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MOLTKE.
Frontispiece.
MOLTKE * u '
BIOGRAPHICAL AND CRITICAL STUDY
BY
WILLIAM O'CONNOR MOERIS
1 1
SOMETIME SCHOLAR OF ORIEL COLLEGE OXFORD
residesque movebit
Tullus in arma riros, et jam de sueta triumphis
Agmina
Ernet ille Argos, Agamemnoniasque Mycenas,
Ipsumqne ^aoidem, genna armipotentis Achilli,
Ultns avos Trojae, templa et temerata Minervaa.
VIRGIL.
WITH EIGHT PORTRAITS, MAPS, AXD PLANS OF BATTLEFIELDS
LONDON
WAUD AND DOWNEY
(Limited)
12 YORK STREET COVENT GARDEN W.C.
1893
[J.M rights reserved']
M7M1
MORSE
cut.
PREFACE.
YEARS will, doubtless, elapse before a complete
biography of Moltke can be given to the world. It
is impossible at present exactly to know the part
he had in the organization of the Prussian array,
and even in the military operations of 1866-70-1 ;
very little of his correspondence has seen the light,
especially his correspondence with public men ; and
his figure is still 1^oo near the eyes of the living to
stand in the true perspective of history. But the
work he did, and his great achievements have been,
to a considerable extent, ascertained ; his character
and his career may be traced, if not in all their
parts, in a fairly distinct outline ; and it may be
advisable to attempt a short description of them,
as a " prenotion," in Bacon's phrase, of the more
perfect picture reserved for the future. I have
endeavoured in this study correctly to record what
Moltke accomplished in the preparation of war,
and in the direction of armies in the field, to form
a just estimate of his exploits, and to portray the
man in his real nature. I trust I have alike kept
clear of extravagant eulogy profuse and undis-
cerning in this case too often and of undeserved
A 2
509516
IV PREFACK.
detraction and censure. Of one part of this work
I shall simply say this : In narrating the main
events of the second phase of the war of 1870-1, I
have given prominence to the extraordinary efforts
of France, and to the remarkable deeds of her great
soldier, Chanzy, for these passages of a grand page
of history have been little noticed, and have been
almost lost sight of, in the bewildering glare of
German triumphs.
Many of the authorities from which my text has
been composed will be found in the notes contained
in this volume. I have, however, subjoined a com-
plete list, which may be of use to the general
reader. Unfortunately I do not know the German
language, and thus I have been unable to read some
books which throw light on Moltke's career ; and
in many instances I have been obliged to rely on
translations. Nevertheless, I hope, in spite of
these drawbacks, that I have not wholly failed to
master my subject.
J.
FOR MOLTKE'S LIFE AND HIS WRITINGS BEFORE 1870.
1. Moltke, his life and character. Translated hy Mary Hernis.
London : Osgood & Co., 1892.
2. Letters of Field-Marshal Count Helmuth von Moltke to his
mother and brothers. Translated by Clara Bell and Henry W.
Fischer. 2 vols. London : Osgood & Co., 1891.
3. Moltke's Letters on the East. Translated into French by
Alfred Marchand. Paris : Libraire Fischbacher.
4. The Russians in Bulgaria and Eumelia in 1828 and 1829.
PBEFACE. V
From the German of Baron von Moltke. London : Murray,
1854:
5. Moltke's Campaign of Italy in 1859. Translated into
French. Paris ; J. Dumaine, 1862.
6. Moltke's Letters on Russia. Translated into French by
Alfred Marchand. Paris: Libraire Gaudez et Fisehbacher, 1877.
7. Moltke's Remarks on the French Army, referred to in Le
Maieehal de Moltke. Par. xxx. Paris Libraire Moderne, 1888.
IT.
THE ORGANIZATION AND CONDITION OF THE PRUSSIAN AND
GERMAN ARMIES IN 1866-70.
1. Analysis of the Organization of the Prussian Army. By
Lieutenant Talbot. London: Triibner & Co., 1871.
2. Rapports Militaires edits de Berlin, 1866-1870. Par le
Colonel Baron Stoffel. Paris : Gamier Freres, 1871.
3. Note stir 1'Organizatioii de la Confederation de TAllemagne
<lu JSTord. Wilhelmshoe, 1871. By Napoleon III.
4. The Brain of an Army. By Spenser Wilkinson. London :
Macmillan & Co., 1890.
5. The Prussian Campaign of 1866, a Tactical Retrospect.
Translated from the German. By Colonel Ouvry. London :
Mitchell & Co.
6. A Retrospect on the Tactical Retrospect. Same Translator
and Publishers, 1871.
7. The Prussian Infantry in 1869. Same Translator and
Publishers, 1870.
8. Letters on Artillery,' Cavalry, and Infantry. By Prince
Kraft Hohenlohe. Translated by Colonel Walford. 3 vols.
London: Edward Stanford, 1888-1889.
9. L'art de cornbattre TArmee Francaise. By Prince Frederick
Charles. French Translation. Paris : E. Dentu, 1870.
III.
THE WAR IN BOHEMIA IN 1866.
1. The Campaign of 1866 in Germany. "The Prussian Staff
History." Translated into English by Colonel von Wright and
Captain Henry M. Hozier. London : 1872.
VI PREFACE.
2. Les Luttes de 1'Autriche en 1866. The Austrian Staff
History. Translated into French by Franz Croussd. 3 vols.
Paris : J. Dumaine, 1870.
3. Guerre de la Prusse et de 1'Italie centre I'Autriche et la
Confederation Germanique en 1866. Par Ferdinand Le Comte
Colonel Federal Suisse. Lausanne. 2 vols. 1866.
4. La Guerre de 1866. Par le Major Vandevelde. Paris :
Charles Tanera, 1869.
5. Great Campaigns. Major C. Adams. Edinburgh : Black-
woods, 1877. This work includes an account of the war of
1870-1.
6. Moltke on the Battle of Koniggratz. Translated from the
German by Spenser Wilkinson. The United Service Magazine.
7. Field-Marshal Count von Moltke. By General Viscount
Wolseley. The United Service Magazine, Oct. 1891. Part II.
8. M. de Moltke. Par Charles Malo. Paris : Berger Levrault
et Cie. 1891.
IV.
THE FRENCH ARMY IN 1870.
1. L'Armee Franaise en 1867. By General Trochu. Paris :
Amyot, 1870.
2. Les Forces Militaires de la France en 1 870. Par le Comte
de la Chapelle. Napoleon III. Paris: Amyot, 1872.
3. Les Causes de nos De*sastres. Attributed to Napoleon III.
Bmxelles. J. Kozez, 1871.
4. La Verite* sur la Campagne de 1870. Par Fernand Giraudeau.
Marseille, 1871.
5. L' Ad ministration de 1'Armee Fran9aise. Paris : Henri
Plon, 1870.
6. Commission des Conferences Militaires. Paris: J. Dumaine,
1869. See also Note Sur 1'Organisation Militaire, and les
Kapports du Colonel Stoffel, before referred to.
V.
THE WAR OF 1870-1.
1. The Franco-German War, 1870-1. "The Prussian Staff
History." Two parts. 1st part, 2 vols. ; 2nd part, 3 vols.
PREFACE. vii
Translated by Captain Clarke, from the German official account.
London, 1874, 1883.
2. The Franco-German War of 1870. By Field-Marshal
Count Helmuth von Moltke. Translated by Clara Bell and
Henry W. Fischer. 2 vols. London: Osgood & Co., 1891.
The references in the text are to this edition. An edition cor-
rected by Mr. A. Forbes has also been published.
3. The War for the Rhine Frontier. By v. Riistow. Trans-
lated by J. L. Needham. 3 vols. Edinburgh : Blackwoods,
1872.
4. The French Campaign, 1870-1. By. A. Nieumann. Trans-
lated by Colonel E. Newdigate. London : W. Mitchell & Co.,
1872.
5. The Operations of the Bavarian Army Corps, under General
von der Tann. By Captain H. Helvig. Translated by Captain
G. S. Schawbe. London : Henry S. King & Co., 1874.
6. The Operations of the German Armies in France from Se'dan
to the end of the War. By W. Blume. Translated by Major
E. M. Jones. London : Henry S. King & Co., 1872.
7. The Operations of the South Army, in January and February,
1871. By Count Wartensleben. Translated by Colonel von
Wright. London: Henry S. King & Co., 1872.
8. Histoire de la Guerre de 1870-1. Par le General Baron
Ambert. Paris: H. Plon, 1873.
9. Histoire de la Guerre de 1870. Par V. D. Paris: J.
Dumaine, 1871.
10. La Guerre de 1870. Bruxelles, 1871.
11. L'Armee du Rhin. Par le Marechal Bazaine. Paris:
H. Plon, 1872.
12. Episodes de la Guerre de 1870. Par 1'ex-Mare'chal Bazaine.
Madrid : Gaspar, 1883.
13. Sedan. Par le General de Wimpflen. Paris: Libraire
Internationale, 1871.
14. La Journe'e de Sedan. Par le General Ducrot. Paris : E.
Dentu, 1873.
15. La Campagne de 1870. Par un Officier de l'Arme*e du
Rhin. Bruxelles.
16. Arruee de Metz. Par le General Deligny. Minister,
1871.
Vlll PREFACE.
17. 'Operations et Marches da 5me Corps. Par le General de
Failly. Bruxelles: A. M. Labeque.
18. Metz Campagne et Negociations. Par un officier superieur
de 1' Armee du Bhin. Paris: J. Dumaine, 1872.
19. Eapport du Gene'ral de Riviere. Paris: E. Dentu, 1873.
20. Proces Bazaine. Paris : Le Monileur Universel.
21. The Campaign of Sedan.- By George Hooper. London:
George Bell & Sons, 1887.
22. Decisive Battles since Waterloo. By T. W. Knox. New
York and London : Putnarns Sons, 1887.
23. The Great Battles of 1870 and the Blockade of Metz. By
H. B. Franklyn. London : Triibner & Co., 1887.
24. La Defense de Paris. Par le General Ducrot. Paris: E.
Dentu, 1875. 4 vols.
25. Le Siege de Paris. Par le Ge'neral Vinoy. Paris : A.
Plon, 1872.
26. Memoire sur la Defense de Paris. Par E. Viollet le Due.
Paris: Vve. Morel et Cie., 1871.
27. La Guerre en Province. Par Charles de Freycinet. Paris :
Michel Levy, 1871.
28. La Premiere Armee de la Loire. Par le General D'Aurelle
de Paladines.
29. La Deuxieme Armee de la Loire. Par le General Chanzy.
Paris: H. Plon, 1871.
30. Campagne de 1'Armee du Nord. Par le General Faidherbe.
Paris: E. Dentu, 1871.
31. Enquete Parlementaire. See Bazaine sur la Guerre de
1870 and General Ducrot's fourth volume.
32. Fortification. By Major Clarke. London : Murray,
1890.
33. Le Marechal de Moltke, Organisateur et stratege. Par le
General Lewal. Paris : L. Baudoin, 1891.
34. Le Feld-Marechal de Moltke, Revue Militaire Suisse. Par
Abel Veuglaise.
35. Tactical Deductions from the War of 1870-1. By A. V.
Bogulawski. Translated by Colonel Graham. London : Henry
S. King & Co., 1872.
36. The Campaign of 1870. Republished from the Times.
London: Bentley, 1871.
PREFACE. IX
37. The Special Correspondence of the Times, the Daily News,
and the Pall Mall Gazette.
VI.
DIFFERENT WORKS NOT INCLUDED IN THE ABOVE LIST, AND
KELATING TO MILITARY AND GENERAL HISTORY.
1. Commentaires de Napoleon Premier. Paris : Imprimerie
Imperiale, 1867. 6 vols.
2. Thcoiie de la Grande Guerre. Par le General de Clause witz.
Translated into French by Colonel de Vitry. Paris : L. Baudoin,
1886. 4 vols.
3. Strategic et Grande Tactique. Par le General Pierron.
Paris: Berger Levrault et Cie., 1887. 2 vols.
4. La Guerre Moderne. Par le General Derrecagaix. Paris :
L. Baudoin et Cie., 1890. 2 vols.
5. The Operations of War. By General Hainley. Black woods,
1889.
6. War. By Colonel F. Maurice. London: Macmillan & Co.,
1891.
7. A History of Modern Europe. By C. A. Fyfle. London .
Cassell& Co., 1889. 3 vols.
8. The Overthrow of the German Confederation. By Sir A.
Malet. London: Longmans, 1870.
9. The Kefounding of the German Empire. By Colonel
Malleson. London : Seeley & Co., 1893.
10. Who is responsible for the War ? By Scrutator. London :
Kivingtons, 1871.
11. France and Prussia. Correspondence relating to the
Negotiations preliminary to the War. Presented to Parliament,
1870.
WILLIAM O'CONNOR MORRIS.
29th June, 1893.
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER I.
Estimate formed of Moltke in Germany, France, and England
His birth and parentage Sent to the Military School of
Copenhagen ; enters the Danish, and then the Prussian
army ; is attached to the Staff College at Berlin His early
promise and attainments His domestic life and excellence
He travels in the East, and attempts to reform the
Turkish army the battle of Nisib " His Letters on the
East " He is attached to the staff of the 4th Corps d'Armee
His marriage His work on the war of 1828-29 He is
made aide-de-camp of Prince Henry of Prussia His view
of 1848 in Germany He becomes Chief of the Staff of the
4th Corps and a friend of the Crown Prince, afterwards
King and Emperor Travels in England, Russia, and France
Records of these experiences He is appointed Chief of
the General Staff of the Prussian Army ....
CHAPTER II.
Sketch of the history of the Prussian army The army of Fre-
derick the Great That of 1813-14 The Reforms of 1815
The results Reorganization of the army in 1859-60 Great
improvements effected by the King, Roon, and Moltke
Special work of Moltke in the staff and the army Formid-
able power of the army after 1860 The Danish War The
war of 1866 Political situation of the belligerent powers-
Austria and Prussia stand on the defensive The offensive
projects of Moltke frustrated Assembly of the Prussian
armies on the frontiers of Saxony and Silesia Assembly
of the Austrian army in Moravia Characteristics of that
army the Prussians invade Saxony and Bohemia Ad-
vance of the Austrians into Bohemia The projects of
General Benedek He loses a great opportunity Defeat
of the Austriane in a series of combats and battles
Benedek retreats behind the Biatritz . . .. .29
Xll CONTENTS.
CHAPTER III.
PAGE
The Battle of Sadowa or Koniggratz Complete victory of the
Prussian armies Retreat of Benedek The Prussians march
to the Danube The Treaty of Prague Reflections on the
conduct of the war, and especially on the strategy and tactics
of Moltke and the Prussian leaders 66
CHAPTER IV.
Immense increase of the military power of Prussia after 1866
League with Southern Germany The Army of Prussia
and the Confederation of the North Its South German
auxiliaries Great efforts made to improve these forces-
Attitude of France and Prussia after 1866 War probable
Efforts made by Napoleon III. to increase and strengthen
the French army Sketch of the history of that army The
Emperor's attempted reforms almost fail Deplorable
weakness of the French compared to the German armies
Other causes of inferiority The war of 1870-1 The plan
of Napoleon III. The Army of the Rhine The Emperor's
plan is frustrated The plan of Moltke Concentration of
the First, Second, and Third German armies in the Palati-
nate and the Rhenish provinces Positions of the belligerent
armies at the end of July The French perhaps lose an
opportunity to strike the First Army The combat of Sarre-
bruck Advance of the united German armies to the frontier
of France Combat of Wisgembourg and defeat of a French
detachment Battle of Worth and defeat of the French
army Precipitate retreat of Macmahon Battle of Spi-
cheren and second defeat of the French Critical position
of the Army of the Rhine 03
CHAPTER Y.
The German armies do not- pursue the French after Worth and
Spicheren Opportunity lost by Moltke Retreat of the
Army of the Rhine, in part towards Chalons, in part to-
wards the Moselle Projects of Napoleon III. The main
part of the French army falls back from the Nied to Metz
Advance of the German armies to the Moselle Marshal
Bazaine made Commander-in-chief of the whole French
army, including the part approaching Chalons His first
operations The French attempt to retreat on Verdun
Battle of Colombey Nouilly or Borny Advance of the
Germans beyond the Moselle Bazaine and the French
army to the west of Metz Battle of Mars La Tour Bazaine
falls back to a strong position outside Metz What he
might have accomplished Advance of the Germans
Battle of Gravelotte Its vicissitudes and characteristics
The French, at last defeated, are driven back on Metz
Reflections on this passage in the war, and on the conduct
of Moltke and his adversaries . . 133
CONTENTS. Xlll
CHAPTER VI.
PAGE
The results of Gravelotte Formation of the Army of the Meuse
and investment of Metz Inaction of Bazaine Opportunity
still perhaps open to him Advance of the Third Army
Formation of the Army of Chalons under Macmahon He
assents to a project to march on Metz for the relief of
Bazaine Folly of this plan The Army of Chalons on the
march Fine project of Moltke to intercept this movement
Slow progress of the Army of Chalons Macmahon,
though aware of the danger, yields to advice from Paris and
persists in the march the German armies reach their
enemy Action of Nouart Battle of Beaumont Mac-
mahon misses an opportunity of escape The Army of
Chalons at Sedan Advance and night march of the German
armies Battle of Sedan and destruction of the Army of
Chalons Conduct of Moltke at the capitulation Reflec-
tions on these operations 172
CHAPTER VII.
Advance of the Army of the Meuse and of the chief part of
the Third Army through France The Germans in front of
Paris Confidence of Moltke His miscalculation in sup-
posing that France would yield in a short time Revolution
of 4th September The Government of National Defence
Paris resolves to stand a siege Resources of the capital in
material and in military force Investment of Paris by the
German armies Trochu and Ducrot The zone of invest-
ment The zone of defence Sorties made by the Parisian
levies Gambetta The rising of France against the in-
vaders Organization of the defence Extraordinary ability
and energy of Gambetta Formation of provincial armies
Erroneous views of Moltke as to the reality of the defence
of France Fall of Laon, Toul, Strasbourg, Soissons, and
other places First defeats of the French provincial armies
The resistance continues Conduct of Bazaine after the
investment of Metz The 26th of August at Metz The
battle of Noisseville Criminal negligence and intrigues of
Bazaine The fall of Metz Reflections on these events . 215
CHAPTER VIII.
Advance of the First and Second Armies into France after the
fall of Metz The besiegers' lines around Paris strengthened
and reinforced Mistake of Moltke as to the position of
affairs outside Paris The external zone The Army of the
Loire restored and largely increased The Battle of Coul-
miers Alarm at the German headquarters at Versailles
Moltke makes preparations to raise the siege Accidents
which prevented the Army of the Loire from gaining the
full results of its victory Disastrous effect of the fall of
XIV CONTENTS.
Metz on the military situation as regards France
D'Aurelle falls back on Orleans, and places the Army of
the Loire within lines Moltke again mistaken in the dis-
tribution of the German forces The Grand Duke of
Mecklenburg sent to the West Prince Frederick Charles
near Orleans Immense increase of the Army of the Loire
Prince Frederick Charles directs a general concentration of
his own and the Grand Duke's forces Views of Chanzy
Fatal mistakes made by Gambetta The Battle of Beaune
la Rolande Ill-directed advance of the Army of the Loire,
in the hope of relieving Paris It is defeated and driven
back on Orleans Great sortie from Paris combined with
false attacks The Battle of Yilliers The sortie ultimately
fails Reflections on these events, and on the situation . 261
CHAPTER IX.
The First Army in Picardy Indecisive battle near Amiens
Advance of the First Army into Normandy Retreat of
the French Army of the North Rouen captured Fall of
Thionville, Montmedy, and, before long, of Mezi^res These
successes strengthen the position of the Germans round
Paris and in France Preparations for the bombardment
of Paris Werder in Burgundy and Tranche Comte The
siege of Belfort Werder at Dijon The French Army of
the East Garibaldi and Cremer The Germans in the east
reinforced by part of the First Army The prospect becomes
gloomy for France Sudden change effected by Chancy on
the Loire Events on this theatre of the war since the fall
of Orleans Chanzy attacked by the Germans Protracted
and desperate conflict of four days Great ability of Chanzy
His skill and commanding influence over his troops and
their officers His retreat to the Loire His masterly
arrangements baffle the German commanders They con-
centrate their forces against him He retreats to the
Sarthe, occupies Le Mans, and resumes the offensive The
Grand Duke and Prince Frederick Charles fall back
Heavy losses of their armies The French Army of the
North marches towards the Somme Indecisive battle on
the Hallue Ineffectual sortie from Paris The military
situation, if unfavourable to France, is still doubtful
Gradual and immense additions to the numbers of the
German troops The efforts of France continue Reflec-
tions on these operations 304
CHAPTER X.
Retrospect of the military situation since Sedan Position of
affairs on the theatre of war at the end of 1870 What the
operations of the French ought to have been Wise views
of Chanzy Gambetta directs Bourbaki and the First
Army of the Loire towards the east Reckless imprudence
of this strategy in existing circumstances The Grand
CONTENTS. XV
Duke and Prince Frederick Charles advance against
Chanzy and the Second Army of the Loire Skilful
operations of Chanzy Battle of Le Mans The Germans
held in check all day The capture of one point in the line
of defence at night compels Chanzy to retreat He falls
back on Laval and reorganizes his troops Campaign in the
north Faidherbe successful at Bapaume He moves on St.
Quentin, and retreats after an indecisive battle Campaign
in the east Bad condition of Bourbaki's army He ad-
vances against Werder, and is successful at Villersexel
He loses a great opportunity, chiefly owing to the ^tate of
his troops Werder retreats behind the Lisaine Battles
of Hericourt, and retreat of Bourbaki Paris isolated The
external zone of the Germans intact Bombardment of
the forts and the enceinte of Paris The city bombarded
Complete failure of the attack Sortie of the 19th January
It fails Sufferings of the population of Paris Its
heroic attitude The armistice Bourbaki's army excepted
Views of Chanzy in the event of hostilities being re-
sumed His masterly arrangements and unshaken con-
stancy Advance of Manteuffel and the German Army of
the South against Bourbaki Skill of Moltke in directing
this operation Bourbaki tries to commit suicide Cata-
strophe of his army, chiefly owing to a misunderstanding as
to the armistice It is forced to cross the frontier of France,
and to retreat into Switzerland Fall of Belfort and other
French fortresses Chauzy is still for war The Assembly
at Bordeaux pronounces for peace The Treaty of Frank-
fort Part taken by Moltke in the conditions imposed on
France Reflections on the war, with special references to
events after Sedan 328
CHAPTER XL
Welcome given to Moltke on his return from the war in France
Honours and distinctions cenferred on him He resumes
his post as Chief of the Staff His dislike of flattery His
declining years Celebration of his sixtieth year of military
service His work with the General Staff Preparation
for war Speeches in the Reichstag and Prussian Chamber
- Jealousy of France Life at Creisau Moltke retires from
the post of Chief of the Staff Celebration of his ninetieth
birthday His death Reflections on his career . . . 385
INDEX , 413
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.
PiGE
Von Moltke Frontispiece
Von Moltke (2nd portrait) . ' . : 25
Napoleon III., Emperor of France ..... 109
Marshal Bazaine . . . . . . . .141
Marshal Macmahon . . . . . . . .197
Bismarck 221
General Chanzy 313
William I., Emperor of Germany 3G1
MAPS AND PLANS.
Map of Bohemia 65
PlanofSadowa 69
Plan of Gravelotte 161
Plan of Sedan 203
Map of Fortifications of Paris 225
Map of Fiance, showing territory in undisputed possession
of the Germans and of the French 337
MOLTKE :
A BIOGRAPHICAL AND CRITICAL STUDY.
CHAPTER I.
Estimate formed of Moltke in Germany, France, and England
His birth and parentage Sent to the Military School of
Copenhagen ; enters the Danish, and then the Prussian army ;
is attached to the Staff College at Berlin His early promise
and attainments His domestic life and excellence He
travels in the East, and attempts to reform the Turkish
arm y The battle of Nisib " His Letters on the East "He
is attached to the staff of the 4th Corps d'Armee His
marriage His work on the war of 1828-29 He is made
aide-de-camp of Prince Henry of Prussia His view of 1848
in Germany He becomes Chief of the Staff of the 4th Corps
and a friend of the Crown Prince, afterwards King and
Emperor Travels in England, Russia, and France Records
of these experiences He is appointed Chief of the General
Staff of the Prussian Army.
IN the early spring of 1891 Germany sate mourning
for her most renowned soldier. To the imagination
of the Teutonic race Moltke seemed a type of the
mythical gods, worshipped in the past by his
pagan fathers ; he had wielded the bolts of Thor
and the axe of Odin. His industry and skill had
been main elements in the creation of that mighty
instrument of war, the Prussian army, of the second
B
2 MOLTKE.
half of the century. He had directed the opera-
tions, which, in 1866, had struck down Austria in
three weeks ; had thrust her out of her supreme
place in Germany ; and had made Prussia the head
of the German people. Four years afterwards he
had led the crusade of the League of Germany
against Imperial France ; had more than avenged
the disaster of Jena by the extraordinary triumphs
of Metz and Sedan ; had crushed the heroic rising
of the French nation ; and -had imposed a humiliat-
ing peace at the point of his sword, within sight, so
to speak, of conquered Paris.
The modest and retiring nature of the man,
impatient of the tribe of undiscerning flatterers,
only strengthened the chorus of general acclaim,
which swelled around his grave in no uncertain
accents. He had been known to his countrymen as
" the great strategist " ; and they described him as
the first of the masters of war, surpassing even
Napoleon in power and in genius. France herself,
who saw in him a deadly enemy, was 'not blind to
his remarkable parts, and especially to his adminis-
trative gifts, and while freely criticizing passages in
his career, more than one French writer has given
him a place above Frederick, and even beside
Turenne. In England, where the worship of mere
success prevails more widely than in other lands,
and where the art of war is very little studied, the
tribute of eulogy was without stint or measure.
Moltke was transformed into an ideal hero ; and it
was gravely announced that he was easily supreme
CHILDHOOD. YOUTH. MANHOOD. 3
in the noble company of the most famous warriors.
A reaction, probably due, in part, to the publication
of Moltke's work on the memorable war of 1870-71
a superficial and unjust book, bearing plainly the
marks of mental decay, has set in of late against
this extravagance ; and the oracles have for some
time been dumb which proclaimed their idol
"unrivalled and faultless." In this fluctuating state
of ill-led opinion, it. is advisable, perhaps, to trace
briefly the incidents of Moltke's life and career ; to
try to ascertain what he really was ; to form an
impartial estimate of his achievements ; and to
endeavour to determine his true position among the
great men who have prepared war, or who have
conducted military operations in the field. Such a
study, no doubt, must be incomplete; our know-
ledge is still imperfect in many respects ; and we
cannot always point out the exact part played by
Moltke in the most striking events in which he was
a prominent actor. But the subject is one of im-
mediate interest ; and it is better, perhaps, to treat it
at once, inadequate as must be the treatment, before
Moltke passes into the domain of History.
Helmuth Charles Bernard Von Moltke was born
in 1800, at Parchim, a little town in Mecklenburg, on
an affluent of the Lower Elbe. The family of the
child, of German origin, had for centuries belonged
to the noblesse of the country ; and it produced a
soldier in the Thirty Years' War, a follower, perhaps,
of the great G-ustavus. It had scattered, however,
over many lands ; and the grandfather of the future
B 2
4 MOLTKE.
warrior is said to have served in the Austrian
army towards the close of the eighteenth century.
His sons were nearly all Prussian soldiers ; one
was wounded on the fatal day of Jena ; another,
perhaps, appeared in the train of the sovereigns
who bowed the knee, at Erfurt, to the Protector of
the Confederation of the Rhine ; a third seems to
have died, at the Beresina, in the ranks of the
perishing Grand Army ; and the father of Helmuth,
though a Danish general, is believed to have been
a Prussian officer. Of this parent of Moltke little is
known, except that * he was almost a failure in life,
and that he probably was an inferior man ; but
Henrietta Paschen, his wife, was a remarkable
woman, of fine parts, and of great strength of
character ; and in the case of Moltke, as in that of
Napoleon and of many other illustrious names, it
was the mother who transmitted the high qualities
exhibited by the renowned offspring.
General Moltke was a very poor man with a
large family; and Helmuth grew up like his
brothers and sisters, under the cold shade of privation
and want, the best training, Napoleon has said, for
a soldier. After learning the rudiments as he best
could, the boy was entered a cadet at the Military
School of Copenhagen when in his twelfth year.
He was at this seminary until 1818 ; and one of his
comrades has told us what was thought of him in
the daily round of school life at this period. His
industry was intense and never flagged ; and his
1 Moltke's "Letters," vol. i. p. 18. English translation.
CHILDHOOD. YOUTH. MANHOOD. 5
marked gifts and resolute will commanded the
respect of his young companions, for boys, as a
rule, are good judges of character. Curiously
enough, however, the stern reticence seen in the
man, in mature age, was not apparent in these
early days. Moltke was modest and shy, and even
occasionally sad ; but he was amiable, and, in
short, a " good fellow " ; and, in this respect, he
was the exact opposite of the silent Corsican lad,
who, in his teens, stood moodily apart from his
mates, at Brienne. Moltke's reminiscences of the
Military School were, nevertheless, by no means
happy. The discipline of the place was harsh,
nay brutal ; and he has said that it did him
permanent harm. 2 " I had no education," he wrote
to one of his brothers, " but thrashing. I have had
no chance of forming a character. I am often pain-
fully conscious of it. This want of self-reliance
and constant reference to the opinions of others,
even the preponderance of reason over inclination,
often gives me moral depressions, such as others
feel from opposite causes. They were in such a
hurry to efface every prominent characteristic, every
peculiarity, as they would have nipped betimes
every shoot of a yew hedge, that the result was
weakness of character, the most fatal of all." Moltke,
however, is not just to himself, in this estimate of
his mental and moral qualities. If not of the very
highest order, his intellect was of remarkable
power, and certainly was not dwarfed or stunted ;
2 " Letters," vol. ii. p. 112.
6 MOLTKE.
and he possessed firmness of purpose, and strength
of character, pre-eminently among the warriors of
his age.
After an apprenticeship to Court life as a page,
Helmuth obtained a commission in the Danish
army. Perhaps, owing to the first stirrings of an
earnest desire to rise in life, but more probably to
his family ties, the youth passed from the service of
a petty state to that of the military Prussian
monarchy, and he became a lieutenant of Prussian
infantry in 1822 when just of full age. He was
soon afterwards attached to the Staff College 1 at
Berlin, an institution which has been the nursery
of many eminent and scientific soldiers, and this
proved a turning point in his career. He was
already a ripe and laborious scholar ; he was ani-
mated by a deep sense of duty ; pinched by in-
digence, but with the pride of noble birth, he felt
the impulse of nascent ambition ; and the discipline
and the studies of the place were congenial to his
powerful and acute intellect, and to his strong and
resolute nature. Even now devoted to military
pursuits, Moltke flung himself into his work with
characteristic energy ; and though he did not lose
his regimental rank, he remained for five years at the
Staff College a most able, learned, and assiduous
pupil. The time was well calculated to encourage
the industry of an eager and thoughtful student of
war, and to make his knowledge enlarged and
1 "The War School" of Scharnhorst, founded in 1810, but to
be traced up, perhaps, to Frederick the Great.
CHILDHOOD. YOUTH. MANHOOD. 7
fruitful. The long peace, indeed, kept Europe in
repose, and the great forces and changes which
ultimately were profoundly to affect the military
art, possessed, as yet, scarcely any influence. But
the preceding era had been one of war, in grandeur
beyond example ; the world had been convulsed by
the shock of arms echoing from Paris to Madrid
and Moscow ; the star of Napoleon had blazed over
Europe, and had disappeared in portentous eclipse,
and many eminent men had turned their minds to
the interpretation of such events as Bivoli, Auster-
litz, Torres Vedras, Waterloo. Not to speak of
the invaluable contributions made by the chief
actors in the drama themselves, the masterpieces of
Napoleon in exile, and the admirable writings of
the Archduke Charles, the greatest work of Jomini
had appeared ; and the pens of many other ac-
complished soldiers were skilfully illustrating the
whole period.
This important literature, as may be supposed,
was not neglected at the Staff College, a military
seminary of the highest repute ; and, indeed,
Clausewitz, one of the best of critics, was, if we
mistake not, lecturing at it on the campaigns of
Napoleon, at this very time. Moltke eagerly
studied, and completely mastered, the vast in-
formation which this era affords to a careful
thinker on war, but he carried his researches
much further back. He became thoroughly versed
in the history of his art from the days of Hannibal
to that of Frederick, and few minds, certainly, have
8 MOLTKE.
made the theory of the profession of arms so wholly
his own. The earnest scholar, however, did not
confine himself to the literature or the science of
war. He seems, indeed, never to have been deeply
versed in politics in the highest sense ; he had not
Napoleon's comprehensive grasp of political facts
in their widest aspects ; he was deficient in the fine
political tact seen in Marlborough, Turenne, and
Wellington. But he devoured general history in
all its branches ; he became one of the most learned
of men, and, especially, he showed astonishing
power in acquiring a knowledge of many tongues.
French writers, however, are much in error when
they describe Moltke as a mere " bookworm," " a
military monk," in these laborious days. He was
often employed in making surveys of different parts
of the Prussian dominions and in other duties of
the engineer ; and this training stood him in good
stead when it fell to his lot to direct armies. He
travelled, too, a good deal in these years, and his
notes of these journeys reveal a mind far-reaching,
healthy, and rich with sympathy. He regarded the
Polish race with the eye of a Prussian, yet he was
touched by the memory of its glories in the past,
and he almost mourns over its fallen greatness. He
was strongly moved, too, by the pomp and the
majesty of the Catholic ritual in the great towns
of Poland, and he took a marked interest in all that
he saw in Silesia. The most striking feature of
these experiences is, however, the admiration shown
by the author for the grandeur of Nature ; it is
CHILDHOOD. YOUTH. MANHOOD. 9
alike heartfelt, keen, and intelligent. The broad
river and the cultivated flat suggest all kinds of
felicitous thoughts ; and like most dwellers in lands
of plains, Moltke sought with delight the heights
of the mountain. In one of his letters he dilates
with ecstasy on the vast panorama of varied beauty,
which unfolds itself to the eye from the top of
Schneekoppe the highest peak of the Giant Hills
the region through which, forty years afterwards,
he was to move the armed strength of Prussia to
the field of Sadowa.
The intelligent heads of the Staff College appre-
ciated the remarkable promise and unceasing in-
dustry of the young officer, who seems to have
easily surpassed his fellows, and Moltke was at-
tached to the general staff of the Prussian army in
1828, having been an instructor for a short time at
a district military school at Frankfort. It has
often been observed that he rose slowly in life, and
this, to a great extent, is true ; but, in the first
years of his career as a subaltern his merits secured
him more speedy advancement than was usual at
the time in the Prussian service. He served on
the staff, without intermission, for some years in
the first instance, and his professional duties were,
in part, the same as those which he had performed
at the Staff College, that is, he was much engaged
in the work of surveys. But he was employed
a good deal in teaching pupils at the Staff College
the knowledge of war ; he drew up abstracts of
several important campaigns; he attended the
10 MOLTKE.
military manoeuvres which, even in those days,
formed part of the training of the Prussian soldier ;
he made a number of confidential reports ; above
all, he had ample means of making himself ac-
quainted with the administration of the Prussian
staff and with the organization of the Prussian
army. He gradually became a man of some mark ;
a report from his pen on the Danish army was
selected for special praise by the king; and in 1835
he was promoted to the rank of captain, 1 " having
passed over the heads of four of his seniors arid the
whole body of twelve first lieutenants." He found
time, however, for the pursuit of letters, to which
he remained devoted through life, amidst his multi-
farious work on the staff ; and he made his first
essays, in these years, in authorship. Two works
from his pen, one on " Belgium and Holland,'* the
other on "Poland, and its present State," were
published in 1830-31, but they have long been out
of print and forgotten. The first, he informs us,
cost him prodigious toil, but its real merits could
have hardly been great, for he has said that he
could not understand the reasons why the Belgians
and Dutch disliked each other, an instance of the
want of political insight, which we see in his ideas
about Alsace and Lorraine, and their sympathies in
1870-71. The book on Poland, however, attracted
attention, and was described by the censor of the
press at Berlin " as the work of a man of fifty years'
experience." About this time, too, Moltke under-
1 " Letters," vol. i. p. 115.
CHILDHOOD. YOUTH. MANHOOD. 11
took the task of translating the " Decline and Fall "
of Gibbon, but he seems to have completed one
volume only. Still under the heavy stress of
poverty, he agreed to accomplish this " herculean
work " for a miserable payment of about 60L
The inner and domestic life of Moltke, during
these years of his early manhood, reveal a very
pleasing side of his character. His marked ability,
his great acquirements, his growing reputation, his
strong will, had made him the real head of his
family, and he became its mentor and master spirit.
His father, evidently a weak man, had been long
disgusted with his profession ; the son, though
scarcely able to make ends meet, offered to divide
his scanty pay with him, in the hope that he would
remain in the Danish service. Moltke' s letters to
his brothers Adolf and Ludwig, both destined to
rise above the common herd, constantly urge them
forward in the path of duty; he reminds them
" how 1 imperatively and seriously necessary it is
that we should make our own way in life ;" and yet
they are wholly free from attempts at dictation and
from the self-assertion of a superior nature. The
spirit in which he confronted the battle of life, for
the sake of those dear to him, as well as his own,
appears in more than one passage like this 2 : "I
will set out with new courage on the thorny race-
course, on which I am striving after fortune alone,
and so far from you all. May I attain it for you
1 " Letters," vol. ii. p. 107.
2 Ibid. vol. i. p. 10.
12 MOLTKE.
all ! " To his mother, whom he greatly loved and
revered, he gave the full expression of his thoughts
and hopes ; and his letters to her confirm the im-
pression we obtain from many sources of his real
character, aspiring and solid, manly, but tender.
He rejoices in her sympathy, as he slowly climbs up
the difficult ascent that leads to distinction ; he
cheers her in her life of privation and sorrow she
had been parted for years from her husband ; he
consults her on almost all subjects. Like other
young men he often has the idea of marriage in his
mind ; and it is curious to note that, grave and
sedate, he thinks that mere passion, in most
instances, is not a prelude to a happy union ; and
he believes lady-killers to be nearly always fools.
Yet Moltke's heart was not closed to love; he felt
deeply the charms of a fair young Pole, though,
with characteristic pride of race, he tells his mother
he would not give her " a Polish daughter-in-law ; "
and he was strongly attached to two sisters, to
whom he addressed a poetaster's homage, not above,
we must say, the average standard. Nor was he
by any means a morose recluse in these years of
hard work and engrossing study. He was joyous
and brilliant in social converse, and was much liked
by his brother officers ; and he saw a great deal of
the high life of Berlin.
In 1835 Moltke set off on a long journey to the
East. He explored Vienna ; made his way, with
difficulty, through the immense tracts watered by
the Lower Danube; and reached Constantinople,
CHILDHOOD. YOUTH. MANHOOD. 13
from across the Balkans. The Sultan, Mahomed
II., was, at this time, engaged in an attempt to
restore his military power ; and he gladly availed
himself of the aid of a soldier, recommended to him
by the Prussian embassy. Moltke soon stood well
with the advisers of the Porte, being held in peculiar
esteem by Ohosref Pacha, the War Minister, and
commander-in-chief ; and a small party of Prussian
officers was sent from Berlin to help him in his new
official duties. The companions remained in the
East for nearly four years ; and Moltke penetrated
into almost every part of the vast and decaying
realms of Islam, from the Bulgarian plains to the
range of the Taurus. What he really accomplished
in the work of reform and reorganization is well
nigh unknown. The period was one when the
Turkish Empire seemed on the verge of speedy
extinction. Russia had made Mahomed almost a
vassal ; whole provinces were in constant revolt ; the
subject populations had begun to stir under the iron
yoke of their detested masters; and the fierce
janissary horde, the true embodiment of the con-
quering power of the Osmanli race, had perished
under the hand of their chiefs. Moltke surveyed
the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, and gave the
Sultan excellent advice, as to the defences of his
renowned capital, lately menaced by the legions of
Diebitsch; and he accompanied him on a journey
to the Danubian fortresess, half destroyed by the
last Russian invasion. He proposed, also, it seems,
that a kind of militia, resembling, in some measure,
14 MOLTKE.
the Prussian landwehr, should be formed and
arrayed throughout the Empire; and it deserves
special notice that, like a true reformer, he endea-
voured to adapt the reforms he suggested to national
habits, tendencies, and tastes. It is evident, how-
ever, that his administrative powers made no perma-
nent impression on the sloth, the corruption, and
the imbecility of the Turkish War Office, and added
little to the military strength of the Porte. The
Crimean War found the Empire almost defenceless,
and its armies an assemblage of ill-trained levies,
in which 1 " what was good in barbarian warfare
was lost without much gain from what civilization
gave/'
Moltke and his companions were in Asia Minor, in
1838 and 1839, attached to one of the armies of the
Porte. The Kurds in the East were in revolt, and
Ibrahim Pacha, a son of Mehemet Ali, the powerful
and rebel satrap of Egypt, was threatening the
Empire from the Syrian frontier. Moltke made his
way throughout the great Peninsula, where the
remains of the glories of Greece and Home still rise
to the sight amidst the waste and desolation pro-
duced by barbarian conquest, and where Nature
unfolds some of her most majestic scenes. He
visited several ports of the Euxine; crossed the
table-land of the central provinces ; descended
into the Mesopotamian plain dividing the Tigris
from the Euphrates ; and explored the ruins of the
great fortresses which formed the advanced posts
1 " The Russians in Bulgaria and Roumelia," by Moltke, p. 269.
CHILDHOOD. YOUTH. MANHOOD. 15
of the Legions in the East. .One incident of these
days may be noticed, for it was significant of his
persevering and strongly marked character. Moltke
was invited by Hafiz, the Pacha in command of the
Ottoman force, to endeavour to ascertain if the
Euphrates was navigable along a certain space, and
could be made an avenue for the transport of sup-
plies ; and he set off on an errand, declared to be
impossible by the Kurdish boatmen on the spot.
Having had a raft constructed, he launched it on
the stream ; it was in vain that, after a few hours'
experience of the force of the current, part of his
crew dropped off ; he persisted doggedly in the
perilous attempt, and though his frail craft was
half swamped, and nearly dashed to pieces, he suc-
cessfully threaded a maze of cataracts, and returned
to his chief with a detailed report. Moltke made
his earliest experiences in the field at this period ;
and it was his fortune, like that of Eugene of Savoy,
to see war for the first time as it was conducted by
the arms of Islam. In the summer of 1839 the
Egyptian army of Ibrahim Pacha was set in motion,
and, having reached Aleppo, it threatened to ad-
vance, through the passes of the Taurus, into the
northern provinces. Two Turkish armies were
opposed to it, that of Hafiz Pacha in Western
Kurdistan, that of Hadzchi Pacha, spread around
Koniah, the Iconium of the age of Imperial Rome,
but they were separated by vast and scarcely pass-
able tracts, and Ibrahim might force his way between
them, and possibly even defeat them in detail. To
16 MOLTKE.
avert this, Hafiz approached the verge of Syria,
upon the Upper Euphrates, and placed his army in
a camp round Biradchik, not far from the little
stream of the Nisib. Moltke entreated the Pacha
to take advantage of a circuitous movement made
by Ibrahim, in order to turn his enemy's flank; but
Hafiz failed to seize the occasion ; and his adviser
insisted that all that was now to be done was to
fall back to the camp, from which the Turkish army
had lately advanced. The Pacha, however, turned
a deaf ear to the warnings of the soldier who,
throughout the affair, had given proof of a true
military eye ; and, persuaded by the ignorant mol-
lahs on the spot the sachems of the superstitious
Turk persisted obstinately in maintaining his
ground. Ibrahim 1 interposed between his adver-
sary and his camp, attacked boldly on the 23rd of
July, and easily won a complete victory, so decisive
that the virtual independence of Egypt may be said
to date from the day of Nisib. Moltke and his com-
rades escaped, with difficulty, through masses of
fugitives in headlong rout ; it is significant of the
idea he had formed of the military worth of a Turkish
army, that he thought it a positive gain that there
were no means of retreat open from the camp of
Hafiz, for this would " force the Osmanli to do or
to die."
A series of " Letters on the East " records all that
Moltke saw and did in these travels. This volume
1 A French officer, Captain Hautpoul, curiously enough, urged
Ibrahim to make this movement.
CHILDHOOD. YOUTH. MANHOOD. 17
alone would entitle the author to some distinction in
the sphere of literature; it abounds in thorough
and well-digested knowledge, in cultivated thought,
in true human sympathy. Professional studies fill
many pages ; and Moltke dwells on the natural
strength of Constantinople as a seat of Empire, on
the great capabilities of the Dardanelles for defence,
on the value of the Balkans and the line of the
Danube as barriers against an invading army. He
explodes, we may note, what in those days was,
perhaps, an article in the faith of British seamen ;
and insists that ships are no match for forts, as was
seen at Sebastopol years afterwards. The book,
however, is mainly one of travels, and few experiences
of the East possess equal interest. In every
chapter we find the accomplished scholar, the man
of reflection, the master of language. A military
search for the ruins of Troy recalls the immortal
memories that cling around Ida, the Simois, and
the land of Priam, The forms of buried empires
rise out of the past, as Moltke threads his way
between the great rivers that watered the realms of
Belshazzar and Cyrus. Edessa, Nisibis, and other
remains of the grandeur of Rome revive images
of the Caesars and their all-subduing armies ; and
the Kurd tillers of the soil and the wandering
Arabs are seen through eyes that have loved the
Sacred Writings. If somewhat wanting in imagina-
tive power, the descriptions of scenery are well
finished, and especially are rich in life and colour.
We see Vienna before us, with its antique streets,
c
18 MOLTKE.
its gay public places, and its noble church over-
looking the Marchfield and the mighty Danube.
Bucharest rises brightly from the Wallachian flats,
a human oasis in a desolate waste; the Balkan
heights and the Bulgarian plains stand out with
the Euxine in the far distance. But Constantinople
is the most striking scene ; and the animation of
the West stirring along the Bosphorus, in strange
contrast with the decaying grandeur of other parts
of the Imperial City, and all the associations, of
which the dome of St. Sophia may be deemed the
centre, have never been more effectively portrayed.
The work ends with a comparison between what
has been achieved by the Czars and the Sultans
during the last two centuries in the work of
Empire. Here, however, Moltke has missed part
of the truth ; he is less successful with man than
with Nature ; he ought to have brought out more
clearly the fact that the Russians are a great if a
backward nation, and that the Turks are a mere
degenerate horde.
In 1840 Moltke was again in Berlin ; he
attained the rank of major a short time afterwards,
and he was placed on the staff of the 4th Corps
d'armee, a passage in his career that was to prove of
moment. He was now in the prime of full manhood ;
and a casual observer has given us a faint glimpse
of a figure and bearing that have become historical.
He describes Moltke " as thin and tall of stature,
with a sharp, bronzed face, and with lips that seldom
opened, grave, taciturn, and self-contained ; " and
CHILDHOOD. YOUTH. MANHOOD. 19
this description evidently has been a model for
French writers, who, in the bitterness of their
hearts, have compared his aspect in old age to
that " of a vulture, lean and silent, as it devours
its prey." Yet if we may judge from authentic
portraits, Moltke was at this time a handsome man,
blue-eyed, fair-haired, and refined in look ; and
though he was not in any sense talkative, and he
never wore his heart on his sleeve, he was a delight-
ful companion to those who knew him well. The
mother he loved had now passed away; she was to
be soon followed by his surviving parent ; and his
brothers and sisters were settled in life, two of the
brothers, Adolf and Ludwig, referred to before,
having made their mark in the Civil Service of the
debateable lands of Schleswig and Holstein. In 18 i2
Moltke made the acquaintance of Mary Burt, the
daughter of an English gentleman, whose second
wife had been one of Moltke's sisters; and the
acquaintance led to a most happy union. Marie, as
he always called her, was the fitting helpmeet of the
hard-working and ambitious soldier ; she appre-
ciated his lofty and strong character; and he was
deeply, nay, passionately, attached to her. What
she was appears in these few words, witten by her
husband to one of his family x : " My little wife is
my greatest joy. In five years I have rarely seen
her sad, and never cross. She has no vagaries, and
allows of none in other people. But no one should
do her a real wrong, for, with the best will in the
1 " Letters," vol. i. p. 177.
o 2
20 MOLTKE.
world, she could not forgive it ; with all her light-
heartedness, she has a decided, strong, and deep
nature, which she would assert under all adverse cir-
cumstances. God preserve her from such. But I
know what I possess in her." After twenty-six
years of wedded happiness, this excellent and really
superior woman was carried away before her time,
but she lived to see all Prussia do homage to her lord,
as he returned a conqueror from Sadowa to Berlin.
A simple monument raised to her memory at the
home of Moltke's last honoured years, contains this
epitaph from his thoughtful pen : " Love is the ful-
filment of the law of God."
About the time of his marriage Moltke published
his 1 History of the War between the Russians and
Turks in 1828 and 1829. Unlike the bulky volumes
compiled by the Prussian Staff, which chronicle
the great conflicts of late years, but only bear slight
marks of his hand, this work is entirely from his
pen, and it is alike interesting and, in some respects,
curious. A strong imagination was not one of
Moltke's gifts, but he seems always to have thought
that this creative faculty was out of place in de-
scribing war, and the book has no traces of the
animation and beauty repeatedly seen in the
" Letters on the East." The narrative is sedate
and without colour, though the subject abounds in
1 This book is entitled, "The Russians in Bulgaria and
Rouuielia in 1828 and 1829." A translation of it into English
appeared in 1854, during the Crimean War. Moltke was even
then so little known in Europe that the translator asserted he
was dead.
CHILDHOOD. YOUTH. MANHOOD. 21
dramatic scenes ; the storming of Ibrail is tame and
lifeless compared to Napier's sketch of the storming
of Badajoz ; the passage of the Danube and that of
the Balkans do not awake one spark of poetic fire,
and the account of the sieges of the Turkish strong-
holds is little more than the diary of an engineer.
But the criticism of the operations of the contending
armies is very able, and valuable in the extreme ;
and this is the more remarkable because Moltke,
unlike Napoleon, is not given to military criticism
and comments on war. The mistakes made by the
Russian commanders in crossing the Danube wifch
too weak a force, and especially in waiting whole
weeks around Shumla, and the incapacity of the
Turkish Pachas, are clearly and completely set forth,
and full justice is done to the powers of Diebitsch,
and, above all, to his boldness in pressing forward to
Adrianople with the wreck of an army, wasted by
forced marches, want, and disease. Yet the most
striking characteristic of the work is the attention
the author bestows on the mechanism of war, on the
nature and composition of the hostile forces, and on
the preparations made for their movements in the
field. Moltke dwells with emphasis on the frightful
losses sustained by the Russians through sheer
neglect, and he significantly points out how ill-
adapted the troops in many respects were to cope
with the difficulties of a campaign in Bulgaria. A
master of organization is more apparent throughout
the volume than a master of war.
Though remaining attached to the staff of his
22 MOLTKE.
corps, Moltke was appointed aide-de-camp to Prince
Henry of Prussia a brother of the monarch who
succumbed at Jena and was with his chief in Eome
in the autumn of" 1845. The Prince was a dying
invalid, and Moltke and his wife had ample leisure
to see the Eternal City and its departed glories.
Characteristically he thoroughly studied Niehbuhr,
and extracted fruit from those hard, dry husks ;
but his sound judgment rebelled against the de-
structive scepticism of the historian, and he continued
to believe in Egeria and Numa. A short work on
'Italy appeared from his pen, but it does not require
special notice ; it scarcely alludes to the Italian
Question, already beginning to stir the Continent,
and it relates chiefly to Eome and Italian scenery.
One passage, however, in Moltke J s letters, 1 which
dwells on all that he saw and felt from the dome of
St. Peter's, is a good specimen of his peculiar
descriptive skill ; the associations of the past are
well blended in a thoughtful picture with the present
landscape. A short journey through Spain, made
after the death of Prince Henry, closed this chapter
of travels, and it is interesting to show that, as the
reflecting soldier notes how " German colonists in
Spain and other lands forget their fallen nationality
and its ties," he gives proof of a yearning for
German unity. In 1847 Moltke, now become a
colonel, was again at his work with the 4th Corps,
and, 2 strangely enough, he had thoughts of leaving the
army, at the very time when the tide of fortune was
1 "Letters," vol. ii. p. 160. 2 Ibid. vol. i.p. 177.
CHILDHOOD. YOUTH. MANHOOD. 23
near. This resolve was, possibly, in part due to
the mutterings of the revolutionary storm already
beginning to be heard in Germany. Moltke had
the political faith of a Prussian noble ; he detested
Liberalism and all its ways; and, if he wished to
see Germany rise from her weakness, he felt nothing
but scorn for German democracy. When 1848
swept over the Continent, and " shriekers in Frank-
fort" were trying to erect a new Germany on the
wrecks of princedoms and thrones, and anarchy had
revelled in the streets of Berlin, it seemed to Moltke
as if the end of all things was near, and he l contem-
plated, for a moment, quitting the Old World and
making a home for those he loved in the New, if
his sword was not immediately required for his
country's service.
Events, however, turned Moltke aside from what
was probably but a fleeting purpose. He was
made Chief of the Staff of his Corps towards the
close of 1848, an honour to which he had long
aspired, and which he had thought the extreme
range of his highest ambition. His was now really
the directing mind of a small army complete in
itself, and his ability, his industry, his attention to
details, felt through the whole sphere of regimental
work, soon raised the 4th Corps to marked eminence. 2
" Such troops, if Frederick the Great had only had
them," he wrote of his men, with honourable pride ;
and it may be remarked that, though strict in the ex-
treme, he was popular with the young staff officers.
1 "Letters," vol. i. p. 181. 2 Ibid. vol. i. p. 228.
24 MOLTKE.
He was stationed at Magdeburg during the next
few years, and for some time lie was engaged in
repressing the irregular risings and mob violence
in which the movement of 1848 had ended, a duty
sternly but discreetly performed, and not in the
spirit of Dalzell or Claverhouse. As usual, too, he
devoted many hours to military duties at this period,
and he gave considerable attention to the Crimean
War, the last exhibition of the conduct and method
of war in the first years of this century, eliminating
genius and experience in the field. These passages,
however, were not the most important in this part
of Moltke's career. The Crown Prince the King
and Emperor who was to be was Commander-in-
Chief of the 4th Corps, and this true soldier, who
had the high faculty of discovering and esteeming
superior men, had appreciated the merits of the
Chief of his Staff. The Prince and Moltke became
fast friends, and seldom, indeed, have two minds
been united by ties of such close sympathy. The
Crown Prince had the wrongs of his mother
to avenge the ill-fated Louise of Jena and
Tilsit and cordially hated all that was French,
and Moltke felt towards France as a Prussian
soldier, and had described her as the 1 disturber of
Europe. Both, too, had a fixed, if undefined, notion
that Prussia ought to be the head of a united
Germany, and that this object was to be attained
through the army ; both resented the weakness, the
folly, the license, which had been so disastrous in
1 " Letters," vol. i. p. 78.
MOLTKE.
To face page 25.
CHILDHOOD. YOUTH. MANHOOD. 25
1848 ; both believed tbat " heroes would take the
place of spouters" a pregnant and significant
pbrase of Moltke and botb bitterly felt the dis-
grace of Olmiitz, the subjection of Prussia to the
will of Austria, in 1851-2, and the sorry attitude of
Prussia during the Crimean "War. 1
The reputation of Moltke, in the words of Horace,
" grew like the hidden growth of a tree." He did
not become a general until 1856, when verging on
the decline of manhood, an age when most com-
manders have done their work. Through the
influence, doubtless, of the Crown Prince, he was
made an aide-de-camp of his son Frederick the late
and deeply-regretted Emperor and he went with
his chief once more on his travels. He was present
at the marriage of the Princess Royal, but he has
scarcely referred to what he saw in England,
though, like Bugeaud, he admired the British
infantry, and, like Bugeaud, probably thought them
a handful of men. A collection of letters from his
pen, to his wife, describes a visit to Russia in 1856,
and though full of details of Court life and gossip,
is, nevertheless, of some lasting interest. St.
Petersburg did not strike Moltke, but he was deeply
moved by the sight of Moscow that city of the East
on the border of the West, oriental in type, yet,
above all, Christian and from the summit of the
Kremlin he looks back at the days when the plain
1 The views and opinions of the Crown Prince on these subjects
are well known. For those of Moltke, see ''Letters," vol. i. pp.
188, 189, 193, 217, 228, &c.
26 MOLTKE.
swarmed with the horsemen of the Golden Horde,
and the affrighted Muscovite shrank behind ram-
parts thrown up to resist the conquering Tartar.
Curiously enough, he only alludes in one passage to
the great invasion of the West in 1812; and he
complacently gazes on hundreds of French cannon,
captured in the long and awful retreat. The
Russian army made a strong impression on his
mind ; that armed assemblage of many races and
tongues from the Caucasus to the Baltic and Cas-
pian brings vividly before him the power of the
Czars ; and he dwells with marked approbation on
the well-ordered lines and steadiness of the masses
of the Russian troops, characteristic of a nature
which made discipline and obedience the first of a
soldier's qualities. Soon after this time he was with
the Prince in Paris, but his record of his experiences
is brief and trivial. The splendour of the Tuileries
and the gay magnificence of the City on the Seine
delight and amaze him; and we seem to be in the
presence of a great martial Goth, who, dimly
conscious that the hour of his race is at hand,
passes through the Rome of Decius and Gallus. Of
the French army he says very little, but anything
he says is by no means in its favour. He had called
the Empire 1 a " magnificent swindle," and he sees
plainly that Caesarism without a Csesar Napoleon
III. in the seat of Napoleon democracy, faction,
routine, and tradition had injured the military in-
stitutions of France. At a time when the French
1 " Letters," vol. i, p. 231.
CHILDHOOD. YOUTH. MANHOOD. 27
army was deemed a model for all the great Con-
tinental armies, Moltke criticized sharply the loose
indiscipline and irregular marching of French
troops ; and to a mind like his, which placed order
before liberty, the intelligence and agility of the
French soldier were not rated at their true worth. 1
Moltke was to show that he did not comprehend
the essential aptitude for war of the illustrious race
which has been the wonder and terror, more than
once, of Europe.
The hour of deserved advancement, deferred
for years, was, at last, to come for the man of
thought and action, remarkable alike for strength
of mind and of character. Frederick William of
Prussia was learned and enlightened, but he had
been, in the main, a bad ruler; he had missed his
opportunity in 1848, had rejected the Crown offered
by the German people, and had been false and
infirm of purpose ; he had let Prussia sink into a
third-rate power, and had allowed the Prussian
army greatly to decline. His intellect gave way in
1857, and the Crown Prince, his brother, the friend
of Moltke, having become Regent and ere long
King, addressed himself to the task of raising the
Monarchy and the State from its fallen position.
King William, we have seen, had a kind of notion
that Prussia should be at the head of the German
nation ; he detested the policy of his predecessor,
and he clearly saw that the military power of
1 " Le Mareehal Moltke," par. xxx. 107-8. This work is by a
French General Officer.
28 MOLTKE.
Prussia must be greatly increased if she was to
work out her apparent destiny. Conservative,
simple-minded, and above all a Prussian soldier,
intent on Prussian interests, it was some time before
he lent an ear to the audacious and crafty counsels
of Bismarck, and thought of reaching the goal of
German unity by seconding " with blood and iron,"
and without doubt or scruple, a movement partly
revolutionary, and in part national. But he resolved
from the first to reform the Prussian army, and to
make it what it had ceased to be, a formidable and
efficient instrument of war. As early as 1858, and
years before Bismarck became Minister, the late
Commander of the 4th Corps appointed Moltke
Chief of the General Staff, that is, gave him the
supreme direction of military affairs. Eoon, the
Minister of War, soon became his colleague, and
the complete reorganization of the armed strength
of Prussia was steadily taken in hand.
CHAPTER II.
Sketch of the history of the Prussian army The army of Fre-
derick the Great That of 1813-14 The Keforms of 1815
The results Keorganization of the army in 1859-60 Great
improvements effected by the King, Boon, and Moltke
Special work of Moltke in the staff and the army Formidable
power of the army after 1860 The Danish War The war
of 1866 Political situation of the belligerent powers
Austria and Prussia stand on the defensive The offensive
projects of Moltke frustrated Assembly of the Prussian
armies on the frontiers of Saxony and Silesia Assembly
of the Austrian army in Moravia Characteristics of that
army The Prussians invade Saxony and Bohemia Advance
of the Austrians into Bohemia The projects of General
Benedek He loses a great opportunity Defeat of the
Austrians in a series of combats and battles Benedek re-
treats behind the Bistritz.
THOUGH the youngest army of the great powers of
Europe, the Prussian army has known many
strange vicissitudes. It owed its existence to the
Great Elector, a contemporary and opponent of
Turenne ; it had been made a powerful and well-
trained force by soldiers brought up in the school
of Marlborough ; it became a most formidable
organization for war in the vigorous hands of
Frederick the Great. It had, nevertheless, many
essential defects, though these were scarcely apparent
when it was led by a commander, if not of the very
first order, far superior to the commanders of his
30 MOLTKE.
time. 1 It was largely recruited from mere mer-
cenaries ; it had hundreds of foreign officers in its
ranks ; it was subjected to a barbarous discipline,
and badly supplied in many particulars ; its supe-
riors were drawn from a caste of nobles, who had
a kind of property in the troops they mustered;
and if the fire of its infantry was in the highest
degree excellent, and its cavalry was a mighty arm,
its formations, though much the best of its day,
were, nevertheless, somewhat stiff and cumbrous.
The army rapidly declined after the death of
Frederick ; and its essential vices became but too
manifest, when it went down in 1806-7, before the
soldiery of Revolutionary France, commanded by
the greatest of captains, enthusiastic, flexible, and
well-handled by officers largely promoted for merit ;
when desertion carried away all its alien elements,
and when, in a word, it was reduced to impotence.
The army of Frederick, in fact, disappeared ; but
Prussia, a martial people, remained ; and in the
hour of subjugation and defeat, her military chiefs
undertook the task of creating a new army out of
the ruins of the old. This was a most dangerous
and difficult work, for the Conqueror of Jena had
insisted that the Prussian army should, in no case,
exceed 42,000 men ; and the policy of Napoleon, in
fact, was to keep it in a state of mere vassalage to
himself. A man of genius, however, and the spirit
1 Among many other authorities, " The Memoirs of General
Marbot," Tome i. 286-7, contain interesting details on the subject.
See also The Edinburgh Review for January, 1892.
CHIEF OF THE STAFF. THE PRUSSIAN ARMY. 31
of the race contrived to baffle the will of the all-
powerful despot. Scharnhorst, made the minister
of war of Prussia, afraid of the jealous Lord of the
Continent, kept the standing army within the
limited strength, as regards the troops in actual
service ; but he passed through the ranks and
partly trained tens of thousands of youths in rapid
succession; and these, fired with patriotism and
apt for war, were admirably fitted to become good
soldiers, and formed elements of great military
power. Other reforms lessened and even removed
the most glaring defects of the old army; and, as
the result, the army of Scharnhorst expanded sud-
denly in 1813 to a force of more than 200,000 men,
superior to that of its allies in Saxony. The mar-
vellous rising of Germany did the rest ; volunteers,
burning to avenge their country, flocked in multi-
tudes to the Prussian standards; and such was
the enthusiasm of the wronged nation, that Prussia
was able to raise a powerful militia, ever since
known by the name of Landwehr. What these
formidable arrays achieved in the field, was seen in
many a hard-fought struggle from the banks of the
Elbe to those of the Seine, and especially on the
crowning day of Waterloo.
The military institutions of Prussia, however,
were not permitted to rest permanently on the
patriotic levies of 1813 ; their bases were laid two
years afterwards ; for it is characteristic of Prussia
that she establishes her organization for war in
peace. The general main lines on which the
32 MOLTKE.
armed strength of the nation has ever since been
built up were not finally marked out until 1815.
By these arrangements, it was provided that every
Prussian subject is bound to military service as his
duty to the State ; and in theory, this principle has
been steadily retained. In practice, however, a
yearly contingent of not more than 40,000 men
was sent into the ranks of the army, a succession
of these contingents yielding the elements which
made up the national forces. The standing army
was composed of about 200,000 men, liable, in the
first instance, to serve for three years, and then
drafted into a reserve in which they were to serve
for two ; and they next passed into the reserve of
the Landwehr, which, divided into two main bodies,
could furnish perhaps 300,000 men, for the most
part beyond the age of youth. The army, con-
stituted in this way, was organized on a local terri-
torial system ; that is, it was formed into corps
d'armee, each belonging to a separate part of the
monarchy, and being a unit distinct in itself;
this corresponding to immemorial tendencies and
traditions of the Teutonic race, which * Ca3sar and
Tacitus inform us, went to war in tribes. The
Landsturm, a kind of universal levy, to be called
out only in the event of invasion, formed the last
defensive force of the State.
This organization gave Prussia an army of half
a million of men, including the Landwehr but not
1 Caesar, De Bello Gallico, cap. 51 ; Tacitus, De Moribus
Germanise, cap. 7.
CHIEF OF THE STAFF. THE PRUSSIAN ARMY. 33
the Landsturm, an irregular and extraordinary
force. But if the army was large in numbers and
appeared powerful, the system, on which it rested,
had many defects, and it became a very inferior
instrument of war. The yearly contingent remained
40,000 strong ; but, as the population of the State
increased, it ought to have been enlarged in pro-
portion ; and many thousands of men, who might
well have served, were never summoned to join the
colours. The term of service, too, in the standing
army was, especially for the reserve, short ; it could
not exceed five years in the whole and, in fact, it
was often reduced to four. The most faulty side
of the system, however, was exhibited in the Land-
wehr as a military force. It had been assumed
that this great reserve would always give proof of
the high martial qualities it showed in 1813-14, and
would yield the army regularly an ample supply of
trained, mature, and thoroughly loyal soldiers.
But what was possible in a general national rising,
was not to be expected in ordinary times ; and the
Landwehr, composed of men in middle life with
settled occupations and, for the most part, married,
became a bad and unsound element for feeding and
sustaining the standing army. The Prussian army,
in fact, became divided into an assemblage of troops,
comparatively weak in numbers and not sufficiently
trained, and a collection of men disinclined to serve
and discontented whenever called out. It fell far
short of its normal strength, and was below the
standard of other armies of the time ; and this, no
D
34 MOLTKE.
doubt, was the real cause of the surrender of
Olmiitz in 1850, and of the vacillation of Prussia
during the Crimean War.
King William, we have seen, had resolved to
bring the Prussian army out of this state of decline,
and had selected Moltke and Roon to aid him in
the task. The work of reform began in 1859-60,
and was carried out with admirable skill and
forethought. The principles of the arrangements
of 1815 were not changed in a marked degree ;
that is, military service continued to be the possible
obligation of all Prussians, and the army remained
arrayed on the local system, with the exception of
the corps d'elite of the Guard. But the yearly
contingent of recruits was raised from 40,000 to
63,000 men, thus taking in a quota that ought to
have served, and lessening what had become a
grievance ; and the time of service was extended
from five to seven years, four years being the term
in the reserve. The Landwehr was at the same
time made a wholly separate force from the standing
army, and it became less one of its component
parts, than a supplement available when an occasion
required. In this way, when the reform was com-
plete, the standing army was increased in numbers
from 200,000 to more than 400,000 men, and its
military value was perhaps quadrupled, owing to
the enlargement of the time of service, and its
organization apart from the Landwehr. Simul-
taneously, large supplies of material of all kinds
were laid in and stored, and the military strength of
CHIEF OF THE STAFF. THE PRUSSIAN AEMY. 35
Prussia was increased from 500,000 to more than
700,000 men, taking the Landwehr but not the
Landsturm. into account. The real augmentation
of power, however, was in the change effected in
the standing army, which had been transformed
from a weak, untrustworthy force into a really for-
midable and efficient array. Yet such is the force of
routine and tradition that this extraordinary growth
of the armed strength of Prussia did not attract
much attention at the time, even among the mili-
tary states of the continent.
The King and Roon had the principal part in
increasing the strength of the Prussian army ;
but Moltke was their fellow-worker, and gave ex-
cellent advice. The staff, however, of which he
had been made the chief, was his special province,
and wholly his own, and it soon felt the effects of a
master's hand. The Prussian staff, in the form it
still retains, was a result of the partition of powers
made between Bliicher, a hero indeed, but a soldier
only, unlettered and rude, and Gneisenau, an able
and scientific officer ; its chief was held to be the
responsible counsellor of the general in command
in the field; and it was at once permanent, and
had much independence. It had had two chiefs of
a high order, Muffling, a companion-in-arms of
Wellington in the decisive campaign of 1815, who
had done much to promote learning and professional
studies of all kinds ; and Krauseneck, the real author,
perhaps, of the great manoeuvres in peace of the
Prussian army, if Frederick the Great had a share
D 2
36 MOLTKE.
in the honour. Moltke added to the number of his
subordinates, superintended their education with
incessant care, and spared no pains in selecting the
officers ; and, in a word, steadily laboured to make
the Prussian staff, what it has been aptly called,
the Brain of the Army, the source and centre of its
intellectual force. The complete instruction of the
staff officer was naturally, indeed, an ideal sought
by one who excelled in the learning of war ; and
the Staff College, ultimately under Moltke's auspices,
developed into the great " Academy of War," a
military university of the best kind. In two main
particulars, the new Chief of the Staff made the
efficiency of his department much greater than it
had been at any previous time. Moltke accumulated
information, exact and minute, on the military
resources of every state in Europe, for he had
always an eye to the possible events of war; and
these statistics have proved of the highest value.
Knowing, too, how important is the study of the
military art from recorded facts the only means,
indeed, through which it can be understood he
inaugurated the practice of compiling histories of
the most memorable campaigns of the day, which
has been a special task of the Prussian staff : and
the first of the series, an account of the campaign
of 1859, in Italy, is wholly, it is believed, from his
pen. This admirable sketch is of a much higher
order than the elaborate descriptions of the great
wars of 1866 and 1870 the composition of inferior
men on the staff, which, as we have said, are too
CHIEF OF THE STAFF. THE PRUSSIAN ARMY. 37
voluminous, are overloaded with petty details, and
contain scarcely any striking comments ; and it
is singularly characteristic of the mind of the
author. Moltke is more of a critic than is his
wont ; he dwells on the irresolute slowness of
Gyulai, at the outset of the war; and he approves
on the whole of the well-known march, by which
Napoleon III. turned the Austrian right, " because
he could trust in his army and its superior strength,"
although he admits it was " hazardous in the ex-
treme." But, as usual, he addresses himself chiefly
to the arrangements made by both sides for war,
and to the general conduct of the armies in the
field. He points out essential defects in the military
organization of France and Austria ; he dilates on
the fatal effects of divided councils in the Austrian
camp, and of the value of unity in advice and com-
mand ; and, spite of apparent signs to the contrary,
he insists that precision of fire must prevail over
the most brilliant charges in modern battles.
Moltke, however, was more than a Chief of the
Staff, taking the expression even in its widest
import. Napoleon reduced Berthier to the position
of a clerk ; King William, conscious of Moltke's
powers, made him virtually the head of the whole
Prussian army. It was under his direction that
this mighty instrument was gradually fashioned, and
made effective to answer the uses of modern war,
and what he achieved must be rapidly glanced at.
It was Moltke' s great and peculiar excellence that
he thoroughly understood, and turned to the best
38 MOLTKE.
advantage, the new conditions of war evolved in his
time, as Turenne, intent on his wars of marches,
had increased the infantry in the armies of
Lous XIV., as Napoleon, pre-eminent in quickness
of movement, drew immense consequences from the
progress of husbandry, and from the multiplication
and improvement of roads, which had taken place
since the days of Frederick.
During the era of peace that came after Waterloo,
conservatism and routine prevailed, as a rule, in
the War Offices of every Power in Europe. In
England, Wellington obstinately clung to the
traditions of the Peninsular War ; Soult, in France,
followed the ways of the Empire, but weakened the
military strength of the State ; Austria and Russia
carried out the ideas of the Archduke Charles, of
Diebitsch and Paskevitch ; and the wars that were
waged at the close of this period, were all con-
ducted upon the methods established in the age
of Napoleon. Yet during this time, and the suc-
ceeding years, mighty forces and influences were
making themselves felt, which were largely to
change the order of Europe, and to affect, most
deeply, the operations of war. The population of
all nations greatly increased ; education had reached
the masses, and had been widely diffused ; and the
rude elements, therefore, of military power had
become more ample than they had ever been while
the intelligence and self-reliance of the classes,
which form the chief material of armies, had been
developed beyond all previous experience. Agri-
CHIEF OF THE STAFF. THE PKUSSIAN AEMY. 89
culture, too, had made a rapid advance, the lines of
ordinary roads had been much extended; the
system of railways had spread through all lands,
and had added immensely to the facilities of loco-
motion already existing ; and these prodigious
changes had made it possible, that armies should
possess a power and an ease of movement never
before witnessed. The age, besides, was one of
material knowledge, rifled cannon and the breech-
loading musket had been invented, and were partly
used ; and this formidable mechanism was destined
to modify the order of battles and the whole art of
tactics. And ere long, we should add, the great
Civil War of America, showed on a vast scale what
modern discoveries could effect in war ; it proved
the uses of the electric telegraph, of the steam
engine, and of appliances of the kind; and,
generally speaking, it made manifest the value of
the new inventions in operations in the field.
Moltke's distinctive merit, we repeat, was that he
saw through these facts, and all that resulted from
them, more clearly than most of the soldiers of the
day, who either did not thoroughly grasp the truth,
or stood on the old ways, behind the time. The
Prussian army, through his assiduous efforts, was
gradually adjusted to the new conditions. The
later campaigns of Napoleon had shown that armies
had become too large even for his master-hand ;
how would it be when growing population would
expand the armies of the existing age into far ampler
proportions ? To avert this grave inconvenience
40 MOLTKE.
Moltke arranged tliat the Prussian army should be
divided into separate and distinct armies, each
powerful but of manageable size, when it had
become necessary to take the field ; and he especially
insisted, while maintaining the importance of unity
in supreme command, that the chiefs of the different
armies must enjoy a freedom of action and an
independence which Napoleon's marshals never
possessed. The progress of education again had
increased the natural powers of the individual man ;
and Moltke drew excellent results from this, by
taking advantage of intelligence and skill, and,
notably, by making the troops and their officers feel
a real sense of personal duty, and by uniting them
in a gradation of well-planned services, so that the
whole army presented the image of that connected
series of denned relations to which the first 1 of
historians ascribed the secret of the success of Sparta
in war. As regards the improvement in the means
of communication which was taking place, Prussia
had given special attention to railways ; and
Moltke laid down careful and excellent rules to
secure that her railways and other roads should be
readily available for the conveyance of troops, and
for the transport of the material of war, in order
that the assembly of her military forces and their
movements should be made as rapid as possible.
Moltke, we have seen, had perceived that the power
of fire-arms would be the decisive element in
modern battles ; and certainly he carefully studied
1 Thucydides.
CHIEF OF THE STAFF. THE PEUSSIAN ARMY. 41
the effects which rifled guns and breech-loaders
would produce. 1 His conclusions, however, on
these subjects appear to have been somewhat slowly
formed ; and experience alone perhaps convinced
him, that having regard to the tremendous force of
the new artillery and small arms, the dense forma-
tions and the compact lines of the days of his
youth must be abandoned. From the American
war, in which he was thoroughly versed, he drew
information of much value as to the use of the
electric telegraph in the field.
The Prussian army, greatly enlarged in numbers,
though not so perfect as it became afterwards, was
made,, through these means, a most formidable
array, well arranged, well ordered, easily handled,
and capable of being quickly drawn together and
moved. It was already far the first of the armies
of Europe; and it should be added that the
Prussian foot-soldier was armed with the breech -
loading needle-gun, a weapon not employed in any.
other service, and as superior to the rifle charged
from the muzzle, as the long bow of Crecy was to
the Genoese cross-bow. Not only, too, it appears
probable, was Moltke the principal constructor of
this mighty force, he had, perhaps, a voice in
appointing to the chief commands in it. It is certain,
at least, that at this time, the Prussian generals were
able men ; and this exactly carried out a maxim, 2 on
1 See " A Tactical Retrospect " and a " Retrospect of the Tactical
Retrospect," the first work by a very able soldier, Captain May,
the second by Moltke.
2 " Campaign of Italy in 1859," p. 8.
42 MOLTKE.
which he has more than once insisted, that if
captains of the first order are seen only at wide
intervals of time, good commanders can always be
made forthcoming. Be this, however, as it may,
the Prussian army under his care had the immense
advantage of direction of a superior kind, as well
as of an organization wholly unequalled ; and this
was another element that made it supreme. Finally
and this should be carefully borne in mind this
vast combination of military force was prepared and
equipped with a special view to the method of
warfare which, Moltke knew, 1 has proved to be in
every age the best. Versed thoroughly in the history
of war, bold, capable and firm in the extreme of
purpose, he perfectly understood the immense value
of the initiative in operations in the field; and he
had made it the end of his unceasing efforts that
the Prussian army should be always ready to take
the offensive at the briefest notice, and to fall in
force on an enemy at once. The local territorial
system, it should be observed, in itself strongly
promoted his object.
The great instrument of power which Moltke
had fashioned, was soon tried, if not really tested.
It would be superfluous to notice the Danish war, a
conflict between a petty state and two of the
leading Powers of the Continent, the issue of which
was never doubtful. It is disputed, indeed, 2 to what
1 " Faites la Guerre offensive," Napoleon.
2 See Von Sybel, " History of the Foundation of the German
Empire," and " Field-Marshal Von Moltke," by Von Fircks, both
CHIEF OF THE STAFF. THE PRUSSIAN ARMY. 43
extent Moltke planned or directed the Prussi'an
movements ; superiority in command certainly does
not appear in the repulse at Missiinde, or in the
elaborate efforts made against the redoubts of
Diippel. In two particulars, however, the war was
important with reference to events in the near
future. Moltke was present during the invasion of
Jutland; and he had ample opportunity to examine,
on the spot, the working of the military system of
Austria, and to lay to heart all that was defective
in it. The Austrian chiefs, on the other hand, full
of the memories of Novara and Olmiitz, seem to
have held the army of their allies cheap, and
especially disregarded the destructive effect of the
formidable weapons of the Prussian infantry.
The military power of Prussia was made clearly
manifest, for the first time, in the great war she
waged against Austria and the German Confedera-
tion in 1866. On the causes of the conflict we
cannot dwell ; they were broadly due to the long-
standing rivalry of Austria and Prussia, as German
powers, and especially to Bismarck's ambitious policy,
yet we cannot avoid a passing glance at the political
situation evolved at the time", for it largely con-
trolled the events of the war, and it explains much
that, otherwise, would be obscure. The German
nation was strongly against a struggle, which it
condemned as fratricidal and unwise; and the King of
Prussia, if eager to enlarge the monarchy, and even
cited by " Charles Malo," the nom de plume of a distinguished
soldier, and military critic, in his sketch of Moltke.
44 MOLTKE.
zealous in the cause of German unity, had resolved
if possible to maintain a defensive attitude, and
not to be the first to draw the sword. On the other
hand, Austria dreaded a rupture; she, too, felt the
force of German opinion ; she knew that Italy was
a deadly enemy ; she was sinking under financial
distress, and she trembled for the safety of her ill-
compacted Empire. Besides, Austria and Prussia
were both afraid of the probable armed intervention
of France, and thus the military counsels of both
states were strongly affected by the hesitation and
delays, to be ascribed to a halting and somewhat
timid policy. Bismarck was the one statesman
who distinctly saw his way.
These circumstances must be steadily kept in
view in following the operations of the war of 1866,
which have been the subject of a great amount of
criticism. On the side of Prussia, Moltke laid
down the general lines of the plans of the cam-
paign, and certainly the resolve to oppose a weak
force only to the ill-prepared levies of the Con-
federate States, and to concentrate the great mass
of the Prussian army against Austria, the only
dangerous foe, shows much firmness of purpose
and the clearest insight. The measures, however,
taken to cope with Austria were, apparently, far
from equally wise, and, indeed, they can be under-
stood only, at the outset at least, by bearing in
mind the considerations before referred to. Austria
had begun to arm towards the close of March;
hostilities seemed about to open, though there had
THE PRUSSIAN ARMY. THE WAR OF 1866. 45
been no actual declaration of war ; and Moltke,
there is some reason to believe, wished to assemble
at once the main Prussian armies, to bring them
together around Gb'rlitz and the adjoining Lusatian
plains ; and having covered the approaches to the
heart of Prussia, especially the great cities of Berlin
and Breslau, to be ready to advance across the
Bohemian frontier, following, probably, a single
line of invasion. The king, however, would not
hear of such a course as this ; he deferred the
assembly of the Prussian armies for weeks, as
he was anxious not to take the offensive ; and,
as on the assumption that he would stand on the
defensive only, they could not find the means of
subsistence were they kept together long within
a contracted space, it became necessary to give
up a project, at once daring and well conceived.
The strategy of Moltke was, in fact, baffled in this
respect by his master's scruples. 1
The preparations of Austria went steadily on,
while those of Prussia were long delayed, and it
was not until nearly the middle of May that the
real assembly of the Prussian forces began. By
this time, however, the occasion had been lost of
concentrating the great mass of the Prussian army
around Gb'rlitz or any other given point. In view
of the situation it had become perhaps necessary
to gather together, as quickly as possible, and by
1 These conclusions may, we think, be drawn from a careful
study of the " Prussian Staff History of the War of 1866,"
chapter ii. See especially \21-29.\ English translation.
46 MOLTKE.
every means of communication on the spot, the
different parts of the armed strength of Prussia;
this involved their distribution at wide distances,
and, besides, the insuperable difficulty of supplies
would increase should an attempt be made to unite
them closely, and the king should maintain an
attitude of defence. Moltke's arrangements were
made to meet a position of affairs in which he was
circumscribed and restricted, and if their strategic
merit admits of question, they show how admirable
had been his organizing powers. Of the nine J
corps d'armee, which made up the army, eight arid
a half were opposed to Austria ; these great masses
of men, about 260,000 strong, and all their vast
material of war, drawn together from their different
local centres, were moved towards Saxony and into
Silesia by the numerous roads and railways spread-
ing throughout Prussia; and the celerity and
precision of this great movement, accomplished in
the space of three weeks only, astonished, nay, even
alarmed Europe. Three large armies were now
formed; the first, composed of one corps and a
half, to be soon joined by a powerful reserve, and
given the name of the Army of the Elbe ; the
second, known as the First Army, for the moment
comprising three corps, with two more not far in
the rear ; and the third, designated as the Second
Army; and the huge arrays, divided into three
groups, were extended upon an immense line, from
Torgau on the Elbe to Waldenburg and Landshut,
1 Including the Guards.
THE PEUSSIAN ARMY. THE WAR OF 1866. 47
where the Giant Hills mark out the Bohemian fron-
tier. The Army of the Elbe was in the hands of
Herwarth Bittenfield, a general of proved expe-
rience and worth ; the First and Second were led
by Prince Frederick Charles and the Crown Prince,
the eldest son of the king, both true to the martial
traditions of their House.
This wide dissemination of the Prussian forces,
had Moltke's assumptions been correct, would cer-
tainly have been extremely hazardous, 1 for he
believed that a large part of the Austrian army was
collected at this time in Bohemia, prepared to join
hands with its Saxon allies, and a few days, nay,
hours, might bring forth war. From what we
have seen, however, he had but little choice, though
possibly he had advanced the armies too near to
Bohemia, with a view to the bold offensive he had
in his mind ; and in judging his strategy, we must,
we repeat, remember the situation that had been
made for him. All apprehensions and dangers of
the kind were, nevertheless, without foundation,
owing to the disposition made of the forces of
Austria. That Power, we have seen, was averse to
war; the Emperor, like the King of Prussia, was
disinclined to begin hostilities, and if Austria armed
long before Prussia, this was caused by a belief,
which was perfectly true, that she did not possess
the means of assembling her armies as rapidly as
1 "Prussian Staff History," p. 25. The writer admits, p. 18,
that the " intelligence was very defective " concerning the Austrian
movements.
48 MOLTKE.
her well-prepared rival. Her project for a cam-
paign was strictly defensive ; the staff 1 prepared an
elaborate plan of operations with this object only ;
and while Prussia was drawing near the Bohemia
passes, by far the greater part of the Austrian
army was collected in Moravia, around Brimn and
Olmiitz, one corps alone being in Bohemia. The
attack, therefore, which Moltke thought not im-
probable, and which most soldiers in Europe
believed would be made, on the widely divided
Prussian armies, was not possible, and was not
even designed.
It was not until the llth of June that the
positions of the main body of the Austrian army
became certainly known in the Prussian camp.
Silesia seemed threatened by an advance from
Olmiitz, and, in order to guard against this danger,
a new direction was given to the Prussian armies,
political considerations in this respect, too, 2 being,
not improbably, without influence. The Second
Army was strengthened by the Guards and the
1st Corps, the two divisions which had been in-
tended to form a part of the First Army ; and the
Crown Prince moved to the tracts round the Neisse,
where the river descends from its source to the
Oder. The Army of the Elbe was left in its former
position, but the First Army was drawn towards
1 " Austrian Staff History," translated into French, and called
" Les Luttes de 1'Autriche, vol. i. p. 79.
3 Austria was believed to be, and perhaps was, hankering after
Silesia. See " Fyffe's History of Modern Europe," vol. iii. p. 367.
THE PEUSSIAN ARMY. THE WAR OF 1866. 49
the Second, extending from Niesky and Gorlitz to
Reiehenbach and Lowenburg, along the verge of
the Giant Hills ; the defence of Silesia, it is evident,
being the immediate object of these movements,
but with a view to the offensive, should an occasion
offer. War broke out on the 15th of June ; there
" was no more talk about defensive flank marches J>1
in the Prussian councils, and the king consented
at last to take the offensive, yielding probably to
the advice of Moltke and Bismarck, who had given
his voice for decisive operations from' the first.
At this juncture the three Prussian armies were
spread along a front of about 130 miles, from the
Middle Elbe to the Upper Neisse ; and offensive
operations being designed, two courses only, per-
haps, were open to Moltke. He might draw his
forces together, within a more contracted space,
behind the range of the Bohemian hills, on the
verge of Saxony and in Silesia, and might then
move into Bohemia and Saxony, making the inva-
sion on a single line only. But, apart from other
objections to an operation of the kind, this strategy
would involve considerable delay; and, as the
result, the Austrian army would have ample time
to march into Bohemia, and, uniting with its Saxon
supports, to fight a great battle, fully concentrated,
in one of the strong positions, chosen by itself,
which abound to the south of the mountain barrier.
The alternative was to advance, at once, with the
1 " Prussian Staff History," p. 30. The tone of impatience at
previous delays cannot be mistaken.
50 MOLTKE.
three armies from where they stood ; to enter
Saxony and Bohemia with these, on double, but con-
verging lines of invasion ; and to unite the armies,
as quickly as possible, at a point south of the great
Bohemian ranges, in the hope that they would
forestall the enemy, and join before he could pre-
vent their junction. This operation, however,
involved the drawing together of large masses,
divided by wide distances, and separated by obstacles
of all kinds, hill ranges, mountain passes, and rivers,
and the assembling them in a hostile country, where
the Austrians might be collected in force a con-
tingency by no means improbable ; and from the
days of Turenne to those of Lee, movements of the
kind have repeatedly proved disastrous, especially
when an adversary is bold and skilful.
Moltke instantly adopted the second course,
though it is idle to suppose that he did not weigh
the hazards, or was unaware of the undoubted
dangers. He remained at Berlin to direct the great
offensive movement, the electric telegraph giving
him the means of communicating with the chiefs of
the armies, and perhaps of lessening the risk of the
converging march ; and he assigned Gitschin, a
well-known spot, between the Upper Iser and the
Upper Elbe, as the point where the junction was to
be made. Operations now began along the im-
mense front still occupied by the three Prussian
armies. The Army of the Elbe, 70,000 strong, with
its reserve, entered Saxony on the 16th of June;
was in possession of Dresden by the 18th ; and
THE PRUSSIAN AEMY. THE WAR OF 1866. 51
having sent detachments to its left was in com-
munication with the First Army on the 19th and
20th ; the two armies being now placed under the
chief command of Prince Frederick Charles, though
their principal divisions remained apart. The
Prince had invaded Bohemia by the 22nd and 23rd,
the First Army, under his immediate orders, being
about 93,000 men ; the Army of the Elbe, reduced to
perhaps 60,000 for it had been necessary to leave
some divisions in Saxony advanced, on the right,
in a parallel line ; and the two masses more than
150,000 men, had reached Reichenberg and Gabel
by the 25th, still a long march from the line
of the Iser, where the Austrians had a part of their
army.
Meanwhile, on the opposite side of the great field
of manoeuvres the Crown Prince had advanced from
the Neisse with the Second Army, about 115,000
strong; and having made skilful demonstrations
to his left, in order to feign an attack on Olmufcz,
he directed the chief part of his forces towards the
passes which lead into Bohemia, through long
defiles, ending at Trautenau and Nachod. On the
25th, however, when Prince Frederick Charles had
already approached the course of the Iser, the Crown
Prince was still on the Bohemian frontier; and
thus the three armies, though drawing towards each
other, were fully seventy or eighty miles apart, and
divided by a difficult and intricate country. Was it
probable for five or six days were required even if
they had scarcely to fire a shot that they would be
E 2
52 MOLTKE.
able to meet near, or round Gitschin, before their
enemy would stand in force between them ? And
in considering these operations it deserves special
notice that, at this moment, the exact positions of
the Austrian army were not known. 1
While the Prussian armies were thus on the
march, a broad and dangerous gap being still
between them, the Austrian army had begun to
move. The chief mass of that army, we have seen,
had been placed around Briinn and Olmiitz, and it
was in these positions on the llth of June, but it
broke up from its camp a few days afterwards.
Before reviewing its operations a word must be
said on the nature and characteristics of this impos-
ing force, which, with the corps in Bohemia and its
Saxon allies, was not less than 270,000 strong ; that
is, nearly equal in numbers to the three Prussian
armies, including the detachment left behind in
Saxony. As an instrument of war it was not to be
compared to the well-organized and efficient arrays,
composed, too, of soldiers of one nation, which it
was about to meet in the field. The cavalry, indeed,
formed an excellent arm, and the artillery was
better, perhaps, than the Prussian, but the infantry,
the backbone of an army, 2 was, as it has always
been, of inferior quality. The tactics of the
1 "Prussian Staff History," 62.
2 " La mauvaise infanterie Autrichienne," Napoleon. A striking
instance of the bad quality of the Austrian infantry is to be found
in General Marbot's Memoirs, vol. iii. p. 273. See also Edinburgh,
Review, April, 1892.
THE PRUSSIAN ARMY. THE WAR OP 1866. 53
Austrians, too, were radically unsound ; they were
based on the principle that determined charges
would get the better of effective fire ; the troops
were marshalled in too close formations, and, above
all, they were armed with the muzzle-loading rifle,
and did not possess the deadly needle-gun. Nor
were the Austrian commanders to be even named
with their able and thoroughly trained antagonists.
The gen eral-in- chief, Benedek, was a stout soldier,
of the school of Daun, famous in Austrian history ;
but he had no capacity for the higher parts of war ;
and he was unfortunately matched against such a
man as Moltke. Few of his subordinates, too, were
capable men; and the staff, though numbering
some good officers, was rather behind the require-
ments of the age. If we add most important, per-
haps, of all that the Austrian army was largely
made up of troops of different races, which disliked
their rulers, we shall see how unfit it was to cope
with its enemy.
Benedek, who had been given a free hand, had
reached Olmiitz in the first days of June, and his
purpose seems to have been to take the offensive,
and to abandon the defensive projects of the
Austrian staff. He wished, however, not to begin
hostilities until the contingents of the Confederate
Powers were, in some measure, ready to afford him
aid ; and, in any event, his intention was not to
take the field until the 20th of June. Nevertheless,
having been l apprised by the telegraph that war
1 "Luttes de 1'Autriehe," vol. iii. p. 10.
54 MOLTKE.
had been declared on the 15th, and that it was of
great importance to move at once, he set his army
in motion on the 17th of June; his object being to
enter Bohemia, and to find a favourable oppor-
tunity to attack the enemy. By this time the Saxon
army, about 25,000 strong, had retreated before
the Prussian invasion ; and ere long it had joined
the single Austrian corps which, we have seen, had
been in Bohemia for weeks. Benedek ordered the
chiefs of the united bodies, from 55,000 to 60,000
men, to stand firmly on the Upper Iser, between
Jung Bunzlau and Munchengratz, and to make head
against the advancing Prussians; and with the
remaining six corps of his army, considerably more
than 200,000 men, he broke up from around Briinn
and Olmiitz, directing the troops by parallel roads
and much of his material along the lines of rail-
way which reach Bomisch Triibau from these places,
and formed a single line as they approached the
Elbe. The object of these operations was to attain
the table-land between the Iser and the Elbe, which,
protected to the east by the two fortresses of
Josephstadt and Koniggratz, extends westward to
near Jung Bunzlau and Munchengratz, a region
rendered memorable in 1778 by the successful
resistance made by Loudon and Lacy to all the
efforts of Frederick the Great. Holding this tract
in force, Benedek hoped to be able to interpose
between the hostile armies, to attack, and to defeat
them in detail ; and his intention was to direct his
efforts, first against the army of Prince Frederick
THE PRUSSIAN ARMY. THE WAR OF 1866. 55
Charles, and having fallen on this in superior
strength, to turn against the army of the Crown
Prince, and to strike it down as it emerged from
the passes of Bohemia in very inferior numbers.
This plan was perfectly right in principle, and had
it been carried out the Austrian chief would have
held a central position between divided foes, and
interior lines on the scene of the contest; he would,
in fact, have had the same points of vantage as
Napoleon possessed in 1796, when army after army
succumbed to his strokes, in operations still perhaps
unrivalled, as his enemies converged in double and
separate lines towards his formidable lair, round
Mantua and the Adige.
Had Benedek been a great captain, had he made
use of the ordinary means employed to keep back
an enemy on the march, and had his army been
thoroughly prepared, he probably would have
attained his end. The telegraph had kept him
aware of the Prussian movements, 1 especially of
those of the Crown Prince; he had to traverse a
distance of about a hundred miles only, going back
even to his corps in the rear ; and he might,
with proper arrangements, have reached the posi-
tions he had in view, by the 28th or 29th of June,
interposing between the hostile armies, who should
have been retarded on their way. But he gave no
orders to Clam Gallas, 2 the leader of his corps on
1 " Luttes de 1'Autriche," vol. iii. p. 25.
2 Clam Gallas, however, ought to have taken these measures of
his own accord, and without waiting for command from his
56 MOLTKE.
the Tser, or to the Crown Prince, the chief of the
Saxon forces, to break up roads, to destroy rail-
ways, or generally to impede the advance of the
enemy ; he directed them only to stand on the Iser ;
and, 1 especially, he did not push forward troops to
occupy the Bohemian passes, to obstruct, and to
bar the defiles, and so to check the Crown Prince's
columns, as they moved from the Silesian frontier.
His movements too, were unsteady and slow ; the
soldiers were harassed by conflicting orders ; the
arrangements for procuring supplies were defective ;
and, in short, his army was feebly directed, and
was unable to march with anything like celerity.
superior. That he did not, shows the difference in capacity and
intelligence between the Austrian and Prussian generals. See
" Great Campaigns," by Major C. Adams, p. 445 an able work,
but somewhat deficient in accuracy, and too much of an apology
for Benedek.
1 This is well pointed out by the Austrian staff, which has
fairly described the position of affairs, and what ought to have
been done at this critical juncture : " Luttes de 1'Autriche,"
vol. iii. p. 15. "Si au lieu d'attendre jusqu'au dernier moment
en avait fait partir, par exemple, les 4 e et 8 e corps un ou deux
jours plustot ; si le 2 e corps stationne a Landskron, qui etait le
plus rapproche* de Josephstadt, avait commence le mouvement,
au lieu de le fermer, la concentration de 1'armee autour de cette
ville eut etc effectuee quelques jours plustot. Si, enfin, on avait
envoye rapidement en Boheme, par le chemin de fer, quelques
brigades d'infanterie avec la mission d'observer et de rendre im-
practi cables les defiles de la frontiere prussierme, en eut, sin on
empeche', au moins retarde le debouche des colonnes de la 11"
armee, ce qui eut permis de diriger la plupart des corps autrichiens
contre 1'armee du prince Frederic Charles, et de 1'ecraser par des
forces superieures. Ces d fferentes mesures de precaution etaient
parfaitement indiquees."
THE PBCJSSIAN ARMY. THE WAR OF 1866. 57
As the general result, the Austrian army had not
approached the positions sought by its chief the
table-land between the Iser and the Elbe until it
was, perhaps, too late; and as the march of the
Prussians had not been thwarted by precautions
even of the most obvious kind, Prince Frederick
Charles, we have seen, had drawn near the Iser,
ready to advance, by the 25th of June, the Crown
Prince, however, being still distant. In these cir-
cumstances, the Austrian leader though this has
been the subject of much controversy ought, we
think, to have abandoned his project ; he was still
four or five marches, at the rate of his movements,
from the points he had intended to hold; and if
he made an attempt to occupy these, he ran the
risk of being wedged in, between the foes con-
verging against him, and of meeting the fate of
Napoleon at Leipzig. Yet, though he had been
baffled to this extent, one of the best opportunities
ever presented to a real general was row offered
to him. By the 26th of June, the great mass of
his forces was concentrated, on either bank of the
Elbe, round Josephstadt, Koniggratz, Opocno,
and Tynist, and at a short distance from the
Bohemian frontier ; and, if Prince Frederick
Charles was close to the Iser, the Crown Prince
had not even entered the passes, which lead from
Silesia into Bohemia, his army too being widely
scattered, and extended upon a very broad front.
Had Benedek, therefore, who, we repeat, had been
kept informed of the enemy's movements, drawn in
58 MOLTKE.
his corps from the Iser one march only, and
directed the principal part of his army towards
Trautenau and Nachod, where the defiles nearly
end, and meet the Bohemian plains, he would have
opposed l an overwhelming force to any the Crown
Prince could bring against him, and might perhaps
have gained important success. In that event he
would have had ample time to turn in full strength
against Prince Frederick Charles, and to attack
him with largely superior numbers. He was
already, in fact, in the central position, which it
had been, from the first, his object to gain, and in
possession of interior lines ; and, had he known
how to turn this advantage to account, we shall
1 This is well indicated by the Austrian staff. " Luttes de
Autriche," vol. iii. p. 49 : " De 1'ensemble de tous ces rapports il
etait aise de conclure dans la soiree du 26, que la 11* armee
prussienne netarderait pas a entrer en Boheme, et qu'elle s'avan-
cait en trois colonnes fort eloignees les unes des autres. D'un
autre cote, il est incontestable qu'il etait non seulement possible,
mais facile d'opposer a 1'ennemi : d'abord le 4 e corps puis
le 10 e corps en troisieme lieu, le 6 e corps en-
suite les 3 e et 8 e corps enfin le 2 e corps et la 2 e division
de cavalerie le'gere." The " Prussian Staff History " practically
arrives at the same conclusion, and the following is probably from
the hand of Moltke himself : " Now that all is over, anyone may
say that the best plan would have been to have fallen with all
force on the 11 Army debouching from the mountains." The
writer, however, expresses a belief that the march of the Crown
Prince was not known to Benedek, but this is positively denied
by the Austrian staff, which was in possession of the facts,
p. 48. Major Adams adopts the view that Benedek was not aware
of the movements of the Crown Prince, but significantly observes,
p. 415 : " Had Benedek known what the Crown Prince was about
to undertake, he might have punished him."
THE PRUSSIAN ARMY. THE WAR OF 1866. 59
not say, so inferior his army was, that he would
have completely beaten his enemy, but probably he
would have made the invasion collapse.
Unhappily for Austria the chief she had chosen
had none of the gifts of a great commander. To
make effective use of a central position, such as
that which Benedek actually had, and of the in-
terior lines on which he was placed, requires
promptitude, decision, boldness, insight, and
especially power to seize the occasion ; and Benedek
did not possess these qualities. A gallant soldier,
he was no strategist ; and if tenacious and stubborn
in a high degree, he was obstinate, very slow of
perception, and essentially a man of fixed ideas,
who will not recede from a settled purpose. Though
the opportunity had, we are convinced, been lost,
he persisted in carrying out his original design, and
in endeavouring to place his army on the table-land
between the Iser and the Elbe, in the hope of strik-
ing Prince Frederick Charles ; and as he did not
interpret the facts correctly, he committed himself
to a whole series of false, erroneous, and disastrous
movements. Instead of drawing Clam Gallas and
the Saxons towards himself, he left them isolated
on the Iser, a much stronger enemy being already
at hand ; and, instead of concentrating, as he might
have done, a very superior force against the Crown
Prince, he turned aside the corps, which would have
served his purpose, believing that he could attack
Prince Frederick Charles with effect. At the same
time, having been made aware that the Crown
60 MOLTKE.
Prince was advancing in force, and was approaching
the Bohemian passes, he sent a detachment to hold
him in check ; but this consisted of two corps only,
inadequate to resist a whole army. Clam Gallas and
the Saxons thus remained exposed to the First Army
and the Army of Elbe; the great mass of the
Austrian army was directed to positions which it
could not reach in time to paralyze Prince Frederick
Charles, and was diverted from the enemy it might
have beaten, the Second Army of the Crown Prince ;
and a fraction only of Benedek's forces was marched
against the Crown Prince with his 115,000 men. 1
The distribution, in a word, of the Austrian army
was fatally erroneous at every point ; weak bodies
were opposed, on either wing, to enemies immensely
greater in strength ; and the main force, in the
centre, was engaged, far from its supports, in a
hopeless task. In these circumstances all the
advantage of its central position and interior
lines was thrown away, and had even become a
peril.
The results of Benedek's false operations were
soon developed with astounding quickness. Clam
Gallas was attacked on the 26th of June by the
1 "Luttes de 1'Autriche," vol. iii. p. 26: "Dans les derniers
jours, au moment decisif, alors qu'il n'y avait pas une heure a
perdre, le commandant-en-chef ordonne, d'un cote au prince royal
de Saxe une chose impossible ; se tenir sur 1'Iser contre des
forces tres superieures ; et, de 1'autre, il envoie des corps, isoles
se faire battre successivement, et isolement sur la rive gauche
de 1'Elbe. Ces mesures devaient necessairemont avoir des con-
sequences desastreuses, car elles detruisirent et la cohesion et
le moral de 1'armee."
THE PRUSSIAN ARMY. THE WAR OF 1866. 61
First Army, and driven across the Iser ; and the
blow was followed by blows in rapid succession.
The Prussians had crossed the Iser by the 27th ;
and Prince Frederick Charles, turning away from
Gitschin the point where the armies were to meet l
conduct which has exposed him to some censure
fell in force, at Munch engratz, on the 28th, on the
combined Austrian and Saxon corps, and defeated
them with considerable loss. The Prince now made
for Gitschin, and again routed his enemy completely
on the 29th, Clam Gallas and the Saxons falling
back towards the main Austrian army, in a pre-
cipitate retreat. Through these engagements, the
advanced columns of the First Army and of the Army
of the Elbe had reached the appointed place of
junction ; and the isolated wing of the Austrian
army had been cruelly stricken and half de-
stroyed, the main body, still at a great distance,
not being able to give it support.
Meantime, on the opposite scene of the conflict,
the Crown Prince had got through the defiles of the
hills, making for Trautenau and Nachod by the
roads, which traverse the passes into Bohemia, and
the results to Austria had been even more disastrous.
One of the two corps, indeed, which had been sent
by Benedek to check the progress of the Crown
Prince, defeated and drove back a Prussian corps at
Trautenau, on the 27th of June ; but this repulse was
avenged by the Prussian Guards, who routed their
enemy, at Soor, on the 28th. Simultaneously the
1 " Great Campaigns," p. 410.
62 MOLTKE.
other Austrian corps had been shattered to pieces,
at Nachod, on the 27th ; and a third corps, hurried
up to afford it aid, and misdirected in every way,
was involved at Skalitz in a terrible defeat. The
second wing of the Austrian army, divided from
the main body, like the first, and, like it, too weak to
resist the enemy, had been driven in, and almost
crushed ; and Benedek, with the mass of his forces,
unable to reach his adversaries at any point, and
to strike a single blow with effect, stood impotent
in the centre, looking on, so to speak, at the
annihilation of powerful arrays, which, if properly
directed, might have accomplished much.
In this series of conflicts the Austrians lost from
30,000 to 40,000 men, the Prussians probably not
10,000. The result was due, in the first instance,
to the fatal mistakes made by the Austrian chief,
who not only let a grand opportunity slip, but, in
his subsequent operations, did almost everything
which ought not to have been done, as affairs stood.
What indeed can be said to excuse a commander,
who, in the presence of enemies gathering round
him, exposes the forces he had detached to be
beaten in detail, and persists in making the mass
of his army powerless, but that he was the counter-
part of the unskilful boxer, who, in the words of
the Greek orator, was always too late to stop his
adversary's blows? Yet other and potent causes
concurred to make the defeats of the Austrians so
complete and disastrous. The Austrian generals
did not act well in concert, and Benedek had much
THE PRUSSIAN ARMY. THE WAR OF 1866. 63
reason to complain of more than one of his lieu-
tenants in command, especially on the Iser, and
after Nachod. The Austrian soldiery, too, in vain
endeavoured to oppose the bayonet charge to the
fire of the Prussians, and they literally withered
away under the destructive effects of a weapon to
which they had little to oppose. It should be added
that they had been taught by their officers to
despise their enemy, and when they discovered
what the Prussians were in the field, false confidence
was replaced by abject despair, and they easily
broke up into hordes of fugitives. An immense
number, besides, of unwounded prisoners fell into
the hands of the victorious Prussians, and this
distinctly shows that a large part of the army, that
composed of Hungarian and Slavonic elements,
not to speak of the rebellious Italians, 1 had no
heart in the cause of the Empire. As for the con-
duct of the Prussian commanders, Prince Frederick
Charles has been blamed for not making for
Gitschin at once, and his movements were by no
means rapid. But the Crown Prince gave proof of
remarkable skill in these operations from first to
last, and it may generally be said that the Prussian
chiefs admirably carried out a very difficult plan ;
co-operated heartily with each other, and showed
1 Soldiers, however disloyal their nationality may be, will
usually be true to their standards, as long as success attends
them. But soldiers of this kind always show their natural
tendencies in the hour of defeat. The Germans, who followed
Napoleon in 1807, 9, 10, rose against him in 1812 13.
64 MOLTKE.
that they had that sense of duty and that readiness
to act and think for themselves, which were due in
some measure, doubtless, to Moltke' s training. The
Prussian army was as superior to the Austrian in
organization and military worth, as its infantry
was in destructive fire, and this difference alone
was almost decisive.
The successive defeats of the hostile corps, sent
against him in inadequate strength, and ending in
the terrible reverse at Skalitz, had enabled the
Crown Prince to march into Bohemia, and to ad-
vance in triumph to the Upper Elbe. Ere long
Moltke and King William had hastened from Berlin
to the theatre of war, and the Prussian armies were
directed by Moltke on the spot. So complete was
the prostration of the Austrian army that the Crown
Prince could, without difficulty, have joined Prince
Frederick Charles at Gitschin, and the united armies
might have borne down on the enemy in irresistible
strength. Moltke, however, deliberately kept the
Prussian armies apart at a distance of more than
twenty miles ; this, he believed, would give them
more freedom of action, and Benedek 1 had perhaps no
longer the power to thrust himself between them.
By the 30th of June, Prince Frederick Charles and
the Crown Prince were advancing, in separate masses,
to the Elbe, and the beaten Austrian army, its
wings shattered, and its centre sharing the contagion
of defeat, was falling back in confused fragments,
which, however, had nearly effected their junction.
1 " Prussian Staff History," 157.
THE PRUSSIAN ARMY. THE WAR OF 1866. 65
It still stood between divided enemies, but apart
from the question whether it had sufficient space to
endeavour to strike at its foes in succession, it was
so disheartened, injured and broken-down, 1 that an
attempt of the kind would, perhaps, have been fatal.
Nevertheless a gap remained open between the
enemies in its front; 2 good judges have thought
that the Austrian leader had still a last chance to
strike with effect, and possibly a man of genius, like
the youthful Bonaparte, who, before Arcola, was in
a plight, apparently as desperate as that of Benedek,
might, at the last hour, have plucked safety, nay
success, from danger. But Benedek had neither
inspiration nor resource ; merely a tenacious soldier,
his only thought was to make a determined stand,
and to fight a defensive battle, in a strong position,
for the honour of his master's arms, but with
scarcely a hope of victory. Drawing in his shattered
forces on all sides, with a steadiness and skill which
has been justly praised, he retreated slowly behind
the Bistritz, an affluent of the Upper Elbe; the
veteran stood stubbornly here to bay.
1 " Luttes de 1'Autriche," vol. iii. p. 163.
2 Lecomte : "La Guerre de la Pmsse et de T Italic centre
1'Autriche, et la Confederation Germanique," vol. i. pp. 365-6.
This distinguished veteran was sometime the first aide-de-camp of
Jomini, and is almost the last living link between the Napoleonic
wars and those of this age. He is a scientific and admirable
military critic.
CHAPTER III.
The Battle of Sadowa or Koniggratz Complete victory of the
Prussian armies Retreat of Benedek The Prussians march
to the Danube The Treaty of Prague Reflections on the
conduct of the war, and especially on the strategy and tactics
of Moltke and the Prussian leaders.
WHILE Benedek was retreating behind the Bistritz,
the Prussian armies advanced slowly, scarcely
pressing the beaten enemy, as he fell back. This
was a marked feature of Moltke' s strategy, very
different from the conquering march of Napoleon,
which we shall see over and over again, and con-
tact with the Austrian army was lost. It was
believed in the Prussian camp, on the 2nd July, that
the Austrians had retired beyond the Elbe, and were
in position, resting on either flank, on the fortresses
of Josephstadt and Koniggratz, and Moltke's in-
tention was to reconnoitre in force, and either to
attack the enemy, where it was supposed he stood,
or to turn his left wing by a march on Pardubitz.
In the afternoon, however, it was ascertained that
a considerable part of the Austrian army was at
hand, having fallen back behind the Bistritz, but
not the Elbe ; and Prince Frederick Charles, with
characteristic daring, determined to assail his foe at
once, with the First Army, and that of the Elbe,
which had been for some time nearly in line with him.
SADOWA. 67
As, however, it might turn out that Benedek
would be in largely superior force, the Prince sent
a message to the Crown Prince now at Konighinhof
about twelve miles distant for the Prussian
armies had gradually approached each other, re-
questing the assistance of one corps at least ; and
the Chief of his Staff was dispatched to Gitschin,
the general head-quarters of all the Prussian armies,
to inform the King and Moltke of the intelligence
that had been obtained, and of the purpose that
had been already formed. Moltke J s decision was
marked by the boldness and insight which almost
always marked his resolves in war. The project of
Prince Frederick Charles was a half measure only,
and Moltke sent a message to the Crown Prince to
march at once, not with a single corps, to co-operate
with his colleague as had been proposed, but
drawing together the whole of his forces, to fall on
the flank of Benedek on the. right, and to over-
whelm him with the three united armies. The
order carried by a single officer, 1 immense as were
the issues depending on it, was not, however, dis-
patched until midnight ; 2 Konighinhof was more
than twenty miles from Gitschin ; the Second Army,
1 To have sent this order by one messenger was a clear mistake,
and it is surprising it was made hy the Prussian staff. Mistakes
of the kind, however, were repeatedly made by Berthier in the
wars of Napoleon, and were twice made by Soult on occasions of
supreme importance in the campaign of 1815.
2 There was no telegraphic communication between the Prussian
armies at this moment. See Hamley's " Operations of War,"
p. 213. Ed. 1889.
F 2
68 MOLTKE.
widely divided, was still, for the most part, beyond
the Elbe, and at distances of from ten to twelve
miles from the positions of Benedek near the
Bistritz ; the Elbe would have to be crossed to
reach the enemy ; and heavy rains and continued
bad weather had broken up the roads, and flooded
the plains. Was it probable, in the face of difficul-
ties like these, that the Crown Prince would attain
the field in time, and be able to complete the de-
cisive movement, before his colleague, doubtless
exposed to very superior forces, would have perhaps
succumbed ? Would the heir of Prussia achieve
what had been achieved by Bliicher, in his celebrated
march from Wavre to Waterloo, or would he fail,
like the Archduke John at Wagram, not to refer to
many other instances, to reach the First Army until
it was too late ?
While the operations of the Prussians were being
matured, Benedek was making preparations for a
great defensive battle. The aspect of his stricken
and desponding soldiery, as they defiled under his
eye on their way to the Bistritz, had shaken for a
time the resolve he had formed to await the enemy's
attack in a strong position, and he had entreated
the Emperor in a telegraphic message, an expression
of a mind that had begun to despair, " to make
peace in order to avert a catastrophe." By degrees
however, his firmness, in part, returned ; his master
had bade him to fight stubbornly on ; he had got
rid of Clam Gallas 1 and other lieutenants, who had
1 Clam Gallas is a name well known in the military annals of
SADOWA. 69
proved themselves to be incapable men ; his troops,
after a day of repose, had, in some measure, taken
heart again, and he returned to his original design,
to stand behind the Bistritz and to strike hard for
Austria. Nevertheless he hesitated and lost pre-
cious hours ; at a Council of War held on the 2 ad
July he did not utter a syllable to his subordinates
to indicate 1 the decision he had formed, and it was
far in the night before he declared his intentions,
and gave orders for a great and decisive battle.
This delay was in many respects unfortunate, if
it had little to do, probably, with the final issue of
events.
The note of preparation had sounded in the
Austrian camp by the early dawn of the 3rd of
July. The bivouacs were astir, with great masses
of men seen dimly in the light of the dying watch-
fires, and the sullen rumble of guns and trains in
motion gave token of the impending conflict. The
position in which Benedek was taking his stand
may be briefly described as a huge oblong square,
extending between the Elbe and the Bistritz, rising
in the space between into ranges of uplands, here
and there forming well-marked heights, and dotted
all over with woods and hamlets. The Bistritz
covered a large part of the Austrian front, dividing
it from the First Army and the Army of the Elbe;
the Trotinka, another feeder of the Elbe, ran along
Austria since the Thirty Years' War. The representative of the
House, in 1866, had also done badly in Italy in 1859.
1 "Les Luttes de TAutriehe," vol. iii. pp. 174-5.
70 MOLTKE.
part of the Austrian right, in the direction of the
army of the Crown Prince ; the interval between
the two streams was filled by eminences containing
the points of Horenowes, Maslowed, and Cistowes ;
and the Elbe bridged, however, at different places
to afford an army the means of retreat flowed
behind the Austrian rear by Koniggratz. Benedek's
army, about 210,000 strong, including some 24,000
cavalry and 770 guns, and made up of eight corps,
comprising the Saxons, was so placed as to fill
nearly the whole square, which, in some respects,
formed a good position of defence. On the left the
Saxons, with the 8th corps in the rear, held the
rising grounds round Problus in force, throwing
detachments to the course of the Bistritz, at the
village of Nechanitz and thence to Lubno. At
fhe centre, occupied in great strength, spread the
masses of the 10th and 3rd corps, with outposts
advancing to the Bistritz, the main body gathering
around the heights of Lipa, and especially of Chlum,
this last commanding the whole scene around, and
it guarded, besides, in imposing force, the broad
main road, which, running from Koniggratz,
approached, near Sadowa, the enemy's vedettes
and almost divided the Austrian lines. The right
of Benedek was formed by the 4th and the 2nd
corps, but owing to delays and obscure orders these
parts of the army were thrown more forward than
the Austrian leader had intended ; they held
Horenowes and part of the adjoining tract, between
the Trotinka and the Bistritz ; and the Austrian
SADOWA. 71
right flank was protected by a small force only from
the projected attack of the Crown Prince's army.
The 6th and the 1st corps, and the great mass of
the cavalry, were held towards the extreme rear, in
reserve, extending from near Koniggratz and
touching the centre, and at different parts of the
position, as a whole, a few earthworks had been
hastily thrown up, in order to check the enemy's
progress. The artillery was ranged in formidable
tiers of guns at every favourable point of vantage,
especially along the heights at the centre; trees
were cut down and cleared to give play to its fire,
and farmhouses and villages had here and there
been fortified to strengthen and increase the means
of defence.
The arrangements of Benedek, taken altogether,
were in many particulars very defective. He must
have known that the Crown Prince's army was
menacing his right at no great distance, and that
an attack from this side was possible, but he made
no preparations to resist such an effort, and he
left his right flank almost uncovered, even if his
4th and his 2nd corps had advanced further than
he had originally designed. He evidently thought
that he would have to cope only with the First
Army and the Army of the Elbe, but, considering
the situation even from this point of view, mis-
taken and deceptive as it was, his dispositions were
far from judicious. His army was drawn up for a
passive defence only, a system of tactics radically
bad, and it was not arranged with skill and
72 MOLTKE.
intelligence upon this faulty and perilous system.
The line of the Bistritz was not turned to account,
though it formed in places a strong obstacle, for it
was guarded by weak detachments only ; the army
was crowded into a relatively narrow space, where
it had not sufficient freedom of action ; the centre
presented a convex front that exposed it terribly to
a converging fire, and its masses were so huddled
together that bold attacks might lead to confusion
and ruin. The reserve, besides, was by far too
large, and a common defect in Austrian tactics
the cavalry, instead of covering the wings, and
being enabled to exhibit its powers, was collected
in the rear and almost paralyzed, except in the
case of eventual defeat. The army, in a word, was
ill-ordered, even for a purely defensive battle ; but
it is unnecessary to say a truth proved by number-
less examples in all ages that it should have been
so arranged as to possess the means of readily
making counter attacks, and of taking the offensive
in defending itself. And, above all, it must be
borne in mind that nothing or nearly nothing was
done to guard against the great force of the Crown
Prince.
The three Prussian armies, should they once
unite, would form a mass somewhat superior in
numbers 200,000 footmen, perhaps, 30,000 horse-
men, and about 790 guns and infinitely superior
in real force to the hostile army arrayed against
them. The Crown Prince, however, was nearly a
march distant, a river and a difficult country in his
SADOWA. 73
way ; the First Army and the Army of the Elbe
did not exceed 124,000 men, with from 300 to 400
guns, and for hours this would be the only force
to be opposed to an army nearly double in size.
Yet Prince Frederick Charles did not hesitate to
attack; and at about seven in the morning, 1 the
2nd and 4th corps of the First Army, the 3rd
being in reserve, and almost the whole of the Army
of the Elbe had drawn near the line of the Bistritz.
The Austrian outposts and other detachments fell
back before the advancing enemy, abandoning
important points of vantage, and the stream was
mastered after 8 a.m. by three divisions of the First
Army. These troops boldly pressed forward against
the Austrian main line, and, making some impres-
sion on the 10th and 3rd corps, gained ground in
front of the enemy's centre, but they were crushed
by the fire of the powerful batteries accumulated
round the hostile position, which their weaker
artillery could not subdue ; and though there was
not a thought of retreat, they were brought to a
standstill and made no progress. Meanwhile, on
their right the Army of the Elbe had been detained
for hours in crossing the Bistritz, for though the
Saxons did not defend the river, wide and flooded
marshes spread around Nechanitz, and the passage
was by a single defile ; and here, too, the Prussian
advance was arrested. And, on the opposite side,
1 The " Prussian Staff History " reckons the First Army and
the Army of the Elbe by divisions, but, for the sake of clearness
in the narrative, we have adhered to the enumeration by corps.
74 MOLTKE.
to the Prussian left, the turn of events seemed even
less prosperous. A single division of the First
Army the 7th, and its chief, Fransecky, deserve to
be named had achieved important success at first,
and had nearly cut its way to the Austrian centre,
bat it was overwhelmed by the masses of guns on
the spot, and by the efforts of the 4th and the 2nd
Austrian corps, which drove it, struggling to the last,
backward, and its position had become so critical
that Prince Frederick Charles was compelled to send
nearly his whole reserve to afford it support. It
seemed probable, too, that even this addition of
force would be unable to stem the advancing
enemy, and to restore, at this point, the Prince's
battle.
It was now past eleven, and the scales of Fortune
appeared to incline against the two Prussian armies.
The divisions in the centre barely held their ground,
and were perishing under a destructive fire ; the
Army of the Elbe was kept back on the Bistritz,
and the 7th division had almost succumbed. The
superiority of numbers had, in fact, told ; though
not defended as they ought to have been, the
approaches to the Austrian positions had been
difficult to force ; the Austrian artillery had done
great things, and the needle-gun had been unable
to produce its effects amidst the woodlands and
other obstacles which covered large parts of the
Austrian front. The Austrian army, in short, was
as yet unshaken ; more than one of Benedek's
highest officers entreated him to assume the offen-
SADOWA. 75
sive; 1 the project was seriously discussed round the
commander-in-chief ; and it will always remain 2 a
grave question whether, at this crisis, a determined
attack made by the mass of the 10th, the 3rd, the
4th, and the 2nd corps, against the thin and en-
feebled Prussian centre, might not have been
attended with success. Even if we conclude that
in the presence of the enemies about to appear in
the field, an effort of the kind would have ultimately
failed, the First Army might have been driven back,
and, in that event, the course of the battle would
have probably taken a different turn. It is certain
at least that serious alarm prevailed for a time in
the Prussian camp ; anxious eyes were turned to
scan the horizon and to endeavour to descry the
Crown Prince's columns, and officer after officer
was despatched to the left to accelerate the advance
of the Second Army. Time, however, passed, and
there was no sign of the necessary and eagerly-
hoped-for relief ; and meanwhile a tempest of shot
and shell was ravaging the dwindling Prussian
ranks, and the enemy was thought to be preparing
1 "Luttes de 1'Autriche/ 7 vol. iii. pp. 210-12.
2 The " Prussian Staff History," pp. 205-6, admits that the 7th
division 4< was in very great danger," but insists that a general
Austrian attack would have been disastrous. The Austrian staff,
" Luttes de 1'Autriche/' vol. iii. p. 210, it is fair to add, concurs in
this view. But see, on the other side, General Derreeagaix's
" La Guerre Moderne," vol. ii. p. 269, a very able work. His words
are significant : " Vers le milieu du jour 1'avantage appartenait
aux Autrichiens ; il n'y avait plus qu'a prononcer un effort decisif,
et le sueces semblait certain."
76 MOLTKE.
a grand attack. Yet Moltke's confidence was never
disturbed, his combinations he felt assured would
succeed ; he awaited calmly the coming of the
Second Army which, he was convinced, would be on
the field in time ; and, in reply to an earnest
question of the King, simply said, 1 " Your Majesty
will win to-day, not only the battle but the cam-
paign."
At the prospect of success which seemed at hand,
the Austrians had felt hope and pride revive, and
Benedek was greeted with enthusiastic cheers by
the soldiery as he rode towards the front. The
Austrian chief, however, had lost the occasion, if
he had a favourable chance of attacking, and before
noon the heads of the Crown Prince's columns
were seen advancing and threatening his right.
The telegraph had informed Benedek that the
Second Army was upon the march, 2 but he gave
little attention to the report, and the advent of the
new enemy seems to have taken him by surprise.
The Crown Prince had set his army in motion at
between 7 and 8 a.m. ; he had effected the passage
of the Elbe, and his troops, marching with speed
and ardour, had overcome the obstacles in their
way, and were now advancing towards the tract
that spreads between the Trotinka and the Bistritz.
1 Moltke on the Battle of Koniggratz, United Service
Magazine, Dec. 1891, p. 443. Moltke's only answer to Bismarck,
who was in a state of passionate excitement, for he had staked
everything on the war, was an offer of a cigar.
2 " Luttes de 1'Autriche," vol. iii. p. 234.
SADOWA. 77
Benedek hastily recalled the 4th and 2nd corps
these had been thrown too forward, we have seen,
from the first, and had recently pressed still more
onward against Fransecky's shattered division
and ordered them to confront the Second Army ;
but the message, unfortunately, arrived too late.
The Prussian Guards, seizing the opportunity at
once, had reached the Austrian positions with ex-
treme celerity ; had taken possession of the hills
of Horenowes, which had been left almost without
defence, and had soon swept with their batteries
the plains beyond as far as Cistowes and Maslowed.
The 4th and 2nd corps were thus forced to make
the retrograde movement, exposing their flanks to
a terrible storm of deadly missiles, and the 4th
corps, inclining to the right, retreated upon the
Austrian centre, while the 2nd corps assailed by
the 6th of the Prussians, the left wing of the
Second Army, which had passed the Trotinka, was
scattered in flight, and with difficulty attained the
Elbe.
Ere long misfortunes, in quick succession, fell
on the imperilled and, even now, doomed army.
Owing partly to the retreat of the 4th and 2nd
corps, and partly to the confusion of the strife, the
dominant height of Chlum in the centre had been
left for a time ill-guarded, and, taking advantage
of a fog on the plain, the Prussian Guards pressed
forward and had soon seized Chlum, the key of the
whole position of their foes. Benedek, who, hither-
to had seemed unaware of the manifold perils
78 MOLTKE.
gathering around, now really alarmed, moved his
6th corps in reserve against the audacious Guards ;
Chluni and the heights were taken by fche Austrians
again, but before long Prussian reinforcements came
up, and the 6th corps was almost destroyed, the
needle-gun doing prodigious havoc. Meanwhile,
on the opposite side of the battle, defeat had
lowered on the Austrian banners. The Army of
the Elbe having at last succeeded in crossing the
Bistritz, had attacked the Saxons, and its com-
mander skilfully turning his enemy's left, had,
despite the efforts of the 8th corps in the rear,
forced the whole wing back in precipitate retreat.
The great Austrian army might now be com-
pared to a huge sea animal, hemmed in on all sides,
by assailants plying their deadly harpoons. The
right flank had been driven in by the Crown Prince;
the occupation of Chlum had placed the Prussians
upon its centre, and had made them masters of the
main road, which formed its principal avenue of
retreat, and its left wing had been beaten by the
Army of the Elbe. The First Army, by this time
relieved from the oppressive strain to which it had
been exposed, soon advanced in force against its
stricken foes ; and the Second Army, drawing in
from the right, completed a disaster already certain.
The whole Austrian army gave way; its convex
front suffered frightful losses from the cross fire of
its uniting foes, and its masses, confused and
crowded together, were soon involved in despairing
rout. Yet Benedek, a true soldier if not a real
SADOWA. 79
chief, fought stubbornly and heroically to the end,
and left nothing undone to keep back the enemy.
The last corps of the reserve, moved rapidly for-
ward, for a time checked the march of the Prussians,
but it, too, ere long was broken up and scattered.
It was now the turn of the Austrian cavalry, unwisely
kept inactive for hours on the field ; and these fine
squadrons, nobly supported by artillerymen, who
fought and fell by their guns, covered the retreat,
not without success. The defeated army was en-
abled to get over the Elbe, but it lost not less than
187 guns and rather more than 40,000 men, in-
cluding fully 20,000 prisoners, of whom half had
suffered from no wounds. The losses of the
Prussians were less than 10,000 men, but their
armies were so worn out and their ranks so con-
fused the inevitable result of their junction on the
field that Moltke did not attempt to press the
pursuit.
Decisive a battle as Sadowa was, it cannot be com-
pared with Jena or Austerlitz, " those mighty waves
that effaced the landscape." The Prussians once
more lost sight of their enemy ; and Benedek drew off
his shattered forces making for Olmiitz, by very rapid
marches. Custozza had by this time been fought ;
a worthy son of the Archduke Charles had com-
pletely defeated the Italian army, and information
reached the Prussian camp that the whole remain-
ing forces of Austria would be gathered together
for the defence of Vienna. Moltke advanced
cautiously towards the Austrian capital ; the three
80 MOLTKE.
Prussian armies approaching each other, although
moving on separate lines ; and he succeeded l by a
very able movement in cutting Benedek off from
Vienna, and intercepting his intended retreat. By
the 22nd of July the victorious Prussians had made
their way into the great plains of the Marchfield,
not far from the historic field of Wagram, having
performed feats of arms which had never entered
the imagination of Frederick the Great ; and a
Power once a vassal, had overthrown its Suzerain.
The Treaty of Prague, negotiated in some measure
by France, brought the momentous strife to an end ;
the supremacy of Germany was transferred from
Austria to Prussia, as the leading state ; Austria in
fact, was driven out of Germany, and Prussia
acquired a large extent of territory, and became the
head of a German Confederation of the North. It
is unnecessary to follow the contest between the
small force which Prussia had employed against the
Confederate States of Germany ; it strikingly illus-
trates the success which a little but well-directed
army may obtain against forces superior in numbers,
but without good organization or command.
The extraordinary success of Prussia, in the great
war of 1866, astonished and almost terrified Europe.
Her military power had not been suspected, and an
immense majority of soldiers believed that Austria
would easily defeat the enemy. Yet the dispositions
of Moltke were generally condemned, especially the
1 These operations are very well analyzed by General Derre-
cagaix, " La Guerre Moderne," vol. i. pp. 552, 556,
SADOWA. 81
double march into Bohemia and Saxony ; and the
needle-gun alone was set down as the cause of Sa-
dowa and the other Prussian victories. A genera-
tion, indeed, which retained memories of the marvels
of 1796 and 1814, and which had lately witnessed
the fine operations around Richmond, of that great
captain, Lee, 1 could not fail to censure strategic
methods which unquestionably departed from the
principles these grand passages of arms illustrate ;
and it may confidently be asserted that no impartial
critic of repute approved of Moltke's direction of
the war, until after the triumphs of 1870-1. The
subject invites a few comments, the excitement of
the time having passed away, and our knowledge of
the facts having been enlarged.
Moltke invaded Bohemia on a double line, with
three and then two armies widely divided by a
mountainous and intricate country, but converging
to an arranged point of junction, the Austrian army
being nearly equal in number to his entire forces and
not distant. Operations of this kind are hazardous in
the extreme, for not to refer to other dangers, the
enemy is given an opportunity to strike in, before the
1 Among many other authorities we may cite Lecomte, " Guerre
de la Prusse, etc." vol. i. p. 369, who expresses the ideas of
Jomini in this matter. " Depuis qu'on fait la guerre, en avait
rarement place de telles masses dans des conditions d'action plus
pitoyables que 1'etaient les masses Prussienes. La eelebre
bevue des generaux Autrichiens de 1796, s'ava^ant au secours
de Mantoue en trois colonnes separees, bevue si bien chatiee par
Bonaparte et connue de tous les ecoliers, etait certes un chef
d'oeuvre de strategic a cote du plan prussien de 1866."
G
82 MOLTKE.
separate masses unite, and to attack and beat them
successively in detail. Many notable examples have
made this truth manifest ; and Napoleon's exploits
around Mantua, only illustrate, with peculiar
splendour, what, for instance, has been achieved by
Turenne, by the Archduke Charles, and the illustrious
Lee. Nor does the war in Bohemia, in 1866, disprove
a conclusion that may be accepted as an axiom of the
military art. Had Benedek been a real general, had
his army been equal to rapid movements, he pro-
bably could have carried out his project ; could
have reached the table-land between the Iser and
the Elbe before the approach of the Prussian
armies ; and holding a central position, and interior
lines, could have fallen first on Prince Frederick
Charles, and then turned against the Second Army.
Nay, false and slow as his operations were, and bad
as were his army's arrangements, he might certainly
on the 26th and 27th of June have attacked the
Crown Prince with very superior forces, and made
Prince Frederick Charles powerless, so decisive was
the advantage of the position which, without know-
ing it, he had attained. Moltke's strategy, therefore,
was very dangerous ; it might have led to real dis-
asters, and it should be added that Napoleon has
condemned this strategic method in many passages,
and that he l emphatically condemned movements of
1 " Commentaires," voL vi. p. 336, ed. 1867, " II est de prineipe
que les reunions des divers corps d'armee ne doivent jamais se
faire pres de Tennemi ; cependant tout reussit au roi." Attempts
have been made to distinguish the operations of Frederick from
SADOWA. 83
the kind, undertaken, on the same theatre of war,
by Frederick the Great in 1756 and 1757, although
the King was completely successful. Nor can it be
forgotten that in 1778 Frederick failed, in circum-
stances extremely similar, against Lacy and the
brilliant Loudon.
The question, therefore, is, what excuse can be
made for the violation of a principle in war, which
exposed the Prussian armies to great dangers,
though every kind of advantage was on their side ?
An apology has been composed by the Prussian
Staff, very possibly from the pen of Moltke him-
self, but it fails to meet the real facts of the case,
and if not uncandid, it is at best inadequate.
Benedek, the argument runs, had not sufficient
time 1 to interpose between the Prussian armies, and
to command space enough, on the scene of the con-
flict, to enable him to attack them when apart ; his
central position and interior lines were, accordingly
of no use to him, and he placed himself between
them only to incur disaster. In the events that
happened, this, we believe, is true, as regards the
Austrian leader's project, to gain the table-land
between the Iser and the Elbe, and to fall on Prince
Frederick Charles, in the first instance, repeating
the attack on the Crown Prince, but this really
those of Moltke, but they have not been very successful, and
Napoleon's remark is of universal application.
1 " Prussian Staff History," p. 65. Here and there " auri per
ramos aura refulget," the hand of Moltke appears through these
masses of details. Yet it is doubtful if he really is the author of
this apology.
G 2
84 MOLTKE.
evades the true issue. Benedek had time and space
enough on the 26th of June, and until after the end
of the 27th, 1 to assail the Crown Prince in over-
whelming numbers, and to hold Prince Frederick
Charles in check, and this consideration will be held
decisive, except in the eyes of the worshippers of
success. This apology, therefore, falls to the
ground, it cannot stand the test of well-informed
criticism.
Another explanation of Moltke's strategy, is
that he made use of a discovery of the age, which
lessened the risk he certainly ran. One of the
dangers of an advance on a double line is, that it is
difficult to make the converging armies keep time
with each other on their march ; and this gives the
adversary an occasion to interpose, and to strike
right and left at his divided enemies. But the
electric telegraph enables armies to communicate
with each other, at any distance, from hour to hour,
nay from minute to minute, and so to regulate their
movements as to be in concert; this immensely
diminishes, in operations of the kind, the hazards
which otherwise would be incurred ; and Moltke
directed the Prussian armies, by the electric tele-
graph, in their advance on Gitschin. In reply to
this, it might be enough to 'say, that no hint is to
be found in the "Prussian Staff History," that this
argument is of the slightest value ; it should be
1 The subject is very ably discussed by General Derrecagaix,
" La Guerre Moderne," vol i. p. 292. A simple analysis of the real
facts is conclusive.
SADOWA. 85
recollected that the electric telegraph did not pre-
vent Prince Frederick Charles from acting without
regard to the Crown Prince, and marching on
Munchengratz instead of Gritschin ; and, above all,
did not prevent Benedek l from gaining a central
position between them, and possessing the advan-
tage of interior lines. There is, however, we
believe, even a more complete answer to what is
little more than an ingenious afterthought. Benedek
had the assistance of the electric telegraph, even to
a greater extent than Moltke ; 2 the conditions of
communication were, therefore, rendered at least
equal for the hostile armies ; and, though this is
not the place to examine the subject, it can be
proved, we think, that the electric telegraph is of
1 Writers who have made the discovery that te Moltke invented
a new strategy/' have denied that a central position and interior
lines are of any advantage ; Moltke would have been the first to
laugh at such nonsense. The value of a central position and of
interior lines was seen conspicuously in 1866, in the operations of
Falkenstein, against the levies of the German Confederation, and
in the Prussian advance to the Danube ; and it was exhibited
very clearly, as we shall notice afterwards, in Moltke's move-
ments during the siege of Paris. The advantage may not be so
decisive, in the case of the immense armies of the present age
as it was in the days of Turenne, or even of Napoleon, but it is,
and must be very considerable. General Derrecagaix ably
reviews the question in, " La Guerre Moderne," vol. i. pp. 275,
293, and seems to think that the change in the size of armies has
made no essential difference.
2 This evidently is the opinion of Lord Wolseley, United
Service Magazine, October, 1891, p. 6. "The power which the
electric telegraph gave Moltke was most important ; but the tele-
graph ought also to have helped Benedek."
86 MOLTKE.
more use to an army in a central position, and
standing upon interior lines, than to two armies
drawing towards each other, but still far apart.
A third apology that has been made for Moltke
has found favour with distinguished soldiers, and
certainly is entitled to respect. He knew, it is
alleged, that Benedek was a bad general, and that
the Austrian army was of inferior quality ; and,
acting on this knowledge, he ventured to under-
take, in order to gain decisive success, operations
hazardous no doubt in theory, 1 but not really
perilous, as affairs stood. It deserves notice that
this is the very excuse made by Clausewitz 2 for
Frederick the Great, probably with reference to
Napoleon's censures on the movements of the King
in 1756 and 1757, analogous, we have seen, to
those of Moltke. Moltke, too, probably was not
ignorant of the character of Benedek, and of the
state of his army; and, unquestionably, many a
great captain has done things in the presence of an
adversary he could hold cheap, which he could not
attempt in the presence of a really able enemy,
commanding a good and efficient army. This is
repeatedly seen in the campaigns of Turenne, of
Marlborough, and above all of Napoleon ; the most
striking instance perhaps in history is Nelson's
attack on the fleet of Villeneuve, an inspiration of
1 This is the position taken by Lord Wolseley, United Service
Magazine, Oct. 1891, pp. 4, 6.
* Theorie de la grande Guerre," French translation, vol. iii.
p. 193.
SADOWA. 87
genius, which would have been madness had not
Nelson been well aware of the impotence of the foe
in his grasp ; and it should be added that this kind
of discernment is one of the distinctive marks of a
real leader in war. But disregarding an enemy
may be carried too far ; and a whole plan of opera-
tions, based on the notion that liberties may safely
be taken with him, is assuredly open to adverse
comment. Napoleon has over and over again
insisted that a strategic project ought to assume
that a opponent, as a rule, will do what is right, 1
and that it should follow correct methods; and
wonderful as were his feats of arms, when dealing
with men like Alvinzi and Mack, he never deviated
from this sound principle. But the whole plan of
Moltke, in 1866, was in its conception too hazardous,
and this apology, therefore, is not sufficient.
The true excuse to be offered for Moltke, is we
believe of a different kind, and curiously enough is
found in the work of an enemy. 2 We have already
indicated what that excuse is, but we shall very
briefly recur to the subject. The excessive dis-
semination of the forces of Prussia, at the moment
when hostilities begun, was, as we have seen, not
1 This, too, is laid down by Moltke himself, "The Franco-
German War," English translation, vol. i. p. 94.
2 Les Luttes de 1'Autriche, vol. iii. p. 27 : " Cette concentra-
tion des deux armees offrait evidemment de grand dangers, mais
elle etait la consequence force du plan adopte par 1'etat major
prussien." The writer, however, was not aware that this plan
was adopted by Moltke, under the stress of circumstances, over
which he had no real control.
88 MOLTKE.
to be ascribed to Moltke ; and, had he been free to
carry out his ideas from the first, there is reason
to believe that he would not have attempted the
invasion of Bohemia on a double line. But the
Prussian armies being divided as they were, he had
no choice, but to do what he did, or to operate in
quite a different way, that is to concentrate the
armies behind the Bohemian hills, and to advance
on a single front of invasion ; and this course must
have involved delay, and would have enabled the
Austrian army to take defensive positions of the
greatest strength, and possibly even to take the offen-
sive. He was limited therefore to two alternatives ;
and though it has been urged by good judges, 1
that the alternative he adopted was the worse of
the two, that he ought to have drawn all his forces
together, and entered Bohemia on one line only,
and that, in that event, he would have achieved
success, decisive and certain, without running
risks ; this conclusion is by no means obvious. In
any case, if fault is to be found with his strategy,
this must be attributed in the main to a position
of affairs, 2 which was, in no sense, of his own
making.
If Moltke' s operations in 1866 were, therefore,
hazardous in a high degree, and are fairly open to
1 Lecomte, vol. i. pp. 370-1. This view probably was that of
Jomini.
2 Lord Wolseley, who seems to have had special information
on the subject, distinctly asserts, United Service Magazine, Oct.
1891, p. 8 ; " Moltke was not responsible for the dispersion of the
army."
SADOWA. 89
sharp criticism, the situation must be taken into
account, and, from this point of view, much is to
be said for them. These operations, however, will
not find a place among the master-pieces of the art
of war; and they can be justified only upon
assumptions, which must be kept in sight, if they
are not to be condemned. It is otherwise if we
confine our study of the contest to the day of
Sadowa ; here Moltke's dispositions rise above cen-
sure, and deserve all but the very highest praise.
The Prussian leader, indeed, did not regard a prin-
ciple on which Napoleon often insists, 1 that separate
armies ought not to unite in face of the enemy on
the field ; and the course even of this battle shows
that the great master, as a rule, is in the right.
The First Army on that 3rd of July was for a time
in undoubted peril ; the Second Army might quite
conceivably have failed to perform "a most arduous
task ; the junction of the two armies caused such
confusion that it was impossible to pursue the
enemy, and Benedek drew off the great mass of
his forces. But the incapacity of the Austrian
chief, and the feebleness and despondency of the
Austrian army had, by this time, been made clearly
manifest ; it is very doubtful, too, if Benedek had
a real opportunity to attack with success ; and the
tactics of the Prussians, bearing in mind the existing
state of affairs, were the best possible. The bold
1 " Commentaires," vol i. p. 444; "Le principe de ne jamais
reunir ses colonnes devant et pres de 1'ennemi." Waterloo and
Sadowa are special exceptions that really prove the rule.
90 MOLTKE.
and rapid decision of Moltke, too, to unite the three
armies for a decisive effort was worthy of a chief of
a high order, and it should be said, besides, that a
general-in-chief was never more loyally and ably
seconded. The march of the Crown Prince to the
field was one of the finest in the annals of war ;
and the conduct of the Prussian Guards has been
never surpassed.
Moltke gave proof, in the war of 1866, of deci-
sion, promptness, and force of character, but not,
we think, of strategic genius. His movements are
still censured 1 by very able critics, and had his
career ended on the field of Sadowa, he would
never have been placed among great captains.
The causes of the success of the Prussians are
manifest, and lie upon the surface. Benedekwas a
commander of the most faulty type ; he was dull-
minded, obstinate, and sluggish in the field, and
inevitable disaster was the consequence. He had
one great chance, but he threw it away ; his opera-
1 Charles Malo, before referred to, observes: if Du 22 au 29
Juin, il ne tenait qu'au general autriehien de les battre en detail,
et de rendre leur jonction impossible, pour peu qu'il sut mettre
a profit sa position centrale et ses lignes interieures ; aucune raison,
militaire ne I'empechait, et s'il est assurement permis a la guerre de
faire fonds jusqu'a un certain point sur 1'imperitie de son
adversaire, si Ton peut se permettre vis-a-vis d'un Mack ce qui 1'on
ne tenterait pas impunement vis-a-vis d'un archiduc Charles, il y a
lieu de reconnaitre avec tous les historiens impartiaux de la cam-
pagne, que 1'etat-major prussien a par trop largement escompte des
fautes qu'un eclair de bon sens ou un sage conseil suffisait a faire
eviter. En un mot, il ne faut rien moins que tant inertie d'une
part, pour faire excuse de 1'autre, de tant de temerite."
SADOWA. 91
tions from the 26th to the 30th of June simply
played into his enemy's hands ; his dispositions
at Sadowa were poor and defective. In General
Hamley's words, 1 he was one of those leaders who
" spoils his offensive movements by hesitation,
defends himself by makeshifts, and only half under-
stands his own blunders when they have ruined his
army ; " and he became the easy prey of his skilled
antagonists. The Austrian army, too, was not to
be compared in natural strength, in moral force, in
organization, in power of manoeuvre, and in arma-
ment, to the enemy it met ; it was even more inferior
to King William's army, than the army of Daun
was to that of Frederick the Great. The Prussian
army, on the other hand, if not nearly as perfect as
it was made afterwards, was by many degrees the
best army of the time. It had been adjusted to
the new conditions, its organization had been
admirably arranged, it had been divided into units
of manageable size ; the rapidity of its movements
and its energy in the field received justly the praise
of all eye-witnesses. Its leaders, too, though
mistakes were made, for mistakes must necessarily
be made in war, exhibited skill, vigour, intelli-
gence, promptness, and usually acted in perfect
concert ; and in these respects we perceive how fine
had been their training. The tactics of the three
arms had not yet been perfected, but the needle-
gun alone gave the Prussian infantry a prodigious
advantage over their foes ; and the Austrians
1 Operations of War," p. 469. Ed. 1889.
92 MOLTKE.
quailed under the power of this destructive weapon.
This army which, when in face of its enemy was
" like a panther darting on an ox," had been, in a
great measure, the creation of Moltke ; this circum-
stance was, in 1866, his real title to renown.
CHAPTER IV.
Immense increase of the military power of Prussia after 1866
League with Southern Germany The army of Prussia and
the Confederation of the North Its South German
auxiliaries Great efforts made to improve these forces
Attitude of France and Prussia after 1866 War probable
Efforts made by Napoleon III. to increase and strengthen the
French army Sketch of the history of that army The
Emperor's attempted reforms almost fail Deplorable weak-
ness of the French compared to the German armies
Other causes of inferiority The war of 1870-1 The plan
of Napoleon III. The Army of the Rhine The Emperor's
plan is frustrated The plan of Moltke Concentration of
the First, Second, and Third German armies in the Palatinate
and the Rhenish provinces Positions of the belligerent
armies at the end of July The French perhaps lose an
opportunity to strike the First Army The combat of Sarre-
bruck Advance of the united German armies to the frontier
of France Combat of Wissembourg and defeat of a French
detachment Battle of Worth and defeat of the French
army Precipitate retreat of Macmahon Battle of Spicheren
and second defeat of the French Critical position of the
Army of the Rhine.
THE Treaty of Prague, we have seen, had enlarged
Prussia, and had made her the head of a German
Confederation of the North. An immense develop-
ment of her resources for war was one of the
immediate results of this sudden growth of power.
Schleswig-Holstein, Hanover, and Hesse- Cassel,
had become parts of her newly acquired territory ;
94 MOLTKE.
Saxony and other small states were her Confederate
allies ; and four new corps d'armee, raised in these
lands, were added to the nine of the Prussian army,
increasing the total number to thirteen, while the
system of the reserves and Landwehr of Prussia was
extended to these conquered or dependent provinces.
The standing army of the Confederation of the
North, that is, of Prussia under another name,
became thus fully 550,000 strong, and the Land-
wehr not less than 400,000, the Prussian Landsturm
being again omitted ; and the standing army, in-
cluding the reserve, was composed in the main of
trained soldiers, while the Landwehr, though a
supplemental force, was capable of good service in
second line. Yet even these figures do not convey an
adequate notion of the huge increase of the military
strength of Prussia at this time. Partly owing to the
fear of the ambition of France, for 1813 had been
never forgotten, and recent events had revived its
memories, and partly to the impulse to German unity,
which the war of 1866 had greatly quickened, the
German states of the South soon joined hands with
Prussia, though allies of Austria a few months before,
and Bavaria, Baden, and Wiirtemberg placed their
forces at the disposal of their late enemy. The
standing armies of these three powers exceeded
100,000 men ; the reserves, corresponding to the
Prussian Landwehr, were not less than 60,000
or 70,000 ; and these arrays formed a powerful
addition to the armed strength of the dominant
state of Germany. Within less than four years from
THE WAR OF 1870-1. WORTH AND SPIOHEREN. 95
the day of Sadowa, the standing army of Northern
and Southern Germany, directed and controlled
from Berlin, was fully 650,000 strong, including
about 100,000 horsemen and 1500 guns ; and this
colossal mass was supported by nearly half a million
men, for the most part equal to the work of war.
Napoleon had never such a force in arms, even
when he drew levies, of many races and tongues,
from all parts of a subdued continent.
Nor were earnest and constant efforts wanting to
strengthen the formidable military machine which
had been enlarged into these huge proportions.
Trained officers were employed to extend the
system of Prussian organization through the Con-
federate allies, and especially to reform the South
German armies. The most careful attention was
given to the means of transport and communication,
with a view to war ; new railways were made and
others designed ; and wonderful as had seemed the
rapidity of the assembly of the forces of Prussia
in 1866, a much higher rate of celerity was attained.
Sadowa, in fact, instead of making the victors rest
content on their laurels, and satisfied with what
they had already won, became a point of departure
for fresh preparations, and for perfecting the state
of the Prussian army. The experiences of the con-
test were turned to advantage; faults that had been
committed were carefully noted, and especially the
methods through which the three arms can be
brought to a state of the highest efficiency, became
the subject of intelligent study. The formations of
96 MOLTKE.
the infantry, if not finally settled, were gradually
made more light and flexible, in order to increase
the power of its fire, and to lessen the effects of the
fire of the enemy; the cavalry, which had been
scarcely a match for the Austrian squadrons, was
much improved ; the material of the artillery was
transformed, old smooth-bore guns being given up
as useless, and rifled breech-loading guns being
placed in their stead ; and the tactics of the artil-
lery were greatly changed, the reserves of guns of
the age of Napoleon having been found to be
extremely cumbrous, and of little avail in the battles
of the day. These multifarious and searching re-
forms, too, were carried out by the military chiefs
with an energy, a thoroughness, and a practical
skill, of which eye witnesses have left no uncertain
sound. (< The activity of the Prussian army,"
said one of the ablest of these, " is prodigious. It
is not equalled in any other army of Europe ; it is
that of a hive of bees." 1
We cannot exactly set forth the share of Moltke
in these great works of reform; but they had, we
1 For further information on the extension of the military
power of Prussia after 1866, and on the improvement of the
Prussian and German armies, the reader may consult, among other
authorities, Riistow, vol. i., chaps, iv. and v.: "Note sur Porgani-
sation Militaire de la Confederation de PAllemagne du Nord,"
written by Napoleon III. ; Talbot's " Analysis of the organization
of the Prussian Army ; " Reports of the " Commission des Con-
ferences Militaires ; " the " Letters on Artillery, Cavalry and
Infantry " of Prince Kraft Hohenlohe ; and, above all, the im-
portant " Rep.orts " of Baron Stoffel, a French military attache at
Berlin during this period.
THE WAR OF 1870-1. WORTH AND SPICHEREN. 97
know, his cordial support. These preparations were
not without cause ; the long-standing feud between
Prussia and France, composed for a time, had be-
come again active, and war between the two states
was already probable. Napoleon III. had not been
averse to the aggrandizement of Prussia, up to a
certain point, and he had even sympathies with
German unity ; but France, he insisted, should have
an equivalent in an extension of her frontier to-
wards the Ehine. Bismarck artfully flattered the
Emperor's hopes, without committing himself to
definite pledges; and, when Austria and Prussia
became involved in war, Napoleon probably thought
that he would have an occasion to carry out suc-
cessfully his ambitious projects. He was baffled,
however, by the results of Sadowa ; instead of
being made an arbiter between the contending
Powers, he had to submit to the will of Prussia ;
his demands for compensation out of German terri-
tory were courteously, but distinctly, rejected, and
the formation of the German Confederation of the
North, and the alliance of the South German States
with Prussia, made him aware that a gigantic Ger-
man Power had established itself along his borders.
He felt the bitterness of humiliation and defeat ;
and, meanwhile, the splendour of the Prussian vic-
tories had aroused the jealousy of the French army,
and the immense increase of the power of Prussia
for war had alarmed French politicians and states-
men. The classes which direct opinion in France
began to denounce Prussia as a deadly enemy ; and
H
98 MOLTKE.
Prussia, in turn, intent on becoming the undisputed
head of a united Germany and on being supreme
from the Rhine to the Niemen, saw in France the
only obstacle in her path. Old passions and hatreds
were quickened into life by the animosities of the
present time ; and a rupture, ultimately perhaps to
grow into a furious conflict of hostile races, seemed
imminent in a not distant future. Prussia, accord-
ingly, had sharpened her weighty sword ; and the
prodigious extension of her military strength, and
especially her league with the South German Powers,
were largely due to the prospect of a struggle with
France.
In view of the war, which they deemed certain,
the French Emperor and the men around his throne
directed their minds to the state of the army and to
the means of increasing its force. The army of
France, perhaps the oldest in Europe, has, like the
nation, " had its ebbs and flows," and has proved
every extreme of fortune. It was little more than
a feudal militia until after the middle of the seven-
teenth century ; it became the admiration and the
scourge of the Continent when administered by
Louvois and directed by Turenne. After a series of
defeats, due to Eugene and Marlborough, it emerged
from the War of the Spanish Succession, stricken
but victorious, under a great chief, Yillars ; and,
though it fought brilliantly when led by Saxe, it
sank into decrepitude during the Seven Years' War.
It almost perished in the Great Revolution, yet
reappeared in the masses of levies which drove the
THE WAR OF 1870-1. WORTH AND SPICHEREN. 99
League of Europe across the frontiers, and it accom-
plished wonders against the hosts of the Continent,
ill-organized, with incapable leaders, and in the
fetters of obsolete routine. Ere long it fell into the
hands of Napoleon, and though it was by no means
free from very grave defects, it marched, with the
great master, from Madrid to Moscow, and it
inscribed on its banners a roll of victories un-
paralleled for their number and splendour. Yet its
reverses were as great as its triumphs, and it saw
Vitoria, Leipzig, Waterloo, as well as Marengo,
Jena, and Austerlitz. At the Kestoration it was
little more than the shadow of a great name for
many years.
After the fall of Napoleon the French army was
formed on a plan, of which the chief authors were
Marshals Gouvion St. Cyr and Soult, well-known
lieutenants of the great Emperor. This scheme of
organization embodied ideas of the Republican and
Imperial eras, adapted, however, to an age of
peace and of national exhaustion, after a strife with
Europe. The conscription, established in 1798-9,
which formed the system of recruiting in France,
which had filled the ranks of the Grand Army with
hundreds of thousands of good soldiers, but which
Napoleon had frightfully abused, was retained as an
institution of the state, but was modified to a
considerable extent ; and the practice was allowed
of admitting substitutes in the place of the recruits
drawn to enter the army. The principle, therefore,
of the Prussian system, that every subject is bound
H 2
100 MOLTKE.
to military duty, a principle first asserted in Revo-
lutionary France, was abandoned, or evaded at
least ; and more than one writer has, perhaps fanci-
fully, declared that a decline in the warlike temper
of the French people may be traced to this circum-
stance. The conscription was divided into two
classes, the first of men called to serve in the ranks,
the second of men to form a reserve ; and this last
class was left wholly untrained, the experiences of
1792-1815 having proved, it was thought, that the
youth of France had such a natural fitness for war
that a few months of preparation would make them
soldiers. The army, constituted in this way, was
composed of about 300,000 men, for the most part
troops of a high order, for the term of service was
eight years at least ; it was supplied, also, with good
material of war, and with thousands of skilful and
veteran officers, the survivors of the Napoleonic days,
and it could be increased by nearly 300,000 more ;
this reserve, however, it must be borne in mind,
being without military discipline and skill, and in
fact an assemblage of rude levies. In this respect
the reserve was very inferior even to the Landwehr
of the Prussian system, for the Landwehr had had
experience in the ranks ; but Soult, recollecting the
glories of the past, especially insisted that a force
of this kind would prove formidable and efficient in
the field, and would suffice as a second line for the
regular army.
The army of France, formed on this system,
distinguished itself in Algerian warfare, produced
THE WAR OF 1870-1. WORTH AND SPICHEREN. 101
at least one eminent chief, Bugeaud, and a consider-
able number of brilliant officers, and played a
conspicuous part in the siege of Sebastopol. After
the accession to the throne, however, of Napoleon
III., it underwent a marked change for the worse ;
and this, owing to two distinct causes. By this
time the old officers of the Grand Army had passed
away, and had left no successors of equal military
worth and skill ; and the principle of commuting
the duty to serve, by the mere payment of a sum of
money, a most mischievous principle had been
established. Eecruits, who had been compelled to
find substitutes, approved by the state, or to serve
in person, had been made enabled to discharge
themselves from military liabilities of all kinds, by
a simple contribution to the War Office, and the
results were, in different ways, disastrous. The
army became crowded with bad troops, tempted
into the ranks by the sums thus obtained ; it was
largely avoided by the better classes ; its quality
was in some measure impaired ; and it was
even considerably reduced in numbers, for men
could not be always found to replace the men who
had freed themselves from the obligation to serve.
Yet these were not the worst defects in the existing
military system of France. New conditions of war
were being developed ; owing to the extension of
railways, operations in the field were year after
year becoming more rapid ; and the invention of
rifled small-arms and cannon made it necessary that
soldiers should have a careful training. In these
102 MOLTKE.
circumstances the untried reserve of the French
army became almost useless. Becruits, who, in the
first part of the century, had months to learn a
soldier's calling, before they were summoned to
join their regiments, had now only a few weeks or
days ; and raw conscripts, who could become familiar
with the old musket in a very short time, could not
equally deal with arms of precision. The reserve
therefore became a mere force on paper ; and
Napoleon III. made it no secret that, in the Cam-
paign of Italy in 1859, he had no second line to the
regular army.
The expedition to Mexico, almost as fatal to the
Second Empire as Spain had been to the First, still
further weakened the French army. The Emperor,
a man of thought and ideas, though almost a
failure as a man of action, had endeavoured, mean-
while, to introduce improvements into a military
system behind the age ; and, in some measure, he
strengthened the reserve by requiring that its levies
should have a partial training. The French army,
nevertheless, remained a very imperfect instrument
of war ; and Napoleon made an effort, after
Sadowa, and in view of the probable war with
Prussia, to augment its numbers and to render it
more efficient. The classes for recruiting were
somewhat increased, further attempts were tried to
give the reserve discipline ; and the principle of a
general liability to serve was asserted by the institu-
tion of the Garde Mobile, a levy, however, which,
even in theory, could not form a really effective
THE WAR OF 1870-1. WORTH AND SPIOHEREN. 103
force, for it was to be called out for a fortnight
only in the year, and it could be at best simply a
weak militia. These changes, moreover, were only
proposed between 1866 and 1868 ; time was needed
to make them of any use, insufficient and feeble make-
shifts as they were; and ere long Marshal Niel, the
ablest of the Imperial counsellors, was removed from
the scene by premature death, and faction and folly
in the Chambers in Paris baffled and set at nought
the Emperor's projects. The reform of the army
proved, in a word, abortive ; and when 1870 had
come that army presented a strange contrast to that
of Prussia and her auxiliary States. It showed a force
on paper of more than a million of men ; but 500,000
of these were Gardes Mobiles, a levy scarcely called
into existence, and that must be almost left out of
the account ; and it was really composed of 567,000
men, of whom a considerable part was an ill-trained
reserve. Immense deductions, too, had to be made
from this total, for troops in Algeria, in depots, in
fortresses, and for men that could not be deemed
effective ; and the true number of the standing
army of France was under 340,000 men, 1 comprising
some 40,000 cavalry, and less than 1000 guns, and
backed by a weak reserve of very little value. This
was wholly different from the colossal arrays which
1 < l The Franco-German War." "Prussian Staff History," vol.i. 12.
The great importance of the military statistics collected by Moltke
is proved by the fact that, in 1866 and in 1870 he was perfectly
acquainted with the military resources of Austria and France.
Spies, too, were very largely employed.
104 MOLTKE.
Prussia and her dependents could send into the
field ; and France would be outnumbered nearly
two to one should she venture to enter the lists with
her rival.
Nor were numbers only anything like a test of
the inferiority of the military power of France. The
army of Prussia, we have seen, was organized on the
local territorial system ; and this system, if well
administered, whatever objections may be made to
it, unquestionably facilitates the assembly of troops,
for the operations of war, in a short space of time.
It is obvious, in fact, that when corps d'armee are
established in separate tracts or provinces, with
their reserves and their requirements on the spot,
they can be brought rapidly into the field ; and this
celerity is of supreme importance, for it may secure
the initiative in the first moves of a campaign. The
French army, on the other hand, was formed on
what we may call the central national system ; that
is, large bodies of troops existed, as a rule, in
certain parts of the country, but it was necessary,
on a declaration of war, to unite these into corps
d'armee; their reserves were scattered throughout
France, and many of their essential needs were
kept in great depots and arsenals at a distance
from them. This considerably delayed their
assembly in the field; and though mechanism is not
to be rated too highly, it has been fairly remarked,
that, 1 under the one system the instrument could be
used at once, and that, under the other, time was
1 " Note sur 1'Organisation Militaire," p. 69.
THE WAR OP 1870-1. WORTH AND SPICHRREN. 105
required to put together its component parts. The
railways, again, of Prussia and Germany were
generally constructed with a view to war ; those of
France were rather made for the ends of commerce ;
and this difference alone would give the Prussian
army a great advantage, in the event of a collision
between the two powers, for it would enable it to
combine, and to take the field more quickly than
its supposed enemy. Yet even all this does not
suffice to show how ill-fitted France was to cope
with an infinitely stronger and better prepared
antagonist. Napoleon III. had no administrative
power ; he never possessed a good war minister ;
many of the subordinates in the War Department
were incapable men, without a sense of duty ; and
the military organization of France accordingly
was out of joint, and did its work badly. On the
other hand, Moltke and Eoon had brought the
military organization of Prussia, and to a certain
extent of the lesser states, to a point that almost
approached perfection.
On the opposite sides of the Rhine, therefore,
formidable military strength confronted weakness,
and an admirable organization for war was placed
beside one that was bad and defective. Apart from
inferiority in numbers, too, the army of France was
not equal to that of Prussia. In the chassepot rifle,
indeed, the French infantry possessed a better weapon
than the Prussian needle-gun ; and this gave it a
distinct advantage. But the German artillery was
far superior to the French ; and the mitrailleuse,
106 MOLTKE.
a feeble instrument in the field, had been largely
substituted for the ordinary gun, to please Napoleon
III., in the French batteries. The cavalry of France
was still true to its noble traditions, and excelled
in daring and rapid movements ; but it had not
been trained as an exploring force, one of its chief
uses in the days of Napoleon ; and in this respect
the Prussians were far before it. If, too, a con-
siderable part of the French army was composed of
troops who had been in the ranks much longer
than the young Prussian soldiers, a considerable part
was a mass of recruits ; and the elements, therefore,
of military power were better combined in the hosts
of Prussia. But the most marked feature of
inferiority was this : in the French army, the three
arms had not been accustomed to act in concert,
as systematically as in the Prussian service ; their
proper functions had not been as fully ascertained ;
and this told powerfully against the French.
Turning to the higher grades and the chief com-
mands, the French staff, even in the time of
Napoleon, exhibited several plain defects; it had
since declined from a high standard ; and it could
not be compared to the staff of Prussia, by many
degrees the best in Europe. The French army,
therefore, did not possess a source of power of
extreme value ; and in the most important respect
of all, its supreme direction, it was sadly wanting.
It had not a single great commander in high places :
most of its leaders, versed in Algerian warfare,
had neglected the nobler parts of the military art,
THE WAE OF 1870-1. WORTH AND SPICHEREN. 107
and were unequal to large operations in the field :
they had little knowledge of scientific war, and of
strategy and tactics of the grand kind : and these
heirs of the renown of Napoleon's legions were
ignorant of Napoleon's teaching and methods.
Men such as these are " but stubble to the swords "
of the generals of Prussia, and above all, of
Moltke.
In this sketch of the military state of France, some
elements of power have to be still considered. Her
organized army was pitiably weak ; but in her
Algerian reserves, in her large garrisons, in thou-
sands of veterans, who had seen service, and in her
gallant and martial youth, she had real materials
of strength in war, and ill-arranged and scattered
as they were, time was to show that these could
be made formidable. She had besides, immense
wealth, and world-wide credit, the command of
the sea as against Germany, and the patriotism
and pride of a great nation, and these resources,
seldom borne in mind sufficiently, even by the
ablest soldiers, were, as they have always been, of
the highest value. Nevertheless the French people
at this juncture was in a condition that was not
favourable to a perilous conflict with such a power
as Germany. Its sons, indeed, were, in no sense,
degenerate, as a fine page of history was ere long
to prove, and it had still that singular aptitude for
war which distinguished the Gauls of the age of
Caesar. But it had been devoted for years to the
arts of peace, to the accumulation of riches, to
108 MOLTKE.
successful industry ; it had suffered from the effects
of democratic despotism, most injurious to the
national life, and corruption and sloth were but
too prevalent in its higher, and even its middle
classes, with consequences pregnant with many evils.
On the other hand, Germany was animated by a
strong feeling to complete, once for all, the national
unity ; and she was inspired by a growing hatred of
France, the enemy of ages that was thwarting her
purpose. The enthusiasm of 1792-4, which had
enabled France to triumph over old Europe, was
now, in fact, on the side of Germany. 1
The Luxemburg incident showed how profound
were the animosities dividing Prussia and France ;
though negotiations, never clearly explained, were
continued, even after Sadowa, between Napoleon
III. and Bismarck, on the principle of composing
mutual discord 2 by the spoliation of a neighbouring
and friendly state. The Hohenzollern candidature
for the throne of Spain brought the festering
elements of passion to a head, and involved Germany
and France in a tremendous conflict. This is not 8
1 Ample details respecting the state of the French army, at
this period, will be found, inter alia, in General Trochu's " L'armee
Fran9aise en 1867 ;" in the " Reports " of Stofl'el ; in Riistow,
vol. i. chap. iii. ; in the " Prussian Staff History," vol. i. chap. i. ;
and in the " Conferences Militaires." See also " Les Forces
Militaires de la France en 1870," by le Comte La Chapelle,
Napoleon III., under a feigned name.
2 For a sketch of these negotiations, see Fyffe's " History of
Modern Europe," vol. iii. pp. 384-5.
8 On this subject the reader may consult the official correspon-
NAPOLEON III.
Emperor of France.
. To face page 109.
THE WAR OF 1870-1. WORTH AND SPICHEREN. 109
the place to pronounce a judgment on the conduct
of the persons engaged in a lamentable quarrel that
appalled Europe : enough to say that the provoca-
tion came from Prussia, that the French Govern-
ment was guilty of petulant folly, and that Bismarck
aroused to frenzy the wrath of Paris, in concert
perhaps with chiefs l of the army who, indisputably,
were eager to force on a war, in which the chances,
they knew, would be all against France. At a
great Council of State held at the Tuileries, the die
was cast on the 14th of July, 1870 ; the French
reserves were called out on the following day ; the
Chambers voted immense credits, amidst a scene
of thoughtless excitement ; and Paris, overflowing
with madding crowds, and clamouring wildly
through her streets, hailed with exultation the
declaration of war.
The fury of the capital hardly stirred the nation,
and alarmed and embarrassed Napoleon III. The
Emperor had, at heart, been opposed to a rupture;
he knew much better than his " lightminded " coun-
sellors how immense was the military strength of
Germany ; but he had yielded to importunities he was
too weak to resist, and he was forced to confront a
position of affairs, fraught with tremendous peril to
France and his throne, with a mind and body
dence on the dispute between France and Prussia ; an able, but
one-sided pamphlet, " Who is responsible for the war 1 " by
" Scrutator ; " and Fyffe, vol. iii. pp. 417, 421.
1 Many passages in Moltke's letters show that he had long
been desirous of a trial of strength, between France and Prussia,
in the field.
110 MOLTKE.
enfeebled by disease. His plan for the campaign
had been formed for some time, and he has told us
himself that it followed the design of his mighty
kinsman in 1815, one of the most splendid of the
designs of Napoleon. 1 In 1815 the armies of
Bliicher and Wellington were disseminated upon
a wide and deep front, extending from Ghent and
Liege to Charleroi; and Napoleon, drawing his forces
together, with a secrecy and skill that have never
been surpassed, succeeded in striking the centre of
the Allies, and in separating their divided masses,
and only just missed a decisive triumph. Napoleon
III., in the same way, believed that the armies of
Prussia and Southern Germany would be far
apart at the beginning of the campaign, and his
purpose was to collect a powerful army behind
the great fortresses of Metz and Strasbourg, to
cross the Rhine between Eastadt and Germersheim,
and, having paralyzed or defeated the South German
armies, to attack the Prussians in the valley of
the Main, in the hope of renewing the glories of
Jena. Though he was aware that the enemy would
be superior in numbers, in the proportion at least
of two to one, he calculated that this bold and rapid
manoeuvre would make up for deficiency of force,
and he had resolved to oppose 250,000 Frenchmen
1 See Comte La Chapelle, and " Campagne de 1870," par un
officier attache a 1'Elat-Major-General, generally attributed to
Napoleon III. ; " Prussian Staff History," vol. i. p. 20. We
believe Napoleon III. set off, in 1870, with his uncle's account
of Waterloo in his carriage.
THE WAR OF 1870-1. WORTH AND SPIOHEREN. Ill
to about 550,000 Germans, who, he assumed, would
be widely divided, as Napoleon had opposed 128,000
to 224,000 of Bllicher and Wellington. But would
a sovereign, who had never excelled in war, be able
to wield the arms of Achilles, and to imitate
Napoleon's march to the Sambre ? Was the French
army of 1870 to be compared in organization and
military worth to that which sprang into Bel-
gium in 1815 ? Above all, would the chiefs of the
German armies repeat the mistakes of Bliicher and
Wellington, and would the forces of Prussia and
Southern Germany be at a distance from each other
when the blow would fall ?
The bold offensive project of Napoleon III. was,
it is believed, founded, also, on x a hope that Austria
and Italy would join hands with him, should the
French eagles appear beyond the Rhine, and it
should be added that if he 2 contemplated an
advance at first, with 250,000 men only, he was
convinced that he would have an immediate reserve
of not less than 150,000, without reckoning the
unorganized Garde Mobile. The plan, however,
brilliant perhaps in conception, in no sense
corresponded to the facts, and in a few days
proved wholly abortive. Immense efforts were
nevertheless made, in the first instance, to carry
it out ; and it is a mistake to suppose that the
French War Office, and the administrative services
attached to it, were deficient in active good
1 Fyffe, vol. iii. pp. 424, 425.
Comte La Chapelle.
112 MOLTKE.
will and energy. Eight corps d'armee, including
the Imperial Guard, were given the name of the
Army of the Rhine, and directed into Alsace and
Lorraine ; the organized parts of these arrays
were soon collected along a broad arc, extending
from Thionville to Strasbourg and Belfort, and
thousands of troops and other men of the reserve
were hurriedly despatched to join these forces.
Here, however, the military system of France
betrayed its inferiority, and, to a great extent,
broke down, and the assembly of the army, which
ought to have been rapid in the extreme, to give it
a chance of success, was tardy, mismanaged, and
in all respects imperfect. Even the formation of the
corps d'armee required time, and the large contin-
gents needed to make up their strength were scat-
tered over all parts of the country. The railways, too,
especially in Alsace and Lorraine, were not sufficient
and not well prepared to carry masses of men and
material, with the celerity which the occasion
demanded; and the administration of the French
army, founded on the principles we have referred to,
and, at the crisis, largely composed of inexperienced
and incapable men, proved unequal to bear the
strain upon it, and to supply the corps and the
troops on the march with all kinds of appliances
necessary for taking the field. 1 Napoleon III.
/
1 The French accounts of the maladministration and want of
preparation of the army may be suspected of exaggeration. But
they are confirmed by that of the "Prussian Star! History,"
THE WAR OF 1870-1. WORTH AND SPICHEREN. 113
reached Metz in the last days of July, and the
spectacle before him was very different from that
which he had expected to find. Most of his corps,
indeed, were spread along the frontier ; but instead
of 250,000 men, not 200,000 had been assembled ;
large parts of these were inferior troops ; the
reserve fell far short of what it was on paper, and
the whole Army of the Ehine was not yet a
sufficiently equipped and organized force. In these
circumstances the ill-fated monarch virtually gave
up his offensive project; but " willing to wound
and yet afraid to strike," and already dreading
opinion in Paris, he did not adopt any other
course, and he allowed his forces to remain in the
positions they held, irresolute, and already waiting
on events.
Moltke had been hampered in 1866; but in
1870 he had perfect freedom of action, and, under
the nominal command of the King, he now directed
the whole armed strength of Prussia and her con-
federate allies. Learned in the history of war, and
possessing rare insight, he had anticipated the
design of the French Emperor as long previously
as 1868, and, in view of a probable conflict with
France, he had proposed in a very able paper, 1 that
the South German armies, on a declaration of war,
should not remain isolated south of the Main, but
should march to the Rhine, and effect their junction
vol. i. p 29, and by Moltke in his "Precis of the Franco-
G-erman War," vol. i. p. 6. English translation.
1 " Prussian Staff History," vol. i. p. 50.
I
114 MOLTKE.
with the armies of Prussia and the States of the
North. It was as if Wellington and Bliicher in
1815 had drawn their forces together, on a narrow
front, before their adversary had approached Belgium,
and this project of Moltke must have completely
baffled the offensive design of Napoleon III. But
when the armies of Germany had come into line,
what were their movements to be in the next
instance ? Moltke well knew that the united
military power of Germany was much greater than
that of France ; he believed, too, that the German
armies could be assembled more quickly than their
antagonists, and he formed a plan of operations,
which, if dictated, so to speak, by the situation
before him, was, nevertheless, admirably conceived
and masterly. The Rhenish Provinces and the
Palatinate had formed a kind of sallyport for an
attack on Germany in the wars of Louis XIV. and
of Napoleon, but they had been in the hands of
the Germans since 1815; and, if strongly occupied
by German armies, they would be a base of opera-
tions of the highest value for a great offensive
movement into Alsace and Lorraine. Moltke in-
sisted therefore that the German forces, to be
collected, we have seen, on the Rhine, should cross
the river and join hands with those of Rhenish
Prussia, to the west, and the uniting masses were
to bear down in irresistible strength on the French
frontier, where, to the north-east, it is most vul-
nerable. Should the enemy attempt to take the
offensive, he was to be met and encountered in
THE WAR OF 1870-1. WORTH AND SPICHEREN. 115
pitched battles, the issue of which could be hardly
doubtful, for the Germans would be two-fold in
numbers; but should he assume a defensive atti-
tude, he was to be driven from any lines he might
hold, and a general invasion of France was to
follow. In that great movement the main object of
the Germans 'should be to force the French armies,
in defeat, into the Northern Provinces, and thus to
open a way to the capital of France.
This plan was not a conception of genius, or
even, in any sense, original ; it was that of Marl-
borough when, after Blenheim, he had intended to
enter France ; it was that laid down by Clausewitz,
perhaps, for Gneisenau, with a view to a contest
with France after 1815. But it was distinctly the
best that could be adopted, and it reveals a daring
and accomplished strategist, bent on a grand and
decisive offensive movement. The project of Moltke
was carried out with a celerity and precision that
showed how perfect the organization of the German
armies had become. The orders for the assembly
of these prodigious hosts were received on the 15th
of July; the operation was completed in about
sixteen days; and the working of the machinery
to effect this object was so admirable that, Moltke,
it is said, in reply to the anxious question of a
friend, remarked, " I have nothing to do ; my
arrangements are made." The corps d'armee,
collected, and formed on the spot, had soon called in
their reserves at hand ; their material hard by was
quickly supplied ; and the gathering masses were
i 2
116 MOLTKE.
rapidly conveyed, by the military system of the
German railways, from the Niemen, the Vistula,
the Oder, and the Inn, and westward from the
Lower Moselle to the Rhine, and the tract on its
western bank, the Palatinate and the Rhenish
Provinces. Three large armies were now formed,
on the system of 1866 ; the First, composed * of two
corps for tne present, and numbering about 60,000
men, under the command of the old and gallant
Steinmetz; the Second, 130,000 strong at least,
four 2 corps, led by Prince Frederick Charles ; and
the Third formed of five 3 corps, a combined Northern
and South German army, about equal in force to
the Second, and under the direction of the Crown
Prince of Prussia. These masses, however, fully
320,000 men, were sustained in second line by a
gigantic reserve, 4 five corps, excellent and trained
soldiers ; and the forces collected for the invasion
of France already numbered half a million of men,
with guns and cavalry in due proportion, drawn
together in little more than a fortnight. By the
end of July the First Army, the right wing of the
coming invasion, held the region around Treves
and Lower Sarre ; the Second, the centre, was
assembled about Mayence, and thence extended
1 The 7th and 8th Prussian corps.
2 The 3rd, 10th, and 4th Prussian corps, and the Guards.
3 The 5th and llth Prussian corps, two Bavarian corps, the
1st and 2nd, and two divisions of Wurtemberghers and Badeners,
equal to one corps.
4 The 1st corps to be added to the First Army, the 9th, 12th,
and 2nd to join the Second, and the 6th to support the Third.
THE WAE OF 1870-1. WORTH AND SPICHEREN. 117
along the main roads leading through the Pala-
tinate towards the verge of Lorraine ; and the
Third Army, the left wing, had its centre at
Landau, filling the country between Neustadt and
Spires, and already overhanging Alsace. A con-
centration of force, so rapid and complete, had
never been witnessed before in war, and it was
powerfully aided by the enthusiastic ardour of the
Teutonic race from the Niemen to the Moselle. Ger-
mans disliked the conflict of 1866, but the nation
in 1870 sprang, as a man, to arms to avenge old
wrongs and more recent injuries, on the enemy of
Eossbach, of Jena, of Waterloo.
The Emperor, meanwhile, had lingered at Metz,
and no important change had been made in the
disposition of the Army of the Rhine, the mass of
which lay spread on the French frontier, along
the borders of Lorraine and Alsace. In the judg-
ment of its chief, it was still not ready to take the
field and to begin to move, though great efforts
had been made, during the last few days, to furnish
it with the needs it required, and considerable rein-
forcements had been added by degrees. It is probable
however that, at this conjuncture, a real commander
would have found the means of directing it against
the enemy in his front, and of retarding at least
the German invasion, if not of gaining important
success. On the last day of July, and for a day or
two afterwards, the First Army on the Lower Sarre
and at Treves stood isolated, and without supports
at hand ; three corps of the French army and the
118 MOLTKE.
Imperial Guard were only two or three marches
distant, and it is difficult to suppose that x 100,000
men, supplied with all that was necessary for the
march, might not have been moved against the
60,000 of the First Army, and have fallen on it in
overwhelming strength. Villars had taken a step
like this, with excellent results, when confronting
Marlborough on this very ground in the indecisive
campaign of 1705 ; and had it been taken by
Napoleon III., the Army of the Rhine, after partial
success, would probably have found the means of
retreating safely, and of stubbornly defending the
line of the Moselle, as Villars had done, with
ultimate success. The Emperor, however, was
not a great general ; he let a good opportunity
pass, and he was, besides, wholly unable to direct
the large mass of the Army of the Rhine, which,
unlike the independent German armies, remained
altogether under his sole command. Instead of the
bold offensive, which was, at least, promising, he
adopted a perilous and weak half measure, to satisfy,
it would seem, the Parisian populace, already cla-
mouring for an advance to the Rhine. On the 2nd
of August a small German detachment was assailed
by a largely superior force at Sarrebruck on the
Middle Sarre, but an idle demonstration could have
no effect ; the French did not even cross the river,
1 This operation, and the probable results, are fully and clearly
explained by General Derrccagaix, " La Guerre Moderne," vol. i.
pp. 512-13. See also "La Guerre de 1870," by V. D., p. 98.
The " Prussian Staff History " is silent on the subject.
THE WAR OF 1870-1. WORTH AND SPIOHEREN. 119
and the Army of the Rhine remained in its camp a.
By this time, indeed, indecision and alarm were
predominant in the French Councils. Intelligence
had been received that the German armies were
approaching the frontier in immense strength, but
nothing definite had been ascertained ; and, though
attempts at reconnoitring on a great scale had
been made, the French cavalry, unskilled in this
service, had been unable to discover the real position
of affairs. In these circumstances, Napoleon III.
maintained his passive and expectant attitude, the
worst possible in view of impending events.
The hurried advance of the chief part of the
Army of the Rhine to the French frontier, deficient
as it was in requirements for the field, had induced
Moltke to believe, for a time, that the French
intended to take a bold offensive ; he had made
preparations for a defensive stand, and he did not
push forward the German armies for a few days
after they had been assembled. The puny attack
at Sarrebruck, however, and the continued inaction
of the Army of the Rhine, facts made known at the
head-quarters at Mayence, through the excellent
exploring of the German horsemen, soon made the
situation clear to him ; and orders were given for an
immediate advance to the frontier. The First and
Second Armies drew near each other, the one making
for the Middle Sarre, the other marching in the
same direction, behind the western slopes of the
German Yosges, along the main avenues into
Lorraine ; and thus the prospect of striking the
120 MOLTKE.
First Army, and beating it in detail, disappeared.
The Third Army, meanwhile, had all but reached
Alsace prepared to deal the first weighty blow, and
to begin the great general offensive movement, which
was to force the French northwards and to uncover
Paris; and the three armies had, by the 4th of
August, their foremost divisions quite near the
frontier. The march of the invaders was carefully
screened by bodies of horsemen, thrown forward,
and keeping away the enemy's patrols ; and the
French seem to have been unaware of its signifi-
cance, and even as to its true direction, until the
reality was ascertained too late.
Turning to the opposite camp we must next glance
at the situation of the Army of the Rhine, already
within reach of the destructive tempest. Of its
eight corps two were all but out of the account, one 1
being upon the Marne at Chalons, and the other, far
to the south, round Belfort, 1 though this had de-
spatched a single division northwards. Six corps
therefore only remained, and these, by this time
210,000 strong, spread along the frontier, in dis-
jointed parts, and dangerously exposed to a bold
attack. One corps 2 was behind Sarrebruck, on
the Middle Sarre, two 3 being immediately in the
rear ; the Imperial Guard was not far from Metz,
and these masses, perhaps 135,000 men, formed the
left wing of the whole army. A 4 single corps,
1 The 6th and 7th corps respectively.
8 The 2nd corps. * The 3rd and 4th corps.
4 The 5th corpg,
THE WAR OF 1870-1. WORTH AND SPICHEREN. 121
about 25,000 strong, was in the centre, holding at
Bitohe a chief passage through the French Vosges ;
and another 1 corps and a part of that at Belfort,
perhaps 50,000 men in all, and composing the right
wing of the French army, were on the northern
verge of Alsace. 320,000 men, therefore, the first
line of the German invasion, well led, well combined,
and acting well in concert, were about to fall on
210,000, unprepared, separated at wide distances,
and, for the most part, under inferior chiefs.
The Third Army, as Moltke had arranged, was
the first to pour over the French frontier. Its
advanced divisions had surrounded the old town of
Wissembourg, famous for the lines of Villars, by the
forenoon of the 4th of August ; and it had soon
been engaged with a single French division, impru-
dently thrown forward without supports, in com-
plete ignorance of the German movements. The
French made a stern and prolonged resistance, but
they were overwhelmed by the converging masses
of enemies, fourfold at least in numbers ; and the
division, losing more than a third of its men,
was driven, in rout, upon the main body. This
was the right wing of the Army of the Ehine, com-
posed of the 1st corps and of a part of the 7th, and
under the command of Marshal Macmahon, the Ney
of the days of the Second Empire ; and it was in
positions around Worth, a strategic point of no
small importance, covering roads that lead to Stras-
bourg and across the Vosges. Macmahon was
1 The 1st corps.
122 MOLTKE.
now aware that the Germans were at hand, but,
extraordinary as it may appear, he had no concep-
tion of the immense superiority of their approaching
forces, his cavalry had been so ill employed ; and,
even after the defeat of Wissembourg, he thought
for a moment that he could take the offensive, and
he did not at once call to his aid the corps at Bitche,
the 5th, directed by General Failly, which the
Emperor had placed under his orders. Even on
the 5th he did not believe that anything like serious
peril was near, and it was not until the following
day that he requested Failly to join hands with
him, and that with one division only, a proof how
little he understood the true state of affairs.
As a battle, however, might be imminent, he drew
up his army along the heights near W5rth before
nightfall upon the 5th, and his confidence, it is said,
was so great that he exclaimed to his staff, " The
Prussians will be badly worsted." The position was
one of great strength against a direct attack made
by foes not in overpowering numbers. The stream
of the Sauer ran before the Marshal's front, a
difficult obstacle to an advancing force ; his lines
were protected by the villages of Frosch wilier,
Elsasshausen, and Morsbronn, defensive points
that had been in part fortified ; the slopes which
the enemy would be compelled to ascend were in
most places very intricate ground, and yet they
afforded facilities at certain spots for counter
attacks, essential for defence, especially in the case
of French soldiers. The position, however, was
THE WAR OF 1870-1. WORTH AND SPIOHEREN. 123
liable to be turned on both flanks, and dense woods
on either side of the French army would give a
powerful adversary a marked advantage to conceal
and combine his attacks. Macmahon placed his
divisions along the line ;* his force, allowing for the
loss at "Wissembourg, was probably about 46,000
men, including 5000 horsemen a ad 120 guns.
The Crown Prince meantime had been making
ready for a decisive effort against Macmahon' s
army. He had ascertained the position and the
strength of the French by pushing forward his
bodies of horsemen, but he did not contemplate a
general attack until he had all his corps in hand,
an event not probable until the 7th of August. An
accident, however, or it is more likely the impetuous
zeal of subordinate chiefs, precipitated dangerously
a hard fought battle. On the morning of the
6th the 5th Prussian corps fell boldly, near Worth,
on the French centre, and the attack was sup-
ported by the 2nd Bavarian corps issuing from the
woods on Macmahon's left. These efforts, however,
completely failed, and though part of the llth
Prussian corps soon came into line, and the supe-
riority of the German artillery was proved even
1 There is no French official account of the war, but the careful
analysis made by General Derrecagaix, in " La Guerre Moderne,"
the narrative of V. D., and many tracts and books written by
distinguished French officers, in some measure supply a lamentable
desideratum. These works should be read to check the " Prussian
Staff History," not always trustworthy, especially as regards the
numbers engaged in several battles, no doubt in order to conceal
the overwhelming superiority, as a rule, of the Germans in force.
124 MOLTKE.
from the first moment, the difficulties of the attack
were great, and the French, possessing much the
better small-arms and skilfully making offensive
returns, had for three or four hours a distinct
advantage. The condition of the Germans, indeed,
had become so critical that orders arrived from the
Crown Prince to suspend the course of the fight
for a time, and it has been thought that had Mac-
mahon seized the favourable opportunity, at this
moment, he might have forced his enemy to draw
off beaten. The presence of mind, however, and
the self-reliance of Kirchbach, the chief of the 5th
corps, inclined the scale trembling in the balance ;
lie refused to give up the doubtful struggle, and he
was thanked for his bold resolve by the Crown
Prince, who reached the field soon after mid-day.
By this time the remaining part of the llth corps
had joined in the contest, the Wiirtemberghers
being a short way in the rear, and determined
efforts were made to turn Macmahon's right, while
the 5th corps fell on the French centre. The
pressure of superior numbers at last told, notwith-
standing admirable charges of the French infantry,
who more than once drove their enemies back,
entangled as they were in difficult ground ; the
Germans, sheltered by ravines and woods, gradually
established themselves on their enemy's flank, and
the French right wing was compelled to fall back
towards the centre round Elsasshausen. A noble
incident, however, marked its defeat : the French
cavalry made an heroic attempt to protect their
THE WAR OF 1870-1. WORTH AND SPICHEREN. 125
comrades as they retired, and though they were
almost wholly destroyed by a withering fire in the
street of Morsbronn, one of the finest charges in
the annals of war recalled the historic days of
Eylau and Waterloo.
During all this time the 5th corps had been
making a furious onslaught on Macmahon's centre,
while the 2nd Bavarian corps had renewed its
attack from behind its wooded screen on the French
left; but decisive success was not achieved, until
the 1st Bavarian corps, coming on the field, made
the overwhelming pressure impossible to withstand.
Another splendid division of the French cavalry
offered itself up a victim to shield the footmen ;
but, gradually the defence began to slacken, and
the beaten army to show signs of panic. Never-
theless some brave regiments clung tenaciously to
every point of vantage to the last ; and it was not
until their foes, in irresistible force, had converged
against them on both flanks, had stormed Frosch-
willer and Elsasshausen, and had pierced Mac-
mahon's centre right through, that the battle can
be said to have come to an end. The whole French
line then precipitately gave way, and the roads
through Alsace swarmed with affrighted fugitives,
hurrying away in despair and hideous rout. The
retreat was in some degree covered by the arrival
of the division of Failly's corps, summoned, we
have seen, by Macmahon late ; but the victory of
the Germans was not the less complete. The
French army lost nearly half its numbers, reckoning
126 MOLTKE.
prisoners, and a fourth part of its guns ; the losses
of the Germans were nearly 10,000 men, a proof
how fierce the conflict had been; but they had
almost ruined their beaten enemy. Macmahon,
who had fought to the last moment, did not
attempt to retreat towards the main French army,
through the passes of the Vosges, in his rear ; he
made through Lower Alsace with the wreck of his
forces.
At Worth, 46,000 Frenchmen and 120 guns,
these very inferior to those of the enemy, had been
opposed to 100,000 Germans, and not less than
300 guns, and the issue of the contest had been
long uncertain. The battle is honourable to France
in the highest degree ; but had it been conducted
on the German side with due regard to the prin-
ciples of war, it could not have lasted for this space
of time. The attacks of the Germans were, at
first premature ; until after noon they were badly
combined, and the immense superiority in force
of the Third Army was not felt until nearly the
end of the struggle. This precipitate haste, and
these imprudent tactics alone enabled Macmahon's
army to protract the noble defence it made ; and
had the battle followed the Crown Prince's design,
the result would have been quick and decisive.
The boldness and firmness of Kirchbach, however,
in continuing the strife, when it had once begun
another among repeated instances of the charac-
teristics of the Prussian leaders, acquired largely
through Moltke's precepts are worthy of the very
THE WAE OF 1870-1. WOETH AND SPIOHEREN. 127
highest praise ; and the German divisions supported
each other admirably, when they had been at last
collected for the decisive attack.
Macmahon skilfully fought a very brilliant fight,
if we regard Worth as an isolated fact only ; and
the French soldiery, who formed the flower of the
army, and who had perfect confidence in themselves
and their chief, especially the cavalry, showed
heroic qualities. Yet, if we examine the Marshal's
conduct as a whole, and with reference to the
military art, we perceive that it was a series of
errors. It is difficult to understand, how, after the
affair of Wissembourg, he was ignorant of the
strength of the enemy in his front, and why he did
not at once fall back from Worth. He ought,
evidently, to have summoned the entire corps of
Failly to his assistance on the 5th ; as he had
made up his mind to fight, it was his obvious interest
to have every available man on the field. He, no
doubt, showed tactical skill at Worth, but he ought
not to have made a hopeless attempt to resist, after
both his flanks had been turned, and his centre
broken ; and this was a main cause of the rout of
his army. Above all, he ought to have effected his
retreat on the main army, through the passes in his
rear, and not have made an eccentric movement
southwards ; this gave his enemy a most favourable
chance to annihilate the remains of his forces, and
it uncovered the centre and left of the Army of the
Rhine, with the gravest and most disastrous
results. The rout, however, of Worth was so
128 MOLTKE.
complete, that perhaps he had not his troops
sufficiently in hand to direct their retreat in the
true direction.
A battle, meanwhile, of a very different kind,
had been fought on the same day, far to the left of
Worth, and west of the Vosges. The Germans,
we have seen, had approached the frontier of
Lorraine and Alsace by the 4th of August, and
three divisions of the First and Second Armies, a
fourth being at a little distance, had, by the follow-
ing day, drawn near Sarrebruck. The French
corps, the 2nd, under General Frossard, which had
taken part in the demonstration of the 2nd, at the
intelligence of the advance of the enemy, had fallen
back from the plains behind the town, and had
occupied a position near Forbach, along a series of
heights in the midst of woods, extending from
Spicheren to the village of Stiring. Kameke, the
chief of the foremost German division, believed that
his adversary was in full retreat, and having
obtained the permission of his leader, Zastrow,
fell boldly on the strong line of the French. The
Prussian artillery again showed its superiority
to that opposed to it, but the attack of Kameke
at first failed, though his troops displayed the
most determined courage. Another German divi-
sion ere long came up, and though the French
were in turn reinforced, the assailants gradually
had the advantage ; a projecting eminence, called
the Red Spur, was stormed by an heroic effort, and
the Germans, as at Worth, made their footing good
THE WAR OF 1870-1. WORTH AND SP10HEREN. 129
on their enemy's right, under the screen of a forest,
which spread along this side of the French position.
Up to this moment Frossard had thought that a
real attack was not being made, and he had not even
appeared on the field. He now, however, took his
troops in hand, and sent off to the chief of the corps
in his rear, making an earnest demand for imme-
diate aid. But meanwhile the third German divi-
sion had joined in the fight, and made its presence
felt, and while the battle raged along the front of
the French, a bold effort was made to turn their
left, and to seize Stiring, on which it rested. The
struggle continued for some hours, each side
fighting like good soldiers, though the destructive
fire of the German batteries produced gradually
marked effects; L but no reinforcements reached
the hard-pressed French ; and Frossard was
already contemplating a retreat, when the ap-
parition of the fourth hostile division, on his
left, compelled him hurriedly to draw off his forces.
Stiring was now captured and the whole position
lost, but the retreat was conducted in good order,
and the Germans did not attempt a pursuit. Their
losses, indeed, exceeded those of the enemy, about
4800 to 4000 men, but they had not the less gained
important success. The defeat of Frossard laid
Lorraine open, and broke the front of the Army of
the Rhine.
The Germans were at first inferior in force at
Spicheren, 1 but less so than is commonly supposed.
1 It is impossible even nearly to reconcile the German and
K
130 MOLTKE.
They were superior, however, at the close of the
battle, without taking into account the last division,
the presence of which determined the retreat of
Frossard, and they were then probably about
30,000 to 25,000 men. On the other hand, there
was no feat of arms on the side of the French,
compared to the storming of the Red Spur height,
and the troops of the 2nd French corps were not
equal in quality to those which Macmahon led.
The most striking feature of the battle, certainly,
was the contrast presented by the contending
leaders. The attack of Kameke was, no doubt,
premature, as had been the original attack at Worth,
but he was admirably seconded by his colleagues ;
and here we see once more a remarkable instance
of one of the best characteristics of the Prussians
in command. How utterly different was the con-
duct of the generals in the opposite camp ! Fros-
sard was not in the field until the afternoon; he
was absent from his post at a momentous crisis,
and he lost precious hours in applying for the aid
which otherwise he might perhaps have secured.
Yet this was by no means the worst : three French
divisions, commanded by Bazaine, a name of evil
repute in the war of 1870, were not ten miles from
French accounts of the numbers engaged on either side at Spich-
eren. " The Prussian Staff History " repeatedly assumes that the
French were largely superior in force; but this is denied by
General Derre*cagaix, " La Guerre Moderne," vol. i. p. 530. The
French seem to have had at first the numerical advantage, but
they were outnumbered at last.
THE WAR OF 1870-1. WORTH AND SPICHEREN. 131
the scene of the conflict ; and if Frossard was late
in seeking assistance, the sound of the battle ought
to have prompted Bazaine to advance with all his
troops to Spicheren. Had he taken this course,
25,000 men would have been placed in the scale
on the side of France, and the French must easily
have gained a victory. Bazaine, however, remained
inactive, and a fine opportunity was thrown away.
From the day of Ro^esvalles to that of Waterloo,
it has been a distinctive fault of the warriors of
France to think of themselves only, and to neglect
their comrades.
Worth and Spicheren were the first act in the
great drama of the war between France and
Germany. The Emperor's plan for the campaign
had failed ; he had been tried in the balance and
found wanting. Moltke had perfectly carried out
his fine strategic project, and France had been
invaded in irresistible force. Gleams of the old
lustre had shone on the French arms ; the conduct
of Macmahon's soldiery on the field of Worth had
been worthy of the heirs of Napoleon's legions.
But the Germans were in overwhelming strength ;
and not in numbers only, but in military worth,
their armies were better than that of their enemy.
They had been more quickly assembled in the field ;
their organization was far superior ; they were
better prepared, equipped, and trained for war;
in artillery, and in the art of exploring, by cavalry,
they easily surpassed the French. The French
army, on the contrary, was numerically weak ; its
K 2
132 MOLTKE.
administration had not fulfilled its functions ; it was
sent to the frontier before it was ready ; it had a
considerable admixture of bad soldiers ; and, owing
to its deficiency in reconnoitring power, it was like
a man with short sight fighting with a man endowed
with perfect and true vision. Its leaders, too, were
far behind those of the Germans ; not that a great
military genius had appeared among these, but that
the German generals were skilful, daring, and self-
reliant, and especially acted well together, while the
French generals were deficient in these respects.
As to the supreme direction of the two armies, it
would be absurd to compare Napoleon III. to
Moltke, and the Emperor was already beset by a
difficulty, which was to cause his ruin, the necessity
he felt of yielding to opinion in Paris. It was this
that led to the trifling of Sarrebruck ; it was this that
kept his army upon the frontier when he knew that
it was outnumbered two to one, and when a retreat
had become his only safe course ; and it was this,
we shall see, that made his advisers neglect mili-
tary considerations for supposed reasons of state,
and that precipitated an appalling catastrophe. He
might plaintively assert, 1 "All may yet be repaired,"
but dark clouds even now were lowering on France.
1 The well-known phrase of the Emperor, "Tout peilt se reparer,"
uttered after Worth and Spicheren, is an exact repetition of a
remark of Napoleon after Waterloo. " Comment.," vol. v. p. 194.
CHAPTER V.
The German armies do not pursue the French after "Worth and
Spicheren Opportunity lost by Moltke Ketreat of the Army
of the Khine, in part towards Chalons, in part towards the
Moselle Projects of Napoleon III. The main part of the
French army falls back from the Nied to Metz Advance of
the G-erman armies to the Moselle Marshal Bazaine made
commander-in-chief of the whole French army, including the
part approaching Chalons His first operations The French
attempt to retreat on Verdun Battle of Colombey Nouilly
or Borny Advance of the Germans beyond the Moselle
Bazaine and the French army to the west of Metz Battle o
Mars La Tour Bazaine falls back to a strong position outside
Metz What he might have accomplished Advance of the
Germans Battle of Gravelotte Its vicissitudes and charac-
teristics The French, at last defeated, are driven back on
Metz Reflections on this passage in the war, and on the
conduct of Moltke and his adversaries.
THE double defeat of Worth and Spicheren had
broken up the Army of the Rhine. Macmahon, we
have seen, had fled southwards to the right ;
Frossard, on the left, had moved to Sarreguemines,
exposing himself to an attack on his flank ; Failly,
with the centre, had hurried away from Bitche,
detaching part of his troops to the main army, and
seeking, amidst many perils, to join Macmahon.
The German leaders, however, did not press the
enemy, as had happened after the victories that
134 MOLTKE.
preceded Sadowa ; and they did not turn their
immense success to advantage. In the belief that
Macmahon had fallen back, as he ought to have
done, on the main army, they sent a small force
along the roads towards Bitche ; but when it was
found that he had gone in another direction they
did not attempt to molest his retreat. Frossard,
again, was not even followed ; Failly was permitted
to effect his escape, and to unite with the wreck of
Macmahon's forces ; and, as had been witnessed
in Bohemia before, contact with the foe was
altogether lost. Moltke was not, perhaps, respon-
sible for all this, for he was still many leagues in
the rear ; but, at this moment, he did not contem-
plate a determined pursuit of the French army, and
it is characteristic in fact of him, that he seldom
attempted to crush a defeated enemy, the very
opposite, in this respect, to Napoleon. Without
troubling himself with the movements of the French,
he proceeded leisurely, but surely, to carry out the
design which he had formed for the campaign, that
is to make the success of the invasion certain, to
drive his adversaries, beaten, to the north, and to
secure an approach to the French capital. For this
purpose the immense reserves of the German
armies, already on the march, were hastened forward
to the scene of events ; and five corps, 1 about
150,000 strong, were added to the gigantic forces
1 The 1st corps joining the First Army ; the 9th, 12th, and 2nd
the Second Army ; the 6th corps the Third Army. See ante. The
2nd corps was still some marches in the rear.
METZ. MAES LA TOUR. GRAVELOTTE. 135
already spreading over Alsace and Lorraine. On
the 8th of August, two days after Worth, the vast
columns of the Third Army were directed through
the passes of the Vosges ; and while the Baden
division was told off to secure the flank, and to lay
siege to Strasbourg, the left wing of the great
invasion was marched to the Sarre, and thence to
the Upper Moselle. Meanwhile, the First and the
Second Armies, the right wing and centre of the
German hosts, advanced slowly on the 10th of
August through the table-lands and plains of
Lorraine, the First Army forming the pivot of a great
general movement on the Moselle, where the French
army, it was supposed, was making a stand on the
line between Metz and Thionville. 450,000 men,
at least, were thus set in motion to overwhelm the
remains of an army of 210,000, which had already
suffered heavy reverses, which at this moment could
hardly place 150,000 men on the course of the
Moselle, but which, it was assumed, was in a strong
position, resting on two fortresses covering its
flanks.
It is difficult to condemn the strategy, for, mani-
fold as are the chances of war, it made ultimate
success all but certain, and in the event it was more
than justified, if this is no conclusive test of its
merits. Moltke had resolved not to enter the
interior of France without an overwhelming
superiority of force, and this once secured he
might fairly expect that he would be able to effect
his daring project. He therefore waited until his
136 MOLTKE.
reserves were at hand, and he moved, without an
attempt at haste, to the Moselle, ever intent on the
one great object in view. Nor can it be denied
that circumspection and caution were needed in the
advance ; it was reasonable to expect that the
French army would defend the formidable line of
the Moselle, as Villars had held it against Marl-
borough ; the real state of that army and its chiefs
could hardly be fully known in the German camp,
and a great invasion of France had been always
perilous. Nevertheless, an impartial student of war
will probably think that in this instance Moltke let
a grand opportunity slip, and failed to strike a
blow that might have been decisive. He was in
communication by the telegraph with the three
armies, and it is not easy to understand why, after
Worth and Spicheren, he did not at once follow his
defeated enemy. A very slight effort of the Third
Army would have simply annihilated Macmahon's
forces, and probably would have destroyed Failly ;
and had it sent even a small detachment across the
Vosges, the First and Second Armies, with this
support, could have crushed to atoms the remaining
parts of the 1 Army of the Rhine, already beaten.
In that event, a great and decisive victory might
have been won about the 10th of August, before the
French army had had time to retreat, and the war
would perhaps have come to an end without a
1 This movement has been indicated by several writers ; and
what Moltke might have accomplished is well shown by Y. D.,
"La Guerre de 1870," pp. 213-17.
METZ. MARS LA TOUR. GRAVELOTTE. 137
desperate struggle protracted for months. Be this
as it may, when on the path of victory Moltke was
never to be even named with Napoleon, though
the telegraph gave him an immense advantage,
unknown in the days of Jena and Austerlitz, but
the difference cannot be deemed surprising if we
recollect that Moltke was in his seventieth year. 1
It was certainly, also, a plain mistake that the
French army was not kept in sight; this gave it
ample time to escape had it been even rationally
led ; nay, in spite of the overpowering strength of
its foes, it afforded it, we shall see, more than one
chance to strike with effect, perhaps to achieve
great things had a real commander been at its
head.
Meanwhile the shattered Army of the Rhine,
though not pressed as it ought to have been, had
been effecting its retreat in distress and confusion.
Macmahon, ultimately joined by Failly, after falling
back towards Haguenau and Strasbourg, had marched
hurriedly through the defile of Saverne ; and cross-
ing the Upper Moselle and the Meuse, was, in obedi-
1 In commenting on the operations of the Germans after Worth
and Spicheren, Major Adams, though an enthusiastic admirer of
Moltke , observes, " The one quality in which Von Moltke seems
deficient is that of reaping the full and instantaneous fruits of
victory. The time that was permitted to elapse after the first
struggle lost to the Germans the opportunity of bringing the war to
a brilliant and rapid conclusion," " Great Campaigns," pp. 614-15.
Still, the thinker on war should ever bear in mind the sagacious
remark of Turenne, "Memoires," p. 185 : " Souvent les personnes
les plus habiles font des fautes qu'il est plus aise de remarquer que
de prevenir."
138 MOLTKE.
dence to the commands of his ill-fated master, seek-
ing a refuge near the great camp of Chalons, where he
could rally the corps that had been placed at Belfort,
the 7th, commanded by General Douay. The
left wing and part of the centre of the French
army, for the time not 140,000 strong, taking even
into account the troops sent off by Failly, were
thus left exposed to a crushing blow, which, how-
ever, we have seen, was not struck, and they remained
open to the irresistible attacks of an enemy almost
threefold in strength, should they attempt to make
a stand in Lorraine. In these circumstances Na-
poleon III. resolved to abandon the line of the
Moselle, and ordered a general retreat on Chalons ;
and this probably was the most judicious course, for
if he could not expect to repeat the marvels of the
campaign of 1814, his whole forces would have been
drawn together, and Paris, a colossal fortress, would
have formed a huge entrenched camp, most favour-
able as a field of manoeuvre.
Once more, however, the dread of the scorn of
the capital had a fatal influence on the troubled
Head of the State, who never should have been a
general-in-chief. The Emperor was afraid to retreat
so far ; and when it had become apparent that the
German armies were not making a rapid advance, he
resolved for a few hours to try to stand on the Nied,
an affluent of the Sarre, to the east of Metz. The
corps which had been formed at Chalons, the 6th,
" under Canrobert, the Crimean veteran, had been
hurriedly directed to move upon Metz, and three-
METZ. MARS LA TOUR. GBAVELOTTE. 139
fourths of it had, ere long, reached the fortress,
raising the numbers, therefore, of the army in
Lorraine l to about 170,000 men, 10,000 of these
probably being not effective troops. Macmahon,
however, was not called up, though as yet he was
far to the east of Chalons, and a single day sufficed
to induce the Emperor to give up any project of
accepting battle. The line of the Nied was too
short to afford a good position of defence against a
more powerful enemy ; and, at the intelligence of
the approach of the Gerrdans, the French army was
hastily directed on Metz, invaluable hours having
been lost. The retreat was effected in severe
weather; 2 signs of insubordination, panic, and terror,
had begun to show themselves among the French
soldiery, always sensitive either in victory or defeat ;
and the attitude of their chiefs was despondent in
the extreme. By the 12th of August the retiring
army was in front of Metz on the eastern bank of
the Moselle. It had not been molested by the slow
moving enemy, and it might easily have made its
way to Chalons, but for lamentable vacillation and
weakness in command.
1 A careful comparison of many authorities seems to prove that
the calculation is fairly correct. The figures given by Moltke, we
shall see, are altogether wrong, and those of the Prussian Staff are
not nearly correct.
2 A good account of the state of the French army, in its re-
treat 011 Metz, after Worth and Spicheren, at least as regards the
troops in Lorraine, will be found in u Metz, par un officier superieur
de 1'armee du Rhin," p. 50. See also "Guerre de 1870," by
Bazaine, pp. 42, 46.
140 MOLTKE.
During these lame and halting operations of the
French, the invaders had been overrunning Lor-
raine. The Third Army, detaching a few troops to
mask the petty forts of the Yosges, but reinforced
by an additional corps, had reached the Upper
Moselle by the 14th of August, had taken possession
of Lun^ville and Nancy, the chief towns of the old
Duchy, and already held the avenues leading to
Paris. The First and Second Armies, strengthened
by four corps, advanced along the great roads be-
tween the Sarre and the Moselle, and spread over the
adjoining region, at first extended on a wide front,
but drawn towards each other when the news
arrived that the French army was upon the Nied.
When informed that the enemy was in full retreat,
Moltke made arrangements for a further advance of
the two armies upon the Moselle, which deserve the
attention of students of war. He had lost sight of
the French army, but he had been apprised that it
was behind the Moselle, yet, as it was quite possible
as was the case in fact, that it was concentrated east
of the river, and in the neighbourhood of the great
stronghold of Metz, his preparations were formed on
this assumption. The First Army was directed to
stand on the Nied, to observe and even to reach the
enemy, and the most forward corps of the Second
Army were ordered to attain and master the Moselle,
so that, in conjunction with the Third Army, they
should be able to take part in the great movement,
which was to send the French northward and to lay
open Paris. The march, however, of the Second
Army was a march across the front of a still power-
MABSHAL BA/A1NK.
To face paye 141.
MBTZ. MARS LA TOUR. GRAVELOTTE. 141
ful foe, under the protection of a stronghold of the
first order ; and this flank march, to use technical
language, was admirably screened by dense masses
of horsemen, which covered all the approaches from
Metz. On the supposition, however, that the French
were at hand, two corps of the Second Army were
moved to support the First Army, should it be
assailed, and the combined forces were so placed
that, in Moltke's judgment, they would possess the
means of falling on their enemy in front and flank.
By this time the stress of opinion in the camps of
the French had compelled the Emperor to give up
his command. Marshal Bazaine, who had been
already placed at the head of the army still in Lor-
raine, the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th corps, the Imperial
Guard, and the 6th corps just arrived at Metz, was
nominated, on the 12th of August, Commander-in-
Chief of the whole French army, including the
corps of Macmahon, Failly, and Douay, the 1st,
5th, and 7th, on their way to Chalons. Every
allowance ought to be made, in justice, for a general
who, at a moment's notice, received a command in
the grave straits in which the Marshal was even
now placed, that is, who undertook to direct a
defeated army, threatened by an enemy in over-
powering strength, and separated from its supports
by a wide distance ; and if Bazaine, in the progress
of events, was to prove himself the evil genius of
France, his first operations are not to be harshly
judged. It is remarkable indeed that, at the out-
set, the Marshal wished to adopt a course, which
might have given the French arms a victory, nay,
142 MOLTKE.
have had a marked effect on events, had he followed
it up with boldness and energy. Moltke, we have
seen, had left the First Army on the Nied, and had
placed two corps sufficiently at hand, as he thought,
to afford it aid in the event of an attack from
Metz, 1 but this calculation was not accurate ; had
the French army fallen on the enemy, in collected
force, on the 13th of August, it ought to have de-
feated the First Army before the two corps could
have reached the field, 2 and Bazaine contemplated
this very movement, though not probably fully
aware of the facts, or of the advantage he might
have won.
Indecision, however, and want of firmness of par-
pose, combined with indolence and dulness of mind,
were the characteristics of Bazaine, as a chief, and
he gave proof of these qualities from the first,
though we repeat he is not yet to be lightly con-
demned. The Emperor, if no longer in command,
still had the influence that belongs to a sovereign ;
he entreated the Marshal to fall back at once to
conduct the army across the Moselle, and, leaving
Metz, to hasten on to Verdun, with a view of reach-
ing Chalons at last, and it is only just to remark
that this was the advice of nearly all the French
generals on the spot. The Marshal gave up his
1 This is very clearly shown by General Derrecagaix, " La Guerre
Moderne," ii. p. 57. A fault was, no doubt, left in the German
cuirass.
2 " L'Armee du Ehin " par le Marechal Bazaine, p. 51 ; " Guerre
de 1870," par 1'ex-Marechal Bazaine, p. 62. These works, the
apologies of the unfortunate Marshal, are of little intrinsic merit,
but deserve attention.
METZ. MAES LA TOUR. GBAVELOTTE. 143
offensive project, he ordered an immediate retreat
on Verdun, and, by the morning of the 14th of
August, the French army was defiling through
Metz, and passing the Moselle on its way to the
Meuse. The march was halting and slow in the
extreme, the columns were delayed and entangled
as they wound through the streets and alleys
of the town ; the mass of the impedimenta was
immense, but though Bazaine 1 has been severely
censured for not having bridged the Moselle more
fully to expedite the march of his troops, 2 the charge
appears to be not justified. It was otherwise cer-
tainly when the army had begun to get clear of
Metz and its hindrances, and had crossed the
Moselle to continue the retreat. Two main roads
led from Metz to Verdun, one by Gravelotte, and
thence in two large branches, by Mars La Tour,
Woevre, and to the north by Etain, the other still
further north, by Briey, and lesser roads ran into
these great avenues from many points of the town
and the fortress. The Marshal, however, .crowded
his whole army on the single main road, forming one
line only, until it divides into two at Gravelotte; he
made little or no use of the secondary roads, and
obviously this was a palpable error, for the retrograde
movement was delayed for hours, when celerity was
of supreme importance.
By the afternoon of the 14th of August, consider-
1 See the Eeport of General Riviere, p. 22. This report, however,
is really the official indictment of Bazaine at his trial, and is charged
with every kind of accusation, true or not.
2 " L'Armee du Rhin," p. 48 ; " Guerre de 1870," p. 61.
144 MOLTKE.
ably less than half of the French army had crossed
the Moselle and reached the west of Metz. But
the clouds of dust which announced the retreat,
and the reports of patrols and perhaps of spies,
had attracted the attention of the generals of the First
Army placed, we have seen, by Moltke on the Nied ;
and just as had happened at Worth and Spicheren,
these leaders resolved to attack the enemy before
waiting for the direction of the general-in-chief.
At about 5 p.m. two Prussian divisions had advanced
along the main roads from the Sarre to Metz, on
Colombey and Nouilly and the outposts of the
French, and an extending line of fire marked the
course of a battle along the eastern front of the
great neighbouring stronghold. The French seem
to have been almost surprised, and the enemy
threw them back for a time, taking possession of
more than one point of vantage, -but they really
were superior in force at first ; and parts of the
3rd and 4th corps, commanded by Generals Decaen
and L'Admirault, had ere long brought the assail-
ants to a stand. A furious conflict now raged for
a time, marked by the usual feature of these
engagements, the ascendancy of the Prussian guns,
and the superiority of the French rifle, and Bazaine,
who had hastened to the spot, showed considerable
skill in directing his troops, though he did not
employ his great reserves at hand. The arrival at
last of another Prussian division, and of the ad-
vanced guard of one of the two corps which had
been placed to support the First Army, compelled,
METZ. MARS LA TOUR. GRAVELOTTE. 145
however, the Marshal to retreat at nightfall, and
the French retired slowly under the guns of Metz.
They had not been defeated from a tactical point
of view ; the battle in fact was drawn, as a mere
passage of arms, and the Germans had suffered far
the most heavy loss, 5000 compared to 3400 men.
Bazaine had been a good soldier in this fierce
encounter, and had even inspired his disheartened
troops with confidence. But he had shown want
of capacity as a general-in-chief, and he had missed
an occasion which he might have seized. The
Guard, and part of the 2nd French corps, were on
the spot, and had he sent this formidable reserve
to the aid of the 3rd and the 4th corps he must
have defeated the Prussian divisions, and possibly 1
have even beaten the First Army in detail. He was,
however, a man of weak half measures, like most
inert and incompetent chiefs ; he never thought of
recurring to his former design, and though he
might have attacked with a fair prospect of success,
he was satisfied when he had merely kept back
the enemy. Moltke, on the other hand, drew
fruitful results from this hard-fought and prolonged
battle, known as Colombey JSTouilly or Borny.
He had not probably wished the blow to be struck,
though he had made preparations for an event of
the kind, but the conflict had still further retarded
the slow retreat of the French from Metz ; and he
saw an opportunity, owing to this delay, of inter-
1 See V. D., Guerre de 1870," p. 215, and authorities cited in
note.
L
146 MOLTKE.
cepting Bazaine on his march, and of striking him
before he could reach Verdun ; success in this
operation being a further step in the fundamental
scheme of his strategy, to force the enemy north-
ward and to expose Paris. By this time a part of
the Second Army, the movement masked, we have
seen, by cavalry, had taken possession of the line
of the Moselle, between Dieulouard and Pont a
Mousson, at no considerable distance from Metz,
and the remaining corps, save one, was at hand.
Moltke's orders were issued on the 15th of August ;
the First Army was to approach the Moselle, draw-
ing near the southern part of Metz, and leaving one
corps in observation in the rear, and the great mass
of the Second Army was to press forward west-
wards, and, having passed the Moselle, was to
endeavour to close on the line of the enemy's retreat
and to cut him off from Verdun and the Meuse.
This contrast between the remissness of Bazaine
and the insight and energy of his antagonist must
be evident to every student of war. The Germans,
meanwhile, had been advancing even before Moltke's
arrangements were complete, and throughout the
15th of August they had been gathering on the
Moselle. By the evening of that day the First
Army, the right wing of the immense invasion, had
two corps, the 8th and the 7th, near the region
between the Moselle and its feeder, the Seille, the
attendant cavalry approaching Metz, and one corps
only, the 1st, was in the rear. The Second Army,
the centre, having a single corps, the 2nd, not yet
METZ. MAES LA TOUR. GRAVELOTTE. 147
come into line, and communicating on the left by
one corps, the 4th, with the Third Army, the left
wing, round Nancy, had five corps ready for the
great march westwards, the 3rd, the 10th, the
Guards, the 9th and the 12th, this colossal force
being on either bank of the Moselle ; and everything
had been prepared for the decisive movement,' next
day, to intercept the retreating enemy. Here, how-
ever, a great mistake was made, which might have
been followed by evil results. Moltke had wished
that the mass of the Second Army should sweep
circuitously round on the retiring French, holding
the various roads from Metz to Verdun ; in this
way they would surely be cut off, and compelled to
fight a disastrous battle. Prince Frederick Charles,
however, the chief of the Second Army, seems to
have thought that this movement would be too late,
and that Bazaine was already not far from the
Meuse, and, modifying the general orders he had
received, he despatched one corps, the 3rd, towards
the main road leading to Verdun, by Mars La Tour,
and he sent another, the 10th, in the same direc-
tion, but at a considerable distance to the left.
The object of these operations was, no doubt, to
pursue Bazaine, to press on his rear, and to force
him to stand at bay and to fight ; and as the Prince
communicated, at least in part, the new dispositions
he had made to the headquarters at Pont a Mousson,
Moltke, in some measure perhaps, was accountable
for them. 1
1 That this is a fairly accurate account of these operations,
L 2
148 MOLTKE.
The advanced patrols of the German cavalry,
exploring far beyond the bodies in the rear, had
approached Mars La Tour on the 15th of August,
and had met and defeated some squadrons of French
horsemen. By the morning of the 16th the 3rd
Prussian corps had drawn near the great road from
Metz to Verdun, by Mars La Tour, as had been
directed, and the 10th was on the way by Thiau-
court, nearly half a march distant. Meanwhile the
French army, under Bazaine, had been continuing
its retreat from Metz, but its movements had been
more than ever slow. The battle of the 14th had
greatly retarded its advance ; the masses of troops,
collected on a single road, and the huge trains of
supplies and munitions had proceeded almost at a
snail's pace, and the 4th corps had been compelled
to follow the northern road, towards Briey, in order
to avoid confusion. The retreat, indeed, had been
much more tedious than the German commanders
could have supposed, and Prince Frederick Charles
had been deceived when he had heard that his
enemy was near the Meuse. On the morning of the
16th the retiring army was still but a short way
from Metz, the left wing and centre, the Guard,
the 2nd and the 6th corps being around the great
road by Mars La Tour, from Rezonville, and Vion-
may, we think, be gathered from the " Prussian Staff History,"
vol. i. pp. 351, 355. Attempts have been made to show that
Prince Frederick Charles was in no sense responsible, but these
are certainly futile. The responsibility of Moltke is much more
doubtful, but may be, we believe, inferred.
METZ. MAES LA TOUE. GEAVELOTTE. 149
ville, to Verneville northwards, the right wing, the
3rd and the 4th corps, being in the rear, north-
wards also, and but a few miles distant. The
Emperor by this time had left the army he had
abandoned the helm of the imperilled ship and his
departure had removed the chief influence that had
directed the French to seek Verdun and the Meuse.
It would be absurd to charge Bazaine with the
sinister conduct attributed to him, even at this
time, by violent partisans and time-servers ; but he
had never approved of the march towards Verdun ;
he had a strange longing to stay around Metz, and
when his master was gone he began to hesitate.
He ordered a general halt for the forenoon of the
16th, ostensibly to enable his 3rd and 4th corps to
come into line with the rest of the army, and he
already looked back with regret, there can be little
doubt, to the stronghold he had been induced to
leave. The general result was that the French
army, about 140,000 strong in the field, was
collected within a space comparatively small, while
a single Prussian corps, with another far off, was
near this formidable mass, and within striking dis-
tance. Had Bazaine been a real commander, he
ought to have swept his enemy, routed, from his
path.
These operations led to the battle of Mars La
Tour, one of the most memorable of the war of
1870-1, and perhaps the most glorious to the
German arms. On the morning of the 16th of
August, a body of Prussian cavalry, detached by
150 MOLTKE.
the chief of the 10th corps, and supported by a few
thousand infantry, fell on a larger body of French
horsemen, reconnoitringround the hamlet of Yionville
on the great road by Mars LaTour, and put the enemy,
discreditably surprised, to flight. Ere long a single
division of the 3rd Prussian corps, one of the most
distinguished of the Prussian army, had, obeying
its orders, reached the scene ; it was preceded by
another division of horsemen, and its chief, Alvens-
leben, probably in the belief that he was in the
presence of an enemy in retreat, attacked the 2nd
French corps of Frossard, part of the left wing of
Bazaine's forces. The attack was, for a time, re-
pelled, but the second division of the 3rd corps had
soon come to the aid of its comrades, and, after a
protracted struggle, in which, as always, the Ger-
man artillery had the advantage, the corps of
Frossard, beaten at Spicheren, and diminished by a
division left behind at Metz, was driven back on
the reserves in the rear, and the villages of Vion-
ville and Flavigny were lost. By this time
Bazaine had appeared on the spot ; he skilfully
withdrew his shattered troops, and filled the gap
that had been made in his line, with part of the
Imperial Guard left carefully in the rear, and this
movement, covered by a fine charge of horsemen,
completely restored the Marshal's battle. Alvens-
leben, however, persisted in fighting what was
evidently an army with his one corps, and before
long, Canrobert and the 6th corps had fallen in
force on the hard-pressed Germans. The unequal
METZ. MAES LA TOUK. GRAVELOTTE. 151
contest was nobly maintained, but the approach of the
3rd French corps, now under Le Boeuf its former
chief had fallen on the 14th compelled the 3rd
corps to retreat by degrees, and probably it would
have been severely worsted, but for the superiority
of its well-served guns, and a magnificent effort
made by the cavalry at hand. The Prussian squad-
rons, "courageous unto death," like the French
at "Worth, charged the enemy drawing near, but
more fortunate than the French at Worth, though
hardly stricken, they were not destroyed, and they
extricated the infantry from what might have been
ruin, had the French made a well combined attack.
The French army had, at first, been surprised,
and the 2nd corps had been fairly beaten. Bazaine,
too, had made no attempt to crush the single divi-
sion which had dared to assail him, and the 6th and
3rd French corps arrived on the field, successively,
and in a defensive attitude. At last, however, the
French were in line, in overwhelming strength corn-
compared to their enemy, and the approach of the
4th corps of L'Admirault increased the huge pre-
ponderance of force. The Marshal was entreated
to give orders for a general attack from Mars La
Tour on his right, to Rezonville on his left, and had
this been given nothing could have saved Alvensleben
from a crushing defeat. 1 Bazaine, however, refused
to advance ; he kept the great body of the Guard
inactive in the rear ; he insisted that the 6th and
3rd corps should remain where they stood, and a
1 "La Guerre Moderne," General Derrecagaix, vol. ii. p. 221.
152 MOLTKE.
great opportunity was, indisputably lost. At about
four in the afternoon, the heads of the 10th Prussian
corps appeared on the ground and sustained the
3rd, and before long the greater part of the main
body hastened to the spot with the energetic good-
will characteristic of the Prussian commanders,
and in some measure redressed the balance of
numbers. The 4th French corps, however, had
come into line, and once more the pressure on the
overmatched Germans became so intense, that
they partly gave way, especially on their left near
Mars La Tour. Another heroic effort of the
Prussian cavalry, in which the French cavalry were
driven from the field, succeeded in keeping the
enemy back ; but certainly the 10th corps would
have been in the gravest peril, had its adversaries,
instead of holding their ground, collected their
forces for a determined attack. Meanwhile a single
division of the 8th Prussian corps, and a fraction of
the 9th, had come to the aid of the 3rd, still
struggling against superior numbers, and the terrible
strain was, to a certain extent, relieved. Night
closed on a bloody and protracted conflict, in which
a few thousand men, if largely reinforced by degrees,
had defied and baffled a whole army for hours, and
in which neither side could lay a claim to victory.
The losses of the Germans and French were about
equal, from 16,000 to 17,000 men.
The Prussians were not 25,000 strong in the
first instance at Mars La Tour, and they seem at
last to have been about 75,000. On the other hand
METZ. MARS LA TOUR. GRAVELOTTE. 153
the French must have had more than 90,000 men
on the field, and they might have had fully 120,000.*
Yet, if we except the beaten troops of Frossard,
the army of Bazaine fought extremely well, though
the confidence of Worth had passed away, and had
been transferred to the German camp. The reasons
that a very superior force failed to defeat, nay to
rout, a much weaker enemy, are apparent on a
survey of the battle. The daring offensive assumed
by the 3rd Prussian corps, the arrival of the 10th
corps late, and the noble self-sacrifice of the
Prussian cavalry, could not have deprived the
French of a victory had Bazaine simply put forth
his strength, and boldly attacked with his greatly
more powerful forces. Inactive, halting in mind,
and ever clinging to Metz, he kept his army
passively on the spot, and would not allow it to seize
success when before it, and he threw away one of
the best chances ever offered to a soldier by fortune.
Nothing, on the contrary, could have been finer than
the tenacity and daring of the undaunted Germans ;
and their leaders displayed their wonted energy,
and gave each other, as usual, cordial support.
Yet the conduct of Alvensleben in risking the
attack, and especially on persisting in it, must be
pronounced excessively rash, though it is very
remarkable it received the approval of his superiors
after the event. In truth he was less to blame than
1 This estimate has been formed after a comparison of many
authorities. The figures given by V. P., " Guerre de 1870," are
grossly wrong.
154 MOLTKE.
Prince Frederick Charles, who, we have seen,
had, probably owing to false reports, diverted the
3rd and 10th corps from the positions they were
intended to take, and had placed them too near
the French army, with orders probably to attack,
on the supposition that it was far from Metz, and
was approaching the Meuse in hasty retreat.
Moltke was not responsible, at least at first, for
what was an undoubted error, but he seems, we
think, to have acquiesced in it, and if he did, all
that can be said is that errors of this kind are
inevitable in war.
The French army passed the night on the field,
exhausted, and without orders from its chief. The
Germans expected to be attacked on the morning
of the 17th, and sent forward every available man
and horse, and had Bazaine been a capable leader,
he might possibly even yet have brushed aside his
enemy, and made good his retreat to the Meuse.
This operation, however, would have been at best
of doubtful, perhaps of disastrous, result, and he
might have made a much grander move had he
possessed energy, resource and insight. He was
still in the neighbourhood of a vast fortress, with
ample passages over a large river, an admirable
position to make his army secure, and to prepare it
for a great offensive effort ; and the communica-
tions of the Germans from the Rhine to the Moselle
had been left exposed by their rapid advance to cut
him off from the Meuse and Verdun. On the 17th
of August one corps only of the First Army was to
METZ. MAES LA TOUR. GEAVELOTTE. 155
the east of Metz, five corps of the Second Army
were far to the west, and even the last corps, the
2nd, was on the Moselle, with directions to hasten
towards the main body, and the Third Army was
beyond Nancy, its chiefs thinking of a march on
Chalons. Had Bazaine, therefore, withdrawn his
forces with secrecy and swiftness into Metz, and
issued from the fortress on the 18th of August,
along the great roads leading to the Nied and the
Upper Sarre, he might have overwhelmed the single
hostile corps in his path, have seized, ravaged and
cut in two the communications of his foes, and very
possibly have raised the siege of Strasbourg. The
Germans could not have had time to retrace their
steps, and to ward off a tremendous stroke, and the
Marshal, grasping the invaders, so to speak, by the
back, would probably have gained important success
and have retarded the German march for weeks, and
would almost certainly have saved himself and his
army. 1 By a manoeuvre somewhat analogous, but
of far more risk, the youthful Bonaparte turned
defeat into victory, when, beaten at Caldiero, he
marched through Verona, and, crossing the Adige,
fell on Alvinzi's flank, after a fierce struggle on the
dykes of Arcola.
1 This movement occurred to more than one French officer at
the time, " Metz Campagne et negotiations," p. Ill, and has been
indicated by a series of writers. The problem has been admirably-
worked out by General Hamley, " Operations of War," pp. 329,
332, ed. 1889. The "Prussian Staff History" and Moltke
maintain a most suggestive silence.
156 MOLTKE.
The buzzard, however, is not the eagle, and
Bazaine was not equal to an effort of this kind. He
was a soldier, however, of some tactical skill ; he
had great confidence, as his writings show, in the
power of modern small-arms on the defensive ; and
he had, we have seen, a fixed idea to keep fast to
Metz. Under these impressions, he drew back his
army towards the fortress, on the 17th of August,
after being many hours in inaction ; he had
abandoned the notion of a retreat on Verdun ; and l
there seems to be no foundation for his assertion
that this was inevitable from want of munitions
and supplies. His next step was to select a strong
position in the vicinity of Metz, where he might
await the impending onset of the German army, his
belief being that, by tactics of this kind, he would
repel and ultimately 2 wear out his enemy. Such a
position was formed near the west of Metz, along a
range of uplands, extending to the left, from the
village of Kozerieulles to Eoncourt on the right,
and fronting the great roads which lead to the
Meuse, by Gravelotte, Doncourt, and to the north by
Briey. This line in some respects was formidable
in the extreme ; to the left it was protected by
Metz ; the stream of the Mance ran like a fosse be-
fore it ; it afforded cover to reserves in the rear ; and
it was dotted with villages and large farm-houses
which, nearly all, could be strongly fortified.
Bazaine placed his four corps along this ground of
vantage, a front of seven or eight miles in length ;
1 Riviere, " Report," pp. 36, 39. 2 " L'Armee du Rhin," p. 67.
METZ. MAES LA TOUR. GEAVELOTTB. 157
the left, the 2nd, on either side of the great road
from Metz to Gravelotte, the 3rd and 4th, the
centre extending to Amanvillers ; and the 6th, the
right, reaching St. Privat and Roncourt. The
various resources of the military arfc were employed
to increase the means of defence ; batteries were
carefully placed to bear on the enemy ; trenches and
pits had been formed to shelter the infantry, and to
afford ample scope to the deadly rifle ; and every
hamlet and building had been made an outwork to
repel the weight of the German onset. But the
Imperial Guard was reserved in the rear, around the
western forts of Metz, with an evident purpose to
cling to the place ; and it was separated from the
main army, and especially from the right wing, by
a long interval of space.
This position was one of extreme strength for
passive defence a bad method in all ages, and
especially so in modern war but it had two marked
and very grave defects. It afforded little facility
for counter attacks at any point of the far extend-
ing line ; and it was comparatively weak, at the
extreme right, at Roncourt, a danger aggravated by
the fact that the 6th corps of Canrobert had arrived
from Chalons with but few sappers, and with
hardly any tools to make field entrenchments. The
Imperial Guard, too, was most wrongly placed,
detached around Metz, and far from the army ; and
strategically the position of Bazaine was unsafe, for
he was about to accept a battle with his back to the
Rhine, and his communications with France cut
158 MOLTKE.
off, and a real defeat would be probably fatal. We
pass from the French, to the German camp, and to
the operations of Moltke and his lieutenants. They
had expected, we have said, an attack on the 17th,
and had assembled all their forces at hand ; but as
the enemy made no sign, it was resolved to resume
again a determined offensive, and to fall on Bazaine
and his army as quickly as possible. To effect this
purpose five corps of the Second Army were brought
together, during the course of the day, and placed
near the main road from Metz by Mars La Tour,
from Flavigny on the right to Hannonville on the
left ; and the 2nd corps in the rear was ordered to
come up. Meanwhile two corps of the First Army
were collected on the right of the Second Army, and
spread from Flavigny to the approaches to Metz ;
and one corps was left on the eastern bank of
the Moselle, to make demonstrations against the
fortress. Nine corps d'armee, therefore, 1 were to
take part, more or less directly, in the great on-
slaught to be made on the weakened five corps of
the French, and to stifle the enemy under sheer
weight of numbers.
By this time, however, as had been seen before,
contact with the French army had been lost, except
at the point of the line near Metz, and this marked
failing in Moltke's strategy was to be attended
with grave results. On the morning of the 18th of
1 The 3rd, 10th, 9th, 12th corps, with the Guards, of the
Second Ann j, and the 2nd corps in the rear ; the 7th and 8th
corps of the First Army and the 1st beyond the Moselle.
METZ. MAES LA TOUR. GBAVELOTTE. 159
August the German chiefs did not know where
Bazaine was, and they were unable to direct the
huge masses that spread along a front of nearly
twelve miles, against the enemy, with any kind of
certainty. Time, so precious in war, was lost, and
Moltke's operations were at first tentative. The
Second Army was moved northwards towards Don-
court, and even near to Briey, on the supposition
that the French were trying to retreat by the
northern roads that led to the Meuse, and the
First Army was kept where it stood. As it might
turn out, however, as was suspected, that Bazaine
was still near Metz, orders were given that if this
should be proved the case, the Second Army should
make a great wheel eastwards, and fall on the
enemy when attained ; the First Army being made
the pivot for this prolonged and circuitous move-
ment. The Second Army was, therefore, at first
sent in a direction far away from the French ; and
the morning was advanced when it became manifest
that these were prepared to accept battle, in front
of the west of Metz. Even then a remarkable
mistake was made. Bazaine' s right wing, which
reached, we have seen, Eoncourt, was reported as
extending to Amanvillers only, that is to the ground
held in force by the centre ; and part of the Second
Army was, at the first instance, directed towards
Amanvillers chiefly, to outflank, as was supposed,
the enemy. The great sweep was now made, and
the German columns, admirably arrayed, marched,
at intervals, over the space which separated them
160 MOLTKE.
from the French army. The movement, however,
had been retarded ; and, what obviously might
become perilous, the exact position of Bazaine was
not yet accurately known. 1
The great battle of the 18th of August, given
the name of Gravelotte by the victors, was the con-
sequence of these dispositions on either side. At
about noon, the 9th Prussian corps, its chief
believing that he had attained the extreme right of
Bazaine, had become engaged with the enemy's
centre, from La Folie on the left, to Araanvillers
on the right ; and an order recommending him to
pause in the attack, for the real situation of affairs
was being discovered, arrived too late to make it
safe to suspend the action. In this, as in so many
instances, the French were, at first, surprised ; and
the assailants, screened by masses of woodland,
gained ground, and captured some petty outposts.
But when the Prussians drew near the main position,
the result of their error became manifest ; they were
not outflanking the right of their foe, but striking
his centre strongly entrenched ; and they were
engaged, in front, with L'Admirault's 4th corps,
and with part of the 3rd corps of Le Boeuf, superior
in numbers and well prepared for defence. The
9th corps bravely maintained the conflict ; but the
French guns, trained to search all vulnerable points,
and the murderous fire of the French infantry,
1 These operations should be carefully studied in the " Prussian
Staff History," vol. ii. pp. 1, 19, and in General Derrecagaix, "La
Guerre Moderne," vol. ii. pp. 61, 67.
METZ. MARS LA TOUR. GBAVELOTTE. 161
fighting under shelter, and not to be reached, gave
the troops of Bazaine an immense advantage, and
the power of the Prussian artillery was not felt for
a time. The Prussians in fact, though reinforced
by degrees, might have been worsted had the French
chiefs endeavoured to strike a bold counterstroke ;
and they were only relieved from peril by the 3rd
corps, the heroes of Mars La Tour, hastening up from
the rear. Meanwhile it had become certain that the
right of Bazaine extended to Roncourt, that is miles
beyond Amanvillers ; and the Guard and the 12th
corps, having come into line with the 9th corps,
between 1 and 2 p.m., were directed to make a
general movement towards St. Privat and Roncourt
beyond, in order to turn and outflank the enemy.
This circuitous march, through intricate ground,
required several hours to make ; but meanwhile,
an outlying post of the French, the village of St.
Marie, was successfully stormed by the 12th corps
and the Prussian Guard. As nothing decisive,
however, could be done until the great turning
movement was well advanced, the battle on this side
of the scene became for hours merely a contest of
guns, in which the Prussian batteries, more
numerous and with a better weapon, gained, by
degrees, complete superiority over the French.
Such was the position of affairs, until late in the
afternoon, on the left and left centre of the great
German line, and on the corresponding right and
right centre of Bazaine. Meantime, far away on
the other side of the battle, a terrible conflict was
M
162 MOLTKE.
raging between the French left and left centre and
the First Army. The 7th and 8th corps of the
veteran Steinmetz, supported by part of the 1st
corps, which threatened Metz from the east of the
Moselle, and effected l a really powerful diversion,
had come into action with the greatest part of the
3rd French corps, and the 2nd corps of Frossard,
extending along the line of uplands, from La Folie
to Hozerieulles. The onset of the assailants was
bold and well sustained, but they encountered a
stern and tenacious resistance; Frossard, an en-
gineer, had made the defences along his front
prodigiously strong, and the French infantry, hidden
in pits and behind field trenches, wrought frightful
havoc with their far-reaching small-arms. At last
St. Hubert, an important out-post on the great road
from Metz to Mars La Tour, was stormed after a
bloody struggle; other fortified points appeared
abandoned, and Steinmetz thought that the enemy
was about to fall back from the position, beaten.
He gave orders for a grand general attack in the
close columns of the days of his youth, and it was
then seen how tremendous are the effects of arms of
precision in the hands of an enemy. The French
had never thought of retreating ; and the German
masses, as they pressed forward along the main
road and on either side of it, were devastated by a
crushing fire, which mowed down the assailants in
1 This was only a demonstration, but sufficient attention has
not been directed to it. It made Bazaine cling to Metz more
closely than ever, and possibly paralyzed the Imperial Guard.
METZ. MARS LA TOUR. GRAVELOTTE. 163
heaps. An imprudent attack, in fact, altogether
failed; the 7th and 8th Prussian corps were
fairly beaten ; 1 and had their enemy at this crisis
boldly fallen on, the German right wing would have
been imperilled, with results disastrous to the
battle as a whole. Ere long, however, the 2nd
Prussian corps, which had hastened forward by a
forced march, relieved the stress on Steinmetz and
his troops ; and a counter-stroke, attempted late
by the French, was feebly made and became fruit-
less. The position, however, of the First Army
was critical until the close of the day, and the
French retained their positions until the last moment,
along this front of the long line of battle.
The contest, meanwhile, in the other part of the
field, was going on with varying and long uncertain
fortunes. After the capture of St. Marie, it had
become, we have seen, a duel of guns, in order
to enable the German masses to outflank the French
right at St. Privat and Eoncourt. At about
5 p.m. the battle began to rage again, and the
weakened 9th corps made another attempt to
advance and beat back the enemy's centre. The
attack, however, was not successful ; and, up to the
last, the 3rd and 4th French corps had the advan-
1 The Prussian Staff does not give an accurate or candid
account of this episode of the battle. The defeat of the First
Army is attested by many impartial witnesses on the spot. In
fact Steinmetz, it is believed, at the express instance of Moltke,
was dismissed from his command, and sent into honourable
retirement.
M 2
164 MOLTKE.
tage over their baffled foes. The day was now far
spent, and the evening at hand ; the 12th, or Saxon
corps, was gathering on Roncourt in its long and
far-extending march, and the chiefs of the Prussian
Guards deemed the time had come to make a
determined attack on St. Privat, and to bring the
desperate strife to a close. The effort, however,
almost wholly failed ; the assailants were struck
down by a destructive fire issuing from all parts of
the fortified village ; and Canrobert and his men
could boast with truth that the flower of the
Prussian army perished under their blows. But,
in the interval, the great turning movement was
making itself felt on the French right ; and the
Saxon columns drew near Roncourt, to outflank
Bazaine's position, and to make it untenable.
Canrobert had foreseen the danger for hours ;
messenger after messenger had ridden to Bazaine
entreating the assistance of the Imperial Guard,
but the Marshal sent only a few guns, and a division,
despatched afterwards, was too late. This conduct
caused the loss of the battle ; Canrobert drew back
his already shattered corps from Roncourt, known
to be a weak point, and, isolated and deserted, he
endeavoured, for a time, to make head against the
flood of his enemies. But the French were out-
numbered more than two to one ; the Saxons and
the Guards drawing in towards each other stormed
St. Privat after a furious struggle ; Roncourt had
already fallen into their hands, and the arrival of
the 10th Prussian corps on the scene inclined still
METZ. MAES LA TOUR. GEAVELOTTE. 165
further the balance of fortune. The French right
was turned, as night fell on the scene ; and the
army of Bazaine by degrees retired from the
positions they could no longer hold. The battle,
however, was only just won, and the issue might
easily have been very different. The losses of the
Germans exceeded 20,000 men ; those of the French
were more than 12,000.
At Gravelotte more than 200,000 l Germans, with
from 700 to 800 guns, fought 120,000 or 130,000
Frenchmen, with certainly less than 500 guns.
1 As usual, it is impossible to reconcile the conflicting estimates
of the numbers engaged on either side at the battle of Gravelotte,
but the above figures are, we believe, tolerably correct. An
estimate made by Moltke in his " Precis of the Franco-German
War," vol. i. p. 84, English translation, is wholly, nay grotesquely,
erroneous. He says that only "seven corps faced the French ;"
and he puts their numbers at 178,818 men. But he does not
include the 2nd Prussian corps, which reached the field late, but
gave valuable support to the 7th and 8th corps, nor yet part
of the 1st corps of the First Army, which threatened Metz from
the eastern bank of the Moselle ; and he thus omits fully 30,000.
His calculations as to the French are even worse. He contends
that "more than 180,000 French were engaged," because 173,000
were in Metz when the fortress fell. But this figure of 173,000
comprises the garrison of Metz, about 29,000 strong, a division of
Frossard's corps, which was joined to the garrison, and a con-
siderable assemblage of Gardes Mobiles, and franctireurs, not less
than 20,000 men ; and none of these troops, probably from 60,000
to 65,000 men, took part in the battle of Gravelotte. Even the
Prussian Staff estimates Bazaine's forces at from 125,000 to
150,000 men only ; Bazaine says they were 100,000 ; and General
Ham ley asserts that the French " were outnumbered two to one."
The high character of Moltke repels the charge of disingenu-
ousness, but statements like these are very unfortunate. The
Precis, however, compiled at the age of 87, is a bad book.
166 MOLTKE.
The ultimate results of the battle were immense ;
but the splendour of the triumph that was yet to
come ought not to blind the student of war to the
character of the operations on either side. The
great march of the German masses, in the morning
of the 18th, was a very fine movement, remarkable
for its precision and skill ; the Prussian leaders
supported each other with the energy and zeal
habitual to them, and their troops gave proof of
devoted courage. But grave mistakes were cer-
tainly made : the battle was begun rather too late ;
the French centre was assailed, instead of the right$
at first ; the grand attack of Steinmetz was almost
reckless ; the first attack on St. Privat was pre-
mature, and caused frightful losses; and it was a
mere accident that, at the last moment, the great
turning movement was attended with success. As
the Germans were in overwhelming force, these
results cannot be deemed remarkable ; and had the
battle been better directed the French should have
been utterly routed. The errors, however, of the
German leaders run up, more or less, to the first
error that Bazaine's army had been lost sight of ;
this caused false marches, delay, and precipitate
haste ; and it is difficult to say that Moltke was not
responsible, in some degree at least, for not having
kept his enemy in view, a fault more than once to
be ascribed to him. On the other hand, the French
army had fought well, although in the first instance
surprised, as happened repeatedly in the war ; and
the defence of St. Privat by Canrobert and his men
METZ. MARS LA TOUR. GRAVELOTTE. 167
was an incident glorious to the arms of France.
The loss of the battle, beyond question, was due
to the incapacity and indolence of Bazaine. Ron-
court was the most defenceless point in his line;
and he ought to have placed the Imperial Guard
near it, as has been justly observed l by the Prussian
Staff. He kept, however, this great reserve around
Metz, thinking only of his hold on the fortress,
and probably alarmed by the demonstrations made
by the enemy east of the Moselle; he remained
inactive near the forts of Metz, and was not even
on the field of battle ; and he refused to send the
Guard to the help of Canrobert, until a small re-
inforcement was sent too late. Had he made a
proper use of this noble force, and despatched it at
about 3 p.m. to his endangered right, St. Privafc
and Eoncourt would not have been taken, and the
Germans could not have gained a victory. The
measure of his misdeeds, however, was not yet full ;
the cup was to overflow in disgrace and ruin.
By the 19th of August the army of Bazaine had
fallen back from the lines they had held, and had
been assembled under the forts of Metz, exhausted,
indeed, but not desponding, for the soldiers knew
they had fought a good fight against an enemy
greatly superior in force. Nevertheless, that brave,
but unfortunate army was to leave the fortress only
as a mass of captives, victims of criminal neglect
of duty and intrigue ; and the curtain had fallen on
the second act of the drama of the war of 1870-71.
1 " Prussian Staff History," vol. ii. p. 7.
168 MOLTKE.
Moltke had steadily carried out his design, and had
achieved more success than he had hoped to achieve ;
he had not exactly driven his enemy northwards,
but he had compelled him to take refuge under the
guns of Metz, whence he was not to make his
escape ; and the Third Army stood on the roads
to Paris. He had worked out his plan with great
strength of purpose, and with remarkable and un-
ceasing energy ; he had occasionally shown con-
spicuous skill, especially in the flank march to the
Moselle ; and his movement to intercept Bazaine
and to cut him off from Verdun and the Meuse
had been daring and well-conceived. The supe-
riority, too, of the German armies, not in numbers
only, but in efficiency in the field, had been
established by new and convincing proofs, and the
German generals had admirably worked together,
if more than once they had been extremely rash.
The operations of Moltke, nevertheless, were not
those of the highest genius in war, and were marked
by errors that might have been made disastrous.
The French army ought to have been crushed after
Worth and Spicheren ; it was allowed ample time to
effect its retreat, and it would have escaped had it
been tolerably led. The disposition of the German
corps on the 14th of August gave Bazaine a chance
which he might well have seized, and Colombey
Nouilly might have been a victory for France.
On the 16th a comparatively small German force
was opposed to an army at first three-fold in
strength, and it is difficult to assert that, to some
METZ. MAES LA TOUR. GRAVELOTTE. 169
extent at least, Moltke was not responsible for this
mistake. The enemy was lost sight of on the 17th ;
false movements and delays were the consequence ;
an ill-conducted battle was fought, and victory was
hardly won at last, large as was the preponderance
of the German army ; and here, Moltke, too, was
probably in part to blame. Nor can it be forgotten
that Bazaine was afforded a chance to sever the
communications of his foe ; and if we survey these
operations as a whole, Moltke did not give proof
during these eventful days of the dexterity, the
resource, the art of seizing opportunities, and
making the most of them, which are distinctive
gifts of the greatest captains ; and his success was
largely due to the gross faults of his enemy. Still
he rose more than once to a high level in war, and
he showed some of the best qualities which cha-
racterize the most able leaders of armies.
Passing to the opposite side, the French army
occasionally gave signs of loss of moral power, the
natural result of ill leading and defeat, although
the stand made by the 6th corps at St. Privat was
an heroic exploit. In organization, however, in
skill in manoeuvre, in exploring, in military value,
in a word, the French were inferior to their enemy,
and sometimes they were shamefully surprised. It
is unnecessary to dwell on their numerical weak-
ness ; and, in fact, had Napoleon been in the place
of Moltke, they would have been annihilated, we
believe, before Metz had been reached, and they
would have never fought Mars la Tour and Gra-
170 MOLTKB.
velotte. The chief feature, however, of the French
operations is the fatal vacillation and weakness of
their chiefs. The Emperor advised the true course
after the disastrous battles of Worth and Spicheren,
but he allowed supposed policy to master strategy ;
his ill-fated army was marched to and fro, and it lost
the means of effecting its retreat to Chalons, con-
ceded to it, so to speak, by Moltke. The conduct
of Bazaine was infinitely worse ; immensely inferior
as he was in force, he had opportunities which
might have saved his army, nay, have secured
important success, had he known how to take
advantage of them ; but his inactivity, his blunder-
ing, his want of strength of character, made in-
dignant Fortune turn aside from him, and he had
already placed his army on the path to ruin.
We ought not to blame him for the events of the
14th, for he had only just assumed a most difficult
command, but he might easily have won a victory
at Mars la Tour, and after that indecisive battle he
possessed the means of issuing out of Metz and
breaking the communications of Moltke and of
giving a wholly new turn to the war. His choice
of standing at Gravelotte was strategically bad, but
had he placed the Imperial Guard in its true
position, or sent it in time to the help of Canrobert,
he could not have lost that hard-fought battle, and
his indolence and negligence on the field were fatal.
It is lamentable to observe how he had no insight ;
how he wavered from one false move to another ;
how aimless and feeble his operations were ; and if
METZ. MAES LA TOUE. GRAVELOTTE. 171
he had a fixed idea to cling to Metz, this was not
to make use of the great fortress, as a real general
would have made use of it, but as a mere place of
refuge in a tempest he feared. Worse, far worse,
was yet to be witnessed ; but already Bazaine had
sunk below the Soubises and Clermonts of the
Seven Years' War. 1
1 The " Prussian Staff History," vol. ii. pp. 165-7, very candidly
admits the " many errors that were made proceeding from un-
certainty as to the enemy's intentions," and enumerates them in
detail. As to the operations of Bazaine, the writer observes,
" there were phases in the contest, in which, a will on the French
side, penetrated with an appreciation of the situation, and ener-
getically applied with singleness of purpose, might have secured
many advantages." These comments are probably from the pen
of Moltke.
CHAPTER VI.
The results of Gravelotte Formation of the Army of the Meuse
and investment of Metz Inaction of Bazaine Opportunity
still perhaps open to him Advance of the Third Army
Formation of the Army of Chalons under Macmahon He
assents to a project to march on Metz for the relief of Bazaine
Folly of this plan The Army of Chalons on the march
Fine project of Moltke to intercept this movement Slow
progress of the Army of Chalons Macmahon, though aware
of the danger, yields to advice from Paris and persists in the
march The German armies reach their enemy Action of
Nouart Battle of Beaumont Macmahon misses an oppor-
tunity of escape The Army of Chalons at Sedan Advance
and night march of the German armies Battle of Sedan and
destruction of the Army of Chalons Conduct of Moltke at
the capitulation Reflections on these operations.
GKAVELOTTE, we have said, had accomplished more
than Moltke had had reason to expect. The French
had not been driven towards the north, but, in-
decisive as the battle had been, Bazaine and his
army had fallen back on Metz, and showed, for the
present, no signs of life. The second part, too, of
the plan of the German chief was being realized
with the fairest promise. The Third Army held
the approaches to Paris, and nothing stood between
it and the capital of France, but an assemblage of
levies being combined with the beaten troops of
Macmahon and Failly, in the neighbourhood of
SEDAN. 173
Chalons and its great camp. A new distribution
of the German armies was made, with a view, in
the first instance, to an advance on Paris, and to
annihilating the army being formed at Chalons ;
and Moltke' s arrangements were carried out with
the decision and energy characteristic of him. Two
corps, the Guards and the Saxon 12th, were de-
tached from the forces that had fought at Gravelotte,
and, united with the 4th which, we have seen, had
been in communication with the Third Army, were
given the name of the Army of the Meuse ; and
this army, from 80,000 to 100,000 l strong, was
ordered to press forward to the Meuse, and, form-
ing the right wing of the Third Army, to take part
in the intended march on Paris. This was a far-
sighted and very able move, attended ultimately
with great results ; for the Army of the Meuse,
directed in this way, not only secured to the Third
Army an irresistible superiority of force, but inter-
posed an impassable obstacle to an attempt to
relieve the fortress of Metz. It constitutes, in
fact, one of the best titles of Moltke to rank among
great captains.
Bazaine, however, was within Metz, at the head
of an army still formidable, of a large garrison, and
1 Moltke, in his " Precis of the Franco- German War," vol. i.
p. 86, English translation, says that the Army of the Meuse was
" 138,000 strong." This, however, must be an error of the
printer ; three corps, two greatly weakened at Gravelotte, could
not have attained these numbers. The best estimate is from
80,000 to 100,000 men.
174 MOLTKE.
of other forces, and in possession of a great strong-
hold ; and it was necessary to make things safe,
with this enemy, before undertaking the march on
the capital. Prince Frederick Charles was placed
in command of the First Army, and of the remaining
part of the Second the other part had formed the
Army of the Meuse and Moltke had made pre-
parations by the 20th of August for investing Metz,
and hemming the French within lines to be thrown
around the fortress. The operation was unex-
ampled in war ; a force from 150,000 to 180,000
strong was to surround a force scarcely inferior in
numbers, reckoning all the troops under Bazaine's
command, to isolate it, and to prevent its escape,
though it held Metz, a vast entrenched camp, and
the passages over a great river. 1 Yet the effort was
made and proved successful ; it might well have
been deemed impossible, and it must have failed
against a real general. Five corps d'armee, and
part of a sixth, were placed along the western bank
of the Moselle, not far from the tract which had
been the scene of the terrible battle of the 18th, for
Moltke seems to have been convinced that any
attempt which Bazaine might make to break out
would be made from the western side of the fortress,
1 Moltke, " Precis of the Franco-German War," vol. p. i. 86,
English translation, estimates the investing force at Metz at only
150,000 men; but this is much below every other estimate.
Counting the garrison and all other forces, besides the regular
army, Bazaine, even after Gravelotte, must have disposed of nearly
180,000 men at Metz.
SEDAN. 175
that is, on his natural line of retreat. One corps,
however, strengthened by a division from the re-
serve, by part of another corps, and by a body of
horsemen, was alone placed on the eastern bank,
and that over a wide space of from fifteen to twenty
miles in extent ; and this comparatively small force
was the only obstacle, in this direction, in the way
of Bazaine and his whole army. Meantime inces-
sant exertions were made to strengthen the lines
being drawn around Metz. Thousands of men were
employed in breaking up roads, in constructing
stockades, in throwing up entrenchments, and in
placing batteries at available points, in order to
repel an advancing enemy; and rapid com-
munication was assured by the telegraph along
the whole besieging circle. But the circum-
ference of the lines exceeded thirty miles ; and
over the greater part of this space they were very
weakly occupied. 1
The investment of Metz, under these conditions,
before the event, would have appeared hopeless.
Bazaine, we repeat, held a first-rate fortress, and
both banks of the wide Moselle ; and, in addition to
this immense advantage, he had a central position
and interior lines at every point of the sphere of
manoeuvre. His army, too, apart from his other
1 The corps investing Metz on the western bank of the Moselle
were the 8th and part of the 7th of the First Army, and the 2nd,
10th, 3rd and 9th of the Second. On the eastern bank there
were part of the 7th, the 1st, and one division of the reserve.
To these should be added large bodies of cavalry on either bank.
176 MOLTKE.
forces, was still more than 100,000 strong ; 1 it had
not lost heart, and was eager to fight ; and it is
wholly untrue 2 that it was ill-provided with muni-
tions and other requirements for the field. Bazaine,
therefore, ought to have been able to hold the enemy
in check with part of his forces ; to concentrate the
great mass of his army against the Germans spread
on a wide circumference ; to break through the
investing lines, and to escape from Metz ; and the
experience of ages 3 confirms this inference. By
this time, however, Moltke had had ample proof of
the indolence and incapacity of his foe, and of his
persistent resolve to cling to Metz ; and, apart from
the fact that it was crowned with success, the ex-
1 Thia, indeed, is admitted by Bazaine himself, " L' Armee du
Rhin," p. 76. General Deligny gives this account of the state of
the army : " Armee de Metz," p. 12 : " Son armee, demeuree in-
tacte, avait conserve toute sa vitalite* ; sa confiance en sa valeur
s'etait meme accrue de ce que, s'etant mesuree avec des forces tres
superieures aux siennes, elle etait chaque fois demeuree maitresse
du champ de hataille."
2 Riviere, pp. 99-100: Proces Bazaine, p. 711.
a One of the most distinguished generals of the British army,
who visited Metz after the war, more than once assured me that
" 200,000 Germans could not have shut up 100,000 Frenchmen
within Metz, had Bazaine done his duty." A very able Belgian
military critic, Major Vandevelde, remarks, " La Guerre de 1870-
71," " Non-seulement le marechal serait parvenu a se dcgager, mais
avec un peu d'intelligence et de savoir faire, il aurait pu prendre
1'offensive contre 1'armee dti prince Frederic Charles, et lui faire
payer cher la difficile et temeraire enterprise de vouloir, avec une
armee de 200 mille hommes en bloquer une de 180 mille dans un
camp retranche." The whole of these comments is too long to
be quoted, but it deserves attention.
SEDAN. 177
periment of hemming in Bazaiue, hazardous as it
was, may be fully justified. It was one of the
occasions when it is legitimate to take liberties with
a worthless antagonist.
Nevertheless, the disposition of the German forces
around the fortress has been severely criticized ;
and it gave the Marshal a second grand chance,
even after Gravelotte, to appeal to Fortune. Five
and a half corps barred an exit from Metz along
the western bank of the Moselle ; but a force, equal
to two corps only, and that spread over a wide
space, closed the avenues along the eastern bank ;
and the great roads that lead to the Nied and the
Sarre remained open for a time, and were never
strongly held. Had Bazaine, accordingly, at any
moment, before the investment was complete,
that is, between the 20th and 27th of August and
even afterwards the move was possible marched
in this direction with his whole army, he ought
easily to have overpowered the weak detachments
that stood in his path, and to have made good his
way from Metz to the south-east. The consequences
must have been very great ; in all probability he
would have saved the bulk of his forces from im-
pending peril ; he might have fallen on the German
communications with success, raised the siege of
Strasbourg, and checked the invasion ; he would
almost certainly have averted frightful disasters,
and he might have changed the whole position
of affairs. The opportunity he had on the
18th of August, in a word, was given him once
N
178 MOLTKE.
more, if the conditions, doubtless, were less
promising. 1
A bold movement, however, of this kind did not
cross the mind of Bazaine. He was bound, we shall
see, by the strongest pledges that could bind a
soldier, to endeavour to make a determined attempt
to break out from Metz, in order to join a too gene-
rous colleague ; but he maintained his attitude of
passive defence, and devoted the week that followed
Gravelotte to reorganizing his army, replenishing
his magazines, and strengthening the fortifications
of the place, which he never really intended to
leave. We turn to the operations of the German
armies engaged in carrying out the projected inva-
sion. The Third Army, we have said, had filled the
region around Luneville and Nancy by the middle
of August ; it had soon broken up from the Upper
1 Curiously enough, the Prussian Staff', which passes over with-
out notice what Bazaine might have accomplished on the 18th of
August, had he broken out from Metz, to the eastward, acknow-
ledges that he might have been successful, had he adopted this
course, even as late as the 31st, or the 1st of September. " Staff
History," vol. ii. p. 533. The passage should be carefully studied.
General Hamley, " Operations of War," p. 332, ed. 1889, signifi-
cantly observes: "This opinion refers to a time (31st August)
when the Germans had been for twelve days investing Metz. If
the chances in favour of Bazaine's supposed attempt were, at that
time, so great, how much greater would they have been on the
17th, when the Germans were scattered, and unprepared for
resistance on that side." The simple truth is that the Prussian
Staff is not always candid, and will not admit the many oppor-
tunities Moltke gave Bazaino opportunities which, in our judg-
ment, Napoleon might have made disastrous to the invaders. See
also "Metz et negotiations," pp. Ill, 1L2
SEDAN. 179
Moselle, and by the 19th its foremost divisions had
passed the line of the Upper Meuse. This great
array composed of five corps and a half, and num-
bering probably 160,000 l men, had soon rolled
into the plains of Champagne, approaching the
valley of the Upper Marne ; and it halted, for a
moment, to effect its junction with the Army of the
Meuse, which, we have seen, had been formed by
Moltke and made its right wing. The two masses,
perhaps 240,000 strong, had come into line by the
23rd ; and spreading over the wide tract between
Verdun on the Meuse, and St. Dizier on the Marne,
moved slowly towards the great camp of Chalons,
preceded by tens of thousands of horsemen. To
overwhelm every hostile force on their path and
then to march in triumph on Paris, was almost the
only thought of their chiefs ; and Paris, these be-
lieved, would, like Jericho, fall at the first blast of
an enemy's trumpet. Attempts made to capture
Verdun and Toul on the way, had, nevertheless,
failed; but the huge waves of invasion rolled far
beyond these petty obstacles without let or
hindrance.
Meanwhile the remains of the army routed at
Worth, the greater part of the corps of Failly, and
1 The Third Army was now composed of the 5th, llth, and 6th
Prussian, of the 1st and 2nd Bavarian corps, and of the Wurtem-
berg division. Moltke, " Precis of the Franco- Grerm an War,"
vol. i. p. 86, estimates the Third Army and the Army of the Meuse
at 223,000 men ; but this is considerably a less number than most
other estimates.
N 2
180 1MOLTKE.
the 7th corps of Douay, drawn in from Belfort, had,
after a series of forced marches, assembled in the
well-known camp of Chalons. The Government
in Paris, of which the Empress was, for the present,
the nominal head she had been named Regent
in her husband's absence had, during these days,
made earnest efforts to increase and strengthen this
shattered force. A new corps, the 12th, composed
in some measure of marines, hastily summoned from
the fleet, had been formed and despatched from the
capital ; and several regiments, largely made up of
untrained recruits and raw Gardes Mobiles, had
been added. By the 2nd of August the collective
array numbered from 130,000 to 140,000 men, with
about 380 or 400 guns ; and it was the only army
of reserve which, for the time, France could fit out
and send into the field, so defective was her organi-
zation for war. Macmahon was placed at the head
of this force, for he had still power over the hearts
of his men ; and the unfortunate Emperor, just
arrived from Metz, had become a companion-in-arms
of the Marshal, though he made no attempt to direct
his counsels. With the enthusiasm characteristic
of the race, the troops gathered together in this
way demanded to be led against the enemy ; but
any skilful observer could have easily seen that
they were not equal to bold and decisive movements.
The Army of Chalons, as it was called, was a bad
army in every sense of the word ; it was a medley
of beaten soldiers and of rude levies ; the marines,
though good troops, were not accustomed to march-
SEDAN. 181
ing, and the cavalry, except two or three regiments,
were of little value, and had inferior horses. The
organization and administration of the army, be-
sides, was ill-arranged, and did not fulfil its functions;
a deficiency of supplies was, from the first, apparent;
and the discipline and temper of the soldiers was
such as would not endure the stress of ill-fortune.
The army, in a word, as an instrument of war, was
feeble and, in every respect, imperfect. 1
These considerations did not escape the experi-
enced eye of the Duke of Magenta, and his first
operations were in accordance with the military
situation, and with true strategy. By the 20th of
August he had become aware that Bazaine had not
succeeded in his march on Verdun, and that his
retreat was probably cut off; and he had positive
information that two great hostile armies were on
their way from the Meuse to the Marne. He had
almost resolved to fall back on Paris, but as Bazaine
might perhaps have got out of Metz, and might be
on the march northwards, and as, in any case, it was
1 The events that led to the catastrophe of Sedan begin from,
this point. The narrative of the Prussian Staff is bj far the
best ; encumbered as it is with details, it is clear and masterly,
and it bears plain traces 6f the hand of Moltke. The evidence
given by Marshal Macmahon at the Enquete Parlementaire,
should be carefully studied; it reveals in full completeness the
character of the man, and his conduct as a general-in-chief.
Valuable information will be found in the " Sedan " of General
Ducrot, and the " Sedan " of General Wimpffen ; in the work
of Prince Bibesco, which especially describes the operations of the
7th corps of Douay, in the Apology of Failly, and in Vandevelde's
" Guerre de 1870."
182 MOLTKE.
not advisable to fight a great battle in the plains of
Chalons against an enemy immensely superior in
strength, the Marshal determined to move on
Rheims, where he would at once possess the means
of retiring on Paris, would approach Bazaine, should
he be on the way from Metz, would avoid a prob-
ably fatal conflict, and would hold a favourable and
strong position, hanging on the flank of the German
invasion. This was judicious and well conceived
strategy ; and had Macmahon held to his purpose,
France would not have mourned a frightful disaster.
On the 21st the Marshal had attained Eheims ; *
the march of his army from Chalons had been slow
and difficult, and this had given him proof of its
inferior quality. His intention was declared 'on the
following morning ; he had obtained no intelligence
from Bazaine, he was convinced that Metz was
being besieged ; the Army of the Meuse and the
Third Army were drawing near in irresistible force ;
and he " vehemently insisted " that " the only thing
fco be done " was to retreat on the capital as soon as
possible. He had prepared his orders for the move-
ment on the 23rd, a movement which, as Moltke
has remarked, was the only judicious step 2 as affairs
stood, a movement we will add, which, if carried
out, would have completely changed the course of
1 Enquete Parlemcntaire.
2 " Precis of Franco-German War," vol. i. p. 90 ; " Prussian Staff
History," vol. ii. p. 185. It has been argued that Macmahon ought
to have marched southwards, and relieved Bazaine in that direc-
tion. But the Army of Chalons was unequal to any such movement.
SEDAN. 183
the war, and would probably have saved Alsace and
Lorraine. But at this momentous juncture the fatal
influence, which had already had such disastrous
effects, began to interfere with common-sense and
prudence ; and an accident completed the resulting
mischief. E-ouher, a servant of the Empire, had
come to Kheims ; he entreated Macmahon to advance
on Metz to relieve Bazaine, and not to approach
Paris ; and this evil counsel was probably largely
due to fear of the Parisian populace, and to a regard
for a government already in peril. Macmahon
"resisted stiffly " at first; he gave unanswerable
reasons against the proposed movement, and even a
message from the men in power at the Tuileries did
not affect, for some hours, his purpose, that military
rules should not yield to reasons of State. At last,
however, a calamitous chance changed a resolve,
perhaps even now faltering, that ought to have been
inflexibly fixed. Bazaine, we have seen, had not
been on the field of battle of the 18th August ; he
appears not to have fully ascertained the results
even by the next day, and he sent on the 19th a
despatch to Macmahon, announcing, though in
ambiguous terms, " that he hoped " to retreat
northwards to reach Montmedy, and "thence to
descend from Mezieres on Chalons." This message
was received by Macmahon late on the 22rid ; the
Marshal saw in it a clear announcement that his
colleague was on his way to join him ; he was
already divided in mind and wavering, and, in an
evil hour for France and himself, he countermanded
184 MOLTKE.
his previous orders, and directed his army to move
eastwards, in the hope of meeting Bazaine on the
Meuse. Napoleon III., it is only just to add, in no
way interfered with the misguided chief. 1
This project of Macmahon may be described as
one of the most fatal ever made in war. At this
moment the Army of the Meuse and the Third
Army were spread along a front of nearly fifty miles
in width, on the edge of Champagne : they were in
numbers almost two-fold the Army of Chalons ;
they were infinitely superior in military worth ;
and the Army of the Meuse was much nearer the
river than the French, while the Third Army was
only three marches distant. Macmahon, therefore,
in advancing to the succour of Bazaine and he
was well informed of his enemy's strength and posi-
tions proposed to execute a march along an arc of
from eighty to a hundred miles in extent, of which
his adversary held at most points the chord, and
was, even now, almost within striking distance ; and
he proposed to do this with a bad army, completely
unable to cope with its foe, and in a situation in which
a defeat would probably force it over the Belgian
frontier. Speaking technically, this was a flank
march of the most perilous and reckless kind to be
attempted with all the chances against it, and to be
attempted, too, when even a check would almost
1 The conduct of Macmahon, at this memorable crisis, appears
fully from his own evidence in the Enquete Parlementaire. It
is a striking illustration of the old confession, " Video ineliora
proboque, deteriora sequor."
SEDAN.
185
certainly involve ruin. Except on the absurd
assumption that the German commanders were
shallow fools, who could not deal with an insensate
movement, the prospect of success was almost hope-
less, and the prospect of disaster was self-evident
to any one versed in the operations of war. 1
Yet even these were not the chief reasons why this
calamitous movement ought not to have been made.
The Army of Chalons was the last hope of France ;
ill-organized as it was, it might become the nucleus,
if husbanded, of very large forces, should France be
given time to collect her strength ; and it could be
really formidable in a good defensive position.
Every consideration, therefore, should have com-
pelled the Duke of Magenta to retreat on Paris, as
he had first intended; the capital was already a
powerful fortress, and could easily be made a great
entrenched camp ; it was the centre on which the
national levies could be most readily and quickly
assembled ; and the Army of Chalons could hope
to resist the Germans behind its forts and its
ramparts. Had the Marshal taken this, the only
rational course Moltke has pointed this out with
repeated emphasis we shall not assert that he
1 One or two soldiers, carried away by Crimean sympathies,
have attempted to justify Macmahon's march ; but their argu-
ments cannot bear examination. The weight of well-informed
opinion against this fatal movement is overwhelming ; and I can
say, for myself, that the moment I was apprised of it, a week
before Sedan, I telegraphed to one of the best judges, of men
and things, in Europe, "That army is lost." Prince Bibesco
condemns the march as "insane," pp. 80, 81.
186 MOLTKD.
would have moved with the success of the youthful
Bonaparte around Mantua, or have made Paris a
Torres Yedras ; but the events of the war entitle
us to say that the capital of France would not have
fallen, and the treaty of Frankfort would have
never been signed. 1
Macmahon, however, a hero in the field, was
essentially a weak man of Quixotic nature; and
partly from a generous wish to assist a comrade,
and partly from a desire to support the Govern-
ment, he " consented, saying he would not consent,"
and began the calamitous advance to the Meuse.
o
Celerity, he knew, was his only chance ; and the four
corps of the Army of Chalons, the 1st under Ducrot,
the 5th of Failly, the 7th of Douay, and the im-
provised 12th of Lebrun, were directed on the 23rd
by a forced march to the line of the Suippe, a
tributary of the Aisne. The movement, through a
comparatively open country, was 2 rapid in the ex-
treme and full of promise, and officers and soldiers
looked joyfully forward to a speedy junction with
the Army of Bazaine. At this point, however, the
bad organization of the Army of Chalons became
1 Some of the authorities against Macmahon's march will be
found in General Picrron's work, " Strategic et grande Tactique,"
vol. i. pp. 79, 80. The opinion, however, ascribed to " un ofticier
general anglais," is almost a verbatim copy of an extract from
"The Campaign of 1870-1," republished from The Times, by
Bentley ; and this work was written by a civilian.
2 Bibesco, p. 84 : " Nous avions en deux jours franchi une
detour d'au moins 60 kilometres, ce qui est enorme pour une
agglomeration aussi nornbreuse."
SEDAN. 187
apparent, and the absence of preparation for a great
movement eastwards had a disastrous effect on
the operations in hand. 1 The forced march had
fatigued and harassed the troops, the plains were
crowded with stragglers and impedimenta in the
rear, and there was a deficiency of supplies of almost
every kind. Macmahon was compelled to turn
northwards, to halt at Rethel in order to rally his
men and to find the means to give them support,
and two days were almost wholly lost. By the
25th of August the Army of Chalons was but a
short distance from the Aisne, filling the country
between Rethel and Vouziers, and still nearly fifty
miles from the Meuse. The bearing of the soldiery
was of evil omen ; short-lived excitement had died
away, disorder and confusion were seen everywhere,
and signs of insubordination and even of mutiny
were visible among the young levies. The region
to be passed through was, besides, difficult ; it was
intersected by good main roads, but it was dense
with masses of forest and woodland, and made
intricate in places by long defiles.
"While the Army of Chalons was being thus
delayed the two German armies had continued their
march. The cavalry exploring the great plains in
their front had ascertained, by the 24th of August,
that the French had left Chalons and had moved
on Rheims ; a letter had been intercepted disclosing
the news that Macmahon was on his way to Metz,
and a general officer of rank had expressed his
1 Enquete Parlementaire.
1S8 MOLTKE.
opinion at a Council of War, that the Army of
Chalons was on its way to relieve Bazaine. This
intelligence was confirmed by various reports and
by the telegraph on the following day ; and Moltke,
though still doubting whether the enemy would
venture on an operation of reckless folly, gradually
made up his mind l " that political requirements
might have outweighed all military considerations/'
and that the French were on their way to the Meuse.
It had thus become necessary to guard against
the supposed junction of Macmahon and Bazaine,
and Moltke's plan was formed with that decision
and insight of which he repeatedly gave ample proof.
Assuming that the French had marched from
Rheirns on the 24th, and had advanced rapidly,
they might have crossed the Meuse before they
could be reached ; but the Germans held the shorter
lines on the theatre, and the enemy could not
descend on Metz, nay, might be placed in extreme
danger if precautions were taken to arrest his pro-
gress. To attain the object he had in view Moltke
proposed that the Army of the Meuse, already gathered
around the river, should cross it and move to the
eastern bank ; in the meantime, two corps were to
be detached from Metz, 2 and to join hands with the
Army of the Meuse ; and the united forces were to
take a position on the table-lands between the Meuse
and the Moselle, between Damvillers and Longuyon
1 "Prussian Staff History," vol. ii. p. 205.
2 In theory this move would have been extremely hazardous;
but Moltke had taken the measure of Bazaine.
SEDAN. 189
and to fall on the approaching Army of Chalons.
Meanwhile the Third Army was to advance north-
wards to occupy the roads between Rethel and
the Meuse, and to attain the flank and rear of
Macmahon ; and thus while the Marshal would be
assailed in front by an army at least equal to his
own in numbers, and very superior in real strength,
his retreat might be completely cut off by an enemy
in irresistible force. As, however, the facts were
not yet quite known, orders were not issued for
carrying out this plan, until the situation had been
fully ascertained, as it, doubtless, would be on the
26th of August.
This design was masterly and admirably con-
ceived, if extravagant praise has been lavished on
it. It was rendered possible, it should be observed,
by the direction given to the Army of the Meuse,
after Gravelotte, in the first instance, and it is here
that we perceive the foresight of Moltke. The
German leader had not long to wait for the intel-
ligence required to confirm his purpose. By the
26th of August the Army of Chalons had advanced
some way into the intricate region that lies between
the Aisne and- the Meuse, and spread from Tourteron
to Le Chene and Vouziers ; but the cavalry had not
explored the country, and Douay's corps, the 7th,
was around Vouziers, its flank covered on the right
by a few horsemen only. The German squadrons,
scouring the surrounding tracts, reached a hostile
outpost not far from Grand Pre, and they had ere
long ascertained that a large hostile army was in
190 MOLTKE.
the neighbourhood on the march eastward. The
position of affairs had now been made clear ; carrying
out his project, Moltke directed two corps from
Metz on Etain and Briey, and the 12th corps of
the Army of the Meuse was pushed forward to seize
the passages of the river at Stenay and Dun. At
the same time the masses of the Third Army were
moved northwards on a wide front by St. Mene-
hould and Clermont en Argonne, to strike the line
of Macmahon's march and fall on his exposed flank,
the object of these movements being to intercept
the Marshal upon his way to Metz, to defeat and,
if possible, to destroy his army. On the 27th the
German armies were in full motion, the telegraph
connecting their operations as a whole, and their
advance, if not rapid, was admirably arranged. In-
deed, that they were able to execute an immense
change of front in a few hours, and at a moment's
notice, and that their huge columns, with their im-
pedimenta in their train, succeeded in threading
their difficult way through the wooded hills, the
ravines, and the defiles of the Argonne the theatre
of the campaign of Valmy is a most striking
instance of the wonderful excellence their organiza-
tion for war had attained, of the energy of the
chiefs, and of the power of the soldiery.
While the Germans were approaching their foes,
the Army of Chalons had made scarcely any pro-
gress. The apparition of hostile cavalry on his
flank, followed by two or three sharp skirmishes,
had alarmed Douay and brought him to a stand ;
SEDAN. 191
and Macmahon had ordered part of his army to
descend on Vouziers, and support the 7th corps.
As the enemy, however, made no attack in force,
the Marshal countermanded the movement, and by
the evening of the 27th his four corps, divided into
two main columns, and at wide distances, were again
on their way. They had not made, it should be
observed, more than twenty miles from Rethel in
nearly four days; "erratic marches," as Moltke
grimly remarked, " had been the result of counter-
orders," and they were still nearly thirty miles from
the Meuse, and eighty or ninety by the present
route from Metz. On the night of the 27th Mac-
mahon was convinced that the enterprise could only
lead to disaster, and l he has acknowledged that the
situation was plainly before him. He knew by this
time that Bazaine was still within Metz ; the last
despatches, indeed, 2 received from the Marshal
rather discountenanced the idea that he could join
his colleague ; he knew that the Army of the Meuse
had crossed the river and was already barring his
way to the fortress, and he knew that the Third
Army was gathering on his track not less than
" 150,000 strong." In these circumstances the
Marshal came to the only rational conclusion that
1 Enquete Parlementaire. Bazaine, " Guerre de 1870," p. 135.
Macmahon, with all his faults, is an honourable gentleman; and
his evidence is transparently candid.
~ This appears from Riviere, " Report/' pp. 57, 59. Bazaine was
deeply guilty, as we shall see, but many of the charges heaped
upon him are far-fetched and absurd. He never meant, as has
been insinuated, to attract Macmahon to Metz by false reports.
192 MOLTKE.
could be formed; he could not expect to reach
Bazaine, and he was even now in imminent danger,
and he gave orders for a retreat on Mezieres next
day, for he might hope to descend from that place
by the valley of the Oise, with his army on Paris,
Once more, however, the ill-fated chief succumbed
to the influence which had proved so fatal to France
in this disastrous war, and which he ought to have
boldly spurned. A telegraphic message from Paris
reached him at midnight ; the Government adjured
him to proceed to the Meuse, " for the desertion of
Bazaine would cause a revolution;" he counter-
manded the movement on Mezieres, and, perfectly
aware that it was a fatal step, he undertook to
attempt to continue the march on Metz. History
can scarcely show another such instance of l
criminal weakness on the part of a chief and of the
disregard of military prudence to gain a political
end.
Bellona, who brooks no rival, had been madly
provoked, and a frightful catastrophe was to mark
her vengeance. Macmahon, conscious that haste
1 This may appear harsh language; but let us hear Napoleon on
the subject, " Comment./' vol. i. p. 4'20, ed. 1867: "Un general-
en-chef n'est pas a couvert par un ordre d'un ministre, ou d'un
prince eloigne* du champ d'operations, et connaissant mal, ou ne
connaissant pas du tout, le dernier etat des choses. Tout gcneral-
en-chef qui se charge d'executer un plan qu'il trouve mauvais et
desastreux, est criminel." Macmahon required no inspiration
but that of common sense ; but he must have known how
Napoleon had refused to obey the orders of the Directory to
divide his army in Italy, and he may have read of Turenne's
conduct in 1646.
SEDAN. 193
was more than ever needful, gave orders for a
forced march on the 28th, and, leaving his army in
their present formations, directed his four corps to
speed to the Meuse. But the weather had become l
rainy and severe ; conflicting orders had led to
endless confusion ; the French troops were in a
dangerous mood, and the roads, strewn with im-
pedimenta and disbanded men, gave presage already
of coming disaster. The army divided into two
great masses, made in the first instance for Mouzon
and Stenay, by the main and other roads which
traverse the district ; the left wing, the 1st and 12th
corps, moving by Le Chene, Stonne, and La Besace,
the right wing, the 7th and 5th corps, advancing
by Boult aux Bois and Belval ; and Macmahon, it
is said, became hopeful after he had made his throw
of a desperate gambler. Spite of every effort,
however, the march was not rapid ; the enemy had
not appeared in strength, but he was known to be
closing in on all sides, and the two French columns,
already widely apart, began to separate at an in-
creasing distance, for the 5th corps was harassed
by hostile cavalry, and the 7th was burdened by an
immense train of impedimenta extending 2 for miles.
This interval was enlarged because Macmahon,
having learned that the Germans held Stenay, had
ordered the whole army to turn northwards towards
1 " Prussian Staff History," vol. ii. p. 220. The tone of scorn in
the passage is evident.
2 Ibid. vol. ii. p. 243. The train is said to have been nine
miles long.
194 MOLTKE.
Kemilly, Raucourt, and Mouzon ; and l Failly, still
on his way to Stenay, had not been apprised of
this change of purpose. The 12th corps crossed
the Meuse on the evening of the 29th, the 1st
being not far in the rear ; and thus the left wing
of the Army of Chalons was for the time compara-
tively safe. But the right wing, that which was
next the enemy, was isolated, unsupported, and
exposed on its flank, and the 5th corps was running
into its adversary's mouth.
The slow and tortuous march of the Army of
Chalons had, in a certain measure, perplexed
Moltke, 2 who had expected to strike it east of the
Meuse. By the 29th of August, however, it had
become evident that the enemy was still to the west
of the stream, and new orders were issued to the
German armies. The 12th corps of the Army of
the Meuse was directed to return across the river,
and to join the two corps which had not crossed it ;
the two corps detached from Metz were sent back ;
and the march of the Third Army was continued
northward. A great battle was, perhaps, expected
on the 30th or 31st, as the Germans were drawing in
on their foes ; but the movement of the 5th and of
the 7th French corps, inclining towards the enemy,
and away from their supports, precipitated the con-
test, and gave a new turn to affairs. On the 29th
Failly had been sharply attacked by a hostile
1 " Prussian Staff History," vol. ii. p. 230. The officer bearing
Macmalion's order to Failly was taken prisoner.
2 Ibid, vol. ii. p. 222.
SEDAN. 195
division near Nouart. This warned him not to
advance on Stenay, and he fell back on Beaumont,
a small town near the banks of the Meuse, and not
far from Mouzon. The place is an oasis amidst
dense woodland ; and on the morning of the 30th
the French were surprised and assailed by the 4th
corps of the Army of the Meuse, which had pressed
forward. Failly, 1 not more to blame than other
French chiefs repeatedly surprised in the same way,
called his troops to arms, and made a stout defence ;
but Beaumont was before long captured, and the
5th corps was driven at last towards Mouzon,
having narrowly escaped being forced into the
Meuse. Its situation, indeed, had become so
critical that part of the 12th French corps, which,
we have seen, had got over the Meuse and lay
around Mouzon, recrossed it, and tried to give aid
to its comrades. A fierce struggle took place for a
time, but the French at last were completely routed,
and with difficulty fought their way across to
Mouzon. Meanwhile, the 7th corps of Douay had
been running the gauntlet of enemies gathering on
its flank and rear. The troops, kept back by their
great convoy, and losing men in hundreds, advanced
slowly, and by nightfall on the 30th August they
had only just reached the Meuse, seething with
discontent, exhausted, and famished.
Macmahon, by this time, was east of the Meuse^
1 Failly was unjustly made a scape-goat. His retreat from
Bitche showed presence of mind and skill, and he fought well at
Beaumont.
2
196 MOLTKE.
and had been contemplating a descent on Mont-
medy, and a march from that place to relieve
Bazaine. His 1st corps had got safely over the
Meuse, a few hours only, after the 12th, and he had
pushed forward part of this corps to Carignan, in
the valley of the Chiers, a long march from Monfr-
medy. Extraordinary as it may appear, the French
commander 1 believed that important success was
at hand ; and the unfortunate Emperor, who had
followed in his train, sick, broken down, and letting
things drift, 2 but taking no part in military affairs,
had sent a message to his wife " that we are on the
eve of victory." It is a proof how weakness can
deceive itself that such a notion could have been
entertained. The Army of Chalons was fifty miles
from Metz, its retreat imperilled by the Third
Army ; the Army of the Meuse was hanging on its
flank, and part actually on the way to bar its
progress; the Army of Prince Frederick Charles
stood in its way at Metz ; and all this was perfectly
well known by Macmahon. The terrible news of
the rout of Failly and of part of the 12th and 7th
French corps, soon known, dispelled the Marshal's
delusion, and he gave immediate orders for a general
retreat. Sedan, a fortress of the fourth order, on
the Meuse, lay a few miles to the rear, and Mac-
1 The emotional and somewhat shallow nature of Macmahon
was exactly that which Napoleon has declared unfits a general for
a great command, and was strikingly exemplified on this occasion.
2 Napoleon III., however, had expressed his disapproval of the
reckless march on the 28th.
MARSHAL MACMAHON.
To face page 197.
SEDAN. 197
mahon directed the Army of Chalons to assemble
round the place as a harbour of refuge. Through-
out the night of the 30th, and the early morning of
the 31st, the French columns were toiling painfully
on their way, and they were drawn together near
Sedan long before noon. The aspect of the army,
however, was pitiable in the extreme; the 1st corps,
still intact, had a martial bearing, but the appearance
of the other three corps was alarming. There was
a deficiency of supplies, and many men were
starving; whole regiments were broken up and
confused, stragglers spread over miles around in
thousands, and sounds of mutiny and fear were
heard in more than one camp. 1 Nevertheless, that
army, as a whole, could fight, and could certainly
march, if well directed.
It is at crises like these that a great chief, espe-
cially if he commands a French army, can do much
to avert impending disaster. Not later than the
early afternoon of the 31st Macmahon had his
whole army in hand ; and a French corps, the 13th,
under General Yinoy, sent forward from Paris to
1 An eye-witness gives this description of part of the army, the
part, no doubt, that had suffered most. Wimpffen, "Sedan,''
p. 137 : "Un nombre considerable de fantassins marchaient sans
ordre, et eornme des tirailleurs, en grandes bandes, occupant une
vaste surface. Je me hatai de descendre dans la plaine pour ar-
reter ce desordre et interpeller ces fuyards. J'eu de la peine a
m'en faire comprendre. En vain je leur criais : ' Mais, malheureux,
regardez done derriere vous, le canon de 1'ennemi est encore loin.
Vous n'avez rien a redouter.' Us ne m'ecoutaient pas dans leur
course haletante.
198 MOLTKE.
support the Marshal, was near Mezieres, only a
march distant. At this time the Army of the
Meuse was, in part, on the eastern bank of the
river, in order to prevent a descent on Montmedy ;
the other parts were far off, on the western bank,
and the Third Army was still a long way from
Sedan, divided, too, from the place by the Meuse,
the heads only of a Bavarian corps being near the
fortress. The Germans, therefore, had not their
enemy in their grasp; a retreat to the westward
was still partly open, and had Macmahon formed at
once a bold resolve, abandoned his bad and most
enfeebled troops, left his heaviest impedimenta in
Sedan, and broken down the bridges on the Meuse,
he would probably have made good his way to
Mezieres, at the sacrifice of 20,000 or 30,000 men,
but having saved three-fourths of his army. Napo-
leon, at the Beresina, was in a far worse plight ;
and yet history has recorded how that mighty
warrior rescued his stricken troops from the ex-
treme of peril, and baffled, by his marvellous resource,
his astounded foes. ISTor did the movement to
Mezieres escape the notice of judicious observers
in the camp of the French ; it was suggested,
at least, by Napoleon III., and Ducrot, the leader
of the 1st corps, a very able and experienced
soldier, 1 had prepared for it even on the night of
the 30th.
Genius and insight, however, were wanting to
France in that calamitous hour of her destiny.
1 Ducrot, " Sedan," pp. 10, 11. His remarks should be studied.
SEDAN. 199
Macmahon l knew that he could not stay long at
Sedan, but he did not wish to fall back on
Mezieres ; he believed that he had time to give a
day's rest to his troops. He thought the Germans
more distant than they were, and his real intention
was to resume, if possible, the march on Montrnedy.
He threw, therefore, away his one chance of safety ;
he lost the precious hours of the 31st; the roads to
Mezieres, and even to Sedan, were left open to the
approaching enemy, for the chief bridges on the
Meuse were not destroyed. A council of war that
clear token of weakness in command came to no
decision, and it was finally resolved to wait on
events round Sedan. Vacillation and disregard of
every principle of war were the characteristics of
this fatal conduct, to be soon visited by a tremendous
penalty. The only decided step taken by Macmahon
was to replace Failly in his command by- Wimpffen,
an officer who had been despatched from Paris to
succeed the Marshal in the event of his fall ; and the
choice was to prove, in many respects, unfortunate.
During all this time the two German armies had
been gradually approaching Sedan. The great
masses, however, had moved somewhat slowly, and
until late on the 31st Moltke, who had not brought
1 These conclusions follow from an impartial review of Mac-
mahon's evidence at the Enquete Parlementaire. See also
"Bibesco," p. 105; Wimpffen, " Sedan." The "Prussian Staff
History " is in error in intimating, vol. ii. p. 292, that Macmahon
wished to retreat on Mezieres. The Marshal said exactly the
reverse.
200 MOLTKE.
his enemy to bay, as lie had, perhaps, hoped to do
before, hardly expected that he could accomplish
more than to drive Macmahon 1 over the Belgian
frontier that is, to disarm the Army of Chalons in
a neutral's country. By the evening of the 31st the
Army of the Meuse had completely closed the roads
to Montmedy, and, having crossed the Meuse with
all its divisions, held the tract between the river and
the Chiers ; but the Third Army was half a march
from Se*dan, though it had gradually drawn near
the course of the Meuse, standing from the right to
the left on a broad space, 2 and threatening Mac-
mahon' s retreat to Mezieres. Moltke certainly
expected that the French commander would attempt
to effect his escape that way, and he had made
preparations to cross the Meuse and to endeavour
to force him, we have said, into Belgium, an
event, however, by no means probable had Mac-
mahon been a capable chief. But hours passed and
the French made no sign ; the advanced corps of
the Third Army seized the principal bridges on the
Meuse, left intact, we have seen, by neglect, and
1 " Prussian Staff History," vol. ii. p. 290. The movements of
Macmahon had puzzled the German commanders ; they were so
contrary to common sense. " I cannot understand," General
Blurnenthal, Chief of the Staff of the Third Army, said to a by-
stander, " what the Marshal is at." A very able military critic,
equally perplexed, hazarded the surmise that Macmahon would
march into Belgium, violate neutral territory, and re-enter France
near Givet, making his escape in this way.
2 The 6th corps of the Third Army was leagues in the rear, and
west of Mezieres.
SEDAN. 201
as the Army of Chalons did not move from Sedan,
Moltke saw that his enemy was within the toils, and
that he could be hemmed in on Sedan and destroyed.
Orders were issued for a great night march. The
Army of the Meuse was to advance on the fortress,
and to attack the French on its eastern front ; the
Third Army was to cross the Meuse, and, leaving a
large force on the southern front, was to close on
the enemy from the west ; and the uniting masses
were, like a huge serpent, to envelop and crush
their doomed prey. By the early dawn the great
columns were in motion, well led, well directed, and
advancing steadily; and this movement, one of the
most decisive ever made in war, was indisputably
that of a great captain.
Macmahon, meanwhile, had arranged his army in
a defensive position around Sedan, ready, if neces-
sary, to meet the attack of his enemy. Strategically,
the situation could hardly be worse ; the French
were close to the Belgian frontier, and a lost battle
would entail ruin. But tactically the position was
extremely strong, unless, as at Gravelotte, the
Germans were in overwhelming force ; and there is
reason to think that the Marshal believed a large
part of the Third Army distant. The fortress itself
gave little protection ; but north of it a tract
extends, covered on every side by difficult obstacles,
and the Army of Chalons held this ground of vantage,
drawn up in a great semi-circle to resist an attack.
The brook of the Givonne, with the adjoining villages
of Bazeilles, La Moncelle, Daigny, and Givonne,
202 MOLTKE.
opposed a barrier on the east to the Germans, and
Macmahon held this front with his 1st and 12th
corps, the best parts of his enfeebled army. Few
troops were needed on the southern and south-
western fronts, for, not to speak of the artillery of
Sedan, the Meuse ran along this whole space, form-
ing a huge bend like a great double fosse, and
the approaches on this side were made very intricate
for miles by masses of dense woodland. On the
northern and north-western fronts the ground was
more open ; but the hamlets of Floing, St. Menges,
and Fleigneux afforded valuable points of defence ;
and the 7th corps was placed on this part of the
field, assembled in a comparatively narrow space.
The centre of the circumference thus closed or
occupied was filled by the shattered 5th corps, the
reserve of the three corps outside, and the position,
we repeat, was, as a whole, formidable against an
enemy not in immense numbers. But it afforded no
facilities for counter attack, and hardly any means
of retreat; it was "cramped," confined, and for
this reason dangerous ; it was commanded on the
north by the heights of Illy, and should the Germans
once gain this point of vantage, and especially should
they unite upon it, a frightful disaster would cer-
tainly follow; the French army would have no
power to escape, and would be precipitated into the
lowlands around Sedan.
The memorable 1st of September had come ; a
day of woe and despair for France. It was still
dark when the 1st Bavarian corps attacked Bazeilles,
SEDAN. 203
a suburb of Sedan, near where the Givonne falls into
the Meuse. The 12th Saxon corps had soon come
into line, and assailed the hamlets of La Moncelle
and Daigny, and the thunder of battle rolled along
the space which extends before the south-east of
the fortress. The French made a most stubborn
defence, the marines of Lebrun displaying heroic
courage, and the chassepot made its superiority felt
in what was, in a great measure, a combat in streets.
An unfortunate incident had already occurred ;
Macmahon, who had ridden to the front of the line,
still hoping to find his way to Carignan, had been
struck by the splinter of a shell, and he handed over
the chief command to Ducrot, a lieutenant, in whom
he justly placed confidence. Ducrot, we have seen,
as far back as the 30th of August, had judged
correctly that a retreat on Mezieres was the only 1
chance of safety for the endangered French, and he
instantly gave orders 2 that the whole army should
fall back to the heights of Illy, and endeavour to
force its way westwards. This movement could not
have conjured away a disaster, but it might have
saved a large part of the Army of Chalons ; yet, at
the supreme moment, it was arrested by interference,
unwise and calamitous.
Wimpffen believed, like Macmahon, that the true
1 " Operer sa retraite sur ses renforts un des trois grandes regies
de la guerre." Napoleon.
2 The " Prussian Staff History," vol. ii. pp. 323-4, does not
explain this clearly. Moltke, ( ' Precis of Franco- German War,"
vol. i. p. 119, is quite accurate.
204 MOLTKE.
course to adopt was to attempt to break through
the enemy in front, and, by Oarignan, to advance on
Montmedy ; and, assuming the chief command after
the Marshal's fall, he countermanded Ducrot's
orders and directed the army to hold its gronnd.
At this time the French still maintained their posi-
tions ; they made repeated and vigorous efforts to
fall on the Bavarians and Saxons, and so to force
a passage and escape eastwards. But the 4th corps
of the Army of the Meuse had reached the field about
9 a.m. ; the Guards, who had had a long way to
march, through a difficult and thickly wooded
tract, had speedily joined in a general attack; the
crushing fire of the Prussian batteries told decisively
as the battle developed, and the pressure on the
French proved impossible to withstand, as the line
of fire became more intense, and spread on all sides
as far as Givonne. By noon the line of the Givonne
was lost ; the hamlets on it had been stormed or
abandoned; and the 1st and 12th corps were driven
backward into the valley to the south and east of
Sedan. They rallied in this position on a second
line, but their situation was already critical in the
extreme.
Ere long a tremendous storm had burst on the
north-western front of the French ar my. The mass
of the Third Army had marched through the night,
and by the early morning the 5th and llth corps,
the Wlirtembergers being some distance to the left,
had reached the Meuse, and were crossing the river.
Besides the principal bridge of Donchery, artificial
bridges had been made a , striking contrast to
SEDAN. 205
Macmahon's negligence for celerity was of supreme
importance; and the Germans were arrayed on
the northern bank at between 7 and 8 a.m. The
march, however, to reach the position of the French
was long, and retarded by many hindrances ; the
great bend of the Meuse closed part of the way ;
the country was thickly covered by wood, and it was
nearly 11 a.m. before the first troops of the llth
corps had reached St. Menges and Fleigneux,
advanced posts of the 7th corps of Douay. Batteries
were pushed forward to support the infantry, but
the 5th corps was not yet on the scene ; the
Wiirtembergers were far distant, observing the roads
that led to Mezieres, and this indicates that had
Ducrot's orders, given between 7 and 8 a.m.,
been speedily and thoroughly carried out, the Army
of Chalons might have, in part, escaped, even if
assailed in flank by a victorious enemy, and probably
in the rear by the Army of the Meuse. The 7th
French corps met the enemy boldly, and even
attempted counter attacks, but St. Menges and
Fleigneux were scarcely defended, and after a fierce
and protracted struggle, Floing was captured, and
the triumphant Germans pressed towards and seized
the heights of Illy, nearly joining hands with the
advancing Guards, who had occupied, we have seen,
Givonne. An iron circle was closing round the
French, but their disaster was ennobled by a fine
feat of arms. The few good cavalry of the Army of
Chalons made a magnificent 1 effort to beat back the
1 King William, who witnessed these heroic charges from a
distant hill, exclaimed, " What splendid troops." The " Prussian
206 MOLTKE.
enemy, and, though they failed, some hundreds of
these gallant horsemen contrived to effect their
escape into Belgium.
It was now three in the afternoon, and nothing
could save the defeated French from the coming
doom. To the east and south-east, the troops of
the 1st and 12th corps were gradually forced from
their new positions, and were driven back on the
ramparts of Sedan. To the north and north-east,
the uniting columns of the Prussian Guards and of
the 5th and llth corps spread over the space from
which Illy rises ; and the routed 7th corps was
scattered into the valley below. The south of the
French position was closed by the Meuse and by the
2nd Bavarian corps, detached in the morning from
the Third Army ; and the converging enemies
gathered in on the ruined host, pent in a narrow
enclosure, like a flock for the slaughter. The 5th
French corps shared in the universal wreck, and by
five in the afternoon a huge coil had been drawn
around an army still of 110,000 men. Every avenue
of escape was barred ; the cross-fire of 500 guns
at least carried death and despair into shattered
masses fast dissolving into chaotic multitudes ; and
the lost battle became a massacre. Yet even in
this hour of appalling woe noble hearts rose superior
Staff," vol. ii. p. 375, and Moltke's " Precis of the Franco-German
War," vol. i. p. 130, join in the tribute of admiration. General
Gallifet, one of the leaders of these noble squadrons, survives,
and is one of the most distinguished chiefs of the new army of
France.
SEDAN. 207
to Fortune. Wimpffen hastily collected a few
thousand men and made a frantic effort to break
through by Bazeilles ; and little knots of fugitives,
eluding their foes, made their way over the adjoin-
ing frontier. It is useless, however, to dwell on
the struggles of caged animals caught in the trap of
the hunter. The Army of Chalons soon ceased to
exist, 1 and became a horde filling the approaches to
Sedan, and crowding its streets with wounded men
and stragglers. Scenes of hideous insubordination
and fury closed a catastrophe without a parallel in
war.
Napoleon III. had visited the field of battle on
the morning of this great and terrible day. He was
suffering, however, from a cruel disease, and was
unable to keep his seat on horseback, and he
witnessed from the interior of Sedan the appalling
rout of the Army of Chalons. Towards the close of
the day, when all hope had vanished, he very pro-
perly rejected the advice of Wimpffen, to put him-
self at the head of a handful of men and to endea-
1 General Ducrot, " Sedan," p. 48, gives us this description of the
appearance of the town at the close of the struggle : " A 1'interienr
de Sedan, le spectacle e"tait indescriptible ; les rues, les places, les
portes etaient encombrees de voitures, de chariots, de canons, de
tous les impedimenta et debris d'une armee en deroute. Des
bandes de soldats, sans fusils, sans sacs, accouraient a tout
moment, se j etaient dans les maisons, dans les eglises. Aux
portes de la ville on s'e'crasait. Plusieurs malheureux perirent
pie"tmes. A travers cette foule, accouraient des cavaliers ventre a
terre, des caissons passaient au galop, se taillant un chemin au
milieu de ces masses affalees."
208 MOLTKE.
vour to escape from a scene of horror, and he
rightly ordered the white flag to be raised as a
sign that all resistance had ceased, and that the time
had come to stop useless and murderous car-
nage. Negotiations had soon begun at Donchery ;
Wimpffen, much against his will, represented the
French, and Bismarck and Moltke were the envoys
of the King of Prussia to treat for victorious Ger-
many. The interview, a great scene of history,
brought out clearly one side of Moltke' s character.
Bismarck spoke of the cession of Alsace and Lorraine,
but was generous to the defeated enemy, and seemed
willing to discuss conditions of peace. Moltke did
justice to the courage of the French, but was harsh,
peremptory, and stiff in his manner, and his
language showed that he rather desired to annihilate
foes already crushed. He was not to blame for
insisting that the French troops should lay down
their arms and become prisoners of war, and he was
within his right, when, a few hours afterwards, he
rejected a proposal of the ill-fated Emperor, that
they should march into Belgium, pledged not to
fight again. War is not an affair of sentiment, and
there were special reasons, in the existing state of
France, when the Empire evidently was on the brink
of ruin, and there could be little hope of a stable
government, that concessions should not be lightly
granted. But Moltke' s bearing was unnecessarily
severe, and in the hour of his triumph he ought not
to have sneered at " the presumption and shallow-
ness " of the French people, an expression which
SEDAN. 209
wounded French nature to the quick. The con-
duct of Maryborough to Tallard, after Blenheim, and
of Napoleon to the Austrian officers at Ulm, pre-
sents a striking and painful contrast, 1 and the atti-
tude of Moltke on this great occasion reveals a dis-
like and scorn of France, and a want of tact and of
knowledge of men, to be noticed in more than one
passage of his career.
The German armies on the field of Sedan were
about 180,000 or 190,000 strong, with from 600 to
700 guns ; the Army of Chalons had about 350
guns, and numbered, in the morning, 120,000 men.
Defeat could not have been averted, yet this fright-
ful disaster should not have occurred. When the
Germans, indeed, had encircled their prey, it was
impossible to resist or escape ; the French, placed
in positions from the first too confined, were driven
in a multitude against a worthless fortress ; all
avenues of retreat were effectually shut, and the
German batteries had free play on the mass of
routed soldiery. But had Ducrot's advice been fol-
lowed, a considerable part of the Army of Chalons
would, in all probability, have reached Mezieres,
and it would have been better to have tried to break
out for Carignan, before the German armies had
met at Illy, than to wait to be caught in a deadly
trap, even if this movement must have led to defeat.
1 How different was the policy of the chiefs of conquering Rome,
expressed in the noble lines of Virgil:
" Hae tibi sint artes ; pacisque imponere morem,
Parcere subjectis, et debellare superbos."
P
210 MOLTKE.
Nothing can excuse such a calamity as Sedan,
and the responsibility largely falls on "Wimpffen,
for interfering with Ducrot at a most critical
time, and for insisting on adopting a most unwise
course. 1 The scenes that followed the capitulation
of Sedan form one of the darkest pages in the
annals of France. In view of the birth-place of
Turenne we may fancy the shade of that great
warrior indignant at the events of the preceding
days and on plains thickly strewn with the ravages
of war, 85,000 disarmed and captive men, the re-
mains of the lost Army of Chalons, were huddled
within enclosures near the Meuse, until their con-
querors should obtain the means to transport them
beyond the Rhine and the Elbe. The unhappy Em-
peror had already gone ; confusion had waited on
his banners, and it was, indeed, idle to state that the
heir of Napoleon went into exile, attended by a
brilliant escort of the soldiery whose fathers had
witnessed Jena. The bearing of the French was
characteristic of the race ; imprecations fell from
many passionate lips, cries that " We are betrayed
and abandoned" were loudly heard; and the fool
1 For the chances of the escape of the Army of Chalons had
Ducrot's orders been carried out, see Ducrot's " Sedan," pp. 27, 28.
The general is too sanguine, but his view is remarkable. It may
fairly be said that had he commanded in chief on the 30th of
August, the army would have got to Me"zieres, and Sedan would
not have been fought. The arguments of Wimpffen are quite
untenable. We shall notice the observations of Villars and Napo-
leon on disasters of this kind, when we come to the surrender
of Metz.
SEDAN. 211
fury of Paris blended with the sullenness of despair.
Yet the attitude of thousands was manly and noble ;
the martial port, the undaunted countenance of the
disciplined veteran were not changed, and eye-
witnesses have told how, even in this hour of woe,
brave hearts still beat high with hope for France.
The vast material of the Army of Chalons fell a
trophy of war into the hands of the victors.
Sedan forms the third act in the drama of the
war ; it was the prelude to the fall of the French
Empire, and to the renewal of the struggle under
changed conditions. The Imperial armies of France
had been swept from the open field, and all that
remained of them was the army of Bazaine, immured
around Metz, and soon to become captive. Such
disasters had never been witnessed before ; they
surpassed Austerlitz, Jena, and Friedland, and the
idolaters of success, it is needless to say, have
extolled the victories of the Germans as miracles
of war, and have described Moltke as the first of
strategists. Impartial history pronounces a different
judgment, though she gives the meed of de-
served eulogy. The operations of Moltke in this
episode of the campaign were very superior to
those around Metz, which have been rightly sub*
jected to adverse comments. The formation and
direction of the Army of the Meuse, the invest-
ment of Metz, as affairs stood, and above all,
the admirable night march on Sedan, exhibit,
almost in the highest degree, decision, promptness,
and clear insight, and they were undoubtedly
p 2
212 MOLTKE.
the moves of a great commander. The immense
superiority, too, of the German armies in essential
elements of military power, over the ill-organized
Army of Chalons, was illustrated in the fullest
completeness ; it naturally exceeded all that had
been seen before, in the case of the more efficient
Army of the Khine. But when it is alleged that the
advance on Sedan was even finer than the advance
on Ulm, in the memorable campaign of 1805, and
that the victory of Sedan shows more genius than
Ulm, a fair inquirer must express an emphatic
protest. It is one thing to move armies a few
leagues, towards an object already almost within
sight, and quite another to move armies from
Hanover and Brittany to the Upper Danube,
and if Sedan was a " bigger thing " than Ulm, it
does not give proof, on the part of the conquerors,
of equal forethought or strategic power. Moltke
showed in many passages of his career great resolu-
tion and force of character, and he could deal most
ably with what was at hand and before him. But
he did not possess the imagination that sees into
the unknown, or the supreme genius that regulates
grand movements, at immense distances, and re-
mote in time ; in this, as in many other respects, he
is not to be compared with Napoleon, and, spite
of the telegraph and appliances of the kind,
the strategy of Ulm and Mareugo surpassed his
achievements. It should be added that, at Sedan,
as throughout the war, he had an overwhelming
superiority of force, and Macrnahon played into
SEDAN. 213
his hands even more completely than Mack played
into those of Napoleon.
As for the operations of the French, ending at
Sedan, they were at least as faulty as those of
Bazaine, although for very different reasons. Mac-
mahon was a brave and intelligent soldier, his cap-
ture of the Malakoff, his march to Magenta, were
dashing, brilliant and well conceived exploits, but a
general of division, Napoleon has remarked, is very
different from a general-in- chief , and Macmahon
was unfit for supreme command. His march to the
Meuse admits of no excuse ; he knew that he ought
to fall back on Paris ; he was perfectly aware of his
enemy's movements ; and yet he consented to a fatal
course to assist a colleague, and to prop up a
government. Still more unpardonable was his
resolve to advance eastwards on the 28th of August,
and to give up the retreat to Mezieres ; this was a
deliberate sacrifice, for supposed reasons of state,
of the most obvious principles of war ; and, we re-
peat, this conduct was well-nigh criminal. Nothing,
too, could be more unwise and feeble than the
inactivity of the 31s b of August, the indecision in
not moving on Mezieres, the neglect to break down
the bridges on the Meuse ; and Macmahon's idea, to
which he clung to the last, that he might be able to
reach Carignan and Metz, proves that he had no
knowledge of the higher parts of war. Vacillation,
hesitation, and want of purpose, were the faults of
the Marshal during these woful days, and he showed
himself to be without the strength of character
214 MOLTKE.
which Napoleon has called the best quality of a chief.
He was, no doubt, an honourable and high-minded
man, and it is to his credit that, in an inquiry on
Sedan, he took the whole responsibility on himself,
and blamed neither the Government nor his lieu-
tenants. But he was utterly in error in hinting, as
he did, that his fall may have changed the fortunes
of the day; he would have rejected the advice of
Ducrot; Wimpffen obstinately carried his ideas, out,
and a tremendous catastrophe was the result. It is
unnecessary to dwell on the bad condition of the
Army of Chalons compared to its enemy ; this cir-
cumstance alone should have induced Macmahon to
avoid the calamitous march eastwards, and that he
did not retreat on Paris was one principal cause
that France succumbed, and was compelled to bow-
to the will of the conqueror.
CHAPTER VII.
Advance of the Army of the Meuse and of the chief part of
the Third Army through France The Germans in front of
Paris Confidence of Moltke His miscalculation in suppos-
ing that France would yield in a short time Revolution of
4th September The Government of National Defence
Paris resolves to stand a siege Resources of the capital in
material and in military force Investment of Paris by the
German armies Trochu and Ducrot The zone of investment
The zone of defence Sorties made by the Parisian levies
Gambetta The rising of France against the invaders
Organization of the defence Extraordinary ability and
energy of Gambetta Formation of provincial armies
Erroneous views of Moltke as to the reality of the defence
of France Fall of Laon, Toul, Strasbourg, Soissons, and
other places First defeats of the French provincial armies
The resistance continues Conduct of Bazaine after the
investment of Metz The 26th of August at Metz The
battle of Noisseville Criminal negligence and intrigues of
Bazaine The fall of Metz Reflections on these events.
SEDAN had engulphed, as if in an earthquake, the
last army of France in the field, and the Army of
the Rhine was immured at Metz, a circle of iron
thrown around it. All that seemed required to
bring the war to a close was to march on Paris at
once, to witness its fall, and to dictate the terms of
a triumphant peace. Moltke had accomplished more
than he had deemed possible, and in the serene
confidence of speedy success, he directed an im-
216 MOLTKE.
mediate advance on the capital, carrying out the
design he had formed from the first. Two corps l
were left to watch the captives of Sedan, with orders
to follow in the wake of the conquerors, and within
three days after the great surrender, the Army
of the Meuse and the Third Army, now composed
of six and a half corps, 2 had uncoiled themselves
from around the fortress which had been the scene
of the 1st of September, and were on their way for
the plains of Champagne, through the difficult
region of the Argonne. The invaders moved on an
immense front, the Army of Meuse spreading over
the valley of the Aisne, pushing detachments north-
wards, as far as Laon, and descending into the valleys
of the Ourcq and the Oise; the Third Army filling
the valley of the Marne, and extending to the dis-
tant valley of the Aube. Historic towns and strong-
holds were passed on the march, and scenes
illustrated by the genius of Turenne, and by the
immortal exploits of 1814 ; but France seemed
unable to lift up her head, and the German masses
rolled steadily onwards, encountering no resistance
on their path. By the 16th and 17th September,
the two armies, drawing towards each other, had
entered the region of forest and hill, of winding
river and of fertile plain, of which Paris, girdled
1 The llth Prussian and 1st Bavarian corps.
2 The Army of the Meuse was still composed of the Guards and
the 4th and 12th corps ; the Third Army was composed at this
time of the 5th and 6th Prussian corps, of the 2nd Bavarian,
and of the Wurtembergers.
THE GEUMAN ADVANCE ON PARIS. 217
by her dependent villages and suburbs, forms the
imposing centre, and thousands of peasants, flock-
ing in with their household stuff, had given the
capital almost the only sign of the approach of the
all-mastering enemy. One incident only had ruffled
the calm of a movement that seemed a huge triumphal
progress. The 13th corps of Vinoy, which, we
have seen, had been sent to Mezieres to support
Macmahon, had rapidly fallen back, at the close of
the battle, and the 6th Prussian corps, even now
in its rear, had made an attempt to cut off its
retreat. Vinoy, however, skilfully making forced
marches, had succeeded in effecting his escape by
Laon ; and his troops, increased by numerous
fugitives from Sedan, reached Paris in safety
before the invaders.
Probability is the rule of life, and you must act
quickly on probabilities in war. Moltke is not to
be blamed, if tried by this test, for advancing on
Paris, with a full conviction that the city would
fall and France succumb in a few days, or, at most,
a few weeks. The armies of the Empire had been
swept from the scene ; the Empire itself had become
a phantom, and could a nation under the heel of a
conqueror resist the omnipotent hosts of Germany ?
Not a soldier beyond the Rhine, and very few in
France, believed that Paris, although fortified, could
hold out against a victorious enemy ; and France had
yielded, in 1814 and 1815, when the example had
been set by the capital. A Prussian commander,
too, might reasonably suppose that, after disasters
218 MOLTKE.
surpassing Jena, the French would imitate the
Prussian people, especially as Austria and Italy had
abandoned France, and her misfortunes had left her
without a friend in Europe. All the chances, there-
fore, seemed on the side of Moltke, and if we
accept the criterion of success, his strategy was
altogether justified, for Paris and France were sub-
dued at last.
The march on Paris was, nevertheless, a mistake,
founded on calculations that proved false, and that
very nearly changed the fortunes of the war. Like
most soldiers, Moltke had little faith in moral power
in conflict with material force ; he had a rooted
dislike and contempt for Frenchmen, and he did
not believe that France would make a real effort
to vindicate her great name, and to oppose the
invader. This, however, was a complete error,
and there were other considerations that might have
made the Prussian leader pause in his march of
conquest. Paris had more than once resisted an
enemy; it had now become a gigantic fortress;
over and over again, in her splendid history, France
had risen Phoenix-like from her ashes; and,
" stamping her proud foot had called legions out of
the earth," which had discomfited even the Leagues
of Europe. Metz, too, had not fallen as yet; the
German armies, in the march to Paris, were only 1
150,000 strong, and could not be largely increased
for a time ; a net- work of strongholds stood in their
rear, and not even one of the great railway lines to
1 " Prussian Staff History," Part ii. pp. 1, 32.
FALSE CALCULATION OF MOLTKE. 219
the capital had been completely mastered. Was it
wise, therefore, under these conditions, to plunge
into the interior of France, a country, which,
prostrate as it was, was rich in elements of power
for war, and with communications, so to speak,
strangled, to attack an immense and fortified city,
which could not be assaulted, or regularly besieged,
for a period of many months at least ? Moltke,
however, took the hazardous course ; and, as the
result, Paris resisted stubbornly. France rose,
almost to a man, to arms ; the invaders were placed
in grave peril, the resources of Germany were cruelly
strained, to an extent that, perhaps, will be never
known ; she triumphed after a protracted contest,
owing to accidents mainly, on which she could not
reckon ; and if France was at last vanquished, she
assuredly taught her foes a lesson, not to advance
hastily to the Loire and the Seine, and she inscribed
another grand page on the national annals. It is
not difficult, after the event, to see that Moltke
might have obtained all that Germany obtained
at last, without running enormous risks, and setting
fortune on the hazard of the die. But if he was in
error, he made the mistake made by Napoleon,
when he advanced on Moscow, and omniscience is
not given to the children of men.
During the march of the German armies through
France, a revolution had broken out in Paris. The
Government of the Regency had done much to
increase the national resources for war, and
especially to strengthen the menaced capital ; but
220 MOLTKE.
the Empire had been long undermined ; Palikao,
the Imperial War Minister, had insisted on the
fatal advance to the Meuse, and at the intelligence
of the disaster of Sedan, Paris rose up in fury
against the men in office. Scenes, too like those of
1792, were witnessed ; mobs broke into the As-
sembly of the State, clamouring for the " deposition
of the Man of Sedan ;" the Empress, to her honour,
retired into Belgium, in order to avert a civil war ;
and at a tumultuous meeting at the City Town
Hall, the leaders of the party which, since 1851,
had always been sworn foes of the Empire, declared
that Napoleon III. had forfeited his crown, and set
up a Republic in his stead. A Provisional Govern-
ment was quickly formed ; it had seized the reins
of power by the 4th of September, and it proclaimed
itself a " Government of National Defence," pledged
to resist the invader to the last. The nominal head
of the new power was Trochu, a general of some
parts and distinction, for years neglected under the
Empire ; but its master spirit was Leon Gambetta,
a lawyer little known, but a man of genius, of a
rash and domineering nature, indeed, yet endowed
with the supreme gift of command ; and if the
Government had no lawful origin, it represented
the convictions of Paris, and, as was soon to appear,
of the nation, both resolved to defend the soil of
France. The ministry entered on its functions at
once, and while the veteran statesman, Thiers,
went on a mission to the Courts of the Great
Powers, to plead for France and to invoke their
J5ISMARCK.
Tu fact; j>ui/e 221.
THE FALL OF THE EMPIRE. THE SIEGE OF PARIS. 221
sympathy, it addressed itself to the gigantic task
of preparing to withstand the German invasion.
Negotiation, indeed, was tried for a moment ; but
as Bismarck insisted on harsh conditions, which
Favre, the new Foreign Minister, would not accept,
it failed, and war was the only alternative. Spite of
the cynical scoffs of politicians and soldiers, who
believed further resistance hopeless, Paris girded
up her loins for the contest, declaring that France
would yield " neither her lands nor her fortresses ;"
and the whole nation proved by heroic deeds, that the
noble cry of patriotism was no vainglorious boast.
The enemy, however, was at the gates of Paris,
and how was it to resist his efforts ? As early as
July the Imperial Government had taken precau-
tions for the defence of the city, and, after "Worth
and Spicheren, the Regency, we have said, had ac-
complished much to secure this object. Immense
stores of provisions were laid in ; heavy guns were
brought from the great naval arsenals ; large bodies
of marines and sailors and of Gardes Mobiles were
gathered together within the capital ; munitions of
war of all kinds were collected, and attempts were
made to strengthen the fortifications of the place,
by constructing earthworks, redoubts, and entrench-
ments. The new Government owed much to these
labouz^s, but the Revolution, which had just taken
place, undoubtedly quickened into intense activity
the exertions of the world of Paris, patriotic and
w arlike in all ages, though on the surface given to
ease and pleasure. Local committees were formed
222 MOLTKE.
by the citizens themselves, connected with a great
Central Committee of Defence, composed of
Trochu, and other men in power, and the work of
obtaining supplies, of forming and drilling troops,
of clearing ramparts, of repairing forts, of making
improvised armed lines, and, in short, of turning
the city into a real fortress, capable of enduring a
protracted siege, went on with marvellously rapid
and fruitful results.
By the second week of September Paris was in
a state of preparation to resist the Germans, far
more complete than was generally supposed. For
the time, indeed, it was really safe, for Moltke had
never thought of trying to assault a city which
could be made a mass of barricades, not to refer to
its walls and forts, and the invaders did not
possess any artillery for a siege. In fact, the
capital was already prodigiously strong, and the
only present defect in its armour was the absence of
an effective military force. Vinoy's corps, indeed,
had fortunately returned, and a new corps, the 14th,
had been formed and placed under the command of
Ducrot, the ablest of the French chiefs at Sedan ;
but these arrays, though fully 70,000 strong, were
composed for the most part of rude levies, of troops
from depots, of men of the untried reserves, and
contained only two trained regiments. There were
also about 115,000 Gardes Mobiles, youths without
discipline or experience in war, and to these should
be added a huge assemblage of about 300,000 l
1 The "Prussian Staff History," Part ii. p. 30, is incorrect
THE SIEGE OF PARIS. 223
National Guards, traders, artisans, and partly the
scum of the populace, as a whole little fit for the
work of soldiers. The administrative services, too,
required for armies, were deficient, or in a most
embryonic state, and, in short, of the half million of
men who were to defend Paris, not 20,000 were
real troops. Intelligence, energy and devoted
courage can, nevertheless, do much behind armed
walls, and the city was to give a noble example of
this truth to the world.
Moltke had never hesitated as to the true method
of operating against and reducing Paris, an event
which he believed not distant. His orders were
given on the 16th and 17th of September, and on
the following day the Army of the Meuse began to
close round the city to the east and the north.
The advancing masses met no resistance, and by
the 19th they had traced a great investing line,
extending from Neuilly on the Marne to the Seine
beyond Paris. Two fronts of the capital were thus
hemmed in, and meanwhile the Third Army had
addressed itself to the task of surrounding the
southern and western fronts. The Seine was
crossed between Villeneuve Saint Georges and
Corbeil, and the invaders advanced along the
heights overlooking the capital from Clamart and
Chatillon, towards Sevres, Marly, and -Versailles, in
in estimating the entire number of the men employed at first in
defending Paris at 300,000 only. General Ducrot, in his elaborate
work, " La Defense de Paris," livre ii. chap, i., computes them at
nearly half a million.
224 MOLTKE.
order to complete the investing circle. They were
not, however, unmolested on the march, and on the
19th the first engagement took place between the
conquerors and the Republican levies. Trochu, a
cautious and able, but not a daring man, had wished
to confine Paris to a passive defence, but Ducrot, a
chief of a higher order, had persuaded him to allow
the 14th corps to fall boldly on the flank of the
Germans, as they wound round this side of the city,
especially as Clamart and Chatillon were points of
vantage, if possible not to be won by the enemy.
A brisk and well contested encounter followed, but
a panic seized a part of the untrained French
troops, and Ducrot was ultimately forced to retreat.
The views of Trochu seemed thus justified; the
French refrained from offensive movements, and
indeed, for a time, showed few signs of life, and
the Germans had soon made their way to Versailles.
Having gained the positions they sought around
Paris, the invaders proceeded to strengthen their
lines of investment, and by these means to besiege
the city. 1 The capital of France has been made by
1 For the second phase of the war, beginning with the Siege of
Paris, the " Prussian Staff History " should, of course, be consulted.
But this part of the work is not so valuable as the first part ; it
abounds in suppressions and occasionally in misrepresentation ; it
is far from candid, and it is pervaded by a spirit of contempt for
the efforts of France. Moltke's Precis exaggerates these faults ;
and the same may be said of all the works on the German side
which have come under my notice. The French authorities are
numerous and good, and deserve careful attention. General
Ducrot's book, and an admirable volume by M. Viollet Le Due,
should be studied, with General Vinoy's resume, for the Siege of
THE SIEGE OF PARIS. 225
nature an extremely formidable centre of defence,
offering many obstacles even to the most powerful
enemy. To the east the converging streams of the
Marne and the Seine, running into each other at
Charenton, present a great double fosse to a hostile
army, compelling it to divide and to secure its rear,
and the united rivers, now known as the Seine only,
after passing through Paris, form a series of bends
extending for miles, as far as Poissy, and protecting
in three great folds the city to the west. To the
north-east rises a great tableland, stretching from
near Vincennes to Montreuil and Romainville, and
opposing a barrier to attack ; and the wide plain of
St. Denis to the north is commanded by a succes-
sion of heights, La Villette, Belleville, and Mont-
martre, points of vantage against an advancing
enemy. To the south a long range of uplands
and hills, spreading from St. Cloud to the Seine
eastwards, by Versailles, Meudon, Sceaux and
Villejuif, and offering to the sight from the heights
of Chatillon magnificent scenes of grandeur and
beauty, covered Paris for ages from that side, and
though this was l always the vulnerable front, and
Paris. The war in the provinces has been well described by M.
de Freycinet, by Generals D'Aurelle and Faidherbe, and especially
by the illustrious Chanzy, as regards the operations in which they
took part. The elaborate and careful analysis of General Derre-
cagaix should also be perused. Riistow's History, though written
from a German point of view, is tolerably impartial.
1 Edward III. advanced against Paris from the heights of
Chatillon in 1360 ; so did Henry IV. to begin the celebrated
siege which ended the 'War of the League. Bliicher, too,
threatened the capital in 1815 from the south.
Q
226 MOLTKE.
modern artillery, from many points of these eminences,
can ravage the city, still they are not in any sense to
be easily mastered if there is a trained military force
to support the defence. In the midst of this
immense circle of engirdling rivers, of heights rising
into natural bastions, of highlands difficult to ascend
and subdue, Paris, shielded from hostile approach,
lies cradled ; a huge world of buildings stretching
out for leagues, decked with edifices of historic
renown, running out into petty towns and hamlets,
and animated in all its parts by intense life and
passion.
In the ages of Barbarism, and the Middle Ages,
Paris, like all cities, was rudely fortified, and, as
Napoleon has remarked, it often owed its safety to
its walls. Louis XIV., in the plenitude of his power,
removed the ancient ramparts to enlarge his chief
town, but Vauban a fact not generally known-
proposed a scheme of new defences not unlike that
adopted ultimately in the present century. Napoleon
always wished to fortify Paris, but incessant war
interfered with his purpose, and it was not until 1
the Hundred Days that he threw up a few entrench-
ments around the city, a precaution rendered fruit-
less by the defeat of Waterloo. The design was
renewed under Louis Philippe, and between 1840
and 1845 a regular system of fortifications was
planned arid completed. The city was surrounded
by a wall and ramparts, made difficult to assail by a
1 Napoleon's observations on the fortification of Paris will be
found in his " Commentaries," vol. v. pp. 104-9. E<1.
THE SIEGE OF PARTS. 227
broad ditch, and ninety-four bastions were added
to protect this inner circle of defence with their fire.
But Paris was not to be exposed to the horrors of
an assault, and fifteen forts were constructed beyond
the enceinte, to increase the strength of existing
obstacles, to guard and cover vulnerable points,
and to keep away the approach of a hostile army.
One fort was at the confluence of the Marne and
the Seine ; three, combined with the old chateau of
Vincennes, extended to the east and the north-east,
commanding from the tableland along this front the
valley of the Marne, and the adjoining lowlands ;
and five more closed the plain of St. Denis, and
shielded the historic town of that name. To the
west there was only one fort, for an attack on that
side was not probable, and the triple coil of the
Seine formed a powerful defence, but this was in
itself a fortress, and the great work of Valerien
could sweep with its fire the peninsula next to the
Bois de Boulogne. Not less than five forts covered
the southern front, but these were commanded by
the heights above, and 1 this vice in their position
had been pointed out long before artillery possessed
its present range and power. The south of Paris,
therefore, remained its weakest point, and yet art
added immensely to the strength of a spot strongly
defended by nature. The engineers who fortified
the French capital believed that a period of sixty
days would be the extreme limit of its power of
resistance ; it held out considerably more than
1 Clarke, " Fortification," p. 59.
Q 2
228 MOLTKE.
double that time under conditions of the worst
possible kind.
In the presence of the colossal fortress around
which they had already gathered, the first care of
the Germans was to secure the circle they had
formed from attack. For this purpose, the methods
were followed already adopted before Metz ; roads
were broken up, batteries carefully laid, entrench-
ments thrown up, and stockades made ; and inun-
dations were formed on several. lowlands to prohibit
access to an assailant. The villages, the buildings,
the forests, the woodlands, which spread along every
side of the city, gave facilities to the besiegers'
work; these were strongly fortified, or made
impassable, and the fairest scenes that adorned the
adjoining tract were turned into barriers to resist
the enemy. In a very short time, a huge line of
investment, on a circumference of more than fifty
miles, was drawn nearly around the whole capital,
and the German masses were placed behind this
immense zone, to hold Paris in .their grasp, and to
defy their foes. The invading armies had gradu-
ally closed in, and the Army of the Meuse now held
positions, though still beyond the range of the
forts, from the Marne to beyond Argenteuil north-
wards, in the second peninsula formed by the
Seine to the west. A narrow gap was left in the
investing line on this front ; for the besieged, it
was believed, would not be able to cross the bends
of the Seine on that side, before the besiegers could
force them back ; but along the whole southern
and south-eastern fronts, the Third Army, ere long
THE SIEGE OF PARIS. 229
reinforced by the two corps left? behind at Sedan,
extended from St. Ger mains to the far-distant
points where it joined hands with the Army of the
Meuse, holding Marly, Versailles, Chfitillon, Sceaux,
Bonneuil, Bry, and all the other adjoining villages,
and thus completing the besiegers' circle. Outside
this zone, detachments of troops were sent to secure
the passages of the rivers around, and to put down
any hostile gatherings ; and an external zone, for
the present imperfect, was thrown beyond the zone
that engirdled the city. Paris was thus isolated
and cut off from the world ; and Moltke, at the
head of the German armies, and entrenched behind
his impenetrable lines, calmly awaited the hour of
its approaching fall. The revolutionary follies, he
thought, of the citizens, would accelerate a con-
summation which, in any event, famine would
render certain in no long space of time.
Paris had not been inactive during these days,
when a kind of Chinese wall was being built
around it. But a master-mind was wanting to the
defence ; and this deficiency continued to the last
moment, even if it did not affect the final result.
There were no discords between the chiefs in com-
mand, but there was a strongly marked divergence
of views, and conflicting projects distracted energies
which ought to have been concentrated on a single
purpose. Ducrot, the more original and able man, 1
believed that the only chance for the capital was to
1 Ducrot, "La Defense de Paris," vol. i. pp. 316-319. This
plan is noticed in the " Prussian Staff History," but without
comment, a tolerable proof that it was a good one.
230 MOLTKE.
break the investing circle by its own efforts. He
was convinced that France did not possess the
means of creating a real army of relief; and, differ-
ing from Trochu in this respect, he had formed a
plan of operations on these assumptions. Having
carefully surveyed the German lines, he thought
they presented one weak point at the gap left, we have
seen, to the west ; and he proposed to make prepara-
tions to force a passage by the second peninsula
formed by the bends of the Seine. A large army
was to be collected in the first peninsula, and, under
the protection of the fire of the great work of
Valerien, and of other works thrown up for the
purpose, it was to cross the river at Carrieres and
Bezons, to establish itself in the second peninsula,
overpowering any enemies in its path ; and escaping
by Argenteuil to the north a false attack was to
keep the Germans in check here it was to make
its way into the valley of the Oise. Having thus
cut through the investing zone, it was to occupy
Rouen, and make the sea its base ; and having
strengthened itself, and secured supplies, it was to
summon to its aid the provincial levies, to march
again on Paris, and to attack the enemy in the rear,
the movement being seconded by great sorties from
the capital.
This operation offered some hopes of success, and
Trochu allowed Ducrot to have his way, and to take
the first steps to give effect to his enterprise. But
Trochu did not approve of the project at heart, he
did not give it earnest support ; and as no deter-
THE SIEGE OP PARTS. 231
mined attempt was made to complete it, the only
result was to weaken and hamper the defence. 1
The ideas of Trochu, in fact, were altogether
different from those of his more daring colleague ;
O O 7
and as he was invested with supreme command, he
naturally insisted on carrying them out. He be-
lieved the Germans intended to assault Paris; and
his first care, therefore, was to seek to make the
capital impregnable to this mode of attack. When
this had been effected he thought that the lines of
the invaders might be, perhaps, weakened by push-
ing out counter approaches to them ; and he was
willing to try the effects of sorties, in order at once
to harass the enemy, and to inure the armed masses in
Paris to war. But he thought that the capital could
never save itself, and that an army of relief would
be required to cause the raising of the siege ; and
he looked to France to supply this force from out-
side. He regarded Paris, in a word, as a fortress,
to be defended and assisted in the ordinary way ;
and his ideal was the defence of Sebastopol, a siege
at which he had gained distinction.
Acting on these notions Trochu proceeded to
secure the city, in the first instance, from assault ;
and if divided counsels were not without mischief,
he was admirably seconded by the armed bodies in
Paris, and especially by the citizens as a whole.
The forts, largely garrisoned by the marines and
1 For the evil results of the want of complete unity in direction
and of divergent views on the defence of Paris, the reader may
consult the admirable work of M. Viollet le Due in every chapter.
232 MOLTKE.
sailors, were manned in force, and received the best
gunners to be found ; the enceinte was occupied by
the National Guard, and was strengthened and
improved in different ways, and the spaces between
the forts were, at different points, filled by redoubts
and entrenchments armed with powerful batteries.
A zone of defence, which defied the enemy, was
thus opposed to the zone of investment, both con-
nected throughout, as at Metz, by the telegraph ;
and this barrier in the besiegers' way became even
more impenetrable than their hastily constructed
lines. This gain, however, was only trifling ;
Moltke, we have seen, had never contemplated an
assault, and obviously if Paris could not do more
than this, its surrender was only a question of time.
Trochu's operations failed at this point, and it can-
not be said that at any part of the siege he dis-
played the qualities of a great captain, even if Paris
could not have averted its fall. Nevertheless, the
city made immense exertions on the principles of
defence laid down by its rulers. A system of
counter approaches was begun, and a series of
vigorous sorties was made against the enemy's lines
in many directions. These attacks, protected by
the fire of the forts, were ultimately repelled in every
instance, but two were, for a time, successful ; they
were most honourable to the Parisian levies, and, in
fact, they were much more effective than the
wretched demonstrations made about this time by
the army of Bazaine enclosed in Metz. Meanwhile,
Trochu and his lieutenants continued the work of
THE SIEGE OF PAEIS. 233
organizing and forming into soldiers the armed
multitudes within the capital, and, all things con-
sidered, the results were wonderful. Two bodies,
deserving in some measure the name of armies,
were by degrees arrayed, and even the National
Guards did good service. Yet one great and im-
portant mistake was made ; after the bad fashion
of a revolutionary time, the Gardes Mobiles and
the National Guards were allowed to elect their own
officers, and this not only greatly injured the defence,
but proved a cause of frightful disasters afterwards.
The close of October was now at hand, and,
though besieged for nearly six weeks, Paris re-
mained defiant, and showed no signs of yielding.
The defences of the city could resist any attack;
the levies within the walls were acquiring, by degrees,
something like military discipline and worth, and
had given proof of this in more than one encounter.
The positive results were not, perhaps, very great,
and yet they had begun to attract the attention of
thousands of observers in many lands. The attitude
of the great mass of the citizens was the most distinc-
tive feature of this period. Men of all ages had
taken up arms ; the elders held watch on the ram-
parts and walls ; the youths filled the ranks of the
quickly increasing armies. Every calling, profession,
and trade ministered to the great duty of maintain-
ing the defence ; and the energy and intelligence
that were displayed in supplying the innumerable
requirements for the levies and troops, were, in the
highest degree, admirable. The activity of 1793
234 MOLTKE.
was witnessed again, but without the crimes of the
Keign of Terror, and Paris exhibited a truly heroic
aspect. Sounds of revolutionary passion were
heard, of discontent, of fretful impatience ; but
these had no real or lasting effect, and the world of
the capital rallied round the Government, despising
privations already severe, and resolved to fight and
to endure to the last. An ebullition of anarchy,
caused by the failure of Thiers to obtain assistance
for France, 1 was put down without the least diffi-
culty ; Jacobinism had no hold on the heart of the
city.
While Paris, in spite of divided counsels and of
military resources imperfect* in the extreme, was
thus holding the invaders at bay, a great change
had almost transformed France. Three members
of the Government of National Defence had gone to
Tours to arouse the provinces, and to call on the
nation to take part in the war ; but their mission
had been almost wholly fruitless. It was otherwise
when a man of real power appeared on the scene,
and made his presence felt. Gambetta, escaping
from Paris in a balloon, had joined his colleagues
in the first days of October ; he addressed himself
to the herculean task of organizing France against
the conquerors, and the results he achieved astounded
Europe. The mass of Frenchmen, accustomed for
years to repose, and subjected to a despotic cen-
1 The account of this petty outbreak by the Prussian Stall' is
thoroughly unfair. " History," part ii. vol. i. pp. 261, 262.
" General Ducrot," vol. ii. pp. 39, 70, is accurate and impartial.
THE NATIONAL RISING OF FRANCE. 235
tralized government, had scarcely lifted up a hand
to attack the enemy ; they showed the apathy of
1814-15 ; they had looked listlessly on while the
German armies were overrunning the natal soil.
And if the nation appeared to be wanting to itself,
the means of prolonging the war seemed equally
absent. A few thousand men of the Algerian army,
some thousands of troops, still in their depots, and
a mass of young recruits and of Gardes Mobiles,
were the only materials of military power at hand
which remained to France in the hour of her agony.
To compose armies that could take the field out of
these feeble elements might have been deemed im-
possible ; l there was an immense deficiency of
trained officers, of artillery, of small-arms, of horses,
of trains, of all the equipment essential to organized
force ; and the many departments of which the ser-
vice is required to maintain troops on foot, to
make them efficient, and to support war, being
confined by the Empire to two or three large centres,
were not to be found generally in the provinces
of France. The new levies, too, would, even in
mere numbers, be very inferior to the German
hosts, if they could not be enormously increased.
Gambetta, however, did not hesitate ; he pos-
sessed the creative genius of Italy, an indomitable
1 For these details, and for the results of Gambetta's efforts,
the reader should consult M. de Freycinet's "La Guerre en
Province." This able man was Gambetta's best support, and has
played a conspicuous part in reorganizing the military power of
France. Riistow's History may also be studied, vol. ii. chaps. 30-4,
236 MOLTKE.
will, and a strong nature ; and extraordinary success
attended his efforts. His first care was to summon
into the field all the existing military forces of
France, and to form corps d'armee, or lesser divi-
sions out of the bodies of men bound by law to
serve. At the same time the wealth and the
credit of France were employed in obtaining the
material of war from all parts of the civilized
world ; and as the Germans had no fleets at sea,
stores of munitions of war and supplies of all kinds,
hundreds of cannon, and rifles in tens of thousands,
were poured rapidly into the French ports. Gam-
betta turned his attention next to organizing and
preparing the levies thus raised ; he found old
soldiers to fill the place of officers ; he sought com-
manders in men in retreat, or passed over by the
Imperial Government, and especially in officers
drawn from the fleets ; and the civil service yielded
hundreds of recruits to assist the military service
in its different branches. By these means, in an
incredibly short time, the elements of armies were
put together, and in less than a month more than
90,000 men were in the field, ready to fight for
France, and not devoid of real military power.
T hese forces, however, were quite inadequate ; and
Gambetta made a passionate appeal to the patriot-
ism and energy of the French people. The nation,
which in every phase of its history, has always
required a great leader to bring out its noblest and
best qualities, shook off its lethargy like an
evil dream. Frenchmen flocked in multitudes from
THE NATIONAL RISING OF FRANCE. 237
Brittany to Provence, to draw their swords in the
defence of their country ; the impulse effaced divi-
sions of class ; peer and peasant stood up in arms
together, and enormous levies en masse were formed
in the provinces, in eager response to the demands
of the Government. The movement was sponta-
neous, universal, amazing ; it surpassed even the
rising of 1793, and it proved that France had not
fallen from her high estate.
In this way, a prodigious addition was made to
the troops already combined and prepared. The
new levies were placed in camps of instruction to
be made fitted for the work of war ; and France was
divided into a set of districts to furnish what was
required for her young soldiers. Meanwhile sup-
plies from the outer world continued to flow in ;
England, the United States, and many other lands
became, in fact, arsenals for the needs of France ;
and Gambetta actually raised and equipped an
armed force of 600,000 men, and put into the field
1400 guns within three months from his first
appearance at Tours. Extraordinary means were
adopted to make the levies capable of playing a real
part in the war. Men of promise were advanced
and made officers ; the customary rules of promotion
were annulled in favour of merit wherever found,
and soldiers from foreign lands were invited to join
in a crusade for the defence of France. Nor were
irregular forces wanting to supplement the impro-
vised armies ; bands of free-shooters were raised and
armed in every district fit for a guerilla warfare ;
238 MOLTKE.
and thousands of these marksmen swarmed in the
passes of the Vosges, or in the woods and forests
around Paris.
Even the best of these levies, it is unnecessary
to say, were not to be compared to the German
armies. They contained comparatively few soldiers ;
their officers were not in sufficient numbers, and,
in many instances, were bad and unskilful ; they
wanted cohesion, experience, and self-reliance ; and
much of their material was of an inferior kind.
But they exhibited the peculiar fitness of French-
men for war ; they had thousands of gallant men in
their ranks, and the elements of the armed strength
of France were being combined and made effective
beyond what had been deemed possible. Towards
the close of October there were three bodies in the
field that had some pretensions to the name of
armies. The first, the 15th corps, called the Army
of the Loire, had been formed in the region around
Orleans ; the second, known as the Army of the
East, was gathering in Burgundy, and Franche
Comte ; and the third, the Army of the North,
was collected in Normandy. These arrays, how-
ever, were but the first line of the immense masses
being assembled from all parts of the territory of
France, and being made ready to appear in the field.
The resolution and firmness shown by Paris, and
the universal rising of France were treated at first
by Moltke with scornful contempt. He was con-
vinced, we have seen, that the city would soon
yield ; and France, he believed, had no real means
THE NATIONAL RISING OF FRANCE. 239
of resistance. Disliking, as he did, the French
character, he laughed at the phrases of Parisian
rhetoric, and he failed to perceive the depth and
the strength of the national movement against the
invaders. In his eyes the Provisional Government
was an illegal junta without right or power; the
defence of Paris was wicked foolishness, causing
havoc and waste to no purpose ; the provincial
armies and the levy en masse were partly mythical
and partly worthless. There was no real patriotism
or sense of duty in France ; and the immense masses
summoned to take up arms were droves of unwilling
peasants and artisans, compelled by tyranny and
imposture to shed their blood to no purpose. He
judged France in a word, as the Yorks and Ooburgs
had judged France eighty years before, as Napo-
leon had judged the insurrection of Spain; the
efforts of folly and Jacobin boasting would be easily
put down by organized force ; and a prolonged
struggle was riot possible. Nor had success ceased
to attend the arms of Germany, though France was
making a useless parade of war. 1 The sorties of the
1 The sentiments of Moltke as to the absurdity and hopeless-
ness of the resistance of Paris and of France, and as to the real
character of the national defence, will be found in letters to his
brother Adolf, vol. ii. pp. 49-76, English translation. We can
only quote a few passages: "La France, ' qui est plus forte que
jamais,' even under these circumstances, talks big as usual. Any
army in the field has ceased to exist, but they still have JVI.
Kochefort, ' prof esseur de barricades ' and * la poitrine des patriotes
invincibles.' ... I cherish a private hope that I may be shoot-
ing hares at Creisau by the end of October. . . . France has no
longer an army, and yet we must wait till the Parisians, who are
240 MOLTKE.
Parisians had failed ; they had made no impression
on the German lines. The forts daily broke out in
a cannonade ; but their volleys were almost a waste
of powder. The situation outside the capital had
even improved ; Laon, Toul and Soissons had
opened their gates ; the railways of the provinces
were being mastered ; and the communications of
the invaders to the Rhine were being enlarged and
opened. The great prize, too, of Strasbourg had
been seized ; the Landwehr were joyfully flocking to
the war, and the numbers of the armies in the field
were kept up, nay increased. A 14th corps had
been formed to besiege Belfort, and to overrun the
eastern provinces ; and one incident was of the
happiest omen. The young Army of the Loire had
advanced to Artenay, as if to threaten the besiegers'
lines around Paris, and it had been driven in rout
beyond the river.
The position of the Germans, nevertheless, was,
even now, not without peril. The calculations of
Moltke had proved to be mistaken ; and he was
committed to an enterprise on which he had not
reckoned. Paris was more powerful, and had
rising in delirium, give up this hopeless resistance. ... It is
frightful to see the havoc wrought by the mob in power, and
laughable too The terrorists drag every man, up to the
age of forty- six, from house and farm, from home and family, to
follow the flag. . . . Only the Advocates' reign of terror can suc-
ceed in getting such armies together, badly organized, without
trains for supplies, and exposed to the inclemency of the weather
. . . The terrorism of the Provisional Government has continued
to work on all the good and bad qualities of the French nation. . ."
THE NATIONAL RISING OP FRANCE. 241
ampler resources than he had, at first, been led to
suppose, and the city steadily defied the enemy.
France had sprung to arms, to fight to the death ;
a great national rising was gathering on all sides,
and was harassing and weakening the German
armies. The Army of the Loire had been defeated ;
but in a few days it had renewed its strength, its
numbers were before long doubled. The Army of
the North had become menacing ; the Army of the
East was so formidable that the enemy could hardly
make head against it. The huge tumultuary levies
were as yet feeble, but they were gradually ac-
quiring discipline and power ; and the irregular
bands that were seen flitting hither and thither,
had become so annoying, and had done such havoc
by cutting off small hostile bodies of men, and by
injuring communications, and breaking up railways,
that stern measures had been taken against them,
and villages had been burned by way of reprisals.
Thick clouds of war were slowly rolling up, and
lowering upon the still exulting conquerors ; and
the contest which had been one of armies, was
becoming that of a race against its invaders. The
German armies, too, were comparatively weak in
most parts of the country overrun by them ; the
sieges of Metz and Paris absorbed their forces ; and
as long as these places continued to hold out, they
were spread around, and confined to, two immense
circles, and were most dangerously exposed to attack.
The invaders, so to speak, were girt round by
fires, which might kindle into a vast conflagration.
R
242 MOLTKE.
At this conjuncture, another immense disaster
seemed to announce to France that she was to
cease to hope. We turn to the operations of Bazaine
at Metz, and to the results that flowed from his
conduct. As we have seen, 1 he had informed
Macmahon, if the language, it is fair to say, was
ambiguous, that he hoped to be able to join hands
with him, by a movement from the north, by
Montmedy, and this had, in part, caused the march
that had ended at Sedan. His despatches, however,
it is only just to add, became day after day less
hopeful; 2 he spent the week after the great fight
of Gravelotte, as we have said, in restoring his
army, and in strengthening the fortifications of
Metz ; and it is impossible to doubt that he was
still clinging to the fortress, as he had clung from the
first. It has been confidently alleged that, on the
23rd of August, 3 a message came to him from
Macmahon, informing him of the advance to the
Meuse ; but the fact, if sustained by some evidence,
1 Ante, p. 191.
2 Riviere Report, pp. 57, 66. This report, and the proceedings,
in " le Proees Bazaine," should be studied with attention, as regards
the conduct of Bazaine after Gravelotte. Many of the charges,
however, we repeat, are far-fetched and strained, and exhibit the
bad animus, and the too great ingenuity common in prosecutions
in France. The Marshal's apology, " Guerre de 1870," should be
read ; but it is a feeble book. An exhaustive review of the facts
will be found in the Times of 6th, 9th and 12th December, 1873.
3 Riviere, pp. 80, 87. There is much to be said for this view :
but an accused man should always huvo the benelit of u dmilit,
and it is better to accept the German view, " Prussian >StuH'
History," vol. ii. p. 490, that the message from Macmahon is not
shown to have reached Ba/,;iinr.
THE FALL OF METZ. 243
has been distinctly denied by Bazaine ; and though
he still lingered inactive at Metz 3 he probably had
no thought of betraying a colleague. On the 26th,
however, he gave orders for a great demonstration
against the enemy ; if we are to accept his state-
ment, 1 his purpose was to break out from Metz,
and to endeavour to march northwards ; but if this
was so, all that can be said is that his operations
were as ill-conceived as possible. 2
He made no attempt to surprise the Germans ;
he did not throw bridges over the Moselle; the
delays of the 14th and 15th were repeated ; and, in
a word, the Marshal made no use of his central
position, and interior lines, against the besiegers
spread over a wide circumference, and weak in the
extreme, on the eastern bank of the river. A
singular incident now occurred. Bazaine convened
a council of war, and asked his lieutenants their
advice, and these unanimously recommended that
the Army of the Rhine should not make an attempt
to escape, but should remain in its positions round
Metz. This conclusion, however, was founded on
the assumption that there was not a sufficient
supply of munitions, 3 and the commandant of
Metz urged besides, that the forts were not in a
state to resist an attack. The assumption, never-
theless, was untrue, and untrue to the Marshal's
1 " Guerre de 1870," p. 163. The Marshal's own language, how-
ever, shows that he was hesitating.
" "Metz Campagne et negociations," pp. 129, 137.
3 Rivere, pp. 93, 97. Bazaine, " Guerre de 1870," pp. 164, 167.
E 2
244 MOLTKE.
knowledge. Bazaine had received an official report, 1
that the store of munitions was abundant ; and the
excuse as regards the forts was almost baseless,
even if it could be deemed an excuse, which, in
any case, it was certainly not. Bazaine evidently
caught at opinions which fell in with his own ideas ;
and it is a clear proof of this, that he suppressed
the truth as to the fact on which the advice was
founded, and did not inform the Council that there
was no want of munitions. The order for an
offensive movement was countermanded ; and the
French army remained in its camps, greatly to the
indignation of officers and men, who described the
26th of August as a second " Day of Dupes."
Had Bazaine been a real commander, nay, had
he had the heart of a true soldier, he would, after
his first despatch to Macmahon, have left nothing
undone to get away from Metz, and to effect his
junction with the Army of Chalons. His word was
pledged ; the issues at stake were immense ; and
success, we have said, ought to have been probable. 3
He was, however, a worthless and dull-minded man,
without a clear conception of his plain duty ; but
though he was gravely to blame for still holding
on to Metz, it is not likely that, on the 26th of
August, he deliberately intended to do nothing from
the first, to desert Macmahon, and to deceive his
comrades, even if he was guilty of double dealing
1 Riviere, pp. 99, 100. " Proces Bazaine," pp. 107, 112.
2 Referring to a memorable passage in the history of France.
3 See ante, p. 177.
THE FALL OF METZ. 245
in accepting counsels given upon assumptions,
which he knew were without genuine warrant.
The next passage in his conduct was of a piece with
the last, but it exposes him to more decided censure.
On the 29th he certainly received a despatch,
announcing that Macmahon was on the Meuse ;
and he has maintained that he made a real effort,
to leave Metz, and to join the Army of Chalons. 1
He, no tloubt, gave orders that the Army of the
Rhine should advance to the north-eastern front of
the place, and endeavour to force the German lines,
where the table-land of St. Barbe rises from the
hamlets of Failly, Servigny, and Noisseville ; and
his intention, he has written, was to push on to
Thionville, and from that point to draw near his
colleague.
His dispositions, however, were so bad, that it
is not easy to suppose this was his settled purpose ;
at best he was weak, remiss, and half-hearted. The
movement began on the morning of the 31st ; at
that moment, two whole French corps were con-
fronted by a few thousand men only, near St. Barbe,
on the eastern bank of the Moselle, 2 and yet the
Marshal did not direct an attack. The faults of the
26th, too, were committed again, and aggravated
in a deplorable manner. 3 No effort was made to
surprise the enemy ; the Moselle was so inadequately
1 " Guerre de 1870," p. 169.
2 " Metz Campagne et negotiations," p. 146.
3 All this is very well pointed out in " Metz Campagne et
negotiations/' pp. 147, 148.
246 MOLTKE.
bridged, that the movement of the corps on the
western bank, across the stream, was lamentably
slow ; no feinfc was made to perplex the Germans,
and nothing was done to turn the hostile positions ;
the artillery reserves were not brought up ; the
troops were crowded together, on a narrow front,
in which their numbers were of little use ; and,
worse than all, perhaps, it was late in the afternoon
before an attempt to assail St. Barbe began. Yet,
notwithstanding these grievous errors, the advantage
of the Marshal's central position and interior lines
became clearly apparent. The French stormed
Noisseville and two or three other villages ; and
though the German leaders made the greatest ex-
ertions to bring every available man to the spot,
their troops were outnumbered, 1 nearly three to
one, at the decisive point, the uplands of St. Barbe.
The artillery of the besiegers gave them, indeed, an
advantage, and their lines had been already con-
structed ; but, with this immense superiority of
force, the Army of the Rhine, if even honestly led,
ought to have been able to overcome all obstacles,
and to make its way through the investing circle.
Bazaine renewed the attack on the 1st of Sep-
tember, but the effort was a demonstration only;
it is far from clear that it was not a pretence. By
this time the Germans had retaken one of the lost
villages, and as Prince Frederick Charles and his
lieutenants had toiled hard, through the night, to
draw a powerful force to the positions menaced the
1 " Prussian Staff History," vol. ii. p. 531.
THE FALL OF METZ. 247
day before, the chances against their enemy had
been increased. The Germans fell on the French
boldly, taking the initiative in the true spirit of
war, and, at the first sign of a repulse of his right
wing, the Marshal withdrew his whole army from
the field, and was soon again under the forts of
Metz. Still, even on this day, the French had a
large preponderance of force on their side ; l the
besiegers had not been able to array against their
concentrated enemy an equal number of troops, so
large was the circle they held ; and Bazaine might
even yet have conquered had he been a straight-
forward and determined soldier. The battle of
Noisseville, as it has been called, was discredit-
able to him in the highest degree. His incapacity
was made more than ever manifest, and perhaps
more than incapacity may be laid to his charge.
The occasion was one of supreme importance, and
he should have made a strenuous, persistent, and
continuous effort to get out of Metz and to join
Macmahon. He assuredly did not do this ; if he
had thought of breaking the German Hues, he soon
recurred to his old purpose, and slunk back
ignobly to Metz ; and even if treachery was not in
his heart, his conduct must be sternly condemned,
as we look back at the events of these .two days.
The most conclusive proof, perhaps, that he was
not in earnest, appears from the fact that in a
struggle, in which he ought to have risked every-
thing and fought to the last, he lost not much
1 "Prussian Staff History," vol. ii. p. 531.
248 MOLTKE.
more than 3000 men ; * and charity itself must
admit that in his case, an impotent Priam wielded
the spear of Hector.
A few days after these demonstrations at Metz,
Bazaine was apprised of the disaster of Sedan, of
the captivity and fall of Napoleon III., and of the
establishment of the Government of National
Defence. The duty of the Marshal was now
evident ; the Army of Chalons had disappeared ;
he had not to try to extend a hand to Macmahon,
and he was obviously bound to seek to break out
from Metz, and to place the Army of the Rhine in
the field. How to attempt, and perhaps to accom-
plish this, was perceived by many able men in the
camps of the French. Bazaine, as affairs stood,
was not to look northwards, and to endeavour to
escape in that direction, a dangerous and the most
difficult course ; but he had still a chance, and a
reasonable chance, of being able to get out to the
south-east, along the great roads towards the Nied
and the Sarre. The effort, no doubt, would be
more arduous than it would have been a few days
before ; the lines of investment had been com-
pleted, and Prince Frederick Charles had at last
strengthened the small force on the eastern bank
1 French "writers are naturally, and very properly, indignant
at the conduct of Bazaine, on this and other occasions. The
Germans, on the other hand, palliate his faults as much as they
can, for, if not wilfully, he really played into their hands.
Nevertheless, the Prussian Staff (" History," vol. ii. p. 534) is
severe on the Marshal for his operations on the 31st of August
and the 1st of September.
THE FALL OF METZ. 249
of the Moselle, and had increased the risks of an
attack from that side. Yet the experience of
Noisseville had already proved, what indeed ought
to have been plain beforehand, that it was possible
to collect a great superiority of force against the
Germans at almost any point. At this very time,
full a fifth part of the besieging army was disabled
by fever and other diseases ; and it was by no
means impossible that a real chief would have
succeeded in breaking out from the south-east of
Metz. 1 Success in this operation would have had
effects as marked, and perhaps more decisive, than
would have been the case had the movement been
made on the 18th of August, or a few days after-
wards. Not only would the communications of
the enemy with the Ehine have been seized, and
the besiegers round Paris have been in peril, but
the Army of the Rhine would have been set free
to give the consistency and power to the pro-
vincial levies of which they were in special need,
and the war would have taken a different turn.
Bazaine's duty, therefore, was to make the
1 We have already referred, ante pp. 177-8, to the opinion of
General Hamley, and to the remarkable admission of the Prussian
Staff, as to the probability of the French being able to escape
from Metz, between the 17th of August and the 1st of September.
For views, on the French side, on this all-important subject,
see again "Metz Compagne et negociations," pp. Ill, 112. A
very few days could not have made a complete difference in the
military situation at Metz ; and to the last moment two generals,
at least, of Bazaine's army believed it was possible to break out
from the south-east.
250 MOLTKE.
attempt ; and even if it had failed, another course,
beside inactivity at Metz, was open to him. Trained
officers, he must have known well, were one of the
chief requirements of the new improvised armies ;
his army could provide an abundant supply of
these, and he might have despatched parties of
officers at night, from time to time, to give valuable
aid to the forces being raised for the defence of
France. Many of these officers would have,
perhaps, been captured ; but hundreds would have
probably got through the German lines, and this
reinforcement would have been of the highest
importance. It should be added that the Army of
the Rhine was still capable of most vigorous
efforts ; it was suffering less at the time than the
German army, and it had not lost the confidence
it had acquired at Gravelotte.
Bazaine, however, had no notion of undertaking
operations of this kind ; he believed that the end
of the war was at hand ; he continued to recognize
the fallen Empire as the only lawful Government
of France; and on the 12th of September he
informed his lieutenants l " that he would not run
the risk of the fate of Macmahon, and that he
would not make a great sortie from Metz." Dis-
astrous and palpable as had been his faults, we
may ascribe them, perhaps, up to this-point of tin it 1
to dulness, vacillation, and incapacity for command ;
1 '* Metz ot negociations," p. 205. This conversation is not
specially noticed in the prosecution of Bazaine, but it certainly
took place.
THE FALL OF METZ. 251
he had clung to Metz, all through, probably for his
own safety, and not from a sinister motive to gain
power for himself, or to abandon and betray Mac-
mahon, as has been alleged by partisan accusers.
But thenceforward his conduct admits of no ex-
cuse ; it became, in no doubtful sense, criminal.
As his intention had been perhaps from the first,
to remain with the Army of the Rhine at Metz,
it was his bounden duty to do all that in him
lay to store provisions for the support of the
garrison, of the population, and of his own troops,
and to husband them with the most scrupulous
care, to enable him to hold out for as long a time
as possible. This duty, however, he did not fulfil,
not even after he had made it known that he would
not try to break out from Metz ; he did not procure
the supplies of food from the neighbouring villages,
which he might have obtained ; he took no care to
distribute these with a strict regard to the neces-
sities of the place ; and this was an unpardonable
offence. Not only were crops and cattle not brought
in from the surrounding farms and hamlets, as
might have been done, but the soldiery were
allowed to consume everything they could buy;
the people of Metz were not put on rations; and
thousands of tons of corn were wasted in feeding
horses which had become useless, as it had been
arranged that the army was not to move. Even
on the wretched system of passive defence, adopted,
in reality, from the first, the Marshal was guilty of
the worst misconduct ; and the results were in the
252 MOLTKE.
highest degree calamitous. Had he made the best
use of the resources of Metz, from the time when
he first assumed the command, 1 the place which
held out for nine weeks only, might have held out
for nearly five months ; had he done this, even after
the 1st September, it might have held out for more
than three ; and this culpable negligence was,
perhaps, fatal to France.
This, however, was not the full measure of
Bazaine' s guilt ; he became, virtually, if not of set
purpose, a traitor. After Sedan, he issued a pro-
clamation to his troops, insisting upon their duty
to France, 2 but containing ominous allusions to
late events in Paris. The German leaders probably
caught at the hint; and towards the close of
September, 3 a spy of the name of Regnier was
conveyed through the German lines into Metz, and
began to sound the Marshal on conditions of peace.
Bazaine, to do him justice, called in two of his
lieutenants to hear what wa.s said by the spy, who
pretended to be an envoy from the Empress ; and,
extraordinary as the fact may appear, Bourbaki,
the chief of the Imperial Guard, left Metz to confer
1 "Riviere," p. 260. " Proces Bazaine," p. 113 seqq. An
impartial observer will probably be of opinion that Bazaine's
conduct, as regards supplies at Metz, was, by many degrees, the
worst feature in his case.
2 " Guerre de 1870," p. 178.
3 That Regnier was a spy seems established by incontrovertible
evidence, " Guerre de 1870," pp. 179, 185. A trick of the
same kind was played by the Prussians at the siege of Mayerice
in 1793. See the " Life of Kleber," by Pajol, pp. 20, 21.
THE FALL OF METZ. 253
with the late Regent. The Empress instantly dis-
avowed Regnier ; but these crooked intrigues did
not end with his mission. On the 10th of October,
when it had become evident that the fall of Metz
could not be long delayed, Bazaine called another
council of war ; and after the customary talk on
occasions of the kind, of " the honour of arms, and
holding out to the last," one of the Marshal's aide-
de-camps was allowed to leave Metz, and to make
proposals at the German headquarters at Versailles,
" for honourable terms for the Army of the Rhine."
The aide-de-camp arrived with a written note from
Bazaine, apparently not made known to his col-
leagues, 1 which plainly stated that France could
resist no longer ; that she was the prey of anarchy
and revolution, and that the army could be made
an instrument " to restore order and to protect
society." Bismarck evidently perceived what this
implied, and informed the aide-de-camp that all
might be well, 2 if the army at Metz would declare
for the Empress; and that if Bazaine would secure
its support for the Regent, a treaty of peace would
probably follow. The aide-de-camp immediately
returned to Metz. Another council of war was
called, and it was agreed that the aide-de-camp
should see the Empress, and try to obtain terms
for the Army of the Rhine, all questions of State
being left to the Empress alone. Throughout this
1 "Guerre de 1870," p. 210. This letter of Bazaine's con-
demns him, even under his own hand.
2 Guerre de 1870," p. 223.
254 MOLTKE.
whole time Bazaine had stood aloof from the
de facto Government of National Defence; he had
scarcely any communication with it, though this
was possible in different ways ; he did not make it
aware of his dealings at Versailles ; and little doubt
can exist that he would have at least tried to
employ his army to restore the Empire, to put
down the men in power in Paris and at Tours, and
to compel France to accept an ignominious peace. 1
The Empress, however, acting as she did, with a
high and delicate sense of honour, in all that related
to France and her fortunes, refused to have any-
thing to do with negotiations of the kind, and gave
Bazaine' s messenger only a few words of sympathy.
The chief motive of Bazaine in these sorry
intrigues was, possibly, the impulse of a desperate
man, to save, by any means, himself and his army.
He could hardly suppose that he would be master
of the situation, after what had occurred at Metz ;
that he could induce his troops to betray France,
and to force upon her a disgraceful peace. Nor is
it likely that Bismarck believed that negotiations
would be successful ; he probably saw in them, in
the main, a way to diminish the power of resistance
1 The report of General Riviere, and the statement of the
prosecutor in the u Proccs Bazaine," set forth these intrigues and
negotiations in detail v/ith as adverse comments to Bazaine as
possible. It is safe, as has been done in this brief narrative, to
rely mainly on the unfortunate Marshal's own admissions and
statements, and they are ample to convict him. The " Prussian
Staff History " discreetly passes over this episode in the war, or
touches it* very lightly.
THE FALL OF METZ. 255
at Metz, and to injure the existing government of
France. But be this as it may, the fault of Bazaine
is manifest, and has rendered his name infamous.
He doubtless had, to a certain extent, the counte-
nance of his lieutenants at Metz; he did not positively
declare that he would employ his army in order to
set up the Empire again, to put down the existing
regime in France, and to dictate terms to her at the
bidding of Germany. But he had already wasted
the resources at Metz with consequences of the
worst kind ; and his evil dealings directly tended to
increase this waste, to distract his officers, to perplex
their men, to encourage negligence ; in a word, to
paralyze and impair the defence. His conduct,
too, proved that the leader, at least, of the only well-
organized army of France was an enemy of her
present rulers ; and this not only added to the
power of the Germans, but weakened and em-
barrassed Gambetta and Trochu, and made the
strength of the nation for resistance less. Nor
should we forget that if he had not the power he
had the will to provoke civil war in France, in the
face of her foes, in the heart of her provinces ; and
he was ready to be the author of a shameful 18th
Brurnaire, which would have been her ruin and
not her safety. Some of the charges against him
are not true, others are exaggerated and over-
strained ; but he was rightly condemned for his
negligence at Metz, and for trafficking with the
national invader in the field, and withholding the
fact from the men actually in power. When we
256 MOLTKE.
look back at his incapacity, his guilt, and his treason,
and the terrible consequences of his misdeeds, we
cannot feel surprised that he has been deemed the
curse of France by the generation of Frenchmen
that beheld the war.
The intrigues with Versailles having come to
nothing, or probably served the ends of the
Germans, the fall of Metz was ere long to follow.
Bazaine had more than once spoken of attempts to
break out, after his declaration of a few weeks
before, but all that was done was to make a few
weak demonstrations against the German lines to
the north, the very direction that should not have
been taken. Yet more than one of these efforts
were, in part, successful, so decisive was the advan-
tage of the positions of the French, a significant
proof of what might have been the result had the
Army of the Rhine had a real commander. After
fruitless and timid councils of war, the Marshal
accepted the terms of his conquerors, not improbably
circumvented in the dishonourable game of double
dealing he had badly played. 173,000 l men,
including the army, the garrison of Metz, a great
body of irregular levies, and the sick and wounded
who had borne arms, defiled, on the 29th of October,
1870, under the eyes of the exulting Germans ; the
great bulwark of Lorraine had fallen, and even the
unexampled disaster of Sedan was surpassed by a
more ignominious surrender. The attitude of the
1 For the real numbers of the French troops at Metz, see ante,
note, p. 165.
THE FALL OF METZ. 257
captive soldiery was, nevertheless, becoming ;* they,
at least, knew they had done their duty; they
had not been subdued in fair fight, but had been
the martyrs of criminal misdeeds ; and, unlike the
captives of Sedan, they maintained a haughty
silence. Bazaine was of a piece with himself to the
last ; his demeanour was one of stolid indifference ;
he had even neglected to destroy the eagles which
had flown at Borny, Mars La Tour, and Gravelotte,
and which now hang their wings in many a town in
Germany ; and he went on his way without a
thought of the execrations of the townsmen of
Metz denouncing him as a false-hearted traitor. It
is characteristic of the want of insight and blunder-
ing stupidity of the man, that he had the effrontery
to compare the defence of Metz to Kleber's defence
of Mayence and Massena's defence of Genoa, noble
instances of skill and heroic endurance ; and, at
his trial in 1873, he was so devoid of perception as
to appeal to Prince Frederick Charles as a witness
in his behalf, as though Napoleon had not warned
French officers to beware of the interested praise of
an enemy. 2
The surrender of Metz, long before the time when
the place might be expected to fall, threw a pro-
1 " Prussian Staff History," Part ii. vol. ii. p. 201.
2 The capitulations of Sedan and Metz are events that ought
never to have occurred, and reflect disgrace on the arms of France.
It may be interesting to observe what great French commanders
thought of disasters similar in kind, though very different in
degree. Villars wrote thus of the surrender of the French right at
S
258 MOLTKE.
digious weight into the scale against France, and
had an immense influence in deciding the war. It
was an accident on which Moltke could not calcu-
late; he was justified, we believe, in investing the
fortress, even with a force scarcely larger than the
besieged, after his experience of the incapacity of
Bazaine; but he could not anticipate that the
Marshal would squander his resources, and betray
his trust. The result, in a great degree, rectified
his mistake in hastily advancing on Paris ; but for
this he had to thank Fortune, and not his own fore-
thought. The Imperial armies of France had now
Blenheim, " Memoirs," vol. ii. p. 330, the genuine Vogue edition :
"C'estdans ses occasions ouil faut repondre aux imbeciles, qui
disent que pouvait on faire de mieux."
" Qu'il mourust
" Ou qu'un beau desespoir alors le seeourust."
"L'infanterie espagnole aRoeroyn'aima-t-elle pas mieux perir que de
demander quartier ? Le soldat et 1'officier ne doit-il pas preferer une
mort glorieuse, cherchant a se faire jour la bayonette au bout du fusil,
a rignominie de perir de faim et de misere dans les prisons ? Je
suis honteux et penetrepour la nation d'une reddition aussi lasche."
Napoleon has thus referred to the capitulation of Maxen in the Seven
Years' War ; he was probably thinking of the capitulation of Dupont
at Baylon. " Comment.," vol. vi. p. 402 : "Mais que doit done
faire un general qui est cerne par des forces superieures ? Nous ne
saurions faire d'autre reponse que celle du vieil Horace. Dans une
situation extraordinaire, il faut une resolution extraordinaire ;
plus la resistance sera opiniatre, plus on aura de chances d'etre
secouru ou depercer. Que de choses qui paraissent impossibles ont
etc faites par des hommes resolus n'ayant plus d'autre ressource que
la mort ! Plus vous ferez de resistance, plus vous tuerez de monde
a 1'ennemi, et inoins il en aura, le jour meme ou le lendemain,
pour se porter centre les autre corps de Parmee. Cette question ne
nous parait pas susceptible d'une autre solution sans perdre Pesprit
militaire d'une nation, et Pexposer aux plus grands malheurs."
REFLECTIONS. 259
wholly disappeared, and the annihilation of the
Army of the Rhine, which had kept Prince Frederick
Charles round Metz, let loose prematurely, and at
an opportune moment, another host of invaders to
subdue France. The results of the war had been
astounding, surpassing all that had been seen in
history; and if not the idol he has been made by
the courtiers of success, Moltke deserves high
honour for what he had achieved. He had, doubt-
less, missed opportunities and given chances ; he
had not shown the dexterity and the perfect skill
of Napoleon in moving masses of men, in more than
one conspicuous instance ; he had repeatedly failed
to strike a defeated enemy, and his sudden march
on Paris was to prove perilous. But he had carried
out, most ably, a well conceived plan ; and some of
his operations had been those of a daring and
admirable master of war. Nevertheless, the extra-
ordinary success of the Germans was not due in the
main to Moltke' s faculties ; it should be ascribed,
for the most part, to other causes. The superiority
of their forces was so decisive in numbers, organiza-
tion, and military worth, that it was difficult for the
French to contend against them ; the unparalleled
triumphs of Sedan and Metz are to be ascribed to
Macmahon's weakness and levity, and to the
vacillation and guilt of Bazaine. The paramount
cause, however, of the disasters of France was the
disregard of military for political objects ; this led
to the first defeats on the frontier ; this prevented
the retreat from the Sarre to Chalons ; this con-
Q O
*J
260 MOLTKE.
tributed to the ruinous march to the Meuse ; and
this, too, prompted Bazaine to neglect his duty, and
to dabble in the treason which ended in the fall of
Metz many weeks before this should have been
possible. Once more France seemed about to
succumb, and the German leaders believed that all
would soon be over. Yet Paris and France were
again to deceive them, and to make efforts so
intense and amazing that the contest was protracted
for months, and its issue seemed almost to the last
uncertain, so grave was the stress placed on the
invaders.
CHAPTER VIII.
Advance of the First and Second Armies into France after the
fall of Metz The besiegers' lines around Paris strengthened
and reinforced Mistake of Moltke as to the position of affairs
outside Paris The external zone The Army of the Loire
restored and largely increased The Battle of Coulmiers
Alarm at the German headquarters at Versailles Moltke
makes preparations to raise the siege Accidents which
prevented the Army of the Loire from gaining the full
results of its victory Disastrous effect of the fall of Metz on
the military situation as regards France D'Aurelle falls back
on Orleans, and places the Army of the Loire within lines
Moltke again mistaken in the distribution of the German
forces The Grand Duke of Mecklenburg sent to the West
Prince Frederick Charles near Orleans Immense increase
of the Army of the Loire Prince Frederick Charles directs
a general concentration of his own and the Grand Duke's
forces Views of Chanzy Fatal mistakes made by Gambetta
The Battle of Beaune la Kolande Ill-directed advance of
the Army of the Loire, in the hope of relieving Paris It is
defeated and driven back on Orleans Great sortie from
Paris combined with false attacks The Battle of Villiers
The sortie ultimately fails Reflections on these events, and
on the situation.
THE fall of Metz concurred with the outbreak in
Paris in putting an end to parleys, perhaps insincere,
between Bismarck and the new French Government.
The forces of the invaders had been almost doubled
by the extinction of the Army of the Rhine, before
262 MOLTKE.
that event should have been possible ; and opinion
in Europe again announced that France had no
choice but to lay down her arms. Moltke steadily
proceeded to turn to advantage the immense favour
bestowed by Fortune, on which, we repeat, he could
not have reckoned when he ventured to risk an
advance on Paris, a fact to be kept in mind when we
examine his strategy on established principles of
the art of war. The First Army was withdrawn
from the great stronghold of Lorraine, and while
part of it was sent off to reduce the fortresses which
still barred the Moselle and the Meuse Mezieres,
Montmedy, Thionville and Verdun the other part
was marched to the valley of the Oise, to strengthen
the external zone of the forces besieging Paris.
Yerdun was mastered in a few days ; but the remain-
ing places held 'out for a time, and some weeks
passed before the invading host, retarded by bad
weather and the bands of the rising, attained the
verge of Picardy and the Isle of France. Of the
Second Army, one corps l was despatched to Paris,
to take part in the work of the siege; and the
remaining 2 three corps were moved southwards, in
order to put down the provincial levies gathering
between Berri and Franche Cornte, and especially to
crush the French Army of the East, 3 which, as we
have seen, had become menacing. The troops,
1 The 2nd corps. 2 The 9th, 3rd and 10th corps.
3 "Prussian Staff History," Part ii. vol. ii. p. 225. The real
strength of this army was long underrated at the German
headquarters.
THE DOUBLE GERMAN ZONE. 263
joyous at their release from Metz, though their
ranks had been largely thinned by disease, moved
steadily on a wide front, through the broad and
vine-clad plains of Champagne, and they had soon
reached the line of the Upper Seine and the Aube,
approaching the great table-land of Langres. Their
march, however, even in this open country, had been
harassed in places by the swarms of free- shooters,
which buzzed around them and occasionally stung.
The resistance of France, at this juncture, how-
ever, seemed chiefly confined to the great centre of
Paris, and Moltke's main object was to secure his
position around the beleaguered city. He still
believed that its fall could not be distant ; but
its defences, he knew, had been immensely
strengthened; its defiant attitude had changed by
degrees his sentiments of derisive contempt ; and he
had resolved that assurance should be made doubly
sure, in a contest on which he had risked every-
thing. The work of fortifying and improving the
zone of investment had gone on since the first
moment ; by this time it had, perhaps, been made
impassable by the Parisian levies ; and the idea of
bombarding the capital had been entertained,
though, owing to the absence of the huge siege train
required, this could not be attempted for two or
three months. The first care of Moltke was to add
largely to the numbers of the besieging armies,
originally, we have seen, comparatively small, but in-
creasing since the beginning of the siege. The two
corps, left at Sedan, had come up long before, as
264 MOLTKE.
we have had occasion to point out; 1 another, marched
from Germany to the camps round Metz, had, after
a halt of a few days only, been directed upon the
French capital ; a third, we have said, was just
arriving ; and the forces of the besiegers had, by
degrees, been augmented by large bodies of
Landwehr hastening eagerly to a war which had
become national. The besieging armies, which in
September were not more than 150,000 strong, ex-
ceeded 250,000 by the second week of November;
and a force of 40,000 or 50,000 men was joined to
the masses already spread behind the lines drawn
around Paris. By these means the investing circle
was made much more able to resist attack ; and the
gap at the west, though still weakly occupied, was
closed by a choice veteran body, the Landwehr of
the renowned Prussian Guard.
The external zone beyond the besiegers' lines
became the next object of Moltke's attention. This
girdle, composed of many detachments, placed
irregularly along an immense circumference, had
been, we have said, from the first incomplete ; but
this weakness had not appeared dangerous, as long
as France had remained prostrate. It had become
necessary to add to its strength, as the national
rising developed itself; and the bodies of troops,
which had scoured the districts around Paris and
put down resistance, especially of horsemen, had been
increased. Considerable reinforcements were sent
1 The 13th corps, composed of a regular and a Landwehr
division.
THE DOUBLE GERMAN ZONE. 265
to these ; and if ominous sounds of incessant war
gathered on every side round the German camps,
Moltke thought the situation of affairs secure, for he
still underrated the power of France, and was scep-
tical as to her patriotic purpose. To the east the
German communications were safe ; the 14th corps,
led by Werder, occupied Alsace ; the Second Army
was on the verge of Tranche Comte, and would
overwhelm resistance along that frontier. There
were assemblages of armed men in the northern
provinces, and these had been called an Army of the
North ; but the First Army would soon dispose of
these, and in any case would keep them away from
Paris. There seemed nothing to apprehend from
the south ; the Army of the Loire had, we have
said, been routed., and forced to seek refuge beyond
the river, and the 1st Bavarian corps, which had
won this victory, after having been detached from
the siege of Paris, held Orleans and the whole
adjoining region, with the roads and railways that
led to the capital. The west and the north-west
were the only points from which danger appeared
possible : forces, large in numbers, at least, it was
rumoured, were gathering together in the wide tracts
extending between the Eure and the Mayenne, and
obviously it was from this direction, the most
remote from the main German armies, that an
attempt to assail the besiegers of Paris and to fall
on their rear might be deemed probable. Two con-
siderable divisions were, therefore, placed in the
fertile country around Chartres, in order at once
266 MOLTKE.
to oppose an enemy coming from the west and to
cover the investing circle on this front ; and cavalry
was sent in every direction to overrun the adjoining
provinces, and to bring in to the besiegers supplies.
The external zone was thus strengthened at one of
its parts, but the Bavarians at Orleans were left
without support, and almost isolated along the
Loire. 1
These dispositions appeared sufficient to render
the besiegers of Paris secure, and to lead to the
defeat of the provincial armies. They were
founded, however, on false assumptions, and they
were the prelude of a reverse for the arms of
Germany, which might easily have ended in a grave
disaster. Moltke, at his headquarters, which had
been placed at Versailles, had been misinformed as
to the true positions and numbers of the new
French levies; the insurrectionary bands, the hard-
1 It is very difficult to estimate, even approximately, the
strength of the German armies around Paris and in the adjoining
districts at this period. The Army of the Meuse, when the siege
began, consisted of the 4th and the 12th corps and of the Guards,
the Third Army of the 5th and 6th corps, of the 2nd Bavarian
corps, and of the Wiirtemberghers. To these should be added the
llth and 1st Bavarian corps of the Third Army, marched from
Sedan within a few days: the 13th Corps, composed of two
divisions, and the 2nd corps of the Second Army moved, on
different occasions, from Metz, and the Landwehr of the Guard,
with other bodies of Landwehr. The " Prussian Staff History "
passes lightly over these reinforcements, perhaps in order to conceal,
as much as possible, the risk incurred in the great march on Paris.
But they probably were more than 100,000 men, and as the
besiegers were at first 150,000 strong, they must now, it is likely,
have exceeded 250,000.
THE ARMY OF THE LOIRE. 267
ships of winter, and the obstacles of an enclosed
country had made the exploring of the German
cavalry much less perfect than it had previously
been, 1 and he was mistaken as to the real situation
of affairs. On strategic principles he had rightly
judged that danger was most to be feared
from the west and the north-west, but the French
Army of the West was, as yet, a phantom, a mere
collection of the rudest levies, and he had made no
provision to meet an attack from the direction
where it had become imminent. Gambetta had
placed the Army of the Loire, after its late defeat?
into the experienced hands of D'Aurelle, a distin-
guished veteran ; and under the care of a chief
endowed with the faculty of command and organizing
power, the beaten force quickly acquired consistency,
self-reliance, and real military worth. Meanwhile,
the energy of the new ruler of France, and the
prodigious exertions of the French people, had
succeeded in increasing the Army of the Loire to
an extent not even suspected at Versailles. A new
corps, the 16th, had been formed, and this body,
about 80,000 strong, and partly composed of good
soldiers, was entrusted to Chanzy, a young general
of brigade, who was to prove that France still
had a great commander. The Germans were thus
really menaced from the south, and the position of
1 " Prussian Staff History," Part ii. vol. i. pp. 264, 266, 283.
" Even as late as the middle of November," it is acknowledged
that " no success had attended the endeavours to gain a clear idea
of the positions and intentions of the adversary."
268 MOLTKK.
the Bavarians, spread around Orleans and com-
pletely exposed, invited attack. The main part of
the Army of the Loire, originally called, we have
said, the 15th corps, was moved from the camps
where it had been reformed ; it crossed the Loire
and joined the 16th, and towards the close of
October a plan was combined for falling upon the
Bavarians in force, and for retaking Orleans in the
event of success. The movement was to be made
by D'Aurelle and Chanzy, advancing along the
northern bank of the river, with their united forces;
and it was to be seconded by a part of the 15th
corps, which was to descend the Loire from above
Orleans, and to close on the rear of the enemy
when assailed in front.
This operation was ill-designed in one essential
point, and was retarded by unfortunate delays ; but
it was, nevertheless, to a large extent successful.
By the 7th of November, D'Aurelle and Chanzy,
having marched from the tract around Mer and
Beaugency, had reached the forest of Marchenoir,
not far from the plains to the east of Orleans, and
a skirmish with a hostile detachment was fought.
Tann, the Bavarian general, a skilful officer, had
been already put on his guard owing to the time that
had been lost by the French, and that had deprived
them of the advantage of a surprise ; and having
learned that the enemy was in force before him,
and that a French division was approaching his
rear, he evacuated Orleans with praiseworthy quick-
ness, and drawing all his available troops together,
COULMIERS. 269
made preparations to accept a defensive battle.
He had from 20,000 to 23,000 men in hand ; and
he chose a strong position, protected by a brook, and
by villages and buildings hastily fortified, which
extended from Baccon, an outpost on the left to
Coulmiers, and St. Sigismund on the right, points
in front of a wood not far from Orleans. He was
attacked on the 9th by D'Aurelle and Chanzy, at
the head of, perhaps, 1 50,000 men, and the young
Army of the Loire, which had been supplied with
artillery of a superior kind, gave proof 2 of real
excellence on the field and gained a complete, if not
a decisive, victory. The Bavarians were driven
from Baccon and Ooulmiers ; their line which, as if
in contempt of their enemy, had been spread over
too wide a distance, was broken through on their
left and centre ; and it was a mistake only of a
French cavalry chief that prevented their right from
being defeated, and their whole army, perhaps,
1 The account of the Battle of Coulmiers in the " Prussian Staff
History," Part ii. vol. ii. 271-79, is not candid or accurate. It
estimates the French at 70,000 men ; but this includes the isolated
division of the 15th corps, which did not get near the field. By
far the most complete and impartial account will be found in
General Derrecagaix's work, vol. ii. 292, 322. He rightly says
that the French were about 50,000 strong.
2 M. de Freycinet, " La Guerre en Province," p. 98, gives us this
extract from a letter written by a Bavarian officer taken prisoner
at Coulmiers : " II n'y a plus d'armee de La Loire disait on, les
forces de 1'ennemi sonfe epuisees, et maintenant je trouve tout un
corps bien organise avec une artillerie formidable, une cavalerie
admirablement monte, et une infanterie qui nous a prouve ce dont
elle etait capable a la bataille de Coulmiers. "
270 MOLTKE.
from being cut off from its line of retreat, the main
roads of Paris. Tann ably drew off his shattered
forces, having lost more than 3000 l men, including
prisoners taken at Orleans and on the field, and his
escape must be pronounced fortunate. But if the
French had unquestionably won the day, an unto-
ward incident had occurred that deprived them of
the best fruits of victory. The division which had
descended the Loire, and was to have fallen upon
the enemy's rear, had not been able to take part in
the battle, another, among repeated instances, how
hazardous it is to attempt to unite widely separated
forces on a given field, though under peculiar con-
ditions, as at Sadowa, this course may be justified,
nay, may be the best. 2
The Battle of Coulmiers, as it was called, would
have ended in the annihilation of the 1st Bavarian
corps, but for a tactical mistake on the field, and
for the false strategy which kept a whole division
irom it. The consequences, however, were real and
striking. The apparition of the Army of the Loire
had surprised and discomfited the German leaders;
3 "The Prussian Staff History," Part ii. vol. ii. 279, states that
the loss of the Bavarians at Coulmiers was only " about 800 men."
D'Aurelle and Chanzy mention that the prisoners alone were from
2000 to 2500. Major Adams' " Great Campaigns," p. 582, puts
the Bavarian loss at " 4000 men and two guns." It was certainly
more than 3000.
2 This is well pointed out by General Derrecagaix, *' La Guerre
Moderne," vol. ii. 315. His observations, however, are little more
than a repetition of what Napoleon has over and over again laid
down.
ALAEM OF THE GERMANS. 271
the external zone that covered the besiegers' lines
had been broken by a victorious enemy, whose
strength had not been even suspected; and the
dangerous position of the German armies thrown
around Paris, on a vast circumference, and liable to
attack, had become manifest. Something like con-
sternation prevailed at Versailles ; a message was
despatched to Prince Frederick Charles to hasten
by forced marches to the aid of Tann ; the two
divisions near Chartres, which had been placed under
the command of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg,
were ordered to hurry off in the same direction;
and amidst exclamations in the German camp that
the siege was " a gigantic mistake," Moltke made
preparations, it is all but certain, 1 to raise the siege
and to abandon his lines, should the Army of the
Loire appear near the city. This event probably
would have occurred, had. D'Aurelle overwhelmed
his foe at Ooulmiers ; and even as affairs stood, it
1 The evidence that Moltke intended to raise the siege of Paris
at this conjuncture is very strong. The fact was asserted by
several writers at the time, notably by the correspondent of The
Times, " Campaign of 1870, 191 ;" and it has been repeated by
Major Adams, " Great Campaigns," p. 583. It is remarkable, too,
that a German journal, believed to have been under Moltke's in-
fluence, referred, at this very time, to Napoleon's raising of the
siege of Mantua in 179$, at the approach of Wiirmser; and the
silence of the " Prussian Staff History " after these statements, is
significant in the extreme. The only evidence the other way is a
declaration by Moltke himself, " Precis of Franco-German War,"
vol. ii. 303, English translation, that it " never entered anybody's
head to leave Versailles ; " but this distinctly refers to a sortie from
Paris, and to a different occasion.
272 MOLTKE.
might, perhaps, have happened. Tann had fallen
back on Artenay and Toury, covering the roads to
Paris, after his defeat ; but his troops had lost heart
and had greatly suffered, and he could not have
stopped the march of the Army of the Loire, now
joined by its late absent division, flushed with
victory, and nearly fourfold in numbers. The
Bavarians, too, were without support; even the
heads of one corps of Prince Frederick Charles were
leagues distant on the 14th of November; only a
few troops of the Grand Duke had reached Tann
on the llth and 12th; and had D'Aurelle, there-
fore, pressed boldly forward, he might have beaten
both his adversaries in detail, and gained a signal
and most important triumph. 1 In that case he
would doubtless have advanced on Paris, and
Moltke, we believe, would have raised the siege.
D'Aurelle, however, did not adopt the course,
which, hazardous certainly as it would have been,
might, as affairs were, have been, perhaps, the
wisest. Had he routed Tann and the Grand Duke,
1 This operation is indicated by Chanzy, one of the most truth-
ful and modest of men : " La Deuxieme Armee de la Loire," p. 35 :
"Ileut peutetre etc possible en mettant a profit Fenthousiasme
produit par la victoire du 9, d'atteindre et d'achever de battre
Parmee du General de Tann, avant qu'elle cut pu etre secourue
par celle du grand due, sur laquelle on se serait porte ensuite, et de
prendre ainsi les Allemands en detail." Major Adams, " Great
Campaigns," p. 581, though an ardent admirer of the Germans,
says ; " A little more judgment and decision on D'Aurelle's part
would have involved Von der Tann in a signal disaster, and
perhaps have seriously affected the German investment."
CONDUCT OF D'AURELLE. 273
he would, in all probability, have pressed on to Paris,
under the stress of opinion in his camp ; but he
paused after Coulraiers, for two or three days, and
he made no attempt to draw near the capital. With
the possible exception of the chief of his staff, 1 none
of his lieutenants, not even the gifted Chanzy, whose
powers were already becoming manifest, proposed,
it is just to say, a bold march northwards ; and it
is impossible to deny that considerations of weight
existed against an operation of the kind. Though
the Second Army was still out of reach, the most
advanced corps of Prince Frederick Charles was
now only three or four marches distant, the two
corps in the rear only seven or eight marches ; and
obviously there would have been grave peril in
moving on Paris, with a certain prospect of having
to assail an enemy in front, while a second enemy
was threatening the assailants in flank. D'Aurelle
fell back on Orleans with the Army of the Loire ;
the Bavarians and the Grand Duke gave him little
alarm; but it was the approach of the Second Army
endangering his right, which, he 2 tells us himself,
was the principal cause that he did not endeavour
to press forward, and that he made a retrograde
movement. This proves, with a clearness not often
observed, how fatal to the cause of France was the
untimely and shameful surrender of Metz. Had
1 M. de Freycinet, "La Guerre en Province," p. 102. This
statement is flatly contradicted by D'Aurelle, p. 142.
2 D'Aurelle, " La Premiere Arme'e de la Loire," p. 134. The
passage is too long to be quoted, but deserves attention.
T
274 MOLTKE.
the fortress held out a few weeks longer, as, beyond
question, ought to have been the case, Prince
Frederick Charles would have been far away from
the theatre of the war on the Loire ; and, in that
event, Coulmiers might have changed the whole
course of the struggle. But for the guilt and
treason of Bazaine, the Army of the Loire, despite
other mishaps, would very probably have reached
Paris ; and if so, Moltke would have raised the siege,
with results which must have powerfully made for
France. " The capitulation came in the very nick
of time," is an admission made by a German writer.
Owing to a series of accidents, of which the most
disastrous was the premature and unexpected fall
of Metz, Coulmiers had not had the decisive
results which probably might have flowed from it.
It had shown, however, as if by a sudden flash
of light, how, notwithstanding their prodigious
success, the position of the Germans had become
precarious, and how colossal were the efforts of
France, 1 and Moltke thenceforward had no illusions
1 The change in Moltke's views as to the war is most remark-
able. We have seen what these were in September and October.
He wrote in the following strain after Coulmiers, though he
still held the false belief that Frenchmen were dragooned into the
defence of their country : "Letters," vol. ii. p. 66, English
translation : " After Sedan and Metz it may have seemed to
you in Berlin that all was over; but we have been having
a very anxious time. The greater part of our forces i\n*.
detained round Paris, and the obstinate endurance of Bazaine's
army though he is now proclaimed a traitor hindered the
earlier advance of fresh troops. . . . Surrounded as we are by
VIEWS OF MOLTKE AFTER COULMIEBS. 275
as to the nature of the tremendous contest.
Opinion, too, in Europe veered round once more ; l
after having scoffed at the efforts of France 9 it
began to speculate on her prospects of success, and
it did not pronounce against her again, the scales
of Fate were so long in suspense. It is no idle task,
as has been suggested by more than one of the
courtiers of Fortune, to conjecture what might have
been the results, had the Army of the Loire, as
might well have happened, compelled the abandon-
ment of the siege of Paris. It is easy to say that
Moltke would have crushed D'Aurelle and Chanzy
with a single stroke, and would have drawn his
lines round the capital again before Trochu and
Ducrot would have known what had happened, and
it is easy to say that the German armies would
have suffered a tremendous disaster, assailed from
within and without as they moved off from the city.
The truth probably lies between either extreme.
hostile bands of armed men, within the circle we have had to
face desperate sorties, and treachery and surprises from without.
Now when the whole French army has migrated, as prisoners to
Germany, there are more men under arms in France than at the
beginning of the war. Belgium, England and America supply
them with weapons in abundance, and if a million were brought
in to-day, within a few days we should have a million more to
deal with."
1 Even a cursory reader of the Press of Europe, before and after
Coulmiers, will be convinced of the truth of this sentence.
The following telegram, from the Daily News Correspondent of
Berlin, sent at the close of November, is very significant : "The
war news from the front is confused and contradictory. Much
uneasiness is felt here."
T 2
276 MOLTKE.
Had the siege been raised, the leaders in Paris could
not have failed to be informed of the fact ; in that
case they would, almost certainly, have destroyed
a large part of the besiegers' lines, and have brought
in the immense supplies accumulated by the enemy
for weeks ; Ducrot, there is every reason to Suppose,
would have conducted an army outside the capital,
and in this state of affairs the resumption of the
siege would have been difficult in the extreme, if
not impossible. In that event a complete change
would have passed over the scenes of the war, and
France might have obtained an honourable peace.
Military considerations, however, are not sufficient,
as elements of a judgment on this subject ; higher
considerations must be taken into account. Denain
saved France from impending ruin, and sent her
again on the path of victory ; Valmy rescued her
from the yoke of the conqueror, and gave her her
first triumph over old Europe, and such an event
as the raising of the siege of Paris might have led
to results not less wonderful.
Having fallen back, we have said, on Orleans,
D'Aurelle placed the Army of the Loire in a series
of camps in front of the city. His purpose was to
await the attack of the German armies in these
positions, an event which he believed at hand, and
should he succeed in beating the enemy, he thought
that he would be able to advance on Paris, and
effectually to assist the beleaguered capital. To
strengthen his camps, a double set of lines was
constructed round Orleans to the north ; heavy
THE ARMY OF THE LOIRE ROUND ORLEANS. 277
batteries were mounted with large ship guns, and
thousands of peasants took part in the work ; and
the defences, extending on a two-fold arc, the first
along the edge of the Great Wood of Orleans, the
second at some distance beyond, became formidable
in a few days. D'Aurelle, in a word, sought to
make a Torres Vedras near the Loire ; when the
barrier had broken the power of the Germans, he
would then, and only then, assume the offensive.
He was confident that, under these conditions, his
army l was equal to great achievements ; and if this
strategy of passive defence was probably not the
very best, it is to be regretted, in the interests of
France, that he was not permitted to carry it
out. It deserves notice, however, that it was not
approved by Chanzy, a chief of a much higher type,
though he faithfully obeyed his superior's orders.
Chanzy, for many reasons, wished that his corps 2
should be moved at least to the line of the Conie,
a small river still further to the north; it was
to hold a menacing attitude from this position, and
1 D'Aurelle's estimate of the quality of the Army of the Loire
was somewhat exaggerated ; but it was far nearer the truth than
the accounts that represented it as an assemblage of rude levies :
p. 278. " Le General D'Aurelle a toujours eu la ferme conviction,
partagee par tous les officiers generaux sous ses ordres et par tous
les gens du metier, que cette armee de la Loire, animee d'un
ardent patriotisme, et d'un courage eprouve, pouvait, etant rcunie
culbuter 1'armee prussienne."
2 See this remarkable despatch of Chanzy: "La Deuxieme
Armee de la Loire, p. 49. Every line written by this great general
should be carefully studied.
278 MOLTKE.
to interpose between the enemy's forces, at this
moment widely apart ; and had this advice been
followed, the events of the next few weeks would
have certainly taken a different turn. While
D' Aurelle was thus fortifying his lines near Orleans,
a new v direction had been given to the German
armies. Prince Frederick Charles, indeed, whose
foremost troops had reached Fontainebleau by the
14th of November, was ordered to advance and
hold the country between Orleans and the main roads
to Paris ; he was to close the external zone where
it had been broken. But the Grand Duke, who had
just joined Tann, a few days after D'Aurelle's
success, was again moved away to the west ; his
forces and those of Tann were united, and they
were placed once more in the tract around Chartres,
in order to cover the siege on this front, to collect
supplies, and to resist the enemy. This eccentric
movement was another mistake, due to a strange
ignorance of the operations of the French. 1 Moltke
had never ceased to believe in a French Army of the
"West, he had, as we have often seen before, lost
contact with a not distant foe ; beset by hindrances
still on the increase, he did not possess, in the
1 This is admitted by the "Prussian Staff History," part ii.
vol. i. pp. 283, 291. " All observations pointed to the impending
attack of the enemy from the west. . . . The proceedings of the
French Army of the Loire after the engagement at Coulmiers
had led the German Head-quarters Staff to believe that that
Army would unite with the troops assembled at Nogent Le
Rotrou and behind the Eure, and after this junction press forward
from the west towards Paris."
MOVEMENTS OF THE GERMAN ARMIES. 279
highest degree, the extraordinary gift of Napoleon
in divining the movements of an opponent, and,
despite the telegraph and mechanism of the kind,
he had come to a conclusion, absolutely wrong, that
the Army of the Loire had broken up from Orleans,
and had come into line with the Army of the West,
and that both were advancing upon the capital.
The Grand Duke and Tann were, therefore, sent
in a direction completely away from the enemy ;
there was nothing like a real Army of the West ;
D'Aurelle was in his camp at Orleans, and this
movement of Moltke was altogether false. The
error was discovered ere long, and the Grand Duke
and Tann had soon spread their troops over the rich
tract between the Eure and the Sarthe, levying con-
tributions, and waging, with increasing fierceness,
the war of reprisals already begun. But a wide
gap existed between their forces and those of Prince
Frederick Charles, and, as affairs stood, this was
even now perilous.
The Second Army, meanwhile, had reached its
positions, between Orleans and the chief ways of
Paris ; by the 2 1st of November it stood on a line
from Angerville to Pithiviers, and, on the east, to
Montargis. Its three corps, wasted by sickness
and hardship, did not probably exceed 60,000
men, 1 and Prince Frederick Charles had little
doubt of the coming fate of the untrained Army
1 According to the " Prussian Staff History," Part ii. vol. i. 313,
the infantry of the Second Army did not, at this time, exceed
45,000 men.
280 MOLTTCE.
of the Loire. He contemplated an immediate
advance on Orleans, with the victors of Mars La
Tour and Gravelotte, and reserving this exploit
for himself, he sent the Grand Duke, who had
become his subordinate, still further west, to
descend from Le Mans, on Tours, the seat of the
Republican Government, despised and detested
in the Prussian camps. But, in the meantime,
Gambetta had made preparations for a new and
mighty effort. 1 With wonderful energy and
administrative power, he had formed a 17th
corps on the Loire, near Blois, and an 18th
far higher up, at Nevers ; he had, with admirable
secrecy and skill, moved a 20th corps from the
Army of the East ; these arrays had been drawn,
by degrees, towards the Army of the Loire, and
the uniting masses, 2 from 150,000 to 200,000
strong, were being combined on a front extending
from the eastern verge of the Great Wood of
Orleans to the Forest of Marchenoir on the west.
A concentrated force, largely superior in numbers
at least, was being thus opposed to a widely
scattered force, and though the new levies were
by no means equal in quality to the troops of
D'Aurelle, still the Army of the Loire, thus
1 Even the Prussian Staff cannot withhold its admiration of
the " surprising activity " of the French, and the "indomitable
will " of Gambetta.
2 These numbers cannot be even nearly ascertained. M. de
Freycinet speaks of 250,000 men, the Prussian Staff of 200,000.
D'Aurelle acknowledges " 145,000 effectives" only.
THE FRENCH AND GERMANS ROUND ORLEANS. 281
immensely increased, was, in its present position,
a grave danger to the separated and disseminated
German armies, nay, even to the besiegers of
Paris. About the 24th of November, Prince
Frederick Charles became aware, for the first
time, of a situation before unknown, and unsus-
pected once more at Versailles ; he drew his three
corps more closely together, and he directed the
Grand Duke to hasten to his aid, sending cavalry
westward to join his colleague. The Grand Duke,
however, who had been moving in many columns,
in all directions, from near Le Mans to Nogent le
Rotrou, and Vendome, and who had been ordered
by Moltke to advance on Beaugency, required
time to collect his forces ; and he was not on the
Loir an affluent of the much greater Loire
on a line between Bonneval and Chateaudun,
until the 27th and 28th of November, at a consider-
able distance still from the Second Army.
The position of the armies around Orleans was
now one of peculiar interest. On the 28th of Novem-
ber, the Second Army, which had been gathering
together for some days, was on a front extending
about forty miles from Beaune La Bolande on the
east, to Orgeres westwards, covering the avenues
to Paris from the Great Wood of Orleans. But
the Grand Duke, though a thin line of horsemen,
brought him in contact with Prince Frederick
Charles, was still only just moving from the Loir
if, indeed, he was in motion at all there was still
a gap between his force and his colleague, a gap,
282 MOLTKE.
too, by no means easy to close, and one which,
had Chanzy held the Conie, as he had recom-
mended, could not have been closed without
running the risk of a most hazardous battle. On
the side of the French, the 18th and the 20th
corps, the right wing of the Army of the Loire,
held positions around Maizieres and Boiscommon,
not far from the German left at Beaune La
Kolande ; the centre composed of the 15th corps,
lay between Chevilly and Chilleurs sur Bois, at
the edge of the Great Wood of Orleans ; Chanzy
and the 16th corps were about Peravy, in communica-
tion with D'Aurelle and the 15th; and the 17th corps,
the extreme French left, which had been threaten-
ing the Grand Duke, was closing in from Marche-
noir towards Chanzy. The whole Army of the Loire
was thus concentrated on a front much shorter
than that of the Germans ; its columns were near
each other at all points, and it was assembled in
camps behind formidable lines, which alone gave it
a great advantage. Strategically its position was,
beyond comparison, superior to that of its divided
foes; for the defensive it was admirably placed, it
might even hope to take the offensive, to defeat the
enemy in its front and to reach Paris, and this
had been due, in the main, to Gambetta, who had
drawn together this immense array of forces, and
had concealed the operation from Moltke at
Versailles.
The military situation, so in favour of France,
was suddenly changed by a disastrous incident.
FAULTS OF GAMBETTA. 283
Gambetta was a greater man than Danton, but
he had the temper of an imperious Dictator, and
he had too much in common, in the conduct of
war, with the delegates of the Convention who,
in 1793-4, imposed their rule on reluctant generals.
He had been in communication with Trochu and
Ducrot ; he was feverishly impatient to relieve Paris,
and he had already urged D'Aurelle to advance
northwards, to try to reach Pithiviers, and to march
on the capital. D'Aurelle had succeeded in putting
a stop to an enterprise he deemed too hazardous,
though in order to please the discontented minister
he had sent part of the 15th corps to Chilleurs sur
Bois ; but in a few days Gambetta resolved to
attempt an operation on which he had set his heart.
His eagerness to go to the assistance of Paris was
quickened by a desire to protect Tours, threatened,
we have seen, by the Grand Duke's forces, and he
took on himself to order a movement, which, he was
convinced, would at least promote his objects. He
peremptorily directed the 18th and 20th corps, the
right wing of D'Aurelle's army, to push forward to
Beaune La Eolande, and to fall on the 10th German
corps, the extreme left of the Second Army ; he
hoped thus to gain a position from which to march
on Paris, and also to compel the Grand Duke to
draw off from Tours. The movement, if undertaken
at all, ought obviously to have been made by the
whole French army, especially as Chanzy, at this
moment, had still a chance of thrusting himself
in between the Grand Duke and Prince Frederick
284 MOLTKE.
Charles, but, attempted as it was, it naturally failed,
and the blame for the failure must fall on Gambetta.
On the 28th of November, the 18th and 20th corps
attacked the 10th at Beaune La Rolande ; the French
stormed some petty villages, but the Germans had
entrenched themselves in fortified posts. Although
greatly inferior in numbers, they steadily maintained
their ground for hours, and the arrival of a division
of the 3rd corps at last turned the scale in their
favour. The battle was in no sense decisive, but a
premature and ill-conceived effort had shattered the
right wing of the Army of the Loire, and the Ger-
man leaders had been thoroughly aroused. 1
The Grand Duke was now approaching the
Second Army, being concentrated in front of the
Great "Wood of Orleans. Chanzy 2 beheld, with an
anguish he could not suppress, his enemy defiling
within striking distance, and exposing his flank to
a formidable attack, and an opportunity was lost
to the French. The position, however, of the Army
of the Loire, though the 15th corps was somewhat
too divided, and the 18th and 20th had suffered
much, was, nevertheless, excellent for the defensive ;
the Grand Duke and Prince Frederick Charles had
probably not 100,000 men, and they could hardly
1 The " Prussian Staff History," part ii. vol. i. 291, 321, gives
an inadequate account of this whole series of operations. They
should be carefully studied in D'Aurelle and M. de Freycinet's
volumes. The Prussian Staff states that the three brigades of the
10th corps engaged at Beaune La Rolande were only 11,000 strong.
If so, they must have been terribly reduced by disease and other
ises.
2 "La Deuxieme Armee de La Loire," p. 56.
FAULTS OF GAMBETTA. 285
have defeated a much more numerous force strongly
entrenched behind well fortified lines. At this
crisis the fair hopes of France were injured by Gam-
betta for the second time. With powers of organi-
zation of the highest order, he had not the sagacity
and calm judgment which have enabled some great
men, though in civil life, to indicate generally what
ought to be done in war, and his impatience had
now overpassed all restraints. He had been
informed by a balloon, which had dropped in
Norway, and had therefore sent the intelligence
late, that Ducrot was about to attempt to break
out from Paris, and, on the 30th of November, he
insisted through M. de Freycinet, his subordinate,
at a council of war, convened for the purpose,
that the Army of the Loire must march on
Pithiviers, attack the enemy, and try to reach the
capital. The operation was to begin next day, and
D'Aurelle and Chanzy protested in vain against a
movement which each declared would be fatal.
The orders of the young Dictator, however, were
final, and the two chiefs thought they were bound
to obey. 1
The movement began on the 1st of December ; it
was inevitably ill-combined and precipitate. Chanzy
and the 16th corps, with the 17th in the rear, ad-
vanced from the left against the Grand Duke ; the
15th corps, the French centre, scarcely stirred, for it
1 This obedience, however, to the ruler de facto of France, prac-
tically on the spot, was very different from Macmahon's weak
compliance before Sedan.
286 MOLTKE.
was the pivot on which the army would turn in
making to the north-east for Pithiviers, and the
French right, the 18th and 20th corps, was left in-
active, and, as it were, out of sight, owing, it is to be
feared,to a dispute between D'Aurelle and Gambetta.
Not one half, therefore, of the Army of the Loire was
employed in an effort against an enemy completely
united by this time, and disaster could be the
only result. On the 1st Chanzy attacked the
Grand Duke, and gained at Villepion promising
success, but when he attempted on the following
day to assail his adversary, who had fallen back on
Loigny, and placed his troops in very strong posi-
tion, the event was altogether different. He ably
directed, indeed, a hard fought battle, and the losses
of the Germans, who in numbers seem to have been
nearly equal to the French, at least, in the first part
of the day, scarcely fell short of his loss on the
field, a clear indication of the skill in tactics, for
which he was to become conspicuous. But his
young troops were no match for their veteran foes,
standing on the defensive, in fortified posts, a
panic fell on his right wing, and he was only extri-
cated from defeat at hand, by a part of the 15th
corps hastening to his aid.
This reverse checked the advance of the Army of
the Loire, engaged prematurely, and nearly half
paralyzed. The operations of Moltke, up to this
time, had been marked by ignorance of the facts,
and had been, in a great degree, mistaken. He had
wrongly sent the Grand Duke to the west ; he had
DEFEAT OF THE ARMY OF THE LOIRE. 287
really been surprised by the enormous addition
made by Gambetta to the Army of the Loire. It
was by accident only that the Grand Duke and
Prince Frederick Charles had effected their junction ;
and bad the forces of the French been well directed
he might have seen another defeat of the arms of
Germany, and perhaps been compelled to raise the
siege of Paris. He was now, however, to have his
revenge, and his decision was formed with charac-
teristic energy. When informed by the telegraph of
the check of Chanzy, 1 he ordered Prince Frederick
Charles instantly to attack, and his orders were
carried out with decisive results, largely owing to
disastrous mistakes of the French. The Prince,
leaving the 18th and 20th corps, which had remained
motionless during all this time, and, quickly drawing
his forces together, swooped in irresistible might on
D'Aurelle's centre, the 15th corps, already divided
and the success of the German onset was complete.
The French, indeed, gave proof of heroic courage;
they fought stubbornly for nearly two days, and
retreated at first in excellent order, but they were out-
numbered at the decisive point. The young soldiers
of the 15th corps could not endure the incessant strain,
and gradually the French centre gave way and was
broken. The double line of entrenchments was
carried, 2 and the Germans ere long had entered
1 " Prussian Staff History," part ii. vol. i. p. 344.
3 The bravery displayed by the French in this retreat is attested
by many eye-witnesses. All Frenchmen had joined to defend
their country. The Prince de Joinville had come from exile, and
288 MOLTKE.
Orleans again, in the flush of hard bought but un-
doubted victory. Yet D'Aurelle conducted the
retreat ably; Chanzy fell off to the left with the
16th and 17th corps, and Bourbaki, who had not
returned to Metz after his mission to the Empress,
referred to before, drew off the 18th and 20th corps
on the right, having been made their chief at the
last moment.
Superficial writers, following the worshippers of
success, have interpreted these operations, from
first to last, as the necessary result of a conflict
between trained and regular troops and rude levies.
This, nevertheless, is a complete mistake, though it
is not pretended that the Army of the Loire could
be compared, as an instrument of war, to the armies
of the Grand Duke and Prince Frederick Charles.
But it was in no sense a force to be despised ; it
was greatly superior to its foes in numbers, and its
disastrous defeat is to be mainly ascribed to faulty
direction, ill-starred and manifest. It had a distinct
advantage on the field of manoeuvre, owing to the
separation of the enemies in its front, until Gambetta
recklessly interfered ; and had Chanzy been at this
moment its chief he might perhaps have beaten the
Grand Duke and led his victorious troops to the
capital. Even after the battle of Beaune La
Eolande the French around Orleans were pro-
bably safe; and it was the fatal movement which
Gambetta commanded that almost inevitably proved
was in the lines of Orleans ; Charette, a descendant of the hero of
La Vendee, fell on this occasion.
THE SIEGE OP PARIS. 289
ruinous. That operation itself would not have been
so calamitous as it soon became, had not the French
right wing been left wholly useless; this really was
the principal cause that Prince Frederick Charles
was enabled to attack the centre of D'Aurelle in
overwhelming force, to break it, and to gain a
decisive triumph. This series of reverses was chiefly
due to presumptuous interference with the French
chiefs, leading to a number of disastrous errors ;
and it may safely be asserted that it would not have
occurred had Chanzy had the supreme command, or
had D'Aurelle been allowed to carry out his pro-
jects. As for the operations of the Germans, they
were marred by misconceptions of many kinds, but,
when made thoroughly aware of the facts, Moltke
sent his thrust home with remarkable skill, and was
admirably seconded by Prince Frederick Charles. 1
We pass from the banks of the Loire to the Seine,
where Paris remained erect and defiant. The belli-
gerents had gone on, since October, in strengthening
the investing and defensive zones, spread in a double
circle round the beleaguered capital. The besiegers,
we have seen, had been largely reinforced ; the gap
on the western front had been filled, and the lines
drawn to repel attacks from the city had been made
more than ever impassable. The besieged, how-
1 The real causes of the defeats of the French before Orleans
are set forth by the Correspondent of the Times, " Campaign of
1870-1," pp. 201-9. Major Adams, "Great Campaigns," pp. 586, 7,
has evidently had this book in view, in his comments, but he does
not refer to it ; he merely says it was the work " of an excellent
pen."
U
290 MOLTKE.
ever, had been not less active ; they had slightly
enlarged the positions they held behind the forts ;
they had multiplied batteries and entrenchments, so
that the enceinte was completely shielded ; and they
had placed gunboats on the Seine, and long lines of
waggons, armed with cannon and clad with iron,
which formed movable points for attack and defence.
Meantime extraordinary progress was made in the
formation and training of the Parisian levies. The
National Guards were now a huge army in them-
selves, and, though partly composed of bad elements,
especially in their elected officers, they were, never-
theless, animated by patriotic fervour, and were
amply" sufficient to defend the walls, and even to
furnish a contingent for sterner duties. The assem-
blages of regular troops, of Gardes Mobiles, of
veterans, and of choice volunteers, which had been
acquiring military power by degrees, had long
ceased to be an armed multitude ; they had become
two armies in a real sense, of course far from equal
to the Germans in their front, but capable of daring
and persistent efforts. These armies were now
170,000 strong; one, called the Second Army,
under the command of I)ucrot ; the other, the
Third, under that of Vinoy. The incessant exer-
tions of the citizens had supplied their needs in
horses and other material, and, recollecting the
situation, the results were wonderful. In addition
to the garrisons of the forts, composed largely of
marines and sailors, the National Guards were more
than 200,000 men, and had as their leader Clement
THE GREAT SORTIE. 291
Thomas, one of the victims of the Communist
Eeign of Terror.
During these weeks Ducrot had matured the
project for endeavouring to break out from Paris,
to which we have already referred. The first
peninsula made by the bends of the Seine had
been covered with strongly armed works, of the
nature of solid counter approaches, and, protected
by the batteries of Valerien, had become an en-
trenched camp of prodigious strength. Ducrot had
everything prepared for a determined effort to force
his way, to the west, through the German lines
established around the second peninsula, and then
to make northwards for Rouen and the sea ; and, if
the operation was to succeed at all, this probably
was the best course to adopt. But Moltke had by
this time closed the aperture on the western front,
and, though this was still the most assailable point,
Ducrot had gradually abandoned the hope of being
able as he had intended to carry out a really
large army with him. He had become convinced
that he could not expect to break through the in-
vesting circle with more than 50,000 or 60,000 men,
assembled rapidly for a sudden attack, and this
force would not, in itself, suffice to hold the field or
to relieve Paris. He looked, therefore, to the pro-
vincial armies, and he earnestly demanded that the
Arrny of the Loire should, after Coulmiers, march
swiftly westwards, and, co-operating with the levies
of the north, should ascend to the line of the Eure
and the Seine, and join hands with the force led out
u 2
292 MOLTKE.
from the capital. This plan, he has maintained,
could have been carried out ; and if so, this proves
that, if mistaken in fact, Moltke was in theory
right in his belief, that the best chance for the
relief of Paris was by armies uniting from the
west; and, doubtless, it was on this assumption
that he persisted in keeping the Grand Duke near
Chartres, false as the course was, in the actual state
of affairs.
Ducrot had convinced Trochu of the merits of
his plan, and had received valuable assistance from
him. The resources of Paris had, in fact, been
employed for some time in making arrangements for
the great sortie from the western front, and for a
march to the course of the Oise, when the intelli-
gence of Coulmiers interfered with what was
probably Trochu's unsettled purpose. Opinion in
the capital turned to a project of breaking out to the
south or the south-east, and joining hands with the
Army of the Loire, supposed to be on the way from
Orleans, and Trochu, who had always believed that
the siege of Paris could only be raised by the arrival
on the spot of an army of relief, began to yield to
the popular demand. Gambetta 1 seems to have
taken no part in the decision ultimately formed in
the city, but messages passed between him. and
1 Gambetta had much to answer for, and not unreasonably was
severely condemned by several French generals for his pre-
sumptuous dictation. But a remarkable letter from his pen, cited
by General Ducrot, " La Defense de Paris," vol. ii. p. 117, certainly
lends to show that ho did not mar Ducrot's plan, but rather
approved of it.
THE GREAT SORTIE. 293
Trochu, and it was finally agreed that the project
of Ducrot should, in existing circumstances, be
given up, that the besiegers' lines were not to be
assailed from the west, and that the Army of the
Loire was not to march in that direction to the aid
of the city. The sortie was to be made, therefore,
from the south or the south-east, and to be
supported by D'Aurelle pressing forward from the
Loire ; and this had been the cause of the disastrous
movements, due to Gambetta's most unwise med-
dling, which had led to the defeats of the French
before Orleans. Ducrot was enjoined to carry out
the new arrangement in direct opposition to his
hopes and views, and he proceeded to the task with
a heavy heart. His first intention was to endeavour
to break out from the southern front, in order to
join the Army of the Loire as quickly as possible ;
but the great strength of the besiegers' lines pro-
tecting the German communications with Versailles,
compelled him to abandon this plan, and at the
suggestion of a young officer, 1 now the rising hope
of the Army of France, he resolved to make the
attempt from the east. This, next to the west,
was the best direction, as affairs stood, at the
present moment. The defensive zone bristled here
with whole tiers of batteries, the windings of the
Marne afforded protection to an advancing army on
both flanks ; if once the besiegers' lines were forced
the country beyond was easy to traverse, and the
enemy on the spot was not in gresit numbers. But
1 General Miribel.
294' MOLTKE.
precious time was inevitably lost in changing tte
dispositions for the sortie, and in 'massing troops
and the material .required from one side of Paris to
the other, *and this was probably turned to account
by the German commanders.
On the? 28th of November,' at night, the forts and
their supporting defences burst out in thunder, to
cover the first great effort 'of Paris to break forth
from her chains. By this time the army of Ducrot
had been assembled around Vincennes, and the
troops, fired with enthusiastic ardour, eagerly waited
for the dawn to obtain the means of passing the
course of the Marne hard by. A sudden rise,
however, in the waters of the stream prevented the
necessary bridges being laid ; the effort was put off
for a whole day, and this gave the Germans an
immense advantage, for it enabled them to collect
large masses of troops for the defence of the point
that was being menaced, and it deprived the French
of all they -could gain by a surprise, and from a
central position and interior lines. Demonstrations,
nevertheless, were made on the 29th at parts of the
investing circle, but these false attacks were with-
out result, except that the upland of Avron, an
important* point, commanding a section of the
German lines on the ' Marne, was captured and
occupied by French batteries. On the 30th the
effort was made at last, and the Marne having
been rapidly bridged, Ducrot's men advanced
against the Wurtembcrgers, and two bodies of the
Saxons, entrenched in his front, between Noisy Le
THE GREAT SORTIE. 295
Grand and Coeuilly, their centre holding the hamlet
of Villiers, the key of a position of prodigious
strength. The onset of the French, covered by a
terrific fire from the forts and batteries along the
river, was attended at first with marked success ;
the villages of Champigny and Bry were stormed,
but when the assailants reached the main German
lines, they were arrested by the defences of Villiers,
a mass of walls and buildings almost impregnable.
The battle raged confusedly for some hours, Ducrot
awaiting the support of his left wing, which had
been directed to turn the position of Villiers the
guns from Avron were here to take part persisted
in continuing the onset in front, and his troops were
mown down in heaps by the fire from an enemy
who suffered comparatively little behind his en-
trenchments. The long-hoped-for reinforcement
appeared at last, but the general in command, by a
fatal mistake, attacked Villiers, in turn, in front,
arid the effort, after a protracted struggle, which
cost an immense waste of life, was fruitless. Mean-
while an attack on Coeuilly, on the French right,
had been at last repulsed, and the line of the
Germans, though severely tried, had proved sufficient
to keep back the enemy. Ducrot fell back, at night-
fall, on Champigny and Bry, still hoping to renew
the fight on the morrow.
While this battle had been raging along the
eastern front, a part of Ducrot 1 s forces had been
engaged in making a demonstration on Montmesly,
in order to keep the enemy in check to the south-east,
296 MOLTKE.
and Vinoy had employed the Third French Army in
different attacks on Choisy Le Roi to the south,
and on Epinay, to the north of the investing circle.
These efforts, made under the continuous fire of the
forts and batteries, and of the gunboats on the
Seine, were attended here and there with partial
success ; they relieved the pressure on the Second
French Army, and prevented reinforcements being
sent to Yilliers. But if the battle of the 30th was
indecisive, this was equivalent to a defeat for the
French ; the zone of the besiegers had not been
forced, and the gain of Champigny and Bry was
worthless. Characteristically true to his favourite
method, 1 Moltke resolved to assume the offensive
again ; parts of the 2nd and the 6th corps were
marched to the aid of the defenders of Yilliers ;
Fransecky, a hero of Sadowa, was placed at their
head, and at the dawn of the day of the 2nd
December, the Germans pressed forward to storm
Champigny. The French, who, without any means
for encampment, had cruelly suffered from cold and
privations, were driven at first out of part of the
village, surprised, as had so often happened ; but
Ducrot had strongly entrenched his position, and
Champigny was regained after a protracted conflict.
Nearly the same results were witnessed at Bry;
i " Prussian Staff History," part ii. vol. i. p. 381. This account of
the great sortie, and of the battles of the 30th November and the
2nd December, is jejune and inadequate. General Ducrot's account,
" La Defense de Paris," vol. ii. p. 80, 289, iii. p. 103, is more com-
plete and impartial. General Vinoy's book too should be read.
THE GllEAT SORTIE. 297
and wherever the defensive zone was approached,
the power of its fire overcame everything, and the
Germans were forced back defeated and baffled.
The struggle of the 2nd was again indecisive, but
it was not the less a reverse for Ducrot ; the lines
of the besiegers had proved impregnable, and he had
no choice but to recross theMarne, and to fall back
with his army on Paris. The retreat was made in
good order on the 3rd ; but the losses and hard-
ships of the French had been terrible.
In this fierce and prolonged contest Ducrot had
proved himself a skilful and resolute soldier. 1 But
the enterprise was undertaken against his will ; he
had little faith in a successful issue ; he wished the
sortie to be made from the western front, and the
change in the operation was of evil omen. Ducrot,
too, had been badly treated by Fortune ; the sudden
1 An unwarrantable charge, afterwards withdrawn, was made
that Ducrot broke his parole after Sedan ; and he has been ridi-
culed for a rhetorical expression in an address to his troops before
the sortie. But he was a very able and valiant warrior, and he
rightly insisted that France should fight after Sedan. He inter-
preted the judgment of History more accurately than Thiers, who
wished to temporize, and make an ignominious peace. " La
Defense de Paris," vol. ii. p. 76 : " ' General,' dit M. Thiers, ' vous
parlez comme nn soldat, c'est tres bien, mais vous ne parlez pas
eomme un homme politique.' ' Monsieur, je crois egalement parler
en homme politique ; une grande nation comme la France, se
releve toujours de ses mines materielles, elle ne se releve jamais
de ses ruines morales. En continuant a defendre pied a pied le
sol de la Patrie, notre generation souffrira peutetre davaiitage,
mais nos enfants beneficieront de 1'honneur que nous aurons
suuveV " Noble words, uttered amidst the scoffs and scepticism
of what was called European opinion, but amply confirmed.
298 MOLTKE.
rise of the Marne had delayed the attack on Villiers
for twenty-four hours at least, and this alone almost
assured the defeat of the French arms. He was
badly seconded, besides, by his left wing, which,
having arrived on the field late, assailed the main
position of the Germans in front, instead of endea-
vouring to turn it, as had been directed, and two or
three lesser mistakes were made. But a study of
these engagements induces us to think that Ducrot
could hardly have succeeded in any event ; the zone
of the besiegers was too strong to be broken ; and
even if it had been forced the French would have
been pursued, and probably defeated in the open
country. It deserves notice, too, that though
Ducrot' s army was much more numerous than the
enemy it assailed, it was so confined to a narrow space
that the French were not more than 55,200 1 against
45,000 men at the decisive points, the attacks on
Villiers and Coeuilly ; and these figures almost prove
that success was hopeless, bearing in mind the
strength of the German positions. In the battle of
the 2nd, according to Ducrot, the numerical supe-
riority was reversed ; the Germans were 72,000 to
62,000, 2 and yet, in their efforts against the zone of
the defence, they too were, on the whole, worsted.
1 " La Defense de Paris," vol. ii. p. 286.
2 Ibid. vol. iii. p. 55. The " Prussian Staff History " is silent
on the subject, and must be presumed to acquiesce in these
figures, as it is partly compiled from General Ducrot's work. It
is unnecessary to refer to German writers, who have described
the sortie as the defeat of 100,000 Frenchmen by 20,000
Germans.
THE GREAT SORTIE. 299
It is probable, in fact, that by this time the lines of
the besiegers and the lines of the besieged had
become impregnable to attack, save through ap-
proaches made by the art of the engineer, a possible
exception being the western front, covered at this
moment by formidable works, where a sortie, com-
bined with a determined effort made by an army of
relief from without, might, both Moltke and Ducrot
thought, have had some chances of success. But
though they failed, the French had been not un-
worthy of their martial race in this desperate
struggle, aod they lost more than 9000 men, a
result in striking contrast with the trifling of
Bazaine. 1 The losses of their enemy were not 2000,
such was the protection afforded to the defence at
Villiers ; the Germans had borne themselves as
became good troops, still upheld by the renown of
Metz and Sedan.
The arms of Germany had once more triumphed ;
the Army of the Loire had been rent in twain ; the
great sortie from Paris had failed; the efforts to
relieve the capital had been frustrated. Yet there
was little exultation in the German camp; an
uneasy feeling of anger pervaded Germany ;
opinion in Europe refused to predict another suc-
cession of German victories. The fall of Metz, a
caprice of fortune, had alone saved the besiegers
from the gravest perils ; the Army of the Loire
might, perhaps, have raised the siege; the invaders
1 The total losses of the French in all these sorties exceeded
12,000 men.
300 MOLTKE.
were thrown upon the defensive ; they were exposed
to attacks of a formidable kind as long as the
capital should hold out ; and all this had become
distinctly manifest. The prodigies, too, of the first
part of the war had been followed by a second
prodigy, the gigantic national resistance of France ;
she had risen from the depths of misfortune to
show how great was her power ; her hastily
gathered levies had done wonders, and the chariot-
wheels of the once boastful conquerors " drave
heavily" through ever-increasing obstacles. Yet
Moltke maintained his undaunted attitude ; if he
tacitly admitted that he had made mistakes in ad-
vancing on Paris before the time, and in undervaluing
the resources of France, he left nothing undone to
repair these errors, and while many around him
doubted and feared he manfully stood up against a
sea of troubles. His position around Paris was, for
the moment, safe ; D'Aurelle had been defeated on
the Loire ; events in the north, which we shall
glance at, had been favourable to the German arms,
and the great city was, for the present, in eclipse.
He continued steadily to forge the chains which, he
was convinced, would yet subjugate France stern,
resolute, able, and self-reliant. The besiegers' lines
were still further strengthened ; the armies which
formed the external zone were reinforced in every
direction ; the severest measures were taken to put
down the national resistance where it raised its
head ; and the march of the invaders was often lit
up by the flames of hamlets, revealing the ghastly
THE WAll AT THE END OF NOVEMBER. 301
spectacle 1 of peasants hung and shot for being
found in arms and for striking a blow to defend
their country. To sustain him in his task, Moltke
could look with confidence to devoted lieutenants of
proved skill and to admirably organized military
power ; and Germany, aflame with national passion,
went forth to uphold a mighty conflict which had
become an internecine strife of races. The youngest
recruits and the oldest men of the Landwehr had
been already called into the field, and a fierce impulse
sent tens of thousands of warriors, like their Gothic
fathers in the distant past, to descend on the lands
beyond the Rhine. The final issue of the contest
was determined as much, perhaps, by this universal
movement as by the regular armies of Germany.
If we turn to the opposite side, the efforts of
France had scarcely had a parallel even in her
history. Nearly a million of men had been enrolled
in arms in Paris and in the provincial levies, and
this after the Imperial armies had been carried into
Germany captive. The result had been characteristic
of an heroic .race, and, to a certain extent, it had
been successful. The Germans had been decidedly
checked ; Coulmiers had been a real, if not a
fruitful victory; a series of mischances had alone
saved the invaders from defeat, perhaps from
1 These executions are not to be too harshly condemned ; they
were in accordance with the laws of war. But the franctireurs
of France were treated as Napoleon treated the Spanish guerillas ;
and the sufferings of the one class of victims were disregarded,
while the other class was extolled as heroes and martyrs.
302 MOLTKE.
disaster. The issue of events was still doubtful ; and
France, deprived of her organized forces, had risen
from under the heel of a conqueror, and had, in a
few weeks, made the national defence so power-
ful, so general, so unyielding that the scales of
fortune hung in even balance. But unity and
subordination in command were wanting to France at
this supreme crisis, not less than well-ordered military
force. Gambetta had destroyed as well as created ;
the defeat of the Army of the Loire is to be ascribed
to him; the best chance for the relief of Paris,
difficult as it would have been in any event, had
been lost by divided counsels and by compliance with
thoughtless and idle opinions. Chanzy and D'Aurelle,
each of whom could have done much, had been reck-
lessly crossed and thwarted. France did not possess
a single uncontrolled leader to make the most of
her resources of war, and to carry out operations in
the field with a definite aim and a settled purpose ;
and the armed strength of the nation, inferior as it
was to that of an adversary well prepared for years,
was wasted unwisely and misdirected. The exer-
tions of France, therefore, grand as they were, were
spasmodic, ill- regulated, and, in a great degree,
paralyzed ; and she was in a death struggle with a
gigantic foe, whose military power was perfectly
matured, and was directed with admirable energy
and skill ; who had hundreds of thousands of trained
soldiers on foot, and who was animated by passions
as ardent as her own. The evil influences that
weakened the strength of France were to produce
THE WAR AT THE END OF NOVEMBER. 303
their effects up to the last moment, and contributed
largely to her ultimate defeat. The end, however,
had not yet come ; she was yet to show that she
had not lost the illustrious breed of her great sol-
diers ; she was yet to fight with such intense
earnestness, that the invaders remained in continual
peril ; and she was to give proof of such inherent
power, that she was to be formidable even in adverse
fortune.
CHAPTER IX.
The First Army in Picardy Indecisive battle near Amiens
Advance of the First Army into Normandy Retreat of the
French Army of the North Rouen captured Fall of Thion-
ville, Montmedy, and, before long, of Mezieres These suc-
cesses strengthen the position of the Germans round Paris
and in France Preparations for the bombardment of Paris
Werder in Burgundy and Franche Comte The siegeof Belfort
Werder at Dijon The French Army of the East Garibaldi
and Cremer The Germans in the east reinforced by part of
the First Army The prospect becomes gloomy for France
Sudden change effected by Chanzy on the Loire Events on
this theatre of the war since the fall of Orleans Chanzy
attacked by the Germans Protracted and desperate conflict
of four days Great ability of Chanzy His skill and com-
manding influence over his troops and their officers His
retreat to the Loire His masterly arrangements baffle the
German commanders They concentrate their forces against
him He retreats to the Sarthe, occupies Le Mans, and resumes
the offensive The Grand Duke and Prince Frederick Charles
fall back Heavy losses of their armies The French Army
of the North marches towards the Somrne Indecisive battle
on the Hallue Ineffectual sortie from Paris The military
situation, if unfavourable to France, is still doubtful-
Gradual and immense additions to the numbers of the
German troops The efforts of Franco continue Reflections
on these operations.
THE defeat of the Army of the Loire at Orleans,
and the failure of the great sortie from Paris,
were not the only ominous signs at this conjunc-
ture, and during the next few weeks, of disaster
THE WAR AT THE BEGINNING OP DECEMBER. 305
for the arms of France. Part of the First Army,
after the fall of Metz, had, we have seen, been
moved towards the valley of the Oise; and, by
the last days of November, it had entered Picardy
and the flourishing region around Amiens. It was
here opposed by part of the French Army of the
North, raised by Gambetta in Artois and Picardy,
and given the name of the 22nd corps ; and it had
passed from Bourbaki's hands, when he had been
sent to the Loire, into those of General Farre, a
distinguished soldier. The hostile forces encoun-
tered each other near Villers Bretonneux, just to
the east of Amiens ; a fierce and indecisive battle
was fought, most honourable to the French 1 levies,
but Farre ere long fell back behind the Somme, and
Amiens capitulated a few days afterwards. The
invaders now overran Normandy, meeting little
resistance from a motley force of 40,000 or 50,000
men, the remaining part of the Army of the North ;
they had soon seized Rouen and the mouths of the
Seine, and, like Csesar's Italian soldiers, they saw,
for the first time, the waves of the Channel. La
Fere, a petty fortress that molested their rear, was
taken before the end of November ; and the First
Army spread over a vast arc, extending from the
Upper Oise to the Eure westwards, covered the
1 On the French side General Faidherbe's " Campagne de
PArmee du Nord " is our best guide. This experienced and able
soldier thus describes the conduct of the French levies at the
battle near Amiens : " La bataille d' Amiens avait ete tres honorable
pour une armee aussi rapidement improvisee que 1'Armee du Nord."
Farre's retreat, indeed, was mainly caused by want of munitions.
X
306 MOLTKE.
Army of tlie Meuse before the n or them front of
Paris, from hostile efforts made in that direction.
The external zone of the besiegers' forces received
thus new additional strength, and, menacing as was
the position of the French Army of the North behind
the fortresses between the Somme and the frontier
famous in the great wars of Louis XIV. the
Army of the Meuse was thenceforward secure.
Thionville and Montmedy had, ere long, suc-
cumbed to the part of the First Army that had been
left in the rear, and Me*zieres surrendered some time
afterwards. The fall of these fortresses gave the
Germans possession of several railway lines from
the east ; and as they had mastered Lorraine, and
nearly the whole of Alsace, their communications,
dangerously straitened at first, were made perfectly
open and secure. This enabled the armies besieging
Paris, not only to obtain vast stores of supplies,
and reinforcements even now needed, but to bring
up the immense siege train required for the bom-
bardment ; and the transport of the heavy guns and
other material which had been in progress for
several weeks, in order to compel, as was hoped in
the German camp, the speedy submission of the
proud city was accelerated, and protected from
attack.
Meanwhile, Moltke addressed himself to strength-
ening the external zone in the east, and quelling
the efforts of the French levies between the Or-
leanais and Franche Comte. The French Army
of the East had, we have seen, been consider-
THE WAR AT THE BEGINNING OP DECEMBER. 307
ably weakened along this line by the removal of
the 20th corps to the Loire ; and at present it con-
sisted of two masses, one under Garibaldi, the
renowned Italian, who had brought his sword to
the assistance of France, and the other under
Gremer, an unknown soldier. These bodies, sup-
ported by bands of irregulars, and in communica-
tion with levies gathering in the south, held the
tract between Besangon and the Upper Yonne,
sending occasional detachments to the Army of the
Loire ; and as the chief part of the Second Army
had been suddenly moved on Orleans, at the intelli-
gence of the fight at Coulmiers, they held a threaten-
ing position upon the extended flank of the German
invasion from the Rhine to Paris. Werder, accord-
ingly, and the 14th corps, increased by many
thousands of men, had been directed to press the
siege of Belfort, almost the last stronghold of the
French in Alsace, and he had established himself
firmly around Dijon, repelling, from this great cen-
tral position, the desultory attacks of the Army of
the East. A gap, however, existed between the
divisions of Werder and the Second Army, and
Moltke filled this towards the close of November with
the 7th corps of the First Army, detached from Metz,
and the fortresses of the Moselle, placing it between
Dijon, the Yonne, and the Loing, and in contact
with Prince Frederick Charles. Some partial skir-
mishes were fought along this line, in several
instances favourable to the French ; but Werder and
the chief of the 7th corps successfully maintained
x 2
308 MOLTKK.
the ground they held, and kepfc back the ever
advancing enemy.
Having secured his position in the north and the
east, and made his communications easy and broad,
Moltke turned next to the west and south. The
external zone along these fronts of the siege ap-
peared at first, in all respects, safe, and able to defy
the provincial armies. On the west, indeed, it was
only composed of bodies of cavalry and a small
force of infantry, the Grand Duke having set off
for Orleans ; but though levies were being raised
in multitudes, in Normandy, Brittany, Maine, and
Anjou, these were, as yet, in a backward state, and
had not ventured to draw near the capital. The
situation for the invaders, after the complete defeat
of the Army of the Loire, before Orleans, was
deemed, at Versailles, perfectly safe in the south ;
in fact, all that was to be thought of was to gather
in thoroughly the fruits of victory. Prince Frede-
rick Charles and the Grand Duke were in fall force
in the region between the large bend of the Loire,
on both sides of Orleans ; they had taken the city,
we have seen, again ; they held both banks of the
great river; they had sent detachments into the
Sologne, and they occupied the course of the Loire
from Gien to near Meung, the chief body of their
troops being on the northern bank. On the other
hand, the defeated Army of the Loire had given, for
a moment, not a sign of life. The routed centre,
the 15th corps, had fled to Salbris, far south of the
Loire, and D'Aurelle had been deprived of his com-
THE WA AT THE BEGINNING OP DECEMBER. 309
mand by a gross act of wrong on the part of Gam-
betta. The right wing, the 18th and 20th corps,
left idly " in the air," after Beaune La Rolande, had
made its escape, by Gien, far away ; before long it
had joined the 15th, and the collected force, in a
pitiable state, having been placed in Bourbaki's
hands, was ultimately rallied around Bourges. As
for Chanzy, and the 16th and 17th corps, it was
not exactly known where he was ; but the con-
querors assumed that the French left wing was a
horde of fugitives, like the centre and right, and its
speedy annihilation was hourly expected. In the
first days of December, the Grand Duke and the
Prince were directed " to crush the defeated enemy,"
and this result seemed easy and certain alike.
By these operations the external zone, originally
restricted and feeble in the extreme, had been spread
over an immense circumference, and made an almost
impassable line ; and Paris was enclosed within a
double rampart of foes, the one defying the efforts
of the besieged, the other keeping back the provin-
cial armies. The communications of the invaders
had, too, been assured ; the attack on Paris was
soon to begin, and the citizens to pass through the
ordeal of fire, and outside the capital little seemed
to be done but to destroy the remains of the
Army of the Loire. And should Paris even stand
a bombardment, she would necessarily yield before
long to famine ; and meanwhile, as her power of
resistance slackened, Moltke, now in possession of
interior lines, and of a central position amidst his
310 MOLTKE.
foes, would be able to detach troops from the be-
sieging armies to send them to every point menaced
in the external zone, and to defeat in detail the pro-
vincial levies. The mistake of the original advance
on Paris, which, we have said, had been largely
averted by the unexpected surrender of Metz, had
by this time been almost wholly corrected, owing in
part to Moltke's unbending constancy, in part to
the misdirected efforts of France, chiefly, perhaps,
to the gigantic onset of Germany, and he could
look forward to the result hopefully. The prospect,
in truth, had become dark for France, but a light
suddenly shone out at one point of the scene, to
the discomfiture of her astounded foes, and this
revealed to the world a great captain, showed
how prodigious was yet her essential strength, illus-
trated admirable feats of her arms, and proved the
issue of the strife to be still uncertain.
Chanzy had, we have seen, fallen back to the left
during the disastrous retreat of D'Aurelle on
Orleans. He had endeavoured in vain to join his
colleague, and on the 5th of December he was in
positions considerably to the south-west of the city, on
a line between Beaugency on the Loire and Josnes.
He was here informed that the Army of the Loire
had been divided into two great parts, the one com-
posed of the centre and right, entrusted, we have said
before, to Bourbaki, and the second, the 16th and
17th corps, placed under his command as General-in-
Chief, and he found himself unexpectedly reinforced
to an extent that might have been deemed impos-
CHANZY ON THE LOIRE. 311
sible. With characteristic energy and resource Gam-
betta had moved the best divisions of the Army of
the West, called the 21st corps, to the aid of Chanzy,
and had pushed forward a strong detachment from
Tours, and the chief of the new Second Army of the
Loire, owing to this extraordinary and well- concealed
effort, was at the head of 80,000 or 90,000 men.
These troops, however, for the most part, were mere
levies ; and the 16th corps, the soldiers ofCoulmiers
and Loigny, had suffered such losses, and had been
so weakened, that a fragment only of it could remain
in the field. The army, however, had good artillery,
obtained by Gambetta from abroad ; its far-reaching
small-arms could be made most destructive in a
region of plains; some excellent officers were in its
ranks, notably Jaureguibbery, a distinguished sea-
man, and, above all, it was in the hands of a com-
mander of most remarkable powers. Chanzy resolved
to make head against the enemy, and to defend, where
he stood, the valley of the Loire ; and with this
object he chose a strong position, extending from
the Forest of Marchenoir on his left, to Meung and
Beaugency on the extreme right, and covered in
front by many villages, affording excellent points for
defence. Behind this line, difficult to turn on the
flanks, bristling with obstacles to a direct attack,
and giving spaces for offensive returns, Chanzy drew
up his army of recruits, and sternly awaited the
German onslaught.
At this juncture the Grand Duke and his army,
from 30,000 to 40,000 strong, were approaching
312 MOLTKE.
Meung, on the northern bank^of the Loire ; and of
the three corps of the Second Army, one was around
Gien observing Bourbaki, another was holding
Orleans and the adjoining tract, and the last was
marching down the southern bank of the Loire,
divided from the Grand Duke by the river. The
German leaders were not aware that Chanzy
and his army were at hand, and had no idea that he
had received a reinforcement, great in numbers, at
least ; and they had placed their forces on either side
of the Loire in order easily to pounce on Tours, and
to crush, in its seat, the Republican Government.
Their boastful hopes were rudely dispelled, and an
astonishing passage of arms was witnessed. On
the 6th of December a slight encounter took place
between an advanced guard of the Grand Duke and
a detachment of Chanzy near Meung, and as the
French were, on the whole, beaten, the Germans
pressed forward with increased confidence. The
result was very different when they had come before
the admirably chosen positions of their foes. A
desperate contest raged for four days ; the Grand
Duke searched every part of Chanzy's line, and
assailed it in front and on both flanks, but he not
only failed to overwhelm his enemy, but was com-
pelled to seek the assistance of the corps at Orleans,
and of the corps on the opposite side of the Loire ;
and his army lost many thousands of men, while
some of his divisions were cut to pieces. 1 At the
1 The German account of these battles, " Prussian Staff History,'*
Part ii. vol. ii. 47, 63, is quite inadequate, and far from candid.
GENERAL CHANZY
From photograph by F. Etienne Caiiat, Paris
To face page 313.
CHANZY ON THE LOIRE. 313
close of this extraordinary struggle the right wing
of Chanzy Lad lost some ground, owing chiefly to a
surprise by night, but the centre and left wing had
scarcely fallen back ; and though his young levies
had cruelly suffered, they had successfully kept
their well- trained adversaries in check. Had the Ger-
man chiefs had the least notion of Chanzy's position
and of the strength of his army, they would never
have divided their forces on the Loire, perhaps would
not have attacked at all ; and they were baffled in
this fierce and protracted conflict. 1 Yet the success
The writer, indeed, does not deny the losses of the Grand Duke,
but he asserts that the French had " a fourfold superiority of
strength." This calculation can only be arrived at by suppressing
the facts that the 9th Prussian corps, on the southern bank of
the Loire, assisted the Grand Duke by keeping a large French
division in check, and that two divisions of Chanzy's 16th corps
were not engaged at all. The French could hardly have been
much more than double the number of the Germans, unless the
Grand Duke had suffered more losses before these days than has
ever been suspected.
1 How well contested and terrible these battles were has been
attested by many eye-witnesses, especially by a correspondent of
the Times, writing with German sympathies from the German
camp. One passage from Chanzy's most valuable work, " La
Deuxieme Armee de la Loire," p. 447, will suffice here : " Pendant
les rudes journees de Josnes, un officier superieur allemand fait
prisonnier, ne dissimulait rien de 1'etonnement que lui causait
la resistance de nos jeunes troupes, comparait ces batailles de la
Beauce a celles de 1866 auxquelles il avait pris part, et avouait
que ces dernieres n'etaient qu'un jeu d'enfants aupres de ces
luttes acharnees et incessantes qu'il lui fallait de nouveau soutenir
pour reduire un pays qu'ils croyaient a bout de ses ressources apres
ses desastres. C'est la le plus bel eloge de ces armees nouvelles
que la volonte et le patriotisme de la France ont fait surgir."
316 MOLT'KE
The German corps on the southern bank of the
Loire was moving down the river, and menacing
Blois ; two of the divisions of the 16th .corps, which
had not taken part in the late battles, were at Mer
and Blois on the northern bank; and Chanzy
directed the commander of one of these to hold
Blois to the last extremity ; and if the enemy should
force the passage, to retreat further down the river
to Amboise, and to withdraw attention from the
main army. At the same time lie sent repeated
messages, entreating Bourbaki to make an effort to
attack the corps on the southern bank ; and thus
he not only screened his projected movement, but
sought to have a diversion made on the rear of the
Germans, and perhaps to place them in grave danger.
These admirable moves completely succeeded;
and Chanzy made good his way to the LoirL and J
occupied the two points of FreteVal and Vendome,
almost unmolested by the hostile armies. The
Grand Duke and Prince Frederick Charles, indeed,
lost sight of the French for nearly two days ; and
they then pursued, in the wrong direction, not
following Chanzy's line of retreat, but making cir-
cuitous movements on Freteval and Vendome. The
German corps, no doubt, on the southern bank of
the Loire, contrived to effect the passage at Blois,
and thus to join its supports late ; and Bourbaki's
army was not in a state to make a demonstration
in its rear ; l but at every other point of the field of
1 Bourbaki had not Chanzy's capacity and resource, and the
chief of the Imperial Guard naturally had no confidence in mere
CHANZT ON THE SARTHE. 317
manoeuvre, the German leaders had been out-
generalled. Prince Frederick Charles, when made
aware at last of the position taken by Chanzy on
the Loir, resolved, if possible, to destroy his ad-
versary; he had already summoned his only
remaining corps from Gten and Orleans to join in
the contest ; and he attacked Chanzy at Vendome
on the 15th of December, hoping in a day or two to
crush him with his whole united forces. The battle
was indecisive, but the French lost ground ; and
Chanzy with perfect judgment fell back on the
Sarthe, and spread his wearied army in camps round
Le Mans, a strategic point of the first importance.
By this time, the German corps 'in the rear had
come up ; but the German commanders did not
pursue ; the Grand Duke had ere long retired on
his former positions around Chartres ; the Prince
fell back on the tract near Orleans, and only 'a
single corps of the Second Army was left beyond
the Loir to observe Chanzy. That indefatigable
chief was soon in the field again, sending out flying
columns to hold his enemy in check ; and one of
these was engaged, not without success, with a
hostile detachment near Vendome.
These operations of Chanzy form a striking episode
in the drama of the war of 1870-1. His retreat on
the Loir and the Sarthe, a more remarkable feat
levies. But he was a gallant and loyal, if afterwards a most
unfortunate, soldier, and his army was not at this moment fit to
move. See a remarkable letter by Gambetta, " La Deuxieme
Ariuce de la Loire," p. 517.
318 MOLTKE.
than the retreat of Moreau through the Black Forest,
was really a great strategic movement, successful in
the main objects aimed at; and equal to one of the
fine marches of Turenne. In the first contest he
had baffled his confident foes, who had attacked
him with forces unwisely divided ; he had out-
manoeuvred them as he fell back on Vendome and
Le Mans ; he had carried out his original design,
had drawn near his supports in the west and the
north, and stood menacing the investing circle
round Paris ; * he had inflicted immense injury on
the German armies ; and he had done these great
things with, an assemblage of levies, not a fourth
part of them being trained soldiers. The nature
of the situation, in fact, created by him, was made
evident 2 in the alarm which prevailed at Versailles,
where it was thought that, impregnable as it had
appeared, the external zone might be even now
broken ; but it was best proved by the operations of
the Germans themselves. At the intelligence of
the fierce struggle with Chanzy, Moltke had urged
the Grand Duke and Prince Frederick Charles nob
to press forward too far towards the west, and
especially to keep an eye on Bourbaki, who might
slip past them, and march on the capital. The
pursuit of Chanzy, therefore, was soon given up ;
1 See the very intelligent reports of a correspondent of the
Times, quoted by Chanzy, ' ' La Deuxieme Armce de la Loire,"
pp. 522, 525.
2 See a number of report? quoted by Chanzy in the same work,
pp. 526-7.
SKILL OF HIS OPERATIONS. 319
and a mere demonstration made by Bourbaki, in the
hope of assisting his hard-pressed colleague, had
caused the German commanders to fall back, the
one towards Chartres, the other on Orleans. These
operations, however, were timid in the extreme ;
and had the Grand Duke and Prince Frederick
Charles been able at this juncture to keep the field,
assuredly Moltke would have spared no effort, to
strike down the still invincible foe, who had really
discomfited his perplexed lieutenants. But the
forces of the invaders had been half destroyed,
in the late bloody and exhausting contest ; the
Bavarians alone, it has been asserted, were reduced
to 5000 or 6000 men ; and the Germans were so
broken down, in heart and courage, that it had
become necessary to give them repose. In fact,
but for the large reinforcements which fortunately
had been provided for them, these divisions of the
great conquering host would, perhaps, have been
unable to fight again ; and had Bourbaki, at this
moment, possessed the means of making a great
offensive movement, the Germans in the south would
have been in the gravest peril. The great com-
mander, in a word, who had suddenly appeared,
had, imperfect as his resources had been, very
nearly changed the position of affairs. 1
1 " The Prussian Staff History," Part ii. vol. ii. pp. 39, 97, con-
tains a very meagre and deceptive account of Chanzy's operations.
It cannot, however, altogether conceal the discomfiture of the Grand
Duke and Prince Frederick Charles, and the great losses sustained
by their armies. It should be confronted at every point by
320 MOLTKE.
Chanzy had establisliecl his army firmly at
Le Mans, as 1870 was about to close. Meanwhile
operations, not without interest, had taken place on
the theatre of war in the north. After the inde-
cisive battle near Amiens, the invaders, we have
seen, had overrun Normandy ; and having occupied
Rouen, and other towns, were menacing even the
great port of Havre. But Gambetta had added
another corps, the 23rd, to the 22nd in the north,
and had placed at their head the ablest chief after
Chanzy, seen on the side of France ; and Faidherbe
had made the Army of the North capable of appear-
Chanzy's narrative " La Deuxieme Armee de la Loire," pp. 101,
222 ; and by General Derrecagaix's excellent epitome, " La Guerre
Moderne," vol. ii. pp. 444, 465. For the real state of the situation
after the retreat to Le Mans, see Chanzy, p. 222. I quote the fol-
lowing striking passage : " La deuxieme armee venait encore d'operer
une retraite tout aussi difficile que les precedentes et qui, corame
elles, lui fait honneur. L'ennemi, contenu partout, etait devenu
de moms en moins entreprenant ; il etait facile de voir que, pas
plus que les notres ses troupes n'avaient pu resistor a la fatigue ;
ses hommes etaient, eux aussi, grandement demoralises par cette
persistance d'une lutte qui se reprodnisait constamment, alors
qu'ils la croyaient terminee : le desordre se mettait parfois dans ses
colonnes, malgre sa solid e organisation et sa discipline. Un
officier d'ordonnance du gencral-en-chef egare dans le brouillard
en portant un ordre, avait trouve les convois allemands dans la
plus grande confusion dans les ravins d'Azay, et les troupes qui
les escortaient completement debandees ; les memes renseignements
ctaient donne par les gens du pays. II y avait dans ces circon-
stances les chances d'un succes certain, si nous avions eu alors,
sur nos derrieres, quelques troupes fraiches, et une reserve
solidement organisee, ou bien s'il cut etc possible an general Bour-
baki de faire une diversion qui eut maintenu sur la Loire une
partie des corps avec lesquels le prince Frederic Charles s'acharnait
centre la deuxieme armee."
FAIDHERBE IN THE NORTH. 321
ing in the field towards the end of December.
Advancing from the great fortress of Lille, he pushed
forward to the line of the Somme, in order to reach
the flank of the German invasion ; and this skilful
movement compelled the enemy to evacuate part of
Normandy, and even Amiens. Manteuffel, now the
leader of the First Army, marched rapidly to strike
his adversary down, but Faidherbe had chosen a very
strong position behind the Hallue, an affluent of the
Somme; and the battle that followed did high
honour to the hastily organized levies of the
French. The Germans l tried to turn the right of
Faidherbe, as at Gravelotte, by an out-flanking
movement, and fell in force on his well-protected
centre, but both attacks were without success, and
the French army retained its positions. The essen-
tial difference, however, between troops inured to
1 The "Prussian Staff History," Part ii. vol. ii. p, 110, asserts
that Faidherbe' s army consisted of " some 43,000 men and eighty-
two guns." It was composed of three divisions only; and General
Derrecagaix, " La Gurre Moderne," vol. ii. p. 389, after a care-
ful calculation, estimates the force of the Germans at 28,000 men
and 108 guns, and that of the French at 35,000 men and sixty-six
guns. This excellent writer and critic thus clearly indicates one
of the chief distinctions between an army of recruits and of trained
soldiers : " Meme avec les armes modernes, des soldats impro-
vise"s animes du sentiment de devoir, enflammes par 1'amour de
la patrie, peuvent resister a de vielles troupes, quand ils ont pour
chefs des officiers de valeur et pour theatre de leurs efforts un
terrain de combat favorable. Mais pour depasser ce but, pour
prendre 1'offensive et obtenir des succes decisifs, il faut, on le voit,
des soldats exerces, une organisation solide, une cohesion, et une
discipline que les armees longuement preparees peuvent seules
322 MOLTKE.
war, and mere young soldiers, convinced Faidherbe
that he had not the power to resist the enemy's
second effort ; and he fell back behind the strong-
holds of the north. He had not contemplated an
attempt to relieve Paris, and he had probably accom-
plished all that he had hoped ; Normandy was for
the present freed to some extent from the enemy.
But he had abandoned the offensive, and was com-
pelled to retreat, and Moltke's great object had
been secured; the external zone shielding the
Army of the Meuse, on the northern front of the
siege, had not been even shaken.
We turn to Paris, the chief centre of the intermit-
tent but gigantic struggle, now raging from the
Vosges, and the Jura, along the Loire to the verge of
Brittany. After his retreat behind the Marne on the
3rd December, Ducrot had intended to renew the con-
test within two or three days at most, in order to sup-
port the Army of the Loire, supposed to be on its way
to fche capital. A letter from Moltke, however, in-
forming Trochu of the complete defeat of D' Aurelle,
at Orleans, prevented an attempt to renew the sortie ;
and a fortnight was devoted to the necessary task
of restoring the Second Army of Paris, shattered
frightfully, we have seen, in the contest on the
Marne. Preparations were completed in the third
week of December, for another great effort against
the German lines ; and on this occasion the northern
front of the investing circle was the chief point of
attack, probably because Faidherbe and the Army
of the North were known to be only a few marches
INEFFECTUAL SORTIE FROM PARIS. 323
distant. The sortie was made at daybreak on the
21st, on as vast a scale as that of November ; a
formidable attack on the plain of St. Denis, and
thence on Bondy, and towards the line of the
Marne, was combined with demonstrations against
the lines to the west ; but it failed, after a brief
struggle, and it became evident that the besiegers'
zone was not to be broken by mere assaults, and
that the Parisian levies were losing their former
confidence. Vinoy, indeed, covering his troops by
the fire of numerous batteries placed on the hill of
Avron, captured two or three outposts to the north-
east ; and Ducrot gained some partial success in an
advance between Drancy and the Wood of Bondy.
But the main attack, 1 conducted by Eonciere de
JSToury, a distinguished chief of the French Navy,
was repelled with little difficulty by the Prussian
Guard ; the onset of the French broke in fragments
against Le Bourget, a strongly fortified village, and
though Eonciere was not sustained on his right,
there is no reason to believe that, in any event, the
issue of the conflict would have been different. The
Parisian armies fell back at all points, suffering again
severely from cold and hardship ; but their losses in
the field had not been great, an indication that
their courage had flagged ; and there are grounds
for an opinion expressed by Ducrot, that the Ger-
mans had been informed beforehand of the projected
sortie through their numerous spies.
1 The armour-clad waggons seem to have done good service
with their guns on this occasion.
Y 2
324 MOLTKE.
The easy discomfiture of this effort provoked
irritation and anger in Paris. The Government,
sprung from revolution itself, was little able to quell
revolutionary clamour, and exhibited alarming signs
of weakness. The Ministry, too, was divided in
mind; a minority, supported in this by Ducrot, saw
in Moltke's letter a pacific overture, and thought
that the time to treat had come ; but the majority
including Trochu, and led by Gambetta, who
though absent, bowed his colleagues to his will-
insisted on prolonging the struggle. The reins of
power were held with increasing slackness; and this
was not only injurious to the defence, but strength-
ened the evil and noxious elements abounding at all
times in the capital of France. Vile demagogues
eager to gain cheaply applause for themselves, by
appeals to the multitude, denounced the Govern-
ment as false and worthless; a Press, valiant on paper,
echoed their cries ; noisy clubs of Jacobins pro-
nounced for a rising ; the hideous figures, which,
before long, were to become the infamous leaders of
the Commune, began to make their influence felt ;
and faction and disorder raged in parts of the city. 1
The attitude, nevertheless, of Paris, as a whole,
continued to be, as it had been from the first, un-
daunted, patient, calm, and heroic. The work of
the defence went steadily on ; arrangements were
made for another great sortie, and no signs of yield-
1 For all these details see Ducrot's " La Defense de Paris,"
vol. iii. pp. 189, 232.
STATE OF PARIS. 325
ing appeared, though the bombardment, it was
known, was at hand, and the batteries of Avron
were soon to be destroyed by siege guns brought
up by the Germans after Vinoy's late ineffectual
effort. The citizens, unawed, still sternly held
out ; and this, though the sufferings of all classes
had already become intense, nay terrible. The mass
of- the population had been placed on rations, and
had no sustenance but a worthless compound that
scarcely deserved the name of bread. Domestic
animals and the vermin of the sewer had for weeks
been eagerly consumed for food ; and the spectre of
famine was even now visible. The death-rate was
increasing with frightful speed; the mortality of
the young had become appalling, and the gay,
animated, and resplendent city wore the aspect of a
plague- stricken space, cut off from the world, left in
outer darkness, and frozen by the cold of an Arctic
winter, for light and fire had almost vanished. Yet
the population which, two centuries before, had
defied Conde and Anne of Austria in their boasts
that Paris could not do without the delicacy of the
" bread of Gonesse," proved that its courage had
not declined, and still kept more formidable enemies
at bay. 1
1 Ducrot was an Imperialist and had no sympathy with the
population of Paris ; but he describes its conduct in this language :
"La Defense de Paris," vol. iii. p. 217 : "A part le groupe des
factieux, des revolutionnaires, qu'il ne peut jamais compter quand
il s'agit de devoir, de sacrifice, a part cette populace sans nom, sans
foi, sans patrie, ecume cosmopolite qui salit toutes les grandes
326 MOLTKE.
Moltke had not made his influence felt decisively,
in the field, in this passage of the war. He had
left his lieutenants to do their work in the provinces,
and had only interposed in a single instance,
with the Grand Duke and Prince Frederick Charles.
But, confining himself to the great labour of the
siege, and of the operations depending on itj he had
so strengthened the double zone around Paris, and
far beyond in France, that he might expect success
in the near future. He had continued to make the
best use of the huge reinforcements ever coming in;
and he had largely increased of late the armies in
the field, enormously reduced by the never-ending
contest. His grasp was even now on the throat
of the capital, for its power of resistance was
visibly on the wane ; and while he could defy all
that the besieged could do, he could always array
imposing forces against the provincial armies,
villes, on peut dire qu'a Paris toutes les classes, riches ou pauvres,
tons les ages, jeunes ou vieux, rivaliserent d'ardeur, de devoue-
ment. Chacun mettant de cote efc ses affections et ses esperances,
ne songea qu'au pays menace ; devant la Patrie en peril, il n'y out
plus qu'un grand parti, celui de la Patrie." M. Viollet Le Due is
equally a trustworthy witness from an opposite point of view in
politics : " Memoire sur la Defense de Paris," p. 32 : " Oui
1'attitude de la population de Paris est faite pour toucher prof onde-
ment les ames vraiment fra^aises. A part quelques echauffourees
ridicules autant qu'odieuses, et trop bien annoncees par Tennemi
pour n'etes pas un pen son ouvrage, cette population, signalee dans
le monde comme futile, legere, tcute a son bien etre et ego'iste et
toute a ses plaisirs, a donn un example, peut-etre unique dans
1'histoire, de Constance, de fermete, d'abnegation, et de charite
delicate."
THE WAR AT THE END OF DECEMBER. 327
spread as these were on a vast circumference of
which he held the centre. He could now easily
send detachments from the besieging circle to the
external zone; and he had, besides, this immense
advantage : he could flash his orders to all parts of
France from the Rhine to the Loire, and thence to
the Seine, while the communication between Paris
and all her armies of relief was tardy and precarious
in the extreme. The balance was turning against
France, and the invasion, at first a broken current,
had become a destructive and far- spreading flood.
Her exertions, however, were still worthy of her;
the patriotic movement was as strong as e.ver;
Glambetta still created new armies; Faidherbe re-
mained unconquered in the north ; the illustrious
Chanzy had reduced two hostile armies to impotence
for a time, and was menacing the besiegers' lines ;
Bourbaki, Garibaldi and Cremer were in the field ;
and armed levies were on foot in still growing
multitudes. Strong as it was, the external zone
might yet yield to well applied pressure ; so long as
the invaders were kept around Paris their position
could not be deemed safe, nor would the fall of the
capital necessarily lead to the defeat and the sub-
jugation of France. If, at this supreme moment,
her armed strength were ably directed and husbanded
with care, the ultimate issue of the gigantic strife
of infuriated races was still far from certain.
CHAPTER X.
Retrospect of the military situation since Sedan Position of
affairs on the theatre of war at the end of 1870 What the
operations of the French ought to have been Wise views of
Chanzy Gambetta directs Bourbaki and the First Army of
the Loire towards the east Keekless imprudence of this
strategy in existing circumstances The Grand Duke and
Prince Frederick Charles advance against Chanzy and
the Second Army of the Loire Skilful operations of
Chanzy Battle of Le Mans The Germans held in check all
day The capture of one point in the line of defence at night
compels Chanzy to retreat He falls back on Laval and
reorganizes his troops Campaign in the north Faidherbe
successful at Bapaume He moves on St. Quentin, and
retreats after an indecisive battle Campaign in the east
Bad condition of Bourbaki's army He advances against
Werder, and is successful at Villersexel He loses a great
opportunity, chiefly owing to the state of his troops
Werder retreats behind the Lisaine. Battles of Hericourt,
and retreat of Bourbaki Paris isolated The external zone
of the Germans intact Bombardment of the forts -and the
enceinte of Paris The city bombarded Complete failure of
the attack Sortie of the 19th January It fails Sufferings
of the population of Paris Its heroic attitude The
armistice Bourbaki's army excepted Views of Chanzy in
the event of hostilities being resumed His masterly arrange-
ments and unshaken constancy Advance of Manteuffel and
the German Army of the South against Bourbaki Skill
of Moltke in directing this operation Bourbaki tries to
commit suicide Catastrophe of his army, chiefly owing to a
misunderstanding as to the armistice It is forced to cross
THE WAR AT THE END OF DECEMBER. 329
the frontier of France, and to retreat into Switzerland Fall
of Belfort and other French fortresses Chanzy is still for
war The Assembly at Bordeaux pronounces for peace
The Treaty of Frankfort Part taken by Moltke in the
conditions imposed on France Reflections on the war, with
special references to events after Sedan.
THE end of December was now at hand ; we may
rapidly glance back at the course of the struggle
colossal, and still of varying fortunes which had
raged in France since the catastrophe of Sedan.
Moltke had marched on Paris with a comparatively
small force, leaving his communications almost
closed, and not to speak of Bazaine and his army
with a series of fortresses in his rear ; and he had
taken this step because he believed, in common with
all in the German camp, that France and her
capital would not dare to resist. Like Diebitsch,
praised in his " Letters on the East," he had
pressed boldly forward to bring the war to a close,
but unlike Diebitsch, Moltke had to deal, not with
the effete Turk, but with the French people. Paris
had shut her gates, and France rose to arms. The
invaders, bound to the investing circle they had
drawn round the defiant city, were for months ex-
posed to the incessant attacks of levies formidable
in numbers and power ; the Germans were placed in
grave peril, and their operations, which had been a
succession of triumphs, became for a time feeble,
uncertain, tentative. Moltke had emerged safe from
this sea of troubles partly because Metz had fallen
before its time, partly because Gambetta, with
330 MOLTKE.
extreme unwisdom, had misdirected the arms of
France, but chiefly, perhaps, because the whole
German nation had passionately joined in a war of
races, and had made gigantic efforts to support its
armies.
But if Moltke had been mistaken in the first
instance, his firmness, his energy, his clear insight,
had done much to incline the balance of fortune, as
the strife progressed, to the side of Germany. He
had taken the true course for reducing Paris ; he
had written, indeed, thirty years before, that
" Towns of half a million of men do not fall by
force of arms," * and dangerous as the situation had
been, he could almost count on the fall of the city.
Meanwhile, with steadfast aim and unchanging
purpose, he had devoted himself to the two-fold
task of making his communications with the Rhine
secure, and opening a broad way for the invasion,
and of so strengthening the external zone he had
thrown from the first around the besiegers, that
it would be able to resist the French in the field ;
and in this he had at last succeeded, having made
the best use of the huge reinforcements placed
unreservedly in his hands by Germany. By this
time many of the fortresses in their way had fallen ;
the German armies occupied France from the Saone
and the Loire to the Oise and the Somme ; thrown
on the defensive during the first months of the
siege, they could now generally take a bold
offensive, and Moltke, fortunately given an un-
1 The Kussians in Bulgaria and Rumelia, p. 435.
THE WAK AT THE END OF DECEMBER. 331
divided command, was at last able to make their
immense power felt. He could with safety send
detachments from Paris, to add to the force of the
external zone, for the strength of the besieged was
failing ; he could direct the invading armies, at a
moment's notice, from a central position, and on
interior lines, against enemies scattered along a
huge circle, and scarcely able to transmit a message
to Paris ; and these conditions, as we have already
pointed out, gave him a great, if not a decisive
advantage in the final contest about to begin.
Moltke, in a word, had been like a mariner, whose
craft, struck by a sudden gust of wind, had been
nearly thrown on its beam ends, but who, having
averted shipwreck by courage and skill, could now
look forward to a prosperous voyage.
If we turn to France, her complete prostration
after Sedan had seemed to invite the Germans to
dictate peace in the midst of the capital. But
Paris and the nation had sprung to arms, and the
vast elements of military power in France, combined
and arrayed by Gambetta's genius, had been suddenly
formed into huge levies, which had checked and
imperilled the amazed conquerors. The besieged
city held the invaders to the spot, and the waves
of an immense and universal rising, gathered in on
all sides, on the German hosts, and more than once
seemed about to engulph them. The premature
surrender of Metz, however, had removed many of
the dangers at hand ; the Army of the Loire, which
could have done great things, had been recklessly
332 MOLTKE.
wasted in the field ; the vigorous sortie of Ducro.t
had failed, and after these reverses the provincial
armies had, on the whole, been undoubtedly
worsted, and Paris, which, in any event, would have
to yield to famine, if not relieved, was exhibiting
signs of increasing weakness. The military situa-
tion had become of evil omen for France, and the
position of the armies in Paris, and of the armies
outside, was, as we have pointed out, unfavourable
in the extreme. The prospect, nevertheless, was
by no means desperate, if the prodigious resources
of the nation for war were even now employed with
real skill and judgment. So long as Paris continued
to hold out, the invaders were more or less in-
secure ; Moltke's external zone might even yet be
broken, exposed as it was to far spreading attacks,
and, in that event, the result would bode ill for
them. Nor was France vanquished, though Paris
should yield ; half of her territory was not yet
occupied, and the national rising had been so
powerful that it might yet weary the Germans
out, if conducted on a wise defensive system.
France, too, had still large armies in the field;
Chanzy had done wonders with his young levies ;
Faidherbe was by no means a contemptible foe ;
Gambetta had added 1 four new corps to those he
had already raised, and behind them was an in-
exhaustible supply of armed men, eager to fight for
their country. Opinion in Europe, even at this
great crisis, refused to predict the course of fast-
1 The 19th, 24th, 25th and 26th corps.
THE WAR AT THE END OF DECEMBEK. 333
coming events, as can be seen by referring to the
Press of the day.
A few words will describe the positions of the
belligerents on the theatre of war. Swelled by rein-
forcements, of which the estimate has varied from
half a million to 300,000 men, 1 the Germans in
France were fully 800,000 strong, this immense
total including a mass of non-combatants. The
besiegers of Paris had been reduced from some
250,000 to 200,000 men, and the rest of the vast
invading host was divided into garrisons of the
captured fortresses, troops holding the communica-
tions to the east, and the armies actively engaged
in the field. The Grand Duke and Prince Frederick
Charles were, the one at Chartres, the other at
Orleans, having received large additions to their
1 The " Prussian Staff History " scarcely alludes to these rein-
forcements ; the writer, no doubt, wishes to keep out of sight the
tremendous strain put on the resources of Germany, and does not
like to admit how much a half-despotic military monarchy owed to a
great national movement. In an appendix, indeed, vol. v. p. 106, a
statement is introduced to the effect that the reinforcements sent
to the German army, from the beginning of the war to March ,
1871, were about 240,000 men; but this seems to include only
troops sent to the armies round Paris and in the field, and not to
refer to the troops that covered the communications and held the
fortresses of France. This estimate, it may be affirmed, falls far
short of the truth, as ascertained by many authorities. A corre
spondent of the Times wrote these significant words at this junc-
ture ; they tell more than carefully-arranged statistics : " That
the whole country (of Germany) is being fast drained of its able-
bodied male population is becoming terribly evident. The contrast
since my visit in October is very striking. The number of men
in the prime of life seems fearfully diminished."
334 MOLTKE.
shattered forces, and they were observing Chanzy
and Bourbaki alike, each supposed to be trying to
march to the relief of the capital. To the north
Manteuffel was watching Faidherbe, and sending
detachments to overrun Normandy ; and Werder,
with an army ever on the increase, was occupying
Burgundy and Franche Comte, and endeavouring to
hasten the siege of Belfort, which was making a most
stubborn defence. At the south-eastern part of the
external zone Moltke had raised a new barrier
against the enemy ; he had brought back to Paris
the 1st Bavarian corps, almost ruined by the efforts
of Chanzy, but he was despatching from the siege
the 2nd corps, to give support to the 7th, which,
we have seen, was extended upon a long line con-
necting Prince Frederick Charles with Werder.
On the French side, the armies in Paris had been
greatly reduced in numbers 100,000 men had pro-
bably disappeared and the fighting power of the
city, we have said, was failing, while a month would
see the end of the store of provisions. As for the
provincial armies, Chanzy was at Le Mans, his
troops not reinforced as fully as he had hoped ;
Bourbaki had, in some measure, restored his army,
now given the name of the First Army of the Loire,
and both commanders were in positions that enabled
them to try to advance on Paris by a direct and well-
combined movement. For the rest, Faidherbe was
threatening the enemy on the Somme ; a large array
of levies was filling the region between the Lower
Seine, the Eure, and the Mayenne ; Garibaldi and
THE WAR AT THE END OF DECEMBER. 335
Cremer were still opposing Werder; and a new
army, which had been formed in the south, was on
the way from Provence to Eranche Comte'. Not-
withstanding her losses, France had still at least a
million of men in arms, and these prodigious num-
bers were yet growing. These improvised forces,
however, we need scarcely repeat, were not trained
or well-organized soldiers; they were ill-furnished
with many kinds of appliances needed for great
movements, and, as it was now the depth of a severe
winter, they were especially unfit for operations
that required celerity, endurance, and power of
manoeuvre.
In these circumstances common sense pointed out
the course of operations for the arms of France.
An attempt to relieve Paris was the necessity of the
hour, for the city could not hold out much longer,
and this could be accomplished only by an imme-
diate advance of the provincial armies on the
beleaguered capital. As the effort, too, would not
improbably fail, it was absolutely essential, with a
view to the defence of France in the near future,
that the armies of relief should run as little risk as
possible, and should possess lines of retreat open, in
order to maintain and prolong the contest. All
this was perfectly seen by Chanzy, the one com-
mander on' the side of France who gave proof of
real strategic insight, and was an adversary fit to
cope with Moltke ; and, at this juncture, be en-
treated Gambetta in despatches which should be
carefully studied to give direction to the conduct of
336 MOLTKE.
the war, which alone promised success or safety. He
clearly perceived the prodigious value of Moltke's
central position and interior lines, and the facilities
they gave the German commander to keep his hold
on the Parisian forces, and to defeat the armies
outside in detail,, and he did justice to the skill and
resource of his enemy. But, like a true soldier, he
had not ceased to hope, and he thought that victory
might yet be plucked from danger. A concentric
march of all the provincial levies from their present
positions on the besiegers' lines, combined with
determined sorties from Paris, might yet, he believed,
cause the siege to be raised, nay, lead to a reverse
for the German arms, and, in any event, an opera-
tion of the kind would enable the French to fall
back and renew hostilities in the still intact pro-
vinces. He proposed, therefore, that, at a given
time, he should advance from Le Mans to the
Seine; that Bourbaki, from the Loire, should make
a corresponding movement ; that Faidherbe should
press forward from across the Somme ; that armed
levies should march in second line ; and that, when
the occasion had come, the armies in Paris should
make desperate efforts to join in the attacks of all
the armies uniting from without, and thus endeavour
to force the zone of investment. Were this once
effected, the Germans around Paris would obviously
be placed in the gravest peril. 1
1 Charizy's views will be found in "La Deuxieme Armee de la
Loire," pp. 234, 254. We have only space for a few words :
" Dispose comnie il Test 1'ennemi cherche evidemment a se pro-
MASTERLY VIEWS OF CHANZY. 337
This project of Chanzy was, from every point of
view, the best that could be formed as affairs stood ;
even if it had failed, as we think would have hap-
pened, it was not hopeless, and it was at least safe,
and it was the one that Moltke expected and
feared. 1 Most unhappily for France, Gambetta had
lent an ear to the counsels of a theorist ignorant of
war, and had already committed himself to a grand
scheme of operations on an imposing scale, in which
his fervid imagination beheld a glorious prospect.
He had been forcibly impressed by the success with
which he had recently moved large masses from the
Saone to the Loire, and had unquestionably sur-
prised the German commanders ; he had organized,
we have seen, a new force in the South, which had
been named the 24th corps ; he had called into
being the 25th, near the Loire ; and opinion in
France was eager for the relief of Belfort, defended,
we have said, heroically for months, and for a
senter successivement, et en forces, devant chacune de nos armees ;
il manoeuvre tres habilement. . . . Nos trois principales armees
une fois sur les positions indiquees, se mettre en communication
avec Paris et combiner des-lors leurs efforts de chaque jour pour se
rapprocher de 1'objectif commun avec des sorties vigoureuses de
1'armee de Paris, de f a9on a obliger les troupes ennemis d'investisse-
ment a se maintenir tout entieres dans leurs lignes. Le resultat
sera des-lors dans le sucees d'une des attaques exterieures, et si ce
succes est obtenu, si 1'investissement peut-etre rompu sur un point
un ravittaillement de Paris peut devenir possible, 1'ennemi peut-etre
refoule et contraint d'abandonner une partie de ses lignes et de
nouveaux efforts combines entre les armees de 1'exterieur et de
1'interieur, peuvent dans la lutte supreme aboutir a la delivrance."
1 "Prussian Staff History," Partii. vol. ii. p. 143; "The Franco-
German War," vol. ii. pp. 87, 88, English translation.
Z
338 MOLTKE.
great effort to give succour to Paris. With these
facts before him, and knowing besides that Bour-
baki had a large army round Bourges, and that
Garibaldi and Cremer held their own in Burgundy,
at the head of forces in considerable strength, Gam-
betta, yielding to shallow advice, thought that he
possessed the means of compassing at once the various
objects he had in view, and he had devised a plan
which, as he conceived, would alike ensure the
raising of the siege of Belfort, would compel the
besiegers to draw off from Paris, and would, perhaps,
cause the invasion to collapse. Fired with this
vision of splendour, he had taken on himself, with-
out consulting a single French chief, to order Bour-
baki to break up from his camps, and to move, not
directly on the Seine, but into Franche-Comte', far to
the east and this operation, which was to be con-
ducted rapidly, and carefully concealed, was to be
combined with a general advance of the 24th corps
from Lyons and the south, and of a considerable
detachment led by Cremer ; these bodies uniting
with Bourbaki, and joining in a decisive movement
against Werder, standing alone in their path, and
thence into the heart of Alsace. By these means
Werder would be overpowered, attacked by an im-
mensely larger force ; the siege of Belfort would be
abandoned ; and Bourbaki, having seized and held
the long line of the German communications with the
Rhine, would force Moltke to give up the siege of
Paris and to endeavour to gain contact with Ger-
many again, and would, perhaps, obtain most
UNWISE PEOJECT OF GAMBETTA. 339
important successes. Garibaldi was to cover the great
march on the left ; and the 25th corps was to make
demonstrations on the Loire which would probably
detain Prince Frederick Charles round Orleans.
This plan of Gambetta was as ill-conceived, at
least, as that which sent the Army of Chalons to
its fate. A great concentric movement of the pro-
vincial armies was the only rational way to relieve
Paris ; this was an eccentric movement, which
could hardly succeed, and which would, perhaps,
lead to immense disasters. As a question of pure
strategy, the direction of Bourbaki and his Army,
to the east, would, almost certainly, enable Prince
Frederick Charles and the Grand Duke to attack
Chanzy, and to defeat him, greatly reinforced as
they were ; and even if Bourbaki, Cremer, and the
corps from the South, should effect their junction
in Franche-Comte, it would be a waste of time to
attempt to raise the siege of Belfort. Nor was it
obvious that Werder would be crushed ; and even
if all these results were attained, the occupation of
Alsace, and the seizure by the French of the com-
munications of the enemy, on that line, would not
even probably force the Germans away from Paris,
and make them abandon the investing circle, for
they were masters of the railways and roads that
led into Lorraine from the Palatinate and the
Rhenish Provinces, and besides, they could obtain
supplies in France, that would suffice until the fall of
the city was at hand. The stroke at the communi-
cations, in a word, would be at too remote a point
z 2
340 MOLTKE.
to prove decisive, or even important ; l and, on the
other hand, the operation would, from first to last,
be inevitably pregnant with many perils, especially
if Garibaldi should not be able to throw back the
forces, which might be despatched, from the external
zone, on the flank and rear of Bourbaki's army as
he approached Alsace. This strategy, therefore,
was, even in theory, false; but the question was
not one of pure strategy ; it was that of the
execution of an ambitious design, under existing
conditions well-nigh impossible, and all but certain
to prove disastrous. The means of transporting
the First Army of the Loire into Franche-Comte
were very imperfect ; nearly all the troops to be
engaged in an enterprise which, in order to have a
chance of success, required soldiers inured to war,
equal to forced marches, and well organized, were
little more than an assemblage of recruits ; the
movement was to be made under an Arctic climate,
in a mountainous, intricate, and barren country;
and no preparations had been made beforehand to
secure for the great host that was to be combined,
the munitions, the food, and the other supplies
absolutely necessary to enable it to march or to
fight. To commit rude levies, in circumstances
like these, to a task beyond their powers, and itself
most dangerous, was recklessness that deserves
the severest censure. 2
1 See on this point Hamley's " Operations of War," p. 128. Ed.
1889.
2 Writers have been found, who have compared this project of
MARCH OF BOURBAKI TO THE EAST. 341
In the last week of December, the First Army of
the Loire, the 18th and 20th corps, followed by the
15th, had set off on its march to Franche-Comte.
Gambetta had all the advantage of a surprise, 1 for
the German commanders, as had so often happened,
had lost sight of their enemy's movements ; and
they thought Bourbaki was about to advance on
Paris. But the difficulties of the enterprise were
apparent from the first : the railways between the
Loire and the Saone were inadequate to convey
large masses of men ; the troops had begun to
suffer from cold and privations, and hundreds sank
under contagious diseases ; and the progress of the
Army was slow in the extreme. Meanwhile, the
Grand Duke and Prince Frederick Charles had left
their camps to assail Chanzy, the adversary most
dangerous to the arms of Germany. Their armies
were now about 90,000 strong; but a strategic
mistake which might have cost them dear they
left a large detachment to observe the Loire, being
ignorant that Bourbaki was far distant; and they
Gambetta to Napoleon's magnificent conception of the Campaign
of 1800. It resembled it as the fancy of a lunatic resembles the
ordered imagination of Dante. Of the execution of the two plans
not a word need be said : Gambetta had nothing ready ; Napoleon's
preparations were matured with the greatest care. For myself,
when apprised of Bourbaki's fatal march, I telegraphed to the
correspondent before referred to, " This will be another Sedan."
1 Surprises, in these days of telegraphs, are probably more
difficult than they were in the age of Napoleon. Gambetta,
nevertheless, surprised the Germans on two and even three
occasions. The " plans d'avocat " have been rightly condemned ;
but justice should be done to a man of real genius.
342 3VIOLTKE.
marched on Le Mans, in the first days of the new
year, converging against Chanzy, with some 75,000
men, by a double movement from Chartres and
Orleans. They had hoped to surprise and over-
whelm their enemy; but they were disappointed
in this from the outset ; and another fine passage
of arms was the result.
Chanzy, we have seen, had fallen back on Le
Mans after the memorable stand he had made on
the Loire. Le Mans is a strategic point of the
greatest value, for a series of railways meets on the
spot, especially from the north, the south, and the
west, by which reinforcements can be easily brought
up ; and it affords admirable positions for defence.
The French chief had led his army to the place in
the hope of strengthening it greatly with new levies,
and of ultimately directing it to the relief of Paris,
when it had been made equal to renewed efforts.
He had expected 60,000 men to join him ; but these
numbers had dwindled down to about 15,000, for
the Army of the West was still incomplete ; and the
recruits, drawn for the most part from Brittany,
and largely composed of peasants of La Vendee,
were not inclined to leave their native province,
and had traditional feelings against a French Ee-
public. The Second Army of the Loire, however,
had been made about 90,000 or even 100,000 strong ;
Chanzy had placed it in positions around Le Mans,
which he had fortified with forethought and skill ;
and he stood, with the mass of his forces, on either
bank of the Huisne, ready to encounter the German
THE GEEMANS ADVANCE AGAINST CHANZT. 343
attack. But lie eschewed, as always, a passive
defence ; he had, we have said, sent flying columns,
before his retreat, as far as the Loir ; and these
detachments now filled the tract between the Braye,
the Huisne, and the Loir, in order to confront and
throw back the enemy. As the Grand Duke and
Prince Frederick Charles advanced through the
intricate region that extends between Nogent Le
Eotru, and Vendome, and ends, in an angle, at Le
Mans, they had to fight their way through bodies
of foes that held them in check, still falling back ;
and it became evident that they had no chance of
taking their able adversary unawares. A long
succession of combats followed between the 4th
and the 9th of January ; the Germans steadily made
their way forward by La Ferte Bernard, St. Calais,
and Bouloire, drawing towards each other on
Chanzy's lines ; and the young French soldiers,
as was sure to happen, showed signs of weakness and
loss of heart, as they retreated before their trained
antagonists. The invaders, nevertheless, were
greatly harassed, and suffered no inconsiderable
loss, as they toiled through the district of thickets
and streams, of infrequent roads, of passes and
defiles, which divides the Loir from the Sarthe
and the Huisne ; and the mitrailleuse, an inferior
weapon, was made to do good service, for the first
time, in this close and difficult country. The
general result of their first operations was that
Chanzy's levies had been worsted, and part of his
right wing had been isolated, and was unable to
344 MOLTKE.
join the main army. But the Germans had also
been severely stricken ; 1 and the 10th corps of
Prince Frederick Charles was considerably, in the
rear, on his left.
By the evening of the 9th of January, the
Germans had converged on Chanzy's positions be-
fore Le Mans. The army of the Grand Duke, called
again the 13th corps, comprising the divisions he
had led for months, stood on the right, on the
eastern bank of the Huisne ; the centre, the 3rd and
the 9th corps, held the main road that led from
Vendome to Le Mans, but the left, the 10th corps,
we have seen, was distant. The leaders, on both
sides, had wished to assume the offensive, but
Chanzy, who had acutely felt the growing demorali-
zation of his immature troops, took care to be the
first to attack, in order to restore in some degree their
confidence. On the 10th 2 another succession of
engagements took place ; at the centre the French
were driven fairly back, and the 3rd corps stormed
the hamlet of Change almost on the verge of
Chanzy's lines. But on the German right little
progress was made ; the Grand Duke, indeed, suc-
cessfully crossed the Huisne, and placed part of his
1 " La Deuxieme Armee de La Loire/' 307 : " Tous les ren-
seignements recueillis depuis, de la bouche ineme des officiers de
i'ctat major prussien pendant leur sejour au Mans, confirment
1'etat de decouragement auquel cette lutte opiniatre et pied a pied
avait reduit leurs troupes."
2 As in the case with all the operations of Chanzy, the " Prus-
sian Staff History," Part ii. vol. ii. p. 139-219, contains an imperfect
and misleading description of this episode of the war. The real
THE BATTLE OF LE MANS. 345
troops on the western bank ; but he was held in
check by the enemy in his front, and he failed to
execute the turning movement against the French
left which had been his purpose. By nightfall
Chanzy had drawn in his hard-pressed army within
its lines, and made ready for a great fight on the
morrow. His divisions, covered on part of their
front by entrenchments, batteries, and obstacles of
all kinds, affording a vantage ground to the fire of
his infantry, were extended in a line of about ten
miles in length, from the confluence of the Sarthe
and the Huisne, to the villages of Chanteloup and
Lombron, north of Le Mans, on the western bank
of the Huisne ; and they formed a semicircle
around Le Mans, shielding the ancient town from the
enemy's efforts. Chanzy's right, composed of part
of his 16th corps part, we have seen, had not come
into line held the roads that meet at Pontlieu,
before Le Mans, the certain avenues of attack ; and
he had reinforced this wing with a body of Gardes
Mobiles, despatched lately to his camps from Brit-
tany. The 17th corps, his centre, was ranged
along a series of uplands, known by the name of
Auvours, the key of his position in front ; and his
left wing, the 21st corps, with other divisions, was
placed on the western bank of the Huisne, to make
head against the Grand Duke's forces. Chanzy
character of the battle of Le Mans especially is not placed correctly
before the reader. The narrative of Chanzy, " La Deuxieme
Armee de la Loire," pp. 223-371, is more complete and far more
trustworthy. It deserves attentive study.
346 MOLTKE.
firmly held the passages of the Huisne, where his
centre came in contact with his left ; and his troops
could support each other along the whole line, and
had facilities for making counter-attacks. He had
from 80,000 to 90,000 men in his hands, with be-
tween 300 and 400 guns.
The German leaders disposed of about 70,000
men, and rather more than 300 guns, to attack the
French levies in this position. The general idea
of their operations was this : the Grand Duke was
to turn the left wing of Chanzy, by a great out-
flanking movement west of the Huisne, while Prince
Frederick Charles was to assail the French centre in
front. On the morning of the llth the German
columns marched on the points selected for attack ;
and the 3rd Corps, always foremost in the fight,
which, as we have said, had seized Change, advanced
boldly against the heights of Auvours. The false
tactics of Worth were, however, repeated ; the effort
of the 3rd Corps was premature ; the troops were
exposed to their foes, so to speak, piecemeal, and
the resistance of the French was so successful,
that the 9th and even the 10th Corps, still in the
rear, were summoned to take part in the frontal
attack. The battle raged on for several hours ;
the spell of Chanzy 's example and presence inspired
his lieutenants and his best troops ; he had terrified
the weak and cowardly with severe menaces ; the
position of Auvours was taken and then retaken ;
and ultimately it remained in the defenders' power.
Meanwhile the Grand Duke had been baffled ; his
THE BATTLE OF LE MANS. 347
divisions proved unable to pass Chant eloup and
Lombron, on the extreme French left ; and the turn-
ing movement was stopped on this part of the line.
By nightfall the French still held the positions they
had fought for throughout a fiery trial ; and Chanzy,
who had been the soul of a masterly defence, direct-
ing his troops to every threatened point, and taking
the offensive when the chances offered, looked
forward at last to victory at hand. 1 Ere long,
however, a disastrous incident changed the issue of
the battle at the last moment. The 10th Corps,
advancing towards Pontlieu, over whelmed the Breton
Mobiles in their path ; the important point of La
Tuilerie was lost ; and Chanzy 's right centre was
pierced through by an enemy fast approaching Le
Mans. Jaureguibbery, now the chief of the 16th
Corps, as gallant a seaman as ever trod a deck, made
a desperate effort to throw the Germans back ; but
the 10th Corps stubbornly held its ground, and
though the French remained in their camps through
the night, the position of Chanzy had become unten-
able.
It had now become necessary to retreat from
Le Mans, and to resist the invaders on another line
of defence. Had the Germans retained their effici-
1 "L'action dura sur taute la ligne jusqu'a six heures du soir.
La nuit etait venue, nous etions restes maitres de toutes nos
positions, de ce cote comme au plateau d'Auvours, et sur la voie
droite de 1'Huisne. Notre seul echec serieux avait ete 1'evacuation
momentanee d'Auvours, mais il avait ete rapidement et brillamment
reparee." La Deuxieme Armee de la Loire, pp. 318-19. Not a
word of this appears in the Prussian accounts.
348 MOLTKE.
ency and power, they ought to have annihilated the
defeated army ; but they had been hardly stricken in
the late battle ; l they had suffered from privations
and forced marches, and their pursuit of the enemy
was slow and feeble. 2 Thousands of Chanzy's recruits,
indeed, disbanded, and he lost nearly a fourth part
of his levies, but he drew off the mass of his army
intact, and except a combat in the streets of Le Mans,
and two or three insignificant skirmishes, he was
scarcely molested in his retreat. Always steady in
his purpose to relieve Paris, he intended at first to
march on Alen^on, where he would be nearer the
capital than at Le Mans, and he probably could have
attained his object, though the Prussian staff has
condemned this strategy. 3 Gambetta, however,
directed him to diverge westwards, in order to
obtain reinforcements at hand, and to avoid an
1 " The Prussian Staff History," Part ii. vol.ii. p. 200, 205, 210,
cannot conceal how much the Germans had suffered : " The Grand
Duke had but few full battalions at his disposal ; the exhaustion
of his troops was great. . . . The effective of the 3rd Corps had
become extremely weak, the loss on the last day, especially in
officers, having been considerable. . . . Many of the companies
were commanded by sergeant-majors."
2 " La Deuxieme Armee de la Loire," pp. 347, 367 :
L'ennemi ne s'etait montre entreprenant nulle part. ... Us
avaient du reste considerablement souffert pendant les trois
derniers jours ; leurs soldats etaient cpuise's. . . . Ces instructions
furent executees en tout point et sans que 1'ennemi cherchat de
nouveau a" inquieter la retraite."
3 " Prussian Staff History," Part ii. vol. ii. p. 200. This view
is, no doubt, in theory right ; and Chanzy was aware of the danger
of a march on Alen9on. But he probably would have reached
the place ; the pursuit was so ineffectual.
RETREAT OF CHANZY TO LAVAL. 349
operation apparently rash : and by the 16th January
he had reached the Mayenne, and had taken posi-
tions around Laval, another important strategic
point, where he could easily receive aid from the
north and the west. He was ere long strengthened
by the 19th Corps, another of Gambetta's new
creations ; and, in a few days, he had to a great
extent, reorganized and restored the Second Army
of the Loire, with characteristic skill and energy.
From Laval he still turned an eye on Paris, hoping
against hope that he might yet reach the Seine ;
but though disasters were thickening all round, he
continued to insist that the fall of the capital ought
not to involve the submission of France, and he
prepared himself for renewed efforts. Meanwhile
the German leaders had given up a pursuit which
had really been one only in name. The Grand
Duke had been sent off into Normandy, the
movements of the enemy in the north requiring
assistance to be given to the First Army. The
apparition, too, of the 25th Corps on the Loire had
compelled Prince Frederick Charles to detach the
9th to observe and keep back this new hostile
force ; and Chanzy at Laval was only confronted
by the 3rd and 10th Corps of the Second
Army, not sufficiently strong to venture to
attack.
In this brief and indecisive contest Chanzy had
withstood trained and well-organized armies, which,
but for the detachment left behind at Orleans,
might have been nearly equal to his own in numbers,
350 MOLTKE.
with an army composed, in the main, of recruits.
He had been defeated, no doubt, in a pitched battle,
but the defeat only fell short of a victory ; and,
after his admirable defence of Le Mans, he had
effected his retreat, and had been scarcely pursued,
if panic and desertion had deprived him of some
20,000 of his young soldiers. The result does him
the highest honour ; the strategy and tactics of his
antagonists, in truth, were very far from good,
especially on the day of Le Mans ; and his superiority
as a leader became again manifest. But he had
not the less been forced away from Paris ; he had
not a chance of relieving the capital now; the
object of Moltke had been gained ; the Grand Duke
and Prince Frederick Charles had advanced from
the external zone, and had driven their ablest adver-
sary back, and they held a central position and
stood on interior lines against Chanzy and his army
on the Mayenne.
We pass on to the theatre of war in the
north, where the ubiquitous contest was being
still prolonged. After the indecisive battle on the
Hallue, Faidherbe had fallen back, we have seen,
northwards ; and Peronne, the " virgin fortress "
of the seventeenth century, had been besieged by
part of the First Army. In the first days of
January, Faidherbe advanced again, perhaps in the
hope of relieving the place, which gave him a
passage over the Somme, and on the 3rd he en-
countered a hostile force at Bapaume, not far to
the south of Arras. The French were largely
superior in numbers, and endeavoured to surround
FAIDHERBE IN THE NORTH. 351
and overwhelm their enemies; but the Germans
made a stubborn defence, entrenched in the villages
around Bapaume, and the combat remained for
hours doubtful. At last, however, the assailants
fairly won the day ; their adversaries drew off from
Bapaume, and signs of weakness and fear, it is
said, 1 appeared not only among the troops, but
even among some officers in command. The French,
nevertheless, were so exhausted a common failing
with boyish soldiers that they could not follow up
their success; and Bapaume was ultimately re-
gained by the enemy. Meanwhile Peronne had ere
long fallen ; the Germans did not attempt a regular
siege, but the old and small fortress was quickly
reduced, as was seen repeatedly in the war, by
bombardment, a cruel but effective method, in the
case of fortresses of this kind.
A greater and more important battle was fought
on the 19th of January. The last days of the
great siege had come, and Gambetta entreated
Faidherbe to make a diversion in the north in the
hope of assisting a final sortie from the falling
capital. The French commander thought that his
best course was to threaten the German communi-
cations eastwards, and he marched with his two
corps on St. Quentin, a name of ill-omen in the
annals of France. By this time Manteuffel had
been replaced by Goeben, in the command of the
1 Faidherbe quotes from a Berlin correspondent of the Daily
Telegraph, referring to the engagement at Bapaume : "General
von Goeben . . . demands from the commanders of regiments a list
of officers who fled, that they may be instantly cashiered."
352 MOLTKE.
First Army, and the new chief, a very able man,
followed his adversary along both banks of the
Somme. An opportunity, perhaps, 1 was given to
Faidherbe to turn back and try to defeat his pur-
suers in detail, but probably he felt that his rude
levies were not equal to an operation of the kind,
and he was close to St. Quentin on the 18th. Goe-
ben, however, was at hand and ready to attack ;
and Faidherbe had no choice but to accept battle in
defensive positions around the town. Moltke had
long ceased to apprehend danger from attacks made
by the Parisian armies ; he had diminished, we have
seen, the besieging forces, and he had just sent a
detachment from the Army of the Meuse, to co-
operate with Goeben in the impending conflict.
The opposing armies were nearly equal in numbers,
about 32,500 Germans to 40,000 French ; and the
result, therefore, was almost assured. Faidherbe
indeed, showed skill and resource, and his levies
made a gallant defence ; but superior discipline
and training prevailed, and he was forced to retreat
again on the stronghold of the north, after losing
6000 or 7000 men. His attempt to give aid to
Paris had, in a word, failed ; and in his case, as in
that of Chanzy, Moltke had successfully accom-
plished his task. The First Army had issued from
the external zone, and driven away the approaching
enemy ; and Moltke, from the centre where he
stood at Versailles, had been able to throw back
1 " Prussian Staff History," Part ii. vol. ii. p. 263. Chanzy
would probably have made the attempt.
BOURBAKI IN THE EAST. 353
the provincial levies at another point of the vast
circumference, on which they were compelled to
advance. It should be added that the war in the
north came to an end after the fight at St. Quentin ;
the Grand Duke, who had arrived at Rouen, and
the First Army effectually kept down resistance
between the Somme and the Seine.
We turn to the east to follow the course of Gam-
betta's ambitious, but ill-starred, enterprise. 1 The
First Army of the Loii^e, pursued by no enemy, but
retarded, on its way, and already weakened, had
accomplished the first part of its mission ; it had
come into line with Cremer's troops and with the
24th corps, under Bressoles, of the south ; and by
the 2nd of January, the uniting forces were ex-
tended upon a long line, stretching from Dijon to
Auxonne and Besan^on. Bourbaki was now at
the head of 150,000 men, and he advanced on a
broad front, through Franche-Comte, . to attack
Werder, and to raise the siege of Belfort. The
German chief was not 50,000 strong, and evacuated
Dijon, Gray, and Vesoul ; and the French com-
mander began to look forward with hope to success,
with his immensely more numerous forces. The
1 The memorable and important operations of the belligerent
armies in the east, most unfortunate for France, but honourable in
the extreme to Germany, are fully, and on the whole, fairly
described in the "Prussian Staff History," Part ii. vol. ii. 287, 361,
and Part ii. vol. iii. 1, 179. I am not aware that any of the French
commanders have written on the subject. But the evidence of
Bourbaki, and of Generals Borel and Clinchant given in the
Enquete Parlementaire, is very valuable and full of interest.
A a
354 MOLTKE.
march of his army, however, became very slow, as
it reached the wooded and hilly region between the
Saone, the Ognon, and the Doubs ; the left wing
under Oremer was far in the rear ; the line of march
was already crowded with disbanded men, and
perishing horses, and ominous signs of distress were
apparent. Nevertheless Fortune treacherously
smiled at the outset on the ill-conceived adventure.
Bourbaki encountered part of the army of "VVerder
at Yillersexel on the Ognon, on the 9th of January ;
the French levies, encouraged by their superior
numbers, fought well and threw the enemy back ;
and after a long and well-contested struggle, the
Germans retreated, beyond dispute, beaten. 1
A great opportunity, at this moment, was possi-
bly afforded to the French chief. Werder had
hastily moved northwards ; Yillersexel is a point on
the main road to Belfort, hardly three marches
distant, and Bourbaki was as near the fortress as
his defeated enemy. Had Bourbaki, therefore,
pressed boldly forward, he might, perhaps, have
raised the siege of Belfort before Werder could have
interfered ; and success, such as this, would have
been most important. He made, however, a long
halt of four days, and though his " inactivity " has
been censured by the Prussian Staff, 2 his army, ill-
1 The " Prussian Staff History/' Part ii. vol. ii. 318, does not
admit this defeat, but it cannot be really questioned. Bourbaki
deposed at the Enquete Parlementaire : " L'ennemi fut mis en
complete deroute, et laissa un grand nombre de prisonniers dans nos
mains."
2 " Prussian Staff History," Part ii. vol. ii. 322.
BOURBAKT IN THE EAST. 355
provided, and depending for supplies on the rail-
way line from Eesangon only, appears to have been
unable to move. 1 The alarm of Werder was, never-
theless, great ; he contemplated, perhaps, a further
retreat ; but Moltke, taking the bolder and wiser
course, sent a message from Versailles by the tele-
graph, directing his lieutenant to " await attack,
and to accept battle in the strong positions" 2
before Belfort. Werder, accordingly, marched
across the front of the French army still fixed to
its camps ; and he found the point of vantage he
sought behind the rocky banks of the Lisaine, a
small river just west of Belfort. The position was
one of great natural strength, though capable of
being turned on both flanks. Three eminences
protected a defender's front, the chateau and little
town of Montbeliard afforded strong shelter on the
left, and along the line from Hericourt, to the right
1 Moltke had foreseen that the movements of Bourbaki must
be retarded from this cause. " Prussian Staff History," Part ii.
vol. ii. appendix, 168: " The operations of the enemy's forces, owing
to generally defective organization of the commissariat and ammu-
nition train, are tied to the railways." General Derrecagaix " La
Guerre Moderne,"ii. 331, acquits Bourbaki of making an unneces-
sary delay, and remarks : ' ' Le general Bourbaki avait alors a sur-
monter de grandes diffieultes pour le ravittaillement de son armee ;
et craignant de s'eloigner du chemin de fer de Besan9on a Mont-
beliard qui etait sa base d'approvisionnements, il fut force, pour
avoir des vivres de perdre les 10, 11, 12, et 13 Janvier." Still
Bourbaki did not lay stress on this cause of his halt before the
Enquete Parlementaire ; and possibly he might have done more
than he did.
2 " Prussian Staff History," Part ii. vol. ii. appendix, 176.
A a 2
356 MOLTKE.
a series of villages, of farm-houses, and of petty
hamlets, present formidable obstacles to attack.
Werder fortified this position with skill and care ;
heavy guns were detached from the siege of Belfort,
and placed in battery at vulnerable points, and
precautions were taken to secure cover for the
troops, and to give free and ample scope to their
fire. He awaited the attack of an enemy threefold
in numbers, with some 45,000 footmen and 150
guns.
The battle, or, rather, the series of battles, that
followed, 1 were not without honour to France, but
honourable in the highest degree to Germany.
After preliminary skirmishes of no importance,
Bourbaki advanced, on the 15th January, to attack
the Germans in their strong lines of defence. He
was familiar with the scene of the approaching con-
flict and with the numberless difficulties in his path ;
and his plan was to assail the enemy in front with
the 15th, 24th, and 20th corps, on the space between
Montbeliard and Hericourt, and imitating the ma-
noeuvre of Gravelotte, to turn his right at Changey
and Chenebier with the 18th corps and Cremer's
divisions. The French, animated by their late
success, fell boldly on, and made their way into
Montbeliard ; and though unable to force the
1 The description in the " Prussian Staff History," Part ii. vol.
ii. 331, 358, of the battles on the Lisaine should be compared with
the elaborate and exact account of General Derrecagaix, " La
Guerre Moderne," ii. 330, 362, and with Bourbaki's evidence at
the Enquete Parlementaire.
THE BATTLES OF HtSRICOURT. 357
centre of Werder, they kept the Germans all the
day engaged in their formidable positions around
Hericourt. The great out-flanking movement, on
which all depended, was, however, delayed, and
attempted too late ; and both armies rested on the
ground they occupied, Bourbaki expecting great
things from the morrow. The battle raged along
the whole line on the 16th, and the assailants, swept
by a destructive fire, suffered cruelly as they en-
deavoured, in vain, to press the frontal attack with
their superior numbers. But the turning movement
at the French left was successful; Werder' s right
was out-flanked, and fell away defeated ; Chenebier
was occupied by the troops of Cremer ; the road to
Belfort was laid open, and the situation for the
Germans became critical. Meantime, however, the
defence of Hericourt had proved disastrous to the
young French soldiers flung desperately against
impassable lines. Cremer, in no sense a capable
chief, was held in check by a demonstration on his
left, and did not follow up the success he had gained,
and, hard pressed as they were, the Germans main-
tained their ground. The difference was then con-
spicuously seen between a real army and an assem-
blage of levies. Bourbaki' s troops were utterly
worn out, and brought to a stand by the incessant
fighting. A Council of War pronounced against a
renewal of the attack, and an immediate retreat was
declared necessary. The French columns, weakened
by heavy losses, dispirited, and starved by hunger
and cold, drew silently off from the fatal field ; and
358 MOLTKE.
though not pursued by their wearied foes, became
almost a fugitive horde, as they toiled painfully on
their way to Besancon. The attempt to raise the
siege of Belfort had failed, and Gambetta's project
had come to nought from the outset.
Bourbaki was not a chief of the highest order,
and he had little faith in an army of recruits ; and
Cremer had shown no resource in this protracted
conflict. It is useless, however, to conjecture
whether the French generals could have done more
in the battles of Hericourt, as they have been
called ; the broad results need alone be glanced at.
On the Lisaine, as at Le Mans and St. Quentin, the
external zone had kept back the enemy ; the pur-
pose of Moltke had been fulfilled, and, in the case
of Bourbaki, it would be well for France should his
army escape an immense disaster. Through the
successive defeats of the provincial levies, Paris was
left isolated and without external aid, and the
besiegers had made, before this time, the active
attack they had long prepared. On the 27th of
December the German batteries opened fire on the
highlands of Avron, and the works on the spot,
hastily thrown up, were made untenable after a
short bombardment. The besiegers turned then on
the eastern part of the city, and a tempest of shot,
and shell rained for many days on the forts of
Nogent, Rosny, and Noisy, and on the long line of
the improvised defences extending from the Marne
to the table-land of Eomainville. The southern
front, however, became the main point of attack.
THE SIEGE OF PARIS. 359
This, we have seen, was the vulnerable side, and
the exposed forts of Issy, Vanves, and Montrouge,
with the redoubts and entrenchments along the
space between, were swept for more than a fortnight
by the concentrated fire of heavy guns placed on
the heights commanding the enceinte and the capi-
tal beyond. An attempt was next made to destroy
St. Denis, and the western front, in fact, was alone
spared, covered by the great fortress of Valerien.
These attacks, however, altogether failed; the
injuries done to the forts and the defensive zone,
trivial in themselves, were easily repaired. The
losses of the besieged were very small ; two or
three of the forts, chiefly manned by seamen, made
an admirable and most skilful defence, and the
batteries of the besieged, as the struggle progressed,
had a marked and daily increasing advantage. The
siege train of the Germans, immense as it was, was
not nearly sufficient for the gigantic attack, and
the operations of their engineers, besides, gave little
proof of science or resource.
Experiments meanwhile were tried to affright
the world of the city into submission. Moltke
had been averse to bombarding Paris. 1 He pro-
bably foresaw the attempt would fail, and Bismarck 2
had been of the same opinion. But Germany had made
1 " I should not wish to be in a hurry to adopt the last cruel
alternative of a regular bombardment." (Moltke to his brother
Adolf, " Letters/' ii. 61. English Translation,)
2 " On ne bombarde pas une ville comme Paris, mais peut-etre,
cependant, nous faudra-t-il, a un moment donne, en venir a cette
derniere extremite," was a remark made by Bismarck to the aide-
360 MOLTKE.
a great national effort, and felt the savage passions
of a war of races ; and the German commanders
were forced to leave nothing undone to quell the
resistance of France at its fountain-head. While
the forts and the enceinte were being attacked, the
city was ravaged with flights of shells, and the
storm of missiles raged day after day, carrying
devastation and death in its course. The noblest
edifices seemed marked out for destruction : the
churches, the hospitals, the historic buildings the
glory of centuries which adorn Paris, were wrecked
and marred in too many instances, and the pitiless
volleys crashed through peaceful roofs, or broke in
fury in stately squares and streets. Yet this in-
human and reckless warfare, without a parallel in
a civilized age, that recalled the onslaught of the
barbarians on Rome, and that might have annihilated
treasures above price of science and art, the delight
of mankind, proved, as was to be expected, utterly
fruitless. Two or three hundred inoffensive towns-
men were slain, and considerable material damage
was done ; but the bombardment did not hasten by
a single hour the impending fall of the suffering
city ; and this alone is enough to stamp it with
disgrace. On the contrary, it excited indignation
and wrath, and roused the population to make new
efforts ; and it has left memories behind which will
not be forgotten as long as Paris retains life and a
heart. The attack, in truth, whether on the armed
de-camp of Bazaine before referred to. " Guerre de 1870-1,"
p. 221.
WILLIAM 1.,
Emperor of Germany.
To face page
THE BOMBARDMENT. 361
defences, or on the city, rising from their midst,
only showed how prodigious is the strength of the
position given by nature to Paris ; how powerful
her fortifications were, even against the ordnance
of modern times, and how impotent were the
besiegers' efforts. 1
The exasperation caused by the bombardment
led to an angry and general demand that another
and final sortie should be made. The Government,
yielding to popular clamour, weakly consented,
against its real wishes, for every general felt the
attempt to be hopeless. The points selected for
attack were, perhaps, the strongest in the whole
circle of the German lines ; and possibly in this
instance also the multitude overbore Trochu.
King William had just been proclaimed Emperor,
to the delight of the whole Teutonic race, in the
magnificent hall which had mirrored the splendours
for a century of the Bourbon monarchy ; and this
exhibition, which may yet prove an illustration of
1 The " Prussian Staff History," Part ii. vol. ii. 362, 390, describes
very imperfectly and uncandidly the bombardment of Paris. The
elaborate account of General Ducrot, " La Defense de Paris," iii.
232, 312 ; and iv. 1, 27 ; and the excellent volume of M. Viollet
le Due, should be carefully perused. See these works especially
as regards the bad quality of the German offensive works ; the
evident deficiency of the engineers in scientific knowledge ; the
complete failure of the attacks on the forts, the enceinte, and the
city ; and the feelings of hatred and anger they provoked. These
views are confirmed by many English eye-witnesses. Major
Clarke, " Fortification," 63, remarks : " In spite of their in-
numerable defects, the Paris defences, built before the revolution
in artillery, were an unexpected triumph for fortification."
362 MOLTKE.
the irony of Fate, had so irritated Paris before the
event, that a cry had arisen to break out at Ver-
sailles. The National Guards insisted that they
should take a principal part in a last struggle, and
on the 19th of January a huge array of troops,
levies, and National Guards was assembled, under
the guns of Valerien, in the first peninsula formed
by the bends of the Seine, to attack the besiegers
from the space that extends between St. Cloud and
Malmaison to Versailles beyond. The advance of
the columns, however, had been very slow, for there
were only two bridges to cross the river. The
enemy had had ample time to make preparations and
guard against surprise and, as we have said, the
German defences at this part of their front were
formidable in the extreme. The battle was fierce,
and protracted for hours, but the ultimate issue
was never doubtful. The French, indeed, gained
partial success. Vinoy, on the left, forced the hos-
tile outposts at St. Cloud ; Ducrot penetrated into
Malmaison on the right ; and Buzenval, in the
centre, was stormed and occupied. But the attack
was broken against the triple folds of the entrench-
ments forming the main defence; the assailants,
100,000 fighting men at least, were crowded upon
a narrow front that did not give space for 25,000.
Unable to deploy and to make their numbers felt,
they were struck down by the destructive fire of ene-
mies sheltered and almost concealed ; and the scenes
that had been witnessed at Villiers were repeated
with far more disastrous results. After repelling a
THE LAST SORTIE. 363
hostile counter-attack and vainly displaying fruit-
less courage, the French gradually drew off from
the field, and despair had soon mastered the
defeated army, little accustomed to the stern reali-
ties of war. The bridges and roads were choked
by the broken masses hurrying away in precipitate
flight ; order, discipline, and military bearing were
lost, and the spectacle of its own defenders filled
the city with affright.
This disaster provoked a movement in Paris like
that which had been seen before, when the sortie of
the 21st of December had failed. The Press of the
rabble teemed with angry invectives, clubs were
harangued by orators of the mob, denouncing the
men in office as knaves and traitors ; a cry went
forth that the citizens, in a mass, with their wives
and children, should march out and fight, and folly
and fury reigned in too many places. A partial
rising of the dregs of society was ominous too of
impending perils, and the foul creatures, who were
soon to strew whole quarters of the city with ashes
and blood, began to make their evil influence felt,
by villainous appeals to patriotic passion. The
Government, terrified, perplexed, and hopeless, made
no attempt to exert its authority, and Trochu was
removed from supreme command, a scapegoat,
indeed, but not unjustly deemed to have been
unequal to a most arduous task. Nevertheless,
order and obedience to law continued to prevail
through the world of Paris, and this though the
sufferings of all classes of the population were almost
364 MOLTKI;.
beyond endurance. By this time the store of pro-
visions had dwindled down to the supply of a few
days, the whole of the citizens had been put on
rations, the most odious kind of food was a
welcome repast, death revelled in the train of ever-
present want, and every night darkness, that might
be felt, fell like a pall over the scenes once gay with
exuberant life, and brilliant pleasure, or was made
more fearful by the distant gleams that marked the
lines of the besiegers' watch-fires. The spirit of
resignation and self-sacrifice kept, however, the
community together, in the trial ; noble examples
of charity and piety were made, and the wit of
Paris flashed out to the last, as troops of urchins
mockingly offered for sale fragments and splinters
of the enemy's impotent shells. But the end of the
long defence had come ; the great city, still un-
subdued, was forced to yield to famine. Bismarck
and Favre, the minister, had two or three interviews,
and the terms of the capitulation were arranged, on
the 26th of January, 1871. The regular troops,
including the Gardes Mobiles, the marines and sea-
men, laid down their arms ; the forts were occupied
by German garrisons, and the immense material of
war on the spot passed into the hands of the
exulting conquerors. Meanwhile an armistice of
three weeks was agreed to, a National Assembly
was to be convened, and France was to pronounce
on the question of war or peace. Two provisions
of the negotiations require notice ; l for reasons
1 This exception, -which involved the ruin of Bourbaki's army,
FALL OF PARIS. 365
never fully explained, the theatre of military
operations in the east was still to remain a scene of
hostilities, and the National Guard, too largely
composed of elements of the most dangerous kind,
and controlled only by officers chosen by itself,
was, at the instance of Favre, allowed to retain its
arms.
The defence of Paris will form, for all time, a
conspicuous feature in the history of the world. The
military operations, indeed, did not give proof of
originality or peculiar skill, and they were marked
by the want of steadfastness, and the divided
counsels, so fatal to France in this part of the war.
The project of breaking out by the western front,
and conducting an army to the coast, as a base,
devised by Ducrot, and not without promise, was
abandoned in deference to popular cries; a
systematic attempt to force the besiegers' lines by
counter approaches was not made, and mistakes
occurred in all the sorties. It will always, too, be
doubtful in the extreme whether Paris, immense as
were its resources, could have set itself free by its
own efforts ; whether an army of relief was, not
has been accounted for in different ways. The te Prussian Staff
History," Part ii. vol. ii. 390, says that " both sides anticipated a
successful result ; " but Ducrot, " La Defense de Paris," iv. 296,
insists that Favre knew, or ought to have known, that Bourbaki
was in the gravest peril, and severely blames the minister. Still,
he admits, iv. 306, that, even at this time, much was expected
from Bourbaki. Bismarck and Moltke were probably aware of
the real state of the case, and kept it to themselves, even if it be
true that Bismarck gave a broad hint to Favre.
366 MOLTKE.
necessary to second the attacks of the citizens from
within ; and difficult as their position was, the men
in power, and especially Trochu, were not capable,
and exhibited weakness. These circumstances,
however, do not detract from the grandeur of the
defence in its true aspect. The world scornfully
denied that a luxurious capital, a centre, beyond all
others, of frivolous pleasure, would venture to stand
the trial of a siege, and yet Paris resisted the
mighty power of the German armies for more than
four months, and was unconquered, when it was
forced to succumb. That such a city should have
created great armies in a few weeks, out of levies
of recruits, and its own population, was a marvel of
energy ; that it should have kept the hosts of the
invaders at bay, and made the result of the contest
long uncertain, was an extraordinary passage of
war ; above all, that during a protracted period of
suffering, of privations, and of agony at last, it
should have presented, with rare exceptions, the
spectacle of heroic endurance, of noble patience,
and of social order, was a magnificent instance of
patriotic duty. It is deplorable to have to add that
this glorious achievement was ere long tarnished by
the frightful crimes that disgraced the Reign of
Terror of the Commune ; but these should not be
laid to the charge of the mass of the citizens. They
were the deeds of a few wicked men, who laid hold
of elements of disorganization and trouble, that
came to a head in a time of disorder and anarchy ;
they were largely due to the unwisdom that left
CITANZY AT LAVAL. HIS COUNSELS. 367
arms in the hands of dregs of the populace, and
they were committed at a time when the minds of
men were distempered by indignation and passion,
as in the case of the massacres of September, 1792.
The armistice found Chanzy, at Laval, at the head
of an army, still equal to war, and reinforced by a
new corps, the 26th, raised by Grambetta's incessant
exertions. In arranging the lines of demarcation
between the lately contending forces, Moltke had
insisted on occupying the southern bank of the
Loire; and there can be little doubt that his
object was, in the event of hostilities being resumed,
to cut Chanzy off from the southern provinces, and
to drive him, isolated and beaten, into the west. But
the great French chief had anticipated this attack ;
and he had thought a plan of operations out, which he
confidently hoped, might yet wring apeace honourable
to his country, from an exhausted enemy. Within
three months France would be able to place more *
than 600,000 men in the field, without reckoning
Bourbaki's army, and the Parisian levies by this
time lost; and Chanzy calculated that with these
forces, directed with care by his masterhand, he
would be able to maintain a guerilla warfare, with
the support of other chiefs, and of the national
rising, retreating from point to point, and taking
advantage of every position between the Loire and
the Pyrenees, 2 and so harassing the Germans that
1 "La Deuxieme Armee de la Loire," p. 416.
2 Moltke and the German generals were seriously apprehensive
of the consequences of a resistance of this kind ; and no impartial
368 MOLTKE.
at last, war-worn and fatigued as they already
were, they would accept conditions not unfavour-
able to France. He proposed, therefore, to lead
his army, now more than 200,000 strong, into
Poitou, and to await events ; and in letters resem-
bling those of Wellington, when the great English-
man planned the defence of Portugal, the Du
Gruesclin of the war of 1870-1 showed how
safety might be plucked from danger, if France
would earnestly second his heroic efforts. It is
idle to say that his projects were vain, when we
bear in mind what he had accomplished in his
admirable operations between the Loire and the
Mayenne ; and it should be recollected that, by
this time, the efficiency of the German armies,
largely filled with landwehr and mere recruits, was
being diminished day after day. 1
observer denied, at the time, that it might have been successful.
Some courtiers of fortune, and writers inspired from Germany,
were found in England, who condemned this kind of warfare as
"unfair;" as if Thermopylae, Saguntum, Morat, Valleyforge,
Saragossa were not names immortal in history.
1 Chanzy's views should be carefully studied. They will be
found in "La Deuxieme Armee de la Loire," pp. 417, 424. We
quote a single passage from his remarkable despatches : " Les
troupes, dont nous disposons, il ne faut pas se le dissimuler,
n'ont encore ni une organisation assez solide, ni une cohesion
snffisante, ni une assez grande habitude de la vie militaire, pour
constituer des armees pouvant manoeuvrer et lutter avec Constance
et persistance centre celles que 1'ennemi va pouvoir leur opposer
en nombre au moms egal. II faut done eviter les engagements
qui peuvent etre decisifs. Le but a atteindre est d'affirmer
1'idee de la resistance et de la produire sur tous les points a la
fois, de fafon a forcer 1'ennemi a se disperser, d'obliger 1'Alle-
ADVANCE OF THE GERMANS AGAINST BOUIIBAKI. 3GO
Meanwhile, however, an appalling disaster had
befallen the army, rashly sent, in ignorance of war,
by G-ambetta to the east. Moltke and his lieutenants,
we have seen, 1 had remained unaware, during
many days, of the march of the Second Army
of the Loire; and the first week of January had
almost passed, before the direction Bourbaki had
taken had been ascertained at the German head-
quarters. But Moltke had already, with excellent
forethought, 2 despatched, we have pointed out, the
2nd Corps to support the 7th, on the long space
between the Germans on the Loire and Werder's
forces ; and these arrays holding this part of the
external zone, were, by the 12th of January,
approaching each other, between Chatillon on the
Seine, and Nuits on the Arman^on, an affluent of
ruagne a maintenir en France une armee d'au moins 500,000
homines de lui imposer des sacrifices qui finiront par le . lasser,
et d'atteindre aussi le moment ou solidement organises nous
pourrons, par un supreme effort, entreprendre, dans de bonnes
conditions, de refouler 1'ennemi de notre territoire. Ce que
les Allemands redoutent le plus, c'est la guerre de detail, la
defense du sol pied a pied, la resistance derriere tous les obstacles.
C'est ce qu'il faut obtenir du veritable patriotisme de nos popula-
tions. Les armees, les corps formes ne doivent etre que des points
d'appui, des moyens menages pour profiter habilement des fautes de
1'ennemi, desesechecs, et de sa dispersion. II faut done organiser
partout la defense locale en faisant appel a tous les gens de cceur,
en les groupant autour de personalites influentes dans leur propre
pays, habituant la nation a 1'idee des sacrifices qu'elle doit faire.
II faut qu'apres avoir dispute le terrain pied a pied on le cede a
1'ennemi en faisant le vide autour de lui, en le privant de toute
ressource."
1 See ante, p. 341. 2 See ante, p. 334.
B b
370 MOLTKE.
Yonne to the west. When the march of Bourbaki
Jiad become fully known, Manteuffel, the chief of
the First Army, was sent from the north to lead the
7th and 2nd Corps, from 50,000 to (30,000 strong,
against the enemy in Franche-Cornte ; and the
German commander at once set off bearing quickly
down on his still distant quarry. The march of
the advancing columns in intense cold, across the
barren and wind-swept uplands of Langres, was
difficult in the extreme and marked with many
hardships, but it was admirably carried out and
very quick ; and here we see distinctly the pro-
digious difference -between a trained and well-
organized army, and an assemblage of levies, ill
provided and equipped. Garibaldi, we have said,
had been directed to guard against an attempt
from this side ; another French division, too, had
been thus employed ; but Manteuffel pushed aside
his surprised foes, and kept them in check by small
detachments; and on the 20th, he was upon the
Saone, haying ably made a most arduous move-
ment. By this time the battles of Hericourt had
been fought; Bourbaki was in retreat southwards ;
and Werder was about to pursue his enemy through
the intricate country that leads to Besan^on. "With
an inspiration worthy of a great captain, Man-
teuffel resolved not to join Werder, well able, after
his success, to protect himself, but to press on east-
ward, without stopping a moment, and falling on
Bourbaki' s exposed flank, to cut him off from his
line of retreat to the south. By the 21st his
RETREAT OF BOURBAKL 371
advanced guard was upon the Doubs ; by the 23rd
it occupied the main road which descends from
Besancon on Lyons; and Bourbaki was already in
the gravest peril. Moltke had not ordered, but he
highly praised, 1 a movement promising immense
results, if certainly in some respects hazardous, a
movement, we should add, in keeping with the
principles of war he had impressed on the minds of
every German chief.
Eourbaki, meantime, had been effecting his
retreat from the Lisaine on Besancon. His march,
we have seen, was not molested at first, for the
losses of Werder had been severe ; and he 2 suc-
ceeded, in some measure, in restoring discipline
and in inspiring his troops with hope. But supplies
failed the stricken and exhausted soldiery ; thou-
sands perished through cold and the ravages of
disease, 3 and his army again became a wreck, be-
fore Besancon was even approached. At this place
the unfortunate chief found himself in a situation
strongly resembling that of Napoleon, in 1812,
when the Emperor was apprized, at Smolensk,
that his famishing host, with Kutusoff hanging on
its rear, was intercepted by Wittgenstein and
1 Moltke made this report to the king on Manteuffel's conduct.
"Prussian Staff History," Part ii. vol. iii. 10 : " General v. Man-
tenffel's movement is extremely bold, but it may lead to the
greatest results ; should he suffer a check he ought not to be blamed,
for in order to gain great success, something must be risked."
2 Bourbaki asserted this at the Enquete Parlementaire, and his
evidence bears all the marks of truth.
3 Small-pox was very destructive in Bourbaki's army.
B b 2
372 MOLTKE.
Tchitchakoff, as it was making for the Beresina
on its way to Poland. Bourbaki had been promised
that at Besancon he would receive an ample store
of supplies ; he had been assured that Garibaldi
possessed the means of effectually protecting his
flank on his march, and of keeping back any enemies
on his path. But no magazines had been formed at
Besancon ; there were provisions for a few days
only ; and Werder was already pressing the French
from the north, while Manteuffel was closing round
from the south. The situation was well-nigh
desperate ; yet Bourbaki probably did all that could
be expected from a stout and gallant soldier. He
directed his 18th and 24th corps to throw Werder
back and to cover the retreat, and he pushed for-
ward his 15th and 20th corps, with Cremer, to
gain the second main road leading from Besan9on,
east of the first, on Lyons. Werder, however,
routed his enemy in the rear, the second avenue of
escape was barred by Manteuffel's rapidly converg-
ing forces; and the French general had no real
choice left, but to diverge eastward towards the
Swiss frontier, and to seek the means of effecting
his retreat, through the defiles between the Upper
Doubs and the Jura. By this time, however, his
ruined army 1 was scarcely able to keep the field ;
1 Bourbaki described the state of his army at the, Enqueto
Parlementaire in these words : " La demoralisation des troupes
ctait profonde, elle etait la consequence des circonstances, des
miseres supporte'es, de la satisfaction incomplete des besoins
materiels, de la jeunesse se soldats, de leur manque d'habifcude
des choses de la guerre, de leur defaut destruction, et surtou
:
BETREAT OF BOUEBAKI. 373
winter, hunger, and discouragement had done their
work, and despair had taken possession of the ill-
fated commander. He had been defeated, and
cruelly deceived ; he could scarcely hope to avert
another Sedan, and, at this terrible moment, he
was recklessly goaded by Gambetta urging him to
break out at Auxonne, a movement dangerous in
the extreme, in any case, 1 and possible only to a
well-equipped army. The reason of the brave
soldier suddenly gave way, and in his agony, he
made an attempt on his own life. 2
The command of Bourbaki was taken by Clin-
d'education militaire, du manque de cadres, et d'anciens soldats
fa9onnes au metier .... Ceci ce faisait Messieurs, avec un
froid de 15 degres en moyenne, un verglas epouvan table ....
Nos chevaux d'artillerie tombaient tous les quatres pas ; il fallait
les relever, il retombaient ; on les relevaient ils tombaient encore ;
et cela durait toute la journee."
1 The " Prussian Staff History," Part ii. vol. iii. p. 40, indicates
that this movement was conceivable, and undoubtedly Man-
teuffel's centre was rather exposed at this point. But Bourbaki
insisted at the Enquete Parlementaire that it was impossible in
the existing state of his army, and it would at best have exposed
the French to be hemmed in between the Doubs, the Ognon, and the
Saone. The best proof that he was right is that all his colleagues,
with one doubtful exception, concurred in his views ; and his
successor, a distinguished soldier, was of the same opinion."
. 2 Bourbaki's account of this incident is pathetic ; he has long
ago disappeared from the army, of which he was an ornament,
but we do not know if he is dead: "La crainte de voir mon
armee internee en Snisse, le manque de vivres pour mes troupes,
1'appreciation injuste que le ministre de la guerre faisait d'efforts,
si constants, si soutenus, si desesperes, tentes dans des conditions de
temperature affreuses, toutes ces pcnsees m'assaillirent, et alors
. 1'acciderit est arrive."
374 MOLTKE.
chant, an officer who had distinguished himself in
the operations of the French from first to last.
The new general, without hesitation, followed the
dispositions of his late chief; and moved his
worn-out army towards Pontarlier, only a few miles
from the edge of Switzerland, while he left nothing
untried to secure the possession of the one and the
only road still open to the south. It was now the
28th of January ; and but for an unhappy incident,
the greater part of the First Army of the Loire
might, perhaps, have escaped along this line, a
defile, we have said, between the Jura and the
heads of the Doubs. The approach is closed from
the side of Franche-Comte, by hills impassable, save
at two points ; and Clinchant pushed forward horse-
men to occupy these, and so to bar an hostile
advance, his purpose being to conduct the mass
of his forces, from Pontarlier along the defile
towards Lyons. But on the 29th, a despatch
arrived informing the French commander that a
cessation of arms had been arranged between the
belligerent Powers, but leaving out the all-important
fact that this did not extend to operations in the
East of France ; and this fatal blunder seems to
have been due to the negligence of Favre, who had
almost lost his head.
Clinchant claimed the benefit of the armistice ;
but Manteuflfel, made aware of the truth, refused to
suspend hostilities beyond a few hours, and this
sealed the doom of the French army. Even before
the armistice had been announced, a small detach-
HIS ARMY CUT OFF. 375
ment of German cavalry had seized one of the two
passes, but so weakly that it might have been
easily dislodged ; and the rearward corps of the
retiring army had been defeated not far from
Pontarlier. Escape nevertheless was still possible, 1
had not Clinchant stopped the march of his columns,
in the belief that the contest had come to an end,
and had not the exhausted soldiery made a halt,
along the whole line, at the news of the armistice,
and generally shown reluctance to stand to their
arms. 2 The Germans had soon closed in on all
sides : a few thousand men and a number of officers
contrived to make their way through the defile
southwards, but the remains of the French army,
80,000 fugitives, had no choice but to break up
from Pontarlier and to find a refuge in the neutral
ground of Switzerland, where they were lost to
France should the war be prolonged. The arms of
France had thus, for the second time, met a disaster
like that of the Array of Chalons ; and the project
of Gambetta, ill-conceived in principle, but in-
1 This at least was Bourbaki's judgment at the Enquete Parle-
mentaire : " Cette armee courait le risque d'etre internee en
JSuisse. Les evenements ont prouve depuis cette necessite meme
n'aurait pas ete subie par la l re armee, si 1'armistice n'avait pas eu
lieu, ou s'il n'avait ete donne a mon successeur aucun ordre de
1'observer avant que la commandant des forces ennemies eut reu
les memes instructions."
2 Evidence of General Clinchanfc at the Enquete Parle-
mentaire : " La nouvelle de 1'armistice avait acheve de detruire
le moral."
" Pourquoi nous batterons nous," disaient les soldats, " si nos
camarades des autres armees ne se battent plus 1 "
376 MOLTKE.
sensate, under existing conditions of climate, and
military organization and force, had ended in an
immense catastrophe. Yet this result would not
have been obtained had not the arms of Germany
been directed with ability and energy both con-
summate. The operations of Manteuffel deserve
the highest praise ; they were worthy of Moltke's
best teaching ; Werder seconded Manteuffel with
vigour and effect ; and in the movements which
annihilated Bourbaki's army, we see again the self-
reliance, the well-concerted action, the boldness,
the resolution, the well-prepared efforts conspicuous
on the side of Germany in the first part of the war,
but seldom exhibited in the second part. 1
The catastrophe of Bourbaki's army was soon
followed by the fall of Belfort, after a protracted
and admirably-sustained defence. Many other
fortresses had been captured, besides those already
referred to, and the whole interior of France,
between the Loire and the Seine, had been laid
open to the invaders. These sieges had exhibited
the same features : a bombardment had had decisive
effects, where the places attacked were old and
1 In addition to the authorities before referred to, a good analysis
of these operations in the East of France will be found in General
Pierron's work, *' Strategic et Grande Tactique," vol. i. pp. 122,
158. General Ducrot, " La Defense de Paris," vol. iv. pp. 346,
355, contends that, but for the mistake respecting the armistice,
Clinchant would have saved the largest part of the army, and
indicates how this was on the point of being accomplished.
Ducrot, however, disliked Favre and throws as much blame on
him as is possible.
CHANZY STILL FOE WAE. 377
small, but regular operations had, in most instances,
been feebly conducted, with tardy success, even
against garrisons of mere levies, and the Germans
had shown little skill in the art of the engineer.
The succession of disasters which had reached a
climax in the surrender of Paris, and the calamity
in the east, broke down the spirit of resistance in
France, and the National Assembly, that had met
at Bordeaux, virtually accepted the terms imposed
by the conquerors. Chanzy, however, maintained
to the last moment, that the war might be con-
tinued with good hopes of success, on the system
of which he had laid down the lines ; and if we
bear in mind the resources still possessed by France,
the great deeds of her illustrious soldier, and that
his judgment was formed under the gravest sense
of responsibility incurred by himself, and in the
presence of immense dangers, few will venture to
say that he was wholly in error. He recorded
his convictions in weighty words, at which the
worshippers of success have scoffed, but of which
history will form a very different estimate. " No
doubt we must seek for the causes of our defeats,
in the weakness and insufficiency of our organization
for war, seduced as we were for some years by false,
ignorant, or factious opinions, and in the want of
unity, fatally conspicuous in all our strategic com-
binations; but, in our judgment, we, who had
found again, in our improvised armies, the great
military qualities, which are the inalienable heritage
of our nation, the chief cause of our final disasters,
378 MOLTKE.
was our want of confidence in ourselves. Our fine
armies had been lost, our capital had fallen after
glorious and heroic efforts ; and we ceased to
believe that success was possible, when it was still
within our reach." 1 2
The Treaty of Frankfort set a seal to the results
of the war of 1870-1. German horsemen rode
under the Arch of the Star, a monument raised to
the Grand Army, as Napoleon's Guards had passed
through Berlin ; and Germany glories in Metz and
Sedan, as France gloried in Jena and Austerlurz.
A ransom was extorted from the vanquished
nation, unexampled in the annals of war ; it
was stripped of two of its most loyal provinces ;
and Alsace and Lorraine have been held ever since
by force, a trophy of conquest that will be hardly
lasting. It has been generally understood, that
unlike Bismarck, Moltke insisted on this territorial
cession ; but to do him justice he had no sympathy
with noisy pedants, who, as in the case of Schleswig
1 " La Deuxieme Armee de la Loire," p. 448.
2 Moltke is somewhat chary of merited praise when he merely
remarks, " The Franco-German War," vol. ii. p. 46, English
Translation, that " General Chanzy was certainly the most' capable
of all the leaders, whose duty it became to fight the invaders in
the open fields." It is gratifying to know that the real hero of
the second part of the war of 1870-1 was received, during a visit
to Berlin, some years afterwards, with the greatest cordiality
and distinction by the Emperor William, his adversary Prince
Frederick Charles, and Moltke himself. The " stetimus tela
aspera contra, contulimusque manus " should create a brotherhood
in the noble profession of arms, as in the cases of Turenne and
Conde, of Eugene and Villars, of Soult and Wellington.
THE TKEATY OF FBANKFO.RT. 379
Holstein, fabricated a claim for Prussia, to posses-
sions to which she had no shadow of a right. With
Kadetski, he thought that Imperial rule was best
secured by a strong frontier, whatever animosities
this might provoke ; and, with a marked aversion
to the French character, and little real experience
of mankind, he caused the Tricolor to be torn down
from Metz and Strasbourg, indifferent to the tradi-
tions and feelings of Frenchmen. Yet the Austrian
eagle has disappeared from the Adige and the
Mincio, in the course of events which prove that
the sword does not rule the world ; and, in the
negotiations of 1871, Moltke gave no proof of
Wellington's forethought, who warned the allies
that a discontented France, with her vast elements
of military power, would permanently endanger the
repose of Europe. The peace dictated by victorious
Germany has already had many evil results, and is
pregnant with future and general troubles. A
second Poland has been formed on the Rhine ; and
clumsy attempts to win the hearts of a people
justly devoted to France, have ended in conspicuous
failure. The Continent has become a huge armed
camp, for every State has been compelled to imitate
the Prussian military system to protect its interests ;
alliances have been formed against France, in the
hope of averting universal war ; and France herself,
renewing her strength, with the elastic energy of
life she has always displayed, has become more
formidable on land and at sea, than she has been
since the days of Napoleon, and is only biding her
380 MOLTKE.
time to take vengeance on an enemy she deems a
hateful despoiler. In this position of affairs peace
must be precarious ; and uneasiness, and a sense of
ever-impending danger, pervades the public mind in
five-sixths of Europe. Yet the worst feature of the
situation is this : the Triple alliance combined
against France, has necessarily caused France to
draw near to Russia ; and this ominous conjunc-
tion may lead to a contest, to which history can
show no parallel. In the irony of Fate, Napoleon's
prediction may be realized in a not distant future ;
and if Europe, in the progress of events, shall
become half Republican and half Cossack, this
will be largely ascribed to the unwise Peace of
Frankfort.
The second part of the war of 1870-1 was not,
like the first, a great drama of well connected and
defined acts, leading, in quick succession, to a
tragic conclusion. It was rather a long and event-
ful epic, abounding in episodes of profound interest,
ending in a mighty struggle of race, but grand and
heroic in its highest aspects. We have endeavoured
to describe the part played by Moltke in this magni-
ficent spectacle of human action, and we shall not re-
peat what we have already written. His figure stands
out in supreme prominence, in the earlier scenes of
the great contest. He conducts hosts, largely
fashioned by himself, from the Vistula and the
Elbe to the Rhine and the Meuse, and, steadily
carrying out a preconcerted plan, directs them
against the weak armies of France ; and, if in the
REFLECTIONS ON MOLTKE. 381
conflict that follows lie does not display military
genius of the very highest order, if he triumphs
mainly through the errors of his foes, and his own
overwhelming superiority of force, he astonishes the
world by his prodigious success, and he shows that
he has many of the gifts of a great warrior. In the
second phase of the strife, he is suddenly beset by
unforeseen and immense obstacles ; he is arrested in
his course of victory, and is troubled and perplexed
for a time ; and his personality loses its command-
ing place, in view of the resistance of Paris, and
the wonderful national rising of France. He,
nevertheless, remains conspicuous, giving proof of
grand constancy, and strength of will ; and when,
owing to accidents, and his enemy's mistakes, and
the passionate support of a united Germany, he
extricates himself from surrounding perils, he shows
remarkable military skill, and directs operations
that deserve the highest praise. Yet the figures of
Gambetta, with all his failings, and of Chanzy,
superior in defeat to Fortune, will probably fill as
large a space q on the page of history, as that of
1 Mr. Fyffe, " History of Modern Europe," vol. iii. 452,
truly remarks : " Whatever share the military errors of Gambetta
and his rash personal interference with commanders may have
had in the ultimate defeat of France, without him it would nevor
have been known of what efforts France was capable. The proof
of his capacity was seen in the hatred and fear with which down
to the time of his death he inspired the German people. Had
there been at the head of the armv of Metz a man of one-tenth
of Gambetta's effective force, it is possible that France might have
closed the war, if not with success, at least with undiminishcd
territory."
382 foOLTKE.
Moltke, in the later passages of the war of 1870-1 ;
and the noble and patriotic efforts of France will
certainly be their most striking feature. For the
rest Germany did not exhibit in a movement, which
had some things in common with the great move-
ment of 1798-4, the recklessness, the folly, and
the lust for war, exhibited by Revolutionary France ;
but she made a bad use of the rights of conquest,
and Nemesis seldom fails to avenge injustice.
The war, we should add, like all great wars,
brought clearly out, the essential qualities, and
historical antecedents of the Powers in conflict.
Prussia, a state long of the second order, and
trodden under foot in 1806-12, but conscious of
her inherent strength, and chafing at the inferior
position she held, submitted patiently to a severe
discipline to make her able to cope with France ;
and when her military resources had become so
vast, that ultimate success was almost assured, she
obtained the aid of a dependent Germany, engaged
in the conflict with steadfast purpose, and persisted
in it, with unflinching firmness, enormous as was
the strain on her energies. Taught by adversity
not to be rash, stern, resolute, and determined to
make their influence felt, the hitherto divided
German races joined in the crusade against their
ancient foe ; and, thoroughly prepared and ready
for war, never relaxed their efforts until they had
gained their end. France, on the other hand,
proud of her renown in arms, and carelessly relying
on mere traditions, enfeebled by a corrupt and
WAR BRINGS OUT QUALITIES OF FRANCE & GERMANY. 383
unstable government, and devoted for years to the
pursuits of peace, had allowed her military power
to dwindle and decay ; and she rushed thought-
lessly into a gigantic struggle, in which she had
hardly a chance of real success. The result was
soon seen by an astounded Europe ; the armies of
the effete empire, and their worthless and incap-
able leaders, went down like leaves before the
autumn blast ; and the first victories of Germany
were beyond example. France, however, refused
to confess defeat ; the heroism of the race was
shown in its noble resolve to defend the natal soil ;
and hopeless as the situation was deemed, the
conflict that followed was so desperate, so well sus-
tained, so fierce, so prolonged, that Germany was
tasked to the very utmost, to obtain the success
that had seemed secure. Yet in that final struggle
organized force, trained military power and wise
direction, prevailed at last over all the efforts
pf patriotic valour and passion often misguided,
and thrown away ; and in this supreme crisis
France displayed the failings repeatedly seen in her
chequered history, misplaced energy, discordant
counsels, and a proneness to follow the first leader,
who has the audacity to assume a dictator's part.
France could have obtained a less onerous peace,
had she submitted to the terms of her conquerors,
after the defeat of her Imperial armies. The
circumstance has been made a pretext for con-
demning her heroic resistance ; but only weak
heads or corrupt hearts will accept a cowardly and
384 MOLTKE.
false argument. A nation's most precious posses-
sion is its honour ; and France would have forfeited
this great heritage, had she tamely bowed her neck
to the yoke, after "Worth, Spicheren, Gravelotte and
Sedan. She took the wiser and nobler course ; and
if she has suffered in the result, the gain has been
infinitely more important. By the defence of
Paris and the great national rising, she has blotted
out the disgrace that fell on her arms ; Metz and
Sedan did not leave her degenerate ; she justified
her claim to stand in the rank of the ruling Powers
and races of mankind. Nay, from a mere material
point of view, her perseverance in the contest did
her immense benefit. It was not in vain that
rustic and noble, that men of science and art, and
men of trade, took up arms to fight for the natal
soil ; that Paris endured the agony of the siege ;
that France sent her sons in hundreds of thousands
to do battle with a revengeful but alarmed enemy.
The struggle proved how gigantic is her power ;
how she succumbed mainly through mere accidents
that probably will not occur again ; that in spite of
the cant of the courtiers of Fortune, she has far
more inherent strength than Germany ; that she is
a great and formidable Power of the first order.
A German commander will hardly venture to
advance hastily on Paris again, whatever may have
been his triumphs in the field.
CHAPTER XI.
Welcome given to Moltke on his return from the war in France
Honours and distinctions conferred on him He resumes his
post as Chief of the Staff His dislike of flattery His de-
clining years Celebration of his sixtieth year of military
service His work with the General Staff Preparation for
war Speeches in the Reichstag and Prussian Chamber
Jealousy of France Life at Creisau Moltke retires from the
post of Chief of the Staff Celebration of his ninetieth birth-
day His death Reflections on his career.
MOLTKE had passed his seventieth year by some
months when his splendid but brief career in the
field closed. Germany instinctively felt that her
extraordinary success was due to him more than to
any other leader, and gave him a national greeting
on his return from Erance. On the day when the
victorious soldiers of Prussia defiled through the
exulting streets of Berlin, after a long march from
the Seine to the Spree, thousands of eyes turned on
the impressive figure of the veteran who had
directed the arms that had gained triumphs with-
out a parallel, and thousands of voices rang out a
joyous acclaim. Deserved honours fell thick- on
the illustrious warrior. His sovereign and friend
relaxed in his behalf rules that excluded him from
certain high grades and dignities. He received the
C
386 MOLTKE.
staff of a Field Marshal, the special distinction of a
commander-in-chief, a rank he had not technically
attained ; the Prussian Chambers voted him a large
sum of money, and cities vied with each other to
give him their freedom. Yet Moltke cared little
for these things, and quietly resumed the duties of
Chief of the Staff, which had been for years his
task and his delight. The real head of the great
hosts of Prussia, surrounded by colleagues formed
by his hand, and directing younger men to tread in
their steps, he went steadily on in the incessant
work of military organization, which was his pe-
culiar excellence, and of elaborating to still higher
perfection the mighty instrument of war of which
he had been a chief creator. Mistakes made in the
late war were noted ; defects in the army and its
dependent services were carefully examined and set
right ; and the great " Staff History " of the events
of 1870-1 was compiled under Moltke's own
auspices spite of many faults, a remarkable work.
The famous Chief of the Staff, however, was not a
recluse, as he had not been in any part of his life ;
he was naturally a grand- figure at Court, where he
was loved and esteemed by the Royal Family ; and
though, as age advanced, he had become taciturn
and austere in manner except to real friends here,
again, the opposite of Napoleon he was the charm
of the social hour with those who knew him well.
But for the herd of flatterers who hung on his foot-
steps he felt, and did not conceal, his dislike. " I
detest," he wrote, " the adulation of which I have
HIS HONOURED OLD AGE. 387
become an object. I hear it, and make this reflec-
tion : ' What would they have said if success had
not attended our arms ? J These ill-deserved praises
would have been changed into as many unjust cen-
sures and stupid invectives." 1
Twenty years of honoured life were still vouch-
safed to Moltke ; and like Turenne, Eugene of
Savoy, and Wellington, it was his good fortune to
read in a nation's eyes that he was a pillar of one
of the great Powers of Europe. In his case, it
would be more than superfluous to enumerate all
the distinctions he obtained ; he had nothing in
common with the boaster Villars, who sets his
achievements out in the style of a herald. A man-
of-war and one of the forts of Strasbourg were
named after him at the command of the Emperor ;
a statue was raised to him at his birth-place,
Parchim, and a trophy in front of his home in
Silesia. The anniversary of the sixtieth year of
his service was celebrated at Berlin with military
state ; stars of noble orders were gratefully
bestowed ; and the Royal House of Prussia joined
in the tribute of honour. During this period the
still hale veteran was usually present at the great
manoeuvres which form part of the training of the
Prussian army, and his keen criticism and attention
to details showed that time had not yet weakened
the force of his intellect. He visited also, with his
1 " Revue Militaire Suisse. Le Feld-Marechal Moltke." By
Abel Veuglaix. This, too, is characteristic : " We do not exactly
know what our army is worth ; it has not suffered reverses."
c c 2
388 MOLTKE.
imperial master, the famous battle-fields around
Metz; and he gave considerable attention to the
German navy, for he had been strongly impressed
by the advantage possessed by France in the late
war through her command of the sea, which had
enabled her to arm her levies for the field.
The multifarious work of the Staff, however,
remained the great occupation of its renowned
chief, and he found ample scope for his energy and
care in duties multiplying in the state of the world
around him. The progress of events which had so
changed the resources of States and the conditions
of war since the first half of the present century, had
been going on with accelerated speed ; population
and civilization were growing ; material discovery
was, year after year, producing new inventions and
destructive weapons of the first importance in the
military art. And, at the same time, every Power
on the Continent had doubled, trebled, nay, quad-
rupled its armies ; and France especially, rising, as
it were, from the dust, had given her frontiers of
defeat such prodigious strength, and had armed
such huge masses behind the Vosges, that she could
be terrible in war at any moment. Moltke grasped
the situation in its full significance ; never ceased to
impress on the staff and the Emperor the necessity
of keeping up the armed strength of Germany at
the highest point of numbers and efficiency in the
field ; and went steadily on with preparations for
war, following in this Prussia's traditional policv.
He gave expression more than once to his views
HIS LIFE AT CEEISAU. 389
in the Reichstag and the Prussian House of Peers,
of both of which he had been long a member, and
his sentiments and language were characteristic.
He showed how the military supremacy of a United
Germany was an object of alarm and suspicion, and
how every State on the Continent was armed to
the teeth. But like the Roman Cato, his voice was
chiefly raised against the ancient enemy alike hated
and feared. He dwelt on the gigantic resources of
France ; pointed out how the events of 1870-1
were no proof she would be vanquished again, arid
maintained that she might arise once more to afflict
the world with a war of revenge. The irony of
facts did not strike the speaker's mind ; it did not
occur to him to what an extent the development of
the military system of Germany and the annexation
of Alsace and Lorraine contributed to the unrest
and the troubles of Europe.
There was, however, another side to the life of
Moltke beside that of the warrior and servant of
the State. He had been always attached to the
ties of home ; he had been an admirable brother,
husband, and son, and he was devoted to intellectual
tastes and pursuits. It was given him to enjoy
many of these blessings during the later part of
his long career of honour. After his first great
triumph, in 1866, he had received a national grant
to buy an estate, and he had wished to regain part
of the lands possessed by his fathers in Mecklenburg,
near the Elbe. He was unable, however, to fulfil this
wish, and he became the owner of a small domain
390 MOLTKE.
not far from the old stronghold of Schweidnitz, a
scene memorable in the wars of Frederick the
Great, and where part of the Crown Prince's army
assembled before it marched into Bohemia. Moltke
usually passed the summer months at Creisau,
amidst the hills and plains he had surveyed in youth,
and where he had formed happy associations and
kind friends ; and he gathered around him to this
secluded spot the last resting-place of his loved
Marie several of the younger members of his far-
divided family, an object he had had long at heart. 1
At Creisau Moltke lived as a country gentleman ;
but his mental activity and the turn of his character
were exhibited in the round of his simple life. He
found his house ruinous and his manor a waste, and
he made both models of skilful improvement. He
covered acres with wood, laid out parks and gar-
dens, dammed out streams, made useful works of
drainage, and tried all kinds of rural experiments ;
and in these different labours he gave ample proof
of the intelligence, the industry, and the attention
to details which had distinguished him in a grander
sphere of action. As may be supposed, he did
much for education and the training of the young ;
he built churches, endowed schools, and established
savings-banks for the earnings of the poor ; and,
1 Moltke wrote to his brother Adolf, as far back as 1848
("Letters," vol. i. p. 181, English translation): "My cherished
idea is that by degrees we should gather on an estate somewhere or
other. ... I would rather that this possession should be on the
beloved soil of Germany."
HIS LIFE AT CREISAU. 391
in a word, he performed the duties of a good
English landlord a class he held in special esteem
in a nook of Europe little accustomed to them.
The veteran, too, in these times of leisure,
eagerly recurred to the intellectual studies which
had inspired his ambitious and laborious youth, and
had been kept up through his manhood of action.
Few have been the equals of Moltke in learning
and culture ; and he devoted a part of each day at
Creisau to music, drawing, and careful reading.
He was familiar with the literature of all ages,
especially with history and good poetry ; and he
had a marked taste for the philosophic theories of
the great German thinkers of the last century. He
was fond of speculation, as some of his writings
show, on the problems of human life and destiny ;
"in thought elevate he reasoned high, on pro-
vidence, foreknowledge, will, and fate ;" but he
was not less at home in other spheres ; he delighted
in the rich humour of Dickens, and tried to turn
the warblings of Moore into German. The warrior,
too, like other great warriors, had the deepest
reverence for the Lord of Hosts, and he felt the
presence of the Divine in human things, as Napo-
leon, the child of a godless age, could yet rise to
the heights of the unknown God. The religious
musings of Moltke bear the mark of the German
theology of his day ; he rejected dogma and cast
aside creeds ; but this half- scepticism was kept
under control by a sound judgment, a deep sense
of duty, and especially perhaps by the experience
392 MOLTKE.
of a life of hard work. He constantly read a Bible
that had belonged to his wife ; and he was in the
habit of marking favourite texts that expressed
truths he, no doubt, felt deeply. " My strength
is made perfect in weakness/' the strong man
noted ; and the loyal subject and God-fearing
citizen marked out for admiration the noble words :
" Of a truth I perceive that God is no respecter
of persons : but in every nation he that feareth
Him, and worketh righteousness, is accepted with
Him."
At Creisau Moltke was an excellent host, and
occasionally had numerous guests at his board.
But his chief pleasure was to live in the company
of the grand-nephews and nieces he had adopted
the warrior was unhappily childless and to watch
over their youthful development. He was the
delight of these offsets of the family tree " he was
very fond of children, and the little ones repaid
his kindness to them with true affection. He spent
hours with these great-nephews and great-nieces,
who were like young shoots round an old trunk ; he
looked at picture-books, or they tried to catch him.
In his habits and tastes he was simple nay, austere;
he never possessed more than two suits of clothes "
a tradition probably of his youth of privations
and " the unadorned study at Creisau, where he felt
happy and comfortable, is a reflection of this
innocent simplicity; nor can anyone look without
emotion at the plain little room adjoining his study,
in a kind of square tower which served him for a
I11S LIFE AT CJIEISAU. 393
bedroom. A bed and a washstand are the only
pieces of furniture in it." In conversation lie was
still gay and brilliant with those whom he could
call friends ; he was not without a vein of dry
humour ; but he " had a horror of affectation and
circumlocution, of all outward show and deception;
his keen intellect at once separated the chaff from
the wheat." As years advanced, the rigid lines of
his countenance, in later manhood, softened by
degrees ; and his venerable face regained something
of the beauty and refinement of his look in youth.
" One must have seen him walking under his
beloved trees, a slim figure in a simple coat, bent a
little forward, with a step which remained light and
elastic up to his latest years. His clean-shaven
face, of a delicate pallor, showed scant traces of
advancing age. On that firm and expressive brow
time had not printed the furrows which tell of
passion and self-indulgence, but there and round
the grave eyes mental toil had drawn ennobling
lines. His whole appearance was full of dignity
and refinement, and his whole countenance was
illumined by the purity of a long life, which nothing
base had ever marred."
Time dealt tenderly with the old soldier, but its
inevitable changes came by degrees. The process
of decay told slowly on Moltke ; his fine intellect
was not dimmed, but it stiffened into a set of
fixed ideas, and his memory lost its retentive power.
In his eighty-seventh year he began to write his
" Precis " of the great war of 1870-1 ; and it gives
394 MOLTKE.
clear proof of these mental defects, for it exagge-
rates the faults of the Prussian Staff History, and
in many particulars is very incorrect. Moltke paid
the penalty of extreme old age, in seeing the friends
of his life pass away ; he has left a touching record
how his revered master " struggled with inex-
haustible patience and sweetness, one foot ou
the throne, and another in the grave ; J and he
witnessed the death of the Emperor Frederick, one
of his best lieutenants, though a man of peace.
Soon after the accession of the present Emperor,
the veteran, feeling that he was no longer equal to
duties of the most arduous kind, resigned his post
as Chief of the Staff; and his young sovereign
expressed his sense of his priceless services in
language of befitting dignity and grace. The
illustrious commander bade farewell to the com-
panions in arms trained by his care, and to the
representatives and heads of the great institution,
which had so largely contributed to Prussia's
triumphs, in significant and characteristic words.
He kept his eyes still watchfully fixed on France ;
he warned his hearers that in the contest he
foresaw, " supreme direction would be the chief
element of success," a truth not placed in suffi-
cient prominence in an age of colossal armies and
material force and he expressed his satisfaction
" that the enemy no doubt envied but did not
possess anything corresponding to our great
General Staff, the object of the care of the last days
1 " Letters, " vol. ii. p. 236, English translation.
HIS NINETIETH YEAR. 395
of his life." l His master spoke only the simple
truth when he wrote that his " tenure of the office
of Chief of the Staff would be honourably remem-
bered as long as there is a Prussian soldier or a
Prussian heart left in the world."
All the work of Moltke, however, was not yet
done ; he was made President of the Council of
National Defence a commission of high officers of
state, the name of which expresses its purpose and
he occasionally accompanied the Emperor in tours
of inspection. He was given, too, a permanent
abode in the palace of the great General Staff ; and
his successor often sought the aid of his counsels. 2
He completed his ninetieth year in October, 1890 ;
and the occasion was made one for a great festival
throughout the length and breadth of the Ger-
man Empire. The day was a holiday in every
school of the state ; and deputations went from
many cities and towns to offer addresses to the
great Field Marshal. But the chief centre of
homage was Berlin ; a place of honour was laid
out for Moltke in one of the rooms of the Palace
of the Staff; and he witnessed torch-light pro-
cessions of applauding crowds, received greetings
of respect from guilds of trades, from bodies of
students, from men of letters and art ; and, in a
1 " Le Marechal de Moltke," par xxx, a French general officer,
pp. 252, 253.
2 Most of the particulars of the later years of Moltke will be
found in a work called " Moltke, his life and character," trans-
lated by Mary Herms a book quite unworthy of the subject, but
containing useful information.
396 MOLTKK.
word, was hailed as one of the founders of the
national greatness. The ceremony ended with a
grand banquet, when the veteran was thanked for
his great deeds by the Emperor and the Koyal
House, and received an Honorary Marshal's staff;
the Princes of Germany joined in the chorus of
praise : and a message of congratulation came from
the Emperor Francis Joseph, a token of friendship, in
spite of Sadowa. This was the last scene of Moltke's
public life ; he passed quietly away a few months
afterwards. His end was sudden, but painless and
peaceful ; after an evening spent with his adopted
family, he felt unwell and retired to his room ; in a
few moments the struggle with death was over,
and an eye-witness, who hastened to the spot
on hearing a groan from the dying man, has re-
corded that his last effort was " to turn his head
gently to the left, to the wall where the portrait of
his beloved wife hung, surrounded by palms." It
is unnecessary to say how Germany mourned her
great loss ; the flag hung at half-mast from castle
and steeple, on men-of-war, and on the fleets of com-
merce ; the bier that carried the remains of Moltke
had borne those of his two late sovereigns ; and he
was attended by the magnificence of war in sorrow.
He sleeps by the side of the woman he loved in his
quiet home in the Silesian hills ; but his country
may say with truth of the great man taken from
her : 1 " Quidquid ex Agricola amavimus, quid-
quid mirati sumus, manet mansurumque est in
1 Tacitus, " Julii Agricolae Vita," c. 50.
HIS DEATH AND CHARACTER. 397
animis hominum, in seternitate temporum, fama
rerum."
Nature gave Moltke the best gift she can bestow
on a man in any walk of life, and especially the
best in the case of a soldier, 1 great strength of
character and firmness of purpose ; and she added
constancy, daring, and intense perseverance. If
she refused imagination of a high order, and the
power of attracting the hearts of men, she supplied
an intelligence keen and profound, clear insight,
vivid perception and thought, and a sound, stead-
fast, and practical judgment. It was not, however,
the fortune of Moltke to direct armies until he had
reached old age ; and his best years were devoted
to the study of war, and to preparing for war in
time of peace. His faculties and the accidents of
life made military organization his peculiar calling ;
and this, beyond dispute, was his supreme ex-
cellence. His distinctive merit was that he saw
more clearly than any other personage in high rank
at the time how the circumstances of a new era
had largely changed the conditions of war ; and he
applied this knowledge with consummate skill, with
assiduous toil, with never-ceasing care, to that
mighty assemblage of force, the Prussian army.
He divided masses that otherwise would have been
too vast into distinct units manageable in the
field ; , he turned to advantage the increased self-
reliance and mental training of the individual
soldier, by encouraging him to be more than a
1 Napoleon.
398 MOLTKE.
mere fighting machine; he made the railway
system and the extension of roads secure a celerity
and precision in the early operations of war, which
had not been often possible before; and he caused the
telegraph, the rifled gun, and the breech-loading
musket, to yield their best uses to the requirements
of his art. Ease in great manoeuvres on a theatre
of war, marked improvement in the lower ranks of
the army, rapidity in the assembly of troops, and
the adaptation of tactics and strategy to the
material inventions by which they were modified,
were thus realized in the Prussian service more
completely than in that of any other State ; and
the world beheld the results with amazement. But
Moltke achieved much more than this ; learned in
the history of war almost beyond example, he
perfectly understood its best methods ; and he so
constituted the armed force of Prussia, that it
should be ever ready to take the offensive, and
to have the initiative in the first operations in
the field. It is certain, too, that he had much
influence in gaining for intelligence and worth their
due place in the higher grades of the army ; and it
is probable that, through his authority with the
king, he had much to do with the selection of even
the chief commands. We know, at least, that in
1866 and 1870, the Prussian army, of which he was
the real head, possessed a staff and an array of
officers by many degrees the best on the Con-
tinent, and its leaders were almost all distinguished
for zeal, resolution, skill, and acting well in concert,
HIS LIFE AND CHAEACTEE. 399
and in some instances for great capacity. It was
the superior organization of the Prussian army,
more or less imitated in the other States of Ger-
many, combined with overwhelming superiority of
force, and coming in conflict with hostile armies
immensely inferior in every respect, and also
ill- directed in every way, that, far more than con-
spicuous genius in war, caused the utter defeat of
Austria and France.
The superiority of Moltke as a director of armies
is much less conspicuous than in organization for
war. Yet in this more exalted and arduous sphere
his remarkable faculties were apparent, and he
stands on a high, if not on the highest eminence.
His plan of operations in 1866 remains open to
adverse comment; but he exhibited great decision,
and the clearest insight in his arrangements for the
march of the Prussian armies, and especially for
the movement of the Crown Prince, which led to a
decisive result at Sadowa. His project for the
defence of Germany against a sudden attack by
France, anticipated admirably the scheme of the
enemy; his method of invading France on her
north-eastern frontier, and forcing her armies north-
wards, away from Paris, if not original or very
striking, was perfectly thought out, and the best
conceivable. In carrying out these operations he
made mistakes, gave his opponents chances, and
did not make the most of overpowering superiority of
force ; but he steadily accomplished even more than
he had hoped, with boldness, resolution, patience,
400 MOLTKE.
forethought ; and the course he adopted to destroy
Macmahon, his march against the Army of Chfdons,
and the measures he took to ensure its ruin at
Sedan, if not exploits of supreme genius, show that
he had many of the faculties of a great warrior.
If success, too, is to b$ a test of merit, Moltke's
triumphs in the first part of the war of 1870 are
without a parallel in the annals of the world ; and
if this is a most unsafe criterion, it is at least a
proof that he had the capacity to turn to account the
astounding faults of his enemies, and to bring
suddenly on them appalling ruin. In the second
part of the war he certainly made a mistake in
advancing in haste on Paris ; and thus placed the
Germans, conquerors as they were, in grave peril
for a considerable time. His conduct, nevertheless,
in this most trying contest, gives proof of steadfast
constancy, and, on some occasions, of consummate
skill and profound judgment. He followed the true
method to make Paris fall ; and it may be assumed
that he expected little from the cruel and fruitless
attack by bombardment. Nothing, too, can have
been more able than the manner in which he em-
ployed and strengthened the external zone on a
vast field of manoeuvre, and than the advantage he
took of his central position and interior lines
against the provincial armies ; and though he was
not the author of the decisive movement of Man-
teuffel against Bourbaki's army perhaps the finest
of the whole war this was an inspiration derived
from his teaching. And if we reflect that these
HIS MERITS AND DEFECTS IN WAR. 401
great achievements were accomplished by a chief
far advanced in years, who had not had experience
in the field, until the ardour and vigour of youth
had been spent, no impartial observer will deny
that Moltke has a place amongst the great masters
of war.
His place, however, in this illustrious band is not
one of the very highest eminence. The conceptions
of his campaigns were not original ; that of 1866 was
borrowed from Frederick the Great a conception
distinctly condemned by Napoleon ; that of 1870
was borrowed from Prussian leaders, who had
formed it many years before ; and, if excellent, it
does not display genius. Moltke was never called
upon to attempt exploits like those before Mantua
in 1796, like the march on Ulna, and the march that
led to Marengo ; but he did not possess the imagina-
tive power directing the profound calculation and
craft, which have given these combinations their
matchless splendour ; it may safely be affirmed
that he was unequal to them. In his operations
in the field, too, we sometimes see a want of
dexterity and resource ; he ought to have crashed
the Army of the Rhine, after Worth and Spicheren,
before it reached Metz ; and he gave opportunities
more than once to Bazaine, which a real general
would have made disastrous to him. In his con-
duct of armies, a deficiency of art, a failure quickly
to seize the occasion, a rigidity and even a slowness
of movement, are manifest in several striking
instances ; he never could have achieved feats of
D d
402 MOLTKE.
arms like Arcola, Rivoli, and Montmirail ; and lie
seems to have been devoid of the gift of surprise
and stratagem, one of the highest gifts of a great
captain. But of all these defects the most con-
spicuous was his constant habit of losing sight of
his enemy, and of failing to pursue him in defeat ;
this is the more remarkable because he possessed
advantages in this sphere of his art, completely
unknown in former ages ; and it may be the
consciousness of this, that made him assert that 1
" novices," forsooth, are those who chiefly contend
" that pursuit ought always to follow a victory," as
if the chase of Wurmser through the defiles of the
Brenta, and the inarch of the conquerors after
Jena, do not confute a paradox of the kind. It
must, moreover, be kept in mind in considering
Moltke's place as a leader in war that he usually
had such a superiority of force on his side, and was
opposed to commanders of so low an order, that he
could hardly have failed to attain success ; and
this fact must largely detract from his merits. The
Austrian army in 1866, the French armies in 1870-1,
were not to be compared to the Prussian and
German hosts, in all that constitutes military
power ; and it was not difficult to overcome chiefs
of the type of Benedek, Bazaine, and Macmahon,
especially in the circumstances in which these were
placed.
Certain writers have maintained that, in the
1 "The Franco-German War," vol. ii. p. 167. English
Translation.
HIS MEEITS AND DEFECTS IN T WAK. 403
conduct of war Moltke hardly committed a single
mistake. He would have been the first to condemn
such a notion ; the aphorism of Turenne remains
true, "he is the greatest general whose faults are
the fewest," and all generals must fall into error,
for they must often act on inadequate knowledge.
Moltke made at least his full share of mistakes,
apart from what may be called shortcomings. His
whole strategy in 1866 has been called false by well-
informed and capable critics ; indeed we believe it
can be only justified on the assumption that he had
no better choice in the situation in which he was
placed. His disposition of the German armies on
the frontier in August, 1870, exposed the First
Army to a perilous attack ; the same may be said
of his arrangements before Borny, and it is difficult
to say that he was not to blame for the faults com-
mitted before Gravelotte a battle which would
have been lost to the Germans, immense as was
their preponderance of force, had Bazaine been
anything like a chief. In his movements round
Metz, Moltke, too, exposed his communications in
a most dangerous way,, and that without much
certainty of success ; and, as General Hamley has
justly said, he need not have risked a defeat at
Gravelotte. But the greatest of all his mistakes,
as we have more than once remarked, was his
advance on Paris after Sedan ; he thrust himself
into the heart of France, at the head of 150,000
men, with the Army of the Rhine at Metz on his
rear, imprisoned, no doubt, but still a danger;
D d 2
404 MOLTKE.
with his retreat to Germany almost closed, with a
gigantic fortress in his immediate front, with a
great nation that might rise up in arms against
him, and the results were in a few weeks manifest.
Moltke was " brought up," so to speak, like a ship
by a tempest. The German armies spread around
the capital were perilously exposed for at least
three months ; their movements were for a time
most feeble ; they were scarcely able to keep the
enemy down ; they were nearly compelled to raise
the siege. Had Metz held out even a fortnight
longer, and had the Army of the Loire been better
directed, they would probably have met a serious
reverse, and they succeeded at last, in the main,
because they received the enthusiastic support of a
national crusade. Moltke' s strategy is a striking
instance that an enemy, fallen though he be, is not
to be despised, and that offensive warfare should
be conducted on principles proved to be true by
experience, and if he triumphed after an inter-
necine conflict, it may confidently be said that he
could have compelled France to cede the provinces
she ultimately lost, without running the enor-
mous risks that were run.
Moltke, therefore, we think, was not pre-eminent
in forming the great combinations of war, in the
art known by the name of strategy, though his
capacity and excellence are not doubtful. It is
more difficult to find his true place in the lesser
but most important sphere of tactics, and that
chiefly for this reason, that he did not command an
HIS MERITS AND DEFECTS IN WAR. 405
army in the field, in person, on any occasion. It
is certain, however, that he thoroughly understood
that the power of fire would, in modern war, be
infinitely superior to that of force a question
much debated thirty years ago and that he knew
well the value of offensive tactics ; and, in theory,
he was a most learned tactician, even though it
seems that he was some time in comprehending the
true relations of the three arms in battles of this
day. He was not often present in the field, in war ;
he never, we have said, actually led troops ; and in
the immense engagements of the present age, when
a general cannot embrace the whole scene of
action, and much must be left to subordinates, the
most perfect tactician will be often at fault. It
may be said, however, that the three great battles,
in which Moltke took a real part, Sadowa, Grave-
lotte, and Sedan, do not exhibit the tactical genius
shown at Eamillies, Leuthen, and Austerlitz, the
masterpieces of tactics in war ; if the attacks at
Sadowa were well conducted, nay, the best that
could be made as affairs stood, they are not models
to be made examples ; the German tactics at Grave-
lotte were very far from good, and Sedan was little
more than a massacre. Moltke, it has been said,
had a marked liking for flanking, rather than for
frontal attacks; this, indeed, is a tradition of
Frederick the Great, and in the case of the armies
of this age, and of the weapons of destruction they
wield, flanking attacks will be more than ever
adopted. It is, however, a mistake to pretend that
406 MOLTKE.
Moltke's favourite method contrasts with the
" central attack " of Napoleon ; the great master,
like all true generals, ever sought to assail the
flank of his enemy, in preference to merely striking
his centre in front ; but it was the peculiar merit
of Napoleon's tactics, that his attacks were usually
so arranged, as to be the best possible on the
ground before him, and there was no kind of
mannerism in these splendid efforts. It has been
alleged that Moltke's system of tactics often aimed
at " holding " the enemy on the spot, with a force
comparatively small at first, and then of attacking
him, in front and flank, with masses brought into the
field in succession, and certainly more than one of
the battles of 1870-1 exhibit this method. But
such modes of attack can be only justified when
the assailant is certain to be superior in numbers
and force, at the decisive moment; and if it is
implied that, as a general rule, attacks are to be
made piecemeal, and without coherence, by separate
divisions of an army, marched only by degrees to
the field, all history shows that these tactics are
false.
Like all chiefs who have excelled in war, espe-
cially if they have done great things, Moltke has
deeply impressed the military thought of his time.
It has been said of him that he has " displaced the
axis of ideas in the art ; l and because the organiza-
tion of the German armies was a main element of
their prodigious success, it has been hastily inferred
1 " Lc Marcchal dc Moltke," by General Lcwal, p. 18.
HIS MERITS AND DEFECTS IN WAR. 407
that mechanism, and not genius in war, is the
great secret of ensuring victory. Moltke, we have
seen, has distinctly condemned this notion, and it
is a great and dangerous mistake. Unquestionably
training, discipline, and good arrangement, are
influences of supreme importance, in obtaining
successful results in war ; as Gibbon has remarked,
the words that signify an army in the Greek and
the Latin tongues, almost explain the history of two
great races. Unquestionably too, the greatest com-
mander can do comparatively little with a bad
instrument ; and in the case of the huge armies of
this age there must be more independence in com-
mand, and division of labour in the highest grades,
than was seen in the days of Jena and Austerlitz.
But now, as always, and now more than ever, for
war has never before been so vast and rapid,
superior direction will be the dominant force that
will achieve success in campaigns and battles ; the
divine part of the art, in Napoleon's language, will
more than ever make its magical power felt ; a
really great captain will more than ever control
events. The two great wars in which Moltke took
part bring out this truth, indeed, with peculiar
clearness. Place Napoleon on the throne of
Francis Joseph, and can we doubt that he would
have declared war before the Prussian armies were
ready, would have struck them down when widely
apart, and have marched by the Elbe to Berlin in
triumph? Or give Turenne the staff held by
Benedek, and we strongly suspect the Crown
408 MOLTKE.
Prince's army would have been annihilated before it
had reached its supports, and have left Prince
Frederick Charles a prey for his enemy. Or again,
does anyone suppose that if Moltke had been in
the position of Napoleon III., he would have played,
at every point, into his adversary's hands? that
Wellington would have fought G-ravelotte, after the
fashion of the worthless Bazaine? or that that
great master of defence would have lent an ear to
the counsels that doomed the Army of Chalons,
and would have hesitated to fall back on Paris ?
Nay, might not the whole course of the war have
taken a wholly different turn, had Bazaine seized
the opportunities presented to him, as the General
of 1796 would have seized them, or had Chanzy had
the supreme direction of the provincial armies of
France throughout ? The maxim of Napoleon
remains true : "A general is the head, the soul of
an army ; it was Caesar, not the Roman army, who
conquered Gaul ; it was Hannibal, not the Cartha-
ginian army, who made the Republic of Rome
tremble at its gates ; it was not the Macedonian
army, but Alexander that reached the Indus ; it
was not the French army that warred on the Weser
and the Inn, but Turenne ; it was Frederick the
Great, not the Prussian army, who defended
Prussia for seven years against the three greatest
Powers of Europe." !
It is difficult to determine the place that Moltke
i Napoleon, " Comment.," vol. vi. p. 115. Ed. 1867.
HIS MERITS AND DEFECTS IN WAR. 409
will hold among great warriors, not because, as has
been absurdly said, the difference between war 'in the
present age, and of war in the ages of Turenne and
Napoleon, makes a really just comparison hopeless;
but because we do not exactly know the part he
played in preparing and directing armies, though
our knowledge is in many respects sufficient. He
will be always an idol of the worshippers of suc-
cess, and he has been naturally raised to a high
eminence in the opinion of soldiers of his time, for
he understood better, perhaps, than any other man
the existing conditions of modern warfare. In the
judgment of history, nevertheless, we do not believe
he will be in the very first rank of the few cap-
tains supreme in the noblest of arts. His figure
seems dwarfed beside that of Napoleon, of whom
he has been called, unwisely, the peer; he was
markedly deficient in some of the gifts and facul-
ties, which were characteristic of the modern
Hannibal. Organization was his peculiar province,
yet he achieved no marvels like the preparations for
the descent on England in 1803-5, for the cam-
paigns of 1807 and 1812, for the crossing the
Danube in 1809 ; and he did not do as much in
this sphere as Turenne, who transformed a feudal
militia into an army essentially of a modern aspect,
and for many years the terror of Europe. In the
conduct of war he was able in the extreme, his
conceptions were usually clear and just, his con-
stancy and daring deserve the highest praise ; but
410 MOLTKE.
he was not original, or what may be called sublime ;
and he was often wanting in dexterity and art. Not
to speak of the mightiest deeds of Napoleon, which
have raised him far above all modern warriors, no
achievement of Moltke was as brilliant as the march
of Gustavus through " the Priest's Lane," as two or
three of the marches of Turenne ; no conception of
his was as splendid and bold as the plan of Villars
to descend on Vienna, a plan perfectly feasible
when designed, and that must have changed the
fortunes of Europe, had it been carried out in
1703 ; no operation of Moltke was as fine and
daring as Eugene's advance up the Po on Turin ;
and the glories of Metz and Sedan, when calmly
examined, pale beside those of Rivoli, Marengo,
Jena, and Austerlitz. Napoleon, indeed, has had no
successor ; but if the mantle of his genius fell on
anyone, it was not, as has been said, on Moltke ;
it fell on the great warrior of the South, Lee, whose
exploits around Richmond were not unworthy of
those of 1796 and 1814. Nevertheless, Moltke
must hold a grand place among the leaders of war
in the nineteenth century; he was certainly
superior to the Archduke Charles, and to every
one of Napoleon's Marshals, and he will probably
attain as high a level as Wellington, with whom he
had certain points in common, though as an admin-
istrator he easily surpassed Wellington, while, on
the other hand, he can show no achievement equal in
genius and resource to the defence of Portugal.
HIS MERITS AND DEFECTS IN WAR. 41 1
In one respect, indeed, it is difficult in the
extreme to compare Moltke with other great
warriors. As he was never actually at the head of
troops, we do not exactly know what his influence
was, or might have been, over the German soldiery.
But he had little imagination, sympathy, or fiery
passion, and we may feel convinced that he could
never have attained the magical power over the
hearts of men possessed by Conde, Marlborough, and
Villars, and one of the most striking of the gifts
of Napoleon. We see these defects in his writings
on war ; they are able, judicious, and well worked
out, but they are without the sounding march
and the energy divine of the masterpieces of
the history of war ; his " Campaign of Italy/ 7 for
instance, one of his best works, is, compared to
Napoleon's " Campaigns of Italy/' what a book of
Polybius is to a book of Thucydides, or the verse of
Silius Italicus to the song of Homer. For the rest
Moltke had little knowledge of men, and was
deficient in political insight ; he never rose above
the ideas of a Prussian junker in affairs of State;
he had nothing of the genius which made Marl-
borough the most perfect diplomatist of his time, of
the sagacity of Wellington as a statesman, of the
extraordinary capacity shown by Napoleon in
mastering all that relates to international questions,
to civil administration, to law, and to government.
We have already glanced at Moltke's private life ;
we can only repeat that it was a grand example,
412 MOLTKE.
of a noble sense of duty, of work well done, of
purity of conduct, of brilliant social converse, of
intellectual tastes of the highest order, and of
all the virtues that make family and home
blessed.
INDEX.
A.
ALSACE, invasion of, 135 j cession of,
378.
Alvensleben, General, attacks at
Mars La Tonr, 150.
Army, the Austrian, sketch of,
62-3 ; defects in, 52-3, 63.
Army, the French, sketch of, 98,
seqq.; complete inferiority of, to
that of Germany, 103.
Army, the German, in 1870, concen-
tration of, in 1870, 115, seqq.;
invasion of France by, 129; ad-
vance of , after Worth and S picheren,
140 ; enormously reinforced dur-
ing the war, 326.
Army, the Prussian, sketch of, 29-
34 ; reform of, in 1859-60, 34-42 ;
great increase of, after 1866, 94 ;
reforms in, 95-6.
Assembly, the National, of France,
at Bordeaux, 364; accepts the
Treary of Frankfort, 377.
Austria at war with Prussia in 1866,
43 ; stands at first on the defen-
sive, 44; completely defeated, and
loses her supremacy in Germany,
80 ; perhaps a secret ally of France
in 1870, 111.
B.
BAPAUME, battle of, 351.
Bazaine, Marshal, his negligence
when near Spicheren, 130 ; made
coinmander-in-chief of the French
armies, 141 ; his retreat from
Metz, 143 ; his conduct at Borny,
144 j his retreat to Mars La Tour,
148-9 ; his conduct at Mars La
Tour, 150-5 ; what he might have
achieved after Mars La Tour,
154-5 ; he places the French Army
in positions round Gravelotte,
156-7; his incapacity at Grave-
lotte, 167, seqq. ; he is invested
at Metz, 174, seqq. ; he misses
another great opportunity, 177;
his conduct during the siege of
Metz, 242, seqq. ; at Noisseville,
245 ; his negligence and waste,
251 ; his dealings with Eegnier,
252 ; he sends an aide-de-camp to
negotiate with Bismarck, 253 ; he
stands aloof from the Provisional
Government, 254 ; his conduct
treasonable, 256 ; he surrenders
Metz, 259 ; the results fatal to
France, 258.
Beaune La Rolande, battle of, 284.
Belf ort, siege of, 307 ; fall of, 376.
Benedek, General, in command of
the Austrian Army in 1866, 53;
his advance from Briinn and
Olmiitz, 54 ; his projects, 55 ; he
loses a great opportunity, 59 ; is
defeated in a series of combats
and battles, 60-2 ; retreats behind
the Bistritz, 65 ; he is defeated at
Sadowa, 79 ; his retreat, reflec-
tions on his operations, 90-1.
Bismarck, Count and Prince, policy
of, 28, 44; at Sadowa, 76; in-
trigues of, with Napoleon III., 97,
108 ; arouses the fury of Paris in
1870, 109; at Sedan, 208; nego-
tiates with Favre, 221 ; dealings
of, with Bazaine, 253-4 ; opposed to
the bombardment of Paris, 35H ;
and perhaps to the cession of
Alsace and Lorraine. 378.
Bittenfield, General, commands the
Army of the Elbe, 47.
Bohemia, invasion of, 51.
Borny, battle of, 144.
Bourbaki, General, sent from Metz
to see the Empress, 252-3 ; makes
a demonstration against the
Grand Duke and Prince Frederick
Charles, 319 ; is sent off by Gam-
betta to the East with the First
Army of the Loire, 341 j succesBiul
414
INDEX.
at Villersexel, 354 ; defeated on
the Lisaine in the battles of
Hericonrt, 358 ; his army excepted
from the armistice, retreats to
Besancon, 372 ; his desperate con-
dition, 372-3 ; he is goaded by
Gambetta, and tries to kill him-
self, 373.
C.
CANBOBERT, Marshal, his conduct at
Mars La Tour, 150 j at Gravelotte,
164.
Chalons, Army of, commanded by
Macmahon, 180; its bad quality,
181 ; its march to the Meuse,
184, seqq. ; its condition before
Sedan, 197 ; it is routed at Sedan
and compelled to lay down its
arms, 203-10.
Chanzy, General, commands part of
the Army of the Loire at Coul-
miers, 268-9 ; his wise counsels
to D'Aurelle not followed, 277;
he commands at Villepion and
Loigny, 286; falls back west of
Orleans, 288 j he is largely rein-
forced, and confronts the Grand
Duke and Prince Frederick
Charles, 312, seqq. ; great ability
of, 314, seqq. ; his masterly retreat
from the Loire, 315, seqq. j is
attacked at Vendome, and retreats
to the Sarthe and Le Mans, 317 ;
his admirable views as to the
situation in the last part of the
war, 335 ; his advice to Gambetta,
336; he is attacked by the Grand
Duke and Prince Frederick
Charles, 343; his skill, 343; he is
only just defeated at Le Mans,
347 ; he falls back to Laval, 349 ;
and restores his army, 349-50 ;
his able plans for the continuance
of the war, 367-8; his resolve to
fight to the last, 377.
Clinchant, General, takes the com-
mand of Bourbaki's army, 373;
directs it towards Pontarlier, 374 ;
it is forced over the frontier of
Switzerland, 375.
Colombey Nouilly, battle of (see
Borny).
Confederation of the North of Ger-
many, 94, seqq.
Copenhagen, military school of, 4.
Coulmiors, battle of, 268-9 ; its results
frustrated from several causes,
270-1, 274.
Cremer, General, in command of the
French in the East, conduct of, at
the battles of Hericourt, 357.
Crown Prince of Prussia, the, his
operations in Bohemia, 51, seqq. ;
he is directed to march on Sadowa,
67 ; his movement decides the
result of the day, 76, seqq. ; he
commands the Third Army in 1870,
116 j his conduct at Worth, 123 ;
be advances into France with the
Third Army, 135 ; his advance
against the Army of Chalons, 179 ;
he leads the Third Army to Sedan,
200, seqq. ; and to Paris, 216.
D.
D'AURELLE, General, commands the
Army of the Loire at Coulmiers,
268-9 ; question if he should have
advanced on Paris, 272 ; he falls
back on Orleans, 273 ; is defeated,
289; unjustly deprived of his
command, 300.
Decaen, General, killed at Borny,
144.
Diebitsch, General, 21, 229.
Ducrot, General, commands part of
the Army of Chalons, 186 : wise
projects of, before Sedan, 198; at
Sedan, 203; in Paris, commands
the 14th corps, 224 ; views of, for
the defence of Paris, 229, seqq. ;
obliged to abandon his project,
293 ; commands in the great sortie,
294, seqq. ; at battle of Villiers,
295 ; falls back, 295-8; commands
in sorties of 21st December and
19th January, 323, 362.
E.
EAST, Army of, 241 (see Garibaldi
and Cremer).
Elbe, Army of, invades Saxony, 50 ;
with the First Army, 60-1 ; at
Sadowa, 73.
F.
FAIDHERBE, General, commands the
Army of the North, 320 : tights an
indecisive battle on the ilallue,
INDEX.
415
321 ; successful at Bapaume, 351;
defeated at St. Quentin, 352.
Failly, General, 122, 133; defeated
at Nouart and Beaumont, 195.
Farre, General, at Villers Breton-
neux, 305.
Favre, Foreign Minister of the Pro-
visional Government, 221 ; nego-
tiates with Bismarck, 221, 364.
First Army assembled in 1866 (see
Prince Frederick Charles).
First Army assembled in 1870 (see
Steinmetz, Prince Frederick
Charles, Manteuffel, and Goeben).
France, Invasion of, 121; prostration
of, 216; national rising of, 235,
seqq. ; immense but misdirected
efforts of, 302-3 ; was wise in re-
sisting to the last, 383-4.
Frankfort, Treaty of, 378.
Fransecky, General, fine conduct of,
at Sadowa, 74.
Frederick Charles, Prince, opera-
tions of, in Saxony and Bohemia,
51, seqq. ; begins the attack at
Sadowa, 73, seqq. : commands the
Second Army in 1870, 116 ; ad-
vances after Worth and Spicheren,
135 ; conduct of, before Mars La
Tour, 147; commands the First
and Second Armies at Metz, 174 ;
ordered to march to the aid of
Tann, 271; reaches the country
around Orleans, 279 ; defeats the
Army of the Loire, 289 ; attacks
Chanzy and is baffled, 316; falls
back to obtain reinforcements,
319 ; advances with the Grand
Duke against Chanzy, 341; suc-
cessful at Le Mans, 347 ; gives up
the pursuit of Chanzy, 349.
Frederick the Great, the Prussian
Army under, 29 ; operations of, in
1756 and 1757 condemned by
Napoleon, 82-3.
G.
GALL AS, CLAM, General, faulty con-
duct of, 55, seqq.
Gambetta, real leader of the French
nation, 220 ; appeals to France to
rise, 234; energy and genius of,
235, seqq. ; collects immense rein-
forcements for the Army of the
Loire, 230 ; makes fatal mistakes,
283-5 ; continues to increase the
French armies, 332 ; disregards
the advice of Chanzy, and sends
Bourbaki to the East, 338.
Garibaldi, commands the French in
the East, 335.
Germany, Southern States of, allies
of Prussia after 1866, 94 ; national
passions of, in 1870, 117, 302.
Gitsohin, battle at, 61.
Goeben, General, commands the
First Army, and wins the battle
of St. Quentin, 352.
Gouvion St. Cyr, Marshal, 99.
Gravelotte, battle of, 160, seqq.
H.
HADZCHI, Pacha, 15.
Hafiz, Pacha, 15 j defeated at
Nisib, 16.
Hallue, battle on, 321.
Hericourt, battles of, on the Lisaiue,
356-8.
I.
IBRAHIM, Pacha, victorious at Nisib,
16.
Italy, perhaps secret ally of France
in 1870, 111.
J.
JAUBEGUIBBERY, Admiral, a lieu-
tenant of Chanzy, 311 ; efforts of,
at Le Mans, 347.
K.
KAMEKE, General, attacks at Spiche-
ren, 128.
Kirchbach, General, fine conduct of,
at Worth, 129.
Koniggratz, battle of (see Sadowa).
L.
L'ADMIRAULT, General, 144, 160.
La Fere, fall of, 305.
Laon, fall of, 240.
Le Boauf, Marshal, at Gravelotte,
160.
Le Brun, General, commands part of
the Army of Chalons, 186.
Lee, General, 82.
416
INDEX.
Le Mans, battle of, 346-7.
Loigny, combat of, 286.
Loire, Army of, formed by. Gam-
betta, 268; gains a victory at
Coulmiers, 269 j withdrawn to
Orleans, 273 ; increased by Gam-
betta, 280; excellent position of,
282 ; part of, is defeated at Beaune
La Rolando, 284; defeated at
Orleans, 287-8 ; divided into the
First and Second Armies (see
Chanzy, D'Anrelle, Gambetta,
and Bourbaki).
Lorraine, invasion of, 135 j cession
of, 378.
MACMAHON, Marshal, the Duke of
Magenta, tactics of, at Worth,
127 ; mistakes of, 127 ; defeated at
Worth and retreats in disorder,
133 ; commands the Army of
Chalons, 180 ; his fatal decision to
march to the relief of Bazaine,
184 ; his grave misconduct in per-
sisting in the march, 192 ; illu-
sions of, before Sedan, 196 ; weak
conduct of, 199 ; wounded at
Sedan, 203; his conduct to be
condemned, 213.
Manteuffel, General, commands the
First Army on the Hallue, 341 ;
admirable operations of, against
Bourbaki's army, 369-76.
Marlborough, 115, 207.
Mars La Tour, battle of, 149, seqq.
Mecklenburg, Grand Duke of, sent to
the aid of Tann after Coulmiers,
271 ; sent off again to the
West, 278 ; joins Prince Frederick
Charles, 284; takes part in the
defeat of the Army of the Loire,
286-7; advances against Chanzy,
309 ; attacks him in vain, 312-13 ;
is baffled by Chanzy, 316; falls
back for reinforcements, 319 ; ad-
vances with Prince Frederick
Charles again against Chanzy,
341 ; baffled at Le Mans, 346 ; sent
to Normandy, 349.
Metz, investment of, 174 ; fall of,
242, seqq. (see Bazaine, Napoleon
III.).
Mouse, Army of, formed by Moltke,
173 ; takes part in the operations
against the Army of Chalons, 188;
at Sedan, 201, aeqq. ; marches to
Paris, 216; takes part in the in-
vestment, 223.
Mezieres, should have been point
of Macmahon's retreat, 198 ; fall
of, 306.
Moltke, Adolph, 11.
Moltke, Helmuth Charles Bernard,
Field-Marshal, Count, born at
Parchim, 3 ; sent to the military
school of Copenhagen, 4; obtains
a commission in the Danish army,
6 ; and afterwards in the Prussian
army, 6; is attached to the Staff
College at Berlin, 6 ; employed in
surveying, 8; at Frankfort, 9;
made captain, 10 ; early writings,
10-11 ; domestic life and tastes of,
11 ; travels in the East, 12, seqq. ;
reforms of, in the Turkish army,
14 ; in Asia Minor, 15, seqq. ;
anecdote of his courage, 15 ; at
the battle of Nisib, 16; his
" Letters on the East," 16 ; made
major, 18; on the staff of the 4th
Corps, 18 ; his work on the war of
1828-9 in Roumelia, 20 ; made aide-
de-camp of Prince Henry of
Prussia, 22 ; at Borne and in Spain,
22; made colonel, 22; thinks of
leaving the army, 23; views of,
on 1848, 23; made Chief of the
Staff of the 4th Corps, 23; at
Magdeburg, 24 ; becomes friend
of the Crown Prince, afterwards
King and Emperor, 24 ; import-
ance of this, 24 ; is made general,
25 ; aide-de-camp of Prince Frede-
rick, afterwards Emperor, 25 ; in
England, 25 ; " Letters of, on
Russia," 25-26; experiences of
Paris, remarks of, on French
army, 26-7; made Chief of the
General Staff, 28; co-operates
with the King and Roon in re-
forming the Prussian army, 35 ;
his work on the Staff, 36; his
great influence in the work of
military reform, 36-42 ; his work
on tke campaign of 1859 in Italy,
37; projects of, in the war of
1866 frustrated, 45 ; he assembles
the Prussian armies on the fron-
tiers of Saxony and Bohemia, 47 ;
alternatives presented to him, 49 ;
he invades Saxony and Bohemia
on a double line of operations,
50 ; he reaches the theatre of war,
64; moves towardi the Elbe, 64;
directs the- movements of the
INDEX.
417
Crown Prince to Sadowa, 67-8 ;
anecdote of, on the field, 76 ; his
skilful but cautions advance on
Vienna, 79 ; he cuts Benedek off,
80 ; reflections on his operations
in 1866, 81, seqq. ; co-operates in
the reforms made in the Prussian
and German armies after Sadowa,
96 ; plan of campaign of, in 1870 ;
113, seqq. ; probably misses a great
opportunity after Worth and
Spicheren, 136 ; operations of, in
the advance to the Moselle, 140;
and after Borny, 145, seqq.;
whether he made a mistake, 147 ;
he directs the operations that lead
to Gravelotte, 159; how far re-
sponsible for the mistakes made,
166 ; he forms the Army of the
Meuse, 173 ; invests Metz, 174 ;
fine operations of, against the
Army of Chalons, 188-9; harsh
conduct of, at the capitulation of
Sedan, 208 ; he directs the Army
of the Meuse and the Third Army
to Paris, 215; fault of this strategy,
215; he invests Paris, 223, seqq.;
treats the resistance of Paris and
France with contempt, 238-9 ; his
good fortune in the surrender of
Metz, 258; he directs the First
and Second Armies to strengthen
the external zone round Paris,
262-3; he strengthens the posi-
tions of the besiegers, 263 ; makes
a mistake in these operations,
266 ; prepares to raise the siege
of Paris after Coulmiers, 271 ; is
at last convinced of the power of
the resistance of the French na-
tion, 275 ; sends the Grand Duke
to the West in error, 279 ; directs
the attack on the Army of the
Loire at Orleans, 287 ; still further
strengthens the external zone,
306, seqq. ; his position around
Paris becomes formidably strong,
310 ; he withdraws Prince Frede-
rick Charles and the Grand Duke
from the pursuit of Chanzy, 318 ;
becomes master of the situation
round Paris, 326 ; conspicuous
ability of, in the later stages of
the war, 330; dislikes bombarding
Paris, 359 ; sends an army under
Manteuffel to attack Bourbaki,
369 ; he insists on the cession of
Alsace and Lorraine, 378; his un-
wisdom in this, 379 ; his great
position at the end of the war,
386; honours bestowed on him,
386; the later years of his life,
387 ; his attitude in the Reich-
stag and House of Peers, 389 ; his
pursuits at Creisau, 390, seqq. ;
his literary and scientific tastes,
391; his theological sympathies
and piety, 391-2 ; his last years
as Chief of the Staff, 394; he
resigns the office, 394 ; national
festival on the anniversary of his
90th birthday, 395 ; his peaceful
death, 396 ; estimate of his career,
his achievements, and character,
397, 411.
Moltke, Ludwig, 11, 19.
Moltke, Marie, wife of Moltke, her
character, 19 ; her death, 20.
Montmedy, fall of, 306.
Munchengratz, combat at, 61.
N.
NACHOD, battle of, 16.
Napoleon, 29, 30, 55; he condemns
the operations of Frederick the
Great in 1756 and 1757, 82-3, 99,
110, 192 note ; remarks upon the
surrender of Maxen,259 note, 371,
407.
Napoleon III. baffled after Sadowa,
97 ; attempts of, to increase and
reform the French army frustra-
ted, 103; reluctantly consents to
the war with Germany, 109 ; his
plan for the campaign, 110-11 ;
he reaches Metz and perhaps
misses an opportunity, 118 ; fatal
hesitation of, after Worth and
Spicheren , 138 ; he leaves the Army
at Metz, 149 ; with Macmahon and
the Army of Chalons, 180 ; disap-
proves of the march of Macmahon,
196; at Sedan, 207.
Nisib, battle of, 16.
Noiseeville, battle of, 245.
North, Army of (see Farre, Faul-
herbe).
O.
ORLEANS, battle of, and defeat of the
Army of the Loire, 287-8.
P.
PARCHIM, birthplace of Moltke, 3.
E 6
418
INDEX.
Paris, excitement of, when war de-
clared in, 1870, 109 ; evil influence
of opinion of, in the operations of
the French, 118, 132, 138, 183,
192 ; revolution in, 219 ; Pro-
visional Government formed in,
220 ; preparations of, to stand a
siege, 221, seqq. ; description of
natural and artificial defences of,
225, seqq. ; investment of, 228,
seqq. ; energy of the citizens, 232,
seqq.; outbreak in, 234; great
sortie from, 289, seqq. ; sortie
from 21st December, 323 ; heroic
and patient attitude if, 325 ; the
forts and enceinte bombarded,
358-9; and the city, 360; com-
plete failure of the attack, 361 ;
last sortie from, 362 ; partial rising
in, 363 ; sufferings of the popula-
tion, 364 ; capitulation of, 364.
Paschen, Henrietta, mother of
Moltke, 3.
Peronne, fall of, 351.
Prague, treaty of, 80.
Prussia, at war with Austria and the
German Confederation in 1866,
43 ; stands at first on the de-
fensive, 43 ; victorions in 1866,
80 ; head of the Confederation of
the North of Germany, 93 ; ag-
grandisement of, after Sadowa,93.
R.
REINFORCEMENTS, immense, sent to
the German armies, 333.
Rhine, Army of, 112 ; slow con-
centration of, in 1870, 112 ; dis-
semination of, on the French
frontier, 113 ; dangerous position
of, in August, 120; retreat of,
after Worth and Spicheren, 137-8;
defeated at Mars La Tour, 149;
and at Gravelotte, 160; invested
at Metz, 174 ; is surrendered by
Bazaine, 256.
Ronciere de Noury, Admiral, takes
part in the sortie of 21 at December,
323.
Roon, Minister of War of Prussia,
co-operates with the King and
Moltke in reforming the Prussian
army, 28.
SADOWA, battle of, 69, eeqq. (see
Koniggriitz).
Sarrebruck, skirmish of, 118.
Saxony, invasion of, 50.
Second Army assembled in 1866 and
under the command of the Crown
Prince of Prussia (see Crown
Prince of Prussia).
Second Army assembled in 1870,
and under the command of Prince
Frederick Charles (see Prince
Frederick Charles).
Sedan, battle of, 202, seqq.
Skalitz, battle of, 62.
Soor, battle at, 61.
Soult, Marshal, 38, 99, 100.
Spicheren, battle of, 128, seqq.
St. Quentin, battle of, 352.
Steinmetz, General, he commands
the First Army in 1870, 116;
advances after Worth and Spiche-
ren, 140; his conduct at Grave-
lotte, 162.
Strasbourg, siege and fall of, 210.
T.
TANN, General, defeated at Coul-
miers, 269 ; skilful retreat of, 270.
Thionville, fall of, 306.
Third Army, the (see Crown Prince
of Prussi^.
Tonl, fall of, 240.
Trautenau, battle at, 61.
Trochu, General, nominal head of
the Provisional Government, 220 :
views of, as to the defence of
Paris, 229 ; weakness of, 324 ; re-
moved from the supreme com-
mand, 363.
Turenne, 38, 210, 216, 318, 407, 409.
V.
VERDUN, attempt of French to re-
treat on, 142 ; fall of, 262.
Villars, 118; remarks of, on the
surrender at Blenheim, 259 note.
Villepion, combat at, 286.
Villers Bretonneux, battle of, 305.
Villiers, battle of, 295.
Vinoy, General, his retreat from
Mezieres, 217 ; in command in
Paris, 222 ; takes part in the great
sortie, 296 ; in that of 21st Decem-
ber, 323; and of 19th January,
362.
W.
WELLINGTON, 38, 379, 408.
INDEX.
419
Werder, General, occupies Alsace,
265; at Dijon and besieges Bel-
fort, 307 ; defeated at Villersexel,
354; wins the battles of Hericourt
on the Lisaine, 354-8.
William, King of Prussia and Em-
peror, appoints Moltke Chief of
the General Staff, 28; opposed to
offensive operations in 1866, 45 ;
with the enemy in 1865, 64, seqq. ;
and in 1870, 113; proclaimed
Emperor at Versailles, 361.
WimpTen, General, mistakes of, at
Sedan, 214 ; represents the French
army at the capitulation, 208.
Wissembourg, combat at, 121.
Wolseley, General Lord, 85-6.
Worth, battle of, 123, ssqq.
Z.
ZASTROW, General, 128.
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