f"«r ^<^--\ I A '11/ UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO 3 1822 02584 1974 ? BRARY K'VERSITY OP ^•*»- s v lilll)iri'ain?.^n9^LIF0RNIA, SAN DIEGO 3 1822 02584 1974 ■4 ^ i\ ■:,i DIPLOMATIC REMINISCENCES DIPLOMATIC REMINISCENCES BEFORE AND DURING THE WORLD WAR, 1.911 — 1917 BY A: NEKLUDOFF - ) FORMERLY RUSSIAN MINISTER AT SOFIA AND AT STOCKHOLM AND AMBASSADOR AT MADRID TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH BY ALEXANDRA PAGET NEW YORK E. P. BUTTON AND COMPANY 1920 PREFACE My Diplomatic Reminiscences include the period between February, 191 1, when I was appointed Russian Minister to Sofia, and September, 1917, when I put an end to my ephemeral term of office in Madrid by refusing my further services to M. Kerensky's Government. The first fourteen chapters deal with my work in Bulgaria and with the two Balkan Wars, that of 1912 and that of 1913, which form the prelude to the catastrophe of 1914. The succeeding chapters have to do with Sweden, with the World-War and with the Russian Revolution as I saw them from my post in Stockholm. In my Reminiscences I describe what came under my notice, not disdaining small touches ; I note what I was able to gather ; but as by virtue of my diplomatic position my range of vision and my information were limited, 1 in no way aspire to explain the whole of the great drama which has just been performed. Moreover, circumstances have obliged me to compile my work far awa}'' from sources at which I might have refreshed and verified m}' impressions,^ and consequently there are a few inevitable gaps in the narrative, probably also a few inexactitudes and some errors in dates. I tender my apologies beforehand to the reader for these involuntary errata, and I leave them to become the prey of those who might wish to profit b}'- them to invalidate my testimony when this testimony does not suit them. ^ My Reminiscences were written at Nice between June, 1918, and July, 1919. f> vi PREFACE Nevertheless I venture to cherish the hope that the faithful description of what I have been enabled to see, to hear and to know, and even the judgments that I pass — in all sincerity — on men and matters, will form a contribution to the study of those events which have destroyed an entire world, and which are inaugurating a new and unknown order of things. This order of things is greeted by some with ecstasy ; others view it with terror ; others again hope to exploit it to their own advantage or to that of their old moral and political conceptions which they are striving to disguise as best they can. I prefer to confess at once that— although sincerely deploring the disappearance of a world to which I was bound by my former habits, my mentality and my work — I do not suffer from any illusion as to the possible return of this old world, of this ancient order of things. And more especially must I realise this where it is a question of Russia and of her future destinies. All of us who have taken an active part in the tremendous events which have just occurred, belong to an irrevocable past, and history is already preparing to engrave our final sentence on its tables of bronze. That is why — contrary to established custom — I have allowed myself, in the course of these Reminis- cences, to judge my contemporaries with complete frankness, and to say all I think about them and the part they have played, when I have observed them, heard them or seen them act. And the dead — I bury my dead as my conscience dictates : To some — the pomp of a national funeral, the mournful chants of Melpomene, the fumes of incense and of smouldering torches ; to others — the modest procession of relatives and a few friends ; to others again — the felon's end. A. N. Feb. 1 6, 1920. CONTENTS CHAPTER I MY APPOINTMENT TO SOFIA PAGES My former relations with M. SazonolT — Scheme for a Russo-Bulgarian military convention — Question of relations with King Ferdinand — Audience of the Emperor ; H.I.M. gives me his instructions — Serious illness of M. SazonolT — I leave for Sofia ...... i-6 CHAPTER n KING FERDINAND OF BULGARIA His youth ; his sudden rise to power — First years of his reign — His recon- ciliation with Russia — Relations between the King and the people ; the King's janizaries — Moral and political portrait of Ferdinand ; his distrust ; his irresolution ....... 7~IS CHAPTER in BULGARIA IN 191I My audience of the King — Fall of the Malinov Cabinet ; its antecedents — The Turkish Revolution of 1908 — The crisis of the annexation of Bosnia ; complete independence of Bulgaria ; we favour the new King- dom in the settlement of the crisis — Ulterior Bulgarian ambitions dictate the formation of a new Nationalist and essentially Russophile Cabinet .......... 16-24 CHAPTER IV RUSSIAN AND BULGARIAN RELATIONS M. John Gueshov — M. Todorov — M. Danev ; my first conversation with him — My relations with Gueshov — The Great Sobrattji of Tirnova in June, 191 1 — Visit to Russia of the Crown-Prince Boris ; matrimonial schemes — Death of M. Stolypin ; his characteristics ; influence of his disappearance on the foreign policy of Russia — Visit of the Russian Squadron to Varna — Outbreak of the Italo-Turkish war . . 25-37 CHAPTER V SERBO-BULGARIAN RELATIONS Serbo-Bulgarian relations ; the Bulgarians enter on fresh parleyings with the Serbians — Historical statement of Russian action with regard to the Serbians and Bulgarians — My journey to Davos — An unexpected meeting — Conversation with M. Sazonoff — Return by Belgrade ; con- versation with M. Hartwig; characteristics of the latter . . S^^S^ viii CONTENTS CHAPTER VI THE SERBO-nULGARIAN TREATY pages Scrbo-Bulgarian negotiations — Demarcation of the " spliercs of influence " in Macedonia — Fixing boundaries — Conversations with the King — I warn St. Petersburg of the dangers which might result from a Scrbo- Bulgarian alliance — The alliance is concluded with our approval — Festivities for the coming-of-age of Prince Boris — Personal service rendered to King Ferdinand by H.I.M. the Emperor — Audience of the King before my departure for St. Petersburg — Ferdinand's perplexities and suspicions ......... 52-66 CHAPTER VII RASPUTIN Arrival in St. Petersburg ; violent speech by M. Gutchkoff at the Duma — Rasputin ; his peculiarities become a subject for scandal ; his influence — Mile. Tutcheff" — Audience of II. I. M. the Emperor — The Empress Alexandra spends an afternoon in St. Petersburg — Conversation with General Jilinsky, the Chief of the General Staff — Conversations with MM. Kokovtzoff^ and Gutchkoff; drawing-room gossip — Reception at the Sazonoffs' ; the " Rasputin crisis " is successfully settled — I return to Sofia 67-81 CHAPTER VIII INTRIGUES AT SOFIA Bulgarian "activist" party; M. Danev's journey to Russia — Colonel Merrone — Italian military circles know of the Serbo-Bulgarian agree- ment — Intrigues directed against me ; I fall into disfavour with Ferdinand ; the King's candidates for my post ; M. Rizov enters the arena — King Ferdinard's Policy — My reconciliation with the King — Rumours of my recall — ^Journey to Constantinople ; conversations with M. de Giers and with General Holmsen ; their opinion of the Turkish Army — Political ferment in Sofia and Belgrade ; my telegram of the 4th July ; my warning disregarded ; Kotchana and Ishtib incidents — M. Gutchkoff in Sofia and Belgrade — Prince Alexander goes to inspect the army — The Schipka Veterans' Fete; "it is war!" — M. de Giers warns Bulgaria — Europe does not believe it — Jubilee for the twenty- five years' reign of Ferdinand — M. Sazonoffs apathy . . 82-107 CHAPTER IX THE BALKAN WAR, I912 Mobilisation of the Balkan allies ; futile protests of the Cabinets ; war breaks out — First decisive successes of the Allies — Lozengrad taken — Greco-Bulgarian incident at Salonika — Victory of Lule-Burgas ; Bulgarians and Greeks at Salonika ; torrential rains alone stop the Bulgarian advance — King Ferdinand's elation ; his inordinate ambition ; his dreams — Reverse of Chataldja — In St. Petersburg the question of the " prohibited area " in Thrace is raised ; I succeed in causing this prohibition to be removed — Russian concessions — Ferdinand wishes to have Rodosto at any cost — General Radko-Dmitriev's mission to St. Petersburg — The Bulgarians allow the propitious moment for the con- clusion of peace to escape ....... 10S-113 CONTENTS ix CHAPTER X THE BALKAN WAR, 1912 {continued) pages The Serbians, having to renounce an outlet to the Adriatic, demand com- pensations in Macedonia — My conversations on the subject with my Serbian colleague — Serbian claims — Msit of M. Venizelos to Sofia ; our conversation — My advice to Gueshov ; his powerlessness — Two meetings with Ferdinand ; the French Minister's audience of the King ; The German Minister's audience — Bulgaro-Rumanian relations ; the Dobrudja — Russo-Rumanian relations ; M. Rosetti-Solesco ; our representatives at Bukharest ; succeeded by M. Nicolas Schebeko ; jubilee of the annexation of Bessarabia ; commencement of the Russo- Rumanian intimacy — Rectification of the Dobrudja frontier in favour of Rumania .......... 132-153 CHAPTER XI QUARRELS BETWEEN THE ALLIES ' Capture of Adrianople — Quarrels with the Serbians — Bulgarian cruelties ; the character of the Bulgarian people is a product of their history — I advocate the creation of a small autonomous State, embracing those parts of Macedonia which the Balkan Allies are contesting — Emperor Alexander II. 's letter to Prince Alexander — My suggestion rejected — Idea of an Anti-Bulgarian league ; this idea is carried out owing to the Bulgarian faults ; the Serbo-Greek alliance is concluded — The Press in St. Petersburg is against the Bulgarians — I am ordered to preach con- ciliation to them — Madame Karavelov ; scene in the military hospital in Sofia — Peace signed in London — Interview between Gueshov and Pachitch — My Serbian colleague and I begin to hope — The Emperor of Russia offers himself as mediator ; telegrams exchanged — Conflict in Sofia about the Russian proposal — King Ferdinand's telegram attri- buted falsely to me — Greece and Serbia continue to arm — Bulgaria suggests a time limit —Satisfactory outlook .... IS4~^7S CHAPTER XH BULGARIA ATTACKS HER ALLIES Danev's return spoils everything — Warlike preparations — An earthquake — Gueshov leaves the Cabinet ; Danev remains alone at the 'head — The King holds a Council ; our mediation is accepted ; I entreat Danev to start at once for St. Petersburg — The Bulgarians treacherously attack the Serbians — The shameful underhand play — War begins — Soldiers refuse obedience — The Bulgarians beaten by the Greeks and by the Serbians ; my advice to Danev ; Mission of General Paprikov and Colonel Romanowski ; the Rumanian Aimy enters Bulgaria and approaches Sofia ; the Turks return to Adrianople — Fall of the Danev Ministry — Collapse of Bulgarian Army — The King summons the foreign representatives ; a ridiculous conference — Russian influence — The Bulgarians forced to conclude the Peace of Bukharest . 176-202 CHAPTER XHI THE PEACE OF BUKHAREST Comparison of the conditions of the Peace of London (May, 1913) with those of the Peace of Bukharest (September, 1913) — The question of Mount Athos; the " Monte Santo" and its customs; the Russian cenobites — Nature of the Treaty — Sacrifices imposed on Bulgaria at CONTENTS I'AGES Bukharesl — The Turks keep Adrianople and Eastern Thrace ; enor- mous signification of this restitution — Diplomatic influences — We do not insist on tlie autonomy of Mount Athos — Pan-Germans at work — Disquieting situation in Sofia — Why Ferdinand's power was not wrecked — Solemn reception of the Bulgarian troops on their return to Sofia — I am intended for the post of Stockholm . . . 203-219 CHAPTER XIV MY TRANSFER TO STOCKHOLM Departure from Sofia for Paris — Bad omen — Arrival in Paris ; conversation with M. Sazonoff — The Grand-Duchess Marie's divorce — The Russians enjoy themselves wildly — M, Kokovtzoff in Paris — I go to the Crimea — General Dedulin's death — General Dumbadze — Rasputin again — Audience and luncheon at Livadia ; I give the Emperor a detailed report — Journey to Sofia and farewell audience of the King and Queen — St. Petersburg in February, 1914 ; " balls and festivities " ; very serious conversations during the parties — Count Witte — Prince Alexander of Serbia — M, Kokovtzoff out of office — M. Goremykin — Conversation with M. Zinovieff, our former Ambassador to Constanti- nople — The "young people" continue to be optimistic — I leave for Stockholm .......... 220-245 CHAPTER XV SWEDEN IN 1 9 14 Three ;centuries of Swedish history — Gustaf III. — Struggles with Russia — Change of dynasty — New aspect of Sweden — Union with Norway — The people and their qualities — Sweden's prosperity — The Spaniards of the North — French influence replaced by German influence — Reasons for this change — The Bernadottes — King Oscar II. and German influences — Prince Max of Baden — German intrigues — Russian aspira- tions — The Anti-Russian current — Sven-Hedin — The Bondestog — Change of Ministry — Political situation in March, 1914 . . 246-267 CHAPTER XVI ON THE EVE OF WAR Solemn audience of King Gustaf V. — "Do not judge Sovereigns too harshly ! " — Queen Victoria — The Royal Family — Interesting conver- sation with M. Wallenberg ; I draw erroneous conclusions — My foreign colleagues — Mr. Howard — M. Thiebaud — Baltic exhibition at Malmo — The Riksdag " of national defence " — Alarming symptoms every- where — Our incomprehensible calmness — M. Sverbeieff in Berlin — Our Ambassadors in Berlin and Vienna — Count Osten-Sacken's warn- ings — M. Schebeko in Vienna — Precarious situation in Russia — The assassination at Serajevo — Another trip to Malmo ; Count Brock- dorf-Rantzau — Delightful expedition ; a bad fairy overhears me — The Austrian ultimatum to Serbia 268-288 CONTENTS xi CHAPTER XVII THE TRAGIC WEEK pages The tragic week — President Poincare's arrival — Banquet at the Palace — M, Poincare's advice — "The torch of Bellona" — Germans determined on war — Last conversation with my German colleague, Reichenau ; "the war will kill the monarchical principle" — Duties of a monarch — Colonel Kandauroft's tidings — The Emperor Nicolas wishes to avoid war at all costs — Deep emotion in Sweden — I suggest, if neces- sary, energetic action in Bulgaria — War is declared — " Let us drain the cup to the dregs " ......,, 289-305 CHAPTER XVIII SWEDISH NEUTRALITY What will Sweden do? — Audience of the King ; reassuring words of H,M. — France and England offer guarantees to Sweden — We associate our- selves with this declaration — Neutrality of Sweden ; pacificist sentiments of most of the country — England's decision — Russians fleeing from Germany inundate Stockholm ; tragico-comic scenes — Refugees of note — Our Ambassador arrives from Berlin — Generous hospitality of the Swedes — Tales of German brutality — First events of the war ; Russian reverses ; the luck turns ; the Marne victory ; German propa- ganda — Our advance in Galicia — Grand-Duke Nicolas' Manifesto on the subject of Poland — Decisive hour for the Empire of the Hapsburgs — Aims of Russian diplomacy — Neither Austria nor Russia profit by this hour — Our mistakes in Galicia — Turkey enters the war — In spite of the agitation of Germanophiles and Activists, the absolute-neutrality party gains ground in Sweden — Interview of the three Scandinavian Monarchs .......... 306-331 CHAPTER XIX SWEDEN IN 1 915 Economic situation of Sweden during the war — Temporary prosperity — The hold over Sweden possessed by the Entente Powers on one side (the grip of the Entente) and by Germany on the other — Causes of the economic influence of Germany — A strange tangle — Perfect co-opera- tion of the Entente representatives in Stockholm — Baron von Lucius ; intrigues of the German Legation — My official attitude — Decrease in Swedish hostility to Russia ; the Murman railway ; the Straits ; the case of M. Perrichon — I wish to build for the future — Finland for Sweden — Russian reverses in 191 5 encourage Sven-Hedin afresh — German peace proposals — The Yul-Klappor and Swedish indignation — Prince Gortchakoff and M. de Giers — The understanding between the three Scandinavian countries counter-balances the efforts of the Activists — The question of the Aland Islands ..... 332-357 CHAPTER XX WAR SUFFERERS The Russians in Sweden during the war — The Russian committee of bene- volence — Prisoners' correspondence — The Duke of Amalfi and the splendid work of the Spanish Legation — The Y.M.C.A. — Treatment of prisoners of war in Germany — Conference of the Red Cross repre- sentatives in Stockholm, and improvement resulting from it — The ambulance trains — Humanity of the Swedes — Touching scenes ; a xii CONTENTS PACKS strange people ; odi et amo ; an epic hero — An old acquaintance re- appears — Ferreting out a secret — Russian official personages pass through Sweden — M. Peter Struve — The Poles — The Lithuanians and Lithuania— M. Itchas — Other typically Russian silhouettes . 358-384 CHAPTER XXI A VISIT TO PETKOGRAD I go to Petrograd — Conversation with Sazonoff — General Polivanoff's opinion as to Rumanian help — Rumania's difficult position — I see my successor in Sofia again ; M. Savinsky on Balkan affairs ; what he tells me and what he does not tell mc — RI. Stiirnier appointed President of the Council — The Emperor present at the Duma — Prince N. Galilzyn — Prince Alexander of Oldenburg — M. Alexis Neidhart and the " Moderates " — Audience of the Emperor — The Grand-Duke Paul and his family — Audiences of the Empress Alexandra and the Dowager Empress — The Grand-Duke Nicolas Mikhailovitch — Impressions of my visit — Misgivings in political and Government circles — In popular circles — Mutterings of revolution — German machinations — The Ger- mans increase their efforts to bring about a revolution in Russia , 385-410 CHAPTER XXII EVIL OMENS IN PETROGRAD Return to Stockholm — Audience of the King — Russian " parliamentarians " pass through Stockholm ; I make Protopopoff's acquaintance — The Swedish Activists raise the Aland question — Wallenberg's wise and clever policy — M. Branting — All is serene — Bad news from Petrograd ; Sturmer, Rasputin, the Empress Alexandra — The Empress at General Headquarters; idyll and tragedy; JNL Odier ; prophetic verses — Brussiloff's offensive — M. Protopopoff and the Polaks — -Protopopoff's talks with M. Warburg — M. Pokrovsky — The rest of the parliamentary delegation returns by Stockholm — M. Schingareff — Russo-Swedish banquet — Baron Rosen — Count S. Wielopolski — Operations in Galicia — Sturmer replaces Sazonoff — Sazonoff- — A subaltern of the Guards has done his whole duty ; painful journey to Petrograd — Conversations with Sazonoff; a band of malefactors — Count Wielopolski with Proto- popoff — I call on Stiirmer — Sazonoft's minute on the Polish question — • The Rumanians come into the war — Odious impressions of Petrograd 411-443 CHAPTER XXIII RUSSIA IN DECLINE Return to Stockholm — Bad turn of affairs on the Rumanian front — Ferment and disorder in Russia — Protopopoff", Home Secretary ; his vagaries ; his madness — Prince Nicolas of Greece goes to Russia — I expect to leave my post — Fall of Stiirmer ; succeeded by M. Trepoff — I retain my post — The Protopopoff-Warburg incident begins to agitate t'ne Russian public — I emphatically contradict the Home Secretary — The Minister for Foreign Affairs has again a perfectly honest man in view — Intense agitation in all grades of Russian society — Murder of Rasputin — ProtopopofPs increasing influence — The Trepoff Ministry is of short duration — The situation becomes worse— Protopopoff and an American spiritist — Rizov arrives from Berlin to talk to me ; his curious prophecy — " The Emperor must go " and a great illusion — The Revolution breaks out and triumphs — Every one is happy and content — I adhere to the Provisional Government ....... 444-468 CONTENTS xiii CHAPTER XXIV REVOLUTION PAGES The Hindu fakir ; a theory of suggestion — The Revolution relieves the conscience of our Allies and reassures them — Illusions — First alarming revelations — Report of a Danish eye-witness — The Prikase No. I — The real origin of those March days ; the real situation in Russia — A tragic dialogue — The Soviets supreme — Political exiles return to Russia — Prince Kropotkin — " Madam demands her whole paraphernalia" — A revolutionist of the old stamp — Early memories of Moscow — Bolsheviks — An Armenian throws off his mask — Some dancers — The army of treachery — Lenin and Trotsky pass into Russia — M. Keskula states the Esthonian case — I am appointed Ambassador to Madrid — Ead news from Petrograd — M. Kerensky, Dictator — His praiseworthy efforts — Increasing dissolution — I leave Stockholm with a heavy heart and scant hopes for the future ...... 469-498 CHAPTER XXV IN SPAIN AND IN EXILE Journey from Stockholm to Paris — Brief revival of hopes and illusions — Solemn reception of an Ambassador in Madrid — Stately ceremonies — Generous step of King Alfonso XIII. — Two Queens — Reception by the Marquis de Lema and M. Dato — Sad reflections — My colleagues — Bird's-eye view of Spain — Grievous news from Russia — I reconsider my position — ^Journey to Paris ; I am disgusted with all I see and hear — I return to San Sebastian and send in my resignation to Kerensky — Letter to M. Terestchenko — A well-advised counsellor — I go into exile ........... 499-521 Index 523-541 DIPLOMATIC REMINISCENCES CHAPTER I MY APPOINTMENT TO SOFIA I WAS on leave in St. Petersburg in January, 1911, when the news arrived there, first of the serious illness, and then of the death, of M. Sementovsky, Russian Minister in Sofia. Having been for more than six years Counsellor to the Embassy in Paris, I had an indisputable right to pro- motion, and having spent seventeen years as secretary in Sofia, Constantinople and Belgrade, my professional antecedents seemed to entitle me to one of the Balkan posts. My appointment was talked of all over the town and at the Foreign Office. I therefore was not surprised when a few days after M. Sementovsky's death, M. Sazonoff, who had only been Minister for Foreign Affairs for three months, sent for me, and informed me that my appointment to Sofia had just received the Emperor's approval, and that I was to prepare to take up my post almost immediately. I had been acquainted with M. Sazonoff for some time, but it was only in Paris that I enjoyed the privilege of seeing him frequently and of discussing political affairs with him. In June, 1904, we had both been raised on the same day to the dignity of Counsellors : he to the Embassy in London and I to the Embassy in Paris. M. Sazonoff remained in London three years; in 1907 he was appointed Minister to the Holy See, and in 1909 assistant to the Minister in St. Petersburg. During his 2 MY APPOINTMENT TO SOFIA [chap. i. lime in London he often came to Paris; times were strenuous and interesting : first the Japanese war and the Treaty of Portsmouth ; followed immediately by the first Russian Revolution, with Dumas succeeding one another and ending in the Stolypin regime, which appeared to quell the great tumult ; finally, the Russo- British Entente. All this gave rise to much interchange of opinions and ideas between two close colleagues. These meetings in Paris cemented a certain intellectual intimacy between us, and later on when M. Sazonoff became assistant to M. Isvolsky, I often had the satis- faction of noticing that he still took an interest in my opinions. In announcing my appointment to me, M. Sazonoff said, amongst other things, that I was going to Sofia at a particularly interesting moment : King Ferdinand appeared to be directing his policy more and more towards Russian sympathies and designs, and his Government — composed of Radicals with Malinov at their head — proposed to us to conclude a military con- vention. This was a matter for mature deliberation, and the Minister was confident that my knowledge of Balkan affairs would enable me to study the proposal and to give my advice on the expediency of such negotiations. He advised me to try and be on good terms with Ferdinand, who had the reputation of being very dis- trustful and unreliable in his dealings with foreign representatives, especially the Russian ones. My pre- decessor had achieved notable success in this respect. In 1909, at the outset of M. Sementovsky's term of office. King Ferdinand, on arriving in St. Petersburg, had tried to get rid of the new Russian Minister, and to secure the appointment to Sofia of some person belong- ing to the smartest society in St. Petersburg. But the Ministry, in the offices of which Sementovsky had spent all his career, not being willing to part with him, Ferdinand made haste to be reconciled with a repre- sentative who he felt was well supported, and then tried i9ii] KING FERDINAND 3 to attract him, to make him, if possible, the instrument of his political designs concerning Russia. It was just in the midst of these favours, always very uncertain, that the Russian Minister fell ill and died, furnishing the King with an opportunity of displaying his grief by spectacular funeral ceremonies, which were to serve as a proof of his Russophile sentiments. Although I had no intention of having recourse to such extreme measures in order to collect proofs of royal good-will, yet I entirely shared the Minister's point of view as to the necessity of establishing — infer vivos — good personal relations with King Ferdinand. One may have had a lurking feeling of distrust for him, but it was all-important that this should not be perceived by the public of Sofia, which is strongly addicted to intrigue and feverishly busy with political tittle-tattle. I had been a witness at the outset of my career of the troubles and disappointments undergone by Russian policy through the attitude which we had taken up with regard to the first Prince of Bulgaria, Alexander of Battenberg. In the very midst of the reaction prevailing in Russia in the eighties, we had vehemently supported the grievances of the Bulgarian Radical party against the absolutist inclinations of the young Prince of Hesse ; we ended by quarrelling completely with him and with the Bulgarian Radicals ; we succeeded in bringing about the downfall of the Prince, but only in order to deliver the country over to the Stamboulovists, to give birth in Bulgaria to an entirely Russophobe party, and finally to end in the kingship of Ferdinand of Coburg! He was far more dangerous and a thousand times more crafty than Battenberg, and yet we began to flatter him, after having heaped insults and contempt upon him for years ! Certainly, I should not allow myself to fall into the same mistakes again; I said as much quite frankly to M. Sazonoff, who agreed entirely with my point of view. A few days later I received an audience of H.I.M. the Emperor. My reception was a particularly gracious B 4 MY APPOINTMENT TO SOFIA [ciiAr. i. one, and the Emperor enumerated with me the principal points of my programme of procedure in Bulgaria— a programme which had been previously drawn up in my conversations with M. Sazonoff : the question of relations to the King, the Macedonian question, that of the relations between the Bulgarians and the Serbians, which one would wish to improve above all things, and finally the question of the military convention pro- posed by the Bulgarians. I noticed, however, that the Emperor appeared to slur over this last point and not to attach so much importance to it as Sazonoff did. Since my appointment to Paris, I had several times had business interviews with His Majesty, of course only on matters coming within my sphere. Each time I had carried away the impression of great kindness and extreme personal politeness, of a ready and subtle wit slightly tinged with sarcasm, and of a very quick though somewhat superficial mind. When I wished my august questioner to give an opinion on such and such a subject, I tried to bring the conversation round to it. In this case the Emperor would seize the opportunity — if he wished to — and pass in an almost imperceptible manner and as if on his own initiative to the subject in hand ; if he did not wish to give an opinion, he allowed my allusion to pass unnoticed, showing plainly, however, that he had understood it, but that he did not intend to commit himself On this, as on former occasions, the Emperor displayed the same qualities in our interview. He was obviously well prepared for the discussion, and finally gave me some general instructions which were fairly definite. He spoke in his usual urbane manner, and whilst giving instructions which were really orders, only appeared to be airing his opinions. Once only in the course of the interview did the Emperor assume a solemn and dictatorial manner; after an intentional pause, stepping backwards and fixing me with a penetrating stare, he said: "Listen to me, Nekludoff : do not for one instant lose sight of the fact that we cannot go to war. I do not wish for war as 19"] M. SAZONOFFS ILLNESS 5 a rule; I shall do all in my power to preserve for my people the benefits of peace. But at this moment, of all moments, everything which might lead to war must be avoided. It would be out of the question for us to face a war for five or six years, in fact till 1917. . . . Though if the most vital interests and the honour of Russia were at stake, we might, if it were absolutely necessary, accept a challenge in 191 5, but not a moment sooner — in any circumstances or under any pretext whatsoever! Do you quite understand me ? " I replied promptly that I had assimilated the royal instructions, that I understood the situation perfectly, and that during my time as Minister, I should not ignore for one instant the orders I had just received. On this His Majesty resumed his light, good- natured manner, and dismissed me, after a short con- versation. A few days after my interview at Tsarskoe-Selo, M. Sazonoff was suddenly taken ill with septic inflam- mation of the throat which afterwards attacked his lungs. A fortnight later, as I was leaving for Sofia, the illness was already considered to be serious. During the month of March the Minister's condition became so bad that the doctors hastily dispatched him to Davos, and society in St Petersburg was already taking an inordinate interest in the question of a successor. However, no appoint- ment was made. Stolypin, still fairly powerful, did not wish to abandon the hope that M. Sazonoff, his brother- in-law and friend, would recover and return to his post. This hope was realised. After a stay of a few months at Davos and a very serious operation, the invalid's state of health improved to such an extent that in December he was able to return to St. Petersburg to resume the direction of his Ministry which during his absence had been in the hands of his assistant, M. Neratoff, who had just been promoted to this important post. Such a pro- longed absence of M, Sazonoffs — coming, too, at the time when he was assuming the direction of affairs — 6 MY APPOINTMENT TO SOFIA [chap. i. could not but be prejudicial to the foreign policy of Russia. At the end of Februar}^ I left St. Petersburg, vid Vienna, and on the 17th of March, at a solemn audience, I presented my credentials to King Ferdinand of Bulgaria. % CHAPTER II KING FERDINAND OF BULGARIA Ferdinand of Coburg was then in the twenty-fourth year of his reign. This scion of two races, the Coburgs and the Orleans, who had played a distinguished part in the great events of the eighteenth and of the first half of the nineteenth century, had begun life under circum- stances which did not enable one to form an}^ idea of his ultimate destiny. Son of a father who was almost a nonentity and of a mother who was as intelligent as she was ambitious (that famous ambition of the Orleans ! ), the young Prince Ferdinand of Coburg, youngest son and Benjamin of the family, very much spoilt by his mother but also carefully educated under her super- vision, cut rather a strange figure at the Austrian Court and in high Viennese society. Remarks were made about his Bourbon nose, and every one laughed at his effeminate manner, his exaggerated elegance, and his love for jewels and knick-knacks ; he was supposed to possess inclinations which harmonised with his appear- ance and manner. In a set which only cared for hunting, riding, the society of light and frivolous women, and was only interested in the life in cavalry regiments, — the re- finement and intellectual affectation of young Ferdinand, his pretty speeches, his hatred of riding and all sport, his learning even, served as a butt for the laughter and sarcasms of the young archdukes and grand-dukes. Moreover, he did not possess the gift of making himself liked. His sly and suspicious expression prejudiced people against him. The more he became aware of his unpopularity, the more did he secretly indulge in veno- mous and bitter thoughts, and yet nurse in his heart 8 KING FERDINAND [chap. ii. ambitions and schemes which would have evoked shrieks of laughter if he had ever dared to disclose them. It was only from his mother that he got encouragement and sympathy. And she was the only being that he ever really loved, and who had any influence over him. From the day of Princess Clementine's death, a void was created in Ferdinand's heart which nothing could ever fill. On the abdication of Prince Alexander of Battenberg, the European diplomatic world was astonished at the proceedings of the young Prince of Saxe-Coburg, who presented himself as a candidate. The Courts laughed — ours especially, although Prince Lobanoff, our Am- bassador in Vienna and an intimate friend of Princess Clementine's, had upheld to a certain extent the ambi- tions of young Ferdinand, whom he represented in his dispatches as possessing far more personality than public opinion would have supposed. In Vienna they were certainly glad to have at hand some one of no importance who would be willing to embark on the venture ; if he failed, it would not be a serious rebuff for Austrian policy ; if he succeeded,— then there would be at the head of Bulgaria a Catholic prince, related to the Austrian Royal Family, and naturally prejudiced against Russia, who at this very moment was declaring his election and installation in Bulgaria to be illegal. We are all acquainted with the beginning of Prince Ferdinand's reign and his complete effacement before Stamboulov's omnipotence. We know of his marriage with a princess of Bourbon-Parma — a young lady en- dowed with neither beauty nor health, but whose intelligence and high moral qualities were indisputable. She had a true affection for her husband, who finally re- ciprocated it a little and who even deigned occasionally to take her advice. The people around her loved her, and even in her new country she succeeded in making herself liked. But Princess Marie-Louise's virtues were not suffi- cient in themselves to uphold the tottering throne of the i9ii] RECONCILIATION WITH RUSSIA g Prince. Ferdinand felt that the dictatorship of Stam- boulov could not last long, that the country was tired of it, that plots would multiply, and that if he himself did not forsake the dictator in good time, the downfall of the latter would inevitably entail his own, and per- haps even involve him and his family in a sanguinary catastrophe. At this moment the change of regime in Russia, followed by the appointment of Prince Lobanoff as Minister for Foreign Affairs, opened up to Ferdinand vistas of salvation. By the interposition of Serge Tatischeff, a publicist of great talent and an ex-diplomat, confidential conferences took place between Lobanoff and the Prince of Bulgaria. They led to startling events : the resignation of Stamboulov ; the reception of the eldest son and heir of the Prince — who had been baptised as a Catholic — into the pale of the Orthodox Church ; and the reconciliation of the Prince with Russia. There is an old fairy-tale in which an un- natural lady in a castle, in order to preserve her youth and beauty for ever, allows a horrible witch to plunge her child at midnight into water which has been cursed, and to turn him thereby into a were-wolf Those who are acquainted with the feelings of the old Catholic families of Austria and Italy can readily understand that to all Ferdinand's relations— and especially to his wife— the deed which he had committed with regard to his child was almost equivalent to the infernal baptism in the fairy-tale. He was selling the soul of his innocent child in order to keep his throne. He himself was for ever after haunted by feelings of shame and superstitious terror ; and he never forgave Russia for this sacrifice which he had been obliged to make to our political and religious exigencies. Ferdinand has never been beloved by his people, whom he hated and despised. He allowed this contempt to be apparent to foreigners, especially to the members of the diplomatic corps in Sofia. (" Countess, allow me 10 KING FERDINAND [chap. ii. time to put on my gloves : I have to shake hands with my charming subjects, and I never risk that with a bare hand." "Madame, I am going to take you into the great hall, where the ilite of Sofia is assembled ; you will see dreadful faces ! Do not be alarmed ! " These are the kind of things that I myself have heard him say. And he did so repeatedly.) But Prince and subjects were agreed on other points than those of personal relations and sympathies. In politics, the Bulgarians considered Ferdinand an admir- able tool for their national aspirations ; his personal ambition, his intelligence, his great cunning, his parent- age and connections, were all great natural assets to the Bulgarian cause. On his side the Prince knew that on questions of foreign policy, he could always rely on Bulgarian patriotism, stubbornness and artfulness, and that in the event of war, officers and men would fight with ferocious and even brutal courage, and would display that tenacity, endurance and voluntary sub- mission to iron discipline which would make the Bulgarian army one of the finest in the world. Since the downfall and assassination of Stamboulov, and the reconciliation with Russia, the Prince had been able to breathe more freely and to feel that he was at last master of the country. But dangers and difficulties still existed. Party quarrels, and passionate national aspirations exploited first by one side and then by the other ; the flagrant incompatibility between a decadent prince of Franco- Austrian origin and a people composed of "peasants of the Danube"; Macedonia in a perpetual state of ferment and hurling at Sofia her rifT-rafT who were past-masters in the art of conspiracy — all com- bined to keep alive the Prince's fears and to sharpen his instinct for intrigue. Ferdinand by his very nature belonged to those men who, in order to compass their ends, are far more inclined to bring into play the vices than the virtues of those around them. His reign served to develop this tendency. He loved to stir up irreconcil- able rivalries, he excelled in the art of keeping the fear of t9Ti] FERDINAND'S JANIZARIES n judgment ever before political men who had compromised themselves by bribery and corruption, and in holding them by the dread of punishment or by the necessity of relying on his protection or forgiveness. In 191 3 there was at one time in Bulgaria a Cabinet composed almost entirely of men who had either been sentenced and forgiven, or who were on trial for malpractices and abuse of power. The military element, always dangerous in these countries of pronunciamoifos, became the object of the Prince's special attention. Ferdinand took great trouble over, and spent his own money on building, an enormous school for officers in Sofia, and supplied all the necessary accessories. The young men are com- pletely isolated from the world, and are under the supervision of instructors possessing Ferdinand's com- plete confidence ; their national feeling is intensified, but at the same time they are taught to look on the goodwill of the sovereign and supreme chief of the army as the sole source of all welfare and promotion. When the young men leave the school the vigilant eye of the master is still on them. In order to isolate the soldiers in their garrisons in civil surroundings, com- fortable officers' messes were inaugurated everywhere at the Prince's own expense. Good food and good wines were provided at extremely low prices ; officers passed all their spare time there, and they learnt above all things to be very guarded and discreet. They realised that there were eavesdroppers about who repeated to their superior officers and even to the Sovereign things they had discussed amongst themselves, and they discovered that capable and deserving officers had often been arrested in the midst of a brilliant career, whilst promotion had been given to others whose only claim to it had been their talent in gaining access to the master's ear. Ferdinand, who is well versed in history, knew that the Sultans, when raising janizaries, used to take Bulgarian boys, convert them to Islamism, and have them educated in special schools. He wished to 12 KING FERDINAND [chap. ii. have his own janizaries, and he succeeded up to a point. At the time that I became acquainted with Ferdinand and his Court, Princess Marie-Louise had been dead some years ; her death had caused sincere grief to all around her, and had put an end to all family-life in the Palace in Sofia. Princess Clementine had followed her daughter-in-law to the grave, leaving a terrible void in her son's life; he had married again, but his second wife played no part whatever in his life, or in that of his subjects. The King plunged into voluntary solitude, absorbed completely in his plans, his dreams of grandeur, his acute anxieties, his masterly political combinations. If Ferdinand had lived in the very middle of the " Quattro cento " as podcsta either of Ferrara or Mantua, he would have vacillated between the Pope, the King of France, the Roman Emperor and the " Serenissima " ; he would have pillaged orphanages and erected beauti- ful buildings ; he would have caused his enemies to be stabbed at night in the streets, or he would have poisoned them at his feasts ; he would have surrounded himself with scholars and artists, and luxurious palaces, with brocades and halberdiers covered in gold lace. He would certainly have possessed that fine and true artistic taste which now he only pretends to have. Born four centuries too late, the King of the Bulgarians con- tents himself with indulging in dreams of greatness, with dressing-up as a Byzantine " Basileus," and with being portrayed thus by third-rate painters ; instead of erecting palaces, he is content to lay-out botanical gardens, for, far from having become rich as a sovereign, he has on the contrary ruined himself by presents, endow- ments and pecuniary assistance destined to purchase partisans ; being unable to exterminate his enemies by poison or steel, Ferdinand endeavours to pit them one against the other. But, exactly like his mediaeval proto- types, he wields the weapon of political intrigue admir- ably, preferring it to any other occupation or any other i9ii] PORTRAIT OF THE KING 13 concern, displaying, however, more elasticity than perse- verance, more audacity in conceiving his plans than determination in carrying them out. The portrait that I am drawing of the King of the Bulgarians may appear to be very black and much exaggerated. And yet, in passing judgment on this complicated character and on this person so universally disapproved of, I am ready to plead extenuating cir- cumstances. The exercise of the rights of sovereignty in a Balkan country does not come within the category of callings which ennoble the characters of those who pursue them. More especially must one admit this when it is a question of Bulgaria and the Bulgarians, a people already cursed once by history — for it is they who brought the Turks into Europe — and who then, during five centuries of a particularly cruel yoke, being deprived of the slightest vestige of national autonomy, became uncouth and less civilised than any other nation of the Near East. In a word, for thirty years Ferdinand and the Bulgarians have mutually corrupted each other. But we ought to place to the moral credit of the King of the Bulgarians the fact that in the whole course of his existence as prince, he has lived exclusively in the political life of his people, interesting himself deeply and solely in the problem of the raising of Bulgaria, and consecrating himself to that at all hours and on all occasions. This undoubtedly endued him with strength in comparison with other sovereigns, especially with those whose private life meant far more to them than their public life and that of their subjects. Some were mainly occupied in increasing their fortune ; others gave themselves up to sensual pleasures ; others again sub- ordinated everything — even their most sacred duties — to the joys and cares of family life ; Ferdinand had two passions only : the consolidation of his throne and the career of his people. In Ferdinand's defence one must also plead the fact that he was born neurasthenic, and that the circumstances 14 KING FERDINAND [chap. ii. of his life and calling greatly aggravated this tendency. To this is due his indecision, unsuspected by the public at large, and also his suspiciousness, so patent to every one. Ferdinand has never been able to come to a decision unaided. He could evolve, and cleverly elaborate the details of, a political combination ; when the moment came to carry it out he needed another will to impose itself on his and to force him to act. For a long time his mother had furnished the necessary will- power. With Princess Clementine's death, Ferdinand's indecision assumed formidable proportions. In 1908, when the annexation of Bosnia nearly set all Europe by the ears, Ferdinand, warned in time by M. d'Aerenthal, prepared to follow up the Austrian step by the pro- clamation of Bulgarian independence and sovereignty. Everything was carefully arranged and prepared ; but at the vital moment it was necessary for M. Malinov and his colleagues to force themselves on him in his saloon-carriage and to drag a decision from him — they succeeded far more by threats than by persuasion. And this is no solitary example. Touching his deep distrust I must say that I have seldom seen any one more suspicious than King Ferdinand. Nearly every conversation that I had with him began in a favourable manner; one was face to face with an intelligent, cultivated and subtle questioner willing to use his intellectual charm and entering to a certain extent into one's point of view ; then all of a sudden, without any apparent reason, a shadow would cross his face, his expression became crafty, and the King's thoughts were abruptly hidden from one, and one had to be content with a medley of evasions and commonplaces. This was because at a given moment the usual thought had crossed the King's mind: "Ah I but who knows whether he is not laying a trap for me? Whether he is not seeking an answer from me which may compromise or bind me?" From that moment all one's arguments were futile. i9ii] MY NEW COLLEAGUE 15 This was the Sovereign to whom I came to present my credentials, and whom I was to have as colleague during the course of the most serious events that Bulgaria has ever passed through, and which have had a fatal effect on our relations to the Bulgarian people. CHAPTER III BULGARIA IN I9II The presentation of his credentials by a foreign Minister takes place in Sofia with the usual ceremonial but with a little more pomp than in other Balkan capitals. On the appointed day, gala-coaches and an escort of Hussars of the Royal Guard came to fetch me and my suite, and thus in full uniform and accompanied by the general aide-de-camp of the King, I crossed the short space between the Russian Legation and the King's Palace, an unimposing building situated — ^justas in Abel Hermant's play — between the public gardens, the square and the four-storied house. The King awaited me in the Throne Room, with M. Malinov, President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs, at his side ; I read my speech and handed my credentials to the King, I listened to his reply, after which he stretched out his hand to me with a few words of welcome and invited me to his study, the doors of which closed upon us without M. Malinov being invited to accompany us. There the King begged me to be seated, and we held a fairly long conversation touching on political questions of the moment and the news from the Russian Court, — a conversation of no importance, but in the course of which the King was pleased to show me a great deal of friendliness. When we had exhausted these subjects, we returned to the Audience Hall, where the King's Court and the Prime Minister were still waiting. Having been dismissed with great ceremony by the King, I was taken to pay my court to Queen Eleanor and the heir to the throne, and then 1 left, surrounded by the same pomp. i6 i9n] FALL OF MALINOV CABINET 17 The King's treatment of his Prime Minister did not altogether astonish me ; I had often heard of the off- hand manner with which he treated his Ministers ; moreover, during the customary interview which I had had the day before with M. Malinov, the latter did not conceal from me that the days of his Cabinet were numbered, and that in all probability he would shortly hand in his resignation and that of his colleagues to the King. A few days after my audience I left for Paris, in order to collect my establishment and to make the necessary purchases for my new installation. I stayed a couple of days in Vienna, and there I read in the papers of the resignation of the Malinov Cabinet, and of the formation of the Gueshov-Danev Coalition Ministry, with the leaders of which I had had long conversations before my departure. The fall of the Malinov Cabinet was not due to any acute political crisis. As always happens in parlia- mentary countries, but more particularly in the Balkan States, the Ministry was simply worn out by a fairly long period of power, and then foreign political circum- stances were assuming another direction which naturally demanded other actors. The Malinov Cabinet had witnessed a crisis as strange as it was unforeseen in Macedonian affairs. As is well known, during the first years of the century European diplomacy had undergone high trials in Macedonia. I mean the usual sequence, but becoming year by year more complicated, of plots, provocations, local massacres ; and above all the vehemence of the struggle between the rival Christian nationalities : Serbian, Bulgarian, Greek ; between the two latter, particularly, deeds of ferocious cruelty were committed. The situation gradually led to the direct interference of Europe. The country was placed under the authority of an Ottoman High Commissioner chosen by the Powers ; two civil commissioners — one Russian and one Austrian — were added ; European officers were placed i8 BULGARIA IN 1911 [chap. 111. at the head of a gendanncric which they strove to reform ; finally, an international financial commission inaugurated in the province a system for controlling and preserving the resources of the country from the demands of the Ottoman Treasury. It is worthy of note that relations between the Russian and Austrian commissioners were not at all strained, and that this good understanding reacted in a favourable manner on the actions of the Consuls of the two Empires in Macedonia. This latter state of things was due to the modus vivendi existing between the two rival diplomacies since 1897, which threw cold water on the efforts of the Balkan States, especially those of Bulgaria, to create friction between Russia and Austria, and under cover of this friction to foment serious trouble in Macedonia. With the year 1908 came the overthrow of this scheme, which was partly artificial, partly necessary and beneficial to the work of maintain- ing the peace of the world. In July of that year, at an inopportune moment for every one, the Turkish Revolution broke out. In a few short weeks, Abdul Hamid's regime and — more important still— all the former autocratic Turkish regime were destroyed, and at the same time the enormous influence which Germany 'had been able to acquire in Constan- tinople seemed to be lost for ever. Under the influence of spontaneous enthusiasm, the Christian nations of Turkey believed ardently in the inauguration of a new era of fraternity and progress, they threw themselves into the arms of the sons of their former oppressors, and wished to work out the salvation of their common country. Armenians, Roman Catholic Syrians, Greeks of the Archipelago, and Bulgarians of Macedonia forgot their grievances and their old quarrels. Heads of Macedonian bands fraternised with the members of the Committee " Union and Progress " ; Greeks and Bul- garians embraced one another ; and meanwhile the civil commissioners, the officers of the gendarmerie^ the European members of the financial commission were 19. i] THE TURKISH REVOLUTION 19 gradually disappearing like a useless appendage, in- compatible with the unlimited moral credit which the Powers vied with one another in assigning to Turkey in her radical renovation. Moreover, relations between the European Powers themselves were becoming particularly complicated during the same year 1908. The act of the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina had been prepared before the Turkish Revolution, which as I said before had been a surprise to every one. As the year 1908 coincided with the Jubilee of the sixty years' reign of Francis Joseph of Austria, a newly- appointed and ambitious Minister — M. d'Aerenthal — wishing to make his name from the outset, desired to present the annexation as a Jubilee present to the aged Monarch. In M. Isvolsky — also newly appointed, and keen to make his country forget the recent disasters on the shores of the Pacific and to replace Russian policy in the historic groove of the Near East — M. d'Aerenthal found a suitable partner, willing to listen to proposals and to formulate some of his own. A friendly exchange of views took place through the interposition of the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in St. Petersburg. The Russian Foreign Office received the wishes of Vienna fairly favourably, and suggested on their side that it was necessary for Russia that the government of the Straits should be improved in her favour. In the very midst of these discussions, which were endorsed by a very friendly exchange of views between St. Petersburg and London on this same question of the Straits, the Turkish Revolution broke out. This event, however, did not check the plans of the two partners, and the interview planned between M. Isvolsky and M. d'Aerenthal took place all the same at Buchlau. But there all the cards were shuffled. The ambitious and unscrupulous Austrian Minister persisted with his schemes and, in order to take Europe by surprise, hastened the act of annexation, with the result that Russia— supported by England and France, who thought the moment had c 20 BULGARIA IN 1911 [chap. iii. arrived to regain tiieir former influence in Constantinople — refused to demand the compensation of which she had formerly dreamt, and also absolutely refused to recognise the annexation. The diplomatic negotiations which ensued did not turn to our advantage, as is well known. Thanks to the support which Germanyjhastened to lend to Austria, the annexation was first recognised by the Sublime Porte, then by Russia and by the other Powers on Russia's representations. M. d'Aerenthal received the much coveted title of Count ; and Russian public opinion, violently excited by the ultra-patriotic Press, felt and displayed deep displeasure. This displeasure was much exaggerated : the countries annexed had been for a long time under the real power of Austria-Hungary, and Russia herself, in her con- fidential negotiations with Austria, had contemplated on four separate occasions the possibility of the annexation pure and simple of these provinces (firstly in 1875 at Reichstatt, secondly in 1879 at a select and secret sitting of the Congress of Berlin, thirdly in 1897 on the occasion of the Emperor Francis-Joseph's visit to St. Petersburg, and fourthly at Murzsteg); concerning the government of the Straits, the right of passage through these for our men-of-war belonging to the Black Sea Fleet — which was all that we asked — did not constitute any very real advantage for Russia, for in the event of political com- plications the Porte could always close the Straits to us de facto, finally, the crisis due to the annexation had brought us far nearer to England and had consolidated the entente once for all. Further, our relations with Bulgaria at the settle- ment of the crisis of 1908-1909 assumed a particularly favourable character. Looking on himself, especially at the outset of his ministerial career, as a continuer of Prince LobanofTs policy, M. Isvolsky inherited also the Prince's feelings of good-will towards the Bulgarians and towards Ferdinand. Thanks to the efforts of our Foreign Secretary — supported by the Grand-Duchess i9ii] INDEPENDENCE OF BULGARIA 21 Vladimir, the sworn patroness of King Ferdinand at the Imperial Court— the title of "Tsar," which the latter had assumed under cover of the last European crisis, was accorded to him by Russia before all the other Powers. Ferdinand, when hastening to the funeral of the Grand- Duke Vladimir, who had just died, was greeted in St. Petersburg with the title of " Tsarinian Majesty " and royal honours were given to him. The independence of Bulgaria was also recognised by us without difficulty, and in order to facilitate a definite arrangement between the new kingdom and its former suzerain, our Foreign Office proposed the following combination and succeeded in getting it accepted. Turkey consented to transfer the arrears of the Bulgarian contribution to the account of the war-contribution which she had owed us since 1878 ; and Bulgaria, entirely free of all liabilities to the Ottoman Empire, pledged herself to indemnify us by adequate annuities. M. Isvolsky liked to say in those days that Russia by her benevolent actions had, as it were, freed Bulgaria for the second time ; and up to a point he was right, for our attitude under these circumstances had effectually laid the foundation of an extremely close Russo-Bulgarian understanding which lasted till the end of 1912. Such were the advantages accruing to Russian politics from the crisis of 1908-1909. It is true that some of our statesmen and of our diplomats, such as Count Witte, M. Kokovtzoff", M. Zinovieff, Count Osten-Sacken, Prince Ouroussoff 1 and others, sincerely regretted everything that had happened since the interview at Buchlau, and saw in it a decided step towards the universally dreaded European con- flagration. But the opinions of these men had their origin in a point of view directly opposed to that prevailing amongst the bulk of Russian politicians and intellectual people, and in consequence their critics had nothing in common with the ordinary critics. Alas! The terrible events which dismembered before our very ' Our Ambassadors in Constaiitinople, Berlin, and Vienna. 22 r^ULGARIA IN 1911 [cii. III. eyes our unhappy country, so ill-prepared to face them, justified the apprehensions of these statesmen. Altogether, the crisis of August, 1908 to March, 1909, marked the end of a policy of compromise between Russia and Austria, and accentuated the division of Elurope into two directly opposed camps, whilst compli- cations were to be foreseen in the near future on the Balkan question — henceforth to be a burning one. The Balkan statesmen, ever practical and on the alert, immediately took advantage of the new state of affairs. They realised that Russian policy would most certainly wish to avenge the Buchlau trap, and the thinly disguised German ultimatum of March, 1909; and that in consequence it was necessary to prepare for events which might occur — or even to provoke them if they did not occur with sufficient rapidity. Moreover the evolution of the new Turkish Govern- ment facilitated these schemes of the Balkan States and gave fresh impetus to their national aspirations. Two years had not gone by since the second taking-up of arms by the Young Turks (in April, 1909, followed by the final deposing of Abdul-Hamid) when the Ottoman revolutionaries resumed towards their Christian fellow- citizens the same policy as that pursued by the " Red Sultan," First came the horrible massacre of Adana — said to have been fomented by the partisans of the Old Regime, but in the repression and punishment of which the New Regime displayed rather too obvious a mild- ness ; then by degrees the Young Turks imagined that the Christians were becoming too grasping — which was possibly fairly true — and to check this abuse of liberty they sought to affirm the superiority, indispensable in their eyes, of the believing Osmanlis. They did this so unconstrainedly and with so much impatience that the Christians were forced to guard their new rights by the old means of plots and recourse to foreign protection. Little by little the former state of chaos reappeared in Macedonia and Thrace, then in Armenia and Syria. And simultaneously with this metamorphoses of i9ii] A NEW CABINET 23 Turkey, the Talaats, the Djavids and others who now ruled the Ottoman Empire uncontrolled, were allowing themselves to be more and more allured by the advances made to them by German policy through the medium of the "great and glorious Enver," the promoter of the Revolution, who was a military agent in Berlin, and who lived there surrounded by Imperial care and flattery. Towards the spring of 191 1 the cycle of Turkish evolution was complete, and a practically quo ante political situation existed, except that instead of a Europe ostensibly united, the East had to deal with a Europe frankly divided into two camps and arming herself with feverish haste. Malinov's Radical Cabinet had had its day ; it had profited by the crisis of 1908 to secure the complete independence of the country, and to take over the section of the Ottoman railways which still existed in Rumelia; it had maintained intimate relations with the Bulgarian revolutionaries in Macedonia before as well as after the short-lived period of reconciliation and fraternisation with the Turks ; it had succeeded in securing the pro- tection of the Russian representatives and had not made unfair use of it. But times had changed, causing a new situation to arise. For Bulgaria the key to this situation lay in Russian protection and good-will. The Bulgarian Radicals were on good terms with our diplomacy and on excellent ones with our Liberal Party, but Russian diplomacy was suspected of " Moderantism " and our Liberal Party was far less enthusiastic about enterprises in the Near East than were the Nation- alists who gathered round the Novoye Vremja, the Octo- brists of the Duma, etc. ... It was these groups who had to be conciliated ; moreover, they had corre- spondents in Bulgaria and special proteges amongst the old Bulgarian Nationalists, commencing by the pure Russophiles with M. Danev at their head as the recog- nised successor of the old Dragan Tzankov. It was 24 BULGARIA IN 191 1 [chap. iii. therefore necessary to comply with the newstate of affairs and to present to Slavophile Russia, always impatient of action, an "orthodox" Bulgarian Ministry,/.^, a group of people of ancient traditions, and whose very names would be synonymous with devotion to Russia. This was done by fusing the Danev party with jhat of Gueshov; and King Ferdinand, who personally did not like the one and detested the other, gave way for once to the combination, and accepted the formation of the "great National Ministry." As to M. Malinov'c party, it promised not to oppose his successors in m^J^jers of foreign policy. This was the meaning of the change of Cabinet which took place in March, 191 1, and this the political situation in Bulgaria when I took up my post there. CHAPTER IV RUSSIAN AND BULGARIAN RELATIONS I HAD been acquainted with M. Gueshov for a long time, and I had a liking for this calm, self-possessed old man, whom I held to be perfectly sincere in his feelings towards Russia. Such he appeared to me during the whole time that I had dealings with him. In the spring of 19 1 2, when I was in St. Petersburg, M. Sazonoff, to whom I imparted my sentiments conceiving Gueshov, simply remarked : " he is crafty " ; he repeated this in 1913 when Gueshov had already been out of office for some months; but he would never explain his words. I conclude that this opinion of Gueshov came from a Bulgarian source. It is also true that since 1 9 14 M. Gueshov's newspaper. The Mir, has gone over rather openly to the side of the enemies of Russia and the Entente. Nevertheless, until I have proof to the contrary I shall persist in asserting that during his whole term of office his attitude towards us was perfectly correct, and that he sincerely desired to act in accordance with Russia's views. After the catastrophe of 191 3 Bulgarian feelings changed and became so hostile that even the passing over of old Gueshov to the enemy's camp could be admitted as a possibility; but one ought to know if this really ever took place, and whether Gueshov, who has lived abroad a great deal since 191 3; really inspired the articles in The Mir. At one time also I had been acquainted with M. Todorov,^ who in the Gueshov-Danev Cabinet held the post of Minister of Finance and in the " Narodniak " party the second place after M. Gueshov. He was a very ' His name is now spelled Theodorov, and he is Bulgarian Plenipo- tentiary at the Conference in Paris. 2; 26 RUSSIAN-BULGARIAN RELATIONS [chap. iv. sincere man of moderate views, though a little too excitable in conversation. No one, even amongst us, ever doubted the sincerity of his feelings towards Russia. Among the Tzankovists, I knew M. Ludskonov very well, the son-in-law of the old Tzankov who had died in March, 191 1. He was a perfectly honest and sincere man ; his feelings towards Russia — I should even say his devotion to the Russian cause — were indisputable. But a little weak and far too easy-going by nature, he was not born to lead a party; therefore he gave up his place to M. Danev. I had never met the latter before I came to Sofia as Minister. As soon as I returned from Paris, M. Danev, who in the meantime had been made Home Secretary, called on me, and sketched out his ministerial pro- gramme. I was not very favourably impressed by him. With the experience I had acquired of Balkan politicians, I seemed to recognise in him the typical characteristics of the sworn Russophile — the political man who, whilst not being hostile to us, considers that the Russian representatives are forced to support him in all he does, to hate all his enemies, even personal ones, and to see eye to eye with him on all matters affecting his country. Like most men of this type, Danev appeared to me to be imbued with stubbornness even more than Bulgarian. During his visit he announced — as if he was saying something that would cause me special pleasure— that the new Government was going to carry on the pro- secution, already begun by the Malinov Cabinet, of M. Ghennadiev, General Savov and the other shufflers who had formerly belonged to Stamboulov's camp and who, as was universally known, had been guilty of financial dishonesty when last in office. M. Danev apparently thought that the Russian Minister ought to be delighted at the imminent conviction of the "agents of Austria," which would render them harmless for ever. He was much astonished at the indifference with which I received the news. In the first place I had serious doubts as to i9iil M. GUESHOV 27 whether Ferdinand would allow men to be completely crushed who might be of use to him in the event of any change of political system, and then I considered it to be beneath the dignity of a representative of Russia to take an interest in these internal quarrels and to mix up our political interests with a case which only concerned the penal laws and justice of the country. M. Danev then spoke for some time about the necessity of strengthening the present relations between Russia and Bulgaria by the conclusion of a military convention, and he ended by attacking King Ferdinand very violently. What he said about him was quite true, but I refused to follow him on to this dangerous ground. I was far more satisfied with my first conversations with M. Gueshov, who I often saw in his capacity as Foreign Secretary. In compliance with my orders from St. Petersburg, I entered into practical negotiations with him which aimed at securing definitely the use of the sum lent by us to the Bulgarians in 1909, and at obtain- ing at last the payment — by regular annuities — of the Bulgarian debt of thirteen million francs, unliquidated since the Russian occupation of 1877-79. I succeeded in carrying these matters through, thanks to the good-will of M. Gueshov and M. Todorov, who had set their hearts on maintaining the commercial integrity of Bulgaria. King Ferdinand was away at the moment, as he generally was, either when there were no dangers or disturbances ahead in the country, or when he did not wish to come to a decision — but to await developments — in a difficult political situation. Hence, he was away a great deal ; moreover he was bored to death in his Palace in Sofia. However, the King returned rather early in the summer. The new Cabinet, in agreement with the King and the Radical members of the Opposition, had just put a constitutional question : whether the Royal 28 RUSSIAN-BULGARIAN RELATIONS [chap. iv. Government should be granted the riglit to conclude secret conventions with foreign countries before sub- mitting them to the Sobranje, a right which was not mentioned in the existing constitution. Hence as it would be necessary to add an additional clause to the organic law of the country, the Great Sobranje — i.e. a constituent assembly alone possessing the right to decide the question— had to be convened. As I have just said, the King, his Ministers and the Radicals who were not in power were agreed on this point. The Radicals were desirous of following up the conferences they had held with us on the subject of a Russo-Bulgarian military convention which they thought was on the eve of being concluded. Moreover, at the Russian Legation it was thought that this was the object of the new organic law. In the country at large, opposition only came from the Socialists and the " Agriculturists " — a new party who preached the strictest economy in State expendi- ture, and who were irreconcilable foes to war and armaments. Much astonishment was created in Sofia when the Novoye Vi^cmja and a few other Russian Nationalist newspapers suddenly began to support the Bulgarian Opposition, represented on this question by elements with which these papers had, after all, nothing in common. The Novoye Vremja, which led the campaign, displayed a fear that if the Bulgarian Government obtained the right to conclude secret treaties without having to have recourse to the vote of the Sobranje, Ferdinand would be in a position to come to all kinds of agreements with Austria ! Our Foreign Secretar}' had to intervene in order to persuade the Novoye Vremja to relinquish this ill-timed campaign. In the month of June the " Great Sobranje " was convened at Tirnova, and the Diplomatic Corps was invited to the formal opening. We had a special train for the journey, as if we were going on a pleasure-trip. The weather was beautiful, the political sky fairly clear, and most of the Forrign Ministers were on pleasant terms. The followin;^" summer we made the same trip i9ii] GENERAL FICHEV IN RUSSIA 29 for ihe festivities marking the 25th anniversary of Ferdinand's reign. But how changed the situation had become ! and what fears haunted us ! On the very day of the opening, the Assembly passed the proposed law by a large majority, in spite of a few violent speeches made by the Socialist leaders. Throughout the summer, my relations with Govern- ment and Court were still very friendly. On mine and our Military Attache's initiative. General Fichev, Chief of the Bulgarian General Staff, was invited to the grand manoeuvres at Krasnoe-Selo, where he was to be pre- sented to the Emperor and to meet our military chiefs. Fichev, who had finished his military education at Turin, had never been to Russia, and was looked upon as a Stamboulovist and an enemy to Russian policy. Yet in his relations with us he never showed any hostile feel- ings, but appeared to be sincere and moderate. Acting on the principle that one ought to attract people possessing genuine qualities and not repulse them, we took the necessary steps to insure a hearty welcome to the Bulgarian General. He left St. Petersburg flattered and delighted. Later on, in momentous circumstances, General Fichev displayed a sincerity and prudence that many Russophile leaders might well have envied. He vehemently opposed the march of Bulgarian troops on Constantinople, a move which ended in the bloody and useless sacrifices of Chataldja, and provoked our suspicion and displeasure. By his opposition to this, Fichev fell into disgrace with his master; the Chief of the General Staff was forced to apply for sick-leave and to return to Sofia, leaving the direction of his Staff to his adjutant Nerezov. The latter played a disastrous part later on at the time of the Bulgarian attack on the Serbians (June, 191 3). Fichev's journey to Russia was followed by another of far greater importance. At the wish expressed by M. Gueshov, acting as the King's spokesman, I readily agreed to arrange the visit of the Bulgarian Crown- 2,0 RUSSIAN-BULGARIAN RELATIONS [ciiap.iv. Prince to his godfather the Emperor. My suggestions were favourable received, and Prince Boris was invited to Kieff, where the Imperial Family passed the month of August, and from there he was to accompany them to Tsarskoe-Selo. The young Prince, who was seventeen years of age, had never been to Russia and did not know his august godfather. In a conversation which I had had before leaving St. Petersburg with M. Sazonoff, he had confessed to me that he would very much like to marry one of the Grand-Duchesses, daughters of the Emperor, to the Crown-Prince of Rumania, and another to Prince Boris. Only, as he wisely added, it would be necessary to be extremely cautious, as he had not mentioned the matter at Tsarskoe-Selo, and he knew that the Emperor and Empress would never consent to arrange marriages for their daughters which might be contrary to the feelings and inclinations of the young Grand-Duchesses them- selves. Moreover, from a political point of view, anything was preferable to a marriage missed by a refusal from our side : these humiliations are never forgiven. I agreed entirely with M. Sazonoff. Therefore one can imagine how disagreeably surprised I was on my arrival in Sofia to hear my assistants talking quite openly and unconstrainedly about the future — and apparently settled — marriage of Prince Boris with one of the Emperor's daughters, the only point still unsettled being whether he was to marry the Grand-Duchess Olga or the Grand- Duchess Tatiana! The First Secretary to the Legation, a young man with a great deal of assurance and a very loud voice, even went so far as to mention it in my presence, at the salon of one of my foreign colleagues. 1 immediately silenced my young and impetuous assistant by asking him if he had received these confidences from the Emperor himself, who had not deigned to honour me with the same trust. The lesson was absolutely imperative, but it drew down on me the irreconcilable enmity of the gentleman in question. i9ii] MURDER OF M. STOLYPIN 31 As I had expected, Prince Boris was received with the utmost friendliness; in consequence of his air of extreme youth — he was small and puny, with a childish face — he was treated as a boy and allowed to share without any formality in the intimate family life of the Emperor. The greatest care was taken of him, and he associated quite informally with the two youpgest daughters of the Emperor, the Grand-Duchesses Maria and Anastasie; the former was then only about fourteen years of age. The Crown-Prince's visit to Kieff coincided unfortu- nately with the assassination of the Minister-President of Russia, Stolypin. The Prince was an eye-witness of the foul deed, which occurred in the entr'acte of a gala performance, and one feels sure that this sad and horrible sight must have thoroughly spoilt the good impressions which he would otherwise have brought back from his visit. I was deeply depressed by Stolypin's death. It proved that the Russian Revolution was far from being over. Under cover of an apparent calm, the lava of passion and violence was smouldering, ready to upset a state of order which was really only due to the power of the police and the force of habit. I had known Stolypin as a youth in his parents' house in Moscow. At that time I was very intimate with his eldest brother Michael, since killed in a duel. "Petia" Stolypin, as he was then called, was about fifteen years old, and was noted for his good behaviour, love of study, and deep feeling of honour, which more- over was a distinguishing characteristic of the whole Stolypin family. Such he remained through all the vicissitudes of life and up to his death. I saw him again, after the lapse of long years, at the Winter Palace in St. Petersburg ; he was living there with his family in 1908, in consequence of the criminal attempt made on his life in the summer of 1906, in which some of his children were injured. The President of the 32 RUSSIAN-BULGARIAN RELATIONS [chap. iv. Council gave me the impression then of being very uncommunicative and, up to a point, very much depressed ; I doubt very much whether, in his heart of hearts, he had preserved unbounded confidence in himself and his system. In an uncongenial atmosphere, surrounded by the high dignitaries of St. Petersburg, this country squire displayed an openness and straight- forwardness which won universal esteem, but his task was in no way made easier thereby. On the other hand, his long rural career, more particularly his term as governor of a province, had developed in him leanings towards patriarchal despotism. These tendencies alien- ated all truly liberal minds. The flattery heaped on him by a certain portion of the Press, and the Octobrist section of the Duma — which only existed through his protection — all combined to dim his mental vision; having commenced his ministerial career as a champion of the "Zemstvo," i.e. of provincial self-government, he ended it — sad to say — as the unlucky head of the political police of the old regime ! All the same, in spite of his errors, Stolypin preserved a perfect honesty of purpose, and a strong and upright character. His death deprived the Conservative party of a man who, on going out of office, might have become an eminent political leader. But even if he had remained at the head of the Government, Stolypin would never have allowed the Government machinery to get so completely out of order and to reach a pitch of dilapidation which made possible the new victorous thrust of the Revolu- tionists. The Revolution was ill-timed and disastrous, for in the midst of a world war it aimed at establishing an ultra-Socialist Republic in Russia, and in the mad attempt it destroyed all patriotic feeling in the country. In the sphere of foreign policy, Stolypin played a more important part than was generally supposed. He undoubtedly possessed certain German sympathies, while remaining intensely Slavophile and Nationalist, and consequently firmly attached to the system of the French alliance. The German Empire attracted igii] STOLYPIN'S INFLUENCE 33 him by the order which reigned there, by the national patriotism which seemed to animate all classes of the population, all political parties. Moreover, possessing an intimate knowledge of the actual state of Russia, and realising the internal dangers the Empire would have to face if war broke out, Stolypin frankly dreaded a war and consequently anything which might lead to the collision so often predicted with Germany, As long as he lived he had an indisputable influence on M. Sazonoffs policy and on that of his locum-tenens, M. Neratoff. This influence showed itself in very early days in the interviews which the new Russian Foreign Secretary held with the Berlin politicians in November, 1910, On his return to St. Petersburg and to business after the death of his brother-in-law, Sazonoff had no longer any reason or desire to be under the influence of that incongruous group of men officially called the " Council of Ministers " or " Cabinet." From the autumn of 191 1 our foreign policy was definitely divorced from the home policy of the Empire, and remained solely within the province of the Foreign Office. Sazonoff, who was above all things a good comrade and a staunch friend, was from henceforth entirely under the influence of his own en- vironment, and all his decisions were arrived at in select committees of a few collaborators, men who were mostly intelligent and mentally distinguished, but who often lacked practical experience. During the years that followed, M. Sazonoff" and the Foreign Office became more and more cut off" from the rest of the Government. We ought to note that in general during the years immediately preceding the World War and the Revolu- tion, there was a pecular change in the kind of people who were called upon to govern Russia. Men of no proved political reputation, lacking in experience, with no marked ability, sprang up no one knew whence, and gradually monopolised the power and influence over all state affairs. Thus bank-notes of great value were 34 RUSSIAN-BULGARIAN RELATIONS [chap. iv. exchanged for small change, which rattled about in the money-bags but only possessed one merit : that it was easy to circulate and exchange. The summer of 191 1 ended for me by the visit of the Russian Squadron to Varna. The principal ships of our Black Sea Fleet, under the new Vice-Admiral Bostroem, came this year with great pomp to visit the harbours of Bulgaria and Turkey, and the Rumanian harbour Constanza. At Varna, whither I went with my suite to meet our Squadron, the reception was exceedingly warm. King Ferdinand was not there, of course : as soon as he was free from the worries of the Great Sobranje, he had left for foreign parts. But Queen Eleanor, who was spending the summer at Euxinograd near Varna, all alone in the seclusion of a small ancient convent, hidden away in one of the corners of the park, was delighted to preside at the reception and to receive from our Navy the royal honours which were so grudgingly bestowed on her at the Court of the King her husband. As is customary on such occasions, I received the official visit of the Admirals, and then went the same day with great ceremony on board the flagship and others of the Squadron. Each time it was the usual naval recep- tion : the cutter stopping at the ship's side ; the thunder of the salute, then on board, the reception by the Admiral and the ship's officers, with military honours, and the introduction of the other officers on board ; finally the salute of the crew drawn up on deck, the presenting arms, answered by the usual cheers. I had witnessed these receptions several times at Constanti- nople when I was in attendance on my eminent and never- forgotten chief, M. de Nelidoff, and they had always produced in me a pleasant feeling of emotion : they evoked images of our country, represented by the splendid ships, by the glorious flag of St. Andrew, by the formidable guns, by the charming hospitality of the officers, and last but not least by those tall, fair youths, with open, almost child-like, expressions, who were i9ii] VISIT OF THE RUSSIAN SQUADRON 35 drawn up before us, and who later on, in the evening, sang patriotic songs reminding us of loved ones far away. I felt the same emotion at first when I visited our Squadron lying off Varna. The firing of the salute, the going on board, the cordial shaking hands with the officers . . . but when I was face to face with the men drawn up in battle array, when I had said " good luck, my good fellows, " and had received the usual answer from them, I felt a sudden and painful shock. It was twenty years since I had seen our sailors, and good gracious! what a change! Instead of a row of open countenances, young and happy, looking at one with ingenuous and gay expressions, I only saw surly faces, with dark and suspicious looks, in which one seemed to catch glimpses of ill-concealed hatred. It even appeared to me as if the physical aspect of the crew had changed ; I seemed to remember them fair, with clear grey eyes, and broad, bright faces ; now they stood looking at me with dark eyes that looked old and bilious. At first I thought I was influenced by a preconceived idea; the regrettable incidents of 1905 and 1906, the bloody mutiny on board the Potemkin, the terrible insurrection at Cronstadt had doubtless biassed my mind, and led me to look at very ordinary faces with a prejudiced eye. But no ; the more I observed our sailors during the few days I was at Varna, the stronger my first impression became. As to the officers, they had changed very little : they seemed to have the same good qualities and the same faults. They were the same good fellows who seemed to answer one's silent interrogation by : " We realise what threatens us, but we can do nothing. When the time comes we shall know how to die, as our friends died at Tsushima ; if necessary we shall bare our chests to the bayonets of our own men; but meanwhile let us lead our ordinary daily life, come what may ! " The visit of our Squadron to Varna was marked by official festivities which were very friendly ; there was the dinner I gave to the officers of the Squadron, D 36 RUSSIAN-BULGARIAN RELATIONS [chap. iv. the Bulgarian authorities and the principal townspeople of Varna; a reception given by Queen Eleanor in the beautiful park at Euxinograd ; Her Majesty's visit to the Squadron, when all the ships returned the royal salute; finally the "curfew-bell," followed by a dance on board the flagship, to which the townspeople of Varna were invited. Vice-Admiral Bostroem, who commandedithe Squad- ron and the whole of the Black Sea Fleet, was an acquaintance of mine. We had often met in Paris during the winter of 1904-5, while the International Commission of Inquiry on the Dogger-Bank incident was sitting. Holding at that time the post of Counsellor to our Embassy in Paris, I was appointed delegate of the Russian Government to the Commission ; and Captain Bostroem, then our naval-attache in London, often came to Paris to report to Admiral Dubassoff, Baron Taube, our legal adviser, and to me the result of the investigations he made in Hull and other English seaports. Captain Bostroem was very zealous in his investigations, but rather too credulous concerning the information he gathered ; this finally placed him in a very false position, as two English witnesses, found and presented by him, were convicted of perjury. Alas! The command of the Black Sea Squadron ended even more disastrously for poor Bostroem than his zeal in the Hull incident. A few days after our leave-taking at Varna, when the Russian Squadron, after a series of festivities, was leaving the harbour at Constanza, the Admiral had the bad luck to run his ship aground on a sandbank. This incident put an end to Bostroem's brilliant but brief career. Thus I spent my first summer in Sofia. The summer of 191 1 will remain memorable in history through an event which caused more surprise than emotion in Europe, but which was the starting-point of fateful events. 1 allude to the commencement of the Italo- Turkish War. ^ I9I2] ITALO-TURKISH WAR ly Of course, neither of the two interested parties had realised the importance and significance of their conflict for the world at large. Anxious to secure to the re- stored Ottoman Empire its complete independence of the Powers up till then arbiters of its fate, the Young- Turkish Government had selected Italy as being the least dangerous of the Great Powers on which to impose its claims. It felt certain, moreover, that Germany would intervene at the crucial moment to prevent an armed contest. In reasoning thus it had lost sight of Italy's privileged situation among the rival Powers, and of the fact that Italian action in the East would not arouse exaggerated fears or inclinations to interfere in either of the two camps. As to Italy, she hoped that her energetic attitude would ensure the immediate success of her cause. Rome had not reckoned with the slowness of a war in the desert, in which, as far as Italy was concerned, everything had yet to be organised, whereas the Turks should come off fairly well with a small array of forces, and a ready-made system of guerilla warfare. By lasting for more than a year, the Italo-Turkish War doubtless contributed to the ripening of the Balkan events of 1912 and 1913. And these most certainly hastened, and up to a point prepared, the explosion of the terrible World War. CHAPTER V SERBO-BULGARIAN RELATIONS In my conversations with the principal members of the Cabinet, I repeatedly had opportunities of touching on the question of Serbo-Bulgarian relations; each time I noticed the desire to improve these relations, but 1 always found myself up against a feeling of distrust of the Serbians, so I refrained from insisting too much. However, towards the end of September, 191 1, when paying a call on M, Todorov, who was taking the place of M. Gueshov then on leave, I was very much surprised to hear him broach the whole question. " We have come to the conclusion," said M. Todorov, "that if we wish to guard our complete political and economic independence from the encroachments of Central Europe, and if we truly desire to improve the lot of our kin in Turkey, we must as far as possible make our national and economic polic}^ one with that of Serbia. We represent two nationalities very closely related by blood, language, and even by our former historic destinies. What prevents us from living in perfect harmony together? Simply and solely, at this moment, disagreement on the subject of our sphere of action in Macedonia. We would therefore suggest to the Serbians to go thoroughly into this question with us, in order to arrive at a good and solid understanding. I will not conceal from you that we wish to draw up a settled agreement with Serbia. What do you think of the idea. Monsieur?" I replied, of course, that speaking generally I could not but approve of the reasons and feelings which appeared to sway the Bulgarian Government. But that 38 I9I2] JOURNEY TO DAVOS 39 as to knowing whether we should consider it an opportune moment to start these delicate negotiations between Sofia and Belgrade, I should first have to ask the advice of our Foreign Secretary, and to confer also with my colleague in Belgrade, M. Hartwig. I con- tinued : " I have just received permission to go to Paris for a fortnight on urgent private business. I could go by Vienna instead of straight through by the Orient- Express, and take the Zurich train, and branch off at Landquart to Davos, where M. Sazonoff is still staying. His health has improved so considerably that he will shortly be able to return to St. Petersburg and to business. On returning from Paris, I will stop for a few hours in Belgrade so as to confer with Hartwig. Then in three weeks from now, I could discuss the question far more profitably with you." "Splendid!" said M. Todorov; "the King will probably have returned by then, and so will M. Gueshov ; and if you bring back with you the approba- tion of your Minister and the valuable co-operation of M. Hartwig, I trust we might then succeed in carrying through the negotiations which have been outlined several times, but which up to now have begun and ended there." Two days after I started, and during my journey I had enough leisure to go over in my mind the vicissitudes of Serbo-Bulgarian relations. I will limit myself here to the enumeration of the principal phases. I. Up to about 1870 there existed an almost complete ignorance on the part of Russian policy of Bulgarian nationality and aspirations. Serbia, under the noble Prince Michael Obrenovitch, represented, as far as we were concerned then, the whole Slav cause in the Near East ; the enthusiasts of this cause looked on the Serbian principality as a " Balkan Piedmont." II. Between 1870 and 1875 General Ignatieff, the omnipotent Russian Ambassador to the Sultan Abdul- Azis, discovers Bulgaria, and espouses the Bulgarian 40 SKRBO-BULGARIAN RKLATIONS [chap. v. cause at the time of the movement which founded the Bulgarian National Church. The Bulgarian nation — " Bulgar-meleti " — makes its appearance, as it were, in the political world of the Balkans, with the representa- tive of Russia as godfather. In the meantime Prince Michael Obrenovitch had been assassinated, and during the minority of Prince Milan, Serbian policy was suffering from the want of a respectable and respected Government. III. Balkan troubles begin in 1875 with the Herze- govinian insurrection, secretly supported, if not actually fomented, by Austria. The Emperor Alexander II. and Russian public opinion wish to obliterate com- pletely the recollection of the Crimean campaign, to cover Russian arms with new glory, and especially to resume the illustrious part of Defenders of the Christian Faith in the East. The influence of the aged Prince Gortchakoff, who opposes these projects, is definitely on the wane, and the Emperor frames his own policy — allowing for that of his Chancellor — with his Am- bassadors : Ignatieff in Constantinople ; Count Peter Schuvaloff in London ; and M. Novikoff in Vienna. Disorders break out in Bulgaria followed by massacres, horrible as ever, but this time exaggerated rather than suppressed by the Press and European diplomacy. A palace revolution in Constantinople, and a heated struggle for influence between the Embassies of Russia and Great Britain. Serbo-Turkish War, and enormous enthusiasm in Russia for the Serbian cause, which is completely mistaken for the whole Slav cause. IV. Conference at Reichstadt, at which, in order to guarantee the neutrality, or even under certain con- ditions the co-operation, of Austria in a war in the East which we feel to be imminent, we consent beforehand to the Austrian occupation of Bosnia, Herzegovina, and even of the sanjak of Novibazar; in other words we leave Serbia herself within the sphere of Austro- Hungarian influence. Hence the absolute necessity for our policy to found a new autonomous Slav State in the I9I2] RETROSPECT 41 Balkans, which would constitute a sphere for Russian influence. V. War in the East and the creation of the Bulgaria of San Stefano, the Bulgaria of General Ignatieff, in- cluding the whole of Macedonia, closing Salonika, as an outlet, to the Austrians, and the Nish Valley to the Serbians. Revision of the Treaty of San Stefano in Berlin, and considerable restrictions in the boundaries of Bulgaria. Count Schuvaloff, in answer to the lamenta- tions of M. Ristitch, the Serbian Plenipotentiary, advises him to come to an understanding with Austria, and he is perfectly right, in view of the concessions granted by us to Austria-Hungary at Reichstadt. Impressed by these warlike events and by these clauses in the agreements, Serbia and her young King begin practically to submit to the predominating influence of Austria. In the meantime, Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia appear to be genuinely devoted to Russia and amenable to our advice. VI. (1880-1886). An era of internal political quarrels in Bulgaria, in which we take an active part, begins to disturb Russo-Bulgarian relations. The change of reign in Russia, and the faults of Prince Alexander cause us to dislike the latter. Abandoned by Russia, threatened in Bulgaria, the Prince abruptly changes his policy, discards his absolutist tendencies, calls a Radical Government into power, seeks English protection, and to satisfy national wishes, invades Eastern Rumelia. King Milan of Serbia, under pressure from Austria, turns against his neighbour and declares war on him. This unfair and fratricidal blow does not succeed ; the Serbians are defeated at Slivnitza, the Bulgarians occupy Pirot, and are only stopped before the gates of Nish by European interposition. These events, however, con- stitute a real misfortune for the Slav cause in the Balkans, as they inaugurate a long era of distrust and estrangement between the two adjacent countries. VII. During the next few years and up till 1896 the Serbians take advantage of the complete breach between Russia and the Bulgaria of Stamboulov to enhance in 42 SERBO-BULGARIAN RELATIONS [chap. v. our eyes their national aspirations in Macedonia, where they are fighting Bulgarian propaganda. Towards 1890, on the abdication of King Milan and the formation of the new and powerful national party of the Radicals, the Serbians definitely supplant the Bulgarians in the good graces of official and Slavophile Russia : the Treaty of San Stefano is, as it were, tacitly revised by Russia, and the Serbians benefit by the revision. VIII. A new change of reign and the appointment of Prince Lobanoff to the post of Foreign Secretary mark, between 1895 and 1896, a new trend in Russian policy. The Bulgarians return to favour, and very naturally profit by it to attempt once more to place their Macedonian aspirations under Russian protection. The muddled state of Serbian home policy between 1896 and 1900 seems to facilitate this plan. And soon Bulgarian activity redoubles in Macedonia. IX. But Russian policy, taught by experience, will not undertake to protect one of the competitors at the expense of the other, nor allow itself to be forced into separate action in favour of the populations of Mace- donia. Meanwhile a modus vivcndiis inaugurated with Austria, and Macedonia gradually becomes, thanks to our initiative, a sphere for wise intervention by the Powers, with the exception of Germany. The Foreign Secretary and his Russian representatives in Con- stantinople, Vienna, Belgrade and Sofia use their efforts to bring about a reconciliation and more especially a unification of interests between Serbia and Bulgaria. These efforts are not altogether successful. A certain strain of mutual distrust and jealousy always exists. However, the tension is slightly relaxed, even on the dangerous ground of Macedonia, where, during the particularly troublous times of 1903-1908, the struggle between Bulgarians and Serbians becomes less bitter, and in any case never attains to that pitch of ferocity which characterises during the same period the Bul- garian exploits against the Greeks, and vice-versa. The Turkish Revolution helps to check momentarily all I9I2] MACHA VASSILTCHIKOFF 43 rivalries in Macedonia. They are about to begin again when the advent of the new Russophile Grand Ministry in Sofia appears to facilitate our efforts to bring about an understanding between Bulgarians and Serbians, which would prevent a renewal of former hatred and the repetition of former errors. I only spent a few hours in Vienna ; I did not succeed in reserving a sleeping-carriage to Zurich, so had to take a seat in the evening in a small first-class carriage, where a lady was already installed, signifying to me by her presence that I should spend the night sitting bolt upright, and hence without sleep. My surprise was great when I recognised this lady as a very old ac- quaintance of mine. Mademoiselle Marie Vassiltchikoff — Macha Vassiltchikoff, as she was commonly called — an intelligent and cheerful old maid, of enormous size and brilliant colouring, and very light and amusing in con- versation. At one time she had been maid-of-honour, with active duties, to the reigning Empress, and was in high favour with her royal mistress. She was the daughter of Alexander Vassiltchikoff, keeper and head of the collections of the Imperial Hermitage, and laid claim to artistic taste, and placed this taste at the disposal of the Empress, assisting and advising her in the furnishing of the sumptuous apartments of the young Imperial couple in the Winter Palace in St. Petersburg. I do not know whether it was a natural inclination, or a desire to flatter the tastes of her mistress that made the plump Macha go in so very much for the " secessionist " and decadent style which had just sprung into being in Germany, and which had found an august patron in the person of the unbalanced Grand Duke of Hesse-Darmstadt, brother of the Empress of Russia. This style was utterly discordant with the old walls of the Winter Palace, built by the best Italian and French architects of the middle of the eighteenth century. But naturally every one admitted to visit the new Imperial apartments was lost in admiration and praise. Prince 44 SERBO-BULGARIAN RELATIONS [chap v. Lobanoff, then Foreign Secretary, who in art ostensibly cultivated the principles of the great styles of the eighteenth century, alone dared to be outspoken, and each time that he accompanied the Empress into a room in the Palace which had not yet been touched, would exclaim : " Thank goodness, Macha Vassiltchikoff has not been in here!" Man}^ years had elapsed since then, and Macha, who had left the Court, was now living near Vienna, attracted thither by some close friendships she had made in an agreeable and sympathetic little set of the best Austrian society. My travelling companion explained that she was on her way, accompanied by Prince Francis of Lichtenstein (formerly Ambassador to St. Petersburg) and a few of his guests, to the re-opening of the old castle of Vaduz (capital of Lichtenstein), which had recently been restored; she said that she like me had not been able to get a sleeping berth. Having talked for a long time, we settled ourselves as best we could, each in our corner ; we spent a most unpleasant night, and in the morning dashed as soon as we could into the restaurant-car, to solace ourselves with hot coffee. There we found Prince Lichtenstein, who had known me for some time, and a very gay party, in which I found some former good colleagues. When they saw the two of us appear together, after a night spent in a tete-d-tete it was naturally the signal for a running fire of witticisms : we were treated as a newly-married couple, questioned as to our first impressions, etc., etc. Breakfast was ending merrily when the train reached Vaduz, where my travelling companions got out, and a few minutes later I arrived at Landquart, where I was to take the little mountain railway which goes to Davos. I should have been greatly surprised if any one at that moment had predicted that in a few years I should meet the plump Macha Vassiltchikoff again, in Stockholm on her way to St. Petersburg, i//^ Lapland, in order to I9I2] CONVERSATION WITH SAZONOFF 45 play a brief politico-comic part, to her own disadvantage and to her shame. At Davos I had the pleasure of finding M. Sazonoff really on the road to recovery, and the next day I was able to relate and discuss with him the overtures recently made to me by M. Todorov. M. Sazonoff listened most attentively. "Well," said he, when I had finished, "but this is perfect! If only it could come off! Bulgaria closely allied to Serbia in the political and economic sphere ; five hundred thousand bayonets to guard the Balkans — but this would bar the road for ever to German penetration, Austrian invasion ! " " Quite so," I replied ; "but there is also another side to the question which 1 ven- ture to raise. In the first place, I personally do not greatly dread an Austrian militaiy invasion ; I firmly believe that Austria does not nurse such dangerous schemes. Penetration by intrigues, economic stratagems and other means — that I believe in ; and also that such penetration would be effectually checked by a sincere and lasting Serbo-Bulgarian reconciliation ; but in a direct attack with armed forces, no ! I shall never believe in it, except in a completely new situation and under quite exceptional circumstances!^ But on the other hand, I cannot help wondering whether Bulgaria and Serbia, having united their forces (representing more than half a million soldiers — and admirable soldiers, I assure you), are not thinking much less of guarding against Austrian aggres- sion than of attacking Turkey and of settling the Macedonian question by the sword? The Italo-Turkish war may well encourage them in this idea. That is what I fear. The most serious events might well occur at a time when Russia is not ready and she might have to submit to many disagreeable things if she does not wish to be drawn into the fray . . ." 1 I was wrong as it turns out. But one must allow that the general political situation at the moment when I talked to Sazonoff at Davos was quite different from what it was after the two Balkan wars, and more especially after the Treaty of Bukharest. 46 SERBO-BULGARIAN RELATIONS [chap. v. " Oh ! but Russian diplomacy is there to prevent matters taking such a turn," replied the Minister sharply. " We must simply check all dangerous proclivities at once in Sofia and in Belgrade. You tell me that the present Bulgarian Government is quite sincere in regard to Russia ; you also tell me that King Ferdinand seems to you to be very cautious. We have the same impressions about Belgrade. Under the circumstances, I repeat, we shall make both countries listen to reason. You might write to M. Neratoff and ask him for instructions ; for my part, I firmly believe that a loyal agreement, putting an end to all these sad misunderstandings between Serbians and Bulgarians, is highly desirable, and that we ought openly to encourage them to enter into it." This was briefly the pith of my conversation with the Minister. A fortnight later, on my return from Paris, I stopped in Belgrade to talk with M. Hartwig. He appeared to be very well versed in the overtures made to me by M. Todorov, although he did not openly admit this. " The Bulgarians," said my colleague, " have at last understood that they can do nothing without the co-operation of the Serbians. I expected this and I am quite satisfied: if only the Government in Sofia will display in the negotiations about to commence a true conciliatory spirit, and will not ask the Serbians to give up things which they cannot give up ; for at the last attempt to arrange and define the spheres of influence in Macedonia, the Bulgarians would not even abandon their claim to Uskub — the former Serbian capital — which as you must admit was really insane on their part ! But I have reason to believe that this time the Bulgarians will be obliged to be more reasonable. As to my Serbians, I am quite sure of them." " But are you not afraid that, if they come to a complete and formal agreement, the two Slav states may be tempted to throw themselves immediately into the I9I2] M. HARTWIG 47 fray and to attack Turkey, whose dissolution appears to be setting in again? . . ." " Oh ! I feel sure that the Bulgarians would willingly interpret the matter thus. But the Serbians would not allow themselves to be drawn into such a venture, with Austria in the background ! Moreover, they will always listen to our good advice. King Peter is very prudent, and you yourself know the wisdom of M. Pachitch. . . ." We separated with great cordiality, exchanging the promise to communicate with each other on the negotia- tions doubtless about to commence between the two countries. M. Hartwig played such an important part in the events which have occurred since, that I must here attempt to sketch his political portrait. Born and educated in Russia and in exclusively Russian surroundings, this grandson of a German doctor who had emigrated to Russia, had absolutely nothing German about him, either in his appearance or his way of thinking. To the end of his life he remained typically Russian, a Russian student, an enthusiast for certain ideas, devoted up to his death to certain political conceptions, despising formality, and conventionality in appearance, sometimes even in his intercourse with others ignoring the conventions ; vehement and despotic in his opinions, but a good fellow all the same, and willing to forgive the wrongs he had done to others. (A characteristic far more rare than might be supposed.) Poor and lacking patrons, but with a brilliant scholastic career behind him, and possessing the true Russian powers of application and thoroughness, Hartwig soon attracted attention in the Asiatic Depart- ment of the Foreign Office, which he entered on leaving the University of St. Petersburg. At that time the offices of the Ministry were still divided into two definite camps. On one side the "Chancellor's office" — or Minister's Cabinet — full of young men-of-the-world, well connected, well educated, 48 SERBO-BULGARIAN RELATIONS [chap. v. and destined for careers in tlie Embassies and Legations of the West; cleverness at once attracted attention, if any one showed any true ability all the town talked about it. Much stress was laid on good manners and discreet behaviour generally, and scrupulous good- fellowship ; personal intrigue was rigidly excluded, and every young man who went through the successive stages could be sure of promotion in his turn; ex- ceptions were only made — and approved of among the men themselves — in those cases of recognised striking ability alluded to above. On the other side, the Asiatic Department were supplied from divers grades of society, to which the former Directors had tried to attract the talent and intelligence of the day. Those who were admitted were destined to diplomatic and consular careers in the Near East and in Persia. And as a matter of fact, talents abounded in this profession between the forties and eighties of last century. Later on the composition of this Ministry, which had been so brilliant under Prince Gortchakoff, deteriorated as he grew older and feebler, and men of talent became more rare in the Asiatic Department. But all the same Hartwig had to push himself forward. The ambitious young man became one of the informants of the Novoye Vreuija, which at the time was pursuing the Ministry with criticism and accusing it of lack of vigour and patriotism, more especially in Eastern affairs ; he also kept in touch with our General Staff, which indulged in the same criticism of our diplomacy. But one must admit that it was not personal views alone which induced Hartwig to become the echo of these critics and to furnish them with material ; all his life he had been a staunch adherent of a policy of action in the Near East and in Central Asia; and he devoted his zeal and his talents to this end. It was during the ad- ministration of Count Lamsdorf that Hartwig's career received its true impetus. He promptly became the right hand of the amiable and retiring Minister, who, an I9I2] HARTWIG'S EARLY CAREER 49 ardent worker himself, appreciated unceasing work and devotion to duty in others. Moreover, without entirely shelving his "Activist" convictions in the sphere of our eastern policy, Hartwig succeeded, as long as the Lamsdorf Ministry lasted, in restraining his ardour and in bowing to the wisely Opportunist views of his chief. Appointed Director of the Asiatic Department, he soon became known and recognised in High Places, and when in 1904 Lamsdorfs successor appointed him Minister to Teheran, Hartwig left to take up the post rather as if he were in disgrace, for he had aspired either to the Embassy in Constantinople or to the post of Foreign Secretary. After two years in Teheran, his relations with his colleague of Great Britain became impossible; they no longer spoke to each other, they hardly even bowed ; as at the moment we were inaugurating the entente with England, the two Ministers were recalled by common consent, and Hartwig was appointed to Belgrade. Having spent all his life (with the exception of two short visits to Montenegro and Burgas) in the offices of the Asiatic Department specialising in the Slav question, Hartwig had gained a knowledge not only of Balkan questions and records, but up to a point of the people themselves. To him were sent all the Slavs who came to St. Petersburg : political exiles and refugees, ministers on missions, young princes and princesses educated at the expense of the Court in privileged schools and institutions, etc. Amongst all these people, whom he received with good-nature and in whose favour he interceded with his chiefs, "Nicolas Henricovitch " was deservedly popular. He found himself at once amongst old acquaintances when he took up his post in Belgrade, where he had access to everything, and where he might flatter himself that his advice would be listened to and followed. On this score he experienced a few dis- appointments. But with the innate adaptability of his nature, he appropriated those very ideas which it was his duty to fight, and made himself their authorised 50 SERBO-BULGARIAN RELATIONS [chap. v. champion ; so that they often were approved of by our Foreign Office, where he had left a few fervent friends and some devoted admirers. But one must allow that, in order to have his support, every cause had to bear the stamp of very orthodox Slavophilism, i.e. of hostility to Austria and devotion to Russia. Very intelligent, as 1 said before, gifted with a wonderful memory, and having read and studied much, Hartwig had two flaws in his reasoning powers which sometimes obscured his judgment and hampered his actions. In the first place, he had too much confidence in the might of his own pen, when writing minutes, dispatches, etc. ; his career had endued him with the soul of the publicist and brilliant official writer. With him, an apt syllogism often took the place of the inexorable logic of facts. Secondly, this man, so near the zenith of his career, had framed for himself a political system which was absolutely arbitrary, in- genuous even : Hartwig firmly believed — and said so openly — that it was quite possible for Russia to remain on the best terms with Germany, whilst striving to outdo Austria in every possible way. In St. Petersburg he had always endeavoured to be friendly towards the German Embassy ; in his two posts as Minister, he maintained the best possible relations with his German colleagues. Officially the Germans did the same, but in their heart of hearts they did not like him ; they saw in him a fanatic and a muddler, and suspected him of duplicity. I have always wondered how a man of Hartwig's intellectual worth could fail to see that in Berlin for years they had thoroughly espoused the Austrian cause in the East ; that they had made it their own; that they were driving Austria towards Salonika whilst they were taking possession more and more of Constantinople. To come to a friendly agreement with Austria which should contain nothing disadvantageous, to Germany — that might be contemplated as a merely'' opportunist and temporary policy ! But to attempt to cement a true friendship either with Germany to the I9I2] HARTWIG'S CHARACTERISTICS 5* exclusion of Austria, or with the latter to the exclusion of Germany — here was a policy doomed to failure and, what is more, which might become extremely dangerous at any moment ! I knew the character and the opinions of my colleague of Belgrade long before I was appointed to Sofia, I knew he was as popular in Bulgaria as he was in Serbia, that he had much influence and commanded authentic sources for private information. I was therefore pre- pared beforehand to learn that when the Serbo-Bulgarian negotiations began, Hartwig would wish to play a prominent part in them. Personally I saw no objection to this, and I should have been glad if my colleague had been successful in certain cases in obtaining from the Bulgarians from afar what I should not have been able to obtain from them on the spot. But the continuation of the negotiations proved that whenever it was a question of national claims, all restraining action became difficult in Belgrade, impossible in Sofia. CHAPTER VI THE SERBO-BULGARIAN TREATY The Serbo-Bulgarian negotiations lasted from October, 191 1, till February, 1912. The place chosen was Sofia, King Ferdinand being very persistent on this point : he pretended that Belgrade, owing to its geographical position, was infested with Austro-Hungarian spies ; but the fact of the matter was that it flattered his vanity to see the Serbians coming, as it were, to him ! The negotiations were to be conducted with the utmost secrecy, and only the respective Russian Ministers were allowed to know what was going on. In point of fact, Hartwig and I were the constant arbiters, continually consulted, and referred to in each difficulty, however small, by both parties. The negotiations were soon concentrated almost exclusively on the defining of the spheres of influence in Macedonia, and finally four months were spent in fixing the future frontier between Serbia and Bulgaria. In discussing the line of this frontier in spc, the two parties showed such an entire lack of any conciliatory spirit that I am still wondering how they ever arrived at any agreement ! After long preliminary debates the}^ at last agreed on the two extreme points of this famous frontier. These were : in the north-east the spot where at that period the frontiers of Turkey, Bulgaria and Serbia converged ; in the south-west the northern point of Lake Ochrida. But then the line between these two points had to be drawn. As it was manifestly impossible to send a com- mission to work on the spot (the Turks might have taken this amiss ! ), it was necessary to rely on the most detailed maps of the Russian, Serbian and Bulgarian 52 I9I2] SPHERES OF INFLUENCE 53 General Staffs. The demarcation of the boundary-line gave rise to endless discussions ; each elevation, each village, each stream was bitterly disputed, and to solve the question they sought now the interposition of the Russian Ministers, now the topographical authority of our military agents. Each side wished to mark the frontier by a curved line, curving outwards as far as possible into the future territory of the competitor ; but by dint of arguing, a remarkably straight line was arrived at — and this in spite of the very uneven surface configuration of Macedonia — the result — well-known in physics — of two equal efforts working in an inverse sense ! On the Bulgarian side it was M. Gueshov and M. Todorov who were the most amenable and the most willing to arrive at a sincere agreement, whereas M. Danev and the military, as was moreover to be expected, displayed inflexible obstinacy. So far as the principal re- presentative of Serbian interests — the Serbian Minister in Sofia, M. Spalaikovitch (later on Minister in St. Peters- burg) — was concerned, his vehement nationalism was tempered by the sincere desire to cause Slav solidarity to triumph on this question. Very hasty and very impressionable, M. Spalaikovitch had always been dis- tinguished by his straightforwardness and sincerity, as well as by his keen intelligence : on the whole it was the quintessence of the Serbian nature ; the bonds of friendship which I kept up with him often enabled me to have a soothing and restraining influence on him. Throughout the conferences — more especially during the first three months — King Ferdinand aff'ected to hold himself aloof from them and to give a free hand to his Ministers. He only mentioned the subject to me two or three times. The first time was at the end of November, at the wedding of my eldest daughter, to which the Court and the Diplomatic Corps came. That day, in a brief aside, the King told me of the satisfaction he felt about the Serbo-Bulgarian negotiations ; but he sug- gested a few doubts as to the sincerity of the Serbians. I 54 SERBO-BULGARIAN TREATY [chap. vi. hastened to assure His Majesty, by reason of information received from Belgrade, that the Serbians truly desired to arrive at the most complete agreement with Bulgaria, The second time I went into the subject much more thoroughly with the King. This was on the 6th (19th) December, the birthday of His Majesty the Emperor. It was customary on that day for the King to accept an invitation to luncheon at the Russian Legation, and in the evening for him to give a State dinner followed by a grand reception at the Royal Castle. After the luncheon, having held little formal conversations with every one in iturn, the King came into my study and we talked together for some time. In the course of conversation the King, for the first time, mentioned certain fears he entertained concerning the actual fact of the Serbo-Bulgarian negotiations. His Majesty expressed the rather justifiable thought that if the substance of these conferences came to be known by Vienna and Berlin, the Central Powers might bring for- ward the whole Balkan question and raise difficulties which primarily would not suit St. Petersburg. "That is why," said the King in conclusion, "one cannot possibly be too prudent either in the negotiations them- selves, or as to the ends which these negotiations are to attain." This time Ferdinand seemed to me to be sincere ; doubts and fears were always much more frankly ex- pressed by him than any other sentiments or motives of his complex mind. Up to a point I shared the opinion of the august speaker. The Serbo-Bulgarian con- ferences, in this respect, did most certainly present certain dangers. Of course, the chief reason of Fer- dinand's fears lay in his desire not to break definitely with Vienna; but at the same time, he sincerely dreaded the risk of war, and he fully realised that this risk existed as the result of a Serbo-Bulgarian alliance, based solely on the partition of Macedonia. Bearing in mind the words of the Emperor, and constantly remembering my last conversation with Sazonoff" in which he had ex- pressed his conviction that the chief aim of Russian I9I2] I WARN ST. PETERSBURG 55 diplomacy should consist in avoiding all conflict in the Near East, I, as representative of Russia, was com- pletely at one with King Ferdinand the moment it was a question of avoiding the possibility of war. Con- sequently, in the course of conversation I tried to induce him to express more definitely his dread of a collision with Turkey; but the King avoided doing this : he truly dreaded war, but he was not going to have it said that he dreaded it. In the dispatches which I sent off every fortnight to St. Petersburg, to M. Neratoff and then to M. Sazonoff on his return from Davos, I related in detail the progress of the Serbo-Bulgarian negotiations ; but each of my dispatches was accompanied by a private and confidential letter in which I did not omit to point out the danger of war which might be brought about by the Serbo-Bulgarian agreement, so much extolled and desired by us. I laid great stress on the facts that the negotiations were now exclusively concerned with territorial demarcation and with the defining of a frontier in spe between Bulgaria and Serbia ; that throughout the conferences 1 could not observe a desire to arrive at a really cordial agreement between the two countries ; that these conferences were assuming a character of mere political opportunism, and that the Italo-Turkish war which was going on meanwhile certainly incited the Balkan States to action. Each time the answer from St. Petersburg was to the effect that we certainly would not hear of an armed collision in the Balkans, and that everything must be done to prevent such a collision, but that, on the other hand, a Serbo- Bulgarian agreement would be particularly welcome and agreeable to us, because it would constitute an eftectual barrier against Austro-German penetration in the Peninsula. In the following dispatch I expressed my complete adherence to this point of view of the Ministry, but at the same time I reiterated my apprehensions. To which the answer was once more that " although on the one hand one would . . . etc. . , . notwithstanding, 56 SERBO-BULGARIAN TREATY [ciiap.vi. on the other hand, one perhaps etc., etc ! . . ." This exchange of views lasted till the beginning of February, 1912, when the famous frontier-line was at last settled and marked on the map of Macedonia, and nothing re- mained to be done but to sign the agreement. At this juncture I was informed from St. Petersburg that His Majesty the Emperor, when receiving the Bulgarian military attache, had expressed to him in very precise terms his desire to see the Serbo-Bulgarian agreement concluded and signed. From that moment I no longer felt myself justified in expressing doubts and fears as to the agreement. Roma locuta — causa finita. The Serbo-Bulgarian agreement was signed by the Serbian and Bulgarian Foreign Secretaries in the last days of February, 191 2, and ratified by the two Sovereigns under date of March 13th, which in this leap-3^ear corresponded to February 29th, O.S. I have often remembered, since, the superstitions attached in the West to the number 13, and in Russia to the date of February 29th, which is considered singularly unlucky. But the fact that it had been possible to keep the conclusion of the agreement a complete secret may have consoled the interested parties for this. No one had any idea of it, except Russia, and those to whom we judged it fit and proper later on to confide the secret. Turkey and the Powers of the Triple Alliance only knew of the Serbo-Bulgarian compact when the Balkan War broke out. It is true that our Foreign Secretary had received from Belgrade some information as to the secret of the agreement having been betrayed by Ferdinand to the Austrian Court. Later on, in 1913, this retrospective disclosure appeared in the Novoye V^rernja. Nevertheless it was quite untrue, and our Foreign Secretary had an opportunity of proving to hivcis^Mirrefittably that in Vienna, as in Berlin, there was no idea of the Serbo-Bulgarian agreement till shortly before the Balkan War, and that the German Minister in Sofia denied up to the end, that is till the mobilisation, the very existence of the agreement. I consider it I0I2] COMING OF AGE OF PRINCE BORIS 57 necessary, however, in alluding to the ignorance of the agreement on the part of the Powers of the Triple Alliance to except the military spheres of Italy. But I shall deal with this question later on. The close of the Serbo-Bulgarian negotiations almost coincided with the festivities held for the coming of age of the heir to the Bulgarian throne, Prince Boris. King Ferdinand wished to invest this anniversary with all the pomp possible. Invitations had been issued to related and neighbouring Courts, and for the nth (24th) of February members of the Royal Families and ambassadors extraordinary arrived in Sofia, entrusted with the congratulations and good wishes customary on these occasions. The Emperor of Russia, godfather to young Prince Boris, sent as his representative to Sofia the Grand- Duke Andrew (son of the Grand-Duchess Vladimir). The Crown-Princes of Serbia, Montenegro, Greece and Rumania, the Archduke Charles Albert, the Prince of Prussia, Leopold, completed the group of august person- ages that King Ferdinand, accompanied by his two sons, received at the station in Sofia with military honours and all customary ceremonial. The Ambassadors of the other European Powers, of the United States, and of Turkey all enhanced by their presence the brilliancy of the festivity, which was favoured with exceptionally fine weather. For three days the streets of Sofia, usually rather deserted, were enlivened by automobiles and royal carriages conveying the King's guests and their suites to feasts in the Palace, to receptions and to military parades. The Castle of Sofia, ordinarily so dark and gloomy, was brilliantly illuminated, and filled with the gay life of festivity and by a crowd of courtiers in full dress. The Russian Grand-Duke, as the repre- sentative of the godfather of Prince Boris, took the first place at all ceremonies. Among the princely guests. Prince Alexander of Serbia was the one who made the best impression on ?8 SERBO-BULGARIAN TREATY [ciim'. vi. me. Serious and sincere in manner, he displayed much tact during his stay in Sofia ; he talked a great deal and very willingly with the Bulgarian politicians, preserving an attitude of official respect towards King Ferdinand ; he treated Prince Boris with sincere good-fellowship ; his manner was unassuming, yet perfectly dignified. The Austrian Archduke, still quite young and allowed for the first time in his life to go to foreign parts — and on an official mission, too! — behaved with exemplary modesty, always looking to his governor — an ultra-correct Austrian General. Finally Prince Leopold of Prussia presented the really curious type of a Prussian officer half automaton, half decadent. It seemed as if his every movement was planned in order not to make creases in his extremely well-cut uniform ; even his conversation — if a few short sentences uttered in a perfectly monotonous voice can be called "conversation" — seemed to belong to some ingenious German machine. This Prussian Prince had at one time found special favour in the eyes of the Emperor William, who revived for him the grade of Field-Marshal-Colonel, in disuse since 1800. But on discovering that no real ability was concealed behind the military rigidity of the Prince, William was dis- illusioned about his protege, and henceforth only em- ployed him in formalities. The sending of Prince Leopold to the solemnities in Sofia emphasised the German Emperor's wish to show perfect coldness to- wards Bulgaria and her Sovereign, though at the same time displaying a great deal of correctness ; William desired nothing from the Bulgarians and offered them nothing. In Berlin the choice of persons to whom missions of etiquette and ceremonial were entrusted was always influenced by ulterior motives and certain ideas, and in no way by the desire to please those to whom they were sent. Amongst us, unfortunately, this was never noticed and never well understood. The festivities for the coming of age of Prince Boris ,912] FERDINAND'S REQUEST 59 and the ratification of the Serbo-Bulgarian agreement ended the first winter-season of my stay in Sofia; during this winter my wife and I had given a series of dinners and receptions to Bulgarian society, to the Court, and to the Diplomatic Corps. Having successfully terminated an important negotiation and fulfilled all my social duties, I could think of undertaking my journey ad limina, i.e. of going to St. Petersburg, to explain the ulterior aims of our Balkan policy, and to discuss certain questions of the hour with M. Sazonoff. Among these questions, one in particular would have to be discussed verbally and very secretly. At the beginning of the winter which was just over, the Minister of Finance, M. Todorov, with whom I was on excellent personal terms, and in whom I had much confidence, had come to see me one day to tell me of a very confidential and quite unexpected request made to me by King Ferdinand. It was this : His Majesty was in great financial difficulties, he was especially worried by a debt of a million and a half francs (or Austrian crowns, which amounted to about the same) which he owed to the Laender Bank (Banque des Pays Autrichiens) of Vienna, and the Bank for some time had been making difficulties; it demanded securities or mortgages which the Bulgarian Court would not or could not give; it refused further credit ; and meantime money was scarce in the Palace, and Ferdinand was often reduced to selling, not without difficulty, short-dated Court bonds to the Sofia banks for trifling sums. In order to put an end to this humiliating state of things, the King begged me to arrange with one of our large financial houses in St. Petersburg for a loan of two million francs, as a mortgage on his property of Vrana, situated a few kilometres from Sofia, a property small in area, where the King was laying out a beautiful garden and building a villa. His Majesty, according to M. Todorov, under- stood perfectly well that no Russian bank would accept such a mortgage without receiving supplementary security on the part of the Russian Government ; the 6o SERBO-BULGARIAN TREATY [chap. vi. difficulties which latterly the Laender Bank was always raising for the King were apparently mainly actuated by the displeasure felt by the Austrians at the present Bulgarian policy ; ergo, it entered into our calculations to liberate King Ferdinand from all pecuniary obligation to Vienna, and thus to acquire fresh claims on his sincere gratitude. I answered Todorov by saying that while refusing to enter into these latter arguments, I would at once fulfil the King's wish and would forward his request to St. Petersburg and second it. I did this in a special and very confidential letter to M. Neratoff, who was still managing the Foreign Office. Amongst other things I said that such a loan must most certainly not be considered a means of buying Ferdinand ; that I remem- bered perfectly, during my stay in Belgrade, how our Government, on the entreaties of my chief, M. Persiant, had paid King Milan, who had just abdicated, a million francs on condition that he left the country for ever and never interfered again in the home or foreign policy of Serbia. Milan took the money and left for Paris, but when the last few thousand francs had been lost in gambling or spent on women, he returned quite naturally to Belgrade, as being the only place where he could exist decently, but where his presence soon caused fresh trouble. And it was we who were blamed by public opinion for having given money to a father to enable him to desert his son — a minor ! So I wrote to Neratoff that I wished frankly to warn the Ministry against the erroneous idea that one could buy Ferdinand with those two millions. It was not money that would secure to us a lasting influence in Bul- garia, but systematic and laborious work. Nevertheless, the moment the King was obliged to beg such a favour of us, I considered that we ought to grant it frankly, simply, and without any humiliating conditions. Such a course of action would bind Ferdinand up to a point, and in any case would make our relations with him more intimate. M. Neratoff promptly replied that he I9I2] THE LOAN ARRANGED 6i shared my point of view ; and that he would certainly forward the King's request to the right quarter. But from that moment I had received no further information on the subject, and decided to elucidate the question personally in St. Petersburg. I think it necessary to relate here the end of this affair. Ferdinand's request met with decided opposition at first from M. Kokovtzoff, who as Minister of Finance refused to give any security whatsoever to the society which might be willing to advance the sum in question to the King of Bulgaria. Speaking politically and as President of the Council, M. Kokovtzoff had no objection to granting the King this small favour and was willing to recommend the affair to one of our large banks, but he would not hear of a State guarantee; but without such guarantee no bank would do business. The discussions dragged on for a few months longer, and after renewed entreaties on my part and fresh favourable intervention from M. Sazonoft, the affair was arranged thus : the two million francs were advanced to Ferdinand by the Banque d'Escompte of St. Petersburg; but in reality the money was supplied from the personal funds of His Majesty the Emperor, at five per cent, interest, with repayment spread over a certain number of years. When 1 left Bulgaria towards the end of 1913, the Court of Sofia had already paid the first instalment of this debt. I do not know if it was as punctual in 1914 ; but I should, above all things, be interested to know whether King Ferdinand discharged this debt of honour (he knew whence the two million came) before he definitely passed over to the camp of our enemies, and before he treacherously stabbed heroic Serbia in the back? If Ferdinand did not do so, it is an additional stain on his character. But let us return to the month of March, 1912. Before leaving Sofia for St. Petersburg it was absolutely necessary for me to see the King. However, Ferdinand had had, as if purposely, an attack of his usual ailment — 62 SERBO-BULGARIAN TREATY [chap.vi. the gout— and always kept on putting off my audience. I learnt at last from a fairly authentic source that the King's illness was a diplomatic one, and that for special reasons known to himself alone, he did not wish to see me at the moment or to have the necessary politcal interview with me. Thus forewarned I thought it imperative to insist on my audience, by declaring that I should not go on leave till I had seen the King. Two days after 1 was invited to the Palace. His Majesty received me in his study ; he was half lying on a wide leather sofa; one of his legs was wrapped in a plaid rug, testifying to the attack of gout. On a table next the sofa a few art treasures were littered about : an antique Byzantine crucifix in carved wood set in silver — the gift, if I am not wrong, of the Metro- politan of Moscow; an old snuff-box in gold — the gift of the Empress Alexandra ; a box with artistic miniatures — a souvenir of the Emperor Nicolas II. In his hand, white, dimpled and well cared-for, the King held a crutch-stick with a gold knob in the old Russian style, similar to that with which John the Terrible was always armed ; only the steel point which ended the stick of the Tsar of all the Russias and which the bloodthirsty autocrat sometimes dug into the foot of an undesirable questioner by leaning his whole weight on the knob, was replaced on that of the Tsar of the Bulgarians — for the greater wellbeing of his visitors — by a common rubber end ; the crutch had been given to the King by his cousin the Grand-Duchess Vladimir. "You see before you, Monsieur," began the King, "a poor invalid surrounded by a few of his treasures, valuable by reason of their associations. Here is my sole consolation in my sufferings," he continued, point- ing to the old crucifix, "here, . . ." and the King began to show me the artistic treasures which consoled him on his bed of sickness, and to tell me about their Russian origin. This preamble over, Ferdinand came down to facts. He began by expressing his very vivid fears on the I9I2] FERDINAND'S PERPLEXITIES 67, subject of a possible disclosure of the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty. "They are so imprudent in the Palace of Belgrade ; every one has access to it and they talk to every one. Moreover, the whole of Belgrade is full of Austrian, and especially Hungarian, spies. Hence what would my position be if the old Emperor Francis-Joseph got to know of the agreement that I have just signed, and which has all the appearance of being chiefly directed against the monarchy of the Hapsburgs? And I feel sure that the Serbians will not fail to boast everywhere of their friendship with Bulgaria, that they will allow it to be understood in Vienna that henceforth they can depend on us ; and the Serbian irredentists, that King Peter's Government cannot keep in hand — as / can keep the Macedonians — will not miss the opportunity to annoy Austria in Bosnia and in Herzegovina. And finally, we two, that is Bulgaria and Serbia, instead of profiting by our agreement to guard the rights of our kin in Macedonia, shall be forced to arms in all haste to uphold our own integrity and our own independence. I would entreat you most earnestly, Monsieur, to make my apprehensions known in St. Petersburg and to explain the true state of affairs. I shall await your return with impatience. For my part, I have already given the necessary instructions to General Papriskov" (at that time Bulgarian Minister in St. Petersburg). I listened with some astonishment to the long-winded explanations of the King, in which truth was mingled with lies and clumsy fictions alternated with real opinions and fears. King Ferdinand was sincere when he acknowledged himself guilty towards the Emperor Francis-Joseph. Accustomed from his early youth to respect the aged monarch, he felt truly uneasy at the idea that in the Castle of Schoenbrunn he might be looked on as a traitor and an enemy. The fears which the King expressed on the subject of the Serbian irredentists were also well founded. But what he said about the Palace of Belgrade bore the stamp of wilful exaggeration. 64 SERBO-BULGARIAN TREATY [chap.vi. Most certainly the doors of this palace were thrown open to all Serbians; King Peter did not shut himself up as King Ferdinand did in his study, only admitting those whom he wished to instruct on some point, or those from whom he hoped to hear some interesting gossip. King Peter, taking his j'olc of constitutional monarch very seriously, talked freely with all the representatives of Serbian democracy, interchanging ideas and information with them ; but above all he was guided by the opinions of his strictly constitutional Ministry. Though opening his door to every one, he did not really open it wide, just as he really only disclosed his thoughts and sentiments to true Serbian patriots who were incapable of having any dealings with the enemies of the country. King Peter did not recruit his servants, informants and secret counsellors from the ranks of those persons who were compromised in the eyes of the nation and the law ; among Jiis satellites one did not find a Ghennadiev, a Radoslavov, a General Savov and other doubtful characters of this type ! As to the fact that the newly-signed agreement would necessitate a fresh political situation for Bulgaria, the King could not be unaware of it. The frequent warnings that I had issued on the subject to M. Gueshov and the other members of his Government throughout the course of the negotiations wd'e perfectly well known to him. Taking advantage of the circumstances and of the words that the King had just uttered, I considered it my duty to repeat these warnings to His Majesty. " I am afraid," I said, " that the entirely new situation arising from the Serbo-Bulgarian agreement is not sufficiently clearly understood in Bulgaria. By signing this agree- ment Bulgarian policy has entered on a new course, accurately outlined, and cannot now turn back; having formed ties that cannot be broken with Serbia, Bulgaria has bound herself, by that very fact, to us, and the two Governments will have henceforth to listen very atten- tively to our advice if they really wish to attain their national aims. As to the apprehensions of your Majesty I9I2] I WARN HIS MAJESTY 65 on the subject of Austria, you may rely entirely on us. My august Master does not wish for war, at all costs he will avoid anything that might bring it about ; and we will warn the Serbians, in the most explicit manner, against all dangerous impulses, against anything which might justly irritate the Central Powers. On the other hand, if the two Balkan countries, henceforth united, were to be attacked without cause by Austria we should doubtless look on such aggression as a challenge hurled directly at us. Moreover, Your Majesty knows my opinion and probably shares it, this opinion being that Austria — under present conditions anyhow — would not dare to risk an aggression without due cause. Finally, touching the justifiable claim of Bulgaria and Serbia to protect their kin in Turkey — for us the question resolves itself thus : on the one hand, as Your Majesty knows so well, we should not wish to do anything conducive to an armed collision in the Near East, and I have repeatedly informed the Royal Government that in St. Petersburg everything will be done to prevent such a collision. But on the other hand, we realise perfectly well that the best way to prevent any untoward events would be to resume and successfully to terminate the international work so well started in Macedonia before the Turkish Revolution. At that period one of the stumbling blocks to the work had been Serbo-Bulgarian rivalry. This rivalry once disposed of, our work will become far easier, and Your Majesty may rest assured that we shall avail ourselves of this improved situation." While I was unfolding these ideas of mine, Ferdinand's expression became more and more gloomy. He refrained, however, from all controversy and, passing over to personal subjects, soon dismissed me with the same studied politeness and amiable words as heretofore. But under this apparent amiability I thought I detected signs of displeasure, coldness, even hostility! 1 have since been told — and had, moreover, found it out for myself — that the beginning of my personal rupture with Ferdinand dated from this significant 66 SERBO-BULGARIAN TREATY [charvi. conversation. The King realised that I had no intention of becoming the blind interpreter of his opinions to the Imperial Government ; he also understood that the Serbo- Bulgarian treaty gave a certain hold over him to Russian policy and consequently to the representatives of the Tsar. Ferdinand felt that certain alleys were henceforth closed to him : the feeling was unbearable and roused his anger against the Russian Minister who contemplated hampering the freedom of his political enterprises. M. Gueshov, with whom I had a long interview on the eve of my departure, did not display any apprehension — in contrast to his master — on the score of the newly- signed agreement, and repeated the opinion, already expressed by him during the course of the negotiations with Spalaikovitch, that the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty, concluded under the aegis of Russia, would necessarily involve the conclusion of military conventions between the two contracting parties as well as between both of them and Russia. I had already imparted this suggestion of M. Gueshov's to M. Sazonoff, and added — as my private opinion— that such conventions, drawn up, of course, on strictly defensive lines, might furnish us with further means of preventing ill-timed action on the part of the two Balkan kingdoms. The answer was delayed, and on taking leave of M. Gueshov, I promised him that I would go into the question in St. Petersburg, and would bring him back a definite answer from M. Sazonoff. CHAPTER VII RASPUTIN I ARRIVED in St. Petersburg at the end of March, after an absence of a year. I recollect as if it were yesterday, the first impression of a political nature that I received : the very morning of my arrival, on looking over the Novoye Vreinja, I noticed a short article in which the speech made the evening before by M. Goutchkoff at the Duma was quoted. This speech was a brief but vehement diatribe against certain sinister influences which were dominating the Court and beginning to interfere in Government affairs. I at once realised that this was aimed at the famous Gregory Rasputin. But as up till then I had only heard the strange influence of this individual at Tsarskoe-Selo spoken of as a mystico-hysterical whim of the Empress Alexandra's, and as, on the other hand, the Emperor was not in any case very devoted to Goutchkoff", I dis- approved of this new philippic, which would cause further estrangement between His Majesty and the former President of the Duma: whereas I considered that it would be advantageous to the aff'airs of the country if the Emperor were occasionally to confer with this influential and very well-informed member of our Parliament, who with ardent patriotism and recog- nised authority presided over the Commission of National Defence. In short, I inwardly accused Goutchkoff" of a want of tact. I was thinking all this over when I went to luncheon with a near relation of mine. This relation was also related to Goutchkoff" and did not like him much, and in our intimate conversations often alluded to him as an ambitious man who had become embittered and restless. 67 F n^ RASPUTIN [chap.vii On arriving at my relation's house, 1 found him talking at the telephone: " Is that you, my dear? I ventured to ring you up on the telephone to tell you how very much I admired your excellent speech of yesterday at the Duma. . . . No, no ! do not excuse yourself for a good deed; you have only done your duty as a citizen : it is very regrettable that every one else does not do the same," etc. ... I could not believe my ears, and when my relation had at last finished his conversation, I exclaimed: " Is it really you talking ? How many times have I quarrelled with you by standing up for Goutchkoff when you were abusing him ; and now you overwhelm him with compliments, whereas I — I frankly admit — considered his speech to be a want of tact. What does this change mean?" "Listen," replied my host, "do not let us lose time in idle discussion : you see a great many more people in St. Petersburg than I do ; in three days from now you will have seen and heard so much that there will be nothing left for me to tell you. And then we shall see what you will say ! " My relation was only wrong about the time-limit ! On the evening of the very next day, I had only one remark to make to him : " You were perfectly right ; but, good God ! how sad it all is, and what is more hozv dangerous ! " I had heard the name of Rasputin mentioned in St. Petersburg for the first time in 1908. An intimate friend of mine with whom I was discussing Court affairs — I forget exactly why — said amongst other things : " There are strange rumours in circulation among the public, or rather, among the people ! Yesterday, my wife's house- keeper — you know the one we have had for more than ten years — came into my study and said : * Pray excuse me, sir, but I have something I wish to say to you. I have often heard you complain that your son-in-law could not get the post which had been promised to him ages ago. . . . Well ! I believe I can help you.' 'You! my good woman; but in what way?' 'In this way. My sister, who is also in domestic service, I9I2] HIS ORIGIN 69 told me the other day that her master and mistress often receive a certain "old man " — a man of the people, quite simple : but he is received with a great deal of fuss ; and he has already been an enormous help to that family; he has been able to help many others, as he is quite intimate with the Tsar and Tsarina, who do everything that he tells them. Allow me to beg my sister to speak to the " old man " in your son-in-law's favour ! * As you may imagine," continued my friend, "I did not consent to this curious suggestion; but it is odd what rumours there are about amongst the people ! It is evidently a question of a new Papus or of another M. Philip, only of Russian origin and in the popular style !" While I was spending the winter of 1910-11 in St. Petersburg, rumours and inquiries on the subject of Gregory Rasputin had been the rage in society. It was relatively known that this " old man " or " poor innocent " was a native of Siberia, that he had formerly led a particularly dissolute life ("Rasputin" is derived from " rasputny " = dissolute person) ; that then suddenly he became a"trezvennik," i.e. a preacher of temperance and piety, and that, henceforth protected by a few great ecclesiastical dignitaries, he was summoned by them to St. Petersburg. There, through the " Montenegrins " — the Grand-Duchesses Militza and Stana — and through the salon — " little parish " — of Countess Sophie Ignatieff, he finally worked his way up to the Court, where he finds a patroness and so to speak an impresario in the person of the divorced lady Vyrouboff, nee Taneieff. However, as during this winter of 1910-11, the Empress Alexandra did not shut herself up so completely as in former years, and was apparently feeling quite well, which means that she was behaving more or less normally, there was much less open mention of Rasputin and the Vyrouboff; moreover, the influence of these persons had not yet extended to Government affairs. But matters had assumed a very different aspect during the year that I had spent out of Russia. It appears that in the meantime a group of low " opportunists " 70 RASPUTIN [chap. VII. had sprung up, who, aware of the ever-increasing influence of the Siberian rogue over the august person- ages of Tsarskoe-Selo, set themselves out to guide Rasputin, and allied themselves to the Vyrouboff and her relations in order to gain access to the public offices of the State and particularly to the public funds. One began to hear the names of a Prince Andronnikoff, of a M. Manus, of a MiassoTedoff, and they were spoken of as people who were plotting great things and influencing even the Government. The waiting-room of the uncouth moujik Rasputin was filled every morning by persons coming to ask favours, amongst whom one met with people of position and of the upper classes ; they showed each other notes scrawled by this same Rasputin in a common style and an appalling hand- writing, and in which he recommended some humble protege or some one in need of assistance to the good graces of such and such a Minister. One heard at the same time that the ecclesiastical dignitary who had contributed the most to Rasputin's good fortune had just written a letter to the Emperor in which he revealed the depravity of his ex-protege, and repented bitterly of having introduced him at the Palace ; the honest but ingenuous bishop concluded his epistle by entreating the Emperor to send Rasputin away; for himself, he implored permission to retire as a simple monk into a monastery, in order to do penance there to the end of his da3^s. The story went that the bishop received a very gracious reply from the Emperor, earnestly begging him to remain at the head of his diocese : but Rasputin still continued in high favour. At one time, influenced by a few letters of this kind, the statements of a few officials and some serious warnings, the Emperor did make up his mind to send Rasputin back to his Siberian village, where the adventurer arrived loaded with magnificent gifts and provided with a considerable sum of money ; but by the time I arrived in St. Petersburg all the town was indignantly talking about the return of the "old man " 1912] A SUBJECT FOR SCANDAL n to the capital, and they quoted the names of such and such a lady and of such and such an official, whose houses, in the evening, were the scene of strange religious rites conducted by Rasputin.^ Much comment was also caused by the resignation of two maids-of-honour, specially attached to the Palace : Princess Obolensky, a person noted for her wit, tact, and kindness of heart, who at one time was very intimate with the Empress, and Mile. Tutcheff, much esteemed for her character and her intelligence, to which she owed her position as governess to the Imperial children. The latter had several times protested vehemently against the repeated visits of the " old man" to her august pupils, visits during which he allowed himself to take liberties which were unnecessary to say the least of it. Mile. Tutcheff was promised that this should not occur again, and Rasputin's departure brought the desired solution of the question. But now the terrible scoundrel had reappeared at Tsarskoe- Selo, the question revived with added acuteness and Mile. Tutcheff, foreseeing a return to former practices, definitely left her charming pupils and the Court. My first official visit in St. Petersburg was naturally to our Foreign Secretary. Having discussed with him all that had happened in Bulgaria since our last con- versation at Davos, I begged M. Sazonoff, as was customary, to procure me an audience of His Majesty the Emperor. " The Emperor will probably receive you during this week. To-morrow is the day for my report to Tsarskoe-Selo and I will take the opportunity to inform His Majesty of your arrival." "And does the Empress Alexandra not receive?" "Oh no! She has been ailing for a long time, and in general things are not going well in that quarter." " But what is wrong?" ^ Rasputin was in fact a Khlysf, ?>.'half " Shaker," half Flagellant— a strange sect which from time to time rises in Russia from the common depths to the upper classes of society. ^2 RASPUTIN [chap. VII. "Oh! You will soon hear of it; no one talks of anything else in town." I let the matter drop, as in honour bound. Two or three days later, I got out of the train at the Tsarskoe-Selo station and got into a Royal carriage to go to the Alexander Palace, the usual residence of the Imperial family. The weather was beautiful, dry and sunny. As we were nearing the palace, the footman began to explain to me — with the usual familiarity of those sort of people — why I was being taken to a different entrance than usual. "See, your Excellency, the Empress's carriage standing at the other door! Her Majesty is going out for the first time for a long while," continued the footman with a self-satisfied smile. A few minutes later, preceded by another Royal servant, I was making my way to the Emperor's study through the charming Louis XVI. rooms of the Palace, and across the spacious library, all lit up by the sun- shine, and I was admiring the fine and simple architecture of this masterpiece of Guarenghi's. And beyond the grand colonade of the Palace, I could see the Empress's carriage disappearing on its way to the station. , . . The following day the whole of St. Petersburg was saying that the Empress, having gone unexpectedly into the town to visit an institute for young ladies, then went on to the house of one of Rasputin's faithful followers, and spent two hours there conversing with the "holy man." , . . How many times since then have I recalled that morning, and that Imperial carriage driving away through the dazzling snow across the park at Tsarskoe. How many times have I recalled that magnificent dwelling, simple and grand in outline, with its ex- quisitely-proportioned rooms, its beautiful works of art, its admirable library, its beautiful bay-windows over- looking the park, which is delightful even in winter; all this setting which seemed to call for a royal existence, not so much sumptuous as refined and distinguished ; I9I2] THE EMPRESS AND RASPUTIN 73 conversations with cultivated friends, scholars, poets, and artists ; receptions, rather informal than otherwise, but composed of the real elite of a society in which in- telligent elements have never been lacking ; political discussions with the menof yesterday and of to-morrow, who would be flattered at being admitted into this sanctuary of refinement and elegance. This dwelling, I thought to myself, shelters a sovereign, powerful, but prone to good-nature and simplicity, gifted with a quick and inquiring mind made for the interchange of impres- sions and opinions ; four young girls, whose beauty and charm will gradually be revealed to a respectfully- admiring world, like the blooming of rare and lovely flowers in our hot-houses ; an adored son, just weak and sickly enough to bring a shade of melancholy into the beautiful eyes of his mother. . . . And this mother, this wife, this Empress, moving in this beautiful setting, with all these sources of joy and happiness, leaves the beauti- ful white palace, with its pictures, its sculpture, and its beautiful books, the flowers which perfume it and the delightful children who fill it with life ; she leaves all this with the eager joy of a convalescent going out for the first time into the fresh air, and she goes to shut herself up for hours in a wretched room in a common- place apartment with a dirty and knavish moujik, seek- ing from this creature — so immeasurably beneath her — spiritual consolation, foretelling of the future, guidance for a timid conscience and a sick mind. . . . And then she returns to this Tsarskoe palace, in which she has succeeded in "sequestering" her husband, to this palace whence nothing radiates to the adjacent capital and to the country: neither noble refinement, nor mental shrewdness, nor even political guidance — nothing save an absurd and ridiculous legend — grieved over by the friend and retailed triumphantly by the foe, and which goes on growing and circulating till it becomes one of the chief causes of a downfall and a catastrophe almost unequalled in history ! 74 RASPUTIN [chap.vii. This time my audience with the Emperor was some- what brief. His Majesty first expressed his sincere satis- faction on the subject of the Serbo-Bulgarian agreement. I repeated to the Emperor my last conversation with Ferdinand. "Yes," said the Emperor, "Ferdinand is terribly suspicious and dreadfully afraid that we shall take him altogether in hand. But you may reassure him on this subject. I have no wish to direct Bulgarian policy provided that Bulgaria behaves herself and does not drag us whither we cannot and will not follow her." The Emperor then proceeded to speak of the festivities held for the coming of age of Prince Boris, and charged me to thank the King from him for the welcome extended to the Grand-Duke Andrew Vladimirovitch. I gathered from this audience the impression that His Majesty was indeed very much pleased at the complete reconciliation between Serbians and Bulgarians. When he spoke of King Ferdinand one perceived in his words a sceptical and even slightly scornful touch, but that in spite of that he looked on the King of the Bulgarians as a political factor who would have to be reckoned with. This renewal of goodwill towards Ferdinand might also serve as a sign that the idea of a matri- monial alliance between Prince Boris and one of the Grand-Duchesses, daughters of the Emperor, had grown to a certain extent. And, indeed, in intimate Court circles, I heard great liking expressed for the young Bulgarian heir— which proved relatively that Boris had produced a good impression on the Imperial couple. The next day I went to see M. Sazonoff and gave him— as was fit and proper — an epitome of my interview with his Majesty. I asked the Minister on this occasion what his personal impression was on the subject of the military convention — a question on which we had only touched lightly at our first interview. " Well ! " said Sazonoff, " I wish you would be so good as to go yourself to General Jilinsky (at that time I9I2] GENERAL JILINSKY 75 head of the General Headquarters Staff) and endeavour to find out whether he is really in favour of this convention or not. I am under the impression that the matter is being settled at General Headquarters, although the preliminaries are the work of our former military agent in Bulgaria — Colonel Leontieff — and although, as you say yourself, Lieutenant-Colonel Romanowski endorses his predecessor's point of view." On the appointed day, I went to see General Jilinsky, with whom I had never discussed important matters. At my first allusion to the convention, the General became irritable. "But why should it be necessar}^ for us to conclude a military convention with Bulgaria when one already exists? Have you been told nothing of tHe convention concluded by me pcrsonaily in 1902? It is here in this drawer, but of course I cannot read it to you as it is a most secret convention ; but you had better make inquiries about it at the Foreign Office, and perhaps you will be initiated into the circumstances relating to the conclusion and terms of this arrangement." " I read the convention. General, when I was appointed Russian Minister to Bulgaria, and I re-read it to-day at the Foreign Office before coming to you. I know it by heart, and consequently I realise that it has a fixed object and that the point was directed almost exclusively at Turkey and Rumania. When Rumania had concluded a special convention with Austria-Hungary, we thought it expedient to conclude one with Bulgaria, promising her eff'ectual help in the event of her being attacked by Turkey aided by Rumania. But now the political situation has completely changed ; it is no longer a question of the possibility of an alliance — certainly not an offensive one — between Turkey and Rumania ; on the contrary, we have to deal with the Serbo-Bulgarian alliance, which brings quite different elements into the question. . . ." " All this is quite likely," interrupted the General ; "but so long as the convention of which I spoke, and 76 RASPUTIN [chap.vi. which I m^'self concluded, exists, it is waste of time to speak of any other." I understood that I had to deal with a pre-conceived idea firmly fixed in an obstinate brain ; so I abandoned the principal object of my visit and passed to another subject : the journey which the Chief of the Bulgarian General Staff, General Fichev, had made to Russia a few months previously. "General Fichev," I said, " was very much flattered by the welcome which he received here, and has carried away the best impressions of our military organisation. Up till then he had never been to Russia and did not know anything about the Russian Army. Colonel Romanowski, who accompanied the General, told me that at every moment he uttered exclamations of genuine surprise at the high standard of instruction of our troops, their skill in manoeuvres, etc. . . . His foreign masters (Fichev had been a pupil of the Military College in Turin) had probably described the Russian Army as a semi-Asiatic force." "So that is what M. Fichev told Romanowski, is it?" interrupted the General, "and I happen to know that he talked of our Army and of Russia generally in exceedingly hostile terms !" " Really ?" I exclaimed. " But then be good enough to quote your sources of information. General ; the matter ought to be thoroughly sifted, and we ought to warn our military agent who, since his trip with Fichev, has become very intimate with him and trusts him." " But I did not need any sources of information," replied Jilinsky, angrily. "Being a rabid Stambou- lovist, he could not speak otherwise about Russia and the Russian Army. It is as clear as daylight ! " After this there was nothing left for me to do but to close our interview and to make my bow to the peppery General. Two years and a half after this interview — in September, 1914 — General Jilinsky, who in 1913 had been made Governor-General of Poland, was also igi2 ] OTHER OFFICIAL VISITS 77 commanding an army corps. He was responsible for the operations of General SamsonofTs army in the region of the Mazovian Lakes, operations which ended in the loss of this army. The future historians of the War will have to decide who was the real culprit in this catastrophe : was it General Samsonoff who made mistakes, or was it General Jilinsky who decided on the operations before he had estimated the fighting strength of the army in question, and without knowing exactly what forces the enemy was opposing to it ? I went the next day to see the Foreign Secretary, to repeat the conversation I had had with the Chief of the General Headquarters Staff, and I frankly expressed my conviction that under the circumstances the proposed military convention could never be concluded. "But what is your exact opinion as to the expedi- ency of such a convention ? " asked Sazonoff. "To be quite frank," I replied, " I am still in doubt myself On the one hand, you know my opinion about the desire for conquest of the Bulgarians and Serbians : having concluded with them a military convention of which the point would be directed against Turkey, we should appear to be encouraging their projects ; by making, per contra, this convention into a weapon against Austria-Hungary, we should still further strain the chain of our relations with the Central Empires : woe to us if a link snaps! But on the other hand a military con- vention, drawn up with skill and great caution, might ttnife Serbians and Bulgarians and prevent them taking up arms against our wish, or at a moment we might consider inopportune. All this should be carefully weighed, and it is most regrettable that the chief of our General Headquarters Staff will not even allow a care- ful and impartial examination of such an important question." " In that case, let us wait," said the Foreign Secretary, in conclusion. Besides my audience at Tsarskoe-Selo and my 78 RASPUTIN [chap. vii. interviews with M. Sazonoff, I called on several members of the Government, and amongst others on M. Kokovtzoff— at that time already President of the Council — to whom I was bound by pleasant recollections of work shared in Paris at the time of our great loans of 1906. I also did not omit to visit General Polivanoflf, then assistant to the Minister for War, to whom I always enjoyed talking, and who stood high in my opinion, for the thoroughness and impartiality which he displayed in the examination of all business questions. Moreover, I was bound to inform both these gentlemen of matters relative to my work in Bulgaria. I also visited M. Goutchkoff, and talked at great length with him. Goutchkoff complained, amongst other things, of our want of all military preparation. "You cannot imagine," he said, speaking of the work of the Commission for National Defence for the Duma, " what it has cost us to make the War Office ask for supplies to he voted for the making of big guns for the artillery, of which we hardly possess any. At last the first orders have been given, but they are quite inade- quate." In spite of its being against his principles that grand-dukes should be at the head of public departments, Goutchkoff appeared tc be on fairl}' good terms with the Grand-Duke Serge Mikhailovitch, who was still in command of the artillery; but he complained bitterly of the Minister for War, Soukhomlinoff. I do not exactly remember whether it was on this occasion or later on that Goutchkoff gave me the full details of his collision with General Soukhomlinoff on the subject of the retired colonel of the gendarmerie, Miassoi'edoff, who lived permanently with the Soukhomlinoffs at the War Office, as family friend and general factotum, and whom Goutchkoff openly accused of being a military spy, on behalf of Germany. "Your principal will end at the gallows," he said to MiassoTedoff's seconds when they presented themselves at his house. This prophecy was fulfilled in 191 5. Nevertheless it is very regrettable that Goutchkoff I9I2] DRAWING-ROOM GOSSIP 79 should have consented to fight a duel with this low scoundrel. It was inconsistent on his part. But then it is through inconsistency and superfluous generosity that we Russians usually err. It was not only Goutchkoff who spoke to me with indignation about Soukhomlinoff. The President of the Council, Kokovtzoff, who was always extremely guarded in his conversation, spoke in very bitter terms, one day, about his colleague of the War Office : "What can one do," he said, " when the Minister for War is a gentle- man whose sole wish is to report to the Emperor, in his most agreeable baritone voice, the things which please His Majesty, but which he, Soukhomlinoff, knows perfectly well to be untrue ! " On the other hand, Kokovtzoff did not like Goutchkoff either ; he accused him of being ambitious and conceited, and of causing unscrupulous political disturbances. And it was between these three persons : Soukhom- linoff, Goutchkoff, and Kokovtzoff, that questions re- lative to our armament were to be discussed ! In the salons of St. Petersburg, which I frequented fairly regularly, Rasputin was the sole topic of con- versation. Some persons, who were in a position to know, and A^ho were very truthful, told me amongst other things that the Dowager Empress Marie- Feodorovna had been to Tsarskoe-Selo and had had a heart-to-heart talk with her son and daughter-in-law. " It is no question of you, of your affections, your convictions or rather your religious manias," she said, addressing the Empress Alexandra; "it is a question of the Emperor, of the Dynasty, of Russia! If you go on in this way, you will be the undoing of us all ! " A fortnight after my arrival in St. Petersburg, I was invited to an evening party given by the Foreign Secretary — the first big reception held by the Sazonoffs since their return from Davos. The beautiful " Empire " reception-rooms were brilliantly lit up, and gradually filled with guests : members of the Cabinet, of the So RASPUTIN fcnAP.vii. Council of the Empire and of the Duma, foreign diplomats, journalists, financiers, and society people of St. Petersburg, like one sees at all receptions of this kind. The men wore their orders and decorations, the ladies their smartest evening-dresses; in one of the rooms an excellent orchestra was playing, and in the first drawing-room the host and hostess smilingly received their guests, shaking them by the hand, and exchanging friendly small-talk with them. In short everything was done as it should be at such receptions. Yet nevertheless, from the outset, one felt there was something in the air, something which was depressing all the brilliant assembly. Smiling faces suddenly assumed a severe and anxious expression ; some of the guests with worried looks were whispering together in corners ; the Ministers, in particular, seemed to be in a very nervous state, with the exception, however, of General Soukhomlinoff, who walked through the rooms like a conquering hero, with his over-dressed wife on his arm. I went up to M. Kokovtzoff, who was leaning against a doorpost with an expression on his face like that of a judge about to pass sentence of death. I begged him to grant me an interview so that I could discuss with him an important matter entrusted to me by the King of Bulgaria (that of the loan mentioned above). " Forgive me, my dear M. Nekludoff," interrupted Kokovtzoff, "but at this moment I really have not the heart for that. We have such a situation to face. . . . Besides, how can I make an appointment with you, when 1 do not even know if by to-morrow I shall still be in office? I tell you this quite confidentially, and beg that you will not repeat it." After that there was nothing to be done, but to leave the speaker to his gloomy thoughts. In the next room I met Sazonoff who had left his post as master of the house for a few minutes and was talking with Krivocheine in a window ; the official smile on my chiefs face had given way to a sad and worried expression. What does it all mean? I wondered. T9I2] RASPUTIN'S DISMISSAL AND RETURN 8i At this moment I came across General Polivanoff. I drew him aside. " Look here, General, what is going on amongst you all?" I asked him straight out. "You do not know yet? but it is this," . . . and the General told me that the next day the President of the Duma — it was already Rodzianko — and Makaroff, at that time Minister of Justice, were to go to Tsarskoe-Selo in order to hand to the Emperor the whole revolting record of Rasputin, and to endeavour to obtain the instant dis- missal of this dangerous and infamous person. " If the Emperor does not consent, all the Ministers will resign." " All, do you think ? " I asked the General, glancing at Soukhomlinoff, who was passing at the moment. " Perhaps all is saying too much," amended Polivanoff, with a knowing smile, " but the majority will go : Kokovtzoff, Krivocheine, Sazonoff and others . . ." The next day towards evening the rumour spread in town that the Emperor had favourably received the reports of the President of the Duma and of the Minister of Justice, and consented to the instant dismissal of the " old man " Gregory to his native village. A few days later, the Court left for the Crimea. Among the people who came to see the Imperial Family off at the station, one noticed Mile. Tutcheffand Princess Obolensky, to whom the Imperial couple were particularly friendly ; this might betoken their early return to Court. In St. Petersburg all the official world calmed down ; all the Ministers remained at their posts. Six weeks later, Rasputin returned incognito from Siberia, and took up his abode again in the capital ! Detained in St. Petersburg a little longer by some business matters, I did not return to my post till the end of April {N.S.). CHAPTER VIII INTRIGUES AT SOFIA On my return to Sofia I perceived at once that the situation there was much changed. I noticed that the first result of the newly-signed agreement had been to strengthen the "activist" party, at the head of which M. Danev had of course placed himself; in my absence he had become infinitely more intimate than before with the King. Ferdinand had left for foreign parts a few days before my arrival ; but before leaving he had decided to send M. Danev to Livadia and St. Peters- burg, under pretext of presenting officially to His Majesty the Emperor and to M. Sazonoff the text of the Serbo-Bulgarian agreement. Danev was to be accompanied to St. Petersburg by our military agent in Sofia, Colonel Romanovski. All this was related to me on my arrival as a settled thing, and I learnt at the same time that the discussions about this journey had been confided to General Poprikov, Bulgarian Minister in St. Petersburg. It was quite clear to me that Danev was being dispatched to our country in order to entreat the Emperor and M. Sazonoff to grant active and willing support to Bulgaria in case of certain events and com- plications in Macedonia. And at the same time Danev was to use his best efforts to convince us that King Ferdinand was at present behaving with perfect loyalty towards Russia' and the Tsar, and that we might hence- forth abandon all suspicion and distrust with regard to him. Danev left soon after my return to Sofia. He was very graciously received at Livadia by H.I.M. the Emperor, and perfectly well received in St. Petersburg 82 I9I2] COLONEL MERRONE 83 by M. Sazonoff. On his return, however, he seemed somewhat disappointed. I soon learnt the reason when I received official information on the exchange of views which had taken place between King Ferdinand's envoy on one side, and M. Kokovtzoff and M. Sazonoff on the other. These two statesmen had given Danev to under- stand in a very amiable but very firm manner that we should not, under any circumstances, allow ourselves to be drawn into an active policy in the Balkans. The same thing was repeated to Danev at Livadia. I heard later that Danev had been entrusted with another mission for King Ferdinand ; I will speak of this further on. After my return to Sofia and during the succeeding summer months, I noticed the increased activity of the Italian military attache, Colonel Merrone. During my absence, the latter had formed a close friendship with our military agent. In the summer these gentlemen were already on thee-and-thou terms which evoked a certain amount of astonishment in the Diplomatic Corps of Sofia, for such terms are not customary between two foreign colleagues. Through Romanowski and also through General Fichev — a former Italian pupil — Merrone managed to become acquainted and to be on a friendly footing with several Bulgarian senior officers, from whom there was much to be learnt. I am justified in believing that Colonel Merrone — a tall, fat and jovial Neapolitan, with a very friendly manner, but at the same time intelligent and rather a Paul Pry— knew how to use all these friendships, and that he ended by know- ing of the existence of the Serbo-Bulgarian agreement and its contents. He hastened — as in honour bound — to communicate this information to the Italian General Staff. The Italian Minister in Sofia, Count Bosdari— as I was able to prove conclusively later — was only initiated into the secret some time afterwards. An intelligent man, highly educated and of very moderate views, he did not share the enthusiasm of a certain G 84 INTRIGUES AT SOFIA [chap. viii. number of Italian politicians who wished that a con- flagration should break out in the Balkans in order to assure to Italy a prompt and brilliant victory over Turkey. When Lieutenant-Colonel Merrone's statements on the subject of the alliance concluded between Bulgaria and Serbia were received in Rome, the first question asked must have been as to what Italy could gain from the new situation. Should she approach Serbia and Bulgaria, suggest an alliance with them, and with their help finish the war in a brilliant manner by conquering part of the coast of Asia Minor? Yes, but would Germany and Austria countenance such a proceeding by their ally ? And would the other Powers consent to the balance of power in the Near East being thus upset in Italy's favour? No, this plan, however alluring it might be at first sight, offered too many pitfalls and dangers. Would it not be better, on the contrary, to transmit the valuable information just received to Berlin and to Vienna ; and by warning the Allies thus of the danger which threatened them, incite them thereby to energetic intervention in Constantinople, an intervention which would force the Porte to grant important concessions in Italy's favour, and would put an immediate end to the war ? But in the first place such a course of action would not harmonise with the principles of loyalty ; and then who could guarantee that the Central Powers would set such a price on the information furnished by Italy? It is quite possible that, having warmly thanked the Ally King for the service rendered, Berlin and Vienna might forge any kind of diplomatic weapon with the information, without concerning them- selves further with Italy's interests, and would continue to concentrate all their efforts on increasing German influence in Turkey. But then how could one make use of the information received and of the new political situation ? In this way : by allowing Bulgaria and Serbia complete freedom of action, but by taking great care at the same time not to lavish diplomatic favours on I9I2] IN DISFAVOUR WITH FERDINAND 85 them. If a Balkan war ensued, then either the Porte would immediately accept all the Italian conditions and the Italo-Turkish war, which was beginning to drag on too long, would end very advantageously for Italy ; or some new path would be discovered, some new com- binazione arise which Italy could profit by. By virtue of these considerations of an essentially practical nature, Lieutenant-Colonel Merrone was allowed to watch very closely the patriotic inclinations of his Bulgarian comrades-in-arms. One must be fair to Merrone : he fulfilled this mission with great cleverness and perfect tact, and fully deserved the reward bestowed on him after the conclusion of the Peace Treaty between Italy and Turkey, when he was made aide-de-camp to the King, but allowed all the same to keep his command in the regiment — a distinction very rarely conferred in the Italian army. I have already mentioned in the preceding chapter that King Ferdinand had received unfavourably the explanations which I gave him before my departure for St. Petersburg in regard to my view of the scope of the Serbo-Bulgarian agreement. A fewof my dear colleagues at the Russian Legation profited by my absence to endeavour to exasperate Ferdinand still more against me, by all the means in their power — some of them very unscrupulous ones — and to show him that it was possible to get rid of the Russian Minister who had ceased to please him. The King jumped at these suggestions, and shortly after my departure for St. Petersburg he had already fixed his choice on two candidates for my post. One was the former Chief of the Chancellery in the Foreign Office, M. A. Savinsky, who had just been appointed Minister to Stockholm, and who had twice been recommended for the post in Sofia by M. Sazonoff's predecessor, as well as by the Grand-Duchess Vladimir — Ferdinand's chief patroness at the Russian Court. The other candidate was General Mossoloff, formerly an officer in the Horse Guards, who in his youth was S6 INTRIGUES AT SOFIA [chap. viii. aide-de-camp to Prince Alexander of Battenberg, and who then went into the administration of the Imperial Court, where he was finally given the rank of Lieu- tenant-General, although he had never returned to the Army. Very intimate with the Emperor, Mossoloff was commissoned to accompany the Grand-Duke Andrew Vladimirovitch to Bulgaria, to act as mentor to His Highness in this country where he had so many acquaintances. This flattering mission and the festivities of Sofia awoke in the worthy General the sudden desire to exchange his Court functions for the activity, the honours, and the high salary of a Minister Plenipoten- tiary. He seemed to have been predestined by fate itself to the post of Sofia. All the same it was M. Savinsky who became my successor, and that only at the end of 191 3. As to General Mossoloff, his diplomatic career only began much later, during the celebrated Sturmer's short term at the Foreign Office. The spring of 1912, thus served as a starting point for intrigues emanating from different sides, which aimed at terminating my term of office in Sofia. The historic events which occurred soon after prevented the realisation of these intrigues, up till the moment when these same events in their final development caused my departure from Bulgaria to be almost opportune. I was trans- ferred from Sofia to Stockholm, after the Treaty of Bukharest in 1913, and as I did not approve of the stipu- lations in it, it would have been very painful to me to remain in Sofia; although my presence in Bulgaria during the beginning of the World War might have been of some use to the cause of Russia and the Allies. I received the first information on the subject of the intrigues against me in June, 1912. I heard from St. Petersburg that Danev had repeatedly insinuated there and at Livadia that I had not succeeded in establishing good relations with Ferdinand and that I had not even got on well with the Bulgarians. Besides these accusa- tions of a purely academic nature, I got to know — on good authority — that a great deal of gossip about me I9I2] M. RIZOV ENTERS THE ARENA 87 was circulated in the office, and lobbies of our Foreign Office. Some of this gossip was merely ridiculous, but some was of a fairly shameful nature. This gossip had its origin in Sofia, came from one and the same source, and aimed at one and the same object — that of getting rid of a Russian representative who did not approve of a policy of chance and who possessed some influence over the greater part of the Bulgarian Government. One of the vilest calumnies about me came from a most unexpected source and chiefly through the medium of the Bulgarian Minister in Rome, M. Rizov, who at the moment enjoyed the closest friendship with our Ambas- sador to the Quirinal, M. Kroupensky. This calumny for one instant succeeded in upsetting M. Sazonoff. A year later he begged me "to consign the incident to the place for all noxious things"; but it had produced a certain impression prejudicial to me all the same. M. Rizov is too well known for it to be necessary to say much about him. A schoolmaster in Macedonia and a vehement Bulgarian agitator, he was one of the first Macedonian Bulgarians who thought it useful to the national cause to side with Stamboulov and to declare himself openly an enemy of Russia. For about ten years, between 1885 and 1895, Rizov was the bugbear of our consuls in Macedonia and of our Embassy in Constantinople, for he incited his fellow- countrymen to the most bitter and vehement strife against the partisans of the Universal Patriarchate, and not only against the Greeks but also against the Serbians and the Kutzo-Wallachians (Rumanians). In 1896, when a complete change occurred in the relations of Bulgaria with Russia, Rizov gave up his Catilinarian existence in Macedonia and entered the Bulgarian Diplomatic Service. After long years spent in Cetigne as Bulgarian Diplomatic Agent, Rizov, who in the mean- time had married a young and beautiful Montenegrin, had managed to insinuate himself into the good graces of Prince Nicholas and his set, and to cause his former hostility towards Russia to be forgotten ; he endeavoured 88 INTRIGUES AT SOFIA [chap.viii. to conciliate Russians in general, and his Russian colleague in particular. From Cetigne he was appointed Minister to Rome. At the beginning of the winter of 1912 he came from Rome to Sofia; we saw each other several times and had some interesting interviews, during which, as was only natural, Rizov tried very hard to captivate me. He was undoubtedly an intelligent and shrewd man, who had acquired a certain amount of cultivation, and who knew how to adapt himself to the diplomatic environment which seemed so inappropriate to the poor Macedonian schoolmaster of former days. But, violent, addicted to intrigue and devoid of all principles, Rizov remained a conspirator all his life, and at the crucial moment when Serbo-Bulgarian relations were becoming strained, he played a bold but fatal part. Later on I shall have occasion to mention this remarkable but suspicious personage again. Of course, if from the very beginning our Foreign Office had met the step taken by King Ferdinand with marked coldness, as they had done when he attacked M. Sementovsky,^ the intrigue would have fallen through this time also, and the King would at once have realised that it was better in his own interest to remain on good terms with me. But as it was, I received the impression that the attacks directed against me from Sofia found a very ready echo amongst a certain set in our Foreign Office, amongst just those men who kept up close relations with my colleague of Belgrade and who had been connected in some way or other with my lamented predecessor. I have already given an account of the conversation which I had with the King in March, just before I left for St. Petersburg, and have moreover explained that it was in this conversation that the King's resentment against me had its origin. This ill feeling was carefully and skilfully fostered during my absence. No doubt I made a mistake, in the course of that conversation, in speaking to the King too frankly, and ^ See Chapter I. I9I2] KING FERDINAND'S POLICY 89 in recommending that Bulgaria should henceforward pursue a straightforward and undeviating line of policy, relying confidently on co-operation with Serbia, and in concert with her, on the benevolent and essentially prudent advice of Russia. Now this was exactly what Ferdinand was most afraid of, for above all things he was most anxious to keep himself independent of all such measures and to be free to follow the tortuous policy of which he was so fond. Ever since his arrival in Bulgaria his policy had been that of balancing St. Petersburg against Vienna. The irreconcileable antagonism between the policy of Russia and that of Austria was, with him, not only a dominant article of faith, but also a chosen ground of action. He did not believe that there was the least chance of an agreement, or even of a durable modus vivendi between the two powers who were struggling for mastery in the Balkan Peninsula. Ferdinand was convinced that if he managed affairs so badly as to become irrevocably associated v^ith the policy either of Vienna (which meant Berlin also) or St. Petersburg, Bulgaria would sooner or later be dis- astrously involved in the struggle which was sure to come, and, if that struggle resulted in the decisive defeat of either of the adversaries, Bulgaria and her king, even if they were on the victorious side, would have perforce to submit to the control of the conqueror. Ferdinand's ideal policy, on the other hand, consisted in keeping a free hand for himself and his country, and in securing and consolidating for Bulgaria, an influence, even if it were only a subordinate influence, which would enable him to hold the balance in the Near East. He had much greater confidence in his own political skill than in his military power : he was afraid of war, but always recognised that if it was necessary to fight in order to fulfil the national aspirations of the Bulgarians, it would be much better to ally himself with partners who were weaker than himself than with more formid- able allies. 90 INTRIGUES AT SOFIA [chap. viii. The chief desire at St. Petersburg was to see Bulgaria and Serbia closely united in order to bar the approach to the Peninsula against the Teuton and Swabian aggressors. But to the Bulgarians and their King this was not the chief concern ; they were, above all things, men of action, and sought for immediate and substantial advantages, while Ferdinand, a political dreamer, was forming plans of greater magnitude to which I will refer later on. If the King had been willing to place more confidence in me, and in his conversations with me to enter more frankly and less enigmatically into those political designs which dominated him, he would have seen that I was in no wise disposed to add to his anxieties or to demand what was impossible. But to place confidence in any one was just what Ferdinand was incapable of doing, and this advantage was withheld from all the Russian ministers accredited to his Government. He wanted them to be docile instruments, and to act as the advocates of his cunning desires and ambitions at St. Petersburg. He knew quite well that I would never lend myself to this sort of thing; to a certain extent I vexed him, and he thought it best to get rid of me with all civility. Warned by the intrigue which had been formed against me, I only took two measures to fight it. During the month of July, I informed King Ferdinand, through his private secretary, M. Dobrovitch, that if for any reason His Majesty wished me to leave Sofia, he had only to tell me so quite frankly, and then I would myself beg St. Petersburg to give me another post, as I considered it quite inadmissible that between the King of the Bulgarians and the Russian Minister such constant misunderstandings should exist. Some time after I received, through the same M. Dobrovitch, the answer that the King still appreciated, esteemed and liked me very sincerely ; that if some friction had existed between him and me, it was due solely to mis- understandings ; that the King considered the continua- tion of my work in Sofia to be valuable for Bulgaria, etc., etc. It is true that in the meantime the political I9I2] RUMOURS OF MY RECALL 91 situation had changed completely, and that Ferdinand at the moment was inclined to view things in the same light as I did. Soon after these mutual explanations, the King, at his Jubilee celebrations at Tirnova, con- versed at great length and very amiably with me in full view of all present, and on his return to Sofia sent me a signed photograph of himself. Before all this I had already informed M. Gueshov and M. Todorov of the intrigue against me, and, frankly disgusted at it, they both entreated me earnestly not to try to leave my post. A few months later, when the intrigue frustrated in July began again, one read one day in the Rousskoye Slovo that the Russian Ministers, Nekludoff in Sofia, and Savinsky in Stockholm, were soon to be mutually ex- changed. I wrote then to the man whom 1 esteemed the most in M. Sazonofi^s set. Baron Schilling, begging him to tell me quite frankly if this news was true. 1 added that having always judged people severely who clung to their places, I had not the slightest intention of clinging to the post in Sofia, important and interesting though it was, because the person holding such a post ought above all things to possess the complete confidence of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Schilling replied that the question of my being transferred to an equivalent post had been raised at oiie moment at the Foreign Office, but that at the present moment there was no question of it. All the same, the news published in the Rousskoye Slovo was not officially denied,|as it ought to have been. I came to the conclusion from all this that at the present moment (the Balkan War had just broken out) the Foreign Office still considered my presence in Bulgaria to be indispensable; but that when these serious events were over, they would not scruple in St. Petersburg to send me to another post, even to a far less important one. If I dwell so much on these purely personal intrigues, it is because they did have an indisputable influence over the final course of events in Bulgaria. Towards the end of 1912 ever}' one in Sofia knew that the Russian 92 INTRIGUES AT SOFIA [chap. viii. Minister's position was insecure and that from hence- forth one need not reckon much with his opinions or advice. All this was known also to my foreign col- leagues, and several of them gave me friendly warning of what was being plotted and hatched against me. But I am anticipating events. Let us return to the spring of 1912. During the month of May I succeeded in making a trip to Constantinople which I had had in view for a long time. I had left the Bosphorus twenty years ago and I was delighted at the prospect of renewing my glorious impressions of this unique spot. Moreover, I wished to have a heart to heart talk to Michel de Giers, recently appointed Russian Ambassador to Constan- tinople, to Hartwig's intense disappointment. I had met M. de Giers in St. Petersburg in March, but we had not had time to talk at great length, besides de Giers lacked the most essential element of a political inter- view — his own impressions of Constantinople, where he was going for the first time. During an enchanting week, I had again before my eyes the marvellous panorama of the shores of the Bosphorus and of the Sea of Marmara and all the well- known pictures of Constantinopolitan life. I found few changes. Only the wretched street curs no longer existed ; the picturesque and crazy wooden bridge con- necting Galata and Stambul, and lined with fruit stalls and shops where Turkish delicacies were sold, had been replaced by an ordinary iron bridge ; and in the environs of Pera Turkish soldiers, newly dressed in khaki, were drilling without ceasing under the watchful eye of German instructors, which in my day was a somewhat rare sight. Everything else looked very much as usual. During one of my visits to the Grand Bazaar of Stambul a fire broke out in the adjacent quarter between St. Sophia and the sea, and immediately assumed the pro- portions that a fire assumes in Constantinople alone, because of the accumulation of old wooden buildings I9I2] IN CONSTANTINOPLE 93 made of dry old planl^s. A very familiar sight to me : a motley crowd intent on rescuing its wretched garments, the sinister double illumination of the fire on one side and of the sun veiled and reddened on the other ; swarms of pigeons driven out of their nests by the fire, and flying around at the same time as the burning brands in clouds of white smoke ; the tonloumbadjis (voluntary firemen), half-naked, rushing to the fire and giving wild shrieks from time to time. . . . The fire lasted two days, and delayed for a few hours the departure of the train which was to take the German Ambassador, Baron Marschall von Biberstein, who had been appointed to London in the same capacity. I remember meeting the aged diplomat on his way to the station. The carriage in which Baron Marschall, his wife and his daughter were seated was preceded by an open carriage entirely filled with bouquets and bunches of flowers, gifts, evi- dently, of the German colony and the "grateful Turks." "Do look," I said to my companion, "it's exactly like a funeral : here is the carriage with flowers and wreaths preceding the hearse, and behind, the long file of carriages accompanying the deceased to his last resting- place ! Truly I should not have liked to leave my post surrounded by that style of ceremonial ! " My words were an involuntary prophecy. Two months later Baron Marschall died suddenly in London, carrying with him into the grave all the hopes centred by Germany on their new Ambassador. Marschall was replaced in London by Prince Lichnowsky, and in Constantinople by the fiery Wangenheim. M. de Giers, to whom I confided my impressions on Bulgaria and my apprehensions as to the real aim of the Serbo-Bulgarian alliance, expressed his own fears quite as frankly. I even received the impression that in his heart he was blaming me for having consented to serve as intermediary in the negotiations between Bulgaria and Serbia and for having taken such an active part in them. I feel sure, however, that if he had been in my place he would have done exactly the same, for 94 INTRIGUES AT SOFIA [(hap.vhi. it was not part of the duty of a Russian representative in a Slav country to offer opposition to the reconciliation or even the alliance of this country with another Slav country. Of course our policy was bound to check beforehand all the warlike tendencies of Bulgaria and Serbia and was capable of doing so; but this role belonged to the central organ of our diplomacy, which moreover had been warned in good time and repeatedly by me. Our new Ambassador to Constantinople in our inter- views also emphasised — with the obvious intent that I should pass the information on to Sofia— the enormous danger that according to him war with Turkey would present to the two Slav kingdoms themselves. Accord- ing to M. de Giers the Ottoman Army was quite different from what it had been in Abdul Hamid's time. Admirably equipped and perfectly trained, under the command of German generals and senior officers and of young Turkish officers, well trained and drilled, it constituted a real power which might cause disagreeable surprises to Serbian and Bulgarian optimists. The Ambassador maintained this opinion till the actual war of 191 2, or rather till the first decisive defeat of the Turks. Always concientious in his work as in the expression of his opinions, M. de Giers usually placed entire confidence in his professional collaborators in any branch. His opinion of the Turkish Army was based entirely on the reports and information of our military agent in Constantinople, General Holmsen, an honest Finno-Swede, married to the daughter of the former Governor-General of Finland, Bobrikoff. Holmsen was on very intimate terms with the military attache and the German senior officers, who were very attentive to him and who furnished him with all sorts of informa- tion on the Ottoman Arm}^ And in representing to their Russian colleague the state of this Army as a truly brilliant one, the German officers were far from displaying premeditated duplicity : they were simply guided b^^ that very natural feeling which consists in I9I2] GENERAL HOLMSEN 95 seeing one's own work through rose-coloured spec- tacles. Be that as it may, Holmsen himself was firmly convinced that the Bulgarian and Serbian Armies were infinitely inferior to the Turkish Army, and he maintained this opinion with the straightforwardness and obstinacy inherent in his Swedish nature. It is a fact that the brave general did not know the condition of the Serbian and Bulgarian Armies. I met General Holmsen four years later in Stock- holm, on his return from captivity in Germany — he was a physical wreck! From the beginning of the war he commanded a brigade in the army corps of General Buhakoff, which, at the time of our second defeat in East Prussia in February, 191 5, displayed heroic courage in cutting through the hostile army which surrounded it on all sides. General Holmsen told me that there were neither guns nor shells left in some of the battalions of the division of which he had become the head on the battlefield, and half the bayonets were twisted or broken by the continual shock of hand-to- hand fighting. The soldiers, worn out by four days and nights of continued fighting and marching, sometimes fell down in the snow and went off into a leaden slumber without paying any attention to death which was raging round them— so terrible was their fatigue. At last the remnants of the heroic army corps reached the first line of defence of Grodno : alas ! it was already occupied by the enemy, so they had to surrender. They did not know that Grodno was still held by Russian troops, and that if they had advanced, these could have rescued them. In listening to this heartrending account, I naturally refrained from reminding the General of our conversations in Constantinople and from pointing out how mistaken he had been in his prognosti- cations ! One of the things which struck me most in Constanti- nople was the complete serenity, the indiff'erence even, with which every one seemed to look on the Italo-Turkish 96 INTRIGUES AT SOFIA [chap.viii. war; one really could not believe in the Italian Fleet blockading the Dardanelles, and that quite recently the Italians had tried to break through the Straits. The only complaint heard — and that a bitter one — was of stagnation in commercial affairs. In May and June there appeared on the whole to be a political lull in Sofia. The King was still abroad, and M. Gueshov at some watering-place. But shortly after my return from Constantinople, I learnt through several sources that very important business was being trans- acted at the Bulgarian Foreign Office, and more especially at the War Office. My Serbian colleague was also holding frequent interviews with the Bulgarian Ministers and politicians. The tone of the Bulgarian Press was becoming more and more nervous with regard to Macedonia and what was going on there. In the streets of Sofia one met more and more frequently brown and sunburnt individuals with gloomy expressions, sometimes armed to the teeth, who were the object of great curiosity ; these were the heads of well-known troops arriving from Macedonia. Finally I was informed in a more definite manner that Serbia and Bulgaria were on the point of concluding a military convention aimed exclusively at Turkey. Having some slight knowledge of the psycho- logy of Balkan nations, I soon possessed proof that my fears of a conflagration were about to be realised. After a little hesitation, on the 4th July, 1912, I dispatched a fairly long code-telegram to M. Sazonoff, in which I mentioned all the alarming signs I had noticed, and I concluded the telegram by expressing my deep-rooted conviction that both on the Bulgarian and the Serbian side, they were actively preparing for war, and that they even intended to hasten events. I heard later that my telegram produced an impression highly unfavour- able to me. " Have you read Nekludoff s hysterical telegram ? " the heads of departments and the young secretaries of Sazonoffs set were continually asking each other. I9I2] MY WARNING DISREGARDED 97 Alas! This telegram proved to be historical, not hysterical ! During the month of July M. Gueshov and the other Ministers who had been on leave returned to Sofia. At the same time affairs in Macedonia were taking a more and more alarming turn. It was quite clear that, setting aside natural and logical causes, one was confronted by the work of Serbo-Bulgarian agitators and abettors. Two small towns in Macedonia, Ishtib and Katchaneh, in particular became in turn the scene of bloody events of the kind so common in Hamid times. In both these places, on market day, bombs exploded close to the bazaar; among the killed and wounded, naturally, Turkish women and children were found : immediately, as at a given signal, the Mussulman population fell on the Bulgarian peasants who had come to market and began to massacre them ; they also attacked the houses of Bulgarian patriots and leading men, and the usual "atrocities" took place. In both cases the Turkish garrison did nothing to stop the massacre ; it was even suspected of having aided and abetted. Certainly the people who threw the bombs — and they never were Turks — knew perfectly well what the result of their deeds would be. Such sad incidents were of frequent occurrence in the days before the Turkish Revolution ; but then no one thought of making them a casus belli; Bulgaria became irritable, the Bulgarian newspapers published warlike articles, the Great Powers cautioned the Porte, and then everything resumed its normal aspect. That was why the respective Governments of Western Europe did not attach any extraordinary significance to the Macedonian events of July, 1912. But our Foreign Secretary, who was perfectly well aware of the true meaning of these regrettable incidents, ought to have perceived a serious warning in them. That is how I understood them, and consequently I did not fail to emphasise in my telegrams and dispatches that the Balkan War was the order of the day and was a perpetual menace. 98 INTRIGUES AT SOFIA [ciiAr.viii. On this occasion it is noteworthy that M. Gueshov, as soon as he returned from his holiday, was remarkably frank and correct in his behaviour to me. He confirmed the information that I had received from a private source on the conclusion of the Serbo-Bulgarian Military Con- vention, and if my memory does not deceive me, the actual text of this convention was communicated by Colonel Romanowski to our General Headquarters Staff. M. Gueshov even went further in his confidences; he confided to me that Bulgaria and Serbia had just made an arrangement with Greece; this arrangement, in contrast to the Serbo-Bulgarian agreement, was not concerned with the demarcation of boundaries in Mace- donia, but it was a kind of military convention in case of " Turkish aggression." There is one curious detail ; whereas M. Gueshov was displaying so much frankness towards me, the Greek Government took great care not to communicate this arrangement to our representative in Athens, although he was much esteemed and very popular there. At the end of July I went to Vienna to meet M. Sverbeieff, to discuss some important private matters with him. Sverbeieff, who had just left the post of Athens and was on his way to Berlin, where he had been appointed Ambassador, heard for the first time from me that the Greeks had made an arrangement with Bulgaria and Serbia. In the first days of July I was more or less agreeably surprised by the advent of my friend M. A. Goutchkoff in Sofia. As managing director of one of our principal insurance companies, he came to Bulgaria and Serbia to assist at the inauguration of branches of this company. At least that was the avowed object of his journey, but in reality the journey was a kind of political inquiry. In Russian activist circles in which Goutchkoff possessed undoubted authority, they had got wind of the events which were shaping in the Balkans, and I9I2] GOUTCHKOFF IN SOFIA 99 Goutchkoff was commissioned — unless he was acting on his own initiative — to verify de visa the rumours which were circulating. Political circles in Sofia greeted the eminent Russian guest with the most cordial reception. The principal Ministers conversed at great length with him ; the members of the former Malinov Cabinet met Goutchkoff at an evening party given by their colleague, M. Liaptchev, a fiery and irreconcilable Macedonian. Under the influence of all that he had heard there, Goutchkoff talked to me for a long time and appeared desirous of convincing me that the events, apparently imminent in Bulgaria and Sofia, were not only un- avoidable but desirable. "But look here," I replied, "was it not you yourself who told me four months ago that Russia's equipment was absolutely inadequate, and that a war, taking us unawares, might be fatal to us? And now you appear to think it natural and almost desirable that the Balkan States should declare war on Turkey ! But what in this case would Russia's position be, forced to remain a passive witness of these events, whatever their result?" "Yes, that is true," said Goutchkoff; "but then have we ever been prepared for events during the whole course of our modern history? and nevertheless we have progressed considerably in the solution of our historic problems in the Near East. Moreover, at this moment, as I have satisfactorily proved, the Slav States will not wait for the concentration of our forces. You yourself, M. Nekludoff, who, by virtue of family traditions and the whole of your earlier career, have had Constantinople as a centre of attraction, would you not be happy to have your name connected with the definite solution of the Straits question in our favour?" "Certainly, I should have felt the most intense and legitimate pleasure. But on the other hand, what heavy responsibility I should have taken on myself if, seduced by this mirage of personal ambition, I had allowed H loo INTRIGUES AT SOFIA [ciiap.viii. myself to be drawn into a game which might have ended in cruel disappointments for Russia!" Goutchkoffs opinion that we often reaped success in spite of our perpetual unpreparedness was shared by our military agent, and it often led him, in his interviews with the Bulgarian military, into making assertions which I should have wished to be less encouraging and less enthusiastic. P>om Sofia Goutchkoff went to Belgrade, where he was received with even more cordiality than in Sofia, there was even an official tinge in the reception given in his honour. A few days after I had taken leave of him, I left to meet Sverbeieff in Vienna, and at the Belgrade station I was an incognito witness of the almost triumphal departure of Goutchkoff, who got into my train. The royal waiting-rooms were brilliantly lit up, a soft red carpet was laid down up to the door of the wagon-lit; and after a somewhat long wait, 1 perceived the excellent M. Goutchkoff, dressed for travelling, accompanied by all the Serbian Ministers headed by M. Pachitch, M. Hartwig, the Mayor of Belgrade, and other political personages ; most of these gentlemen were in evening clothes, for they had just come from a grand banquet given to the eminent Russian guest. At last all the good-byes were said, there was much shaking of hands, some friendly tapping on the back, cries of "jivio," and the train slowly steamed out of the station, while Goutchkoff, touched by so much cordiality, stood at the open window of his coupe waving to his Serbian friends. He was slightly abashed when I suddenly emerged out of the darkness of the corridor and asked him : " Well, my dear Goutchkoff, and what have you been doing in Belgrade?" The following morning, before we reached Vienna, he told me that the public mind was much excited in Serbia, and that Macedonian events were looked on as most serious ; he omitted to tell me what he himself had said and preached to the Serbians. Three days after, on my return from Vienna, I was a I9I2] THE SCHIPKA VETERANS' FETE loi witness at the same Belgrade station of another de- parture : that of the heir to the throne, Prince Alexander, who, with M. Pachitch, was going to inspect the troops in the south-east of Serbia, that is near the Turkish frontier, I could not help thinking that this journey was rather significant. Towards the beginning of August, Bulgaria's dis- quieting state of mind was already the constant topic at the interviews of members of the Diplomatic Corps of Sofia. I noticed that the representatives of the Triple Alliance, and the new Turkish Minister, the intelligent and shrewd Nabi-bey, had no idea of the complete understanding between the Bulgarians and the Serbians, and did not perceive, in the conduct of the two Govern- ments, a direct preparation for war; but all the same they were beginning to be anxious, and watched my words and deeds with suspicious curiosity. Moreover, Nabi-bey soon left for Switzerland, ostensibly to take a cure, but in reality to begin secret negotiations, by order of the Porte, with some Italian financiers, selected ad hoc. These secret conferences were transformed into official negotiations of peace as soon as the Balkan War had broken out. I have reason to believe that the pre- liminaries of these negotiations had been laid down in Sofia before Nabi-bey's departure to Switzerland. On the nth (24th) August, the feast of the veterans of the first Bulgarian militia was generally celebrated in Sofia, and always with great pomp. During the days — celebrated for ever in Bulgaria's history — of the 9th to the nth August (O.S.), 1877, when the Turks, pursuing from Kazanlyk the weak detachment of General Gourko, ascended the southern slope of the Balkans and tried to take the Schipka Pass by assault — a position fiercely defended by us— the Bulgarian militia, newly formed into picked battalions, displayed heroic courage side by side with regiments of Russian Chasseurs, and helped to save Shipka and to bar the road to northern Bulgaria to the Turks. Ever since, the anniversary of the i ith (24th) I02 INTRIGUKS AT SOFIA [chap.viii. August has been celebrated every year by the illustrious survivors of these battles. On the eve of this day, the veterans gave a banquet to the representatives of the Government and to the Russian Legation ; on the day itself a solemn service was held in the cathedral of Sofia, and the historical colours of the first Bulgarian militia, amongst which the flag called "of Samara" was par- ticularly noticeable, were brought from the Palace to the church ; this was the flag embroidered and presented to the Bulgarian militia by the Russian ladies of the town of Samara ; it was covered with Bulgarian blood in the hand-to-hand fighting near Stara-Zagora {Eski- Zagra), where the Bulgarian militia with their bayonets succeeded in cutting through the Turkish lines and in saving the precious flag. The Bulgarians in general have not an expansive nature. This people, reserved and taciturn, is almost completely incapable of boisterous manifestations of enthusiasm. So that the festival of the veterans usually went off very calmly according to the programme once drawn up ; and the crowd gathered round the cathedral appeared to watch with indifference the pro- cession of the colours and the review of the veterans and of the Sofia garrison which took place in the big square. On this occasion, that is in 1912, we received as usual an invitation to the veterans' banquet and to the service in the cathedral. But on the eve of the banquet Gueshov said to me: "Shall you go to the banquet, Monsieur? " "I was just going to ask you the same question," I replied. " I think," said Gueshov, " that it would be better for you and me not to go ; every one is over-excited ; at the banquet speeches may be made which would place us in an embarrassing position. But I shall, of course, go to the cathedral, and we earnestly beg of you to come as usual." On arrival at the cathedral at the appointed time, we were struck by the emotional atmosphere which per- vaded the sacred edifice. One saw pale faces, shining I9I2I "IT IS WAR" 103 eyes, tears coursing down the cheeks of aged men . . . and all of a sudden from the precincts of the cathedral, where an enormous crowd was collected, a formidable " hurrah ! " resounded, but a " hurrah ! " the like of which I have not heard since my childhood, when in the large square of the Kremlin in Moscow the crowd cheered the Tsar- Liberator Alexander II. What can this mean? I inwardly wondered. Is the King arriving at the cathedral, and would they give hint such an ovation ? At this moment the doors of the church were thrown open, and there appeared : first the flag of Samara, then theold colours of the militia, and then Macedonian colours entwined in crepe. But all eyes were bent on the flag of Samara; the veterans gathered round it ; with tears in their eyes they kissed the staff, the drapery, the St. George streamers. A thought flashed like lightning through my mind : it is war, I thought. Certainly and undoubtedly, it is war ! The review passed off with every one still in the same frame of mind, and when I drove to the Legation I was cheered with cries of "hurrah!" and "Russia for ever ! " Soon after Gueshov informed me of the agreement concluded with Montenegro. In all my interviews with Bulgarian Ministers I always tried to restrain the war- like tendencies of some amongst them, by proving to them the undoubted dangers to which Bulgaria and Serbia would expose themselves if they allowed them- selves to be drawn into a war with Turkey, even if they were supported by Greece and Montenegro. I quoted the excellent state of the Turkish Army reformed and commanded by German generals, the possibility of an attack on the Serbians from behind by Austria and the utter impossibility of our doing anything to prevent this; I did not conceal my doubts of the Balkan allies maintaining close solidarity up to the end ; but my principal argument was that Russia was afraid of blood- shed which might finally spread all over Europe — which 104 INTRIGUES AT SOFIA [chap.viii. would not lielp tlic cause of our Balkan kinsmen in the least. My arguments on the subject of the strength and perfect equipment of the Turkisii Army were received by my Bulgarian listeners with a sceptical smile. Gueshov assured me repeatedly that the Bulgarian Headquarters Staff possessed quite different information on the state of the Ottoman Army, information based on systematic observation and absolutely reliable secret intelligence. And that concerning our wise desire to prevent a war in the Near East, the only way to attain that would be for Russia and Europe to resume their former course of action and their work of organisation and autonomy in Macedonia ; in short that Europe must at last renounce her illusions on the subject of a new state of affairs in Turkey. I entirely shared this last point of view, and I remember that after the second massacre which took place in Macedonia, I made the suggestion, in a dispatch to M. Sazonoff, that the Powers should take Macedonian affairs in hand and immediately send their consuls to Katchaneh and Ishtib, to hold an inquiry on the massacres which had taken place there, just as was done under the old Turkish regime, which was exactly like the new one. I also communicated my views to our Ambassador in Constantinople. In St. Petersburg it was not thought possible to carry out my idea. It is true that it would be difficult to change our relations with Turkey all at once, and to reconquer a position voluntarily abandoned by European diplomacy nearly four years ago — four years during which the Powers had vied with one another in good behaviour towards the Young Turks and had almost been obsequious to them. And even admitting that we had decided to change our attitude towards Turkey abruptly, should we have been followed along this path by the other Powers, even those of the Entente? M. de Giers was not long in replying to me from Constantinople ; and he persuaded me to warn the I9I2] FERDINAND'S JUBILEE 105 Bulgarians in the most emphatic manner that they were courting certain disasterif they declared war on Turkey. M. de Giers — a serious-minded and straightforward man — was absolutely sincere in his warning. He felt much sympathy for the Slavs of the Balkans and dreaded their defeat, which would have had as a consequence either the considerable diminishing of the prestige of Russia, or our being dragged into a collision with the Central Empires. I took care to impart to Gueshovthe opinion of our Ambassador in Constantinople, but I could only realise afresh and more fully that arguments on the subject of the military strength of the Ottoman Empire would not produce any effect on the Bulgarians. I heard besides that King Ferdinand, who in April and May had seemed inclined for war, was much per- plexed at this moment ; he dreaded extreme measures and would have liked things to drag on for some time. In August, 191 2, it was twenty-five years since Prince Ferdinand of Coburg had been elected Prince of Bulgaria and had set foot on Bulgarian soil, although he was not recognised by Russia and a few other powers. This anniversary was to be solemnly celebrated at Tirnova in the presence of the Diplomatic Corps. Given the circumstances and the activist fever which had seized the Bulgarians, it was to be feared that the Jubilee would not pass off without incident; I foresaw at the same time that at Tirnova all eyes would be fixed on the Russian Minister and that the King himself would pay me marked attention. By a concurrence of strange and significant circumstances, the representative of that Power which a quarter of a century earlier had positively refused to recognise Ferdinand, now became the most prominent acolyte — I might even say the principal trophy — of his Jubilee! The celebrations passed off well. There were no political demonstrations; only in all the speeches addressed to the King, beginning with the sermon of the io6 INTRIGUES AT SOFIA friiAP.vm. Metropolitan of Tirnova, the following note predomin- ated : " Vou, sir, have enhanced Your own prestige, won the attention of the Powers, raised Bulgaria to the rank of a sovereign State, and assumed for Yourself the title of King; but You must remember that during these twenty-five years You have not furthered by a single degree the real aims of Bulgaria, those which had been fixed by the Tsar-Liberator in the treaty of San Stefano ! " Russia and the Tsar-Liberator were repeatedly men- tioned in the speeches. After the banquet served in the municipal theatre, the King drew me aside and had a long talk with me. He complained of his difficult position, assured me of his sincere desire to avoid a collision with Turkey, but at the same time alluded to the patriotic agitation which had seized on the whole of Bulgaria and which would only settle down in a peaceful manner if the rights and the autonomy of the Bulgarians of Macedonia and Thrace were truly and effectually realised. "You have heard the speeches which have just been made, and you have probably grasped their true mean- ing. Hence you can judge the difficulty of my position. Nevertheless I mean to act up to the last moment with the idea of preserving peace. I beg you to transmit this to St. Petersburg, and at the same time to entreat them earnestly to come to my assistance." This was my last interview with the King before the Bulgarian mobilisation. Of course, I informed M. Sazonoff of the purport of it, and added that, according to my own opinion, events could still be checked by energetic action respecting the Porte, but that in a few weeks it would be too late. I was inordinately astonished, and up to now I cannot understand that, in spite of my warnings, our Foreign Secretary could remain so calm about Bulgaria and Serbia. When the mobilisation was announced, we like all the other European Cabinets were aghast, and we pro- ceeded to heap on Sofia, Belgrade, Athens and Cetigne 1912] M. SAZONOFFS APATHY 107 threatening warnings and reproaches which were almost ultimatums. But it was too late ! At the time I explained this impenitent optimism of St. Petersburg to myself in the following way : our Foreign Office was certain that without the help of Serbia, the Bulgarians would never make up their minds to move ; moreover, no one in our country doubted the obedience and good behaviour of the Serbians ; and M. Hartwig took great care not to report to the Foreign Office what was really happening in Belgrade, as it might shatter our illusions. But later on I came to the conclusion that the behaviour of my colleague in Belgrade did not repre- sent so much a cause of ulterior events as one of the symptoms of our way of tackling political questions. Our diplomatic chiefs in St. Petersburg, simply, were filled with what M. Isvolsky, in a speech made at the Duma some time before, had called " healthy optimism," and which had led Russia then to the brink of war ! CHAPTER IX THE BALKAN WAR, I9I2 The 17th (30th) September, 1912, the Bulgarian mobi- lisation was ordered simultaneously with the Serbian, Greek, and Montenegrin mobilisations, and from the first moment all the members of the Diplomatic Corps in Sofia without exception understood that this mobi- lisation meant a determined war with no turning back. But such was not the opinion of the European Governments. For several days warnings, prayers, and threats were abundantly poured on Sofia, Belgrade, etc., but they produced no effect whatever on those to whom they were addressed. Finally, on the fourth or fifth day, the representatives of the Powers in Sofia, Belgrade, etc., received from their respective Govern- ments instructions to declare to the Government to which they were accredited that the Powers were de- termined to obtain from Turkey a regime of justice and autonomy for all the people of a common origin of the four Balkan States at present allied ; but that if, on the other hand, these States would not listen to the wise advice offered them, and insisted on making war on Turkey, the Powers, even in the event of victory by the allies, would not permit any territorial change in the Peninsula prejudicial to the Ottoman Empire. The first part of this declaration was eminently sound, and corresponded on all points with what 1 had suggested and preached in June and July ; but in October, and after mobilisation had been ordered, the promises of the Powers were arriving decidedly too late ! Having assembled at the house of our senior, we decided to make the prescribed declaration the very 108 I9I2] FUTILE PROTESTS 109 next day to M. Gueshov, one after the other, and in a verbal form but strictly identical. To effect this we drew our communication up together, and each of us was to read the text to M. Gueshov. It is not difficult to guess that not one of us expected any result from this proceeding. The evening before, my French col- league and I had confessed as much to one another. The next day, when I was on my way to the Foreign Office at the appoijited hour, I met Count Tarnowski, the Austro-Hungarian Minister, coming out of his Legation. " Well, so we are going to take our famous step, are we ? " he asked with a sarcastic smile. "Certainly," I replied. "And you think that something will come of it?" " I doubt it." "And I am quite sure that nothing will," replied my colleague sharply; "Europe is simply placing herself in a ridiculous position ! " I did not answer, but in my heart of hearts I could not but agree that Tarnowski was perfectly right. A few weeks later, when the final and brilliant success of the Balkan States was clearly evident, the Powers com- pletely /or^o/ the declaration they had made during the mobilisation ; every one in Europe began to court the victors, more especially the Bulgarians. Such always has been and such always will be the power of success. But after this what must the Bulgarians, Serbians, etc., have thought of the august decisions of Europe, of her warnings, her threats? The mobilisation went off splendidly in Bulgaria and in Serbia. I should never have thought that a people so reserved as the Bulgarians were capable of the enthusiasm they displayed during those memorable days. There were no drunkards : there never are in Balkan countries. Everywhere exemplary order reigned, except in a few railway stations where the reservists who had been called up took the trains by assault, and even climbed up on the roofs of the carriages in order no THE BALKAN WAR, 1912 [chap. ix. to arrive more quickly at the rallying-point. My wife and my youngest daughter, who were returning from Russia vid Bukharest and passing through the whole of northern Bulgaria exactly at this time, told me that at each station there were crowds of women, old men, and children escorting, with flowers, songs, and jokes, their sons, husbands, and brothers who were jo^^fully going off to the decisive conflict with the time-honoured enemy. The same thing was told me by travellers who had crossed Serbia. The day after the one on which the mobilisation was ordered war became inevitable. If the Bulgarian or Serbian Government had wished to obey the injunctions of the Powers and — not to demo- bilise — but only to check the course of events, it would have inevitably provoked a revolution, and the armed troops would have crossed the frontier on their own initiative. The die was cast. As to us, representatives of the Great Powers in Sofia, we could only be spectators of military deeds and of the first decisive encounters. I often wondered at the time and afterwards how the Central Empires could have allowed the Balkan States to go to war without at least trying to prevent it by more prompt and effectual means than the representa- tions of united Europe and her platonic threats. I explain the fact by the complete confidence possessed by Berlin in the victory of the Turks over the Allies. Such a victory would necessarily lead to diplomatic negotiations between the Powers, and during these negotiations the Central Empires would have the enor- mous advantage of being on the side of the victor. The unexpected, and what is more, rapid and decisive, success of the Serbian and Bulgarian arms flabber- gasted Berlin and Vienna to such a pitch that they had not even time to agree together to prevent this success. It became henceforth necessary to change the sphere of action to that of the inevitable competition between the victorious countries, and to postpone the decisive blow to another day and a more propitious moment. I9I2] WAR BREAKS OUT m Germany waited for this moment for exactly twenty- two months. I must confess that from the moment war broke out I was entirely and whole-heartedly on the side of the Serbians, the Bulgarians, and the Greeks. I was witnessing the accomplishment of all that had been prepared by the efforts, the blood, and the thought of several generations of Russian statesmen, soldiers, and thinkers. The three small nations — of a common origin and Orthodox — had become strong enough to risk a contest with their time-honoured foe, alone and without outside help ; their victory would serve as a striking justification of all our previous policy, of all the efforts, all the sacrifices of the Russian people ; hence any one will realise the intense interest with which I followed the military operations which had just begun. I knew through private sources that the Bulgarian Army would advance boldly in Thrace, and that the key to its final success would be the taking of Lozengrad (Kirk-kilisseh), whilst the Serbian Army had reserved Macedonia as its scene of action in the direction of Skoplie (Uskub) and beyond. I was overjoyed the morning that Gueshov telephoned to tell me that Lozen- grad had been taken by two Bulgarian divisions which crushed the Turks by a truly overwhelming advance. From that moment the Bulgarians were threatening the rear of the Turkish Army, which had to retreat hurriedly before the principal forces of the Bulgarians. By the afternoon all the town knew of the happy event, and towards evening there was a procession of townspeople, school children, Macedonians, and reservists marching with torches through the principal streets, and stopping to cheer lustily in front of the Palace and the houses of Gueshov and Danev, and more lustily still in front of the Russian Legation. This time I thought it my duty to go out on to the corner balcony which overlooked the Square, to listen to the excited speeches of the leaders of the procession and to reply by a short but 112 THE BALKAN WAR, 1912 [chap. ix. stirring address. From that day and at each fresh success of the Bulgarian arms up to the taking of Adrianople inclusive, the like manifestations were re- peated in front of the Russian Legation, but none of them made such a lasting impression on me as the first one, in honour of the taking of Lozengrad, A few days later we heard that the Serbian Army, after the sanguinary assault of the "Zrny-Vrch" positions, during which the Serbians accomplished astounding feats of valour, had completely beaten the Turkish Army and was pursuing it across the elevated plain — so sadly famed in the history of the Serbian people — which bears the name of " Kossovo Pole." I was told later that when the Serbians reached this place, hallowed throughout centuries by immortal memories of heroism and mourn- ing, and extolled in the three epic poems called the " Kossovo Pole Songs," that each Serbian soldier bent down to kiss the sacred soil and placed a handful of earth in his bosom in a clean cloth. . . . Such moments are indeed rare in the history of nations : all honour to those amongst them who have purchased them by time- honoured fidelity to the historic ideal, and with their noble blood shed on the very spot and at the vital moment ! . . . Neither the Bulgarian nor the Serbian Army gave the enemy time to recover. While the Serbians had occupied their former capital Skoplie almost without striking a blow, had advanced on Bitolia and there, after four days' ferocious and difficult fighting, had utterly and completely beaten the last Turkish troops, the Bulgarians were overtaking the Ottoman Army at Lule-Burgas. After three days' sanguinary fighting^ during which the positions were perpetually changing hands, the Turkish resistance was finally overcome and their Army forced to the most hurried retreat, which at times degenerated into a flight. Such is the glorious account of the first Balkan War (October, 1912). But beside these glorious annals, an incident far less I9I2] GRECO-BULGARIAN INCIDENT 113 flattering to the Bulgarians occurred at the very outset of the War. As I have already said, the principal operations in Macedonia fell to the Serbian Army ; but parallel to the Serbian action and more to the south-east a large Bulgarian detachment was operating, that of General Todorov, who was sent across the Rhodope Mountains straight in the direction of Salonika. In this quarter there were but few Turkish troops, and only the town and port of Salonika, constituting the base of opera- tions of defence in Macedonia, were guarded by a fairly large garrison. General Todorov's detachment, having crossed the mountains and routed the irregular detach- ments of native Mussulmans who courageously defended the passes and defiles, at length emerged on the road to Salonika. The Bulgarians advanced so quickly that they hardly had time to set fire to the rich Turkish villages, or to massacre many of the inhabitants. This was because from another side the troops of the " Diadoch " Constantine were advancing, or rather rush- ing with giddy haste. Never before, since the days when Achilles with the swiftness of a stag pursued Hector round the walls of Troy, have the Greeks marched with such rapidity as on this occasion, when they had at all costs to reach Salonika before the Bul- garians. And the Greeks were the first to get near the town of St. Cyril and Methodius. When General Todorov's detachment got near Salonika the Greeks had already been there two days, and the whole Turkish garrison, discouraged by a series of defeats in Mace- donia, and knowing that they were between two fires, had already surrendered to the "Diadoch." But this did not suit the Bulgarians at all. Having arrived in sight of the Turkish camp, they opened fire, and then dispatched envoys to the Ottoman heads suggesting they should surrender. The 'Turks, who had just surrendered to the Greeks, hastened to surrender again to the Bulgarians. But the Greeks would have none of this. And when General Todorov's troops began to 114 THP: BALKAN WAR, 1912 [chap. ix. surround the Turkish camp, the commander of the Greek troops informed the Bulgarians that he would resort to force if they did not cease immediately to molest their Turkish prisoners and if the}^ did not abandon the idea of entering the town. A little more and they would have come to blows, but fortunately the young Crown Prince Boris was in Todorov's de- tachment, and this constrained the Bulgarian general to prudence, and the " Diadoch " Constantine, who had been warned in time, to be a little more conciliatory. The incident was at last settled. A Bulgarian brigade was allowed to enter the town, and to garrison the northern suburb, while the greater part of Salonika remained in the power of the Greeks, who made their headquarters there. The Turkish prisoners also were left in Greek hands and sent to Greece. This beginning augured no good. Throughout the duration of the war, the Greeks and Bulgarians who occupied the southern part of Macedonia were in a permanent state of feud. Each side schemed to occupy more ground, and shortly before the conclusion of peace a real collision took place, which ended in bloodshed ; I will refer to this further on. The complete defeat of the Turkish Army at Lule- Burgas opened to the Bulgarians the road as far as Constantinople, or rather up to the strongly fortified line of Chataldja, which encircles the town north of the shores of the Black Sea as far as those of the Sea of Marmara. The demoralisation of the Turkish troops and the state of panic in Constantinople were such that if at this moment the army of Radko-Dmitriev had risked an immediate march on Chataldja it could have taken the Turkish fortifications at one stroke. Unfortunately for the Bulgarians they were short of munitions, and had to halt for three or four days await- ing them. But at this moment a circumstance occurred which, although quite natural, had not entered into the Bulgarians' calculations ; and Stambul was saved. I9I2] RAINS STOP THE ADVANCE 115 Generally speaking, the autumn, or at least the months of September and October, O.S., constitute the most beautiful season of the year in the entire Balkan Peninsula. During the seventeen years that I spent there at the outset of my career I only once saw a wet autumn; in the other years this season was fine, mild, and sunny, except for a few stormy days now and then. Such was also the previous autumn of 191 1 which I spent in Sofia. But in 1912, shortly before the battle of Lule-Burgas, rain suddenly began to fall, and there were continual downpours lasting for at least a month. From the first, the bad Bulgarian roads and the execrable Turkish ones became absolutely impassable ; the heavy clay soil of this part of the Peninsula turned into deep and holding mud, and the military convoys stuck on the road. A few days later all the draught-horses had died ; then the bullocks succumbed, and only the bufi'aloes still held out and managed to draw their heavy loads, but at a snail's pace. The doctors and sisters of one of our Red Cross detachments who at this moment were travelling between the Bulgarian frontier and Lozen- grad told me later that their convoy only managed to do from four to six kilometres a day, and that only thanks to the efforts of the robust Russian medical attendants, and of the no less robust Bulgarians of the convoy, who perpetually shovelled away the clay into which the wheels of the waggons were sinking up to the axle. Under these conditions the march of the Bulgarian Army was becoming extremely difficult : the guns had to be drawn by buffaloes, and as to the cavalry it simply had to halt, as the horses, up to the hocks in mud, were perpetually breaking their legs. Also the head of the Bulgarian Headquarters Staff, General Fichev, and most of the other generals protested firmly against the further advance on Constantinople. But at this moment a new factor in the development of events appeared on the scene : the ambition, suddenly aroused and immeasur- ably increased, of the King of the Bulgarians ! Knowing Ferdinand fairly well, I could easily picture I ii6 THE BALKAN WAR, 1912 [chap. ix. his terrible anguish during the fateful days of the mobi- lisation and the first days of military operations. But when at the King's headquarters the news came through, first of the brilliant victory of his troops at Lule-Burgas and of the decisive successes of the Serbians in Macedonia, when in a few short weeks there was nothing remaining to the Turks in Europe but Constantinople and its outskirts, Adrianople, Janinaand Scutari in Albania surrounded and besieged, and the peninsula of Gallipoli — then Ferdinand's anguish suddenly gave place to a violent outburst of pride and ambitious hopes. A Bulgarian lady, Russian by birth, who met the King just at this time, told me some amusing details about Ferdinand's behaviour; he did not conceal his almost childish joy and his overweening pride in the least. The King walked with her along the platform of the station where his headquarters were, and the in- credible elasticity of his movements were a great con- trast to his usual heavy walk of a gouty and obese person : His Majesty bounded in the air like an india- rubber ball. "Now then!" he exclaimed with a trium- phant smile, "what have you to say about it, madame? What do you say ? Bulgav-Vilayct ! Eh what? Bulgar- Vilayet? Who would have thought it?" and the King went on repeating his Biilgar-Vilayet, accompanying the words with his most malicious smile aimed at the Padishah. At this moment he was evidently remembering his first journey to Constantinople, when the Sultan was holding an investiture ; he remembered his meeting with the sly, obstinate, old Abdul-Hamid, and how he had to bow before him and to kiss the hand of the Padishah, his sovereign. Yes, he had gone through it all ; he had done it in an insinuating manner, as if it cost him nothing ; but in reality he had felt deeply humiliated, and the memory had never been effaced from his heart. It was at this period that at the Sultan's Court Bulgaria was always spoken of as Bulgar-l/ilayet (the Bulgarian I9I2] FERDINAND'S ELATION 117 province). And now "what a change of destiny by the grace of God ! " The fate of Turkey seemed to be in Ferdinand's hands as it had once been in the hands of the Bulgarian Tsar Simeon, who approached the walls of Constantinople with his army, with the object of cutting a way through and being proclaimed Emperor of the East. And Ferdinand with his vivid and prompt imagination foresaw himself playing the part of Simeon. The objects assigned to the war with Turkey seemed to him to have been left far behind, and all his thoughts, all his projects were centred now on the town so near at hand. He pictured himself making his entry into the Imperial City, having obliterated the last traces of Ottoman domination in Europe. And then on his skill, his subtle diplomacy an unexpected solution of the Straits question might depend — a solution in favour of the Bulgarians, this people who forty short years ago had been ignored by the whole world. There is Russia, it is true, who for two centuries has been aspiring to the possession of the Straits and dreams of erecting the cross on the dome of St. Sophia. But these political ambitions of the Tsars, these tradi- tional aspirations of the Russian people have always met with and will continue to meet with irreconcilable opposition from the rest of Europe. Even in allied France the Russians would scarcely find a handful of politicians willing to accept the installation of the Empire of the Tsars in Constantinople and in the Dardanelles. The possession of the Straits by a Power like Russia would increase her might to such an extent that she would become a real danger to the balance of power in Europe. The old formula of Napoleon I. that the Power which possessed the Straits would acquire world-wide supremacy has not yet lost its meaning. For Austria it would be the signal for the disintegration and the secession of her Slav dominions; for Germany, the overthrow of all her projects of commercial and " Kultur" supremacy in the Near East ; for England the ii8 THE BALKAN WAR, 1912 [chap. ix. sharing of her supremacy in the Mediterranean ; finally, for Italy the sudden approach of an alarming giant. Russia in Constantinople would be the reconstitution of the Rome of the Orient, but how far more powerful than Byzantium ever was ! And where in this case would the Rome of the West be, where the second half of the Roman Empire which counterbalanced the Oriental half? One would most certainly not seek this Rome at Pots- dam, and still less in Vienna or at the Quirinal ! There still exists one power, thought Ferdinand, continuing his soliloquy, which has neither lost its prestige nor abandoned its aspirations to universal supremacy, and to which the extension of the Empire of the Tsars as far as the shores of the Sea of Marmora would be intolerable and almost fatal. This power is Roman Catholicism. The triumph of the cause of Greek Orthodoxy the day after the abrogation of the temporal power of the Popes — for to the Church fifty years are but a day — would furnish a palpable proof that the * Ccesarian-papacy of the Orient is at least equal to the power of the Roman Holy See. Hence, concluded Ferdinand, all the vital forces in Europe are hostile to the installation of the Russians in Constantinople. But if the stupid domination of the Turks in this capital of world-wide importance were once broken and were to disappear, would it be possible for Europe to restore it ? No, that is out of the question 1 Who then would replace the Turks on the shores of the Bosphorus ? Would Constantinople become an inter- national free town, in other words the principal market and seat of power of European bankers and Americans of Jewish origin ? Or would one give Turkey over to that " Constantine XIV." who with his tiny army had just " prigged " Salonika from the Bulgarians ? Would it not be infinitely more natural for the European Powers to favour the installation on the Bosphorus of a State powerful enough to guard the Straits, but not powerful enough to be a menace to the balance of power in Europe, i.e. Bulgaria? I9I2] KING P^ERDINAND'S REASONS 119 And how would the Holy See look on such a solution of the question? But to this Ferdinand had an answer ready, formulated during long years of meditation. The Bulgarians, throughout the course of their history, have represented one of the feeblest supports of Greek Orthodoxy ; sometimes they fell under the influence of Rome; sometimes the heresies of the Paulicians and Albigenses triumphed all over the kingdom ; and not so very long ago, at the very first awakening of the Bulgarian national conscience in the forties, this awakening was already partly exploited by Roman propaganda. The first preachers of Bulgarian liberty did not issue only from the universities and seminaries of Moscow and Kieff. Several of the striking personali- ties of the future Bulgaria had received their education either at Montpellier or in Constantinople under the vigilant eye of the Lazarists and of the brothers of the Christian Faith, until the English Robert College and the Protestant work of American missions competed against these. Given these precedents Ferdinand did not think it would be so very difficult to guide his people into the path of a reconciliation with Rome, a path traced nearly four centuries ago by Ignatius Pocej in Western Russia. In imagination Ferdinand already drew the picture of this reconciliation — under his aegis — of the Western Church with the Church of the East; the solemn Mass in St. Sophia's, celebrated strictly in accordance with the Oriental ritual (Ferdinand had made a deep study of this ritual), but during the course of which the name of the successor to St. Peter would be mentioned before and above that of the Patriarch of Constantinople. Then only would they understand in Rome that by consenting to his son's conversion to the Greek Church, Ferdinand had rendered one of the greatest services to Roman Catholicism. And then not only would his excom- munication be rescinded, but also his name would be blessed and quoted side by side with those of the great isapostolic monarchs. I20 THE BALKAN WAR, 1912 [chap. ix. There is no doubt that this hope of a reconciliation witli the Holy See (and with his own conscience into the bargain) was one of the mainsprings which incited Ferdinand to the taking of Constantinople. And there is also no doubt that— from the moment that such in- credible prospects unfolded themselves to the King of the Bulgarians— he at once realised that he had but one real competitor and enemy, and that this enemy was Russia. Onward then ! onward ! whate'er the cost, towards these sacred wails, while Europe has not yet realised the whole importance of the success of the Serbian and Bulgarian arms. The King's headquarters sent off an order to Sofia to dispatch at once all the grand uniforms of the Royal Guard, the gala-coaches, and six white horses : perhaps it would be as well to include even the costume of the Byzantine Basileus in which, shortly, before, the King had posed to a French painter and a Viennese medallist; this costume would surely be found in the Royal wardrobe ! The ceremonial of the entry into Constantinople of the new Tsar Simeon — for Ferdinand intended to adopt this name in the event of eventual success — was thought out in every detail. " Biilgar-Vilayct ! Eh what? Who would have thought it? Bulgar-Vilayet V' But the floodgates of heaven which were opening over the Balkan Peninsula prevented, this time at least, the realisation of all this phantasmagoria. It was not till a week after the victory of Lule-Burgas that the Bulgarian troops, by the King's express order, resumed their march on Constantinople, and a week went by before they could approach the lines of Chataldja. In the interval Berlin had pulled herself together, and so had the German military instructors of the Ottoman Army. The Baron von Wangenheim and the German generals in Constantinople united their efforts to infuse some energy into the broken and wavering spirits of the Young Turks. The fortifications of Chataldja were I9I2] REVERSE AT CHATALDJA 121 hurriedly armed, guns were brought in, the garrison made up to strength, and on both sides of the fortified line, in the Black Sea and the Sea of Marmara, the battle- ships of the Ottoman Fleet with their guns prevented the Bulgarians creeping along the shores. When the Bulgarian Army began nevertheless to attack the line of Chataldja, the enterprise was found to be too much even for the indomitable courage of the Bulgarians : one after the other the hosts of brave men who rushed to the attack were mown down and littered the ground with their corpses ; and after two days of deadly effort, only one Turkish redoubt had been taken, only to be lost the next day, for the Turks concentrated the fire from their other forts on to it. No, the line of Cha- taldja was absolutely impregnable without the assist- ance of big guns or of ships of the line, if it were only from the Black Sea side; and the Bulgarians possessed neither. Checked and thrown back at Chataldja, the Bulgarian Army spread over the whole of Thrace, with the excep- tion of the narrow peninsula of Gallipoli, where it also was stopped by the formidable positions of Bulair; moreover, the Bulgarians had no interest in occupying the European shore of the Dardanelles. The Bulgarian sphere established itself on the whole of the northern shore of the Sea of Marmara, and Ferdinand had his headquarters sometimes at Kavala on the iEgean Sea, sometimes at Rodosto on the Sea of Marmara. But his dreams about Constantinople were decidedly shattered. Ferdinand realised this himself, and from that moment all his efforts were concentrated on securing to Bulgaria all the country just occupied by his Army, plus that part of Macedonia which was due to the Bulgarians by virtue of the agreement with Serbia. It would be difficult to say to what extent the Bul- garian people shared or did not share the dreams of their master about Constantinople. On the one hand, there existed in Bulgaria — and ever since the eighties 122 THE BALKAN WAR, 1912 [chap. ix. — some extreme patriots who looked on Constantinople as the natural portion of the Bulgarian people, and who, like Ferdinand, dreamt of the times of the Tsar Simeon. In the celebrated military song composed during the Russo-Turkish War for the use of the Bulgarian militia, and which has since become the national anthem of Bulgaria, " Schoumi Maritza," one already read the line, "March, march — Tzarignid \i.c. Constantinople] is ours ! " But I have always thought, and I still think, that the greater part of the Bulgarian " intelligence," and more especially the mass of the people, did not dare, and did not even wish, to aspire to the possession of the town, which was commonly considered the goal and lawful portion of the Great Liberator — Russia. Bulgarian public opinion — I would rather say the opinion of the Bulgarian people — which was thoroughly intractable on the subject of Macedonia and of the famous frontiers of San Stefano, did not aspire to the south-eastern part of the peninsula beyond Adrianople and Lozengrad. But these two towns were considered by the Bulgarians to be theirs by right, although Adrianople was inhabited principally by Turks, and Kirk-Kilisseh by Turks and Greeks. The latter had been in the power of the Bulgarians from the first days of the war, and Adrianople surrounded and besieged, it was easy to see that the Bulgarians were determined to take it at all costs, and to possess definitely this ancient capital of the Osmanlis (before the conquest of Constantinople by Mahomet II.). I knew, on the other hand, that amongst us — or at least our Headquarters Staff— a rule existed about a prohibited area round the Straits, within the limits of which the aspirations of no matter which other country would not be tolerated by us ; and the Bulgarians had been warned of this about 1909. Towards the end of October, when all Russia — not excepting official Russia — was hailing the Serbian and Bulgarian victories with enthusiasm, and when the famous threat of the Powers not to recognise any of the conquests of the Balkan I9I2] THE PROHIBITED AREA 123 States had been completely forgotten by every one, 1 received from St. Petersburg instructions to remind the Bulgarian Government of the rule about the pro- hibited area, or in other words to warn it that Russia would not allow the Bulgarians definitely to occupy Adrianople and its environs. These instructions placed the Russian representative in Sofia in a very awkward position. Bulgarian public opinion, as I said above, demanded the taking and the annexation of Odrine. Moreover, the military opera- tions which were developing in Thrace showed clearly that if such a formidable fortress, situated at the junc- tion of the Maritza and the Arda, were left in the hands of the Turks, the establishment of the Bulgarians on the shores of the ^^gean Sea would become very pre- carious. Now, not only were we not opposed to this establishment, but we even supported it up to a point. Southern Bulgaria is separated from the ./Egean Sea by ranges of very high and impassable mountains : the only practicable road from Philippopolis towards the shores of the i£gean Sea follows the valley of the Maritza in a south-crt'5/ direction as far as Lule- Burgas, and from there it turns abruptly to the south-zc^s/ and reaches the sea at Dedeagatch. One could, if necessary, make the road from Dedeagatch end above Lule-Burgas but not above Adrianople. During the war and so long as Adrianople held out, the Bulgarians could not even make a way round which would connect the two sections of the Sofia-Constantinople line, as topographical con- ditions were too difficult. 1 could well imagine what an unfavourable impression our communication on the subject of the prohibited area would produce, and how all our enemies in Bulgaria would hasten to profit by it. But other reflections were added to this one. It was evident to every one that the Turkish Revolution of 1908 had not caused the political scales in Constanti- nople to turn in favour of England, of France, and still less of Russia. German influence had issued triumphant 124 THE BALKAN WAR, 1912 [chap. ix. from this momentary trial, and had continued to reign on the shores of the Bosphorus up till the day when the Balkan war broke out. At this very moment the fate of this influence, or rather of this taking possession, was at stake. If Turkey ended by losing all her Euro- pean possessions, except Constantinople and the strip of land absolutely indispensable to the defence of the Straits, the Turks would be led by direct evidence to- understand how little they had reaped from German influence and protection. The prestige of Germany in the Near East would be for ever compromised. But there would be more in it : seeing a Bulgaria, doubly strong with her obstinate people and her immoderately ambitious King, rising up so near her own capital, Turkey would be inclined to seek the protection of those who, in case of danger, could come to her assist- ance directly and with no delay. Now, such help could only be brought to the Turkish capital by the Fleet that Russia kept in the Black Sea, and by the troops of Russian origin which could be brought up in a few days ; on the Dardanelles side a like service could be rendered to Turkey by the English and French Medi- terranean Squadrons. Such a situation of the Powers of the Entente in Constantinople would naturally not constitute the definite solution of the Eastern question, but it would hold enormous guarantees for us in the event of Germany planning to provoke a collision with Russia, In short, I considered that the real diminution of Turkish power on the European shores of the Straits and of the Sea of Marmara would bring about the downfall of German iufluence and the increase of our own. The world-wide events of the last years have confirmed the opinion I formed then. I am convinced that if in 1913 the Turks had not been enabled almost entirely to recover their former frontier with Bulgaria, the Young-Turk regime would have promptly come to an end, and Turkey, humiliated, disillusioned about German benefits and constantly threatened on the Bul- garian side, would never have dreamt of challenging I9I2] RUSSIAN CONCESSIONS 125 Russia, but on the contrary would have sought our protection. Inspired by these considerations I answered the telegram of M. Sazonoff, who enjoined me to remind the Bulgarians of our rule about the "prohibited area," by saying that I considered such a proceeding most dangerous to our influence in Bulgaria and to our future relations with the country. My arguments prevailed. A few days later I received another telegram in which I was told that Russia was rescinding her prohibition on the subject of Adrianople, and was recognising beforehand between Turkey and Bulgaria a frontier going from Midia on the Black Sea to Enos on the iEgean Sea ; this frontier effectually gave full satisfaction to the justifiable aspirations of the Bulgarians. 1 was authorised to inform the Bulgarian Government of the matter, and the good news was hurriedly made public. " From this day forward there are no more Russophobes in Bulgaria," I wired to Sazonoff. And in fact the Russian name has never enjoyed so much prestige in Bulgaria as it did from this moment until the untoward events of the summer of 1913. But the line of the future Turko-Bulgarian frontier still had to be drawn more accurately. I considered that it ought to ascend slightly from Midia to the environs of Lule-Burgas, and curve again southwards as far as Enos, so as not to go too near the Sea ot Marmara. But our military agent, who, under the influ- ence of Bulgarian victories, had arrived at a paroxysm of Bulgarophile sentiments, thought we ought to consent to the line which would follow the course of the Erghen, and which the Bulgarian General Staff favoured. His opinion prevailed in St. Petersburg, and our Head- quarters Staff, who but a month before were insisting on the " prohibited area," were now giving their consent to a line which only left a strip of land about forty kilometers in depth for the " hinterland " of the Straits. But Ferdinand's ambition was not satisfied with this 126 THE BALKAN WAR, 1912 [chap. ix. concession. Having had, with a heavy heart, to give up the conquest of Constantinople, he began from December, 1912, obstinately to demand the extension of the new Bulgarian territory to the shores of the Mar- mara, the inclusion of the town of Rodosto, and the annexation by Bulgaria of two islands in the itgean Sea: Samothrace and Thasos. The island of Samo- thrace, close to the exit from the Dardanelles, evidently tempted Ferdinand by the divine classic lines of its pearl-grey rocks rising out of the blue sea; thus it met his gaze from Dedeagatch, but at the same time this island is so near the Straits that if necessary it could command the entry. The large island of Thasos, separated from Kavala only by a narrow arm of the sea, forms a natural complement of the Macedonian coast where Bulgaria was going to establish herself; as it possesses vast forests this island could be very useful to its new owners. Unfortunately nearly the whole of it is the private property of the family of the Khedives of Egypt, direct descendants of the lucky native, the celebrated Mehmed Ali. Hence the annexation of Thasos could only be effected by virtue of a special arrangementwith the reigning Khedive and consequently with England ; and the latter appeared in no way dis- posed to deliver into the unscrupulous hands of the Bulgarians the beautiful forests of Thasos and the mineral riches with which the island was credited. Ferdinand's entreaties on the subject of Rodosto assumed an acute character during the last months of the war. The King repeatedly sent his confidants to me, to persuade me to lend my help to the arranging of the affair; but each time I absolutely refused to touch it. Then Ferdinand wished to profit by a journey which the Minister of Finance, Todorov, was going to take to St. Petersburg — on business connected with his depart- ment — and he gave him a statement, which he hoped would be passed on to M. Sazonoff, and which showed the absolute necessity for Bulgaria to possess the town of Rodosto as an outlet on the Marmara. The King I9I2] GENERAL DMITRIEV'S MISSION 127 availed himself of this opportunity also to send letters on the same subject to his friends and exalted patrons in St. Petersburg, and Todorov himself was to endorse the aspirations of his master in our country. As may be supposed, all this was done behind my back ; but Todorov, who has always been sincere with me, confided the secret to me, and in exchange I gave him the friendly advice not to make himself the advocate of the King's claims on the subject of Rodosto in St. Petersburg, as these claims could not fail to create an unfavourable impression amongst us. As was to be expected, the reply to the King from St. Petersburg was to the effect that there could be no question of Bulgaria annexing Rodosto or any other point on the Marmara. The King, however, would not acknowledge himself beaten. Some time after he dispatched to St. Peters- burg the victor of Lule-Burgas, General Radko-Dmitriev, who was considered by us — and rightly so — to be quite devoted to Russia. The General was ordered to be persistent with the Russian Government and even with His Majesty the Emperor on the subject of Rodosto. He was also told to be careful, when leaving Sofia, that his journey and the object of this journey should not be known to me. To this end, the General was not even to have his passports vised at the Russian Legation in Sofia, but by our consul in Rustchuk, and from there he was to travel by the Bukharest-Odessa line. Having carried out these instructions with regard to " Russian diplomacy," Radko-Dmitriev, however, did not think it possible to conceal his journe}^ and the object of this journey from his comrade-in-arms, our military agent in Sofia ; and the latter -naturally informed me of it. Moreover, Radko-Dmitriev's journey was no more successful than the other steps taken by the King : in St. Petersburg every one turned a deaf ear to the subject of Rodosto. When he had abandoned all hope, Ferdinand re- solved to leave the town which had become so dear to him and where he had stayed several times during the 128 THE BALKAN WAR, 1912 [chap. ix. winter months of 1912-13. But befere his departure he visited the cemeteryNvhere lie the bones of some of the unsuccessful actors in the Hungarian insurrection of 1848, who after the failure of their efforts had taken refuge in Turkey and were interned at Rodosto. Ferdinand prayed fervently on the graves of the Magyar national heroes. Sulking with Russia he thought it a well-chosen moment to remember his Kohary ancestors and his Hungarian possessions. . . . For want of something better Rodosto at least gave him an opportunity of parading his Magyar sympathies : who knows but that he might derive some profit from this parade? It is easy to realise that Ferdinand's behaviour after the battle of Lule-Burgas and his obstinate proceedings on the subject of Rodosto should have aroused the displeasure and distrust of the Russian Government : his insatiable ambition and his secret schemes, incom- patible with the historic problems and vital interests of Russia, stood revealed. In mentioning all this political intrigue here, I am anticipating events a little. The journeys of M. Todorov and General Radko-Dmitriev only took place in 191 3, but Ferdinand's intrigues and the steps he took in St. Petersburg form the natural sequel to the attitude adopted by him ever since November, 1912. From December, 191 2, when the success of the allied arms was clearly proved, the Turks entered into negotia- tions for peace. For this purpose, by common consent of the belligerents and of the Great Powers, a Conference was convened in London, at which Bulgaria was represented by M. Danev. An armistice was decided on, and concluded on most advantageous conditions for the allies and particularly for the Bulgarians ; ^ 1 Thus the Bulgarians were authorised to send trains full of provisions by the railway line which goes through the fortified place Adrianople, whereas the Turks could not obtain the right to provision the garrison, which was already beginning to suffer from hunger ! I9I2] THE CONFERENCE OF LONDON 129 afterwards the clauses of the Peace were discussed. The Turks consented to give up the whole of Thrace to the Bulgarians, as far as the line of Midia, Adrianople, Dedeagatch. The forts of Adrianople were to be razed to the ground, and the Turks even yielded to the Bul- garians the railway line and station situated three or four kilometers from the town. In this way Adrianople would only be nominally in the power of the Turks. Nevertheless, the Ottoman plenipotentiaries clung tenaciously to this nominal possession, being well aware of the bitter humiliation which would be felt in the Mussulman world if the ancient capital of the Osmalis in Europe with its celebrated mosque and the tombs of the Sultans, ancestors of Mahomet II., were to be handed over to the giaotws. The negotiations in London coincided with the reawakening, on the part of the Central Empires, of the desire to limit as much as possible any territorial acquisitions of the Balkan Allies. The idea of an autonomous Albania was suggested and, in support of this idea, Austria began to bar the outlet to the Adriatic to the Serbians, an outlet which the}^ had just conquered at the cost of enormous sacrifices. She also vetoed beforehand the annexation by Montenegro of the town of Scutari, still being besieged and around the walls of which streams of the noblest Montenegrin blood had been shed. In Rumania an agitation was setting in on the subject of the " rectification of frontiers " in Dobrudja, and even amongst the Allies dangerous dissensions had begun and were increas- ing day by day. I am not speaking of the misunder- standings between Bulgarians and Greeks ; these had broken out almost simultaneously with the war; the question of Salonika was not yet settled and the Bulgarian chauvinists upheld claims which enraged the hearts of the Greek chauvinists. Even in Serbia every one was agitating and laying down the principle that the Serbians had a right to supplementary com- pensations in Macedonia in exchange for what they 130 THE BALKAN WAR, 1912 [chap. ix. were threatened with losing on the Adriatic; that Bul- garia by laying a hand on the whole of Thrace had received more than she expected to receive, and that in return she ought to give up to Serbia a part of the territory she had acquired by the treaty of February 29th, 1912. In short, one foresaw clearly and in the immediate future a conflict of interests between the Bulgarians on one side and the Serbians and the Greeks on the other. In view of this tangled situation I strongly advised the Bulgarian ruling powers to moderate their demands regarding the Turks, and to patch up a general peace as quickly as possible. The Bulgarians could insist on all their territorial claims in Thrace, but by allowing the Turks free access to Adrianople, which would represent an Ottoman enclave within the actual limits of the town. At the moment the Turks would have been glad to conclude peace on this condition. Gueshov shared my opinion and acted on it, but without success. He was confronted by the opposition of Danev, of the military, and of the King himself, who was willing to give up Salonika, but who wished for the whole of Thrace with its ancient capital and ardently coveted Rodosto and Samothrace. At last the Turkish plenipo- tentiaries in London were induced to resign themselves and to yield. The Bulgarians received Adrianople and the whole of Thrace up to the line Midia-Enos. But alas ! this diplomatic success was essentially ephemeral and only existed on paper. The intense humiliation undergone by Turkey at the London Conference was the signal for a new pro- nunctamento from Enver-Bey, for the assassination of Nazim-Pasha, for the downfall of the Grand Vizier Kiamil-Pasha, and for the annulment of the peace con- ditions which the latter was already prepared to sign. On the 2ist January (4th February), 191 3, the London Conference paused in its labours and the Balkan War broke out afresh. I had then a very strong feeling that this foreboded no good either to Bulgaria or to the Slav igi 3] FRESH OUTBREAK OF WAR 131 cause generally. The unbounded ambition of King Ferdinand and the exaggerated claims of his subjects were at this moment preparing the destruction of the brilliant edifice of Bulgarian power, which had been erected with the rapidity of a fairy-tale, and which was to fall down just as rapidly. CHAPTER X THE BALKAN WAR, I912 {cOHtillUCd) At the beginning of February, 191 3, the situation was as follows : the war between Turkey and the Balkan Allies had begun again, and the peace conference had suspended its sittings ; but the ambassadors of the Great Powers in London continued to confer on the questions relative to the future peace and to the definite distribution of the Balkan territories. In reality at that period only Bulgaria and Monte- negro had any interest in the prolongation of the war. The Bulgarians wished to take Adrianople, the Monte- negrins Scutari. The two other allies had already gained the objects for which they had taken up arms. Greece, with Crete restored to her, had laid hands on all the islands of the Archipelago — except those taken by the Italians in 191 1 — and was occupying Salonika, Chalcidice, part of Southern Macedonia, and Epirus, the capital of which, Janina, surrendered to the Greek Army shortly after the resumption of hostilities. The Serbians held all the rest of Macedonia and Northern Albania with the ports of San Giovanni, Medua and Durazzo ; and they knew perfectly well that the result of their efforts and sacrifices did not depend on the prolongation of the war and on Turkish demoralisation, but on Austrian claims and chicanery. Already in December, 1912, when the irreconcilable opposition of Austria, backed up by Germany, to the establishment of the Serbians on the shores of the Adriatic became apparent, Serbia began to contemplate the possibility of an outlet on the J£gea.n Sea ; for that, it would be necessary to occupy the whole of Western Macedonia, with Monastir, and to come to 132 I9I3] SERBIAN DEMANDS 133 an arrangement with the Greeks for absolutely free transit to Salonika. Such a combination would naturally constitute a violation of the Serbo-Bulgarian agreement ; but Belgrade justified this by saying to herself that the Bulgarians would be compensated to a great extent by the annexation of Adrianople and of the whole of Thrace, as far as the Erghen, a conquest they had not dared to dream of when they signed their agreement with the Serbians. I remember perfectly well the day on which, for the first time, I heard my colleague Spalaikovitch state these claims. It was a foggy afternoon in December, and I was taking my usual walk along the highroad of Tsari- grad, and near the " fourth kilometre " — the usual goal of my walks — I met Spalaikovitch and we walked back together towards the town. It was then that Spalaiko- vitch, complaining bitterly of the behaviour of the Bulgarians towards the Serbians, described the above- mentioned combination to me. I was very unfavourably impressed by it ; I realised the fanaticism with which the Bulgarians looked on and maintained their right to that part of Macedonia allotted to them by the agree- ment of 1912, and I could picture the storm of indigna- tion which the new Serbian claims would raise in Bulgaria, and how the relations of alliance between the two countries would immediately change into bitter hostility. Moreover, a treaty is a treaty, and to the one signed by the Serbians and Bulgarians in February, 1912, Russia had morally set her seal; this agreement had been made under our aegis, and we had taken part in it, if not formally, at least by lending the support ot our sympathies and consent. I mentioned all these considerations to my Serbian colleague and entreated him — and his Government — not to "start that hare." But Spalaikovitch did not appear to be too willing to listen to reason. Some time after, when the coup d'etat of Con- stantinople had occurred and hostilities were beginning again, the trend of opinion mentioned above became 134 THE BALKAN WAR, 1912 [chap. x. more pronounced in Serbia. The Serbians had to make fresh sacrifices in men and money for an object to which they were supremely indifferent — for the siege of Adrianople. The Bulgarians had hardly any heavy artillery; the Serbians, on the contrary, owing to the wise foresight of M. Pachitch, were fairly well supplied. The Bulgarians could not even think of taking Adrianople without the help of Serbian artillery, and without the co-operation of their troops, because the Bulgarian Army was scattered between the positions of Chataldja, Bulair, and the numerous garrisons in Southern Macedonia, where they had to oppose the Greek allies. Also, before the armistice the Serbians had placed at the disposition of the Bulgarians before Adrianople about 100 of their big Creusot guns and two divisions of infantry, which held the trench against the bastions north of the town, which were by far the strongest of the whole defences. With the resumption of hostilities, the question naturally arose as to whether the Serbians would leave these forces before Adrianople. At this moment the Serbians could realise clearly that the outlet to the Adriatic would be barred to them by the irreconcilable opposition of Austria-Hungary. Russian diplomacy, which for a long time had sup- ported the legitimate aspirations of the Serbians, and at the London conferences had upheld Serbia's right to an outlet on the Adriatic, was forced at last to give in to the hostile mood not only of Austria-Hungary, but also of Germany. M. Sazonoflf evidently did not wish for a repetition of 1909, when a thinly-veiled ultimatum from Berlin forced us to change our course abruptly, and to recognise Austrian claims. In the person of our Ambassador in London, Count Bencken- dorf, Russia possessed a plenipotentiary who was energetic as well as extremely well-informed. At the conferences of the Ambassadors, for a long time the Count stubbornly upheld the vital interests of Serbia; but when he saw that affairs were taking an acute turn, and that the Cabinet of Mr. Asquith and Sir Edward I9I3] SERBIAN CLAIMS i35 Grey, determined above all to maintain peace, was not disposed to uphold to the end the just aspirations of the Serbians — then he did not conceal from St. Peters- burg that henceforth all his efforts in Serbia's favour would be futile. On which there was nothing left to us but to persuade the Serbians themselves that it was necessary to yield in the cause of universal peace. The position of the Russian Minister in Belgrade became almost impossible. Whatever his personal influence over the Serbians, and his intimacy with the Court and the party in power may have been, it was a very arduous task to make the Serbians give up the long-wished-for outlet to the sea — after the sacrifices they had made, and the victories they had gained ! In such an undertaking M. Pachitch's authority, firmly established though it was, the popularity of the new dynasty, and Russian influence in Belgrade might well be shipwrecked. Therefore it would be unfair to blame M. Hartwig too much if, in order to get out of such a terribly difficult situation, he promised the Serbians to uphold, by all the means in his power, their schemes for obtaining an outlet to Salonika and the JEgean Sea. It was then that Serbia's stern resolve took shape, to keep for herself Southern Macedonia, and to remain on that side in close proximity to Greece. One must also admit that during the whole period of military operations, the Bulgarian authorities by their greed, their lack of any conciliatory spirit, and their domineering attitude, had roused the indignation, not only of the Greeks, but also of the Serbians. The latter had every reason to hope that, once masters of Monastir, and neighbours of Greece, they would easily obtain free and direct transit to Salonika; on the other hand, if it was a question of establishing this same transit through Bulgarian territory, one might justly fear perpetual difficulties and quibbles. Hence, a com- munity of interests and a natural solidarity bound the Greeks and the Serbians with regard to Bulgaria. Already, in the middle of January, that is to say 136 THE BALKAN WAR, 1912 [chap. x. before the resumption of hostilities, Spalaikovitch had come one day to tell me that he had made the following suggestion to Belgrade : the Serbian Government should warn the Bulgarian Government that, having no longer any interest in the continuation of the war, Serbia would only consent to leave her troops and her guns before Adrianople in return for supplementary compensations in Macedonia. I must confess that this suggestion pleased me enormously : such a warning from the Serbian Government might force the Bul- garians to make the necessary concessions, and thus hasten the conclusion of peace. I foresaw already that the prolongation of the war might become fatal to Bulgaria first, and then to the Slav cause in general. Such a prolongation would constitute a menace to the peace of Europe. In the course of about six weeks, the Balkan Allies, astounding Europe by the rapidity of their successes, had managed — incredibile dicta — to drive the Turks definitely out of Europe, with the exception of Constantinople and a restricted hinterland of the Straits. It was imperative to confirm these results without delay : more especially because, during the short space of time that the armistice had lasted, Germany and Austria had pulled themselves together and had presented, almost in the form of an ultimatum, their demands, which were so unfair to Serbia and to Montenegro. How would it be, then, if war broke out afresh, and if the differences already existing in the heart of the Balkan Alliance were to become more acute and more palpable? No, it was high time to confirm the results obtained, in comparison with which the differences of the Allies appeared to me to take a secondary place. It was by virtue of these considerations that I approved so thoroughly of Spalaikovitch's idea, and 1 awaited his answer from Belgrade with great im- patience. A few da3^s later my worthy Serbian colleague, in a very unhappy frame of mind, came to call on me : M. Pachitch did not approve of his idea I9I3] M. SPALAiKOVITCH'S VIEWS 137 at all, and told him very emphatically not to mention it to any one. Evidently Pachitch considered the taking of Adrianople to be indispensable. This town, and Thrace as far as the Ergene, to Serbian eyes apparently, represented for the Bulgarians the equivalent of what they would have to give up in Macedonia. I concluded from this that in Belgrade they had irrevocably decided to obtain a modification of the demarcation agreement of 1912, and especially to insist on the Serbian and Greek frontiers joining. News came very soon that M. Venizelos, then omnipotent Prime Minister of Greece, was going to Belgrade to confer with M. Pachitch. This news caused great alarm in the political circles of Sofia, because the relations between the Bulgarians and their Greek allies were already very bad, and those between the Bulgarians and Serbians were palpably changing for the worse. Before Adrianople the Serbian and Bulgarian soldiers still fraternised willingly enough ; but the officers already looked askance at one another, and ended by forbidding their men to associate mutually; but I ought to mention that the initial step of this odious measure was taken by the Bulgarian Headquarters Staff At the same time, in Sofia, Spalaikovitch no longer refrained from expressing his displeasure and his suspicions with regard to the Bulgarians. He was extremely outspoken on the subject, especially when he was talking to the repre- sentatives of the Entente. One of the conversations I had with him at this period engraved itself deeply on my memory. I was trying to persuade him that it was not to the interest of the Serbians and that it was even very dangerous for them to be at daggers drawn with the Bulgarians. " I admit," I said to Spalaikovitch, "that Serbia has been cruelly wronged compared to Bulgaria. They have taken from her the outlet to the sea, to which she had every right to aspire, and which she purchased with her blood. 1 admit also that the Bulgarians have made territorial acquisitions 138 THE BALKAN WAR, 1912 [chap. x. in Thrace, which the}' did not even dare to hope for when they took up arms. All that is quite true. But one must also look to tiie future. The Bulgarians will have nothing more to gain, whereas the Serbians will have all their historic goals before them. These goals are situated in the west. Sooner or later, the Serbians will aspire to unite all Serbian lands, and then, if successful, they will possess a splendid coast, inhabited by Serbians of the purest race, and who have been experienced sailors, from father to son, whereas, in this respect, the Bulgarians have to depend on Greeks and Turks. If at the present moment you contrive to keep intact the Serbo-Bulgarian alliance — even at the cost of real sacrifices — the achievement of your great national aims is already half guaranteed." "All that would be quite true," replied Spalaikovitch sharply, " if the Bulgarians were not Bulgarians and if their Tsar was not Ferdinand. Do you seriously think that, if we yield to them in everything to-day, they will come to our assistance when the moment arrives for us of a decisive national contest?" " No, that I could not guarantee," I agreed ; " and it would be particularly difficult to expect such noble behaviour on Ferdinand's part. It is as you say. But on the other hand, if to-day you violate the agreement and if you succeed in keeping Southern Macedonia, to the detriment of the claims so long matured by the Bulgarians, you may be quite certain that at the moment of the supreme and decisive contest, Bulgaria will attack you from behind. And in doing so the Bulgarian people will be one with Ferdi- nand, for you know the essentially vindictive character of the Bulgarians." I had no idea at the time that my prediction would come true so quickly. I took care to inform M. Sazonoff of my conversa- tions with Spalaikovitch, and to warn him of the storm which was brewing and of the frame of mind of the Bulgarians with regard to it. During the first week in March M. Venizelos really I9I3] M. VENIZELOS COMES TO SOFIA i39 went to Belgrade and held long conferences with M. Pachitch, with Hartwig and with the members of the Royal Famil3^ From Belgrade the Greek President of the Council, with the tact and courtesy for which he is noted, announced his visit to Sofia, undertaken in order to confer with Bulgarian statesmen. He was only to stay exactly one da}-, from the morning to the evening. I greatly wished to make the acquaintance of M. Venizelos and to converse with him, but I foresaw that the Bulgarians, under pretext of the too short duration of the visit, would try to conjure mvay the Greek President of the Council from the foreign repre- sentatives, more especially from the Russian one. Consequently I wrote a note beforehand to my worthy Greek colleague, M. Panas, to beg him to arrange an interview for me with Venizelos. We arranged that after the luncheon that the Bulgarian Ministers were going to give in honour of their guest at the club in Sofia, Panas should escort Venizelos to the reading- room of the club, where he would find me installed. This was done. At the hour agreed on, the Greek Minister led M. Venizelos up to me, introduced us to each other, and then left us alone. We began our con- versation without losing any time. I have rarely seen a man who, at the first meeting, has produced such a favourable impression on me as M. Venizelos did. An astonishing simplicity, an abso- lutely frank and open way of expressing his opinions and convictions — which one feels to be deep — consti- tuted and still constitute the strength and the prestige of this true statesman. I felt at once that I was in the presence, first, of a perfect gentleman and then of a scrupulously honest politician. No phraseology, no desire to deceive his questioner were apparent in the clear, precise and modest expression of his thoughts. The very fact that he, promptly and without any pre- amble, broached the principal question — that of Greco- Bulgarian demarcation — predisposed me enormously in his favour. 140 THE BALKAN WAR, 1912 [chap. x. Venizelos began by telling me quite openly that he had not yet concluded any separate alliance, nor any convention with the Serbians. Such a convention would only be necessary in the event of the Bulgarians becoming unreasonable in their demands. Then on a large map hanging on the wall of the room we began to examine the possible line of the future frontier. In discussing this frontier M. Venizelos laid stress only on the absolute necessity for Greece to possess, north of Salonika and of Chalcidice, a large enough hinterland adapted to the efficacious defence of these new terri- torial acquisitions; west of Salonika he thought it would be fair to extend the Greek frontiers as far as Fiorina, inclusive. Such a frontier was strategically sufficient and had the advantage of forming a fairly straight line. It is true that it left to Greece part of the Slav population of Macedonia, south of Mona- stir; but in return the Bulgarians, at Seres, Drama, Kavala, etc., were taking over populations which were entirely Greek, and their celebrated tobacco plantations, which represented the great riches of those parts. I promised Venizelos to endorse as far as possible his opinion among the Bulgarians, and more especially his outline of the frontier ; but I made a few reservations on the subject of some localities which it would be difficult to persuade the Bulgarians to give up. " Oh ! but that can always be settled during negotiations," remarked Venizelos judiciously. " What is bad, and what makes me anxious, is the fact that nothing on earth will induce the Bulgarians to enter into negotiations with us, as we have repeatedly suggested they should do. They always elude the subject, as if they were on the watch for fresh occurrences or some new situation ; and yet amongst us public opinion is very much excited over the tone of the Bulgarian Press, which even disputes our possession of Salonika!" All this was absolutely true. But on this we had to close our interview, M. Venizelos being expected at I9I3] MY ADVICE TO M. GUESHOV 141 the Palace. The meeting and conversation with this eminent Greek statesman left not only an agreeable impression on me, but also a tranquillising one. The next day I went to see Gueshov, and had a long conversation with him on the subject of what Venizelos had said to me the evening before. I impressed most emphatically on the Bulgarian President of the Council the necessity of starting negotiations in due order as soon as possible with the Greek Government, and of responding to the wise moderation of Venizelos by prudent concessions. " If the policy pursued by you here at the moment is continued for two or three months more, you will be sur- rounded by irreconcilable enemies," I said to Gueshov. "You complain of the Serbian claims and of their inten- tion to violate the treaty signed hardly a year ago. But if you settle the demarcation question definitely and in a friendly way with the Greeks, the Serbian claims will naturally diminish ; in the opposite case you are actually threatened with the danger of a defensive and even offensive alliance between the Greeks and the Serbians, an alliance not yet concluded, for I have complete trust in Venizelos' word — but which might be concluded in the immediate future. Besides this, you seem to have completely forgotten your relations with Rumania, who looks on the increase of Bulgarian power as a real menace to her. And you must surely realise that even after the conclusion of peace, the Turks will bear malice for ages, not against all their conquerors collectively, but almost entirely against the Bulgarians, as being the strongest and the nearest — hence the most dangerous of their neighbours. Do try to divide the difficult political problem with which you are faced into several parts, and to solve at least one definitely. It is lucky for you that at the head of Greek policy at the moment there should be a man so essentially moderate and wise as Venizelos. You ought promptly to take advantage of this good luck before Greece gets into such a state of ferment that neither Venizelos nor King George 142 THE BALKAN WAR, 1912 [chap. x. himself-also an essentially moderate man — will be able to calm her." M. Gueshov, who was listening to mo with bowed head, was silent for a while, and tlien replied : "M. Nekludoff, I have thought over all this myself for a long time, and I must confess that I entirely share your opinion. . . ." "Then it is King Ferdinand who is against an arrangement with Greece ? " I interrupted. " No," replied M, Gueshov somewhat sharply; "as far as I know, His Majesty would be very willing to converse and to come to terms with Athens. But Danev, whose attitude to London is so irrecon- cilable; and some of his partisans here . . . and the military. Do not forget that the present Cabinet is a Coalition Cabinet. On such a serious question I cannot dissociate myself from Danev." "But surely," I exclaimed, "the question is so serious that you have every right to appeal to the King, as to a supreme authority. If His Majesty the King and you, as President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs, can agree on this question, Danev will be obliged to give in ! As you know, I should be the last person to encourage the perpetual and uncontrolled interference of King Ferdinand in questions of the Home and Foreign Policy of Bulgaria ; but given the exceptional circumstances an appeal to the King's decision would be quite natural ; it is done in most constitutional countries." " It is easy to talk, M. Nekludoff," replied Gueshov with a deep sigh, " but do you know that it is more than six weeks since I have seen my constitutional sovereign ? Under one pretext or another he avoids interviews and conversations with me. When he wants anything, he writes me a little note, or even sends me his question or his opinion verbally through his private secretary, M. Dobrovitch, and I am expected to answer in the same way. No business can be done like that, and I am more and more inclined to send in my resignation ! " I9I3] FERDINAND'S EVASIVENESS 143 I tried fervently to dissuade Gueshov from taking such a step ; but in my heart of hearts I could not help agreeing that indeed things could not go on like that, and that such an abnormal situation would finally lead to disastrous consequences for the country. King Ferdinand was not hiding himself only from Gueshov at this period. I have already mentioned the curious state of things existing at his headquarters, which he hardly left at the beginning of the war. During the month of December he began coming more frequently to Sofia, but he remained invisible and in- accessible there. More especially did he hide himself carefully from the diplomats accredited to his person, thinking— and not without foundation — that these latter would endeavour to give him the advice of their Govern- ments, which he was not at all inclined to listen to. Since the King's Jubilee and the festivities at Tir- nova (in August, 1912) and up to April, 1913, I had the honour of catching sight of the King twice only, and both times in the cathedral; the French Minister saw him once at the Palace, and the German Minister once also at the Royal villa of Vrana (near Sofia) ; all the other Ministers also saw him once in the cathedral, and that is all. My two meetings with Ferdinand took place as follows: on the ist (14th) January, 1913, I went to the Sofia cathedral, according to the Orthodox custom, to attend High Mass and the Tc Dcmn for the New Year. In previous years all the Diplomatic Corps appeared in full dress at the Tc Dcitm, by special invi- tation from the Court ; after the Te Dcuui the King came to talk to the foreign Ministers and to exchange with them good wishes for the New Year ; in the evening a dinner at the Palace was given to the Diplo- matic Corps, at which the senior member made a con- gratulatory speech to the King. On this occasion there was no invitation from the Court, and we were not even certain if His Majesty was in Sofia. Just before the Tc Dcmn began the King made his 144 THE BALKAN WAR, 1912 [chap. x. entr^'^ into the cathedral in a khaki uniform, which, by the way, did not suit him at all ! The service over, he hurried up to me, shook hands with me and said that he greatly regretted not to see my colleagues. " We have received no official invitation, sir," I said to the King. "Oh ! there has doubtless been some mistake," replied P^erdinand sharply. " Please tell all your colleagues this, and convey to them my best wishes for the year just beginning." Having exchanged congratulations and good wishes with me, the King left the cathedral. The second time I saw Ferdinand was at the Requiem Mass for King George of Greece, who had been assas- sinated at Salonika by an insane Greek anarchist on the 6th (19th) March. When this sad news was known, the Court of Sofia ordered a Solemn Mass to be held in the Sofia Cathedral, to which all the Diplomatic Corps, in full dress, were invited. The service over, the King, who appeared to be genuinely moved, went up to the Greek Minister, and talked for some time with him, expressing his condolences. Then passing the other Ministers by, Ferdinand sprang towards me, seized my hand, and keeping it in his, repeated : " M. Neklu- doff, it's horrible ! . . . it's horrible ! . . . horrible ! . . . horrible ! " Now, for some weeks and even months, I had tried in vain to obtain an audience of the King, or at least to seize an opportunity to present to his Majesty my newly-appointed Counsellor to the Legation, M. Sabler. Very little impressed by the King's manner, I was not going to allow the opportunity to escape of at last in- troducing my chief collaborator to him : " Sir, allow me to present to Your Majesty the new Counsellor to the Russian Legation, M. Sabler." The King, with an angry frown, drew his hand away from mine and held it out to M. Sabler — who bowed low — and went on repeating : " It's horrible . . . hor- rible ! . . . horrible ! " I9I3] FERDINAND'S AUDIENCES <45 " M. Sabler is the son of the Procurator of our Holy Synod"; I went on with my introduction without allowing myself to be the least perturbed. "Horrible! . . . horrible! . . . horrible!" continued the King, casting at Sabler, who was much dis- concerted at this reception, such stern glances that one would have thought that he suspected him — or even his pious and illustrious father — of having parti- cipated in the abominable assassination at Salonika. Then calling out to me once more his "horrible! . . . horrible ! . . . horrible ! " the King hurriedly left the cathedral. In February, 191 3, after the election of M. Poincare, the French Minister was to present to the King — according to etiquette — an autograph letter from the new President of the Republic. After three weeks of negotiations and delays, M. de Panafieu was at last granted an audience. I naturally was interested to know what the King would tell him during this audience, and my French colleague, with whom I was very intimate, promised to call on me on leaving the Palace. " Well, and how did your audience go off? What did the King say to you?" I asked M. de Panafieu, who came to me at the hour agreed on. " His Majesty was excessively kind and amiable," replied my colleague, smiling. " He kept me for half an hour, and this half-hour was taken up by a mono- logue, bright and charming, from the King ! He spoke of his recent journey to Paris (in 1910), of M. Fallieres, of the way in which he had made the acquaintance of the present President, even of the scientific studies of the President's cousin, Poincare the mathematician ; in short, he tried not to let me get in a word, afraid evi- dently that I might try and put in a question or a remark of a political nature. When the half-hour was over, he dismissed me with the same studied friendliness; and here I am ! " The German Minister, Herr von Below, was invited by the King to a tcte-a-Ute luncheon with him at Vrana, 146 THK BAIJ