animals, fuch as the Bee, the Beaver, 
 the Swallow, &c. See Vol.1, p. 8, 9, 10, 158, 159, 
 Vc. 2
 
 BOOK THE THIRD. 331 
 
 the Original, will by help of the fame Ch-HI. 
 faculties know alfo its Imitations. But it 
 by no means follows, that he who knows 
 any Being, fhould know for that reafon 
 its Greek or Latin Name. 
 
 THE Truth is, that every Medium, 
 through which we exhibit any thing to 
 another's Contemplation, is either derived 
 from Natural Attributes, and then it is 
 an IMITATION; or elfe from Accidents 
 quite arbitrary, and then it is a SYM- 
 BOL (^). 
 
 : > 
 
 Now, 
 
 i R TO OMOIHMA T SYMBO- 
 AOT, xa6oVo TO [*.lv opoix^x, TW ^Jutrty avrrv TX 
 
 XT TO 
 
 y y ax EOtf tfy* ^r auTo jaeraTrAatrai* TO yap tv TIJ 
 SJKOUI 'ye'y^xft.fji.svK TS Sw^arK? ofMiupXy it pr, xai T 
 > TO" <rt*o N y x TO s 
 
 ix ju.ov>i; u!pr'*/Avotf T^ yptTzoofS ETrtvoiaj' o.'ov,
 
 332 H E R M E S. 
 
 Ch.III. N6w, if it be allowed that in far the 
 greater part of things, riot any of their 
 natural Attributes are to be found in arti* 
 culate Voices, and yet thro' fuch Voices 
 are things of every kind exhibited, it will 
 follow that WORDS mitft of neceffity be 
 SYMBOLS, becaufe k appears that they 
 cannot be Imitations. 
 
 BUT here occurs a Queflion, which de- 
 fcrves attention " Why in the common 
 " intercourfe of men with men have 
 ." Imitations been negleded, and Symbols 
 
 " pre- 
 
 v^/a.- A REPRESENTATIOI-? er 
 RESEMBLANCE differs from ^SYMBOL, / #* OTW^ <?j 
 /^ Refemblance aims as far as pcjjille to reprefent the 
 very nature of the thing, nor is it in cur power to Jhift or 
 vary it. 'Thus # REPRESENTATION intended for So- 
 crates in a Pitfure, if it have not thofe c ir cum/lances pe- 
 
 tuliar
 
 BOOK THE THIRD. 333 
 
 <s preferred, although Symbols are only Ch.III. 
 Xt known by Habit or Inftitution, while 
 ft Imitations are recognized by a kind of 
 et natural Intuition ?" To this it may be 
 anfwered, that if the Sentiments of the 
 Mind, like the Features of the Face, were 
 immediately vifible to every beholder, the 
 Art of Speech or Difcourfe would have 
 been perfectly fuperfluous. But now, 
 while our Minds lie inveloped and hid, 
 and the Body (like a Veil) conceals every 
 thing but itfelf, we are neceffarily compel- 
 led, when we communicate our Thoughts, 
 
 to 
 
 culiar to Socrates, the bald, the Jlat-nofed, and tie prs- 
 jefting Eyes, cannot properly be called a Reprefeniatian of 
 him. But a SYMBOL or SIGN (for the Pkilofopber 
 Ariftotle ufes both names) is wholly in our our own pow- 
 er, as depending Jingly for its exi/Jence on our imagina- 
 tion. Thus for example, as to the time when two armies 
 Jhoitld engage, the Symbol or Sign may be the founding of 
 a Trumpet, the throwing of a Torch, (according to what 
 Euripides fays, 
 
 But when the flaming Torch was hurl'd, thefign 
 Of purple fight, as when the Trumpet founds, &C.J 
 or elfe one may fuppofe the elevating of a Spear, the dart- 
 ing of a Weapon, and a thoufand ways befides. Ammon, 
 in Lib, de Jnterp. p. 17. b.
 
 334 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.III. to pafs them to each other through a Me- 
 dium which is corporeal (c). And hence it 
 is that all Signs, Marks, Imitations, and 
 Symbols muft needs bzfenjible, and ad- 
 drefied as fuch to the Senfes (d). Now 
 THE SENSES, we know, never exceed 
 their natural Limits; the Eye perceives 
 no Sounds; the Ear perceives no Figures 
 nor Colours. If therefore we were to 
 converfe, not by Symbols but by Imitations, 
 as far as things are characterized by Fi- 
 
 gure 
 
 A; xj/jp^al otl 5 ( uTflaj, 'yvf/.v&i fj.lv 
 yi'vacjTO $S aurwv TWV vor)jtx,<XTv 
 
 rai, iy.w viits STEoixzXvTrxa'iv OIVTUV TO vooov, f.- 
 Qr.ffay ruv cto ( uaTwv, h* uv cri/x,aiy(rt aAA/Aa? ra 
 aoa.'yij.cit.rtx.. Animi nojlri a corporis compage fecret'i res 
 vicijjim ani mi ccnceptionibus fignificare pojjent : cum au- 
 tem corporibus involuii Jinf, perinde ac nebula, ipforum 
 jntelligendi vis obtegitur : quccirca opus eis fuit nomini- 
 -tus, quibus res inter fe Jignifaartnt, Amman, in Praedi- 
 cam. p. 18. a. 
 
 (d) ^iiicquid fcindi pojffit in differ enti as fatis nume- 
 rofas, ad notion urn varietatem explicandam (modo differ- 
 entia illte fenfui perceptibilesy^/J fieri potejl vebiculum 
 cogitationum de bcmine in bominem. Bacon, de Augm. 
 Sclent. VI. i.
 
 BOOK THE THIRD. 335 
 
 gure and Colour, our Imitation would be Ch.III. 
 necefTarily thro' Figure and Colour alfo. 
 Again, as far as they are characterized by 
 Sounds, it would for the fame reafon be 
 thro* the Medium of Sounds. The like 
 may be faid of all the other Senfes, the 
 Imitation ftill (hifting along with the Ob- 
 jects imitated. We fee then how compli- 
 cated fuch Imitation would prove. 
 
 IF we fet LANGUAGE therefore, as a 
 Symbol y in oppolition tofuc/j Imitation -, if 
 we confider the Simplicity of the one, and 
 the Multiplicity of the other; if we con- 
 fider the Eafe and Speed, with which 
 Words are formed (an Eafe which knows 
 no trouble or fatigue; and a* Speed, which 
 equals the Progrefs of our very Thoughts) 
 if we oppofe to this the difficulty and 
 length of Imitations ; if we remember 
 that fome Objects are capable of no Imi- 
 tations at all, but that all Objects univer- 
 fally may be typified by Symbols ; we may 
 
 plainly 
 
 See before p.
 
 336 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.III. plainly perceive an Anfwer to the Queftion 
 here propofed " Why, in the common 
 *' intercourfe of men with men, Imita- 
 " tions have been rejected, and Symbols 
 tf preferred." 
 
 HENCE too we may perceive a Reafon, 
 ivhy there never was a Language, nor in- 
 deed can pojjibly be framed one, to exprefs 
 the Properties and real Rffences of things, 
 as a Mirrour exhibits their Figures and 
 their Colours. For if Language of itfelf 
 imply nothing more, than certain Species 
 of Sounds with certain Motions concomitant -, 
 if to fome Beings Sound and Motion are 
 no Attributes at all ; if to many others, 
 where Attributes, they are no way eiTen- 
 tial (fuch as the Murmurs and Wavings 
 of a Tree during a ftorm) if this be true 
 'tis impoffible the Nature of fuch Beipgs 
 fhould be exprefled, or the leaft efTential 
 Property be any way imitated, while be- 
 tweeen the Medium and tbemfehes (here is 
 nothing CONNATURAL (e). 
 
 Tis 
 
 See Vol. I. Treatife JI. c, 3. p. 70.
 
 337 
 
 'Tis true indeed, when Primitives were Ch.III. 
 once eftablimed, 'twas eafy to follow the 
 Connection and Subordination of Nature, 
 in the juft deduction of Derivatives and 
 Compounds. Thus the Sounds, Water, 
 and, Fire, being once annexed to thofe 
 two Elements, 'twas certainly more natural 
 to call Beings participating of the firft, 
 Watry, of the laft, Fiery, than to com- 
 mute the Terms, and call them by the 
 reverfe. But why, and from what natu- 
 ral Connexions the Primitives themfelves 
 might not be commuted, 'twill be found, 
 I believe, difficult to affign a Reafon, as 
 well in the inftances before us, as in moft 
 others. We may here alfo fee the Reafon, 
 why ALL LANGUAGE is FOUNDED IN 
 COMPACT, and not in Nature; for fo are 
 all Symbols, of which Words are a certain 
 Species. 
 
 THE Queflion remains if WORDS are 
 
 Symbols, then SYMBOLS OF, WHAT? 
 
 Z If
 
 338 HERMES. 
 
 Chill. If it be anfwered, OF THINGS, the Que- 
 ftion returns, OF WHAT THINGS ? If it 
 be anfwered, of the federal Individuals of 
 Senfe, the various particular Beings, ivbicb 
 exift around #j to this, 'tis replied, may 
 be raifed certain Doubts. In the firft place 
 every Word will be in fact a proper Name. 
 Now if all Words are proper Names, how 
 came Lexicographers, whofe exprefs buii- 
 nefs is to explain Words, either wholly to 
 omit proper Names, or at leaft to explain 
 them, not from their own Art, but from 
 Hiftory ? 
 
 AGAIN, if all Words are proper Names, 
 then in ftrictnefs no Word can belong to 
 more than one Individual. But if fo, 
 then, as Individuals are infinite 9 to make 
 a perfect Language, Words mujl be infinite 
 alfo. But if infinite, then incompreben- 
 fible, and never to be attained by the wifeft 
 Men; whole labours in Language upon 
 this Hypothecs would be as idle as that 
 ftudy of infinite written Symbols, which 
 
 Million-
 
 BOOK THE THIRD. 339 
 
 Mifiionaries (if they may be credited) at- Ch.III. 
 tribute to the Chinefe. 
 
 AGAIN, if all Words are proper Names, 
 or (which is the fame) the Symbols of 
 Individuals ; it will follow, as Individuals 
 are not only infinite, but ever paffing, that 
 the Language of thofe, who lived ages 
 ago, will be as unknown now, as the very 
 Voices of the Speakers. Nay the Lan- 
 guage of every Province, of every Town, 
 of every Cottage, muft be every where 
 different, and every where changing, fince 
 fuch is the Nature of Individuals, which 
 it follows. 
 
 AGAIN, if all Words are proper 
 the Symbols of Individuals, it will follow 
 that in Language there can be no General 
 Proportion, becaufe upon the Hypothecs 
 all Terms are particular ; nor any Affirma- 
 tive Propojltion^ becaufe no one Individual 
 in nature is another. It remains, there can 
 be no Proportions, but Particular Nega- 
 Z 2 fives.
 
 340 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.III. fives. But if fo, then is Language inca- 
 pable of communicating General Affirma* 
 the Truths If fo, then of communicating 
 Dcmonftration If fo, then of communi- 
 cating Sciences, which are fo many Syftems 
 of Demonftrations If fo, then of com- 
 municating Arts, which are the Theorems 
 of Science applied practically- If fo, we 
 {hall be little the better for it either in 
 Speculation or in Practice (e). And fo 
 much for this Hypothefis ; let us now try 
 another. 
 
 IF WORDS are not the Symbols of ex- 
 ternal Particulars, it follows of courfe, 
 they muft be THE SYMBOLS OF OUR 
 IDEAS : For this is evident, if they are not 
 
 Symbols 
 
 (e] The whole of Euclid (whofe Elements may be 
 called the bafis of Mathematical Science) is founded 
 upon general Terms, and general Proportions , moft of 
 which are affirmative. So true are thofe Verfes, how- 
 ever barbarous as to their ftile, 
 
 Syllogizari non ejl ex Particular!, 
 Neve Nfgativis, refit concludcre ft vis.
 
 BOOK THE THIRD. 341 
 
 Symbols of things without, they can only Ch.III. 
 be Symbols of fomething within. 
 
 HERE then the Queftion recurs, if SYM- 
 BOLS OF IDEAS, then of WHAT IDEAS ? 
 OF SENSIBLE IDEAS. Be it fo, and 
 what follows ? Every thing in fad:, which 
 has followed already from the fuppofition 
 of their being the Symbols of external 
 Particulars; and that from this plain and 
 obvious reafon, becaufe the feveral Ideas, 
 which Particulars imprint, mud needs be 
 as infinite and mutable, as they are them- 
 felves. 
 
 IF then Words are neither the Symbols 
 of external Particulars, nor yet of parti- 
 cular Ideas, they can be SYMBOLS of no- 
 thing elfe, except of GENERAL IDEAS, be- 
 caufe nothing elfe, except thefe, remains. 
 And what do we mean by GENERAL 
 IDEAS? We mean SUCH AS ARE COM- 
 MON TO MANY INDIVIDUALS; not only 
 to Individuals which exifl now, but which 
 3 exiiled
 
 342 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.III. exiilcd in ages paft, and will exifl in ages 
 future -, fuch for example, as the Ideas 
 belonging to the Words, Man, Lion, Cedar. 
 Admit it, and what folio ws? It fol- 
 lows, that if Words are the Symbols of fuch 
 general Ideas, Lexicographers may find 
 employ, though they meddle not with 
 proper Names. 
 
 IT follows that one Word may be, not 
 bomonymoiifly, but truly and effentially com- 
 mon to many Particulars, pad prefent and 
 future; fo that however thefe Particulars 
 may be infinite, and ever fleeting, yet Lan- 
 guage notwithstanding may be definite and 
 Jleady. But if fo, then attainable even by 
 ordinary Capacities, without danger of in- 
 curring the Chinefe Abfurdity *. 
 
 AGAIN, it follows that the Language 
 of thofe, who lived ages ago, as far as it 
 
 {rands 
 
 * See p. 338, 339.
 
 HOOK THE THIRD. 343 
 
 Rands for the fame general Ideas, may be as Ch.IH, 
 intelligible now, as it was then. The like 
 may be faid of the fame Language being 
 accommodated to diflant Regions, and 
 even to diftant Nations, amidft all the va- 
 riety of ever ne-w and ever changing Ob- 
 jects. 
 
 AGAIN, it follows that Language may 
 be expreffive of general Truths ; and if fo, 
 then of Demonftration, and Sciences, and 
 Arts j and if fo, become fubfervient to 
 purpofes of every kind (f). 
 
 Now if it be true " that none of thefe 
 " things could be afTerted of Language, 
 " were not Words the Symbols of genera! 
 " Ideas and it be further true, that thefe 
 " things may be all undeniably aflerted 
 " of Language" it will follow (and that 
 neceiTarily) that WORDS ARE THE SYM- 
 BOLS OF GENERAL IDEA?. 
 
 Z 4 AND 
 
 (/) See before Note (e^
 
 344 HER M E S, 
 
 AND yet perhaps even here may be an 
 Objedion. It may be urged, if Words are 
 the Symbols of general Ideas, Language 
 may anfvver well enough the purpofe of 
 Philofophers, who reafon about general, 
 and abflratt Subjects but what becomes 
 of the bufinefs of ordinary Life ? Life we 
 know is merged in a multitude of 'Particu- 
 lars, where an Explanation by Language 
 is as requilite, as in the higheft Theorems. 
 The Vulgar indeed want it to no other End. 
 How then can this End in any refpeft be 
 anfwered, if Language be exprefTive of 
 nothing farther than general Ideas ? 
 
 To this it may be anfwered, that Arts 
 furely reipect the bufinefs of ordinary Life; 
 yet fo far are general Terms from being 
 an Obftacle here, that without them no 
 Art can be rationally explained. How 
 for inftance mould the meafuring Artift 
 afcertain to the Reapers the price of their 
 labours, had not he firft through general 
 
 2 Terms 
 
 <j i
 
 BOOK THE THIRD. 345 
 
 Terms learnt thofe general Theorems, that Ch.III. 
 re(pe<5l the dodlrine and practice of Men- 
 furation ? 
 
 BUT fuppofe this not to fatisfy a perfe- 
 vering Obje&or fuppofe him to infift, 
 that, admitting this to be true, there were 
 Jlill a multitude of occajions for minute 
 particularizing, of which 'twas not poffible 
 for mere Generals to be Jufceptible fup- 
 pofe, I fay, fuch an Objection, what mould 
 
 we anfwer ? That the Objection was 
 
 jufl ; that 'twas necefTary to the Perfec- 
 tion and Completion C/'LANGUAGE, that 
 it Jhould be exprejfive of PARTICULARS, 
 as well as ^ GENERALS. We muft how- 
 ever add, that its general Terms are by 
 far its moft excellent and eflential Part, 
 iince from thefe it derives " that com- 
 f prehenfive Univerfality, that juft pro- 
 " portion of Precifion and Permanence, 
 " without which it could not pombly be 
 " either learnt, or underftood, or ap- 
 !' plied to the purpofes of Reafoning and 
 
 " Science ;"
 
 346 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.III. " Science ;" that particular Terms have 
 their Utility and End, and that therefore 
 care too has been taken for a fupply of 
 thefe. 
 
 ONE Method of exprerTing Particulars, 
 is that of PROPER NAMES. This is the 
 lead artificial, becaufe proper Names be- 
 ing in every diftridt arbitrarily applied, 
 may be unknown to thofe, who know the 
 Language perfectly well, and can hardly 
 therefore with propriety be confidered as 
 parts of it. The other and more artificial 
 Method is that of DEFINITIVES or AR- 
 TICLES (g), whether we affume the/>r0- 
 nominal, or thofe more ftrictly fo called. 
 And here we cannot enough admire the 
 exquiiire Art of Language, which, with- 
 out ivandring into infinitude, contrives how 
 to denote things injinite -, that is to fay in 
 other words, which, by the fmall Tribe 
 of Definitives properly applied to general 
 
 Terms, 
 
 (g) See before p. 72, &c. 233, &c.
 
 BOOK THE THIRD. 347 
 
 Terms, knows how to employ thefe laft, Ch.III. 
 tho' in number finite, to the accurate ex- 
 preffion of infinite Particulars. 
 
 To explain what has been faid by a 
 fingle example. Let the general Term be 
 MAN. I have occafion to apply this Term 
 to the denoting of fome Particular. Let 
 it be required to exprefs this Particular, 
 as unknown ; I fay, A Man known ; I fay, 
 THE Man indefinite; ANY Man definite-, 
 A CERTAIN Man prejent and near ; THIS 
 Man prefent and dijlant ; THAT Man 
 like to fome other ; SUCH A Man an inde- 
 finite Multitude; MANY Men a definite 
 Multitude ; A THOUSAND Men; t be ones 
 of a Multitude, taken throughout ; EVERY 
 Man the fame ones, taken with diftinclion; 
 EACH Man taken in order ; FIRST Man, 
 SECOND Man, &c. the whole Multitude 
 of Particulars taken collefthely, ALL Men 
 the Negation of this Multitude ; NO Man. 
 But of this we have fpoken already, when 
 we inquired concerning Definitives. 
 
 THE
 
 348 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.III. THE Sum of all is, that WORDS ARE 
 THE SYMBOLS OF IDEAS BOTH GENERAL 
 AND PARTICULAR; YET OF THE GENE- 
 RAL, PRIMARILY, ESSENTIALLY, AND 
 
 IMMEDIATELY; OF THE PARTICULAR, 
 ONLY SECONDARILY, ACCIDENTALLY, 
 AND MEDIATELY. 
 
 SHOULD it be afked, " why has Lan- 
 " guage this double Capacity ?" May we 
 not afk, by way of return, Is it not a kind 
 of reciprocal Commerce, or Intercourfe of 
 our Ideas? Should it not therefore be 
 framed, fo as to exprefs the whole of our 
 Perception ? Now can we call that Per- 
 ception intire and whole, which implies 
 either INTELLECTION without Se?ifation t 
 or SENSATION without Intelk&ion ? If 
 not, how ihould Language explain the 
 iL-bclc of our Perception, had it not Words 
 to exprefs the Objects, proper to each of 
 the two Faculties ? 
 
 To
 
 BOOK THE THIRD. 349 
 
 To conclude As in the preceding ChJIL 
 Chapter we confidered Language with a 
 view to its MATTER, fo here we have 
 confidered it with a view to its FORM. Its 
 MATTER is recognized, when 'tis confi- 
 dered as a Voice ; its FORM, as 'tisjignifi- 
 cant of our federal Ideas ; fo that upon the 
 whole it may be defined A SYSTEM OF 
 ARTICULATE VOICES, THE SYMBOLS 
 OF OUR IDEAS, BUT OF THOSE PRIN- 
 CIPALLY, WHICH ARE GENERAL OR 
 UNIVERSAL. 
 
 CHAP.
 
 350 HERMES. 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 Concerning general or unmerfal Ideas. 
 
 Ch.IV. 71 /T UCH having been faid in the pre- 
 i. * JL ceding Chapter about GENERAL 
 OR UNIVERSAL IDEAS, it may not perhaps 
 be amifs to inquire, by what procefs we 
 come to perceive them, and what kind of 
 Beings they are; fince the generality of 
 men think fo meanly of their exigence, 
 that they are commonly confidered, as 
 little better than Shadows. Thefe Sen- 
 timents are not unufual even with the 
 Philofopher now a days, and that from 
 caufes much the fame with thofe, which 
 influence the Vulgar. 
 
 THE VULGAR merged in Se?ife from 
 their earlieft Infancy, and never once 
 dreaming any thing to be worthy of pur- 
 fuit, but what either pampers their Appe- 
 tite, or fills their Purfe, imagine nothing 
 
 to 
 
 3
 
 BOOK THE THIRD. 351 
 
 to be real, but what may be tafted, or Ch.IV. 
 touched. THE PHILOSOPHER, as to thefe 
 matters being of much the fame Opinion, 
 in Philofophy looks no higher, than to 
 experimental AmufementS) deeming nothing 
 Demonftration, if it be not made ocular. 
 Thus inftead of afcending from Senfe to 
 Intellect (the natural progrefs of all true 
 Learning) he hurries on the contrary into 
 the midft of Senfe, where he wanders at 
 random without any end, and is loft in a 
 Labyrinth of infinite Particulars. Hence 
 then the reafon why the fublimer parts of 
 Science , the Studies of MINP, INTELLEC- 
 TION, and INTELLIGENT PRINCIPLES, 
 are in a manner neglected ; and, as if the 
 Criterion of all Truth were an Alembic or 
 an Air-pump, what cannot be proved by 
 Experiment, is deemed no better than 
 mere Hypothecs. 
 
 AND yet 'tis fomewhat remarkable, 
 amid the prevalence of fuch Notions, that 
 there fhould ftill remain two Sciences in 
 
 famion,
 
 352 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.IV. faflnon, and thefe having their Certainty 
 of all the leaft controverted, which are not 
 in the minutejl article depending upon Expe- 
 riment. By thefe I mean ARITHMETIC, 
 and GEOMETRY (a). But to come to our 
 Subject concerning GENERAL IDEAS. 
 
 MAN'S 
 
 (a] The many noble Theorems (fo ufeful in life, 
 and fo admirable in themfelves) with which thefe two 
 SCIENCES fo eminently abound, arife originally from 
 PRINCIPLES, THE MOST OBVIOUS IMAGINABLE ; 
 Principles, fo little wanting the pomp and apparatus of 
 EXPERIMENT, that they are felf- evident to every one, 
 poflefled of common fenfe. I would not be underftood, 
 in what I have here faid, or may have faid elfewhere, to 
 undervalue EXPERIMENT ; whofe importance and uti- 
 lity I freely acknowlege, in the many curious Noftrums 
 and choice Receipts, with which it has enriched the 
 necefTary Arts of life. Nay, I go farther I hold all 
 jujlifialle Practice in every kind'of Subjefl to be founded 
 in EXPERIENCE, which is no more than the refiilt of 
 many repeated EXPERIMENTS. But I muft add with- 
 al, that the man who a6ls from Experience alone, tho' 
 he act ever fo well, is but an Empiric or ^uack^ and 
 that not only in Medicine, but in every other Subject. 
 'Tis then only that we recognize ART, and that the 
 EMPIRIC quits his name for the more honourable one 
 of ARTIST, when to his EXPERIENCE he adds 
 
 SCIENCE,
 
 353 
 
 MAN'S FIRST PERCEPTIONS arethofe Ch.IV. 
 of the SENSES, in as much as they com- 
 mence from his earlieft Infancy. Thefe 
 Perceptions, if not infinite, are at leaffc 
 indefinite, and more fleeting and tranfient, 
 than the very Objedts, which they exhibit, 
 
 becaufe 
 
 SCIENCE, and is thence enabled to tell us, not only, 
 WHAT is to be done, but WHY 'tis to be done; for ART 
 is a compojite of Experience and Science, Experience 
 providing it Materials, and Science giving them A 
 FORM. 
 
 In the mean time, while EXPERIMENT is thus ne- 
 ceflary to all PRACTICAL WISDOM, with refpe& to 
 PURE and SPECULATIVE SCIENCE, as we have 
 hinted already, it has not the leaft to do. For who 
 ever heard of Logic, or Geometry, or Arithmetic being 
 proved experimentally ? 'Tis indeed by the application 
 of thefe that Experiments are rendered ufeful j that they 
 are aflumed into Philofophy, and in fome degree made 
 a part of it, being otherwife nothing better than puerile 
 amufements. But that thefe Sciences themfelves fhould 
 depend upon the Subje&s, on which they work, is, as 
 if the Marble were to fafhion theChizzle, and not the 
 Chizzle the Marble.
 
 354 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.IV. becaufe they not only depend upon the 
 exijlence of thofe Obje&s, but becaufe 
 they cannot fubfift, without their imme- 
 diate Prefence. Hence therefore it is, that 
 there can be no Senfation of either Paft or 
 Future, and confequently had the Soul no 
 other Faculties, than the Senfes, it never 
 could acquire the lead Idea of TIME (^). 
 
 
 
 BUT happy for us we are not deferted 
 here. We have in the firft place a Faculty, 
 called IMAGINATION or FANCY, which 
 however as to its energies it may be fub- 
 fequent to Senfe, yet is truly prior to it 
 both in dignity and ufe. THIS 'tis which 
 retains the fleeting Forms of things, when 
 Things themfelves are gone, and all Senfa- 
 at an end. 
 
 THAT this Faculty, however connected 
 with Senfe, is ftill perfectly different, may 
 
 be 
 
 (i>] See before p. 105. See alfo p. 112. Note (/).
 
 BOOK THE THIRD. 355 
 
 be feen from hence. We have an Imagi- Ch.IV. 
 nation of things, that are gone and ex- 
 tinct ; but no fuch things can be made ob- 
 jects of Senfation. We have an eafy com- 
 mand over the Objects of our Imagina- 
 tion, and can call them forth in almoft 
 what manner we pleafe ; but our Senfa- 
 tions are necefTary, when their Objects are 
 prefent, nor can we controul them, but 
 by removing either the Objects, or our- 
 felves (c). 
 
 As 
 
 (r) Befides the diftinguifhing of SENSATION from 
 IMAGINATION, there are two other Faculties of the 
 Soul, which from their nearer alliance ought carefully 
 to be diftinguifhed from it, and thefe are M N H M H, 
 and ANAMNH2I2, MEMORY, and RECOL- 
 LECTION. 
 
 When we view fome rtlift of fenfation repofed within 
 us, without thinking of its rife^ or referring it to any fcn- 
 fible Objeft, this is PHANSY or IMAGINATION. 
 
 When we view fome fuch relifl^ and refer it withal 
 to that fenfible Object, which in time pa/t ivas its caufe and 
 original^ this is MEMORY. 
 
 A a 2 Laftly
 
 356 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.IV. As the Wax would not be adequate 
 to its bufmefs of Signature, had it not a 
 Power to retain, as well as to receive ; the 
 fame holds of the SOUL, with refpeft to 
 Senfe and Imagination. SENSE is its re- 
 ceptive 
 
 Laftly the Road, which leads to Memory through a 
 feries of Ideas, however connected whether rationally or 
 cafually, this is RECOLLECTION. I have added ca- 
 fually, as well as rationally, becaufe a cafual connection 
 is often fufficient. Thus from feeing a Garment, 1 
 think of its Owner ; thence of his Habitation ; thence 
 of Woods ; thence of Timber j thence of Ships, Sea- 
 fights, Admirals, 3V. 
 
 If the Diftin&ion between Memory and Phanfy be 
 not fufficiently underftood, it may be illuflrated by be- 
 ing compared to the view of a Portrait. When we 
 contemplate a Portrait, without thinking of whom it is 
 the Portrait, fuch Contemplation is analogous to 
 PHANSY. When we view it with reference to the Ori- 
 ginal, whom it represents, fuch Contemplation is analo- 
 gous to MEMORY. 
 
 We may go farther. IMAGINATION or PHANSY 
 may exhibit (after a manner) even things that are to 
 tome. 'Tii here that Hope and Fear paint all their plea- 
 fant, and all their painful Pictures of Futurity. But 
 MEMORY is confined in the ftricteft manner to thepajt. 
 
 What 
 i
 
 Boeic THE THIRD. 357 
 
 ceptive Power; IMAGINATION, its re- Ch.IV. 
 tentivc. Had it Senfe without Imagina- 
 tion, 'twould not be as Wax, but as Wa- 
 ter, where tho' all Impreffions may be 
 inftantly made, yet as foon as made they 
 are as inftantly loft. 
 
 THUS then, from a view of the two 
 Powers taken together, we may call SENSE 
 (if we pleafe) a kind of tranfient Imagina- 
 tion ; and IMAGINATION on the contrary 
 a kind of permanent Senfe (d). 
 
 Now 
 
 What we have faid, may fuffice for our prefent pur- 
 pofe. He that would learn more, may confult Arijlot. 
 de Anima^ L. III. c. 3, 4. and his Tre'atife de Mem. et 
 Reminifc. 
 
 (^) T TOWVV 
 
 St? V6t"iv iv nu.'iv diro ruv ivi 
 iOB Tjvlo 
 
 v 
 
 A a 3
 
 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.IV. Now as our Feet in vain venture to 
 walk upon the River, till the Froft bind 
 the Current, and harden the yielding Sur- 
 face; fo does the SOUL in vain feek to exert 
 its higher Powers, the Powers I mean of 
 REASON and INTELLECT, till IMAGI- 
 NATION firft fix ihzjluency of SENSE, and 
 thus provide a proper Bafis for the fupport 
 of its higher Energies. 
 
 AFTER 
 
 ^ TOV TOJKTOU u<nrep TITTOV, <&AN- 
 
 TAIIAN xaXscnv. Now what PHANSY or IMA- 
 
 
 GINATION *V, we may explain as follows. We may 
 conceive to be formed within us, from the operations of our 
 Senfes about fenjible Subjefts, feme bnprejjion (as it were) 
 or Pifture in our original Senforiwn, being a relift of that 
 motion caused within us by the external objett \ a relitt^ 
 which when the external objett is no longer prefent, remains 
 and is Jlill preferved y being as it were its Image, and 
 which, by being thus preferved, becomes the caufe of our 
 having Memory. Now fuch a fort of relief and (as it 
 were) ImpreJJion they call PHANSY or IMAGINATION. 
 //<?*. dpbrod. de Animd^ p. 135. t>. Edit. Aid.
 
 BOOK THE THI R D. 
 
 AFTER this manner, in the admirable Ch.IV. 
 Oeconomy of the Whole, are Natures fub- 
 ordinate made fubfervient to the higher. 
 Were there no Things external, the Senfes 
 could not operate ; were there no Senfa- 
 tions, the Imagination could not operate ; 
 and were there no Imagination, there could 
 be neither Reafoning nor Intellettion, fuch 
 at lead as they are found in Man, where 
 they have their Intenfions and Remiffions 
 in alternate fucceflion, and are at firft no- 
 thing better, than a mere CAPACITY or 
 POWER. Whether every Intellect begins 
 thus, may be perhaps a queftiofi -, eipe- 
 cially if there be any one of a nature more 
 divine, to which " Intention and Remiffion 
 " and mere Capacity are unknown (e)." 
 But not to digrefs. 
 
 'Tis 
 
 (e) See p. 162. The Life, Energy, or Manner of 
 
 MAN'S Exiftence is not a little different from that of 
 
 the DEITY. THE LIFE OF MAN has its Eflence in 
 
 A a 4 MOTION.
 
 360 H E R M E S. 
 
 Ch.IV. 'Ti5 then on thefe permanent Phantafms 
 that THE HUMAN MIND firft wprks, and 
 
 by 
 
 MOTION. This is not only true with refpect to that 
 lower and fubordinate Life, which he fhares in com- 
 mon with Vegetables, and which can no longer fubfift 
 than while the Fluids circulate, but 'tis likewife true ig 
 that Liffj which is peculiar to him as Man. Objects 
 from without frjl move our faculties, and thence we 
 jnove of ourfelves either to Practice or Contemplation. 
 But the LIFE or EXISTENCE of GOD (as far as we 
 can conjecture upon fo tranfcendent a Subject) is not 
 only complete throughout Eternity, but complete in 
 every Inftanf, and is for that reafon IMMUTABLE and 
 
 SUPERIOR TQ ALL MOTION. 
 
 'Tis to this diftirjftion that Arijloth alludes, when 
 be tells us Ou 'yu.f povw xjvv'oWf is-n tvip'yiuxy aAAa 
 x, ax'j>)(7i5* *y flJciw juaAAov iv rpi^ix. tr*'v, i 'w xtvr,- 
 fAfraSoA^ $t TS-dvTuv J'Auxu, xara TO-J < sroijT?*y, 
 
 o# fVtxjf . ^r /^r<f w <?/ ^^ tf Energy of MO- 
 TION, ^/ fl/" IMMOBILITY ; <7<f PLEASURE ^r FE- 
 LICITY exiji* rather in REST than in MOTION ; 
 Change of all things being fweet (according to the Poet) 
 from a principle of Pravity in thofe who believe fo. For 
 
 n
 
 BOOK THE THIRD. 361 
 
 by an Energy as fpontaneous and familiar Ch.IV. 
 to its Nature, as the feeing of Colours is 
 familiar to the Eye, it difcerns at once 
 
 what 
 
 in the fame manner as the bad man is one fickle and change- 
 able, fo is that Nature bad that required Variety^ in as 
 much as fuch Nature is neither fimple nor even. Eth. 
 Nicom. VII. 14. & Ethic. Eudem. Vl.fubfin. 
 
 'TJS jtO this UNALTERABLE NATURE OF THE 
 
 PEITY that Boethius refers, when he fays in thofc 
 elegant verfes, 
 
 ..... Tempus 
 Ire jubes, STABILISQUE MANENS das cuntta 
 moveri. 
 
 From this fingle principle of IMMOBILITY, may be 
 derived fome of the nobleft of the Divine Attributes ; 
 fuch as that of IMPASSIVE, INCORRUPTIBLE, IN- 
 CORPOREAL, &c. Vide Arijltf. Phyfic. VIII. Me- 
 taphyf. XIV. c. 6, 7, 9, 10. Edit. Du-Val. See alfo 
 Vol. I. of thefe Treatifes, p. 262 to 266 alfo p. 295, 
 where the Verfes of Boethius are quoted at length. 
 
 It muft be remembred however, that tho' we are not 
 Goo's, yet as rational Beings we have within us fome- 
 thing Divine, and that the more we can become fupe- 
 rior to our mutable, variable, and irrational part, and 
 place our welfare in that Good, which is immutable, 
 
 per-
 
 362 HERMES. 
 
 Ck.1V. what in MANY is ONE; what in things 
 DISSIMILAR and DIFFERENT is SIMILAR 
 and the SAME {/). By this it comes to 
 
 behold 
 
 permanent, and rational, the higher we {hall advance 
 in real Happinefs and Wifdom. This is (as an antient 
 writer fays) 'OpwurK TU S-EW xara TO Juvarov, the 
 becoming tike to GOD, as far as in our power. To~? ^ 
 sojf lira? o J3/-* /txaxjr ' PL&" TO/? avQ 
 
 For to THE GODS (as fays another antient) / 
 /" ///^ M on^ continued bappinefs ; ^w/ ^ MEN, 'tis fo far 
 happy 9 as it rifes to the refemblance offo divine an Energy. 
 See Plat, in Thesetet. Arift. Eth. X. 8. 
 
 (/) This CONNECTIVE ACT of the Soul, by 
 which it views ONE IN MANY, is perhaps one of the 
 principal A6ts of its moft excellent Part. 'Tis this re- 
 moves that impenetrable mifr, which renders Objefls of 
 Intelligence invifible to lower faculties. Were it not for 
 this, even ti\t fenfible World (with the help of all our 
 Senfations) would appear as unconnected, as the words 
 of an Index. 'Tis certainly not the Figure alone, nor 
 the Touch alone, nor the Odour alone, that makes 
 the Rofe, but 'tis made up of all thefe, and other at- 
 tributes UNITED ; not an unknown Conftitution of in- 
 fenftble Parts, but a known Conftitution offenfible Parts, 
 unlefs we chufe to extirpate the poffibility of natural 
 Knowlege. 
 
 WHAT
 
 BOOK THE THIRD. 363 
 
 behold a kind offaperior Objects ; a new Ch.IV. 
 Race of Perceptions, more comprebenfive 
 
 than 
 
 WHAT then perceives this CONSTITUTION or 
 UNION ? Can it be any of the Senfes ? No one of 
 thefe, we know, can pafs the limits of its own pro- 
 vince. Were the Smell to perceive the union of the 
 Odour and the Figure, it would not only be Smell, 
 but it would be Sight alfo. 'Tis the fame in other 
 inftances. We muft neceffarily therefore recur to 
 fome HIGHER COLLECTIVE POWER, to give us a 
 profpecl of Nature, even in thefe her fubordinate IPJioles, 
 much more in that comprehenfive Whole, whofe Sym- 
 pathy is univerfaJ, and of which thefe fmaller Wholes 
 are all no more than Parts. 
 
 But no where is this colletting^ and (if I may be al- 
 lowed the expreflion) this unifying Power more con- 
 fpicuous, than in the fubjects of PURE TRUTH. By 
 virtue of this power the Mind views One general Idea 
 in many Individuals ; One Proportion in many general 
 Ideas ; One Syllogifm in many Propofitious ; till at length 
 by properly repeating and connecting Syllogifm with 
 Syllogifm, it afcend into thofe bright andjleady regions 
 of SCIENCE, 
 
 )uas neque concutlunt vcnti^ neqne nubila nimbis 
 Adfpergunt, &c. Lucr. 
 
 Even
 
 364 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.IV. than thofe of Senfe ; a Race of Percep- 
 tions, each one of 'which may be found in fire 
 
 and 
 
 Even negative Truths and negative Conclufions can- 
 rot fubfift, but by bringing Terms and Propofitions 
 together, fo necejjary is this UNITING Power to every 
 Species of KNOWLEGE. See p. 3. 250. 
 
 He that would better comprehend the diftinlion be- 
 tween SENSITIVE PERCEPTION, and INTELLEC- 
 TIVE, may obferve that, when a Truth is fpoken, it 
 is heard by our Ears, and underflood by our Minds. 
 That thefe two A<5h are different, is plain, from the 
 example of fuch, as bear the founds, without know- 
 ing the language. But to fhew their difference ftill 
 ftronger, let us fuppofe them to concur in the fame 
 Man, who (hall both hear and under/land the Truth 
 propofed. Let the Truth be for example, Tut Angles 
 of a Triangle are equal to two right Angles. That this 
 is ONE Truth, and not two or many Truths, I believe 
 none will deny. Let me afk then, in what manner 
 does this Truth become perceptible (if at all) to SEN- 
 SATION ? The Anfwer is obvious j 'tis by fucceffive 
 Portions of little and little at a time. When the firft 
 Word is prefertt, all the fubfequent are abfent ; when 
 the laft Word is prcfent^ all the previous are abfent ; 
 when any of the middle Words arc prefent^ then are 
 there fome alfent y as well of one fort as the other. 
 No more e.xifts at once than a fmgle Syllable, and the 
 Remainder as much not, (to Senfation at leaft) as 
 
 tho'
 
 BOOK THE THIREU 365 
 
 end iv hole in the feparate individuals of an Ch.IV. 
 infinite and fleeting Multitude, without de- 
 parting 
 
 tho' it never had been, or never was to be. And fo 
 much for the Perception of SENSE, than which we fee 
 HOthing can be more dijjlpated t fleeting^ and detached. 
 And is that of the MIND, fimilar ? Admit it, and 
 what follows ? It follows, that one Mind would no 
 more recognize one Truth, by recognizing its Terms 
 fuccejjively and apart, than many diftarit Minds would 
 recognize it, were it diftributed among them, a dif- 
 ferent part to each. The cafe is, every TRUTH is 
 ONE, tho' its TERMS are MANY. It is in no refpet 
 true by parts at a time, but 'tis true of neceflky at 
 ctift, and in an inftant. What Powers therefore re- 
 cognize this ONENESS or UNITY? Where even 
 does it refide, or what makes it ? Shall we antwer 
 with the Stagirite, To c\ EN ITOIOTN TTO o 
 NOT 2 Exarov If this be allowed, it fhould feem, 
 where SENSATION and INTELLECTION appear to 
 concur, that Senfation was of MANY, Intellection was 
 of ONE; that Senfation was temporary , divifible and 
 fuccej/rue j Intellection, inftantantous, indhifible, and at 
 once. 
 
 If we conflder the Radii of a Circle, we {hall find 
 at the Circumference that they are MANY ; at the 
 Center that they are ONE. Let us then fuppofe SENSE 
 and MIND to view the fame Radii, only let Senfe 
 view them at the Circumfereme, Mind at the Center ; 
 
 and
 
 366 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.IV. parting from tbe unity and permanence of 
 its own nature. 
 
 AND 
 
 and hence we may conceive, how thefe Powers differ, 
 even where they jointly appear to operate in perception 
 of the fame object. 
 
 There is ANOTHER ACT OF THE MIND, the 
 very reverfe of that here mentioned ; an A&, by 
 which it perceives not one in many, but MANY IN 
 ONE. This is that mental Separation, of which we 
 have given fome account in the firft Chapter of this 
 Book ; that Refolution or Analyfis, which enables us 
 to investigate tbe Caufes, and Principles, and Elements of 
 things. 'Tis by Virtue of this, that we are enabled 
 to abftraft any particular Attribute, and make it by 
 itfelf the Subject of philofophical Contemplation. 
 Were it not for this, it would be difficult for particu- 
 lar Sciences to exift ; becaufe otherwife they would be 
 as much blended, as the feveral Attributes of fenfible 
 Subftances. .How, for example, could there be fuch 
 a Science as Optics, were we neceffitated to contem- 
 plate Colour concreted with Figure, two Attributes, 
 which the Eye can never view, but aflbciated ? I men- 
 tion not a multitude of other fenfible qualities, fome 
 of which ftill prefent themfelves, whenever we look on 
 any cohurcd Body. 
 
 Thofc
 
 BOOK THE THIRD. 367 
 
 AND thus we fee the Procefs by which Ch.IV. 
 we arrive at GENERAL IDEAS -, for the 
 
 Per- 
 
 Thofe two noble Sciences, ARITHMETIC and 
 GEOMETRY, would have no bafis to ftand on, were 
 it not for this feparative Power. They are both con- 
 verfant about QUANTITY ; Geometry about CONTI- 
 NUOUS Quantity, Arithmetic about DISCRETE. EX- 
 TENSION is eflential to continuous Quantity} MO- 
 NADS, or UNITS, to Difcrete. By feparating from 
 the infinite Individuals, with which we are furrounded, 
 thofe infinite Accidents, by which they are all diverji- 
 fied> we leave nothing but thofe SIMPLE and PER- 
 FECTLY SIMILAR UNITS, which being combined 
 make NUMBER, and are the Subject of ARITHME- 
 TIC. Again, by feparating from Body every poffible 
 fubordinate Accident, and leaving it nothing but its 
 triple Extenfion of Length, Breadth, and Thicknefs, (of 
 which were it to be deprived, it/ would be Body no 
 longer) we arrive at that pure and unmixed MAGNI- 
 TUDE, the contemplation of whofe properties make* 
 the Science of Geometry* 
 
 By the fame analytical or feparative Power, we in- 
 veftigate DEFINITIONS of all kinds, each one of 
 which is a developed Word, as the fame Word is an in- 
 V eloped Definition. 
 
 To conclude IN COMPOSITION ANJ> DIVISION 
 
 CONSISTS THE WHOLE OF SdSNCJE, CoMPOSI- 
 4 TION
 
 368 H fi R M E S. 
 
 Ch.IV. Perceptions here mentioned are in facl no 
 other. In thefe too we perceive the ob- 
 jects of SCIENCE and REAL KNOWLEGE^ 
 which can by no means be, but of that 
 which is general, and definite, and fat (g). 
 
 Here 
 
 TION MAKING AFFIRMATIVE TRUTH, AND 
 SHEWING US THINGS UNDER THEIR SIMILARI- 
 TIES AND IDENTITIES; DIVISION MAKING NE- 
 GATIVE TRUTH, AND PRESENTING THEM TO 
 US UNDER THEIR DISSIMILARITIES AND Dl* 
 VERSITIES. 
 
 And here, by the way, there occurs a Queftion. 
 If all Wifdom be Science, and it be the bufinefs of 
 Science as well to compound as tofeparate, may we not 
 fay that thofe Philofophers took Half of Wifdom for 
 the Whole, who diftinguifhed it from Wit, as if WIS- 
 DOM only fepara ted, and WIT only brought together? 
 Yet fo held the Philofopher of Malmejbury, and the 
 Author of the EJJay on the Human Under/landing. 
 
 (g) The very Etymologies of the Words EIII- 
 TTHMH, SCIENTIA, and UNDERSTANDING, 
 may fefve in fome degree to {hew the nature of thefe 
 Faculties, as well as of thofe Beings, their true and 
 proper Objects. EIIIZTHMH fcU/xrj, Ji TO 
 2 T A I N *) 'ov TWP Br
 
 fe O O K T ti E T H I ft D. 369 
 
 Here too even Individuals, however of Ch.lV. 
 themfelves unknowable, become obje&s of 
 
 Knowlege^ 
 
 WV ir 
 Z7Ti$-wu.ri wsjl ret xaSoAa 
 
 SCIENCE (EFI12THMH) has itsnamefrom 
 bringing us (Efll XTA2IN) TO SOME STOP W 
 BOUNDARY of things ^ taking us away from the unbounded 
 nature and mutability of Particulars ; for it is converfant 
 about Subjefls, that are general, and invariable. Niceph. 
 Blem. Epit. Logic, p. 21. 
 
 This Etymology given by Blemmides, and long be- 
 fore him adopted by the Peripatetics^ came originally 
 from Pfaio, as may be feen in the following account of 
 it from his Cratylus* In this Dialogue Socrates, having 
 firft (according to the Heraclitean Philofophy which 
 Cratyliis favoured) etymologized a multitude of Words 
 vrith a view to that Flow and tlnceajing Mutation, fup- 
 pofed by Heraditus to run thro' all things, at length 
 changes his Syfteffi, and begins to etymologize from' 
 another, which fuppofed fomething in nature to be per- 
 manent and fixed. On this principle he thus proceeds 
 riy t ot'jruv avaXusOVTig STCWTOU [ji.iv 
 tr iv EniSTHMHNj ; a 
 
 EH I roif GT' 
 
 *' 
 
 Let us confider then (fays he) fame of the very 
 B b
 
 37 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.IV. Knowlege, as far as their nature will per- 
 mit. For then only may any Particular 
 
 be 
 
 Words already examined-, and in the firji place, the Word 
 SCIENCE ; how difputable is this (as to its former Ety- 
 mology^ how much more naturally does it appear to ftgni- 
 fy t that IT STOPS THE SOUL AT THINGS, than 
 that it is carried about with them. Plat. Cratyl. p. 437. 
 Edit. Serr. 
 
 The difputable Etymology, to which he here al- 
 ludes, was a ftrange one of his own making in the for- 
 mer part of the Dialogue, adapted to the flowing Sy- 
 ftem of Heraclitus there mentioned. According to this 
 notion, he had derived EITJ2THMH from iTrtSoii 
 and HASI/SJV, as if it kept along with things, by perpetu- 
 al \y following them in their motions. See Plato as be- 
 fore, p. 412. 
 
 As to SCIENTIA, we are indebted to Scaliger for 
 the following ingenious Etymology. RATJOCINA- 
 TIO, mot us quidam ejl ; SCIENTIA, quies : unde et no- 
 men^ turn apud Gracos, turn etiam nojlrum. Uctcst TO 
 Eni I2TA20AI, EIIIZTHMH. Siflitur enim 
 mentis agitatio^ et Jit fpecies in animo. Sic Latinum 
 SCIENTIA, Sn yutreu 2 X ESI 2 TOT ONTO X. 
 Nam Latini, quod nomen entis fimplex ab ufu abjecerunt 
 atque repudiarunt^ omnibus aflivis participiis idem ad- 
 junxerunt. Audicns, axouww uv. Sciens t o^wv u\>. 
 Seal, in Thcophr. de Caufts Plant. Lib, I. p. 17. 
 
 The,
 
 BOOK THE THIRD. 371 
 
 be faid to be known, when by aflertin^ it Ch.lV. 
 to be a Man, or an Animal, or the like, 
 
 we 
 
 The Englijb Word, UNDERSTANDING, means 
 not fo properly Knowlege, as that Faculty of the Sou!, 
 where Knowlege refides. Why may we not then 
 imagine, that the framers of this Word intended to re- 
 prefent it as a kind of firm Bo/is, on which the fair 
 Structure of Sciences was to reft, and which was fup- 
 pofed to STAND UNDER them, as their immoveable 
 Support ? 
 
 Whatever may be faid of thefe Etymologies, whe- 
 ther they are true or falfe, they at leaft prove their 
 Authors to have confidered SCIENCE and UNDER- 
 STANDING, not vs. fleeting powers of Perception, like 
 Senfe, but rather as Jleady, permanent^ and durable 
 COMPREHENSIONS. But if fo, we muft fomewhere 
 or other find for them certain Jieady, permanent^ and 
 durable OBJECTS; fince if PERCEPTION OF ANY 
 
 KIND BE DIFFERENT FROM THE THING PER- 
 CEIVED, (whether it perceive ftraight as crooked, or 
 crooked as ftraight ; the moving as fixed, or the fixed 
 asmoving)sucHPERCEPTiON MUST OF NECESSITY 
 BE ERRONEOUS AND FALSE. The following paf~ 
 fage from a Greek Platonic (whom we fhall quote again 
 hereafter) feems on the prefent occafion not without 
 
 its weight ' 15-} yvuviq a,Koi^E$-tc>!x, TI? ajtSijrfwr, 
 
 T&;y j^>)Twv. If there bt 
 Bb 2 A
 
 372 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.IV. we refer it to fome fuch comprehenjive, or 
 general Idea. 
 
 Now 'tis of thefe COMPREHENSIVE and 
 PERMANENT-IDEAS, THE GENUINE PER- 
 CEPTIONS OF PURE MIND, that WORDS 
 of all Languages, however different, arc 
 the SYMBOLS. And hence it is, that as 
 the PERCEPTIONS include, fo do thefe their 
 
 SYMBOLS 
 
 A KNOWLEGE more accurate than SENSATION ; there 
 mujl be certain OBJECTS of fuch knowlege MORE TRUE 
 
 THAN OBJECTS OF SENSE. 
 
 The following then ^re Queftions worth confider- 
 ing, What thefe Objects are ? Wlxre they refide ? 
 And how they are to. be difcovered ? Not by expe- 
 rimental Philofophy 'tis plain j for that meddles with no- 
 thing, but what is tangible, corporeal, and mutable 
 nor even by the more refined and rational fpeculation 
 of Mathematics ; for this, at its very commencement, 
 takes fuch Objects for granted. We can only add, 
 that if they refide in our own MINDS, (and who, that 
 has never looked there, can affirm they do not ?) then 
 will the advice of the Satirift be no ways improper, 
 
 -s NEC T QUJESIVERIS EXTRA. 
 
 P,rf.
 
 BOOK THE THIRD. 373 
 
 SYMBOLS exprefs, not this or that fet ofCh.IV. 
 Particulars only, but all indifferently, as 
 they happen to occur. Were therefore the 
 Inhabitants of Sali/bury to be transferred 
 to Tork, tho' new particular objects would 
 appear on every fide, they would ftill no 
 more want a new Language to explain 
 themfelves, than they would want new 
 Minds to comprehend what they beheld. 
 All indeed, that they would want, would 
 be the local proper Names ; which Names, 
 as we have faid already *, are hardly a part 
 of Language, but muft equally be learnt 
 both by learned and unlearned, as often 
 as they change the place of their abode. 
 
 *Tis upon the fame principles we may 
 perceive the reafon, why the dead Lan- 
 guages (as we call them) are now intelli- 
 gible ; and why the Language of modern 
 England is able to defcribe antient Rome -, 
 B b 3 and 
 
 * Su p- P- 345> 346.
 
 374- H E R M E S. 
 
 Ch.IV. and that si ancient Rome to defcribe modern 
 England (6). But of thefe matters we 
 have fpoken before. 
 
 . 2. AND now having viewed the 
 Procefs, by which we acquire general Ideas t 
 let us begin anew from other Principles, 
 and try to difcover (if we can prove fo 
 fortunate) whence 'tis that theje Ideas origi- 
 nally come. If we can fucceed here, we 
 may difcern perhaps, what kind of Beings 
 they are, for this at prefent appears ibme- 
 what obfcure. 
 
 LET 
 
 (h] As far as Human Nature, and the primary Ge- 
 nera both of Sub/lance and Accident are the fame in all 
 places, and have been fo thro' all ages j fo far all Lan- 
 guages fhare one common IDENTITY. As far as pe- 
 culiar fpecies of Sub/lance occur in different regions ; and 
 much more, as far as the pofitive Injlitutions of religious 
 and civil Polities are every -where different ; fo far each 
 Language has its peculiar DIVERSITY. To the Caufes 
 of Diverfity here mentioned, may be added the di/iin- 
 guijhing Character and Genius of every Nation t concern- 
 ing which we {hall fpeak hereafter,.
 
 BOOK THE THIRD. 375 
 
 LET us fuppofe any man to look for Ch IV. 
 the firft time uponfome Work of Art, as 
 for example upon a Clock, and having 
 fufficiently viewed it, at length to depart. 
 Would he not retain, when abfent, an Idea 
 of what he had feen ? And what is it, to 
 retain fticb Idea? 'Tis to have A FORM 
 INTERNAL correfpondent to THE EXTER- 
 NAL ; only with this difference, that the 
 Internal Form is devoid of the Matter-, the 
 External is united with it, being feen in 
 the metal, the wood, and the like. 
 
 Now if we fuppofe this Spectator to 
 view many fuch Machines, and not limply 
 to view, but to confider every part of them, 
 fo as to comprehend how thefe parts all 
 operate to one End , he might be then 
 faid to poffefs a kind of INTELLIGIBLE 
 FORM, by which he would not only un- 
 derflana, and know the Clocks, which he 
 had feen already, but every Work alfo of 
 like Sort, which he might fee hereafter. 
 B b 4 Should
 
 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.IV. Should it be afk'd " which ofthefeForm* 
 is prior, the External and Senjible -, or 
 " the Internal and Intelligible-" the Anr 
 fwer is obvious, that the prior is the Sen- 
 
 THUS then we fee, THERE ARE iNr 
 TELLIGIBLE FORMS, WHICH TO THE 
 SENSIBLE ARE SUBSEQUENT. 
 
 BUT farther ftill If thefe Machines be 
 allowed the Work not of Chance, but of 
 &i Artifl, they mud be the Work of one, 
 who knew what he was about. And what 
 is it, to work, and know what one is about ? 
 'Tis to have an Idea of what one is 
 doing-, to poffefs A FORM INTERNAL, cor- 
 refpondent to the EXTERNAL, to which ex- 
 ternal it fervesfor an EXEMPLAR ^AR- 
 CHETYPE. 
 
 HERE then we have AN INTELLIGI- 
 BLE FORM, WHICH is PRIOR TO THE 
 SENSIBLE FORM; which> being truly prior
 
 BOOK THE THIRD. 377 
 
 as well in dignity as in time, can no more Ch.IV, 
 become fubfequent, than Caufe can to Effect. 
 
 THUS then, with refpedt to Works of 
 ART, we may perceive, if we attend, A 
 TRIPLE ORDER OF FORMS ; one Order, 
 intelligible and previous to thefe Works ; 
 zfecond Order, fenjible and concomitant; 
 and a third again, intelligible zn&fubfequenf. 
 After the firft of thefe Orders the Maker 
 may be faid to 'work ; thro' the fecond, 
 the Works themfelves ex?/}, and are what 
 they are -, and in the third they become. 
 recognized, as mere Objects of Contempla- 
 tion. To make thefe Forms by different 
 Names more eafy to be underflood ; the 
 firft may be called THE MAKER'S FORM; 
 the fecond, that of THE SUBJECT ; and the 
 third, that of THE CONTEMPLATOR. 
 
 LET us pafs from hence to Works of 
 NATURE. Let. us imagine ourfelves view- 
 ing fome diverfified Profpect ; ' a Plain, 
 f for example, fpacious and fertile ; a 
 
 * c river
 
 378 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.IV. " river winding thro' it; by the banks 
 " of that river, men walking and cattle 
 " grazing ; the view terminated with 
 <l diftant hills, fome craggy, and fome 
 " covered with wood." Here 'tis plain 
 we have plenty of FORMS NATURAL. 
 And could any one quit fo fair a Sight, 
 and retain no traces of what he had be- 
 held ? And what is it, to retain traces 
 of what one has beheld? 'Tis to have cer- 
 tain FORMS INTERNAL correfpondent to 
 the EXTERNAL, and refembling them in 
 every thing, except the being merged in 
 Matter. And thus, thro' the fame reten- 
 tive and collective Powers, the Mind be- 
 comes fraught with Forms natural, as be- 
 fore with Forms artificial. Should it be 
 afked, " ivhicb of thefe natural Forms are 
 " prior, the External ones viewd by the 
 " Senfes, or the Internal exijling in the 
 " Mind" the Anfwer is obvious, that 
 the prior are the External. 
 
 THUS
 
 BOOK THE THIRD. 379 
 
 THUS therefore in NATURE, as well as Ch.IV 
 in ART, THERE ARE INTELLIGIBLE *" 
 FORMS, WHICH TO THE SENSIBLE ARE 
 SUBSEQUENT. Hence then we fee the 
 meaning of that noted School Axiom, Nil 
 eft in INTELLECTU, quod non prius fuit in 
 SENSU - y an Axiom, which we muft own 
 to be fo far allowable, as it refpedls the 
 Ideas of a mere Contemplator* 
 
 BUT to proceed fomewhat farther Are 
 natural Productions made BY CHANCE, or 
 BY DESIGN ? Let us admit by Defign, 
 not to lengthen our inquiry. They arc 
 certainly* more exquifite than any Works 
 of ART, and yet thefe we cannot bring 
 ourfelves to fuppofe made by Chance. 
 Admit it, and what follows ? We muft of 
 necejjity admit a MIND alfo, becaufe DESIGN 
 implies MIND, wherever 'tis to be found. 
 Allowing therefore this, what do we 
 
 mean 
 
 * Arijl, de Part. Animal. L.I. c, i.
 
 380 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.IV. mean by the Term, MIND ? We mean 
 Jomething, which, when it atfs, knows what 
 it is going to do -, fomething Jlored with Ideas 
 of its intended Works, agreeably to which 
 Ideas thofe Works are fajhioned. 
 
 THAT fuch EXEMPLARS, PATTERNS, 
 FORMS, IDEAS (call them as you pleafe) 
 muft of necejfity be, requires no proving, 
 but follows of courfe, if we admit the 
 Caufe of Nature to be A MIND, as above 
 mentioned. For take away thefe, and 
 what a Mind do we leave without them ? 
 CHANCE furely is as knowing, as MIND 
 WITHOUT IDEAS ; or rather, MIND 
 WITHOUT IDEAS is no lefs blind than 
 CHANCE. 
 
 THE Nature of thefe IDEAS is not diffi- 
 cult to explain, if we once come to allow 
 a poffibility of their Exiftence. That they 
 are exquifitely beautiful, various, and or- 
 derly, is evident from the exquifite Beauty, 
 Variety, and Order, feen in natural Sub- 
 
 ftances,
 
 BCXOK THE THIRD. 381 
 
 fiances, which are but their Copies or Pic- Ch.IV. 
 tures. That they are mental is plain, as 
 they are of the Efence ofMixv, and con- 
 fequently no Objects to any of the Senfes, 
 nor therefore circumfcribed either by Time 
 or Place. 
 
 HERE then, on this Syftem, we have 
 plenty of FORMS INTELLIGIBLE, WHICH 
 
 ARE TRULY PREVIOUS TO ALL FoRMS 
 
 SENSIBLE. Here too we fee that NATURE 
 is not defective in her TRIPLE ORDER, 
 having (like Art) her FORMS PREVIOUS* 
 HER CONCOMITANT, and HER SUBSE- 
 
 QJJENT (/). 
 
 THAT 
 
 (/') SimplicitiSy in his commentary upon the Predica- 
 ments, calls theory? Order of thefe intelligible Forms, 
 ra zD-flo TTK fAfQ^f&K, thofe previous to Participation* 
 and at other times, v> ifyoypew xttNrnr, the transcendent 
 Univerfality or Samemfs; the fecond Order he calls r* 
 lj jtAs6f?fi, thofe which exi/i in Participation^ that is, 
 thofe merged in Matter; and at other times, he call* 
 them y xxTZTtTz'yp&r) Konornfj the fubordinate Univer- 
 faUty or Semenefi ; laftly, of the third Order he fays, 
 
 that
 
 382 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.IV. THAT the Previous may be juftly fb 
 called is plain, becaufe they are eflentlatty 
 
 prior 
 
 that they have no independent exiftence of their own, 
 but that i^r? a^eAo'vTf? aura iv ru,~q nprrtpous sv- 
 oizi; 9 xaS* laura UTrej-iKrji/Afv, we curfelves abjlrafting 
 them in our own Imaginations , have given them by fuch ab~ 
 Jlrattion an exigence as of themfelves. Simp, in Praedic. 
 p. 17. In another place he fays, in a language fome- 
 what myfterious, yet ftill comformable to the fame 
 do&rine Mysore Sv rpirlo-j >.Ji7r1/ov TO xoivcv, TO fj.iv 
 v ray x6' Vxaj-a, ^ UITICV Tns in eivrtSf xoi- 
 
 KOtrOt, TW [AlWJ ttXVTU (^VffJV, WffTTfp X,' TTtf $IX- 
 
 XT TW croAvfiJr] nrfo'Arj-J/u Jtirftov $t tft 
 TO 
 
 - TP 
 
 TPTOK 
 
 ov - Perhaps therefore we mujl admit a TRIPLE 
 ORDER OF WHAT is UNIVERSAL AND THE 
 SAME ; that of the firjl Order^ tranfcendent andfuperior 
 to Particulars^ which throi* its uniform nature is the taufe 
 of that Samenefi exifting in them^ as tljro* its multiform 
 pre- conception it is the caufe of their Diverfity that of 
 ihefecond Order, what is infufcd from the firjl universal 
 Caufe into the various Species of Beings , and which has its 
 exijlence in thofe feveral Species that of the third Order, 
 what fubfifts by abftrattion in cur own* Under/landings, 
 being offubjlqucnt crign to the other tivo* Ibid, p, 2 1 . 
 
 To
 
 BOOK THE THIRD. 383 
 
 prior to all things elfe. The WHOLE visi- Ch.IV. 
 BLE WORLD exhibits nothing more, than 
 
 fo 
 
 To Simplidus we fhall add the two following Quota- 
 tions from Ammoniut and Nicephorus Blemmides^ which 
 we have ventured to tranfcribe, without regard to theii 
 uncommon length, as they fo fully eftablifli the Doc- 
 trine here advanced, and the works of thefe Authors 
 are not eafily to be procured. 
 
 roaruv 
 
 Wa -nroAAa Kccgotx.tipEva' o c\ 
 er^aj't^ETw TO - JJ x!s; tsravjoj 1 iff-fcov Je 
 u xj &tiant[Ari>QC TO. y.wia, tTris-ytrxi; o'rt 
 vo'f iV<y ExIuTr^aaro?, l^ TU> ^^p' UTW TO 
 ^ hzvotx. *H TOI'/JV <r^^^;? 11 sv TU Jax- 
 TJA/W Alyerai FIFO TflN HOAAHN sTvai- ij j 
 v TO?? xufwif, EN TO IS nOAAOIS- r JE cv 
 ro/xa^^ufva, EHI TOI2 nOAAOIT, 
 TOUTO cy blWti&M >^ ITT* TWW J/fuwy xa 
 V o yoip AJJWICU^O?, T^OJCOV zzravra, 
 laurw ra vavrwv z3 - a^aJt)'fAaTa* cicv, zroiaiv 
 ' ' sraoj o 
 
 TW Ayjjuiow^w ra stjjj acxouru raura, wf o 
 j//ov^Er, -^ EtJ'co; ra yV aCr tupnw* 
 
 x ii^*<r. 'AAA' ^w ^jj" C T W,-, oJx ^ 
 
 TK 5^^p > /*AAav amifCM TJ
 
 384 H E R M E 8. 
 
 Ch.1V. fo many pajfing Pi&ures of thefe immutdbU 
 Archetypes; Nay thro' thcfe it attains even 
 
 a 
 
 j ov yoi^ w? fyifj aAoj/w 
 
 Xto? TW ^i/VOOUlw) 'Ef J 1 / TJ X 
 TO \T\iQi\(fl VTT 
 
 * \VA c *-v v ?" ^ * 
 
 *i JtT OilOWTTOV 00f TiJOiej OJOf TO U7T 
 
 5/;9/vo^i/oy* u o^ oiJiv o TOOUJ, auTo'Ot eTr^Acv, cof 
 sv TW AJI^JKOU^W T JJjj. "Ert <Te TO Tj!?o? tv TU 
 
 ^ w? 6 t'v TW JaxluAiw TU'TTOJ' x 
 TTO to v liJo? nPO THN HOAAfiNj x 
 
 *Eo <? TO TiJbf T a'pOwVa E'K TOUT 
 
 cf T* iu rc? 
 rot TOIKUTU EN TOII HOAAOIS 
 
 tin Ta b'rifov EAfic'vTo,, xat iource.p.ix ra. 
 
 t.t^at tUvro tv ry Jiavoia* xal 
 EHI TOI2 nOAAOIZ, fi>ou 
 xal Jj-f;o^fVf. Intelligatur annulus, qui alicitjus^ t<t- 
 pote ^chillis, imaglneyi infculptam babeat : multa infupef 
 (erafinty et ab annulo imprimantur : veniat de'mde qu:f- 
 piam, videatque ceras omnes utiius annuli imprejjione for- 
 matas, annullque imprejjionem in mente contineat : figillum 
 annulo infculptttm^ ANTE MULTA dicetur : in cerulis 
 imprejjum^ in MULTIS : quodvero in ill'ius, qui illo ve- 
 rnal intclligentiu remanferit, PO^T MULTA, et poflr- 
 . riw
 
 BOOK THE THIRD. 385 
 
 a Semblance of Immortality, and con- ChJV. 
 
 tmues 
 
 rius genitum dicetur. Idem in generibus et formis intelli- 
 gendum cenfeo : eten'tm ille optimus procreator mundl Deus, 
 omnium rerum formas, atque exempla habet apudfe : utji 
 kominem efficere velit, in hominis for mam ^ quam habet y 
 intueatur, et ad illius exemplum cat eras facial omnes. At 
 fi quis rejliterit, dicatque rerum formas apud Creatorem 
 non ejje: quafo lit diligent er attendat : Opifex, qua facit t 
 vel cognofcit, vel igncrat : Jed is, qui nefeiet, nunquam, 
 quicquam fadct : quis enim idfacere aggreditur^ quod fa- 
 cere ignorat ? Neqite enim facultate quadam rationis ex- 
 perte aliquid aget, prout agit natura (ex quo conficitur, 
 ut natura etiam agat, etfi qua faciat^ non adver'tat :) Si 
 vero ralione quadam aliquid facit^ quodcunque ab eo fac- 
 tum ejl omnino cognovit. Si igitur Deus non pejore ra- 
 tione, quam homo, facit quid? qu<e fecit cognovit : fi cog- 
 novit qua fecit) in ipfo rerum formas ejje perfpicuum eft. 
 Forma autem in opifice funt perinde ac in annulo figillum* 
 hacque forma ANTE MULTA, et avulfa a materia dici- 
 tur. Atqui hominis fpecies in unoquoque hcmine ej} y quern- 
 Qdmodum etiam ftgilla in ceris ; et IN MULTis, nee avulfa 
 a materia dicitur. At cumjingulos hominet animo confpi- 
 cimuS) et eandem in unoquoque formam atque effigiem vide- 
 muS) ilia effigies in mente nojlra injidens POST MULTA, 
 et pofterius genita dicetur : veluti in ilk quoque dicebamus, 
 qui ?nulta Jigilla in cera unv et eodem annulo imprejfe con- 
 fpexerat. Amman, in Porphyr. Introducl. p. 29. b. 
 
 C C Afynlxt
 
 386 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.IV. tinues throughout ages to be SPECIFI- 
 
 CALLY 
 
 SI roc yivit xal rx tlfa II PO TUN 
 nOAAiiN, EN TOI2 nOAAOII, EIII 
 TO IS IIOAAOIZ* oToi) swot&u rt <r^a 
 iw xai ixlt'Jrto.z TO TUOV l ou xWa izroAA* 
 
 oAw? TO G$ 
 ra v o*f TO H^vm^URf 
 
 isaivlot T aurSf (AITIXJIHTIV txIuTrwwaT^, xa 
 
 T 
 
 rai HPO TliN HO A A UN' TO <f wf 
 EN TO 1 2 nOA'AOII' TO tTc ^ aurwi; 
 A-^Ofv, xat xara Jiavoiay &uAwf U7ros-v, EEEI TOIS 
 IlOAAOir. "O'JTW? ^ x*\ ra 
 
 JIPO TUN noAAiiN ^ Ei 
 
 y'tfj Jtara TW? 
 
 xa wpow^((re xa 
 srv.pfiyat.ytv vlfits-iwivai & htyovlou ra y'tvy xal T 
 S^ EN TOIS nOAAOII, ACT* i TO?C 
 to TK atidaJTTH fiJ'oj to xa) 
 
 TO T 
 
 tVwoi?, xat TO^ aAAojf 
 
 XJM TOif 
 
 f t TO CJttOlT Xtf
 
 BOOK THE THIRD. 387 
 
 CALLY ONE,- amid thofe infinite parti- Ch.lV- 
 
 cular 
 
 ti TO Jf/axJ/v^W el <& ffvv TO?? f 
 7n<rxo7r~v xai T av/ua TO" 
 
 TO TJCWTOV yiv^ (p<x,v~TOii xat Q/fvixcoTalcv xa 
 eVrco /ASV EN TOI2 HOAAOIZ u'<pfc-ixe T* Jn 
 ^ ra ysuTj. KaTaXaoajv Si TJJ Ix r0* xara /x*^^ av- 
 
 T^W d'JTUV QvTIVy Tti'i Ce,'^ft'j}7rOT7lTOe, 3 X J's TWU 
 
 yr^tf TV jTrTrorijTa, xa< T&) TOW 
 xal TOP xa9oA iTTTrey ETrtvorjiraj' xat 
 TO x9oAa wov Jx rwy x 
 xal TO xaOo'Aii OU&JJTJXOV, xa 
 TO xa9eAa <rwu, xat Tr ; y 
 aTravTwv <rjAAoyt7a | ufy0- > , o TotaTl^ Iv T 
 V5 T ^-1/7] xj Ta Tj atfAu? wV/j-nirev E II I 
 TOI2 nOAAOIZ, THT/O, jwfra T -aroA- 
 Aa xi Jj-fPo^vuf. Genera vero et Species dlcuntur 
 
 ejje ANTE MULTA, IN MULTIS, POST 
 
 MULT A. Ut puta y intelligatur figlllum^ quamtibet figu- 
 ram baben^ ex quo multee cera ejufdem figura fmt parti* 
 cipes, et in medium aliquis has proferat y nequaquam pra- 
 vifo figilk. Cum autem vidiffit eas ceras in quibus figura 
 exprimitur^ et animadvertijjet omnes eandem figuram par- 
 ticipare, et qua videbantur mult a , ratione in unum coegif- 
 Jet) hoc in mente teneat. Nempe figillum didtur ejfifpccies 
 ANTE MULTA j ilia vero in ceris^ IN MULTIS; qu< 
 vero ab Us defumitur, et in mente immaterialiter fubji/iit^ 
 POST MULTA. Sic igitur et Genera et Species ANTE 
 MULTA in Creator t funt^ fecundum ratlines efficients. 
 C 2 In
 
 3*8 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.IV. cular changes, that befal it every mo- 
 ment (). 
 
 MAY 
 
 In Deo enim rerum effeflrices rationes una et ftmpliciter 
 pree-exijlunt-, fecundum quas rationes ille fupra-fubjlantia- 
 lis omnes res et pradeftinavit et produxit. Exiftere autem 
 dicimtur Genera et Species IN MULTIS, quoniam in fm- 
 gulis hominibus hominis Species, et in fmgulis equis equi 
 Species ejl. In hominibus aque ac in equis et a His ani- 
 malibus Genus invenitur harum fpecierum, quod ejl ani- 
 mal. In animalibus etiam una cum Zoophytis magis uni- 
 verfale Genus, nempe fenfitivum exquiritur. Additis vero 
 plantis, fpeclatur Genus animatum. Si vero una cum ani- 
 matis quifquam vdit perfcrutari etiam inanimate, totum 
 Corpus perfpiciet. Cum autem entia incorporea conjunfta 
 fuerint Us modo traflatis, apparebit primum et generalijji- 
 tnum Genus. Atque it a quidem IN MULTIS fub/iftunt 
 Genera et Species. Comprebendens vero quifquam ex fm- 
 gulis hominibus naturam ipfam bumanam, et ex fmgulis 
 equis ipfam equinam, atque (ta univcrfalem hominem et 
 univerfalem equum conftderans, et univerfale animal exjin- 
 gulis raiione colligens, et univerfale fenfitivum, et univer- 
 fale animatum, et univerfale corpus, et maxime univerfale 
 ens ex omnibus colligens, hie, inquam, in fuamente Genera, 
 et Species immaterialitcr conjlituit E II I TOI2 ITOA- 
 AOIE, hoc ejl, POST MULTA, et po/ierius genita. 
 Nicepb. Blem. Log. Epit. p. 62. Vid. etiam Alcin. 
 in Platonic. Philofoph. Introduft. C. IX. X. 
 
 (>) THE following elegant Lines of Virgil vet worth 
 attending to, tho' applied to no higher a fubjet than 
 
 Bees. 
 
 Ergt
 
 BOOK T HE TH i R D. 
 
 MAY we be allowed then to credit thofe Ch.IV. 
 fpeculative men, who tell us, *' 'tis In 
 
 " thefe 
 
 Ergo ipfas quamvis angufti terminus ecvi 
 Excipiat : (neque enim plus feptima dudtur at as) 
 AT GENUS IMMORTALE MANET - G. IV. 
 
 The fame Immortality, that is, . the Immortality of the 
 Kind may be feen in all perijkable fubftances, whether 
 animal or inanimate; for tho' Individuals perijh, the 
 fever al Kinds Jlill remain. And hence, if we take Ti Si E , ' 
 as denoting the fyftem of things temporary, we may col- 
 left the meaning of that paflage in the Timteus, where 
 the Philofopher defcribes TIME to be - pz 
 
 CCIM( v vi xar a^ijuov b-<rav iwviov tiwvot. 
 nitatis in uno permanentis Jmaginem quandam, certis nu- 
 merorum articulis progredientem. Plat. V. III. p. 37. 
 Edit. Serrqn. 
 
 We have fubjoined the following extract from Boe- 
 tbius, to ferve as a commentary on this defcription of 
 TIME. - JE TERNITAS igitur eft, interminabilis vita 
 totajimul et perfcfla pojjejjio. Quod ex collatione tefnpora- 
 Hum clarius liquet. Nam quidquid vivit in TEMPO RE, 
 id prafens a pr&teritis in futura procedit : nihi'que eft in 
 tempore ita conjlitutum, quod totum vitts fute fpatium pa- 
 riter pojjit ampleRi ; fed crajiinum quidem ncndum appre- 
 hendit, befternum vero jam perdidit. In hodicrna quoque 
 ifitd nvn amflius vhitis > quam in illo mob'Ji tranfityrisque 
 C c 3 ma~
 
 390 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.IV. " t '-hefe permanent and comprebenjivel? 'OR MS 
 that THE DEITY views at once, without 
 ct looking abroad, all pofjible productions 
 " both prefent, paft, and future that this 
 " great and Jlupendous View is but a View 
 -" of himfelf, where all things lie inveloped 
 " in their Principles and Exemplars, as be- 
 
 " ing 
 
 momenta. Quod Igltur Temporis patitur conditionem, licet 
 illudyjicut de mundo cenfuit Arijloteles^ nee caper it unquam 
 ej/e, nee definat, vitaque ejus cum temporis infinitate tenda- 
 fwr, nondum tamen tale eft, ut tzternum effe jure credatur. 
 Non enim totum fimul infinite licet vita: fpatium compre- 
 hendlt, atque compleflitur, fed futura nondum tranfafla 
 jam non habet. Quod igitur interminabilis vit<s plenitu- 
 dlnem totam pariter comprehendit* ac pojjidet, cut neque 
 futuri quidquam ab/it, nee pmteriti fluxerit, id JETER- 
 NUM ejje jure perbibetur : idque necejje ejl^ et Jut compos 
 prafemfibi femper ajjijlere^ et infimtatem mobilis temporis 
 habere prajentem. Unde quidam non recTe^ qul cum au- 
 diunt vifum Platoni^ mundum hunc nee habuijje initium, 
 nee babiturum ejje defettum, hoc modo conditori conditum 
 mundum fieri co~aternum putant. Aliud ejl eni*i PER 
 
 INTERMINABILEM DUCJ VITAM, ( quod Mundo 
 
 Plato tribuit) aliud INTERMINABILIS VIT^E TOTAM 
 
 PARITER COMPLEXAM ESSE PRJESENTIAM, quod 
 
 Divinae Mentis proprium ejje manifejlum eft. Neque enim 
 
 Dem
 
 BOOK THE THIRD. 391 
 
 f < ing ejjential to thefulnefs of his unroerfal Ch.IV. 
 " Intelkttion T ' If fo, 'twill be proper, 
 that we invert the Axiom before men- 
 tioned. We muft now fay -Nil eft in 
 SE N s u, quod non priusfuit in IN T E L L E o 
 TU. For tho' the contrary may be true 
 with refpe& to Knowledge merely human, 
 vet never can it be true with refped: to 
 C c 4 Know-* 
 
 De us conditis rebus antiquior videri debet temporis quanti- 
 tate, Jed fimplicis potius proprietate natures. HUNC 
 
 ENIM VIT./E IMMOBILIS PR JESENTARIUM STA- 
 TUM, INFINITUS ILLE TEMPORALIUM RERUM 
 MOTUS IMITATUR ; cumque eum effingere, atqus aqvare 
 nenpojjit) ex immobilitate deficit in motitm ; ex Jimplicitate 
 fresfentia decrefcit in infinitam futuri ac prater iti quanti~ 
 tatem ; et , cum totam pariter vita fuae plenitudinem nt- 
 queat pojjidere^ hoc ipfo, quod allquo modo nunqttarn effe 
 defmlt^ illud y quod implere atque exprimere non poieft t 
 aliquatenus videtur amulari^ alligans Je ad qualemcunqite 
 prafentiam hujus exigui volucrifque momenti : quts^ quo- 
 
 niam MANENTIS ILLIUS PRJESENTI^ QUANDAM 
 
 GESTAT IMAGINEM, quibufcumque contigerit) id pr&~ 
 Jlaty ut ESSE videantur. hioniam vero mature non pe- 
 tuit t infinltum Temporis iter arripuit : eoqtte tnodafaftum 
 
 /?, Ut CONTJNUARET YITAM EUNDO, CUJUS pknt- 
 
 tudinem complefli non valuit PERMANENDO. 
 ^c. De Confolat, Philofoph. L. V.
 
 392 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.IV. Knowlege univerfally, unlefs we give Pre+ 
 cedence to ATOMS and LIFELESS BODY, 
 making MIND, among other things, to be 
 ftruck out by a lucky Concourfe. 
 
 . 3. 'Tis far from the defign of this 
 Treatife, to infinuatc that Atheifm is the 
 Hypothefis of our later Metaphyfkians, 
 But yet 'tis fomewhat remarkable, in their 
 feveral Syftems, how readily they admit 
 of the above Precedence* 
 
 FOR mark the Order of things, accor- 
 ding to their account of them. Firfl 
 comes that huge Body, thefenjible World* 
 Then this and its Attributes beget fenfibl* 
 Ideas. Then out of fenfible Ideas, by a 
 kind of lopping and pruning, are made 
 Ideas intelligible, whether fpecific cr gene- 
 ral. Thus, mould they admit that MIND 
 was coeval with BODY, yet till BODY gave 
 it Ideas, and awakened its dormant Pow- 
 Crs, it could at beft have been nothing 
 
 more
 
 393 
 
 more, than a fort of dead Capacity, for Ch.IV. 
 INNATE IDEAS it could not pojjibly have 
 any. 
 
 AT another time we hear of Bodies fo 
 exceedingly jine, that their very Exility 
 makes them fufceptible of fenfation and 
 knowledge -, as if they mrunk into Intellect 
 by their exquifite fubtlety, which rendred 
 them too delicate to be Bodies any longer. 
 'Tis to this notion we owe many curious 
 inventions, fuch as fubtle JEther, animal 
 Spirits, nervous Duts y Vibrations, and the 
 like; Terms, which MODERN PHILOSO- 
 PHY, upon parting with occult Qualities y 
 has found expedient to provide itfelf, to 
 fupply their place. 
 
 BUT the intellectual Scheme, which ne- 
 ver forgets Deity, poftpones every thing 
 corporeal to the primary mental Caufe. 'Tis 
 bere it looks for the origin of intelligible 
 Ideas, even of thofe, which exift in human 
 Capacities. For tho' fenfible Objects may 
 
 be
 
 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.IV. be the deftined medium, to awaken the 
 dormant Energies of Ato's Understanding, 
 yet are thofe Energies themfelves no more 
 contained in Senfe, than the Explofion of 
 a Cannon, in the Spark which gave it 
 fire (/). 
 
 IN 
 
 (/) The following Note is taken from a Manufcript 
 Commentary of the Platonic Olympiodorus, (quoted be- 
 fore p. 371.) upon the Pk<zdo of Plato ; which tho' per- 
 haps fome may object to from inclining to the Doctrine 
 of Platonic Reminifcencc, yet it certainly gives a better 
 account how far the Setifes aflat in the acquifition of 
 Science, than we can find given by vulgar Philofophers. 
 
 rx y^n'cw x) Stvrspot KWXI v\ amof 
 
 xara rauTW ^ -njv moiay titTa* xai TO iv Tt- 
 OT Ji' ev/&;j xai 
 
 things, which are inferior and fe- 
 twdary, are by no means the Principles or Caufes of the 
 more excellent ; and tho' we admit the common interpreta- 
 tions, and allow SENSE to be a Principle <T/" SCIENCE, 
 vie muji however call it a Principle^ not as if it was thf 
 
 efficient
 
 BOOK THE THIRD. 395 
 
 IN fhort ALL MINDS, that are, are Si- Ch.IV- 
 and CONGENIAL ; and fo too are 
 
 their 
 
 efficient Caufe, but as it roufes our Soul to the Recollefiion 
 of general Ideas. According to the fame way of thinking 
 is it f aid in the Timaus, that through the Sight and Plear- 
 ing we acquire to ourfelves Philofophy, becaufe we pafs 
 from Objetts of SENSE to REMINISCENCE or RE- 
 
 JCOLLECTION. 
 
 And in another paflage he obferves 
 
 J //^ SOUL, by containing the Princi- 
 ples of all Beings, is a fort of OMNIFORM REPRE- 
 SENTATION or EXEMPLAR; when It is rcuzed by 
 objefts of Senfe, it recollects thofe Principles, which it 
 contains ivithin^ and brings them forth. 
 
 Georgius Gemijlus, otherwife called Pletho^ writes 
 upon the fame fubjecl in the following manner. 
 T^X'?" ?* a(rti; o* T^ ii^rt TiQty.tvvi dvxXx.[4 Sav 
 ;J? iv roij a<&J! 
 
 J. Oj ^'' ay -.idaa ^AAc'Si
 
 396 H E R M E S. 
 
 Ch.IV- their Ideas, or intelligible Forms. Were 
 it otherwife, there could be no intercourfe 
 
 between 
 
 OVTWV /uv, )*.\uv SI XZT* aAAwtf li 
 xara TO ooQov J/wjjtx/vac. 
 T<vo> (pafffajf oraXXw ETJ Kff/rlovo? TE xj 
 
 <P}XH TV X^!J^/W TO TfXWTfl3U TBTO T 
 
 77^ who fuppofe IDEAL FORMS, 
 /^ yZv aj/umes, for the purpofes of 
 Science, thofe Proportions, which exijl in fenfible objects, 
 pvjfrjfcs them with a fuperior accuracy and perfection, than 
 teat to -which they attain in thofe fenfible objefts. Now 
 tiiis fupcrior Perfection or Accuracy the Soul cannot have 
 from fenfible objefts, as it is in faEi not in them ; nor yet 
 can Jhe conceive it herfelf as from herfelf, without its 
 having exijlence any where elfe. For the Soul is not 
 formed fo as to conceive that, tubicb has exijlence no where^ 
 face evenfucb opinions, as are falfe, are all cf 'them com- 
 pofitions irregularly formed^ not cfmere Non-Beings, but 
 ef various real Beings, one ^uith another. It remains 
 therefore that this Pcrfeclion, which is fuperior to the 
 Proportions exiting in fenfible objefis, mujl defcend to the 
 Soul from SOME OTHER NATURE, WHICH is BY 
 
 MANY DEGREES MORE EXCELLENT AND PER- 
 
 TECT. Plcth. de Arijlctcl. et Platonic. Philofoph. 
 Diff. Edit. Paris 1541. 
 
 The AOTOI or PROPORTIONS, of which Ge- 
 
 mifius here fpeaks, mean not only thofe relative Pre- 
 
 I portions
 
 BOOK THE THIRD. 397 
 
 between Man and Man, or (what is more Ch.IV. 
 important) between Man and God. 
 
 FOR 
 
 portions of Equality and Inequality , which exift in Quan- 
 tity, (fuch as double, fefquLalter, &c.) but in a larger 
 fenfe, they may be extended to mathematical Lines, 
 Angles^ Figures^ &c. of all which AOJ/OJ or Proportions^ 
 tho' we pofTefs in the Mind the moft clear and precife 
 Ideas, yet it may be juftly queftioned, whether any one 
 of them ever exifted in thefenfible World. 
 
 To thefe two Authors we may add Boethius, who, 
 after having enumerated many acts of the MIND or 
 INTELLECT, wholly diftinft from Senfatian, and inde- 
 pendent of it, at length concludes, 
 
 Hac eft efficient magis 
 Longe caujj'a potentior, 
 )uam quee materiee mod* 
 ImpreJ/as patitur notas. 
 Prtscedit tamen excitans, 
 Ac vires animi movens, 
 Vivo in corpore pajjlo. 
 Cum vel lux oculos ferit^ 
 Vel vox auribus injlrepit ; 
 'Turn MENTIS VIGOR excitus^ 
 
 QUAS INTUS SPECIES TENET, 
 
 Ad motus Jimileis vocans, 
 Notts applicat extiris, 
 INTRORSUMQJJE RECONDITIS 
 FOR MIS mifcet imagines. 
 
 De Confolat. Philo/bph. L. V.
 
 398 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.IV. FOR what is Converfation between Mart 
 and Man ? 'Tis a mutual intercourfe of 
 Speaking and Hearing. To the Speaker, 
 'tis to teach ; to the Hearer, 'tis to learn.- 
 To the Speaker, 'tis to defcend from Ideas 
 to Words ; to the Hearer, 'tis to afcend 
 from Words to Ideas. If the Hearer, in 
 this afcent, can arrive at no Ideas, then is 
 he faid not to underjland; if he afcend to 
 Ideas diflimilar and heterogeneous, then is 
 he faid to mij underjland. What then is 
 requifite,that he may be faid to underjland? 
 That he mould afcend to certain Ideas, 
 treafured up within him/elf, correfpondent 
 and fimilar to thofe within the Speaker. 
 The fame may be faid of a Writer and a 
 Reader; as when any one reads to day or to 
 morrow, or here or in Italy, what Euclid 
 wrote in Greece two thoufand years ago. 
 
 Now is it not marvelous, there mould 
 b&fo exaft an Identity of our Ideas, if they 
 3 were
 
 BOOK THE THIRD. 399 
 
 were only generated from Jen/lble Objefts, Ch.IV, 
 infinite in number, ever changing, diftant 
 in Time, diftant in Place, and no one 
 Particular the fame with any other ? 
 
 AGAIN, do we allow it poflible for GOD 
 to iignify his wit/to Men ; or for MEN to 
 fignify their wants to GOD ? In both thefe 
 cafes there muft be an Identity of Ideas, or 
 elfe nothing is done either one way or the 
 other. Whence then do thefe COMMON 
 IDENTIC IDEAS come? Thofe of Men, 
 it feems, come all from Senfation. And 
 whence come God's Ideas? Not furely 
 from Senfation too -, for this we can hardly 
 venture to affirm, without giving to Body 
 that notable Precedence of being prior to the 
 Intellection of even God bimfelf. Let them 
 then be original; let them be connate, and 
 effentialto the divine Mind. If this be true, 
 is it not a fortunate Event, that Ideas. of 
 corporeal rife, and others of mental, (things 
 derived from fubjetfsfo totally dijlintt ) Jhould 
 
 fi
 
 400 HERMES. 
 
 Ch.lV.Ja happily co-incide in the fame wonderful 
 Identity ? 
 
 HAD we not better reafon thus upon (b 
 abftrufe a Subjeft ? Either all MINDS 
 have their Ideas derived-, or all have them 
 original-, or fame have them original, and 
 fome derived. If all Minds have them de- 
 rived, they muft be derived from fome- 
 thing, which is iff elf not Mind, and thus 
 we fall infenfibly into a kind of Atheifm. 
 If all have them original, then are all 
 Minds divine, an Hypothefis by far more 
 plaufible than the former. But if this 
 be not admitted, then muft one Mind (at 
 leaft) have original Ideas, and the reft 
 have them derived. Now fuppofing this 
 laft, whence are thofe Minds, whofe Ideas 
 are derived, moft likely to derive them ? 
 From MIND, or from BODY ? From 
 MIND, a thing homogeneous; or from 
 BODY, a thing heterogeneous ? From 
 MIND, fuch as (from the Hypothefis) has 
 
 ' original
 
 Book THE THIRD. 401 
 
 original Ideas i or from BODY, which we Ch.IV. 
 cannot difcover to have any Ideas at all? (/) 
 An Examination of this kind, purfued 
 with accuracy and temper, is the moft 
 probable method of folving thefe doubts. 
 *Tis thus we fhall be enabled with more 
 aflurance to decide, whether we are to 
 admit the Doctrine of the Epicurean 
 Poet, 
 
 ^ 
 
 CORPOREA NATURA anlmum conjlare, 
 animamque ; 
 
 or truft the Mantuat2 Bard, when he fings 
 in divine numbers, 
 
 Igneus eft oil is vigor, 
 Se minibus. > 
 
 BUT 
 
 (/) NGTN & *'<? 
 
 rx ANOHTA NOTN ^w<roi ; No BODY pro- 
 duces MIND : for bow fiould THINGS DEVOID OF 
 M i N D produce MIND? Sallujl de Dili et Mundo, c. 8. 
 
 D d
 
 402 HERMES, 
 
 Ch.IV. BUT 'tis now time, to quit thefe Specu- 
 lations. Thofe, who would trace them 
 farther, and have leifure for fuch ftudies, 
 may perhaps find .themfelves led into re- 
 gions of Contemplation, affording them 
 profpecls both interefting and pleafant. 
 We have at prefent faid as much as was 
 requifite to our Subject, and mall there- 
 fore pafs from hence to our concluding 
 chapter. 
 
 CHAP,
 
 So OK THE THIRD. 403 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 Bub-ordination of Intelligence Diffidence 
 of Ideas* both in particular Men, and in 
 whole Nations Different Genius^ of dif- 
 ferent Languages Character of the 
 Englifti, the Oriental, the Latin, and 
 the Greek Languages Superlative Ex~ 
 cellenct of the Lajl Conclujion. 
 
 ORIGINAL TRUTH (a], having the 
 moft intimate connection with the 
 fupre?ne Intelligence, may befaid (as it were) 
 
 to 
 
 (a] Thofe Philosophers, whofe Ideas of Being and 
 Knovjlcge are derived from Body and Senfation y have a 
 ihort method to explain the nature of TRUTH. 'Tis 
 a .faffitioju thing, made by every man for himfelf j 
 which comes and goes, juft as 'tis remembred and for- 
 got; which in the order of things makes its appearance 
 the loft of any, being not only iubfequent to fenjlble Ob- 
 jedts, but even to our Senfatiotu of them. According 
 to this Hypothefis, there are many Truths, which have 
 been, and are no longer j others, that will be, and have 
 D d 2 not
 
 404 HERMES. 
 
 Ch. V. to (Line with unchangeable fplendour, en- 
 lightening throughout the Univerfe every 
 poffible Subject, by nature fufceptible of 
 its benign influence. Paffions and other 
 obftacles may prevent indeed its efficacy, 
 as clouds and vapours may obfcure the 
 Sun -, but it felf neither admits Diminu- 
 tion, nor Change, becaufe the Darknefs re- 
 ipects only particular Percipients. Among 
 thefe therefore we muft look for ignorance 
 
 and 
 
 not been yet ; and multitudes, that poffibly may never 
 exift at all. 
 
 But there are other Reafoners, who muft furely have 
 had very different notions ; thofe 1 mean, who repre- 
 ferit TRUTH not as the /#/?, but the firjl of Beings ; 
 who call it immutable, eternal, cmniprefent ; Attributes, 
 that all indicate fomething more than human. To 
 thefe it muft appear fomewhat ftrange, how rricn 
 fhould imagine, that a crude account of the method 
 bow they perceive Truth, was to pafs for an account of 
 Truth itfelf; as if to defcribe the road to London, could 
 be called a Defcription of that Metropolis. 
 
 For my own part, when I read the detail about Scr> 
 fation and Reflection, and am taught the procefs at 
 large how my Ideas are all generated, 1 teem to view 
 
 the
 
 BOOK THE THIRD. 405 
 
 and errour, and for that Subordination cfCh. V. 
 Intelligence, which is their natural confe- 
 quence. 
 
 WE have daily experience in the works 
 of ART, that a partial Knowlege will fuf- 
 fice for Contemplation, tho' we know not 
 enough, to profefs ourfelves Artifts. Much 
 more is this true, with refped: to NA- 
 TURE ; and well for mankind is it found 
 D d 3 to 
 
 the human Soul in the light of a Crucible, where Truths 
 are produced by a kind of logical Chemiftry. They 
 may confift (for aught we know) of natural materials, 
 but are as much cratures of our own, as a Bolus or 
 Elixir. 
 
 If Milton by his URANIA intended to reprefcnt 
 TRUTH, he certainly referred her to a much more an- 
 tient, as well as a far more noble origin. 
 
 Heav'nly born ! 
 
 Before the hills appear' d, >or fountains floiu'dy 
 'Thou with eternal Wifdom didji converfe^ 
 Wifdom thy Sifter ; and with her didji play l 
 In prefence of th' almighty Father , pleas' d 
 With thy celejiid Song. P. L. VII. 
 
 See Proverbs VIII. 22, &c. Jeremiah X. 10. 
 Marc Antwin. IX. i.
 
 HERMES. 
 
 Ch. V. to be true, elfe never could we attain any 
 natural Knowlege at all. For if the con- 
 
 Jlituthe Proportions of a Clock are fo fub- 
 tle, tbat few conceive them truly, but the 
 Artift himfelf j what (hall we fay to thoje 
 
 feminal Proportions, which make the ef- 
 fence and character of every natural Su6- 
 
 jeft? Partial views, the Imperfections of 
 Senfe; Inattention, Idlenefs, the turbu- 
 lence of Paffionsj Education, local Senti- 
 ments, Opinions, and Belief, confpire in 
 many inftances to furnifli us with Ideas, 
 fome too general, fome too partial, and 
 (what is worfe than all this) with many 
 that are erroneous, and contrary to Truth. 
 Thefe it behoves us to correct as far as 
 poffible, by cool fufpence and candid ex- 
 amination. 
 
 AND thus by a connection perhaps lit- 
 tle expected, the Caufe of LETTERS, and 
 
 that
 
 BOOK THE THIRD. 407 
 
 that of VIRTUE appear to co-incide, it Ch. V. 
 being the buiinefs of both to examine our 
 Ideas> and to amend them by the Standard 
 of Nature and of Truth (6). 
 
 IN this important Work, we {hall be 
 led' to obferve, how Nations, like fingle 
 Men, have their peculiar Ideas; how thefe 
 peculiar Ideas become THE GENIUS OF 
 THEIR LANGUAGE, fince the Symbol muft 
 of courfe correfpond to its Archetype (c) ; 
 D d 4 how 
 
 (1} How ufeful to ETHIC SCIENCE, and indeed to 
 KNOWLEGE in general, a GRAMMATICAL Dis- 
 QU I s I T I o N i nto the Etymology and Meaning of Wo R D s 
 was efteemed by the chief and ableft Philofophers, may 
 be feen by confulting Plato in his Cratylus ; Xcnopb. 
 Mem. IV. 5, 6. Arrlan. Epift. I. 17. II. 10. Marc. 
 Anton.lll. ii. V. 8. X. 8. 
 
 (c} H00TE XAPAKTHP r r a-^fuTra 
 A O T O I. Stob. Capiwitur Signa baud levin, fed ob- 
 fcrvatu digna (quod fortaffe qulfpiam non putarit) de in- 
 gen'ris ci moribus populornm ft natlonum ex lingua ipfcrum. 
 Bacon de Augm. Sclent. VI. i. Vid. etiain Qunftil. 
 L. XI. p. 675. Edit. Capperon. Diag. L.I. P- 58. et 
 Menag. Com. 7ufc. Difp. V. 1 6.
 
 408 H E R M E S. 
 
 Ch. V. how the ivifeft Nations, having the tnoft 
 and bejl Ideas, will confequently have the 
 heft and mo ft copious Languages ; how others, 
 whofe Languages are motley and com- 
 pounded, and who have borrowed from 
 different countrys different Arts and Prac- 
 tices, difcover by WORDS, to whom they 
 are indebted for THINGS. 
 
 To illuftrate what has been faid, by a 
 few examples. WE BRITONS in our time 
 have been remarkable borrowers, as our 
 multiform Language may fufficiently (hew. 
 Our Terms in polite Literature prove, that 
 this came from Greece ; our Terms in 
 Mujic and Painting, that thefe came from 
 Italy, our Phrafes in Cookery and War, 
 that we learnt thefe from the French ; and 
 our Phrafes in Navigation, that we were 
 taught by the Flemings and Low Dutch. 
 Thefe many and very different Sources of 
 our Language may be the caufe, why it is 
 fo deficient in Regularity and Analogy. Yet 
 have this advantage to compenfate the
 
 BOOK THE THIRD. 409 
 
 defect, that what we want in Elegance, we Ch. V. 
 gain in Copioufnefs, in which laft refpect 
 few Languages will be found fuperior to 
 
 LET us pafs from ourfelves to the RE- 
 GIONS OF THE EAST. The (d) Eaftern 
 World, from the earlieft days, has been at 
 all times the Seat of enormous Monarchy. 
 On them fair Liberty never fhed its genial 
 influence. If at any time civil Difcords 
 arofe among them (and arife there did in- 
 numerable) the contefl was never about 
 the Form of their Government -, (for this 
 was an object, of which the Combatants 
 had no conception ;) 'twas all from the 
 poor motive of, who foould be their MASTER, 
 
 whether 
 
 to r ol JUEV 
 
 TWV 'AA-^o;y, c'j ol TS-epl Tr,v Atrixv TUV Tsreai 
 VTTO^SO-I rr.v $e<nroT wv a.o%ri<j, zlv 
 For the Barbarians by being more Jlavijb 
 in their Manners than the Greeks, and thofe of Afia than 
 thofe of Europe, fubmit to dcfpotic Government without 
 or difcontcnt. Arift. Polit. III. 4.
 
 4 io HERMES. 
 
 Ch, V. whether a Cyrus or an Artaxerxes, a Ma- 
 homet or a Muftapba. 
 
 SUCH was their Condition, and what 
 was the confequence ? Their Ideas be- 
 came confonant to their fervile State, and 
 their Words became confonant to their 
 fervile Ideas. The great Diftindion, for 
 
 
 
 ever in their fight, was that of Tyrant and 
 Slave ; the moft unnatural one conceiva- 
 ble, and the mod fufceptible of pomp, and 
 empty exaggeration. Hence they talk'd 
 of Kings as Gods, and of themfelves, as 
 the meaneft and moft abjecl: Reptiles. 
 Nothing was either great or little in mode- 
 ration, but every Sentiment was heightened 
 by incredible Hyperbole. Thus tho' they 
 fometimes afcended into the Great and 
 Magnificent (e}, they as frequently dege- 
 nerated 
 
 (e) The trueft Sublime of the Eaft may be found in 
 the Scriptures, of which perhaps the principal caufe is 
 the intrinfic Greatnefs of the Subjects there treated 9 
 the Creation of the Univerfe, the Difpenfatior.s of di- 
 vine Providence, &c. i
 
 BOOK THE THIRD. 411 
 
 nerated into the 'Tumid and Bumbaft. he Ch. V. 
 Greeks too ofAfia became infedted by their 
 neighbours, who were often at times not 
 only their neighbours, but their mafters ; 
 and hence that Luxuriance of the Afiatic 
 Stilf, unknown to the chafte eloquence 
 and purity of Athens. But of the Gree&swe 
 forbear to fpeak now, as we {hall fpeak of 
 them more fully, when we have firft confi- 
 dered the Nature or Genius of the Romans. 
 
 AND what fort of People may we pro- 
 nounce the ROMANS ? A Nation engaged 
 in wars and commotions, fome foreign, 
 fome domeftic, which for feven hun- 
 dred years wholly engrolTed their thoughts. 
 Hence therefore their LANGUAGE be- 
 came, like their Ideas , copious in all Terms 
 expreffive of things political, and well 
 adapted to the purpofes both of Hijlory 
 
 and popular 'Eloquence. But what was 
 
 their Pbilofcpby ? As a Nation, 'twas 
 none, if we may credit their ableft Writers. 
 And hence the Unfitnefs of their Language 
 
 to
 
 412 HERMES. 
 
 Ch. V. to this Subject ; a defect, which even C/- 
 cero is compelled to confefs, and more fully 
 makes appear, when he writes Philofo- 
 phy himfelf, from the number of Terms, 
 which he is obliged to invent (f). Virgil 
 
 feems 
 
 (/) See Cic. de Fin. I. C. i, 2, 3. III. C. i, 2, 4, 
 
 &c. but in particular Tufc. Difp. I. 3. where he fays, 
 PHILOSOPHIA jacuit ufque ad bane at at em y nee ullum 
 babuit lumen LITERARUM LATINARUM ; qua il- 
 luftranda et excitanda nobis ejl ; utjiy &c. See alfo Tufc. 
 Difp. IV. 3. and Acad. I. 3. where it appears, that 'till 
 CICERO applied himfelf to the writing of Pbilofophy 9 
 the Romans had nothing of the kind in their language, 
 except fome mean performances of Amafanius the Epi- 
 curean^ and others of the fame fe&. How far the Ro- 
 mans were indebted to Cicero for Philofophy, and with 
 what induftry, as well as eloquence, he cultivated the 
 Subjet, may be feen not only from the titles of thofe 
 Works that are now loft, but much more from the 
 many noble ones {till fortunately preferved. 
 
 The Epicurean Poet LUCRETIUS, who flourifhed 
 nearly at the fame time, feems by his filence to have 
 over- looked the Latin writers of his own Seel ; deriv- 
 ing all his PhiJofophy, as well as Cicero, from Grecian 
 Sources; and, like him, acknowleging the difficulty of 
 writing Philofophy in Latin, both from the Poverty of the 
 Tongue, and from the Novelty of the Subject. 
 
 Net
 
 BOOK. THE THIRD. 413 
 
 fcems to have judged the moft truly of his Ch. V. 
 Countrymen, when admitting their infe- 
 riority in the more elegant Arts, he con- 
 cludes at laft with his ufual majefty, 
 
 Ntc me animtfalliti GRAIOSUM olfcura reperta 
 Difficile inlujlrare LATINIS verftbus ejje^ 
 ( Multa novis rebus pr&fertim quomfit agendum,) 
 Propter EGESTATEM LINGUA et RERUM NO- 
 
 VITATEM : 
 
 Sfd tua me virtus tamen, et fperata voluptas 
 
 Suavis amicitits quemvis perferre laborem 
 
 Suadet- Lucr. I. 137. 
 
 In the fame age, VARRO, among his numerous 
 works, wrote fome in the way of Philofophy ; as did the 
 Patriot BRUTUS, a Treatife concerning Firtue^ much 
 applauded by Cicero ; but thefe Works are now loft. 
 
 Soon after the Writers above-mentioned came HO- 
 RACE, fome of whofe Satires and Epiftles may be juftly 
 ranked among the moft valuable pieces of Latin Pbilo- 
 fopky, whether we confider the Purity of their Stile, or 
 the great Addrefs, with which they treat the Subject. 
 
 After Horace, tho' with as long an interval as from 
 the days of Augujlus to thofe of Nero, came the Saiirift 
 PERSIUS, the friend and difciple of the Stoic Corr.utus ; 
 to whofe precepts as he did honour by his virtuous Life, 
 
 fo
 
 HERMES. 
 
 REGERE IMPERIO POPULOS, Ro- 
 
 manf f memento, 
 (Ha tibi erunt artes) pactfque importer e 
 
 morem y 
 Parcerejubjeftis, et debellarefupcrbos. 
 
 FROM 
 
 fo his works, tho' fmall, fhew an early proficiency in 
 the Science of Morals. Of him it may be faid, that 
 he is almoft the {ingle difficult writer among the Latin 
 Claffics, whofe meaning has fufficient merit, to make 
 it worth while to labour thro' his obfcurities. 
 
 In the fame degenerate and tyrannic period, lived alfo 
 SENECA ; whofe character, both as a Man and a Wri- 
 ter, is difcufled with great accuracy by the noble Au- 
 thor of the Cfaraften/tiu, to whom we refer. 
 
 Under a milder Dominion, that of Hadrian and the 
 jfntoninesy lived AULUS GELLIUS, or (as fome call 
 him) AGELLJUS, an entertaining Writer in the mif- 
 cellaneous way ; well fkilled in Criticifra and Antiqui- 
 ty ; who tho' he can hardly be entitled to the name of 
 a Philofcpber, yet deferves not to pafs unmemioned here, 
 from the curious fragments of Fhilofophy interfperlcd 
 in his works. 
 
 With Auhis Gell'ius we range MACROBIUS, not be- 
 
 caufe a Contmporaiy, (foe he is fuppofed to have lived 
 
 under
 
 BOOK THE THIRD. 415 
 
 FROM confidering the Romans, let us Ch. V. 
 pafs to THE GREEKS. THE GRECIAN 
 
 COMMON- 
 
 under Honnrius and Theodofms] but from his near refem- 
 blance, in the chara&er of a Writer. His Works, 
 like the other's, are mifcellaneous ; filled with Mytho- 
 logy and antient Literature, fome Philofophy being in- 
 termixed. His Commentary upon the Somnium Scipio- 
 nis of Cicero may be confidered as wholly of ihefbi/o- 
 fcphical kind. 
 
 In the fame age with Aldus Gettius, flourifhed APU- 
 LEIUS of Madaura in Africa, a Platonic Writer, whofe 
 Matter in general far exceeds his perplexed and affected 
 Stile, too conformable to the falfe Rhetoric of the Age 
 when he lived. 
 
 Of the fame Country, but of a later Age, and a 
 hai {her Stile, was MARTIANUS CAPELLA, if indeed 
 he deferve not the name rather of a Philologift, than of 
 a Pbilofopher. 
 
 After CV?/*//tf, we may rank CHALCIDIUS the Pla- 
 tonic, tho' both his Age, and Country, and Religion 
 are doubtful. His manner of writing is rather more 
 agreable than that of the two preceding, nor does he, 
 appear to be their inferior in the knowlege of Philofo- 
 phy, his work being a laudable Commentary upon the 
 Timaus of Plato. 
 
 The
 
 4i6 HERMES* 
 
 Ch. V. COMMON WEALTHS, while they maintained 
 their Liberty, were the moft heroic Con- 
 federacy, that ever exifted. They were 
 
 the 
 
 The laft Latin Philofopher was BOETHIUS, who 
 was defcended from fome of the nobleft of the Roman 
 Families, and was Conful in the beginning of the fixth 
 Century. He wrote many philofophical Works, the 
 greater part in the Logical way. But his Ethic piece, On 
 the Confutation of Phllofophy^ and which is partly profe, 
 and partly verfe, deferves great encomiums both for the 
 Matter, and for the Stile j in which laft he approaches 
 the Purity of a far better age than his own, and is in 
 all refpe&s preferable to thofe crabbed Africans already 
 mentioned. By command of Tbeoderic king of the 
 GothS) 'twas the hard fate of this worthy Man to fuffer 
 death ; with whom the Latin Tongue, and the laft re- 
 mains of Roman Dignity, may be faid to have funk in 
 the weftern World. 
 
 There were other Romans, who left Philofophical 
 Writings; fuch as MUSONIUS RUFUS, and the two 
 Emperors, MARCUS ANTONINUS and JULIAN ; but 
 as thefe preferred the ufe of the Greek Tongue to their 
 own, they can hardly be confidered among the number 
 of Latin Writers. 
 
 And fo much (by way of fketch) for THE LATIN' 
 AUTHORS OF PHILOSOPHY; a fmall number for fo 
 vaft an Empire, if we confider them as all the produft 
 of near fix fucceffive centuries.
 
 BOOK THE THIRD. 4-17 
 
 the politeft, the braveft, and the wifeft of Ch. V, 
 men. In the fhort fpace of little more 
 than a Century, they became fuch Statef- 
 men, Warriors, Orators, Hirtorians, Phy- 
 ficians, Poets, Critics, Painters, Sculptors, 
 Architects, and (laft of all) Philofophers, 
 that one can hardjy help confidering THAT 
 GOLDEN PERIOD, as a Providential Event 
 in honour of human Nature, to mew 
 to what perfection the Species might af- 
 cend (g)< 
 
 Now 
 
 If we except Homer , Hefiod^ and the Lyric 
 Poets, we hear of few Grecian Writers before the e?i- 
 pedition of Xerxes. After that Monarch had been dc-" 
 feated, and the dread of the Perfian Power was at art 
 end, the EFFULGENCE OF GRECIAN GENIUS (if 
 I may ufe the exprefiion) broke forth, and fhone till 
 the time of Alexander the Macedonian, after whom it 
 difappeared, and never rofe again. This is that Golden 
 Period fpoken of above. I do not mean that Greece 
 had not many writers of great merit fubfequent to that 
 period, and efpecially of the philofophic kind ; but the 
 Great) the Striking^ the Sublime (call it as you pleafe) 
 attained at that time to a height, to which it nevef 
 eould afcend in any after age. 
 
 E e The
 
 4i8 HERMES. 
 
 Ch. V. Now THE LANGUAGE or THESE 
 GREEKS was truly like themfelvcs , 'twas 
 
 con- 
 
 The fame kind of fortune befel the People of Rome. 
 When the Pttnic wars were ended, and Carthage their 
 dreaded Rival was no more, then (as Horace informs 
 us) they began to cultivate the politer arts. 'Twas 
 foon after this, their great Orators, and Hiftorians, 
 and Poets arofe, and Rome, like Greece, had her Golden 
 Period^ which lafted to the death of Oftavius Ca- 
 far. 
 
 I call thefe two Periods, from the two greateft Ge- 
 niufes that flouriflied in each, one THE SOCRATJC 
 PERIOD, the other THE CICERONIAN. 
 
 There are ftill farther analogies fubfifting between 
 them. Neither Period commenced, as long as follici- 
 tude for the common welfare engaged men's atten- 
 tions, and fuch wars impended, as threatned their de- 
 ftrudlion by Foreigners and Barbarians. But when 
 once thefe fears were over, a general fecurity foon en- 
 fued, and inftead of attending to the arts of defence 
 and felf-prefervation, they began to cultivate thofe of 
 Elegance and Pleafure. Now, as thefe naturally pro- 
 duced a kind of wanton infolence (not unlike the vi- 
 tious temper of high-fed animals) fo by this the bands 
 of union were infenfibly diffolved. Hence then among 
 3 tlic
 
 BOOK THE THIRD. 419 
 
 conformable to their tranfcendent and Ch. V. 
 univerfal Genius. Where Matter fo 
 
 abounded, 
 
 the Greeks that fatal Peloponnefian War, which toge- 
 ther with other wars, its immediate confequence, broke 
 the confederacy of their Commonwealths j wafted their 
 ftrength ; made them jealous of each other ; and thus 
 paved a way for the contemptible kingdom of Macedon 
 to inflave them all, and afcend in a few years to uni- 
 verfal Monarchy. 
 
 A like luxuriance of profperity fowed difcord among 
 the Romans ; raifed thofe uhappy contefts between the 
 Senate and the Gracchi j between Sylla and Marius ; 
 between Pempey and Cafar ; 'till at length, after the 
 laft ftruggle for Liberty by thofe brave Patriots Brutus 
 and CaJJius at Pbilippi, and the fubfequent defeat of 
 Antony at Afiium y the Romans became fubje&s to the 
 dominion of a FELLOW-CITIZEN. 
 
 It muft indeed be confefled, that after Alexander and 
 Oflavius had eftablifhed their Monarchies, there were 
 many bright Geniufes, who were eminent under their 
 Government. Ariftotle maintained a friendfhip and 
 epiftolary correfpondence with Alexander. In the time 
 of the fame Monarch lived Ybtopbrajha* and the Cy- 
 nic, Diogenes. Then alfo Demojlhenes and &fchines 
 fpoke their two celebrated Orations. So likewife in the 
 time of Oflavius, Virgil wrote his Ens'id^ and with 
 E e 2 Horace^
 
 420 HERMES. 
 
 Ch. V. abounded, Words followed of courfe, and 
 thofe exquilite in every kind, as the Ideas 
 for which they flood. And hence it fol- 
 lowed, there was not a Subject to be 
 found, which could not with propriety be 
 expreft in Greek. 
 
 HERE were Words and Numbers for 
 the Humour of an Ariftophanes -, for the 
 
 native 
 
 Horace^ Varius^ and many other fine Writers, partook 
 of his protection and royal munificence. But then it 
 muft be remembrcd, that thefe men were bred and edu- 
 cated in the principles of a free Government. 'Twas 
 hence they derived that high and manly fpirit, which 
 made them the admiration of after ages. The Suc- 
 ceflbrs and Forms of Government left by Alexander and 
 Oflavius, foon ftopt the growth of any thing farther in 
 the kind. So true is that noble faying of Longinus - 
 Q-s'xJ/a; Tf J/ap Ixoc-w TX (pcovr.ponz ruv / 
 tj EAEY0EPI.A, x} 7; \7n'<rai, ^ c!. 
 
 (>AOTJ^I:X.:. 'Tis LIBERTY that is formed te 
 nurfe the fcntiments of great Geniufes ; to injpire them 
 with hope ; to pufi) forward the propenfity of conteft cne 
 luith another, end the generous emulation of being the firjl 
 in rank. DC Subl. Sedt. 44.
 
 BOOK THE THIRD. 421 
 
 native Elegance of a Philemon or Me- Ch. V. 
 nander, for the amorous Strains of a Mim- 
 nejrmus or Sappho ; for the rural Lays of a 
 Theocritus or Eion; and for the fublime 
 Conceptions of a Sophocles or Homer. The 
 fame in Profe. Here Ifocrates was enabled 
 to difplay his Art, in all the accuracy of 
 Periods, and the nice counterpoife of 
 Diction. Here Demoftbenes found mate- 
 rials for that nervous Compofition, that 
 manly force of unaffected Eloquence, 
 which rufhed, like a torrent, too impe- 
 tuous to be withftood. 
 
 WHO were more different in exhi- 
 biting their Pbilofophy, than Xenophon, 
 Plato* and his difciple, Ariftotle? Dif- 
 ferent, I fay, in their character. of Com- 
 pojition ; for as to their Philofophy itfdf> 
 'twas in reality the fame. Ariftotk> 
 ftrict, methodic, and orderly; fubtle in 
 Thought; fparing in Ornament; with 
 little addrefs to the Paffions or Ima- 
 gination ; but exhibiting the whole with 
 E e 3 fuch
 
 422 HERMES. 
 
 Ch. V. fuch a pregnant brevity, that in every 
 fentence we feem to read a page. 
 How exquifitely is this all performed in 
 Greek ? Let thofe, who imagine it may 
 be done as well in another Language, 
 fatisfy themfelves either by attempting to 
 tranflate him, qr by perufing his tranfla- 
 tions already made by men of learning. 
 On the contrary, when we read either 
 Xenofbon or Plato, nothing of this me~ 
 tbod and ftrift order appears. The For- 
 mal and Didatfic is wholly dropt. What- 
 ever they may teach, 'tis without profef- 
 fing to be teachers -, a train of Dialogue 
 and truly polite Addrefs, in which, as 
 in a Mirrour, we behold human Life, 
 
 adorned in all its colours of Sentiment 
 
 
 
 and Manners. 
 
 AND yet though thefe differ in this 
 manner from the Stagirife, how differ- 
 ent are they likewife in character from 
 each other ? Plato, copious, figura- 
 tive,
 
 BOOK THE THIRD. 423 
 
 tive, and majcftic -, intermixing at times Ch. V. 
 the facetious and fatiric j enriching his 
 Works with Tales and Fables, and the 
 myftic Theology of ancient times. Xe- 
 nopbon, the Pattern of perfect fimpli- 
 city; every where fmooth, harmonious, 
 and pure ; declining the figurative, the 
 marvelous, and the myftic ; afcending 
 but rarely into the Sublime ; nor then 
 fo much trufling to the colours of Stile, 
 as to the intriniic dignity of the Sentiment 
 itfelf. 
 
 THE Language in the mean time, in 
 which He and Plato wrote, appears to fuit 
 fo accurately with the Stile of both, that 
 when we read either of the two, we can- 
 not help thinking, that 'tis he alone, who 
 has hit its character, and that it could not 
 have appeared fo elegant in any other 
 manner. 
 
 AND thus is THE GREEK TONGUE, 
 
 from its Propriety and "Univerfality* made 
 
 E e 4 for
 
 424 HERMES. 
 
 Ch. V.for all that is great, and all that is beauti- 
 ' fuf, in every Subject ^ and under every Form 
 of writing. 
 
 GRATIS ingenium, GRAIIS dedit ort 
 
 rotundo 
 Mufa loqui. f 
 
 'TWERE to be wimed,thatthofeamong{l 
 us, who either write or read, with a view 
 to employ their liberal leifure (for as to 
 fuch, as do either from views more fordid, 
 we leave them, like Slaves, to their deftined 
 drudgery) 'twere to bewifhed, I fay, that 
 the liberal (if they have a relifh for letters) 
 would infpect the fmimed Models of Gre- 
 cian Literature; that they would not 
 wafte thofe hours, which they cannot re- 
 call, upon the meaner productions of the 
 French and Englijh Prefs ; upon that fun- 
 gous growth of Novels and of Pamphlets, 
 where 'tis to be feared, they rarely find 
 
 4
 
 BOOK THE THIRD. 425 
 
 any rational pleafure, and more rarely Ch. V. 
 ftill, any folid improvement. 
 
 To be competently (killed in antient 
 learning, is by no means a work of fuch 
 infuperable pains. The very progrefs it- 
 felf is attended with delight, and refem- 
 bles a Journey through fome pleafant 
 Country, where every mile we advance, 
 new charms arife. 'Tis certainly as eafy 
 to be a Scholar, as a Gamefter, or many 
 other Characters equally illiberal and low. 
 The fame application, the fame quantity 
 of habit will fit us for one, as completely 
 as for the other. And as to thofe who 
 tell us, with an air of feeming wifdom, 
 that 'tis Men, and not Books we muft 
 ftudy to become knowing; this I have 
 always remarked from repeated Experi- 
 ence, to be the common confolation and 
 language of Dunces. They fhelter their 
 ignorance under a few bright Examples, 
 whofe tranfcendent ^abilities, without the 
 
 common
 
 426 HERMES. 
 
 Ch. V. common helps, have been fufficient of 
 themfehes to great and important Ends. 
 But alas ! 
 
 Decipit exemplar ijitiis imitabile 
 
 IN truth, each man's Underftanding, 
 when ripened and mature, is a compofite 
 of natural Capacity > and of fuper-inductd 
 Habit. Hence the greateft Men will be 
 neteflarily thofe, who poffefs the beft Ca- 
 pacities, cultivated with the bejl Habits. 
 Hence alfo moderate Capacities, when 
 adorned with valuable Science, will far 
 tranfcend others the mod acute by na- 
 ture, when either neglected, or applied 
 to low and bafe purpofes. And thus for 
 the honour of CULTURE and GOOD 
 LEARNING, they are able to render a 
 man, if be 'will take the pains, intrinfi- 
 catty more excellent than his natural Supe- 
 riors. 
 
 AND
 
 BOOK THE THIRD. 427 
 
 AND fo much at prefentasto GENERAL Ch. V, 
 IDEAS; bow we acquire them; whence 
 they are derived-, what is their Nature ; 
 and what their connection with Language. 
 So much likewife as to the Subject of this 
 Treatife, UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR. 
 
 End of the THIRD BOOK. 
 
 AD-
 
 ADVERTISEMENT. 
 
 rr*HE following Notes are either Tran- 
 Jlations of former Notes, or Additions 
 to them. The additional are chiefly Ex- 
 trafts from Greek Manufcripts, 'which 
 (as the Author has faid already concern- 
 ing others of the fame kind) are valua- 
 ble both for their Rarity, and for their 
 intrinfic Merit*
 
 ADDITIONAL NOTES. 
 
 PAG. 95. - TO STOP, &V."J The Quotation 
 from Proclus in the Note may be thus rendred 
 - THAT THING is AT REST, -which FOR A TIME 
 
 PRIOR AND SUBSEQUENT IS IN THE SAME PLACE, 
 btth itfelf, and its Parts. 
 
 P. 105. In the Note, for yi'y-.ofj.iwit read 
 and render the paflage thus For by this Fatuity (nameiy 
 the Faculty of Senfe) rue neither know the Futur % nor 
 the Pafti but the Prefent only. 
 
 P. 106. NOTE (^).j The pafiage of 
 here referred to, but by mi/lake omitted, has refpe& to 
 the notion of beings corporeal and fenjible^ which were 
 (aid to be nearly approaching to Non-Entitys. The Au- 
 thor explains dais, among other reafons, by the fol- 
 lowing - flw; $t TO?? f*v *<n "ytrnui^ti ; Ilfwrcv 
 ri wrauOa TO wafl?x9&v 10 J TO /wfAXov, rau 
 ovra* TO y.tv yxp r,^)Ji-^s~on >ej ax m to, TO Ji 
 
 Pvov J'f rr? 
 
 Haw therefore is if that thfy approach nearly to Non-Enti- 
 tys? In the firjl place ^ becaufe HERE (where they exift) 
 exifls THE PAST a^/ THE FUTURE, and thefe art 
 NON-ENTITYS; for the one is 'uanijhed^ and is nt 
 more, the other is not as yet. Now all natural Subftan&s 
 pafi away along with TIME, or rather 'tis upon their 
 Motion that TIME is an Attendant. 
 
 P.
 
 432 ADDITIONAL NOTES. 
 
 P. 119 in the Note here fubjoined mention is madd 
 of the REAL Now, or INSTANT, and its efficacy. 
 To which we may add, that there is not only a necejjary 
 Connection between Exigence and the Prefent Injtant, 
 becaufe no other Point of Time can properly be faid to 
 be, but alfo between Exigence and Life, becaufe what- 
 ever lives, by the fame reafon neceflarily Is. Hence 
 Sophocles, fpeaking of Time prefent, elegantly fays of it 
 
 THE LIVING, and Now prefent TIME. 
 
 Trachin. V. 1185. 
 
 P. 227. The Paffage in Virgil, of which Servius 
 here fpeaks, is a defcription of Turnus's killing two 
 brothers, Amycus and Diores ; after which the Poet fays 
 of him, 
 
 - curru abfciffa DUORUM 
 Sufpendit capita- - 
 
 This, literally tranflated, is he hung up on his cha- 
 riot the heads of Two perfons, which were cut off, 
 whereas the Senfe requires, of THE Two perfons, that 
 is to fay, of Amycus and Diores. Now this by Ambo- 
 rum would have been expreft properly, as Amborum 
 means THE Two ; by Duorum is expreft improperly, 
 as it means only Two indefinitely. 
 
 P. 259. The Paflage in Note (<?) from Tbemijlius, 
 may be thus rendered - Nature in many in/lances ap- 
 pears to make her tranfition by little and little, fo that in 
 fome Beings it may be doubted, whether they are Animal, 
 tr Vegetable. 
 
 P.
 
 ADDITIONAL NOTES. 433 
 
 P. 294. Note (c] There are in the number of things 
 toiany, which have a mojl known EXISTENCE, bvtamo/l 
 unknawn ESSENCE ; fuchfor example as Motion, Place 
 and more than, either of them, Time. The EXISTENCE 
 of each of thefe is known and indifputable, but what their 
 ESSENCE is, or Nature, is among the moft difficult things 
 to difcern. The Soul alfo is in the fame Clafs : that it is 
 Something, is mojl evident j but what it is, is a matter 
 not ft eafy to learn. Alex. Aphrod. p. 142. 
 
 P. 340. LANGUAGE INCAPABLE OF COMMU- 
 NICATING DEMONSTRATION.] See Three Trea- 
 tifes, or Vol. I. p. 220, and the additional note on the 
 words, The Source of infinite Truths, &c< 
 
 P. 368 in the Note yet fo held the Philofepttir <rf 
 Malmefbury, and the Author of the Effay, &c. J 
 
 Philoponus, from the Philofophy of Plato and Pytha-* 
 goras, feems to have far excelled thefe Moderns in his 
 account of WISDOM or PHILOSOPHY, and its Attri- 
 butes, or ejfential CharaSJers. "iJtov 
 TO Iv TO~? -zsroAAoiV ^X 8<rt Jixtyopctv $? 
 j^ TO tv ToTj ZB'oXAo:? i%v<ri xojvojui'ay Sii'fccu rivi 
 
 8 "yotp Jy^e^t? TO JsJ^at (>Tvr;,- (legff (^xrlrt 
 fcilWVMWj (TSCCJ\I y&p trcavrlov) aAA* 
 
 TO StdtydPOV TTWU llTTtTv' (? X'JUi? Xy 7ri 
 
 AAa ti xoivou spi7W. IT IS THE PRO- 
 PER BUSINESS CF PHILOSOPHY TO SHEW IN 
 
 MANY THINGS, WHICH HAVE DIFFERENCE, 
 
 WHAT is THEIR COMMON CHARACTER ; and IN 
 MANY THINGS, WHICH HAVE A COMMON CHA- 
 HACTER, THRO* WHAT 'TIS THEY DJFFER. It 
 
 F f it
 
 434 ADDITIONAL NOTES. 
 
 is indeed no difficult matter to foew the common Character 
 of a Wood-Pigeon and a Dove, (for this is evident t$ 
 every one) but rather to tell where lies the Difference ; nor 
 to tell the Difference between a Dog and a Horfe, but ra- 
 ther to Jhew^ what they poffefs in common. Philop. Com. 
 MS. in Nicomach. Arithm. 
 
 P. 379 THEY ARE MORE EXQUISITE THAN, 
 
 &fc.] The Words of Arijt 'otle, here referred to, arc 
 thefe ~ /uaAAoy $' to TO a Vvtxg > TO xaAov tv TO~S 
 T*if tyvaiws toyotf, i) tv TOIJ T]j Tfyv>;f. THE PRIN- 
 CIPLES OF DESIGN and BEAUTY are more in the 
 Works ^NATURE, than they are in thofe of ART. 
 
 P- 379 WE MUST or NECESSITY ADMIT A 
 MIND, &c.] The following quotation, taken from 
 the third book of a manufcript Comment of Proclus on 
 the Parmenides of Plato, is here given for the fake of 
 thofe, who have curiofity with regard to the doctrine 
 of IDEAS, as held by antient Philosophers. 
 
 El S\ Sit VWrO/UVC I ITTl'lV TVfll OttTlOtV TTlf TijV lolUV U7TC- 
 
 OTl T1 
 
 * > 
 
 7TO 
 
 X; aiTas, x m tTa?, 
 
 x^/r7c) TWW aflp/uv, ufoV TU x^ o (f>j(rr; o *Aflij~OTAi; 
 
 fi OU- 
 
 ' 
 
 TO 
 
 ?ro TCfJlopotTV TyctvGvTigo-j ay ?y TO xa/ aiT/av, t< 
 
 ihfre-
 
 ADDITIONAL NOTES. 435 
 
 therefore we are to relate concifely the Caufe, why THE 
 HYPOTHESIS OF IDEAS pleafed them (namely Parme- 
 nides, Zeno, Socrates, &c.) we mujl begin by observing 
 that all the 'various vifible objefls around us, the hea- 
 venly as well as the Jublunary, are either from CHANCE, 
 or according to a CAUSE. FROM CHANCE is IM- 
 POSSIBLE j for then the more excellent things (fuch as 
 Mind, andReafon, and Caufe, and the Effetts of Caufe) 
 will be among thofe things that come lajl, andfo the END- 
 INGS of things will be more excellent than their BEGIN- 
 NINGS. To which too may be added what Ariftotley^yj; 
 
 that ESSENTIAL CAUSES OUGHT TO BE PRIOR TO 
 
 ACCIDENTAL, in a s much as EVERY ACCIDENTAL 
 CAUSE is A DEVIATION FROM THEM; fo that 
 whatever is the Effeft of fuch ej/ential Caufe [as is indeed 
 every work of Art and human Ingenuity] mujl needs 
 be prior to that which is the Effett of Chance, even tho' 
 we were to refer to Chance the mojl divine of vifible ob~ 
 jefts, [the Heavens themfelvesj. 
 
 The Philofopher, having thus proved a definite Caufe 
 of the World in oppofition to Chance, proceeds to {hew 
 that from the Unity and concurrent Order of things 
 this Caufe muft be ONE. After which he goes on, as 
 follows. 
 
 - EJ atv sv Ao/ov TKTO a,T07rw i<r&i yap Tt 
 
 10 
 
 ov, x T 
 
 foi;, 6 tfn oiir a'iT/f aAo^a TOTO. 'i ol 
 
 lauro ^-/ITTK TW 
 
 atnou ov, n TKTO ^yov, ct^i/on<re *rr\v 
 
 Ff 2
 
 436 ADDITIONAL NOTES. 
 
 TO flay, x) rv1 t v 70 Day, v I 
 Kal ii TSTC, TO i\f lauro ^a j3A<To,', > 
 
 , cJf ra jur' &UT9. Aoycis ago. ^ TicWiv au- 
 
 Jlav, x) ?riv tv UTI^I rd Ilau, wj 
 
 IF THIS CAUSE BE VOID OF REA- 
 
 SON, that indeed would be abfurd ; fc r then again there 
 would befimething among thofe things , which come lajl 
 in order , more excellent than their Principle or Caufe. I 
 mean by more excellent, fomething operating according to 
 Reafon and Knowlege, and yet within that Univerfe, and 
 a Part of that Whole y which is, what it is, from a Caufc 
 devoid of Reafon. 
 
 But if> on the contrary, THE CAUSE OF THE UNI- 
 VERSE BE A CAUSE, HAVING REASON and know- 
 ing itfelf, it of courje knows itfelf to be the Caufe of all 
 things ; elfe being ignorant of this, it would be ignorant 
 of its own nature. But if it know, that from ITS VERY 
 ESSENCE IT is THE CAUSE OF THE UNIVERSE, 
 and if that, which knows one part of a Relation definite- 
 ly, knows alfo of necejjity the other, it knows for this rea- 
 fon definitely the thing of which it is the Caufe. IT 
 
 KNOWS THEREFORE THE UNIVERSE, and all 
 
 things out of which the Univerfe rs compofed, of all which 
 alfo it is the Caufe. But if this be true, 'tis evident that 
 
 BY LOOKING INTO ITSELF, AND BY KNOWING 
 ITSELF, IT KNOWS WHAT COMES AFTER IT- 
 SELF, AND is SUBSEQUENT. 'Tis therefore, through 
 certain REASONS and FORMS DEVOID OF MATTER 
 
 that
 
 ADDITIONAL NOTES. 437 
 
 that it knows thofe mundane Reafons and Forms, out of 
 "which the Univerfe is compcfed, and that the Univerfe is in 
 it y as hi a Caufe, di/linft from and without the Matter. 
 
 P. 380 - AGREEABLE TO WHICH IDE.AS THESE 
 
 WORKS ARE FASHIONED, &c.] 'Tis upon thefe 
 Principles that Nicomachus in his Arithmetic, p. 7. 
 calls the Supreme Being an Artijl - i\> TV? T* TE^V/TS. 
 0-5 ojavo:a, in Dei artificis mente. Where Philo- 
 ponus, in his manufcript Comment, obferves as follows 
 
 - TfYWT1J (pj)<T TOV &}f<JV, W TffXVIUV TX; TS-fUtTOtf J. 
 
 r/af Y.Z.} T\ Xoyea; aurwu -^ov7. He calls GOD <? 
 ARTIST, as poffejjlng within himfelf the frft Caufes of 
 all things, and their Reafens or Proportions. Soon after 
 fpeaking of thofe Sketches, after which Painters work, 
 and finifh their Pictures, he fubjoins -- WO-TTEQ ?y 
 fifths, fV T TOIOOJTX cyux.'y^y.^uot.ra. |3A7rou7ff, aroi- 
 tspsv roil T, 8Tw xal o 3t)fi.Hifty9{ t arj( Xu/a Vo- 
 ASTTCOV, ra TJ;^? WKvjct Y.v/^y^.'f^a' AA r~/5y, O'T* ra 
 
 S'EW AO'^OJ aa^/T'j7ro x^l 5sy.v]iXti<>i iunv. As there- 
 fore we, looking upon fuch Sketches as thefe, make fuch 
 andfuch particular things, fa alfo the Creator, looking at 
 thofe Sketches of his, hath formed and adorned with beauty 
 all things here below. We mujl remember however, that 
 the Sketches here are imperfefl ; but that the others, thofe 
 REASONS or Proportions, which exijl in GOD, are 
 ARCHETYPAL ^/^ALL-PERFECT. 
 
 'Tis according to this Philofophy, that Milton repre- 
 fents God, after he had created this vifible World, 
 
 contemplating 
 
 F f 3 - how
 
 438 ADDITIONAL NOTES. 
 
 -- how it Jhow'd 
 
 In profpefi from bis throne, bow goody how fair , 
 ANSW'RING HIS GREAT IDEA - 
 
 P. Loft VII. 556. 
 
 Proclus proves the Exiftence of thefe GENERAL 
 IDEAS or UNIVERSAL FORMS by the following Ar- 
 guments. - f TOJ'VI/V j-)v atria TV crav7o; atrra> TW 
 
 TO <? aurw TW Itvat 
 
 TO 
 
 WW; xat o tVi cr^Twr, S'duxri TW av(Vju,vu Jst/T/tfa;?* 
 iou TO 7iru) xa SI&WGI Siu.oTrilx. aXAw xa) 10 
 
 TOI> oyeVj ocra av 
 aiTtov ^y T varrc aVru TOJ Ttvat -srotBy TTO 
 
 & ?Tp o xocr/xoj rjTpcdj. fi o xo ( ao> 
 
 -j, xal a'vfifWTrcp U7rj~j<rf, xal 
 
 
 T>) atT/a T sravloV, aXAo; A<oj 
 
 0vrw> T 
 
 X#T* Toy u^Attf* Aoj/ov, y Tr) //.i T 
 ? atTia ic-o : J7ra^oy7a;. If therefore THE CAUSE 
 OF THE UNIVERSE Ztf a Caufe which operates merely 
 by exi fling^ and if that which operates meerly by txiftingj 
 operate from its own proper EjJ'cnce^ SUCH CAUSE is 
 
 PRIMARILY, WHAT ITS EFFECT IS SECONDARI- 
 
 LY, and that, which it is primarily, it giveth to its f~ 
 
 feflfccondarily. 'Tis thus that Fire loth giveth Wamith 
 
 3 *
 
 ADDITIONAL NOTES. 
 
 toflmething elfe, and is itfelf warm ; that the Soul giveth 
 Life, and pojjejjeth Life j and this reafoning you may per- 
 ceive to be true in all things whatever , which operate merely 
 by exifting. It follows therefore, THAT THE CAUSE 
 OF THE UNIVERSE, operating after this manner, is 
 
 THAT PRIMARILY, WHICH THE WORLD IS SE- 
 CONDARILY. If therefore the WORLD be the ple- 
 nitude 0/"FoRMs of all Sorts, thefe FORMS MUST 
 
 ALSO BE PRIMARILY IN THE CAUSE OF THE 
 WORLD, for 'twas the fame Caufe, which conjlituted the 
 Sun, and the Moon, and Man, and Horfe, and in gene* 
 ral all the Forms exijllng in the Univerfe. Thefe therefore 
 txiji primarily in the Caufe of the Univerfe ; another Sun 
 bejides the apparent, another Man, and fo with refpefl to 
 tvery Form elfe. 7 he FORMS therefor*, PREVIOUS to 
 the fenfible and external Forms., and which according to 
 this reafoning are their ACTIVE arid EFFICIENT CAU- 
 SES, are to be found PRE-EXISTING IN THAT ONE 
 
 AND COMMON CAUSE OF ALL THE UNIVERSE. 
 
 Prodi Com. MS. in Plat. Parmenid. L. 3. 
 
 We have quoted the above paflfages for the fame 
 reafon, as the former ; for the fake of thofe, who may 
 have a curiofity to fee a fample of this antient Philofo- 
 phy, whjch (as fome have held) may be traced up 
 from Plato and Socrates to Parmenides, Pythagoras, and 
 Orpheus himfelf. 
 
 If the Phrafe, to" operate meerly by exifting, fhould ap- 
 pear queftionable, it muft be explained upon a fuppofv- 
 tion, that in the Supreme Being no Attributes zrcjecon- 
 dary, intermittent, or adventitious, but all original, ever 
 perfefl and ejjential. See p. 162, 359. 
 
 F f 4 That
 
 440 
 
 That we fhould not therefore think of a blind 
 fcious operation, like that of Fire here alluded to, the 
 Author had long before prepared us, by uniting Know- 
 lege with natural Efficacy ', where he forms the Chara&er 
 of thefe Divine and Creative Ideas. 
 
 But let us hear him in his own Language. 
 
 \OlpS'J TJJW IJlOTlfllX. OtVTUV (f~C. L^SCy) 
 
 10. TWU < yvugi[j.urieuv 9 KTTO [jt.tv rwy 
 
 TO CSUTW TW won Tro^-nxoy, Sv <?/? 
 
 a?ro d rwy TJVJXWI/ TO VMOXOV coy 
 
 f x, 
 /*w 
 
 the peculiar char after of IDEAS ^y 
 <? aj ^^ tbemfehes, let us affume 
 jrom NATURAL PRINCIPLES THE POWER OF EF- 
 FECTING, MEEKLY BY EXISTING, all the things that 
 theyeffett-, and from ARTIFICIAL PRINCIPLES THE 
 POWER OF COMPREHENDING all that they effett^ 
 although they did not effeft them meerly by exijling; and 
 then uniting ihofe two, let us fay that IDEAS are at once 
 the EFFICIENT and INTELLIGENT CAUSES of all 
 things produced according to Nature. From book the fe- 
 cond of the fame Comment. 
 
 The Schoolman, Thomas Aquinas^ a fubtle and acute 
 writer, has the following fentence, perfectly cor- 
 refponding with this Philofophy. Res omnes comparan- 
 tur ad Divinum Intelleflum, ftcut artijiciata ad Artem. 
 
 The 

 
 ADDITIONAL NOTES. 441 
 
 The Verfes of Orpheus on this fubje& may be found 
 in the tradl De Mundo, afcribed to Arif.otle, p. 23. 
 Edit* Sylburg. 
 
 Ztvs tig<rw yivsTO } Zfyj x, T. A. 
 
 P. 39! WHERE ALL THINGS LIE INVELOPED, 
 
 o<rcc -nrlp so T A II O A A A xara <Jij TWX 
 ov, rocraoTa xai TO EN IKMO "nr^o ra 
 TO -srotyrri Kps^iq' v < yxf Vv, w? sAa^trotf, xa- 
 o 27TU(7i7r7roj ^o A^-tv, aAA EN, fi 2 
 IIANTA. -^ numerous as is THE MULTITUDE 
 OF INDIVIDUALS by Partition, fo numerous alfo is that 
 PRINCIPLE OF UNITY by umverfal Impartiality. For 
 it is not ONE, as a minimum is one, (according to what 
 Speucippusfeemedtofay,) but it is ONE, as being ALL 
 THINGS. Damafcius zs-fol 'A^wv, MS. 
 
 P. 408 THE WISEST NATIONS THE MOST 
 COPIOUS LANGUAGES.] 'Tis well obferved by Mu- 
 retus - NuUi unquam, qul res ignorarent, nomina, 
 quibus eas exprimerent, qu&Jierunt. Var. Let. VI. i. 
 
 P. 411 - BUT WHAT WAS THEIR PHILOSO- 
 
 PHY ?] The fame Muretus has the followin'g paflage 
 upon the ROMAN TASTE FOR PHILOSOPHY.- - 
 Beati autem illi, et opulent i, et omnium gentium vi flares 
 ROM AN I, in petendls honor ibus, et in prenfandis civibus y 
 ft in exteris nationibus verbo componendis, re compilandis 
 occupati-i philofophandi curam fcrvis out libertis fuis> et 
 Grteculis efurientibus rellnquebant. Ipfi, quod ab avari- 
 
 tia,
 
 ADDITIONAL NOTES. 
 
 tia y quod ab ambltione^ quod a voluptatibus reUquum erat 
 temporis, ejus ft partem aliquam out ad audiendum Gra- 
 cum quempiam philofophum^ out ad aliquem de philofophia 
 llbellum vel legendum vel fcribendum contulijjent, jqmfe ad 
 eruditionh culmen pervenijfe, jam vittam a fe et profliga^ 
 jam jactre Grtcciam fomniabant* Var. Le6l, VI. x. 
 
 IN-
 
 INDEX. 
 
 A. 
 
 ADJECTIVE, how it differs from other Attribu- 
 tives, fuch as the Verb, and the Participle, 186. 
 verbal, 187. pronominal, 189. ftri&ly fpeaking can 
 have no Genders, 190 
 
 ADVERBS, their charafl.-r and ufe, 192 to 194. Ad- 
 verbs of Interifion and Remifiion, 195. of Compa- 
 rifon, 19610 '99. of Time, and Place, and Mo- 
 tion, 204, 205. made out of Prepofitions, 205. Ad- 
 verbs of Interrogation, 206. affinity between thefe 
 laft, and the Pronoun relative, 206 to 208. Adverbs 
 derived from every Part of Speech, 209. found in 
 every Predicament, 210. called by the Stcits ITav- 
 A'jclwf, ibid. 
 
 ./ESCHINES, 419 
 
 ALEXANDER APHRODISIENSIS, 294, 310, 433. his 
 account of Phanfy or Imagination, 357 
 
 ALEXANDER and THAIS, 71. his influence upon the 
 Greek Genius, 4 J 9> 420 
 
 AMAFANIUS, 412 
 
 AMMONIUS, his account of Speech, and its relations, 
 4. of the progrefs of human Knovvlege from Com- 
 plex to Simple, 10. of the Soul's two principal Pow- 
 ers, 17. of the Species of Sentences, ibid, his notion 
 of GOD, 55. quoted, 59. his notion of a Verb, 87, 
 193. his notion of Time, 100. illuftrates from Ho- 
 mer the Species of Modes or Sentences, 145. quoted, 
 154. his notion of conjunctive Particles, and of the 
 Unity which they produce, 241. quoted, 2/8. his 
 account of Sound, Voice, Articulation, &c. 321, 
 
 328.
 
 INDEX. 
 
 328. of the diftinction between a Symbol and a Re- 
 femblance, 331. what he thought the human Body 
 with refpect to the Soul, 334. his triple order of 
 Ideas or Forms, 382 
 
 Analyfis and Syntkefo, 2, 3, 367. analyfis of Cafes, 
 
 275, 276, 285 
 
 ANAXAGORAS, 269 
 
 ANTHOLOGIA GR. 47, 50 
 
 ANTONINUS, 183, 310, 405, 407, 416 
 
 APOLLONIUS, the Grammarian, explains the Species 
 of Words by the Species of Letters, 27. his elegant 
 name for the Noun and Verb, 33. quoted, 63. his 
 idea of a Pronoun, 65,67. quoted, 70. explains the 
 Diftinction and Relation between the Article and 
 the Pronoun, 73, 74. his two Species of A -~I>- or 
 Indication, 77. holds a wide difference between the 
 Prepofitive and Subjunctive Articles, 78. explains 
 the nature of the Subjunctive Article, 80. corrects 
 Homer from the doctrine of Enclitics, 84', 85. his 
 notion of that Tenfe called the Prateritum perfec- 
 tum^ 129. holds the Soul's difpofition peculiarly ex- 
 plained by Verbs, 141. his notion of the Indicative 
 Mode, 151. of the Future, implied in all Impera- 
 tives, 155. explains the power of thofe part Tenfes, 
 found in the Greek Imperatives, 156. his idea of the 
 Infinitive, 165. his name for it, 166. quoted, 168, 
 175. his notion of middle Verbs, 176. quoted, 179, 
 181, 195. explains the power and effect of theGm-^ 
 Article^ 217 to 222. holds it efiential to the Pronoun 
 not to coalefce with it, 225 to 228. {hews the dif- 
 ferent force of the Article when differently placed in 
 the fame Sentence, 231. quoted, 238, 239. his idea 
 of the Prepofition, 26 1 
 
 4 APU-
 
 INDEX. 
 
 APULEIUS, fhort account of him, 415 
 
 AQUINAS, THOMAS, quoted 440 
 Argument a priori & a pofteriori, 9, 10. which of the 
 two more natural to Man, ibid. 
 ARISTOPHANES, 420 
 
 ARISTOTLE, his notion of Truth, 3. quoted, 8. his 
 notion of the difference between things abfolutely 
 prior, and relatively prior, 9, 10. quoted, 15. his 
 Definition of a Sentence, 19. of a Word, 20. of 
 Subftance, 29. divides things into Subftance and Ac- 
 cident, 30- how many Parts of Speech he admitted, 
 and why, 32,33, 34, &V. his notion of Genders, 
 42. his account of the metaphorical ufe of Sex, 48. 
 quoted, 55, 56, 89. his Definition of a Verb, 96. 
 his notion of a Now or Inftant, 102. of Senfation li- 
 mited to it, 104, 105,431. of Time, 106, 107. of 
 Time's dependence on the Soul, 112. quoted, 119, 
 193. his notion of Subftance, 202. calls Euripides 
 o -GroiyTrig^ 223. himfelf called the Stagirite, why, 
 ibid, a diftinftion of his, 224. his definition of a Con- 
 junction, 239. a paflage in his Rhetoric explained, 
 240. his account of Relatives, 286. his notion of the 
 divineNature, 301. whom he thought'twas probable 
 the Gods fhould love, 302. his notion of Intellect and 
 intelligible Objects, ibid, held Words founded in 
 Compact, 314, 315. quoted, 310, 320. his account 
 of the Elements or Letters, 324. his high notion of 
 Principles, 325. quoted, 357, 379, 434. his notion 
 of the difference between moveable and immoveable 
 Exiftence, 360. between intellectual or divine Plea - 
 fure, and that which is fubordinate, ibid, quoted, 
 361. his notion of the divine Life or Exiftence, com- 
 pared with that of Man, 362. of the difference be- 
 tween
 
 INDEX. 
 
 tween the Greeks and the Barbarians, 409. his cha* 
 rader as a Writer, compared with Plato and Xeno- 
 phtm, 421. correfponds with Alexander ^ 419 
 
 Arithmetic^ founded upon what Principles, 352. (See 
 Geometry.) its fubjed, what, 367. owes its Being to 
 the Mind, how, ibid. 
 
 Arty what, andArtift, who, - in, 352 
 
 ARTICLES, 31. their near alliance with Pronouns, 
 73. of two kinds, 214. the firft kind, 214 to 232. 
 the fecond kind, 233 to 236. Englijh Articles, their 
 difference and ufe, 215. Greek Article, 219. Articles 
 denote pre -acquaintance, 218, 220. thence eminence 
 and notoriety, 222 to 224. with what words they af- 
 ibciate, with what not, 224 to 229. Greek Article 
 marks the Subject in Proportions, 230. Articles, in- 
 flances of their effect, 231, 232. Articles pronomi- 
 nal, 72, 73, 233. inftances of their effect, 235, 236, 
 347. Subjun&ive Article, fee Pronoun relative or fur> 
 jundive. 
 
 Articulation^ fee Voice. 
 
 ASCONIUS, 132 
 
 ATTRIBUTIVES, 30, 31. defined, 87. of the firft or- 
 der, 87 to 191. of the fecond order, 192 to 211. 
 S^VERB, PARTICIPLE, ADJECTIVE, ADVERB. 
 
 AULUS GHLLIUS, fliort account of him as a Writer, 
 
 414 
 
 B. 
 
 BACON, his notion of Univerfal Grammar, 2. of*- 
 tient Languages and Geniufes, compared to modern^ 
 288. of mental Separation or Divifion, 306. of Sym- 
 bols, to convey our thoughts, 334. of the Analogy 
 
 be-
 
 INDEX, 
 
 between the Geniufes of Nations and their Lan* 
 guages, 47 
 
 Being* or Exigence, mutable, immutable, 90, 371. 
 temporary, fuperior to Time, 91,92. See7rf, 
 GOD. 
 
 BELISARIUS, 150 
 
 BLEMMIDES, NICEPHORUS, his notion of Time pre* 
 fent,H9. his Etymology of 'Eiris*npr), 368. his triple 
 order of Forms or Ideas, 386 
 
 Body, Inftrument of the Mind, 305. chief Object of 
 modern Philofophy, 308. confounded with Matter, 
 309. human, the Mind's veil, 333. Body, that or 
 Mind, which has precedence in different Syftems, 
 
 392 393 
 
 BOERHAAVE, 32! 
 
 BOETHIUS, how many Parts of Speech he admitted as 
 neceffary to Logic, 33. his idea of GOD'S Exiftence, 
 92. illuftrates from Virgil the Species of Modes or 
 Sentences, 146. quoted, 312. held Language found- 
 ed in Compact, 315. refers to the Deity's unaltera- 
 ble Nature, 361. his notion of original, intelligible 
 Ideas, 397. of the differer.ee between Time (how- 
 ever immenfe) and Eternity, 389. fhort account of 
 his Writings, and character, 416 
 Both, differs from Two, how, 227 
 BRUTUS, 413, 419 
 
 C. 
 
 CAESAR, C.JuLius, his Laconic Epiftle, 
 
 CffiSAR, OCTAVIUS, influence of his Government 
 
 upon the Roman Genius, ^ 4 X 9> 4 2 
 
 CALUMACHUS, 52 
 
 CASES,
 
 I N D E X, 
 
 CASES, fcarce any fuch thing in modern Languages, 
 
 273. name of, whence, 277. Nominative, 27910 
 
 282. Accufative, 282, 283. Genitive and Dative, 
 
 284 to 287. Vocative, why omitted, 276. Abla 
 
 live, peculiar to the Romans, and how they employed 
 
 lt * 276, 277 
 
 Caufes, Conjunctions connect the four Species of, with 
 
 their effects, 248. final Caufe, firft in Speculation, 
 
 but laft in Event, ibid, has its peculiar Mode, 142; 
 
 peculiar Conjundion, 248. peculiar Cafe, 287 
 
 CHALCIDIUS, 301. fhort account of him, 415 
 
 Chance ', fubfequent to Mind or Reafon, 434, 435 
 
 CHARISIUS, SOSIPATER, 205, 210 
 
 CICERO, 132, 170, 269, 272, 311, 313, 407. com- 
 pelled tq allow the unfitnefs of the Latin Tongue 
 for Philofophy, 411. one of the firft that introduced it 
 into the Latin Language, 412. Ciceronian and Sacra- 
 lie Periods, 4I g 
 
 City, Feminine, why, , 4 g 
 
 CLARK, Dr. SAM. I2 8 
 
 COMPARISON, degrees of, 197 to 199. why Verbs 
 admit it not, 200. why incompatible with certain 
 Attributives, ibid, why with all Subftantives, 201 
 CONJUNCTION, 32, its Definition, 238. its two 
 kinds, 240, 241. Conjunctions Copulative, 242. 
 Continuative, ibid. Suppofitive, Pofitive, 244. Cau- 
 fal, Collective, 245, 246. Disjunctive Simple, 252. 
 Adverfative, ibid. Adverfative abfolute, 254. of 
 Comparifon, 255. Adequate, ibid. Inadequate, 256. 
 Subdisjundtive, 258. Some Conjunctions have an 
 obfcure Signification, when taken alone, 259 
 
 CONNECTIVE, 30, 31. its two kinds, 237. its firft 
 kind, ibid, to 260. its fecond, 261 to 274. See 
 CONJUNCTION, PREPOSITION, 
 
 CON-
 
 INDEX. 
 
 CONSENTIUS, his notion of the Neuter Gender, 43* 
 of middle Verbs, 177. of the pofitive Degree, 198. 
 Confonant, what, and why fo called, 323 
 
 Contraries, pafs into each other, 1 32. deftructive of 
 each other, > 251 
 
 Converfation, what, 398 
 
 Converfwn, of Attributives into Subftantives, 38. of 
 Subftantives into Attributives, 182, 189. of Attri- 
 butives into one another, 187. of Interrogatives into 
 Relatives, and vice versa, 206,207. of Connectives 
 into Attributives, 205, 272 
 
 CORN. NEPOS, 212 
 Country, Feminine, why, 48 
 
 D. 
 
 DAMASCIUS, his notion of Deity, 44! 
 
 Death, Mafculine, why, 51. Brother to fleep, 52 
 Declenfjon, the name, whence, 278 
 
 DEFINITIVE, 30,31,214. See ARTICLES. 
 Definitions, what, 367 
 
 A*I?, 64, 76 
 
 DEMOSTHENES, 49,419,421 
 
 Derivatives, more rationally formed than Primitives, 
 
 why, 336 
 
 Defign, neceflarily implies Mind, 379, 434 
 
 DIOGENES, the Cynic, 419 
 
 DIOGENES LAERTIUS, 34, 145, 154, 317, 322, 324, 
 
 407 
 
 DIONYSIUS of HalicarnaJJus, 34> 35 
 
 Diverjtty, its importance to Nature, 250. heightens by 
 
 degrees, and how, ibid, to 252 
 
 DONATUS, 74, 272 
 
 G g E,
 
 INDEX. 
 
 E. 
 
 Feminine, why, 47 
 
 ECCLESIASTICUS, 56 
 
 Element, defined, 324. primary Articulations or Let- 
 ters fo called, why, ibid, their extenfive application, 
 325. See Letters. 
 
 Empiric , who, 352 
 
 Enclitics, among the Pronouns, their character, 84, 85 
 ENGLISH Tongue, its rule as to Genders, 43. a pecu- 
 liar privilege of, 58. expreffes the power of contra- 
 diftincHve and enclitic Pronouns, 85. its poverty as 
 to the expreffion of Modes and Tenfes, 148. its an- 
 alogy in the formation of Participles, 185, 186. 
 neglected by illiterate Writers, ibid, force and power 
 of its Articles, 215 to 233. fhews the Predicate of 
 the Propofition by pofition, as alfo the Accufative 
 Cafe of the Sentence, 26, 274, 276. its character, 
 as a Language, 408 
 
 EPICTETUS, 310, 407 
 
 E7nrruj, its Etymology, 368 
 
 Ether, Mafculine, why, 46 
 
 EUCLID, a difference between him and Virgil, 69. his 
 Theorems founded upon what, 340 
 
 EURIPIDES, 52, 310, 331 
 
 Exigence, differs from EJfence how, 294, 433 
 Experience, founded on what, 352 
 
 Experiment, its utility, 352. conducive to Art, how, 
 ibid, beholden to Science, tho' Science not to that, 
 
 353 
 
 F. 
 
 .Form and Matter, 2, 7. elementary Principles, 307. 
 myfterioufly blended in tkeir co-exiftence, ibid, and 
 
 312.
 
 INDEX. 
 
 312. Form, its original meaning, what, 310. trans- 
 ferred from lower things to the higheft, 311. pre- 
 exiftent, where, 312. defcribed by Cicero , 311, 313. 
 in Speech what, 315, 326, 327, &c. Form of 
 Forms, 312. triple order of Forms in Art, 374. in 
 Nature, 377. intelligible or fpecific Forms, their 
 peculiar charader, 364, 365, 372, 380, 396, 436, 
 
 438. 
 
 Fortune, Feminine,' why, 57 
 
 FULLER, - 183 
 
 G. 
 
 GAZA, THEODORE, his Definition of a Word, 2 I. 
 explains the Perfons in Pronouns, 67. hardly admits 
 the Subjunctive for an Article, 78. his account of 
 the Tenfes, 129. of Modes, 140. quoted, 151. 
 calls the Infinitive the Verb's Noun, 165. quoted, 
 181. his Definition of an Adverb, 195. arranges 
 Adverbs by clafles according to the Order of the 
 Predicaments, 210. explains the power of the Arti- 
 cle, 2 1 8. quoted, 225. explains the different pow- 
 ers of conjunctive Particles, 245. of disjunctive, 
 249. his fingular explanation of a Verfe in Homer, 
 253. quoted, 262, 271 
 
 GEMISTUS, Georgius, otherwife Pletho, his doctrine 
 of Ideas or intelligible Forms, 395 
 
 Genders, their origin, 41. their natural number, 42. 
 (See Sex.) why wanting to the firft and fecond Pro- 
 noun, 69 
 
 Genus and Species, why they (but not Individuals) ad- 
 mit of Number, 39. 
 
 Geometry, founded on what Principles, 352. that and 
 
 Arithmetic independent on Experiment, ibid. (See 
 
 G g 2 Science.)
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Sdtwe.) its Subjeft, what, 367. beholden for it to 
 the Mind, how, - ibid. 
 
 GOD, exprefled by Neuters, fuch as TO $tuv, Numen, 
 
 . &c. why, 54, 55. as Mafculine, why, ibid, immu- 
 table, and fuperior to Time and its Diftin&ions, 92. 
 all wife, and always wife, 301. immediate objects of 
 his Wifdom, what, ibid, whom among men he may 
 be fuppofed to love, 302. Form of Forms, fovereign 
 Artift, 312, 313, 437. above all Intentions and Re- 
 millions, 162, 359, 439. his Exiftence different 
 from that of Man, how, 360, 362. his divine At- 
 tributes, 361. his Exiftence neceflarily infers that 
 of Ideas or exemplary Forms, 379,380, 436. ex- 
 quifite Perfection of thefe divine Ideas or Forms, 
 380, 437. his ftupendous view of all at once, 389, 
 390,442. region of Truth, 162,391,403, 405. 
 in Him Knowlege and Power unite, 440 
 
 Goody above all utility, and totally diftindt from it, 
 297. fought by all men, 296, 298. confidered by 
 all as valuable for itfelf, ibid, intellectual, its cha- 
 racter, 299. See Science, GOD. 
 
 GORGIAS, 52 
 
 Grammar, philofophical or univerfal, 2. how eflen- 
 tial to other Arts, 6. how diftinguifhed from other 
 Grammars, n 
 
 Grammarians, error of, in naming Verbs Neuter, 177. 
 in degrees of Comparifon, 198. in the Syntax of 
 Conjunctions, 238 
 
 GREEKS, their character, as a Nation, 415, &c. 
 dfiatic Greeks, different from the other Greeks, and 
 why, 410. Grecian Genius, its maturity and decay, 
 
 417, fcfr. 
 
 GREEK
 
 INDEX. 
 
 GREEK Tongue, how perfect in the expreflion of Modes 
 and Tenfes, 147. force of its imperatives in the paft 
 tenfes, 156. wrong in ranging Interjections with 
 Adverbs, 289. its character, as a Language, 418, 
 
 423 
 GROCINUS, his Syftem of the Tenfes, 128 
 
 H. 
 
 HERACLITUS, Saying of, 8. his Syftem of things, 
 
 what, 369, 370 
 
 HERMES, his Figure, Attributes, and Character, 324, 
 325, 326. authors, who have writ of him, 326 
 HESIOD, called o TS-OW,;?, the Poet, by Plato, 223 
 HOADLY'S Accidence, 128 
 
 HOMER, 50, 52, 82, 84, 145, 149, 221, 223, 235, 
 
 253. 2 73> 28 5 3 8 > 4i7> 42i 
 
 HORACE, 57, 80, 125, 142, 163, 169, 178, 199, 
 
 207, 232, 260, 413, 424, 425 
 
 I. 
 
 Ideas, of what, Words the Symbols, 341 to 347. , if 
 only particular were to exift, the confequence what, 
 337 to 339- general, their importance, 341^ 342. 
 undervalued by whom, and why, 350. of what fa- 
 culty the Objects, 360. their chara6ter, 362 to 366, 
 390. the only objects of Science and real Know- 
 lege, why, 368. acquired, how, 353 to 374. de- 
 rived whence, 374, &c. their triple Order in Art, 
 376. the fame in Nature, 381. eflential to Mind, 
 why, 379, 380. the firft and higheft Ideas, cha- 
 racter of, 380, 440. Ideas, their different Sources, 
 dated, 400. their real fource, 434, 438
 
 INDEX. 
 
 JEREMIAH, 405 
 
 Imagination, what, 354. differs from Sen fe, how, 355. 
 from Memory and Recollection, how, ibid. 
 
 Individuals, why fo called, 39, 40. quit their cha- 
 racter how and why, 40, 41. their infinity, how 
 exprefled by a finite number of Words, 214 to 21 7, 
 234, 346. become objedts of Knowlege, how, 369 
 
 INSTANT, See Now. 
 
 Intellect, See Mind. 
 
 INTERJECTIONS, their application and effect, 289. 
 no diftinft Part of Speech with the Greeks, though 
 with the Latins, 289. their character and defcrip- 
 tion, ' 290 
 
 Interrogation, its fpecies explained and illuftrated, 151 
 to 154. Interrogatives refufe the Article, why, 228 
 
 JOANNES GRAMMAT. See PHILOPONUS. 
 
 IsOCRATES, 421 
 
 JULIAN, 416 
 
 K. 
 
 KUSTE.R, 176 
 
 Knowlege, if any more excellent than Senfation, the 
 
 confequence, 37 J >37 2 
 
 L. 
 
 LANGUAGE, how conftituted, 327. defined, 329. 
 founded in Compact, 314, 327. (See Speech.] fym- 
 bolic, not imitative, why, 332 to 355. impoflible 
 for it to exprefs the real Eflences of things, 335. its 
 double capacity why necefTary, 348. its Matter, 
 what, 349. its Form, what, ibid, its Precifion and 
 Permanence derived whence, 345. particular Lan- 
 guages,
 
 INDEX. 
 
 guages, their Identity, whence, 374. their Diver- 
 lity, whence, ibid. See Englijh, Greek, Latin, Ori- 
 ental. 
 
 LATIN Tongue, deficient in Aorifts, and how it fup- 
 plies the defect, 125. its peculiar ufe of the Prateri- 
 tum Perfeffum, 131. has recourfe to Auxiliars, for 
 fome Modes and Tenfes, 148. to a Periphrafis for 
 fome Participles, 185. in what fenfe it has Articles, 
 233. the Ablative, a Cafe peculiar to it, 276. right 
 in feparating Interjedtions from the other Parts of 
 Speech, 289, 290. its character, as a Language, 
 411. not made for Philofophy, ibid. 412. funk with 
 Boethius, 416 
 
 Letters, what Socrates thought of their inventor, 325. 
 divine honours paid him by the Egyptians, ibid. See 
 Element. 
 Liberty, its influence upon Mens Genius, 420 
 
 Life, connected with Being, 300, 301, 432 
 
 LiNN.ffius, 44 
 
 Literature, its caufe and that of Virtue, connected, 
 
 how, 407. antient, recommended to the Study of 
 
 the liberal, 424. its peculiar effet with regard to a 
 
 man's character, 425, 426 
 
 Logic, what, 3, 4 
 
 LONGINUS, noble remark of, ' - 420 
 
 LUCIAN, 41 
 
 LUCILIUS, ibid. 
 
 M. 
 
 MACROBIUS, ihort account of him, 414. quoted 
 
 127, 157, 168 
 
 G g 4 Man,
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Alan, rational and focial, i,'2. his peculiar ornament, 
 what, 2. firft or prior to Man, what, 9, 269. his 
 Exiftence, the manner of, what, 359. how moft 
 likely to advance in happinefs, 362. has within him 
 fomething divine, 302. his Ideas, whence derived, 
 393 to 401. Medium, thro' which he derives them, 
 what, 359, 393. his errors, whence, 406. to be 
 corrected, how, ibid. 
 
 Manufcripts quoted, of OLYMPIODORUS, 371, 394, 
 395. ofPniLOPONUs, 431,433,437. of PRO- 
 
 CLUS, 434,435,438,440. ofDAMASCIUS, 441 
 
 MARCIANUS CAPELLA, fhort account of him, 415 
 Majler Artijl, what forms his character, 1 1 1 
 Matter joined with Form, 2, 7. its original meaning, 
 confounded by the Vulgar, how, 309. its extenfive 
 character according to ancient Philofophy, 308. de- 
 fcribed by Cicero, 313. of Language, what, 315. 
 defcribed at large, 316, &c. 
 
 MAXIMUS TYRIUS, his notion of the Supreme In- 
 tellect, 162 
 Memory and Recolleflion^ what, 355. diftinguifhed 
 from Imagination or Phanfy, how, ibid. 
 
 Metaphor ', its ufe, >. 269 
 
 JMetaphyficians modern, their Syftems, what, 392 
 
 MJLTON, 13, 14, 44, 45, 47, 49, 51, 53, 56, 59, 
 
 60, 112, 124, 147, 207, 267, 268, 404, 437 
 
 jVliND (notSenfe) recognizes time, 107 to JI2. uni- 
 
 verfal, 162, 311, 312, 359. differs not (as Senfe 
 
 does) from the objects of its perception, 301. acts 
 
 in part through the body, in part without it, 305. 
 
 its high power of fcparation, 306, 366. penetrates 
 
 into all things, 307. Nov? *T> i;:cV, what, 310. 
 
 Mind differs from Senfe, how, 364, 365. the fource 
 
 pf
 
 INDEX. 
 
 of Union by viewing One in Many, 362 to 365. 
 of Diftin&ion by viewing Many in One, 366. with- 
 out Ideas, refembles what, 380. region of Truth 
 and Science, 371, 372. that or Body, which has 
 precedence, 392, &c. Mind human how fponta- 
 neous and eafy in its Energies, 361, 362. all Minds 
 
 fimilar and congenial, why, 395 
 
 MODES or MOODS, whence derived, and to what end 
 deftined, 140. Declarative or Indicative, 141. Po- 
 tential, 142. Subjunctive, 143. Interrogative, ibid. 
 Inquifitive, ibid. Imperative, 144. Precative or Op- 
 tative, ibid, the feveral Species illuftrated from Ho- 
 mer, Virgil, and Milton, 145 to 147. Infinitive 
 Mode, its peculiar character, 162,163. how digni- 
 fied by the Stoics, 1 64. other Modes refolvable into 
 it, 166. its application and coal efcence, 167. Mode 
 of Science, of Conjecture, of Proficiency, of Le- 
 giflature, 16810170. Modes compared and diftjn- 
 guifhed, 14910160. Greek Imperatives of the Paft 
 explained, and illuftrated, 156, 157 
 
 Moon, Feminine, why, 45 
 
 jdetiotiy and even its Privation necefTarily imply Time, 
 
 95 
 
 MURETUS, quoted, 441, 442. his notion of the Ro- 
 mans, Hid, 
 MUSONIUS RUFUS, . 416 
 
 N. 
 
 Names, proper, what the confequence if no other 
 words, 337 to 339. their ufe, 345. hardly parts 
 of Language, 346, 373 
 
 J^ATHAN and DAVID, 232
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Nature, firft to Nature, firft to Man, how they differ, 
 9,10. frugality of, 320. Natures fubordinate fub- 
 fervient to the higher, . 
 
 NICEPHORUS, See BLEMMIDES. 
 
 NICOMACHUS, 
 
 NOUN, or Subftantive, its three Sorts, 37. what 
 Nouns fufceptible of Number, and why, 39. only 
 Part of Speech fufceptible of Gender, 41, iy i, 
 
 A Now or INSTANT, the bound of Time, but no 
 part of it, 101, 102. analogous to a Point in a geo- 
 metrical Line, ibid, its ufe with refpedl: to Time, 
 104. its minute and tranfient prefence illuftrated, 
 117. by this Prefence Time made prefent, 116, 
 117, 1 1 8. See Time, Place, Space. 
 
 Number, to what words it appertains, and why, 39, 
 
 40 
 
 O. 
 
 Objeftors, ludicrous, 293. grave, - 294 
 
 Ocean, Mafculine, why, 49 
 
 OLYMPIODORUS, quoted from a Manufcript, as to 
 
 his notion of Knowlege, and its degrees, 371, 372. 
 
 of general Ideas, the objects of Science, 394, 395 
 ONE, by natural co-incidence, 162, 173, 192, 241, 
 
 262 to 265. by the help of external connectives, 
 
 241, 265 
 Oriental Languages, number of their Parts of Speech, 
 
 35. their character and Genius, 409 
 
 ORPHEUS, 441 
 
 OVID, 132, 141, 206 
 
 P.
 
 INDEX. 
 
 P, 
 
 PARTICIPLE, how different from the Verb, 94, 184. 
 its eflence or character, 184. how different from 
 the Adje&ive, 186. See Attributive, LATIN and 
 ENGLISH Tongues. 
 
 Particular^ how though infinite, expreffed by Words 
 which are finite, 346. confequence of attaching 
 ourfelves wholly to them, 35 r 
 
 PAUSANIAS, 285 
 
 Perception and Volition, the Soul's leading Powers, 15, 
 17. Perception two-fold, 348. In Man what firft, 
 9, 10, 353, 359. fenfitive and intellective differ, 
 how, 364, 365. if not correfpondent to its objects, 
 erroneous, * 37 r 
 
 Period^ See Sentence. 
 
 PERIPATETIC Pbilofophy, in the latter ages com- 
 monly united with the Platonic, 160. what fpecies 
 of Sentences it admitted, 144. its notion of Cafes, 
 277. held Words founded in Compact, 314 
 
 PERIZONIUS, his rational account of the Perfons in 
 Nouns and Pronouns, 171 
 
 PERSIUS, 76, 163, 372. fliort account of his charac - 
 ter, 413 
 
 Perfons, firft, fecond, third, their Origin and Ufe, 
 
 65 to 67 
 
 Phanjy, See Imagination. 
 
 PHILOPONUS, his notion of Time, 431. of the bu- 
 fmefs of Wifdom or Philofophy, 433. of God, the 
 
 Sovereign Artift, 437 
 
 Philofophy, what would banifh it out of the World, 
 
 293, 294. its proper bufmefs, what, 433. antient 
 
 4 differs
 
 INDEX, 
 
 differs from modern, how, 308. modern, its chief 
 
 object, what, - * ibid. 
 
 Pbilofophers, ancient, who not qualified to write or 
 
 talk about them, 270. provided words for new Ideas, 
 
 how, . 269 
 
 Philofophers, modern, their notion of Ideas, 350. 
 
 their employment, 351. their Criterion of Truth, 
 
 ibid, deduce all from Body, 392. fupply the place 
 
 of occult Qualities, how, 393 
 
 P/ace, mediate and immediate, 118. applied to ill u- 
 ftrate the prefent Time, and the prefent Inftant, 
 ibid, its various relations denoted, how, 266,271. 
 
 its Latitude and Univerfality, 266 
 
 PLATO, 21. how many Parts of Speech he admitted, 
 
 32. his account of Genus and Species, 39. quoted, 
 
 92. his Style abounds with Particles, why, 259. 
 
 new- coined Word of, 269. quoted, 325. in what 
 
 he placed real happinefs, 362. his two different, and 
 
 oppofite Etymologies of 'EmoiVw, 3^9> 37' nis 
 
 Idea of Time, 389. quoted, 407. his character, as a 
 
 XVriter, compared with Zenophoi and Arijloth^ 422 
 
 PLETHO, SeeGEMisrus. 
 
 PLINY, his account how the antient artifts infcribed 
 
 their names upon their Works, 136 
 
 PLUTARCH, 33 
 
 Poetry^ what, 5, 6, 
 
 PORPHYRY, 39 
 
 Pofition, its force in Syntax, 26, 274, 276, 230 
 
 PREPOSITIONS, 32. defined, 261. their ufe, 265. 
 
 their original Signification, 266. their fubfequent 
 
 and figurative, 268. their different application, 270, 
 
 271. force in Com pofition, 271,272. change into 
 
 Adverbs, . 272, 205 
 
 Priii-
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Principles, to be eftimated from their confequences, 7, 
 232, 236, 325. of Union and Diverfity, their dif- 
 ferent ends and equal importance to the Univerfe, 
 250. (See ONE, Union, Diverfity) elementary Prin- 
 ciples myfterioufly blended, 307. their invention 
 difficult, why, 325. thofe of Arithmetic and Geo- 
 metry how fimple, 352 
 
 PRISCIAN, defines a Word, 20. explains from Philo- 
 fophy the Noun and Verb, 28, 33. quoted, 34. ex- 
 plains how Indication and Relation differ, 63. the 
 nature of the Pronoun, 65. of pronominal Perfons, 
 67. his reafon why the two firft Pronouns have no 
 Genders, 70. why but one Pronoun of each fort, 
 71. ranges Articles with Pronouns according to the 
 Stoics, 74. a pertinent obfervation of his, 88. ex- 
 plains the double Power of the Latin Prateritwn y 
 125, 131. his doctrine concerning the Tenfes, 130. 
 defines Moods or Modes, 141. his notion of the 
 Imperative, 155. of the Infinitive, 165, 166. of 
 Verbs which naturally precede the Infinitive, 168. 
 of Imperfonals, 175. of Verbs Neuter, 177. of the 
 Participle, 194. of the Ad verb, 195. of Compara- 
 tives, 202. quoted, 210. his reafon why certain 
 Pronouns coalefce not with the Article, 225, 226. 
 explains the different powers of Connectives which 
 conjoin, 243, 244, 245. of Connectives which dif- 
 join, 250. quoted, 262. his notion of the Interjec- 
 tion, 291. of Sound or Voice, 316 
 
 PROCLUS, his Opinion about Reft, 95,431. quoted, 
 310. explains the Source of the Doctrine of Ideas, 
 
 434, 435 43 6 43 8 
 
 PRONOUNS, why fo called, 65. their Species, or Per- 
 fons, 65, 66. why the firft and fccond have no Sex, 
 3 69,
 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 69, 70. referable Articles, but how diftinguimed, 
 
 73. their coalefcence, 74,75. their importance in 
 
 Language, 77. relative or fubjunclive Pronoun, its 
 
 nature and ufe, 78 to 83. thofe of the firft and fe- 
 
 cond perfon when exprefTed, when not, 83. 'Ey- 
 
 xXiliJcal and ofloTovvpevoii, how diftinguifhed, 84. 
 
 Primitives, refufe the Article, why, 225 
 
 PROTAGORAS, his notion of Genders, 42. a Sophifm 
 
 of his, - -- 144 
 
 Proverbs of Solomon , A 05 
 
 PUBLIUS SYRUS, - 
 
 0, 
 
 QUINTILIAN, 154, 233, 407 
 
 Dualities occult, what in modern Philofophy fupplies 
 their place, ^ ... 30,3 
 
 R. 
 i 
 
 Relatives, mutually infer each other, 251, 286. 
 
 their ufual Cafe, the Genitive, ibid. 
 
 Rhetoric* -what, 5, 6 
 
 ROMANS, their character as a Nation, 411. Roman 
 
 Genius, its maturity and decay, 418, &c. 
 
 S. 
 
 SALLUSTIUS PHILOSOPH. - 401 
 
 SANCTIUS, his elegant account of the different Arts 
 
 refpe&ing Speech, 5. quoted, 36, 163, 171. re- 
 
 jects Imperfonais, 175. quoted, 202. his notion of 
 
 the Conjunction, after Scaliger, 238. of the Inter- 
 
 SCA-
 
 INDEX. 
 
 SCALIGER, his Etymology of >uis, 82. his notion of 
 Tenfes from Grodnus, 128. his elegant obfervation 
 upon the order of the Tenfes, 138. upon the pre- 
 eminence of the Indicative Mode, 169. his account 
 how the Latins fupply the place of Articles, 233. 
 his notion of the Conjunction, 238. his fubtle ex- 
 plication of its various powers, 242 to 247, 258. 
 his reafon from Philofophy why Subftantives do not 
 coalefce, 264. his origin of Prepofitions, 266. his 
 
 Etymology of Scientia, 370 
 
 Science, 5. its Mode the Indicative, and Tenfe the 
 Prefent, why, 159. its Conjunction the Collective, 
 why, 246. defended, 295. valuable for its confe- 
 quences, ibid, for itfelf, 296 to 303. (See GOD) 
 pure and fpeculative depends on Principles the moft 
 fimple, 352. not beholden to Experiment, though 
 Experiment to that, 353. whole of it feen in Com- 
 pofition and Divifion, 367. its Etymology, 369. 
 refidence of itfelf and objects, where, 372. See 
 Mind. 
 
 Scriptures? their Sublimity, whence, 410 
 
 SENECA, 47, 139, 414 
 
 Senfation, of the Prefent only, 105, 107, 139. none 
 
 of Time, 105. each confined to its own Objects, 
 
 333, 369. its Objects infinite, 338, 353. Man's 
 
 firft Perception, ibid, coniequence of attaching our- 
 
 felves wholly to its objects, 351. how prior to In- 
 
 telledion, 379. how fubfequent, 391 
 
 Sentence, definition of, 19, 20. its various Species in- 
 
 veftigated, 14, 15. illuftrated from Milton, 147,^. 
 
 connection between Sentences and Modes, 144 
 
 Separation, corporeal inferior to mental, why, 306 
 
 SERVIUS, 132, 227, 432 
 
 Sex,
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Sex, (See Gender.} transferred in Language to Beings, 
 
 that in Nature want it, and why, 44, 45. Sub- 
 
 ftances alone fufceptible of it, . jyj 
 
 SHAKESPEAR, 12,13,23,41,47,51,53 
 
 Ship, Feminine, why, . ^g 
 
 SIMPLICIUS, his triple Order of Ideas or Forms, 
 
 3 8 *> 382 
 
 SOPHOCLES, 432 
 
 Soul, its leading Powers, 15, 5V. 
 
 Sound, fpecies of, 314, 317. the C/ TA or Matter of 
 
 Language, 315. defined, 316. See Voice. 
 Space, how like, how unlike to Time, ioo. See 
 
 Place. 
 
 Speech, peculiar Ornament of Man, i, 2. bow re- 
 folved or analyzed, 2. its four principal Parts, and 
 why thefe, and not others, 281031. its Matter and 
 Form taken together, 307 to 315. its Matter taken 
 feparately, 316 to 326. its Form taken feparately, 
 327 to 359. neceflity of Speech, whence, 332, 333. 
 founded in Compact, 3H> 327 
 
 SPENSER, 134, 164 
 
 Spirits animal, fubtle Ether, nervous Du&s, Vibra- 
 tions, &c. their ufe in modern Philofophy. See 
 totalities occult. 
 
 STOICS, how many Parts of Speech they held, 34. 
 ranged Articles along with Pronouns, 74. their ac- 
 count of the Tenfes, 130. multiplied the number of 
 Sentences, 144. allowed the name of Verb to the 
 Infinitive only, into which they fuppofed all other 
 Modes refolvable, 164 to 166. their logical view of 
 Verbs, and their Diftin&ions fubfequent, 179 to 
 181. their notion of the Participle, '194. oftheAd- 
 vcrb, 195. called the Adverb zcW/x.V:, and why, 
 
 210.
 
 INDEX. 
 
 called the Prepofition 
 261. invented new Words, and gave new Signified 
 tions to old ones, 269. their notion of Cafes, 278; 
 of the "TAj or Matter of Virtue, 309, 310. of 
 Sound, 316. bf the Species of Sound, 322. their 
 Definition of an Element, 324 
 
 Subjeft and Predicate, how diftinguifhed in Gr&x, 230; 
 how in Englijh, ibid, analogdui to what in nature, 
 
 27$ 
 
 Subftance and Attribute, 29. the great Objects of natu- 
 
 ral Union, 264. Subftance fufceptible of Sex, 171, 
 41. of Number, 40. coincides, not with Subftance, 
 264. incapable of Intenfiori, and therefore of Com- 
 parifon, - - 201, 202 
 
 SUBSTANTIVE, 30, 31. defcribed, 37. primary, ilid: 
 to 62. fecondary, 6310 67. (See NOUN, PRO- 
 NOUN.) Subftantive and Attributive, analogous in 
 Nature to what, - 27$ 
 
 Sun, Mafculine, why, 45 
 
 Sylva, a peculiar Signification of, 308, 309 
 
 Symbol, what, 330. differs from Imitation, how, ibid. 
 
 preferred to it in conftituting Language, whyj 332 
 
 T. 
 
 their natural Number, and why, li^, lid. 
 Aorifts, 123. Tenfes either paffing or completive, 
 what authorities for thefe DiftindYions, 128 to 130. 
 Prateritum perfcfium of the Latins, peculiar ufes of, 1 
 131 to 134. Imperfefium, peculiar ufes of, 135 t 
 137. order of Tenfes in common Gram mars not for- 
 tuitous, . - - 138 
 
 H h TtRENCEj
 
 INDEX. 
 
 TERENCE, 205, 206, 272 
 
 THE and A, See ARTICLE. 
 
 THEMISTIUS, 9. his notion how the Mind gains the 
 idea of Time, ic8. of the dependance of Time on 
 the Soul's exigence, 112. of the latent tranfition of 
 Nature from one Genus to another, 259, 432 
 
 THEODECTES, - - 35 
 
 THEOPHRASTUS, his notion of Speech under its va- 
 rious Relations, 4. mentioned, 419 
 
 THEUTH, inventor of Letters, 324. See HERMES. 
 
 TIBULLUS, - 76, 132, 133 
 
 Time* Mafculine, why, 50. why implied in every 
 Verb, 95, 96. gave rife to Tenfes, ibid, its moft 
 obvious divifion, 97. how like, how unlike to Space, 
 ico to 103. ftrictly fpeaking no Time prefent, 105. 
 in what fenfe it may be called pfefent, 116, 117, 
 432. all Time divifible and extended, 118, 100, 
 ior. no object of Senfation, why, 105. how faint 
 and fhadowy in exiftence, 106,431. how, and by 
 what power we gain its idea, 107. Idea of the paft, 
 prior to that of the future, 109. that of the future, 
 how acquired, 109, no. how connected with Art 
 and Prudence, in. of what faculty, Time the pro- 
 per Object, 112. how intimately connected with 
 the Soul, ibid, order and value of its feveral Species, 
 i 13. what things exift in it, whatnot, 160 to 162. 
 its natural effect on things exifting in it, 161, 50. 
 defcribed by Plato, as the moving Picture of perma- 
 nent Eternity, 389. this account explained by Eot- 
 tk'uts, ibid. Sec Now or INSTANT. 
 
 < Tr;tth t necefiary, immutable, fuperior to all diftinctions 
 of prefent, paft and future, 90, 91, 92, 159, 160, 
 404, 405. (See Being, GOD ) its place or region, 
 
 162*
 
 INDEX. 
 
 162, 372. feen in Composition and Divifion, 3, 
 367. even negative, in fome degree fynthetical, 3, 
 250, 364. ever)' Truth One, and fo recognized, 
 how, 364, 365. factitious Truth, 403 
 
 V. 
 
 VARRO, 56,61,74,413 
 
 VERB, 31. its more loofe, as well as more fttidt 
 acceptations, 87, 193. Verb ftri&ly ib called, its 
 character, 93, 94. diftinguifhed from Participles, 
 94. from Adjectives, ibid, implies Time, why, 95. 
 Tenfes, 98, 119. Modes or Moods, 140, 170. 
 Verbs, how fufceptible of Number and Perfon, 170. 
 Species of Verbs, 173. active, 174. paffive, ibid. 
 middle, 175, i~6. tranfitive, 177, neuter, ibid, in- 
 ceptive, 126, i?2. defiderative or meditative, 127. 
 formed out of Subftantives, 1 82, 1 83. (See 77m?, 
 ;, MODES.) Imperfonals rejected, 175 
 
 Subflantivesy their pre-eminence, 88. eflential to 
 every Proportion, ibid, implied in every other Verb, 
 90, 93. denote exiftence, 88. vary, as varies the 
 exiftenceor Being, whkh they doiiote 3 Q,I S 92. See 
 Being> Truth ^ GOD. 
 
 Verfes, logical, 340 
 
 Vicey Feminine, why, - 56 
 
 VIRGIL, 46, 47, 48, 49, 57, 68, 83, 132. his pecu- 
 liar method of coupling the paifing and compktive 
 Tenfes, 133 to 136. quoted, 141, i82> J^S* 199, 
 306, 235, 286, 287, 389,401, 432. bis idea of 
 the R smax Genius, - -'"- 235.^4131 
 
 ftrtue y Feminine, why, 55. moral ajid tnteHe&ual <iif- 
 fer s how, 2o/9> ^oo. its Matter^ what s $p<fr 3 
 Hh 2
 
 INDEX. 
 
 its Form, what, 311. conne&ed with Literature, 
 how, - - 407 
 
 Under/landing* its Etymology, 369. human Under- 
 itanciing, a compofite of what, 425 
 
 IJnhn, natural, the great objeds of, 264, 279. per- 
 ceived by vyhat power, 363. in every truth, whence 
 
 . derived, -~ .1 . 365 
 
 See fForld. 
 
 defined, 318. fimple, produced how, 318, 319. 
 differs from articulate, how, ibid, articulate, what, 
 319 10324. articulate, fpecies of, 321 to 323. See 
 Vowel, Confonant) Element. 
 
 Volition^ See Perception. 
 
 Vossius, 35, 75, 290 
 
 Vowel, what, and why fo called 321, 322 
 
 Utility, always and only fought by the fordid and illi- 
 beral, 294, 295, 298. yet could have no Being, 
 were there n.ot fomething beyond it, 297. See 
 
 W. 
 
 Whole and Partf^ - 7 
 
 ffffelomy how fomq Philofophers thought it diflinguifh- 
 ed from Wit, 368, 433 
 \VORDS, defined, 20, 21, 328. the feveral Species of, 
 23 to 31. fignificant by themfelves, fignificant by 
 Relation, 27. variable, invariable, 24. fignificant 
 by themfelves and alone, 3710211. by Relation 
 and aflbciated, 213 to 274. fignificant by CompacT:, 
 314, 327. Symbols, and not Imitations, 332. Sym- 
 bols, of what not, 33710341. Symbols, of what, 
 341 to 349, 372. how, though in Number finite, 
 f t>I? ^o expjefs infinite Particulars, 346, 372, 373
 
 INDEX. 
 
 ^ vifible and external, the pafling Pi&ure of 
 what, 383, 437. preferved one and the fame, though 
 ever changing, how> 384, 385. its Caufe not void 
 ofReafon, 436 
 
 Writer^ antient polite differ from modern polite, in 
 what and why, 259, 260 
 
 X. 
 
 XENOPHON, 56, 407. his character as a writer, com- 
 pared with Plato and Arljlotle 9 422, 423 
 
 Y. 
 
 *TAw, 308. See Matter , Sylva. 
 
 FINIS. 
 
 ERRATA. 
 
 Page 4. for arftrftiilzi, read, tvyvrMtla.!. P. 29. fir Piifc. L. IX. 
 rtad, Prifc. L. XI. P. 87. for XAiuyofuptvQi, read, *ij*y,tifi}jumt. P. 
 96. fur Proposition, read, Piepofition. P. 107. Note /or (d) riad (e). 
 
 P. 259. Ncte/tr A\x3, */, (WK\*x* P>zfa' firMotttr, red, 
 Mcrien
 
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