fuEiJC SpEARij^q ^ • ^^'^ATEL, I- Bv moh Holyoake H" UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LOS ANGELES SCHOOL OF LAW LBRARY ^ ^K^o^^c--t>«-'-i56e^-«^'««^ '. PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE 1 I PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE A Manual for Advocates and Agitators BY GEORGE JACOB HOLYOAKE AUTHOR OF 'SIXTY YEARS OF AN AGITATOR'S LIFE' ' All who in the service of God or Man disseminate sentiments of truth and equity, are agitators in the better sense of the term ' Maxim of Progress FOURTH IMPRESSION (Jecond Edition) LONDON T. FISHER UN WIN PATERNOSTER SQUARE B95 [A// Rights reserved?}^ ft TO THE REV. JOSEPH PARKER, D.D. HIMSELF A MASTER IN THE ART THIS BOOK IS WRITTEN TO COMMEND, WHOM THE AUTHOR FOUND TO BE FAIR IN DISCUSSION, IN DAYS WHEN FEW MINISTERS WERE SO ; AND WHO IN LATER YEARS WAS HIS FRIEND, NOTWITHSTANDING HIS DIVERGENCY IN THEOLOGICAL OPINION. 7797iB7 CONTENTS CHAP. I, INTRODUCTION, ... II. THE SOCIAL AND PUBLIC USES OF RHETOR:C, III. THE NATURE OF RHETORIC, . IV. WHAT IS MEANT BY ELOCUTION, V. REPRESENTATIVE SPEECH, VI. LOGIC OF EVERY-DAY LIFE, VII. DELIVERY, . . - . . VIII. GESTURE MEASURED DY CONVICTION, . IX. CONDITIONS OF EFFECTIVENESS, X. LAW^S OF DEBATE, . . . , XI. PERSONALITIES THE DIGRESSIONS OF DEBATE, XII. POLICY OF DEBATE, .... XIII. DEFENCE OF DEBATE, .... XIV. THE THEORY OF EPITHETS— MORAL AS WELL AS RHETORICAL, . . . . XV. METHOD IN EXPRESSION XVI. TACT AN ACQUISITION, XVII. CONTINGENCIES OF PUBLIC MEETINGS, XVIII. WRITING FOR THE PRESS, XIX. SOURCES OF TASTE, .... XX. PREMEDITATION IN SPEECH, . XXI. REPETITION A NECESSITY, PAGE I 4 6 8 II 15 26 37 39 50 60 67 75 83 92 102 108 "3 119 124 i-,o vin CONTENTS CHAP. XXII. SIGNS OF MASTERY, . XXIII. NATURE AND CONDITIONS OF ORATORY, XXIV. ORIGINALITY IN ORATORY, XXV. THE OUTSIDE MIND OF THE ORATOR, XXVI. PULPIT ORATORY, XXVII. PLATFORM READING, . XXVIII. FIGURES OF SPEECH, . XXIX. POETRY IN RELATION TO RHETORIC, XXX. STYLE EXPLAINED, XXXI. WHAT HAS BEEN SAID, XXXII. PARLIAMENTARY ORATORY, , INDEX, ..... PAGE 141 161 180 197 202 212 222 230 240 2S7 PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Many years ago I printed an outline book on this sub- ject {Public Speaking atid Debate) for the use of persons who found learned treatises on oratory uninteresting, or too profound to be intelligible. Though dealing alone with the Rudiments of the art, it was reprinted in America, and in 1853 the New York Tribtme described it as being 'unpretentious and practical.' After the ex- perience of forty years, I write a new book, and trust the reader will find the same qualities in it. In 1862, the Rev. Mr Vickers of Boston, America, then visiting England, informed me that he took up, in a New York book-shop, a copy of a work entitled, Public Speaking and Debate^ by John Bower. Upon opening it he found that it was an American edition of Public Speaking and Debate, by G. J. Holyoake, with the name of the author borne by another. This, I hope, may be taken as proof that the book was thought useful by the new author. But a testimony of which I have always been proud was that of Wendell Phillips — whom Mr Briglit said to me had the most eloquent voice which spoke the English tongue.' Mr Phillips sent me word that he had lent ' his well-thumbed copy of Public Speaking and Debate until he had lost it, upon A 2 PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE the theory [he benevolently held] that he who most needed a book had the greatest right to it.' Upon that principle, Mr Phillips certainly did not require it. Still, I sent him another copy. It was probably the ethical theory of debate contained in it, upon which we had had personal contro- versy,* which interested him. The earliest and most generous of English critics was the Rev. Dr Joseph Parker, who, when he edited the Pulpit Analist, said to young preachers : ' There is Mr Holyoake's Rudiments of Public Speaking and Debate. Get this book if you can. I am afraid it is out of print. It is full of wise and practical counsel, and rich with allusion and quotation of the best kind,' in illustration of which a passage of two pages was cited. Considering that Dr Parker's belief differed widely from mine, of which he was well aware, seeing that we had held a public debate thereupon for several nights, I cite his words (though it will seem egotistical to do it), since they exceed anything I could think of saying myself, to the end of engaging the attention of the reader to these pages, which I suppose to be the object of all intro- ductions. Another motive higher than egotism, induces me to in- scribe this book as the reader sees I do. When Mr Allsop proposed to supplement an annuity given me, Dr Parker sent a subscription and wrote a letter to the Daily News, intended to be of service to the fund. I cannot agree where I would — were coincidence of belief a matter of will — but an act of kindness I never forget, and I am glad when I can acknowledge it. As respects the texture of the following pages, the reader will discern that it has no merit save incitement, if indeed it has that. What is called a ' systematic treatise ' is what is usually looked for on the subject of public speaking. But I have * See ' Reply to Letter of Ion ' in the Melodeon, Boston — the only reply Mr Phillips told me he ever marie to a European critic. INTRODUCTION 3 found those who have followed such have rarely become speakers of mark, until they have freed themselves from the ' system ' and trusted to themselves. A system is a sort of machine, and one reared in it, is apt to be entangled in wheels within wheels, when the time comes for action ; or he finds that the machine, though of most excellent construc- tion, will not work just when it is most wanted to do it. Now, a series of chapters on the essential parts of public speaking — not chained together, but capable of independent use on emergency, with a springing board in each of them from which a speaker of moderate activity can throw himself at will, as it were, into the heart of an argument — will best serve the practical student. The execution may not equal the design but this is the rule on which these pages are written. Whatever may conduce to improvement in the art and character of agitation, as it is the hope of the Author this book will do, may be of public service, seeing what an increase of wise, reasoning voices will be heard in the land, as sure-footed democracy advances. The Archbishop of Canterbury, being apparently only acquainted with the bad meaning of the term, lately spoke contemptuously of * agitators,' whereupon the Rev. Stewart Headlam justly asked, ' Were not Paul, and even our Lord Himself, agitators ? Surely it depends upon what you agitate for, and how you agitate, as to whether an "agitator " is to be condemned or praised.' Mr Headlam might have asked, where would the Archbishop be but for that superb, irrepressible agitator Luther? Not thought much of by the archbishops of his day. Just-minded agitation prevents the putrefaction of opinion, which is as fatal to States as to Truth. Cowper wrote : — Winds from all quarters agitate the air, And fit the limpid element for use. CHAPTER II THE SOCIAL AND PUBLIC USES OF RHETORIC In this country, where the political genius of the people lies in self-government, where liberty depends upon the capacity of justly stating its claims, the art of public speaking has public importance. To be able to take a subject well in hand, like a stage- coach driver does his horses, to hold the reins of argument firmly, to direct and drive well home the burden of mean- ing, is a power useful to every man who rises to address a congregation or a council, or stands up in Parliament to persuade, or on a platform to convince a meeting. ^ Perfect expression is even an indispensable household acquisition — a social charm, an economy in explanation, and hourly ministers to good understandings. In pubhc, a good speech, well-spoken, is part of the necessary defence of truth and right. In one of his famous letters to Mr Delane (1864), Mr Cobden remarks :— ' It is known that I am not in the habit of writing a word beforehand of what I speak in public. Like other speakers, practice has given me as perfect self-possession in the presence of an audience, as if I were writing in my closet. Now, my ever-constant and over-ruling thought while addressing a public meeting— the one necessity which long experience of the arts of controversialists has impressed on my mind, is to avoid the possibility of being misrepresented, and prevent my opponents from raising a false issue — a trick of logic as old as the time of Aristotle. If I have, as some favourable critics are pleased to think, sometimes 4 THE SOCIAL AND PUBLIC USES OF RHETORIC 5 spoken with clearness, it is more owing to this ever-present fear of misrepresentation than any other cause.' This remarkable antobiographical passage shows how the practice of rhetoric had trained great natural powers to explicitness and mastery in their use. Progression is a series of stages — individuals first, then groups, then classes, then nations are raised. You can no more introduce the people at once to the highest results of philosophy than you can take them to the summit of a monument without ascending the steps, or reach a distant land without travelling to it. But it is possible to impart method in classification, coherence in inferences, and inculcate justice in invective. The people are not waiting for new discoveries in thought; there is more wisdom extant than they master, more precepts than they apply. The scaling-ladders of the wise, which they, having mounted the citadel of wisdom, have kicked down, are yet of service to those who are below. The author has picked one of these ladders up, and reared it in these pages for the use of those who have yet to rise. In the ancient state of society, war was the only trade, force the only teacher, and the battle-axe the only argu- ment. A transition has, indeed, taken place ; the times, and means, and ends are changed. The struggle now is for income and intelligence, and most men are engaged in a double battle against want and error. Provided the literary sword will cut, few will quarrel about its polish. If the blade has good temper, he who needs it will put up with a plain hilt. A poor man cannot rival the rich in luxury of life, but he can in luxury of knowledge. He cannot furnish his house as the wealthy can, but he can furnish his head. He cannot found a house of note, but he may found a mind of mark. Though some kingdoms may be afflicted or adorned with kings, learning has always been a republic, where all are equal who know. CHAPTER III THE NATURE OF RHETORIC Plato's definition of rhetoric is still bright and suggestive ; namely : ' Rhetoric is the art of persuading the minds of men.' Rhetoric is commonly regarded as a pretentious, superfine, or ornate way of presenting an argument; whereas rhetoric merely means the art of speaking to a purpose. A rhetorician originally meant a public speaker, whose object was orally to influence opinion in courts, in council, or in public meetings. The highest effort of public speaking is seen when the object of the speaker is to per- suade the minds of men to accept some great principle, or adopt some just policy in public affairs. There were two Herberts of mark in literature — George (158 1) and Edward (1593). Edward is commonly spoken of as Lord Herbert of Cherbury. It is he who likens rhetoric to ' a diamond which is of small use until it is cut and polished, when its angles send forth flashes of light which arrest and delight every eye.' By reasoning we satisfy ourselves, by rhetoric we satisfy others. The rhetorician is commonly, but unwisely, con- sidered most perfect who carries his point by whatever means. ' Men like to see the man who is a match for events, and equal to any exigency.' But it is plain we must make some distinction as to the manner in which a point is to be carried. We may as well say that a man may carry the point of life by any means, that is fill his pockets 6 THE NATURE OF RHETORIC 7 by any means, as influence men by any means. A low appeal to the passions we call claptrap. Dr Johnson, who put morality into his definitions, said, ' Oratory is the power of beating down your adversaries' arguments, and putting better in their places.' It implies force and individuality of mind when a man desires to reason out things for himself. Most men prefer to be told what to think ; they are perplexed, and find them- selves lost in a maze of feeling, prejudice and interests ; they cannot see far, nor appreciate what is near. They might have a commanding view of the field of difficulty from an eminence, but eminences are not to be attained without exertion, and most men are disinclined to exertion. They are therefore grateful to anyone who will climb the mount and tell them what he sees. But if he can do more — can tell them not only what they should do and why they should do it — he opens their minds, satisfies their judgment, and inspires them with a new and, let us hope with Dr Johnson, a right purpose. He who satisfies by right reason the conscience of others, commands them without fraud or force. He teaches no unmanly subjection of the under- standing ; he neither invokes nor needs submission to authority ; he represents the only leadership consistent with progress — the leadership of ideas commended by reason. Such are the just aims of honest rhetoric. CHAPTER IV WHAT IS MEANT BY ELOCUTION The literal meaning of elocution is 'to speak out.' Dic- tionaries and writers on rhetoric define elocution as that pronunciation which is given to words when they are arranged into sentences and form discourse. This concep- tion of it confines it to articulation, whereas elocution includes accurateness, distinctness and natural modulation of words, in private as well as public life. Modulation comes by emotion, but accuracy and distinctness of speech come by art. The object of public speech is persuasion. It ought to be the object of private speech also. To persuade by public speech requires a voice articulate and audible. That is the beginning of practical influence in elocution. A man will speak all his life and never notice that words are merely sounds. Accustomed to see words in books, he forgets, or does not realise, that words are merely sounds to the hearer. The difference between the foreign language and the English consists only in a different set of sounds. A man wonders, when he stands by a telegraph clerk, how he turns ticks into words, and does not know that the ticks are sounds of words made by a machine. Chicago is a fine Indian word, sounding as though written She-car-go. If anyone should pronounce it Chick-a-go, nobody would understand what place he meant ; or should he at dinner, wanting tomatoes, pronounce the word tom-a-toes, the waiter would not know what to give him. A speaker must use his ears to learn what sounds he 8 WHAT IS MEANT BY ELOCUTION 9 should make, and be alert with his ears to note what sounds others make. People will listen to one who can be easily heard. The clear, strong speaking man can command a hearing. He who fills the ear carries weight. Few have minds to fill — all have ears. A letter addressed as follows was a puzzle to the best readers in the Post Office for some time : — ' Serum Fridavi, Londres;' when, by reading the address aloud, with the French as well as the EngUsh sound of the vowels, it was found to be — ' Sir Humphry Davy, London.' At an Anti-Corn Law meeting held in Glasgow, in 1845, I sat at half-distance from the platform. As my name had been given to the Lord Provost, I was uncertain whether I should not be called upon to take part in the proceedings, and therefore was anxious to hear all that was said. It was at this time that I first felt perfectly the annoyance of indis- tinct speaking. At the Newhall Hill meetings in Birming- ham I had been accustomed to hear Warwickshire orators vocal, but in Glasgow I found they only spoke, and spoke as though they were paid for the sound they made, and did not get a good price for it. At length the Rev. Dr King arose, who spoke with strong deliberateness — words well conceived and well delivered. The syllables fell on the ear like the steady tolling of a bell. His voice was the relief of the night. Whenever I go to a pubUc meeting, I pray that one of the speakers may have Dr King's quality of utterance. There are two ways of speaking — one from the throat, the other from the chest. The chest voice is louder, and lasts longer. The stage voice is a chest voice, whose uniformity and peculiarity everyone knows. Both actors and singers in- flate the chest to deepen, strengthen, and prolong the tones. Most grammars give a list of about twenty-two words beginning with h in which the h is not sounded. These words have to be spoken as though they began with a vowel. All other words beginning with h must have that letter dis- lO PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE tinctly heard. In illustration of this neglect of aspiration*" where proper, teachers of elocution say that if the Indian swallows the sword we (h)eat the poker. Care in speaking the aspirate words, and in not aspirating words where the h is silent, nor in words beginning with a vowel, will dis- appoint novelists who, unable to delineate character in which the person is identified by his mind, invent peculiarities of manners or of speech. Writers of small knowledge delight to sneer at those who have less, and write the names of Harriet and Harry without the H. Rapid utterance and a slovenliness of speaking, habitual with those who have not thought upon the intention of speech, make it difficult to them to aspirate when they should and avoid doing it when they should not. To speak the aspirate at will, or to omit it at will, comes easy to those who speak deliberately. Vowels should have a bold open tone — a slight, short, mincing pronunciation of the unaccented vowels is a fault to be well avoided. Audibility depends chiefly on articulation, and articulation depends much on the distinctness with which we hear the final consonants. They need attention as well as vowels. W. J. Fox, the great preacher of South Place Chapel, whose voice was neither loud nor strong, was heard in every part, and all over Covent Garden Theatre, when he made Anti-Corn Law orations there, by the clearness with which he pronounced the final consonants of the words he spoke. I must myself have failed in this respect when speaking at the Walsall Literary Institute, and comparing the speak- ing of Pitt and Mr Chamberlain as having the same quality of ' overcomingness.' The report in the papers represented me as charging Mr Chamberlain with ' over-cunningness,' which was a sinister imputation neither in my mind nor on my tongue — but the error was owing to defect of the reporter's ear, or more probably to indistinctness in my pronunciation. * Aspiration is pronouncing the h with a full breath. CHAPTER V REPRESENTATIVE SPEECH To speak or debate to any advantage, a person must possess some knowledge of the laws of speech. This means a prac- tical idea of grammar — practical in the sense of being on a level with the average capacity of mankind. As I have said elsewhere, no department of knowledge is like grammar. A person may conceal his ignorance of any other art — but every time he speaks he publishes his ignorance of this. Other arts may be practised occasionally, but the art of speaking must be practised continually. Is it not strange that what all must do hourly, few care to do correctly ? There can be no greater imputation on the intelligence of any man, than that he should talk from the cradle to the tomb, and never talk well. It is as necessary to get knowledge as to eat and drink. You would not ask another to eat and drink for you. All are as well able to learn as to eat, and it is quite as needful. Lord Herbert, heretofore quoted, tells us that 'between grammar, logic and rhetoric there exists a close and happy connection, which reigns through all science and extends to all the powers of eloquence.' Everybody knows what representation means in politics, A little thought of this will save a man from ordinary error. To make things plain in speech it only needs that a man makes up his mind as to what he is talking about. If he reasons, let it be not upon hearsay, or rumour or imagination. 12 PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE but upon ascertained facts, and he will seldom go wrong. What is called grammar is the same thing as the Franchise Bill. It is simply the full representation of the facts of speech. Daily talk is of a man, or of a woman, or of a thing and of something they do. If when we speak of the man we allude to the man as he, if we refer to a woman we take care to say she, or if we speak of a thing we allude to the thing as it, we accord each fair representation. What a man or woman, or a thing does is expressed by a verb. If one person does a thing we say he does it. If two persons do a thing we say they do it. If it be a thing which acts, as the sun, we say it shines. Just as every voter at the poll says, ' That is my house on the register, and I pay the rent there,' so in grammar all men and women and things have pronouns and verbs and delegate words which belong to them, and by which alone they can be identified and repre- sented, and whoever gives them their proper representation makes his meaning plain to all men. Grammar is but the universal suffrage of common sense. Inattention to conditions and care is expressed in an epigram of sensible if not elegant lines : — He started with lect'ring and ended with verse, And from first to last got gradually worse ; He wrote without spelling, and spoke without rule, Long declaimed without knowledge, and ended a fool.. How different another, who thinks night and day, Deciding what will best become him to say, And how best to say it when he has made up his mind 1 A contrast more useful is not easy to find. The way in which nouns (which signify names) are repre- sented by pronouns (or fornouns) is shown in an admirable sentence of Dr Johnson's : — ' Pope was not content to satisfy ; he desired to excel, and therefore always endeavoured to do his best ; he did not court the candour, but dared the judgment of his reason, REPRESENTATIVE SPEECH I3 and expecting no indulgence from others, he showed none to himself.^ Without the employment of pronouns the sentence would read, with many unpleasant repetitions, thus : — Pope was not content to satisfy ; Pope desired to excel, and therefore always endeavoured to do Pope's best ; Pope did not court the candour, but dared the judgment of Pope's reader, and expecting no indulgence from others. Pope showed none to Pope's self. There is the same kind of representation in verbs. Every verb is connected with or actuated by some noun or pro- noun, expressed or understood. Example : — Hazlitt looked with despairing wonder on Burke's style. Year after year he tried to write a single essay that should please himself.' If we inquire here who looked ? the answer is Hazlitt. Who tried ? HazHtt. Whenever a verb is found, the actor must be found and both examined, to see if the two agree, for every verb must be of the same number, and of the same person, as the noun or pronoun with which it is con- nected, whether it be expressed or merely understood. When this representation is observed, a person is said to speak grammatically. Representation is grammar. There may be good speaking and writing with a moderate knowledge of grammar. One who has authority in these matters asks, — •' How would some of our fashionable writers stare if they could read Thucydides or Plato ! The best authors had no authority before them. Pascal and Madame de Sevigne wrote before there was any French grammar, I believe ; Demosthenes and Cicero before there was a Greek or a Latin one.' When I conducted classes at Crutched Friars, about 1845, I wrote and printed an Act of Parliament for enforcing the Queen's English. Its clauses prescribed the rules of repre- sentation I have explained. Nor did I find any difficulty in teaching little children to 14 PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE write little letters to their parents in a week. As soon as a child can make a round O and a straight line it can make all the letters of the alphabet. A is composed of three straight lines, B of a line and two halves of O. A line and half O makes D. G is O left open with a short line. E F H I K L M N T V W X Y Z are all made of straight lines. J is a line and half an O. P is made the same way. R is two hnes and half an O. Q is an O and short line. 8 is two halves of O up end on end. U is made by half an O and two up- right lines. There you have the whole alphabet, from which a child will select DEAR MOTHER in an hour. A Child's First Writing Book I published, made this plain and easy to hundreds of children fifty years ago. A child will go forward himself as soon as his teacher finds for him a beginning, which the little learner can see, understand, and feel to be within his power. It is the same with older students on the threshold of a new subject. CHAPTER VI LOGIC OF EVERY-DAY LIFE The public speaker requires to know something of the rudiments of reasoning, which we may call the logic of every- day life. Logic is the basis of oratory, for no sensible man is moved to action unless he sees a reason for it. Genius in argument consists in seeing relevancies and in enabling others to see them. Natural pride in the distinction of learning and the passion for superiority, from which the learned are not exempt, lead them to decry all capacity outside their own, so that common sense is belittled and discouraged, and many never use or cultivate the natural power they have, and cease to have confidence in themselves. All the while, common sense is the natural sense of mankind. It is the product of common observation and experience. It is modest, plain and un- sophisticated. It sees with everybody's eyes and hears with everybody's ears. It has no capricious distinction, no perplexities, and no mysteries. It never equivocates and never trifles. Its language is always intelligible. It is known by clearness of speech and singleness of purpose. The most prudent of all the children of fact, it never forsakes nature or reason. Some outline laws for its employment in reasoning — if they can be indicated — must be better than a distrustful, aimless and desultory use. Why, in speaking, should not anyone express himself with l6 PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE grammatical coherence and a certain bold perspicuity, if not able to reach refinement and elegance ? Why, in pro- nunciation, should ordinary persons not speak with a certain manly openness of vowel sound and a distinct articulation, if not with all elocutionary modulation ? Why should not their discourse be expressed in brief, clear sentences? If their punctuation went no further than placing capital letters at the commencement of sentences and of proper names, and periods at the conclusion of sentences, it would render their writing more intelligible than are half the communications they now send to the press. If they mastered only brevity and abrupt directness, and learned to omit wearying prolixity, they would command a hearing in many cases where now they are denied one. If in logic they made a shrewd mastery of plain facts — being as sure as they could, when once set on surety, avoiding conjecture and supposition — if they followed the methods of nature and good sense, where the elaborate methods of art are hidden from them, who will not admit that they would be more intelligible than now, exercise power, and extort attention and esteem where now they excite compassion, or outrage plain taste? The people would be enabled to do these things, but that so many, who prepare treatises for their guidance, alarm them by the display of abstruse dissertation above their powers, their means, their time, and their wants. There is less occasion to speak of the utility of logic than to show it to be easy of acquisition. John Stuart Mill observes : — ' We need not seek far for a solution of the question so often agitated respecting the utility of logic. If a science of logic exists, or is capable of existing, it must be useful. If their be rules to which every mind conforms in every instance in which it judges rightly, there seems little necessity for discussing whether a person is more likely to observe those rules when he knows the rules, than when he is unacquainted with them.' * * System of Logic, p. 12. Second Edition. LOGIC OF EVERYDAY LIFE 1 7 Certainly people are not so much prejudiced against logic on account of its supposed uselessness as on account of its supposed difficulties. Logic has always had a good reputation. The popular impression has uniformly been in its favour. It has been valued like the diamond — but considered, like that precious stone, to be of very uncertain access and difficult to polish, save by experts. Common sense — the exercise of the judgment unaided by scholastic rule — being the best sense the untutored have, they wisely use it, and no wonder if they laud what they are constrained to employ. Doubtless they perceive that common sense would be the better for being made orderly, as a spirited horse is the fitter for use after it has been 'broken.' If common sense can be rendered disciplined sense, it will have all the advantage of the trained soldier over the raw recruit. A few years ago, England was interested in an American teacher of equine rhetoric, Mr Rarey, who won both money and renown by giving lessons in the art of persuading the minds of horses. Dean Swift, in his Gulliver's Travels, shows that the kingdom of horses is in many respects a more rational kingdom than the kingdom of men. The horse is simple in its taste, temperate in its habits, graceful in its movements, proud in spirit, and wary in conduct — which is much more than can be said of many men. Mr Rarey showed that he believed in the reasoning power of horses, and that it is possible to persuade their minds to good conduct. If horses can learn to reason, why not men? Reasoning is a simple business. To reason is to state revelant facts in support of a proposition. Reason is the faculty of perceiving coherences. Efiective reasoning is stating them so that others cannot but see them too. Reasoning on the abstrusest questions consists in arriving at a remote truth by discovering its coherence with the preceding facts in the same chain. B l8 PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE A syllogism is a peculiar form of expression, in which every argument may be stated. It consists of three propositions. 1. Whoever have their heads cut off ought to be allowed to ask the reason why. 2. Women have their heads cut off. 3. Therefore women ought to be allowed to ask (politically at least) the reason why. This is an argument of Madame de Stael in the days of the first Napoleon, in allusion to the beheading of women in France, without allowing them any voice in making the laws which determine the offences for which they suffered. A syllogism is constructed upon the principle (known as the Dictum of Aristotle) that whatever is affirmed or denied universally of a whole class of things, may be affirmed or denied of anything comprehended in that class. Thus, the first proposition introduces the class of persons who have their heads cut off. Of this class it is affirmed that they ought to be allowed to ask the reason why. But women are included in the class of persons who have their heads cut off, and consequently that may be affirmed of them which is affirmed of the whole class, when the conclusion is — that they should be allowed to ask the reason why. Logic may be defined as the art of recognising, stating and testing truth. To make a truth plain it is put in the form of a syllogism. All men have common sense. Peter Luton is a man. Therefore Peter Luton has common sense. Now Peter may be a known idiot, but the syllogism is true. The logic of the schools has nothing to do with the truth of the facts, opinions, or presumptions, from which an inference is derived ; but simply takes care that the inference shall certainly he true if the premises be true. But the chief premise in the syllogism given is not true — that all men have common sense, and therefore the infer- ence is not true that Peter Luton has common sense. This is the point that the reader should consider. It LOGIC OF EVERYDAY LIFE 1 9 was Sir James Mackintosh, I think, who said that * men fall into a thousand errors by reasoning from false premises to fifty they make by wrong inferences from premises they employ.' The late Professor Jowett is reported to have said that ' logic is neither an art nor a science, but a dodge.' It is little better than a 'dodge' when it is confined to making inferences from premises not known to be true. An assertion that represents things as they really are, is a truth — an assertion that represents things as in reality they are not, is a falsehood. Truth, in sculpture, means an exact similitude of some living form, chiselled in stone or marble. Truth, in painting, is a natural representation on canvas, or otherwise, of some person or object. In the same manner, moral truth is an exact image of things set forth in speech or writing. The logical definition of truth is given in these words : — ' Truth is that which admits of proof,' that is, an assertion or denial which can be sub- stantiated by facts. Tyranny, says Cobbett, has no enemy so formidable as the pen. Why ? ' Because the pen pursues tyranny both in life and beyond the grave.' How is it proved to be the most formidable enemy of tyranny ? From the fact that tyranny has no enemy so formidable as that which assails not only its existence, but its reputation, which may pursue it in life and beyond the grave. Such interroga- tories and replies generate the syllogistic form thus : — 1. Tyranny has no enemy so formidable as that which may assail not only its existence, but its reputation, which may pursue it in life and beyond the grave. 2. The pen may pursue tyranny in life and beyond the grave. 3. Therefore, tyranny has no enemy so formidable as the pen. Syllogism need not begin with a universal proposition. But care must be taken not to draw an infinite conclusion from finite premises. 20 PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE In the following syllogism the chief proposition is limited : Aristides was virtuous, Aristides was a pagan, therefore Some pagan was virtuous. The inference is limited. The proof is that some one pagan was virtuous. Induction — a mode of logic which Bacon established — means reasoning from facts. A proposition is concluded to be true when the number of facts relevant to it and in favour of it greatly exceed all the known facts against it. But the quality of the facts as well as the number must be carefully weighed. When a lady once consulted Dr Johnson on the degree of turpitude to be attached to her son's robbing an orchard — 'Madam,' said Johnson, 'it all de- pends upon the weight of the boy. I remember my school- fellow, Davy Garrick, who was always a little fellow, robbing a dozen orchards with impunity, but the very first time I climbed up an apple tree, for I was always a heavy boy, the bough broke with me, and it was called a judgment. I suppose that is why Justice is represented with a pair of scales.' This may not be the precise reason why Justice has a pair of scales, but the point goes to the root of the matter. Without weighing there can be neither justice nor fair induction. When Ali Pacha was at Janina, the case of a poor woman, who accused a man of the theft of all her property, was brought before him ; but the woman having no witnesses, the case was discharged, as the man asserted his innocence, and insisted, as a proof, that he had not a farthing in the world. On their leaving his presence, Ali ordered both to be weighed, and then released them without further notice. A fortnight afterwards he commanded both into his presence, and again weighed them ; the woman had lost as much as the man had gained in weight, and Ali decided that the accusation was just. Ali Pacha was the LOGIC OF EVERYDAY LIFE 21 Burlamiqui of justice ; Burlamiqui was a writer on logic, who insisted on attention being given to the preponderance of relevant facts. In the case of the Leigh Peerage a number of witnesses were examined in the House of Lords as to the existence of a certain monument in Stonely Church — ' The first witness described the monument as being black ; the second spoke of it as a kind of dove-colour ; the third said it was black and white ; the fourth said it was originally white, but dirty, vhen he saw it ; the fifth, differing from the others, said it was blue ; the next witness described it as a light marble, but said it had a dark appearance as if it had been bronzed ; and the last witness spoke of it as being of a light grey colour. Then, as to the form of the monument, the first witness said it was oblong ; the next said it was square at the top, and came down narrower to the bottom, and there rested on a single truss ; the third witness described it as being square at the bottom, resting upon two trusses, and went up narrower and narrower to a point at the top ; the fourth witness said it was angular at the top ; the next said it was square at the bottom, was brought to a point in the middle, and was then curved into a sort of festoon ; the sixth witness stated that it was square at the top and bottom, and had a curve ; and the last said it was square at the top and bottom. As to the language of the inscriptions, the first witness stated that the names of Thomas and Christopher Leigh were in English ; the next said the inscription was not in English ; the third said there was a great deal in English ; the fourth witness said the whole (with the exception of the name Christopher Leigh) was in a language which he did not understand ; the next witness stated that the inscription was all in English, except the words Atifio Domini ; and the last witness said it was not in English.' All these witnesses agree as to the fact in dispute, but their variances in testimony illustrate the common inattention of observation and indistinctness of memory ; and this case 22 PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE further admonishes us that if such differences may exist as to a question of fact, little wonder that differences exist as to matters of opinion, where intellectual capacity and informa- tion are so various. If a man looks well to the truth of the premises from which he reasons, he will never go far wrong. When Pope, in a moment of aberration, wrote, — Be not the first by whom the new is tried, Nor yet the last to lay the old aside, it only wants common sense — and not much of that — to see that if all men act on this advice, no one will ever try a new thing or leave off an old one, and the world would stand still. A few years ago, a distinguished clergyman of the Univer- salist denomination was accused, while in Lowell, of 'violently dragging his wife from a revival meeting, and compelling her to go home with him.' He replied : ' Firstly, I have never attempted to influence my wife in her views, nor her choice of a meeting ; secondly, my wife has not attended any of the revival meetings for any purpose whatever ; thirdly, I never on any occasion forbade my wife to attend a revival meet- ing ; fourthly, neither my wife nor myself have any inclina- tion to attend those meetings ; and fifthly, I never had a wife.' This is a fair example of confutation without creating satisfaction. The clergyman gave a technical answer. The questioner assumed that the lady they had in their minds was his wife. She may have been his sister, or niece, or housekeeper, or relative in his house, over whom he had control — and used it. He would have been more instructive and given more satisfaction had he denied having interfered or sought to control anyone attending the meeting in ques- tion. Though he had * no desire to attend ' such place, he may have been there all the same. He merely fenced with his reply, which is clever but not creditable. Imagine a tramcar director, waited upon by persons who LOGIC OF EVERYDAY LIFE 23 want to know whether the new car would leave at the usual time, and take up passengers at the usual places, who should answer : — Firstly, we have no 'new car,' and never had; secondly, we do not leave at the ' usual time ' ; thirdly, we do not 'take up passengers,' that is the business of the police ; fourthly, we have no ' usual places.' This would be a good technical reply of the ofificial type. But having regard to the interests of the company, he would explain that they had taken over the rolling stock of another company, and had built no ' new car ' themselves ; the ' usual time ' was now a quarter of an hour earlier ; that passengers ' step up ' into the car, are not ' taken up ' ; and that they now stop for passengers wherever hailed. The representative of an interest is communicative and explanatory, why not the representative of truth ? The schoolmen, by teaching that logic has only to do with inferences, and that if the inference is true, the thing reasoned upon has to be accepted, have caused great superstitions to have long life in the world. He who begins to reason with- out knowing what from, is trying to get a living inference out of dead premises. Be sure your premises are alive, or your inferences will smell like stale fish when brought into the market of debate. Man should begin with himself. He loves truth--it is the first impulse of his nature. He loves justice — the bandit on the throne, as well as the bandit in the forest, respects justice in some form or other. Man loves cheer- fulness — it is the attribute of innocence and courage. He loves fraternity — it knits society together in brotherhood. These are standards in the mind of him who thinks. His codes of life and judgment arise therefrom. That which ac- cords with these principles is reasonable. Whatever develops these principles in conduct is moral. These sentiments are to be confirmed by his own observations. His experi- ence in connection with these rules is the light with which he may examine religions, creeds, books, systems, opinions. 24 PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE Pope, one of the few poets who had logic in his bones, writes : — Say first of God above or man below, What can we reason but from what we know ? Definition is the soul of argument, and therefore attention must be paid to it. Definition originates in accurate and comprehensive observation. ' There cannot be,' says Mill, 'agreement about the definition of a thing, until there is agreement about the thing itself. To define a thing is to select fro77i among the whole of its properties those which shall be understood to be designated and declared by its name ; and the properties must be very well known to us before we can be competent to determine which of them are fittest to be chosen for this purpose.' To define a thing, says Dr Watts, we must ' ascertain with what it agrees, then note the most remarkable attribute of difference, and join the two together.' In fact, a valid definition selects that particular in which the thing in question differs from every other. So that it cannot be confounded with any other. Every man of common sense can tell upon reflection what course of conduct would be useful if all men followed it. At least, in affairs of daily life men can tell this, and in affairs of public life considering the effect of a thing upon society is a good guide. Dumont puts this very clearly in the following questions : — ' What is it to give a good reason for a law ? It is to show the good and the evil which that law tends to produce ; so much good, so much argument in its favour; so much evil, so much argument against it.' ' What is it to give a bad reason ? It is to allege for or against a law, any other thing than its effects, whether good or evil.' * Nothing more simple ; yet nothing more new. It is not the principle of utility which is new ; on the contrary, it is of LOGIC OF EVERYDAY LIFE 2$ necessity as ancient as the race of man. Whatever there is of truth in morals, whatever there is of good in law, proceeds from this principle.' There are five things which young logicians mistake for reasons: — (i) Antiquity of a thing is not a reason, because mankind were never infallible. (2) Religious authority is not a reason, for in every nation it has often been in the wrong. (3) Disowning innovation is not a reason, for to reject all innovation is to reject all improvement. (4) Arbitrary definition is not a reason, for using a word in a sense it has not been used in before, it bewilders the reader or hearer by an appearance of depth and subtlety which is unreal. (5) Metaphor or analogy is not a reason, they illustrate an argument but do not make one. There are three maxims in law which may be usefully remembered in reasoning: — (i) Words spoken of one thing ought not to be perverted to another. (2) He who does not truly speak the truth is a betrayer of truth, (3) Contradictions cannot be brought into being. CHAPTER VII DELIVERY Delivery relates primarily to ease, audibility, and expres- siveness of speaking. Expressiveness includes fervour and gesture. But fervour and gesture belong to natural passion rather than to care and skill. Delivery is a carrier's term, and sounds too mechanical for elocution ; nevertheless, a speech is a delivery of information or incentive, and the manner of it is important. Delivery is, in fact, elocution in practice. Vigorous, sonorous delivery is called declamation. The speech of Brutus, defending the assassination of Caesar, or that of Anthony denouncing it, are declaimed on the stage. Declamation is also applied to speech pompously spoken without adequate force of sense — to propositions daring in sound but meek in proof. Oriental speech is generally graceful and fascinating declamation — ornament without profit. Paul's famous declamation on charity includes no reason why anyone should have charity. Many contrive to do very well without it. Its beauty, its eminence as a virtue, the apostle excels in setting forth. It remained for Richard Hooker sixteen centuries later to show how much more any man needs the charity of all men, than that all men need the charity of any one man, and that it is therefore prudent to establish a claim to the good-will of the world by showing good-will towards it. This is the reason which commends charity as a civil policy, were it not a principle of justice. 26 DELIVERY 27 So much describes declamation intrinsically as regards matter. As respects manner, declamation means the loud, vigorous, impetuous utterance of resounding sentences. But force in delivery may be obtained in other ways — where there is mind behind the words. The Rev. Robert Hall, whose talent for speaking was such that, when eleven years old, he was set up to preach ex- tempore to a select auditory of full-grown men, says of him- self: 'To me to speak slow was ruin. You know, sir, that force or momentum is conjointly as the body and the velocity ; therefore, as my voice is feeble, what is wanted in body must be made up in velocity.' This is a mathematical figure of speech, and is more true of dynamics than rhetoric. Hall's remark has misled many young speakers. Unless there is strength of voice to sustain the momentum imparted, indistinctness and alternations of screechings and whispers will be the result. Some years ago, we had in Parliament a momentum speaker of no mean repute. It is said of Mr Macaulay (I think by Francis, in his Orators of the Age), that when an opening is made in a discussion in the House of Commons, he rises, or rather darts up from his seat, and plunges at once into the very heart of his subject without exordium or apologetic preface. In fact, you have for a few seconds a high-pitched voice, monotonous and rather shrill, pouring forth words with inconceivable velocity ere you have become aware that a new speaker, and one of no common order, has broken in upon the debate. A few seconds more and cheers, perhaps from all parts of the house, rouse you com- pletely from your apathy, compelling you to follow that ex- tremely voluble and not very enticing voice in its rapid course through the subject on which the speaker is entering, with a resolute determination, as it seems, never to pause. You think of an express train which does not stop even at the chief stations. On, on Macaulay speeds, in full reliance on his own momentum, never stopping for words, never stopping .'"or 28 PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE thoughts, never halting for an instant even to take breath, his intellect gathering new vigour as it proceeds, hauling the subject after him and all its possible attributes and illustra- tions, with the strength of a giant, leaving a line of light on the pathway his mind has trod, till, unexhausted and apparently inexhaustible, he brings his remarkable effort to a close by a peroration so highly sustained in its de- clamatory power, so abounding in illustration, so admirably framed to crown and clench the whole oration, that surprise, if it has even begun to wear off, kindles anew, and the hearer is left prostrate by the whirlwind of ideas and emotions which has swept over him. A man may take this liberty with elocution if he has genius to compensate for it. That member must beware who attempts to charm the House of Commons by a monotonous tone without Macaulay's wit, his power of enlightenment and amazing fecundity of illustration. In some persons real power of speaking is marred by a physical peculiarity, as in the case of the late Lord Derby, which cannot be overcome by any device. A weak voice may be made stronger by exercise ; stammering may be mitigated as it is said Demosthenes did in his case, by declaiming with stones in his mouth ; but a husky voice is incorrigible. Lord Rosebery remarks of Pitt that 'unfriendly critics said that his voice sounded as if he had worsted in his mouth ; but the general testimony is that it was rich and sonorous.' Pitt's voice when animated rose to sonorous- ness, but he must have had worsted moments. Not even * unfriendly critics ' would invent a pecuUarity which would be confuted five nights a week. Such a voice is not a de- fect of oratory ; where it exists, it is a defect of nature — still a disadvantage. Mr Goschen speaks as though he had once been a pedlar of worsted, and had accidentally swallowed a ball ; or had suffered from a cold in the throat when young, and the flannel intended to encase it had been inadvertently put inside instead of out. This filamentariness of speech im- DELIVERY 29 parts a woollen effect to many wise things he says. There are times when Mr Goschen's impassioned tones expand into the volume of the fog-horn, when their impressiveness effaces all sense of defect. Others have natural advantages. Lord Coleridge had deliberateness of speech, and, like Lord Westbury, was unresting and unerring in his choice of terms. When Lord Coleridge, then Sir John Duke Coleridge, first spoke in the Commons, his tones filled the House with the silvery accents of a lute. Sir John Bowring says, ' The Chinese shoot arrows to which a musical pipe is attached, and when launched, sing in the air.' That describes Lord Coleridge's sentences. Some orators of mark on the political platform suffer their voice to fall at the closing words of a sentence — though in the last words lie the whole point they intend. Great is the disappointment of hearers who lose interest in an argument incompletely made known to them. The cleverer a speaker is the more surely the sting of his mean- ing will be in the tail of sentences of importance. What does he speak for save to make that word clear ? Yet he will drop his voice just there. Just as a man seldom writes his own name plainly because, knowing it himself, he con- cludes all other persons know it. Yet a proper name obscurely written, Hke an argument whose culmination is undisclosed, no one can certainly make out. This negli- gence in speaking is counted defective elocution. There is a vanishing point in art, but none in sentences. Droll misapprehensions through indistinctness of utterance or neglect of emphasis, are familiar to every reader. There is the case of the archdeacon, whose housemaid gave notice to leave because she was held up to detestation every day in the morning prayers. The archdeacon read with the slovenly indistinctness common with some Churchmen, the words, 'O Lord, who hatest nothing that Thou hast made,' sounded thus : ' O Lord, who hatest nothing Imt the shone- 30 PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE maid ; and Mary, with her honest red elbows, said she would stand it no longer. A clergyman, who denied that emphasis was proper in the pulpit, one day found his mistake by the smiles of his congregation, on his reading the text : ' And he spake to his sons, saying ; " Saddle me^ the ass, and they saddled /«■;;/." ' He would have made the meaning clear had he, instead of 'saddled him,' said 'saddled the ass.' A man whom he reprimanded for swearing, replied that he did not see any harm in it. ' No harm in it ? ' said the minister. 'Why, do you not know the commandment " Swear not at «//?"' 'I do not swear at a//,' said the man, ' I only swear at those who annoy me.' The emphasis which is suggested by the sense is the best guide. Let a person make sure of the sense and his emphasis will be natural and varied. By natural is meant giving the chief force to those words upon which the mean- ing turns. For instance, in so simple a phrase as ' Come here.' If you wanted the person to come, and he would not, the speaker would throw a tone of entreaty into the word come : but if the person spoken to did not understand where he was to come to, and the speaker wanted him where he stood, he would put distinctness and force into the word here. But more of this in another chapter. ' Sufficient unto the place — is the evil thereof?' Attracted by the pretensions of a placard, adorned by a testimonial from the Times, I went, in Glasgow, to hear some professional recitations. One of them was the ' Story of a Broken Heart.' The unfortunate girl, of whom it was told, did not die immediately, but it struck me she would have done so had she heard Mr Wilson recite her story. The subject was that piece of graceful effeminacy, in which Washington Irving has told the story of the proud love of the daughter of Curran for the unhappy and heroic Emmet. No one can recite with propriety what he does not feel, and the key to gesture as well as to modulation is earnest- DELIVERY 31 ness. No actor can portray character with truth unless he can realise it, and he can only reahse it by conceiving it for a time his own. It is said of one of the Kembles that his daughter had been forbidden to marry an actor, and her father was inexorable at her disobedience ; but after he had seen her husband upon the stage, he relented, and forgave her with this observation, ' Well, well ! I see you have not disobeyed me after all ; for the man is not, and never will be, an actor.' The prompting of Lucio to Isabel, when pleading before Angelo for the life of her brother, as rendered by Shake- speare in ' Measure for Measure,' is one of the happiest practical lessons in the art of persuasion on record. As a piece of perceptive teaching, neither the rhetoric of modern or of ancient times, so far as I have knowledge, has produced anything so wise, so concise, and yet so com- prehensive, as Hamlet's directions to his players. It is a manual of delivery in miniature. Do manners matter? is a question a public speaker should put to himself. In social life, those who affect to despise manners as too superfine for persons of their manly taste, forget that every man has manners — good or bad. A good manner is but art in doing what you have to do with consideration for others. A tone means much. Even laughter is an art. Some women laugh like joy. Some laugh like a peal of bells. Others laugh and you feel worse for having heard them. Is there such a thing as tone in the world? One would think not w^hen we hear men cry ' Matter not manner.' A man shall hate his friend, not for what he says but for the imperious tone in which he says it. How many malevolent purposes have been changed by a kindly spoken word ; how many hearts have been broken by unkind tones. There are tones, whatever their purport may be, so en- chanting that no ear would willingly forget them. Yet tone is a matter of manner. All manner is but policy in the 32 PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE sense of being a chosen line of action. Manner is the half of life. Without some refinement of manner life would not be worth having. Dress to the gentleman, skill to the workman, discipline to the soldier, knowledge to all — is manner. Grammar is manner of speech ; poetry is manner of expression ; rhetoric is the manner of the passions ; art the manner of genius. Daily watchfulness in speech is of the greatest import- ance. Ordinary conversation should be well and clearly spoken — whether a question, an answer, or an anecdote ; every word should be carefully said. Lord Wolseley wisely counselled English officers in command of Zulu or Indian troops, not to conclude that they were stupid or wilful because they disobeyed orders, unless they were quite sure the soldiers understood what was said to them. The stupidity might be on the part of the officer who was in- capable of making himself understood. Habitually audible and accurate speech will make it easy to speak in public. What anyone does well in daily life, he will do well in public, and have confidence that he can do it well. Well or ill, everybody is making short speeches in business or conversation, and a public speech is but the expansion or multiplication of short speeches. No one has a right to speak unless he has something to say, and he has no right to say it publicly unless it is publicly important, and what it is publicly important to say should be said so distinctly and audibly that the public present can hear it. Deliberation in delivery is more difficult to acquire or maintain than in former times. The world has been hurried by railways. They have originated a murderous punctu- ality in order to accelerate business. More deaths occur at railway stations through hurry to arrive there, than on all the coaches by the old and tardy traffic. Public meetings, as a rule, have neither order nor limit. Everybody is held to have a right to speak now a meeting DELIVERY 33 may number 30,000, as everyone had when a pubhc meet- ing seldom numbered 300. Now, too many resolutions are proposed, too many speakers appear, and speaking is hurried. Lord Palmerston was a speaker who knew the value of taking time. Once, at Tiverton, a vehement electoral opponent inquired whether he would give a plain answer to a plain question. To this Lord Palmerston assented. The question was — Would he vote for a Radical measure of re- form ? Palmerston at once answered : ' I will ' — pausing, while the Liberals cheered — then adding, ' not,' whereupon the Conservatives applauded ; waiting until they had done, Palmerston continued, ' tell you ; ' when the wily and evasive candidate retired amid laughter and distrust all round. Without deliberateness, self-possession is unattainable, and self-possession alone sometimes makes the fortune of a speech ; and if it does not, it conduces to the repute of the speaker. I have seen Mr John Stuart Mill in the House of Commons pause in an argument until the sequence occurred to him. The House would wait, as Mill's words were chosen, I have noticed Lord John Russell pause when the word he wanted did not occur to him. One night his son, Lord Amberley, paused twice in a short, wise speech, for the same reason. Being acquainted with him, 1 congratulated him upon the promise he gave of being a Parliamentary speaker, through self-possession, and the courage which waited for accuracy. A speaker should pro- vide less to say than he might say at his ordinary rate of speaking, so that he must fill the time allotted to him by more deliberation and emphasis. Between deliberate, full- toned, and energetic speaking, and feeble, indistinct and spiritless utterances, there is the difference of live and dead oratory. A certain energy in delivery — which prevents drawling, and a slowness that avoids whirling accents, or clipping half the sounds away, as hasty speaking does — are conditions of elocution. A speaker should take time to c 34 PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE Utter well, speak trippingly without tripping. If anyone must be extreme, he had better be heavy than hasty. A slowness carried too far would produce tedium, but without a certain slowness there can be no distinctness, nor will there be time for the speaker to think and for the auditors to apprehend the speaker's meaning. It could never be meant that people should rush through this world, seeing how many advantages wait on those who take time to consider before they precipitate themselves into action. Difficulties, which seem insuperable to the beginner, vanish before those who have the wisdom to observe Pope's rule : — Learn to speak slow — all other graces Will follow in their proper places. The graces may not follow then, but slowness gives them a chance of doing it if they have a mind to. Nevertheless, deliberation is the beginning of power in speech. The limit of slowness is drawling. Without a certain energetic slowness there can be no certain effect, and seldom any effect at all. One who knew the House of Commons well has said : — ' Fellows who have been the oracles of coteries from their birth — who have gone through the regular process of gold medals, senior wranglerships, and double firsts — who have nightly sat down amid tumultuous cheering in debating societies, and can harangue with an unruffled forehead and an unfaltering voice, from one end of a dinner-table to the other — who on all occasions have something to say, and can speak with fluency on what they know nothing about — no sooner rise in the House than their speUs desert them. All their effrontery vanishes. Common-place ideas are rendered even more uninteresting by a monotonous delivery; and keenly alive, as even boobies are in those sacred walls, to the ridiculous — no one appears more thoroughly aware of his unexpected and astounding deficiencies than the orator himself. He regains his seat, hot and hard, sultry and stiff, DELIVERY 35 with a burning cheek and an icy hand — repressing his breath lest it should give evidence of an existence of which he is ashamed ; and clenching his fist that the pressure may secretly convince him he has not as completely annihilated his stupid body as his false reputation.' * This passage has discouraged more persons than it ought. If a man goes into Parliament to make a demonstration at sight he will commonly fail. But if he modestly gives it information, and speaks when a sense of duty comes over him, upon what he understands, he will succeed according to what is in him. One who acquired great reputation for capacity, Thomas Paine, confesses that the world (when he first came to America) could not have persuaded him that he should be either a soldier or an author. ' If I had any talents for either,' he said, 'they were buried in me, and might have ever continued so had not the necessity of the times dragged and driven them into action.' He was unconscious of his powers, as most persons are ; hence, trusting yourself to events is good. It is prudent in men not to guess their abiUties, but determine them by enterprise and achievement. The first step to success is to try. There is no learning to swim without going into the water. Had Hamlet contem- plated being an orator, his soliloquies would have run thus : — To spout, or not to spout, that is the question : Wliether 'tis better for a shamefaced fellow (With voice unmusical and gesture awkward) To stand a mere spectator in this business, Or have a touch at Rhetoric ? To speak — to spout No more ; and by this effort, to say we end That bashfulness, that nervous trepidation Displayed in maiden speeches — 'twere a consummation Devoutly to be wished. To read — to speechify Before folks — perhaps to fail : ay, there's the rub ; For from that ill success what sneers may rise, Youngs Duke, by Disraeli. 36 PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE Ere we have scrambled through the sad oration, Must give us pause. 'Tis the same reason That makes a novice stand in hesitation, And gladly hide his own diminished head Beneath some half- fledged orator's importance, When he himself might his quietus make By a mere recitation. Who could speeches hear, Responded to with hearty acclamation, And yet restrain himself from holding forth — But for the dread of some unlucky failure, Some unforeseen mistake — some frightful blunder — Some vile pronunciation or inflection. Improper emphasis or wry-necked period, Which carping critics note, and raise the laugh, Not to our credit — nor so soon forgot ? We muse on this ! Then starts the pithy question : Had we not best be mute, and hide our faults, Than spout to publish them ? Spout and publish them without hesitation if you wish to cure them. Had Raphael feared to daub, he had never been Raphael of renown. Had Canova feared to torture marble, he had never been a sculptor. Had Charles Kean feared to spout, he had never been an actor regarded as next to Garrick. If you stammer like Demosthenes, or stutter like Curran, speak on. He who hesitates to hesitate will always hesitate. CHAPTER VIII GESTURE MEASURED BY CONVICTION As genius in ideas will compensate for the neglect of elocutionary art in utterance, so earnestness and com- manding thought will produce eloquence of effect without gesture in delivery. At the same time, fitting gesture, which grows out of personal animation, is an advantage. To underdo it, rather than overdo it, is a safe rule. If the arm moves from the shoulder, rather than from the elbow, angularity of action, which is never well received, will be avoided. It is better to commence a speech with moderate action and leave it to the natural fervour of conviction to augment it. As a rule, a chaste, concise and energetic style is more effective than a florid, turgid and prolix one ; so the judici- ous employment of moderate gesture is more effective upon the taste of the English people, who love modera- tion, than any possible amplification of spasmodic attitudes or redundancy of facial changes. He who commences with moderate gesture may increase it without danger of falling into exaggeration, while he who begins with affluence of action exhausts his resources of motion before the moment for supreme effect arrives. Robert Hall had no oratorical action, scarcely any kind of motion, excepting an occasional lifting or waving of the right hand; and in his most impassioned moments only an alternate retreat and advance in the pulpit by a short 37 38 PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE step. Nor had W. J. Fox much gesture. His hands were crossed before him. One or other arm was raised (I do not remember to have seen both raised at once) and pointed towards, rather than at, the audience. The action seemed more effective from its moderation. Mr Bright had impres- sive gestures, which were moderately used. Mr Gladstone's striking and animated gestures are one of the charms of his oratory. Gambetta was a master of gesture : but it was slow, imposing, sustained by his mighty voice and well- chosen words. He excelled in vigorous sentences, which no compeer could express with like luminousness. His gestures illustrated his sense ; they were not, as with many animated speakers, a substitute for sense. Sincerity is not always elegance, nor is earnestness always grace ; nevertheless, earnestness is the best schoolmaster of gesture. Awkwardness and angularity of movement is forgiven to the sincere. In some, grace of gesture comes by nature, some acquire it by dancing. Grace mostly comes by training, but those who have it not should confine themselves to few motions. Awkwardness will not be so apparent then. Besides, there is another com- pensation — a little gesture goes a long way when there is manifest conviction behind it. However, gesture is but the outward and visible ornament of inward sources of effective- ness. To venture upon imitating Italian or French gesture, the speaker needs Italian grace and French animation. CHAPTER IX CONDITIONS OF EFFECTIVENESS Besides the effectiveness which relates to manner of deUvery, there is the effectiveness which depends upon the mind. Effectiveness is the aim of oratory. So far as it can be compassed — it can be compassed more or less by calculation in statement. There may be effective- ness without calculation, and effects unpremeditated are sometimes marvellous. But a wise speaker does not depend on chance — his strength is to foreknow. Manifest sincerity in speech may be depended upon to create a good impres- sion on an audience. Earnestness is a quality which on the platform might degenerate into emotionalism, which, lack- ing self-possession, would be fatal to pubUc effect. Sincerity is a manly, self-contained sentiment, less pretentious than earnestness. Nevertheless, earnestness, when good sense controls it, is a noble quality. Yet not even sincerity is everything. It does not imply the truth of what is said. That still requires to be proved. Some think sincerity is errorless. Once everybody, save a few philosophers, be Ueved it to be a sign of truth. Robespierre was sincere : he was a man who made sincerity terrible. Some of his speeches, not all, read Hke a murder. There was a guillo- tine in them. His sentences dripped with blood. No genius, no talent, no sincerity is to be trusted or praised — unless it conduces, and is intended to conduce, to the welfare of others. 39 40 PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE Nevertheless, with all its limitations, sincerity and capa- city annihilate personal disadvantages. I knew a rotund orator, who appeared on the platform as Charles James Fox must have appeared in Pitt's days — like a sugar hogs- head on two props, yet upon whom the audience looked with admiration while he spoke. Louis Blanc was diminutive in stature, but he was so entirely a man, and his speaking was so sonorous, pregnant and animated, that his small stature seemed an advantage to him. Robert Hall was a preacher who had ideas, as well as precision and energy of style, yet the spiritual and intrinsic charm of his speech was its earnestness. Foster said of Hall, ' Truth (to him) was a universal element, and to enforce its claims was his con- stant aim. Whether he attempted to engage the reason, the affections, or the fancy, all was subsidiary to this end. He was always in earnest,' as to the necessity of discerning truth, explaining it, and vindicating it. Effectiveness Ues also in proportion. Not in the beauty of a pillar, or the finish of a frieze, but in the commanding- ness which the whole building has over the spectator — not in the brilliance of a passage, but in the coherence of the whole lies the effectiveness of a speech or a book. One conspicuous element of force is a defined pur- pose. Better say nothing than not to the purpose. No part should attract the main attention entirely to itself. The chief merit of any part is its subserviency to the whole design. When parts are praised, a speaker is said to have briUiance ; when the whole impresses, he is said to have power. In a speech, as in a drawing on a reduced scale, all the proportions have to be there. If a subject is too ex- tensive for an ordinary speech, present a distinct portion which shows the quality of the whole. Hierocles carried a brick in his pocket as a specimen of the house he wanted to sell. It gave no idea of its situation, or convenience, but it proved his confidence in the quality of its material. Lucidity of arrangement is intent made evident to an CONDITIONS OF EFFECTIVENESS 4I assembly, and is no mean element of effectiveness. As reasoning proceeds from axioms which cannot be lost sight of without confusion — so an argumentative speech has a foregone object which must be disclosed to the hearers, or they will be unable to follow the speaker intelligently. The Encyclflpcedia Metropolita7ia has explained clearly the advantages of this course in the following terms : — ' In purely argumentative statement, or in the argumenta- tive division of mixed statements, and especially in argu- mentative speeches, it is essential that the issue to be proved should be distinctly announced in the beginning, in order that the tenour and drift that way of everything that is said may be the better apprehended ; and it is also useful, when the chain of argument is long, to give a forecast of the principle bearings and junctures, whereby the attention will be more easily secured and pertinently directed throughout the more closely consecutive detail, and each proposition of the series will be clenched in the memory by its foreknown relevancy to what is to follow.' These are well-known rules, which it were superfluous to cite, except for the instruction of the young. But examples may be occasionally observed of juvenile orators who will conceal the end they aim at until they have led their hearers through the long chain of antecedents, in order that they may produce surprise by forcing a sudden acknowledgment of what had not been foreseen. The disadvantage of this method is that the hearer is apt to resent being trapped into assent. It puzzles and provokes the hearer during its statement, confounds him in the conclusion, and gives an overcharged impression of the orator's ingenuity on the part of those who may have attended to him sufficiently to have been convinced. It is a method by which the business of the argument is sacrificed to ostentation in the conduct of it, and the ease and satisfaction of the auditors sacrificed to the vanity of the arguer. The novelist or dramatist will often conceal the secret of his plot to allure the reader to 42 PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE the end, and take him by surprise then, if he can. In that case the story has to be entertaining up to that point, or the reader will not hold on till he reaches it. Unless a speaker is sure of enchanting his audience as he goes along, hearers will not wait for the point of his argument, which has been concealed from them. Besides, there is this difference between a novel and an argument. The novel is intended to amuse, the argument to convince, and when a link is lost, by ignorance of its relevance, the chain of proof is dis- connected. Yet though the aim of an argument must be divulged, the drift of an illustration, if brief, may be kept back. In one of the Anti-Corn-Law orations of W. J. Fox in Covent Garden Theatre, there occurred a striking example of this. He commenced by stating the case of certain poachers, related in the newspapers of that day, who had been sentenced at Ashby - de - la - Zouch to considerable terms of imprisonment. When to this punishment was added the loss and privation to which the families of the prisoners were subjected, the penalty was serious. No one foresaw the relevance of the story, but which the orator did not long withhold. He demanded to know ' i this shall be done to the poor man who steals the rich man's bird, what shall be done to the rich man who steals the poor man's bread ? ' I know of no first words of any speech which produced so great an effect. The argument was as a match applied to a funeral pyre where the fallacies of protection were burned before the eyes of the meeting. An appeal to experience is a force in due place. ' The argument,' says Emerson, ' which has not the power to reach my own practice, I may well doubt will fail to reach yours. I have heard an experienced counsellor say, that he never feared the effect upon a jury of a lawyer who does not believe in his heart that his client ought to have a verdict.' Samuel Bailey, in his Review of Berkeley's ' Theory of Vision^ says : — CONDITIONS OF EFFECTIVENESS 43 * Many years ago, I held what may be styled a derivative opinion in favour of Berkeley's Theory of Vismi, but having in the course of a philosophical discussion had occasion to explain it, I found, on attempting to state in my own language the grounds on which it rested, that they no longer appeared to me to be so clear and conclusive as I had fancied them to be. I determined to make it the subject of a patient and dispassionate examination. The result has been a clear conviction in my own mind of its erroneousness, and a desire to state to the philosophical world the grounds on which that conviction has been formed.' This is an interesting instance of the truth of the obser- vation that that statement only is fit to be made public which you have come at in attempting to satisfy your own understanding. An editor of Shelley's posthumous poems apologises for the publication of some fragments in a very incomplete state, by remarking, ' how much more than every other poet of the present day, every line and word he wrote is instinct with beauty.' Let no man sit down to write with the purpose of making every line and word beautiful and peculiar. Sir Henry Taylor thought ' the only effect of such an endeavour will be to corrupt the judgment and confound the under- standing.' Augustine Birrell, in a criticism wise in a new way, like many other criticisms of his, remarks that ' Emerson writes like an electrical cat, emitting sparks and shocks in every sentence. The lights irradiate the forest, but disclose no path.' The same critic explains what many have felt. 'You never know what Emerson will be at. His sen- tences fall over you in glittering cascades, beautiful and bright, and for the moment refreshing. But after a very brief while the mind, having nothing to do on its own account but to remain wide open and see what Emerson will send it, grows first restive and then torpid. Admiration 44 PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE gives way to astonishment, astonishment to bewilderment, and bewilderment to stupefaction.' As a rule, men are not much in danger of being too brilliant. Happily for orators, occasional phrases of power are sufficient for effect and reputation. Brightness and force are attain- able by him who, knowing what he wishes to say, knows why it should be said. Telling the audience the reason which has convinced the speaker is that explanation which produces impression. It fulfils Mr J. R. Green's rule — ' it takes the public into the speaker's confidence, who are addressed as though they knew as much as the speaker himself.' An orator will be all the more explanatory, in- teresting and engaging, if he assumes in his own mind that his hearers know nothing upon the subject. A painting all white or all black allures no eye. It is light and shade that make the picture. A fixed beacon light is not seen at sea as far, nor as well, as a revolving light. To speak, study simplicity ; abjure affectation and be natural. The natural voice is heard the farthest, and the natural effects the soonest. ' The costly charm of the ancient tragedy is that the persons speak simply, speak as persons who have great good sense without knowing it.' Nothing astonishes men so much as common sense and plain dealing. Sincerity and simplicity carry all before them. On Thiers's first appearance in the French Chamber he experienced an almost universally unfavourable reception. He was diminutive, with an expression of countenance — though intellectual, reflective and sarcastic — far from possessing beauty. The face itself, small in form, was en- cumbered with a pair of spectacles so large that, when peering over the marble edge of the long narrow tribune whence all speakers address the Chamber, he was described as appearing suspended to the two orbs of crystal. With such an exterior M. Thiers, full of the impassioned eloquence of his favourite revolutionary orators, sought to impart those thrilling emotions recorded of Mirabeau. The attempt pro- CONDITIONS OF EFFECTIVENESS 45 voiced derision, but only for a time. In his new sphere, as in the others he had passed through, he soon outshone competition. Subsiding into the oratory natural to him — simple, vigorous and rapid, he proved himself one of the most formidable of Parliamentary champions. Have a clear meaning and never obscure it. A wit may leave his words open to two interpretations if he intends to amuse and not to deceive. Dryden, a great poet, and Otway a poet also, but of lesser magnitude, lived in the same street in houses facing each other. One morning Otway wrote in chalk on Dryden's door the line : — Here lives Dryden, a poet and a wit. Dryden, on coming out, saw it, and wrote underneath it : — Written by Otway opposite. It has never been settled to this day whether Dryden meant merely to say that the line of praise his neighbours would see written on his own door about him, was not written by him- self—but written by a person living opposite ; or that Otway was the opposite of ' a poet and a wit.' But in matters of moment, which will affect themselves and others, men like to know, and have a right to demand, with General Ludlow, that a speaker's words shall not only be such as can be understood, but such as cannot possibly be misunderstood. For effectiveness in speech or writing, keep clear of philo- sophical fogginess and common-place sentiment. Avoid as far as possible abstract terms, abstract questions, and abstract ideas. Keep to palpable things, and such as pass before the auditors in daily life. It is very well to entertain Utopian ideas — it implies an outside mind ; but it is not convincing to act altogether on Utopian principles till you are in Utopia. Beware of the transition epoch in argument, so common and so false, by which so many alarm the public at what 46 PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE they call the decay of faith, which is being superseded by the evolution of higher truth. Transition is no new thing ; it has been going on ever since time began. Transition is the step of ceaseless progress. Its determined and tireless tread is heard in every epoch. Transition is the change- bringer of time. The hills, the ocean, the climate, society, men and creeds are changing hourly and always. It is an open question whether a particular change is good or bad. It is reasonable to reason about it. But to talk of the present time as one of transition, which the speaker has found out, is no novelty of discovery. It is older than the mountains. Transition is eternal. Men so well-informed, and so self-conscious of infallibility as Carlyle was, could say in the days passing over him, 'Few men have seen more impressive days of endless calamity, disruption, dislocation, confusion worse con- founded. If they are not days of endless hope too, then they are days of utter despair.' Public men, priests and politicians before the days of Noah, and ever since, have said the same thing. It is the common jargon of Parlia- ment. I have seen the sun of England set for ever annually for sixty years, according to the predictions of our political Cassandras. It weakens public respect for a man's judgment to hear him talk thus. Foolishness destroys effectiveness. No more should be said at any time than can be said well. Brevity is the instinct of art. If anything is pro- longed it must be varied and perfect in every part. It is a mistake to try to say everything which can be said upon a subject. Confine yourself to so much as will make a distinct impression. Enough is as good as a feast and better, and too much is worse than a fast. Against multitudes of words the poets have given many warnings. One who knew exclaims : — Words are like leaves ; and where they most abound, Much fruit of serse beneath, is rarely found. CONDITIONS OF EFFECTIVENESS 47 There are those who, Uke Talleyrand, regard words as given to us to conceal our meaning. But where the intention is to make things clear, we must give heed to Moore's sug- gestion — The wise men of Egypt were secret as dummies, And e'en wlien they most condescended to teach, They paclced up their meaning, as they did their mummies, In so many wrappers, 'twas out of one's reach. Co-operators ought to be good speakers ; their study being economy, and economy in words is the source of effectiveness in speech. Economy is honourable in war. Wellington was a greater general than Napoleon, inasmuch as he compassed great effects with a smaller expenditure of men; as he is the greatest speaker who accomplishes conviction with the smallest number of words. We can do without any article of luxury we never had, but when once obtained, it is not in human nature to surrender it voluntarily. Of twelve thousand clocks left on trial by Sam Slick, only ten were returned. ' We trust to soft sawder,' said Sam, 'to get them into the house, and to human nature that they never come out of it.' Yet how many persons expect to produce effects upon assemblies of men who never bestow half the time upon the study of their natures as was given by our American clock-seller. The young speaker will do well to notice that morality is better understood, at least in theory, than in former days, and that the public like sincerity on the part of a speaker. A life which shall illustrate what the orator seeks to enforce will add materially to his influence. Some will ask — May not a recommendation be a good one though the giver of it be bad ? Yes ; but is it not an advantage when both are worthy ? The public may accept good advice from men who will not take it themselves. But is it not the object of a wise rhetoric to increase the number of men 48 PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE who act themselves on the advice they give ? If the public should be composed of men who hear only and never practise, who does not see that we may give over all exhorta- tions of amendment ? Mankind reason that that which is good for the public is good for individuals, since individuals make up the public. And when it is seen that a man does not follow his own advice, it is concluded that either he is a simpleton, and consequently is not to be heeded, or that he is secretly conscious of some inapplica- bility in his own recommendations, and therefore to be suspected. The moral existence of men is made up of a few trains of thought, which, from the cradle to the grave, are excited and re-excited again and again. These leading ideas rule despotically over conduct, and, whoever awakens these, influence those whom he addresses. It is in these leading ideas that we see the source of character. These features the rhetorician studies. When Napoleon in Egypt was threatened by his disaffected generals, he vanquished them by an appeal to three traits in their character — their pride, their honour and their bravery. Walking among them, he exclaimed : ' You are too many to assassinate me, and too few to intimidate me.' The fury of the men was subdued to admiration, and they turned away, exclaiming, ' Damn him, how brave he is.' It is said the heart has no avenue so open as that of flattery, which, like some enchant- ment, lays its guards asleep. But flattery which succeeds with the intelligent requires art. If honest, it is excellent. A famous politician, at a Royal Academy dinner, listening to insincere praise which others called ' clever,' he answered, ' I call it hellish.' Youth should lay the foundation of eloquence in char- acter and honesty. Let him speak for the right ; let him not borrow the language of idle gentlemen or self-complacent scholars, much less that of sensualists, absorbed in greed of purse and palate ; let him speak for the absent, defend the CONDITIONS OF EFFECTIVENESS 49 friendless, the poor, the slave, the prisoner and the lost. Let him look upon opposition as opportunity ; he is one who cannot be defeated or put down. Let him feel that it is not the people who are in fault for not being convinced but the speaker who cannot convince them. CHAPTER X LAWS O F DEBATE Debate is a larger question than is generally understood. Every man is debating daily, either with himself or someone else. A man debates questions with his household or with friends. Whenever a difference of opinion arises oetween two persons, they instinctively debate it together. This term has, also, a public signification, and is applied to discussions in Parliament and formal debates on public platforms. Correspondence in newspapers, reviews and periodicals often takes the form of controversy. All forms of co%-«Y~oversy, where one person seeks to justify his opinion against the differing opinion of another, is debate ; for intellectual life is a perpetual discussion. Conversation is often a friendly debate. Error of idea is everywhere an antagonist Some people are so disquieted by contrariety of opinion that they fear the fate of the Catholic and Jew, who debated together the grounds of their faiths, and ended by the Jew becoming a Catholic and the Catholic a Jew. Some fear discussion because they are like the judge who said he understood a case when he had heard only one side — it was the other side which perplexed him. The risk of this perplexity he must undergo who would be wise. Before taking part in debate, a man has to vindicate to himself the uses of debate. I. It creates two-sided people. SO LAWS OF DEBATE $1 2. It instils toleration. 3. It proves truth which may be trusted. 4. It puts into the mind the sense of reasoned truth. 5. It sows the seeds of new truth. Those who object to these things may as well keep clear of debate, for they will misuse it and distrust it. The first rules to be observed in taking part in debate is : — 1. To state your case. 2. To clear your case. 3. To prove your case. 4. And then sit down. There was once an old doctor, the lecturer on logic and rhetoric at a Scotch university, who received the fees from the pupils on entering, who used to say to them, when they had finished their term, that there were only two rules to follow — ' One was, when you have anything to say, say it in as few words as you can ; the other is, when you've said it, hold your tongue.' General Ludlow held that a man should say what he means and mean what he says. This is as true in debate as in morals. In debate, you must not only say what you mean — but know what you mean. The audience will soon find out if you do not know it. I. The speaker must state his case that the hearers may understand to what he asks their attention ; without this information they cannot judge what his object is, nor tell when he is relevant or when he digresses. In stating your case give the other side of the case — if you know it. The contrast will make your meaning clear, and show that you know what your case is. There is a fine instance in the writings of Toulmin Smith* — 'Decentralisation or adminis tration by localities, is that system of government under which the greatest number of minds, knowing most about the special matter in hand, having the greatest opportunities of knowing about it, and having the greatest interests in its * Local Self- Government, pp. 395 to 409, 52 PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE well-working, have the management of it or control over it. Centralisation or administration by departments is that system of government under which the smallest number of minds, knowing the least about the special matter in hand, having the fewest opportunities of knowing about it, and having the smallest interest in its well-working, have the management of it or control over it.' 2. Then the speaker must clear his case — showing plainly what he is aiming at, making his question quite distinct, that it may not be mixed up with something likely to be advanced by another disputant. He must free his main terms from ambiguity, so that ignorance cannot mistake what he intends, nor an adversary pervert his meaning. On a certain occasion a witness said he knew the accused ' the moment he obtained a full-faced view of his back.' A back may have its peculiarities, but a 'full-faced' view of it is difficult to obtain. General Grant said of his rival for the presidency (General Hancock) that, sitting behind him, ' you knew when he was pleased, for you could see him laugh behind his ears.' I have seen other Hancocks do this. 3. A speaker must next prove his case, so that the reasons of his argument may be evident. Here he should adduce facts which cannot well be disputed in support of his con- tention, and employ, if he can, such illustrations as make his meaning clearer. 4. Having done all he can to put the hearer in posses- sion of his case — he gives place to his adversary within the allotted time — if the time be prescribed. A barrister will occasionally state a complex case to the jury before him, beginning with the simplest circumstances, continuing with the more difficult, arranging the facts in such order that the series throw light on the most obscure points— that the whole case may be fully understood. When he feels this to be accomplished he returns, recapitu- lates, selects those points he wishes to have most weight, puts them before the jury freshly, prominently, and as forcibly LAWS OF DEBATE 53 as he can. If his brief affords it, and he has no scruples, he can, hke Charles Phillips, in his defence of Courvoisier for the murder of Lord William Russell, seek to fix the guilt on an innocent man ; or, like Sir Fitzroy Kelly, shed tears to attest his belief that Tawell was innocent, whom he knew to be guilty. But he who does this loses evermore the confidence of those who know it. In debate, it is a great point to have the main point in mind, and never to lose sight of it. An argument is like a picture which has a point to which all fines converge. It was O'Connell who said an orator should always know what he is aiming at, for when a man aims at nothing he is almost sure to hit it. Young debating societies have a tendency not to know what the point is, and to wander from it when they do know it. Upon the chairman is cast the trouble of dis- cerning what the main points are in the mind of the person who opens the debate, and if this has not been made clear to the chairman, he should ascertain what the main points meant to be debated are, and state them himself to the meet- ing before the discussion commences. Having once made the question unquestionably plain, he should remind every speaker of it who forgets it, and point out to him when he is wandering therefrom. But a chairman should not use much strictness in doing this, because some speakers cannot see a point, and cannot keep to it if they do. Therefore, if they were strictly called to order they would be incapable of speaking at all. But though it might be desirable, for the sake of affording young speakers practice, and of training a society in the habits of debate, to allow disputants to speak in the best way they can, the meeting should be incident- ally kept informed when the question is getting mixed up with something else. In a debate, if speakers introduce irrelevant subjects, the good or evil of these different subjects will be entered upon. Other speakers arise and combat what other speakers have said upon these subjects, 54 PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE and in less than half an hour hardly anybody remembers what the actual subject before the meeting was. Now, the business of disputants is to discuss the speech of the opener of the debate, rather than the speeches of each other. What other speakers say should be referred to only, or mainly, so far as it relates to the topic before the meeting. Discussion is excellent discipline in the art of discovering what a point is and what relates to it. Dis- cussion is always valuable, inasmuch as it elicits contrariety of opinion that nobody could suspect, and misconceptions which nobody could imagine. No person can be said to entirely understand any subject until he has debated it with sharp-witted people. In the art of seeing all round a question, a night in a discussion room will do more for a man than a month in a library, that is, supposing the president has sufficient knowledge of the speakers before him to bring their various powers into play, and at the same time supposing that the speakers have powers which the president can elicit and bring into action. No opponent should be accepted whose sincerity cannot be assumed, since it ought not to be questioned in debate. To give an adversary credit for good faith is economy in reasoning, since you have only to refute his principles — not himself— which leaves you all your time and force for the greater and more useful task. Find no fault with his grammar, manner, intentions, tone. Attend only to the matter. Hear all things without impatience and without manifest emotion. Let your opponent fully exhaust his matter. Encourage him to say whatever he thinks relevant. Many persons believe in the validity and magnitude of their positions, because they have never been permitted to state them to others— and when they have once delivered themselves of their opinions, they often find for the first time how insignificant they are. There are some persons whom nobody can confute but themselves. When you distinguish such, your proper business is to let them do it. LAWS OF DEBATE 55 Learn to satisfy yourself and to present a conclusive state- ment of your opinions, and when you have done so, have the courage to abide by it. If you cannot trust your state- ment to be canvassed by others — if you feel anxious to add some additional remark at every step — suspect your know- ledge of your own case and amend it on further reflection. Master as completely as you can your opponent's theories, and state his case with manifest fairness, and, if possible, state it with more force against yourself than your opponent did. The observance of this rule will teach you two things — your opponent's strength or weakness, and your own also. If you cannot state your opponent's case you do not know it, and if you do not know it you are not in a fit position to argue against it. If you dare not state your opponent's case in its greatest force, you feel it to be stronger than your own, and in that case you ought not to argue against it. The course here suggested will be as useful to truth as to the disputant. Great prejudice may often be disarmed by daring it. In this manner, Gibbon delivered his argument in favour of an hereditary monarchy. ' Of the various forms of government which have prevailed in this world, an hereditary monarchy seems to present the fairest scope for ridicule. Is it possible to relate, without an indignant smile, that, on the father's decease, the property of a nation, like that of a drove of oxen, descends to his infant son, as yet unknown to mankind and to himself; and that the bravest warriors and the wisest statesmen, relinquishing their natural right to empire, approach the royal cradle with bended knees and protestations of inviolable fidelity ? Satire and declamation may paint these obvious topics in the most dazzling colours, but our serious thoughts will respect a useful prejudice that establishes a rule of succes- sion independent of the passions of mankind ; and we shall cheerfully acquiesce in any expedient which deprives the multitude of the dangerous, and indeed the ideal power of giving themselves a master.' 56 PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE In Gibbon's days the discovery of a removable master had not been made. Debate should have for its object the vindication of some truth seriously disputed. The Dutchman, who re- garded debate as a duty, being pressed as to the value of a dog for whose loss he had brought an action, said, 'No- thing ; but let him pay for it.' When his adversary was asked whether it was true that he killed the dog, he said, 'To be sure I did, but let him J>rove it,' which was foolish, but not more silly than many disputants of pretension, who will dispute for disputation sake, where there is nothing real or useful to contend for. For the adjustment of a difference a man should under- state his case — should make no material assertion unaccom- panied by the proof — make the fairest allowance for his rival's excitement (if he be excited), put a fair interpreta- tion on his words and acts. All whose suffrages are worth having will make just judgment. The reason of so many departures from this rule is the want of courage, or the want of sense. It is the opinion of the ignorant that if a man does not bluster and retort, he is deficient in spirit. This apprehension often betrays weak men into violence, and to prove themselves independent they become rude and insolent — whereas courage pursues its own way with- out ostentation, preserves its independence, corrects mis- representation, repairs any injury it may have unwittingly done, and answers slander (if there be slander) with the truth. No wise man answers a fool according to his folly. He shows that it IS folly, and abandons it to die by its own hands. Hamilton's Parliamentary Logic gives maxims, which that experienced tactician had treasured up, observed, or invented, many unworthy, some shrewd : — ' State what you censure by the soft names of those who would apologise for it. ' In putting a question to your adversary, let it be the lasf thing you say. LAWS OF DEBATE. 57 * Distinguish real from avowed reasons of a thing. This makes a fine and brilliant fund of argument. 'Upon every argument consider the misrepresentations which your opponent will probably make of it. ' If your case is too bad, call in aid the party : if the party is bad, call in aid the cause.* ' Nothing disgusts a popular assembly more than being apprised of your intention to speak long.' Having had experience in the ways of adversaries — the unscrupulous and the fair — I noticed the rules they ordin- arily followed, and found, as Wordsworth's little girl said of her brothers and sisters, ' We are seven,' which were these : — 1. To show that the objection made against what you mainly said is wrong, and that you were in the right. For this course to succeed one must be very clear upon the subject, and make it very clear to others that it is the objector alone who is in error. If this cannot be done, the matter requires some consideration. 2. Not to take any notice of the objection raised ; but if he who advances it is a person whose opinion has weight, his objection will have force, and tell against you, whether you take notice of it, or not. 3. To notice the objection made, and affect to see no- thing in it. But it is necessary to bear in mind that, if other people happen to see something in it, your alleged want of penetration will not serve you. 4. To admit there is ' something in it,' but maintain that it is a mere misapprehension of your meaning. In that case, you must explain what your meaning was, or that expedient will not answer. 5. To allege that your own statement is open to two distinct interpretations, and argue that your critic has * ' If neither is good,' says Hamilton, ' wound your opponent,' which may be Parliamentary, but is discreditable in the speaker and a waste of public time. 58 PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE adopted the wrong one. This course, however, is attended with some risk ; since it is the duty of a speaker to be aware of double meanings, to choose one, and leave the hearer in no manner of doubt which sense was intended, and to fix that sense so that the meaning could not be inteUigently misunderstood. 6. Admit that your statement was open to some objec- tion, making light of it, giving the hearer the impression it was very unimportant, and that your critic could not have anything very serious on his mind to make so ' much ado about nothing' — by which means the unobservant hearer will be hardly sensible that you have fallen into any error at all, and even be disposed to regard the objector to what you have said, as a trivial and captious commentator. But the intelligent observer will distrust you. 7. The remaining course open is to admit frankly you were in the wrong. Careless phraseology, an inaccurate argument, or a conflicting statement (whether fallen into unawares or not), is an imposition upon the mind of the hearer, and a waste of language, since it weakens and obscures the proper argument. Therefore, the right thing is to express yourself under obligations to an auditor who pays you the great compliment of considering what you have said, and takes the trouble to amend what has been unwit- tingly left defective. Persons, really honest-minded, do often find a difificulty in frankly admitting that they have made a mistake ; but it is far better to cultivate the habit of admitting an error, which you see to be such, than to foolishly persist that you are right, and to persist in the foolishness of the mis-state- ment which everybody sees to be so, and which you ought to see yourself. To try to create the impression that you are never in error, is to pretend to infallibility — it is to pretend that you know everything, that you know it always, and that you are so perfect that you never forget it or over- look it. Everybody knows that there never was any person LAWS OF DEBATE 59 of this description ; and to pretend to be, or to imagine that you are, such a person is to betray to every reflecting reader that you are ignorant as well as conceited. A real lover of truth is glad to have any error into which he may have fallen pointed out, that he may avoid it in the future. CHAPTER XI PERSONALITIES THE DIGRESSIONS OF DEBATE Controversy, though the pathway to truth and final test of it, is an unwelcome word in many ears. This is because it is so often protracted and unsatisfactory. It is protracted through digression, and unsatisfactory, being so often disfigured by personalities, which mainly cause digression and ill-feeling. Things evil, as well as things good, do not come by chance. Disease as well as health has its conditions ; and personali- ties, however capricious and irregular they may seem, have their laws. St Jerome said : ' If an offence come out of the truth, better the offence come than that the truth be concealed.' There is no natural offence in truth. The offence is generally put into it by personalities, which cause digressions from the truth into hateful and dis- honouring imputations. The Edinhirgh Neivs lately turned to the file of London papers as they existed in the pure and happy days of a four- penny stamp, and found a licence of speech quite edifying. Thus the Times calls its neighbour, the Mornmg Chronicle, 'that squirt of filthy water,' and the Chronicle, not to be behind, calls the Post 'that slop-pail of corruption.' The Standard describes the Globe as * our blubber-head contem- porary.' The Mornitig Herald accosts its neighbour, the Courier, as 'that spavined old hack,' while the Morning Advertiser hurls its wrath against the Times as ' that bully of 6q PERSONALITIES THE DIGRESSIONS OF DEBATE 6 1 Berkshire and braggadocio of Printing House Square.' The Thnes, not to be outdone, commenced one of its leaders on the 13th of June 1835, with* The Liberal Hars,' and then turning on the Chronicle, continues, ' A disgraceful morning print, which actually feeds on falsehood and lies'; then going into the subject, it adds, 'The smaller rascal, Mr Gingall, copies the paragraph from the larger blackguard.' The Times of the same date, elsewhere referring to its opponent, says, ' The community must be shocked to know that there are such beings as these scribblers out of the treadmill, and because every exposure of the ragamuffins gives to foreigners an additional proof that there have crept into the press of this country a number of scoundrels, who not only are unfit for the society of gentlemen, but who would be a disgrace to the vilest coteries of Europe.' To this the Standard retorts, ' It can scarcely be doubted that the habits of writing down to the ignorance and below the brutality of the rabble, which the Times has acquired by long experience, acting, of course, upon original ignorance and intuitive brutality, has rendered this journal a more powerful organ of excitement than a whole workshop of railers.' This was the way in which ' gentlemen wrote for gentle- men ' in those days ; and all agreed in one thing, that the abolition of the fourpenny stamp would lower the press, as though it could fall into a lower depth than that in which the fourpenny stamp writers burrowed. The press has been freed from all taxation, and the standard of the cheap press is far higher than in its dearest days. The working-class have found a better way of expression. Nevertheless, the poli- tical and ecclesiastical controversy of our 'betters' still presents samples of the old manner. Liteiature has not always had a civil tongue in its head, and was ready to assist pohtical animosity. Bute pensioned Dr Johnson and Dr Shebbeare, which caused the wits to say he had pensioned a He-bear and a She-bear. Dr Shebbeare 62 PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE had been in the pillory and lost his ears, which was the point of these lines — Witness, ye Hills, ye Johnsons, Scots, Shebbeares, List to my call, for some of you have ears. Byron and Shelley disagreed widely on several questions, but that made no difference in their regard for each other. Byron had hatreds — Shelley had fanaticisms. Vegetarianism was one. Byron did not hesitate to deny outright Shelley's coreal ideal. Byron sang — Man's a carnivorous production, And must have meals ; at least one meal a day. He cannot live, like woodcocks, upon suction, But, like the shark and tiger, must have prey ; Although his anatomical construction Bears vegetables in a grumbling way. Your labouring people think, beyond all question, Beef, veal and mutton better for digestion. Shelley, walking down Bond Street, composing a poem and munching a new roll for his dinner, would be likely to produce dyspeptic verse that day. Shelley wrote no line of malice in reply to Byron. But then these poets were gentlemen. One way to disarm personalities when they come is to brave them. To court them is fatal to yourself; to retaliate fatal to union. The partisan of a cause ought to be able to dare all opinions. And all opinions might be dared by those in the right. There can be no quarrel unless hvo parties engage in it. And it is always in the power of one party to make a quarrel difficult by refusing to be a party to it. No man can quarrel with another without the other's consent. Hence the veto of peace, if not of amity, is always in the hands of one of the disputants. It is often a duty ; it is often indispensable to notice individual error. But the discharge of such a duty would not be so distasteful to the public as it now is, were it not for the personally disparaging PERSONALITIES THE DIGRESSIONS OF DEBATE 63 manner in which it is generally done. If, when objections to a public man must be made, the points were fairly selected and urged, without ill-will, the criticism would be felt to be useful and tolerable. Instead of this course a mis- cellaneous fire is often extended to every imaginable fault, and conjectures called in when facts are exhausted, until what was, or should be, public instruction becomes a gratification of private resentment. Malevolence is not necessary on the platform, nor in the press. Canadian journalists told me that Mr Goldwin Smith, by showing in his own writing how a m.an of genius could be effective without employing dishonouring epithets, had raised the character of the whole Canadian press. It is not just to refer to a man's lameness of body ; but lameness of mind may be complained of, because that is remediable. A lame man would not enter himself in a public race with agile men, and if he enters into public controversy he must be assumed to have mental nimbleness. But, if he is always behind in his argument, his deficiency in pace may be ascribed to natural causes — to lameness of understanding. Misfortunes of nature are indefensible allusions. Canning has not been forgiven for alluding to a political opponent as the 'revered and ruptured Ogden,' The permanent reason for avoiding outrage is that the mugwumps who can imitate nothing else, can imitate unpleasantnesses. The debater should keep a sharp eye on an opponent who introduces personalities. It is the device by which an astute adversary allures his assailant from his gun — so that he is not at hand to discharge it — when the enemy is in front of it. Civilisation has imposed laws on contests, and even on war. An invading army must not poison the wells of the enemy; a duellist must stand at the assigned distance before he fires ; a prize-fighter is forbidden to hit below the belt; neither man, nor horse, nor boat is allowed to 64 PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE foul a competitor in a race. But in controversy there is no law, save that of honour, to prevent an adversary assailing an opponent by dishonouring imputations. Once, in the United States Assembly, a member in audience, being weary of listening to the member in pos- session of the floor, rose and said, ' Mr Speaker, I should like to know how long that blackguard is to go on tiring me to death in this manner.' In the Irish House of Commons, Mr Grattan said of Mr Corrie, ' I will not call him villain, because he is a Chancellor of the Exchequer; I will not call him Uar, because he is a Privy Councillor ; but I will say of him, that he is one who has taken advantage of the privileges of this House to utter language to which, in any other place, my answer would have been a blow.' A duel was the immediate result. And if a duel was intended the lauguage was well chosen for the purpose. De Morgan relates that the late Professor Vince was once arguing at Cambridge against duelling, and some one said, 'Well, but. Professor, what would you do if anyone called you a liar ? ' ' Sir,' said the fine old fellow, ' I should tell him to prove it, and if he did prove it, I should be ashamed of myself, and if he didn't he ought to be ashamed of himself.' The obvious laws to be observed in controversy seem to be these : — 1. To consult the improvement of those opposed to you, and to this end argue not for resentment, or gratification, or pride, or vanity, but for their enlightenment. 2. When surmising motives do not surmise the worst, but adopt the best construction the case admits. 3. To distinguish between the personalities which impugn the judgment and those that criminate character, and not to advance accusations affecting the judgment of an adversary without distinct and indisputable proof; and never to assail character (where it must be done) on suspicion, pro- bability, belief or hkelihood. TERSONALITIES THE DIGRESSIONS OF DEBATE 65 4. Never make an incriminating imputation unless some public good is to come out of it. It is not enough that a charge is true, it must be useful to prefer it before it can be justifiably made. 5. Be so sure of your case as to be able to defy the judgment of mankind, and when assailed, maintain self- respect in reply, not forgetting justice to those to whom you are opposed. Leigh Hunt prophesied long ago that the old philosophic conviction would revive among us, that ' the errors of man- kind arise rather from the want of knowledge than from defect of goodness.' Stupidity can be informed, ignorance can be enlightened, but the coUision of interest, passion and self-will, can destroy association, until men acquire justice in speech, and equity towards others. The necessity of enforcing this most practical part of rhetoric (the Rhetoric of Dispute), which is taught in no School, Mechanics' or Literary Institution, is evidenced in the fact that an impartial, impersonal and dispassionate tone is in many eyes almost fatal to prosperity in newspaper and periodical literature. To the uneducated populace nothing that is just seems spirited. He who is not offensively per- sonal is pronounced tame. The rancorous are most relished. The reason is that most men, when stung by a sense of injury, are naturally precipitated from extreme to extreme. Their opinions, when sincere, are not produced by the ordinary law of intellectual births, by induction or inference, but are equivocally generated by the heat of fervid emotion, wrought upon by some sense of unbearable oppression.. But all this changes with the growth of knowledge. Art discards the gaudy colours of the savage ; so rhetoric discards savage invective. Civilisation implies a sense of proportion. Personalities, even those which relate to defects of under- standing, are allowable within the limits of not impugning sanity ; but not personal allusions which relate to defect of honour, or veracity. If you call a man an idiot, you pass E 66 PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE the limit of allowable personalities of the mind. He who thinks another an idiot, should be silent with regard to him. If a person be an idiot it is of no use arguing with him. He is incapable of reasoning. To use such a term towards an adversary is to stop debate — if you believe what you say. The moment this word is said the friends of the alleged imbecile are up in arms to resent the insult to his under- standing, and probably the ' idiot ' himself leaps up to retort upon his accuser. Then there is an end of the subject in debate. Partisans digress from it to join in the vindica- tion of the assailed, or of the assailant. The moment one person accuses another of want of honour or veracity, the reply is a blow, or a duel, which are held to be justifiable. If the term is believed it destroys the accused, and he feels justified in destroying his accuser. Dishonouring charges should properly go before a magistrate. A charge of personal dishonour is a breach of the peace, and the law court, and not the platform, is the more fit- ting place to make it To introduce offensive accusation is to terminate debate by a pernicious digression, and arouses recrimination and passion, through which the rays of truth penetrate not. This consequence is so well under- stood that he who causes such digression may be suspected of intending it. The mischief of personalities which offend is that persons who cannot argue can recriminate. A hundred persons can make imputations for ten who can reason. The discovery of truth in the maze of words and diversity of view requires concentration of attention. But irrelevancies require no thought and are popular with the majority of hearers who have not reflected on these things, or to whom irrelevancies are a relief. CHAPTER XII POLICY OF DEBATE There are three points of policy in debate. 1. The first is the search for the truth — its recognition when found, whether in the mouth of your adversary, or elsewhere. As Dr Johnson says in his ' Irene ' : — Be virtuous ends pursued by virtuous means, Nor think the intention sanctities the deed. No talent, no genius is entitled to esteem, except as the use to which it is put is conducive to the welfare of all. 2. Since the adversary is the friend of truth, he should never be outraged or humiliated, or he will withdraw himself from the arena, or his friends will if he does not. Then debate is ended and discredited in public estimation. 3. Because discussion is the agency of establishing truth, the credit of debate should always be in the minds of both disputants. Be not contemptuous or impatient of those whose faculties are not ' on sight,' or perhaps non-existent. I would listen a reasonable time to a madman. ' Light is still light, whether it pass through coloured glass or even a cracked window.' Whether ridicule and satire may be employed in debate, are questions of judgment as well as rule. ' Cicero con- descended to employ ridicule against certain chimeras.' ' Condescended ' is Gibbon's word, admitting or implying that ridicule is at best but one of the lower forms of argu- ment. Satire, in the hands of Lucian, was, Gibbon thought, 67 68 PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE a much more adequate as well as a more efficacious weapon, Shaftesbury regarded ridicule as 'one of those principal lights ' under which things are to be viewed in order to their full recognition. Truth, it is supposed, may bear all lights. So it will, but the holders of the ridiculed truth will not. Most things, owing to time or circumstance — some intrin- sically — have an absurd side. But it requires dexterity to show it without giving offence. In politics it requires con- summate art to employ ridicule without outraging those held up to laughter. In religion it is never successful, if the object is conversion. Instructive ridicule is so difficult ; and foolish ridicule is so easy, and commonly coarse and buffoon- ish, that, without the instinct and cultivation of art, ridicule should not be attempted. One rule is clear — a cause in a minority should never ridicule the cause of the majority. The wise profit by Coleridge's warning : ' Truth is a good dog, but beware of barking too closely at the heels of error, lest you get your brains kicked out.' Those in the majority, political and ecclesiastical, employ ridicule against the minority, without scruple or mercy, but are furious when it is employed against themselves, and resent it dangerously. Only now and then a man of genius does it on good part and amusingly. It is said by omniscient and self-complacent writers, that ' to argue with folly is to make it feel important.' But what one may deem folly may be matter of honest and serious conviction on the part of others. The subject of our ridicule, or satire, may be sacred to them : and there is neither sense nor self-respect in inflicting pain, outrage or humihation upon sincere persons, however foolish we may deem them. A master in advocacy, John Stuart Mill, held that, ' in general, opinions, contrary to those received, can only obtain a hearing by studied moderation of language and the most cautious avoidance of unnecessary offence, from which they hardly ever deviate, even in the slightest degree, without losing ground.' Sarcasm is mocking, and when without bitterness is enlivening. Ridicule holds persons or POLICY OF DEBATE 69 things up to laughter or contempt. Satire is diverting since it reflects on the intellectual oversight of adversaries. Ridicule is more common, because malice may inspire it. Satire is more difficult, since it is futile without wit. Satire, like a polished razor keen, Wounds with a touch which is scarcely felt or seen. Sarcasm, ridicule and satire have always been regarded as bright weapons of controversy, but they require to be used with judgment and, above all, with good temper. It is well to avoid words which may mean more than you can prove. Be chary of saying a thing is ' very ' good or ' very ' exact, when it may be merely good, and perhaps not that : its exactness may hardly come up to the average, when looked into. 'Most' is as dangerous as 'very.' It requires wide knowledge to say a thing is ' most ' excellent. The word 'none ' and 'all,' 'every' and ' always,' should be used very warily. It may require you to go over all mankind, over all time, and every event, to justify such wide-reaching terms. If you invite opposition, do it with circumspection. The value of free speech is too great to be trifled with. Seek conflict only with sincere men. Concede to your opponent the first word and the last. Let him appoint the chairman. Let him speak double time if he desires it. Debate is objected to as an exhibition in which disputants try to surprise, outwit, take advantage of, and discomfit each other. To obviate this objection, explain to your opponent, before- hand if you can, the outline of the course you intend to pursue, acquaint him with the books you shall quote, the authorities you shall cite, the propositions you shall endeavour to prove, and the concessions you shall ask. And do this without ex- pecting the same at his hands. He will not now be taken un- awares. He will be pre-warned and pre-armed. He will have time to prepare, and if the truth is in him, it ought to come out. If you feel that you cannot give all these advantages to your opponent, suspect yourself and your side of the question. Every conscientious and decided man believes 70 PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE his views to be true, and if consistent he believes them to be impregnable. Neither in minutes, months nor years are they to be refuted. Then a man so persuaded may concede advantages to his adversary, and enable him to arm himself beforehand. In another particular discussions were esteemed unsatis- factory. When statement and reply have been made, then came the reply to the reply, and then the reply to that, till the cavil seemed perplexing, tiresome and endless. Now, the object of discussion is not the vexatious chase of an opponent, but the contrastive statement of opinion. Therefore endeavour to select main points, to state them strongly and clearly, and when your opponent replies be con- tent to leave his arguments side by side with your own, for the judgment of the auditors. Do not disparage an opponent, mis-state his views, or strain his words, and thus, for the sake of a verbal triumph, produce ill-feel- ing. Your sole business is with what he says, not how he says it, nor why he says it. Your aim should be that the audience should lose sight of the speakers, and be possessed with the subject ; and that those who come the partisans of persons shall depart the partisans of principles. The victory in a debate lies not in lowering an opponent, but in raising the subject in public estimation. Controversial wisdom lies not in destroying the adversary, but in destroying his error — not in making him ridiculous, but in making the audience wise. A principle is a pathway. Deviation is error and waste of time. Intellectual courtesy to persons is consideration for others ; it is conceding to others the right of acting on their convictions. But courtesy does not apply to giving up your own conviction nor in concealing it. He who is with- out principle is without any guide, not knowing what to do himself. Relinquishing or concealing personal principle is being useless to others, who are instructed by knowing their neighbours' path as well as knowing their own. POLICY OF DEBATE 7i Never invent opponents — never invent the opinions of opponents. Take real ones. The dangerous preference of imagination to reality is perhaps nowhere so apparent as in the construction of controversial books. Authors satisfy themselves with inventing the arguments of their opponents, when the easiest and most satisfactory course is to extract the most powerful reasoning the other side has produced ; by this course real objectors can be answered instead of fictitious ones. A perpetual device, or error of controversialists, is to state as a fact against an adversary their inference from his doctrines, and declare that he means what they say. After a while, if the accusers have a powerful party on their side, they will assert that the very terms used, in such inference, were the original language of their adversary. This used to be constantly done with applause in political, ecclesiastical and sectarian controversy. The practice has not wholly died out yet. The late Mr Delane inferred from Mr Cobden's expressed opinion in favour of land reform, that he would parcel out the land of the country among the people, and said in the Times that Mr Cobden advised this course — which was never in Mr Cobden's mind nor in his words. Mr Delane put forth his own inference as Mr Cobden's actual avowal, which he indignantly and successfully re- pudiated in letters which became famous. Controversialists make much ado about the onus probandi, meaning the burden of proof, which rests with him who makes an assertion. He who denies what is asserted is often, without reason, called upon to prove his negative. Beyond remarking that it is the province of the assertor to prove, accept the logically unfair demand and give the reasons why you hold the negative opinion. This meets the case as far as a negationist can meet it. It continues the discussion, and compels it to proceed, and gives the negationist the opportunity of becoming the assailant by request of his adversary. 72 PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE Debate requires self-possession — a power to think on your legs. But even in debate the victory is oftener with the foregone than with the impromptu thinker. A man who knows his subject well will be forearmed. He alone can distinctly see the points in dispute, and the nature of the proof or disproof necessary to decide the question. Two persons of opposite opinions often mistake the way of coming to a common understanding : as, for instance, when one speaks at the other instead of explaining his own views to him. Each expects the other to come over to him, which neither is inchned to do, nor intends to do. A, in expecting B to come to him, assumes that on the part of his opponent there exists a predisposition for his views. This should never be assumed. It is the first endeavour of a foreseeing propagandist to create it if it does not exist, and strengthen it if it does — and whether it exists or not, he should always reason as though it did not. The business of A, the converter, is to meet B on the platform B stands upon, to examine his principles, study his views and turn of thought until he finds some common ground, if such there be, of faith, morals, opinion, or practice, with which he can identify himself. There is no easier method of commencing a conversation than by asking a question. There is no safer introduction to an argument than by asking an opponent what he means, where his meaning is doubtful. Time and circumstance have given new usage, new senses, and new associations of idea, to words that once had but one meaning. Most words have now many meanings. Where the sense in which a word is used is open to doubt — do not assume a meaning, but inquire the sense in which an opponent employs it. The Socratic method of disputation or artful questioning (of which Zeno the Eleatic was the author), by which an opponent is entrapped into concessions, and thus confuted, is rather fit for wranglers and sophists than reasoners,, POLICY OF DEBATE 73 There is ground for believing that Socrates conde- scended to this course often at the expense of ingenuous- ness. It is said in his defence that he did it not as the sophists, for the sake of confounding virtue, but for the purer purpose of confounding dexterous vice. It is, how- ever, beneath the dignity of a reasoner to betray his opponent into the truth. Questioning, however, is an essential instrument. A high authority, Dr Arnold, has put this in a useful light : — 'An inquiring spirit is not a presumptuous one, but the very contrary. He whose whole recorded life was intended to be our perfect example, is described as gaining instruc- tion in the temple by hearing and asking questions — the one is almost useless without the other. We should ask questions of our books and of ourselves; what is its purpose — by what means it proceeds to effect that purpose — whether we fully understand the one — whether we go along with the other — do the arguments satisfy us — do the descriptions convey lively and distinct images to us — do we understand all the allusions to persons or things ? In short, does our mind act over again from the writer's guidance what his acted before? do we reason as he reasoned, conceive as he conceived, think and feel as he thought and felt ? or if not, can we discern where and how far we do not, and can we tell why we do not ? ' Questioning has also a place in rhetoric as well as in research. Frankly conducted, it is a mode of conviction without offence. To whatever an opponent urges, with which we do not agree, of course we have some objection. Put this objection incidentally, or ask as a question, what answer can be given to it ? This is a good conversational mode of debate, where the improvement of an opponent, rather than a triumph over him, is the object. It is not showy, but it is informing. In a similar way confidence may be acquired by diffident speakers. A novitiate conversationalist is shy of taking 74 PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE part in debating a topic, lest he should not be able to sustain himself. To such I have said — put your argument in the form of an objection which some would urge, and beg some one of the company to tell you what he would say in reply. If to this answer you have an objection further, put that also in the questioning form; for a man would be able to ask a question who would never be able to make a speech. Wise members of Parliament know this. Once in conversation, the diffident will speak freely enough — perhaps too freely. A coward will fight when he grows warm in strife. By questioning a novice may learn the best answers others can give to his own argument, and without exposure learn his own weakness or strength, or that of others. In interpreting the words of an adversary, he who replies has to put some construction upon it. It is safest to put the best. He is nearly always wrong who puts the worst, whether in debate or in daily life. To put the best con- struction possible on a proposition in dispute is to raise debate to a higher level and maintain it there. CHAPTER XIII DEFENCE OF DEBATE Speaking a few years ago at a Liverpool college, Mr Gladstone, who is always for fairness to adversaries, said : * The day had gone by when reticence or railing at opponents was regarded as a sufficient defence of opinion. Assailants of religious tenets must be met by reason and not by railing.' In words to this effect he counselled that adversaries should be met by argument. Mr Gladstone is as much an ecclesiastical as a political authority, and no one else of his eminence as a Christian has, in my time, justified reasoning controversy. It is only those who, consciously or unconsciously, lack confidence in the truth of their opinions, who decry honest discussion. To him who believes he has the truth, opposition is his opportunity. He who under- stands that the sincere adversary is the friend of truth will find debate a great advantage. Your opponent may be the enemy of your opinions, but he is the friend of your improve- ment. The more ably he confronts you the more he serves you. The gods, it is said, have not given to mortals the privilege of seeing themselves as others see them ; but, by a happy compensation in human affairs, it is given to adver- saries to supply what the gods deny. They afford that indispensable light of contrast which enables you to discover the truth if hidden from you, or the opportunity to display the truth if you possess it. 'A good writer,' says Godwin. ' must have ductility of thought that shall enable him to put 75 76 PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE himself in the place of his reader, and not suffer him to take it for granted, because he understands himself, that every one who comes to him for information will understand him. He must view his phrases on all sides, and be aware of all the senses of which they are susceptible.' But this facility can nowhere be so certainly acquired as in debate. A master of debate amid orators of renown — Edmund Burke, said : ' He that wrestles with us strengthens our nerves and sharpens our skill. Our antagonist is our helper. This amiable conflict with difficulty obliges us to an intimate acquaintance with our object, and compels us to consider it in all its relations. It will not suffer us to be superficial.' Discussion commences without prepossession, and ends without dogmatism when each disputant is anxious to explain as well as to defend his opinions. As an established truth is that which is generally received after it has been generally examined, it is evident that, though truth may be discovered by research, it can only be established by debate. The only verification of truth possible, is when proposi- tions supposed to be true are subjected to criticism. The most competent writers (as Samuel Bailey, to wit) on the means of ascertaining Truth, agree that, while true things are true in themselves, and may come to be accepted with- out controversy, no one can be sure of the truth of very important propositions until they have been openly, freely, and universally discussed in a fair field of inquiry. All Milton asked was ' a free and open encounter ' for truth, and no one could doubt its victoriousness. Like all intrepid advocates of a cause in a minority, Milton was too sanguine. A ' free and open ' encounter is not enough — it should be a fair encounter also. If disputants are unequally matched as to powers of expression, extent of knowledge or means of obtaining it, or leisure for preparation for the encounter — truth for that time may not obtain the advantage. People seem not to think that debaters should be as equally matched as may be. A savage undrilled against a soldier DEFENCE OF DEBATE TJ trained — a racer lame against one swift of foot — a village spouter against a London actor — a pedagogue against a professor — would be no fair encounter however 'free and open ' it might be. That is no fight — as everybody knows — Where only one side deals the blows, And the other has to bear them. It is because common-sense conditions of fairness are overlooked in discussion that many decry debate as un- instructive or disappointing. The sureness of a truth is known only when it obtains acceptance after every competent person has been heard, who has anything to say against it. Freedom of thought, and the free and equal criticism of it, is a condition of truth and progress. It is the well-understood interest of every community to permit, to encourage, and to give every man who can think, a chance of adding to the sum of Truth. At the same time, no person can hope to obtain from men of thought that indispensable criticism which they can give, unless the advocate of truth is himself studiously fair and friendly in speech. Every man, said Walpole, and later, Pitt, has his price. Whether either had sounded the venality of patriotism and fixed the market price of his own virtue I know not. If Pitt was incorruptible, as is believed, he should not have said what he did. But with more truth and less offensiveness it may be said that every man has his reason, which, when once presented to him, will sway him ; and to find this out is the problem rhetoric has to solve. I am not more favourable than Hood to the plan of ' dropping truth gently, as if it were china, and likely to break.' But if a fair case be so stated as not to mortify others by arrogance, nor annoy by ceaseless importunity, nor disgust by seeming vanity, but accompanied by evident indications of dis- interested sincerity, it will generally prove acceptable. It is not the truth men hate, but the disagreeable auxiliaries 78 PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE which so often attend its enunciation. Bacon, I think it is, who says in his regal manner : ' Whosoever has his mind fraught with many thoughts, his wits and understanding do clarify and break up, in the communicating and dis- coursing with another ; he tosseth his thoughts more easily ; he marshalleth them more orderly ; he seeth how they look when they are turned into words ; finally, he waxeth wiser than himself; and that more by an hour's discourse than by a day's meditation.' Very few people are capable of charity without compromise, or can distinguish between them. Charity recognises how a man may come by his error without being conscious of it. Compromise is suffering some error to remain, out of courtesy or expediency, in order to obtain co-operation in carrying into practice a portion of truth which would other- wise be rejected. It is of use trying to find a common ground for debate. He who cannot find it, cannot convert. How can persons, any more than bodies, cohere, who never touch ? So long as each denies to the other a share of reason on his side — so long as each maintains an infallibility of pretension to complete truth — they both assume what is contrary to the nature of things, and exclude the common ground which must be established between them, where truth and error can join issue. There are few impassable gulfs between contending men or contending opinions but such as are dug by pride and passion. All have a common consciousness of impression — a common nature to investi- gate — a common sincerity to actutate us — truth is our common object, and we have a common interest in dis- covering it. Nature made us friends : it is mostly false pride or false impressions that make us enemies. Thus common ground exists between most disputants. The common ground which exists is not one which policy makes, but one that nature provides. These remarks regard conviction as depending upon truth DEFENCE OF DEBATE 79 not upon forms of procedure. Nothing is recommended here which is inconsistent with truth — no cunning question- ing, no sophistical entrapment. The sole precepts are those of condescension and contrast. From a common ground of agreement, you have a common point of sight, from which all objects are seen m the same light ; and a clear plane is obtained on which principles can be drawn, and a perfect outline of truth and error displayed. He who has the truth will make it plain by relevant elucidation. Differences are often made wider by irrelevant, repulsive debate. Differences which did not exist are often created in this way. All honest men desire the truth, and there is a way in which they can find it. The understandings of men commonly run in a given channel — each thinker looks as it were through a telescope of his own. It is only in debate that he sees it through the telescope of his opponent, which clarifies his own views. Let no man conclude be- cause no immediate change of opinion is manifest in debate, that none has taken place. The life of thought may be begun. Seed brought from Egypt was found to grow more than eighteen centuries after it was garnered. The supreme advantage of debate is that it compels a man to think. A man is not a man unless he is a thinker — he is a fool having no ideas of his own. If he happens to live among men who do think, he browses, like an animal, on their ideas. He is a sort of kept-man, being supported by the thoughts of others. He is what in England we call a pauper, who subsists upon out-door relief allowed him by men of intellect. Nevertheless, there are persons in every assembly who, like Curran, have powers and know it not ; or, like Macklin, who was more than forty years old before he knew that He was the Jew Whom Shakespeare drew. Thousands have powers unsuspected by themselves or 80 PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE Others. Some may be compared to that daughter of the first Duke of Marlbrough — % All nature's charms in Sunderland appear, Bright as her eyes, and as her reason clear ; Yet still their force, to men not safely known, Seems undiscovered to herself alone. The defence of debate — Hke that of national education — is that it discovers and trains latent talent for the service and exaltation of the nation. Oral examination surpasses all other forms. Discussion after many discourses would be of great public value. The argument against debate, that it would lead to strife and dis- cord, is one reason why it should be practised. Men are childish intellectually, while in that state in which debate must be prohibited. If they be children, train them in the art of debate until they are translated into men. To admit debate after an address, it is said, enables factious individuals to destroy the effect of what has been said. It is often the fault of the speaker if anyone is able to efface the effect of his speech. As a general rule, discussions, set and accidental, are good. A twofold reality by means of debate is brought to bear on the public understanding, more exciting than that of any other intellectual agency. An opinion that is worth holding is worth diffusing, and to be diffused it must be thought about ; and when men think on true principles they become adherents — but only those adherents are worth having who have thought over both sides, and discussion alone makes them do that. True, men may read on both sides ; but it seldom happens that men who are impressed by one side care to read the other. In discussions they are obliged to hear the other side. If men do read both sides, unless they read a ' discussion,' they do not find all the facts on one side specially considered on the other. In a discussion read, unless read at one sitting, the strength of any impres- DEFENCE OF DEBATE 8l sion and the clearness of the argument on one side is partly lost before the opponent's side is perused. But in an oral debate, the relation of fact to fact is more complete — the pro and con are heard successively, the light of contrast is full and clear, and both sides are weighed at the same time, when the eye of the mind is sharply fixed on the balance. If the disputants are intellectual gladiators so much the better, provided they are in earnest. The stronger they are, the mightier and the more instructive the conflict. It is said that people come out of such dis- cussions as they go into them, that the same partisans shout or hiss on the same side all through. This is not always true, and no matter if it is. The work of conviction is often done though the audience may not show it. They may break your head, and afterwards own you were right. Human pride forbids the confession, but change is effected in spite of pride. But if an audience remain the same at night, they will not be the same the next morning. Conviction is begun in discussion which is not ended there. He who hastily changes his views is to be suspected of weakness, or carelessness, or caprice. The steady, in- quiring and deliberate thinker is the safest convert. It is a maxim of the schoolmen that we never really know what a thing is, unless we are also able to give a sufficient account of its opposite. This is the maxim of contrast that enters into all effective persuasion. Professor Bain, in his ' Essay on Early Philosophy,' remarks : — The essence of the Dialectic Method is to place side by side with every doctrine and its reasons, all opposing doctrines and their reasons, allowing these to be stated in full by the persons holding them. No doctrine is to be held as expounded, far less proved, unless it stands in parallel array to every other counter-theory, with all that can be said for each. For a short time this system was actually maintained and practised ; but the execution of Socrates gave it its first check, and the natural intolerance F 82 PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE of mankind rendered its continuance impossible. Since the Reformation, struggles have been made to regain for the discussion of questions generally — philosophical, political, moral and religious, the two-sided procedure of the law- courts, and 'perhaps never more strenuously than now.' Remember that — Through mutual intercourse and mutual aid, Great deeds are done, and great discoveries made ; The wise new wisdom on the wise bestow, Whilst the lone thinker's thoughts come slight and slow. Persons whom you take to be wise and choose to think honest, will arrest discussion and conceal their own ignor- ance by insisting that the point in dispute is a mere affair of terms. 'What's in a name?' they say. Everything. Truth is in the right name. The wrong name misleads. Difference in terms means difference of ideas. To one who says he means the same as you, only under a different name, ask him to take your name and thus indicate the unity of his idea. He will do nothing of the kind, and you will soon see there is a difference in his mind. But for debate he would go on believing there was none. It is no mean excellence in debate that it alone relieves a man of honourable conscience of responsibility. How can anyone bear the idea of putting forth opinions for which others, who adopt them, must in this life or the next be answerable — and he accords them, no opportunity of the self-defence of debate ? He who is not infallible must often be in error, even where he is most earnest, and he is answer- able for whatever he says or does which influences the life of others. Discussion alone can save him from the con- sequences of his advocacy, so far as it may be erroneous. CHAPTER XIV THE THEORY OF EPITHETS — MORAL AS WELL AS RHETORICAL The question of epithets cover so wide a range of morals, manner of mind as well as policy of speech, that several considerations are necessary to adequately understanding it. At every step an observing student is admonished how con- scientiously a man will say things he will one day wish he could recall. Carlton tells truly — Boys flying kites haul in their white-winged birds ; You can't do that way when you're flying words. Careful with fire is good advice we know ; Careful with words is ten times doubly so, Thoughts unexpress'd may sometimes fall back dead, But God Himself can't kill them once they're said. Many enter the quagmire of recrimination without ade- quate reflection. The question is commonly put, ' Ought we not to state all we know to be true ? ' Not unless it can be shown to be useful. Every man knows a thousand things which are true, but which it would advantage nobody to hear. When we speak, the rule is absolute that we speak the truth, but what truth we will voluntarily communicate good sense must be the judge. If all truth must be pubHshed, without regard to fitness or justice, William Rufus, who drew a tooth a day from a rich Jew's head, to induce him to tell truly where his treasures were concealed, was a great moral philosopher. ' Well, but what a man believes to be true and useful may he not 83 84 PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE State ? ' will be asked by some. Not unless he can prove it. If every man stated his suspicions, no character would be safe from aspersion, all society would be a school of scandal. Suspicion is the food of slander. There is already more evil in existence than the virtuous are likely soon to correct, and little necessity exists for suspicion to supply hypothetical cases. 'But,' observes the reader, 'if two disputants have respectively proved the fitness of the epithets they have mutually applied, are they not justified in having used them ? ' Better leave that to the audience, unless, as has been said, the object is to end the discussion, for the auditors assured they have two rascals before them, will leave the room. No disputant should unite the offices of witness, jury and judge, giving his own evidence, returning his own verdict, and pronouncing the sentence in his own favour. It is this habit which has been the discredit of religious, political and literary discussions. Lawyers are the philosophers of disputes, and have wisely taken out of the hands of interest, petulance and prejudice, the power of deciding upon their own case. Yet disputants will do that unhesitatingly with regard to each other, which, in a court of justice, would long tax the patience and dis- cernment of twelve disinterested, dispassionate men. The difficulty of being right as to epithets shows the necessity of being sparing in their use. Epithets are more safely applied to the characterisation of opinions than of persons. If you accuse certain stones of a certain property which is not possessed by all, the exceptional stones will not be scandal- ised, as the same number of men would whom you happened to include in a carelessly-worded, disparaging, general asser- tion. The wrongly accused are not pacified by your saying, ' Oh, I did not mean you ; I meant to allow that there were exceptions.' Never forget that ' all ' means everyone. It is a wise maxim in law — in rhetoric as well — that ten guilty men had better escape than that one innocent man should suffer. So with personal judgments. The one THE THEORY OF EPITHETS 85 innocent man condemned will do both judge and justice more harm than the ten guilty who escape. Persons who deem duels with daggers or pistols absurd and murderous, will fight duels with their tongues or pens, though tragedies of domestic alienation, or public hatred and wreck of parties frequently follow therefrom. Since the perfect style of public invective can no longer be employed, why should the habit still linger ? After Grattan had denounced Corrie as a liar, all progress in discussion was arrested until the two orators had attempted to murder each other. Professor A. de Morgan, in his reply to Sir W. Hamilton, in their discussion on the origination of Formal Logic, makes these useful remarks : — ' In the days of swords it was one of the objects of public policy to prevent people from sticking them into each other's bodies on trivial grounds. We now wear pens ; and it is as great a point to hinder ourselves from sticking them into each other's characters, without serious and well-con- sidered reasons. To this end I have always considered it as one of the first and most special rules, that conviction of the truth of a charge is no sufficient reason for its promulga- tion. I assert that no one is justified in accusing another until he has his proof ready ; and that in the interval, if indeed it be right that there should be any interval between the charge and the attempt at substantiation, all the leisure and energies of the accuser are the property of the accused.' Improvement and not mortification of person or detraction of character should govern the employment of epithets as well as arguments. Disagreements are human and inevitable. Differences are in themselves as natural and as innocent as variation in form, colour or strength. It is the manner in which those who differ seek to adjust their differences that constitutes any disgrace there may be in any divergence of opinion or belief. Philosophy has been preached to us in vain, if we ever take up arms against an opponent without at 86 PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE the same time keeping justice to him in view, as well as our own defence. To promote the welfare of those who pro- bably hate us, is generous but difficult. Addison called his opponents 'miscreants,' Dr Clarke 'crazy,' Paley 'insane,' which did not produce amity or instruction. The profit of controversy lies in contrast of argument ever fresh and instructive. Recrimination, if common to both disputants, has, like the common quantities in an equation, to be struck out of the dispute as only making delay in finding the true result. Epithets are better confined to error. Even in Parliament the Speaker seems to possess no diction- ary of personal epithets. Members are not always checked when they use inadmissible terms, and when attention has been called to them the Speaker, for the time being, has not always been ready with a definition of the disputed word, and has sometimes been wrong when he has given it. Leaders of the House have sometimes been unready in supplying a decisive meaning, which shows that there is no Parliamentary Code of epithets in existence, and neither Sir Erskine May nor Mr Palgrave, who have written on Parliamentary procedure and practice, appear to have com- piled any such work. Mr Gladstone, who appears to know the meaning of every word, and never errs in terms of imputation, might compile such a code at will. Indeed, one might be made from episodes in his speeches. Take two instances. Sir Stafford Northcote one day complained of what Mr Gladstone had just said. ' Of what do you complain?' Mr Gladstone asked. 'Of misrepresentation,' answered Sir Stafford. 'The right honourable gentleman does not mend the matter by that rather rude expression.' Misrepresentation implies an intentional perversion of another's meaning. Speaking in reply to Lord R. Churchill, Mr Gladstone remarked — ' My reference was this. The noble lord distinctly accused me and accused the Liberal party of traducing an adversary. It is impossible to con- ceive a charge more disgraceful. It is a charge which THE THEORY OF EPITHETS ^7 implies falsehood in the first place. There is no traducing by error. Traducing is a wilful act, and that wilful act is imputed to me by the noble lord.' A few examples of the meaning of terms disparaging or dishonouring may show the student the sort of attention which epithets meant to wound (the kind here considered) require. Liar means that a person says what is not true and know? it to be untrue, and that he consciously and deliberately says what he does say with a view to deceive. * Liar ' is a favourite epithet with the lowest class of opponents. It puts a man who uses it out of any court, save a court of law. No court of honour would adjudicate upon it. It should be referred to a court of scavengers, whose business it would be to remove it. The term is not a matter of taste ; it is a breach of the peace, and would be resented by a blow, or a duel, or contempt, which would keep him inexorably at a dis- tance who used it. If a man thought his adversary was not to be believed on his word he might say so. But then he puts an end to the controversy, which it is useless to con- tinue when one disputant does not believe what the other says. It is like cheating at cards. The playing is over as soon as the charge of cheating is made. One who wrote with authority said, if one says to another 'You lied there,' and we regard only the principal signification of that expres- sion, it is the same thing as if he had said to him, ' You know the contrary of what you say.' But besides this principal signification, these words convey an idea of con- tempt and outrage ; and they inspire the belief that he who uttered them would not hesitate to do us harm, which renders them offensive and injurious. The minor terms of turpitude are many, which contain dishonouring imputations. Of such is the term 'traduce.' To say another traduces you, implies that he vilifies and defames you, not only falsely but knowingly. I have seen a memorial addressed to Lord Palmerston, in which he was 88 PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE accused of 'duplicity.' The term killed the memorial. What Minister could look at a request from persons who affixed to him the stigma of double dealing ? To charge an opponent with ' quibbling ' is to say he knows the truth is against him, and that he seeks to evade it. To accuse an adversary of ' garbling ' is equally offensive. It means that he knowingly quotes what gives a false impression. It is lawful to warn an opponent that what he imputes to you, you regard as insulting ; but to charge him with insulting you is to charge him with an intentional outrage upon you, and if he be a person of self-respect he will not hold further intercourse with one while he persists in the charge. A ' falsehood ' is not only something untrue, but known to be untrue by the teller. If it is not intended to imply this, the statement must be de- scribed as untrue, erroneous, or founded on misinformation. Any man of reflection can tell by one test whether a term is fit to be applied to another by asking himself whether he would submit to have it applied to himself. No term that implies consciousness of moral wrong can be used towards another without offence. But there are a class of words which relate to errors of the mind which touch a man's capacity, and not his honour, which may be used. A sensible man is instructed by the most penetrating criti- cism or characterisations of his inconsistencies or narrow- ness of knowledge. To say a man is economical in the use of truth refers to the smallness of his hoard of it, and not to a fraudulent reservation of it. It may be allowable to refer to malformation in the mind in which the backbone of fact is evidently crooked. I have said to an adversary whom I did not intend to accuse of wilful misrepresenta- tion, that he had a * refracting mind.' The straightest stick put into a pail of water appears bent, and the straightest fact put before some minds will appear distorted ; the trouble being with the medium and not with the intent. Take a familiar instance of the difficulties of explicit expression, 'I said the gentleman lied, it is true. I am THE THEORY OF EPITHETS 89 sorry for it.' What is true? Did the gentleman lie? I said I was sorry for it. Does it mean he did not lie, and that I was sorry I said he did, or that it is true he did lie, and that I am sorry to have to admit it ? This is a case which shows how difficult it is sometimes to say straight off what is intended. If men understood half the trouble there is in making out what the truth really is, and half the trouble there is in making it plain to others, so that they cannot possibly misunderstand it, there would not be half the anger or half the wonder there now is, when one person differs from another in opinion — and more hesitancy in applying dis- paraging epithets upon first impressions. There is a point of extreme interest attaching to this question which it may be useful to mention, but irrelevant to discuss. What is to be done with persons who make dishonouring imputations ? Should they be noticed ? If persons ' of no importance ' — as Oscar Wilde would say — should be raised from their noisome obscurity by reference to them as though they were authorities on manners and their opinion had weight, imputation would be good policy for the obscure. Should a man like Thackeray, having cause of offence against Edmund Yates, withdraw from his club unless Mr Yates was expelled ? When a person who has a character to lose, uses aspersive words towards another, it seems sufficient to show they were unfounded, when their untruth must be admitted, and it is the asperser who is damaged and not the aspersed. The asperser is regarded as belonging to a class who have no sense of honour in the use of terms. When a young man, I was appointed secretary to the Garibaldi Committee. Hearing one day an inquiry as to the accounts, I made them up and sent a cheque for the balance to the treasurer; whereupon a member of the committee, then in Parliament and afterwards in the Cabinet, came down and expressed vehement indignation, 90 PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE saying gentlemen were not as other people who go by suspicion, but act on facts, and what I had done was an imputation upon them — adding, in a cordial tone, ' Remember, if I had not had great respect for you I would not have taken the trouble to express this resentment,' The storm broke in a compliment. But I never forgot the lesson that with a sensible man personal dissent from you, and the rectification of your error, depends upon the respect in which an adversary holds the person to be put right. In a society a good deal turns upon how far a man should tolerate the comradeship of those who have made aspersive charges. Excellent and most useful members of a party will resign and leave it very much the poorer by their loss, because of some offensive thing said of them. We see this done in the House of Commons, and some- times those driven from their party seek to destroy it in resentment. Why is it that some dishonouring epithet used by some coarse-minded, ill-tempered, inconsiderate member of a party should have conceded to it the power of driving its best members out of it, and even of breaking it up ? This is not the place to pursue the subject, but so much as is said may serve to show the danger that lurks in evil epithets and phrases. It is worth while asking — Cannot honour protect itself; cannot it stand upon its own well-earned repute without the hot explosion which a vicious epithet often calls forth ? Lord Coleridge had the most silvery tongue on the Bench, but if assailed he could defend himself with words which had vitriol in them and burnt where they fell ; yet he did not intend that the object of his resentment should believe all he said. How often are noble friendships cancelled, acts of kindness and generosity obliterated, and all for a word, probably spoken in choler, or under excitement, misinformation, or pressure of care which paralyse, if not unhinge, the mind. There is a good deal of empty, mean, timid pride which goes by the name of ' honour.' THE THEORY OF EPITHETS 9 1 Let two persons talk together with all deliberation and caution, and note how many expletives they employ — how many errors they commit — how insequential are their thoughts, and often how inexact their language. How few ready writers or speakers are precise — how few are continu- ously coherent — how much is said which is never meant, even by those who are careful ! How few acquire the habit of thinking before they speak ! Does not the lawyer, whose life is a study of accuracy, find the carefully debated Act of Parliament open to three or four interpretations? And does not the philosopher daily regret the vagueness of human language ? Then on what principle of good sense can men, without careful inquiry as to the actual meaning of others, hurl at them noxious epithets? All might usefully bear in mmd the Arab saying (which, indeed, is the moral of this chapter) lately rendered by Constantia Brooks in the Century : — Remember, three things come not back ; The arrow sent upon its track — It will not swerve, it will not stay Its speed ; it flies to wound or slay. The spoken word, so soon forgot By thee ; but it has perished not j In other hearts 'tis living still, And doing work for good or ill. And the lost opportunity, That Cometh back no more to thee. In vain thou weepest, in vain dost yearn, Those three will never more return. CHAPTER XV METHOD IN EXPRESSION Method is policy in statement, and relates mainly to arrangement of the parts of a discourse. When I was a Social Missionary in Robert Owen's days, one of my colleagues was a tailor — Mr Speir — who had only such knowledge as a person of his occupation could acquire him- self; but he had so fine a faculty of method that what he did know relating to any subject he spoke upon, was set forth with such masterly lucidity — each succeeding part following from the preceding one — that he produced more conviction than other lecturers with many times his know- ledge. When I was a learner and a listener to lectures in the Birmingham Mechanics' Institution, I observed that when a man of great repute in his department addressed us, he was the simplest and most lucid of all — said the least, and taught us most. Coleridge asks, ' What is it that first strikes us, and strikes us at once, in a man of education, and which, among edu- cated men, so instantly distinguishes the man of superior mind ? Not always the weight or novelty of his remarks, nor always the interest of the facts which he communicates — for the subject of conversation may chance to be trivial, and its duration to be short. Still less can any just admira- tion arise from any peculiarity in his words and phrases. The true cause of the impression made on us is that his mind is methodical. We perceive this in the unpremedi- 92 METHOD IN EXPRESSION 93 tated and evidently habitual arrangement of his words, flowing spontaneously and necessarily from the clearness of the leading idea, from which distinctness of mental vision, when men are fully accustomed to it, they obtain a habit of foreseeing at the beginning of every sentence how it is to end, and how all its parts may be brought out in the best and most orderly succession. However irregular and desultory the conversation may happen to be, there is method in the fragments.' Those who try it will find that a little method is worth a great deal of memory. 'Since custom,' says the wise Bacon, 'is the principal magistrate of a man's life, let him, by all means, endeavour to obtain good customs.' Digressiveness is the natural action of the human faculties, till custom or habit come in to give them a settled direction. Man is as liable, and more liable, to be influenced by the last impression than by any preceding one ; and the liability of man is the char- acteristic of children. The teacher knows this. It is the object of discipline to check the tendency to digression, and give stability to method. A man may be made to perceive method, but not to follow it, without the power of discipline. A child accustomed to it will go to bed in the dark with peace and pleasure, but all the rhetoric in the world would not accomplish the same end without habit. Nothing but habit will give the power of habit. Drawing characters in novels or dramas is a matter of method. An original character of general interest is not easily conceived. Heroes or heroines must have some characteristic of speech or — better and more difficult to sustain — some manner of mind, by which the reader knows them whenever they appear. The method of the successful author is to keep these characteristics in sight. Coleridge thought that 'the character of Hamlet is decided by the constant recurrence, in the midst of every pursuit, of philo- sophic reflections.' Mrs Quickly's talk is marked by that lively incoherence so common with garrulous women, 94 PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE whereby the last idea suggests the successor, each carrying the speaker further from the original subject. After this manner : — ' Speaking of tails — we always like them that end well — Hogg's for instance — speaking of hogs — we saw one of these animals the other day lying in the gutter, and in the opposite one a well-dressed man ; the former had a ring in his nose, the latter had a ring on his finger. The man was drunk, the hog was sober. A man is known by the company he keeps.' As Dr Caius clips English, some of Bulwer's characters amplify periods. Scott makes Dominie Sampson exclaim 'Prodigious.' Dickens's Sam Weller talks droll slang. In other and highest forms of art, an overwhelming passion pervades a character, or an intellectual idiosyncrasy is the peculiar quality, leading the possessor to look at everything in a given light. But what- ever may be the feature fixed upon, its methodical working out constitutes individuality of character. In the preceding paragraph the reader has met with this sentence : ' We saw the other day one of these animals (a pig) lying in the gutter, and in the opposite one a well- dressed man ; the former had a ring in his nose, the latter had a ring on his finger.' He who would cultivate direct- ness and vigour of speech, his method should be to avoid these hateful trouble-giving words ' former ' and ' latter,' and even 'one 'and 'other,' as representing things cited, unless they are close at hand and immediately before the eyes, as in Hamlet's remark, ' look on this picture and on that.' ' Former ' and ' latter ' are always detestable, as they interrupt attention while it goes back to look for the thing referred to. Suppose the pig sentence above quoted was put thus : We saw the other day a pig lying in the gutter, and in the opposite gutter a well-dressed man. The pig had a ring in his nose — the man had a ring on his finger. Here is methodical directness, and no doubts raised as to whether ' one ' refers to pig or gutter, and no doubt as to the two animals referred to. METHOD IN EXPRESSION 95 Next to those who talk as though they would never come to the point, are a class of bores who talk as though they did not know what the point was. Before they have pro- ceeded far in telling a story, they stumble upon some Mr ' What's-his-name,' whom they have forgotten, and, though it does not matter whether he had a name or not, the narrative is made to stand still until they have gone through the tiresome and fruitless task of trying to re- member the name — in which they never succeed. When Fadladeen is asked his critical opinion on the poem of Feramoz he commences thus : — ' In order to convey with clearness my opinion of the story this young man has related, it is necessary to take a review of all the stories that ever were told — ' ' My good Fadladeen ! ' exclaimed Lalla Rookh, interrupting him, ' we really do not deserve that you should give yourself so much trouble. Your opinion of the poem we have just heard will, no doubt, be abundantly edifying, without further waste of your valuable erudition.' 'If that be all,' replied the critic — evidently mortified at not being allowed to show how much he knew — 'if that be all that is required, the matter is easily dispatched.' He then proceeded to analyse the poem. The wit of Moore here satirises a discursiveness common to the learned as well as to the uninstructed. Prolixity, says Bentham, may be where redundancy is not. Prolixity may arise, not only from the multifarious insertion of unnecessary articles, but from the conservation of too many necessary ones in a sentence ; as a workman may be overladen not only with rubbish, which is of no use for him to carry, but with materials the most useful and necessary, when heaped up into loads too heavy for him at once. There is a limit to the lifting powers of each man, beyond which all attempts only charge him with a burthen to him immovable. There is in Uke manner a limit to the grasping power of man's apprehension, beyond 96 PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE which, if you add article to article, the whole shrinks from under his utmost efforts. 'Too much is seldom enough,' say the Authors of Guesses at Truth. ' Pumping after your bucket is full prevents it keeping so.' It belongs to method to limit information to the capacity of the hearers to deal with it, as well as to the capacity of the speaker to dispense it. The mind is often stricken with a palsy of thought ; sometimes with a paralysis by weight of informa- tion which prevents it thinking. It was probably know- ledge of this nature that made Hobbes exclaim, 'If I read as much as my neighbours I should be as ignorant as they are.' The word ' cramming ' excludes a selection of knowledge for choice in use. Cramming is filling the mind with all the information relating to many subjects, so that thought has no room or power to move on any. It was said — when he became querulous — -by Mr Somer- ville, the 'Whistler at the Plough,' that Mr Cobden em- ployed him to cram him on Corn-Law questions. If Mr Cobden employed him to collect outlying facts for him, he did wisely. Cobden always kept his mind disengaged and free to deal with relevant facts, as was manifest in his judg- ment and decision in what he brought forward in argument. Mr Spurgeon wisely employed a reader at the British Museum to look up for him droll sayings of humorous preachers, which he used with a discretion and fitness which made them his own. It is method which directs an orator in the uses of illustration, and keeps them from becoming the substance instead of the light of a discourse. Method in common things is often important. A good deal may depend on how you place your facts. Some years ago it was the custom in Glasgow, when a fire broke out in the evening, for the pohce to enter the theatre and announce the fire and the locality, that if any person concerned was present, he might be apprised of his impending loss. On one occasion, when the watch commenced to announce ' Fire — 45 Candleriggs,' the audience took alarm at the METHOD IN EXPRESSION <)f word ' Fire,' and concluded that it applied to the theatre. A rush ensued, which prevented the full notice being heard, and several persons lost their lives. The inversion of the order of announcement, '45 Candleriggs on Fire,' would have prevented the disaster. But afterwards, the practice of such announcements was forbidden, as though it were im- possible to reform the rhetoric of policemen. A like want of method appeared on the tombstone of a preacher who died in India, which ran thus : ' Sacred to the memory of the Rev. David Zelus, who, after twenty years of unremitting labour as a missionary, was accidentally shot by his steward.' Then followed the line, 'Well done, thou good and faithful servant.' The object was not to praise the man for killing his minister, but the line was so placed as to do it. What eloquence is more touching, as a rule, than that of a simple tale of actual wrong ? Dispassionateness gives the air of truth. Controlled passion leads us to suspect the partisan. Invective is the twin brother of exaggeration. The suffrage of mankind is always on the side of dignity. When a man feels that he has a strong case, his hearers have less excitement and no self-returned verdict. A man who thinks he has a clear case can safely leave it to the judg- ment of others. No barrister makes a long speech to the jury when the evidence is all on his side. Sir Fitzroy Kelly never shed tears except when he had Tawell to defend, who had confessed his crime to him, nor did Sergeant Phillips weep save when he knew Courvoisier guilty. As has been said, earnestness is an element of force ; but earnestness must go only as far as the hearers will believe it to be real. No assembly is moved by an intensity they do not feel to be well founded and cannot share. It is not only in vain you say more than your hearers will believe ; it is against you. For those who distrust your judgment cease to be under your influence. Art in statement is like cultivated taste in exhibiting G 98 PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE treasures. The picture or statuette must be seen with the glory of space around it. All crowding is distraction and detraction. Multiplicity is not magnificence, as the unedu- cated think. Details have but a limited place in statement. Out of place they are meaner things crowding about the nobler, hiding the proportions of beauty, distracting, tor- menting and outraging the trained eye or ear. As the mariner sees a revolving light easier than a fixed one, so an object alternately dark and light is seen more clearly and noticed longer than uniformity of brightness. In the English International Exhibition there were ten times more objects of art and of industrial invention and skill than in the French Exhibition of the same character. But the French produced ten times more effect than we did, because the English less understand that space is a part of splendour. Thus in literature and eloquence, as well as in art, it is a rule of method to let the main points be distinctly seen without impediraentary obstacles or the shadow of an alien attraction. Bear in mind that diversion is dispersion of power. On the principle of method, things related should go to- gether, and this relationship kept in view not only assists the understanding of the hearer, but aids the memory of the speaker. Forty-two years ago (October 1854), the Quar- terly Review gave the following instance without showing or knowing its origin or lesson. Macklin, himself a great actor, one evening gave a lecture on ' Memory in Connec- tion with Oratory,' and said that he had a system of memory by which he could repeat anything after once hearing it. Whereupon Foote, a wit of that day, handed him a paper, asking him to read it and then repeat it from memory. The paper contained these words : — ' So she went into the garden to cut a cabbage-leaf, to make an apple-pie : and at the same time a great she-bear, coming up the street, pops its head into the shop. " What ? No soap." So he died, and she very imprudently married METHOD IN EXPRESSION 99 the barber, and there were present the Picninnies, and the Jobhllies, and the GarceHes, and the grand Panjandrum himself, with the Httle round button at top; and they all fell to playing the game of catch as catch can, till the gun- powder ran out at the heels of their boots.' Macklin's Art of Memory failed him straightway. The utter disconnection of every idea presented with that which went before — the total absence of all relationship defeated him. Relationship, the principle of method, is the hand- maid of memory. The very rudiment of method is to have a point and keep to it — that is, to let the march of speech lead direct to it. Remember, the shortest distance to any point is a straight line. One who knew says : ' Keep always to the point, or with an eye upon it ; ' and instead of saying things to make people stare and wonder, say what will with- hold them hereafter from wondering and staring. To make remote things tangible, common things extensively useful, useful things common, is philosophy. If you wish a traveller to reach a distant town — by a way unknown to him — you endeavour to select for him a way free from cross-roads, lest he may turn aside and lose him- self. An exordium should be of this character, that the understanding may pass uninterruptedly into the heart of the subject. Motley terms, questionable assertions, disput- able dogmas, are the cross-roads; so much like the real road that the traveller after truth often loses himself before he is half way on his journey. A discerning writer, John Morley, I think, in his book on Burke, says : — ' Of the effect of the want of method in neutralising the most magnificent powers, Burke is a remarkable instance. As an orator, Burke dazzled his hearers, then distracted them, and finished by fatiguing or offending them. And it was not uncouth elocution and exterior only which impaired the efficacy of his speeches. Burke almost always deserted his subject before he was abandoned by his audience. In the lOO PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE progress of a long discourse he was never satisfied with proving that which was principally in question, or with enforcing the single measure which it was his business and avowed purpose to enforce — he diverged to a thousand collateral topics — he demonstrated as many disputed pro- positions — he established principles in all directions — he illuminated the whole horizon with his magnificent, but scattered, lights. Having too many points to prove, his auditors in their turn forgot that they had undergone the process of conviction upon any.' But how can method in oratory be better illustrated than in the following passage from a morning sermon at South Place Chapel, London, delivered by W. J. Fox when he was preacher there : — ' From the dawn of intellect and freedom Greece has been a watchword on the earth. There rose the social spirit to soften and refine her chosen race, and shelter as in a nest her gentleness from the rushing storm of barbarism ; there liberty first built her mountain throne, first called the waves her own, and shouted across them a proud defiance to despotism's banded myriads ; there the arts and graces danced around humanity, and stored man's home with comforts, and strewed his path with roses, and bound his brows with myrtle, and fashioned for him the breathing statue, and summoned him to temples of snowy marble, and charmed his senses with all forms of eloquence, and threw over his final sleep their veil of loveliness ; there sprung poetry, like their own fabled goddess, mature at once from the teeming intellect, gilt with arts and armour that defy the assaults of time and subdue the heart of man ; there match- less orators gave the world a model of perfect eloquence, the soul the instrument on which they played, and every passion of our nature but a tone which the master's touch called forth at will ; there lived and taught the philosophers of bower and porch, of pride and pleasure, of deep specula- tion, and of useful action, who developed all the acuteness METHOD IN EXPRESSION lOT and refinement, and excursiveness, and energy of mind, and were the glory of their country when their country was the glory of the earth.' Here the student discerns the hand of a master of method. There was no cheering at the close of this splendid period, but the rustle of dresses and stir of admira- tion as the congregation, who had bent forward, sat upright again, told of the enchantment diffused by the brilliant relevance of the preacher. CHAPTER XVI TACT AN ACQUISITION No one can have tact who has not taste. How can a man tell which is the best thing to do who has no intelligent preferences ? Tact consists in graceful conciliation. The distinction between method and tact is illustrated by the following practical remarks of Paley : — ' For the purpose of addressing different understandings — for the purpose of sentiment — for the purpose of exciting admiration of our subject we diversify our views, we multiply examples. [This is tact.] But for the purpose of strict argument one clear instance is sufficient; and not only sufficient, but capable, perhaps, of generating a firmer assurance than what can arise from a divided attention.' [This is method.] When an opponent urges an objection, one way of reply- ing to it is to prove that the assertion contained in the objection is not true. Another is to show that if even the assertion be true, it is no objection to the position taken. It sometimes happens that the argument advanced against an opponent is really an argument in his favour. Tact discovers and avails itself of these advantages. Method arranges the materials, tact applies the resources of reasoning. An obituary notice of Sir William Follet said :— * We do not mean that at any period of his life he could be described as a scientific lawyer. His professional position was attributed neither to the superiority of his professional 102 TACT AN ACQUISITION IO3 knowledge nor to any talent above his contemporaries. In Parliament he displayed no stores of political, literary and economical information, nor versatility, nor vigorous in- vective. It must be admitted that he was neither an orator, nor a man of genius, nor a man of learning, apart from the speciality of his profession. He had neither passion, nor imagination of the fancy or of the heart. In what, then, lay his barristerial superiority ? His great skill consisted in presenting his case in the most harmonious and fair- purposed aspect. If there was anything false or fraudulent, a hitch, or a blot in his cause, he kept it dexterously out of view, or hurried it trippingly over, but if the blot was on the other side, he had the eye of the lynx and the scent of the hound to detect and run down his game. He had the greatest skill in reading an affidavit, and could play the "artful dodger" in a style looking so like gentlemanly candour, that you could not find fault ; but in reading an affidavit on the opposite side, he was cunning of fence.' Such an example illustrates legal tact. Tact so employed may denote a clever lawyer, but a very indifferent man. Thom, the weaver poet, told a story in the best vein of Scotch shrewdness. He was one day recounting an anec- dote of Inverarie, or old Aberdeen — the point of the story rested on a particular word spoken in a fitting place. When he came to it he hesitated, as though at a loss for the term. ' What is it you say under these circumstances ? ' he asked ; ' not this — nor that,' he remarked, as he went over three or four terms by way of trial, as each was endeavouring to assist him. ' Ah,' he added, apparently benevolent towards the difficulty into which he had thrown his hearers, *we say ! for want of a better word.' This of course was the word wanted, the happiest phrase the language afforded. He gained several things thus. He enlivened a narrative by an exciting digression, which increased the force and point of the climax. He created a difficulty for his auditors, who, when suddenly asked, would be 104 PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE unable to find a term which seemed denied to his happy resource, or, finding it, would distrust it and not have the courage to present it to such a fastidious epithetist. Thom thus exalted himself by finding what appeared out of their power, and excited an indefinite wonder at his own skill in bringing a story to so felicitous an end by the employment of a make-shift phrase. What would he have done if he could have found the right one ? was naturally thought. This was tact. It was a case analogous to that given by Dickens in one of his early papers, where the president of a Club, at an apparent loss for a word, asks, ' What is that you give a man who is de- prived of a salary which he has received all his life for doing nothing ; or, perhaps worse, for obstructing public improve- ment ? ' ' Compensation,' suggested the Vice. To do by design what Thom did without it is necessary to choose some rare and happy word to use in some intended remarks, and keep in memory two or three other words which might be tolerable in that place. Hesitate on coming to the right term, inquire for it, and repeat the inferior words one by one and dismiss them ; then name, as though it was just thought of, the fitting word. Spontaneity is the charm of the incident ; but all is spoiled if calculation is perceived in it. As a device such experiments are useful to the student, as practice in aptitude, since the difficulty of finding the right word at a critical point constantly occurs, when hesitation is not artifice but inevitable. As an artifice it begets distrust. There is tact in the use of phrases free from any objection. E. S. Dallas cites Sainte Beuve as throwing out his meaning in a happy phrase, which being insufficient, he tries another. That is not quite right. By one phrase which falls short, by another that goes too far, and others which are beside the mark, he indicates what he would be at. It is the judicious application of means that constitutes tact. In journalism tact is indispensable. The history of TACT AN ACQUISITION 105 Mr Murray's daily paper, the Representative, published for six or eight months, is proof that unlimited command of capital, great literary ability in every branch of knowledge, and the highest patronage, are all insufficient to establish a paper without tact. Mr Murray's regal and legal, ermined and coroneted, lay and clerical, civil and military friends, lacked that essential gift, or the editor did. There is tact in reply, as when a gentleman who had been out shooting over a friend's estate with ill-success, and was anxious to learn the gamekeeper's opinion, inquired ingratiatingly whether he had ever seen a worse shot. The gamekeeper, unwilling to make an admission which might be discomforting to his master's guest, answered, ' Oh, yes, I have met with many much worse, for you misses them so cleanly.' An Irishman being asked by two ladies ' which he thought the older ? ' saw, with the quickness of his race, that if he made a distinction he should get into trouble with one of them, rephed brightly, 'To tell you the truth, you each look younger than the other.' With such an assurance both were satisfied. Douglas Jerrold excelled in extricating himself from a difficulty on the spur of the moment. Overtaking one whom he took to be a familiar friend, he slapped him on the back. The gentleman turned round, looking as black as a judge's hanging cap. Jerrold said, ' I beg your pardon, I thought I knew you — but I'm glad I don't.' Tact of this kind depends on brightness and self - possession, qualities capable of cultivation. It never occurs to some people that gaiety of mind is a charm on the platform as well as in the household. They do not understand that cheerfulness is a duty towards others, and tells upon an audience as well as upon friends. The grave are always dull. They belong to the charnel-house side of life. Others have hedgehog manners, and prick all who approach them. Hedgehogs are good roasted, but nobody thinks of embracing one in its natural state. No I06 PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE one doubts that a moderate sense of tact would alter this. The tact of consideration for others — in the respect of personal courtesies — goes a long way in politics, as in social life. The effect of the want of it Lord Lytton depicts in his ' New Timon ' in describing Lord John Russell : — How formed to lead, if not too proud to please, His fame would fire you, but his manners freeze ; Like or dislike, he does not care a jot, He wants your vote, but your affections not ; Yet human hearts need sun, as well as oats, — So cold a climate plays the deuce with votes ; And while his doctrines ripen day by day. His frost-bit party pines itself away. Public geniality had been good policy. Lord Lytton measured political duty by the standard of fashion, which regulates votes, not by principle, but by the courtesies of ministers. That Lord Russell had amenity of manners when duties of State left him leisure, is proved by his light- hearted and changeless friendship for men like Thomas Moore and Leigh Hunt, whose spirits were all sunshine. Lately, when a distinguished peer explained a passage in a speech which was construed against him by adversaries, Mr Courtney said a man might do three things. ' The first was to stick to the assertion. Any fool could do that : but all the same, very few fools did. Second, he might say openly that when he came to reflect he found that his words went further than his thoughts. That was the heroic method. The third way was not withdrawing the words but attenuating the meaning.' The best tact in a dif^culty of misapprehension is frankness — substituting unmistakable words. Everybody knows the difference between things said or done anyhow, and said or done with consideration. Hearts in love use their own tongues ; Let every eye negotiate for itself, And trust no agent. TACT AN ACQUISITION IO7 Shakespeare understood tact in love. Everyone has tact, more or less, when they are interested — and reflection and good sense will make it an acquisition. It has been well said that no one learns to think by getting rules for thinking, but by getting materials for thought. CHAPTER XVII CONTINGENCIES OF PUBLIC MEETINGS It is of no mean importance to an orator or speaker, who is invited to address a meeting, to make himself acquainted how that meeting is hkely to be conducted, and who are announced, or are Ukely, to address it. If there are many speakers, he who speaks first, or second, or at any time, must be brief, in courtesy to others. If the speakers are not brief, the orator who has decided upon, and arranged the order of his arguments, will find that he has to drop out, one by one, points he deems important. It is the duty of a chairman to take care that the meeting — unless one of unusual importance in the eyes of the auditors — should not exceed two or two and a half hours. It is the duty of the chairman to see the list of speakers invited to address the meeting, and arrange with the convenors of the meeting what time should be given to each, and notify to each that when that time is nearly up he will make known the same to him. Not one chairman in ten ever does this, nor reflects that, as the audience is responsible to him for maintaining order in the meeting, he is responsible to the audience for keeping time on the platform. For want of this thought half an hour of time is commonly wasted, which to a meeting of five hundred persons means a loss of twenty-five days of ten hours each. In fact, meetings are frequently prolonged till eleven o'clock, which might have been concluded at ten, which to an audience of a thousand persons implies a loss 1 08 CONTINGENCIES OF PUBLIC MEETINGS IO9 of fifty working days of ten hours. This needless extension of the duration of the meeting means the adulteration of the proceedings, by prohxity, decrease of animation, and weariness to hearers, who become less inclined to attend meetings which no one knows when they will end. The speaker who is called upon late should understand these contingencies, and take them into account by speaking with what directness and energy he can. I have heard Mr Bright kindle a fire of enthusiasm at a Birmingham meeting which was breaking up late and listlessly. But this is only possible to orators of the type of those who Mark Antony said once stirred the stones of Rome. Under such circumstances the ordinary speaker would be ineffectual ; and late speakers at exhausted meetings will do well to say little or nothing — for a speech which would be successful when the meeting was fresh or unwearied, will command no attention later. Sometimes a special paper is read at a meeting, under an announcement that no paper is to exceed twenty minutes in length. It will probably extend to forty or fifty minutes ; and those who gave the pledge that twenty minutes should be its limit will actually print the extended paper and deliver it to the appointed reader, although they see that no one could gabble through it audibly in the prescribed period. Thus the succeeding commenters on the paper confront an assembly of wearied and baffled listeners, who have failed to retain its excess of matter in their minds. It is well that succeeding speakers understand this, lest they interpret the listlessness of the hearers as indifference to them. There is another liability from which a speaker whose voice is not loud must protect himself, by profiting from what he may know of the vocal capacity of others likely to precede him. If he is allotted to follow a Boanerges (a son of thunder) of the plat- form, the contrast will be against him — say what he will. But if he speaks before them he will be heard on his merits. Frequently, a public meeting is called to consider and discuss some question of importance. Then the trouble is I lO PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE cast upon the chairman of discerning what the main point or points are which he should state to the meeting — since it is his duty to see that speakers keep to them. Anyone intending to speak should get clear ideas on the subject himself, since he will speak most effectively who knows what the question is and keeps to it. The business of those who speak at conference or discussion is to consider alone the question stated by the chairman or other responsible person — the reader of a paper or the opener of the question — and not the speeches of others, except so far as they relate to the main point at issue. A speaker who understands these things can attain ascendency in the meeting, for all are ready to applaud anyone who sees clearly, clears up confusion, and leads distracted public attention back to the point. When a speech or lecture is thrown open to criticism, each critic commonly expects to occupy the same time as the speaker, which often prevents more than one being heard in reply. In co-operative meetings this is prudently pre- vented by limiting the time of each speaker. It is not the work of any one speaker, but the work of many, to appraise and comment upon a whole lecture or paper, and each critic should select a leading point, and ten minutes would afford time for an effective objection if one could be raised. A speaker, therefore, who has talent by which he can advance a cause, or add to the public information, should seek, beforehand, conditions which give him a fair oppor- tunity consistent with the fair chances of others. At public meetings, where opposing parties often struggle to be heard, confusion, delay and ill-feeling might be obviated by each party pre-appointing a representative of ability, in whom confidence could be reposed, to speak on their behalf, and by those calUng the meeting being made acquainted with and consenting to the arrangement — the views of half a dozen parties could be advocated, where the views of one are often heard but inadequately and im- patiently now. CONTINGENCIES OF PUBLIC MEETINGS III Sometimes a speaker is confused and disconcerted at a public meeting by hearing loud calls for another person to speak, and thinks — as I have known a reverend orator do — the audience are impatient with him and want to hear some one else. All the while it was the plot of an ambitious publicist, who had personal admirers whom he besought to attend meetings and call for him, giving the impression that he was in public demand. There is the story of the auditor, at an American meeting, who kept calling, 'Mr Corkles; let Mr Corkles speak.' At length the Chairman said, 'Can't you be quiet? Mr Corkles is now speaking.' ' That Mr Corkles ? ' said the astonished interrupter, ' why, that is the man who gave me a half-dollar to holler out his name.' A case occurred at a northern meeting some time ago, where the hall was so crowded that those wedged far in wished they were outside. One man who tried in vain to make his way to the door, and for whom no one would make an opening, began to call out, ' What did Mr Gladstone say ? What did Mr Gladstone say ? ' until the speaker on the platform could not be heard and the audience were incensed. Whereupon cries arose, 'Turn him out,' and the man so anxious to hear ' what Mr Gladstone said,' was turned out. When one who had assisted in his ejection said to him, ' What was it Mr Gladstone said ? ' 'I have no idea,' was the answer. ' Then why did you call out ? ' The reply was, ' Because I wanted to get out ; when by my becoming an interrupter everybody made way for me.' If the arts and expedients of public meetings are understood by a speaker, he will not be needlessly perturbed by inter- ruptions. Many persons cry out whose object is not at once apparent, and whose intentions are not at all implied in what they say. Public meetings in the country, and in the town also, are conducted on the crudest principles. If many men were disposed to take part in the meeting, it would be impossible 112 PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE that any business could be transacted under several days. The assumption that every man has a right to be heard could not be acted upon if half who usually attend public meetings were to enforce that ' right.' In Saxon days, when a public meeting consisted of a small number of persons under a tree, every one having the right to speak caused no inconvenience. It is strange that this right should remain in force after looo years, when public meetings consist of 30,000 persons, as was the case at Bingley Hall, Birmingham, when Mr Gladstone spoke there. Had each person present claimed the right to be heard, and insisted on it, the meeting had lasted six months. C HAPTER XVIII WRITING FOR THE PRESS Every public speaker or debater is likely, sooner or later, to come in contact with the press. He will need it to assist in making known his view, or in vindicating himself against the adverse criticisms of opponents, or in correcting erroneous reports of what he has said. Even John Arthur Roebuck, the most direct speaker of his day, had to do this. Even Mr Cobden, whom it was difficult to mis- construe or misunderstand, had to do this. Even Mr Gladstone, the most circumambient speaker of all — that is, he travels all round his main idea, and not only explains it, but illustrates its purport — has had to write to the press, from time to time, in vindication of his meaning. There- fore humbler speakers, who may one day be publicists, may be interested in knowing something of the art of communi- cating to the press, with fewer of those disappointments usually ascribed to editorial malevolence or neglect of rising genius, when the fault is in the writer. Every attempt at expressing opinion by the pen, how- ever ill it may succeed, is a part of the process of self- education, and often the only mode available to the poor. Whatever shall render this more practicable and common among the people does good, and to this end a few rules are submitted for the guidance of correspondents un- accustomed to write to the press. Literature is a re- public where all eminence is honourable, where none can H 114 PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE attain distinction save by effort and patience, which are the chief forces of genius. But by reason of the necessary conditions of admission being overlooked, many sustain disappointment, which to them is inexplicable. The con- ditions which are very simple, I have heretofore expressed for students thus : — I. Use large note-size paper, because a larger sheet covers the printer's case, and hinders his work. 2. Do not write on the back of the paper, as while one side is being ' set up ' what is written on the back cannot be ' gone on with.' 3. Write with dark-black ink, for an editor will read with reluctance what he sees with difficulty, and the compositor, for the same reason, will dislike to set it up. 4. Always write a plain, bold hand ; if you send an undis- tinguishable scrawl, it will be thrown aside until the editor has leisure to make it out, which may not be until the 'interest of the article has passed away,' and it may be too late to print it. 5. Remember, that whatever gives an editor trouble at his desk, may double expense in the printing office ; the printers and readers waste time in deciphering bad MS., and out of any failure in interpreta- tion commonly grows a charge against the journal for ' mis- representing ' the writer. 6. If you know that the editor will take any trouble to oblige you, and you have no scruples, give him any trouble you please. If you are rich, and can send the printers a guinea for making out your letter, you may scrawl like a gentleman. If you have a great name, so that the responsibility of anything you write will attach to yourself and not reflect on the paper, express yourself how you will ; you may scribble with a pin on butter paper, and the editor will try to make it out. But if the editor is under no obligation to you, if you have no guineas to spare, if you are not so popular that anything must be printed that bears your name, you had better cleave to good sense, good taste, clear expres- sion, black ink, and a plain hand. If you cannot write WRITING FOR THE PRESS II 5 plainly, have your communication copied by someone who can. Never fear that an editor will omit or abridge your communication without cause. If it have value he will be glad of it. If it contains only relevant facts, and be, as all relations of facts ought to be, briefly told, without declamation, digression, or personal imputation on others, it will be impossible to abridge it. A well-written letter or narrative is incapable of being altered or abbreviated for the better. Hardly anything is ever refused, if well written. The artistic taste of an editor for the literary perfection of his paper is a ruling passion, stronger than personal feeling or political prejudice, and next to the love of fair play he is attracted by a communication which is well expressed. It is common with new writers to put all they have to say into one sentence. A long sentence is most diffi- cult to construct clearly — and that is what the inex- perienced first attempt, though not knowing how to separate distinct pieces of information. After a while, young writers discover that every separate idea should be separately expressed, in separate sentences. Long sentences are wearisome to read, difficult to understand, and almost impossible to correct. This fault in writing prevents many useful articles from appearing in print. Editors cannot find time for re-writing such papers. It is a common complaint that editors strike out the 'best parts' of papers sent them. They do this seldomer than is supposed, for editors in their own interest are com- monly good judges of the 'best parts' of letters or other communications calculated to interest or allure readers. In Mavor's History of Greece, which used to be a common school-book for young students, may be read in Chapter XI. such sentences as the following : — ' Nicias asked merely for quarter for the miserable remains of his troops who had not perished in the Asinarius, or ri6 PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE upon its banks.' No one need be at loss to discover the superfluous information given that Nicias asked for quarter for ' those who had not perished.' No general asks for quarter for those who have. The same writer tells us that 'discipline yielded to the pressure of necessity. They hurried down the steep in confusion and without order, and trod one another to death in the stream.' Necessity is all ' pressure,' and it is not necessary to specify the essence of a thing as operative. It is needless to tell us, that men all 'in confusion' 'were without order.' It had been better for Mavor's History and his own reputation had some editor put his pen through his superfluous words. When we discover a number of emphatic words employed, we know the writer or speaker has no sense of measure. ' When Rigby,' says Disraeli, ' was of opinion he had made a point, you may be sure the hit was in italics, that last resource of the forcible feebles.' ' Ordinarily,' says Schlegel, ' men entertain a very erroneous notion of criticism, and understand by it nothing more than a certain shrewdness in detecting and exposing the faults of a work of art. Art cannot exist without nature, and man can give nothing to his fellow-men but himself.' This explains all the student need take to heart at this point. If he will give 'himself,' in his communications he will be interesting. Cobbett said, 'the secret of good writing is to talk with the pen.' If a writer will put down his sentences in the free, natural, unaff'ected way he would speak them to a friend in talking over what interests him, he will find favour with editors. If a man is dull, and his dulness is absolute, perfect, complete in all its parts, and coherent — he will often obtain a hearing, like Mirabeau's head, whose entire ugliness endered it alluring. Perfect stupidity or relevant, unaflected good sense will win attention. It is the mixture that gives editors trouble. Delane, the editor of the Twies, once struck out a weak sentence and an irrelevant remark in a letter of mine to my great advantage. I was very gra,teful WRITING FOR THE PRESS II 7 for it. But it is rarely an editor will do this. The writer is almost sure to charge him with emasculating his com- munication, and rather than risk this, the editor leaves out the letter. One thing the correspondent of a newspaper should bear in mind is — not to make any dishonouring imputation upon the persons he writes about. Even if he thinks he has been wilfully misrepresented by an adversary, a reporter, or by the editor, he had better not say so. First, because he can hardly ever be sure of it. Second, because he can hardly ever prove it, and it is a serious thing to make a charge of dishonourable wilfulness, if you cannot prove it. Third, because human capacity for seeing things the wrong way, and drawing the wrong conclusion from the plainest premises, is so universally diffused among mankind that you can hardly ever be quite sure that a perversion of what has been said is really wilful. The Dutch proverb says, ' It is misapprehension which brings lies to town.' Now, the power of honest misapprehension is very strong in well-meaning people. Besides, the editor has to be consulted. To publish a personal imputation might render him liable to an action, and he may not like it. If he inserted the imputation, the person assailed might claim the right of reply and might give his assailant ' as good as he had sent,' which might convert the journal into a bear garden, and the readers might not like this. Finally, it may be worth while to consider what kind of person the editor to whom you write is. If he has strong prejudices, it is wisdom to say as little as you can which may excite him, and as much as you can which may conciliate him. If you wanted to borrow half a guinea you would not think of asking the first person you met, but would cast about among all the persons you knew for one likely to have half a guinea about him, and give some thought as to the best way of addressing him likeliest to induce him to part with the same. An editor's compliance Il8 PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE with your request may in one way or other, sooner or later, be worth many half-guineas to the writer. Thus editors are worthy of consideration in the way in which they are addressed, and especially in the nature and expression of the communication sent to them. CHAPTER XIX SOURCES OF TASTE Taste is a part of good oratory, and is no mean equipment of a great speaker. No man goes far in a speech without betraying to the auditor his coarseness or refinement. A man may be an orator without taste and command ap- plause, but he never commands respect without it. An orator may ruin a cause by a single phrase. A secretary of a great political party in Manchester lost the election of its candidates by a single expression which wounded the self- respect of the city. When Mr Blaine was presidential candidate in America his election was lost by one of his advocates, the Rev. Dr Burchard, who had coined an alliterative phrase, which he thought much of, but had never thought how it would be regarded by the great assembly to whom it was addressed. The publicans, the Catholics, and the southern party had been won over in sufficient numbers to give Blaine a majority, when Dr Burchard must say that Blaine would be victorious over ' Rum, Romanism and Rebellion.' This rendered the publicans furious, the Catholics indignant, the south vindictive ; and so Blaine's majority was dissolved by this odious and high-sounding phrase. The phrase cited was said to be 'bad taste,' But bad taste means bad judgment, bad knowledge, and disregard for the feelings of others. To assail the self-respect of adversaries is not an act of taste — it is an outrage. Taste is preference and selection 119 I20 PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE in personal things, of that which neither annoys nor harms others. Persons who seek to excuse or escape the responsi- biUty of the preferences of themselves or others, will say 'there is no accounting for tastes.' Yes, there is. Taste has its roots in habit, in education, and has its laws and standards. Town Councillors who put and keep up hideousness in the town they are appointed to improve, no sooner visit the Continent than they acquire taste in streets and picturesque open spaces. Space is the first condition of a fine street. If dignity cannot be given to a town, gleams of brightness may be let into it, and it need not have monotonousness perpetuated in it. Bad taste in towns can be accounted for. It is owing to the ignorance of its chief inhabitants. Taste in writing has its laws. There must be distinctness. There is writing so elegant that it cannot be read. The first law of writing is that every letter is distinct in form from every other letter. One form of letter should be decided on and not departed from. Neatness and plainness follow. Taste in writing is founded on the standard that it can be read easily without trouble or effort, and no single letter in it can be mistaken for any other letter. Taste in truth depends on accuracy, clearness, vitalness — that is its usefulness and relevance. Taste in books is determined by width of margin, clear- ness of type, strength and durability of paper, apart from the binding and contents. Taste in mind has conditions of vividness, perspicacity, force, the sense of proportion, veracity and integrity. Taste in manliness has reference to symmetry, grace of movement, resiHence and health. Taste, therefore, is not wantonness of choice, but depends on knowledge; and there would be better taste were it understood that the quality of taste is the outward and visible sign by which a person betrays his attainments. Taste in oratory has also its laws and conditions. One is SOURCES OF TASTE 121 that no illustration should be used without reference to the subject. If the object is to lower the pretension of a person or thing, the illustration should do it. If the purpose is to exalt, the illustration should elevate it. I knew an agitator of no mean qualities of mind defend himself before a judge, by quoting the simile of Bishop Warburton, who compared critics of his way of thinking, to swine, which, though not popular animals, were yet useful in routing up acorns and fertilising trees. For the defendant to compare himself to unsavoury swine was to confirm the court in its unpleasant impression of him; whereas his interest was to exalt the character and services of the agitator, whom he might have compared to the explorer, who risks his reputation, and not unfrequently life or liberty, to discover new advantages or opportunities for his countrymen, who may never know him, and if they do neither regard him nor requite him. Such an illustration would be in good taste, having regard to the de- fendant's purpose. The first illustration was in bad taste, and he who used it, who was an orator by nature, would have seen it to be so had he reflected ; by which I want the student to see that one of the conditions of good taste is reflection. Proportion is also a form of taste. To those who have that sense in art or eloquence, disproportion is an outrage, and he who is guilty of it loses the power of being impressive. Measured and relevant words intensify rather than decrease vividness and imagination. We are told of Dante that, great and various as his power of creating pictures in a few lines unquestionably was, he owed that power to the directness, simplicity and intensity of his language. In him 'the invisible becomes visible,' as Leigh Hunt said, — 'darkness becomes palpable, silence describes a character, a word acts as a flash of lightning, which displays some gloomy neigh- bourhood where a tower is standing, with dreadful faces at the window.' ' In good prose ' (says Frederic Schlegel) ' every word should be underlined ' — that is, every word should be the 122 PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE right word ; and then no word would be righter than another. It comes to the same thing, where all words are italics, one may as well use roman. There are no italics in Plato, because there are no unnecessary or unimportant words. It is a sign of taste in writing or speaking that it needs few italicised or emphatic words. Taste is also part of the art of commendation. Most persons carry a stock of hate on hand. Censure is always ready-made. But praise is a different thing. It only pro- ceeds from generosity or gratitude, and those are deliberate sentiments. A man may rage without art, but he cannot applaud sensibly without it. This is why the quality of a man's mind is more easily seen in his praise than in his censure. Defamation shows his feeling, praise his under- standing ; and, if he wishes to give an idea of his strong sense of a service rendered him, he can best do it by show- ing that he accurately estimates it, and this is the only praise anyone, not vain, cares to receive, or which is an actual tribute to him who receives it. Taste in praise is rare. Its principle is that there can be no praise except from equals or superiors who can measure the difificulties over- come in the attainment of excellence. Inferiors may admire. Mrs Barbauld recognised this in her admirable Une in reference to the inadequacy of the creature professing to praise the Creator. She, as Hooker had suggested before her, wrote — Silence is our least injurious praise. Taste in manners is no mean attainment, and goes for much in the public estimation of the orator. ' Do manners matter ? ' ask some who have not thought much upon the subject. There is reason to think manners do matter. The proverb says, ' Manners make the man.' No careful speak- ing man would say this. There are persons whose manners are coarse or brutal at times, quick, hasty, abrupt and in- considerate, who are yet tender, full of feeling for others SOURCES OF TASTE 1 23 and generous. There are others who are all suavity and courtesy, whose souls are base and selfish. Men must be judged by what they do, as well as by what they seem. Nevertheless, good manners are good as far as they go. Everybody knows this ; even those who affect to despise courtesy as servility or mealy-mouthedness, are quickly stung themselves and irritated and implacable, if they find themselves treated with discourtesy. Bad manners give a bad impression of a good heart, and a bad presentment gives a bad impression of a good cause. A definition should not only help you to find a thing, but help you to know it when you do find it. How many definitions of politeness and good breeding have been given, but who has defined it in such words of light and guidance as Swift, who said, 'Whoever makes the fewest persons uneasy, is the bes bred man in the company.' Politeness is thoughtfulness for others and forgetfulness of yourself. Good breeding is consideration for the pleasure of those about you. It is the same in palace and cottage ; in the highest assembly and the lowest ; in Parliament or a town council ; in pulpit or on the platform ; at the fireside or in the street. It is possible to all in the workshops, in the mill, or in the store. It is not rank, it is not wealth, it is not learning that constitutes good breeding. Good breed- ing is good feeUng, and it is good taste to remember it. CHAPTER XX PREMEDITATION IN SPEECH Premeditation is but thoughtfulness in speech, and he who speaks without thought will soon have hearers who will pay him no attention. He who speaks without preparing what he will say is but a gambler in oratory who trusts to the right dice turning up as he proceeds. Preparation is premeditation. A book is not written — a poem is not written, a play is not planned, a picture is not painted — without premedita- tion. If they are, the book will lack arrangement — the poem will be wanting in grace, the play will be deficient in con- struction, and the picture will not be the best expression of the artist's powers. Of course there are exceptions. Inspira- tion may come like a flash of light and reveal a remarkable design ; but though premeditation is not in it, and could not produce it, meditation alone can perfect the design. Speeches are the better for premeditation. Even sermons are improved by it. A young candidate for holy orders had to preach his trial sermon before Archbishop Whately. That experienced prelate discovered crudeness of arrange- ment and want of finish of expression in what he heard, and asked the young preacher whether he was accustomed to prepare his discourses. He answered that he was not, as he trusted to the divine promise — ' In the hour in which you have to speak it shall be given to you what you shall say.' The Archbishop remarked that that promise was 124 PREMEDITATION IN SPEECH I25 given to the Apostles, and unless he was sure that he was an apostle it might not apply to him. The candidate had trust and piety, without which preaching is ineffective, but the shrewd prelate knew that without preparation piety could seldom commend its cause in the pulpit. Orators of renown have not disdained to premeditate their speeches, both in Parliament and on the platform. Porson said that ' Pitt carefully considered his sentences before he uttered them, but that Fox threw himself into the middle of his, and left it to God Almighty to get him out again.' But those who lack the splendid confidence of Charles James Fox had better acquire that sureness in speech affirmed of a certain French speaker, whose sentences were like cats — when showered into the air they found their feet without trouble. There is reason to believe that the greatest masters of oratory have been sensible of the value, and have practised premeditation. It is only the young, would-be speaker who expects to be great without effort, or whose vanity leads him to impose upon others the belief that he is perfect at will — and needs no preparation. One of the biographers of Canning tells us that he was himself fastidious to excess about the slightest terms of expression. He would correct his speeches and amend their verbal graces. He was not singular in this. Burke, whom he is said to have closely studied, did the same. Sheridan always prepared his speeches ; the highly-wrought passages in his speech on the Hastings impeachment were written beforehand and com- mitted to memory, and the differences were so marked that the audience could readily distinguish between the ex- temporaneous passages and those that were premeditated. Canning's alterations were frequently so minute and exten- sive that the printers found it easier to recompose the matter afresh in type than to correct it. This is to be amendment mad. Frugality in revision is as much a mark of sanity as frugality in metaphors. 126 PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE Oratory in this country is less good than it would be, owing to the foolish contempt for ' cut-and-dried speeches,' till it has come to be considered a sign of weakness for a man to think before he speaks. Those who travelled with Shiel when he spoke in the country, could hear him in the morning repeating his intended oration in his dressing-room. Disraeli said in the Young Duke, ' Mr Shiel's speech in Kent was a fine oration, and the boobies who taunted him for having got it by rote were not aware that in doing so he wisely followed the example of Pericles, Demosthenes, Lycias, Isocrates, Hortensius, Cicero, Caesar, and every great orator of antiquity.' The orations or compositions of Demosthenes are not distinguished by ornament and splendour. It is an energy of thought which raises him above his species. He appears not to attend to words, but to things. We forget the orator, and think of the subject. Demades says, that Demosthenes spoke better on some few occasions when he spoke unpre- meditatedly. Probably he spoke well in some of these instances, but it was the result of power acquired by the habit of preparation. As a general rule, he who thinks twice before speaking once, will speak twice the better for it when he has no time to think. When Macaulay was about to address the House of Commons his anxious and restless manner betrayed his intention. Still, he was regardless of the laugh of the witlings, and continued intent on his effort. This is the real courage that does things well— the courage that is neither laughed nor frowned from its purpose. Macaulay spoke early in the evening, before the jarring of the debate confused him, or long attention enfeebled his powers. When the great Lord Chatham was to appear in public he took much pains about his dress; and in his last speech he arranged his flannels in graceful folds. He was carried into the House when near death. It need not then detract from our respect for Erskine, says Lord Campbell PREMEDITATION IN SPEECH 1 27 in his Lives of the Chancellors^ that ' when he went down into the country on special retainers, he examined the court the night before the trial, in order to select the most advan- tageous place for addressing the jury. On the cause being called, the crowded audience were perhaps kept waiting a few minutes before the celebrated stranger made his appear- ance; a particularly nice wig, and a pair of new yellow gloves, distinguished and embellished his person beyond the ordinary costume of the barrister of the circuit' Amid the applause bestowed upon premeditation, it would not be just to omit the ridicule with which it has been visited by Sydney Smith, who said, ' It is only by the fresh feelings of the heart that mankind can be very power- fully affected. What can be more ludicrous than an orator delivering stale indignation and fervour of a week old? turning over whole pages of violent passions, written out in German text; reading the trophes and apostrophes into which he is hurried by the ardour of his mind, and so affected at a preconcerted line and page that he is unable to proceed any further.' True, 'it is only by the fresh feelings of the heart that mankind can be very powerfully affected.' But nature is always fresh ; and he who repro- duces nature will always be effective. Macready never stabbed his daughter to preserve her honour. Yet every man was moved at his Virginius. As Othello, Macready's ' indignation ' at lago was a glory of the stage for years ; yet men were as much affected by its intensity as on the first day when he displayed it. The speech of Antony over the dead body of Csesar was ' written in German text ' in thedays of Queen Elizabeth ; it was ' cut and dried ' near three hundred years ago. Yet, whatever our satirical canon may say, the idea of premeditation is extinguished by the charm of perfect expression, and the passion ex- cited, in those capable of realising its fitness and force, is fresh to every generation of hearers. Lord Brougham wrote out the last passages of his speech for the defence 128 PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE of Queen Caroline nine times. Its effect was a triumph of preparation. When Dr Black had a class of young men at the Reform Association, he disciplined them in rhetoric by causing each to marshal his discourse on a chosen theme under certain heads. These once gone over, he required these heads to be spoken upon by inversion, beginning probably with the peroration, continuing with the argument, taking afterwards the statement, or other division belonging to the theme, and ending with the exordium. Not until a member could speak well on any one head, and in any order, was he deemed master of his subject. Professor de Morgan remarks in a paper which he fur- nished to Dr Lardner's Geometry, that to number the parts of propositions is the only way of understanding them. To identify details and grasp the whole are the two indices of proficiency. Margaret Fuller relates how backwoodsmen of America, whom she visited, would sit by their log-fire at night and tell 'rough pieces out of their lives.' This disintegration of events by men strong of will and full of matter, in order to set distinct parts before auditors, is a sign of that power which we call mastery. Ability is, always, power under command. Elsewhere, in describing Colonel John Hay's account of Abraham Lincoln, I have said : — It has never been made so clear in what way, and by what qualities, the gaunt rail-splitter attained the Presidency. His speeches show that he excelled in seeing all the way into a State problem and in power of perfect statement of it. His account of his self-education is one by which many students may profit to-day. Lincoln said, ' When a child I used to get irritated when anyone talked to me in a way I could not understand ; that always disturbed my temper, and has ever since.' He ' hunted after the idea in a dark saying ' until he thought he had caught it, and was not satisfied until he PREMEDITATION IN SPEECH 1 29 had put it into language ' plain enough for any boy to understand it.' That was Lincoln's answer as to how he acquired the art of ' putting things ' — which does not come by nature, but by education. In studying law-books, he came upon the word * demonstrate,' which excited his curiosity, and he studied Euclid until he had mastered what demonstration meant in geometry, and afterwards applied the knowledge in argument. Gather relevant knowledge anywhere. Every man is indebted to others for much information. No man knows everything by his own research and verification, unless it be Mr Gladstone. Preparation is power; nor does the hesitation which the desire of exactness sometimes begets, tell against the speaker. Mr T. P. O'Connor says of Mr Sexton on a famous occasion : — ' He spoke, I say, slowly — but at the same time it was evident that he had his mind well fixed on the end which he wished to reach. Nothing adds so much to the effec- tiveness of oratory as the sense that the man who is address- ing you, is thinking at the very moment he is speaking. You have the sense of watching the visible working of his inner mind ; and you are far more deeply impressed than by the glib facility which does not pause, does not stumble, does not hesitate, because the speaker does not stop to think.' Humanity is the instrument upon which the orator has to play, and he had better learn what notes it is capable of before he begins. Experience in Parliament and on the platform will soon teach any observer, that few speakers are worth hearing who do not prepare, and prepare carefully, what they want to say. In writing we may be brief and suggestive, because each word remains to be pondered over. But that which falls on the ear not being so permanent as that which falls on paper, fulness, premeditation and varied treatment are indispensable. CHAPTER XXI REPETITION A NECESSITY Repetition has its uses and necessities, and is excellent in a speaker, provided he does not repeat himself. Few persons, as a rule, ever understand any new thing on its first saying. It is by many repetitions in many forms that a new idea is comprehended. Leaders of opinion, even of the soberer sort, have within my knowledge been so captivated by reason, as to overlook the conditions under which reason acts. They have been so moved when the reason of a thing has become plain to them, that they have had no doubt that all men could be at once convinced by the same exposition of the facts. The processes of educa- tion should have taught them differently. First elementary principles are acquired, then successive stages are reached until the whole subject looms before the mind, impressing it by its completeness. Every step, though with less pre- cision, like the steps in Euclid, recall and repeat what has gone before. The repetition here explained and commended is varia- tion in statement, and means presenting the same idea under different aspects. Every important principle has many relations and applications. To trace these and show them is to recall the cardinal idea without wearying the hearer, who, indeed, is often charmed with the range of view which reveals the same fact operative in divers circum- stances. Bishop Hall said of moderation that it was the 130 REPETITION A NECESSITY I3I •silken string running through the pearl chain of all our virtues.' To trace this silken cord wherever it runs in the channels of possible applications, is the kind of repetition meant in this chapter. It keeps one idea always in view under a brilliant diversity which instructs and charms. There is a ' damnable iteration ' spoken of in the play. That is when the same thing is said in the same way in season and out of season. He who is always obtruding the same view upon others soon becomes tiresome, and people avoid him and his subject. Repetition as a part of rhetoric is an art, and is limited to varying attention on an essential point until it is understood, and no further. To go further is to provoke resentment and dislike. Robert Owen laid down five fundamental facts and twenty laws of human nature. There were a million ideas in them, but because he often repeated them in the same language, unre- lieved by variation and illustration, he was regarded as a man of ' one idea.' Another generation who may look into his works, sayings and designs, will be of a different opinion. Splendid enthusiasts forget themselves in their desire to serve others, and leave it to posterity, who will reap the advantages of their disinterested devotion, to do them justice — if so minded. History acquaints us with the wondrous effects of eloquence upon multitudes, carried away to far crusades by the oratory of a hermit. Even in grave political assemblies and parliaments, a great speaker can persuade so that majorities hang upon his words. Persuasion is a task of skill. ' Inculcating an idea — disseminating it — winning conviction first, and inspiring enthusiasm after — is often like the dropping of a seed, and patiently waiting till it grows — fostering it, watering it, protecting it, until it expands into stem and flower. Such,' said the Daily News years ago, ' is the political eloquence of modern times. He who dis- covered it, and who practises it, is — Richard Cobden.' It is hardlv true that Mr Cobden 'discovered' it. He was ifs 132 PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE greatest illustrator, but it had grown with the growth and commercial character of the nation. Long before Cobden's time, the magic fancy of Burke, the ceaseless sentences of Pitt, the thundering declamation of Fox, all had like features in lesser degree. The king of American trans- cendentalists has said, that ' eloquence at first and last must still be at bottom a statement of facts. All audiences soon ask, " What is he driving at ? " and if this man does not stand for anything, he will be deserted.' And he will be deserted unless his hearers see the same facts stand firm in different lights. Matthew Arnold, says a writer in Scribner, had a re- pellent endowment of one kind of courage — * the courage of repeating yourself over and over again.' It is a sound forensic maxim — tell a judge twice whatever you want him to hear ; tell a special jury thrice, and a common jury half a dozen times, the view of a case you wish them to enter- tain. ' Mr Arnold treated the middle-class as a common jury, and addressed them with remorseless iteration.' In introducing a new topic to an auditory, it is well to repeat the main idea in different forms of expression, each in itself brief, but altogether affording an expansion of the sense to be conveyed, and detaining the mind upon it. It is given to well-calculated reiteration to accomplish that which is denied to power. The reputation of Robes- pierre — now breaking a little through clouds of calumny as dense and dark as ever obscured human name — is a strik- ing illustration of the omnipotence of repetition. The most eloquent of his vindicators has thus sketched his triumph : — ' Still deeper in the shade, and behind the chief of the National Assembly, a man almost unknown began to move. Agitated by uneasy thoughts, which seemed to forbid him to be silent, he spoke on all occasions, and attacked all speakers, indifferently, including Mirabeau himself. Driven from the tribune, he ascended it next day ; overwhelmed REPETITION A NECESSITV 1 33 with sarcasm, coughed down, disowned by all parties, lost amongst the eminent champions who fixed public attention, he was never dispirited. It might have been said, that an inward and prophetic genius revealed to him the omni- potence of a firm will and unwearied patience, and that an inward voice said to him, " These men who despise thee are thine : all the changes of this revolution, which now will not deign to look upon thee, will eventually terminate in thee, for thou hast placed thyself in the way like the inevitable excess in which all impulse ends." ' Robespierre had power of thought, distinction of person ; for, though a democrat, he was scrupulously careful of his dress and of his language, which was never mean or inexact. Had he not had unusual qualities, his pertinacity had done nothing for him. He had sunk into obscurity, or have been remembered only as an irrepressible fool. His relev- ance of thought, and his studied precision of expression, were the qualities which at last commanded attention. In his Historical Characters, Sir H. L. Bulwer (Lord Balling) remarks : — ' Napoleon complained of Talleyrand's repetitions, saying he could not conceive how people found M. de Talleyrand eloquent, " II tournait toujours sur la meme idee."' (He always turned round the same idea.) But this was a system with him, as with Fox, who laid it down as the great principle for an orator who wished to leave an impression. When the columns of the Times were crowded for five days with reports of the trial of Palmer of Rugeley, the lead- ing article upon it, on the sixth day, when the trial had ended, gave a reiterated account of the fat, rascally, horse- racing surgeon who poisoned Cook, an article which the busy man could understand, though he had never read a line of the reports. The article was like a Scotch house — self-contained. It was lighted up, as it were, by freshness of statement, still but a reflection of facts the readers had seen day by day, but could not recall in the same order or 134 PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE with the same effect. One object of repetition is to bring into view all that is necessary to present a complete case to auditor or reader. It is of no use listening to a speaker or reading an author, if you require first to hear or read some one else to understand him. Reiteration, without tiresomeness, is not only an advan- tage but a force. One who knew all things pertaining to the art of persuasion, wrote : — Truth can never be confirmed enough, Though doubt itself were dead. CHAPTER XXII SIGNS OF MASTERY Dr Black's test of mastery (cited in Chapter XX.) is excellent, though arduous. But one instance alone is not sufficient to impress the reader with the advantages of mastery and the signs thereof. A speaker, like an actor, is liable to the criticism of a casual hearing. The auditor who hears you but once may form an opinion of you for ever. Against this there is no protection but in acquiring such a mastery over your powers as to be able always to exert them well, and to impress a hearer, in some respect or other, at every appear- ance. He, therefore, who has a reputation to acquire or preserve, will keep silence whenever he is in danger of speaking indifferently. He will practise in private, and train himself so perseveringly, that perfection will become a second nature, and the power of proficiency never desert him. Those who think genius is an impulsive effort that costs nothing, little dream with what patience the profes- sional singer or actor observes regular habits and judicious exercise ; how he treasures all his strength and power for the hour of appearance. There must, of course, be natural power of personation in an actor, a fine voice in a singer, and that instinctive aptitude and capacity of excel- lence which men call genius, or no cultivation will produce more than talent. At the same time, the highest natural endowment of genius will spend itself without effect, and 1 35 136 PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE perish devoid of renown, unless application and study develop and mature it. The triumphs of application are as remarkable as the triumph of genius. One day, an acquaintance, in speaking of Curran's eloquence, happened to observe that it must have been born with him. ' " Indeed, my dear sir,'' replied Curran, " it was not ; it was born three-and-twenty years and some months after me. When I was at the Temple a few of us formed a little debating club. Upon the first night of meeting I attended, my foolish heart throbbing with the anticipated honour of being styled ' the learned member that opened the debate,' or ' the very eloquent gentleman who has just sat down,' I stood up — the question was the Catholic claims or the slave trade, I now forget which, but the difference, you know, was never very obvious — my mind was stored with about a folio volume of matter, but I wanted a preface, and for want of a preface the volume was never published. I stood up, trembling through every fibre ; but, remembering that in this I was but imitating TuUy, I took courage, and had actually proceeded as far as ' Mr Chairman,' when, to my astonishment and terror, I perceived that every eye was turned upon me. There were only six or seven persons present, and the room could not have contained as many more ; yet was it, to my panic-struck imagination, as if I were the central object in nature, and assembled miUions were gazing upon me in breathless expectation. I became dismayed and dumb. My friends cried ' Hear him ! ' but there was nothing to hear. My lips, indeed, went through the pantomime of articulation, but I was like the unfortunate fiddler at the fair, who, upon coming to strike up the solo that was to ravish every ear, discovered that an enemy had maliciously soaped his bow. So you see, sir, it was not born with me. However, though I was for the time silenced, I still attended our meetings with regularity, and even ventured SIGNS OF MASTERY 1 37 to accompany the others to a more ambitious theatre, the club at Temple Bar. One of them was on his legs ; a fellow of whom it was difficult to decide whether he was most distinguished for the dirtiness of his person or the flippancy of his tongue — just such another as Harry Flood would have called 'the highly-gifted gentleman with the dirty cravat and greasy pantaloons.' I found this learned personage in the act of calumniating chronology by the most preposterous anachronisms. He descanted upon Demosthenes, the glory of the Roman forum ; spoke of TuUy as the famous contemporary and rival of Cicero ; and, in the short space of one half-hour, transported the Straits of Marathon three several times to the plains of Thermopylae. Thinking I had a right to know something of these matters, I looked at him with surprise. When our eyes met, there was something like a wager of battle in mine ; upon which the erudite gentleman instantly changed his invective against antiquity into an invective against me, and concluded by a few words of friendly counsel to "orator mum, who, he doubted not, possessed wonderful talents for eloquence, although he would recommend him to show it in future by some more popular method than his silence." I followed his advice, and, I believe, not entirely without effect. So, sir, you see that to try the bird the spur must touch his blood.' But Curran had the blood of oratory in his veins, or the spur had pricked him in vain. The pretentious ignorance of the previous speaker afforded the very ' preface ' that Curran wanted to his volume. Many persons of real power of speech can never present themselves to an audience unless called upon or provoked by some egregious thing said, or incited by a sense of duty that something not said ought to be said. Then the effect will be accord- ing to the knowledge, capacity and practice of the speaker. Curran's defect in enunciation (at school he went by the 138 PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE cognomen of ' Stuttering Jack Curran') he corrected by a regular system of daily reading aloud, slowly, and with strict regard to pronunciation. His person was short, and his appearance ungraceful and without dignity. To over- come these disadvantages, he recited and studied his postures before a mirror, and adopted a method of gesticu- lation suited to his appearance. Besides a constant attend- ance at the debating clubs, he accustomed himself to extemporaneous eloquence in private, by proposing cases to himself, which he debated with the same care as if he had been addressing a jury. It was thus the great advocate won his self-possession and power. Professor de Morgan's rule was, when he wanted a pupil to work well seven places of decimals, to practise him in working fifteen. When Malibran was introduced to Rossini, as a girl of fourteen, by her father, Garcia, she having sung a cavatina, the grand maestro said : ' Practise, mademoiselle, and you must inevitably rise to the highest point of your profession.' Mr Vera Foster, an authority on copy-book art, remarks that * the grand secret in teaching writing is to bestow much attention upon a little variety. The necessity of a continued repetition of the same exercise till it can be executed with correctness, cannot be too strongly insisted on. But, as this reiteration is tedious for an age so fond of novelty as that of childhood, we should not keep too close to the maxim, and by a judicious intermixture of a few slightly differing forms, contrive to fix attention and to insure repetition.' ' The method of teaching anything to children,' says Locke, 'is by repeated practice, and the same action done over and over again until they have got the habit of doing it well, a method that has so many advantages, which ever way we come to consider it, that I wonder how it could possibly be so much neglected ; ' but it is better for children when there is variety in it as Pestalozzi proved. This rule of repetition is also true in elocution, for SIGNS OF MASTERY 1 39 on the verge of a new art men themselves are distrustful of their own powers. Mastery in any art can only come by practice. When Demosthenes was asked what was the secret of success on the platform, he is said to have answered : ' Action, action, action.' But action gives no power, and Dr Clair J. Grece must be right when contending that the answer of the great orator should be translated : ' Practice, practice, practice,' for there skill comes in. A man who wishes to speak well at a moment's notice should speak every night if he has an opportunity. Preachers and barristers speak better at will than other persons. In speaking, as one writer has observed, it has often been a matter of curious consideration, that a person will explain his views to a single individual in such terms as to force conviction in many instances, and where he fails the exposi- tion would be just such a one as would please an audience. At the same time it is notorious that what will not convince one or two will be effective on many persons; yet when he who can succeed in the more difficult task with one or two, when he comes before an audience he is abashed, and cannot utter two consecutive sentences with propriety, energy or sense. Nevertheless, this incapacity will vanish at once under a sense of duty. Paul says perfect love casteth out fear ; so does a sense of duty in speaking. But where the motive is not an incentive, there is no remedy for confusion of mind before an audience save practice and deliberation ; practice gives confidence, and deliberation gives capacity a chance of manifesting itself — provided the assembly is not too large for the com- pass of the speaker's voice. No man speaks with confi- dence who is not sure that he is heard. Whewell held that we are never master of anything till we do it both well and unconsciously. But there is no test of proficiency so instructive as that put by George Sand into the mouth of Porpora, in her novel of Consuelo. 140 PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE When Consuelo, on the occasion of a trial performance, manifests some apprehension as to the result, Porpora reminds her that if there is room in her mind for misgiving as to the judgment of others, it is a proof that she is not filled with the true love of art, which would so absorb her whole thoughts as to leave her insensible to the opinion of others, and if she distrusted her own powers, it was plain they were not yet matured powers, else they could not play her false. Mastery is manifest when we have no misgiving as to the trial of our attainments ; we are then rather anxious for the opportunity and confident as to the result. In George Eliot's Deronda there is the little Jewess who sings for the first time undismayed before a critical assembly met to judge her capacity. On being asked why she was so un- apprehensive, she answered to this effect, ' Because I knew what I could do, and because the audience, being well- informed, knew what I was doing, knew the difficulties I had overcome, and could appreciate what I did. I am never afraid of singing before those who know.' In the first Lord Lytton's day there was a fashionable figure in society whom everybody regarded as a ' superior person.' Chancing next day to call on Lord Durham, Lytton said, ' I spent six mortal hours with Lord Spraggles ' (the superior person), 'and I don't think there is much in him.' 'Good heavens!' exclaimed Lord Durham, ' how did you find that out ? Is it possible he could have — talked ? ' The superior person had mastered no- thing, and when he spoke it was apparent. CHAPTER XXIII NATURE AND CONDITIONS OF ORATORY A GREAT oration has a great subject stated in a great way ; it deals with large ideas in a large manner. Each orator of mark may move in a different orbit, but he is luminous in it, and shines by a hght which is his own. Mr Cobden com- manded attention by force of argument based on unnoticed facts. Mr Bright was volcanic, and suggested to landlords the danger of allowing explosive materials to accumulate under them. Mr Disraeli flashed with epigram and satire. Mr Gladstone is circumambient, compelHng conviction by considerations drawn from a larger field than any other man is able to survey. In each, newness of insight and force of statement are the qualities by which concurrence was won. No one in the House of Commons could ever tell whether Disraeli had sincerity — the key of all influence in oratory. Certainly he never gave anyone the impression that he had it. He charmed, he intimidated, but never convinced adversaries. As a clever writer in the Fort- nightly said : ' You feel that he has come from another world, and that he must be judged by the law of his domicile.' In one thing he was human ; he was, as Justin M'Carthy has said, 'master of the art of epithets.' In destroying any who stood in the way of the ascendency of himself, he had real passion. Had he had it in public affairs, he had moved the heart of the nation, and kept a HI 142 PUBLIC SPEAKING AND DEBATE lasting place there. What is it that wins for the orator public affection? It is the burning word of passion. It knows no high, no low, no rich, no poor, no citizen, no alien, no foreigner, no class, no colour. Savage and civilised, learned and illiterate (the accidents of condition) sink into insignificance when man speaks to humanity. The orator penetrates to the heart of the race. It was said of Mr Cowen in Parliament that he had the great qualities rare among orators, ' fire, colour and imagination.' He had also conviction, which alone wins adherents, or retains them when won. John Arthur Roebuck, whose own oratory in its coherence and cogency more resembled that of Demosthenes than any other orator of his day, says, in his History of the Whig Ministry atemost.er Buildings, London, E.G. T. FISHER UNW^IN, Publisher, NANCY NOON «T BENJAMIN SWIFT Second Edition. Cloth, GSt r Some Reviews on the First Edition. " ' Nancy Noon ' is perhaps the strongest book of the year, certainly by far the strongest book which has been published by any new writer Mr. Swift contrives to keep his Dook from end to end real, passionate, even intense, ... If Mr. Meredith had never written, one would have predicted, with tlie utmost confidence, a great future for Mr. Benjamin Swift, and even as it is I have hopes." — Sketch. " Certainly a promising first effort." — Whitehall Review. " If ' Nancy Noon ' be Mr. Swift's first book, it is a success of an uncommon kind." — Dundee Advertiser. " ' Nancy Noon ' is one of the most remarkable novels of the year, and the author, avowedly a beginner, has succeeded in gaining a high position in the ranks of contemporary writers All his characters are delightful. In the heat of sensational incidents or droll scenes we stumble on observations that set us reflecting, and but for an occasional roughness of style — elliptical, Carlyle mannerisms — the whole is admirably written." — Westminster Gazette. "Mr. Swift has the creative touch and a spark of genius." — Manchester Guardian. "Mr. Swift has held us interested from the first to the last page of his novel."— World. "The writer of 'Nancy Noon' has succeeded in presenting a powerfully written and thoroughly interesting story." — Scotsman, " We are bound to admit that the story interested us all through, that it absorbed us towards the end, and that not until the last page had been read did we find it possible to lay the book down." — Daily Chronicle. " It is a very strong book, very vividly coloured, very fascinating in its style, very compelling in its claim on the attention, and not at all likely to be soon forgotten."— fir«7«/» Weekly. *"^ " A clever book The situations and ensuing complications are dra- matic, and are handled with originality and daring throughout." — Daily News. "Mr. Benjamin Swift has written a vastly entertaining book." — Academy. 11. Paternoster Buildings, London, E.G. T. FISHER UN WIN, Publisher, A DAUGHTER OF THE FEN J. T. BEALBY Second Edition. Crown %vo., cloth, 6s. "It will deserve notice at the hands ot such as are interested in the ways and manner of living of a curious race that has ceased to be." Daily Chronicle. " For a first book ' A Daughter of the Fen ' is full of promise." — Academy. " This book deserves to be read for its extremely interesting account of life in the Fens and for its splendid character study of Mme. Dykereave." " Deserves high praise." — Scotsman. [Star. " It is an able, interesting .... an exciting book, and is well worth reading. And when once taken up it will be difficult to lay it down." IVesiminster Gazette j IN A MAN'S MIND JOHN REAY WATSON Crown 2>vo, cloth, 6s. "We regard the book as well worth the effort of reading." — British " The book is clever, very clever." — Dundee Advertiser. [Review. " The power and pathos of the book are undeniable." — Liverpool Post. " It is a book of some promise." — Newsagent. "Mr. Watson has hardly a rival among Australian writers, past or present. There is real power in the book — power of insight, power of reflection, power of analysis, power of presentation. . . . 'Tis a very well made book — not a set of independent episodes strung on the thread of a name or two, but closely interwoven to the climax." Sydney Bulletin. 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